The bread-and-butter theories for microeconomics research – incomplete contracts, two-sided markets, risk analysis, inter-temporal choice, market signaling, financial-market microstructure, optimal taxation, and mechanism design – are far more complicated, and require exceptional finesse to avoid inelegance.	微观经济学的面包和黄油理论——契约的不完备性，双边市场，风险分析，跨时空的选择，市场信号，金融市场微观结构，税制优化，以及机制设计——更加复杂，需要高超的阐述技巧才能免于粗陋。


Given this, they are largely excluded from textbooks.	有鉴于此，它们大部分都被排除在教科书以外。


In fact, microeconomics textbooks have remained practically unchanged for at least two decades.	事实上，微观经济学教科书的内容有至少20年没被修改过。


As a result, undergraduate students struggle to understand even the abstracts of papers on the complex representations of microeconomic reality that fill research journals.	以致面对那些研究期刊中大量关于微观经济现实复杂陈述的论文，一个本科学生甚至连摘要都难以理解。


And, in many areas – such as antitrust analysis, auction design, taxation, environmental policy, and industrial and financial regulation – policy applications have come to be considered the domain of specialists.	同时在许多领域——如反托拉斯分析，拍卖设计，税务，环境政策，产业和金融监管——的政策应用已被认为是专家的范畴。


This does not have to be the case.	情况本不应该如此。


While it is true that realistic microeconomic models are more complex than their idealized textbook counterparts, grasping them does not necessarily require years of research experience.	虽然真实的微观经济模型确实比它们的理���化教材版本更为复杂，但掌握它们并不一定就需要多年的研究经验。


A case in point is the economics of two-sided markets, which involve competition between platforms whose principal “product” consists in connecting two categories of users, who then offer each other network benefits.	一个例子是双边市场经济学，其中涉及不同平台之间的竞争，这些平台的主要“产品”在于连接两个类别的用户，而这些用户随后为彼此提供网络收益。


When markets are two-sided, many of the standard assumptions of antitrust analysis no longer hold: market entry can be bad for consumers, exclusive contracts can increase the number of firms in a market, and pricing below cost may not be predatory.	当市场是双边的时候，许多反垄断分析的标准假设就不复存在了：新企业进入市场或许反而对消费者不利，排他性的契约反而增加了市场中的企业数量，而低于成本的定价也不一定是有侵略性的。


A survey by David Evans and Richard Schmalensee describes numerous situations in which applying old assumptions could lead to mistakes by, say, an anti-trust regulator with only an undergraduate degree.	一项由戴维·伊万斯（David Evans）和李察德·施马兰西（Richard Schmalensee）组织的调查描述了在许多情况下，只有本科学位水平的反垄断监管者运用旧有的假设可能会导致错误。


The unmistakable message is, “Don’t try this at home.”	而调查传达了一条明确无误的信息：“别在本国尝试这样做”。


But every behavioral divergence between two-sided and traditional markets can be understood using simple tools of elementary microeconomics, such as the distinction between substitute and complementary products.	但双边和传统市场之间的每一个行为差异都可以利用基础微观经济学的简单工具去理解，如替代品和互补产品的区别。


When producers of substitutes collude, they usually raise prices; producers of complements, by contrast, collaborate to lower them.	当替代品生产者勾结起来，它们通常会提高价格； 相反当互补产品生产者联合起来，价格则会降低。


So, if two platforms that appear to be performing similar services are complementary – for example, because one platform connects consumers with a set of users that helps them to value another set of users more highly – market entry can be bad for consumers.	因此，如果两个看似在提供类似服务的平台实现了互补——例如，因为一个平台通过一组用户来连接消费者，而这些用户又能帮助消费者提高对（另一平台）一组用户的估值——那么新企业进入市场对消费者来说就是不利的。


In fact, two platforms can even be complementary for one set of users and substitutes for another.	事实上两个平台甚至可以成为一组用户的互补品或者彼此的替代品。


The different stages of a televised soccer (football) tournament, for example, are complementary for viewers and substitutes for advertisers.	例如电视对足球联赛各段赛程的转播对观众来说是互补的，对广告商来说则是替代性的。


Moreover, exclusive dealing can increase competition by allowing two platforms to occupy distinct market niches, with the alternative being that one drives out the other.	此外，独家交易可以通过允许两个平台占据不同的细分市场从而增加竞争，而不是一家把另一家驱逐出去。


In short, with a solid understanding of the difference between complements and substitutes, one can do almost everything the fancy models do – without hiring a single expensive expert.	简而言之，只要能深刻理解互补品与替代品之间的差异，人们几乎可以做一切花哨模型能做的事情——而不雇用一个昂贵的专家。


Undergraduate-level microeconomics should empower students, not alienate them.	本科水平的微观经济学应该提高学生的能力，而不是疏远他们。


While the Arrow-Debreu model has its value – namely, it explains why an unplanned economy can produce order – it is discouraging for students to find that what they are deemed capable of comprehending offers little insight into real-life situations.	虽然阿罗-德布鲁的模型有它的价值——比如解释了为什么非计划经济可以催生秩序——但令学生们沮丧的是发现自己被认为有能力理解的知识却对现实生活中的状况知之甚少。


Restructuring the microeconomics syllabus would send a far more inspiring – and accurate – message: even complex ideas developed by experts can be understood and applied by educated laypeople.	对微观经济学教学大纲的重新拟定将发出一个更鼓舞人心——也更准确——的信息：即使是由专家开发的复杂思想也是能被受过教育的外行人理解和应用的。


Paying the Price of Reform	付出改革的代价


Angela Merkel’s poor showing in Germany’s recent election has now put into cold storage any hope of a serious overhaul of the country’s famously rigid economy.	在刚刚结束的德国选举中，安格拉·默克尔的糟糕表现使检视德国众所周知的僵硬经济状况的希望全部落空。


Tony Blair was waiting for her to help launch a drive to make the current British Presidency of the European Union a historical turning point for the Union’s economy.	托尼·布莱尔还期待着她协助发起一次运动，从而使现任欧盟主席的英国能够为欧盟经济创造具有历史意义的转折点。


Now Blair has no project, and all would-be reformers are most likely downsizing their ambitions.	但现在布莱尔已经放弃了这项计划，而所有自诩的改革者也很可能会调整自己的远大抱负。


Europe appears to be more stuck than ever.	欧洲似乎比以往更加沉闷。


But is it?	但情况果真如此吗？


To start with, the private sector is doing well.	首先，私有部门的状况相当不错。


Technology travels fast and is swiftly adopted.	新技术的传播速度令人惊叹。


Firms have responded to inhospitable conditions by cutting workforces and boosting productivity through more capital-intensive production processes and, when needed, by offshoring their capacities.	面对不利的经济条件，企业做出的反应是通过资本密集的生产过程实现裁员和提高生产率，并在必要的时候在海外投资设厂。


The laggards are to be found only in the service industry, which is largely insulated from international production chains and even from internal European competition.	只有服务行业相对较为落后，因为它们接触不到国际生产环节，甚至接触不到欧洲的内部竞争。


More fundamentally, there is no such thing as a “European economy.”	归根结底，根本不存在什么“欧洲经济”。


The Union’s 25 member countries are very diverse.	欧盟25个成员国的经济状况各不相同。


The Nordic countries are high-tech leaders; Spain has slashed its unemployment rate by half (it stood at 25% not so long ago); and the new members from Central and Eastern Europe are cruising briskly along a steady catch-up path.	日耳曼国家在科技领域处于领先地位，西班牙成功地把失业率降低了一半（不久之前那里的失业率还高达25%），而来自中东欧的新成员国正在快速追赶原欧盟国家经济发展的步伐。


The really sick countries are three of the EU’s four biggest: France, Germany, and Italy.	问题严重的反而是欧盟四个大国当中的三个：法国、德国和意大利。


But even they have carried out some reforms – not enough and too recently to make a difference yet; nonetheless, they have started to move.	但即便是他们都采取了一些改革措施¾虽然力度尚嫌不够，而且改革措施刚刚实行还看不出有任何变化，但归根结底，他们已经开始行动了。


More importantly, no one ignores that the old ways have to go if prosperity is to be maintained.	更为重要的是，人们都认清了这样一个事实：要想保持繁荣，旧的方式就必须改变。


Except for a fringe of die-hard Marxists – which can still collect up to 10% of the votes – there is a keen sense that deep reforms are needed to come to grip with the high unemployment and poor growth of the last decade.	除了一小撮顽固的马克思主义分子¾他们目前还把持着10%左右的选票¾人们都清醒地意识到要改变过去10年高失业和低增长的状况，必须要实行较为深入的改革。


Continuing budget deficits have visibly failed to deliver what die-hard Keynesians had promised.	持续不断的财政赤字显然未能兑现顽固的凯恩思主义者做出的承诺。


These days, no politician dares to suggest that continuing to pile up debt is the way to go, even though few are prepared to articulate a credible plan for fiscal consolidation.	如今，再也没有哪位政治家敢说持续负债是一种良性的方式，虽然还很少有人准备宣布巩固财政的可行计划。


The problem, of course is that the most urgently needed reforms will hurt a lot of people.	然而，问题在于迫切需要的改革会伤害很多人。


Most economists agree that high levels of employment protection merely hold down the creation of new jobs rather than reduce joblessness.	多数经济学家都承认过度的就业保护只会限制新的工作机会，而不是降低失业率。


But reducing employment protection scares every worker in the private sector.	但减少就业保护会令私有部门的所有员工惶恐不安。


This is understandable, given an unemployment rate of around 10% in France, Germany, and Italy; with so few new jobs, becoming unemployed is a major disaster.	考虑到法、德、意三国的失业率高达10%以上，他们的恐惧心理也很容易理解。 由于新的工作机会少之又少，一旦失业就会带来一场严重的灾难。


To be sure, comfortable unemployment benefits soften the blow.	可以肯定的是，舒舒服服的失业救济减轻了失业带来的打击。


The problem, though, is that some people have even become addicted; they now aim at living on welfare benefits alone.	但问题是：有些人开始依赖失业救济，他们试图仅靠福利救济轻松地生活。


This is why economists want to change the unemployment and welfare systems to raise the incentives to go back to work.	因此，经济学家们希望改革失业和福利体系，重新刺激人们工作的积极性。


Successful experience notwithstanding, most people interpret “incentives” as painful kicks in the butt, and they want none of it.	尽管取得了一些效果，但人们把“积极性”看作是屁股上被狠狠踢了一脚，他们根本不喜欢这种感觉。


Then consider these countries’ bloated public services, where jobs are guaranteed for life, promotion is by seniority rather than merit, and customers are seen as a nuisance.	再看看这些国家人浮于事的公共服务部门，就业终身制，提拔任用以资历而非业绩为标准，顾客被看成是些烦人的家伙。


The result is red tape all over and a huge drag on productivity.	结果导致繁琐的程序遍地开花，大大影响了生产效率。


Shaping up the public sector is an obvious goal, but civil servants are adamantly opposed to what would in effect mean new and much less attractive work contracts. 	重组公共部门的目标再明显不过，但公务员们却坚决反对这项会使工作合同变得不那么吸引人的改革。


Economists know that important parts of the population are bound to lose from reform.	经济学家其实清楚改革会损害很多人的利益。


Their answer is that more people stand to benefit, and that the benefits far outweigh the costs.	他们的答案是会有更多的人从中受益，而且人们获得的收益会远远超过他们付出的代价。


This is true, but it provides little solace for the potential losers.	这一点千真万确，但潜在的失败者却无法从中得到任何安慰。


Reforms are relatively easier in smaller countries, probably because winners and losers are likely to be personally connected to each other as relatives, neighbors, or friends.	人口很少的国家改革起来相对比较容易，这可能是因为获益者和受害者之间有着亲属、邻居和朋友等私人关系。


In large countries, the fear of being on the losing side is not outweighed by people’s appreciation that the country as a whole will do better.	但在相对较大的国家，国家会越来越好的正确评价并没有减轻人们对失去既得利益的恐惧心理。


One solution is just to go ahead and reform anyway, regardless of the resistance.	一种办法是不管人们可能的反对，径直推行改革。


This is the Thatcher solution, which took almost everyone by surprise.	撒切尔的改革就属于此类，所有人都被惊得目瞪口呆。


Angela Merkel was sometimes called the German Iron Lady, and that seems to have scared enough people to rob her of an expected victory.	安格拉·默克尔有时被誉为德国的铁娘子，这似乎吓住了很多人，夺走了她预期能够取得的胜利。


Even if she becomes Chancellor, she has no mandate for deep reform.	而即便她真的当选德国总理，也依然没有权力进行深度改革。


Meanwhile, the French presidential hopeful, Nicolas Sarkozy, who was associating himself with Merkel and articulating a bold reform program, suddenly seems weak.	与此同时，法国最有希望的候选总统，与默克尔相提并论、积极鼓吹大胆改革计划的尼古拉斯·萨尔科齐，突然间似乎也销声匿迹了。


Clearly, if reforms are to be carried out in Europe, something else must be tried.	显而易见，如果欧洲要推行改革，就必须采用新的方法。


Here is one idea.	有一个办法。


Why shouldn’t winners compensate the losers?	为什么获胜者不能给受害者一些补偿？


Surely, for example, there is a price tag that can be attached to breaking civil servants’ existing work contracts.	举例来讲，我们肯定可以为打破公务员的现有合同制定明码标价。


If a fair one-time payment is offered, it is likely to be taken up by a majority of civil servants, and public opinion will frown upon the greedy or lazy ones who turn it down.	如果支付公平合理的一次性补偿，那么绝大多数公务员就都可以接受，公众舆论也会对拒绝接受的贪婪或懒惰之辈表示不满。


It might be expensive to compensate all potential losers, but we must put our money where our mouth is; if a reform is certain to pay off handsomely, it will pay for the buy-offs, and more.	补偿所有的失败者会十分昂贵，但我们必须拿出实际的行动。 如果某项改革肯定能够盈利，它就能够抵消我们所付出的代价，而且还有剩余。


Governments can borrow what they need to pay out now, and service this debt as reforms yield benefits.	政府可以通过借贷筹集所需的资金，并在改革取得成效以后再偿还这笔借贷。


Not only is paying up-front against future benefits efficient and fair, but it also can provide strong incentives for policy makers to weed out bad reforms.	为未来的收益先行付出不仅公平高效，而且还能使决策者积极地避免有害的改革措施。


If a reform is as good as we think it is, then so is public debt to finance its political acceptability.	如果改革措施真像我们预期的那样好，那么资助其政治可行性的公共债务也就算得上是物有所值。


Peace, Not a Peace Offensive	和平口号背后的“和平攻势”


TOKYO – When a North Korean dove clutching an olive branch suddenly appears, the world should challenge it to reveal its hidden talons.	发自东京——每当朝鲜突然抛出橄榄枝，全世界都应警惕其背后的居心。


This is the only prudent stance for South Korea to adopt when face-to-face negotiations with the North begin on February 8.	因此在2月8日朝韩重开双边会谈之时，韩国人应对朝方的行为和动机留个心眼。


For what Kim is now offering is not peace, but a “peace offensive” – a tactic used by the North repeatedly since the armistice of 1953 in order to sow division whenever the regime’s adversaries have demonstrated unity and resolve.	因为金正日真正想要的并非和平，而是所谓“和平攻势”——某种自1953年停战以来就屡试不爽的伎俩，目的就是为了破坏和瓦解对方阵营的团结。


Kim’s less-than-innocent intentions are demonstrated by his regime’s secret construction of a massive uranium-enrichment facility, containing more than 2,000 centrifuges, revealed to Stanford University’s Siegfried Hecker, a former director of America’s Los Alamos National Laboratory.	金正日的邪恶企图早已昭然若揭：他们向美国洛斯·阿拉莫斯国家实验室前主管，斯坦福大学核武器专家齐格弗里德·汉克尔展示了包括2000座离心机在内的大规模秘密铀浓缩设施。


The existence of the facility seems as clear a declaration as possible that the regime is committed to achieving the capacity to intimidate its neighbors with its nuclear arsenal.	而这些设施的存在清楚地表明：该政权正大力建设其核武器库，以达到威胁其周边邻邦的目的。


Some believe that North Korea has begun displaying its growing nuclear threat in order to secure the succession to power of Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il’s rotund, twenty-something youngest son.	有评论认为朝鲜展示核威慑的目的是为了确保金正日向其子——身材矮胖，稚气未脱的金正恩——成功移交权力。


But, given how long this facility must have been under construction, this cannot possibly be the sole, or even the main, motivation.	但考虑到该设施已经建设了相当长的一段时间，上述观点不可能是其唯一（甚至是主要）的动机。


The “Dear Leader’s” key objective is most likely to secure his own position, given the North’s dire economic condition.	而这位“敬爱的领袖”的真正目的更可能是想在朝鲜极端恶劣的经济状况下保住自身的地位。


For it now seems that the only way for Kim Jong-il to defend his family dynasty against any domestic challenge is to make a show of force as a nuclear power.	看来他在危机面前捍卫金家王朝的唯一方式，就是展示核武力量。


The challenges facing Kim are piling up.	摆在金正日面前的危机堆积如山。


Deification of the leader, once the foundation of the regime, is disintegrating.	自该政权建立以来对领袖的神化宣传正在土崩瓦解。


Economic failure, chronic food shortages, mounting public distrust of and animosity toward Kim’s government, and an apparent reluctance within elements of the North Korean military to go to war all point to the regime’s increasing fragility.	经济破产，长期粮食短缺，公众对政府的质疑和仇恨，以及朝鲜军队内部明显的厌战情绪都意味着这个政权正变得越发脆弱。


There are also signs of growing adoration of liberal countries such as the US and South Korea throughout North Korean society – a sentiment that the regime has sought to appease by broadcasting one or two Western films on state television.	此外还有诸多迹象表明朝鲜社会对美国和韩国这类自由国家的向往正不断加深，以致金家政权只能通过在国营电视台播放一两部西方电影的方式来安抚民众。


More ominously, crime is on the rise and a breakdown in state-controlled health care is fueling the spread of various types of infectious disease.	更危险的是，犯罪案件不断增加，国家卫生系统的瘫痪导致各类传染病不断蔓延。


Kim’s hope must be that, by showing off his nuclear arsenal, he can bully the US, Japan, and South Korea into helping him to resolve some of his regime’s domestic crises.	因此金正日只能寄望于展示核武器库来迫使美国，日本和韩国出手，帮助他解决这些国内危机。


Most immediately, Kim’s aim is to pressure Barack Obama’s administration into weakening the US-led sanctions against North Korea, having evidently decided that his dynasty has no future so long as the sanctions remain in place.	而其中最迫切的莫过于逼使奥巴马政府减轻以美国为首的对朝制裁，这说明只要该制裁存在一天，金家王朝就没有好日子过。


To drive the point home, his regime has been refusing to attend multilateral talks.	为了达到这一目的，朝鲜不惜以拒绝参加任何多边会谈的方式相要挟。


Here Kim has shown just how fundamentally flawed his understanding of the workings of Western democracy is.	但这也彻底暴露出金正日对西方民主国家运作方式的认知是何等肤浅。


He apparently believed that, following the defeat that Obama absorbed in the mid-term elections, the US would lack the will to stand up to a fresh nuclear threat and would move to conclude a peace accord with his regime, thus perpetuating his dynasty.	他显然认为既然奥巴马政府在中期选举中遭遇挫败，美国将放弃对这个新生核威胁的强硬立场，转而试图与朝鲜订立和约，使金家王朝能继续存在下去。


“We are ready for both dialogue and war,” Kim has declared.	正如金正日宣称的那样：“要谈要战，我们都做好了准备。 ”


But, of course, just the opposite is true: the victory of conservative Republicans in Congress has left Obama with even less room to offer carrots to the North.	但事实恰恰相反：保守派共和党在国会的胜利进一步压缩了奥巴马政府向朝鲜示好的空间。


Moreover, nuclear brinkmanship is a particularly poor tactic, since Kim’s behavior is now becoming fused in American minds with arguably the most serious strategic threat on the US agenda: Iran’s push to secure nuclear weapons of its own.	此外，核边缘政策是一个尤其拙劣的伎俩，因为金正日的所作所为已经触动了美国最重大的战略威胁：一个尝试拥有核武器的伊朗。


Indeed, there is considerable talk among Western security services that the recently disclosed centrifuges were not actually assembled in the Nyeongbyeon facility, implying that Kim’s regime is hiding another facility.	事实上，西方安全部门正议论纷纷，认为最近关闭的离心机其实并非在宁边核设施中组装，暗示金正日政权还隐瞒着另一处核设施。


The question then becomes, who helped Kim build these facilities?	问题是，是谁帮助金正日兴建了这些设施？


Who transferred the technology that the North needed?	又是谁向朝鲜输送了相关技术？


Although there is mounting circumstantial evidence of cooperative exchanges between North Korea and Iran, no conclusive proof has been found.	虽然有大量间接证据证明朝鲜与伊朗之间的核技术合作交流，但依然缺乏确凿的证据去证明这一点。


It has been reported that more than 200 North Koreans are currently working surreptitiously in Iran.	有报告称目前有超过200名朝鲜人在伊朗秘密工作。


If these include personnel from Room 99, Kim’s secret nuclear directorate, and Room 39, the bureau that controls his slush fund of hard currencies, more attention is needed.	如果其中有人来自99号办公室（金正日属下的机密核事务主管单位）以及39号办公室（负责管理朝鲜政治贿金的单位）的话，那么就值得特别注意了。


Of course, the inner workings of Kim’s regime are shrouded in mystery, not only to the outside world, but also to most of North Korea’s government.	当然，金正日政权的许多动向依然处于机密状态，别说国际社会，就是许多朝鲜政府部门对此都一无所知。


The only way to increase transparency from outside is to shine a light on North Korea’s external activities, which means exposing as many connections and links between North Korea and Iran as can be found.	唯一能从外界增加其透明度的方法就是披露朝鲜的对外行动，这意味着尽可能寻找任何朝鲜与伊朗之间的渠道与联��。


Nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Iran is no doubt assisting both countries to flaunt international norms – and now it appears that Burma has joined this axis of illicit nuclear proliferation.	毫无疑问，两国的核合作令他们得以不断挑逗国际准则——如今缅甸似乎也加入了这个非法核浓缩的邪恶轴心之中。


One country could help the world gain the transparency – and the leverage – that it needs: China, over whose territory Iran and North Korea must be conducting their nuclear relations.	但有一个国家可以帮助全世界实现急需的透明度——并具有四两拨千斤的影响力，那就是中国，因为朝鲜和伊朗两国的核关系必须通过中国才能实现。


Assuming that China does not approve of this unholy alliance, it has a responsibility to call a halt to these exchanges.	如果中国反对这一邪恶联盟的话，那么他就有责任去阻止这些交流。


Vague expressions of concern, such as those offered by President Hu Jintao during his Washington summit, will not do the job.	而胡锦涛最近访美其间对此的含糊其辞则完全无济于事。


Peace, Not Process	要和平，而不是和平进程


RAMALLAH – The United States should stop pushing for the resumption of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Doing so might be the best way to achieve peace – a paradox that reflects the huge gap between a peace process and achieving genuine peace.	发自拉马拉——美国应当停止重启巴以和平进程的努力，而这样做或许是实现和平的最佳方式——一个反映了和平进程与实现真正和平之间巨大鸿沟的矛盾困境。


Make no mistake: this is not a call to arms or an appeal for a violent uprising.	请别误会，笔者并不是号召战争或是呼吁暴力起义。


Peace between the conflicting parties east of the Mediterranean and west of the Jordan river can and must be achieved through negotiations.	地中海东岸到约旦河西岸之间区域冲突各方的和平可以也必须通过协商的方式实现。


But if one party is more interested in a process than in the need for peace, something must be wrong.	但如果一方更热衷于某种进程而不是和平，那就有问题了。


For Israel, an occupying power whose people enjoy democratic civilian authority and a GDP tens times that of the people it is denying basic rights of freedom and independence, photo opportunities provided by meeting and greeting Palestinian leaders has replaced achieving peace.	对于以色列这个公民享有民主政府，GDP数十倍于巴勒斯坦，并剥夺了巴人自由独立基本权利的占领政权来说，由会议和招待巴勒斯坦领导人所提供的露面机会已经取代了对和平的诉求。


A serious look back at the 17 years since Yassir Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin shook hands on the White House lawn is revealing.	如果我们认真回顾17年前亚西尔·阿拉法特和伊扎克·拉宾在白宫草坪上握手以来所发生的一切，就一定能看出某些问题。


The number of illegal Jewish settlements and settlers has more than doubled in the areas Israel occupied in 1967.	非法犹太定居点和定居者的数量已经比1967年的以色列占领范围翻了超过两倍。


Negotiators have parsed every possible solution to the permanent-status issues of Jerusalem, borders, settlements, refugees, and economic relations.	谈判者们已经在耶路撒冷、边界、定居点，难民和双边经济关系等事务的长期安置上尝试了各种方案。


Leaders of the world’s superpowers, United Nations officials, the Elders, and tens of people of goodwill have offered their goodwill offices and their services to bring about peace.	全球各超级大国的领袖们，联合国官员，众宗教长老以及数十位怀着良好意愿的人士都曾努力推动和平。


All to no avail.	但没人能最终取得成功。


The US efforts, led by Special Envoy George Mitchell, have shown clearly that the current ruling coalition in Israel is incapable of doing the minimum required for peace.	美国方面（以特使乔治·米歇尔为代表）所做出的努力明确表明：现有的以色列执政联盟根本无法满足和平的基本要求。


The Obama administration staked its reputation on getting Israelis and Palestinians to agree at least on security and borders. The results are mixed, at best.	奥巴马政府成功促使以巴双方在安全和边界方面达成共识，并以此赢得了声誉，但这样的结果充其量只是好坏参半的。


Palestinians complied with all Israeli and international requirements for security, while Binyamin Netanyahu’s Israeli government, which gives lip-service to the two-state solution, has yet to elucidate where Israel’s borders will be.	巴方已经满足了以方以及国际社会提出的所有安全要求，而在两国方案上言而无信的内塔尼亚胡政府却依然不愿划定本方边界。


Meanwhile, the Israeli government wants to continue building settlements in occupied areas, in total violation of international law and the minimum requirements for peace detailed in the “roadmap” sponsored by the Quartet (the US, UN, European Union, and Russia).	与此同时，以色列政府还希望在占领区内继续兴建定居点，此举公然违背了国际法以及由四方（美国、欧盟，联合国和俄罗斯）联合推动的和平“路线图”中的最低要求。


The US tried to bribe the Israelis – with $3 billion in fighter jets and political support at the UN – into suspending settlement activities for three months.	美国尝试用价值30亿美元的战斗机和在联合国的政治支持来利诱以色列，使其停止定居点活动3个月。


Instead, Netanyahu stuck his fingers in America’s eyes, counting on the Republicans’ mid-term election victory to help him afterwards.	但内塔尼亚胡却扇了美国人一耳光，并寄望共和党中期选举的胜利能帮他一把。


Not only did Israel’s leaders reject the world community’s requests, but they had the chutzpah to claim that they had convinced the US to drop this requirement for the resumption of talks.	以色列领导人不但拒绝了国际社会的请求，还放肆地声称自己确信美国将放弃重启和平谈判。


Withdrawal by the US from the current push to restart negotiations would send a clear message that bad behavior will not be tolerated, and would encourage Israelis, who overwhelmingly want peace, to force a change in their own government’s position.	因此美国退出当前重启谈判的行为将明确传达一条信息：错误的行为不会被纵容，并将促使极度渴望和平的以色列人改变其政府的立场。


Israel’s Labor Party has consistently said that it would bolt from the current coalition if peace talks were halted.	以色列工党坚称如果谈判搁置将退出执政联盟。


This would force at least a change in the coalition’s makeup (possibly the replacement of the right-wing Yisrael Beitenu, headed by Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, with the more moderate Kadima, headed by Tzipi Livni, Lieberman’s predecessor as foreign minister).	这至少会改变当前联盟的构成（现外长阿维格多·利伯曼领导下的右翼“我们的家园－以色列”党可能被前任外长利夫尼领导的温和派前进党所取代）。


Public-opinion polls have consistently shown that the majority of Israelis and Palestinians want peace (not a peace process) based on a two-state solution.	长期以来的民意调查都表明大多数以色列和巴勒斯坦人都渴望实现一个基于两国方案的和平（而不仅仅是一个和平进程）。


Almost every learned pundit, expert, or politician in the Middle East and around the world knows pretty much what a solution to the conflict would look like – a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders with slight land swaps and an equitable negotiated solution of the Palestinian refugee issue.	中东地区和全世界几乎所有的学者，专家和政治家都深知一个冲突解决方案应该是何种面目——一个基于1967年边界的巴勒斯坦国，双方进行小规模的土地交换，以及针对巴勒斯坦难民问题的公平协商方案。


One group of respected Israelis and Palestinians, the Geneva Group, even drew up a peace plan that tackles every possible negotiating point honestly and fairly.	一个由著名以色列人和巴勒斯坦人组成的“日内瓦集团”甚至构思了一个妥善解决所有谈判点的和平方案。


So what is needed is not negotiations, but political will.	因此我们真正需要的不是谈判，而是政治意愿。


The Palestinians, for their part, have the necessary will.	巴勒斯坦人已经具备了所需的意愿。


Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s latest chapter in his two-year plan – the “home stretch to freedom” – will be complete in August 2011.	总理萨拉姆·法耶兹两年计划的最新一章——“自由的终点”——将在今年8月完成。


In Fayyad’s vision, Palestinians, who bear the brunt of the occupation and are in a greater hurry than the Israelis are to be free of it, are to accept a peace strategy that aims at realizing statehood.	在法耶兹的预期中，遭受占领且比以色列人更渴望结束占领的巴勒斯坦人将接受一个旨在实现建国的和平战略。


Once the institutions of the Palestinian state are in place, the will of the people, coupled with world support, will nonviolently overcome all efforts at denying Palestinians their right to self-determination.	巴勒斯坦国的组织架构一旦就位，人民的意愿加上全世界的支持，必将在不使用暴力的情况下压倒一切试图剥夺巴勒斯坦民族自决权的行为。


In the meantime, there is no need for a process that has no chance of accomplishing peace.	而与此同时，我们也不再需要一个不可能实现的和平进程了。


Peace Now for Palestine	立即实现巴勒斯坦和平


MADRID/WASHINGTON, DC – As revolutionary change sweeps across the Arab world, it is easy to think that now is not the time to push for peace between Israel and Palestine.	马德里/华盛顿——值此革命性变革席卷阿拉伯世界的时刻，人们很容易认为现在不是推动以色列及巴勒斯坦和平进程的时机。


Until the dust settles on the new Middle East, the old roadmaps seem dated, and conventional wisdom holds that progress toward a peace agreement in the face of regional upheaval is wishful thinking.	在新的中东尘埃落定之前，旧的路线图似乎已经过时，传统智慧认为值此区域动荡之际想就和平协议取得进展不过是一厢情愿的痴心妄想。


But the opposite is true.	但事实并不是这样。


Even with so many failed efforts in the past, there is a clear window of opportunity for the United States and Israel to urgently push for a lasting settlement.	即使经历了如此多的失败，美国和以色列紧急推动持久和平的努力显然仍存在着机会之窗。


Everyone needs to start thinking differently about the Middle East.	所有人都需要从不同的角度来审视中东问题。


The international community’s old approach was to prioritize stability over democracy and pursue Israeli-Arab peace on a completely separate diplomatic track.	国际社会的传统做法是将稳定视为高于民主，并从完全独立的外交轨道试图实现以巴和平。


This policy proved to be a failure – placing stability ahead of democracy brought neither, and isolated peace efforts went nowhere.	事实证明这种政策已经遭到失败——将稳定置于民主之上致使这两个目标都渐行渐远，孤立无援的和平努力并未取得任何成效。


If the US and other world powers want to make headway on their three key objectives – stability, political reform, and peace – they need to understand how they are linked and pursue all three simultaneously and holistically.	如果美国和其他世界强国希望就稳定、政治改革及和平等三大重要目标取得进展，他们就要理解这三者之间的内在关系，并同时从整体上追求这三大目标。


Picking and choosing which challenges to care about only increases the risk that they will become intractable problems instead.	就应对何种挑战挑挑拣拣只会让复杂局势变得更为棘手。


The US has been behind the curve from the moment the turmoil sparked, trying to play catch up as two authoritarian governments were toppled by popular protest and more regimes try to cling to power as long as they can.	这场混乱伊始美国就已经被形势的发展甩在了后面，它拼命想在民众抗议推翻独裁政府和更多独裁政权攫取权力之际跟上形势发展的步伐。


The US needs to get out in front.	美国需要领导时局的发展。


And, as the US and the broader international community attempt to address the unfolding events, it would be a mistake to leave the peace process off the agenda.	在美国和国际社会解决问题时，将和平进程排除在外是一种错误的做法。


Whereas the demands of Arab demonstrators concern governance at home, the current turmoil can be used to help end a conflict that has confounded the world for decades. Delaying the Israeli-Palestinian peace process would be a costly blunder.	尽管阿拉伯示威者的要求仅仅关乎国内统治，但当前这场混乱可以结束数十年来让世界束手无策的这场冲突。 推迟以巴和平进程将成为一个代价昂贵的错误。


As we know from bitter experience, waiting only makes a peace settlement harder to achieve.	痛苦的经历告诉我们，等待只会让和平协议难以达成。


For the US, sympathy for Arab publics yearning for freedom cannot exclude compassion for Palestinians dreaming of lives of dignity, which for them includes ending the occupation.	就美国而言，对阿拉伯民众自由渴望的同情不能取代对巴勒斯坦人生命尊严的支持，而对巴勒斯坦人生命尊严的支持就包括结束占领。


The US should not be selective in its support for freedom and democracy.	美国不应在支持自由和民主时抱着挑挑拣拣的态度。


This has never been more true than today, and if America is not seen as an avid supporter of a two-state solution, it will stay well behind the curve and damage its own interests in the Middle East.	这在今天尤其重要，如果美国没有成为两国制的热情支持者，它就会落后于形势的发展，并损害其自身在中东的利益。


Israel also needs to revisit its policies.	以色列也需要对其政策进行重新审视。


As political reform achieves results, Israel will no longer be able to claim that it is the only democracy in the Middle East; with conditions changing on the ground, it will be increasingly difficult to ignore Palestinians’ demand for independence.	随着政治改革取得进展，以色列将无法继续以中东唯一的民主国家自居，随着局势的发展变化，对巴勒斯坦独立呼声充耳不闻的难度将越来越大。


Israel’s concern that the region will grow more hostile will become a self-fulfilling prophecy if new democracies see the Israeli government impeding steps toward a viable and just solution.	如果新生的民主政府看到以色列政府为阻碍以巴问题公正解决所做的手脚，以色列有关地区敌意越来越重的忧虑可能真的变为现实。


At the same time, a peace process backed by elected and more legitimate Arab governments will actually help solidify long-term peace and stability.	与此同时，赢得更具合法性的民选阿拉伯政府支持的和平进程将有助于巩固长期的和平与稳定。


With time for a two-state solution quickly running out, a speedy settlement is in everyone's best interest.	随着达成两国制协议的时间所剩无几，迅速达成协议对各方都有好处。


Waiting and hoping for more favorable conditions could easily backfire.	等待和期望更有利的客观条件很可能产生副作用。


If there is no movement toward peace as new Arab democracies take shape, negative views of Israel and the US will be hardened.	如果阿拉伯民主政府成立时没有���得和平进展，将会强化他们对以色列和美国的负面印像。


And, as we have all witnessed in recent months, Arab public opinion clearly matters.	正如我们近几个月来所目睹的那样，阿拉伯的公众舆论显然举足轻重。


Bad perceptions only complicate future peace efforts, making a breakthrough even less likely.	负面印像只会破坏未来的和平努力，进一步降低取得突破的可能性。


And the US could have less of a role in a new Middle East with new governments less forgiving than their predecessors about the continuation of the occupation.	面对比前任更难容忍持续占领的中东新政府，美国在中东的影响力将会有所削弱。


To argue that peacemaking can’t be successful when governments and regimes are in flux ignores the fact that it is precisely in such circumstances that outsiders can help shape the process.	坚持政府和政权动荡期调停无法成功的观点忽略了这样一个事实，那就是正是在这样的条件下外人才有机会影响和平进程的走势。


Instead of operating in an environment with little influence or room for maneuver, pushing the peace process now could help endear the Arab public to the West and give the US more sway in the new Middle East.	与其在影响力或参与余地都极其有限的环境中操作，现在推动和平进程可以密切西方与阿拉伯民众的关系，增强美国在新中东地区的影响力。


We don’t need never-ending bilateral negotiations between Israel and Palestine; there needs to be a regional solution.	我们不需要以巴无休无止的双边谈判，我们需要达成区域协议。


Tomorrow’s Middle East will not be the same as it was a mere two months ago, but the shape the region will ultimately take is unknown.	明天的中东将与短短两个月前大不一样，但该地区未来的局势如何尚不得而知。


The US has a chance to get on the right side of history and help shape its direction by supporting real reform and advancing a deadlocked peace process.	美国有机会参与正确的历史行动，通过支持真正的改革和推进陷入僵局的和平进程来决定这一地区的走向。


In the end, an uprising against poor governance presents an opening to achieve not only democracy, but also stability and peace.	归根结底，推翻独裁政府的起义不仅会带来实现民主的机会，还有可能带来稳定与和平。


This crisis, like so many others, would be a terrible thing to waste.	这次危机和其他很多千载难逢的机遇一样，我们绝对不该错失。


Peace or Poison	和平还是毒药


HAIFA – Contrary to the hopes of many, the end of the Second World War and the shock of the Nazi atrocities did not mean the end of war and genocide.	海法——事与愿违，第二次世界大战的结束和纳粹暴行引发的震惊并不意味着战争和种族灭绝就此结束。


Indeed, the decades following it have been rife with bloody conflicts in which entire population groups have been murdered.	事实上，二战结束后的数十年间血腥冲突一直连绵不断，有些种族的所有人口在这些冲突中被彻底灭绝。


Remember Angola’s civil war, the Khmer Rouge’s massacre of millions of Cambodians, Rwanda’s tribal wars, the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the extermination of Christians in Southern Sudan.	比方说安哥拉内战，红色高棉屠杀数百万柬埔寨人、卢旺达部落战争、南斯拉夫血腥解体和南苏丹对基督徒的残忍灭绝。


Nor should we forget the Stalinist crimes against the peoples of the former Soviet Empire.	我们同样不该忘记斯大林主义对前苏维埃帝国人民所犯下的罪行。


And yet there is something unique about the Holocaust that made the United Nations single it out and devote a special day to its commemoration.	但二战中的犹太人大屠杀独一无二，因此联合国将其挑选出来，并指定了特别的纪念日。


The difference lies not only in the mind-boggling number of victims and the ferocity with which it was perpetuated, but also in the absence of the usual motives found in other massacres and genocides.	它与其他屠杀事件的不同之处不仅在于超出人们想象的受害者数字和无法从记忆中抹去的残忍，还在于它不具备其他屠杀和种族灭绝的常见动机。


The Nazis did not kill the Jews because they wanted their territory – the Jews had none; or because the Jews were followers of a rival religious faith – the Nazis and their henchmen were atheists and enemies of all religion.	纳粹屠杀犹太人并不是为了抢占领土——犹太人根本没有任何领地； 纳粹屠杀犹太人也不是因为他们信奉敌对的宗教信仰——纳粹及其忠实的追随者都相信无神论，是所有宗教的死敌。


Even less did the Nazis kill Jews because of their ideological differences – Jews had no peculiarly “Jewish” ideology.	纳粹屠杀犹太人更不是因为意识形态差异——犹太人并没有什么独具“犹太特色”的思想意识。


Nor did the Nazis exterminate the Jews in order to take their property – most Jews were poor, and those who owned anything probably would have given it up gladly in order to save themselves.	纳粹灭绝犹太人也不是为了抢夺他们的财产——多数犹太人一贫如洗，而那些略有财产者只要为了挽救自己的生命可能会很高兴地把财产贡献出去。


The Nazis looked at Jews as a strain of “microbes,” and it was for this reason that they wanted to destroy them so brutally and meticulously.	纳粹把犹太人看作一个“微生物”品种，也正因为这个原因，他们想要如此野蛮而一丝不苟的毁灭犹太种族。


The Holocaust was born of an absurd and hallucinatory mechanism that associated the Jews with an invented congenital threat, and that gave rise to a deranged, burning, irrational hatred.	犹太人大屠杀起源于某种把犹太人与子虚乌有的先天威胁联系在一起的荒唐而虚幻的机制，这种机制催生了对犹太人强烈、疯狂而且毫无道理的仇恨情绪。


It is a hatred that did not disappear with Nazism, and that one can still, 65 years after the liberation of Auschwitz, glimpse in terrifying manifestations.	这种仇恨并没有随着纳粹主义的消亡而寿终正寝，在解放奥斯维辛65年后，我们还可以亲身感受到这种可怕的仇恨情绪。


The world must therefore be alert, so that this hatred does not reawaken and direct itself against Jews or other peoples.	因此世界各国必须保持警惕，不让这种仇恨重新滋长，继续危害犹太人和其他民族。


Israel’s leaders, in particular, have sought to reinforce the defenses against the anti-Semitism that still persists in the world.	特别是以色列领导人，一直试图加强对仍然存在的反犹主义的防范措施。


That is why they have tried to obtain political support against the nuclear ambitions of Iran, which periodically threatens Israel, at times proclaiming its desire to wipe it off the face of the earth.	这也能够解释他们为什么在反对伊朗核野心的问题上试图获得政治支持，伊朗的核野心每隔一段时间就会威胁到以色列，而且不时宣称要将这个国家从地球上彻底抹去。


Iran is not Nazi Germany.	伊朗并不是纳粹德国。


Its political regime, its ideology, and its military and economic potential are very different from that of Hitler’s state.	它的政治制度、意识形态和军事及经济潜能都与希特勒的国家有着天壤之别。


Modern Israel is also not like the weak Jewish communities dispersed throughout Europe in the past.	现代以色列也不同于过去散居在欧洲各地的弱小的犹太人群体。


Still, Iran’s rulers have adopted a bizarre and total opposition to Israel’s very existence, a position that can revive the same nefarious mechanism that led to the genocidal hatred of the Holocaust.	可伊朗统治者同样对以色列的存在抱有怪异而彻底的反对态度，这样的立场可能重新催生同样的邪恶机制，而这样的机制曾经助长了引发犹太人大屠杀的种族仇恨情绪。


If Iran gains nuclear weapons, it may, like Nazi Germany before it, be engulfed by murderous folly, threatening disaster for Israel.	如果伊朗掌握了核武器，就可能像之前的纳粹德国一样陷入一个凶残而愚蠢的错误，并为以色列带来灾难性的后果。


What can be done to prevent this?	我们能采取何种预防措施？


The sanctions directed by the international community against Iran are not guaranteed to convince its leaders to desist from developing nuclear weapons.	国际社会强加于伊朗的制裁并不能保证说服伊朗领袖停止研发核武器。


And any attempt to destroy militarily Iran’s nuclear potential could entangle Israel in a prolonged and exhausting struggle that might unite all the enemies of the Jewish state.	而任何在军事上毁灭伊朗核潜力的企图都可能将以色列拖入一场长期而艰苦卓绝的斗争，所有犹太国家的敌人可能在这场斗争中联合在一起。


The bleakness of these alternatives has led many to believe that the best and most moral way of neutralizing the Iranian threat would be for Israel to sign a peace treaty with the Palestinians.	如此这般的前景看不到任何希望，以致于很多人相信化解伊朗核威胁最好也是最符合道德标准的办法是以色列与巴勒斯坦人签订和平协议。


Last month, during a public prayer in Ramallah, the Palestinian Minister of Religion, Mahmoud Habash, delivered a speech that gives hope to proponents of this solution.	上个月，在拉马拉举行的一次公共祈祷活动中，巴勒斯坦宗教事务部长马哈茂德·哈巴什发表了一番讲话，为这种方案的倡议者带来了希望。


Before TV cameras and in the presence of the Palestinian Authority’s senior leaders, he lambasted Iran’s interference in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.	哈巴什面对电视摄像机和巴勒斯坦当局的高级领袖，猛烈地抨击了伊朗队以巴冲突的干预。


Essentially, what he said to the Iranians was this: “Why are you entering this conflict?	哈巴什对伊朗人讲话的内容主要是： “你们为什么要卷入这场冲突？


We don’t need your patronage or your support.	我们不需要你们的帮助和支持。


Instead of helping us and the Israelis reach a solution acceptable to all – two states for two peoples – you do everything to exacerbate the conflict.	你们不仅不能帮助我们和以色列人达成能为各方（两国政府和两国人民）所接受的解决方案，反而竭尽全力来加剧这场危机。


For your own reasons that have nothing to do with our struggle, you encourage the extremism of Hamas, thus provoking Israel’s violent reaction, aggravating our suffering, and pushing back the solution that we all want.	因为你们自身的理由与我们的斗争无关，你们鼓励哈马斯极端主义，并因此引发了以色列的暴力反应，加重了我们的苦难，导致我们都热切盼望的解决方案一再推迟。


Not one Iranian soldier has ever shed his blood for our people the way the soldiers of Egypt and Jordan did, yet their governments later signed peace agreements with Israel.”	没有一名伊朗士兵像埃及和约旦士兵那样为我们的人民洒下热血，但他们的政府后来与以色列签订了和平协议。 ”


The Palestinian leadership knows that if Iran ever launches a nuclear attack against Israel, their people would suffer terribly as well.	巴勒斯坦领导人知道如果伊朗对以色列发动核袭击，他们的人民也会遭受严重的损失。


On the other hand, peace between Israel and the Palestinians might neutralize the poison of Iranian hatred and break the hallucinatory political mechanism that identifies Israel with absolute evil – the “small Satan” that should be annihilated at all cost.	另一方面，以色列和巴勒斯坦人实现和平可能缓和伊朗人仇恨的毒性，打破将以色列视为绝对邪恶势力的虚幻的政治机制——在这样的机制下，以色列被人们看作应当不惜一切代价消灭的“小魔鬼”。


The conclusion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would be far more effective than any military undertaking.	结束以巴冲突将会比任何军事行动更加有效。


A united front of Israelis and Palestinians could push the Iranian people, who until recently maintained good relations with the Jewish state, to rebel against the folly that seems to have taken hold of their leaders.	以色列和巴勒斯坦联合阵线会促使直到前不久仍与犹太国家保持着良好关系的伊朗人民反抗似乎发生在其领导人身上的错误。


By contrast, Israeli or American military action against Iran would risk worsening the situation, prolonging and intensifying the suffering in this very sensitive region of the world.	反之，以色列或美国针对伊朗的军事行动有可能导致局势进一步恶化，导致这一世界敏感地区民众所遭受的苦难进一步延长并加剧。


Peace Process or Real Peace?	要和平进程，还是要和平?


RAMALLAH – Direct talks between Palestinian and Israeli leaders are the most obvious way to achieve peace in the Middle East conflict.	发自拉马拉——如果要实现中东和平，最明显的方法莫过于让巴以双方领导人举行直接谈判。


But history has shown time and again that a high-profile peace process alone is no recipe for success.	但历史一次又一次的告诉我们，单纯操办一场声势浩大的和平进程，是无法带来和平的。


The Arab League is set to meet later this month to advise the Palestinian leadership whether or not to engage in direct talks with Israel.	阿拉伯联盟各成员国将在本月晚些时候召开会议，讨论应否建议巴勒斯坦领导人与以色列展开直接对话。


Palestinian officials say that there is no use in holding direct talks that are nothing more than a photo opportunity intended to create the impression of a peace process while avoiding any substantive commitments.	但有巴勒斯坦官员却认为直接对话根本毫无用处，因为这种对话无法谈到任何实质性问题，只不过是大家聚在镁光灯前在一起摆摆样子，让人觉得和平进程依然存在罢了。


For Palestinians, the first step in real peace talks must include some accord on the basic issues of borders and security.	对巴勒斯坦人来说，实质性和平谈判的第一步必须包含一系列有关边界以及安全等基本问题的协议。


The Palestinians have presented to their Israeli counterparts (through the Americans) a written offer that includes giving up lands occupied by Israel in 1967 and now populated by Israeli settlers. These lands would be swapped for other lands equal in size and importance.	对此巴勒斯坦当局已经通过美国向以色列递交了一份书面草案，内容包括要求以色列放弃其在1967年占领的领土并退出目前被犹太人定居者强占的土地，同时也允许以色列以其他同等面积和重要性的土地进行交换。


Israel has yet to produce a single written document outlining its position on the territory that will become a Palestinian state alongside Israel.	而对于这些未来即将划归巴勒斯坦国的土地，以色列目前却依然未制定出任何文本来阐述自己的立场。


Israel insists that any serious progress will happen only if both sides can sit at the negotiating table face to face.	以色列方面坚持认为除非双方面对面谈判，否则就无法达成任何实质性成果。


According to this view, Netanyahu's right-wing coalition might be persuaded to accept the continuation of the partial settlement freeze, but only if the Israeli public sees President Mahmoud Abbas and Netanyahu publicly engaged in negotiations.	依照这个观点，只有让人们亲眼看到巴勒斯坦民族权力机构主席阿巴斯以及以色列总理内塔尼亚胡一起坐在了谈判桌前，后者所领导的右翼联合政府才有理由去部分冻结定居点建设。


But the history of such negotiations tells a much different story.	但过去这类公开谈判的经验告诉我们：故事有着另外一个截然不同的版本。


All successful efforts in the Middle East conflict have not occurred in front of cameras and through publicly declared direct talks.	迄今为止，所有成功的中东和平成果都不是在媒体镜头下的直接公开对话中取得的。


The visit to Jerusalem of Egypt's then-President Anwar el-Sadat, and the ensuing Egypt-Israel breakthrough at Camp David, took place only after successful behind-the-scenes understandings.	埃及前总统萨拉特对耶路撒冷的访问，以及以埃两国随后在美国戴维营达成的突破性成果，都是在双方前期私下取得谅解之后发生的。


The public Madrid talks failed to bring about any breakthroughs, whereas the much more secretive Oslo channel brought about the PLO-Israel agreement.	公开的马德里会谈没有取得什么大的突破，而暗中运作的奥斯陆谈判渠道却令巴解组织和以色列达成了协议。


Even some of the most explosive situations on the ground between Israel and its northern neighbors have been defused as a result of understandings that often included neutral third parties.	即便是某些双方极可能大打出手的危急时刻，也经常是在某个中立第三方的调停下排除险情的。


Former United States senator George Mitchell represents a relatively neutral third party supervising the current talks.	目前来说，在巴以对话中扮演这个相对中立的第三者角色的是美国前参议员乔治·米歇尔。


These “proximity talks” allow Mitchell to ensure that each side is making serious offers.	这种“代理谈判”的形式让米歇尔可以确保双方都能提出实质性条件。


If the proximity talks are replaced with direct talks in which the US is not physically inside the negotiating room, there is no guarantee that the stronger partner will not try to bully the weaker one.	但如果这种代理谈判变成了直接会谈，而美国方面又不能亲身参与谈判的话，那就无法保证强大的一方不会去威吓弱小的一方。


Direct talks also have some well-known liabilities.	此外，直接会谈同时还存在着诸多众所周知的缺点。


Failed direct talks have often led to a spike in violence.	直接会谈的失败通常是暴力对抗的导火索。


Neither side, nor the rest of the world, wants that.	这当然也是巴以双方乃至于全世界都不愿意看到的。


When former US president Bill Clinton tried to set up the second Camp David summit, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat hesitated. He felt that the situation was not right for direct talks.	当年美国前总统比尔·克林顿尝试召开第二次戴维营峰会，已故的巴勒斯坦民族权力机构主席阿拉法特却对此感到迟疑。


What worried Arafat was the possibility of failure and the potential of a blame game if the talks didn't produce the desired goal.	他感觉到当时的情况不适宜直接会谈，害怕一旦会谈失败并无法达成预定目标的话，双方又会陷入另一场骂战当中。


Clinton, who was embroiled in domestic problems, badly needed an international success, and assured Arafat that fingers would not be pointed at either party if the talks failed.	而当时正在国内问题上焦头烂额的克林顿却迫切需要一场国际胜利，并向阿拉法特保证任何一方都不会因谈判失败而遭到责难。


But no sooner had the parties left Washington after the talks broke down than Clinton joined Israel's then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak in blaming the Palestinians.	谁知就在谈判最终破裂，双方领导人飞离华盛顿之后没几天，他就站到了时任以色列总理的巴拉克一边，异口同声地指责巴勒斯坦人。


That failure, and the emotional responses from both sides as to what was or was not offered in the talks, helped spark the violence which led to the second intifada in the winter of 2000.	那场失败，以及双方针对究竟在会谈上提出了哪些条件的情绪化反应，在某种程度上导致了2000年冬的第二次巴勒斯坦人暴动以及随之而来的暴力对抗。


To his credit, Clinton and his staff decided, despite the violence, to make one last attempt in Taba, Egypt late in his presidency.	但值得赞扬的是，虽然发生了暴力事件，但克林顿及其幕僚依然决定在埃及城市塔巴进行其总统任期末的最后一次尝试。


That effort is said to have been the closest the two parties have ever been to a breakthrough.	而据说这次尝试的成果是以巴双方最接近达成突破性协议的时候。


It would be helpful if the Taba understanding or the more recent efforts by Abbas and former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert could become the basis for direct talks.	如果塔巴谅解，又或者最近由阿巴斯和以色列前总理奥尔默特共同推动的成果能成为直接谈判的基础的话，也不失为一件好事。


The Netanyahu government has refused to agree to any such clear reference point before talks begin.	但内塔尼亚胡政府已经拒绝在谈判开始之前制定任何清晰的行动标准。


The Israelis want talks without conditions, even though Netanyahu has imposed his own condition on the Palestinians: recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, and acceptance of a demilitarized Palestinian state that does not include Jerusalem and the Jordan valley.	以色列人希望召��无条件的会谈，但其实内塔尼亚胡已经向巴勒斯坦人开出了自己的条件：承认以色列是一个犹太国家，巴勒斯坦国不能拥有武装部队，其领土范围不包括耶路撒冷和约旦河谷。


Every expert on the Middle East agrees that the best avenue to a serious breakthrough in Palestinian-Israeli negotiations is quiet, behind-the-scenes negotiations.	事实上，所有中东问题专家都一致认为：实现巴以双方实质性突破的最佳途径就是低调的幕后谈判。


The biggest stumbling block for any successful conclusion is the public on both sides, so the more the public is kept out of the day-to-day talks, the better.	因为任何成功的谈判成果所面对的最大障碍就是公众，因此谈判越淡出人们的视野，就越容易取得成功。


Of course, the public can and should be included through a national referendum in assessing the results once the talks have reached fruition and a comprehensive settlement is reached that both leaders say they can live with.	当然，一旦谈判取得了成果并达成了一个综合性实施方案，而双方领导人也表示认可的话，公众就可以并且应当通过公投的形式来评价这一成果。


But, until that happy day arrives, or at least until the two sides have reached the contours of an agreement, direct talks and photo opportunities should be considered counter-productive.	但只要这美好的一天还没有到来，或者双方没有达成一个协议框架之前，直接谈判和镁光灯都应被视为弊大于利的。


After all, Palestinians and Israelis are no longer interested in the peace process. They just want peace.	毕竟巴勒斯坦人和以色列人都已经厌倦了那些所谓和平进程，因为他们想要的，是真正的和平。


The Last Guerrillas	最后的游击队


BOGOTÁ – During the Cold War, tensions between the West and the Soviet Union affected virtually all countries worldwide.	波哥大——冷战时期，西方和苏联间的紧张局势影响着全球几乎所有国家。


As a result, throughout Latin America, guerrilla groups emerged, seeking to destabilize military dictatorships and attain democracy, freedom, and policy reform – goals that they believed could not be achieved peacefully.	结果导致拉美各地组建游击队，宗旨是推翻军事独裁政权并实现民主、自由和政策改革——他们坚信无法通过和平手段实现这些目标。


Above all, it was the Cuban Revolution of 1959 – in which armed revolutionaries successfully overthrew the military dictator Fulgencio Batista – that inspired this movement.	毕竟，点燃这场运动星星之火的是1959年的古巴革命，这场革命中武装革命者成功推翻了军事独裁者巴蒂斯塔。


Indeed, Che Guevara, an icon of the revolution, died in Bolivia while attempting to export the guerrilla project.	其实，这场革命的标志性人物切·格瓦拉为将游击运动推向国门之外而死于玻利维亚。


At the end of 2012, conditions in Latin America are very different.	2012年，拉美的情况发生了天翻地覆的变化。 民主已经从特例变为常规；


Democracy is not the exception, but the rule; military regimes have succumbed to the power of the ballot box; and guerrilla groups have largely become a relic of the past.	军事政权也已屈服于投票箱的力量； 游击队组织基本已成昨日黄花。


But Colombia – the region’s oldest and most stable democracy – is still plagued by illegal, armed guerilla organizations.	但拉美地区历史最悠久、局势最稳定的民主国家哥伦比亚仍然受到非法武装游击队组织的折磨。


Unlike in other countries, where guerrillas pursued exclusively political demands, Colombia’s guerilla groups became involved in drug trafficking, which transformed them into lethal institutional monsters, one part subversive organization and one part criminal mafia.	其他国家的游击队完全追求政治目标，而哥伦比亚的游击队却参与贩毒，进而转化为致人死命的机构怪物，半是颠覆性组织半是犯罪黑手党。


In response, citizens illegally formed armed self-defense groups.	民众为此非法成立了武装自卫组织。


But these organizations ultimately exacerbated violence, generated land dispossession and forced displacement, and helped to prolong the conflict for nearly five decades.	但这些组织却最终导致暴力局势进一步恶化，它们在这场近五十年的漫长冲突中发挥了不可忽视的作用，导致平民因此而失去土地、流离失所。


As a result, generations of Colombians have grown up surrounded by violence, never having known real peace.	一代又一代哥伦比亚人也因此在暴力环境中长大，从未有缘目睹真正的和平。


Former members of several of the guerrilla groups that arose during the 1960’s and 1970’s have been reintegrated into Colombian society following peace agreements.	二十世纪六七十年代崛起的若干前游击组织成员在订立和平协议后已经重新融入了哥伦比亚社会。


Some have even held important political positions, serving as ministers, members of congress, governors, and mayors.	有些人甚至担任部长、国会议员、州长和市长等重要政治职务。


For example, Bogotá’s current mayor, Gustavo Petro, was a member of the M-19 guerrilla group in the 1980’s.	如波哥大现任市长古斯塔沃·佩特罗就曾于20世纪80年加盟过M-19游击队组织。


Nowadays, only two groups remain immersed in an anachronistic struggle: the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), the larger, older, and better funded of the two, and the National Liberation Army (ELN).	时至今日只有两个组织仍沉迷于过去时代的战斗：规模较大、历史较久、资金供给也较充裕的哥伦比亚革命武装力量（FARC）和民族解放军（ELN）。


After winning the presidency in 2002, Álvaro Uribe vowed to defeat the guerrillas – who have added terrorism to their repertoire – mounting an offensive that employed all of the power of the state and its law-enforcement authorities.	阿尔瓦罗·乌里韦在2002年的总统选举中获胜后发誓要扫除游击队，后者已将恐怖主义与其原有宗旨相结合，而乌里韦已经动用一切国家和执法机关的力量向游击组织发起攻击。


I have had the opportunity – first as Uribe’s defense minister, and now as President – to deal the strongest blows to the guerrillas and drug-trafficking gangs.	在担任乌里韦国防部长及现在就职总统期间，我曾有机会向游击队和贩毒团伙发起最猛烈的袭击。


The government’s commitment to the fight against terrorism has already caused FARC’s membership to plummet, from more than 20,000 a decade ago to little more than 8,000 today.	政府打击恐怖主义的不懈努力已导致哥伦比亚革命武装力量的人数大幅减少，从10年前的20，000多人骤降至今天的8，000人左右。


We will not let up until Colombia is free of guerilla armies.	彻底消灭哥伦比亚武装游击队是我们的目标。


But this irrevocable commitment to defeat terrorism does not preclude us from also prudently pursuing a solution to the conflict through dialogue – while avoiding mistakes made in an earlier round of talks, during which a prolonged cease-fire allowed the FARC to regain some strength.	但打击恐怖主义这一不可改变的目标并不妨碍我们审慎地通过对话寻求解决方案，但需要避免重蹈之前谈判失败的覆辙，当时达成的长期停火协议让哥伦比亚革命武装力量得以休养生息。


Last month, after nearly two years of exploratory conversations, formal peace talks were initiated in Oslo, Norway.	经过近两年的探索性对话，正式和平谈判上月在挪威奥斯陆启动。


This month, the talks moved to Havana, Cuba, where they will be held until their conclusion.	本月谈判地点转移到古巴哈瓦那，并将在那里继续进行直到结束。


The talks will be direct, will follow a brief and precise thematic agenda, and will be conducted within a defined time horizon.	双方将在规定的时间范围内，依据简短精确的主题议程直接展开对话。


Norway and Cuba have served not only as host countries, but also as guarantors of the dialogues.	挪威和古巴不仅作为会议东道国，也负责担保谈判双方的对话。


Representatives from Venezuela and Chile are also attending the negotiations.	委内瑞拉和智利的代表也参与了谈判过程。


The Colombian people are counting on the talks to result in agreement on a clear path toward the end of internal armed conflict.	哥伦比亚人民希望谈判能够签订协议，扫清结束国内武装冲突存在的障碍。


This opportunity must not be wasted.	这次机会绝对不容浪费。


But, given that the guerrillas have thwarted Colombians’ hopes in the past, we are approaching the negotiations with cautious optimism.	但鉴于游击队曾经辜负哥伦比亚人的希望，我们对此次谈判持谨慎乐观的态度。


The peace talks will not paralyze the state or weaken its ability to act.	和平谈判不会麻痹政府或削弱国家行动力。


Indeed, until a final agreement is reached, Colombian law-enforcement authorities will continue to confront forcefully all illegal armed groups whose members insist on threatening the peace and lives of the Colombian people.	事实上在达成最终协议之前，哥伦比亚执法机关将继续强势面对一切继续威胁哥伦比亚民众和平与生命安全的非法武装团体。


Moreover, the government will continue to take action to build peace.	此外，政府将继续建设和平。


This includes implementing social and economic programs aimed at reducing poverty and creating jobs, defending the victims of the conflict, ensuring that stolen land is returned to displaced peasants, and creating more equitable conditions throughout the country.	���关措施包括落实旨在减少贫困和创造就业机会的社会经济项目，保护冲突受害者，确保将被偷走的土地归还给流离失所的农民，并在全国各地创造更加公平的环境。


The serious, realistic, and sober peace process that we have begun with the FARC could end the internal armed conflict in Colombia, implying the defeat, once and for all, of the continent’s guerrilla groups and bringing down the curtain on a half-century of senseless violence.	我们与哥伦比亚革命武装力量已经开始的严肃、现实、清醒的和平对话可能永久结束哥伦比亚的内部武装冲突，这标志南美大陆游击组织的彻底失败，结束近半个世纪毫无意义的暴力冲突。


Indeed, this outcome would contribute to peace and stability for the entire region.	事实上，这种结果将有助于整个地区的和平与稳定。


The conflict’s end would also bolster development efforts in Colombia – already a model of democracy and political and economic stability.	结束冲突也将加大哥伦比亚的发展力度——这里已经是民主、政治和经济稳定的光辉典范。


Even in the wake of the global economic crisis, Colombia’s economy has been growing at an average rate of close to 5%, while benefiting from unprecedented inflows of foreign investment.	即使在全球经济危机后，哥伦比亚的经济也以近5%的平均速度快速增长，并受益于前所未有的外国资金流入。


And Colombian governance is admired worldwide.	哥伦比亚的执政状况的确令全球羡慕。


Reaching an agreement with the FARC to end the conflict – which implies the group’s disarmament and demobilization – would allow Colombia’s star to shine more brightly than ever.	与哥伦比亚革命武装力量达成协议结束冲突意味着该组织解除武装和遣散人员，这能使哥伦比亚的星空比以往任何时候都更明亮。


The Colombian government is committed to making every possible effort to realize the dream of a guerilla-free country – and continent – in 2013.	2013年，哥伦比亚政府将尽一切努力实现在国内和南美大陆遣散一切游击队的梦想。


Peace this Time?	和平终于要来了?


JERUSALEM – The imminent resumption in Washington of direct Israeli-Palestinian peace talks is good news.	发自耶路撒冷——以巴直接和平谈判即将在华盛顿重开，这是个好消息。


But whether these talks will lead to an agreement, let alone within one year as US President Barack Obama hopes, is another matter.	但这些谈判究竟最终能否达成协议（美国总统奥巴马期望能在一年之内），则是另一回事。


When Obama, two days into his presidency, appointed former Senator George Mitchell as his special envoy to the Middle East, many hoped that within two years his efforts would lead to an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians – and to a comprehensive peace between Israel and all its Arab neighbors.	奥巴马在就职第二天就任命前参议员乔治·米歇尔为他的中东特使，许多人也因此希望他能在上任两年内促使以巴之间达成协议——并实现以色列与周边阿拉伯国家的整体和平。


Whether these exaggerated hopes should be traced to Obama’s inexperience or to hubris – or both – is a moot point: what is clear is that, after 18 months and numerous visits to the region, Mitchell was able to achieve only an agreement in principle by Israel and the Palestinians to start talking to each other.	但这些希望最终破灭的原因究竟是奥巴马太缺乏经验，或是太过高估自己——还是两错并犯——依然是个争论不休的问题：但唯一清晰的是，在上任18个月并多次访问该地区之后，米歇尔最终只争取到了一个以巴之间重开谈判的原则性协议。


The problem is that they have been talking to each other now for 17 years, under different Israeli and Palestinian leaders, and under two US Presidents.	问题是，以巴双方已经互相对话整整17个年头了，期间领导人不断更替，连美国总统都换了两届。


To bring them to the negotiating table again is not a breakthrough, but rather an attempt at damage control.	将双方重新拉到谈判桌前并不算是什么突破，而更像是一个亡羊补牢之举。


And, while Mitchell’s successful track record in achieving reconciliation in Northern Ireland seemed like an excellent credential for his current job, it may have hindered him in the Middle East.	此外，虽然米歇尔当年成功促成北爱尔兰冲突双方和解的经历是他获此任命的极佳理由，但这个经历目前似乎却成了他在中东的绊脚石。


The conflict in Northern Ireland was always territorial: not even the most radical Irish Republican group ever denied the legitimacy of Great Britain – only its rule over the six northern provinces of what they consider United Ireland.  The crux of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, by contrast, only partly concerns Israel’s borders.	北爱尔兰的冲突从来都是地域性的：即便是最极端的爱尔兰共和组织也没有否定过大不列颠政府的合法性——而只是否定该政府对爱尔兰北方6省（所谓“联合爱尔兰”）的统治。


The Palestinians contest not just the post-1967 occupation of the West Bank; since the United Nations partition plan of 1947 – which called for the establishment of two states, one Jewish and one Arab – Palestinians have refused to recognize Israel’s right to exist, and most Israelis are not convinced that they have totally abandoned that stance.	相比之下，以巴冲突的核心并不仅仅是以色列的边界问题，而是巴勒斯坦人不但反对1967年以后以色列的占领行动； 还从1947年分治方案（呼吁成立一个犹太国家和一个阿拉伯国家）出台以来就拒绝承认以色列的存在权，对此许多以色列人也不敢确定巴勒斯坦人是否已经放弃了这种看法


Being tone-deaf to these fundamental issues, Mitchell started on the wrong foot by initially acceding, with Obama’s encouragement, to the Palestinians’ demand for a freeze on further construction in Israeli settlements on the West Bank prior to the start of negotiations.	结果，对这些基本问题不甚了解的米歇尔一开始就走错了步调，在奥巴马的鼓动下，他答应了巴勒斯坦人停止以色列继续兴建西岸定居点的要求，而且是在双方谈判开始之前。


A stop to settlement activities in Palestinian territories is a reasonable demand, and the Palestinians could naturally insist on it in the negotiations.	禁止在巴勒斯坦领土上兴建犹太人定居点的要求是合理的，而巴勒斯坦人自然也会在谈判中坚持这一点。


But making a settlement freeze a precondition for negotiations was obviously unacceptable to the Israeli government, which maintained that no preconditions for negotiations should be set.	但如果将其作为谈判前提的话，以色列政府肯定不能接受，这自然也意味着双方谈判不应附加有任何前提条件。


More than a year was wasted on this, causing, among other things, tensions between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government and the Obama administration.	米歇尔在这方面已经耗费了整整一年，并与其他因素一起导致了以色利的内塔尼亚胡政府和奥巴马当局之间的紧张关系。


With a lack of grace, Netanyahu finally agreed to a temporary freeze – due to expire at the end of September – and eventually the Palestinians, this time under US pressure, relented to open negotiations without an explicit Israeli assurance that the freeze would be continued.	内塔尼亚胡政府最终也同意暂时冻结定居点建设——直到9月末——而巴勒斯坦人迫于美国压力，也同意在以方没有明确承诺停建定居点的情况下重开谈判。


Not only was precious time wasted, but further damage was done.	祸不单行的是，美国人的做法不但浪费了宝贵的时间，还造成了进一步的伤害。


Even Israelis who do not agree with Netanyahu’s hard-line positions didn’t like to see their prime minister treated by the US as if he were the leader of Upper Volta.	即便是那些不支持内塔尼亚胡强硬政策的以色列人也不愿意看到他被美国人当作某非洲小国元首来看待。


Indeed, he did, after all, announce last year that contrary to his Likud Party’s previous position, he was now willing to accept a two-state solution – a position that is still anathema to many Likud members, as well to at least three of the smaller parties in his government coalition.	事实上，内塔尼亚胡也曾在去年作出声明，推翻其所属利库德集团的原先立场，同意接受一个两国方案——这个决定如今依然使许多利库德集团成员感到恼火，而其执政联盟内部也至少有三个党派表示反对。


Now that the talks are to begin, will they achieve anything substantial, or will the summit in Washington merely be another photo opportunity, like President George W. Bush’s Annapolis summit in 2007? Only an unreconstructed optimist would give the talks more than a 50% chance of succeeding.	如今谈判就要开始了，那么这次谈判究竟能取得什么实质性成果，或者又是像小布什的2007年安那波利斯峰会那样，仅仅是各方领导人合影留念的机会而已？


The reasons are more immediate than the intractable character of Middle East peace-making.	相对于中东和平进程那些棘手的特点来说，上述理由更加紧迫。


Even if Netanyahu is willing to bow to realism, some of his coalition partners might leave his government.	如果内塔尼亚胡愿意走现实主义道路的话，他的联合政府中的某些盟友就有可能退出政府。


On the Palestinian side, Mahmoud Abbas’s Palestinian Authority lost control in 2006 of the Gaza Strip – now ruled by an illegitimate Hamas-led government – and thus cannot speak anymore for all Palestinians.	在巴勒斯坦方面，马哈茂德·阿巴斯领导的巴勒斯坦民族权力组织在2006年失去了对加沙地区的控制权——该地区如今掌握在由哈马斯领导的一个非法政府手里——并因此失去了代表全体巴勒斯坦人进行谈判的资格。


With more than 600 Palestinians killed in Gaza since Hamas’s violent putsch, making peace among the Palestinians may be as difficult as making peace between them and Israel.	自从哈马斯采取暴力行动以来已经有600名巴勒斯坦人丧生，因此在巴勒斯坦人之间实现和平似乎跟在以巴之间实现和平一样困难。


Moreover, before Israeli-Palestinian talks broke down two years ago, the previous Israeli government, under Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, negotiated for two years with the Palestinian Authority.	此外，在以巴谈判于两年前破裂之前，当时由前总理奥尔默特和外长利夫尼领导的以色列政府就已经预先和巴���斯坦民主权力机构进行了两年谈判。


This was the most moderate Israeli government conceivable, and the same can be said about the Fatah movement controlling the Palestinian Authority.	那届以色列政府堪称是最为温和的一届，而他们的谈判对手，控制巴勒斯坦民族权力机构的法塔赫也是如此。


Yet, after dozens of meetings, public and private, the two sides failed to reach an agreement.	但在经历了一连串会议之后，双方无论是在公开和私下的情况下都未能达成任何协议。


Even the most moderate leaders on both sides could not agree on the core issues of the conflict: borders, settlements, Jerusalem, and the fate of 1947-1948 Palestinian refugees and their descendants.	即便是双方最温和的领导人都无法就冲突的一连串核心问题达成和解：边界、定居点、耶路撒冷，还有1947~1948年间的巴勒斯坦难民以及后裔的安置问题。


Both sides had an immediate stake in reaching an agreement: for Olmert, an agreement might have rescued his position as prime minister, and it would have been a trump card for Abbas in Fatah’s de facto civil war with Hamas.	更何况双方都会从协议中得到好处：对奥尔默特来说，这能使其保住总理之位； 对阿巴斯来说，这将是他领导的法塔赫在与哈马斯的内斗中的杀手锏。


The failure to reach agreement under such apparently auspicious conditions does not bode well for the coming talks.	当年如此有利的情况下都无法达成协议，未来的谈判自然也给蒙上了阴影。


But Netanyahu has said that once negotiations start, “we will surprise everyone,” and the Palestinians have gone further than ever before in building the institutions needed for national independence.	但内塔尼亚胡已经声明一旦谈判开始，“我们将给所有人带来惊喜，”而巴勒斯坦人也在独立建国方面进行了更多的制度建设。


Even a lapsed optimist can see that this time the chances for reconciliation just might be better after all.	即便是一个屡遭挫折的乐观主义者也将看到，这一次，达成和解的机会比过去都要多。


Peace Through Development	以发展促和平


New York – American foreign policy has failed in recent years mainly because the United States relied on military force to address problems that demand development assistance and diplomacy.	纽约—美国的外交政策在最近几年失败是因为它依靠武力应对那些本需要发展援助和外交斡旋来解决的问题。


Young men become fighters in places like Sudan, Somalia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan because they lack gainful employment.	在苏丹、索马里、巴基斯坦和阿富汗这样的地方年轻人成为战士是因为他们缺乏有效就业。


Extreme ideologies influence people when they can’t feed their families, and when lack of access to family planning leads to an unwanted population explosion.	当人们的家庭不得温饱，当计划生育措施的缺乏导致不必要的人口爆炸时，他们就容易受到极端意识形态的影响。


President Barack Obama has raised hopes for a new strategy, but so far the forces of continuity in US policy are dominating the forces of change.	虽然奥巴马总统对新战略冀望甚高，但目前的美国政策中沿袭的力量大过了变革的力量。


The first rule in assessing a government’s real strategy is to follow the money.	评估一个政府实际战略的首要原则是追踪资金的流向。


America vastly overspends on the military compared with other areas of government.	美国在军事上的超支远大于政府的其他方面。


Obama’s projected budgets do not change that.	奥巴马提出的预算也没有改变这一点。


For the coming 2010 fiscal year, Obama’s budget calls for $755 billion in military spending, an amount that exceeds US budget spending in all other areas except so-called “mandatory” spending on social security, health care, interest payments on the national debt, and a few other items.	在即将到来的2010财政年度，奥巴马预算提出的军费开支为7550亿美元，这一数额超出了所有其他方面的预算支出（除了社会保障、医疗、国债利息支付和其他几项所谓“强制性”支出以外。 ）。


Indeed, US military spending exceeds the sum of federal budgetary outlays for education, agriculture, climate change, environmental protection, ocean protection, energy systems, homeland security, low-income housing, national parks and national land management, the judicial system, international development, diplomatic operations, highways, public transport, veterans affairs, space exploration and science, civilian research and development, civil engineering for waterways, dams, bridges, sewerage and waste treatment, community development, and many other areas.	的确，美国军费开支超出了许多其他方面的联邦预算经费总和：包括教育、农业、气候变化、环保、海洋保护、能源系统、国土安全、低收入者住房、国家公园和国家土地管理、司法体系、国际开发、外交运作、公路、公共交通、老兵事务、太空探索和科学、民用研发、针对水道、大坝、桥梁的土木工程、排水和污水处理、社区发展的许多其他方面。


This preponderance of military spending applies to all ten years of Obama’s medium-term scenario.	这种军费开支的权重优势贯穿奥巴马的中期十年。


By 2019, total military spending is projected to be $8.2 trillion, exceeding by $2 trillion the budgeted outlays for all non-mandatory budget spending.	到2019年，全部的军费开支预计将达到8. 2万亿美元，比所有非强制性预算支出经费的总和还要多出2万亿。


US military spending is equally remarkable when viewed from an international perspective.	从国际角度考量美国的军费开支也同样令人咋舌。


According to the Swedish International Peace Research Institute, total military spending in constant 2005 dollars reached roughly $1.4 trillion in 2007.	根据瑞典国际和平研究所的资料显示，以2005年的美元不变价格计算，美国的军费开支在2007年约为1.


In other words, the US spends roughly the same amount spent by the rest of the world combined – a pattern that the Obama administration shows no signs of ending.	4万亿美元。 换言之，美国的军费约是世界其他国家的军费之和—没有任何迹象表明奥巴马政府想要终止这一模式。


The policy decisions of recent months offer little more hope for a fundamental change in US foreign policy direction.	最近几个月的政策决策也没有让我们在美国对外政策的根本性改变方面多看到一点希望。


While the US has signed an agreement with Iraq to leave by the end of 2011, there is talk in the Pentagon that US “non-combat” troops will remain in the country for years or decades to come.	虽然美国已经和伊拉克签署了在2011年前撤军的协定，但五角大楼有消息称美国“非战斗性”部队会继续驻扎在该国几年或几十年。


It is easy to see how the persistence of instability in Iraq, Iranian influence, and al-Qaeda’s presence will lead American policymakers to take the “safe” route of continued military involvement.	显然，伊拉克的持续不稳定、伊朗的影响和基地组织的存在将会让美国的政策制定者们采取继续军事介入的“安全”路径。


Some opponents of the Iraq War, including me, believe that a fundamental – and deeply misguided – objective of the war from the outset has been to create a long-term military base (or bases) in Iraq, ostensibly to protect oil routes and oil concessions.	包括我在内的一些伊拉克战争的反对者认为一种根本的—并且被深度误导的—战争目标从一开始就是要在伊拉克建立一个（或多个）长期的军事基地，这明显就是要保护石油通道和特许采油权。


As the examples of Iran and Saudi Arabia show, however, such a long-term presence sooner or later creates an explosive backlash.	然而，正如伊朗和沙特阿拉伯的先例所证明，这样的长期存在迟早会造成爆炸性反弹。


The worries are even worse in Afghanistan and Pakistan.	这样的担忧在阿富汗和巴基斯坦更甚。


NATO’s war with the Taliban in Afghanistan is going badly, so much so that the commanding US general was sacked this month.	北约在阿富汗与塔利班交战的战绩是如此不堪，以至于担任指挥的美国将军在本月被解职。


The Taliban are also extending their reach into neighboring Pakistan.	塔利班也正在将其势力延伸到相邻的巴基斯坦。


Both Afghanistan and the neighboring provinces of Pakistan are impoverished regions, with vast unemployment, bulging youth populations, prolonged droughts, widespread hunger, and pervasive economic deprivation.	阿富汗和邻近的巴基斯坦省份都是贫穷地区，有着大面积��业、大量年轻人口、连年干旱、蔓延的饥荒和普遍的经济弱势群体。


It is easy for the Taliban and al-Qaeda to mobilize fighters under such conditions.	在这样的情况下，塔利班和基地组织很容易招兵买马。


The problem is that a US military response is essentially useless under these conditions, and can easily inflame the situation rather than resolve it.	症结是美国的军事回应在如此情况下根本无效，反倒还可能使矛盾激化。


Among other problems, the US relies heavily on drones and bombers, leading to a high civilian death toll, which is inflaming public attitudes against the US.	问题之一是美国严重依赖无人机和轰炸机，导致很高的平民死亡率，这就引燃了公众的反美情绪。


After one recent disaster, in which more than 100 civilians died, the Pentagon immediately insisted that such bombing operations would continue.	在最近一次致使100多个平民丧生的灾难性事件之后，五角大楼立即表示这种轰炸行动会继续。


A recent survey showed overwhelming Pakistani opposition to US military incursions into their country.	最近一次民调表明压倒多数的巴基斯坦人对美国在他们国境内的军事行动表示反对。


Obama is doubling down in Afghanistan, by raising the number of US troops from 38,000 to 68,000, and perhaps more later.	奥巴马正将在阿富汗的军事筹码翻倍，把美军人数从38000增加到68000，今后还可能进一步增兵。


There are also risks that the US will get involved much more heavily in the fighting in Pakistan.	美国还有更深卷入巴基斯坦战事的风险。


The new US commanding general in Afghanistan is reportedly a specialist in “counter-insurgency,” which could well involve surreptitious engagement by US operatives in Pakistan.	新任美军驻阿富汗总指挥据称是一位“反叛乱”专家。 这样的战略也很可能被暗中纳入美军在巴基斯坦的行动当中。


If so, the results could prove catastrophic, leading to a spreading war in an unstable country of 180 million people.	果真如此，那么其结果可能是灾难性的。 它会导致战争在这个拥有1800万人口的不稳定国家蔓延。


What is disconcerting, however, is not only the relentless financing and spread of war, but also the lack of an alternative US strategy.	然而，令人惶恐的不仅是军费的超支和战火的蔓延，还有另一种美国战略的缺失。


Obama and his top advisers have spoken regularly about the need to address the underlying sources of conflict, including poverty and unemployment.	奥巴马和他的高级顾问们时常提到有必要解决冲突的深层根源，其中包括贫穷和失业。


A few billion dollars has been recommended to fund economic aid for Afghanistan and Pakistan.	一项针对阿富汗和巴基斯坦的数十亿美元的经济援助计划已经提出。


But this remains a small amount compared to military outlays, and an overarching framework to support economic development is missing.	但这和军费开支相比仍是微不足道，并且一种支持经济发展的总体政策框架依然缺位。


Before investing hundreds of billions of dollars more in failing military operations, the Obama administration should re-think its policy and lay out a viable strategy to US citizens and the world.	在向失败的军事行动投入千亿计的美元之前，奥玛巴政府应该对其政策进行再思考，并为美国民众和世界制定一个可行的战略。 实施一项通过可持续发展实现和平的战略的时机就在当下。


It’s high time for a strategy of peace through sustainable development – including investments in health, education, livelihoods, water and sanitation, and irrigation – in today’s hotspots, starting with Afghanistan and Pakistan.	该战略应从阿富汗和巴基斯坦起步，在当今的热点地区实施。 它的内容包括向医疗、教育、民生、水和卫生以及灌溉方面的投资。


Such a strategy cannot simply emerge as a byproduct of US military campaigns.	这样一项战略不能仅仅被看作是美国军事活动的副产品。


Rather, it will have to be developed proactively, with a sense of urgency and in close partnership with the affected countries and the communities within them.	相反，应该怀着紧迫感，与相关的国家和社团一起，用一种前瞻性的方式来制定它。


A shift in focus to economic development will save a vast number of lives and convert the unthinkably large economic costs of war into economic benefits through development.	以经济发展为中心的战略转变将会拯救无数生命，并通过发展将难以想象的巨大战争经济成本转化为经济收益。


Obama must act before today’s crisis explodes into an even larger disaster.	奥巴马必须在目前的危机剧变为更大的灾难前采取行动。


Brazil’s Statute of Virtual Liberty	巴西的虚拟自由法


RIO DE JANEIRO – It seems like the plot of a horror movie – the type where a little-noticed glitch in the matrix threatens to cause global chaos.	里约热内卢—看起来好像是恐怖电影的情节——矩阵的一个几乎无人注意到的小故障导致了全球大混乱。


This time, it was a simple, but fateful, programming misstep that suddenly left millions of consumers’ most sensitive information vulnerable to hackers.	这一回是一个简单但致命的程序错误，瞬间将数百万消费者的敏感信息暴露在黑客眼前。


News headlines screamed about online dangers that we could barely understand, alerting swarms of digital pirates to a bounty of new criminal opportunities.	新闻大谈我们可能难以意识到的上网危险，警告说大量数字海盗正在觊觎新犯罪机会的巨大利益。


Companies worldwide scrambled to secure their online safety.	全世界的公司无不在竭尽全力保证在线安全。


The story of the so-called “Heartbleed” bug, however, is all too real.	但是，所谓的“心脏出血”（Heartbleed）漏洞太真实了。


It points to a stark truth: In a shockingly short time, we have become completely dependent on the Internet, a frontier we are only beginning to comprehend, let alone map and regulate.	它直指一个严峻的真相：在如此之短的时间里，我们便已经完全依赖上了我们才刚刚开始理解，遑论厘清和监管的前沿——互联网。


Important debates – such as freedom versus security, privacy versus piracy, and cyberspace’s impact on democracy – are far from being resolved.	重要的争论——比如自由与安全之争、隐私与盗版之争和网络空间对民主的冲突之争等——远远没有得到解决。


Yet fears over Heartbleed and similar such threats, and the furor surrounding the aggressive American surveillance tactics revealed by former intelligence contractor Edward J. Snowden, have already put many countries in a defensive posture.	但对“心脏失血”和类似威胁的担忧，以及美国前情报承包商斯诺登所揭露的侵略性监控策略所引发的愤怒已经让许多国家摆好了防御架势。


In many places, efforts to protect Internet freedom have been stymied.	在许多地方，保护互联网自由的措施遭到了威胁。


But, as my home country, Brazil, has shown, a different path is possible.	但是，正如我的祖国巴西所标明的，或许可以另辟蹊径。


Brazil’s House of Representatives has passed a genuine Internet “Bill of Rights,” which was unanimously approved by the senate and signed into law by President Dilma Rousseff last week – much to the delight of civil-society advocates.	巴西众议院通过了真正的互联网“权利法案”，并由参议院一致批准，上周经总统罗塞夫签字生效。 公民社会支持者对这一结果十分满意。


The legislation, widely described as an Internet constitution, seeks to safeguard online freedom of expression and limit government collection and usage of Internet users’ metadata.	许多人将这一立法称为互联网宪法，它旨在保护在线言论自由、限制政府搜集和使用互联网用户元数据。


The bill ensures “net neutrality” (meaning that Internet service providers must treat all information and users equally), and subjects global companies, such as Google and Facebook, to Brazilian law and precedent in cases involving its own citizens.	该法案确保“网络中性”（意味着互联网服务提供商必须平等对待所有信息和用户），并要求谷歌和Facebook等全球公司在对待巴西用户时遵守巴西法律和判例。


Inspiration for Brazil’s embrace of Internet freedom stemmed in part from US President Barack Obama’s historic election campaign in 2008.	巴西的互联网自由思想产生于美国总统奥巴马在2008年具历史意义的竞选策略。


By tapping millions of small donations through social networking sites, he revolutionized election fundraising and seemed to open up new horizons for democracy and civic engagement.	他通过社交网站筹集到数百万小额献金，创造了竞选筹资新革命，也似乎开启了民主和公民参与的新纪元。


But not everyone was convinced.	但并非所有人都这样认为。


A wave of legislation – criminalizing various types of Internet use, such as music sharing, and allowing greater government surveillance – appeared to be turning back the liberal tide.	一系列立法——将共享音乐等多种互联网使用行为入罪以及允许更大程度的政府监控——似乎在逆自由潮流而动。


In Brazil, too, the authorities acquired greater control over the Internet, as the country moved to the forefront of the international fight against cybercrime.	巴西也是如此，随着国家迈向针对网络犯罪的国际斗争前沿，当局也获得了对互联网的更大的控制权。


The situation started to change in 2009, after Brazil’s then-president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, participated in an Internet freedom event, and vowed afterwards to block any legislation restricting online freedoms.	局面在2009年开始了转变，巴西时任总统卢拉参与了一次关于互联网自由的活动，随后宣布不会接受任何妨碍在线自由的立法。


He also pledged to submit the bill that resulted in the newly adopted law.	他还承诺提交刚刚被批准为新法律的法案。


Interestingly, the bill was not drafted by the usual cast of bureaucrats.	有趣的是，该法案不是由常规法律起草官僚起草的。


Instead, the process was opened up to the public, with ordinary citizens allowed to contribute via a government blog.	整个过程完全向公众开放，普通公民可以通过一个政府博客贡献自己的力量。


Advocates of free software mixed it up with law enforcers and lobbyists from the likes of Google and Yahoo, in a pioneering example of “wiki-democracy.”	自由软件支持者将它与执法者和； 来自谷歌和雅虎等的游说者联合起来，树立了一个“维基民主”（wiki-democracy）的榜样。


In 2011, after two years of debate and discussion, a draft bill was sent to Congress.	2011年，在经历了两年的争论和讨论后，立法草案被递交到国会。


Opposition was fierce.	反对声非常强烈。


Lobbyists sought to water down the proposed legislation, with telecommunications companies particularly opposed to its net-neutrality provisions.	游说者事故扼杀立法草案，通讯公司尤其反对网络中立条款。


Nevertheless, the coalition of forces backing the bill – civil-society groups supported by a 350,000-strong petition organized by legendary Brazilian musician and former Minister of Culture Gilberto Gil – overcame traditional political interests.	尽管如此，支持法案的联合力量——巴西传奇音乐家、前文化部长基尔（Gilberto Gil）组织了350,000人的请愿，受到各大公民团体的支持——克服了传统政治利益。


In the process, they seem to have ushered in a new model of lawmaking.	在此过程中，他们甚至带来了新的立法模式。


Elsewhere in the world, however, developments have moved in a different direction.	但是，在世界其他地区，发展方向正好相反。


Obama’s electoral afterglow dimmed.	奥巴马的当选余晖迅速地黯淡了。


The Internet-inspired uprisings in Iran and then in much of the Arab world were brutally crushed.	互联网推动的伊朗起义以及随后阿拉伯世界大部的起义被残酷地镇压了。


New revelations about government surveillance, together with Heartbleed-type security scares, continue to test the world’s faith in online freedom.	新披露的政府监控丑闻，以及“心脏失血”式的安全恐慌继续考验着世界对互联网自由的信奉。


Yet, despite the fears – and the dangers inherent in a free Internet – the world must not give up exploring the transformative potential of cyberspace.	但是，尽管忧虑重重——并且自由互联网本身也孕育着危险——但世界决不能放弃利用网络空间的转型潜力。


Those who are losing their resolve need to only look south, where Brazil is leading the way.	感到决心渐失的人可以向南看，看看巴西的榜样。


People Power in the Caucasus	高加索的人民力量


For the past month, women in Georgia who were displaced from Abkhazia during the 1993 conflict have witnessed history moving backwards; everything they lived through 15 years ago is repeating itself.	过去的一个月中，在1993年的冲突中从阿布哈兹被迫迁移来格鲁吉亚的妇女们目睹了历史的倒退； 她们15年前所经历的一切，都正在重演。


These women are now hosting a new flood of displaced civilians from Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s aggression in those regions, as well as within the Georgian territories that Russian forces have occupied since the invasion.	这些妇女现在正在照顾从在俄罗斯入侵阿布哈兹和南奥塞梯后从那些地区新迁移来此的大量民众，而且，自入侵发生后，俄罗斯也占领了格鲁吉亚疆域内的一些地区。


In Tbilisi alone, there are more than 500 camps for internally displaced people, many of them women and children living with shortages of food and medical supplies.	光是第比利斯一地，就有500多个营地安置国内的迁置难民，其中很多是缺少食品和医药供应的妇女和儿童。


Georgians today hardly feel supportive of their president, Mikheil Saakashvili, who, in a foolish attempt to regain control over South Ossetia, provoked Russia to drop its peacekeeping mission in the region and turn its full military might to pushing Georgian troops out of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and then to occupying much of Georgia.	格鲁吉亚人如今很难感受到他们的总统米哈伊尔萨卡什维利的支持，他曾傻乎乎地试图重新掌握对南奥塞梯的控制，这一行动激怒了俄罗斯把维和部队开进了该地区，并全力发动其军事力量把格鲁吉亚军队赶出南奥塞梯和阿布哈兹，然后又占领了格鲁吉亚的一大部分地区。


The Russians bombed numerous strategic and civilian targets in Georgia, destroying infrastructure and producing growing shortages of food, fuel, and medicine.	俄罗斯军队轰炸了格鲁吉亚无数的战略和民用目标，摧毁了基础设施，造成了食品、汽油和药品越来越严重的短缺。


People are in despair; they are angry at Russia for its aggression and at their own government for provoking this uneven conflict.	人们陷入了绝望； 他们对俄罗斯的入侵和他们的政府挑起的这场力量不对称的冲突感到愤怒。


People of different nationalities and ethnicities have been living in this region side by side for centuries, sharing customs, traditions, bread and wine, and mutual respect for each another’s cultures and languages.	数世纪来，不同国籍和民族的人们在此地区共同生活，共享传统习俗和面包美酒，也彼此尊重各自的文化和语言。


But, going back to the Russian, British, and Ottoman Empires that once battled here, they have been continually exploited by politicians and generals.	但是，回顾俄国、英国和奥斯曼帝国在此地的战争历史，当地的人民其实是一直被政客和军人所剥削利用的。


Women and children suffer the most in times of conflict.	当冲突发生的时，妇女和儿童所受的痛苦是最深的。


Add to this centuries-old patriarchal traditions, 15-year-old post-war traumas, a 20-year economic crisis, and current Russian aggression, and you may begin to grasp what women in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Georgia are enduring these days.	想想他们数世纪的族长传统、15年的战后创伤、20年的经济危机和目前的俄罗斯入侵，把这些加在一起，我们就会体会到南奥塞梯、阿布哈兹和格鲁吉亚的妇女这些日子所受的煎熬。


Besides the general devastation that modern warfare brings, impoverished and angry Russian soldiers were wreaking havoc on civilians by stealing belongings left behind and raping women.	除了现代战争所带来的创伤，贫穷和愤怒的俄罗斯士兵对平民进行了大肆蹂躏，他们偷窃平民留下的财物，他们强奸妇女。


In addition, lawlessness was enticing bandits to cross the border and vandalize and rob properties left by fleeing refugees.	更有甚者，无政府状态诱惑了强盗们越过边界来抢劫逃走的难民留下的财产。


News reports and “analysis” by state-controlled channels in both Russia and Georgia that promote negative images of “the enemy” serve only to widen the gap between ethnic groups.	由俄罗斯和格鲁吉亚国家控制的电视台频道的新闻报道和“分析”，宣传“敌方”的负面形象，这更加重了各民族间的矛盾。


Over the past month, concerned citizens in both Russia and Georgia have started to make attempts to build alliances and reach out to each other outside of the government-controlled media and structures.	在过去一个多月中，俄罗斯和格鲁吉亚的有关人士已开始尝试建立联盟并在政府控制的媒体和框架之外接触对方。


There have been action calls and statements circulated on the Web calling on the people of the region to unite and not allow governments to build bigger walls between them.	呼吁采取行动的呼声和声明出现在互联网上，呼吁该地区人民的团结起来，不要容忍他们的政府在人民之间竖起更高的壁垒。


Despite government propaganda, the region’s people must remember that Russians are not superior to Georgians, Georgians to Ossetians or Abkhazians, and so on.	尽管有政府的宣传鼓动，该地区的人民必须记住，俄罗斯人并不比格鲁吉亚人优越，格鲁吉亚人也不比奥塞梯人或阿布哈兹人优越，其它情况也一样。


We need to stop these territorial battles based on national pride and desire to control and rule.	我们必须制止这种基于民族自豪感和控制欲以及统治欲之上的领土战争。


Saakashvili must be pressured to abandon his effort to wield full control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia.	必须对萨卡什维利施加压力，使其放弃试图完全控制权阿布哈兹和南奥塞梯的行为。


At the same time, the Russian government must be pressured to pull out of the Caucasus and let people there decide their future for themselves.	同时，也必须向俄罗斯政府施加压力，使其撤出高加索地区并让人民自己决定自己的未来。


Now is the time for Georgian, Russian, Abkazian, and Ossetian civilians who are bearing the brunt of the conflict to come together to stop imperial chess games that kill thousands of people and leave thousands more displaced and emotionally wounded.	为了阻止这种使成千上万的人丧失生命并使更多的人流离失所和感情受伤的帝国主义战争游戏，现在该是在冲突中受损最大的格鲁吉亚、俄罗斯、阿布哈兹和奥塞梯人民团结起来的时候了。


It is time to help civil society in this area build a world where peace, not warfare, is the rule.	现在也该是来帮助该地区的公民社会建立一个以和平而非战争来统治的世界的时候了。


Women’s rights activists in the region should not fall into a brainwashing trap of nationalism and territorial disputes, becoming another tool in the hands of politicians.	该地区女权活动家们决不能陷入打着民族主义和领土争端招牌的陷阱而被洗脑，并沦为政治家手中的又一个的工具。


They should demonstrate to their governments that they will not succumb to divisive ideology.	她们应该让她们的政府明白，她们不会屈从于分裂主义的意识形态。


Peril or Promise in North Korea?	朝鲜：危机还是希望？


MADRID – Two days after Kim Jong-il, North Korea’s leader, died in a train in his country, South Korean authorities still knew nothing about it.	马德里——在朝鲜领导人金正日逝世于国内一列火车上之后两天，韩国当局还对此一无所知。


Meanwhile, American officials seemed at a loss, with the State Department at first merely acknowledging that press reports had mentioned his death.	与此同时，美国官员似乎也好不到哪里去，国务院一开始仅仅承认是媒体首先报道了他的死讯。


The South Korean and US intelligence services’ inability to pick up any sign of what had happened attests to the North Korean regime’s opaque character, but also to their own deficiencies.	韩国和美国情报机构没能获得任何消息固然体现了朝鲜体制的不透明，但同时也表明它们自身的无能。


American planes and satellites watch North Korea day and night, and the most sensitive intelligence-gathering equipment covers the frontier between the two Koreas.	美国飞机和卫星日夜监视着朝鲜，朝韩边界则属于最先进的情报收集设备的覆盖范围。


Nonetheless, we know very little of that country, because all vital information is restricted to a small group of leaders obsessed with secrecy.	尽管如此，我们依然对朝鲜所知甚少，因为所有重要信息都掌握在有着保密癖的一小撮领导人手里。


The leadership change is occurring at the worst possible time.	朝鲜领导权的更迭发生在最不应该发生的时刻。


It is known that Chinese leaders had hoped that Kim Jong-il would survive long enough to consolidate support among the country’s various factions for the succession of his son, Kim Jong-un.	众所周知，中国领导人希望金正日活得更长一些，以便理顺国内派系，为其子金正恩的接班赢得足够支持。


All of the symbolic attributes of power have been transferred to Kim Jong-un – reflected in his official position in the funeral ceremonies, his presidency of the Military Commission, and his assumption of the ruling party’s highest rank – with remarkable speed.	所有权力标志都快速地传给了金正恩——这体现在金正恩在葬礼仪式上出现的正式位置、他的出任军事委员会主席一职，以及他的即将出任执政党最高领导人一职。


But such trappings will not make the transition process any easier for a young man of less than 30 in a society where veteran military chiefs retain so much power.	但是，在朝鲜，老资格军方将领手中握有无上权力，因此仪式的冠冕堂皇并表明不到30岁的金正恩可以顺利地接班。


The economic situation, which is still very precarious, with many people living close to starvation, constitutes another key challenge.	朝鲜的经济状况仍然危险，大量人口濒临饿死，这是另一大主要挑战。


Two examples suffice to illustrate the impact: the price of rice has tripled while consumption of electricity is down by two-thirds from two decades ago.	两个例子可以充分说明其影响：20年来，大米价格涨了3倍，电力消费下降了三分之二。


My personal memories of North Korea, now almost ten years old, are of a poor and depressed country.	我个人的朝鲜记忆已经是10年前的往事了，我记得这是个贫穷而压抑的国家。


Pyongyang, the capital, was dark and deserted, illuminated by the cavalcade taking us from the official housing to the opera house, only to return to darkness behind us.	首都平壤黑暗而荒芜，仪仗队把我们从官方下榻地点接往剧院，我们途径的地方有灯光照明，而我们的背后则是一片漆黑。


Kim Jong-il was greeted with the same fervor when he entered the opera house that today marks public mourning of his death.	金正日走进剧院时掌声雷动，正如今日朝鲜万人空巷悼念他的逝世。


My trip took place in April 2002, a somewhat optimistic time.	我是2002年4月去的朝鲜，当时，朝鲜的情况还相对比较乐观。


The European Union had joined an agreement initiated by the two Koreas and the US within the Korean Energy Development Organization program, the objective being to persuade North Korea to freeze and later dismantle its nuclear program.	欧盟参与了由朝韩双方和美国发起的朝鲜能源发展组织（Korean Energy Development Organization）计划，该计划的目标是说服朝鲜冻结其核计划并在日后拆除核弹。


In exchange, two light-water nuclear reactors would be built to generate electric energy, and 500,000 metric tons of oil would be supplied annually until the first reactor began operating.	作为交换，朝鲜将获得两座用于发电的轻水核反应堆，外加每年50万吨原油供应，直到第一座反应堆开始运转发电为止。


In turn, the EU initiated an extensive humanitarian aid project.	欧盟还发起了扩大的人道主义援助计划。


The talks with Kim Jong-il and his collaborators seemed promising.	与金正日集团的谈判似乎颇为鼓舞人心。


Unfortunately, the agreement did not last long.	不幸的是，协定并没有维持太长时间。


In 2003, North Korea abandoned the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.	2003年，朝鲜废除了核不扩散条约。


From that moment, all optimism was lost, until contacts were subsequently reinitiated in a complex six-party format (China, Russia, the US, Japan, and the two Koreas) that continued, with ups and downs, until the end of 2007.	从此，所有的乐观都随之烟消云散，直到后来错综复杂的六方会谈（中国、俄罗斯、美国、日本、朝鲜、韩国）开始才有所改变。


Since the maritime incidents of 2009 and 2010, in which North Korean forces attacked South Korean assets, there has been virtually no contact at all between the two sides.	六方会谈几经起伏，于2007年结束。 自2009年和2010年的海上事故（朝鲜军队袭击韩国设施），朝韩双方便再未有过任何联系。


Given North Korea’s behavior over the last decade, the sudden change of leadership increases the threat of unexpected incidents.	从朝鲜在过去10年的表现看，领导层的猛然更迭将增加意外事件的威胁。


In order to limit the risk, it is essential to keep relations with China as transparent as possible.	为了限制这一风险，最重要的是尽可能地与中国保持透明关系。


It is China that has the most direct contact with North Korea, and that could best catalyze resumption of the six-party talks.	中国与朝鲜的直接联系最为密切，而这可以成为重启六方会谈的最佳催化剂。


China recognizes that North Korea cannot continue in its present form, and would like to see its leaders transform the economy without undertaking substantial political change.	中国认为，朝鲜的现状是无法维持的，其领导层可能在没有重大政治变化的情况下开始经济转型。


Is that possible?	这可能发生吗？


Could it be done quickly enough to boost other regional players’ confidence that the country’s evolution will be predictable?	转型的节奏是否可以足够快到让该地区的其他国家有信心朝鲜的革命将是可预测的？


For China, problems are judged according to the country’s own history and from the standpoint of domestic policy – all the more so the closer the problem is to its borders.	中国对朝鲜问题的判断取决于其自身的历史和国内政策立场——问题越接近于其自身边界越是如此。


For the West, especially the US, every problem should have a solution within a finite period of time.	至于西方（特别是美国），所有问题都应该有一个存在明确时间限制的解决方案。


While the US breaks down problems and tries to find solutions for each part, China considers political problems unhurriedly, as an extended process that might have no resolution.	美国喜欢将问题分解，为各个部分逐一找出解法，而中国喜欢慢条斯理地解决政治问题，把过程拉长，最后可能不了了之。


Beyond the six-party talks, it is necessary to create a framework from which a cooperative dialogue between the US and China might emerge.	除了六方会谈之外，应该建立一个有助于中美展开合作对话的框架。


In the case of Korea – as Christopher Hill, one of the most effective US negotiators on these matters, remembers – the US should make it clear that no possible solution for the divided peninsula would mean a strategic loss for China.	就朝鲜问题而言，美国在这方面最精干的谈判者克里斯托弗·希尔（Christopher Hill）指出，美国应该澄清一点：解决朝鲜半岛分裂状态的任何方案都不会给中国造成战略损失。


After the armistice that ended the Korean War in 1953, the 38th parallel was established as the limit for US forces’ presence; the importance of that war for China should not be forgotten.	自1953年朝鲜战争休战协定签署以来，三八线便一直是美军行动的界线； 朝鲜战争对中国的重要性决不能忘记。


This approach could be one way to stabilize the region during this period of heightened uncertainty.	这一办法将是在当前充满不确定性的阶段维护地区稳定的办法。


There might be others.	也许还有别的办法。


The ongoing opening in Myanmar (Burma) shows that potentially significant political change does not need to be accompanied by regional instability.	缅甸的逐渐开放表明，重大政治变革并不一定伴随着地区不稳定。


In the case of North Korea, where nuclear arms are in play, it cannot afford to be.	但对于拥有核武器的朝鲜，我们玩不起实验。


The Perils of Fed Gradualism	美联储渐进主义的危险


NEW HAVEN – By now, it’s an all-too-familiar drill.	纽黑文—现在，大家已经见怪不怪了。


After an extended period of extraordinary monetary accommodation, the US Federal Reserve has begun the long march back to normalization.	在经历了长期的反常货币宽松后，美联储终于开始了漫长的回归正常化之旅。


It has now taken the first step toward returning its benchmark policy interest rate – the federal funds rate – to a level that imparts neither stimulus nor restraint to the US economy.	现在，它已经迈出了使其基准政策利率——联邦基金利率——回到既不会带来刺激，又不会制约美国经济的水平的第一步。


A majority of financial market participants applaud this strategy.	大部分金融市场参与者都为这一策略欢呼雀跃。


In fact, it is a dangerous mistake.	事实上，这是个危险的错误。


The Fed is borrowing a page from the script of its last normalization campaign – the incremental rate hikes of 2004-2006 that followed the extraordinary accommodation of 2001-2003.	美联储在重复其上一次正常化运动的剧本——2001—2003年反常宽松期之后的2004—2006年渐进式升息。


Just as that earlier gradualism set the stage for a devastating financial crisis and a horrific recession in 2008-2009, there is mounting risk of yet another accident on what promises to be an even longer road to normalization.	前一次渐进主义为2008—2009年的灾难性金融危机和可怕衰退奠定了条件，而现在，再次发生可能导致更加漫长的正常化过程的事故的风险正在积累。


The problem arises because the Fed, like other major central banks, has now become a creature of financial markets rather than a steward of the real economy.	问题产生的原因是美联储和其他主要央行一样，现在已经成为金融市场的创造物，而非实体经济的捍卫者。


This transformation has been under way since the late 1980s, when monetary discipline broke the back of inflation and the Fed was faced with new challenges.	这一转变从20世纪80年代末开始，当时，货币纪律解决了通胀难题，美联储面临着新的挑战。


The challenges of the post-inflation era came to a head during Alan Greenspan’s 18-and-a-half-year tenure as Fed Chair.	后通胀时代的挑战在艾伦·格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）就任美联储主席的十八年半中达到顶峰。


The stock-market crash of October 19, 1987 – occurring only 69 days after Greenspan had been sworn in – provided a hint of what was to come.	1987年10月19日的股市崩盘——此时格林斯潘上任不过69天——是一次预演。


In response to a one-day 23% plunge in US equity prices, the Fed moved aggressively to support the brokerage system and purchase government securities.	为了应对美国股市一日暴跌23%的局面，美联储积极行动起来，支持经纪系统并买入政府政权。


In retrospect, this was the template for what became known as the “Greenspan put” – massive Fed liquidity injections aimed at stemming financial-market disruptions in the aftermath of a crisis.	事后来看，这便是众所周知的“格林斯潘看跌期权”的原型。 格林斯潘看跌期权是指美联储为了阻止危机之后发生金融市场混乱而进行大规模流动性注入。


As the markets were battered repeatedly in the years to follow – from the savings-and-loan crisis (late 1980s) and the Gulf War (1990-1991) to the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1998) and terrorist attacks (September 11, 2001) – the Greenspan put became an essential element of the Fed’s market-driven tactics.	随后十几年中，市场反复遭遇重创——如储贷银行危机（80年代末）、海湾战争（1990—1991年）、亚洲金融危机（1997—1998年）、恐怖袭击（2001年9月11日）——格林斯潘期权也成为美联储随市场而动策略的关键要素。


This approach took on added significance in the late 1990s, when Greenspan became enamored of the so-called wealth effects that could be extracted from surging equity markets.	20世纪90年代末，格林斯潘开始倾心于股市上涨可能带来的所谓的财富效应，这一方针的影响力更大了。


In an era of weak income generation and seemingly chronic current-account deficits, there was pressure to uncover new sources of economic growth.	在收入创造无力、经常项目长期赤字的时代，存在发掘新经济增长源的压力。


But when the sharp run-up in equity prices turned into a bubble that subsequently burst with a vengeance in 2000, the Fed moved aggressively to avoid a Japan-like outcome – a prolonged period of asset deflation that might trigger a lasting balance-sheet recession.	但当股票狂飙突进转变为泡沫并随后在2000年轰然破灭，美联储大力避免日本式的结果——可能导致持久资产负债表衰退的漫长的资产通缩。


At that point, the die was cast.	事已至此，大局已定。


No longer was the Fed responding just to idiosyncratic crises and the market disruptions they spawned.	美联储不再只对特殊的危机及其所造成的市场破坏起反应。


It had also given asset markets a role as an important source of economic growth.	它还让资产市场成为重要的经济增长源。


The asset-dependent economy quickly assumed a position of commensurate prominence in framing the monetary-policy debate.	依赖资产的经济很快就成为货币政策争论的焦点。


The Fed had, in effect, become beholden to the monster it had created.	事实上，美联储被它自己所创造出来的怪兽缠住了。


The corollary was that it had also become steadfast in protecting the financial-market-based underpinnings of the US economy.	结果是它又必须坚定不移地保护美国经济的以金融市场为基础的地基。


Largely for that reason, and fearful of “Japan Syndrome” in the aftermath of the collapse of the US equity bubble, the Fed remained overly accommodative during the 2003-2006 period.	大部分是出于这一原因，再加上害怕美国股市泡沫破灭后出现“日本综合症”，美联储在2003—2006年一直保持过度宽松。


The federal funds rate was held at a 46-year low of 1% through June 2004, before being raised 17 times in small increments of 25 basis points per move over the two-year period from mid-2004 to mid-2006.	联邦基金利率在2004年6月之前一直保持46年来的低点1%，然后在两年的时间里（2004年年中到2006年年中）以每次提高25个基点的节奏逐步升息17次。


Yet it was precisely during this period of gradual normalization and prolonged accommodation that unbridled risk-taking sowed the seeds of the Great Crisis that was soon to come.	但正是在这段逐步正常化和长期宽松时期，无节制的冒险种下了不久后爆发的大危机的种子。


Over time, the Fed’s dilemma has become increasingly intractable.	随着时间的推移，美联储的难题越来越难以对付。


The crisis and recession of 2008-2009 was far worse than its predecessors, and the aftershocks were far more wrenching.	2008—2009年的危机和衰退比此前几次严重得多，余波也更加令人痛苦。


Yet, because the US central bank had repeatedly upped the ante in providing support to the Asset Economy, taking its policy rate to zero, it had run out of traditional ammunition.	但是，美联储反复下注与支持资产经济（Asset Economy），将其政策利率保持在零水平，这导致它用尽了传统工具。


And so the Fed, under Ben Bernanke’s leadership, turned to the liquidity injections of quantitative easing, making it even more of a creature of financial markets.	因此，在本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke）的领导下，美联储转向了通过量化宽松注入流动性，这意味着它彻底沦为金融市场的产物。


With the interest-rate transmission mechanism of monetary policy no longer operative at the zero bound, asset markets became more essential than ever in supporting the economy.	货币政策的利率传导机制在零利率区间不再具有操作性，于是资产市场就成为比以往任何时候都更加重要的支持经济的工具。


Exceptionally low inflation was the icing on the cake – providing the inflation-targeting Fed with plenty of leeway to experiment with unconventional policies while avoiding adverse interest-rate consequences in the inflation-sensitive bond market.	极低的通胀锦上添花——让盯住通胀目标的美联储有充足的空间尝试非常规政策而不会给通胀敏感的债券市场带来负面利率后果。


Today’s Fed inherits the deeply entrenched moral hazard of the Asset Economy.	今天的美联储继承了资产经济的根深蒂固的道德风险。


In carefully crafted, highly conditional language, it is signaling much greater gradualism relative to its normalization strategy of a decade ago.	美联储通过小心组织、充满限定的用词表明，其渐进性将远远过于十年前的正常化策略。


The debate in the markets is whether there will be two or three rate hikes of 25 basis points per year – suggesting that it could take as long as four years to return the federal funds rate to a 3% norm.	市场的争论是每年是否会有两三次25个基点的升息——这意味着联邦基金利率需要四年时间才会回到3%的正常值。


But, as the experience of 2004-2007 revealed, the excess liquidity spawned by gradual normalization leaves financial markets predisposed to excesses and accidents.	但是，2004—2007年的经验表明，渐进式正常化所带来的过度流动性导致金融市场极易出现过剩和事故。


With prospects for a much longer normalization, those risks are all the more worrisome.	在显著更长的正常化过程预期下，这些风险令人无比担忧。


Early warning signs of troubles in high-yield markets, emerging-market debt, and eurozone interest-rate derivatives markets are particularly worrisome in this regard.	从这个角度，高收益市场、新兴市场债务和欧元区利率衍生品市场的早期麻烦信号尤其令人担忧。


The longer the Fed remains trapped in this mindset, the tougher its dilemma becomes – and the greater the systemic risks in financial markets and the asset-dependent US economy.	美联储陷入这一思维越久，它所面临的两难就越难——金融市场和依赖资产的美国经济的系统风险也更大。


It will take a fiercely independent central bank to wean the real economy from the markets.	只有非常独立的央行才能让实体经济与市场脱离。


A Fed caught up in the political economy of the growth debate is incapable of performing that function.	陷入增长争论的政治经济学的美联储无法承担这一功能。


Only by shortening the normalization timeline can the Fed hope to reduce the build-up of systemic risks.	只有缩短正常化时间，美联储才有希望减少系统风险的累积。


The sooner the Fed takes on the markets, the less likely the markets will be to take on the economy.	美联储越早对市场动手，市场对经济的影响就越小。


Yes, a steeper normalization path would produce an outcry.	诚然，陡峭的正常化路径会导致抗议。


But that would be far preferable to another devastating crisis.	但这远比又一场灾难性危机好得多。


Most child refugees are likely to spend more than a decade out of their own countries, so their plight cannot be considered temporary.	多数难民儿童��留国外的时间可能长达十年以上，因此不能将他们的困境归结为暂时。


Pervez Musharraf’s Long Goodbye	佩尔韦兹·穆沙拉夫的漫长告别


ISLAMABAD – Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan stands virtually alone today while facing the most serious challenge to his presidency: possible impeachment by the new democratically-elected government.	伊斯兰堡－现在，巴基斯坦的佩尔韦兹·穆沙拉夫在面对对其总统职位最严重的挑战——新的经过民主选举出来的政府可能对其进行的弹劾——的时候，他事实上是孤零零的。


The potential charges are serious: conspiring to destabilize the government that was elected last February, unlawfully removing the country’s top judges in November 2007, and failing to provide adequate security to Benazir Bhutto before her assassination last December.	可能的指控都很严重：阴谋动摇去年二月份选举的新政府，在2007年11月非法解除国家首席大法官的职务，以及去年12月在贝·布托遇刺之前没有为她提供足够的安全保护。


Allying himself with the Bush administration has increased his unpopularity, especially following missile attacks by the United States in Pakistan’s tribal areas.	特别是在美国对巴基斯坦的部族地区进行导弹袭击以后，穆沙拉夫与布什政府的结盟也加剧了他的不受欢迎程度。


Despite earlier differences on how to deal with Musharraf, Pakistan’s leading political parties are now united against him.	尽管以前巴基斯坦的主要政党在怎样对付穆沙拉夫上有存在分歧，但是，现在它们已经团结起来反对他了。


Feuding between the Pakistan People’s Party, led by Benazir’s widower, Asif Ali Zardari, and the Pakistan Muslim League (N), led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, had given Musharraf a chance to regain some standing after his allies were defeated in the February elections.	由已故的贝·布托的丈夫阿斯夫－阿里·扎尔达里领导的巴基斯坦人民党以及由前总理谢里夫领导的巴基斯坦穆斯林联盟(谢里夫派)之间的长期不和，已经给予穆沙拉夫在其同盟者在二月份的选举失败后重新获得一些名望的机会。


American reluctance to abandon Musharraf – together with prolonged electricity shortages, which made the new government appear incompetent – also raised his hopes.	美国不愿意抛弃穆沙拉夫——和长期的电力短缺一起，而电力短缺使新政府看起来很无能——也增加了他的希望。


Musharraf may be counting on the army, his primary constituency, to bail him out of this crisis.	穆沙拉夫可能会指望军队——他最主要的支持者——使他摆脱危机。


Though such support remains a possibility, it is unlikely that the army leadership will extend itself on his behalf.	虽然这样的支持存在可能性，但是，军队领导人不大可能为了他将此扩大。


Though a protégé of Musharraf, the army’s chief of staff, General Ashfaq Kayani, is a professional soldier for whom the army’s institutional interests are more important than the political interests of his former army boss.	虽然是穆沙拉夫的门徒，但是，军队的三军总司令阿西法克·卡亚尼（Ashfaq Kayani）将军是一个职业军人，对他来说，军队制度上的利益比其前任军队上司的政治利益更加重要。


Kayani has repeatedly declared that the army will not interfere in political affairs, and that the parliament and constitution are supreme.	卡亚尼已经再三声明军队不会干预政治事务，议会和宪法至高无上。


Even if the army is tempted to step in on Musharraf’s behalf, it has been chastened by political developments during the past year.	即使军队被诱使为了穆沙拉夫进行介入，它也已经被去年的政治发展驯服了不少。


The entire legal community arose to demand restoration of the country’s judges and reinforcement of the rule of law. The public’s demand for free elections and the resulting creation of a democratic government have forced the military to accept the public will.	整个法律界奋起要求恢复这个国家法官的职位并加强法治，公众要求自由选举以及由此导致的民主政府的建立，已经迫使军队接受了公众意志。


The army has also paid a heavy price for Musharraf’s approach to the war on terror.	军队也为穆沙拉夫参与反恐战争付出了沉重的代价。


Suicide bombers have struck repeatedly at military installations and personnel around the army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi.	自杀炸弹已经多次袭击位于拉瓦尔品第军队总部周围的军事设施和人员。


An increase in deadly attacks on army convoys in the Pakistan-Afghanistan tribal areas has also pushed the army away from Musharraf.	对在巴基斯坦阿富汗部族地区的军队卫队致命袭击的不断增多，也促使军队远离穆沙拉夫。


Though the army has reaped a financial windfall from US military aid, and has targeted many foreign militants allied with al-Qaeda in the region, its performance against Pakistani militants has been mixed at best.	虽然军队已经从美国的军事援助中发了一笔横财，并在该地区锁定了许多和基地组织结盟的外国武装分子，但是，它反对巴基斯坦武装分子的表现充其量只能算凑合。


Consequently, the prestige of the Taliban and other militant groups operating in the area has grown.	因此，塔利班以及其他在该地区活动的武装团体的声望上升了。