With education squarely in the spotlight, new trends are gaining momentum, many of them merging with “innovative finance” – a concept much beloved by development policymakers and practitioners in difficult economic times.	除了教育的大受关注，还有其他新趋势也显得动力十足，其中许多来自“创新金融”——被发展决策者和实践者在经济困难时期所珍爱的概念。


In particular, the emergence of so-called loan buy-downs could encourage financing for education from reluctant donor countries.	所谓的贷款补贴（loan buy-down）能够刺激不太情愿的出资国威教育提供融资。


A loan buy-down is a transaction in which a third party pays down part of a loan by softening its terms or reducing the principal outstanding, thereby releasing the borrowing country from all or some of its future repayment obligations.	贷款补贴是一种金融交易，由第三方出面以放松贷款要求���降低待还本金的方式替借款人偿还一部分贷款，从而减轻甚至免除借款国的未来还款义务。


Because the buy-down is triggered by achievement of a pre-defined target, such transactions promote results-based financing, bringing about quantifiable reforms that otherwise might not have been realized.	补贴根据事先确定的目标触发，因此这类交易能够促进基于结果的融资，带来可观的原本难以实现的改革。


Appropriately defined triggers thus address one of the main criticisms of international aid.	因此，恰当定义的触发条件便解决了国际援助的一个主要的受人诟病之处。


They also encourage borrowers to invest in projects with long-run returns that may not be politically attractive, such as teacher training.	它们还鼓励借款人投资于或许不具有政治吸引力但能带来长期回报的项目，比如教师培训项目。


Unfortunately, the education sector still lags behind others in harnessing the potential of innovative development finance – and loan buy-downs are no exception.	不幸的是，教育部门在利用创新发展金融方面仍落后于其他部门，在补贴贷款方面也是如此。


As a result, the few examples of buy-downs so far have mainly been for health initiatives.	结果，新兴的贷款补贴主要发生在医疗领域。


The Partnership for Polio Eradication Project in Nigeria and Pakistan – launched in 2003 by the World Bank, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Rotary International, and the United Nations Foundation – is a prime example of how a buy-down program can concentrate global efforts on a single issue and yield benefits for all parties.	2003年，世界银行、比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会（Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation）、扶轮国际（Rotary International）和联合国基金会一起发布了尼日利亚和巴基斯坦消灭脊髓灰质炎合作计划（Partnership for Polio Eradication Project），这是一个贷款补贴计划能够在单一问题上集中全球力量并产生令各方都获益的结果的显例。


The Bank provided upfront long-term zero-interest loans for the purchase of oral polio vaccines in Nigeria and Pakistan, while the other three organizations covered all service and commitment charges associated with the loans.	世界银行为尼日利亚和巴基斯坦提供前端长期零息贷款用于采购口服脊髓灰质炎疫苗，而其他三个组织负责与贷款有关的维持和偿还费用。


At the end of the project – that is, when an independent performance audit determines that the vaccines arrived on time for the campaign, and immunization coverage has reached at least 80% – the partnership will buy down the Bank’s loans.	在该计划结束时——即当独立作业的审计机构认定疫苗已经及时抵达并且免疫覆盖率至少达到了80%时——该合作计划将偿还世界银行贷款。


The World Bank will then cancel the credit and release the recipients from any future liability.	世界银行将因此取消这笔信用，解除借款人的所有未来义务。


Loan buy-downs could mitigate dwindling flows of official development assistance (ODA) for education in low-income countries, which declined by 10% from 2010 to 2011 – and by 5% for basic education.	贷款补贴能够抵消低收入国家教育部门正式发展援助（ODA）日益减少的影响。 2010—2011年间，此项ODA减少了10%，其中基础教育ODA减少了5%。


This reflects lower spending by seven of the 11 major bilateral donors.	这是因为11个主要双边出资国中有七个减少了支出。


The Netherlands led the way, slashing its aid to basic education by 36%, outpacing even the 31% cut by crisis-ridden Spain.	其中位居首位的是荷兰，其基础教育援助削减了36%，甚至比饱受危机困扰的西班牙的削减幅度（31%）还要大。


Japan, too, reduced its aid by 30%, while France and Canada cut their assistance by 25% and 21%, respectively.	日本也将援助减少了30%，法国和加拿大分别削减了25%和21%。


Elsewhere, the United States lowered its budget by 13%, and Norway by 4%.	在其他国家中，美国的预算降低了13%，挪威降低了4%。


Given that the Netherlands has long been a key supporter of basic education, its decision to phase out its education programs was particularly notable.	荷兰长期以来一直是基础教育的重要支持者，因此它的决定退出教育支持计划尤其令人关注。


But, beyond aid reductions, donors may also make it more difficult for borrowing countries to repay the aid funds they owe (this is not limited to loans for education).	但是，除了削减援助之外，出资国还让借款国偿还所欠资金（不限于教育贷款）的难度增加了。


And some donors – such as France, Germany, and the European Investment Bank – are lobbying the OECD Development Assistance Committee to count unsubsidized loans as official development assistance to enable them to meet their ODA targets.	一些出资人——如法国、德国和欧洲投资银行——正在游说经合组织发展援助委员会将无补贴贷款列为ODA，以使它们实现它们的ODA目标。


This reverses the trend over the last few decades toward grant-based financing, especially for basic education.	这逆转了过去几十年来基于赠与的融资，基础教育方面尤其如此。


But education, a crucial public good, should not be left behind in the pursuit of non-grant-based aid.	但是，作为至关重要的公共品，教育不应该因为追求非基于赠与的援助而受到忽略。


Loan buy-downs can help keep the education sector “competitive,” and could prove to be a mechanism to leverage extra resources for education, for which capital-strapped countries may not be willing to borrow otherwise.	贷款补贴能帮助交易部门保持“竞争力”，也能成为撬动额外资源流入教育的杠杆，若无贷款补贴，资本紧缺国家或许不愿意将资源贷给教育。


Despite the potential benefits, the many unanswered questions about buy-downs limit their application.	尽管潜在益处无穷，但许多关于补贴的答案未明的问题限制了它们的应用。


Which countries would be willing to participate, either as borrowers or lenders?	那些国家愿意参与（不管是作为借款人还是贷款人）？


What kinds of triggers should be specified for mobilizing buy-down funds?	为了动员补贴资金，应该设置那些触发条件？


How would it be decided whether these targets had been met?	如何确定这些目标已经达到？


With such questions in mind, Results for Development Institute has prepared a study for the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), analyzing the buy-down model’s use in other sectors and considering ways to apply it to education.	带着这些问题，发展成果研究所（Results for Development Institute）为全球教育合作计划（Global Partnership for Education，GPE）做了一份研究，分析了贷款补贴模式在其他部门的使用情况，并思考了如何将它用于教育。


The report focuses on which countries have the right combination of basic education needs and borrowing potential.	研究报告集中关注哪些国家具有基础教育需求和借款潜力的合理结合。


Moreover, it examines how the buy-down triggers could catalyze results, as well as the operational issues that might arise.	此外，报告考察了贷款补贴触发条件如何促进结果以及可能由此造成的操作问题。


As a next step, the report proposes a pilot program and consultations with borrowers, lenders, and funders to resolve enduring questions about their application.	接着，报告提出了一个试点计划，建议借款人、贷款人和出资人会商解决补贴贷款的应用问题。


That is a sensible approach.	这是一个明智的方针。


Buy-downs may prove to be the solution needed to ensure adequate and stable assistance to education in developing countries.	贷款补贴能够成为确保发展中国家获得充分、稳定的教育援助的解决办法。


It is time to find out.	是时候把它找出来了。


Populism Without the People	没有人民的民粹主义


PRINCETON – Nicolás Maduro’s narrow victory in Venezuela’s presidential election raises an important question (quite apart from the opposition’s question as to whether Maduro really won): Can populism thrive without a genuinely popular, charismatic leader, or are movements like Chávismo doomed to fade into insignificance once they have lost their quasi-deities?	普林斯顿——（抛开反对派对马杜罗获胜是否真实提出的质疑不谈） ，尼古拉斯·马杜罗以微弱优势在委内瑞拉总统大选中获胜提出了一个重要的疑问：没有真正受欢迎、有魅力的领导者民粹主义究竟还能否发展，抑或像查韦斯主义这样的运动一旦失去被奉若神明的领袖之后注定会逐渐走向没落？


For many observers, populism is unthinkable without a strong, direct bond between an anti-establishment leader and citizens who feel neglected by mainstream political parties.	在许多观察家看来，如果没有反建制领袖和自觉被主流政党所忽视的民众间直接有力的联系，民粹主义根本是无法想象的。


Yet the role of leadership in populism is vastly overestimated.	但人们过高估计了领袖在民粹主义中所起的作用。


Indeed, given populism’s importance as a political phenomenon, that view, along with two others – that populism is somehow a call for direct democracy, and that populists can only protest, but never govern – needs to be challenged.	事实上，因为民粹主义是一种重要的政治现象，上述观点和其他两种观点——即民粹主义在某种程度上是一种对直接民主的呼唤，以及民粹主义者只能抗议，但永远无法执政——都需要有所改变。


Populism, unlike, say, liberalism or Marxism, is not a coherent body of distinct political ideas.	民粹主义不像自由主义或马克思主义，它并不是一套鲜明连贯的政治理念。


But it also cannot be defined simply as any political movement that panders to the masses by promoting simplistic policy proposals.	但也不能简单地将其归结为用简单化的政策建议迎合大众的政治运动。


While populists might be particularly prone to advocating facile solutions, they hardly have a monopoly on that tactic.	虽然民粹主义者或许特别乐于崇尚肤浅的解决方案，但这种策略并非由他们所垄断。


Moreover, impugning populists’ intelligence and seriousness only plays into their hands: See how the arrogant, entrenched elites, they will counter, dismiss the common sense of the people.	此外，责难民粹主义者的智慧和态度只会给他们以可乘之机：看看这些根深蒂固的狂妄的精英，他们怎样对普通民众的常识不屑一顾。


Populism cannot be understood at the level of policies; rather, it is a particular way of imagining politics.	从政策的角度很难理解民粹主义； 相反，民粹主义是一种想象政治的特殊方式。


It pits the innocent, always hard-working people against both a corrupt elite (who do not really work, other than to further their own interests) and those on the very bottom of society (who also do not work and live off others).	它将勤劳无辜的民众与腐败的精英阶层（这些人不真正工作，只关心自身利益）和社会底层民众（这些人同样不工作，依靠别人过活）相互对立。


In the populist imagination, both the very top and the very bottom of society are not really a part of it: they are directly or indirectly supported by outside powers (think of pro-European liberal elites in Central and Eastern Europe); more obviously, they are immigrants or minorities, like the Roma.	在民粹主义者的想象中，社会的最顶层和最底层都不属于他们这个群体：这些人直接或者间接地受到外来势力的支持（比方说中东欧地区亲欧洲的自由派精英）； 他们明显是移民或罗姆人那样的少数族裔。


Typically, in the populist political imagination, elites disproportionately care for  those who, like themselves, do not really belong.	通常在民粹主义者的政治想象中，精英总是过分照顾那些像他们自己一样不属于社会大众的人群。


Europe’s elites are regularly accused of lavishing benefits on ethnic minorities in the name of protecting their rights.	欧洲精英往往被指以权利保护为名在少数族裔者身上浪费福利。


America’s Tea Party populists often imagine an unholy alliance of left-liberal, bi-coastal elites and the African-American underclass (an alliance that in their eyes is embodied in President Barack Obama).	美国茶党的民粹主义者经常想象左翼自由主义、东西海岸精英和非洲裔底层民众之间存在某种邪恶联盟（在他们眼中，巴拉克·奥巴马总统就是上述联盟的代表人物）。


A leader who can represent this purely moral – as opposed to political – image helps to provide a focus for voters.	能够代表这种纯粹道德，而非政治形象的领导人有助于赢得选民的关注。


But it is not crucial.	但这并非最重要的因素。


It mattered that Chávez reassured the masses that “I am a little of all of you.”	查韦斯向民众保证“我身上可以找到你们所有人的影子”的确很有好处。


Yet it could be someone else, or a group; or it could be no one in particular (who really leads the Tea Party?).	但同样也可以是另外的个人和团体； 还有可能与个人无关（谁是真正的茶党领袖？


Voters who support populist movements do so because they believe that current elites fail truly to represent them.	选民支持民粹运动是因为他们认为现有精英没有资格充当他们的代表。


They are not against representative democracy as such: they just want different representatives – people whom they consider morally pure.	他们本身并不反对代议制民主：他们只想要道德上更纯粹的人作为代表。


Thus, calls for more popular participation are not essential to populism; rather, they are a symptom of perceived exclusion (which might well be a reality, especially in Latin America).	因此，呼唤更多民众参与并非民粹主义的基本要素； 相反，它是感觉受到排斥的外在表现（尤其在拉美这可能是某种现实）。


But cries for political inclusion are different from demands for direct democracy.	但呼吁政治包容有别于要求直接民主。


Where direct democracy is very much a part of normal politics – in Switzerland, for example – populist parties have been doing better, not worse, than elsewhere.	在直接民主属于常规政治的部分地区（比方说瑞士），民粹主义政党一直比其他地方更生机勃勃。


It is similarly misguided to think that populist politicians, once in power, will not be able to govern effectively, because they have emerged from protest parties whose agendas are defined entirely by what they oppose.	认为民粹主义政治家来自以反对为主的抗议政党，因此一旦掌权将无法有效执政的想法同样是一种误导。


Rather, what is distinctive about populists in power is that they attend only to their clientele (the rest of the population is utterly undeserving) and ride roughshod over checks and balances.	相反，民粹主义者当权的特点是只关注自己的目标客户（其余人完全不配得到关注）。 这些人更乐于使用强硬手段，而不是制衡之术。


From a populist perspective, this makes perfect sense: Why should they accept checks on their power if they represent the authentic will of the people?	从民粹主义者的角度这种态度是顺理成章的：如果代表民众的真正意愿，他们为什么要接受制衡？


Populists can live with representative democracy; what they cannot accept is political pluralism and the notion of legitimate opposition.	民粹主义者可以接受代议制民主，他们不能接受的是政治多元化及合法的反对党。


It was this tendency to demonize opponents, not particular policies favoring the poor, that made Chávez a populist.	正是这种丑化对手、而非偏袒穷人的倾向使查韦斯成为一名民粹主义者。


In Finland, to take another example, it is the claim of uniquely authentic representation, not criticism of the European Union, that makes the revealingly named True Finns a populist party.	再举个例子，只看名字就令人印象深刻的真芬党之所以成其为民粹主义政党不是因为它批评欧盟，而是因其宣称是民众唯一的真正代表。


Likewise, the Italian populist Beppe Grillo’s attempt to empower ordinary citizens is not a cause for concern; but his claim that his Five Star Movement deserves nothing less than 100% of seats in parliament, because all other contenders are corrupt and immoral, certainly is.	同样，意大利民粹主义者毕普·格里罗为普通民众赋权的意愿不是引起关注的原因，真正引起关注的是他公开宣称因为其他竞争者的腐败和非道德行为，其五星运动应该占据议会的所有席位。


It is this feature of populism – the idea that the people want only one thing, and that only true representatives can give it to them – that explains a symmetry (often evoked, but seldom spelled out) between populism and technocratic government.	正是民粹主义的这种特点——相信民众只有一种愿望，且只有唯一的真正代表可以实现他们这个愿望——能够解释民粹主义和技术官僚政府间（常被提起，但却鲜有说明）的近似之处。


Just as technocrats assume that there is only one right solution to every policy challenge – hence political debate is not necessary – so, for populists, the people have one, and only one, uncorrupted will.	这就像技术官僚认为政策挑战只有一种正确的解决方式，因此政治辩论根本就毫无必要。 因此在民粹主义者看来，民众有且只有一个纯洁的愿望。


Liberal democracy assumes just the opposite: space for different perspectives – and for political alternatives.	而自由民主的假设则正好相反：要容忍不同观点和不同的政治选择。


Big Data, Big New Businesses	大数据，大新生意


LONDON – Many people have long believed that if government and the private sector agreed to share their data more freely, and allow it to be processed using the right analytics, previously unimaginable solutions to countless social, economic, and commercial problems would emerge.	伦敦—很多人早就相信，如果政府和私人部门同意更自由地共享它们的数据，并允许这些数据用正确的分析方法进行处理，大量社会、经济和商业问题就会产生此前难以想象的解决方案。


They may have no idea how right they are.	他们可能不知道这样的想法有多么正确。


Even the most vocal proponents of open data appear to have underestimated how many profitable ideas and businesses stand to be created.	哪怕是开放数据最坚定的支持者似乎也低估了可以从中创造多少有利可图的思想和企业。


More than 40 governments worldwide have committed to opening up their electronic data – including weather records, crime statistics, transport information, and much more – to businesses, consumers, and the general public.	全世界40多个政府承诺向企业、消费者和公众开放它们的电子数据——包括天气记录、犯罪统计、交通信息和其他很多数据。


The McKinsey Global Institute estimates that the annual value of open data in education, transportation, consumer products, electricity, oil and gas, health care, and consumer finance could reach $3 trillion.	麦肯锡全球研究所（McKinney Global Institute）估计，教育、交通、消费产品、电力、石油和天然气、医疗以及消费金融开放数据的年价值可达3万亿美元。


These benefits come in the form of new and better goods and services, as well as efficiency savings for businesses, consumers, and citizens.	所产生的好处包括更新更好的商品和服务以及企业、消费者和公民的效率节省。


The range is vast.	受益范围十分广泛。


For example, drawing on data from various government agencies, the Climate Corporation (recently bought for $1 billion) has taken 30 years of weather data, 60 years of data on crop yields, and 14 terabytes of information on soil types to create customized insurance products.	比如，气候公司（Climate Corporation）最近花10亿美元购买了各政府机构的数据，用30年的天气记录、60年的庄稼收成记录和14TB的土壤类型信息数据开发了个性化保险产品。


Similarly, real-time traffic and transit information can be accessed on smartphone apps to inform users when the next bus is coming or how to avoid traffic congestion.	类似地，智能手机用户可以获得实施交通信息，了解下一班巴士合适到站或如何避免交通拥堵。


And, by analyzing online comments about their products, manufacturers can identify which features consumers are most willing to pay for, and develop their business and investment strategies accordingly.	此外，通过分析产品的在线评论，制造商可以识别哪些功能是消费者最愿意掏钱购买的，并据此开发商业和投资战略。


Opportunities are everywhere.	机会到处都是。


A raft of open-data start-ups are now being incubated at the London-based Open Data Institute (ODI), which focuses on improving our understanding of corporate ownership, health-care delivery, energy, finance, transport, and many other areas of public interest.	伦敦开放数据研究所（Open Data Institute，ODI）正在培育大量开放数据创业公司。 ODI专注于改善我们对公司所有权、医疗服务、能源、金融、交通和其他各种公共利益的理解。


Consumers are the main beneficiaries, especially in the household-goods market.	消费者是主要受益者，特别是在家用产品市场。


It is estimated that consumers making better-informed buying decisions across sectors could capture an estimated $1.1 trillion in value annually.	据估计，各部门消费者做出更知情购买决策每年可以产生约1. 1万亿美元价值。


Third-party data aggregators are already allowing customers to compare prices across online and brick-and-mortar shops.	第三方数据汇总商已经使顾客能够比较在线和实体商店之间的价格。


Many also permit customers to compare quality ratings, safety data (drawn, for example, from official injury reports), information about the provenance of food, and producers’ environmental and labor practices.	许多数据汇总商还允许顾客比较质量评价、安全数据（比如从官方伤害报告中提炼出来的信息）、食品产地信息以及生产商环境和劳工记录。


Consider the book industry.	以图书行业为例。


Bookstores once regarded their inventory as a trade secret.	从前，书店将存货信息视为商业机密。


Customers, competitors, and even suppliers seldom knew what stock bookstores held.	顾客、竞争者甚至供应商都难以了解书店的库存情况。


Nowadays, by contrast, bookstores not only report what stock they carry but also when customers’ orders will arrive.	如今的情况正好相反，书店不但报告存货情况，还报告顾客订单的下达情况。


If they did not, they would be excluded from the product-aggregation sites that have come to determine so many buying decisions.	若非如此，它们就无法进入能够决定大量购买决策的产品汇总网站。


The health-care sector is a prime target for achieving new efficiencies.	医疗部门是实现新效率的主要目标。


By sharing the treatment data of a large patient population, for example, care providers can better identify practices that could save $180 billion annually.	比如，通过共享大患者总体的医疗数据，看护服务提供商就能更好地提供服务，每年节省1,800亿美元。


The Open Data Institute-backed start-up Mastodon C uses open data on doctors’ prescriptions to differentiate among expensive patent medicines and cheaper “off-patent” varieties; when applied to just one class of drug, that could save around $400 million in one year for the British National Health Service.	开放数据研究所支持的创业企业Mastodon C公司使用医生处方的开放数据区分昂贵的专利药和廉价的“非专利”药； 只要将这一数据应用于一种类型的药品，每年就可以为英国国民医疗服务局（British National Health Service）节省约4亿美元。


Meanwhile, open data on acquired infections in British hospitals has led to the publication of hospital-performance tables, a major factor in the 85% drop in reported infections.	与此同时，关于英国医院获得的传染病的开放数据催生了医院表现评分表的发布，而该评分表是报告传染病下降85%的主要因素。


There are also opportunities to prevent lifestyle-related diseases and improve treatment by enabling patients to compare their own data with aggregated data on similar patients.	另一类机会是通过让病人将自身数据和类似病人的汇总数据比较，从而防止生活方式相关疾病和改善治疗。


This has been shown to motivate patients to improve their diet, exercise more often, and take their medicines regularly.	形成的效果包括促进病人改进饮食、增加锻炼、规律服药。


Similarly, letting people compare their energy use with that of their peers could prompt them to save hundreds of billions of dollars in electricity costs each year, to say nothing of reducing carbon emissions.	类似地，让人们将自己的能源使用状况与周边人群比较每年能够让他们节约数千亿美元电费，对减少碳排放的功效不言自明。


Such benchmarking is even more valuable for businesses seeking to improve their operational efficiency.	这类基准对寻求改善经营效率的企业来说更加宝贵。


The oil and gas industry, for example, could save $450 billion annually by sharing anonymized and aggregated data on the management of upstream and downstream facilities.	比如，石油和天然气行业可以通过共享关于上游和下游设施的管理情况的匿名汇总数据每年节省4,500亿美元。


Finally, the move toward open data serves a variety of socially desirable ends, ranging from the reuse of publicly funded research to support work on poverty, inclusion, or discrimination, to the disclosure by corporations such as Nike of their supply-chain data and environmental impact.	最后，开放数据运动能促进很多有利于社会的事物，如公共融资研究的再利用以支持贫困、包容和歧视方面的工作以及耐克等公司披露供应链数据和环境影响等。


There are, of course, challenges arising from the proliferation and systematic use of open data.	当然，开放数据的增殖和系统性使用过程中也会产生挑战。


Companies fear for their intellectual property; ordinary citizens worry about how their private information might be used and abused.	公司担心自己的知识产权； 普通民众担心自己的私人信息被使用和滥用。


Last year, Telefónica, the world’s fifth-largest mobile-network provider, tried to allay such fears by launching a digital confidence program to reassure customers that innovations in transparency would be implemented responsibly and without compromising users’ personal information.	去年全球第五大移动网络运营航西班牙电信推出了数字信心计划，向顾客保证透明的创新将得到负责任的实施，不会包含用户的个人信息，试图以此减轻这类担忧。


The sensitive handling of these issues will be essential if we are to reap the potential $3 trillion in value that usage of open data could deliver each year.	如果我们想要获得使用开放数据能够释放的每年3万亿美元的潜在价值，就必须敏感地处理这些问题。


Consumers, policymakers, and companies must work together, not just to agree on common standards of analysis, but also to set the ground rules for the protection of privacy and property.	消费者、决策者和公司必须精诚合作，不但要统一分析标准，还要为保护隐私和产权设立可靠的规则。


In addition to the logistical challenge of reaching every child in Africa’s most populated country, the Nigerian polio-eradication campaign has had to overcome security issues, opposition by religious fundamentalists, and rampant corruption.	除去在非洲人口最多的国家照顾到每一��儿童的后勤挑战，尼日利亚脊髓灰质炎根除运动还需要战胜安全问题、宗教原教旨主义者的反对和猖獗的腐败。


Nigeria’s Resurgent Oil Diplomacy	尼日利亚石油外交的复苏


Russia is not alone in seeing oil as a means to transform its global standing.	俄罗斯不是唯一一个将石油作为改变其全球地位的手段的国家。


Nowadays, the mantra of President Umar Yar’Adua, who took power in June 2007, following controversial elections, is to transform the country into one of the world’s 20 largest economies by 2020.	现今，在颇具争议的大选后于2007年6月掌权的Umar Yar’Adua总统誓愿在2020年将让尼日利亚跻身全球前20大经济体的行列。 Yar’Adua和他的人民民主党(PDP)正努力地在这个拥有1.


Yar’Adua and his Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) are struggling to stamp their authority on an unwieldy and restive country of 140 million people, and the government views rapid growth as a means to achieving that aim.	4亿人口的庞大而难以管理的国家树立威信。 政府将快速的经济增长视为实现该目标的途径。


Nigerians can use a dose of hope.	尼日利亚人需要一剂希望。


Olusegun Obasanjo, who became Nigeria’s first elected president in 1999 after nearly two decades of military dictatorship, left vast swathes of the country trapped in poverty when he handed power to Yar’Adua last year.	1999年成为尼日利亚第一位民选总统的奥巴桑乔在近二十年的军事独裁统治后，于去年将一个为贫所困的国家交给了Yar’Adua。


With oil reaching $100 dollars per barrel, and energy-hungry giants like the United States and China beating a path to Nigeria’s door, Africa’s leading oil producer wants to use petrodollars to cure the country’s economic ills and flex its muscles in the international arena.	随着每桶原油价格逼近100美金，及美国、中国等能源需求大国纷至沓来，这个非洲领先的产油国想用石油美金来医治该国的经济沉疴并提升自己在国际舞台上的实力。


While riding the crest of the last oil boom in the late 1970’s, Nigeria’s military leaders nationalized the assets of British Petroleum and became champions of pan-African co-operation, financing several African liberation movements.	乘着1970年代石油业蓬勃发展的东风，尼日利亚的军事领导人将英国石油公司的资产国有化，进而成为泛非洲合作中的领军人物，并为多项非洲解放运动提供了资金支持。


The interests of the West and Nigeria repeatedly clashed, but Nigeria always stood its ground.	西方和尼日利亚的利益不断发生冲突，但尼日利亚总是坚守立场。


Inept government and economic decline in the 1980’s and 1990’s obliged Nigeria’s leaders to focus on problems closer to home, like the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone.	1980和1990年代的政府无能和经济下滑迫使尼日利亚的领导人更多关注周边的问题，如利比里亚和塞拉利昂的内战。


But old habits die hard.	然而本性难移。


Nigeria has always sought a leadership role in Africa and its diaspora.	尼日利亚一直寻求在非洲及其侨民界的领导地位。


Even in the turbulent 1990’s, when Nigeria was temporarily suspended from the British Commonwealth following the execution of minority rights campaigner Ken Saro-Wiwa by General Sani Abacha’s regime, the governing elite sought to achieve Nigeria’s “rightful” place in global affairs.	即使在动荡的1990年代，由于Sani Abacha将军的政权处死了少数民权运动家Ken Saro-Wiwa而导致尼日利亚的英联邦成员国资格被暂时取消时，其精英统治者们仍企图取得该国在全球事务中的“合理”地位。


There are now signs of a resurgent oil-driven foreign policy.	现在有迹象表明石油驱动的外交政策正在复苏。


Last October, Yar’Adua joined South Africa and Libya in opposing US plans to deploy AFRICOM, its new African regional military command, on the continent.	去年十月，Yar’Adua与南非和利比亚联合反对美国在非洲大陆上部署其新的区域性军事指挥部的AFRICOM计划。


He then asked Nigeria’s National Assembly to write off $13 million of Liberia’s $43 million bilateral debt after Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf withdrew her offer to host the new command.	在利比里亚总统Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf撤销了作为新指挥部东道国的提议后，他又请求尼日利亚国会勾销了利比里亚所欠4300万美元双边债务中的1300万。


Nigerian officials are careful to disavow any link between this financial gift and Johnson’s turn away from AFRICOM.	尼日利亚的官员们审慎地否认这种财政礼物和Johnson拒绝AFRICOM之间的关联。


Nor do they voice their concern that AFRICOM could be part of an American effort to exert control on West Africa’s oil-producing countries.	他们也没有对AFRICOM可能成为美国控制西非产油国的计划的一部分表示担忧。


But, in confidential briefings, Nigeria has strongly hinted that it will not tolerate any foreign incursions on a vital and strategic resource in its own backyard.	但在绝密的内部通讯中，尼日利亚强烈暗示它绝不容忍外国在其后院染指这种至关重要的战略资源。


Domestically, the renewed flexing of Nigeria’s foreign policy muscles is being played out in the ongoing face-off between the new National Energy Council, which reports to the President, and Western oil companies, led by Shell’s Nigerian subsidiary, over when to end production-related gas flaring.	在国内，尼日利亚外交政策的新主张在一场关于何时停止与（石油）生产有关的废气燃烧的对峙中反映出来。 对峙的一方是直接向总统汇报的新“国家能源委员会”，而另一方则是以壳牌尼日利亚分公司为首的西方石油公司。


The government insists on a January 2008 deadline, but the companies complain that the government’s reluctance to fund its share of operating costs fully and rising political violence in the Niger Delta make this deadline unrealistic, and want it extended three years.	政府坚持2008年一月的最后期限，而相关公司则抱怨政府不愿完全承担相应的营运成本，以及在尼日尔德尔塔州日益严重的政治暴力使得既定的最后期限变得不现实。


The Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), the regulatory agency for the oil industry, has dismissed these claims, vowing to impose hefty fines on companies that flout the deadline.	它们希望再延期三年。 石油资源部(DPR)作为石油业的监管机构驳斥了这些指责，并誓要对藐视最后期限的公司处以巨额罚款。


In the early 1990’s, desperately short of hard currency, Nigeria negotiated contracts permitting the oil companies to develop new fields and recoup their investment before sharing profits.	在1990年代初期，由于硬通货紧缺，尼日利亚通过谈判签订合同，允许石油公司开发新油田，并在共享收益之前对其投资进行补偿。


Now, following the companies’ discovery of massive reserves, technocrats appointed by Yar’Adua to take charge of oil policy want Nigeria to get a larger slice of the pie.	现在，随着石油公司发现了大型油田，由Yar’Adua任命负责制定石油政策的技术官僚们想要分更大的一杯羹。


That also means ending government co-financing of operating costs and demanding that the oil companies tap capital markets to bridge the shortfall.	这也意味着停止政府分担营运成本而要求各石油公司通过资本市场解决资金不足的问题。


Moreover, Tony Chukwueke, the DPR’s head, has announced plans to create an African version of Petronas, Malaysia’s state-run oil company, and transform the sclerotic Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation into a powerful oil-producing firm that can dominate the market in the Gulf of Guinea and other emerging regions.	另外，DPR的部长Tony Chukwueke也已经宣布了创建非洲版Petronas（即马来西亚国家石油公司）的计划，将僵化的尼日利亚国家石油公司转变成一家主导几内亚湾和其他新兴（产油）地区的强大的石油生产公司。


Intense Western pressure has been brought to bear on Yar’Adua to re-consider the January deadline.	西方的巨大压力使得Yar’Adua不得不从新考虑一月的最后期限。


His election is being challenged in court by other candidates, and Western backing could play a role in stabilizing his government.	他的当选在法庭受到了其他候选人的挑战，而西方的支持能够在稳定他政府的过程中发挥作用。


But his advisers, some of whom played a key role in shaping Nigeria’s foreign policy in the 1970’s, are keen to use the gas-flaring issue to demonstrate Yar’Adua’s resolve and standing as a pan-African leader.	但他的顾问们（他们中的一些人在制定尼日利亚1970年代的外交政策中扮演了关键角色。 ）却急于用废气燃烧问题来显示Yar’Adua作为一个泛非洲领导人的决心和立场。


But, as in the 1970’s, the success of Nigerian diplomacy will depend on the government’s ability to win legitimacy at home.	但正如在1970年代那样，尼日利亚外交的成功要靠政府在国内赢得合法性的能力。


That will require repairing and improving damaged infrastructure, generating economic prosperity, running efficient social services, and taming the unrest in the delta region.	这就需要修复和改善遭到破坏的基础设施，实现经济繁荣，运行高效的社会服务体系并平息德尔塔地区的动乱。


It is not yet clear whether Yar’Adua’s government can meet these challenges.	Yar’Adua的政府是否能应对这些挑战，前景尚不明朗。


Nigeria’s Sick Man Democracy	尼日利亚的病人民主


How sick is Nigerian president Umaru Yar’Adua?	尼日利亚总统奥马鲁拉·杜瓦病得有多严重？


In May, he admitted during a live television broadcast that he suffers from a kidney ailment, but sought to quell rumors that he was terminally ill by insisting that fears for his health are greatly exaggerated and politically motivated.	在五月份，他在一个电视现场直播中承认他正遭受着肾病的折磨，但是，他试图通过强调对他健康的担忧被极大地夸大了并且具有政治上的目的，从而消除他得了不治之症的传言。


There are plenty of world leaders in less-than-perfect health.	世界上许多国家的领导人健康状况不佳，但是，这一点在尼日利亚特别重要。


But the stakes are especially high in Nigeria, where Yar’Adua embodies the country’s delicate political balance.	在这里，杜瓦体现了该国微妙的政治平衡。


With the fall of Nigeria’s dictatorship and the introduction of democracy in 1999, governors in the mainly Muslim northern provinces believed they had struck a deal with their southern counterparts on a regional rotation of the country’s presidency.	在1999年，随着尼日利亚独裁统治的垮台和民主政治的引进，主要是穆斯林的北部省份的地方长官认为他们已经和南部的地方长官就两地轮流担任国家总统达成了共识。


In 2007, arguing that it was their turn to choose a chief executive, they bitterly opposed a bid by then-President Olusegun Obasanjo, a southerner and a Christian, to rewrite Nigeria’s constitution in hopes of winning a third term.	在2007年，北部认为该他们选择国家总统了，他们愤怒地否决了是南方人兼基督徒的总统奥卢塞贡·奥巴桑乔修改尼日利亚的宪法以赢得第三届任期的提议。


Southern governors countered that the north had controlled the country through more than three decades of authoritarian rule and that a southerner should hold the presidency for years to come.	南部地方长官反击说，北方通过独裁统治已经控制了尼日利亚三十多年，南方人应该在未来的几年里担任总统职位。


Tensions mounted.	这导致了紧张状态的升级。


Once it became clear that his gambit would fail, Obasanjo found a compromise: he named a man he trusted, Yar’Adua, a little-known northern governor and devout Muslim, as his preferred successor.	在其策略会失败变得没有疑问的时候，奥巴桑乔就找了一个妥协的办法：他指定了一个他信任的、不太出名的北方地方长官兼虔诚的穆斯林杜瓦作为他首选的继任者。


In April 2007, Yar’Adua won a disputed landslide presidential victory.	在2007年4月，杜瓦以压倒性多数选票赢得了总统选举的胜利，尽管这个胜利充满了争议。


Western and African observers charged that widespread vote-rigging had tainted the official result, and Nigeria’s Supreme Court has yet to rule on challenges to the election’s legality.	西方和非洲的观察员指责选举中大量的投票舞弊行为玷污了选举的结果，然而，尼日利亚最高法院尚未对选举合法性的挑战作出裁决。


But Yar’Adua shrugged off charges of electoral fraud, and in the first days of his presidency, he drew praise, both at home and abroad, for promises to tackle corruption and pursue an agreement with militia groups in the oil-rich, violence-plagued Niger Delta region.	但是，杜瓦对选举舞弊的指控不屑一顾，并且在他当总统的最初的日子里，他因为承诺遏制腐败，寻求与位于石油储量丰富且遭受武力荼毒的尼日尔河三角洲地区的武装团体达成协议，而赢得了国内和国外的称赞。


In reaching out to armed groups like the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), one of his primary assets has been his vice president, Goodluck Jonathan, a native of the area.	在向像尼日尔河三角洲解放运动组织（MEND)这样的武装团体抛出橄榄枝的过程中，杜瓦最重要的财富是他的副总统固德拉克·乔纳森（Goodluck Jonathan），该副总统是当地人。


Pacifying the Delta is vitally important, because Nigeria, the world’s eighth-largest oil producer, earns 86% of its export revenue from oil.	安抚三角洲地区极其重要，因为作为全球第八大石油生产商的尼日利亚，其86%的出口收入来自石油出口。


Attacks on pipelines have recently intensified ahead of a planned summit meeting between the government and various militia leaders, as small groups of militants stage attacks on oil infrastructure in the Delta to establish their relevance and win a potentially lucrative seat at the negotiating table.	对输油管道的袭击在原计划的政府首脑和各种武装团体领导人之间的会谈前更频繁了，因为小规模的武装团体对三角洲地区的石油基础设施进行袭击，并试图以此确立他们和会谈的相关性并赢得在谈判席上可能有利的地位。


The summit is likely to generate an agreement and positive media coverage, but northern Muslim members of parliament could complicate efforts to implement the deal.	这次首脑会谈可能会达成协议并产生积极的新闻报道，但是，议会中的北部穆斯林议员可能会使执行这个协议复杂化。


The Nigerian government could use some good news.	尼日利亚政府可以利用一些好消息。


Electricity shortages have intensified on Yar’Adua’s watch, producing blackouts in many areas of the country and darkening the foreign investment climate.	电力短缺在杜瓦的监控下加剧了，从而使该国的许多地区实行了灯火管制并使该国的投资环境恶化。


Rising food and energy prices pushed inflation up to 9.7% in May, from 8.2% in April.	上涨的食品和能源价格使通货膨胀率从四月份的8. 2%上升到五月份的9.


Corruption investigations launched by Yar’Adua’s government have uncovered broader and deeper problems than many knew existed.	7%。 杜瓦政府开始的反腐败调查暴露了比许多人知道的更广泛和深入的问题。


A battle between the president and legislature over control of federal spending has not been fully resolved.	在总统和议会之间关于联邦开支控制的斗争还没有完全得到解决。


For foreign investors, the greatest near-term concern may be a broad range of attacks from parliament and some of Yar’Adua’s economic advisors on Charles Soludo, the central bank governor, who is widely credited for Nigeria’s improved economic performance in the past several years.	对外国投资者来说，最近期的担忧可能是来自议会以及杜瓦的经济顾问央行行长查尔斯·索卢多的一系列攻击，查尔斯·索卢多因其在过去几年里对提高尼日利亚经济表现的贡献而备受赞誉。


Under Obasanjo, Soludo initiated much needed banking reforms and argued strenuously that Nigeria should pay its foreign debt.	在奥巴桑乔政府中，索卢多开始了急需的银行改革并极力论证尼日利亚应该支付其外债。


But Soludo’s recent decision to create a sovereign wealth fund has ignited a firestorm.	但是，索卢多最近决定建立一个主权财富基金引发了激烈的争论。


Lawmakers complain they weren’t consulted.	立法者抱怨这个决定没有和他们商量。


Northern Muslims wonder why Soludo, a southern Christian, believes the government should horde excess cash that could be spent to relieve poverty among their constituents.	北部的穆斯林质疑，为什么是南方基督徒的索卢多认为政府应该将可以用于减轻他们选民的贫困状况的额外现金聚集起来。


A favorite of the West, Soludo may not survive the year.	作为西方的宠儿，索卢多可能今年都不能顺利任职下去。


With so many challenges ahead, Nigeria can ill afford an ailing president.	面临这么多的挑战，尼日利亚就不能有一个生病的总统。


Yar’Adua insists that he’s fine and that his trips to Germany for medical treatment, during the election campaign last year and again this April, have been unfairly politicized.	杜瓦坚称，他身体很好，他在去年选举期间和今年四月份到德国进行治疗的旅行被不公正地政治化了。


But there are plenty of unanswered questions about his kidney condition and rumors that he may even have Churg-Strauss Syndrome, a life-threatening autoimmune disease.	但是，对他肾的状况有许多未解的疑问，以及对他可能患有可能致命的自身免疫性疾病变应性肉芽肿性血管炎有许多传言。


The true state of his health may matter less than public fears that he’s hiding something.	他健康的真实状况可能不如公众对他在隐瞒什么东西的担心那么重要。


Yar’Adua’s health worries are creating risks to Nigeria’s stability that run far beyond questions about the Niger Delta or any single political issue.	对杜瓦健康状况的担忧导致了尼日利亚除尼日尔河三角洲或者任何一个单一的政治问题之外的稳定风险。


If Yar’Adua were to die in office, his vice president would succeed him – returning the presidency to a southern Christian.	如果杜瓦在任期内去世，他的副总统就会继任——就是说南部的基督徒再次当上总统。


Nigeria’s northern Muslims are highly unlikely to accept that result without protest.	尼日利亚北部的穆斯林不大可能不进行抗议就接受这个结果。


There is no reason to believe that Goodluck Jonathan will preemptively resign, and removing him from office if he assumes the presidency might well stoke unprecedented violence in the Delta.	没有理由去认为固德拉克·乔纳森（Goodluck Jonathan）会抢先辞职，并且，在他担任总统后解除其总统职位极有可能激起三角洲地区空前的暴力活动。


Given the political friction and violence generated by last year’s election campaign, new balloting would prove a less-than-appealing prospect.	鉴于去年选举活动引起的政治摩擦和暴力活动，进行新选举可能不是一个吸引人的选择。


Only Umaru Yar’Adua’s doctors know for sure how sick he is.	只有奥马鲁拉·杜瓦的医生确定地知道他的病有多严重。


But as answers begin to emerge, we will learn much more about the health of Nigeria’s fragile democracy.	但是，当答案逐渐浮出水面的时候，我们将会知道更多尼日利亚脆弱的民主的健康状况。


The Silver Fox of Dictatorship and Democracy	独裁与民主的银狐


MOSCOW – Throughout his years in power, Eduard Shevardnadze was known as the “silver fox,” a man who seemed to glide effortlessly from leader of Soviet Georgia and Kremlin Politburo member to Mikhail Gorbachev’s reform-minded foreign minister, before reemerging as post-Soviet Georgia’s pro-Western president, ironically opposing Gorbachev.	莫斯科——执政多年的谢瓦尔德纳泽被外界称之为“银狐”，此人能毫不费力地从苏联格鲁吉亚省领导兼克里姆林宫政治局委员变身为戈尔巴乔夫手下颇具改革意识的外交部长。 其后又以后苏联时代格鲁吉亚亲西方总统的姿态出现，颇具讽刺意味地和戈尔巴乔夫唱反调。


He regarded himself as a hero who liberated Georgia from Russia’s tight embrace.	他自视为从俄国严密统治下解放格鲁吉亚的英雄。


He was also one of the most corrupt politicians his country ever saw.	他也是格鲁吉亚有史以来最腐败的政客之一。


By the end of his life, Shevardnadze had become a political pariah in Georgia, the West, and Russia, where he was viewed as an architect of the Soviet Union’s dissolution.	在生命末期，谢瓦尔德纳泽已经被格鲁吉亚、西方和俄罗斯政界打入另册。 俄罗斯将其视为苏联解体的始作俑者。


Yet, even if he was largely forgotten after the Rose Revolution of 2003, when he was ousted by his one-time protégé, Mikheil Saakashvili, his cunning and skill at manipulating political forces still enabled him to manage his legacy to his advantage.	但即便在2003年玫瑰革命后开始逐渐淡出公众视线，当他被过去的门生米哈伊尔·萨卡什维利驱逐时，他的狡猾和政治手腕依然使他成功地将过去的经历转化为优势。


The staunchly pro-American Saakashvili launched successful economic reforms and an all-out assault on police corruption, though he, too, eventually was accused of taking bribes and indulging autocratic impulses.	坚定奉行亲美路线的萨卡什维利成功启动了经济改革和对警方腐败的全方位治理，虽然他本人最终也被控受贿及放任独裁冲动。


Having come to power in the revolt that overthrew the corrupt Shevardnadze, he resorted to the same Soviet-style techniques – intimidating and discrediting opponents, dispersing dissenters by force – to keep his opponents at bay.	在推翻谢瓦尔德纳泽腐败政府的起义中上台后，他使出了一模一样的苏式手段——恐吓及抹黑对手、强行驱散持不同政见者——从而把对手逼入绝境。


The question Georgians have been asking ever since is whether Shevardnadze was really overthrown at all.	格鲁吉亚民众之后一直质疑谢瓦尔德纳泽是否真被推翻了。


Knowing the extent of his unpopularity in 2003, many believe that he was ready to leave power but needed a successor who would ensure that his legacy (and his wealth) survived.	考虑到他在2003年多么不得人心，很多人认为他愿意交出权力，但需要找到确保他名声（和财产）的继任者。


To be sure, Saakashvili became famous as Georgia’s justice minister for submitting corruption charges against the Shevardnadze family, and early in his presidency was able to reclaim for the state $15 million dollars of the Shevardnadze fortune. But Saakashvili’s government never touched Shevardnadze and his family.	可以肯定，萨卡什维利出名是因为任格鲁吉亚司法部长期间对谢瓦尔德纳泽家族提出腐败指控，并且在其执政早期成功从谢瓦尔德纳泽手中为国家追回了1500万美元的财富。


Regardless of whether this theory is true, its persistence lies at the core of Shevardnadze’s legacy.	无论该理论属实与否，它一直是谢瓦尔德纳泽政治模式的核心内容。


Throughout his career, he was known to play all sides, at times threatening his resignation, only to stay on – or accusing enemies of assassination plots, only to stay alive.	他在整个政治生涯中游走于各派之间，有时甚至为了继续当政而威胁辞职——还有时为了活下去而指控对手阴谋施行暗杀企图。


In the 1970s, he would flatter Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev with spectacular displays of fealty to the Kremlin, only to meet with protesting Georgian students in support of their right, in opposition to the Kremlin’s wishes, to speak Georgian, not Russian, as a state language.	20世纪70年代，他曾以对克里姆林的耿耿衷心哄骗时任苏联领导人的勃列日涅夫，后来竟会见示威的格鲁吉亚学生对其违背克里姆林意愿将格鲁吉亚语而非俄语作为官方语言的主张表示支持。


Everything at which Georgians excelled under Shevardnadze in the Soviet era – entrepreneurship, education, and culture – was greatly neglected by him in the 1990s.	格鲁吉亚人在苏联时期谢瓦尔德纳泽治下所擅长的一切——创业、教育、文化——在20世纪90年代都被他视若无物。


Similarly, whereas tens of thousands of functionaries were indicted for corruption or lost their jobs under his leadership in the 1970s, the post-Soviet Shevardnadze of the 1990s reportedly joked that he should have arrested himself, but that he deserved his wealth for his priceless political contribution.	同样，就在数以万计的官员在其20世纪70年代治下被控腐败或丢掉工作的同时，谢瓦尔德纳泽在20世纪90年代开玩笑说他自己也应当遭到逮捕，但他对政治的宝贵贡献让他的财产成为应得。


In 1999, during the New York celebrations marking the tenth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, I myself heard Shevardnadze assert that Georgia had given the twentieth century two historic figures: “One who erected the Iron Curtain [Joseph Stalin], and one who tore it down” – meaning himself.	1999年，在纽约庆祝柏林墙倒塌十周年之际，我亲耳听到谢瓦尔德纳说格鲁吉亚为二十世纪贡献了两位历史性人物：“一位亲手缔造了铁幕[约瑟夫·斯大林]，而另一位终结了它”——他自己就是铁幕的终结者。


Surely, Shevardnadze’s political skills were worthy of another great Soviet politician from the Caucasus, the Armenian Anastas Mikoyan, once Stalin’s trusted trade minister and later Nikita Khrushchev’s fellow anti-Stalinist and deputy prime minister.	当然，谢瓦尔德纳泽的政治手段与来自高加索的另一位苏联伟大政治家米高扬有异曲同工之妙。 米高扬曾是斯大林器重的贸易部长，后来又成为副总理兼赫鲁晓夫反斯大林的同盟。


Mikoyan, as one joke had it, left the Kremlin one day in heavy rain and refused to share a colleague’s umbrella.	有段笑话说米高扬某天在暴雨中离开克里姆林时拒绝与同事一起打伞。


“It’s ok,” he said, “I will walk between the raindrops.”	“没关系”，他说，“我能行走在雨滴之间而不被淋到。 ”


Likewise, Shevardnadze resigned as General Secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia in the 1980s, ostensibly in protest against Soviet rule, only to be appointed Soviet Foreign Minister by Gorbachev.	同样，谢瓦尔德纳泽在20世纪80年代辞去格鲁吉亚共产党总书记职务表面是为抗议苏联的统治，但实际却被戈尔巴乔夫任命为苏联外交部长。


Having gained the trust of Western leaders and overseen the dismantling of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, he then resigned in 1990, declaring that Russia – under Gorbachev – was returning to dictatorship.	在博取西方领导人信任并眼看苏联在东欧的帝国解体之后，他在1990年辞职，声称俄罗斯在戈尔巴乔夫领导下已重新回到独裁政府。


That pose as democracy’s guardian earned Shevardnadze independent Georgia’s presidency at a time when the country was vulnerable to civil war.	这种假扮民主卫士的伎俩在国家可能爆发内战的情况下为其赢得了独立格鲁吉亚的总统职务。


He held the post for 11 years.	他在这个职位上待了11年之久。


Was Shevardnadze ever honest?	谢瓦尔德纳泽有没有诚实的时候？


Was he a democrat or a despot?	他究竟是民主人士还是独裁者？


The reality of the times was that he was both.	事实上他两者皆有。


His death brings closer the end of the Gorbachev generation of reform communists, those who – like Shevardnadze and the late Boris Yeltsin – presented a stark contrast in the late 1980s to the dour Brezhnev-era hard-liners, spurring (mostly inadvertently) the collapse of the Soviet empire and the long transition to democracy.	他的去世将戈尔巴乔夫那代共产改革份子推向了终点，这些人像谢瓦尔德纳泽和已故的叶利钦一样，与20世纪80年代勃列日涅夫时代的强硬派形成了鲜明的对照。 是他们在无意间推动了苏联帝国的解体，启动了向民主政体的长期过渡。


As Russian President Vladimir Putin’s corrupt and authoritarian rule demonstrates every day, that transition is far from finished.	俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京的腐败和专制统治每一天都告诉人们，从专制向民主的过渡还远没有结束。


Yet there is some good news.	但也有令人振奋的消息。


Last year, Georgia elected its new president, Giorgi Margvelashvili, through a peaceful and legitimate process; earlier this summer, the country signed a European Union Association Agreement, implying closer connections to the West.	去年，格鲁吉亚通过和平合法的程序选出Giorgi Margvelashvili为新任总统； 今年夏初，格鲁吉亚与欧盟签署了入盟协定，这预示着与西方的联系越来越强。


None of this would have been possible without Shevardnadze’s decades-long career of cunning, yet brave, political triangulation.	没有谢瓦尔德纳泽数十年的狡猾、勇敢的三角政治生涯，这些都将是不可能的。


Putin’s Tipping Point?	普京的引爆点？


NEW YORK – When incompetence in the Kremlin turns murderous, its incumbents can begin to tremble.	纽约—当克里姆林宫的无能演变为谋杀时，其主人已开始颤抖。


As news of the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over Ukraine trickled into Russia, people with a long memory recalled the Soviet Union’s attack, 31 years ago this September, on Korean Air Lines Flight 007, and its political consequences.	当马来西亚航空公司MH17航班坠毁消息传到俄罗斯时，人们想起了31年前的9月苏联对大韩航空007航班的攻击及其所引起的政治后果。


Back then, the Kremlin first lied to the world by saying that it had nothing to do with the missing KAL plane.	31年前，克里姆林宫先是骗全世界说自己与大韩航空飞机失踪无关。


Later it claimed that the South Korean jet was on an American spy mission.	随后它又宣称韩国飞机在执行美国的间谍任务。


But, within the Soviet leadership, the incident was a tipping point.	但是，在苏联领导层内部，此次事件成为一个引爆点。


It ended the career of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff and a hardliner of the hardest sort, whose inconsistent and unconvincing efforts to justify the downing of the plane proved deeply embarrassing to the Kremlin.	它终结了总参谋长、最强硬的强硬派奥加尔科夫（Nikolai Ogarkov）的职业生涯——他前后不一、令人无法信服的坠机理由令克里姆林宫颜面扫地。


Ogarkov’s ineptness (and inept mendacity), together with the mounting failure since 1979 of the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan, exposed the system’s advanced decrepitude.	奥加尔科夫拙劣的表演（和苍白的谎言），加上1979年以来苏联入侵阿富汗以来的失败，暴露出苏联制度的加速腐朽。


The stagnation that had begun during Leonid Brezhnev’s rule deepened after his death in 1982.	始于勃列日涅夫执政时期的停滞在其1982年逝世后日益加深。


His successors, first the KGB’s Yuri Andropov and then the Communist Party Central Committee’s Konstantin Chernenko, not only had one foot in the grave when they came to power, but were also completely unequipped to reform the Soviet Union.	他的继任者——先是克格勃的安德罗波夫，然后是苏共总书记契尔年科——在掌权时一只脚已经进了棺材，并且完全没有改革苏联的条件。


The huge loss of life in Afghanistan (equal to the United States’ losses in Vietnam, but in a far shorter period of time) already suggested to many that the Kremlin was becoming a danger to itself; the attack on a civilian airliner seemed to confirm that emerging view.	阿富汗战争导致的巨大的生命损失（相当于美国在越南的损失，但时间上短得多）让很多人感到克里姆林宫已经成为其自身的威胁； 攻击民航客机则确认了这一新观点。


It was this realization that spurred Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power, as well as support among the leadership for Gorbachev’s reformist policies of perestroika and glasnost.	正是这一意识刺激了戈尔巴乔夫问鼎权力以及领导层对戈尔巴乔夫机制调整与改革开放政策的支持。


Of course, history is not destiny, but one can be sure that at least some in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s entourage, if not Putin himself, have been thinking about Ogarkov’s failure and its impact on the Soviet elite.	当然，历史不是宿命，但我们可以肯定地说，在俄罗斯总统普京周围至少有一些人，甚至普京本人，一直在思考奥加尔科夫的失败对苏联精英的影响。


After all, Kremlin leaders, Putin included, define themselves through what was, not what could be.	毕竟，包括普京在内的克里姆林宫领导层是用昔日荣光而不是未来可能捍卫自己地位的。


Indeed, Putin’s rationale for annexing Crimea closely resembles Brezhnev’s reasoning for invading Afghanistan: to confound enemies seeking to surround the country.	事实上，普京吞并克里米亚的算盘很像勃列日涅夫入侵阿富汗的理由：挫败���图包围国家的敌人。


In 2004, speaking to Russian veterans about the Afghan invasion, Putin explained that there were legitimate geopolitical reasons to protect the Soviet Central Asian border, just as in March he cited security concerns to justify his Ukrainian land grab.	2004年，在向俄罗斯老兵发表关于入侵阿富汗的演讲时，普京解释道，捍卫苏联中亚边境有合理的地缘政治理由，一如今年3月他以安全担忧为由开脱对乌克兰领土的侵占。


In the Brezhnev era, expansionist policies reflected the country’s new energy-derived wealth.	在勃列日涅夫时代，扩张主义政策反映了苏联得自能源的新财富。


Putin’s military build-up and modernization of the past decade was also fueled by energy exports.	普京在过去十年所进行的军队建设和现代化也是通过能源出口支持的。


But Russia’s latest energy windfall has masked Putin’s incompetent economic management, with growth and government revenues now entirely reliant on the hydrocarbons sector.	但俄罗斯最近的能源暴富掩盖了普京治理经济的无能，如今增长和政府收入完全仰仗碳氢化合物。


Moreover, Putin’s incompetence extends far beyond the economy.	此外，普京的无能远远不局限于经济。


His security forces remain brutal and unaccountable; in some parts of the country, they have merged with criminal gangs.	他的安全力量依然粗暴且不受问责； 在俄罗斯的一些地方，他们与黑帮互相勾结。


His managed judiciary provides no comfort to ordinary people; and the country’s military installations, submarines, oilrigs, mining shafts, hospitals, and retirement homes regularly blow up, collapse, or sink, owing to neglect and zero liability.	他的司法管理完全不能给普通人民带来安心； 而由于被忽视和无人负责，俄罗斯的军事设施、潜艇、钻井平台、挖矿机、医院和养老院不断地萧条、崩溃和沉没。


When public support for Putin’s annexation of Crimea wanes – as it will – his failings will shine more starkly in the light of the MH17 catastrophe.	当公众对普京吞并克里米亚之举的支持逐渐退去——这是迟早的事——他的失败在MH17航班坠毁事件面前更加显露无疑了。


If the Russian state functioned well, Putin could continue to withstand pressure from opposition leaders.	如果俄罗斯国家运转良好，普京能够继续抵抗来自反对派领导人的压力。


But the opposition’s charge that Putin’s regime is composed of “swindlers and thieves” will resonate more strongly, because Russians can now see the results all around them.	但反对派的指责——普京政权纯粹由“骗子和小偷”组成——将引起更多的公民，因为俄罗斯人民现在只要环顾四周就可以看到果。


By making himself, in effect, the state, Putin, like the gerontocracy that collapsed with Gorbachev’s rise, is increasingly viewed as responsible for all state failures.	在早就自己的过程中——事实上也是造就国家的过程中——普京与随戈尔巴乔夫上台而崩溃的老人政治一样，正在日益背上国家失败责任人的形象。


And though thoughtful Russians may be hostages to Putin’s arrogance and blunders, the rest of the world is not.	而尽管思想深邃的俄罗斯人可能沦为普京的傲慢与错误的人质，但世界其他地区不会。


Indeed, his partners – particularly the other BRICS countries (Brazil, India, China, and South Africa) – are now unlikely to be able to turn a blind eye to his contempt for international law and for his neighbors’ national sovereignty, as they did during their recent Brazilian summit.	事实上，他的伙伴国家——特别是其他金砖国家（巴西、印度、中国和南非）——已不再能够对他的蔑视国际法和践踏邻国国家主权视而不见，最近的巴西峰会已经证明了这一点。


And Europe’s last blinders about Putin seem to have fallen, with the result that serious sanctions are almost certain to be imposed.	而欧洲对普京最后的盲目也已经消除，严厉制裁几乎已是板上钉钉。


Putin is only 61, a decade younger than the leaders who led the Soviet Union to the precipice, and the constitution permits him to remain in power for at least another ten years.	普京只有61岁，比把苏联推向绝境的领导人年轻十岁，而俄罗斯宪法允许他至少还能掌权十年。 但2013年GDP增长只有1.


But with GDP up by just 1.3% in 2013 – and with sanctions likely to hasten the economy’s decline – patriotic pride will not be able to shield him much longer.	3%——并且还有可能遭到加速经济衰落的制裁——爱国自豪感是无法为他提供长期屏障的。


By overplaying its hand in Afghanistan and lying to the world about the downing of KAL 007, the Soviet regime exposed and accelerated the rot that made its collapse inevitable.	在阿富汗的不自量力以及在大韩航空007航班坠毁事件上的撒谎让苏联体制的腐败暴露于众。 加速腐败导致苏联的崩溃难以避免。


There is no reason to believe in a different fate for Putin’s effort to re-establish Russia as an imperial power.	没有理由相信普京重塑俄罗斯帝国的努力会有不同的结果。


Nixon Then, China Now	过去的尼克松，现在的中国


CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA – When US President Richard Nixon embarked on his historic trip to China 40 years ago, he could not have imagined what his gamble would unleash.	加州克莱蒙特——40年前美国总统理查德·尼克松踏上访华之路时，他不可能想象到自己这次赌博会释放多大能量。


The immediate diplomatic impact, of course, was to reshape Eurasia’s geopolitical balance and put the Soviet Union on the defensive.	立竿见影的外交影响当然是重塑欧亚大陆的地缘政治平衡，逼迫苏联采取守势。


But the long-term outcome of America’s rapprochement with China became visible only recently, with the economic integration of the People’s Republic into the world economy.	但美中关系恢复的长期结果近期才开始显现，中华人民共和国实现了与世界经济的融合。


Had Nixon not acted in 1972, China’s self-imposed isolation would have continued.	如果1972年尼克松没有采取行动，中国会继续走自我孤立之路。


Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening of China to the world would have been far more difficult. amp#160;	邓小平的改革开放可能会面临更大的难度。


Four decades after the “Nixon shock,” no one disputes that China has benefited enormously Today, the impoverished and autarkic country that Nixon visited is history.	amp#160;“尼克松冲击波”释放四十年后，已经没有人否认中国在今天获益良多，尼克松曾经访问的自给自足的贫穷国家已经成为历史。


Global reintegration has turned China into an economic powerhouse.	重返国际社会已经让中国转而成为经济强国。


It is the world’s largest exporter in volume terms, and is the world’s second-largest economy.	从数量上中国已经是世界最大的出口国和世界第二大经济体。


China’s presence is felt around the world, from mines in Africa to Apple stores in the United States.	从非洲的矿井到美国的苹果专卖店，世界每个角落都能感受到中国的影响。


As we reflect on China’s remarkable progress since 1972, it is also an opportune time to consider how China continues to fall short in overcoming systemic obstacles to long-term success.	在回顾1972年来中国所取得的惊人成就的同时，也应该思考一下中国怎样在克服长期成功的系统性障碍方面做得非常不够。


Because China is widely regarded as a winner of globalization, it is natural to assume that the country has developed the means to meet its challenges.	因为中国被普遍认定为全球化的胜利者，人们自然认为中国已经找到了挑战的应对之策。


But, while China has implemented policies to maximize the benefits of free trade (undervaluing its currency, investing in infrastructure, and luring foreign manufacturing to increase competitiveness), the country remains unprepared for deeper integration with the world.	但尽管中国的政策最大限度地发挥了自由贸易的好处（通过压低货币估值、投资基础设施、吸引国外制造业以提升自身竞争力），但却并没有做好准备与世界深层次融合。


One sign of this is China’s lack of the necessary institutions and rules.	相关迹象是中国缺乏必要的制度和规则。


For example, China has become a significant player in providing economic development assistance (often tied to its strategy for acquiring natural resources).	比如，中国在提供经济发展援助（通常与获取自然资源的战略有关）领域作用已经举足轻重。


Its loans and grants to Africa have now surpassed those made by the World Bank.	它对非洲的贷款和拨款已经超过了世界银行。


But China has no specialized agency in charge of international development assistance.	但中国并没有设立专业机构对国际发展援助进行管理。


As a result, its foreign-aid programs are poorly coordinated and often seem counterproductive.	结果造成其国外援助项目缺乏协调，并往往取得适得其反的效果。


Instead of earning goodwill, they are viewed as part of a sinister neocolonial plot to grab natural resources in poverty-stricken nations.amp#160;	巨额发展援助不仅没有为中国赢得声誉，反而被视为新殖民主义在贫穷国家掠夺自然资源的险恶阴谋。


Another example is China’s lack of an immigration policy.	另一个例子是中国缺乏移民政策。


Even though China is beginning to attract labor from around the world, it has yet to promulgate a comprehensive legal framework that would allow the country to compete for the most talented people or to deal with the complexities of international migration.	尽管中国已经开始吸引世界各地的劳动力，但还没有颁布全面的法律框架，使国家能够参与对最优秀人才的争夺，或面对国际移民的复杂状况。


A third example is the absence of independent policy-research organizations.	第三个例子是缺乏独立的政策研究机构。


Owing to political control and inadequate professional development, government-run research institutions can seldom provide the high-quality, unbiased analysis of global issues on which sound policymaking depends.	由于政治控制和专业发展不足等影响，政府管理的研究机构很少能够提供合理决策所必须的公正、高质量的全球分析报告。


Perhaps most importantly, two decades of rapid GDP growth have masked serious weaknesses on the economic front.	或许最重要的是，二十年的快速GDP增长掩盖了经济领域的严重缺陷。


Because China continues to favor state capitalism and discriminates against the private sector, it lacks strong private firms that can take on Western multinational giants.	因为中国持续倚重国家资本主义并歧视私营部门，导致其缺乏能与西方跨国巨头相抗衡的强大的私营企业。


Except for Huawei, Lenovo, and perhaps Haier (which is nominally collectively owned), there are no private Chinese firms with a global footprint.	除名义上归集体所有的华为、联想和海尔外，中国私营企业都没有实现国际化。


Until now, China has not paid dearly for this.	迄今为止，中国尚未为此付出惨重的代价。


Its role in the global economy is confined to low-to-medium-end processing and assembly functions.	它在全球经济中发挥的作用仅限于中低端加工和组装。


The most critical, sophisticated, and profitable parts of the value chain – research and development, product design, branding, marketing, service, and distribution – are occupied by American, European, Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese companies.	美国、欧洲、日本、韩国和台湾企业仍然占据着价值链最关键、最复杂、也最有利可图的部分，包括研发、产品设计、品牌、营销、服务和销售。


China simply “outsources” these high value-added functions to the likes of Apple and Walmart.	中国只是把这些高附加值产业外包给像苹果和沃尔玛这样的巨头。


Of course, China does have huge firms, but they are inefficient state-owned behemoths that owe their size and profitability to their legal monopolies and government subsidies.	当然，中国同样存在着巨型企业，但它们是效率低下的国有庞然大物，其体量和盈利基本来源于合法的垄断和政府补贴。


They may have the heft needed for global operations, but they lack the motivation to compete with world-class Western firms and are greeted with suspicion and fear around the world.	它们也许具备全球运营所必须的体量，但却缺乏与世界一流西方公司竞争的积极性，并引来世界各地怀疑和恐惧的目光。


A China deeply embedded in globalization also needs a large pool of talented people, comparable to the best that the West can produce.	深层全球化的中国同样需要能与西方顶尖人才相媲美的大量人才储备。


Today’s China lacks that pool.	而今天的中国还远未实现这一目标。


While tens of millions of Chinese young people display impressive innate abilities, the country’s system of higher education does an abysmal job cultivating their talents.	尽管数以千万计的中国年轻人表现出的天赋令人赞叹，但国家高等教育系统在开发潜能方面做得非常糟糕。


For most, the curriculum is largely obsolete, and skewed toward rote learning of theory at the expense of basic analytical and critical-thinking skills.	绝大多数课程基本偏重于对理论的死记硬背，而牺牲了对基本分析和批判性思维技能的培养。


Education in social sciences and humanities is particularly deficient, owing to lack of investment in these disciplines and excessive political control of curricula.	由于在社会及人文科学领域缺乏投资和对课程实行过多政治控制，导致上述领域的教育尤其落后。


As a result, Chinese graduate from colleges and universities having learned relatively little about the outside world in fields such as anthropology, sociology, international relations, comparative literature, and history.	结果导致中国的高校及大学毕业生在人类学、社会学、国际关系、比较文学和历史等领域对外界了解较少。


Unless China reforms its ossified system, the country will not be able to produce enough highly trained talent to compete with the world’s best and brightest.	除非改革僵化体制，否则中国将无法教育出足够数量的训练有素的人才参与全球顶级人才竞争。


None of these shortcomings – the lack of globalization-friendly institutions, rules, corporations, and talent – is an insurmountable obstacle.	缺乏适应全球化的制度、规则、企业和人才都并非不可逾越的障碍。


The real question is whether China can remove them under a one-party regime that is hostile to the liberal values that inspire and underpin globalization.	自由价值观是全球化的灵感来源和基础，真正的问题在于而中国能否在对自由价值观持仇视态度的一党专制下扫除这些障碍。


Nixon himself was probably not bothered by the nature of the Chinese regime four decades ago.	40年前尼克松本人可能并未因中国的政权性质而纠结。


The fact that the question must be addressed now attests to China’s astonishing progress since then.	之所以现在这些问题必须解决正说明中国此后的惊人进步。


But it also shows that China’s long march toward global integration remains unfinished.	但这也表明中国实现全球一体化的长征远未画上句号。


The Assad Dead End	阿萨德死角


PARIS – Forget principles and morality.	巴黎——忘记原则和道德。


Forget, or try to forget, the quarter-million deaths for which Bashar al-Assad is responsible, directly or indirectly, since choosing to respond with violence to a peaceful uprising of the Syrian people.	忘记、抑或尽量忘记因为选择暴力应对叙利亚人民的和平起义，25万人的死亡必须由巴沙尔·阿萨德直接或间接负责。


Set aside the fact that Assad’s forces have caused 10-15 times more civilian deaths thus far than the Islamic State, whose horrific execution videos have overshadowed the Syrian dictator’s invisible massacres.	姑且不论阿萨德部队迄今为止造成的平民死亡10至15倍于伊斯兰国，但叙利亚独裁者无形的杀戮却在后者恐怖的死刑录像面前黯然失色。


But even if you can purge all of this from your thoughts, a policy for Syria that posits Assad as an “alternative” to the Islamic State is simply not viable.	但即便你能无视这样的想法，假定以阿萨德“取代”伊斯兰国的叙利亚政策根本是行不通的。


Assad, after all, literally unleashed the Islamic State’s current savagery: in May 2011, he released hundreds of Islamic radicals from prison, quickly supplying the infant group with fighters and leaders.	归根结底阿萨德是伊斯兰国当前野蛮行为的实际释放者：2011年5月，他从狱中释放了数百名伊斯兰激进分子，迅速为当时新生的恐怖组织提供了战士和领袖。


He then methodically shelled positions held by moderate rebels, while no less methodically sparing the Islamic State’s stronghold in Raqqa.	之后他有条不紊地炮轰温和派叛军阵地，同时却同样有条不紊地放过了伊斯兰国在拉卡的大本营。


And then, in mid-2014, he allowed Iraqi elements of the Islamic State to find sanctuary in eastern Syria.	之后，在2014年年中，他允许伊斯兰国的伊拉克分支将叙利亚东部当作避难所。


In other words, Assad created the monster that he is now pretending to fight.	换句话讲，是阿萨德一手炮制了他现在假装想打的怪物。


Is all that not a little much for a potential ally?	这对潜在的盟友来讲难道没有一点过分之处？


Can working with Assad possibly provide a sound basis for what is supposed to be a common effort?	与阿萨德合作究竟能否为假想中的共同努力打下坚实的基础？


The bottom line is that Assad has no interest in winning.	关键在于阿萨德没有取胜的意愿。


The man who now holds himself up as civilization’s last bulwark against the Islamic State is also the last man who wants to see it eliminated.	这个现在自命为文明对抗伊斯兰国最后一道屏障的人最不愿意看到恐怖组织被消灭的结果。


After all, does a chess player, even a bad one, intentionally sacrifice his most powerful piece?	毕竟，就算水平再差，有没有棋手故意牺牲自己最有力的棋子？


Do any of us ever tear up our insurance policies?	有没有人撕碎自己的保险单？


Do we really believe that Assad and his cronies are too stupid to have realized that their political survival depends on that of the Islamic State and on maintaining themselves as the keepers of the gate through which the rest of us must pass to wage war against it?	难道我们真的认为阿萨德及其亲信都愚蠢到看不透自己的政治生命与伊斯兰国联在一起，看不透他们的命运取决于能否守住大门，不让外界攻打伊斯兰国？


“Of course not,” the advocates of working with him concede.	与阿萨德合作的倡导者们承认“当然不”。


“But let’s take a two-step approach.	“但我们可以分两步走。


Let’s defeat the Islamic State and then worry about Assad.”	先击败伊斯兰国再对付阿萨德。 ”


But this, too, assumes that dictators are more stupid than they really are.	但这种方法也低估了独裁者。


Worse, it ignores that politics follows its own logic, or at least its own dynamics.	更糟的是，它没有意识到政���有其自身的逻辑，或者至少也有其自身的推动因素。


What the sorcerer’s apprentices who want to work with Assad ignore is that they would most likely have a great deal of trouble, when the time comes, distancing themselves from an ally who would not be shy about claiming his share of the victory.	想和阿萨德合作的魔法师的学徒似乎没有认识到一旦时机来临，他们极有可能很难与阿萨德拉开距离，因为这个曾经的盟友在分享胜利果实的时刻丝毫不会害羞。


As a result, jihadism would rush back in, though perhaps in a different guise.	结果是圣战主义会卷土重来，尽管这一次可能会以不同的面目。


“Bashar al-Assad is the Syrian state,” the same people say.	“巴沙尔·阿萨德就是叙利亚政府”，同样这些人说。


“And we must not commit the fatal error of destroying the state.”	“我们决不能犯推翻政府的致命错误。


But this argument is not valid, either.	”但这种说法根本不成立。


The state has already failed: Assad's regime controls only a fifth of Syria’s territory, and the remaining four-fifths will never willingly resubmit to its terrifying control.	国家已经失败了：阿萨德只控制着叙利亚领土的五分之一，其余五分之四永远不会心甘情愿地重新接受其可怕的掌控。


If the regime prevails, Syria’s citizens will continue to flee in droves to Turkey, Lebanon, and Europe.	如果阿萨德政权最终胜出，叙利亚民众将继续成群结队逃往土耳其、黎巴嫩和欧洲。


In fact, Assad’s regime cares so little for its pseudo-state that it abandons its own soldiers caught beyond the territory it controls, as occurred in Tabqa, near Raqqa.	事实上，阿萨德政权根本不在乎这个伪政府，就像拉卡附近塔布卡所发生的那样，它将在控制区域外被捕的士兵弃之不顾。


Baathist Syria, whatever its friends in the Kremlin and elsewhere say, is dead and buried.	无论其在克里姆林宫和其他地方的朋友怎么说，叙利亚社会党的叙利亚已经入土。


And no military trompe l’œil can revive it.	没有任何一种军事错觉可以让其复活。


But the supposed realists refuse to accept reality.	但这样的现实所谓的现实主义者却拒绝接受。


Just as it was necessary to ally with Stalin to defeat Hitler, they claim, we should not be afraid to play the Assad card to rid ourselves of the Islamic State.	就像必须与斯大林结盟才能打败希特勒一样，他们声称，我们也不应该害怕同阿萨德合作消灭伊斯兰国。


Yes, jihadism is the fascism of our day, infected with plans, ideas, and a will to purity comparable to those of the Nazis.	的确，圣战是我们这个时代的法西斯主义，其计划、理念和对纯粹的狂热可以和纳粹相抗衡。


I was one of the first to suggest the comparison some 20 years ago.	20年前第一批做出上述比较的人当中就有我。


And yet it is absurd to compare the power of the two phenomena, or to suggest that in the confrontation with the butchers of Mosul and Palmyra, the democracies face a strategic challenge analogous to that of the Nazi Wehrmacht.	但对比这两种现象背后的力量、或提出面对摩苏尔和巴尔米拉的屠夫，民主国家面临与纳粹德国类似的战略挑战十分荒谬。


This historical leap is possible only for people whose political irresponsibility is matched by their proclivity for lazy analogy.	只有政治上不负责任且总爱胡乱比喻的人才有可能实现这样的历史跨越。


Make no mistake: the Islamic State is strong.	毫无疑问：伊斯兰国的确强大。


But it is not so strong as to leave those who would fight it with only the politics of the lesser of two evils.	但它还没有强大到让自己的对手只能采取两害相权取其轻的对策。


The West must decide what to do.	西方必须决定该怎么做。


In the aftermath of last week’s peace talks in Vienna – which convened the United States, Russia, Iran, China, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, Jordan, Lebanon, and key European Union members – that question becomes increasingly difficult.	上周举行的维也纳和谈后——此次和谈汇集了美国、俄罗斯、伊朗、中国、埃及、土耳其、沙特阿拉伯和其他海湾国家、约旦、黎巴嫩和主要欧盟成员国——解决问题的难度越来越大。


Should we equip what remains of the Free Syrian Army?	我们应该装备余下的自由叙利亚军？


Should we deal with the few remaining Alawite leaders whose hands are not stained with blood, or those members of Assad’s clan who chose exile early and thus were not involved in the massacres?	还是应该与少数几个手上没有沾血的阿拉维派领导人打交道？ 抑或我们应该选择早期流亡的阿萨德派成员，因为他们没有参与过大屠杀？


Perhaps there is still time to bring together, on neutral ground, some of the elements that comprised the old Syria.	或许还有时间在中立地点集合某些原有的叙利亚元素。


Or perhaps more radical solutions – of the type implemented in Germany and Japan after World War II – are now required.	或者这次需要更激进的解决方案，就像二战后在德国和日本实行的那样。


All of these paths remain open, but they are narrowing.	所有这些方案都还可能，但可能性却越来越小。


And none of them depends on the political survival of Bashar al-Assad.	其中没有一个需要巴沙尔·阿萨德。


Nobel Injustice	诺贝尔奖的不公


SINGAPORE – Martti Ahtisaari is a great man.	新加坡--阿赫蒂萨里是个了不起的人物。


He deserves the Nobel Peace Prize for his life work.	他因其毕生从事的工作获得诺贝尔奖名至实归。


But it was a mistake for the Norwegian Nobel Committee to cite his work in Aceh as a reason for giving him the prize.	但是，挪威诺贝尔奖委员会引述其在印尼亚齐省的工作作为获奖理由则有失偏颇。


As a recent story by Agence France Presse put it, Ahtisaari’s “most notable achievement was overseeing the 2005 reconciliation of the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement rebels, bringing an end to a three-decade-old conflict that killed some 15,000 people.”	法新社最近的电稿指出，阿赫蒂萨里“最为杰出的成就是在2005年监督印尼政府和自由亚齐运动反叛组织之间的和解，从而结束了令大约一万五千人丧失、长达三十年之久的冲突”。


But it was Indonesia’s people and leaders who should have received the Nobel Peace Prize for the Aceh political miracle.	但是，正是印尼人民和领导人本应该因亚齐省政治奇迹而获得诺贝尔奖。


More fundamentally, the mentioning of Aceh in this Nobel citation raises serious questions about the mental maps used by the Nobel Prize Committee in making these awards.	更为重要的是，诺贝尔奖得颁奖理由提到亚齐省，这就对诺贝尔委员会颁发奖项时的心理座标提出了严重质疑。


The committee members increasingly seem to be prisoners of the past.	该委员会成员好似越发成为历史的囚犯。


They continue to assume that we live in an era of Western domination of world history.	他们继续假定我们生活在世界历史由西方统治的时代。


But that era is over.	但是这一时代已经结束。


Increasingly, the rest of the world has gone from being objects of world history to becoming its subjects.	世界其他各地越发从世界历史的客体成为主体。


By giving the Nobel Peace Prize to the Indonesians instead of a European mediator for Aceh, the Nobel Prize Committee would have recognized that the world has changed.	如果诺贝尔委员会把诺贝尔奖颁发给了印尼人而非亚齐省问题的欧洲调停人，那么，它就会承认世界已经不同了。


Three other big benefits would also have resulted from giving the award to an Indonesian.	把奖项授予印尼人本还可以有另外巨大的好处。


First, the West associates the Islamic world with violence and instability.	首先，西方把穆斯林世界与暴力和不稳定联系起来。


Few believe that Muslims are capable of solving their political problems by themselves.	很少有人相信穆斯林有能力自己解决他们的政治问题。


But this is precisely what the Aceh story was all about.	但是这正是亚齐省和平得关键所在。


Two key Indonesian leaders, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla, showed remarkable political skill and courage in working out the peace deal for Aceh.	印尼总统苏希洛和副总统卡拉在提出亚齐省和平协议的过程中展示了杰出的政治技巧和勇气。


A Nobel Peace Prize for them would have shown the West that Muslims can be good peacemakers and, equally important, it would have sent a message of hope to the Islamic populations of the world that have seen their self-esteem eroded by stories of failure.	如果把诺贝尔奖授予他们，原本可以向西方表明穆斯林是优秀的和平缔造者，而且同样重要的是，这会给世界上的穆斯林人民传递希望的信息，而穆斯林的自尊已经由于屡屡失败而备受损害。


Aceh was essentially a spectacular Muslim success story.	亚齐省和平在本质上是穆斯林成功的巨大典范。


Hence, the Nobel Peace Prize Committee has squandered a valuable opportunity to send out a message of hope to the world’s 1.2 billion Muslims, one that would have rid the world of the grand global illusion that peacemaking is a “white man’s burden.”	因此，诺贝尔奖委员会浪费了一个宝贵的机会来向全世界十二亿穆斯林传递一个希望的信息。 这一信息原本可以让世界放弃巨大的、遍布全球的幻觉，也就是缔造和平是“白人的责任”。


No Brexit	不会有英国退出


LONDON – Among the multiple existential challenges facing the European Union this year – refugees, populist politics, German-inspired austerity, government bankruptcy in Greece and perhaps Portugal – one crisis is well on its way to resolution.	伦敦—在今年欧盟所面临的多重生存挑战中——包括难民、民粹主义政治、德国要求的紧缩、希腊（也许还有葡萄牙）政府破产等——有一场危机正在走向解决。


Britain will not vote to leave the EU.	英国不会表决离开欧盟。


This confident prediction may seem to be contradicted by polls showing roughly 50% support for “Brexit” in the June referendum.	如此自信的预测似乎与民调相悖。 民调显示，在6月的全民公决中将有大约50%支持“英国退出”。


And British public opinion may move even further in the “Out” direction for a while longer, as euroskeptics ridicule the “new deal” for Britain agreed at the EU summit on February 19.	英国公共观点可能更加偏向于“退出”方向更长一些，欧元怀疑派纷纷对2月19日欧盟峰会所达成的英国“新协议”极尽嘲讽。


Nonetheless, it is probably time for the world to stop worrying.	尽管如此，也许世界现在应该停止担心了。


The politics and economics of the question virtually guarantee that British voters will back EU membership, even though this may not become apparent in public opinion polls until a few weeks, or even days, before the vote.	这个问题的政治面和经济面几乎可以保证英国选民将支持保留欧盟成员资格，尽管民调要等到公决前几周甚至几天才会表现出来。


To understand the dynamics that strongly favor an “In” vote, start with the politics.	要理解强烈偏向于“留下”选项的原因，让我们从政治开始。


Until this month’s deal, Britain’s leaders were not seriously making the case against Brexit.	在本月的协议达成前，英国领导人并没有认真对待英国退出问题。


After all, Prime Minister David Cameron and his government had to pretend that they would contemplate a breakup if the EU rejected their demands.	毕竟，如果欧盟拒绝英国的要求，首相卡梅伦及其政府必须装作要考虑决裂。


Under these circumstances, it was impossible for either Labour politicians or business leaders to advocate an EU deal that Cameron himself was not yet ready to promote.	在这样的背景下，无论是工党政客还是商界领袖都不可能支持卡梅伦本人都不准备推进的欧盟协议。


The Out lobby therefore enjoyed a virtual monopoly of public attention.	因此，“离开”派几乎垄断了公共关注。


This situation may briefly persist, even though the EU deal has now been agreed, because Cameron has no wish to antagonize his party’s implacable euroskeptics until it is absolutely necessary; but as the referendum approaches, this political imbalance will abruptly reverse.	这一局面可能会短暂地持续一段时间，即使如今欧盟协议已经达成，因为卡梅伦不到万不得已不会触怒其所在政党的死硬派欧洲怀疑者； 但随着公决的临近，这一政治不平衡将迅速逆转。


One reason is Cameron’s decision to release his ministers from party discipline during the referendum campaign.	一个原因是卡梅伦决定在公决选战期间让其部长不受党纪约束。


Initially viewed as a sign of weakness, Cameron’s move has turned out to be a masterstroke.	卡梅伦的这一举动乍看上去是示弱，实则是一招妙手。


Having been offered the freedom to “vote your conscience” on the EU deal, most significant Conservative politicians – with the notable exceptions of Boris Johnson and Michael Gove – have come around to supporting Cameron.	获得了向欧盟协议“投出良心票”的机会的所有保守党政治要人都选择支持卡梅伦。


As a result, the Out campaign has been left effectively leaderless and has already split into two rival factions – one driven mainly by anti-immigrant and protectionist sentiment, the other determined to concentrate on neoliberal economics and free trade.	这些新出现的欧盟忠诚派包括两位非常有影响力的欧盟怀疑派——伦敦市长鲍里斯·约翰逊（Boris Johnson）和内政部长特蕾莎·梅（Theresa May）。 因此，“离开”阵营实际上已是群龙无首，分裂为对立的两排——一派主要受反移民和保护主义情绪推动，另一派决定将焦点集中在新自由主义经济学和自由贸易上。


It can be confidently predicted that as the political tide turns, the British media and business opinion will follow, mainly because of direct financial interests.	随着政治潮流的转变，可以很有信心地预测，英国媒体和商界的观点也会跟进，这主要是因为直接金融利益。


For example, Rupert Murdoch, whose outlets dominate the media landscape, needs membership in the EU single market to consolidate his satellite TV businesses in Britain, Germany, and Italy.	比如，主宰媒体界的鲁珀特·默多克（Rupert Murdoch）需要欧盟单一市场成员地位来整合他旗下的英国、德国和意大利卫星电视公司。


Another powerful motivator for Murdoch, as well as for other media proprietors and business leaders, is to be on the winning side and to maintain good relations with Cameron, unless they see overwhelming evidence that he will lose.	默多克——以及其他媒体巨头和商界领袖——的另一动机是要站在赢的一边，保持与卡梅伦的良好关系，除非他们认为有压倒性证据证明卡梅伦会失败。


That brings us to the main reason for ignoring current opinion polls: Only when Britain starts seriously debating the costs and benefits of leaving the EU – and this may not happen until a few weeks before the referendum – will voters realize that Brexit would mean huge economic costs for Britain and no political benefits whatsoever.	这就引出了忽视最近民调结果的主要原因：只有当英国人开始认真讨论离开欧盟的成本和收益时——而这一刻要到公决前几周才会到来——选民才会认识到英国退出将给英国带来巨大的经济成本但毫无政治利益可言。


The economic challenges of Brexit would be overwhelming.	英国退出的经济挑战是巨大的。


The Out campaign’s main economic argument – that Britain’s huge trade deficit is a secret weapon, because the EU would have more to lose than Britain from a breakdown in trade relations – is flatly wrong.	“离开”阵营的主要经济观点——英国的庞大贸易赤字是一个秘密武器，因为如果贸易关系破裂，欧盟的损失要大于英国——大错特错。


Britain would need to negotiate access to the European single market for its service industries, whereas EU manufacturers would automatically enjoy virtually unlimited rights to sell whatever they wanted in Britain under global World Trade Organization rules.	英国需要与欧洲单一市场谈判，允许其服务业进入其中，而欧盟制造商将根据全球世界贸易组织规则，享受几乎无限制地根据自己的意愿向英国出售一切商品的权利。


Margaret Thatcher was the first to realize that Britain’s specialization in services – not only finance, but also law, accountancy, media, architecture, pharmaceutical research and so on – makes membership in the EU single market critical.	撒切尔夫人是第一个认识到英国在服务业——不仅包括金融，也包括法律、会计、媒体、建筑、制药研究等——方面的专长意味着成为欧盟单一市场成员至关重要的人。


It makes little economic difference to Germany, France, or Italy whether Britain is an EU member or simply in the WTO.	对于德国、法国和意大利来说，英国是欧盟成员或仅仅是世贸组织成员在经济上没有什么区别。


Britain would therefore need an EU association agreement, similar to those negotiated with Switzerland or Norway, the only two significant European economies outside the EU.	英国将因此需要与欧盟签订类似于瑞士或挪威的合作协议。 后两者是欧盟之外仅有的两个重要的欧洲经济体。


From the EU’s perspective, the terms of any British deal would have to be at least as stringent as those in the existing association agreements.	从欧盟角度，英国协议的条件至少需要与现有合作协议一样严格。


To grant easier terms would immediately force matching concessions to Switzerland and Norway.	授予英国更���松的条件立刻将迫使它们向瑞士和挪威也做出同样让步。


Worse still, any special favors for Britain would set a precedent and tempt other lukewarm EU members to make exit threats and demand renegotiation.	更糟糕的是，任何偏向英国的特殊待遇都会树立一个先例，诱使其他态度冷淡的欧盟成员国提出退出威胁和要求重新谈判。


Among the conditions accepted by Norway and Switzerland that the EU would surely regard as non-negotiable are four that completely negate the political objectives of Brexit.	在挪威和瑞士所接受、欧盟显然将视为不可谈判的条件中，有四项完全不符合英国退出的政治目标。


Norway and Switzerland must abide by all EU single market standards and regulations, without any say in their formulation.	挪威和瑞士必须遵守所有欧盟单一市场标准和监管，并且不容置喙。


They agree to translate all relevant EU laws into their domestic legislation without consulting domestic voters.	它们同意在不征询国内选民意见的情况下将所有相关欧盟法律引入国内立法。


They contribute substantially to the EU budget.	它们向欧盟预算提供大量资金。


And they must accept unlimited EU immigration, resulting in a higher share of EU immigrants in the Swiss and Norwegian populations than in the UK.	它们必须接受无限制的欧盟移民，这导致瑞士和挪威人口中欧盟移民的比例高于英国。


If Britain rejected these encroachments on national sovereignty, its service industries would be locked out of the single market.	如果英国拒绝这些对国家主权的侵犯，其服务业将无法进入欧盟单一市场。


The French, German, and Irish governments would be particularly delighted to see UK-based banks and hedge funds shackled by EU regulations, and UK-based businesses involved in asset management, insurance, accountancy, law, and media forced to transfer their jobs, head offices, and tax payments to Paris, Frankfurt, or Dublin.	法国、德国和意大利政府尤其乐于见到英国银行和对冲基金被欧盟监管束缚手脚，英国资产管理、保险、会计、法律和媒体公司被迫将工作岗位、总部和税金转移给巴黎、法兰克福或都柏林。


When confronted with this exodus of high-value service jobs and businesses, Britain would surely balk and accept the intrusive regulations entailed by Swiss and Norwegian-style EU association agreements.	面临如此巨大的高价值服务业就业岗位和企业的流失，英国显然只能屈服，接受瑞士和挪威的欧盟合作协议中的侵略性监管条款。


Ultimately, Brexit would not only force a disruptive renegotiation of economic relations; it would also lead to a loss of political sovereignty for Britain.	最终，英国退出不但将迫使英国进行破坏性经济关系重新谈判； 还将导致英国损失政治主权。


Or maybe just for England, given that Scotland would probably leave the UK and rejoin the EU, taking many of London’s service jobs to Edinburgh in the process.	或者也许仅仅对英格兰是如此，因为苏格兰可能脱离英国重新加入欧盟，让大量伦敦服务业岗位转移到爱丁堡。


Once Britain’s political, business, and media leaders start drawing attention to these hard facts of life after Brexit, we can be confident that voters will decide to stay in the EU.	一旦英国政治、商业和媒体领袖开始注意到这些关于英国退出之后的生活的“硬”事实，我们大可信心满满地认为选民将会决定留在欧盟。


Japan’s Coming Political Earthquake	即将来临的日本政坛地震


OSAKA – Japan is now confronting challenges at home and abroad that are as serious as any it has had to face since World War II’s end.	大阪—日本正面临自二战以来最严重的内忧外患。


Yet the Japanese public is displaying remarkable apathy.	但日本公众对此似乎漠不关心。


The country’s two major political parties, the governing Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) recently chose their leaders, yet ordinary Japanese responded with a collective shrug.	该国两大主要政党——执政党民主党和自民党最近选出了各自的党首，但普通日本群众对此一哂了之。


But Japan’s political system is unlikely to remain a matter of popular indifference for much longer.	但公众对日本的政治制度的冷漠态度不会维持太久。


The DPJ first came to power in September 2009, with an ambitious program promising comprehensive administrative reform, no tax increases, and a freer hand in Japan’s alliance with the United States.	民主党2009年9月第一次上台执政，他们有一个雄心勃勃的计划，要进行全面的政治改革、不增税，并对美日同盟采取更自由放任的态度。


But, owing to the party’s inexperience and incompetence at every level of policymaking – shortcomings that were compounded by the unprecedented devastation of the great earthquake of March 11, 2011 – the first two DPJ governments, under Yukio Hatoyama and Naoto Kan, ended with those pledges in tatters.	但是，该党在各个决策层面都缺乏经验和能力——2011年3月11日大地震所造成的前所未有的破坏更是加剧了民主党这方面的缺陷——因此第一届和第二届民主党政府（分别以鸠山由纪夫和菅直人为首相）都在没有完成承诺的情况下下了台。


Consequently, several dozen legislators, led by the perpetual rebel Ichiro Ozawa, defected from the DPJ, forming a new rump opposition party.	结果，以永远的叛逆者小泽一郎为首的数十名立法委员脱离民主党，成立了新的无足轻重的反对党。


The DPJ has now reelected incumbent Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda as its president, despite his very low public-approval rating.	民主党重新选举了现任首相野田佳彦为党首，但他的公众支持度很低。


With a thin majority in the lower house and a narrow plurality in the upper house (which has adopted a censure resolution against Noda), the DPJ on its own is unable to pass fiscal and other legislation essential to running a government.	民主党在众议院和参议员都只占微弱优势（参议院还通过了针对野田佳彦的谴责议案），无法靠自己的力量通过运转政府所必须的财政和其他立法。


As a result, the prime minister is barely muddling through – and only by agreeing with the major opposition parties to dissolve the lower house.	结果，野田佳彦只能疲于应付——而且这也得通过与主要反对党形成妥协以解散众议院来实现。


Though he has not specified exactly when he will do so, the endgame for the DPJ government has begun.	尽管野田佳彦并没有明说什么时候会这样做，但民主党政府的末日已经指日可待了。


Yet the rival LDP, which had governed almost uninterruptedly for several decades until 2009, has proven itself to be an ineffective opposition party.	但其对手、在2009年以前独占执政地位几十年的自民党已经证明自己并不是合格的反对党。


Unable to overcome popular distrust, owing to its longstanding symbiosis with the bureaucrats and subservience to the US, the LDP has been incapable of holding the DPJ accountable in the legislature.	由于长期以来与官僚的相互勾结和对美国的屈膝卑躬，自民党无法克服公众的不信任感。


Instead, the LDP, having failed to reinvigorate itself and attract allies, has occasionally taken a buck-passing approach, such as permitting the DPJ to pass an unpopular but inevitable and necessary increase in the consumption tax.	自民党没能实现自新和吸引盟友，反而时不时地采取推诿的方针，比如，它允许民主党通过了不受公众支持但有不可避免的消费税的必要增税。


In an effort to enhance popular support for the party, the LDP presidential campaign took advantage of a heightened sense of crisis centered on Japan’s territorial disputes with Russia, South Korea, and, most recently and alarmingly, China.	为了增加民众支持度，自民党党首竞选活动充分利用了日本与俄罗斯、韩国以及（最近也是最紧张的）中国的领土纠纷。


The party chose as its leader former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who is known as the hardest of hardliners on nationalist matters, but who is also widely perceived as having acted irresponsibly when he abruptly gave up his premiership in 2007, after only one year in office, due to health problems.	自民党选举前首相安倍晋三为新党首，他是出了名的民族主义强硬派，但人们普遍认为，他在2007年问鼎首相宝座不足一年时便因健康问题而突然辞职是不负责任之举。


His comeback has given the country a rather odd feeling of déjà vu.	他的回归让日本民众有一种奇怪的昨日重现的感觉。


So, the Japanese public is now searching for a party that can take on the tasks of reforming the country, reviving the economy, and enhancing national security.	因此，日本民众现在所要寻找的政党是一个能够改革国家、振兴经济、改善国家安全的政党。


Neither the DPJ nor the LDP appears dependable in any of these areas.	不管是民主党还是自民党，都不能在这些领域有大的作为。


As a result, the public is paying increasing attention to the newly created Japan Restoration Party (JRP) and its populist leader, Osaka City Mayor Toru Hashimoto, a former governor of Osaka prefecture and the son of a minor Yakuza (mafioso).	结果，越来越多的日本民众把目光投向了新成立的日本维新党及其民粹主义党首、大阪市市长、前大阪府知事、黑道���头目之子桥下彻。


The JRP aspires to be a ruling party, or at least a kingmaker in Japanese politics, but it has an almost exclusively domestic agenda and suffers from a dearth of talent below Hashimoto.	维新党有可能成为执政党，至少可以成为能够左右日本政坛的政党，但其纲领几乎只包括国内事务，且除了大桥彻便再无人才。


Without a comprehensive agenda and expertise in foreign and security policy, the party will most likely stumble badly should it come to power.	没有全面的施政纲领以及外交和安全政策方面的专家，维新党即使上台，执政效果恐怕也不会好。


It is almost certain that the next general election will not produce a parliamentary majority for a single party.	几乎可以肯定的是，接下来的大选不会产生一党独大的众议院。


Given the parties’ ideological, organizational, and policy disarray, Japan will enter a period of profound uncertainty, ultimately leading to an unprecedented political shakeup.	由于各党在意识形态、组织和政策各方面相去甚远，日本将步入一个极度不确定的时代，并最终走向前所未有的政治震荡。


This prospect may seem surprising, given that Japan has already lost two decades since its economy’s bubble burst in the early 1990’s.	这一前景看起来令人惊奇，因为自20世纪90年代初经济泡沫破裂以来，日本已经经历了失去的二十年。


But, after a short-lived non-LDP government, successive coalition governments until 2009 had the LDP at their core.	但是，在一个短命的非自民党政府之后，前2009年时代的联合政府的继任者依然要以自民党为核心。


Japan’s hidebound postwar regime has been insulated, externally and internally, by relatively unchanging geostrategic and economic conditions.	日本死板的战后制度因国内外相对稳定的地缘政治和经济环境而被隔离起来。


The country remains the world’s largest creditor, and has slowly but steadily eliminated enormous non-performing loans in its banking sector.	日本仍是世界最大的债权国，其银行部门正在缓慢但稳健地消灭巨量的不良贷款。


Moreover, the Cold War never ended in East Asia, requiring the preservation of a US-led security system centered on the US-Japan alliance – an alliance that appears to presuppose a pliant Japanese political system.	此外，冷战在东亚从未结束，这需要以美日同盟为核心的美国领导的安全体系——而美日同盟需以顺从的日本政治制度为前提。


In fact, the system’s resilience in absorbing huge disruptions – the 2008 financial crisis and the 2011 earthquake – is one key reason for its survival.	事实上，该制度吸收巨大破坏力（2008年金融危机和2011年大地震）的韧性正是其生存下来的关键原因。


Thus, Japan remains broadly credible, at least relative to the US and the European Union.	因此，日本仍拥有极高的信誉，特别是相对美国和欧盟而言。


The yen’s appreciation reflects markets’ assessment that Japan’s economic position is stronger than that of the US and the EU, which are burdened with serious structural problems of their own.	日元的升值表明市场对日本经济状况的评价要高于美国和欧洲，后两者各有各的严峻的结构性问题。


Indeed, with a huge capital surplus and very low interest rates in a time of creeping deflation, Japan now has a golden opportunity to invest in public infrastructure, education, defense, and overseas projects – a burst comparable to the British Empire in the late nineteenth century.	事实上，处于爬行通缩期的日本出现的巨额资本盈余和极低利率，可谓投资公共基础设施、教育、防务和海外工程的黄金机会——可以与19世纪末期不列颠帝国的大爆发相媲美。


But Japan is unable to seize these opportunities, because its political system is incapable of producing competent leadership.	但日本则没能力抓住这些机会，因为其政治制度无法产生胜任的领导层。


Given rising tensions in Asia, the question is how long this can last.	在亚洲冲突重重的情况下，问题在于这一状态会持续多久。


China’s rise and America’s relative decline present not only a danger for Japan, but also an opportunity – and perhaps the needed momentum boost – for real reform.	中国的崛起和美国的相对衰落带给日本的不仅是危险，也是实施真正改革的机会，或许同时也是日本所需要的冲劲。


No Escape from Empire’s Graveyard	无法从帝国的坟墓脱身


NEW DELHI – With the stage set for secret talks in Qatar between the United States and the Taliban, US President Barack Obama’s strategy for a phased exit from war-ravaged Afghanistan is now being couched in nice-sounding terms that hide more than they reveal.	新德里——随着美国和塔利班在卡塔尔筹备秘密会谈，美国总统贝拉克•奥巴马从饱受战争蹂躏的阿富汗分阶段撤离的战略现在使用了悦耳的措辞，其隐含的意思比表明的意思要多。


In seeking a Faustian bargain with the Taliban, Obama risks repeating US policy mistakes that now haunt regional and international security.	为了与塔利班达成浮士德式的交易，奥巴马有可能再犯美国在当今地区和国际安全方面的政策错误。


Since coming to office, Obamahas pursued an Afghan strategy that can be summed up in three words: surge, bribe, and run.	自执政以来，奥巴马追求的阿富汗战略可以概括为三个词：增兵、贿赂、撤离。


The military mission has now entered the “run” part, or what euphemistically is being called the “transition to 2014.”	军事任务现在进入了“撤离”阶段，委婉一点就是“2014年之前的转型期”


The central objective is to cut a deal with the Taliban so that the US and its NATO partners exit the “graveyard of empires” without losing face.	核心目标就是与塔利班签订协议，这样美国及其北约的盟友就可以撤出“帝国的坟墓”，又不丢面子。


This approach – aimed more at withdrawing forces as soon as possible than at ensuring enduring peace and regional stability – is being dressed up as “reconciliation,” with Qatar, Germany, and the United Kingdom getting lead roles in facilitating a settlement.	这种做法——与其说是为了确保长期和平和地区稳定还不如说是为了部队尽快撤离——披上了“和解”的外衣，卡塔尔、德国和英国在牵头促成协议。


Yet what stands out is how little the US has learned from the past.	然而，引人注目的是美国竟然好了伤疤就忘了痛。


In critical respects, it is beginning to repeat its own mistakes, whether by creating or funding new local militias in Afghanistan, or by striving to come to terms with the Taliban.	在关键领域，美国开始重蹈覆辙了，比如在阿富汗组建或资助本土的武装组织、努力与塔利班达成协议等。


As with the covert war that the US waged in the 1980’s in Afghanistan against Soviet military intervention, so, too, have short-term interests driven US policy in the current overt war.	20世纪80年代，出于短期的利益，美国在阿富汗发动了秘密战争，应对苏联的军事干预，但是在当前这场众人皆知的战争中，引导美国政策的还是短期的利益。


To be sure, any leader must work to extricate his country from a protracted war, so Obama is right to seek an end to this one.	当然，任何领导人都必须努力让自己的国家从旷日持久的战争中脱身，因此奥巴马试图结束这场战争无可厚非。


But he was not right in laying out his cards in public and emboldening the enemy.	但是他在公众面前摊牌，为敌人壮胆，这是不对的。


Within weeks of assuming office, Obama publicly declared his intention to withdraw US forces from Afghanistan, before he even asked his team to work out a strategy.	执政才几个星期，奥巴马就公开宣布他打算让美国部队从阿富汗撤离，此前他甚至没有要求他的团队制定相关战略。


A troop surge that lasted up to 2010 was designed not to rout the Taliban militarily, but to strike a political deal with the enemy from a position of strength.	拖到2010年才出台的增兵战略并不是为了击溃塔利班军队，而是为了在与敌人达成政治协议时处于优势地位。


Yet, even before the surge began, its purpose was undercut by the exit plan, followed by a publicly announced troop drawdown, stretching from 2011 to 2014.	然而，增兵还未开始，撤退计划就使增兵的目的大打折扣了。 随后，奥巴马又公开宣布，2011至2014年期间，美国军队将逐步撤离阿富汗。


A withdrawing power that first announces a phased exit and then pursues deal-making with the enemy undermines its regional leverage.	这个正在衰退的大国先是宣布分阶段撤离的计划，接着又努力与敌人达成协议，这降低了其在该地区的影响力。


It speaks for itself that the sharp deterioration in US ties with the Pakistani military has occurred since the drawdown timetable was unveiled.	自撤退时间表公布以来，美国与巴基斯坦军方的关系显著恶化就是明证。


The phased exit encouraged Pakistani generals to play hardball.	分阶段撤离的计划促使巴基斯坦的将军强硬起来。


Worse, there is still no clear US strategy on how to ensure that the endgame does not undermine Western interests or further destabilize the region.	更加糟糕的是，该如何确保在不损害西方利益或导致该地区更加动荡的情况下结束阿富汗战争，美国还没有清晰的战略。


The US envoy to the region, Marc Grossman, has already held a series of secret meetings with the Taliban.	美国该地区的特使马克•格罗斯曼已经与塔利班举行了一系列会谈。


Qatar has been chosen as the seat of fresh US-Taliban negotiations in order to keep the still-skeptical Afghan government at arm’s length (despite the pretense of “Afghan-led” talks), and to insulate the Taliban negotiators from Pakistani and Saudi pressure.	美国和塔利班新一轮谈判的地点选在了卡塔尔，一来是为了防范仍然持怀疑态度的阿富汗政府（尽管谈判假装由阿富汗领导），二来是让塔利班的谈判人员免受来自巴基斯坦和沙特阿拉伯的压力。


Meanwhile, even as a civil-military showdown in Pakistan compounds Washington’s regional challenges, the new US push to contain Iran threatens to fuel greater turbulence in neighboring Afghanistan.	与此同时，虽然巴基斯坦文官和军方之间的摊牌会使美国面临的地区挑战更加复杂，但是美国遏制伊朗的新行动会导致阿富汗的邻国更加动荡不安。


In truth, US policy on the Taliban, at whose birth the CIA played midwife, is coming full circle for the second time in little more than 15 years.	实际上，中情局催生了塔利班，在短短15年内，美国针对塔利班的政策重复了一遍。


The Clinton administration acquiesced in the Taliban’s ascension to power in 1996 and turned a blind eye as that thuggish militia, in league with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, fostered narcotics trafficking and swelled the ranks of Afghan war alumni waging transnational terrorism.	1996年，克林顿政府默许塔利班获得了执政地位，这个残暴的军政府与巴基斯坦的三军情报局合作，助长了毒品走私，壮大了阿富汗战争暴徒的队伍，任由他们发动国际恐怖袭击。


With the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, however, the chickens came home to roost.	然而，2001年9. 11事件发生后，美国开始自食其果。


In declaring war on the Taliban, US policy came full circle.	向塔利班宣战，美国政策完整地实施了一遍。


Now, US policy, with its frantic search for a deal with the Taliban, is about to complete another orbit.	如今，美国竭力与塔利班达成协议，美国政策将再完整的重演一遍。


Indeed, the Qatar-based negotiations highlight why the US political leadership has deliberately refrained from decapitating the Taliban.	实际上，在卡塔尔举行的谈判突出表明了美国的政治领导层故意放过塔利班的原因。


The US military has had ample opportunities (and still has) to eliminate the Taliban’s Rahbari Shura, or leadership council, often called the Quetta Shura because it relocated to that Pakistani city.	美国军方曾有（现在还有）大量的机会消灭塔利班的领导委员会，通常又称为“基达领导委员会”，因为该委员会搬到了这个巴基斯坦城市。


Yet, tellingly, the US has not carried out a single drone, air, or ground strike in or around Quetta.	美国从未在基达周围进行过无人机轰炸，也没有进行过陆空袭击，这很能说明问题。


All of the US strikes have occurred farther north, in Pakistan’s tribal Waziristan region, although the leadership of the Afghan Taliban and of its allied groups, like the Haqqani network and the Hekmatyar band, is not holed up there.	所有美国的袭击都发生在偏远的北部，巴基斯坦部落的瓦齐里斯坦地区，尽管阿富汗塔利班及其哈卡尼组织和希克马蒂亚尔组织等盟友没有隐藏在那里。


Like the US occupation of Iraq, the NATO war in Afghanistan will leave behind an ethnically fractured country.	与美国占领伊拉克一样，北约在阿富汗的战争将留下一个种族四分五裂的国家。


Just as Iraq today is, for all intents and purposes, ethnically partitioned, it will be difficult to establish a post-2014 government in Kabul whose writ runs across Afghanistan.	如今，由于各种各样的意图和目的，伊拉克的种族四分五裂，与伊拉克类似，阿富汗人都知道，2014年后，喀布尔将成立新政府，但是这很难实现。


And, just as the 1973 US-North Vietnam agreements were negotiated after the South Vietnamese regime was shut out of the talks, the US today is shutting out the Afghan government, even as it compels President Hamid Karzai to lend support and appears ready to meet a Taliban demand to transfer five incarcerated Taliban leaders from Guantánamo Bay.	此外，正如1973年，美国和北越在南越没有参与的情况下协商达成协议一样，如今美国也把阿富汗政府拒在了门外，尽管美国还要求哈米德•卡尔扎伊总统提供支持，似乎准备满足塔利班的要求，释放关在关塔那摩监狱的五名塔利班领导人。


These negotiations, in which the US is seeking the creation of ceasefire zones to facilitate its forces’ withdrawal, can only undercut the legitimacy of the Karzai government and bring the Quetta Shura back to center stage.	美国想通过这些谈判创造停火区，促进其部队撤离，但是这些谈判只会削弱卡尔扎伊政府的合法性，让塔利班的领导委员会回到中心位置。


But Afghanistan is not Vietnam.	但是阿富汗与越南不同。


An end to NATO combat operations will not mean the end of the war, because the enemy will target Western interests wherever they may be.	北约的作战行动结束并不意味着战争的结束，因为敌人总是会针对西方的利益。


America’s fond hope to contain terrorism regionally promises instead to ensure that Afghanistan and Pakistan remain a festering threat to regional and global security.	美国最希望遏制地区的恐怖主义，但这反而确保了阿富汗和巴基斯坦仍然将进一步威胁地区和全球安全。


Don’t Fear a Rising Dollar	不必担心美元升值


LONDON – The US Federal Reserve is almost certain to start raising interest rates when the policy-setting Federal Open Markets Committee next meets, on December 16.	伦敦—美联储几乎肯定要在12月6日的美联储公开市场委员会政策会议上开始升息。


How worried should businesses, investors, and policymakers around the world be about the end of near-zero interest rates and the start of the first monetary-tightening cycle since 2004-2008?	企业、投资者和决策者对于近零利率时代的结束、2004—2008年货币紧缩周期结束以来的首次升息应该抱以多大的担忧？


Janet Yellen, the Fed chair, has repeatedly said that the impending sequence of rate hikes will be much slower than previous monetary cycles, and predicts that it will end at a lower peak level.	美联储主席珍妮特·耶伦反复说，即将到来的一连串升息将比此前的货币周期缓慢得多，并预测利率的峰值也要更低。


While central bankers cannot always be trusted when they make such promises, since their jobs often require them deliberately to mislead investors, there are good reasons to believe that the Fed’s commitment to “lower for longer” interest rates is sincere.	央行官员的这种承诺永远不能太当回事，因为他们的职责决定了他们常常要故意误导投资者，但有很好的理由相信美联储“更长时间更低利率”的承诺是真诚的。


The Fed’s overriding objective is to lift inflation and ensure that it remains above 2%.	美联储的首要目标是提高通胀率，并确保它保持在2%以上。


To do this, Yellen will have to keep interest rates very low, even after inflation starts rising, just as her predecessor Paul Volcker had to keep interest rates in the 1980s very high, even after inflation started falling.	要实现这一点，耶伦必须将利率保持在极低水平，即使通胀率已经开始上升，正如其前任保罗·沃尔克（Paul Volcker）在20世纪80年代将利率保持在极高水平，即使通胀已经开始下降。


This policy reversal follows logically from the inversion of central banks’ objectives, both in America and around the world, since the 2008 crisis.	这一政策上的反转背后的逻辑是2008年危机以来美国和全世界央行目标的变化。


In the 1980s, Volcker’s historic responsibility was to reduce inflation and prevent it from ever rising again to dangerously high levels.	20世纪80年代，沃尔克的历史责任是降低通胀，防止它一路升高到危险的高水平。


Today, Yellen’s historic responsibility is to increase inflation and prevent it from ever falling again to dangerously low levels.	如今，耶伦的历史责任是提高通胀，阻止它再次下降到危险的低水平。


Under these conditions, the direct economic effects of the Fed’s move should be minimal.	在这样的情况下，美联储动作的直接经济影响很小。


It is hard to imagine many businesses, consumers, or homeowners changing their behavior because of a quarter-point change in short-term interest rates, especially if long-term rates hardly move.	很难想象许多企业、消费者或屋主因为短期利率四分之一个百分点的变化而改变他们的行为，特别是在长期利率几乎不变的情况下。


And even assuming that interest rates reach 1-1.5% by the end of 2016, they will still be very low by historic standards, both in absolute terms and relative to inflation.	即使假设利率在2016年上升到1—1. 5%，它们也远低于历史水平，不管是绝对水平还是相对通胀的水平。


The media and official publications from the International Monetary Fund and other institutions have raised dire warnings about the impact of the Fed’s first move on financial markets and other economies.	媒体和国际货币基金组织（IMF）和其他机构的官方报告严重警告美联储的首次动作对金融市场和其他经济体的影响。


Many Asian and Latin America countries, in particular, are considered vulnerable to a reversal of the capital inflows from which they benefited when US interest rates were at rock-bottom levels.	特别是许多亚洲和拉丁美洲国家被认为极易受到资本流逆转的冲击。 美国利率触底期间，这些国家因为资本流入而获益良多。


But, as an empirical matter, these fears are hard to understand.	但是，从实证角度看，这些担忧让人难以理解。


The imminent US rate hike is perhaps the most predictable, and predicted, event in economic history.	美国利率的微小提高是经济史上最容易预测、也最经常被预测到的事件。


Nobody will be caught unawares if the Fed acts next month, as many investors were in February 1994 and June 2004, the only previous occasions remotely comparable to the current one.	如果美联储下个月升息，没有人会感到意外，一如1994年2月和2004年6月（仅有的两次与此次升息略有可比性的先例）的许多投资者。


And even in those cases, stock markets barely reacted to the Fed tightening, while bond-market volatility proved short-lived.	而即使在这两次先例中，股市也对美联储的紧缩动作没有什么反应，债券市场的波动也是转瞬即逝。


But what about currencies?	那么货币呢？


The dollar is almost universally expected to appreciate when US interest rates start rising, especially because the EU and Japan will continue easing monetary conditions for many months, even years.	几乎所有人都预期，如果美国利率开始升高，美元将升值，特别是因为欧盟和日本将继续实施宽松货币环境多个月甚至多年。


This fear of a stronger dollar is the real reason for concern, bordering on panic, in many emerging economies and at the IMF.	这一美元升值恐慌是许多新兴经济体和IMF担忧（甚至恐惧）的真正原因。


A significant strengthening of the dollar would indeed cause serious problems for emerging economies where businesses and governments have taken on large dollar-denominated debts and currency devaluation threatens to spin out of control.	美元的剧烈升值确实会给企业和政府存在大量美元计价债务、货币贬值有可能失控的新兴经济体带来 严重问题。


Fortunately, the market consensus concerning the dollar’s inevitable rise as US interest rates increase is almost certainly wrong, for three reasons.	幸运的是，市场对美国升息必然导致美元升值的共识几乎肯定是错误的。 原因有三。


First, the divergence of monetary policies between the US and other major economies is already universally understood and expected.	首先，美国和其他主要经济体之间的货币政策差异早已被众人所理解和预期到。


Thus, the interest-rate differential, like the US rate hike itself, should already be priced into currency values.	因此，利息差异和美国升息本身一样，应该已经体现在货币估值中。


Moreover, monetary policy is not the only determinant of exchange rates.	此外，货币政策不是汇率的唯一决定因素。


Trade deficits and surpluses also matter, as do stock-market and property valuations, the cyclical outlook for corporate profits, and positive or negative surprises for economic growth and inflation.	贸易赤字和盈余也很重要，股市和房地产市场估值、公司利润的周期前景、经济增长和通胀的积极和消极意外亦然。


On most of these grounds, the dollar has been the world’s most attractive currency since 2009; but as economic recovery spreads from the US to Japan and Europe, the tables are starting to turn.	在这些因素中，自2009年以来美元一直是全世界最吸引人的货币； 但随着经济复苏从美国扩及日本和欧洲，情况开始发生变化。


Finally, the widely assumed correlation between monetary policy and currency values does not stand up to empirical examination.	最后，广泛认为的货币政策和货币估值之间的相关关系在实证中并不存在。


In some cases, currencies move in the same direction as monetary policy – for example, when the yen dropped in response to the Bank of Japan’s 2013 quantitative easing.	在一些例子中，货币与货币政策同向变动——比如，当日本银行2013年推出量化宽松时，日元应声贬值。


But in other cases the opposite happens, for example when the euro and the pound both strengthened after their central banks began quantitative easing.	但在其他一些例子中情况正好相反，比如，当欧洲和英国央行开始量化宽松时，欧元和英镑都出现了升值。


For the US, the evidence has been very mixed.	对美国来说，证据模棱两可。


Looking at the monetary tightening that began in February 1994 and June 2004, the dollar strengthened substantially in both cases before the first rate hike, but then weakened by around 8% (as gauged by the Fed’s dollar index) in the subsequent six months.	在始于1994年2月和2004年6月的两次货币紧缩中，美元较第一次升息前大幅升值，但在随后的六个月中贬值约8%（以美联储的美元指数衡量）。


Over the next 2-3 years, the dollar index remained consistently below its level on the day of the first rate hike.	在此后的2—3年中，美元指数一直低于首次升息当日的水平。


For currency traders, therefore, the last two cycles of Fed tightening turned out to be classic examples of “buy on the rumor; sell on the news.”	因此，对货币交易员来说，前两次美联储紧缩周期似乎是“在流言中买进，在新闻中卖出”的经典案例。


Of course, past performance is no guarantee of future results, and two cases do not constitute a statistically significant sample.	当然，过去的表现绝不意味着未来的结果，两次例子也绝不构成有统计意义的样本。


Just because the dollar weakened twice during the last two periods of Fed tightening does not prove that the same thing will happen again.	仅仅因为美元在前两次美联储紧缩周期中贬值并不代表未来也会发生同样的事。


But it does mean that a rise in the dollar is not automatic or inevitable if the Fed raises interest rates next month.	但这确实意味着，如果美联储在下个月升息，美元升值并不是自动反应或不可避免。


The globally disruptive effects of US monetary tightening – a rapidly rising dollar, capital outflows from emerging markets, financial distress for international dollar borrowers, and chaotic currency devaluations in Asia and Latin America – may loom less large in next year’s economic outlook than in a rear-view glimpse of 2015.	美国货币紧缩的全球破坏影响——急剧升值的美元、新兴市场资本外流、国际美元借款人财务恶化、亚洲和拉美混乱的货币贬值等——在明年经济展望中也许还不如后视镜中的2015年。


A No-Fly Zone for Syria	为叙利亚设置禁飞区


WASHINGTON, DC – A recent front-page photo in the New York Times of a boatload of Syrian refugees drifting on the Mediterranean Sea beneath an enormous setting sun could not have been more apt.	华盛顿—最近，《纽约时报》发表了一张头版照片，照片上，一艘叙利亚难民船在夕阳下的地中海上漂浮。 这张照片十分切题。


The sun seems to be setting on Syria itself.	夕阳的位置看起来正是叙利亚本身。


In the words of David Miliband, a former British foreign secretary and current president of the International Rescue Committee, the disaster in Syria has reached “almost biblical proportions.”	用前英国外交大臣、现任国际救援委员会（International Rescue Committee）主席大卫·米利班德（David Miliband）的话说，叙利亚灾难已经达到了“接近圣经的程度”。


The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimates that, over the last four years, nearly 250,000 people have been killed, including more than 100,000 civilians, many of whom were killed in horrific ways by their own government.	叙利亚人权观察组织（Syrian Observatory for Human Rights）估算，在过去四年中，近250,000人被杀，包括100,000多名平民，其中有许多是被本国政府以骇人听闻的方式杀害的。


The United Nations estimates that over half of the country’s 22 million citizens have left their homes, something the world has not seen since World War II.	联合国估算叙利亚2,200万公民中有一大半已经逃离祖国，这是二战以来从未发生过的事情。