Moreover, they have half the level of cancer-protective vitamin D as whites, and they are much more likely to live in polluted neighborhoods.	另外，他们体内可预防癌症的维生素D水平只有白人的一半，并且还更有可能居住在受到污染的社区。


Indeed, cases of cancer that are not tied to smoking or aging are increasing.	的确，与吸烟和衰老无关的癌症病患正在增加。


Cancer is the leading cause of death in middle-aged persons and children (after accidents), and we can’t explain why, for most forms of cancer, death rates are higher for blacks than they are for whites.	癌症是造成中年人和儿童（仅次于事故）死亡的主要原因。 而且我们不能解释为什么对于大多数种类的癌症黑人的死亡率要高于白人。


What we can say is that the disease itself is the wrong enemy.	我们现在可以断言的是癌症本身是一个错误的敌人。


Instead, we should be attacking known environmental carcinogens – not just tobacco, but also radiation, sunlight, benzene, solvents, and some drugs and hormones.	我们应该打击所知的环境致癌物质—不仅仅是烟草，还有辐射、阳光、苯、溶剂和某些药物及荷尔蒙。


Modern cancer-causing agents like diesel exhaust, pesticides, and other air pollutants are not systematically studied.	现代的致癌物质，如柴油废气、杀虫剂和其他空气污染物都没有得到系统的研究。


When they are considered at all, they are deemed to be the inevitable price of progress.	即便在我们考虑到这些因素时，也认为它们是进步的必然代价。


But most cancers are made, not born, arising from damage to our genes that occurs throughout our lives.	但大多数的癌症都是后天而非先天的，是我们的基因在整个生命的过程中不断遭受破坏的结果。


Despite having remarkably similar genes at birth, identical twins do not develop the same cancers.	虽然在出生时，同卵双胞胎的基因极其相似，但他们却罹患不同的癌症。


By age 50, their chromosomal bands are profoundly different from one another.	到50岁时，他们的染色体带已大不相同。


America’s Centers for Disease Control and Prevention confirm that children’s blood today contains dozens of chemicals that did not exist two decades earlier, including many gene-damaging compounds known to cause cancer and a host of other diseases.	美国疾病控制与预防中心确认当今儿童的血液中含有二十年前并不存在的数十种化学物质，其中包括许多已知会导致癌症和一系列其他疾病的破坏基因的化合物。


Men and women of child-bearing age now carry enough hormone-disturbing compounds in their bodies to impair their fertility.	现在育龄期男女的体内所携带的扰乱荷尔蒙分泌的化合物足以降低他们的生育能力。


Women exposed to higher levels of the pesticide DDT before the age of fourteen have a five times higher chances of developing breast cancer when they reach middle age.	在十四岁以前接触过高含量的杀虫剂DDT的女性到中年时患乳腺癌的几率要高五倍。


Could such compounds play a role in unexplained and growing rates of childhood cancer, testicular cancer, and non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma throughout the industrial world?   Should we wait to find out?	在整个工业化世界的儿童癌症、睾丸癌和非霍奇金淋巴瘤发病率不断攀升的谜团背后，这些化合物扮演了怎样的角色呢？ 我们应该探究这种关联么？


While we are phenomenally successful at keeping young people from dying of cancer today, that success comes as a Faustian bargain.	尽管我们目前在防止年轻人因癌症而死亡方面取得了巨大的成功，但这种成功却是一种“浮士德式交易”的结果。


One of three young women treated with radiation to the chest to arrest Hodgkin’s disease will develop breast cancer by age 32.	为控制非霍奇金淋巴瘤而在胸部接受过放射治疗的女性有三分之一的人会在32岁时罹患乳腺癌。


Of course, many cancers might not have developed in the first place had these patients not been exposed to other cancer-causing agents in the environment.	当然，这些病人如果没有接触过环境中的致癌物质，许多癌症首先就不会发生。


Our dependence on many modern conveniences makes us the subject of vast uncontrolled experiments to which none of us is asked to consent.	我们对现代生活方便性的依赖使我们非自愿的情况下成为许多不受控制的实验的对象。


For example, the long-term safety of mobile phones remains unproven.	例如，手机的长期安全性仍然未能得到证实。


Widely publicized studies in the early 1990’s touting their safety excluded business users.	在1990年代早期吹捧其安全性的研究中并没有纳入商务使用者。


Recent reports from France and Sweden find that those who have used mobile phones for ten or more years have double the risk of brain cancer.	最近来自法国和瑞典的研究报告表明那些使用手机达十年或更长时间的人患脑癌的风险增加了一倍。


Also troubling is the fact that the limit for microwave emission from mobile phones is 500 times lower in Switzerland and China than in the US.	同样令人不安的是，瑞士和中国手机微波辐射的法定极限比美国的低五百倍。


A way of looking is a way of not looking, runs a Chinese proverb.	有一句中国成语叫：一叶障目。


The limited nature of evidence on some environmental cancer hazards should not be confused with proof that no harm has occurred: the research is hard to do, and, in the US, very little of it is now funded by the government and private sector.	对某些环境性癌症隐患的证据有限不应该与证明无害混为一谈：相关研究比较困难，且在美国只有极少一部分受到政府和商业的资助。


Moreover, confusion about environmental cancer risks also results from longstanding, carefully cultivated, and well-financed disinformation campaigns inspired by the machinations of the tobacco industry.	另外，烟草工业通过诡计，以巨额的资金支持发动长期的、处心积虑的假信息攻势，也在环境癌症风险方面混淆视听。


We cannot afford to ignore the signs of the importance of the environment for our health.	我们不能忽略环境对我们健康的重要性。


To address the scourge of cancer, we must complement efforts to detect and treat cancer with new ways to keep people from developing the disease in the first place.	为了应对癌症的灾难，我们必须致力于首先防止人们罹患癌症以作为对其诊治研究的有力补充。


Can China Beat Deflation?	中国能战胜通缩吗？


BEIJING – At a time of slowing economic growth and massive corporate debts, a deflationary spiral would be China’s worst nightmare.	北京—当经济减速、公司债务高企时，通缩循环将是中国最不堪的噩梦。


And the risk is mounting.	风险正在堆积。


The producer price index (PPI) has been in negative territory for 39 consecutive months, since February 2012.	自2012年9月以来，生产者物价指数（PPI）已连续39个月负增长。


The growth of China’s consumer price index (CPI), though still positive, has also been falling steadily, from 6.5% in July 2011 to 1.2% in May.	中国消费物价指数（CPI）尽管仍在正增长，但幅度稳步下降，从2011年7月的6. 5%降至今年5月的1.


If past experience is any indication, China’s CPI will turn negative very soon.	2%。 从历史经验看，中国CPI也将很快步入负增长。


In China’s last protracted bout of deflation, from 1998 to 2002, persistent declines in prices were the result of monetary and fiscal tightening that began in 1993, compounded by the lack of exit mechanisms for failed enterprises.	中国上一次经历长期通缩是1998—2002年，物价持续下降的原因是1993年开始的货币和财政紧缩，而缺少倒闭企业退出机制则令情况雪上加霜。


After peaking at 24% in 1994, inflation began to decline in 1995.	通胀在1994年达到顶峰（24%），随后从1995年开始下降。


But GDP growth soon began deteriorating rapidly.	但GDP增长很快开始大幅恶化。


In an effort to revive growth in a difficult global environment and buffer exports against the impact of the Asian financial crisis, the Chinese government loosened monetary and fiscal policy beginning in November 1997.	为了在困难的全球环境下重振增长、在亚洲金融危机的冲击下支持出口，中国政府从1997年11月开始放松货币和财政政策。


But it was too little too late.	但放松来得太晚，强度也太小。


By 1998, when CPI inflation began to fall, producer prices had already been declining for eight months, and remained negative for a total of 51 months, with CPI growth beginning to recover after 39 months.	1998年CPI通胀开始下降时，生产者物价已经下跌了八个月，并在总共51个月的时间里保持负增长，而CPI在39个月后开始恢复。


An obvious lesson is that the government should have switched to loosening earlier, and more forcefully.	一个显而易见的教训是政府应该早一点开始放松政策，力度也应该更大。


But this experience also underscores the impotence of monetary policy in a deflationary environment, owing to the unwillingness of banks to lend and of enterprises to borrow.	但这一经验也彰显出通缩环境中货币政策的无力，因为银行不愿放贷，企业也不愿借钱。


The fact that loss-making enterprises were allowed to churn out cheap products, eroding the profitability of high-quality enterprises (and thus their incentive to invest), prolonged the deflation.	亏损企业被允许大量生产廉价商品，从而影响到高质量企业的盈利能力（以及它们的投资激励），这一事实延长了通缩时间。


Nonetheless, China eventually managed to rid itself of deflation and return to rapid economic growth.	尽管如此，中国最终成功地摆脱了通缩，回归了快速经济增长之路。


For starters, a decline in investment during the deflationary period – together with firm closures, mergers, and acquisitions – reduced overcapacity, clearing the way for investment to rebound strongly in 2002.	首先，通缩时期的投资下降——以及企业的关停并转——削减了产能，为2002年投资强劲反弹铺平了道路。


At the same time, expansionary fiscal policy increased effective demand, while the government, backed by its strong public-finance position, was able to tackle nonperforming loans effectively, thereby increasing commercial banks’ willingness to lend and firms’ ability to borrow.	与此同时，扩张性财政政策增加了有效需求，而政府在良好的公共财政状况的支持下也能够有效处理不良贷款，从而增加了商业银行的放贷意愿和企业的借款能力。


Moreover, housing-market reforms and the development of a mortgage-loan market in the late 1990s fueled rapid growth in real-estate investment, which reached an annual rate of over 20% in 2000.	此外，20世纪90年代末房地产市场改革和按揭贷款市场的发展助长了房地产投资的快速增长，到2000年，房地产年增长率达到了20%。


As a result, real-estate development became the most important contributor to economic growth, even as exports boomed following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization.	结果，房地产开发成为经济增长的重要引擎，即使在中国加入世贸组织大幅提振出口之后仍是如此。


The problem with the emergence of these new growth engines is that it enabled China’s leaders to delay important structural reforms.	伴随新增长引擎出现而出现的问题是它让中国领导人推迟了重要的结构改革。


As a result, China now faces many of the same challenges it faced in the late 1990s – beginning with overcapacity.	结果，如今的中国面临着许多与20世纪90年代末同样的问题——首先就是产能过剩。


After 15 years of rapid growth in real-estate development, this is not surprising.	在经历了15年的房地产开发快速增长后，这并不令人奇怪。


But that does not make it any less risky.	但这并没有降低任何风险。


In fact, if overcapacity is allowed to continue putting downward pressure on prices, China’s economic growth will not stabilize at a rate consistent with its potential; instead, the economy will be pushed into a vicious spiral of debt deflation.	身水身汗，如果放任产能过剩继续给物价造成下降压力，中国的经济增长将无法稳定在与其潜力一致的水平上； 相反，中国经济将陷入债务通缩的恶性循环。


At this point, the authorities could eliminate overcapacity through firm closures, mergers and acquisitions, and other structural measures.	眼下，当局可以通过关停并转和其他结构性措施消除过剩产能。


They could also seek to eliminate excess capacity by using expansionary monetary and fiscal policies to stimulate effective demand.	当局还可以通过用扩张性货币和财政政策刺激有效需求来消除过剩产能。


In theory, the long-term solution would be to pursue structural adjustments that would improve the allocation of resources.	理论上，长期解决办法应该是追求结构性调整以改进资源配置。


But that would be painful and slow.	但这一过程将痛苦而缓慢。


Striking a balance between the short- and long-term approaches will prove to be a major challenge for China’s leadership.	在短期和长期方针之间形成平衡将是中国领导层的主要挑战之一。


Complicating this effort is the fact that, unlike in 1997-2002, China cannot absorb overcapacity by stimulating real-estate investment and exports.	让局面更加复杂的是以下事实：与1997—2002年间不同，如今中国无法通过刺激房地产投资和出口吸收过剩产能。


And no one knows whether the much-discussed “innovative industries” can have the impact that real-estate investment and exports did – not least because there is so much excess capacity in the traditional industries.	也没人知道被热议的“创新产业”是否能够形成与昔日的房地产投资和出口等量齐观的影响力——因为传统行业的产能过剩情况实在太严重了。


China must do what it takes to avoid falling into the debt-deflation trap.	中国必须竭尽全力避免陷入债务-通缩陷阱。


Fortunately, China still has room to invest in growth-enhancing infrastructure and innovative industries.	幸运的是，中国仍有空间投资于能促进增长的基础设施和创新行业。


Policies to expand social security and improve the provision of public goods could support these efforts, boosting domestic consumption by allowing households to reduce their precautionary savings.	扩大社会安全、改善公共品供给的政策能支持这方面的动作，通过让家庭减少预防性储蓄提振国内消费。


At the same time, however, China’s leadership must continue to pursue its agenda of structural reform and adjustment, even if it may have an adverse impact on growth in the short run.	但是，与此同时，中国领导人必须继续追求结构改革和调整日程，及时这样会对短期增长造成消极影响。


China simply cannot afford to continue to kick the reform can down the road.	中国绝不可继续回避改革。


As Mark Twain once purportedly said, “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme.”	据说马克·吐温曾经说过：“历史不会重演，但总是惊人的相似。


China should brace itself for a period of deflation, which may be even more protracted than the last one.	”中国应该为一段时间的通缩做好准备，这段时期也许比上一次通缩期更长。


But, with the right approach – and a bit of good luck – it can make sure that, this time, it recovers more sustainably than in the past.	但是，如果有正确的方针——以及一点点运气——中国可以确保这一回的复苏将比过去更加可持续。


The Renminbi Challenge	人民币的挑战


SEOUL – Last month, China unveiled its first aircraft carrier, and is gearing up to challenge the United States in the South China Sea.	发自首尔——上个月中国公开其第一艘航空母舰，为在南中国海地区挑战美国作好准备。


By initiating a plan to internationalize its currency, China is similarly seeking to challenge the dollar on the international stage.	与此同时，通过启动一项货币国际化计划，中国也正试图在国际舞台上挑战美元。


In carving out a global role for the renminbi, Chinese policymakers are proceeding deliberately.	在为人民币打造一个国际角色的过程中，中国的政策制定者的行动相当谨慎。


In the words of the venerable Chinese proverb, they are “feeling for the stones while crossing the river.”	用中国的一句古话说，就是“摸着石头过河”。


The authorities’ first step was to authorize Chinese companies to use the renminbi in cross-border trade settlements.	当局的第一步是授权中国公司在跨境贸易结算中使用人民币。


As foreign firms exporting to China accepted payment in renminbi, the currency piled up in their bank accounts in Hong Kong.	随着出口到中国的国外公司接受用人民币结算，这些公司在香港的银行账户上就会累积人民币。


That led to the next step: Foreign firms wishing to invest in China were allowed to tap those deposits by issuing renminbi-denominated bonds, and eligible offshore financial institutions were permitted to invest renminbi funds in China’s interbank bond market.	随后就到了第二步:希望在中国投资的外国公司被允许通过发行以人民币计价的债券来使用这些存款，同时符合条件的境外金融机构被允许在中国的银行间债券市场投资人民币基金。


Then, last summer, China announced plans to allow banks in Hong Kong to lend renminbi to companies in Shenzhen, opening that city financially to the rest of the world.	然后，去年夏天中国宣布了允许香港银行出借人民币给深圳企业的相关计划，这就相当于在金融意义上向全世界开放了深圳。


The expectation is that if financial opening works in Shenzhen, it will be implemented more widely.	人们预期如果金融开放能在深圳奏效，那么也可以在国内其他地区广泛推广。


Finally, as a step toward making the renminbi a reserve currency, China signed currency-swap agreements with the Philippines, South Korea, Japan, and Australia.	最后，作为把人民币变成储备货币这个过程中的其中一步，中国与菲律宾，韩国，日本和澳大利亚签订了货币互换协议。


Meanwhile, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Chile have already acquired modest amounts of renminbi reserves.	同时，马来西亚，尼日利亚和智利也已经储备了一定数额的人民币。


Other central banks are expected to follow.	其他国家的中央银行估计也会效仿。


So, will China’s plan for transforming the renminbi into an international rival to the dollar succeed?	那么，中国要把人民币转化为美元的国际对手这一计划是否能成功呢？


The answer, in my view, turns on how China addresses four challenges.	在我看来，答案在于中国如何应对以下四个挑战。


First, China will have to build more liquid financial markets.	首先，中国需要建立流动性更强的金融市场。


Its bond markets remain small, and trading volume is low, because the majority of bonds are held to maturity by domestic investors.	其债券市场规模依然较小，交易额偏低，这是因为大部分债券都由国内投资者持有直至到期。


This is a matter of considerable importance to central banks, which value liquidity when deciding which currencies to hold as reserve.	而这对其他国家的中央银行来说是一个相当重要的问题，因为它们在决定持有哪种货币作为储备时都会重点考虑流动性。


After all, it is the liquidity of US Treasury bonds that makes them the world’s leading reserve asset.	毕竟正是美国国库债券的流动性使其成为世界上最主要的储备资产。


Second, much will depend on how China navigates the transition to a more open capital account.	第二，这将取决于中国如何将这一转型进程引导向一个更加开放的资本帐户。


History is littered with financial crises occurring in the wake of precipitous capital-account liberalization.	历史经验告诉我们，紧随资本帐户急剧自由化过程之后的往往就是金融危机。


Falling prey to a crisis would not exactly encourage international use of China’s currency.	一旦中国遭受金融危机的冲击，显然也对促进国际上对其货币的使用没什么好处。


Third, the renminbi’s international and reserve-currency prospects will be shaped by how China handles its growth slowdown.	第三，人民币成为国际储备货币的前景将受中国如何处理其经济增长放缓状况的影响。


The key will be whether it manages a smooth deceleration, in which case renminbi internationalization will proceed, or suffers a hard landing, in which case social unrest will intensify and all bets are off.	关键在于它是否能做到平稳地减速——如果成功平稳减速，那么人民币的国际化将会继续进行，相反如果经济出现硬着陆，这样的话社会动荡将会加剧，所有的希望也将落空。


The last challenge can be stated as a question that is rarely posed: Is China’s political system an obstacle to renminbi internationalization?	最后一个挑战可以用一个很少被提出的问题来阐明：中国的政治体系会不会是人民币走向国际化的障碍？


The pound sterling and the dollar, the principal international and reserve currencies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries respectively, were issued by democracies.	分别作为19世纪和20世纪主要国际储备货币的英镑和美元都是由民主国家发行的。


Britain and the US had contested elections and political systems that limited the arbitrary exercise of executive power – institutions that are absent in China’s political system.	英国和美国都拥有竞争性选举以及限制滥用行政权力的政治体制——但这些东西在中国的政治制度中是缺失的。


One reason why democracy might matter for international currency status is that democratically elected governments are best able to make the credible commitments needed to develop deep and liquid financial markets.	民主政治对国际货币地位很重要的原因之一在于民主选举出来的政府最能够许下开发大规模以及流动性的金融市场所需的信用承诺。


They can commit not to expropriate creditors, since the latter will vote them out of office if they do.	它们可以承诺不剥夺债权人的权利，因为如果不能够保证这一点的话后者就会投票赶它们下台。


And the same respect for creditor rights that reassures domestic investors reassures foreign investors – both official and private – as well.	这种对债权的尊重既使国内投资者放心，同样也使国外的官方和私人的投资者放心。


Might it be possible for China to establish limits on arbitrary executive power and strengthen creditor rights sufficiently without undertaking a full-fledged transition to democracy?	那么中国是否可以不需要实现民主全面过渡，就足以限制恣意妄为的行政权力并强化债权？


Until now, constraints on decision-making by the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, the country’s highest-ranking official, have been – how to put it politely? – limited.	直到目前为止，对中国共产党总书记，也是该国最高领导人的决策约束一直是——委婉地说——有限的。


But that is beginning to change.	但情况正在发生变化。


The general secretary is increasingly constrained by the CCP’s other institutions.	中共中央总书记的权力正日益受到中国共产党其他机构的限制。


The deliberations of the National People’s Congress, for example, are becoming less ceremonial and more substantive.	比如，全国人民代表大会的审议已经逐渐在从形式化向实质性过渡。


Other bureaucratic decision makers, for their part, are increasingly constrained by requirements of transparency and disclosure.	对其他的政府决策者而言，他们越来越受制于公众对透明度和信息披露的要求。


Internet-based movements are forcing Chinese policymakers to strengthen labor and environmental standards.	基于互联网的运动正推动中国政策制定者加强劳工和环保标准。


Why not creditor rights?	那强化债权人的权利又有何不可？


Since the early nineteenth century, the leading international currencies have been those of countries with democratic political systems, where arbitrary official action is constrained and creditors are well represented.	从十九世纪初以来，主要的国际货币都一直都是由是处于民主政治体制下的国家发行，而在这些国家官方是不能任意行动的，债权人的权利也因此得到良好的保障。


This does not imply that China must have a Democratic Spring before the renminbi becomes a leading international and reserve currency.	这虽然并不意味着中国要人民币成为主要国际储备货币就必须经历一个民主之春。


But it does suggest that it will have to strengthen the powers of the National People’s Congress further and create a more transparent rules-based bureaucracy in order to achieve its monetary goals.	但它的确表明中国必须进一步加强全国人民代表大会的权力并创建一个以规则为基础且更加透明的政府机构，从而实现其货币目标。


Poison-Proofing China	百毒不侵的中国


STANFORD – Last January, China’s environmental authorities barely averted the contamination of nearly three million people’s drinking water after a mining company dumped cadmium – a toxic heavy metal used in the manufacture of batteries, paint, solder, and solar cells – into the Longjiang River.	斯坦福——去年一月，一家矿业公司向龙江倾倒镉废料后，中国环保当局勉强避免了近三百万人的饮用水遭受污染。 镉是一种有毒重金属，一般用于电池、油漆、焊接和太阳能电池的制造工艺。


To stop the contamination from spreading, the local fire department had to add significant quantities of dissolved aluminum chloride, which binds to cadmium and settles on the river bottom. The toxic sediment will eventually be dredged.	为了防止污染扩散，当地消防部门被迫倒入了大量的水解氯化铝，目的是让氧化铝与镉发生反应沉入江底。 反应形成的有毒化合物最后被从江底挖出来。


Such threats to health and the environment are not uncommon in China.	这样的健康及环境威胁在中国并不鲜见。


The water in as many as half of the country’s rivers and lakes is unfit for human consumption or contact.	人类不适宜饮用或接触中国高达半数的河流和湖泊水源。


China has also gained a reputation for food and drug contamination (not to mention lead paint in toys and poisonous toothpaste).	中国还因为食品及药品污染事件而名扬海外（用含铅油漆生产的玩具和有毒牙膏自不必多言）。


For example, in 2008, the industrial chemical melamine was added to milk products in order to give falsely high readings of milk protein, causing the death of six infants and sickening 300,000 other people.	比方说2008年发生过在奶制品中添加工业化学物质三聚氰胺，以此来伪造奶制品中的蛋白质含量。 这起事件导致6名婴儿死亡，另外300，000人因此而患病。


Similarly, Mengniu, China’s largest dairy company, announced last December that it had destroyed hazardous products at a plant in the Sichuan province after government safety inspectors discovered the carcinogen aflatoxin in a batch of its milk.	同样，去年12月，政府质检员在其某批次牛奶中检出致癌物质黄曲霉毒素后，中国最大的乳制品公司蒙牛宣布已销毁由四川某工厂生产的危险产品。


(The company denied that any contaminated milk had reached consumers.)	（该企业否认有消费者购买了受污染的奶制品。 ）


In 2007, melamine was deliberately added to an ingredient in pet food to enhance artificially its protein levels, causing renal failure in hundreds of cats and dogs in North America, Europe, and Africa.	2007年，有人在宠物食品中故意添加三聚氰胺，以人为提高蛋白质的含量水平，导致北美、欧洲和非洲的数百只猫狗发生肾衰竭。


Later that year, diethylene glycol was mislabeled as non-toxic glycerin, then mixed into cold medicine, killing at least 100 people in Panama, including many children.	同年晚些时候，二甘醇被误标为无毒甘油加入感冒药，在巴拿马夺去了100多人的生命，其中还包括很多儿童。


The following year, crude precursors of the blood-thinning medication heparin were contaminated, causing hundreds of allergic reactions and 19 deaths in the United States, and at least 80 serious adverse health events in Germany.	第二年，血液稀释药肝素前体遭到污染，导致美国数百人产生过敏反应，19人死亡。 德国也发生了至少80起严重的健康事件。


Eggs contaminated that year with melamine caused kidney stones and renal failure in children.	同年遭三聚氰胺污染的鸡蛋导致儿童发生肾结石和肾功能衰竭。


Internal criticism of the Chinese government’s management of health, safety, and overall quality-of-life issues is growing.	中国政府在健康、安全和总体生活质量方面的管理引发了越来越强烈的国内批评。


In July 2011, following the highly publicized crash of a supposedly state-of-the-art high-speed train in eastern China, Qiu Qiming, a news anchor for the national broadcaster CCTV, turned the disaster into a metaphor.	2011年7月，在东部发生尽人皆知的高铁事故后，中国国家电视台中央电视台的主播邱启明针对这场灾难打了个比喻。


“While satisfying our need for speed, we might be forsaking many things,” she said. “China, please slow down.	她说，“为了追求我们可能放弃了很多东西，中国，请放慢你的脚步。


If you’re too fast, you may leave the souls of your people behind.”	如果跑得太快，民众的灵魂就会被甩在身后。 ”


Given the pervasiveness of Chinese-made goods, China’s safety record concerns consumers worldwide.	鉴于中国制造的商品无处不在，中国的安全记录引发了全世界消费者的担忧。


But Chinese officials’ piecemeal efforts to restore confidence in the country’s exports – for example, establishing limits for trace amounts of melamine in dairy products and tightening quality-control regulations for the dairy industry – are unlikely to reassure foreign consumers or importers.	但中国官员修复对其出口产品信心的零散努力——如在乳品行业制定三聚氰胺含量限制并强化质量控制规定——不太可能打消外国消费者或进口商的疑虑。


Indeed, Chinese policymakers seem unable to grasp the importance of crafting appropriate incentives and disincentives.	事实上，中国决策者似乎把握不了拟定适当奖惩规则的重要性。


Rather than adopting the Western model of motivating every link in the supply chain to adhere to specified quality and safety standards, the government continues to rely on top-down policies.	政府仍然采用自上而下的政策制度，而不是运用西方模式，鼓励供应链上每一个环节遵守规定的质量和安全标准。


But the decentralized, dispersed nature of many industries, the absence of an effective regulatory infrastructure, and the lack of firm-level inducements undermine the effectiveness of this approach.	但行业分散、缺乏有效监管制度及欠缺企业层面的诱因严重影响了这种方式的有效性。


In fact, perverse incentives throughout the supply chain facilitate the widespread, systematic contamination of food and drugs. Both milk producers and heparin-precursor suppliers were motivated to add adulterants that would make their products appear to be of a higher quality than they actually were.	其实，供应链中无所不在的错误刺激造成了食品和药品行业普遍性、系统性的污染问题。 奶企和肝素前体供应企业都主动添加违禁物质，通过造假手段来提高产品质量。


To be sure, Chinese authorities face a daunting task.	毋庸置疑中国政府面临着一项艰巨的任务。


Only a few decades ago, China was a poor, largely rural country with an agrarian economy and almost no middle class.	短短几十年前，中国还基本属于贫穷的农业国，主要依赖农业经济，几乎没有中产阶级。


Today, it boasts the world’s second-largest economy, a thriving manufacturing sector, and a rapidly growing, prosperous middle class, while more than half of China’s 1.5 billion citizens now live in cities.	今天，中国已成为位居世界第二的经济体，拥有蓬勃发展的制造业和迅速壮大的富裕中产阶级。 当今中国15亿人口中有超过半数居住在城市。


Until relatively recently, environmental protection and consumer safety were secondary issues in the United States and Europe.	直到不久前，环境保护和消费安全在美国和欧洲都还是相对次要的问题。


In 1952, London experienced five days of lethal, particulate-laden smog that killed 12,000 people and sickened more than 100,000.	1952年，伦敦连续5天出现充满微粒的致命烟雾，导致12，000人死亡，超过100，000人患病。


And, in 1969, America’s heavily polluted Cuyahoga River caught on fire.	1969年，美国污染严重的凯霍加河燃起熊熊大火。


Just as Europe and the US have made substantial progress in implementing effective health and environmental policies, China’s quality-control mechanisms can be improved.	正如欧洲和美国在实施有效的健康和环境政策领域已经取得了实质性的进展，中国的质量控制机制也同样有改善的余地。


But, in tackling the issue, Chinese officials would do well to heed the proverb: “With time and patience, the mulberry leaf becomes a silk gown.”	但要想解决这一问题，中国官员应该重视一句谚语：“只要功夫深，铁杵磨成针。 ”


Can China Rescue Europe?	中国可以拯救欧洲吗？


CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA – The debt crisis in Europe is no longer a European affair.	克莱蒙特，加利福尼亚——欧洲的债务危机已不再光是欧洲事件了。


Coupled with fears of a double-dip recession in the United States, the European debt crisis is dragging the global economy into another cycle of financial panic and economic recession.	欧洲债务危机加上对美国二次探底衰退的担忧，正在将全球经济拖入另一次金融恐慌和经济衰退循环。


Sitting on the sidelines, emerging-market economies in general, and the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) in particular, may feel fortunate to be spared this financial maelstrom.	身处外围的新兴市场经济体大体上（特别是所谓的金砖国家，即巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国）都深感幸运，没有被卷进这个金融大漩涡。


But they should think again.	但它们应该再好好想想。


With closely integrated global financial markets and trading networks, financial crises and economic contractions in the developed economies, which still account for nearly 60% of the world’s GDP, will inevitably undermine emerging-market countries’ prosperity.	在全球金融市场和贸易网络高度一体化的背景下，发达经济体（至今在全球GDP仍占近60%的比重）的金融危机和经济收缩将不可避免地有损于新兴市场国家的繁荣。


Some have thus called upon major emerging countries to step up and use their huge foreign-exchange reserves to purchase the debt of crisis-ravaged countries, such as Greece, Italy, and Spain.	于是就有人开始呼吁新兴国家拿出它们的巨量外汇储备来购买希腊、意大利和西班牙等危机国的债务。


In particular, China, with its $3.2 trillion in foreign-exchange reserves, is seen as a potential white knight coming to the rescue of debt-ridden European nations.	手握3. 2万亿美元外汇储备的中国更是被视为将欧洲国家救出债务泥淖的潜在白衣骑士。


Playing upon such hopes, China has been both coy and demanding.	在人们的如是期许下，中国显得颇为犹豫，提出了各种各样的要求。


Without committing itself to any substantive assistance, the Chinese government has publicly demanded that the European Union grant China the coveted status of “market economy” if it expects China to loosen its purse strings.	中国政府没有做出任何实质性的援助承诺，倒是公开要求欧盟给予中国梦寐以求的“市场经济”地位——如果它想让中国慷慨解囊的话。


That status matters, because achieving it will make it more difficult for Chinese firms to be found guilty of dumping goods on overseas markets.	“市场经济”地位绝非小事，因为这意味着更难将中国企业在海外市场的倾销行为视为非法。


Unfortunately, those who expect China to play a direct role in calming the financial panic in Europe are being unrealistic.	不幸的是，那些希望中国在平复欧洲金融恐慌中起到直接作用的人太不现实了。


Chinese leaders have been extremely risk-averse in their forays into international financial affairs, and, on the eve of a leadership transition (expected to take place a year from now), no senior official dares to risk his political prospects by advocating bold and controversial action.	中国领导人在涉水国际金融事务时极度厌恶风险，此外，在领导人交接前夕（大约会在一年后发生），也没有哪个高级官员敢拿自己的政治前途冒险，支持激进且充满争议的行动。


Even assuming China’s willingness to help Europe’s troubled economies, it would be able to contribute only a modest portion of the huge amount of financing required to restore confidence in European sovereign debt.	即使中国愿意帮助欧洲受困经济体，它也只能提供重塑欧洲主权债务信心所需要的巨额融资的一小部分。


But this does not mean that China can do nothing to help Europe.	但这并不意味着中国在援助欧洲的问题上什么都做不了。


While the attempt by Chinese officials to extract a huge concession – market-economy status – is ill-timed and in poor taste, China’s government needs to weigh the significant benefits that it could receive by providing limited but meaningful assistance to Europe in its hour of need.	中国官员试图以此换取欧洲的巨大让步——承认其市场经济地位，但在时机和效果上都讨不到好结果，同时，中国政府需要三思——如果在欧洲急需帮助的时候出手，施以有限但意义重大的援手，那么它会获得很大的好处。


Indeed, to do so would be in China’s own interest as a key stake-holder in Europe’s economic stability.	事实上，作为欧洲经济稳定的相关利益者，对欧洲施以援手是符合中国自身利益的。


The EU is China’s largest trading partner, accounting for $383 billion in merchandise exports in 2010.	欧盟是中国最大的贸易伙伴，2010年中国对欧盟商品出口额高达3830亿美元。


So a recession in Europe would cause a slowdown in China’s export-dependent economy as well.	因此欧洲发生衰退会令依赖出口的中国经济减速。


The financial fallout from the debt crisis could also result in huge losses for China.	债务危机的金融后果也会令中国蒙受巨大损失。


About $800 billion of China’s foreign-exchange reserves are invested in euro-denominated assets.	在中国的外汇储备中，有大约8000亿美元投资于欧元资产。


A disorderly default, and the resulting downward pressure on the euro, would unavoidably cause Chinese investments to lose value.	如果发生无序违约并因此造成欧元贬值的压力，中国的投资就将不可避免地遭遇价值缩水。


China can take three measures to help Europe, but, if they are to succeed, the EU must set aside some of its long-standing suspicions about China.	中国可以通过三大举措帮助欧洲，但是，要想成功，欧盟也必须抛弃某些针对中国的长期猜疑。


First, China can help boost the EU’s exports by lowering its administrative trade barriers to products from the EU.	首先，中国可以通过降低其针对欧盟商品的行政贸易壁垒帮助提振欧盟的出口。


In the short term, this might dampen China’s own growth, but, given China’s mammoth trade surplus with the EU ($230 billion in 2010), this is both long overdue and reasonable.	从短期看，这会影响中国自己的经济增长，但中国对欧盟有着巨大的贸易顺差（2010年为2300亿欧元），因此这是早就应该实施的应有之义。


A 10% increase in the EU’s exports to China (a net increase of $15 billion a year) would help create at least 300,000 jobs and boost Europe’s growth prospects.	如果欧盟对中国的出口提升10%（相当于一年净增150亿美元），就能创造至少30万个就业岗位，并提振欧洲的增长前景。


Second, China can participate in bank recapitalization in Europe.	其次，中国可以参与欧洲的银行资本重组。


At the moment, Europe’s banks desperately need to shore up their balance sheets.	如今欧洲银行正在竭尽所能强化资产负债表。


China’s sovereign wealth fund and non-bank financial institutions have been eager to invest in well-established Western banks.	而中国的主权财富基金和非银行金融机构早已开始对久负盛名的西方银行跃跃欲试了。


This is a good time to do so, as these banks’ valuations have plunged.	现在银行估值大幅缩水，采取如是行动正是时候。


Finally, Europe’s crisis presents an attractive opportunity for China to expand its direct investment there.	最后，欧洲的危机对中国来说也是一次扩大对欧直接投资的良机。


In 2010, Chinese direct investment in the EU totaled only $1.3 billion.	2010年，中国对欧盟直接投资额只有13亿美元。


Today, when governments and companies in Europe are opening their arms to foreign investors, Chinese companies eager for markets, technologies, and diversification should find rich pickings.	如今，欧洲政府和公司纷纷敞开怀抱欢迎外国投资者，而中国公司则可望更大的市场、技术和多元化的机会，应该可以在欧洲找到大把机会。


But Chinese money has been viewed with suspicion in Europe, reflecting fears that China has a hidden political agenda.	但欧洲人一直对中国资金心存疑虑，这是因为他们担心中国还有不可告人的政治图谋。


Such bias has discouraged Chinese capital from making bigger bets on Europe.	这样的偏见也使得中国资本不愿意在欧洲进行大手笔投资。


It is now time for Europe to gamble on China.	现在，欧洲是时候把宝押在中国身上了。


Such measures are likely to boost Europe’s medium-term growth prospects.	这些举措可以提振欧洲中期增长前景。


While they would most likely have no immediate calming effect on today’s panic-stricken financial markets, they are far superior to watching with folded hands as Europe descends into a financial abyss.	它们很可能无法立刻平复当下金融市场风声鹤唳的状况，但总比在欧洲滑向金融深远时袖手旁观强得多。


Can Democracy Defeat Terrorism?	民主能否战胜恐怖？


The Bush administration provided three major rationales for going to war in Iraq. Only one remains at all credible: the need to transform the Middle East through democratization and thereby undercut support for terrorists.	布什政府发动伊拉克战争有三个重要的理论依据，其中只有一条似乎还站得住脚：那就是对中东进行民主化改造，并以此来削弱恐怖分子的根基。


But does this argument really have any more basis in reality than the administration’s previous claims of an “imminent” threat from weapons of mass destruction or Saddam Hussein’s alleged support for al‑Qaeda?	但与美国政府先前提出的大规模杀伤性武器迫在眉睫的危机或萨达姆·侯赛因支持基地组织的指控相比，这条理由在现实中真能站得住脚吗？


With post-invasion inspectors concluding that no WMD stockpiles existed, and intelligence agencies now convinced that the Iraq war’s net effect has been to boost al‑Qaeda recruitment throughout the Islamic world, the Bush administration is understandably emphasizing the claim about democratization.	随着入侵后委派的调查人员认定伊拉克并未储存大规模杀伤性武器，情报部门现在认定：伊拉克战争的实际效果无非是给基地组织在整个伊斯兰世界的招募活动注入了一针强心剂。 在这样的情况下，布什政府也就自然而然地强调所谓的民主化作用。


Indeed, it has become a dominant theme of Bush’s second term.	实际上，这已经成了布什连任任期内最为重要的主题。


As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice put it in a recent speech in Cairo, “Freedom and democracy are the only ideas powerful enough to overcome hatred, division, and violence.”	正如国务卿康多莉扎·赖斯在不久前的开罗讲话中谈到的那样，“自由和民主是战胜仇恨、分离和暴力的最有力的思想武器。 ”


Cynics view this as merely an argument of convenience, one that has gained in prominence only because the other two rationales for the war collapsed.	愤世嫉俗者认为这不过是用来推卸责任的言论，只是由于另外两个战争借口都已经土崩瓦解，它才开始被世界所关注。


More importantly, skeptics also doubt the validity of the administration’s argument linking democracy and reduction of terrorism.	更重要的是，怀疑者也对政府将民主与减少恐怖联系起来的说法疑虑重重。


After all, British citizens in one of the world’s oldest democracies carried out the recent terrorist attacks in London.	归根结底，正是世界历史最悠久的民主国家－英国的公民策划了不久前对伦敦的恐怖袭击。


Similarly, an American citizen carried out the worst terrorist attack in the United States before September 11, 2001.	与此相似，2001年9月11日以前，策划美国有史以来最大恐怖袭击的也是美国公民。


The skeptics have a point, but they go too far.	怀疑论者也并非没有道理，但他们有些过于极端化了。


For one thing, it is still too early to judge the merits of the argument.	首先，判断这种说法是否正确还为时尚早。


A full assessment of the Iraq war and its effects on the Middle East will take a decade or more.	对伊拉克战争及其对中东影响的全面评估需要10年时间甚至更长。


Clearly, the January 2005 election there was a positive step for the region.	显而易见，2005年1月的地区选举迈出了积极的一步。


In the last six months, there have been national elections in Lebanon and local elections in Saudi Arabia.	过去6个月以来，黎巴嫩举行了全国大选，沙特阿拉伯也进行了地区性选举。


Egypt has amended its constitution to allow it presidential election to be contested.	埃及已经修改了宪法，允许竞选总统。


Further elections are scheduled in Iraq and the Palestinian Authority.	伊拉克和巴勒斯坦当局也即将进行选举。


As Walid Jumblatt, the Lebanese Druze leader said, “It’s strange for me to say it, but this process of change has started because of the American invasion of Iraq.”	正如黎巴嫩德鲁兹派领袖瓦利德·琼卜拉特所说，“这话听上去也许很奇怪，但上述改革进程正是在美国入侵伊拉克后开始的。 ”


Perhaps that outcome shouldn’t seem so strange.	也许产生这种结果也毫不奇怪。


After all, as the columnist David Brooks recently observed, “If there is one soft power gift that America does possess, it is the tendency to imagine new worlds.”	归根结底，正如专栏作家大卫•布鲁克斯近来所观察到的，“如果美国真的拥有所谓的软性权力天赋，那就是他们构想新世界的愿望。


In other words, the invasion of Iraq, and the subsequent increase in the rhetoric of democracy in the Middle East, may have changed frames of reference about the status quo.	”换句话说，入侵伊拉克，以及中东地区随之而来的对民主的关注，也许已经改变了现状赖以存在的基本框架。


Democracy, however, is more than just elections. It also requires tolerance of minorities and respect for individual rights, as well as the development of effective institutions for resolving political conflicts in divided societies.	然而民主绝不只是选举，还需要容忍少数族裔，尊重个人权利，以及制定解决分离社会政治冲突的有效制度。


If this occurs in Iraq, it may provide some post hoc legitimization for the war.	如果这在伊拉克得以实现，也许会为这场战争提供迟来的依据。


But such an outcome remains in doubt.	但这样的结果能否实现还未可知。


In the short run, the invasion of Iraq has created an intensifying insurgency and incipient civil war.	在短期内，入侵伊拉克造成叛乱升级，内战开始。


The presence of foreign troops creates a stimulus for nationalist and jihadist responses.	外国驻军的存在刺激了民族主义者和吉哈德分子采取行动。


The future of Iraq, not to mention democracy there, remains uncertain at best.	伊拉克的未来，更不要说民主，充其量也只处在一种不确定的状态。


Nevertheless, we can still conclude from the Iraqi experience that while the development of democracy can be aided from outside, it cannot easily be imposed by force.	尽管如此，我们仍然可以从伊拉克战争中得出结论：那就是尽管民主的发展可以适当地借助外力，但却不能通过武力强制获得。


While it is true that Germany and Japan became democratic after American occupation, it required their total defeat in a devastating war, and a seven-year occupation.	尽管德国和日本的确在美国占领之后成为了民主国家，但这需要在摧毁一切的战争中将它们彻底击垮，而后又是长达7年的漫长占领。


Moreover, Germany and Japan were relatively homogeneous societies with some prior experience of democracy.	不仅如此，德国和日本的社会结构都相对单一，以前又曾经有过一定的民主经历。


It is hard to see such conditions repeated in today’s world.	要在今天的世界复制上述条件的确非常困难。


The Bush administration may be correct in arguing that the extremely high costs and risks of promoting democracy are less than the costs and risks of allowing the authoritarian status quo in the Middle east to persist indefinitely.	布什政府辩解说推进民主所付出的高昂代价和风险大大低于容许独裁现状在中东无限期延续所付出的代价，这种说法也许有一定的道理。


But democracy is not the only instrument for a transformation that addresses the roots of terrorism.	但民主并非是铲除恐怖根基的唯一变革手段。


The development of civil societies, economic growth, and openness to the world are equally important.	建立平民社会、经济发展和向全世界开放也同等重要。


So is employing young men, educating young women, and addressing values of liberty and justice, which means ameliorating the sense of indignity in the region that stems from issues like the Israel-Palestine conflict.	雇佣年轻人、教育年轻人、建立自由和公正的价值观也十分重要，因为这能够缓解该地区由于以色列－巴勒斯坦冲突而产生的耻辱感。


Moreover, democracy alone will not convert the current crop of extremist jihadis to peaceful change.	不仅如此，单靠民主的力量无法和平地改变目前极端主义吉哈德分子所播下的种子。


If anything, too rapid a democratic transition may destabilize governments and enhance the extremists’ opportunities to wreak havoc.	如果硬要找出有什么不同，那就是民主过渡太快会威胁政府的稳定，为极端分子进行破坏提供更好的机会。


But, in the longer term, the slow, steady progress of democratization can provide a sense of hope for moderates, creating a plausible vision of a better future – the essence of soft power – that undercuts the message of hate and violence promoted by the extremists.	但长远来看，缓慢而稳健地推动民主化进程会为温和派带来希望，缓解恐怖分子所宣扬的仇恨和暴力，进而创造似乎更加美好的未来，这就是软性力量的实质。


Democratization can surely help remove some of the sources of rage that fuel terrorism, but it is only part of the solution.	民主化进程肯定会有助于消除制造恐怖的某些仇恨源泉，但它只是整体解决方案的一个组成部分。


Can Democracy Take Hold in Ukraine?	乌克兰会实现民主吗？


Certainly, the diversity of forms of governance used over the centuries by Russia, Poland, Lithuania, and Austria-Hungary when they ruled what is now Ukraine make creating a classic "nation state," with one dominant culture, difficult to imagine.	当然，几个世纪来俄国、波兰、立陶宛和奥匈帝国的统治方法多种多样，使得创造只有一种主流文化的典型"民族国家"变得难以想象。


Consider, for example, the robustness of the Russian language and the strength of the Orthodox Church- Moscow Patriarchate - in Donetsk that is in eastern Ukraine and the robustness of the Ukrainian language and the influence of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Lviv in the west.	举例来讲，俄语和东正教堂¾莫斯科大主教¾在乌克兰东部的顿涅茨克占据了统治地位，而与此同时，希腊天主教在乌克兰西部的利沃夫最为盛行，而乌克兰语也成了那里的主要语言。


Yet Spain, India, Belgium, and Switzerland are all consolidated democracies that do not fit the classic model of the nation state.	但西班牙、印度、比利时和瑞士都是联合民主国家的典范，都不符合 "民族国家"的传统模式。


Indeed, multiple but complementary identities are the norm in all four countries.	实际上，上述四个国家都具备多样但却互补的典型特征。


These multiple identities emerged because the democratic state provided a "roof" of equal rights above all citizens, whatever their religion, language, or culture.	这种多样化的特征之所以存在，是因为民主国家为不同宗教、语言或文化的公民提供了包容一切的平等权利。


This helped develop a strong sense of identity with the statewide political community.	这有助于全国范围内的政治团体形成强烈的身份认同。


These profoundly pluralistic countries are not classic "nation states," but rather what I call democratic "state nations."	这些深层次的多元化国家不是典型的"民族国家"，而是我所谓民主的"国家民族"。


During the recent presidential election, many suggested that reconciling the "two Ukraines" was impossible.	在最近举行的总统选举中，很多人都认为调和"两个乌克兰"是根本无法实现的目标。


But polarization has not been a constant factor in the history of independent Ukraine.	但两级分化在独立的乌克兰中并不是常见的现象。


On the contrary, Ukraine is closer to being a "state nation" than many people think.	恰恰相反，乌克兰比多数人想象的更接近"国家民族"的理想。


Moreover, its prospects for becoming a consolidated democracy are enhanced by the fact that its political elites - and most ordinary Ukrainians - have eschewed the idea of being a classic "nation state."	不仅如此，乌克兰的政治精英和多数普通的乌克兰百姓都对成立典型"民族国家"的想法避之不及，这也加大了乌克兰成为联合民主国家的可能性。


Indeed, more than 80% of Ukraine's Russified eastern districts voted for independence in 1991, and the 1999 parliamentary and presidential elections did not split the country nearly as much as the 2004 presidential elections did.	事实上，早在1991年80%乌克兰东部的俄化领土就曾投票选择独立，但1999年的议会和总统选举对国家造成的恶劣影响远远赶不上2004年的总统大选。


A survey in 2001 of the two supposedly most polarized cities, Donetsk and Lviv, showed convergence in their approval of independent Ukraine, with only 1% of respondents in Lviv and 5% in Donetsk preferring that Ukraine be divided into two or more countries.	2001年在顿涅茨克和利沃夫这两个分化最为严重的城市做过民意测验，结果他们都赞成成立独立的乌克兰国，只有1%的利沃夫人和5%的顿涅茨克人希望把乌克兰分成两个甚至更多的国家。


As in other "state nations," surveys in Ukraine indicate that common symbols have helped build elements of a common identity.	和其它"国家民族"一样，乌克兰的民意测验表明共同的象征创造了共同的国籍身份。


Both ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians view the tenth-century feudal state known as "Kyiv Rus" very favorably.	无论是该国的俄罗斯还是乌克兰族，都对10世纪的所谓封建"基辅俄国"非常认同。


Moreover, both groups share the seventeenth-century Cossack warrior Bohdan Khmelnytskyi as their most popular historical figure, and both revile Stalin due to the famines caused by his forced collectivization of agriculture in the 1930's (whereas most ethnic Russians in Russia view Stalin as the heroic state savior of WWII).	不仅如此，双方都把17世纪哥萨克战士赫米尔尼茨基看作最受欢迎的历史人物，也都对20世纪30年代斯大林强制推行农业集体化造成的饥荒痛加谴责（而俄罗斯境内的俄族人却把斯大林看作二次大战中的救国英雄）。


These shared attitudes toward Ukrainian symbols and statehood owe much to a recognition that independence will not be well protected by forging a classic nation state, that is, a "Ukrainian Only" state.	对于乌克兰象征和地位的共同见解很大程度上来源于这样一个共识：那就是成立典型的民族国家，也就是"单一的乌克兰国家"无法很好地维护独立。


Thus, the country's declaration of independence 13 years ago was made in the name of "The people of Ukraine," and citizenship was offered to everyone who was born on the territory of Ukraine, regardless of nationality.	因此，13年前该国以"乌克兰人民"的名义宣布独立，而每一个出生在乌克兰领土上的人，无论其民族状况，都被赋予了公民权利。


I was invited as an adviser to two constitutional committee meetings in Kyiv in the 1990's.	20世纪90年代，我应邀以顾问的身份参与了两次宪法委员会会议。


My impression from the discussions was that both Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine were acutely aware of the need to avoid ethnic conflict.	讨论给我的印象是：乌克兰人和俄罗斯人都深刻认识到了避免种族冲突的重要性。


In fact, an informal state-building alliance of convenience emerged between key non-communist Ukrainian nationalists and key pro-sovereignty, ethnic Russian communists.	实际上，在主要的乌克兰非共民族党派和要求主权的俄罗斯共产党之间，已经成立了正式的建国联盟。


The perception of "two Ukraines" emerged in the presidential election of 2004 partly due to the charge that Yushchenko would eliminate the constitutional guarantee that ethnic Russians could use Russian as their primary language of instruction in schools.	"两个乌克兰"的说法来自2004年的总统大选，部分原因是尤先科打算取消俄族人使用俄语进行学校教育的宪法保证。


But during his campaign Yushchenko assured Russophones that he would uphold such rights.	但竞选时尤先科又向俄族人承诺他会保留上述权利。


Finally, much of what has been described as "secessionism" in the east is in fact regionalism.	最终，东部所谓的"分离主义"实际上就是地方主义。


Greater legally respected decentralization in Ukraine, especially in Crimea, would be a logical and overdue "state nation" policy.	在乌克兰，特别是克里米亚实行法律保证的分权政策将是一种合理而且迟来的"国家民族"选择。


The other major issue raised during the Orange Revolution concerns presidential powers.	其它在"橙色革命"中提出的主要问题都与总统权力密切相关。


Many Yushchenko loyalists are unhappy that, in exchange for the government agreeing to fairer election rules, Yushchenko agreed to transfer some presidential powers to the parliament.	为了让政府采用更加公平的选举规则，尤先科不得不同意把一部分总统权力转移给国会，这让他的追随者们倍感不满。


Not withstanding the self-serving intentions of outgoing President Leonid Kuchma, this historic pact may in the long run produce positive results for Ukraine's democracy and prospects for joining the European Union.	尽管卸任总统库奇马是出于自私的目的，但长远来看这项历史性的协议可能为乌克兰的民主和加入欧盟的前景融入积极的因素。


The Ukrainian Constitution of 1996 adopted a model of governance close to the French style semi-presidentialism created by Charles de Gaulle for the Fifth Republic: a directly elected president with significant executive powers and a prime minister responsible to parliament.	1996年乌克兰宪法采用���管理模式与戴高乐为第五共和创建的法式半总统制非常相似：都拥有掌握重要行政权力的直选总统和对议会负责的总理。


This system works best when the president and the prime minister come from the same political party or coalition.	在总统和总理出自同一政党或联盟的情况下，这样的制度能发挥最佳的效果。


But, as in Russia under President Vladimir Putin, Kuchma vastly increased presidential powers in Ukraine.	但和俄国总统普京执政时一样，库奇马大大加强了乌克兰的总统权力。


Indeed, no real democracy in the world has such unchecked presidential authority.	事实上，世界上没有一个真正的民主国家，其总统权力可以这样的不受限制。


A look at the eight postcommunist countries just admitted to the European Union is instructive.	看看刚加入欧盟的8个后共产主义国家，会给我们很多启发。


Four - Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Latvia - are parliamentary.	这8个国家的其中4个¾即匈牙利、捷克共和国、爱沙尼亚和拉脱维亚¾实行的都是议会制。


The other four - Slovenia, Poland, Lithuania, and Slovakia - have directly elected presidents, but none comes constitutionally and politically close to Kuchma's Ukraine.	而8国的另外4个¾斯洛文尼亚、波兰、立陶宛和斯洛伐克¾都具备直选总统，但从政治和宪法的角度却没有一个能与库奇马领导的乌克兰相媲美。


Like Portugal in the 1980's, they adopted semi-presidential systems that so reduce presidential authority and increase the parliament's powers that they are most accurately described as "parliamentarized semi-presidential" systems.	比如20世纪80年代的葡萄牙就采用了削弱总统权力而扩大议会权力的半总统制，以至于把这种体制称为"议会半总统制"似乎更为妥当。


This is the model toward which Ukraine could be moving, however unwittingly.	无论多不情愿，这才是乌克兰应该前进的方向。


If so, the presidency would most likely cease to be a potential source of ethnic polarization, thereby strengthening the common identity that both Ukrainian and Russian citizens are committed to upholding.	如果真能这样，总统也许就不再是民族分化的潜在缘由，这样就可以加强乌克兰和俄罗斯人都希望坚持的共同特色。


Can Developing Countries Carry the World Economy?	发展中国家能撑起世界经济的大旗吗？


CAMBRIDGE – In the early days of the global financial crisis, there was some optimism that developing countries would avoid the downturn that advanced industrial countries experienced.	发自剑桥——在全球经济危机早期，有些人乐观地认为发展中国家不会重蹈发达国家的覆辙。


After all, this time it was not they that had engaged in financial excess, and their economic fundamentals looked strong.	毕竟这次的经济过热问题并不是发展中国家的的责任，而且这些国家的经济基础似乎也非常稳固。


But these hopes were dashed as international lending dried up and trade collapsed, sending developing countries down the same spiral that industrial nations took.	但这希望在国际贷款枯竭和贸易崩溃之后迅速化为了泡影，而发展中国家也与发达国家一道坠入了深渊。


But international trade and finance have both revived, and now we hear an even more ambitious version of the scenario.	但当全球贸易和经济双双恢复元气之后，我们又听到了更多野心勃勃的设想。


Developing countries, it is said, are headed for strong growth, regardless of the doom and gloom that has returned to Europe and the United States.	有人说不管欧美地区如何愁云惨淡，发展中国家已经成为了强劲增长的领头羊。


More strikingly, many now expect the developing world to become the growth engine of the global economy.	更有甚者还预测发展中国家会成为全球经济增长的核心引擎。


Otaviano Canuto, a World Bank vice president, and his collaborators have just produced a long report that makes the case for this optimistic prognosis.	而世界银行副行长奥塔维亚诺·卡努托及其同僚最近则撰写了一篇长篇大论的报告来佐证这一乐观的预测。


There are many reasons why such optimism is not unreasonable.	这种乐观预测的不合理性可以用许多理由来证明。


Most developing countries have cleaned up their financial and fiscal houses and do not carry high debt.	大多数发展中国家都对本国经济和财政进行了整顿并摆脱了高负债；


Governance is generally improving along with the quality of policymaking.	政府治理也随着政策制定水平的提高而得到改善；


The possibilities of technology transfer through participation in international production networks are greater than ever.	同时通过参与国际制造业网络来获得技术转移的可能性也大大增加。


Moreover, slow growth in the advanced economies need not exert a drag on developing countries’ performance.	此外，发达国家的低速增长并没有拖了发展中国家的后腿。


Long-term growth depends not on foreign demand, but on domestic supply.	事实上，长期增长的基础并不是外部需求，而是国内供应。


Sustained rapid growth is the result of poorer countries catching up to rich countries’ productivity levels – not of growth in the rich countries themselves.	持续的快速增长源自于穷国生产力迅速向富国看齐的过程——而并非来自于这些发达国家自身的增长。


For most developing countries, this “convergence gap” is wider now than it has been at any time since the 1970’s. So the growth potential is correspondingly larger.	对于大多数发展中国家而言，与富国经济之间的“水平差距”相对上世纪70年代其实有增无减，此消彼长之下，所谓的发展空间看上去倒变得更大了。


But the good news stops right about there.	但发展中国家的优势也到此为止了。


Sustained growth requires a growth strategy, and most developing countries do not yet have one that would put them irrevocably on the path of economic convergence.	持续增长需要制定相应的发展策略作为支撑，但大多数发展中国家且尚未制定一个类似的策略，因此也无法确保他们能进一步缩短与发达国家之间的经济差距。


For too many of these countries, economic growth in the last two decades relied on a combination of two factors: a natural rebound from previous financial crises (as in Latin America) or political conflicts and civil war (as in Africa), and high commodity prices.  Neither can be relied on for the productive transformation that developing countries need.	而对许多这类国家来说，近20年来的经济增长由两方面组成：一是过去遭遇了经济乱局（比如拉美）或者政治冲突和内战（比如非洲）后产生的自然反弹，二就是商品价格的提升。 而这两点都无法为发展中国家带来急需的生产力转型��


Consider, for example, Latin America’s growth model of the last two decades. Global competition has whipped many of the region’s industries into shape and fostered significant productivity gains in advanced sectors, but these gains have remained limited to a narrow segment of the economy.	以拉美过去20年的发展模式为例，全球竞争沉重打击了该地区的许多工业，并在某些领先行业中孕育了令人瞩目的生产力提升，但这些成果依然只局限于是整体经济的一小部分而已。


Worse still, labor has been displaced from more productive tradable activities (in manufacturing) to less productive informal activities (services).	更严重的问题则是劳动力从更有生产力的贸易活动（制造业）流向了生产力较低的非正式活动（服务业）。


In most Latin American countries, structural change has served to reduce rather than promote economic growth.	在大多数拉美国家，这种结构性变化不但未能促进生产力，还起到了反作用。


Because Asian governments have tended to support their modern, tradable sectors to a greater extent, most Asian countries have managed to avoid this malady, and have done much better as a result.	相必之下，由于亚洲各国政府更倾向于为现代化贸易部门的扩张提供支持，因此大多数亚洲国家都避免了拉美的问题，并取得了更可观的增长成果。


But even the Asian model may be reaching its limits.	但即便是这种亚洲模式也有其不足之处。


China, in particular, needs to confront the fact that the rest of the world will not allow it to run a huge trade surplus forever.	亚洲国家，尤其是中国，必须认清一个事实，那就是国际社会不会坐视其永远享有一笔巨额贸易顺差。


An undervalued currency, which serves to subsidize China’s manufacturing industries, has been a key driver of the country’s economic growth for the last decade.	而中国过去这些年经济增长的关键因素，则是人民币这种为补贴制造业而被刻意低估了的货币。


A significant appreciation of the renminbi will reduce or even eliminate that growth subsidy.	因此人民币的大规模升值也将逐步使这种补贴措施失去效用。


Regardless of developing countries’ growth prospects, there is a deeper question.	在发展中国家的繁荣之外还有一个更深层次的问题。


Will a world economy in which developing countries have substantially greater weight foster the kind of global governance that sustains a hospitable economic environment?	一个发展中国家日益坐大的世界经济是否能孕育出一种足以支撑良性经济发展环境的全球治理？


Emerging-market economies have not yet shown the kind of global leadership that suggests an affirmative answer to this question.	而事实上，这些新兴经济体在这方面还未能表现出足以令人信服的领导力。


The global institutions of our day – the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization – are still largely the creation of American leadership at the end of World War II (though they have obviously undergone considerable change since then).	当今的全球金融架构——世界货币基金组织，世界银行和世界贸易组织——在很大程度上依然是美国在二战后所树立的领导地位的产物（即便这些机构自建立之初已经发生了许多重大变化）。


These institutions reflected American interests, but they also codified certain norms of behavior – rule-based decision-making, non-discrimination, multilateralism, transparency – which eventually came to constrain American power as well.	这些机构都提现了美国的利益，但它们也制定了某些行为规范——以国际规则为基础的决策程序、非歧视原则，多边主义和透明运作——最终也反过来规范了美国的行为。


Countries like Brazil, China, India, and South Africa, however, have so far shown little interest in contributing to the construction of global regimes, preferring to remain free riders.	但巴西、中国，印度和南非似乎还没打算参与到对全球体系的建构当中，而是偏爱自行其是。


Jorge Castañeda, a former foreign minister of Mexico, goes further, arguing that these countries have systematically opposed global rules, in areas ranging from climate change to international trade.	前墨西哥外长豪尔赫·卡斯塔涅达对此有更为激进的看法，认为这些国家正在从气候变化到国际贸易的一系列领域中有组织有计划地与全球秩序相对抗。


Lest we be too harsh on developing countries, however, let us also remember that political scientists have long worried that greater diffusion of economic power would produce a less stable world economy.	请原谅我对发展中国家过于苛刻了，但请让我们记住政治学家的担忧——经济实力的不断稀释会带来一个更不稳定的世界经济。


If the world economy’s center of gravity shifts substantially toward developing countries, this will not be a smooth – and possibly not even a benign – process.	如果世界经济的重心不断向发展中国家转移，那将不会是一个平稳——甚至可能不会是良性的——过程。


We can be certain of two things: only those countries that adopt growth strategies based on stimulating domestic structural change will do well, and the conundrum of global governance – how to manage a world economy that has become unruly – will almost certainly get worse.	我们能确定的只有两件事：只有那些那些制定并实施了发展战略，而这种战略又是以促进国内经济结构转型为目标的国家才会有所成就； 而全球治理的困局——关于如何管理一个越来越难驾驭的世界经济——将进一步恶化。


Candor on Cancer Screening	癌症筛查辩


BOSTON – One of today’s most contentious medical debates centers on cancer screening, the benefits of which seem anything but debatable.	波士顿— 当今最具争议的医学议题集中于癌症筛查，而癌症筛查好处似乎是毫无争议的。


Indeed, earlier detection, many believe, logically must give patients an advantage in fighting the disease.	事实上，许多人认为，从逻辑上讲，早期诊断必然能增加患者战胜疾病的机会。


In fact, the evidence does not always support this assumption.	但现实证据表明并不总是如此。


Prostate cancer is a case in point.	前列腺癌就是一例。


Screening entails the mass testing of individuals of a certain age and gender, regardless of family history or personal health, to identify a potential disease state.	筛查包括对特定年龄和性别个体（不管家族史和个人健康状况）的大量试验，以识别潜在病情。


For screening to be useful, the test or procedure must readily identify the disease in question, and the subsequent treatment must result in some measurable benefit.	为了让筛查起作用，试验或程序必须能够识别可以病症，后续的治疗也必须产生可测量的效果。


In other words, the screened population must be better off than the non-screened population.	换句话说，被筛查人群的境况必须较未被筛查人群更好。


For some health issues – such as elevated cholesterol – screening yields positive results: a simple blood test measures the amounts of good and bad cholesterol in the blood, making it easier to detect related cardiovascular disease, which could lead to heart attacks or strokes.	对于某些健康问题——比如高胆固醇——筛查能产生积极效果：做一下简单的血液测试，测量一下血液中好胆固醇和坏胆固醇的数量就能让诊断相关心血管疾病更加容易，心血管疾病可能导致心脏病发或中风。


Those who are screened, diagnosed, and treated experience a lower rate of cardiovascular events.	接受筛查、诊断和治疗的人发生心血管状况的比率会降低。


Screening for prostate cancer, too, requires a blood test – the prostate-specific antigen (PSA) test.	筛查前列腺癌也需要血液测试，即前列腺抗原（PSA）测试。


Elevated PSA levels would suggest the presence of prostate cancer, even if no physical abnormalities were detected, so a tissue biopsy would be conducted.	PSA水平高代表前列腺癌症状，即使没有检查出其他身体异样，接着，病人将接受组织活体检查。


At this point, a diagnosis can be made.	至此已可以下诊断了。


If positive, cancer treatment, such as surgery or radiation, will follow.	如果结果呈阳性，则会跟进癌症治疗手段，比如手术或放疗。


And, one hopes, the individual will be cured.	当然，我们希望病人能被治愈。


Supporters of screening argue that it helps to detect and treat cancer earlier, when the chances of curing it are highest.	筛查的支持者认为这有助于更早地诊断和治疗癌症，让治愈可能性达到最大。


Moreover, younger patients, at least, can better withstand the side effects of cancer treatment.	此外，年轻患者至少能够更好地抵抗癌症治疗的副作用。


Proponents also contend that the two-decade decline in the overall incidence of deaths from prostate cancer is the result of increasingly widespread PSA testing.	支持者还认为，20年来前列腺癌致死人数的持续下降是PSA测试越来越普及的功劳。


Indeed, they encourage more vigorous screening programs.	事实上，他们鼓励进行更激进的筛查程序。


But screening’s benefits are not as straightforward as supporters claim.	但筛查的好处并非如支持者所宣称的那样直接。


To be sure, at-risk men – for example, those with a family history of prostate cancer, African-Americans, or men with enlarged prostates who are treated with 5-alpha-reductase inhibitors (whose failure to lower PSA levels could reflect increased risk of developing prostate cancer) – may want to consider getting tested.	诚然，高风险人群——有前列腺癌家族史者、非洲裔美国人、以及用5-阿尔法还原酶抑制剂治疗前列腺肥大者（5-阿尔法还原酶抑制剂不能降低PSA水平意味着发展为前列腺癌的风险增加）——可能会愿意考虑参加测试。


For most healthy men, however, the United States Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF) – a leading independent panel of experts on prevention and primary care – has publicly recommended against widespread PSA tests.	但是，对大部分健康男性来说，美国预防服务专职小组（USPSTF）——由预防和初级治疗专家组成的独立领导小组——公开反对普及PSA测试。


Several well-managed, randomized, long-term human trials have shown almost no survival benefit for those who are screened, diagnosed, and treated, compared to those who were never screened.	不少精心组织的长期随机人体试验表明，与从未被筛查人群相比，被筛查、诊断和治疗的人群几乎没有获得任何生存优势。


Of the studies cited by the USPSTF, one, conducted in Europe, showed a minor benefit in a subset of men, with no significant quality-of-life improvement.	USPSTF所引用的研究中包括一项来自欧洲的研究，该研究表，有一个子类的人获得了微弱的生存优势，但生命质量并未显著改善。


Another, conducted in the US, showed no evidence that PSA screening improved prostate-cancer survival rates.	另一项来自美国的研究表明，没有证据能证明PSA改善了前列腺癌的存活率。


In addition, a recent study comparing outcomes for patients whose prostate gland was surgically removed to those for patients who underwent only observation found no differences in survival rates between the two groups.	此外，一项最近的研究比较了手术切除前列腺患者和只接受观察的患者的治疗结果，结果发现两组患者的存活率并没有区别。


Because the average age at diagnosis is 71-73, men are likely to die from other causes before prostate cancer claims their life.	由于患者的平均诊断年龄是71—73岁，因此很可能在前列腺癌夺走生命之前就因其他原因逝世了。


And there is no credible evidence that low-grade prostate cancer uniformly progresses to higher-grade cancers, so early treatment is not essential.	也没有可信证据表明早期前列腺癌会毫无例外地转变为晚期癌症，因此早期治疗并不是必须的。


Moreover, cancer treatment often carries serious side effects – including urinary incontinence, erectile dysfunction, and, in those who undergo radiation, inflammation of the lower rectum or bladder, as well as underreported effects like fecal incontinence – that can negatively affect patients’ quality of life.	此外，癌症治疗通常会导致严重的副作用——包括尿失禁、勃起功能障碍、（接受化疗的病患的）低位直肠和膀胱炎症以及大便失禁等被低估的副作用——这些副作用会极大影响患者的生活质量。


Given that many patients diagnosed with prostate cancer as a result of the PSA test would never suffer any symptoms, such consequences are difficult to justify.	由于许多因PSA测试而被诊断为前列腺癌的患者原本不会出现任何症状，因此筛查的必要性很难证实。


Yet many refuse to give up screening.	但很多人还是不愿意放弃筛查。


Given this, an active surveillance program could be the best way to address the most serious consequence of excessive screening: premature, overly aggressive treatment.	出于此，积极的监督措施也许是纠正过度筛查最严重后果——过早、过于激进的治疗——的最佳方式。


In an active surveillance program, a patient diagnosed with a PSA-prompted biopsy delays treatment. Instead, he is closely monitored with various follow-up tests.	在积极监督措施中，因PSA过高而被诊断需进行活体组织检查的患者将推迟治疗，而替之以通过各种后续测试进行密切监视。


Only when signs indicate that the cancer is becoming dangerous is treatment initiated. While this approach is still being studied, the results so far appear promising: men who participate in active surveillance programs are 14 times more likely to die of a cause unrelated to prostate cancer.	这一方法仍在研究中，但目前的结果颇令人鼓舞：参与积极监督措施的男性因与前列腺癌无关原因而死亡的可能性要高14倍。


As evidence tilts the balance away from widespread PSA testing, a new screening test or biomarker is urgently needed that can distinguish effectively between potentially life-threatening prostate cancers and less dangerous forms.	由于证据不利于普��PSA测试，因此急需新的筛查测试和生物标记。 它们应能有效区别具有潜在生命危险的前列腺癌和危险性较小的前列腺癌。


Likewise, less risky treatments are crucial.	同样，低风险治疗也很关键。


Active surveillance programs are an encouraging prospect for minimizing the negative consequences of PSA testing.	积极监督措施是令人鼓舞的最小化PSA测试负面作用的办法。


But, without vastly improved screening practices, prostate cancer screening is unlikely to help – and can even do serious harm.	但是，除非筛查能够有重大进步，否则前列腺癌筛查称不上有益，甚至可能有害。


Can Draghi Be Believed?	德拉吉可信吗？


LONDON – Mario Draghi, the president of the European Central Bank, has repeatedly claimed that the ECB will do everything necessary to save the euro.	伦敦—欧洲央行行长德拉吉一再宣称欧洲央行将采取一切必要措施拯救欧元。


Nothing has been formally agreed yet, but the ECB is expected to announce a new government bond-buying program following next week’s meeting of its Governing Council.	虽然到目前为止还未形成正式一致，但预计欧洲央行将在下周治理委员会会议后出台新的债券购买计划。


Will it work?	该计划会奏效吗？


To have a significant impact on Italian and Spanish borrowing costs, the latest effort must be big enough to dispel the convertibility risk that underlies the extreme polarization of government bond yields across the eurozone: investors are loathe to hold Spanish and Italian debt, because they fear that both countries might be forced to leave the currency union.	如想大大改变意大利和西班牙的借贷成本，那么最新措施的规模必须足够大，以打消让欧元区国债收益率产生重大差异的兑换风险：投资者厌恶西班牙和意大利国债是因为他们担心这两个国家可能被迫脱离欧元区。


Unfortunately, it is highly unlikely that the ECB will do enough to persuade investors that membership is unequivocally forever, not least because Germany’s Bundesbank opposes any open-ended commitment to capping borrowing costs.	不幸的是，欧洲央行不太可能说服投资者相信欧元区成员地位具有无可置疑的永久性，其中一大原因便是德国央行反对任何无期限借贷成本控制承诺。


Spain, Italy, and the eurozone periphery face unprecedentedly high real borrowing costs, which are preventing a recovery in investment and hence economic growth.	西班牙、意大利和欧元区外围面临着前所未有的高实际借贷成本，投资复苏——从而经济增长——因此受阻。


Without a return to growth, they cannot quell investors’ doubts about their fiscal sustainability and their banks’ solvency.	而如果不能恢复增长，它们就无法打消投资者关于财政可持续性和银行偿付能力的疑虑。


The Italian and Spanish governments argue that their high borrowing costs largely reflect convertibility risks, and that the ECB should do as much as necessary to address them.	意大利和西班牙政府指出，它们的高借贷成本基本上是兑换风险的反映，欧洲央行应该采取一切必要手段纠正这一问题。


But eurozone members that currently benefit from exceptionally low borrowing costs – Germany, Austria, Finland, the Netherlands, and, to a lesser extent, France – maintain that Italian and Spanish borrowing costs largely reflect these countries’ failure to reform their economies and strengthen their public finances.	但目前从极低借贷成本中收益的欧元区成员国——德国、奥地利、芬兰、荷兰，从一定程度上说还包括法国——坚持认为意大利和西班牙的高借贷成本基本上是两国没能采取经济改革强化公共财政所致。


There is merit in both positions – but much more in the Spanish and Italian argument.	这两大观点各有各的道理，但西班牙和意大利的说法理由充分得多。


Opponents of open-ended ECB action argue that Italian and Spanish borrowing costs are not actually that high: interest rates have merely returned to levels seen in the run-up to the introduction of the euro, when investors distinguished properly between the countries that now share the euro.	无期限欧洲央行行动的反对者认为意大利和西班牙的借贷成本实际上并不高：利率水平只是回到了欧元引入前后的状态，当时，投资者可以对如今共用欧元的国家恰当地予以区分。


High borrowing costs are needed to focus minds and instill discipline.	高借贷成本有助于引起重视、巩固纪律。


Were the ECB to take aggressive action to bring them down, moral hazard would result: countries would face no punishment for delaying reforms.	如果欧洲央行采取激进行动将利率压低，将产生道德风险：延迟改革的国家不会受到任何惩罚。


In nominal terms, Italian and Spanish borrowing costs are indeed comparable to the levels of the late 1990’s.	从名义水平看，意大利和西班牙的借贷成本确实处于20世纪90年代末的水平。


But it is the real (inflation-adjusted) cost of capital that is crucial, and for both countries it is much higher now than it was in the run-up to their adoption of the euro.	但实际（经通胀调整的）资本成本才是关键的，而两国的实际资本成本均远高于刚开始使用欧元时的水平。


Moreover, it is erroneous to compare the present with the late 1990’s. Italy and Spain are at very different points in the economic cycle now than they were then.	此外，将现在与20世纪90年代末相比也是不正确的。


In the late 1990’s, both economies were growing (rapidly in the Spanish case), whereas now they face hard times and a mounting risk of deflation.	彼时和此时的意大利和西班牙处于截然不同的经济周期阶段。


And countries facing depressions and rapidly weakening inflation typically face very low borrowing costs: investors purchase government bonds for want of profitable alternatives. This is what we see in the United Kingdom and the United States, where borrowing costs remain at all-time lows, despite both countries’ weak public finances and poor growth prospects.	20世纪90年代末，两国均在增长（西班牙还增长得相当快），而如今，它们面临着萧条和日益增加的通缩风险。


To be sure, investors must differentiate between eurozone governments, in order to ensure that risk is correctly priced.	平心而论，投资者必须区别对待欧元区的不同国家，这样才能确保风险被正确定价。


The Italian and Spanish authorities acknowledge as much.	意大利和西班牙当局也承认这一点。


But the current spread between the yield on German sovereign debt and that of the Italian and Spanish governments far exceeds what is required to ensure that investors differentiate appropriately.	但目前德国和意大利和西班牙之间的主权债务收益率差远高于确保投资者将它们予以恰当区分的水平。


The polarization of borrowing costs has politically explosive distributional effects: Germany is borrowing and refinancing its existing debt at artificially low interest rates.	借贷成本的两极分化具有政治爆炸性的分配效应：德国享受着人为压低的利率借贷和再融资。


According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, investor flight from the government debt markets of the eurozone’s struggling members to Germany has already saved the German government almost €70 billion ($88 billion).	根据基尔世界经济研究院（Kiel Institute for the World Economy）的研究，投资者逃离欧元区受困成员国国债、奔向德国国债的动作替德国政府节省了将近700亿欧元。


Other countries, by contrast, face ruinously high borrowing costs, which are simultaneously increasing the scale of their reform challenges and narrowing their political scope to address them.	与此相反，其他国家面临着畸高的借贷成本，这同时导致了改革挑战的规模、挤压了纠正问题的政治空间。


The longer Italian and Spanish borrowing costs remain at such elevated levels, the greater the damage to those economies, and the harder it will become to marshal the necessary political support for further reforms.	意大利和西班牙借贷成本在如此高水平停留得越久，两国经济受到的伤害就越大，动员必要政治支持进行进一步改革的难度也就越大。


The Italians and Spaniards are right: the principal reason for the size of the spread between the periphery and Germany is convertibility risk.	意大利和西班牙是对的：外围和德国利差如此大的主要原因是兑换风险。


Investors are demanding a hefty premium to insure against the chance that Italy and Spain are ultimately forced out of the eurozone – thus bringing that day closer by weakening countries’ fiscal positions and raising their private-sector borrowing costs (which are set by government bond yields).	投资者要求的是巨额风险溢价，以确保抵消意大利和西班牙最终被迫脱离欧元区的风险，而这削弱了两国财政状况、提高了私人部门借贷成本（由国债收益率决定），从而将两国向脱离欧元区又推了一把。


With private and public consumption in both Italy and Spain set to remain depressed for years to come, economic recovery requires stronger investment and exports.	意大利和西班牙私人和公共消费在未来数年中仍将受到抑制，因此经济复苏要靠更强的投资和出口。


But the steep fall in the value of Italian and Spanish banks’ holdings of government debt, combined with mounting bad loans as a result of recessions exacerbated by punitive borrowing costs, is forcing the banks to rein in business lending further.	但意大利和西班牙银行国债持有量的大幅下降加上惩罚性高借贷成本恶化了衰退，从而造成不良贷款越积越多，银行正在进一步收紧商业贷款。


The ECB’s latest program of bond purchases will be big enough to ensure that Draghi does not lose face.	欧洲央行的最新债券购买计划规模将足以确保德拉吉的颜面。


But it will not be big enough to dispel convertibility risk and hence demonstrate the ECB’s credibility as a lender of last resort.	但并不足以打消兑换风险从而证明欧洲央行作为最后贷款人的信誉。


And it is the ECB’s credibility problem, not that of member states, that is the principal reason for unsustainably high borrowing costs in Italy, Spain, and other distressed eurozone countries.	而造成意大利、西班牙和其他受困欧元区国家借贷成本畸高的主要原因不是成员国，而是欧洲央行的信誉问题。


Can East Asians Cooperate?	东亚合作能实现吗？


SEOUL – As China continues its unremitting rise, people throughout East Asia are wondering whether their states will ever be able to achieve the peaceful, stable relations that now characterize Europe.	发自首尔——眼看着中国不断崛起，东亚地区的人们都不禁思索是否也能在东亚各国之间建立一种欧洲式的和平稳定关系。


Given the regularity of serious diplomatic spats – over everything from tiny atolls in the South China Sea to the legacy of World War II – this may sound like an elusive dream.	考虑到东亚各国之间不时上演的，几乎涵盖从南中国海海岛归属到二战后遗症等问题的严重外交冲突，这个梦想似乎有点不切实际。


But, with nationalism and military budgets rising sharply, achieving consensual stability has become imperative for the region.	但随着各国民族主义情绪以及军费的不断高涨，取得各方一致共识下的稳定已成为了该区域最为紧迫的问题。


Can it be done?	那么这一点又能否实现呢？


The “liberal” view of international relations recommends three ingredients: political democratization, deeper economic interdependence, and viable institutions through which East Asia’s states can conduct their affairs in a multilateral way.	对此国际关系上的“自由主义”理念提出了三个要素：政治民主化，更深层次的经济依存度，并建立一系列机构，使各国得以通过多边方式处理相关事务。


Because, as Immanuel Kant noted long ago, states with democratic political systems tend not to fight with each other, democracy should be encouraged in order to secure peace.	正如伊曼纽尔·坎特（Immanuel Kant）在很久之前所指出的那样，实行民主制度的国家一般都不愿互相攻伐，因此应该推动民主以实现和平。


Pursuit of a Pax Democratia has long been embedded in American foreign policymaking.	长期以来，对民主的追求都根植于美国的外交政策制定之中。


And European states have, since 1945, made democracy a core element in their integration.	而欧洲国家从1945年至今都将民主作为欧洲一体化的核心要素。


But East Asia’s wide variety of political systems makes such a democratic consensus highly unlikely, at least for now.	但就在目前来说，东亚地区政治体制的多样性使得这一民主共识极难达成。


On the other hand, economic interdependence among East Asia’s states has been deepening.	另一方面，东亚国家间的经济依存度正不断加深。


For 30 years, East Asians have received the ample rewards of Adam Smith’s insight that free trade would bring material benefits to participating countries.	亚当·斯曾说自由贸易将为所有参与者带来物质利益，而30年来东亚人所取得的丰硕成果恰恰证明了这一点。


Regional policymakers nowadays are loath to risk this progress through hostile behavior.	有见及此，当今的区域性政策制定者也都不愿意用敌意行为破坏这一进程。


Economic interdependence in East Asia gained momentum following the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998.	在1997~1998年亚洲经济危机后，经济上的互惠互利为东亚带来了新的动力。


But confrontations between the United States and China, the US and Japan, and China and Japan over the past year have left many wondering whether economic interdependence alone can bring about stable regional relations.	但美中，美日和中日之间在去年爆发的多场冲突使许多人不禁怀疑：或许仅靠经济依存根本无法实现区域稳定关系。


The third liberal route to peace – institutionalizing international relations – aims to regularize the behavior of states through a system of norms and rules, thereby creating order (and peace) out of quasi-anarchy.	而实现和平的第三个自由主义路径——所谓制度化的国际关系——希望通过一个长期设立的系统来规范各国行为，并以此实现秩序（以及和平），避免类似于诸侯争霸的政治局面。


Such thinking motivated US President Woodrow Wilson’s desire to establish the League of Nations after World War I, and it also underlay President Franklin Roosevelt’s push to create the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions after World War II.	这种理念促使美国总统伍德·威尔逊在一战后成立国家联盟（国联），也推动了另一位美国总统富兰克林·罗斯福在二战后成立联合国并创建布雷顿森林体系。


Likewise, European states accept the common norms and rules of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and are almost always prepared to be regulated by them.	同样，欧洲各国也认可欧洲安全与合作组织所订立的各项规范条例，并随时准备接受相关条例的监管。


Indeed, the European Union is the fruit of a long, continuous effort to strengthen common norms and rules among European states.	事实上，欧盟也是欧洲国家之间长期不断强化共同规范后结下的硕果。


In contrast to Europe, East Asia is composed of states that are radically different in terms of their size, development, and political-economic systems.	相比之下，东亚各国在国土面积，发展程度和政治经济架构方面都存在巨大差异。


East Asian policymakers understand that there is little that they can do to alter their neighbors’ political systems. Nor can they do much in an official way to deepen economic interdependence in the short term.	东亚政策制定者们也自知无从改变邻国的政治制度，也无法在短期内以官方手段加深各国之间的经济依存度。


So it is natural for the region’s policymakers to focus more on institutionalization, with lively discussions regularly taking place about the region’s nascent constellation of groupings: ASEAN+3, the East Asian Summit, the East Asian Community, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, Asia-Pacific Community, etc.	因此该区域的政策制定者们很自然地将目光转向了制度化道路，而该议题也在新生的区域组织中进行了热烈讨论，其中包括东盟+3、东亚共同体、东亚集团，亚太经合组织以及亚太共同体等。


But this process has been politicized and ridden by an acute behind-the-scenes competition for influence among the major powers.	但这一进程却遭到了政治化，并被各大势力之间的幕后恶斗所左右。


Indeed, East Asia seems to lack the equivalent of major EU architects like Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman – visionaries with the stature and political support needed to begin building a framework for regional peace in a time, like today, of great change.	事实上，东亚似乎缺少像让·莫内（Jean Monnet）和罗贝尔·舒曼（Robert Schuman）这样的欧盟设计师——既有远见卓识与极高的思想境界，又拥有所需的政治支持去创建一个在这个变革时代实现区域和平的框架。


So, for now, East Asians should be very pragmatic about institutionalizing regional affairs.	因此如今东亚人应当对区域事务制度化方面抱有谨慎务实的态度。


Rather than spending energy on trying to build large-scale institutions covering the entire region, it would be better to focus more on smaller, issue-oriented institutions.	与其花精力去尝试建立大规模机构去覆盖整个区域，不如着手创建规模更小且专注于特定事务的相关组织。


For example, the first successful step toward regional economic cooperation in East Asia was the Chiang Mai Initiative for international currency swaps, which followed the 1997-1998 crisis.	比如说，向区域经济合作成功迈进的第一步就是在1997~1998年危机后达成的清迈国际货币互换协议。


Similarly, the Six-Party Talks on the denuclearization of North Korea, though producing no significant results so far, remain the only useful mechanism for addressing the problem collectively.	同样，关于朝鲜核问题的六方会谈虽然至今未能取得重大成果，但依然是合作应对这一问题的唯一有效机制。


The nuclear disaster in Fukushima, Japan, could give rise to another issue-specific regional institution, this one focused on nuclear safety.	而日本福山核事故则可能催生另一个专管该事故以及核安全的区域性机构。


For Japan’s neighbors, the International Atomic Energy Agency is not enough; their urgent worries are creating pressure to establish a regional mechanism.	对于日本的邻国来说，国际原子能组织的作用是不够的； 各国当前的极度担忧更加有助于建立这样一个区域性机制。


The coming summit between South Korea, China, and Japan on May 21-22 in Tokyo, for example, will focus on nuclear safety and prepare a regime for closer regional cooperation.	而即将于5月21~22日在东京举行的韩中日三国峰会将把核安全作为中心议题，并为创立一个更紧密区域合作的机制做准备。


With 88 nuclear power plants currently operating in South Korea, Japan, and China, the initiative is an important one.	鉴于目前已经有88座核电站在这三个国家投入运行，这一动议显然非常重要的。


What would happen if any of their reactors develops problems similar to those at Fukushima?	试想如有另一座核设施也发生福岛那样的事故该，我们该如何应对？


Moreover, North Korea has been running its Yongbyon nuclear facility without international inspection.	此外，朝鲜如今正在脱离国际监管的情况下运行宁边核设施。


According to the wife of a North Korean defector who worked for 20 years as a nuclear scientist at Yongbyon, safety standards there are dangerously lax.	有位朝鲜叛逃者的妻子曾作为科学家在宁边核设施工作了20年，据她所述，该设施的安全标准相当松懈，危险程度极高。


More broadly, only through the establishment of less ambitious, smaller-scale, and functionally oriented institutions can momentum be built for a regional framework for peace.	总的来说，只有通过建立一系列野心更小，范围较窄，并以功能为导向的机构才能为一个区域和平框架的构建提供所需动力。


After all, Rome wasn’t built in a day, and the EU – rooted in the post-war European Coal and Steel Community – began with similar small steps toward integration.	毕竟罗马不是一天建成的，而奠基于二战后欧洲煤钢联营的欧盟，也是通过每一小步的积累而最终实现一体化的。


Can Egypt Become a True Democracy?	埃及能实现真正民主吗？


WASHINGTON, DC – Hosni Mubarak’s resignation as President of Egypt marks the beginning of an important stage in that country’s transition to a new political system.	发自华盛顿特区——埃及总统胡斯尼·穆巴拉克的辞职标志着埃及向新政治系统转型的进程步入了一个重要的阶段。


But will the political transition ultimately lead to democracy?	但这一转型能否最终导向民主呢？


We cannot know with certainty, but, based on the history of democratic government, and the experiences of other countries – the subject of my book, Democracy’s Good Name: The Rise and Risks of the World’s Most Popular Form of Government – we can identify the obstacles that Egypt faces, as well as the advantages it enjoys, in building political democracy.	对此我们目前还难以定论，不过基于民主政府的历史以及其他国家的经验——也正是笔者拙作《民主的盛名：当世最流行之政府架构的崛起与风险》的论题——我们可以发现并定义埃及在建立政治民主的过程中所面对的一系列障碍以及享有的各种优势。


Understanding any country’s democratic prospects must begin with a definition of democracy, which is a hybrid form of government, a fusion of two different political traditions. The first is popular sovereignty, the rule of the people, which is exercised through elections.	对任何国家民主前景的理解都必须从对民主的定义开始，民主是政府的一种杂交形态，是两种不同政治传统的融合体——其一是人民主权，就所谓人民的治理，通过选举实现。


The second, older and equally important, is liberty – that is, freedom.	另一种更古老但同样的重要的是自主选择的权利——就是自由。


Freedom comes in three varieties: political liberty, which takes the form of individual rights to free speech and association; religious liberty, which implies freedom of worship for all faiths; and economic liberty, which is embodied in the right to own property.	自由有三种形式：政治自由，即个人有发表言论和结社的自由； 宗教自由，意味着可以自由崇拜任何信仰；


Elections without liberty do not constitute genuine democracy, and here Egypt faces a serious challenge: its best-organized group, the Muslim Brotherhood, rejects religious liberty and individual rights, especially the rights of women.	没有自由的选举并不能构成真正的民主，因此埃及也面临着一个严重的挑战：其国内组织最严密的社团——穆斯林兄弟会——反对宗教自由和个人权利，尤其是妇女权利。


The Brotherhood’s offshoot, the Palestinian movement Hamas, has established in the Gaza Strip a brutal, intolerant dictatorship.	该组织在巴勒斯坦的分支哈马斯已经在加沙地区建立起了一个残酷而狭隘的专制政府。


In conditions of chaos, which Egypt could face, the best-organized and most ruthless group often gets control of the government.	在局势混乱的情况下（埃及可能会遭遇这一点），组织最好且最冷酷无情的社团通常会接管政府。


This was Russia’s fate after its 1917 revolution, which brought Lenin’s Bolsheviks to power and condemned the country to 75 years of totalitarian rule.	俄罗斯在1917年革命后的情况正是如此，列宁的布尔什维克夺取了权力并给这个国家带来了整整75年的极权统治。


In the same way, the Muslim Brotherhood could seize power in Egypt and impose a far more oppressive regime than Mubarak’s ever was.	同样，穆斯林兄弟会可能执掌埃及大权，并推行一个连穆巴拉克都自叹弗如的残暴统治。


Even if Egypt avoids control by religious extremists, democracy’s two-part anatomy makes swift and smooth progress to a democratic system problematic.	即便埃及避免了被极端宗教组织控制的局面，但民主的两大组成部分将使向民主系统的转化和平稳过渡问题重重。


While elections are relatively easy to stage, liberty is far more difficult to establish and sustain, for it requires institutions – such as a legal system with impartial courts – that Egypt lacks, and that take years to build.	虽然选举的实施相对容易，但自由却更难以建立和维持，因为后者需要相关机制——比如一个拥有中立法庭的司法系统，但这些机制却是埃及目前所不具备，并要花费多年才能建立的。


In other countries that have become democracies, the institutions and practices of liberty have often emerged from the working of a free-market economy.	在其他实现了民主的国家，相关机制和自由的实践通常都源自于自由市场经济的作用。


Commerce fosters the habits of trust and cooperation on which stable democracy depends.	商业孕育了人们互相信任与合作的习惯，而这正是民主所倚重的。


It is no accident that a free-market economy preceded democratic politics in many countries in Latin America and Asia in the second half of the twentieth century.	因此20世纪下半段许多拉美和亚洲国家在自由市场经济后才出现民主政治的现象并非意外。


Here, too, Egypt is at a disadvantage.	在这方面埃及也处于不利地位。


Its economy is a variant of crony capitalism, in which economic success depends on one’s political connections, rather than on the meritocratic free-market competition from which liberty grows.	该国经济实际是权贵资本主义的一个变种，经济成功并非来自于孕育了自由的自由市场竞争，而是取决于谁在政界有“关系”。


Egypt suffers from another political handicap: it is an Arab country, and there are no Arab democracies.	此外埃及还面临着另一个政治障碍：它是一个阿拉伯国家，而目前还不存在任何阿拉伯民主国家。


This matters, because countries, like individuals, tend to emulate others that they resemble and admire.	这非常重要，因为国家跟个人一样倾向于模仿那些它们崇拜的同类。


After they overthrew communism in 1989, the peoples of Central Europe gravitated to democracy because that was the prevailing form of government in the countries of Western Europe, with which they strongly identified.	在1989年推翻共产主义统治后，中欧各国人民倒向民主就是因为这是西欧国家通行的政府形式，而且得到了人们的强烈支持。


Egypt has no such democratic model.	但埃及却缺乏类似的民主榜样。


Egypt is, however, better placed to embrace democracy than the other Arab countries, because the obstacles to democracy in the Arab world are less formidable in Egypt than elsewhere.	然而相对于其他阿拉伯国家来说，埃及也更容易拥抱民主，因为存在于阿拉伯世界的民主障碍在该国较为弱小。


Other Arab countries – Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, for example – are sharply divided along tribal, ethnic, and religious lines.	其他阿拉伯国家——比如伊拉克，叙利亚和黎巴嫩——都处于部落，种族和宗教的尖锐分裂之中。


In divided societies, the most powerful group is often unwilling to share power with the others, resulting in dictatorship.	在这些分裂的社会中，最有权势的团体往往不愿意与其他团体分享权力，于是便导致了专制。


Egypt, by contrast, is relatively homogeneous. Christians, who make up 10% of the population, are the only sizable minority.	与其相反，埃及的社会成分相对单一，占总人口10%的基督教徒��唯一比较大的少数群体。


The oil that the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf have in abundance also works against democracy, for it creates an incentive for the rulers to retain power indefinitely.	波斯湾阿拉伯国家手中丰富的石油也经常成为民主的障碍，因为它会诱使统治者无限期地维护自己的权力。


Oil revenues enable them to bribe the population to remain politically passive, while discouraging the creation of the kind of free-market system that breeds democracy.	石油收入使他们可以收买本国的人民，让他们在政治上保持消极。


Fortunately for its democratic prospects, Egypt has only very modest reserves of natural gas and oil.	幸运的是埃及的石油和天然气储备不甚丰富，也有助于其民主前景。


The fact that the large protest movement that suddenly materialized has, until now, been a peaceful one also counts as an advantage for building democracy.	突然爆发的大规模抗议活动至今依然保持平和的事实也有助于建立民主。


When a government falls violently, the new regime usually rules by force, not by democratic procedures, if only to keep at bay those it has defeated.	当一个政府遭暴力推翻时，新政权通常会实行暴力统治而非民主程序，只为了在防止被推翻者卷土重来。


The cause of democracy in Egypt has one other asset, the most important one of all.	埃及的民主进程还有另一个最重要的资产。


Democracy requires democrats – citizens convinced of the value of liberty and popular sovereignty and committed to establishing and preserving them.	民主制度需要民主主义者——那些相信自由和人民主权的价值并致力于建立和维护它们的公民。


The political sentiments of many of the hundreds of thousands of people who gathered in Cairo’s Tahrir Square over the last three weeks leave little doubt that they do want democracy, and are willing to work and even to sacrifice for it.  Whether they are numerous enough, resourceful enough, patient enough, wise enough, and brave enough – and whether they will be lucky enough – to achieve it is a question that only the people of Egypt can answer.	数十万名在过去三个星期内聚集在开罗解放广场的人民已经表明了对民主的渴求，并愿意为此付出努力甚至是牺牲。 而他们是否有足够人数，足够资源，足够耐心，足够聪明和足够勇敢——也足够幸运——去实现民主，则是只有埃及人民才能回答的问题。


Can Energy Be Governed?	能源能被管理么？


Energy lies at the heart of the world’s most pressing global challenges.	能源是当今世界面临的最为核心的全球性挑战。


Yet at both the global and national levels, energy is poorly governed.	不论是在全球还是国家层面来说，能源的管理水平都很差。


The fiasco of the Copenhagen climate summit is just one illustration of how far the world is from being able to bring about the desperately needed transition to a system of sustainable and secure provision of energy services.	哥本哈根气候峰会的失败就是这样的一个缩影，它告诉我们，要想转移到一个可持续性和安全的能源体系，我们还有很长的路要走。


The key role of energy in global problems is clear.	能源问题的重要性不言而喻。


Some two-thirds of the greenhouse-gas emissions that are causing climate change trace back to fossil fuel use.	大约三分之二的温室气体都可以归结于化石燃料的使用。


A renewed scramble for oil is raising fears of a new generation of geopolitical conflicts.	对石油的争夺引发了新一轮的地缘冲突。


Global economic instability correlates strongly with energy-price volatility.	能源价格的波动也直接影响到全球经济形势的稳定性。


Economic development is in significant part defined by the process of overcoming energy poverty, yet 1.6 billion people still lack access to even the most basic energy services.	经济的发展很大程度上依赖于如何解决能源匮乏难题。 世界上还有 16 亿人口甚至缺乏基本的能源使用。


Only recently has it become clear that these seemingly disparate issues are a collective manifestation of a dysfunctional energy system.	我们刚刚知道，过去一些不尽相关的问题，现在看起来也环环相扣，它们都和能源系统的管理缺失有着一定的关系。


Globally and at the national level, energy is still conceptualized and managed in terms of energy sources, not in terms of the energy services those sources provide.	从全球或是国家层面来看，能源还是仅仅被看成是能源资源，不包括能源行业提供的相关服务。


Yet consumers of energy services have no particular interest in what sources of energy fuel their production, transportation, lighting, heating, air conditioning, or appliances.	诚然，消费者对他们所使用的产品，运输，照明，加热或空调，设备来自何种能源不感兴趣。


The existing paradigm serves to rigidify decision-making at a time when extraordinary flexibility and rapid change are essential.	现有的僵化决策机制有些过时，特别是在当今高度灵活和快速变化成为主流之际。


At the global level, a host of inter-governmental organizations is tasked with addressing various pieces of the energy puzzle.	从全球范围来看，为了解决不同的能源问题，涌现出大量的跨国性组织。


Among these, the most conspicuous is the International Energy Agency (IEA). Created by oil consumers in the 1970’s in response to the OPEC price shocks and the embargoes by Arab oil exporters, the IEA has succeeded in establishing and supervising a system of national oil stockpiles, which has helped to prevent a recurrence.	其中最为瞩目的是国际能源署（ IEA ），它成立于 1970 年代，当时的石油消费国为了应对欧佩克国家的石油危机和阿拉伯出口国的石油禁运而设置的。


With a small but highly competent professional staff, the IEA has also become the primary source for the world’s energy statistics and is playing a key role in the climate debate.	国际能源署成功地建立和监督一种能控制各国石油产量的体系，避免石油危机的再次发生。 它拥有高效能的专家团队，提供世界能源数据的主要来源，在全球暖化辩论中起到关键性的作用。


But it is nowhere near the truly international organization that its name implies.	但和其名称比较起来， IEA 所发挥真正的国际性作用还没有体系出来。


The IEA was established by and for a small number of wealthy oil-importing countries, under the aegis of the OECD.	IEA 是在经合组织的框架下，由世界上少数几个石油进口富国建立的。


Its membership remains restricted to OECD countries, even though surging demand from non-member countries like China and India is rapidly undermining the IEA’s ability to speak for, and coordinate responses among, oil importers as a group.	随着中国印度两国的崛起， IEA 作为石油进口国代言人的权威性和协调功能有所下降。


Although the IEA’s mandate has expanded beyond oil since the early 1990’s to include broader energy policy, several of its own member governments, led by Germany, found its record on renewables so unsatisfactory that they recently established the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), whose membership is open to all.	虽然在 1990 年代以后， IEA 的功能扩展到石油之外的其他更为广泛的能源政策上，以德国为首的一些国家政府觉得 IEA 不能在可再生能源上发挥作用，因而发起成立国际可再生能源署（ IRENA ），欢迎世界上所有的国家加入。


Other key inter-governmental organizations face their own limits.	其他一些主要的国际组织也有着自身的局限性。


The International Energy Forum, which grew out of a series of meetings of energy ministers, is intended to provide a common forum for fossil-fuel producers and consumers.	由一些石油国家部长们发起的国际能源论坛，为化石燃料的生产国和消费国提供一个相互交流的机会。


It has taken some useful steps that may help to stabilize markets, such as the Joint Oil Data Initiative, but it plays a relatively minor role.	它在稳定市场方面，例如联合石油数据计划上也取得了一些成绩，但影响力还是相当有限。


The Energy Charter Treaty has failed to bring Russia into a rule-based framework for international transit via oil and gas pipelines.	能源宪章条约在石油管道运输管理上，无法将俄罗斯纳入其框架管理之内。


And, the World Bank’s energy financing remains overwhelmingly dedicated to fossil fuels, despite limited efforts to establish funding for low-carbon energy.	包括世界银行的能源融资也只是针对化石燃料，没有为低碳经济做出什么贡献。


Numerous networks and partnerships have emerged in response to the gaps in global energy governance.	在管理全球性能源问题上，有着为数众多的网络和合作组织。


For example, the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership, founded in the United Kingdom, has grown into a multi-stakeholder body supporting renewables and efficiency in numerous countries.	例如，由英国发起的国际可再生能源和能源效率合作组织，已经发展成为众多国家在可再生能源和节能能源上的多功能性组织。


So far, however, such initiatives remain quite small.	但是，到目前为止，这些组织的功能还很局限。


They will not, in the foreseeable future, operate on a scale that can foster a rapid transition away from fossil fuels or provide energy services to billions of new consumers.	在不远的将来，它们的发展也难以应对化石能源的迅速转型，以及为数以十亿人们提供能源服务。


As is true of other global problems, much depends on the capacity and willingness of the most powerful national governments to find ways to act collectively.	正如其他全球性的问题那样，要想解决能源问题，很大程度上要依赖于大国政府的联合行动。


Yet these countries’ deeply flawed systems of national energy governance will make such collective action all the more challenging.	然而，这些大国在管理本国能源上都有所缺失，这就导致国与国之间的联合行动举步维艰。


Indeed, in many ways, the situation has been getting worse. Over the past two decades, advocates of privatization have promised greater efficiencies and lower energy prices, but the failure to accompany privatization with appropriate regulation and enforcement has left many countries with poorly governed and often deeply corrupt energy sectors.	实际上，目前在能源管理上的情形在许多方面有所恶化，在过去的 20 年中，私人化的倡导者认为私有化会提高效率和降低能耗，但由于缺乏适当的监管和法律体系，许多管理不善的国家在能源领域催生出大规模贪腐行为。


Moreover, given the vast profits available under the current system, the struggle to bring about a significant energy transition faces stiff resistance from deeply entrenched vested interests.	而且，在目前如此高额的利润体系下，要想转变当前的能源模式，面临着众多利益团体的顽强抵抗。


And market forces alone are unable to cope with major externalities such as greenhouse-gas emissions, with overwhelming government control over major energy sources such as oil, and with huge numbers of people too poor to constitute a market.	单凭市场的力量无法解决例如温室气体排放等的客观事实，在政府垄断着当前包括石油等的能源前提下，大量贫困人口依然无法享用基本的能源。


Our fractured landscape for energy governance was not planned. It has evolved piecemeal, with little coordination among its various parts.	我们对未来能源管理的计划还没有形成，目前推进的也较缓慢，各个分支之间没有相互之间的协调。


If we are to avoid paying a high economic, strategic, and environmental price for its shortcomings, a better system of developing and enforcing internationally agreed energy rules is essential.	如果要想避免为我们的错误付出高昂的经济，战略和环境的代价，建立和实施一个更加完善的国际能源法规势在必行。


Can Europe Be Saved?	欧洲能得救吗？


VIENNA – In 2011, Europe’s financial and banking crisis escalated into a sovereign-debt crisis.	维也纳——2011年，欧洲金融和银行危机升级为一场主权债务危机。


A problem that began in Greece ended up raising doubts about the very viability of the euro – and even of the European Union itself.	从希腊发端的问题导致欧元、甚至是欧盟本身的可行性遭到质疑。


A year later, those fundamental doubts remain undiminished.	一年过去了，上述根本性的疑虑仍然没有消失。


But, if one compares the EU with the United States or Japan (where public debt equals 200% of GDP), the Union’s current poor image is unjustified.	但是如果拿欧盟与美国或者日本进行比较（上述两国的公共债务相当于GDP的200%），欧盟目前糟糕的形象并没有充分的依据。


Indeed, employment in the EU as a whole remains high, as do private savings rates.	事实上，欧盟总体就业率仍居高不下，私人储蓄率也同样如此。


Moreover, the Union’s trade is in balance with the rest of the world.	此外，欧盟与他国贸易总体上处于平衡态势。


One reason for doubt about the euro and the EU is that, since the spring of 2010, Europe’s leaders have rushed from one crisis summit to the next, each time devising supposed solutions that provided too little and arrived too late.	质疑欧元和欧盟的理由之一是从2010年春天开始，欧盟领导人就接二连三地赶赴危机峰会，但每次出台的解决方案不是力度太弱就是执行太迟。


Europe’s leaders have never fully deployed their economic and political firepower.	欧洲领导人从来没有充分地部署自己的政治和经济火力。


On the contrary, rather than taming the financial markets, as they once intended, Europe’s leaders continue to be besieged by them.	他们不仅没有像想象中那样驯服金融市场，反而接连不断地为金融市场所困。


It should come as no surprise that, with national governments’ parochialism impeding joint EU action, financial markets are using what the communists used to call “salami tactics” to slice away at the Union by attacking its member countries one by one.	在国家政府的狭隘观念阻碍欧盟采取联合行动的情况下，金融市场利用共产主义者曾经提出的“香肠战术”对欧盟成员国各个击破，并籍此削弱欧盟的势力并不是什么怪事。


Indeed, the European Parliament and the European Commission have been sidelined, while a new management model for Europe has emerged: Germany makes the decisions, France gives the press conferences, and the rest nod in agreement (except the British, who have chosen isolationism once again).	事实上，欧洲议会和欧盟委员会已经被挤到一边，同时出现了一整套新的欧洲管理模式：德国进行决策，法国召开发布会，其余国家点头同意（再次选择孤立主义的英国不在其列）。


This management structure is neither democratically legitimate nor justified by its performance (which appears to consist of mere reactions to pressure from financial markets).	这套管理结构既缺乏民主合理性，也没有取得令人信服的业绩（这套体系似乎仅仅对来自金融市场的压力被动做出反应）。


Indeed, some estimate that, by 2050, Europe will produce only 10% of the world’s GDP, and will comprise just 7% of its population.	事实上，有人估算到2050年，欧洲将仅占全球GDP的10%和全世界人口的7%。


By then, not even Germany’s economy will be significant in global terms, to say nothing of the other European economies.	届时，即使德国在全球经济中的地位都已经无足轻重，更不用说其他欧洲经济体。


As early as 2012, when the world economy is expected to grow by only 2.5%, the battle for shares of the global pie will become fiercer.	最早在2012年，当世界经济预期增长率仅为2. 5%的时候，对全球蛋糕份额的争夺将变得更加惨烈。


Europe is fighting for its economic survival, but it does not seem to know it.	欧洲正在为自身的经济生存而浴血奋战，但它自己却似乎并未意识到。


So, do we Europeans intend to remain relevant in the twenty-first century, which means strengthening our position?	那么，我们欧洲人还想不想强化地位，在21世纪占据一席之地？


Or are we prepared to undergo a painful decline brought on by nationalist infighting and complacency?	我们是否打算经历一场由民族主义内讧和自满所带来的痛苦的经济衰退？


I advocate a strong Europe that embraces the challenges of a relentlessly changing world.	我主张建设一个能直面无情变化所带来挑战的强大的欧洲。


We need a new contract among European nations, generations, and social classes, which implies difficult choices.	我们需要在欧洲国家、几代人和社会各阶层之间订立新的契约，而这就意味着做出艰难的抉择。


We must bid farewell to national egoisms, vested interests, dirty tricks, and assumed certainties.	我们必须告别民族利己主义、既得利益、肮脏的花招和想当然的确定性。


If Europe wants things to remain as they are, things will have to change dramatically.	如果欧洲希望保住现有的地位，就必须进行大规模改革。


First, the EU must become a true democracy – with a directly elected president and a stronger parliament – if pan-European decisions are going to have full legitimacy.	首先，如果泛欧决策想要具有不折不扣的合法性，欧盟必须成为真正的民主政体——并通过直接选举产生总统和强大的议会。


The fiscal pact to which EU members (except the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic) agreed in December 2011 cannot be left to bureaucrats and courts alone.	2011年12月欧盟成员国（除英国和捷克共和国以外）通过的财政协议不能只交给法庭和官僚机构。


The European people, the true sovereigns, must ultimately gain the right to make Europe’s policy choices via elections.	作为真正主权主体的欧洲人民必须最终获得通过选举决定欧洲政策的权利。


Second, we must close the income gap.	其次，我们必须缩小收入差距。


The growing divide between rich and poor, stagnating real wages, and deep regional disparities in unemployment are both morally unacceptable and economically counterproductive.	日益扩大的贫富鸿沟、停滞的实际工资、失业率巨大的地区差异既对经济增长产生副面影响，也在道德上无法接受。


The EU’s increasing income inequality misallocates the purchasing power that its economy desperately needs for growth and employment.	欧盟日益严重的收入不平等导致购买力错配，而欧盟经济想要实现增长和就业迫切需要购买力的支持。


Finally, the welfare state needs a serious overhaul.	最后，需要对福利国家进行一次真正的修理。


Today, the EU allocates a large part of its public spending to pensions and health care for the elderly, while education suffers from underfunding.	今天，欧盟将公共开支的很大部分用于老年人的医疗和养老，而教育资金却严重不足。


A welfare state that focuses mainly on the elderly, and does not provide sufficient opportunities for younger generations, is not sustainable.	将注意力集中在老人、却不为年轻一代提供充分机会的福利国家根本不可持续。


Moreover, the inequities created by privilege, such as public-sector pension schemes and discretionary advantages for vested-interest groups, must be addressed.	此外，因特权存在而导致的不公，如公共部门养老金计划和既得利益群体的无条件优势都需要加以调整解决。


In order to make these changes, higher taxation of wealth and capital income is inevitable.	为了实现上述改革，不可避免要增加财产收入税和资本收入税。


But, while these additional tax revenues would improve Europe’s public finances, they would not obviate the need to reform the welfare state.	但在额外税收改善欧洲公共财政状况的同时，它们也无法排除进行福利国家改革的必要性。


Indeed, at best, they could facilitate a socially responsible transition to more efficient forms of social protection.	事实上，增量税收充其量能够促进向提高社保保障效率更负责任的过渡。


It is also a mistake to believe that austerity measures – the prime focus of Europe’s leaders up to now – will consolidate public finances.	相信欧洲领导人迄今为止作为首要重点的紧缩政策能够巩固公共财政也没有任何依据。


Europe is on the brink of recession.	欧洲正处于衰退的边缘。


Governments should therefore restrict spending cuts to those that will not cause the economy to contract.	政府因此应该限制那些无法导致经济收缩的压缩开支。


Likewise, they should increase only those taxes that, when raised, do not reduce consumption, investment, or job creation.	同样，他们应该提高那些不会影响消费、投资或就业机会创造的税收种类。


In addition, a “European Marshall Plan” that provides investment in infrastructure, renewable energy, and energy efficiency is needed.	此外还需要制定能提升基础设施投资、可再生能源和能源效率的“欧洲马歇尔计划”。


Such an initiative would not only foster growth, but would also lower current-account deficits (because expensive fossil-energy imports could be reduced).	上述举措不仅能促进增长，还能降低经常账户赤字（因为可以减少昂贵的化石能源进口）。


Public finances would be consolidated only by growth, not by austerity.	公共财政状况只能通过增长，而不是通过紧缩来巩固。


The European Central Bank must adapt to the fiscal pact’s new rules.	欧洲央行必须适应新的财政协议规则。


National governments’ vulnerability to the financial markets and their exaggerated interest rates must be reduced.	必须控制国家政府面对金融市场的弱点及其夸张的利率。


Only the ECB, by taking on the role of lender of last resort, can stop the eurozone’s capital outflow and restore confidence in Europe’s capacity to solve its own problems.	只有欧洲央行承担起最终贷款人的角色，才能制止欧元区资本外流，并恢复人们对欧洲解决自身问题能力的信心。


Europe is running out of time.	欧洲的时间非常紧迫。


The EU’s institutions must exercise their creativity to the fullest – conventional thinking will not be enough to save the Union.	欧盟机构必须充分发挥创造力——传统的思维方式救不了欧盟。


Only when the EU has its head above water again can we embark on the difficult but necessary path of framing and adopting a new treaty for a new Europe.	只有欧盟将头露出水面，新欧洲才能走上制定并执行新协议的艰苦的必由之路。


Can Food Prices Be Stabilized?	食品价格可以稳定下来吗？


CAMBRIDGE – Under French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s leadership, the G-20 has made addressing food-price volatility a top priority this year, with member states’ agriculture ministers meeting recently in Paris to come up with solutions. Small wonder: world food prices reached a record high earlier in the year, recalling a similar price spike in 2008.	坎布里奇——


Consumers are hurting worldwide, especially the poor, for whom food takes a major bite out of household budgets. Popular discontent over food prices has fueled political instability in some countries, most notably in Egypt and Tunisia.	在法国总统萨科齐的领导下，G20已将减少食品价格波动列为今年头等大事，并在最近的巴黎G20农业部长会议上给出了解决方案。


Even agricultural producers would prefer some price stability over the wild ups and downs of the last five years.	此事不足为奇：今年早些时候，世界食品价格创出了新高，让人们想起了2008年的食品价格飙升潮。


The G-20’s efforts will culminate in the Cannes Summit in November.	全世界的消费者都在受害，穷国尤甚，因为那里的食品占据着家庭预算的大头。


But, when it comes to specific policies, caution will be very much in order, for there is a long history of measures aimed at reducing commodity-price volatility that have ended up doing more harm than good.	在一些国家中，公民对食品价格的不满已经引起了政治动荡，最引人瞩目的就是埃及和突尼斯。 即使是食品生产国也宁愿将食品价格稳定下来——过去五年，食品价格上下波动幅度实在太大了。


For example, some inflation-targeting central banks have reacted to increases in prices of imported commodities by tightening monetary policy and thereby increasing the value of the currency.	G20的措施将在11月的戛纳峰会上达到高潮。


But adverse movements in the terms of trade must be accommodated; they cannot be fought with monetary policy.	但是，在制定具体政策的时候必须慎之又慎，历史上，意在降低商品价格波动性的措施最后反而助长波动的例子数不胜数。


Producing countries have also tried to contain price volatility by forming international cartels.	比如，面对高涨的进口品价格，一些以通胀为目标的央行收紧了货币政策，从而使本币升值。 但由此产生的贸易平衡恶化问题必须得到解决；


But these have seldom worked.	这一问题无法用货币政策来解决。


In theory, government stockpiles might be able to smooth price fluctuations. But this depends on how stockpiles are administered.	生产国也在试图降低价格波动，它们的办法是建立国际卡特尔。


The historical record is not encouraging.	但这样的办法很少奏效。


In rich countries, where the primary producing sector usually has political power, stockpiles of food products are used as a means of keeping prices high rather than low.	从理论上讲，政府储备或许可以熨平价格波动。


The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy is a classic example – and is disastrous for EU budgets, economic efficiency, and consumer pocketbooks.	但这取决于政府如何管理储备。 历史记录并不乐观。


In many developing countries, on the other hand, farmers lack political power.	在发达国家，初级产品生产部门通常掌握着政治大权，食品储备的目的是维持高价而不是低价。 欧盟共同农业政策（Common Agricultural Policy）就是典型例子——这给欧盟预算、经济效率和消费者的腰包带来了灾难性的后果。


African countries adopted commodity boards for coffee and cocoa.	另一方面，在许多发展中国家中，农民通常缺少政治权力。