In Rome, for example, Clodius, a noted ladies’ man, committed sacrilege by dressing up as a woman and infiltrating the female-only religious festival of the goddess Bona Dea, with the aim of seducing Pompeia, Julius Caesar’s wife.	比如，克劳狄乌斯是罗马著名的妇女之友，他因为男扮女装混入只限女性参与的祭祀玻娜女神的宗教节日而犯下渎神罪行，他这样做的目的是勾引凯撒的妻子庞培娅。


The scandal led Caesar to divorce Pompeia, and gave rise to the famous quip that Caesar’s wife needed to be beyond suspicion.	这一丑闻导致凯撒和庞培娅离婚，并且催生了著名的俗语：凯撒的老婆必须无可置疑。


After escaping punishment by employing a large legal team and doling out generous bribes, Clodius entered politics in an effort to secure the respect of the ruling class, which was quick to dismiss him as a buffoon.	克劳狄乌斯通过组建庞大的法律团队和大肆贿赂逃脱了惩罚，接着，他进入政界，试图保证很快就将他鄙视为小丑的执政阶级的尊重。


What Clodius’s critics failed to realize was that he was smart, determined, and very much in touch with the frustrations of the common people.	克劳狄乌斯的批评者没有意识到他聪明、果断，并且充分利用了普通民众的不满。


After the elite rebuffed him, Clodius began breaking every rule in his quest for power.	在被精英阶层拒绝后，克劳狄乌斯开始在他追求权力的过程中打破一切规则。


He gave up his standing as a nobleman and officially joined the plebs, positioning himself as the leader of the angry Roman working classes.	他放弃了贵族身份，正式加入平民阶级，将自己定位为愤怒的罗马工人阶级的领袖。


Using his natural charm, fiery rhetoric, and keen sense of how to play establishment politicians against each other, he rammed through legislation establishing the first regular handout of free grain in Western history.	利用天生的魅力、煽动的言辞和挑拨建制派政客的敏锐感觉，他强行通过了西方历史上首个定期免费派发小麦的立法。


This provided him with a huge following among the common people, especially those who had lost their jobs in recent economic upheavals.	这让他获得了大量普通群众的追随，特别是在最近的经济动荡中失业的人。


He became the king of the Roman streets and unleashed a populist uprising unlike anything the Republic had ever seen.	他成为落马街头的国王，并发动了罗马共和国前所未见的民粹主义暴动。


Rome’s ruling classes had no idea how to control Clodius, whom they continued to despise.	罗马的执政阶级对于如何控制仍然被他们鄙视的克劳狄乌斯束手无策。


If the Republic were going to be destroyed, the famous orator and establishment politician Cicero lamented, at least let it fall by the hand of a real man.	著名雄辩家、建制派政客西塞罗哀叹，如果共和国继续不遭到破坏， 那么至少让它毁在真正的男人手里。


Exacting revenge, Clodius engineered Cicero’s exile and laid his plans to rise to the top of the political pyramid.	克劳狄乌斯对西塞罗的报复是将他驱逐，并实施爬上权力金字塔顶端的计划。


During his campaign for the praetorship, an elected magistrate that ranked just below Rome’s ruling consuls, the elections had to be postponed twice because of fighting in the streets between his followers and the faction of his enemy, Annius Milo.	在谋求裁判官（地位仅次于罗马执政官的民选职位）过程中，选举两次中断，原因是普尔喀的追随者和他的对手安尼乌斯·麦洛派在街头斗殴。


When Clodius happened to meet Milo along the Appian Way, a fight broke out between their guards, and Clodius was gravely wounded.	克劳狄乌斯在阿皮亚大道偶遇麦洛，结果引起双方卫兵之间的打斗，克劳狄乌斯身受重伤。


Reckoning that a dead rival was less of a threat than a live and angry one, Milo ordered his men to finish him off.	麦洛认识到，死去的对手威胁总比愤怒的活着的对手小，因此下令手下了结克劳狄乌斯。


But though Clodius had been killed, the populist forces he unleashed remained very much alive, and they quickly found new champions, most notably Caesar.	但尽管克劳狄乌斯已经受戮，其所释放的民粹主义力量仍然充满活力，并且很快就有了新的领军人物，首屈一指的便是凯撒。


The ruling classes stood by dazed and helpless as control of the state they had run for centuries slipped from their hands.	执政阶级茫然而无助地眼看着他们掌控了几百年的国家从手中溜走。


In 49 BC, Caesar crossed the Rubicon, engulfing Rome in civil war.	公元前49年，凯撒越国卢比孔河，掀起罗马内战。


Caesar’s murder on the Ides of March was followed by a revolt that destroyed, once and for all, the power of the ruling classes.	凯撒在3月15日事变中被杀，随后发生的动乱彻底摧毁了执政阶级的权力。


An autocratic Empire arose, and the Roman Republic vanished forever.	独裁帝国崛起，罗马共和国永远消失。


The Donald Trump of North Korea	朝鲜的唐纳德·特朗普


DENVER – By all accounts, the much-anticipated Seventh Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea was a non-event.	丹佛——人人都说万众瞩目的朝鲜劳动党第七次代表大会结果令人失望。


If the first such meeting of North Korea’s highest organ in more than 35 years had any impact at all, it was to dash any hopes that the country’s irascible leader, Kim Jong-un, would turn his attention to economic reform.	如果说35年来首次召开的朝鲜最高机构此类会议有任何影响的话，那就是浇灭了暴躁的国家领导人金正恩将注意力转向经济改革的任何希望。


In the time Kim spent avoiding discussing North Korea’s shambolic economy, he made it abundantly clear that the country’s real pride is its nuclear program.	金正恩竭尽全力避谈朝鲜经济混乱，他的所作所为向世界清楚地表明核计划才是朝鲜真正的骄傲。


Despite past pledges to abandon nuclear-weapons development, the government has lately been pursuing new research, evidently in the hope of proclaiming the achievement of some new technological milestone.	尽管过去曾经承诺放弃核武器开发，但朝鲜政府近年来一直在进行新的研究，显然抱有达到某个全新技术里程碑的希望。


Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, most of the world has jumped on the free-market bandwagon.	1989年柏林墙倒塌以来，世界多数国家已经接受了自由市场。


But North Korea has held fast to its isolation.	但朝鲜却一直坚持奉行孤立政策。


Its cult-like regime has encouraged a hyper-nationalist worldview, according to which any systematic cooperation with another country – much less the international community at large – is considered a threat to North Korea’s sovereignty.	该国邪教般的政权催生了高度民族主义的世界观，在他们看来与其他国家——更不要说整个国际社会——的任何全面合作都是对朝鲜主权的威胁。


And, as the latest party congress made clear, this will not change anytime soon.	而且，最近召开的劳动党七大表明这种情况不太可能迅速得到改观。


Nowadays, however, North Korea is beginning to look less like an outlier than a forerunner in a broader trend toward nationalism, autarky, and authoritarianism.	而今天，朝鲜看起来越来越不像局外人，而更像民族主义、自给自足和独裁主义大潮的先行者。


Global trends, as measured by Freedom House and other nongovernmental authorities, include a surge in despotic regimes not seen since the first half of the twentieth century.	在自由之家和其他非政府机构看来，全球趋势表现出20世纪上半叶以来从未有过的专制政权抬头倾向。


The embrace of nationalism can be seen virtually everywhere, from conflict-prone regions to the world’s most robust democracies.	民族主义浪潮几乎无所不在，从冲突易发区到世界最繁荣的民主国家。


While the emergence of another North Korea is not in the cards, the growing momentum of nationalism and illiberalism is troubling, to say the least.	尽管另一个朝鲜的崛起暂时还不太可能，但至少可以说不断发展的民族主义和反自由主义势头是令人不安的。


No country is free of structural problems, especially given the ease with which central governments can become overburdened, exhausted, and corrupt.	结构性问题普遍存在，尤其鉴于中央政府很容易腐败、筋疲力竭和不堪重负。


And it is never easy to balance the power of the center with the preferences of minorities, the rights of regions, and the authority of local entities.	而且平衡中央集权和少数族裔偏好、局部权利和地方机构权威从来都不容易办到。


But, over the years, solutions have emerged to ease these internal imbalances and clashes.	但这些年也找到了许多缓解内部失衡及冲突的办法。


One such solution is integration into broader structures, such as the European Union.	其中之一是融入更大范围的欧盟等机构。


Strife in the Balkans, for example, was supposed to be resolved with progress toward EU membership.	举例来讲，人们认为入盟方面的进展能够解决巴尔干冲突。


Other kinds of supra-national structures and alliances that help countries to recognize and advance common interests have a similar impact.	帮助国家认识并促进共同利益的其他种类的超国家机构和联盟也能造成类似的影响。


Unfortunately, that model is not what it used to be.	不幸的是，这种模式现在也已江河日下。


And, nowadays, public opinion polls indicate that supra-national entities are losing their appeal.	而且如今，民意调查显示超国家实体的吸引力正在迅速减弱。


Perhaps the most salient example is the United Kingdom’s referendum on continued EU membership next month.	英国下个月就是否留在欧盟进行公投或许是最突出的例子。


And Euroskeptic parties are on the rise across Europe, and have even joined government coalitions in some places.	而且欧洲怀疑主义政党在整个欧洲大陆纷纷崛起，甚至在某些地方已经加入了执政联盟。


Meanwhile, countries left out of European integration – such as Turkey – now seem pleased to have missed the boat, as they attempt to chart their own way forward (or, it often seems, backward) without external interests or responsibilities constraining their behavior.	此外，未参与欧洲一体化的国家（如土耳其）现在似乎很高兴自己没有加入，这样它就可以在不考虑外部利益或不承担外部责任的情况下选择自己前进（或者后退）的方向。


But, as Turkey moves to shape Middle Eastern affairs, it looks less like a robust nation-state than like a bumptious regional power that has learned little and forgotten less.	但在其对中东局势施加影响力时，与其说土耳其像是强大的民族国家还不如说更像傲慢固执的区域列强。


Of course, the Middle East’s ongoing turmoil is one of the main challenges facing the entire world, not just Turkey.	当然，中东持续动荡不仅影响土耳其，而且影响到整个世界。


Those who believed that the Arab Spring would give rise to a new era of democracy and participatory governance in the Arab world never anticipated the power of retrograde forces – such as the self-described “Islamic State” – to push the region toward more primeval forms of tribal and sectarian loyalty.	那些相信阿拉伯之春运动会开启阿拉伯世界全新民主时代和参与性执政的民众从来没有预料到会遭遇倒退的力量——比方说自称的“伊斯兰国”——将地区推向更加原始的对部落和教派的效忠。


Even countries that have fought hard to maintain secular government have fallen into a familiar trap, with the military emerging as the only cohesive body capable of imposing its will.	就连一直竭尽全力维护世俗政府的国家也已经陷入到类似的陷阱，似乎军方才是唯一能够执行其意愿的有凝聚力的力量。


Egypt, which seemed to be establishing democracy in the wake of the Arab Spring revolutions, is the poster child for this trap.	而在阿拉伯之春革命刚刚发生时看似正在建立民主制度的埃及其实是落入上述陷阱的典型形象。


The weakening of democracy is accompanied by another disturbing trend: the reemergence of hostility among counties that would benefit far more from cooperation than competition.	民主制度的弱化伴随着另外一种令人不安的趋势：那就是敌对情绪再次出现在合作远比竞争对双方更为有利的国家。


Vladimir Putin’s Russia has become a major revisionist power, seeking to change by force the terms of the Soviet Union’s breakup, and even decisions taken at the height of Soviet power (namely, the incorporation of Crimea into Ukraine).	普京所领导的俄罗斯已经成为主要的修正主义力量，它试图通过武力改变苏联解体时的现状，甚至改变苏维埃政权鼎盛时所作出的（允许克里米亚并入乌克兰的）决策。


China, too, has engaged in unilateral efforts to assert its territorial claims, especially in the South China Sea.	中国也已开始（尤其是在南中国海）单方面维护其领土要求。


That has not only complicated its relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors, which have watched China’s rise with growing trepidation, but also with the United States, which maintains treaty ties with several of those states.	这不仅导致中国与东南亚邻国关系复杂化（上述邻国越来越惶惶不安地注视着中国的崛起），同时也导致中国与（若干地区国家签署条约的）美国关系恶化。


But the US has its own problems.	但美国也有其自身的问题。


The presidential primaries – specifically, Donald Trump’s rise to become the US Republican Party’s presumptive nominee – are raising doubts about America’s capacity to help lead the world through troubled times.	总统初选——具体而言是唐纳德·特朗普异军突起成为美国共和党推定提名人——正导致世界对美国在当今乱世期间的领导能力提出质疑。


Trump’s campaign has been marked by bellicose nationalism and anti-immigrant proposals – from the construction of a massive wall to keep out immigrants to a ban on all Muslims from entering the US – as well as reckless criticisms of America’s relations with friends and foes alike.	特朗普的竞选以好战的民族主义和移民提案为特色——从大规模修墙阻挡移民到禁止所有穆斯林进入美国——以及不分青红皂白地批评美国与盟国和敌国之间的关系。 但他却仍有可能在选举中获胜；


Yet he remains electorally viable; indeed, he commands a large and often virulently loyal following.	事实上，他能够指挥数量庞大且往往非常忠实的追随者。


The internal political strain that this reflects and reinforces highlights just how vulnerable the world order is today.	其中反映并且强化的国内政治紧张凸显了今天的世界秩序是多么脆弱。


With his blustery and reckless style, Trump seems to lack the knowledge, wisdom, and temperament needed to execute the steady stewardship that today’s world requires.	因为风格暴躁鲁莽，特朗普似乎缺乏当今世界稳定执政的所需的知识、智慧和性格。


In that sense, he has quite a lot in common with the callow Kim – except that, if Trump gains power, he will have control of a far more influential country.	从这个意义上讲，他与乳臭未干的金正恩有很多共同点——所不同的是，如果特朗普掌握权力，他所控制的将是影响力大得多的国家。


Donald Trump’s Message	唐纳德·特朗普传递的信号


CAMBRIDGE – Donald Trump’s lead in the race for the Republican Party’s nomination as its presidential candidate in November has caused consternation.	坎布里奇——唐纳德·特朗普11月在共和党总统候选人提名竞争中保持领先已经造成了某种程度的恐荒。


The Republican establishment fears he will not be able to defeat Hillary Clinton, the likely Democratic nominee.	共和党体制担心他无法战胜可能的民主党候选人希拉里·克林顿。


But some observers worry more about the prospect of a Trump presidency.	但某些观察家则担心特朗普当选总统后美国的未来。


Some even see Trump as a potential American Mussolini.	有些人甚至将特朗普视为潜在美国墨索里尼式的人物。


Whatever its problems, the United States today is not like Italy in 1922.	无论有什么问题。 今天的美国都不是1922年的意大利。


The Constitution’s institutional checks and balances, together with an impartial legal system, are likely to constrain even a reality-TV showman.	宪法制度的牵制和平衡，加之公正的法律制度，或许完全可以制约这位真人秀表演者。


The real danger is not that Trump will do what he says if he reaches the White House, but the damage caused by what he says as he tries to get there.	真正的危险不在于特朗普入主白宫后会践行他的诺言，而在于他力求入主白宫时抛出言论所造成的损伤。


Leaders are judged not only on the effectiveness of their decisions, but also by the meaning that they create and teach to their followers.	评判领袖的标准不仅在于其决策的有效性，还在于他们能否创造内涵并将其传授给追随者。


Most leaders gain support by appealing to the existing identity and solidarity of their groups.	多数领袖通过迎合所在团体现有身份认知和一致看法来获取支持。


But great leaders educate their followers about the world beyond their immediate group.	但伟大领袖则会教育追随者认识他们所处群体以外的世界。


After World War II, during which Germany had invaded France for the third time in 70 years, the French leader Jean Monnet decided that revenge upon a defeated Germany would produce yet another tragedy.	在70年内德国第三次入侵法国的二次大战后，法国领导人让·莫内认定对战败的德国施以报复将再次酿成悲剧。


Instead, he invented a plan for the gradual development of the institutions that evolved into the European Union, which has helped make such a war unthinkable.	相反，他制定了一项后来逐步演化为欧盟的体制计划，这让人们很难想象会再次爆发这样的战争。


Or, to take another example of great leadership, Nelson Mandela could easily have chosen to define his group as black South Africans and sought revenge for the injustice of decades of apartheid and his own imprisonment.	或者以伟大的领导人纳尔逊·曼德拉为例，曼德拉可以轻易选择限定其所在机构服务南非黑人，并为长达数十年的种族隔离屈辱及其自身的监禁寻求报复。


Instead, he worked tirelessly to expand the identity of his followers both by words and deeds.	相反，他不知疲倦地通过语言和实际行动来吸引不同身份的追随者。


In one famous symbolic gesture, he appeared at a rugby game wearing the jersey of the South African Springboks, a team that had previously signified South African white supremacy.	作为某种著名的颇具象征意义的姿态，他身着南非羚羊队的球衣出席一场橄榄球比赛，这支球队此前曾是南非白人至上主义的象征。


Contrast Mandela’s efforts to teach his followers about a broader identity with the narrow approach taken by Robert Mugabe next door in Zimbabwe.	曼德拉扩大追随者阵营的努力与邻国津巴布韦总统罗伯特·穆加贝所采取的狭隘策略形成了鲜明的对比。


Unlike Mandela, Mugabe used colonial-era grievances to build support, and now is relying on force to remain in power.	和曼德拉不同，穆加贝利用殖民时代积累的怨愤来博取支持，现在则完全依靠武力来进行执政。


In the US today, while the economy is growing and the unemployment rate is at a low 4.9%, many feel excluded from the country’s prosperity.	今天的美国，虽然经济仍在增长且失业率处于4. 9%的低位，但很多人仍然感觉自己无法享受国家的繁荣。


Many blame rising inequality over the past few decades on foreigners, rather than technology, and it is easy to rally opposition both to immigration and globalization.	很多人将过去几十年不平等的扩大归咎于外国人而非技术，组织一股反对移民和全球化的势力可谓举手之劳。


In addition to economic populism, a significant minority of the population also feels threatened by cultural changes related to race, culture, and ethnicity, even though much of this is not new.	除经济民粹主义外，即使多数问题早已不是新鲜事，但绝大部分民众仍然感受到与种族、文化和族裔相关的文化变革的威胁。


The next president will have to educate Americans about how to deal with a globalization process that many find threatening.	下一任总统必须教育美国人如何面对他们视为威胁的全球化进程。


National identities are imagined communities in the sense that few people have direct experience of the other members.	从某种意义上讲，国家身份是人们想象出来的群体概念，因为很少有人曾经体验过其他类型的文明。


For the past century or two, the nation-state has been the imagined community that people are willing to die for, and most leaders have regarded their primary obligations to be national.	过去两个世纪以来，民族国家一直是人们愿意为之牺牲的想象共同体，而多数领导人也认为他们主要的义务应当面对国民。


This is inescapable, but it is not enough in a globalizing world.	这种状况无法避免，但在全球化世界中这却远远不是全部。


In a world of globalization, many people belong to a number of imagined communities – local, regional, national, cosmopolitan – that are overlapping circles sustained by the Internet and inexpensive travel.	在全球化世界中，很多人同属于想象中的共同体——包括地方、区域、国家���世界——上述共同体多以互联网和低成本旅行作为支撑。


Diasporas are now connected across national borders.	被国境线隔断的离散人群现在建立了联系。


Professional groups like lawyers have transnational standards.	像律师这样的职业群体则奉行跨国标准。


Activist groups ranging from environmentalists to terrorists also connect across borders.	从环保主义者到恐怖分子的活动人士团体也跨越国界建立了联系。


Sovereignty is no longer as absolute as it once seemed.	主权已经失去了曾经的绝对性。


Former President Bill Clinton has said that he regrets his failure to respond adequately to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, although he was not alone.	前总统克林顿曾说他为未能充分应对1994年卢旺达爆发的种族灭绝危机而感到遗憾，尽管应该遗憾的人还有很多。


Had Clinton tried to send US troops, he would have encountered stiff resistance in Congress.	如果克林顿试图派遣美军他将遭遇国会的顽强抵抗。


Good leaders today are often caught between their cosmopolitan inclinations and their more traditional obligations to the people who elect them – as German Chancellor Angela Merkel has discovered in the wake of her brave leadership on the refugee crisis last summer.	今天的优秀领导人往往在世界主义和更传统的选民义务中陷入两难——就像德国总理默克尔在勇敢领导去年夏天难民危机时所发现的那样。


In a world in which people are organized primarily in national communities, a purely cosmopolitan ideal is unrealistic.	在以国家社会为主要组织形式的世界里，纯粹的国际化理想是不现实的。


We see this in widespread resistance to acceptance of immigration.	这一点我们在普遍抵制接收移民的浪潮中可以亲眼见证。


For a leader to say there is an obligation to equalize incomes globally is not a credible obligation, but to say that more should be done to reduce poverty and disease and help those in need can help to educate followers.	由领导人提出全球收入均等化的目标并不可信，但提出进一步减少贫困疾病和帮助那些需要的人却可以教育他们的追随者。


Words matter.	口头承诺也同样重要。


As the philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah puts it, “Thou shalt not kill is a test you take pass-fail.	正如哲学家克瓦米·安东尼·阿皮亚所言，“只有通过或失败的考验你将无法抹杀。


Honor thy father and thy mother admits of gradations.”	承认不同层次的存在才对得起父母。


The same is true of cosmopolitanism versus insularity.	”世界主义和偏狭主义的对决也是这样。


As the world watches the US presidential candidates wrestle with issues of protectionism, immigration, global public health, climate change, and international cooperation, we should ask what aspect of American identities they are appealing to and whether they are educating followers about broader meanings.	随着世界亲眼见证美国总统候选人纠结于保护主义、移民问题、全球公共卫生、气候变化和国际合作，我们应该问问他们要迎合美国身份的哪个方面，以及是否把更广泛的含义传递给追随者。


Are they stretching Americans’ sense of identity as best they can or just appealing to their narrowest interests?	他们是否尽力拓展美国人的身份意识，抑或只是抓住他们最狭隘的利益来加以迎合？


Trump’s proposal to bar Muslims from entering the US and his demands that Mexico pay for a wall to stop migration would be unlikely to pass constitutional or political muster were he elected President.	即使特朗普当选总统，其禁止穆斯林入境和要求墨西哥出钱修围墙阻止移民的提案也不太可能通过宪法或政治审核。


Then again, many of his proposals are not policies designed to be implemented, but slogans crafted to appeal to an insular populist mood among a segment of the population.	但话又说回来，他的很多提案不过是为唤起部分人孤立民粹主义情绪提出的口号，而不是可以真正落实到位的政策。


Given his lack of a strong ideological core and his celebration of “the art of the deal,” Trump might even prove to be a pragmatic president, despite his narcissism.	鉴于缺乏稳固的思想内核且宣扬“交易文化”，尽管特朗普十分自恋，但事实可能证明他或许能够成为一名务实的总统。


But good leaders help us define who we are.	但优秀领导人可以帮助我们确定身份。


On that score, Trump has already failed.	从这个意义上讲，特朗普已经失败了。


The Taming of Trump	驯服特朗普


NEW YORK – Now that Donald Trump has unexpectedly won the US presidency, it is an open question whether he will govern in accordance with his campaign’s radical populism, or adopt a pragmatic, centrist approach.	纽约—现在，特朗普出人意料地赢得美国总统大选，他将依照竞选纲领中的激进民粹主义治国，还是采取务实的中间道路，这成了一个开放性问题。


If Trump governs in accordance with the campaign that got him elected, we can expect market scares in the United States and around the world, as well as potentially significant economic damage.	如果特朗普根据让他赢得大选的竞选纲领治国，那么可以预期美国和全世界将爆发市场恐慌，甚至有可能引起重大经济损失。


But there is good reason to expect that he will govern very differently.	但有很好的理由认为他不会这样治国。


A radical populist Trump would scrap the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), repeal the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and impose high tariffs on Chinese imports.	激进的民粹主义者特朗普将废除跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）、撤销北美自由贸易协定（NAFTA），并向中国进口品施加高额关税。


He would also build his promised US-Mexico border wall; deport millions of undocumented workers; restrict H1B visas for the skilled workers needed in the tech sector; and fully repeal the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare), which would leave millions of people without health insurance.	他还将建造承诺的美墨边境隔离墙、驱逐数百万无证移民工人、收紧高科技行业所需要的高技能员工的H1B签证，并完全推翻平价医疗法（奥巴马医保）从而让数百万人失去医疗保险。


Overall, a radical Trump would significantly increase the US budget deficit.	总体而言，激进的特朗普将大大增加美国的预算赤字。


He would sharply reduce income taxes on corporations and wealthy individuals.	他将大幅削减公司和富裕个人的所得税。


And while he would broaden the tax base, increase the carried-interest tax, and encourage companies to repatriate foreign profits, his plan would not be revenue-neutral.	尽管他将扩大税基，增加附带收益税，鼓励公司将海外收入汇回美国，但他的计划并不是税收收入中性的。


He would increase military and public-sector spending in areas such as infrastructure, and his tax cuts for the rich would reduce government revenue by $9 trillion over a decade.	他将提高军事和基础设施等公共部门的支出，他的富人减税计划将在十年中减少政府收入9万亿美元。


A radical Trump would also drastically change the current monetary-policy approach – first by replacing US Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen with a monetarist hawk, and then by filling current and upcoming Fed Board vacancies with more of the same.	激进的特朗普还将大幅改变当前货币政策方针——首先是用货币鹰派取代现任美联储主席耶伦，然后用更多的货币鹰派填补目前和即将出缺的美联储理事会席位。 此外，他将废除2010年多德-弗兰克（Dodd-Frank）金融改革；


Moreover, he would repeal what he could of the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial reforms; gut the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; cut alternative-energy subsidies and environmental regulations; and slash any other regulations that supposedly hurt big business.	撤销消费者金融保护局（Consumer Financial Protection Bureau）； 减少替代能源补贴和环境监管；


Finally, a radical Trump’s foreign policy would destabilize America’s alliances and escalate tensions with rivals.	最后，激进的特朗普的外交政策将动摇美国的盟友，升级与对手的紧张。


His protectionist stance could incite a global trade war, and his insistence that allies pay for their own defense could lead to dangerous nuclear proliferation, while diminishing American leadership on the world stage.	他的保护主义立场将带来全球贸易战，他坚持盟友自己为自己的防务买单将导致危险的核扩散，同时削弱美国在世界舞台上的领导力。


But it is actually more likely that Trump will pursue pragmatic, centrist policies.	但实际上更有可能特朗普将追求务实的中间政策。


For starters, Trump is a businessman who relishes the “art of the deal,” so he is by definition more of a pragmatist than a blinkered ideologue.	首先，特朗普是一位商人，沉迷于“交易的艺术”，因此他天生是一个务实派而不是狭隘的空想家。


His choice to run as a populist was tactical, and does not necessarily reflect deep-seated beliefs.	他选择以民粹主义的面貌出现是一种策略，未必反映了他的内心深处。


Indeed, Trump is a wealthy real-estate mogul who has lived his entire life among other rich businessmen.	事实上，特朗普是一位腰缠万贯的地产大亨，这辈子一直在与其他富豪商人打交道。


He is a savvy marketer who tapped into the political zeitgeist by pandering to working-class Republicans and “Reagan Democrats,” some of whom may have supported Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders in the Democratic primary.	他是精明的推销高手，通过迎合工作阶级共和党和“里根民主党”——其中一些可能在民主党初选阶段支持了佛蒙特州参议员伯尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）——利用了政治时代精神。


This allowed him to stand out in a crowded field of traditional pro-business, pro-Wall Street, and pro-globalization politicians.	这让他能够从传统的亲商业、亲华尔街、亲全球化的政客中脱颖而出。


Once in office, Trump will throw symbolic red meat to his supporters while reverting to the traditional supply-side, trickle-down economic policies that Republicans have favored for decades.	开始执政后，特朗普将给他的支持者象征性地分一些肉，同时恢复几十年来共和党一直偏爱的传统供给侧涓滴式（trckle-down）经济政策。


Trump’s vice-presidential choice, Mike Pence, is an establishment GOP politician, and his campaign’s economic advisers were wealthy businessmen, financiers, real-estate developers, and supply-side economists.	特朗普的副总统人选麦克·彭斯是一位建制派共和党政客，而他的选战经济顾问都是富裕的商人、金融家、房地产开发商和供给侧经济学家。


What’s more, he is reportedly already considering mainstream Republicans for his cabinet, including former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, Tennessee Senator Bob Corker, Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions, and former Goldman Sachs executive Steven Mnuchin (who also advised his campaign).	此外，据说他已经在考虑让主流共和党进入内阁，包括前众议院议长纽特·金里奇（Newt Gingrich）、田纳西州参议员鲍勃·考克（Bob Corker）、亚拉巴马州参议员杰斯·赛逊斯（Jess Sessions）和前高盛公司高管史蒂文·姆努钦（Steven Mnuchin，他也为特朗普的选战出谋划策）。


The traditional Republicans and business leaders Trump will likely appoint will then shape his policies.	特朗普可能任命的传统共和党人和商界领袖将影响他的政策。


The executive branch adheres to a decision-making process whereby relevant departments and agencies determine the risks and rewards of given scenarios, and then furnish the president with a limited menu of policy options from which to choose.	政府行政机关所遵守的决策程序是，相关部门和机构确定给定情景的风险和收益，形成一份选项有限的政策选择清单呈给总统以供选择。


And, given Trump’s inexperience, he will be all the more dependent on his advisers, just as former Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush were.	而考虑到特朗普缺乏经验，他将更加依赖于顾问，正如前总统里根和小布什。


Trump will also be pushed more to the center by Congress, with which he will have to work to pass any legislation.	国会也将促使特朗普转向中间道路，特朗普要想通过任何立法都必须与国会合作。


House Speaker Paul Ryan and the Republican leadership in the Senate have more mainstream GOP views than Trump on trade, migration, and budget deficits.	众议院议长保罗·莱恩（Paul Ryan）和参议院共和党领导层在贸易、移民和预算赤字等问题上的观点都要比特朗普更加接近共和党主流。


Meanwhile, the Democratic minority in the Senate will be able to filibuster any radical reforms that Trump proposes, especially if they touch the third rail of American politics: Social Security and Medicare.	与此同时，参议院中的民主党少数派也能通过冗长演说阻挠特朗普所提出的任何激进改革，特别是当他触及到美国政坛的第三轨——社会安全与医疗保险时。


Trump will also be checked by the American political system’s separation of powers, relatively independent government agencies such as the Fed, and a free and vibrant press.	特朗普还将受到美国政治制度中权力分割、美联储等相对独立的政府机构，以及的生机勃勃的新闻自由的制衡。


But the market itself will be Trump’s biggest constraint.	但市场本身才是特朗普最大的约束。


If he tries to pursue radical populist policies, the response will be swift and punishing: stocks will plummet, the dollar will fall, investors will flee to US Treasury bonds, gold prices will spike, and so forth.	如果他试图追求激进的民粹主义政策，将导致迅速的惩罚性的反应：股票暴跌、美元贬值、投资者逃向美国国债、金价暴涨，等等。


If, however, Trump blends more benign populist policies with mainstream pro-business ones, he will not face a market fallout.	但是，如果特朗普将温和民粹主义政策和主流亲商政策打成一片，他就不会面临市场的反对。


Now that he has won the election, there is little reason for him to choose populism over safety.	既然他已经赢得选举，没有理由会选择民粹主义比安全更重要。


The effects of a pragmatic Trump presidency would be far more limited than in the radical scenario.	务实的特朗普总统所带来的影响将远远比激进的特朗普有限。


First, he would still ditch the TPP; but so would Hillary Clinton.	首先，他仍然会放弃TPP； 但希拉里·克林顿也会这样做。


He claimed that he would repeal NAFTA, but he will more likely try to tweak it as a nod to American blue-collar workers.	他宣称他将废除NAFTA，但他更有可能调整NAFTA，以此作为对美国蓝领工人的让步。


And even if a pragmatic Trump wanted to limit imports from China, his options would be constrained by a recent World Trade Organization ruling against “targeted dumping” tariffs on Chinese goods.	而即使务实的特朗普想要限制中国进口品，其选择也将受到世贸组织最新裁决——反对向中国商品征收“针对性倾销”关税的限制。


Outsider candidates often bash China during their election campaigns, but quickly realize once in office that cooperation is in their own interest.	外部候选人常常会在选战中抨击中国，但一旦开始执政，就会迅速认识到合作才符合自身利益。


Trump probably will build his wall on the Mexican border, even though fewer new immigrants are arriving than in the past.	特朗普也许会在墨西哥边境建起他的高墙，即使新移民的数量将比以前更少。


But he will likely crack down only on undocumented immigrants who commit violent crimes, rather than trying to deport 5-10 million people.	但他可能将只驱逐有过暴力犯罪记录的无证移民，而不是试图驱逐500—1,0000万人。


Meanwhile, he may still limit visas for high-skill workers, which would deplete some of the tech sector’s dynamism.	与此同时，他可能仍将限制高技能员工签证，这将让高科技部门失去一些活力。


A pragmatic Trump would still generate fiscal deficits, though smaller than in the radical scenario.	务实的特朗普仍将带来财政赤字，尽管要比激进情形小一些。


If he follows the Congressional Republicans’ proposed tax plan, for example, revenue would be reduced only by $2 trillion over a decade.	比如，如果他遵循国会共和党提出的税收计划，十年中税收收入将只减少2万亿美元。


To be sure, the policy mix under a pragmatic Trump administration would be ideologically inconsistent and moderately bad for growth.	诚然，务实的特朗普征服的政策组合在意识形态上可能会出现不一致，并对增长略微不利。


But it would be far more acceptable to investors – and the world – than the radical agenda he promised his voters.	但对投资者——以及全世界——来说，这比他向选民所许下的激进日程更加容易接受多了。


A New-Model Trump?	新模式的特朗普？


BERLIN – On the 27th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States elected a president who plans to build an even bigger wall, this time on the border with Mexico.	柏林—在柏林墙倒塌27周年之际，美国选出了一位计划建造一道规模更加庞大的高墙的总统。 他的墙要造在美墨边境。


Now, President-elect Donald Trump must decide whether he wants to plow forward with his divisive agenda or actually advance America’s best interests.	现在，当选总统特朗普必须决定要推进他的分离计划还是要真的推进美国的最佳利益。


There are strong parallels between Trump’s victory and the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union last June.	特朗普的胜利与6月英国投票退出欧盟有异曲同工之妙。


Republicans interviewed after the election result was known looked almost as shocked as the architects of the UK’s “Leave” campaign on the morning after the referendum.	大选结果出炉后接受采访的共和党看上去与公投次晨英国“退欧”阵营缔造者一样震惊。


But no one was more dumbfounded than those on the losing side, which in both cases had been widely expected to come out on top.	但最目瞪口呆的还是输掉的一方，不论在美国还是在英国，事前他们一直被广泛认为必胜。


One effect of the Brexit vote that has already emerged in the US as well is a surge in hate crimes, including an alarming number of incidents being reported at schools and on college campuses.	英国退欧投票的一个影响已经在美国出现，即仇恨犯罪激增，包括令人警觉的学校 和大学校园犯罪事件数字。


Trump’s win has emboldened some of his supporters to move from the anonymity of abusing targets on social media to accosting them openly on the street.	特朗普胜选让他的一些支持者壮大了胆子，从在社交媒体上匿名攻击转为在街头公开挑衅。


This is not surprising: Trump’s campaign was marked by nearly 18 months of vitriol, aimed not just against his opponent, but also at US government institutions, the press, and many segments of the US population, particularly immigrants, refugees, supporters of the Black Lives Matter movement, and Muslims.	这不足为奇：在长达近18个月的选战中，特朗普阵营极尽刻薄讽刺之能事，其目标不仅包括他的反对者，也包括美国政府机构、新闻媒体和许多美国人群体，特别是移民、难民、黑人生活问题（Black Lives Matter）运动支持者和穆斯林。


He attracted the endorsement of the Ku Klux Klan and surrounded his campaign with the white nationalists of the so-called alt-right.	他获得了3K党的支持，他的阵营充斥着白人民族主义这，即所谓的另类右派。


In fact, many of the promises Trump made to his supporters during the campaign are highly divisive and even dangerous, and their implementation could have serious adverse effects on the lives of ordinary Americans, triggering civil unrest.	事实上，特朗普在选战期间向其支持者所许下的许多承诺具有高度的分裂性，甚至可以说非常危险，而兑现这些承诺有可能给普通美国人的生活带来严重负面影响，引发社会动荡。


Conversely, abandoning some of the policies he promised could trigger a backlash – perhaps violent – among his supporters.	反之，抛弃一些他承诺的政策可能引起其支持者的不满——甚至骚乱。


However busy Trump is planning the transition to the White House – selecting his cabinet and prioritizing his many promises – he must not ignore this risk.	不管特朗普如何忙于准备入主白宫——遴选内阁、给他的诸多承诺排定顺序——他都不能忽视这一风险。


If he hopes to be anything remotely close to a responsible leader, he must move urgently to address the deep divisions that he so enthusiastically fueled during his campaign.	如果他有一丝成为负责任的领导人的志向，就必须进款解决他在选战期间竭力煽动起来的深刻分歧。


That means becoming more presidential, by advocating a calm and reasonable approach that emphasizes, above all, upholding the US Constitution and the rule of law.	这意味着他要更像个总统，支持冷静负责的方针，首先要强调坚守美国宪法和法治。


He should start by speaking out firmly against violence, and taking proactive measures to protect immigrants and minorities, who are understandably fearful of attacks by his supporters.	首先他应该坚决谴责暴力，采取积极措施保护移民和少数群体——不难理解，后两者担心受到他的支持者的攻击。


More broadly, Trump must avoid triumphalism, and acknowledge, with uncharacteristic humility, the magnitude of the challenge ahead.	更进一步讲，特朗普必须保持低调，并以非常谦逊的态度承认自己面临艰巨挑战。


And he must convey a credible message about a consensual approach, discarding the partisan hostility that has dominated US politics in recent years and, in particular, during the just-concluded campaign.	他必须释放出可信信号将采取共识方针，放弃在近几年中——特别是在刚刚结束的选战期间——主宰美国政坛的党派对立。


Of course, Trump is not in this alone, and a leader is only as good as his or her team.	当然，特朗普不是一个人在战斗，领袖好不好，全看团队。


To build credibility, Trump will need to be transparent about how he crafts his administration, ensuring that it includes the knowledge and experience that he lacks.	要构建信誉，特朗普需要开诚布公地宣布他如何组建政府，确保他的政府具备他本人所欠缺的知识和经验。


He does not have a deep bench to draw from, but he must find a way to make it work, assembling a group that can advise him wisely.	他没有很深的根基可以仰仗，但他必须找到办法让政府运转起来，组成一支能够给他明智的建议的团队。


It is vital that Trump takes these steps quickly, so that his administration can hit the ground running.	迅速完成这些步骤很关键，如此，他的政府才能打响头炮。


Only then can he hope not only to meet his commitments for the first 100 days in office, but also – and more important – to begin easing the fear and anger that his campaign has brought to fever pitch.	然后，他才能寄望于在兑现执政100天时的承诺，并且——这一点更加重要——开始缓解他的选战所造成的巨大的恐慌和愤怒。


All legislators – whether pro- or anti-Trump, Republican or Democrat – must participate fully in the effort to reduce tensions, improve cooperation, and protect the US political system’s checks and balances.	所有立法者——不论是否支持特朗普，不论是共和党还是民主党——必须充分参与缓解紧张、改善合作、保护美国政治制度中的制衡。


They must recognize that the US today is a tinderbox.	他们必须认识到，今天的美国是一个火药桶。


The time for playing with fire is over.	现在绝不是玩火的时候。


Cool heads must prevail.	冷静必须压倒头脑发热。


The business, culture, and non-profit sectors, as well as the press and pundits, must remain calm as well, resisting the lure of hyperbole and scare tactics, and look toward a shared future.	商业、文化和非营利部门，以及新闻媒体和专家，也必须保持冷静，抵御夸张和恐慌策略的诱惑，着眼于共同未来。


Most important, community leaders must not allow their constituents to be manipulated or goaded into behavior that risks dangerous knock-on effects.	最重要的是，社区领袖决不能让社区成员受到操纵或被煽动做出有可能带来危险的连带效应的行为。


Judging by Trump’s long history as a public figure, the idea that he would help to bridge the divides in the US probably seems ludicrous.	从特朗普漫长的公共人物生涯判断，认为他能弥合美国的分歧看上去简直可笑。


His victory speech did include the traditional pledge to be “president for all Americans.”	他在胜选演讲确实相当传统地发誓要成为“全体美国人的总统”。


The American people need to hold him to that sentiment – and uphold it themselves.	美国人民必须让他保持这一信念——自己也要保持这一信念。


Some – indeed many – will never support him; but it is his job, as president, to reach out to all and appeal to the country’s shared values.	一些人——其实是很多人——永远不会支持他； 但作为总统，他有责任接触所有人并提出共同美国价��观的诉求。


Being president and running for president require very different skills.	成为总统和执政需要完全不同的技能。


President-elect Trump must use his first 100 days in office not just to make appointments and prioritize legislation, but also to set a reassuring tone for his administration.	当选总统特朗普必须利用执政的第一个100天任命内阁、排定立法重点，还要制定令人放心的政府基调。


Stability and trust must be the order of the day.	稳定和信任必须成为最重要的事项。


In his second inaugural address, following a period of extreme division and civil war, Abraham Lincoln declared, “let us strive on” and “bind up the nation’s wounds.”	在他的第二次就职演说中——在经历了极度分歧和内战之后——亚伯拉罕·林肯宣布“让我们奋斗”并“建设在国家的伤口之上”。


Trump is no Lincoln, but he did invoke the same spirit in his victory speech.	特朗普不是林肯，但他的胜选演讲确实引用了同样的精神。


One hopes that he meant it.	但愿他是认真的。


The Many Extremes of Donald Trump	唐纳德·特朗普的众多极端


WASHINGTON, DC – Much attention in the United States and elsewhere is focused on whether US presidential candidate Donald Trump will shift away from the anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, and anti-rational rhetoric that carried him to the Republican Party nomination.	华盛顿—在美国和其他国家，许多人都在关注美国总统候选人唐纳德·特朗普是否会转变让他赢得共和党提名的反移民、反穆斯林和反理性的言辞风格。


Some of his advisers are reportedly recommending that he move toward “mainstream” Republican positions, such as those held by the leadership of the House of Representatives.	他的一些顾问据说建议他转向“主流”共和党立场，如美国众议院领导层所持的立场。


It is entirely possible that Trump will follow their counsel.	特朗普完全有可能遵循建议。


After all, his current positions are not generating enough support to make victory in November likely (the widely cited FiveThirtyEight website puts his odds at around 20%).	毕竟，他目前的立场没有获得充分的支持使他有望在11月胜出（引用率颇高的FiveThirtyEight网站认为他获胜的概率为两成左右）。


And Trump’s running mate, Mike Pence, Governor of Indiana, served in the House from 2000 to 2012 and has close ties to Speaker Paul Ryan and other Republican leaders.	而特朗普的竞选搭档、印第安纳州州长麦克·彭斯（Mike Pence）2000至2012年间在众议院供职，与众议院议长保罗·莱恩（Paul Ryan）和其他共和党领导人关系甚密。


The Republican establishment, deeply divided over Trump’s candidacy, certainly hopes for such a shift.	共和党建制派因为特朗普的候选人资格产生了深刻的分歧，他们显然希望看到这样的转变。


But, if it comes about, no one should mistake it for a move toward more “moderate” positions.	但是，果真如此的话，也决不能视此为转向较“温和”的立场。


In any other year, the House Republicans would be regarded as irresponsible extremists.	换做其他任何一个年份，国会共和党都会被视为不负责任的极端分子。


To see this, consider the record from a recent hearing of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, chaired by Representative Jason Chaffetz.	要明白这一点，可以参考以众议员贾森·查菲兹（Jason Chaffetz）为首的众议院监督和政府改革委员会的一份最新听证记录。


The ostensible focus of the hearing was the policies of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), particularly with regard to the creation of new banks.	该听证表面上的重点是联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）的政策问题，特别是关于成立新银行的内容。


As the hearing unfolded, however, it became clear that most Republican members were intent on broad-ranging deregulation of finance – rolling back all of the reforms put in place after the 2008 financial crisis.	但是，随着听证的展开，很显然大部分共和党成员的目的是广泛地为金融业去监管——取消2008年金融危机以来所实施的所有改革。


(I testified at the hearing at the invitation of House Democrats.)	（我接受众议院民主党的邀请在会上做了听证。 ）


In effect, most of the senior Republicans who spoke wanted to return to the pre-crisis world – or even to less financial regulation than existed under President George W. Bush.	事实上，大部分发言的资深共和党希望回到危机前的状况——甚至在小布什的基础上进一步减少金融监管。


This is a recipe for repeating the boom-and-bust cycle that created the worst crisis since the 1930s and caused at least a decade of damage to the US economy.	这必将导致带来20世纪30年代以降最严重的危机、给美国经济造成至少十年伤害的枯荣循环重现。


Moreover, while sitting officials are typically treated with respect, the Republicans on the committee were extraordinarily uncivil toward Martin Gruenberg, the FDIC chairman.	此外，尽管在座官员常常以礼相待，但委员会中的共和党对FDIC主席马丁·格鲁恩博格（Martin Gruenberg）非常粗鲁。


Worse, in addition to their rudeness and confrontational manner, the Republican members displayed a striking lack of interest in even the most basic facts.	更糟糕的是，除了粗鲁和敌意的举止，共和党委员还表现出对哪怕是最基本的事实也毫无兴趣。


For example, some of them claimed that low interest rates should make it attractive for new banks to be created – so, in their view, the lack of banking start-ups is an indication that the FDIC is doing something profoundly wrong.	比如，一些人宣称低利率应该意味着成立新银行更有吸引力——因此，在他们看来，少有银行成立表明FDIC犯了很大的错误。


But researchers at the Federal Reserve have examined this closely and established, beyond any reasonable doubt, that the achievable interest-rate spread (the difference between deposit rates and loan rates) for potential start-up banks is extremely low.	但美联储研究者对此进行了严密的考察，以无可辩驳的依据指出，对潜在新银行来说，可实现的息差（存款利率与贷款利率之差）非常小。


This lack of expected profitability – a side effect of monetary policy – is the primary reason people do not want to start new banks.	预期盈利能力的低迷——货币政策的一个副作用——才是人们不愿意成立新银行的主要原因。


Unfortunately, the House Republicans simply do not want to be confronted with the findings of social science (on banking) – or apparently of science (for example, on climate change).	不幸的是，众议院共和党根本不想面对（关于银行的）社会科学的发现——对科学（比如气候变化）的发现显然也是如此。


If you put the facts before them, as happened in that hearing, they become aggressive and unpleasant – sounding rather like smaller versions of Trump.	如果你在他们面前摆事实，比如说像这次听证会那样，他们就会变得好斗而不快——好像一个个都是小号特朗普。


A civilized exchange of ideas and information is impossible.	文明地交换想法和信息根本不可能。


The House Republicans have another big economic idea on their agenda about which we will likely hear more from Trump: a massive tax cut.	众议院共和党的日程上还有一个经济学大思想，兴许这方面他们会更加听从特朗普：大量减税。


If enacted, a few people at the top of the income distribution would do well; everyone else, not so much.	如果得到实施，位于收入分配顶端的一小撮人将非常满意； 其他所有人都将不甚满意。


Meanwhile, the deficit and government debt would soar, just like they did during the pre-2008 period.	与此同时，赤字和政府债务将会激增，一如2008年之前的时期。


Any growth that resulted would prove illusory, with the inevitable hard landing leading to austerity, which would be imposed disproportionately on less well-off Americans.	任何由此带来的增长都将是幻觉，硬着陆并导致紧缩将势在必行，而紧缩将大部分落在境况并未得到多少改善的美国人头上。


Good luck having a sensible discussion about those issues with House Republicans.	与众议院共和党就这些问题进行有意义的讨论简直就是天降横福。


Anyone wishing for Trump to “move to the middle” in today’s Republican Party is really just asking for a more dangerous version of George W. Bush, at home and abroad.	任何希望特朗普在今天的共和党环境中“走向中间派”的人其实都只是在要求出现一位更加危险的小布什，对于国内和国外都是如此。


Bush pushed through a big tax cut, along with other major increases in government spending – including for two disastrous foreign wars – and funded it all with debt.	小布什推行了大幅减税，也大幅增加了政府支出——包括打了两场灾难性的对外战争——而资金全部来自债务。


He also presided over a more complete form of financial deregulation than the US had ever seen, resulting in the largest economic contraction in almost 80 years.	他还主持了比美国历史上任何时候都要更加全面的金融去监管，结果导致了近80年来最大规模的经济萎缩。


With Trump in the White House, the United States might get the white-supremacist agenda of his “alt-right” allies: massive discrimination against minorities and other groups, and probably some form of police state to detain and expel millions of residents.	如果特朗普入主白宫，美国可能采取他的“高级右翼”（alt-right）盟友的白人至上主义日程：严重歧视少数族裔和其他群体，并可能实行某种形式的警察国家抓捕和驱逐数百万居民。


Or it might get complete financial deregulation and a return to the most irresponsible fiscal policies the US ever experienced.	或者他将采取全面的金融去监管化，回到美国所经历过的最不负责任的财政政策。


The most likely scenario is that it would get both.	最有可能的结果是两者同时发生。


The Ethics of Ebola	埃博拉伦理


LONDON – As the Ebola virus grips an unprecedentedly wide swath of Africa, many are asking whether it is time to begin administering untested drugs and vaccines.	伦敦——因为非洲大片地区史无前例地遭到埃博拉病毒的侵袭，很多人提出是否该允许未经测试的药物和疫苗投入使用。


Given that the disease can kill up to 90% of its victims – higher than the mortality rate from the bubonic plague – there seems to be little to lose from relaxing clinical norms.	因为这种病能致死高达90%的感染者——死亡率甚至超过鼠疫——放松临床规范似乎没什么可以失去的。


But the suggestion raises difficult ethical questions – and the urgency of the situation does not leave much time for deliberation.	但这项建议诱发了复杂的伦理问题——而局势的紧迫性又不让人有太多时间考虑。


One reason that there is no proven cure or vaccine for Ebola hemorrhagic fever is the wiliness of crossover diseases.	埃博拉出血热之所以没有行之有效的治疗方法或疫苗是因为传染性疾病大多非常狡猾。


These viruses are transmitted from animal populations, which can act as reservoirs where the pathogens can develop and mutate, making it difficult for researchers to keep pace with the diseases’ variations.	病毒的传播起源于动物种群，而动物体就像病原体发展变异的蓄水池。 研究人员因此很难跟上传染病的变化速度。


But another reason is pharmaceutical companies’ declining interest in manufacturing vaccines.	但另一个原因是制药企业对生产疫苗越来越失去兴趣。


Indeed, only four companies today make vaccines, compared to 26 companies 50 years ago.	事实上，今天生产疫苗的企业只有4家，而50年前有26家疫苗生产企业。


These firms know that the return on their investment will be relatively low, owing to the long lead-in time that results from slow manufacturing processes (though new, faster methods offer some hope).	这些企业知道生产疫苗的投资回报率较低，因为缓慢的制造过程（尽管新的加速方法让人们有了些许希望）造就了漫长的导入期。


Public distrust of vaccines has also played a major role in this decline.	公众对疫苗的不信任也在很大程度上促成了疫苗生产的衰退。


In the late 1990s, anti-vaccine sentiment manifested itself in a backlash against the measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine.	20世纪90年代后期反麻疹、腮腺炎和风疹疫苗情绪甚嚣尘上就是一例。


Similarly, a 2004 New York Academy of Medicine survey indicated that twice as many people were worried about the side effects of the well-established smallpox vaccine as were concerned about the disease itself.	同样，2004年纽约医学科学院一项调查显示担心早已被证明行之有效的天花疫苗副作用的民众是担心疾病本身者的两倍。


The comparative docility of infectious diseases like smallpox has contributed to a degree of complacency about the magnitude of the risks of refusing vaccination.	天花等传染病不温不火助长了人们的自满情绪，导致对拒绝接种后果认识并不充分。


When an epidemic actually begins, people quickly change their minds, and demand the rapid production and distribution of vaccines.	疫情爆发时人们迅速改变想法，要求快速完成疫苗生产和流通。


That is probably a good thing, but it is also unrealistic.	这或许是件好事，但这并不现实。


The British pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline recently announced that, together with the US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, it is developing an experimental vaccine for Ebola.	英国制药公司葛兰素史克最近宣布正和美国国家过敏和传染病学院一道开展埃博拉疫苗的试验工作。


But it is just entering phase I clinical trials to test toxicity.	但试验工作还仅仅处在毒理测试临床试验I期。


With two more trial stages to go, the vaccine would not be ready for deployment before 2015.	因为还要完成两个阶段的试验，疫苗不会在2015年之前面世。


The duration of the trial process has provoked complaints of excessive red tape.	试验过程引发了人们对过度繁文缛节的攻击。


But such criticism is unfounded, given the potential of proposed drugs to cause serious illness or even death.	但这样的批评其实缺乏依据，因为接受试验的药物可能造成严重疾病甚至死亡。


Indeed, phase I trials – also called “first-in-man studies” – are extremely risky and ethically knotty, meaning that they must be handled with the utmost care.	事实上，I期试验——也称为“I期人体试验”——既危险又在道德上非常棘手，这意味着必须秉承极度的小心谨慎行事。


In 2006, phase I trials of the drug TGN1412 had to be suspended when previously healthy volunteers developed multiple organ failure, with some barely escaping death.	2006年，新药TGN1412的I期试验被迫暂停，因为本来健康的志愿者表现出多器官功能衰竭，有些人将将逃过一死。


University College London pharmacologist Trevor Smart believes that they may never fully recover.	伦敦学院药理学家特雷佛·斯马特认为很多受试者可能永远无法彻底康复。


But what about when a population is already ill?	但如果受试者本来已经患病？


In 1996, during a major meningitis epidemic in northern Nigeria, the drug company Pfizer supplied doctors with the oral antibiotic Trovan, which was being tested against another drug, ceftriaxone.	1996年，在尼日利亚北部脑膜炎大规模流行期间，制药公司辉瑞向医务人员提供了口服抗生素特洛芬，目的是与另外一种药物头孢曲松钠进行对比。


Eleven children died during the Trovan trial, and others were left permanently disabled.	特洛芬试验期间有11名儿童死亡，其余的人留下了终身残疾。


Still, the death rate in the Trovan trial was much lower than the rate from untreated meningitis, bolstering the case for administering untested Ebola drugs today.	但特洛芬试验的死亡率还是比脑膜炎未经治疗低得多，这为今天服用未经试验的埃博拉药物提供了依据。


In fact, the World Health Organization has already pronounced the use of the experimental serum ZMapp – a mixture of genetically engineered antibodies intended to help patients fight the disease – ethical.	事实上，世卫组织已经宣布使用实验性血清Zmapp合乎伦理——这是一组混合基因工程抗体，旨在协助患者对抗埃博拉病毒。


ZMapp never made it to human trials and is not yet licensed by the US Food and Drug Administration.	Zmapp还从未进行过人体试验，也从未获得过美国食品与药物管理局的认证。


As it stands, only a few doses of ZMapp exist, and it will take months to produce even a modest supply.	目前仅有极少量Zmapp存在，就连小规模生产也需要等上几个月。


This raises another ethical dilemma: Who should receive such a scarce resource?	这使人们在道德上陷入两难境地：这样的稀缺资源该分到谁的手里？


The first three doses of ZMapp were administered to the American medical missionaries Kent Brantly and Nancy Whitebol, who have recovered, and the Spanish priest Miguel Pajares, who has since died.	起初的三剂Zmapp被用于美国医学传教士肯特·布兰特利和南希·怀特博尔，两人最终都得以康复，余下的一剂用于治疗西班牙神父米格尔·帕哈雷斯，帕哈雷斯现在已经去世。


Some offered a practical justification for the widely criticized selection of Brantly and Whitebol: It makes sense to treat health workers first, so that they can continue to help others.	有人从实用角度对选择布兰特利和怀特博尔这一引起广泛争议的做法给出了解释：理应先治疗医务工作者，这样他们才能继续为他人提供帮助。


But this argument largely fell apart with the selection of the 75-year-old Pajares.	但选中75岁高龄的帕哈雷斯让这种说法不攻自灭。


The credibility of claims that practicality drove the selection was, to some extent, revived by the decision to provide doses to three African doctors.	为三名非洲医生提供治疗的决策在某种程度上恢复了实用主义选择标准的可信度。


In any case, the available supply of ZMapp has been exhausted.	无论如何，现有的Zmapp资源已经耗尽。


It is important to note that even pragmatic arguments about rationing scarce medical resources can be highly controversial.	需要注意的是从实用主义出发配给稀缺医疗资源的做法具有极大的争议。


During World War II, when army doctors were forced to ration doses of penicillin, they decided to give first priority to men with sexually transmitted diseases, who would be ready to return to the battlefield more quickly.	二战期间，当军医被迫配给有限的青霉素时，他们决定优先治疗性病患者，因为这些人可以更快地重返战场。


But many contended that men who had been wounded in battle were more deserving.	但不少人提出异议认为在战斗中负伤的士兵更有资格得到药物。


Putting such a moral spin on the allocation of Ebola treatments, it could be argued that Africans should be selected over Westerners, because Africa’s health-care systems are less able to combat the disease.	如果把类似的道德因素加入到埃博拉病毒的治疗，我们可以说非洲人比西方人更有备选资格，因为非洲的医疗系统抵御埃博拉病毒的能力较弱。


But one might also contend that Western medical workers deserve higher priority because they volunteered to expose themselves to the disease, in order to help those who had no choice.	但你也可以说西方医务工作者有资格得到优先救治，因为他们主动去往疫区，救治那些别无选择的民众。


Such arguments make reaching agreement virtually impossible.	这样的争论要想达成一致几乎是不可能的。


Worse, using social, rather than medical, criteria for rationing treatments is a slippery slope.	更糟的是，利用社会而非医学标准配给治疗机会可能带来灾难性的后果。


One need only recall Seattle’s notorious “God” committee, which in the early 1960s allocated then-scarce kidney dialysis on the basis of criteria like earnings, church involvement, and even Scout membership.	只要回忆一下西雅图臭名昭著的“上帝”委员会，该机构曾在20世纪60年代早期依据收入、去不去教堂甚至是不是童子军成员分配当时稀缺的肾透析资格。


The use of social criteria for treatment allocation has had a bad name ever since – and rightly so.	利用社会标准分配治疗机会自此后就变得臭名昭著——而且这也是罪有应得。


Genetics for the People?	为了人民的遗传学？


LONDON – “Your genetic information should be controlled by you,” declares an advertisement for the American direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic-testing firm 23andMe.	伦敦—“你的遗传信息必须由你控制，”直销（direct-to-consumer）遗传测试公司23andMe的广告如是说。


Amid the current furor over electronic eavesdropping, the notion that individuals should decide who can access their personal data is particularly appealing.	在最近关于电子窃听的汹涌民意中，谁可以获得个体的个人数据必须由个体自己决定这一概念显得特别有号召力。


But whether 23andMe is practicing what it preaches remains dubious, at best.	但23andMe公司的宣传和实践是否一致仍颇为可疑。


In fact, even some “techno-libertarians,” who believe that government should not regulate new developments in biotechnology, have supported the US Food and Drug Administration’s decision – outlined in a scathing letter to 23andMe CEO Anne Wojcicki last November – to prevent the firm from marketing its tests pending further scientific analysis.	事实上，即使在认为政府不应该监管生物技术的新发展的“技术自由主义者”（techno-libertarians）中也有不少支持美国食品药品监督管理局（FDA）的决定——FDA给23andMe公司CEO安妮·沃伊西奇（Anne Wojcicki）寄了一封措辞严厉的公函，阻止该公司在后续科学分析期间推销其遗传测试服务。


“I’d like to be able to argue that the [FDA] is wantonly standing in the way of entrepreneurism and innovation by cracking down on 23andMe,” wrote Matthew Herper in Forbes. “I wish that was the story I’m about to write, but it’s not.”	“我也十分希望能够指出[FDA]打击23andMe是在阻挠创业精神和创新，”马修·赫伯（Matthew Herper）在《福布斯》杂志中写道，“我希望我写的是这样的故事，但事实并非如此。


According to the FDA, 23andMe’s marketing of an unapproved Personal Genome Service (PGS) violated federal law, because, after six years, the firm still had not proved that the tests actually work.	根据FDA的说法，23andMe在推销未经批准的个人基因组服务（PGS），这违反了联邦法，因为该公司花了六年时间还没有证明这些测试实际有用。


23andMe is also coming under fire from its users.	23andMe也受到了来自用户的抨击。


Just five days after the FDA sent its letter, a California woman, Lisa Casey, filed a $5 million class-action lawsuit against the firm, alleging false and misleading advertising.	在FDA寄出公函前五天，一位名叫丽莎·卡塞（Lisa Casey）的加州女性提起一项500万美元的集体诉讼，指控公司虚假和误导宣传。


Doubts about 23andMe’s PGS go back a long way.	对23andMe公司的PGS的质疑由来已久。


In 2008, the American Society of Clinical Oncology commissioned a report that declared that the partial type of genetic analysis offered by 23andMe had not been clinically proved to be effective in cancer care.	2008年，美国临床肿瘤协会（American Society of Clinical Oncology）发布了一份委员会报告，称23andMe公司所提供的局部类型遗传分析在临床上并不是有效的癌症疗法。


Two years later, the US Government Accountability Office concluded after a lengthy investigation that DTC genetic tests provide “misleading” results – a situation that is complicated further by “deceptive marketing.”	两年后，美国政府问责办公室（US Government Accountability Office）在经过长期的调查后认定DTC遗传测试提供了“误导性”结果——而“欺骗性营销”让这一局面更加复杂了。


What 23andMe offered was a $99 test for some 250 genetically linked conditions, based on a partial reading of single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) – points where individuals’ genomes vary by a single DNA base pair.	23andMe公司提供的是250种左右的与遗传相关的情况的测试，其测试基于对单核苷酸多态性（SNP）的局部读取——个体基因组因为单一DNA碱基对而呈现出不同的点。


Given that DTC genetic tests target only a fraction of the human genome’s three billion markers, and various companies sample different SNPs, different tests may return disparate results for the same customer, who might then make serious medical decisions based on inaccurate information.	这项测试费用是99美元。 由于DTC遗传测试的目标仅仅是人类基因组三十亿个表示点的一小部分，且不同公司对SNP的取样也不同，因此对于同一客户，不同测试可能呈现完全不同的结果，从而导致因信息不准确而引起的严重医疗后果。


In this context, it is unsurprising that even those who oppose regulation in general see the need for it in the case of DTC testing.	在这样的背景下，毫不奇怪即使是那些总体上反对监管的人也认为有必要监管DTC测试。


But the issue goes beyond inaccuracy.	但问题不仅仅在于不准确。


As the journalist Charles Seife has pointed out, the retail genetics test is “meant to be a front end for a massive information-gathering operation against an unwitting public.”	正如记者查尔斯·赛菲（Charles Seife）所指出的，零售遗传测试“必然是针对不知情公众的大规模信息收集操作的前沿。


Indeed, when 23andMe customers log in to their accounts, they are invited to fill out surveys about their lifestyle, family background, and health, adding epidemiological value to the genetic data, which are then used by the firm’s research arm, 23andWe.	”事实上，当23andMe公司客户登陆他们的账户时，他们会被邀��填写关于生活方式、家庭背景和健康的调查，从而使这些遗传数据具有流行病学分析价值，而这些信息随后将被该公司的研究部门23andWe所用。


In providing this information, 23andMe’s customers are building a valuable “biobank” for the company.	在提供这些信息的过程中，23andMe的客户为该公司建立了价值连城的“生物银行”。


Given that the United States decided not to create a national biobank like the United Kingdom’s, owing to the high set-up costs – estimated at about a billion dollars – 23andMe may well view its growing biobank as saving it a massive outlay.	由于昂贵的建造成本——据估计高达10亿美元左右，美国决定不像英国那样建立国家级的生物银行，因此23andMe踌躇满志地认为不断增长的生物银行可以节省一大笔开支。


Some 60% of 23andMe customers have agreed to provide the requested information.	23andMe公司的客户中有60%左右同意提供所要求的信息。


Of course, one could argue that they are not “an unwitting public,” but altruistic volunteers – so generous, in fact, that, beyond paying for the service, they hand over the value of their subsequent labor in providing epidemiological data.	当然，你可以说他们不是“不知情的公众”，而是无私的志愿者——事实上，他们是如此慷慨，不但付费购买23andMe公司的服务，还不计酬劳地为该公司提供流行病数据。


Tom Sawyer pulled off that business strategy when he persuaded his friends to pay him for the privilege of taking over his hated chore, painting the picket fence.	汤姆·索耶尔（Tom Sawyer）是这一商业战略的发明者。 他说服朋友花钱向他购买接管他所讨厌的家务活——给尖庄篱笆刷油漆的特权。


But most scientific research subjects either receive compensation or contribute their time free of charge; they do not pay to participate.	这就是23andMe的商业模式雏形。 但大部分科学研究者要么领取报酬，要么免费贡献时间，从来不会花钱参与。


Casey’s lawsuit has latched onto this practice, which her attorney calls, “a very thinly disguised way of getting people to pay [23andMe] to build a DNA database.”	卡塞的诉讼就是针对这一行为，她的律师称之为：“伪装拙劣的把戏，诱导人们花钱[给23andMe]建立DNA数据库。


Even 23andMe admits that the biobank is the core of the company’s strategy.	”23andMe公司也承认生物银行是公司的核心战略。


“The long game here is not to make money selling kits, although the kits are essential to get the base level data,” says board member Patrick Chung. “Once you have the data, [23andMe] does actually become the Google of personalized health care.”	“长期大局不是卖小服务赚钱，尽管这一小服务确实是获取基层数据的关键，”董事帕特里克·钟（Patrick Chung）说，“只要有数据，[23andMe]便成了实际上的个性化医疗领域的谷歌。


That is exactly the problem, according to Seife.	按赛菲的说法，这才是问题所在。


The massive corporate data store that Google has accumulated through all of our individual searches has become its most valuable asset.	谷歌通过我们的个人搜索所建立起来的大规模公司数据仓库已经成为它最有价值的资产。


“By parceling out that information to help advertisers target you, with or without your consent, Google makes more than $10 billion every quarter,” Seife writes.	“谷歌可以把这一信息做出适当的分类，帮助广告商定位于你，不管你喜不喜欢，而谷歌每个季度可以从中获得10亿多美元，”赛菲写道。


In other words, users have become the product.	换句话说，用户变成了产品。


To be sure, the 23andMe Privacy Statement stipulates that it “uses Genetic and Self-Reported Information [only] from users who have given consent.”	诚然，23andMe隐私协议规定它“只使用自己同意的用户遗传和自我报告的信息。


But it also includes a less prominently displayed qualifier: “If you do not give consent…we may still use your Genetic and/or Self-Reported Information for R&D purposes.”	”但它还加上了不太起眼的限定语：“如果你不同意……我们仍将使用你的遗传和/或自我报告信息用于研发目的。


This “may include disclosure of Aggregated Genetic and Self-Reported Information to third-party non-profit and/or commercial research partners who will not publish that information in a peer-reviewed scientific journal.”	”这“可能包括将汇总的遗传和自我报告信息向第三方非盈利和/或商业研究伙伴披露，但这些信息不会发表在同行评议的科学期刊上。 ”


In other words, commercial use of non-identifiable information is still allowed without donors’ explicit consent.	换句话说，不具名信息的商业使用仍然可以在信息提供者没有明确同意的情况下发生。


That is what worries libertarians – and anyone else who is concerned about the expansion of online efforts to gather information about individuals.	这正是自由主义者担心的地方，也是任何担心在线个人信息收集行为日益扩大的人担心的地方。


As a 23andMe blog post by Wojcicki puts it, “Wikipedia, YouTube, and MySpace have all changed the world by empowering individuals to share information.	一篇沃伊西奇所撰写的23andMe博客指出：“维基百科、YouTube和MySpace都通过加强个人分享信息的能力而改变了世界。


We believe this same phenomenon can revolutionize health care.”	我们相信同样的事情可以带来医疗革命。


But if individuals share information involuntarily, it is the company – not its customers – that will be empowered.	”但如果个人分享信息是不自觉的，那么得到加强的将是该公司，而不是它的客户。


Don Quixote, Dissident	唐吉诃德是反对派


It is now four centuries since the birth of a masterpiece whose author and hero both seem younger than we do.	距离这部伟大著作诞生至今已有四个世纪了，但该作的作者和主角看起来都比我们年轻。


The simplest explanation for this may be found in Flaubert’s words about Don Quixote : “I found my origins in this book, which I knew by heart before I learned how to read.”	福娄拜对《唐吉诃德》的评论也许最能解释这个原因：“我在这本书中找到了自己的根源，这种根源是我在识字以前就已经用心感受到。


Indeed, at the core of Don Quixote is something essential that we knew even before we read it but which became part of our nature only after we completed its mesmerizing journey.	”事实上，《唐吉诃德》的核心正是那些我们在阅读这本书以前就已经知道的最基本的东西，但是这些东西只有在我们跟随唐吉诃德完成美妙之旅后才会成为我们天性中的一部分。


This is the unmistakable stamp of greatness in a writer.	毫无疑问，这是一个作家心中伟大之印记。


Hunting after his own ghost – an obvious sign of inner unhappiness – Hidalgo searched for a place where dreams, reality, sainthood, love, and justice coexist.	追寻着他自己的灵魂——内心忧伤的一个明显征兆——海德尔格·唐吉诃德寻找着一个梦想、现实、神圣、爱和正义能够共存的地方。


In their burlesque approach to humanity, Don Quixote and Sancho Panza are the most enduring and endearing clownish couple in world literature.	在他们对人性的嘲讽模仿中，唐吉诃德和桑丘·潘沙成为了世界文学中生命最为持久同时也是最受喜爱的一对小丑。


It is no surprise, then, that for the last 400 years Don Quixote and Panza have bred many relatives and successors, including countless buffoonish boss-and-servant couples.	所以，也难怪在过去的400年中唐吉诃德和潘沙繁衍出了许多亲戚或后代，包括无数对老大-仆人的小丑组合。


Even the history of the circus is focused on such a pairing: the vain, dignified White Clown and Augustus the Fool, the humble loser who is kicked in the pants by his stiff, pompous partner.	甚至连马戏团历史对这样一种组合青睐有加：自负威严的白色小丑和奥古斯都愚人，谦卑的失败者被他呆板浮夸的伙伴一脚踢开。


For an East European like myself, it is not easy to ignore the history of the circus – or history itself.	对于我这样的东欧人来说，马戏团的历史——或历史本身，都是难以忽略的。


The solemn Communist Manifesto announced the specter of the Great Utopia haunting Europe, but failed to warn us of the bloody tyranny.	庄严的《共产党宣言》宣称大乌托邦的幽灵笼罩欧洲，却没有警示我们血腥的专政。


The gullible Sancho Panza was meant to adopt the revolution’s deceptive dogma as entitlement to wage a brutal war against all.	容易上当受骗的桑丘·潘沙定会接受革命欺骗性的信条主张，把它作为发动一场反对所有人的战争依据。


The dream of improving the world disguised a farce that affected not only a single life, as in Cervantes’ story, and affected not only the misleading army of buffoons believed to be missionaries.	改变世界的梦想掩饰了这场闹剧。 这场闹剧不仅仅如塞万提斯故事中那样影响了个人的命运，也影响了那支受到误导以为自己是传教士的小丑军队。


This dream destroyed generations of victims.	这个梦想毁了几代受害者。


In the world circus, the poet looks like a Knight of the Sorrowful Countenance, and Augustus the Fool appears ill-equipped for everyday life.	在世界这个马戏团中，诗人看起来就宛若愁容骑士，奥古斯都愚人看来对每天的生活缺乏准备。


Like Don Quixote – and Cervantes himself – the artist dreams of other rules and rewards than his fellow men, who are content to digest their everyday lives.	至于唐吉诃德——以及塞万提斯本人——艺术家比他的仆人更梦想着其他的法规和奖赏，而他的仆人只要每天生活过得好就心满意足了。


In the socio-political arena, Augustus the Fool faces the Clown of Power.	在社会政治舞台，奥古斯都愚人面对着权力小丑。


Cervantes’ political parody can be read in many twentieth-century East European stories.	塞万提斯对政治的嘲讽可在许多二十世纪的东欧国家的历史中看到。


Its incomparable vitality and language, for example, find their way into the work of the Soviet writer Andrei Platonov.	该书无与伦比的活力与语言，影响到了苏联作家安德烈·普拉托诺夫的作品。


A communist who considered himself an honest proletarian writer, but called by Stalin, the Red Clown of Power, “svoloc” (scoundrel) and “balagancik” (buffoon), Platonov lived a lifelong ordeal.	拉托诺夫自认为是一个诚实的无产阶级作家，是一名共产主义者，却被斯大林，红色政权的小丑，称为 “ svoloc”（恶棍）和“balagancik” （小丑），一生受尽折磨。


His carnivalesque odyssey of totalitarianism displays a world of misery, boredom, and obedience in its dark journey to an unreachable paradise.	他那快乐的极权主义之旅展示了一个充满悲惨、无聊、屈从的世界，身处黑暗之旅，却试图走向一个难以触及的天堂。


The communist Knight, the new “caballero de la triste figura,” a kind of enlightened idiot, blinded by his loyalty to the unreal and by his harsh political correctness, considers Lenin a new Moses.	共产主义骑士，新“唐吉诃德”—— 某种经过启蒙开化的愚人，他被自己对虚幻的忠诚以及苛刻的政治正确性蒙蔽了双眼，把列宁看作一个新的摩西。


He rides the Rosinante of the Proletarian Force, falls in love with the dead Rosa Luxemburg in her role as Comrade Dulcinea and has intercourse with a locomotive.	他骑着无产阶级力量驽马，爱上了已去世的罗莎·卢森堡的角色——Dulcinea同志，并总是与机车进行交流。


In today’s free-market carnival, nothing seems visible unless it is scandalous and nothing is scandalous enough to be memorable.	在当今自由市场的狂欢声中，人们只看得到丑闻，只有够耸人听闻才会令人难忘。


So we pay homage to Cervantes at a time when we routinely co-habit with a very different outrageousness: religious fanaticism and terrorism, political manipulation, the cacophony of perverted simplification, the belligerent marriage between a new messianism and an aggrandizing quixotic blindness.	当我们每次对某种不同的野蛮无理：宗教狂热和恐怖主义，政权斗争，误用简化的不合之声以及一种新弥赛亚主义和一种夸大的唐吉诃德式盲目之间的交战融和习以为常之时，我们向塞万提斯致敬。


So long as we celebrate Cervantes, however, perhaps all is not lost.	只有在我们歌颂塞万提斯的时候，也许所有的一切才不会被遗失。


Don’t Blame it on Rio	不要归咎于里约


PARIS – We are little more than a decade into the twenty-first century, but a terrible precedent has already been set: all of the major international negotiations and cooperative efforts initiated in this century thus far have ended in failure.	巴黎——进入21世纪仅有十余年的时间，但是已经设定了一个可怕的先例：本世纪开始的所有主要国际合作谈判都难逃失败的厄运。


With regard to the environment, the fight against global warming has come to a standstill, with the United Nations’ last three annual climate-change conferences, in Copenhagen, Cancún, and Durban, failing to renew the Kyoto Protocol.	随着联合国过去三年在哥本哈根、坎昆和德班举行的气候变化会议未能续签《京都议定书》，环境领域反对全球变暖的斗争已经陷入停滞。


Similarly, although last year’s conference in Paris to review the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and subsequent nuclear-disarmament talks between US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev in New York, made positive inroads, the results were a far cry from ensuring a future free of nuclear arms.	同样，尽管去年巴黎《不扩散条约》的审议会议及美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马和俄罗斯总统德米特里·梅德韦杰夫其后在纽约举行的核裁军谈判取得了积极的进展，但结果还远不能确保未来没有核武器。


The list goes on: events in the Middle East have killed all prospects for peace in the region; the measures taken to aid global recovery –ampnbsp;including regulatory improvements, such as separation of retail and investment banking, elimination of tax havens, and cracking down on rating agencies’ conflicts of interest –ampnbsp;have been feeble; and the last two G-20 meetings have been gross failures.	类似的例子不胜枚举：中东局势进展断绝了实现区域和平的所有希望； 监管机制改革等辅助全球复苏的措施（如分离零售和投资银行业、消除避税天堂、打击评级机构的利益冲突等）绵软无力；


The causes and parties responsible for these failures are diverse, but there is one constant: in recent years, nationalistic, even xenophobic, rhetoric has intensified dramatically.	造成失败的原因和责任人多种多样，但有一个因素却从未改变过：那就是近年来民族主义，甚至是排外主义论调的愈演愈烈。


Patriotism and sovereignty are now stressed ever more insistently, while expressions of distrust of “others” have appeared everywhere – even in the Arctic Ocean, where Canada and Russia are engaged in what one expert has called “Cold War lite.”	人们越来越刻意地强调爱国和主权，随处可见不信任“他人”的表述——甚至远在北冰洋，加拿大和俄罗斯也正在进行一位专家所称的“简化版冷战。 ”


The consequence of the international community’s increasing balkanization is that consensus-oriented conferences tend to end in impasses.	国际社会日益分崩离析的后果是以共识为目标的会议往往以僵局而告终。


These failures do not mean that most people around the world do not see eye-to-eye on these issues, or that they are unprepared to make timely, even courageous, decisions.	这种失败并不意味着世界多数民众在这些问题上没有共同点，也不意味着他们无法做出及时、甚至是勇敢的决策。


Unfortunately, ordinary people’s sentiments rarely triumph when governments meet.	令人遗憾的是，在政府会晤时，普通民众的态度很少占据上风。


The conclusion is unavoidable: it is the quest for absolute consensus – unanimity – that is undermining progress on major global concerns.	由此不可避免地可以得出结论：导致在全球重大问题上无法取得进展的正是力求达成绝对共识（一致）的态度。


Consensus-oriented negotiations can work when a treaty is being struck between victors and vanquished –ampnbsp;the strong and the weak.	以绝对共识为目标的谈判只有在战胜方和战败方（也就是强者和弱者）的谈判中才可能实现。


After World War I, the Allied Powers tried to promote international peace by creating the League of Nations.	一次大战后，盟军试图以建立国际联盟的方式来促成国际和平。


But the League’s unanimity requirement effectively gave all members veto power, and the United States Senate’s refusal to ratify its Covenant condemned the effort to a premature death.	但国联的一致性要求实际赋予了所有成员国否决权，而美国参议院拒绝批准其《公约》导致那次努力过早陷入夭折。


The League’s abject failure to prevent World War II resulted in a second effort to build international comity after the fighting ended.	联盟在防止二战努力彻底失败在战后启动了重建国际秩序的第二次努力。


The new UN was much better structured than its predecessor, and the world gained an institution that fosters debate and deliberative decision-making much more vigorously than is possible in consensus-driven organizations.	新的联合国比其前身结构更加合理，而世界也因此拥有了能积极促进讨论和慎重决策的机构，这在以共识为导向的机构中是不可想象的。


But a shift that contradicts the UN Charter’s spirit has occurred.	但近年来发生了与《联合国宪章》背道而驰的变化。


In an effort to avoid resolutions or measures that expose their disagreements, the world’s great powers have adopted the habit of organizing worldwide debates and conferences that revert to decision-making by consensus.	为避免将相互间分歧公之于众的决议或措施，世界大国已经习惯于组织世界范围的会议及讨论，重新恢复了以共识为基础的决策机制。


According to the UN Charter, the primary focus of the General Assembly and the Security Council is to promote international security.	《联合国宪章》规定促进国际安全是联大和安理会的主要任务。


But the UN has become the “general operator” for global conferences, acting as administrator and furnisher of services and facilities (such as locations and interpreters) for events that are not officially part of its core operations.	但联合国已经成为全球会议的“总体运作者”，并为实际不属于其核心任务的各式会议扮演着管理者及服务和设施（如会议地点和口译人员）提供者的角色。


As a result, the UN is increasingly taking the blame for these conferences’ failures, which not only leave the issues unresolved, but also undermine the UN’s authority.	结果导致联合国越来越多地为这些会议的失败而承担指责，这样做不仅不能解决问题，而且还导致联合国的权威遭到削弱。


The Rio+20 conference, which will examine the progress made since the first “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro 20 years ago, will take place there this June.	将要审核20年前里约热内卢首次“地球峰会”所取得进展的里约20+会议将于今年6月在里约举办。


Designed with a wide range of objectives, including a focus on both the green economy and sustainable development, the conference seems destined to fail.	因为原定要讨论各式各样的目标，包括对绿色经济和可持续发展的重点关注，此次会议似乎注定无法取得成功。


Without consensus, no action can be taken, and consensus will be impossible.	如果达不成一致意见就无法采取行动，共识也就更加没有可能。


Of course, there is a chance that the world will recognize its quandary at Rio.	当然，世界各国也有可能在里约意识到自身的困境。


If a majority of the countries present dares to declare that demanding consensus is equivalent to enforcing paralysis, and if they insist upon following the voting procedures enshrined in the UN Charter, we could see enormous progress.	如果多数国家敢于提出声明认为强求共识就等于陷入瘫痪，如果他们坚持执行《联合国宪章》中的投票程序，我们也可能看到巨大的进步。


Global warming and economic crisis are threatening international security.	国际安全正受到全球变暖和经济危机的威胁。


This alone justifies referring these issues to the UN General Assembly, which, unlike the Security Council, knows no veto power.	仅此一点就有理由将上述问题提交联大，而联大不同于安理会之处就是它无法行使否决权。


A strong declaration and a call for binding measures to address these issues would then be possible.	这使得强力宣言和呼吁采取有约束力的举措来解决这些问题成为可能。


The economic and environmental crises before us are too urgent to play games that give the appearance of international unanimity.	我们所面临的经济和环境危机太过紧迫，没有时间再玩各国一致赞同的游戏。


It is past time to address not only global warming and the economic crisis, but also the international decision-making process.	解决全球变暖和经济危机问题，改革国际决策程序的时机稍纵即逝。


Why not start with Rio?	我们为什么不从里约开始？


Don’t Cripple the Tigers	将应对气候变化中的压力变为动力


COPENHAGEN – This December, global leaders will meet in Copenhagen to negotiate a new climate change pact to reduce carbon emissions.	哥本哈根－今年十二月，全球领导人将齐聚哥本哈根，就降低碳排放的新气候变化公约进行谈判。


Yet, the way that it has been set up, it will inevitably fail.	然而，鉴于该会议创立的方式，它不可避免的是要失败的。


The best hope is that we use this lesson finally to deal with this issue in a smarter fashion.	最好的期望是，我们最终能吸取这一教训，以更聪明的方式来应对气候变化问题。


The United States has made it clear that developing countries must sign up to substantial reductions in carbon emissions in Copenhagen.	美国已经明确表示，在哥本哈根会议中，发展中国家必须承诺对碳排放进行实质性的减排。


Developing nations – especially China and India – will be the main greenhouse gas emitters of the twenty-first century – but were exempted from the Kyoto Protocol because they emitted so little during the West’s industrialization period.	发展中国家——特别是中国和印度——将会是21世纪主要的温室气体排放国——但是，因为在西方国家的工业化时期，发展中国家排放的温室气体非常少，所以《京都议定书》豁免了它们的减排义务。


Europe, too, has grudgingly accepted that without developing nations’ participation, rich nations’ cuts will have little impact.	欧洲也勉强承认，没有发展中国家的参与，富裕国家的减排效果有限。


Some would have us believe that getting China and India on board will be easy.	有人可能想让我们相信，让中国和印度承诺减排会很简单。


According to former US Vice President Al Gore, “developing countries that were once reluctant to join in the first phases of a global response to the climate crisis have themselves now become leaders in demanding action and in taking bold steps on their own initiatives.”	根据美国前副总统阿尔·戈尔的说法，“曾经不愿意参加应对气候危机第一阶段全球行动的发展中国家，现在成为主动要求采取行动和实施坚决措施的领导者了。 ”


But Gore’s fellow Nobel laureate, Rajendra Pachauri, the chair of the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, is not so sure.	但是，和戈尔一同获得诺贝尔奖的联合国政府间气候变化专门委员会主席金德拉·帕乔里（Rajendra Pachauri）并不如此肯定。


He recently told an Indian audience, “of course, the developing countries will be exempted from any such restrictions, but the developed countries will certainly have to cut down on emissions.”	他最近告诉一些印度听众，“当然，发展中国家会被豁免任何此类的限制，但是，发达国家肯定要消减排放。 ”


It is likely that Pachauri is right and Gore is wrong: neither China nor India will commit to significant cuts without a massive payoff.	很可能帕乔里对了而戈尔错了：在没有巨大收益的情况下，中国和印度都不会承诺进行重大的减排。


Their reasons are entirely understandable.	他们的理由是完全可以理解的。


The biggest factor is the massive cost and the tiny reward.	最大的因素是碳减排高昂的成本和微小的回报。


Reducing emissions is the only response to climate change that environmental campaigners talk about, despite the fact that repeated attempts to do so – in Rio in 1992 and in Kyoto in 1997 – failed to make a dent in emission levels.	尽管有几次这样做的努力——1992在里约热内卢和1997年在京都的努力——都没有在排放水平上取得进展的事实，减少排放仍然是环境保护主义者讨论的对气候变化的唯一应对方法。


Some believe that past agreements did not go far enough, but Kyoto actually turned out to be overly ambitious.	有人认为，过去有关气候变化的协议走得不够远，但是，《京都议定书》实际上被证实是过于雄心勃勃了。


Ninety-five percent of its envisioned cuts never happened.	它预想的减排95％都没有发生过。


Yet, even if Kyoto were fully implemented throughout this century, it would reduce temperatures by an insignificant 0.3°F (0.2oC), at an annual cost of $180 billion.	然而，即使在本世纪《京都议定书》被完全加以执行，它也只能以每年1800亿美元的代价，给气温降低无足轻重的华氏0. 3度（摄氏0.


China and India are enjoying swift growth that is helping millions of people lift themselves out of poverty.	中国和印度现在正在经历帮助几百万人口脱离贫困的快速增长。


India’s External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee recently said, “India is very concerned about climate change, but we have to see the issue in the perspective of our imperative to remove poverty so that all Indians can live a life of dignity.”	印度对外事务部长穆克杰(Pranab Mukherjee)最近说，“印度对气候变化非常关注，但是，我们不得不从消除贫困以使所有的印度人都过上有尊严的生活的紧迫任务的角度，来看待这个问题。 ”


And Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao recently said, “it’s difficult for China to take quantified emission reduction quotas at the Copenhagen conference, because this country is still at an early stage of development.	并且，中国总理温家宝最近说，“因为中国还处在发展的初级阶段，所以中国在哥本哈根会议上承诺量化的减排限额是很困难的。


Europe started its industrialization several hundred years ago, but for China, it has only been dozens of years.”	欧洲在几百年前就开始了其工业化进程，但是对中国来说，中国的工业化只有几十年的时间。 ”


Some environmental campaigners argue that, given the effects of global warming, every nation must act.	有些环境保护主义者认为，考虑到全球变暖所带来的影响，所有国家都必须采取行动。


But if one takes a closer look at China, this argument disintegrates.	但是，如果对中国进行更近仔细的观察，这个观点就会瓦解。


Climate models show that for at least the rest of this century, China will actually benefit from global warming.	气候模型显示，至少在本世纪剩下的时间里，中国实际上会从全球变暖中受益。


Warmer temperatures will boost agricultural production and improve health.	温度升高会推进农业生产并改善健康状况。


The number of lives lost in heat waves will increase, but the number of deaths saved in winter will grow much more rapidly: warming will have a more dramatic effect on minimum temperatures in winter than on maximum temperatures in summer.	在热浪中死亡的人数会增加，但是，在冬天被挽救的生命会更快地增加：变暖对冬天的最低温度比对夏天的最高温度，有更巨大的影响。


There are few arguments for China and India to commit to carbon caps – and compelling reasons for them to resist pressure to do so.	有中国和���度应遵守碳排放标准的几个理由——也有它们抵制这样做的压力的令人信服力的理由。


Kyoto’s successor will not be successful unless China and India are somehow included.	除非中国和印度在某种程度上被包括进来，否则《京都议定书》的后续协议都不会成功。


To achieve that, the European Union has made the inevitable, almost ridiculous proposal of bribing developing nations to take part – at a cost of €175 billion annually by 2020.	为了将中国和印度纳入进来，欧盟提出了不可避免近乎荒谬的向发展中国家行贿以使它们参加的建议——到2020年，每年为此付出的代价为1750亿美元。


In the midst of a financial crisis, it seems unbelievable that European citizens will bear the financial burden of paying off China and India.	在发生金融危机的过程中，欧洲公民还要承担贿赂中国和印度的经济负担，这似乎是令人难以置信的。


The sadder thing, though, is that this money would be spent on methane collection from waste dumps in developing nations, instead of on helping those countries’ citizens deal with more pressing concerns like health and education.	可是，更可悲的是，这些钱是用来收集发展中国家的废料堆排出的甲烷，而不是用来帮助这些国家的公民应对像健康和教育这样更紧迫的问题。


There is an alternative to spending so much to achieve so little.	对花费如此之大而收获如此之小的减排状况，有一个可以代替的选择。


Cutting carbon still costs a lot more than the good that it produces.	减少碳排放所付出的成本，仍然要比减排所带来的好处多得多。


We need to make emission cuts much cheaper so that countries like China and India can afford to help the environment.	我们要让减排更便宜，以使像中国和印度这样的国家有能力为环境作出贡献。


This means that we need to invest much more in research and development aimed at developing low-carbon energy.	这意味着，我们要在致力于发展低碳能源的研究和开发上，进行更多的投资。


If every country committed to spending 0.05% of its GDP exploring non-carbon-emitting energy technologies, this would translate into $25 billion per year, or ten times more than what the world spends now.	如果每个国家都承诺投入其GDP0. 05%的资金来开发非碳排放能源技术，那么，这就会变成每年250亿美元的投入，即比现在全世界投入的资金多十倍。


Yet, the total also would be seven times cheaper than the Kyoto Protocol, and many times cheaper than the Copenhagen Protocol is likely to be.	然而，这样做的总投入仍然比《京都议定书》所需的支出便宜七倍，并且比《哥本哈根议定书》可能的支出便宜许多倍。


It would ensure that richer nations pay more, taking much of the political heat from the debate.	这样的规定可以保证富裕国家投入更多的资金，从而减少应对气候变化争论中的许多政治情绪。


Decades of talks have failed to make any impact on carbon emissions.	几十年的会谈没有对碳排放产生任何冲击。


Expecting China and India to make massive emission cuts for little benefit puts the Copenhagen meeting on a sure path to being another lost opportunity.	期望中国和印度在受益很小的情况下进行大规模的碳排放减排，会将哥本哈根会议置于一条肯定是另一个失去的机会的道路之上。


Yet, at the same time, the Chinese and Indian challenge could be the impetus we need to change direction, end our obsession with reducing emissions, and focus instead on research and development, which would be smarter and cheaper – and would actually make a difference.	然而，与此同时，中国和印度带来的挑战可以变成我们改变方向，结束我们对减少排放的沉迷以及转而关注研发的推动力——关注研发更为明智而低廉，并且可能实际上带来变化。


Don’t Cry for Doha	不要为多哈哭泣


CAMBRIDGE – Will they or won’t they?	剑桥－他们会还是不会呢？


Will the world’s trade ministers eventually sign a new multilateral trade agreement that reduces agricultural subsidies and industrial tariffs, or will they walk away empty-handed?	世界各国的贸易部长会最终签订一个新的降低农业补贴和工业关税的多边贸易协定呢，还是会空手而归？


The saga has been ongoing since November 2001, when the current round of negotiations was launched in Doha, Qatar, with numerous subsequent ups and downs, near-collapses, and extensions.	当本轮谈判于2001年在卡塔尔的多哈启动的时候，随着随后无数的起起落落、谈判濒于失败以及谈判时间的延长，这个故事就上演了。


The latest round of talks in Geneva has once again failed to produce an agreement.  Judging by what the financial press and some economists say, the stakes could not be higher.	最近一轮在日内瓦进行的会谈再次以没有达成任何协议收场。 根据一些财经报道和经济学家的说法判断，对它的期望再高都不为过。


Conclude this so-called “development round” successfully, and you will lift hundreds of millions of farmers in poor countries out of poverty and ensure that globalization remains alive.	如果这场所谓的“发展回合”以成功结束，就会使在贫困国家的几亿农民脱离贫困并可以确保全球化继续下去。


Fail, and you will deal the world trading system a near-fatal blow, fostering disillusionment in the South and protectionism in the North.	如果“发展回合”以失败结束，就会给世界贸易体系一个几乎致命的打击，使南方的希望幻灭并刺激了北方的保护主义。


And, as the editorialists hasten to remind us, the downside is especially large at a time when the world’s financial system is reeling under the sub-prime mortgage crisis and the United States is entering a recession.	而且，像新闻主笔急于提醒我们的那样，在世界金融体系在次级抵押贷款危机下岌岌可危以及美国进入衰退的时候，本回合失败的负面影响尤其巨大。


But look at the Doha agenda with a more detached set of eyes, and you wonder what all the fuss is about.	但是，如果从更旁观的角度看多哈议程，你会奇怪为什么会有这些大惊小怪。


True, farm-support policies in rich countries tend to depress world prices, along with the incomes of agricultural producers in developing countries.	富裕国家支持农民的政策倾向于压低世界价格及减少了发展中国家的农产品生产者的收入，这是事实。


But for most farm products, the phasing out of these subsidies is likely to have only modest effects on world prices – at most a few percentage points.	但是，对于绝大部分的农产品，逐步取消这些补贴对世界价格的影响有限——最多只有几个百分点。


This is small potatoes compared to the significant run-up in prices that world markets have been experiencing recently, and it would in any case be swamped by the high volatility to which these markets are normally subject.	这和最近世界市场经历的巨大的农产品价格涨幅相比，是微不足道的，并且最终，它也会被这些农产品市场具有的高度的波动性所吞没。


While higher world farm prices help producers, they hurt urban households in developing countries, many of which are also poor.	虽然更高的全球农产品价格帮助了农产品生产者，但是它们也伤害了发展中国家的城市家庭，许多这样的城市家庭也很贫穷。


That is why the recent spike in food prices has led many food-growing countries to impose export restrictions and has caused near panic among those concerned about global poverty.	这就是最近食品价格的飙升使许多粮食生产国施加出口限制以及在那些关注全球贫困的人中几乎造成惊慌的原因。


It is hard to square these fears with the view that the Doha trade round could lift tens, if not hundreds, of millions out of poverty.	很难将这些担忧和多哈贸易回合至少可以使几千万人——如果达不到几亿人的话——脱离贫困这样的观点统一起来。


The best that can be said is that farm reform in rich countries would be a mixed blessing for the world’s poor.	最恰当的说法是，在富裕国家进行的农业改革对世界的穷人来说，是一件好坏参半的事。


Clear-cut gains exist only for a few commodities, such as cotton and sugar, which are not consumed in large quantities by poor households.	明显的好处只在诸如棉花和糖这样的几种商品中存在，而贫困家庭并不大量消费这些东西。


The big winners from farm reform in the US, the EU, and other rich countries would be their taxpayers and consumers, who have long paid for the subsidies and protections received by their farming compatriots.	美国、欧盟以及其它富裕国家进行农业改革的最大赢家是它们本国的纳税人和消费者，这些纳税人和消费者长期以来为他们的农民同胞获得的补贴和保护买单。


But make no mistake: what we are talking about here is domestic policy reform and an internal redistribution of income.	但是别搞错了：我们在这里谈论的是国内政策改革和内部收入再分配。


This may be good on efficiency and even equity grounds.	这可能对效率甚至公平都有好处。


But should it have become the primary preoccupation of the World Trade Organization?	但是，这应该成为世界贸易组织的当务之急吗？


What about industrial tariffs?	工业关税呢？


Rich countries have demanded sharp cuts in import tariffs by developing countries such as India and Brazil in return for phasing out their farm subsidies.	富裕国家要求像印度和巴西这样的发展中国家大幅降低进口关税以换取它们的农业补贴的逐步取消。


(Why they need to be bribed by poor countries to do what is good for them is an enduring mystery.)	（富裕国家为什么需要穷国贿赂它们以使它们做对自己有好处的事是一个不解之谜）。


But here, too, the potential benefits are slim.	但是，在这里，这些措施潜在的好处也很小。


Applied tariff rates in developing countries, while higher than in advanced countries, are already at an all-time low.	发展中国家适用的税率虽然比发达国家要高，但是也已经处在历史最低点了。


According to World Bank estimates, complete elimination of all merchandise trade restrictions would ultimately boost developing-country incomes by no more than 1%. The impact on developed-country incomes would be even smaller.	根据世界银行的统计，彻底消除所有的商品贸易障碍对发展中国家收入的最终推进比例不超过1%，对发达国家收入的影响就更小了。


And, of course, the Doha Round would only reduce these barriers, not eliminate them altogether.	并且，当然，多哈回合只是减少这些贸易障碍，而不是完全消除它们。


The Doha Round was constructed on a myth, namely that a negotiating agenda focused on agriculture would constitute a “development round.” This gave key constituencies what they wanted.	多哈回合建立在这样一个神话上，即关注农业的谈判议程构成了一个“发展回合”。


It provided rich-country governments and then-WTO Director General Mike Moore with an opportunity to gain the moral high ground over anti-globalization protesters. It gave the US a stick with which to tear down the EU’s common agricultural policy.	这给了重要的支持者需要的东西，它为富裕国家的政府和当时的世界贸易组织秘书长麦克·摩尔提供了一个取得对反全球化的抗议者的道德高地的机会，给美国一个拆除欧盟共同的农业政策的手杖。


And it was tailor-made for the few middle-income developing countries (such as Brazil, Argentina, and Thailand) that are large agricultural exporters.	并且，它是为几个中等收入且是农业出口大国的发展中国家（例如巴西，阿根廷和泰国）量身定制的。


But the myth of a “development” round, promoted by trade officials and economists who espouse the “bicycle theory” of trade negotiations – the view that the trade regime can remain upright only with continuous progress in liberalization – backfired, because the US and key developing countries found it difficult to liberalize their farm sectors.	但是，由支持贸易谈判“自行车理论”——认为贸易体制只有在自由化中不��进步才能不倒的观点——的贸易官员和经济学家推进的“发展”回合神话已经事与愿违，因为美国和主要的发展中国家发现很难使它们的农业部门自由化。


What ultimately led to the collapse of the latest round of negotiations was India’s refusal to accept rigid rules that it felt would put India’s agricultural smallholders in jeopardy.	印度拒绝接受它感到可能使印度的小农生产者处于危险境地的刚性规则，是最终导致最近一轮谈判失败的原因。


More importantly, the fears underlying the bicycle theory are wildly inflated.	更重要的是，潜藏在自行车理论中的担忧被极大地夸大了。


We live under the most liberal trade regime in history not because the WTO enforces it, but because important countries – rich and poor alike – find greater openness to be in their best interest.	我们生活在历史上最自由的贸易体制中不是因为世界贸易组织执行它，而是因为重要的国家——不管是富裕国家还是穷国——都发现更大程度的开放符合它们的最佳利益。


The real risks lie elsewhere.	真正的危险在其它地方。


On one side is the danger that today’s alarmism will prove self-fulfilling – that trade officials and investors will turn the doomsday scenario into reality by panicking.	一方面的危险是现在的危言耸听会自我实现——由于恐慌，贸易官员和投资者将想象中的灾难变成了现实。


On the other side is the danger that a completed “development round” will fail to live up to the high expectations that it has spawned, further eroding the legitimacy of global trade rules over the longer run.	另一方面的危险是，“发展回合”的完成没能达到它引起的高预期，从而进一步在长期内侵蚀了全球贸易规则的正当性。


In the end, it may well be the atmospherics – psychology and expectations – rather than the actual economic results on the ground that will determine the outcomes.	最后，极有可能是氛围——心理和预期——而不是实际的经济效果决定结果。


So don’t cry for Doha.	所以，不要为多哈哭泣。


It never was a development round, and tomorrow’s world will hardly look any different from yesterday’s.	它从来就不是一个发展回合，而且，它不会使明天的世界和昨天的世界看起来有任何的不同。


Don’t Feed the Dragon	莫把东方之龙喂饱了


The European Union, after a three-year spat with President Bush, is keen to be regarded as a world player to be reckoned with.	经过三年与美国总统布什的磕磕碰碰之后，欧盟渴望着被当作一个真正的世界级“选手”来对待。


Many EU leaders see newfound respect coming in the form of a “strategic partnership” with China that is designed to balance the power of the United States.	许多欧盟领导人在与中国的“战略性合作”方式中看到了这种尊种，而这一新合作方式将有助于抑制超级大国美国的权利。


Some want that partnership to include trade in advanced weaponry—witness the recent push to remove the EU’s 15-year-old ban on arms sales to China.	有些人希望高级军备贸易也能在这一新型合作中有所体现——这一观点最近正在推动欧盟解除对华实施长达15年的军售禁令。


Although America objects strongly, a number of Europeans shrug off any opposition.	尽管美国极力反对，但是许多欧洲国家却对他们的反对呼声不屑一顾。


But China is no ordinary trading partner.	但是中国可不是普普通通的贸易伙伴。


If not openly committed to opposing Western values and interests, China’s interests in cowing Taiwan and in asserting regional hegemony across Asia certainly are not those of Europe and the West, not to mention Japan, India, and the rest of Asia.	即使不公开对抗西方价值观和利益，中国也有威胁台湾、谋求亚洲地区霸主地位的企图。 当然，这有悖于欧洲和西方世界的利益，更不消说日本、印度和亚洲其他国家了。


Indeed, China stood with Russia, Belarus, and a few other despotic regimes in prematurely recognizing the thuggish, ballot-stuffing Viktor Yanukovych as President of Ukraine.	事实上，中国和俄罗斯、白俄罗斯以及其他一些专制政权早就意见一致地承认了暴政专权的维克托·亚努科维奇当选乌克兰总统，尽管他在选举中并不得志。


This should come as no surprise, as the Chinese government does not plan to hold free and fair elections soon. Indeed, perhaps Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, with those thousands of protesters in Kiev’s Independence Square served as a potent reminder to China’s leaders of the Tiananmen Square protests 15 years ago, and – in contrast to Ukraine – their own strategy of brutal repression.	这一点丝毫不令人奇怪，在乌克兰的这场橘色革命中，几千名反对派的抗议者在聚集在基辅中央独立广场的情景，大概一下子就让中国领导人想起了15年前的天安门广场事件，当然也想起了他们所采取的与乌克兰截然不同的严酷镇压政策。


If not as dark as 15 years ago, China’s human rights record remains abysmal.	虽然中国已不再如15年前般黑暗，但是中国人权记录依然糟糕。


The British Foreign Office’s annual human rights report for 2004, the most comprehensive in the EU, condemns China’s extensive use of the death penalty (even for such crimes as corruption, pimping, drug offenses, and tax fraud), its systematic torture of dissidents, and its restrictions on freedom of speech – including the Internet – and religion.	欧盟最具综合权威性的英国外务办公室年度人权报告在2004年谴责中国政府滥用死刑（甚至将死刑用于贪污、嫖娼、贩毒和税务诈骗罪犯）、长期镇压持不同政见者、禁止宗教和自由言论（包括互联网）


All of these abuses are raised repeatedly at EU-China summits, to little or no avail.	在欧盟-中国的峰会上，这些弊端被一再提及，但结果却石沉大海，收效甚微。


So is this the time to end the arms ban imposed by both Europe and America after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989?	自1989年天安门广场屠杀事件后欧盟联合美国对华禁售武器，难道现在应该是结束这条禁令的时候了吗？


China’s human rights record is not the only problem.	令人担心的还不止是中国的人权纪录。


It is bad enough that no mechanism exists to prevent China’s government from using EU arms for internal repression. But nor does any mechanism exist that would stop China from re-exporting the weapons to places like North Korea.	目前没有有效机制能够防止中国政府将欧盟的军备武器用于国内镇压，这点足以堪忧，更何况，还没有任何机制能够阻止中国向朝鲜等国再次出口武器。


Indeed, China has a track record as a serial proliferator, having helped Pakistan build its atomic bomb.	事实上，有记录表明中国曾帮助巴基斯坦建造原子弹。


Its role in providing missile and rocket propulsion materials to Iran remains unclear.	而它是否曾向伊朗提供导弹和火箭推进原料目前尚未定论。


Yet France and Germany, with Britain and Italy not far behind, say such criticism is outdated. (They are strongly opposed by Holland, the Scandinavian countries, and the former Communist countries of Eastern Europe, which are familiar with communist repression.)	不过法国和德国声称此类批判早已过时，英国及意大利也紧随其后发表相同见解（但他们遭到了荷兰、斯堪的纳维亚地区的国家和一些东欧前社会主义国家的反对，这些东欧国家对社会主义镇压可是在熟悉不过了）。


Supporters of lifting the arms export ban argue that this litany of sins does not reflect China’s real improvements in human rights and penalizes European armaments jobs to the benefit of Russia, which enjoys a lively arms trade with its neighbor (something it might one day regret).	废除军售出口禁令的支持者们辩称，这些老调重弹并不能真正反映中国在人权方面的进步，相反却让俄罗斯与其邻居在热火朝天的军火交易中赚得盆盈钵满，令欧洲的军火生意蒙受损失。


For France, lifting the embargo is also an important symbol, one that recognizes China’s role in fighting Islamist terrorism.	法国的对华港口解禁也代表着法国承认中国在反伊斯兰恐怖主义活动中的重要地位。


Libya had such EU restrictions lifted last October ostensibly for joining the fight against terrorism and abandoning its weapons of mass destruction.	去年10月，利比亚参加反恐阵营并放弃发展大规模杀伤性武器，欧盟因此公开解除对其制裁。


In addition, those in favor of reviving EU-China arms trade see such sales as a stabilizer in bouts of political turbulence and are loath to let bad politics interfere with good business.	支持复苏欧中军火贸易的人们将这些事件看作动荡政治的稳定器，并希望恶化的政治不会殃及火热的生意。


China apologists claim that the 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports is sufficient to limit arms sales. But they conveniently ignore the fact that the Code of Conduct is voluntary and thus not enforceable.	中国的支持者们指出1998年的《欧盟关于武器出口的行为规范》能有效限制军火销售，但是他们想当然地忽略了一个事实，即该行为规范属于“自愿”性质，对各成员国不具强制性。


This is why the European Parliament voted across party and national lines in November against lifting the ban until the EU Code of Conduct is made binding.	这也是为什么欧洲议会在11月全票通过，只有当该行为规范具备法律约束力时才能解除对华武器禁售。


Can anything pull the Atlantic alliance’s policies on arms exports together?	究竟什么才能统一大西洋联盟各国的军备出口政策呢？


Trade with a country with China’s human rights record must not only make economic sense; it must also fit the wider aims of foreign policy.	与一个有中国这样人权纪录的国家进行贸易往来除了要熟悉经济形势外，更要适应更为深层广泛的外交目的。


That means, above all, avoiding trade that makes it more difficult to pursue those aims.	也就是说，要避免那些会让外交陷于不利的商业贸易。


Just as American presidents looked foolish when they bent US foreign policy to the dictates of American wheat farmers in the 1970’s and 1980’s, European governments that are prepared to mortgage Asian security to a restless China also command no respect.	就像上世纪七八十年代，美国听了本国小麦农民的话而改变其外交政策，这件事给美国总统留下了笑柄； 而欧洲政府有意将亚洲证券抵押给动荡不安的中国一事也遭到批评。


The lesson is clear: security interests must come before business interests.	这个教训是深刻的：安全利益高于商业利益。


So transatlantic coordination is needed, to ensure that any trade of sophisticated arms and weapons-related technologies with China does nothing to enhance China’s military power, and that competition between Western producers of goods that may legitimately be sold to China does not damage Western political unity.	因此欧美必须相互合作，以保证与华尖端军备和武器相关技术贸易不会加强中国军事力量，同时保证获准合法向中国市场出口货物的西方生产商之��的竞争不会影响到西方政治的步调一致。


In the Cold War era, there was a mechanism for such trade. From 1949 until the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Consultative Group Coordinating Committee (Cocom) monitored and controlled the export of Western technology to the Soviet Union.	在冷战时期曾有这样一个贸易机制：在1949年到柏林墙拆除期间，咨询小组统筹委员会(Cocom)在一个君子协议框架下，监控着西方世界向苏联的技术出口，可谓卓有成效。


It did so by a gentlemen’s agreement, and with reasonable success. Cocom provided an opportunity to settle squabbles and plug loopholes quietly.	他们为和平解决争端、修补贸易漏洞提供了一个良好的机会，而这，正是我们现在迫切需要的。


Don’t Follow America on Health Care	医疗改革勿要紧跟美国步伐


TORONTO – With the United States Supreme Court set to begin considering the Affordable Care Act (the historic health-care reform derided by opponents as “Obamacare”), it is worth noting that the number of Americans without health insurance reached an all-time high in 2010, the year the law was enacted. Roughly 50 million US residents (one in six) pay out-of-pocket for medical expenses.	多伦多 ——美国最高法院开始考虑合理医疗费用法案（这一历史性的医疗改革方案被奥巴马的对手嘲笑为“奥巴马医改”），但是值得注意的是，虽然2010年颁布了医疗改革法律，但是当年没有享受医疗保险的美国人口却创下历史新高——大约50万美国居民（1/6的美国人口）无力支付巨额的医疗费用。


The 2008 recession is not the only reason for this staggering figure; long-term political and policy choices are also to blame.	这一惊人数字产生的原因并不只是因为2008年爆发的经济衰退，长期的政治和政策选择也有难辞其咎。


Globally, but especially for rapidly growing economies, the lesson is simple: avoid America’s private health-care model.	在全球范围内，特别是经济迅速增长的国家，这一教训很简单：避免美国的私人医疗保健模式。


The US is one of the few high-income countries that does not finance health care through a publicly funded prepaid system.	世界上大多数高收入国家都通过政府资助的预付系统为医疗保健买单，美国却是例外。


On average, wealthier countries spend roughly 11% of their GDP on health, with more than 80% publicly financed and only 14% of spending taking place on a fee-for-service basis.	富裕国家每年平均医疗支出约占国内生产总值的11％，其中80％以上来自公共资金，只有14％用于医疗服务。


Public finance (or, in some cases, government-regulated cooperative insurance funds that amount to public financing) pays for most discretionary medical services, with private insurance supplementing only minimal extra services.	公共财政（在某些情况下，政府监管下的合作保险基金也等同于公共融资）为大多数医疗服务买单，私人保险只补充提供极少的额外服务。


Most rich countries choose to finance their health care publicly for several reasons.	多数富裕国家之所以选择公共融资方式来资助医疗保健，主要以下几个原因考虑。


First, free-market health care is usually inequitable and inefficient.	首先，自由市场运作的卫生保健体系通常不能保证公平且效率低下。


Individual needs vary significantly, and private companies are often unwilling to insure the very people who need the most care (such as those who are already ill, or who have conditions like diabetes, which predispose them to other health problems).	个人需求差别很大，但是私人保险公司往往不愿投保那些最需要医疗服务的人群（例如那些已经生病的人，或可能会引发其他健康问题的糖尿病患者）。


Moreover, those who buy care – insurers and patients – are unlikely to have the information necessary to choose the safest and most effective treatments.	此外，那些购买医疗保险的人（承保人和病人）不可能获取必要信息以选择最安全、最有效的治疗方式。


At the same time, public spending acts as a brake on overall spending, and prevents the rapid cost escalation to which America’s private insurance companies contribute.	与此同时，公共开支发挥着经济闸门的作用，可以控制国家整体开支，防止私人保险公司引发的成本快速上升。


The US spends 1% of its GDP annually simply to administer its complex, unwieldy insurance system.	美国每年支出其国内生产总值的1％，仅仅是为了管理复杂低效的保险体系。


Without reform of the type now before the Supreme Court, total US health expenditures will rise from 16% of GDP today to 25% by 2025.	如果最高法院当前没有通过改革计划，美国医疗保健支出总额将从现在GDP的16％上升到2025年GDP的25％。


The economic impact of the current system already is severe.	现行制度产生的经济影响已经非常严重。


The last US census showed a marked increase in the number of Americans living below the poverty line, a fact closely related to lack of health insurance, which in turn reflects over-reliance on employer-based insurance coverage.	去年美国人口普查显示，生活在贫困线以下的美国人口数量显著增加，这当然与缺乏健康保险密切相关，但同时也反映出美国过度依赖以雇主为基础的保险覆盖体系。


In emerging-market economies, governments should bear in mind five considerations when devising health-care systems.	新兴市场经济体政府在制订卫生保健系统时应牢记以下五点。


First, investments in health provide an important safety net against poverty traps, especially in times of economic upheaval.	首先，医疗领域的投资会为“贫困陷阱”提供重要的社会保障安全网络，经济动荡时期尤为如此。


For example, each year, 37 million uninsured Indians fall below the poverty line because of catastrophic health expenditures (generally defined as costs exceeding 10% of a household’s total expenditures).	例如，由于灾难性卫生支出（一般定义为医疗成本超过家庭总支出的10％），印度每年有37万人没有享受医疗保险而沦落至贫困线以下。


Second, public financing of health care frees the poor to use their money to satisfy other needs.	第二，公共医疗融资使穷人可以自由支配财富以满足其他需要。


In low-income countries, half of all health-care spending (about 2.5% of GDP) is out-of-pocket (compared to 2% in middle-income countries).	在低收入国家中，所有医疗保健支出中有一半（约占GDP的2. 5％）属于非预算款项开支，而这一比重在中等收入国家仅为GDP的2％。


This spending consumes a large proportion of poorer households’ income, precludes more productive household investments, creates few jobs, and often remains untaxed, as doctors and hospitals are frequently paid under the counter.	这一巨大开支占据了贫困家庭总收入的很大部分，抑制了更富有成效的家庭投资，却几乎没有创造任何工作岗位，而且这些开支对于医生和医院往往是免税的，因为他们经常通过暗箱操作捞取油水。


Third, publicly financing health could increase overall employment.	第三，公开医疗融资可以提高整体就业率。


Canada’s provinces phased in national health insurance from 1961 to 1975.	加拿大各省从1961年到1975年就分阶段引入国民健康保险。


Employment and wages rose where the program was introduced, even though average working hours were unchanged.	一方面，推行该方案的地区在就业和工资方面均出现上涨，但平均工时却保持不变。


Provinces with high levels of private insurance coverage, on the other hand, had lower employment rates and slower wage growth.	另一方面，私人保险水平较高的省份，就业率较低，工资增长较慢。


More recently, Canada beat the US in a bid for a new Toyota plant, in part because private health-insurance costs in the US add several thousand dollars to the cost of manufacturing a car there.	最近，加拿大击败了美国，获得了丰田汽车投资建立新厂的竞标，部分原因是因为美国昂贵的私人医疗保险成本会使汽车制造成本增加几千美元。


Fourth, existing national health-care systems in wealthier countries can serve as models for emerging-market economies that choose to adopt similar systems.	第四，较富裕国家现行的国家卫生保健系统可以作为选择采用类似系统的新兴市场经济体效仿的模型。


Importantly, public finance need not mean only public delivery; private hospitals and clinics can sometimes deliver services more effectively.	公共融资需求并不意味着只有公共部门提供服务，私人医院和诊所有时也可以更有效地提供服务，这一点非常重要。


Taiwan initiated a single-payer system in 1995, significantly curbing health-care costs and improving the population’s quality of life.	1995年台湾推行了一种“单付费者制度”，极大地遏制了医疗费用上涨，改善了人口的生活质量。


Mexico’s new universal health-insurance system was implemented first in the poorest parts of the country.	墨西哥的新全民健康保险制度首先在该国最贫穷的地区实施。


China, on the other hand, provides a sobering example of the consequences of withdrawing publicly financed health insurance.	另一方面，中国的健康保险撤回政府投资，这一做法产生的严重后果发人深省。


In the early 1980’s, market reforms left roughly 100 million rural citizens without insurance, almost overnight.	20世纪80年代初，中国推行的市场化改革使近100万农村居民几乎在一夜之间失去医疗保险。


Out-of-pocket costs skyrocketed, infant mortality rates stopped declining, and the disease surveillance system was weakened, which may have contributed to the SARS epidemic in 2002-2003, which took more than 900 lives worldwide and caused economic losses worth an estimated $60 billion.	非预算款项开支暴涨，婴儿死亡率停止下降，疾病监测系统削弱，这可能在一定程度上导致了2002-2003年SARS疫情爆发，全球超过900人死亡，经济损失估计约60亿美元。


The Chinese government has acknowledged that the reforms were a flop, and has committed to spending several billion dollars on publicly financed health care.	中国政府已经公开承认改革失败，并承诺将支出几十亿美元用于公共融资的医疗保健。


Finally, following the principle, “everyone is covered, but not everything is covered,” governments must investigate which services are most cost-effective, and which should not be publicly financed, because they are both expensive and ineffective.	最后，政府要遵循医疗保险“覆盖所有人而不覆盖一切”的原则，调查研究哪些服务最划算，哪些服务不应接受公开资助，因为这些服务不仅成本高而且效益低。


The list of insured services can always grow in step with incomes and government revenues.	保险服务的数量可以总是与增加居民收入和政府收入状况保持一致。


In particular, higher tobacco taxes yield a double benefit: they reduce smoking, a leading cause of adult death, and raise revenue.	提高烟草税尤其能产生双重效益：一方面可以减少吸烟（成年人死亡的首要原因），另一方面政府可以增加收入。


China, India, and South Africa have all committed to adopting national health insurance.	中国、印度和南非都致力于推行国民健康保险。


Which country achieves this goal first will depend not only on revenue, but also on the political will to overcome vested interests.	哪个国家可以率先达到这一目标，不仅取决于该国的财政收入多少，而且也取决于是否有克服既得利益的政治意愿。


It will also depend on institutions’ ability to design rational health care, monitor delivery, and properly assess new treatments.	这也将取决于医疗体系规整合理医疗保健方案、监控医疗服务状况、正确地评估新的治疗方法的能力。