This strategy is not only desperate; it is also delusive, for it seems obvious that, if the planet is to remain habitable, competition in economic growth must give way to competition in quality of life.	这一战略不但显得着急冒进，而且容易令人产生错觉，因为，显而易见，如果地球想要保持宜居，那么经济增长的竞争必须让位给生活质量的竞争。


In short, we are far from having developed a reliable set of precepts and policies to guide us toward a safer future.	简言之，我们还远远没有制定出一套可靠的戒律和政策指引我们通往更加安全的未来。


Small wonder, then, that Western populations look ahead with foreboding.	因此，毫不奇怪，西方人会有不祥的预感。


Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Reconsidered	反思恐怖主义和反恐


The arrests in London of 21 terrorists who appear to have planned to blow up a number of airplanes over the Atlantic reminds us, if any reminder is needed, of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington of September 11, 2001.	21名看起来打算在大西洋上空炸毁数架飞机的恐怖分子在伦敦被捕。 如果我们还需要提醒的话，那么，这一事件让我们回想起来2001年9月11日对纽约和华盛顿的恐怖主义袭击。


9/11 remains the date that has come to signify modern terrorism in all of its terrible capacity to cause death and destruction.	9/11这个日子已经成为现代恐怖主义在其全部的能力内制造死亡和毁灭的标志。


Five years may be too short a period for historians to judge the full significance of the event, but it does offer an opportunity to take stock.	对于历史学家而言，五年的时间尚不足以评判这一事件的全部意义，但是，它还是提供了反思的机会。


At best, it is a mixed record.	这段期间最多是喜忧参半。


Terrorist attacks have occurred subsequently in Indonesia, Madrid, London, Egypt, and most recently Mumbai.	恐怖主义袭击随后又在印尼、马德里、伦敦、埃及以及最近的孟买发生。


Thousands of innocent men, women and children have been killed.	数以千计无辜的男女老幼被杀害。


There is also the steady drumbeat of terrorist violence in Iraq – violence that risks pushing the country into full-scale civil war.	恐怖暴力的战鼓在伊拉克持续敲响。 那里的暴力有可能把该国推向全面内战。


But the terrorists still have not done anything on the scale of 9/11.	然而，恐怖分子还没有做出什么和9/11事件旗鼓相当的事情。


The reason for this is worth thinking about.	为何如此是值得我们思考的。


It may reflect the ouster of the government of Afghanistan and the elimination of al-Qaida’s safe haven there.	这可能反映了推翻阿富汗政府以及消除基地组织在那里的庇护所。


Improved and better coordinated intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security efforts at both the national and international levels have made it more difficult for terrorists to succeed.	在国家以及国际层面上得到改善和更为协调的情报、执法以及国土安全措施使得恐怖分子更难以得逞。


And as the recent arrests in London suggest, it is also possible that the desire of some terrorists to accomplish something more dramatic than the 9/11 attacks may have complicated their ability to implement their plans and increased the prospect that they will be detected.	正如新近伦敦的逮捕所表明的那样，有可能是某些恐怖分子制造比9/11更为骇人听闻的事件的欲望可能使得其实施计划的能力受阻并且增加了被侦破的可能性。


None of this should make anyone sanguine.	这些都不应该让人乐观。


Globalization makes it easier for terrorists to acquire the tools of their trade and to move about.	全球化让恐怖分子更为容易地获得恐怖工具以及转移。


The odds also favor terrorists, in that one success can compensate for multiple failures.	形势也对恐怖分子有利，因为只要得逞一次就可以补偿多次失败。


Modern technology, possibly including weapons of mass destruction, increases the possibility that any terrorist success will cause damage of great magnitude.	现代技术、可能包括大规模杀伤性武器增加了恐怖得逞将会造成巨大损失的可能性。


In addition, Iraq is producing a new generation of experienced terrorists along the lines that Afghanistan did two decades ago.	此外，伊拉克正在制造新的一代富有经验的恐怖分子，正如阿富汗在二十年前的一样。


So what needs doing?	那么，需要做些什么事情呢？


One answer put forward by the Bush administration is to promote democracy.	布什政府提出的一个答案是促进民主。


The thinking is that young men and women will be less likely to become terrorists if they are members of societies that provide them with political and economic opportunities to live meaningful and satisfying lives.	他们的考虑是，年轻男女如果生活在为他们提供政治和经济机会、让他们过有意义和心满意足的生活的社会之中，那么，他们就不大会成为恐怖分子。


Unfortunately, the evidence does not support this.	不幸的是，现实并非支持这一观点。


Individuals growing up in mature democracies such as the United Kingdom can still become alienated and radicalized.	在像英国那样成熟的民主国家中长大的人还是脱离社会并走向极端。


A more democratic Iraq has become a more violent Iraq.	更为民主的伊拉克成为了更为充满暴力的伊拉克。


Similarly, elections in Palestine did not persuade Hamas to turn its back on violence any more than elections in Lebanon dissuaded Hezbollah from initiating the current crisis in the Middle East.	同样，巴勒斯坦选举并未让哈马斯放弃暴力，正如黎巴嫩阻止真主党发动当前的中东危机一样。


Moreover, even if democracy were the answer, it is extraordinarily difficult to bring about, as Iraq shows.	而且，即使是民主就是问题的答案，也极难实现。 伊拉克就是最新的例证。


Building a true democracy (as opposed to simply holding elections) is an enterprise that requires decades or even generations.	建立一个真正的民主国家(与简单地举行选举对照)是一项耗费几十年甚至几代人的艰巨事业。


In the meantime, however, we require a policy to deal with the terrorism that confronts us.	但是目前，我们需要的是一项应付我们面临的恐怖主义的政策。


What is more, democracy is irrelevant to those who are already committed terrorists.	并且，对于那些死心塌地的恐怖分子而言，民主也是无关紧要。


Their goals of re-creating some 7th century caliphate or, in the case of Iraq, restoring Sunni domination are unlikely to be satisfied by free men and women openly choosing their political system and leadership.	自由人士公开选择其政治制度和领导人难以满足他们重建7世纪政教合一的国家或者在伊拉克恢复逊尼派统制的目的。


So what, then, needs doing?	既然如此，又当如何呢？


The first thing to do is to drop the metaphor of a “war on terrorism.”	首要的是放弃“反恐战争”的比喻。


Wars are mostly fought with arms on battlefields between soldiers of opposing countries.	绝大多数战争发生在敌对国家间，士兵们在战场上兵戎相见。


Wars have beginnings and ends.	战争有始有终。


None of these characteristics apply here.	上述特征没有一个能在这里适用。


Terrorism can now be carried out with boxcutters and airplanes as easily as with explosives.	恐怖主义可以轻而易举地用开盒子刀、飞机以及炸药实施。


Office buildings and commuter trains and coffee shops are today’s battlefields.	办公大楼、通勤列车以及咖啡厅是当今的战场。


There are no uniforms, and often those doing the killing are acting in the name of causes or movements.	没有军装，而且那些进行杀戮的人往往顶着某些事业或者运动的名义。


And there is no end in sight.	而且结束也遥遥无期。


To the contrary, terrorism is now part of the fabric of contemporary life.	相反，恐怖主义成为了当今生活的组成部分。


There is another reason to jettison the martial vocabulary.	还有一个理由来丢弃这一战争词汇。


Terrorism cannot be defeated by arms alone.	无法仅仅用武器来打败恐怖主义。


Indeed, other instruments of policy, including intelligence, police work and diplomacy, are likely to play a larger part in any effective policy.	的确，在任何有效的政策中，其他的政策手段，包括情报、警力以及外交等有可能发挥更大的作用。


Second, it is essential to distinguish between existing and potential terrorists.	其次，区分现有的恐怖分子和潜在的恐怖分子至关重要。


Existing terrorists need to be stopped before they act; failing that, societies need to protect themselves and have ready the means of reducing the consequences of successful attacks.	需要在现有恐怖分子行动以前制止他们。 做不到这一点，各国就需要自我保护，而且需要准备好手段来减少袭击得逞的后果。


But much more than that can - and should - be done to persuade young men and women not to become terrorists in the first place.	但是，从一开始就劝戒年轻男女不要成为恐怖分子就需要做更多的工作，而且也可以这样做。


The aim must be to create an environment in which terrorism is seen as neither acceptable nor necessary.	目标必须是建立一个认为恐怖主义既无法接受又无必要的环境。


Terrorism must be stripped of its legitimacy; those carrying it out must be shamed.	必须破除恐怖主义的合法性。 那些实施恐怖主义的人必须感到羞耻。


No political cause justifies the taking of innocent life.	没有任何政治事业可以给杀害无辜生命提供理由。


Arab and Muslim leaders need to make this clear, be it in public pronouncements by politicians, lectures by teachers, or fatwas by leading clerics.	阿拉伯和穆斯林领袖们需要表明这一点，无论是政治家们的公开声明、教师的教授或者是主要教士的法令。


The initial critical reaction on the part of several Arab governments to Hezbollah’s kidnapping of Israeli soldiers is a sign that such criticism is possible, as are selective comments by a number of Muslim religious leaders.	几个阿拉伯国家政府对于真主党绑架以色列士兵的最初批评性的反应就是标志，那就是，这样的批评以及几位穆斯林宗教领导人有选择性的评论是可能的。


But terrorism also needs to be stripped of its motivation.	但是，还必须破除恐怖主义的动机。


This translates into the United States and others spelling out the gains Palestinians can expect in a peace agreement with Israel and what Sunnis and Shia can reasonably expect in Iraq’s new political order.	这就转化成为美国和其他国家列举在一项与以色列的和平协议中巴勒斯坦可以预期，以及逊尼派和什叶派穆斯林在伊拉克新的政治秩序中可以合情合理地预期得到的利益。


Bringing about a lasting cease-fire in Lebanon will also help calm the emotions that will lead some to become terrorists and others to tolerate or support them.	在黎巴嫩实现持久停火还可以帮助平息将会让某些人成为恐怖分子以及其他人容忍或支持他们的情绪。


The way ahead is clear: vigilance against violence coupled with political possibility.	前方的道路是清楚的。 那就是说对暴力保持警觉，辅之以政治解决的可能性。


Such a counter-terrorism policy will not eliminate the scourge of terrorism any more than modern medicine can eliminate disease.	这样一项反恐政策不会比现代医学消除疾病更能够消除恐怖主义的灾害。


But it does hold out the promise of reducing it to a scale that will not threaten the openness, security, or prosperity of modern societies.	但是它确实给予希望，把恐怖主义降低到不会威胁现代社会的开放、安全或者繁荣的程度。


The French Climate-Terror Connection	法国的气候与恐怖联系


TOKYO – Since the November 13 terrorist bloodletting in Paris, the City of Light has been practically under martial law.	东京——自11月13日发生巴黎恐怖流血事件后，光明之城实际已经处于戒严状态。


In this subdued and challenging context, world leaders are now convening in the city at the United Nations Climate Change Conference to hammer out a new global agreement to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions.	在这样阴郁而艰难的大背景下，世界领导人正在这里召开联合国气候变化大会制定新的全球协议实现温室气体减排。


Could disrupting the talks have been part of the terrorists’ agenda?	恐怖分子的部分目的会不会就是破坏谈判？


It certainly seems possible.	当然无法排除这样的可能性。


After all, severe environmental conditions in much of the Middle East and North Africa’s Sahel region contribute to the sense of desperation that fuels Islamic extremism.	毕竟，中东大部分地区和北非萨赫勒地区恶劣的环境条件助长了伊斯兰极端主义的绝望感。


Given this, arranging the attacks in such a way that could distract from efforts to ameliorate those conditions – while advancing the terrorists’ other goals, of course – would seem like a “winning” strategy.	有鉴于此，为干扰改善上述条件的努力而发起袭击——当然在推进恐怖分子其他目标的同时——可能被看作某种“致胜”的策略。


The situation in the Middle East and the Sahel is certainly dire, with rapid desertification devastating pastoral economies and the livelihoods of farmers, shepherds, nomads, and those who depend on them.	中东和萨赫勒地区的局势无疑相当可怕，快速荒漠化毁坏了牧区经济和以此来养家糊口的农牧民生活。


This combination of environmental and economic degradation has created fertile conditions for murderous Islamist movements, including Boko Haram in Nigeria, al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.	环境和经济的共同恶化为残忍的伊斯兰运动，包括尼日利亚博科圣地、索马里和肯尼亚青年党和伊拉克叙利亚伊斯兰国创造了千载难逢的条件。


Where climate change threatens to lay waste to the environment, fanatics have banded together to lay waste to civilization.	在那些气候变化有可能破坏环境的国度，狂热分子们联起手来威胁对文明进行破坏。


To be sure, climate change is by no means the primary cause of Islamist extremism.	当然，气候变化绝不是伊斯兰极端主义的首要原因。


Failed economies and brutal secular dictatorships, together with deep-rooted ethnic and religious rifts, have fueled a volatile combination of fear, instability, and anger.	糟糕的经济和残酷的世俗独裁统治，再加上根深蒂固的种族和宗教分歧，共同助长了恐惧、动荡和愤怒的不稳定环境。


But no one should doubt that the framework of fanaticism has been abetted by the dire environmental conditions that now prevail in much of the Middle East and the Sahel.	但任何人都不应怀疑恶劣的环境条件助长了狂热主义架构，目前这样的可怕局面正在中东和萨赫勒的大部分地区盛行。


And those conditions are set to deteriorate further, as rapid population growth puts even greater strain on resources.	而上述条件注定会进一步恶化，因为快速人口增长进一步加剧了资源紧张的局面。


The surge in carbon dioxide emissions has been fueled not just by industrialization; the UN expects Earth’s human population to reach 9.7 billion by 2050 and 11.2 billion by 2100.	二氧化碳排放量激增已不仅因为工业化； 联合国预计地球人口将在2050年达97亿，2100年达到112亿之多。


That growth will happen disproportionately in the Muslim world, including the Middle East and the Sahel.	上述增长将主要发生在穆斯林世界，包括中东和萨赫勒地区。


Indeed, the countries with the highest fertility rates are predominantly Muslim, led by Niger, with 7.6 live births per woman, followed by Somalia with 6.7, and Chad with 6..	事实上，生育率名列前茅的国家大多以穆斯林为主，其中最高的是尼日尔，每名妇女产下7. 6名活婴。


According to the Pew Research Center, the number of Muslims in the world will nearly equal the number of Christians by 2070, and Islam will become the world’s largest religion by 2100.	7名和乍得的6名。 皮尤研究中心数据显示，全球穆斯林人数将在2070年接近基督徒的人数，而2100年伊斯兰教的规模将成为世界第一。


Rapid population growth in countries where the environment is already failing to meet people’s needs, and where economies show scant signs of creating new employment opportunities, provides a fertile ground for fanaticism.	人口快速增长国环境不能满足民众需求且经济无法创造新的就业机会为狂热主义的滋生提供了肥沃的土壤。


Consider Mali, where Islamist militants attacked a hotel filled with foreigners just one week after the attacks in Paris.	比方说马里，那里的伊斯兰武装分子在巴黎袭击短短一周后就袭击了一座住满外国人的酒店。


Drought and desertification have exacerbated poverty – the country’s per capita GDP is just $765, placing it 168th worldwide – and extremely perilous living conditions are reflected in the world’s seventh-highest child-mortality rates: 123 of every 1,000 children will not make it to their fifth birthday.	干旱及荒漠化加剧了贫困——该国的人均国内生产总值仅为765美元，列世界第168位——世界排名第七的儿童死亡率反映了极为危险的生活条件：每千名儿童中有123人活不到自己的五岁生日。


In such a poor society, inadequate education leaves people without the knowledge they need to improve their lot, such as by limiting pregnancies or taking advantage of opportunities to boost economic productivity.	在如此贫穷的社会中，缺乏教育机会令人们无法通过限制怀孕或提高经济生产率来改变自己的生活。


Add to that the lack of anything close to a reliable, much less clean, energy supply and the severity of the situation is obvious.	再加上可靠（更不用说清洁）能源供应短缺，局势的严重性是显而易见的。


Under these conditions, it should not be surprising that Islamist terrorism has been a consistent scourge.	在这样的条件下，伊斯兰恐怖主义祸患无法根除也就不足为奇了。


In short, much of the Middle East and the Sahel are locked in a vicious cycle of environmental degradation, economic failure, and Islamist extremism.	总之，环境恶化、经济失败和伊斯兰极端主义恶性循环正在中东和萨赫勒的大部分地区发生着。


The question is how to break out of it.	问题是如何打破它。


The Paris summit is likely to be a buttoned-down diplomatic battle among countries for grants to support their pledges to mitigate and adapt to climate change.	巴黎峰会很可能是一场老套的外交战，各国为争夺支持其兑现缓解和适应气候变化承诺的拨款而在外交上打得头破血流。


Unfortunately, the effectiveness of the pledges that will be made – particularly in ravaged lands like Somalia, northern Nigeria, and Iraq’s Anbar province – is entirely uncertain.	不幸的是，即将做出承诺的有效性——尤其是在索马里、尼日利亚北部和伊拉克安巴尔省等惨遭蹂躏的土地上——完全是不确定的。


The most important factor in the long-term effort to save societies in the Middle East and the Sahel from environmental and economic ruin – with major implications for combating Islamic extremism – will not be discussed in Paris next week.	挽救中东和萨赫勒地区经济环境免遭毁灭的长期工作最重要的因素——在对抗伊斯兰极端主义方面也有着重要意义——下周将不会在巴黎会议上进行探讨。


That factor is education.	这就是教育因素。


After all, to improve their health and preserve their environment, people need access to information about birth-control methods, modern farming and cooking practices, and much else.	毕竟，为改善健康和保护环境，民众需要掌握有关节育、现代农业、烹饪实务和其他诸多方面的知识和方法。


And to improve their economic prospects, they need the knowledge and skills that employers require.	要想改善经济前景，雇主需要的技能和知识民众必须能够熟练掌握。


Former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who serves as UN Special Envoy for Global Education, is working tirelessly to promote access to education among the millions of refugees in the region.	现任联合国全球教育特使的英国前首相戈登·布朗正不知疲倦地面向该地区成百上千万难民推动教育工作。


It is time for more global players to support this effort, so that it can be expanded across the Middle East and the Sahel.	更多的全球参与者现在应予以支持，以便在中东和萨赫勒地区推广这项工作。


Education is the key to giving strained populations hope for a better future.	教育是赋予愤怒群体对美好未来希望的关键所在。


And hope is fundamental to negating the allure of extremism, in all of its forms.	而希望又对抵制一切形式的极端主义诱惑意义极其重大。


Five Truths about Terrorism	恐怖主义五大真相


SAO PAULO – American politics has been captured by terrorists.	圣保罗——恐怖分子已经俘获了美国政治。


In December 2015, polls showed that one in six Americans, some 16% of the population, now identify terrorism as the most important national problem, up from just 3% in the previous month.	2015年12月，民调显示美国总人口的约16%，也就是每六个美国人中就有一位将恐怖主义视为国家最重要的问题，而上个月该比例仅有3%。


This is the highest percentage of Americans to mention terrorism in a decade, although it is still lower than the 46% measured after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.	尽管仍低于2001年9月11日恐怖袭击后测得的46%，但其比例却创下了近10年来美国人提到恐怖主义的新高。


The effect of this change in public opinion has been particularly strong in the Republican presidential primary.	这样的舆论变化影响在共和党总统初选中体现得特别之强。


It certainly boosted the candidacy of Donald Trump, whose anti-Muslim rhetoric has been particularly tough (if not incendiary).	它无疑提振了反穆斯林言论尤其强硬（甚至颇具煽动性）的特朗普的竞选活动。


Some politicians are starting to call the battle against terrorism “World War III.”	有些政治家开始将反恐战争冠名为“第三次世界大战”。


Terrorism is a problem for the United States, as the attack in San Bernardino, California in December showed.	加利福尼亚州圣贝纳迪诺12月的袭击表明，恐怖主义问题在美国确实存在。


But it has been blown out of proportion, both by the presidential candidates and by a news media that adheres to the old adage, “If it bleeds, it leads.”	但这个问题却被总统候选人和信奉古老格言“越血腥越吸引眼球”的新闻媒体所夸大。


To put terrorism in proper perspective, Americans – and others – should bear in mind the following considerations.	要想正确认识恐怖主义，美国人——和其他人——要牢记以下注意事项。


Terrorism is a form of theater.	恐怖主义是某种形式的演剧。


Terrorists are more interested in capturing attention and putting their issue at the forefront of the agenda than in the number of deaths they cause per se.	恐怖分子更热衷于吸引眼球、使其问题处于关注中心，而非行动本身造成的死亡人数。


The Islamic State (ISIS) pays careful attention to stagecraft.	伊斯兰国（ISIS）非常注重舞台艺术。


The barbaric beheadings that are broadcast and disseminated through social media are designed to shock and outrage – and thereby capture attention.	借助社交媒体传播的野蛮斩首其目的是引发震惊和愤怒——并以此来吸引眼球。


By exaggerating their effect and making every terrorist act a lead story, we play into their hands.	通过夸大效果让每次恐怖活动成为头条新闻，我们正好中了他们的计策。


Terrorism is not the biggest threat facing people in advanced countries.	恐怖主义并非发达国家民众所面临的最大威胁。


Terrorism kills far fewer people than auto accidents or cigarettes.	车祸和香烟的致死人数都远比恐怖主义多。


Indeed, terrorism is not even a big threat – or a small one, for that matter.	事实上，恐怖主义甚至算不上很大的威胁——就连小的也算不上。


One is likelier to be struck by lightning than to be killed by a terrorist.	人们死于雷击的可能性都比恐怖行动要大。


Experts estimate that an American’s annual risk of being killed by a terrorist is one in 3.5 million.	专家估计美国人每年死于恐怖袭击的可能性是350万分之一。


Americans are more likely to die in an accident involving a bathtub (one in 950,000), a home appliance (one in 1.5 million), a deer (one in two million), or on a commercial airliner (one in 2.9 million).	美国人死于浴缸意外（950,000分之一）、家电事故（150万分之一）、撞鹿事故（200万分之一）或商业客机失事（290万分之一）的几率都比恐怖行动要大。


Six thousand Americans die annually from texting or talking on the phone while driving.	每年有6，000名美国人死于边开车边发短信或打电话。


That is several hundred times more than die from terrorism.	这比死于恐怖主义的几率高出数百倍之多。


Radical Islamic terrorism kills fewer Americans than attacks by disgruntled workplace and school shooters.	美国死于激进伊斯兰恐怖主义的人数还不及心怀不满的办公室和学校枪手多。


Terrorism is not World War III.	恐怖主义不是第三次世界大战。


Global terrorism is not new.	全球恐怖主义已经不是新闻了。


It often takes a generation for a wave of terrorism to burn out.	恐怖主义浪潮往往需要一代人才能逐渐褪却。


At the beginning of the twentieth century, the anarchist movement killed a number of heads of state for utopian ideals.	20世纪早期，无政府主义运动因为乌托邦理想刺杀了几位国家元首。


In the 1960s and 1970s, the “new left” Red Brigades and Red Army Faction hijacked planes across national borders and kidnapped and killed business and political leaders (as well as ordinary citizens).	20世纪六七十年代，“新左翼”红色旅和红军军团曾劫持跨境飞机并绑架和杀害（普通公民及）商界和政界领袖。


Today’s jihadist extremists are a venerable political phenomenon wrapped in religious dress.	今天的圣战极端分子是披着宗教外衣的一种古老政治现象。


Many of the leaders are not traditional fundamentalists, but people whose identity has been uprooted by globalization and who are searching for meaning in the imagined community of a pure Islamic caliphate.	很多领导人都并非传统的原教旨主义者，而是在全球化浪潮中被连根拔起并且在想象中的纯伊斯��哈里发团体中寻找生存意义的民众。


Defeating them will require time and effort, but ISIS’s parochial nature limits the range of its appeal.	打败它们需要时间和精力，但伊斯兰国自身的狭隘性限制了其受众。


With its sectarian attacks, it cannot even appeal to all Muslims, much less Hindus, Christians, and others.	其宗派主义袭击甚至不能吸引所有穆斯林，更不要说印度教、基督教和其他教徒。


ISIS will eventually be defeated, just as other transnational terrorists were.	伊斯兰国最终会被击败，这和其他跨境恐怖分子没有区别。


Terrorism is like jiu jitsu.	恐怖主义很像巴西柔术。


The smaller actor uses the larger actor’s strength to defeat it.	小个选手借大个选手的力来打败他。


No terrorist organization is as powerful as a state, and few terrorist movements have succeeded in overthrowing one.	没有恐怖组织像国家一样强大，也没有几个恐怖运动成功推翻了政府。


But if they can outrage and frustrate citizens of the state into taking self-defeating actions, they can hope to prevail.	但如果它们能激怒一国民众弄巧成拙，他们就有获胜的希望。


Al-Qaeda succeeded in luring the US into Afghanistan in 2001.	2001年基地组织成功地引诱美国侵入阿富汗。


ISIS was born in the rubble of the subsequent US-led invasion of Iraq.	其后在美国领导的入侵伊拉克行动的瓦砾堆中诞生了伊斯兰国。


Smart power is needed to defeat terrorism.	击败恐怖主义需要智慧的力量。


Smart power is the ability to combine hard military and police power and the soft power of attraction and persuasion.	智慧力量能将军警硬实力和吸引说服的软实力相结合。


Hard power is needed to kill or capture die-hard terrorists, few of whom are open to attraction or persuasion.	硬实力可以杀死或俘获铁杆恐怖分子，这些人基本不会接受引诱和劝说。


At the same time, soft power is needed to inoculate those on the periphery whom the die-hards are trying to recruit.	与此同时，软实力可以为顽固份子试图招募的边缘民众打预防针。


That is why attention to narrative and how US actions play on social media is as important and as necessary as precision air strikes.	因此注重舆论和美国行动在社交媒体上的形象和精准空中打击一样重要和必要。


Antagonistic rhetoric that alienates Muslims and weakens their willingness to provide crucial intelligence endangers us all.	疏远穆斯林并削弱其提供关键情报意愿的对立言论为我们所有人带来威胁。


That is why the anti-Muslim posturing of some of the current presidential candidates is so counterproductive.	这也解释了某些当前总统候选人的反穆斯林姿态为何造成如此适得其反的效果。


Terrorism is a serious issue, and it deserves to be a top priority of our intelligence, police, military, and diplomatic agencies.	恐怖主义是个严重问题，它理应成为我们情报、警察、军事和外交机构的重中之重。


It is an important component of foreign policy.	它是外交政策的重要组成部分。


And it is crucial to keep weapons of mass destruction out of terrorists’ hands.	而且不让大规模杀伤性武器落入恐怖份子之手至关重要。


But we should not fall into the terrorists’ trap.	但我们不应落入恐怖分子的圈套。


Let the actions of thugs play out in an empty theater.	让暴徒们在空无一人的影院上演他们的行动。


If we let them take over the main stage of our public discourse, we will undermine the quality of our civic life and distort our priorities.	如果让他们接管公众舆论的主要舞台，将会有损我们公共生活的质量、扭曲我们的重点日程。


Our strength will have been used against us.	他们会用我们自己的力量来对付我们。


Testing Medicine	试验药物


Most people are surprised to learn that rigorous application of formal rules of evidence to evaluate medical research and decide on the best treatments is a recent phenomenon.	绝大多数人在听说最近在评估医学研究和决定最佳疗法上严格运用证据的形式规则时都感到很惊讶。


They might be just as surprised to learn that health policy is not yet subject to the same approach.	也许当他们听说医疗卫生政策并不运用同样的方法时同样会感到很惊讶。


So-called “evidence-based medicine” entails a hierarchy of empirical proof that ranks medical studies according to their quality.	所谓的“循证医学”对医学研究根据它们的质量推行一个经验证据等级系统。


Physiological research on animals, or of human responses in laboratory settings, rank low on the hierarchy.	对动物的生理研究或者人类对实验室设置的回应在等级系统中级别较低。


Observational studies that compare outcomes for patients who receive particular treatments and control subject who do not rank higher, but may still be misleading.	通过对比接受特定治疗的病人和不接受特定治疗的控制主体的结果来进行研究的对比研究级别并不高，但是可能会产生误导。


Convincing studies of drugs and surgical procedures usually come only from randomized trials, in which patients receive treatment or don’t according to a process analogous to a coin flip.	对于药物和手术程序令人信服的研究通常只会从随机试验中产生。 在随即试验中，病人接受或不接受治疗是通过一个类似投硬币来决定的程序来确定的。


Well-conducted randomized trials incorporate additional safeguards against bias, including use of placebo medication that allows investigators to blind patients and caregivers to whether patients are, or are not, receiving active treatment.	实施良好的随机试验会对避免偏差现象注入额外的保障，包括使用安慰剂药物使调查者可以让病人及看护人不清楚到底是否正在接受积极治疗。


Doctors have made many errors that they could have avoided had these principles been applied.	如果医生们能运用这些原则的话那他们本可以避免许多错误。


For example, for a decade leading doctors advocated hormone replacement therapy to lower cardiovascular risk in post-menopausal women.	比如，数十年来，有影响的医生提倡使用荷尔蒙替代疗法来降低绝经妇女患心血管疾病的危险。


These recommendations, based on physiological and observational studies, proved profoundly misleading.	这些基于生理和对比研究的建议被证明完全是一种误导。


Randomized trials ultimately showed no benefit, and a clear increase in breast cancer and vascular blood clots.	随机实验最终证明它完全无益，并且显著增加了患乳腺癌和血管血块的几率。


Similarly, cardiologists once prescribed drugs to reduce sudden death in patients after heart attacks.	同样地，心脏病学家曾经开药方以减少病人在心脏病发作时突然死亡的概率。


The drugs suppressed arrhythmias – disturbances of the heartbeat associated with sudden death.	这些药能抑制心律不齐，它会扰乱心跳从而导致突然死亡。


The logic seemed clear: suppress the asymptomatic but nasty-looking arrhythmias, and you will reduce sudden death.	这个逻辑是很清楚：抑制无症状但很危险的心律不齐，就可以减少突然死亡。


Unfortunately, when investigators undertook randomized trials, they found that treated patients had a higher death rate.	不幸的是，当调查者们进行了随机试验后，他们发现接受治疗的病人死亡率 更高 。


Clinicians stopped using the drugs, but not before causing a large number of unnecessary deaths.	临床医师不再使用这些药物，但是它们已经造成了大量不必要的死亡。


But awareness that principles of evidence-based medicine should also guide health policy has been slower to take root.	但是人们认识到循证医学的原理同样应该指引医疗卫生政策却花了很长时间。


Here, although randomized trials are not feasible, it remains possible to follow evidence-based medicine’s primary rule: to base action on systematic summaries of the highest quality evidence available.	在这里，尽管随机疗法并不可行，但还是可以遵循循证医学的首要规则：基于可提供的最高质量的证据的系统性总结来进行行动。


Consider the issue of whether countries should fund health care publicly, through taxes, or privately, through health insurance and user fees.	让我们来看一下国家应该通过税收以公共的方式还是应该通过健康保险和病人付费以个人的方式来给健康护理注资的问题。


Private health insurance has proved enormously wasteful, with large administrative expenditures on activities that include developing insurance packages, marketing those packages, and assessing claims.	个人健康保险被证明存在巨大的浪费，大量的管理费用被花在了包括开发保险套餐、推销这些套餐以及评估索赔这样的活动上。


Public funding eliminates these activities, resulting in far lower administrative costs.	公共基金不存在这些活动，从而使管理费用要低得多。


Likewise, user fees discourage the poor and elderly from accessing needed health services, whereas public funding largely eliminates inequities in the provision of care while producing health outcomes that are as good as, if not better than, mixed public-private funding models.	同样地，病人付费使穷人和老人面对他们所需要的健康服务时望而却步，而公共基金在很大程度上消除了在提供护理上的不公平，同时产生的健康成果与混合了公共和个人的基金模型同样好，如果不是更好的话。


Public funding also benefits a country’s economy, because large employers are spared the expense of providing health benefits to their workers.	公共基金还会使国家的经济受益，因为大量的雇主节省了给他们的工人提供健康福利的费用。


Thus, the evidence suggests that public funding of all key aspects of medical care – physician and hospital services, drugs, and devices –- offers benefits of equity, efficiency, and industrial advantage.	因此，证据表明对于医疗护理的所有重要方面，即医师服务和医院服务、药物和医疗器械进行公共注资提供了公平、高效和产业优势等好处。


The medical community has come to accept the need for systematic reviews to guide decisions regarding drugs and surgical therapies, but their use in health policy is only now taking hold.	医疗行业已经接受了在有关药物和手术疗法的决定上需要采取系统评价的观点，但是它们在医疗卫生政策上的运用才刚刚起步。


Systematic reviews have summarized the evidence regarding the provision of hospital services by large for-profit companies versus not-for-profit providers.	系统评价概括了有关对比盈利性公司与非盈利性服务提供者提供医院服务的证据。


The primary studies forming the basis of these reviews come largely from the United States, where for-profit and not-for-profit providers work side by side in the same environment, and where large administrative databases allow accurate detection of death rates.	形成这些评价基础的主要研究大多来自美国，在那里盈利性公司与非盈利性服务提供者并行存在于在同一个环境内，并且那里庞大的管理数据库可以对死亡率进行精确的调查。


But, while these observational studies are threatened by bias from patient selection – sicker patients mean higher death rates, for example – the available administrative databases document patient characteristics such as age, severity of illness, and co-morbidity, including diabetes and high blood pressure.	但是，这些对比研究可能会因病人的选择而产生偏差。 比如，病情更严重的病人意味着更高的死亡率，而可提供的管理数据库记录了病人的特征，比如年龄、疾病的严重性以及共病，包括糖尿病和高血压。


This information allows statistical approaches that level the playing field, helping to protect against biases associated with patient selection.	这些信息使研究者可以采取统计学的方法从而使竞争环境变得平等，使研究不会因病人的选择问题而产生偏差。


These systematic reviews have shown that for-profit hospital care leads to higher death rates than not-for-profit care, despite higher charges to third-party payers.	这些系统评价表明盈利性医院护理所产生的死亡率比非盈利性护理的死亡率要高，尽管它们对第三方付费者收取更高的费用。


Systematic reviews have demonstrated the same phenomenon in outpatient dialysis facilities – lower death rates in not-for-profit facilities – and have also shown higher quality care in not-for-profit nursing homes.	系统评价显示出在门诊病人血液透析设施上存在同样的现象，非盈利性设施的死亡率较低，此外非盈利性疗养院的护理质量也更高。


The reason that not-for-profit providers can achieve higher quality care with better health outcomes at lower cost is evident.	非盈利性服务提供者能够在提供更高质量的护理的同时以更低的成本获得更好的健康效果的原因很明显。


While for-profit providers have higher administrative costs and larger executive salaries, their main burden relative to not-for-profit provision is the need to generate returns for their shareholders.	因为盈利性服务提供者行政管理费用和管理人员的工资都更高，它们相对非盈利性服务提供者最沉重的���担在于需要为它们的股东提供回报。


These additional costs mean that approximately 20% of the total income that not-for-profit providers can devote to patient care is unavailable.	这些额外的费用意味着它们无法将非盈利性服务提供者可以用在病人护理上的总收入的大约20%用在病人护理上。


The result is cutting corners, deficiencies in care, and poorer outcomes for patients.	结果必然带来它们要节约人力和物力、护理的缺陷以及对病人治疗结果较差。


Principles of evidence-based medicine have transformed the way we look at clinical interventions and may prevent repetitions of public-health disasters such as the inappropriate promotion of hormone replacement therapy and anti-arrhythmic drugs.	循证医学的原理已经转变了我们对临床干预的看法，并且可能会阻止类似不恰当地推行荷尔蒙替代疗法和抗心律不齐药物这样的公共卫生灾难的重复发生。


Application of these principles to health policy can lead to wiser decisions about how to run our health systems.	把这些原理运用到医疗卫生政策上可以在如何运行卫生体系的问题上作出更明智的决策。


The available evidence provides strong support for public funding of health services delivered by not-for-profit providers.	现有的证据强烈表明我们应当为给非盈利性服务提供者提供的医疗卫生服务进行公共注资。


Testing Obama’s Foreign Policy	考验奥巴马的外交政策


CAMBRIDGE – Approaching the end of his first year as president, Barack Obama has taken a bold step in deciding to increase the number of American troops in Afghanistan to over 100,000. Critics on the left point out that the Korean War crippled Harry Truman’s presidency, just as the Vietnam War defined Lyndon Johnson’s administration.	剑桥——


But critics on the right have complained that Obama’s approach to foreign policy has been weak, too apologetic, and overly reliant on soft power.	在即将任满总统一年之计，巴拉克·奥巴马向前勇敢地走出了一步：他决定将美军驻扎阿富汗的人数增加到超过10万人。 左派的批评人士认为，这无疑当年是哈里·杜鲁门的总统被韩战所困扰，又像林登·约翰逊政府被越战所束缚的翻版。


They worry about Obama’s promise to begin withdrawing American troops from Afghanistan 18 months after the surge.	国内政治议程将被一场艰难的战争而笼罩，奥巴马不得不成为第三个这样的民主党总统，


Obama inherited a fraught foreign policy agenda: a global economic crisis, two	但来自右派的批评者，却在抱怨奥巴马对外政策的过于软弱，过多的道歉和过于依赖软实力。 他们担心，在此次增兵之后，奥巴马将在18个月之后把美军从阿富汗撤走。


difficult wars, erosion of the nuclear non-proliferation regime by North Korea and Iran, and deterioration of the Middle East peace process.	奥巴马从前任接下的是如此困难的外交现实：一场全球性的经济危机，两场棘手的战争，朝鲜和伊朗队无核化进程的困扰以及越来越糟糕的中东和平进程。


Obama’s dilemma was how to manage this difficult legacy while creating a new vision of how Americans should deal with the world.	奥巴马的难题是怎样才能打开这么困难的现实，创造出一个美国与世界的全新关系。


Through a series of symbolic gestures and speeches (in Prague, Cairo, Accra, the United Nations, and elsewhere), Obama helped to restore American soft power.	通过一系列的有象征意义的姿态和演讲（在布拉格，开罗，安卡拉，联合国等场合），奥巴马重建了美国的软实力。


As a recent Pew poll reported, “in many countries opinions of the United States are now as positive as they were at the beginning of the decade before George W. Bush took office.”	根据近期的民意调查显示，“不同于本世纪初的小布什政府时期，如今，很多国家开始对美国有了积极正面的印象。 ”


It is a mistake to discount the role that transformative leaders can play in changing the context of difficult issues.	对一个还处于过渡期的领导人来说，特别是在面对如此众多困难问题之中的转型期间，过于苛刻的要求显然不太现实。


Power involves setting agendas and creating others’ preferences as well as pushing and shoving.	权力除了制定新计划之前，还必须对原有的环境进行修补。


That is why Obama’s administration speaks of “smart power” that successfully combines hard and soft power resources in different contexts.	这也就是奥巴马政府所说的“巧实力”，即成功地将硬实力和软实力这两个不同内涵整合在一起。


But soft power can create an enabling rather than a disabling environment for policy.	软实力能创造出有利于政策出台的一个良好氛围。


Critics contend that Obama has been all words and no deeds.	批评人士认为，奥巴马只是光说不练。


They portray him as a rock star who won a Nobel prize on the basis of promise rather than performance.	更像一个获得诺贝尔奖的摇滚明星，只知道到处承诺，没干什么实事。


They scoff at his popularity, and note that the Middle East remains intractable, North Korea nuclear, Iraq and Afghanistan unsettled, and Iran difficult.	他们对他的欢迎度也嗤之以鼻，中东地区依然问题重重，朝鲜的核武器，伊拉克和阿富汗战争还未解决，伊朗也还是个大问题。


But no serious analyst would expect otherwise in the short term.	但是，坦率来说，没有人会认为这些问题能在短期内得到解决。


Bush and Cheney’s hard-power approach certainly did not solve these problems.	当年布什和切尼的所谓硬实力的方法同样没能解决这些问题。


Moreover, in addition to words, there have been some important deeds.	况且，除了宣讲之外，奥巴马也取得了一些重要的成绩。


First and foremost was Obama’s handling of the economic crisis.	首先，也是最为重要的一点，奥巴马在经济危机的处理中的举措。


When he came into office, his economic advisors told him that there was a one-in-three chance of a 1930’s-style depression.	在他就任总统之初，经济顾问告诉他说，美国有三分之一地可能陷入1930年代式的大萧条。


If Obama had not avoided that disaster, all else would have paled in comparison.	如果不是奥巴马，我们很难避免这种灾难的局面出现，还有��么比这个更为重要的呢？


Success required not only an economic stimulus package at home, but international coordination.	要想取得如此的成功，这不仅需要国内的经济刺激方案，更要国际间的相互协调。


Despite US measures against imports of Chinese tires, the level of protectionism has been much lower than in the 1930’s and than many observers predicted.	出乎一些观察人士的预测，除了对中国轮胎加收关税之外，美国的保护主义措施远远低于1930年代水平。


Moreover, Obama used the crisis to accomplish what many had suggested for years: transform the G-8 into a broader institutional framework of a G-20 that includes the major emerging economies.	而且，奥巴马还利用经济危机的机会，做成了多年以来一直没有的做成的事情：将8国集团扩充到20国集团，在其中增加了一些主要的新兴市场国家。


Closely related to the economic crisis has been Obama’s handling of relations with China.	除了处理经济危机之外，奥巴马在处理和中国的关系上也值得一提。


How America responds to the rise of Chinese power is one of the most important foreign-policy challenges of the twenty-first century.	美国如何应对中国的崛起成为21世纪最为重要的外交挑战。


Obama broadened the Treasury-led economic meetings to a strategic dialogue co-chaired by the State Department with an agenda that includes climate change as well as multilateral issues.	奥巴马将两国的会谈从财政部主导的经济会议扩充到双方政府主导的战略对话，这其中就包括气候变化等众多问题。


Contrary to some skeptical press reports, Obama’s summit meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao in November was a quiet success.	不像一些悲观的报道，奥巴马和中国国家主席胡锦涛在11月的峰会相当成功。


At the same time, he has recognized that maintaining close alliances with Japan and Australia – and good relations with India – helps to maintain the hard-power capabilities that shape the environment for a rising China.	以此同时，他还表示会保持与日本和澳大利亚的亲密关系——和印度保持良好的关系——以此保持一种硬实力来迎接一个正在崛起的中国。


A third significant accomplishment of Obama’s first year has been to reframe the issue of nuclear non-proliferation, which many experts regarded as being in crisis at the end of the Bush era.	奥巴马第三个重要贡献就在于，重新构造了核不扩散问题，很多专家都认为，这个问题在布什政府的后期已经相当危险。


By embracing the long-term goal of a non-nuclear world (though perhaps not in his lifetime), Obama reiterated America’s long-standing commitment, written into Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to reduce the role of nuclear weapons.	在重新回归无核化世界的战略愿景之后（虽然恐怕不是在他有生之年），奥巴马重申了美国长期承诺。 即核武器不扩散条约六点，减少核武器的比重。


Moreover, he followed up by negotiating with Russia a successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty by the end of this year, and has moved the non-proliferation issue to the top of the agenda at the UN and the G-20.	更有甚者，他还和俄罗斯在今年年底达成协议，将减少战略武器的续约进一步落实，并将无核化议题提交联合国和20国集团讨论。


Critics charge that these accomplishments, as well as efforts to unblock the stalemates in Sudan and Burma, have been achieved at the price of giving up moral clarity on human rights.	批评者不仅对这些成绩视而不见，同时对在苏丹和缅甸问题上的僵局的突破也嗤之以鼻，说这是放弃人权的道德标准。


But public proclamations are often less effective than long-term strategies in promoting human rights.	在推动人权问题上，公开的谴责往往不如战略推进来的有效。


Obama’s speech in Ghana, carefully located in an African country that recently had a successful democratic change of government, illustrated such an approach.	奥巴马精心选择在非洲的加纳进行演讲，帮助了该国近期成功地进行了民主式的政权交割。


Other critics on the left have complained that he has not been able to get Congress to pass a tough energy bill before the Copenhagen conference on climate change.	一些左派人士也有微词，他们抱怨奥巴马没有在哥本哈根气候会议之前，说服国会通过颇具争议的能源方案。


But Obama has helped to persuade China and India to announce useful efforts, and he will set an American target of reducing greenhouse emissions that should prevent the conference from being a failure.	不过，奥巴马成功说服了中国和印度作出明确的减排承诺，同时也设定了美国减排的目标，以防止哥本哈根协议的流产。


Of course, the big test lies ahead in Afghanistan.	当然，对于奥巴马来说，最大的考验来自于阿富汗。


Can Obama combine hard and soft power into a smart-power strategy that works?	这种组合着硬实力和软实力的“巧实力”能否生效？


Will the increase in American and allied troops, and the increases in development aid produce enough stability for his planned withdrawal to begin in 2011?	美国及其盟国的增兵是否足以保证局面的稳定，以实现他所承诺的2011年全面撤军的计划？


Can the Afghan government begin to provide the security that will protect its citizens against Taliban violence?	阿富汗政府能否能维持局面，控制住来自塔利班的袭击？


Or will Afghanistan prove to be a quagmire that defines Obama’s presidency?	还是阿富汗最终成为奥巴马总统的政治败笔？


As Obama approaches the end of his first year in office, he must know that Afghanistan will be the major test according to which future historians will grade his foreign policy.	在奥巴马完成其任内的第一年之际，他必须明白，阿富汗将会是一个重大考验，后世的历史学家将因此给他的外交政策打分。


Testing Putin in Syria	在叙利亚考验普京


NEW YORK – There has been no shortage of scrutiny of what Russian President Vladimir Putin is up to in Syria and why.	纽约—关于俄罗斯总统普京在叙利亚想干什么、为什么想这么干，已经有了太多的分析。


Much of the analysis, though, has been narrowly focused on the short term and may be too negative in assessing his actions’ likely long-term consequences.	尽管如此，许多分析狭隘地关注短期，也许对评估普京行为的可能的长期结果过于消极。


What we know is that Putin has decided to come to the aid of Bashar al-Assad’s embattled regime.	我们知道，普京决定出手助身陷重围的巴沙尔·阿萨德政权一臂之力。


Russian bombs and missiles are now raining down on an array of armed groups that have been fighting Syrian government forces, which has given the regime the breathing space that Russia’s intervention was intended to provide.	眼下，俄罗斯炸弹和导弹像雨点一样朝与叙利亚政府军对抗的武装集团打去，这给了巴沙尔政权喘息空间——也是俄罗斯干预的初衷。


As bad as the Assad government is, and as much as it has to answer for, this outcome is arguably preferable in the short run to the regime’s collapse.	巴沙尔政府是个坏政府，并且它应该受到惩罚，但从短期看，这一结果很可能比政权倒台更好。


The painful truth in Syria today is that a government implosion would most likely lead to genocide, millions more displaced people, and the establishment of the Islamic State’s so-called caliphate in Damascus.	如今，叙利亚的痛苦事实是政府从内部崩溃很可能导致种族灭绝，增加几百万流离失所者，伊斯兰国也有可能在大马士革建立所谓的哈里发。


Putin’s motives are a matter of speculation, but it would appear that he did not want to see Russia’s long-term ally in the Middle East fall.	普京的动机只能猜测，但似乎他不愿意看到俄罗斯的长期中东盟友崩溃。


Moreover, he never misses an opportunity to remind the world that Russia remains a major power, able and willing to act on behalf of its perceived interests.	此外，他从不错过任何机会提醒世界俄罗斯仍是主要大国，能够也愿意代表它所感到的利益行动。


It is also possible that he sought to distract domestic attention from a shrinking economy and the rising cost of intervention in Ukraine.	还有可能，他是在试图将国内关注焦点从经济衰退和干预乌克兰日益增加的成本上引开。


Putin’s high approval ratings suggest he may well be succeeding.	普京的高支持率表明他很有可能成功。


Many fear that Russia’s latest activism will not only prolong Syria’s brutal civil war, but also strengthen the Islamic State.	很多人担心，俄罗斯最近的激进主义不但会延长叙利亚的野蛮内战，还有会强化伊斯兰国。


This could well turn out to be the case, as hatred of the Assad regime is a major recruiting tool.	这很有可能成为事实，因为对巴沙尔政权的仇恨是伊斯兰国的重要招募口号。


And, thus far at least, the Islamic State seems to be a low priority for the Russian military, which appears to be attacking mainly other anti-Assad groups.	此外，至少到目前为止，伊斯兰国只是俄罗斯军队的次要目标，俄军的袭击主要针对的是其他反巴沙尔集团。


Indeed, there have been reports of the Islamic State moving into areas that others have abandoned following Russian attacks.	事实上，有报道说伊斯兰国在俄罗斯袭击开始后迁往其他人所放弃的地区。


Russia seems to be playing the same cynical game as Assad: framing the war as a binary choice between the Islamic State and a regime that, however flawed, still deserves the world’s support.	俄罗斯似乎在玩和巴沙尔一样的犬儒游戏：将战争塑造成二元选择，一边是伊斯兰国，一边是尽管缺陷重重但仍值得得到世界支持的政权。


Some also fear that this demonstration of Russian assertiveness presages a new wave of such interventions, even a new Cold War.	也有一些人担心俄罗斯如此彰显魄力预示着新一波类似的干预，甚至新的冷战。


But this is unlikely, if for no other reason than that Russia lacks the economic and military means to sustain such efforts on multiple fronts.	但这是不可能的，如果仅��从俄罗斯缺乏经济和军事方法在多条战线上保持同时出击这一点看的话。


It is also not clear that the Russian people are prepared to pay a high price for such a foreign policy.	俄罗斯人民是否准备好为这一外交政策付出高昂代价也不清楚。


So it all comes down to Putin, who enjoys a degree of autonomy in Kremlin decision-making not seen since the Stalin era.	因此，一切取决于普京，他拥有克里姆林宫自斯大林时代以来从未有过的自主决定权。


Putin is widely known to be a martial-arts enthusiast, and his action in Syria is entirely consistent with many of the discipline’s principles, including the importance of the decisive thrust that neutralizes the opponent’s strengths and exploits his weaknesses.	众所周知，普京是个兵法迷，而他在叙利亚的动作也完全与兵法原则相符，包括一鼓作气摧毁敌人的优势、利用敌人的弱点。


But force has its limits.	但武力有其极限。


Russia’s intervention in Syria cannot succeed if success is defined as enabling the Assad government to regain control over the bulk of the country’s territory.	如果成功意味着巴沙尔政府能够重新控制叙利亚大部分领土，那么俄罗斯对叙利亚的干预不可能成功。


Putin’s policy can, at most, establish a relatively secure enclave.	普京的政策充其量只能建立一片相对安全的飞地。


Even this modest aim will prove costly, because the Islamic State is also becoming stronger.	即使这一平庸的目标也将改价高昂，因为伊斯兰国也在日益变强。


And it could prove expensive to Russia itself: it is only a matter of time before suicide bombings (such as the recent attack in Ankara) occur in Moscow.	并且这对于俄罗斯本身来说也可能十分昂贵：莫斯科发生（类似于最近的安卡拉的）自杀式炸弹袭击只是时间问题。


The real question, then, is whether Putin sees bolstering the Assad government as an end in itself or as a means to an end.	因此，真正的问题是普京将支持巴沙尔政府视为结局本身还是通往结局的手段。


If it is the latter – if Putin is thinking in terms of chess, the preferred game of many Russians, and planning several moves ahead – a diplomatic process, in which Assad is removed at some point, is conceivable.	如果是后者——如果普京采取许多俄罗斯人所热衷的象棋运动的思维，走一步想三步——那么要求巴沙尔在某个时刻下台的外交进程尚有可能。


Russia might support such a process; after all, Putin is not known for his sentimentality.	俄罗斯也许会支持这样的进程； 毕竟，普京绝不是感情用事的人。


Indeed, he might embrace a political process that enabled him to demonstrate Russia’s central role in shaping the future of the Middle East.	事实上，他可能采纳让他能够证明俄罗斯在决定中东未来方面起核心作用的政治进程。


In the meantime, the United States and others should pursue a two-track policy.	与此同时，美国和其他国家应该追求双规政策。


One track would channel steps to improve the balance of power on the ground in Syria.	一条轨是引导改善叙利亚地面力量平衡的措施。


This means doing more to help the Kurds and select Sunni tribes, as well as continuing to attack the Islamic State from the air.	这意味着以更大的力度帮助库尔德人和某些逊尼派部落，并继续从空中打击伊斯兰国。


Relatively safe enclaves should emerge from this effort.	这样应该可以形成一些相对安全的飞地。


A Syria of enclaves or cantons may be the best possible outcome for now and the foreseeable future.	由飞地或小片行政区组成的叙利亚也许是目前以及可预见的未来的最好的可能结果。


Neither the US nor anyone else has a vital national interest in restoring a Syrian government that controls all of the country’s territory; what is essential is to roll back the Islamic State and similar groups.	重建一个控制叙利亚全境的叙利亚政府不是美国和其他任何国家的根本国家利益； 最根本的是击溃伊斯兰国和类似的集团。


The second track is a political process in which the US and other governments remain open to Russian (and even Iranian) participation.	第二条轨是一个政治进程，在这个进程中，美国和其他国家对俄罗斯（甚至伊朗）的参与持开放态度。


The goal would be to ease Assad out of power and establish a successor government that, at a minimum, enjoyed the support of his Alawite base and, ideally, some Sunnis.	进程的目标是让巴沙尔远离权力，并成立一个至少赢得巴沙尔所在的阿拉维派、最好还包括一些逊尼派支持的继任政府。


Such a process might well confer prestige on Putin.	这一进程也许会给普京带来声望。


That would be a price worth paying if it contributed to a dynamic that over time reduced both the suffering of the Syrian people and the danger posed by the Islamic State.	这是个值得付出的代价，如果它有助于逐渐减少叙利亚人民的苦难和伊斯兰国带来的危险的动态的话。


Testing the Limits of Fossil Fuels	测试化石燃料的限度


MILAN – Most people recognize that human activity, primarily the use of fossil fuels, is contributing mightily to an increasing level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.	米兰——多数人承认人类活动，主要是化石燃料的应用，正在使大气中的温室气体含量大幅度增加。


These gases, particularly CO2, increase the risk of damage to the world’s climate.	这些温室气体，特别是二氧化碳，使世界气候受损的危险加大。


This means that limits on our consumption of fossil fuels cannot be measured only by the availability of supplies, but must also take account of the environmental costs.	这意味着不能只用供应量来衡量人类消费化石燃料的极限，而必须将环境成本也纳入到考虑的范畴。


Yet considerable uncertainty remains about the magnitude of the impact of rising levels of atmospheric greenhouse gases on temperatures and climate.	但是大气中不断升高的温室气体对温度和气候的影响程度还存在很大的不确定性。


This uncertainty must be taken seriously when formulating strategies to combat climate change.	这种不确定性必须在制定战胜气候变化战略时认真加以考虑。


The high-growth developing countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and others in the G-20 – now include more than half the world’s population.	快速增长的发展中国家——巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和其它二十国集团成员——现在已经囊括了超过世界半数的人口。


If they continue their current strong growth trajectories, as seems likely, they will approach advanced-country levels of income by mid-century or shortly thereafter.	如果它们目前强劲的增长势头持续下去（这种几率似乎很大），它们将在本世纪中期或稍晚一些时候在收入水平上接近发达国家。


At that point, the part of the world’s population with advanced-country income levels ($20,000 dollars or above in today’s dollars) would increase from 16% to 66%.	到那时，达到发达国家收入水平的世界人口（以美元现值计价为20，000美元或更多）将从16%增长到66%。


And, if the newly affluent follow the patterns of consumption, energy use, and carbon emissions that accompany high income levels now, the climate change battle will have been lost.	但如果新崛起的富裕阶层效仿现在高收入者的消费、能源使用和碳排放模式，那么气候变化这场战役就失败了。


Emissions and natural processes that increase atmospheric carbon are known as “flows.”	增加大气中碳含量的排放和自然过程称为“循环流动”。


Mitigation attempts to reduce these flows and thus reduce the rate of increase of the stock of carbon in the atmosphere, with the ultimate goal of stabilizing or reducing it to safe levels.	减排措施试图降低这种循环流动，从而减缓大气中碳储量的增加速度，其最终目的是将碳含量稳定或降低到安全的水平线上。


Without mitigation, and assuming that the high-growth developing countries reach current advanced-country levels of annual per capita CO2 emissions (10 to 11 tons, though much higher in North America), the current global average of 4.8 tons will almost double in 50 years, to 8.7 tons.	如果没有减排措施，假设快速增长的发展中国家达到目前发达国家二氧化碳的年人均排放量（10到11吨，虽然北美还要高出很多），那么目前全球4. 8吨的人均排放量将在50年内实现翻番，达到8.


This compares poorly with the most recent estimate of a reasonably safe level of CO2 emissions calculated by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.	这种预测与联合国政府间气候变化工作小组最近通过计算得出的二氧化碳排放合理的安全水平两相比较就显得更加糟糕。


To prevent further climate change, the IPCC believes, emissions should be brought down to 2.3 tons per person globally, or roughly half the current per capita average, in the next 50 to 75 years.	气候变化工作小组（IPCC）认为，为防止进一步的气候变化，全球范围内的排放量应该在未来的50到75年内降低到人均2. 3吨的水平，或者降到目前人均排放量的大约一半。


On our current course, without a significant mitigation effort, by mid-century we would be at around four times the safe level.	按照目前的情况测算，如果不采取重大的减排措施，到本世纪中叶我们的碳含量水平将达到安全水平的将近四倍。


Advanced countries have been the biggest sources of carbon emissions until relatively recently.	直到不久前，最大的碳排放源还一直是发达国家。


But energy consumption – and thus carbon emissions – rise with per capita income.	但能源消费——以及随之而来的碳排放——随着人均收入的提高而提高。


China and India, which account for 40% of the world’s population, were recording 9-10% annual GDP growth before the financial crisis hit in 2008 and are likely to resume rapid growth in the post-crisis period, meaning that their economies will double in size every 7-10 years.	占世界人口40%的中国和印度在2008年金融危机爆发前实现了9-10%的年国内生产总值增长，而且很可能在后危机时代继续保持这种快速增长态势，这就意味着它们的经济总量每7-10年将出现翻番的增长。


Their contribution to total emissions will rise accordingly.	它们在总排放量中所占的份额也会水涨船高。


Other economies are growing at relatively high rates, too.	其它经济体也在以相对较快的速度增长。


As a result, while many advanced and developing countries are pursuing far-reaching measures to increase energy efficiency and adopt clean-energy technologies, their existing technologies, incentives, regulations, and commitments imply a sharp rise in total carbon emissions in the coming decades.	因此，尽管许多发达及发展中国家正在采取意义深远的措施提高能源效率并采用清洁能源技术，但它们现有的技术、激励、法规和目标意味着今后数十年的碳排放总量将急速增加。


Despite the IPCC’s target for annual per capita CO2 emissions, we still do not know how much warming various levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will cause.	尽管联合国政府间气候变化工作小组已经确定了二氧化碳排放的年人均目标，我们仍然不清楚大气中不同含量的温室气体将在多大程度上导致变暖的结果。


The estimated ranges vary widely, even after a quarter-century of scientific effort, owing to the complexity of the environment itself.	尽管已经进行了四分之一个世纪的科学研究，但由于环境自身的复杂多变，导致预期的范围波动很大。


This is one reason why successful mitigation at the global level faces stiff headwinds.	这也是全球范围内的成功减排仍然面临重重阻力的一个因素。


Indeed, it is not reasonable to expect that any country, rich or poor, should set or agree to 50-year targets.	事实上，期待任何国家（无论贫富）制定或同意50年目标只是一种不切实际的幻想。


Given the structure of the problem – sequential decision-making with uncertainty about all the relevant parameters (including costs, the efficient pattern of mitigation, and technology) – it would be wiser to adopt a more flexible strategy that provides incentives and regulations to achieve measurable intermediate progress, while generating a lot of useful information along the way.	由于问题本身的结构——涉及无法确定相关参数（包括成本、减排的有效模式和技术）的一系列决策——明智的做法是实施更为机动灵活的策略，为实现可以量化的中期进展提供激励和法规保障，并在实现目标的同时搜集很多有用的资讯。


In other words, we should focus our efforts on a shorter time frame, say, the next 15 years.	换言之，我们应当关注短期措施，比如说今后15年的变化。


In the long run, success will require major technological advances and their broad adoption.	从长远来看，取得成功需要重大的技术进步和对先进技术的普遍应用。


As these are still unknown today, the initial challenge will be to jump-start the mitigation and learning processes, and create powerful incentives for technology that will increase energy efficiency and reduce CO2 emissions in the long run.	因为这在今天还无法预测，因此从长远来看的首要挑战在于启动减排和学习过程，并能有效刺激提高能源效率的技术，同时降低二氧化碳排放。


Acting now can be thought of as buying what financiers call “tail insurance” – some protection against the most adverse among all the possible outcomes.	立即行动可以想象成是购买金融家们所说的“长尾保险”——以期获得针对所有可能结果中最坏结果的某种保护。


The question is what	问题在于我们应当采取


This is why delaying the adoption of long-term targets is not a recipe for business as usual.	这也解释了为什么推迟确定长期目标不能如以往一样成为解决之道。


On the contrary, as the possible outcomes become clearer, we will almost certainly face the need for serious and costly reductions in energy use, at least among the advanced countries, as well as costly technological advances designed to make energy use more efficient in both the advanced and developing world.	相反，随着可能的结果越来越明确，至少在发达国家内部，我们几乎肯定要付出巨大代价认真减少能源的用量，并采用代价昂贵的技术进步成果，从而使能源应用在发达和发展中国家都更加高效。


This will surely involve sharp cuts in the consumption of fossil fuels, bolstered by taxes and other restrictions.	这肯定将涉及大幅度削减化石燃料消费，还会涉及与之配套的税收和其它限制政策。


No one should expect that the costs of combating climate change will be low.	没有人应该认为对抗气候变化的代价不高。


But those costs will have a significantly higher expected value if we do not adopt sensible global strategies that include adjusting our mitigation efforts in response to new information.	但如果我们不采取包括根据最新资讯调整减排措施之类明智的全球政策，那么上述成本的价值将会大大超出预料。


Figure 1. CO2 Emissions per Capita	图1：人均二氧化碳排放量


Source: IPCC and Human development report 2007/2008 (UNDP)	来源：联合国政府间气候变化工作小组和2007/2008年度联合国开发计划署人类发展报告


Figure 2. Total Global Emissions (Gigatons)	图2：全球碳排放总量（十亿吨）


Source: Author’s calculations	来源： 作者的计算结果


Better THAAD than Dead	与其赴死，不如“萨德”


WASHINGTON, DC – South Korea is moving forward with plans to host an advanced missile-defense system – known as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD – in partnership with the United States Army.	发自华盛顿——韩国正逐步与美军合作引进一套名为为末端高空区域防御系统（英文缩写为THAAD，译为“萨德”）的先进的导弹防御系统。


The decision by South Korean President Park Geun-hye has sparked controversy, with China and Russia objecting, and some commentators predicting the start of a “new Cold War.”	韩国总统朴槿惠的这一决定已经引发了争议，中国和俄罗斯表示反对，一些评论家则预测说一场“新冷战”即将启动。


But China and Russia should welcome THAAD, because it alleviates the need for South Korea or Japan to pursue other defense options, which could include the development of nuclear weapons.	但中国和俄罗斯应该欢迎”萨德”，因为它令韩国或日本免于寻求包括发展核武器在内的其他防御方案。


South Korea and Japan have good reason to shore up their defenses.	韩国和日本有足够的理由去巩固自身的防御。


The threat of North Korean aggression is real and will not be eliminated anytime soon.	朝鲜的侵略威胁是真实存在，而且短期内不会消除。


North Korea is escalating its bellicose rhetoric and behavior as it strengthens its military capabilities, which include weapons of mass destruction, long-range ballistic missiles, and cyber and special forces.	随着朝鲜包括大规模杀伤武器，远程弹道导弹以及网络和特种部队在内的军事实力不断增强，该国的好战言论和挑衅行为也不断升级。


The US has repeatedly warned North Korea not to pursue nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles, to no avail.	美国曾多次警告朝鲜不要发展核武器或弹道导弹，但都无济于事。


And diplomacy – both sanctions and inducements – has failed to stop the North.	外交手段——无论是制裁还是利诱——也未能阻止朝鲜。


Many people in South Korea and Japan now worry about the strength of America’s commitment to defend them from external attack.	虽然美国承诺会为韩日两国防御外部袭击，但当前两国民众都忧虑这份承诺能否兑现。


Recent developments have undermined US credibility, from President Barack Obama’s failure to enforce his “red line” warning against the use of chemical weapons in Syria, to the Republican Party’s nomination of Donald Trump as its presidential candidate.	而最近的一系列事态发展也令美国信誉扫地——奥巴马总统未能针对禁止叙利亚各方使用化学武器的“红线”警告做出实质性措施，而唐纳德·特朗普则被共和党提名为总统候选人。


In fact, Trump has only made nuclear-weapons proliferation in Asia more likely.	事实上，特朗普的崛起只会增加亚洲核武器扩散的可能性。


He recently complained to the New York Times that the US spends too much money on missile defenses and troops stationed in South Korea and Japan, and promised that, if elected, he would require both countries to contribute more to their own defense.	他最近对《纽约时报》抱怨说美国在导弹防御和驻韩日美军身上已经花费了太多资金，并承诺如果当选，他将要求两国更多地承担自身防御责任。


If they do not do so willingly, Trump says, he is “absolutely prepared to tell those countries, ‘Congratulations, you will be defending yourself.’”	如果日韩表示反对，特朗普说，他“绝对会对这些国家说：‘恭喜你，现在你只能靠自己了。 ’”


Some members of South Korea’s governing conservative Saenuri Party now openly call for the acquistion of nuclear weapons, believing that this will deter a North Korean attack and prompt China to increase pressure on its client to roll back its weapons programs.	目前执政的韩国保守派新世界党的一些成员最近公开呼吁发展核武器，认为这将阻止朝鲜进攻，并促使中国对它的小弟进一步施加压力以放弃其武器计划。


If South Korea develops a nuclear arsenal, Japan is likely to do the same, especially given China’s aggressive pursuit of its claim to the Japanese-occupied Senkaku Islands (which the Chinese claim as the Diaoyu Islands).	如果韩国开发出核武器，日本很可能会跟进，尤其是考虑到中国正不断强化对日本占领的尖阁列岛（中国称为钓鱼岛）的领土主张。


Japan has an enormous stockpile of separated plutonium and the technical wherewithal to be a “virtual nuclear power”: without having any nuclear weapons on hand, it could quickly develop them if necessary.	日本拥有巨大的分离钚储备的和足够的技术实力去令自身成为“事实上的核势力”：虽然现在手头没有任何核武器，但如果它认为有必要的话就能在短期内造出来。


By developing nuclear weapons, South Korea and Japan would each be risking its relationship with the US and exposing itself to economic and energy sanctions.	一旦发展核武器，韩日两国都会冒着与美国闹僵的风险，并自身暴露于经济和能源制裁之下。


Such a move by South Korea, in particular, really would be the start of a new Cold War, or worse.	特别对韩国来说，一旦拥核，真的就意味着一场新冷战的启动（或者更糟糕）。


A nuclear standoff on the Korean Peninsula would be characterized by both sides’ incentive to strike first to wipe out the other’s ability to counterattack.	在朝鲜半岛这块狭小地域上的核对峙意味着双方都想先下手为强以消灭对方的反击能力。


Short of that doomsday scenario, nuclear weapons are of limited use in deterring small-scale provocations.	在上述末日情景之外，核武器在阻止小规模挑衅的作用也有限。


The possibility of a US nuclear strike did not stop North Korea from sinking a South Korean warship in 2010.	正如遭受美国核打击的可能性也并未能阻止朝鲜于2010年击沉一艘韩国军舰。


Moreover, if South Korea and Japan develop nuclear weapons, a regional – or even global – arms race could result; and not every country seeking to develop its own nuclear arsenal would be favorably disposed to the West.	此外，如果韩国和日本发展核武器，就可能引发一场区域——甚至全球性的——军备竞赛;也不是每一个谋求发展自身核武库的国家都会对西方有好感。


This would be an extremely dangerous scenario: All things being equal, more nuclear-weapon states implies a higher risk of nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, and nuclear accidents.	这将是一个极其危险的状况：在其他条件不变的情况下，更多的核武器国家必定意味着更高的核战争，核恐怖主义和核事故风险。


Against this backdrop, the case for THAAD is clear.	在此背景下，“萨德”的情况就变得较为清晰。


The US, South Korea, and Japan should cooperate on missile defense as the first line of regional deterrence, while also fortifying and dispersing vulnerable targets, deepening trilateral intelligence sharing on North Korean threats, and working with the international community to disrupt the North’s weapons programs.	美国，韩国和日本应该将导弹防御作为实现区域性威慑的首要条件，同时巩固和分散那些易受攻击的目标，不断深化针对朝鲜威胁的三边情报共享，并与国际社会合作以制止朝鲜的武器发展计划。


The effectiveness of deterrence is difficult to prove: by definition, nothing happens when it works; if a country is deterred from attacking, it is a non-event.	威慑的有效性是难以证明的：根据定义，有效的威胁就是确保什么也不会发生； 如果一个国家收到威慑而不发动攻击，它就是一种不存在��何内容的事件。


Skeptics can plausibly argue that the presumed aggressor never planned to attack, or canceled an assault for other reasons.	那些威慑的怀疑论者可以振振有词地声称假想中的侵略者从来没有计划发动攻击，或因其他原因而取消了攻击。


Nonetheless, the historical record speaks for itself: since 1953, North Korea has not launched a large-scale military assault on South Korea, and has limited its threats against Japan to belligerent rhetoric.	然而历史记录不言自明：自1953年以来朝鲜一直没有对韩国发动大规模军事进攻，对日本也就是打打嘴炮而已。


This most likely reflects the consistent and credible threat of US retaliation.	这很可能反映了遭受美国报复的威胁是持续存在和可信的。


South Korea and Japan should not alienate the US by setting out on their own – no matter what Trump tells them.	无论特朗普说什么——韩国和日本都不应该自立门户而疏远美国。


Thailand’s Stunted Transition	泰国过渡受阻


BANGKOK – One year after Thailand’s 12th military coup in its 83 years under constitutional rule, and as the controversial trial for criminal negligence of former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra gets under way, the country’s future is perilously uncertain.	曼谷——泰国宪法执政83年间第12次军事政变爆发一年后，随着对前总理英拉·西那瓦过失罪争议审判的进行，危险的不确定性充斥着这个国家的未来。


In the months ahead, the military-enforced calm will coexist with growing anxiety about what will follow King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s nearly seven-decade-long reign.	未来几个月，军事强制管理下的平静局面将伴随着普密蓬·阿杜德国王近七十年统治下不断增长的焦虑情绪。


Will compromise and mutual accommodation – extremely rare in recent years, enable Thailand to reshape its contested political order – currently underpinned by an elite-driven, monarchy-centered hierarchy – to reflect better the principles of electoral democracy?	近年来极为罕见的相互妥协和适应能否令泰国重塑目前由精英推动、以君主制为核心的官僚体系支撑的充满争议的政治秩序，从而体现选举制民主的优秀原则？


Three key factors have defined Thai politics over the past year.	三项关键因素决定了过去一年泰国政治的主基调。


First, unlike tried and tested post-coup arrangements from the past, the junta that seized power last May, the National Council for Peace and Order, chose to rule directly, with the coup’s leader, General Prayut Chan-ocha, assuming the premiership, rather than appointing a recognized and capable figure to the position.	首先，去年5月夺取政权的军政府和平与秩序全国委员会改变了过去久经考验的后政变统治体制，不再任命一名公认的能员担任总理，而改由政变领导人帕拉育将军以总理身份直接执政。


Four-star generals also fill top ministerial positions, from commerce and transport to labor and education.	从商业、运输到劳动、教育等高级部长同样由四星上将担任。


Even the foreign minister is a general, rather than a career diplomat.	就连外交部长也不是职业外交官而是将军。


The government’s few technocrats, including the deputy prime minister and the finance minister, are holdovers from the previous coup government of 2006-2007, and they complain that they lack authority.	现政府有数的几位技术官员，包括副总理和财政部长，都还是上届2006-2007年政变政府留下来的旧人，并且他们没有实权的抱怨时有耳闻。


This approach has produced an incoherent economic strategy and vague, sluggishly implemented policy targets.	上述做法造成了经济策略不连贯和对政策目标的推进迟缓、模糊。


But it is unlikely to change.	但目前改变的可能性微乎其微。


Thailand’s new military leaders view themselves as a kind of cleanup crew, tasked with eradicating corruption, keeping politicians in line, and restoring the old order, underpinned by a symbiotic relationship between the military and the monarchy, with the bureaucracy handling day-to-day governance.	泰国新一届军事领导人认为自己扮演了清洁工的角色，在军方及王室共生关系支持及官僚日常治理机制框架下铲除腐败、恢复原有秩序和监督政治家所为。


To be sure, Thailand’s military rulers do not reject responsiveness to public demands or deny the imperatives of adapting to globalization.	可以肯定，泰国的军事统治者并不拒绝承认迫切需要适应全球化或响应公众诉求。


Rather, they hope to establish a form of electoral rule that can function within a political order based on traditional Thai institutions and customs.	相反，他们希望在以传统泰式体制和习俗为基础的政治秩序框架内建立起某种形式的选举规则。


Their goal is to take the country a few steps back and sideways, with the goal of moving forward in a completely different direction.	他们希望先放慢脚步、调整方向，再找到完全不同的前进目标。


For now, this means promoting conventional conservative values like discipline, deference, duty, and sacrifice.	就目前而言，这意味着弘扬纪律、顺从、责任和牺牲等传统保守价值观。


Civil servants have been prodded to wear customary khaki uniforms, and women encouraged to don traditional dresses.	政府号召公务员穿上传统的卡其布制服，还鼓励女性穿着传统泰式连衣裙。


Even the fabled floating markets in Bangkok’s canals are back, on Prayut’s orders.	帕拉育甚至命令重开传说中曼谷运河上的漂流市场。


At the same time, the junta’s agenda entails measures to control the direction of Thai politics – in particular, by marginalizing opponents, especially politicians tied to the influential Shinawatra family.	此外，军政府议程还包括控制泰国的政治方向——尤其需要排斥对手，特别是有权有势的西那瓦家族。


Indeed, the second major factor shaping the post-coup interregnum was the impeachment of Yingluck Shinawatra, the sister of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was deposed by the military in 2006 and remains abroad in self-imposed exile.	事实上，影响后政变过渡期局势的第二大因素是弹劾前总理他信·西那瓦的妹妹英拉·西那瓦，2006年他信被军方废黜后一直在海外过着流亡生活。


Yingluck has been banned from politics for five years.	英拉则在五年中被禁止踏入政坛一步。


The dilemma for the junta is that Thaksin’s supporters – who are plentiful enough to have enabled his parties to win every election since 2001 – have been marginalized as well, with little say in the face of martial law and Prayut’s absolute rule.	令军政府进退两难的是他信的支持者——其数量之庞大足以让其所在政党在从2001年来的所有选举中获胜——也被边缘化，其在戒严法和帕拉育的集权统治面前发言权被剥夺。


Though they have remained quiet since the coup, they will undoubtedly maneuver to re-enter the fray as new political opportunities emerge.	虽然政变后这些人一直保持沉默，但无疑将在新政治机会出现时重出江湖。


In any case, they will have to be reckoned with down the road, when a new political order is brokered.	无论如何，未来的泰国政治注定要有他们的参与，成为缔造新政治秩序的重要力量。


Of course, the junta hopes to lay the groundwork for the future political order now, on its own terms, by adopting a new constitution.	当然，军政府想借制定新宪法，凭一己之力奠定未来的政治格局。


This effort – which has so far entailed the creation of the 36-member Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) and the 250-member National Reform Council to help write the new constitution – marks the third key factor influencing domestic politics over the past year.	上述做法——到目前为止已创立由36名成员组成的宪法起草委员会（CDC）和250名成员组成的国家改革委员会协助起草新宪法——成为过去一年里影响国内政治的第三个关键因素。


The draft constitution completed last month has raised serious concerns, as it places excessive checks on political parties and politicians, while giving appointed bureaucrats and judges the power to overrule policy decisions by elected officials.	上月完成的宪法草案在民众中引发严重关切，因其过度限制政党及政客，并授权官僚和法官否决民选官员决策。


Elections conducted according to such a constitution are unlikely to produce legitimate results.	据此宪法举行的选举不太可能产生合法的结果。


The good news is that the junta has agreed to put the draft to a popular referendum early next year, although that probably means that the promised elections will not be held until August, at the earliest.	好消息是军政府已同意明年初对宪法草案实施全民公决，虽然这可能意味着拟议中的选举最快也不会早于8月。


Military rule has cleared the streets, locked down the political system, and ushered in a long transition to some new, as-yet-undefined arrangement.	军政府已经清理街道、封锁政治体制，并启动了向某种尚未确定的新型制度的长期过渡。


While the anti-coup forces support a return to electoral democracy, the pro-coup coalition, led by the Democrat Party, is increasingly realigning itself against the military, in the hope of securing power in whatever post-coup system emerges.	虽然反政变部队支持重新回归民主选举，但由民主党领导的亲政变联盟正以在后政变体制中掌权为目标，不断调整对军方的态度。


For now, Thailand is trapped between authoritarianism and democracy, between the past and the future – and will likely remain there, until the long royal twilight has passed.	目前，泰国正在专制与民主、过去与未来的夹缝中挣扎——直到漫长的皇室影响过去才有可能改变这种状况。


At that point, the Thai people, buffeted by domestic polarization and regional challenges, will have to muster their once-famous negotiation skills to achieve a workable compromise based on their shared interests.	真到那时，与国内极化和地区挑战英勇斗争的泰国人民将不得不利用他们曾经著名的谈判技巧，在共同利益基础上实现某种可以接受的折衷。


Thailand Turns Banana Republic	泰国成了香蕉共和国


BANGKOK – “Thailand’s future is up for grabs,” proclaimed the eminent Thai scholar Thitinan Pongsudhirak just before the country’s Constitutional Court ruled, in effect, that the ruling People Power Party (PPP) and its two smaller coalition partners are “illegal,” and hence must disband due to “election frauds” committed by party executives a year ago. Party leaders, including Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat, are barred from politics for five years.	曼谷－就在泰国宪法法院有效判决执政的人民力量党(PPP) 及其两个小联盟党“非法”，并且人民力量党(PPP)党由于其执行委员一年前的“选举舞弊”而必须被解散，包括总理颂猜·翁沙瓦在内的人民力量党(PPP)领导人5年之内禁止参政之前，泰国著名学者提蒂南·蓬素提叻（Thitinan Pongsudhirak ）宣称，“泰国的未来任人抢夺”。


With that one stroke, Thailand’s popularly elected government fell.	伴随着这个判决，泰国公众选出的政府倒台了。


Parliament must now reconstitute itself without the three parties loyal to Somchai.	现在，泰国议会必须在没有忠于颂猜的三个政党的情况下，进行重组。


In Thailand’s current crisis, history is repeating itself, for the PPP under Somchai was the same Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais) Party formed by the ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a figure much-hated by the country’s Bangkok-based elite.	在泰国当前的危机中，历史正在重演，因为颂猜领导的人民力量党(PPP)和由被流放的泰国总理他信·西那瓦建立的泰爱泰党是同一个政党——他信是位于曼谷的泰国精英非常憎恨的人物。


The PPP was created because TRT had been outlawed at the time of Thaksin’s removal.	因为在他信被免职的时候，泰爱泰党被宣布为非法，所以建立了人民力量党(PPP)。


What is perverse about this is that every recent poll in Thailand shows that Thaksin remains wildly popular with the vast majority of Thais, most of whom live outside Bangkok.	关于这一点反常的是，非常近的一次泰国民意测验显示，他信仍然受到大多数泰国人的广泛欢迎，这些人绝大部分住在曼谷之外。


So, despite the ousting of two Thaksin proxies in a row by the court and the elite, Thais are likely to return yet another Thaksin loyalist if they are allowed to vote in an unrigged election.	所以，尽管泰国法院和精英们连续罢黜了他信的两个代理人，如果允许泰国人在一个不受操纵的选举中投票，他们可能会再次选择一个忠于他信的人。


The current crisis has been brewing for some time, but the breaking point came when anti-government protestors occupied Bangkok’s main airport.	泰国当前的危机已经酝酿了一段时间，但是，当反政府抗议者占领了曼谷主要的机场时，突破点出现了。


The protestors march under the banner of the “People’s Alliance for Democracy,” but the truth is that they have resorted to undemocratic means to topple a democratically elected government.	抗议者举着“人民民主联盟”的标语游行，但是事实是，他们采取了不民主的手段，推翻了一个民主选举出来的政府。


This parade of toppled and ousted governments has led Pavin Chchavalpongpun, another eminent Thai scholar, to call his country a “failed state.”	这一系列被推翻和放逐的政府，使另一位杰出的泰国学者帕文·差瓦彭分（Pavin Chchavalpongpun）将自己的国家称为“失败的国家”。


That description may not yet be true, but the shadow of state failure is certainly growing.	这种说法可能还不正确，但是，泰国国家失败的征兆的确正在增强。


Thaksin’s unforgivable sin was his violation of Thailand’s unwritten rules about how the country’s ruling elites are to behave.	他信不可饶恕的罪过是，他违反了泰国有关该国统治精英应该怎样行为的不成文规则。


The key rule here is that the winner in any power play must not shut out his opponents.	其中主要的规则是，在任何权力游戏中的获胜者都不能将其对手排除在外。


In a land of “smiles” and plenty, the winner must not take all.	在一个“微笑”和物产富饶的国家，获胜者不能独占所有的东西。


But Thaksin, a self-made billionaire, allowed his greed and huge electoral successes to get the better of him.	但是，他信，一位白手起家的亿万富翁，让他的贪婪和巨大的选举胜利打败了他。


After his two landslide victories, he thought he could have it all.	在他获得两次压倒性的胜利之后，他认为他可以占有所有的东西。


The traditional Bangkok elites had always thought of him as an uncouth upstart.	传统的曼谷精英一直认为他信是一个粗俗的暴发户。


Once in power, he essentially shut them out of the “grabbing” game, preserving it for himself and his cronies.	一旦掌权，他信彻底将这些曼谷精英排除在“抢夺”游戏之外，仅仅为自己和自己的亲信保留利益。


Thaksin’s supposedly legal “tax planning,” which allowed him to pay zero capital gains tax on the billion dollar sale of his flagship telecom company, Shin Corporation, in 2006, offended the rising urban professional classes.	他信据称合法的“税收计划”——该计划使他信在2006年出售其旗舰电信公司西瓦那集团（Shin Corporation）几十亿美元的交易中，一分钱的资本利得税都不用交，这触怒了崛起的城市职业阶层。


But Thaksin had by then won over Thailand’s rural population through popular policies including handouts.	但是，他信在此之前，通过包括施舍在内的受欢迎的政策，赢得了泰国农村人口的支持。


Some of these projects were the proverbial bridges to nowhere.	他信的这种政策中有些项目是众所周知的绝路桥；


But others did meet real rural needs: cutting medical costs, providing subsidized agricultural loans, and maintaining price supports.	但是，其他的一些项目真正地满足了农村的需要，包括：降低医疗成本，提供农业贷款补贴，以及维持政府价格补贴。


Thaksin’s rural base rewarded him by returning him to power, ignoring his personal corruption.	他信在农村的支持者使其重新执政作为对他的回报，而忽略了他个人的腐败。


Thaksin’s detractors call his rural strategy (which his proxy successors have followed) cynical vote buying.	他信的批评者将其农村策略（他信的代理继任者遵循了这一策略）称为伪善的选票收买。


But Thaksin’s rural base wonders why the anti-Thaksin groups and his predecessors in power never tried to do much for them.	但是，他信在农村的支持者想知道，为什么反他信团体及他信的前任们从来没有试图为他们多做一些事情呢。


Such vote buying to win hearts and minds is, after all, a fair game for any party to indulge in.	毕竟，这样赢得民心的选票收买，对任何参与其中的政党来说，都是一个公平的游戏。


The going “wage” for the “Rent-A-Crowds” at the heart of the crisis was 300 Baht a day per person, plus food, transportation, and a clean yellow T-shirt – yellow being the Royal color.	泰国当前的危机中被“花钱动员来的群众”的现行“工资”，是每人每天300泰铢，外加食物、交通以及一件干净的黄色体恤衫——黄色是皇室的颜色。


These protests have run, on and off, for nearly 200 days, with crowd sizes ranging from a few hundred to tens of thousands.   It is widely known that the anti-Thaksin business elites provided the money to keep people in the street.	这些抗议，断断续续持续了将近200天，抗议人口也从几百人增加到几万人。 反他信的商业精英出钱使人们待在街上抗议，广为人知。


Thailand ’s universally loved and respected King has not taken a public stand on the occupation of the airports nor on any other recent public demonstrations.	泰国广受爱戴和尊敬的国王，既没有对占领机场也没有对最近其他的公众游行，公开表明立场。


Some analysts say anti-government leaders have hijacked the Royal Color to pretend that they have his support.	一些分析人士称，反政府领导人已经劫持了皇室的颜色，来假装他们得到了国王的支持。


Nevertheless it is widely believed that Thaksin committed “lèse majesté” by attempting to undermine the moral authority of the crown, a cornerstone of the kingdom, perhaps replacing it with a republic that he would control.   Lèse majesté is a grave crime in Thailand.	然而，人们普遍认为，他信试图通过破坏王权的道德权威——它是泰王国的一个基石——的方式，来亵渎君主，或许他还打算用他可以控制的共和制来取代君主制。 亵渎君主在泰国是一个严重罪行。


It is true that Thailand’s queen herself recently presided over the funeral of a protestor killed in a clash with the police.	事实上，泰国王后本人最近亲自主持了一个在与警察的冲突中被杀的抗议者的葬礼。


From that point on, policing of the protests became utterly passive.	从这以后，警察维持抗议秩序的行动变得完全被动了。


The queen is rumored to have said she would pay the medical expenses of any injured demonstrators.	有谣传说，王后曾说过，她将支付任何受伤的抗议示威者的医疗费用。


The anti-Thaksin factions have failed to produce a knockout in any recent general election.	反他信的派别在最近的任何大选中，都没有击败对手。


Street protests to paralyze the government remain their sole weapon.   But until and unless the anti-Thaksin civilian elite can convince the rest of the country that they are serious about winning the hearts and minds of the poor, Thailand will remain on a knife edge between banana republic and failed state.	进行街头抗议，使政府瘫痪，成了他们唯一的武器。 但是，直到并且除非反他信的平民精英能够说服泰国的其他国民，他们对赢得穷人的民心是认真的，否则，泰国仍将处在香蕉共和国与失败国家之间的危机时刻。


Thaksin Returns	他信回国


Former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has returned to Bangkok 17 months after being deposed in a military coup.	泰国前总理他信在军事政变被推翻17个月后已经回到了泰国。


Thaksin has repeatedly denied that he intends to reenter politics, from which he has been barred for five years.	他信多次否认他打算重返政治，而他也被禁止五年内从政。


But how realistic is it to expect so driven and flamboyant a man to stay away from the limelight?	但是，人们怎么能指望这样一个野心勃勃而又张扬的人过隐姓埋名的生活呢？


Thaksin already is believed by many to be providing advice to the government of Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej.	许多人已经相信他信正在向沙马总理的政府提供咨询。


Indeed, Samak’s People Power Party (PPP) is widely considered a proxy for Thaksin.	实际上，许多人相信沙马的人民力量党就是他信的代理人。


It was, after all, formed from the remains of Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party, which was disbanded after the coup.	毕竟，人民力量党是在他信的泰爱泰党的残部上建立的，而泰爱泰党在政变后遭到解散。


Of course Thaksin’s political revival can’t get underway unless and until he has been acquitted of corruption charges.	当然，除非他信能够洗清其腐败指控，否则就无法在政治上东山再起。


But he is likely to have made all the calculations related to the charges and other allegations before leaving London, and to have concluded that his chances of remaining free are high.	但是他在离开伦敦以前就可能对所有指控的做了周密的盘算，并且得出结论认为他保持自由的机会还是很高的。


After all, Thaksin is too serious a man to risk freedom for the sake of sentimentality.	毕竟，他信是个严肃认真的人，不会情感用事而让其人身自由受到威胁。


Moreover, he remains very popular in Thailand, if not in Bangkok.	而且，他在泰国依旧广受欢迎，即使不是在曼谷，在其他地方也是如此。


His presence in the country might well spark a clamor for his “reluctant” return to politics.	他人在泰国很可能引发民众吁求，让他“迁就民意”重返政治。


Now, add to all this a soccer team.	现在还有一支足球队的因素。


Thaksin’s ownership of the Manchester City football club might not seem of great importance to observers outside Thailand and Asia.	他信拥有英国曼城足球俱乐部，这对泰国和亚洲以外的观察家来说可能并不十分重要。


But Thais are soccer enthusiasts and even bigger fans of the English Premier League.	但是泰国人酷爱足球，而且是英超联赛德忠实拥趸。


Thaksin’s ownership is a source of considerable pride, especially outside elite circles in Bangkok.	他信有了这样一支球队给特别是曼谷精英阶层以外的人带来巨大的自豪感。


His proprietorship provides Thais with a direct connection to an elite team in the world’s most popular sport.	他信拥有球队让泰国人与世界上最为流行的运动的顶级球队直接联系起来。


This, in turn, gives him a substantial popularity dividend to add to his store.	这反过来给了他信实质性的民众支持。


It was not for nothing that he had two Man City players accompany him on his return to Thailand.	他信让两名曼城俱乐部的球员陪同他回到泰国决非毫无目的。


The PPP’s victory in the December polls has also been seen as vindication of sorts for Thaksin.	人民力量党在十二月的选举中获胜还被视为是给他信某种平反。


Given the opportunity to vote, voters turned to a party not unlike Thaksin’s pre-coup Thai Rak Thai.	鉴于投票的机会，选民们转向了并非与政变前他信的泰爱泰党两样的政党。


So why not complete the picture?	那么为何不干脆一蹴而就呢？


Obviously, none of this will please Thaksin’s opponents.	很明显，所有这些都不会让他信的政敌高兴。


So the possibility of demonstrations, stalemate, and a new crisis cannot be discounted.	所以就无法排除示威游行、僵局以及新危机的可能性。


The situation is all the more uncertain in view of a problem facing the PPP.	鉴于人民力量当面临的一个问题，形势变得更为捉摸不定。


Just hours before Thaksin returned to Bangkok, Thailand’s Election Commission convicted the speaker of the parliament’s lower house of fraud after he paid civil servants to campaign on behalf of the party.	就在他信回国的几个小时之前，泰国选举委员会判定议会下议院主席舞弊，原因是他给公务员付钱来为政党竞选。


The Supreme Court must uphold the ruling, but if it does, the speaker will lose his parliamentary seat.	最高法院必须维持这一裁决，但是如果这样，这一主席将会丧失其议会席位。


And more ominously, the case could easily snowball, leading to the dissolution of the PPP and an end to Thaksin’s nascent political recovery.	而且更为糟糕的是，这一案件很可能愈演愈烈，导致人民力量党的解体并终结他信新近的政治复生。


This would throw the party, government, and country into fresh turmoil.	这将会把该党、政府以及国家带入新的混乱之中。


Thus, under almost any scenario, Thaksin’s return could well mark a return to those fraught days of 2006 just before the last coup.	这样，他信回国几乎肯定会标志着泰国回到2006年上一次政变前苦难重重的日子。


Thatcher and the Big Bang	撒切尔和“大爆炸”


LONDON – In the United States, for people of a certain age, Margaret Thatcher was a superstar, and Americans have been surprised at the sharply divided views on display in the Britain that she governed for 11 years.	伦敦—在美国，对某个年龄层的人来说，玛格丽特·撒切尔是一颗超级巨星，美国人感到诧异的是，她执政了11年的英国对她的评价分歧如此之大。


But Britons were not astonished. Like Tony Blair, Thatcher has long been a British product with more appeal in export markets than at home.	和托尼·布莱尔一样，撒切尔一直是英国造产品——在出口市场远比国内受欢迎。


All aspects of her legacy are earnestly disputed.	她身后的一切都引发了激烈的争论。


Was she prescient about the problems of European monetary union, or did she leave Britain isolated on the fringes of the continent?	她是对欧洲货币联盟的问题有着先见之明，还是让英国孤立于大陆边缘之外？


Did she create a new economic dynamism, or did she leave the United Kingdom bitterly divided, more unequal, and less cohesive than before?	她是创造了新的经济动态，还是让英国陷入了苦涩的两极分化、不平等性加剧、凝聚力日薄西山？


Did she destroy the power of vested interests and create a genuine meritocracy, or did she entrench bankers and financiers as the new elite, with disastrous consequences?	她是摧毁了既得利益并创造了真正的精英治国制度，还是巩固了银行家和金融家的新精英地位，导致了日后的灾难性后果？


Indeed, one issue that has come under the microscope is Thatcher’s reforms of the City of London in the late 1980’s.	事实上，一个被放在了显微镜下的问题是撒切尔在20世纪80年代末对伦敦金融城的改革。


In 1986, her government was instrumental in what is known colloquially as the “Big Bang.”	1986年，撒切尔政府推行了日后俗称“大爆炸”的改革。


Technically, the main change was to end “single capacity,” whereby a stock trader could be a principal or an agent, but not both.	从技术上讲，主要变化是结束了“单一资格”——即股票交易者只能作为委托人或代理人之一，而不能兼而任之。


Before 1986, there were brokers, acting for clients, and jobbers, making a market, and never the twain could meet.	1986年之前，存在代表客户利益的经纪人和做市的批发商，两者不能合而为一。


This system had been abandoned elsewhere, and the reform opened London to new types of institutions, especially the major US investment banks.	这一制度在其他国家早已被弃，撒切尔的改革也打开了伦敦的大门，新的机构类型，特别是美国大投行开始涌入。


The first and most visible consequence was the demise of the long lunch.	第一个、也是最显而易见的后果是午餐时间缩短了。


Beginning with a gin and tonic just after noon, and ending with a Napoleon brandy at three o’clock, lunch prior to the Big Bang was often the most arduous part of a stockbroker’s day.	在“大爆炸”之前，午餐时间始于午后的杜松子酒和小憩充电，终于三点钟的拿破仑白兰地，对股票经纪人来说，这是工作日最难熬的一段时间。


That cozy culture ended soon after the thrusting, brash Americans, who worked even over breakfast, hit town.	这一享受文化在积极又性急的美国人涌入后不久就寿终正寝，美国人恨不得边吃早饭边工作。


But some believe that there were downsides, too.	但也有人认为这有利也有弊。


Philip Augar, the author of The Death of Gentlemanly Capitalism, argues that “Good characteristics of the City were thrown out along with the bad,” and that Thatcher’s reforms “put us on a helter-skelter course towards the financial crisis.”	《绅士资本主义之死》（The Death of Gentlemanly Capitalism）的作者菲利普·奥格（Philip Augar）认为“金融城的好传统连同坏习惯一起被抛弃了，”撒切尔的改革“让我们仓促地奔向金融危机。 ”


How justified is this charge?	这个观点的合理性如何？


Can we really trace the roots of today’s malaise back to the 1980’s?	我们真的可以把今天乱象的根源回溯到20世纪80年代吗？


Was the Iron Lady an author of the world’s current misfortunes?	铁娘子真是当下世界之不幸的始作俑者吗？


Nigel Lawson, Thatcher’s Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, denies it.	撒切尔的财政大臣奈杰尔·劳森（Nigel Lawson）否认这一点。


(Full disclosure: I was an adviser to Lawson in the 1980’s).	（充分披露：20世纪80年代我是劳森的顾问。


He points out that the reforms were accompanied by new regulation.	）他指出，改革有新监管作为补充。


The Financial Services Act of 1986 put an end to the pure self-regulation regime.	1986年金融服务法终结了纯粹的自我监管制度。


Financial interests opposed it vigorously at the time, viewing it as the thin end of a dangerous wedge, though they could not have guessed just how thick that wedge would eventually become.	当时，金融利益集团强烈反对它，认为这潜藏凶机，尽管它们无法猜想凶机最后能凶到什么程度。


It is also difficult to trace back to the 1980’s the origins of the credit explosion and the proliferation of exotic and poorly understood financial instruments that lay at the heart of the 2007-2008 crisis.	也很难把信用爆炸和难以理解的有毒金融工具——2007—2008危机核心——的源头追溯到20世纪80年代。


The most dangerous trends, including the upsurge of global imbalances and the dramatic financialization of the economy, accelerated dangerously from about 2004 onwards.	最危险的趋势——包括全球失衡的激增和经济的大面积金融化——2004年以后才开始危险的加速。


Thatcher herself was not an enthusiast for credit, once famously saying, “I don’t believe in credit cards.”	撒切尔本人并非信用的拥趸，她有句名言：“我不相信信用卡。


Indeed, she espoused a rigorous philosophy about borrowing: “The secret of happiness is to live within your income and pay your bills on time.”	”事实上，她支持严格的借贷观：“幸福的秘密在于量入为出，及时付清账单。 ”


But perhaps there is a deeper level on which we can see some connections between Thatcherism and the crisis.	但对于撒切尔主义和金融危机，我们可以看到更深层次的联系。


Her mantra, “You can’t buck the market,” did contribute to a mindset that led governments and central banks to be reluctant to question unsustainable market trends.	她的信条——“你不能抵抗市场”——的确形成了一种观念，导致政府和央行不愿质疑不可持续的市场趋势。


Thatcher was referring specifically to the dangers of fixed exchange rates, and can certainly not be counted as one of the principal architects of the so-called “efficient markets hypothesis.”	撒切尔还特别提到了固定汇率的危险，她显然不能被指为所谓的“有效市场假说”的主要缔造者之一。


But she was a strong believer in the expansion of private markets, and was instinctively suspicious of government intervention.	但她坚定地相信私人市场的扩张，从本能上怀疑政府干预。


As the late economist and European central banker Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa once put it, Thatcher “shifted the line dividing markets from government, enlarging the territory of the former at the expense of the latter.”	已故经济学家、欧洲央行行长夏欧帕（Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa）曾说，撒切尔“移走了分割市场和政府的界线，扩大了前者的地盘，缩小了后者的地盘。


Padoa-Schioppa regarded this as a factor contributing to the US and UK authorities’ reluctance to step in at the right time before the 2007-2008 crisis.	”夏欧帕认为这是美国和英国当局不愿在2007—2008年危机之前的正确时点出手干预的因素之一。


Thatcher was certainly no friend of central bankers.	撒切尔决不是央行行长之友。


She remained, to the end, hostile to central-bank independence, regularly rejecting the advice of her chancellors to allow the Bank of England to control interest rates.	她到最后都反对央行的独立，拒绝手下大臣关于让英格兰银行控制利率的建议。


She feared that independent central banks would serve the interests of their banking “clients,” rather than those of the economy as a whole.	她担心独立央行会屈从其银行“客户”的利益，而不顾及整个经济的利益。


She was especially hostile to what she saw as the excessive independence of the European Central Bank.	她特别反对她眼中的欧洲央行的过度独立性。


In her last speech in Parliament as Prime Minister, she attacked the ECB as an institution “accountable to no one,” and drew attention to the political implications of centralizing monetary policy, accurately forecasting the dangers of a “democratic deficit,” which now worries many in Europe, and not just in Cyprus or Portugal.	在最后一次作为首相在议院发表的演讲中，她抨击欧洲央行是一个“不对任何人负责”的机构，她将人们的吸引力吸引到集中货币政策的政治含义上，正确地预见了“民主赤字”的危险——如今，不仅塞浦路斯和葡萄牙，很多欧洲人都在担心这一点。


So, in the financial arena, as elsewhere, there is light and shade in the Thatcher inheritance.	因此，在金融竞技场和其他领域，撒切尔身后留下的既有明珠，也有泥沙。


Her Alan Greenspan-like belief in the self-correcting features of financial markets, and her reverence for the integrity of the price mechanism, do not look as well-founded today as they did in the 1980’s.	对于金融市场的自我纠正功能，她和格林斯潘观点相似，而她对价格机制的诚实性的信念在今天已不像20世纪80年代那样坚定。


So, in that sense, she can be seen as an enabler of the market hubris that prevailed until 2007.	因此，从这个角度讲，她可以视为延续至2007年的市场自大的促成者之一。


On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine that a Thatcher government would have run a loose fiscal policy in the 2000’s.	另一方面，很难想象撒切尔政府会在21世纪的第一个十年里实行宽松的财政政策。


And it is equally unlikely that, had she had her way, the eurozone would be the camel – a horse designed by committee – that it is today.	同样难以想象的是，如果撒切尔的愿望达成，欧元区会成为今天那样的骆驼——由委员会设计出来的马。


That Old Tax Magic	老套的税收魔术


WASHINGTON, DC – Tax time in the United States – the dreaded mid-April deadline for filing annual income-tax forms – has come and gone.	华盛顿—美国的税收时刻——令人不寒而栗的每年四月中旬所得税申报截止期——来了又走了。


The system, Americans have been reminded, has become painfully complex, with many a loophole through which one might try to squeeze.	美国人都知道，美国税收系统极其复杂，到处都是可以利用的漏洞。


The fear of an audit by the Internal Revenue Service lurks in homes across the country.	每家每户都得对国税局的审计提心吊胆。


At such a sensitive time, it is no surprise to hear politicians pitching the idea of “tax reform” – suggesting that they can simplify the system, close loopholes, and use the proceeds to reduce tax rates.	在如此敏感的时刻，毫不奇怪，政客们又开始兜售他们的“税收改革”计划了——他们说，他们可以简化税收系统，堵上漏洞，用堵漏得到的税金来降低税率。


The allure of such appeals is that a crackdown on others’ tax avoidance will mean that you personally will pay less in taxes.	这些方案的诱惑之处在于，其他人不再能够避税意味着你个人可以缴纳更少的税。


In the policy jargon increasingly heard in today’s political discourse, tax reform will be “revenue neutral” – meaning that it will not worsen the budget deficit or drive up the national debt.	用当今政治讨论中越来越流行的政策术语讲，税收改革将是“收入中性”的，也就是说，它不会让预算赤字恶化或增加国民债务。


The broader subliminal message is that you can have whatever you currently expect in terms of government services for less than it costs you now.	更广义的潜台词是，你可以以较现在更少的花费获得当前可以得到的所有政府服务。


The problem with this vision of tax reform is that it is magical – an attractive illusion with no basis in reality.	这一税改愿景的问题在于它只是一种魔术——一种令人向往的幻象，根本没有现实基础。


Consider the recent pronouncements of Mitt Romney – now the presumptive Republican candidate to challenge President Barack Obama in November.	以罗姆尼（Mitt Romney）的最新建议为例——他大概将在11月大选中代表共和党挑战现任总统奥巴马。


Romney wants to cut tax rates, mainly benefiting those at the upper end of the income distribution.	罗姆尼希望降低税率，受益者主要是处于收入分配顶端的人群。


He also wants to close loopholes, but none of the details that he has offered add up to much.	他还希望堵上漏洞，但他所提出的详细方案不会有太大作用。


His boldest proposal – eliminating deductions for interest paid on mortgages on second homes – is trivial in terms of generating revenue.	他最激进的方案是取消第二套住房的按揭利息优惠，这对于增加税收收入根本没什么效果。


Obama is only slightly better.	奥巴马也好不到哪里去。


While he talks less about “tax reform,” he is currently communicating the message that merely raising taxes on rich people – the infamous 1% – will bring the budget and national debt under control.	他倒是不再言必称“税收改革”了，其最新的观点是只提高富人——也就是那不仁的1%——的税收有助于控制预算和国民债务。


That, too, is a pipedream.	这也只是妄想而已。


Americans – and taxpayers in many other countries – need a more transparent approach to assessing candidates’ budget proposals.	美国人——以及许多其他国家的纳税人——需要更透明的方法来评估候选人的预算方案。


In the US, there are groups that offer their own assessments.	在美国，有不少团体都提出了自己的评估。


For example, the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget performed an admirable service in “scoring” the fiscal plans of rival candidates for the Republican nomination.	比如，尽责联邦预算委员会（Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget）就有一项上佳的服务，可对共和党提名的候选对手所提出的财政计划进行“评分”。


The problem is that in an election with high stakes and deep polarization, who, exactly, can voters trust?	问题是在一个事关重大又泾渭分明的选战中，选民到底可以信任谁？


Everyone has an agenda, perceived or real.	每个人都有各自的日程，不管是装模作样还是确有其实。


The veracity of any organization that is funded by particular individuals, or through less transparent corporate channels, will be called into question.	任何组织，只要它依靠某些个人提供资金，或者通过不太透明的公司渠道融资，其可信性都会受到质疑。


What the US and many other countries need is an independent, competent, and experienced body that leans neither right nor left.	美国和其他不少国家所需要的是独立、胜任且经验丰富又不偏不倚的机构。


Fortunately, the US has the Congressional Budget Office, which scores legislation in terms of its budgetary impact, assesses official budget proposals, and formulates its own economic projections.	幸运的是，美国还有国会预算办公室，它可以根据预算冲击给立法打分，评估官方预算方案，并给出自己的经济预测。


(I serve on the CBO’s Panel of Economic Advisers, which comments on the draft forecast twice a year, but does not assess budget proposals or anything else.)	（我便是国会预算办公室经济顾问委员会成员，每年两次对预测草案进行评论，但经济顾问委员会不会评估预算方案或其他事项。 ）


Because the CBO reports to the relevant congressional committees – those dealing with tax and budgets – both Republicans and Democrats watch its every move.	国会预算办公室将向处理税收和预算事宜的相关国会委员会提交报告，共和党和民主党都盯着它的一举一动。


But the CBO, created in the 1970’s precisely to bring greater transparency and accountability to the rather byzantine congressional budget process, really is independent and run by professionals.	但国会预算办公室的确是独立的，由专业人士运作，其在20世纪70年代创立的初衷就是向拜占庭式的国会预算过程注入透明度和可问责性。


The CBO does not, however, score proposals by political candidates, and that is part of the problem.	但当前国会预算办公室并不对政治候选人提出的方案打分，这便是问题的一部分。


In the run-up to the pre-election debates between Obama and Romney, both sides should agree to submit detailed budget proposals in the correct format for CBO assessment.	奥巴马和罗姆尼就要进入选前辩论了，双方应该都会投以提交格式正确的详细预算方案让国会预算办公室评估。


The relevant congressional committees also should agree to this exercise.	相关的国会各委员会应该也会同意这样操作。


If one presidential candidate refuses to cooperate in this manner, that should confer an advantage on the candidate who is willing to disclose more fully the specifics of his plan.	如果某位总统候选人拒绝这样做，那么愿意充分披露其计划细节的候选人就会赢得优势。


And, to make this pressure to disclose meaningful, part of one debate should focus on budget proposals, with the questions being structured around how the CBO has reacted to specifics.	此外，为了让披露压力变得更有效，选前辩论的一部分应该聚焦于预算方案，问题可以围绕国会预算办公室对具体细节如何反应来展开。


If either candidate does not want to bring the national debt under control, he should be pressed to explain why.	如果某方候选人不愿让国民债务处于可控范围，那么他将被迫对此作出解释。


This is not a matter only for the world’s largest economies.	这并不是世界最大经济体独有的问题。


Candidates to lead their countries should not be allowed to get away with speaking in generalities or engaging in vague rhetorical flourishes.	要想成为国家领导人，候选人就不能只谈整体轮廓，用如簧巧舌给选民画饼。


Democracy can and should be better than that.	民主可以也应该比这做得更好。


That Stalling Feeling	发达经济体又没劲儿了


NEW YORK – Despite the series of low-probability, high-impact events that have hit the global economy in 2011, financial markets continued to rise happily until a month or so ago.	纽约——2011年，一系列小概率大事件冲击了全球经济，尽管如此，金融市场持续上行，直至一个月前为止。


The year began with rising food, oil, and commodity prices, giving rise to the specter of high inflation.	年初高企的粮食、石油和商品价格，唤醒了高通胀的幽灵。


Then massive turmoil erupted in the Middle East, further ratcheting up oil prices.	中东地区的群众骚乱进一步推高了油价。


Then came Japan’s terrible earthquake, which severely damaged both its economy and global supply chains.	接着，日本大地震打击了日本经济，也重创了全球供应链。


And then Greece, Ireland, and Portugal lost access to credit markets, requiring bailout packages from the International Monetary Fund and the European Union.	随后，希腊、爱尔兰和葡萄牙丧失了融资能力，向国际货币基金组织（IMF）和欧盟寻求“保释”（bailout）。


But that was not the end of it.	但事儿还没完。


Although Greece was bailed out a year ago, Plan A has now clearly failed.	虽然一年前希腊已经得到过一次保释，但A计划显然已经失败。


Greece will require another official bailout – or a bail-in of private creditors, an option that is fueling heated disagreement among European policymakers.	希腊请求再度由官方出资保释，或是由私人债权人“作保”（bail-in）——到底选哪个，欧洲的政策制定者产生了严重的意见分歧。


Lately, concerns about America’s unsustainable fiscal deficits have, likewise, resulted in ugly political infighting, almost leading to a government shutdown.	稍后，对美国财政赤字不可持续前景的担忧引发了激烈的政治内斗，几乎造成政府关门。


A similar battle is now brewing about America’s “debt ceiling,” which, if unresolved, introduces the risk of a “technical” default on US public debt.	眼下，另一场围绕美国“债务天花板”的恶斗正在酝酿之中，如不能妥善解决，将导致美国公债“技术性”违约风险。


Until recently, markets seemed to discount these shocks; apart from a few days when panic about Japan or the Middle East caused a correction, they continued their upward march.	直至最近之前，市场似乎对这一轮轮冲击波视而不见。 除了有几天因为日本和中东恐慌而略有调整之外，各大金融市场持续上行。


But, since the end of April, a more persistent correction in global equity markets has set in, driven by worries that economic growth in the United States and worldwide may be slowing sharply.	然而，自从四月底以来，全球资本市场开始了一轮持续时间比较长的调整，其背后的担忧是，美国和世界经济增长可能急剧放缓。


Data from the US, the United Kingdom, the periphery of the eurozone, Japan, and even emerging-market economies is signaling that part of the global economy – especially advanced economies – may be stalling, if not dropping into a double-dip recession.	来自美国、英国、欧元区边缘地带、日本甚至新兴市场经济体的数据显示，全球经济就算不陷入双底衰退，也会局部失速——尤其是发达经济体。


Global risk-aversion has also increased, as the option of further “extend and pretend” or “delay and pray” on Greece is becoming less desirable, and the specter of a disorderly workout is becoming more likely.	随着“延长并假装”或“拖延并祈祷”策略越来越不得人心，全球风险厌恶情绪有所抬头，投资者无序外逃的可能性也日益增加。


Optimists argue that the global economy has merely hit a “soft patch.”	乐观者说，全球经济只不过撞上了一段“淡光景”。


Firms and consumers reacted to this year’s shocks by “temporarily” slowing consumption, capital spending, and job creation.	为了应对今年的各种冲击，企业和消费者“暂时”减缓了消费、投资和创造就业岗位的活动。


As long as the shocks don’t worsen (and as some become less acute), confidence and growth will recover in the second half of the year, and stock markets will rally again.	如果有关情况不恶化（某些方面且有所缓和），到下半年，信心和增长就将恢复，而股市也将重振。


But there are good reasons to believe that we are experiencing a more persistent slump.	但颇有理由相信，我们正在经历一场较为持久的不景气。


First, the problems of the eurozone periphery are in some cases problems of actual insolvency, not illiquidity: large and rising public and private deficits and debt; damaged financial systems that need to be cleaned up and recapitalized; massive loss of competitiveness; lack of economic growth; and rising unemployment.	首先，欧元区边缘地带的问题有些是真正的资不抵债，而不仅仅是周转不灵——公私赤字和债务规模巨大且仍在增长，破损的金融体系亟需清理和资本重组，出口竞争力严重受损，经济增长无望，失业率却居高不下。


It is no longer possible to deny that public and/or private debts in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal will need to be restructured.	如今，再也无法否认希腊、爱尔兰和葡萄牙的公私债务需要重组这个现实了。


Second, the factors slowing US growth are chronic. These include slow but persistent private and public-sector deleveraging; rising oil prices; weak job creation; another downturn in the housing market; severe fiscal problems at the state and local level; and an unsustainable deficit and debt burden at the federal level.	其次，拖慢美国经济增长的若干因素是中长期性的，包括公私���门缓慢却持续的去杠杆化、高企的油价、就业岗位增长缓慢、州和地方层面严重的财政困难以及联邦层面不可持续的赤字和债务负担。


Third, economic growth has been flat on average in the UK over the last couple of quarters, with front-loaded fiscal austerity coming at a time when rising inflation is preventing the Bank of England from easing monetary policy.	第三，近几个季度，英国经济增长相当缓慢，大刀阔斧的财政瘦身政策生不逢时，上扬的通胀令英格兰银行不敢出台宽松的货币政策来加以配合。


Indeed, inflation may even force the Bank to raise interest rates by the fall.	说真的，通胀甚至可能迫使英国央行于今年秋季加息。


And Japan is already slipping back into recession because of the earthquake.	而日本震后已重新陷入衰退。


All of these economies were already growing anemically and below trend, as the ongoing process of deleveraging required a slowdown of public and private spending in order to increase saving rates and reduce debts.	所有这些经济体依然增长乏力、低于预期，而长路漫漫的去杠杆化又要求削减公私开销，以增加储蓄率、削减债务。


And now, in addition to the string of “black swan” events that advanced economies have faced this year, monetary and fiscal stimulus has been removed in most of them, or soon will be.	如今，发达经济体除了遭遇一系列“黑天鹅”事件之外，很多已经结束了货币或财政刺激阶段，或很快就要结束。


If what is happening now turns out to be something worse than a temporary soft patch, the market correction will continue further, thus weakening growth as the negative wealth effects of falling equity markets reduce private spending.	如果未来表明，事情不仅仅是一段“淡光景”那么简单，市场就会进一步调整，由此而来的反向财富效应将令私人缩减支出，从而进一步拖累经济。


And, unlike in 2007-2010, when every negative shock and market downturn was countered by more policy action by governments, this time around policymakers are running out of ammunition, and thus may be unable to trigger more asset reflation and jump-start the real economy.	与2007到2010年期间不同的是，当时政府出台了好些政策以抵消负面冲击和市场下行的影响，如今政策制定者已弹尽粮绝，也许无法再靠推动资产价格来发动实体经济了。


This lack of policy bullets is reflected in most advanced economies’ embrace of some form of austerity, in order to avoid a fiscal train wreck down the line.	政策工具捉襟见肘，这在大多数发达经济体表现为各种各样的财政瘦身方案，否则财政窟窿会突破底线。


Public debt is already high, and many sovereigns are near distress, so governments’ ability to backstop their banks via more bailouts, guarantees, and ring-fencing of questionable assets is severely constrained.	公债已然高企，许多主权信用评级已现险情，于是政府靠保释、担保和剥离不良资产等办法为银行撑腰的能力大打折扣。


Another round of so-called “quantitative easing” by monetary authorities may not occur as inflation is rising – albeit slowly – in most advanced economies.	再搞一轮所谓“量化宽松”已经不太可行，因为大多数发达经济体的通胀上扬了，虽然还比较温和。


If the latest global economic data reflect something more serious than a hiccup, and markets and economies continue to slow, policymakers could well find themselves empty-handed.	如果说最近的经济数据反映的情况远不止经济“打个嗝儿”那么简单，那么市场和经济将继续放缓，政策制定者最后会发现自己无计可施。


If that happens, the risk of stall speed or an outright double-dip recession would rise sharply in many advanced economies.	万一出现这种情况，许多发达经济体就会出现经济停滞风险，甚至索性来一场双底衰退。


The Globalization of Justice	公正的全球化


PARIS – When the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by the United Nations Security Council 20 years ago, on May 25, 1993, many regarded it as a meaningless gesture.	巴黎—20年前，1993年5月25日，联合国安理会成立了前南斯拉夫国际刑事法庭（ICTY），当时很多人认为这只是个无意义的姿态。 当是时，波斯尼亚战争已经开始一年有余；


At the time, the war in Bosnia was already more than a year old; the city of Sarajevo was under siege; tens of thousands of civilian noncombatants had already died; and hundreds of thousands had been forcibly displaced.	成千上万非军事平民丧生； 还有数十万人被迫流离失所。


The Bosnian Serbs – and their supporters in Serbia – seemed to be winning the war, while the UN made no provision for taking into custody those charged with ordering or carrying out atrocities.	波斯尼亚塞族人——以及他们在塞尔维亚的支持者——似乎马上就要赢得战争，而联合国也没有采取行动拘留那些受控下令或执行暴行的人。


Indeed, some saw the creation of the ICTY as a poor substitute for the military intervention that was needed to halt the slaughter.	事实上，一些人认为ICTY的成立只不过是军事干预的拙劣替代品，后者才是阻止屠杀所需要的行动。


For a long time, that cynical response seemed to be justified.	在很长一段时间里，这一怀疑态度似乎被证实了。


The ICTY was slow in getting off the ground.	ICTY启动缓慢。


It took the UN 14 months to appoint a chief prosecutor.	联合国花了14个月才认命了首席检察官。


Another year passed before his office issued indictments against high-ranking figures responsible for major crimes.	又过了一年，首席检察官办公室才发布了南斯拉夫要员有严重罪行的起诉书。


By then, the massacre of about 8,000 Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica, the largest mass killing in Europe since World War II, had already taken place.	此时，斯雷布雷尼察约有8 000穆斯林男子和男孩被杀，这是二战以来欧洲最严重的大屠杀。


But, though some aspects of the ICTY’s performance merit criticism, its overall performance and achievements over the last two decades have made it a great success.	但是，尽管ICTY的表现不乏应该批评之处，但在过去二十年中，其总体表现和成果称得上是很大的成功。


That success is twofold: the tribunal’s achievements with respect to the former Yugoslavia, and its impact worldwide on ending impunity for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.	这一成功包括两方面：法庭关于前南斯拉夫的裁决，以及它对结束战争罪、反人类罪和种族灭绝罪罪犯逍遥法外所产生的全球性影响。


As for the former Yugoslavia, the ICTY eventually obtained custody of all whom it indicted, except those who died in the interim.	对前南斯拉夫来说，ICTY最终拘禁了所有它所指控的人员，除非他在此期间去世。