The harsh economic and security measures that Venezuela needs to emerge from its current debacle cannot be implemented without some form of consensus, which requires an end to repression and polarization.	委内瑞拉需要严厉的经济和安全措施才能克服当前的障碍，这些措施只能在取得一定形式的共识的情况下才能实施，而取得共识又需要结束镇压和极端化。


Unfortunately, none of this seems likely if left exclusively in the hands of Venezuelans, who have failed repeatedly over the past 15 years to find solutions to their dilemmas.	不幸的是，如果完全由委内瑞拉人民自行处理，镇压和极端化就不可能结束，因为在过去15年中，委内瑞拉人从未找到过走出困境的办法。


Some have suggested a papal mediation; others have advocated intervention by a group of Latin American former presidents.	一些人建议采用宗教斡旋； 也有人建议让由拉美国家前总统组成的小组进行干预。


The problem is that no Latin American government, with the exception of Panama, wants to dirty its hands.	问题在于，除了巴拿马以外，没有一个拉美国家政府愿意染指。


The three that count because of their size – Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico – are all frightened of the consequences: Brazil that its companies will lose contracts, Mexico that the Venezuelans will finance opposition to their energy reforms, and Argentina of losing an ally that knows too much.	三个有影响力的大国——阿根廷、巴西和墨西哥——都有各自担心的结果：巴西担心其公司会失去合同； 墨西哥担心委内瑞拉会为其能源改革反对者提供融资；


The other two conceivably relevant countries – Colombia and Chile – refuse to get involved for different reasons.	另外两个据信关系也比较大的国家——哥伦比亚和智利出于不同的原因拒绝牵涉其中。


Colombia needs President Nicolás Maduro’s cooperation to sustain negotiations with the FARC guerrillas; the new Chilean president, Michelle Bachelet, has always had a soft spot for Chavismo and its antics.	哥伦比亚需要委内瑞拉总统马杜罗的合作维持与FARC游击队的谈判； 而智利新总统巴切莱特的软肋一直是查韦斯主义及其作态。


In the case of Crimea, the deaths of hundreds of demonstrators in Kyiv and the possible Russian takeover of eastern Ukraine has called into question principles such as non-intervention.	在克里米亚事件中，有数百人在基辅的示威中丧生，而俄罗斯有可能吞并东乌克兰，这使得不干预原则大有问题。


Not in Latin America: the number of students in Venezuela that are killed by government-sponsored paramilitary groups is still viewed as nobody’s business but the Venezuelans’, even though the country is a party to every regional instrument of international human-rights law.	而拉丁美洲并非如此：被征服支持的准军事集团杀害的数百名学生被认为只是委内瑞拉的内政，尽管该国加入了所有地区国际人权法机构。


And no outside mediation is feasible without a minimum of censure or criticism of Maduro’s extremism, even if the opposition takes its lumps, too, for some of its factions’ radical, occasionally subversive stances.	而任何外部调停都会遭到马杜罗极端主义的谴责和抨击，尽管反对派也在忍气吞声，因为反对派的一些派系持有激进的破坏性立场。


Paradoxically, whereas the Western powers are probably powerless in Ukraine, Latin America’s major players could exert great influence in Venezuela.	矛盾的是，西方强国或许在乌克兰问题上无能为力，但拉丁美洲大国可以向委内瑞拉施加很大的影响力。


Economic sanctions on Russia may eventually hurt, and the Kremlin may desist from further encroachment; but the Ukrainian crisis is largely impervious, in the short term, to outside involvement.	对俄罗斯的经济制裁或许最终会形成伤害，克里姆林宫可能停止进一步的侵略； 但乌克兰危机在短期几乎不可能由外部干预。


In Venezuela, the danger is just as great for everybody, and addressing it is much cheaper and easier.	委内瑞拉的危险不下于乌克兰，而解决委内瑞拉问题比乌克兰成本低得多，也容易得多。


But doing so requires what most Latin American governments sorely lack: vision and courage.	但解决委内瑞拉问题需要大部分拉丁美洲国家非常欠缺的东西：远见和勇气。


Brazil’s Cautious Voters	巴西的谨慎选民


MEXICO CITY – Brazil has been in the global spotlight this year, and not always for the right reasons.	墨西哥城—今年以来，巴西一直是全球的焦点，不过原因并不总是光彩的。


Following the 2013 riots over the amount of money being spent on the 2014 soccer World Cup, protests continued up to, and even during, the tournament in June.	继2013年爆发针对2014年世界杯花费太多问题的骚乱后，示威活动一直持续到6月份，甚至世界杯举办期间都没有停息。


There were dire – though ultimately misplaced – predictions about chaotic conditions for participants, and then, of course, the catastrophic performance of the home team.	关于参赛者情况混乱的悲观预言时不时出现——尽管最终被证明是杞人忧天，当然还有随后东道主噩梦般的表现。


Now, the costs of the soccer jamboree, coming on top of the country’s ongoing economic slowdown, are coming home to roost.	如今，足球狂欢的代价开始显露，令正处于经济减速中的巴西雪上加霜。


Several analysts have concluded that Brazil’s bubble has burst, and that the so-called “country of the future” will remain stuck in the present.	一些分析师认为巴西的泡沫已经破裂，所谓的“未来之国”将依然困顿于当下。


Economic uncertainty is also dramatically affecting Brazilian politics.	经济不确定性也在大大地影响着巴西政治。


And a once placid, even predictable, presidential election campaign has been thrown into disarray by the death of the Brazilian Socialist Party candidate, Eduardo Campos, in an airplane crash in August.	而曾经平稳甚至可预期的总统选战因为8月份社会党（Socialist Party）候选人爱德华多·坎波斯（Eduardo Campos）飞机失事遇难而变得扑朔迷离。


Campos’s running mate, Marina Silva, was then nominated to take his place.	随后，坎波斯的竞选搭档玛琳娜·席尔瓦（Marina Silva）被提名为候选人顶替坎波斯。


A presidential candidate four years ago who ran on a green, socially conservative, but strongly pro-democratic platform, Silva received nearly 20 million votes.	席尔瓦四年前就是总统候选人，经营着一个绿色、社会保守但坚定支持民主的平台。 她获得了近2,000万选票。


Her ties to Brazil’s huge evangelical churches, and her unwillingness to break with them on issues such as abortion, same-sex marriage, and drug policy, alienate many voters.	她与巴西庞大的福音教派的关系，以及她的不愿与他们在堕胎、同性婚姻和毒品政策等问题上决裂让她失去了许多选票。


Nonetheless, she has rapidly overtaken Aécio Neves, the Social Democratic Party (PSDB) candidate, as the main challenger to Dilma Rousseff, the incumbent President and Workers’ Party (PT) candidate.	尽管如此，他很快就超过了社会民主党（Social Democratic Party）候选人艾西奥·尼维斯（Aécio Neves），成为现任总统、工党（Worker’s Party）候选人罗塞夫的主要挑战者。


A run-off between the two women, following the October 5th first round, seems inevitable, as opinion polls give neither close to 50% of the vote.	在10月5日的首轮投票后，两位女性之间的斗争看起来已是不可避免，因为民调显示两人都不太可能获得50%的选票。


Though competent and tough, Rousseff faces voter fatigue after 12 years of PT rule, which many will remember, perhaps unfairly, for corruption scandals and the national team’s 7-1 drubbing by Germany in this year’s World Cup.	罗塞夫有能力也有韧劲，但她面临着工党执政十二年后的选民疲劳，许多人能记住的（尽管这不太公平）也许只有腐败丑闻以及巴西国家队在世界杯上被德国队以7比1血洗。


But it is the government’s dismal economic record over the past four years that is causing the biggest problems for Rousseff’s campaign.	但过去四年政府拙劣的经济记录才是影响罗塞夫选情的最大问题。


At the same time, Silva will not be able to win the run-off without an enthusiastic and persuasive endorsement from Neves and the PSDB.	与此同时，如果没有尼维斯和社会民主党的既热情又有说服力的支持，席尔瓦也无法胜出。


Fortunately for Silva, the PSDB is highly critical of the PT administration, especially the foreign policy of Rousseff’s predecessor, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva.	对席尔瓦而言，幸运的是社会民主党对工党政府持严厉批判态度，特别是对罗塞夫前任卢拉的外交政策。


PSDB-allied diplomats and former senior officials strongly have opposed the PT’s support for Latin America’s authoritarian regimes (particularly in Cuba and Venezuela), its futile insistence on a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, and its excessive embrace of non-aligned, anti-imperialist positions.	社会民主党阵营的外交官和前高级官员强烈反对工党对拉丁美洲极权政权（特别是古巴和委内瑞拉）的支持、对联合国安理会常任理事国席位徒劳无益的执着以及对不结盟反帝国主义立场的过分坚守。


A Silva victory would herald change in domestic and foreign policy alike.	席尔瓦的胜利将预示着国内和外交政策的变化。


But perhaps its most remarkable impact would be cultural.	但也许最令人瞩目的影响在于文化。


Though she would not be the first woman president (Rousseff broke the gender barrier) or the first from humble origins (Lula broke that taboo), she would be the first mulatto – darker-skinned than traditional Brazilian political leaders – to hold the office.	尽管她不是第一任女总统（罗塞夫打破了性别壁垒），也不是第一任出身卑微的总统（卢拉打破了这一禁忌），但她将是第一任混血总统——比传统巴西政治领袖肤色更深。


Just as Lula’s 2002 election signified a sea of change in a highly class-conscious, socially stratified society, Silva’s election would shake up the racial order in a country – and indeed continent – where racism has not been eradicated.	正如2002年卢拉的当选预示着一个具有高度阶级意识、阶层分化明显的社会的大转变，席尔瓦的当选将颠覆这个至今仍未消灭种族主义的国家——事实上是大陆——的种族秩序。


Indeed, in a country that has been proud of its supposedly non-racist nature, there has been no Afro-Brazilian politician of significant stature for a century.	事实上，在这个以自称的不带种族色彩特征为豪的国家，一百年来从未有非洲裔巴西人政治家赢得崇高地位。


Despite the excitement aroused by her candidacy, however, Silva is unlikely to win.	尽管席尔瓦成为候选人引起了高涨的热情，但席尔瓦获胜可能性很小。


Since Latin America’s democratization in the 1980s, only two incumbents have lost – Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua (who was not really elected the first time) and Hipólito Mejía in the Dominican Republic.	自20世纪80年代拉丁美洲开始民主化以来，只有两位在任者输掉了选举——尼加拉瓜的奥尔特加（他第一次也不是真正靠选举上台的）和多米尼加共和国的梅西亚。


More than a dozen incumbents have won re-election, more or less democratically.	十多位在任者都或多或少地通过民主方式赢得了连任。


The incumbent’s advantage in Latin America owes much to the feeble regulations restricting the government’s use of the state apparatus for campaign purposes.	拉丁美洲的在任者之所以获得如此优势，很大程度上是因为对政府动用国家机器为竞选造势的限制很小。


The scope for abuse of power, public money, the media, and most state institutions available to sitting presidents makes it almost impossible to defeat them.	在任总统可以大规模滥用权力、公共资金、媒体和大部分国家机构，这使得他们几乎不可战胜。


Ultimately, Brazilians may just be too unsure about handing power to Silva, who has become a media phenomenon but remains an unknown quantity.	最终，巴西人或许无法下定决心将权力交给席尔瓦——尽管她已经成为媒体的宠儿，但资质仍有待观察。


Rousseff will probably be re-elected, not so much on the strength of her record as because voters fear the unfamiliar.	罗塞夫也许能够连任——与其说因为她的执政记录，不如说因为选民害怕不熟悉的对象。


That would be a pity.	这将是一件憾事。


After all, most new political challengers appear unprepared for the top job until they are in power.	毕竟，大部分新政治挑战者在赢得权力之前都没有做好问鼎最高宝座的准备。


But Brazilians may feel that they have already broken enough political barriers and taboos in recent years, and that Silva would represent one too many.	但巴西人也许觉得近几年中他们已经打破了足够多的政治禁忌，少一个席尔瓦无关紧要。


Mexico’s Second Revolution	墨西哥的二次革命


MEXICO CITY – Mexico, a stagnant and violence-plagued country in recent years, finally began to overcome its malaise in 2013, thanks to an activist president and a coalition of political parties determined to move the country forward.	墨西哥城——多亏身为政党活动家的总统和决心推动国家进步的政党，近年来经济停滞、饱受暴力之困的国家墨西哥终于开始在2013年走出低迷境况。


But, alongside substantive changes, there is considerable uncertainty and hyperbole.	但在出现实质性变化的同时也不乏不确定和夸张。


It could hardly be otherwise.	几乎肯定会出现这种现象。


The situation resembles that of 20 years ago – almost to the day.	现在的情况与20年前何其相似——几乎就是20年前的同一天。


When the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among Mexico, Canada, and the United States entered into force on January 1, 1994, it seemed that Mexico was poised for a true takeoff.	1994年1月1日墨西哥、加拿大和美国达成北美自由贸易协定（NAFTA）时，墨西哥似乎正面临着真正的腾飞。


But a series of events – the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, the assassinations of a presidential candidate and the incoming president’s chief aide, and the collapse of the currency – shook Mexico that year, underscoring the depth of the challenges it faced.	但之后发生的一系列事件——恰帕斯州爆发萨帕塔起义、总统候选人及其即将上任的首席助理被暗杀再加之货币崩溃——那一年的系列事件沉重打击了墨西哥，并凸显出这个国家所面临的挑战。


NAFTA brought with it a spectacular increase in Mexican exports, as well as a dramatic shift in their composition.	北美自由贸易协定不仅令墨西哥出口显著增加，还使出口构成发生了戏剧性的改变。 但在外资流入及经济增长领域该协定的效果却令人失望。


But it proved to be a great disappointment in terms of foreign investment inflows and economic growth, which has averaged 2.6% per year over the last two decades – slower than Peru, Chile, Colombia, Brazil, and Uruguay.	20年来墨西哥2. 6%的年均增长率排在秘鲁、智利、哥伦比亚、巴西和乌拉圭之后。


As a result, Mexico’s income gap with the US and Canada has barely narrowed.	结果是墨西哥与美国加拿大的收入差距几乎没有缩小。


Thus, President Enrique Peña Nieto’s task since taking office one year ago has been to ensure that the promise of major change in Mexico finally translates into sustained economic growth, improved living standards, and faster convergence with the US and Canada.	因此，总统恩里克·佩尼亚·涅托上任一年来的任务是确保墨西哥发生重大变革的承诺最终带来经济持续增长、人民生活水平提高以及加速追赶美国和加拿大。


While both the foreign and local press refer generally to “reforms,” or lump together education, labor, financial, fiscal, energy, telecommunications, and political reforms, there are significant differences among them.	虽然国外和当地媒体都爱谈论“改革”，也称为教育、劳动、金融、财政、能源、电信和政治等领域的综合改革，但他们之间却有着非常显著的差别。


Some consider all of the changes that have taken place in Mexico this year to be equally important.	有人认为今年墨西哥方方面面的改革同等重要。


Others have mused that Peña Nieto’s administration sometimes seems intent on announcing reforms, regardless of their content, the time necessary to implement them, or their actual impact on Mexican society.	还有人认为佩尼亚·涅托内阁有时似乎着意于宣布改革，但却忽略了改革内容、推进时间或改革对墨西哥社会的实际影响。


In fact, a clear distinction can be drawn between two subsets of legislative achievements: those that, while not meaningless, are incomplete, superficial, or essentially maintain the status quo, and those that will change Mexico (if all goes well).	事实上，立法成就可以明确划分为两个部分：一部分虽然并非毫无意义，但改革内容片面、肤浅、或者说从本质上维持现状，而如果一切进展顺利，另一部分则能让墨西哥的现状发生变化。


The changes in how teachers are evaluated and their labor rights (wrongly described as an education reform), together with changes to tax and telecommunications legislation, belong to the first category; energy and political reforms belong to the second.	教师评估方式及其劳工权利（错误地被描述为教育改革）改革连同税收和电信法规改革均属于第一大类； 而能源和政治改革则属于后者。


Energy reform opens up electricity generation and oil exploration, extraction, and refining to private foreign or domestic investment through licenses, concessions, production sharing, or profit sharing.	能源改革借助许可、特许、产品分成或利润共享等方式向国外私营及国内投资公司开放发电、石油勘探、开采和冶炼业务。


The oil workers’ union has been banished from the board of directors of Pemex, the national oil company, and new contracts for shale oil and gas, together with deep-water prospecting and drilling, will be signed with a government agency, not with Pemex.	石油工人工会已被逐出墨西哥石油公司（Pemex）董事会，很快就将与政府机构、而非墨西哥石油公司签订新的页岩油气及深海勘察钻探合同。


Once the myriad legal and political obstacles are cleared, Mexico will be able to increase oil and gas production, drive down the price of electricity, and stimulate growth in an otherwise lethargic economy. One hopes that 12 years of obstruction by Peña Nieto’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) will not mean that these reforms are too little, too late.	一旦多如牛毛的法律及政治障碍得以清除，墨西哥就能增加石油天然气产量、压低电价并刺激死气沉沉的经济���人们希望佩尼亚·涅托的革命制度党（PRI）12年来的阻挠不会使上述改革来得太少太迟。


The second crucial reform is political.	第二次关键改革是在政治领域。


For the first time since the early 1920’s, Mexican legislators and mayors will be allowed to seek reelection to consecutive terms.	20世纪20年代以来，墨西哥议员和市长将首次被允许寻求竞选连任。


While no panacea, reelection is one of the most important instruments of accountability in a democracy, and Mexico has been deprived of it for nearly a century.	虽然没有包治百病的灵丹妙药，但连任是民主国家责任制的重要工具，而连任在墨西哥已经近一个世纪不被允许。


The same is true of ballot initiatives, referenda, and independent candidacies, all of which were non-existent until the recent reform.	类似的还有公民投票、全民公决和独立候选人制度，直到最近这次改革之前根本不存在这些民主工具。


For the first time since Mexico left behind 70 years of authoritarian rule, the country has a political and electoral framework that resembles those found in all modern democracies.	在长达70年的专制统治后，民主国家所具备的政治和选举架构首次在墨西哥建立。


Both reforms are incomplete and may not be sufficient to jump-start the economy and mobilize a singularly passive civil society.	这两次改革都还没有完成，或许不足以启动经济发展和动员消极被动的民间团体。


Because Pemex, unlike the Brazilian and Colombian state-owned oil companies, will not be listed on the New York or Mexico City stock exchanges, internal reform will be postponed or half-baked.	墨西哥石油公司不像巴西和哥伦比亚的国有石油公司那样可以在纽约或墨西哥城证券交易所上市，因此可能导致其内部改革有些草率和延迟。


Moreover, it will be years before any oil actually begins to flow from the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico, and how much shale oil and gas actually exists in northeastern Mexico is unknown.	此外，墨西哥湾深海水域开始实际产油可能还需要等几年，而且墨西哥东北部页岩油气的蕴藏量也依然是未知数。


Nor is it certain that foreign investment (or tourism) will increase, given the country’s current levels of violence, crime, and human-rights violations.	鉴于墨西哥目前的暴力、犯罪和侵犯人权行为，外资（或旅游）的增加也具有不确定性。


Likewise, restrictions and ambiguities continue to plague the institutional arrangements sought by the framers of the country’s political and electoral reforms.	同样，限制和歧义继续困扰着该国政治及选举改革策划者的制度安排。


Reelection is permitted only for candidates nominated by the same party for which they originally ran, and the enabling legislation for independent candidates, ballot initiatives, and referenda remains unclear.	只有代表最初提名政党竞选的候选人才被允许竞选连任，独立候选人、公民投票和全民公决的授权法律仍不甚明确。


Most important, the government appears to be backtracking on a commitment to allow a binding referendum on the opening of the oil sector and other “transcendent” issues.	最重要的是，政府似乎背弃了一项允许就石油部门开放及其他“超验”问题进行决定性公投的承诺。


Its reluctance is understandable, because voters are evenly divided on the issue, and no one will invest a cent in Mexican oil or gas if the recently approved constitutional amendment on Pemex can be overturned in 2015, as the opposition claims will happen.	政府勉为其难的态度可以理解，因为选民在这个问题上的态度几乎平分秋色，如果不久前批准的墨西哥石油公司宪法修正案真能如反对派所言在2015年被推翻，那么没有人愿意对墨西哥的石油天然气进行一分钱的投资。


But curtailing democracy in order to modernize the energy sector is not a good idea.	但为实现能源现代化而遏制民主也不是一个好主意。


Finally, skepticism persists with regard to the Mexican economy’s capacity to achieve sustainable 4-5% annual economic growth – the bare minimum needed to ensure long-term prosperity.	最后，很多人仍然怀疑墨西哥经济能否持续实现4-5%的年度经济增长——这样的增长速度是确保长期繁荣所必须的。


Deficient education, infrastructure, security, and courts, together with endemic corruption and scant entrepreneurial dynamism, militate against excessive optimism.	妨碍过度乐观的包括教育、基础设施、安全及法律资源短缺，再加上地方腐败和缺乏创业活力。


NAFTA 20 years ago, and Peña Nieto’s reforms now, are necessary but insufficient conditions for progress.	20年前的北美自由贸易协定和今天的佩尼亚·涅托改革都是进步的必要而非充分条件。


More is needed, and what is needed is not necessarily attainable.	进步需要付出更多努力，而需要的东西并不一定能成为现实。


Putin’s Reality Check for Europe	普京的欧洲现实检验


BERLIN – For far too long, the West has harbored illusions about Vladimir Putin’s Russia – illusions that have now been shattered on the Crimean peninsula.	柏林—长久以来，西方一直对普京的俄罗斯抱有幻想——如今，这一幻想在克里米亚半岛被一举击碎。


The West could (and should) have known better: Ever since his first term in office as Russian president, Putin’s strategic objective has been to rebuild Russia’s status as a global power.	西方本可以（也应该）更好地知道，自第一次任俄罗斯总统以来，普京的战略目标就一直是重塑俄罗斯全球霸权的地位。


To this end, Putin used Russia’s energy exports to recover gradually the territories lost when the Soviet Union collapsed a generation ago.	在这方面，普京用俄罗斯的能源出口逐渐恢复了二十五年前苏联解体造成的领土损失。


Ukraine has been at the heart of this strategy, because, without it, the aim of a revived Russia is unachievable.	乌克兰是这一战略的核心，因为没有乌克兰，复苏的俄罗斯就无法实现其目标。


So Crimea was just the first target; the next will be eastern Ukraine and persistent destabilization of the country as a whole.	因此克里米亚只是第一个目标； 下一个将是乌克兰东部以及乌克兰作为一个整体国家的永久动荡。


Before our eyes, the post-Soviet international system in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia is being overthrown.	在我们眼里，东欧、高加索和中亚的后苏联时代国际体系正在被推翻。


Nineteenth-century concepts of international order, based on zero-sum balance-of-power considerations and spheres of interest, are threatening to supersede modern norms of national self-determination, the inviolability of borders, the rule of law, and the fundamental principles of democracy.	十九世纪的国际秩序概念——以零和实力平衡考虑和利益圈为基础——有可能正在取代国家自决权的现代范式、国界的不可侵犯性、法治精神以及民主的基本原则。


As a result, this upheaval will have a massive impact on Europe and its relations with Russia, for it will determine whether Europeans live by twenty-first-century rules.	结果，乌克兰剧变将对欧洲及其对俄关系造成巨大影响，因为它将决定欧洲是否能生活在二十一世纪的规则下。


Those who believe that the West can adapt to Russian behavior, as Putin’s Western apologists suggest, risk contributing to further strategic escalation, because a soft approach will merely embolden the Kremlin.	有人（如普京的西方辩护者）认为西方可以适应俄罗斯的行为，这有可能导致进一步的战略升级，因为软方针只能让克里姆林宫变本加厉。


Indeed, whether or not its leaders acknowledge it, the European Union is now in direct conflict with Russia over its enlargement policy since the end of the Cold War.	事实上，不管其领导人是否承认，如今欧盟自冷战结束以来的扩大政策已经与俄罗斯形成了直接冲突。


That is because Russia’s re-emergence as a global power requires not just the reintegration of lost Soviet territories, but also direct access to Europe and a dominant role there, especially in Eastern Europe.	正因如此，俄罗斯重新崛起为全球霸权不但需要重获失去的苏联领土，还需要进军欧洲并在欧洲起到主导作用，特别是在东欧。


So a fundamental strategic struggle is now a given.	因此，基本战略斗争现在已经开始了。


From a Western perspective, willful confrontation makes little sense, because the EU and Russia are and will continue to be neighbors.	从西方角度看，故意对抗是毫无意义的，因为欧盟和俄罗斯现在是、将来也是邻居。


Looking ahead, Russia will need the EU even more than vice versa, because in its Far East and in Central Asia, China is emerging as a rival of entirely different dimensions.	放眼未来，俄罗斯需要欧盟更甚于欧盟需要俄罗斯，因为在远东和中亚，中国正在崛起为一个各方面完全不同的对手。


Moreover, Russia’s rapid demographic decline and enormous modernization deficit imply the need for a joint future with Europe.	此外，俄罗斯人口的快速下降以及巨大的现代化赤字意味着它的未来与欧洲息息相关。


But seizing this opportunity is possible only on the basis of the rule of law, not of force, and must be guided by the principles of democracy and national self-determination, not great-power politics.	但要抓住这一机会必须建立在法治精神而不是武力的基础上，并且必须以民主原则和国家自决权而不是实力政治为指导。


Instead, Putin has now triggered a lasting crisis.	相反，普京已经触发了持续危机。


The West’s response will be a new containment policy, mainly taking the form of economic and diplomatic measures.	西方的反应是新的遏制政策，即采取经济和外交手段。


Europe will reduce its energy dependence on Russia, review its strategic alignment and priorities, and scale back investment and bilateral cooperation.	欧洲将降低其对俄罗斯的能源依赖，重新审视其战略一致性和低昂务之急，并收回投资和双边合作。


In the short term, Putin seems to have greater leverage, but the weakness of his position will soon become apparent.	在短期，似乎是普京尽占上风，但他的处境的弱点很快就会暴露。


Russia is completely dependent, economically and politically, on its commodity and energy exports, which go primarily to Europe.	俄罗斯在经济上和政治上完全依赖于其大宗商品和能源出口，而主要出口地就是欧洲。


Lower European demand and an oil price that no longer suffices to sustain Russia’s budget stand to hobble the Kremlin very quickly.	欧洲需求的减少和无法充分支持俄罗斯预算的油价必将很快让克里姆林宫深感掣肘。


Indeed, there is reason to believe that Putin may have overplayed his hand.	事实上，有理由认为普京的做法已经过犹不及。


The collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990’s was caused not by the West, but by a wave of secession, as nationalities and minorities, seeing the party-state weakened, seized the opportunity to break free.	20世纪90年代初的苏联解体不是西方造成的，而是由一系列脱离造成的，而脱离是因为民主主义者和少数族裔看到了党国已经变弱，于是抓住机会脱离苏联。


Today’s Russia has neither the economic nor the political strength to regain and integrate the lost Soviet territories, and any attempt by Putin to press on with his plan would impoverish its people and lead to further disintegration – a bleak prospect.	如今，俄罗斯在经济上和政治上都没有强到可以重新获得并统一失去的苏联领土的程度，而普京计划的实施将让俄罗斯人民陷入贫穷，造成进一步的离心离德——前景黯淡。


Europeans have reason to be worried, and they now have to face the fact that the EU is not just a common market – a mere economic community – but a global player, a cohesive political unit with shared values and common security interests.	欧洲有理由担忧，并且现在不得不面对一个现实，即欧盟不仅仅是一个共同市场，一个经济共同体，它也是一个全球行动者，一个团结的、拥有共同价值和安全利益的政治单元。


Europe’s strategic and normative interests have thus re-emerged with a vengeance; in fact, Putin has managed, almost singlehandedly, to invigorate NATO with a new sense of purpose.	欧洲的战略和规范利益因此意外地重新浮现； 事实上，普京几乎凭借一己之力让北约有了新的使命感。


The EU will have to understand that it is not acting in a vacuum in its eastern and southern neighborhood, and that, for the sake of its own security interests, the conflicting interests of other powers there cannot simply be ignored or, worse, accepted.	欧盟需要认识到它不是在东部和南部周边真空中行动，并且出于其自身安全利益考虑，那里的其他大国的冲突利益绝不容忽视（甚至不容接受）。


The EU’s enlargement policy is not merely some expensive, expendable annoyance; it is a vital component of the EU’s security and outward projection of power.	欧盟的扩张政策并不只是一些昂贵、消耗性质的聒噪； 而是欧盟安全和外向实力工程的关键要素。


Safety comes with a price tag.	安全是有代价的。


Perhaps now there will be a reassessment in the United Kingdom of the costs of an EU exit.	或许如今英国将重新评估退出欧盟的代价。


And maybe there will be a realization on the Continent that European unification must move forward more quickly, because the world – and Europe’s neighborhood in particular – has turned out to be not as peaceful as many, above all the Germans, perceived it to be.	也许欧洲大陆将意识到欧洲统一必须更快地向前迈进，因为世界——特别是欧洲周边——并不像许多人（特别是德国人）认为的那样安全。


The EU peace project – the original impetus for European integration – may have worked too well; after more than six decades of success, it had come to be considered hopelessly outdated.	欧洲安全工程——欧洲一体化的原始动力——可能运转得太好了； 在六十多年的成功后，它也许已经彻底过时了。


Putin has provided a reality check.	普京提供了一次现实检验。


The question of peace in Europe has returned, and it must be answered by a strong and united EU.	欧洲的和平问题回来了，并且必须由一个强大而统一的欧盟来面对。


The Middle East in the Arab Winter	阿拉伯冬天里中东


BERLIN – Travel broadens the mind, goes the old saying.	柏林——古语说：旅行可以开阔思路。


This is especially true for the Middle East.	这句话尤其适用于中东。


But travel there nowadays can be extremely disorienting; indeed, developments that were impossible to contemplate just a few months ago are becoming reality.	但今时今日去那里旅行让人异常迷惑； 事实上，短短几个月前还无法想象的事态目前正在发生。


The youth revolt that began in Tunis and Cairo in 2010-2011 has come to an end (at least for the time being), though the region has been changed fundamentally by it.	2010-2011年始于突尼斯和开罗的青年起义已经结束（至少目前暂时结束），但这次起义已经彻底改变了中东地区的格局。


The victory of counter-revolution and power politics, as in Egypt, has only seemed to restore the old order; the current regime’s political foundations are simply too brittle.	埃及反革命及强权政治获胜似乎不过是恢复了旧有的秩序； 现政权的政治基础实在过于薄弱。


Equally noticeable has been the permanent shift in the region’s political-strategic axis.	该地区政治战略轴心的永久性改变同样引人注目。


Iran, with its nuclear and hegemonic ambitions, is the current center, while the old center – the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – has been marginalized, giving rise to entirely new alliances of interests.	拥有核野心及霸权抱负的伊朗成为当前的核心，而以巴冲突代表的原有核心已经边缘化，缔造出全新的利益联盟。


Saudi Arabia and Israel (which have no formal diplomatic relations) are united against Iran – and against the possibility of a US-Iranian détente.	（并未建立正式外交关系的）沙特和以色列共同反对伊朗——反对美伊关系出现缓和的可能性。


Ideologically, the central conflict between Iran and its neighbors is based on the sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shia Islam.	意识形态上，逊尼和什叶派穆斯林的教派冲突是伊朗及其邻国核心冲突的起源。


The devastating Syrian civil war is already being fought along these lines; given signs of a military and political stalemate, those lines could become the basis of a permanent division of the country, as in Bosnia.	由此引发了毁灭性的叙利亚内战； 由于已经显露出军事政治僵局的迹象，上述问题可能像在波斯尼亚那样造成国家的永久性分裂。


If this happens, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan would not be left unaffected.	如果这种情况真的出现，伊拉克、黎巴嫩和约旦肯定无法置身事外。


The old Anglo-French Middle East mapped out by the Sykes-Picot Agreement in May 1916 would be gone for good.	1916年5月赛克斯-皮科协定描绘的英法划界中东的原有格局将一去不复返。


Moreover, the Kurdish issue has reappeared – and could indirectly influence and re-radicalize the Palestinian question.	另外库尔德问题又再次出现——这可能间接影响到巴勒斯坦问题，导致局面重新激化。


Unfortunately, there is not much evidence that an Israeli-Palestinian settlement based on a two-state solution will preempt this development.	不幸的是，没有多少证据表明基于双边谈判的以巴方案能够防止这样的情况出现。


Then there is the question of the long-term consequences of Al Qaeda’s rebirth in the form of Sunni jihadism in Syria, Yemen, and North and East Africa.	再有就是基地组织以逊尼圣战主义的名义在叙利亚、也门、北非和东非地区重生，以及由此带来的长期后果。


The Gulf monarchies are trying to ride this tiger militarily against Iran.	海湾君主国在与伊朗的军事对抗中已经势成骑虎。


But what will happen when they one day find themselves in the role of the sorcerer’s apprentice?	如果有一天他们发觉自己扮演了魔法师学徒的角色将会怎样？


Will this fanatical wind blow back to the Arab peninsula?	这股狂热之风是否将吹回阿拉伯半岛？


And could these societies’ domestic institutions withstand such an attack?	上述国家的国内机构能否经得起这样的破坏？


Throughout the Middle East, most of the political elite remain trapped within a worldview defined by power politics and nineteenth-century notions of sovereignty.	中东地区多数政治精英今天仍受到强权政治和十九世纪主权观念造就的世界观的束缚。


Their strategic watchwords are national rivalry, balance, and hegemony – concepts that offer no solution for the future of the region’s nations and states.	他们的战略口号是国家竞争、平衡和霸权——这些概念无法造就地区民族和国家未来的前途。


Intraregional economic cooperation, which is essential to achieving sustained growth and social development, much less a regional security framework to ensure peace and stability, remains an alien idea.	迄今为止他们依然对实现持续增长和社会发展、以及确保和平稳定的地区安全架构所必不可少的区域经济合作概念非常生疏。


In essence, the Middle East is experiencing a crisis of modernization.	中东本质上正在经历一场现代化危机。


The rebellious youth who led popular demands for change are lying low (or have been rounded up); but, given the intellectual paralysis of the region’s rulers (and large parts of the opposition), an even more violent eruption can be expected.	引领民众改革要求的叛逆的年轻人正在暂避风头（或者遭到围捕）； 但因为地区统治者（和多数反对派）的精神瘫痪，爆发更猛烈的抗议行动是早晚的事。


As in the past, Egypt will play a guiding role for the entire region (whether it wants to or not).	（无论本身情愿与否，）埃及将一如既往地引领整个地区。


The region’s modernization crisis is being compounded by the partial withdrawal of an exhausted force for order, the United States.	筋疲力尽的美国维和部队部分撤离加剧了中东地区的现代化危机。


This is fueling tremendous anxiety in the region and has contributed to the overthrow of existing alliances and the search for new ones.	美国撤军助长了该地区的焦虑情绪，加速了原有联盟的解体和新联盟的构成。


President Barack Obama has ended America’s ruinous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.	奥巴马总统结束了美国在伊拉克和阿富汗的毁灭性战争。


Above all, it was the war in Iraq – and thus former President George W. Bush and his neoconservative advisers – that brought Iran to its current position of strategic strength.	归根结底，让伊朗拥有目前战略地位的恰恰是前总统乔治·W·布什及其新保守主义顾问发动的伊拉克战争。


Yet it is Obama who is now regarded as weak in the Middle East.	但现在奥巴马却在中东背负软弱的恶名。


Obama is heavily criticized for not having intervened militarily in Syria, even though his threat to do so subsequently forced President Bashar al-Assad’s government to surrender its chemical weapons.	尽管奥巴马的军事干预威胁后来迫使巴沙尔·阿萨德总统政府交出了化学武器，但他仍因未进行军事干预叙利亚而遭到严厉的批评。


Likewise, far from strengthening Iran further, Obama has pushed the Islamic Republic into a corner by leading the global push for strict economic sanctions.	同样，由奥巴马发起领导的全球性的严厉经济制裁运动不但遏制了伊朗实力进一步增长，而且迫使伊斯兰共和国陷入困境。


To be sure, many aspects of Obama’s policy in the region are worth criticizing – above all, the defensive attitude with which his administration presents it.	奥巴马在诸多领域的地区政策无疑都值得探讨——其中尤以美国政府采取防御性态度最值得批评。


But, rather than weakness, what America’s traditional allies in the Middle East fear most is far-reaching change in the status quo.	但最让美国在中东的传统盟友害怕的却并非软弱，而是当前现状发生意义深远的变革。


And Obama’s policy does indeed appear to be aiming for precisely that: a nuclear détente with Iran, an end to Syria’s civil war by means of a regional security architecture, and a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.	而奥巴马的政策似乎恰恰以此为目标：在核问题上与伊朗缓和关系、建立区域安全架构结束叙利亚内战和敦促双边解决以巴冲突。


It is a policy that sounds almost utopian, given the enormous inertial force of the region’s problems.	考虑到区域问题的巨大惯性，这种政策似乎颇有些乌托邦的味道。


But if, against all expectations, Obama succeeds, his accomplishment will be historic.	但如果奥巴马出人预料地取得了成功，他将取得历史性的成就。


And if he fails?	可如果他失败呢？


The Middle East will continue its slide into mayhem – perversely befitting the upcoming centenary of World War I’s outbreak.	中东局势将与近在眼前的一战爆发百周年纪念日极不相称地持续动荡。


The Great War’s Long Shadow	大战的长期阴影


BERLIN – This year marks the centennial of the outbreak of World War I, which is reason enough to reflect on what this seminal European catastrophe teaches us today.	柏林—今年是第一次世界大战爆发一百周年，光是这一理由便已足以让我们反思这场欧洲的灾难对今天的意义。


Indeed, the Great War’s consequences for international relations and the global system of states continue to be felt.	事实上，一战对国际关系和全球国家体系所造成的后果至今仍能感受到。


So, have we learned anything from the policy failures of governments, institutions, and international diplomacy that occurred in the summer of 1914?	那么，我们从1914夏天所发生的政府、制度和国际外交方面的政策失误中学到了什么？


Large parts of the northern hemisphere continue to struggle with the legacies of the great European empires – Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman – that collapsed in WWI’s wake, or whose decline, like that of the British Empire, was initiated by the war and sealed by its even bloodier sequel a generation later.	北半球的大部分地区仍在欧洲大帝国——哈布斯堡、沙俄和奥斯曼——因为一战而崩溃所造成的后果中挣扎，更有一些帝国——如大英帝国——因为一战而衰落，并且因为二十多年后的另��场更加血腥的战争而板上钉钉。


The resulting fracture zones – in the Balkans and the Middle East, for example – are the source of some of today’s gravest risks to regional and even world peace.	由此所造成的分裂区——如巴尔干半岛和中东——成为当今地区乃至世界和平的最大风险源。


After the Cold War’s end and the collapse of the Russian Empire’s Soviet successor, war returned to the Balkans under very similar conditions to those that prevailed in the period before 1914, with aggressive nationalism ultimately reconfiguring the disintegrating Yugoslavia as six separate states.	冷战结束以及沙俄帝国的后继者苏联解体后，战争回到了巴尔干半岛，因为那里的情况变得与1914年前极为相似，最后，激进的民族主义把南斯拉夫打散重组为六个独立国家。


Of course, Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, whose call for a “Greater Serbia” triggered the war, was not alone: For a moment, Europe was in danger of reverting to the confrontation of 1914, with France and the United Kingdom supporting Serbia, and Germany and Austria favoring Croatia.	当然，以提出“大塞尔维亚”而引发战争的塞尔维亚总统米洛舍维奇（Slobodan Milošević）并不孤独：有一段时间，欧洲大有重回1914年冲突之势，法国和英国支持塞尔维亚，德国和奥地利站在克罗地亚一边。


Fortunately, there was no relapse, because the West had learned its lessons from historical mistakes.	幸运的是，故态没有复萌，因为西方从历史错误中汲取了教训。


Today, three factors loom large in the avoidance of disaster: the United States’ military presence in Europe, the progress of European integration, and Europe’s abandonment of great-power politics.	如今，三大因素有助于有效地避免灾难：美国在欧洲的驻军、欧洲一体化进程以及欧洲放弃了大国政治。


Yet there is no point in fooling oneself: Only as long as the Balkan countries believe in the European Union and the benefits of membership will today’s precarious peace in the region become permanent.	但我们也不能自欺欺人：只有巴尔干国家相信欧盟并因为加入欧盟而获益，今天在该地区如履薄冰的和平才能持久。


No such hope currently exists for the Middle East, whose contemporary political borders were largely established by Britain and France during WWI, when the diplomats Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot negotiated the division of the Ottoman Empire.	中东则不存在这样的希望。 当代中东的政治边界大体由英国和法国在一战期间划定，双方外交官赛克斯（Mark Sykes）和皮科（François Georges-Picot）商议了分割奥斯曼帝国的计划。


Likewise, the creation of Israel harks back to the 1917 Balfour Declaration, whereby the subsequent British mandatory power in Palestine supported the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people.	类似地，以色列的建立可以追溯到1917年巴尔福宣言（Balfour Declaration），后来巴勒斯坦英国托管政权据此支持为犹太人建立一个国家。


The Middle East created back then is, more or less, the Middle East today.	当时所建立起来的欧洲或多或少地就是今天的欧洲。


Yet we are now witnessing its disintegration, because the Sykes-Picot design always implied a strong external hegemonic power (or two) able and willing to maintain stability by channeling (or suppressing) the region’s numerous conflicts.	但如今我们正在目睹中东的分崩离析，因为赛克斯-皮科方案需要一个（或两个）强大的外部霸权能够也愿意通过疏导（或镇压）该地区的众多冲突维持稳定。


Great Britain and France, the first hegemonic powers, were succeeded by the US and the Soviet Union – and, finally, by the US alone.	一开始的霸权是英国和法国，后来是美国和苏联，最后只剩下美国一个。


America’s misadventure in Iraq, its exhaustion as a world power, and its unwillingness to maintain its previous level of commitment to the region have rendered the Sykes-Picot structure untenable, because no other external force for order is available.	美国在伊拉克的出师不利、其作为世界超级大国的衰落以及其不愿维持如同过去那样的对中东地区的干涉程度导致赛克斯-皮科结构不再能够维持下去，因为再无其他外部势力或秩序可用。


The resulting vacuum has been filled by various currents of political Islam, terrorism, protest movements, uprisings, secession attempts by national or religious minorities, and aspiring regional hegemons (Iran and Saudi Arabia).	填补由此造成的真空的是如今一波又一波的政治伊斯兰教、恐怖主义、反抗运动、起义、民主或宗教少数派的分裂活动以及雄心勃勃的地区霸权（伊朗和沙特阿拉伯）。


Indeed, the partial withdrawal of the US implies that the end of the enforced stability of the old Middle East will not spare the Sykes-Picot borders.	事实上，美国的局部撤退意味着旧中东的强迫稳定的结束不会仅限于赛克斯-皮科边界。


Developments in Syria and Iraq already suggest as much, and the future of Lebanon and Jordan has become increasingly uncertain.	叙利亚和伊拉克的局面已经证明了这一点，黎巴嫩和约旦的未来也变得越来越不确定。


One of the few positive features of the region is that no global power rivalries are currently playing out there.	极少数积极特征之一是目前该地区不存在世界级大国的对立。


But the regional struggle for mastery between Iran and Saudi Arabia (with Israel as a third actor) could prove to be all the more dangerous, given the prevailing – and deeply entrenched – mindset of traditional power politics.	但是，考虑到主流的、根深蒂固的传统实力政治思维，伊朗和沙特阿拉伯（以色列则是第三方）质检的霸权之争可能十分危险。


Institutions and traditions supporting cooperative conflict resolution hardly exist in the region.	支持合作性冲突解决方案的制度和传统在该地区几乎不存在。


The memory of 1914 may trigger the most concern in East Asia, where all the ingredients of a similar disaster have accumulated: nuclear weapons, the rise of China as a global power, unresolved territorial and border disputes, the division of the Korean Peninsula, historical resentments, an obsession with status and prestige, and hardly any cooperative conflict-resolution mechanisms.	对1914年的记忆可能引发亚洲最大的隐忧，在亚洲，爆发类似于一战的灾难的所有要素都已经积累起来：核武器、中国崛起为全球强国、悬而未决的领土和边境纠纷、朝鲜半岛的分裂、历史恩怨，对地位和特权的着迷，以及缺乏任何合作性冲突解决机制。


Distrust and power politics are the order of the day.	不信任和实力政治就是当前的秩序。


And yet there are grounds for optimism in East Asia.	但对于东亚同样存在了管理有。


The world has changed dramatically since the summer of 1914.	世界从1914年夏天以来已有了显著的变化。


At the time, the world’s population was two billion; now it is seven billion.	当时，世界人口只有二十亿； 如今是七十亿。


This, together with the communications revolution, has created even more interdependencies and has forced more cooperation upon governments – as has the continued presence of the US as a stabilizer in the region, which has proved to be indispensable.	这一点加上通信革命已经造成更大的相互依赖型，并迫使各国更多地建立政府间的合作——比如美国一直作为稳定器存在于该地区，其作用被证明是不可或缺的。


Moreover, while nuclear weapons pose a continuing danger, they also inhibit the risk of war as a means of power politics by making mutual destruction a certainty.	此外，尽管核武器代表了永久性威胁，但也因为让互相毁灭成为笃定之事而降低了将战争作为实力政治手段的风险。


Military technology, the mindset of politicians and citizens, the structure of international diplomacy, and much more have changed in the century since WWI erupted.	军事技术、政治家和人民的思维、国际外交结构以及其他诸多因素改变了自一战爆发以来的这个世纪。


And, yes, we have even learned a few things from history, which has made the world safer.	是的，我们甚至从历史中学到了一些教训，这让世界变得更加安全。


But, lest we forget: in the summer 1914, most actors regarded the impending disaster as an impossibility.	但是，我们不能忘记，在1914年夏天，大部分行动方也认为即将到来的灾难是不可能事件。


Defusing Iran	接触伊朗的风险


BERLIN – On February 18, crucial negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program began in Vienna between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany (the P5+1).	柏林——2月18日，联合国安理会五大常任理事国加德国（P5+1）与伊朗间就伊朗核计划的关键谈判在维也纳开始。


The alternative to the talks is a further nuclear buildup by Iran, followed by additional international sanctions and, eventually, another war in the Middle East, which no one believes can resolve the problem.	谈判的替代方案是任由伊朗核问题继续发酵，进一步加码国际制裁并最终引发又一场中东战争。 没有人认为这种方法能够解决问题。


So, can a comprehensive agreement that respects Iran’s right to civilian nuclear energy, while allaying the international community’s fears of weaponization, be achieved?	那么，究竟能否签署一项尊重伊朗民用核能权、同时又能缓解国际社会对核能武器化担忧的全面协议？


The interim agreement reached last November in Geneva reflected the West’s de facto acceptance that Iran is entitled to carry out limited low-grade uranium enrichment within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).	去年十一月在日内瓦达成临时协议，这表明西方在事实上承认了伊朗在核不扩散条约（NPT）框架内进行有限度低级铀浓缩的权利。


The West released about $7 billion of frozen Iranian funds and relaxed some sanctions (in particular, on crude oil and auto parts), while Iran agreed to a quasi-freeze of its nuclear program.	西方解冻了约70亿美元被冻结的伊朗资金，此外还放宽了某些制裁限制（尤其是在原油和汽车零部件领域），而伊朗则同意对其核计划采取准冻结措施。


That created the basis for a lasting agreement. But realizing that potential will be difficult.	虽然这项进展为最终订立持久协议打下了基础，但将这种可能性变为现实还需要经过艰苦的努力。


First and foremost, a mountain of mutual distrust will need to be overcome.	首先，双方需要解决相互不信任的问题。


The West and Israel do not believe that Iran’s nuclear program is meant to serve merely civilian aims.	西方和以色列并不相信伊朗的核计划仅仅服务于民用目的。


Otherwise, why would Iran invest billions of dollars in a program that is almost tailor-made for military purposes, including long-distance delivery systems?	否则伊朗怎么会为一项几乎纯粹为军事目的服务的计划投资数十亿美元，其中还包括研制远程运输系统？


The Iranian leadership, for its part, remains convinced that the United States still seeks to bring about regime change.	而伊朗领导人仍然相信美国依旧以政��更迭为目的。


From Iran’s perspective, accepting an American hand extended in a spirit of conciliation could turn it into a fist.	从伊朗的角度看，美国以调停为目的伸出的手可能演变为重拳出击。


Moreover, any compromise would be fiercely contested within both camps, possibly leading to serious domestic political conflict.	此外，任何妥协都可能在两方阵营引发严重的争议，甚至可能导致严重的国内政治冲突。


And even if both sides’ current leaderships are sincere, will this hold true for their successors?	而且就算双方目前领导人本着真诚的态度，他们的继任者是否也能如此？


The absence of trust between Iran and the West leads directly to the second obstacle to a comprehensive agreement: verification and monitoring.	伊朗和西方间欠缺信任也直接导致了达成全面协议的另一个障碍：那就是核查和监测措施。


The central issue in these negotiations, around which everything else revolves, concerns Iran’s “breakout capability” – the time it would need, within the framework of any agreement with the West, to renege and build a nuclear weapon.	谈判中的一切都围绕伊朗“突破能力”这一核心问题。 具体来讲，就是伊朗在西方协议框架下会用多长时间背信弃义制造出核武器。


How much supervision will be required not just to verify compliance but also to detect any possible attempt at a breakout?	如何监管才能确保伊朗遵守协议规定，并发现可能突破的蛛丝马迹？


The technical questions are complex, and the proverbial devil really is in the countless details.	技术问题的确复杂，众所周知魔鬼也的确藏在无数细节中。


But prospects for a deal will hinge on resolving three broad issues.	但能否达成协议将取决于能否解决三大问题。


The first two issues reflect the two paths toward the bomb: uranium enrichment and plutonium production.	前两个问题反映了制造核弹的两条必由之路：铀浓缩和钚制造。


Any workable agreement will require Iran to renounce uranium enrichment above the 5% level needed for a civilian nuclear-power program; accept limits on enrichment volumes, the number of centrifuges, and technology; agree to forgo reprocessing; and address operations at the heavy-water reactor in Arak.	任何可行的协议都要求伊朗放弃高于民用核能项目要求的5%以上的铀浓缩计划;伊朗还必须接受提取数量上的限制，离心机的数量和技术； 同意放弃后处理并妥善处理阿拉克重水反应堆的操作。


The third issue concerns supervision and monitoring, which for quite some time would probably have to go beyond that agreed in the Additional Protocol to the NPT and include certain military installations.	第三个问题与督促和监测机制有关，它在特定时间内很可能会超出双方同意的不扩散条约附加议定书的范畴，并包含某些特定的军事设施。


Indeed, the duration the agreement will be of vital importance.	事实上，协议的持续时间在这里至关重要。


The West wants it to be implemented for as long as possible, while Iran would prefer a very short timeframe within which to achieve its central objectives: a comprehensive and lasting repeal of international sanctions and recognition as an NPT non-military nuclear power.	西方希望持续的时间越长越好，而伊朗则希望在短时间内达到其全面永久废除国际制裁和跻身不扩散核武器条约非军用有核国家的核心目标。


That raises another important question: Does US President Barack Obama really have a domestic mandate for negotiating a comprehensive repeal of the sanctions?	由此又引出了另外一个重要问题：那就是美国总统奥巴马是否真的能在全面废止制裁措施的谈判中说话算数？


Here, we are brought back to the central issue in this process: technical questions, though important, are still only an expression of the underlying political conflicts and animosities.	这里我们又重新回到整个过程的核心：技术问题无论多重要，仍始终不过是表达了潜在的仇恨和政治冲突。


These are the real factors driving the confrontation that the Vienna negotiations are meant to defuse over the next six months.	这些才是今后六个月维也纳谈判想要化解对抗的真正驱动因素。


And the current regional and sectarian confrontation in the Middle East affects the nuclear negotiations directly.	而当前的中东地区和宗派对抗才是核谈判的直接影响因素。


All of the relevant players – including those, like Saudi Arabia and Israel, that are not sitting at the table but whose presence is very much felt – are clinging to their initial positions.	包括像沙特和以色列在内的所有相关势力虽然没有直接坐到谈判桌前，但他们的影响力却是切实存在的。 这些国家都坚持他们最初的立场。


The US does not want Iran to become a military nuclear power or gain regional predominance; above all, the Americans do not want another Middle East war.	美国不希望伊朗成为军事核国家或占据地区优势； 毕竟美国人不希望中东再燃战火。


Iran, however, wants to become a (non-military?) nuclear power and shape a region in which it is heavily involved militarily (in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq).	但伊朗则力争成为（非军事？ ）核国家，在本国大量驻军的地区（叙利亚、黎巴嫩和伊拉克）扮演举足轻重的角色。


Europe shares the US position, but is more flexible.	欧洲与美国有着相似的立场，但欧洲人的态度却更加灵活。


Saudi Arabia, a Sunni power, wants to stop Shia Iran from becoming an emerging or, worse still, a military nuclear power in the Gulf, and has taken the opposite side in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq.	逊尼派强国沙特希望阻止伊朗成为海湾地区新兴核力量甚至是军事核力量，并且在叙利亚、黎巴嫩和伊拉克都采取了与伊朗对立的态度。


Israel opposes Iran’s becoming a military nuclear power – or even a nuclear-threshold state – and is willing to try to prevent this by military means.	以色列则反对伊朗成为军事核力量——甚至于基本核力量——而且不惜使用武力达到自己的目标。


To achieve a sustainable compromise that all sides accept (even if with gritted teeth), the negotiations must be accompanied by diplomatic steps aimed at building trust both in the region and beyond.	为了实现各方都能接受的长期妥协（就算其中有人在咬牙切齿），谈判就必须辅之以在区域内外建立信任的外交步骤。


Europe is very well versed in such processes and should put its experience to good use.	欧洲人非常熟悉这样的过程，应该很好利用自身经验完成这样的任务。


Iran must decide whether it wants to follow the North Korean route to international isolation, or some variation on the Chinese route to integration into the global economy.	伊朗必须决定是否要追随朝鲜的国际孤立线路，还是采取某种类似于中国的方式融入全球经济的范畴。


It must also understand that its relationship with both Israel and Saudi Arabia will affect the negotiations, either positive or negatively.	它还必须明白与以色列和沙特阿拉伯的关系会影响到谈判结果，而这种影响不是正面就是负面的。


And the West – the US, Europe, and, more than any other country, Israel – will have to get used to the idea of living with an Iranian civilian nuclear-power program, while limiting Iran’s capacity to become an emerging military nuclear power.	而西方（美国和欧洲，尤其是以色列）一定要接受与伊朗民用核计划共存的思想，同时限制伊朗成为新兴的核军事强国。


As the very different examples of the Soviet Union and China show, the Iranian regime might someday collapse or change fundamentally – probably when hardly anyone expects it.	虽然两者差别很大，但苏联和中国的例子都表明伊朗政权或许会在某天崩溃或发生根本变化——很可能是在任何人都没有预料到时候。


Until then, we must do our best to defuse the nuclear time bomb together.	在此之前，我们必须竭尽全力共同化解伊朗这颗核定时炸弹的威胁。


Revoking America’s Exorbitant Privilege	废除美国的过度特权


NEW YORK – The ongoing political stalemate in the United States holds two major implications for the international monetary system.	纽约—美国没完没了的政治僵局给国际货币体系带来了两大影响。


The better-known consequence has been deepening uncertainty about the US dollar, the main global reserve currency, and US Treasury securities, supposedly the world’s “safest” financial asset.	为人所熟知的后果是深化了主要全球储备货币——美元和号称世界“最安全”金融资产的美国国债的不确定性。


Not surprisingly, the major investors in US Treasuries, China and Japan, have expressed alarm.	毫不奇怪，美国国债的主要投资者中国和日本纷纷拉响警报。


Simply put, the global economy has at its center a dysfunctional political regime that generates recurrent threats of default on the world’s major reserve asset.	简言之，全球经济的核心占据着一个无法正常运转的政治机制，这套机制时不时发出世界主要储备资产违约的风险。


The second implication is further postponement of the International Monetary Fund’s 2010 quota and governance reforms, which would double member countries’ contributions and modestly increase major emerging economies’ voting power.	第二个影响是国际货币基金组织（IMF）的2010年配额和治理改革被进一步推迟，这项改革将倍增成员国的出资额，并略微提高主要新兴经济体的投票权。


Prior to its approval by the IMF Board in December 2010, the reform, agreed at the G-20 Seoul Summit, had been hailed as a “historic” breakthrough.	在2010年12月被IMF理事会批准之前，已在G-20首尔峰会上达成一致的这一改革方案被称为“历史性”突破。


But history has stalled without approval by the US, which has an effective veto over major IMF decisions.	但没有美国的批准——该国拥有IMF重大决策的实际否决权，历史将停滞不前。


The threat of a US default may well end in a political agreement to raise the US government’s debt ceiling, as occurred in 2011.	美国违约的风险很有可能因为关于提高美国政府债务上限形成了政治一致而结束，这一幕在2011年就发生过。


But, whatever the outcome, the latest episode makes it abundantly clear that our globalized world deserves a better international monetary system than the current “non-system” that evolved in an ad hoc manner after the collapse in the early 1970’s of the initial Bretton Woods arrangements.	但是，无论结果如何，最近的债务上限之争充分表明，我们的全球化的世界应该有一套更好的国际货币体系。 当前的“无体系”实际上是20世纪70年代初布雷顿森林体系崩溃后的权宜之计。


The need to overhaul the international monetary and financial system was one of the basic lessons of the global financial crisis.	修正国际货币和金融体系的需要是全球金融危机最根本的教训之一。


While there have been major, albeit incomplete, reforms of international finance, efforts in 2009 and 2010 to reform the international monetary system – including the proposed changes at the IMF – have led to no significant action.	国际金融方面已经有了重大（尽管有欠全面）的改革，但2009年和2010年改革国际货币体系的努力——包括IMF的变革方案——并未带来重大行动。


The reform proposals came from diverse quarters: the governor of the People’s Bank of China; a commission convened by the United Nations General Assembly on reform of the international monetary and financial system, headed by the Nobel laureate Joseph E. Stiglitz; and the French Palais Royal Initiative, led by former IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus.	改革方案来自各个方向：中国人民银行行长、联合国大会召集的以诺贝尔经济学奖获得者斯蒂格利茨（Joseph Stiglitz）为首的国际货币和金融体系改革委员会，以及以前IMF总裁康德苏（Michel Camdessus）为首的法国王宫倡议（French Palais Royal Initiative）。


There have been myriad academic contributions to the debate as well.	学界也纷纷为这一话题出谋划策。


The first element of reform should be to give a greater role to the only true international money that the world now has: the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights, created in 1969 as the result of another dollar crisis.	改革的第一要素应该是给予当今世界唯一真正的国际货币——始创于1969年美元危机后的IMF特别提款权（SDR）——更大的角色。


The establishment of SDRs was accompanied by a commitment, included in the IMF Articles of Agreement, to “making the special drawing right the principal reserve asset in the international monetary system” (Article VIII, Section 7 and Article XXII).	SDR的创立伴随着一项承诺，并写入了IMF协定章程中：“让特别提款权成为国际货币体系的主要储备资产”（第八条第7款和第二十二条）。


But this commitment has remained a dead letter, except for periodic emissions of SDRs during crises, including the equivalent of $250 billion in 2009.	但这一承诺至今形同虚设，SDR只是在危机爆发时发放过几次，包括2009年所发放的相当于2500亿美元的SDR。


The IMF Articles of Agreement should be amended to allow more flexible use of SDRs, replicating the way central banks operate.	IMF协定章程应该作出修订以允许更灵活地使用SDR，复制中央银行的操作方式。


That is, SDRs could be created during global recessions and withdrawn during booms.	也就是说，SDR应该在全球衰退期间创造，在全球繁荣期间收回。


They should be the major source of IMF financing as well, replacing quota subscriptions or lending to the Fund by member countries (potentially making the IMF a purely SDR-based institution, as proposed decades ago by the late IMF economist Jacques Polak).	SDR还应该成为IMF的主要资源，取代成员国的配额认购和IMF贷款（这有望使IMF成为纯粹的基于SDR的机构，如同已故的IMF经济学家波拉克（Jacques Polak）几十年前所建议的那样）。


The simplest approach would be for countries to “deposit” the SDRs that they receive at the IMF, which could then lend them to countries and invest the remainder in sovereign bonds.	最简单的方法是各国将它们得到的SDR“储蓄”在IMF，IMF将这些SDR贷给各国并将剩下部分投资于主权债券。


This should be combined with a more active role for the IMF – rather than the G-20 – as the true instrument of global macroeconomic policy coordination.	此外，IMF——而不是G-20——应该扮演更积极的角色，成为真正的全球宏观经济政策协调工具。


One essential (and generally agreed) goal of such coordination should be to reduce global imbalances like those caused in recent years by the European Union’s rising external surplus, which has forced many emerging economies to run growing deficits.	一个根本性（也被广泛接受的）协调目标应是减少类似于近几年来因欧盟外部盈余增加从而迫使许多新兴经济体赤字抬头而造成的失衡。


Because other global currencies – the dollar, the euro, and increasingly the renminbi – would continue to coexist with the SDRs as global reserve assets, another essential element of global macroeconomic cooperation should be defining the particular obligations of countries (or regions) issuing reserve currencies.	由于其他全球货币——美元、欧元，人民币也日渐跻身其中——将继续与SDR共存作为全球储备资产，因此，另一个全球宏观经济合作的根本性要素应该是定义发行储备货币的各国（或各地区）的具体义务。


Still another element of international monetary reform is better management of the global exchange-rate system (or, again, “non-system”), which should aim at avoiding currency “manipulation” – but only after defining precisely what that means.	国际货币改革的另一项要素是更好地管理全球汇率体系（或者说也是“无体系”），此项改革的目标应该是避免货币“操纵”——但必须明确定义什么是操纵。


It should also reduce the high levels of exchange-rate volatility – “a tax on international specialization,” as the economist Charles Kindleberger once put it – that we have seen in recent years, including among major currencies.	改革还应该降低近几年来出现的剧烈的汇率波动水平——经济学家金德尔伯格（Charles Kindleberger）称之为“国际专业化税”——包括主要货币对在内。


Long-term global-finance discussions have also made clear that, under certain conditions, regulation of capital flows (“capital-flow management measures,” in current IMF terminology) are warranted on “macroprudential” grounds – an understanding accepted by the G-20 at its 2011 Cannes meeting and by the IMF last year.	长期全球金融讨论还明确地表明，在一定条件下，资本流监管（用当前IMF术语讲，叫“资本流管理措施”）必须有“宏观审慎”基础，这一点在2011年的G-20戛纳峰会被接受，IMF也在去年接受了它。


Last but not least, the international monetary system requires governance reform, which includes giving a stronger voice to emerging and developing countries.	最后，国际货币体系需要治理改革，包括给予新兴和发展中国家更大的话语权。


Aside from the final adoption of the 2010 reforms and the forthcoming 2014 quota debates, the changes should include those recommended by the Stiglitz Commission, the Palais Royal Initiative, and the 2009 Committee on IMF Governance Reform headed by Trevor Manuel, among others.	除了最后采纳2010年的改革和即将到来的2014年配额争论外，还应该包括斯蒂格利茨委员会、王宫倡议和以曼努埃尔（Trevor Manuel）等人为首的2009年IMF治理改革委员会提出的变化。


One central element of these proposals is to eliminate, once and for all, the veto power of any individual country.	这些议案的一个核心要素是一劳永逸地取消任何单个国家的否决权。


With the world waiting anxiously for some of America’s political leaders to behave like adults, the cost of maintaining the current non-system has become all too obvious.	全世界正在焦急地等待美国政治领导人向成年人那样行动，维持无体系现状的成本早已一目了然了。


After the Dollar	美元之后


NEW YORK – It is symbolic that the recent BRICS summit in Fortaleza, Brazil, took place exactly seven decades after the Bretton Woods Conference that created the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.	纽约—最近在巴西福塔雷萨（Fortaleza）举行的金砖国家峰会具有象征意义，其召开正逢建立了国际货币进组织和世界银行的布雷顿森林会议七十周年。


The upshot of the BRICS meeting was the announcement of the New Development Bank, which will mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects, and a Contingent Reserve Arrangement to provide liquidity through currency swaps.	金砖国家峰会的一个重要成果是宣布成立新开发银行为基础设施和可持续发展工程动员资源，以及建立一个应急储备安排（Contingent Reserve Arrangement）以通过货币互换提供流动性。


The Bretton Woods Conference marked one of history’s greatest examples of international economic cooperation.	布雷顿森林会议是历史上国际经济合作最伟大的范例之一。


And, while no one can say yet whether the BRICS’ initiatives will succeed, they represent a major challenge to the Bretton Woods institutions, which should respond.	而尽管没人能说金砖国家的最近举动能够成功，但它们构成了对布雷顿森林机构的重大挑战，后者应该有所回应。


Rethinking the role of the US dollar in the international monetary system is a case in point.	反思美元在国际货币体系中的作用是其中的应有之义。


One key feature of the Bretton Woods system was that countries would tie their exchange rates to the US dollar.	布雷顿森林体系的一个关键特征是各国将汇率与美元绑定。


While the system was effectively eliminated in 1971, the US dollar’s central role in the international monetary system has remained intact – a reality that many countries are increasingly unwilling to accept.	尽管该体系在1971年已事实解体，但美元在国际货币体系中的核心地位并未受到动摇——许多国家日益不愿接受这一现实。


Dissatisfaction with the dollar’s role as the dominant global reserve currency is not new.	不满于美元首要全球储备货币地位并非新鲜事。


In the 1960s, French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing famously condemned the “exorbitant privilege” that the dollar’s status bestowed upon the United States.	20世纪60年代，法国财政部长德斯坦（Valéry Giscard d’Estaing）就有过著名的批评，他称美元的地位让美国拥有了“过度特权”。


The issue is not merely one of fairness.	这一问题并不只是公平问题。


According to the Belgian economist Robert Triffin, an international monetary system based on a national currency is inherently unstable, owing to the resulting tensions among the inevitably divergent interests of the issuing country and the international system as a whole.	根据比利时经济学家特里芬（Robert Triffin）的理论，基于国家货币的国际货币体系具有内在不稳定性，因为这必然会导致货币发行国利益于国际体系整体利益的冲突。


Triffin issued his warning more than 50 years ago, but it has recently gained traction, as China’s rise has made the world increasingly disinclined to tolerate the instability caused by a dollar-denominated system.	特里芬在50多年前就提出了这一警告，但直到最近才获得重视，中国的崛起让世界越来越不愿意忍受美元计价体系带来的不稳定性。


The solution, however, lies not in replacing the dollar with the renminbi, but in strengthening the role of the world’s only truly global currency: the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights.	但是，解决方案并不在于用人民币取代美元，而在于强化世界唯一的全球货币——IMF的特别提款权（Special Drawing Rights，SDR）的作用。


Following the creation of SDRs in 1969, IMF members committed to make them “the principle reserve asset in the international monetary system,” as stated in the Articles of Agreement.	SDR建立于1969年，IMF成员国承诺让SDR成为“国际货币体系的主要储备资产”，这一点写入了IMF章程。


But the peculiar way in which SDRs were adopted limited their usefulness.	但SDR的特殊实施方式限制了它的用途。


For starters, the separation of the IMF’s SDR account from its general account made it impossible to use SDRs to finance IMF lending.	首先，IMF的SDR与其总账是隔离的，这意味着SDR不能用于为IMF贷款提供资金。


Furthermore, though countries accrue interest on their holdings of SDRs, they have to pay interest on the allocations they receive.	此外，尽管各国所持有的SDR都能获得利息，但也必须为得到的配额支付利息。


In other words, SDRs are both an asset and a liability, functioning like a guaranteed credit line for the holder – a sort of unconditional overdraft facility.	换句话说，SDR既是资产也是负债，起作用就像是持有者所获得的信用配额保证——一种无条件的透支便利。


Nonetheless, SDRs have proved to be useful.	尽管如此，SDR仍起着作用。


After initial allocations in 1970-1972, more were issued to increase global liquidity during major international crises: in 1979-1981, in 1997, and, in particular, in 2009, when the largest issue – the equivalent of $250 billion – was made.	1970—1972年首次分配后又多次在主要国际危机期间增发以提高全球流动性：1979—1981年、1997年、2009年莫不如此，特别是2009年，增发量高达2,500亿美元。


While developed countries, including the US and the United Kingdom, have drawn on their allocations, the major users have been developing and, in particular, low-income countries.	尽管美国和英国等发达国家已充分利用了它们的配额，但主要使用者一直是发展中特别是低收入国家。


In fact, this is the only way in which developing countries (China aside) share in the creation of international money.	事实上，这是发展中国家（中国除外）唯一的参与国际货币创造的方式。


Several estimates indicate that, given the additional demand for reserves, the world could absorb annual allocations of $200-300 billion or even more.	一些测算表明，考虑到对储备的新增需求，世界每年可以吸收2,000—3,000亿美元甚至更多的配额。


This has prompted many – including People’s Bank of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan; the United Nations-backed Stiglitz Commission; the Palais-Royal Initiative, led by former IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus; and the Triffin International Foundation – to call for changes to the international monetary system.	这促使许多人呼吁改变国际货币体系，包括中国人民银行行长周小川、联合国支持的斯蒂格利茨委员会（Stiglitz Commission）、前IMF总裁康德苏（Michel Camdessus）领衔的皇宫倡议（Palais Royal Initiative）和特里芬国际基金会（Triffin International Foundation）等。


In 1979, the IMF economist Jacques Polak, who had been part of the Dutch delegation at the Bretton Woods conference, outlined a plan for doing just that.	1979年，IMF经济学家波拉克（Jacques Polak，他是布雷顿森林会议荷兰代表团成员）就提出了一项这样做的计划。


His recommendations include, first and foremost, making all of the IMF’s operations in SDRs, which would require ending the separation of the IMF’s SDR and general accounts.	他的计划中最重要的内容是让IMF的所有操作都通过SDR进行，这要求结束将SDR与IMF总账分离的做法。


The simplest way to fulfill this vision would be to allocate SDRs as a full reserve asset, which countries could either use or deposit in their IMF accounts.	实现这一目标的最简单的办法是将SDR作为完全储备资产进行配置，各国可以使用它，也可以将它存在自己的IMF账户中。


The IMF would use those deposits to finance its lending operations, rather than having to rely on quota allocations or “arrangements to borrow” from members.	IMF将使用这些存款为其贷款项目提供资金，而不是依靠配额分配或来自成员国的“借贷安排”。


Other provisions could be added.	还可以加入其他内容。


To address developing countries’ high currency demands, while enhancing their role in the creation of international money, a formula could be created to give them a larger share in SDR allocations than they now receive.	要满足发展中国家高企的货币需求，同时强化他们在国际货币创造中的作用，可以创造一套模式让它们获得比现在所得到的更大的SDR配额比例。


The private use of SDRs could also be encouraged, though that would likely be met with strong opposition from countries currently issuing international reserve currencies, especially the US.	SDR的私人用途也可以鼓励，尽管可能受到当前国际货币储备发行国特别是美国的反对。


Keeping SDRs as pure “central-bank money” would eliminate such opposition, enabling them to complement and stabilize the current system, rather than upend it.	将SDR作为纯粹的“央行货币”能消除这一番队，让SDR完胜和稳定当前体系而不是动摇它。


Just as the Bretton Woods framework restored order to the global economy after WWII, a new monetary framework, underpinned by a truly international currency, could strengthen much-needed economic and financial stability.	正如布雷顿森林框架在二战后重建了国际经济秩序，以真正的国际货币为基础的新的货币安排能够强化当前所急需的经济和金融稳定。


Everyone – even the US – would benefit from that.	所有人——包括美国——都能从中获益。


Waste Not, Want Not	无浪费，无欲求


ROME – Every year, we waste or lose 1.3 billion metric tons of food – one-third of the world’s annual food production.	罗马—我们每年要浪费13亿吨的粮食——相当于世界粮食年产量的三分之一。


The sheer scale of the number makes it almost impossible to grasp, no matter how one approaches it.	这个规模之大是很难想象的，不管你用什么方法。


Try to imagine 143,000 Eiffel Towers stacked one on top of another, or a pile of 10 trillion bananas.	你可以试想143 000座彼此重叠的埃菲尔铁塔，或者10万亿根香蕉组成的大堆。


The figure is all the more unfathomable, given that, alongside this massive wastage and loss, 840 million people experience chronic hunger on a daily basis.	还有更加难以想象的数字。 在如此大规模浪费和损失的情况下，仍有8.


Many millions more suffer from “silent hunger” – malnutrition and micronutrient deficiencies.	4亿人经历着长期的每日饥饿。 更有千百万人遭受着“静默的饥饿”——营养不良和微量元素缺乏。


For the more economically minded, here is another number: food wastage and loss, expressed in producer prices, costs roughly $750 billion per year.	从经济上看，还有另外一个数字：用生产者价格计算，粮食浪费和损失每年造成约7500亿美元损失。


If we were to consider retail prices and the wider impacts on the environment, including climate change, the figure would be much higher.	如果我们把零售价格和更广泛的环境冲击（如气候变化）考虑在内，这个数字还要大得多。


In an era of austerity, it is difficult to understand how such a massive hemorrhage of resources could be neglected.	在紧缩年代，很难理解如此大规模的资源渗漏会被忽视。


In fact, in some places, the volume of food wastage is rising.	事实上，在一些地区，粮食浪费量还在增长。


Now a new report by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization focuses on another troubling aspect of the problem: the negative consequences for the environment and the natural resources on which we rely for our survival.	眼下，联合国粮农组织的一份最新报告关注了这一问题的另一个棘手方面：对我们所赖以生存的环境和自然资源所造成的消极后果。


When food is lost or wasted, the energy, land, and water resources that went into producing it are squandered as well.	当粮食损失或被浪费时，生产粮食所投入的能源、土地和水资源也随之东流了。


At the same time, large amounts of greenhouse gases are released into the atmosphere during production, processing, and cooking.	与此同时，在生产、加工和烹饪过程中有大量温室气体排入���气。


From any perspective – ethical, economic, environmental, or in terms of food security – we simply cannot tolerate the annual wastage of 1.3 billion tons of food.	从伦理、经济、环境以及粮食安全等诸多角度看，我们绝对不能容忍每年浪费13亿吨粮食。


This is why serious reduction of food loss and wastage is one of the five elements of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s “Zero Hunger Challenge” and a major focus of the UN High Level Task Force on Global Food Security.	大幅减少粮食损失和浪费成为联合国秘书长潘基文的“零饥饿挑战”（Zero Hunger Challenge）的五大要素之一以及联合国高级别全球粮食安全工作组（UN High Level Task Force on Global Food Security）的主要关注点之一，原因就在于此。


We are working together within the UN system and with a broad coalition of other partners to ensure universal access to adequate food all year round; eliminate childhood stunting; make all food systems sustainable; and eradicate rural poverty.	我们在联合国系统内共同合作，与其他合作伙伴组成广泛的同盟以确保人人都能全年获得充足的粮食、消灭儿童发育迟缓、让所有粮食体系变得可持续、并根除农村贫困。


Next week, the Global Green Growth Forum in Copenhagen will allow for a deeper look at this issue.	下周，哥本哈根全球绿色增长论坛（Global Green Growth Forum）将让我们根深度地检视这一问题。


There is much that can be done.	我们可以做很多事。


For starters, food loss and wastage needs to be seen as a cross-cutting policy issue, rather than a lifestyle choice to be left in the hands of individual consumers and their consciences.	首先，粮食损失和浪费需要被视为跨越性政策问题，而不只是个人消费者及其良心决定的生活方式选择问题。


The world needs to wake up to the need for policies that address all stages of the food chain, from production to consumption.	世界需要警醒——我们需要针对包括从生产到消费的整个粮食链的所有阶段的政策。


Food loss – on farms, during processing, transport, and at markets – undermines food security in most developing countries, where post-harvest losses can reach as high as 40% of production.	粮食损失——在地头、在加工过程中、在运输期间、在市场交易中——威胁着大部分发展中国家的粮食安全，收获后损失可能高达产量的40%。


Investment in infrastructure for transport, storage, and marketing of food is badly needed, as are programs to train farmers in best practices.	粮食运输、存储和营销方面的基础设施投资严重不足，农民也急需培训以了解最佳行动方式。


In developed countries, food-retailing practices require a rethink.	在发达国家，粮食零售行为也需要反思。


For example, rejection of food products on the basis of aesthetic concerns is a major cause of wastage.	比如，因审美观念而拒绝粮食生产是极大的浪费源。


Some supermarkets have already begun relaxing standards on fruit appearance, selling “misshapen” items at reduced prices and helping to raise awareness that ugly does not mean bad.	一些超级市场已开始放松对水果外观的标准，以折扣价售卖“畸形”水果，这有助于让人们了解丑并不意味着差。


More approaches like this – and concerted efforts to find markets or uses for surplus food – are needed.	我们需要更多的类似行为以及共同寻找剩余粮食的市场和用途。


Businesses and households alike should monitor where and how they waste food and take corrective steps, because prevention of wastage is even more important than recycling or composting.	企业和家庭应该监控他们在哪些环节浪费了那些粮食，并采取矫正措施，因为预防浪费甚至比回收或堆肥更重要。


Yes, 1.3 billion tons is a mindboggling figure.	是的，13亿吨是一个令人咋舌的数字。


But these simple steps are easy enough to grasp – and within reach for everyone.	但这些简单措施很容易掌握，并且人人可以做到。


The world confronts many seemingly intractable problems; food wastage is one issue that we all can do something about now.	世界面临着诸多看似棘手的问题； 粮食浪费是我们可以人人做起、从现在做起的问题。


Argentina’s Griesafault	阿根廷的葛里萨违约


NEW YORK – On July 30, Argentina’s creditors did not receive their semiannual payment on the bonds that were restructured after the country’s last default in 2001.	纽约—7月30日，阿根廷债权人没有收到该国2001年违约后经历重组的债券的半年利息。


Argentina had deposited $539 million in the Bank of New York Mellon a few days before.	几天前，阿根廷在纽约梅隆银行（Bank of New York Mellon）存入了5.


But the bank could not transfer the funds to the creditors: US federal judge Thomas Griesa had ordered that Argentina could not pay the creditors who had accepted its restructuring until it fully paid – including past interest – those who had rejected it.	39亿美元。 但该银行无法把这笔钱转给债权人：美国联邦法官葛里萨（Thomas Griesa）判决，在连本带息足额偿付拒绝重组的债权人之前，阿根廷不能偿付接受重组的债权人。


It was the first time in history that a country was willing and able to pay its creditors, but was blocked by a judge from doing so.	这是历史上第一次由国家愿意也有能力支付债权人，却被法官阻挠。


The media called it a default by Argentina, but the Twitter hashtag #Griesafault was much more accurate.	媒体称之为阿根廷违约，但Twitter标签更加正确——“葛里萨违约”（#Griesafault）。


Argentina has fulfilled its obligations to its citizens and to the creditors who accepted its restructuring.	阿根廷履行了其对国民和接受重组的债权人的义务。


Griesa’s ruling, however, encourages usurious behavior, threatens the functioning of international financial markets, and defies a basic tenet of modern capitalism: insolvent debtors need a fresh start.	但葛里萨的裁决却在鼓励高利贷行为，威胁了国际金融市场的运行，也践踏了现代资本主义的一条基本原则：资不抵债的债务人需要从新开始。


Sovereign defaults are common events with many causes.	主权违约是一个常见现象，原因多种多样。


For Argentina, the path to its 2001 default started with the ballooning of its sovereign debt in the 1990s, which occurred alongside neoliberal “Washington Consensus” economic reforms that creditors believed would enrich the country.	就阿根廷而言，2001年的违约起因是20世纪90年代积累了太多的主权债务，而这又是拜“华盛顿共识”所赐。 债权人相信，新自由主义的华盛顿共识经济改革能让阿根廷走向富裕。


The experiment failed, and the country suffered a deep economic and social crisis, with a recession that lasted from 1998 to 2002.	这场实验以失败告终，阿根廷也经历了深刻的经济和社会危机，衰退从1998年一直持续到2002年。 最终，创纪录的57.


By the end, a record-high 57.5% of Argentinians were in poverty, and the unemployment rate skyrocketed to 20.8%.	5%的阿根廷人陷入贫困，失业率也一飞冲天，达到了20. 8%。


Argentina restructured its debt in two rounds of negotiations, in 2005 and 2010.	阿根廷通过两轮谈判（2005年和2010年）重组了债务。


More than 92% of creditors accepted the new deal, and received exchanged bonds and GDP-indexed bonds.	92%的债权人接受了新协议，并获得了与GDP挂钩的替换债券。


It worked out well for both Argentina and those who accepted the restructuring.	对阿根廷和接受重组的债权人来说，这一新协议相当成功。


The economy soared, so the GDP-indexed bonds paid off handsomely.	阿根廷经济实现了腾飞，GDP挂钩债券的偿付情况也非常不错。


But so-called vulture investors saw an opportunity to make even larger profits.	但所谓的兀鹫投资者看到了攫取更大利润的机会。


The vultures were neither long-term investors in Argentina nor the optimists who believed that Washington Consensus policies would work.	这些“兀鹫”既非阿根廷长期投资者，亦非认为华盛顿共识能够奏效的乐观派。


They were simply speculators who swooped in after the 2001 default and bought up bonds for a fraction of their face value from panicky investors.	他们无非是投机客，在2001年违约时猛冲下来，以面值的几分之一从恐慌的投资者手中收购债券。


They then sued Argentina to obtain 100% of that value.	然后，他们把阿根廷告上法庭，要求获得100%的债券价值。


NML Capital, a subsidiary of the hedge fund Elliot Management, headed by Paul Singer, spent $48 million on bonds in 2008; thanks to Griesa’s ruling, NML Capital should now receive $832 million – a return of more than 1,600%.	对冲基金艾略特管理公司（Elliot Management）旗下的NML资本公司在保罗·辛格（Paul Singer）的带领下于2008年花了4,800万美元购买这些债券； 根据葛里萨的裁决，NML资本公司现在应该获得8.


The figures are so high in part because the vultures seek to earn past interest, which, for some securities, includes a country-risk premium – the higher interest rate offered when they were issued to offset the larger perceived probability of default.	如此高的回报部分是因为兀鹫投资者要求获得过去的利息，而对一些证券来说，其中需要包含国家风险溢价——当违约概率较高时，债券发行就必须提供更高的利率作为补偿。


Griesa found that this was reasonable.	葛里萨认为这是合理的。


Economically, though, it makes no sense.	但是，从经济上讲，这毫无意义。


When a country pays a risk premium on its debt, it means that default is a possibility.	当一国为其债务支付风险溢价时，这意味着违约成为可能。


But if a court rules that a country always must repay the debt, there is no default risk to be compensated.	但如果法庭裁决一国永远必须偿付债务，就不存在需要补偿的违约风险。


Repayment on Griesa’s terms would devastate Argentina’s economy.	根据葛里萨的要求实行偿付会毁掉阿根廷经济。


NML Capital and the other vultures comprise just 1% of the creditors, but would receive a total of $1.5 billion.	MNL资本公司和其他兀鹫投资者只占债权人的1%，但总共可以获得15亿美元。


Other holdouts (6.6% of total creditors) would receive $15 billion.	其他坚持抵制的债权人（占债权人数量的6.


And, because the debt restructuring stipulated that all of the creditors who accepted it could demand the same terms as holdouts receive, Argentina might be on the hook for $140 billion more.	6%）可以获得150亿美元。 而由于债务重组规定所有者接受方案的债权人都可以要求与坚持抵制的债权人相同的条件，因此阿根廷可能会因此多付出1,400亿美元。


Every Argentine might thus owe more than $3,500 – more than one-third of average annual per capita income.	这样一来，每个阿根廷都背上了3,500多美元的债务——相当于人均收入的三分之一以上。


In the United States, applying the equivalent proportion would mean forcing every citizen to pay roughly $20,000 – all to line the pockets of some billionaires, intent on wringing the country dry.	若是在美国，这相当于强迫每位公民付出约20,000美元，而这笔钱几乎全部流入了少数企图榨干这个国家的亿万富翁的腰包。


What’s more, the existence of credit default swaps creates the possibility of further gains for the vultures.	不仅如此，信用违约互换（CDS）的存在使得兀鹫投资者还有进一步获利的可能。


A CDS insures against a default, paying off if the bonds do not. They can yield substantial returns, regardless of whether the bonds are repaid – thus reducing their holders’ incentive to achieve an agreement.	CDS相当于违约保险，在债券无法偿付时赔偿持有人，它可以产生巨大的回报，不管债券是否被偿付——从而刺激持有人达成协议。


In the run-up to July 30, the vultures conducted a scare campaign.	7月30日，兀鹫投资者发动了一场恐吓行动。


A second default in 13 years would be a big setback for Argentina, they claimed, threatening the country’s fragile economy.	他们说，13年后的第二次违约将是阿根廷的一次重大退步，威胁到脆弱的国家经济。


But all of this presumed that financial markets would not distinguish between a default and a Griesafault.	但他们的论断有一个前提：金融市场无法区分违约和葛里萨违约。


Fortunately, they did: Interest rates for different categories of Argentine corporate loans have not reacted to the event.	幸运的是，金融市场有这个能力：不同类型的阿根廷公司贷款的利率并未对此事件产生反应。


In fact, borrowing costs on July 30 were lower than the average for the whole year.	事实上，7月30日的借贷成本低于全年平均水平。


Ultimately, though, the Griesafault will carry a high price – less for Argentina than for the global economy and countries needing access to foreign financing.	但是，最终葛里萨违约会带来高昂代价——相对于阿根廷，全球经济和需要外国融资的国家受影响更大。


America will suffer, too.	美国也会蒙受损失。


Its courts have been a travesty: As one observer pointed out,it was clear that Griesa never really fathomed the issue’s complexity.	美国法院已经成了嘲弄对象。 一位观察家指出，显然葛里萨根本不明白此事的复杂性。


The US financial system, already practiced at exploiting poor Americans, has extended its efforts globally.	大肆掠夺美国穷人的美国金融体系要把触手伸向全球。


Sovereign borrowers will not – and should not – trust the fairness and competence of the US judiciary.	主权债务人不会——也不应该——相信美国司法的公平和胜任能力了。


The market for issuance of such bonds will move elsewhere. 	这些债券的发行市场会转向别处。


Debeaking the Vultures	切掉兀鹫之喙


NEW YORK – In the midst of the ongoing dispute between Argentina and the “vulture funds” that hold its bonds, a broad consensus has emerged concerning the need for sovereign-debt restructuring mechanisms (SDRMs).	纽约—在阿根廷与持有其债券的“兀鹫基金”之间闹得不可开交之际，一个共识已经浮现：我们需要主权债务重组机制（SDRM）。


Otherwise, US Federal Judge Thomas P. Griesa’s ruling that Argentina must pay the vultures in full (after 93% of other bondholders agreed to a restructuring) will give free rein to opportunistic behaviors that sabotage future restructurings.	否则，美国联邦法官托马斯·葛里萨（Thomas P. Griesa）的裁决——阿根廷必须足额偿付兀鹫（尽管93%的其他债券持有者同意重组）——将让机会主义者肆无忌惮地阻挠未来重组。


Most recently, the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) recommended new terms for government bonds.	最近，国际资本市场协会（International Capital Market Association，ICMA）建议对政府债券采取新条款。


Though the ICMA’s proposal leaves unresolved the hundreds of billions of bonds written under the old terms, the new framework says in effect that Griesa’s interpretation was wrong, and recognizes that leaving it in place would make restructuring impossible.	尽管ICMA的建议保留了数千亿已发行债券的旧条款，但新框架事实上宣判了葛里萨的裁决是错误的，并认为让该裁决继续存在下去将让重组无从进行。


The ICMA’s proposed contractual terms clarify the pari passu clause that was at the heart of Griesa’s muddle-headed ruling.	ICMA所建议的合约条款明确了作为葛里萨糊涂裁决核心的平等权利条款。


The intent of the clause – a standard component of sovereign-bond contracts – was always to ensure that the issuing country treated identical bondholders identically.	该条款是主权债券合约的标准组成部分，其初衷总是为了确保发行无差别地对待相同的债券持有人。


But it has always been recognized that senior creditors – for example, the International Monetary Fund – are treated differently.	但人们总是认为高级债权人——比如国际货币基金组织（IMF）能受到区别对待。


Griesa did not seem to grasp the common understanding of the clause.	葛里萨似乎没有抓住对该条款的普遍理解。


After Argentina defaulted on its sovereign debt in 2001, vulture funds bought defaulted bonds in the secondary market at a fraction of their face value, and then sued for full payment.	在2001年阿根廷对其主权债务违约后，兀鹫基金在二级市场以面值的几分之一买入违约的债券，然后起诉要求足额偿付。


According to Griesa’s interpretation of pari passu, if Argentina paid the interest that it owed to creditors that accepted the restructuring, it had to pay the vultures in full – including all past interest and the principal.	根据葛里萨对权利平等条款的解释，如果阿根廷向接受重组的债券人偿付利息，就必须足额偿付兀鹫——包括之前的所有本息。


The vultures’ business was enabled in part by litigation over the so-called champerty defense – based on a longstanding English common-law doctrine, later adopted by US state legislatures, prohibiting the purchase of debt with the intent of bringing a lawsuit.	兀鹫之所以能如此行事，部分是拜所谓的帮诉辩护（champerty defense）诉讼所赐——其基础是由来已久的英国普通法概念，随后被美国州立法机关所采纳，禁止以打官司为目的购买债券。


Argentina is simply the latest victim in the vultures’ long legal battle to change the rules of the game to permit them to prey on poor countries seeking to restructure their debts.	阿根廷只是最新的受害者——长期以来，兀鹫一直在进行法律斗争改变游戏规则，以使他们能掠食试图重组债务的穷国。


In 1999, in Elliot Associates, LP v. Banco de la Nacion and the Republic of Peru, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the plaintiff’s intent in purchasing the discounted debt was to be paid in full or otherwise to sue.	1999年，在艾略特联合工作四诉秘鲁共和国国民银行案（Elliot Associates, LP v. Banco de la Nacion and the Republic of Peru）中，第二巡回上诉法院裁决原告购买折价债务的意图是为了获得足额偿付，否则原告就会上诉。


The court then ruled that Elliot’s intent, because it was contingent, did not meet the champerty requirement.	因此，法院裁定艾略特公司的意图——因其具有或有性——不符合帮诉条件。


Though some other courts accepted the Second Circuit’s narrow reading of the champerty defense, the vultures were not satisfied and went to the New York state legislature, which in 2004 effectively eliminated the defense of champerty concerning any debt purchase above $500,000.	尽管其他一些法院接受了第二巡回法院关于帮诉辩护的狭义解读，但兀鹫并没有就此满足，而是来到纽约州立法机关。 2004年，纽约州立法机关事实上取消了金额超过500,000美元的所有债务购买行为的帮诉辩护。


That decision contradicted understandings according to which hundreds of billions of dollars of debt had already been issued.	这一决定有悖于数千亿美元已发行债务所根据的理解。


Investors who acquire defaulted sovereign debt at huge discounts should not expect repayment in full; the discount is an indication that the market does not expect that, and it is only through litigation that one could hope to receive anything close to it.	以巨大折价买入违约主权债务投资者不应该期待足额偿付； 折价已经表明市场并不期待能够如此，只有诉讼才有可能让投资者接近这一目标。


An important change in the legal framework, such as the elimination of the champerty defense, is de facto a change in “property rights,” with the debtors losing, and creditors who purchase the bonds intending to sue if they are not paid what they want – the vultures – gaining.	法律框架的重要变化，比如取消帮诉辩护，实际上是一种“产权”变化，债务人受损，购买债券以便为了得不到想要的偿付时起诉的债权人——即兀鹫——获益。


The vultures were thus unjustly enriched, doubly so with the novel and unjustified interpretation of the pari passu clause.	因此，兀鹫大发不义之财，因为对平等权利条款的不公平的“奇葩”解释让利润翻番。


Will so-called collective-action clauses (CACs) – another aspect of the ICMA “reform” aimed at debeaking the vultures – save the day?	所谓的集体行动条款（collective-action clauses）——ICMA旨在打击兀鹫的“改革”的另一个重要方面——能力挽狂澜吗？


In many countries, CACs stipulate that if, say, two-thirds of the investors accept a company’s (or a country’s) restructuring proposal, the other investors are bound to go along.	在许多国家，集体行动条款规定，如果（比如）三分之二的投资者接受某公司（或某国）的重组方案，其他投资者也必须遵守。


This mechanism prevents speculative holdouts from holding up the restructuring process and demanding ransom.	该机制阻止了投机性强硬派劫持重组程序、要求赎回。


But CACs do not exist for sovereign debt written in many jurisdictions, leaving the field open for the vultures.	但很多司法辖区所发行的主权债务中不含集体行动条款，这给兀鹫的行动创造了条件。


Moreover, CACs are no panacea.	此外，集体行动条款也不是万灵丹。


If they were, there would be no need for domestic bankruptcy law, which spells out issues like precedence and fair treatment.	如果是的话，就不需要国内破产法了，破产法的存在就是为了避免效仿先例和公平对待。


But no government has found CACs adequate for resolving domestic restructuring.	但没有一个政府发现集体行动条款已足以解决国内重组。


So why should we think that they would suffice in the much more complex world of sovereign-debt restructurings?	既然如此，我们又怎么能认为它们能胜任于复杂得多的主权债务重组问题呢？


In particular, CACs suffer from the problem of “aggregation.”	特别是，集体行动条款受“加总”问题的困扰。


If a CAC required, say, 75% of the holders of each bond class, vultures could buy 26% of only one bond class and block the entire restructuring.	如果集体行动条款要求（比如）每种债券级别都有75%多数的持有者，那么兀鹫只要买入一种债券类别的26%，就可以阻挠整个重组。


The recent Greek debt restructuring had to confront this issue.	最近的希腊债务重组就不得不面临这一问题。


The ICMA’s new framework seems to provide a way out: The supermajority would be defined by the acceptance of the aggregate principal amount of outstanding debt securities of all of the affected series.	ICMA的新框架似乎提供了解决之道：绝对多数由所有受影响序列的未偿还债务政权的总本金数量决定。


The supermajority’s decisions would be binding on all other investors.	所有其他投资者都必须遵守绝对多数的决定。


But this, too, poses a problem: The more junior creditors could vote to have themselves treated in the same way as more senior creditors.	但这也存在一个问题：多数低级债权人可以投票使自己获得与多数高级债权人同样的地位。


What recourse would the senior creditors then have?	那么，高级债权人能获得什么索偿权呢？


In bankruptcy court, they would have grounds for objecting, and the judge would have to weigh the equities.	在破产法庭，他们有反对权，法官将根据他们的要求权衡。


These issues are especially important in the context of sovereign-debt restructurings, because the claimants to a country’s resources include not only formal creditors; others, too – for example, pensioners – might not be paid if bondholders are paid in full.	这些问题在主权债务重组中特别重要，因为对某国的索偿权的主张者不但包括正式债权人； 如果债券持有人获得足额偿付，其他人——比如退休者——也可能无法获得偿付。


Chapter 9 of the US Bankruptcy Code (which applies to public entities) recognizes these rights – unlike Griesa and the vultures.	美国破产法第九章（适用于公共实体）承认这些权利——这与葛里萨和兀鹫不同。


Today, the international community faces two challenges.	如今，国际社会面临两大挑战。


One is to deal with the hundreds of billions of dollars of debt written under the old terms, which cannot be restructured under Griesa’s ruling.	一是处置根据旧条款发行的数千亿美元债务，它们无法根据葛里萨的裁决重组。


The second is to decide on the terms that should be imposed in the future.	二是决定应在未来采用的条款。


The investing community has made a serious proposal.	投资界提出了严肃的方案。


But changes of this magnitude must be based on discussions among creditors and debtor governments – and more is needed than tweaking the terms of the agreements.	但这种程度的变化必须基于债权人和债务人政府之间的讨论——也不是光在协议条款问题上扯皮就行的。


An initiative at the United Nations to encourage the establishment of SDRMs is receiving the support of prominent academic economists and practitioners.	联合国鼓励建立主权债务重组机制的计划受到了著名经济学者和实践家的支持。


Global efforts are good first steps to remedy the damage to international financial markets that the US courts have inflicted.	全球努力是弥补美国法院所造成的国际金融市场伤害的可喜的第一步。


For the sake of a healthy global economy, the vultures must be grounded.	为了全球经济的健康，不能放纵兀鹫肆虐。


The Innovation Enigma	创新之谜


NEW YORK – Around the world, there is enormous enthusiasm for the type of technological innovation symbolized by Silicon Valley.	纽约—环顾世界，人们对以硅谷为象征的科技创新有着无尽的热情。


In this view, America’s ingenuity represents its true comparative advantage, which others strive to imitate.	在这些人看来，美国的聪慧代表着它的真正比较优势，其他国家都在尽力模仿。


But there is a puzzle: it is difficult to detect the benefits of this innovation in GDP statistics.	但在这里有一个迷：很难看出这种创新对GDP统计数字的贡献。


What is happening today is analogous to developments a few decades ago, early in the era of personal computers.	今天所发生的事情与几十年前个人电脑时代肇始时有几分相似。


In 1987, economist Robert Solow – awarded the Nobel Prize for his pioneering work on growth – lamented that “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics.”	1987年，因在增长方面的开创性贡献而荣获诺贝尔奖的经济学家罗伯特·索洛（Robert Solow）哀叹：“电脑时代的印记随处可见，就是在生产率数据中看不到。


There are several possible explanations for this.	”对于这一点，可能的原因有好几个。


Perhaps GDP does not really capture the improvements in living standards that computer-age innovation is engendering.	也许GDP并不真正能够体现电脑时代的创新所带来的生活水平的提高。


Or perhaps this innovation is less significant than its enthusiasts believe.	或者这一创新并没有热烈支持者所认为的那么意义重大。


As it turns out, there is some truth in both perspectives.	事实表明，两者兼而有之。


Recall how a few years ago, just before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the financial sector prided itself on its innovativeness.	不妨回忆一下，几年前，雷曼兄弟倒闭前夕，金融部门以创新而自负。


Given that financial institutions had been attracting the best and brightest from around the world, one would have expected nothing less.	金融机构吸引着全世界最优秀、最聪明的人才，你还能期待什么呢？


But, upon closer inspection, it became clear that most of this innovation involved devising better ways of scamming others, manipulating markets without getting caught (at least for a long time), and exploiting market power.	但是，近距离的检视表明，金融创新大部分无非是更好地蒙骗他人、操纵市场而不被抓住（或者在相当长的时间里不被抓住）以及利用市场权力。


In this period, when resources flowed to this “innovative” sector, GDP growth was markedly lower than it was before.	在此期间，资源纷纷流入这一“创新”部门，而GDP增长比此前显著地降低了。


Even in the best of times, it did not lead to an increase in living standards (except for the bankers), and it eventually led to the crisis from which we are only now recovering.	即使在最佳时期，它也没有提高生活水平（银行家除外），最终还导致了我们至今仍在尽力摆脱的危机。


The net social contribution of all of this “innovation” was negative.	这一“创新”的净社会贡献是负数。


Similarly, the dot-com bubble that preceded this period was marked by innovation – Web sites through which one could order dog food and soft drinks online.	类似地，前一次互联网泡沫也打着创新的幌子，尽是些可以让你在线订购狗粮和软饮料的网站。


At least this era left a legacy of efficient search engines and a fiber-optic infrastructure.	这次创新潮好歹还留下了管用的搜索引擎和光纤基础设施。


But it is not an easy matter to assess how the time savings implied by online shopping, or the cost savings that might result from increased competition (owing to greater ease of price comparison online), affects our standard of living.	但很难说在线购物所节省的时间，或者竞争的提高（因为上网比较价格比以前方便了很多）所节省的成本在多大程度上影响了我们的生活水平。


Two things should be clear.	有两点应该澄清。


First, the profitability of an innovation may not be a good measure of its net contribution to our standard of living.	首先，创新的盈利能力并不是衡量其对我们的生活水平的净贡献的耗指标。


In our winner-takes-all economy, an innovator who develops a better Web site for online dog-food purchases and deliveries may attract everyone around the world who uses the Internet to order dog food, making enormous profits in the process.	在赢家通吃的经济中，开发出更好的在线狗粮购买和递送网站的创新者可能把全世界所有用互联网订购狗粮的用户都吸引过去，在此过程中赚取大笔利润。


But without the delivery service, much of those profits simply would have gone to others.	但若没有递送服务，这笔利润的大部分将流入他人的腰包。


The Web site’s net contribution to economic growth may in fact be relatively small.	网站对经济增长的净贡献事实上可能相对很小。


Moreover, if an innovation, such as ATMs in banking, leads to increased unemployment, none of the social cost – neither the suffering of those who are laid off nor the increased fiscal cost of paying them unemployment benefits – is reflected in firms’ profitability.	此外，如果一项创新，如银行ATM机，增加了失业，则这一社会成本——不管是被裁员者所遭遇的困难还是给他们发放失业救济增加的财政负担——并不会体现在企业的盈利能力中。


Likewise, our GDP metric does not reflect the cost of the increased insecurity individuals may feel with the increased risk of a loss of a job.	类似地，我们的GDP数字也不会反映个体因丢掉工作风险增加而感受到了不安全感。


Equally important, it often does not accurately reflect the improvement in societal wellbeing resulting from innovation.	同样重要的是，它通常无法准确反映创新所带来的社会福利改善。


In a simpler world, where innovation simply meant lowering the cost of production of, say, an automobile, it was easy to assess an innovation’s value.	在更简单的世界中，创新无非意味着降低（比如汽车的）生产成本，评估创新的价值就比较容易。


But when innovation affects an automobile’s quality, the task becomes far more difficult.	但如若创新影响的是汽车的质量，则评估其价值就比较困难了。


And this is even more apparent in other arenas: How do we accurately assess the fact that, owing to medical progress, heart surgery is more likely to be successful now than in the past, leading to a significant increase in life expectancy and quality of life?	其他领域就更加如此了：我们如何准确地评现在估心脏手术因为医学进步而比过去增加的成功率，从而极大地增加了寿命预期、改善了生命质量这一事实？


Still, one cannot avoid the uneasy feeling that, when all is said and done, the contribution of recent technological innovations to long-term growth in living standards may be substantially less than the enthusiasts claim.	但是，你无法摆脱一种不安感，即，当一切都说到做尽时，最新的科技创新对长期生活水平增长的贡献可能远远不如拥趸所宣称的。


A lot of intellectual effort has been devoted to devising better ways of maximizing advertising and marketing budgets – targeting customers, especially the affluent, who might actually buy the product.	大量知识创新被用在了构思更好的最大化广告和影响预算的办法上——将目标定位在实际可能购买产品的客户，特别是生活丰裕人群。


But standards of living might have been raised even more if all of this innovative talent had been allocated to more fundamental research – or even to more applied research that could have led to new products.	但如果创新天才用在更基本的研究上，或者用在能带来新产品的应用性更强的研究上，生活水平或许能得到更多的提升。


Yes, being better connected with each other, through Facebook or Twitter, is valuable.	是的，通过Facebook和Twitter更好地与他人互联是很有价值的。


But how can we compare these innovations with those like the laser, the transistor, the Turing machine, and the mapping of the human genome, each of which has led to a flood of transformative products?	但我们如何将这类创新与激光、晶体管、图灵机和人类基因组图谱这样的创新相比？ 后四者都带来了如潮水般的变革型产品。


Of course, there are grounds for a sigh of relief.	当然，我们也有理由不必瞎操心。


Although we may not know how much recent technological innovations are contributing to our wellbeing, at least we know that, unlike the wave of financial innovations that marked the pre-crisis global economy, the effect is positive.	尽管我们可能不知道最近的科技创新能给我们的福利形成多大贡献，但我们至少知道它们不是代表危机前全球经济的金融创新，它们的效果至少是正数。


Creating a Learning Society	打造学习型社会


NEW YORK – Citizens in the world’s richest countries have come to think of their economies as being based on innovation.	纽约—最发达国家的公民已开始认为他们的经济建立在创新的基础上。


But innovation has been part of the developed world’s economy for more than two centuries.	但创新成为发达世界经济的一部分已有两个多世纪的历史。


Indeed, for thousands of years, until the Industrial Revolution, incomes stagnated.	事实上，几千年来，直到工业革命前，收入一直处于停滞状态。


Then per capita income soared, increasing year after year, interrupted only by the occasional effects of cyclical fluctuations.	工业革命后，人均收入开始激增，一年更比一年高，只是时常会受到周期性波动的干扰。


The Nobel laureate economist Robert Solow noted some 60 years ago that rising incomes should largely be attributed not to capital accumulation, but to technological progress – to learning how to do things better.	60年前，诺贝尔经济学奖获得者罗伯特·索洛（Robert Solow）指出，收入的提高主要不是来自资本积累，而是来自技术进步——即学习如何将事情做得更好。


While some of the productivity increase reflects the impact of dramatic discoveries, much of it has been due to small, incremental changes.	尽管生产率的提高部分反映了重大发现的影响，但大部分都要归因于渐进的小变革。


And, if that is the case, it makes sense to focus attention on how societies learn, and what can be done to promote learning – including learning how to learn.	果真如此的话，就应该将注意力集中在社会如何学���以及如何促进学习上——包括学习如何学习。


A century ago, the economist and political scientist Joseph Schumpeter argued that the central virtue of a market economy was its capacity to innovate.	一个世纪前，经济学家兼政治学家约瑟夫·熊彼特（Joseph Schumpeter）指出，市场经济的最大好处是其创新能力。


He contended that economists’ traditional focus on competitive markets was misplaced; what mattered was competition for the market, not competition in the market.	他认为，传统上经济学家关注竞争市场，这是个错误； 真正重要的是为创造市场而竞争，而不是在市场中竞争。


Competition for the market drove innovation.	为创造市场而竞争推动了创新。


A succession of monopolists would lead, in this view, to higher standards of living in the long run.	根据这一观点，从长期看，前赴后继的垄断者能带来生活水平的提高。


Schumpeter’s conclusions have not gone unchallenged.	熊彼特的结论受到了挑战。


Monopolists and dominant firms, like Microsoft, can actually suppress innovation.	垄断者和主导且——如微软等——实际上可能抑制创新。


Unless checked by anti-trust authorities, they can engage in anti-competitive behavior that reinforces their monopoly power.	除非受到反垄断当局制约，否则它们可能采取反竞争行为以强化垄断力。


Moreover, markets may not be efficient in either the level or direction of investments in research and learning.	此外，市场在决定研究和学习投资水平或方向方面未必有效。


Private incentives are not well aligned with social returns: firms can gain from innovations that increase their market power, enable them to circumvent regulations, or channel rents that would otherwise accrue to others.	私人激励与社会回报并不完美匹配：企业可以从增强器市场实力的创新中获益，使它们能够绕过监管或将本可能流向他人的租引导到自己囊中。


But one of Schumpeter’s fundamental insights has held up well: Conventional policies focusing on short-run efficiency may not be desirable, once one takes a long-run innovation/learning perspective.	但熊彼特的一个基本洞见是成立的：从长期创新/学习角度看，关注短期效率的传统政策或许并不值得追求。


This is especially true for developing countries and emerging markets.	对于发展中国家和新兴市场而言尤其如此。


Industrial policies – in which governments intervene in the allocation of resources among sectors or favor some technologies over others – can help “infant economies” learn.	产业政策——政府干预资源在各部门间的配置或优待某些技术——有助于“婴儿经济体”（infant economy）学习。


Learning may be more marked in some sectors (such as industrial manufacturing) than in others, and the benefits of that learning, including the institutional development required for success, may spill over to other economic activities.	一些部门（如工业生产部门）的学习可能会胜过其他部门，而学习的好处，包括成功所必须的制度发展——可能溢出到其他经济活动中。


Such policies, when adopted, have been frequent targets of criticism.	当采取这些政策时，往往会招来批评。


Government, it is often said, should not be engaged in picking winners.	人们常说，政府不应该主动去挑选赢家。


The market is far better in making such judgments.	在这方面，市场的判断要好得多。


But the evidence on that is not as compelling as free-market advocates claim.	但这方面的证据并不如自由市场鼓吹者宣称的那样令人信服。


America’s private sector was notoriously bad in allocating capital and managing risk in the years before the global financial crisis, while studies show that average returns to the economy from government research projects are actually higher than those from private-sector projects – especially because the government invests more heavily in important basic research.	美国私人部门在全球金融危机前几年的配置资本和管理风险水平之低已是众所周知，而研究表明，经济得自政府研究项目的平均回报其实要高于私人部门项目——特别是因为政府投资更偏向重要的基础研究。


One only needs to think of the social benefits traceable to the research that led to the development of the Internet or the discovery of DNA.	只要想一想催生了互联网的发展和DNA的发现的研究就能一窥端倪。


But, putting such successes aside, the point of industrial policy is not to pick winners at all.	但是，除却这些成功不谈，产业政策的要点决非挑选赢家。


Rather, successful industrial policies identify sources of positive externalities – sectors where learning might generate benefits elsewhere in the economy.	相反，成功的产业政策要识别具有正外部性的资源——即本部门学习可能给经济的其他部门带来好处的部门。


Viewing economic policies through the lens of learning provides a different perspective on many issues.	从学习的角度看待经济政策让我们能用不同的目光审视许多问题。


The great economist Kenneth Arrow emphasized the importance of learning by doing.	著名经济学家肯尼斯·阿罗（Kenneth Arrow）强调干中学（learning by doing）的重要性。


The only way to learn what is required for industrial growth, for example, is to have industry.	比如，学习产业成长的必要基础的唯一办法是拥有该产业。


And that may require either ensuring that one’s exchange rate is competitive or that certain industries have privileged access to credit – as a number of East Asian countries did as part of their remarkably successful development strategies.	而这需要有高竞争力的汇率或者某些产业拥有获得信用的特权——这正是许多东亚国家取得巨大成功的发展战略的要点。


There is a compelling infant economy argument for industrial protection.	婴儿经济体有一个很强大的产业保护理由。


Moreover, financial-market liberalization may undermine countries’ ability to learn another set of skills that are essential for development: how to allocate resources and manage risk.	此外，金融市场自由化可能破坏一国学习发展所必须的技能组合的能力，即如何配置资源和管理风险。


Likewise, intellectual property, if not designed properly, can be a two-edged sword when viewed from a learning perspective.	类似地，知识产权如能得到合理设计，可以成为学习角度看来的双刃剑。


While it may enhance incentives to invest in research, it may also enhance incentives for secrecy – impeding the flow of knowledge that is essential to learning while encouraging firms to maximize what they draw from the pool of collective knowledge and to minimize what they contribute.	它能够强化研究投资激励，但也可能强化保密激励——阻止学习的关键知识的流动并鼓励企业尽可能在集体知识总量中占取最大份额、贡献最小力量。


In this scenario, the pace of innovation is actually reduced.	在这一情形中，创新的速度实际上可能受到削弱。


More broadly, many of the policies (especially those associated with the neoliberal “Washington Consensus”) foisted on developing countries with the noble objective of promoting the efficiency of resource allocation today actually impede learning, and thus lead to lower standards of living in the long run.	更广地看，许多打着促进当今资源配置效率的冠冕堂皇的口号强加给发展中国家的政策（特别是与新自由主义“华盛顿共识”相关的政策）实际上在阻碍学习，从而导致长期生活水平下降。


Virtually every government policy, intentionally or not, for better or for worse, has direct and indirect effects on learning.	几乎所有政府政策——不管有意还是无意，好还是差——都会对学习造成直接和间接的影响。


Developing countries where policymakers are cognizant of these effects are more likely to close the knowledge gap that separates them from the more developed countries.	决策者认识到这一影响的发展中国家更有可能弥补让它们与发达国家产生区别的知识差距。


Developed countries, meanwhile, have an opportunity to narrow the gap between average and best practices, and to avoid the danger of secular stagnation.	与此同时，发达国家有机会缩小一般实践和最佳实践之间的差别，避免长期停滞的危险。


South Africa Breaks Out	南非的爆发


NEW YORK – International investment agreements are once again in the news.	纽约—国际投资协定再一次成为新闻。


The United States is trying to impose a strong investment pact within the two big so-called “partnership” agreements, one bridging the Atlantic, the other the Pacific, that are now being negotiated. But there is growing opposition to such moves.	美国正在试图在两份大型的所谓“合作伙伴”协定中纳入强大的贸易契约，其中一个协定联系大西洋，另一个联系太平洋，目前都在谈判中。


South Africa has decided to stop the automatic renewal of investment agreements that it signed in the early post-apartheid period, and has announced that some will be terminated.	南非决定不再为后种族隔离时代早期签署的投资协定自动更新，并且宣布一些投资协定将会终结。


Ecuador and Venezuela have already terminated theirs.	厄瓜多尔和委内瑞拉已经终结了它们的投资协定。


India says that it will sign an investment agreement with the US only if the dispute-resolution mechanism is changed.	印度表示只有在争议解决机制做出改变后才会与美国签署投资协定。


For its part, Brazil has never had one at all.	而巴西则没有签署贸易协定。


There is good reason for the resistance.	如此抵制，其来有自。


Even in the US, labor unions and environmental, health, development, and other nongovernmental organizations have objected to the agreements that the US is proposing.	即使在美国，工会和环保、健康、发展和其他非政府组织也在反对美国正在推行的协定。


The agreements would significantly inhibit the ability of developing countries’ governments to protect their environment from mining and other companies; their citizens from the tobacco companies that knowingly purvey a product that causes death and disease; and their economies from the ruinous financial products that played such a large role in the 2008 global financial crisis.	这些协定会极大地制约发展中国家政府保护其环境不受矿业和其他公司伤害、其人民不受有意识地推销致病致死产品的烟草公司的伤害、以及其经济不受在2008年全球金融危机中扮演重要角色的破坏性金融产品伤害的能力。


They restrict governments even from placing temporary controls on the kind of destabilizing short-term capital flows that have so often wrought havoc in financial markets and fueled crises in developing countries.	这些协定甚至还限制政府，使其难以采取针对破坏性短期资本流的临时性管制，这类资本流经常造成发展中国家金融市场浩劫、助长危机。


Indeed, the agreements have been used to challenge government actions ranging from debt restructuring to affirmative action.	事实上，这些协定被利用来制约从债务重组到平权行动的各种政府行为。


Advocates of such agreements claim that they are needed to protect property rights.	这些协定的支持者宣称需要靠它们来保护产权。


But countries like South Africa already have strong constitutional guarantees of property rights.	但南非等国家已经建立了强大的宪法产权保护。


There is no reason that foreign-owned property should be better protected than property owned by a country’s own citizens.	外国���有的产权没有道理应该获得比本国公民所有产权更好的保护。


Moreover, if constitutional guarantees are not enough to convince investors of South Africa’s commitment to protecting property rights, foreigners can always avail themselves of expropriation insurance provided by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (a division of the World Bank) or numerous national organizations providing such insurance.	此外，如果宪法保护仍不足以说服南非投资者信任南非的产权保护承诺，那么外国人还可以投保没收险，多边投资担保机构（Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency，世界银行的一个分支）和其他多个国家组织提供这种保险。


(Americans, for example, can buy insurance from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.)	（比如，美国可以向海外私人投资公司（Overseas Private Investment Corporation）购买这种保险。 ）


But those supporting the investment agreements are not really concerned about protecting property rights, anyway.	但支持投资协定者并不真关心产权保护。


The real goal is to restrict governments’ ability to regulate and tax corporations – that is, to restrict their ability to impose responsibilities, not just uphold rights.	他们的真正目标是限制政府对公司进行监管和课税的能力——也就是说，不仅要保护权利，还要限制政府施加义务的能力。