The London School of Economics’ Centre for Economic Performance calculates that the long-term costs to Britain of lower trade with the EU could be as high as 9.5% of GDP, while the fall in foreign investment could cost 3.4% of GDP or more.	根据伦敦政治经济学院经济绩效研究中心的估算，英国因减少对欧盟贸易而产生的长期成本可能相当于GDP的9. 5％，而外国投资下降的影响则可能超过GDP的3.


Those costs alone dwarf the potential gains from Brexit.	4％。 仅仅这两项成本就将缩小脱盟的潜在收益。


Britain’s net contribution to the EU budget amounted to only 0.35% of GDP last year, and scrapping EU regulation would bring limited benefits, because the UK’s labor and product markets are already among the freest in the world.	英国对欧盟预算的净贡献额只相当于去年GDP的0. 35％，而由于英国的劳动力和产品市场本来就已经享有极高的自由度，因此摆脱欧盟法规会带来的好处也极为有限。


The exit process would generate prolonged uncertainty. Officially, it is meant to take two years.	退出进程也将产生长期的不确定性，官方程序上这个“长期”指得是两年。


But it would probably take much longer.	但它可能需要更长的时间。


In the 1980s, it took three years to negotiate the exit of Greenland (population: 50,000), and the only controversial issue was fish.	在上世纪80年代，格陵兰岛（5万人口）的退出谈判就花了三年时间，而且只存在渔业这么一个争议点。


Extricating Britain (the EU’s second-largest economy, with a population of 64 million) would be far more complex.	而英国这个拥有6400万人口的欧盟第二大经济体如果要退出，情况肯定会更为复杂。


Moreover, any agreement on a new economic relationship with the UK would require unanimity among the EU’s 27 remaining members.	此外，与英国签订的任何新经济关系协议都将需要余下的27个欧盟成员国达成一致。


And Britain would also have to renegotiate – from scratch – the 50-plus trade deals that the EU has with other countries.	同时英国也不得不重新——而且是从头开始——与欧盟就50多项贸易协议展开谈判。


All of this would take a long time.	所有这一切都需要很长的时间。


In the meantime, Britain’s trading rules and domestic regulations would be up in the air. Investment and employment decisions would be postponed or canceled.	在此期间，英国的贸易规则和国内规章都难以落地，投资和就业决策都将被推迟或取消，英镑直线下跌。


The pound would plummet. The foreign investors financing Britain’s current-account deficit – which hit 7% of GDP in the final quarter of last year – might drive up the risk premium on UK assets or, worse, pull out.	那些投钱支撑英国经常账户赤字——在去年最后一个季度达到GDP的7％——的外国投资者可能会推高对英国资产的风险溢价，而更糟糕的情况则是撤离。


All of that would weaken economic growth, jeopardizing the government’s fiscal plans.	所有这些都将削弱经济增长，破坏政府的财政计划。


Once the agreements were made, Britain would have worse access to both EU and global markets.	一旦协议签订下来，英国与欧盟和全球市场对接的渠道将恶化。


Economically, the least painful option would be to seek membership of the European Economic Area, along with Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein.	在经济上，最少痛苦的选择是寻求像挪威，冰岛和列支敦士登那样成为欧洲经济区成员。


That would provide almost full access to the single market (with opt-outs from EU agriculture and fisheries policies), albeit with customs controls and other trade barriers such as rules-of-origin requirements.	尽管存在海关管制以及其他类似原产地规则这样的贸易壁垒，但这将提供一条进入欧洲单一市场（不参与的欧盟农业和渔业政策）的近乎全方位的渠道。


Politically, though, EEA membership would be a raw deal. Britain would have to comply with single-market rules and legislation in areas such as consumer protection, the environment, and social policy – rules that it would have no say in creating.	但在政治上，欧洲经济区成员资格将是一项不公正的待遇，因为英国将必须在诸如消费者保护，环境和社会政策领域遵守单一市场规则和立法——而在制定这些法律法规的过程中不享有任何发言权。


It would also have to contribute to the EU budget, without receiving any spending in return.	英国还必须缴纳欧盟预算，却无法享受任何支出返还。


And it would have to allow EU citizens free entry, a political bugbear for most Brexit supporters.	它还必须允许欧盟公民自由进入，这在政治上足以令大多数脱盟支持者苦恼不已。


Given that the key motivation for Brexit is to restore the country’s supposedly lost sovereignty, a deal that gives the UK no say, but requires that it pay and obey, would be deeply unpalatable.	鉴于脱盟的关键动机是恢复该国所谓丧失了的主权，一场英国没有发言权却必须掏钱和服从的交易显然让人难以接受。


Trading with the EU according to World Trade Organization rules, as the United States and China do, would involve the fewest political constraints.	如果像美国和中国那样根据世界贸易组织规则与欧盟进行交易的话会受到最少的政治约束。


Britain would be free to keep out hard-working, taxpaying EU migrants. But this would entail reciprocal EU controls on UK migrants, harming Britons twice over.	英国将可以任意将吃苦耐劳且纳税的欧盟移民拒之门外，但欧盟也会反过来限制英国移民进出，一来一去就对英国人造成了两道伤害。


This approach would also entail import tariffs on British goods – including a 10% duty on its car exports to the EU – as well as non-tariff barriers.	这种做法也将意味着欧盟对英国商品征收进口关税——包括10％的汽车出口关税——以及非关税壁垒。


UK-based financial institutions would lose their passport to export freely to the EU.	总部设在英国的金融机构将失去自由进入欧盟的权利。


And without full access to the $16 trillion EU single market, with its 500 million consumers, foreign investment would drop.	一旦英国丧失了通往拥有16万亿美元规模和5亿消费者的欧盟单一市场的全面路径，外国投资将下降。


Intermediate options, from the Swiss to the Canadian model, are scarcely more appealing.	连类似瑞士到加拿大模式这类中转选项都比英国更具吸引力。


Brexit supporters claim that Britain could strike its own special deal, cherry picking the provisions it likes.	脱盟支持者声称英国可以签订专属协议，只选择那些有利于自身的规定。


The UK would have the whip hand, they argue, because it buys more from the EU than it sells in return.	他们认为英国有谈判的优势，因为它从欧盟的进口额超过了出口额。


But this, too, is a delusion.	但这也不过是种妄想。


The US also has a trade deficit with the EU, yet it doesn’t get to dictate terms in the negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.	美国也存在与欧盟的贸易赤字，但也未能在跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系协定谈判中占据统治地位。


Moreover, exports to the EU, at 13% of GDP, matter more to the UK than exports to Britain (just 3% of GDP) do to the EU.	此外，英国对欧盟的出口占了自身GDP的13％，显然比欧盟对英国的出口（占GDP的3％）更要紧。


In short, the EU would call the shots – and doubtless be tough with the UK.	总之，主导权在欧盟手里——而且肯定会处处为难英国。


Many economic actors – from German car manufacturers to French farmers to financial centers around the EU – would want to hamper their British competitors.	其它许多经济参与者——德国的汽车制造商，法国的农民以及欧盟内部的各大金融中心——无不想阻挠他们的英国竞争对手。


For their part, EU governments would want to punish Britain, not least because they know that a velvet divorce with Britain would bolster anti-EU parties, such as France’s far-right National Front, which has already called for a referendum on EU membership.	而欧盟各国政府都会想惩罚英国，因为他们知道与英国天鹅绒式和平分手将令法国极右翼国民阵线党——该党已经号召要举行脱盟公投——这类反欧盟政党士气大涨。


Britain’s new trade deals with non-EU countries would also probably involve worse terms.	此外英国在与非欧盟国家的新贸易谈判上也很可能遭遇更严苛的条款。


While the UK wouldn’t be hamstrung by protectionist interests in the EU, its smaller economy, largely open markets, and desperation for deals would weaken its clout.	虽然英国将不会受到欧盟经济保护主义利益的束缚，但其更小规模的经济，很大程度上开放的市场，以及对交易的渴望都将削弱其影响力。


Indeed, the US has stated that it has no immediate interest in negotiating a trade deal with Britain.	事实上美国已表示自身不存在与英国谈判贸易协定的迫切意愿。


And the protectionist tone of the current US presidential election campaign suggests that the next few years will not see much trade liberalization.	而当前美国总统竞选活动中的保护主义基调表明，未来几年内都不会看到太多的贸易自由化举措。


Thinking through all the economic implications of Brexit is complicated.	考虑脱盟所产生的所有经济影响是相当复杂的。


But the bottom line is simple: Leaving the EU would make Britain much worse off.	但底线很简单：离开欧盟只会让英国的境况变得更糟。


The Trade Costs of Leaving the EU	脱离欧盟的贸易成本


BRUSSELS – The “Brexiteers” – those who want Britain to leave the European Union – argue that their goal would be virtually cost-free and have no effect on the United Kingdom’s global trade.	发自布鲁塞尔——那些想让英国退出欧盟的“脱盟论者（Brexiteers）”认定他们所追求的目标几乎不会产生任何成本，也不会影响英国的全球贸易。


They are wrong.	他们错了。


On June 23, when voters in Britain cast their ballots in the referendum on the question, they need to consider what is actually involved in leaving the EU – and how the free-trade benefits they now enjoy (and take for granted) could be maintained after Brexit.	当6月23日英国的选民就该问题的全民公决投下一票之时，他们需要考虑脱离欧盟的举措中究竟包含了什么——以及在脱欧之后如何才能把现在享有（且觉得理所当然）的自由贸易利益维持下去。


Start with the basics. Leaving the EU means that the UK would exit the EU’s Customs Union, which is the basis for cross-border free trade among the EU’s 28 members (and establishes a common external tariff vis-à-vis third countries).	让我们从最基本的一点开始：离开欧盟意味着英国将退出关税同盟，这是欧盟28个成员国之间实施跨境自由贸易（并与外部其他国家实施共同对外关税）的基础。


It also means exit from the Single Market – the basis for the free movement of goods and services among EU members.	这也意味着退出欧洲单一市场——商品和服务在欧盟成员国之间自由流动的基础。


By definition, non-members of the EU cannot belong to the Single Market.	根据定义，非欧盟成员国不能参加单一市场。


So what would happen next?	那么一旦脱盟通过后会出现什么情况？


During the two-year period before Britain’s withdrawal takes final effect, there would be UK-EU negotiations on many points – sovereignty, the legal order, immigration, finances, and economic matters.	在最终完全脱离欧盟之前的两年时间内，英国与欧盟之间将针对多项问题展开谈判——主权，法律秩序，移民，财政以及经济事务。


The assumption is that a crucial goal for Britain would be to negotiate a trading relationship as close as possible to the free-trade relationships that exist today.	在人们的设想中英国一项至关重要的目标就是与欧盟谈妥一整套尽可能接近当前自贸关系的贸易条款。


That is easier said than done. The best result would be if all players agreed to maintain the free trade already achieved, with the UK setting a new external tariff on a duty-free basis, applicable to all comers.	但这事说来容易做来难，最好的结果莫过于所有参与者都同意维持当前的自由贸易状况，同时英国在免税的基础上设置一个新的对外关税，适用于所有欧盟成员国。


This is what happened in the 1970s after Britain and Denmark left the European Free Trade Association: Free-trade agreements were negotiated among EFTA members and between them and the EU (or the EEC as it was then known).	这正是1970年代英国和丹麦脱离欧洲自由贸易联盟时所发生的状况：两国一方面与各欧洲自由贸易联盟成员国展开自贸协定谈判，一方面又与欧盟（时为欧洲经济共同体）进行谈判。


But Brexiteers should realize that there is no guarantee that this would happen again – and, in any case, there would be complications.	但脱盟论者应该认识到：没人能保证上述状况必定重演——而且无论怎样总会出点状况。


While this solution would be good for the 45% of British exports that are sold in EU markets, it would reduce protection for British industries to zero.	虽然这种解决方案将有利于占英国出口量45％的出口欧盟产品，但也会将对英国工业的保护降到零。


Under the rules of the World Trade Organization, the same import duties must be applied to all WTO participants – which means that if Britain’s imports from the EU are duty-free, its imports from the rest of the world must be, too.	因为根据WTO规则，同样的进口关税必须适用于所有WTO参与者——这意味着，如果英国向欧盟的出口商品提供免税待遇，也就必须对来自世界其他地区的出口商品一视同仁。


The alternative would be for UK exporters to accept the EU’s common external tariff, and for the UK to create its own import tariff, applied to all imports, including from the EU.	另一套方案则是英国出口商接受欧盟的共同对外关税，同时英国创设自身的进口关税并适用于所有（包括来自欧盟的）进口商品。


Because the common tariff is at a relatively low level on industrial and fishery products, this might not be an insuperable barrier for UK exports, and it would allow some flexibility in protecting UK companies from imports.	因为欧盟在工业和渔业产品方面的共同关税处于相对较低的水平，这可能不会对英国出口产品造成难以逾越的障碍，也可以在保护英国公司免受进口冲击方面有一定的灵活性。


The potential pitfall is that any British tariff increase above the EU level would expose the UK to claims for compensation from third countries in the WTO.	潜在的缺陷是一旦英国将关税上调至高于欧盟的水平，就可能面临第三国在WTO组织提出索赔的风险。


The bigger question that the Brexiteers need to answer is how to secure a high level of access to the EU’s internal market.	脱盟论者需要回答的更大问题是如何保住进入欧盟内部市场的高规格渠道。


This is vitally important for Britain’s service industries, particularly for the City of London’s exports of financial services.	这对英国的服务业（尤其是伦敦金融城的金融服务出口）非常重要。


There is only one precedent for non-EU members being able to negotiate access to the internal market equivalent to that enjoyed by EU members. This is the European Economic Area agreement concluded with the EU by Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein in 1992.	对此只有一个非欧盟成员国通过谈判获取相当于欧盟成员国同等渠道的先例：欧盟与挪威，冰岛，列支敦士登三国于1992年签订的欧洲经济区协议。


In the view of many observers, including me, access to the Single Market through the EEA is no longer available. But what if we’re wrong?	虽然在包括我在内的许多观察家眼中，借助欧洲经济区协议进入单一市场的渠道已不复存在，但如果我们错了呢？


The point is that such a deal would go against all the instincts (and rhetoric) of the Brexiteers, because it would mean accepting the EU’s “four freedoms”: not just the free movement of goods, services, and capital – but of people, too.	问题的关键是在于这一协议将违背脱盟论者所有的本意（以及说辞），因为这将意味着接受欧盟的“四大自由”：不仅是商品，服务和资本的自由流动——还包括人。


That would be hard to square with the Brexit objective of “controlling our borders.”	这显然难以与脱盟论者“把控英国边境”的诉求相契合。


The Brexiteers would also blanch at Britain’s obligation under an EEA-type agreement to continue contributing to the EU budget.	同时欧洲经济区这类协议也会要求英国继续缴纳欧盟预算，这就足以让脱盟论者望而却步了。


Of course, there could be specific arrangements for particular sectors.	当然也有可能有针对特殊部门的具体安排。


But it seems unlikely that such arrangements would be possible in financial services and the major professional services (including doctors, architects, and lawyers), which are important for Britain’s competitors in Europe.	但这样的安排似乎不太可能出现在金融服务和各大专业服务（包括医生，建筑师和律师服务），因为这些都是英国的欧洲竞争对手看重的地方。


Indeed, it is possible that the EU would adopt a tough mercantilist stance: If you want privileged access, you should stay in the club.	事实上，欧盟可能会将采取强硬的重商主义姿态：如果你想享受特权渠道，就得留在圈子里。


The final consequence of Brexit is that the UK would lose its free-trade arrangements with third countries under the many trade agreements that the EU has signed since 2000.	脱盟的最终结果是英国将与第三国签署的众多自贸协议都将失效，因为这些协议都是在欧盟自2000年以来各项协议的框架下运行的。


Replacing these agreements with bilateral deals would take time.	用新的双边协议来取代这些协议将需要时间。


There is no guarantee that the EU would agree to an interim continuation of free trade, and it seems certain that UK exports would face higher tariffs than its former EU partners in those third countries (placing British exporters at a competitive disadvantage).	谁也不能保证欧盟会同意暂时延续自由贸易，而且似乎可以肯定的是英国对第三国的出口将面临较前欧盟伙伴更高的关税（导致英国出口商处于竞争劣势）。


It’s a big stretch for the Brexiteers to ask us to believe that the world’s most prominent leaders, European or not, have all got the impact of Brexit wrong.	相当长的一段时间以来脱盟论者都试图让我们相信那些世界上最杰出的领导人，无论是否来自欧洲，都错误地理解了脱盟的影响。


In the trade debate, we have had the International Monetary Fund, US President Barack Obama, and the OECD – quite apart from the UK Treasury – telling Britons that a vote to leave would be bad for the economy.	在贸易的辩论中，我们听到世界货币基金组织，美国总统奥巴马和经合组织——而非英国财政部——都告诉英国人投票脱离欧盟对经济是没好处的。


It is not much of a reply to argue that the OECD is “in the pay of the EU” or that Obama is anti-British because he had a Kenyan father in British colonial days.	至于那些指责经合组织“拿了欧盟的钱”，或者说奥巴马的反英情绪是受了他那位曾遭受英国殖民统治的肯尼亚父亲的影响的说法都不值一驳。


Economic forecasting is an uncertain science.	经济预测是门充满不确定性的科学。


But when almost all projections point in the same direction – that Brexit would be hugely damaging to the UK – it is time to decide what is credible and what is not.	但是当几乎所有的预测指向同一个方向——脱盟将对英国造成极大损害——那就是时候决定哪些是可信的而哪些不是。


Brexit In Reverse?	英国脱欧逆转？


LONDON – Economic reality is beginning to catch up with the false hopes of many Britons.	伦敦—经济现实正在开始追上许多英国人错误的希望。


One year ago, when a slim majority voted for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, they believed the promises of the popular press, and of the politicians who backed the Leave campaign, that Brexit would not reduce their living standards.	一年前，英国以微弱多数投票退出欧盟，当时的英国人流行媒体承诺，相信支持脱欧阵营的政客的承诺。 他们说，英国脱欧不会降低英国人的生活水平。


Indeed, in the year since, they have managed to maintain those standards by running up household debt.	事实上，在此后的一年里，他们通过增加家庭债务维持了英国的生活水平。


This worked for a while, because the increase in household consumption stimulated the economy.	这管用了一段时间，因为家庭消费的增加刺激了经济。


But the moment of truth for the UK economy is fast approaching.	但英国经济的真相时刻马上就要来了。


As the latest figures published by the Bank of England show, wage growth in Britain is not keeping up with inflation, so real incomes have begun to fall.	英格兰银行最新发布的数据显示，英国工资增长跟不上通货膨胀，因此，真实收入已经开始下降。


As this trend continues in the coming months, households will soon realize that their living standards are falling, and they will have to adjust their spending habits.	如果这一趋势在未来几个月中保持下去，家庭很快就会认识到他们的生活水平正在下降，从而必须调整支出习惯。


To make matters worse, they will also realize that they have become over-indebted and will have to deleverage, thus further reducing the household consumption that has sustained the economy.	更糟糕的是，他们还将认识到自己举债过多，必须降低杠杆，这将进一步降低支撑经济的家庭消费。


Moreover, the BoE has made the same mistake as the average household: it underestimated the impact of inflation and will now be catching up by raising interest rates in a pro-cyclical manner.	此外，英格兰银行和普通家庭犯了同样的错误：它低估了通货膨胀的影响，现在，它将面临顺周期升息的压力。


These higher rates will make household debt even harder to pay off.	利息的升高将让家庭更加难以偿还债务。


The British are fast approaching the tipping point that characterizes all unsustainable economic trends.	英国正在快速接近所有不可持续的经济趋势所共有的引爆点。


I refer to such a tipping point as “reflexivity” – when both cause and effect shape each other.	我将这个引爆点称为“反身性”，它是原因和结果开始互相影响的那个点。


Economic reality is reinforced by political reality.	经济现实被政治现实所强化。


The fact is that Brexit is a lose-lose proposition, harmful both to Britain and the EU.	事实上，英国脱欧是一个双输方案，英国和欧盟都得不偿失。


The Brexit referendum cannot be undone, but people can change their minds.	英国脱欧公投不可能推翻，但人民可能改变想法。


Apparently, this is happening.	显然，这正是现在正在发生的。


Prime Minister Theresa May’s attempt to strengthen her negotiating position by holding a snap election badly misfired: she lost her parliamentary majority and created a hung parliament (no single party has a majority).	首相梅试图通过举行提前大选来加强她在谈判中的地位，但结果适得其反：她失去了议会多数地位，造成了一个悬浮议会（没有一个政党能够单独赢得多数）。


The primary cause of May’s defeat was her fatal misstep in proposing that elderly people pay for a substantial portion of their social care out of their own resources, usually the value of the homes that they have lived in all of their lives.	梅之败的主要原因在于她犯了一个致命的错误：要求年长者自己想办法承担他们的社保支出的大头，这个办法往往就是依靠他们住了一辈子得房子。


This “dementia tax,” as it became widely known, deeply offended the core constituency, the elderly, of May’s Conservative Party.	这就是众所周知的“老年痴呆税”，极大地冒犯了梅的保守党的核心票仓——年长者。


Many either did not vote, or supported other parties.	许多人要么拒绝投票，要么转投其他政党。


The increased participation of young people was also an important contributing factor in May’s defeat.	年轻人参与率的提高也是梅惨遭失败的重要原因。


Many of them voted for Labour in protest, not because they wanted to join a trade union or because they support Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn (although he gave an unexpectedly impressive performance throughout the campaign).	他们中很多人投了反对党工党，不是因为他们想加入工会或者他们支持工党党首杰里米·科尔宾（Jeremy Corbyn，不过他在选战期间的表现出人意料地令人印象深刻）。


The attitude of Britain’s young people to the single market is diametrically opposed to that of May and supporters of a “hard” Brexit.	英国年轻人对单一市场的态度与梅和“硬”脱欧支持者截然相反。


Young people are eager to find well-paying jobs, whether in Britain or elsewhere in Europe.	年轻人渴望找到高薪工作，管它是在英国还是在欧洲别的地方。


In that respect, their interests correspond with the interests of the City of London, where some of those jobs are to be found.	从这个角度讲，他们的利益与伦敦金融城的利益是一致的，而伦敦金融城颇提供了一些高薪工作。


If May wants to remain in power, she must change her approach to the Brexit negotiations.	如果梅想要保持权力，就必须改变英国脱欧谈判的方针。


And there are signs that she is prepared to do so.	有迹象表明她正准备这么做。


By approaching the negotiations that will start on June 19 in a conciliatory spirit, May could reach an understanding with the EU on the agenda and agree to continue as a member of the single market for a period long enough to carry out all the legal work that will be needed.	带着妥协的精神进入将于6月19日开始的脱欧谈判，梅可以与欧盟就日程问题形成谅解，并同意在足够长的时间内继续作为单一市场的一员解决所有需要解决的法律问题。


This would be a great relief to the EU, because it would postpone the evil day when Britain’s absence would create an enormous hole in the EU’s budget.	这对于欧盟来说可以大松一口气，因为欧盟不必因为英国的缺席而面临可能的预算巨洞。


That would be a win-win arrangement.	这将是一个双赢安排。


Only by taking this path can May hope to persuade Parliament to pass all the laws that need to be in place once the Brexit talks are completed and Britain withdraws from the Union.	只有走这条路，梅能够寄希望于说服议会通过脱欧谈判完成、英国脱离欧盟后需要就位的所有法律。


She may have to abandon her ill-considered alliance with the Democratic Unionist Party in Ulster and side more emphatically with the Tories of Scotland, who are keen on a softer version of Brexit.	她可能需要放弃与奥尔斯特的民主联盟党（Democratic Unionist Party）的错误结盟，更加团结一致地与想要软化英国脱欧立场的苏格兰保守党站在一起。


May will also need to atone for the sins of the Tories in the London borough of Kensington with regard to last week’s Grenfell Tower fire, in which at least 30 people, and perhaps many more, lost their lives.	梅还需要补偿保守党在伦敦所辖自治市肯星顿（Kensington）所犯的错误——上周肯星顿格伦菲尔大楼（Grenfell Tower）发生大火，至少30人丧生，并且人数可能还会继续上升。


If May embraces such a platform, she could then carry on leading a minority government, because nobody else would want to take her place.	如果梅采取了这样的姿态，就可以继续领导少数派政府，因为没有人想要取代她。


Brexit would still take at least five years to complete, during which time new elections would take place.	英国脱欧仍将至少需要五年才能完成，在此期间，还会发生新的选举。


If all went well, the two parties might want to remarry even before they have divorced.	如果一切顺利，英国和欧盟或许在还没有完成离婚之前就想复合了。


Britain’s Road to Perdition	英国的万劫不复之路


LONDON – Full English Brexit is off the menu.	伦敦—英国完全退欧已经从选项表中剔除。


Before leaving the European Union altogether, the British government now wants an “interim period,” in which the United Kingdom would retain the commercial rights of EU membership, while still contributing to the EU budget, observing EU regulations and legal judgments, and allowing the free movement of people.	在彻底脱离欧盟之前，英国政府现在想要一个“过渡期”，在此期间，英国将保留欧元区成员的商业权利，同时继续缴纳欧元预算，遵守欧盟监管和司法裁决，允许人员自由流动。


This period would last for at least two years after March 2019 – the official deadline for the Brexit process – meaning that until 2021, Britain would essentially be an EU member state without any voting rights.	过渡期将在2019年3月——英国退欧过程的官方期限——后继续维持至少两年，也就是说，在2021年之前，英国都将是实质上的欧盟成员国，但没有任何投票权。


In the meantime, British Prime Minister Theresa May’s government, having promised to maintain a “deep and special” relationship with Europe, would try to negotiate a new “treaty-based arrangement” with the EU.	与此同时，英国首相梅的政府——它承诺要保持与欧洲的“深刻而特殊”的关系——将试图谈判一个新的与欧盟的“基于条约的协定”。


But Britain will have a vanishingly small chance of concluding a new treaty in so short a time.	但英国在这么短的时间内达成新条约的机会十分渺茫。


Indeed, come 2021, the UK will still be hurtling toward a “cliff edge”: a full break from Europe, with no alternative arrangement in place to cushion the blow.	事实上，到了2021年，英国将仍然在向“悬崖边缘”运动，即完全脱离欧洲，不再准备替代安排抵御冲击。


Politically, that timing would pose even greater risks for May’s government than it faces today, since the next general election must be held by June 2022.	从政治上讲，这样的择时将给梅政府带来比现在更大的风险，因为下一次选举必须在2022年6月前举行。


So the UK may try to extend the transition period beyond 2022.	因此，英国可能会试图将过渡期延长到2022年以后。


And as past experience tells us, once an extension is granted, it may never end.	而过去的经验告诉我们，期限一旦被延长了一次，就会无休无止地一次次延长下去。


The UK seems to be approaching the scenario I outlined three months ago.	英国似乎正在走向我三个月前列出的情景。


May’s fateful decision to hold an early election in June has allowed her opponents to demand that the UK negotiate a transitional arrangement similar to what Norway has as a member of the European Economic Area.	梅在6月提前举行的大选的重大决定让她的反对派有机会要求英国去谈判一个类似于挪威作为欧洲经济区（EEA）成员的过渡性安排。


The EEA was originally created in 1994 as a temporary framework for various countries preparing to join the EU.	EEA始创于1994年，是为了几个准备加入欧盟的国家而制定的临时性框架。


But because Norwegian voters rejected a referendum on EU membership 11 months later, the EEA has now lasted for 24 years.	但由于挪威选民在11个月后的欧盟成员公投中拒绝加入欧盟，EEA也一直持续到24年后的今天。


Nobody can predict what will happen in 24 years.	没人能够预料24年后会发生什么。


But the good news for Britain is that the EU may already be moving slowly toward a two-track structure.	但对英国来说，好消息是欧盟可能已经开始慢慢向双轨结构转变。


To prosper, the eurozone will need to establish a political union.	要想实现繁荣，欧元区需要建立一个政治联盟。


This will leave non-euro countries such as Denmark, Poland, and Sweden forming an outer ring of economic cooperation outside the eurozone.	这将让丹麦、波兰和瑞典等非欧元国家形成一个欧元区外的经济合作外环。


These countries would have membership in the single market, but not in the monetary or political union.	这些国家将拥有单一市场成员地位，但不参与货币或政治联盟。


A two-track Europe would be very different from the “two-speed” model that applies to Europe today.	双轨欧洲与今天的“双速”模式截然不同。


In the latter, every country is theoretically heading toward “ever-closer union,” just at different rates.	在双速模式中，每个国家理论上都在朝“日益紧密”的联盟前进，只不过速度有所不同。


In a two-track scenario, by contrast, Britain could comfortably re-join the outer track along with Norway and, perhaps, Switzerland.	相反，在双轨情景中，英国可以心安理得地重新加入外轨，和挪威，也许还有瑞典一起。


Now for the bad news.	现在来看坏消息。


A transition arrangement for the UK may be unacceptable to both EU governments and British voters.	英国过渡安排可能对于欧盟各国政府和英国选民来说都是不可接受的。


Committed federalists in the EU want Britain out as quickly as possible, because Britain has long given cover for others – such as Denmark, Poland, and Sweden – to resist deeper integration.	欧盟的坚定的联邦主义者希望英国尽快退出，因为长期以来英国一直为其他抵制深化融合的国家——如丹麦、波兰和瑞典——提供掩护。


Federalist zealots hate the idea of a two-track Europe.	狂热联邦派憎恨双轨欧洲的概念。


They want to force all EU member states to adopt the euro within the next decade, and to embed themselves permanently into a full-scale political and fiscal union.	他们希望迫使所有欧盟成员国在下一个十年中接受欧元，并永远地牢牢锁定在全方位的政治和财政联盟中。


And they rightly believe that achieving this goal will be easier with Britain out of the picture.	他们正确地相信，将英国踢出局，能够更加容易地实现这一目标。


But a transition period is no panacea for the UK either.	但过渡期对英国来说也不是万灵丹。


Britons have already started to get a glimpse of the economic costs of Brexit, as international businesses that once used Britain as a hub for their European operations have started to relocate some of their activities.	随着曾经将英国作为欧洲业务枢纽的跨国企业开始将一些业务活动迁移到其他国家，英国人已经开始领略英国退欧的经济成本。


As the UK government tries to maintain the fiction of a strictly time-limited transition, this process will accelerate further.	由于英国政府一直心存有严格时间限制的过渡期的幻想，这一过程还会进一步加速。


Moreover, the EU will use the transition period to change its own regulations, so that businesses generating employment and large tax revenues will have to move onto EU territory.	此外，欧盟将利用过渡期改变自己的监管规则，使创造就业和大量税收收入的企业将不得不迁往欧盟领土。


For example, the European Banking Authority and the European Medicines Agency are already relocating from London, meaning the many legal, managerial, and lobbying jobs connected to highly regulated activities such as finance and pharmaceutical research will have to relocate, too.	比如，欧洲银行局（European Banking Authority）和欧洲药品局（European Medicines Agency）已经开始迁出伦敦，这意味着许多与受监管程度较高的活动（如金融和药物研究）有关的法律、管理和游说工作，也必须外迁。


A transition period would thus hit international businesses based in Britain with a regulatory double-whammy: they would be subject to the whims of UK and EU bureaucracies at the same time.	因此，过渡期将用监管双击打击位于英国的跨国企业：它们将同时受到英国和欧盟官僚的管理。


Making matters worse, the promise of a long transition could delay the shift in public opinion needed to reverse Brexit before it is too late.	更糟糕的是，长过渡期的憧憬可能延长公众观点的变化，导致无法及时地扭转退欧。


After March 28, 2019, the UK will be officially out of the EU, where economic growth has already started to overtake that of Britain.	2019年3月以后，英国将正式退出欧盟，而欧盟的经济增长已经开始赶超英国。


If it ever wants to be readmitted, it will have to settle for far less attractive terms than what it enjoys today.	如果英国想要再次加入欧盟，将不得不接受比现在恶劣得多的条件。


Not only would it no longer receive budget rebates or special treatment on social regulations; it might even be forced to join the euro.	英国不但无法获得预算回款或社会监管方面的特殊待遇； 还有可能被迫加入欧元区。


Even the 48% of British voters who voted “Remain” might reject such humiliating terms.	即使是投票“留欧”的英国选民，也有可能无法接受如此令人蒙羞的条件。


Britain would thus be stuck in limbo – like Norway, but without the oil wealth or social cohesion.	因此，英国将进退两难——就像挪威一样，但它没有挪威的石油财富和社会凝聚力。


As the Labour Party’s trade spokesman has aptly put it, a semi-permanent transition period based on the “Norway model” would turn Britain into a “vassal state.”	工党贸易发言人正确地指出，基于“挪威模式”的准永久性过渡期，将让英国沦为“附庸国”。


It would still pay large sums into the EU budget and adhere to EU laws, but it would have no say over how that money is spent or how those laws are made.	它将为欧盟预算提供巨款，并遵守欧盟法律，但它无权置喙这些钱怎么用，或这些法律如何制定。


In the months ahead, the British public may start to foresee this humiliating endgame.	在未来几个月中，英国公众可能会开始想见这一耻辱性结局。


The Norway model will satisfy neither Britain’s elderly, provincial Europhobes, nor the young, urban voters who want to preserve the rights of EU citizenship that they have taken for granted all their lives.	挪威模式满足不了英国年长群体，满足不了地方仇欧派，也满足不了想要保留他们出生以来就视为理所当然的欧盟公民权利的年轻城市选民。


With this depressing prospect setting in, British voters could change their minds about Brexit before their leaders go through with it.	前进如此暗淡，英国选民可能会在领导人完成退欧过程之前，就改变对退欧的想法。


But for such a Damascene conversion to happen, the country would have to experience a political or economic crisis large enough to shake public opinion out of its fatalistic complacency.	但要发生这一大转变，英国必须经历一场足够大的政治或经济危机，让公众观点摆脱致命的自负。


As things stand, Britons have been emulating that beloved national slogan, “Keep calm and carry on.”	目前，英国人一直在效仿他们所喜爱的国家口号“保持冷静，坚持不懈”。


Before things can get better for Britain, they will probably have to get much worse.	在英国的情况可能好转之前，或许先要大大恶化。


How Money Could Unblock the Brexit Talks	金钱如何扫清英国退欧谈判障碍


LONDON – Like many divorce proceedings, Britain’s negotiations with the European Union have reached an impasse that can be broken only by compromise.	伦敦—和许多离婚过程一样，英国与欧盟的谈判也陷入了只有通过妥协才能打破的僵局。


The solution is for both sides to admit that a permanent new relationship cannot be agreed in the short time remaining until the Brexit deadline in March 2019.	解决办法是双方都承认无法在2019年3月英国退欧大限前的短暂的时间里形成永久性新关系。


So, instead of letting the United Kingdom crash out of the EU then, the talks should now shift to the temporary “transition” that Prime Minister Theresa May officially requested last month – and which a strong consensus among Britain’s business leaders and public now demands.	因此，谈判不应该着眼于让英国在那时离开欧盟，而应该转向英国首相梅在上个月正式要求的临时性“过渡”，这也是如今英国商界领袖和公众形成强烈抑制并要求的。


Above all, the negotiators should focus immediately on the British budget contributions that will be required to make an orderly transition possible.	最重要的是，谈判者应该立即将重点放在有序过渡所要求的英国预算贡献上。


An agreement on a mutually beneficial transition would require some compromises from both sides.	形成双赢过渡协定需要双方都做出一些妥协。


But neither Britain nor the EU would have to abandon any fundamental principles.	但不论是英国还是欧盟，都不需要放弃任何根本性原则。


For Europe, shifting the focus of negotiations to a temporary agreement, probably modeled on the EU’s relationship with Norway, would involve only a small loss of face: EU leaders would have to concede that the sequencing they originally proposed for the Brexit talks had to be rejigged.	对欧洲来说，将谈判焦点转向临时性协定——也许可以以欧盟与挪威的关系作为样板——只不过是略微失去点颜面：欧盟领导人不得不承认他们最初安排的英国退欧谈判顺序必须重新调整。


Instead of agreeing on a financial settlement first, and then moving on to trade relations, finance and trade would have to be acknowledged as interdependent – and thus be discussed simultaneously.	不再是首先进行金融结算，然后谈判贸易关系，相反，必须认识到金融和贸易是相互依存关系——因此要同时讨论。


For Britain, a change of focus from permanent arrangements to the conditions for an orderly transition could transform the budgetary issues now preventing progress into a key that could unlock the talks.	对英国来说，谈判焦点从永久性协定转向有序过渡的条件能够将现在阻止退欧进程的预算问题转变为清除谈判障碍的关键。


In a speech delivered in Florence last month, May offered to make EU budget contributions of roughly €10 billion ($11.8 billion) annually for a transition period of at least two years after the Brexit deadline, as well as to maintain free movement of labor and enforce all EU rules.	在上个月于佛罗伦萨所做的讲话中，梅提出在英国退欧大限之后设定至少两年的过渡期，在此期间，英国每年贡献大约10亿欧元的预算，并保持劳动力自由流动和执行所有欧盟规则。


May hoped that her promise would win over European leaders – especially the biggest contributor, Germany, and the big net recipients, such as Poland and Portugal.	梅希望她的承诺能够赢得欧洲领导人——特别是最大的预算贡献者德国，以及主要预算受益者波兰和葡萄牙。


But her offer failed to impress, probably because EU leaders are less worried about the financial hole created by Brexit in 2019 and 2020 than they are about the next budget cycle, from 2021 to 2026.	但她的建议并没有引起多大关注，也许这是因为欧盟领导人并不太担心英国在2019年和2020年退欧所造成的金融漏洞，而是更关心2021—2026年的下一个预算周期。


To suggest that Britain should pay budget contributions well into the next decade may seem completely unrealistic, given the vehement opposition to all EU payments from Euroskeptics in May’s Conservative Party.	提出英国应该在下一个十年的大部分时间里继续缴纳预算看上去完全不现实，因为梅所在的保守党中的疑欧派强烈反对一切向欧盟的支付项。


But, on closer inspection, making a long-term budget offer could have two big advantages for May.	但是，更仔细的观察可以发现，长期缴纳预算对梅来说有两个大优点。


First, transitional budget contributions could be presented as commercial payments to support European programs from which Britain benefits, instead of the punitive-sounding “divorce settlement” of €50-60 billion currently demanded by the EU.	首先，过渡性预算贡献可以包装为商业支付，以支持英国能从中受益的欧洲计划，而不是欧盟现在所要求的、听起来像是惩罚性质的五六十亿欧元的“离婚费”。


If Britain’s transitional payments continued near the current level of €10 billion for the five or six years realistically required to negotiate a permanent trading relationship, they would add up to the same amount.	如果英国过渡性支付在五六年中一直保持在当前水平（10亿欧元）左右——这是谈判永久性贸易关系的现实要求——其总和也将达到这一规模。


Second, a British budget offer would be a powerful tool to create the “deep and special partnership” with Europe that May claims is her ultimate goal.	其次，英国提出缴纳预算是实现梅所谓的她的终极目标——与欧盟的“深刻而特殊的关系”的强大工具。


Until last month, May avoided defining this phrase, for fear of antagonizing her party’s hardline Europhobes.	直到上个月，梅一直避免提出这一方案，担心这样会引起党内强硬疑欧派的抵触。


But in her Florence speech, May promised British businesses something close to the current level of access to EU markets.	但在佛罗伦萨讲话中，梅承诺英国企业能获得与接近当前水平的欧洲市场准入。


She also recognized that any privileged access to EU markets would require budget contributions, as in the case of Norway and Switzerland.	她还认可了任何欧洲市场准入特权都需要英国贡献欧盟预算，就像挪威和瑞士一样。


The implication was clear: something close to the current level of access to EU markets would demand something close to the current level of budget contributions.	言下之意显而易见：要想获得接近当前水平的欧盟市场准入，就要贡献接近胆管水平的欧盟预算。


And if May’s “deep and special partnership” is to be a permanent feature of British-EU relations, the budgetary contributions will have to be permanent, too.	而如果梅的“深刻而特殊的关系”要想成为英国-欧盟关系的永久性特征，预算贡献也必须是永久性的。


But what if May is not really serious about that “deep and special partnership”?	但万一没对于“深刻而特殊的关系”其实并不是认真的呢？


What if her true objective is to satisfy Conservative hardliners by bringing about a “clean break”  with the EU?	万一她的真正目标是通过与欧盟“决裂”满足保守党强硬派呢？


Even then, Britain will need to continue paying budget contributions for many years, if it wants an orderly and non-disruptive Brexit.	即便如此，英国仍需要支付预算多年，如果它想实现有序的、不会引起破坏的退欧的话。


Let’s assume that Britain’s ultimate aim is to create completely new global trading relationships, without any special EU trading privileges.	不妨认为英国的终极目标是建立全新的全球贸易关系，而不是特殊的欧盟贸易特权。


These new trade deals will take many years to negotiate, and until their completion, British businesses are desperate to avoid two costly disruptions: one when EU membership ends in March 2019, and another at whatever future date the new global trade agreements are finalized and come into effect.	这些新贸易协议需要多年时间谈判，在它们完成之间，英国企业急需避免两大迫在眉睫的破坏：一个将发生在2019年3月英国不再具有欧盟成员资格时，另一个发生在新全球协定完成并生效时（可能在未来的任何时候）。


Avoiding such a double disruption is the whole point of May’s proposal for a “standstill” transition period from 2019 to 2021.	避免这一双重破坏是梅提出在2019—2021年间设立一个“静止”过渡期的全部目的。


But achieving that objective will require the standstill in Britain’s EU arrangements to continue until new global agreements are ready to implement.	但实现这一目标需要英国的欧盟安排一直保持静止，直到新全球协定准备就绪。


This implies that Britain’s budget contributions must also continue until new global agreements are finalized.	这意味着英国的预算贡献也必须一直保持到新全球协定完成。


The probability that complex negotiations with dozens of countries can be completed within just two years of Brexit is vanishingly small.	与几十个国家进行的复杂谈判在短短两年的英国退欧期之内完成，这样的概率微乎其微。


So, even if British politicians and voters really want a hard Brexit involving total rupture with Europe, UK businesses will need to preserve their special EU trading arrangements, along with the associated budget contributions, for at least several years beyond 2021.	因此，即使英国政客和选民真的想要完全与欧洲撕破脸面的硬退欧，英国企业也需要保留特殊的欧盟贸易安排——至少在2021年之后再延续几年，相应地，英国也需要继续缴纳欧盟预算。


The upshot is that, regardless of what type of Brexit the UK wants, any orderly withdrawal will require continued post-Brexit budget payments to the EU.	最后的结果是，无论英国希望哪种退欧，有序撤退都需要在其在退欧之后继续为欧盟支付预算。


The only question is whether these payments turn out to be permanent, as they would if May really wants a “deep and special partnership,” or continue only for the 5-7 years required to negotiate new trade agreements after a hard Brexit.	唯一的问题是这一支付是持久的——如果梅真的想要“深刻而特殊的关系的话”，还是只延续到在硬退欧后进行新贸易谈判所需要的5—7年。


Either way, May should recognize that EU budget payments will be inevitable for many years after Brexit.	无论如何，梅应该认识到，支付欧盟预算是退欧后多年之内都无法避免的。


More than that, she should turn this recognition into an impressive long-term financial offer to unblock the Brexit talks.	此外，她还应该将这一认识转变为有吸引力的长期金融方案，以扫清退欧谈判的障碍。


The Bloom Is off the BRICS	金砖国家繁荣已去


STANFORD – A few years ago, pundits and policymakers were predicting that the BRICS countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – would be the new engines of global growth.	斯坦福—几年前，专家和决策者预测金砖国家——巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非——将成为全球增长新引擎。


Naive extrapolation of rapid growth led many people to imagine an ever-brighter future for these economies – and, thanks to them, for the rest of the world as well.	将高速增长简单外推让许多人开始构想这些经济体无比光明的未来——以及托它们之福，全世界都会迎来灿烂前途。


But now the bloom is off the rose.	但如今，繁荣已经凋零。


The economies of Brazil and Russia are contracting, while those of China and South Africa have slowed substantially.	巴西和俄罗斯经济正在衰退，而中国和南非也大幅放缓。


Only India’s growth rate has stayed up, now slightly exceeding China’s.	只有印度增长率在向上攀升，目前略高于中国。


Will the BRICS fulfill their former promise?	金砖国家能实现此前的前景吗？


Or are continued problems inevitable?	还是会遇到难以避免的持续问题？


Given that low-income economies typically have little fixed capital (computers, factories, infrastructure) and human capital (education and training) per worker, they tend to have higher potential returns to capital investment.	低收入国家往往人均固定资本（计算机、工厂、基础设施）和人力资本（教育和培训）极低，因此资本投资回报潜力较高。


That means they can grow more rapidly than wealthier economies, until their per capita income catches up.	这意味着它们可以以比富裕国家更快的速度增长，直到人均收入实现赶超。


While China, India, and Brazil still have very large rural populations, they have made great strides in reducing poverty, with several hundred million people (the largest proportion in China), escaping it in the last few decades.	中国、印度和巴西仍存在庞大的从村人口，但它们在减少贫困方面取得了巨大成就，在过去几十年中，数亿人（主要是中国）摆脱了贫困。


And these countries’ middle classes are growing fast as well.	这些国家的中产阶级也在快速成长。


Rapid progress in the emerging economies has contributed to economic pessimism in Europe and North America.	新兴经济体的大踏步前进助长了欧洲和北美的经济悲观论。


After all, the developing economies’ combined GDP now exceeds that of the advanced economies – a situation that would have been unimaginable a generation ago.	毕竟，发展中经济体GDP之和已经超过了发达经济体——二十年前我们还无法想象这一情景。


Moreover, the hundreds of millions of low-cost workers who joined the global labor force when China, India, and Eastern Europe opened their economies are still putting pressure on the wages of all but the most skilled workers in the advanced economies.	此外，中国、印度和东欧经济开放后，数亿低成本工人加入全球劳动力大军，迄今仍在给发达经济体的工人（技能极高者除外）工资造成压力。


As the Nobel laureate economist Paul Samuelson observed in 1948, international trade leads to factor-price equalization, with wages, adjusted for skill levels, equilibrating across countries.	诺贝尔经济学奖获得者萨缪尔逊（Paul Samuelson）在1948年观察到，国际贸易导致因素价格趋同，不同国家经技能水平调整的工资趋于均衡。


But, for the BRICS, continued rapid progress may become more difficult.	但是，对金砖国家来说，持续高速进步可能会日益困难。


Experience shows that there is a point – usually when per capita income levels reach about $15,000-20,000 (roughly one-third the level in the United States) – when growth tends to slow.	经验表明，在某一点上——通常是人均收入达到15,000—20,000美元（约为美国水平的三分之一）时——增长开始趋缓。


In recent decades, only a few economies – notably, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore – have managed to escape the so-called “middle-income trap” and continue to increase their prosperity.	近几十年来，只有少数经济体——特别是韩国、中国台湾和新加坡——成功地摆脱了所谓的“中等收入陷阱”，实现了持续繁荣。


Beyond the problems that almost all developing economies confront – for example, weak institutions and poor governance – each of the BRICS countries faces a unique set of challenges.	除了几乎所有发展中经济体都会面临的问题——比如机构不力和治理不善——每个金砖国家都面临着自身独特的挑战。


For example, Brazil must contend with a recession, low oil prices, and an unprecedented corruption scandal at Petrobras, the state oil company.	比如，巴西必须与衰退、低油价和前所未有的国有巨头巴西石油公司腐败丑闻作斗争。


Given this, freer trade, such as with the NAFTA countries (Canada, the US, and Mexico), and more hospitable terms for foreign investment, especially in energy, should top President Dilma Rouseff’s agenda.	考虑到这些因素，自由贸易（如与北美自由贸易协定国家——加拿大、美国和墨西哥之间的贸易）和更友好的外来投资条件（特别是能源领域）应该成为总统罗塞夫日程的重点。


Russia, too, is feeling the pressure of lower oil prices, both on its current budget and in terms of its ability to pursue further energy-sector development.	俄罗斯也正在感受低油价的压力，其经常预算和进一步发展能源业的能力都在受到冲击。


Compounding the challenge are the economic sanctions imposed by the US and Europe in response to President Vladimir Putin’s aggressive policies toward Russia’s immediate neighborhood.	美国和欧洲因为其总统给普京对近邻的侵略性政策而采取了经济制裁，这进一步加剧了俄罗斯面临的挑战。


Finally, Russia has a staggering demographic problem, characterized by a shrinking population, life expectancy far below the advanced-country average, and a growing brain drain.	最后，俄罗斯还存在长期人口问题：人口减少、寿命预期远低于发达国家平均水平以及人才流失。


India, at least for the moment, has the best short-run economic conditions.	至少从目前来看，印度的短期经济状况最好。


Inflation, a major threat to the economy until recently, is down under the guidance of the Reserve Bank of India’s governor, Raghuram Rajan.	此前构成经济主要威胁之一的通货膨胀在印度储备银行行长拉詹（Raghuram Rajan）的指引下有所降低。


And growth is projected at 7.5% for this year.	今年增长率预计将达7. 5%。


But India’s fiscal position remains challenging, and the country’s population, which will soon overtake China’s, remains mostly rural and impoverished.	但印度的财政状况仍相当棘手，而印度人口——不久就将超过中国——大部分仍生活在农村和贫困中。


Despite the looming challenges, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been slow to implement the promised economic reforms.	尽管面临紧迫挑战，总理莫迪实施承诺的经济改革的速度仍然十分缓慢。


Indeed, although he has made some small improvements in regulation, privatization, and cash transfers to the poor, bolder land and labor-market reforms remain elusive.	事实上，尽管他在监管、私有化和面向穷人的转移支付等方面取得了一些小进展，但在更大手笔的土地和劳动力市场改革上仍然没有拿出明确动作。


China, for its part, is attempting a difficult economic rebalancing, from an export-led to a consumption-based growth model.	至于中国，它正在尝试艰难的经济再平衡，从出口拉动型增长模式转型为基于消费的增长模式。


In poker terms, Chinese President Xi Jinping is attempting to pull an inside straight, gambling that a growing middle class will demand enough manufactured goods to prevent the economy’s immense excess capacity in basic industries from leading to widespread unemployment.	用德州扑克术语讲，中国国家主席习近平面临一副缺少中间一张的顺子，他在下注成长起来的中产阶级将需要足够的制造品，足以防止中国经济基础产业严重过剩的产能导致大面积失业。


At under 40% of GDP – compared to at least 60% in advanced economies – Chinese household consumption certainly has space to grow.	中国家庭消费占GDP之比不足40%——发达经济体至少为60%——显然还有增长空间。 但中国经济仍面临大量风险。


But China’s economy remains prone to considerable risks.	如几十年前的日本所发生的，中国正在面临来自越南等国家的低成本竞争；


As occurred in Japan decades ago, China is starting to face lower-cost competition, such as from Vietnam; its stock market is frothy; and Xi’s anti-corruption program, though popular with ordinary citizens, has led to widespread uncertainty about the “rules of the game.”	中国股市泡沫巨大； 而习近平的反腐运动尽管广受普通群众支持，但也造成了“游戏规则”的巨大不确定性。


Finally, South Africa’s problems reflect a loss of confidence in the government, endemic corruption, massive infrastructure needs, and restrictive labor-market and foreign-investment regulation.	最后，南非的问题反映在人们对政府丧失信心、腐败根深蒂固、基础设施需求巨大、劳动力市场和外来投资监管过于严格。


And, in terms of reform, President Jacob Zuma is not headed in the right direction.	而从改革的角度讲，总统祖玛的方向也并不正确。


The BRICS are – and always have been – subject to the same forces as other economies.	金砖国家受到——一直都是如此——与其他经济体相同的因素的影响。


But, although they have increased their dependence on market forces, their governments continue to dictate too many major economic decisions, increasing the risk of imbalances or even crises.	但是，尽管它们提高了对市场力量的依赖，但它们的政府仍过多地干预重大经济决策，增加了失衡甚至危及的风险。


Their ability to develop institutions that support greater economic freedom, with more reliance on market competition and less on government, will likely be the main determinant of their long-term success.	它们是否有能力发展支持更大经济自由的机构，更多依赖市场竞争、更少依赖政府，这一问题可能将是它们长期成功的主要决定因素。


How Britain Could Change Its Mind About Brexit	英国如何改变退欧思维


LONDON – Will 2018 be the year when the United Kingdom changes its mind about leaving the European Union?	伦敦—2018年会成为英国改变脱离欧盟思维的一年吗？


Conventional wisdom says that stopping Brexit is impossible.	传统智慧说，停止退欧是不可能的。


But what did conventional wisdom say about Donald Trump?	但传统智慧对特朗普怎么说？


Or Emmanuel Macron?	马克龙呢？


Or, for that matter, the original Brexit referendum?	或者，一开始的退欧公投呢？


In revolutionary times, events can go from impossible to inevitable without ever passing through improbable.	在革命年代，事件可以从不可能跨越未必能，直接变成不可免。


Brexit was such an event, and its reversal could be another.	英国退欧就是一起这样的事件，它的逆转则有可能是另一起这样的事件。


Just ask Nigel Farage, the former UK Independence Party leader, who has suddenly said that the June 2016 Brexit referendum could be overturned.	问问尼格尔·法拉奇（Nigel Farage）。 他是英国独立党（UK Independence Party）前领导人，他突然说，2016年6月的英国退欧公投可以推翻。


“The Remain side are making all the running,” Farage warned his fellow hardline Leavers this weekend.	“留欧阵营遥遥领先，”法拉奇在这个周末警告他的强硬退欧派同志们。


“They have a majority in parliament, and unless we get ourselves organized we could lose the historic victory that was Brexit.”	“他们在议会中是大多数，除非我们自己也组织起来，否则我们将失去英国退欧这一历史性胜利。 ”


The votes for Brexit and Trump are often described today as an ineluctable result of deep socioeconomic factors like inequality or globalization.	投票给英国退欧和特朗普，这样的现象在今天常常被描述为是不平等和全球化等深刻社会经济因素的不可避免的结果。


In some ways, this description is right.	从某些角度讲，这一描述是对的。


Political upheavals of some kind were to be expected after the 2008 economic crisis, as I have argued for years.	2008年经济危机后，发生某些形式的政治剧变是意料中事，我多年来一直这样认为。


But there was nothing inevitable about the specific upheavals that happened.	但具体发生的剧变，完全不是不可避免的。


Brexit, like Trump, was a contingent outcome of small perturbations in voter behavior.	和特朗普一样，英国退欧是选民行为出现小波动的偶然结果。 只要1.


If just 1.8% of Britons voted differently, Brexit would now be a forgotten joke-word.	8%的英国人投出不同的票，英国退欧现在早已是一个被忘却的笑话。


If Hillary Clinton’s popular majority of three million votes was distributed slightly differently among the states, the phrase “President Trump” would be as laughable today as it was in January 2016.	如果希拉里·克林顿（Hillary Clinton）所多赢的三百万张选票能够在各州之间分布得略有不同，“特朗普总统”现在也将和2016年1月时一样可笑。


To stop Brexit in the year ahead, four similarly modest shifts in behavior need to happen.	要想在新的一年里阻止英国退欧，需要发生四个类似的略微的行为变化。


Public opinion must shift slightly further against the Brexit decision, which is already viewed as “wrong in hindsight” by a 4% point margin.	公共观点必须略微更加反对退欧决定。 目前，认为它“事后看来是个错误”的人要比不那么认为的人多4%。


Politicians who privately detest Brexit must speak out publicly.	私下里反对英国退欧的政客必须公开说出来。


Reasoned opposition to government policies must be recognized again as a hallmark of democracy, not an act of treason.	理性反对政府政策必须再次被认为是民主的标志，而不是叛国行为。


And the sense that Brexit is inevitable must be dispelled.	英国退欧不可避免的观点必须消除干净。


These requirements are interdependent.	这些要求是相辅相成的关系。


Politicians will speak out only if they sense public opinion shifting; but public opinion will shift only with credible political leadership.	只有当政客感到公共观点有所改变时，才会公开发声； 但公共观点只有在可信的政治领导下，才会发生改变。


Politicians are cowed into silence if all opposition is branded as anti-democratic.	如果所有的反对都被打上反民主的标签，那么政客就会三缄其口。


And if Brexit appears inevitable, why should voters bother to think again?	而如果英国退欧看起来不可避免的话，为什么选民还要重新思考这个问题?


The sense of inevitability, opinion polls and focus groups show, is the most important obstacle to a reversal.	民意调查和焦点小组表明，不可避免感是逆转退欧决定的最重要的障碍。


About 30% of British voters oppose the EU so passionately that they will always back leaving, regardless of the economic costs, just as Trump’s “base” will always support “their” president regardless of how he behaves.	大约30%的英国选民坚决反对欧盟，他们永远都是脱离欧盟的支持者，不管这回带来多大的经济代价，正如特朗普的“票仓”永远都会支持“他们的”总统，不管他的行为如何。


But these diehard Euroskeptics would never have won a majority without some 20% of voters who cared little about Europe, but treated the referendum as a protest vote.	但只要这些死硬疑欧派无法赢得对欧洲不太在乎，当将公投视为抗议投票的20%选民，他们就无法赢得多数。


Many of these low-conviction voters are now dismayed that Brexit has distracted attention from their real grievances about health, inequality, low wages, housing, and other issues.	如今，这些立场并不太坚定的选民中有很多惊愕于退欧让人们的注意力从他们真正的怨恨对象——医疗、不平等性、低工资、住房和其他问题——上转移开去。


Yet, for this very reason, they want the inevitable departure from Europe to happen as quickly as possible so that the country can get back to business as usual.	但正是出于这一原因，他们想要不可避免的退欧尽快发生，以使国家可以回到常规轨道上来。


Now suppose these voters began to believe that Brexit, far from being inevitable, might never happen.	现在，假设这些选民看是相信，英国退欧远非不可避免，倒有可能永远不会发生。


They would demand that politicians “should stop banging on about Europe” and start dealing with the people’s real concerns.	他们会要求政客“停止在欧洲问题上喋喋不休”，开始解决人民真正的担忧。


The sense of inevitability could be dispelled by recent shifts in the internal politics of both the Conservative government and the Labour opposition.	不可避免感可能因为最近在保守党政府和工党反对派内部政治局面的改变而消失。


Labour has begun to realize that its only possible route back to power is by opposing Brexit.	工党已经开始认识到，其唯一的重掌权力之路便是反对英国退欧。


Detailed analysis of the 2017 election returns has shown that Labour’s unexpected gains were due almost entirely to affluent young voters whose motivation was the hope of derailing Brexit.	2017年选举结果的详细分析表明明，工党出人意料的胜利几乎完全可以归因于出于希望“搅黄”英国退欧动机的富裕年轻选民。


Had it not been for these anti-Brexit voters, Prime Minister Theresa May would have won the widely predicted landslide.	如果不是这些反对退欧的选民，首相梅可能将赢得被广泛预测的一边倒的大胜。


If Jeremy Corbyn, the Labour leader, now becomes “the handmaiden of Brexit,” in Tony Blair’s memorable phrase, by shying away from effective opposition, these new voters will feel betrayed, the party will split between the Marxists and centrists, and its hopes of ever winning a general election will be dashed.	如果工党党魁杰里米·科尔宾（Jeremy Corbyn）现在成为“英国退欧侍女”——布莱尔令人印象深刻的用词——不进行有效的反对，那么这些新选民会感到遭到了背叛，工党也将分裂为马克思主义者和中间派，其赢得大选的希望将付之东流。


If, on the other hand, Labour decided to fight Brexit, public opinion would rapidly shift.	另一方面，如果工党决定要挑战英国退欧，公共观点将迅速转变。


Opposition to Brexit would start to be treated as a natural feature of democratic politics.	反对退欧将开始被认为是民主政治的自然结果。


Labour would start to benefit from the government’s negotiating blunders.	工党将开始从政府的谈判失误中受益。


And the sense of Brexit’s inevitability would vanish.	英国退欧的不可避免感也将消失。


That, in turn, would give courage to pro-European Conservatives.	这反过来将给予亲欧保守党以勇气。


Tory MPs are unlikely to vote against their party leadership if the absence of Labour opposition allows the government to win anyway.	如果因为工党不高举反对大旗而导致政府无论如何都会胜出，那么保守党议员就不可能反对本党领导层。


If, however, concerted opposition from Labour created a genuine possibility of stopping Brexit, Tory MPs who put national interest ahead of party loyalty would find themselves praised for their mettle, not ridiculed for folly.	但如果工党的一致反对创造了阻止退欧的真正的可能性，那么将国家利益置于当派忠诚之前的保守党议员就会因为勇气而被歌颂，而不会因为愚蠢而被取笑。


They might even calculate that their own careers would prosper if their party reconciled itself to Europe.	他们甚至会觉得，如果本党与欧洲形成妥协，自己的职业生涯也会就此添彩。


This chain of events now seems to be starting.	这一系列连锁事件似乎正在启动。


In December, May lost her first important Brexit battle, when Labour MPs united with 12 Tory rebels to pass an amendment requiring a specific Act of Parliament to approve whatever deal is negotiated with the EU.	12月，梅输掉了第一场重要的退欧战役，工党议员联合12位保守党叛徒通过了一份修正案，要求一切与欧盟谈成的协议都需要国会法案批准。


This means that any Brexit plan that arouses serious opposition, either from hardline nationalists or from pro-European Tories, could be used to trigger a new referendum.	这意味着任何引起严重反对的退欧计划——不管是来自强硬民族主义者还是来自亲欧保守党——都可以用来触发新的公投。


Following this breakthrough, the first serious cross-party campaign explicitly aiming to stop Brexit, and not merely to mitigate damage by seeking a “softer” divorce deal, will be launched later this month.	随着这一突破，第一波明确以阻止退欧为目标，而不仅仅是以通过“软”分手协议来降低伤害为目标的严肃的跨党派行动将在本月晚些时候发动。


To succeed, this campaign will need to persuade disillusioned Remainers that Brexit is not inevitable.	要想获得成功，这次行动需要说服幻灭的留欧派，退欧不是不可避免的。


It will need to show protest voters that whatever their problems, Brexit is not the answer.	这次行动需要向抗议选民证明，不管他们的问题是什么，退欧都不是答案。


It will need to convince Labour politicians that collaboration with Brexit is electoral suicide, and persuade pro-EU Tory rebels that a rebellion would not be futile.	这次行动需要说服工党政客，参与退欧合谋就是选举自杀，还要说如亲欧盟的保守党叛徒，背叛不是徒劳。


Finally, it will need European leaders to state unequivocally that Britain is legally entitled to change its mind about leaving.	最后，这次行动需要欧洲领导人毫不含糊地声明，英国有改变退欧想法的合法权利。


These requirements are challenging, but not impossible.	这些要求非常具有挑战性，但并非不可能。


David Davis, the pro-Brexit Tory who is now leading the UK’s Brexit negotiations, once said that, “If a democracy cannot change its mind, it ceases to be a democracy.”	大卫·戴维斯（David Davis）是一位支持退欧的保守党，他目前主持着英国的退欧谈判。 他曾经说，“如果民主不能改变思维，那么它就不再是民主。


Britain is still a democracy, and it can still change its mind about Brexit.	”英国仍然是一个民主国家，并且它仍然可以改变退欧思维。


The British Leadership Disease	英国的领导病


LONDON – Ethical political leadership is in short supply worldwide, from the United States to Turkey to the Philippines.	伦敦—有道德的（ethical）政治领导在全世界都处于短缺状态，从美国到土耳其到菲律宾都是如此。


But perhaps the most striking instance of dishonest leadership has been in the United Kingdom, where the Brexit referendum and its aftermath have caused more instability than Britain experiences in a typical decade.	但英国也许是最令人震惊的不诚实领导的例子，英国退欧公投及其后果所导致的动荡规模已经超过了平常时间十年。


In just the first couple of weeks after the referendum, David Cameron, the prime minister who brought about the vote, resigned, and his Conservative successor, Theresa May, appointed a new Cabinet.	公投举行后不出几周，举行公投的首先卡梅伦便提出辞职，而他的保守党继任者梅已经认命了新内阁。


Though some of the Brexiteers – most notably former London Mayor Boris Johnson – are now in the government, none of those who led the campaign to leave the European Union are ultimately responsible for carrying it out.	尽管一些脱欧派——包括最著名的前伦敦市长约翰逊（Boris Johnson）——已经入职政府，但领衔头欧阵营的人中没有一位最终为脱欧负责。


May herself supported the “Remain” campaign.	梅本人支持“留欧”阵营。


Meanwhile, the opposition Labour Party has fallen into disarray.	与此同时，反对党工党陷入了混乱。


Almost the entire Shadow Cabinet has resigned, having lost confidence in party leader Jeremy Corbyn, and efforts to challenge him have been exceptionally acrimonious, with Corbyn supporters even throwing a brick through the window of one of his rivals' constituency office.	影子内阁对党领袖科尔宾（Jeremy Corbyn）已失去信心并几乎全体辞职，挑战科尔宾的动作也是风起云涌， 科尔宾的支持者甚至朝他对手的选区办公室窗户投掷砖块。


And the post-referendum turmoil runs deeper.	公投后乱象愈演愈烈。


The number of reported hate crimes since the referendum has soared by 500%, amid a lowering mood of social, political, and economic uncertainty and discontent.	社会、政治和经济不确定性和不满导致人们情绪低落，公投以来仇恨犯罪数量飙升500%。


More than £100 billion ($131 billion) was wiped off the FTSE 100 in the first ten minutes of trading after the result was announced, while the pound has plumbed a 35-year low against the US dollar.	FTSE100指数在公投结果公布十分钟内市值蒸发1,000亿多英镑 ，而英镑兑美元汇率更是暴跌至35年来的低点。


One of the most striking lessons of the British case – and many others – is that promising efforts to hold business leaders to account and ensure that companies behave ethically have not carried over to our political systems.	英国——以及其他许多例子最触目惊心的教训之一是问责商业领袖、确保公司行为合乎道德的有用措施在我们的政治制度并未施行。


Our elected leaders, often among the first to demand sound strategy, succession planning, and accountability in the private sector, have spectacularly failed to practice what they preach.	我们的民选领导人——他们往往是一马当先要求私人部门拿出可靠战略、继任规划和问责性的人——在按照他们所鼓吹的那样行动方面可谓表现一团糟。


We expect business leaders to plan for the certainty of uncertainty and to manage risks properly.	我们希望商业领袖为确定的不确定性（certainty of uncertainty）做好规划并合理管理风险。


In the past year, companies big and small in the UK, elsewhere in the EU, and around the world have held countless meetings and high-level planning sessions to prepare for a Brexit vote.	去年，英国、欧盟其他国家以及全世界大大小小的公司举行了数不清的会议和高规格规划研讨会为英国脱欧投票做好准备。


When the results came in, it seemed that the only people who hadn’t planned for the “Leave” campaign’s victory were those who led it.	当结果出炉时，唯一没有为“脱欧”阵营的胜利做好准备的似乎恰恰是导致这一结果的人。


Indeed, according to a recent report by Parliament’s foreign affairs select committee, Cameron’s “considered view not to instruct key departments including the Foreign Office to plan for the possibility that the electorate would vote to leave the EU amounted to gross negligence.”	事实上，据英国议会外交委员会的最新报告，卡梅伦“认为不需要通知包括外交部在内的重要部门为选民投票支持脱欧的可能性做好计划，这是一个重大过失。 ”


The only UK political leader who quickly stepped forward with a clear and decisive strategy was Scotland’s first minister, Nicola Sturgeon.	唯一一位带着明确果断的战略迅速做出反应的英国政治领导人是苏格兰首席部长斯特金（Nicola Sturgeon）。


Her plan is to hold another referendum on Scottish independence and rejoin the EU.	她的计划是再次举行苏格兰从英国独立并重新加入欧盟的公投。


And it was an unelected Canadian, Mark Carney, the governor of the Bank of England, whose authoritative reassurance helped to calm the markets.	而以权威保证帮助市场冷静下来的则是非民选的加拿大人、英格兰银行行长卡尼（Mark Carney）。


In 2015, Carney came under fire for forming a committee to carry out forward planning for the possibility of Brexit.	2015年，卡尼因为组建了一个为英国脱欧可能性未雨绸缪的委员会而遭受抨击。


And in early July, he was called to testify before the House of Commons Treasury Committee, accused of leaning toward “Remain” in the run-up to the referendum, simply because he presented a bleak (and accurate) assessment of the economic consequences of a Leave victory.	7月初，他被传唤前往英国下议院财政委员会参与听证，被指控在公投举行前夕倾向“留欧”，而原因仅仅是他对脱欧胜利的经济结果做出悲观（并正确）的评估。


When Nigel Farage, one of the Leave campaign’s most vociferous and extreme leaders, decided to step down as leader of the UK Independence Party on July 4, he said, “I want my life back.”	7月4日，脱欧阵营最高调、最极端的领袖法拉奇（Nigel Farage）决定辞去英国独立党领导人的职位，他说，“我想找回我的生活。


If that sounds familiar, it is because Tony Hayward, then-CEO of BP, used the same phrase when talking about the impact – on him – of the 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.	”听起来很耳熟吧，因为时任英国石油首席执行官唐熙华（Tony Hayward）在论及2010年墨西哥湾石油泄漏事件的影响——对他的影响时也这么说过。


When Hayward said it, the condemnation was swift.	唐熙华这么说立刻遭到了口诛笔伐。


His words conveyed a complete lack of empathy for the people who were actually affected by the spill.	他的说辞显然得不到受泄漏事件实际影响的人的共鸣。


Likewise, Farage, having helped drive Britain to disaster, blithely walked away when the destination was reached.	类似地，将英国推向灾难的帮凶法拉奇在达到目的后卸任愉快。


As mortifying as it is to see Johnson appointed Foreign Secretary, given his history of lying, xenophobic statements, and insulting remarks about other world leaders, at least he will bear the stain of Britain’s catastrophe publicly.	同样令人痛心的是约翰逊被任命为外交大臣，考虑到此人说谎、仇外言论和对世界其他领导人不敬的历史，至少他将公开承担英国灾难的污点。


The deeper problem in the UK is that there is no alternative.	英国更深层次的问题在于没有其他道路可走。


The Labour Party is simply too divided to take power.	工党太分裂，无法掌权。


If Corbyn were a CEO who lost the confidence of his entire executive team and board, he would be forced to resign or be fired.	入股偶科尔宾是一名首席执行官，已经失去了整个执行团队和董事会的信任，那么他将被迫辞职或被炒鱿鱼。


If a CEO can’t command the respect of his leadership team, he can’t lead the company to success, even if most of the employees think he’s great.	如果一名首席执行官无法赢得他的领导团队的尊重，那么他就无法领导公司取得成功，即使大部分员工认为他很了不起。


The same is true of political parties, though they often take longer to act, causing the enterprise – in this case, the UK – to flounder.	政党也是如此，尽管它们常常需要更长时间采取行动，导致整个实体——在这个例子中是英国——不知所措。


With very few exceptions, the Brexit vote has brought out the worst in Britain’s leaders.	除了及少数例外，英国脱欧投票揭露了英国领导人最糟糕的一面。


If a CEO lied to investors and consumers as much as Farage, Johnson, and Michael Gove lied to UK voters, the consequences would be swift and painful, both from regulators and the market.	如果一位首席执行官对投资人和消费者说谎如同法拉奇、约翰逊和戈夫（Michael Gove）对英国选民说谎一样形同家常便饭的话，痛苦的后果将很快到来——既有来自监管者的，也有来自市场的。


They could not simply resign and move on, much less receive a future role in the organization (and certainly not a senior post).	他们无法简单地辞职走人了事，更不用说在组织中担任另一个职位（高级职位更加不可能）。


They would be fined (or worse), professionally ostracized, and sent packing to Florida.	他们将被炒鱿鱼（甚至更加糟糕），职业生涯就此终结，收拾好去佛罗里达养老。


When we can hold our business leaders to account more effectively than we can our elected political leaders, we should worry for the future – and not just in the UK.	当我们问责商业领袖比问责民选政治领导人更加有效时，就应该担心未来了——不仅英国是如此。


If it can happen here – in the homeland of Edmund Burke and Tony Benn – it truly can happen anywhere.	如果作为伯克（Edmund Burke）和贝恩（Tony Benn）的故乡的英国可以发生这种事，其他地方绝对也可以发生。


When Welfare Sabotages Lives	故意捣乱的福利制度


OXFORD – As Christmas approaches, the United Kingdom is accelerating the rollout of a social security scheme only Ebenezer Scrooge could love.	发自牛津——随着圣诞节的临近，英国正在加速推出只有埃比尼泽·斯克罗吉（Ebenezer Scrooge，狄更斯小说中的一个讨厌圣诞的吝啬鬼）才会喜欢的社会保障计划。


The “universal credit” program replaces six different welfare benefits – such as the child tax credit and the housing benefit – with one.	“通用福利”计划将取代六种不同的福利待遇——例如儿童税收抵免和住房福利。


The goal is to incentivize employment, and to create an online system that is easier to use.	目标是鼓励就业，并创建一个更容易使用的在线系统。


That’s the idea, anyway.	这个想法其实不错。


Unfortunately, the new system’s rollout has been rocky.	可不幸的是新系统的推出一直都不顺利。


A minimum 42-day wait for the first payment has meant that some families have been left penniless for as long as six weeks.	第一笔福利款需要等待42天才能到账，意味着有些家庭可能要囊中空空地等待六周时间。


When money has arrived, many recipients have found that their benefits have been reduced.	而钱到账后很多受助者都发现自己的福利被削减了。


And in areas where universal credit has been widely implemented, referrals to food banks are increasing, as are evictions.	在那些通用福利制度广泛实施的地区有越来越多的民众转而向食品银行这类慈善组织求助，因无法支付房租而被赶出住宅的人数也在增加。


But, for all the dramatic headlines, there is a deeper, unreported problem with the UK’s welfare reform: rather than reduce poverty, it could actually exacerbate it.	但在所有这些夺人眼球的新闻头条之外，英国福利改革还存在一个更深入的，未被报道的问题：与其说是减少贫困，它实际上可能会加剧贫困状况的恶化。


In their pioneering 2013 book Scarcity: Why Having Too Little Means So Much, Harvard’s Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar Shafir of Princeton University examined the conditions under which people make decisions regarding how they manage their jobs, families, and lives.	哈佛大学经济学教授森迪尔·穆莱纳森（Sendhil Mullainathan）和普林斯顿大学心理学教授埃达尔·沙菲尔（Eldar Shafir）在他们2013年出版的开创性著作《稀缺：为何过度的匮乏影响如此巨大》一书中研究了人们在管理工作，家庭和生活的各类决定条件。


Their study holds two lessons that should be considered in evaluating the latest overhaul of the UK’s welfare system.	而他们的研究会为英国福利体系最新改革的评估提供两点教益。


The first lesson is that people – rich and poor – often make bad choices when they lack a key resource, like money or time.	第一个教益是，人们——无论是贫是富——经常都会在缺乏关键资源（如金钱或时间）时做出错误的选择。


For example, ruinously expensive “payday loans” can be appealing to cash-strapped borrowers, even if the terms of these loans tend to push people deeper into debt.	例如对于那些资金匮乏的借款人来说利息高得吓人的“发薪日贷款”极具吸引力，即便这些贷款的条款只会令人们在债务中越陷越深，。


This is not because people lack education.	这不是因为人们缺乏教育。


In controlled studies, Mullainathan and Shafir asked Princeton University students to play a timed computer game in which they were given the opportunity to “borrow” extra seconds, even though doing so would mean forfeiting double the number of seconds from their overall time.	在几项受控研究中，穆莱纳森和沙菲尔让普林斯顿大学的学生玩一个他们有机会“多借”几秒钟的定时电脑游戏，尽管这样做意味着在总体游戏时间中扣除两倍的时间。


Many took the opportunity, leading Mullainathan and Shafir to conclude that poor decisions can result from conditions of scarcity and stress.	许多人都借了这个时间，令穆莱纳森和沙菲尔得出结论：糟糕的决定可能是来自于稀缺和压力。


Britain’s latest welfare reforms will push many recipients into a similar calculus, given that many of the poor have had their support reduced.	英国最新的福利改革将推动许多受助者陷入类似的算计，因为许多穷人都被削减了福利。


This was not the original goal of the “universal credit” system, but a government seeking to cut spending found slashing welfare to be irresistible.	这可不是“通用福利”制度的最初目标，但一个试图削减支出的政府总是忍不住去压缩福利。


The result is a system that is £3 billion ($4 billion) less generous than the system it replaces.	其结果就是一个比它所取代的系统少支出30亿英镑（折合40亿美元）的系统。


It is estimated that some 1.1 million two-parent families will lose an average of £2,770 per year, while working single parents will lose an average of £1,350 per year.	据估计约有110万双亲家庭会因此年均少收入2770英镑，而有工作的单亲家庭年均损失1350英镑。


These reductions in benefits are likely to perpetuate a cycle of bad planning and decision-making.	这些福利的减少很可能会导致一个糟糕的规划和决策周期。


It is a vicious cycle; the more the poor are deprived of resources, the more damaging their decisions can become.	这是一个恶性循环;穷人越是被剥夺了资源，他们的决定就变得越危险。


A second lesson from Shafir and Mullainathan applies to the limits of human “bandwidth.”	穆莱纳森和沙菲尔的第二个教益则关于人类的“带宽”限制。


We all know that drivers using mobile phones are far more likely to have accidents, or that students using laptops during lectures learn less.	我们都知道使用手机的驾驶员更容易发生事故，或者在讲座期间使用笔记本电脑的学生内容吸收率较低。


If people’s brainpower is distracted by a pressing concern, they perform worse in problem-solving situations.	如果人们的脑力被某些紧迫关注所分散，他们解决问题的表现就会更差。


Britain’s benefit system operates in a similar fashion; it is a voracious consumer of bandwidth.	英国的福利制度也是以类似的方式运作； 它是一个贪婪的带宽消费者。


For example, the predecessor to the universal credit scheme, the Welfare Reform Act of 2012, created caps to local housing allowances and total benefits, and under-occupancy penalties.	例如，2012年福通用福利计划的前身2012年《福利改革法案》规定了当地住房补助和总福利的上限以及住房空置的处罚。


Disability benefits and eligibility tests were also dramatically changed.	残疾福利和资格评审也发生了巨大变化。


And all of these “improvements” followed dozens of other changes, creating a maelstrom of bureaucracy that strained bandwidth and tested resolve.	而所有这些“改进”都伴随着其他几十个变化，造成了一场管理制度上的大混乱，既导致带宽紧张，又考验了执行的决心。


Now come the new changes, which, in effect, create debilitating distractions for beneficiaries, forcing the poor to spend even more mental energy navigating yet another system, with new rules and procedures.	如今出现的新变化实际上会给受助者造成削弱性的分心，迫使穷人花更多精神精力去使用另一个拥有新规则和程序的系统。


This is akin to forcing people to use mobile phones every time they drive.	这类似于强迫人们每次开车都使用手机。


It is unclear how parents and workers navigating a system intended to “make work pay” are supposed to perform either role well.	目前还不清楚那些既要照顾孩子又要上班的人们如何在驾驶一套“让工作者得回报”系统的同时又承担好两个角色。


Britain’s new program was championed as a way to reduce costs and incentivize better decisions, thereby moving more people into work and reducing benefit claims.	英国的新计划被鼓吹为一种降低成本和激励更佳决策的方式，可以使更多的人投入工作，减少福利需求。


But, so far, there is little evidence to support this rosy scenario.	但迄今为止没有什么证据能支持这种乐观设想。


By reducing benefits received by the poor, the government is ensuring that scarcity surges and poor decisions multiply.	通过减少穷人获得的福利，政府正在确保稀缺性不断上升以及糟糕决策倍增。


And by changing the system frequently and making it more complicated to access, Britain’s leaders are also forcing the poor to consume more mental bandwidth.	在频繁改变福利体系使其更加复杂后，英国领导人也迫使穷人消耗更多的精神带宽。


Taken together, these factors are leaving welfare recipients worse off.	总而言之，这些因素使得福利受助者变得日益窘迫。


Policymakers should read Mullainathan and Shafir, and consider how their research could be applied to future welfare reforms.	决策者应该阅读穆莱纳森和沙菲尔的著作，并考虑如何将他们的研究应用于未来的福利改革。


The goal should be benefits that are generous and stable enough to let people focus on finding work, while also helping their children with homework and looking after their own health.	目标应该是慷慨和稳定的福利，让人们专注于找工作，同时辅导孩子的功课并照顾自己的健康。


That type of system is possible to create.	这类系统的创建不是不可能的。


The alternative is a system that places additional burdens on those least able to bear them.	而另一种办法是给那些最无力承受的人增加负担。


A Better Way from ‘R’ to ‘D’	从‘研究’到‘开发’的更好方法


BELLEVUE, WASHINGTON – When business leaders get together to talk about innovating their industries, they typically focus on initiatives like improving government funding for basic research, or building technology hubs and incubators.	华盛顿贝尔维尤——在商业领袖汇聚一堂探讨行业创新时，他们往往将重点放在改善基础研究或建设技术中心及孵化器的政府资助行动上。


But a crucial element of “innovation” is often absent from these discussions: the final products.	但上述讨论往往缺乏最终产品这一“创新”的关键元素。


That’s no oversight.	这并非疏忽。


On the contrary, the lack of product-focused discussion is symptomatic of a far more serious problem facing businesses of all sizes in nearly every industry.	恰恰相反，缺乏以产品为核心的讨论恰恰表明几乎所有行业和大大小小的企业所面临的问题要严重的多。


Simply put, product development takes a back seat in innovation strategy because the financial link between ideation and commercialization is broken.	简言之，产品开发在创新战略中处于次要地位，因为创意和商业化之间的金融联系被切断了。


For economies to prosper, good ideas need a nudge getting to market.	要想实现经济繁荣，需要推动好的理念走向市场。


Innovative products are, after all, what makes life healthier, more efficient, and more fun.	毕竟创新产品让生活更健康、更高效也更快乐。


But there’s ample evidence to suggest that development – the “D” in R&D – has not kept pace with the blistering speed of “R” – modern-day research.	但有充分的证据表明开发——也就是研发中的“发”——并未能够跟上“研究”——也就是现代研究惊人的发展速度。


Even the most robust economies have a surplus of ideas that never reach consumers.	就连最强劲的经济体也存在永远无法接触消费者的过剩的想法。


In the US, for example, just 5% of all active patents are ever licensed or commercialized.	比如在美国，仅有5%的活跃专利可以发放许可证或商业化。


Most companies use less than a quarter of the inventions they own.	多数企业付诸应用的发明还不到其拥有专利的四分之一。


Technology transfers from academia aren’t going so well, either.	学术界技术转让的形势也同样严峻。


Although more than 75,000 patents have been issued to American universities since 1969, the vast majority of technology transfer offices – administrative units that manage a school’s intellectual-property output – are failing to generate enough revenue even to cover their operating costs.	尽管自1969年以来美国大学已经被授予超过75，000项专利——但绝大多数负责管理学校知识产权成果的技术转让部门所得收入甚至无法弥补其自身的运营支出。


If we want to reverse these trends and maximize innovation output, we need more mechanisms for funding the commercialization of smart ideas.	如果想扭转上述趋势并最大限度地提高创新产出，我们需要更多机制来为聪明的理念提供商业化资助。


At the moment, venture capital-backed startups are the standard mechanism for moving from “R” to “D.”	目前，风险资本支持的创业企业是从研究转向开发的标准机制。


These companies are formed for the sole purpose of pushing good ideas through the development pipeline.	这些企业成立的全部目的就是要推动好的理念进入开发渠道。


And, given the stellar valuations of some startups, it’s easy to assume that a healthy ecosystem of savvy companies and venture capital funding is all that is needed to ensure innovation.	而且，考虑到某些创业企业估值很高，人们很容易认为由精明企业和风险投资资金所组成的健康生态系统是确保创新所需要的全部因素。


But most companies are simply unable to take good ideas to market, because they lack access to pools of capital earmarked for innovation.	但多数企业根本无法将好的理念推向市场，因为它们缺乏获得创新资金的渠道。


Small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) often struggle to secure financing to build R&D infrastructure.	中小企业（SMEs）往往很难获得融资来建设研发基础设施。


Multinational corporations use retained earnings to finance R&D, but because this approach can adversely affect a company’s stock valuation, even they tend to be conservative in pushing new ideas forward.	跨国企业利用留存收益作为研发资金，但因为这种方法可能对企业股票估值造成负面影响，所以就连他们往往都对推动新理念持保守态度。


Compare that scenario with the way that multinationals finance infrastructure investments.	下面我们将这种方案与跨国公司融资基础设施的投资方式进行比较。


Let’s say, for example, that DuPont wanted to build a new manufacturing facility.	比方说，假设杜邦想要建设一家新的制造厂。


It could borrow money from a bank and repay it from resulting profits.	它可以从银行借款，之后用所得的利润进行偿付。


But if DuPont needed capital to produce a new chemical in an existing plant, it couldn’t get a loan, because banks don’t know how to assess the risks of innovative products (in the chemical industry or any other).	但如果杜邦需要资金在现有工厂生产一种新化学品，那么它无法获得贷款，因为银行不知道创新产品的风险评估方法（无论是涉及化工行业还是其他）。


Unless you’re a giant like Alphabet, Apple, or Tesla, you can’t justify the risk and expense of a blue-sky R&D program.	除非你是像Alphabet、苹果或特斯拉那样的巨星企业，否则你无法证明一项蓝天研发计划是合理的。


These days even the biggest companies are more likely to acquire a new, pre-packaged technology than to develop it in-house.	现在就连规模最大的企业也更乐意收购一项已经打包好的新技术，而不是进行内部研发。


That’s one reason why mergers and acquisitions are increasingly common (and why some observers see M&As as the new R&D).	这也是为什么兼并和收购越来越普遍的一个理由（这还能够解释为什么有些观察家把兼并收购看成一种新的研发）。


This situation isn’t ideal for investors, either.	这种状况对投资者而言同样并不理想。


Consider the case of Sony’s PlayStation gaming console.	比如索尼公司的PlayStation游戏机项目。


Development of the PlayStation attracted considerable attention from investors in the 1990s.	PlayStation的研发在二十世纪九十年代吸引了投资者的广泛关注。


But the only way to back the project was to buy shares in the parent company—which encompassed music, film, camera, and television businesses as well.	但支持研发计划的唯一方法是购买母公司的股票——而母公司还包括音乐、电影、相机和电视等业务。


This sort of misalignment is just as inefficient for companies as it is for investors.	这样的错配对企业而言像对投资者一样低效。


And it’s not even an option for smaller companies; selling equity is hard when you’re an SME.	而且对小企业这甚至算不上一项选择； 小企业出售股权难度很大。


Clearly, current funding models stifle product-specific innovation and investment, and all but freeze out SMEs.	显而易见，目前的融资模式扼杀了产品创新和投资，几乎完全冻结了中小企业。


The government officials with whom I speak are more concerned with maintaining the health of their countries’ SMEs than protecting multinational corporations, for good reason: SMEs everywhere account for an overwhelming share of employment and job creation.	与我谈论这个问题的政府官员更关注保持国内中小企业的健康，而不是跨国企业的保护，他们这么做理由非常充分：无论哪里的中小企业都在就业和岗位创造方面都占据绝大多数份额。


Yet they aren’t getting the financing opportunities they deserve.	但它们却无法得到应有的融资机会。


To turn things around, businesses need financing vehicles tied to product development.	为了扭转这种局面，企业需要将融资工具与产品开发挂钩。


One idea is debt-based funds offering bonds with more predictable returns based on revenue from new products.	一种方法是设立债权基金，并将相关债券与可预测的新产品收入回报相挂钩。


These funds could be structured to distribute risk among a variety of projects or sectors, which might make them more attractive to investors who avoid high-stakes venture financing.	这类基金可以设计成在各类项目或行业之间分散风险，这可能提高它们对躲避高风险投资的投资者的吸引力。


This kind of funding would also enable much closer alignment between investors and innovative projects.	这种基金也可以在投资人和创新项目之间达成更紧密的一致。


Companies with proven track records, technical skills, experienced management teams, and established sales channels are sources of innovation that no country can afford to squander.	拥有良好记录、技术能力、经验丰富的管理团队和既有销售渠道的企业是任何国家都不能浪费的创新资源。


The limitations of the current financing regime mean that countries are letting opportunity pass them by.	现有融资机制的局限性意味着国家正在白白浪费机会。


Despite few ready avenues for product commercialization, the world’s companies, research institutes, and university and government laboratories together spend more than a trillion dollars on R&D annually.	尽管产品商业化现成的机会很少，但全世界的企业、研究机构、大学及政府实验室合起来每年投入超过1万亿美元用于研发。


Without a new approach to product financing, most of what they discover will remain on the shelf.	如果没有产品融资的新方式，他们的多数发现都将被束之高阁。


Bubble Trouble	泡沫的麻烦


The future of the housing boom, and the possible financial repercussions of a substantial price decline in coming years, is a matter of mounting concern among governments around the world.	房地产繁荣的未来以及未来数年价格大跌可能带来的金融影响已经越来越引起世界各国政府的担心。


I learned this first-hand while attending this year’s Jackson Hole Symposium in the remote wilderness of Wyoming, where, ironically, there are almost no homes to buy.	我在参加今年在怀俄明州遥远的荒野举行的Jackson Hole会议了解了有关这方面的第一手信息。 具有讽刺意味的是，那里几乎没有房子可买。


The howls of coyotes and bugling of elk rang out at night.	夜晚可以听到郊狼和驼鹿的叫声。


But, by day, everyone was talking about real estate.	但是，白天大家谈论的都是房地产问题。


This conference has grown to be a major international event for government monetary policymakers, with governors or deputy governors of 34 central banks attending this year.	该会议已经发展成为各国政府货币政策制定者的重要国际聚会，今年的会议有来自34个国家的中央银行的行长或副行长参加。


Roughly two-thirds of these countries have had dramatic housing booms since 2000, most of which appear to be continuing, at least for the time being.	这些国家中大约有三分之二自2000年以来经历了房地产的高度繁荣，其中绝大多数的繁荣看上去还会继续下去，至少从目前来看是如此。


But there was no consensus on the longer-run outlook for home prices.	但是大家对于房价的长期走势看法却不尽相同。


Of all these countries, the United States appears to be the most likely to have reached the end of the cycle.	在所有这些国家中，美国看上去最有可能已经达到了一个循环的终点。


According to the Standard & Poor’s/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index, US home prices increased 86% in real, inflation-corrected, terms from 1996 to 2006, but have since fallen 6.5% – and the rate of decrease has been accelerating.	根据标准普尔Case-Shiller美国全国房价指数，美国的房价在1996-2006年之间去除通货膨胀的影响实际上升了86%，但是此后已经下降了6. 5%，并且下降的幅度还在加快。


That looks like the beginning of the end of the boom, though, of course, one can never be sure.	看上去一段繁荣的结束已经开始了，尽管你永远不能对此下定论。


I presented a bearish long-run view, which many challenged, but no one obviously won the argument.	我提出熊市观点，就是房价从长期来看将持续下跌，尽管许多人提出质疑，但是显然没有人能说服对方。


Nevertheless, an outside observer might have been struck by the weight given to the possibility that the decade-long boom might well suffer a real reversal, followed by serious declines.	然而，一个局外观察者也许会对如此多的人认定为期10年的繁荣可能会遭受一次真正的倒转并且随之引发房价的暴跌而感到震惊。


There seems to be a general recognition of substantial downside risk, as the current credit crisis seems to be related to the decline in US home prices that we have already seen.	大家似乎公认存在实质性的不利风险，因为目前的信贷危机似乎与我们已经看到的美国房价的下跌相关。


The boom, and the widespread conviction that home prices could only go higher, led to a weakening of lending standards.	房地产的繁荣，以及大家普遍相信房价只会越来越高，导致了借贷标准的降低。


Mortgage lenders seem to have believed that home buyers would not default, because rising prices would make keeping up with their payments very attractive.	抵押借贷者似乎已经认定房屋购买者不会拖欠还款，因为越来越高的价格会使得按期归还贷款变得极有吸引力。


Moreover, the boom resulted in a number of financial innovations, which may have been good ideas intrinsically, but which were sometimes applied too aggressively, given the risk of falling prices.	此外，繁荣带来了大量的金融创新产品，它们从内在来看也许是好的，但是如果考虑到跌价的风险，它们有时应用得有点过分自信了。


Mortgage-backed securities were urged onto investors for whom they were too risky.	抵押支持证券被推销给对于他们来说有点冒险的投资者。


As with homebuyers, all would be well, the reasoning went, on the premise that home prices continue to rise at a healthy pace.	而对于购房者来说，一切都会很好，其推理的基础是房价会继续以健康的步伐持续上升。


At the Jackson Hole conference, Paul McCulley of PIMCO, the world’s largest bond fund, argued that in the past month or two we have been witnessing a run on what he calls the “shadow banking system,” which consists of all the levered investment conduits, vehicles and structures that have sprung up along with the housing boom.	在Jackson Hole会议上，世界上最大的债券基金太平洋投资管理公司的Paul McCulley说，在过去的一两个月我们已经看到了他所谓的“影子银行系统”的运作。 影子银行系统由伴随这房地产的繁荣涌现出来的所有杠杆投资渠道、媒介和结构组成。


The shadow banking system, which is beyond the reach of bank regulators and deposit insurance, fed the boom in home prices by helping provide more credit to buyers.	它处于银行监管者以及储蓄保险的控制之外，通过帮助向购买者提供更多的信用来享受房价的暴涨所带来的利益。


Bank runs occur when people, worried that their deposits will not be honored, hastily withdraw their money, thereby creating the very bankruptcy that they feared.	当人们担心他们在银行的存款得不到支付而急切地取回他们的钱时就会发生银行的挤提现象，而这正好带来他们所担心的破产。


It is no coincidence that this new kind of bank run originated in the US, which is the clearest example of falling home prices in the world today.	这种新型的挤提最早发生在美国并不是一个巧合，因为它是当今世界的房价下跌的最好例子。


When home prices stop rising, recent homebuyers may lose the enthusiasm to continue paying their mortgages – and investors lose faith in mortgage-backed securities.	当房价停止上升，最近的房屋购买者也许会失去继续归还他们的抵押贷款的信心，而投资者会对抵押支持证券失去信心。


The US Federal Reserve is sometimes blamed for the current mortgage crisis, because excessively loose monetary policy allegedly fueled the price boom that preceded it.	美联储有时被指责应该对目前的抵押贷款危机负责，因为它所实行的宽松的货币政策被认为刺激了此前的价格上涨。


Indeed, the real (inflation-corrected) federal funds rate was negative for 31 months, from October 2002 to April 2005.	事实上，从2002年10月至2005年4月这31个月的实际（去除通货膨胀的影响）联邦基金利率是负的。


The only precedent for this since 1950 was the 37-month period from September 1974 to September 1977, which launched the worst inflation the US has seen in the last century.	自1950年以来这样的情况仅仅在1974年9月至1977年9月这37个月发生过，这是上个世纪美国发生最严重通货膨胀的阶段。


What then helped produce a boom in consumer prices now contributed to a boom in home prices.	当时导致消费品价格上涨的情况现在引发了房屋价格的上涨。


But loose monetary policy is not the whole story.	但是宽松的货币政策并不是所有的问题所在。


The unusually low real funds rate came after the US housing boom was already well underway.	美国房地产繁荣所带来的超低的实际基金利率已经存在很长一段时间了。


According to the Standard & Poor’s/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index, home prices were already rising at almost 10% a year in 2000 – a time when the Fed was raising the federal funds rate, which peaked at 6.5%.	根据标准普尔Case-Shiller美国全国房价指数，房价在2000年已经几乎上涨了10%，同期美联储将联邦基金利率提到了6. 5%的最高水平。


The rapid increase thus appears to be mostly the result of speculative momentum that occurred before the interest-rate cuts.	于是房价的快速上升看起来很可能是利率降低前投机冲动的表现。


Alan Greenspan, the former Fed chairman, recently said that he now believes that speculative bubbles are important driving forces in our economy, but that, at the same time, the world’s monetary authorities cannot control bubbles.	美联储前主席格林斯潘最近说他现在认为投机泡沫是我们经济的重要驱动力，但是与此同时世界各国的货币主管部门无法控制泡沫。


He is mostly right: the best thing that monetary authorities could have done, given their other priorities and concerns, is to lean against the real estate bubble, not stop it from inflating.	他在很大程度是对的：考虑到它们其他需要优先考虑的事情和担忧，货币主管部门能采取的最好办法就是倚靠房地产的繁荣，而不是阻碍它的膨胀。


The current decline in home prices is associated just as clearly with waning speculative enthusiasm among investors, which is likewise largely unrelated to monetary policy.	目前房价的下跌很明显是与投资者投机热情的消退相联系，而在很大程度上与货币政策并没有联系。


The world’s monetary authorities will have trouble stopping this decline, and much of the attendant problems, just as they would have had trouble stopping the ascent that preceded it.	世界各国的货币主管部门将很难制止这种下跌以及解决参与房地产泡沫的人士的所面临的困难，正如它们很难在房价上涨前制止它一样。


Who Does Business Represent?	企业代表了什么？


CAMBRIDGE – On whose behalf do business associations speak?	坎布里奇—企业联盟代表谁说话？


Well, business.	好吧，当然是企业。


But who is “business”?	但“企业”又是谁？


It’s an increasingly urgent question, because while firms have radically changed how they think about themselves, business associations have yet to catch up.	这个问题正变得日益紧迫起来，因为，尽管企业极大地改变了我们对自我的看法，但企业联盟还没有跟进。


And the resulting lag is making capitalism less legitimate in many countries.	而由此造成的滞后正在导致资本主义在许多国家失去合法性。


The traditional view of the firm – shared by both Karl Marx and Milton Friedman – is that it is an organization owned by capitalists (shareholders), on whose behalf it is run.	传统企业观——不论是马克思还是米尔顿·弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）——认为，企业是一个由资本家（股东）所有、代表其经营者的组织。


It hires workers and buys other inputs to maximize returns for those who put up the money.	它雇用工人、购买其他投入品，为出钱的人创造最大化回报。


According to Friedman, the social responsibility of the firm is to increase profits.	按照弗里德曼的说法，企业的社会责任就是增加利润。


Any goal that does not directly benefit shareholders is just another distortionary tax.	一切不直接有利于股东的目标都是一种扭曲的税。


But what makes all of a firm’s stakeholders behave in a way that maximizes value?	但是什么让企业的所有相关利益方，以价值最大化的方式行动？


In fact, modern corporations struggle to create a sense of a collaborative community of employees, managers, suppliers, lenders, distributors, service providers, customers, and shareholders, all cooperating to create value by better satisfying customer needs and aspirations.	事实上，现代企业很难形成一种员工、管理者、供应商、贷款人、分销商、服务提供商、客户和股东的合作共同体（collaborative community）感，让这些方面精诚合作，通过更好地满足客户的需要和趣味创造价值。


That’s why United Airlines would prefer that its employees treat passengers with grace.	正因如此，美联航更希望它的员工能够对顾客更加宽容。


Or why Goldman Sachs wishes its bankers would not aid and abet massive corruption.	正因如此，高盛不愿它的银行家协助和教唆大规模腐败。


Apple expects its suppliers to treat their workers humanely.	苹果希望它的供应商人道地对待工人。


UnitedHealthcare hopes its employees manage reimbursements honestly.	联合健康保险公司（UnitedHealthcare）希望他的员工诚实地管理赔付。


Uber’s shareholders worry that misbehavior by senior executives may cause customers to switch service providers and valuable workers to quit.	优步的股东担心高管的不当行为可能导致客户改换门庭和重要员工流失。


To create functioning collaborative organizations, humans have evolved a sense of “us,” a feeling of belonging to what the historian and political scientist Benedict Anderson famously called an “imagined community.”	为了建立运转良好的合作性组织，人们进化出一种“我者”感，这种感觉就是历史学家兼政治学家本尼迪克特·安德森（Benedict Anderson）著名的“想象的共同体”的一部分。


We owe such communities our loyalty, and we feel pride in their achievements, pain in their stumbles, and hope for their continued success.	我对这类共同体效忠，我们为这类共同体的成就而骄傲，为它们的波折而痛苦，希望它们能一直取得成功。


We cooperate not just because it is in our cold pecuniary interest to do so, but because a cocktail of moral sentiments – loyalty, pride, guilt, shame, outrage, glee – make us work and root for our team.	我们合作，不仅是因为这符合冷冰冰的金钱利益，也是因为各种道德感的综合效应——忠诚、骄傲、罪恶、羞愧、愤怒、兴奋——它让我们投入工作，也是我们结成团队的根源。


Anderson’s focus was the rise of nationalism.	安德森的关注点在于民族主义的崛起。


But corporations try to create an analogous sense of allegiance by specifying their mission, vision, and values in lofty terms.	但企业试图通过用崇高而具体化的使命、愿景和价值观，建立一种类似的结盟感。 2000年，当大通曼哈顿银行收购J.


When Chase Manhattan Bank bought J.P. Morgan in 2000, its managers assumed that they had also acquired the right to rename the organization.	摩根时，其管理层认为他们同时也买下了更改组织名称的权利。 他们很快就发现，在客户和员工眼中，J.


They soon discovered that J.P. Morgan was a more prestigious imagined community than Chase in the eyes of its customers and employees.	P. 摩根的想象的共同体要比大通的想象的共同体高贵得多。


It is easy to see why the vision of the firm as a collaborative community is winning out in business schools and the most successful companies.	很容易理解，为何作为一个合作共同体的企业的愿景会在商学院和最成功的公司中脱颖而出。


One reason is that in most publicly traded corporations, shareholders are passive investors who just want to know enough about the firm to decide whether to buy or sell; they do not want to get involved in decisions.	一个原因是在大部分上市公司中，股东都是消极投资者，他们向足够地了解企业以决定是买入还出卖出； 他们并不像卷入企业决策中。


At the same time, creating a sense of allegiance and trust by stakeholders facilitates running the show.	与此同时，通过相关利益方建立结盟感和信任感有利于唱好大戏。


A narrow focus on shareholders’ interests would impel all other stakeholders to pursue their narrow interests as well, increasing strife and transaction costs.	狭隘地注重股东利益会驱使其他相关利益方也都只关注各自的狭隘利益，从而加剧冲突，增加交易成本。


The CEO may be appointed by a board of directors whose members are chosen by the shareholders, but he or she is supposed to represent and motivate the network of stakeholders that underpin the corporation’s success.	CEO可能由股东选出的董事会成员任命，但他原本应该代表和动员作为企业成功的基石的相关利益方网络。


The Fellows of the Harvard Corporation appoint my employer’s president, but they try to choose someone who will make us stakeholders proud.	哈佛理事会的成员任命了谁来当我的雇主的校长，但他们的人选一定要能够让我们这些相关利益方感到骄傲。


And yet the social and political representation of business more closely resembles Friedman’s archetype.	但企业的社会和政治面貌更加接近于弗里德曼的诠释。


Business associations too frequently speak only on behalf of the narrow interest of the capitalist owners.	企业联盟常常完全只顾资本家所有者的狭隘利益。


In country after country – whether in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, France, Mexico, or the United Kingdom – business organizations give political voice to employers, not to the network of stakeholders.	不管什么国家——阿根廷、 智利、 哥伦比亚 、法国、墨西哥、英国都是如此——企业组织让雇主，而不是相关利益方网络，拥有了政治话语权。


Political representation of business per se, if well conceived, is invaluable for society.	企业的政治面貌本身，如果考虑周密的话，对社会的价值十分巨大。


After all, economic progress requires that the invisible hand of the market be coordinated with the visible hand of the state.	毕竟，经济进步需要市场的看不见的手和国家的看得见的手精诚合作。


The cellphone industry requires the creation of property rights on the spectrum.	手机行业需要以频段的产权制度为前提。


The real estate industry needs to convince customers that their apartment building will not burn down.	房地产行业需要说服客户它们所建造的公寓不会被烧毁。


The IT industry would benefit if kids learned to code in school.	IT行业得益于儿童从学校就开始学习编程。


As these and many other examples show, business can become more efficient if governments provide the right combination of a diverse, relatively specific, and evolving set of public goods.	这些和其他许多例子表明，如果政府能提供多样化的、相对具体的、与时俱进的正确的公共品组合，企业可以变得更加高效。


Business associations need to interact with government in order to identify those public goods that would make economic ecosystems more productive, so that they can create more value for stakeholders.	企业联盟需要与政府互动，以认清哪些公共品可以让经济生态系统更加有利于生产，从而为相关利益方行创造更大的价值。


But that task is burdened by the perception that those at the table are there to represent employers’ narrow interests, as their policy agenda – often focused on shifting the burden of taxation onto others – clearly suggests.	但这一任务有一个障碍，即人们认为坐在谈判桌上的，无不代表着雇主的狭隘利益，这从他们的政策日程——常常关注如何将税收负担转移给他人——就可以显然地看出来。


As a consequence, governments often require that they meet in the presence of labor associations, so that employees also get a voice.	结果，政府常常要求他们在工会在场的情况下才能谈判——从而让员工也可以发出声音。


Setting the table in this tripartite way dramatically changes the nature of the conversation, by focusing it on labor and other distributive issues that could be resolved within the business network, at the expense of addressing how to supply productivity-enhancing public goods that could benefit all stakeholders.	这一三方谈判的设计大大改变了对话的性质，使其关注劳工和其他可以在企业内部网络解决的分配问题，而如何提供提高生产率、进而令所有相关利益方都受益的公共品的问题，却被搁置在一旁。


And it happens because the transformation in the conception of what a business is has yet to be reflected in the conception of what a business association should be.	而之所会这样，原因是企业改变的转变尚未反映在企业联盟的应有概念中。


Naturally, this lag leads to confrontation with other stakeholders, who must respond with their respective organizations.	自然地，这一滞后导致了与其他相关利益方的产生，后者必须与各自的组织应对这一情况。


But if business associations could transform themselves so that they represented and gave voice to the network of stakeholders on which businesses are actually built, they could contribute enormously to the creation of a much more collaborative and inclusive society.	但如果企业联盟可以转变自身，让它们代表作为企业的实际基础的相关利益方网络，并让它们发出声音，就可以为建立更加合作、更加包容的社会做出巨大贡献。


The Trumping of Cambodian Democracy	颠覆柬埔寨的民主


WASHINGTON, DC – Over the last year, Cambodia’s ruling party, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), has dramatically increased its pressure on its political opponents and civil society.	华盛顿——去年，柬埔寨执政的柬埔寨人民党（CPP）大幅增加了对政治对手和公民团体的压力。


Democracy in Cambodia has always been fraught, and elections are not completely free and fair.	柬埔寨民主状况一直令人担忧，选举也不是彻头彻尾自由和公平的。


But the current crackdown is much greater in scope, and far more concerning, in part because it is being enabled by American apathy.	但这次镇压涉及范围要大得多，并引发人们更深重的关切，因为这在某种程度上是美国漠不关心所导致的后果。


Prime Minister Hun Sen, East Asia’s longest-serving non-royal ruler, has used his power to silence critics and close outspoken media outlets, including one independent newspaper, the Cambodia Daily.The CPP has also expelled the National Democratic Institute, a US-based nonprofit that focuses on rights and democracy, and detained political challengers.	东亚地区执政时间最长的非皇族统治者柬埔寨首相洪森利用手中的权力遏制批评者并查封敢于直言的媒体，包括一家独立报纸柬埔寨日报。 柬埔寨人民党还驱逐了一家总部设在美国并关注权利和民主等话题的非营利机构民主研究院，并且拘留了政治挑战者。


Kem Sokha, who co-headed the main opposition group, the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), was arrested in September on dubious treason charges.	主要反对团体柬埔寨国家救助党（CNRP）的联合党首肯·索卡在9月因涉嫌叛国罪名而被捕。


The other main opposition figure, Sam Rainsy, remains in exile in France.	而另一位主要反对派人士桑兰西仍然在法国流亡。


But in recent weeks, Hun Sen has increased the pressure, essentially ending Cambodia’s shaky attempts at democracy.	但近几周，洪森加大了压力，实际上终结了柬埔寨本就摇摇欲坠的民主。


Earlier this month, a court dominated by CPP allies dissolved the CNRP.	本月早些时候，一家由柬埔寨人民党主导的法庭解散了柬埔寨国家救助党。


As a result, the party will most likely be unable to contest national elections next year, all but ensuring that Hun Sen will win another term as prime minister.	结果导致该党很大可能无法参与明年的全国大选，这几乎可以确保洪森将继续连任柬埔寨首相。


The ruling could also help enable Hun Sen eventually hand power to another family member.	这次裁决还可以协助洪森最终向一名家庭成员进行权力移交。


Fearing for their lives, around half of CNRP lawmakers have left Cambodia.	因为担心自身的生命安全， 约半数的柬埔寨国家救助党党员已经出国。


Hun Sen has hardly been shy about his slide toward what the Cambodia Daily, on its last day of publishing, termed a “descent into outright dictatorship.”	洪森几乎毫不掩饰地滑向柬埔寨日报最后一天出版时所说的“沦为彻头彻尾的独裁统治者”。


In fact, Hun Sen, like other Southeast Asian autocrats, now seems to believe that he has political carte blanche, given the low priority that US President Donald Trump has placed on human rights.	事实上，与其他东南亚独裁者一样，洪森现在似乎认为自己得到了全权政治委任，因为美国总统唐纳德·特朗普对人权问题的重视程度并不高。


In the past, Western pressure had managed to keep Hun Sen in check.	过去，西方压力已经能够制约洪森的行动。


Foreign aid, including from the US, accounts for as much as 40% of Cambodia’s national budget.	外国援助，包括来自美国的援助，占到柬埔寨国家预算高达40%的份额。


And, while President Barack Obama’s administration did expand cooperation with Cambodia, it also repeatedly raised the issue of human-rights abuses with Hun Sen, including during a tense visit by Obama to Phnom Penh in 2012.	而且，虽然巴拉克·奥巴马总统政府的确扩大了与柬埔寨的合作，但也一再向洪森提及侵犯人权问题，包括在2012年奥巴马密集访问金边的时候。


The Trump administration has rolled back this pressure, and then some, by downplaying human rights and democracy promotion.	特朗普政府已经减轻了这种压力，而且还淡化了推进人权和民主。


In an address to the United Nations General Assembly in September, Trump made clear that his priority would be sovereignty rather than rights.	在9月进行的一次联大发言中，特朗普已经明确表示主权、而不是权利，将成为他的重中之重。


Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, meanwhile, has even reportedly considered removing democracy promotion from the State Department’s mission.	与此同时，国务卿雷克斯·蒂勒森甚至据称曾考虑从国务院的使命清单中去除宣传民主。


Hun Sen recognized this shift almost immediately.	洪森几乎立即就意识到这样的转变。


In February, he compared his disdain for Cambodia’s media to Trump’s distrust of the mainstream media in the US.	今年2月，他曾把自己对柬埔寨媒体的蔑视与特朗普不信任美国主流媒体相比较。


And although lower-ranking US officials, including the Senior Director for Asia on the National Security Council, have met with their Cambodian counterparts to press them on rights issues, Trump has said nothing negative about Hun Sen’s actions.	尽管包括国家安全委员会高级亚洲主管在内的美国低级官员曾经会晤缅甸对口部门，并就权利问题向其施压，但特朗普却从未对洪森的所作所为进行过任何负面评价。


In a speech in early November, Hun Sen essentially praised Trump for his indifference and non-interventionism.	在11月初的一次演讲中，洪森实际上因为漠不关心和不干涉主义而 赞扬了特朗普 。


Other Southeast Asian autocrats, or elected leaders with autocratic tendencies, have also celebrated the arrival of Trump’s “America First” foreign policy.	其他东南亚独裁人物，或者具备专制主义倾向的当选领袖，也对特朗普的“美国第一”外交政策持欢迎态度。


Thai Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha, who led a coup against an elected government three years ago, was welcomed at the White House this year.	泰国总理巴育·占奥差三年前领导政变推翻民选政府，今年却在白宫受到了热情的接待。


So was Malaysian leader Najib Razak, whose wealth may be questioned by the US Justice Department as part of a wide-ranging investigation into fraud at a Malaysian sovereign wealth fund.	同样情况的还有马来西亚领导人纳吉布·拉扎克，作为对马来西亚主权财富基金全面欺诈调查的组成部分，美国司法部可能会质疑他所掌握的财富。


Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, meanwhile, held a friendly phone call with Trump back in April.	与此同时，菲律宾总统罗德里戈·杜特尔特曾经在今年4月与特朗普进行过一次友好的电话谈话。


Trump praised the Philippine leader for his brutal, lawless “war on drugs,” in which, according to Human Rights Watch, more than 12,000 people have died.	特朗普赞扬这位菲律宾领导人无法无天的残酷“禁毒战争”，据人权观察报道，超过12，000人在这场禁毒战争中死亡。


During Trump’s visit to Manila in November, Duterte serenaded him with a song, and then Trump laughed when, in a joint appearance, his counterpart blasted the media, calling them “spies.”	在特朗普11月访问马尼拉时，杜特尔特为他演唱了一首小夜曲，而且在双方出席的正式场合，特朗普在杜特尔特用“间谍”一词来抨击媒体时开怀大笑。


(The Philippines is one of the most dangerous countries in the world to be a journalist, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists.)	（据记者保护委员会统计，菲律宾是全世界从事记者职业一个最危险的国家。


Trump later claimed he briefly mentioned human rights to Duterte, but a Philippine government spokesperson said the two had not discussed rights issues.	）特朗普后来声称他简单向杜特尔特提到了人权问题，但一名菲律宾政府发言人表示两人并未就人权问题进行任何探讨。


As Hun Sen, Duterte, and others have shown, the new US approach fosters impunity for autocratic leaders.	正如洪森、杜特尔特和其他人所表明的那样，美国新策略导致专制领袖可以不受惩罚。


Although other donor countries, such as Canada and France, have at times spoken out against Hun Sen’s abuses, the US government, as the actor wielding the most leverage, has historically led the charge.	尽管其他捐助国，包括加拿大和法国，有时会对洪森的侵权行为提出反对意见，但作为拥有最多筹码的美国政府在历史上一直是主要的指控方。


But the Trump administration’s see-no-evil approach hinders other countries’ ability to promote rights and democracy.	但特朗普政府“无视邪恶”的策略妨碍了其他国家推动人权和民主。


For example, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, in his own bilateral meeting with Duterte this month, did raise concerns about the drug war in the Philippines.	例如加拿大总理贾斯汀·特鲁多本月在与杜特尔特的双边会晤中确实对菲律宾的禁毒战争表达了担忧。


But without US support, Trudeau’s pressure lacked credible measures.	但没有美国的支持，特鲁多的压力缺少可信的举措。


Trump’s policies are placing America’s long-term interests at risk.	特朗普的政策正在将美国的长期利益置于危险之中。


As in Cambodia, many of Asia’s strongest supporters of democratic change are young men and women.	就像在柬埔寨一样，亚洲的青年男女是民主变革最有力的支持者 。


Opposition parties in Malaysia, Cambodia, and other Southeast Asian countries attract a high share of young people, as do many of the media organizations and civil-society groups now under pressure.	马来西亚、柬埔寨和其他东南亚国家的反对党吸引了大批年轻人，现在面临重重压力的媒体和民间社会机构也是一样。


And, most important from the standpoint of national interest, the US has built its strongest partnerships in Asia with other democracies.	而且，从国家利益的角度看，最重要的是亚洲其他民主国家与美国的合作关系最为牢固。


Policies that ignore human rights and democracy will not benefit the US or the region.	忽视人权和民主的政策不利于美国也不利于亚洲。


An “America First” approach that disregards these issues – in Cambodia or elsewhere – will only leave the US weaker in the end.	不顾上述问题的“美国第一”政策——无论是在柬埔寨还是在其他国家——最后只会让美国的实力不断削弱。


Can Trump Turn His Presidency Around?	特朗普能扭转其总统生涯吗？


STANFORD – The United States’ economy is growing at a modest pace, with low unemployment and inflation.	斯坦福—美国经济增速温和，失业率和通货膨胀率都很低。


Normally, these conditions would strengthen a US president’s standing with the public.	通常，这些条件有利于美国总统在公众心目中的地位。


And yet Donald Trump’s approval rating is well below 40%, as one would expect to see during a recession.	但特朗普的支持率却大大低于40%，而这通常是衰退期间才会出现的现象。


Of course, Trump’s true popularity may be a little higher than the polls suggest, given that the same surveys failed to predict his victory last November.	当然，特朗普的真正支持率也许会比民调结果高一些，因为同样的调查在去年11月也没有预测他会赢得总统竞选。


But even if Trump has maintained the support of his base, his post-inauguration honeymoon proved to be fleeting.	但即使特朗普维持了其“基本盘”的支持，他就职后的“蜜月期”也很快就结束了。


Now, he is starting to lose the support of Republicans who had hoped that he would smooth his rough edges and grow once in office.	如今，他可能要失去那些寄希望于执政之后他会收起棱角、有所成长的共和党的支持了。


So far, Trump has failed to deliver any major legislative policy achievements.	到目前为止，特朗普还没有实现任何重大立法政策成果。


Nonetheless, he has helped the economy by rolling back President Barack Obama’s damaging regulatory and administrative diktats in areas such as energy, education, finance, and labor law.	尽管如此，他收回了奥巴马总统在能源、教育、金融和劳动法等方面的弊端重重的监管和行政命令，这有助于美国经济增长。


Moreover, even congressional Republicans who have distanced themselves from Trump’s more extreme statements – some even before his inadequate response to the violence at a white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia – still support his main policy proposals, and are relying on him to sign conservative legislation that Obama vetoed.	此外，即使是与特朗普比较极端的言辞划清界限的国会共和党——其中不乏在其发表针对弗吉尼亚州夏洛特维尔（Charlottesville）白人至上主义游行的不当言论之前就与他划清了界限——也仍然支持他的主要政策方案，并且需要依靠他签署奥巴马拒绝签署的保守派立法。


Whether Trump is in the Oval Office, on Air Force One, or at his Mar-a-Lago resort, he, like all presidents, resides in a giant bubble, where those around him usually tell him what he wants to hear.	不管特朗普是在椭圆办公室、空军一号，还是他的海湖庄园，他都和所有总统一样，身活在一个巨大的肥皂泡中，身边的人总是捡他爱听的话说。