They also need to redirect the $21 billion spent in Africa on subsidies for loss-making utilities and electricity consumption – which mainly benefit the rich – toward connection subsidies and renewable-energy investments that deliver energy to the poor.	他们还需要将非洲210亿美元的亏损公用事业及电费补贴（主要由富人享受）转移到能为穷人提供能源的接入补贴和可再生能源投资领域。


There is also a clear course of action for the leaders of major CO2-emitting countries.	主要二氧化碳排放国领导人同样���明确的行动路线。


They need to put a proper price on their emissions by taxing them, instead of continuing to subsidize them by spending billions on fossil-fuel exploration.	他们要通过征税对排放收费，而不是以耗费数十亿美元从事化石燃料勘探等方式继续为上述行业提供补贴。


G-20 countries must set a timetable for phasing out such subsidies.	二十国集团必须为逐步淘汰上述补贴订出时间表。


And rich countries need to mobilize international development finance, which can play a key role in helping African countries meet their energy needs.	富国需要调动国际发展资金，从而在帮助非洲国家满足其能源需求方面发挥关键的作用。


The fragmented, under-resourced and ineffective system for financing climate policy has failed Africa.	非洲现在实行的零散、资源不足和无效的气候政策筹资体系并不成功。


It needs wholesale reform.	它需要进行大规模改革。


Unfortunately, the world’s largest emitters have shown little commitment to the United Nations’ Green Climate Fund.	但不幸的是，世界最大的碳排放国表示对联合国绿色气候基金不承担任何义务。


Corporate leaders have a responsibility to act as well.	企业领导人有责任采取相应的行动。


They should demand a price on carbon, drive innovation, and seek opportunities to fund low-carbon development across Africa.	他们应当要求制定碳价、推动创新，并寻找在非洲进行低碳发展投资的机会。


Natural gas and renewable energy sources, such as sun, water and wind, are an opportunity, not a risk, in Africa.	天然气和可再生能源，如阳光、风力和水，在非洲不是风险而是机会。


Millions of energy-poor, disconnected Africans earning less than $2.50 a day constitute an energy market worth $10 billion a year.	成百上千万缺乏能源、散居各地的非洲人日均收入不到2. 5美元，但却构成了每年超过100亿美元的能源大市场。


Some hope for rapid change may be glimpsed in the fact that Africa now leads the world in adopting many new technologies.	或许可以从现在非洲走在世界新技术运用前列的现实中窥见些许快速变化的希望。


It is bypassing earlier ones and jumping straight into the digital age.	非洲跨越了前面所有时代，直接进入到数字时代当中。


East Africa’s M-Pesa system for transferring money via mobile phones is spurring new microfinance services, such as peer-to-peer lending.	东非通过手机转账的M-PESA系统正在刺激个人贷等新型小额信贷服务。


Commodity exchanges are enabling farmers to access real-time prices.	商品交易所正在让农民了解实时价格。


Let us put those timeless, old-tech skills of far-sightedness and collaboration together with new technology.	让我们把永恒、古老的长远技术合作与新技术相结合。


If we do, the current generation of African leaders has a unique opportunity to protect future generations from a climate disaster, deliver on the promise of energy for all, and build shared prosperity.	如果成功，现在这一代非洲领导人将有独一无二的机会保护后代免于气候灾难、他们还能让所有人享受能源带来的好处并建设共同繁荣。


Can the Democrats and Republicans Heal Themselves?	民主党及共和党能否自我治愈？


WASHINGTON, DC – The contests to decide the nominees of America’s two main political parties, the Democrats and the Republicans, for the presidential election are all but over.	华盛顿——决定美国民主及共和两大政党总统候选提名人的争夺终于有望结束。


That leaves both parties facing the challenge of reuniting for the fall campaign – a feat that will be much harder to pull off this year than it was in most other presidential election years.	两党因此面临重新集结开展秋季竞选活动的挑战——而今年大选期间完成这项任务比往年要难得多。


Though it is mathematically impossible for Bernie Sanders to win enough pledged delegates to capture the Democratic nomination, he is staying in the race, which means that Hillary Clinton cannot yet begin her healing effort.	虽然从数学上看伯尼·桑德斯赢得足够的代表承诺从而获得民主党提名几乎不太可能，但他仍然没有退出竞选，而这意味着希拉里·克林顿还不能着手进行修复工作。


But winning the support of the millions of voters who fervently back Sanders poses a serious challenge.	但赢得热切支持桑德斯的数百万选民支持对希拉里构成了严峻的挑战。


Sanders is not simply an adversary; he leads a movement that opposes what Clinton and the “establishment” stand for.	桑德斯绝非仅仅是个简单的对手； 他还是反对克林顿及现行“体制”立场的领导者。


The contest between Clinton and Barack Obama in 2008 seemed to end amicably enough.	2008年克林顿和巴拉克·奥巴马之间的竞争似乎结束得相当友好。


Though Clinton stayed in the race to the end, she toned down her rhetoric against Obama as the contest wound down.	虽然克林顿一直坚持到竞选结束，但随着竞选逐渐接近尾声，她开始淡化了反对奥巴马的言论。


That summer, she took the unusual step of going onto the convention floor to urge the party to nominate him by acclamation.	那年夏天，她采取了一项不寻常的举动，那就是亲自前往会议大厅，敦促民主党人对奥巴马的提名予以鼓掌通过。


Yet the efforts in 2008 to unite the Democratic Party weren’t as successful as the conventional wisdom suggests.	但2008年团结民主党的工作并不像传统智慧所想象的那般成功。


It is one thing for candidates to decide that they must be gracious in defeat. Their followers can be harder to reconcile.	候选人自己决定坦然接受失败是一回事，但其追随者的矛盾可能很难调和。


After 2008, tensions between some of Clinton’s and Obama’s strongest supporters lingered for years.	2008年后，克林顿和奥巴马某些最坚定支持者之间剑拔弩张的局面持续了长达数年之久。


One way to unite party factions is for the nominee to select his rival as his running mate.	团结党内派系的一种方法是由提名人选择对手出任竞选搭档。


John F. Kennedy chose his formerly bitter opponent, Lyndon B. Johnson.	就像约翰·F·肯尼迪曾选择他之前的死对头林登·约翰逊一样。


(That merger didn’t go well.)	（这对组合的结果并不美妙。


But Clinton isn’t about to make Sanders her running mate.	）但克林顿不会选桑德斯作为竞选搭档。


Sanders is temperamentally unsuited for the role of subordinate, and their policy disagreements reflect deeply held views about the role of the federal government.	桑德斯的气质并不适合担任下属，并且他们之间的政策分歧反映出对联邦政府作用的看法根本不同。


Obama probably chose Clinton to be his first Secretary of State for reasons that went beyond her considerable intelligence: It was better to have her in the tent than outside it.	奥巴马选择克林顿为首任国务卿或许不仅仅因为她拥有超人的智慧：而是因为她作为团队成员好过竞争对手。


Even so, Clinton’s loyalty was not absolute.	即便如此，克林顿的忠诚也不是绝对的。


In her book Hard Choices, she took some shots at his handling of Syria’s civil war, and in her campaign she has sometimes distanced herself from his policies.	在她的著作《艰难的选择》中，她对奥巴马对叙利亚内战的处理提出了某些批评，而且在竞选活动中有时会故意疏远奥巴马的政策。


Yet Obama, once Sanders is out of the race, will surely campaign hard for Clinton.	不过一旦桑德斯退出竞选，奥巴马肯定会为克林顿大张旗鼓地争取支持。


It is clear that Sanders intends to challenge Clinton on some issues to be included in the party’s 2016 policy platform.	显而易见，桑德斯有意挑战克林顿准备纳入民主党2016年政策平台的某些事务。


During the nomination campaign, he managed to pull her somewhat to the left on trade, the minimum wage, and mass incarceration.	争取提名期间，他在某种程度上成功地迫使克林顿接受了贸易、最低工资和大规模监禁等问题上倾向左翼的政策。


But there’s only so far she can go in the general election without losing the votes of independents.	但在大选期间克林顿所能做出的让步有限，否则就有可能失去独立选票。


While Sanders’s proposals are popular, particularly among young people, much of his agenda – such as transforming Obamacare into a single-payer health system – isn’t politically feasible.	虽然桑德斯的提案尤其在年轻人中颇受欢迎，但他的很多议程——如将奥巴马医改转化为某种单一付款人的健康体制——在政治领域的可行度不高。


Likewise, Wall Street’s banking behemoths are unlikely to be broken up.	同样，桑德斯的提案不太可能分化华尔街的银行巨头。


Moreover, at this point, Clinton and Sanders are exasperated by each other.	此外，到目前为止，克林顿和桑德斯已经被对方所激怒。


She and her husband, Bill, are annoyed with Sanders for continuing to campaign (even though she did the same in 2008) and for not toning down his critique of her record.	她和她的丈夫比尔对桑德斯继续竞选（尽管她在2008年也采取了同样的做法）感到恼火，更令她不快的是，桑德斯并未在批评她过往记录时有所淡化。


Candidates rarely forget such things.	候选人对这样的过节会一直记得。


Thirty years later, Jimmy Carter still spoke bitterly about an incident at the Democrats’ convention in 1980.	30年后，卡特在谈到民主党1980年大会事件时还依然念念不忘。


Carter, the incumbent president, was reduced to chasing his defeated challenger, Edward M. Kennedy, around the stage in pursuit of the traditional photo of former rivals with arms raised and hands clasped.	时任总统卡特被迫放下身段满台��逐他所击败的挑战者爱德华·肯尼迪，只为拍摄一张与前对手抬起双臂、双手紧握的传统照。


Instead of a beaming show of unity, Carter got only a grudging handshake.	相比于喜气洋洋地展现团结，卡特只得到了一个勉勉强强的握手。


The main reason why it could be hard for Clinton to win over Sanders’s supporters is that a great many of them don’t like her.	克林顿很难争取桑德斯支持者的原因之一是其中很多人都不喜欢她。


A third of them have said that they won’t vote for her.	有1/3的桑德斯支持者明确表示不会投票给她。


In April, only 40% of Democrats gave her high marks for being honest and trustworthy, and only 50% of Democrats rated her favorably overall.	今年4月，因为诚实守信给她打高分的民主党人仅有40%，而且仅有50%的民主党人认为她总体而言是讨人喜欢的。


(Obama’s favorability rating in 2008 was 60%.)	（2008年奥巴马的这一比率为60%。 ）


Though Republicans relish the possibility that Clinton will be indicted for routing official business through a private email server when she was Secretary of State, prosecutors would have to prove that she intended to break the law, which is unlikely.	虽然共和党人一直对克林顿可能因为任职国务卿期间通过私人邮件服务器转发方式处理公务而遭到起诉津津乐道，但检察官必须证明她本人有违反法律的意图，而事实上检方不太可能完成这项任务。


But the email row has highlighted some of the reasons people don’t like Clinton: To put it charitably, she’s been evasive in her responses to questions about what was undeniably a reckless act.	但电子邮件问题凸显了民众不喜欢克林顿的某些原因：说得好听一点，她在回答问题时一直对这种毋庸置疑的鲁莽行为持避重就轻的态度。


As a result, her standing has gone down during the campaign.	因此导致她在竞选期间的地位有所下降。


Clinton has a great many fervent supporters, of course, but her presidential campaigns have both suffered from a dearth of passion.	当然，克林顿拥有众多狂热的支持者，但她两次竞选总统都受困于选民的热情缺乏。


The greatest danger she faces in the election in November is that too many Democrats simply won’t bother to vote.	11月大选中她所面临的最大挑战是太多民主党人根本就懒得投票。


Her campaign is counting on Donald Trump to unite the party, and that might well happen; but she will have her work cut out, particularly among young and first-time voters, who have overwhelmingly backed Sanders.	她的竞选还指望借用唐纳德·特朗普的力量来为她团结本党，这种情况是有可能发生的； 但尤其在首次投票的年轻选民中她的工作可能会大打折扣，因为这些人都对桑德斯持压倒性的支持态度。


The Republicans will also have a problem uniting around Trump, who is now the party’s presumptive nominee.	特朗普目前已经是共和党方面的推定提名人，但共和党人团结在特朗普的周围可能也很有难度。


Most elected Republicans view him as too ill-informed and bombastic to be President.	多数当选的共和党代表认为特朗普太过缺乏教养和夸夸其谈，因此不适合担任总统。


In late April, 40% of Republicans polled said that they wouldn’t support Trump in the general election.	4月下旬，接受民调的40%共和党人表示不会在总统大选时支持特朗普。


Republicans also worry that Trump could be defeated badly enough to cost them control of the Senate and cut their majority in the House of Representatives.	共和党人还担心特朗普会输得很惨，导致他们失去参议院控制权和众议院多数席位。


For this reason, many are agonizing over what to do about Trump.	出于这个原因，很多人都在纠结如何对待特朗普。


Some are stretching to say that they support Trump, but don’t endorse him.	有些人勉强说他们支持特朗普，但不会为他背书。


Presidents George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush have both said that they’ll stay out of this race.	乔治·H·W·布什总统和乔治·W·布什总统双双表示他们不会插手这次竞选事务。


For the first time in American history, both parties’ nominees are far more disliked than liked by the country at large, though Trump does lead Clinton in this department.	两党竞选提名人总体而言的不受欢迎程度超过受欢迎程度，这在美国历史上尚属首次。 但特朗普在这个问题上比克林顿更甚一筹。


This is not a very good basis for starting the next presidency.	这绝不是开启下届总统任期的良好基础。


Overcoming India’s Official Homophobia	克服印度官方的同性恋恐惧症


NEW DELHI – Sixty-six years after adopting one of the world’s most liberal constitutions, India is being convulsed by a searing debate over a colonial-era provision in its penal code, Section 377, which criminalizes “whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman, or animal.”	新德里—印度实施全世界最自由之一的宪法已经六十年，眼下，印度正在开展一场如火如荼的争论，争论的主题是一条殖民地时期的刑法规定，即刑法典第377条，“任何与男性、女性和动物自愿发生的与自然规则相悖的肉体关系”都属于犯罪。


Though not widely used – there were 578 arrests under Section 377 last year – the law is a tool for the harassment, persecution, and blackmail of sexual minorities within India.	尽管该条法律没有得到广泛应用——去年只有578人因为这条规定被捕——但它是骚扰、迫害和勒索印度国内性少数群体的工具。


It must be changed.	这一局面必须改变。


Beyond forcing millions of gay men and women to live in fear and secrecy, Section 377 has undermined HIV-prevention efforts and contributed to depression and suicides.	除了让数百万同性恋男女生活在恐慌和隐秘之中，刑法典第377条还破坏了艾滋病预防措施，导致抑郁和自杀。


A 2014 study by the World Bank revealed that India suffers a loss of between 0.1% and 1.7% of GDP because of homophobia.	2014年的一份世界银行研究披露，由于同性恋恐惧症，印度损失0. 1—1.


The issue is not one of sex, but of freedom.	问题不在于性，而在于自由。


By giving the state the authority to control what Indian adults do, consensually, in their bedrooms, Section 377 violates the constitutional rights to dignity, privacy, and equality enshrined in Articles 14, 15, and 21, respectively.	刑法典第377条授予国家控制印度成年人床笫行为的权威，它违反了宪法第14条、15条和21条中规定的尊严、隐私和平等权利。


As the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen has observed, “The criminalization of gay behavior goes not only against fundamental human rights, but it also works sharply against the enhancement of human freedoms in terms of which the progress of human civilization can be judged.”	诺贝尔奖获得者阿玛蒂亚·森（Amartya Sen）观察到，“同性恋行为入罪不但有悖于基本人权，也严重危害人身自由的强化，而人身自由是判断人类文明进步的标准。 ”


In the period after a liberal Delhi High Court struck down Section 377 in 2009, the heavens did not fall; Indian society did not collapse.	2009年，宽宏的德里高等法院推翻了刑法典第377条，此后，天没有塌下来； 印度社会也没有崩溃。


Yet bigots petitioned to reverse that decision, ultimately succeeding in turning back the clock for gay rights in India in 2013, when the Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s decision.	但顽固派上诉要求收回这一裁决，并最终得逞，2013年，最高法院推翻了德里高等法院的裁决，同性恋权利退回起点。


Like many Indians, I found the Supreme Court’s 2013 ruling antithetical to India’s commitment to pluralism and democracy, which provides for the embrace of a multitude of identities, including those based on sexual orientation.	和许多印度人一样，我认为最高法院2013年的裁决与印度对多元化和民主的承诺相悖，多元化和民主意味着接受多重身份，包括基于性取向的身份。


So, last December, I sought to introduce a bill that would have amended Section 377 and decriminalized all consensual sex between adults, irrespective of their gender and sexuality.	因此，去年12月，我寻求引入修正刑法典第377条并让一切成年人之间的性行为（不论性别和取向）脱罪的法案。


A vocal section of homophobes in the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) voted overwhelmingly against the bill’s introduction, so that no pragmatic debate on the bill’s merits could take place.	执政的印度人民党（BJP）的反同性恋阵营一边倒地反对我的提案，因此对于该法案的利弊不可能有务实的争论。


The same thing happened when I tried again in March.	3月份我有做了一次尝试，同样无功而返。


Sneering comments were made about my alleged personal interest in the bill, to which I responded that one does not need to be a cow to defend the rights of animals.	有人指责我在该法案中有个人利益，对此进行冷嘲热讽，而我的回应是，你不需要身为奶牛才能捍卫动物权利。


The BJP’s vote is incongruous on several levels, but most glaringly in its rejection of millennia of Indian practice in favor of a British colonial law (which the British themselves have outgrown).	印度人民党在很多层面上的投票都不太“和谐”，但最扎眼的是它反对印度上千年的行为而支持英国殖民地法律（而英国本身已经抛弃了该法律）。


The Indian ethos toward sexual difference has historically been liberal, with neither mythology nor history revealing the persecution or prosecution of sexual heterodoxy.	历史上，印度对性差异的风气相当自由，不管是传说还是历史，都没有因为性异端而受到迫害和起诉的记录。


In fact, the Hindu epics are dotted with characters like Shikhandi in the Mahabharata, who was born female and became male; many Hindus venerate the half-man, half-woman Ardhanarishvara; and temple sculptures across India depict homosexual acts.	事实上，印度教史诗中充斥着《摩诃婆罗多》中的卡吉（Shikhandi）这样的角色，他生为女儿身，后来变成男性； 许多印度教崇拜对象为半男半女的Ardhanarishvara；


Yet the BJP, the party of Hindu chauvinism, chooses to ignore this Hindu tradition.	印度国内也遍布描绘同性性行为的庙宇雕塑。 但持印度教沙文主义印度人民党却无视这一印度教传统。


In its 2013 judgment, the Supreme Court said that legislators, not judges, must decide the fate of Section 377.	在其2013年的裁决中，最高法院说，立法者而不是法官才能决定刑法典第377条的命运。


Unfortunately, thanks to the prejudices of a few dozen vocal and motivated BJP members, parliament is not up to the task.	不幸的是，由于几十名印度人民党议员的颇有用心的大放厥词，议会不会承担这一任务。


Indeed, legislative recourse for the injustice of Section 377 may not be available as long as the BJP is in power.	事实上，只要印度人民党仍在台上执政，关于刑法典第377条存在不公的立法程序就无从实现。


But there is still hope for relief through India’s judicial process.	但仍有希望通过印度司法程序获得减罪。


The Supreme Court has now agreed to undertake a “curative review” of its 2013 decision.	最高法院现已同意对其2013年的裁决采取“效果审查”（curative review）。


Such a review could lead it to repeal Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code.	这一审查可能导致废除印度刑法典第377条。


While I have been unsuccessful in my efforts to amend Section 377 through legislative channels, I remain committed to human rights, to keeping the government out of our bedrooms, and to defending Indian pluralism.	我在通过立法渠道修订刑法典第377条方面从未获得成功，但我仍致力于人权，致力于将政府赶出我们的卧室，致力于捍卫印度的多元主义。


As we await the Supreme Court’s review, we can and must continue to seek justice for India’s minorities in the court of public opinion.	在等待最高法院审查期间，我们可以也必须继续为印度少数群体在公共意见中争取正义。


To this end, I have circulated a petition, with the goal of highlighting for Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his party that public sentiment has moved beyond the nineteenth century.	在这方面，我发行了请愿书，目标是提醒总理莫迪及其政党公共情绪早已超越了十九世纪。


With 65,000 people having already signed, the message is clear.	已有65,000人在请愿书上签字，民意是显而易见的。


But, in terms of real change in this area, my hopes rest with the judiciary, rather than the government.	但是，对于这一领域的真正变化，我的希望仍在于司法部门而非政府。


After all, whereas change via legislation would require political courage – a quality sorely lacking in the current Indian government – the judiciary is not hampered by such considerations.	毕竟，通过立法的变革需要政治勇气——而这正是本届印度政府严重欠缺的——但司法途径不会受到这些考虑的妨碍。


The good news is that India’s Supreme Court has an exemplary record of interpreting statutes in a way that expands human rights in the country.	好消息是，印度最高法院在通过司法解释扩大人权方面堪称典范。


The curative review raises hope that it will do so again, creating an India in which the law embodies constitutional values of privacy, equality, dignity, and non-discrimination for all citizens.	效果审查有望再次如此，创造一个法律体现隐私、平等、尊严和绝不区别对待任何公民的宪法价值的印度。


The alternative – allowing Indian law to continue to serve as an iron cage for some of our people – would directly undermine the freedom of identity and expression that constitutes the backbone of Indian democracy.	否则——放任印度法律继续成为束缚某些印度人民的牢笼——将直接破坏构成印度民主基石的身份和言论自由。


What is more, it would leave India out of step with much of the rest of the international community, a country embarrassed before the world’s other democracies.	此外，这也将让印度自绝于国际社会，在世界其他民主国家面前抬不起头。


We must demand that our Supreme Court – if not our lawmakers – affirm a pluralist India that accommodates all identities within our country.	我们必须要求最高法院——甚至立法者——确保一个协调这个国家所有身份的多元主义的印度。


The time for change was many years ago.	变化的时机多年前就已到来。


But it is never too late to do the right thing.	但做正确的事情永远不嫌太晚。


I hope that the Supreme Court is listening.	我希望最高法院能听进去。


Fear of Fracking	液压裂解恐惧症


CAMBRIDGE – Against all expectations, US emissions of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, since peaking in 2007, have fallen by 12% as of 2012, back to 1995 levels.	坎布里奇——出乎所有人预料，美国的二氧化碳大气排放于2007年达到顶峰后，到2012年下降12%，重新回到1995年的排放水平。


The primary reason, in a word, is “fracking.”	主要原因一言以蔽之就是“液压裂解技术”。


Or, in 11 words: horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing to recover deposits of shale gas.	换句话说是利用水平钻井和液压裂解技术提取页岩气。


No other factor comes close to providing a plausible explanation.	没有其他原因能够给出合理的解释。


Unlike the European Union, the US never ratified the Kyoto Protocol, in which participating countries committed to cut CO2 emissions by roughly 5%, relative to 1990 levels, by 2012.	与欧盟不同，美国从未批准《京都议定书》，该《议定书》要求参与国承诺到2012年实现二氧化碳排放在1990年基础上缩减5%的水平。


Nor is America’s continued emissions reduction a side effect of lower economic activity: While the US economy peaked in late 2007, the same time as emissions, the recession ended in June 2009 and GDP growth since then, though inadequate, has been substantially higher than in Europe.	美国的持续性减排也不是经济活动放缓的副产物：虽然美国经济和碳排放在2007年下半年同时达到顶峰，但经济衰退已于2009年6月结束，其后的GDP增长尽管不尽如人意，但一直远高于欧洲的水平。


Yet US emissions have continued to fall, while EU emissions began to rise again after 2009.	然而美国的碳排放却持续下降，而欧盟碳排放则在2009年后再次回升。


One can virtually prove that shale gas has been the major influence driving the fall in US emissions.	页岩气一直驱动美国碳排放下降几乎是毋庸置疑的事实。


Just ten years ago, the natural-gas industry was so sure that domestic production was reaching its limit that it made large investments in terminals to import liquefied natural gas (LNG).	就在10年前，天然气行业还毫不犹豫地认定国内产量已经达到极限，因此在终端投入了大笔资金用于进口液化天然气（LNG）。


Yet fracking has increased supply so rapidly that these facilities are now being converted to export LNG.	但液压裂解技术却实现了供应快速增长，以致于这些设施现在转而用于出口液化天然气。


Natural gas emits only half as much CO2 as coal, and occupies a rapidly increasing share of electricity generation – up 37% since 2007, while coal’s share has plummeted by 25%.	天然气的二氧化碳排放量仅为煤炭的一半，在发电领域所占的份额迅速攀升——2007年来增长37%，而煤炭份额则骤降达25%之多。


Indeed, natural gas has drawn close to coal as the number one source of US power.	事实上，天然气已经向煤炭靠拢成为美国发电的头号能源。


Renewables still constitute only 5% of power generation in the US – less than hydroelectric and far less than nuclear, let alone coal or gas.	可再生能源仍只占全美发电量的5%——这一比例尚不及水电及核能源，更不必说煤和天然气了。


Meanwhile, the share of coal – the dirtiest fuel – has been rising, not falling, in the rest of the world’s energy mix.	与此同时，最脏的燃料煤炭在世界其他地方能源结构中所占的比重不仅没有下降，还一直在上升。


Since 2010, coal dependence has risen even in Europe, where some countries are phasing out emission-free nuclear power and no natural-gas boom has materialized (though CO2 emissions remain far higher in the US than in Europe).	2010年后，就连欧洲都更加依赖煤炭，因为某些国家正逐步淘汰零排放核电，但是天然气的全面繁荣却迟迟没有到来（尽管美国的二氧化碳排放仍然远超欧洲）。


The advent of shale gas has had a variety of implications – more good than bad – for the US economy, national security, and the environment.	页岩气的问世已经影响到美国经济、国家安全和环境。


The economic benefits include job creation in the short term, “re-shoring” of some manufacturing activities in the medium term, and, lower macroeconomic vulnerability to global oil shocks in the long term.	经济利益包括短期内创造就业机会，中期支撑生产活动，以及长期降低宏观经济在全球石油危机面前的脆弱性。


Moving beyond economics, America’s reduction in net energy imports – which have already fallen by one-half since 2007 – means that its foreign policy will be less constrained by events in the Middle East.	在经济领域以外，美国净能源进口的减少——自2007年来已经下降了一半——意味着美国外交政策会较少受制于中东地区的事态发展。


In Europe, the new technology could similarly break Russia’s politically troublesome stranglehold on natural-gas supplies.	而在欧洲，新技术也能打破俄罗斯在天然气供应方面令人烦恼的束缚。


The net environmental effects of growing reliance on shale gas appear beneficial as well.	加大天然气依赖的净环境影响似乎也非常有利。


The substitution of natural gas for coal has put the US on track to meet the Obama administration’s international commitment to reduce CO2 emissions 17% below 2005 levels by 2020.	用天然气取代煤炭使奥巴马政府有可能实现2020年二氧化碳排放比2005年降低17%的国际承诺。


Gas is also better for local air quality, owing to the absence of the sulfur dioxide, nitrous oxide, mercury, and particulates emitted by burning coal.	由于不含二氧化硫、氮氧化物、汞和燃煤排放的颗粒物，天然气对改善当地空气质量也非常有利。


Yet environmentalists are overwhelmingly opposed to fracking, evidently for three reasons.	但环保人士强烈反对液压裂解技术，主要有三个明显的原因。


None, however, is persuasive.	但这三个原因都缺乏说服力。


First, fracking’s opponents worry that shale gas will displace renewable energy sources such as wind and solar power.	首先，液压裂解技术的反对者们担心页岩气会取代风能及太阳能等可再生能源。


But the fact is that CO2 emissions cannot be reduced without cutting coal use, and shale gas is already displacing coal in the US.	但事实是不削减煤炭用量就无法减少二氧化碳排放，而页岩气已经在美国替代煤炭的应用。


This is not speculation; it is happening now.	这绝非某种故意炒作，事实就在真真切切的发生。


Even if some cleaner source becomes viable later, we would still need natural gas as a bridge to get us from here to there.	即便某些清洁能源今后真的可供利用，我们仍需要天然气帮助我们实现过渡。


Put differently, if the world continues to build coal-fired power plants at the current rate, those plants will still be around in 2050, regardless of what other technologies become viable in the meantime.	换句话讲，如果世界继续以目前的速度建设燃煤电厂，那么无论在此期间诞生其他哪些技术，这些电厂到2050年左右仍将能够正常使用。


Solar power cannot stop those coal-fired plants from being built today.	太阳能发电不能阻止人们在今天兴建那些燃煤电厂。


Natural gas can.	天然气却能。


Moreover, natural gas also heats buildings.	此外，天然气还可以为建筑供热。


As the graph below shows, it now accounts for 31% of overall primary energy production, surpassing coal, at 26%, while for solar and wind combined account for just 2%.	如下图所示，天然气目前占一次能源总产量的31%，超过煤炭的26%，而太阳能和风能加起来仅占2%。


[For a high-resolution version of the graph, click here.]	单纯宣布如果经营负责且监管有力，液压裂解技术应当安全并不足以消除人们的担心。 必须考虑到某些监管不力的州有人肆意妄为污染当地供水的可能性。


It is not enough to proclaim that fracking should be safe if operators are responsible and regulators do their job. One must consider the likelihood that in some under-regulated US state, someone will not act responsibly and some local water supply will become contaminated.	但在决定是否允许采用液压裂解技术时（比方说法国已经禁止这项技术，纽约州也已暂停使用），必须将健康、安全和环境方面的风险与替代方法进行比对。


The industry should follow best practices, including making public the chemicals that it uses. High-quality environmental and safety regulation – and vigorous enforcement – are essential.	即使真的发生严重的


But, in deciding whether to allow fracking (France has banned it, for example, and New York state has a moratorium), one must compare the risks to health, safety, and the environment with those of the alternatives. Even a serious fracking mishap would be unlikely to cause as much damage as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe in 2011, or coal-mining tragedies that play out dramatically in frequent explosions and collapses (and more insidiously in the form of lung disease, water pollution, and soil erosion).	液压裂解事故其后果恐怕也很难与2010年的深海地平线号漏油、2011年的福岛核灾难或频繁发生的爆炸及塌方等采煤悲剧（以及肺病、水体污染及水土流失等更隐蔽的形式）相提并论。


The precautionary principle is hard to dislodge.	最后，某些人，尤其是欧洲人害怕一切新的不熟悉的技术；


Is it really true that new technologies are necessarily riskier?	他们奉行所谓的“预防性原则”，要求新事物承担比旧事物更多的举证责任。


By this logic, men who worry about their virility should hesitate to try the unfamiliar new technology, Viagra, and instead stick with powdered rhino horn.	可尽管全新技术会带来未知风险确乎是事实，但这绝不是忽视衡量现有技术已知风险的借口。


Read an extended version of this argument in Jeffrey Frankel’s blog post, “Frack to the Future.”	但新技术的风险是否一定更大？ 如果上述逻辑成立，担心性能力的男性就应该坚持服用犀角粉，而不要尝试伟哥这样不熟悉的新技术。


Getting Past Slow Growth	渡过慢增长


WASHINGTON, DC – Most economists nowadays are pessimistic about the world economy’s growth prospects.	华盛顿—如今，大部分经济学家都对世界经济的增长前景抱悲观态度。


The World Bank has, yet again, downgraded its medium-term projections, and economists the world over are warning that we are facing a “new normal” of slower growth.	世界银行再次下调了中期预测，全球经济学家都在警告我们面临增长放慢的“新常态”。


Where there is less consensus – or so it seems – is in accounting for this weakness.	比较不一致（或者似乎比较不一致）的是对经济弱势的描述。


Almost three years ago, former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers revived Alvin Hansen’s “secular stagnation” hypothesis, emphasizing demand-side constraints.	近三年前，前美国财政部长拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）复活了埃尔文·汉森（Alvin Hansen）的“长期停滞”假说，强调需求侧约束。


By contrast, in Robert Gordon’s engaging and erudite book The Rise and Fall of American Growth, the focus is on long-term supply-side factors – in particular, the nature of innovation.	相反，罗伯特·戈登（Robert Gordon）引人入胜的饱学之作《美国增长的兴衰》（The Rise and Fall of American Growth）将焦点集中在长期供给侧因素上，特别是创新的性质。


Thomas Piketty, in his best-selling tome Capital in the Twenty-First Century, describes the rise of inequality that is resulting from low GDP growth.	托马斯·皮凯蒂（Thomas Piketty）在其畅销巨著《21世纪资本论》（Capital in the Twenty-First Century）中描述了因GDP低增长而导致的不平等性的加剧。


Joseph E. Stiglitz’s book Re-Writing the Rules of the American Economy: An Agenda for Growth and Shared Prosperity blames political choices for both slowing growth and rising inequality.	约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨（Joseph E. Stiglitz）的书《重写美国经济规则：增长和共同繁荣日程》（Re-Writing the Rules of the American Economy: An Agenda for Growth and Shared Prosperity）将增长放缓和不平等性加剧归咎于政治选择。


These accounts differ in emphasis, but they are not contradictory.	这些解释各有侧重，但并不矛盾。


On the contrary, while Summers, Gordon, Piketty, and Stiglitz each examines the issue from a different perspective, their ideas are complementary – and even mutually reinforcing.	相反，萨默斯、戈登、皮凯蒂和斯蒂格利茨从不同角度解释了这个问题，他们的观点是互补的——甚至可以说是互相强化的。


Summers’s Keynesian argument is that the problem is a chronic aggregate-demand shortfall: Desired investment lags behind desired savings, even at near-zero nominal interest rates, resulting in a chronic liquidity trap.	萨默斯的凯恩斯主义观点是，问题出在长期总需求不足上：即使名义利率接近于零，期望的投资仍落后于期望的储蓄，导致长期流动性陷阱。


Today’s near-zero – even slightly negative – short-term policy interest rates do not mean that longer-term rates, which are more relevant to investment financing, have also hit zero.	今天的近零——甚至略负的——短期政策率并不意味着与投资融资关系更大的长期利率也向零靠拢。


But the yield curve in the major advanced economies is very flat, with both real and nominal longer-term rates at historic lows.	但主要发达经济体的收益率曲线相当平坦，真实和名义长期利率都位于历史低点。


There may be many reasons for this, but Gordon describes one possibility: The underlying pace of innovation has slowed, leading to lower expected returns on investment and thus forcing down interest rates.	对于这一点，可能的原因有很多，但戈登描述了其中一种可能：作为基础的创新速度放慢了，这导致投资预期回报降低，从而拉低了利率。


And it is the investment needed to translate new knowledge into actual innovation that links the supply and demand sides and generates growth.	而将新知识转化为连接供给侧和需求侧并产生增长的实际创新需要的正是投资。


Both of these theories can be connected with Piketty’s arguments about the dynamics of capital accumulation.	这些理论都可以和皮凯蒂的资本积累动态的观点联系起来。


Implicit in Piketty’s thesis is that capital can be substituted for labor relatively easily.	皮凯蒂的著作的隐含之义是资本可以相对容易地被劳动力替代。


When capital grows faster than labor and GDP, the rate of return will fall over time, but proportionately less than growth in the amount of capital.	当资本增长快于劳动力和GDP时，回报率就会随时间而下降，但下降比例小于资本量的增长。


The result is a redistribution of income from labor to those who own capital.	结果是收入从劳动力手中再分配给资本所有者。


Summers actually proposed a new form of the production function, whereby the progress of intelligent machines makes capital a perfect substitute for segments of the labor force.	萨默斯实际上提出了一个新形式的生产函数，其中智能机器的进步让资本成为细分劳动力的完美替代品。


An increasing concentration of income at the top, combined with top earners’ high propensity to save, then leads to the chronic shortfall of aggregate demand that characterizes secular stagnation.	收入日益向顶层集中，而顶尖收入者储蓄率很高，这就导致了以总需求长期短缺为特征的长期停滞。


Stiglitz makes the case that policy bias also contributes to income concentration.	斯蒂格利茨指出了政策偏见也对收入集中起到了推波助澜的作用。


Gordon’s thesis is more about a kind of “satiation” in rapid technological progress, which depresses expected returns and thus helps to explain the chronic lack of sufficient investment.	戈登的著作更加注重某种对告诉技术进步的“满足”（satiation），这种满足抑制了预期回报，从而有助于解释长期投资不足。


But, at the end of his book, he makes median income the real indicator of economic performance.	但是，在其著作的最后，他将中位收入作为经济表现的真正指标。


In Gordon’s 2015-2040 projection, annual growth in median income in the United States is only 0.4%, compared to average income growth of 0.8%, reflecting continuously rising inequality.	在戈登的2015—2040年预测中，美国中位收入年增长只有0. 4%，而平均收入增长为0.


(Compare this to 1.82% annual growth in median income from 1920 to 2014.)	8%，体现出不平等性的不断上升。 （而1920——2014年间中位收入年增长为1.


The intertwined forces of chronic Keynesian imbalance, a slowdown in productivity growth, and a concentration of income at the top lead to a very subdued outlook for growth in median income.	长期凯恩斯主义失衡、生产率增长放缓、收入向顶层集中，这些纠缠在一起的因素导致了中位收入前景黯淡。


With expectations about the future being undermined by such deep-rooted and multifaceted forces, perhaps it should not be surprising that voters in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere are expressing anger toward the establishment.	对未来的预期被这些深层次、多维度的因素影响，也许美国、欧洲和其他国家选民对体制表现出愤怒也就不足为奇了。


Fortunately, there are reasons for hope.	幸运的是，有理由保持希望。


First, I do not share Gordon’s assessment of prospects for longer-term technological progress.	首先，我不同意戈登对长期技术进步前景的评估。


I believe that, as the digital revolution and artificial intelligence restructure larger segments of economic activity, overall productivity growth may accelerate again, leading to higher expected returns and, therefore, more investment and faster growth.	我认为，随着数字革命和人工智能对更大的经济活动细分领域进行重组，总生产率增长可能再次加速，形成更高的预期回报，从而带来更多的投资和更快的增长。


That in itself will not lead to a more balanced distribution of wealth or income, and it may not generate enough employment.	这本身不会��来更平衡的财富和收入分配，也许也不会带来足够的就业。


But it could help create the political and fiscal space for inclusiveness-oriented policy reforms.	但这能帮助包容导向的政治改革创造空间。


Second, developing and emerging economies still offer immediate opportunities for large high-return investments, which should be financed by what appears as excess global savings.	其次，发展中和新兴经济体仍然为大型高回报投资提供即刻的机会，这些投资应该通过看似过剩的全球储蓄融资。


With significant room to move toward the technology frontier, including in services, there are still plenty of opportunities for “catch-up” growth.	有巨大的空间向技术前沿进步（包括服务业），“赶超”增长机会仍然充足。


Such investments would help close the global savings gap and generate positive feedback for advanced economies as well.	这些投资将有助于缩小全球储蓄缺口，并为发达经济体带来正反馈。


To take advantage of these opportunities, however, regulatory and political uncertainty must be reduced and public-private partnerships in development finance must be scaled up within a framework that leads to inclusive benefits.	但是，要把握这些机会，必须降低监管和政治不确定性，发展融资方面的公私合作必须在能带来包容性收益的框架内扩大。


It is likely that continued rapid increases in prosperity are possible.	看起来繁荣的持续快速增长有望。


Ultimately, however, political choices will determine whether the diffusion of artificial intelligence leads to widespread increases in median incomes or exacerbates polarization and inequality.	但是，说到底，政治选择将决定人工智能的扩散是带来中位收入的普遍增加还是加剧极化和不平等性。


Political will and powerful messaging will be needed to spur the ambitious social and economic reforms, together with the kind of international cooperation, that will be needed to take advantage of opportunities for inclusive growth.	需要政治意愿和强力信号刺激有宏大的社会和经济改革，以及把握包容增长机会所需要的国际合作。


Overcoming the Copenhagen Failure	Overcoming the Copenhagen Failure


NEW YORK – Pretty speeches can take you only so far.	NEW YORK – Pretty speeches can take you only so far.


A month after the Copenhagen climate conference, it is clear that the world’s leaders were unable to translate rhetoric about global warming into action.	A month after the Copenhagen climate conference, it is clear that the world’s leaders were unable to translate rhetoric about global warming into action.


It was, of course, nice that world leaders could agree that it would be bad to risk the devastation that could be wrought by an increase in global temperatures of more than two degrees Celsius.	It was, of course, nice that world leaders could agree that it would be bad to risk the devastation that could be wrought by an increase in global temperatures of more than two degrees Celsius.


At least they paid some attention to the mounting scientific evidence.     And certain principles set out in the 1992 Rio Framework Convention, including “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities,” were affirmed.	At least they paid some attention to the mounting scientific evidence.     And certain principles set out in the 1992 Rio Framework Convention, including “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities,” were affirmed.


So, too, was the developed countries’ agreement to “provide adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources, technology, and capacity-building….” to developing countries.	So, too, was the developed countries’ agreement to “provide adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources, technology, and capacity-building…. ” to developing countries.


The failure of Copenhagen was not the absence of a legally binding agreement.	The failure of Copenhagen was not the absence of a legally binding agreement.


The real failure was that there was no agreement about how to achieve the lofty goal of saving the planet, no agreement about reductions in carbon emissions, no agreement on how to share the burden, and no agreement on help for developing countries.	The real failure was that there was no agreement about how to achieve the lofty goal of saving the planet, no agreement about reductions in carbon emissions, no agreement on how to share the burden, and no agreement on help for developing countries.


Even the commitment of the accord to provide amounts approaching $30 billion for the period 2010-2012 for adaptation and mitigation appears paltry next to the hundreds of billions of dollars that have been doled out to the banks in the bailouts of 2008-2009.	Even the commitment of the accord to provide amounts approaching $30 billion for the period 2010-2012 for adaptation and mitigation appears paltry next to the hundreds of billions of dollars that have been doled out to the banks in the bailouts of 2008-2009.


If we can afford that much to save banks, we can afford something more to save the planet.	If we can afford that much to save banks, we can afford something more to save the planet.


The consequences of the failure are already apparent: the price of emission rights in the European Union Emission Trading System has fallen, which means that firms will have less incentive to reduce emissions now and less incentive to invest in innovations that will reduce emissions in the future.	The consequences of the failure are already apparent: the price of emission rights in the European Union Emission Trading System has fallen, which means that firms will have less incentive to reduce emissions now and less incentive to invest in innovations that will reduce emissions in the future.


Firms that wanted to do the right thing, to spend the money to reduce their emissions, now worry that doing so would put them at a competitive disadvantage as others continue to emit without restraint.	Firms that wanted to do the right thing, to spend the money to reduce their emissions, now worry that doing so would put them at a competitive disadvantage as others continue to emit without restraint.


European firms will continue to be at a competitive disadvantage relative to American firms, which bear no cost for their emissions.	European firms will continue to be at a competitive disadvantage relative to American firms, which bear no cost for their emissions.


Underlying the failure in Copenhagen are some deep problems.	Underlying the failure in Copenhagen are some deep problems.


The Kyoto approach allocated emission rights, which are a valuable asset.	The Kyoto approach allocated emission rights, which are a valuable asset.


If emissions were appropriately restricted, the value of emission rights would be a couple trillion dollars a year – no wonder that there is a squabble over who should get them.	If emissions were appropriately restricted, the value of emission rights would be a couple trillion dollars a year – no wonder that there is a squabble over who should get them.


Clearly, the idea that those who emitted more in the past should get more emission rights for the future is unacceptable.	Clearly, the idea that those who emitted more in the past should get more emission rights for the future is unacceptable.


The “minimally” fair allocation to the developing countries requires equal emission rights per capita.	The “minimally” fair allocation to the developing countries requires equal emission rights per capita.


Most ethical principles would suggest that, if one is distributing what amounts to “money” around the world, one should give more (per capita) to the poor.	Most ethical principles would suggest that, if one is distributing what amounts to “money” around the world, one should give more (per capita) to the poor.


So, too, most ethical principles would suggest that those that have polluted more in the past – especially after the problem was recognized in 1992 – should have less right to pollute in the future.	So, too, most ethical principles would suggest that those that have polluted more in the past – especially after the problem was recognized in 1992 – should have less right to pollute in the future.


But such an allocation would implicitly transfer hundreds of billions of dollars from rich to poor.	But such an allocation would implicitly transfer hundreds of billions of dollars from rich to poor.


Given the difficulty of coming up with even $10 billion a year – let alone the $200 billion a year that is needed for mitigation and adaptation – it is wishful thinking to expect an agreement along these lines.	Given the difficulty of coming up with even $10 billion a year – let alone the $200 billion a year that is needed for mitigation and adaptation – it is wishful thinking to expect an agreement along these lines.


Perhaps it is time to try another approach: a commitment by each country to raise the price of emissions (whether through a carbon tax or emissions caps) to an agreed level, say, $80 per ton.	Perhaps it is time to try another approach: a commitment by each country to raise the price of emissions (whether through a carbon tax or emissions caps) to an agreed level, say, $80 per ton.


Countries could use the revenues as an alternative to other taxes – it makes much more sense to tax bad things than good things.	Countries could use the revenues as an alternative to other taxes – it makes much more sense to tax bad things than good things.


Developed countries could use some of the revenues generated to fulfill their obligations to help the developing countries in terms of adaptation and to compensate them for maintaining forests, which provide a global public good through carbon sequestration.	Developed countries could use some of the revenues generated to fulfill their obligations to help the developing countries in terms of adaptation and to compensate them for maintaining forests, which provide a global public good through carbon sequestration.


We have seen that goodwill alone can get us only so far.	We have seen that goodwill alone can get us only so far.


We must now conjoin self-interest with good intentions, especially because leaders in some countries (particularly the United States) seem afraid of competition from emerging markets even without any advantage they might receive from not having to pay for carbon emissions .	We must now conjoin self-interest with good intentions, especially because leaders in some countries (particularly the United States) seem afraid of competition from emerging markets even without any advantage they might receive from not having to pay for carbon emissions .


A system of border taxes – imposed on imports from countries where firms do not have to pay appropriately for carbon emissions – would level the playing field and provide economic and political incentives for countries to adopt a carbon tax or emission caps.	A system of border taxes – imposed on imports from countries where firms do not have to pay appropriately for carbon emissions – would level the playing field and provide economic and political incentives for countries to adopt a carbon tax or emission caps.


That, in turn, would provide economic incentives for firms to reduce their emissions.	That, in turn, would provide economic incentives for firms to reduce their emissions.


Time is of the essence.	Time is of the essence.


While the world dawdles, greenhouse gases are building up in the atmosphere, and the likelihood that the world will meet even the agreed-upon target of limiting global warming to two degrees Celsius is diminishing.	While the world dawdles, greenhouse gases are building up in the atmosphere, and the likelihood that the world will meet even the agreed-upon target of limiting global warming to two degrees Celsius is diminishing.


We have given the Kyoto approach, based on emission rights, more than a fair chance.	We have given the Kyoto approach, based on emission rights, more than a fair chance.


Given the fundamental problems underlying it, Copenhagen’s failure should not be a surprise.	Given the fundamental problems underlying it, Copenhagen’s failure should not be a surprise.


At the very least, it is worth giving the alternative a chance.	At the very least, it is worth giving the alternative a chance.


The Eurozone’s Agenda in 2013	欧元区的2013年日程


PARIS – European Union leaders concluded 2012 with a landmark agreement that places all eurozone banks under a single supervisor.	巴黎—欧盟领导人以一项里程碑式的协议作为2012年收官——所有欧元区银行都将置于单一监督者的监管之下。


But the difficult negotiations that led to the agreement eclipsed European Council President Herman Van Rompuy’s recent report, Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, which calls for unity far beyond a banking union.	但协议谈判过程之艰难让欧洲理事会主席范龙佩的最新报告《通向真正的经济和货币联盟》（Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union）黯然失色。 这份报告呼吁形成远远超越银行联盟的统一。


Although “no door was closed,” in the words of European Commission President José Manuel Barroso, EU leaders have clearly refused, at least for now, to hold a serious discussion about deeper integration.	尽管用欧盟委员会主席巴罗佐的话说，“大门仍然开着”，但欧盟领导人显然拒绝了就加深一体化进行严肃讨论的建议，至少在目前是如此。


Van Rompuy’s report raises a fundamental question: What factors are preventing the eurozone from functioning as everyone would wish?	范龙佩的报告引出了一个根本性问题：什么因素使欧元区不能像所有人期许的那样运转？ 要回答这一问题，最重要的是比较欧元的第一个十年——1999—2009年间起作用的动态。


Answering this question requires, first and foremost, comparing the dynamics at play during the euro’s first decade, 1999-2009, when the eurozone ostensibly performed well, with those of the last three years, which have been marred by crisis.	在这段时间中，乍一看欧元表现出色。 但在过去三年中，欧元因危机遭受重创。


At first, the eurozone seemed to function like a true currency union: capital-market integration was accelerated; cross-border activity increased; and the per capita income gap between member countries decreased.	首先，欧元区似乎如一个真正的货币联盟在运转：资本市场一体化加速； 跨境活动增加；


But, unlike in a complete currency union, such as that of the United States, eurozone members retained full financial sovereignty, meaning that they controlled all of the levers of macroeconomic policy.	成员国之间人均GDP差距减小。 但是，和完整的货币联盟（比如美国）不同，欧元区成员国保留了完整的财政主权，这意味着它们控制着所有的宏观经济政策决定权。


Without external constraints, public and private expenditure grew precipitously in many countries on the eurozone periphery, while wages rose faster than productivity.	没了外部约束，欧元区许多外围国家公私支出大幅上升，而工资增长也快于生产率。


As these countries posted current-account deficits, northern European countries accumulated current-account surpluses, exposing a widening competitiveness gap.	这些国家都存在经常项目赤字，北欧国家相应地积累起经常项目盈余，竞争力差距开始拉大。


In a genuine currency union, wealth transfers and automatic stabilizers mean that such discrepancies do not pose a problem.	在一个真正的货币联盟中，财富转移和自动稳定器意味着这样的差异不会成为问题。


With the eurozone as a whole benefiting from a relatively solid balance-of-payments position, European leaders initially failed to foresee the risk incurred by letting competitiveness differentials grow, and underestimated the threat posed by some countries’ accumulation of significant external debt.	欧元区作为一个整体因相对稳固的收支而受益，但欧元区领导人一开始就没能预见到放任竞争力差异增加所蕴含的风险，也低估了某些国家外部债务激增带来的威胁。


Indeed, for ten years, north-to-south income transfers and lending financed excessive aggregate demand, making the eurozone seem stable.	事实上，十年来，北欧-南欧收入转移和借贷撑起了过大的总需求，让欧元区看起来很稳定。


As markets underpriced risk in order to lend to increasingly indebted countries, pressure on interest rates diminished.	由于市场低估风险价格以便为债务日重的国家提供贷款，利率压力不再存在。


(Over the course of the euro’s first decade, interest-rate spreads between ten-year government bonds nearly disappeared.)	（在欧元的第一个十年中，十年期国债利差几近消失。 ）


The global financial crisis exposed the eurozone’s underlying flaw.	全球金融危机暴露了欧元区的内在缺陷。


Meanwhile, international bodies, including the International Monetary Fund and the G-20, encouraged struggling countries to implement loose fiscal policies, claiming that they were needed to overcome the crisis.	与此同时，包括IMF和G20在内的国际机构鼓励受困国家实施宽松的财政政策，声称这是克服危机的必要。


But fiscal stimulus merely aggravated the problem.	但财政刺激只能加剧这一问题。


Financial investors soon recognized that risk had been underestimated in some countries, causing interest rates to rise, sometimes to unsustainable levels, as in Greece, Portugal, and Ireland.	金融投资者很快意识到，一些国家的风险被低估了，这让利率开始抬升，甚至升高到不可持续的水平，比如希腊、葡萄牙和爱尔兰的情形。


While the decline in aggregate demand led to reduced imports, the combination of higher interest rates, lower public expenditure, tax increases, and wage deflation boosted unemployment and triggered recession.	总需求的下滑导致了的减少，尽管如此，利率的升高、公共支出的下降、税收的增加以及工资通缩的合力导致失业率高企，经济陷入衰退。


Normally, by decreasing prices relative to their more fiscally sound neighbors, struggling countries can boost exports, thereby reducing their current-account deficits.	通常，通过价格相对财政情况较稳固的邻国下降，受困国可以提振出口，从而减少经常项目赤字。


But, in the case of the euro crisis, price stickiness caused inflation to increase more in debtor countries than in creditor countries, making adjustment even more painful.	但是，在欧元区危机中，价格粘性导致债务国通货膨胀比债权国更快，从而增加了调整的痛苦程度。


In this context, Van Rompuy’s report is crucial.	在这样的环境下，范龙佩的报告十分关进。


It maps out the architecture needed to “guarantee the minimum level of convergence required for the EMU to function effectively,” and calls for a more integrated financial, budgetary, and economic policy framework.	它描绘了“保证欧洲货币联盟有效运转所需要的最低限度趋同”所必须的安排，并呼吁形成更加一体化的财政、预算和经济政策框架。


Specifically, the report highlights the need for the eurozone to make two fundamental commitments.	特别地，该报告还强调了欧元区需要作出两大根本性承诺。


First, eurozone countries must implement reforms aimed at boosting wage and price flexibility through enhanced competition and improved labor and capital mobility within and between member countries.	首先，欧元区国家必须实施旨在通过强化竞争、改善成员国内部和彼此之间劳动力和资本流动性增加工资和价格灵活性的改革。


Second, wealth transfers to peripheral countries, while controversial, are necessary.	其次，财富必须向外围国转移，尽管这一点具有很大争议。


To surmount the associated political hurdles, eurozone leaders must create a limited “fiscal capacity,” which should act as a “common but limited shock-absorption function” that would “contribute to cushioning the impact of country-specific shocks and help to prevent contagion across the euro area and beyond.”	为了克服相关政治障碍，欧元区领导人必须建立有限的“财政能力”，它应该承担“共同但有限的冲击吸收功能”，从而“有助于缓冲个别国家受到的冲击的影响，并有助于防止危机在传染至欧元区甚至区外。


This mechanism should also provide financial support for structural reforms through “limited, temporary, flexible, and targeted financial incentives.”	”该机制应该为通过“有限、暂时、灵活和定向的财政激励”为结构性改革提供支持。


But Van Rompuy’s minimal proposal may be insufficient.	但范龙佩的最低限度建议可能是不够的。


Currency unions require a mechanism for permanent transfers to poorer regions.	货币联盟需要永久性的向较穷地区转移的机制。


The EU budget should facilitate such transfers in the eurozone, using structural funds.	欧盟预算应该动用结构性基金支持欧元区内的此类转移。


Tax transfers should also act as an automatic stabilizer in the case of asymmetric shocks.	税收转移也应该成为不对称冲击的自动稳定器。


Such reforms undoubtedly require a much more politically integrated, or federalized, eurozone.	毫无疑问，这类改革要求更加政治一体化、联邦化的欧元区。


Facing up to that reality will be the main challenge for Europe’s leaders in 2013.	直面这一现实将是2013年欧洲领导人的主要挑战。


Test-Driving Driverless Cars	试驾自动驾驶汽车


ANN ARBOR – It is June 15, 2030, and for Sam and Sue of Ann Arbor, Michigan, it is going to be a busy day.	安纳伯—现在是2030年6月15日，来自密歇根州安纳伯市的山姆和苏准备迎来繁忙的一天。


Their daughter Sophia has a 9 a.m. karate match.	他们的女儿索菲亚上午9点有空手道比赛。


At noon, her older sister Sally’s high school graduation will begin.	中午，索菲亚姐姐莎莉的高中毕业典礼将拉开帷幕。


And, by 3 p.m., the house must be ready for Sally’s graduation party.	接着，在下午3点，家里必须准备好迎接莎莉的毕业派对。


At 8:40, Sam uses a smartphone app to order a ride from Maghicle, Ann Arbor’s mobility service, which uses self-driving robotic vehicles.	上午8点40分，山姆用智能手机应用预定了Maghicle，这是安纳伯市一项实用自动驾驶机器人汽车的运输服务。


Within minutes, Sam, Sue, and Sophia are headed for the karate club.	几分钟后，山姆、苏和索菲亚已经在前往空手道俱乐部的路上了。


En route, Sophia studies videos of her opponent’s past matches, while Sue catches up on emails and Sam orders appetizers and flowers for the party.	途中索菲亚研究了对手上一场比赛的录像，而苏处理了电子邮件，山姆订好了派对小食和鲜花。


They arrive at the club on time, and the robot proceeds to pick up someone else nearby.	他们及时抵达了俱乐部，机器人按照设定就近接上其他人飞驰而去。


Sally, who must arrive at school by 10:30, has already ordered a Maghicle ride.	莎莉必须在10点30分赶到学校，她也订好了Maghicle服务。


When she boards at 10:15, she receives a text message from her best friend Amanda, who wants to ride with her.	10点15分上车后，她给准备搭她车的闺蜜阿曼达发了一条短信。


Sally enters Amanda’s address in the Maghicle app, and the robot chooses the best route.	莎莉在Maghicle应用中输入阿曼达的地址，机器人会自动选择最优路径。


At 11:30, as a victorious Sophia trades her karate uniform for something better suited for her sister’s graduation, Sam receives a text message confirming that a small temperature-controlled pod has delivered the appetizers for Sally’s party in the secure, refrigerated drop-box at the house.	11点30分，在比赛中获胜的索菲亚用空手道服换来了更合适作为姐姐毕业礼物的小玩意，山姆受到了确认短信，一个小型温控荚已经把莎莉派对小食送进了家里的冷藏升降箱，万无一失。


When Sophia is ready, the family orders another Maghicle ride, this time to Sally’s school.	索菲亚准备完毕后，家里又订了一次Maghicle服务，这次的目的地是莎莉的学校。


They take their seats and, as Sam waves to Sally sitting with her classmates, he is struck by how quickly 17 years have passed.	他们在位子上坐定，山姆朝坐在同班同学边上的莎莉挥挥手，17年弹指一挥间，令他感慨万千。


In 2013, Sam’s day would have been far more difficult, stressful, and expensive.	与此相比，2013年山姆的日子远为更艰难、更有压力、更昂贵。


He would have wasted far too much time in his gas-guzzling SUV, stuck in traffic jams or searching for parking spaces.	他会在油老虎SUV中耗费多得多的时间，在路上堵得寸步难行，或者艰难地寻找停车位。


Now, because he does not need to own a car, he spends far less money on transportation and has more time to do as he pleases.	如今，他不再需要汽车，交通花费少了很多，也有了更多时间找乐子。


With services like Maghicle enabling people to get around safely, affordably, conveniently, and sustainably, Sam does not have to worry about his wife or daughters getting into automobile accidents, as his parents worried about him.	Maghicle等服务让人们可以安全、廉价、便捷、持续地通勤，山姆再也不用想他的父母担心他那样担心妻子或女儿遭遇交通事故。


By contrast, today’s road transportation system is inconvenient, unsustainable, and dangerous.	相反，今天的道路交通系统不便捷、不可持续，而且很危险。


Of the nearly one billion motor vehicles worldwide – enough to circle the planet 100 times if parked end to end – some 95% depend on oil for energy, making car travel subject to resource geopolitics and price volatility.	全世界有近5亿辆车——收尾相连停在一起足以绕地球100圈——其中95%依赖石油供能，这使得驾车旅行受资源地缘政治和价格波动的影响。


Furthermore, combustion engines account for more than one-fifth of the world’s carbon emissions, contributing significantly to climate change.	此外，内燃机排放着全世界五分之一的碳，极大地影响了气候变化。


And, with more than 1.2 million people dying on the road each year, car travel remains a proven killer.	每年都有120多万人在道路上丧命，驾车旅行是名副其实的杀手。


Sam’s world of 2030 is not mere fantasy.	山姆的2030世界并完全是幻想。


But achieving it will require a thorough overhaul of the existing road transportation system – and that means overcoming the complex combination of public and private elements, vested interests, ingrained business models, and massive inertia that has so far impeded its development.	但实现它需要彻底改变现有道路交通系统——而这意味着克服复杂的公共和私人因素组合、既得利益、根深蒂固的商业模式，以及目前阻碍这一发展势头的群体惯性。


Indeed, with certain institutions and industries benefiting when all of the system’s components – vehicles, roads, fuel stations, traffic laws, regulations, vehicle standards, and licensed drivers – work together, no transformational development has occurred in road transportation since Karl Benz invented the car and Henry Ford popularized it.	事实上，当该系统的要素结合在一起时——包括车、路、加油站、交通法、监管、汽车标准、驾照等——某些机构和产业获得了极大的好处，这导致道路交通自卡尔·奔驰发明汽车和亨利·福特将其推广到千家万户以来没有任何发展。


A narrow focus on, say, developing better batteries, improving fuel efficiency, or making automobile production more sustainable is inadequate to catalyze the needed transformation.	狭隘地将关注点集中于（比如）开发更好的电池、改善能源效率、或让汽车生产更加可持续并不足以催化必要的改变。


A genuinely transformational solution is needed – one that meets the needs of consumers, businesses, and governments.	我们需要一个真正的变革性解决方案，它将满足消费者、企业和政府的需要。


An integrated network of driverless, electric vehicles that are connected, coordinated, and shared should form the core of that solution.	互联、协调、共享的无人驾驶电子汽车综合网络构成了这一方案的核心。


Such vehicles would be programmed to avoid crashes, leading to fewer deaths and injuries and less property damage.	这些汽车通过程序设定避免碰撞，以此减少伤亡和财产损失。


In order to minimize the excessive resource consumption associated with driving, the vehicles would be tailored to trip characteristics, such as the number of passengers.	为了最小化与驾驶有关的额外资源消耗，汽车将根据行程性质（比如乘客数量）定制。


For example, lightweight, two-passenger vehicles can be up to ten times more energy efficient than a typical car.	比如，轻型两座汽车可以比典型的汽车拥有高十倍的能源效率。


In the United States, where 90% of automobiles carry one or two people, reliance on such vehicles would result in a dramatic decline in carbon emissions, which would fall even further as a result of less road congestion and smoother traffic flows.	在美国，90%的汽车上只有一到两个人，推广这类汽车将极大地降低碳排放，而由此带来的道路拥挤改善和交通流平稳化还能进一步降低碳排放。


Moreover, the land and infrastructure needed for parking would be significantly reduced.	此外，停车所需要的土地和基础设施也会大大降低。


Under such a system, personal mobility could cost up to 80% less than owning and operating a car, with time efficiencies augmenting those savings further.	在这样一个系统中，个人交通成本将比拥有和操作一辆汽车节约最多80%，由此带来的事件效率提高进一步增加了成本节约。


For Americans earning minimum wage ($7.25 per hour), time spent driving at a rate of 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour costs $0.24 per mile.	美国的最低时薪是7. 25美元，因此以时速30英里（48公里）驾车意味着每英里0.


At the US median hourly wage of $25, each mile costs $0.83.	24美元的成本。 若以美国中位时薪25美元计算，则每英里成本为0.


Given that Americans drive roughly three trillion miles annually, saving just one cent per mile implies $30 billion in annual savings.	83美元。 美国人每年要驾车行驶3万亿英里，每英里成本降低1美分就意味着每年可以节约300亿美元。


The technology needed to advance such a scheme exists.	技术必须先于机制而动。


The task now is to introduce prototype systems in representative communities, in order to prove what is possible, discover consumers’ preferences, determine the most attractive business models, and identify and avert unexpected consequences.	目前的任务是在代表性社会中引入原型系统，以证明什么是可行的，发现消费者偏好，确定最具吸引力的商业模式，识别并避免意料外结果。


Once the prototypes have proved effective and practical, they should scale quickly without public incentives.	一旦原型系统被证明有效实用，它们应该就能在没有公共激励的情况下迅速扩大规模。


As with other innovations – such as mobile phones, e-books, digital photography and music, and flat-screen televisions – large-scale deployment will occur when the new technologies reach the market tipping point, when their value to consumers exceeds the costs to businesses of supplying them.	在其他创新的影响下——比如智能手机、电子书、数字照相和音乐、平板电视——大规模部署将在技术到达市场引爆点时发生，即它们对消费者的价值超过了供应它们的企业的成本。


Policymakers would be responsible only for guaranteeing the expanding system’s safety.	决策者将只需负责保证扩张的系统的安全性。


A cleaner, safer, more convenient road transportation system is possible – and closer to being realized than many believe.	更清洁、更安全、更便捷的道路交通系统是可能的——而且比许多人相信的更接近现实。


It needs only the opportunity to prove itself.	它所需要的只是一个证明自己的机会。


Owning Up to Israel’s Bomb	核弹之事当以诚相告


TEL AVIV – President Barack Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons, and the recent agreement he signed with Russia aimed at cutting back the nuclear stockpiles of both countries, enhances his moral and political leadership.	特拉维夫——巴拉克·奥巴马总统关于无核世界的愿景，以及近期他与俄罗斯签署的、旨在削减两国核武库的协议，使得他在道德和政治方面的领导力得以提升。


But how will his campaign against nuclear proliferation affect Israel, widely seen as the world’s sixth nuclear weapon state, and so far the only one in the Middle East?	但是奥巴马此番对抗核扩散的努力将会对以色列这样一个被广泛视为世界第六个核武器拥有者、也是迄今为止中东地区唯一拥有者的国家产生怎样的影响呢？


US Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller’s recent call for Israel to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which would require it to declare and relinquish its nuclear arsenal, has incited fears that America’s diplomatic umbrella for Israel’s nuclear status is ending.	美国助理国务卿罗斯·高特莫勒于近期发出的、要求以色列加入核不扩散条约（NPT）的呼吁引发了一些忧虑，若以方加入该条约，则将被要求公布并放弃其核武库，于是人们担心美国正要收起它为以色列的核地位所撑起的外交保护伞。


From now on, it appeared to Israelis, the US will treat all states the same when it comes to nuclear weapons.	在以色列人看来，从今往后一旦涉及核武器这个议题，美国将对各国一视同仁；


Israel is especially concerned that Obama might be willing to address Iran’s nuclear ambition by equating it with Israel’s nuclear status.	以方还尤为关切奥巴马可能乐于将以色列的核地位与伊朗的核野心相提并论，以此处理伊朗核问题一事。


The intellectual foundations of the new American attitude were laid down in a famous article by Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, George Schultz, and William Perry entitled “Toward a Nuclear-Free World.”	由亨利·基辛格、萨姆·纳恩、乔治·舒兹以及威廉·佩里等四人合写的“向无核世界迈进”这一篇著名文章为美国新的态度奠定了知识基础。


In calling upon the world’s nuclear powers to preach by example and dramatically reduce their nuclear arsenals, the article was also a call for equality among nations in the nuclear domain.	通过号召全球核大国以身作则、大规模削减其核武库，这篇文章也成为了对核领域中实现各国平等的呼吁。


Bruce Riedel, who until recently headed the Obama administration’s strategy review  for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and who is by no means hostile to America’s unique relations with Israel, has been explicit about this.	直到不久前还在主持奥巴马政府对阿富汗和巴基斯坦进行战略评估的布鲁斯·里德尔对此说得很清楚：“如果美国确实真想与伊朗达成协议，那么以色列就不能继续东躲西藏；


“If you are really serious about a deal with Iran, Israel has to come out of the closet.	一种基于虚构内容与双重标准的政策注定迟早会失败；


A policy based on fiction and double standards is bound to fail sooner or later.	值得一提的是，这项政策竟然维持了这么久。


What is remarkable is that it has lasted so long.”	”虽然里德尔如此表态，但他本人对美以之间的特殊关系毫无敌意可言。


But it was a recent statement to Congress by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates that was especially shocking to Israelis.	不过令以色列人感到特别震惊的还要数美国国防部长罗伯特·盖茨于近期向国会所做的陈述。


He expressed understanding for Iran’s desire to acquire nuclear weapons because, as he said, the Iranians are surrounded by nuclear powers such as Pakistan, India, Russia, and Israel.	在这之中，盖茨表达了对伊朗获取核武器之愿的理解，之所以如此，按他的说法是因为伊朗人身处巴基斯坦、印度、俄罗斯和以色列等核大国的包围之中。


Israel is bound to fight against this emerging new American doctrine that equates it with Iran, or even with India and Pakistan for that matter.	对于这种正在浮出水面的、将其与伊朗、甚至与印度和巴基斯坦等而视之的美国新政策，以色列必将加以反击。


Political contexts matter, the Israelis will argue.	以色列人将会把这一问题归结于政治环境的作用；


Not only has Iran developed its nuclear capabilities while a party to the NPT, the Israelis will say, but it also has put Israel’s destruction high on its agenda.	他们会指出，伊朗不但在身为核不扩散条约成员国期间发展其核能力，而且还将摧毁以色列作为其优先任务。


Israel’s nuclear deterrence is its ultimate defense against an existential threat.	对于这种真实存在的威胁，以色列的核威慑才是其终极的防卫手段。


Across-the-board nuclear equality can, in the end, only boost to Iran’s nuclear claims.	而全面的核平等最终只会助长伊朗的核主张。


India and Pakistan, unlike Israel, which has been committed to a strategy of nuclear opacity, both see themselves as nuclear states and want the world to accept that status.  Moreover, Israel never tested a nuclear weapon, and has unequivocally accepted the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines, which seek to stem proliferation through the control of nuclear exports.	与奉行模糊核战略的以色列不同，印度和巴基斯坦都自视为有核国家，并希望世界对此加以承认。 此外，以色列从未进行过核武器试验，而且已经十分明确地接受了核供应国集团（NSG）的指导方针，后者旨在通过对核出口加以管制，以此阻止核扩散。


Israel expects the Obama administration not only to appreciate the unique context of its ambiguous nuclear status, but also to recognize that it cannot be forthcoming in assuring its neighbors or the rest of the world regarding its nuclear program unless the Middle East political environment changes in a radically positive way.	以色列希望奥巴马政府不但能重视其模糊核地位的独特背景，而且能认识到，除非中东地区的政治环境能发生脱胎换骨般的改善，否则以方不会乐于就其核项目向它的邻国以及世界其他各方做出保证。


Here, a change in Iran’s pattern of behavior toward Israel is an absolute prerequisite.	其中，伊朗改变其对待以色列的行为模式将是绝对的前提条件。


The potential for export of nuclear material and know-how by countries such as Pakistan – and perhaps one day Iran – is also a matter of concern for Israel.	此外，以色列也关心诸如巴基斯坦等国（有朝一日，伊朗也可能跻身其间）在核原料以及核技术出口方面的潜力。


Indeed, Israel insists that it is, after all, Iran, not Israel’s supposed nuclear capabilities, that triggered the current Middle East nuclear arms race.	事实上，以色列坚称挑起当前中东地区核军备竞赛的元凶终究还是伊朗，而非推测中自己所具备的核能力。


But, as with the issue of the West Bank settlements, the Obama administration seems to be moving definitively away from an automatic endorsement of Israel’s understandings with previous US administrations. A revision of US policy towards Israel’s nuclear status can by no means be ruled out.	但是，正如在西岸定居点问题上一样，看起来奥巴马政府将不会对以色列与美国前政府间的谅解自动加以认可，美国修正其对待以色列核地位的政策的可能性也无法被排除。


Gottemoeller’s declaration, as well as Gates’ explicit recognition of Israel’s nuclear status should be interpreted within the context of the Obama administration’s broader disarmament agenda.	对高特莫勒的声明以及盖茨明确承认以色列核地位这两件事的解读，应该放在奥巴马政府更加广泛的裁军议程这样一个背景下进行。


Israel’s policy of nuclear ambiguity has remained practically unchallenged for almost 50 years, not least within Israel itself, where the issue has been a sacred taboo.	以色列的模糊核政策已经在过去近五十年间没有受到过实际的挑战，在其国内，情况更是如此：这一议题一直是不容染指的禁忌。


But the changing international environment, the threat of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, and the new policies being worked out in the US might all be good reasons for Israel to consider revising its nuclear doctrine.	但是不断变化的国际环境、中东地区不受控制的核扩散所带来的威胁以及美国正在酝酿的新政策等因素，可能都为以色列考虑修正其核原则提供了很好的理由。


After all, the current strategy has not really worked either as a deterrent against conventional attacks (which persisted throughout the years that Israel supposedly developed its nuclear arsenal) or as a warning to rivals (such as Iran) against developing a nuclear weapon.	毕竟，目前的核战略既没有真正发挥出对常规袭击的威慑作用（在外界推测以色列发展核武库的这些年间，袭击事件层出不穷），也未能成功地警告其对手（如伊朗）不要发展核武器。


Israel’s official policy is that of a Middle East Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction.	以色列的官方政策被定位为“没有大规模杀伤性武器的中东”。


By abandoning ambiguity and taking its own bomb out of the “basement,” Israel might be able to affirm its capacity for nuclear deterrence more convincingly, and, more importantly, enhance a serious debate about the urgency of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.	通过抛去朦胧的面纱，将本国的核弹公之于世，以色列或许可以使自己对其核威慑能力的确认变得更具说服力； 而更为重要的是，此举可能会促成一场关于在中东建立无核区之紧迫性的严肃讨论。


Pakistan after Bhutto	贝•布托之后的巴基斯坦


The assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has brought Pakistan’s state of turmoil to new heights.	前总理贝•布托的遇刺使得巴基斯坦国内的骚乱状态进一步升级。


As head of the nation’s most popular political party, Bhutto largely transcended Pakistan’s ethnic and sectarian divides.	作为这个国家支持者最为众多的政党领袖，贝•布托在很大程度上是凌驾于巴基斯坦的民族和党派分歧之上的。


Her return from exile in October was seen as a step toward curbing the country’s dangerous fragmentation; her murder shatters those hopes.	今年10月贝•布托流放归来被看作是挽救这个国家于危险分裂的曙光； 而她的遇刺则让那些美好的愿望再次破灭。


President Pervez Musharraf must take immediate steps – most importantly, the formation of a national unity government – to prevent Pakistan from tearing apart at the seams.	佩尔韦兹•穆沙拉夫总统必须立即采取行动了——其中最为首要的，是他必须立即成立一个民族团结政府——防止巴基斯坦从此陷入四分五裂。


In deciding that her People’s Party would participate in the January parliamentary election, Bhutto threw a lifeline to Musharraf, who has been beset by multiple insurgencies, a nationwide terrorist threat, and rock-bottom legitimacy.	人民党将参加一月份的议会选举的决定，不啻为贝•布托抛给穆沙拉夫的一个救生索，要知道总统先生已经被国内的多起叛乱、全国性的恐怖主义威胁和他本人的合法性问题困扰很久了。


Both Musharraf and his supporters in Washington hoped that mainstream parties’ participation in the election would end Pakistan’s governance crisis and provide popular support for a decisive confrontation with the Taliban and al-Qaeda.	穆沙拉夫和他在华盛顿的支持者们都希望，贝•布托领导的主流政党参与该选举的举动可以就此结束巴基斯坦的治理危机，并使民众支持政府对塔利班和基地组织采取果断的对抗行动。


Now, however, the election will likely be postponed.	然而现在看来，选举很可能要被推迟。


Indeed, Musharraf might be compelled to impose emergency rule again, as he did in November, should Pakistan’s stability further deteriorate.	不错，如果巴基斯坦的局势进一步恶化，穆沙拉夫完全可以像他在十一月份所做的那样，再次被迫宣布国家进入紧急状态。


There are reports of violence in cities across Pakistan.	巴基斯坦的各个城市都出现了多起关于暴力和骚乱的报道。


Karachi, a multi-ethnic metropolis, could erupt into full-scale chaos. During the 1990’s, violence there between Bhutto’s party and a local ethnic party – now allied with Musharraf – took thousands of lives.	卡拉奇这个多民族聚居的都市很可能要陷入全面的无政府状态，上世纪90年代，发生在该城市的贝•布托的政党和一个当地少数民族政党——该政党现已是穆沙拉夫的同盟——之间的暴力冲突曾使数千人丧生。


In these circumstances, a state of emergency could be warranted. But, given Musharraf’s lack of legitimacy, such a move would further infuriate Bhutto’s supporters, whose street power Bhutto had contained since October.	在当前的情况下，当然有理由宣布进入紧急状态，但是由于穆沙拉夫总统的不合法地位，这一举动将进一步激怒布托的支持者，自十月份以来，布托一直在竭力遏制这些支持者民众武装的发展。


This could set the stage for a violent confrontation between the Pakistani masses and Musharraf’s regime.	这样一来，巴基斯坦民众和穆沙拉夫政权之间势必要上演一场暴力冲突。


The nightmare scenario envisioned by many in Pakistan – a nuclear-armed country actively targeted by al-Qaeda and the Taliban – could become a reality.	许多巴基斯坦人心中的梦魇很可能会成为现实，这个拥有核武器的国家正频频成为基地组织和塔利班的攻击目标。


But this need not be a foregone conclusion.	然而悲剧也不是完全不可避免的。


Musharraf, who regularly claims to act on the basis of a “Pakistan first” policy, must now let go of partisan objectives and form a national unity government led by a prime minister from the opposition.	经常声称自己的一切行动都是本着“巴基斯坦至上”原则的穆沙拉夫总统现在必须要放弃一切党派目标，组成一个民族团结政府，并由一名反对派领袖担任总理。


Any subsequent measures, including temporary imposition of emergency rule and full-scale war against the terrorists, require the complete support of the opposition parties.	任何后续行动，无论是临时宣布国家进入紧急状态还是对恐怖主义分子全面开战，都需要各反对党的全力支持。


Musharraf and his political allies cannot be seen as benefiting from Bhutto’s assassination; nor can they afford the perception of a cover-up.	穆沙拉夫和他的政治同盟们不能被视为贝•布托遇刺事件的受益者；


His opponents must be incorporated into the decision-making process.	他们也决不能企图对此事视而不见，掩而不宣，反对者们必须被纳入决策过程。


A national unity government must assume three major responsibilities.	一个民族团结政府必须承担起三项重大责任。


First, it must establish an independent commission to determine who was responsible for Bhutto’s murder.	首先，它必须建立一个独立的委员会，调查谁应对谋杀贝•布托的事件负责。


While political assassination is not unfamiliar – Pakistan’s first prime minister was killed in the same park where Bhutto was murdered – it is imperative that the culprits be apprehended and tried.	尽管政治刺杀事件已经不是什么新鲜事儿了——巴基斯坦的首任总理就是在贝•布托遇刺的同一个公园被刺的——但罪犯理应被逮捕并受到审判。


Anything short of this would permanently taint Pakistan’s leadership and impede all attempts at political reconciliation.	做不到这一点，巴基斯坦政府就会永远因此事而蒙羞，任何政治和解的努力都将寸步难行。


Second, it must take necessary measures to ensure public safety and political stability, while paving the way for free and fair elections.	第二，它必须采取必要措施确保公共安全和政治稳定，同时为自由公正的选举开辟道路。


It must offer Pakistan a consensual path toward winning back its tribal areas from the insurgents, end the wave of terror in its cities, and ensure the election of a new, legitimate government.	它必须为巴基斯坦开辟一条达成一致共识的道路，共同从叛军手里夺回其部落领土，结束全国各个城市的恐怖风潮，确保一个新的、合法的政府通过选举产生。


Finally, it must begin a dialogue with Musharraf and the military on a permanent, constitutional separation of powers.	最后，它必须开始与穆沙拉夫及军队之间就永久性的、合乎宪法的权利分配开展对话。


If Bhutto had not been assassinated and, instead, successfully became prime minister, she would likely have clashed with Musharraf over his arbitrary empowerment of the presidency at the expense of the premiership. The issue will not go away with Bhutto’s death.	如果贝•布托没有被刺杀，而是成功地当选总理，她很可能会与穆沙拉夫就后者借损害总理权力而进行总统独裁展开冲突，这一问题并不会随着布托的死亡而平息下去。


Pakistan’s civil and military elite must create a broad consensus – perhaps with foreign assistance, but never with foreign meddling – on the constitutional roles of the prime minister, president, and the military.	巴基斯坦的社会和军队精英集团必须达成广泛共识——或许还要借助国外援助，但绝不需要外国干预——确定总理、总统和军队各自的合宪角色。


Ravaged by endemic elite discord since its founding, Pakistan desperately needs an elite reconciliation that includes all of the country’s major stakeholders.	这个自建国伊始就备受各地精英集团不和之蹂躏的国家迫切地需要各方精英之间达成和解，并吸收巴基斯坦国内所有利益相关方的参与。


Otherwise, Pakistan’s terrorists, who feed off of political instability, will continue to gain, while the country’s poor and illiterate majority will continue to lose ground.	否则，巴基斯坦境内一直从政治不稳定中渔利的恐怖主义分子就会继续得益，而这个国家贫穷而无知的普通百姓则会继续丧失权利。


The murder of Benazir Bhutto need not result in the country’s demise.	贝・布托的遇刺没有必要成为这个国家走向灭亡的序曲。


Pakistan’s elite have an opportunity to overcome their differences, unite in opposition to militants, and transform their failing state into a stable and prosperous democracy.	巴基斯坦的精英阶层可以趁此机会克服他们之间的分歧，团结起来共同对付国内的好战分子，扭转当前的溃败状态，建立一个稳定繁荣的民主国家。


If they succeed in bringing about a national renewal, Bhutto, a monumental political figure in Pakistani history, will not have died in vain.	如果他们能够在民族复兴的道路上取得成功，贝・布托，这位巴基斯坦历史上里程碑式的政治人物，就没有白白死去。


Pakistan’s New Leaf?	巴基斯坦新的一页？


NEW DELHI – As US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton bluntly told Pakistan in 2011 that “you can’t keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbors.”	新德里——希拉里·克林顿任美国国务卿时曾 在2011年直言不讳地告诫巴基斯坦“你们不能养蛇为患，还指望毒蛇只咬自己的邻居。


But her warning (“eventually those snakes are going to turn on” their keeper), like those of other American officials over the years, including presidents and CIA chiefs, went unheeded.	”但就像多年来其他美国官员，包括总统和中情局局长们的警告一样，希拉里的警告（“那些毒蛇终有一天会反过来攻击”豢养者）并没有引起巴方的注意。


The snake-keeper’s deepening troubles were exemplified by the recent massacre of 132 schoolchildren in Peshawar by militants no longer under the control of Pakistan’s generals.	养蛇者自食其果的例子是不在巴基斯坦将军控制下的武装分子最近在白沙瓦屠杀了132名在校学习的孩子。


Such horror is the direct result of the systematic manner in which the Pakistani military establishment has reared jihadist militants since the 1980s as an instrument of state policy against India and Afghanistan.	直接导致这一恶果的是20世纪80年代后巴基斯坦军事机构一直培养圣战武装分子作为反对印度和阿富汗国家政策的工具。


By continuing to nurture terrorist proxies, the Pakistani military has enabled other militants to become entrenched in the country, making the culture of jihad pervasive.	因为长期培养恐怖分子代理组织，巴基斯坦军方已经使其他武装力量在该国根深蒂固，并使圣战文化渗透到每一个角落。


The Peshawar massacre was not the first time that the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism became a terror victim.	白沙瓦大屠杀并不是世界主要恐怖主义赞助国反过来成为恐怖主义牺牲品的首个案例。


But the attack has underscored how the contradiction between battling one set of terror groups while shielding others for cross-border undertakings has hobbled the Pakistani state.	但此次袭击暴露出在打击特定恐怖组织的同时庇护其他组织免受跨境行动打击如何让巴基斯坦政府举步维艰、难以为继。


As a result, the question many are asking is whether, in the wake of the Peshawar killings, the Pakistani military, including its rogue Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, will be willing to break its ties with militant groups and dismantle the state-run terrorist infrastructure.	因此，很多人都在问白沙瓦屠杀事件发生后，巴基斯坦军方，包括其无赖的三军情报局（ISI）机构，是否会愿意切断与激进组织的联系，及拆毁由政府经营的恐怖分子基础设施。


Unfortunately, developments in recent months, including in the aftermath of the Peshawar attack, offer little hope.	但不幸的是，近几个月、包括在白沙瓦袭击发生后的事态发展所带来的希望寥寥无几。


On the contrary, with the military back in de facto control, the civilian government led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is in no position to shape developments.	相反，因为军方重新掌握实际控制权，由纳瓦兹·谢里夫总理领导的平民政府根本无力左右今后的局势。


And, despite the increasing blowback from state-aided militancy, the generals remain too wedded to sponsoring terrorist groups that are under United Nations sanctions – including Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) and the Haqqani network – to reverse course.	而且，尽管由国家资助的好战主义所产生的反弹不断增强，但执政的将军们仍然执着于资助联合国制裁的恐怖组织——包括拉什卡-塔伊巴组织（LeT）和哈卡尼网络——而拒绝改变策略。


Reliance on jihadist terror has become part of the generals’ DNA.	对圣战恐怖主义的依赖已经融入了将军们的DNA。


Who can forget their repeated denial that they knew the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden before he was killed by US naval commandos in a 2011 raid on his safe house in the Pakistani garrison city of Abbottabad?	谁能忘得了就在2011年本·拉登在巴基斯坦要塞城市阿伯塔巴德的藏身处被美国海军突击队突袭并将本·拉登击毙前，巴基斯坦政府反复否认知道本·拉登的下落。


Recently, in an apparent slip, a senior civilian official – Sharif’s national security adviser, Sartaj Aziz – said that Pakistan should do nothing to stop militants who do not intend to harm Pakistan.	不久前还有一位高级文职官员——谢里夫的国家安全顾问萨尔塔杰·阿齐兹不小心说漏了嘴——表示巴基斯坦不必对不打算伤害巴自身的武装分子采取任何遏制措施。


The nexus among military officers, jihadists, and hardline nationalists has created a nuclear-armed “Terroristan” that will most likely continue to threaten regional and global security.	军官、圣战分子和强硬民族主义者之间的关系催生出一个有核武器武装的“恐怖斯坦”，极有可能继续对地区和全球安全构成威胁。


State-reared terror groups and their splinter cells, some now operating autonomously, have morphed into a hydra.	由国家豢养的恐怖组织及其分裂机构（其中有些已经在自主行动）已经演变为一条九头蛇。


Indeed, as the country’s civilian political institutions corrode, its nuclear arsenal, ominously, is becoming increasingly unsafe.	事实上，更严重的是随着该国民间政治机构的不断减弱，其核武库的安全性正在不断降低。


Pakistan is already a quasi-failed state.	巴基斯坦已经处在准崩溃状态。


Its anti-India identity is no longer sufficient to stem its mounting contradictions, which are most apparent in the two incarnations of the Taliban: the Afghan Taliban, which is the Pakistani military’s surrogate, and the Pakistani Taliban – formally known as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – which is the military’s nemesis.	该国的反印诉求已经不足以遏制其愈演愈烈的矛盾，上述矛盾在对塔利班两大化身的不同态度上表现得最为显著：作为巴基斯坦军方代理的阿富汗塔利班，以及巴基斯坦塔利班——正式名称是巴基斯坦塔利班运动（TTP）——他们是军方的死敌。


Pakistan also provides sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban’s chief, Mullah Mohammad Omar (and also harbors a well-known international fugitive, the Indian organized crime boss Dawood Ibrahim).	巴基斯坦还为阿富汗塔利班首领毛拉·穆罕默德·奥马尔提供庇护（还窝藏一位知名的国际逃犯，印度有组织犯罪首领达乌德·易卜拉欣）。


Meanwhile, Hafiz Saeed, the founder of the ISI’s largest surrogate terror organization, LeT, remains the generals’ darling, leading a public life that mocks America’s $10 million bounty on his head and the UN’s inclusion of him on a terrorist list.	同时，ISI最大的代理恐怖组织（LeT）创始人哈菲兹·赛义德依然是将军们的宠儿，其公众生活让美国1，000万美元的悬赏和联合国将其列入恐怖分子名单变成了笑柄。


Earlier this month, Pakistani authorities aided a large public rally by Saeed in Lahore, including by running special trains to ferry in participants, so that the architect of the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack (among many others) could project himself as some sort of messiah of the Pakistani people.	本月早些时候，巴基斯坦当局在拉合尔协助赛义德举办大型公众集会，包括开行特别专列运送参与者，从而使2008年11月孟买恐怖袭击事件（还有其他恐怖袭击事件）的策划者可以在巴基斯坦民众面前享受救世主一般的待遇。


Yet none of that stopped Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Raheel Sharif, and ISI Director-General Rizwan Akhter from rushing to Kabul after the Peshawar attack to demand that President Ashraf Ghani and the US-led military coalition extradite TTP chief Mullah Fazlullah or allow Pakistani forces to go in after him.	但这并没有妨碍巴基斯坦陆军参谋长谢里夫和三军情报局局长阿赫塔尔在白沙瓦袭击发生后飞奔到喀布尔要求总统阿什拉夫·加尼和以美国为首的军事联盟引渡TTP首领毛拉·法兹鲁拉或允许巴基斯坦部队进入阿富汗对其采取行动。


In other words, they seek the help of Afghanistan and the US to fight the Pakistani Taliban while unflinchingly aiding the Afghan Taliban, which has been killing Afghan and NATO troops.	换言之，他们在打击巴基斯坦塔利班时寻求美国和阿富汗的帮助，同时却坚定不移地协助阿富汗塔利班杀害阿富汗人和北约部队。


Such is the generals’ Janus-faced approach to terrorism that six years after the Mumbai attacks, Pakistan has yet to try the seven Pakistani perpetrators in its custody.	这就是将军们面对恐怖主义的双重法则，甚至在孟买袭击发生六年后，巴基斯坦对其关押的7名巴基斯坦肇事者的审判仍没有开始。


Indeed, under the cover of indignation over the Peshawar attack, the leading suspect in the case – UN-designated terrorist Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, who served as LeT’s operations chief – secured bail.	事实上，就在对白沙瓦袭击表面的愤慨背后，本案最大的嫌疑人——联合国指定的恐怖分子、曾担任LeT最高行动首领的扎基 - 乌尔 - 拉赫曼·拉赫维被允许取保候审。


International outrage soon forced Pakistan to place him in preventive detention for up to three months.	国际公愤很快就迫使巴基斯坦对其采取了长达三个月的预防性拘留措施。


Those who believe that the Peshawar massacre might serve as a wakeup call to the Pakistani military should ask why the generals have ignored hundreds of earlier wakeup calls.	认为白沙瓦大屠杀可能使巴基斯坦军方警醒的那些人应当问问将军们为什么对之前的数百次警示置若罔闻。


Despite the blowback imperiling Pakistan’s future, the generals show no sign that they have tired of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds.	虽然由此引发的反响可能对巴基斯坦的未来构成威胁，但没有任何迹象表明将军们厌倦了在与野兔一起奔跑的同时和猎犬一同狩猎。


The international community should stop placing its hope in some abrupt change of heart on the generals’ part.	国际社会应停止将希望寄托在将军们突然改邪归正。


Creating a moderate Pakistan at peace with itself can only be a long-term project, because it hinges on empowering a feeble civil society and, ultimately, reining in the military’s role in politics.	建设平静温和的巴基斯坦仅仅是我们的长期任务，因为这需要授权给虚弱的公民社会，并最终遏制军方的政治作用。


As long as the military, intelligence, and nuclear establishments remain unaccountable to the civilian government, Pakistan, the region, and the world will continue to be at risk from the jihadist snake pit that the country has become.	只要军方、情报机构及核设施仍不归文官政府管辖，巴基斯坦、其所在地区和整个世界就不得不面对这个圣战魔窟的威胁。


The Pakistani Nuclear Deal That Wasn’t	凭空编造的巴基斯坦核协议


LAHORE – Recently, it came to light that the United States was attempting to negotiate with Pakistan a deal to constrain the Pakistanis’ fast-growing nuclear weapons program.	拉合尔——不久前消息传来，美国正试图与巴基斯坦谈判达成一项限制该国快速发展核武器计划的协议 。


That sounds like good news: Any move toward non-proliferation seems like a positive step.	这听上去像个好消息：任何防扩散举措似乎都是积极之举。


Unfortunately, in this case the effort has had some dangerous unintended consequences.	不幸的是，这一次，上述工作已经产生了某些意想不到的危险后果。


It all started last month, when US media reported that an agreement was already near completion.	所有这一切都始于上个月，当时美国媒体报道这份协议已接近达成。


First, David Ignatius of The Washington Post reported, on the basis of conversations with senior US officials, that agreement had already been reached on a number of steps Pakistan would take to reduce its dependence on nuclear weapons for deterrence.	首先，华盛顿邮报的大卫·伊格内修斯报道，与美国高级官员的对话显示，已经就巴基斯坦减少对威慑性核武器依赖的若干步骤达成了共识。


A few days later, David Sanger of The New York Times confirmed.	几天后，纽约时报的大卫·桑格再次在报道中予以证实。


Both accounts suggested that the agreement would be announced in a joint statement following the October 23 meeting in Washington, DC, between US President Barack Obama and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.	这两篇报道都透露协议将于10月23日美国总统奥巴马和巴基斯坦总理纳瓦兹·谢里夫举行华盛顿会晤后以联合声明的形式对外公布。


But the reality is that those media reports were the beginning, not the end, of the process.	但实际情况是上述媒体报道并非协议过程的结束而仅是开始。


According to senior Pakistani officials – including Sartaj Aziz, a key adviser on foreign affairs and national security – there was no agreement in the works when the stories appeared.	据包括外交事务和国家安全重要顾问萨尔杰·阿齐兹在内的巴基斯坦高级官员表示——报道发表时根本没有在谈判任何协议。


Rather, it seemed that the US was using the media to put pressure on Pakistan’s government to respond more readily to America’s pleas to cap production of tactical weapons and the short-range missiles that could deliver them.	相反，看似是美国利用媒体对巴政府施压答应前者限制生产战术武器及相关短程运载导弹的提议。


The reports put Pakistan’s political leaders in an awkward position.	该报道将巴基斯坦政治领袖置于非常尴尬的境地。


They could not possibly succeed in convincing the country’s powerful military establishment to place constraints on the development of the country’s nuclear arsenal.	他们根本无法说服该国强大的军事机构限制研发核武器。


Indeed, the US effort merely widened the divide on security issues within Pakistani– a situation that serves no one’s interests.	事实上，美国的做法仅仅扩大了巴基斯坦人在安全事务中的分歧——这种情况不符合任何人的利益。


Pakistan’s leaders were determined to turn attention back toward their country’s rapidly deteriorating relations with India, a challenge with which the US could help.	巴基斯坦领导人决心把注意力重新转向快速恶化的印巴关系，而美国可以协助化解这一难题。


So when they received America’s draft of the statement to be issued after the Obama-Sharif meeting, and saw that it focused almost entirely on nuclear issues, it was decided that Aziz would head to Washington a day early to agree on revisions.	因此当他们拿到奥巴马谢里夫会后准备印发的美国声明草案并发现其几乎完全集中于核问题时，他们决定将派阿齐兹提前一天前往华盛顿谈判修改问题。


From Pakistan’s perspective, the draft statement seemed to be driven by the White House.	从巴基斯坦的角度看，该声明草案似乎代表了白宫的意思。


It seemed that “the office of the National Security Adviser wanted to add another ‘nuclear feather’ to Obama’s cap, following the successful negotiations with Iran,” Aziz speculated to me in a private conversation.	阿齐兹在与我进行私人谈话时推测，貌似“在与伊朗谈判取得成功后，国家安全顾问办公室要在奥巴马的核成就桂冠上再加一根‘核羽毛’装饰。


Believing that the US State Department was not “kept in the loop,” Aziz requested that, if he could not agree on the statement’s wording with the designated official, he could meet with Secretary of State John Kerry.	”因为相信美国国务院对此“并不知情”，阿齐兹要求如果不能与指定官员就声明内容达成共识，他要求面见国务卿约翰·克里。


To be sure, the US government’s agenda would have some benefits for Pakistan.	可以肯定，美国政府议程将在一定程度上惠及巴基斯坦。


The US would press the Nuclear Supplier Group to issue a waiver to Pakistan, as it has already done for India, so that Pakistan could import the technology, parts, and components needed to build nuclear power plants.	美国将敦促核供应国集团为巴基斯坦开具像印度那样的豁免证书，从而使巴基斯坦得以进口建造核电厂所需的技术和零部件。


And, in fact, Pakistan needs to build about a half-dozen such plants – in addition to the two already being built by the Chinese near Karachi – to address its energy shortfall, which amounts to an estimated 5,000 megawatts annually.	事实上，除中国已经在卡拉奇附近建造的两座核电厂外，巴基斯坦还需要建设六座这样的电厂——才能应对每年高达5，000万千瓦的能源短缺。


With voters heading to the polls in early 2018, genuine progress toward resolving the energy crisis would presumably be good for Pakistan’s political leaders.	因为预定在2018年初举行大选，解决能源危机的切实进展大概有利于巴基斯坦的政治领导人。


In exchange for this, however, Pakistan would have to limit the number of tactical nuclear weapons in its arsenal and cease development work on them.	但作为交换，巴基斯坦将不得不限制核武库中战术核武器的数量，并停止进一步的研发工作。


Moreover, Pakistan would have to mothball the short-range “Nasr” missile, which has already been shown to be capable of delivering small nuclear weapons over a distance of 50-75 kilometers.	此外，巴基斯坦将被迫封存短程导弹“纳斯尔”，事实证明该导弹有能力在50-75公里的范围内发射小型核武器。


The US believed that shifting Pakistani leaders’ attention from nuclear-weapons development to power-plant construction would, in addition to bolstering efforts to close the energy gap, limit Pakistan’s dependence on China for nuclear technology and reduce the risk of an immensely destructive war in South Asia.	美国认为将巴基斯坦领导人的注意力从研发核武器转向发电厂建设除了能缩小能源缺口，还能限制巴基斯坦对中国核技术的依赖，并避免在南亚地区爆发造成巨大破坏的战争。


But these calculations failed to take into account Pakistani security considerations – in particular, the military’s renewed fears about India’s intentions.	但这些算计并未纳入巴基斯坦人在安全方面的考虑——尤其是军方对印度意图重新出现的担忧。


For some time, senior military officials have been concentrating on rooting out terrorism at home, and they have scored some impressive successes.	一段时间来，军方高级官员一直专注于铲除国内恐怖主义，并且也取得了某些令人钦佩的成功。


But recent base-building activity by India near its border with Pakistan has been raising red flags in Islamabad.	但印度近来在印巴边境的基地建设活动已经在伊斯兰堡亮起了红灯。


According to a senior Pakistani military official, India, in pursuit of its “Cold Start” military doctrine, is constructing eight bases at which heavy armor would be stationed.	据一名巴基斯坦高级军官透露，印度为实现其“冷启动”军事策略正在进行八大重武器 基地的建设工作。


Developed after the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, the doctrine calls for Indian troops to move rapidly to occupy 300-500 square kilometers of Pakistani territory in the event of another terrorist attack.	该策略诞生于2001年印度议会袭击事件后，要求一旦再次��生恐怖袭击，印度军队将迅速行动占领300-500平方公里的巴基斯坦领土。


The occupation would end only when Pakistan formally relinquished its claim to Kashmir and dismantled all terrorist training camps operating within its borders.	占领将持续到巴基斯坦正式放弃其对克什米尔的领土要求并拆除境内所有恐怖分子训练营为止。


“Tactical nuclear weapons,” the Pakistani military official explained, “will deter India from following through on this strategy.”	“战术核武器，”巴基斯坦军方负责人解释，“将遏止印度执行上述战略。 ”


Against this background, the US should have known that trying to compel Pakistan to limit its nuclear-weapons capability would fail.	在此背景下，美国应该知道无法成功迫使巴基斯坦限制其核武器能力。


But it pushed anyway.	但这并没有妨碍它推进这项策略。


As a result, Pakistan’s reliance on China has been strengthened, not weakened.	这样一来，巴基斯坦对中国的依赖不但没有削弱，反而有增强的趋势。


And, instead of reducing the chances of a nuclear standoff in South Asia, the White House plan served only to distract attention from efforts to address tensions between India and Pakistan.	白宫计划不但未能减少南亚陷入核僵局的可能性，反而只是分散了缓解印巴紧张局势的注意力。


Ultimately, the Obama-Sharif statement did emphasize India-Pakistan relations, and made no reference to the nuclear issue.	最终，奥巴马谢里夫声明的确强调了印巴关系，而且并没有提及核问题。


Obama mentioned Kashmir as an unresolved issue, while pleading for stability in South Asian affairs.	奥巴马提到克什米尔问题尚未解决，同时呼吁保持南亚的稳定局势。


According to Aziz, Pakistan was satisfied with the final statement.	阿齐兹表示巴基斯坦对最后的声明比较满意。


The US, however, may not have felt the same.	但美国可能并非如此。


Pakistan on the Precipice	巴基斯坦岌岌可危


ISLAMABAD – Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari abruptly returned to Karachi on the morning of December 19, following a 13-day absence for medical treatment in Dubai, where he lived while in exile.	伊斯兰堡——12月19日早上，巴基斯坦总统阿西夫•阿里•扎尔达里突然回到卡拉奇，此前他到迪拜接受了为期13天的治疗，他流放的时候就在迪拜生活。


The government issued no a formal statement about Zadari’s health, but his supporters disclosed that he had suffered a mild stroke, which left him unconscious for several minutes.	当局没有就扎尔达里的身体状况发表正式声明，但是其支持者披露他得了轻度中风，这使他会有几分钟失去知觉。


Zardari’s sudden return fueled speculation about his future, but, more importantly, about the future of civilian rule in Pakistan.	扎尔达里突然回国导致人们进一步怀疑其未来，但是更重要的是，怀疑巴基斯坦文官统治的未来。


His decision followed a three-hour meeting between Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani and General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Pakistani army’s chief of the army.	优素福•拉扎•吉拉尼总理和巴基斯坦陆军参谋长阿什法克•佩尔韦兹•基亚尼将军经过三个小时的会谈之后，他作出了决定。


His choice of destination – Karachi, Pakistan’s largest city and his political base, rather than Islamabad, the county’s capital – suggests the depth of the crisis now bubbling below the surface.	他选择的目的地——巴基斯坦最大的城市及其政治基地卡拉奇而不是该国的首都——表明目前危机已在酝酿之中。


Zardari has held power since 2008, having been elected eight months after the assassination of his wife, Benazir Bhutto.	自2008年以来，他一直手握大权，其妻子贝娜齐尔•布托被暗杀8个月后，他当选了总统。


Even after a constitutional amendment in 2010 made the prime minister the country’s chief executive, Zardari has continued to be the main decision-maker.	即使2010年的宪法修正案规定总理是该国的最高执行官，扎尔达里还是主要的决策者。


His political rise is thus in keeping with South Asia’s tradition of quasi-democratic dynastic politics: he assumed leadership of Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) – founded in 1967 by her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – and appointed his son Bilawal as the party’s co-chairperson, basing his decision on a handwritten will left by his wife.	因此他在政治上的崛起与南亚半民主的王朝政治传统一致：他是布托巴基斯坦人民党——该党由她的父亲佐勒菲卡尔•阿里•布托于1967年成立——的领袖并根据其妻子手写遗志上的决定，任命其儿子比拉瓦尔为该党领导人之一。


To underscore the link, the son was renamed Bilawal Bhutto Zardari.	为了加强这种联系，其儿子的名字被改为比拉瓦尔•布托•扎尔达里。


But, having deftly out-maneuvered his opponents for three years, Zardari seems to have misread the current political environment, for Pakistan is not the same country in which his wife and father-in-law wielded power.	三年来，扎尔达里熟练地战胜了其对手，但是他似乎误判了当前的政治形势，因为现在的巴基斯坦与其妻子和丈人统治的国家有所不同。


By trying to play by the old rules, he committed several mistakes that may ultimately cost him his job and the Bhutto family its hold on power.	他试图墨守陈规，结果犯了些错误，这最终可能导致他下台，布托家族失去掌控的大权。


As many other Pakistani leaders have done before before him, Zardari has relied on American support to stay where he is.	与许多前任巴基斯坦领导人此前所做的一样，扎尔达里也依靠美国的支持保持自己的位置。


This worked for some time, but an alleged attempt to involve the United States more openly in Pakistani politics weakened, rather than strengthened, his hold on power.	这有些时候会起作用，但是据称，试图让美国更加公开地参与巴基斯坦的政治不会巩固反而会削弱其掌控的大权。


Indeed, while the Arab Spring ended the old corrupt bargain that kept so many autocratic rulers in power across the Muslim world, Zardari and his associates appear not to have received the message.	实际上，尽管阿拉伯之春结束了让穆斯林世界许多独裁统治者保持执政的腐败旧交易，扎尔达里及其助手似乎并没有收到消息。


It was widely believed that Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s ambassador to the US, had attempted to enlist America’s help in preventing yet another military coup.	人们普遍认为，巴基斯坦驻美大使侯赛因•哈卡尼曾试图获得美国的帮助，以防止另一场军事政变。


An unsigned memorandum, believed to have been written at Haqqani’s suggestion, was sent to Admiral Mike Mullen, then Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, seeking American help in exchange for fighting extremists in Pakistan’s tribal areas who were complicating America’s efforts to extract itself from Afghanistan.	一份未签署的备忘录（人们认为，这是根据哈卡尼的建议写成的）送到了时任参谋长联席会议主席迈克•马伦那里，寻求美国的帮助，作为回报，巴基斯坦将与其境内部落地区的极端分子作斗争，这些极端分子使美国更难从阿富汗抽身。


What the lively Pakistani media dubbed “memogate” forced Haqqani to resign and enabled the Supreme Court to assert its authority by deciding to investigate the matter.	生机勃勃的巴基斯坦媒体创造了“备忘录门”，这迫使哈卡尼辞职，最高法院裁决决定调查此事。


The court was already casting an eye at Zadari by examining the deal between former President Pervez Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto.	法院已经通过审查前总统佩尔韦兹•穆沙拉夫和贝娜齐尔•布托之间的交易查到了扎尔达里身上。


In exchange for the withdrawal of corruption cases against her, Zardari, and several of their friends and associates, Bhutto agreed to support Musharraf after the elections scheduled for December 2007.	为了撤销对她、扎尔达里以及他们的几位朋友和助手的腐败指控，布托同意在预定于2007年12月进行选举之后支持穆沙拉夫。


The Bush administration, eager to have a democratically elected government in Pakistan to continue the fight against terrorism, was believed to have brokered the agreement.	布什政府渴望巴基斯坦出现民选政府继续打击恐怖主义，人们认为，布什政府斡旋达成了这份协议。


That arrangement has now been struck down by the Supreme Court, which ordered the government to reopen corruption cases, including one in Switzerland, where Zardari is alleged to have parked tens of millions of dollars.	现在最高法院已经确定相关安排，责令当局重新调查腐败案，包括在瑞士的一个案件，扎尔达里涉嫌在瑞士存了数千万美元。


The government balked, and now the Court is working to ensure that the executive branch carries out its orders.	当局不愿这样做，目前最高法院正在努力确保行政部门执行其命令。


But Zardari’s decision to begin grooming his 23-year old son for power may have been his gravest mistake.	扎尔达里决定开始训练其23岁的儿子执政，但是这可能是他犯的最严重的错误。


Zulfikar Ali Bhutto anointed his wife and daughter to be the PPP’s co-chairpersons in case he was executed by the military regime that had overthrown him.	佐勒菲卡尔•阿里•布托指定其妻子和女儿为巴基斯坦人民党的领导人之一，以防推翻他的军方处死他。


Benazir Bhutto, in turn, placed control of the party in the hands of her husband and son.	贝娜齐尔•布托反过来将该党的控制权交到了其丈夫和儿子的手中。


But, this time, an awakened citizenry was not inclined to readily accept that political leadership could be passed on so easily from father to daughter, from wife to husband, from father to son.	但是，这次，清醒的民众不愿接受，政治领导权这样轻而易举地从父亲传到女儿，从妻子传到丈夫，又从父亲传到儿��。


Political change in Pakistan is assured, but it will come about in a way that cannot be foreseen.	巴基斯坦必然会发生政治变革，但是发生的方式是无法预测的。


The Arab Spring, America’s declining influence in the Muslim world, and citizens’ determination to be heard have combined to create an environment in which the unprecedented and the unpredictable are the only certainties.	阿拉伯之春、美国在穆斯林世界的影响力下降、民众决定发出声音，在这样一个环境下，史无前例和无法预测是唯一可以确定的。


Pakistan’s Black Revolution	巴基斯坦的黑色革命


SHANGHAI -- Immediately after taking office last month, Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani ordered the release of the 60 judges who had been detained by President Pervez Musharraf since November.	上海——上月就职后，巴基斯坦总理优素福·拉扎·吉拉尼立即下令释放去年11月被总统佩尔韦兹·穆沙拉夫扣押的60名法官。


This is a triumph for the rule of law in Pakistan, and above all a triumph for the brave Pakistani lawyers who took to the streets to protest Musharraf’s imposition of a state of emergency last autumn.	这是法制在巴基斯坦取得的一场胜利，更是去年秋天走上街头抗议穆沙拉夫强行宣布进入紧急状态的勇敢的巴基斯坦律师们的胜利。


The lawyers marched, sang, danced, and exchanged their briefcases for signs and, occasionally, eggs and stones.	律师们游行、唱歌、跳舞、互掷公文包和标语（还有少量鸡蛋和石头）。


As one Pakistani blogger wrote, “They danced in black coats and they danced in black ties.	正如一名巴基斯坦博客所写的那样：“他们穿着黑色西装跳舞，他们系着黑色领带跳舞。


Their black coats their Kalashnikovs and their black ties their bullets.”	黑色西装就是他们的冲锋枪，黑色领带就是他们的子弹。


In a world of color revolutions, Pakistan’s was clothed in the sober hues of the law.	”在全世界各种颜色的革命中，巴基斯坦的革命笼罩着法律肃穆的色调中。


Last November, Musharraf effectively declared war on both the bar and the judiciary, dismissing all judges who refused to recognize his declaration of a state of emergency, purportedly aimed at protecting the nation from terrorists.	去年11月，穆沙拉夫将所有拒绝同意他宣布紧急状态（据称是为了保护国家免受恐怖分子袭击）的法官解职，相当于对律师界和司法界同时宣战。


The seven-member Supreme Court, headed by Chief Justice Iftikar Mohammad Chaudhry, countered by issuing an order barring the government from proclaiming emergency rule.	由七名成员组成的最高法院在首席法官伊夫提哈尔·默罕默德·乔杜里的领导下做出反击，颁布命令禁止政府宣布紧急状态。


Musharraf dissolved the Supreme Court and the four High Courts, put Chaudhry and his entire family under house arrest, sealed the Supreme Court premises under army guard, and proceeded to arrest and detain all judges who refused to swear allegiance to the Provisional Constitutional Order upholding the state of emergency.	穆沙拉夫解散了最高法院和四个高等法院，将乔杜里及其全家软禁起来，派遣武装警卫封锁了最高法院大楼，继续逮捕和扣押所有拒绝向支持紧急状态的“临时宪法令”宣誓效忠的法官。


The result was the detention of most of the senior judiciary, as well as bar association presidents across the country and all leading lawyers and human rights activists seeking to defend judicial independence.	结果，大多数高级法官被捕，同时被捕的还有全国所有企图捍卫司法独立的律师协会主席、主要律师，以及人权活动家。


In the ensuing protests, lawyers were routinely beaten, gassed, brutalized, and humiliated.	在接下来的抗议活动中，律师们不断地遭到殴打、催泪弹袭击，以及残酷的镇压和侮辱。


They stood with and for their judges, making it virtually impossible for judges willing to take Musharraf’s oath of allegiance to operate.	他们与自己支持的法官并肩作战，使那些愿意向穆沙拉夫效忠的法官几乎无法行事。


The lawyer’s movement, it seems, drove a historic wedge between the judiciary and the executive.	律师们的运动似乎在司法和行政之间凿入了一根历史性的楔子。


Yet in Pakistan, the United States, and other countries where lawyers have helped to lead fights for human rights and the rule of law, lofty ideals cloak an equally important set of interests.	然而在巴基斯坦、美国和其他有律师参与领导争取人权和法制的国家中，高尚的理想掩饰了同样重要的利益。


The Pakistani lawyers were safeguarding their livelihoods as much as their principles.	巴基斯坦的律师们不仅仅是在捍卫他们的原则，同时也是在保护他们的生计。


Lawyers cannot practice without judges to hear their cases.	没有法官审理案件，律师就无法执业。


And clients will not bring those cases unless they believe that the judges are independent enough to decide cases on the merits, rather than on the basis of bribes or political considerations.	而如果当事人不相信法官具有充分的独立性，会根据是非而不是贿赂或政治方面的考虑来审判案件，就不会有案子。


These interests also help explain why Kenya’s lawyers were at the forefront of protests against the corruption of President Daniel Arap Moi’s regime in the early 1990’s, but much less visible in the eruption of tribal violence this past year.	这些利益还可以说明为什么肯尼亚的律师在上世纪90年代初抗议丹尼尔·阿拉普·莫伊政府腐败的时候走在最前沿，而在去年爆发的部落暴力事件中却不怎么看得到。


Corruption corrodes the possibility of making a living through the law, which becomes a preserve of the rich.	腐败会损害通过法律谋生的机会，使之成为富人的禁脔。


By contrast, in crises fueled by ethnic conflict, lawyers’ interests are not so clear.	与此相对，在种族冲突造成的危机中，律师的利益就没那么显眼了。


Noting the convergence between ideals and interests does not in any way demean the Pakistani lawyers’ courage and the importance of their protests.	了解理想和利益的共存并不意味着要贬低巴基斯坦律师的勇气和他们的抗议活动的重要性。


America’s founders, for instance, fully understood that the two must go hand in hand.	比如说，美国的创建者们就完全明白这两个因素必须携手并进。


Their design for constitutional democracy ensured, in James Madison’s words, that ambition would counter ambition and “the interests of the man” would be “connected to the constitutional rights of the place.”	用詹姆斯·麦迪逊的话来说，他们设计的宪政民主制度用野心来对抗野心，“人民的利益”将“与当地的宪法权利联系起来”。


The best foundation for the rule of law is to build an island of legality wherever it is most needed to advance legitimate government goals – to stop corruption, to protect the environment, to clean up the financial system, or to enforce contracts with foreign investors.	建立法制的最佳途径是在最需要的地方形成一个有法必依的法律岛屿，推动政府实现合法的目标——制止腐败、保护环境、净化金融系统、或执行与外国投资者的合同。


Within these limited areas, independent judges and the lawyers who can argue before them have a home.	在这些有限的区域内，独立的法官和在法官面前论辩的律师有其合理的归属。


As these islands begin to form an archipelago, a legal class emerges, supported by the clients who need them.	随着这样的岛屿逐渐形成群岛，会出现一个法律阶级，由需要他们的客户支撑。


And on the day that a judge finally crosses a political line, speaking constitutional truth to usurped power, the government’s refusal to comply threatens the interests and ideals of an articulate and motivated segment of society.	等到有一天，法官终于跨越政治的界线，对篡夺权力的人直陈宪法的规定，如果政府拒绝遵守法律，就会威胁到一个有口���、有决心的社会阶层的利益和理想。


The coming weeks will reveal whether Pakistan’s new government has the courage and integrity not only to release the fired judges, but to restore them to the bench and perhaps to face their scrutiny down the road.	今后的几周将揭示巴基斯坦的新政府是否具备勇气和廉正，不仅释放被解职的法官，还能给他们复职，甚至坦然面对他们接下来的审查。


If it does, Pakistan’s lawyers will be able to return to the courtrooms, and Pakistani citizens will have another chance to make democracy work.	如果能做到，巴基斯坦的律师们就可以重返法庭，巴基斯坦的公民将再次获得实现民主的机会。