Third- and fourth-tier Chinese cities, however, face more challenging balance-sheet adjustments, owing to falling asset prices, outflows of labor, and the need to define new growth models.	另一方面，由于资产价格下跌、劳动力外流以及需要确定新的增长模式，三、四线城市面临着更加艰巨的资产负债表调整的挑战。


In the aftermath of the post-2008 debt-fueled infrastructure-investment boom, these cities need to reform how revenue is shared with the central government, increase the transparency and accountability of local budgets, and overhaul the use of municipal-bond and public-private partnership models for local infrastructure projects.	在经历了2008年以债务驱动的基础设施投资热潮之后，这些城市需要改革，包括改变与中央政府的收入分成方式、增加地方预算的透明度和完善问责制、并完善市政债券的用途和地方基础设施项目的公私合作模式。


But, before such changes can be implemented, these cities must address the overhang of poorly performing projects and loss-making state-owned enterprises (SOEs).	在实施这些变革前，这些城市必须先解决积压的失败工程和亏损的国有企业问题。


In fact, Chinese cities and local enterprises will need even more liquidity than would be required in a classic case of deflation, credit tightening, and falling prices, because infrastructure and property investments by local governments and SOEs are still consuming funds.	事实上，中国城市和地方企业所需要的流动性比传统发达国家的通缩、信用紧缩和价格下跌情形下的需求更多，因为地方政府和国有企业的基础设施和房地产投资仍在消耗大量资金。


And, given state intervention, interest rates do not adjust quickly enough to allocate resources efficiently.	此外，由于国家对基准利率及许多投资项目的控制，市场还无法以足够快的速度仅仅通过利率调整来实现有效的资源配置。


Of course, the People’s Bank of China could lower the interest rate and relax its liquidity policy. But it remains concerned that doing so would spark inflation and fuel wasteful investment – and greater excess capacity – in the real-estate sector.	中国人民银行已经试图通过降低利率及放松流动性等政策来帮助实体经济，但它也担心这样做会导致通胀、股市投机、助长房地产行业的过度投资和其它的产能过剩。


Maintaining relatively tight liquidity, however, also has serious consequences.	可是，保持相对较紧的流动性也有一些难以接受的后果。


For starters, as long as external conditions remain relatively liquid, tighter conditions in China put upward pressure on interest rates in the shadow-banking sector. Together with the growth of the renminbi carry trade, this has pushed up the exchange rate at a time when non-US dollar-linked currencies are largely depreciating.	首先，当外部流动性相对宽松，而中国流动性相对较紧，这会给影子银行带来利率上升的压力，并助长人民币套息交易的增长，及促使汇率升值，特别是相对那些没有与美元挂钩的、正在贬值的货币升值 。


Moreover, interest-rate volatility and uncertainty encourages arbitrage and investment in socially costly rent-seeking and speculation, with central-bank liquidity flowing to financial markets, instead of fulfilling its intended purpose of helping the real sector.	此外，利率波动和不确定性鼓励了套利行为，导致部分央行提供的流动性流向了一些有损于社会利益的寻租和股票投机，而没有实现帮助实业的初衷。


Despite slowing growth, China’s A-share market has risen by nearly 50% since last July, and the banking sector’s margins remain exceptionally large.	尽管经济增长有所放缓，但自去年7月以来，中国A股市场仍上涨了近50%，银行业利润仍然畸高。


Meanwhile, confidence in the non-financial private sector remains depressed, as diminished demand leads to increased production costs.	与此同时，非金融私营部门信心仍萎靡不振，因为需求低迷而生产成本还在上升。


China’s growth model hinges on a governance system in which regions, cities, companies, and individuals compete within an increasingly market-oriented, but still centrally regulated, economy.	中国的增长模式所依赖的一个重要的治理制度就��： 地区、城市、公司和个人在日益市场化但仍受中央监管的经济环境中的竞争。


But, in a country as large and diverse as China, a one-size-fits-all approach will not ensure that the market functions effectively. After all, different local economies have different needs.	像中国这样的一个非常多元化大国，任何一刀切的政策都很难确保市场的有效运行， 毕竟，不同的地方经济有不同的需要。


Consider the city of Foshan’s economy, which, driven by private-sector activity, boasts a higher per capita GDP than Beijing or Shanghai.	以佛山市经济为例。 佛山经济以私营企业为驱动力，人均GDP比北京和上海更高。


Given that Foshan’s ratio of bank credit to GDP in 2011 was only 85% – much lower than Shanghai’s 184% and Beijing’s 221% – the city could use land as collateral to borrow money to expand investment.	可是，2011年，佛山的银行信用占GDP之比只有85%——远低于上海的184%和北京的221%——因此佛山在客观条件上应该比其它高负债地区更有条件使用土地作为抵押贷款来扩大投资。


A tight national credit policy, though potentially useful in some highly indebted areas, would impede such growth-enhancing activities in Foshan.	全国性地收紧信用政策，尽管对高负债地区来说或许有必要，但却可能会阻碍像佛山这类高生产力城市的经济增长。


More generally, most of the structural tools needed to strengthen market allocation – including planning, zoning, environmental standards, property rights, and bankruptcy procedures – are implemented at the local level.	更普遍、更重要的一个问题 是，大部分强化市场配置所需要的结构性工具——包括长期规划、区域规划、环境标准、产权和破产程序——都是在地方层面实施的。


And, adding yet another layer of variability, local economies may experience “creative destruction” as their growth models change, potentially causing temporary slowdowns that drag down overall growth.	此外，地方经济可能在增长模式改变的阶段需要经历一个“创造性的破坏过程”，这就带来了新的动荡因素，可能导致暂时性的经济减速，拖累总体经济的增长，并对短期流动性提出更多的要求。


Against this background, the best way to sustain China’s economic transition and prevent a hard landing is to implement looser monetary and credit policies that enable the most productive cities, companies, and industries to generate new added value.	在这样的背景下，维持中国经济转型、防止硬着陆的最好办法是实施宽松的货币和信用政策，让生产率最高的城市、公司和行业创造新的增加值，并同时推出通常有紧缩效应的结构性改革。


With the risks of inflation and asset bubbles being mitigated by lower oil prices and excess capacity, now is a good time to initiate this policy shift.	如今，通胀和资产泡沫的风险被油价下跌和过剩产能所遏制，正是实施这一相对宽松的货币及财政政策的良机。


Of course, China will probably face some short-term headwinds, so the positive effects of this shift will take some time to emerge.	当然，中国可能会面临一些短期调整的冲击，因此这一政策转变的积极效果需要一些时间才能显现。


As the central government consolidates its power through fiscal reform and an anti-corruption campaign, orchestrating the next phase of structural reforms at the local level will require deft coordination.	中央政府通过财政改革和反腐运动已经巩固了对整体宏观经济的掌控，但在地方层面组织实施下一阶段的结构改革，则需要巧妙的协调各种改革及宏观政策的匹配。


After decades of high-speed growth and policy experimentation, cyclical overshoots – reflected in excess capacity, ghost towns, and local-debt overhangs – are no surprise.	在经历了几十年的高增长和成功政策实验后，周期性超调——体现在过剩产能、鬼城和地方债务积压等现象上——已见怪不怪。


Now it is time to address them.	如今，是纠正这些问题的时候了。


Only by confronting these structural issues can China complete its shift to its new, more developed, and more equitable “normal.”	只有直面这些结构性问题，中国才能完成向更发达、更平等、更可持续的“新常态”的转型。


China’s Transparency Problem	中国如何改善政策透明度？


HONG KONG – The Chinese economy has caught a surprisingly severe cold this winter – a cold so bad that almost all global markets are sneezing.	香港—中国经济在今年冬天遭遇出人意料的严重伤寒——严重到全球所有市场都因此打了寒战。


During the first two weeks of 2016, the Shanghai Composite Index fell 18%.	在2016年的前两周，上证综指下跌18%。


On January 15, the index closed at 2,901 – very close to the trough of last summer’s stock-market crash.	1月15日，该指数收于2,901点——接近去年夏天股市大幅波动的低点。


Foreign analysts almost uniformly predict another market crash or even a hard landing.	海外分析师几乎一致预测将爆发另一场市场崩溃甚至硬着陆。


With oil prices dipping below $28 per barrel, the specter of a global economic pandemic has appeared.	而国际石油价格也下跌到每桶28美元，全球经济传染病的幽灵开始浮现。


China’s New Year financial-market shock has been attributed to several causes, primarily related to policy transparency and clarity.	中国的新年金融市场冲击可归因于几个因素，主要与政策清晰度及其执行过程的透明度不够有关。


One was the reversal of China’s attempt to install a stock-market “circuit breaker,” which, far from tempering volatility, spurred a new wave of selloffs.	其一是中国叫停了股市“熔断机制”，该机制不仅没能遏制波动，反而刺激了新一轮抛售潮。


The other – arguably more serious – problem was market confusion about the direction of the renminbi exchange rate, following a gradual but constant ten-day depreciation against the US dollar that fueled capital outflows, until the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) intervened.	另一个问题——也许是更严重的挑战——是市场搞不懂人民币汇率的变动方向，人民币兑美元汇率经历了连续十天的逐渐贬值，这个短期的趋势刺激了资本外流，直到央行出手干预。


According to the PBOC, the confusion arose from a technical change in the process of setting the renminbi exchange rate, with the common reference rate against the US dollar replaced by a rate established on the basis of an undisclosed basket of key international currencies.	据央行的说法，新年前后的贬值主要源于人民币汇率机制的一个技术性改变，即人民币汇率从之前的维持与美元的汇率稳定转向以维持与一揽子货币的汇率稳定（官方没有正式公开一揽子货币成分 ） 。 这一改革本意是为了增强人民币的稳定性，特别是在美元相对其它货币大幅升值的时候；


This reform may be intended to boost the renminbi’s stability; but it is not good for markets, which prefer stability against the dollar to the uncertainty of a managed float.	但这个变化对市场冲击不小，市场更喜欢人民币兑美元汇率的稳定，而不愿面对参照一揽子货币的有管理的浮动汇率的不确定性。


This is not the first time markets have felt blindsided by well-meaning reforms.	这不是市场第一次被初衷良好的改革打得措手不及。


Last August, the PBOC announced a more market-oriented mechanism for setting the renminbi exchange rate in the interbank market, with the daily fixing rate to be based on the previous day’s closing price.	去年8月，中国人民银行宣布人民币银行间市场汇率将由更加市场化的机制决定，即每日参考基准汇率将基于前一日的收盘汇率。


But, because the move coincided with a one-time devaluation of 1.9% against the US dollar, markets wrongly assumed that the central bank would pursue a policy-induced depreciation.	可是，在执行这个新政策时，由于央行同时将人民币兑美元一次性贬值1. 9%，市场错误地认为，中国将调整政策引导人民币贬值。


Unclear policy communication was compounded by global developments.	不清晰的政策沟通由于全球经济形势低迷而对市场形成了愈加复杂的冲击。


The US Federal Reserve’s decision in December to raise the federal funds rate, together with the uncertainty generated by collapsing oil prices, has also spurred investors to reduce their China exposure and switch to dollars.	去年12月，美联储决定提高联邦基金利率，再加上油价崩溃造成的不确定性，让投资者纷纷降低了对中国的风险敞口，并转向美元安全资产。


Recognizing that exchange rates can overshoot much more than the stock market, especially in emerging economies, the PBOC moved to stabilize the exchange rate, intervening heavily in the offshore renminbi markets and tightening controls on short-term cross-border capital flows.	中国央行认识到汇率超调可能远远大于股市，特别是在新兴经济体，于是开始稳定汇率，大举干预离岸人民币市场，并收紧对短期跨境资本流动的管制。


In December, China’s government reiterated its commitment to implementing tough market-oriented reforms, including measures to address environmental pollution, overcapacity, excessive debt, high taxes, bureaucratic red tape, and monopoly privileges for state-owned enterprises (SOEs).	另一方面，去年12月，中国政府重申将致力于实施棘手的市场化改革，包括针对环境污染、产能过剩、债务积压、高税收、官僚主义和国有企业垄断特权等问题的改革措施。


The problem is that short-term investors are unlikely to wait around for long-term reforms to pay off – preferring short-term hedges against unclear exchange-rate policy.	问题在于短期投资者不会坐等长期改革的成效——它们更偏爱用短期对冲手段规避对冲不明确的短期汇率和其它宏观政策。


All modern economies struggle with the inconsistency between sharp and volatile short-term price movements in financial markets and more gradual long-term structural adjustments in the real economy.	所有现代经济体的政策制定及执行者都对金融市场的剧烈短期价格波动和实体经济更具渐进性的长期结构调整之间的矛盾感到焦头烂额。


Unlike in the past, when Chinese policymakers were able to concentrate on the real economy without worrying about excessive financial-market instability, they now must manage short-term volatility caused by liberalized interest and exchange rates, together with larger and faster capital flows both within and across borders.	在过去，中国决策者可以集中精力于实体经济的长期发展而不必担心金融市场的短期波动，但今时不同往日，如今他们必须管理好利率和汇率自由化以及更大更快的国内和国际资本流动带来的短期波动。


For China, coordinating short-term Keynesian fiscal and monetary policies aimed at stabilizing markets with long-term changes to the industrial structure – all without allowing growth to fall low enough to disrupt expectations – will be no easy feat.	对中国来说，协调旨在稳定短期市场及宏观经济的凯恩斯主义财政和货币政策和旨在调整产业结构的长期改革绝非易事——特别是在需要防止增长下降太多以至于干扰市场预期的限制条件下。


But one thing is clear: effective communication with market participants and real-economy players is crucial to market credibility and stability.	但有一点是明确的：与市场参与者和实体经济参与者的有效沟通是决策层建立可信度及稳定市场预期的关键。


In relatively closed economies, explaining complex policies is less important than delivering results.	在相对封闭简单的经济体中，达到政策��果比解释复杂政策更重要。


But with increasing foreign participation and interaction, maintaining stability means anchoring market confidence with transparent, credible policymaking and action.	但随着外部参与和互动的日益增加，保持稳定意味着通过透明可信的决策和行动锚定市场信心。


Only with market-savvy central- and local-government officials and SOE managers can China implement short-term stabilization measures or long-term structural reforms.	中国需要精通市场的中央和地方政府官员和国有企业管理者来实施短期宏观稳定措施及长期结构改革。


The problem, as China Securities Regulatory Commission Chairman Xiao Gang recently lamented, is that such talent is not widely available in the country; those who possess it tend to seek higher pay elsewhere, worry about the limits of the authorities’ market-friendly approach, or even feel vulnerable to corruption accusations.	正如中国证监会主席肖刚及其它资深官员及市场人士最近感叹，中国这样的人才太少； 具备这种才能的人更愿意在其它地方赚取更高收入，他们也担心当局市场化 改革是否会收到限制，甚至害怕卷入腐败。


The key to attracting market-oriented talent to China’s large bureaucracy is to make it clear that risk-taking – and even failure – will be tolerated.	吸引市场人才加入中国庞大的官僚体系的一个关键点是政府高层需要鼓励下属果断独立的政策执行并容忍善意的决策失误，让有才干的官员在面对不确性而作出实时决定时不会有太大压力。


Only if skilled officials feel comfortable making real-time decisions under uncertain conditions can the state keep pace with markets, responding effectively to new developments and thus maintaining high levels of confidence.	这样，政策制定与执行才能跟上市场的节奏，及有效响应新的发展趋势，从而维持较高的市场信心水平。


To support officials during this process, which will include unpopular decision such as cutting capacity and restructuring failed enterprises, China also needs transparent processes that ensure fairness to all stakeholders.	为了支持官员果断决策，包括作出削减产能和重组倒闭企业等不受欢迎的决定，中国还需要保持决策程序的透明以确保公平对待所有相关利益方。


China is in a strong position to handle the challenges that it faces.	中国在处理当前面临的各种挑战时具有许多有利条件。


Growth, while slower than in the last three decades, remains relatively strong, as does China’s foreign-asset position and its central-government and household-sector balance sheets.	增长尽管不如过去三十年那么快，但仍相对强势。 中国外汇资产头寸以及中央政府和家庭部门资产负债表都很健康。


Stable markets need stable policy transitions.	稳定的市场需要稳定的政策转型。


By installing officials with strong policy credibility and the ability to handle market volatility deftly, China can complete its transition to a more market-oriented, innovation-driven economy – one that also supports stronger global growth.	通过不断建立与维护政策的可信度及培养熟练应对市场变化的监管能力，中国能够一步一步走向更加市场化及创新驱动的经济发展模式——而这一转型也将支持更强劲的全球增长。


The Real Singapore Model	真正的新加坡模式


CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA – The death of Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s founding father, offers an occasion to reflect on his legacy – and, perhaps more importantly, on whether that legacy has been correctly understood.	克莱蒙特，加利福尼亚—新加坡国父李光耀的逝世让我们思考他的遗产——也许更重要的是，还有关于他的遗产能否被正确理解的问题。


During his 31 years as prime minister, Lee crafted a unique system of government, intricately balancing authoritarianism with democracy and state capitalism with the free market.	在31年的总理生涯中，李光耀打造了独特的政府制度，复杂而巧妙地将极权和民主、国家资本主义和自由市场相平衡。


Known as “the Singapore model,” Lee’s brand of governance is often mischaracterized as a one-party dictatorship superimposed on a free-market economy.	李光耀的治国之道被称为“新加坡模式”，常常被误解为一党独裁加自由市场经济。


His success in transforming Singapore into a prosperous city-state is frequently invoked by authoritarian rulers as justification for their tight control of society – and nowhere more so than in China.	他成功地让新加坡变为一个繁荣的城市国家，这常常被极权统治者用来论证严格控制社会的正当性——首屈一指的便是中国。


Indeed, Chinese President Xi Jinping is pursuing a transformative agenda heavily influenced by the Singapore model – a relentless war on corruption, a broad crackdown on dissent, and pro-market economic reforms.	事实上，中国国家主席习近平所实施的转型日程受到新加坡模式的巨大影响——不懈的反腐斗争、大范围打击异见人士，以及市场经济改革。


The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sees in Singapore a vision of its future: the perpetuation of its monopoly on political power in a prosperous capitalist society.	中国共产党把新加坡视为未来愿景之一：在一个繁荣的资本主义社会中永远垄断权力。


But the Singapore model, as China’s rulers understand it, never existed.	但中国统治者所理解的新加坡模式从来没有存在过。


To emulate Lee’s model of government – rather than its cartoon caricature – would require allowing a far more democratic system than the CCP would ever tolerate.	模仿李光耀的政府模式——而不是它的讽刺漫画形象——需要允许远超中共可容忍程度的民主制度。


The true secret of Lee’s political genius was not his skillful use of repressive practices, such as launching lawsuits against the media or his political opponents; such tactics are common and unremarkable in semi-authoritarian regimes.	李光耀政治天才的真正秘密不是他驾轻就熟地使用镇压手段，如起诉媒体或政治反对派； 这些策略很平常，在半极权体制中也好不显眼。


What Lee did that was truly revolutionary was to use democratic institutions and the rule of law to curb the predatory appetite of his country’s ruling elite.	李光耀真正的革命性做法是用民主制度和法治遏制新加坡执政精英的掠夺倾向。


Unlike China, Singapore allows opposition parties to contest in competitive and free (though not necessarily fair) elections.	与中国不同，新加坡允许反对党在选举中自由竞争（尽管未必公平）。


In the last parliamentary election in 2011, six opposition parties won a total of 40% of the vote.	在2011年的上一次议会选举中，六大反对党赢得占总数40%的选票。


Should the People’s Action Party (PAP), the party Lee founded, lose its legitimacy due to poor governance, Singapore’s voters could throw it out of office.	如果李光耀所创立的人民行动党（People’s Action Party，PAP）因为治国不善而失去合法性，新加坡选民可以将它赶下台。


By holding regular competitive elections, Lee effectively established a mechanism of political self-enforcement and accountability – he gave Singaporean voters the power to decide whether the PAP should stay in power.	通过举行定期竞争性选举，李光耀有效地建立了一套政治自我执行和问责的机制——他给予新加坡选民决定PAP是否应该掌握权力的权力。


This enforcement mechanism has maintained discipline within Singapore’s ruling elite and makes its promises credible.	这一执行机制维持了新加坡执政精英内部的纪律，也让精英的承诺有了可信度。


Regrettably, most of the rest of the world has never given Lee proper credit for crafting a hybrid system of authoritarianism and democracy that vastly improved the wellbeing of his country’s citizens, without subjecting them to the brutality and oppression to which many of Singapore’s neighbors have resorted.	遗憾的是，世界其他地区的大部分人都没有给予李光耀的这项成就以相称的赞誉：他建立了一套极权和民主相混合的制度，既极大地提高了新加坡公民的福祉，又没有让他们遭遇新加坡的诸多邻国所采取的残酷统治和镇压。


China would be wise to embrace this model, by introducing a considerable degree of democracy and strengthening adherence to the rule of law.	中国最好模仿这一模式，引入相当大程度的民主并强化法治。


China’s 1.4 billion citizens would benefit immensely if their rulers were to adopt Singapore-style political institutions and practices.	如果中国统治者能实施新加坡式的政治制度和实践，14亿中国公民将获益良多。


This would mean, at a minimum, legalizing organized political opposition, introducing competitive elections at regular intervals, and creating an independent judiciary.	这将意味着至少要合法化有组织政治反对，引入定期举行的竞争性选举，并建立独立的司法制度。


Emulating Lee would allow China to achieve immense progress and become a more humane and open society with a brighter future.	模仿李光耀将让中国实现巨大的进步并成为更人道、更开放的社会，获得更加光明的未来。


Sadly, there is almost no chance of this happening, at least any time soon.	不幸的是，这几乎不可能发生，至少在短期内是如此。


When China’s leaders cite the Singapore model, what they have in mind is limited to the perpetuation of their power.	中国领导人在提及新加坡模式时，心里想的只是其权力的永续性。


They want the benefits of political dominance, without the checks imposed by a competitive institutional context.	他们希望获得政治主宰的好处，而不面对竞争性制度环境的制衡。


Lee may have been skeptical about the benefits of democracy, but he was not viscerally hostile to it; he understood its usefulness.	李光耀也许质疑民主的好处，但他内心并不敌视民主； 他知道民主的用处。


By contrast, China’s leaders view democracy as an existential ideological threat that must be neutralized at any cost.	相反，中国领导人将民主视为生存性意识形态威胁，必须不惜任何代价将其屏蔽。


For them, allowing even a modicum of democracy as a means to impose some discipline on the elite is considered suicidal.	对他们来说，允许哪怕是一丁点作为约束精英纪律的方式的民主，也是自杀性的大错。


Unfortunately, Lee is no longer with us.	不幸的是，李光耀已经永远离开了我们。


One would like to imagine him explaining to China’s leaders what has been truly innovative about the Singapore model.	你也许会想象他想中国领导人解释什么才是新加坡模式真正的创新之处。


Obviously, that is not an option.	显然，这已无从发生。


But it would behoove the CCP – if for no other reason than simple respect for one of Asia’s great statesmen – to stop appropriating the Singapore brand in the service of a completely different agenda.	但中共——如果单纯只是尊重这位亚洲最伟大政治家之一——应该停止打着新加坡模式的旗号让它为完全不同的日程服务。


One option is higher inflation.	��个通常的政策选择是提高通胀。


China’s Latest Five-Year Plan	中国的最新五年规划


CAMBRIDGE – I was in Beijing last month when the Chinese government released a preliminary summary of its 13th Five-Year Plan.	坎布里奇—上个月我在北京，中国政府发布了其第13个五年规划的预览纲要。


This is an important document for understanding where China is headed in the 2016-2020 period.	这是一份重要的文件，可以帮助我们理解2016—2020年中国的走向。


And yet China’s five-year plans just aren’t what they used to be.	但中国的五年规划已不再是从前的五年规划。


The Chinese economy is no longer the state-owned and state-managed system that it was when I first visited more than 30 years ago.	中国经济已不再是我30多年前第一次访问这里时的国家所有和国家管理制度。


In those days, there was no private enterprise, and it was illegal for anyone but the government or a state-owned enterprise to hire an employee.	当时没有民营企业，只有政府或国有企业才能合法雇用员工。


Today, only 20% of employees in China work for SOEs.	如今，中国只有20%的工人为国有企业工作。


The rest of the Chinese economy is dynamic, decentralized, and privately owned.	其余部分为充满活力的分散的民营企业。


American multinational companies and other foreign firms are an important part of the economic scene.	美国跨国公司和其他外国企业也是中国经济图景中的重要部分。


So the five-year plan is no longer a detailed blueprint for industrial expansion; rather, it provides a picture of what the Chinese leadership hopes will be achieved under the government’s general guidance.	因此，五年规划已不再是工业扩张的详细蓝图； 相反，它说明了中国领导层希望在政府总体指导下实现什么目标。


The aim is to improve the overall standard of living – achieving moderately strong growth, raising the share of consumption in GDP, and improving air and water quality – through a combination of Western-style monetary and fiscal policies, state-financed infrastructure development, and changes in environmental and other regulations.	其目的是改善总体生活水平——实现略强的增长，提高消费占GDP之比，并改善空气和水质量——其手段是西方式货币和财政政策、国家融资的基础设施开发以及环境和其他监管改革相结合。


One of the key goals was set back in 2010: doubling real GDP and real personal incomes by 2020.	关键目标之一在2010年便已制定完成：到2020年实现真实GDP和真实个人收入翻一番。


The government now officially estimates that achieving this target will require average annual GDP growth of 6.5% over the next five years.	目前，政府官方测算实现这一目标需要GDP在未来五年平均每年增长6. 5%。


Given that China is still a relatively poor country, with per capita GDP only about 25% of the level in the United States, maintaining such a rapid pace of growth certainly is not impossible.	中国仍是一个相对较贫困的国家，人均GDP只有美国的25%左右，因此维持这一高速增长显然并非不可能。


But many observers are skeptical about China’s official GDP data and dubious of its ability to sustain 6.5% growth.	但许多观察者质疑中国的官方GDP数据，怀疑其是否有能力维持6. 5%的增长。


That skepticism reflects a variety of recent news indicating weak output in parts of the Chinese economy – for example, headlines about reduced industrial production, declines in manufacturing exports, and shutdowns in particular industries.	这一怀疑情绪体现在最近的一系列新闻中：中国经济许多部门产出疲软。 比如，媒体报道了工业产量下降、制造业出口降低、个别产业的倒闭情况等。


Although I cannot claim to be an expert on Chinese economic statistics, I think these headlines are a natural but misleading consequence of the authorities’ intentional effort to shift China’s economic structure away from industrial expansion and exports toward greater reliance on services and household consumption.	我不敢自称是中国经济统计数据的专家，但我认为这些报道是当局有意识地试图将中国经济结构从经济扩张和出口转变为更多 依靠服务和家庭消费的自然结果，但这一结果具有误导性。


Chinese economic experts say that the output of the service sector is growing fast enough to offset growth in industrial output of 5% or even less, thereby achieving the current overall growth rate of about 7%.	中国经济专家说，服务部门产出增速足以抵消工业产出增长只有5%甚至以下带来的影响，从而维持当前7%左右的总体经济增长率。


But even if annual growth really is now at about 7%, achieving a 6.5% rate for the next five years will be a challenge, for at least four reasons.	但即使目前年增长率真的在7%左右，实现未来五年每年6. 5%的增长率也是一项挑战，原因至少有四。


For starters, China’s shift from heavy industry to services implies less output per worker and less control by the central government.	首先，中国从重工业向服务业的专心意味着每工人产出的下降和中央政府控制的减弱。


At the same time, the environmental policies that are urgently needed to improve air and water quality absorb resources and impede growth.	与此同时，改善空气和水质量所急需的环境政策也需要吸收资源、妨碍增长。


And President Xi Jinping’s crackdown on corruption has had the side effect of delaying decision-making and inhibiting new projects.	中国国家主席习近平的反腐运动也存在推迟决策、抑制新项目的副作用。


Finally, and perhaps most important, the population of working-age individuals is no longer growing, a result of the 35-year-long policy of restricting most families to no more than one child.	最后，也许也是最重要的是，拜35年计划生育政策所赐，工作适龄人口不再增长。


Although the government recently replaced the one-child limit with a two-child limit, it will be nearly two decades before that change can increase the size of the working-age population.	尽管政府最近用二胎政策取代了一胎政策，但至少要近二十年才能增加工作适龄人口。


Until then, increasing the growth rate of the effective labor force requires shifting workers from low-productivity employment in agriculture to the urban labor force.	在此之前，增加有效劳动力的增长率要求工人从低生产率的农业岗位转移到城镇劳动岗位。


The Chinese government is therefore considering several policies to increase the pace of urbanization, including the creation of several new large cities to accommodate some of the 600 million individuals who still live in rural China.	因此，中国政府正在考虑用多种政策加快城市化速度，包括建设多个能容纳6亿农村人口的新大城市。


Similarly, the government will phase out the hukou system of residency permits that now prevents migrants to the cities from obtaining full health care and education benefits.	类似地，政府将取消目前阻止城市农民工无法获得完整的医疗和教育福利的户口制度。


A third policy change aimed at promoting urbanization will be to allow Chinese farmers to sell their land rights at realistic market prices, thereby increasing their incentive to cash out and move.	旨在促进城市化的第三个政策是允许中国农民以真正的市场价格出售地权，从而提高他们变现并移民的激励。


And the introduction of a Western-style rental market will allow families without substantial cash or parental support to move to cities (where families currently must purchase their apartments).	引入西方式的租市场能够让囊中羞涩或无法获得父母亲支持的家庭移民到城市中（目前这样的家庭必须买房）。


Not all of these policies have to succeed in order to keep the urban labor force expanding in the next five years.	要维持未来五年城镇劳动力扩张，这些政策不必都取得成功。


If enough of them succeed well enough, 6.5% growth over the next few years might not be out of reach.	只要足够的政策取得成功，实现未来五年每年6. 5%的增长率就不是梦想。


China also has a variety of short-run problems.	中国也存在诸多短期问题。


There is excess capacity in some heavy industries and in residential real-estate markets in some second- and third-tier cities.	一些重工业和一些二三线城市的住房市场存在产能过剩。


Local governments have significant debts that were incurred at the request of the central government in 2007 and 2008 in order to avoid a serious economic downturn.	应2007年和2008年中央政府为避免严重经济衰退的要求，地方政府债务高企。


And there is a large volume of bad loans in some state-owned banks and in the shadow banking system.	一些国有银行和影子银行系统存在巨量不良贷款。


Fortunately, the authorities recognize these problems and have strategies – and, more important, the resources – to deal with them.	幸运的是，当局认识到这些问题，并提出了处理这些问题的战略——以及更重要的，处理这些问题的资源。


China’s economy will not grow as strongly over the next five years as it did in past decades.	未来五年，中国经济无法保持过去几十年那样的高增长。


But if the goals set out in the 13th Five-Year Plan are realized, the Chinese people can look forward to a period of rising consumer spending and an improving standard of living.	但如果十三五规划中提出的目标得以实现，中国人民可以期待迎来一个消费支出增长、生活水平提高的时期。


China’s Slowing New Normal	中国的减速新常态


MILAN – The world’s two largest economies, the United States and China, seem to be enduring secular slowdowns.	米兰—世界最大的两个经济体——美国和中国似乎再忍受长期减速。


But there remains considerable uncertainty about their growth trajectory, with significant implications for asset prices, risk, and economic policy.	但它们的增长轨迹仍存在相当大的不确定性，可能给资产价格、风险和经济政策造成重大影响。


The US seems to be settling into annual real (inflation-adjusted) growth rates of around 2%, though whether this is at or below the economy’s potential remains a source of heated debate.	美国的年实际（经通胀调整的）增长率大概在2%左右，尽管这一水平是低于还是等于经济潜力仍有待争论。


Meanwhile, China seems to be headed for the 6-7% growth rate that the government pinpointed last year as the economy’s “new normal.”	与此同时，中国进入了增长率6—7%的时代，政府在去年准确地指出这是中国“新常态”。


Some observers agree that such a rate can be sustained for the next decade or so, provided that the government implements a comprehensive set of reforms in the coming few years.	一些观察者认为这一增长率可以贯穿未来十年，如果未来几年政府实施全面改革的话。


Others, however, expect China’s GDP growth to continue to trend downward, with the possibility of a hard landing.	但是，其他人认为中国ＧＤＰ将继续下行，并且可能出现硬着陆。


There is certainly cause for concern.	担忧其来有自。


Slow and uncertain growth in Europe – a major trading partner for both the US and China – is creating headwinds for the US and China.	欧洲的增长缓慢而不确定——而它是美国和中国的主要贸易伙伴——这给美国和中国带来了不利影响。


Moreover, the US and China – indeed, the entire global economy – are suffering from weak aggregate demand, which is creating deflationary pressures.	此外，美国和中国——事实上，是整个全球经济——正在受困于总需求疲软问题，总需求疲软正在造成通缩压力。


As central banks attempt to combat these pressures by lowering interest rates, they are inadvertently causing releveraging (an unsustainable growth pattern), elevated asset prices (with some risk of a downward correction, given slow growth), and devaluations (which merely move demand around the global economy, without increasing it).	央行试图通过降低利率抵抗这一压力，但这也在不经意间导致了杠杆率重新上升（一种不可持续的增长模式）、资产价格上涨（在低增长环境下，这意味着下跌修正风险）和贬值（这只能让全球经济需求有所移动，而不能增加需求）。


For China, which to some extent still depends on external markets to drive economic growth, this environment is particularly challenging – especially as currency depreciation in Europe and Japan erode export demand further.	从某种程度上说，中国仍依赖外部市场驱动经济增长，因此，这一环境尤其不利——特别是欧洲和日本货币贬值进一步影响了出口需求。


Even without the crisis in major external markets, however, a large and complex middle-income economy like China’s could not realistically expect growth rates above 6-7%.	但是，即使主要外部市场不发生危机，像中国这样的又庞大又复杂的中等收入经济体期望获得６—７％以上的增长率也是不现实的。


Yet, in the aftermath of the global economic crisis, China insisted on maintaining extremely high growth rates of 9% for two years, by relying on fiscal stimulus, huge liquidity injections, and a temporary halt in the renminbi’s appreciation.	但是，全球经济危机后，中国仍保持了两年9%的超高增长率，这主要是依靠财政刺激、巨量流动性注入和人民币暂停升值实现的。


Had the government signaled the “new normal” earlier, expectations would have been conditioned differently.	如果政府早点暗示“新常态”，期望就会有所不同。


This would have discouraged undue investment in some sectors, reduced non-performing loans, and contained excessive leverage in the corporate sector, while avoiding the mispricing of commodities.	一些部门的过度投资将得到遏制，不良贷款将有所减少，公司部门杠杆过高的情况将有所遏制，大宗商品也将避免定价错误。


Growth would still have slowed, but with far less risk.	增长仍有可能下降，但风险要小得多。


In the current situation, however, China faces serious challenges.	但是，在当前局面下，中国面临严重挑战。


Given weak growth in external demand and an already-large market share for many goods, China cannot count on export growth to sustain economic performance in the short run.	由于外部需求增长疲软，并且许多商品已经占有大量市场份额，因此中国无法依靠出口增长维持短期经济表现。


And, though support for infrastructure investment by China’s trading partners – especially through the “one belt, one road” policy – may help to strengthen external markets in the longer term, this is no substitute for domestic aggregate demand.	此外，尽管支持贸易伙伴的基础设施投资——特别是通过“一带一路”政策——或许有助于增强长期外部市场，但这无法代替国内总需求。


Investment can sustainably drive growth only up to the point when returns decline dramatically.	当投资回报率大幅下降时，投资便无法再持续地推动增长。


In the case of public-sector investment, that means that the present value of the increment to the future GDP path (using a social discount rate) is greater than the investment itself.	在公共部门投资方面，转折点发生在未来GDP路径增量的现值（用社会贴现率计算）大于投资本身时。


The good news is that growing discipline seems to be pushing out low-return investment.	好消息是成长部门似乎正在挤出低回报投资。


And there is every reason to believe that investment will remain high as the economy’s capital base expands.	有理由相信，随着经济资本基础的扩大，投资仍将保持高水平。


But, in order to boost demand, China will also need increased household consumption and improved delivery of higher-value services.	但是，为了刺激需求，中国还需要增加家庭消费、改善高价值服务。


Recent data suggest that, notwithstanding recent wage increases, consumption amounts to only about 35% of GDP.	最新数据表明，尽管最近工资有所增加，消费占GDP之比仍只有35%。


With a high household savings rate of around 30% of disposable income, per capita disposable income amounts to roughly half of per capita GDP.	家庭储蓄率高达可支配收入的30%左右，人均可支配收入大约只有人均GDP的一半。


Expanded social-security programs and a richer menu of saving and investment options could go a long way toward reducing precautionary saving and boosting consumption.	扩大社会安全网、增加储蓄和投资选择大大有利于降低预防性储蓄和刺激消费。


But what is really needed is a shift in the distribution of income toward households.	但真正需要的是改变收入分配格局，使之向家庭倾斜。


Without a concerted effort to increase households’ share of total income and raise consumption’s share of aggregate demand, growth of consumer products and services on the supply side will remain inadequate.	如果不有序增加家庭在总收入中的比重、提高消费占总需求的比重，供给端消费品和服务的增长将继续不足。


Given that services are a significant source of incremental employment, their expansion, in particular, would help to sustain inclusive growth.	由于��务业是就业增量的重要源泉，因此该行业的扩张对于保持包容性增长特别有利。


Another key challenge concerns China’s slumping property sector, in which construction and prices dropped rapidly last year.	另一大关键挑战是房地产部门衰退。 去年，房地产建设和价格均大幅下降。


If highly leveraged developers are under stress, they could produce non-performing loans – and thus considerable risk – in both the traditional and shadow banking sectors.	如果高杠杆开发商陷入压力，传统和影子银行部门都可能出现不良贷款——从而发生巨大风险。


Fortunately, Chinese households’ relatively low leverage means that the kind of balance-sheet damage that occurred in some advanced countries during the crisis, leading to a huge drop in demand, is unlikely, even if real-estate prices continue to decline.	幸运的是，中国家庭杠杆率相对较低，这意味着危机期间一些发达国家所发生的、导致需求暴降的资产负债表损失不太可能在中国出现，即使房地产价格继续下跌也是如此。


It also means that there remains some space for expanding consumer credit to boost demand.	这也意味着存在一些扩张消费信用以刺激需求的空间。


That is not the only source of hope.	其他方面也大有希望。


Wages are rising, deposit insurance will be introduced, and deposit rates are being liberalized.	工资正在增加，存款保险即将引入，存款利率也正在自由化。


Internet investment vehicles are growing.	互联网投资企业正在成长。


New businesses in the services sector – 3.6 million of which were started just last year – are generating incremental employment, thanks partly to a new streamlined licensing framework.	新民营企业——去年一年就有360万家新企业开张——正在产生增量就业，这部分要归因于许可制度新流程。


And online platforms are facilitating increased consumption, while expanding market access and financing for smaller businesses.	在线平台也有利于增加消费，同时也扩大了小企业的市场接触面和融资面。


China’s leaders should aim to accelerate and build upon these trends, rather than pursuing additional fiscal and monetary stimulus.	中国领导人应该把目标放在加快和构建这些趋势上，而不是采取更多的财政和货币刺激。


Public investment is high enough; expanding it now would shift the composition of aggregate demand in the wrong direction.	公共投资已足够高； 现在继续扩大将把总需求组成引向错误的方向。


And, with the corporate sector already overleveraged, a broad-based expansion of credit is not safe.	而在公司部门杠杆率已经过高的情况下，大面积扩张信用也不安全。


Any fiscal stimulus now should focus on improving public services, encouraging consumption, and increasing household income.	如今，任何财政刺激都必须集中在改善公共服务、鼓励消费和增加家庭收入上。


Accelerating the expansion of state-funded social security could bring down household savings over time.	假以时日，国家出资的社会保障的加速和扩张能够让家庭储蓄率下降。


More generally, China must deploy its large balance sheet to deliver income or benefits that expand what households view as safely consumable income.	更一般地说，中国必须用其庞大的资产负债表增加收入和福利，让家庭眼中的可安全消费的收入有所提高。


Given that private investment responds mainly to demand, such measures would likely reverse its current downward path.	私人投资主要根据需求情况波动，因此这些措施有助于扭转当前的下降趋势。


A further slowdown in China is a distinct possibility.	中国的进一步减速可能性不小。


China’s leaders must do what it takes to ensure that such a slowdown is not viewed as secular trend – a perception that could undermine the consumption and investment that the economy so badly needs.	中国领导人必须不惜一切代价确保这一减速不被视为长期趋势——否则，经济所急需的消费和投资可能遭到破坏。


China’s New Normal and America’s Old Habits	中国的新常态和美国的旧习惯


NEW HAVEN – China is generating a lot of confusion nowadays, both at home, where senior officials now tout the economy’s “new normal,” and abroad, exemplified by America’s embrace of Cold War-style tactics to contain China’s rise.	纽黑文—如今，中国正在制造大量困惑，国内国外皆然。 在国内，高级官员力推经济“新常态”；


On both counts, the disconnects are striking, adding a new dimension of risk to the impact of the “China factor” on a fragile world.	在国外，美国采取了冷战式策略遏制中国崛起。 不论在国内还是国外，分离（disconnect）的现象严重，这给“中国因素”对脆弱世界的影响增加了新的风险维度。


The official view in China is that its economy has already arrived in the Promised Land of the “new normal.”	中国的官方观点是其经济已经到达了“新常态”的迦南乐土。


Indeed, that was the theme of the just-concluded China Development Forum (CDF) – an important platform for debate among China’s senior officials and a broad cross-section of international participants that occurs immediately after the annual National People’s Congress.	事实上，刚刚结束的中国发展高层论坛（中国高级官员和各领域国际参与者共同讨论的重要平台，在每年的全国人大会议后立刻召开）便以此为主题。


Since the CDF’s inception in 2000, the Chinese government has used the event to signal its policy priorities.	自2000年中国发展高层论坛开始举办以来，中国政府就将该会议作为释放政策重点信号的场合。


In 2002, for example, the CDF focused on the impact of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization – a precursor to a spectacular surge of export-led growth.	比如，2002年的中国发展高层论坛主题是中国加入世贸组织的影响——出口导向型增长绽放的先声。


In 2009, the emphasis was on China’s aggressive post-crisis stimulus strategy.	2009年，论坛强调了中国果断的后危机刺激战略。


And last year’s event addressed implementation of the so-called Third Plenum reforms.	去年的论坛则以所谓的三中全会改革的实施为主题。


This suggests that China’s “new normal” will be the government’s top priority this year.	这表明中国的“新常态”将成为今年政府的重中之重。


But there remains considerable ambiguity as to what exactly the new normal entails – or whether it has even been achieved.	但对于这一新常态具体包含什么内容，或者如何实现，还有诸多不明之处。


In his keynote speech at the CDF, Zhang Gaoli, one of the seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee (the Chinese Communist Party’s highest decision-making body), declared that the senior leadership has rendered the “strategic judgment that China’s economy has entered the stage of the new normal.”	在中国发展高层论坛的重要讲话中，中共政治局常委张高丽表示，“中国经济发展进入新常……是战略判断。


Yet, at the CDF’s wrap-up session, Premier Li Keqiang suggested, a bit less decisively, that China is basically following the world economy in its transition to a new normal.	”但是，在论坛的总结会议上，李克强总理指出——与张高丽相比略少了一些果断——中国从根本上是在追随世界经济向新常态的转变。


In short, China’s government is confusing a path with the final destination – a point that I stressed in my remarks to the CDF, in which I argued that China is in the early stages of rebalancing its economy toward services and consumption.	简言之，中国政府将路径与最终目的混淆了起来——我在我对中国发展高层论坛的评论中强调过这一点。 我在评论中指出，中国正处在经济向服务和消费再平衡的早期阶段。


In fact, China is far from settling in to a new normal.	事实上，中国距离进入新常态还相当遥远。


The best way to measure how far China still has to go is to consider the development of its services sector – the infrastructure of consumer demand in an economy.	中国还有多长的路要走，最好的衡量方法是考虑其服务业的发展情况。 服务业是经济中消费需求的基础设施。


The good news is that services are now growing faster than any other sector, having reached 48% of GDP in 2014 (thus surpassing the end-2015 target of 47% well ahead of schedule).	好消息是如今服务业比其他所有产业发展都要快，2014年占GDP之比已达48% （大大提前地超过2015年底占比47%的目标）。


The tough news is that this remains significantly lower than the 60-65% share typical of a more “normal” economy.	坏消息是这一比例仍远低于更加“常态”的经济的典型比例60-65% 。


Given this, it is worrying that China’s leaders believe that the new normal is already at hand.	据此，中国领导人认为新常态已近在眼前令人担忧。


The notion that this critical transition has occurred risks generating complacency at a time when China should be focused on the wrenching, but essential, process of structural adjustment – one that will take at least another decade to complete.	这一关键转变已经发生，这样的概念有可能形成自满情绪，而目前中国应该专注于痛苦但关键的结构调整过程——这一过程至少还需要十年才能完成。


Continuing the shift to a services-led growth model is important for a number of reasons.	继续向服务拉动增长模式转变很重要，原因不一而足。


With services in China employing 30% more workers per unit of output than manufacturing and construction, the sector’s expansion will help to preserve social stability, even as economic growth slows to 7%.	在中国，服务业单位产出就业量比制造业和建筑业多30%，扩张服务业有助于保持社会稳定，即使经济增长放缓至7%。


Observers in the West, focused largely on the slowdown of headline GDP growth, continue to miss this key point.	西方的观察者大多将注意力集中在标题GDP增长的放缓上，一直没有注意到这个关键点。


Moreover, because the services sector also requires fewer commodities and less energy, this transition will help China address its serious environmental problems.	此外，由于服务业对大宗商品和能源的需要较低，因此这一转型有助于中国解决严重的环境问题。


In the meantime, China faces another, equally daunting challenge: the United States’ growing determination to contain its growing influence.	与此同时，中国面临着另一个同样艰巨的挑战：美国日益决心遏制中国影响力的增加。


At this year’s CDF, tensions between the hegemon and the rising power were widely discussed, both in the formal sessions and on the sidelines.	在今年的中国发展高层论坛上，现有霸权和崛起力量之间的紧张被广泛讨论，在正式环节和场边讨论中都是如此。


Three developments were especially noteworthy: US resistance to China’s efforts to establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank – a stance now rejected by most of America’s closest allies; President Barack Obama’s signature trade initiative, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which excludes China; and yet another effort by the US Senate to enact legislation on currency manipulation that takes dead aim at China.	三大发展趋势尤其值得注意：美国阻挠中国成立亚洲基础设施投资银行——这一立场已遭到美国大部分最紧密盟友的拒绝； 奥巴马总统的招牌贸易措施——排除中国的跨太平洋合作伙伴（Trans-Pacific Partnership）；


Combined with ongoing disputes over cyber security and territorial claims in the East and South China Seas – not to mention questions about America’s geostrategic “pivot” toward Asia – these issues have chilled the Sino-American relationship.	以及美国参议院再一次针对中国提出货币操纵立法。 再加上网络安全和东海和南海领土主张等问题上的���纷——更不用说美国战略性回归亚洲“支点”的问题了——这些问题大大不利于中美关系。


It fell to Henry Kissinger, who was present at the dawn of the modern US-China relationship, to put it all into context.	在现代中美关系建立初期就活跃在舞台上的亨利·基辛格对此进行了梳理。


At the CDF, he stressed how different the situation is now, compared to 1972, when he and then-President Richard Nixon first met with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai.	在中国发展高层论坛上，他强调了当前局面与1972年他与时任总统尼克松首次与毛泽东和周恩来会面时的不同。


Unlike the immediate military threats back then, today’s challenges – such as climate change, cyber security, and global health – can be addressed only through collaborative strategic engagement.	与当时紧迫的军事威胁不同，今天的挑战——如气候变化、网络安全和全球卫生——都可以仅仅依靠合作性战略参与解决。


The imperative to cooperate is an inevitable outgrowth of globalization.	合作的紧迫性是全球化的不可避免的结果。


As Kissinger emphasized, the Middle Kingdom of China’s dynastic era knew nothing of the Roman Empire, and vice versa.	基辛格强调，封建时代的中国对罗马帝国一无所知，反之亦然。


In today’s world, however, no great power can afford to operate in a vacuum.	但是，在当今世界，没有哪个大国能够在真空中运行。


They receive instantaneous feedback from one another – especially on shared challenges – whether they like it or not.	大国之间的彼此反馈几乎是瞬时的，不管它们喜不喜欢这样——特别是在共同挑战方面。


In a sense, it is no surprise that the US is bristling over China’s ascendance.	从某种程度上说，中国取得优势让美国气急败坏并不令人惊奇。


After all, dominant powers have always struggled to cope with rising ones.	毕竟，主宰力量总是要与崛起力量周旋。


Nonetheless, China, burdened by 150 years of perceived humiliation by the West, does not take kindly to that reaction.	尽管如此，150年来一直对西方怀有屈辱感的中国对美国的反应略欠淡定。


As China confronts the challenges of its economy’s shift to a new normal, it will need to find common ground with the US.	中国面临着经济向新常态转变的挑战，它需要找到与美国的共同点。


And America will need to work to deepen its understanding of China’s transition.	美国也需要加深对中国转型的认识。


Both countries will have to show leadership, vision, and openness to collaborative engagement.	两国都需要表现出领导力、愿景和对合作参与的开放态度。


Sadly, there was little sign of that at this year’s CDF.	不幸的是，在今年的中国发展高层论坛上，我们看不到这样的信号。


Navigating China’s New Silk Road	中国新丝绸之路导航


BEIJING – Since its introduction by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, the “one belt, one road” initiative – an ambitious plan to revitalize the ancient Silk Road overland and maritime trade routes linking East and West – has attracted considerable attention.	北京—2013年，中国国家主席习近平主席提出了“一带一路”战略，这是一个复兴连接东西方的陆上和海上丝绸之路的宏大计划。 一带一路战略引起了广泛的关注。


And for good reason: The project, which involves more than 60 countries and quite a few international organizations, implies unprecedented opportunities – and challenges.	理由很充分：该战略包括了60多个国家和众多国际组织，这意味着前所未有的机会——还有挑战。


The original Silk Road, established more than 2,000 years ago, was a critical network of trade routes that promoted economic, political, and cultural exchange among Asia, Africa, and Europe.	古丝绸之路形成于2,000多年前，它是一条重要的贸易路线网络，促进了亚洲、非洲、欧洲之间的经济、政治和文化交流。


China’s new “Silk Road Economic Belt” and “Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road” will do the same, with newly built or upgraded infrastructure facilitating the flow of trade, investment, culture, and ideas – and thus supporting shared economic growth.	中国的新“丝绸之路经济带”和“二十一世纪海上丝绸之路”也是如此，它们将建造或升级基础设施，为跨境贸易、投资及文化和思想流动提供便利，从而支持分享经济增长。


From China’s perspective, the logic behind the strategy is clear.	从中国的角度讲，一带一路战略背后的逻辑是清晰的。


With its sources of GDP growth coming under increasing strain, China must continue to make progress in opening up the economy.	其GDP传统的增长源泉日益窘迫，必须继续深化改革、加强开放经济的建设。


That means building mutually beneficial relationships with neighboring countries, which can benefit by taking over some of China’s lower-value-added activities.	这意味着要进一步拓展与邻国之间的互利共赢的关系。 周边国家可以接纳一些中国低增加值活动而从中获益。


That promises to boost their own growth while creating space for the Chinese economy to move up the value chain, where productivity and wages – important determinants of consumption – are higher.	这有利于刺激它们自身增长，同时为中国经济创造空间，向生产率和工资——消费的重要决定因素——更高的价值链上游迈进。


China has already laid the groundwork for these relationships, strengthening economic cooperation and trade with countries along the “belt and road.”	中国已经为这样的关系打好了基础，强化与“一带一路”沿线国家的贸易合作。


It has also spearheaded the creation of multilateral institutions – notably, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank – to support the investment projects.	中国还牵头成立了多家多边机构——特别是亚洲基础设施投资银行——以支持投资项目。


China’s comparative advantages, including a global financial center in Hong Kong and a regional financial center in Shanghai, reinforce its leadership role.	中国的比较优势，包括全球金融中心香港和地区金融中心上海，增强了它的领导作用。


Add to that the recent surge in fast-growing, innovative companies – such as Huawei, Alibaba, and Wanda – and China is well placed to implement Xi’s ambitious vision.	此外，高速增长的创新公司——如华为、阿里巴巴和万达等——层出不穷，这让中国很有希望落实习近平的宏达愿景。


But it will not be smooth sailing.	但前方绝非坦途。


Like any cross-border initiative, the “one belt, one road” initiative will require wise diplomacy to manage relationships with diverse countries and careful planning to scale up effectively.	和一切跨国战略一样，“一带一路”战略需要明智的外交管理与各种不同国家的关系，仔细进行有效规模扩张规划。


Each country along the “belt and road” faces a unique combination of risks and challenges.	“一带一路”沿线各国都存在独特的风险与挑战组合。


Many face macroeconomic risks, owing to exchange-rate volatility, large debt burdens, and non-diversified, unsustainable economic structures.	拜汇率波动、沉重的债务负担和多样化程度欠缺、不可持续的经济结构所赐，许多国家面临宏观经济风险。


On the microeconomic level, risks include, for example, weak banking sectors.	微观经济层面的风险也不少，比如资本市场和银行业初级发展阶段中不可避免的各种缺陷。


Governance failures, ranging from corruption to inefficient implementation of reforms, also pose a serious challenge, as do social and political tensions (and, in some areas, the threat of terrorism).	治理失败——如腐败和改革实施的低效率——也是一个严峻挑战，此外还有政治紧张（一些地区还面临恐怖主义威胁）。


And one must not forget the ever-present risk of natural disasters, exacerbated by climate change.	我们也不能忘了，在气候变化的刺激下，自然灾害风险愈演愈烈。


Then there are the complex and varied laws, rules, and regulations shaping the business environment in each country.	还有复杂多样的法律、规则和监管，它们影响着各国的营商环境。


Of course, it is virtually impossible for Chinese enterprises to understand fully each environment before entering it.	当然，中国企业不可能在进入之前充分了解所有国家的环境。


But any violation could put a company’s entire operation and investment at risk.	但任何违规行为都可能导致公司全部经营和投资面临风险。


The challenges may be complex, but the formula for navigating them is simple.	挑战也许十分复杂，但导航秘诀十分简单。


First and foremost, there can be no corruption, which would not only hurt the “one belt, one road” initiative, but would also undermine China’s ability to pursue other cross-border initiatives in the future.	首先也是最重要的，决不能出现腐败，腐败不但会伤害“一带一路”战略，也会破坏未来中国追求其他跨国战略的能力。


Second, no infrastructure project should be pursued without careful consideration of both its financial costs and benefits and its ecological impact, such as air pollution and destruction of ecosystems.	其次，所有基础设施项目都必须仔细考虑财务成本和收益以及生态影响，如空气污染和生态系统破坏。


Finally, all projects must be transparent and include effective checks and balances.	最后所有项目都必须透明并具备有效制约与平衡。


To reinforce this approach, the provision of financing for “belt and road” projects must adhere strictly to market rules.	要想加强这一方针，“一带一路”项目在建设和融资合同条款约定上必须严格遵守市场规则。


Given the scale of most investments, project finance – which is based on projected cash flows, rather than its sponsors’ balance sheets – will prove highly useful, as will effective risk-sharing mechanisms.	大部分项目的投资规模宏大，因此国际上通行的项目融资方法会有很大的帮助——基于预期现金流而不是出资者的资产负债表——和有效的风险共担机制将起到很大的作用。


Furthermore, sponsors should look beyond a project’s construction to the achievement of its long-term objectives, such as ensuring profitability and managing its lasting impact on the local community and the environment.	此外，出资者应该让目光超越项目的建设，放在实现项目的长期目标上，如确保盈利和管理对本地社区和环境的持续影响。


Consultants, lawyers, auditors, NGOs, and other entities with international experience can play a vital role in all of these efforts.	拥有国际经验的顾问、律师、审计师、非政府机构和其他实体在所有这些方面都可以起到关键作用。


There are also practical steps that can be taken to mitigate specific risks.	也可以采取务实步骤减轻具体风险。


For example, to minimize the risks associated with operating in an unfamiliar regulatory and legislative environment, businesses should establish links in advance with a local entity to guide their activities.	比如，要尽量减轻在不熟悉的监管和法律环境中经营的风险，企业应该事先建立好与当地各方面利益相关者的联系，以有效进行在当地的建设、经营管理和社会活动。


China, as the leading promoter of the “one belt, one road” initiative, must take steps to ensure that businesses act responsibly.	中国作为“一带一路”战略的主要推进方，必须采取措施确保企业负责任地行动。


The central government will have to regulate and coordinate sub-national governments effectively, while working to ensure that competition is fair and constructive.	中央要自上而下，有效地指导和协调好各级政府和政府各部门之间的相关工作，去除工作中的盲目性，并致力于确保竞争具有公平性和建设性。


At the same time, China should implement a well-designed training program that provides officials at all levels of government and entrepreneurs with basic information about operating abroad.	与此同时，中国要认真实施精心设计的培训计划，为各层次的政府有关工作人员和企业家们提供了解海外经营基本信息和基本知识以及培训基本技能的机会。


And it should do more to spur the involvement of Hong Kong – which possesses major advantages in finance and logistics, information accessibility, talent recruitment, and implementation of the rule of law – in the initiative.	中国还应该加大力度刺激在金融和物流、信息获取、人才招聘和实施法治方面具备重大优势的香港参与“一带一路”战略。


Last but not the least, the central government needs to strengthen the guidance of crisis management and exit strategies.	最后，中央需要强化危机管理和退出战略指引。


Realizing the “one belt, one road” initiative will not be easy.	实现“一带一路”战略绝非易事。


But China has all of the tools it needs to succeed.	但中国具备了成功所需要的一切工具。


As long as it uses them in a way that is clean, green, and transparent, China and its neighbors will reap vast rewards.	只要以清晰、绿色、透明的方式使用这些工具，中国及其邻邦就能获得极大的收益。


China’s Pursuit of a New Economic Order	中国追求世界经济新秩序


SHANGHAI – Economists are increasingly divided over China’s economic future.	上海—经济学家对中国经济未来的看法日益分歧。


Optimists emphasize its capacity for learning and rapid accumulation of human capital.	乐观者强调中国的学习能力和快速积累人力资本的能力。


Pessimists focus on the rapid decline of its demographic dividend, its high debt-to-GDP ratio, the contraction of its export markets, and its industrial overcapacity.	悲观者关注中国人口红利的快速减少、高企的债务-GDP之比、出口市场的萎缩以及工业产能过剩。


But both groups neglect a more fundamental determinant of China’s economic prospects: the world order.	但这两派都忽略了一个更加基本的中国经济前景决定因素：世界秩序。


The question is simple: Can China sustain rapid GDP growth within the confines of the current global order, including its trade rules, or must the current US-dominated order change drastically to accommodate China’s continued economic rise?	问题很简单：中国可以在当前全球秩序（包括其贸易规则）的约束下维持告诉GDP增长吗？ 还是当前由美国主导的秩序必须做出彻底改变以适应中国经济的持续崛起？


The answer, however, remains unclear.	但答案仍不明朗。


One way that China is attempting to find out is by pushing to have the renminbi added to the basket of currencies that determine the value of the International Monetary Fund’s reserve asset, the Special Drawing Right (SDR).	中国寻找答案的一个办法是促使人民币加入决定国际货币基金组织（IMF）储备资产——特别提款权（SDR）价值的货币篮子中。


As it stands, that basket comprises the euro, the Japanese yen, the British pound, and the US dollar.	目前，这一货币篮子由欧元、日元、英镑和美元组成。


The SDR issue was the audience’s main concern when IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde spoke in Shanghai in April.	IMF总裁拉加德4月份在上海发表讲话时，SDR问题便已成为听众的主要关注点。


Her stance – that it is just a matter of time before the renminbi is added to the basket – garnered considerable media attention.	拉加德的立场——人民币加入SDR货币篮子只是时间问题——吸引了无数媒体关注。


(Regrettably, however, the media read too much into her statement.)	（但遗憾的是媒体对她的话解读过度了。 ）


Former US Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke faced the same question in Shanghai last month.	上个月，前美联储主席伯南克（Ben Bernanke）在上海也遇到了这个问题。


He was purposely vague in his response: the renminbi’s inclusion in the SDR would be a positive step, he said, but it could not be taken until China makes much more progress in reforming its financial sector and transforming its growth model.	他故意把话说得模棱两可：人民币纳入SDR是一个积极步骤，他说，但在此之前中国必须在改革金融业和转变增长模式上拿出更大进步。


The IMF is expected to vote on the renminbi’s inclusion in the SDR this October, at its regular five-year review of the SDR basket’s composition.	预计IMF将在今年10月SDR货币篮子成分的五年评估中投票表决人民币问题。


But even if, unlike in 2010, a majority votes to add the renminbi to the basket, the United States may exercise its veto power.	但即便结果与2010年不同，大部分人赞成人民币加入货币篮子，美国也有可能行使否决权。


Such an outcome would not be surprising, given that US opposition (though in Congress, not within the Obama administration) blocked reforms, agreed in 2010, to increase China’s voting power within the IMF.	这一结果不会令人奇怪，因为在2010年美国就曾扼杀（尽管是国会而非奥巴马政府反对）已经形成一致的增加中国在IMF投票权的改革。


Limited use of the SDR implies that adding the renminbi would be a largely symbolic move; but it would be a powerful symbol to the extent that it served as a kind of endorsement of the currency for global use.	SDR用途有限，这意味着加入人民币只不过是象征性的举动； 但这是一个强有力的象征，意味着认可人民币的全球用途。


Such an outcome would not only advance the renminbi’s internationalization; it would also provide insight into just how much room there is for China within the existing global economic order.	这一结果不但将推进人民币的国际化，也将让人们了解中国在现行全球经济秩序中还拥有多少空间。


So far, it seems that there is not enough.	从目前的情况看，空间已然不足。


In a 2011 book, the economist Arvind Subramanian projected that the renminbi would become a global reserve currency by the end of this decade, or early next decade, based on his observation that the lag between economic and currency dominance is shorter than traditionally believed.	经济学家阿尔文德·萨布拉曼尼安（Arvind Subramanian）在其2011年的著作中预测人民币将在这个十年之末或下个十年之初成为全球储备货币。 这一结论建立在他的一项观察的基础上：经济和货币主导地位的时滞要比传统观点更短。


Today, China is the world’s largest economy (based on purchasing power parity) and the largest participant in world trade, and its government has been actively promoting renminbi internationalization, such as through the relaxation of foreign-exchange regulations.	如今，中国已是世界第一大经济体（用购买力平价衡量）和第一大贸易国，中国政府一直在积极促进人民币国际化，比如通过放松外汇管制。


And yet the renminbi is used internationally much less than Subramanian’s model predicted.	但人民币的国际使用情况仍远远低于萨布拉曼尼安的模型的预测。


As a result, China remains subject to US monetary policy.	因此，中国仍将受美国货币政策制约。


If the Federal Reserve raises interest rates, China must follow suit to keep capital from flowing out, despite the negative impact of higher interest rates on domestic growth.	如果美联储提高利率，中国也必须跟进以防资本外流，即使提高利率会对国内增长产生消极影响。


Given the US dollar’s dominance in international transactions, Chinese companies investing abroad also face risks associated with exchange-rate fluctuations.	由于美元在国际交易中处于主导地位，中国公司的海外投资仍将面临汇率波动的相关风险。


In fact, over the last decade, international trade rules have created significant friction between China and many other countries, including the US.	事实上，在过去十年中，国际贸易规则在中国和包括美国在内的其他许多国家之间制造了巨大的摩擦。


Now, free-trade agreements are being negotiated – namely, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership – that will undermine the continued expansion of Chinese exports to the extent that they raise entry barriers for Chinese firms.	如今，不少自由贸易协定正在谈判中——即跨太平洋合作伙伴关系和跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系——它们将提高中国企业的进入壁垒，从而阻碍中国出口的继续扩张。


Clearly, China has faced major challenges within the existing global system as it tries to carve out a role befitting its economic might.	显然，试图获得与其经济实力相适应的角色的中国，在现行国际体系中面临着巨大的挑战。


That may explain why, with its “one belt, one road” initiative and its establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), China’s government is increasingly attempting to recast the world order – in particular, the monetary and trading systems – on its own terms.	这也许解释了为何中国政府要实施“一带一路”计划并成立亚洲基础设施投资银行（亚投行），以此不断尝试根据自身条件改写世界秩序——特别是货币和贸易体系。


The “one belt, one road” initiative aims to re-create the ancient overland and maritime Silk Roads that carried goods and ideas from Asia to Europe.	“一带一路”计划的目标是重建将亚洲商品和思想传播到欧洲的古代陆上和海上丝绸之路。


Given that the project will entail significant Chinese investment affecting some 50 countries, its appeal in the developing world is not difficult to fathom.	在这一工程中，中国将进行巨大的投资，影响50多个国家，其对发展中世界的吸引力不容小觑。


The AIIB, too, has proved appealing – and not just to developing countries.	亚投行也极具吸引力——并且不仅仅是对发展中国家。


In fact, 57 countries – including major powers like France, Germany, and the United Kingdom – have signed up as founding members, which may reflect a growing awareness of the US-dominated order’s diminishing returns.	事实上，57个国家——包括法国、德国和英国等主要大国——已经加入亚投行并成为创始成员国，这或许反映出越来越多的人认识到美国主导的秩序回报正在下降。


From China’s perspective, sustained domestic economic growth seems unlikely within the existing global system – a challenge that Japan and the other East Asian economies did not encounter during their economic rise.	从中国的角度讲，国内经济增长在现行全球体系中似乎难以为继——这是日本和其他东亚经济体在经济崛起过程中不曾遇到过的挑战。


Indeed, the only country that has encountered it is the US, when it replaced the UK as the world’s dominant economic and financial power before World War II; fortunately, that precedent is one of accommodation and a peaceful transition.	事实上，唯一一个遇到过这一挑战的国家正是美国——它在二战前取代英国成为世界最大的经济和金融力量； 幸运的是，这一先例是一个适应和和平过渡的先例。


To be sure, China still needs to undertake important domestic reforms, especially of the financial sector, in order to eliminate distortions in resource allocation and stem the economy’s slowdown.	平心而论，中国仍需要经历重要的国内改革，特别是金融业改革，以消除资源配置方面的扭曲和阻止经济减速。


But the refusal by China’s leaders to pursue export-boosting currency depreciation, even in the face of decelerating growth, suggests that they are willing to make the needed sacrifices to secure the renminbi’s international role and, with it, long-term economic growth and prosperity.	但中国领导人拒绝追求提振出口的货币贬值——哪怕需要面临增长减速的情况——这表明他们愿意做出必要的牺牲保证人民币的国际角色，同时保证长期经济增长和繁荣。


Whether or not the renminbi is added to the SDR basket this October, a gradual transformation of the global system to accommodate China seems all but inevitable.	不管人民币在10月是否被加入SDR货币篮子，世界体系的逐渐转型以适应中国的趋势是不可避免的。


China’s One-Child Calamity	中国的一胎之灾


CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA – The abolition of China’s 35-year-old one-child policy closes one of the darkest chapters in the country’s history.	克莱蒙特，加利福尼亚—中国放弃了维持了35年之久的一胎政策，结束了该国历史上最黑暗的一页之一。


In the late 1970s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), determined to boost economic growth, decided that population control was the answer.	20世纪70年代末，中国共产党（中共）决定要提振经济增长，认为人口控制是其中的关键。


Millions of abortions, sterilizations, and infanticides later, its chickens are coming home to roost.	随后便是数百万起流产、绝育和杀婴，中国的孩子也自食恶果。


In raw numbers, the one-child policy’s human toll has been even greater than that of Mao’s Great Leap Forward, which caused a famine that killed around 36 million people from 1959 to 1961.	从原始数字看，一胎政策的人道代价甚至比毛泽东的大跃进以及文化大革命还要大。 1959—1961年，大跃进造成的饥荒夺走大约3,600万人的生命。


And it exceeded that of the Cultural Revolution, in which large-scale political violence likely caused as many as another ten million deaths from 1966 to 1976.	而在文化大革命中，大规模政治暴力可能导致1966—1976年间一千万人死亡。


As for the one-child policy, data released by China’s health ministry in 2013 indicate that from 1971 to 2012, 336 million abortions – more than the entire US population – were carried out in registered facilities alone.	至于一胎政策，据中国卫生部门2013年公布的数据看，从1971—2012年，光是注册家庭就发生了3. 36亿起堕胎——比美国人口总数还要大。


(Though the one-child policy was not introduced until about 1979, other family-planning policies were already in place at the time.)	（一胎政策直到1979年左右开始实施，但当时其他计划生育政策已经存在。 ）


The National Health and Family Planning Commission, the government agency responsible for enforcing the one-child policy, reports an even higher figure: more than 13 million surgical abortions each year – a figure that does not include abortions induced by drugs or carried out in unregistered private clinics.	负责执行一胎政策的中国卫生和计划生育委员会报告的数字更大：每年有1,300万多起人工流产——这个数字不包括药物流产以及地下私人诊所实施的流产。


Of course, it is impossible to know precisely what share of those abortions can be attributed to enforcement of the one-child policy.	当然，无法确切知道这些流产中有多大比例可以归因于执行一胎政策。


But in, say, India, where abortion is legal and no comparable family-planning policy exists, the figure is significantly lower – though probably not as low as the 630,000 annual figure provided by the Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.	但在（比如）印度，流产是合法的，并且没有可比的计划生育政策，这一数字要显著更低——也许没有印度卫生和家庭福祉部所公布的每年630,000起那么低。


Indeed, it is probably closer to six million per year.	事实上，也许每年准确的数字接近六百万。


Although there is undoubtedly an economic disparity between India and China, their populations are roughly equal.	当然，印度和中国的经济状况千差万别，但他们的人口数量大致相当。


So it is reasonable to estimate that as many as half of China’s abortions – some 6.5 million registered surgical abortions, plus untold numbers of drug-induced or unregistered abortions, per year – are attributable to the one-child policy.	因此，一个合理的假设是，中国的堕胎中有多达一半——每年650万起注册在案的人工流产，以及未知数量的药物流产或未注册流产——可归因于一胎政策。


This implies that there were upwards of 200 million abortions over the policy’s 35 years.	这意味着在一胎政策执行的35年中发生了2亿以上的流产。


But forced abortions are only the beginning.	但强制流产只是开始。


Indeed, these figures – however shocking – do not capture the human suffering or the harsh economic consequences brought about by the one-child policy.	事实上，这些数字——不管如何令人震惊——并没有体现一胎政策所带来的人道灾难和严重的经济后果。


Media often reported stories of unspeakable brutality by local officials against pregnant women and families who violated the policy – a unique savagery captured in Ma Jian’s novel The Dark Road.	媒体常常报道地方官员以令人难以置信的残忍态度对待违反一胎政策的孕妇和家庭——马建的小说《黑暗之路》（The Dark Road）曾经描写过这种独一无二的野蛮。


In a much-publicized 2012 case, local officials in Shaanxi province forced a woman to undergo an abortion seven months into her pregnancy.	在2012年的一宗广为报道的案子中，陕西省地方官员迫使一位怀孕七个月的孕妇引产。


Beyond physical and emotional trauma, violators of the one-child policy – who are most often among the country’s poorest – face serious economic penalties.	除了身体和精神摧残，一胎政策的违反者——大多为中国最贫困人群——还面临严重的经济惩罚。


Provincial sampling suggests that the Chinese government collects about CN¥20 billion ($3 billion) per year in family-planning fines.	省级样本表明，中国政府每年的计划生育罚款规模高达200亿元。


And local officials in many localities explicitly threaten violators with other harsh punishments, including destruction of their houses and confiscation of their farm animals.	许多地方的官员赤裸裸地威胁违反者采取其他严厉惩罚，包括拆屋和没收农畜。


The one-child policy’s long-term demographic consequences have been devastating as well.	一胎政策的长期人口影响也是灾难性的。


According to official data, China’s old-age dependency ratio – the ratio of those aged 65 and up to working-age people (aged 15-64) – currently stands at 13%.	据官方数据，中国老龄赡养比——65岁及以上人群与工作年龄人口（15—64岁）之比——目前为13%。


As the one-child generation ages – adding some ten million retirees annually – this ratio will skyrocket, with the labor surplus that supported China’s economic miracle giving way to a severe shortage that depresses growth.	随着独生一代老龄化——每年将增加大约1,000万退休者——这一比例将会猛增，支持中国经济奇迹的劳动力剩余将变成遏制增长的严重短缺。


Equally problematic is China’s alarming gender imbalance.	同样大有问题的是中国令人警惕的性别失衡。


Families’ preference that their one child be male led to innumerable sex-selective abortions, as well as female infanticide and abandonment.	家庭希望唯一的孩子是男孩，这导致无数性别选择性堕胎以及杀害和抛弃女婴。


As of 2013, boys aged 0-24 outnumbered girls by 23 million, implying that more than 20 million young men will not be able to find marriage partners in the coming decades.	2013年，0—24岁男孩数量比女孩多2,300万，这意味着在未来几十年，超过2,000万年轻男性无法找到配偶。


The most sobering lesson from this tally of the one-child policy’s toll on China lies in the simple fact that the authorities were able to enforce it for so long.	一胎政策给中国造成的代价的最令人警醒的教训是一个简单事实：当局能够在如此长的时间里执行这一政策。


In fact, China is the only country in history where a government has actually succeeded in using coercion to limit its people’s reproductive choices.	事实上，中国是历史上唯一一个政府成功以强迫手段限制人民生育选择的国家。


The key is its unconstrained one-party regime, underpinned by a huge and powerful bureaucracy.	其中的关键就在于以庞大而强力的官僚体系为基础的不受约束的一党制度。


Outside observers often marvel at the CCP’s capacity to get things done – at least when those things are the construction of super-modern cities and a high-speed rail network.	外部观察者常常惊叹于中共办成事的能力——至少在建设超级现代都市和高铁网络上是如此。


Seldom do they note the disastrous consequences when the Party applies its power in stubborn pursuit of a brutal and destructive objective.	他们很少注意到当中共将其权力用在固执地追求野蛮和破坏性目标时所导致的灾难性后果。


Now is the time to recognize those consequences, particularly given that China’s leaders are not done limiting their citizens’ reproductive choices.	现在应该认识到这些后果了，特别是考虑到中国领导人并没有取消公民的生育选择限制。


On the contrary, they are simply moving from a one-child policy to a two-child policy.	相反，他们只是将一胎政策变成二胎政策。


Outsiders and Chinese alike must emphasize the senseless cruelty that such measures imply and work to ensure that they are never seen again – in China or anywhere else.	外部人士和中国人都必须强调这些政策意味着毫无必要的残忍对待，努力确保它们不再重现——不管是在中国还是其他地方。


China’s Online Financial Sector Comes of Age	中国的在线金融时代


BEIJING – Last month, China’s leaders revealed details of the 13th Five-Year Plan, which will guide the economy’s trajectory until 2020.	北京—上个月，中国领导人公布了十三五规划的细节。 十三五规划将引导中国经济在直到2020年的运行轨迹。


Gone are the directives to expand industrial production at a breakneck pace that characterized previous five-year plans.	过去的五年计划中迅速扩大工业产能的方向已经难觅其踪。


Now, the focus is on achieving sustainable long-term growth, underpinned by domestic consumption, a stronger services sector, entrepreneurship, and innovation.	如今，焦点转向了实现以国内消费、更强大的服务业、企业家精神和创新为基础的可持续长期增长。


The Internet – which already has more than 680 million active users in China – will play a key role in facilitating this shift.	中国的互联网已经超6. 8亿活跃互联网用户，将在促进这一转变中起到关键作用。


In particular, online peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, a streamlined approach to credit allocation, may hold the key to expanding and deepening China’s financial sector, enabling firms to grow and innovate, and bolstering domestic consumption.	特别是在线点对点（P2P）贷款——一种高效信用配置方法——也许是扩大和深化中国金融业的关键，它使企业得以成长和创新，也能刺激国内消费。


In online P2P lending, individual (and, lately, institutional) investors provide funds that can be lent out to individual borrowers, without involving a traditional financial intermediary.	在在线P2P贷款中，个人（以及越来越多的机构）投资者提供资金，这些资金可用于贷款给个人借款人，而不需要传统金融中介的参与。


Loans can range from CN¥100 ($16) to CN¥1 million, and target small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs), as well as individual borrowers, that currently struggle to access credit through traditional institutions.	贷款规模从100元到100万元不等，贷款目标是目前难以通过传统机构获得信用的中小企业以及个人借款人。


Over the last three years, China’s P2P lending sector has been growing annually at an astounding average rate of 245%, with its total value reaching CN¥253 billion last year.	在过去三年中，中国的P2P贷款业年均增长幅度高达245%，去年总值已达到2. 530亿元。


China now has more than 2,000 registered active P2P loan platforms, up from just 50 four years ago.	目前中国有超2,000家注册在案的活跃P2P贷款平台，而四年前只有50家。


Even so, P2P lending still accounts for just a small fraction of overall lending in China.	即便如此，P2P贷款占中国总贷款量的比例依然还小。


Last year, total loans issued through peer-to-peer networks were equivalent to just 1.5% of the CN¥15.1 trillion in consumer loans issued by Chinese banks.	去年，通过点对点网络发行的贷款总额只有中国银行业15. 1万亿消费贷款规模的1.


Clearly, there is plenty more room for growth.	5%。 显然，P2P贷款还有巨大的增长空间。


This growth must, however, be carefully managed.	但是，行业的增长必须小心管理。


The very factors that enable online P2P platforms to deliver loans quickly and broadly – that is, their reliance on consumer credit-ratings databases and eschewal of collateral or guarantees – can generate risks, as they leave important questions about borrowers unanswered.	让P2P平台能够迅速而广泛地提供贷款的因素——依靠消费者信用评级数据库、免除抵押或担保——可能带来风险，因为关于借款人的许多问题得不到回答。


And, in fact, the risks have already begun to materialize.	而事实上，这些风险已开始暴露。


According to the P2P lending database Wangdaizhijia, from 2011 to mid-2015, more than one-third of China’s registered platforms experienced serious problems.	据P2P贷款数据库网贷之家的数据，从2011年到2015年年中，中国超过三分之一的注册平台都出现了严重问题。


For example, investors reported difficulties withdrawing funds on more than 300 platforms, and platform operators absconded with investors’ money on over 300 more.	比如，300多家平台的投资者报告难以抽回资金，平台经营者携300多位投资者的资金潜逃。


For the industry as a whole, high-quality, easily accessible data remains difficult to come by.	从整个行业看，质量高、获取容易的数据依然难觅踪影。


Fortunately, however, these shortcomings can be overcome.	但是，幸运的是，这些短处是可以克服的。


Regulators and Internet financiers can look to traditional bank lending to individuals and SMEs as they devise new measures to minimize risk and lock up bottom lines in the P2P lending sector.	监管者和互联网金融企业可以效仿传统银行给个人和中小企业贷款的方法，设计新措施尽量减小风险，锁定P2P贷款业的利润。


In a study of loan data from five Chinese banks, a team of researchers and I identified five factors that influence the emergence of non-performing SME and consumer loans.	我和一个研究团队对五家中国银行贷款数据的研究表明，有五个因素影响了不良中小企业和消费者贷款的出现。


Some were fairly obvious: Larger loans and higher leverage ratios contribute to higher rates of NPLs.	一些因素显而易见：大贷款额和高杠杆率导致了不良贷款率的升高。


Others – the existence of guarantees or collateral, lending to small companies (instead of the companies’ owners), and lending to borrowers who are geographically farther away – were less so.	其他因素，例如有担保或抵押、贷款给小公司（而不是公司所有人）以及贷款给距离遥远的人，则不那么显而易见。


The lessons are clear: Institutions should aim to issue a higher number of smaller loans to local individuals, while depending less on guarantees.	教训是明确的：机构应着眼于向本地个人发放更大数量的小额贷款，并减少对担保的依赖。


To aid in this process, lending platforms need better channels for sharing credit and leveraging data, and they must build up identity verification systems.	为了协助这一过程，贷款平台需要更好的信用和杠杆数据共享，并且必须建立身份确认系统。


That will require coordination between the government and the private sector, as well as dedicated networks for sharing information.	这需要政府与私人部门的协作，以及专用的信息共享网络。


Current regulations will have to be improved in many areas as well.	现有监管也许多需要改进的地方。


For example, all online P2P lending platforms, regardless of the scope of their business, should be required to register with regulators.	比如，所有在线P2P贷款平台，不论其业务范围如何，都应该要求在监管机构注册。


They should also receive training, provided by a professional association for the sector, aimed at preventing money laundering and the financing of terrorism.	它们还应该接受由专业行业协会提供的培训，以防止洗钱和资助恐怖主义。


Overall, however, a thicket of regulations is unnecessary and should be avoided, as the systemic risks that P2P lending poses to the wider economy are small.	但是总体而言，过度监管没有必要，而应该避免的，因为P2P贷款给总体经济带来的系统性风险很小。


Instead, regulators should adopt a flexible approach.	相反，监管者应该采取灵活的方针。


A tiered licensing system, for example, would work best to address the varying degrees of financial complexity and risk among platforms.	比如，分级许可系统能够最好地解决贷款平台金融复杂度和风险多样化的问题。


Under this scenario, platforms that function as information intermediaries between borrowers and lenders, but are not directly involved in loan transactions, would be free from virtually all formal regulation and supervision, as they generate the least amount of risk.	在这一情形中，作为借款人和贷款人之间的信息中介，而不直接参与贷款交易的平台应该免于几乎一切正式监管和监督，因为它们所产生的风险很小。


Platforms that offer basic deposit and loan facilities should be classified as banks, whose transactions entail credit, liquidity, and trading risks that merit prudential supervision alongside measures like risk-based capital requirements.	提供基础存款和贷款便利的平台应归类为银行，它们的交易包括信用、流动性和交易风险，应通过基于风险的资本要求等措施进行审慎监督。


Nonetheless, it is important not to overburden these firms with complex, high-level capital-adequacy requirements that would impede their operational flexibility.	尽管如此，要点在于不要用复杂的高水平资本充足度要求让企业不堪重负，妨碍它们的经营灵活性。


Finally, platforms with business models that involve higher degrees of financial complexity must be watched carefully for misconduct, as they are the most likely to conduct proprietary trading without adequate expertise, or offer guaranteed returns without appropriate risk assessment and control.	最后，业务模式的金融复杂度较高的平台必须严格监督，谨防不当，因为它们最有可能在不具备足够专业性的情况下进行自营交易，或在不具备合理风险评估和控制的情况下提供保底回报。


And, of course, financial interconnectedness demands international coordination of appropriate standards for the industry.	当然，金融连通性意味着需要就行业的合理标准问题进行国际协作。


P2P lending has its pitfalls, but if they are properly accounted for, the sector will undoubtedly continue to grow, fueled by those whose financing needs have been overlooked by traditional banks.	P2P贷款有其缺陷，但如果能恰当管��，该行业毫无疑问能够继续成长，其背后是大量融资需要被传统银行忽视的群体。


This will help to secure a major role for the sector in the Chinese economy.	这有助于确保该行业在中国经济中扮演重要角色。


China on the Launch Pad	发射架上的中国


SINGAPORE – Behind a veil of secrecy, China’s development of strategic and tactical missiles is well into its third generation of modernization.	发自新加坡——在神秘的面纱背后，中国战略以及战术导弹的发展已经进入了第三阶段的现代化。


While the development of Chinese long-range missile and nuclear forces has traditionally been characterized as conservative, incremental, and slow, it has taken place against a backdrop of steadily growing official emphasis on the country’s defense-industrial complex, particularly its aerospace sector.	虽然该国长程导弹以及核力量的发展一直被外界视为保守，渐进以及动作迟缓，但这一切其实都是在官方对本国国防工业综合体——尤其是航空航天部门——稳步加大强调力度的背景下发生的


This process has been accelerated by a confluence of defense-industry reforms, comprehensive military upgrading, and integration of innovative operational concepts.	通过一系列国防工业改革，军备综合性升级以及创新运作概念的整合，上述进程已经得到进一步加速。


The net effect is a growing capability of China’s strategic missile forces and military space platforms.	而因此产生的直接效果就是中国战略导弹力量以及军事太空平台实力的提升。


Various reports suggest that China is selectively enhancing its strategic and tactical missile capabilities by developing solid-fuel motors; diversifying its range of warheads and increasing their accuracy; deploying missiles with multiple warheads; and upgrading its ballistic-missile defense countermeasures, such as decoys, chaff, jamming, and thermal shielding, and possibly maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).	部署多弹头导弹； 对其反弹道导弹策略进行升级——不但具备诱导、真伪目标识别、干扰以及热屏蔽等手段，甚至可能拥有机动重返大气层飞行器（MaRVs）以及多弹头分导重返大气层飞行器（MIRVs）。


In particular, China is developing, testing, and deploying a new generation of solid-propellant, road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).	而尤其重要的则是中国正在研究，测试和部署新一代可在公路上实施机动的固体燃料洲际弹道导弹（ICBMs）。


These include the DF-31 and DF-31A, which are equipped with nuclear payloads.	其中包括装载核弹头的东风-31以及东风-31A型导弹。


It is also designing and developing new classes of conventional short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), such as the DF-21 – mobile, solid-propellant, longer range, more accurate, and able to exploit vulnerabilities in ballistic missile-defense systems.	此外该国还在设计研究一个新系列的常规短程弹道导弹（SRBMs）和中程弹道导弹（MRBMs），例如东风-21型——可机动部署，使用固体燃料，射程更长更精确，还有能力寻找到弹道导弹防御系统的弱点。


As part of its missile and nuclear-force modernization, China is also focusing on developing its sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) such as the JL-2, testing the DF21-D as an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) for maritime strikes, and further developing its anti-satellite weapon capabilities (ASAT).	作为其导弹以及核力量现代化进程的一部份，中国也把注意力放在了发展诸如巨浪-2型海基弹道导弹（SLBMs），将东风-21D型导弹作为反舰弹道导弹进行测试，并进一步发展其反卫星武器能力（ASAT）等方面。


The purpose behind China’s continuous modernization of its strategic assets is to enhance the credibility of its deterrent threat by improving the survivability of its nuclear forces.	而中国之所以不断对其战略资产进行现代化改造，目的就是通过提升其核力量的生存能力来提升其遏制性威慑的可靠性。


Thus, China is diversifying its missiles in terms of their strike capabilities and mobility, and formulating innovative anti-access/area-denial asymmetric warfare concepts to close the gap with technologically more advanced adversaries and near competitors – principally the United States, Russia, and Japan.	因此中国不断在其导弹的打击能力和机动性方面推陈出新，并构思出各类创新性的反接近/区域封锁不对称战争概念，力求缩小与更先进的对手以及邻近竞争者——主要是美国，俄罗斯和日本——在技术上的差距。


China’s progress in modernizing its strategic assets and capabilities owes much to the ongoing transformation of China’s defense industries, particularly the aerospace sector, over the past decade.	而中国在战略资产和军事能力现代化上所取得的进步则主要得益于其当前进行的国防工业转型，尤其是过去十年间在航空航天部门所取得的成果。


Since the late 1990’s, China’s government has gradually introduced elements of competition and globalization, with the aim of overcoming the entrenched monopoly of China’s traditional defense-industrial conglomerates.	中国政府自1990年代以来逐步在这些领域引入竞争和全球化，目的就是为了打破传统国防大企业根深蒂固的垄断。


The reforms have been guided by two broad concepts: the “Four Mechanisms” – competition, evaluation, supervision, and encouragement – and yujun yumin, or identifying military potential in civilian capabilities, with defense industries integrating into the broader civilian economy.	有两大宏观理念指导了这场改革：“四个机制”——竞争、评估，监管和激励——还有“寓军于民”，就是在民用工业能力中发掘军事潜力，国防工业也因此被整合进范围更广的民用经济之中。


The reforms have essentially enabled China to streamline research and development efforts, as well as technology transfers between selected components of its civil and commercial space programs.	这一改革从根本上令中国理顺和简化了研究和发展之间的关系，也使技术可以在民用和商业航天项目的特定部门之间实现转移。


As a result, China has also been able to bypass existing export controls and restrictions on the transfer of sensitive military technologies, particularly aerospace and satellite components and know-how.	因此中国可以绕过现有敏感军事技术转让方面的出口管制和限制，尤其是在航空航天和卫星部件及其技术要领方面。


Indeed, China’s military use of space is increasingly dependent and interlinked with civilian and commercial space activities, infrastructure, and human capital.	事实上，中国的太空空间军事行动正逐渐与民用和商业航天活动，设备和人力资本产生依赖和联结。


Its space launch vehicles (SLVs) can be used for satellites with a range of applications – including communications, weather, observation, and navigation – which may significantly enhance the effectiveness of China’s military space operations and systems.	其航天发射运载工具（SLVs）可以用来发射具备各种功能的卫星——包括通信，天气预报，观测和导航——而这将大大增强中国军事航天行动和系统设备的效用。


While ballistic missiles have generally different rocket engines, basing profiles, and launch methods, their guidance and control systems may use similar components, and SLVs may use stage components based on ballistic missiles.	虽然弹道导弹拥有不一样的火箭引擎，基地特点以及发射方式，它们的导航和控制系统却可以使用相似的系统，而航天发射运载工具也可以使用基于弹道导弹的分级组件。


The trajectory of China’s ballistic missile R&D and production shows a gradual transition from copying and reproducing first-generation Soviet ballistic-missile technologies to adapting and modifying smaller, mobile, solid-propellant ballistic missiles and their follow-on second-generation systems.	中国弹道导弹的研究发展和生产向我们展示了这样一个历程：从仿制第一代苏联弹道导弹技术，到改进和更新那些体积更小，具备机动性且由固体燃料推进的弹道导弹以及随后研发的第二代技术。


China is now an independent producer and technological innovator of selected missile systems and related aerospace technologies.	如今在特定的导弹系统和相关航空航天技术方面，中国已经成为一个独立的生产者和技术革新者。


Ultimately, China views its military, civil, and commercial space programs as being at the forefront of its national defense, economic development, and geostrategic influence.	最终，中国会将其军事，民用以及商业航天项目视为国防，经济发展和地缘战略影响力的前沿力量。


The rest of the world should regard China’s aerospace capabilities as an important part of its future power projection.	而世界其他国家应���将中国的航空航天能力视为其未来实力投射的重要部分。


Trump Through Chinese Eyes	用中国的眼光看特朗普


IRVINE – When Donald Trump won the United States’ presidential election in November, he had a lot of Chinese fans.	欧文—当唐纳德·特朗普在11月赢得美国总统竞选时，他拥有大量中国“粉丝”。


But Trump’s popularity has since plummeted, owing to his statements – often via Twitter – on contentious issues, such as Taiwan and the South China Sea.	但此后特朗普受欢迎程度暴跌，因为他在台湾和南海等争议问题上的言论——通常通过Twitter发表——让中国人很不高兴。


This isn’t the first time China’s view of a US leader has deteriorated rapidly.	这不是第一次中国对美国领导人的态度急转直下。


The abrupt change in Chinese sentiment toward Trump is reminiscent of what happened to US President Woodrow Wilson after his reelection a century ago.	中国对特朗普的看法的急剧改变让人想起了一个世纪前美国总统伍德罗·威尔逊连任后的情景。


At the time, many Chinese intellectuals, including the young Mao Zedong, admired Wilson, a political scientist and former president of Princeton University.	当时，包括毛泽东在内的许多中国知识分子敬仰身为政治学家、普林斯顿大学前校长的威尔逊。


Then, in 1919, Wilson backed the Treaty of Versailles, which transferred control of former German territories in Shandong Province to Japan, rather than return them to China.	到了1919年，威尔逊支持凡尔赛和约，和约将德国在山东省的殖民地移交给日本而不是归还中国。


Wilson quickly lost his luster in China.	威尔逊因此立刻失去了他的中国拥趸。


The shift was similar – but the reasons are very different.	转变是相似的——但原因大不相同。


A century ago, China was driven to support Wilson, and then to loathe him, by its own weakness.	一个世纪前，中国因为自身的孱弱而支持、后来又憎恨威尔逊。


Today, it is China’s strength that is guiding its view of the US president.	如今，影响中国对美国总统态度的是中国的强大。


In 1916, the year Wilson was elected to his second term, China was in terrible shape.	1916年，即威尔逊当选连任的那一年，中国形势危殆。


While the republic established in 1912 was ostensibly a single entity, it was actually highly fragmented.	1912年建立的中华民国表面上是一个整体，实则各自为政。


Military strongmen controlled different regions, while foreign powers, through bribes and bullying, seized large swaths of China’s territory.	军事强人控制着不同地区，而外国列强通过贿赂和威逼攫取了大量中国领土。


For Chinese intellectuals, Wilson offered a bookish contrast to thuggish warlords.	对中国知识分子而言，威尔逊的书生气质与残暴军阀形成了鲜明对比。


But Wilson’s appeal in China went beyond image.	但威尔逊对中国的吸引力不仅仅在于他的形象。


In 1918, Wilson’s popularity soared – and not just in China – following an address to Congress calling for national “self-determination.”	1918年，威尔逊的受欢迎程度大增——不仅是在中国——因为他在国会的演讲中呼吁民族“自决”。


Overlooking Wilson’s support of Jim Crow in the US and the invasion of Haiti on his watch, intellectuals in imperialism-ravaged countries from Egypt to Korea took his declaration to heart, and began to view him as a savior and champion of the oppressed.	从埃及到朝鲜，饱受帝国主义蹂躏的国家的知识分子们无视他在任内对内支持种族隔离，对外入侵海地，真心相信他的宣言，开始将他视为受压迫人民的救世主和领袖。


Chinese patriots, in particular, hoped that, under Wilson’s leadership, the US might deepen its involvement in Asia in ways that would help protect China from the predations of Imperial Japan.	特别是中国的爱国者们希望在威尔逊的领导下，美国可以加深介入亚洲，帮助中国抵抗帝国主义日本的侵略。


For them, Wilson’s support of the Treaty of Versailles constituted a profound betrayal.	对他们来说，威尔逊支持凡尔赛和约简直是巨大的背叛。


The China of 2016 is unimaginably different from the China of 1916.	2016年的中国较之1916年的中国，变化可谓天翻地覆。


It has leap-frogged even advanced countries in the global economic hierarchy.	在全球经济层次中，它甚至已经超过了很多发达国家。


It is unified under a strong and focused leadership.	它统一在一个强大而专注的领导层治下。


And it is very big, including nearly all the territories that were part of the Qing Empire at its peak.	它幅员辽阔，几乎拥有清朝全盛期的全部领土。


A rare exception is Taiwan, but the “one China” diplomatic fiction sustains the fantasy that someday, somehow, the democratic island and authoritarian mainland will be reintegrated.	极少数例外之一是台湾，但“一个中国”的外交立场让人们保持着幻想，期待有朝一日，民主的台湾和极权的大陆能够以某种方式实现统一。


In short, China no longer needs US protection.	简言之，中国不再需要美国的保护。


Instead, it wants a US president who is occupied largely with domestic issues, and is not much concerned with constraining China’s rise, as Barack Obama was.	相反，它希望看到美国总统忙于内政，无暇遏制中国崛起，就像奥巴马那样。


That way, China could get to work reshuffling power relationships in Asia for its own benefit, without having to worry about American interference.	如此，中国可以从自己的利益出发洗牌亚洲力量关系，而不必担心美国的干预。


Before the election, Trump was already known to level wild accusations at China, typically related to economic issues like trade.	大选前，特朗普就已经以“中国黑”著称，他的指责通常集中在贸易等经济问题上。


But his apparent lack of interest in foreign policy was very appealing for Chinese leaders.	但他显然对外交政策缺乏兴趣，这对中国领导人来说很有吸引力。


He seemed far more likely than his opponent, former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, to leave China alone.	他看起来要比他的竞选对手、美国前国务卿希拉里·克林顿更有可能放任中国自流。


His suggestion that he would be less committed than his predecessors to supporting traditional US allies in Asia, like South Korea and Japan, was music to Chinese nationalists’ ears, much as his questioning of American commitments to NATO was music to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s.	他声称他不会像他的前任们那样支持美国的亚洲传统盟友（如韩国和日本），这对中国民族主义者来说简直是天籁之音，正如他质疑美国对北欧的投入对俄罗斯总统普京来说也是天籁之音。


Like Wilson, Trump also gained some fans simply by virtue of a personality that is atypical for a politician.	和威尔逊一样，特朗普也仅仅凭借罕见于政客的个人魅力赢得了一些粉丝。


Of course, Trump is no bookworm.	当然，特朗普不是书呆子。


But many people liked that he seemed to say (or tweet) whatever he felt, offering “straight talk” that contrasted sharply with the approach of more polished politicians, including President Xi Jinping, who watches his every word.	但许多人喜欢他对自己的感觉“直言”（或发tweet）不讳，与道貌岸然的政客（包括关注他的每一个字的中国国家主席习近平）的策略截然不同。


A similar desire for “authenticity” has fueled – albeit in a very different way – the popularity of another US official, Gary Locke, who became the US ambassador to China in 2011.	类似的对“真性情”的仰慕也让另一位美国官员、2011年担任美国驻华大使的骆家辉的受欢迎程度大涨——不过是以不同的方式。


Photographs of Locke carrying his own daypack and buying coffee at Starbucks – humble acts that high-ranking Chinese officials would have underlings do – spurred a flurry of online posts celebrating him as a virtuous public servant.	骆家辉旅行时自己背包，自己在星巴克买咖啡——中国高级官员让下级去做的琐事他都事必躬亲——这让许多人在网上称赞他是真正的人民公仆。


How different America must be, his fans claimed, from China, where corrupt officials and their pampered offspring indulge in luxurious lifestyles reminiscent of the imperial families of dynastic times.	他的粉丝说，美国与中国真是天差地别，中国的贪官和嚣张跋扈的官二代的奢靡生活让他们想起了封建王朝的帝王之家。


It is hard to imagine that particular US-China contrast carrying weight now, as photos of Trump’s garish Manhattan penthouse and opulent Mar-a-Lago parties continue to emerge.	随着特朗普在曼哈顿金碧辉煌的顶层豪华公寓和奢华的马阿拉歌俱乐部（Mar-a-Lago）派对照片的曝光，难以想象如今这一中美反差还能起到如此作用。


And while Trump’s communication style remains striking, particularly in comparison to Xi’s, it becomes far less appealing when one is the target of his blunt comments on touchy topics.	而尽管特朗普的沟通风格依然辛辣——特别是与习近平相比——但当一个人因为在敏感问题上的鲁莽评论而成为众矢之的时，他的沟通风格魅力不再。


Just as a weak China was not able to count on Wilson’s protection, a strong China will not be able to count on Trump to get out of its way – at least not without throwing a few elbows.	正如孱弱的中国不能指望威尔逊的保护，强大的中国也不能指望特朗普走开——至少在不给他点颜色的情况下是如此。


Keynes and Hayek in China’s Property Markets	楼市背后的凯恩斯与哈耶克之争


HONG KONG – Real-estate prices in China’s top cities are spiking, generating contradictory predictions of either bursting bubbles or a coming economic turn-around.	香港—中国一线城市房地产价格正在暴涨，导致对经济前景针锋相对的预测：即将来临的泡沫破裂还是可以预见的宏观经济峰回路转？


What’s really going on in China’s hot property markets?	中国红得发紫的房地产市场究竟发生了什么？


China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) revealed last week that ten of the 70 large and medium-size Chinese cities surveyed had recorded annual price increases of more than 20% for newly built commercial housing. In the first-tier cities of Shanghai and Shenzhen, those gains were even higher: above 37%.	国家统计局上周公布，70大中城市新建商品房价格同比增长超过20%的城市有10个，其中一线城市上海和深圳涨幅超过了37%，而二线城市厦门和合肥涨幅超过了40%。


Chris Watling of Longview Economics compares China’s property market today to the Dutch tulip mania that peaked in 1637.	长景经济顾问公司（Longview Economics）的克里斯·沃特林（Chris Watling）将当前的中国房地产市场比作 1637年见顶的荷兰郁金香狂热。


He points out that property prices in Shenzhen, in particular, jumped 76% since the start of 2015, bringing a typical home to $800,000, just below the average home price in Silicon Valley.	他特别指出，深圳楼价自2015年初以来上涨了76%，使得当地典型住宅价格已高达800,000美元，仅比硅谷平均房价略低。


This, he suggests, may be the last hurrah before a market meltdown.	他认为，这也许是市场崩溃前的最后疯狂。


Liu Shijin, former Vice Minister of the Development Reform Center of China’s State Council, disagrees.	国务院发展研究中心前副主任刘世锦并不赞同这种悲观的预测。


Instead, he posits that after six years of reduced investment in infrastructure and construction, growth in the Chinese property market may be bottoming out, and liquidity and consumer confidence may be shifting back to housing.	他指出，在经历了六年基础设施和建筑业投资下降后，中国经济，包括房地产，也许正在触底反弹，流动性和消费者信心可能正在上升。


To determine who is right, it is important, first, to recognize that not all Chinese cities’ property markets are surging.	要想判断谁正确，首先要认识到并非所有中国城市楼价都在飙升。


In 42 of the cities surveyed by the NBS – those with industrial overcapacity and excessive property inventories – price increases amounted to less than 5%, with eight cities recording falling or stagnant property prices.	在国家统计局所调查的70个城市中，有42个存在工业产能过剩和房地产库存过剩的城市，其楼价增长不到5%，其中更有八个城市楼价不涨或下跌。


This pattern of divergence creates a dilemma for Chinese policymakers and investors, who now must weigh carefully the insights of two economic giants: John Maynard Keynes and Friedrich Hayek.	这一地区间的分化给中国决策者和投资者出了难题，他们必须仔细思考两位经济巨擘的洞见与影响：凯恩斯与哈耶克之争。


At a time of slowing economic growth, some are advocating more Keynesian macro-stabilization measures, much like those China used to sustain growth after the global economic crisis of 2008.	在经济增长放缓时期，一般更多人支持凯恩斯的宏观稳定措施，如中国在2008年全球经济危机后的稳增长政策。


But in many areas, particularly in the northeast, central, and western parts of the country, the slowdown cannot be resolved through more stimulus.	但在今天，中国许多地区，特别是东北、中部和西部，的经济减速问题无法通过加大刺激来解决。


In fact, stimulus in those regions would largely flow out, along with the labor and capital that is already being propelled toward coastal areas, which boast more advanced technology, higher rates of innovation, superior infrastructure, and a more market-friendly business environment.	事实上，这些落后地区的刺激大部分都可能随着劳动力和资本一起漏出，并流向沿海领先地区。 沿海地区技术更先进，创新动力更高，基础设施更完善，营商环境也更有利于市场。


What slower-growth regions need, therefore, is time to carry out supply-side structural reforms, including cutting inventories, reducing overcapacity, and writing off the bad debts of local governments and state-owned enterprises.	因此，增长较慢地区真正需要的是抓紧时间实施供给侧结构改革，包括去库存、去产能、缩减地方政府和国有企业坏账。


The regions with surging property prices, meanwhile, tend to be the ones that are drawing labor and capital with high growth and superior job opportunities.	与此同时，楼价飙升的地区总是那些以高增长和高就业机会吸引劳动力和资本的地区。


A study by China Securities International showed that, in 2000-2010, cities in eastern China received 82.4% of total migrant inflows.	中信建投的一份研究表明，在2000—2010年间，中国东部城市获得了82. 4%的总移民流入。


By 2010, the migrant population in Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin had more than doubled, to 34.5%, 37.9%, and 21%, respectively.	到2010年，北京、上海和天津的外来人口翻了一番以上，分别达到了34. 5%、37.


In an attempt to manage the growth of these cities, which faced a huge shortage of land, housing inventories, and urban public infrastructure, China’s government imposed restrictions on both demand for and supply of housing.	这些城市面临巨大的土地、房地产以及城市公共基础设施缺口，为了缓和沿海一线城市的增长，中国政府对这些地区住房的需求和供给都进行了控制。


But, as the spike in housing prices in these cities shows, their efforts didn’t work.	但是，这些城市楼价暴涨的形势表明，过往的政府措施并未奏效。


Chinese policymakers had forgotten about Hayek.	中国决策者忘记了哈耶克。


Otherwise, they would have expected that labor and capital markets would continue to drift toward growth and innovation in urban centers.	不然，他们应该可以根据以往楼价的涨势预料到劳动力和资金��向增长和创新型城市的大趋势。


They would also have recognized that market prices naturally transmit complex, specific, and changing local knowledge, which is distributed among individuals and corporations, not controlled by central planners.	他们还应该认识到市场价格往往本能地传递了复杂、具体和不断变化的本地信息，而这些信息往往散布在个人和公司之间，并很难被中央计划者掌控。


And they would have appreciated that if supply is to be matched with demand over time, real-estate and infrastructure investments must reflect that knowledge.	他们还应该理解，如果要让供给与需求逐渐匹配，房地产和基础设施投资就需要反映这些千变万化的本地信息。


Instead, China’s policymakers inadvertently created bottlenecks in local land supply.	相反，中国决策者在不经意间给高速增长城市的土地供给制造了瓶颈。


Residential land transactions in first- and second-tier Chinese cities remain thin and heavily influenced by urban planning policies, despite the depth and sophistication of residential property markets.	一二线城市的住宅用地交易少，饱受城市规划政策的影响，尽管住宅市场已经具备了相当的深度和成熟度。


Fortunately, there is scope for China’s urban planners to relax restrictions on the supply of land and on the floor area ratio (the ratio of gross floor area to the size of the lot on which the building stands).	幸运的是，中国城市规划者还有很大的空间放松土地供给和容积率（楼面总面积与建筑用地面积之比）方面的限制。


According to a study by China International Capital Corp, the urban built-up area in Shanghai is only 16%, compared to 44% in Tokyo and 60% in New York City.	据中金公司的一份研究报告，上海城市建成面积只占16%，而东京为44%，纽约为60%。


Within that area, only 36% is used for residential functions in Shanghai, compared to 60% in Tokyo and 44% in New York City.	在上海的建成面积中，只有36%用于住宅，而东京为60%，纽约为44%。


In other words, the available residential land for sale in Shanghai is considerably smaller than that available in New York City or even Tokyo, which is a major reason for surging property prices in these cities.	换句话说，上海可用于销售的住宅土地远远小于纽约甚至东京，这是房地产价格飙升的一个重要原因。


And, in fact, if the supply of land and usable floor area is not increased, more spending on local public infrastructure will cause prices of existing space to rise even higher.	而事实上，如果土地和可用楼面面积供给不增加，增加地方公共基础设施支出将导致现有住房价格进一步上涨。


Liu’s observation that households are becoming increasingly confident in the housing market also seems to be correct.	刘世锦有关家庭对住房市场信心越来越强的观察似乎也是正确的。


The recent increase in demand for housing may reflect households’ desire to hedge their high savings against inflation or, more fundamentally, the sense that they must secure housing urgently, given limited supply.	最近住房需求的增加可能反映了家庭为保护其高储蓄不受通胀影响的渴望及行动，也反映了他们在供给有限的情况下亟不可待地想要确保获得住房的心态。


Either way, they now seem convinced that investment in housing is a relatively safe bet.	不管是哪种情况，他们现在笃定地认为投资于住房是相对安全的赌注。


If that is the case, the risk of a property bubble in China is probably being overstated.	果真如此的话，中国房地产泡沫的风险可能被夸大了。


But that does not mean that all is well in China’s property sector.	但这并不意味着中国房地产行业一切正常。


If the government ignores market price signals, mismatches between supply and demand could build up, undermining growth in dynamic regions, while leaving low-growth regions weighed down by excess capacity and bad assets.	如果政府忽视市场发出的价格信号，供求不平衡就会愈演愈烈，破坏活力地区的增长，同时让低增长地区继续面临产能过剩和不良资产上升的重负。


The good news is that there is still considerable room for policy maneuver.	好消息是政策仍有大量调整空间。


The question now is whether the Chinese authorities will manage actually to recognize and respond effectively to market signals.	现在的问题是当局是否能够真正辨认市场信号并有效地据此行动。


Righting China’s Property Rights	矫正中国的产权


NEW YORK – China recently adopted new guidelines to strengthen protection of property rights.	纽约—中国最近出台了新的意见以加强产权保护。


The guidelines are an important step toward ensuring long-term economic growth.	该意见是确保长期经济增长的重要一步。


But there is more to be done.	但光有意见是不够的。 。


The guidelines aim to advance three key objectives.	意见旨在推动三个关键目标。


First, they limit the government’s discretionary ability to take private property from entrepreneurs and private citizens.	首先，意见限制了政府从企业家和公民个人手中收缴私人产权的自由裁量权。


In the past, the law defined the state-owned sector as the “foundation” of a “socialist market economy,” and the private sector as its “supplement.”	在过去，法律定义国有部门为“社会主义市场经济”的“基础”，私人部门则是“补充”。


The new guidelines stress the “equal status” of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private firms, and the “equal protection” of their property rights.	新意见强调国有企业和民营企业的“平等地位”，它们的产权得到“平等保护”。


Now, private property will no longer be inferior to state property – at least officially.	现在，私有产权地位不再低于国有产权——至少正式地位是如此。


China has lately been facing a new wave of capital flight, driven partly by concerns among entrepreneurs that President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign – so far focused on corrupt government officials – could one day be re-directed at them and their assets.	最近，中国面临着新一波资本外逃，部分原因在于企业家担心国家主席习近平的反腐运动有一天会盯上他们和他们的资产——目前，反腐运动主要针对腐败的政府官员。


After all, given that the laws and regulations governing business in China are highly complex and, at times, even contradictory, it has been difficult for Chinese entrepreneurs not to violate some rule or another.	毕竟，管理中国商业活动的法律和法规非常复杂，甚至时常自相矛盾，中国企业家难免会触犯这样那样的规则。


The new guidelines address this by calling for forgiveness of “original sins” – irregular or illegal activities or tax evasion by private entrepreneurs in their firms’ early days.	新意见解决了这个问题。 意见要求不追究“原罪”——企业家在创业初期的违法违规活动或偷漏税行为。


This amnesty program – together with a broader shift toward equality between SOEs and private firms – could remove a thick cloud of uncertainty for Chinese businesspeople, encouraging them to keep their wealth and talent in the country.	这项大赦——以及范围更广的国有企业和民营企业的平等化——有望打消中国商人心中的一大块不确定性，鼓励他们将财富和才华留在国内。


The second objective of the new guidelines is to eliminate the expropriation of state-owned assets by private parties, including by self-dealing managers of SOEs.	新意见的第二个目标是取消民营方（包括假公济私的国有企业管理层）挪用国有资产，。


Such self-dealing takes many forms, including selling state-owned assets at below-market value to connected private parties and insider trading in the stock market.	这些假公济私行为形式多样，包括低于市场价值向关联民营方贱卖国有资产和股市内幕交易等。


One positive effect of the anti-corruption campaign has been the suppression of such behavior.	反腐运动的一个积极影响是打压了这类行为。


Even so, to be responsive to Xi’s call to strengthen and expand existing SOEs, it makes sense for the guidelines’ drafters to propose more measures to minimize risks stemming from poor corporate governance.	即便如此，为响应习近平关于做大做强现有国企的号召，意见起草者提出更多措施以最小化拙劣公司治理带来的风险是很有意义的。


The third objective of the new guidelines is to encourage innovation, by protecting the fruits of creative efforts.	新意见的第三个目标是鼓励创新，办法是保护创新的果实。


The engines that have propelled China’s growth over the last few decades – a huge supply of cheap labor, imported technology, and massive physical investment – are petering out.	推动过去十年中国经济增长的引擎——大量廉价劳动力、进口技术和大规模实体投资——正在失去动力。


Now, productivity increases and local innovation must pick up the slack.	如今，必须由生产率提高和地方创新来提供增长动力。


And that requires adequate protection of intellectual property.	而这需要充分保护知识产权。


My own research, carried out with Zhuan Xie and Xiaobo Zhang, shows that Chinese firms – especially in the private sector – have lately accelerated innovation, and are being awarded an increasing number of patents at home and abroad.	我本人和谢传、张晓波的研究表明，中国企业，特别是民营企业，最近开始加速创新，并且因为国内外专利数量的增加而获益。


Unsurprisingly, they have joined multinational firms and foreign trade negotiators in demanding better intellectual-property protections.	毫不奇怪，它们加入了跨国公司和外国贸易谈判员的行列，要求加强知识产权保护。


As intellectual property rights become more secure, China’s new growth engines can gain substantial steam.	随着知识产权权利变得更加安全，中国的新增长引擎也可以获得巨大的动力。


But the new guidelines are not sufficient to guarantee such an outcome.	但新意见不足以保证这样的结果。


For one thing, the amnesty program for entrepreneurs’ “original sins” still lacks sufficient detail.	一方面，赦免企业家“原罪”的计划仍然缺乏足够的细节。