The regulation of financial markets that was imposed during WWII was retained.	在二战期间实施的金融市场规范得以保留。


It is this economic and social system that is usually identified as the “Swedish model.”	这种经济和社会体制通常被人称为“瑞典模式”。


Although economic performance during this period was not dismal, it was certainly not impressive.	尽管经济表现在这一期间并不糟糕，但是却并不令人印象深刻。


Between 1970 and 1995, GDP per capita in Sweden lagged by about 18% behind the average of rich OECD countries.	1970年至1995年期间，瑞典的人均GDP落后于富有的经合组织成员国平均水平18％。


As a result, Sweden fell from third to approximately seventeenth place in the OECD in terms of GDP per capita.	结果，以人均GDP衡量，瑞典在经合组织中的位置从第三名下降到大约第十七名。


This can partly be explained by the “catch up” mechanism, as technologically less advanced countries imported technology from more advanced countries.	这部分可以解释为“追赶”机制，即技术上落后的国家从更为先进的国家进口技术。


But this does not explain why 14 countries not only caught up with Sweden during this period, but  surpassed it in terms of GDP per capita.	但是这并不能解释为什么在这一期间14个国家不仅追赶上了瑞典，而且在人均GDP上超越了它。


The removal of capital-market regulations and foreign-exchange controls in the late 1980’s, and Sweden’s entry into the EU in the early 1990’s, signaled a new era – the embryo of a third Swedish model.	二十世纪八十年代末瑞典解除了资本市场的管制和外汇管制，九十年代早期加入欧盟，这标志着一个新的时代，也就是第三种瑞典模式的胚胎。


In 1991, marginal tax rates were cut by 10-20% for large parts of the population.	在1991年，大部分人的边际税率减少了10％到20％。


These reforms had broad political support and were, in fact, initiated during a social-democratic government.	这些改革具有广泛的政治支持，而且实际上是在社民党执政时期发端的。


Subsequently, mainly during a period of center-right governance, several product markets were deregulated: telecommunications, electricity, road transport, taxis, and, to some extent, railways.	结果，主要是在中间偏右政府时期，数个产品市场解除了管制，包括电信、电力、道路交通、出租车以及铁路的某些领域。


A process of deregulation and privatization, although with continued tax-financing (in fact, basically a voucher system), began in the field of “human services,” in particular for childcare, education, and old-age care.	解除管制和私有化的进程尽管与持续的税收资助相伴（实际上基本上是一种券票体制），但是却开始于“公共事业”领域，特别是托幼、教育以及照看老年。


One purpose of this was to increase competition and freedom of choice.	这样做的目的之一就是提高竞争和选择的自由。


Partly in response to these reforms, Sweden’s growth rate picked up from the mid 1990’s, and today about a third of the previous lag in GDP per capita since 1970 (as compared to other developed countries) has been recovered.	部分地由于这些改革，瑞典的增长率从九十年代中期起得以提高，今天，已经恢复了先前从1970年以来人均GDP落后部分（与其它发达国家相比）的三分之一。


However, Sweden is still characterized by high welfare dependency, with about 23% of working-age people in recent years living on various types of government benefits, including temporary and permanent disability payments.	但是，瑞典的特点还是高福利依赖，大约23％工作年龄的人口在最近几年中依靠不同形式的政府福利生活，这些福利包括临时和永久性残疾福利。


The new center-right government elected in the fall of 2006 has committed itself to continuing economic liberalization.	2006年秋季当选的新中间偏右政府承诺继续经济自由化。


The government has announced plans to privatize state-owned companies, improve conditions for small firms, and continue increasing individual freedom of choice in the case of human services.	政府宣布计划，将国有公司私有化，改善小农庄的条件，并且继续增加公共事业上的个人选择自由。


It has also abolished the wealth tax (after the previous social-democratic government had already abolished the inheritance tax).	该政府取消了财富税（先前的社民党政府已经取消了遗产税）。


Moreover, the government has modestly reduced taxes on wages and slightly scaled down the generosity of some benefits.	而且，该政府还温和地削减了工资税收，轻微地降低了某些福利的慷慨程度。


One argument for the latter policy is to improve the government’s budget, another to make work more economically rewarding relative to government benefits.	后一政策的理由是改善政府预算，另一个是让工作与政府福利相比在经济上更有报偿。


Indeed, in important respects today’s Sweden is moving back to the liberal economic regime that existed before the explosion of government interventionism in the 1960’s.	确实，今天的瑞典在某些重要的方面正在转移回到六十年代政府干预爆炸前的自由经济体制之中。


But there are two basic caveats.	但是这里有两个基本点需要说明。


First, all political parties agree that welfare-state arrangements should remain tax-financed, although possibly with a stronger application of insurance principles in the social insurance systems.	首先，所有的政党都同意，尽管在社会保险体制中可能会更大地采用保险原则，但是福利国家体系应当维持由税收资助。


So even if the generosity of state benefits may be curtailed, aggregate government spending is unlikely to be rolled back dramatically from the current 53% of GDP.	所以，即使国家福利的慷慨程度可能会受到限制，总的政府开支不大可能从目前GDP的53％大幅度退缩。


Second, there is general agreement that the government should take more active responsibility for environmental issues, although policies in this area increasingly rely on market instruments (prices for environmental disturbances) rather than on quantitative regulations	第二，人们大多认为，尽管环境问题上的政策越来越多地依靠市场手段（为破坏环境付费）而不是在数量上的法规，政府应当在这一问题上承担更大的责任。


Clearly, some of these policy measures may conflict with traditional egalitarianism in Sweden, at least in the short term.	很明显，某些政策措施至少在短期内可能会与瑞��的传统平均主义相冲突。


Hence, the big question underlying the current wave of liberalization is whether these reform tendencies are politically sustainable.	因此，目前自由化浪潮的根本问题是这些改革取向在政治上是否可以维系。


The next general election in 2010 will give part of the answer.	2010年的大选将会给出部分答案。


The Time is Now to Fight Disease	现在正是抵抗疾病的时刻


It is possible for a child born just ten years from now to live in a world where AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria are on the wane.	要为十年之后出生的孩子营造一个艾滋病、肺结核以及疟疾日益灭绝的世界是有可能的。


But this can only happen with considerable investment. Now.	但是只有在现在进行大量投资，这种可能才会变成现实。


Otherwise, today’s grim picture will only get worse.	否则，今日严峻的形势只会每况愈下。


Each day, these diseases kill 16,000 people—devastating entire communities and plummeting countries deeper into poverty.	每天，这些疾病带走16,000人的生命——破坏全社会，使国家进一步掉入贫穷深渊。


Upping the ante could turn the tables.	赌注越大，赢面越多。


Recent successes in Brazil against AIDS, in Mozambique against malaria, and in China against TB, show what can be achieved on a global scale with more resources. There are new ways of directing aid to where it is most needed.	近日，巴西成功抵抗艾滋病、莫桑比克成功抗击疟疾以及中国抵御肺结核的例子，显示了全球范围内更多资源所能带来的成功，并产生了一种新方式将援助发放至最需要它的地方。


A key instrument is the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria. Created in 2002 as a partnership between governments and civil society, the Global Fund is unique in the way it aims to deliver assistance.	成立于2002年、由政府和民间合作的全球艾滋病、结核和疟疾基金拥有独一无二的提供援助手段，起到了关键作用。


Driven by real needs on the ground, projects are designed and implemented by recipients, and its procedures and operations are transparent.	援助计划由接受者根据当地的真正需求策划并实施。 全过程和操作完全透明。


Of late there has been much talk about intensifying efforts to eradicate poverty.	最近有许多关于加强力度消灭贫穷的谈话。


Ahead of the G8 summit in Scotland in July, a coalition of non-governmental organizations has launched the “Global Call to Action Against Poverty,” and the UK host has made Africa a top priority.	在即将于七月在苏格兰举行的八国峰会之间，一个非政府组织联盟已经启动了“全球抵抗贫穷行动”，东道主英国将非洲作为了首要扶助对象。


Building on this momentum, the campaigns for debt relief, trade reform, and increasing aid to poor countries have gained traction.	在此动力基础上，减免债务、贸易改革以及加大对贫穷国家的援助力度的运动已经找到方向。


Yet, while pledges to increase development assistance have soared, short-term funding is woefully inadequate.	然而，尽管增加发展援助的呼声越来越高，短期基金数量却完全不够。


Any strategy for raising living standards must include urgent measures that address AIDS, TB and malaria.	任何提高生活水平的策略必须包括有关艾滋病、肺结核和疟疾的紧急措施。


Stemming the spread of this deadly trio of diseases is the linchpin in the global fight against poverty.	阻止这三种致死疾病是全球抵抗贫穷的关键步骤。


Unchecked, these diseases not only sap the strength of national economies, but jeopardize peace and security.	尽管未经证实，这些疾病不仅摧毁了国家经济，也破坏了和平与安全。


Teachers and nurses are dying; police and security forces are being hard hit, and 14 million children have already been orphaned by AIDS.	教师和护士面临死亡威胁； 警察和安全部队正在遭受重击，1400万儿童因为艾滋病而成为孤儿。


We now risk failing to meet the Millennium Development GOAL, set out by the United Nations, of reversing the spread of AIDS, TB and malaria by 2015.	联合国制定的《千年宣言》目标，即在2015年前防止艾滋病、肺结核和疟疾的扩散，有难以实现的风险。


This failure will make remote any hope of reaching the other Millennium goals in the fight against poverty.	这个失败将会使抵抗贫困之战中任何达到其他千年目标的希望变得更为缥缈。


A comprehensive response to AIDS, TB and malaria is needed.	我们需要对艾滋病、肺结核和疟疾做出全面反应。


Acting now means less spending in the long run.	即时的行动意味着减少长期费用。


Investments in effective prevention, treatment and research in 2005 and 2006 will save millions of lives, lessen the socio-economic impact of the diseases in poorer countries, and remove the need for increased spending on these chronic crises in the future.	对有效防范、处理和研究这三种疾病的投资将会在2005、2006年内拯救数以千计的生命，减少疾病在更为贫穷的国家境内所造成的社会经济影响，消除这些长期危机在未来所需的不断上涨的费用。


The Global Fund plays an important role in this funding environment, providing approximately 66% of all current external funds in the fight against TB, 45% in the fight against malaria, and 20% of all external support to combat HIV/AIDS.	全球基金在这一基金环境中作用重大，约占所有抵抗肺结核的外来基金的66%，抵抗疟疾的外来基金的45%，以及抗艾滋病基金的20%。


Since the Global Fund was founded three years ago, it has built an impressive track record: approving 310 grants totaling $3.1 billion in 127 countries and disbursing $920 million since 2002.	自从全球基金三年前成立以来，它已经创造了令人印象深刻的业绩：在127个国家通过了310项拨款，总值高达31亿美元，并自2002年起已经支付出了9.


Despite the scope of its mission, it has a minimal bureaucracy, which allows for a flexible response to changing needs.	2亿美元。 无论业务范围多大，全球基金却鲜有官僚作风，这使得它能够根据变化的需要灵活反应。


The Global Fund is not perfect; as with all new organizations, it is experiencing growing pains.	正如所有新生组织一样，全球基金并不完美，它正在经历成长的阵痛。


Yet, issues such as procurement policies, trade-offs between efficiency and ownership, and the balance between government and non-governmental organizations as implementing partners are being addressed through the Fund’s open and inclusive governance systems.	然而，从该基金公开的到内含的管理体系，都正在处理诸如政策获得、效率和所有制之间的协调，以及使政府和非政府组织成为合作伙伴的的关系平衡问题。


If the Fund is to live up to its potential it will need $2.3 billion to continue its work effectively in 2005.	如果该基金要发挥所有潜能，那么还需要23亿美元以使其在2005年有效工作。


The first of two replenishment conferences for the Global Fund is taking place this week in Stockholm, with the aim of securing financial pledges to cover grant commitments in 2006-2007, as well as to fill the gap for this year.	全球基金的首两次持续捐款会议本周将在斯德哥尔摩举行，旨在为2006-2007的拨款任务确定经济担保，以及填补今天的款额缺口。


Donors have long preached the importance of a funding vehicle such as the Global Fund—one that is needs-driven, relies on local input, and promotes donor coordination.	长期以来，捐赠者们一直宣扬基金媒介的重要性，诸如全球基金这样一个根据需要出发、依靠当地收入并且促进捐赠者协作的基金。


They now have a chance to make good on their word.	他们现在有这样一个机会能把他们所说的话变成现实。


With many battles ahead in the fight against AIDS, TB and malaria, it would be a disgrace if this opportunity is squandered.	当我们面临抗击艾滋病、肺结核和疟疾的斗争时，白白浪费这个机会将是一种耻辱。


Betting on the Tortoise in Japan	打赌日本的龟速发展


CAMBRIDGE – In April 2014, Japan’s consumption-tax rate is set to rise from 5% to 8% in an effort to address the long-term problem of high public debt.	发自剑桥——从2014年4月起，日本的消费税率将从5%提高到8%，以解决长期以来的高公共债务问题。


But will the resulting loss in purchasing power bring an end to the Japanese economy’s fragile recovery, as many fear?	但这是否会像许多人恐惧的那样导致购买力流失，从而扼杀日本脆弱的经济复苏呢？


The question is reminiscent of April 1997.	这问题是不禁让人想起1997年4月。


Larry Summers, who was then Deputy Secretary of the United States Treasury, repeatedly warned the Japanese government that if it proceeded with a scheduled consumption-tax hike, Japan’s economy would slide back into recession.	当时拉里•萨默斯任美国财政部副部长，他一再警告日本政府，一旦其推行上调消费税的计划，那么日本经济将重新陷入衰退。


I was in the US government at the time.	当时我在美国政府工作。


As the date drew near, I asked Summers why he persisted in offering Japan’s leaders this unwanted advice, given that they were clearly locked in politically.	随着日本上调消费税日子临近，我问萨默斯，既然日本领导人显然是为政治所迫，那为什么还坚持向他们提出本不需要的建议呢？


Summers told me that he knew he was unlikely to change anyone’s mind, but that he wanted to be sure that Japanese officials recognized their mistake when they went ahead with the increase.	萨默斯回答说他知道自己无法改变任何人的想法，但他想确保日本官员能在上调行动中意识到自己的错误。


Sadly, his prediction proved correct.	不幸的是，他的预测变成了现实。


Today, Japan’s fiscal problems resemble those of the US and many other countries.	今天，日本的财政问题跟美国以及其他许多国家类似。


The economy is weak, but the Bank of Japan (BOJ) cannot make monetary policy much more expansionary than it already is.	经济疲软，但日本央行（BOJ）已无法使货币政策比当前更加宽松了。


And, while fiscal stimulus is called for in the short run, the long-term outlook for Japan’s public finances is deeply troublesome, owing to the huge debts run up in the past.	与此同时，尽管短期内实施了财政刺激，但由于过去留下的巨额债务，日本公共财政的长期前景依然麻烦重重。


What is required is easy fiscal policy today, together with plans to achieve fiscal rectitude in the long run.	事到如今，我们需要的是简单的财政政策，以及在长期内实现财政合理运行的计划。


The difficulty with this Augustinian approach – “Lord, make me chaste, but not yet” – is that promises of future discipline usually are not credible.	而这个奥古斯丁教义——“主啊，请使我变得纯洁，但别那么快实现”——类似的困难则在于对未来的操行许下的承诺通常是不可信的。


Politicians often say that they will achieve budget surpluses in the future, but seldom do so.	政客们常说他们会在未来实现预算盈余，但却很少能兑现。


Given this, governments should provide specific fiscal-consolidation mechanisms that are visibly likely to take effect when the time comes.	有鉴于此，政府应提供具体的，显然会在时机成熟时发挥作用的财政巩固机制。


Raising the retirement age for future pension benefits qualifies as such a mechanism.	推迟未来合资格领取养老金福利的退休年龄就是这样一种机制。


Legislating phony sunset provisions for current tax cuts, as the US did during the George W. Bush years, does not.	而像小布什时代的美国所做的那样，为眼前减税而立法制定到期失效条款的做法则是不属此类。


For Japan, I like a proposal by Koichi Hamada (a Yale economics professor who is an adviser to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe) and others: the planned jump in the consumption-tax rate should be replaced with a gradual pre-announced path of increases, with the rate rising, say, one percentage point per year for five years.	对日本来说，我喜欢滨田宏一（耶鲁大学经济学教授，担任首相安倍晋三的顾问）和其他人一起提出的一项计划：应该以渐进式提前声明的方式来取代消费税率的跳跃式上升。 也就是说，同样是上调税率，我们可以采取每年上调一个百分点，为期五年的方式。


Because a gradual path establishes long-run fiscal discipline, it would not crash the bond market, as an outright cancellation of the tax increase might.	因为渐进式可以建立长期的财政纪律，它不会像立刻取消增税那样可能对债券市场造成冲击。


At the same time, it spares an already-weak economy damaging fiscal contraction in the short run.	同时还能避免在短期内出现对本已疲弱的经济带来损害的财政紧缩。


Indeed, the expectation that tax-included prices will rise in the future can stimulate households to buy cars, appliances, and other consumer goods today.	事实上，对未来含税价格上涨的预期将刺激当前的家庭去购买汽车，家电和其他消费品。


Such a gradual path has positive implications for monetary policy, too.	这种渐进方式对货币政策也有其积极意义。


In normal times, central banks want to reduce inflation.	在正常时期，央行想减少通货膨胀。


The problem is that pre-announced hikes in tax rates or administered prices can have the undesirable effect of building annual price increases into public perceptions, undermining the central bank’s inflation-fighting efforts.	但问题是预先公布的税率或行政费用上涨会使公众产生全年价格上涨的预期，也削弱了中央银行的抑制通货膨胀的努力。


But these are not normal times.	但现在不是正常时期。


Inflation and interest rates in Japan lately have been even lower than in the US.	日本近期的通货膨胀和利率甚至低于美国。


The most important component of “Abenomics” this year has been the BOJ’s efforts to ease monetary conditions further, despite zero interest rates, and thus end the threat of deflation.	今年“安倍经济学”的最重要组成部分就是日本央行在零利率的情况下进一步放松货币条件，从而终结通货紧缩的威胁。


Under these circumstances, inflation expectations are not a cause for concern.	在这种情况下，通胀预期就不是一个大问题。


On the contrary, positive expected inflation would reduce the real (inflation-adjusted) interest rate – not a bad thing under current conditions.	相反，正面的通货膨胀预期将会降低实际（计算通胀在内）利率——这在目前的情况下可不是件坏事。


There are useful analogies for policies in other countries.	其他国家的政策有一些有用的类比。


The US could legislate a pre-announced path of slow but steady increases in energy or carbon taxes (accompanied by immediate short-term offsets, such as a reduction in the distortionary payroll tax or an end to the damaging spending sequester).	美国会立法去预先宣布一项缓慢但稳定的能源或碳税增加路径（同时伴随一些立刻实施的短期补偿，如降低扭曲性的工资税或结束破坏性的支出扣押）。


As in Japan, such measures would enhance long-run fiscal sustainability without weakening demand at a time when the economy has not yet fully recovered from the Great Recession.	在日本，这些措施能提高长期财政可持续性且不会在经济尚未完全从大萧条中恢复过来的时候削弱需求。


In addition, the environmental and national-security arguments in favor of discouraging fossil-fuel consumption work better if the increase in energy prices is phased in gradually.	此外，如果能源价格的上涨是渐进式的，那么那些支持减少化石燃料消耗的环境和国家安全的论据将准备得更加充分。


That way, people have sufficient time to make effective decisions about automobiles, home heating systems, power plants, research into new technologies, and so forth.	这样人们就有足够时间来进行有效决策，如对汽车，家庭供暖系统，发电厂和新技术的研究等等。


Similar lessons are relevant in emerging-market economies.	类似的教训与新兴市场经济体也是相关的。


Countries like India and Indonesia are now facing possible financial crises, in part owing to large budget deficits, a major component of which has long been food and energy subsidies.	印度和印尼这样的国家当前所面临的潜在财务危机，部分原因是由于庞大的预算赤字，另一个重要原因是长期的食品和能源补贴。


Keeping domestic prices for food and energy artificially low has proved to be not only ruinously expensive, but also very ineffective in achieving the declared goal of helping to alleviate poverty.	人为的保持家庭食品和能源的低价格被证明不仅是毁灭性的昂贵支出，而且对实现纾解贫困这一目标极为无效。


Some leaders in these countries are aware of the need to reduce these subsidies.	这些国家的一些领导人也意识到需要减少这些补贴。


A credible, pre-announced phase-out path would provide much-needed reassurance to skittish global investors, without imposing immediate hardship on the poor.	一个可信的，预先宣布的逐步淘汰机制既能为忧心忡忡的全球投资者提供急需的安慰，也不会对穷人施加直接的困难。


At the same time, the ability to plan ahead in anticipation of the price increases would allow more effective responses, as farmers plant different crops, manufacturers switch to more energy-efficient equipment, and so forth.	同时，预期价格上涨的情况下提前制定计划的能力将允许更有效的对策，农民可以转而种植不同的作物，制造商可以选择更节能的设备等等。


Governments worldwide face a similar imperative: maintain policy credibility without undermining economic recovery.	世界各国政府都面临类似的责任：保持政策的可信度而不破坏经济复苏。


Bold measures like those envisaged by Abenomics may help.	像安倍经济学所设想的那些大胆措施也许会有所帮助。


But slow and steady wins the race.	但是，缓慢和稳定才是最终赢得比赛的原因。


Li Keqiang’s Bottom Line	李克强的底线


SHANGHAI – Everyone is talking about China’s economic slowdown.	上海——中国的经济增长放缓已经成为所有人的话题。


Last year, Chinese GDP growth reached a 13-year low, and no upturn is in sight.	去年，中国GDP增长创13年来的新低，至今尚未出现任何好转迹象。


But, as Premier Li Keqiang seems to recognize, this trend could actually be beneficial, spurring the structural reforms that China needs to achieve its longer-term goal of more balanced and stable GDP growth.	但李克强总理似乎认为这一趋势实际对经济发展有利，因为它能刺激中国推进结构改革，实现确保GDP平衡稳定增长的长远目标。


Recent assessments have offered a downbeat picture of the world’s second-largest economy.	近来对世界第二大经济体的评估充满了悲观情绪。


In its latest Global Economic Prospects report, the World Bank cut its 2013 economic growth forecast for China from 8.4% to 7.7%.	世行在最新一期《全球经济展望》报告中将2013年中国的经济增长预测从8. 4%调降至7.


Moreover, recently released central-bank data show that Chinese banks increased their lending by only about ¥667 billion ($108 billion) in May – a roughly ¥125 billion decline from the same period last year.	7%。 此外，最新公布的央行数据显示中国各银行五月信贷总额仅增加了6660亿人民币（约合1080亿美元）——较之去年同期出现了约1350亿人民币的降幅。


But simply lending more would not improve the situation.	但单纯提高信贷额度恐怕无济于事。


Given that outstanding loans already amount to nearly double China’s GDP – a result of the country’s massive stimulus since 2008 – new loans are largely being used to pay off old debts, rather than for investment in the real economy.	鉴于2008年来的大规模刺激政策已经使中国未偿还贷款接近GDP的两倍，新增贷款主要并未进入实体经济，而是用于偿还旧账。


Thus, the more relevant concern is that the balance of outstanding loans has not risen.	因此，未偿还贷款余额并未上升恐怕更值得关注。


In recent years, tight monetary policy and increasingly strict controls on the real-estate sector have caused the growth rate of fixed-asset investment to fall, from more than 25% annually before 2008 to around 20% today.	近年来，对房地产行业管制从严及从紧的货币政策已经导致固定资产投资增长率从2008年以前的年均超过25%下降到今天的20%左右。


Furthermore, the growth rate in China’s less developed eastern regions amounts to less than half of the national average.	此外，中国欠发达的东部地区增速为全国平均增速的一半不到。


As a result, growth of industrial value added – which contributes almost half of China’s GDP – is slowing even faster, from an average annual rate of 20% during China’s boom years to less than 10% in 2010-2012 and just 7.8% in the first quarter of this year.	结果导致占中国GDP近半壁江山的工业增加值增速放缓，从繁荣期20%的平均增速下降到2010-2012年的不到10%和今年一季度的7. 8%。


The key to restoring China’s GDP growth is, therefore, returning fixed-asset investment growth to at least 25%.	因此，恢复中国GDP增长的关键是让固定资产投资增速至少回到25%的水平。


With a new round of stimulus, China’s excess production capacity and underused outlays (for example, built-up real-estate assets) could be mobilized immediately, restoring 9% annual GDP growth.	新一轮刺激政策能即刻调动中国的过剩产能和未充分利用的经费（比方说已经完工的不动产资产），重现年度GDP 9%的增速。


But the willingness of China’s new leadership to initiate another round of growth-securing stimulus depends on what rate of GDP growth Li can tolerate.	但中国新一届领导班子愿不愿启动新一轮增长刺激计划取决于李能容忍GDP增速下滑到何种程度。


With China’s leaders having offered no indication that they will change current monetary policy, some economists have estimated that Li will not act until GDP growth falls below 7%.	因为没有任何迹象表明中国领导人会改变当前的货币政策，有些经济学家预测除非GDP增速滑落到7%以下，李将不会采取任何行动。


The reason for Li’s inaction emerged in early June, when Chinese President Xi Jinping told his American counterpart, Barack Obama, that China had deliberately revised its growth target downward, to 7.5%, in order to pursue structural reforms aimed at supporting stable and sustained economic development.	中国主席习近平曾于6月初通报美国总统奥巴马，为确保结构改革支持经济稳定可持续发展，中国主动将经济增长目标调降至7. 5%，这也解释了为什么李克强总理尚未采取刺激措施。


Given that China was moving toward such reforms before the 2008 global economic crisis prompted former Premier Wen Jiabao to launch his ¥4 trillion stimulus plan, Xi’s statement suggests that the new government will seek to restore the economy’s pre-2008 fundamentals.	鉴于中国前总理温家宝已经在推行上述改革，后因2008年全球经济危机爆发被迫推出4万亿人民币刺激计划而中断，习近平的讲话表明新一届政府将力求恢复2008年前的经济基本面。


In 2005, China was experiencing currency appreciation, which, as other fast-growing economies in East Asia have demonstrated, can stimulate the government and businesses to pursue structural reforms and industrial upgrading.	2005年曾经出现人民币升值势头，东亚其他快速增长经济体的经验表明，货币升值可以刺激政府和企业推行结构改革和产业升级。


But the subsequent increase in official fixed-asset investment – which rose by 32% in 2009 alone – delayed structural reforms, while over-capacity and a real-estate bubble became even larger and more deeply entrenched problems.	但官方固定资产投资随后的大幅增加（仅2009年一年增幅就达到32%）延缓了结构改革的步伐，导致更为严重的产能过剩和房地产泡沫问题。


The government must now dispel the remaining vestiges of the stimulus-fueled over-investment of 2008-2010, however painful it may be.	无论多么痛苦，政府现在必须消除2008-2010年因刺激计划导致的过度投资。


This means allowing the economy to continue to slow, while maintaining relatively tight macroeconomic policies that force local governments and the business sector to find new sources of growth.	这意味着在允许经济持续放缓的同时保持宏观政策面相对偏紧，从而迫使地方政府及企业部门找到新的增长点。


The combination of external shocks and internal pressure from rising wages can serve as a powerful incentive for governments and businesses to pursue structural reforms.	外来冲击和内在的工资上涨压力可以对政府和企业推行结构改革构成有力的刺激。


For example, firms in China’s export-dependent coastal regions have been burdened by renminbi appreciation since 2004.	比方说，人民币升值从2004年起就开始影响以出口为主的中国沿海地区。


When the economic slowdown hastened the relocation of many manufacturers to inland provinces or neighboring countries, those in the coastal regions began to call for increased openness, deeper structural reforms, and industrial upgrading.	在经济放缓导致众多厂商加速向内陆省份或邻近国家搬迁时，沿海地区开始呼吁扩大开放、深化结构改革和产业升级。


The view that Li will tolerate slower growth only above a particular threshold is based on the belief that GDP growth below 8% would hurt economic development more than it helped, and lead to social instability.	李克强仅容忍经济在一定程度上放缓是因为GDP增长低于8%不仅无助于完成结构改革，还有可能导致社会动荡并损害中国经济。


And, indeed, if unemployment pressure had become as acute today as it was in the 1990’s, the prolonged economic slowdown would undoubtedly have precipitated government intervention.	而如果就业压力达到像20世纪90年代那样的严重程度，则经济持续放缓无疑会引发政府干预。


But, over the last decade, structural changes to China’s economy have caused unemployment pressure to decline significantly – a trend that can be corroborated by across-the-board wage increases.	但十年来中国经济的结构性变化已经使就业压力显著下降，各行各业的工资上涨就可以印证上述趋势。


Now, the setting is very favorable to build the stronger, more stable economy that Li wants – and that China needs.	当前环境非常有利于建设更强大、更稳定的经济，这符合李���强的希望，也符合中国之所需。


The Trade-and-Aid Myth	贸易和援助神话


Trade and aid have become international buzzwords.	贸易和援助已经成了国际时髦词汇。


More aid (including debt relief) and greater access to rich countries’ markets for poor countries’ products now appears to be at the top of the global agenda.	给贫穷国家更多的援助（包括债务减免）和允许它们的产品更多地进入富国市场如今似乎排到了全球议程的首位。


Indeed, the debate nowadays is not about what to do, but howmuch to do, and how fast.	实际上，今天人们讨论的不再是做什么，而是做多少，要达到多快的速度。


Lost in all this are the clear lessons of the last five decades of economic development. Foremost among these is that economic development is largely in the hands of poor nations themselves.	过去50年来经济增长的明确经验早被抛到了九霄云外，其中最重要的是经济增长主要靠的是穷国自己的力量。


Countries that have done well in the recent past have done so through their own efforts. Aid and market access have rarely played a critical role.	不久前取得了骄人成绩的国家无一不是依靠自身的努力，而援助和市场准入很少起到关键的作用。


Consider a developing country that has free and preferential market access to its largest neighbor, which also happens to be the world’s most powerful economy.	假设一个发展中国家拥有对其最大邻国的自由和特惠市场准入，而这个邻国碰巧又是世界上最强大的国家。


Suppose, in addition, that this country is able to send millions of its citizens to work across the border, receives a huge volume of inward investment, and is totally integrated into international production chains.	我们再来假设，成百上千万的该国公民可以出国工作，数额巨大的投资流入国内，其经济实现了与国际产品链的完全融合。


Moreover, the country’s banking system is supported by its rich neighbor’s demonstrated willingness to act as a lender of last resort.	不仅如此，该国的金融体系拥有富裕邻国的明确支持，承诺在其它求助手段无效的情况下为该国提供帮助。


Globalization does not get much better than this, right?	全球化能够带来的好处也不过如此，对吧？


Now consider a second country.	现在来看看另外一个国家。


This one faces a trade embargo in the world’s largest market, receives neither foreign aid nor any other kind of assistance from the West, is excluded from international organizations like the WTO, and is prevented from borrowing from the IMF and the World Bank.	这个国家在全球最大的市场上面临着的贸易禁运，既得不到国外援助，也没有西方国家为其提供其它形式的支持。 这个国家被排斥在世贸机构这样的国际组织之外，也无法从国际货币基金组织和世界银行获得贷款。


If these external disadvantages are not debilitating enough, this economy also maintains its own high barriers on international trade (in the form of state trading, import tariffs, and quantitative restrictions).	如果这样的外部因素还不够困难，该国经济还为国际贸易设置了严重的壁垒（采取了国家贸易、进口关税和数量限制等多种形式）。


As the reader may have guessed, these are real countries: Mexico and Vietnam.	读者也许已经猜到，上述例子都涉及到真实的国家：墨西哥和越南。


Mexico shares a 2,000-mile long border with the United States, which provides not only privileged market access in goods and labor, but also a claim to the resources of the US Treasury (as became apparent during the 1995 peso crisis).	墨西哥与美国有着2，000英里长的共同边界，这不仅为该国提供了商品和劳务市场的特别准入，还可以得到美国财政部的资金援助（这一点在1995年比索危机中得到了充分体现）。


By contrast, America maintained a trade embargo against Vietnam until 1994, established diplomatic relations only in 1995, and did not provide most-favored nation treatment to Vietnamese imports for years after that.	恰恰相反，1994年前美国一直对越南实行贸易禁运，仅在1995年才开始建立了外交关系，而且此后若干年内都没有向越南进口商品提供最惠国待遇。


Vietnam still remains outside the WTO.	越南到今天还被挡在世贸组织的大门之外。


Now consider their economic performance.	现在来比较一下两国的发展状况。


Since NAFTA was signed in December 1992, Mexico’s economy has grown at an average annual rate of barely over 1% in per capita terms.	1992年12月签订“北美自由贸易协议”(NAFTA)后，墨西哥经济的人均年增长率刚刚超过了1%。


This is not only far below the rates of Asia’s economic superstars; it is also a fraction of Mexico’s own growth performance during the decades that preceded the debt crisis of 1982 (3.6% per year between 1960 and 1981).	这不仅远逊于亚洲经济大国的表现，而且比起1982年债务危机前墨西哥自身的增长来讲也非常微不足道（1960到1981年间墨西哥年增长率为3. 6%）。


Vietnam, however, grew at an annual rate of 5.6% per capita between the onset of its economic reforms in 1988 and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the US in 1995, and has continued to grow at a rapid 4.5% pace since then.	而在1988年开始推行经济改革至1995年建立越美外交关系期间，越南的年均增长率达到了5. 6%，而后又以4.


Vietnam witnessed a dramatic fall in poverty, while in Mexico real wages fell.	5%的速度快速增长。 越南的贫困人口大幅下降，而墨西哥的实际工资却有减无增。


Both countries experienced sharp increases in international trade and foreign investment, but the pictures are utterly different where it counts most: rising standards of living, particularly for the poor.	两国的国际贸易和国外投资都迅猛增长，但在最为至关重要的领域情形却迥然不同：那就是民众、特别是贫困人口生活水平的提高。


What these examples show is that domestic efforts trump everything else in determining a country’s economic fortunes.	这些例子表明：在决定国家的经济命运时，国内努力会比其它因素起到更为重要的作用。


All the opportunities that the US market presented to Mexico could not offset the consequences of policy mistakes at home, especially the failure to reverse the real appreciation of the peso’s exchange rate and the inability to extend the productivity gains achieved in a narrow range of export activities to the rest of the economy.	美国市场向墨西哥提供的所有机会也抵消不了国内政策失误的后果，特别是未能扭转比索汇率的实际升值和未能将在出口活动的狭窄领域取得的生产率提高扩展到国内经济的其它领域。


What matters most is whether a country adopts the right growth strategy.	国家是否采取正确的发展策略至关重要。


With none of Mexico’s advantages, Vietnam pursued a strategy that focused on diversifying its economy and enhancing the productive capacity of domestic suppliers.	虽然没有墨西哥的优势条件，但越南采取的策略是实现经济多样化，改善国内供��商的生产能力。


Broader post-war experience supports the conclusion that domestic policies are what matter most.	广泛的战后经验支持了国内政策最为重要的结论。


South Korea took off in the early 1960’s not when foreign aid was at its apex, but when it was being phased out.	20世纪60年代南韩经济腾飞不是因为国外援助达到了高潮，相反，那时国外援助正在慢慢停止。


Taiwan did not receive foreign aid or preferential market access.	台湾并未得到国外援助或最惠国市场待遇。


China and India, today’s two economic superstars, have prospered largely through sui generis reform efforts.	而今天的两个超级经济明星中国和印度，都是通过别具一格的改革措施实现了繁荣强大。


It is tempting to ascribe the rare African successes – Botswana and Mauritius – to foreign demand for their exports (diamonds and garments, respectively), but that story goes only so far.	我们很容易把非洲大陆罕见的成功案例¾博茨瓦纳和毛里求斯¾归结为外国对其出口产品的需求（两者分别是钻石和成衣），但其神话恐怕也仅限于此。


Obviously, both countries would be considerably poorer without access to foreign markets.	显而易见，如果没有对外国市场的准入，两国的经济发展肯定会与目前相去甚远。


But, as in other cases of successful development, what distinguishes them is not the external advantages they possess, but their ability to exploit these advantages.	但在其它成功发展的案例中，令它们与众不同的不是自身拥有的外部优势，而是它们开发自身优势的能力。


Witness the mess that other countries made of their natural-resource endowments.	看看其它国家利用自然资源资产的糟糕状况。


The word “diamond” hardly conjures images of peace and prosperity in Sierra Leone.	“钻石”一词在塞拉里昂很少令人联想到和平与繁荣。


Similarly, few of the export processing zones proliferating around the world have delivered the results observed in Mauritius.	与之相似，遍布世界各地的出口加工区也很少能够获得毛里求斯那样的繁荣。


None of this absolves rich countries of their responsibility to help.	但所有这些都没有免去富国伸出援手的责任。


They can make the world less hospitable for corrupt dictators – for example, by greater sharing of financial information and by not recognizing the international contracts that they sign.	举例来讲，它们能够通过更多地共享金融信息以及不承认独裁者签署的国际合同，使得整个世界对腐败的独裁者更为严厉。


Similarly, increasing the number of poor-country workers allowed to work in rich countries, and providing greater scope for growth-oriented policies by relaxing WTO rules and conditionality from the US, would produce greater long-term development impact.	与此相似，增加可以在富国工作的贫困国家工人数量，以及通过美国牵头放松世贸组织的规则和限制，向以发展为中心的政策提供更为广阔的空间，都将会为长期发展带来更显著的影响。


It is far from clear that expanding market access and boosting aid are the most productive use of valuable political capital in the North.	扩大市场准入和增加援助是发达国家利用宝贵政治资本的最有效的方式，这一点远远没有那么清晰。


Development should focus not on trade and aid, but on improving the policy environment in poor countries.	发展的焦点不应是贸易和援助，而应是改善贫困国家的政策环境。


The Tragedy of President Chen	陈总统的悲剧


Taiwan’s Public Prosecutor has indicted the wife of President Chen Shui-bien for embezzling public funds.	台湾的检察官已经指控陈水扁总统 妻子贪污公款。


Chen, as a sitting president, cannot be indicted even though the prosecutor says that he has evidence to prove his guilt.	作为在任总统，尽管检察官说他有证据表明他有罪，陈水扁本人不会被指控。


But Chen’s legacy was already in tatters.	但是陈水扁必将留下一个烂摊子。


Chen can remain in office until his term ends in 2008, or he could resign now in order to let his vice president and pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) rebuild to win the next election.	陈水扁可以一直呆到2008年他的任期结束，也可以现在就辞职以便他的副总统和他赞成独立的民进党重建以赢得下一次选举。


Whatever his decision, Taiwan’s first DPP president will go down in history as a pathetic failure, because he used his office to divide the island’s citizens, as if his domestic political opponents were Taiwan’s mortal enemies.	不管他作出什么样的决定，台湾第一位民进党的总统必将留下一段遭受可怜地失败的历史，因为他利用他的职位来分化岛内的人民，好像他国内的政治对手是台湾不共戴天的敌人。


The root of Chen’s moral demise is something the classical Greeks identified: hubris.	陈水扁在道义上逊位的根源类似于古希腊人所指出的那样，就是傲慢自大。


Chen’s popularity among his party followers, whose fervency often bordered on fundamentalism, changed him from a person with deep democratic instincts into a textbook case of a man who regards power and its prerogatives as being his by right.	台湾民进党的热忱常常接近于原教旨主义。 陈水扁在他的党内的声望把他从一个有着强烈民主天性的人变成了一个视权力和特权为其一己利益的人的范例。


Chen once had political courage.	陈也曾有过政治上的勇气。


Jailed years ago for his anti-Kuomintang (KMT) activities, he stood up at great odds to the Chinese Communist Party, which sought in vain to subjugate him in cross-Strait relations and in global politics.	他曾因为反对国民党而被监禁了数年之久，他敢于站出来对抗中国共产党，后者徒劳地试图使他屈从于两岸关系和全球政治。


The world has largely deserted Taiwan and its 23 million people – the only democracy among 1.2 billion Chinese.	世界已经在很大程度上抛弃了台湾和它2300万的人民，他们是12亿中国人中唯一的民主政体。


Only 24 countries, mostly tiny island states, maintain diplomatic relations, while all but one of the world’s major powers and all important international institutions, including the United Nations, dance to the mainland’s tune on the issue.	只有24个国家，其中绝大多数是小得可怜的岛国与它保持着外交关系，除一个例外的世界上所有的强国以及所有重要的国际组织，包括联合国，都在这一问题上与大陆保持着同样的基调。


But Chen’s behavior did not help.	但是陈的行为并没有对此有所帮助。


Indeed, he even angered the United States, Taiwan’s only military protector, by his frequent confrontational tactics, such as pushing Taiwan towards independence, which runs counter to America’s longstanding “One-China” policy.	事实上，他甚至激怒了美国，这一台湾唯一的军事保护者，因为他常常采取挑衅性的举动，如推动台湾迈向独立，而这是与美国长期坚持的“一个中国”的政策背道而驰的。


After winning the presidency, Chen could have risen above theatrics by focusing on two Taiwanese strengths: its economy and its unbroken humanist Chinese cultural tradition.	在赢得总统选举后，陈本可以依靠集中力量关注台湾的两个强项，也就是它的经济和它未遭到破坏的人文主义的中国文化传统来提升他的地位。


Instead, Chen balked at further integration into the global economy, refusing to open all of Taiwan’s economic sectors to foreign participation, which would have strengthened Taiwan’s competitiveness and efficiency.	然而实际上，陈在进一步融入全球经济面前畏缩不前，拒绝对外国投资者开放台湾所有的经济领域，这本可以增强台湾的竞争力和效率。


For years, forward looking Taiwanese industrialists, including many hi-tech entrepreneurs, urged Chen to de-bureaucratize and de-politicize Taiwan’s increasingly isolated economy.	多年以来，有远见的台湾工业家，包括许多高科技企业的老板，敦促陈对台湾越来越被孤立的经济实行去官僚主义和去政治化。


Failing to persuade him, they decamped to mainland China.	在无法说服他之后，他们撤离去了中国大陆。


Unwisely, Chen went out of his way to shut out mainland Chinese capital and to retain barriers to other foreign investors in order to protect the domestic businesses of his political allies.	陈不明智地故意大力阻挠中国大陆的资本，并且对其他外国投资者设置障碍以保护他的政治伙伴的国内生意。


Indeed, indicators of economic freedom and competitiveness compiled by the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, the World Economic Forum, and others show that Taiwan’s relative ranking has stagnated or even declined on Chen’s watch.	事实上，由遗产基金会、卡托协会、世界经济论坛和其他一些组织所编制的反映经济自由度和竞争力的指数显示，台湾相关的排名在陈执政期间停滞不前甚至是倒退了。


This stands in sharp contrast to the communist mainland, which has reinvented itself to become one of world’s more open, competitive, and dynamic economies.	这与共产党统治的大陆地区形成了鲜明的对比，后者已把自己树立成世界上更为开放、有竞争力和活力的经济体之一。


As a result, big international corporations and Wall Street banks now flock to China, bypassing Taiwan.	其结果是，大的跨国公司和华尔街的银行现在一起涌向了中国，而把台湾抛在了一边。


They do so not because Taiwan is small – witness Hong Kong and Switzerland – but because it retains too many restrictions against foreign institutions.	他们这样做并不是因为台湾小，香港和瑞士也很小，而是因为它对外国机构设置了太多的障碍。


Taiwan’s missed opportunity reflects its government’s sheer incompetence, arrogance, and ignorance.	台湾错失的机会反映了它的政府绝对的无能、傲慢和无知。


Chen squandered six valuable years as his administration engaged mainly in polemics with its opposition parties while he pandered to the extreme wing of the DPP and mobilized his government to “de-Sinicize” Taiwan culture.	陈把他宝贵的六年时间浪费在让他的行政部门把主要精力放在与他的反对党的争执上，而他本人则迎合民进党的极端势力并且推动他的政府不断地对台湾文化“去中国化”。


Indeed, Chen even argued that the Taiwanese were never Chinese.	事实上，陈甚至辩称台湾人从来就不是中国人。


He ordered the Education Ministry to revise school textbooks to promote the idea that the Taiwanese people were fundamentally different, practically a different race from the Chinese.	他命令教育部修改学校的课本以推行关于台湾人本质上是与中国人不同的、实际上是另一个种族的言论。


Clearly, Chen’s hatred of dictatorship, whether Communist or KMT, consumed him, limiting his ability to think clearly.	显然，陈对无论是共产党还是国民党专政的憎恨使他难以自拔，限制他进行清醒思考的能力。


In fact, Taiwan’s moral superiority over mainland China lies not only in its democratic institutions, but also in its unbroken adherence to the ancient culture that the Chinese communists nearly succeeded in annihilating after coming to power in 1949.	事实上，台湾相对中国大陆道义上的优势不仅在于它的民主制度，还在于它对古代文化一贯的坚持。 大陆在共产党于1949年执政后几乎完全抹杀了古代文化。


Ironically, it is China’s rulers who are now scrambling to resurrect Confucius as a moral anchor in a culture dominated by the pursuit of money.	具有讽刺意味的是，中国的执政者现在正努力重新把儒教树立为盛行拜金主义文化中的道德依靠。


Chen should have celebrated Taiwan’s “Chineseness” proudly and loudly, thereby distinguishing the island from the barbaric legacy of the Chinese Communist Party.	陈本可以自豪并且大声地宣扬台湾的“中国性”，以此来把台湾岛与中国共产党野蛮的遗产区分开来。


Instead, Chen’s futile effort to “de-Sinicize” Taiwan created a wastefully divisive contentious society, pitting “mainlanders” and “locals” against each other.	然而实际上，陈徒劳地努力对台湾“去中国化”从而制造了一个破坏性地分裂和争论的社会，使“大陆派”和“本土派”产生严重的对立。


Chen’s record suggests he will hang on to his failed presidency.	陈过去的历史显示他会继续留在他那已经遭受失败的总统职位上。


He will use his legal training to fight on technicalities.	他将运用他的法律知识在技术细节上进行斗争。


But to the rest of the world, Chen has been revealed as a petty liar over a pitiful amount of money.	但是对世界上的其他人来说，陈已经暴露出他是一个捞取一笔数额可怜的钱的卑劣的撒谎者。


He and his wife lied about their involvement.	他和他的妻子在他们是否与这件事有牵���的问题上撒了谎。


Their close aides have confessed that they forged documents and perjured themselves to protect their political boss.	他们的亲信已经承认他们伪造了文书并且作了伪证以保护他们的政治老板。


What a pathetic ending for a man who could have become one of the most important leaders in modern Chinese history.	一个本可以成为现代中国历史上最最重要的领导人之一的人最落得如此可怜的下场真是令人叹息。


The Tragedy of Trade Blindness	贸易短视的悲剧


LONDON – The Doha Round of global free-trade negotiations is on the brink of collapse after ten years of talking.	发自伦敦——在坚持了十年之后，全球自由贸易多哈回合谈判终于走到了破裂的边缘。


This is a tragedy in the making, because the gains available from what has already been agreed upon in the negotiations are considerable, and would provide a major boost to the global economy.	这堪称一场正在酝酿的悲剧，因为各方其实可以从已达成的谈判共识中获取可观的收益，并将成为全球经济的重要推动力。


Failure would thus constitute a serious indictment of political leaders in major trading countries in both the developed and developing worlds, possibly costing the global economy $700 billion in additional annual income.	而谈判的最终失败将导致各主要发达和发展中贸易国的领导人之间硝烟再起，并可能导致全球经济每年减少7000亿美元的额外收入。


By contrast, if the Round is completed, aside from this generalized gain, specific and important improvements would benefit the world’s least developed countries.	相反如果回合谈判能圆满结束的话，除了上述的好处之外，那些世界上最贫穷的国家也将获得切实且重要的利益。


The European Union, for example, has already agreed that all such countries will be afforded duty- and quota-free market access for their exports.	比如欧盟已经同意向所有这些国家的出口商品授予免税以及不设配额的市场准入机制。


Furthermore, EU export subsidies for agricultural products will be abolished from 2013.	此外欧盟对农产品的出口补贴也将在2013年取消。


Other such examples abound. But probably none will be realized if the general agreement completing the Round is not concluded.	这样的例子不胜枚举，但倘若谈判无法达成总体协议的话就只能是镜花水月。


For the rule governing global trade rounds is that nothing is deliverable until everything is agreed.	因为全球贸易回合谈判的主导规则就是除非全体同意，不然就无法兑现任何承诺。


Moreover, completing the Doha Round is crucial for the World Trade Organization.	此外多哈回合的收尾对世界贸易组织来说也至关重要。


Brazil’s ambassador to the WTO, Roberto Azevedo, said recently that his country “rejects the notion that this organization’s credibility and legitimacy are in a death embrace with the Round. The WTO is bigger than the Round and transcends it.”	巴西驻世贸组织特使罗伯托·阿泽维多（Roberto Azevedo）最近发言说巴西“反对声称WTO组织的信誉和合法性正在多哈回合中消亡的说法没，因为WTO比多哈回合的规模更大，而且位居其上”。


Of course, he is right: even if the Doha Round fails, the WTO will survive.	他显然是对的：即便多哈回合最终崩盘，WTO依然会继续存在下去。


But it would be no minor event, and it would take years for the organization to recover.	但这一事件的影响将非常巨大，以致WTO要花费数年时间才能恢复元气。


Indeed, all previous trade rounds – even the Uruguay Round, which took eight years to complete – concluded favorably.	事实上，过往所有的回合谈判——即便是拖了8年才结束的乌拉圭回合——都取得了圆满的成果。


To pretend that the Doha Round’s failure would not have negative and lasting effects for the WTO betrays a profound lack of understanding of the risks we run, as well as of the Round’s vital importance for weaker and smaller states.	但如果有人还在假设多哈谈判的失败不会对WTO造成长期负面影响，那就是对我们目前所面对的风险认识不足，同时也忽视了该回合谈判对弱小国家的重要性。


So, what will happen?	那么等待我们的将是什么？


Either the Round will fail outright, or some parts of it will be salvaged, with the rest (most of the areas under negotiation) put to one side amid promises to return to them after the 2012 elections in the United States.	要么整个回合宣告破裂，要么其中一些部分被保留下来，而余下部分（大部分正在进行谈判的领域）则承诺在2012年美国大选后重新启动。


Either way, the consequences promise to be far-reaching.	但不管采取了哪条道路，所有的好处都注定将变得遥不可及。


During the last 20 years, the world has witnessed dramatic proliferation of regional and bilateral preferential trade agreements.	在过去20年间，全世界都见证了各类区域性和双边特惠贸易协定的不断膨胀。


Indeed, bilateral trade flows covered by such agreements now amount to roughly half of the world’s imports, and have contributed significantly to the dramatic growth of trade.	事实上，这类协议指导下的双边贸易流大概已经占到了全球进口量的半壁江山，也对贸易的大幅增长发挥了极大推动作用。


Yet such agreements pose great dangers if they are not subject to effective WTO oversight.	但如果不能处于WTO的有效监监管之下的话，这类协议将引发极大的危险。


For one thing, they are largely negotiated by states with great asymmetries of power.	首先，那些实力更强的国家往往会在这类协议中占据上风。


There is a big difference between multilateral negotiations of universal rules and the effective imposition of rules – and even concessions – in a negotiation between the EU or the US and a smaller trade partner.	一方面是基于国际规则的多边谈判，另一方面则是欧盟或者美国将自己的规则——甚至特权——强加在一个小型贸易伙伴身上，两者的利弊截然不同的。


While large developing countries – such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China – can avoid such impositions from developed economies, most others cannot.	当那些大型发展中国家——比如巴西、俄罗斯，印度和中国——得以避免这类不平等协议之时，其他小国只能自认倒霉。


Aside from the great damage caused by unequal bargaining power outside of the multilateral framework, the path of bilateral negotiations threatens to remove the focus from universal outcomes, which are the bedrock of globalization. The basic principle of non-discrimination is at risk: once trading countries negotiate separately with each other, various forms of discrimination become inevitable, giving rise to various kinds of conflicts.	除了由多边框架外的不平等谈判实力所导致的巨大风险之外，双边谈判的路径同时还可能将人们关注的焦点从作为全球化基石的全球产出效应上移走，一视同仁的基本原则正受到动摇：一旦贸易国家选择跟其他国家单独谈判，就无法避免一系列的歧视行为，导致产生各类冲突的风险大增。


A focus on preferential agreements would fragment the global trading system, rather than integrating it.	对优惠协议的关注将无法整合整个全球贸易体系，而是令其走向分裂。


The gradual marginalization of the WTO would also erode its credibility in fulfilling its key role as adjudicator of trade disputes.	WTO的日渐边缘化也将腐蚀组织的信誉，使其无力承担其贸易争端调停者的关键角色。


The success of the WTO’s adjudication system is reflected in its widespread acceptance. Even when WTO decisions have had serious negative effects on a trading partner, they have generally been accepted.	而WTO调停系统的成功恰恰来自于它所受到的广泛认可——即便有些WTO决策将对某一贸易方产生严重负面影响，但这些决定还是��被各方所接受的。


This constitutes a remarkable advance in global governance.	这个系统对于全球治理来说堪称一大进步。


But it will be endangered if the credibility of the WTO is damaged by a Doha Round failure.	但如果WTO的信誉被多哈回合的破裂下损失殆尽的话，整个调停系统就危在旦夕了。


The primary responsibility for completing the Round now rests with the US, Brazil, China, and India.	使得多哈回合圆满完成的主要责任现在就落在美国、巴西，中国和印度身上。


This group’s inflexibility is at the root of the current impasse, and, should the Round fail,	这几个国家的固执正是当前僵局的根源，如果回合最终破裂的话，它们也都会准备好一套冠冕堂皇的理由，把责任全都推在别人身上。


they will all, of course, have their own excuses and blame everyone but themselves.	美国政府已经很久没把心思放在谈判之上了。 不管此举究竟有多愚蠢，但更难理解的是为何中国，巴西和印度至今都未能作出更有决定性的举措。


Yet, with even a little flexibility, the Round could still succeed.	所有这一切都令人回忆起从前那段不堪回首的日子。


The US administration’s heart has not been in this negotiation for a long time.	对全球化进程的威胁不会立刻显现，但却切实存在。


However foolish that stance may be, it is even harder to understand why China, Brazil, and India have not made a more determined effort. They have so much to lose.	多哈回合谈判的破裂将在未来的历史书占据一个重要的篇章；


In fact, Brazil would most likely be the biggest winner from the Round, but it has not made the relatively small concessions in non-agricultural market access that are necessary.	它将成为在一个充满机会的时代体现政治短见的绝佳案例。


The threat to the globalization process may not be immediately apparent, but it is very real. The failure of the Doha Round would be more than a footnote in future history books; it would be a hugely consequential case of political myopia at a time of great opportunity.	而如今最令人苦恼的事，莫过于即便谈判破裂的后果已经摆在了那些领导人面前，他们却依然视而不见。


Most distressing of all, even now, with the consequences of failure staring our political leaders in the face, they do not get it.	彼得•苏瑟兰，曾任关税及贸易总协定(GATT)总干事，世界贸易组织(WTO)总干事，现任高级别贸易专家小组联席主席，该团体由英国、德国，土耳其和印尼政府联合设立，专责研究世界贸易体系。


The Tragedy of Zidane	齐达内的悲剧


Those who the gods may destroy, they grant their wishes.	上帝想要毁了某个人，就给他愿望。


Zinedine Zidane may be pondering that bit of ancient Greek wisdom today.	齐达内现在可能就在思考这一古老的希腊智慧之言。


Having announced that he would end his professional career with the World Cup, Zidane had his wish fulfilled.	齐达内已经宣布将在世界杯赛后结束他的职业生涯，并满足了他的愿望。


After France barely survived the tournament’s first round, Zidane performed at the top of his game and led the team to the brink of a second World Cup championship.	法国队如履薄冰地通过了小组赛，齐达内如日中天，并把法国队带到了第二次世界杯冠军的边上。


But instead of finishing his career in triumph, or at least with an ovation, he was ejected from the final for head-butting an Italian player.	但是，他不仅没有在胜利或起立鼓掌中结束他的事业，反而由于头顶意大利球员而被罚出了决赛场。


There have been few such tragic moments in football history.	足球历史上还很少有这样的悲剧时刻。


Whatever the provocation that led to Zidane’s behavior (probably a racial comment), his violent act, seen around the world, has tarnished his image.	无论是什么挑衅导致了齐达内的行为（可能是种族言论），他的暴力行为被全世界所看到，玷污了他的形象。


The sad paradox is that while the world had been learning of and celebrating his legendary kindness as a person, he will now be distinguished for all time by an act of aggression.	这一难过的矛盾是，尽管世界都在了解和敬仰他作为一个人的传奇般的善良，现在，它将由于一次侵犯行为而令人永志难忘。


Indeed, Zidane’s status as an emblematic champion of the world’s most universal and popular sport does not fully explain why people have been so obsessed with him.	确实，齐达内作为世界上最普及最受欢迎的体育运动的象征性的冠军地位并无法完全解释人们为何对他如此执谜。


His human qualities, as much as his talent and technical feats on the field, counted equally in establishing his popular acclaim.	他的人格特征与他在场上的天才和技术成就在建立起万众爱戴上一样重要。


Football has always been this way.	足球总是这样。


For Argentineans, the diminutive Diego Maradona represented the revenge of the weak and the deprived.	对于阿根廷人而言，身材矮小的马拉多纳代表了弱小者和受压迫的人的复仇。


As a result, his countrymen excused his frequent bad behavior time and again.	结果，他的同胞们不断原谅他时常作出的不轨行为。


Similarly, Pelé became the symbol of a harmonious, inter-racial Brazil.	同样，贝利则成为和谐、种族融洽的巴西的象征。


Zidane offered neither of these romantic images.	这些浪漫的形象齐达内一个也不呈现。


Moreover, after his career is over, he is unlikely to become a manager of his sport like Jean-Claude Killy, the former Alpine skier who was co-president of the 1992 winter Olympics, or his fellow football legend Michel Platini, who helped coordinate the 1998 World Cup.	而且，在足球生涯结束后，他也不大可能像前阿尔卑斯山滑雪运动员、1992年冬季奥运会副主席的让克劳德·凯利，或者帮助协调1998年世界杯的足球传奇人物普拉蒂尼那样成为足球的经理人。


After all, Zidane, arguably the world’s best football player, left with a gesture that has no place in any game.	毕竟，无疑是世界最佳足球运动员的齐达内以一种在任何体育运动中都没有任何位置的举动离开了足坛。


Nevertheless, Zidane will remain a global icon, owing to his profoundly human character and his extreme simplicity.	但是，由于其深刻的人性特点和朴实无华，齐达内依然将是一个全球性的偶像。


Here is a man who is known in the most hidden corners of the planet, yet he retained the presence and discretion of a silent next-door neighbor.	这个星球最偏僻的角落都知道他，但是他依然像是一个安静的隔壁邻居那样有分寸。


At a moment when integration is being debated in France, Zidane embodied the ideal of success through talent and hard work – while never betraying himself or his Algerian origins.	正当法国辩论融入问题的时候，齐达内象征着通过天赋和艰苦工作取得成功的理想，与此同时，从不背叛他自己和他的阿尔及利亚根源。


Moreover, Zidane incarnated values that seem threatened nowadays, but to which ordinary people remain attached: loyalty to family, diligence, and cooperation.	而且，齐达内体现了当今受到威胁的价值观，而普通人依然保持这些价值观，那就是对家庭的忠诚、勤劳以及合作。


Here is a man who was not only a world champion, but also a model son and father.	他不仅仅是一名世界冠军，而且也是一个模范儿子和父亲。


The almost timid way in which, after France’s victory over Spain, he expressed his love for his mother touched viewers around the world.	在法国队击败西班牙队后，他用一种几乎是害羞的方式表达他对母亲的爱则感动了全世界的观众。


To understand Zidane’s popularity, one need only set his modesty and attention to others against the arrogance and indifference that characterize the behavior of so many other celebrities, including football players.	人们只要将他的谦虚和他对他人的关心与其他众多的名人、包括足球选手的傲慢和无动于衷的行为相比较，就可以理解齐达内的受欢迎程度了。


At a time when, in France as in the rest of the world, the chasm between the elite and ordinary people has never been so wide, when the smugness of the affluent has never been so cruelly felt by the less fortunate, Zidane, a son of despised immigrants, became an international star, and yet preserved the simplicity of his origins.	法国和世界其他地方精英分子和普通民众之间的差别从来没有如此之大、弱势群体残酷地感受到有钱人的沾沾自喜的时候，齐达内，一个受人鄙视的移民的儿子成为了国际明星而又保持了其本源中的纯朴。


For this, Zidane was not only admired, but also respected.	齐达内不仅为此而受到崇拜，而且受到尊敬。


His success was never to the detriment of others.	他的成功从来不对他人有害。


On the contrary, he is active in causes such as helping sick children.	相反，他积极参与到例如帮助疾病儿童等的事业中。


It is obvious that he could one day become a tremendous ambassador of peace, or for children, working with the United Nations or another international organization.	很明显，他有可能会有一天同联合国或者其他国际组织合作成为一名重要的和平大使或者儿童大使。


But now the hero has fallen.	但是现在，这位英雄陨落了。


Zidane was not Superman, but a human being.	齐达内不是超人，而是凡夫俗子。


In a single instant of unfathomable fury, his moment of glory was transformed into one of madness and a curse.	在一刻极端愤怒中，他的荣耀时刻便成了疯狂和诅咒的时刻。


His tragedy is ultimately a personal one.	最终，他的悲剧是个人的。


Nevertheless, it would be a great loss – extending far beyond the world of football – if Zidane’s disgraceful exit as a player comes to define his legacy as a man.	但是，如果用齐达内不光彩的退出足坛确定他作为一个人的遗产，那么，这将是一个巨大的损失，其范围远远超过了足球世界。


The Transatlantic Muslim Divide	大西洋两岸穆斯林的差别


Compared with the tension that exists in Muslim communities across Europe, America’s Muslims are a more contented lot.	与遍布欧洲的穆斯林社区存在的紧张现状相比，美国的穆斯林可谓更为心满意足。


A recent Pew Forum study found Europe’s Muslims to be “markedly less well off than the general population, frustrated with economic opportunities and socially isolated,” while most American Muslims say that “their communities are excellent or good places” to live; 71% say they can succeed in the US if they work.	皮尤论坛最近的一项调查发现，欧洲的穆斯林“日子大大不如普通人，对经济机会缺乏感到沮丧，在社会上被孤立”，而大部分的美国穆斯林说“他们的社区很好或者不错”，71%的人说如果他们劳作的话就可以在美国成功。


Both income and college graduation levels match the national norms.	他们的收入和大学教育水平都与全国标准持平。


63% of American Muslims report no conflict between religious devotion and living in modern society.	63%的美国穆斯林并不表示在宗教忠诚和在现代社会中生存之间存在冲突。


Although 53% of US Muslims think that life is more difficult since the terrorist attacks of 2001, most think that this is the fault of the government, not their neighbors.	尽管53%的美国穆斯林认为从2001年恐怖袭击以来日子难过了一点，但是大多数认为这是政府的过错，而不是他们邻居的过错。


Indeed, 73% said they had never experienced discrimination while living in America. Moreover, 85% said suicide bombing is rarely or never justified, and only 1% said violence to defend Islam was “often” permissible.	而且，85%的人说难以或者根本无法为自杀式爆炸辩护，而且只有1%的人说使用暴力来捍卫伊斯兰是“经常”可以允许的。


In Europe, significantly higher percentages of Muslims believe that suicide bombings are “often” or “sometimes” justified.	在欧洲，明显更多数量比例的穆斯林相信可以“经常”或者“有时”可以为自杀式爆炸辩解。


“What emerges,” according to Amaney Jamal, an adviser to Pew, “is the great success of the Muslim American population in its socioeconomic assimilation.”	皮尤论坛的顾问杰梅尔说：“现在显现的情况是美国的穆斯林在其社会经济同化中的巨大成功。


Yet “assimilation” is not what succeeds.	”但是成功的并非是“同化”。


“Assimilation” means dissolving into the mainstream, but Muslim-Americans do not, remaining devoutly Muslim in a country overwhelmingly Christian.	“同化”意味着溶解到主流之中，但是美国穆斯林并非如此，他们在一个基督教占据绝大多数的国家虔诚地保持穆斯林信仰。


America’s Muslims do not so much assimilate as participate in economic, political, educational, and social life.	美国的穆斯林更多地并不是同化，而是参与经济、政治、教育以及社会生活之中。


This might reflect a self-selection process: only the most educated Muslims immigrate to America, as poor social services allow only the best-prepared to survive.	这可能反映了一个自我选择的进程，也就是说，由于贫乏的社会服务只能允许准备最为充分的人生存下来，因此只有教育水平最好的穆斯林移民到美国。


Yet even middle-class Muslims in Britain become alienated, and, unlike the Muslim poor in Europe, poor Muslims in America don’t express alienation or sympathy with al-Qaeda.	但是在英国，即使是中产阶级穆斯林也变得隔离于社会，而且，与欧洲穆斯林不同的是，美国的穆斯林穷人并不表达隔离之意或者对基地组织表示同情。


It can be argued that only those poor eager for the harsh but open possibilities of American life immigrate to the US.	可以这样说，只有那些渴望条件艰苦但是充满可能性的美国社会的穷人移民到美国。


Yet this doesn’t explain why these poorer immigrants remain religious; wanting to succeed US-style, they should want to be quick to “assimilate.”	但是这并不说明为什么这些更为贫穷的移民保持宗教信仰，因为如果他们想要以美国的方式成功的话，就应该很快“同化”。


Why do US Muslims do well while remaining devout and distinctive-looking?	为什么美国的穆斯林日子过得不错，而又保持虔诚以及与众不同的装束呢？


Why can they participate without assimilating?	为什么他们可以在不同化的情况下参与社会呢？


Two factors seem significant: first, relatively porous economic, political and educational arenas that allow immigrants entry to these key areas of American life.	看起来有两个因素非常重要。 第一，美国的经济、政治以及教育领域相对宽松，允许移民进入这些美国生活中的主要领域。


Despite the discrimination and poverty that immigrants often suffer initially, barriers to economic and political participation are relatively low.	尽管移民一开始会受到歧视和贫困，但是经济和政治参与的壁垒相对较低。


The second factor is America’s pluralistic public sphere, an arena not without religion but with many religions, which are visible and active in civil life as the basis for institutions, publications, and symbols that influence values and conduct.	这一领域不是没有宗教，而是有多种宗教。 这些宗教在市民生活中可以见到而且活跃不已。


The US is not a secular society; it is a religiously pluralistic one with secular legal and political structures.	它们构成了各种机构、出版物以及各种象征的基础，影响人们的价值观和行为。 美国并不是一个世俗社会，而是一个宗教多样性、具有世俗法律和政治结构的社会。


Indeed, America’s secular institutions were designed to support pluralism.	确实，美国的世俗机构是用来支持多样性的。


They allow people of many creeds to work in them—a workplace of multiple faiths.	它们允许多种信仰的人在里面工作，这也就是一个多种信仰的工作场所。


The prohibition against a state religion together with freedom of conscience preserves the plurality of religion in civil life.	禁止确立国教以及信仰自由保护了平民生活中宗教信仰的多元化。


This design was crafted not only from enlightened principle but from necessity: America needed to persuade people to cross the ocean and endure the hardships of the frontier and, later, industrialization.	这种设计不仅仅是来自于开明的原则，同时也有其必要性：美国需要劝说人们跨越大洋来忍受前线战事以及后来工业化的艰难困苦。


Freedom to practice one’s religion was an advertisement for America.	可以自由地从事自己的宗教信仰是美国的一个广告。


The benefit of that accidental generosity was the American deal: immigrants have to participate in the economic and political fracas of the nation, but without much of a social service safety “net.”	这种附带慷慨的利益是美国的协议：移民 必须 参与到这个国家经济和政治的纷争中，但是却没有一个社会服务安全“网”。


On the other hand, they can get in.	另一方面，他们可以进入到这个国家。


And they can keep not only their private faith but practice it publicly.	并且他们不但可以保持他们的个人信仰，同时可以在公开场合表达他们的信仰。


Tolerance for other people’s religion is the price paid for tolerance of one’s own.	对其他人宗教信仰的容忍是让别人容忍他们自己的宗教信仰所必须付出的代价。


Prejudice has tended to fall as participation increases.	在参与者增多后，偏见就很容易减少。


It has been in no one’s interest to disturb this live-and let-live pragmatism for very long.	长久以来，干涉这种自己生活同时也让别人生活的实用主义是不符合大家的利益的。


One result of the deal is the paradoxical-sounding “familiarity with difference.”	这种协议的一个结果是看似矛盾但却正确的“对于不同意见的习以为常”。


Because immigrants participate in America’s economic and political arenas, Americans are used to different sorts of people and so distinguish those differences that might damage the country from those that will not.	因为移民参与到美国经济和政治的领域，美国人习惯于不同种类的人以及那些可能会损害这个国家与那些不会损害这个国家的意见之间如此鲜明的差异。


Americans, indeed, are familiar with difference, or at least they tend not to panic.	事实上，美国人对于不同意见习以为常，至少他们不会感到悲哀。


Even after 2001, there were only a few anti-Muslim incidents.	即便在2001年后，也只发生过很少几次反对穆斯林的事件。


Europe, however, demands greater assimilation and offers a less porous economy and politics.	然而，欧洲却要求更大程度的同化，并且它的经济和政治领域并不那么能够宽松地进入。


This means less participation and thus less familiarity with difference on the host country’s side.	这意味着更少的参与以及在接纳这些移民的国家这一面对于差异更少的习以为常。


On the immigrants’ side, there is more resentment against the host, more lassitude about the economy and politics, possible violence or an insistence on maintaining symbolic differences—ironically, in a society less able to accept them precisely because of its discomfort with difference.	在移民这一面，他们对接纳他们的国家更加仇恨、更加懒得参与经济和政治生活、可能会诉诸暴力或者坚持维护形象上的差异。 具有讽刺意味的是，他们所处的社会正是因为对差异感到不快而不太愿意接受他们的。


This is Europe’s headscarf debate in a nutshell.	这正是欧洲在头巾问题上爆发争论的内在原因。


It speaks to none of the barriers to participation or to immigrant responses to them, but demands symbolic assimilation.	它既没有提到对移民参与社会生活的障碍也没有提到移民对这些障碍所做出的反应，而是要求在形象上的同化。


But such demands are a dead end.	但是这种要求只会让事情陷入僵局。


To get out of it, greater entry into the economy and politics is needed, but also less demand for quick-fix assimilation.	要摆脱这种僵局，我们需要放宽对经济和政治生活的限制，同时不再那么要求快速的同化。


All the religions that descend from Abraham have internal mechanisms for change that allow them to reckon with new circumstances in ways that the confessional community can respect.	所有从亚伯拉罕传承下来的宗教信仰都有为了获得宗派社会的尊重而考虑新的环境因素从而做出改变的内在机制。


Both fundamentalism and the demands of assimilation — be like us, now! — pre-empt these mechanisms.	原教旨主义和要求同化，都抢先一步制止了这些机制，现在就表现得像我们一样！


They should be allowed to work.	我们应该允许这些机制发生作用。


But Europe demands assimilation before participation in an economy that immigrants can’t get into anyway.	但是欧洲要求移民在参与他们根据无法进入的经济生活前先要同化。


This, sadly, is a road to the ghetto.	可悲的是，这正好使他们聚居在一起而无法融入到社会中。


The New Obama	新奥巴马


NEW YORK – After the second debate between US President Barack Obama and his Republican challenger, Mitt Romney, Obama’s supporters chorused in near-unison, “He’s back!”	纽约—美国总统奥巴马及其共和党挑战者罗姆尼第二次辩论后，奥巴马的支持者齐声唱道：“奥巴马归来！


The languid, disengaged, and lackluster performer of the first debate had disappeared, and the impressive, beloved figure of the victorious 2008 campaign had reappeared.	”第一次辩论中精神萎靡、心不在焉、乏善可陈的奥巴马消失了，取而代之的2008年大选中那个让人难忘、令人爱戴的胜利者。


As the commentator Andrew Sullivan put it, “I saw the person I first saw...I saw the president I thought I knew.”	评论员苏利文（Andrew Sullivan）说：“我看到了我第一眼看到的那个人……我看到了我自以为了解的总统。 ”


To my eye, however, the old Obama was not back.	但是，在我看来，奥巴马并没有归来。


A new Obama had appeared.	新奥巴马出现了。


The old Obama was youthful, charming, graceful, and full of hope.	旧奥巴马年轻、帅气、优雅、充满希望。


His demeanor was crisp yet easy-going.	他的举止轻快而随和。


His rhetoric soared.	他的演说慷慨激昂。


His smile could light up a stadium.	他的微笑可以点燃整个体育场。


The Obama on display in the second debate – and the third – was harder, chillier, sadder, and more somber.	出现在第二轮（和第三轮）辩论的奥巴马更犀利、更冷酷、更悲观，也更忧郁。


There was tension in the lines of his mouth.	他的言语有些紧张。


His speech was clipped, as if under continuous rigorous control.	他的演说不再从容，仿佛一直受着严格的控制。


His rhetoric did not soar, could not soar.	他的语调不再慷慨激昂，也无法慷慨激昂。


The smile was rare and constrained.	他的微笑只是偶尔浮现，而且显得扭扭捏捏。


But his command of detail and argument was rock solid.	但他对细节和辩论把握依然炉火纯青。


His sentences parsed.	他用语精到。


He spoke with a cold, disciplined energy.	他说话语调冷静、沉稳而不失激情。


In repose (as witnessed on the split screen in the reaction shots) he was often perfectly immobile, almost stony, as if posing for a portrait.	在说话间歇（可以通过脸部特写镜头分屏观察），他总是岿然不动，如同一尊肖像。


One word for all of this would be “presidential,” in the sense of competent, seasoned, and sobered by reality.	所有这些用一个词来概括，就是“总统范”，给人一种胜任、老练、清醒于现实的感觉。


But that word also connotes the fearsome qualities of ruthlessness and brutality that any honest portrayal of the office of President of the United States must include in our day.	但这个词也包含着无情和冷酷等令人担忧的含义，在现时代，任何写实的美国总统办公室形象都会给人这种印象。


Obama has inhabited the White House for four years; now the White House inhabits him.	奥巴马入主白宫已有四年； 如今，白宫在他身上打下了烙印。


Twice this autumn, Obama had already performed before tens of millions of people – in his acceptance speech at the Democratic convention and in the first debate.	今秋，奥巴马已经两次在数千万美国人面前展示了自己——在民主党大会的演讲中，以及在第一轮电视辩论中。


Each time, his performance was flat.	每一次，他的表现都乏善可陈。


At the convention, he seemingly hoped to summon the old Obama, to charm and soar, but that man was simply no longer available.	在党大会上，他似乎想让旧奥巴马振作起来，重现魅力和激情，但这个奥巴马早已不复存在。


The truth appears to be that his muse deserted him sometime in the first year of his presidency.	事实是，他的灵感源泉在他成为总统的第一年便已经枯竭。


The result was a simulacrum of the old Obama, as if he were acting the part of himself.	结果，旧奥巴马只剩下一个空壳，好像他正在扮演自己似的。


Then, in the first debate, no such futile effort was even made, and there was no Obama at all, neither old nor new.	接着，在第一次电视辩论中，奥巴马甚至连徒劳的模仿也不做了，旧奥巴马也好，新奥巴马也好，都荡然无存。


As so many commentators noted, in some sense he simply failed to show up.	很多评论员注意到，从某种程度上说，奥巴马的露面是一次彻头彻尾的失败。


Perhaps he also thought that, well ahead in the polls, he did not have to bother to engage the pesky fellow who imagined replacing him in the White House.	或许他也在想，在民调中遥遥领先的他不必与幻想取代他入主白宫的那个令人讨厌的家伙一般见识。


At the second debate, the loss of the old Obama was apparently accepted and a new one –existing, real, available, and now working in the Oval Office – made its first appearance.	在第二次辩论中，人们显然接受了旧奥巴马的消失和新奥巴马的初次登场——存在的、真实的、触手可及的、在椭圆办公室工作的奥巴马。


Has the presidency hardened Obama?	是总统经历让奥巴马更硬朗了吗？


Has it brutalized him?	总统经历让奥巴马更冷酷了吗？


There are reasons for thinking that it has.	有理由认为确实如此。


First, Obama has taken, perhaps, a heavier beating from his political opposition than most presidents.	首先，也许奥巴马受政治反对派的打击比大部分总统都要大。


The theme of Obama’s life, clearly expressed in his eloquent memoir Dreams from My Father, and shown in the recent Frontline documentary The Choice, is reconciliation. He is not a man whose identity was handed to him by birth.	奥巴马生活的主题是妥协，这一点可以从其雄辩的回忆录《我父亲的梦想》（Dreams from My Father）和最近《前线》（Frontline）纪录片《选择》（The Choice）中一览无余。


Born of a white mother and an absentee Kenyan father, residing in Indonesia as a boy, raised in adolescence by a white single mother in Hawaii, he was forced to figure out his place in life on his own.	他是草根出身，有一个白人母亲和一个始乱终弃的肯尼亚父亲，童年在印度尼西亚度过，青春期由白人单身母亲带着在夏威夷度过。 这样的出身和成长经历迫使他寻找属于自己的生命位置。


He found it in the idea of reconciliation – both racial and ideological.	他以妥协的思维——不管是种族上还是思想上——找到了这个位置。


That was the theme of his defining speech at the Democratic convention in 2004, with its famous line, “There is not a liberal America and a conservative America; there is the United States of America.”	这就是他在2004年民主党大会上的成名演讲的主题，与此同时闻名天下的还有一句名言：“不存���自由美国和保守美国； 只存在美利坚合众国。


It was to be the theme of his presidency.	这也成了日后其总统生涯的主题。


So, when an ideologically implacable Republican opposition, in his very first days in office, threw the vision back in his face, adopting a policy of scorched-earth opposition, the rejection was about more than policy – it affected his very being.	因此，当意识形态与其势不两立的共和党反对派在其入主白宫的第一天就采取焦土政策，把这一愿景当着他的面踩得粉碎的时候，其拒绝合作并非只关乎政策，而是影响到了奥巴马的为人。


The dreams from his father were at an end, and he was left, as he only slowly realized, with the themeless pragmatism that has become the hallmark of his administration.	他父亲的梦想被终结了，而他所有的只剩下无主题的实用主义，并成为他执政的鲜明印记，这一点他日后才逐渐认识到。


Unable to find common ground with the Republican opposition, he cut deals with the other powers that immediately surround the presidency: the military and security apparatus, big pharmaceutical companies, big banks, and big media.	由于无法与共和党反对派找到共同点，他与立刻包围其总统生涯的其他势力达成了一致：军事和安全机关、大型制药公司、大银行、大媒体。


Perhaps more important was the permission that he gave himself for violence and suppression of rights: drone strikes that have killed children as well as terrorists, the futile “surge” in Afghanistan, the continued operation of the prison at Guantánamo Bay, reliance on military tribunals, an unprecedented campaign against whistle blowers, and the assertion of a right to order the assassination of foreigners and Americans alike at his sole discretion.	也许更重要的是他允许自己对权利采取暴力和镇压：在清除恐怖主义者的同时杀害儿童的无人机空袭、徒劳的阿富汗“事变”、关塔那摩监狱的持续运营、以来军事法庭、对爆料人采取前所未有的行动，以及断言其本人拥有下达针对外国人和美国人的追杀令的自由裁量权。


All this, too, stood behind the performance of the man on stage during the second two debates.	所有这些也是后两场辩论中那个辩论者表现的背后原因。


And if he is elected, it is this man who will govern.	如果他当选了，那么将是这个人执政。


The Obama of 2008 is not back.	2008年的奥巴马并没有归来。


He is not coming back. He is gone forever.	他不会归来了，他已经永远消失了。


The Transition to Sustainability	向可持续发展过渡


NEW YORK – The global economic crisis will be with us for a generation, not just a year or two, because it is really a transition to sustainability.	纽约报道－全球经济危机将对我们造成的影响是一个世代，而不只是一两年时间的影响，因为这是真正意义上向可持续发展的过渡。


The scarcity of primary commodities and damage from climate change in recent years contributed to the destabilization of the world economy that gave rise to the current crisis.	近些年，大宗商品的缺乏以及气候变化所造成的损失引发了世界经济的动荡，并最终造成目前危机的爆发。


Soaring food and fuel prices and major natural disasters played an important role in undermining financial markets, household purchasing power, and even political stability.	食品与燃料价格的飚升与主要自然灾难在很多方面都起到了重要的影响，如破坏金融市场与居民的购买能力，甚至是破坏了政治的稳定。


Viewed in this way, an essential policy that developed and developing countries should pursue in overcoming the crisis is to build infrastructure suitable for the twenty-first century.	从这个角度来看，发达国家与发展中国家在克服危机所要积极采纳的必要措施，就应该是建立起适应21世纪发展的基础设施。 这些基建设施就包括了以下几个方面，其一，建立使用可再生能源且效率高的国家电网；


This includes an efficient electricity grid fed by renewable energy; fiber and wireless networks that carry telephony and broadband Internet; water, irrigation, and sewerage systems that efficiently use and recycle fresh water; urban and inter-city public transit systems; safer highways; and networks of protected natural areas that conserve biodiversity and the habitats of threatened species.	其二，建立能传送电话通信与宽带英特网的光纤网络与无线网络； 其三，建立用水、灌溉以及排水系统，该系统不仅要能高效地使用新鲜水资源，还要能重复使用这些水资源；


These investments are needed in the short term to offset the decline in worldwide consumption spending that underlies the global recession.	短期内，我们需要进行这些投资，来抵销全球范围内消费开支的下降，这是这种下降引发了全球的经济萧条。


More importantly, they are needed in the long term, because a world crowded with 6.8 billion people (and rising) simply cannot sustain economic growth unless it adopts sustainable technologies that economize on scarce natural resources.	更为重要的是，这种投资也需要长期进行，因为我们人类所生活的地球挤满了68亿人口（数量仍在增长中），它自身是无法实现经济的可持续增长，除非能采纳可持续发展的科学技术对稀有的自然资源进行有效利用。


In practice, the global crisis means that sustainable investments are being curtailed rather than expanded in the developing world.	实际上，全球经济危机意味着，发展中国家的可持续投资出现缩减，而不是增长。


As access to international bank loans, bond flotations, and foreign direct investment is lost, infrastructure projects talked about in the past are now being shelved, threatening the political and economic stability of dozens of developing countries.	由于这些国家无法得到国际贷款，无法发行公债并得到外国的直接投资，过去谈到的那些基建项目如今年都被搁置下来，这也就让众多的发展中国家的政治与经济稳定受到威胁。


In fact, every part of the world has a huge backlog of vital infrastructure investments.	事实情况是，世界上的每个区域都需要至关重要的基建投资，但却出现巨大的项目积压。


It is time for a concerted global effort to bring those projects on line.	现在是时候进行全球协作了，来把这些现在投资项目开动起来。


This is not easy to do.	但要去实行却并非易事。


Most infrastructure investment requires public-sector leadership to forge partnerships with the private sector.	多数的基建投资都需要国家公有部门做为领导力量，来与私有企业形成合作关系。


Typically, the public sector must enter into contractual agreements with private firms not only to build the infrastructure, but also to operate it as a regulated monopoly or on a concession basis.	一般而言，国家公有部门必须与私有企业签署合同协议，不仅要建造基础设施，而且要以受管制的垄断企业进行运营或对私有企业给予让步。


Governments generally lack the needed technical capacity to design such projects, opening up possibilities of favoritism and corruption when major contracts are awarded.  Such charges are likely to be hurled at governments even when they are not true, though all too often they are.	通常情况下，政府不具有所需要的技术力量来设计这些基建项目，以及在主要协议得到收益时无法揭露出可能出现徇私与腐败的地方。 尽管这种指控经常是真实的，但它在不属实的情况下可能会指向政府。


Still, the backlog of such projects is now wreaking havoc with the world economy.	这些基建项目的积压现在仍对世界经济造成非常严重的危害。


The world’s major cities are clogged with traffic jams and pollution. The atmosphere is filling with greenhouse gases from heavy use of fossil fuels.	世界主要城市出现交通堵塞与污染问题，城市的气候充满了大量使用生物燃料而产生的温室气体。


Water scarcity is hitting virtually every major economic center, from North America to Europe, Africa, India, and China.	水资源的缺乏问题几乎困扰着每个主要的经济中心，且范围涉及颇广，从北美到欧洲、非洲、印度以及中国。


Governments should thus strengthen their ministries of infrastructure (including power, roads, water and sanitation, and information and communication technologies), as well as their national development banks, so that they can properly design long-term infrastructure projects and programs.	就此，各国政府应该加强国家的各个基础建设部门（包括电力、道路、用水与卫生设施，以及信息与通信科技），同样需要提升国家各个发展银行的能力，这样才能正确地设计出长期的基建项目与实施方案。


The ability to offset the crisis in a constructive manner through expanded public-private partnerships will determine the subsequent success of countries and regions.	通过加大公私在基建方面的合作来抵消危机的能力将决定今后国家与地区在经济危机中的成败。


Interestingly, the US is about to create a National Infrastructure Bank for the first time.	颇为有趣的是，美国即将平生第一次建立起起家国家基建银行（来对国家基建项目推波助澜）。


Nevertheless, American and European economic advisers generally believe that a short sharp stimulus will be enough to restore economic growth.	然而，美国与欧洲的经济顾问通常都相信，一个为期短而有力的刺激方案就能足以恢复经济增长。


This is wrong.	这种观点是错误的。


What will be needed is an overhaul of the world economy towards sustainability.	真正所需要的是进行一场大的革新，以让世界经济朝着可持续发展的路上前进。


Moreover, policymakers in the rich world believe that they can continue to neglect the developing world, or leave it to its fate in global markets.	此外，富裕国家的决策人相信，他们能继续忽略发展中的国家，或者让这些国家在全球市场上自己打拼。


This is also a recipe for global failure, and even future conflict.	这种处理方式最终导致的仍是全球市场的萧条，甚至会导致未来的市场冲突。


Developed countries will have to do far more to help poor countries through the transition to sustainability.	发达国家需要通过向可持续发展的过渡来更多地帮助贫穷国家。


Whereas most of the “stimulus” legislation to date has been short-term and inward-looking, increased funding for sustainable infrastructure in poor countries would provide a powerful boost to rich-world economies.	鉴于目前多数的“刺激方案”的立法都是短期措施，并针对内需的发展，加强对贫穷国家的可持续基建的资金投入将能对富裕国家的经济起到非常大的推动作用。


Developed countries should agree to channel considerable savings to developing countries to finance the scale-up of sustainable investments.	发达国家应允诺向发展中国家提供相当大数量的储备资金，用于对他们可持续发展投资的加大提供财政援助。


This can be done directly on a bilateral basis, for example, through long-term loans from developed countries’ export-credit agencies.	这可以直接通过双边合作进行，比如说，通过发达国家的出口信贷机构进行长期国家贷款；


It can also be done multilaterally, by raising the infrastructure investment flows from the World Bank and the regional development banks (including the Inter-American Development Bank, European Investment Bank, African Development Bank, and Asian Development Bank).	这也可以通过多边关系进行，采取的途径可以是从世界银行与区域发展银行（包括泛美开发银行、欧洲投资银行、非洲开发银行与亚洲开发银行）来为基建投资进行筹资。


Both channels should be used.	上述这两种渠道都应该被使用。


Developed countries also fail to recognize that without much greater financing of sustainable infrastructure in the developing world – especially sustainable power generation and transmission – a global agreement on climate change later this year (or any time soon) will be impossible.	发展中国家同样未能看清一个事实，即在发展中国家如果对可持续发展的基建项目没有更多的财政预算——特别是发电与传输方面——那么今年晚些时候（或今后任何时候）将要进行谈判的气候变化协议就不可能实现。


The rich world somehow expects poor countries to restrict their use of fossil fuels without any significant help in financing new and sustainable sources of energy.	可富裕国家期待贫穷国家限制其对生物燃料的使用，而不为这些国家提供必不可少的财政援助去开发新的能源并进行能源资源的可持续发展。


In almost all of the rich-country proposals about targets, limits, commitments, and permits for greenhouse gases, there is hardly a word about helping poor countries to finance the transition to sustainable technologies.	在几乎所有富裕国家提出的关于温室气体目标、限制、承诺与许可的提议书中，几乎找不到一个词语是关于提供财政援助帮助贫穷国家实现可持续科技的过渡。


The G-20 meeting in London on April 2 offers hope for a true global effort to repair the failing world economy.	4月2日即将在伦敦召开的20国首脑会议充满了希望，即全球共同协作来拯救世界经济衰退的希望。


This is the time and place to launch the global drive toward sustainability.	现在启动实现可持续发展的动力，既应天时又拥有地利的条件。


If we fail to meet the challenge, the global crisis will endanger the world for years to come.	如果我们无法面对这种挑战，那么全球危机则将在未来的多年里让整个世界处于危险地带。


The Triumphant Return of John Maynard Keynes	凯恩斯的胜利回归


NEW YORK – We are all Keynesians now.	纽约—现在我们大家都变成凯恩斯主义者了。


Even the right in the United States has joined the Keynesian camp with unbridled enthusiasm and on a scale that at one time would have been truly unimaginable.	即便是美国的右派也加入到了凯恩斯主义的阵营中，他们都充满了无限的热情并且其规模在以前根本是无法想象的。


For those of us who claimed some connection to the Keynesian tradition, this is a moment of triumph, after having been left in the wilderness, almost shunned, for more than three decades.	对于像我们这些声称与凯恩斯主义的传统有某种关联的人来说，现在是一个胜利的时刻，毕竟在过去三十多年里，我们一直被遗忘甚至被回避。


At one level, what is happening now is a triumph of reason and evidence over ideology and interests.	从某种程度上说，现在所发生的事情是理性和证据对意识形态和利益的胜利。


Economic theory had long explained why unfettered markets were not self-correcting, why regulation was needed, why there was an important role for government to play in the economy.	经济理论早就解释了为什么不受管制的市场是无法自我纠正错误的，为什么需要监管，为什么政府在经济中发挥着重要的作用。


But many, especially people working in the financial markets, pushed a type of “market fundamentalism.”	但是有许多人尤其是那些在金融市场从业的人却在积极推动着一种“市场基要主义”。


The misguided policies that resulted – pushed by, among others, some members of US President-elect Barack Obama’s economic team – had earlier inflicted enormous costs on developing countries.	由此产生的被误导的政策其中曾经使发展中国家承受了巨大的代价。


The moment of enlightenment came only when those policies also began inflicting costs on the US and other advanced industrial countries.	美国侯任总统奥巴马的经济团队中的某些成员也在其中起过某些推动作用，只是在当这些政策开始给美国以及其他发达工业国家造成代价时人们才醒悟过来。


Keynes argued not only that markets are not self-correcting, but that in a severe downturn, monetary policy was likely to be ineffective.	凯恩斯指出不仅市场是无法自我纠正错误的，而且在一场严重的经济衰退中，货币政策在很多情况下是无效的。


Fiscal policy was required.	这时候更多需要的是财政政策。


But not all fiscal policies are equivalent.	但是并不是所有的财政政策都会产生同等的效应。


In America today, with an overhang of household debt and high uncertainty, tax cuts are likely to be ineffective (as they were in Japan in the 1990’s).  Much, if not most, of last February’s US tax cut went into savings.	在今天的美国，由于存在巨额的家庭债务和对形势高度的不确定性，减税很有可能不会产生效果（就像在二十世纪九十年代日本所发生的情况）。 去年二月份美国的减税有相当一部分如果不是绝大部分的话都被人们存进了银行。


With the huge debt left behind by the Bush administration, the US should be especially motivated to get the largest possible stimulation from each dollar spent.	面对布什政府遗留下的巨额债务，美国应该尽可能让花出去的每一分钱都发挥最大的刺激作用。


The legacy of underinvestment in technology and infrastructure, especially of the green kind, and the growing divide between the rich and the poor, requires congruence between short-run spending and a long-term vision.	在科技和基础设施，尤其是环保行业，投资过低以及贫富差距的拉大要求美国在短期支出和长远效果方面取得平衡。


That necessitates restructuring both tax and expenditure programs.	这就需要重新制定税收和开支计划。


Lowering taxes on the poor and raising unemployment benefits while simultaneously increasing taxes on the rich can stimulate the economy, reduce the deficit, and reduce inequality.	为穷人减税、提高失业津贴以及同时增加夫人的税收可以刺激经济、降低赤字以及缩小贫富差距。


Cutting expenditures on the Iraq war and increasing expenditures on education can simultaneously increase output in the short and long run and reduce the deficit.	减少在伊拉克战争上的开支以及提高在教育上的支出可以同时提高短期和长期的产出以及降低赤字。


Keynes was worried about a liquidity trap – the inability of monetary authorities to induce an increase in the supply of credit in order to raise the level of economic activity.	凯恩斯曾经担心流动性陷阱，即货币主管部门无力刺激信贷供应的增加以提高经济活动的水平。


US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has tried hard to avoid having the blame fall on the Fed for deepening this downturn in the way that it is blamed for the Great Depression, famously associated with a contraction of the money supply and the collapse of banks.	美联储主席伯南克一直在努力避免人们像在大萧条时期那样指责美联储加剧了经济的衰退，当时普遍的现象就是货币供应的紧缩和银行的大批倒闭。


And yet one should read history and theory carefully: preserving financial institutions is not an end in itself, but a means to an end.	但是人们应该认真地阅读历史和理论：保护金融机构本身并不是目的所在，而是达到目的的一种方式。


It is the flow of credit that is important, and the reason that the failure of banks during the Great Depression was important is that they were involved in determining creditworthiness; they were the repositories of information necessary for the maintenance of the flow of credit.	重要的是要促使信贷的流动，而大萧条时期银行的倒闭之所以显得那么重要是因为它们涉及到决定信用的可靠性。 它们是保持信贷流动所需要的信息的荟萃地。


But America’s financial system has changed dramatically since the 1930’s.	但是在二十世纪三十年代以后美国的金融体系已经发生了巨大的变化。


Many of America’s big banks moved out of the “lending” business and into the “moving business.”	美国的许多大银行已经走出了“借贷”业务而进入了“流动业务”。


They focused on buying assets, repackaging them, and selling them, while establishing a record of incompetence in assessing risk and screening for creditworthiness. Hundreds of billions have been spent to preserve these dysfunctional institutions.	它们把业务的重心放在购买资产、对它们进行重新包装然后再出售上，与此同时却在评估风险和进行筛选以确保信用的可靠上的低能达到了前所未有的水平。


Nothing has been done even to address their perverse incentive structures, which encourage short-sighted behavior and excessive risk taking.  With private rewards so markedly different from social returns, it is no surprise that the pursuit of self-interest (greed) led to such socially destructive consequences.	数千亿美元的资金被花在了保护这些功能失调的机构上，但是在处理它们那些鼓励短视行为和冒过大风险的不恰当的激励机制上却什么也没做。 由于对个人的奖励与对社会的回报差距是如此之大，我们不应该感到奇怪对个人利益的追逐（贪婪）最终导致了对社会破坏性的后果。


Not even the interests of their own shareholders have been served well.	甚至它们自己股东的利益也没有得到很好的照顾。


Meanwhile, too little is being done to help banks that actually do what banks are supposed to do – lend money and assess creditworthiness.	此外，对于那些真正在做银行被认为应该做的事情即贷款以及评估信用的那些银行的帮助非常之少。


The Federal government has assumed trillions of dollars of liabilities and risks.  In rescuing the financial system, no less than in fiscal policy, we need to worry about the “bang for the buck.”	联邦政府已经承担了价值数万亿美元的债务和风险。 在我们为拯救金融系统所花的钱并不亚于在财政政策上的支出时，我们应该担心的是钱是不是用在了刀刃上。


Otherwise, the deficit – which has doubled in eight years – will soar even more.	否则，在过去八年已经翻倍的赤字将会急剧上升。


In September, there was talk that the government would get back its money, with interest.	在九月份的时候，有人说政府将连本带利地收回它的钱。


As the bailout has ballooned, it is increasingly clear that this was merely another example of financial markets mis appraising risk – just as they have done consistently in recent years.	随着投入紧急援助的钱越来越多，大家越来越清楚地认识到这不过是金融市场错误地评估风险的又一个例子，就像它们在过去几年一直在做的那样。


The terms of the Bernanke-Paulson bailouts were disadvantageous to taxpayers, and yet remarkably, despite their size, have done little to rekindle lending.	伯南克和保尔森的紧急援助计划的条款对纳税人是不利的，并且值得注意的是，尽管规模如此之大，然而对于刺激贷款的重新发放做得却很少。


The neo-liberal push for deregulation served some interests well.	新自由主义推动放松监管满足了某些人的利益。


Financial markets did well through capital market liberalization.	金融市场在资本市场自由化的过程表现得非常出色。


Enabling America to sell its risky financial products and engage in speculation all over the world may have served its firms well, even if they imposed large costs on others.	使美国能够把它有巨大风险的金融产品兜售出去以及使全世界都参与到投机中可能服务了美国公司的利益，尽管这让其他国家背负了沉重的代价。


Today, the risk is that the new Keynesian doctrines will be used and abused to serve some of the same interests.	今天，我们所面临的风险在于新的凯恩斯主义教义将被运用和滥用来服务过去那帮人的利益。


Have those who pushed deregulation ten years ago learned their lesson?	那些在十年前鼓动放松监管的人真的吸取教训了吗？


Or will they simply push for cosmetic reforms – the minimum required to justify the mega-trillion dollar bailouts?	还是他们只是在推动表面的改革，付出最小的代价以表明这个数万亿美元救助计划的正确性？


Has there been a change of heart, or only a change in strategy?	他们的想法是否真的改变了，还是只是策略上的改变？


After all, in today’s context, the pursuit of Keynesian policies looks even more profitable than the pursuit of market fundamentalism!	不管怎样，在今天的背景下，采取凯恩斯主义的政策看上去比追求市场基要主义可以获得更大的利益！


Ten years ago, at the time of the Asian financial crisis, there was much discussion of the need to reform the global financial architecture.	十年以前，当亚洲金融危机爆发时，大家曾经纷纷议论需要改革全球金融体系。


Little was done.	但是最终付诸行动的却很少。


It is imperative that we not just respond adequately to the current crisis, but that we undertake the long-run reforms that will be necessary if we are to create a more stable, more prosperous, and equitable global economy.	我们对于当前的危机仅仅做出恰当的回应是不够的，我们必须进行必要的长期性改革，以便我们能创建一个更加稳定、更加繁荣并且均衡的全球经济。


The Triumph of Politics in Europe	欧洲政治的胜利


MADRID – Economics, particularly economic theories, always yield in the end to political imperatives.	马德里—经济学，特别是经济学理论，最后通常会屈服于政治指令。


That is why Europe’s fast-changing political landscape, reshaped by electoral insurrections in France and Greece against German-backed fiscal austerity, is bound to affect Europe’s economic policies as well.	正因如此，欧洲快速变化中的政治图景——拜法国和希腊反对德国支持的财政紧缩的选举乱象所赐——注定将影响到欧洲的经济政策。


Such an imperative has been at work throughout Europe’s postwar history.	这一现象在整个欧洲战后时期都存在。


Indeed, Europe’s shift from the modest customs union of the European Economic Community to the single market and common currency of today’s European Monetary Union was itself a fundamentally political move, one with strategic implications, of course.	事实上，欧洲从松散的关税同盟——欧洲经济共同体转变为单一市场，又转变为如今使用同一货币的欧洲货币联盟，其本身从根本而言就是一次政治运动，当然，这是一次具有战略影响的政治运动。


France wanted to tame German power by harnessing it to the European project, and Germany was prepared to sacrifice the Deutsche Mark for the sake of France’s acceptance of a united Germany, the nightmare of Europe’s recent past.	法国希望用欧洲工程将德国套住，以此限制德国的实力，而德国做好了牺牲马克换取法国接受统一的德国的准备——德国的分裂是欧洲一场的恶梦。


An economically robust Germany is, without doubt, vital to the European project, if only because history has shown how dangerous an unhappy Germany can be.	毫无疑问，经济稳健的德国对欧洲工程来说是至关重要的，光是想一想德国不愉快所造成的危险后果就能理解这一点。


Indeed, it was thanks to the euro – and the captive European market that goes with it – that Germany today is the world’s second-leading exporter (China surpassed it in 2009).	事实上，正是欧元让德国成了欧洲市场的主宰，成为当今世界第二大出口国（2009年被中国超越）。


Europe, however, has always found it difficult to come to terms with an over-confident, let alone arrogant, Germany.	但是，欧洲总是不能和过度自信（甚至目中无人）的德国形成妥协。


The current political turmoil in Europe shows that, regardless of how sensible Chancellor Angela Merkel’s austerity prescriptions for debt-ridden peripheral Europe might be in the abstract, they resemble a German Diktat.	最近的欧洲政坛乱象表明，不管从抽象角度看德国总理默克尔为重债外围国开出的紧缩药方是多么明智，其外表却总像是德国在颐指气使。


The concern for many is not just Europe’s historic “German problem,” but also that Germany could end up exporting to the rest of Europe the same ghosts of radical politics and violent nationalism that its economic success has transcended at home.	很多人所担忧的不仅仅是欧洲历史上的“德国问题”，他们还担心德国会把其在国内被经济上的成功所克服了的极端政治和暴力民族主义出口到欧洲其他国家。


Once the crisis became a sad daily reality for millions of unemployed – particularly for what appears to be a lost generation of young, jobless Europeans – EU institutions also became a target of popular rage.	当这场危机变成数百万人失业——特别是那些找不到工作、眼看将沦为失落的一代的欧洲年轻人——的悲惨现实时，欧盟机构也沦为了千夫所指的对象。


Their inadequacies – embodied in a cumbersome system of governance, and in endless, inconclusive summitry – and their lack of democratic legitimacy are being repudiated by millions of voters throughout the continent.	它们的失职——具体体现在臃肿的治理系统和迟迟拿不出结果的没完没了的峰会中——以及缺乏民主合法性正在受到欧洲大陆千百万选民的唾弃。


Europe’s experience has shown that the subordination of society to economic theories is politically untenable.	欧洲的历史经验表明，社会屈从于经济理论的关系在本质上是不可持久的。


Social vulnerability and frustration at the political system’s failure to provide solutions are the grounds upon which radical movements have always emerged to offer facile solutions.	因政治制度无法给出解决方案而导致的社会脆弱性和挫败感成了极端运动的温床，后者通常能够给出简单的解决办法。


A concomitant of such Kurzschluss between mainstream leaders and voters has always been the politics of accentuated ethnic identity, ultra-nationalism, and outright bigotry.	与这一主流领导人和选民之间的分歧相伴而生的是强调血统的政治、极端民族主义和彻底的偏见。


Former French President Nicolas Sarkozy ended up trying desperately to appeal to those very sentiments in his last-ditch effort to avert his political demise.	法国前总统萨科齐在为其连任做最后一搏时便使出了这一招数。


What we have seen across Europe of late is a rebellion of voters against mainstream politics.	我们看到，席卷欧洲的最新潮流是选民开始反对主流政治。


In the first round of French presidential elections, the extreme right and left received more than 30% of the vote, with Martine Le Pen’s anti-EU National Front threatening to supplant the center-right Union for a Popular Movement as the country’s new mainstream rightist party.	在法国大选的首轮投票中，极右翼和极左翼获得了超过30%的选票，勒庞的反欧盟国民阵线（National Front）差点挤掉中右翼的人民运动联盟（Union for a Popular Movement）成为法国新的主流右翼党派。


In Greece, the party system’s dangerous fragmentation into a range of smaller groups, combined with the robust emergence of a new anti-austerity left, Alexis Tsipras’s Syriza, and a neo-Nazi right, has plunged governance into to a state of total paralysis.	在希腊，政党体系出现了危险的分裂，形成了一系列小团体，加之新反紧缩左翼——奇普拉斯（Tsipras）的激进左翼联盟（Syriza）和新纳粹右翼的稳步崛起，让国家治理完全陷入了瘫痪状态。


Ironically, what the civilized protests of mainstream parties in peripheral Europe failed to achieve – a relaxation of the dogma of austerity – might come about as a result of the politics of brinkmanship proposed by the Greek radical left.	讽刺的是，外围欧洲国家对主流党派的文明示威所没能达到的目标——让紧缩教条有所放松有可能通过希腊极左翼所提出的铤而走险的政治实现。


By its blatant rebellion against German-dictated austerity, and by making Greek withdrawal from the euro a credible possibility, Syriza is bringing closer than ever the euro’s chaotic collapse in Europe’s periphery, if not beyond.	激进左翼联盟公然反对德国一言堂紧缩政策，并让希腊退出欧元区成为可信的威胁，从而将欧元在欧洲外围推向了前所未有的混乱崩溃边缘（如果说还不至于越界的话）。


By insisting that the choice is between new terms for the Greek bailout or a Doomsday scenario, Syriza could be creating the possibility for a quasi-Keynesian resolution of the European crisis.	激进左翼联盟坚持要么重新制定希腊援助计划，要么一拍两散，这倒有可能是在为欧洲危机闯出一条凯恩斯主义解决之路。


Tsipras might be “impetuous,” as his mainstream adversaries from the center-left Pasok and the center-right New Democracy would say, but he is not irrational.	奇普拉斯也许有些“冲动”，其中左翼泛希腊社会运动党（Pasok）和中右翼新民主党的竞争对手会如是说，但绝不是非理性的。


His is a rather sober reading of reality: the austerity plan has become a highway to social hell for his countrymen, and would likely condemn Greece to long years of ruinous depression within a permanent debt trap, and possibly to a breakdown of democracy.	他的口号可谓对现实有着清醒的认识：对他的同胞来说，紧缩计划不啻通往社会地狱的高速公路，可能会让希腊陷入多年的破坏性衰退，在甩不掉的债务陷阱中苦苦挣扎，甚至可能导致民主制度崩溃。


Merkel’s now legendary obstinacy eventually might have to succumb to the imperatives of politics.	默克尔的顽固也称得上传奇了，但最终怕是仍要不得不屈服于政治。


It is one thing to ignore European Commission President José Manuel Barroso’s call for a more flexible economic policy, and quite another to dismiss out of hand the powerful message coming from French and Greek voters.	忽视欧盟委员会主席巴罗佐关于加强经济政策灵活性的呼吁是一回事，不管不顾法国和希腊选民的声音则是完全不同的另一回事。


Nor is it a minor political headache for Merkel to have to face an anti-austerity alliance of Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti and the new French president, François Hollande.	如何面对意大利总理蒙蒂和新当选的法国总统奥朗德组成的反紧缩联盟对默克尔来说同样是个不小的政治难题。


Spain’s capacity to withstand an austerity “cure” that only sinks it deeper into recession must also have its limits.	西班牙抵制只能让其陷入更深衰退的紧缩“治疗”的能力也必然有个限度。


So now Germany’s finance ministry, the guardian of fiscal rectitude, is considering measures such as using the European Investment Bank to foster growth, issuing EU “project bonds” to finance infrastructure investment, and allowing wages in Germany to rise at a faster pace than in the rest of Europe.	因此，如今作为财政诚实的捍卫者，德国财政部长正在考虑实行诸如通过欧洲投资银行提振增长、发行欧盟“项目债券”为基础设施投资以及允许德国工资增速超过其他欧洲国家之类的措施。


The imminent – indeed, inevitable – victory of politics over recalcitrant economics may well be at hand.	政治眼看就要获得对顽固经济学家的胜利了——事实上，此乃不可避免之事。


The Trouble with Hope	希望的麻烦


PARIS – America’s presidential election campaign is being followed in Europe with passionate interest.	巴黎amp#45;amp#45;欧洲正在热切关注美国的总统大选。


It is seen as a long saga full of surprises.	人们认为这一选举精彩纷呈。


The human and intellectual qualities of the three remaining candidates are even viewed with some envy on this side of the Atlantic, where you can hear statements such as: “Could we borrow just one of your candidates?”	大西洋这边对三位剩下的侯选人的人格和智力素质难免有点嫉妒。 人们可以听到这样的话：“我们能不能只借一个侯选人呢？


Many Europeans feel all three candidates are superb, and that, contrast to previous elections, America is suffering from an embarrassment of riches.	”许多欧洲人感到三个侯选人都非常杰出，而且与以往选举不同的是，美国正在由于过于人才济济而尴尬。


But Europeans’ interest in this presidential election cannot mask the fact that what they expect from it is far from clear.	但是欧洲人对这一总统选举的兴趣并不掩盖这一事实，也就是他们对这一选举的期望还很不明朗。


Europeans may want a more “normal” America, closer to their own values, but they simultaneously worry that a more modest America would demand more of them in the realm of “hard” military power.	欧洲人可能想要一个更为“正常”、更为贴近他们自己的价值观的美国，但是他们与此同时也担心一个更为谦虚的美国将会在“硬性”的军事实力上对欧洲提出更多的要求。


America as a model or America as a protector – this “European dilemma” is in itself new.	美国作为一种模式还是作为一个保护人，这一“欧洲难题”本身就是新的。


For, in the immediate aftermath of World War II, most Europeans viewed the United States as both its defender against the Soviet Union’s expansionist aims and the key external actor for their deeply wounded continent’s moral and economic reconstruction.	因为，在第二次世界大战结束不久，大多数欧洲人把美国既看作防止苏联扩张主义目标的保护人，又是深受伤害的欧洲大陆道德和经济重建的关键外部力量。


This is no longer the case.	现在已经不是如此了。


The collapse of the USSR, America’s self-inflicted wounds – particularly in Iraq – and the spectacular rise of Asia have changed European perceptions of the US.	苏联的解体、美国特别是在伊拉克的自残以及亚洲令人瞩目的崛起已经改变了欧洲人对美国的感觉。


America is no longer the protector or model that it used to be, nor is it alone in terms of influence and power.	美国已经不再是以往的保护人或模式了，而且在影响力和实力上也不是如此了。


One can even say that the European Union has slowly become a “normative” force in the world in reaction to the evolution of America’s power.	人们甚至可以说，欧盟已经缓慢地成为世界上相对美国实力演进的“名义”力量。


Europe has long known that it could never balance America in the realm of “hard power”; but, with the decline of America’s “soft power,” it became more important than ever to incarnate the “humane” and law-abiding face of the West.	欧洲长久以来知道它在“硬实力”上永远不可能与美国分庭抗礼； 但是，随着美国“软实力”的衰落，体现西方的“人性化”和遵守法律就比以往更为重要。


In this sense, Europe has come to see itself, at least in part, as an alternative dream for everyone who had stopped dreaming about America.	在这一意义上，欧洲至少部分把自己视为那些不再对美国抱有梦想的人的替换梦想。


But, seen from within, the EU model often appears less convincing.	但是，从内部来看，欧洲模式看起来没有那么令人信服。


Thus, many Europeans continue to be nostalgic for America as a model.	这样，许多欧洲人继续对美国作为一种模式抱有怀旧情绪。


For these Europeans, Barack Obama, campaigning under the banner of “hope,” is the ideal choice to restore, as if by magic, America’s soft power.	对于这些欧洲人而言，在“希望”的旗帜下竞选的奥巴马好像是魔术般恢复美国软实力的理想人选。


After all, he himself incarnates the American Dream.	毕竟，他自己就体现了美国梦想。


But some Europeans prefer Hillary Clinton or even John McCain, because they are apprehensive about the consequences for America’s European partners of a more restrained and less experienced president.	但是有些欧洲人更偏好希拉里·克林顿甚至是麦凯恩，因为他们对于一位更为节制、经验并不老道的总统对美国的欧洲夥伴带来的影响感到担心。


They worry about not only competence, but also the old transatlantic issue of “burden sharing.”	他们并不只是担心能力，而且还有美欧“责任分摊”老问题。


The implicit question behind some European reservations about Obama may be formulated in one question: “Will we have to do more in Afghanistan and beyond?”	这些欧洲人对奥巴马持有保留背后隐含的问题可以概括为：“我们是否要在阿富汗和其他地方做得更多吗？ ”


Could the restoration of America’s international reputation turn out to be bad for Europe, by eroding its new monopoly on representing Western values and calling it back to its hard power duties?	通过侵蚀美国在代表西方价值观并且在硬实力责任上退缩来恢复美国的国际声誉是否对于欧洲而言得不偿失呢？


Could it be that a candidate of fear – McCain or, increasingly, Clinton – really serves Europe’s interests better than a candidate of hope?	令人害怕的侯选人像麦凯恩或者害怕程度越来越高的希拉里·克林顿是否确实要比一个让人怀有希望的侯选人更为符合欧洲的利益呢？


With Obama in power, it would become – at least initially – more difficult for Europeans to denounce America, even if the “New France” of Nicolas Sarkozy has already moved away from this easy temptation.	奥巴马一旦当选，欧洲人至少在开始阶段更为难以批评美国，即使是萨尔科奇的“新法国”也已经偏离了这一轻而易举的诱惑。


But it would also be less easy to reject a call for greater burden sharing in the world.	但是同样也不再容易拒绝分摊更多的世界责任的呼吁。


This “defensive” view of transatlantic relations is problematic.	这一美欧关系的“被动”观点是有问题的。


The best America for Europe and the world is a confident America – an America that sheds its culture of fear and rediscovers the roots of its culture of hope.	对于欧洲和世界而言最好的就是一个自信的美国，这一美国摆脱了害怕的文化并且重新发现了其充满希望的文化的根基。


This is Obama’s America.	这就是奥巴马的美国。


Of course, the greater your expectations are, the greater the risk of disappointment.	当然，你的期望越大，失望的风险也越大。


But, after eight years of America’s self-imposed isolation under Bush, it is a risk worth taking.	但是，美国经历了布什当权八年自我隔绝之后，这个风险值得去冒。


Even if America is no longer the world’s only superpower, it still remains the “indispensable nation.”	即使美国不再是世界上唯一的超级大国，它还是一个“不可或缺”的国家。


So Europeans are right to be fascinated by America’s presidential election.	所以，欧洲人对美国总统选举着迷是有道理的。


Regardless of who wins, the consequences of the outcome will reverberate throughout the world.	无论谁胜出，大选结果的影响都将会冲击世界。


The Trouble With Interest Rates	利率的麻烦


BERKELEY – Of all the strange and novel economic doctrines propounded since the beginning of the global financial crisis, the one put forward by John Taylor, an economist at Stanford, has a good claim to being the oddest.	伯克利—全球金融危机爆发后出现了许多怪异新颖的经济思想，其中最另类也许要数斯坦福大学经济学家约翰·泰勒（John Taylor）提出的理论。


In his view, the post-crisis economic policies being carried out in the United States, Europe, and Japan are putting a ceiling on long-term interest rates that is “much like the effect of a price ceiling in a rental market where landlords reduce the supply of rental housing.”	在他看来，美国、欧洲和日本在危机后所采取的经济政策是给长期利率施加上限，这“很像是给房租减少了租房供给量的租房市场施加价格上限所产生的效应。


The result of low interest rates, quantitative easing, and forward guidance, Taylor argues, is a “decline in credit availability [that] reduces aggregate demand, which tends to increase unemployment, a classic unintended consequence.”	”泰勒说，低利率、量化宽松和前瞻指引的结果是“信用越来越难以获得，以至于降低了总需求，而总需求的降低总是会增加失业，这是经典的意料外后果。 ”


Taylor’s analogy fails to make sense at the most fundamental level.	泰勒的比方在根本上毫无意义。


The reason that rent control is disliked is that it forbids transactions that would benefit both the renter and the landlord.	房租管制不受待见的原因是它禁止了能让租客和房东都获益的交易。


When a government agency imposes a rent ceiling, it prohibits landlords from charging more than a set amount.	当政府机构施加房租上限时，它禁止房东要求给定数额以上的房租。


This distorts the market, leaving empty apartments that landlords would be willing to rent at higher prices and preventing renters from offering what they are truly willing to pay.	这扭曲了市场，让房东愿意以更高价格用来出租的公寓空置，也让租客无法以他们愿意支付的价格租到房子。


With the economic policies Taylor criticizes, this mechanism simply does not exist.	对于泰勒所批评的经济政策，根本不存在这一机制。


When a central bank reduces long-term interest rates via current and expected future open-market operations, it does not prevent potential lenders from offering to lend at higher interest rates; nor does it stop borrowers from taking up such an offer.	当央行通过当前或预期的未来公开市场操作降低长期利率时，它并不阻止潜在贷款人要求更高的贷款利率； 它也不阻止借款人接受这一要求。


These transactions don’t take place for a simple reason: borrowers choose freely not to enter into them.	这些交易之所以不发生，只有一个简单的原因：借款人自由地选择了不贷款。


So how does Taylor arrive at his analogy?	那么，泰勒为何要打这样的比方？


My intuition is that his reasoning has become entangled with his beliefs about the free market.	我的直觉是他的逻辑与他对自由市场的信念纠结在了一起。


Taylor and others who share his view probably begin with a sense that current interest rates are too low.	泰勒和其他同意他的观点的人也许是从这样一个感觉开始的：当前利率过低了。


Given their belief that the free market cannot fail (it can only be failed), they naturally assume that some government action must be behind the unnaturally low rates.	他们相信自由市场不可能失灵（只能“被失灵”），自然地假设不自然的低利率背后必存在某些政府行为。


The goal then becomes to figure out what the government has done to make interest rates so wrong.	于是，其目标变成了找到那些政府行为导致利率如此错误。


And, because any argument that treats government action as appropriate can only be a red herring, the analogy to rent control emerges as one of the possible solutions.	而由于任何人为政府行为合适的说辞都会被解读为文过饰非，于是以房租管制打比方就成为可行的方案之一。


If my intuition is correct, Taylor and his fellow travelers will never be convinced that they are wrong.	如果我的直觉正确，那么泰勒及其同道永远不会相信他们错了。


Accepting the idea that central bankers may be doing the best they can in a difficult situation would require entertaining the possibility that markets are imperfect and fallible.	央行行长可能已经做了他们能在困难情况下所做的一切，接受这一观点需要承认市场可能不完美，可能会犯错。


And that is one thing they will never do.	而这是他们绝不会做的事。


We have seen this play out before.	我们曾经看到过这样的情况。


Five years ago, Taylor and his intellectual allies wrote an “Open Letter to Ben Bernanke,” warning that the quantitative easing planned by the Federal Reserve’s then-chairman risked “currency debasement and inflation.”	五年前，泰勒及其知识界同道写了一封“致本·伯南克的公开信”，警告时任美联储主席伯南克所计划的量化宽松有可能“导致货币贬值和通货膨胀”。


But, although their prediction turned out to be spectacularly wrong, that has not led Taylor or any of the other signatories to rethink their theories or to consider that perhaps Bernanke knows something about monetary economics.	但是，尽管他们的预言大错特错，但这并没有让泰勒以及其他所有署名者反思他们的理论或考虑也许伯南克是懂一些货币经济学的。