When the problem is finally acknowledged, it is usually already an emergency, and rescue efforts all too often focus on propping up irresponsible lenders rather than on facilitating economic recovery.	当问题最终被承认时，常常已经陷入了紧急状态，而救援行动又常常着重于支持不负责任的贷款人，而不是便利经济复苏。


To make matters worse, when a compromise is reached, the burden falls disproportionately on the debtor, in the form of enforced austerity and structural reforms that make the residual debt even less sustainable.	更糟糕的是，当妥协达成时，债务人要接受绝大部分负担——以强迫紧缩和结构改革的形式，结果是剩余债务更加不可持续。


Furthermore, the recent strengthening of creditor rights and the growth of bond financing has made sovereign-debt restructuring enormously complex and open to abuse by highly speculative holdout investors, including so-called vulture funds.	此外，最近对债权人权利的强化以及债券融资的增加让主权债务重组变得非常复杂，被包括所谓的兀鹫基金在内的高度投机性的坚决不让步的资者滥用。


As consensus grows regarding the need for better ways to restructure debt, three options have emerged.	关于需要更好的方法重组债务，人们正在日渐达成共识，有三个选项浮出了水面。


The first would strengthen bond markets’ legal underpinnings, by introducing strong collective-action clauses in contracts and clarifying the pari passu (equal treatment) provision, as well as promoting the use of GDP-indexed or contingent-convertible bonds. This approach would be voluntary and consensual, but it would miss large parts of the debt market and do little to support economic recovery or a return to sustainable growth.	第一个选项是强化债券市场的法律基础，在合同中引入强集体行动条款并澄清同等权利（公平对待）条款，同时促进GDP指数债券或视情况可转换（contingent-convertible）债券的使用。


A second approach would focus on building a consensus around soft-law principles to guide restructuring efforts.	第二个方法着重于围绕软法律原则构建共识以指导重组措施。


The core principles – those under discussion include sovereignty, legitimacy, impartiality, transparency, good faith, and sustainability principles – currently would apply to all debt instruments and could provide greater coordination than market-based approaches.	核心原则——正在讨论中的包括主权、合法性、无偏性、透明性、善意性和持续性原则——目前将用于所有债务工具，提供比市场方法更多的合作。


But, although this effort has the advantage of familiarity, it would be non-binding, with no guarantee that a critical mass of parties would adhere to it.	但是，尽管这一措施具有为人所熟悉的优点，但它不具有约束性，无法保证足够多的相关方遵守。


The third option would attempt to resolve this coordination problem through a set of rules and norms agreed in advance as part of an international debt-workout mechanism that would be similar to bankruptcy laws at the national level.	第三个选择是尝试通过一组事先形成一致的、作为类似于国家层面的破产法的国际债务分期偿还机制的规则和规范解决这一合作问题。


Its purpose would be to prevent financial meltdowns in countries facing difficulties servicing their external debt and to guide their economies back toward sustainable growth.	其目的是防止难以维持外部债务的国家出现金融崩溃，并指导这些国家的经济重回可持续增长。


The mechanism would include provisions allowing for a temporary standstill on all payments due, whether private or public; an automatic stay on creditor litigation; temporary exchange-rate and capital controls; the provision of debtor-in-possession and interim financing for vital current-account transactions; and, eventually, debt restructuring and relief.	该机制将包括允许暂时停止一切偿付（不管是私人债务还是公共债务）的条款、自动搁置债权人诉讼、实施临时性汇率和资本管制、债务人控制条款和关键经常项目交易过渡性融资，以及最终的债务重组和纾困。


Evidence from Ghana, Greece, Puerto Rico, Ukraine, and many other countries shows the economic and social damage that unsustainable debts can cause when they are improperly managed.	来自加纳、希腊、波多黎各、乌克兰和其他许多国家的证据表明，不合理地管理不可持续债务所带来的经济和社会损失可能十分巨大。


In September, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a set of principles to guide sovereign-debt restructuring.	9月，联合国大会通过了一系列原则指导主权债务重组。


This is an important step forward, but much remains to be done to prevent much from coming undone as the global economy confronts the looming wall of debt.	这是重要的一步，但在全球经济面临迫在眉睫的债务墙的时候，还需要做更多的事防止不作为。


How Much Development Data Is Enough?	多少发展数据算够？


NAIROBI – Rapid advances in technology have dramatically lowered the cost of gathering data.	内罗毕—科技的迅速进步极大地降低了收集数据的成本。


Sensors in space, the sky, the lab, and the field, along with newfound opportunities for crowdsourcing and widespread adoption of the Internet and mobile telephones, are making large amounts of information available to those for whom it was previously out of reach.	太空、天空、实验室和实地传感器，以及新兴的众包机会和已得到广泛使用互联网和移动电话正在让人们获得从前无从获得的巨量信息。


A small-scale farmer in rural Africa, for example, can now access weather forecasts and market prices at the tap of a screen.	比如，如今非洲农村地区的小农轻点屏幕就可以了解天气预报和市场价格。


This data revolution offers enormous potential for improving decision-making at every level – from the local farmer to world-spanning development organizations.	数据革命为改善个层面决策提供了巨大的潜力——不论是本地农民还是业务遍布全球的发展组织。


But gathering data is not enough.	但光是收集数据是不够的。


The information must also be managed and evaluated – and doing this properly can be far more complicated and expensive than the effort to collect it.	还必须管理和评估信息——合理地完成这一任务可能远比收集数据更复杂、更昂贵。


If the decisions to be improved are not first properly identified and analyzed, there is a high risk that much of the collection effort could be wasted or misdirected.	如果需要改善的决策从一开始无法得到合理的识别和分析，就极有可能让巨大的集体努力付诸东流或出现方向性错误。 。


This conclusion is itself based on empirical analysis.	这一结论本身便是基于实证分析。


The evidence is weak, for example, that monitoring initiatives in agriculture or environmental management have had a positive impact.	比如，监测农业或环境管理项目能带来积极影响，这一观点的支持证据很弱。


Quantitative analysis of decisions across many domains, including environmental policy, business investments, and cyber security, has shown that people tend to overestimate the amount of data needed to make a good decision or misunderstand what type of data are needed.	多个领域——包括环境政策、商业投资和网络安全——的量化决策分析表明，人们倾向于高估做出好决策所需要的数据量或误解需要的数据类型。


Furthermore, grave errors can occur when large data sets are mined using machine algorithms without having first having properly examined the decision that needs to be made.	此外，如果只使用机器算法挖掘大数据集而不首先合理地考察需要作出的决策，就可能谬以千里。


There are many examples of cases in which data mining has led to the wrong conclusion – including in medical diagnoses or legal cases – because experts in the field were not consulted and critical information was left out of the analysis.	数据挖掘导致错误结论的情况不胜枚举——包括用药剂量和法律案例——原因是没有咨询相关领域的专家，导致关键信息被排除在分析之外。


Decision science, which combines understanding of behavior with universal principles of coherent decision-making, limits these risks by pairing empirical data with expert knowledge.	决策科学将人们对行为的理解与一致决策的基本原理相结合，它能够让实证数据与专家知识相匹配，从而降低这类风险。


If the data revolution is to be harnessed in the service of sustainable development, the best practices of this field must be incorporated into the effort.	如果我们想让数据革命有利于可持续发展，那么就必须将该领域的最佳实践纳入。


The first step is to identify and frame frequently recurring decisions.	第一步是识别和框定频繁循环决策。


In the field of development, these include large-scale decisions such as spending priorities – and thus budget allocations – by governments and international organizations.	在发展领域，这些决策包括大规模决策，如政府和国际组织的支出重点——从而决定预算配置。


But it also includes choices made on a much smaller scale: farmers pondering which crops to plant, how much fertilizer to apply, and when and where to sell their produce.	但也包括规模小得多的选择：农民要决定种植哪种庄稼、使用多少肥料，何时以及在哪里出售收成。


The second step is to build a quantitative model of the uncertainties in such decisions, including the various triggers, consequences, controls, and mitigants, as well as the different costs, benefits, and risks involved.	第二步是在这些决策中建立不确定性的量化模型，包括各种触发因素、后果、控制因素和缓和因素，以及其中所牵涉到的不同成本、收益和风险。


Incorporating – rather than ignoring – difficult-to-measure, highly uncertain factors leads to the best decisions.	纳入——而不是忽略——难以测量、高度不确定的因素才能带来最佳决策。


When put in the service of sustainable development, such a model will often involve projecting the impact of interventions on livelihoods and the environment over several decades.	在可持续发展方面，这类模型常常包括预测未来数十年中干预对生计和环境的影响。


This process is most successful when stakeholders as well as experts are recruited to identify the relevant variables and their relationships.	这一过程要想获得成功，就必须让相关利益方和专家一起梳理重要变量和它们之间的关系。


These participants must be trained to provide quantitative estimates of their uncertainty for the different variables.	这些参与者必须受过训练，能够提供不同变量的不确定性的量化估计。


For example, experts might estimate with 90% confidence, based on available data and their own experience, that farmers’ average maize yields in a given region are 0.5-2 tons per hectare.	比如，基于可获得的数据和自身经验，专家可能以90%的置信度估算出某给定区域的农民平均玉米收成为每英亩0. 5—2吨。


The third step is to compute the value of obtaining additional information – something that is possible only if the uncertainties in all of the variables have been quantified.	第三步是计算获取更多信息的价值——只有在所有变量的不确定性都得到量化之后，这一步才有可能实现。


The value of information is the amount a rational decision-maker would be willing to pay for it.	信息的价值等于理性决策者愿意为此付出多少钱。


So we need to know where additional data will have value for improving a decision and how much we should spend to get it.	因此，我们需要知道新增信息对于改进决策的价值在哪里，以及我们应该花多少钱获得它。


In some cases, no further information may be needed to make a sound decision; in others, acquiring further data could be worth millions of dollars.	在某些情况中，做出可靠决策不需要更多的数据； 但在另一些情况中，获得更多数据可谓价值连城。


This process is repeated until there is no further value in acquiring data and a sound decision – a logical conclusion, based on the information, values, and preferences of the decision-makers or decision-making body – is reached.	这一过程会反复进行，直到获得信息已再无价值，并且可靠的决策已经达到。 可靠的决策是指基于信息、价值和决策者或决策机构的偏好所做出的合乎逻辑的结论。


It provides decision-makers and stakeholders insights into how to improve policies to maximize positive outcomes and reduce risks, such as the possibility of low rates of adoption or limited institutional capacity for effective implementation.	它向决策者和相关利益方提供关于如何改善政策从而最大化积极结果并降低风险（比如发生低通过率的可能性或机构缺乏有效实施的能力）的洞见。


It is not enough simply to assume that the data revolution will benefit sustainable development.	简单地认为数据革命一定有利于可持续发展是不够的。


Ensuring that it does will require recognizing the importance of rigorous analysis in every data-collection effort and the formation of a new generation of decision scientists to work alongside policymakers.	确保这一结果需要认识到严格分析在每一次数据收集工作中的重要性，以及培养新一代决策科学家与决策者合作的重要性。


Decision Time for the Eurozone	欧元区的抉择时刻


ATHENS – Germany’s arguments against introducing Eurobonds, expanding the eurozone’s bailout fund, and instituting a comprehensive system of economic governance are transparent and easy to understand.	雅典——德国人反对引入欧元债券、扩大欧元区援助基金以及建立完整的经济治理体系，他们的态度是公开的，立场也是可以理解的。


But are they right?	但他们就一定对吗？


The Germans fear that such innovations would lead to a rise in domestic borrowing costs, and to direct and indirect fiscal transfers to poorer countries.	德国人担心，这样的举措会导致国内借贷成本上升，并造成流向穷国的直接或间接的财政转移。


Moreover, they warn of the moral hazard generated by relieving over-indebted countries from the pressure to put their public finances in order.	此外，他们警告说，纾缓过度负债国的负担以使它们的公共财政恢复有序状态会造成道德风险。


Third, they cite treaty-related and constitutional difficulties in establishing rules and procedures that would simulate a “fiscal union.”	第三，他们还抬出了条约和宪政方面的理由，说确定刺激“财政联盟”形成的规则和程序十分困难。


Finally, the need to move ahead with European unification in order to legitimize the inevitable infringement of over-indebted countries’ sovereignty might eventually infringe upon German sovereignty as well.	最后，将欧洲统一起来共同前进，以使过度负债国主权不可避免地有所损失的需要最终也会让德国的主权受到损失。


On the other hand, refusing to accept the growing consensus that fiscal union is the key to resolving the debt crisis exposes the eurozone, and Germany, to serious risks.	另一方面，拒绝接受人们日渐一致的观点——财政联盟是解决债务危机的关键——将使欧元区和德国面临重大风险。


Sticking to half-measures exacerbates markets’ impatience and provokes increasingly determined speculative attacks, not only on the weaker peripheral countries, but also on core AAA-rated countries – like France and, eventually, Germany itself – whose banking sectors hold large volumes of peripheral countries’ debt.	半死不活的政策将使市场变得不耐烦，也会激起早已准备就绪的投机袭击，不光疲软的外围国家要遭殃，核心的AAA国家如法国（最终还有德国自己）也脱不了干系——它们的银行部门持有着巨量的外围国家债务。


Indeed, weakening banking conditions are emerging as a major threat to the eurozone’s recovery and stability.	事实上，银行情况恶化正在成为欧元区复苏和稳定的主要威胁。


In the event of sovereign defaults, moreover, the cost of bailing out the banks may far exceed the cost of issuing Eurobonds or instituting a reasonable transfer regime.	此外，如果发生了主权违约，援助银行的成本可能会远高于发行欧元债券或建立合理的转移支付机制。


Investors need to be reassured that debt-service costs are under control, and that debt volumes and deficit limits are firmly monitored in order to minimize default risks and strengthen banks’ ability to lay the groundwork for sustainable growth.	投资者需要获得保证，债务付息成本处于可控状态、债务规模和赤字上限被严密监控以使违约风险最小化并使银行能够成为可持续增长的扎实根基。


In fact, the emerging systemic risk concerning the sustainability of the eurozone produces a vicious circle.	事实上，当前浮现的欧元区可持续性系统风险造成了一个恶性循环。


Systemic risk raises doubts about the solvency of over-indebted countries, which means that these countries’ efforts to consolidate their fiscal position and promote reform do not lead to improvement in financial conditions, which is essential for overcoming the crisis and promoting recovery.	系统风险产生了对过度负债国偿债能力的质疑，这意味着这些国家整合财政并推进改革的努力并不会让财政状况有所改善，而财政状况的改善是克服危机、促进复苏的关键。


As a result, fiscal consolidation becomes increasingly difficult to achieve, inviting renewed speculative attacks.	结果，财政整合变得越来越难以实现，从而导致新一轮投机袭击。


Moreover, viewed from a wider perspective, economic and social turbulence on Europe’s southern periphery will constitute a geopolitical risk.	此外，从更广泛的角度看，欧洲南部外围国家的经济和社会动荡将造成地缘政治风险。


That risk would be exacerbated by the eruption of a major default-related crisis within the eurozone, which might not be contained and, through a Lehman-like domino sequence, could jeopardize the entire edifice.	欧元内部出现大规模违约相关危机会加剧这一风险。 违约相关的危机可能无法避免，而且会造成类似雷曼兄弟的连锁反应，摧毁整个欧元区。


The eurozone’s dilemmas, and the pros and cons of proposed solutions, can be debated endlessly.	欧元区的困境，以及对解决方案提议的反对和支持，可以无止境地争论下去。


It could be argued, for example, that Eurobonds would allow eurozone members to pool their financial strength and, by enhancing the attractiveness of the euro as a reserve currency, hold down borrowing costs to such an extent that AAA-rated countries are not overburdened.	比如，你可以说，欧元债券将能使欧元区成员国把财政实力拧成一股绳，同时，若能增强欧元作为储备货币的吸引力，就能降低借贷成本，使AAA级国家不至于背上沉重负担。


Legal problems could also be overcome in the short term by designing Eurobonds to include credit guarantees, repayment priorities, and the use of specific tax streams as collateral.	法律问题也可以在短期内得到解决，办法是如此设计欧元债：它将包括信用担保、偿还优先顺序，并规定具体的税收流作为抵押品。


Proposals to limit moral hazard, meanwhile, would do so by limiting Eurobonds to 60% of GDP – the eurozone’s current ceiling for member states’ public debt.	与此同时，限制道德风险的方案将把欧元债券规模限制在GDP的60%以内，亦即欧元区目前为成员国设定的公债上限。


A more substantial constraint would be to establish a tougher disciplinary regime on fiscally profligate countries as part of a reinforced institutional framework.	一个更重要的约束是为财政挥霍国设立更为严格的纪律机制，并将其作为强化制度框架的一部分。


Political problems, however they are addressed, should be weighed against the vulnerability of European banks.	政治问题——不管如何解决——应该与欧洲银行的脆弱性问题相权衡。


Germany’s banks today are the most highly leveraged of any of the major advanced economies, while at the start of the crisis they held close to one-third of all loans made to the public and private sectors of Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Italy.	如今，德国银行是主要发达经济体中杠杆率最高的，在危机之初，德国银行的贷款有将近三分之一是贷给希腊、葡萄牙、爱尔兰、西班牙和意大利的公共和私人部门的。


So long as the eurozone’s systemic risk is not addressed, sovereign defaults are not unlikely, leading to extended bank bailouts that could carry unacceptable costs.	只要欧元区系统性风险得不到解决，主权违约可能性就不到消除，这将导致银行援助计划不断膨胀，造成不可接受的代价。


In that case, a full-blown banking crisis could bring about a depression in the eurozone and, perhaps, globally.	果真如此的话，银行业危机的大爆发将在欧元区甚至全世界造成一场萧条。


Europe-wide bank recapitalization is essential in the short term to contain the cost arising from possible sovereign defaults.	从短期看，要降低可能的主权违约所造成的成本，泛欧洲的银行资本重组是关键。


However, addressing the eurozone’s deeper defects cannot be postponed endlessly.	可是，解决欧元区的深层次缺陷的进程不可以被无限期推迟。


Of course, in the midst of so much uncertainty, it is remarkable that the over-indebted countries’ consolidation efforts remain broadly on track; but the European Central Bank’s continued bond-buying and liquidity support is only a temporary palliative.	当然，身处如此不确定的环境，过度负债国的财政整合仍在有序进行，这件事本身就令人瞩目； 但是欧洲央行继续实施债券购买和流动性支持计划只是权宜之计。


An impasse is inevitable, so playing for time is not a solution.	现在的路是走不通的，因此相互扯皮绝非正途。


By contrast, a combination of Eurobonds, a fully-fledged debt facility, enhanced powers for the ECB so that it can act as a lender of last resort, and solid economic governance would work.	相反，我们需要欧元债券、成熟完善的债券便利机制、强化欧洲央行权力以便其担起最后贷款人职责，以及英明的经济治理多管齐下。


In the longer term, radical reforms in capital, product, and labor markets will also be needed, complemented by a stronger and more cohesive investment strategy at the European level, aimed at boosting competitiveness and restoring growth prospects.	从长期看，在资本、生产和劳动力市场上的彻底改革也是必须的，并需要辅之以欧洲层面的更积极、更一致的以提振竞争力、弥补增长缺口为目标的投资战略。


European competitiveness does not have only a global dimension.	欧洲竞争力并不止全球这一个维度。


Large discrepancies exist within the eurozone, reflected in structural trade imbalances between the core and the periphery that lie at the heart of the debt crisis.	欧元区内部也存在巨大的差异，核心国和外围国之间的结构性贸易失衡就是明证，这也正是此次债务危机的核心。


The eurozone’s cohesion and future growth depend critically on creating a framework – through grants and loans – for investment capital to flow to the poorer countries in order to close the competitiveness gap.	决定欧元区凝聚力和未来增长前进的关键因素是通过补贴和带宽建立一个框架，以便让投资资本流向穷国，从而让它们补上竞争力缺口。


To borrow a phrase from the financial world, the euro is too big to fail.	借用一句金融界的话来说，欧元“太大而不能倒”。


Decisions should be taken sooner rather than later, so that the eurozone itself shapes events, rather than being commanded by them.	下决心越早越好，先发制人，后发制于人，此话对欧元区来说乃至理名言。


Decision Time for the Global Economy	全球经济的决策时刻


MILAN – In the dog days of summer, Milan is quieter than many European cities.	米兰—在三伏天，米兰比其他许多欧洲城市都安静。


The locals are away, and, unlike Paris or Rome, tourists do not take their place.	当地人都跑出去了，米兰城也不像巴黎和罗马那样吸引游客。


Here and elsewhere, people, businesses, governments, and markets take a break, decompress, and reflect.	在米兰和其他地方，人、企业、政府和市场都在放假、减压和沉思。


Europe’s economic problems will still be here, waiting for us, in September.	欧洲经济问题仍在那里，等着我们9月假毕归来。


And when summer ends, uncertainty about key issues will be the order of the day – and not only in Europe.	当夏季结束时，重要的问题上的不确定性将成为主宰——不仅仅是在欧洲。


Largely unanticipated protest movements in Turkey and Brazil have raised questions about the economic and social sustainability of emerging-market growth.	土耳其和巴西出人意料的示威运动引起了对新兴市场增长和经济社会稳定的疑虑。


The fires in Bangladeshi garment factories have raised new questions about the governance of global supply chains.	孟加拉国制衣厂的大火引起了全球供应链管理的新问题。


In the United States, the Federal Reserve hinted at “tapering” its quantitative-easing policy later in the year, and a kind of global carry trade based on monetary conditions in advanced countries started to unwind as a result, causing credit tightening and market turbulence in emerging economies.	在美国，美联储暗示将在下半年“减弱”其量化宽松政策，结果，以发达国家货币条件为基础的全球套息交易开始退潮，导致信用紧缩和新兴经济体的市场动荡。


This is probably only a preview of the complexity of the exit from the post-crisis assisted-growth model that has prevailed in the US, Europe, and now Japan.	这可能只是一个前奏，随着美国、欧洲和现在的日本退出危机后才去的提振增长模式，复杂性将大大增加。


A possible political impasse in the US in September over the budget and debt ceiling complicates the outlook further.	9月，美国可能还将迎来预算和债务上限问题上的政治僵局，这让未来前景更加令人迷茫了。


And yet much of the current uncertainty is set to dissipate.	不过，目前的不少不确定性将会减弱。


In the coming months, highly consequential policy decisions (or their absence) in systemically critical parts of the global economy will be revealed, with significant effects on growth rates, asset prices, and overall confidence.	在未来几个月中，在全球经济中起着系统性关键作用部分的一系列政策决策（或不采取它们）将依次宣布，这将对增长率、资产价格和总体信心产生重大影响。


For starters, China’s new leadership has moved away from outsize fiscal and monetary stimulus and accepted an economic slowdown, betting on structural change, systemic reform, and sustainable longer-term growth.	首先，中国新领导层将退出大规模财政和货币刺激，接受经济减速、押注于结构性变革、系统性改革和可持续长期增长。


The key signals will come from the Chinese Communist Party’s plenary meeting in the early fall.	重要信号将在初秋的中共十八大三中全会上出现。


China’s reforms will either support the economic shift, boosting sentiment and lifting growth forecasts, or they will fall short and disappoint, with attention most likely to be focused on the size and nature of state intervention in markets.	中国的改革要么将支持经济转型、提振信心并提高增长预期，要么将令人失望，将主要注意力集中于国家干预市场的规模和性质上。


Either way, with the future of the global economy’s principal growth engine at stake, the effects will be felt worldwide.	无论如何，作为未来全球经济的主要增长引擎，其影响将是全球性的。


In the US, economic deleveraging has proceeded significantly further than it has in Europe.	在美国，经济去杠杆化进程远比欧洲深入。


The US is adjusting structurally and generating real (inflation-adjusted) GDP growth (though well below its potential annual rate of 3-3.5%).	美国在经历结构性调整，真实（经通胀调整的）GDP处于正增长（尽管显著低于3—3. 5%的潜在年增长率）。


The tradable sector is expanding and is not dependent on leverage to generate aggregate demand.	可贸易部门正在扩张，不需要依赖杠杆就能提振总需求。


One can think of the US economy as an 8-cylinder engine running on five, owing to residual deleveraging, fiscal consolidation and drag, public-sector investment shortfalls, and questions about the financial health and security of middle-income households (the backbone of domestic aggregate demand).	你可以把美国经济想象成8缸发动机，但由于去杠杆化尚未完成、财政整合和拖累、公共部门投资不足以及对中产阶级家庭（总内需的支柱）财务健康和安全的担忧，只有5个缸在转动。


Part-time employment is spreading and may become the labor market’s new normal.	兼职就业情况在扩大，或将成为劳动力市场的新常态。


Then there is the question of the Fed’s assisted-growth model.	还有对美联储提振增长模式的疑问。


Is the US economy ready to grow without abnormal policy support?	美国经济已经做好了在没有非常规政策支持的情况下增长的准备了吗？


It seems clear that tapering the Fed’s monthly purchases of long-term securities later this year would cause a realignment of asset values in financial markets.	很显然，在今年下半年减弱美联储长期证券月度购买量将导致金融市场资产价值重估。


How this spills over into the real economy is yet another source of uncertainty.	这将如何影响实体经济则是另一大不确定性。


But, despite some transitional market turbulence, the overall effect will likely be positive.	但是，尽管出现了一些过渡期的市场动荡，但总体影响或将是积极的。


The beneficial effect on the risk-return options available to investors/savers (including pension funds) will outweigh the higher cost of debt; indeed, an important subset of growth engines in the tradable sector is not dependent on low-cost debt.	风险回归选择给投资者/储蓄者（包括退休基金）带来的好处将超过债务成本； 事实上，可贸易部门的重要次级增长引擎并不依赖于低成本债务。


The same cannot be said of Europe, where Germany’s general election in September is viewed as a key barometer of continuing commitment to the euro.	但欧洲并非如此，9月的德国大选被视为维持欧元承诺的关键晴雨表。


The European Central Bank’s “outright monetary transactions” program – though conditional, limited to short-term government debt, and so far unused – appears to have stabilized eurozone sovereign-debt markets, albeit in a low- or zero-growth environment.	欧洲央行的“直接货币交易”（OMT）计划——尽管是有条件、以短期政府债务为限度，但到目前为止从未使用过——似乎已经稳定了欧元区主权债务市场，尽管增长环境仍十分恶劣（低增长甚至零增长）。


But the OMT program is dependent on German support.	但OMT计划依赖德国的支持。


The question is how long this can last, given southern Europe’s growth and employment challenges (and an apparent lack of understanding among policymakers and the public that there are no short-term solutions).	问题是在南欧增长和就业挑战下（以及决策者和公众显然不能理解没有短期解决方案）德国的支持会延续多久。


In Italy, the debate centers on taxes in general, and the rather miniscule property tax in particular.	在意大利，争论的焦点是税收，特别是微不足道的物业税。


The income tax (and thus the tax on employment) is high.	所得税（以及就业税）很高。


But the country is relatively wealthy, especially in terms of property assets on household balance sheets.	但意大利相对较富，特别是以家庭资产负债表上的物业资产衡量的话。


So higher taxes on property and lower taxes on income would contribute to the creation of a more dynamic, competitive economy.	因此提高物业税、降低所得税有助于创造更有活力、更具竞争力的经济。


But that is far from the current focus of public debate.	但这远没有进入当前公共争论的焦点。


The key liberalizing reforms that would enhance the economy’s flexibility and pace of adjustment are simply not on the agenda (owing to an underlying lack of trust among voters).	能增强经济灵活性、加快调整速度的关键的自由化改革并没有出现在日程中（因为选民对此缺乏信任）。


This is important because the private sector in Italy (and in Spain) cannot match the structural flexibility found in the US (and in Germany since its reforms in 2003-2006).	这一点很重要，因为意大利（和西班牙）的私人部门没有像美国（以及2003—2006年改革后的德国）那样的结构性灵活度。


Think now of an 8-cylinder engine running not on five cylinders, but on two or three at best.	它们就好像是8缸发动机，现在转动不是5个缸，而只有两三个缸。


(Admittedly, the Spanish labor market reforms enacted earlier this year may start to lift employment and improve competitiveness and growth on the economy’s tradable side, which is constrained largely by low productivity, not weak demand.)	（平心而论，今年上半年开始实施的西班牙劳动力市场改革或已开始提振就业、改善经济的可贸易部门的增长——它主要约束是生产率过低，而不是需求不足。 ）


But the default option in the context of political gridlock – a halting, slow-growth strategy, focused excessively on fiscal austerity and featuring high unemployment (especially for the young) – is unlikely to remain workable for long.	但在政治僵局环境下的默认选择——徘徊不前的低增长战略，过度强调财政紧缩，并以高失业（特别是年轻人失业）为特征——不可能长期有效。


At some point, the political agenda will either shift toward real reform, or sentiment will shift substantially against the euro.	在某个时点，要么政治日程转向真正的改革，要么情绪转向严重反对欧元。


Fortunately, this uncomfortable uncertainty will not last much longer – in Europe or elsewhere.	幸运的是，这一令人不快的不确定性不会维持太久——不管在欧洲还是在别的地方。


China’s leaders will make their choices, as will German voters.	中国领导人将作出选择，德国选民亦然。


The Fed will clarify the direction of US monetary policy.	美联储将明确美国货币政策的方向。


Markets will adjust and settle down.	市场会调整然后平静下来。


Distortions will begin to unwind.	扭曲将开始消退。


Without dismissing the downside risks, I remain cautiously optimistic about the global economy’s prospects.	下行风险未除，但我继续对全球经济前景保持谨慎乐观。


With greater clarity in terms of Chinese and US policy, both economies should gain momentum.	中国和美国的政策将日益清晰，这两个经济体应该都能获得动力。


That will give developing countries (many of which face difficult domestic policy choices) a tailwind, while making the substantial challenges in Europe and Japan easier to address.	这将给发展中国家（其中不少面临困难的国内政策选择）助一臂之力，同时也让欧洲和日本面临的棘手挑战更易解决。


From Memory to Denial in Russia	俄国从回忆到否认


LONDON – My most painful experience in Russia was a visit to Perm-36, the only one of Stalin’s forced-labor camps to have been preserved, in 1998.	伦敦——我在俄罗斯最痛苦的经历是1998年参观斯大林时期唯一保存下来的“柏姆36号”强制劳改营。


I was in Perm, a city in the Urals, to take part in a seminar of the Moscow School of Political Studies.	当时我在乌拉尔山区小城柏姆参加莫斯科政治研究学院组织的一次研讨活动。


Founded by the remarkable Lena Nemirovskaya, the school’s purpose was to introduce young post-communist Russians to democracy, self-government, and capitalism.	学院的创建者是著名的列娜·内米洛夫斯卡娅，创建的目的是引导后共产主义时期的俄罗斯年轻人认识民主、自治和资本主义。


One bitterly cold March day, I joined a few friends on a trip to the former camp.	一个寒冷的三月天，我和几个朋友一道前往劳改营。


Built in the early 1940s as a “regular” labor camp, Perm-36 was converted into a concentration camp for political prisoners in 1972.	20世纪40年代初建时还是“常规”劳改营的柏姆36号于1972年被改建为关押政治犯的集中营。


The last prisoners were released in 1987, three years into Mikhail Gorbachev’s rule.	1987年，即戈尔巴乔夫执政三年后释放了最后一名政治犯。


Now it was being restored as a Gulag Museum by Memorial, a human-rights group founded by the dissident physicist Andrei Sakharov, to remind Russians of their totalitarian past.	现在持不同政见的物理学家安德烈·萨哈罗夫创立的人权组织“纪念”将其改建为警醒俄国人勿忘极权主义过去的古拉格博物馆。


We were shown around the maximum-security wing.	我们在引导下参观了安全级别最高的监区。


Surrounded by a barbed-wire perimeter, it had housed the political prisoners, mostly from the non-Russian Soviet republics, who were considered to be “particularly dangerous recidivists.”	这个监区周围环绕着带刺的铁丝网，当时主要关押俄罗斯以外苏维埃共和国被视为“特别危险惯犯”的政治犯。


After a Ukrainian television crew filmed the site in 1989, part of it was deliberately destroyed.	乌克兰电视摄制组1989年拍摄这座监狱后，部分区域遭到了故意破坏。


It was obvious that the prisoners had been subject to psychological torture and extreme physical hardship.	这里关押的囚犯显然遭受到极度物质困难和心理折磨。


The tiny radiator in each cell could hardly have dented the October-to-April frost.	每间囚室中小得可怜的暖气很难抵挡住十月到四月的严寒。


The prisoners slept on wooden planks or iron bunks.	囚犯睡在木质或铁质的床铺上。


Their clothes and bedcovers were made of cotton, not wool, and an open hole served as the cell’s lavatory.	他们的衣服和被褥用的不是羊毛而是棉花，监室的厕所就是一个敞开的孔。


Our guide, Maya, explained that the authorities liked to put together prisoners who got on each other’s nerves.	我们的导游玛雅解释说当局喜欢让囚犯刺激对方的神经。


During the day, they were moved across the corridor to identical cells in which they uselessly worked making iron implements.	白天他们穿过走廊到一模一样的监室从事制作铁器等毫无意义的活动。


For one hour each day, they were allowed into an “exercise block,” a nine-foot (2.7 meters), tin-lined cube, with a barbed-wire roof and a guard post on top.	每天有1个小时时间他们被允许进入“锻炼区”，一个9英尺（合2. 7米）的方形盒子，周围衬有马口铁，头顶是带刺的铁丝网和哨兵的岗亭。


The only other “recreation” was a weekly show of propaganda films.	除此之外唯一的娱乐就是每周放映宣传电影。


Of the 56 “dangerous recidivists” held in Perm-36 in the 1980s, seven died.	20世纪80年代柏姆36号关押的56名“危险惯犯”中死亡7人。


One was the Ukrainian poet and nationalist Vasyl Stus.	其中一位是乌克兰诗人兼民族主义者瓦西里·斯塔茨（Vasyl Stus）。


The authorities called it a suicide, but survivors say that, for fun, the guards unscrewed one of the wooden planks from the wall and dropped it on Stus’s head as he lay sleeping.	当局说他是自杀，但幸存者说是警卫为了取乐拧开了墙上的木板，斯塔茨在熟睡时被木板砸到了头。


As Maya recounted the grisly story, I watched the faces of the two young male guards who accompanied us.	我边听玛雅讲述这个可怕的故事，边看身边陪同的两名年轻男警卫的表情。


Their expressions were as frozen as the ground outside.	他们的脸就像外面冰封的大地一样毫无表情。


Were they thinking about football or about making love to their girlfriends?	他们是在想足球还是和女朋友做爱？


Given enough vodka, would they, too, have been capable of murder for fun?	如果喝下足够的伏特加，他们是否也会杀人取乐？


The answer, I fear, is probably yes.	我担心答案是肯定的。


Evil systems never seem to struggle to find the zombie henchmen they need.	邪恶的体制找到需要的僵尸追随者从来都不难。


Organizations like Memorial and the Moscow School of Political Studies have no place in Vladimir Putin’s Russia.	像“纪念”和莫斯科政治研究学院这样的组织在普京领导的俄罗斯无法立足。


Officially, they are deemed “foreign agents” and have been subject to so much legal harassment that it is almost impossible for them to function.	官方认为他们是“外国代理”，他们在法律上受到诸多骚扰，以致于很难正常发挥作用。


Today, the Gulag Museum is under different management.	今天，古拉格博物馆更换了管理层。


“The new presentation,” write Mikhail Danilovich and Robert Coalson, “is devoted not to the repressive forced-labor practices of the Stalin era but to the timber production at the plant and to its contribution to the Soviet victory in World War II.”	“新的解说词”，米哈伊尔·丹尼洛维奇和罗伯特·卡尔森写道，“并未主要介绍斯大林时代压迫性的强制劳改做法，转而介绍这里的木材生产以及对二战苏联胜利所起到的作用。


And, after 20 years, the Moscow School of Political Studies has been forced to suspend its Russian operations.	”而且，20年后，莫斯科政治研究学院已被迫中止在俄国运营。


The fate of the museum and the school is part of the wider clampdown on freedom of expression and behavior in Putin’s third presidential term.	博物馆和学院的命运是普京第三届总统任期大规模取缔言论和行动自由的组成部分。


Dissidents are routinely dubbed deviants, fifth columnists, and traitors, as the regime leads a drive for national unity based on religion, tradition, and paranoid rhetoric.	在当局领导的宗教、传统和偏执言论中，持不同政见者往往被贴上离经叛道、内奸和叛徒的标签。


This represents a major shift from Russia’s early post-Soviet days.	这预示着俄国较之后苏联时代早期发生了重大变化。


The liberal Russia’s Choice party, led by the country’s first democratic prime minister, Yegor Gaidar, received 15.5% of the vote in the 1993 general election, and with its allies formed the largest bloc in the Duma.	俄国首位民主总理盖达尔领导的自由俄罗斯选择党在1993年大选中赢得了15. 5%的选票，并和盟友一道成为杜马的主要力量。


At the time, this was regarded as a catastrophic failure.	当时舆论普遍认为这是一次灾难性的失败。


Today, liberal candidates cannot even get into the Duma.	而今天，自由派候选人甚至无法进入到国家杜马当中。


How has this come to pass?	怎么会变成这样？


Why have the hopes of Gorbachev’s glasnost been so cruelly snuffed out?	戈尔巴乔夫公开化的希望怎么会遭到如此残酷的扼杀？


A widespread view is that Russia is simply reverting to type: freedom was never more than a fleeting vowel in its historical alphabet.	人们普遍认为俄罗斯仅仅是恢复原状：自由有史以来在俄国字母表中从来都不过是转瞬即逝的元音字母。


But this is a facile explanation.	但这样的解释非常浅薄。


True, Russian liberalism has contributed to its own demise, by its incompetence and factionalism.	的确，由于无能和派系林立，俄国自由主义自己走向了灭亡。


But the West did not help.	但西方也从未起到好的作用。


In the 1990s, it failed to put money behind the economic reforms that it sponsored.	20世纪90年代，西方未能资助自己倡导的俄罗斯经济改革。


Expanding NATO into the Baltic States in 2002 – the Alliance’s first enlargement into former Soviet territory – was a catastrophic mistake, which made it almost impossible for a Russian to be both patriotic and pro-Western.	2002年将波罗的海国家纳入北约——也是该组织首次侵入前苏联领土——是一次灾难性的错误，导致俄罗斯人不可能在亲西方的同时保持爱国。


By both omission and commission, the West cut the ground from under Russian political liberalism, enabling the ascendancy of Putinism.	西方这些故意和疏漏之举损害了俄罗斯政治自由主义的基础，导致普京主义日渐抬头。


So far, Putin has displayed an accurate sense of limits.	迄今为止，普京准确无误地把握着限度。


He allows Russians to dream of greatness without getting them into serious trouble.	他让俄国人既保留伟大的梦想，又避免陷入到麻烦之中。


Under his leadership, Russia has shrugged off sanctions, forged a new alliance with China, and annoyed – but not openly challenged – the West in Syria.	在他领导下的俄国对制裁毫不理会， 与中国缔结新的联盟，并在叙利亚骚扰、而非公开挑战西方国家。


But those who know Putin say that he brooks no argument; he is the only one setting the limits.	但了解普京的人说他绝不容忍任何争论； 他是限度的唯一把控者。


And no one can maintain supreme power for as long as he has without being corrupted.	没有人能像他那样持续掌握最高权力而不陷入腐化。


For the moment, Putinism is the only game in town.	迄今为止，没有其他势力能与普京主义竞争。


But, although the forces represented by Memorial and the Moscow School of Political Studies have been marginalized, they have not been eradicated.	但尽管“纪念”组织和莫斯科政治研究学院所代表的力量已经被边缘化，但它们并未被完全根除。


A New Macroeconomic Strategy	新宏观经济战略


NEW YORK – I am a macroeconomist, but I dissent from the profession’s two leading camps in the United States: the neo-Keynesians, who focus on boosting aggregate demand, and the supply-siders, who focus on cutting taxes.	纽约—我是宏观经济学家，但我不同意美国最主要的两个宏观经济学阵营：专注于提振总需求的新凯恩斯主义和专注于减税的供给学派。


Both schools have tried and failed to overcome the high-income economies’ persistently weak performance in recent years.	近几年来，这两个学派试图克服高收入经济体表现持续疲软的问题，但以失败告终。


It is time for a new strategy, one based on sustainable, investment-led growth.	基于可持续投资拉动型增长的新战略是时候粉墨登场了。


The core challenge of macroeconomics is to allocate society’s resources to their best use.	宏观经济学的核心挑战是配置社会资源，加以最佳利用。 选择工作的工人应该找到岗位；


Workers who choose to work should find jobs; factories should deploy their capital efficiently; and the part of income that is saved rather than consumed should be invested to improve future wellbeing.	工厂应该有效部署其资本； 用作储蓄而非消费的收入应该投资以改善未来福祉。


It is on this third challenge that both neo-Keynesians and supply-siders have dropped the ball.	新凯恩斯主义和供给学派就栽在第三个挑战上。


Most high-income countries – the US, most of Europe, and Japan – are failing to invest adequately or wisely toward future best uses.	大部分高收入国家——美国、欧洲大部和日本——投资不足，或没有明智地以未来最佳用途为目标投资。


There are two ways to invest – domestically or internationally – and the world is falling short on both. 	投资有两种——国内和国际——对世界而言，这两种投资都有所不足。


Domestic investment comes in various forms, including business investment in machinery and buildings; household investment in homes; and government investment in people (education, skills), knowledge (research and development), and infrastructure (transport, power, water, and climate resilience).	国内投资形式繁多，包括机械和建筑的商业投资、家庭住房投资以及政府对人力（教育、技能）、知识（研究和开发）和基础设施（交通、电力、水和气候恢复力）的投资。


The neo-Keynesian approach is to try to boost domestic investment of any sort.	新凯恩斯主义方法试图提振国内投资，不管属是哪一类的投资。


Indeed, according to this view, spending is spending.	事实上，根据这一观点，支出就是支出。


Thus, neo-Keynesians have tried to spur more housing investment through rock-bottom interest rates, more auto purchases through securitized consumer loans, and more “shovel-ready” infrastructure projects through short-term stimulus programs.	因此，新凯恩斯主义者试图通过极低的利率刺激更多住房投资，通过消费贷款证券化刺激更多的购车行为，试图通过短期刺激计划带来更多的“万事俱备”基础设施工程。


When investment spending does not budge, they recommend that we turn “excess” saving into another consumption binge.	当投资支出停滞不前时，他们建议将“过剩”转化为又一场消费盛宴。


Supply-siders, by contrast, want to promote private (certainly not public!) investment through more tax cuts and further deregulation.	相反，供给学派希望通过更多减税和进一步去监管化促进私人（绝不是公共！


They have tried that on several occasions in the US, most recently during the George W. Bush administration.	）投资。 他们在美国做过几次尝试，最近的例子是小布什政府。


Unfortunately, the result of this deregulation was a short-lived housing bubble, not a sustained boom in productive private investment.	不幸的是，去监管化的结果是短命的房地产泡沫，而不是生产性私人投资的持续繁荣。


Though policy alternates between supply-side and neo-Keynesian enthusiasm, the one persistent reality is a significant decline of investment as a share of national income in most high-income countries in recent years.	尽管政策在供给学派和新凯恩斯主义狂热之间摇摆，但一个持久的现实是近几年来大部分高收入国家投资占国民收入的比重大幅下降。


According to IMF data, gross investment spending in these countries has declined from 24.9% of GDP in 1990 to just 20% in 2013.	根据IMF的数据，这些国家的总投资支出占GDP之比从1990年的24. 9%下降到2013年的20%。


In the US, investment spending declined from 23.6% of GDP in 1990 to 19.3% in 2013, and fell even more markedly in net terms (gross investment excluding capital depreciation).	6%下降到2013年的19. 3%，若以净值（剔除资本折旧的总投资）衡量，则降幅更加巨大。


In the European Union, the decline was from 24% of GDP in 1990 to 18.1% in 2013.	在欧盟，投资占GDP之比从1990年的24%下降到2013年的18. 1%。


Neither neo-Keynesians nor supply-siders focus on the true remedies for this persistent drop in investment spending.	凯恩斯主义和供给学派都没有将注意力集中在这一投资支出持续下降趋势的真正解决办法上。


Our societies urgently need more investment, particularly to convert heavily polluting, energy-intensive, and high-carbon production into sustainable economies based on the efficient use of natural resources and a shift to low-carbon energy sources.	我们的社会急切地需要更多投资，特别是改变重污染、能源密集和高碳生产方式，转向基于自然资源的高效利用和低碳能源资源的可持续经济的投资。


Such investments require complementary steps by the public and private sectors.	这类投资需要公共和私人部门相互补充。


The necessary investments include large-scale deployment of solar and wind power; broader adoption of electric transport, both public (buses and trains) and private (cars); energy-efficient buildings; and power grids to carry renewable energy across large distances (say, from the North Sea and North Africa to continental Europe, and from California’s Mojave Desert to US population centers).	必要的投资包括大规模部署风能和太阳能、更大规模采取公共（公交车和火车）和私人（小轿车）电力交通、远距离传输可再生能源（如从北海和北非到欧洲大陆以及从加州莫哈韦沙漠（Mojave Desert到美国人口中心）的电网等。


But just when our societies should be making such investments, the public sectors in the US and Europe are on a veritable “investment strike.”	但是，就在我们的社会应该进行这些投资时，美国和欧洲的公共部门却陷入了名符其实的“投资停顿”。


Governments are cutting back public investment in the name of budget balance, and private investors cannot invest robustly and securely in alternative energy when publicly regulated power grids, liability rules, pricing formulas, and national energy policies are uncertain and heavily disputed.	政府打着预算平衡的名号削减公共投资，而在公共监管的电网、责任规则、定价模式和国家能源政策存在不确定性巨大争议时，私人投资者也无法在替代能源领域进行稳健、安全的投资。


In the US, public investment spending has been slashed.	在美国，公共投资支出被大幅削减。


Neither the federal government nor the states have political mandates, funding strategies, or long-term plans to catalyze investment in the next generation of smart, clean technologies.	联邦政府和各州都没有政治权力、融资战略和长期规划推进下一代智能清洁技术投资。


Both neo-Keynesians and supply-siders have misunderstood the investment paralysis.	新凯恩斯主义和供给学派都误解了投资困局。


Neo-Keynesians see investments, public and private, as merely another kind of aggregate demand.	新凯恩斯主义者将公共和私人投资视为仅仅是总需求的一种。


They neglect the public-policy decisions regarding energy systems and infrastructure (as well as the targeted R&D to promote new technologies) that are needed to unleash smart, environmentally sustainable public and private investment spending.	他们忽视与能源系统和基础设施（如旨在推进新技术的定向研发，它们是打开环境可持续的明智的公共和私人投资支出局面的必要条件）有关的公用政策决定。


Thus, they promote gimmicks (zero interest rates and stimulus packages), rather than pressing for the detailed national policies that a robust investment recovery will require.	因此，他们总是弄出各种噱头（零利率和刺激计划），而不敦促制定实施稳健投资复苏所需要的具体的国家政策。


The supply-siders, for their part, seem utterly oblivious to the dependence of private investment on complementary public investment and a clear policy and regulatory framework.	至于供给学派，他们似乎完全忘记了私人投资需要公共投资和明晰的政策和监管框架加以补充。


They advocate slashing government spending, naively believing that the private sector will somehow magically fill the void.	他们鼓吹削减政府支出，天真地认为私人部门能变戏法般地填补空白。


But, by cutting public investment, they are hindering private investment.	但是，他们的削减公共投资的做法拖累了私人投资。


Private electricity producers, for example, will not invest in large-scale renewable energy generation if the government does not have long-term climate and energy policies or plans for spurring construction of long-distance transmission lines to carry new low-carbon energy sources to population centers.	比如，如果政府不拿出长期气候和能源政策或刺激建设长距离输电线从而将低碳能源资源引向人口中心的计划，私人发电商就不会投资于大规模可再生能源发电。


Such messy policy details have never much bothered free-market economists.	混乱的政策细节令自由市场经济学家困扰不堪。


There is also the option of using domestic saving to boost foreign investments.	另一个选择是用国内储蓄提振外国投资。


The US could, for example, lend money to low-income African economies to buy new power plants from US companies.	比如，美国可以贷款给低收入非洲经济体从美国公司手中购买新电站。


Such a policy would put US private saving to important use in fighting global poverty, while strengthening the US industrial base.	这套计划能让美国私人储蓄派上重要用场，参与全球减贫斗争，同时还能增强美国的工业基础。


Yet here, too, neither the neo-Keynesians nor the supply-siders have exerted much effort to improve the institutions of development finance.	但是，在这方面，新凯恩斯主义和供给学派也都没有致力于改善发展金融机构。


Instead of advising Japan and China to raise their consumption rates, macroeconomists would be wiser to encourage these economies to use their high savings to fund not only domestic but also overseas investments.	宏观经济学家不应该建议日本和中国提高消费率，更聪明的做法是鼓励这些经济体利用其高储蓄为投资项目融资——不仅包括国内投资，也包括海外投资。


These considerations are reasonably clear to anyone concerned with the urgent need to harmonize economic growth and environmental sustainability.	这些考虑对于任何关心协调经济增长和环境可持续性问题的人来说都是显而易见的。


Our generation’s most pressing challenge is to convert the world’s dirty and carbon-based energy systems and infrastructure into clean, smart, and efficient systems for the twenty-first century.	我们这一代最紧迫的挑战是将全球肮脏的碳基能源系统和基础设施改造成清洁、智能、高效的二十一世纪系统。


Investing in a sustainable economy would dramatically boost our wellbeing and use our “excess” savings for just the right purposes.	投资于可持续经济将极大地改善我们的福祉，有利于利用我们的“过度”储蓄为正确的目标服务。


Yet this will not happen automatically.	但这不会从天上掉下来。


We need long-term public-investment strategies, environmental planning, technology roadmaps, public-private partnerships for new, sustainable technologies, and greater global cooperation.	我们需要长期公共投资战略、环境规划、技术路线图、新型可持续技术的公私合作以及更大的全球合作。


These tools will create the new macroeconomics on which our health and prosperity now depend.	这些工具将创造我们的健康和繁荣所依赖的新宏观经济学。


America’s Overrated Decline	被高估的美国衰落


CAMBRIDGE – With the approach of the US Congressional elections, questions about the health of America’s political institutions and the future of its global leadership have become rampant, with some citing partisan gridlock as evidence of America’s decline.	美国剑桥—随着美国国会选举的临近，关于美国政治制度健康及其全球领导力未来的争论日嚣尘上，一些人拿党派僵局作为美国衰落的证据。


But is the situation really that bad?	但情况真的这么糟糕吗？


According to the political scientist Sarah Binder, the ideological divide between America’s two main political parties has not been as large as it is now since the end of the nineteenth century.	根据政治学家萨拉·宾德（Sarah Binder）的看法，自十九世纪末以来，美国两大政党的意识形态分歧从未向现在那么大。


Despite the current gridlock, however, the 111th Congress managed to pass a major fiscal stimulus, health-care reform, financial regulation, an arms-control treaty, and revision of the military policy on homosexuality.	但是，尽管面临着僵局，但第111届国会仍通过了大型财政刺激、医疗改革、金融监管、一项武器控制条约以及军队同性恋政策修改。


Clearly, the US political system cannot be written off (especially if partisan gridlock is cyclical).	显然，美国政治制度不会衰亡（特别是在党派僵局具有周期性特征的情况下）。


Nonetheless, today’s Congress is plagued by low legislative capacity.	尽管如此，今天的国会仍饱受立法能力不足的困扰。


Though ideological consistency has more than doubled over the last two decades, from 10% to 21% of the public, most Americans do not have uniformly conservative or liberal views, and want their representatives to meet one another halfway.	尽管意识形态一致性在过去二十年中增加了一倍，从占公众的10%升高到21%，但大部分美国人并非一边倒的保守派或自由派，他们希望他们的代表保守和自由兼而有之。


Political parties, however, have become more consistently ideological since the 1970s.	但是，政党的意识形态一致性自20世纪70年代以来就一直在增长。


This is not a new problem for the US, whose constitution is based on the eighteenth-century liberal view that power is best controlled by fragmentation and countervailing checks and balances, with the president and Congress forced to compete for control in areas like foreign policy.	这并不是美国的新问题，美国宪法的基础是十八世纪自由观——控制权力最好的办法是分散化和对抗性制衡，迫使总统和国会为控制外交政策等领域而斗争。


In other words, the US government was designed to be inefficient, in order to ensure that it could not easily threaten the liberty of its citizens.	换句话说，美国政府是以低效为目的设计的，这样做是为了确保它不会轻易威胁公民的自由。


This inefficiency has likely contributed to the decline in confidence in American institutions.	这一低效率或许是对美国制度信心下降的原因。


Today, less than one-fifth of the public trusts the federal government to do the right thing most of the time, compared to three-quarters in 1964.	如今，不到五分之一的公众相信联邦政府在大部分时间里做着正确的事，而1964年的这一比例为四分之三。


Of course, these figures surged occasionally during that period, such as after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks; but the overall decline is considerable.	当然，这些数字偶尔会在某个时期出现飙升，比如2001年9月11日恐怖袭击后就是如此； 但总体而言下降趋势相当明显。


The federal government is not alone.	联邦政府在这方面不是孤家寡人。


Over the last several decades, public confidence in many influential institutions has plummeted.	在过去几十年中，对许多高影响力机构的公众信心出现了暴降。


From 1964-1997, the share of Americans who trusted universities fell from 61% to 30%, while trust in major companies fell from 55% to 21%.	从1964年到1997年，信任大学的美国人比例从61%降低到30%，而信任大公司的美国人比例从55%减少到21%。


Trust in medical institutions dropped from 73% to 29%, and in journalism from 29% to 14%.	信任医疗机构者从73%下降到29%，信任新闻者从29%下降到14%。


Over the last decade, confidence in educational institutions and the military has recovered, but trust in Wall Street and large corporations has continued to fall.	在过去十��中，对教育机构和军队的信心有所恢复，但对华尔街和大公司的信任仍在继续下降。


But these ostensibly alarming figures can be misleading.	但这些表面上引人警觉的数字可能具有误导性。


In fact, 82% of Americans still consider the US to be the world’s best place to live, and 90% like their democratic system of government.	事实上，82%的美国人仍然认为美国是世界上最适合生活的地方，90%的美国人喜欢政府的民主制度。


Americans may not be entirely satisfied with their leaders, but the country is certainly not on the brink of an Arab Spring-style revolution.	美国人或许对他们的领导人不是完全满意，但这个国家显然没有走到阿拉伯之春这样的革命的边缘。


Moreover, though party politics have become more polarized in recent decades, this follows the 1950s and early 1960s, when the escape from the Great Depression and victory in World War II fueled unusually high confidence in US institutions.	此外，尽管党派政治在近几十年来日益极化，但此趋势的起点是20世纪50年代至60年代初，当时，从大萧条中走出并在二战中获胜使得美国人对美国制度的信心空前高涨。


In fact, the sharpest decline in public trust in the government occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s.	事实上，对政府的公共信任的最剧烈降幅发生在20世纪60年代末到70年代初。


Moreover, declining trust in the government has not been accompanied by significant changes in citizens’ behavior.	此外，对政府的信任的下降并未伴随着公民行为的重大变化。


For example, the Internal Revenue Service is among the government institutions that inspire the least public confidence; yet there has been no major surge in tax evasion.	比如，美国国税署（Internal Revenue Service）是公众熊欣欣最低的政府机构之一； 但偷漏税情况并没有出现剧烈增加。


In terms of controlling corruption, the US still scores in the 90th percentile.	从控制腐败的角度看，美国仍比九成的国家强。


And though voting rates in presidential elections declined from 62% to 50% in the latter half of the twentieth century, they stabilized in 2000, and rose to 58% in 2012.	而尽管二十世纪下半叶总统选举投票率从62%下降到50%，但在2000年实现了企稳，并于2012年回升至58%。


The loss of confidence that Americans have expressed may be rooted in a deeper shift in people’s attitudes toward individualism, which has brought about decreased deference to authority.	美国人所表现出来的信心下降也许植根于人们对个人主义的态度的更深层次的变化。 对个人主义的态度的变化导致了对权威的顺从程度有所下降。


Indeed, similar patterns are characteristic of most post-modern societies.	事实上，类似的过程是大部分后现代社会的特征。


This social shift probably will not influence US institutions’ effectiveness as much as one might think, given America’s decentralized federal system.	拜美国的分散化联邦制所赐，这一社会变迁可能不会如你所想象的那样影响美国制度的效率。


In fact, gridlock in the national capital is often accompanied by political cooperation and innovation at the state and municipal levels, leading citizens to view state and local governments, as well as many government agencies, much more favorably than the federal government.	事实上，华盛顿的僵局通常伴随着州和市政层面的政治合作和创新，让公民对州和地方政府——以及许多政府机构——刮目相看，给出远高于联邦政府的评价。


This approach to governance has had a profound impact on the mentality of the American people.	这一治国之道对美国人民的心态具有深远影响。


A 2002 study indicated that three-quarters of Americans feel connected to their communities, and consider their quality of life to be excellent or good, with nearly half of adults participating in a civic group or activity.	一份2002年的研究指出，四分之三的美国人认为自己与社区息息相关，并认为自己的生活质量属于优良之列，近一半的成年人参与公民团体或活动。


That is good news for the US.	对美国来说，这是好消息。


But it does not mean that America’s leaders can continue to ignore the political system’s shortcomings, such as the gerrymandered “safe seats” in the House of Representatives and obstructive processes in the Senate.	但这并不意味着美国领导人可以继续无视美国政治制度的短处，如众议院通过不公正地划分选区而出现的“稳得议席”以及参议院臃肿碍事的流程。


Whether such sources of gridlock can be overcome remains to be seen.	这些形成僵局的原因是否能克服还有待观察。


And there is legitimate reason to doubt America’s ability to maintain its “hyperpower” status, not least owing to the rise of major emerging economies.	此外，有充分的理由怀疑美国是否有能力维持其“超级大国”地位，因为主要新兴经济体正在崛起。


But, as the conservative author David Frum notes, over the last two decades, the US has experienced a swift decline in crime, auto fatalities, alcohol and tobacco consumption, and emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide, which cause acid rain – all while leading an Internet revolution.	但是，如保守派作家大卫·弗鲁姆（David Frum）所指出的，在过去二十年中，美国经历了犯罪率、交通事故数、酒精和烟草消费以及二氧化硫和一氧化氮（它们会造成酸雨）排放的快速下降——还引领了一场互联网革命。


Given this, dire comparisons to, say, the decline of Rome are simply unwarranted.	基于此，将美国与（比如）罗马帝国的衰亡相提并论完全是无稽之谈。


Defamation and Development in the Arab World	诽谤和阿拉伯世界的发展


AMMAN – With the violent radicalism and civil wars of the Middle East and North Africa capturing the world’s attention, the region’s grossly distorted legal systems are being given short shrift.	阿曼—中东和北非的暴力激进主义和内战吸引着全世界的目光，而该地区极度扭曲的司法体系则基本无人关注。


Yet problematic laws, like those criminalizing defamation, \ facilitate political and economic repression, undermine development, and destroy lives.	但有问题的法律，比如便利政治和经济压迫的诽谤罪，破坏了发展，贻害生命。


Egypt’s government is perhaps the biggest abuser of defamation and blasphemy laws to suppress differing views.	埃及政府也许是诽谤和渎神法律最大的滥用者，用它们来镇压异见。


In particular, the Egyptian authorities brazenly use Article 98(f) of the Egyptian Penal Code – which prohibits citizens from defaming a “heavenly religion,” inciting sectarian strife, or insulting Islam – to detain, prosecute, and imprison members of non-majority religious groups, especially Christians.	特别是，埃及当局明目张胆地使用埃及刑法典第98条（f）款——禁止公民诽谤“神圣的宗教”、煽动宗派冲突或冒犯伊斯兰教——逮捕、起诉和关押非多数宗教群体成员，特别是基督徒。


All that is needed is a vague claim that their activities are jeopardizing “communal harmony.”	抓人所需要的只是笼统地宣称他们的行为危害到“公共和谐”。


Moreover, the writer Ahmed Naji was recently handed a two-year prison sentence for violating “public modesty,” by publishing a sexually explicit excerpt from his novel.	此外，作家纳吉（Ahmed Naji）最近被判两年徒刑，因为他“行为不端”，在他的小说中进行露骨的性描写。


This came just a month after the author Fatma Naoot appealed the three-year sentence she received when a Facebook post criticizing the slaughter of animals for a Muslim feast led to a guilty verdict for “contempt for Islam.”	此前一个月，作者纳乌特（Fatma Naoot）就其获得的三年徒刑进行上诉。 她因为发了一条Facebook批评穆斯林宴席屠宰动物而被定“蔑视伊斯兰教”罪。


Ominously, according to a 2015 report by the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, blasphemy cases have been on the rise since 2011.	令人不安的是，根据美国国际宗教自由委员会2015年报告，2011年以来渎神案数量有所增加。


In January 2015, President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi issued a decree that permits the government to ban any foreign publications it deems offensive to religion, thereby expanding the government’s already significant censorship powers and increasing pressure on journalists further.	2015年1月，埃及总统塞西发布政令，允许政府禁止一切它认为冒犯宗教的外国出版物，从而扩大了政府已经十分巨大的审查权力，也给记者造成了进一步的压力。


The situation is not much better in Tunisia, where, according to Freedom House’s 2015 report, “criminal defamation remains one of the biggest obstacles to independent reporting.”	突尼斯的情况也好不到哪里去，据自由之家（Freedom House）2015年的报告，“诽谤罪仍是独立报道的最大障碍之一。


Moreover, many are concerned that the country’s newly established cyber-crime investigative agency will carry out “unchecked government surveillance on Tunisian citizens,” as occurred under former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who was ousted in the Arab Spring revolution.	”此外，许多人担心突尼斯新成立的网络犯罪调查机构将让“政府不受约束地监视土耳其人民”，一如被阿��伯之春革命赶下台的前总统本·阿里。


Jordan has also ratcheted up its attempts to limit free expression, with a June 2015 amendment to its cyber-crime law allowing the attorney-general to detain, without a court order, anyone deemed to have used the Internet for defamation.	约旦也在加大限制言论自由的措施，2015年6月的网络犯罪法修正案允许检察长在没有法庭指令的情况下拘捕任何被认为使用互联网进行诽谤活动的人。


While Jordan’s Press and Publications Law prohibits the arrest of journalists for opinions expressed in print, journalists are now fair game if those opinions appear online.	尽管约旦言论和出版法禁止因书面观点拘捕记者，但如果这些观点出现在网上，记者就要遭殃了。


And, indeed, charges have already been brought against several.	而事实上，不少记者已经被起诉。


Among the highest-profile defamation-related cases in the Middle East today is that involving Najat Abu Bakr, a member of Palestine’s parliament who has been summoned for interrogation by the attorney-general after leveling corruption accusations against Hussein al-Araj, a cabinet minister with close ties with President Mahmoud Abbas.	当今中东最高规格的诽谤相关案件牵涉到巴勒斯坦议会成员巴克（Najat Abu Bakr）。 在针对与总统阿巴斯关系密切的内阁部长阿拉吉（Hussein al-Araj）提出腐败指控后，他被检察长传讯。


The move seems also to be motivated by Bakr’s support for a teacher’s strike in the West Bank – an embarrassment to the Abbas government.	这一动作背后的另一个原因也许是巴克支持约旦河西岸教师罢工，令阿巴斯政府十分难堪。


Though Palestine’s attorney-general is allowed, under existing defamation legislation, to hold a person for 48 hours of questioning, human-rights groups have condemned the move.	根据现行诽谤法，巴勒斯坦检察长有权羁押个人48小时进行问询，但人权组织谴责这一做法。


Bakr, for her part, refused the order, and staged a sit-in at the parliament building.	巴克拒绝执行传唤令，在议会大厦静坐示威。


Palestinian security forces surrounded the building, but did not attempt to arrest her.	巴勒斯坦安全力量包围了大厦，但没有逮捕她。


The intensification – and increasingly broad application – of defamation laws in the Middle East and North Africa represents a dangerous trend, one that is fueling an increasingly powerful backlash from civil-society groups.	中东和北非地区诽谤法的加强——以及日益广泛的应用——是一个危险趋势，正在引起公民社会组织日益猛烈的反击。


Naji’s case, for example, spurred Egyptian writers, artists, and filmmakers to launch a public campaign for greater freedom of creativity and expression.	比如，纳吉案刺激了埃及作家、艺术家和制片人发起一场增加艺术创作和言论自由的公共运动。


Furthermore, the former Google executive Wael Ghonim, who was active in the country’s 2011 uprising, publicly criticized the verdict against Naji.	此外，在2011年埃及暴乱中表现积极的前谷歌高管戈尼姆（Wael Ghonim）公开批评将纳吉定罪。


And several state-owned artistic publications were issued with their front pages either depicting Naji or including just a few words expressing support for free speech, with the rest of the page left blank.	一些国有艺术刊物纷纷把显要位置留给纳吉，或者刊登他的画像，要么刊登寥寥数语支持言论自由而将版面的其他部分留白。


In Jordan, a coalition led by the Center for Defending Freedom of Journalists has launched a new campaign, “Talk is Not a Crime,” to raise awareness about declining media freedom.	在约旦，由捍卫记者自由中心（Center for Defending Freedom of Journalists）领导的联盟发起了一项新运动——“说话不是犯罪”以提高人们对媒体自由度下降的认识。


And in Palestine, protests against the use of defamation laws to imprison political opponents have gained traction, with popular support for Bakr having played a key role in spurring the agreement that allowed her to return to her house in Nablus without being arrested or called in for questioning.	而在巴勒斯坦，针对通过诽谤法抓捕政治反对者的示威游行势头甚猛，在巴克的群众支持度的关键作用下，政府同意让她返回位于纳布卢斯的家中，免遭拘捕或要求问询。


Outcries against individual cases can go only so far.	对个案的愤怒只能限于此。


Campaigns must – and, increasingly, do – focus on genuine changes to defamation laws, to ensure that governments cannot use them to stifle dissent.	运动必须——也确实这么做了——将重点放在诽谤法的真正改革上，以确保政府不能使用诽谤法来扼杀异见。


The key will be to remove the criminal element from defamation cases, and thus the prospect of imprisonment, and instead prosecute them as civil cases, with those found guilty of defamation being subject to reasonable fines.	关键在于取消诽谤案的刑事性质，从而使它们不会带来牢狱之灾； 将它们只作为民事案件起诉，对被判诽谤行为成立者课以适当的罚款。


Compelling lawmakers to decriminalize defamation will not be easy.	说服立法者让诽谤法去刑事化绝非易事。


But with a concerted effort from all relevant parties – especially the media, civil society, and human-rights activists – plus the support of regional and international actors, it is possible.	但若所有重要各方精诚合作——特别是媒体、公民社会和人权活动家——再加上地区和国际行动方的支持，它是可以完成的任务。


Given the critical importance of free speech to economic and social progress, there is no time to waste.	言论自由对于经济和社会进步具有关键重要性，不容浪费时间。


Defeating North Korea’s Nuclear Blackmail	击败北朝鲜的核勒索


North Korea’s announcement that it possesses nuclear weapons has fuelled a diplomatic frenzy.	北朝鲜宣布自己拥有核武器的申明引起了外交恐慌。


To persuade North Korea to return to the six-party talks – with China, Japan, the US, Russia, and South Korea – on defusing the nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula, Japan, the US, and South Korea have now offered to expand the scope of the talks to allow North Korea to raise any issue that concerns it.	为了说服北朝鲜重返以消除朝鲜半岛上核威胁为议题的六方会谈（其他五方为中国、日本、美国、俄罗斯和南朝鲜），日本、美国和南朝鲜主动提出扩大会谈范围，允许北朝鲜自由提出自己关心的议题。


This could be a grave mistake.	这可能是个严重的错误。


The talks ground to a halt in June 2004, when the North Koreans pulled out, citing the allegedly hostile policies of the US and Japanese governments.	2004年六月，北朝鲜以美国和日本政府政策具有敌意为由，退出六方会谈，致使会谈搁浅。


Now they claim to have manufactured nuclear weapons for self-defense.	现在北朝鲜又声称已经制造出了以自卫为目的的核武器。


Although there had been several unofficial statements by Kim Jong-Il’s regime admitting that North Korea possessions nuclear arsenal, the announcement was the first official confirmation.	尽管在此之前，金正日政府曾数次非正式地承认北朝鲜拥有核武器库，但正式承认，这还是首次。


What lay behind the declaration was the regime’s recognition that a second-term Bush administration would not soften its demand for a complete repudiation of its nuclear program, but would instead continue to pursue policies aimed at isolating and stifling North Korea.	金正日政府之所以正式承认拥有核武器，是认识到了连任的布什政府在要求北朝鲜完全放弃其核武器方案方面不会让步，而是会继续实行孤立、扼杀北朝鲜的政策。 在此问题上日本也持同样态度。


The same goes for Japan, whose stance on the abduction of its citizens by North Korean agents in the 1970’s and 1980’s was also cited by the Kim regime last June as a reason for walking out of the six-party talks.	去年6月，金正日政府在退出六国会谈时，就以日本政府对20世纪70年代和80 年代北朝鲜间谍劫持日本公民事件的立场来证明了这一点。


With this in mind, the North Koreans’ motives in playing the nuclear trump card are clear, and the timing couldn’t have seemed more advantageous for them: force the Americans into making concessions while the situation in Iraq leaves the US with no room for maneuver, and undercut the rising call in Japan for economic sanctions against North Korea over the abduction issue.	弄清楚了这点，北朝鲜打出核武器牌的目的就昭然若揭了。 对北朝鲜来说，这是最有利的时机：伊拉克目前的局势使得美国没有任何机动的余地，此举可以迫使美国做出让步，同时可以压制日本国内日益高涨的因为人质劫持问题而要求对北朝鲜进行经济制裁的呼声。


Thus, whereas North Korea’s announcement of its nuclear capability strongly condemned Japan and the US, it did not mention China, Russia, and South Korea, which had been more conciliatory during the six-party talks.	尽管北朝鲜在核武器能力通告中强烈谴责了日本和美国，但却没有提及中国、俄罗斯和南朝鲜，因为这三国在六方会谈中采取了相对和缓的态度。


Indeed, in withdrawing from the six-party talks, North Korea did not completely abandon the possibility of resolving the nuclear standoff through dialogue.	事实上，尽管退出了六方会谈，但北朝鲜并没有完全否认通过对话来打破核僵局的可能性。


Rather, North Korea’s aim was to postpone the six-party talks as long as possible in order to force direct bilateral negotiations with the US, in which it would presumably extract energy assistance and other aid while demanding a security guarantee for “Dear Leader” Kim Jong-il.	北朝鲜的目的是尽可能地拖延会谈以迫使美国同意进行双边直接谈判，这样北朝鲜就可能从谈判中获得能源和其它援助，并且可以要求为他们“敬爱的领袖”金正日提供安全保障。


America didn’t budge on bilateral negotiations, and its response to North Korea’s recent announcement that it possesses nuclear weapons likewise emphasized the need to revive the six-party talks.	在双边谈判问题上，美国没有做任何让步。 美国对北朝鲜最近的核武器宣告做出的反应同样强调了恢复六方谈判的必要性。


Japan adopted a similar stance.	日本态度与美国相仿。


Like Japan, the Bush administration’s relatively moderate stance toward North Korea has changed since the talks broke down last year.	在去年会谈破裂后，布什政府和日本政府一样，改变了原来对北朝鲜相对温和的态度。


The US seems to be tightening its diplomatic encirclement of North Korea with a view to shifting the nuclear discussion to the UN Security Council.	美国似乎在加紧从外交上孤立北朝鲜，正打算将核讨论转移到联合国安理会。


Moreover, the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee brought together the countries’ foreign and defense ministers in Washington in February to discuss common strategic objectives related to the reformation of US forward forces.	此外，今年2月，美日安保协议委员会将两国的外交部长与国防部长聚集到华盛顿，讨论与美国先头部队改革相关的共同战略目标。


This includes US forces in Japan, which will focus on responding to North Korean nuclear and ballistic-missile threats, as well as new threats posed by international terrorism and China’s military build-up.	美国驻日部队也包括在其中。 该部队的主要任务将是应对北朝鲜核武器和弹道导弹威胁，以及国际恐怖主义和中国加强军事力量带来的新威胁。


Remaining in step with each other on security issues is essential if Japan and the US are to maintain a firm alliance to ensure the stability of the Asia-Pacific region.	美日两国若要维持牢固联盟以确保亚太地区的稳定，则双方在安全问题上保持步调一致将至关重要。


The Japanese government has also been searching for effective measures to respond to North Korea’s consistently insincere attitude on regional and bilateral issues, including the abduction cases.	日本政府也正在寻求有效措施以应对北朝鲜在地区和双边事务上（包括人质劫持事件）一贯不诚恳的态度。


Militarily, Japan revised its law on the Self-Defense Forces to establish procedures for ballistic missile defense, with a strong focus on North Korea.	在军事上，日本修订了自卫队方面的相关法律，以建立弹道导弹防务程序，重点针对北朝鲜。


The decision, coming at the cabinet’s regular meeting on February 15th, was not intended to coincide with Kim Jong-il’s 63rd birthday the following day.	虽然日本政府在1月15日的内阁例会上，即金正日63岁生日的前一天，达成这一决定并非刻意安排， 但也确实表明了日本政府不受胁迫的决心。


But it did show that Japan’s government, having long suspected that North Korea already possessed nuclear weapons, would not be intimidated into a fundamental policy change by confirmation of the threat.	日本政府早就怀疑北朝鲜已经拥有核武器，不会因为这一威胁的确认便被迫对相关政策进行根本性大调整。


The revision establishes the future direction of Japan’s military posture by delegating greater authority to the commanders of the Self-Defense Forces to initiate defensive actions against immediate threats.	此次修订赋予了自卫队司令官更大的权力，可以主动采取防御行动以应对紧急威胁。 这为日本未来的军事态势指明了方向。


According to South Korean news reports, in addition to its existing mid-range Nodong missiles, North Korea has improved its Scud missiles, extending their range to reach Japan’s main islands.	据南朝鲜的新闻报道，除了现有的中程“芦洞”导弹外，北朝鲜还改进了“飞毛腿”导弹，其射程在提高后已可��达日本本土（主要岛屿）。


If North Korea is, indeed, continuing to develop not only its nuclear arsenal, but also various types of ballistic missiles, in defiance of international commitments, it is truly a rogue state.	事实上，如果北朝鲜无视国际公约，不仅继续开发核武器，还开发各种弹道导弹，那么她确实可称得上是无赖国家。


As for the nuclear issue, Japan’s policy toward North Korea should continue to emphasize solidifying ties with the US and strengthening cooperation with China, South Korea, and Russia, making every effort to promote early resumption of the six-party talks.	在核武器问题上，日本对北朝鲜的政策应该是继续巩固与美国之间的关系，加强与中国、南朝鲜及俄罗斯的合作，尽一切努力尽早恢复六国会谈。


But dialogue with the Kim regime cannot be an end in itself.	但与金正日政府的对话本身不是目的。


Negotiation is necessary, and it must be sufficient, but progress will be impossible if North Korea is allowed to turn its mere participation in the six-party talks into a bargaining chip.	谈判是必要的，也必须进行充分的谈判，但如果允许北朝鲜将参加六国会谈变成讨价还价的资本，那么就不可能取得任何进步。


China Confronts the Market	中国面临市场


CAMBRIDGE – China’s current economic woes have largely been viewed through a single lens: the government’s failure to let the market operate.	美国剑桥—人们常常用单路思维看待中国当下的经济颓势：政府没有让市场运转起来。


But that perspective has led foreign observers to misinterpret some of this year’s most important developments in the foreign-exchange and stock markets.	但这个角度让外国观察者误读了今年汇率和股市的一些最重要的发展态势。


To be sure, Chinese authorities do intervene strongly in various ways.	诚然，中国当局用各种方式进行了强力干预。


From 2004 to 2013, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) bought trillions of dollars in foreign-exchange reserves, thereby preventing the renminbi from appreciating as much as it would have had it floated freely.	从2004年到2013年，中国人民银行购入了数万亿美元的外汇储备，从而防止人民币升值幅度大于自由浮动的情形。


More recently, the authorities have been deploying every piece of policy artillery they can muster in a vain attempt to moderate this summer’s plunge in equity prices.	最近，当局拿出了所有政策手段，徒劳地试图缓和今年夏天的股价暴跌。


But some important developments that foreigners decry as the result of government intervention are in fact the opposite.	但被外国人指责为政府干预的后果的一些重要发展态势其实正好相反。


Exhibit A is the August 11 devaluation of the renminbi against the dollar – a move that invoked for US politicians the old adage, “Be careful what you wish for.”	最重要的证据是8月11日人民币兑美元贬值——这一动作让人们想起了美国政客的古老格言，“小心许愿。


The devaluation – by a mere 3%, it should be noted – reflected a change in PBOC policy intended to give the market more influence over the exchange rate.	”贬值——必须指出，幅度只有3%——反映了人民银行政策的变化。 人民银行想增加市场对汇率的影响。


Previously, the PBOC allowed the renminbi’s value to fluctuate each day within a 2% band, but did not routinely allow the movements to cumulate from one day to the next.	此前，人民银行允许人民币价值日内波动2%，但一般不允许第二天继续累积前一天的波动。


Now, each day’s closing exchange rate will influence the following day’s rate, implying adjustment toward market levels.	如今，每天的收盘汇率将影响第二天的汇率，即向市场水平的调整。


The authorities probably would not have moved when they did had it not been for growing market pressure for a depreciation that could help counteract weakening economic growth.	当局也许本来不会采取行动，如果日益增加的贬值市场压力能够有助于抵消经济增长颓势的话。


In fact, bolstering growth might have been the primary motivation for the country’s political leaders, even as the PBOC remained focused on advancing the longer-term objective of strengthening the market’s role in determining the exchange rate.	事实上，提振增长也许是中国政治领导人的主要动机，尽管人民银行仍关注推进加强市场在决定汇率中的作用这一长期目标。


But the two motivations are consistent: market forces would not be placing downward pressure on the renminbi if China’s economic fundamentals did not warrant it.	但这两个动机是一致的：市场力量不会对人民币产生贬值压力，如果中国经济基本面不允许的话。


The American politicians who demanded that China float its currency may have anticipated a different outcome – somewhat unreasonably, given that market forces reversed direction in mid-2014 – but one can hardly blame the Chinese for taking them at their word.	要求中国浮动汇率的美国政客也许预料的是不同的结果——考虑到市场力量在2014年年中出现了逆转，他们的预期并不太合理——但你很难指责中国没有照办。


To be sure, China remains far from embracing a free-floating currency, let alone a fully convertible one, which would require further liberalization of controls on cross-border financial flows.	诚然，中国的汇率远远没有实现自由浮动，更不用说完全可兑换了。 后者要求进一步放松跨境金融流管制。


Unification of onshore and offshore markets is more important than a floating exchange rate in determining whether the International Monetary Fund will include the renminbi in the basket of currencies used to determine the value of its reserve asset, the Special Drawing Right.	对于IMF是否将人民币纳入决定其储备资产特别提款权（SDR）的货币篮子而言，在岸和离岸市场的统一比浮动汇率更重要。


Much commentary on the subject has underestimated the importance of the criterion that the currency be “freely usable.”	许多这一问题的评论者低估了货币应该是“可自由使用的”这一标准的重要性。


Nonetheless, many are fretting that China’s exchange-rate adjustment has triggered a “currency war,” with other emerging economies devaluing as well.	尽管如此，许多人担心中国的汇率调整引发了一场“货币战争”，其他新兴经济体也纷纷贬值。


But, more than a year after the economic fundamentals swung against emerging markets (and especially away from commodities) and toward the United States, this adjustment was due.	但是，一年多来，经济基本面逐渐不利于新兴市场（特别是不利于大宗商品）而有利于美国，因此这场调整应该在预料之内。


Though the Chinese move likely influenced the timing, other devaluations would have inevitably taken place.	尽管中国的动作可能影响了调整时间，但其他国家的贬值都是难以避免的。


Warnings about competitive devaluations are misleading.	关于竞争性贬值的警告具有误导性。


Exhibit B in the case against attributing financial developments in China to government intervention is the stock-market bubble that culminated in June.	认为不应将中国金融发展态势归咎于政府干预的第二个证据是在6月达到顶峰的股市泡沫。


According to the conventional wisdom, the authorities consistently intervened not only to try to boost the market after the collapse, but also during its year-long run-up, when the Shanghai Stock Exchange composite index more than doubled.	从传统智慧来看，当局一直在干预，不但包括市场崩溃后的救市措施，也包括在长达一年的涨势期间的干预。 在此期间，上证综合指数几乎翻番。


The finger-wagging implication is that Chinese policymakers, particularly the stock-market regulator, have only themselves to blame for the bubble.	言下之意是，中国决策者，特别是股市监管者，对于泡沫只能责怪自己。


There is undoubtedly some truth to this story.	毫无疑问，这一说法有些道理。


It seems clear that the extraordinary run-up in equity prices was fueled by a surge in margin financing of stock purchases, which was legalized in 2010-2011 and encouraged by the PBOC’s monetary easing since last November.	显然，股价的反常暴涨受保证金融资买股激增的推动，这一行为在2010—2011年被合法化并受到人民银行去年11月的货币宽松的鼓励。


Likewise, there was plenty of support for the bull market in government-sponsored news media, for example.	类似地，官方媒体等也大量宣传对牛市的支持。


But what many commentators fail to note is that China’s regulatory authorities took action to try to dampen prices over the last six months of the run-up.	但许多评论者没有看到，中国监管当局在大牛市的最后六个月采取了遏制价格的措施。


They tightened margin requirements in January, and again in April, when they also facilitated short-selling by expanding the number of eligible stocks.	1月份，保证金要求有所提高，4月份又提高了一次，同时还扩大了融券标的数量以方便卖空。


The event that ultimately seems to have pricked the bubble was the China Securities Regulatory Commission’s June 12 announcement of plans to limit the amount that brokerages could lend for stock trading.	最后扼杀泡沫的事件似乎是中国证监会6月12日宣布限制券商能够用于股票交易贷款的额度。


This is precisely the kind of counter-cyclical macroprudential policy that economists often recommend.	这正是经济学家经常建议的反周期宏观审慎政策。


But, whereas advanced economies rarely implement this advice, China and many other developing countries do tend to adjust regulation, including reserve requirements for banks and ceilings on homebuyers’ borrowing, counter-cyclically.	但是，发达经济体很少实施这一建议，而中国和其他许多发展中国家确实常常反周期地调整监管措施，包括银行准备金要求和限制住房抵押贷款。


One could criticize the Chinese regulator on the grounds that the effect of its moves to increase margin requirements did not last long; or one could criticize it on the grounds that its moves caused the recent crash.	你可以批评中国监管者他们提高保证金要求的动作的效果没有维持多少时间，你也可以批评他们的动作导致了最近的崩盘。


But, either way, these measures were intended to stem the rise in market prices, rather than to contribute to it.	但是，无论如何，这些措施是为了阻止市场价格的攀升，而不是促使它们攀升。


This is not a trivial point.	这不是一个无关紧要的点。


Nor is the fact that the PBOC’s interventions in the foreign-exchange market over the last year have aimed to dampen the renminbi’s depreciation, not add to it.	去年人民银行的外汇市场干预是为了阻止而不是加剧人民贬值也是如此。


Given this, it is facile to blame China’s problems on government intervention.	因此，将中国的问题归咎于政府干预是不负责任的。


Defending Japanese Defense	防卫日本的国防


Japan’s government and National Security Council plan to revise the country’s National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) by the end of this year.	日本政府和国家安全委员会计划在今年底之前修改国家防卫计划大纲（NDPO）。


A draft of proposed changes submitted to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi assigns three key tasks to the Self-Defense Forces (SDF): effective response to new threats, participation in international peacekeeping activities, and defense against invasion.	提交给首相小泉纯一郎的修改草案给自卫队（SDF）分配了三项关键性的任务：对新的威胁做出有效的反应、参与国际维和活动、抵抗侵略。


Today’s complex security environment, with terrorist attacks by non-state actors occurring alongside traditional state-to-state wars, demands a nimble, integrated strategy.	当前安全因素复杂多变，除了传统的国与国之间的战争外，非国家的活动分子实施的恐怖袭击也频频发生，因此需要一个敏捷、统一的战略。


The draft revision of the NDPO seems to recognize this, emphasizing the need for Japan’s own defense efforts, cooperation through the Japanese-US alliance, and contributions to multilateral missions.	NDPO的修改草案似乎认识到这一点，同时强调日本自卫、日美联盟的合作、以及对多边使命做出贡献的必要性。


Moreover, the National Security Council has indicated the need to introduce a new plan for multi-functional flexible defense forces.	此外，国家安全委员会还指出有必要制定新的计划，建立多功能的灵活防卫部队。


Unfortunately, key components of Japan’s emerging security strategy remain vague and contradictory.	不幸的是，日本新的安全战略的关键部分仍然模糊不清，自相矛盾。


For example, while the likelihood of an invasion threat is judged to be low, the Defense White Paper of 2004 argues that the SDF’s “most fundamental function” is to prepare for the worst, because sufficient defensive power cannot be developed overnight.	例如，虽然遭受侵略的可能性被认为很低，但2004年国防白皮书还是辩称自卫队“最基本的职能”是预防最糟糕的事件发生，因为充分的自卫能力不能在一夜之间产生。


In other words, Japan will clearly assert its will to defend the nation, and to prevent invasion in combination with the Japan-US security system.	也就是说，日本明确声称它将结合日美安全制度保卫自己的国家，防止侵略。


On the other hand, the National Security Council proposes “scaling down the size of defense forces,” implying mitigation of the will to defend.	另一方面，国家安全委员会提议“削减防卫部队的规模”，暗中降低了自卫的意愿。


Indeed, the failure to suggest any possibility of an “emergency expansion” of the SDF compounds this anxiety.	的确，没有建议对自卫队进行“紧急扩建”的事实加剧了这方面的焦虑。


To be sure, the government is ultimately responsible for determining the appropriate scale of defense power in line with fiscal considerations.	诚然，从根本上讲，政府有责任根据财政因素决定自卫部队的适当规模。


But it is also the responsibility of the government to prepare a detailed and realistic policy aimed at securing the necessary level of defense capability in the event of unforeseen threats.	但是政府同样有责任制定详细的、有现实意义的政策，以便在发生不可预见的威胁时有必要的自卫能力。


Japan’s government should thus give a clear indication of a true will to defend the country’s security.	因此，日本政府应该明确表明保卫国家安全的真实意愿。


Of course, defense capability cannot be judged solely according to force levels.	当然，自卫能力不能仅根据部队规模来判断。


The draft NDPO’s vision of a new, more adaptable, mobile, flexible, and multi-purpose SDF, with advanced technological resources and information gathering capacity, calls for a fundamental reassessment of the existing organization and equipment.	NDPO草案提出要建立一支新型的、具有更强适应性、移动性、灵活性、以及先进的技术资源和情报收集能力的多功能自卫队，这就必须对现有的结构和设备重新进行基本的评估。


In conformity with the international community’s efforts to secure peace and stability, the draft also creates a core unit within each of the military branches, and establishes an integrated operational system.	按照国际社会为了和平稳定所做的努力，草案还在每个军事部署内创建了一个核心单位，并建立了一套统一的行动制度。


The military reorganization that the NDPO envisages is far-reaching.	NDPO设想的军事重组具有深远的意义。


Japan’s ground forces are to reorient their current structure, which is geared to combat capability in response to large-scale invasion, toward increased adaptability for military action in less severe circumstances.	日本的地面部队要重组针对面临大规模入侵时的作战能力的现有结构，提高在情况不太严重时采取军事措施的适应能力。


The navy is to shift its focus away from the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability of the Cold War era, creating a structure aimed at defending islands, monitoring and responding to ballistic missiles, and combating illegal spy ship activities.	海军要创建一套机制，把重心从冷战时期的反潜艇战（ASW）职能，转移到保卫各个海岛，监督弹道导弹并做出回应，以及防止非法的间谍活动上。


The air force is to continue its monitoring activities in neighboring airspace and maintain response readiness against air attack, while modifying invasion response tactics somewhat as the likelihood of an attack from the air diminishes.	空军要继续监督领空，保持随时回击空中袭击的状态，同时调整反侵略策略，因为空袭的可能性已减小。


One problem is the dilution of ASW capability.	反潜艇能力的削弱是一个问题。


Japan needs to develop well-balanced defense forces with the capacity needed to respond to new threats, such as the rapid build-up of China’s navy, especially its submarine forces.	日本需要发展平衡的、能回击新的威胁（如中国海军的迅速壮大，特别是其潜艇力量）的防卫部队。


The importance of ASW capability in the Western Pacific has not waned.	西太平洋上反潜艇能力的重要性没有降低。


On the contrary, recent illegal violation of Japanese territorial waters by Chinese nuclear submarines suggests that, rather than being reduced, ASW capability should be built up further.	相反，最近中国核潜艇非法侵入日本领海的行为表明，反潜艇能力不但不应该削减，反而应该进一步增强。


If Japan does decide to scale down its defense forces in this respect, a bold and qualitative change is inevitable.	如果日本真的决定削减这方面的防卫力量，则必须在质量上进行大胆的改变。


In particular, this could mean the introduction of what has so far been viewed as somewhat taboo equipment, such as light aircraft carriers or nuclear submarines.	具体来讲，这可能意味着引入迄今为止被认为是禁忌的设备，如轻型航空母舰或核潜艇。


In this age of uncertainty, when even the nature of the threats that nations face is uncertain, Japan’s strategic and military planners must continue to seek ways to adapt the SDF to today’s myriad current threats.	值此不确定时期，就连各国面临的威胁本身都不确定，日本的战略和军事策划者们必须继续寻找方法调整自卫队，以适应如今数不胜数的威胁。


But they must do so in a way that provides genuine direction, and that Japan’s people, military, and neighbors find convincing.	但是其方式必须能指出真正的方向，并且能让日本的人民、军队和邻国信服。


“Each of us has deeply held beliefs,” he said in his victory speech in 2012. “And when we go through tough times, when we make big decisions as a country, it necessarily stirs passions, stirs up controversy,” which he called “a mark of our liberty.”	“我们每一个人都有坚定的信念，”他在2012年获胜演讲中说，“当我们经历艰难时光时，当我们作为一个国家做出重大决定时，都必然会激起热情，激起争议，”他将这称为“我们的自由的���志”。


Don’t Fear the IMF	不要害怕IMF


CAMBRIDGE – The International Monetary Fund is, in many places, the organization that everybody loves to hate.	美国剑桥—在许多地方，国际货币基金组织（IMF）是一个人见人恨的组织。


According to some, the IMF is bad for the poor, women, economic stability, and the environment.	按照这些人的说法，IMF 对穷人、妇女、经济稳定和环境不利。


Joseph Stiglitz, whose influence is amplified by his Nobel Prize, blames the IMF for causing and then worsening the economic crises it was called on to resolve.	因获得诺贝尔奖而拥有巨大影响力的约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨（Joseph Stiglitz）指责IMF引起并恶化了人们求它解决的经济危机。


The IMF purportedly does so to save capitalists and bankers, not ordinary people.	据说IMF这样做是为了拯救资本家和银行家，而不是普通群众。


Though untrue, this belief does enormous harm and limits the potential good that the IMF can do.	尽管这并非事实，但这一观点确实给IMF造成了极大的伤害，也制约了IMF做好事的能力。


For starters, consider how the world deals with refugee crises, such as Syria’s, and the way it deals with financial crises.	首先，我们来看看世界如何应对叙利亚等国家的难民危机和金融危机。


As its name indicates, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is a person, not an institution.	顾名思义，联合国难民事务高级委员是个人而非机构。


He or she heads an “office,” not a full-fledged organization.	他领导一个“办公室”，而非完善的组织。


This weakness is what forced German Chancellor Angela Merkel to bully her European Union partners into a more coherent response to the ongoing influx of asylum-seekers.	这一弱点迫使德国总理默克尔威逼其欧盟伙伴采取更加团结的措施应对寻求庇护者的持续涌入。


By contrast, the system to prevent and resolve financial crises is anchored by a full-fledged institution: the IMF.	相反，防止和解决金融危机的体系以一个完善的机构为基础，这个机构就是IMF。


It may not be perfect, but, compared to areas such as refugees, human rights, or the environment, it is light-years ahead.	它也许并不完美，但是，与难民、人权或环境等领域相比，它已经领先了好几光年。


It is easy to misunderstand what the IMF does.	很容易误解IMF是干什么的。


The bulk of its efforts are dedicated to crisis prevention.	它的大部分努力是为了防止危机。


As Franklin D. Roosevelt said at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, where the IMF and the World Bank were established, “Economic diseases are highly communicable.	富兰克林·罗斯福在IMF和世界银行宣布成立的1944年布雷顿森林会议上说，“经济病很容易传染。


It follows, therefore, that the economic health of every country is a proper matter of concern to all its neighbors, near and distant.”	因此，每个国家的经济健康都应该得到其远近邻邦的恰当的关注。 ”


That is why the 44 countries in attendance, and the 188 that now belong to the IMF, agreed to “consult and agree on international monetary changes which affect each other… and they should assist each other to overcome short-term exchange difficulties.”	正因如此，当时与会的44国以及如今加入IMF的188国都同意要“就影响彼此的国际货币变化进行磋商和取得一致……并且各国应该胡夏昂帮助以克服短期汇兑困难。


Operationally, this is expressed in so-called Article IV consultations.	”在操作层面，这一点被写入了所谓的第四条磋商。


These formal policy discussions between the IMF and member governments, typically carried out annually, are written up, reviewed by the Fund’s Board of Executive Directors (representing all 188 governments), and published for anyone to read online.	这些IMF与成员国政府之间的正式政策讨论（常常每年进行一次）都被记录在案，由IMF理事会（Board of Executive Directors，代表所有188家政府）审核并在线发布供所有人浏览。


This is a standard of collective surveillance and transparency to which organizations addressing other issues should aspire.	这是解决其他问题的组织都应该效仿的集体监督和透明度标准。


The IMF has been instrumental in developing the tools with which countries measure, assess, and improve their current macroeconomic position: fiscal and monetary policy, as well as financial, currency, and price stability.	IMF一直是开发各国可用于测量、评估和改善当前宏观经济状况的工具的重镇，包括财政和货币政策以及金融、货币和物价稳定。


It helps countries find better ways to implement measures in all of these fields, and it seeks to identify broad lessons from the experience of many countries that may shed light on the options that any particular country has.	IMF帮助各国寻找更好的方法实施所有这些领域的措施，并试图从许多国家的经验中认识广泛的教训，总结各国可能用到的选择。


Through dialogue, research, advice, technical assistance, and training, the IMF has helped create a global community of practice.	通过对话、研究、建议、技术支持和培训，IMF帮助构建了一个全球实践界（community of practice）。


Today, it is much easier to be a central bank president or a finance minister than it is to be a minister of health or justice.	如今，当央行行长或财政部长比当卫生部长或司法部长容易得多。


This is not because the challenges are easier, but because the international community of practice, led by the IMF, provides a level of support that simply does not exist in other areas.	这不是因为他们面临的挑战更容易，而是因为以IMF为首的国际实践界提供了其他领域所没有的支持水平。


The IMF’s most controversial activities come during times of crisis management and resolution.	IMF最有争议的活动发生在危机管理和解决期间。


Countries ask for IMF financial assistance when they are in trouble and have lost or fear losing the ability to borrow on international markets.	各国在陷入麻烦、失去或害怕失去在国际市场上借贷的能力时就会要求IMF给予金融援助。


The IMF can mobilize hundreds of billions of dollars of member countries’ money to give borrowers the time to get back on their feet.	IMF能够动员数千亿成员国资金，为借款国赢得时间重新自力更生。


Its resources dwarf the sums that the international community can mobilize for other issues, because its money is lent and is supposed to be paid back.	其所拥有的资源比国际社会在其他问题上所能动员的总和还要多得多，因为它的钱是贷出去的，并假设可以获得偿付。


In exchange for its financial support, the IMF typically requires countries to address the imbalances that caused their problems, not only so that they can repay the money, but also for their own good, so that they can restore their creditworthiness (and hence their access to capital markets).	作为金融支持的交换，IMF通常要求各国解决导致问题发生的失衡，这样它们不仅能够偿还IMF贷款，对其自身也有好处——它们可以重新获得信誉（从而得以进入资本市场）。


But it is too easy to confuse the pain caused by the crisis itself with that caused by the remedy.	但这样就太容易了，根本不会混淆危机本身带来的痛苦和解决危机的办法带来的痛苦。


To be sure, the IMF inevitably makes mistakes, partly because the questions and issues it must address are constantly changing, so that it never knows whether the current state of thinking is adequate to new challenges.	诚然，IMF难免会犯错，这部分是因为它必须解决的问题和状况总是在变化，因此它永远不知道现有思维是否足以应对新挑战。


But it is a sufficiently open organization that it can and must be responsive to its critics.	但IMF足够开放，它能够也必须对其批评做出反应。


Now consider the alternative.	现在我们来看看替代方案。


A world without the IMF looks a lot like today’s Venezuela.	没有IMF的世界看上去就像今天的委内瑞拉。


Hugo Chávez became the darling of IMF bashers, including Stiglitz, when he suspended Article IV consultations in 2004.	查韦斯（Hugo Chávez）是IMF批评者的最爱，斯蒂格利茨就是如此——具体可参见他2004年对第四条磋商的质疑。


As a consequence, Venezuelans lost access to the basic economic information that the country is obligated to share, through the IMF, with the world.	结果，委内瑞拉无法获得它有义务通过IMF与世界共享的基本经济信息。


The break prevented the international community from expressing its voice as the country undertook truly irresponsible policies, spending in 2012 as if the price of oil was $197 a barrel, not $107.	这一断层阻止了国际社会在委内瑞拉采取真正不负责任政策时的声音。 2012年，委内瑞拉花钱之大方好像油价仍在每桶197美元，而非107美元。


With the collapse in the price of oil since then, the economy has gone into a tailspin: GDP is contracting at a record pace, inflation is in excess of 200%, the currency has plunged to less than 10% of its previous value, and massive shortages have emerged.	此后，随着石油价格的崩盘，委内瑞拉经济也陷入了混乱：GDP以创纪录的速度缩水，通货膨胀率超过200%，货币价值暴跌超过90%，各种短缺层出不穷。


Venezuela has tried to finance itself with the help of the China Development Bank, which does not impose the kind of conditionality that IMF bashers dislike.	委内瑞拉求助于中国国家开发银行为其融资，该银行不会对委内瑞拉施加IMF批评者所不喜欢的条件。


Instead, the CDB lends on secret terms, for uses that are undisclosed and corrupt, and with built-in privileges for Chinese companies in areas like telecommunications (Huawei), appliances (Haier), cars (Chery), and oil drilling (ICTV).	相反，它根据秘密条款发放贷款，贷款用途秘而不宣并且腐败，而中国公司在诸多领域取得特权，包括通讯业（华为）、电器（海尔）、汽车（奇瑞）和钻井（ICTV）等。


The Chinese have not required that Venezuela do anything to increase the likelihood that it regains creditworthiness.	中国人不要求委内瑞拉采取任何行动增加重获信誉的可能性。


They merely demand more oil as collateral.	他们只是要求更多的石油作为抵押。


Whatever the IMF’s faults, the CDB is a disgrace.	不管IMF犯过多么严重的错误，中国国家开发银行的做法都是一个丑闻。


The tragedy is that most Venezuelans (and many citizens of other countries) believe that the IMF is there to hurt, not help.	悲剧的是，大部分委内瑞拉人（以及其他国家的许多公民）认为IMF做得坏事比好事多。


As a consequence, they eschew the massive resources and wisdom that the international community can offer at a time of economic crisis to lessen the pain and hasten recovery.	结果，他们在经济危机期间回避国际社会能够提供的缓解痛苦、加快复苏的大量资源和智慧。


That has left them far worse off than the IMF bashers can bring themselves to admit.	这给他们带来了更大的痛苦，而IMF批评者是不会承认这一点的。


What Is the International Community?	什么是国际社会？


PARIS – Despite the frequency with which the phrase “international community” is invoked, its precise meaning – like its origins – is difficult to discern.	巴黎—尽管人们频繁使用“国际社会”一词，但其准确含义——就像其起源——很难弄清楚。


And, as France’s recent intervention in Mali has shown, this ambiguity lies at the root of many of today’s most urgent foreign-policy problems.	正如法国近期对马里的干预所显示的，这一模糊性的根源在于当今世界最紧迫的外交政策问题。


For some, an international community simply does not exist.	在一些人看来，国际社会根本不存在。


For others, the term refers, more pragmatically, to all countries when they decide to act together.	也有人比较实际，认为这个词意指决定集体行动的所有国家。


Still another, more accurate definition encompasses all countries with international influence – that is, any country whose identity and sovereignty is recognized, and that chooses to participate in global discussions and decision-making.	还有一些人使用更准确地定义，即包括所有具有国际影响的国家——任何身份和主权得到承认并选择参与国际讨论和决策的国家。


Beyond semantics lies the more consequential, but equally ambiguous, question of the international community’s role and responsibility.	在语义学之外是后果更严重但同样不清不楚的问题——国际社会的角色和责任。


Just as too broad a definition could undermine a country’s sovereignty, too narrow a definition – like that which seems to predominate today – allows violence and instability to proliferate.	太宽泛的定义会破坏一国的主权，太狭窄的定义——比如主宰当今世界之物——又会让暴力和动荡蔓延。


For centuries, sovereign states have regulated their relations – from ending wars and demarcating borders to establishing diplomatic privileges and conducting trade – with treaties.	几百年来，主权国家用条约约束彼此之间的关系——从结束战争和划定边界到建立外交特权和进行贸易。


Together, these official agreements comprise international law, which compensates for its lack of specific penalties by establishing strict and unambiguous concepts and one overarching sanction – universal blame for its transgression – that matters to everybody.	这些正式协定加起来组成了国际法，国际法通过设定所有人适用的严格明晰的概念和实施制裁——对违反国际法的一致指责——补偿具体惩罚措施的缺乏。


And yet, throughout these centuries of treaty-making, violence between countries persisted.	但是，在几百年的缔约史中，国与国之间的暴力从未消失。


So countries began to deepen and develop international law by building shared institutions.	因此各国开始通过建立共同机构来深化和发展国际法。


The process began quietly, with the establishment in 1874 of the Union Générale des Postes (which later became the Universal Postal Union), and went virtually unnoticed by those in fields that lacked any need for global agreements.	这一过程静悄悄地开始——1874年成立了Union Générale des Postes，即日后的万国邮盟，并在没有国际协定需要的区域鲜为人知地运行着。


The devastation of World War I, however, highlighted the need for stronger international cooperation on peace-keeping, leading to the establishment of the League of Nations.	但是，第一次世界大战凸显出需要更强的国际合作来维持和平，这催生了国际联盟。


But the organization was weak and inefficient, largely owing to the United States’ refusal to ratify its charter.	但这一组织软弱而低效，主要原因是美国拒绝在国际联盟宪章上签字。


As a result, it failed to accomplish its primary objective of preventing another world war.	结果，国际联盟没能完成它的主要目标——防止有一场世界大战。


In the wake of World War II, a stronger and more influential institution – the United Nations – was established.	第二次世界大战爆发后，成立了更强大、更有影响力的机构——联合国。


The UN, which has a specialized agency for each aspect of a humane society, has successfully supported decolonization, helped to build states, and averted the spread of regional conflicts, especially that between Israelis and Palestinians.	联合国在人类社会的每一个方面都设有专门机构，成功地支持了去殖民地化、帮助世界各地人民建立国家、避免了地区冲突（特别是以色列和巴勒斯坦）的蔓延。


UN efforts have also led to the eradication of many infectious diseases; the adoption in 1982 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the principal framework for handling maritime disputes; and the establishment in 1988 of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, whose regular reports play an important role in assessing hazards related to climate change.	联合国的努力还使人们根除了许多传染病，使人们在1982年通过了处理海事纠纷的海洋法公约（Convention on the Law of the Sea）、在1988年成立了政府间气候变化委员会（Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change，其定期报告在评估气候变化��关风险方面起着重要作用）。


But the UN was unable to avert the Cold War, wars in Algeria, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia, or genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda.	但联合国无法遏制冷战、阿尔及利亚战争、越南战争和南斯拉夫战争，也无法阻止柬埔寨和卢旺达的种族灭绝。


Contrary to expectations, the collapse of communism did not bolster international cooperation.	与预期相反，共产主义的崩溃并未增进国际合作。


On the contrary, all international negotiations – on global warming, financial regulation, and nuclear disarmament (despite the efforts of US President Barack Obama and former Russian President Dmitri Medvedev to conclude a bilateral nuclear-disarmament agreement) – launched since the end of the twentieth century have failed.	相反，20世纪末以来的所有国际谈判——关于全球变暖、金融监管和核裁军（尽管美国总统奥巴马和前俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫达成了双边核裁军协定）等问题皆是如此——都失败了。


Another force – global public opinion – is needed to strengthen and expand the scope of international law.	另一大力量——全球公共舆论——也需要用来加强和扩张国际法的范畴。


Indeed, global public opinion, galvanized by the actions of NGOs, has pushed governments to sign treaties, such as the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, and to establish international institutions, such as the International Criminal Court in 1998.	事实上，由非政府组织带动的全球公共舆论促使政府签署了不少条约，比如1997年的禁止地雷公约（Mine Ban Treaty）、成立了不少机构，比如1998年的国际刑事法庭（International Criminal Court）。


Global public opinion should be channeled more effectively in order to compel the international community to take responsibility in new areas.	全球公共舆论的渠道应该加强，以迫使国际社会在新领域承担起责任来。


This will require a more acute collective awareness of the violence and chaos threatening territories and people worldwide, including in Somalia, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and, most recently, Mali.	这需要更敏锐的关于威胁领土和全世界人民的暴力和混乱（包括索马里、海地、利比里亚、塞拉利昂以及最近的马里）的集体意识。


In January, France, which no longer has strategic or economic interests in western Africa, responded to a request from Mali’s citizens and caretaker leaders to intervene to prevent Islamist rebels from Libya and Algeria from overrunning the country.	1月，在西非地区已无战略和经济利益的法国响应了马里人民和看守领导人的要求，干预阻止了来自利比亚和阿尔及利亚的伊斯兰叛军入侵该国。


Four months after France’s military operation successfully expelled occupying forces from northern Mali, most French troops and equipment are headed home.	在法军成功将占领军从马里北部驱除出境四个月后，大部分法国部队和装备已经调回国内。


The intervention lacked the support of the international community, which, with the exception of the United Kingdom, failed to understand the sense of responsibility that underpinned France’s decision.	这次干预缺少国际社会支持，国际社会（除了英国）没有理解法国决定背后的责任。


But, with French forces on their way out and Mali desperately in need of rebuilding, the international community must adopt a new perspective and offer its support.	但是，在法军撤出、马里极度需要重建之时，国际社会必须采取新角度提供支持。


The UN, which carries the mantle for the international community, has already deployed a peacekeeping force to Mali.	作为国际社会的旗帜，联合国已经在马里部署了维和部队。


Moreover, in accordance with its regulations and practices, the UN has called for a presidential election, which has now been set for July 28.	此外，根据其规则和实践，联合国还呼吁举行总统选举，目前选举日期定在7月28日。


But, given that Mali lacks political parties with popular support, candidates who command respect, and a permanent polling-station system, an election held so soon would probably bring an international civil servant to power – an outcome that could reignite internal conflicts.	但是，由于马里缺少受公共支持的政党、受到尊敬的候选人以及永久性的投票站体系，如此仓促地举行选举可能导致国际公职人员执政——这样的结果可能令内部冲突重燃。


Restoring security in Mali requires dialogues between village and tribal leaders.	让马里恢复安全需要村落和部落领袖之间的对话。


Likewise, rebuilding the country’s infrastructure depends on talks between any remaining municipal authorities and village leaders.	类似地，重建马里基础设施依赖于现存市政当局和村落领袖的谈判。


Both processes will take time, and neither can be completed successfully without external support.	两个过程都需要时间，没有外部支持，一个也无法成功完成。


A country that lacks a government cannot rebuild after a crisis without help.	缺少政府的国家无法自力更生地完成危机后重建。


That does not mean forcing it to follow an unrealistic and potentially dangerous electoral ritual just because it is embedded in UN regulations.	这并不意味着仅仅因为联合国规则的需要就必须继之以不现实的、可能造成危险的选举仪式。


The international community should support Mali’s gradual process of renewal where it counts – on the ground in the country’s conflict-battered communities.	国际社会应该支持马里的逐渐新生——在该国饱受冲突的社会的基础上。


And it is up to the global public to stand up for that idea.	而这取决于全球公众是否支持这一思想。


Deflation and Democracy	通缩和民主


PRINCETON – The history of finance is partly the history of a struggle for a stable, secure way to measure value.	普林斯顿－金融历史中的一部分，是努力寻找测量价值安全而稳定的方法的历史。


And, like any quest for certainty in our unpredictable world, it was doomed to failure.	然而，像对我们这个不可预知的世界的确定性的任何其他探求一样，这注定是要失败的。


The latest financial crisis powerfully highlights this vulnerability, as it destroys any sense that we can put an accurate price on assets.	当最近的金融危机摧毁了我们能够为资产确定一个精准的价格这一看法的同时，它也有力地突显了这一弱点。


Most people are now convinced that this shortcoming is inherent in the financial system.	现在，许多人深信这一缺陷是金融体系所固有的。


But uncertainties about value also expose deep problems in the political order.	但是，有关价值的不确定性也暴露了政治秩序深层次的问题。


In the past, metallic money provided an inconvenient and unsatisfactory solution to the question of value.	在过去，金属货币为价值问题提供了一个解决办法，但是这一解决办法并不便利和令人满意。


It was inconvenient because gold was awkward for everyday transactions, and silver had too little value for major transfers.	说它不便利，是因为在日常交易中，黄金使用起来不方便，而白银对重大交易来说，价值太低。


Moreover, metallic money was prone to unpredictable shifts in value with the discovery of new supplies.	而且，金属货币在发现了新供给的时候，其价值容易发生不可预测的变化。


The arrival of silver from the New World in the sixteenth century triggered sustained inflation.	在16世纪，来自新大陆的白银引发了持续的通货膨胀。


The discovery of gold in California in the mid-nineteenth century, and in Alaska, South Africa, and Australia 50 years later, also produced mild inflation, while the absence of such new discoveries in the 1870’s and 1880’s led to mild deflation.	19世纪中期加州黄金储藏的发现，以及50年后阿拉斯加、南非以及澳大利亚黄金储藏的发现，也导致了温和的通胀，而在19世纪70年代和19世纪80年代，这样的发现的缺乏却导致了温和的通缩。


Consequently, many economists and politicians concluded that paper money could be more easily controlled and more stable.	因此，许多经济学家和政治家断言，纸货币更加易于控制并且更稳定。


This innovation, which was dependent on high-security paper-making and printing techniques, transformed the twentieth century.	这一依赖高度安全的造纸和印刷技术的创新，改变了20世纪。


But it initially produced a much less stable outcome, because of the strong temptation of political abuse.	但是，由于政治滥用的强大诱惑，它最初产生了一个更不稳定的结果。


Instead of moderate inflation, most of the twentieth century was wildly inflationary, as governments over-issued currency.	与温和通胀不同的是，因为政府过度发行纸币，20世纪的许多时候发生的都是极度的通胀。


In the last two decades of the twentieth century, however, an intellectual revolution occurred.	但是，在20世纪的最后20年里，发生了一个学术革命。


Entrusting monetary policy to an independent central bank promised to be a perfect way to counter the political pressure to print money.	将货币政策授予独立的中央银行，可望成为一个对抗印刷钞票的政治压力的完美途径。


At the United States Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker engineered a sustained and successful process of disinflation beginning in 1979.	在美联储，从1979年开始，保罗·沃克尔（Paul Volcker）开始了一个持续而成功的防止通胀的过程。


Europe learned the same lesson with the move to monetary union and the creation of the European Central Bank to manage its new currency, the euro.	欧洲在结成货币联盟以及建立欧洲中央银行来管理其新货币欧元的过程中，也吸取了同样的教训。


As a result, people assumed that the problem of monetary stability had been solved, and that they could pile up assets and then use them as collateral to borrow ever-larger sums.	结果，人们认为货币稳定问题已经得到了解决，他们可以积累资产，然后将这些资产作为抵押物来借越来越多的钱。


But the large-scale destruction of financial assets because of underlying uncertainty about the extent of losses in the wake of the sub-prime crisis, and especially after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, shook that assumption.	但是，在次级抵押贷款危机爆发之后，因为损失程度暗含的不确定性，特别是在雷曼兄弟破产之后，金融资产大规模的毁灭粉碎了人们的这一看法。


Deflation that emanates from the financial sector is lethal. It is more difficult to deal with than inflation, in part for the technical reason that interest rates can be reduced only to zero.	源自金融部门的通缩是致命的，它比通货膨胀更难应对，这部分是因为利率只能降到零这样的技术原因。


The closer to zero they fall, the more problematic monetary policy becomes.	利率离零越近，对货币政策来说就越棘手。


The policy instruments no longer work.	政策工具再也不起作用了。


Central banks have expanding balance sheets, but prices continue to fall and uncertainty rises.	各国中央银行已经扩张了资产负债表，但是，价格却持续下降并且不确定性增加了。


There is a further reason why deflation is such a threat, and why policymakers setting out to eliminate it have a much tougher task than inflation fighters: all prices do not move down; in particular debts do not adjust because they are fixed in nominal terms.	通货紧缩是如此大的一个威胁，并且着手消除通缩的政策制定者比遏制通胀的斗士面临着更为严峻的任务，有其更深层次的原因：所有的价格都不向下运行； 特别是因为债务是以名义价值确定的，所以它们都没有调整。


Inflation and deflation of debts produce very different outcomes.	债务的通胀和通缩会产生非常不同的结果。


Inflation reduces the value of debt, which for many people and companies feels like slowly sipping champagne, producing a nice buzz of light-headed excitement as they are unburdened.	通胀降低了债务的价值，这对许多人和公司来说，感觉就像是在慢慢品味香槟，在他们没有负担的时候，产生了轻飘飘的美妙眩晕。


Deflation, on the other hand, increases debt, and feels like being smothered by a lead blanket.	另一方面，通缩增加了债务，人们对此的感觉就像是被铅毯子窒息了一样。