In fact, anti-Israel rhetoric reflects Iranian leaders’ confidence that Israel will not attack – a view that is bolstered by the situation in Syria.	事实上，反以色列立场反映了伊朗领导人对以色列不会发动袭击的信心——这种观点因叙利亚的现状而起。


They are convinced that, even if Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime falls, Iran will be able to destabilize the country in such a way that would pose a major security threat to Israel.	伊朗领导人相信，即使叙利亚总统巴沙尔的政权倒台，伊朗也能够以给以色列带来重大安全威胁的方式动摇这个国家。


According to this view, it is Israel that has an interest in refraining from further antagonizing Iran, not vice versa.	根据这一观点，以色列才应该保持克制不要进一步挑衅伊朗，而不是相反。


Recent editorials in Kayhan – the hardline Iranian newspaper that serves as a mouthpiece for the Supreme Leader – indicate that Khamenei is looking forward to the US presidential election.	走强硬路线、充当最高领导人喉舌的《世界报》（Kayhan）的最新社论表明，哈梅内伊正在密切关注美国总统大选。


Regardless of the outcome, he foresees no threat of military action, at least through next year.	不管结果如何，他认为都不会产生军事行动危险，至少明年不会。


A victory by Obama would reinforce America’s unwillingness to attack Iran and renewed efforts to rein in Israel.	奥巴马获胜将使美国更加不愿意袭击伊朗，而会采取新措施控制以色列。


And, if Republican challenger Mitt Romney is elected, he will need months to form his national security team and assemble his cabinet, leaving him unable to attack Iran immediately.	而如果共和的那个挑战者罗姆尼当选，他将需要好几个月的时间组建国家安全团队和内阁，也无法立刻袭击伊朗。


That said, since the Islamic Republic’s emergence in 1979, Iran’s leaders have generally preferred Republican presidents to Democrats: despite their harsh rhetoric, Republicans have been more willing to engage with Iran in practice.	这么说吧，自从1979年成立伊斯兰共和国以来，伊朗领导人大体上喜欢共和党甚于民主党：共和党嘴上很硬，但在动作上更愿意包容伊朗。


Indeed, given that Iran has so far survived severe international sanctions, its leaders believe that they could get an offer from the US after the election – particularly if Romney wins – that recognizes their right to enrich uranium.	事实上，由于伊朗在严厉国际制裁的情况下仍活得好好的，因此其领导人认为美国会在大选后——特别是罗姆尼当选的请款下——向伊朗颁发铀浓缩许可证。


In fact, it is far from certain that Iran will be able to withstand current sanctions-related pressures indefinitely.	事实上，伊朗是否能够长久地抵抗住当前的制裁相关压力还远未可知。


But its leaders’ confidence that they can remains a crucial element of their strategy, and the West cannot afford to ignore their perceptions. America, whether led by Obama or Romney, must understand that Iran will not negotiate seriously on its nuclear program until it perceives a clear, convincing, and unified consensus in the US and Israel on an approach that addresses both Iran’s ambitions and Israel’s concerns.	但其领导人对“能”的信心仍是其战略的关键要素，而西方不能无视他们的想法。 美国，不管由奥巴马还是罗姆尼领导，必须明白，除非伊朗认为美国和以色列就如何处理伊朗的野心和以色列的担心问题形成统一意见，它是不会认真讨论其核计划事宜的。


Achieving such a consensus in the context of an American presidential election will be no small feat.	在美国总统大选的背景下达成这样的统一意见并非易事。


Nor is it easy to create consensus in Israel, especially as its political parties prepare for elections next year.	以色列国内形成一致亦然，特别是以色列各政党要为明年的选举做准备的时候。


But only with significantly greater cohesion within the US and Israel will Iran’s leaders even consider accepting a compromise on their nuclear program.	但只有美国和以色列内部形成了更大的合力，伊朗领导人才会考虑在核计划问题上妥协。


Iran’s Hardline Choice	伊朗的强硬派选择


Iran’s choice for its next president, the hardline Mayor of Teheran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is likely to worsen relations with the West and the country’s international isolation.	伊朗下一任总统，德黑兰的强硬派市长艾哈迈迪内贾德，很可能使该国和西方的关系及目前的国际孤立状态进一步恶化。


Yet in domestic terms the Islamist regime is likely to be better off than it would have been with a more moderate result.	然而就伊朗国内而言，相对于一个更为温和的结果，这一结果可能对该伊斯兰政权更加有利。


Clearly, Ahmadinejad has a real base of support.	显然，艾哈迈迪内贾德拥有真正的支持基础。


But the fact that he ran as a populist, talked about helping the poor, condemned the government’s performance, and acted almost like an opposition candidate are all irrelevant: he was the regime’s choice, and, in the end, he received official help even against rival hardline candidates.	但他以人民党党员的身份参选，大谈帮助穷人，批评政府的表现，行为举止就像一位反对派竞选者的事实却是无关紧要的：他是现政权的选择，并最终得到了官方的帮助以击败其他强硬派的竞争对手。


The regime played its hand brilliantly.	该政权的这一手无疑是高明的。


It turned the slightly more pragmatic Hashemi Rafsanjani, who disagreed with some current policies, into the “establishment” figure and its own man into the rebel.	它将更功利主义一些，且在一些现行政策方面持不同意见的拉夫桑贾尼描画称“当权派”人物，并将自己的人选变成了反叛者。


The government thus used anti-establishment feeling to revitalize its own rule.	于是政府就可以利用反当权派的情绪来重振其统治。


Given the fact that the last president, Muhammad Khatami, was a supporter of the reform movement – albeit a timid one who ultimately accomplished nothing – only underlines how thoroughly the rulers turned around the political situation.	鉴于前任总统哈塔米是改革运动的支持者—虽然怯懦使他终究一事无成—这就更加突出说明了统治者们是如何彻底地操控了政治局势。


Ahmadinejad is a representative of the younger activists in the anti-Shah revolution of a quarter-century ago.	艾哈迈迪内贾德是25年前反伊朗国王革命的较年轻的活动家代表。


He was directly involved in the holding of American hostages in Iran, though exactly how much so remains a matter of dispute.	他直接参与了伊朗的美国人质事件，虽然具体的参与程度仍有争议。


Most worrisome of all, he is close to the two main groups that represent the most extreme elements in Iran: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basij organization.	最令人担心的是他和伊朗两个代表最极端主义的组织关系密切：伊斯兰革命卫队和动员队（Basij）组织。


The first is a parallel pro-regime army; the second is an organization for intimidating opponents and anyone seeking a more open society.	前者是平行的亲政府武装，而后者是一个恐吓反对者和任何寻求建立一个更开放社会的人士的组织。


However, concern that an even more radical leadership has taken over in Iran is mitigated by two factors.	然而，有两个因素可能会减轻人们对伊朗被一个更为激进的领导层掌控的焦虑。


First, Ahmadinejad is more likely to focus on domestic issues, trying – with whatever degree of success is unclear – to improve living standards for the poorest Iranians.	首先，艾哈迈迪内贾德很可能会更关注国内问题，并尽力—不管会在多大程度上取得成功—提高最贫困的伊朗民众的生活水平。


Second, the same group that has been in control ever since the revolution will basically continue to run ideological and foreign policy.	其次，自革命以来就一直掌权的政治集团事实上会继续控制意识形态和外交政策。


The president has fewer powers than it seems, overshadowed particularly by Supreme Guide Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.	特别是在最高领袖哈梅内伊的阴影笼罩下，这位总统的实权要比表面上看起来小。


Nevertheless, Ahmadinejad’s election starkly clarifies the challenge that Iran poses for Western policy and Middle East stability.	但不论如何，艾哈迈迪内贾德的当选使得伊朗对西方政策和中东稳定带来的挑战完全清晰化了。


First and foremost, it sends a signal to the most extreme elements in Iran and that country’s terrorist clients – Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and various small groups operating against Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and other Arab countries – that they have a green light for launching attacks.	首先也最为重要的是它向伊朗最极端的组织和该国的恐怖主义附庸—黎巴嫩真主党，巴勒斯坦的哈马斯，伊斯兰圣战组织和其他各类反对沙特阿拉伯、伊拉克和其他阿拉伯国家的小型组织—发送了一个让它们可以发动袭击的信号。


They are likely to assume that Iran will support them whatever they do.	这些组织很可能会认为不论它们做什么都会得到伊朗的支持。


Outwardly, Iran has often been relatively cautious, but, at the covert level, it has been the world’s leading sponsor of terror.	从表面上看，伊朗从来都相对谨慎，但暗地里它一直是世界恐怖主义的主要支持者。


Sometimes individual Iranian officials may have acted on their own to order and coordinate specific operations; they will now feel freer to do so.	有时，伊朗官员会以个人的名义下令或协调具体的行动； 他们现在就更可以放开手脚了。


Moreover, Ahmadinejad openly advocates Iran’s crash program to obtain nuclear weapons.	另外，艾哈迈迪内贾德还是核武器计划的公开倡议者。


Most Iranian politicians – at least those allowed by the government to function openly – support the program, but favor a quieter and more cautious approach.	大多数伊朗政治人物—至少是那些被政府允许公开行使职权的—都支持该计划，但却倾向于用一种更谨慎和不张扬的方式。


Rafsanjani, for example, put building better economic relations with the West ahead of pushing forward on the nuclear front.	例如，拉夫桑贾尼就将与西方建立更好的经济关系的重要性放在推进核战线建设之前。


If Ahmadinejad is president of a nuclear Iran, he is more likely to use the weapons in an adventurous manner.	如果艾哈迈迪内贾德是核伊朗的总统，他就极有可能会以一种更加冒险的方式来利用这些武器。


This does not mean that he would fire them, but rather that he would use them for purposes of diplomatic blackmail, raising threats to crisis levels.	这并不意味着他会发射核武，而是说他很可能将其用于外交讹诈的目的，使威胁上升到危机的水平。


Since Iranian leaders daily proclaim their desire to wipe Israel off the map and to fight the US (Ahmadinejad stepped on a picture of an American flag on his way to vote), the risk of confrontation has increased.	由于伊朗领导人们总是扬言要把以色列从地图上抹去并要反抗美国（艾哈迈迪内贾德在去投票的路上踩过一张美国国旗的照片），对抗的风险已经增加了。


Finally, Ahmadinejad is likely to be bolder in subverting stability in Iraq, and his victory will encourage radical Iranian officials and extremists within Iraq itself.	最后，艾哈迈迪内贾德在颠覆伊朗的稳定方面更为大胆，而他的胜利又会鼓励激进的伊朗官员和伊拉克的极端主义分子。


Iran is already sending many agents into Iraq and supporting clients seeking to turn that country into a clone.	伊朗已经派许多特工潜入伊拉克，并支持其附庸从而企图把该国变成伊朗的克隆。


Iraqis, including Shia Muslims – who follow the same version of Islam as Iranians — generally reject such interference.	包括和伊朗人信奉同一支伊斯兰教的什叶派在内的伊拉克人，大都反对这样的干涉。


A more militant Iranian posture is likely to increase friction with Iraq, as well as inspire more anti-American violence there.	伊朗更好战的态度可能会增加与伊拉克的摩擦，同时也可能激发伊拉克的反美暴力。


In short, Iran’s electoral outcome is a dangerous one, though precisely how destabilizing it ultimately turns out to be will depend on Ahmadinejad’s actions and the degree of power granted him by Khamenei.	简而言之，伊朗的选举结果是危险的，虽然它最终会带来多大的不稳定性还要取决于艾哈迈迪内贾德的行动和哈梅内伊赋予他的权力大小。


Moreover, dealing with such an openly extreme Iran – radical even by the hardline regime’s standards – will be a challenge not just for the US, but for Europe as well.	另外，与这样一个公然极端的伊朗（甚至以强硬派政权的标准来看也甚为激进）打交道，不仅对美国，对欧洲也同样是一个挑战。


Will European countries try to pretend that Ahmadinejad’s militant rhetoric and provocations don’t matter and that some diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear ambition can be found?	欧洲国家会对艾哈迈迪内贾德的好战言论和挑衅佯装不睬，并坚持认为伊朗的核问题能够通过外交途径解决吗？


With Rafsanjani, either a real agreement or the pretense of cooperation would have been easy to maintain.	对于拉夫桑贾尼来说，不论是一个真正的协议还是表面上的合作都容易维持。


But, with Ahmadinejad, a high level of appeasement will be necessary for even the most minimal diplomatic process to continue.	但对于艾哈迈迪内贾德而言，要使即便是最小的外交进展得以为继，也需��目前的局面有很大程度的缓和。


Some Iranian reformers and exiles put a bright face on Ahmadinejad’s election, arguing that his administration is more likely to show the regime’s real face and disabuse any Western hopes of compromise.	一些伊朗改革派和流亡人士则以一种积极的态度看待艾哈迈迪内贾德的当选。 他们认为这一届政府更可能会表现出现政权的真正立场并破除西方任何认为伊朗会妥协的奢望。


Yet it may also represent the regime’s success at co-opting dissatisfaction with a quarter-century of radical Islamist rule.	但它还可能代表着现政权在拉拢和利用伊朗人对25年来激进伊斯兰统治的不满方面的成功。


Whatever the outcome, for the West, Ahmadinejad’s victory means that everything related to Iran is set to become even hotter.	不论结果如何，对西方而言，艾哈迈迪内贾德的胜利意味着与伊朗相关的一切都会变得更为棘手。


Iran’s Less-is-More Nuclear Policy	伊朗的“少即多”核政策


NEW YORK – The recent United States National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which reports that Iran once had a “nuclear weapons program” but suspended it in 2003, means that there will probably be no American attack on Iran during the Bush administration.	纽约——不久前，美国国家情报估测（NIE）的报告称伊朗曾有过“核武器计划”，但已于2003年中止。 这意味着布什执政期间美国不大会进攻伊朗。


How could America’s president explain to the world why he was bombing nuclear weapon facilities that his own intelligence services have said do not exist?	否则，对于他自己的情报机构都说不存在的核武器设施，美国总统要怎么向世界解释轰炸的理由？


So, in all likelihood, the world has been spared a policy that would be as futile as it would be destructive.	因此，世界很可能躲过了一项既无用又有害的政策。


Indeed, the one act most likely to guarantee that Iran obtains nuclear weapons would be to attack it.	其实，进攻伊朗才是最有可能促使伊朗获得核武器的行为。


(Nine years after Israel’s bombing raid on Iraq’s nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981, Saddam Hussein was nevertheless within a year of having an atomic bomb.)	（1981年以色列轰炸了伊拉克Osirak的核反应堆，然而九年后，萨达姆·侯赛因还是具备了在一年内制造出原子弹的能力。 ）


Yet the NIE arrived at its result by a strange route.	不过，NIE得出这个结论的路线十分怪异。


Every technically competent person knows that the paths to civilian nuclear power and to nuclear weapons are the same, except for a few last, comparatively simple steps.	每个具备一定技术知识的人都知道，民用核能和核武器的研制途径除了最后几个相对简单的步骤外都是一样的。


The hard part is obtaining the fissionable materials – plutonium or highly enriched uranium.	难处在于如何取得裂变物质——钚或高浓缩铀。


Once that’s done, any nation – or even a sophisticated terrorist group – can do the rest.	这个问题一旦解决，其他的任何国家——甚至一个严密的恐怖主义组织——也可以完成。


Nuclear power requires low-enriched uranium as fuel.	核能需要用低浓缩铀作燃料。


Enrich it further, in the same facilities, and you have bomb-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU).	在同样的设施里进一步浓缩就能得到可用来制作原子弹的高浓缩铀（HEU）。


The remaining step – slamming two pieces of HEU together to create a critical mass and an explosion – is easy: the blueprints can be downloaded from the Internet.	剩下的步骤——将两个HEU结合在一起达到临界质量，产生爆炸——很简单：蓝图可以从互联网上下载。


Indeed, the “secret” of the hydrogen bomb was published in 1979 in an article by Howard Morland in The Progressive magazine, sparking a failed legal suit by the US government to suppress it.	其实，早在1979年Howard Morland就在《进步》杂志上公开了氢弹的“秘密”，当时美国政府还提出起诉，企图查禁，不过败诉了。


The hard work of building facilities for enriching uranium is precisely what the Iranians are now already doing, if not yet in sufficient quantity to make a bomb, which might take them five or ten more years to acquire. But, once they acquire sufficient capacity, only the easy steps will remain.	建设铀浓缩设施这个难点正好是伊朗人已经在做的事情，或许数量还没有达到足够制造原子弹的程度（可能需要五年或十年的时间），不过，一旦他们掌握了足够的生产能力，剩下的就只是那些简单的步骤了。


Yet it is work on the easy steps, allegedly attempted and then canceled, that the NIE called Iran’s “nuclear weapon program.”	然而正是这些简单步骤上的努力（号称曾经尝试过，但又取消了）被NIE称作伊朗的“核武器计划”。


In light of the technical realities, it would have been more accurate to designate the difficult and openly acknowledged enrichment activity as the nuclear weapons program, for this is what can supply the guts of an atomic bomb.	按照现实技术，那些 公开承认 的较难的铀浓缩活动才更应该被称作核武器计划，因为这才是原子弹的核心来源。


Ironically, Iran’s suspension of the easy steps creates the impression that its weapon program has been stopped, while the most important activity continues in plain sight.	具有讽刺意味的是，伊朗中止那些简单的步骤给人留下武器计划已经停止的印象，然而最重要的活动仍在众目睽睽下继续。


Of course, this does not mean that once Iran has adequate enrichment facilities, it will make a bomb. But it is capacity, not intention, that counts.	当然，这并不是说伊朗一旦拥有足够的铀浓缩设施 就肯定会 制造原子弹，但重要的是能力，而不是意图。


Iran could easily do what Japan does – hold enrichment facilities in readiness to make a bomb without actually doing so.	伊朗完全可以学日本那样——准备好制造原子弹的铀浓缩设施，但却不着手进行。


Or, like India in 1974, it might wait a long time, then dash to the finish line and conduct an atomic test.	或者像1974年的印度那样，耐心等待一段时间，然后突然冲到终点，进行原子弹试验。


How has this confusion arisen?	这种混乱是怎么产生的？


One answer lies in the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which forbids nuclear weapons to most of its signatories but guarantees them the right to build technology for nuclear power, including uranium enrichment.	答案之一在于《核不扩散条约》（NPT）的规定。 《核不扩散条约》禁止大多数签约国制造核武器，但是却保护他们发展包括铀浓缩在内的核能技术的权利。


Thus, the treaty unfortunately permits any signatory to acquire the most important facilities needed for making atomic bombs.	结果，该条约实际上允许任何签约国建设制造原子弹所需的核心设施。


So, when the Bush administration wanted to oppose Iran’s program, merely pointing to the bare fact of enrichment wasn’t enough.	因此，当布什政府想反对伊朗的计划时，仅仅针对铀浓缩这个显而易见的事实是不够的。


It had to point to other acts, including concealment efforts, which violate the NPT, and argue that these infractions were so serious that Iran’s enrichment right must be taken away.	他必须针对其他违反NPT的行为，包括隐瞒行为，宣称这些违规行为十分严重，必须取消伊朗发展铀浓缩的权利。


The US was thus led to a series of over-statements.	因此，美国开始了一系列的夸大其词。


In December 2005, Vice President Dick Cheney said, “There is every reason to believe that they are seriously pursuing nuclear weapons.”	2005年12月，副总统迪克·切尼说：“我们完全有理由相信他们真的在研究核武器。


President Bush now argues that all along it has been the above-board enrichment of uranium, not some other, secret program, that carries Iran ever closer to having nuclear weapons.	”现在布什总统说，使伊朗距离掌握核武器越来越近的一直是光明正大的铀浓缩，而不是什么其他的秘密计划。


But he makes that legitimate point in vain: having rested its case on misjudgments, the administration now finds itself discredited by its own intelligence estimate.	然而他这个合理的说法毫无用处：由于根据是建立在错误判断上的，布什政府现在被自己的情报估测来了个釜底抽薪。


We are left in a situation that layers paradox upon paradox.	我们现在看到一个矛盾重重的情况。


A disastrous possible policy – military attack on Iran – has been headed off by a misguided, misinterpreted intelligence report.	一项可能实施的、灾难性的政策——进攻伊朗——因一个被误导、被曲解的情报报告而搁置。


One question is why Bush and Cheney set themselves up for this embarrassment.	一个问题是为什么布什和切尼会让自己陷入这样的尴尬局面。


Bush has said that he learned of the NIE’s conclusion only a week before it came out – a statement that either is false or reveals a level of incompetence beyond anything suspected so far.	��什说他在NIE的结论出来之前一周才知道——这个说法如果不是谎言，就说明其无能的程度比以前想的还高。


None of that matters now.	现在这些都不重要了。


The Bush administration’s habits of falsehood have undone its aggressive proclivities, leaving a gaping vacuum.	布什政府弄虚作假的习惯已经挫败了其好斗的癖性，留下一个巨大的真空。


The doctrine according to which great powers, many of them nuclear-armed, try to stop lesser powers from acquiring nuclear weapons by force and threats of force – a fiasco in Iraq, nuclear-armed North Korea, and now Iran – has reached a dead end.	大国（很多都有核武器）用武力和威胁来阻止小国获得核武器的老办法——在伊拉克、拥有核武器的北韩、以及现在的伊朗均遭遇惨败——已经走进死胡同。


But, report or no report, the danger that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons is real, and may even have increased.	但是，不论有没有报告，伊朗将掌握核武器的可能性是真实的，甚至可能有所上升。


What’s missing is a policy to address it.	现在缺少的是解决这个问题的政策。


Iran’s Muddled Presidential Politics	乱作一团的伊朗总统政治


WASHINGTON, DC – The decision of former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami not to seek the presidency again has revealed how muddled Iranian presidential politics now is.  In trying to sort out this muddle, the most important thing to keep in mind is not so much who will be elected, but what that choice will reveal�about the intentions of the country’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.	华盛顿哥伦比亚特区—伊朗前总统莫哈默德·哈塔米做出决定不去再度角逐总统大选，这已经显示出伊朗的总统政治现在混乱到何种地步。 要想解开这团乱麻， 最重要的不是牢记谁会当选，而是记住这样一个选择将会如何反映出这个国家的最高领袖：阿亚图拉·哈梅内伊的意图。


Unfortunately, the most likely outcome will be continuing transformation of the Islamic Republic from a civil government into a garrison state in which the military plays a major role in determining political and economic matters.	不幸的是，最可能出现的结果将是这个伊斯兰共和国继续转变，从一个文官政府转化为一个军官国家，其中军事力量会在决定政治和经济事宜中发挥主要作用。


Who will actually win the vote is unpredictable, but not because Iran is democratic.	预测谁的确将会赢得选举是不可能的，但这不是因为伊朗是个民主国家。


Ayatollah Khamenei, who is also the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, oversees the agencies that will run the election: the Guardian Council and the Ministry of Interior, which supervise the electoral process, and the Basij militia and Revolutionary Guard (IRGC), which unofficially control the ballot-boxes and the vote-counting process.	担任军事力量总司令的阿亚图拉·哈梅内伊同时还监督着举行选举的机构：监护委员会和内政部 （它们监督选举的程序），还有“巴西吉”民兵部队和革命卫队（IRGC）(它们非官方地控制着票箱和计票程序)。


Recent surveys show that the increasing unpopularity of the current president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, stems primarily from his economic policies.	最近的调查显示，现任总统马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪—内贾德越来越不受民众欢迎，这主要是因为他所施行的经济政策。


Although oil prices reached an all-time high in 2008, unemployment and inflation (now 31%) are out of control and the government is facing a $44 billion budget deficit.	虽然石油价格在2008年达到了有史以来的最高点，失业和通货膨胀（现在是31%）却失控了，政府面临着440亿美元的预算赤字。


The public sector accounts for roughly 80% of the economy, and relies mostly on now-plummeting oil revenue, while Iranian banks face a credit crisis, with Mahmoud Bahmani, the governor of the Iran Central Bank, estimating total delinquent payments to be $38 billion.	公共领域占了经济的大约80%，主要是依赖现在已经急剧回落的石油收入。 伊朗的银行面临着信用危机，央行行长马哈茂德·巴赫曼尼估计被拖欠的应付款总计将达到380亿美元。


But Ahmadinejad’s unpopularity does not necessarily weaken his chances of being re-elected.	虽然艾哈迈迪—内贾德不受欢迎，但这并不会必然削减他当选的机会。


A few months before the election, neither of the two main political currents, conservative and reformist, has settled on its candidate.	选举还有几个月就要举行，而两大政治派别：保守派和改革派都还没有确定各自的候选人。


Among the reformists now in the race, Mehdi Karrobi, the former speaker of the Majlis is a declared reformist candidate. Mir Hossein Moussavi, a former prime minister, and Abdullah Nouri, a former interior minister, are also expected to enter the race.	在改革派的内部竞争中，前议会发言人莫赫迪·卡鲁比已经宣布他要代表改革派参加选举，而前总理米尔·侯赛因·穆萨维和前内政部长阿卜杜拉·努里也有可能会加入竞选。


On the conservative side, Ahmadinejad so far stands alone.	在保守派一方，目前是艾哈迈迪—内贾德一枝独秀。


But many conservatives also oppose his economic policies, as well as his management style.	但是许多保守派人士也反对他的经济政策和管理风格。


Conservative voices have repeatedly argued that supporting Ahmadinejad will cost them votes and reinforce the economic crisis.	保守派一方反复论证说支持艾哈迈迪—内贾德将会让他们失去选票，而且加重经济危机。


Conservative disenchantment with Ahmadinejad is apparent in the current Majlis, which is predominantly conservative.	保守派对艾哈迈迪—内贾德不抱幻想，这在现在的议会里显而易见，而议会是由保守派占主导地位的。


The Majlis has rejected the government’s economic bills, and has repeatedly impeached or challenged Ahmadinejad’s cabinet ministers.	议会拒绝了政府的经济法案，反复弹劾或挑战艾哈迈迪—内贾德的内阁部长们。


Iran’s main diplomatic challenge will center on its nuclear program and relations with the United States.	伊朗主要面临的外交挑战将集中在该国的核计划和对美关系上。


Since the president has no authority over these issues, any disagreement between the Supreme Leader and the next president will place the president in a difficult position with no real power.	因为总统对这些事务没有权威，任何最高领袖和下任总统的不和都会将后者置于一个毫无实权的艰难之境。


In terms of domestic policy, the major challenge for the next president will be the economy.	在国内政策方面，下任总统主要面临着的经济方面的挑战。


Over-reliance on oil revenues, the effect of longstanding international sanctions, and the reluctance of foreign companies to invest in Iran have exacerbated the economy’s structural problems.	过分依赖石油收入，长期国际制裁，再加上外国公司不愿前来投资已经加重了伊朗的经济结构问题。


Perhaps one of the most significant elements in Iran’s stagnation is that the Revolutionary Guards control a large portion of the economy, and are beyond the reach of government regulation.	也许导致伊朗停滞的最重要的因素之一就是革命卫队控制了大部分经济，不受政府管理。


In order to manage the economic crisis successfully, any president must not only shift economic policy, but also amass enough political power to be able to thwart the intervention of the Revolutionary Guards and other organizations in economic policy-making.	为了成功地应对经济危机，任何一位总统必须不单改变经济政策，而且还要聚集足够的政治权力，以便能够阻止革命卫队和其他组织对经济政策的制定进行干涉。


Former President Khatami’s initial decision to run for the post again grabbed the international community's attention.	前总统哈塔米最初决定参加竞选再次引发了国际社会的关注。


Yet a Khatami victory would not have guaranteed change.	但是哈塔米的胜利也不能保证就会带来变化。


As president, he faced criticism from reformists for his failure to resist a range of powerful groups that sabotaged economic reform and improvement in Iran’s relations with the west.	作为总统，他受到了来自改革派的批评，指责他未能抵抗暗中破坏经济改革的多个强力集团，也没能改善伊朗和西方世界的关系。


Khatami’s organizational savvy had not improved much since then.	在那以后，哈塔米并没有就自己的组织才能做出太大改进。


So far, he lacks even a media platform for his faction.	到目前为止，他自己的派别甚至缺乏一个媒介平台。


Reformist critics believe that in order to mobilize people it will not be enough just to campaign against Ahmadinejad.	改革派的批评家们相信，要想让人们行动起来，仅仅向艾哈迈迪—内贾德发动攻势是不够的。


If a reformer is to win he must prove that he will be able to sway Iran’s political structures toward a reform agenda.	如果任何一位改革派想要赢得选举，他必须证明自己能够引导伊朗的政治结构朝着改革日程发展。


But reformists ask: if the Supreme Leader does not even permit the Khatami faction to have a newspaper, would he really have allowed Khatami to become president?	然而改革派们在问：如果最高领袖甚至不允许哈塔米派拥有一家报纸，他会真的已经允许哈塔米成为总统吗？


Even if any reformer does become president, will he be able to overcome his differences with the Supreme Leader?�	即使任何改革者真变成了总统，他又有能力来克服自己和最高领袖之间的分歧吗？


Speculation about the outcome of the election is an interesting parlor game.	推测选举结果是一项有趣的空谈游戏。


But it should not distract us from the fundamentals of Iranian politics.	但是这不应该把我们的注意力从伊朗政治的基本原则上转移开来。


The next president may have room to adjust economic or social policies.	下一任总统也许会有调整经济或社会政策的空间。


But, on the big issues of foreign policy, relations with the West, and the nuclear program, the identity of the president is not important.	但是，对于外交政策，与西方的关系和核计划这样的大事而言，总统的身份无足轻重。


These issues will be decided by a man who is not running for office in June, but whose power is secure: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader.	这些事宜将由一位不参加六月份选举的人物来决定，然而他的权力坚不可摧：他就是阿亚图拉·哈梅内伊，伊朗的最高领袖。


Iran’s Nuclear Grass Eaters	伊朗核问题，吃草的人


MADRID – After long years of failed international efforts to end Iran’s cunning drive to develop nuclear weapons, the question today is no longer whether the West can prevent the nuclearization of Iran’s military arsenal, but whether the Islamic regime collapses first.	马德里 — 在国际社会终结伊朗秘密开发核武器的努力失败后，今天的问题已不再是西方能否阻止伊朗军火核武器化，而是这个伊斯兰政权是否会先垮台。


Unfortunately, if it does not, the only option for stopping Iran is war – and war is a very bad option.	不幸的是，如果它不垮台，那么阻止伊朗的唯一方式就是战争 — 而战争将是一个非常坏的打算。


Pakistan is worth invoking when assessing whether the sanctions now imposed on Iran will force it to surrender its nuclear program.	看待对伊朗实施的制裁能否够迫使其放弃核计划之时，巴基斯坦值得援引。


In 1965, Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulficar Ali Bhutto famously declared that if India, its sworn enemy, went nuclear, his country would “eat grass and even go hungry” in order to develop a nuclear bomb of its own.	1965年，巴基斯坦外交部长佐勒菲卡尔·阿里·布托高调宣布，如果印度这个不共戴天的敌人实现核武器化，巴基斯坦将“吃草，甚至挨饿”来开发自己的核炸弹。


Today, Pakistan, a near-failed state on the verge of disintegration, possesses more nuclear warheads than India.	今天，巴基斯坦，一个濒临解体、近乎失败的国家，拥有比印度更多的核弹头。


Iran’s theocratic regime, immersed in a momentous struggle for survival against what it regards as an unholy alliance of Israel, the American “Great Satan,” and a surrounding Arab world that abhors its hegemonic ambitions, will not surrender its nuclear ambitions easily. Indeed, nuclear weapons appear to be the regime’s only real route to self-preservation.	伊朗这个政教合一的政权，不会轻易放弃其核野心，它认为以色列、“大撒旦”美国以及周边阿拉伯世界组成的邪恶联盟憎恶其霸权野心，它必须与它们顽强抗争以谋求生机。


The French and the Soviet revolutions taught us that exporting the revolution is one way to protect it.	法国和苏联革命告诉我们，输出革命即是保护革命的一种方式。


Iran tried that, and failed.	伊朗试图这样做，但是失败了。


The almost inevitable fall of Iran’s closest ally in the region, the Baath regime in Syria, only adds to the regime’s paranoid anxieties – and makes developing a nuclear capability seem all the more necessary for its survival.	伊朗在本地区最亲密的盟友 — 叙利亚复兴党政权注定的衰落给伊朗徒增焦虑，使其认为发展核武器对于它的生存似乎越来越有必要。


Iran’s leaders might be ready to let their people “eat grass and even go hungry” for the sake of their nuclear ambitions, but Iran’s squeezed middle class, one hopes, will not submit to such degradation.	为了核野心，伊朗领导人可能已准备好人民“吃草，甚至挨饿”。 但人们希望，伊朗饱受剥削的中产阶级不会向这种屈辱低头。


Social unrest has been building up in Iran for years, and certainly began well before the West became serious about imposing economic and financial sanctions.	多年来，伊朗的社会动乱日益突显，而且早在西方严肃对伊朗实施经济制裁之前就已存在。


In fact, the popular revolts in Tunisia and Egypt were directly inspired by Iran’s Green movement, which emerged during the massive post-election protests in 2009, before succumbing to a brutal government crackdown.	事实上，突尼斯和埃及人民起义的灵感来源于伊朗“绿色运动”，该运动始于2009年选举后的一次大规模抗议，遭到政府残酷镇压。


The sanctions against Iran have undoubtedly bitten hard.	对伊朗的制裁无疑对它打击重大。


But the truth is that the severe economic hardships suffered by ordinary Iranians mainly reflect the regime’s economic mismanagement, and the widespread fear that the threat of war from both Israel and the United States, sometimes abetted by Iran’s own war rhetoric, has unleashed.	但现实是，普通伊朗人遭受的经济困难主要反映出该政权经济管理不力； 伊朗偶尔煽动战争言论，对于以色列和美国发动战争的普遍恐惧，已经挣脱束缚。


Indeed, Iran’s economy is now firmly in the grip of a war panic.	确实，现在伊朗经济被一种对战争的恐慌牢牢禁锢。


When a national currency loses 50% of its value in a matter of weeks, economic collapse is at hand.	当国家货币几周内贬值50%，那么经济崩溃就在眼前。


Businessmen find it impossible to use the rial even for domestic transactions, because inflation is spiraling out of control.	由于通货膨胀失控，商人们发现里亚尔甚至无法用于国内交易。


Commodity prices, moreover, are skyrocketing, and the cost of small and mid-size apartments has become prohibitive for a middle class severely hit by unemployment.	此外，物价飞涨，中小型公寓的价格已经使饱受失业打击的中产阶级望而却步。


Iran’s backward economy, a third of which is controlled by the Revolutionary Guard, is simply incapable of offering job opportunities to Iran’s growing cohorts of university graduates – the same segment of society that toppled the Shah.	伊朗经济落后，其中1/3受控于“革命卫队”，根本无法为越来越多的大学毕业生提供就业机会，这也是推翻伊朗国王统治的社会问题。


The problem has become increasingly acute, because 60% of Iran’s population was born after 1979.	这一问题变得日益尖锐，因为60%的伊朗人出生于1979年后。


Moreover, rapid population growth and bungled economic policy have made Iran excessively dependent on food imports.	此外，人口的迅速增长和拙劣的经济政策已使伊朗过分依赖粮食进口。


Yet, however crippling the effect of sanctions might be, they will not bring the regime to surrender its nuclear program.	然而，无论制裁的效果有多严重，它们也不会使伊朗政权放弃核计划。


The most for which one can hope is that sanctions enhance the chances of regime change by reawakening popular protest, thereby triggering an Iranian version of the Arab Spring.	人们最希望的是，通过唤醒民众抗议，这些制裁能够增加伊朗政权更替的机会，从而引发伊朗的“阿拉伯之春”。


This might be wishful thinking, however.	但这可能是一厢情愿。


And, even if social unrest does erupt, repression might succeed again.	即使爆发社会动乱，镇压可能接踵而至。


But an attack by either Israel or the US on Iran’s nuclear installations would be a calamitous mistake, or, as Meir Dagan, a former chief of Israel’s Mossad intelligence service, put it, “the stupidest idea” possible.	但如果以色列或者美国对伊朗核设施发起攻击，这将是一个灾难性的错误，或者就像以色列摩萨德情机构前首脑梅厄·达甘说的那样是“最愚蠢的想法”。


So it is to be hoped that Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s war rhetoric and vulgar manipulation of the memory of the Holocaust are nothing more than a ploy to divert the world’s attention from the Palestinian problem that he has done nothing to resolve.	如此，人们希望以色列总理本雅明•内塔尼亚胡的战争言论和操纵大屠杀记忆的卑劣行径仅仅是他转移世界对巴勒斯坦问题关注的一种手段。 到目前为止，他未采取任何行动去解决巴勒斯坦问题。


Alas, one cannot rule out a scenario in which nothing – diplomacy, sanctions, or the push for a regime change – works.	不过，我们不能排除这种情景 — 外交手段，经济制裁或者促进政权更替的努力统统失效。


In that case, one should not underestimate the pernicious effects of Israel’s Holocaust complex.	要是这样，人们就不应该低估以色列的大屠杀情节了。


What led Israel to war in 1967 was not a sound assessment of Egypt’s intentions to attack, but fear of a second Shoah.	1976年致使将以色列发起战争的不是对埃及侵犯意图的全面评估，而是对第二场大屠杀的恐惧。


An attack on Iran might, however, produce precisely the effect that Netanyahu seeks to avoid.	攻击伊朗可能会恰恰产生内塔尼亚胡力求避免的效果。


Post-war global diplomacy might have to promote, perhaps more robustly than ever, the creation a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East, and thus address Israel’s nuclear capabilities, as well as the Palestinian problem – issues that Netanyahu has worked hard to ignore.	战后全球外交可能比以往更加强劲地促进中东核武器自由区的建立，因而考虑解处理以色列核能力，解决巴勒斯坦问题，这些正是内塔尼亚胡一直以来努力逃避的问题。


But if the path of war is finally taken, and, in its aftermath, the international community fails once again to pacify the world’s most dysfunctional region, the Middle East would devolve into an unruly chaos far more dangerous than the threat of an Iranian bomb.	但如果最后选择了战争，处理战后问题时国际社会平息这个全球最反常的地区的努力再次失败，那么中东地区将分裂为一片难以驾驭的混乱，远比伊朗制造原子弹的威胁更加危险。


Iran’s Nuclear Zealot	伊朗的核狂热者


With negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program looming once again, understanding Iran’s new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is critically important.	随着就伊朗核计划的谈判再次迫近，了解伊朗新任总统穆罕默德·艾哈迈迪内贾德其人至关重要。


Perhaps the best place to start is the moment the world first gained a glimpse of Ahmadinejad’s character and hardline program.	或许这样的了解选择在世界首次对艾哈迈迪内贾德的性格和强硬路线计划惊鸿一瞥之际最为恰当。


When President Ahmadinejad addressed the United Nations in New York last September, he suddenly felt himself surrounded by light.	艾哈迈迪内贾德总统9月份在纽约向联合国发表演说时，他突然感觉周围豁然一亮。


It wasn’t the stage lighting, he said.	他说，那可不是讲台的灯光。


It was light from heaven.	那是天国之光。


Ahmadinejad related his otherworldly experience in a videotaped meeting with a prominent Ayatollah in Tehran.	在与德黑兰著名的阿亚图拉进行录象会晤的时候，艾哈迈迪内贾德讲述了他的这次天国经历。


A transcript of his comments and sections of the video-tape wound up on a hard-line, pro-regime website, baztab.com.	他的评论和录像带剪辑最终刊登在宣传强硬路线、亲政权的网站baztab. com上。


According to the transcript, Ahmadinejad said that a member of his entourage at the UN meeting first told him of the light.	据该记录称，艾哈迈迪内贾德说，他的一位随从在联合国会议上首先与他说起光。


“When you began with the words ‘In the name of God’… I saw a light coming, surrounding you and protecting you to the end [of the speech].”	“你开口说‘以上帝的名义’…时，我看见一道光闪过，包围了你，一直保护着你，直到（演讲）结束。


Ahmadinejad confirmed sensing a similar presence.	” 艾哈迈迪内贾德确定有类似的感觉。


“I felt it myself, too, that suddenly the atmosphere changed and for 27-28 minutes the leaders could not blink....They had their eyes and ears open for the message from the Islamic Republic,” he told Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli.	他告诉阿亚图拉Javadi-Amoli，“我自己也感觉到，突然间，气氛发生了变化，有二十七、八分钟，那些领导人眼睛一眨都不眨…他们睁大眼睛、张大嘴巴，聆听来自伊斯兰共和国的声音。 ”


Ahmadinejad’s “vision” at the UN could be dismissed as political posturing if it weren’t for a string of similar statements and actions that suggest he believes that he is destined to bring about the “End Times” – the end of the world – by paving the way for the return of the Shia Muslim messiah.	如果不是因为一系列类似的声明和行动，艾哈迈迪内贾德在联合国的“所见所闻”可以被当作一种纯粹的政治姿态； 这些声明和行动表明他相信，通过为什叶派穆斯林弥赛亚的回归铺平道路，他注定要带来“终结时代”，即世界末日。


Given that Iran continues to pursue suspect nuclear programs, which could bring the Islamic Republic dangerously close to weapons capability, a leader with messianic visions is worrying.	但考虑到伊朗继续实施可疑的核计划，有着弥赛亚幻觉的领导人就有理由令世界提心吊胆，因为上述计划可以使这个伊斯兰共和国拥有生产武器的能力。


After all, this is the same man who recently pledged to use Iran’s newfound powers to “wipe Israel off the map” and to “destroy America.”	毕竟，就是同一个人最近发誓要用伊朗新发现的力量 “将以色列扫出地图”和“摧毁美国”。


In a November 16 speech in Tehran to senior clerics who had come from all over Iran to hear him, the new president said that the main mission of his government was to “pave the path for the glorious reappearance of Imam Mahdi (May God Hasten His Reappearance).”	11月6日在德黑兰向来自伊朗各地的高级神职人员演讲时，这位新总统说，伊朗政府的主要使命是“为马赫迪伊玛姆的光荣重现铺平道路（愿上帝加快他的重现）。


The mystical 12th Imam of Shia Islam disappeared as a child in 941 CE, and Shia Muslims have awaited his reappearance ever since, believing that when he returns, he will reign on earth for seven years, before bringing about the Last Judgment and the end of the world.	”什叶派伊斯兰教神秘的十二世伊玛姆在公元941年还是个孩子时失踪了，自此，什叶派穆斯林人一直等待他的重现，认为他回来时，将掌管地球七年，接着，最后审判日和世界末日就会到来。


In order to prepare for the Mahdi, Ahmadinejad said, “Iran should turn into a mighty, advanced, and model Islamic society.”	为了准备好马赫迪的回归，艾哈迈迪内贾德说，“伊朗应成为一个强大、先进、模范的伊斯兰社会。


Iranians should “refrain from leaning toward any Western school of thought” and abstain from “luxurious lives” and other excesses.	”伊朗应该“避免倾向于任何西方思想流派”并放弃“奢侈的生活”和其他无节制行为。


Three months into Ahmadinejad’s presidency, his views of the 12th Imam are being widely discussed in Tehran.	艾哈迈迪内贾德任职三个月来，他对十二世伊玛姆的看法在德黑兰广为传播。


According to one rumor, as mayor of Tehran, Ahmadinejad drew up a new city plan for the Imam's return.	有一种传闻称，艾哈迈迪内贾德担任德黑兰市长时已为伊玛姆的归来拟定了一个新的城市计划。


In recent weeks, Ahmadinejad’s aides have denied another rumor that he ordered his cabinet to write a pact of loyalty with the 12th Imam and throw it down a well near the holy city of Qom, where some believe the Imam is hiding.	近几周来，艾哈迈迪内贾德的助手否定了另一个传闻，即他命令其全体阁员写一份效忠十二世伊玛姆的契约，将其投入圣城库姆附近的一口井中，据称该井为伊玛姆的藏身之所。


Those who give credence to the rumor point to an early decision of his cabinet to allocate $17 million to renovate the Jamkaran mosque, where devotees of the 12th Imam have prayed for centuries.	相信这种传闻的人所指的是总统内阁早先的一个决定，即拨款1,700万美元修缮Jamkaran清真寺，十二世伊玛姆的信徒几百年来一直在此做祷告。


Similarly, reports in government media outlets in Tehran have quoted Ahmadinejad as having told regime officials that the Hidden Imam will reappear in two years.	同样，德黑兰的政府媒体报告引证艾哈迈迪内贾德曾告诉执政官员，隐身的伊玛姆两年后就会回来。


This proved too much for one Iranian legislator, Akbar Alami, who publicly questioned Ahmadinejad’s judgment, saying that even Islam’s holiest figures have never made such claims.	这对于一位伊朗立法者Akbar Alami而言是难以接受的，他曾公开质疑艾哈迈迪内贾德的看法，认为即便是伊斯兰最神圣的人物也从未做过这种声明。


While many Shia Muslims worship the 12th Imam, a previously secret society of powerful clerics, now openly advising the new president, are transforming these messianic beliefs into government policies.	在什叶派穆斯林礼拜十二世伊玛姆的同时，有势力的神职人员先前组成的秘密学会现在公开向新总统提议，把救世主的信仰转化为政府政策。


Led by Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, who frequently appears with the Ahmadinejad, the Hojatieh society is considered by many Shia as the lunatic fringe.	阿亚图拉Mesbah Yazdi频频与艾哈迈迪内贾德一同在公开场合露面，他负责Hojatieh学会，许多什叶派将该学会视为极端分子。


During the early years of the Islamic Revolution, even Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini found their beliefs too extreme and sent them scurrying underground.	伊斯兰革命早期，就连阿亚图拉Ruhollah Khomeini也认为他们的信仰过于极端，导致他们的活动最终转入地下。


As devotees of the 12th Imam, the Hojatieh believe that only great tribulation will warrant his coming.	作为十二世伊玛姆的信徒，Hojatieh认为，唯有巨大的苦难能确保他的降临。


Akin in some ways to Lenin’s doctrine that worsening social conditions would hasten revolution, the Hojatieh believe that only increased violence, conflict, and oppression will bring the Mahdi’s return.	与列宁恶化社会条件将加速革命的信条如出一辙，Hojatieh认为，暴力、冲突和压迫升级将促成马赫迪的归来。


Since taking office last August, Ahmadinejad has installed Hojatieh devotees in his cabinet and throughout the bureaucracy.	艾哈迈迪内贾德自8月份就职以来已将Hojatieh信徒安插进了总统内阁和整个官僚机构。


The Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS), largely sidelined by former President Mohammed Khatami, has re-emerged as a powerful repressive force, using plain-clothes agents, allied with the paramilitary Bassij and non-government vigilantes, to crack down on potential opponents of the regime.	信息安全部（MOIS）很大程度上被前总统穆罕默德·卡塔米搁置一旁，如今却作为一支强有力的压制力量重新登上政治舞台，利用便衣特务，与准军事化的巴思吉（Bassij）和非政府义务警员联合，镇压潜在的政权反对者。


As the world prepares to confront an Iranian regime that continues to defy the International Atomic Energy Agency on its nuclear programs, we must listen to what Iran’s leaders say as we watch what they do.	世界做好准备打击继续挑衅国际原子能机构对其核计划进行调查的伊朗政权之时，我们应该观察伊朗领导人的一言一行。


A religious zealot with nuclear weapons is a dangerous combination the world cannot afford to tolerate.	核武器和宗教狂热是一种危险的结合���对此，全世界都无法容忍。


Iran’s Options	伊朗的选择


Berlin -- With President Bush in Europe getting EU leaders to agree to toughen UN sanctions against Iran, and with the ongoing debate between John McCain and Barack Obama about whether the US needs to talk with Iran’s rulers, the issue of Iran’s nuclear program is heating up.  Iranians, no surprise, are watching this debate with interest.  They need to do more than watch.	柏林－随着布什总统在欧洲使欧盟领导人同意加强欧盟对伊朗的制裁，以及约翰·麦凯恩和巴拉克·奥巴马正在进行的美国是否需要和伊朗的统治者会谈的辩论，伊朗的核计划问题正在升温。 毫不奇怪，伊朗人正饶有兴趣地关注着这场辩论。


Iran’s political elite sees the United States, rather than Europe, as their appropriate international counterpart.	伊朗的政治精英将美国，而不是欧洲，作为与他们相当的国际对手。


Only the US can give the Islamic Republic the security guarantees it craves.	只有美国可以给予这个伊斯兰共和国它渴望的安全保证。


The US, indeed, should be prepared to eventually give such guarantees if it wants Iran to stop the more suspicious parts of its nuclear program.	确实，如果美国希望伊朗停止其核计划中更令人怀疑的部分，它就应该准备最终给予伊朗这样的保证。


But Iran must do its part to make any future dialogue with the US a success.	但是伊朗自己也应该作出努力，以使它将来和美国的对话取得成功。


In talks with members of Iran’s policy community, I am continually astounded that they see resolving the nuclear conflict (or, indeed, other problems in which Iran has a stake) to be primarily the responsibility of the US, Europe, and other major powers, not of Iran.	在和伊朗的政策制定者们谈话的过程中，我经常感到吃惊，因为他们认为解决核冲突（或者，甚至与伊朗有厉害关系的其他问题）主要是美国、欧洲和其他主要大国的责任，而不是伊朗的责任。


Such passivity is not in Iran’s interest.  As the Middle East’s essential regional player, Iran can trigger and heat up conflicts as well as contribute to their solution.	这样的被动不符合伊朗的利益。 作为中东重要的区域性国家，伊朗可以引起和加剧冲突，也可以对解决冲突作出贡献。


Yet few in the Iranian establishment understand that being the leading regional power brings responsibility; and that only responsible behavior can create legitimacy and acceptance that Iran craves.	然而伊朗政府中很少有人明白作为区域性的领导者会带来责任； 并且只有负责任的行为可以产生伊朗渴望的合法性和其他国家的接纳。


Iranian policymakers must, therefore, try to develop their own ideas for a negotiated resolution of the nuclear and other regional security issues, as well as to think about how Iran can rebuild trust in its actions.	因此，伊朗的政策制定者必须努力形成他们自己的关于核和其他区域性安全问题的谈判解决的观点，以及考虑怎样在其行动中重建其他国家对伊朗的信任。


Iran’s leaders should begin by shunning hostile rhetoric.	首先，伊朗的领导人应该避免敌对的言论。


Incendiary statements about Israel exacerbate the lack of trust among Iran’s would-be partners, and make it hard for those in Europe and the US who are interested in building more favorable relations.	关于以色列的煽动性言论加剧了想要成为伊朗伙伴的国家对它的不信任，并且使欧洲国家和美国想要和伊朗建立更良好的关系变得困难。


Iran hints that it wants to have a high-level dialogue with the US in the not-too-distant future.	伊朗暗示它想在不远的将来和美国进行高层对话。


If true, Iran should realize that violent statements on sensitive issues will set back any serious attempt to get a dialogue going.	如果果真如此，伊朗应该意识到在敏感问题上的暴力言论将会阻碍任何启动对话的认真尝试。


Iran could also build trust if it became more transparent, particularly about its own strategic ambitions.	如果伊朗能变得更透明，特别是在它自己的战略雄心上，伊朗也可以建立其他国家信任。


A good start would be to publish key documents that are constantly referred to by Iranians but never seen – say, Ayatollah Khamenei’s fatwa that reportedly rules that Islam prohibits the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons?	伊朗可以把公布伊朗人经常引用但是从来没有被人看见的关键文件作为一个良好的开端－例如，据传规定伊斯兰教禁止从事核武器的生产、储存和使用的阿亚图拉·哈梅内伊的裁定？


It would also be helpful if Iran laid out its strategic vision for the region.	如果伊朗能详细计划出它在该地区的战略远景，也会对事情有帮助。


It should accept the concerns of its neighbors, seek to develop its own ideas for regional confidence- and security building, and participate in efforts to create regional security arrangements.	它应该承认邻国的担忧，寻求发展自己的建立区域信任以及安全的理念，并参与建立区域安全安排的努力。


It should also positively respond to offers from the US to establish confidence-building measures between the two countries’ military forces, particularly their navies.	它也应该对美国提出的在两国军队，特别是海军之间实施信心建立措施的提议作出积极地反应。


As to the nuclear issue, Iran should try to switch from the language of “inalienable rights” to one of pragmatic solutions.	至于核问题，伊朗应该设法将其态度从“不可剥夺的权利”这样的言论转变成选择一个实用的解决方法。


This would help depoliticize the issue.	这有助于该问题的非政治化。


The right to independent nuclear research and development under the NPT is not disputed.	在《不扩散核武器条约》中，独立进行核研究和发展的权利是没有争议的。


But rather than insist as a matter of principle on operating the fuel cycle independently under national sovereignty, Iran could engage the Saudis about their idea of a regional joint venture, or explore different options of multilateral consortia with other countries.	但是，伊朗可以采纳阿拉伯人关于建立区域合作的观点，或者探索和其他国家建立多边合作机制的不同选择，而不是将在国家主权下独立进行核原料再循环活动作为一个原则来坚持。


Iran’s parliament, now led by Ali Larijani, Iran’s former nuclear negotiator, could make a strong contribution to confidence building and to the resolution of the nuclear conflict by ratifying the NPT’s Additional Protocol.	现在由伊朗前核谈判代表阿里·拉里贾尼领导的议会，可以通过批准《不扩散核武器条约》的附加议定书的方式，为建立信任和解决核冲突作出重大贡献。


Other clarifications are also needed.  Is Iran prepared to accept a compromise that responds to European and other international concerns about its nuclear program, and thereby gain wide-ranging economic, energy, technology and science cooperation?	对其他问题的澄清也是必要的。 伊朗准备接受就欧洲和其他国家关于其核计划的担忧作出的妥协，从而取得广泛的经济、能源、技术和科学合作吗？


Nuclear energy, after all, is only one technology, and a 20th century, rather than a 21st century one at that.	毕竟，核能只是一项技术，并且还是一项20世纪而不是21世纪的技术。


Eventually, partnership with Europe could help Iran keep the best of its young generation at home rather than having them queue for visas at foreign embassies – or, more often, the US consulates in Istanbul or Dubai.	最终，和欧洲的伙伴关系可以帮助伊朗将年青一代中最优秀的人才留在国内，而不是使他们在外国大使馆－或者，更多的时候，是在伊斯坦布尔或者是迪拜的美国领事馆，排队申请签证。


The willingness of major countries to accept Iran with a nuclear status similar to Japan depends on whether Iran not only refers to itself as a status-quo power – which it occasionally does – but whether it acts as such.	主要国家承认伊朗拥有和日本类似的核地位的意愿不仅仅取决于伊朗是否将自己作为一个危机时的大国－它偶尔这样作－而且取决于它是否这样行为。


If it wants to be seen as a status-quo power, it needs to accept local and international efforts at establishing peace between Israel and its neighbors.	如果它想被当作一个危机时的大国，它需要认可本地区国家和国际社会在以色列及其邻国之间建立和平的努力。


For a grand bargain with the US, Iran needs to end its support for militant organizations like Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad which undermine efforts at reaching a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine.	在和美国的大交易中，伊朗需要结束其对诸如哈马斯或巴勒斯坦伊斯兰圣战组织这样的武装组织的支持，这些组织破坏了以色列和巴勒斯坦达成两国解决方案的努力。


Even without such a bargain, however, Iran will have to do certain things if it wants to be seen as a constructive regional player.	但是，即使没有这样的交易，如果伊朗想被当作一个有建设性的区域行国家，它也必须做一些事情


It will have to accept all the other states in the region as legitimate players with their own legitimate interests as much as it wants to be recognized as such itself.	它必须承认该地区所有的其他国家是合法的参与者，拥有它们自己的合法利益，就像它自己想被承认的那样。


It will also have to accept the wish of the huge majority of Palestinians for a peaceful settlement with Israel.	它也将不得不承认绝大多数巴勒斯坦人希望与以色列和平解决争端。


Iranian officials sometimes try to make relative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s more violent statements about Israel as nothing more than a call for “regime change.”	伊朗官员有时候试图将马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪－内贾德关于以色列的更暴力的言论说成仅仅是要求“更换政权”的一个号召，没有其他意义。


That is not a status-quo policy.	这不是一个可以用于危机争端时的政策。


Iran is entitled to seek assurances against externally forced regime change. But it cannot have it both ways, seeking guarantees against regime change at home, and promoting it in its neighborhood.	伊朗有权寻求外部势力不会强迫其更换政权的保证，但是它不能见风使舵，在寻求不更换国内政权保证的同时，却在邻国内推行这一点。


Iran’s Political Clerics	伊朗的政治教士


Iran’s theocratic regime appears more confident than ever.	伊朗神权政府似乎掌握了前所未有的权力。


Its standoff with the West over its nuclear program, together with its ties to Syria and its growing influence in Lebanon and Iraq, suggest the emergence of a strong regional power.	它与西方国家在核计划方面的分歧、与叙利亚的密切关系以及在黎巴嫩和伊拉克日趋扩大的影响都在宣告一个地区大国的诞生。


But, while Western analysts and Iran’s neighbors raise the alarm, the regime’s authority is in fact built on insecure foundations.	然而，尽管伊朗的强盛引起了西方分析家和邻国的高度警惕，但事实上伊朗政权赖以存在的根基一点也不稳固。


The 1979 revolution, which ended Iran’s monarchical tradition, created a new political order based on Shiite theological foundations and giving absolute ruling power to a Shiite jurist/cleric.	1979年革命结束了伊朗帝王政治的传统，建立了以什叶派神学为基础的崭新的政治秩序，赋予法学家/教士以至高无上的权力。


Throughout Iran’s long history, Shiite seminaries exercised great influence on Iranian society and politics, but they had been considered civil institutions.	在伊朗历史上，虽然什叶派神学院对伊朗社会和政治有着巨大的影响，但它们仍然属于民间组织。


It was not until the Iranian revolution that the seminary establishment came to be considered a source of political legitimacy.	直到伊朗革命后，神学院机构才被公认为政治合法性的源泉。


The change followed Ayatollah Khomeini’s theory of the “jurist-ruler.”	变化发生在阿亚图拉霍梅尼提出“法学家执政”的理论之后。


In Khomeini’s view, the jurist-ruler could modify religious laws, depending on his interpretation of the needs of the regime.	在霍梅尼看来，执政的法学家可以根据自己对政府需求的理解来修改宗教法律。


As a result, religious interpretation – previously, a highly decentralized function undertaken by various seminaries – was concentrated in the hands of a political leader.	于是，此前由不同神学院履行的高度分散的职能逐渐被集中到了政治领袖的手中。


Accordingly, the seminary establishment was no longer a civil structure managing only religious affairs, but instead developed into a unified, ideological party serving the interests of the regime.	进而，神学院组织也不再只是管理宗教事务的民间机构，而是演变成了为政府利益服务的统一的意识形态组织。


That transformation was far-reaching.	这一变化的意义非常深远。


Traditionally, Shiite seminaries were rather unorganized, unstructured places, based on pre-modern styles of management.	从历史上看，什叶派神学院的组织和结构十分松散，一直采用前现代的管理方式。


The concept of a decentralized religious establishment is difficult for Westerners to understand, given the highly structured administrative framework of Christian churches and ecclesiastical orders.	而由于基督教堂和教会秩序的管理框架十分严谨，因此西方人很难理解松散的宗教机构是怎样一种概念。


But this fluid hierarchy, an absence of written rules and organizational order, allowed the various seminaries – and their different interpretive traditions – to survive despotic political regimes and resist intervention by different dynasties and monarchies.	但正是由于这种灵活的层级制度摆脱了书面规则和组织秩序的羁绊，才使得神学院及其特有的诠释传统能够摆脱来自不同朝代及君主的一切干扰，从而在专制的政治制度下完整地保存下来。


This change in Shiite orientation also reflects a very modern influence on politics.	什叶派定位的改变也反映出政治所受到的现代化影响。


Since Shiite fundamentalism is itself a recent phenomenon, the early Iranian revolutionaries inevitably rebuilt the religious seminaries along lines suggested by the Iranian opposition’s most powerful pre-revolutionary discourse: communist ideology.	因为什叶派原教旨主义现象本身才出现不久，早期的伊朗革命者就不可避免地按照伊朗反对派在革命前提出的最为有力的理论，也就是共产主义理论来开展宗教学院的重建工作。


By “modernizing” the seminaries following a single-party model, the revolutionaries gained control over them. The seminaries became little more than an extension of the political system.	通过以一党模式对宗教学院实行“现代化”，革命者最终获得了控制权，而宗教学院也基本变成了国内政治体系的一种延伸。


The death of Ayatollah Khomeini – and that of other religious authorities ( marjas ) like Ayatollah Abul Qassem Khoi in Najaf, Iraq – marked the end of the ideal of a ruler who had mastered both religion and politics.	阿亚图拉霍梅尼和伊拉克纳杰夫的阿亚图拉Abul Qassem Khoi等宗教权威人士（马里亚什）的逝世标志着集宗教和政治大权于一身的统治者梦想的结束。


Iran’s current supreme ruler, Seyyed Ali Khamenei, whose religious degree was a focus of suspicion in the seminary and among the clerical elite, was not considered a jurist by merit.	伊朗目前的最高统治者赛义德·阿里·哈梅内伊（Seyyed Ali Khamenei）的宗教学位受到来自神学院和宗教精英各方的置疑，其自身的素质不足以担负执政法学家的重任。


Consequently, Khamenei’s evident lack of religious legitimacy has pushed the government to assume full control over the clerical establishment, further depriving the seminaries of their historical independence.	结果，哈梅内伊在宗教合法性方面的明显欠缺促使政府对宗教组织实行全面的控制，进而进一步剥夺了神学院原来享有的独立地位。


The last decades have provided the regime with near-ideal conditions to seize control over the Shiite clerical establishment in Iraq as well.	过去十年来，政府夺取对伊拉克什叶派宗教机构控制权的条件也近乎完美。


Under Saddam Hussein, restrictions were imposed on the Shiite seminary in Najaf – traditionally a counterbalance to Iran’s Shiite establishment – forcing the emigration of a number of clerics to the Iranian seminary in Qom.	在萨达姆·侯赛因的统治下，位于纳杰夫的什叶派神学院受到种种限制，而这些神学院曾经是与伊朗什叶派组织分庭抗礼的主要力量，在这种情况下，许多教士被迫向伊朗库姆神学院迁移。


Indeed, growing Iranian control of the Shiite clerical establishment extended beyond Iraq.	事实上，伊朗对什叶派宗教组织日益扩大的影响不仅局限于伊拉克。


It was also strengthened by the regime’s activities in the 1980’s, when it created Hezbollah as a guerilla organization in Lebanon, thereby expanding its domination over the most important Shiite areas in the region.	政府20世纪80年代在黎巴嫩建立真主党游击队武装的行动也扩大了这种影响，进而加强了对该地区最为重要的什叶派区域的控制。


The Iranian regime then consolidated its mastery of the Shiite network in the Middle East, and now uses this control to further its own interests.	伊朗政府紧接着巩固了自己对中东什叶派网络的控制，并正在利用这种控制来为自身谋取利益。


There is thus little prospect of an alternative Shiite power center emerging out of the chaos in Iraq.	因此，其他什叶派权力中心从伊拉克目前的混乱局势中脱颖而出的可能性微乎其微。


Khamenei, the supreme leader, has succeeded in politicizing the Shiite clerical establishment, primarily by controlling the financial resources of the religious authorities and Shiite institutions in Iran and the region.	最高领导人哈梅内伊主要通过控制伊朗和区域内宗教权威机构和什叶派组织的经济来源，成功地促使什叶派宗教机构实现了政治化。


Iraq’s leading Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Ali Sistani, has not been able to act independently and has avoided opposing Iranian policies toward Iraq in order to protect his fragile network of institutions.	伊拉克颇有威望的什叶派教士阿亚图拉阿里·西斯塔尼为了保护自己属下脆弱的组织网络未能采取独立行动，尽力避免与伊朗对伊拉克政策发生直接冲突。


As a result, despite Saddam’s fall, the Najaf seminary remains impotent.	结果即使在萨达姆倒台之后，纳杰夫神学院的衰弱状况也没有得到多大改变。


Ironically, it seems that theocratic theory in Iran has led to anti-theocracy.	具有讽刺意味的是，似乎正是伊朗的神权理论导致了神权政治的衰微。


With the seminaries politicized and their independence greatly reduced, the religious establishment is no longer in a position to confer political legitimacy on the regime.	随着神学院的政治化及其独立能力日益减弱，这些宗教组织已经不能在政治上赋予政府合法的地位。


Nor can it exercise its traditional functions in the religious sphere to provide support to civil society in the country.	同时，神学院也已经无法在宗教领域履行自己的传统职能，为国内的民间团体提供支持。


At a time when the Islamic Republic has failed in its economic and political promises to the Iranian people, the regime’s most glaring weakness may prove to be the absence of a credible religious authority that can justify its shortcomings.	在伊斯兰共和国未能兑现其对伊朗民众所做出的经济和政治承诺的时刻，伊朗政府最突出的弱点可能莫过于缺少一个可信的宗教权威机构，能够为政府存在的种种缺陷找出正当的理由。


Iran’s Quest	伊朗的求索


A major shortcoming in today’s world is the persistence of a zero-sum sense of geopolitics.	当今世界的一大弊端是地缘政治挥之不去的“零和”感。


The world expected something different in the post-Cold War era to promote peace and stability.	世界期望能有一些不同的东西在后冷战时代推动和平与稳定。


Instead, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, momentum swung toward a “global war on terror” that, in practice, became the rationale for maintaining a Cold War mentality and supporting strategies of preemptive war and regime change that have intensified insecurity, instability, and international terrorism.	然而，自从2001年9月11日的恐怖袭击之后，局面的发展转向了一场“全球的反恐战争”。 实际上，它成为了维持冷战思维和支持先发制人的战争和政权变更战略的根本原因，从而进一步加深了不安全、不稳定和国际恐怖主义。


Consider my country, Iran, which has not invaded any country in the past 250 years.	再看看我的国家，伊朗，它在过去的250年里没有侵略过任何一个国家。


After decades of struggle against dictatorship and foreign domination, we secured our freedom and independence in 1979 by establishing a political system of our own choosing.	经过数十载与独裁政权和外国控制的斗争，我们通过建立自己选择的政治制度，在1979年获得了自由和独立。


But instead of establishing friendly relations with Iran based on this new reality, the United States has consistently sought to restore its domination, even providing massive diplomatic, financial, and military support to Saddam Hussein in his war against my country during the 1980’s.	然而美国非但没有基于这个新的现实与伊朗建立友好的关系，反而一直企图重建它对伊朗的控制，甚至在1980年代萨达姆•侯赛因对我国发动的战争中对其提供了大规模的外交、财政和军事支援。


The current dispute over Iran’s peaceful and legal nuclear program is part of this pattern, replete with unfounded accusations, double standards, and moral and legal inconsistency, all hidden behind the alleged threat of proliferation.	当前关于伊朗和平合法的核计划的争端就是这种政策模式的一部分。 它充满了毫无根据的指控、双重标准和道德与法律上的自相矛盾，而这一切都隐藏在所谓核扩散威胁的幌子后面。


But Iran’s peaceful nuclear program originates from the late 1960’s and 1970’s.	但伊朗的和平利用核能计划开始于1960年代末期和1970年代。


Iran’s energy demand will exceed its supply, possibly reducing or even eliminating its oil export capacity in the near future.	伊朗的能源需求会超过其供给，甚至可能在不久的将来使我们降低甚至丧失石油出口能力。


Thus, Iran urgently needs to produce 20,000 megawatts of nuclear power by 2020.	因此，伊朗急需在2020年以前发展2万兆瓦的核电。


As long ago as 1973, the US government itself saw that Iran would need nuclear power.	早在1973年，美国政府自己就预见伊朗将会需要核电。


Indeed, the US expected that Iran would be capable of generating 20,000 megawatts by 1994.	美国当时估计伊朗在1994年时会具备2万兆瓦的核电发电能力。


Despite the encouragement of Iran’s civil nuclear program by the US, Britain, Germany, and France, they all ultimately reneged on their contractual commitments after our revolution in 1979.	尽管美国、英国、德国和法国都鼓励伊朗发展民用核计划，但在我们1979年的伊斯兰革命以后，它们最终都单方面违背了契约承诺。


Today, some of these governments are even questioning Iran’s need for nuclear energy – a matter that was obvious to them 30 years ago.	现今，它们当中的一些政府甚至质疑伊朗对核能的需求—这一在它们30年前看来是显而易见的事实。


Iran does not need nuclear weapons to protect its regional interests, and such weapons have no place in Iran’s security strategy.	伊朗不需要核武器来保护其地区利益，这种武器在伊朗的安全战略中没有一席之地。


It seeks to win the confidence of its neighbors and has remained within the confines of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).	伊朗力图赢得邻国的信任并一直遵守《核不扩散条约》（NPT）的规定。


The latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency has verified that there has been no diversion of Iran’s civil nuclear program to weapons development.	国际原子能委员会的最新一份报告已经证实伊朗的民用核计划没有向武器发展转变。


Iran has even proposed regional and multinational participation in its uranium enrichment facilities – only to be met by resounding silence from the Western powers.	伊朗甚至提议其铀浓缩设施实行地区和多国参与—但得到的回应只是西方大国的沉默。


Meanwhile, US policy toward nuclear non-proliferation and the NPT regime is a case in point of double standards and the lack of sensitivity to other countries’ security concerns.	与此同时，美国对核不扩散及NPT体系的政策完全显示了他的双重标准和对其他国家的安全考虑缺乏敏感。


While the US seeks to use unilateral and unlawful pressure to preclude Iran’s legitimate right to peaceful nuclear energy, it has assisted in developing Israel’s nuclear capabilities.	美国一方面力图运用单方面和非法的压力来否定伊朗和平利用核能的合法权利，而另一方面又支持以色列发展核能力。


Indeed, the US has acted as a buffer to insulate Israel—whose prime minister has boasted about its nuclear weapons—from any international scrutiny, while ignoring calls by Iran and other countries to create a Middle East nuclear-free zone.	的确，美国的缓冲器作用将以色列（该国首相公开吹嘘其核武器）从国际审查中隔离开来，而又对伊朗及其他国家建立中东无核区的呼吁充耳不闻。


With regard to international terrorism, Iran, as a victim of terrorism, condemns it in all its forms.	在国际恐怖主义方面，伊朗作为恐怖主义的受害者，谴责一切形式的恐怖活动。


But the same double standards are apparent here.	但在这一点上同样显示了（美国的）双重标准。


The US has used and is still using extremist organizations to promote its foreign policy goals.	美国曾经并仍然利用极端主义组织来推动其对外政策目标。


This could be said of US conduct with regard to al-Qaeda’s precursors in Afghanistan in the 1980’s, and of its current dealings with terrorist groups such as the People’s Mujahadeen Organization (MKO), and the Kurdish PEJAK and PKK.	这从美国在1980年代与基地组织在阿富汗的前身们，以及其与“人民圣战组织” (MKO)和库尔德人的PEJAK和PKK的交道中可见一斑。


The MKO, which was once on Saddam Hussein’s payroll and responsible for the loss of many innocent lives in Iran and Iraq, is now under the protection of the US government in Iraq and operates freely in the US itself.	MKO，这个曾一度得到萨达姆的金钱支持并在伊朗及伊拉克大量杀害无辜的组织，现在美国政府的保护之下在伊拉克和美国境内自由行动。


Iran has always considered regional stability to be in the vital interest of its own security and development.	伊朗向来就认为地区稳定与其安全和发展休戚相关。


Our efforts to establish a regional security and cooperation arrangement in the Persian Gulf date back to 1986, at the height of the war with Iraq.	我们在波斯湾地区建立区域安全与合作安排的努力可以追溯到1986年，两伊战争如火如荼之时。


We have continued to pursue these initiatives in the post-Saddam era, engaging in confidence-building measures with our immediate neighbors in order to offset extra-regional agitations.	在后萨达姆时代，我们继续推进这一努力，通过实施与周边邻国建立信任的举措来抵消来自地区以外的煽动因素。


Iran currently applies the same policy considerations to Iraq and Afghanistan, despite its opposition to the US-led invasions of these countries.	尽管伊朗反对美国领导下的对伊拉克和阿富汗的侵略，但它目前仍对上述国家采取同样的政策考量。


Iran has established excellent relations with post-Taliban Afghanistan and post-Saddam Iraq, and the most senior officials of both countries consistently reject US allegations of Iranian interference.	伊朗已经与后塔利班的阿富汗和后萨达姆的伊拉克建立了良好的关系，两国的大多数高层官员都一直否认美国关于伊朗插手两国内政的指控。


These accusations are designed to portray Iran as a threat to regional stability and frighten other countries into creating an anti-Iran coalition, with the aim of diverting attention from the consequences of failed US policies not only in Iraq, but also in Lebanon and with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.	编造这些指控的目的是将伊朗描绘成对地区稳定的威胁并使其他国家在恐惧之下结成一个反伊朗联盟，目的是为了将国际社会的注意力从美国政策失败的后果上转移开来。 这些失败的政策不仅是针对伊拉克，还有在巴以冲突的背景下针对黎巴嫩的政策。


The world deserves better.	我们应该有一个更好的世界。


A just global order must be defined in terms of peace and security, alleviation of poverty, a fairer distribution of wealth, better protection of the environment, and respect for local cultural particularities.	一种公正的全球秩序必须体现在和平与安全、减轻贫困、更公平的财富分配、更好的环境保护和对地区文化特点的尊重上。


We can build a global order based on justice, one that negates the current unipolar order by developing tolerance for diversity instead of seeking imposition and assimi lation. Such an order will be culturally inclusive and less hegemonic, encompassing states, non-state actors, and social groups to minimize violence and maximize economic well-being.	我们可以建立一种��于公正的全球秩序，一种通过培养对多元化的宽容而不是力图强制与同化的秩序来否定现行的一极化秩序。 这样的秩序将会在文化上更为包容、更少霸权主义，涵盖国家、非国家成员和社会团体，从而使暴力冲突最小化，经济福祉最大化。


Erich Fromm, the late German psychologist and philosopher, once said that “history is a graveyard of cultures that came to their catastrophic ends because of their incapacity for planned and rational voluntary reaction to challenges.”	已仙逝的德国心理学家和哲学家Erich Fromm曾说“历史是许多文化的墓葬。 这些文化走向灾难性终结的原因是它们不能以有计划的、理性的方式自发地应对挑战。


We cannot predict our fate, but we can be certain that security will only come through real solidarity and global partnership.	”我们不能占卜命运，但我们可以确保从真正的团结和全球伙伴关系中获得安全。


Iran’s Rattling Saber	伊朗亮剑


WASHINGTON, DC – As the West ratchets up its economic pressure on Iran to halt its drive to develop nuclear weapons, the Islamic Republic’s rulers are not sitting idly by.	华盛顿——随着西方启动经济压力迫使伊朗中止其核武器开发行为，伊朗伊斯兰教共和国的执政者没有坐视不理。


Since Iran lacks the soft power and the economic capacity to counter Western pressure, it is likely that its leaders will resort to threats, and even to force, to prevent the West from cracking down further, as the recent attack on the British embassy in Tehran shows.	由于伊朗缺乏软实力和抗衡西方压力的经济能力，因此很有可能其领导人会采用威胁甚至强迫手段防止西方的进一步打击，比如最近的袭击德黑兰英国使馆事件。


Iranian authorities claimed that angry “students” spontaneously stormed the embassy.	伊朗当局称，愤怒的“学生”自发地袭击了大使馆。


While inside, they seized documents and set others alight, and took six embassy employees hostage.	而在进入了大使馆后，他们先查封了文件，然后烧掉了其他东西，还劫持了6名大使馆工作人员作为人质。


It was only much later that the crowd came under police control and the hostages were set free.	警察控制住混乱的人群以及人质被释放则是很久以后才发生的事情。


The scene was quite familiar.	这一幕似曾相识。


In 1979, the United States embassy was also attacked by angry “students,” fueling enmity between the two countries that continues to this day.	1979年，美国大使馆也被愤怒的“学生”袭击，并燃起了两国延续至今的敌意。


Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was not aware of the students’ plan in 1979.	1979年，霍梅尼根本不知道学生们的计划。


But he later endorsed their actions, and made anti-Americanism a pillar of Iran’s foreign policy.	但事后他宣布支持他们的行动，并将反美作为伊朗外交政策的旗帜。


Iran today is not the revolutionary Iran of 1979.	如今的伊朗早已不是1979年革命的伊朗了。


Thirty-two years after the Islamic Republic was established, Iran’s tactics are obvious to everyone.	伊斯兰共和国已经成立了32年，伊朗的策略也早已是人尽皆知了。


The so-called students are members of the Basij militia, which was ordered to attack the embassy, with the police only pretending to stop them.	所谓的学生其实是巴斯杰（Basij）民兵组织成员，他们是受命袭击大使馆的，警察制止他们只是在逢场作戏。


In the government’s thinking, it does not have to accept responsibility for the attack, the attackers’ identity will remain a mystery, and no one will even be accused of or tried for breaking the law.	在伊朗政府的思维中，它不必为此次袭击负责，袭击者的身份将被保密，甚至不会有人因违法犯罪而受到起诉。


The Fars News Agency, which is affiliated with Iran’s powerful Revolutionary Guard has called the British embassy a “lair of espionage” – the same term used to describe the US embassy in 1979.	与伊朗的当权派革命卫队相关的塔斯社将英国使馆称为“间谍巢穴”——与1979年美国使馆获得评价一模一样。


This is not the first time that a European or British embassy has been attacked by the Basij.	这不是欧洲或英国使馆第一次被巴斯杰袭击了。


But the stakes are higher now than ever before.	但这一次的赌注比以前任何一次都要大。


In response to Iran’s nuclear program and Iranian banks’ money-laundering activities, Britain sanctioned the Central Bank of Iran.	为了应对伊朗的核计划和伊朗银行的洗钱行径，英国对伊朗央行实施了制裁。


As a result, Iran felt compelled to respond – and not solely with the assault on the British embassy: a few days prior to the attack, a majority in the Iranian parliament voted to downgrade the country’s diplomatic relations with Britain.	结果，伊朗觉得必须做出回应——包括但不限于袭击英国大使馆：袭击发生前几天，伊朗议会以多数通过将伊朗同英国的外交关系级别降格。


Reacting to mounting fear of Western military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities, Revolutionary Guard commanders recently sharpened their rhetoric against the US and Israel.	作为越来越担心西方针对伊朗核设施的军事行为的反应，革命卫队首脑最近大大强硬了其针对美国和以色列的语言立场。


Amir Ali Hajizadeh, commander of the Guard’s Aerospace Division, said that, in the event of war, “NATO’s missile-defense installations will be attacked by Iran.”	革命卫队航天师指挥官哈吉扎德（Amir Ali Hajizadeh）说，如果发生战争，“北约的导弹防御设施将会遭到伊朗的打击”。


Moreover, he threatened that Iran’s armed forces would not remain quiet if “economic and cultural pressures” continued.	此外，他还威胁说，如果“经济和文化压迫”继续的话，伊朗武装力量将不再保持沉默。


Likewise, Yahya Rahim Safavi, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s military adviser and a former commander-in-chief of the Revolutionary Guard, appealed to Iranian officials not to confine their threats to words, but rather to respond with military action.	类似地，最高领袖哈梅内伊的军事顾问兼革命卫队前最高指挥官萨法伊（Yahya Rahim Safavi）呼吁伊朗官员不要将威胁停留在口头，而是应该采取军事行动作为回应。


He not only argued that Iran’s strategy should be offensive rather than defensive, but also threatened that Tel Aviv would be attacked by Hamas and Hezbollah if Israel went to war with the Islamic Republic.	他不但声称伊朗的战略应该是进攻性的，而不是防御性的，还威胁说，如果以色列胆敢和伊朗伊斯兰共和国动武的话，哈马斯和黎巴嫩真主党将对特拉维夫发动袭击。


Some experts argue that if covert operations against Iran’s nuclear and military programs – such as the assassination of nuclear scientists and explosions at the Revolutionary Guard’s missile arsenals – are already taking place, war has already begun.	一些专家指出，针对伊朗核和军事计划的隐蔽行动——比如暗杀核科学家和引爆革命卫队的导弹库——一开始进行，那么可以说战争已经开始了。


Indeed, Khamenei and Revolutionary Guard commanders believe that covert war will inevitably become overt if Israel and the West truly believe that Iran is approaching a dangerous point in its nuclear program.	事实上，哈梅内伊和革命卫队指挥官相信，如果以色列和西方真的认为伊朗的核计划已经触及了危险点，那么隐蔽战争将不可避免地从幕后走到台前。


Khamenei recently stated that “we should threaten [the West and Israel] in response to their threats,” which prompted Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff Brigadier General Mohammad Baqeri to conclude that Khamenei’s remark meant “revising [Iran’s] defense strategy.”	哈梅内伊最近宣称“我们应该威胁（西方和以色列），作为它们对我问的威胁的回应，”这使得伊朗武装力量副总参谋长巴盖里（Mohammad Baqeri）准将认为哈梅内伊的意思是“修正（伊朗的）防御战略”。


Obviously, Revolutionary Guard commanders will not divulge what the new strategy is.	显然，革命卫队指挥官不可能泄露新战略到底是什么。


Instead, they hope that their own covert action might stop the West from applying more sanctions and greater pressure.	相反，他们希望自身的隐蔽行动能让西方停止进一步制裁和施加压力。


Thus, the West’s main concerns should stem not from Iran’s official responses, but from “independent elements,” like those that attacked the British embassy.	因此，西方的主要关注点不应该是伊朗的官方回应，而是“独立元素”，比如那些袭击英国大使馆的人。


Recently, the US accused an Iranian-American of being instructed by a member of the Quds Force (a Revolutionary Guard unit tasked with carrying out foreign operations) to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington. 	最近，美国指控了一位伊朗裔美国人，说他受一位圣城旅（Quds Force，执行海外任务的革命卫队部门）成员的���唆，行刺沙特驻华盛顿大使。


Back in 2007, Iranian forces captured a group of British sailors in the Persian Gulf, releasing them a few weeks later under strong pressure from the United Kingdom.	2007年，伊朗军方在波斯湾俘虏了一小队英军士兵，几周后迫于英国的强大压力不得不将他们释放。


With tensions much higher today, however, such acts – even if carried out by unknown or unofficial groups – can trigger war.	如今，形势之紧张已远胜两年前，这样的行为——即使是由非官方的不知名武装力量做出——可能引发战争。


Indeed, Iran might become so fearful of an overt war that it starts one itself.	事实上，伊朗可能太怕正式动武，因此与其由他人挑起，不如由自己发动。


Iran’s Republic of Fear	伊朗，恐惧的共和


WASHINGTON, DC – Iran’s clerical regime governs by a simple formula: he who is the most frightening, wins.	发自华盛顿特区 —— 伊朗的教权主义政权一直以来都沿袭着一个简单的统治模式，那就是最令人畏惧者得天下。


“Victory by terrifying” is trope that is present in many of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s speeches. Indeed, it is a reliable guide to his political philosophy.	而“恐吓制胜”也是最高领袖阿亚图拉阿里·哈梅内伊在其演说中经常用到的比喻，事实上这也是解读此人政治哲学的一条可靠线索。


This view was not invented by Khamenei, but rather is drawn from the Koran and the Shiite tradition.	但这一观点的始作俑者并不是哈梅内伊，而是出自于《古兰经》和伊斯兰教什叶派的传统。


The Iranian Revolutionary Guard have uniforms bearing a Koranic verse that reads, “Make ready for them whatever force and strings of horses you can, to terrify thereby the enemy of God and your enemy, and others besides them that you know not; God knows them.”	比如伊朗革命卫队的制服上就绣有一段《古兰经》经文 —— “准备好一切武力和马鞭，去威吓神的敌人，你的敌人以及其它你所未知的敌对者； 神知道他们（的行踪）。


Furthermore, in the Shiite tradition, the strategy of the Mahdi, the Shiite Messiah, will be to intimidate all his enemies upon his return to Earth.	”此外，根据什叶派传统，马赫迪这位什叶派救世主所采用的策略，就是在他重新降临世界之时威吓一切敌人。


But cultivating fear in others also makes one more susceptible to fear, and nothing is more frightening to Khamenei and the leaders of the Islamic Republic than the social dynamism unleashed by the democratic movement brewing inside the country.	但与此同时，在其它人之中制造恐惧的行为同样也会令策划者对恐惧变得更加敏感，而对于哈梅内伊和伊斯兰共和国的领导人来说，没什么比那些在国内酝酿而生的民主运动中所释放出来的社会能量更令他们感到畏惧的了。


The regime seems convinced that there is only a small likelihood of a military attack on its nuclear program. It does not believe that sanctions can bring about its collapse.	这个政权似乎确信，自己的核计划不大可能遭到外军袭击，而国际制裁似乎也难以令政权崩溃。


Thus, external forces do not appear to pose much of a threat.	因此，来自外部的威胁根本不算什么。


What has shaken the government, and indeed threatens the existence of the ruling Islamic ideology, is the pressure of the Iranian people for human and political rights.	而真正撼动了政府，并对伊斯兰神权统治意识形态构成了实质性威胁的，则是伊朗人民追求人权和政治权利的压力。


Hossein Saffar Harandi, a former minister of culture and Islamic guidance, expressed this fear when he said that “citizens who want the government to be accountable before the people (are) part of a soft war against the Islamic Republic.”	对此文化和伊斯兰指导部前部长侯赛因·萨法尔·哈兰迪则表达了这种恐惧，他说：“这是一场针对伊斯兰共和国的‘软战争’，而那些希望拥有一个负责任政府的公民们就是战争的一部分。 ”


For 30 years, the Islamic Republic has relied on the heavy hand of the internal-security apparatus to silence dissidents and critics.	30 年以来，伊朗依靠内部保卫部门的大力打击来压制异见分子和批评者。


Fear is a cornerstone of the republic.	恐惧堪称撑起这个共和国的一块基石。


But, since Iran’s post-election crisis in June, the people have become fearless, and in turn are terrifying the government.	然而自从伊朗 7 月爆发大选后危机以来，人民已经变得无所畏惧，而且开始反过来令政府感到战栗。


The extent to which Khamenei fears this social upsurge is stunning.	而哈梅内伊对这场社会剧变所表现出来的恐惧程度也令人吃惊。


He is afraid of the humanities, books, arts, universities, satellites, the Internet, and even mobile phones.	他害怕一切东西：人，书籍，艺术，大学，卫星，网络，甚至手机。


For him, the state must control public access to global culture and technology. If not, these forces will work to undermine the state.	对他来说，国家必须控制公众获取外界文化和技术的一切途径，否则的话，这些力量就将颠覆整个国家。


Unlike the Islamic Republic’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Khamenei lacks charisma and deep learning.	但跟伊朗伊斯兰共和国的缔造者阿亚图拉鲁霍拉·霍梅尼不一样的是，哈梅内伊既缺乏强大的个人魅力，也没有深厚的学养。


Both his political legitimacy and religious authority are highly questionable, and the street violence and prison brutality of recent months has undermined his authority and shaken his social base.	他在政治和宗教上的统治合法性都饱受质疑，而近来发生的街头暴力和监狱野蛮行为更削弱了他的权威和社会基础。


Increasingly reliant on the Revolutionary Guard as the bulwark of his regime, Khamenei has cut himself off from the possibility of compromise.	随着他的政权对革命卫队的依赖性越来越大，哈梅内伊也断掉了和民众进行妥协的后路。


Khamenei’s foreign policy is now completely subject to how the domestic situation in Iran develops.	哈梅内伊的外交政策如今也完全受制于国内形势的发展。


As recent months have shown, he will consider a compromise with the West only when he loses his certainty that all is under control internally.	正如最近几个月所见，他只有在觉得对国内局势失去控制的时候才会尝试与西方妥协。


It is like a seesaw: Khamenei’s domestic weakness changes the balance of Iran’s foreign policy.	一切就像个跷跷板：哈梅内伊在国内的虚弱打破了伊朗外交政策的平衡。


Thus, initially intimidated by the post-election crisis, the regime acceded to the October 1 proposal in Geneva that would have allowed the controlled enrichment of Iran’s uranium outside the country.	比如在选举后危机的威胁下，伊朗最初同意在日内瓦提出的 10 月 1 号方案，允许将伊朗拥有的铀在第三国进行受监控的浓缩。


In November, when the government thought that street brutality had intimidated the protest movement, Iranian officials backed away from the compromise.	谁知到了 11 月，当伊朗政府认为自己已经通过街头暴力手段威吓住了人们的街头抗议之后，伊朗官员当即就放弃了妥协。


In this sense, the Iranian people can be regarded as a strategic ally of the West, not only because they want democracy at home and peace in the region, but because their continued protests offer the West the most effective leverage against the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program.	因此在这种意义上，伊朗人民可以被视为西方的一个战略同盟，不仅因为他们希望能为自己的国家带来民主，为这个地区带来和平，而是他们的持续示威为西方提供了足以制衡伊朗核计划的最有效筹码。


This regime cannot survive in the long term with a political crisis such as the one it now faces.	而如果这场政治危机能够一直持续下去，整个政权必定难以维持长久。


Continued crackdowns would result in a military dictatorship, while an accommodation with the protest movement would produce some kind of consensual semi-democratic government.	不断的镇压将催生军事独裁，而如果和示威运动进行妥协的话，必将产生一个经过各方认可的半民主政府。


In either case, however, the democratic movement would not die.	在这两种情况下，民主运动都不会消亡。


It would reemerge continuously, despite heavy repression over short periods of times, raising the kinds of challenges that pose an existential threat to any non-democratic government.	尽管可能在短期内遭到强力镇压，但民主运动将不断风起云涌，对任何不民主的政府构成事实上的挑战。


Support of human rights and democracy in Iran is not only a matter of morality. It should be a strategic priority for the West.	至此，支持伊朗的人权和民主已经不仅仅是一个道德问题，而应该是西方一个优先的战略着眼点。


Empowering the Iranian people means weakening Khamenei and his military allies.	向伊朗人民赋予力量意味着削弱哈梅内伊及其军事同盟。


And a weakened Khamenei is more likely to compromise on the nuclear front.	而一个虚弱的哈梅内伊，将更可能在核问题上作出让步。


Iran’s Revolutionary Echoes	伊朗的革命回响


STONY BROOK, NY – Iran’s continued unrest, now extending through the 30th anniversary of the revolution that toppled the Shah, raises the question of whether the Islamic Republic is about to fall.	发自美国纽约州石溪 —— 伊朗的动荡局面久拖不决，已经持续到推翻巴列维王朝革命 30 周年纪念之际了，这也令人不得不怀疑：伊斯兰共和国是否已经走到了尽头？


As in 1979, millions of Iranians have taken to the streets, this time to protest electoral fraud in the presidential vote last June.	如同 1979 年数百万伊朗民众涌向街头一样，人们又一次走上街头，齐声抗议去年 6 月总统大选的选举弊案。


The cheated presidential candidates, both veterans of the revolution, instinctively thought of a replay of history.	而在大选中遭到对手暗算的两位总统候选人 —— 也都是当年的老革命 —— 则本能地把眼前的局面视为一次历史的重演。


Mir Hossein Moussavi saw the green symbols of the demonstrators as representing the color of the House of the Prophet, and urged his supporters to continue their nightly rooftop chants of “God is Great!”	米尔·侯赛因·穆萨维把示威者的绿色标志看作是先知之屋（ House of the Prophet ）的颜色，并敦促其支持者每晚坚持在自家楼顶上高唱圣歌《真主伟大！


Thus, the first slogan of the opposition invoked the religious credo of the 1979 revolutionaries.	》，可见反对派的第一条口号正是借用了 1979 年那些革命者的宗教口号。


More recently, protesters chanted it during the funeral demonstrations for Grand Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri in the closing days of 2009.	而就在最近，在 2009 年年末举行的大阿亚图拉侯赛因·阿里·蒙塔泽里的葬礼上，抗议者也再次唱响了这首圣歌。


And yet we risk being led astray by memories of 1979. It is far too soon to predict another revolution.	但我们受到 1979 年记忆误导的可能性也很大，毕竟到目前为止依然难以断定另一场革命即将到来。


But t he divide between Iran’s society and its government is much greater today than it was under the Shah 30 years ago.	然而也必须指出，当今伊朗社会与其政府之间的分歧要比 30 年前巴列维治下的分歧要大得多。


Change seems just as inevitable.	因此变革似乎也是无法避免的。


Technological advances greatly favor the 2009 protesters.	同时，技术的进步也给予了 2009 年的抗议者以极大的帮助。


Text messages, Twitter, and the Web are infinitely superior to the smuggled cassettes of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s speeches that fueled the opposition in 1979.	手机短信，推特 (Twitter) 以及网站的力量都远远超过了 1979 年时录有魯霍拉·穆薩維·霍梅尼讲话的走私录音带的作用 —— 当年这些录音带曾经有力地推动了反对派阵营。


What’s missing this time, however, is a charismatic leader comparable to Khomeini.	但这次运动也有跟 1979 年不同的地方，那就是缺少了一位跟当年霍梅尼一样富有魅力的领袖人物。


Indeed, the striking feature of the Iranian opposition movement is the lack of effective leadership, despite the astonishing persistence of protests.	事实上，尽管本次抗议运动持续的时间惊人地漫长，但其最严重的缺陷就是缺乏一位有能力的领袖。


As Moussavi has readily acknowledged, neither he nor the other presidential candidate, Ahmad Karroubi, feels in charge by now.	连穆萨维也承认，无论是他自己还是其他总统候选人，比如马赫迪·卡鲁比，都无法掌控当前的局面。


The greatest difference between 2009 and 1979 was created by the revolution itself.	而 2009 年的运动与 1979 年最大的区别则是来自于革命本身。


R evolutions give birth to a new political class, and Iran’s Islamic revolution was no exception.	一般来说，革命都要催生一个新的政治阶级，伊朗的伊斯兰革命自然也不例外。


The Iranian leadership formed after the revolution consisted of a narrow ruling stratum and a much broader supporting group that was given charge of administration and political mobilization.	革命后上台的伊朗领导层是由数量较小的统治阶层和大量的支持者组成，而这些支持者则被任命去掌控政府的官僚机构以及执行政治动员工作。


In the 20 years since Khomeini’s death, the composition of this political class has changed drastically.	但在哈梅内伊去世 20 年后，这一政治阶级的组成成分已经发生了剧变。


The clerical elite has gradually lost power to the military-security groups, from whose ranks President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad emerged.	宗教精英学者的权力已经慢慢地被军事安全组织所侵蚀殆尽 —— 总统艾哈迈迪·内贾德就是从中崭露头角的。


Bureaucratic and security services dominated by the Revolutionary Guards and its militia, the Basij (Mobilization Corps), are now firmly in command.	伊朗政府的官僚机构和国家安全事务已经牢牢地控制在了革命卫队及其民兵组织 —— 巴斯基（ Basij ，动员部队）手里。


The leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, blessed the Revolutionary Guards’ decision to steal the presidential election.	而作为伊斯兰共和国的领袖，阿亚图拉赛义德·阿里·哈梅内伊公开对伊朗革命自卫队窃取总统选举结果的决定表示赞成。


By identifying squarely with the military-security apparatus headed by Ahmadinejad, Khamenei has alienated an important segment of the ruling clerical elite. He has also reduced his own status as the ultimate arbiter in Iranian society, a role that was central to Khomeini’s dominance of the system.	通过对内贾德领导的军事安全机构的直接支持，哈梅内伊不但疏远了作为统治阶层重要组成部分的宗教精英学者，同时也贬低了自己作为伊朗社会最终仲裁者的地位 —— 这也是霍梅尼从前得以掌控伊朗社会系统的核心角色。


As a result, he has produced a rupture between the two pillars of the revolutionary regime: the clerical elite and military-security structure.	透过这一系列的行动，他在革命政权的两级 —— 宗教学者精英和军事安全集团之间 —— 制造了裂痕。


The growth of Khamenei’s personal, extra-constitutional power introduces a strong element of uncertainty into Iran’s future.	此外，哈梅内伊的个人以及宪法外权力的增长则成为影响伊朗未来不确定性的一个重要因素。


Political regimes that rely on personal power, commonly known as dictatorships, prove to be fragile in crisis.	构建于个人权力之上的政治统治，即通常所谓的独裁，在面对危机时是十分 脆弱的。


This was the weakness of the Shah’s regime, which collapsed as he became paralyzed in his decision-making. There was nothing behind him supporting the system.	这也正是巴列维王朝的弱点所在，在巴列维的决策系统瘫痪之时，王朝就覆灭了，因为没有任何人能够站出来支撑起整个系统。


Khamenei’s backing of the June 2009 putsch now appears to be a costly mistake.	哈梅内伊对 2009 年 6 月这场群众运动的背弃是个代价高昂的错误。


With this single error, he has undermined what had appeared to be a robust post-revolutionary course for the first and only theocracy in modern history. The cries of “God is Great!” have now been overtaken by chants of “Death to the Dictator!” in recent demonstrations in Tehran, Tabriz, Shiraz, and other Iranian cities.	仅仅由于这一错误，他就为伊朗（现代历史中第一个而且是唯一一个神权国家）的后伊斯兰革命时代的社会进程埋下了隐患。 最近，在德黑兰，大不里士，设拉子及其他伊朗城市举行的示威中，“真主伟大！


The Iranian regime is now critically dependent on decisions made by one man, the Leader.	如今伊朗政权的维系在很大程度上依赖于一个人所作的决定，那就是最高领袖。


For that reason, it is demonstrating a degree of fragility that is comparable to the Shah’s regime in the latter part of the 1970’s.	而这也因此说明当今的政权与 1970 年代后期巴列维王朝政权一样的脆弱。


Most spokespersons of the Green protest movement advocate civil disobedience instead of revolution.	即便如此，伊朗绿色抗议运动的大部分发言人倡导的都是公民不服从（ civil disobedience ）而不是革命。


Earlier this month, Ezattolah Sahabi, who was a member of the revolutionary provisional government in 1979, issued a statement in Tehran stating categorically that “a revolution in today’s Iran is neither possible nor desirable.”	这个月早些时候，伊扎多拉·沙哈比（ Ezattolah Sahabi ），这位 1979 年革命临时政府的成员之一，在德黑兰发表了一个声明，明确说明“在今天的伊朗，革命既不可能，也不可取”。


At roughly the same time, five prominent opposition intellectuals living in exile released a reformist, not revolutionary, manifesto directed against the “despotic guardians.”	而几乎与此同时，在反对派中，有 5 位流亡国外的重要知识分子共同发表了一份非革命的，改良主义的宣言，将矛头指向“独裁的监护者”（指哈梅内伊）。


But there is little chance that these children of the Islamic revolution – now graying reformists – will remain in control of the Green movement, which now reflects the aspirations of a post-revolutionary generation of young women and men and students.	但是，那些从前投身伊斯兰革命的“小鬼” —— 现在已经是头发斑白的改良主义者 —— 不见得还能在绿色运动中继续拥有控制权，因为这场运动反映的可不是他们的意愿，而是伊斯兰革命后那一代伊朗年青男女和学生的意愿。


The ayatollah-dictator and the Revolutionary Guards have tried their best to discredit their opponents by concocting, through forced confessions at show trials, a conspiracy of regime change based on a “velvet revolution” produced by “Western social sciences.”	通过在公开审判强迫证人作伪证，宗教独裁者和伊朗革命自卫队竭力诋毁他们的对手，指责对手是在图谋策划一场基于由“西方社会科学”所滋生的“天鹅绒革命”的政权更替。


Deep down, they know there is no conspiracy. Their fear is grounded in what they see in front of them: the forward march of history.	但在这些人的内心深处，他们明白压根就不存在什么阴谋，他们的恐惧来源于自己眼前的现实：历史的车轮，正在滚滚前进。


Iran’s Young Guard	伊朗年轻的守护者


TEHRAN – Iranians will go to the polls on June 12 to elect a new president.	德黑兰——6月12日伊朗选民将走入投票站，选举出一名新的总统。


While some argue that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s re-election is a foregone conclusion, the outcome is, in fact, not at all clear.	一些人认为现任总统马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪－内贾德的再次当选毫无异议。 但实际上，结果还不很明朗。


Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has repeatedly said in public settings that he will not declare his preference among the candidates.	伊朗最高领袖阿亚图拉赛义德·阿里·哈梅内伊多次公开表示，他对目前总统候选人没有倾向性。


Indeed, in Mashad on March 21, Ayatollah Khamenei said, “There were some rumors that I support a special candidate for the presidential elections.	在3月21号麦什得的一次讲话中，他说：“有传言说我支持某个特定的总统候选人。 不过，我也只有一张选票。


But I have one vote, and I would not determine a certain candidate because the people themselves should choose their candidates based on their own knowledge.”	我不能决定谁当总统，因为人们都可以基于自己的判断来作出选择。 ”


So how will the Iranian people weigh their votes?	那么伊朗选民如何来行使自己的投票权呢？


To answer, one needs to understand the composition of the Iranian electorate.	要回答这个问题，让我们首先要来了解一下伊朗选民的组成结构。


With the voting age set at just 16 years, Iran has roughly 48 million eligible voters.	伊朗公民年满16岁就获得了投票权，也就是说伊朗的合格选民大约有4千8百万左右。


Turnout averages 60-65% in presidential elections, implying that around 29 million votes are likely to be cast.	如果按照60-65%的投票率来算的话，就意味着有大约2千9百万的选民会参加投票。


Analysts point to several electoral cleavages, particularly the urban-rural split and socioeconomic status.	分析人士指出，不同的选民团体有着不同的政治倾向。 例如，选民可以以城市和乡村以及不同的社会经济状态来区分。


Moreover, a key determinant of voting behavior in the upcoming elections is likely to be generational.	而且，投票人可能由于不同的年龄差距而选择不同的候选人。


Some 46% of the electorate is under the age of 30.  In previous elections, younger voters have turned out in greater numbers than their elders, leading some to predict that half of the voters will be in the 16-to-29 age bracket.	目前，约有46%的选民年龄在30岁以下。 以过去的选举经验来看，年轻的选民比年老的有更高的投票率，一些人士预测，超过半数的参与投票选民的年龄将在16—29岁之间。


The number of potential first-time voters (16 to 19 years old) is estimated at six million.	预计第一次参加投票的选民人数（年龄为16至19岁选民）将超过600万人。


Several factors distinguish members of this group from the rest of the Iranian electorate.	这些年轻选民有着自己独有的特点。


They are more educated, more urbanized, and more internationally oriented than previous generations.	比起他们的前辈，他们受到良好的教育，更加城市化和国际化。


More of them are university educated, and, of this group, a majority is female.	他们当中的很多人都有着大学文凭，女性占多数。


They have branched out into new lines of work and social engagement, as inventors, entrepreneurs, and bloggers.	他们的职业选择也趋于多元化，一些人成为投资者，企业家和博客写手等。


No candidate can be elected president of Iran without significant support among younger voters.	如果离开年轻选民的支持，总统候选人就不可能赢得选举。


Age, not social class, will determine the outcome of June’s election.	年龄的因素，而不是社会阶层将决定着6月的选举结果。


Like all Iranians, younger voters are focused on economic issues, particularly the difficult combination of high inflation and high unemployment.	和所有的伊朗人一样，年轻选民更加关注经济问题，特别是在如今高通胀和高失业率的艰难时期。


The populist policies of the past four years have not brought economic improvement.	过去四年民粹主义的政策并没有带来多少经济上的发展。


Younger Iranians have a particular economic concern as well.	年轻的伊朗人更加关心经济问题。


With so many of them graduating from universities, they suffer from a mismatch between their qualifications and the jobs on offer.	很多从大学毕业出来的年轻人发现，他们在学校所学习的知识和社会所提供的工作机会不能匹配。


Underemployment is deeply frustrating to them.	高失业率一直困扰着他们。


They also want a more liberal social environment that would loosen restrictions on their dress, broaden access to cultural products like film and music, and enlarge press freedoms.	他们更需要社会给他们有一个更为宽松的环境，让他们自由着装，更加自由地消费电影，音乐等文化产品。 他们需要更多的新闻自由。


They want university campuses, in particular, to be more open.	年轻人尤其希望大学能够更加开放一些。


Finally, younger Iranians are tired of Iran’s international isolation.	最后，伊朗的年轻人厌倦了本国在国际上的孤立地位。


They want Iran to succeed – and to be recognized for its success – in sports, arts, and education at an international level.	他们希望伊朗在体育，文艺和教育领域的水平能进一步提升，得到国际社会的认可。


As of this writing, only two presidential candidates have declared themselves: former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Moussavi and former parliament speaker Mehdi Karroubi. Assuming that Ahmadinejad seeks re-election, this line-up lacks any candidate with clear appeal to the youth vote.	到本文截稿时为止，目前有两人宣布参加总统候选人的选举：他们是前总理米尔-侯赛因·穆萨维和前议长迈赫迪·卡鲁比、就算加上艾哈迈迪－内贾德 ——如果他想也谋求连任的话，目前的这几个总统候选人对年轻选民缺乏吸引力。


Given their dissatisfaction, it would be natural for young voters to take out their frustrations on Ahmadinejad.	由于对现状的不满，他们自然对现任总统艾哈迈迪－内贾德充满怨气。


One seemingly unrelated event to watch: in the week before the presidential vote, Iran will play two critical football matches as part of the qualifying round for the 2010 World Cup.	目前，好像有一件看似不相干的事件也在左右着局面——在本次总统投票前，也就是本周，伊朗将参加两场关键的2010年世界杯足球预选赛。


If Iran fails to qualify, this could turn some young voters against the incumbent.	如果伊朗队输球的话，一些年轻选民就会将怨气撒在现任的执政者头上。


Among the other candidates, who will pick up this slack?	在其他这两个候选人中，谁会来收拾这个烂摊子呢？


Moussavi, Iran’s prime minister between 1981 and 1989, is barely known to young voters.	曾经担任1981到1989年总理的穆萨维恐怕不为年轻选民所熟悉。


However, his campaign has been hinting that, if elected, Moussavi will loosen some social and cultural restrictions.	不过，他的竞选团队暗示，如果他能当选，他将放松社会和文化领域的一些限制。


Karroubi, too, is handicapped among the young. Many consider him to be an old, out-of-touch cleric with no feel for their concerns.	卡鲁比也不为年轻选民熟知，很多人认为他是一个过于衰老和脱离世俗社会的教士，和他们没有共同语言。


Former President Mohammad Khatami, who openly considered trying again for the office, would have been a strong candidate for young voters.	前总统罕默德·哈塔米过去曾宣称会重返政坛，他对年轻选民会有很强的吸引力。


His decision not to run disappointed many of them.	但他不参选的决定让很多人感到失望。


Standing in the wings is one possible candidate who might take up where Khatami left off and address the economic and cultural concerns of young Iranians.	谁更能关心年轻伊朗人的经济文化需求？ 他就可能继承哈塔米的政治遗产而获得大家的拥护。


Though he has not announced his candidacy, Mohammad Baquer Qalibaf, now Mayor of Tehran and formerly the country’s chief of police, has a relatively moderate track record and an image of someone who can get things done.	现任德黑兰市长和前任国家警察首脑罕默德·巴基尔·卡里巴夫的形象相对比较温和，给人一种干练的印象。 虽然目前为止他本人还没有宣布参选。


But Qalibaf still has not taken the plunge. If he doesn’t, and if no younger candidate emerges, the youth bloc in Iran’s electorate may have nowhere to turn.	但目前为止 ，卡里巴夫还没有参选，如果他不参选，再加上如果没有相对较年轻的候选人出现的话，年轻伊朗人将不知道将选票投给谁。


Without a voice for their concerns, Iran’s young people face the prospect of increased frustration, whatever the outcome of the election.	因为没有代表他们说话的人物出现，如果真是这样的话，不管选举结果如何，伊朗的年轻人将会越来越感到沮丧失望。


Iran, Turkey, and the Non-Arab Street	伊朗、土耳其和非阿拉伯街头


PRINCETON – To Western eyes, Middle East politics have again been stood on their head.	普林斯顿—在西方人眼里，中东政治再一次吸引了他们的眼球。


Iran’s theocratic mullahs allowed the election of Hassan Rowhani, a man who announced in his first speech as President-elect that his victory is “the victory of wisdom, moderation, and awareness over fanaticism and bad behavior.”	伊朗的理论毛拉批准了鲁哈尼的当选，后者在作为当选总统的第一次演讲中声称自己的胜利是“智慧、克制和了解狂热和坏行为的胜利”。


Iranians, apparently surprised that the candidate whom a majority of them had backed (over six harder-line candidates) had won, poured into the streets and hailed a victory “for the people.”	伊朗人民显然对大部分人支持的候选人（压倒六名强硬派候选人）获胜感到惊喜，他们涌上街头，欢呼“人民”的胜利。


To be sure, it was a carefully controlled election: all candidates who might actually have challenged Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s authority were disqualified in advance.	平心而论，这是一场精心控制的选举：所有可能在事实上挑战最高领袖哈梅内伊权威的候选人都被剔除了。


But, within those limits, the government allowed the people’s votes to be counted.	但是，在如此这般限制之内，政府仍允许人民用选票说话。


Next door, in Turkey, the West’s favorite Islamic democrat, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was using bulldozers, tear gas, water cannon, and rubber bullets to clear central Istanbul’s Taksim Square and Gezi Park of peaceful protesters who would not bend to his will.	在隔壁的土耳其——西方最喜欢的伊斯兰民主国家——总理埃尔多安使用推土机、催泪弹、水炮和橡皮子弹清理伊斯坦布尔市中心的塔克西姆广场（Taksim Square）和盖兹公园（Gezi Park）上不向他的意志低头的和平示威群众。


Erdoğan’s theory of government seems to be that, because he was elected by a majority of Turks who still support him, anyone who opposes him is a terrorist or a pawn of sinister foreign forces.	埃尔多安的政府理论是这样的：因为他是仍然支持他的大多数土耳其人选出来的，所以任何反对他的人不是恐怖分子，就是邪恶外国势力的走狗。


He appears to see no room for legitimate opposition, for the idea that today’s majority can be tomorrow’s minority and that the rules of the game must allow both to be heard.	他不能接受合法的反对，也不能接受今天的多数可能是明天的少数、游戏规则必须让多数和少数都能发声的思想。


Four years ago, when hundreds of thousands of young Iranians flooded the streets of Tehran to protest outgoing President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s reelection, the Iranian government shot at them with live rounds.	四年前，几十万年轻伊朗人涌向德黑兰街头反对内贾德连任总统，伊朗政府朝他们开了枪。


The protests were brutally repressed, with participants rounded up, imprisoned, and reportedly raped and tortured, damaging the regime’s standing not only among Iranians, but also among the millions of young Arabs across the Middle East and North Africa who would soon rise up to demand their social and political rights.	示威遭到了残酷镇压，参与者被逮捕、入狱并且据说遭到了强暴和虐待，不但让伊朗政权在国内斯文扫地，也让千百万中东和北非阿拉伯青年感到失望，很快他们就奋起要求自己的社会和政治权利。


Erdoğan was initially a hero to those same crowds.	同样是对于这群人，埃尔多安曾经是个英雄。


He toured Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya in September 2011 and received a hero’s welcome.	2011年9月，他出访埃及、突尼斯和利比亚，受到了英雄般的欢迎。


He presented his Justice and Development Party as the Muslim equivalent of Europe’s Christian Democratic parties, combining economic growth, anti-corruption policies, and free elections.	他把他的正义和发展党（Justice and Development Party）发展成了穆斯林世界的欧洲基督民主（Christian Democratic）党，将经济增长、反腐���政策和自由选举相结合。


Today, Erdoğan’s government looks much more like the governments against which young Arabs rose, targeting journalists and accusing a “high-interest-rate lobby” of speculators of seeking to harm the Turkish economy.	如今，埃尔多安政府与阿拉伯青年奋起反抗的政府已经别无二致，它针对记者，指责投机者“高利率游说团”妄图伤害土耳其经济。


He has also taken a page from Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s book, not only demonizing the demonstrators, but also going after the medical personnel who care for them and the hoteliers who shelter them.	他还援引叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德的书中的某页，不但把示威者妖魔化，也不放过为他们提供治疗和住宿的医务人员和旅馆经营者。


Turkey is certainly not Iran, and vice versa.	土耳其当然不是伊朗，反之亦然。


But comparing current developments in the two countries yields lessons that resonate across the Middle East and North Africa.	但比较两国的最新形势所得出的教训放之整个中东和北非地区而皆准。


Most important, in a world that at least pays lip service to democracy, the voice of “the people” matters.	最重要的是，在这个至少名义上大谈民主的世界，“人民”的声音至关重要。


It confers a kind of legitimacy that simply cannot be acquired by force and that is ultimately the surest guarantee of investment and growth.	它能授予某种绝不可能通过暴力获得的、能充当投资和增长最有力保障的合法性。


Of course, “the people” are never truly one: fickle in their loyalties and subject to demagoguery, they often unite in opposition but fracture once in command.	当然，“人民”从来不是单一的：他们的忠诚时刻变化着，他们极易受到煽动，他们经常因反对而集结，因禁制令而解散。


Nonetheless, the willingness of large numbers of people to stand up (or sit in) for their right to be heard, despite the imminent possibility of violent repression, announces to their fellow citizens and the world that something has gone very wrong.	尽管如此，大批人民仍愿意站起来（或静坐着）争取发声的权利，即使暴力镇压随时可能出现也在所不惜，这不啻于向同志和全世界宣告有些东西大错特错了。


Khamenei and his fellow guardians of Iran’s Islamic revolution were able to weather the 2009 storm, but their façade of legitimate power was collapsing.	哈梅内伊及其伊朗伊斯兰革命捍卫者同志能安然度过2009年政治风暴，但他们的合法权力外衣已开始剥落。


Somewhat paradoxically, the election of Rowhani will strengthen their political hand.	饶有矛盾意味的是，鲁哈尼的当选将强化他们的政治手腕。


And, though Erdoğan may well be able to force the protest genie back into the bottle, he will be significantly weakened until the next Turkish election.	而尽管埃尔多安极有可能迫使示威的幽灵回到瓶中，他的权力将在下一次大选前大大削弱。


A second lesson of recent events in Iran and Turkey is that the spectrum of government in the Middle East and North Africa runs from autocracy and theocracy to varieties of managed democracy.	伊朗和土耳其近几年局势的第二个教训是，中东和北非的各国政府脱离了独裁和神权，涌向各种有管理的民主。


No country qualifies as a full liberal democracy – that is, as a political system that combines free and fair elections with constitutional protections of individual rights for all its citizens.	没有一个国家够资格称得上完全的自由民主，即结合了自由公平的选举和宪法对全体公民个人权利的保护的政治制度。


Iran has long qualified as what the American foreign-policy analyst Fareed Zakaria has called an “illiberal democracy.”	长期以来，伊朗一直可称为美国外交政策分析家扎卡利亚（Fareed Zakaria）所谓的“不自由的民主”。


Turkey, for its part, seemed to be on a path toward true liberal democracy, notwithstanding the criticism of those who pointed to Erdoğan’s jailing of journalists and generals; it is now backsliding for all the world to see.	至于土耳其，它似乎走曾在通往自由民主的路上，尽管很多人指责埃尔多安逮捕记者和将军； 而如今，全世界都看到它在开倒车。


A final lesson is that the test of a secure government is whether it can bear to hear itself criticized, even excoriated.	最后一个教训是，对安全政府的考验是它是否能批评，甚至是尖锐的批评。


Erdoğan seems outraged, above all, by Turkish citizens’ temerity to speak up against him.	尤其是埃尔多安，他似乎因为人民对他的冒失批评而大发雷霆。


After Erdoğan appeared to broker a deal with the protesters regarding the fate of Gezi Park, the planned demolition of which sparked the initial demonstrations, one of my Twitter followers expressed his satisfaction at the outcome and said the demonstrators should now go home, because “three weeks is enough.”	在埃尔多安摆出姿态，要与关心盖兹公园命运的示威者达成妥协后（最初导致游行爆发的乃是盖兹公园的拆迁计划），我的一位Twitter粉丝表示对结果很满意，并说示威者现在应该回家了，因为“三个星期已经够了。


But enough for what?	”但够什么了？


Recall that the Occupy Wall Street protesters in 2011 took over lower Manhattan for two full months.	别忘了，2011年爆发于曼哈顿的的“占领华尔街”运动维持了整整两个月。


New York City officials ultimately did shut down the protest, but largely for health and sanitary reasons and related complaints by neighborhood residents.	纽约市官最终取缔了示威，但主要是为了健康和卫生以及周边社区居民的相关投诉考虑。


At a press conference on the day the protests began, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg said: “People have a right to protest, and if they want to protest, we’ll be happy to make sure they have locations to do it.”	在示威开始日的新闻发布会上，纽约市张布隆伯格说：“人民有示威的自由，如果他们想示威，我们会很高兴地确保他们有地方这样做。 ”


Meanwhile, in Syria, “the people” rose up, were fired upon, took up arms, were manipulated, and began a cycle of sectarian killing and revenge that can only fracture them further.	与此同时，在叙利亚，“人民”奋起示威了，被开枪镇压了，拿起武器了，被操纵了，然后开始了伤害日深的宗派杀戮和报复循环。


Neither Iran nor Turkey has reached that point.	伊朗和土耳其都没有走到这一步。


Nonetheless, peaceful protest, lawsuits, political negotiation, compromise, and ultimately fresh elections would provide both countries – and many others in the region and beyond – a far better way to resolve their internal tensions than the approaches their leaders currently employ.	尽管如此，和平示威、诉讼、政治谈判、妥协以及最后举行新大选能让土伊两国——以及该地区内外的其他许多国家——获得远远优于两国领导人当前所采取的化解内部紧张的办法。


Iran v. Britain: Who Blinked?	伊朗和英国谁示弱了？


While commentators have charged that Britain capitulated to Iran and handed them a humiliating victory in obtaining the release of the 15 British Marines last week, it would appear that something more like the opposite is actually the case.	当评论家们批评英国向伊朗屈服，在上周释放15名英国水兵的问题上让其赢得一场羞辱性胜利的时候，真正的情况似乎却恰恰相反。


But to understand why this is so, we have to look at the larger picture of internal Iranian politics against which the crisis played out.	要理解为什么会是这样，我们应该从危机发展的伊朗国内政局大背景说起。


Our Iranian problem is actually a problem with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, or in Persian Pasdaran) and allied institutions like the Basij militia.	伊朗真正的问题在于伊斯兰革命卫队（IRGC，伊斯兰语中称为Pasdaran）和巴斯基民兵。


These are the “power” agencies that serve as the political base for the conservatives inside Iran.	这些“强力”机构是伊朗国内保守派的政治基础。


In return for its support, political leaders like ex-president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have allowed the IRGC to grow into a semi-autonomous state-within-a-state.	作为对其支持的回报，像前总统拉夫桑贾尼和最高领袖哈梅内伊允许伊斯兰革命卫队壮大为一个半自治的国中之国。


Today it is a large and sprawling enterprise, that controls its own intelligence agency, manufacturing base, and import-export companies, much like the Russian FSB or the Chinese military.	今天它是一个庞大并且涉足广泛的单位，控制其自身的情报部门、制造业和进出口公司，很像俄罗斯的克格勃和中国的军队。


Since coming to power, the current Ahmedinejad regime has awarded IRGC-affiliated companies billions in no-bid contracts, increasing the already great perception among the Iranian public of its corruption.	自登台以来，现总统内贾德送给伊斯兰革命卫队的下属公司几十亿的未经过招标的合同，使得在伊朗国民眼中本已盛行的腐败变得更加猖獗。


It is widely believed that Supreme Leader Khamenei put the current nutcase president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad into office as a means of counterbalancing former president Rafsanjani, and has been regretting this decision ever since as Ahmedinejad spouted off about the Holocaust and pushed Iran deeper and deeper into isolation.	大家普遍认为最高领袖哈梅内伊之所以让狂人内贾德走上现在的总统宝座是为了制约前总统拉夫桑贾尼，但是自从内贾德在犹太人大屠杀的问题上大放大放厥词，并且把伊朗越来越推向孤立的深渊，他开始后悔自己的决定了。


The current president comes out of the IRGC (specifically, the Ramazan Unit of the Quds Force), and has used that organization and the Basij to help consolidate his power by moving against more liberal political opponents.	现任总统出身于伊斯兰革命卫队（确切地说，是圣城旅的拉马赞分队），并且依靠该组织和巴斯基民兵的帮助通过打击自由派政治对手来巩固他的权力。


No one knows exactly why the naval wing of the IRGC took the 15 British Marines captive at the end of March.	没有人能确切地知道为什么伊斯兰革命卫队的海军会在三月底抓走15名英国水兵。


Some have speculated that it was a matter of freelancing by the IRGC’s command, or the navy, reacting to a local target of opportunity.	有些人猜测这是伊斯兰革命卫队指挥官或者海军面对一个局部的机会而自作主张。


The IRGC may have wanted some bargaining chips to help spring of its members captured in Iraq.	伊斯兰革命卫队可能需要有一些谈判的筹码来换取释放其被关押在伊拉克的成员。


It does not seem to be an accident, though, that the capture came quickly after the Security Council passed a very specific set of sanctions against Iran that targeted not just IRGC-affiliated companies and financial institutions like the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group and the Bank Sepah, organizations dealing with nuclear or ballistic missile activities, but also a series of senior IRGC commanders, including Morteza Rezaei, the Guards’ deputy commander, Vice Admiral Ali Ahmadian, chief of the Joint Staff, and Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi, commander of the Basij.	但是它看上去并不像是一起突发事件，因为抓捕正好发生在安理会刚刚通过一项针对伊朗的制裁措施之后。 这些制裁措施针对性非常强，不仅制裁了伊斯兰革命卫队的子公司和金融机构，比如弹药和冶金工业集团，塞帕银行，从事核或弹道导弹活动的机构，还制裁了一系列伊斯兰革命卫队的高级指挥官，包括革命卫队副司令Morteza Rezaei、参谋长Ali Ahmadian中将和巴斯基民兵司令Mohammad Hejazi准将。


By freezing Iranian assets outside of Iran, the UN was hitting the IRGC where it hurt, in its pocketbook.	通过冻结伊朗国外的资产，联合国这次真正击到了伊朗钱袋子的痛处。


Clearly, whoever was responsible for the decision to take the British Marines prisoner was hoping to rekindle some of the fervor of the 1979 revolution, and use that to force the rest of the leadership into a confrontation with Britain and America.	显然，不管是谁作出了抓捕英国水兵的决定，他都是希望借此重新燃起像1979年革命那样的热情，并由此来迫使其他领导人来与英国和美国进行对抗。


Hence the televised “confessions” that hearkened back to the taking of hostages in the American Embassy (the “nest of spies”), and the rallies against foreign embassies.	于是电视上出现了英国水兵“悔罪”的镜头，叫嚣要到美国大使馆（“间谍窝”）抓人质，以及外国大使馆门前群众集会的场景。