But there is a greater and more immediate danger: Even if Spain and Italy are fundamentally sound, there may not be two years to find out.	但这里还有一个更巨大也更迫在眉睫的危险。 即便西班牙和意大利在根本上都是可靠的，但已经没有两年时间给它们证明自己了。


The level of Greek interest rates shows that markets believe that Greece will default very soon.	目前的希腊利率水平显示市场相信该国会很快发生违约。


And even before that default occurs, interest rates on Spanish or Italian debt could rise sharply, putting these countries on a financially impossible path.	而即便是在违约发生之前，市场向西班牙和意大利贷款的利率都可能大幅上升，使两国走上一条金融上的不归路。


The eurozone’s politicians may learn the hard way that trying to fool markets is a dangerous strategy.	而欧元区的政治家们会得到一个痛彻心扉的教训：愚弄市场，可是一个危险的策略。


Europe’s Historic Gamble	欧洲：下注无悔


BERKELEY – The last few weeks have been the most amazing – and important – period of the euro’s 11-year existence.	伯克利——最近几周是欧元问世11年来最刺激也最重要的一段日子。


First came the Greek crisis, followed by the Greek bailout.	先是希腊危机和救助。


When the crisis spread to Portugal and Spain, there was the $1 trillion rescue.	当危机蔓延到葡萄牙与西班牙，又出台了1万亿美元的救助计划。


Finally, there were unprecedented purchases of Spanish, Portuguese, Greek, and Irish bonds by the European Central Bank.	最后，欧洲央行史无前例地购买西班牙、葡萄牙、希腊和爱尔兰的债券。


All of this was unimaginable a month ago.	在1个月以前还显得不可思议的事情，居然全都发生了。


Europe’s fortnight mirabilis was also marked by amazing – and erroneous – predictions.	种种惊人然而错误的预言也令这两周更加波诡云谲。


Greece would be booted out of the monetary union.	什么希腊会被踢出欧元同盟咯；


The eurozone would be divided into a Northern European union and a Southern European union.	什么欧元区会分裂成一南一北两个同盟咯；


Or the euro – and even the European Union – would disintegrate as Germany turned its back on the project.	更有甚者，说如果德国不支持救助方案，欧元乃至欧盟都会解体云云。


But, rather than folding their cards, European leaders doubled down.	然而，欧盟各国领导人没有选择亮牌，而是加倍下注。


They understand that their gamble will be immensely costly if it proves wrong.	他们明白，如果押错了宝，这个赌局的代价会十分巨大。


They understand that their political careers now ride on their massive bet.	他们明白，各自的政治生命都押在这上头了。


But they also understand that they already have too many chips in the pot to fold.	他们也明白，既然已经下了注，也就不能反悔了。


Those forecasting the demise of the euro were wrong because they misunderstood the politics.	那些预言欧元崩溃的人之所以会错，是因为不懂政治。


The euro is the symbol of the European project.	欧元是欧洲一体化的象征。


Jacques Delors, one of its architects, once called the single currency “the jewel in Europe’s crown.”	欧元的缔造者之一，欧盟委员会前主席雅克·德洛尔（Jacques Delors）曾把单一货币誉为“欧洲王冠上的宝石”。


Abandoning it would be tantamount to declaring the entire European integration project a failure.	放弃欧元就等于宣布，整个欧洲一体化方案以失败告终。


It is true that Germans are incensed about bailing out Greece.	救助希腊的政治博弈固然惹恼了德国人。


It is true that Angela Merkel is the first postwar German chancellor not to have lived through World War II.	安格拉·默克尔固然是二战后第一位战后出生的德国总理。


But her views and actions are shaped by the society in which she lives, which in turn is shaped by that history.	但她的见解和行为方式受制于她所处的那个社会，而那个社会的心态又受制于二战那段历史。


And what is true of Merkel is still true of Europe.	对默克尔适用的情况仍然对整个欧洲适用。


This is why European leaders swallowed hard and took their unprecedented steps.	这就是为什么，欧盟各国领导人会咬着牙迈出史无前例的一步。


But, having doubled their bet, Europeans now must make their monetary union work. Europe has excellent bank notes.	可是，既然已经加倍下注，欧洲人就必须让他们的货币同盟正常运作。


It has an excellent central bank. But it lacks the other elements of a proper monetary union.	欧洲有很棒的钞票，也有很棒的央行，但它缺少一个货币同盟所需要的其他一些要素。


It needs to establish them – and fast – which requires finally addressing matters that have been off-limits in the past.	它需要创造那些要素，而且得快，这就必须触动那些向来视为禁忌的话题。


First, Europe needs a Stability Pact with teeth.	首先，欧洲需要一个有实际约束力的《稳定与增长公约》。


This will now happen, because Germany will insist on it.	这一点有望实现，因为德国会坚持到底。


As the European Commission has proposed, the strengthened pact will have tighter deficit limits for heavily indebted countries. Exceptions and exemptions will be removed.	正如欧洲委员会所提议的，加强后的《公约》将为高负债国家设定更严格的赤字上限，而且取消一切例外和豁免。


Governments will be required to let the Commission vet their budgetary plans in advance.	各成员国政府得让欧盟委员会事先监督它们的预算编制过程。


Second, Europe needs more flexible labor markets.	其次，欧洲的劳动力市场得变得更加灵活。


Adjustment in the United States’ monetary union occurs partly through labor mobility.	当年美国之所以能统一到美元旗下，一部分原因是劳动力的灵活流动。


This will never apply to Europe to a similar degree, given cultural and linguistic barriers.	鉴于欧洲的文化和语言壁垒，欧洲的劳动力市场流动性不太可能达到像美国这样的程度。


Instead, Europe will have to rely on wage flexibility to enhance the competitiveness of its depressed regions.	那么，欧洲就应该转而依赖工资的灵活性，以增进其落后地区的竞争力。


This is not something that it possesses in abundance.	在这方面它做得也不够。


But recent cuts in public-sector pay in Spain and Greece are a reminder that Europe is, in fact, capable of wage flexibility.	然而近来西班牙和希腊削减公共部门工资的做法证明，欧洲实际上是可以提高工资灵活性的。


Where national wage-bargaining systems are the obstacle, the European Commission should say so, and countries should be required to change them.	如果哪个国家的工资议价集团从中作梗，欧盟委员会就应该发出明确的告诫，要求该国推动改革。


Third, the euro area needs fiscal co-insurance.	第三，欧元区需要财政互保。


It needs a mechanism for temporary transfers to countries that have put their public finances in order but are hit by adverse shocks.	对于那些已经完成财政整顿的国家，一旦它们受到副作用的冲击，应该有一个临时提供财政转移支付的机制。


To be clear, this is not an argument for Germany’s dreaded “transfer union” – ongoing transfers to countries like Greece.	需要澄清的是，这并不是说要建立一个“转移支付同盟”，像希腊那样的国家持续转移支付——德国人就怕这个。


It is an argument for temporary transfers to countries like Spain, which balanced its budgets prior to the crisis but then was hit by the housing slump and recession.	而是说，向那些在危机前预算平衡，却受到房地产崩盘和经济衰退冲击的国家，比如西班牙，提供临时转移支付。


It is an argument for fiscal insurance running in both directions.	而且，这种财政互保是双向的。


Fourth, the eurozone needs a proper emergency financing mechanism.	第四，欧元区需要建立一个紧急融资机制。


Emergencies should not be dealt with on an ad hoc basis by 27 finance ministers frantic to reach a solution before the Asian markets open.	紧急事态不应由现行的27国财长月度例会来处理，那个例会为了在亚洲市场开盘前达成决议，总是搞得神经兮兮。


And European leaders, in their desperation, should not coerce the European Central Bank into helping.	而欧盟各国领导人，也不应在陷入绝望的时候才强拉欧洲央行来帮忙。


There should be clear rules governing disbursement, who is in charge, and how much money is available.	应该有一个规定明确的出资机制，谁负责，提供多少钱等等都应明确下来。


It should not be necessary to obtain the agreement of 27 national parliaments each time action is needed.	每次需要行动的时候，也不必获得27国议会的一一批准。


Finally, Europe needs coherent bank regulation.	最后，欧洲需要协调一致的银行监管。


One reason the Greek crisis is so difficult is that European banks are undercapitalized, overleveraged, and stuffed full of Greek bonds, thereby ruling out the possibility of restructuring – and thus lightening – Greece’s debt load.	希腊危机之所以如此难以处理，原因之一就是，欧洲的许多银行都处于资本金不足、杠杆过高的状态，大把希腊债券烂在手里，所以债务重组的可能性就被排除了，因而加剧了希腊的债务压力。


That happened because European bank regulation is still characterized by a race to the bottom.	而这种局面的根源在于，欧洲的银行监管还是处于一场“放松监管竞赛”的状态中。


“Colleges” of regulators, the supposed solution, are inadequate.	作为一种可能解决方案的监管者委员会仍付阙如。


If Europe has a single market and a single currency, it needs a single bank regulator.	既然欧洲有一个单一市场和一个单一货币，它同业也需要一个单一的银行监管者。


This is a formidable – some would say unrealistically ambitious – agenda.	这个行动纲领令人望而生畏——有人会说根本不现实。


But it is the agenda Europe needs to complete to make its monetary union work.	但这恰恰是欧洲需要的纲领——如果它想让它的货币同盟正常运行的话。


Europe Should Dump Anti-Dumping	欧洲应该抛弃反倾销


Stockholm – Defending Europe’s economy against unfair international trade practices has long been a key element of the European Union’s external policies.	斯德哥尔摩——保护欧洲的经济不受不公平的国际贸易行为的损害长久以来已经成为欧盟外部政策的一个重要组成部分。


It is almost an instinct among some politicians and business leaders that if competition is deemed unfair, the European Commission should marshal new trade defenses.	在一些政治家和商业领袖中，如果竞争被认为是不公平的，那么欧盟委员会就应该召集使用新的保护贸易的措施，这几乎成为他们的一种本能反应。


But what are Europeans defending against, and what are “unfair” trade practices anyway?	但是，欧洲人防卫的是什么，并且究竟什么是“不公平的”贸易行为呢？


In the absence of international competition regulations to prevent predatory pricing and other anti-competitive activities, trade defenses are a second-best option.	在缺乏防止掠夺性价格和其他反竞争行为的国际竞争规则的情况下，保护贸易的措施是次优的选择。


By far the most widely used instrument are anti-dumping duties aimed at imposing some restraint on companies that behave in an anti-competitive way.	迄今为止，使用最广泛的工具是反倾销税，其目的是向以反竞争方式行为的公司施加一些限制措施。


But, by increasing tariffs, prices also rise, which often means a welfare loss for society as a whole.	但是，关税提高了，商品价格就会上涨，这通常意味着社会总体福利的一个损失。


This fact has long been ignored by firms seeking trade defence.	这个事实长久以来被寻求保护贸易的措施的公司所忽略。


What is new, however, is that the firms  themselves might not gain from trade defense.	但是，新情况是，这些公司 本身 可能不能从保护贸易的措施中获得好处。


The very word “defense” creates an image of a nation state that is commercially connected to the rest of the world only via traditional trade.	正是“防卫”这个词给一个国家创造了这样一个形象：这个国家和世界上其他国家的商业联系仅仅是通过传统贸易进行的。


For such a state, all imports would truly be foreign goods, and its trade defenses would consequently be directed only against foreign interests.	对于这样一个国家，所有的进口货物都真正的是外国货物，因而它的保护贸易的措施仅仅针对的是外国的利益。


But this is not true in today’s globalized world.	但是在当今的全球化世界里，这并不正确。


Although we still have traditional trade, we also have foreign direct investment, offshoring, and outsourcing.	虽然我们仍然有传统贸易，但是也有外国直接投资，境外生产和业务外包。


We have global supply lines in which goods are developed in one country, manufactured in another, and assembled in a third.	我们拥有全球供应链，在这个链条中，商品在一个国家研发，在另一个国家生产，在第三个国家组装。


Capital and know-how flows across borders, so traditional bilateral trade flows have been replaced by a complex web of international commercial relations.	资本和技术秘密在不同的国家之间流动，因此传统的双边贸易流动已经被一个复杂的国际商业关系网络所取代。


This has major implications for trade defense.	这对保护贸易的措施影响很大。


If your mobile phone was assembled in India, but developed and designed in Finland, is it an Indian or a Finnish product?	如果你的移动电话是在印度组装的，但是是在芬兰研发和设计的，那么它是一个印度产品还是是一个芬兰产品呢？


When European corporations outsource labor-intensive manufacturing to low-cost countries but keep the rest of the production process in Europe, they greatly complicate matters for anyone trying to evaluate the economics of trade defense.	当欧洲的公司将劳动密集型的制造业务外包到成本低的国家，但是将其他的生产过程留在欧洲的时候，对任何试图评价贸易保护措施的经济学的人来说，情况就变得非常复杂了。


To aim an anti-dumping measure against an Asian manufacturer may inflict most of the damage on a European producer.	针对一个亚洲制造商的反倾销措施所造成的损失，可能绝大部分由一个欧洲生产商来承担。


That happened in the October 2006 anti-dumping action against leather shoes, when the EU decided to impose anti-dumping tariffs against China and Vietnam.	在2006年，当欧盟决定对在中国和越南生产的皮鞋征收反倾销税时，就发生了这样的事情。


Sweden’s National Board of Trade conducted a case study of five European shoe producers in different countries and market segments to establish where the value added in their production processes was created.	瑞典国家贸易协会对在不同国家和不同细分市场的五个欧洲制鞋厂商进行了一个案例研究，以确定在它们的生产过程中附加值是在哪里创造出来的。


Although manufactured in China and Vietnam, shoes were designed, developed, and marketed in Europe.	虽然是在中国和越南制造的，但是这些鞋子是在欧洲设计，开发和销售的。


These largely intangible production processes before and after the physical manufacturing sometimes constituted 80% of the value added.	有时候，在真正制造以前和以后的大量无形的生产过程构成了附加值的80%。


In other words, shoes from China were 80% European!	也就是说，来自中国的鞋子有80%是欧洲的！


For less expensive shoes, with lower sums invested in the intangible parts of the production process, this figure was not as high, but still more than 50%.	对于不是那么贵的鞋子，由于投入到生产过程中无形的部分的资金比较少，这个数字不是那么高，但是仍然超过了50%。


The anti-dumping measures imposed by the EU therefore hit European companies in an unintentional way.	因此，欧盟实行的反倾销措施在无意之中打击了欧洲公司。


Sectors with a higher human capital content – electronic consumer goods, for example – have much higher R&D costs than the shoe sector, so manufacturing these goods on an assembly line in a low-cost country is probably not very costly in comparison to R&D and other intangible costs.	人力成本较高的产业——例如电子消费产品——比制鞋业拥有更高的研发成本，因此，与研发和其他无形的成本相比，将这些产品在一个低成本国家的装配线上生产可能不是非常昂贵。


For more advanced goods, the EU value added (if the intangible part of the production process is in Europe) is quite high.	对于更先进的产品，欧盟附加值（如果生产过程中的无形部分是在欧洲）非常高。


Imposing trade defense against such goods, even if legally warranted, is likely to create problems for globalized European companies.	实行贸易保护措施抵制这样的产品，即使是合法的，也有可能给全球化的欧洲公司带来问题。


Many say that these problems are the price to be paid for ensuring that companies do not engage in anti-competitive behavior, or receive trade-distorting subsidies.	许多人说这些问题都是为了确保公司不从事反竞争行为或者接受扭曲贸易的补贴付出的代价。


But, even if the measures worked as supposed, the majority of trade defense measures are probably not directed against anti-competitive business practices.	但是，即使这些措施像预想的那样有效，大部分保护贸易的措施也有可能不是用来针对反竞争的商业行为的。


More often it is the politics of protectionism that are the crucial factor behind trade defenses.	更多的时候，在保护贸易的措施的背后，保护主义的政治学是至关重要的因素。


Anti-dumping measures are frequently used against products that are simply so cheap that they pose a threat to European producers, even though that is no more than fair competition.	反倾销措施经常用来针对这样的商品，它们非常便宜，因此对欧洲的生产商构成了威胁，即使这只是公平竞争。


This raises a fundamental criticism Europe’s trade defense mechanisms.	这引发了对欧洲贸易保护机制的一个根本性的批评。


International trade is by definition a competition between companies on an uneven playing field.	根据定义，国际贸易是不同的公司在一个不平坦的运动场上的竞争。


Some companies have easier access to capital, whereas their competitors cannot get access to finance at reasonable interest rates.	有些公司比较容易取得资金，然而它们的竞争对手却不能以合理的利率取得资金。


Some have excellent infrastructure at their disposal, while their international competitors may have to contend with constant power cuts.	有些公司拥有任其使用的良好的基础设施，然而它们的国际竞争对���却可能不得不对付经常性的断电。


Some must pay excessive taxes, while others operate out of tax havens.	有些公司支付超额税费，然而有些却在避税天堂里经营。


Some find it easy to recruit top-notch engineers, whereas for others enjoy an abundance of cheap labor.	有些公司发现很容易招聘到顶尖的工程师，然而有些却只有丰富的廉价劳动力。


To create a completely level playing field in trade is impossible.	在贸易中，创造一个完全平坦的运动场是不可能的。


Yet many politicians and business leaders are keen to focus on the differences they don’t like and would like to see “leveled.”	然而，许多政治家和商业领袖热切地关注着他们不喜欢的不同，并且想要看到不同的“消除”。


In reality, what they don’t like is competition itself, and they fight it by deploying an instrument that can inflict even greater damage on themselves.	事实上，他们不喜欢的是竞争本身，并且他们通过设置一个可能给他们造成更大损失的工具来和它作斗争。


Europe Should Step Up By Standing Down	欧洲应该以退为进


LONDON – Ten years on, the euro is a resounding success.	伦敦—十年以来，欧元是一个巨大的成功。


A financial-market heavyweight, it now outperforms the dollar, the yen, and, until recently, the mighty Chinese yuan, while euro-denominated bond trading rivals the US market in size.	作为金融市场上的一支重量级货币，它的表现超过了美元、日元，直到最近也一直在强大的人民币之上，同时以欧元计数的债券交易与美国市场相当。


But Europe should be doing better.	但欧洲应该做得更好。


It should act with greater imagination to unleash more genuine economic freedom and competition, stop championing national enterprises, and start giving the European Central Bank more support.	它应该采取更富想象力的举措，以释放更多真正的经济自由度和竞争，停止扶持国家企业，并开始给予欧洲央行更多的支持。


Euro-zone policymakers should also seize the initiative in the world’s key economic clubs.	欧元区的政策制定者们也应该在世界关键性的经济俱乐部中发挥更大的作用。


In particular, members of Europe’s economic and monetary union should give up their seats in the G-7 and the International Monetary Fund.	特别是欧洲经济与货币联盟的成员国更应该放弃它们在G-7和国际货币基金组织的席位。


There may be some justification for each EMU state to be represented in the G-8, but not in the main economic organizations.	欧洲货币联盟的每一个成员国都在G-8现身或许还讲得通，但在主要的经济组织中却不然。


If they volunteered to act collectively at these forums, Europe would free up much-needed space for other important countries at the top table of world economic discussions, which would foster greater respect for global policymakers.	如果它们自愿在这些论坛中统一行动，那么欧洲就能在最高级别的国际经济讨论中为其他重要的国家腾出必要的空间，而此举将会赢得全球政策制定者们的更多尊敬。


Internally, euro-zone “success” can best be measured by the yardstick of economic growth.	从内部而言，衡量欧元区的“成功”的最佳指标是经济增长。


Many commentators cite the wide disparities between euro-zone members’ growth rates as a sign of failure.	许多评论家援引欧元区各成员国之间经济增长率参差不齐的现象作为失败的佐证。


But many other single-currency areas, including the US, display similar divergence.	但在许多包括美国在内的其它的单一货币区，也显现出同样的分野现象。


It should also be obvious that, in the absence of currency markets to act as a “valve” for economic and financial pressures, economic volatility may increase.	同样明显的是在没有货币市场作为宣泄经济和金融压力的“阀门”的情况下，经济的不稳定性可能增加。


In fact, euro-zone leaders should be less worried about variations in internal growth than about clear evidence of overall economic underperformance.	实际上，欧元区的领导人们不应该过分关注内部增长的差异而应该更重视整体经济表现欠佳的明显信号。


While growth has been reasonably stable since EMU started, per capita GDP – probably the best measure of economic success available – shows that Europe has lagged other regions, even when the figures are adjusted for workforce size.	尽管自欧洲货币联盟启动以来经济增长较为平稳，但人均GDP—可能是衡量经济成功的最佳指标—却显示欧洲落于其他地区，即便是统计数据由于劳动力规模的原因进行了调整之后依然如此。


It is also well known that European productivity is falling behind, too, probably due to the same factors that make Europe seem dull, cautious, and lacking in ambition when compared with many of its competitors.	欧洲生产力正在掉队也是众所周知，可能正是同样的原因造成了欧洲在和其它对手相比之下的沉闷、谨慎和缺乏雄心。


When it comes to internal competition policies, most European countries still think within the national “box.”	在内部竞争的问题上，大多数欧洲国家仍然保持着国家“条框”内的思维方式。


For the euro to help lift European growth and productivity in any significant way, governments must allow – indeed, encourage – stronger competitive forces across the EMU area.	为了能让欧元在提升欧洲经济增长和生产力方面发挥应有作用，各国政府必须允许—甚而鼓励—整个欧洲货币联盟区域内更为积极的竞争。


In terms of external economic policy, European policymakers have done very little in response to the wholesale changes now underway in the world economy – beyond complaining about Chinese imports and Russia’s aggressive use of its commodities, and, most recently, becoming embarrassingly obsessed with so-called Sovereign Wealth Funds.	在对外经济政策方面，欧洲的政策制定者们在应对世界经济中正在发生的全局性变化上几乎无所作为—除了抱怨中国的进口商品和俄罗斯进攻性的使用其商品以及最近令人难堪地沉迷于所谓主权财富基金。


This is a poor showing for countries that successfully confronted the challenges of creating the EU and monetary union.	作为成功应对了创立欧盟和货币联盟的挑战的各国而言，这样的表现实在差劲。


After all the diplomacy and effort that these epoch-making events required, European policymakers should be able to tackle reform of the IMF, the World Bank, the G-7, and the G-8.	在这些划时代的事件所必需的外交斡旋及努力之后，欧洲的政策制定者们应该能够应对IMF、世界银行、G-7和G-8的改革。


Yet all of these institutions still reflect the post-World War II status quo, which serves little purpose in today’s world.	然而所有这些机构都仍然反映着二战以后的情况，这对当今的世界几乎没有多大意义。


For example, why is there an international economic organization such as the G-7 without China, which is poised to overtake Germany as the world’s third largest economy and since 2000 has contributed almost as much to global economic activity as the entire euro zone?	例如，为什么要有一个像G-7这样的，不包括中国在内的国际经济组织呢？ 中国在2000年就摆出了架势要取代德国成为世界第三大经济体，而它对全球经济活动的贡献几乎与欧元区相当。


Most global economic issues today cannot be solved without policy steps in China.	没有中国的切实政策步骤，当今大多数的全球经济问题都几乎无法解决。


Indeed, how can the G-7 have the audacity to make repeated public comments about the currency of an outside country and hope for a positive response?	的确，G-7怎么能够大言不惭地对其体系外的一个国家的货币一次次妄加评论并期望得到积极的回应呢？


It is almost farcical.	这几乎就是一场闹剧。


Meanwhile, France, Germany, and Italy are all in the G-7, even though they share the same monetary policy and currency.	同时，法国、德国和意大利尽管有着共同的货币政策和货币，也都是G-7的成员。


It would be better if the ECB and the EU finance ministers adopted a common position ahead of G-7 meetings, then allowed their joint view to be represented by a single Council representative and the ECB’s president.	如果欧洲央行和欧盟的财政部长们能够在G-7会议之前达成一个共同的立场，并允许由一个共同的会议代表和欧洲央行总裁来阐述他们的统一观点，那么情况会好得多。


Because ministers meet before each G-7 meeting, this would be an easy procedure to introduce.	由于部长们在每次G-7会议前都要碰头，所以这项程序应该很容易引入。


Indeed, a “financial G-6” may today make more sense than the current G-7, but that may no longer hold true tomorrow.	的确，今天一个“金融G-6”可能比现在的G-7更有意义，但这种情形可能明天就不复存在。


In another 10 years, India may be in the top echelon of economic powers.	再过十年，印度可能进���第一层次的经济强国之列。


Or Britain might have joined the euro, making its independent role redundant.	抑或英国也可能加入了欧元区，从而使其独立的角色变成多余。


Can Canada keep its place while Russia and Brazil are excluded?	在俄罗斯和巴西仍被排除在外的情况下，加拿大还保得住自己的位置么？


And what other economic giants are waiting in the wings?	还有哪些蓄势待发的经济强国？


Clearly, therefore, we need to devise a system of membership for key international organizations that ensures that their structures are relevant but that is also flexible enough to allow members to come and go.	诚然，我们需要为重要的国际组织建立一种成员制度从而确保它们的架构是合适的，并确保有足够的灵活性允许成员更替。


One way forward would be to establish numerical guidelines – along the lines of the Maastricht Treaty – for conferring G-7 membership.	改革的方式应该是建立一种量化的指南—在马斯特利赫特条约的框架内—来授予G-7的成员资格。


Europe should lead by example – offering the world the benefit of its deep experience of financial diplomacy and volunteering to take the first steps forward.	欧洲应该显示出模范的领导力—让世界从其在金融外交方面的深厚经验中获益，并愿意迈出前进的第一步。


Given that Europe managed to construct EMU, the Maastricht Treaty, and the stability and growth pact that underlines the euro, it should be relatively easy for euro-zone experts to help devise a system for judging G-7 type membership.	鉴于欧洲已经成功地缔造了欧洲货币联盟、《马斯特利赫特条约》和《稳定与增长协定》，建立一个确定G-7式成员资格的体系对于欧元区的专家们来说应该相对容易。


Unless European countries take the initiative on global financial institutional reform, it will remain a lost cause.	除非欧洲国家在全球金融制度改革方面发挥积极作用，这项改革将不会成功。


Europe’s Immigration Challenge	欧洲的移民挑战


LONDON – Europe faces an immigration predicament.	伦敦—欧洲面临着移民困境。


Mainstream politicians, held hostage by xenophobic parties, adopt anti-immigrant rhetoric to win over fearful publics, while the foreign-born are increasingly marginalized in schools, cities, and at the workplace.	主流政客囿于“恐外症”党派的要挟，不得不用反移民口号来取悦忧心忡忡的公众，而外国出生的公民则在学校、城市和工作单位日益受到边缘化。


Yet, despite high unemployment across much of the continent, too many employers lack the workers they need.	然而，尽管欧洲大陆很多国家面临着高失业，大量雇主却找不到他们所需要的员工。


Engineers, doctors, and nurses are in short supply; so, too, are farmhands and health aides.	工程师、医生和护士均存在供给不足，农场工人和健康护理师也是如此。


And Europe can never have enough entrepreneurs, whose ideas drive economies and create jobs.	欧洲的企业家也总是处于不足的状态，而他们的新思想正是驱动经济和创造就业的动力。


The prevailing skepticism about immigration is not wholly unfounded.	流行的质疑移民的观点并不是一无是处。


Many communities are genuinely polarized, which makes Europeans understandably anxious.	许多社区确实被极化了，无怪乎欧洲人会对此忧心不已。


But to place the blame for this on immigrants is wrong, and exacerbates the problem.	但把这一现象归咎于移民并不正确，只能让问题扩大化。


We are all at fault.	我们所有人都有责任。


By not taking responsibility, we allowed immigration to become the scapegoat for a host of other, unrelated problems.	我们没有承担起责任来，这使得移民成了一系列与他们不相关问题的替罪羊。


The enduring insecurity caused by the global economic crisis, Europe’s existential political debates, and the rise of emerging powers is too often expressed in reactions against migrants.	全球经济危机、关乎欧洲存亡的政治争论以及新兴势力的崛起所造成的持久的不安全感总是被说成是移民的结果。


Not only is this unjust, but it distracts us from crafting solutions to the real problems.	这样说不仅不公正，还会分散我们的注意力——我们原本应该专注于构想解决真正问题的办法的。


European countries must finally and honestly acknowledge that, like the United States, Canada, and Australia, they are lands of immigrants.	欧洲各国最终必须如实承认，与美国、加拿大和澳大利亚一样，它们也是移民国家。


The percentage of foreign-born residents in several European countries – including Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, and Greece – is similar to that in the US.	在不少欧洲国家（包括西班牙、英国、德国、荷兰和希腊），外国出生居民比重与美国不相上下。


Yet, despite this, we do not make the necessary investments to integrate newcomers into our schools and workplaces.	但尽管如此，我们仍然没有投入足够的投资让新来者融入到我们的学校和工作单位中去。


Nor have we done enough to reshape our public institutions to be inclusive and responsive to our diverse societies.	我们也没有改革我们的公共机构，让它们变得更包容、更能响应多元化社会。


The issue is not how many new immigrants are accepted into the European Union, but acknowledging the nature and composition of the societies in which we already live.	问题不在于多少新移民被欧盟接受，而在于承认我们生活在其中的社会的性质和组成。


It is ironic – and dangerous – that Europe’s anti-immigrant sentiment is peaking just when global structural changes are fundamentally shifting migration flows.	这既讽刺，又危险——欧洲的反移民情绪在全球结构性变迁为移民流带来基础性变化的当口达到了最高峰。


The most important transformation is the emergence of new poles of attraction.	最重要的转变是新吸引力极（poles of attraction）的出现。


Entrepreneurs, migrants with Ph.Ds, and those simply with a desire to improve their lives are flocking to places like Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, Mexico, China, and India.	企业家、拥有博士学位的移民以及纯粹为了改善生活的移民正在涌向巴西、南非、印尼、墨西哥、中国和印度。


In the coming decade, most of the growth in migration will take place in the global south.	在未来十年中，移民增长的大头将出现在南方。


The West is no longer the Promised Land, placing at risk Europe’s ability to compete globally.	西方不再是迦南乐土，欧洲的全球竞争力也将因此蒙上一层阴影。


The aging of Europe’s population is historically unprecedented.	欧洲人口老龄化是历史上从来不曾出现过的现象。


The number of workers will decline precipitously, and could shrink by almost one-third by mid-century, with immense consequences for Europe’s social model, the vitality of its cities, its ability to innovate and compete, and for relations among generations as the old become heavily reliant on the young.	工作人口数量将出现大幅下降，到本世纪中叶将减少近三分之一，这将对欧洲的社会模式、城市的存亡、创新和竞争力以及（随着老人越来越依赖年轻人）代际关系产生巨大的影响。


And, while history suggests that countries that welcome newcomers’ energy and vibrancy compete best internationally, Europe is taking the opposite tack by tightening its borders.	历史表明，欢迎新公民能量和活力的国家最能获得最强的国际竞争力，但欧洲却在反其道而行之——收紧边境线。


But all is not lost.	但欧洲并不是不可救药。


Europe got itself into this situation through a combination of inaction and short-sighted policymaking.	欧洲之所以落得如此田地，是拜不作为和短视决策的综合作用所赐。


This leaves considerable room for improvement.	这意味着欧洲有很大的改善空间。


In fact, there are rays of hope in certain corners of Europe.	事实上，某些欧洲国家已经出现了希望之光。


Consider Sweden, which has transformed its immigration policy by allowing employers to identify the immigrant workers whom they need (the policy has built-in safeguards to give preference to Swedish and EU citizens).	比如瑞典。 瑞典已经修改了移民政策，允许雇主为所需要的移民员工争取身份（该政策包括一项保护措施，优先对待瑞典人和欧盟公民）。


In more rational times, these reforms would be the envy of Europe, especially given the relative resilience of Sweden’s economy.	在理性时期，这类改革会让欧洲钦羡不已，特别是考虑到瑞典经济在欧洲本来就属于韧性较强的。


They certainly have caught the attention of Australia and Canada, which aim to emulate them.	这些政策显然已经引起了澳大利亚和加拿大的注意，它们准备模仿瑞典的做法。


There have also been innovations in integrating immigrants.	在融合移民方面也有不少创新。


Some initiatives, albeit modest, encourage those with immigrant backgrounds to apply for public-sector jobs in police forces, fire departments, media, and elsewhere.	不少方案（尽管力度不大）鼓励有移民背景者申请警察、消防队、媒体和其他公共部门的职位。


Such measures also respond to the urgent need for public institutions that look like the populations they serve.	这些措施也对公共机构的迫切需要有所响应，这些机构与它们所服务的人群看上去颇为相似。


There are many other tools to advance integration.	还有很多工具可以用来增进融合。


We understand well the importance of early childhood education, and what kinds of programs can bridge the gap between immigrant and native children. We know as well the importance of finding a job in the integration process.	我们都清楚早期儿童教育的重要性，知道什么样的教育计划可以填补移民儿童和土著儿童之间的差异。


We know how to recognize immigrants’ skills better, and how to provide the right kind of vocational training. We know how to ward off discrimination in hiring.	我们也明白融合过程中找到工作的重要性，知道怎样更好地识别移民的技能，知道怎样为他们提供正确的语言培训，知道怎样克服招聘中的歧视。


But, while we know what to do, we now need to muster the political will to do it.	但是，尽管我们知道如何做，但如今还需要更多的政治意愿来实行。


The good news is that, if we get integration right, we will be far more likely to bring publics along on more open immigration policies.	好消息是，如果我们可以处理好融合问题，就有很大机会���动公众支持更加开放的移民政策。


Equally important is international cooperation on migration.	同样重要的是移民的国际合作问题。


Last year, during the Arab revolutions, the EU missed a historic opportunity to begin weaving together the two sides of the Mediterranean.	去年阿拉伯革命期间，欧盟坐失一次团结地中海两岸的良机。


It failed to open its doors to young students, entrepreneurs, and other North Africans.	欧洲没有向年轻学生、企业家和其他北非人敞开大门。


Today, the EU is making a more serious effort to engage its southern neighborhood.	如今，欧盟正在付出更大的努力包容南面的邻居。


Among the potential opportunities are free-trade agreements, an easing of visa requirements for university students, temporary work programs, and incentives to attract entrepreneurs.	潜在机会包括自由贸易协定、放松大学留学生的签证要求、临时性务工项目以及吸引企业家的激励。


No country is an island when it comes to migration, and none can address it alone.	在移民问题上，没有哪个国家可以独善其身，也没有哪个国家可以单枪匹马解决问题。


We have a long way to go, probably in a climate that will not turn favorable to immigration for many years.	我们还有很长的路要走，国际环境也可能在未来多年内不利于移民。


How much progress we can make will hinge on our ability to break through the myths about migration.	我们能够取得多少进步取决于我们是否有能够打破关于移民的流言。


Migration is changing in fundamental ways, and we must continue to push ourselves to devise systems and approaches that respond to new realities.	移民正在发生根本性转变，我们必须鞭策自己设计出适应新现实的制度和方法。


If we succeed, human mobility can become one of the great assets of the twenty-first century. 	如果能够成功，人力流动将成为21世纪的优良资产。


Europe’s Inevitable Haircut	欧洲债务减记不可避免


BERKELEY – What once could be dismissed as simply a Greek crisis, or simply a Greek and Irish crisis, is now clearly a eurozone crisis.	伯克利——“那只不过是希腊危机”，“那只不过是希腊和爱尔兰的危机”，人们曾经那样以为，可是现在不行了，因为那显然已经是一场欧元区的危机。


Resolving that crisis is both easier and more difficult than is commonly supposed.	要对付它，比通常料想的既更容易，又更困难。


The economics is really quite simple.	这场危机的经济学道理相当简单。


Greece has a budget problem.	希腊的财政有问题。


Ireland has a banking problem.	爱尔兰的银行业有问题。


Portugal has a private-debt problem.	葡萄牙的私债市场有问题。


Spain has a combination of all three.	西班牙在上述三方面都有问题。


But, while the specifics differ, the implications are the same: all must now endure excruciatingly painful spending cuts.	尽管细节各异，结论是一样的：这几个国家都得经受痛苦的削减开支的过程。


The standard way to buffer the effects of austerity is to marry domestic cuts to devaluation of the currency.	要抵消紧缩政策的副作用，通常的办法是把国内减支和本币贬值结合起来。


Devaluation renders exports more competitive, thus substituting external demand for the domestic demand that is being compressed.	贬值会增强出口竞争力，也就是拿外需来补内需。


But, since none of these countries has a national currency to devalue, they must substitute internal devaluation for external devaluation.	但是，这几个国家都是欧元区国家，它们没有独立的本币可以贬值，所以它们只能用内部贬值来代替外部贬值。


They have to cut wages, pensions, and other costs in order to achieve the same gain in competitiveness needed to substitute external demand for internal demand.	它们必须削减工资、退休金和其他成本，以增加出口竞争力，达到扩大外需的效果。


The crisis countries have, in fact, shown remarkable resolve in implementing painful cuts.	其实，这几个危机国家勒紧裤腰带的决心是不小的。


But one economic variable has not adjusted with the others: public and private debt.	但是有一个经济变量并没有随着其他变量的调整而改变，那就是公私部门的债务。


The value of inherited government debts remains intact, and, aside from a handful of obligations to so-called junior creditors, bank debts also remain untouched.	政府累积债务的账面价值并未改变，银行债务——除了欠普通债权人（junior creditors）的一些债务以外，也基本没变。


This simple fact creates a fundamental contradiction for the internal devaluation strategy: the more that countries reduce wages and costs, the heavier their inherited debt loads become.	就是这个简单的事实使内部贬值策略陷入自相矛盾的境地：越是削减工资和其他成本，累积债务的负担就相对越重。


And, as debt burdens become heavier, public spending must be cut further and taxes increased to service the government’s debt and that of its wards, like the banks.	债务负担越重，就越是得削减公共开支、增加税收，才能应付政府及其拱卫者（譬如银行）的债务。


This, in turn, creates the need for more internal devaluation, further heightening the debt burden, and so on, in a vicious spiral downward into depression.	这反过来要求更多的内部贬值，进一步推高债务负担，如此恶性循环，把经济拖入萧条的泥潭。


So, if internal devaluation is to work, the value of debts, where they already represent a heavy burden, must be reduced.	所以，要令内部贬值策略见效，必须想办法降低债务面值。


Government debt must be restructured.	政府债必须进行重组。


Bank debts have to be converted into equity and, where banks are insolvent, written off.	银行债必须搞债转股，银行资不抵债时则应注销。


Mortgage debts, too, must be written down.	按揭债也必须减记。


Policymakers are understandably reluctant to go down this road.	政策制定者不愿意走这条路，这是可以理解的。


Contracts are sacrosanct.	契约神圣。


Governments fear that they will lose credibility with financial markets.	政府担心失信于金融市场。


Where their obligations are held by foreigners, and by foreign banks in particular, writing them down may only destabilize other countries.	如果债权人主要来自国外，尤其是外国银行，减记只会连累其他国家。


These are reasonable objections, but they should not be allowed to lead to unreasonable conclusions.	这些顾虑不能说没有道理，但是不应由此得出不合理的结论。


The alternatives on offer are internal and external devaluation.	出路只有两条：内部贬值或外部贬值。


European leaders must choose which one it will be.	欧洲国家的首脑们必须二选其一。


They are united in ruling out external devaluation.	他们一致排除了外部贬值的路子。


But internal devaluation requires debt restructuring.	但内部贬值必然要求债务重组。


To deny this is both unreasonable and illogical.	否认这一点，既没道理，也不合逻辑。


The mechanics of debt restructuring are straightforward.	债务重组的操作简单明了。


Governments can offer a menu of new bonds worth some fraction of the value of their existing obligations.	政府可以发行一批债权，其面值在现有债务面值上按一定比例打折。


Bondholders can be given a choice between par bonds with a face value equal to their existing bonds but a longer maturity and lower interest rate, and discount bonds with a shorter maturity and higher interest rate but a face value that is a fraction of existing bonds’ face value.	债券持有人可以选择，要么坚持按面值兑换手中债券，但到期时间较晚，利率较低； 要么接受面值低于现有债券的打折债券，但到期时间较早，利率也高。


This is not rocket science. It has been done before.	这不是什么尖端科技，以前就有人搞过。


But there are three prerequisites for success.	但要搞成功，有三个前提。


First, bondholders will need to be reassured that their new bonds are secure.	第一，要向债券持有人保证新债券的安全。


Someone has to guarantee that they are adequately collateralized.	得有人出来为这批债券担保。


When Latin American debt was restructured in the 1980’s under the Brady Plan, these “sweeteners” were provided by the United States Treasury.	20世纪80年代，根据布雷迪计划实施拉美债务重组时，扮演“担保大哥”的是美国财政部。


This time around, the International Monetary Fund and the German government should fill that role.	如今，国际货币基金和德国政府可以担起这个责任来。


Second, countries must move together.	第二，各国必须一致行动。


Otherwise, one country’s restructuring will heighten expectations that others will follow, giving rise to contagion.	否则，一个国家的重组会提高对其他国家的预期，引起传导现象。


Finally, banks that take losses as a result of these restructurings will need to have their balance sheets reinforced.	最后，由债务重组而遭受亏损的银行，其资产负债表必须得到巩固。


The banks need real stress tests, not the official confidence game carried out earlier this year.	这些银行需要经受真正的压力测试，而不是今年早些时候搞的那种官样文章。


Where realistic debt-restructuring scenarios indicate capital shortfalls, across-the-board conversion of bank debt into equity will be necessary.	如果债务重组预示着资本金不足，就得对有关银行���务进行全盘的债转股。


And where this does not suffice, banks will need immediate capital injections by their governments.	如果这还不够，就必须由政府出面对有关银行注入资本。


Again, making this work requires European countries to move together.	这一条同样需要各国一致行动。


And, with banks’ balance sheets having been strengthened, it will be possible to restructure mortgage debts, bank debts, and other private-sector debts without destabilizing financial systems.	一旦银行的资产负债表巩固了，就有可能重组按揭债、银行债和其他私人部门债务而不至于动摇整个金融系统。


Now we get to the hard part.	现在来说说最大的难点。


All of this requires leadership.	所有这一切都需要坚决的领导。


German leaders must acknowledge that their country’s banks are dangerously exposed to the debts of the eurozone periphery.	德国的领导人们必须承认，该国银行在欧元区边缘国家债务上的风险敞口很大，情况危急。


They must convince their constituents that using public money to provide sweeteners for debt restructuring and to recapitalize the banks is essential to the internal devaluation strategy that they insist their neighbors follow.	他们必须让后台老板和选民们相信，动用公共资金为债务重组和银行再注资提供担保是内部贬值策略的必要条件； 既然德国敦促其他欧盟国家采取这种策略，它就应该义不容辞地肩负担保的责任。


In short, Europe’s leaders – and German leaders above all – must make the case that the alternative is too dire to contemplate.	一句话，欧洲的领导人，尤其是德国的领导人得把后果说得更严重一点——不这样做就会大难临头。


Because it is.	因为事实就是如此。


Europe’s Interest in Closing Guantánamo	关闭关塔那摩监狱背后的欧洲利益


BRUSSELS – For years, the European Union has called loudly for the closure of the Guantánamo Bay detention center. Now that US President Barack Obama has taken the decision to do so, the EU stands ready to provide political and practical support to the United States to help achieve that goal.	发自布鲁塞尔——多年以来，欧盟一直高调呼吁要关闭关塔那摩监狱，而今美国总统奥巴马也已下定决心照此办理，对此欧盟则准备好了向美国提供政治和现实上的支持，以确保美方能顺利达到这项目标。


We share President Obama’s assessment that “Guantánamo became a symbol that helped Al Qaeda recruit terrorists to its cause.	对于奥巴马对关塔那摩监狱的评估结论，我们也深有同感，奥巴马指出“关塔那摩监狱已经变成了基地组织借以招募恐怖分子的一个象征。


Indeed, the existence of Guantánamo likely created more terrorists around the world than it ever detained.”	而事实上，关塔那摩监狱的存在似乎制造了比关押在内的囚犯数目更多的恐怖分子。


We in the EU believe that it is our common interest with the US to prevent radicalization and recruitment to terrorism throughout the world.	”欧盟对此也相信，我们在防止宗教极端主义和打击恐怖分子招募活动方面的利益，和美国是一致的。


The primary responsibility for closing Guantánamo and re-settling detainees lies with the US. But Europeans want to help the US turn the page.	虽然关闭关塔那摩监狱并重新安置其囚犯的首要责任在美国人身上，但欧洲人也希望能从旁给予协助。


That is why EU member states have already received their own nationals and former residents from Guantánamo.	这也解释了下面一些行为：几个欧盟成员国重新接收了那些关押在关塔那摩监狱的本国公民和居留者；


That is why France recently received an Algerian ex-detainee.	法国最近接收一个曾经入狱的阿尔及利亚籍囚犯；


And that is why several other EU countries are now considering receiving ex-detainees cleared for release, but who, for compelling reasons, cannot return to their countries of origin.	而另外几个欧盟成员国正考虑接收那些被排除了恐怖嫌疑，却因为某些不可抗因素而难以回到其所属国的囚犯。


We in the EU expect the US to do likewise; if it is safe to release these people in Europe, it is safe to do so in the US.	至此欧盟人希望美国也能采取同样的行动：如果在欧洲释放这些囚犯是安全的，那么在美国应该也一样。


More generally, we agree with Obama that “in the long run we...cannot keep...safe unless we enlist the power of our most fundamental values,” and that “we uphold our most cherished values not only because doing so is right, but because it strengthens [us] and keeps us safe.”	在更大意义上，我们赞同奥巴马关于“在长远来说我们将……难以维护……自己的安全，除非我们能从自身最基本的价值观上汲取力量，”而“我们秉承这些最珍视的价值观的原因，并不仅仅是因为这样做是对的，而是由于它能令我们更强大，并维护我们的安全。


The experience of European democracies confronted with a long-term terrorist threat shows that human rights and the rule of law are our strongest assets. That is why terrorists want to destroy them.	”在这方面，欧洲民主国家与恐怖主义威胁长期斗争的经验告诉我们，人权和法治这两项价值观是我们最有力的武器，同时也是恐怖分子殚精竭虑要破坏的东西。


The closure of Guantánamo must be accompanied by a fundamental review of the underlying policies that gave rise to its existence.	而关闭关塔那摩监狱的行动则要跟彻底的调查相结合，来检讨当年监狱借以设立的相关基本政策。


Obama’s decisions to ban “enhanced interrogation” and end secret detention are important steps in the right direction.	对此奥巴马禁止“刑讯逼供”和秘密关押行为的决定则是在正确方向上迈出的重要一步。


But more steps are needed.	但我们依然需要取得更多的改进。


In particular, indefinite detention without trial needs to be addressed to avoid the recurrence of problems.	尤其是在缺乏法庭审讯的情况下就胡乱拘留的问题需要得到解决，以防其死灰复燃。


Therefore, the review of detention, trial, transfer, and interrogation policies is of utmost importance.	因此对拘留、审判、押解和审讯等一系列政策的检讨也是异常重要的。


There must be no gaps in protection, whatever law is applicable.	因为只要有法律的地方，对个人权利的保护就不应该有空白。


The EU will take up the Obama administration’s invitation to share its views with his Detention Policy Task Force on international law principles relevant to the fight against terrorism.	而欧盟将与奥巴马政府共同携手，与总统成立的拘留政策专责小组在与反恐相关的国际法原则上进一步交换意见。


We hope the US will change its “war on terror” paradigm and re-think its conception of a global armed conflict against Al Qaeda.	我们希望美国能改变那些所谓“反恐战争”的武断论调并重新思考其在全球范围内与基地组织发生冲突的行为理念。


No EU member has taken such an approach.	但至今没有一个欧盟成员国采取相关的措施。


There is an obvious difference between persons engaged in an armed conflict, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, and terrorist suspects arrested outside of armed conflict.	与此同时，对于那些在阿富汗或者伊拉克作战中被捕的人员和在战斗之外被捕的恐怖分子，两者是应该区别对待的。


A case-by-case approach is therefore necessary.	因此一个针对不同个案分别处理的运作方式也是必需的。


We welcome the fact that the first former Guantánamo detainee is facing criminal charges in New York.	对于首次有前关塔那摩监狱囚犯在纽约受审的事实我们也表示欢迎。


The perpetrators of the Madrid and London bombings were prosecuted in ordinary criminal trials.	涉嫌发动马德里和伦敦爆炸案的嫌疑人在纽约普通刑事法庭上被起诉。


One plotter in the attack of September 11, 2001, appeared before ordinary courts in Germany.	还有一个策划“9·11”事件的嫌疑人则被送上德国普通法庭的被告席。


In many EU member states, criminal law has been strengthened and is being used to prevent attacks.	许多欧盟成员国的刑法被加强并用以防止恐怖袭击。


Membership of a terrorist organization, including those operating on foreign soil, training and recruiting people for terrorism, and promotion of terrorism have been made criminal offenses.	而那些恐怖组织成员，包括在别国境内活动，招募��怖分子或者推动恐怖主义行动的人都会被判有罪。


The fight against international terrorism raises important legal questions.	而与国际恐怖主义的斗争也催生了一系列重要的法律问题。


We are looking forward to continuing our productive dialogue with the US State Department Legal Adviser.	我们希望能和美国国务院的法律顾问继续展开建设性的谈话和交流。


The threat from Al Qaeda is global. The EU and US must work together to make Europe and America safe.	基地组织的威胁是全球性的，而欧盟和美国将共同致力于维护欧洲和美国的安全。


By closing Guantánamo and addressing the underlying policy issues, the US is creating a much stronger foundation for close EU-US cooperation in counter-terrorism and the fight against international crime, one based on the rule of law and human rights.	通过关闭关塔那摩监狱和处理某些基本政策事务，美国正在为美欧双方在反恐以及打击跨国犯罪方面的更紧密合作建立一个建立在人权和法治之上的，更加强大的基础。


Together, the EU and the US will be in a better position jointly to promote justice, human rights and freedom around the world.	而美欧双方也将联合在全球推广正义、人权和自由方面夺取更有利的形势。


This has been and remains the most sustainable way of preventing radicalization and recruitment to terrorism.	这才是防止极端主义和打击恐怖分子招募活动的行之有效并可持续采用的方法。


Closing Guantánamo is not a gesture to win applause from Europeans. It is a necessary revision of policy that will make the US, Europe, and the world safer.	由此可见，关闭关塔那摩监狱并不是为赢得欧洲人赞誉而故意做出的一种姿态，而是为了维护美国、欧洲和全世界安全所必需的政策修正。


Europe’s Last Best Chance	欧洲的最后良机


STANFORD – The resignations of Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi have highlighted how Greece, Italy, and many other countries obscured for too long their bloated public sectors’ long-standing problems with unsustainable social-welfare benefits.	发自斯坦福——希腊总理帕潘德里欧和意大利总理贝卢斯科尼的双双辞职凸显出希腊，意大利以及其他许多国家所面临的问题：面对其臃肿公共部门中长期存在的不可持续社会福利补贴，他们是如何久拖不决，乃至酿成苦果的。


Indeed, for many of these countries, meaningful reform has now become unavoidable.	事实上对许多这样的国家来说，重大改革已经无从逃避了。


The social-insurance systems in Europe, as in the United States, Japan, and elsewhere, were designed under vastly different economic and demographic circumstances – more rapid economic growth, rising populations, and lower life expectancy – from those prevailing today.	跟美国，日本以及其他国家一样，欧洲的社会保险体系是依据与当今形势截然不同的经济和人口状况（更快的经济增长，不断增加的人口和更低的期望寿命）设计的。


Governments (the focus is on Greece and Italy at the moment, but they are not alone) have promised too much, to too many, for too long.	各国政府（虽然目前焦点都集中在希腊和意大利身上，但它们并不是孤例）对过多的人许下了过多也过久的承诺。


My 1986 book Too Many Promises pointed to the same problem with America’s social-welfare system.	对此笔者在1986年出版的《过多承诺》一书也指出了美国社会福利系统存在的类似问题。


This fundamental problem has now manifested itself in these countries’ unsustainable debt dynamics.	这些根本性问题如今在这些国家无以为继的债务循环上暴露无疑。


Euro membership, which temporarily enabled massive borrowing at low interest rates, merely aggravated it.	欧元区成员的身份虽然在短期内允许其大量低息借债，但其实是加速了这一问题的恶化。


Reforming social-welfare benefits is the only permanent solution to Europe’s crisis.	因此改革整个社会福利系统才是解决欧洲危机的唯一长期对策。


One hopes that, with the help of national governments, the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Financial Stability Facility, the holes in the sovereign-debt-funding dike will be temporarily plugged, and that European banks will be recapitalized.	有人希望在别国政府、欧洲央行，国际货币基金组织和欧洲金融稳定基金的帮助下，主权债务融资的漏洞能够暂时被堵住，而欧洲的银行也能进行资产重组。


But this will work only if structural reforms make these economies far more competitive.	但这些工作只有在这些经济体实施改革并变得更有竞争力之后才可以进行。


They must both lower the tax burden and reduce bloated transfer payments.	它们必须同时减轻税负并削减数量庞大的转移支付。


Too many people are collecting benefits relative to those working and paying taxes.	因为相对于那些工作并缴税的人来说，有太多人在领取补贴了。


Meanwhile, the bond market’s concern over fiscal deficits and debt dynamics is driving these countries’ borrowing costs higher.	与此同时，债券市场对财政赤字和债务循环的关注也使得这些国家的借债成本不断上升。


Short-term and long-term policies are therefore closely related; unless temporary stopgaps are combined with fundamental long-term structural reform, another disaster like the current one – or worse – will become inevitable.	短期和长期的政策也因此紧密地联系了起来； 除非临时应急措施能与根本性的长期结构改革相结合，另一个与目前类似（甚至更加恶劣的）灾难将在劫难逃。


There are three fundamental factors that determine the evolution of a country’s sovereign debt: its rate of economic growth; its borrowing costs; and its primary budget position (the budget balance net of interest payments).	有三个根本性问题因素将决定一国主权债务的发展状况：经济发展速率； 借债成本；


A country with a balanced primary budget collects enough revenue to pay its current expenses but not the interest on its outstanding debt.	以及该国的基本预算状况（除利息支付之外的预算平衡状况）。 一个基本预算平衡的国家将有足够的收入去支付其现有支出（其未偿还的债务支付利息除外）。


Higher interest rates, slower growth, and a weaker primary budget position all raise the debt-ratio trajectory.	更高的利率，更低速的增长和更脆弱的基本预算状况都会使得债务比率的曲线不断上升。


Italy is now paying 7% interest annually on its sovereign debt, while its economy is growing at only 1%.	例如意大利目前的经济年增长率只有1%，却必须为其主权债务支付7%的年利息。


Thus, Italy needs sustained, large primary surpluses, much faster growth, and/or far lower interest rates to avoid a debt restructuring.	于是意大利必须拥有可持续的，巨额的基本预算盈余，更加快速的增长，以及/或者远低于目前水平的借款利率来避免出现债务重组。


A credible path to sufficient primary surpluses would lower interest rates.	一个实现基本预算盈余的可靠路径将会降低利率。


In the long run, if primary surpluses are achieved by controlling spending, the increase in national saving will promote investment and growth, whereas higher tax rates would work in the opposite direction.	长远来说，如果基本预算盈余能通过控制政府支出来实现的话，那么国家储蓄的增加将推动投资和增长，而高税率则会使事情向相反方向发展。


Successful post-World War II fiscal consolidation in OECD countries averaged $5-$6 in spending cuts per $1 of tax hikes.	二战后在经济合作与发展组织国家中成功实施的财政巩固政策表明：每1美元的税务上升所带来的效应平均需要5~6美元的支出削减来抵消。


Some experts, such as former ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet, argue that fiscal consolidation would be expansionary.	一些专家（比如欧洲央行前主席让-克劳德·特里谢）则认为财政巩固政策可能是扩张性的。


Specifically, it would boost confidence, which would lower interest rates and offset any direct effect on demand, as occurred in Ireland and Denmark in the 1980’s.	简而言之，这种手段可以刺激信心，从而降低利率并抵消对需求造成的任何直接影响，正如爱尔兰和丹麦在1980年代的情况那样。


But that is less likely now, as many countries are undertaking fiscal consolidation simultaneously, non-sovereign interest rates are already low, and monetary union prevents the most troubled countries in the eurozone – Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain – from devaluing their way to competitiveness.	但如今这种情况不太可能发生，因为许多国家都同时在推行财政巩固政策，利率也已经很低，而货币联盟则不允许那些问题最严重的欧元区国家——葡萄牙、意大利、爱尔兰，希腊和爱尔兰——用货币贬值的方式来增强竞争力。


Substantial primary surpluses will be needed for many years in order to stabilize the debt ratio and gradually reduce it to the economic safety zone of less than 60% of GDP (Italy and Greece are over 100%).	为了稳定债务比率并将其逐渐降低到低于GDP60%的安全区域内（意希两国都超过100%），基本预算大量盈余的状况必须持续许多年。


A credible long-term program of reforms must be implemented now, while temporary emergency measures – bond purchases by the EFSF, IMF, and the ECB – provide breathing room.	在由欧洲金融稳定基金，国际货币基金组织和欧洲央行所提供的临时紧急措施带来喘息空间的同时，一个可靠的长期改革计划也必须同时启动。


If the primary surpluses are insufficient, temporary measures will only postpone the inevitable debt debacle.	因为如果基本预算盈余不足的话，临时措施就只不过是推出了必将到来的债务崩溃而已。


Even more fundamental arithmetic lies at the core of the debt quandary.	在债务困境的核心还有更多的基础演算要做。


The tax rate required to fund social-welfare benefits depends on three factors: the dependency ratio (the ratio of recipients to taxpayers); the replacement rate (the ratio of benefits to average wages); and the economic-growth rate (roughly, productivity plus population growth).	用以支付社会福利补贴的税率取决于三个因素：依赖比率（补贴享受者与纳税人之比）； 替代率（补贴与平均工资之比）；


In other words, the more generous and widespread the government benefits, the higher the required tax rate.	换句话说，政府的补贴越慷慨，覆盖范围越大，所需要的税率就越高。


This core problem will increasingly affect even the Northern European countries, notwithstanding their current appearance of economic strength and fiscal soundness.	这个核心问题甚至将逐渐影响到目前看似经济强劲且财政稳固的北欧国家。


In Europe’s highly taxed economies, better tax compliance or selective revenue measures can produce only a small amount of additional tax revenue without undermining growth.	在欧洲的高税负经济体中，更自觉的纳税行为或者选择性财政增收手段只能在不削弱增长的情况下获取少量的额外税收收入。


Spending cuts are the only way to improve the budget position significantly.	而支出削减则是大幅改善预算状况的唯一方法。


But that course will be difficult.	但这个过程将较为艰难。


In many European countries, the government pays benefits to a majority of the population.	在许多欧洲国家，领取政府补贴的人数竟占到了总人口的大部分。


A key question is whether incoming Greek Prime Minister Lucas Papademos and his new Italian counterpart, Mario Monti, both highly regarded economists, have the leadership skills to navigate these treacherous waters.	一个关键问题就是即将就任希腊总理的卢卡斯·帕帕季莫斯和他的意大利同行马里奥·蒙蒂——两人都是知名经济学家——是否拥有纵横这些危险海域所需的领导技巧。


Their examples will test whether other European democracies with heavily benefit-dependent populations can rein in the welfare state’s excesses.	他们的例子将检验其他高补贴欧洲国家是否能遏制住福利国家的过度支付行为。


It is not an impossible challenge.	这并不是一个不可能完成的任务。


Canada has staged a substantial retreat from the welfare state’s worst excesses, as center-left and center-right governments alike reduced the share of government spending as a proportion of GDP by eight percentage points in recent years.	例如加拿大就大幅减少了堪称福利国家中最恶劣的过度支付，因为无论是中左翼还是中右翼政府都努力在近年间将政府支出占GDP的比例减少了8%。


Several European countries are considering raising their remarkably low retirement ages, or have already done so.	已经有数个欧洲在考虑升高其过低的退休年限，其中一些已经付诸实行。


Given demographic trends, this may well be Europe’s last chance to build a firmer foundation for future prosperity.	考虑到人口发展的趋势，这将是欧洲为其未来繁荣打下坚实基础的最后机会。


Winston Churchill once famously said of America that you can count on it to do the right thing once it has exhausted all other alternatives.	丘吉尔有句关于美国的名言：只有在所有其他方案都被证明无效之后，你才可以确定美国人在做正确的事。


Let us hope that his dictum proves correct for Europe as well.	希望他的名言也可以在欧洲身上应验吧。


Europe’s Leisure Trap	欧洲的休闲陷阱


Black Friday in the United States traditionally is the day after Thanksgiving that signals the start of the holiday season sale.	在传统上，美国的黑色星期五是感恩节的第二天。 这一天标志着节日季节大减价的开始。


At daybreak, people line up before department stores to get the special “early bird” bargains.	天亮的时候，人们在百货公司前排起长队来抢购“先来先得”降价商品。


In Europe, black Saturday falls in the last weekend of July, when the French and other Europeans set off in droves for their Mediterranean holiday destinations, and highways get jammed with traffic.	在欧洲，黑色星期六是七月份的最后一个周末。 那时，法国和其他欧洲各国的人们成群结队地前往地中海假日目的地，高速公路上都在堵车。


This contrast could serve as a metaphor for the difference in lifestyles on either side of the Atlantic.	这一比较可以作为大西洋两岸生活方式区别的象征。


Americans work more hours per week and have less vacation time, but they have more money to spend.	美国人每周工作时间更长，休假时间更短，但是他们有更多的钱可以花。


Not only does a higher percentage of American adults work, but they also work more hours per week and more weeks per year.	不仅美国成年人工作的比例更高，而且他们也每周工作更长，每年工作更多的星期。


In 2004, the French worked 28% fewer hours per person than Americans, and the Germans and Dutch each put in 25% fewer hours, and the money they earned was correspondingly lower—almost 30% less income per person than Americans received.	2004年，法国人比美国人人均工作时间少28％，德国人和荷兰人少25％，而他们挣的钱也就相应比美国人少。 他们的人均收入几乎要比美国人低30％。


According to the MIT economist Olivier Blanchard, Europeans simply enjoy leisure more than Americans do, even if it means that they have less money.	麻省理工大学经济学家布兰查德认为，欧洲人比美国人更为享受休闲时光，即使这意味着他们收入更少。


In his view, this difference in attitude explains the income gap between Europe and the US.	根据他的观点，这一态度上的差异解释了欧洲和美国之间的收入差距。


But not everybody agrees with Blanchard.	但是并非所有人都同意布兰查德的观点。


Some economists point out that high tax rates in Europe make work less rewarding – and thus leisure more attractive.	有些经济学家指出，欧洲的高税率使得工作报酬降低而休闲则更为吸引人。


Other economists see Europe’s powerful labor unions as an important determinant in European attitudes towards work.	其他经济学家认为，欧洲强大的工会势力是欧洲人对待工作态度的一项重要决定因素。


After all, employees do not negotiate individually the length of the workweek.	毕竟，雇员们并不单个地谈判工作周的长度。


During past economic downturns, labor unions in Europe negotiated a reduced workweek or more vacation time with no reduction in wages.	在以往的经济衰退中，欧洲的工会谈判达成了缩短工作时间或者在不减薪的情况下更多的休假时间。


Moreover, Blanchard fails to note that the preference for leisure is not gender-neutral.	而且，布兰查德没有注意到喜爱休闲有性别差异。


The transatlantic difference in hours worked can be explained in part by comparing the labor input of European women to the input of American women.	大洋两岸工作时间的差异有一部分可以通过比较欧洲妇女和美国妇女的工作量来解释。


While American women work 36 hours per week on average, Dutch women put in only 24 hours per week, while German women work 30 hours.	美国妇女平均工作36个小时，荷兰是24个小时，而德国则为30小时。


French women with a job work on average 34 hours per week, but the percentage of women who work outside the home in France is almost 20% lower than in the US.	法国有工作的妇女每周平均工作34个小时，但是，法国离家工作的妇女的比例比美国要低几乎20％。


Are European females that much lazier than American females?	是否欧洲妇女比美国要懒惰呢？


The answer depends on whether one considers the time women in Europe spend on domestic work.	答案取决于人们是否考虑欧洲妇女花在家务上的时间。


The economists Ronald Schettkat and Richard Freeman have calculated that American women spend ten hours per week less on cooking, cleaning, and childcare than European women do.	经济学家切卡特和弗里曼估计，美国妇女花在烧饭、清洁和照看儿童上的时间要比欧洲妇女每周少10小时。


Instead of performing these household jobs themselves, Americans pay other people to do them.	美国人并不自己做这些家务，而是花钱让别人来做。


Americans eat more often in restaurants, make ample use of laundry, dry-cleaning, and shopping services, and hire nannies to take care of young infants.	美国更多地在餐馆就餐，大量使用洗衣房、干洗以及购物服务，并且雇佣奶妈来照看婴儿。


Indeed, in the US, one finds all kinds of personal services that do not exist on a similar scale in Europe.	确实，美国有各种各样的个人服务，欧洲就没有这样的规模。


A manicure, carwash, or a massage is often only a stone’s throw from one’s home.	修指甲、洗车或者按摩等服务经常近在咫尺。


Doorman buildings provide round-the-clock service to residents and dog-walkers look after pets during the workday.	有门童的大厦为住户提供全天候的服务，溜狗员在平日照看宠物。


In New York City, one can get help during the weekends to prepare meals for the coming week, with a culinary expert to advise you on the recipes, buy the groceries, and do part of the cooking.	在纽约，人们可以在周末得到帮助来准备下一周的饭菜，烹饪专家给你提供食谱的建议、购买食品杂货，还做一点饭。


In other words, American women work more hours and use the money they make to hire people to do the tasks that they can’t do because they’re working.	换句话说，美国妇女工作时间更长，因为她们上班，她们就用挣来的钱来雇人做那些她们做不了的事情。


By contrast, European women work less and have less money to spend on services.	相比较而言，欧洲妇女工作时间短，也就没有更多的钱用在服务上。


In their “free time,” European women are busy cleaning the house and looking after the children.	在她们的“自由时间”里，欧洲妇女忙于清扫房屋、照看孩子。


On balance, therefore, European and American women work about the same amount of hours.	因此平均而言，欧洲和美国妇女工作时间大体相当。


Meanwhile, more wealth is created in the US than in Europe.	目前，美国创造的财富比欧洲多。


After all, women professionals do not have to choose between a career and children, but can enjoy both.	毕竟，女性专业人士并非必需在事业和孩子们之间作出选择，而是可以兼顾。


By spending part of their extra income on household jobs and personal services, American women limit their workload while creating demand for service jobs that wouldn’t exist otherwise.	美国妇女把额外收入花在家务和个人服务上，美国妇女限制工作量，同时创造了服务性工作的需求，而这些工作在其他情形下就不会存在。


To put it inelegantly, two birds are killed with one stone.	直截了当地说，那就是一箭双雕。


In Europe, no birds get killed at all.	但是在欧洲，根本就没有雕可以射。


Highly educated European women who have children either stay at home or work part-time and get stuck in low-end jobs.	受过高等教育、有孩子的欧洲妇女要么留在家里，要么做兼职工作、陷于低水平的工作。


They take care of the household and children themselves.	她们自己料理家务和照看儿童。


Meanwhile, there are not enough service jobs in Europe to put everybody to work.	与此同时，欧洲没有足够的服务性工作可以让每个人都就业。


The social benefits paid to the out-of-work increase the tax burden on labor income, which in turn discourages women from full-time work.	失业的社会补助增加了劳动力收入的税负，反过来又阻碍了妇女从事全职工作。


The leisure trap thus keeps both the best educated and the least educated out of the workplace.	因此，这一休闲陷阱让教育程度最高的最低的人都失去了工作。


Europe’s Economic War of Attrition	欧洲的经济消耗战


NEWPORT BEACH – I was nine years old when Egypt entered what became known as its “war of attrition” with Israel.	纽波特海滩—我九岁的时候，埃及和以色列打了一场现在被称为“消耗战”的战争。


During this period of “no war and no peace,” underlying tensions festered, and a fragile tranquility was periodically interrupted by armed skirmishes.	在这段“非战非和”时期，基本冲突在不断恶化，脆弱的平静不断地被小规模武装冲突打断。


The war of attrition followed the June 1967 war, in which Egypt – to the immense surprise of most of its citizens and the outside world – was soundly defeated.	这场消耗战在1967年6月的战争后开始，埃及显然是战败的一方——乍一看，埃及人民和外部世界一定会对这一结果感到诧异。


Its air force was crippled and its army was virtually overrun, with Israel capturing the entire Sinai Peninsula.	其空军打残，其陆军也保守蹂躏，而以色列占领了整个西奈半岛。


Positioned on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, Israel’s army was just over 100 kilometers from Cairo.	部署在苏伊士运河东岸的以色列军队距离开罗只有100公里。


And, with Israeli jet fighters still controlling the airspace, Egypt’s capital and its major population centers were greatly exposed.	以色列战斗机控制着空域，埃及首都及其大部分人民暴露在以色列轰炸机下。


The official narrative reflected little of this.	官方说法对此几乎一字不提。


Whether on state television or in government-controlled newspapers – at the time, there was no free press, Internet, or cable news – citizens were reassured that Egypt had regained control of its destiny.	不管在国家电视台还是在政府控制的报纸上——那时候还没有言论自由、互联网和有线电视新闻——埃及人民看到的是埃及已夺回命运主动权的豪言壮语。


But they knew better.	但他们知道的远不止这些。


To this day, I remember vividly the sense of general anxiety that prevailed among citizens, accentuated by deep concern about what the future might hold.	我至今仍能清晰地记得埃及人民中间广泛弥漫这的忧虑，人们对未来会如何忧心忡忡。


People were afraid to invest, and many wondered whether they should emigrate in search of a better future.	人们不敢投资，很多人在考虑要不要为了更美好的未来而移民。


With the underlying issues left unaddressed, the war of attrition was followed by another full-scale war in 1973 – one that again surprised most people inside and outside Egypt.	基本问题还没有解决，消耗战便演变为1973年的全面战争——这场战争再一次震惊了埃及内外的大部分人。


This time, the Egyptian armed forces won a number of early battles and secured a cease-fire that regained part of the Sinai, setting the stage for the 1979 peace agreement with Israel.	这一回，埃及陆军赢得了早期一系列战役，并在停火时夺回了西奈半岛的部分领土，为1979年与以色列的和平协议创造了条件。


I recount this history not to draw a parallel with today’s Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which, just a couple of weeks ago, resulted in many civilian deaths, overwhelmingly in Gaza.	我叙述这些往事不是为了描绘今日巴以冲突图景——几周前，巴以冲突导致众多平民（绝大部分是加沙居民）丧生。


Rather, it is because I see too many parallels with what is happening in the European debt crisis.	我叙事这些往事是因为我认为它与欧洲债务危机的发展态势有着太多的相似之处。


European citizens – particularly in peripheral economies such as Greece, Portugal, and Spain – are anxious.	欧洲人民——特别是希腊、葡萄牙和西班牙等外围经济体的人民——十分焦虑。


Unemployment is unacceptably high, and is still rising.	失业率保持在不可接受的高水平，并在继续上升。


Their economies continue to implode, leading to cumulative contractions that are setting tragic new records.	经济继续萎靡，累积衰退已经创造了悲剧新纪录。


Poverty is on the rise.	贫困在抬头。


Not surprisingly, increased emigration to the stronger eurozone countries (such as Germany) has been accompanied by higher outflows of financial capital.	毫不奇怪，向坚挺欧元区国家（比如德国）的移民在增加，并伴随着金融资本的加速外流。


Admittedly, and fortunately, the parallels are far from perfect.	不可否认的幸事是，这只是相似，绝不是相同。


Europe does not have armed conflicts.	欧洲并不存在武装冲突。


Feelings of intense insecurity are not related to bombs and sirens.	深深的不安全感与炸弹和防空警报无关。


The threat is economic rather than military.	欧洲的威胁是经济上的，而不是军事上的。


Yet there is a real sense of “no peace and no war.”	但欧洲确实存在“非战非和”的感觉。


Europe’s economic peace remains elusive for a simple reason: governments have still not found a way to generate the trifecta of growth, employment, and financial stability.	欧洲的经济和平仍然晦暗不明，原因很简单：政府仍未找到增长、就业和金融稳定三管齐下的办法。


The longer this prevails, the more oxygen is sucked out of sectors that remain relatively healthy – and for three distinct reasons.	这一状况维持得越久，相对健康的部门失血就会越多，原因有三。


First, the eurozone economy is extremely interconnected.	首先，欧元区经济互相之间紧密相连。


As such, it is only a matter of time until weakness in one part migrates to other parts.	如此，疲软从其中一部分蔓延到其他部分只是时间问题。


Witness what is happening in Germany, a well-managed country once thought itself immune from the troubles around it.	以德国为例，该国治理良好，一度自认为不会受周边麻烦的影响。


After a period of record low unemployment, economic growth has slowed markedly, reaching just 0.2% in quarterly terms in July-September.	在经历了一段时间创纪录的低失业率之后，德国经济增长显著放缓，7—9月季度增长率只有0.


On current trends, the fourth quarter’s growth rate will turn negative.	2%。 若按现有趋势发展，第四季度增长率将为负数。


Second, the eurozone’s bailout bill continues to rise.	其次，欧元区援助规模在继续上升。


Cyprus is expected to join the other three “program countries” (Greece, Ireland, and Portugal) in requiring considerable official financing; and, of the other three, only Ireland is getting close to regaining normal access to capital markets.	预计塞浦路斯也将加入“计划国”（希腊、爱尔兰和葡萄牙）行列，要求大规模正式融资； 而在上述三国中，只有爱尔兰接近于重新正常进入资本市场。


With Spain also requiring billions more to recapitalize its banks, the contingent claims on taxpayers in the core countries continue to mount.	西班牙也在要求数十亿的新援助以重组其银行，核心国纳税人的或有债券在继续增加。


Indeed, this is one of the factors that contributed to Moody’s decision – following Standard & Poor’s – to strip France of its AAA credit rating.	事实上，这正是穆迪（步标准普尔之后）剥夺法国AAA信用评级的一大因素。


Finally, adverse contagion is extending beyond the 17 countries in the eurozone.	最后，传染病正在冲出欧元区17国范围之外。


The region’s debt crisis is undermining cooperation within the larger 27-member European Union, resulting in the spectacular failure of the recent summit on the EU budget.	欧元区债务危机正在破坏规模更大、拥有27个成员国的欧盟的合作，造成最近峰会上关于欧盟预算方案的大失败。


It has also contributed to the economic slowdown in China, raising concerns (which I believe are exaggerated) that the country’s new leadership may have problems engineering a soft landing for an economy accustomed to double-digit (or high single-digit) growth.	中国的经济放缓也受此影响，人们开始担心（我认为这有瞎操心之嫌）中国新领导人难以让这个习惯了两位数（或较大一位数）增长的国家实现软着陆。


This lack of peace would have resulted in outright economic and financial war if not for the critical – and growing – role played by the European Central Bank.	要不是欧洲央行所扮演的关键而分量日重的角色的话，和平的缺乏早已引发全面经济和金融战争了。


Under the bold leadership of Mario Draghi, the ECB has committed to provide as much time as possible for most governments to get their acts together.	在德拉吉的强力领导下，欧洲央行尽量提供时间让大部分政府能够共同行动。


And it has done so by relying on innovative measures that substitute its elastic balance sheet for those of over-extended governments, gun-shy private investors, and fleeing bank depositors.	欧洲央行之所以能如此，靠的是以其弹性资产负债表替代过度扩张的政府、风声鹤唳的私人投资者以及仓皇出逃的银行存款人的创新手段。


Yet it would be a grave mistake to assume that the ECB can deliver lasting economic peace.	但认为欧洲央行能够带来持续经济和平将是严重的错误。


It cannot.	它无法完成这一点。


If governments continue to dither and bicker, the most that it can do is delay the war for a while.	如果政府继续萎靡和争吵，欧洲央行行动充其量也只能延长些许时间。


Like Egypt’s war of attrition, the eurozone’s underlying economic, financial, and social ferment continues.	与埃及的消耗战一样，欧元区的基本经济、即溶和社会问题在不断发酵。


If governments continue to stumble from one patchwork remedy to another – a probability that remains uncomfortably high – the delay in implementing a comprehensive solution will eventually overwhelm the defenses that the ECB has so courageously put in place.	如果政府继续在一个又一个修补方案之间换来换去——这样的可能性相当高——全面解决方案的迟迟得不到实施将压倒欧洲央行所尽力争取的效果。


Some say that, just as Egypt’s war of attrition eventually gave way to a full-scale war and then a peace treaty, Europe needs a major crisis to move forward.	有人说，正如埃及消耗战最终演变为全面战争和和平条约，欧洲也需要一场大危机来推动其前进。


But this is a dangerous notion, one that entails not just massive risks, but also unacceptably high interim human costs.	但这是危险的想法，不仅包含巨大的风险，还隐含着不可接受的高昂过渡性人力成本。


European governments are well advised to use the financial cease-fire that the ECB is willing to buy for them.	欧洲各国政府都得到了很好的意见：利用欧洲央行所愿意为他们买来的金融停火。


Allowing it to expire without progress toward permanent stability would expose Europe to disruptions that would diminish significantly its prospects for long-term economic stability, growth and job creation.	坐视金融停火结束而无法向永久稳定方向取得进展将让欧洲面临灾难，极大地挫伤其长期经济稳定、增长和就业创造前景。


Europe’s Market-Led Integration	由市场推动的欧洲一体化


BERLIN – For two years now, one European summit after another has ended with assurances that – at long last – the necessary measures for containing the eurozone’s sovereign-debt crisis have been taken.	发自柏林——两年多以来欧洲已经接连召开了多个峰会，而且每一场在闭幕时都向外界保证遏制欧元区主权债务危机的必要手段“终于”得以推行。


Most were publicly portrayed as breakthroughs, though they were nothing of the sort.	大多数峰会都向外界自称为突破性进展，最终却名不副实。


As a rule, it took about three days before markets caught on and the crisis entered another round.	最后竟形成了一个定势：市场一般会在峰会闭幕后的三天后意识到这个骗局，而危机也会随之进入下一个循环。


Because Europe’s political leaders have failed to manage the crisis effectively, the cost of ending it has risen.	由于欧洲的政策制定者们无法有效应对这场危机，终结危机的花费也逐渐水涨船高。


Indeed, an easily manageable financial crisis in Greece was allowed to grow into a life-threatening emergency for the states on the southern periphery of the European Union – and for the European project as a whole.	事实上，一场本可以轻易处理的希腊财政危机竟然演化成影响欧盟南部各国生死的紧急事件——甚至动摇了整个欧洲一体化计划。


This was statecraft at its worst, for which most of the blame can be laid at German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s door.	其中体现了极为糟糕的治国方略，而大部分的责难都会指向德国总理默克尔。


Indeed, prior to the European summit in Brussels in December, the stock of trust in the European Council had become so depleted that no one seemed to take its decisions seriously.	其实在12月布鲁塞尔欧洲峰会之前，欧洲理事会的公信力已经沦落到了极为低下的地步，以至于根本没人会把他们的决策当回事。


Of course, it could be that the United Kingdom’s veto of the summit’s proposed changes to the EU’s Lisbon Treaty drowned out all else, while further increasing distrust on the part of the public and financial markets of a divided Europe.	当然，或许英国否决峰会里斯本条约修订案的行为压倒了对其他议题的关注，而在欧洲内部意见不合的情况下，公众舆论和金融市场中的不信任也逐渐增加。


But talk about an EU split is nonsense.	但讨论欧盟的分裂是愚蠢的。


No British prime minister could consent to a treaty change to create a fiscal union without having to call a referendum at home, the outcome of which would force the UK to withdraw from the EU. And no EU leader in his or her right mind could have any interest in that.	没有一个英国首相能在不经过国内公投的情况下批准一项旨在建立财政联盟的条约修订——因为这场公投的后果甚至可能导致英国退出欧盟，同时也没有一个头脑清醒的欧洲领导人会有兴趣去干这件事。


The UK has every interest in ending the crisis and preserving a strong euro, just as Europeans on the continent need the British inside the EU.	英国能从终结危机和维护欧元监听方面获取大量好处，反过来欧洲大陆也需要英国留在联盟内部。


So it has been clear for months that a legally binding basis for moving toward a European fiscal union, while indispensible, could only take place outside the framework of the Lisbon Treaty, namely on an intergovernmental basis and as an EU-17 or EU-17+, as has just happened.	但这几个月来所发生的事件也逐渐证明，虽然我们必须建立一个为最终实现欧洲财政联盟服务的具有法律效力的基础，但这一切必须以政府间联盟以及（刚刚出现的）欧盟-17国或者17+的名义在里斯本条约的框架之外进行。


Moreover, alarmist talk of a “split” overlooks the reality that the EU and the monetary union have long been moving at different speeds.	此外，那些发出“分裂”警告的人都忽视了一个事实：欧盟以及货币联盟的构建一直以来都是以不同的速度在推进。


The British veto, and the hullabaloo that it caused, is thus something that Europe could have done without, and Cameron will soon be sorry that he offered himself up as a hostage to his Euroskeptic backbenchers. Strengthening them will drastically weaken the UK’s influence in the EU.	在这一情况下，欧盟完全可以不理会英国人投的否决票以及因此而引发的噪声，而卡梅伦很快也会后悔自己成为了所属党派中那些欧洲怀疑论者的人质，更可况这类势力的壮大将极大削弱英国对欧盟的影响力。


That is all the more true because the Brussels summit flung open the door to a fiscal union for the EU-17+.	而这一切也逐渐成为现实，因为布鲁塞尔峰会已经为在欧盟17+基础上建立财政联盟的打开了缺口。


If a new treaty is negotiated by March 2012 and ratified in the following months, the EU will have taken a remarkable step forward – indeed, only one step away from a real political union, which will have to follow if Europe is to end the crisis for good.	如果一个新协议能在2012年3月订下并在随后几个月得到各国政府批准，那么欧盟就将实现重大跃进——事实上距离真正的政治联盟只有一步之遥，而如果欧盟想要一劳永逸地结束当前这场危机的话，就必定要走出后面那一步。


And yet confidence in the recent decisions taken in Brussels remains low, owing not only to dissipated trust and the fuss about the British veto, but also to the apparent absence of measures to intervene in the current crisis.	但最近在布鲁塞尔峰会上做出的决策依然信心不足，这不仅源自于缺乏信任或者在英国否决票上的小题大做，还包括对本次危机明显缺乏干涉手段的状况。


But this, too, is a misconception.	但这其实也是一个错误的理解。


If one reads through the decisions taken in Brussels, one immediately notices that Germany and the EU’s other rich countries received all the stability mechanisms and guarantees that they had previously requested, leaving them no reason to continue to refuse crisis-intervention measures, including appropriate financial guarantees.	如果浏览一下在布鲁塞尔峰会上所作出的决定，你会立刻发现德国以及其他欧盟富国都得到了他们原先要求的所有稳定机制和保证，也使它们没有理由再拒绝包括恰当的金融保证在内的危机干涉方案。


The recent summit in Brussels opened the way to a fiscal union, including both a stability pact and – critically important – a liability pact.	最近召开的布鲁塞尔峰会开启了通往财政联盟之门，其中既包括一个稳定协议还有一个——极端重要的——责任分配协议。


In Germany, none of this has yet registered at all.	但在德国，这两项协议都未获承认。


In the short term, the liability union is to be implemented by the European Central Bank, whose independence will once again be held up as sacred in Berlin, providing a European fig leaf for Germany’s domestic-policy priorities.	在短期上，责任分配协议应该由欧洲中央银行来实施，而其独立性也会在柏林再一次被视为神圣不可侵犯，使其变成德国国内政策利益的一块欧洲遮羞布。


From this point of view, Merkel should be grateful to Cameron for the distraction that he created in Brussels.	有见及此，默克尔应该感谢卡梅伦在布鲁塞尔的行为分散了大家的注意。


And whom do we have to thank for all this European progress?	那么我们是不是应该感谢某些人帮助欧洲取得了这些进步？


Do we owe it to the wisdom of Europe’s political leaders, particular that of the “Merkozy” odd couple of Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy?	我们是否应该感激那些欧洲领导人所表现出来的高超政治智慧，尤其是德国总理默克尔和法国总统萨科齐的“Merkozy”组合？


Unfortunately not: progress resulted almost exclusively from the pressure of the much-maligned financial markets.	不幸的是：我们所取得的进步基本上都来自于那个遭万人唾骂的市场所产生的压力。


Just as former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was brought down not by political opponents, but by jittery investors, it was the markets, not European leaders, that opened the door to European fiscal and political union.	正如把意大利前总理贝卢斯科尼赶下台的不是政敌，而是神经过敏的投资者，也正是市场而非欧洲领导人开启了构建欧洲财政和政治联盟的大门。


That is no cause for celebration. On the contrary, it reflects European politicians’ lack of sufficient strategic vision and courage in dealing with the eurozone crisis – and also in regulating the markets.	这并不值得庆祝，相反，它反映了欧洲政治家们在应对欧元区危机（以及监管市场）时缺乏战略眼光和勇气的事实。


Europe’s Military Injustice	欧洲的军事不公


LONDON – The cost of sending troops and military hardware around the world to provide security when and where it is needed is causing major financial headaches across Europe.	伦敦－对由在必要的时候向需要安全保障的地区派出军队和提供武器装备的费用所引起的财政问题，欧洲各国都觉得非常头痛。


Indeed, Europe’s finance ministries face a dilemma over how much of their stretched national budgets to allocate to the military; and European defense officials must somehow ensure that precious funding is spent in the most efficient manner.	事实上，欧洲各国的财政部都面临着将捉襟见肘的国家预算中多大一部分投入到军事上的两难问题； 而且，欧洲各国的国防官员还必须在一定程度上保证宝贵的资金被以最有效的方式加以使用。


The problem is acute in Britain, not only because of our current troop deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also because of the unfair systems by which NATO-led missions and military operations under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) are financed.	在英国，这个问题很尖锐，不仅是因为英国当前在阿富汗和伊拉克有驻军，而且还因为欧洲各国为在欧洲安全防卫政策（ESDP）下由北约领导的任务和军事行动提供资金的制度，是不公平的。


Under both systems, those who accept responsibility to take military action also take on the lion’s share of the financial burden.	在这两种制度下，那些担负采取军事行动责任的国家，也承担了军事行动大部分的经济负担。


It is time our collective security alliances overhauled these inequitable funding methods and made sure that all member states pay a proportionate price for global security.	我们的集体安全联盟对这些不公平的提供资金的方法进行审视，并确保所有的成员国为全球安全提供适当的资金，现在正当其时。


It is no secret that Britain’s Ministry for Defense is facing a funding crisis.	英国国防部现在面临着资金危机已经不是什么秘密了。


Despite British forces having been engaged in two major military operations since 2003, defense spending represents only 2.3% of GDP – the lowest since the 1930’s.	尽管英国军队自2003年以来参加了两次重大的军事行动，但是，英国的国防开支只占GDP的2. 3%——这一比例是20世纪30年代以来最低的。


As a share of total government spending, defense expenditure has fallen from 7.8% in 1998 to 6.1% in 2006.	英国国防开支作为政府全部开支的一部分，已经从1998年占全部政府开支的7. 8%下降到2006年的6.


Owing to the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, any future British government will inherit a military that is overstretched, undermanned, and working with worn-out equipment.	由于在伊拉克和阿富汗持续的军事行动，现在的英国政府会给将来的英国政府留下一支资金困难、人员不足并且装备陈旧的军队。


The unfunded liability associated with this will total billions of pounds.	与此有关的资金缺口共达几十亿英镑。


Better military and financial burden-sharing within both NATO and the ESDP would not only benefit the United Kingdom, but would also help to alleviate some of the pressure on other national defense budgets in Europe.	在北约和欧洲安全防卫政策（ESDP）内进行更好的军事和经济负担分担，不仅会使英国受益，而且有助于减轻欧洲其他国家国防预算上的某些压力。


We must take full advantage of our organized security structures to ensure that the global security burden is shared in a fair and proportionate manner.	我们必须充分利用我们的有组织安全结构，确保全球安全责任被以公平和适当的方式加以分担。


To date, this has not happened.	但是，到目前为止，用公平和适当的方式分担全球安全责任的事情还没有发生过。


For NATO to work properly, its members must be prepared not only to supply troops and equipment for NATO-led military operations, but also to fund and sustain these operations until missions are completed.	为了使北约能够顺利工作，北约成员国不仅要为北约领导的军事行动做好提供军队和装备的准备，还必须为这些行动提供资金和支持，直到行动结束。


Instead, certain members now do a disproportionate amount of the fighting, funding, and dying.	然而，现在有些北约成员国却在参加战斗、提供资金和做出牺牲方面，承担了数量非常不均衡的责任。


This is not sustainable.	这是不可持续的。


All NATO countries must understand that membership brings implicit and explicit responsibilities to ensure that their military forces have the capability to fight and win on the modern-day battlefield.	所有的北约成员国都必须明白，北约成员资格带来了确保其军队具有在现代战场上战斗并取胜的能力的明示和默示的义务。


They must recognize the need to create a sounder financial system for alliance operations.	各北约成员国还必须认识到为联盟行动建立更坚实的财务制度的必要性。


There is currently common funding for certain shared costs, such as headquarters, with contributions linked to the member states’ GDPs.	当前，北约各成员国对某些共同开支，例如指挥部的开支，按照其GDP一定的比例共同提供资金。


But the amounts covered by common funding are only a small part of an operation’s total cost.	但是，北约成员国共同提供资金的数量只是一次军事行动总开支的一小部分。


All other expenses “lie where they fall”: the more troops and equipment a country contributes to a mission, the more it ends up paying.	所有其他的费用都是“自行承担”：一个国家为军事行动派出的军队和提供的装备越多，它最后的支出就越多。


The cost to the UK for its contribution to the NATO operation in Afghanistan, for example, totals £3.1 billion – a heavy burden on British taxpayers.	例如，英国为北约在阿富汗的行动派出人员和提供装备的支出达到31亿英镑——这对英国纳税人来说是一个沉重的负担。


Because of the expeditionary nature of today’s military operations, that system is an anachronism.	由于现代军事行动的远征性质，这样的责任分担制度是一个时代错误。


Yet fixing the problem is easier said than done.	然而，修正这个问题说起来容易做起来难。


NATO has been trying for years – without success – to get its member states to spend the required 2% of GDP on defense.	北约几年来一直在努力使其成员国将要求的GDP的2%作为国防开支，但是没有成功。


Compliance would mean an estimated $67 billion increase in Alliance-wide defense spending, or roughly the equivalent of adding another British or French defense budget – no panacea, but very helpful nonetheless.	如果所有的北约成员国都遵守这一要求，就意味着联盟内的国防开支会增加大约670亿美元，这约等于增加一个英国或法国的国防预算——这样做不是万能的，但是，仍然十分有用。


Last April, the leader of the UK’s opposition Conservative Party, David Cameron, explained why we should establish a real operational fund for NATO expeditionary missions, with every member state required to contribute.	去年四月份，英国反对党保守党领袖大卫·卡梅隆（David Cameron）说明了为什么我们应该为北约的远征任务建立一个真正的行动基金，并且所有的成员都要为这个基金提供资金。


Doing so would provide some reimbursement to countries that currently carry an unduly large part of the burden.	这样做可以减轻那些当前承担过多责任的国家的一些负担。


It would also offer potential funding to countries that might deploy forces but face short-term financial difficulties in meeting the cost.	这也可以为那些可能部署军队，但是在军事行动所需开支上面临短期财政困难的国家提供潜在的资金。


The new NATO operational fund would clearly be more equitable than today’s system, which penalizes proactive member states and rewards members that prefer to do nothing.	这一新北约行动基金显然比现在的制度更加公平，现在的制度对积极承担军事责任的成员国不利，却鼓励了那些宁愿什么也不做的成员国。


Why should the few carry the many?	为什么少数几个国家应该承担这么多的责任？


Common security implies common commitment.	共同安全意味着共同承担责任。


Moreover, solving NATO’s burden-sharing problem is not enough.	而且，仅仅解决北约的负担分担问题还不够。


The European Union’s crisis management missions face similar issues when military forces are involved.	欧盟的危机管理任务在涉及军队时面临着同样的问题。


EU civilian crisis management is funded directly from the Common Foreign and Security Policy budget.	欧盟的民事危机管理直接由共同外交和安全政策预算提供资金。


But, apart from the common costs of an operation (usually less than 8% of the total), the ESDP uses the same funding method as NATO, which means that the bulk of the money for both ESDP and NATO-led military operations comes out of the same defense pot in each member state.	但是，除了军事行动的共同开支（通常不到总费用的8%）之外，欧洲安全防卫政策（ESDP）使用和北约同样的筹资方法，这意味着欧洲安全防卫政策（ESDP）和北约领导的军事行动的大部分资金，都���自成员国的国防资金。


So there is no point in fixing one funding mechanism without simultaneously fixing the other.	所以，在修正一个筹资机制的时候不修正另一个筹资提供机制，是没有道理的。


Interestingly, there was some discussion under the French presidency about reforming the so-called Athena Mechanism, which is the means used to determine the amount that each EU member state contributes to the common costs of a mission.	有趣的是，法国总统对改革所谓的雅典娜机制——这一机制是用来确定每个欧盟成员国对军事任务共同开支的应付份额的方法，有一些讨论。


Like the NATO common fund, EU contributions are largely based on GDP.	和北约共同基金一样，欧盟成员国提供资金的份额主要是根据GDP确定的。


The French also called for the “costs lie where they fall” concept to be abandoned in the name of financial solidarity.	法国也呼吁“费用自行承担”的观念应该在财政共同责任的名义下加以抛弃。


Any change made to the Athena Mechanism must include reforms to its rules and procedures.	对雅典娜机制进行的任何改变都必须包含对其规则和程序进行的改革。


Currently, non-EU members of NATO that contribute troops to an operation cannot vote – or even be present at votes – when the Athena Special Committee sets the mission budget, even though their troops will fight and possibly die.	当前，在雅典娜特别委员会确定行动预算时，北约成员国中为军事行动派出军队的非欧盟成员国，不能进行投票——甚至不能出现在投票现场——即使它们的军队要参加战斗，并且可能会有人员伤亡。


This is discriminatory, undemocratic, and no way to treat important allies like Norway and Turkey.	这样做是歧视性的、不民主的，而且对像挪威和土耳其这样重要的盟友是行不通的。


Collective security alliances are just that – collective.	集体安全联盟是——集体的。


It is time that everyone contributed their fair share to the common good.	现在是每个人都要为共同利益承担公平责任的时候了。


Europe’s Misguided “Growth Pessimists”	欧洲误入歧途的“增长悲观主义者”


Such is the deep pessimism in Europe about the economy that the better the economy does today, the worse people think it will do tomorrow.	欧洲对于经济深度悲观主义就是今天经济形势越好，那么人们就会认为它明天就会变得越糟糕。


This year has been an excellent one for Europe’s economic growth.	今年欧洲的经济增长良好。


Yet instead of thinking that the momentum building in 2006 will carry forward and make 2007 an even better year, Europe’s gloomy experts are predicting a significant slowdown.	但是欧洲悲观的经济学家们不是认为2006年所建立起来的这种势头将会延续下去而2007年经济形势会更好，反而预言经济将会出现明显的下滑。


For them, it seems out of the question that Europe can have two good years in a row.	对于他们来说，欧洲根本不可能有连续两个好的年景。


Of course, every year has its growth challenges, and 2007 will be no exception.	当然，每一年要取得增长都会面临很多的挑战，2007年也不例外。


What motivates – or frightens – the growth pessimists, in particular, are (1) higher European interest rates, (2) the slowing US economy, and (3) the increase in the German value-added tax (VAT) from 16% to 19% set for the beginning of the year.	而尤其让增长悲观主义者产生这种论调，或者让他们感到恐惧的是（1）欧洲更高的利率，（2）增长放缓的美国经济，以及（3）德国的增值税从明年开始将从16%调高到19%。


But they are wrong to be frightened by these factors.	但是他们根本不应该对这些因素所吓倒。


Fear over the growth effects of the European Central Bank’s 2006 rate increases is based on confusion between real and nominal interest rates.	对于欧洲央行2006年度加息的担忧出自对于实际利率和名义利率的混淆。


By the end of the year, European interest rates will have been raised 150 basis points (to 3.5%, from 2% in January).	到今年年底，欧洲的利率将会提高150个基点（从一月份的2%提高到3. 5%）。


But European inflation is growing at approximately the same rate.	但是欧洲的通货膨胀率也以大约同样的比率在增长着。


This means that real interest rates – interest rates measured in terms of goods and services – have stayed the same.	这就是说实际的利率，也就是依照货物和服务来衡量的利率并没有变化。


And it is the real interest rate – not the money rate – that counts for economic growth.	而影响经济增长的是实际的利率而不是货币的利率。


Europe must ask itself: how can interest rates induce a slowdown in 2007 when real interest rates have hardly budged despite an economically healthy 2006?	欧洲必须自问：尽管2006年经济良好并没有导致实际利率产生变化，那么利率又怎么会导致2007年的衰退呢？


Moreover, because profits are high in Europe, likely future increases in real interest rates needed to ensure price stability easily can be financed out of profits without economic disruption.	还有，因为欧洲的收益很高，那么为了保证物价稳定而有可能会在将来提高的实际利率只会带来更大的收益而不会引起经济的震荡。


The truth of the matter is that interest rates – both nominal and real – are too low in Europe, not too high.	真实的情况是欧洲的利率，无论是名义上的还是实际上的都是太 低 了，而不是太高了。


As for the United States, plummeting gas prices – an extraordinary 25% decline in roughly one month – have increased consumer confidence and spending at a time when consumers were supposed to be in full retreat because of the housing market decline.	至于美国，油价暴跌，在大约一个月的时间里跌去了惊人的25%，在消费者本来被预计会因为房地产市场的回落而使他们的信心和支出都全面下降的时候却反而增加了他们的信心和支出。


Moreover, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan says the housing market correction is already almost over.	此外，美联储前主席格林斯潘认为房地产市场的回落已经基本上结束了。


Pessimistic Europeans are behind the curve.	悲观的欧洲人已经严重落后于形势了。


They are bracing for a 2007 US growth slowdown that already has taken place with little consequence for both the US and European economies.	他们坚持认为美国经济在2007年增速会放缓，但是其实这种增速放缓已经发生了而它对美国经济和欧洲经济都影响甚微。


Of course, falling gas prices are occurring in Europe as well, and this will help take the sting out of the controversial VAT increase engineered by German Chancellor Angela Merkel.	当然，欧洲的油价同样也下跌了，而这会帮助减轻因为德国总理默克尔所推动的颇受争议的增加增值税所带来的刺痛。


The German Chancellor has been lucky.	德国总理是很幸运的。


The falling gas price and Germany’s high profits will “finance” the tax increase, which should prove little more than a speed bump for the German economy, at least if lower gas prices hold into the coming year.	油价下跌和德国的高收益会推动税收的增长，从而使得这一政策的调整最终只是成为德国经济一个小小的障碍，至少如果低廉的油价能持续到明年的话。


Indeed, the German government is slowly coming to realize that its pessimism about the economy has been misplaced, which is reflected in continuous “upward revisions” of growth forecasts throughout 2006.	事实上，德国政府慢慢地也认识到它对经济的悲观是不正确的，这表现在他们对2006年经济增长的预期不断的“往上调整”。 最近，政府把它对今年和明年的经济增长预期分别从1.


Recently, the government raised its growth forecasts for this year and next, from 1.6% to 2.3% for 2006, and from 1% to 1.4% for 2007.	6%调到了2. 3%，以及从1%调到了1.


Expect further upward revisions as the government continues to be surprised by the economy’s ongoing strength.	4%。 我想随着政府面对经济强劲的上升势头，他们还会对经济增长预期继续往上调整。


An important by-product of Europe’s good growth is that it is making the need for structural reform an urgent matter.	欧洲良好的增长势头所带来的一个重要的副产品就是使得对于结构改革的要求变得越来越急迫起来。


The lack of structural reform of Europe’s labor markets, competitive practices, and so on means that European potential economic growth – its growth ceiling – is lower than it should be.	欧洲劳工市场、竞争规则以及其他方面因为没有进行结构改革而使得欧洲潜在的经济增长，即它的增长顶点将会比应有的水平要低。


With a low growth ceiling, strong economic performance generates inflationary pressures at a relatively early stage in the growth process.	如果经济增长的顶点不高的话，那么强劲的经济表现会在增长过程中的一个相对较早的时期就带来通货膨胀的压力。


This makes it hard for Europe to enjoy an extended period of high growth without inflation.	这将会使欧洲很难享受到一段很长的没有通货膨胀的高增长时期。


Premature inflationary pressures are a prime reason that both ECB presidents, the late Wim Duisenberg and now Jean-Claude Trichet, have consistently pressed for structural reform in their press conferences and speeches.	过早的通货膨胀压力正是欧洲央行的前任主席伊森贝赫和现任主席特里谢在他们的记者招待会和演讲中不断敦促进行结构改革的主要原因。


It is the ECB, after all, that must fight the inflation caused by Europe’s lack of structural reform.	无论如何，需要与由于欧洲没有进行结构改革而导致的通货膨胀作斗争的是欧洲央行。


Growth pessimists have a point if they are wary about Europe’s prospects for structural reform to raise the growth ceiling.	增长悲观主义者如果对于欧洲进行结构改革以提高经济增长的最终幅度的前景表示担忧，则是不无道理德。


Europe’s politicians simply refuse to take the lead on this all-important issue.	欧洲的政治家们总是拒绝带头来进行这件十分重要的事情。


They are wrong, however, about Europe’s prospects for achieving its restricted growth potential.	然而，他们对于欧洲将达到它被限制了的增长潜力的预期是错误的。


Europe’s actual economic growth has been quite good and – thanks to low gas prices, low real interest rates, solid profits, and strong growth momentum – promises to get better before the ceiling is hit and inflationary pressures set in.	欧洲实际的经济增长是非常出色的，这归功于低廉的油价、很低的实际利率、坚实的收益和强劲的增长势头，并且在增长顶点到来以及通货膨胀压力显现之前还会一直很好地保持下去。


Call me a “growth optimist”, but Europe looks poised for another good growth year in 2007.	就把我称作一个“增加乐观主义者”吧，但是欧洲看上去真的很可能在2007年迎来又一个良好增长的年份。


Provincial Europe	地方主义的欧洲


BERLIN – Multitasking is not exactly the strong point of Europe’s current generation of leaders.	柏林—多任务并不是欧洲当前一代领导人的优势所在。


They have rightly given the eurozone crisis – the central question bearing on the European Union’s future – top priority.	他们正确地给予了欧元区危机——欧元区未来最核心的问题——最高的优先级。


But all other important issues – above all, a common foreign and security policy – have been almost completely ignored.	但所有其他重要问题——其中又以共同外交和安全政策为最——几乎被完全忽视了。


And it is here – Europe’s external relations, an issue absolutely vital to the future of all EU citizens – that renationalization is rearing its ugly head again.	而在这一问题上——欧洲的对外关系，对所有欧盟公民的未来来说，这绝对是关键性的问题——重新国家化的阴影再次抬头了。


Today, we can recognize the outlines of a post-American international (dis)order – not only its emerging structures, but also its risks, threats, and conflicts, all of which are intensifying.	如今，我们可以勾勒出后美国时代国际秩序的大致轮廓——不仅包括新的结构，也包括其中的风险、威胁和冲突，没有一项容易解决。


For Europe – and for the rest of the world – the financial crisis has proven to be an accelerant of far-reaching changes.	对欧洲——以及对世界其他地区——来说，金融危机只不过是深远变革的加速器而已。


In East Asia, the world’s most dynamic and dominant region in terms of future global economic development, confrontation is escalating between the key powers – China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan – over border issues, territorial claims, prestige, and unfinished historical business.	在东亚，世界最有活力、也是未来全球经济发展的主导地区，主要势力——中国、日本、韩国和中国台湾——关于边界问题、领土主张、声望和未解决历史遗留问题的冲突已呈爆发之势。


Add to this the perennial crisis on the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan conflict, which could flare up again anytime.	在此之上还有维持了多年的朝鲜半岛和台湾冲突，随时随地都可能再度爆发。


East Asia’s regional powers operate almost without any multilateral framework, a state of affairs comparable to that of Europe toward the end of the nineteenth century.	东亚的地区势力之间几乎无多边框架可言，其状态就像是19世纪末的欧洲。


Only the United States’s military and political presence ensures regional stability.	幸好有美国的军事和政治部署保证着地区稳定。


Yet, at least in the medium term, that presence implies a significant risk of inciting a global confrontation between China and the US.	但是，至少是在中期，这样的部署隐含着引发中美之间全球冲突的大风险。


Moreover, Russia – which extends to East Asia, but, owing to its economic and political weakness, has been a background player there – would certainly seek to benefit from this development.	此外，俄罗斯——它正在向东亚扩大影响，但囿于其经济和政治弱势，一直只是二流东亚势力——肯定也会寻求在如此发展态势中获利。


Europe, however, will play no part in the region, simply because any attempt to do so would place too much strain on its reach and resources.	但欧洲不会在东亚有任何动静，因为任何这方面的努力都会对其影响范围和资源形成重大约束力。


Yet, given Europe’s growing economic dependence on East Asia, its interests are massively engaged – a mismatch that could cause the EU considerable discomfort in the medium term.	但是，由于欧洲对东亚的经济依赖意见严重，其在东亚的利益也极其巨大，从中期看，这一不匹配状况可能引起欧盟严重的不安。


The same is true, to varying degrees, of Europe’s relationship with South Asia; but here the India-Pakistan conflict, a looming “post-American” Afghanistan in 2014, and uncertainty concerning Iran and the Persian Gulf have a direct security impact on the EU.	从各种角度看，欧洲于南亚的关系也是类似的； 但在南亚，印度-巴基斯坦冲突、从2014年开始的“后美国”时代阿富汗以及伊朗和波斯湾局势的不确定性将对欧盟安全形成直接威胁。


This is where discomfort meets danger.	在南亚，不安与危险交织在一起。


Russia, under Vladimir Putin’s third presidency, has made its choice.	在第三度出任总统的普京的领导下，俄罗斯���经做出了选择。


Under the banner of a “Eurasian Union,” and relying on the renationalized oil and gas sectors as both a carrot and a stick, the Kremlin wants to tie as many of the former Soviet territories as possible to the Motherland.	由于“欧亚联盟”的阻挠，以及将原油和天然气的重新国有化同时作为胡萝卜和大棒，克里姆林宫希望尽可能团结更多的前苏联加盟国。


At the center of this policy is Ukraine, the linchpin of Europe’s post-Soviet order.	这一政策的核心目标是乌克兰，它也是后苏联欧洲秩序的关键所在。


Yet Putin is caught in a fundamental contradiction.	但普京陷入了根本性冲突之中。


His Great Russia policy requires economic strength, and therefore successful modernization of the country.	他的大俄罗斯政策需要经济强势，从而要求国家成功地实现现代化。


But, to achieve this, he must encourage reforms that would lead to a strong middle class, which, as can already be seen in Russia’s big cities, opposes Putin’s clientilist “guided democracy” and the massive corruption that comes with it.	但是，为了达到这一目标，他必须鼓励能产生强大中产阶级的改革，而正如俄罗斯大城市所显示的，中产阶级反对普京的侍从主义“有指导的民主”以及与之相伴而生的大规模腐败。


Putin’s dilemma poses a real challenge for the EU and the US – but also an opportunity, if they choose significant long-term engagement.	普京的困局代表了欧盟和美国的真正挑战，但也是机会，如果它们选择长期大规模介入的话。


On both sides of the Atlantic, however, ignoring the issue seems to have been mistaken for a policy.	不过，大西洋两岸似乎都犯了忽略这一问题的错误。


That is a grave oversight, for it is clear that Russian foreign policy has again taken a provocative and confrontational turn.	这是一个后果严重的疏漏，因为，显然，俄罗斯外交政策已经做出了挑衅性、冲突性的转变。


Russia remains a steadfast supporter of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and is not shying away from conflict with Turkey, or from forging a de facto alliance with Iran, in order to defend the Assad regime.	俄罗斯依然是叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德的坚定支持者，并且不惜与土耳其产生冲突，或在事实上和伊朗结盟，以捍卫巴沙尔政权。


Together with the war clouds hovering over the Iranian nuclear program, the failed Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and radical political change throughout the wider Middle East, the conflict in Syria shows that Europe’s southeast will continue to be a major security challenge.  Yet, despite Russia’s ambitions for reshaping its neighborhood – and despite decreasing US involvement in the Middle East – Europe is hardly prepared to act.	与伊朗核计划头上的战争阴云、失败的以色列-巴勒斯坦和平京城以及大中东彻底的政治变革一道，叙利亚冲突表明，东南方向将依然是欧洲的主要安全挑战。 但是，尽管俄罗斯野心勃勃意欲改造其邻邦，而美国在中东地区的介入越来越小，欧洲却并没有做好行动准备。


Clearly, the relationship between Turkey and the EU needs its own “reset.”	显然，土耳其和欧盟的关系需要自我“重置”。


Otherwise, both sides will find themselves among the losers.	否则的话，双方会发现自己都是输家。


Turkey is currently confronting the limits of its possibilities, while the EU finds that it can do very little in this region without Turkey.	土耳其正在挑战其能力极限，而欧盟发现，对它来说，在这一地区土耳其是不可缺少的。


And, to Europe’s immediate south, across the Mediterranean, new risks are emerging in the vastness of North Africa and the Sahara, including the threat of an Al Qaeda state in northern Mali.	此外，在欧洲的南方近邻，即地中海地区，新风险正在北非和撒哈拉地区迅猛崛起，包括基地组织对马里北部的威胁。


If one adds to this European sketch of global development the fact that, whatever the outcome of the US election, America will shift its strategic focus to East Asia (and otherwise mainly look after itself), nearly everything cries out for a robust EU foreign and security policy.	如果你在这幅全球发展态势图上在加上一个事实，即不论美国大选结果如何，美国都会将其战略焦点移向东亚（或换句话说，移向看好自己），则几乎所有事务都要求稳健的欧盟外交和安全政策。


Unfortunately, exactly the opposite is happening: here, too, renationalization is uppermost in the minds of Europe’s peoples and decision-makers.	不幸的是，目前的方向与此南辕北辙：在欧洲各族人民和决策者中间，重新国家话才是压倒性的优势观点。


In Berlin, the question asked more and more often is, “What does this mean for Germany?” rather than, “What does this mean for Europe?”	在柏林，越来越多的人提出这样一个问题：“这对德国来说意味着什么？ ”而不问“这对欧洲来说意味着什么？


The same is true in other European capitals.	”其他欧洲国家也是如此。


But the wrong question leads to wrong answers, because Europe’s security interests can be defended only within a European and Western context, not at the national level.	但错误的问题导致错误的答案，因为欧洲安全利益只有在欧洲和西方环境下才能解决，在国家层面上是解决不了的。


That is why it is high time for Europeans to abandon their provincialism, launch a common foreign policy worthy of the name, and finally start to invest properly in their future security.	这就是为什么现在欧洲必须抛弃其地方主义，实施名副其实的共同外交政策，并最终合理地为其未来安全投资。


Europe must grow up and develop the capacity to defend its own interests, because the day is fast approaching when others will be less able and willing to do this for us than they once were.	欧洲必须成熟起来，开发捍卫自身利益的能力，因为形势变化太快，其他人早已不像从前那样愿意替我们完成这个任务了。


Europe’s Moment of Decision	欧洲作决定的时刻


BRUSSELS -- Is amnesia an integral part of politics?	遗忘症是政治不可分割的一部分吗？


When it comes to the treaty to reform the Union’s institutions, which will be finalized in November, recent events suggest that amnesia does play a central role.	在有关将于11月份最终签订的改革欧盟机构的条约的问题上，最近的事态表明遗忘症确实扮演了一个中心的角色。


Let’s examine the “illness” that leads certain EU leaders with questionable scruples to forget even the recent past.	让我们来看一下使某些怀有可疑的顾虑的欧盟领导人忘记甚至是最近发生的事情的那种“病症”吧。


Busy with domestic political affairs, they do not hesitate to use Europe as a scapegoat to avoid breaking bad news to their fellow citizens.	忙于处理国内事务的他们在把欧洲作为避免向他们的国民透露糟糕消息的替罪羊上是从来都毫不迟疑的。


Some display separatist tendencies that worry, and frustrate, their electorates.	一些人表现出分离主义者的倾向，而使他们的选民感到担心和沮丧。


No surprise, then, that many EU citizens refuse, or at least hesitate, to embrace the European cause.	因此我们就不应该对许多欧盟公民拒绝，或者至少是对拥抱欧洲事业感到犹豫不决表示惊讶了。


This form of political racketeering may win elections, but it sabotages any opportunity to experience, or to perceive, politics as a process that can contribute to global development.	这种政治欺骗也许能赢得选举，但是它严重破坏了任何能体验或是观察政治作为一个能对全球发展作出贡献的进程的机会。


Consider Gordon Brown, Britain’s new prime minister, according to whom globalization strips the European project of any meaning, a form of political autism that in fact will prevent the EU from adapting to change and from being able to find solutions to globalization’s challenges.	让我们来看一下英国的新首相布朗，根据他的看法全球化使欧洲计划失去了任何意义，这种政治上的自我中心论事实上将阻止欧盟适应任何变化并且无法找到应对全球化挑战的方案。


Fortunately, openly anti-European political programs are not the norm, at least not yet.	幸运的是，公开反对欧洲政治的计划还没有形成潮流，至少现在还没有。


In fact, if, on the eve of the 2009 European Parliament elections, the new Reform Treaty enters into force, each member country will be forced to clarify and justify its position.	事实上，如果在2009年欧洲议会选举前，新的改革条约能够生效，到时各个成员国都将被迫澄清并证明其立场的正当性。


The Treaty will be essential not only to the proper functioning of Europe’s institutions, but also to their further “deepening” – something that many call for without necessarily really wanting to achieve.	这份条约不仅对欧洲机构法规正常功能是至关重要的，同时对这些机构的进一步“深化” ，这是某些人呼吁但并非真的想要达成的事情，也是至关重要的。


Thanks to “reinforced cooperation,” recalcitrant states will no longer hinder those seeking to make progress, and could even resort to an “opt-out” process and “liberate” themselves from the EU, perhaps by means of a referendum.	得益于“强化合作”，那些不顺从的国家将不会再阻碍那些寻求取得进展的国家甚至可以寻求进入一个从欧盟“选择退出”的过程并且把它们从欧盟中“解放”出来，也许通过全民复议公决的方式。


Then there are those who believe that EU enlargement has prevented greater “deepening,” and who, with scant regard for the past or the future, argue that pursuing the latter requires abandoning the former.	还有那些认为欧盟的扩大阻止了进一步的“深化”的人以及那些对过去或未来都很少关心、辩解说寻求未来就必须抛弃过去的人。


But who can reasonably claim to know what shape the EU will need to take to meet the challenges of the next 50 or 100 years?	但是谁可以有理由地主张说造就欧盟的那些元素需要被用来迎接未来50年或100年的挑战呢？


Already, issues like climate change and energy supply demonstrate the futility of isolated national action and the critical importance of both deepening and enlarging the EU.	像气候变化和能源供应这样的问题已经反映出单个国家行动徒劳无益以及深化 和 扩大欧盟的至关重要性。


Having suffered from disruptions in oil and gas supplies following disputes between Russia and Ukraine and then Belarus, the EU’s members have finally understood that their survival depends on their capacity to diversify their energy sources.	在因为俄罗斯与乌克兰以及后来的白俄罗斯之间的争执而导致石油和天然气供应出现中断后，欧盟的成员国最终明白了它们的生存依赖于它们将能源来源多元化的能力。


Further EU enlargement is undoubtedly in Turkey’s interest, and in Europe’s, too.	欧盟的进一步扩大无疑既符合土耳其的利益，也符合欧洲的利益。


In addition to the constructive role that Turkey could play, especially in the Middle East, its membership is vitally important in terms of energy.	除开土耳其能够扮演的建设性角色，尤其是在中东，它成为成员国在能源问题上也是至关重要的。


Moreover, admitting Turkey would demonstrate the EU’s political consistency, while representing a qualitative step forward in the European project.	此外，吸收土耳其也能够表现欧盟在政治上的一致性，同时也是朝欧洲计划迈出的质的一步。


For politicians like French President Nicolas Sarkozy, such considerations may be meaningless.	对于像法国总统萨科奇这样的政治家来说，这种考虑也许是毫无意义的。


But what if Turkey were to abandon its European ambitions and align itself strategically with Russia or even Iran?	但是如果土耳其放弃其加入欧洲的梦想，而在战略上与俄罗斯甚至伊朗站在一起将会带来怎样的后果呢？


The consequences for European security would be severe.	那将给欧洲的安全带来严重的后果。


Then there is Britain’s political leadership, for whom enlargement is a way to avoid deepening, and, indeed, to dissolve political Europe.	然后还有英国政治领导层的问题，对于他们来说扩大是一种阻止机构深化改革，以及实际上化解将欧洲政治化的一个途径。


While such ideas are not for everyone, certain Continental countries secretly prefer Britain’s disjointed scenarios, with some heads of governments even considering their countries’ commitments reversible.	尽管这种想法并不为每个人所接受，某些大陆国家私下里还是很支持英国将欧洲肢解的想法，有一些政府的首脑甚至考虑对他们国家的承诺作出180º的改变。


What, for example, should we make of Poland’s governing Kaczynski brothers?	那么，比如说，我们应该怎样对待波兰执政的卡钦斯基兄弟呢？


The quick-tempered twins took issue with the reform treaty’s proposed voting system for the Council of Ministers, and then stole the limelight from papacy with their own homophobic declarations, proclamations that seem to exclude any possibility of integrating the EU’s Charter of Rights into Poland’s domestic law.	这对性情急躁的双胞胎对改革条约拟议的部长会议的投票表决制度持有异议，然后用他们自己公开表明对同性恋的憎恨来把人们的目光从教皇统治制度中吸引过来，这种声明似乎排除了把欧盟基本权利宪章与波兰国内法律相结合的任何可能性。


Russian President Vladimir Putin may be the only one who welcomes this desertion from Europe’s community of values.	俄罗斯总统普京也许是唯一一个对这种抛弃欧洲社会价值观的行为表示欢迎的人。


In this climate, Dutch Prime Minister Peter Balkenende, still bogged down in his country’s “no” vote on the EU’s draft constitutional treaty in 2005, has been seeking to win British, Czech, and Polish support for measures to make it possible to diminish the EU’s areas of responsibility.	在这种情况下，荷兰总理巴尔克内德依然因为他的国家在2005年全民公决“反对”欧盟宪法条约草案而无法前进，他一直在寻求英国、捷克和波兰的支持以便可以采取措施缩减欧盟的责任范围。


Indeed, he may not even object to ruining the EU’s entire legislative engine by granting national parliaments a veto.	事实上，他也许甚至不会反对通过授予国家议会否决权来破坏欧盟的整个立法机制。