As one anonymous US State Department official put it, President Donald Trump “does not seem to care about alliances and therefore does not care about diplomacy.”	一位不愿披露姓名的美国国务院官员表示，特朗普总统“似乎不太在乎结盟，因此也不太在乎外交。 ”


South Korea and Japan are thought to hold about 80% of their international reserves in dollars.	据说韩国和日本的国际储备中大约有80%是美元。


One can imagine that the financial behavior of these and other countries would change dramatically, with adverse implications for the dollar’s exchange rate and US borrowing costs, were America’s close military alliances with its allies to fray.	可以想象，如果美国与其盟友之间紧密的军事联盟有所松懈，它们和其他国家的金融行为将会发生巨大的改变，对美元汇率和美国借贷成本造成不利影响。


Nor is it hard to imagine how this fraying could come about.	也不难想象这一松懈为何会发生。


President Donald Trump has painted himself into a strategic corner: he needs a concession from North Korea on the nuclear-weapons issue in order to save face with his base, not to mention with the global community.	特朗普总统已经把自己逼到了战略的墙角：他需要朝鲜在核武器问题上有所让步，以挽回他在选民基本盘（更不用说在全球社会）中的颜面。


And, for all of Trump’s aggressive rhetoric and posturing, the only feasible way to secure such a concession is through negotiation.	此外，尽管特朗普言辞和姿态咄咄逼人，但确保朝鲜做出让步的唯一可行办法是通过谈判。


Ironically, the most plausible outcome of that process is an inspections regime not unlike the one negotiated by Barack Obama’s administration with Iran.	讽刺的是，这一过程最有可能的结果是与奥巴马总统的政府与伊朗所谈成的内容没有什么两样的检查机制。


To get there, Trump’s administration will have to offer something in return.	要想达到这一目标，特朗普政府也必须给予一些回报。


The most obvious bargaining chip that could be offered to make the North Korean regime feel more secure is a reduction in US troop levels on the Korean Peninsula and in Asia in general, With that, the US security guarantee for Asia will weaken, in turn providing China an opportunity to step into the geopolitical breach.	要让朝鲜政权有安全感的显而易见的讨价还价筹码是缩减美军在朝鲜半岛和整个亚洲的规模。 而这样一来，美国对亚洲的安全保证就会被削弱，反过来给中国提供填补地缘政治缺口的机会。


And where China leads geopolitically, its currency, the renminbi, is likely to follow.	而在中国领衔地缘政治的地方，人民币也会跟进。


The Kindleberger Trap	金德尔伯格陷阱


CAMBRIDGE – As US President-elect Donald Trump prepares his administration’s policy toward China, he should be wary of two major traps that history has set for him.	坎布里奇——在美国当选总统唐纳德·特朗普筹备其内阁对华政策时，他应当警惕历史为他设置的两大陷阱。


The “Thucydides Trap,” cited by Chinese President Xi Jinping, refers to the warning by the ancient Greek historian that cataclysmic war can erupt if an established power (like the United States) becomes too fearful of a rising power (like China).	其一是中国主席习近平提出的“修西得底斯陷阱”，指的是古希腊历史学家修西得底斯警告如果一个现有大国（如美国）太过恐惧一个正在崛起的大国（如中国），那就有可能爆发灾难性的战争。


But Trump also has to worry about the “Kindleberger Trap”: a China that seems too weak rather than too strong.	但特朗普还必须担心“金德尔伯格陷阱”：也就是中国似乎太弱而不是太强。


Charles Kindleberger, an intellectual architect of the Marshall Plan who later taught at MIT, argued that the disastrous decade of the 1930s was caused when the US replaced Britain as the largest global power but failed to take on Britain’s role in providing global public goods.	马歇尔计划的思想构建者之一、后来在麻省理工大学任教的查尔斯·金德尔伯格认为二十世纪三十年代多灾多难的原因是虽然美国取代英国成为世界大国，但却未能接替英国扮演为全球提供公共产品的角色。


The result was the collapse of the global system into depression, genocide, and world war.	结果导致全球体系陷入衰退、种族灭绝和世界大战。


Today, as China’s power grows, will it help provide global public goods?	今天，随着中国力量不断壮大，它是否会为提供全球公共产品贡献自己的力量？


In domestic politics, governments produce public goods such as policing or a clean environment, from which all citizens can benefit and none are excluded.	国内政治环境下，政府负责提供维护治安或清洁环境的公共产品，民众可以从中获益，这些产品能够惠及所有人。


At the global level, public goods – such as a stable climate, financial stability, or freedom of the seas – are provided by coalitions led by the largest powers.	而在全球环境下，公共产品——如稳定的气候、稳定的金融或航行自由——则由大国领导的联盟负责提供。


Small countries have little incentive to pay for such global public goods.	小国鲜有意愿为全球公共产品付费。


Because their small contributions make little difference to whether they benefit or not, it is rational for them to ride for free.	因为它们贡献太小，它们受益与否并没有多大差别，因此他们搭便车是理性行为。


But the largest powers can see the effect and feel the benefit of their contributions.	但大国可以明显感受到贡献的好处。


So it is rational for the largest countries to lead.	因此大国领导同样是理性行为。


When they do not, global public goods are under-produced.	如果大国不承担领导责任，会导致全球公共产品供应短缺。


When Britain became too weak to play that role after World War I, an isolationist US continued to be a free rider, with disastrous results.	当英国在一次大战后衰落到无法承担这一责任时，奉行孤立主义的美国却继续搭便车，并由此产生了灾难性的后果。


Some observers worry that as China’s power grows, it will free ride rather than contribute to an international order that it did not create.	有些观察家担心随着中国力量不断增长，它会免费享受国际秩序所带来的好处，而不是为一套并非由其创建的秩序添砖加瓦。


So far, the record is mixed.	到目前为止，中国的表现比较混合。


China benefits from the United Nations system, where it has a veto in the Security Council.	中国因在安理会掌握否决权而受益于联合国体制。


It is now the second-largest funder of UN peacekeeping forces, and it participated in UN programs related to Ebola and climate change.	它现在是联合国维和部队排名第二的出资者，并参与了与埃博拉和气候变化有关的联合国项目。


China has also benefited greatly from multilateral economic institutions like the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.	中国同样从世贸组织、世界银行和国际货币基金组织等多边经济体系中受益良多。


In 2015, China launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which some saw as an alternative to the World Bank; but the new institution adheres to international rules and cooperates with the World Bank.	2015年，中国发起成立了亚洲基础设施投资银行，有人认为这是世界银行的替代性选择； 但新体系依然遵守国际法，并与世界银行展开合作。


On the other hand, China’s rejection of a Permanent Court of Arbitration judgment last year against its territorial claims in the South China Sea raises troublesome questions.	另一方面，有人质疑中国去年拒绝接受常设仲裁庭就其南海领土要求所做出的仲裁结果。


Thus far, however, Chinese behavior has sought not to overthrow the liberal world order from which it benefits, but to increase its influence within it.	但到目前为止，中国的所作所为并非以推翻现有自由世界秩序为目的，而是为了强化其自身对国际秩序的影响。


If pressed and isolated by Trump’s policy, however, will China become a disruptive free rider that pushes the world into a Kindleberger Trap?	但如果遭到特朗普政策的压制和孤立，中国是否会成为破坏性的免费受益者，从而将世界体系推入到金德尔伯格陷阱之中？


Trump must also worry about the better-known Thucydides Trap: a China that seems too strong rather than too weak.	特朗普同样必须担心更加著名的修西得底斯陷阱：即中国太过强势而不是太过衰弱。


There is nothing inevitable about this trap, and its effects are often exaggerated.	落入这一陷阱并非不可避免，而且由此带来的后果往往被外界夸大。


For example, the political scientist Graham Allison has argued that in 12 of 16 cases since 1500 when an established power has confronted a rising power, the result has been a major war.	例如，政治学家格雷厄姆·艾利森认为从1500年后现有大国面对崛起大国共有十六个案例，其中十二个案例均以爆发大规模战争收场。


But these numbers are not accurate, because it is not clear what constitutes a “case.”	但这样的数字并不准确，因为“案例”包括哪些并没有明确指出。


For example, Britain was the dominant world power in the mid-nineteenth century, but it let Prussia create a powerful new German empire in the heart of the European continent.	举例而言，英国是十九世纪中叶的全球主导力量，但却任由普鲁士在欧洲大陆的核心缔造了强大的新德意志帝国。


Of course, Britain did fight Germany a half-century later, in 1914, but should that be counted as one case or two?	当然，英国半个世纪后确实于1914年与德国开战，但这究竟应当算作一个案例还是两个？


World War I was not simply a case of an established Britain responding to a rising Germany.	第一次世界大战并不仅涉及现有大国英国和正在崛起的德国。


In addition to the rise of Germany, WWI was caused by the fear in Germany of Russia’s growing power, the fear of rising Slavic nationalism in a declining Austria-Hungary, as well as myriad other factors that differed from ancient Greece.	除德国崛起外，一战爆发的原因还有德国害怕俄国势力不断增长、害怕奥匈帝国势力不断衰落的同时斯拉夫民族主义不断壮大以及不同于古希腊案例的其他理由。


As for current analogies, today’s power gap between the US and China is much greater than that between Germany and Britain in 1914.	回到当前类比，今天美中之间的实力差距远大于1914年的德国和英国。


Metaphors can be useful as general precautions, but they become dangerous when they convey a sense of historical inexorableness.	比喻作为一般预警制度或许有效，但在断定历史无法改变时却是颇具危险性的。


Even the classical Greek case is not as straightforward as Thucydides made it seem.	就连经典的希腊案例也不像修西得底斯所说的那样直截了当。


He claimed that the cause of the second Peloponnesian War was the growth of the power of Athens and the fear it caused in Sparta.	他声称雅典人崛起和斯巴达人因此产生的恐惧导致了第二次伯罗奔尼撒战争。


But the Yale historian Donald Kagan has shown that Athenian power was in fact not growing.	但耶鲁历史学家唐纳德·卡根（Donald Kagan）已经证明雅典人的力量其实并未增长。


Before the war broke out in 431 BC, the balance of power had begun to stabilize.	在公元前431年战争爆发前，力量平衡已经开始趋于稳定。


Athenian policy mistakes made the Spartans think that war might be worth the risk.	雅典政策失误导致斯巴达人误以为可能值得冒险发动战争。


Athens’ growth caused the first Peloponnesian War earlier in the century, but then a Thirty-Year Truce doused the fire.	雅典的不断壮大导致那个世纪早些时候爆发了第一次伯罗奔尼撒战争，但之后长达三十年的停火阻止了蔓延的战火。


Kagan argues that to start the second, disastrous war, a spark needed to land on one of the rare bits of kindling that had not been thoroughly drenched and then continually and vigorously fanned by poor policy choices.	卡根认为导致第二次灾难性的战火需要未能被彻底浇灭、其后又被不断大力煽动的愚昧政策的罕见余火重新引燃。


In other words, the war was caused not by impersonal forces, but by bad decisions in difficult circumstances.	换句话说，战争不是由与人无关的力量造成的，恰恰是困难情况下的愚昧决策导致战火重燃。


That is the danger that Trump confronts with China today.	这是特朗普今天在处理中国问题时所面临的危险。


He must worry about a China that is simultaneously too weak and too strong.	他必须同时担心太过衰弱和太过强大的中国。


To achieve his objectives, he must avoid the Kindleberger trap as well as the Thucydides trap.	为实现目标，他必须同时避开金德尔伯格和修西得底斯陷阱。


But, above all, he must avoid the miscalculations, misperceptions, and rash judgments that plague human history.	但更重要的是，他必须避免人类历史随处可见的误算、误解和草率判断。


A Bull Named Trump in a Shop Called China	中国商店里的一头叫特朗普的公牛


CAMBRIDGE – Some of US President-elect Donald Trump’s nastiest attacks have been directed at China.	坎布里奇—美国当选总统唐纳德·特朗普的一些最猛烈的抨击都是针对中国的。


He has accused it of “raping” the United States with its trade policies, and of creating global warming as a “hoax” to undermine US competitiveness.	他指责中国用贸易政策“强奸”美国，指责中国炮制全球变暖“骗局”破坏美国的竞争力。


Why, then, are many Chinese policy advisers and commentators sanguine about future US-China relations?	既然如此，为什么有那么多中国政策顾问和评论家对未来美中关系持乐观态度？


The reasoning seems to be that Trump is a businessman, and, to paraphrase US President Calvin Coolidge, the business of China is business.	原因似乎在于特朗普是一位商人，并且，借用美国总统柯立芝的话说，中国事务就是生意。


China, the thinking goes, can work with a swashbuckling deal-maker like Trump better than with a supposedly “ideological” Hillary Clinton.	这一思维认为，与想必“空想流”的希拉里·克林顿比起来，中国与特朗普这样的虚张声势的商人打交道更便于合作。


Many people would be surprised to see Clinton categorized as an ideologue.	许多人会惊讶于将克林顿归为空想家一类。


And there is scant evidence to support the claim that businesspeople somehow embody pragmatism, given that so many powerful US business leaders are committed ideologues.	认为商人总是务实的观点也没有多少证据支持，因为大量强势美国商业领袖都是坚定的空想家。


The Koch brothers, for example, stubbornly cling to impractical and thoroughly debunked libertarian ideas, and numerous Fortune 500 CEOs instinctively side with Republicans, even though the US economy consistently performs better under Democratic administrations.	比如，柯克（Koch）兄弟坚定不移地持有不食人间烟火、早已被彻底拉下神坛的自由主义思想，许多《财富》500强公司CEO也本能地站在共和党一边，尽管美国经济在民主党执政期间总是表现更好。


And one should not forget Andrew William Mellon’s infamous and reckless advice to former US President Herbert Hoover on the eve of the Great Depression: “liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate farmers, liquidate real estate.”	你想必也没有忘记安德鲁·威廉·梅隆（Andrew William Mellon）的鲁莽的著名建议：在大萧条前夕，他建议美国总统胡佛“出清劳动力，出清存货，出清农民，出清房地产。 ”


The revelation that Trump and President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan spoke by telephone has probably now shattered any residual hope that the incoming US administration will be anything but a bull in a China shop.	特朗普与台湾“总统”蔡英文通电话被曝光也许粉碎了一切残存的希望，即将履新的美国政府必然是一头闯进中国商店的公牛。


That phone call violated a protocol – avoidance of direct contact between the US and Taiwan at the presidential level – that American presidents from both parties have carefully observed for four decades.	这次通话打破了四十年来美国两党诸任总统谨守的规则——避免美国和台湾元首级别的直接联系。


Trump’s diplomatic breach sent shock waves across Asia, which he then aggravated by asking, in a series of tweets, if China consulted with the US before devaluing its currency or building a massive military base in the South China Sea.	特朗普的“叛逆”弯角在亚洲引起轩然大波，随后，这一风波又被他用一系列tweet愈演愈烈——他质问中国在人民币贬值和在南海建设大规模军事基地之前没有和美国商量。


But by calling into question the “One China” policy, Trump is playing with fire.	但质疑“一个中国”政策的特朗普在玩火。


Careful and deft management by both Republican and Democratic administrations has helped maintain the fragile peace between China and Taiwan.	共和党和民主党政府在这个问题上如履薄冰，好歹维持着中国与台湾之间的脆弱和平。


For the US, the primary objective is to maintain the status quo, by dissuading Taiwan from actively seeking independence and discouraging China from forcing Taiwan into a speedy reunification.	对美国来说，主要目标是维持现状，劝阻台湾不要积极寻求独立、中国不要急于强迫台湾统一。


In another tweet, Trump asked why he shouldn’t engage with Taiwan at the presidential level when the US is selling Taiwan billions of dollars worth of weapons.	在另一条tweet上，特朗普质问，在美国向台湾出售价值数十亿美元的武器的情况下，为什么他不能和台湾进行元首级别的互动。


Feigned or not, such bafflement from the American president-elect is truly worrying.	不管是不是摆姿态，美国当选总统如此思维混乱实在令人担忧。


The US sells Taiwan military equipment mostly for self-defense, and as a signal to China that the US will not stand idly by in the event of Chinese military action against the island.	美国对台军售主要是为了自卫，也是向中国传递信号：如果中国对台采取军事行动，美国不会袖手旁观。


But the US deliberately attenuates this message by refusing to engage with Taiwan at the highest levels, which is meant to disabuse Taiwan of the notion that it can count on American support if the island ever actually declares independence.	但美国也有意识地淡化这一管理手段，不与台湾进行最高级别的互动，这样做的意思是破除台湾果真宣布独立还能获得美国支持的幻想。


For more than 40 years, this doctrine of “strategic ambiguity” has worked brilliantly.	40多年来，这一“战略性模糊”的思想作用显著。


Peace has survived multiple leadership changes on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.	台湾海峡两岸领导层经历了多次变更，但和平一直得以维持。


And trade and investment between Taiwan and mainland China have flourished.	台湾和大陆之间的贸易和投资也实现了繁荣。


A break with long-established policy by Trump would be damaging in many ways.	特朗普打破由来已久的政策将在诸多方面带来破坏。


For starters, he could embolden Taiwan to be more aggressive in trying to upend the status quo.	首先，他可能促使台湾更加激进地试图打破现状。


Indeed, Tsai’s own Democratic Progressive Party is officially committed to Taiwan’s independence, and while Tsai herself has not yet sought to realize revisionist goals, that could change if she feels that Trump is sympathetic to her cause.	事实上，台湾民进党的官方目标是台湾独立，尽管蔡英文本人尚未寻求实现这一修正主义目标，但如果她感到特朗普的同情态度的话，可能会有所改变。


Trump could also do damage by inflaming Chinese government and military hardliners, if he confirms their belief that the US wants to undermine their country’s “core interests” – namely, sustaining the appearance, if not the reality, that there is only one China.	特朗普的另一个破坏来自激怒中国政府和军界强硬派，如果他让他们认定美国想要破坏中国的“核心利益”——即保持表面上（尽管未必是实质上）的一个中国——的话。


The Chinese foreign ministry initially voiced mild criticism of Trump’s call with Tsai, but People’s Daily, the Chinese Communist Party’s house organ, has since issued a far stronger rebuke, warning that “creating troubles for the China-US relationship is creating troubles for the US itself.”	中国外交部一开始委婉地批评了他朗普与蔡英文通话的做法，但后来中共喉舌《人民日报》又发表了更加强烈的批评，警告“为中美关系制造麻烦就是给美国自身制造麻烦。


Soon after, the Chinese Navy temporarily seized an American submersible drone in international waters.	”此后不久，解放军海军又在国际海域暂扣了一台美军无人潜艇。


China is clearly signaling its agitation.	中国在明确表达它的不安。


There is no method to Trump’s madness.	特朗普的疯狂有些“无厘头”。


In the same tweet justifying his phone call with Tsai, he repeated a false charge that China is devaluing its currency to gain export advantages vis-à-vis the US.	在为自己和蔡英文通话辩解的同一条tweet中，他又重申了一次子虚乌有的指控——中国让人民币贬值来获得对美国的出口优势。


His knowledge of international economics is either non-existent or ten years out of date.	他要么是国际经济学文盲，要么用的是早已过时的教材。


In reality, China is now hemorrhaging foreign-exchange reserves and desperately trying to prop up the renminbi’s value in the face of capital flight.	在现实中，中国正在流失外汇储备，面对资本外逃，中国急切地想要支持人民币汇率。


Trump is apparently antagonizing China for no good reason.	特朗普显然是在毫无意义地激怒中国。


Worse, by announcing that the US will withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership – designed, at least in part, to shape global trade and investment flows according to Western rules, rather than China’s mercantilist vision – Trump is also abandoning a US policy that could have checked China’s surging influence in Asia.	更糟糕的是，特朗普还宣布美国将退出跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）——该协议至少部分是为了按照西方规则引导全球贸易和投资流而制定，绝不是为了满足中国的重商主义愿景——因此放弃了一项美国可以用来制衡中国日益兴盛的亚洲影响力的政策。


Since Trump’s TPP announcement, many Asian countries have now pledged to join a regional trade bloc spearheaded by China.	自特朗普宣布他的TPP政策以来，许多亚洲国家已决定加入中国牵头的地区贸易区。


With Trump’s help, the “Chinese Century” may arrive sooner than anyone expected.	在特朗普的帮助下，“中国世纪”也许要比任何人预料的都要来得早。


By moving closer to Taiwan, attacking China on phantom grounds, and dismantling the TPP, Trump is provoking China while simultaneously empowering and enabling it.	特朗普与台湾套近乎、子虚乌有地攻击中国、废除TPP，这样的做法既是在挑衅中国，同时也在加强中国的实力和能力。


This is not the art of the deal.	这可不是交易的艺术。


It’s the road to disaster.	这是一条毁灭之路。


America and China’s Codependency Trap	美中两国的相互依赖陷阱


NEW HAVEN – Seemingly at odds with the world, US President Donald Trump has once again raised the possibility of a trade conflict with China.	发自纽黑文——美国总统特朗普似乎总想和全世界对着干，又把与中国爆发贸易冲突的可能性提了出来。


On August 14, he instructed the US Trade Representative to commence investigating Chinese infringement of intellectual property rights.	8月14日，他指示美国贸易代表着手调查中国侵犯知识产权的行为。


By framing this effort under Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974, the Trump administration could impose high and widespread tariffs on Chinese imports.	根据1974年《美国贸易法》第301条的规定，特朗普政府可以对中国商品征收高额且覆盖广泛的进口关税。


This is hardly an inconsequential development.	这一事态可不是无关紧要的。


While there may well be merit to the allegations, as documented in the latest “USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance,” punitive action would have serious consequences for US businesses and consumers.	尽管最新公布的《美国贸易代表就中国遵守WTO规则状况呈交国会的报告》中有足量证据支撑这些指控，但这种惩罚性行动将为美国企业和消费者带来严重的后果。


Like it or not, that is an inevitable result of the deeply entrenched codependent relationship between the world’s two largest economies.	无论喜欢与否，这是世界两个最大经济体之间根深蒂固的相互依赖关系所导致的必然结果。


In a codependent human relationship, when one party alters the terms of engagement, the other feels scorned and invariably responds in kind. The same can be expected of economies and their leaders.	在一个相互依赖的人际关系中，一旦某方改变参与条件，另一方就会觉得自己受了侮辱并以牙还牙，经济体及其领导人也是如此。


That means in a trade conflict, it is important to think about reciprocity – specifically, China’s response to an American action.	这意味着在贸易冲突中应该重点考虑双方的互惠关系——具体来说就是中国对美国行为的回应。


In fact, that was precisely the point made by China’s Ministry of Commerce in its official response to Trump’s gambit.	事实上这正是中国商务部对特朗普这一手的正式回应中所秉承的观点。


China, the ministry vowed, would “take all appropriate measures to resolutely safeguard its legitimate rights.”	中方表示将“采取一切适当措施坚决维护本国合法权益”。


Caught up in the bluster of the US accusations being leveled at China, little attention is being paid to the potential consequences of Chinese retaliation.	人们都在关注中国如何化解美国的恫吓，却几乎没有注意到一旦中国报复所带来的潜在后果。


Three economic consequences stand out.	而因此产生的经济后果会有三个：


First, imposing tariffs on imports of Chinese goods and services would be the functional equivalent of a tax hike on American consumers.	首先，对中国商品和服务征收的进口征收关税将起到等同于向美国消费者加税的作用。


Chinese producers’ unit labor costs are less than one fifth those of America’s other major foreign suppliers. By diverting US demand away from Chinese trade, the costs of imported goods would undoubtedly rise sharply.	由于中国生产者的单位劳动成本还不到美国其他主要外国供应商的1/5，一旦将美国需求从对华贸易中转移出来，进口货物的成本无疑将大幅上涨。


The possibility of higher import prices and potential spillover effects on underlying inflation would hit middle-class US workers, who have faced more than three decades of real wage stagnation, especially hard.	进口价格上涨的可能性及其潜在溢出效应对基础通胀的影响将令已经遭遇了三十多年实际工资停滞的中产阶级美国工人日子更加艰难。


Second, trade actions against China could lead to higher US interest rates.	其次，针对中国的贸易行动可能导致美国利率上涨。


Foreigners currently own about 30% of all US Treasury securities, with the latest official data putting Chinese ownership at $1.15 trillion in June 2017 – fully 19% of total foreign holdings and slightly higher than Japan’s $1.09 trillion.	外国人目前持有美国国债总额的30%左右，而最新官方数据显示，2017年6月中国持有其中的1. 15万亿美元——占外国持股总额的19％，略高于日本1.


In the event of new US tariffs, it seems reasonable to expect China to respond by reducing such purchases, reinforcing a strategy of asset diversification away from US dollar-based assets that has been under way for the past three years.	在美国施加新关税的情况下，可以预计中国会通过减少国债采购来进行应对，这也进一步强化了该国在过去三年以来推行的去美元资产多元化战略。


In an era of still-large US budget deficits – likely to go even higher in the aftermath of Trump administration tax cuts and spending initiatives – the lack of demand for Treasuries by the largest foreign owner could well put upward pressure on borrowing costs.	在美国财政赤字仍然庞大的时代——在特朗普政府减税和支出措施后可能还会膨胀一些——最大的外国持有者对国债缺乏需求可能会为美国的借款成本造成上升压力。


Third, with growth in US domestic demand still depressed, American companies need to rely more on external demand.	第三，由于美国国内需求的增长依然疲软，美国企业需要更多地依靠外部需求。


Yet the Trump administration seems all but oblivious to this component of the growth calculus.	然而特朗普政府似乎完全忘记了增长计算的这一组成部分。


It is threatening trade sanctions not only against China – America’s third-largest and fastest-growing major export market – but also against NAFTA partners Canada and Mexico (America’s largest and second-largest export markets, respectively).	它不仅威胁要对中国这个美国第三大和增长最快的主要出口市场实施制裁——而且还针对加拿大和墨西哥（分别为美国最大和第二大出口市场）这类北美自贸区合作伙伴。


As the reactive pathology of codependency would suggest, none of these countries can be expected to acquiesce to such measures without curtailing US access to their markets – a counter-response that could severely undermine the manufacturing revival that seems so central to the Trump presidency’s promise to “Make America Great Again.”	正如相互依赖的反应性病态所表现的那样，这些国家中没有一个会默默承受这些手段，而是会反过来削弱美国进入本国市场的渠道，而这可能会严重损害作为特朗普“让美国再次伟大起来”核心承诺的制造业复苏。


In the end, China’s economic leverage over America is largely the result of low US domestic saving.	最后，中国对美国的经济影响主要是美国国内储蓄率低迷的结果。


In the first quarter of 2017, the so-called net national saving rate – the combined depreciation-adjusted saving of businesses, households, and the government sector – stood at just 1.9% of national income, well below the longer-term average of 6.3% that prevailed over the final three decades of the twentieth century.	2017年第一季度，美国的所谓国民净储蓄率——企业，家庭和政府部门的计入折旧后的合共储蓄率——仅为国民收入的1. 9％，远低于在二十世纪最后三十年6.


Lacking in saving and wanting to consume and grow, the US must import surplus saving from abroad to close the gap, forcing it to run massive current-account and trade deficits with countries like China to attract the foreign capital.	3%的长期平均水平。 美国一方面缺乏储蓄，另一方面又要实现消费和增长，只得从海外进口过剩储蓄缩小差距，迫使其与中国等国产生巨额经常账户和贸易逆差来吸引外资。


It is sheer political chicanery to single out China, America’s NAFTA partners, or even Germany as the culprit in a saving-short US economy.	将中国，各北美自贸协定伙伴，甚至是德国归咎为美国储蓄短缺经济的罪魁祸首是一种政治诡计。


Fostering policies that encourage an economy to squander its saving and live beyond its means makes trade deficits a given – as are the seemingly unfair trading practices that may come with this Faustian bargain for foreign capital.	鼓励一个经济体去挥霍其储蓄以及超前消费的政策使得贸易逆差成为一种宿命——这种可能伴随着不择手段聚敛国外资本的讨价还价一同出现的，看似不公平的贸易操作也是如此。


The US ran trade deficits with 101 countries in 2016 – a multilateral external imbalance rooted in America’s chronic domestic saving problem.	美国在2016年对全球101个国家拥有贸易赤字——多边外部失衡源自于美国长期的国内储蓄问题。


The fix for this problem cannot be made in China.	这个问题的解决方案并不会来自于中国。


Ironically, with the Trump administration’s policies likely to lead to larger budget deficits that put national saving under additional downward pressure, the need for Chinese and other foreign capital will actually intensify and the codependency trap will only close more tightly.	具有讽刺意味的是，由于特朗普政府的政策有可能导致更大的预算赤字使得国家储蓄面临更大的下行压力，对中国和其他外国资本的需求实际上将会加剧，这种相互依赖陷阱只会越陷越深。


America does not hold the trump card in its economic relationship with China.	美国在与中国的经济关系中并非手握王牌。


The Trump administration can certainly put pressure on China, and, on one level, there may well be good reason to do so.	特朗普政府肯定会对中国施加压力，在某种程度上他们可能有足够的理由去这样做。


But deep questions concerning the consequences of such pressure have been all but ignored.	但是关于这种压力所导致后果的深刻问题一直都遭到了忽视。


Getting tough on China while ignoring those consequences could be a blunder of epic proportions.	而在忽视这些后果的同时对中国来硬的，很可能是个极为愚蠢的错误。


Can Trump Deal with North Korea and China?	特朗普能和中朝做交易吗？


CAMBRIDGE – For years, Americans have misunderstood the nuclear threat from North Korea, misjudging how to address it.	发自剑桥——那么多年以来，美国人都误解了朝鲜的核威胁，也误判了这个问题的解决路径；


They have also misunderstood the bilateral trade deficits with China, overestimating their importance.	他们还误解了美中两国间的双边贸易赤字，过度高估了其重要性。


Today, as President Donald Trump threatens new trade barriers against China, on which the United States must depend to help rein in an increasingly dangerous North Korea, these two issues have become closely connected. Yet US officials seem no closer to figuring them out.	如今随着特朗普总统威胁要对中国设立新的贸易壁垒，而美国又必须依靠这些壁垒来协助遏制日益危险的朝鲜，这两个问题已经变得紧密相连，可是美国官员在如何应对这两者方面似乎还没什么头绪。


The stakes obviously are much higher regarding North Korea, with US-South Korean joint military exercises this week aggravating already-high tensions.	在朝鲜身上冒的风险显然更高，上周的美韩联合军演又令本已紧绷的局势进一步恶化。


If the US and North Korea do get into a military confrontation, there is a real risk that nuclear weapons will be used. Even a conventional war would likely be catastrophic.	一旦美国和朝鲜发生军事对抗就会引发动用核武器的真实危机，而即使是一场常规战争也可能是灾难性的。


Trade is relevant to the North Korean nuclear challenge, because strict economic sanctions by China – potentially including a halt in oil supplies – are probably the world’s best bet for stopping the North’s nuclear program (in exchange for certain security guarantees from the US).	贸易与朝鲜的核挑战相关，因为中国的严厉经济制裁——可能包括停止石油供应——可能会是阻止朝鲜核计划（以换取美国某些安全保障）的最佳选择。


Trump may well understand this. But he apparently believes that he can use US trade with China as a bargaining chip to secure its help in dealing with North Korea.	特朗普或许非常明白这一点，但他显然相信自己可以利用美中贸易作为谈判筹码来换取中国出手协助处理朝鲜问题。


This is the wrong approach.	这个做法就是错误的。


Trump’s approach to governance – characterized by an unprecedented lack of interest in rules, principles, alliances, and institutions – is sometimes described as transactional.	特朗普的治理手法——以他本人对规则，原则，联盟和体制的极端漠视为特征——有时被描述为好像是在做交易。


Justifications of that approach typically focus on Trump’s business background, which supposedly makes him the dealmaker the US needs.	这种说法的依据通常来自于特朗普的商业背景，而大家原本期望他可以成为美国所需的交易高手。


In fact, Trump’s behavior reflects a lack of regard for some of the most elementary requirements for successful negotiation.	但事实上，特朗普的行为体现出他并没有考虑到一些实现成功谈判的最基本要素。


A skillful negotiator knows that one must look at the game from the other player’s viewpoint, in order to determine which outcomes they may view as favorable, and find common ground.	一位老练的谈判者知道自己得从对手角度来看待这场博弈，以便确定哪些结果能被双方确认为有利并找到共同点。


Moreover, concluding a deal requires credibility with respect to both inducements and punishments.	此外，缔结一项协议需要在威逼和利诱两方面都要说话算话。


Trump’s attempts at bargaining with China reflect a failure on both fronts.	而特朗普与中国谈判的尝试却在两方面都没有做好。


From China’s perspective, a nuclear-armed North Korea is undesirable, but still less problematic than the potential breakdown of order in the country, which could produce an influx of refugees into China and bring American troops closer to China’s border.	从中国的角度来看，一个拥有核武和朝鲜固然不可取，但至少比一个秩序全面奔溃的朝鲜要好，因为这可能会导致大量难民涌入中国同时让美军推进到本国边界。


Against this background, erratic US trade threats are not the way to convince China to apply pressure on its troublesome ally.	在这种背景下，反复无常的美国贸易威胁可没法说服中国去对自己那个爱惹麻烦的盟友施加压力。


Instead, the US, along with South Korea, should promise that, if Chinese-backed sanctions did cause the North Korean regime to collapse, China would not be confronted either by US troops north of the 38th parallel or by a unified, nuclear-armed Korean Peninsula.	相反，美国和韩国应该承诺：如果中国支持的制裁确实导致朝鲜政权崩溃，中国不会遭遇派驻三八线以北的美军部队或者一个统一且拥有核武装的朝鲜半岛。


In the shorter term, the US and South Korea should offer to pause the deployment of America’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea, if China adopts and enforces additional sanctions on the North.	如果想在短期内让中国对朝鲜采取和强加额外的制裁，美韩就应该暂停在韩国部署萨德导弹系统（THAAD）。


But credibility on the part of the US president is needed to make this – or any – strategy work.	但是做到这一点——或者任何——战略要求美国总统必须言而有信。


Unfortunately, Trump’s statements – whether about the past, the present, or the future – are often out of touch with reality.	不幸的是，特朗普的言论——无论是关于过去，现在或未来——往往都与现实脱节。


On the North Korean nuclear issue alone, he has shown a remarkable lack of consistency, credibility, and follow-through.	在朝核问题上他显然缺乏一贯性，可靠性和后续跟进意识。


In January, Trump tweeted that North Korea’s development of a nuclear weapon capable of reaching parts of the US “won’t happen!”	在今年1月，特朗普发推特说朝鲜研发出能到达美国部分地区的核武器“是不可能的！


By July, the North was testing an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the US, and it is believed that the country already possesses the capability to produce a miniaturized, ICBM-ready nuclear payload.	”结果到了7月，朝鲜已经在测试能够打到美国的洲际弹道导弹，且据信该国已经具备生产可以安装上洲际弹道导弹的小型化核弹头的能力。


Earlier this month, when Trump said that any North Korean threat “will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen,” North Korean leader Kim Jong-un responded by threatening to attack Guam.	而在本月初，特朗普表示任何来自朝鲜的威胁“都将遭遇前所未有的怒火与打击”，对此朝鲜领导人金正恩则以威胁袭击关岛的方式作出回应。


Instead of delivering fire and fury, Trump reiterated that if Kim “utters one threat in a form of an overt threat … he will truly regret it. And he will regret it fast.”	特朗普重申，如果金正日“以公然的方式发出威胁……他很快会悔恨不已的。


These statements clearly are neither credible nor accurate.	”但这些声明显然不可信也不准确。


Trump has displayed similar caprice and lack of follow-through with respect to China.	特朗普在跟中国打交道时表现出类似的善变和有头无尾。


In December, then-President-elect Trump challenged the “One China” policy that his predecessors, Democrats and Republicans alike, had respected.	在去年12月，即将接任总统的特朗普就挑战了他的民主党和共和前任所共同遵守的“一个中国”政策。


He either didn’t know that China is more willing to go to war over Taiwan than the US is, or was displaying his characteristic shortsightedness.	他这样做要么是没意识到中国可比美国更愿意去打一场台湾战争，要么就是在展示自己特有的短视。


In any case, on February 9, he had to reverse his position, losing face just a couple of weeks after his inauguration and setting a bad precedent for future deal-making with the strategically savvy Chinese.	无论如何他不得不在随后的2月9日扭转自己的立场，刚就职后几个礼拜就丢了面子，并为未来跟战略上精明老道的中国人做交易开了个坏头。


Likewise, Trump backed down on his oft-repeated promise that he would name China a currency manipulator as soon as he took office.	同样，特朗普曾一再承诺会在上任后就会把中国定性为货币操纵者，结果在这一点上又食了言。


It was a foolish threat all along – not least because, if Chinese authorities had stopped intervening in the foreign-exchange market in 2015-2016, the result would have been a weaker renminbi, not a stronger one.	其实这个威胁相当愚蠢——尤其因为如果中国当局在2015~16年期间没有出手干预外汇市场，那么结果将是一个更弱势的人民币，而非更强势。


By now, Chinese President Xi Jinping, like most world leaders, has learned to discount Trump’s warnings.	到目前为止，中国国家主席习近平和大多数世界领导人一样，已经学会了把特朗普的警告打折来听。


Trump’s statements suggesting a lack of loyalty to America’s allies – he took months to affirm his support for Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s bedrock collective-defense clause – have left even close US partners hesitant to make deals with his administration.	特朗普的声明表明他对美国的盟友缺乏忠诚——他花了好几个月的时间来才愿意确认自身对《北大西洋公约》第5条的支持，而这条正是为北约奠基的集体防御条款——让那些最亲密的合作伙伴都不敢贸然与他的政府达成协议。


The White House is still pursuing aggressive trade-policy measures against China, only some of which have any merit.	白宫仍然在对中国采取进攻性的贸易政策措施，但只有其中一些能占上风。


(While the effort to enforce intellectual property rights has some basis in reality, the attempt to block steel imports using a national-security exemption is farcical.)	（虽然推动知识产权保护的努力拥有一定的现实基础，但动用国家安全豁免权来阻止钢铁进口的做法是非常糟糕的）。


But these initiatives will not do much, if anything, for America’s trade balance, real income growth, or employment. And they certainly won’t convince China to help mitigate the North Korean nuclear threat.	但对于美国的贸易平衡，实际收入增长和就业而言，这些举措将不会起到太大作用，也肯定无法说服中国去帮助缓解朝鲜的核威胁。


The US Cannot Go It Alone On Iran	美国在伊朗问题上不可单打独斗


NEW YORK – US President Donald Trump has announced what was long anticipated: that he will not certify that Iran is complying with the July 2015 “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA) signed by the United States, China, Russia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Iran.	纽约—美国总统特朗普宣布了一件人们早已预料到的事：他不会认可伊朗遵守2015年7月与美国、中国、俄罗斯、法国、德国和英国签订的《全面联合行动计划》（JCPOA）。


Nor will he certify that the suspension of sanctions undertaken by the US as part of the agreement is justified and in the vital national interest of the US.	他也不会认可作为该协定一部分的美国暂停制裁是合理的、符合美国核心国家利益的。


To be clear, such certifications are not required by the JCPOA.	澄清一下，这样的认可并不是JCPOA的要求。


Rather, they are required every 90 days by a law enacted by the US Congress soon after the accord was signed.	相反，这是美国国会在协议签署后不久所实施的一部法律的规定，每90天就要认可一次。


It is also essential to underscore that Trump did not withdraw from the JCPOA itself.	同样重要的是要注意到特朗普并没有从JCPOA本身退出。


What he chose was a compromise: to make clear his disdain for the agreement without leaving it or reintroducing sanctions that were removed as part of it (a step that would be tantamount to US withdrawal).	他选择了妥协：明确表达自己对这份协定的鄙夷，而不退出这份协定，也不重启作为该协定一部分被取消的制裁（如果这样做的话，等同于美国撤出该协定）。


What happens next is unclear.	接下来会发生什么尚不清楚。


Congress has 60 days to reintroduce some or all of the suspended sanctions but is unlikely to do so.	国会有60天时间重启部分或全部被暂停的制裁，但它不太可能这样做。


It might, however, introduce new sanctions tied to Iran’s behavior in Syria or elsewhere in the region.	但是，它有可能根据伊朗在叙利亚和域内其他地方的行为，引入新的制裁。


Consistent with this, Trump announced his intention to place extra sanctions on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.	与此相一致，特朗普还宣布他准备对伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队实施额外制裁。


If the US were to impose new sanctions for any purpose at any time, it would likely find itself alone.	不论美国在什么时候，出于什么目的实施新的制裁，都有可能陷入孤军奋战。


The Europeans, China, and Russia are highly unlikely to join, not only because of financial self-interest, but also because Iran is in compliance with the JCPOA.	欧洲、中国和俄罗斯都不太可能加入美国的行列，不仅是出于金融自我利益的考虑，还是因为伊朗遵守JCPOA。


This is a point made by international inspectors operating under United Nations auspices, as well as by senior US officials, including Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis.	这是国际调查员在联合国的主持所做出的结论，并获得包括美国国防部长吉姆·马蒂斯（Jim Mattis）在内的美国高官的承认。


To argue, as some in America do, that Iran is not complying with the spirit of the JCPOA is meaningless: “spirit” is a phrase without legal standing.	一些美国人指出，伊朗没有遵守JCPOA的精神，这其实毫无意义：“精神”这个词没有法律地位。


And while it is fair to argue that much of what Iran is doing in the region is a legitimate cause for concern, it is not grounds for reintroducing sanctions under the accord.	伊朗在域内的所作所为大多确实构成了合理的关注原因，但这并是根据协议重启制裁的理由。


Renegotiating the JCPOA to extend the duration of several of its constraints, make inspections more intrusive, and expand its coverage to missiles is attractive in the abstract.	重新谈判JCPOA，延长某些约束条件的期限、让检查更加深入，并将检查覆盖面扩大到导弹绝对很具有吸引力。


But it is totally unworkable in practice, as Iran and most (or all) of the other signatories of the JCPOA would reject these demands.	但实际上完全不具有可操作性，因为伊朗和其他大部分（或者说全部）JCPOA签署国都将拒绝这些要求。


The threat to terminate US participation in the JCPOA if such changes are not made will thus prove either empty or self-defeating if carried out.	如果无法实现这样的改变，美国就有可能不再参与JCPOA，这样的威胁纯属虚张声势，即使兑现了也必然会失败。


None of this is meant to argue that the JCPOA is a good agreement.	所有这些都不是说JCPOA是一份好条约。


Still, Trump’s decision not to certify was unwarranted and ill-advised.	尽管如此，特朗普决定不认可它仍然是毫无必要、毫无道理的。


The agreement was the result of a collective effort.	该协定是集体努力的产物。


American unilateralism now could make forging a common front against Iran much more difficult in the future.	如今，美国单边主义可能导致未来结成反伊朗统一战线变得极端困难。


Trump’s move is also bad for US foreign policy.	特朗普的举动对于美国外交政策也十分不利。


There must be a presumption of continuity if a great power is to be great.	一个超级大国之所以是超级大国，一个必要的前提是其政策的连续性。


Unpredictability can provide a tactical advantage, but it is also a strategic liability.	反覆可能能够带来战术性优势，但必然是战略性负担。


Here there is an obvious link with North Korea.	这方面显然与朝鲜也有关。


At some point, the US may determine that diplomacy has a role in managing the North Korean nuclear and missile challenges.	也许有一天，美国会认为外交能够对管理朝鲜核和导弹挑战起积极作用。


But America’s ability to offer a credible diplomatic path will be seriously undermined if others judge that it cannot be trusted to stand by agreements.	但如果其他国家认为美国在遵守协定方面不可信任，那么其提出可信外交途径的能力就会大大受损。


There is also a more immediate problem: if the US sets in motion a dynamic that causes the JCPOA to unravel, and Iran resumes nuclear activities currently precluded by the accord, a crisis will erupt at a time when the US already has its hands full with North Korea.	还有一个更加紧迫的问题：如果美国开启了一个导致JCPOA崩溃的进程，使伊朗重新启动目前根据协议停止的核活动，就会在美国已经与朝鲜完全“翻脸”的情况下，爆发一场危机。


Despite these considerations, it would also be a mistake to focus just on the US announcement and not also on Iranian behavior.	尽管有这样那样的考虑，但只关注美国宣布了什么而不同时关注伊朗的动作，也是不正确的。


In the short run, the world needs to contend with an Iran that is an imperial power, one that seeks to remake large swaths of the Middle East in its image.	在短期，世界需要与作为帝国主义力量、寻求在中东打造庞大势力范围的伊朗角力。


What is needed is a policy of containment of Iran across the region – including support for the Kurds in northern Iraq and Syria, as well as of other groups and countries that are pushing back against Iran.	世界需要在整个地区内遏制伊朗的政策——包括支持伊拉克北部和叙利亚的库尔德人以及其他反抗伊朗的组织和国家。


In the longer run, the challenge is to deal with the JCPOA’s flaws, above all with its sunset provisions.	在长期，挑战在于如何应对JCPOA的缺陷，特别是其中的日落条款。


The agreement “parked” the nuclear problem, rather than resolving it.	该协定“挂起”了核问题，而没有解决它。


Important provisions of the accord will expire in either eight or 13 years.	协议的重要条款将在八年或13年后失效。


At that time, inspections will not prevent Iran from putting in place many of the prerequisites of a nuclear weapons program that could be made operational with little warning.	到那时，检查员就不能阻止伊朗部署多种核武器计划的前提条件，并且伊朗在不做出警告的情况下就可以启动计划。


It cannot be assumed, as some do, that Iran’s intentions and behavior will moderate over the next decade or 15 years.	一些人认为，在未来十年或15年中，伊朗的意图和行为将保持温和。


On the contrary, Iran is more likely to remain a hybrid regime in which a government coexists with a permanent religious authority and with powerful military forces and intelligence units that exercise considerable political influence and largely operate outside the government’s control.	不能做出这样的假设。 相反，伊朗更有可能保持混合制度，政府与永久性宗教当局共存，同时，强大的军事力量和情报机构拥有巨大的政治影响力，并基本不为政府所控制。


Dealing with an ambitious and powerful Iran thus entails a broad range of other open-ended challenges that define the ever-turbulent Middle East.	因此，对付一个野心勃勃的强大的伊朗将引出其他一系列有无限多种可能的挑战，它们将构成更加动荡的中东。


Without the JCPOA, however, those challenges would become even more daunting.	但是，没有JCPOA，这些挑战会变得更加艰巨。


The Iran Nuclear Deal Is Bad – and Necessary	伊朗核协议不好但却必要


TEL AVIV – US President Donald Trump has refused to certify the nuclear agreement with Iran, launching a process by which the US Congress could re-impose sanctions on the country.	特拉维夫——美国总统唐纳德·特朗普准备拒绝承认伊朗核协议，并启动可能导致美国国会重新对该国实施制裁的政治进程。


Fortunately, it seems likely that Congress, rather than pulling the plug on the deal, will seek some alternative that allows Trump to save face with his supporters, to whom he has long promised US withdrawal from the Iran deal.	幸运的是，国会很可能不会突然中断伊核协议，而是会寻求某种能让特朗普在支持者面前保留脸面的替代方案（这位美国总统一直承诺美国将退出伊核协议）。


Nonetheless, decertification is a serious mistake.	尽管如此，拒绝承认伊核协议将会犯下严重的错误。


Like many Israelis, I agree with Trump that the international agreement reached with Iran in 2015 is fundamentally a bad deal.	像许多以色列人一样，我同意特朗普的看法，认为2015年与伊朗达成的国际协议从本质上看非常糟糕。


But it is also a done deal.	但这又是一笔已经完成的交易。


Even if the United States does decide to withdraw from it completely, none of the other parties – not China or Russia or even the Europeans (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) – will follow suit.	即便美国真的决定完全退出伊核协议，该协议的其他缔约方——中国、俄罗斯甚至包括欧洲（法国、德国和英国）——都不会仿效美国的榜样。


Iran would continue to reap the agreement’s benefits.	伊朗依然会从伊核协议中继续收获好处。


At the same time, however, Iran could view the US decision to renege on the deal as justification for reviving its halted nuclear program.	但与此同时，伊朗可以将美国的违约行为作为其恢复已经停止的核计划的理由。


After all, the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act authorizes the US president to decertify the deal if Iran violates its terms.	毕竟，《伊朗核协议审查法案》授权美国总统在伊朗违反条约规定的情况下拒绝承认伊核协议内容。


And, at least technically, Iran has done no such thing.	但至少在技术上，伊朗从未这样做。


Of course, Iran’s behavior – developing powerful ballistic missiles, helping to spread terror across the Middle East, and running intensive cyber warfare campaigns – is deeply troubling, and measures should be taken to apply pressure on Iran to address these issues.	当然，伊朗的所作所为——研发威力强大的弹道导弹、协助在中东地区散播恐怖活动以及发动密集的网络战争——都令外界深感不安， 我们也应当采取措施施压伊朗制止这些行动。


But none of them was part of the nuclear deal.	但这些都不属于伊核协议的内容。


In this context, if Trump does decertify the Iran deal right now, it will undermine America’s credibility when it comes to reining in another nuclear threat: North Korea.	在这样的背景下，如果特朗普现在拒绝承认伊核协议，就会破坏美国在控制另一场核威胁，也就是朝鲜威胁方面的可信度。


If the US can default on its international commitments for no reason, why would Kim Jong-un bother to engage in negotiations?	如果美国可以毫无理由的违反已经做出的国际承诺，那么金正恩还有什么参与谈判的理由？


Kim might be an extremist of the first order, but his motivations are easy to discern.	金可能是顶级的极端主义分子，但他的动机很容易看清。


He views nuclear weapons as the ultimate insurance against a steep and ignominious fall, like those of Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein.	他把核武器看作是避免像利比亚卡扎菲和伊拉克侯赛因那样可耻的彻底失败的终极保险。


Moreover, however mighty the US military is, it cannot destroy North Korea’s nuclear arsenal without provoking a counterattack inflicting untold destruction on South Korea and perhaps also Japan – both close US allies.	此外，无论美国军队有多么强大，也无法在不招致毁灭韩国、或许还有日本的反击的情况下摧毁朝鲜的核武库——而韩日两国又都是美国的盟友。


That gives Kim substantial leverage.	金正恩也因此有了巨大的谈判空间。


The only possible way to deter Kim is through coercive diplomacy that compels him to freeze his nuclear program at something like its current level.	遏制金正恩唯一可行的办法是通过强制性外交手段迫使他将核计划冻结在目前的水平。


And it was just this sort of coercive diplomacy, backed by sanctions and a united position among major international actors, that compelled Iran to sign its own deal.	而恰恰是这种类型的强制性外交在制裁措施和主要国际势力统一立场的支持下曾经迫使伊朗签署核协议内容。


If such diplomacy loses its credibility, Kim will inevitably continue to expand his nuclear-weapons program, and global risks will rise exponentially – not least because neighbors like South Korea and Japan will be increasingly eager to develop their own nuclear weapons.	如果这样的外交手段失去可信度，金正恩将不可避免地继续扩大其核武计划，而全球风险将因此呈指数级上升——这不仅是因为像韩日这样的邻国将越来越迫切地希望研发本国核武器。


With that, the cause of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament – a goal that the US has pursued for almost 70 years – will be all but dead.	而在这样的情况下，核不扩散和裁军事业——这个美国已经为之努力了近70年的目标——将几乎陷入绝境。


The most immediate threat would be a decision by Iran to relaunch its own nuclear-weapon program.	伊朗决定重启本国核武计划是其中最直接的威胁。


Should that happen, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey would be virtually certain to pursue nuclear breakout.	如果发生这样的情况，埃及、沙特阿拉伯和土耳其几乎肯定会寻求核突围。


In fact, any third-rate dictator in the world watching these developments might decide to pursue nuclear weapons.	事实上，目睹上述进展的任何一个世界三流国家的独裁者都可能决定研发核武器。


The entire global order would be fundamentally changed.	整个全球秩序因此将从根本上遭到动摇。


North Korea is the proverbial horse that has broken the stable door and bolted.	朝鲜就像谚语中破门而出的那匹脱缰野马。


But, thanks to the current agreement, the Iranian horse remains in the barn.	但多亏签署了目前的协议，伊朗这匹马还被关在马厩中。


The US should be attempting to corral North Korea, not giving Iran reason to bolt, too.	美国应当想办法围堵朝鲜，而不是让伊朗这匹马也冲出马厩。


This does not mean that the US needs to be passive.	这并不是说美国需要消极等待。


In fact, the US should be preparing for a potential future Iranian nuclear breakout – a distinct possibility, even if the current deal is upheld.	事实上，美国应当为伊朗未来潜在的核突围准备好——即使目前的协议得以遵守，这样的可能性也是明确存在的。


Iran would be unlikely to pursue nuclear breakout immediately, because the deal still affords it substantial benefits.	伊朗不太可能立即开始进行核突围，因为伊核协议仍然能带给它巨大的好处。


A few years from now, however, those benefits would be largely secured, giving Iran less reason to stick to its promises.	不过，几年后，当上述利益在很大程度上得到保障，导致伊朗兑现承诺的理由变得没有那么充足。


Given this, rather than parting ways with the other parties that helped to negotiate the agreement, the US should be seeking a consensus on what would constitute an Iranian breakout, in order to help guide the inspections conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency.	有鉴于此，美国应当为协助指导国际原子能机构所进行的核查工作力求就遏制伊朗核突围的措施达成共识，而不是与协助谈判协议的其他各方分道扬镳。


The US should also coordinate with the agreement’s other signatories regarding the sanctions and other punishments that would be meted out if Iran actually did breach the deal.	美国还应当与协议其他签字方就如何实施制裁和其他惩罚措施达成共识，假使有一天伊朗真的违反协议内容。


For any of this to work, however, the “big American stick” must be present.	但要想真正达到效果，“美国大棒”必须是不可或缺的。


The US must be prepared, in terms of intelligence, weapons, and political will, to intervene – unilaterally, if needed – to stop Iran, should it try to follow in North Korea’s footsteps.	美国必须在情报、武器和实施干涉的政治意愿方面做好准备——如有必要甚至单方面采取行动——以阻止伊朗核计划，如果伊朗真的试图追随朝鲜的脚步。


Deal or no deal, Iran represents a serious threat – to Israel, of course, but also to the stability of the Middle East and, in a sense, of the whole world.	无论协议签署与否，伊朗都对外界构成严重的威胁——这种威胁不仅针对以色列，而且针对整个中东，甚至从某种意义上讲针对整个世界。


But, as of now, that threat is not existential.	但到目前为止，这种威胁并不是现实存在的。


Preventing it from becoming so should be a top priority today.	如今的头等大事应当是防止这种情况真的发生。


We in Israel who have been thinking seriously about this challenge for some time – not to mention working hard to prepare ourselves for various contingencies – recognize that, for now, our security is best served by maintaining the current deal.	我们这些一直在认真思考这一挑战——更不要说竭尽全力准备应对各种突发事件的以色列人——认为到目前为止，维护现有的伊核协议是我们最佳的安全保障。


Over the last 25 years, six countries have tried to turn themselves into nuclear states.	过去25年来，共有六个国家试图转型为核国家。


Two of them – Libya and South Africa – gave up.	其中两个——利比亚和南非——最终放弃了。


Another two – Syria and Iraq – were stopped.	而另外两个——叙利亚和伊拉克——被阻止了。


And two – Pakistan and North Korea – succeeded, in defiance of the international community.	还有两个——巴基斯坦和朝鲜——不顾国际社会的意愿成功地实现了这个目标。


We must ensure that Iran is not allowed to join their ranks.	我们必须确保不让伊朗加入他们的队伍。


And, so long as Iran remains compliant, the nuclear deal, however bad it is, remains our best chance to do just that.	而且，只要伊朗仍然遵守协定，这份核协议无论内容多么糟糕，仍然是我们阻止伊朗成为拥核国家的最好办法。


Trump the Destroyer	毁灭者特朗普


LONDON – With all the skill of an experienced arsonist, US President Donald Trump is preparing America for a firestorm.	伦敦——拥有经验丰富纵火犯的全副技能的美国总统唐纳德·特朗普正准备在美国点燃一把熊熊大火。


His actions have heightened insecurity, instability, and fear, while potentially making populations elsewhere in the world even more susceptible to political fire-starters.	他的所作所为加剧了不安全、不稳定和恐惧，并有可能导致世界其他地方的民众更容易受到政治点火者的威胁。


Voters in the United States who thought they were supporting the only capable firefighter around have been played.	那些认为自己支持了唯一一位能力出众的消防战士的美国选民其实被欺骗了。


But Trump has a knack for manipulating perceptions.	但特朗普长于操纵人们的看法。


To deflect attention from potentially incendiary policies, he launches baseless accusations against his supposed enemies – beginning with the media.	为转移人们对其煽动性政策的注意力，他开始对媒体这个所谓的敌人发动毫无根据的指责。


Portraying negative coverage as “fake news” has helped Trump to distract from scandals big and small: his family’s conflicts of interest, his dodgy business deals around the world, white supremacists among his senior staff, the rejection of ethics training for senior White House staff, and much else.	将负面报道冠之以“假消息”帮助特朗普分散了民众对大大小小丑闻的注意力：关于其家族利益冲突、他在世界各地狡猾的商业交易、其高级职员信奉白人至上主义、拒绝接受白宫高级职员道德培训，还有很多很多。


Perhaps the most prominent such scandal concerns the string of revelations tying Trump’s administration to Russia, including the resignation of National Security Adviser Michael Flynn over “misleading” the vice president about the nature of his pre-inauguration conversations with Russia’s ambassador to the US.	也许最著名的丑闻涉及将特朗普内阁与俄罗斯捆绑在一起的一系列爆料，包括国家安全顾问迈克尔·弗林因涉嫌在就职典礼前就其与俄驻美大使对话性质“误导”副总统而被迫辞职。


When the charge of “fake news” proved inadequate to silence the whispers, Trump pulled out the big (still imaginary) guns, tweeting that former President Barack Obama had Trump Tower’s “wires tapped” before the election.	当“假消息”的指责被证明无法压制人们的窃窃私语后，特郎普拿出了（仍然是臆想出来的）王牌武器，在推文中称前总统巴拉克·奥巴马在大选前“监听”特朗普大厦的对话。


Amid the bread and circuses, Trump continues along his path of demolition.	凭借这些小恩小惠和疯狂表演，特朗普继续坚持其毁灭之路。


His first proposed budget would slash funding for social programs, efforts to reduce drug use and trafficking, the arts, climate science, medical research, education, Meals on Wheels (food delivery for the elderly), financial assistance for low-income college students, the Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children, and much else.	他拟议中的首份预算案将大幅削减用于社会计划、减少毒品吸食贩运、气候科学、医疗研究、教育、老年人送餐、低收入大学生经济援助、妇女、婴儿及儿童营养补充方案以及其他许多计划的资金拨付。


He is determined to eliminate environmental protections as well: one of his first major actions was to eliminate a rule restricting coal companies from dumping mining waste into streams.	他还决心要废除环境保护：其主要行动之一是废除一项限制煤炭企业向河流中倾倒采矿废物的规则。


In the meantime, Trump will pursue his goal of drastically increasing defense spending, even as his policies put some members of US military families at risk of deportation.	与此同时，特朗普将大幅增加国防开支，即使他的政策使美国军事家族的某些成员有可能被驱逐。


Such moves are egregious, and companies must resist taking advantage of them, even if they seem to benefit the company in the short term.	这样的举措臭名昭著，企业必须抵制住利用这些措施来牟利的冲动，即使它们在短期内似乎能为企业带来好处。


Board members and executives must remember that they are also parents, children, partners, and friends.	董事会成员和高管必须记住自己同样是父母、子女、合作伙伴和朋友。


They should fear a future of overwhelming pollution, inadequate education, poor working conditions, increasingly extreme weather events, geopolitical conflict, and the destruction of programs and policies created to build a safer, more secure, and more prosperous future for all.	面对大规模污染、教育不足、工作条件恶劣、极端天气事件频繁发生、地缘政治冲突和旨在为所有人创造更安全、更繁荣未来的计划和政策遭到破坏，他们有理由感到担忧。


Trump is no leader; he cannot create, only distract and destroy – and put his name on what others have built.	特朗普根本不配作为领袖； 他不会创造，只会分散注意力和破坏——并抢夺他人建设的功劳。


That is also true of his proposed wall on the US border with Mexico, which will outshine all the buildings around the world – from Brazil to Indonesia – to which he has licensed his name.	拟议中在美国和墨西哥边境筑墙也是如此，这堵墙将令特朗普已经授权建造的从巴西到印度尼西亚的世界所有国家的建筑相形见绌。


In size, scope, and fame, the wall will surpass the Hoover Dam and Mount Rushmore.	无论从规模、范围还是知名度上，这堵墙都将超越胡佛大坝和拉什莫尔山。


No highway or airport named after a US president will come close.	没有哪条以美国总统名字命名的高速公路或机场能与之相比。


(The one thing on which Trump does not want his name is the Republicans’ widely derided new health-care proposal, intended to replace Obama’s signature Affordable Care Act.)	（特朗普唯独不想与共和党被普遍嘲笑的新医疗提案有关，这份提案正在取代标志奥巴马成就的平价医疗法案。 ）


What’s next?	接下来将如何发展？


Perhaps Trump will follow the example of Saparmurat Niyazov, Turkmenistan’s first president for life, and start renaming the months of the year, beginning with “Trumpuary.”	或许特朗普将效法土库曼斯坦第一任终身总统萨帕马尔图·尼亚佐夫的榜样以“Trumpuary”重新命名月份。


The absurdity need not end there.	荒诞剧还不一定就此结束。


Having already run roughshod over nepotism norms, why not, appoint his wife Vice President, as the presidents of Azerbaijan and Nicaragua have done.	在粗暴践踏了裙带主义规则后，为什么不像阿塞拜疆和尼加拉瓜总统一样任命自己的妻子当副总统。


Or he could start marching around in a faux military uniform, made to his own specifications (by a Trump Organization subsidiary and manufactured in China, of course).	或者他可以穿着按自制规格定制的假军服走来走去（由特郎普附属机构设计并且当然在中国制造）。


He already visited an aircraft carrier in a bomber jacket and cap.	他已经身着飞行员夹克和军帽参观了一搜航母。


Not even Trump believes his own act.	就连特朗普自己都不相信他的所作所为。


He certainly can’t sustain it for long.	他当然无法长期维持这样的状况。


His governance by id means that he will always reveal his true self, whether in the form of maniacal claims like those about being wiretapped, or when he reveals his true intentions by saying that his latest travel ban is just the old one watered down.	他的个人治理意味着他将永远展现真实的自我，无论是以遭窃听这种疯狂指责的形式，还是通过表露新旅行禁令不过是之前禁令掺水的翻版来揭示自己的真实意图。


So when does it all become too ludicrous?	那么，什么时候这一切才会变得太过荒唐？


At what point will commentators stop gushing that Trump has finally become “presidential” every time he sticks to a script?	什么时候评论员才能在每一次特朗普照章办事时不再说特朗普终于变得更像总统？


When they will stop treating every raving tweet as part of a rational plan?	他们什么时候才能不再将每一条疯狂的推特当作一项理性的计划？


Trump’s cohorts, many of whom are not accustomed to life in the spotlight, only make matters worse.	特朗普的很多追随者都不习惯在聚光灯下生活，这只能让局面进一步失控。


Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, for example, noting that he is “not a big media press access person,” flies around the world without a press entourage – unsurprising for a former CEO of a multinational oil company, but highly unusual for the top US diplomat.	例如国务卿雷克斯·蒂勒森公开表示他“不善于和媒体接触。 ”蒂勒森在没有新闻界陪同的情况下进行环球访问——这对一位前国际石油公司首席执行官而言并不值得大惊小怪，但对美国最高外交官而言却实在非同寻常。


And Tillerson cut short his trip to South Korea – in the midst of a growing crisis on the peninsula – due to fatigue (a reminder never to send a man to do a woman’s job).	而且蒂勒森在半岛危机愈演愈烈的情况下提前结束了他对韩国的访问——他对外界给出的理由是身体疲劳（这提醒人们永远不要让男人去做女人的工作）。


As Trump occupies himself with manipulating appearances and performances, the rest of the world is concerned about North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, the crisis in Syria, the Brexit negotiations, climate change, and the growing threat of starvation and famine in Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, and Nigeria.	在特朗普一心一意专注于外观和表演的时候，世界其他国家却因为朝鲜的核及导弹计划、叙利亚危机、英国脱欧谈判、气候变化和也门、索马里、南苏丹及尼日利亚的饥荒危机愈演愈烈而倍感担忧。


Against this background, the last thing the world needs is a volatile and unabashedly dishonest US president, much less one who likes to play with matches.	在这样的情况下，世界最不需要一个厚脸皮、不懂诚信、反复无常的美国总统，更不要说这位总统还喜欢玩火。


Making Crises Great Again	让危机死灰复燃


CAMBRIDGE – Debates about financial regulation tend to focus on quantity, not quality.	发自剑桥——有关金融监管的辩论往往侧重于数量而非质量。


But “more versus less” isn’t so much the issue; the details are.	但“更多与更少”其实不是核心问题；


And when it comes to financial reform in the United States, President Donald Trump is unlikely to get the details right.	因为细节才是真正的核心。 当谈到美国的金融改革时，唐纳德·特朗普总统不太可能得到正确的细节。


Earlier this month, Trump issued an executive order directing a comprehensive review of the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation of 2010.	本月早些时候，特朗普发布了一项行政命令，要求对2010年多德 - 弗兰克金融改革法案进行全面审查。


The administration’s goal is to scale back significantly the regulatory system put in place in response to the 2008 financial crisis. This is a risky move.	白宫的目标是大幅缩减针对2008年金融危机制定的监管体系，而这则堪称一项冒险的举动。


Dodd-Frank’s key features – such as higher capital requirements for banks, the establishment of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the designation of Systemically Important Financial Institutions, tough stress tests on banks, and enhanced transparency for derivatives – have strengthened the financial system considerably.	多德 - 弗兰克法案的主要内容——比如提高银行资本要求，建立消费者金融保护局，定义重要系统性金融机构，对银行进行严格的压力测试，以及提高衍生品的透明度——都极大巩固了金融系统。


Undermining or rescinding them would substantially increase the risk of an eventual recurrence of the 2007-2008 financial crisis.	而破坏或解除上述条款都将大大增加2007~08年金融危机最终卷土重来的风险。


This is not to say that current legislation could not be improved.	这并不是说现行法例没有改进的空间。


The most straightforward way to do that would be to restore some of the worthwhile features of the original plan that have been weakened or negated over the last seven years.	最直接的做法是恢复原计划中那些在过去七年中被削弱或否定的一些有价值的条款。


Dodd-Frank might, in theory, also benefit from a more efficient tradeoff between the compliance costs that banks and other financial institutions confront and the danger of systemic instability (in areas like the “Volcker Rule” restricting proprietary trading by banks).	理论上，多德-弗兰克法案也可以从银行及其他金融机构所承担的合规成本和系统性不稳定风险（在类似“沃尔克（Volcker）规则”限制银行自营交易的领域）之间的更有效权衡中获益。


But achieving this would be a difficult and delicate task.	但实现一点将是一个困难和微妙的任务。


Contrary to what some in the financial industry seem to believe, there is no evidence that Trump will manage it properly.	与金融行业中某些人的看法不同的是，没有证据表明特朗普会合理地管理它。


On the contrary, even before the review of Dodd-Frank gets going, Trump has already gotten financial regulation badly wrong.	相反，即使在审查多德-弗兰克法案之前，特朗普就已经严重误判了金融监管。


As Trump ordered the review of Dodd-Frank, he also suspended implementation, pending review, of the so-called fiduciary rule, adopted, after extensive preparation, by President Barack Obama’s administration.	在特朗普下令对多德-弗兰克进行审查的同时，他还暂停了在长期准备后由奥巴马政府通过的所谓受托规则（fiduciary rule）的执行，并将其放入等待审查的队列中。


The rule, which was supposed to take effect in April, is intended to ensure that professional financial advisers and brokers act in the best interests of their clients when collecting fees to advise them on assets invested through retirement plans.	该规则本应在4月生效，目的是确保专业财务顾问和经纪人在为客户提供退休计划资产投资提供咨询而收取费用时，能基于客户的最佳利益行事。


The need for such a rule is clear.	建立这样一条规则的必要性很明显。


Many investment advisers and brokers are motivated by conflicts of interest to recommend a stock, bond, or fund that is not quite as good as another.	许多投资顾问和经纪人都会基于利益冲突去推荐一些并非最优的股票，债券或基金。


For example, the adviser may receive an undisclosed commission or de facto “kickback” for recommending a particular product. It may be the advising firm’s own offering.	例如顾问可能收到私下的佣金或事实上的“回扣”来推荐特定产品，也可能来自于的咨询公司本身的奖励。


Because most investors assume that their advisers are obliged to act in their best interests, they don’t second-guess the recommendations.	由于大多数投资者都认为自己的顾问有义务为自己的最佳利益行事，因此也不会过多猜疑这些建议。


The end result is underperformance of the saver’s retirement account.	而最终的结果就是保险人的退休基金账户回报表现不佳。


Canceling the fiduciary rule would have no purpose other than to maximize financial institutions’ profits, at the expense of the average American family.	除了能以牺牲美国普通家庭为代价令金融机构的利润最大化之外，取消受托规则不会有其他结果。


The rule’s opponents make the argument that the requirement amounts to government overreach, because it deprives families of choices.	该规则的反对者认为这个要求相当于政府过度干预，因为它剥夺了家庭的选择权。


This is disingenuous, because it disregards the reason why savers seek the services of financial advisers in the first place: to help them figure out what investments best serve their interests.	这一说法非常虚伪，因为它忽视了储户寻求财务顾问服务的根本原因：帮助他们找出什么投资最适合自身利益。


A saver could always choose not to hire a financial adviser.	储户当然可以选择不雇用财务顾问。


Those who believe their judgment to be superior to that of the average investor can choose which individual assets or actively managed funds to buy and sell.	那些相信自身判断优于普通投资者的人可以选择买卖单一资产或积极管理型基金。


Such investors distill information on their own and have no need for a retirement savings adviser to help them sift through the huge variety of financial assets, products, and funds that is available, particularly in a country like the US.	这样的投资者会自己分析信息，没有必要聘请退休储蓄顾问来帮助他们筛选各种各样的金融资产，产品和基金，特别是在像美国这样的国家。


But there are downsides to this approach.	但这一做法有缺点。


Most investors who pursue it buy and sell too often, burn through a lot of money in cumulative transaction costs, and are unrealistically optimistic about their ability to pick winners or time the market.	大多数投资者会过度频繁交易，不但耗费大量交易成本，还会不切实际地高估自己选择优秀产品或选择入市时机的能力。


An alternative, recommended by most economists, would be for savers simply to park their money in broadly diversified low-cost funds, such as the index funds offered by Vanguard.	大多数经济学家推荐的另一种方法是，储蓄者只是把他们的钱投资于广泛多样化的低成本基金——比如Vanguard基金公司提供的各类指数基金。


Here, too, there is no need for a professional adviser.	这样做也不需要一个专业顾问。


Recommended allocations of individuals’ total financial wealth are something like 60% equities, 30% bonds, and 10% cash, depending mainly on the saver’s degree of risk aversion and need for liquid assets.	对个人总财产的推荐分配比例是60％的股票，30％的债券和10％的现金，主要取决于储户的风险延误程度以及对流动资产的需求。


Yet many small investors just can’t bring themselves to believe that index funds are the best they can do.	然而，许多小投资者不相信指数基金自己的最优选择。


Recognizing that they lack the time, skills, or interest necessary to invest their savings independently, they seek the services of an investment adviser.	在意识到自己缺乏独立投资储蓄所需的时间，技能或兴趣之后，他们转而求助于投资顾问。


They want to discuss their portfolios with an expert, with someone they can trust to give them good advice.	他们想和一个专业人士讨论自身投资组合，让一个可信的人给出好的投资建议。


But if that expert can’t be relied upon to put savers’ interests first, why are they collecting fees?	但是，如果这位专业人士不能把储蓄者的利益放在首位，他们又凭什么去收费呢？


Of course, not all financial advisers act contrary to their clients’ interests.	诚然，并非所有财务顾问都会损害其客户的利益。


Some apply a fiduciary standard in practice, to earn their clients’ trust, even though the law does not yet require them to do so.	即使法律尚未要求，有些人也会在工作中奉行受托准则以赢得客户的信任。


Truly ethical advisers tend to support Obama’s fiduciary rule, because the removal of unscrupulous competitors is good for their business.	真正有道德的投资顾问会倾向于支持奥巴马的受托规则，因为去除不道德的竞争对手将有利于扩大他们的业务。


In this sense, the financial industry is no different from the used-car business.	在这个意义上，金融行业与二手车业务没有什么不同。


The dealers who would oppose a law preventing them from turning back the odometer are probably the ones engaging in that practice.	那些反对禁止调低行车里程表法规的经销商可能就是实施这类做法的人。


Honest dealers would favor it as a way to level the playing field.	诚信的经销商会欢迎这一法规并将其视为实现公平竞争环境的方式。


They do not claim that such laws deprive consumers of the “choice” to buy a used car under fraudulent terms.	他们并不认为这些法律会剥夺了消费者购买作弊二手车的“选择权”。


It is in ordinary Americans’ best interest for the fiduciary rule to go into effect in April, as planned.	按计划在4月份实施受托规符合普通美国人的最大利益。


They would be best served if the Trump administration kept its hands off Obama’s other financial reforms, too.	而最符合这些利益的，莫过于特朗普政府不去染指奥巴马政府留下的其他金融改革。


How Trump Could Rebuild America	特朗普如何重建美国


BERKELEY – In the United States today, with partisan polarization at record levels, there is still at least one policy goal on which there is broad consensus, not only among Republicans and Democrats, but also among business and labor leaders, states and cities, and ordinary citizens: infrastructure.	伯克利—如今，美国党派极化堪称历史之最，但至少在一个政策目标上，存在广泛的共识，不仅共和党和民主党之间是如此，企业和劳工领袖之间、州和市之间、普通公民之间都是如此。 这个政策目标就是基础设施。


The US has been short-changing infrastructure for years.	美国基础设施短缺的情况已经维持了多年。


Historically, federal, state, and local governments have together invested about 2.5% of GDP in non-defense infrastructure assets.	历史上，联邦、州和地方政府用于非防务基础设施资产的投资总量大约为GDP的2.


But, over the last 35 years, federal investment as a share of GDP has dropped by more than half.	5%。 但在过去35年中，联邦投资占GDP之比下降了一大半。


For a long time, state and local governments were able to cover the shortfall, increasing their contribution to three quarters of total spending.	长期以来，州和地方政府能够弥补缺口，它们对基础设施的贡献已提高到支出总量的四分之三。


But when the Great Recession hit, states and cities were forced to slash their budgets.	结果，截至今年二季度，总公共基础设施支出下降到了GDP的1.


As a result, in the second quarter of this year, total public expenditure on infrastructure fell to an estimated 1.4% of GDP, the lowest share on record.	4%左右，为有记录以来的最低水平。


This is all the more worrying, given the already-poor state of US infrastructure, which earned a grade of D+ from the American Society of Civil Engineers in its 2017 quadrennial report.	更令人担忧的是，美国基础设施早已破败不已，美国土木工程师协会的2017年四年报给出了D+的评分。


Almost 20% of US highways are in disrepair.	将近20%的美国高速公路处于失修状态。


The costs and consequences of deferred maintenance are apparent everywhere, and almost every city and state has its horror stories: dysfunctional subways in New York City, lead-contaminated drinking water in Flint, Michigan, the near-collapse of a major dam in Oroville, California.	维护推迟的代价和后果随处可见，几乎每个城市和州，情况都惨不忍睹：瘫痪的纽约市地铁、被铅污染的密歇根州弗林特（Flint）饮用水系统、近乎溃堤的加利福尼亚州奥罗维尔（Oroville）大坝，等等。


The report estimates that restoring US infrastructure to “a state of good repair” would cost $4.6 trillion between 2016 and 2025.	报告估计，让美国基础设施恢复“修缮良好状态”需要在2016—2025年间投入4.


That is $2.1 trillion more than has been committed so far.	6万亿美元。 这比目前已经承诺的投资多2.


Developing new funding sources for infrastructure investment is therefore critical.	1万亿美元。 因此，为基础设施投资拓展新资金源至关重要。


An innovative strategy under discussion in Washington, DC, is linked to corporate-tax reform – a priority for President Donald Trump and congressional Republicans.	华盛顿正在讨论一个创新战略，它与公司税改革挂钩，而公司税改革则是特朗普总统个国会共和党的工作重点。


Under the current tax system, US multinationals can defer tax payments on their foreign earnings until the earnings are repatriated.	在当前税制下，美国跨国公司的海外利润在汇回美国之前不必纳税。


With foreign earnings growing and foreign corporate-tax rates falling, deferral has become increasingly attractive.	随着海外利润的增长和外国公司税率的下降，这项税收递延吸引力也越来越大。 结果是美国公司坐拥大约2.


As a result, US companies are holding an estimated $2.6 trillion in foreign earnings abroad, rather than repatriating it and paying taxes that could be used to finance, say, domestic infrastructure investment.	6万亿海外利润，而没有把这笔钱汇回美国、缴纳税收。 美国本可以用这些税款用于为（比如）国内基础设施投资融资。


Since 2013, the US Congress has floated several reform proposals to increase revenues collected on the stock of foreign earnings.	2013年后，美国国会提出了多项改革措施，意在提高来自海外利润存量的税收收入。


Two recent bipartisan bills – which seem to have the support of Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, among others – link such reforms directly to federal infrastructure funding.	两项最近的两党法案——众议长保罗·瑞恩（Paul Ryan）和其他人似乎对这两个法案持支持态度——将这些改革和联邦基础设施资金直接挂钩。


But Trump seems eager for state and local governments, which are in the strongest position to assess the needs of their communities, to shoulder much of the burden.	但特朗普似乎渴望让州和地方政府来主力承担这一负担。 州和地方政府能够更加便利地评估各自社区的需要。


Federal funding, he has signaled, would be limited to “high priority,” “transformative” national projects and used as leverage to encourage public-private partnerships (PPPs).	特朗普表示，联邦资金将仅限于“最重要的”、“变革性的”全国项目，用作撬动公私合作（PPP）的杠杆。


Private investors have long been eager to invest in public infrastructure – such as transportation or energy – in exchange for a share of those projects’ future revenues.	长期以来，私人投资者一直渴望投资于公共基础设施——如交通和能源——换取这些项目未来收入的分成。


Of course, private investors are generally not interested in projects that don’t generate revenue – such as, say, school libraries, urban “greenways,” or low-income housing – despite the importance of those projects for the economy and society.	当然，私人投资者一般对不能产生收入的项目不感兴趣——比如学校图书馆、城市“绿道”和经济适用房——尽管这些项目对于经济和社会至关重要。


In some areas, however, PPPs can offer substantial value.	但在一些领域，PPP可以巨大的价值。


Though private finance may be more expensive than tax-advantaged public finance, over a project’s entire life, a PPP can benefit its government partner in numerous ways: through innovation; reduced design, construction, and lifetime maintenance costs; and risk mitigation.	尽管私人融资可能比有税收优势的公共融资更加昂贵，但在项目的整个生命周期中，PPP能够在诸多方面得益于其政府合作伙伴：畅通无阻的创新； 设计、建造和生命周期维护成本的降低；


To date, PPPs have played only a minor role in infrastructure development in the US.	目前，PPP在美国基础设施开发方面只起到了次要作用。


Trump seems convinced that the problem is a lack of available private capital, and thus has proposed a tax plan that includes generous credits to encourage private investment in infrastructure.	特朗普似乎认为，问题在于可用私人资本不足，因此他提出的税收计划包括了慷慨的税收优惠以鼓励私人基础设施投资。


That is the wrong approach.	这是错误的方针。


What is really limiting private infrastructure investment is, to some extent, public opposition to the private ownership of public assets and, mainly, impediments to matching private capital with infrastructure opportunities.	从某种程度上说，真正限制私人基础设施投资的是公众反对私人拥有公共资产，以及（这才是主要原因）将私人资本与基础设施相匹配的障碍。


While 37 states have some form of enabling legislation and regulatory framework for infrastructure PPPs, there are wide disparities among states.	37个州都有基础设施PPP的促进立法和监管框架，但州与州之间的差异巨大。


Moreover, many states and localities lack the capacity to evaluate the costs and benefits of PPPs – a problem that President Barack Obama proposed solving with a new federal PPP knowledge center.	此外，许多州和地方没有能力评估PPP的成本和收益——奥巴马总统提出通过建立新的联邦PPP信息中心解决这个问题。


Ultimately, restoring America’s failing infrastructure will require what we call “progressive federalism”: harnessing the strengths of each level of government and working with the private sector to address pressing social and economic challenges.	说到底，重振美国破败的基础设施需要我们所谓的“进步联邦主义”：利用各级政府的优势，与私人部门合作解决紧迫的社会和经济挑战。


The federal government must promote national-level goals; impose tough criteria for project selection and rigorous performance metrics in construction and maintenance; and push state and local governments to eliminate bureaucratic red tape and costly internecine squabbles.	联邦政府必须推进全国性目标； 制定苛刻的遴选项目标准和严格的建设和维护表现指标；


From a financial perspective, it should provide adequate funding for projects of national and regional significance, and use its financial leverage to overcome obstacles and enforce best practices.	并推动州和地方政府取消官僚繁文缛节和代价高昂的内讧。 从金融角度，联邦政府应该提供足够的资金给具有全国和地区重要性的项目，并利用其金融杠杆克服障碍、执行最佳实践。


State governors and city mayors, for their part, must take the lead in setting state and local priorities, with each deciding whether to opt into national projects.	州长和市长则必须带头制定州和地方重点，各自决定是否加入全国项目。


And private investors can provide risk capital, innovation, and management expertise, both as contractors on publicly funded projects and as partners in revenue-generating projects.	私人投资者可以提供风险资本、创新和管理方面的专长，既可以充当公共融资项目的承包人，也可以作为能产生收入的项目的合作方。


To support such a process, we urge Congress to establish a “Commission on Twenty-First-Century Infrastructure,” co-chaired by teams from the National Governors Association (perhaps led by Republican Governor John Kasich of Ohio) and the Conference of Mayors (perhaps led by Democratic Mayor Eric Garcetti of Los Angeles).	为了支持这一过程，我们敦促国会建立一个“二十一世纪基础设施委员会”，由来自美国州长协会（National Governors Association，可以由俄亥俄州共和党州长约翰·卡西奇（John Kasich）为首）和市长联合会（Conference of Mayors，可以由洛杉矶市民主党市长埃里克·加尔赛第（Eric Garcetti）为首）的成员共同执掌。


The Commission should include business leaders and cabinet-level representatives of the Trump administration, like Secretary of Transportation Elaine Chao and National Economic Council Director Gary Cohn.	该委员会应该包括商界领袖和特朗普政府的内阁级别代表，如交通部长赵小兰和国家经济委员会主任加里·科恩（Gary Cohn）。


At a time when Americans seem to agree on little else, almost everyone agrees that it is time to rebuild the country’s infrastructure.	如今，在美国人几乎对所有问题都无法形成一致的时候，几乎每个人都同意必须重建美国的基础设施。


The task now is to turn consensus into action.	现在的任务是将共识转化为行动。


Trump’s Quixotic Energy Policy	特朗普异想天开的能源政策


MADRID – April 22, 2017 – International Earth Day – marks one year since the signing of the Paris climate agreement, which entered into force last November, and now has 195 signatories.	马德里—2017年4月22日——国际地球日——是巴黎气候协定签署一周年的日子。 巴黎气候协定在去年11月生效，目前有195个签署国。


That landmark multilateral treaty still represents the most important step forward to date in the global fight against climate change.	这一里程碑式的多边条约至今仍是全球遏制气候变化最重要的一步。


But its first anniversary has been darkened by US President Donald Trump’s energy policies.	但美国总统特朗普的能源政策给巴黎协定一周年纪念日蒙上了一层阴影。


In 2016, the hottest year on record, average global temperatures were 0.9º C above the twentieth-century average.	2016年是有记录以来最热的一年，地球平均温蒂比二十世纪平均水平高出0.


The Paris agreement’s main objective is to prevent average world temperatures from rising more than 2º C above pre-industrial levels by 2100.	9º C 。 巴黎协定的主要目标是在2100年前阻止世界平均温度较前工业化时代上升2℃以上。


Notably, developing countries such as China and India – the world’s largest and third-largest greenhouse-gas producers, respectively – have committed themselves to reaching this goal.	值得注意的是，发展中国，如分别是世界最大和第三大温室气体排放国的中国和印度，都承诺要达到这一目标。


The Paris agreement established a revolutionary new framework for such commitments: the “Nationally Determined Contributions”.	巴黎协定为这些承诺制定了革命性新框架：“国家自定贡献”（Nationally Determined Contributions，NDC）。


Each signatory country outlines in its NDC its voluntary contribution toward the common global goal of mitigating the impact of anthropogenic climate change.	每个签署国都列出自己的NDC，即其自愿为减轻人为气候变化的影响这一全球共同目标做出的贡献。


After suggesting during the presidential campaign that he would “cancel” the Paris agreement, Trump later claimed to be keeping “an open mind” about it.	特朗普在总统竞选期间表示他将“撤销”巴黎协定，随后又宣布对巴黎协定持“开放态度”。


But while the world waits to see what he decides, his administration has issued a budget blueprint that is hardly in line with the spirit of the accord.	但在世界坐等他做出决定时，他的政府发布了一份与协定精神背道而驰的预算蓝图。


Trump is proposing to eliminate federal funding for scientific research on climate change, and to slash the Environmental Protection Agency’s budget by nearly a third.	特朗普准备取消气候变化科学研究的联邦拨款，并将环境保护署的预算削减近三分之一。


As if that were not enough, he recently issued an executive order instructing government agencies to roll back the Obama-era Clean Power Plan, which was designed to limit emissions from coal-fired power plants, and promote renewable energies.	他似乎还意犹未尽，最近又发布行政令要求政府机构撤销奥巴马时代的清洁电力计划。 该计划的目的是限制来自燃煤电厂的排放和促进可再生能源。


“My administration is putting an end to the war on coal,” Trump declared while signing the order.	“我的政府将结束与煤炭的战争，”特朗普在签署行政令时宣布。


Trump went on to promise that he would deliver “clean coal, really clean coal.”	后来特朗普又承诺他将实现“清洁煤炭，真的清洁的煤炭”。


But “clean coal” is an oxymoron.	但“清洁煤炭”一词自相矛盾。


At best, we can aspire to cleaner coal, by implementing costly measures whose effectiveness is still debated among environmental experts.	充其量我们只能期待更加清洁的煤炭，通过采取效果在环境专家中间仍存在争议的高成本方法实现。


In any case, Trump’s policies are not likely to reverse the steady decline in US coal production.	无论如何，特朗普的政策不可能扭转美国煤炭产量稳步下滑的趋势。


And in the laxer regulatory environment Trump favors, so-called clean coal has no chance of competing with conventional coal.	而在特朗普所支持的比较宽松的监管环境下，所谓的情急煤炭根本没机会与常规煤炭竞争。


From a business standpoint, “clean coal” is viable only with the right incentives, not least a price on carbon.	从商业角度，“清洁煤炭”必须要辅之以正确的激励才可行，尤其是碳定价。


Moreover, the US coal industry will continue to lose out to another industry that Trump supports: shale-gas production.	此外，美国煤炭行业将继续被另一特特朗普所支持的行业压到喘不过气来：页岩气。


Over the last decade, increased shale-gas extraction has driven down the price of natural gas, rapidly eroding coal’s position in the US energy mix.	在过去十年中，页岩气开采量的上升 抑制了天然气价格，导致煤炭在美国能源消耗中的占比迅速下降。


While natural gas is also a fossil fuel, it generates only about half the CO2 that conventional coal does.	尽管天然气也属于化石燃料，但其产生的二氧化碳量只有常规煤炭的二分之一左右。


In principle, it is less harmful, so long as production is strictly controlled to prevent methane, the main component of natural gas, from leaking into the atmosphere.	理论上，它的破坏性更低，只要严格控制产量以防止其主要成分甲烷泄露到大气中。


Unfortunately, given the content of Trump’s executive order, such controls are not likely.	不幸的是，从特朗普的行政令看，很难采取如此严格的控制。


Though market forces alone will not give rise to a decarbonized economy, they do play a critical role.	尽管光靠市场力量无法带来去碳化的经济，但市场力量的作用是至关重要的。


And the private sector has come around to viewing renewable energies as a potentially profitable business.	私人部门也开始将可再生能源视为有潜在盈利能力的业务。


In the US, the cost of wind energy has fallen by two-thirds since 2009, and the cost of utility-scale solar energy has decreased by 85%.	在美国，风能成本自2009年以来下降了三分之二，而规模太阳能成本下降了85%。


In addition, according to a recent US Department of Energy report, the number of jobs in the wind and solar industries increased by 32% and 25%, respectively, in 2016 alone.	此外，据美国能源部的最新报告，风能和太阳能行业就业数量光是在2016年就分别增加了32%和25%。


Trump’s policy priorities will inevitably clash with those of states such as California, which has been taking the initiative to encourage climate-minded technological innovation.	特朗普的政策重点将不可避免地与加利福尼亚等州的政策重点发生冲突，加州一直在采取措施鼓励重视气候的科技创新。


And, fortunately for the planet, other global powers are not joining Trump in backing away from their climate commitments.	此外，其他全球大国都不准备和特朗普一起收回它们的气候承诺，这真是地球之幸。


China – which is acutely aware of its severe environmental problems – understands the socioeconomic boon that investment in renewable energies can provide.	中国非常明白其环境问题的严重性，清楚投资于可再生能源能够带来巨大的社会经济效益。


The European Commission does, too, with recent signs that economic growth can be decoupled from emissions having provided further encouragement.	欧盟委员会也是如此，最新迹象表明，经济增长可以与碳排放脱钩，这是一个令人欢欣鼓舞的消息。


Both Europe and China have also come to recognize the geostrategic advantages that renewable-energy sources confer – specifically, increased energy security, as vulnerability to natural disasters, and the threat of terrorism, decreases.	欧洲和中国也都意识到可再生能源资源所提供的地缘战略优势——即增加能源安全，因为有了可再生能源资源，自然灾害的影响和恐怖主义的威胁就会降低。


If anything, Trump’s policy of fossil-fuel promotion will end up undermining US energy independence, rather than strengthening it, as he claims, because it will allow other countries to take the lead on the central political and economic issue of the twenty-first century.	说到底，特朗普的化石燃料促进政策只能破坏，而无法如他所宣称的那样加强美国的能源独立性，因为这将让其他国家在二十一世纪的核心政治和经济问题上领先于美国。


The same can be said for his rejection of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which China is already trying to replace with a regional trade pact that would exclude the US.	他拒绝跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）的计划也是如此，中国已经开始试图用一个不包括美国的地区贸易协定取而代之。


Trump’s policies could also endanger the long-term commitments that the US made when it signed onto the Paris agreement, even if the immediate effects of his policies are limited by market factors.	特朗普的政策还可能影响到美国在签署巴黎协定时所许下的长期承诺，即使其政策的短期效应受到市场因素的遏制。


But if Trump does finally decide to abandon – rather than “cancel” – the agreement, that choice could have an even stronger negative impact on international efforts to reduce emissions – a point that even ExxonMobil has made.	但如果特朗普针对最终决定放弃——而不是“撤销”——巴黎协定，这一选择可能会带来更加严重的减排消极影响——就连埃克森美孚都做出了这样的判断。


The fight against climate change is far from over.	气候变化斗争远未结束。


If we maintain existing levels of greenhouse-gas emissions, we will fall short of the objectives established in Paris.	如果我们保持当前温室气体排放水平，就根本无从实现巴黎协定中确立的目标。


Regardless of how much markets come to favor renewable-energy sources, we will still need better national regulations – such as carbon pricing– to create economic incentives and manage negative externalities stemming from energy production.	无论市场多么青睐可再生能源资源，我们仍然需要更好的国际监管——如碳定价——来创造经济激励和管理源自能源生产的负外部性。


A stable climate is a global public good that can be achieved only through the kind of international coordination embodied in the Paris agreement.	稳定的气候是一项全球公共品，只能通过巴黎协定中所规定的国际合作来实现。


That is why we must defend it.	因此，我们必须捍卫巴黎协定。


Sowing doubt about the deal’s importance or the scientific evidence backing it up would be a ruinous error.	质疑巴黎协定的重要性和其背后的科学证据将是一个可怕的错误。


Why Business is Greener than Trump	商界比特朗普更绿色


LONDON – The relationship between business, politics, and the environment is about to become more complicated.	伦敦—商业、政治和环境之间的关系将变得更加复杂。


As US President Donald Trump’s administration threatens to dismantle vital environmental protections, some of which have existed for decades, business leaders are increasingly recognizing – and acting upon – the need for environmentally sustainable policies.	美国总统特朗普政府威胁要取消关键性环保措施，其中不乏一些已经存在了几十年之久的措施，而商界领袖日益认识到环境可持续政策的重要性——并据此展开行动。


Trump, who once called climate change a Chinese hoax intended to weaken the US economy, has already repealed the Stream Protection Rule, which bars coal producers from dumping waste into waterways.	特朗普曾经说气候变化是中国的骗局，目的是削弱美国经济。 如今他已经废除了溪流管理规则（Stream Protection Rule，该规则禁止煤炭生产商将废物倒入水域）。


Next on the chopping block may be the Clean Power Plan, which limits greenhouse-gas emissions from generating plants – by far the country’s largest source of CO2 emissions – with the goal of cutting carbon pollution from the power sector to 32% below 2005 levels by 2030.	下一个板上鱼肉可能是清洁电力计划（Clean Power Plan，该计划限制发电厂温室气体排量，目标是到2030年实现电力部门碳污染较2005年水平下降32%。 发电厂目前是美国最大的二氧化碳排放源）。


The Trump administration has even threatened to back out of the Paris climate agreement, to which the world’s governments committed in 2015.	特朗普政府甚至威胁要退出2015年各国政府做出承诺的巴黎气候协定。


A decade ago, business leaders would have largely welcomed such regressive environmental policies, which can lower costs and expand opportunities, by reducing constraints on their companies’ behavior.	十年前，商界领袖大多会欢迎这类退步环保政策，因为如此一来，公司行为约束就会减少，从而可以降低成本、增加机会。


But today, even as markets respond bullishly to Trump’s “business-friendly” pledges – not just deregulation and tax cuts, but also a trillion-dollar infrastructure plan that would include reviving coal – business leaders have remained cautious.	但如今，虽然市场对特朗普的“企业友好”政策——不仅包括去监管化和减税，也包括万亿美元规模的基础设施计划，其中包括复兴煤炭业的措施——反应积极，商界领袖仍然保持谨慎。


In particular, they have strong reservations about a potential withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement.	特别是，他们对于退出巴黎气候协定持强烈保留的态度。


Whatever benefits could be derived from a low-regulation economy would not offset the harm of reneging on environmental commitments that are viewed as vital to American business success.	低监管经济不论带来多少收益，都无法抵消放弃环境承诺所造成的伤害。 环境承诺被视为美国商业成功的关键。


Some are already making their voices heard on the matter.	已经有人为此发出声音。


Since Trump’s election, nearly 900 companies and investors, many of them American, have signed an open letter, “Business Backs Low Carbon,” calling on the administration not to withdraw the US from the Paris agreement.	自特朗普当选以来，近900家公司和投资者——其中许多来自美国——联署了一封公开信《商界支持低碳》（Business Backs Low Carbon），呼吁政府不要让美国退出巴黎协定。


These companies, which include large multinationals, believe that failure to build a low-carbon economy would jeopardize America’s prosperity.	这些公司包括一些跨国巨头，它们相信无法构建低碳经济将威胁到美国的繁荣。


There is compelling recent research to support this view.	令人信服的最新研究支持这一立场。


Last month, a study by Energy Innovation showed that elimination of the Clean Power Plan alone could cost the US $600 billion and cause 120,000 premature deaths by 2050.	上个月，能源创新（Energy Innovation）的一份研究表明，光是取消清洁电力计划一项措施就会在2050年之前给美国造成6,000亿美元的损失和120,000人过早死亡。


By contrast, efforts to build a more sustainable economy would bring far-reaching benefits.	相反，构建更加可持续的经济的措施将带来影响深远的收益。


A December 2016 report by the Risky Business Project, led by American CEOs and former municipal and federal leaders, shows that savings in fuel costs from an 80% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2050 could exceed the required capital investment by $150 billion.	由美国CEO和前市政和美联储领导人牵头的高风险商业项目（Risky Business Project）的2016年12月的报告指出， 到2050年削减80%的二氧化碳排放所节约的燃料成本将比所需要的资本投资多1,500亿美元。


Last January, the Business & Sustainable Development Commission, which I chair, estimated in its flagship report that companies could unlock $12 trillion globally in revenue and savings by pursuing sustainable business models.	去年1月，由我担任主任的商业和可持续发展委员会（Business & Sustainable Development Commission）在其旗舰报告中估算，全球而言，公司能够通过采取可持续商业模式释放12万亿收入和成本节约。


Such models can also create up to 380 million jobs by 2030 in key economic sectors, including food and agriculture, energy, transport, health, and municipal government.	可持续商业模式还能在2030年前创造多达3. 8亿个重要经济部门就业岗位，包括食品和农业、能源、交通、医疗和市政等。


In the energy sector alone, the opportunities are valued at $4.3 trillion.	光是在能源部门，可持续商业模式所带来的机会就价值4. 3万亿美元。


Corporate strategies are increasingly falling into line with these findings.	公司战略日益与这些发现一致。


In 2005, on the heels of Hurricane Katrina, which devastated the US Gulf Coast and affected a significant regional consumer base for Walmart, the company’s then-CEO Lee Scott delivered a telling speech, entitled “Twenty-First Century Leadership,” to all company employees.	2005年，卡特里娜飓风摧毁了墨西哥湾地区，动摇了沃尔玛公司为数巨大的地区消费基础，随后该公司时任CEO李·斯科特（Lee Scott）向公司全体员工发表了一份有力的演讲，题为《二十一世纪的领导力》（Twenty-First Century Leadership）。


Scott set significant environmental goals, as part of a broader vision for Walmart to become a more responsible corporate citizen.	斯科特制定了宏大的环境目标，作为沃尔玛整体愿景——成为更加负责的公司公民——的一部分。


Today, Walmart is a leading commercial solar and on-site renewable-energy user, deriving about 25% of its global energy consumption from renewable sources.	如今，沃尔玛是商业太阳能和现场可再生能源的领先用户，其全球总能源消费中有25%来自可再生资源。


(The company’s goal, set by Scott, is to rely entirely on renewables.)	（斯科特为公司制定的目标是完全依靠可再生能源。


By increasing the efficiency of its US fleet of trucks, Walmart avoided the emission of nearly 650,000 metric tons of CO2 from 2005 to 2015, and saved nearly $1 billion in 2016 alone.	）通过提升公司美国车队的效率，沃尔玛在2005—2015年期间减少排放近650,000吨二氧化碳，光是在2016年就节约了近10亿美元。


Another US company, Mars, Inc., is on a similar path.	另一家美国公司玛氏（Mars）也采取了类似的道路。


A signatory of the Business Backs Low Carbon letter, Mars is working to eliminate its greenhouse-gas emissions entirely by 2040, through greater efficiency and investment in renewable energy projects like wind turbines.	玛氏是《商界支持低碳》公开信的联署公司之一，正致力于通过提高效率和进行风能的可再生能源项目的投资，实现到2040年完全停止温室气体排放的目标。


The company’s CEO, Grant Reid, is also a member of the Business & Sustainable Development Commission.	公司CEO格兰特·里德（Grant Reid）也是商业和可持续发展委员会成员。


But, while business leadership and collective action are needed to create a sustainable and inclusive economy (a central message of our commission’s report), the private sector cannot do it alone.	但是，建立可持续的包容经济固然需要商界领导力和集体行动（这也是敝委员会的报告的核心观点之一），光靠私人部门的努力是不够的。


Government must be an active partner, helping to scale sustainable activities by creating market conditions that spur a “race to the top” and unlock the finance needed to keep America competitive and innovative.	政府也必须是积极的合作者，通过创造刺激“力争上游”的市场环境和释放保持美国竞争力和创新力所需要的资金来帮助扩大可持续行为。


So it is not enough simply to oppose Trump’s environmentally damaging policies; businesses need to get his administration on their side, so that the US authorities create an environment that encourages sustainable practices and green innovation.	因此，仅仅反对特朗普的危害环境的政策是不够的； 企业需要争取特朗普政府，从而让美国当局建立一个鼓励可持续行为和绿色创新的环境。


Such an environment could include carbon pricing, which a growing number of businesses are pursuing internally, and tax credits for carbon efficiency.	这样的环境可以包括碳定价（越来越多的企业已经开始在内部进行碳定价）、为碳效率提供税收优惠等。


Trump’s own businesses have benefited from such government interventions.	特朗普本人的企业也从这些政府干预中获益。


As the New York Times recently revealed, in 2012, Trump secured nearly $1 million in energy-efficiency incentives and low-interest loans from New York State.	《纽约时报》最近披露，2012年特朗普获得了纽约州近100万美元的能源效率激励和低息贷款。


A groundswell of support from CEOs, on a nonpartisan basis, could be the key to spurring the needed action.	来自打破党派藩篱的CEO的强烈支持也许是刺激采取必要行动的关键。


Before the Paris climate conference, politicians knew that environmental activists wanted a deal to limit climate change; arguably, what ultimately drove them to act, however, was finding out that CEOs and boards felt the same way.	巴黎气候会议召开前，政客们都知道环保积极分子想要一个限制气候变化的协议； 但是，最终促使他们行动的不如说是他们发现CEO和董事会也有这样的愿望。


Business leaders need to show Trump that they are not cheerleaders for coal, pollution, and global warming.	商界领袖需要向特朗普表明他们绝非煤炭、污染和全球变暖的拥趸。


They are determined champions of an enlightened environmentalism that is in the interest of all their stakeholders – customers, shareholders, employees, and the communities in which they operate.	他们是意志坚定的开明环保主义者，因为这符合他们的所有相关利益方的利益——包括客户、股东、员工和企业所在社区。


The Return of the Madman Theory	狂人理论的回归


MOSCOW – In the 1970s, US President Richard Nixon instructed Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to convince the leaders of hostile communist countries that he could be erratic and volatile, particularly when under pressure.	莫斯科——20世纪70年代，美国总统理查德·尼克松指示国务卿亨利·基辛格说服敌对共产主义国家领导人尤其在承受压力时，他可能情绪非常不稳定并且容易冲动。


Kissinger, a shrewd practitioner of Realpolitik, saw the potential in this approach, which he readily implemented.	基辛格是个精明的实力政治信奉者，他看到了这个方法所蕴含的潜力，并心甘情愿地予以执行。


With that, the “madman theory” of diplomacy was born.	外交“狂人理论”正是以这种方式正式诞生。


Nixon was far from mad, though his heavy drinking at the height of the Watergate scandal prompted Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger to establish a way to monitor his control of the nuclear codes.	尼克松离疯狂还差得很远，尽管他在水门丑闻高潮时期的疯狂酗酒行为曾促使基辛格和国防部长詹姆斯·施莱辛格设计了一套针对他对核密码控制权的监控手段。


Nixon’s goal in trumpeting his supposed erratic nature was to stoke fear among his foreign adversaries that making him angry or stressed could result in an irrational – even nuclear – response, thereby impelling them to check their own behavior.	尼克松鼓吹他所谓情绪不稳定的性格特质其目的就是要在外国对手间引起恐惧，让他们知道他生气或承受压力时可能作出非理性——甚至是核打击——反应，从而促使他们控制自己的行为。


Today, with Donald Trump leading the United States, the madman doctrine is back with a vengeance.	今天在唐纳德·特朗普的领导下，狂人主义再次报复性回归。


But, this time around, it is far less clear that it’s just an act, and that Trump would not really decide, in a fit of rage or frustration, to attack, or even nuke, his opponents.	但这一次，人们不敢肯定这仅仅是一种表演，也无法肯定特朗普不会真的在愤怒或沮丧的状态之下决定向他的对手发动常规乃至核打击。


Exhibit A in a hearing on Trump’s sanity would have to be his recent address to the United Nations General Assembly, which resembled the lunatic ramblings of Aerys Targaryen, the “mad king” in the television show “Game of Thrones.”	有关特朗普精神是否健全听证会的附录A是他最近对联合国大会的讲话，这次讲话与电视连续剧《权力游戏》中的疯子国王伊里斯·坦格利安漫无边际的疯话非常相似。


Putting his own spin on Targaryen’s infamous line “burn them all,” Trump threatened that the US would “totally destroy” North Korea if it continues to develop its nuclear program.	以坦格利安臭名昭著的台词“把他们都烧死”作为他讲话的高潮段落，特朗普威胁如果朝鲜继续进行核武器研发它将被美国所“彻底摧毁”。


In the same speech, Trump also savaged the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran.	在同一篇讲话中，特朗普还抨击了2015年与伊朗签订的核协议。


As he spoke, his chief of staff, retired US Marine Corps General John Kelly, who was appointed in July to bring order and a degree of stability to Trump’s White House sanitarium, could be seen with his head in his hands, as if in shock or despair.	在他讲话时，人们看到7月刚刚受命负责为特朗普白宫疯人院注入秩序和某种程度稳定的参谋长美国退休海军陆战队将军约翰·凯利双手抱头，似乎无法摆脱震惊或绝望的情绪。


Many Americans have perhaps grown desensitized to Trump’s off-the-wall tirades, having endured months of his late-night Twitter assaults on the press, his opponents and fellow Republicans, even his own cabinet members.	许多美国人或许已经习惯了特朗普疯疯癫癫的长篇大论，因为他们已经见识过这位总统对反对者及共和党同事、甚至他自己内阁成员的长达几个月的深夜推特攻击。


The famously thin-skinned Trump has shown that, when provoked or insulted, he can be counted on to retaliate.	以神经过敏而闻名于世的特朗普已经向世人表明在遭到挑衅或侮辱的情况下，他一定会展开报复。


But, unlike many of Trump’s previous unhinged ramblings, the UN speech was read from a teleprompter, which means that it was vetted ahead of time.	但和特朗普之前漫无边际的讲话不同，他在联合国演讲时使用了电子提词装置，这意味着这次演讲的内容已经经过了事先审核。


Those who thought that the “grownups” in Trump’s administration – Kelly, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, and National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster – would keep US security strategy within the bounds of reason might need to think again.	那些认为特朗普内阁中的“成年人”——包括凯利、国防部长吉姆·马蒂斯和国家安全顾问麦克马斯特——能够确保美国安全战略处于理性限度之内的人现在可能需要重新考虑。


Perhaps the maddest part of all is Trump’s apparent calculation that North Korea’s boy-king Kim Jong-un might cower in the face of his threats.	也许这一切中最疯狂的是特朗普明显认为朝鲜的男孩国王金正恩面对他的威胁有可能退缩。


After President Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union an “evil empire” in 1983, he was advised not to repeat it, in the interest of improving the bilateral relationship.	在罗纳德·里根总统1983年将苏联称为“邪恶帝国”后，他被告知不要再重复这样的说法，而这样做是为了改善双边关系。


Recognizing the importance of such an improvement for mitigating the nuclear threat, Reagan followed his advisers’ counsel.	认识到上述改善对缓解核威胁的重要性后，里根接受了顾问的建议。


The same cannot be said of Trump, who surely has been warned of the dangers of hurling insults like “Rocket Man” at the brutal and inexperienced Kim.	我们不能同样相信特朗普，因为他之前肯定已经收到过将残暴而又缺乏经验的金正恩辱骂为“火箭人”可能造成的危险的警示。


When Nixon adopted his own “mad” persona, he was in some ways drawing on the example of Nikita Khrushchev, my grandfather and Nixon’s adversary during his tenure as US vice president.	当尼克松披上“狂人”伪装时，他其实是在某种程度上借鉴了赫鲁晓夫的实例，赫鲁晓夫既是我的祖父，也是尼克松在担任美国副总统期间的对手。


In the so-called “kitchen debate” of 1959 – one of the Cold War’s weirdest moments – Nixon sparred with Khrushchev in Moscow over the superiority of capitalism over socialism.	在1959年所谓“厨房辩论”——也是冷战时期最怪异的时刻之一——期间，尼克松和赫鲁晓夫在莫斯科就资本主义相对于社会主义的优越性进行了激烈的争辩。


A year later, at the UN General Assembly in New York, Khrushchev made quite the appearance.	一年后，在纽约联大上，赫鲁晓夫相当出名。


Cuba’s new revolutionary leader Fidel Castro was, as was his wont, flamboyantly issuing extravagant threats.	古巴的新任革命领导人菲德尔·卡斯特罗就像他所习惯的那样，毫不犹豫地发出种种荒谬的威胁。


Not to be outdone, “Hurricane Nikita” used every opportunity to stir the diplomatic pot, whistling and banging his fists – and even, allegedly, his shoe – on the desk.	不甘落后的“尼基塔飓风”抓住一切机会搅动外交这趟浑水，边吹口哨边拍桌子——甚至据说脱下鞋子来敲打桌面。


There was abundant evidence that Western powers had been trying to hoodwink the Soviet Union.	有大量证据表明西方强国一直在试图蒙蔽苏联。


A U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, which President Dwight Eisenhower had denied existed, had been shot down over Soviet territory.	一架被德怀特·艾森豪威尔总统否认存在的U2侦察机却在苏联领空范围内被击落。


Moreover, the US had demanded that the Soviet Union respect the Monroe Doctrine, which assigned Latin America to America’s sphere of interest, but was unwilling to accept Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.	不仅如此，美国曾经要求苏联尊重门罗主义，而门罗主义在规定拉美是美国势力范围的同时，却不愿接受苏联在东欧地区的霸权。


And it had dismissed a Soviet-initiated disarmament plan, the first official attempt at peaceful coexistence, out of hand.	美国还否决了一项由苏联提议的裁军计划，这也是第一份尝试实现和平共处的正式文件。


The West, Khrushchev thought, didn’t take him seriously.	赫鲁晓夫认为西方没有把他当回事。


This is why he acted so outrageously at the UN.	他因此在联合国表现得如此愤怒。


He behaved, he explained later, as the early Bolsheviks would: when you disagree with an opponent, you must make your argument loud and clear – and drown theirs with noise.	他后来解释说，他的表现仿效了早期的布尔什维克：当无法与竞争对手达成一致时，必须明确而响亮的表达你的观点——并用噪声完全盖过对方的陈述。


In 1962, Khrushchev took this approach a step further, testing the young President John F. Kennedy with a “mad” plan to install nuclear missiles in Cuba.	1962年，赫鲁晓夫又将这种策略推进了一步，用一份在古巴部署核导弹的“疯狂”计划来测试年轻的总统约翰·F·肯尼迪。


The move triggered the Cuban Missile Crisis, the most dangerous standoff of the Cold War.	此举触发了古巴导弹危机，也是冷战期间美苏双方最危险的对峙。


But JFK did not cower, nor did he respond with bluster.	但约翰·F·肯尼迪并没有退缩，他也没有做出气势汹汹的反应。


Instead, he cleverly ignored Khrushchev’s threats, and instead responded to a letter that showed the Soviet premier as a rational leader negotiating for parity in world affairs.	相反，他巧妙地忽略了赫鲁晓夫的威胁，而选择对一封证明这位苏联总理其实是位理性领导人，不过是想在世界事务中借谈判来寻求平等地位的书信做出反应。


That cool calculation enabled JFK and Khrushchev to defuse tensions, saving the world from nuclear conflict.	那次冷静的思考使得肯尼迪和赫鲁晓夫缓和了紧张局势，并使世界摆脱了核冲突。


The world must now hope that Trump can begin to act as coolly in assessing Kim as JFK was dealing with Khrushchev.	世界现在必须期待特朗普能够开始像肯尼迪对待赫鲁晓夫那样来冷静地评估金正恩。


Kim responded to Trump’s UN speech by calling him “mentally deranged” and a “dotard.”	金正恩用“精神错乱”和“老糊涂”来回应特朗普在联合国的演讲。


Either Trump’s madman act is working, or Kim is more right than he – or the rest of us – would like.	要么是特朗普的狂人表演太过成功，要么是金正恩的观点比他和我们其他人愿意承认的有更多正确的成分。


Donald Trump’s Climate Fantasies	唐纳德·特朗普的气候幻想


NEW YORK – Legend holds that King Canute brought his flatterers to the sea to show them that even a king could not command the ocean waves, that the laws of nature are more powerful than the decrees of men.	纽约——传奇故事记载卡努特国王曾把他的奉承者带到海边，向他们展示即使国王也无法指挥海浪，告诉他们自然规律比人类的法令更强大。


So pity Donald Trump, who really believes that his executive orders can hold back the tides.	可惜唐纳德·特朗普打心底里相信他的行政命令可以挡住海浪。


Trump is surrounded by cronies rather than flatterers, and they and their foolish, ignorant king believe that by denying climate change they can restore the wealth and glory of coal, oil, and gas.	特朗普的周围都是密友而不是阿谀奉承者，他们和他们愚蠢无知的国王认为否认气候变化就可以恢复煤炭、石油和天然气的财富和荣光。


They are wrong.	他们想错了。


Greed will not reverse human-caused climate change, and Trump’s executive orders will not stop the global process of phasing out coal, oil, and gas in favor of wind, solar, hydro, nuclear, geothermal, and other low-carbon energy sources.	贪婪不会扭转人为的气候变化，而特朗普的行政命令也不会阻止全球逐步淘汰煤炭、石油和天然气、并代之以风能、太阳能、水电、核能，地热等低碳能源的步伐。


In less than 100 days, we have learned that Trump is a man living in a fantasy world.	不到100天，我们就清楚地看到特朗普生活在幻想的世界当中。 他发布政令、吼叫着发布命令，半夜发布推特，但这些都于事无补。


He issues decrees, barks orders, sends out midnight Tweets, but to no avail.	切实存在、而不是他专事“掩盖”的事实——不断拆穿他的谎话。 这些事实既有物理规律；


The facts – real ones, not his “alternative” variety – keep intervening.	也有法律； 法庭裁决；


There is physics; there is law; there are courts; there are procedures; and there are voters, only 36% of whom approve of Trump’s job performance.	程序； 还有选民，仅有36%的选民满意特朗普的工作表现。


There is also China, which wins technologically and diplomatically from every self-defeating move by the incompetent US president.	此外还有中国，中国在技术和外交领域从这个无能的美国总统所做出的每一项自我毁灭的举动中受益。


The latest fantasy involves climate change.	最新的幻想涉及气候变化问题。


Trump has issued executive orders that he claims will reverse former President Barack Obama’s climate policies.	特朗普已经发布行政命令，声称将扭转前总统巴拉克·奥巴马的气候政策。 他的命令将废除美国环保署的“清洁能源计划”规定；


His orders would rescind the Clean Power Plan regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency; roll back standards to control methane releases from oil and gas production and distribution; and end the regulatory use of a “social cost of carbon,” introduced by the EPA to calibrate the dollar value of climate damage caused by the emission of an additional ton of carbon dioxide.	压低石油和天然气生产及运输所产生的甲烷排放的控制标准； 并结束环保署所颁布的“碳社会成本”的使用规则，实行这项规则的目的是要衡量气候损害所造成的额外二氧化碳排放的美元价格。


According to Trump, these new measures will create new jobs in the coal sector, achieve US “energy independence,” and boost economic growth.	按照特朗普的说法，这些新举措将在煤炭行业创造新的工作岗位，实现美国“能源独立”，并促进经济增长。


In addition, Trump recently authorized the building of the Keystone XL pipeline from Alberta, Canada to the US state of Nebraska, with the purpose of linking Canada’s oil sands to oil refineries in the US.	不仅如此，特朗普最近授权修建从加拿大艾伯塔省到美国内布拉斯加州的基斯顿输油管道，目的是实现加拿大油砂与美国炼油厂之间的连通。


Obama had rejected that project on the grounds that it would aggravate global warming.	奥巴马曾以恶化全球变暖为理由拒绝批准这个项目。


Trump’s overriding motivation is to serve the economic interests of the US coal, oil, and gas industries, which provide ample campaign financing and media backing for the Republicans in Congress and in state governments across the country.	特朗普最主要的动机是服务于美国煤炭、石油和天然气行业的经济利益，上述行业为国会和州政府共和党人提供充足的竞选资金和媒体支持。


In short, this is political corruption: government policies in exchange for campaign funds.	简言之，这是一种政治腐败：用政府政策来交换竞选资金。


ExxonMobil, Chevron, the US Chamber of Commerce, and Koch Industries are all major players, and almost all of the Republican members of Congress are implicated in this disgraceful behavior.	埃克森美孚、雪弗龙、美国商会和科赫工业都是主要的参与者，几乎所有共和党国会议员都参与了这种可耻的行动。


They are prepared to look like fools in public – denying climate science and global warming – as long as it keeps the campaign money flowing.	他们准备在公众面前扮演傻瓜——否认气候科学和全球变暖——只要这样做能维持竞选资金流。


Whether or not Trump himself is foolish enough to believe what he says, he knows that his executive orders play into the sweet spot of Republican power.	无论特朗普自己是否能蠢到相信自己所说的话，他都清楚自己的行政命令能让共和党当权派笑逐颜开。


But, as with so many of Trump’s decisions, there is more bark than bite, more bluster than reality.	但就像特朗普所做的太多决定一样，他的所作所为更多是言胜于实，耀武扬威。


First, Trump can’t stop the waves, or the rising ocean levels in the case of global warming.	首先，特朗普无法阻止海浪，也无法阻止全球变暖所导致的海平面上升。


The science is real, even if Trump is happy to show off his scientific ignorance.	科学是真实的，即使特朗普乐于宣扬他对科学的无知。


Second, the world knows it’s real.	其次，世界知道全球变暖是真实的。


Every UN member state signed the Paris climate agreement in 2015.	所有联合国成员国都在2015年签署了巴黎气候协定。


The planet has just experienced the hottest three years on record.	这个星球刚刚经历了有史以来最热的三年。


The oceans are warming dramatically (recently damaging 93% of Australia’s Great Barrier Reef in the process).	海洋温度正在大幅变暖（最近已经导致93%的澳大利亚大堡礁被损害）。


Trump’s cynicism and ignorance will change no minds and will attract no followers globally.	特朗普的愤世嫉俗和无知无法改变人们的意志，也不能在全球范围内吸引追随者。