In addition, given that local-government debt comprises 27% of China’s 2010 GDP, while central government debt and policy loans stand at 20% and 6% of GDP, respectively, the total public debt-to-GDP ratio is approximately 53% – lower than Germany’s.	此外，由于地方政府债务占中国2010年GDP的27%，而中央政府债务和政策贷款分别占20%和6%，因此中国的债务-GDP比率总水平大约为53%，低于德国。


So, while China should not be complacent about local-government debt, panic is unwarranted.	因此，尽管中国的地方政府债务不能说高枕无忧，但也没有理由需要恐慌。


Finally, there is a long history of underground lending and borrowing in some of China’s east coast region, especially in Wenzhou.	最后，在中国东部沿海地区（特别是温州），地下借贷由来已久。


Whenever monetary tightening causes bank credit to shrink, small and medium-size private enterprises are prepared to borrow at suicidally high interest rates from relatives or loan sharks.	只要货币紧缩导致银行信用收缩，中小规模私人企业就准备以极高的利率从亲朋好友和高利贷公司借款。


In recent years, real-estate speculation has become another important source of demand for underground loans.	近几年来，房地产投机已成为地下贷款的有一大重要需求源。


When real asset prices fall and cause local credit networks to collapse, not only are hundreds of families left financially shattered and enterprises bankrupted, but banks suffer collateral damage, as occurred recently in the Wenzhou region.	当真实资产价格下跌并导致地方信用网络崩溃时，不但数以千计的家庭和企业陷入破产状况，银行也会遭受抵押品损失，最近在温州所发生的事情就是明证。


But the severity of Wenzhou’s underground credit crisis has been exaggerated.	但温州地下信用危机的严重性被夸大了。


In fact, Wenzhou’s underground credit accounts for less than 20% of total credit in the region, while the region accounts for less than 1% of China’s GDP.	事实上，温州的地下信用只占该地区信用总量的20%，而该地区占中国GDP的比重还不到1%。


The total volume of affected bank credit in the crisis was just above RMB3 billion – roughly 0.5% of bank loans in the Wenzhou region.	这场危机所涉及的银行信用总量大约略高于30亿人民币，大约为温州地区银行贷款总量的0.


So, the damage that the breakdown of Wenzhou’s underground credit networks has inflicted on the regional banking system is limited, with scant national impact.	5%。 因此，温州地下信用网络的断裂对地方银行体系的影响有限，对整个国家基本无影响。


Thus, despite the high likelihood that China’s economic growth will slow significantly in 2012, a hard landing is unlikely.	因此，尽管中国经济增长很有可能在2012年大幅减速，但硬着陆的可能性很小。


Nevertheless, while there is no need to be overly bearish about China’s short-term economic prospects, because of the slow progress in fundamental adjustment and further reform, even Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao has noted that China’s growth is ultimately unsustainable.	尽管如此，一方面我们没必要过度看空中国的短期经济前景，另一方面，由于基础性调整和深化改革步伐缓慢，就连温家宝总理都指出，中国的增长从根本上说是不可持续的。


The real test has yet to come.	真正的考验还没有来临。


The China Question	中国问题


President Bush’s recent visit to Asia made little news – by design.	布什总统最近的亚洲之行刻意乏善可陈。


But that’s because Bush didn’t begin to address the issue that is looming ever larger in the region: the changing face of security in Asia in view of China’s growing economic and military might.	但是，这是由于布什并不着手处理该地区日益严重的问题，即亚洲的安全格局由于中国不断增长的经济和军事实力正在改变。


This summer, for example, China and Russia conducted their first-ever grand-scale joint military exercise.	例如，今年夏天，中国和俄罗斯举行了首次大规模联合军事演习。


This was followed by Russian news reports that China, Russia, and India would conduct trilateral military exercises, named “Indira 2005,” on the same scale before the end of this year.	随后，俄罗斯新闻报道，中国、俄罗斯和印度将在今年底前举行代号为“因德拉2005”的三国军事演习。


In the past, such a combination of countries was almost unthinkable, and these exercises cannot be explained away as simple “one-off” affairs with little resonance.	过去，三国如此联合军演几乎不可思议； 而且，此类演习不可解释为“一次性的”，不具有共振效果。


Instead, they reflect China’s long-term strategic goal of establishing hegemony across Asia.	相反，它们反映的是中国在亚洲建立霸权的长期战略目标。


One tool of this ambition is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), under which the Sino-Russian exercises took place.	这一野心的其中一个工具是上海合作组织。 中俄军演就是在这一组织的框架内举行。


Established in June 2001, the SCO includes China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.	上合组织建立于2001年6月，包括中国、俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯坦、塔吉克斯坦以及乌兹别克斯坦。


The SCO’s original purpose was to mitigate tensions on the borders of China and the Central Asian countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the arrival of the United States military with the war in Afghanistan.	上合组织的最初目的是在苏联解体以及随着阿富汉的反恐战争美军进驻后减少中国和中亚国家的边境紧张局势。


China regards the SCO as a stage for broadening its influence over a vast region, ranging from the Asia-Pacific to Southwest Asia, the Middle East, East Africa, and the Indian Ocean.	中国将上合组织视为在广大地区扩大其影响力的舞台。 这一地区横跨亚太、东南亚、中东、东非以及印度洋。


Indeed, its members include about 45% of the world’s population, and 28% of the landmass ranging across the Eurasian continent.	实际上，上合组织的成员包含全球45％的人口以及欧亚大陆28％的陆地面积。


China’s active leadership of the SCO has resulted in policies that it favors.	中国在上合组织中积极扮演领导者角色，产生了其所希望的政策。


Gradually, the SCO shifted its focus to fighting Islamic radicals.	上合组织逐步将其重点转移到打击伊斯兰恐怖主义。


Nowadays, however, the SCO is often used as a forum to campaign against supposed American unilateralism and to provide a united front – especially between China and Russia – against the US with respect to security and arms-reduction issues in the region.	但是目前，上合组织经常被用来作为反对想象中的美国的单边主义的论坛，并为在该地区的安全和军控问题上反对美国而提供统一战线，特别是在中国和俄罗斯之间。


This includes joint anti-terror training and demands to reduce US forces in the region, particularly from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.	这包括联合反恐训练以及要求美国在该地区、特别是从乌兹别克斯坦和吉尔吉斯坦削减兵力。


The SCO provides China not only with a platform to confront the existing US-led alliance in the Asia-Pacific region, but is increasingly being used to prevent the formation of a US-led network to restrain China’s advance.	上合组织不仅为中国提供对抗亚太地区现存的美国领导的联盟的平台，而且正日益被用来防止形成美国领导的限制中国推进的网络。


Ultimately, it is feared that the SCO could develop into a military alliance similar to the Warsaw Pact of the Cold War era, with an embryonic “Great China Union” at its core.	最终，有人担忧上合组织会发展成为类似冷战时期华约组织的军事联盟，其核心是萌芽中的“大中华联盟”。


But China’s regional diplomacy goes far beyond the SCO.	但是，中国的地区外交远远超出上合组织。


It seizes every opportunity that comes its way, including the Six Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, to emphasize its centrality to the settlement of any and all Asian issues.	它抓住每个机会，包括有关北韩核武发展野心的六方会谈，来突显其解决所有亚洲事务的中心地位。


Moreover, it continues to build its “ string of pearls” of military bases at every key point on maritime transportation routes along the “arc of instability” from the Middle East to China’s coast.	此外，它继续在沿着从中东到中国海岸的“不稳定之弧”的海运通道上的每个关键点建立军事基地的“珍珠链”。


No one seems to know how to respond to China’s diplomatic and military muscle flexing in Asia, for the extent of China’s ambitions remains utterly unclear.	无人知道如何应对中国在亚洲施展的外交和军事力量，这是因为中国的雄心根本无人知晓。


But, while everyone else ponders China’s motives, its government is acting.	但是，人们在揣摩中国意图之时，其政府却在行动。


Indeed, the UK’s premier security think tank, the Institute for International Strategic Studies, recently warned that, while the world focuses on the fight against international terrorism and the unfolding events in the Middle East, China is rapidly expanding its influence from Asia to Africa.	实际上，英国的主要安全思想库国际战略研究所最近警告说，当世界关注于国际反恐战争以及中东不断演化的事件之时，中国正在从亚洲到非洲快速扩充其影响力。


The “pearls” in Africa include Sudan, Angola, Algeria, Gabon, Namibia, Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Djibouti, Mali, Central Africa, Liberia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.	非洲的“珍珠”包括苏丹、安哥拉、阿尔吉利亚、加蓬、纳米比亚、坦桑尼亚、津巴布维、乌甘达、吉布提、马里、中非、利比里亚、埃塞俄比亚、莫桑比克、塞拉利昂以及刚果民主共和国。


In each country, China is nurturing special military and commercial relations intended to promote loyalty to Chinese interests.	中国在每个国家都在培养特殊的军事和商业关系来促进对中国利益的忠诚。


As in Asia, there is a pattern at work: growing Chinese influence begets increased support for Chinese policies.	正如亚洲一样，也有一种运作模式。 那就是，中国不断增长的影响力增加对中国政策的支持。


Of course, it’s a two-way street.	当然，这也是礼尚往来。


Whenever complaints come up in the United Nations’ Human Rights Committee, China can count on the support of many African countries that have their own human rights problems.	只要联合国人权委员会出现抱怨，中国就可以指望从许多自身都有人权问题的非洲国家得到支持。


Even the selection of Beijing as the site of the 2008 Olympics benefited from “African votes.”	即使是北京被选为2008年奥运会主办城市也得益于“非洲选票”。


And China has publicly stated that it will back African nations in potential disputes at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other international organizations.	中国已经公开宣称它将在世界贸易组织以及其他国际组织中支持非洲国家。


Similarly, many African states now seem to be leaning heavily toward China in its dispute with Taiwan.	同样，在同台湾的争执中，许多非洲国家现在愈发倾向中国。


When Japan’s government tried to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, few African countries backed its bid, despite receiving economic aid for decades.	尽管几十年来非洲国家从日本接受经济援助，但是当日本政府试图成为联合国安理会常任理事国时，支持日本的非洲国家寥寥无几。


China likes to boast of its “peaceful rise.”	中国喜欢吹嘘其“和平崛起”。


But the rise of Bismarck’s Germany at the end of the nineteenth century was also peaceful – for a while.	但是十九世纪末俾斯麦的德国也是和平崛起，但是却好景不长。


The question is not whether China rises to great-power status peacefully, but whether it intends to remain peaceful when it gets there.	问题并不是中国是否和平崛起而拥有大国地位，而是崛起后它是否打算保持和平。


Just as the world confronted the “German Question” 125 years ago, it is now confronting the “China Question.”	正如125年前的“德国问题”一样，世界正在面对“中国问题”。


We need a better answer this time.	这一次，我们需要一个满意的答案。


The China Threat, Part Two?	中国威胁论，第二部？


Lost in the debates about whether the European Union should lift its arms export embargo on China is a much broader and more pressing question: does the Bush administration once again see China as a strategic competitor, as it did in the early days of the Bush presidency, before the war on terror forced Bush to seek cooperation with China’s rulers?	在有关欧盟是否应当解除对华军售禁令的争论中，一个更为广泛更为迫切的问题被人们忽略了，即：布什政府是否再一次将中国定位成了一个战略竞争者？ 就如其在执政早期阶段、也就是布什迫于反恐战争压力转而寻求与中国领导人的合作之前一样？


That Japan has joined the United States in standing alongside Taiwan in opposing an end to the EU’s arms embargo on China suggests that this is so.	日本加入美国阵营、与台湾一起反对欧盟对华军售解禁之举则暗示着情况确实如此。


Never before has Japan’s government joined a US administration so closely on the Taiwan issue.	日本政府从没有在台湾问题上有过与美国政府如此亲密的合作。


When the two countries upgraded their alliance relationship in 1996, Japan’s military operational sphere was expanded far from the Japanese main island.	1996年两国联盟关系升级的时候，日本的军事行动范围已经远远超出了日本本土范围。


But the government remained deliberately vague about its responsibilities, and refused to clarify the geographic boundaries of Japan Defense Force activities.	但是日本政府一直故意对他们的责任含糊其词，拒绝对日本防卫部队活动的地理边界范围作出明确划分。


Nearly ten years later, Japan is ready for strategic clarity.	大约十年之后，日本意欲挑明其战略。


Shinzo Abe, the acting secretary-general of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party and a leading candidate to succeed Junichiro Koizumi as Japanese prime minister next year, put it bluntly: it would be wrong for Japan to send a signal to China that the US and Japan will watch and tolerate a Chinese military invasion of Taiwan.	安倍晋三，日本执政党自民党干事长、最有可能在明年接替小泉纯一郎担任日本首相的候选人，直截了当地说：如果我们向中国发出美国和日本将会坐视并容忍中国对台湾动武的信号，那么我们就错了。


Monitoring this development and tracking its context, China’s government appears deeply disturbed.	此话严重激怒了对此事发展一直保持关注、追踪全局背景的中国政府。


China’s foreign ministry condemned the US-Japanese move as interference in Chinese internal affairs and expressed resolute opposition to Abe’s statement.	中国外交部谴责美日的行为是对中国内政的侵犯，并对安倍的言论予以坚决反对。


The Chinese regard Japan’s seizure of Taiwan in 1895 and the ensuing 50-year occupation as one of the most humiliating events in the country’s modern history.	1895年日本占领台湾，继而在那里进行了50年统治，中国人将此看作是该国现代历史中最为羞辱的事件之一。


In particular, China’s government has resented any Japanese involvement in Taiwan since 1972, when Japan severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan’s government and recognized the communist regime.	特别自1972年日本与台湾当局断绝外交关系并承认共产主义政权后，中国政府对日本插手任何与台湾有关的问题尤为反感。


But in recent years, pro-Taiwan groups and politicians in Japan have been gaining momentum.	但是近几年，日本的亲台湾团体和政治家却势力大长。


For example, despite Chinese protests, Japan hosted a birthday reception for the Emperor in Taipei in 2003.	例如，2003年日本不顾中国抗议在台湾为日本天皇举办生日酒会。


Last year, Japan issued a visa to Taiwan’s former president, Lee Teng-hui, a man who explicitly advocates a US-Japan-Taiwan alliance against China.	去年，日本向公开鼓吹反华的美日台同盟的台湾前总统李登辉发放签证。


Japan’s growing coziness with Taiwan has been accompanied by worsening political relations with China.	伴随着日本与中国的政治关系日益恶劣，日本与台湾的关系却日趋密切。


Despite the fact that China surpassed the US to become Japan’s largest trading partner last year, the top leaders of the two countries have not visited each other’s capitals since 2001.	尽管中国已经在去年超越美国成为了日本最大的贸易伙伴，两国的高层领导人自2001年起就再也没有相互访问过彼国首都。


Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has insisted on paying an annual visit to the Yasukuni shrine, where Japan’s past aggressive wars are glorified, and where war criminals are among the buried, behavior that China’s government considers unacceptable.	日本首相小泉纯一郎坚持每年去参拜为日本昔日侵略战争歌功颂德、祭祀着战争罪犯的靖国神社，这正是中国政府难以接受的行为。


Tensions are also running high in the East China Sea, where the two countries dispute sovereignty over a number of islands.	在中国东海地区，两国对许多岛屿的主权发生争执，导致两国关系高度紧张。


China is exploring gas fields close to the border as defined by Japan.	中国正在日本单方面划定的“中间线”附近探索天然气资源。


A brief incursion by a Chinese submarine into Japanese territorial waters a few months ago caused further alarm in Tokyo.	几个月前，一艘中国潜水艇短暂侵入日本海域，引发东京的升级警告。


In response, a new Japanese defense review identified China as a threat.	作为回应，日本最新的国防报告中将中国定义为军事威胁。


Japan’s Self Defense Forces outlined three scenarios of a potential Chinese invasion and are making preparations accordingly, while the Japanese government announced last month that it had formally taken control of an island chain over which China, Taiwan, and Japan all claim sovereignty.	日本自卫队拟定了中国将袭击日本的三大假想并正在采取相应准备措施，与此同时，日本政府上月宣布它已经正式控制了一个中国、台湾和日本都宣称具有主权的岛群。


Moreover, America’s military is closely coordinating with Japan, redeploying its troops and strengthening its command and combat capabilities near Taiwan.	此外，美国军队正在与日本紧密合作，重新部署它的军队，加强其在台湾地区附近的指挥和战斗能力。


So, barely two months into the second Bush administration, alarm bells about the China threat seem to be ringing again.	因此，就在布什第二任期还不到两个月的时候，有关中国威胁论的警钟又再一次响起。


Key US foreign policymakers now openly contradict conclusions reached last year by the Independent Task Force on Chinese Military Power headed by former defense secretary Harold Brown and retired admiral Joseph Prueher.	美国外交政策的主要制定者现在公开反驳去年由前国防部部长哈罗德·布朗和退休海军上将约瑟夫·普理赫领导的“中国军力专案小组”独立课题研究组得出的结论。


That panel found that the balance of power between the US and China, both globally and in Asia, is likely to remain decisively in America’s favor beyond the next 20 years.	那个专家小组发现，从全球范围以及亚洲地区来看，美中两国的军事力量关系，很有可能在今后二十年内仍然保持美国绝对领先的优势，至少领先中国20年。


More significantly, with the latest statement over Taiwan, the US and Japan are poised to use their joint military forces to deter, deny, and ultimately defeat potential Chinese military actions across the Taiwan Strait.	更意味深长的是，随着美国最近发布有关台湾问题的讲话，美国和日本准备使用联合军事力量阻止、遏制并最终阻挠中国可能在台湾海峡发动的军事行动。


What counter-measures China will deploy are yet to be discerned.	中国会采取何种应对措施还有待观察。


Europe, however, needs to decide if it is ready to sign on with the US, as Japan has now clearly done, to contain China’s strategic and military ambitions.	然而，欧洲需要做出决定：是否也像日本已经明确行动了的那样加入美国阵营，抑制中国的战略和军事野心。


The Chinese Mirror	中国魔镜


TOKYO – The closing decade of the twentieth century offered a crystal ball for anyone peering into the future of the Asia-Pacific region.	发自东京——20世纪的最后十年为所有渴望窥知亚太地区未来的人提供了一个水晶球。


Japan’s economy, once the region’s leader, was “lost” after its asset bubble burst, whereas China overcame the economic stagnation that followed the Tiananmen Square crisis of 1989 to achieve its current path of strong growth.	曾经占据区域老大地位的日本自资产泡沫爆破之后就走向了“迷失”，而走出了1989年天安门事件后期经济停滞的中国则迈向了如今的强劲增长之路。


The debate raging 10 years ago about China’s rapid growth – whether it represents a danger or an opportunity – has now settled into broad agreement that wider regional development would be impossible without it.	10年前流行的那场针对中国快速增长的辩论——所谓这种增长究竟是威胁还是机会——如今已尘埃落定，大多数人都同意缺少了中国就不可能有更大范围的区域经济发展。


Further geo-political implications for the region and the world follow from three key changes in China.	对亚太地区乃至整个世界来说，更深入的地缘政治影响将取决于发生在中国身上的三个关键变化。


The first concerns the pattern of Chinese economic growth, which so far has been achieved mainly by rapid increases in factor inputs – labor, capital, and energy. But recent research suggests that about one-third of China’s economic growth comes from technological progress, or from the increase in total factor productivity.	首先是中国经济的增长模式，目前主要还是由快速增长的生产要素投入——劳动力，资本和能源——来实现，但最近有研究显示中国约有1/3的经济增长来自技术进步，或是源自总生产要素生产力的提升。


In other words, China’s growth pattern is becoming similar to that of industrialized economies, suggesting that growth will be increasingly balanced.	换言之，中国的发展模式已经开始向发达经济体靠拢，意味着其增长将日趋平衡。


The second transformation is the substantial appreciation of the renminbi that seems inevitable in the coming years.	第二种转变则是人民币势必在未来几年内持续升值。


Today, given the importance of exports to China’s economy, its government is reluctant to permit a major revaluation, despite strong pressure by foreign governments to allow the renminbi to appreciate in line with the country’s huge trade surplus.	尽管各国政府施加了强大压力要求人民币在该国庞大的贸易顺差下升值，但考虑到目前中国经济对出口的依赖程度，中国政府依然对其货币的大幅币值重估有所保留。


But Chinese officials know that renminbi appreciation is also in China’s interest, as they seek to dampen inflationary pressures.	但中国官员也意识到人民币升值同样符合本国的利益，因为这有助于缓和国内的通胀压力。


China’s government therefore appears ready to allow the renminbi to appreciate, the question being how fast.	因此中国政府似乎已经准备好让人民币升值，问题只不过是速度快慢而以。


From 2003-2005, long before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the renminbi appreciated by 20%.	在2003年到2005年间（距离雷曼兄弟破产还有很长一段时间），人民币升值了20%。


In light of China’s rapid economic growth and the renminbi’s growing strength, Chinese GDP (based on the market dollar rate) will likely exceed that of the US much earlier than expected, possibly in 10-15 years.	考虑到中国经济的快速增长和人民币的日渐强势，中国的GDP（以国际外汇市场美元汇率计算）将可能比原先预期更早地超越美国（大概会在10-15年内）。


And, when measured in terms of purchasing power parity, China’s GDP will reach that of the US around 2015, thus changing the world’s balance of economic power.	如果用购买力平价计算的话，中国GDP将在2015年达到美国的水平，并因此改写世界的经济实力格局。


The third transformation is demographic: the fallout from China’s official one-child policy, which will cause the working-age population to start declining in the mid-2010’s.	第三个转变则是人口：中国长期奉行的独生子女政策将导致劳动人口数量在2010年代中期开始下降。


This will cause economic growth to slacken, complicating effective management of China’s domestic problems, which range from deep income disparities to the lack of political institutions capable of channeling popular grievances and demands.	而该现象将阻碍经济的发展，也令中国国内问题的有效治理更加复杂化，其中包括巨大的贫富收入差距以及缺乏能够疏导民众愤怒并传达需求的政治体制。


In these circumstances, the role of the country’s political leadership will become much more important.	在这种情况下，该国领导层所扮演的角色将变得更加重要。


Although the current president, Hu Jintao, is due to step down in 2012, he will continue to hold a degree of power through the military, so the succession of power to the next generation will not be completed until around 2015.	虽然现任中国国家主席胡锦涛必将在2012年卸任，但他依然在一定程度上掌握着军权，因此权力向下一代领导人的交接要到2015年才能彻底完成。


Although Chinese GDP is large and growing, its per capita income is still low, and its economic policies differ sharply from those prevailing in the region’s OECD countries.	虽然中国的GDP规模极为庞大且持续增长，其人均收入却一直偏低，奉行的经济政策也与亚太地区的经合组织国家大不相同。


The geopolitical landscape that emerges around the middle of this decade will thus reflect significant changes elsewhere in Asia as well.	因此未来4~6年内逐渐凸显的地缘政治图景也将反映出亚洲其他地区所发生的变化。


Even so, Chinese policy choices significantly influence other Asian countries, with China’s “state capitalist” economic model now being mimicked elsewhere in the region.	即便如此，中国的政策取向早已极大影响了其他亚洲国家，其“国家资本主义”经济模式也吸引了众多亚洲追随者。


Of course, Japan, Korea, and Singapore had similar policy models in the past (though they later adapted them in line with their GDP growth). Now, however, these countries are once again espousing forms of state capitalism and a return to industrial policy (encouraged as well by the 2008 global financial meltdown, which gave a new rationale for a return to government intervention).	日本，韩国和新加坡三国曾经拥有相似的政策模式（虽然它们随后都将其与本国的GDP增长挂钩），到如今这些国家却又重拾国家资本主义并再度执行工业政策（其中当然也包括2008年全球金融危机的影响，为政府干预提供了一个新的理由）。


In Japan, postal services that had been privatized are to be re-nationalized, and the role of government finance is being strengthened.	在日本，原本私有化的邮政服务将再度收归国有，政府的金融角色也得到加强。


Japan Air Lines, which was almost bankrupt, was rescued by a government bailout, a device that seems to be increasingly common.	濒临破产的日本航空公司最终在政府的财政救助下起死回生，而这种做法似乎日渐普遍。


Similarly, while many Asian countries already have sovereign wealth funds, now South Korea’s government is establishing a new type of fund to support the construction sector’s export activities.	同样在许多亚洲国家都建立了主权财富基金之时，韩国政府如今也成立了一个新形式的基金去支持建造行业的出口。


In short, closer business-government relationships are being re-established throughout the Asian-Pacific region.	简而言之，政府与商界之间的亲密关系在亚太地区又重新建立了起来。


Countries are especially seeking to strengthen their infrastructure exports through a combination of public- and private-sector activity.	各国都尤其致力于通过公私合作的方式促进自身的大型工业基础设备出口。


But that means that international regulations will be needed to limit government intervention, or at least to define the circumstances in which it will be deemed acceptable.	但这意味着需要建立一套国际准则来限制政府干预，或者至少定义哪些情况是可以接受的。


To achieve this, the United States and China must reconcile their very different views of how a market economy should operate.	为了实现这一点，美国和中国这两个市场经济运行观南辕北辙的大国就必须达成一致。


As the world begins to grapple with the creation of a new economic order, the moderating role of a third party in conflicts between the US and China will be extremely important.	随着世界在一个新经济秩序的襁褓中挣扎，一个中美之间的第三方调解人将必不可少。


It is a role that will fall to Japan for Asian-Pacific issues, but to European countries on global issues.	对此日本将在亚太事务上承担这个角色，而欧洲则负责在全球事务上进行调停。


If Europe can successfully manage this role, US-China tensions can be overcome, offering the entire world the opportunity to harness and benefit from the strength of its two largest economies.	如果欧洲能成功扮演这一角色的话，美中两国的紧张对峙状态将被消除，最终使全世界都有机会在这前两大经济体的力量中得益。


The Chávez Challenge	查韦斯挑战


Venezuela’s recent legislative elections confirmed trends that have repeatedly brought the country into the headlines in recent years.	委内瑞拉最近的立法选举印证了在最近几年中不断使该国成为头条新闻的趋势。


President Hugo Chávez showed once again that he enjoys broad support among the nation’s poor and desperate, and that he is miles ahead of his opposition in terms of political skill, cunning, and ruthlessness.	查韦斯总统再一次表明他在该国的穷苦人中享有广泛的支持，而且与其反对派相比，他在政治技巧、狡猾以及残酷无情上都远胜一筹。


Yet at the same time voter turnout is declining with each passing election under Chávez, and the questionable fairness of the electoral process has grown increasingly apparent.	但是同时，在其统治时期，每次选举的投票率都在下降，而且，选举过程中不断显现令人怀疑的公正性。


To be sure, the opposition’s withdrawal from the election just days before the vote was, as Chávez claimed, more a symptom of its own weakness than of problems with the electoral process.	的确，正如查韦斯所言，反对派在投票前几天退出选举表明的不仅仅是选举过程中的问题，而是反对派自身的虚弱。


And, just as surely, that very weakness is a function of the gradual stifling of many features of Venezuela’s traditional democratic order.	而且同样清楚的是，反对派的虚弱正是委内瑞拉传统民主秩序众多特征逐步窒息的功能。


Even so, the opposition’s mistakes have been massive, ranging from support for the failed coup against the democratically elected Chávez in April 2002 to the failed strike at PEDEVSA, Venezuela’s national oil company, in early 2003.	即使如此，反对派的错误连连。 从2002年4月针对民选的查韦斯的流产政变到2003年初委内瑞拉国家石油公司PEDEVSA半途而废的罢工都是如此。


Nothing is more lethal in politics than failure in direct confrontation.	在政治中，没有比直接对抗更为致命的了。


In such circumstances, Chávez can afford to be bold, despite his policies’ failure to benefit his core constituency: the more than 50% of Venezuelans who live in destitution and despair.	在这种情况下，尽管查韦斯的政策没有使得其核心选民受益，但是他仍然可以我行我素。 超过一半的委内瑞拉人生活在困苦绝望之中。


Poverty has grown since Chávez took office in 1998; government finances and the trade balance are more dependent on oil revenues than before, and, aside from Cuban literacy programs and neighborhood “barefoot doctor” services, the overall welfare of the poor remains the same, if not worse.	政府财政以及贸易平衡比以往更为依附于石油收入； 而且，尽管古巴提供扫盲项目以及邻国提供“赤脚医生”服务，贫困人口的整体福利即使没有下降，也没有改观。


Major changes are unlikely in the foreseeable future.	在可以预期的未来，重大变化不大可能出现。


Chávez will be able to modify the Constitution largely as he pleases, and pack both the justice system and the electoral authority with his placemen.	查韦斯基本上可以随心所欲地修改宪法，并用其人马充斥司法系统和选举机关。


He will continue to dole out oil-based subsidies in the well-worn Venezuelan tradition of Marcos Pérez Jiménez and Carlos Andrés Pérez.	他将继续奉行知名的委内瑞拉吉梅内斯和佩雷斯的传统，提供以石油作为后盾的补贴。


As a result, Chávez will be re-elected late next year, and he may well remain in power until the end of the next decade.	因此，查韦斯将在明年再次当选，并将在下一个十年前一直掌权。


Yet, if this is what the Venezuelan people want, then so be it.	如果这就是委内瑞拉人民所希望的话倒也罢了。


It is, after all, their business who governs them, and how, as long as human rights are not systematically violated, democratic institutions are not indefinitely suspended, and standard norms of international conduct are respects.	毕竟，只要没有系统性地破坏人权、无限期地中止民主政体以及尊重国际交往的惯例，谁掌权以及如何执政是他们自己的事务。


Judged by the last standard, at least, Chávez may have crossed the line.	根据最后一项标准衡量，查韦斯至少越线了。


For years, he has been accused of taking over where Fidel Castro left off: supporting the rhetoric of radicalism and anti-imperialism, if not revolution, throughout Latin America.	多年来，他被指责为效仿卡斯特罗的所作所为，即，即使不支持拉美地区革命，也是支持极端主义和反帝主义的豪言壮语。


It could now be time for other Latin American nations and the international community to take such charges more seriously.	现在，其他拉美国家和国际社会应当更为严肃对待这些指责了。


Chávez is giving away oil to Caribbean island nations and Cuba, and buying off Argentine debt to help President Nestor Kirchner’s political fortunes.	查韦斯将石油赠送给加勒比岛国和古巴，替阿根廷清偿债务以为该国总统基什内尔增加政治运程。


In Mar del Plata, Argentina, last month, he openly participated in a rally against the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), in the company of, among others, Evo Morales, the coca-leaf growers’ leader from Bolivia who might well become that country’s next president.	上个月，在马德普拉塔布，他公然参加反对美洲自由贸易区的集会。 参加者中包括莫拉雷斯，他是来自波利维亚的古柯叶种植园大亨，有可能成为该国下届总统。


Similarly, Chávez is clearly supporting Daniel Ortega, the perennial Sandinista presidential candidate in Nicaragua, and Shafick Handal, the equally perennial FMLN candidate in El Salvador.	类似的行动还有：查韦斯明显支持多次不断竞选尼加拉瓜总统的桑地诺派候选人奥特加，以及同样不断竞选萨尔瓦多总统的FMLN候选人安德尔。


His former ambassador to Mexico participated openly and vociferously in campaign events for Mexico City Mayor Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador’s presidential campaign.	查韦斯的前任驻墨西哥大使公开肆无忌惮地参加墨西哥市市长欧布拉多的总统竞选活动。


There seems to be a common thread to most of Chávez’s foreign policy: to provoke a major confrontation with the United States.	这些都是贯穿查韦斯的大部分外交政策的主线，即挑起与美国的重大对抗。


The danger, of course, is that if and when confrontation comes – over Bolivia, the FTAA, human rights, or press freedoms – it will be too late to defuse it.	当然这样做的危险是，一旦对抗到来，无论何时，也无论是由于波利维亚、美洲自由贸易区、人权或者新闻自由等问题，想要平息都为时已晚。


The challenge, then, lies in avoiding a confrontation that Chávez clearly wants.	因此，挑战在于避免查韦斯明显想要引发的对抗。


Unfortunately, George W. Bush’s administration has not proved particularly adept at conflict prevention.	不幸的是，布什当局并不特别善于防止冲突。


The hemisphere’s other nations have a direct stake in attempting to pre-empt a fight that would force them to take sides and might threaten their economic and national-security interests.	这一冲突将迫使西半球其他国家表明立场并有可能威胁其经济和国家安全利益。 它们力图避免这一争斗与其自身息息相关。


Although many of Chávez’s positions have found support in certain Latin American nations, the division that he and Castro’s Cuba have created in Latin America – between left and right, free-traders and “Bolivarians,” and pro- and anti- Americans – is mainly artificial and certainly not impossible to overcome.	尽管查韦斯的许多立场在某些拉美国家得到支持，但是，他和古巴的卡斯特罗在拉丁美洲所造成的左翼和右翼之间、自由贸易主义者和“波利维亚主义者”之间以及拥美和反美人士之间的分裂大体都是表面上的，当然不会无法克服。


To be sure, many Latin American leaders have tried to assuage and control Chávez, and they have all failed.	的确，许多拉美国家领导人都试图平息并控制查韦斯，都无功而返。


But the cost of not trying again could be extremely high.	但是，不再努力的成本将会非常巨大。


The last time revolutionary leaders confronted the US head-on, in Central America during the 1980’s, everyone lost.	二十世纪八十年代革命派领导人最后一次在中美洲与美国正面对抗之时，大家都受到损失。


A new split up and down the hemisphere, engineered by a leader awash in oil money, would prove far more disastrous.	一位坐拥大量石油财富的领导人在西半球所挑起的分裂将会远远更为具有灾难性。


The Citizen Bank	作为公民的银行


LONDON – Soon after the financial crisis began in 2008, I was at a meeting in the United States where a senior White House economic adviser put a question to me: “Do you think banks can be good citizens?”	发自伦敦——在2008年金融危机刚爆发没多久的时候，我到美国参加了一个会议，会上一位白宫高级经济顾问向我提出了一个问题：“你觉得银行能成为良好公民吗？ ”


As I started to answer “Yes,” he interjected: “If your answer is ‘yes,’ think about the fact that no one will believe you.”	正当我张嘴说“可以”之时，他又插了一句：“如果你的回答是‘能’的话，试问谁又会相信你呢？ ”


His follow-up gave me pause.	这番话令我一时语塞。


I’ve thought a lot about it over the past three years, which have been so difficult for the world economy.	随后三年间我对这个问题思考了许多，而对世界经济来说，这又是多么艰难的三年。


The economic environment in which we are all living and working nowadays is particularly challenging.	然而尤其具有挑战性的莫过于我们如今生活和工作着的经济环境。


In Europe, the United Kingdom, and the US, we are feeling the effects of the unsustainable levels of public and private debt accrued in the years before 2008.	在欧洲以及英美两国，人们深刻感受到了2008年前积累下来的非可持续公共/私人债务所带来的冲击。


Spending cuts are being put in place by governments and households alike, with varying degrees of public acceptance and social unrest.	支出削减同时在政府和家庭层面展开，并随之引发了不同程度的公众反响和社会骚乱。


The single most important issue for banks and other businesses to focus on in 2012 is economic growth and job creation.	银行和其他企业在2012年必须关注的唯一一个重中之重就是经济增长以及创造就业。


But, to play their proper role in generating employment, banks need to rebuild the trust that has been decimated by the events of the past three years.	但如果要推动就业的话，银行就必须重建被过去三年经历的种种事件所腐蚀的信任。


That requires bankers to use the lessons learned from the crisis to become better and more effective citizens.	这就要求银行业从危机中吸取教训并以此成为一个更良好也更有贡献的公民。 .


Simply put, the private sector has an obligation to be the engine of growth and employment, and banks have a vital role to play in achieving that end.	简而言之，私人部门理应成为带动增长和就业的引擎，而银行则在实现这一目标的过程中扮演着重要角色。


Frankly, though, banks have done a very poor job of explaining how we contribute to society. We need to fix that as part of the process of restoring trust in what we do.	坦白来讲银行业在说明自身对社会的贡献方面做得不够，而我们则必须将其作为整个信任重建过程的一部份加以修补。


At the most fundamental level, banks are entrusted with deposits from individuals, businesses, and governments.	在最基础的层面上，个人，企业和政府都将储蓄委托给银行管理。


We put that money to work by helping people to buy homes, for example, or by lending to growing companies.	我们则通过帮助人们购买房屋或向扩张企业提供贷款来使这些钱发挥其作用。


Banks also provide critical services to governments and business, by providing direct access to global buyers of debt and equity, and by establishing large, consistent markets of buyers and sellers.	银行同时也向政府和企业提供非常重要的服务，比如提供与国际债券和股票买家对接的路径以及在买卖双方之间建立大规模且连续运行的交易市场。


Some characterize these activities as speculative trading, and even caricature financial markets as casinos.	有些人批评这些行为是投机买卖，甚至将金融市场夸张地比喻成赌场。


In fact, these markets serve a fundamental client need.	但事实上，这些市场满足了客户的根本需求。


Of course, to meet these needs, banks must be safer and stronger than they were prior to the crises.	当然，为了满足这些需求，银行必须变得比危机之前更加安全和健全。


The reality is that much is different in today’s financial sector.	事实上如今的金融系统早已脱胎于以往了。 银行的借款数额比往年要少；


Banks are not borrowing as much; they have more capital; and they have far more stable and liquid sources of funds to lend.	资本金则更多； 它们也拥有更稳定且更具流动性的资金来源来实施贷款。


Strong banks want strong regulation, and we believe that no taxpayer money should ever again be put at risk to rescue a failed or failing bank.	健全的银行业也呼唤健全的管制机制，我们也相信纳税人的钱不应再次被冒险用于拯救那些破产或者濒临破产的银行。


But, three years on from the 2008 financial crisis, we still face considerable challenges, as the continuing eurozone crisis demonstrates.	但正如持续发酵的欧元区危机所体现的那样，虽然金融危机至今已是三年，我们却依旧面临着相当大的挑战。


So it’s not surprising that many people doubt that anything has really changed.	因此许多人对（银行业）是否真正有所改变的质疑也是可以理解的。


The only way that banks will win back the public’s trust is to become better citizens.	银行重新赢得公众信任的唯一方式就是成为一个更加良好的公民。


That starts with how banks behave, and in demonstrating that we act with trust and integrity.	一开始银行要拿出行动来，并展现出我们是依靠信任与诚实来运作的。


This means that the interests of customers and clients must be at the very heart of every decision we make.	这意味着顾客和客户的利益必须成为我们每一个决策的核心考虑因素。


In 1970, the Nobel laureate Milton Friedman – one of my favorite economists – wrote an influential article arguing that the only social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. On that point, I disagree with him.	诺贝尔奖获得者弥尔顿·弗里德曼——也是我最喜爱的经济学家之一——曾于1970年撰写了一篇影响极大的文章，认为企业的唯一社会责任就是增加其利润，而我对此则不以为然。


Businesses must increase profits in a way that creates sustainable shareholder value, not just short-term gain.	企业必须通过创造可持续股东价值的方式增加利润，而非着眼于短期收益。


This applies across industries, not just in banking. One sees the benefits of this approach in the paths that companies like Unilever, PepsiCo, and Nestle are forging.	这一点适用于包括银行业在内的所有行业，而联合利华，百事和雀巢公司都是以这种方式来成长起来的。


Banks can and should do the same by focusing on the interests of the customers, clients, and communities that they serve.	银行业可以也应当通过关注顾客，客户以及所在社区的利益来做到这一点。


The challenge is to balance our obligations to all of our stakeholders, both customers and shareholders, including the pension funds that help millions of people around the world save for retirement.	而挑战在于平衡我们对所有利益相关方所负有的责任，顾客和股东都要兼顾，包括那些帮助全球数百万人储蓄退休金的养老基金。


That is not always easy, and the decisions that we – just like any other business – make every day are imbued with inherent dilemmas.	做到这一点可不太容易，而我们——跟其他任何行业一样——每天的决策中都存在着固有的两难取舍。


But doing what’s right for customers, clients, shareholders, and communities will ensure that we get those judgments right much more often than we get them wrong.	但做对顾客，客户，股东和社区有益的事情将确保我们做出的正确决策要比错误的多得多。


That is why the answer to the question posed to me three years ago is that banks must be good citizens.	这就是为何我对三年前那个问题的回答是银行必须成为良好公民。


I appreciate that persuading people of that concept will require that they see a visible difference in the way that banks participate in society.	说服人们接受这个概念就必须要让他们看到银行参与社会事务的方式发生了切实的转变，对此我深表赞同。


People may not recognize any difference right now; the change that is now taking place is in its early stages.	但人们目前或许无法意识到任何改变； 因为这种改变依然处于初始阶段。


But we are determined to keep working at it, and I am committed to making it happen.	但我们有决心坚持下去，而我本人也将致力于实现这一点。


The Climate Change Revolution	气候变化革命


The world is in the midst of a great political transformation, in which climate change has moved to the center of national and global politics.	世界正处于巨大的政治转型之中。 在这一转型中，气候变化已经移动到了国内和国际政治的中心。


For politicians in persistent denial about the need act, including US President George W. Bush, Australian Prime Minister John Howard, and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, there is no longer any place to hide.	对于那些一贯否认有必要采取行动的政客们，包括美国总统布什、澳大利亚总理霍华德以及加拿大总理哈伯等而言，已经没有藏身之地了。


The science is clear, manmade changes in climate are being felt, and the electorate’s demand for action is growing.	科学证据是明白不过的，那就是人们正在感受到人为的气候改变，而选民采取行动的要求正在增强。


Though unlikely just a few months ago, a strong global agreement by 2010, one that will set a path for action for decades to come, now stands a good chance of being implemented.	在2010年以前签署一项具有强大约束力的全球性协议将在未来几十年规划出行动路线。 这在几个月以前还不大可能，而现在很有可能得到落实。


Political leaders in countries that produce coal, oil, and gas – like the US, Australia, and Canada – have pretended that climate change is a mere hypothesis.	美国、澳大利亚以及加拿大等生产煤炭、石油以及天然气的国家中的政治领导人一直假装说气候变化只是一个假设。


For several years, the Bush administration tried to hide the facts from the public, deleting references to manmade climate from government documents and even trying to suppress statements by leading government scientists.	几年来，布什政府试图向公众隐瞒事实，把人为气候变化的引文从政府文件中删除，甚至还试图压制主要政府科学家们的声明。


Until recently, Exxon Mobil and other companies paid lobbyists to try to distort the public debate.	直到最近，埃克森美孚公司和其他公司还支付游说公司试图扭曲公共辩论。


Yet truth has triumphed over political maneuvers.	但是真相战胜了政治伎俩。


The climate itself is sending a powerful and often devastating message.	气候本身正在传递强大而又经常是毁灭性的信息。


Hurricane Katrina made the US public aware that global warming would likely raise the intensity of destructive storms.	卡特琳娜飓风让美国公众知道，全球变暖有可能增强破坏性风暴的强度。


Australia’s great drought this past year has similarly made a mockery of Howard’s dismissive attitude toward climate change.	霍华德对气候变化的态度是不屑一顾。 澳大利亚去年的大旱也同样对此做出了嘲讽。


Scientists themselves have operated with great seriousness of purpose in educating the public.	科学家们自己在教育大众上采取了严肃认真的态度。


We can thank the United Nations for that.	我们可以就此感谢联合国。


The UN sponsors the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a worldwide body of hundreds of climate scientists who report every few years to the public on the science of climate change.	联合国赞助了政府间气候变化委员会。 这是一个由全世界数百名科学家组成的组织，每隔几年向公众汇报有关气候变化的科学。


This year, the IPCC is releasing its fourth round of reports, starting with the one issued early in February.	今年，该委员会发表其第四回合的报告。 报告从二月上旬的一期开始。


That report was unequivocal: there is a powerful scientific consensus that human activity, mainly the burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil, gas), as well as deforestation and other land uses (such as growing paddy rice), leads to massive emissions of carbon dioxide into the air.	那一报告直截了当地指出，科学家们的强烈共识是，人类活动，主要是燃烧化石燃料(煤炭、石油和天然气)以及砍伐森林和其他土地使用(例如种植稻田)导致二氧化碳大量排放到大气之中。


This is causing climate change, which is accelerating and poses serious risks to the planet.	这导致气候变化加速并对地球构成严重威胁。


The single biggest threat comes from the production and consumption of energy for electricity, transport, and heating and cooling buildings.	单一最大的威胁来自生产和消费能源用于电力、交通以及给建筑物取暖和冷却。


But the world’s scientists and engineers, as well as global technology leaders such as General Electric, are also sending a clear message: we can solve the problem at modest cost if we put our best thinking and action into real solutions.	但是世界上的科学家和工程师们以及像通用电气那样的全球性技术领先者同样也传达着一个明确的信息，那就是，如果我们集思广益并采取切实行动，就能够以温和的代价解决问题。


By shifting to alternative energy sources, economizing on energy use, and capturing and safely storing the carbon dioxide produced by fossil fuels, global society can limit its emissions of carbon dioxide to prudent levels at an estimated cost of under 1% of global income.	通过转向替代性能源，节约能源使用以及捕捉并安全地储存由化石燃料产生的二氧化碳，世界就可以将二氧化碳的排放限制到合适的水准，而成本只有全球收入的1%不到。


The changeover to a sustainable energy system will not come quickly, and will require new kinds of electrical power plants, new kinds of automobiles, and “green buildings,” which economize on energy use.	转向可持续的能源系统并不能一蹴而就，而且将会要求新型的发电厂、新型汽车以及节约能源使用的“绿色建筑”。


The process will take decades, but we must start now and act on a global basis, using carbon taxes and emission permits to create market-based incentives for companies and individuals to make the necessary changes.	这一进程需要几十年的时间，但是我们必须从现在开始并且采取全球性行动，使用二氧化碳排放税收和排放许可来为公司和个人建立基于市场基础之上的鼓励措施来做出必要的改变。


Those incentives will come at modest cost and huge benefit, and they can be designed to protect the poor and shift the climate-change burden to those who can afford it.	这些激励措施的代价将会是温和的而效益将会是巨大的，而且可以被用来保护穷人并将气候变化的负担转移到那些有能力支付的人身上。


A reasonable timetable is possible.	一个合理的时间表是可能的。


By the end of 2007, all of the world’s governments should begin negotiations on a climate-change system for the years after 2012, when the current Kyoto Protocol expires.	到2007年底，全世界所有国家的政府都应该开始为2012年以后的气候变化体系进行谈判。 那时，现在的京都议定书就将失效。


Basic principles should be established during 2008, and by 2009, the world community, including the two largest emitters of carbon dioxide, the US and China, should be ready to make a serious deal, which should be concluded by 2010 and ratified in time to replace the Kyoto Protocol.	到2009年，国际社会，包括两个最大的二氧化碳排放国家美国和中国应该做好准备达成一项严肃的协议。 这一协议应当在2010年得以达成并及时批准以便取代京都议定书。


The Kyoto Protocol was the first attempt at such a system, but it applied only to rich countries and set only modest objectives.	京都���定书是建立这一体系的第一个尝试，但是它仅仅适用于富有国家而且仅仅制定了温和的目标。


The richest country and biggest contributor to global climate change, the US, didn’t even sign.	作为最为富有的国家以及全球气候变化最大的制造者的美国甚至没有签署。


Neither did Australia.	澳大利亚也没有。


Canada signed but has failed to act.	加拿大签署了但没有行动。


Nor did huge energy users like China and India, which must be part of any meaningful solution, face serious responsibilities under the Kyoto agreement.	像中国和印度那样巨大的能源使用国根据京都议定书的规定也并不承担严肃的责任。 这两个国家必须是任何有意义的解决之道的组成部分。


All of that will have to change.	所有这些都应当改变。


All countries will have to shoulder their responsibilities to the rest of the world and to future generations.	所有的国家都应当承担它们向世界其他地方和子孙后代所承担的责任。


There is now a way for individuals and companies to make their own voices heard.	现在，个人和公司都可以有办法让别人听到他们的意见。


The Earth Institute at Columbia University, which I direct, hosted a Global Roundtable of leading businesses, environmental groups, and other international organizations to reach a consensus to help inform the upcoming negotiations.	我担任主任的哥伦比亚大学地球研究所主持召开了全球圆桌会议。 主要的工商界、环境团体以及其他国际组织达成共识来帮助为即将来临的谈判提供信息。


The Roundtable produced an important Statement of Principles and a longer overall statement that has been signed by many of the world’s largest businesses, including those based in the US, Europe, Canada, China, and India.	圆桌会议发表了一项重要的原则声明以及一项篇幅更长的总体声明。 世界上最大的企业，包括那些位于美国、欧洲、加拿大、中国以及印度等国的企业都签署了这一声明。


Many of the world’s leading scientists signed, too.	许多世界主要的科学家也都签署。


Global climate change requires global decisions, and initiatives like the Roundtable Statement show that we can find areas of agreement for powerful action.	全球气候变化要求采取世界范围的决定，而类似圆桌声明那样的倡议表明，我们能够找到共识的领域以采取有力的行动。


It’s time for the world’s political holdouts to join that effort.	现在，世界上的政治抵触者应当加入这一努力中来。


The Climate Imperative	气候变化下的责任


NEW DELHI – Today, international action on climate change is urgent and essential.	新德里——如今，对气候变化采取国际行动不仅势在必行，而且十分紧迫。


Indeed, there can no longer be any debate about the need to act, because the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), of which I am chairman, has established climate change as an unequivocal reality beyond scientific doubt.	的确，对于采取行动的必要性，现在已不再有任何异议，因为本人忝任主席的政府间气候变化专门委员会（IPCC）已确定气候变化是经科学证实的事实。


For instance, changes are taking place in precipitation patterns, with a trend toward higher precipitation levels in the world’s upper latitudes and lower precipitation in some sub-tropical and tropical regions, as well as in the Mediterranean area.	例如，降水的规律正在发生变化，纬度较高的地方降水水平有升高的趋势，而某些亚热带和热带地区则在减少，如地中海地区。


The number of extreme precipitation events is also increasing – and are increasingly widespread.	极端降水情况也在增多——而且分布也越来越广。


Moreover, the frequency and intensity of heat waves, floods, and droughts are on the rise.	此外，热浪、洪水和干旱发生的频率和强度也在上升。


This change in the amount and pattern of rainfall has serious implications for many economic activities, as well as for countries’ preparedness to handle emergencies such as large-scale coastal flooding or heavy snowfall.	上述降雨量和降雨模式的变化对许多经济活动造成了严重影响，同样受影响的还有各国处理沿海大型洪灾或雪灾等紧急灾害的能力。


Some parts of the world are more vulnerable than others to these changes.	这些变化对世界上某些地区的影响尤其严重。


The Arctic region, in particular, has been warming at twice the rate of the rest of the globe.	特别是北极，气温升高的速度是全球其他地方的两倍。


Coral reefs, mega-deltas (which include cities like Shanghai, Kolkata, and Dhaka), and small island states are also extremely vulnerable to rising sea levels.	海平面的上升对于珊瑚礁、大型三角洲地带（包括上海、加尔各答和达卡等城市）和小型岛国来说也极为有害。


Other negative effects of climate change include possible reductions in crop yields.	气候变化的其他负面影响还包括农作物产量可能减少。


In some African countries, for example, yields could decline by as much as 50% by 2020.	例如，在某些非洲国家，到2020年，农作物产量可能减少50%。


Climate change would also lead to increased water stress, which by 2020 could affect 75-250 million people in Africa alone.	气候变化还会引起用水短缺加剧，到2020年仅在非洲就有750万到2500万人受到影响。


Overall, temperature increases are projected to increase by the year 2100 within a range of 1.1 to 6.4˚C. In order to focus on this set of outcomes, the IPCC has come up with a best estimate at the lower end of this range of 1.8˚C, and 4˚C at the upper end.	4˚C。 为了集中解决这一系列的后果，IPCC提出的最佳估计是最低可能上升1.


Even at the lower estimate, the consequences of climate change could be severe in several parts of the world, including an increase in water stress, serious effects on ecosystems and food security, and threats to life and property as a result of coastal flooding.	8˚C，最高可能上升4˚C。 即使按照最低估计，在全球的几个地区，气候变化的后果也可能非常严重，包括用水短缺加剧、生态系统和食物保障受到严重破坏、沿海洪灾威胁生命财产。


There also may be serious direct consequences for human health if climate change is not checked, particularly increased morbidity and mortality as a result of heat waves, floods, and droughts.	如果气候变化没有得到遏制，人类的健康也可能会受到严重的直接影响，特别是热浪、洪灾和干旱引起发病率和死亡率上升。


Moreover, the distribution of some diseases would change, making human populations more vulnerable.	此外，某些疾病的分布可能变化，使人类更容易患病。


Because the impact of climate change is global, it is essential that the world as a whole take specific measures to adapt.	因为气候变化的影响是全球性的，所以全世界必须团结起来一致采取特殊的措施来解决。


But it is already clear that the capacity of some communities to adapt will quickly be exceeded if climate change goes unmitigated.	不过，很明显，如果气候变化的趋势没有缓和，某些地区将很快失去解决问题的能力。


To help these most vulnerable communities, it is essential for the world to devise a plan of action to limit the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs).	为了帮助受灾最严重的地区，全世界必须制定一套行动计划来限制温室气体（GHG）的排放。 IPCC对几种情况做了评估，其中一种可以把未来气温的升高限制在2.


Several scenarios have been assessed by the IPCC, and one that would limit future temperature increase to between 2.0-2.4˚C would require that emissions peak no later than 2015, and decline thereafter.	0-2. 4˚C之间，但要求必须在2015年之前达到排放高峰，然后逐步减少。


The rate of decline would then determine the extent to which the worst effects of climate change can be avoided.	然后，减少的速度将决定避免气候变化最糟糕的后果发生的几率。


The IPCC also found that the cost of such a strict effort at mitigation would not exceed 3% of global GDP in 2030.	IPCC还发现，在2030年，如此严格的减排措施成本不会超过全球GDP的3%。


Moreover, there are enormous co-benefits to mitigation: lower emissions of GHGs would be accompanied by lower air pollution and increased energy security, agricultural output, and employment.	而且，减排还能带来巨大的附带利益：减少温室气体的排放可以降低空气污染，提高能源保障、农业产量和就业。


If these co-benefits were taken fully into account, that price tag of 3% of GDP in 2030 would be substantially lower, perhaps even negative.	如果充分考虑这些附带利益，2030年GDP的3%的代价还会大幅度降低，甚至降为负数。


The world could actually enhance economic output and welfare by pursuing a path of mitigation.	全世界说不定还能通过推行缓解气候变化的措施提高经济产出和福利。


The need for international action, therefore, stems from two important observations arising out of the IPCC’s work.	因此，采取国际行动的必要性来自IPCC的两个重要观察结果。


First, if we do not mitigate emissions of GHGs, the negative effects of climate change will be difficult to reverse, implying great hardship and possibly danger to mankind and other species.	首先，如果我们不缓解温室气体的排放，气候变化的负面影响将很难逆转，对人类和其他物种可能造成巨大的苦难，甚至危险。


Second, the benefits of mitigating emissions of GHGs are so overwhelming that this, combined with the prospect of the harm resulting from inaction, makes it imperative for the world to devise an international response and a plan of action.	其次，缓解温室气体排放的益处也非常巨大，再加上不采取行动可能带来的伤害，全世界务必要采取一种国际态度和行动计划。


Given the challenge facing us, the magnitude and nature of which were clearly brought out by the IPCC, the Copenhagen Conference later this year must produce a multi-lateral agreement that deals adequately with climate change.	考虑到我们面临的挑战（IPCC已清楚阐明其量级和性质），下半年的哥本哈根会议必须就充分处理气候变化问题达成多边协议。


The Coming Age of Interest	利率的将来


One swallow does not make a summer, and one month of normal job growth, and rising prices in the United States does not mean that the Federal Reserve no longer fears economic malaise and deflation. But the time will come when world interest rates begin to rise, as central bankers prepare to resist the upward creep of inflation.	正如一燕不是夏，美国一个月正常工作和物价增长也不能表示美联储不用再为经济问题和通货紧缩而担心，而当央行准备抑止通货膨胀的增长势头时，世界的利率总有一天会上升的。


Whenever that moment arrives - whether this fall, in 2005 or 2006, or in 2007 - America and the global economy will face financial vulnerabilities that reflect the success of the past three years of monetary stimulation in stemming declines in production and moderating unemployment.	无论这个时刻何时到来--今年秋天，2005年，2006年，或者2007年--美国以及世界经济都将直面财政弱点，而这正反映了过去三年来为阻止生产下降和调解失业问题而采取的货币激励制度的成功。


Short-term interest rates are astonishingly low: only 2% in the euro zone, just 1% in the US, and zero in Japan.	短期的利率低得惊人：在欧元区只有2%。 在美国是1%，而日本是0。


Expansionary monetary policy has been successful, but only by pushing interest rates to historic lows - and by convincing investors that borrowing costs will remain at their current levels for a long time.	扩张性的货币政策已经取得了成功，但仅仅是把利率推向了历史的低点--外加说服投资者这样的借贷成本还会保持相当长的时间。


The main result of monetary stimulus has been to boost asset prices: anything that pays a yield, a dividend, or a rent becomes much more attractive - and hence much more valuable in money terms - when interest rates are very low and expected to stay very low.	货币激励政策的一个主要结果就是使资产价格上扬：只要利率特别低，并且有望保持这样的低水平，任何能带来收益、红利和租金的东西都显得更加诱人，而且在货币意义上更有价值。


This explains the large gaps between current prices for real estate in the US, equities in New York, London, and Frankfurt, and long-term bonds everywhere and what one would conventionally think their fundamental values should be.	这就解释了美国的房地产，纽约、伦敦和法兰克福的股票，世界各地的长期债券与人们认可的传统基本价值之间形成的巨大落差。


So what will happen when central banks start raising interest rates?	因此，如果央行开始提高利率会怎样？


In 1994, rising short-term rates caused increases in long-term rates - and declines in long-term bond prices - that were at least double what standard models at the time were predicting.	1994年，短期利率的增长引起了长期利率的提高，以及长期债券价格的下降，波动的幅度至少是人们预计的正常水平的两倍。


Moreover, interest rates in the world's peripheral, developing economies rose far more than rates in the advanced industrial core.	另外，处于经济边缘的发展中国家的利率增幅远远超过了处于经济核心的发达工业国家。


Thus, the first danger to worry about for 2005 and beyond - when world interest rates will most likely rise - is another wave of emerging-market financial crises.	因此，2005年及以后的首要危险是，如果世界利率真如预想中那样提高，就会再次引发新兴市场金融危机。


For countries like Mexico, Brazil, Turkey, Argentina, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, the record of the 1990's demonstrates that interest-rate spreads can widen and capital flows reverse remarkably rapidly, regardless of how favorably IMF officials and analyses by major banks view a country's policies.	20世纪90年代的记录表明，像墨西哥、巴西、土耳其、阿根廷、韩国、马来西亚和泰国这样的国家，无论国际货币基金组织和各大银行分析家对其政策持怎样的乐观态度，利率波动的幅度都可能突然加大，资本流向的逆转也可能非常迅猛。


Emerging-market interest-rate spreads now are abnormally low.	目前，新兴市场利率的波动幅度低得超乎寻常。


International money flows - aside from inflows into the US - are not yet at levels associated with "irrational exuberance," but there is still time for that to happen before interest rates start to rise.	除去流入美国的资金外，国际货币流动还未出现"失去理性的繁荣"，但在利率上扬之前，出现这种情况的可能性仍然存在。


This is an alarming prospect, because if there is one lesson from the 1990's, it is that nobody should overestimate the stability of international financial flows.	这需要引起人们的警惕，因为有了90年代的教训，没有人可以对世界金融流动的稳定性持过分乐观的态度。


The second danger springs from high asset values within the advanced industrial core.	另一个风险来自核心工业国家的高资产价值。


The dominant mode of thought within the Federal Reserve - with which I agree - appears to be that the information-technology revolution is continuing, that the pace of growth of potential output in the US remains very fast, and that the output gap is thus relatively wide.	美联储的主要观点是，信息技术革命正在继续，美国生产能力继续保持高速增长，与实际生产力的差距也相对较大。 对此，我也很赞同。


This implies that interest rates may, in fact, need to stay low for a very considerable period.	这意味着利率很可能需要在相当长的时间内保持低水平。


Moreover, confidence in the Federal Reserve is high, and the last remnants of the 1970's inflation risk premium have been wrung out of interest rates.	另外，美联储信心十足， 20世纪70年代通货膨胀仅剩的一点的风险酬劳的也已从利率中清除出去。


As a result, even after output levels return to their potential, interest rates will stay low by the standards of the 1980's and the 1990's.	因此，即便生产能力恢复到最好水平，与20世纪八、九十年代相比，利率仍将保持在较低状态。


All of this is, of course, good news for those who own assets like long-term bonds, stocks, and real estate.	当然，所有这一切对那些持有长期债券、股票和地产的人来说是好消息。


Indeed, elevating long-term asset prices was precisely the point of lowering interest rates: making bondholders and especially real estate owners richer, after all, provides a fillip to spending.	确实，提高长期资产价格正是降低利率的关键：让债券、特别是地产持有者更加富裕毕竟可以刺激消费。


But the bad news is that even if interest rates are expected to remain low for a while, they will not stay this low indefinitely.	但坏消息是，即使较低的利率水平还会保持一段时间，也不会永远维持现有的低水平。


The bottom line is that when interest rates rise, asset values will fall.	最终情况是利率一旦升高，资产价值就会降低。


It is during such periods - particularly when asset values fall swiftly and substantially - that we discover exactly how good our central bankers are at their main job: reducing financial volatility and promoting economic stability.	在这一阶段，特别是当资产价值迅速大幅度降低时，我们会发现央行的银行家们是怎样忠于职守：降低金融风险，促进经济稳定。


It is also during such periods that we discover how many people who are holding long-term bonds, real estate, or stocks are doing so not because they think current prices are attractive relative to fundamentals, but because their prices have gone up over the past several years.	同样在这段时间里，我们会发现，很多持有长期债券、地产、股票的人，他们这么做不是认为现在的价格相对于实际价值有吸引力，而是因为这些东西的价格在过去几年里不断上涨。


This is a crucial question for policy makers, because those who bought long-term assets due to what seemed like perpetually rising prices are also those who will sell as soon as price trends seem to be reversing.	这对政策制订者们是个很关键的问题，因为那些由于价格持续上涨购买长期资产的人，一旦价格走势逆转，就会立即卖出手中的资产。


In particular, the US trade deficit looms as a massive source of instability should long-term asset prices fall significantly.	特别是如果长期资产价格猛烈下跌，美国贸易赤字将成为巨大的不稳定因素。


To be sure, the challenges facing the world's economic policy makers during the next several years will be different from those that they have faced since the collapse of the NASDAQ bubble.	可以肯定的是，未来几年中，世界经济政策制订者们所面临的挑战将与NASDAQ泡沫破灭后的挑战不同。


The risks associated with inflation are probably less dangerous than those generated by collapsing output and the threat of deflation.	通货膨胀带来的危险可能会比产出降低及通货紧缩的危险小。


But, as we learned in the 1990's, this does not mean that the coming challenges will be easier to handle.	但是，经过20世纪90年代的教训，这并不表示即将到来的挑战更容易应付。


Four Marijuana Moments	四个大麻时刻


MEXICO CITY – Latin America and the United States have experienced what one could call a series of “marijuana moments” over the past few weeks.	墨西哥城—过去四个星期中，拉丁美洲和美国经历了一系列可以被称为“大麻时刻”的事件。


Given growing support for ending the senseless and bloody decades-long “war on drugs,” these signs of progress toward decriminalization and legalization should not pass unremarked.	对终结几十年来“毒品战争”的无谓流血的支持与日俱增，这些通往除罪化和合法化的进步不应该不引起注意。


The first moment took place during the Organization of American States’ annual General Assembly, held this year in Antigua, Guatemala, at the beginning of June.	第一个时刻发生在今年6月初危地马拉安提瓜岛举行的美洲国家组织（OAS）大会年会。


The OAS Secretary General, José Miguel Insulza, presented a report entitled “The Drug Problem in the Americas,” which had been requested by the region’s heads of state when they met at last year’s Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia.	OAS秘书长因苏尔萨（José Miguel Insulza）作了题为《美洲的毒品问题》（The Drug Problem in the Americas）的报告，之所以作这个报告，是应美洲各国首脑在去年哥伦比亚卡塔赫纳美洲峰会上提出的要求。


The report was drawn up by experts from almost all OAS member states, and was divided into two parts: an excellent analytical section, and a brief and somewhat exasperating chapter devoted to future scenarios.	几乎所有OAS成员国都有专家参与报告的起草。 报告分为两部分：一是出色的分析部分，而是颇可气人的关于未来前景的简报。


The document itself represents a watershed, because it provides the data needed for a scientific and empirical discussion of an issue that is too often debated in ideological terms.	报告本身算得上一座里程碑，因为它提供了科学地、实证地讨论问题所需的数据。 此前，问题的讨论往往基于意识形态。


The report breaks down the issue in a compelling way: by countries (producers, transit states, consumers, or all of these); by substances (marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and synthetic drugs); by links among these illicit substances; and by the consequences of consumption, production, or trade of each drug for societies, institutions, and international relations.	报告用一种吸引眼球的方式将问题予以分解：按国家分类（制造国、运输国、消费国，或兼而有之国）、按物质分类（大麻、可卡因、海洛因和合成毒品）、按这些非法物质的联系分、按每种毒品的消费、制造或交易对社会、制度和国际关系的影响分。


The report also states explicitly that decriminalization of marijuana consumption is a legitimate, reasonable, and feasible option, though it does not recommend such a policy.	报告还明确提出，大麻消费的除罪化合法、合理、可行，尽管它并没有建议这样做。


This is only an initial step, but it is an enormous one.	这只是一个开始，但这个头炮打得很响。


The second “marijuana moment” occurred in the US, where the states of Washington and Colorado have entered the final stages of fully legalizing marijuana usage, following popular referenda last November.	第二个“大麻时刻“发生于美国，去年11月举行公投后，华盛顿州和科罗拉多州进入了大麻使用完全合法化的最后步骤。


Both states have just concluded the drafting and publication of the rules and regulations that will translate their referendum results into law: how to forbid consumption by minors; how to punish consumers driving under the influence; what kind of taxes and tax rates are most appropriate; and how non-residents will be treated, among other complicated and controversial issues.	两个州均刚刚决定起草和公布将公投结果转化为法律的规则和规定：如何禁止未成年人消费大麻、如何惩罚吸大麻后开车的消费者、怎样以何种税率征税比较合适、非本州居民如何处置，以及其他富有争议的复杂问题。


As legal pioneers in the US, both states will have to proceed by trial and error.	作为美国的立法先锋，这两个州将以身试错。


But perhaps the most interesting and intriguing facet of this process is President Barack Obama’s eloquent indifference to the entire affair.	但或许这一过程最有趣的、最令人着迷的部分总统奥巴马意味深长地对此事的漠不关心。


So far, at least, he has refused to intercede in the discussion of whether federal law should trump state legislation, having said that he has “bigger fish to fry.”	至少到目前为止，他拒绝参与联邦法律是否应该压倒州立法的讨论，声称自己“有更大的事要做”。


The third “marijuana moment” stems from recent decisions in New York and Illinois – the third and fifth most populous US states, respectively – to proceed with legalizing medical marijuana.	第三个“大麻时刻”发生于纽约州和伊利诺伊州最近的决定。 这两个州分别是美国第三大和第五大人口州，它们开始了大麻医用合法化的程序。


In May, the Illinois legislature passed a highly restrictive bill governing marijuana use for therapeutic purposes, which the governor has not yet decided whether to sign.	5月，伊利诺伊州立法者通过了约束治疗目的的大麻使用的高度限制法案，州长尚未决定是否签署。


Soon after, the New York State Assembly passed a strict bill on medical marijuana, which the State Senate has yet to vote on.	不久，纽约州议会通过了关于医用大麻的严格法案，还有待州参议员投票。


If New York and Illinois move forward, they will become the 19th and 20th of the 50 US states that, together with the District of Columbia, permit medical use of marijuana.	如果纽约州和伊利诺伊州更进一步，它们将成为美国50个州（以及哥伦比亚特区）中第19和第20个允许以医用目的使用大麻的州。


Finally, earlier this month, the US-based international NGO Human Rights Watch formally adopted a stance that rejects criminalization of possession and consumption of all drugs and calls for a radically different approach.	最后，本月早些时候，美国国际非政府组织人权观察组织（Human Rights Watch，HRW）正式宣布了它的立场——拒绝任何毒品的拥有和消费的除罪化，并呼吁采取截然不同的态度。


Most important, HRW did so from a human-rights perspective, and its statement is worth quoting:	更重要的是，HRW是出于人权角度采取这一立场的，其声明值得载录：


“Subjecting people to criminal sanctions for the personal use of drugs, or for possession of drugs for personal use, infringes on their autonomy and right to privacy.	“因个人使用毒品，或拥有毒品以作个人使用而将人治罪侵犯了他们的自治权和隐私权。


The right to privacy is broadly recognized under international law, including in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights.	隐私权被国际法广泛承认，包括《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》和《美洲人权公约》。


Limitations on autonomy and privacy cannot be justified unless they meet the criteria for any restriction of a basic right, namely legitimate purpose, proportionality, necessity, and non-discrimination.	限制自治权和隐私权是站不住脚的，除非它们符合限制基本权利的标准，即合理的目的、程度、必要性和无歧视性。


While protecting health is a legitimate government purpose, criminalizing drug use to protect people from harming themselves does not meet the criteria of necessity or proportionality.”	尽管保护健康是合理的政府目的，但将毒品使用犯罪化以保护人们不会自残并不符合必要性和合理程度的标准。 ”


None of these recent developments will lead, on its own, to decriminalization.	所有这些最新发展动态本身都不会导致除罪化。


International conventions still limit governments’ leeway, and the US government remains opposed to any backtracking from the punitive, prohibitionist strategy that it has pursued since 1981.	国际公约仍然限制着政府动作的余地，美国政府仍然反对任何退出1981年以来所实施的惩罚性禁止战略。


Even the boldest Latin American governments – including those in Colombia, Uruguay, and Guatemala – are reluctant to advance much further, especially if they remain isolated.	即使是最激进的拉丁美洲政府——包括哥伦比亚、乌拉圭和危地马拉——也不愿意走得太远，特别是在它们仍显孤立的时候。


And presidents like Brazil’s Dilma Rousseff, Mexico’s Enrique Peña Nieto, and Argentina’s Cristina Fernández de Kirchner are sticking to their orthodox, conservative, and anachronistic stances, unwilling to budge until public opinion leaves them no other choice.	而巴西总统罗塞夫、墨西哥总统涅托和阿根廷总统基什内尔仍然坚持正统、保守而过时的立场，等待公共舆论迫使他们做出改变。 但西半球已经开始松动；


Yet something is stirring in the hemisphere; as its “marijuana moments” arrive with greater frequency, can a milestone be far off?	“大麻时刻”越来越频繁地出现，我们距离划时代的一步还会远吗？


Where Europe Works	欧洲起作用的地方


STOCKHOLM – With Swedish cities roiled for weeks now by rioting by unemployed immigrants, many observers see a failure of the country’s economic model.	斯托克霍姆—眼下，瑞典各大城市陷入失业者骚乱长达数周，许多观察者看到了瑞典经济模式的失灵。


The Swedish/Scandinavian model that has emerged over the last 20 years has provided the only viable route to sustained growth that Europe has seen in decades.	过去20年中出现的瑞典/斯堪的纳维亚模式给出了欧洲几十年来唯一的可靠持续增长。


Europeans should remember that perceptions of strength and weakness change fast.	欧洲人不应该忘记，对优势和劣势的感觉变化很快。


In the 1980’s, Scandinavian countries stood for chronic budget deficits, high inflation, and repeated devaluations.	20世纪80年代，斯堪的纳维亚国家陷入了长期预算赤字、高通胀和一再贬值。


In 1999, The Economist labeled Germany “the sick man of the euro” – a monument of European sclerosis, with low growth and high unemployment.	1999年，《经济学人》（Economist）给德国打上了“欧元病夫”（“the sick man of the euro”）的标签——欧洲症候的象征，低增长和高失业并存。


Now, however, the specter of devaluation has disappeared from northern European countries.	然而，如今贬值在北欧国家已经难觅踪迹。


Budgets are close to balance, with less public expenditure and lower tax rates, while economic growth has recovered.	预算近乎平衡，公共开支减少，税率下降，而经济增长则复苏。


The transformation of the old European welfare state started in northern Europe, and it is proceeding to most of the rest of the continent.	昔日欧洲福利国家的转型从北欧开始，目前正在普及欧洲大陆的其余部分。


Today, it is difficult to imagine the mindset that prevailed before Margaret Thatcher came to power in the United Kingdom in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in the United States in 1981.	如今，很难想象有人还会持有1979年撒切尔在英国以及1981年里根在美国上台时的思想。


Thatcher’s greatest achievement was the liberalization of the overregulated British labor market, while Reagan turned the tide with his inaugural address: “In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem.”	撒切尔最大的成就是实现了过度监管的英国劳动力市场的自由化，而里根以他的就职演说开启了新潮流：“在当下的危机中，政府不是解决我们的问题的方案，政府乃是问题。


The moral superiority of high marginal income taxes suddenly waned.	”高边际税率的道德优越性一夜之间消失了。


Free-market ideas took hold.	自由市场思想成为主流。


In northern Europe, the transformation of the welfare state started in Denmark in 1982.	在北欧，福利国家的转型始自1982年的丹麦。


In deep financial crisis, traditionally social-democratic Denmark elected a conservative prime minister, Poul Schlüter, a jovial man with a bow tie.	在深度金融危机中，传统社会民主国家丹麦选出了保守派首相施吕特，一位打领结的乐观主义者。


One of his first decisions was to peg the Danish krone to the Deutschmark to stop the inflation-devaluation cycle.	他的首批决策之一是将丹麦克朗盯住德国马克，以阻止通胀-贬值循环。


The Danish peg – now to the euro – still holds.	克朗的盯住政策现在依然有效——对象换成了欧元。


Schlüter’s second big decision was to deregulate the Danish economy, which now has the world’s largest number of enterprises per citizen.	施吕特的第二项重大决定是放松对丹麦经济的管制，如今，丹麦人均企业数量是世界之最。


But he left the country’s high taxes and welfare state in place.	但他保留了丹麦的高税率和福利国家。


In the early 1990’s, Norway, Sweden, and Finland experienced a horrendous real-estate, banking, and currency crisis.	20世纪90年代初，挪威、瑞典和芬兰经历了可怕的房地产、银行和货币危机。


Output fell and unemployment skyrocketed.	产出下跌，失业率暴增。


In 1991, Swedish voters broke the reign of the Social Democrats, electing a coalition government under conservative Prime Minister Carl Bildt, who called his program “the only way.”	1991年，瑞典选民打破了社会民主党的主宰，选出了以保守派首相比尔特为首的联合政府。 比尔特称自己的方案是“唯一的道路”。


Bildt tried to follow Schlüter’s lead, but, in 1992, Sweden was forced to devalue – though his deregulation of markets did work well.	他试图追随施吕特的做法，但在1992年，瑞典被迫贬值——尽管其市场去监管化做得很好。


Sweden’s greatest achievement was a gradual cut of public spending by no less than one-fifth of GDP from 1993 to 2007.	瑞典的最大成就是逐渐削减了公共支出，1993—2007年间总共削减了GDP的五分之一弱。


Meanwhile, Sweden’s public debt was reduced from 73% of GDP to 39% of GDP, while taxes have been cut repeatedly.	与此同时，瑞典公共债务从GDP的73%下降至GDP的39%，税收也多次下降。


The Social Democrats returned to power in 1994, but they accepted Bildt’s new fiscal policies, and even carried out a revolutionary pension reform in 1998 that properly tied benefits to payments.	社会民主党于1994年重新上台，但接受了比尔特的心财政政策，甚至还在1998年推出了革命性的退休改革，将福利与支付合理地挂钩起来。


In parallel with the Scandinavian crisis, communism collapsed in Eastern Europe in 1989 and in 1991 in the Baltic states.	与斯堪的纳维亚危机形成对照的是，共产主义于1989年在东欧崩溃，于1991年在巴尔干地区崩溃。


Poland’s first post-communist finance minister, Leszek Balcerowicz, showed an amazed world how communism could be abolished and a market economy built almost instantly.	波兰后共产主义时期的首任财政部长巴塞洛维茨（Leszek Balcerowicz）让世人大跌眼镜，他展示了如何在一夜之间抛弃共产主义并建立市场经济。


The rest of Central Europe and the Baltic states followed his lead.	其他东欧和巴尔干国家纷纷群起效仿。


Former Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar was the most radical European reformer.	前爱沙尼亚总理拉尔是最激进的欧洲改革家。


Indeed, his ideas about taxation have revolutionized Europe.	事实上，他关于税收的思想在欧洲掀起了一场革命。


In 1994, he introduced a flat personal-income tax, a policy that most Eastern European countries have since adopted.	1994年，他引入了公平个人所得税，此后大部分东欧国家都采纳了这一税制。


In 1999, when Laar became Prime Minister again, he abolished the tax on corporate profit, which was harming entrepreneurship.	1999年，拉尔再度成为总理，他废除了对企业利润征税的做法，这会伤害企业家精神。


As a consequence of the ensuing tax competition, corporate-tax rates have fallen to 15-25% in most European countries.	税收竞争随之而来，其结果是大部分欧洲国家的公司税率降低至15—25%。


More broadly, Estonia has revolutionized public finances.	从更广的意义上说，爱沙尼亚掀起了公共财政革命。


Since 1992, it has maintained a more or less balanced budget, with hardly any public debt.	1992年以来，它一直维持着或多或少平衡的预算，几乎没有公共债务。


It slashed public expenditure and capped spending at 35% of GDP – the same level as in the United States.	它大幅削减公共支出，将开支限制在GDP的35%以内——与美国相当。


As free-market thinking has taken hold and similar reforms have proliferated, the social-welfare state is being transformed into a social-welfare society.	随着自由市场思想的根深蒂固以及类似改革的遍地开花，社会福利国家也在转型成社会福利社会。


Government spending remains large enough to guarantee reasonable public services and a social safety net.	政府支出保持大到足以保证公共服务和社会安全网。


Reformers have exposed the public sector to competition, not least from private providers, rendering it more efficient.	改革者让公共部门暴露于竞争之下，接受私人供给者的挑战，以增加其效率。


The systematic reforms in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Poland, and Estonia have much in common.	英国、丹麦、瑞典、波兰和爱沙尼亚的系统改革具有大量共同点。


First, all were caused by a profound crisis of the social-welfare state: falling output, rising unemployment, large budget deficits, inflation, and devaluation.	首先，所有这些国改革都是由社会福利国家深远的危机引发的：产出下降、失业上升、大规模预算赤字、通货膨胀以及贬值。


Without severe crisis, no significant reform was likely.	没有严重的危机，就不会有重大改革。


Second, a change of government through elections prompted reforms and gave them democratic legitimacy.	其次，通过选举改变政府刺激了改革，并给予改革民主合法性。


Reform does not require a state of emergency, as is often argued.	与经常所指出的不同，改革并不需要紧急状态。


Third, reforms require a strong leader.	第三，改革需要强势领导人。


No major reform has been undertaken through consensus, though successful reforms usually generate a broad consensus a few years later.	没有哪项重大改革是通过共识实施的，尽管成功的改革往往会在几年后形成广泛共识。


At that point, reforms can be carried forward by those who had initially opposed them, as happened in Denmark and Sweden.	此后，改革可以由一开始反对它们的人继续推进，丹麦和瑞典就是明证。


Finally, fundamental reform of the social-welfare state requires leaders who embrace free-market ideas.	最后，社会福利国家的根本性改革需要领导人接受自由市场思想。


Rethinking requires a new ideology, and, after one country has shown the right direction, neighbors often follow.	反思需要新思想，在一国证明了正确的方向后，邻国通常会跟上。


Europe has now reached the point at which most of its laggards are prepared to accept the social-welfare society.	如今，欧洲处在一个其大部分落后国家准备接受社会福利社会的节点。


This humane European capitalism is now hastening toward crisis-ridden southern Europe.	这一高尚的欧洲资本主义目前正在加速跑向处于危机中的南欧。


The Coming Global Credit Glut	即将到来的全球信用泛滥


HONG KONG – With world leaders meeting at the end of this week at the G-20 summit in Cannes, France, the next economic minefield that they will face is already coming into view.	香港——世界领导人将于本周末的法国戛纳G20峰会上聚首，而他们将面临的下一个经济雷区已经浮现在了眼前。


It is likely to take the form of an opaque global credit glut, turbocharged by the fragile mixture of too-big-to-fail global banking with a huge and largely unwatched and unregulated shadow banking sector.	这雷区的形式可能是不透明的全球信用泛滥，其背后的推手是由“大而不能倒”的全球银行体系和规模巨大但几乎不为人知、不受监管的影子银行部门所组成的脆弱混合体。


To be sure, that is not what many see.	实事求是地说，很多人并没有看到这一点。


Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke and others have blamed the financial crisis of 2008 on a global savings glut, which fuelled flows of money from high-savings emerging-market economies – especially in Asia – that run chronic balance-of-payments surpluses.	美联储主席伯南克和其他人指责2008年金融危机的罪魁是全球储蓄泛滥，储蓄泛滥导致资金从长期以来存在国际收支盈余的高储蓄新兴市场经济体，特别是亚洲，源源不断地流出。


According to this school of thought, excessive savings pushed long-term interest rates down to rock-bottom levels, leading to asset bubbles in the United States and elsewhere.	根据这一派的看法，过度储蓄导致了长期利率跌至最低点，吹起了美国和其他地方的资产泡沫。


But Claudio Borio and Piti Disayat, economists at the Bank for International Settlements, have argued convincingly that the savings-glut theory fails to explain the unsustainable credit creation in the run-up to the 2008 crisis.	但国际清算银行的经济学家克劳迪奥·博利奥（Claudio Borio）和皮蒂·迪沙亚特（Piti Disayat）有力地指出，储蓄泛滥理论并不能解释导致2008年危机的不可持续的信用创造。


They have shown that the major capital inflows were not from emerging markets, but from Europe, where there was no net balance-of-payments surplus.	他们证明，流入资本主要并非来自新兴市场，而是来自不存在国际收支净盈余的欧洲。


The alternative theory – of a global credit glut – gained more ground with the release last week of the Financial Stability Board’s report on shadow banking.	另一个比较可信的理论，国际信用泛滥，在上周金融稳定性委员会的影子银行报告中得到了诸多证实。


The FSB report contains startling revelations about the scale of global shadow banking, which it defines as “credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking system.”	金融稳定性委员会报告的披露令人震惊：全球影子银行（该报告定义为“以常规银行体系之外的实体和活动为形式的信用中介”）规模巨大。


The report, which was requested by G-20 leaders at their summit in Seoul last November, found that between 2002 and 2007, the shadow banking system increased by $33 trillion, more than doubling in asset size from $27 trillion to $60 trillion.	该报告是应去年11月首尔峰会G20领导人要求撰写的，报告指出，在2002—2007年间，影子银行体系增长了33万亿美元，资产规模从27万亿美元提高到了60万亿美元。


This is 8.5 times higher than the total US current-account deficit of $3.9 trillion during the same period.	这是同期美国经常项目赤字总额——3. 9万亿美元的8.


The shadow banking system is estimated at roughly 25-30% of the global financial system ($250 trillion, excluding derivatives) and at half of total global banking assets.	据估计，影子银行大约占全球银行体系（250万亿美元，不包括衍生品）的25—30%，占全球银行资产的一半。


This represents a huge regulatory “black hole” at the center of the global financial system, hitherto not closely monitored for monetary and financial stability purposes.	这显示全球金融体系的核心区域存在巨大的监管“黑洞”，迄今都没有以货币和金融稳定性为出发点进行密切监控。


Its importance was exposed only by analysis of the key roles played by structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and money-market funds (MMFs) in the 2008 meltdown.	这一点有多重要？ 分析一下结构性投资实体（SIV）和货币市场基金在2008年崩盘中所起的作用就知道了。


The shadow banking system is complex, because it comprises a mix of institutions and vehicles. Investment funds other than MMFs account for 29% of total, and SIVs make up 9%, but the shadow system also includes public financial institutions (such as the government-backed mortgage lender Fannie Mae in the US).	影子银行体系很复杂，因为它是各式各样机构和实体的混合体。 除货币市场基金之外的投资基金大约占总量的29%，SIV占9%，但影子银行体系还包括公共金融机构（比如美国市场上的政府支持按揭贷款商房利美）。


They are some of the largest counterparties with the regular banking system, and their combined credit creation and proprietary trading and hedging may account for much of the global liquidity flows that make monetary and financial stability so difficult to ensure.	它们是常规银行体系的最大交易对手，它们的信用创造和自营交易及对冲总量占全球流动性流动量的大头，而后者正是货币和金融稳定性难以得到保证的原因。


The trouble is that, by 2010, the shadow banking system was about the same size as it was just before the 2007 market crash, whereas the regulated global banking system was 18% larger than in 2007.	麻烦在于，到2010年为止，影子银行体系的规模与2007年市场崩溃前差不多，而受监管的全球银行体系增长了18%。


That is why the FSB report pinpoints the shadow banking system, together with the large global banks, as sources of systemic risk.	这就是金融稳定性委员会明确地将影子银行体系和全球大银行一起指为系统性风险来源的原因。


But the global problem is likely to be much larger than the sum of its parts.	但全球问题可能要比各部分之和还要严重。


Specifically, global credit creation by the regular and shadow banking systems is likely to be significantly larger than the sum of the credit creation currently measured by national statistics.	特别是，来自常规和影子银行体系的全球信用实际数字可能远远高于各国统计数字��和。


There are several reasons for this.	造成这一现象的原因是多方面的。


First, credit that can be, and is, created offshore and through off-balance-sheet SIVs is not captured by national balance-of-payments statistics. In other words, while a “savings” glut may contribute to low interest rates and fuel excess credit creation, it is not the main cause.	首先，信用可以以离岸的形式创造，也可以通过表外SIV创造（事实也正是如此），这些信用不会出现在国民国际收支统计中。 换句话说，“储蓄”泛滥可能导致低利率、助长信用的过度创造，但绝非主因。


Second, the volatile “carry trade” is notoriously difficult to measure, because most of it is conducted through derivatives in options, forwards, and swaps, which are treated as off-balance sheet – that is, as net numbers that are below the line in accounting terms.	其次，众所周知，高波动性的“套息交易”很难得到测量，因为它们大多是都通过期权、远期、互换等衍生品进行的，被处理为表外资产——用会计术语讲，它们只是些线下净数字。


Thus, in gross terms, the leverage effects are larger than currently reported.	因此，从总量上说，杠杆效应要比当前的报告数字更大。


Third, the interaction between the shadow banking system and the global banks is highly concentrated, because the global banks act as prime brokers, particularly for derivative trades.	第三，影子银行体系和全球银行的互动是高度集中的，因为全球银行担当着主经纪商的角色，特别是在衍生品交易中。


Data from the US Comptroller of Currency suggest that the top five US banks account for 96% of the total over-the-counter (OTC) derivative trades in the US.	美国货币审计署的数字表明，美国前五大银行经手了美国96%的场外衍生品交易。


Indeed, the nightmare scenario haunting the world is the collapse of another shadow banking entity, causing global trade to freeze, as happened in 2008.	事实上，在世界头上萦绕不去的噩梦情景是再次出现某家影子银行实体的倒闭，引发全球交易冻结，重蹈2008年的覆辙。


The Basel III agreement on capital adequacy and other recent reforms still have not ring-fenced trade financing from these potential shocks.	巴塞尔III资本充足性协议和其他现有的改革方案并未能将交易融资与潜在冲击隔开。


We urgently need to monitor and understand the role of shadow banking and the too-big-to-fail banks in creating the global credit glut.	我们急需监控并弄清楚影子银行业务和“大而不能倒”的银行在导致全球信用泛滥方面的作用。


Obtaining a full picture of global monetary and credit numbers and their determinants is a vital first step.	获得全球货币和信贷的完整数字以及数字背后的因素是关键的第一步。


So far, the G-20’s call to “think globally” has turned into “act locally.”  We hope that the G-20 leaders will think systemically at Cannes, and act nationally and cooperatively to defuse the global credit glut minefield.	到目前为止，G20的呼吁已从“全球着眼”变成了“本国着手”。 我们希望，G20领导人能在戛纳进行系统的思考，从本国出发，相互合作，扫除全球信用泛滥雷区。


The Coming Revival in French-American Relations	法美关系即将面临好转


With the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, French-American relations reached a low point.	随着美国于2003年入侵伊拉克，法美关系跌入了低谷。


The Bush Administration felt betrayed by French diplomatic tactics at the United Nations, while French President Jacques Chirac felt confirmed in his mistrust of the sole superpower and his call for a multipolar world.	布什政府感觉被法国在联合国的外交手段背叛了，而法国总统希拉克则更坚定了他对单一超级大国的不信任，并且呼吁建立一个多极世界。


Today, on the eve of the French presidential elections, opinion polls show that three-quarters of French voters believe that France should distance itself from the United States.	今天，把法国总统选举前夕，民意调查显示有四分之三的法国选民认为法国与美国应当保持距离。


Despite a long history of alliance dating back to the American Revolution and including two world wars, France has always had a somewhat ambivalent attitude toward the US, and the Iraq War was not the first time that a controversial security policy undercut America’s attractiveness in France.	尽管两国自美国独立战争时期起就保持了合作，包括在两次世界大战期间，但是法国对于美国一直怀有一种矛盾心理，而伊拉克战争并不是第一次出现一项有争议的安全策略削弱了美国对法国的吸引力。


Polls show similar reactions after the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Vietnam War in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, and the deployment of intermediate range missiles in Europe in the early 1980’s.	民意调查显示在1956年的苏伊士运河危机、60年代末至70年代初的越南战争以及80年代初在欧洲部署中程导弹后法国民众都出现了同样的反应。


In addition, France has long had a strand of cultural anti-Americanism.	此外，法国长期存在着一种文化上的反美主义。


Some conservatives disliked the crude egalitarianism of American culture, while some on the left saw America’s faith in markets as a symbol of capitalist exploitation of the working class.	一些保守派不喜欢生硬地强调平等主义的美国文化，而另一些左翼人士则把美国人对市场经济的迷信看作资本家剥削工人阶级的象征。


After World War II, France banned Coca-Cola for a time, and, more recently, the farmer José Bové became a folk hero by destroying a McDonald’s restaurant.	二战以后，法国曾禁止过可口可乐，而最近，农场主波韦因为砸了一家麦当劳店而成了民间英雄。


But the French still flock to McDonald’s and to theatres playing American movies, despite limits on their import.	但是法国人依然涌向麦当劳以及去电影院观看美国电影，尽管它们的进口被受到限制。


While such ambivalence will not change, French-American relations are likely to improve no matter which of the three leading candidates prevails in the final round of voting on May 6, in part owing to Chirac’s exit.	尽管这种矛盾心理不会有什么改变，法美关系却很有可能会得到改善，而不管现在处于领先的三位候选人最终是谁在5月6日的最后一轮投票中胜出，这部分得归因于希拉克的离开。


In fact, French-American relations have already begun to improve, as both sides realized that their pubic dispute was damaging their interests.	事实上，法美关系已经开始改善了，因为双方都认识到它们的公开争论损害了它们的利益。


The exit of some of the most strident neo-conservatives in the Bush administration over the past year has also helped, and with growing opposition to the Iraq War, some Americans are beginning to think that the French may have had a point after all.	过去一年布什政府内的某些最强硬的新保守派的离去对此也有帮助，同时随着对伊拉克战争越来越大的反对声，一些美国人开始认识到法国人的观点还是有道理的。


Of the three major candidates, the conservative Nicolas Sarkozy has expressed the most pro-American views and traveled to Washington for a photo opportunity with Bush. He told a Washington audience that anti-Americanism was an elite indulgence not shared by the French at large.	在三个主要候选人中，保守派的萨尔科齐表达了最亲美的观点，并且去了一趟华盛顿与布什一起在媒体面前亮了一次相。


“The truth is that the French listen to Madonna, just as they used to love listening to Elvis and Sinatra,” Sarkozy said.	他跟华盛顿的听众说反美主义只是一种精英们迷恋的事物，绝对不是法国大多数民众的观点。


“And all French parents dream of sending their child to an American university.” According to Sarkozy, “The virulence of the press and a portion of French elites against the United States reflects a certain envy of your brilliant success.”	“事实是法国人爱听麦当娜的歌，就像他们曾经喜欢听猫王和辛纳屈的歌那样，” 萨尔科齐说，“并且所有的法国父母都梦想能够送他们的孩子去上一所美国大学，”以及“媒体的刻毒和部分法国精英对美国的反对反映了他们对你们所取得的辉煌成功的某种嫉妒。


In response, an advisor to the socialist candidate Ségolène Royal labeled Sarkozy “an American neo-conservative with a French passport.”	作为回应，社会党候选人罗雅尔的一位竞选顾问称萨尔科齐是“一位拿着法国护照的美国新保守派”。


But while Royal has been careful to placate her socialist base, she has also talked about the need for market reforms in the French economy, and taken some foreign policy positions on Iran and Turkey that are closer to the American view than are Sarkozy’s.	但是在罗雅尔小心翼翼地安抚她的社会党支持者的同时也在呼吁要对法国经济进行市场经济的改革，并且她在伊拉克和土耳其问题上的某些外交政策立场比萨尔科齐的更接近美国的立场。


The centrist candidate, former education minister François Bayrou, for his part, has relatives in the US and has called for a “third way” in French politics analogous to the paths forged by Bill Clinton and Tony Blair.	而中间派候选人前教育部长贝胡本人则有美国亲戚，而他呼吁克林顿和布莱尔所开创的路线很相似的法国政治“第三条道路”。


The candidates differ in other ways as well.	这些候选人在其他方面意见同样也有分歧。


Both Sarkozy and Royal have appealed to nationalism.	萨尔科齐和罗雅尔均倾向于民族主义。


Sarkozy has boasted that he expelled tens of thousands of illegal immigrants when he was interior minister, and in 2005 he referred to Muslim rioters in the suburbs as “scum.”	萨尔科齐自豪地声称在他担任内政部��期间他驱逐了数以万计的非法移民，而在2005年他把在郊区发动骚乱的穆斯林人称为“人渣”。


Aware of the ultra-nationalist threat from Jean-Marie Le Pen, who took second place in the 2002 presidential election, Sarkozy has said that he wants “to talk to those who have moved toward the far right because they are suffering.”	面对在2002年总统选举中排名第二的极端民族主义者勒庞的威胁，萨尔科齐称他想“跟那些向极右派靠拢的人谈谈，因为他们受到了伤害。


While Royal has been critical of Sarkozy, she, too, has appealed to nationalism, calling for a “re-conquest of the symbols of the nation” from the right.	”尽管罗雅尔对萨尔科齐的观点表示了批评，但是她同样有民族主义的倾向，呼吁从右派手中“夺回对国家象征的掌握”。


Only Bayrou has denounced the “nationalistic obsession” that has marked the campaign.	只有贝胡谴责成为竞选主流的“民族主义情结”。


But one should not read too much into these differences.	但是人们无须对这些分歧看得太重。


All three candidates support Chirac’s opposition to the Iraq War, will protect French agriculture in global trade negotiations, and will promote French leadership in Europe.	所有这三位候选人都支持希拉克对伊拉克战争的反对立场，都将在全球贸易谈判中保护法国的农业，并且将推进法国在欧洲的领导地位。


Despite French voters’ rejection of a new constitution for the European Union in 2005 (in part a protest vote against Chirac), all three candidates recognize that the EU has been an important means to enhance French power in world affairs.	尽管法国选民在2005年的时候反对制定欧盟新宪法（这部分也是对希拉克的反对投票），但是所有三位候选人都认识到欧盟是加强法国在世界事务中的地位的一个重要工具。


None is likely to become an American poodle.	也没有人愿意成为美国人的走狗。


Indeed, that is not the way French politics works.	事实上，这从来就不是法国政治运作的方式。


French leaders often like to be seen resisting American pressure before striking a compromise and cooperating in a manner that serves both French and American interests.	法国领导人经常喜欢在最终达成妥协并以一种对法国和美国的利益都有利的方式进行合作之前，表现出面对美国的压力毫不退让的态度。


Friction with the US is thus inevitable, but in the long run there is usually fruitful cooperation.	因此与美国的摩擦是难以避免的，但是从长期来看它们却保持着富有成果的合作。


Despite the tension of the past few years, Europe and America have cooperated in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Iran, and on countering Al Qaeda.	尽管在过去几年间关系紧张，但是欧洲和美国在科索沃、阿富汗、黎巴嫩和伊朗问题上，以及对抗基地组织的问题上保持了合作。


Whatever the outcome of the French election, French-American relations are likely to remain on a steady course, and may well improve further after the US presidential election 2008.	不管是谁最终在法国选举中胜出，法美关系都将很有可能稳步改善，也许在2008年美国总统选举后会进一步改善。


The Coming Showdown with Iran	即将与伊朗的摊牌


FLORENCE – US President Barack Obama’s administration has lost little time in announcing that it will seek direct talks with the Iranian government.	佛罗伦萨-美国总统奥巴马政府没有浪费任何时间，宣布了它将寻求与伊朗政府直接会谈。


This means, at the very least, a tough confrontation over Iran’s quest for a regional strategic advantage in the form of a nuclear weapon.	这至少意味着，将要与伊朗的以拥有核武器的方式来寻求区域战略优势的政策进行强硬对抗。


There is more at stake here than coming up with the right set of incentives and threats to change the Iranians’ minds.	问题不仅仅是制定一套正确的激励加威胁的政策来改变伊朗的想法，还牵涉到更多的利害关系。


Rather, the time has come to approach the nuclear question in its full regional context rather than piecemeal and operationally.	现在时机已到，是该让核问题在全地区范围内得以解决了，而不是停留在零敲碎打和操作层面上。


The entire world knows the risk posed by a nuclear Iran: a drastically altered balance of power in the Middle East and Central Asia, with Iran able to exert far more regional leverage – both overt and implicit – than it now possesses in pursuit of its interests.	全世界都知道伊朗拥有核武器所带来的风险是什么：中东和中亚的力量平衡会明显改变，伊朗将在追求自己的利益方面，能对本地区施加远大于目前的影响-不论是公开的还是隐蔽的影响。


Moreover, nearby states are likely to launch or further their own nuclear programs in response, leading to a protracted nuclear arms race in one of world’s most volatile regions.	此外，伊朗的邻国对此的反应，很可能会开始或更进一步发展他们自己的核武器计划，从而在这个世界上最不稳定的地区内导致长期的核军备竞赛。


It is not in the interest of the US or Europe for any of the states at the head of the list – Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Algeria – to have its own nuclear weapons capability.	如果下列任何一个国家-埃及、土耳其、沙特阿拉伯、叙利亚和阿尔及利亚-拥有自己的核武器的话，那是不利于美国或欧洲的任何国家的利益的。


While neither outcome is certain, each remains likely.	虽然上述的结论没有一个是肯定会发生的，但每个结果的可能性依然存在。


There is considerable domestic pressure in each of these countries – as there has been in Israel and Pakistan, currently the region’s only nuclear states – to secure the presumed benefits in power and prestige of possessing nuclear weapons.	上述每个国家都有相当大的国内压力-正如在目前该地区仅有的核国家以色列和巴基斯坦国内已经发生的情况一样-民众要确保他们的国家拥有威力的好处以及拥有核武器的威望。


Such pressure is magnified when rivals and neighbors are perceived to have any kind of strategic advantage.	当竞争对手和邻国都被认为有任何形式的战略优势的时候，这种压力就会被放大。


Yet each of the region’s states has important security concerns and vulnerabilities.	然而，该地区的每个国家都有重要的安全担忧和脆弱性，伊朗也不例外。


Iran, a multiethnic state whose rulers have struggled to advance national cohesion, is no different.	作为一个多种族的国家，其统治者一直在挣扎中推进民族凝聚力。


Shi’a nationalism has followed Persian chauvinism as a rallying point, but neither has succeeded fully in bolstering Iran’s political institutions and securing the allegiance of its young population, nearly two-thirds of which is under the age of 30.	什叶派的民族主义分子一直把波斯沙文主义作为凝聚人的着力点，但没有完全成功地提高伊朗的政治体制，也没有确保其年轻的人口的忠诚-其人口的将近三分之二的在30岁以下。


The nation’s unity is periodically threatened by its clerical rulers’ unpopularity among large sections of the population, as well as by regional and ethnic divisions, conflict and instability in its immediate neighborhood, and the hostility engendered by its regional clients and/or proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.	国家统一不断地被威胁，其原因是文员统治者在广大人口中不得人心，也因为区域间和种族间的分歧、冲突和邻国的不稳定，再加上在伊拉克、黎巴嫩和阿富汗以及其它地方的人所产生的敌意。


In theory, all of these factors are potential sources of leverage for outside powers like the US.	从理论上讲，所有这些因素都可能给美国这样的大国带来对该国施加影响的机会。


But opposing Iran’s nuclear ambitions directly has had the opposite effect so far.	但是，直接反对伊朗的核野心的做法所起的效果，迄今来看是事与愿违的。


Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons – with its boost to national pride and promise of regional preeminence – has played a critical unifying role, as well as a political and military one.	伊朗寻求核武器的政策-其对民族自豪感的增强和在该地区出类拔萃的可能性-在团结人民方面起了重要的作用，也起了政治上和军事上的作用。


The challenge is to craft a consistent policy that both contains and deters Iran’s ambitions without exacerbating its inherent sense of national vulnerability.	目前的挑战是制定稳定不变的政策来阻挡和震慑伊朗的野心，但又不加剧其一贯的认为自己国家很脆弱的感觉。


The policy debate outside the region currently centers on whether to use force if talks fail.	目前该地区之外对政策的辩论集中在，如果谈判失败，是否要使用武力。


Iran, predictably, has refused to back down, which some observers have suggested reflects the failure of the world’s major powers to speak with a unified voice.	不奇怪的是，伊朗一直拒绝妥协，一些观察家认为，这反映了世界主要大国没有以统一的声音说话。


This is true, but it is an insufficient explanation.	这虽说是事实，但仅仅以这个理由来解释是不够的。


Others have claimed that Iran’s leaders do not care one way or the other about world opinion.	另一些人声称，伊朗领导人从不在乎世界舆论。


This, too, is an insufficient explanation, for no country, not even North Korea, lives in a vacuum.	这个解释也不全面，因为没有一个国家，甚至朝鲜，是生活在真空中的。


Formulating the right mix of carrots and sticks is extremely difficult, and the US is hardly seen in the region as an honest broker.	制定适当的胡萝卜加大棒的政策是极其困难的，而美国在该地区很少被当作一个诚实的中间人。


Therefore, its focus should be less on calibrating tactics per se than on recasting the regional context in which Iran’s leaders will determine whether to proceed or desist.	因此，美国的重点应少放在调整策略本身方面，而应放在重新铸造整个地区的形势，这样伊朗的领导人就能决定是否继续他们的做法或是放弃。


The starting point should be further enhancement of conventional military forces throughout the region, which means more than increasing weapons inventories.	应该从进一步加强在整个地区的常规军事力量开始，这不仅意味着越来越多的武器存有量。


There should be more confidence-building measures, including joint training exercises and information exchanges, among all the region’s militaries.	应该有更多措施建立信心，包括该地区所有国家的军队联合演习和情报交流。


A major boost to confidence would be a clear-cut strategic commitment from the West in the form of an extension of NATO’s own deterrent to the Middle East.	以扩大北约自己对中东德威慑力的形式来大大提升信心，将是西方一个明确的战略承诺。


It need not single out Iran, and would be more effective than a unilateral US guarantee to Israel or any other single state.	这样将是更有效的策略，而不必仅仅是对伊朗或是美国单方面保证以色列或其他任何单一国家。


Instead, NATO members should pledge to defend any Middle Eastern state that is attacked with nuclear weapons.	相反，如果任何中东国家遭到核武器的攻击，北约成员国应保证要捍卫它们。


Under ideal diplomatic circumstances, Russia and China would be persuaded to join with NATO in a joint declaration.	在理想的外交情况是，俄罗斯和中国也将被说服加入北约的联合声明。


Such steps alone are unlikely to deter Iran or fully to reassure the region’s other states.	仅仅这些措施是不可能阻止伊朗或完全让该地区的其它国家放心的。


But, along with continued international pressure from the United Nations Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency, they would send a clearer signal that the major powers of the world regard Middle Eastern peace and security as critical to their own.	但是，如有联合国安理会和国际原子能机构发出的不断的国际压力，这将发出一个明确的信号，即世界主要大国把中东的和平与安全看成和自己的和平和安全一样重要。


That would help to diminish the possibility of an unbridled regional arms race if talks fail and Iran someday tests a weapon.	如果谈判失败，而伊朗有朝一日试验核武器，这将有助于减少出现肆无忌惮的地区性军备竞赛的可能性。


The Coming St. Putinsburg Summit	即将到来的圣彼得堡首脑会议


St. Petersburg is a great place in early summer, when the “White Nights” bathe the city’s imperial palaces and avenues.	今年夏初，在圣彼得堡的皇宫和大道都沐浴在“白夜”之中时，这座城市一片辉煌灿烂。


Small wonder, then, that Russian President Vladimir Putin likes to show off his hometown.	那时，对俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京（Vladimir Putin）喜欢炫耀自己家乡这点，很少有人感到疑惑。


Three years ago, during the Tsarist capital’s 300th anniversary, Putin hosted some 40 heads of state, ranging from George W. Bush and Gerhard Schroeder to Belarusian dictator Alexandar Lukashenka and Turkmenistan’s Saparmyrat Nyazov, who styles himself “Turkmenbashi,” the father of Turkmen.	三年前，在圣彼得堡这个沙皇的首都三百年华诞之际，普京款待了约 40 名国家首脑。 这些人中既有乔治·W·布什 （George W.


Human rights activists questioned the wisdom of endorsing the leader of a growingly authoritarian Russia.	Bush），也有格哈德·施罗德（Gerhard Schroeder），还有白俄罗斯独裁者 Alexandar Lukashenka，以及土库曼自称为“克拉斯诺沃茨克（Turkmenbashi）” ——土库曼人之父的Sapurmurad Nyazov。


Yet Putin managed simultaneously to celebrate his anti-Iraq war cooperation with Europe, have the US swallow this, and be recognized in front of his local minions as a world leader.	人权行动派人士质疑，支持独裁日益严重的俄罗斯领袖是否为明智之举。 但普京竟然还同时欢庆了与欧洲结成的反伊拉克战争合作，让美国有苦难言，并让自己在当地部属面前被认可为世界领袖。


This summer, St. Petersburg (dubbed by local wits “St. Putinsburg”) may see a repeat performance: Russia will preside over a G8 summit for the first time, despite increasing authoritarianism, the ongoing bloody war in Chechnya, and now support for Iran’s nuclear program.	今年夏天，这种场面可能会在圣彼得堡（被当地的才子们戏称为“圣普京堡” ）一再重现。 尽管独裁主义日益盛行，车臣境内的血腥战争正在进行，并且如今又开始支持伊朗的核计划，但俄罗斯却将首次主办八国集团首脑会议。


Deflecting mounting criticism, Bush rejects appeals to boycott the summit.	布什不顾批评指责日盛，拒绝了联合抵制首脑会议的请求。


“I need to be in a position where I can sit down with him [Putin] and be very frank about our concerns,” Bush said in late March at Freedom House in Washington.	“我需要一个位置，好坐下来和他[普京]一起，开诚布公地就我们的忧虑进行讨论，”三月末，布什在华盛顿的自由之家这样说道。


Is Bush wrong?	布什错了吗？


The question of whether to meet with nasty but powerful people has dogged diplomacy since its inception, and both ends of the question have been argued endlessly – and inconclusively.	是否要与卑鄙下流但却权势显赫的人会晤，这个问题从一开始便困扰着外交关系。 对这个问题的两个答案，人们争执不休，而且一直没有得出结论。


So it is probably best to examine the merits of each case separately, looking to precedents and agendas for guidance.	所以，可能最好的办法是，分别审视这两种情况的优劣之处，看看以前的先例和议事日程以从中获得指导。


What is now known as the G8 was launched in 1975 as an informal group of the United States, Europe’s Big Four – Britain, France, Germany, and Italy – and Japan, with Canada added as an afterthought.	所谓的八国集团为非正式团体，发起于 1975 年，由美国、欧洲四强——英国、法国、德国和意大利、日本组成，后来又加上了加拿大。


It expanded to include Russia in 1998 for political, not economic, reasons.	1998 年出于政治而非经济原因，又把俄罗斯纳入了其中。


Russia’s unhappy status as a democratizing, but still potentially threatening, former superpower, played a role, as did its huge energy reserves, which is why China, incomparably more powerful economically but politically beyond the pale, was never invited to join.	俄罗斯以前是超级大国，虽然正在进行民主化，但还是存在着潜在的威胁性，这种不愉快的地位，以及其巨大的能源储备，是俄罗斯能加入八国集团的原因。 也是经济实力远比俄罗斯强大，政治上却为世界所不容的中国为什么从来没有受到加入邀请的原因。


Indeed, though supposedly grouping the world’s largest economies, the G8 now includes a country with an economy the size of Holland’s, even if it is still excluded from deliberations of the other members’ finance ministers.	实际上，尽管八国集团被认为是囊括了全世界最强大的经济大国，但现在却包括了一个经济实力只相当于荷兰的国家，尽管这个国家还被排斥在其他成员国财政部长的审议之外。


In retrospect, Russian membership should probably be considered a mistake.	回头看看，俄罗斯的成员地位可能应被视为一个错误。


Russia has stabilized under Putin, but its has become markedly less democratic.	在普京的领导下，俄罗斯已经稳定下来，但其民主程度也大大降低。


Its economy has boomed thanks to oil and gas exports, not to healthy market developments.	俄罗斯经济的繁荣得益于石油和天然气出口，而非健康的市场发展。


The state still controls the economy as it sees fit, as the de-facto renationalization of Yukos amply demonstrates.	俄罗斯还是会在自己认为适当的时候，对经济进行控制，这点已经为尤科斯事实上的重新国有化所充分证明。


On the other hand, the Kremlin has refrained from international adventurism, and rather consistently supported the US in its “war on terror.”	另一方面，克里姆林宫也没有采取国际冒险主义，而是一直支持美国进行“反恐战争”。


As European economies grew more dependent on Russian oil and gas, and the US military in Central Asia on Russian acquiescence, reversing the decision to admit Russia to the G8 became politically unthinkable.	随着欧洲各国经济对俄罗斯的石油和天然气的日益依赖，和在中亚的美国军方对俄罗斯默许的日益依赖，撤销将俄罗斯纳入八国集团的决定从政治上来说，完全不可想象。


The 2003 summit confirmed Russia’s privileged position.	2003 首脑会议确认了俄罗斯的特权地位。


A repeat performance this summer would make it all but unshakeable.	今年夏天的重复表现也让俄罗斯的这一地位更加不可动摇。


Has “being frank about our concerns,” the justification for hobnobbing with the likes of Putin, proven effective?	“开诚布公地就我们的忧虑进行讨论”，这一为与普京之流过从甚密辩解的理由已经被证明了有效吗？


Perhaps not.	可能没有。


Nevertheless, although Russia has been backsliding since Putin took power in 2000, his policies might have been worse had he been ostracized.	不管怎样，尽管从2000年普京掌权后，俄罗斯就开始后退，但如果普京真被排斥在外，那么他的政策可能会更差劲。


In any case, a US boycott of the forthcoming summit would be a Russian triumph, as it would throw the West into disarray.	无论在哪种情况下，如果美国拒绝参加即将来临的首脑会议，这将是俄罗斯的胜利，因为这会让西方陷入一片混乱。


But there need to be limits to the West’s tolerance, particularly given the summit’s agenda, which features energy security, fighting disease, promoting education, counter-terrorism, and non-proliferation.	但西方的容忍也应该有一定限度。 尤其���考虑到首脑会议日程的特色：能源安全、对抗疾病、促进教育、反对恐怖主义和防扩散。


Is Russia a trustworthy partner in these areas?	在这些领域，俄罗斯是一个值得信任的合作伙伴吗？


Russia is, in fact, the main provider of energy insecurity in Europe.	事实上，俄罗斯是给欧洲能源带来不安全的主要因素。


Its gas blackmail of Ukraine frightened the entire Continent, and its new Baltic pipeline to Germany has provoked howls of outrage from Poland and the Baltic states, which are angry at losing the economic and political dividends a land route gives them.	其对乌克兰的天然气勒索让整个欧洲大陆惊恐不安，通往德国的新波罗的海管道已经挑起了波兰和波罗的海各国的公愤。 失去陆上通路带来的经济和政治红利让这些国家愤怒不已。


They are also fearful that Russia will use the energy weapon against them in the future, once the new pipeline allows the Kremlin to do so without affecting Western Europe.	这些国家还害怕在未来一旦新管道让克里姆林宫能够在不影响西欧的情况下用能量武器来对付他们，那么俄罗斯会真的这么做。


This made little impression on their German EU partners – unsurprisingly, since Schroeder now chairs the consortium that will build the pipeline.	这对它们的德意志欧盟合作伙伴而言，几乎没有造成什么影响。 这倒在意料之中，因为施罗德现在正担任着管道修建财团的主席。


As former French Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy put it in 1981, when he refused to cancel a gas deal with the USSR over the imposition of martial law in Poland, “Should the suffering of French people deprived of gas be added to the suffering of Polish people deprived of freedom?”	正如1981年在波兰实行戒严令期间，法国前总理皮埃尔·莫鲁瓦(Pierre Mauroy) 拒绝取消与前苏联的一笔天然气交易时所说：“应该在波兰人民因为自由被剥夺的痛苦上，再加上法国人民因为天然气被剥夺的痛苦吗？


Old habits die hard.	”旧习难改。


Russia’s record is equally bleak on other items on the summit’s agenda.	俄罗斯在首脑会议日程其他项目上的记录同样严峻。 在可预防疾病传播表上，俄罗斯高居榜首。


It heads the list on the spread of preventable diseases – not only HIV, but tuberculosis, with 32,000 deaths last year alone – and its education standards are in severe decline.	这些疾病不仅包括 HIV，还包括肺结核，光去年死亡人数就达到了32,000。 此外，其教育标准也在严重下滑。


On terrorism, Russia was the first country to host an official Hamas delegation after the Palestinian elections, and it continues to crush Chechen terror and resistance with methods that would bring it to an international court, were it not a Security Council member.	在恐怖主义方面，俄罗斯是巴勒斯坦大选后头一个接待哈马斯代表团的国家。 同时，还继续以高压手段镇压车臣的恐怖活动和抵抗运动。


On non-proliferation, just ask the ayatollahs in Teheran.	如果不是因为俄罗斯是安理会成员的话，它所采取的这些手段足以将其带上国际法庭。 至于防扩散，问问德黑兰的阿亚图拉就可以了。


Putin’s Russia is not a place for democratic leaders to hold a summit, especially after the paltry results of the last one.	普京的俄罗斯并非民主领袖们举行首脑会议的好地方，尤其是在最近一次首脑会议收效甚微后。


Nor does the summit’s agenda justify holding it there.	首脑会议的日程安排也不能证明在俄罗斯举办有什么正当理由。


While Putin’s policies could have been much worse – it is legitimate to give him credit where it is due – Russia should not be allowed to take the West for granted.	普京本来可以采取比现在还糟糕得多的政策——给他一些应得的荣誉也合情合理——但是，不应该允许俄罗斯把西方不当回事。


Nothing would be gained by breaking with Russia and engaging in confrontation with it, but there is no reason not to respond to Realpolitik with Realpolitik.	与俄罗斯破裂，并与之对抗不会有什么好处，但也没有任何理由不以强权政治来回应强权政治。


Merkel in the Land of Smiles	微笑之地的默克尔


BERLIN – Germany’s elections are over.	柏林—德国大选已经结束。


The winners and losers are clear, and the political landscape has changed profoundly.	赢家和输家已经一目了然，政治图景发生了深远变化。


The real drama, however, occurred not among the country’s main parties but on the boundaries of the political spectrum.	但是，真正的大戏不在于德国主要政党之间，而在于政治图景的边界。


Chancellor Angela Merkel is celebrating a landslide victory, with her Christian Democratic Union (CDU) having fallen just short of an outright parliamentary majority.	总理默克尔正在庆祝她的压倒性胜利，她的基督教民主联盟（CDU）几乎获得了议院的全部多数。


But the scale of her triumph is mainly due to the collapse of her liberal coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), which for the first time in the German Federal Republic’s history will not be represented in the Bundestag.	但她之所以获得如此大胜，主要是因为她的自由派联盟伙伴自由民主党（FDP）的崩溃，该党在德意志联邦共和国的历史上第一次没能获得联邦议院席位。


The liberals have always formed a key part of German postwar democracy; now they are gone.	自由派向来是德国战后民主的关键部分； 如今他们告别了政坛。


Responsibility for that lies, first and foremost, with the FDP.	之所以如此，首要原因在于FDP。