He is a ruthless operator who presents himself as the champion of the developing world, protecting the interests of Africans, Asians, Arabs, and South Americans against the arrogant West.	他是一个无情的“作手”（operator），把自己打造成发展中世界的旗手，保护非洲、亚洲、阿拉伯和南利益免受傲慢的西方的侵蚀。


Things have changed since the days when venal men from poor countries were paid off to further Western political or commercial interests.	来自穷国的贪婪之辈收钱推动西方政治或商业利益以来，这一情况已经开始改变。


This still occurs, of course.	当然，这一幕至今仍在发生。


But the really big money now, more often than not, is made outside the West, in China, the Persian Gulf, and even Russia.	但如今，真正的“大钱”更多地来自西方以外，来自中国、波斯湾乃至俄罗斯。


Western businessmen, architects, artists, university presidents, and museum directors – or anyone who needs large amounts of cash to fund their expensive projects – now have to deal with non-Western autocrats.	西方商人、建筑师、艺术家、大学校长和博物馆馆长——或任何需要大量资金推进昂贵项目的人——现在都需要和非西方独裁者打交道。


So do democratically elected politicians, of course.	当然，民主选举的政客亦然。


And some – think of Tony Blair – turn it into a post-government career.	而一些人——比如托尼·布莱尔（Tony Blair）——已经将它作为退出政府后的职业。


Pandering to authoritarian regimes and opaque business interests is not a wholesome enterprise.	为极权政权和密不透风的商业利益当掮客并不是高枕无忧的生意。


The contemporary alliance of Western interests – in the arts and higher education no less than in sports – with rich, undemocratic powers involves compromises that might easily damage established reputations.	西方利益——艺术和高等教育在这方面不亚于体育——与富有的非民主力量的当代同盟中不乏可以轻易摧毁卓著信誉的妥协。


One way to deflect the attention is to borrow the old anti-imperialist rhetoric of the left.	一种转移视线的办法是借用左翼的旧反帝国���义论调。


Dealing with despots and shady tycoons is no longer venal, but noble.	与独裁者和幕后大佬做交易不再是唯利是图的，而是高尚的。


Selling the franchise of a university or a museum to a Gulf state, building yet another enormous stadium in China, or making a fortune out of soccer favors to Russia or Qatar is progressive, anti-racist, and a triumph of global fraternity and universal values.	将大学或博物馆的特许经营权卖给海湾国家、在中国建造有一座巨型体育场，或从流向俄罗斯或卡塔尔的足球资金中中饱私囊是进步的、反种族主义的，因此是四海一家和普世价值的胜利。


This is the most irritating aspect of Blatter’s FIFA.	这是布拉特的国际足联最令人愤慨之处。


The corruption, the vote-buying, the absurd thirst of soccer bosses for international prestige, the puffed-out chests festooned with medals and decorations – all of that is par for the course.	腐败、收买选票、足球高官对国际特权的荒谬的渴望、昂首挺胸接受奖牌和花环——所有这些都是意料中事。


It is the hypocrisy that rankles.	让人愤慨的是伪善。


To lament the shift in global power and influence away from the heartlands of Europe and the US is useless.	哀叹全球实力和影响力不再属于欧洲核心地带和美国无济于事。


And we cannot accurately predict this shift’s political consequences.	我们也无法准确预言这一转变的政治后果。


But if the sorry story of FIFA is any indication, we can be sure that, whatever forms government might take, money still rules.	但如果国际足联的丑闻有象征意义的话，我们可以肯定，不管政府以何种形式出现，钱仍是万能的。


Back to Disease-Fighting Basics	回到打击疾病的基本面


LONDON – Combating antimicrobial resistance will require groundbreaking technological solutions.	伦敦—打击抗药性需要突破性技术解决方案。


To prevent superbugs from claiming an estimated ten million lives a year by 2050, we will need to invent new types of antimicrobial drugs and develop rapid diagnostic tests to avoid unnecessary treatment and cut our massive overuse of antibiotics.	为了防止超级病菌在2050年夺走预计一千万人的生命，我们需要发明新型抗生素，开发快速诊断测试以避免不必要的治疗和减少抗生素的大规模滥用。


And yet, as important as these high-tech contributions may be, they are only partial fixes.	但是，这些高科技的贡献固然重要，但它们只是解决办法的一部分。


To tackle the problem permanently, the only option is to prevent infections from occurring in the first place – with improved hygiene, sanitation, and disease surveillance.	要永久解决这个问题，唯一的选择是在源头上组织传染的发生——这需要改善卫生、卫生设施和疾病监控。


Indeed, only by focusing on these areas will we lower the demand for new drugs over the long term.	事实上，只有专注于这些方面，我们才可以降低长期新药需求。


Indeed, in the nineteenth century, long before modern drugs were available, major Western cities tackled diseases by seeking to prevent infections.	事实上，在十九世纪，现代药物还远远没有出现的时候，西方大城市就开始通过阻止传染对付疾病。


And this approach remains the best solution for large cities with growing populations.	而对于人口不断增加的大城市，这一方法仍然是最佳方案。


Consider London in the 1850s: Living conditions for the poor were grim.	以19世纪50年代的伦敦为例：穷人的生活条件非常凄惨。


Male life expectancy was 40 years.	男性寿命预期为40岁。


Diseases like cholera and tuberculosis were rife, and there was no way to treat them.	霍乱和结核病横行，也没有治疗之方。


In September 1854, a cholera outbreak devastated the city’s impoverished, central Soho district, killing 500 people in just ten days.	1854年9月，一场霍乱席卷伦敦贫民区中央苏豪（Soho）区，仅仅十天就导致500人丧命。


Enter John Snow, a pioneering physician who had intuited that cholera was spread not through the air, as conventional wisdom held, but through water.	这时，约翰·斯诺（John Snow）挺身而出。 他是一位有开创精神的医生，直觉地认为霍乱不是如同传统智慧认为的那样通过空气传播，而是通过水传播。


Snow monitored the progress of the Soho outbreak in unprecedented detail, mapping each case.	斯诺以前所未有的详细程度监控苏豪区疫情的进展，画出每一例病例的地图。


His research convinced him that the source of the outbreak was a shared water pump in the heart of the district.	他的研究让他确信，霍乱爆发的根源是该区中央地带一口公用水井。


And once the pump’s handle was removed, the pace of the outbreak slowed dramatically.	把水井泵的手柄换掉后，霍乱爆发速度大幅降低。


Several of Snow’s methods are directly applicable to the modern problem of antimicrobial resistance.	斯诺的一些方法可以直接应用在抗生素耐药性这一现代问题上。


For starters, his effort demonstrated the efficacy of using data to understand a public health crisis.	首先，他的努力表明，使用数据来理解公共卫生危机是有效的。


His mapping and statistical analysis helped identify the epicenter of the outbreak and thus its root cause.	他的疾病地图和统计分析有助于确认疾病爆发的中心点，进而确认爆发根源。


Snow’s emphasis on using data to guide his intervention is a principle that institutions like the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation insist upon today.	斯诺所强调的使用数据指导干预也是比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会等机构今天所坚持的原则。


The recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa demonstrated, in tragic fashion, the importance of good data.	最近西非的埃博拉疫情通过一场悲剧证明了好数据的重要性。


The epidemic spread most dramatically in areas where basic infrastructure and surveillance systems had broken down.	这场传染病在基本基础设施和监测系统破败的地区蔓延最甚。


As a result, even after Ebola had been declared a public health emergency and funding had been made available, it remained difficult for many weeks to direct resources where they were most needed.	因此，即使在埃博拉被宣布为公共卫生紧急情况、资金也到位后，仍然花了好几周时间才将资源引入最需要的地区。


Worryingly, as the latest paper from my Review on Antimicrobial Resistance warns, there is no globally coordinated system of surveillance to monitor the emergence and spread of superbugs around the world.	令人担忧的是，我的抗生素耐药性评估（Review on Antimicrobial Resistance）的最新文章警告，缺少全球协作的监控的系统检测超级病菌在全球范围的出现和传播。


Fundamental gaps remain in how data are gathered and shared, even in the world’s richest countries.	基本缺口仍在于如何收集和共享数据，即使在世界最富裕的国家也难以实现。


The result is a series of enormous blind spots that deprive us of the key insights and early warnings that we need to mount an effective response.	结果形成了一系列巨大的盲点，让我们无法做出有效响应所需要的关键性洞察和早期警告。


Snow’s other major contribution was to identify the central role that water plays in spreading diseases like cholera, leading authorities in Europe to invest in the development of sewage and sanitation systems.	斯诺德另一大贡献是认识到水在传播霍乱等疾病上的关键作用，让欧洲当局投资于污水和环境卫生系统的开发。


Decades before the discovery of cures like penicillin, there was no alternative but to invest in prevention to beat infectious diseases and protect growing urban populations.	在青霉素等药物被发现前几十年，战胜传染病、保护日益增长的城市人口别无他法，只能投资于预防工作。


This infrastructure-building was spectacularly successful: The last urban cholera outbreak in Western Europe occurred in 1892, and by the time World War I broke out, communicable diseases had ceased to be the leading cause of death across much of the continent.	这一基础设施建设取得了巨大的成功：西欧最后一次城市霍乱爆发发生在1892年，到一战开始，传染病已不再是欧洲大部最主要的死亡原因。


As antimicrobial drugs became more widely available, however, the focus moved away from preventive measures.	但是，随着抗生素药物的普及，重点不再是预防措施。


This has not only had dire implications for urban dwellers forced to live in unsanitary conditions; it has also contributed to rising drug resistance.	这不但造成了迫使城市居民被迫生活在不卫生条件下的不良影响； 也导致了抗药性的增强。


Today, inadequate access to safe water and sanitation is one of the leading causes of diarrheal illness – a major killer and the reason that hundreds of millions of people take antibiotic treatments each year.	如今，安全水源和卫生设施不足是痢疾的主要发病原因，而痢疾每年要夺走大量生命，也是数亿人使用抗生素治疗的原因。


Most of this consumption is unnecessary, however, as the cause of diarrhea is usually viral; taking antibiotics in these cases only contributes to the development of resistant bacteria.	但是，这些抗生素消费大部分是不必要的，因为痢疾的原因常常显而易见； 对这种病使用抗生素只能促进抗药细菌的发展。


Estimates provided to my team suggest that in India, Nigeria, Brazil, and Indonesia alone, nearly a half-billion cases of diarrhea are treated each year with antibiotics.	我的团队所获得的估计表明，仅仅在印度、尼日利亚、巴西和印度尼西亚，每年就有近五亿例痢疾用抗生素治疗。


Were these four countries to provide their citizens with universal access to clean water and sanitation, this consumption could be reduced by at least 60%.	如果这四个国家能为全体公民提供清洁水和卫生设施，抗生素的消费量至少可以下降60%。


Such infrastructure is costly, and all countries face tough budgetary choices.	这些基础设施成本高昂，所有国家都面临艰难的预算选择。


But it is one of the best value-for-money investments a middle-income country can make.	但这是中等收入国家能够做出的最划算的投资之一。


When one controls for income, increasing a population’s access to sanitation by 50% is correlated with more than nine years of additional life expectancy.	如果控制收入变量，让卫生设施在人口中的普及率提高50%可以带来寿命预期增加九年。


John Snow would have been pleased.	约翰·斯诺对此一定很欣慰。


One of his most significant contributions to the field of health care – the judicious use of data – is confirming the importance of another: investment in hygiene and sanitation.	他在卫生领域的最大贡献之一——审慎地使用数据——正在印证另一大贡献的重要性：投资于卫生和卫生设施。


Sometimes those who study history are blessed to repeat it.	有时候，以史为镜可以复制成功。


Fighting Biopiracy	与生物剽窃作斗争


OTTAWA– In April 1999 Larry Proctor, a United States citizen and owner of a seed company, won a patent at the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), claiming a Mexican yellow bean.	渥太华——1999年4月，美国公民兼种子公司所有人Larry Proctor从美国专利商标局（USPTO）获得一项专利，掌握对一种墨西哥黄豆的所有权。


The patent conferred Proctor exclusive rights over a bean variety he called “Enola.”	那项专利授予Proctor对一种名叫“Enola”的黄豆品种的独家所有权。


That decision is one of the most outrageous examples of biopiracy in the history of intellectual property systems.	这项决定是知识产权体系建立以来最令人气愤的生物剽窃事件。


The bean for which Proctor was granted a patent is a farmers’ variety, originally from Mexico and in the public domain for centuries.	Protor被授予专利的黄豆是一种源于墨西哥的作物种类，几百年来一直是人类的共有财产。


The bean is consumed throughout Mexico and by Mexicans and Mexican-Americans in the US who know it by the names Mayocoba, Canario, or Peruano.	生活在墨西哥的墨西哥人和美国的美籍墨西哥人普遍食用这种名叫Mayocoba、Canario或Peruano的黄豆。


Although the bean variety existed in publicly available seed collections, it took ten years, hundreds of thousands of dollars, massive protest by farmers and civil society, the intervention of international agencies, and five consecutive legal decisions before the USPTO finally annulled the patent in July 2009.	虽然这种豆可以在公开种子展上买到，但在农民和民间团体的大规模抗议和国际机构的干涉下，却耗费了整整十年时间、数十万美元、历经连续五次司法判决才最终于2009年7月由美国专利商标局废除这项专利权。


By then, Proctor had exercised a complete monopoly over the production, distribution, and marketing of the bean for more than half of the patent’s lifespan.	但彼时Proctor已经在专利寿命过半的时间内对这种黄豆的生产、销售和营销推广行使完全的垄断权。


The story began in 1994, when Proctor purchased a bag of beans in Mexico.	1994年Proctor在墨西哥购买一袋“Enola”黄豆，这个故事便从此发端。


He planted the beans, selected seeds from the same plants, and planted them again, repeating the procedure two more times.	他种植这种豆，从同一种植物上选种，而后再次种植，并重复这一过程两次以上。


In late 1996, after barely two years, he stated that he had invented a “unique” variety, and applied for a patent.	在仅仅两年后的1996年末，他声称已经发明“独特”的品种，并为此申请专利。


As soon as Proctor was awarded the patent, he sued two importers of the yellow beans, demanding that they pay royalties.	专利获批后，Proctor起诉两家黄豆进口商，要求他们支付专利使用费。


Although the importers knew that Proctor’s invention was ludicrous (because they had been importing the bean from Mexico for years), they had no choice but to accept the patent’s legality, causing 22,000 Mexican farmers and their families to lose 90% of their export incomes in just the first year.	虽然进口商知道Proctor这项发明荒唐可笑（因为他们多年来一直从墨西哥进口黄豆），但他们别无选择，只能承认专利的合法性，从而导致22，000名墨西哥农民和他们的家人仅第一年就损失90%的出口收入。


In January 2000, the Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration (ETC Group, then known as RAFI) published the first denunciation of the Enola patent as technically invalid and morally unacceptable.	2000年1月，侵蚀、技术和集聚行动小组（简称ETC小组，当时称为RAFI）首次发布公告，谴责Enola专利不仅在技术上无效而且在道德上不能接受。


To obtain a patent, an applicant must demonstrate that an invention meets three criteria: newness, non-obviousness (that there is an inventive step), and utility (the invention does what it claims to do).	为获取专利，申请人必须证明某一项发明符合新面世、非显见（其中涉及发明步骤）和具备实用价值（即发明能起到所称的作用）等项条件。


In the case of the Enola bean, there was nothing at all new: the yellow bean is the result of centuries of collective work and ingenuity on the part of Mexican farmers and indigenous peoples.	具体到Enola黄豆这一案例，根本不存在任何新发明：这种黄豆是墨西哥农民和土著数百年集体努力和创造的结果。


Moreover, the bean was incorporated into public collections held by INIFAP, the Mexican national agricultural research institute.	此外，这种黄豆还被收入由墨西哥国家农业研究院举办的公开展览。


ETC Group took the case to the Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) in Cali, Colombia.	ETC小组将这一案件向哥伦比亚卡利的热带农业国际中心（CIAT）提交。


CIAT is one of the international centers of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR).	热带农业国际中心是世界农业研究咨询小组（CGIAR）下属的国际中心之一。


The CGIAR system maintains more than 600,000 samples of crop varieties in gene banks, mostly collected from peasant fields.	世界农业研究咨询小组系统在基因库中保存着超过600，000种作物品种样本，其中多数均来自农田地头。


Acknowledging this, CGIAR signed a Trust Agreement with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 1994, pledging to keep the seeds in their collections free of any intellectual property claims.	世界农业研究咨询小组为确认上述事实曾于1994年与联合国粮农组织（FAO）签订信托协议，承诺保持所搜集种子的无知识产权状态。


Joachim Voss, then CIAT’s director, confirmed that the yellow beans were present in CIAT’s gene bank, and that they had originated in Mexico.	热带农业国际中心负责人Joachim Voss出面确认这种黄豆已收入该中心的基因库，并确认这种黄豆原产于墨西哥。


At the end of 2000, CIAT, supported by the FAO, requested that the USPTO re-examine the patent.	2000年底，热带农业国际中心在联合国粮农组织的支持下，要求美国专利商标局重新对这项专利进行审核。


Geneticists then performed genetic fingerprinting on the yellow beans, and concluded that Proctor’s Enola bean was identical to the Mexican beans covered by the Trust Agreement.	遗传学家随后对黄豆进行基因指纹识别，结论是Proctor的Endola黄豆与信托协议中的墨西哥黄豆在基因上完全吻合。


Meanwhile, in 2001, taking advantage of the USPTO’s slow response, Proctor sued 16 small seed companies in Colorado for patent-infringement.	与此同时，2001年，利用美国专利商标局反应慢的弱点，Proctor对科罗拉多州16家小型种子公司提出侵犯专利权的诉讼。


Only in December 2003 did the USPTO announce its first “non-final” rejection of the patent.	直到2003年12月，美国专利商标局才首次“非终审”宣布取消专利。


Proctor appealed, and the USPTO issues its final rejection of the patent in April 2005.	Proctor就此提出上诉，而美国专利商标局于2005年4月发布终审取消公告。


But that was not the end of the Enola bean issue.	但Enola黄豆纠纷并未就此结束。


Proctor requested that the patent examination be continued, submitting additional patent claims and even changing his lawyers several times (allowing more bureaucratic delay).	Proctor要求继续对专利进行审核，提交其他几项专利申请甚至几次更换律师（目的就是争取将诉讼时间拖得更长）。


In total, the patent was rejected and appealed four times within a decade, until the US Court of Appeals rejected it for the fifth time this summer.	这项专利在10年时间里被起诉并否决四次，直至今年夏天美国上诉法院颁布第五次否决公告。


For more than a decade, a single patent owner disrupted the bean market in the US and Mexico.	十多年来，一个专利所有者破坏了美国和墨西哥的大豆市场。


Importers stopped importing not only the yellow bean, but also other Mexican beans, fearing lawsuits.	因为害怕惹上官司，进口商停止黄豆和其他墨西哥豆类的进口。


Although the patent was eventually rescinded, the Enola case shows how the intellectual property system facilitates the monopolization of public and collective resources, favoring those who can pay expensive lawyers’ fees.	虽然这项专利最终被撤销，但Enola案件证明知识产权体系是如何催生对公共和集体资源的垄断，为有能力支付昂贵律���费用的人带来好处。


The Enola patent was wrong from the outset, yet it remained enforceable for half its life, despite the active efforts of international institutions, governments, and civil-society organizations.	Enola专利从一开始就是个错误，但尽管国际机构、政府和民间组织付出积极的努力，但这项专利在其近半的寿命时间内却始终有效。


It may be tempting to dismiss the Enola patent as an aberration, but there are hundreds of examples of such biopiracy.	也许人们更愿意将Enola专利事件作为一种错误，但同样的生物剽窃事例还有数百个。


Mexican beans, South Asian basmati rice, Bolivian quinoa, Amazonian ayahuasca, Indian chickpeas, Peruvian nuña beans, Andean maca – all have been subject to predatory intellectual property claims.	墨西哥黄豆、南亚香米、玻利维亚昆诺阿藜、亚马逊卡皮木、印度鹰嘴豆、秘鲁努纳豆、安第斯玛卡——都曾经经历过掠夺性的知识产权诉求。


The Enola controversy is a stark illustration of the danger of patenting life, and the power of patents to block agricultural imports, disrupt or destroy developing countries’ export markets, hijack staple food crops that are the cultural heritage of millennia, plunder collective knowledge, and threaten food security.	Enola纠纷是专利制度危险性的明证，表现出专利阻碍农业进口、破坏或摧毁发展中国家出口市场、劫持数千年文化传承的粮食作物、掠夺人类集体智慧和威胁食品安全的巨大力量。


The Enola case demonstrates that being right is not enough: small farmers, indigenous people, and the poor can’t out-last a decade of lawsuits and monopoly.	Enola案件表明最终结果正确是不够的：农民、土著和穷苦人经受不起长达十年的诉讼和垄断。


Undoubtedly, international institutions and countries in the global South have far more urgent goals than to spend resources suing greedy companies.	无疑，南方国家和国际机构有比耗费资源起诉贪婪的企业更为急迫的目标。


It is high time to question the very existence of an intellectual property system that privileges monopoly ownership over the common good.	是时候对将垄断所有权凌驾于人类共同利益之上的知识产权体系是否有必要存在提出质疑了。


Cancer’s Dangerous Mythology	癌症的危险传说


GENEVA – This year, World Cancer Day will focus on dispelling damaging myths about the disease.	日内瓦—今年，世界癌症日的焦点将是打消这一疾病的破坏性传说。


The theme – illustrated in the tagline “Cancer – Did you know?” – offers an opportunity to reflect on cancer’s true consequences and enhance global prevention and treatment efforts.	这一主题——以“癌症——你了解过吗？ ”（Cancer—Did you know）为标题——给我们提供了一个机会，认真思考癌症的真正后果并加强全球预防和治疗。


One prevailing myth is that cancer is primarily a developed-country problem.	一个流行的传说是癌症主要是发达国家的问题。


But, while it is true that cancer is pervasive in wealthy countries, people in the world’s poorest countries lose more years of life to the disease.	但是，尽管癌症确实在富裕国家普遍存在，但世界最穷国家的人们因癌症损失的寿命更长。


As medical advances and technological developments have helped cancer patients in high-income countries to live longer – to the extent that some forms of cancer have effectively become chronic conditions – those in low-income countries continue to die young.	医学进步和技术发展让高收入国家癌症患者能够活得更长——从某种程度上说，某些癌症实际上无非是慢性病——而低收入国家患者年纪轻轻就死了。


Besides being unjust, this is deeply tragic.	除了不公平之外，这还是沉痛的悲剧。


Having eluded killers like malaria and AIDS, one should not then be killed prematurely by cancer – especially a form of cancer that could have been prevented with something as simple and as affordable as a vaccine.	在逃过了疟疾和艾滋病后，人们本不应该因癌症而过早撒手人寰——特别是那些打一针负担得起的疫苗便可预防的癌症。


The often-overlooked link between vaccines and cancer highlights a second common misconception: fate alone (and perhaps smoking) determines who gets cancer.	疫苗和癌症之间的联系常常被忽视，这是第二个普遍存在的误解：光是命运（或许还有吸烟）决定了谁得癌症。


In fact, one in six cancer cases worldwide is caused by a known infectious agent, with the proportion rising to one-third in some countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.	事实上，全世界六分之一的癌症是由已知致病因子造成的，在撒哈拉以南的一些非洲国家，这一比例高达三分之一。


The four main culprits are hepatitis B and C (hepB and hepC), human papillomavirus (HPV), and Helicobacter pylori, which are collectively responsible for 1.9 million cases of liver, cervical, and gastric cancer annually.	四大主要致病因子是乙肝和丙肝、人类乳突病毒（HPV）以及幽门螺旋杆菌四者加起来每年造成190万例肝癌、子宫癌和胃癌病例。


Cervical cancer now kills more women than childbirth, claiming a life every two minutes.	子宫癌每年造成的女性死亡数量比分娩还要高，平均没两分钟就有一人致死。


Of the 275,000 women who die of cervical cancer annually, 85% live in the world’s poorest countries.	每年有275 000女性因子宫癌死亡，85%生活在最穷国家。


After all, cervical cancer tends to target the most vulnerable in particular, such as women infected with HIV.	毕竟，子宫癌患者通常是最虚弱的人群，如感染艾滋病毒的女性。


If left unchecked, the number of cervical cancer deaths is set to rise to 430,000 annually by 2030.	若不加以控制，子宫癌年致死数量将在2030年增加到430 000。


Then there is hepB, which is over 50 times more infectious than HIV and often passed from mother to child before or shortly after birth, increasing the likelihood of liver cancer later in life.	其次是乙肝，其传染性比艾滋病毒高50倍，通常在分娩之前或之后不久通过母婴渠道传播。 乙肝会增加一生中患肝癌的可能性。


An estimated two billion people alive today have been infected with hepB, while 350 million people are chronically infected.	据估计，如今在世者中有20亿人感染了乙肝，3 500万人为慢性。


Of these, roughly one-quarter will die from hepB-related liver cancer or cirrhosis (a consequence of chronic liver disease).	在这些人中，大约四分之一会死于与乙肝相关的癌症或肝硬化（慢性肝病的后果之一）。


The good news is that powerful tools are available to avert many of these deaths.	好消息是，已经存在强大的工具防止大量此类死亡。


Existing HPV vaccines can prevent up to 70% of cervical cancer cases, and new vaccines are in the pipeline that will improve this record further.	现有HPV疫苗可以防止最多70%的子宫癌，研发中的新疫苗还能进一步提高这一纪录。


Likewise, hepB vaccines are 95% effective at preventing infection and its chronic consequences.	类似地，乙肝疫苗在预防乙肝传染及其慢性后果方面的有效性高达95%。


Vaccines protecting against Helicobacter pylori and hepC are in development (although the latter is proving particularly challenging).	针对幽门螺旋杆菌和丙肝的疫苗正在研发中（尽管后者的困难很大）。


Even an Epstein-Barr virus vaccine, which would protect against some kinds of lymphoma, is achieving promising results.	就连人类孢疹病毒（Epstein-Barr virus）疫苗（可预防某些种类的淋巴癌）也获得了可喜的成果。


But paying for and delivering these vaccines to the most vulnerable citizens of low-income countries poses a significant challenge.	但购买并将这些疫苗送到最脆弱的低收入国家公民手中仍是一项重大挑战。


Although the World Health Organization (WHO) has recommended including the hepB vaccine in routine immunization since 1992, its high price initially hindered its uptake in some developing countries.	尽管世界卫生组织在1992年便已建议将乙肝疫苗纳入常规免疫，但其高昂的价格仍限制了其在一些发展中国家的使用。


More recently, the same problem threatened to hinder the adoption of HPV vaccines.	后来，同样的问题又出现在推广HPV疫苗上。


But the GAVI Alliance intervened to ensure that this is no longer a concern with hepB, and it is unlikely to occur with HPV.	但全球疫苗免疫联盟（GAVI Alliance）的出手干预保证了乙肝不再是个问题，HPV亦然。


Since its launch in 2000, the GAVI Alliance has sought to increase access to life-saving vaccines for the world’s poorest children.	自2000年成立以来，GAVI联盟一直在寻求让更多的最穷儿童获得拯救生命的疫苗。


In partnership with the World Bank, the WHO, UNICEF, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, it has used innovative financing tools to raise funds for global immunization programs, while working with industry to lower the prices of vaccines.	在与世界银行、世卫组织、联合国儿童基金会和比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会的合作中，GAVI联盟使用创新性融资工具筹集全球免疫项目资金，同时与产业界合作以降低疫苗价格。


By including the hepB vaccine as part of a pentavalent (five in one) vaccine, the Alliance has already facilitated its delivery to children in 70 countries as part of routine immunizations.	通过将乙肝疫苗纳入到五价（五合一）疫苗的一部分，GAVI联盟已让它走进了70个国家，成为常规免疫的一部分。


The Alliance is now working to make the HPV vaccine available to more than 30 million of the world’s poorest women and girls by 2020; as part of this effort, and coinciding with World Cancer Day, it has launched demonstration programs in eight developing countries.	目前，GAVI联盟正在致力于在2020年之前让3 000万世界去穷妇女和女孩获得HPV疫苗； 作为这项努力的一部分，也正好赶上世界癌症日，GAVI联盟在八个国家开展了示范性项目。


A growing body of evidence shows that vaccines’ benefits extend beyond preventing illness and death.	越来越多的证据表明，疫苗的好处不仅局限于预防疾病和死亡。


They have also been found to aid infants’ cognitive development and children’s educational attainment, thus boosting countries’ economic-growth potential.	它们还被发现有助于婴儿的认知发展和儿童的教育程度，从而提振一国经济增长潜力。


In the fight against cancer, medical advances can shave precious percentage points off of mortality rates, which implies that improved access to vaccines can have a massive impact, slashing the number of future cases in developing countries for just a few dollars per dose.	在与癌症的斗争中，医学进步需花费巨大的努力才能让死亡率有所下降，这表明改善疫苗的普及具有重大意义，只消花几美元打一针，就可以抑制发展中国家未来癌症患者数量。


People in rich countries are undoubtedly familiar with the maxim that prevention is better than cure.	毫无疑问，发达国家的人们已非常明白预防优于治疗的道理。


But, given the ready availability of vaccines in developed countries, the focus of prevention efforts has shifted to changing cancer-causing lifestyles.	但是，由于发达国家疫苗已经获得了普及，对预防措施的关注已经移到了改变致癌生活方式上。


Meanwhile, people in developing countries lack access to simple and effective tools for preventing several of the most common cancers.	与此同时，发展中国家的人们缺少预防集中最常见癌症的简单而有效的工具。


Improving access to vaccines is crucial to addressing this global inequity and reducing the widening gap between rich and poor.	改善疫苗普及是纠正这一全球不平等并拉近越来越大的贫富差距的关键。


This requires, first and foremost, dispelling the myth that one cannot “catch” cancer.	而这首先要求打破人类无法“抓获”癌症的传说。


Fighting Corruption Won’t End Poverty	打击腐败无法终结贫困


CAMBRIDGE – Countries are poor because governments are corrupt.	美国剑桥—国家之所以穷，是因为政府腐败。


And, unless they ensure that public resources are not stolen, and that public power is not used for private gain, they will remain poor, right?	除非它们保证公共资源不被窃取，公共权力不用于私利，否则它们就会一直穷下去，对吗？


It certainly is tempting to believe so.	显然，相信这种说法很有诱惑力。


Here, after all, is a narrative that neatly aligns the promise of prosperity with the struggle against injustice.	毕竟，有一种叙事将繁荣承诺与反不公斗争漂亮地联系在一起。


As Pope Francis said on his recent trip to Latin America: “corruption is the moth, the gangrene of a people.”	教皇方济各在其最近的拉美之行中说：“腐败是蠹虫，是人民中的坏疽。


The corrupt deserve to be “tied to a rock and cast into the sea.”	”腐败理应“绑上岩石，沉入大海。 ”


Perhaps they do.	也许确实如此。


But that won’t necessarily make their countries more prosperous.	但这并不一定能让他们的国家变得繁荣。


Consider the data.	用数据说话。


Probably the best measure of corruption is the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator, which has been published since 1996 for over 180 countries.	最好的腐败指标或许是世界银行的腐败控制指标（CCI）。 该指标1996年开始发布，涵盖了180多个国家。


The CCI shows that while rich countries tend to be less corrupt than poor ones, countries that are relatively less corrupt, for their level of development, such as Ghana, Costa Rica, or Denmark, do not grow any faster than others.	CCI表明，富国的腐败情况比穷国少，但相对腐败更少的国家，比如加纳、哥斯达黎加和丹麦，并不比发展水平相当的国家增长更快。


Nor do countries that improve in their CCI score, such as Zambia, Macedonia, Uruguay, or New Zealand, grow faster.	CCI分数有所改善的国家，如赞比亚、马其顿、乌拉圭和新西兰，并没有增长得更快。


By contrast, the World Bank’s Government Effectiveness Indicator suggests that countries that, given their income level, have relatively effective governments or improve their performance, do tend to grow faster.	相反，世界银行政府效率指标表明，给定收入水平，政府效率相对较高或改善政府绩效的国家确实增长更快。


For some reason – probably related to the nature of what NYU’s Jonathan Haidt calls our “righteous minds” – our moral sentiments are strongly related to feelings of empathy in the face of harm and unfairness.	出于某些原因——也许与纽约大学的乔纳森·海特（Jonathan Haidt）所谓的“正义思维”的性质有关——我们的道德情绪与面对伤害和不公时的感同身受有很大关系。


It is easier to mobilize against injustice than for justice.	动员反对不公远比动员支持公正容易。


We are more enthusiastic to fight the bad – say, hunger and poverty – than to fight for, say, the kind of growth and development that makes food and sustainable livelihoods plentiful.	我们对“斗恶”——比如饥饿和贫困——有很大热情，而对为了保证粮食和可持续生计充裕的增长和发展而奋斗的热情要小得多。


Sometimes switching from the “bad” to the corresponding “good” is simply a matter of semantics: to fight against racism is to fight for nondiscrimination.	有时，从“恶”转变为相应的“善”完全只是语义学问题：打击种族主义就是为无歧视而奋斗。


But, in the case of corruption, which is a bad that is caused by the absence of a good, attacking the bad is very different from creating the good.	但是，在腐败的例子中，腐败是一种恶，其根源是善的缺失，因此斗恶与造善完全不同。


The good is a capable state: a bureaucracy that can protect the country and its people, keep the peace, enforce rules and contracts, provide infrastructure and social services, regulate economic activity, credibly enter into inter-temporal obligations, and tax society to pay for it all.	善是一种能力国家（capable state）：能够保护国家及其人民、维持和平、执行规则和契约、提供基础设施和社会服务、监管经济活动、可信地进行跨期借贷、对社会征税并用之于全社会的官僚体系。


It is the absence of a capable state that causes corruption (the inability to prevent public officials, often in collusion with other members of society, from subverting decision-making for private gain), as well as poverty and backwardness.	能力国家的缺失（无力阻止公职人员以公谋私以至于常常与社会其他成员的利益相悖）造成腐败，也造成了贫困和退步。


Some might argue that reducing corruption entails the creation of a capable state; the good is created out of the fight against the bad.	一些人也许会说，减少腐败包括了建立能力国家； 善是在斗恶的过程中创造出来的。


But is it?	但果真如此吗？


Teachers and nurses often do not show up for work, but that does not mean that performance would improve much if they did.	教师和护士常常不在工作中露面，但这并不意味着如果他们出工绩效就能得到改善。


Policemen may stop asking for bribes, but that will not make them any better at catching criminals and preventing crime.	警察也许会停止索贿，但这并不能让他们更好地抓捕罪犯、阻止犯罪。


Curtailing side-payments does not imply the ability to manage concession contracts or collect taxes.	减少补偿性支付（side-payments）并不意味着管理特许经营合同或征税的能力。


Aside from prosecuting some bad apples, measures to fight corruption typically involve reforming procurement rules, public financial-management systems, and anti-corruption legislation.	除了起诉害群之马，打击腐败的手段常常包括改革采购规则、公共财政管理体系和反腐立法。


The underlying assumption is that the new rules, unlike the previous rules, will be enforced.	基本假设是新规则将不同于此前的规则，它们将获得执行。


That has not been Uganda’s experience.	乌干达的经验表明并非如此。


In 2009, under pressure from the aid community, the government enacted what was billed at the time as the best anti-corruption legislation in the world; and yet all corruption indicators have continued to worsen.	2009年，在救援社会的压力下，政府实施了当时被誉为全世界最佳反腐立法的法律； 但所有腐败指标依然继续恶化。


Uganda is not an exception.	乌干达绝非例外。


My colleague at Harvard, Matt Andrews, has documented the failure of public financial management reforms designed to prevent graft.	我的哈佛同事马特·安德鲁斯（Matt Andrews）记录了预防贪污的公共财政改革失败的情况。


And the reasons for these failures are not specific to financial management.	失败的原因并不限定于财政管理。


All organizations need to be perceived as legitimate.	所有组���都需要被认为合法。


They can create this perception by actually performing the function for which they were created, which is difficult.	它们可以通过实际行使它们的建立初衷功能创造出合法的形象。 但这样很困难。


Alternatively, they can borrow from the natural world a strategy called isomorphic mimicry: just as non-poisonous snakes evolve to resemble a poisonous species, organizations can make themselves look like institutions in other places that are perceived as legitimate.	或者，它们可以借助于一个自然界的战略，即所谓的同构拟态（isomorphic mimicry）：就像无毒蛇进化出与毒蛇相近的外貌，组织可以让它们看起来像是其他地方被人合法的机构。


And this is what the anti-corruption agenda often ends up stimulating: the creation of organizations that are more obsessed with abiding by the new and burdensome processes than they are with achieving their stated goals.	而反腐斗争常常会刺激这一行为：出现更沉迷于遵守繁复的新流程而不是实现既定目标的组织。


As Harvard’s Lant Pritchett, Michael Woolcock, and Andrews argue, when inept organizations adopt “best practices” such as financial management systems and procurement rules, they become too distracted by decision-distorting protocols to do what they were established to do.	哈佛大学的兰特·普莱切特（Lant Pritchett）、迈克尔·乌尔科克（Michael Woolcock）和安德鲁斯指出，当无能的组织采取财政管理系统和采购规则等“最佳实践”时，它们就会彻底沉沦在扭曲决策的协议中，根本无法完成成立它们的初衷目的。


As Francis Fukuyama has pointed out, the development of a capable state that is accountable and ruled by law is one of the crowning achievements of human civilization.	弗朗西斯·福山（Francis Fukuyama）指出，可问责的、法治的能力国家的发展是人类文明成就的皇冠。


It involves the creation of a shared sense of “us,” an imagined community on whose behalf the state acts.	它需要创造出“我们”的共同感，即一个国家代表其行动的“想象的共同体”。


This is not an easy task when societies are deeply divided by ethnicity, religion, or social status.	当社会因为种族、宗教或社会地位而处于深度分裂状态时，这绝不是个容易的任务。


After all, who is the state for?	毕竟，谁才是国家？


All Iraqis or just the Shia among them?	是所有伊拉克人还是只是其中的什叶派？


All Kenyans or just the Kikuyu?	是所有的肯尼亚人还是只是其中的基库尤人？


What is to prevent the ethnic group currently in power from diverting resources to itself on the argument that “it’s our turn to eat?”	怎样防止当前掌权的种族群体带着“风水轮流转”的心态霸占资源？


Why shouldn’t those currently in control of the state transform it into their patrimony, as in Venezuela, where, more than two years after former President Hugo Chávez’s death, his daughters still occupy the presidential residence?	为何目前掌握在国家手中的资源不会成为他们的传家之物？ 比如，在委内瑞拉，前总统查韦斯逝世已经两年多，但其女仍然占据着总统官邸。


The fight against corruption mobilizes all of us because we want to do away with evil and injustice.	反腐斗争之所以能动员我们所有人，是因为我们希望赶走恶魔和不公。


But we should remember that casting the bad into the sea does not imply the sudden appearance on our shores of the good that we need.	但我们应该铭记，将恶投入大海并不能让我们需要的善立刻出现在眼前。


Fighting Poverty in America	在美国扶贫


BERKELEY – From 2005 to 2014, the real income of two-thirds of households in 25 developed economies was flat or fell.	伯克利—2005年到2014年间，25个发达经济体三分之二家庭的真实收入不增或下降。


Only after very aggressive government intervention in taxes and transfers have some countries been able to hold families at least even.	一些国家在经过了政府的大量税收和转移支付干预后才实现家庭收入不降。


This experience holds lessons for countries like the United States, where inequality and income distribution loom large in the run-up to November’s presidential and congressional elections.	这一经验给美国等国家带来了教训。 在即将到来的11月总统和国会选举中，不平等性和收入分配至关重要。


What can the US learn from what works?	美国可以从有用的政策中学到什么？


The US is a global outlier in tying much of its social safety net to employment.	美国是全球异类，其社会安全网与就业紧密相关。


Social-welfare spending averages 23% of GDP in Europe, but only 16% in the US.	在欧洲，社会福利支出平均占GDP的23%，美国只有16%。


And the US is an especially distant outlier when it comes to families: only three other countries – Tonga, Suriname, and Papua New Guinea – lack a national policy on paid family leave.	而对家庭来说，美国是异类中的异类：只有三个国家——汤加、苏里南和巴布亚新几内亚——没有带薪探亲假国家政策。


There are, however, many successful policy initiatives in the US.	但是，美国也有诸多成功的政策计划。


For example, Pete Weber, a retired business executive from Fresno and a member of the California Republican Party’s executive committee, is at the forefront of a nationwide movement of efforts to think boldly about how to move families out of poverty and into self-sufficiency.	比如，弗雷斯诺（Fresno）退休商业高管、加州共和党执行委员会成员皮特·韦伯（Pete Weber）领导着一场大胆思考如何让家庭摆脱贫困、实现自足的全国计划运动。


The Fresno Bridge Academy, founded by Weber in 2010, has received statewide and national acclaim for its results – not only its success with individuals in need, but also its cost effectiveness.	2010年，韦伯创建了弗雷斯诺桥学院（Fresno Bridge Academy）。 该学院的成果赢得了全州和全国的赞誉——不仅因为在个体需要方面的成功，也因为其高超的性价比。


The program is an 18-month employment-training program that also provides support services for families – including computer-literacy classes, résumé assistance, parenting classes, and tutoring for children – through its non-profit umbrella agency, Reading and Beyond.	该学院是一个18个月的就业培训计划，也为家庭提供支持性服务——包括计算机扫盲班、简历助手、育儿班和儿童辅导——通过旗下非盈利下属机构“阅读及其他”（Reading and Beyond）进行。


Located in the poorest postal code in California, the program has helped 1,200 families who enrolled voluntarily and is funded to serve an additional 2,300 families over the next two years.	该学院在加州最贫困邮政编码区帮助了1,200户自愿参与家庭，并以获得资金支持在未来两年在帮助2,300户家庭。


To date, 80% of enrolled families have gained employment or significant wage growth, and 80% of those that do, retain these gains a year later.	目前，80%的参与家庭找到了工作或实现工资大幅增长，而在这些家庭中，80%在一年后能够保持收益。


Thirty percent have achieved full self-reliance within just 18 months.	三成家庭能够在区区18个月后就实现充分自立。


The Fresno scheme, funded by an innovation grant from the SNAP (formerly food stamps) program, is rigorously outcome-based and quantitatively assessed.	弗雷斯诺计划的资金来自SNAP（前食品券）计划的创新补助。 该计划严格基于结果，并采取两化评估。


It has generated $22 of benefit for every dollar invested, with $16 going to the families and $5 going to taxpayers (mainly in the form of higher revenues and reduced outlays for food stamps).	其所投入的每一美元能够产生22美元收益，其中16美元归家庭，5美元归纳税人（主要以更高的税收收入和食品券发放量降低的形式实现）。


While the circumstances in Fresno are particular to the agricultural economy there, Weber believes the program is scalable and is already extending it to two other California counties (San Joaquin and Napa).	弗雷斯诺的环境比较特殊，那里是农业经济，但韦伯相信该计划可以扩展，并已经着手向其他两个加州郡——圣华金（San Joaquin）和纳帕（Napa）推广。


Through a broader effort with California Forward’s Economic Summit, Weber is embedding the lessons from Fresno in an effort to move a million families out of poverty in the state by 2025.	通过与加州前进会经济峰会（California Forward’s Economic Summit）的更广泛的合作，韦伯正在将弗雷斯诺经验加入到2025年加州实现一百万家庭脱贫的计划中。


New approaches such as that taken by the Fresno Bridge Academy come at a time when both the left and the right are questioning current anti-poverty programs.	弗雷斯诺桥学院所采取的新方针出现得正是时候——左派和右派都在质疑当前扶贫计划。


By some estimates, since President Lyndon B. Johnson launched his “War on Poverty” in 1964, total spending on the fight has exceeded $22 trillion.	据一些统计数据，自1964年约翰逊总统发动“扶贫战争”以来，总支出已经超过了22万亿美元。


Yet the front isn’t moving. The official poverty rate in the US seems stuck at roughly 15%.	但战线并未得到推进，美国官方贫困率依然高位徘徊在15%左右。


On the right, Speaker of the US House of Representatives Paul Ryan’s Expanding Opportunity in America anchors the view that America already spends enough and just needs to spend it better.	在右翼，美国众议院议长保罗·莱恩（Paul Ryan）的美国扩张机会（Expanding Opportunity in America）认定美国已经花了足够多的钱，只需要更好地花这些钱。


Ryan’s plan focuses on integrating programs into an “opportunity grant,” expanding the earned income tax credit (EITC), and criminal justice reform – all while encouraging economic growth, so that job creation does the heavy lifting.	莱恩的计划着重于将各种计划整合为一个“机会津贴”、扩大低收入所得税优惠（EITC）以及刑事司法改革——同时要鼓励经济增长，从而让就业创造来担当大任。


On the left, organizations like the Opportunity Institute (full disclosure: we both sit on its board of directors) argue for targeted spending, particularly in early education; linking college to careers; and reducing criminal recidivism.	在左翼，机会研究所（Opportunity Institute，充分披露：我们都是其董事会董事）等组织支持定向支出（特别是早教方面）、将大学和就业挂钩以及减少刑事累犯。


Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton’s policy platform proposes new programs to address these issues, with a particular focus on family leave and early childhood and college education.	民主党总统提名人希拉里·克林顿的政策平台提出了解决这些问题的新计划，并特别强调探亲假和早教和大学教育。


Many if not most scholars who have explored the topic, such as a joint effort by the Brookings Institution and the American Enterprise Institute, include elements from the left and the right – particularly strategies aimed at strengthening families, improving the quality and quantity of work available, and breaking the cycle of recidivism.	许多甚至大部分研究过这一主题的学者，如布鲁金斯研究所和美国企业研究所（American Enterprise Institute）的联合研究计划，兼顾了左翼和右翼要素——特别是旨在强化家庭、改善现有工作质量和数量以及打破累犯循环的战略方面。


The EITC also has broad backing (more than three-quarters of economists surveyed by the American Economic Association support expanding it).	EITC也获得了广泛的支持（在美国经济学会进行的调查中，四分之三的受访经济学家支持扩大EITC）。


There is also broad consensus on the need for better quantitative assessment of what works.	另一个广泛共识是需要对哪些政策管用进行更好的定量评估。


Others, especially many in Silicon Valley’s technology world and some in the labor movement, are concerned that technology will outpace job creation and leave many out of work.	其他人，特别是许多硅谷科技界人士以及一些劳工运动人士，担心科技发展超过就业创造速度，造成大量人员失业。


They would prefer a universal basic income (UBI), which would sever the link between employment and income.	他们更喜欢切断就业和收入之间的联系的全民基本收入（UBI）计划。


Swiss citizens roundly rejected that approach in a recent referendum, but the energy devoted to more radical approaches to help those who need it is welcome, even if the specifics of UBI and its cost have yet to proven.	在最近的全民公投中，瑞士人民婉拒了UBI，但致力于更加激进的方针帮助需要人士值得欢迎，即使UBI的详情及其成本仍有待论证。


Examples like the Bridge Academy – and others, such as the Federal Home Visiting Program– show that initiatives that are deeply rooted in and tailored to the needs of the communities they serve, and that are driven by evidence of effective outcomes, can work.	桥学院以及联邦家庭访问计划（Federal Home Visiting Program）等例子表明，深度植根和面向服务社区、受有效结果证据推动的计划能起作用。


Unfortunately, we too often embrace the opposite approach: broad-brush national programs with no focus on outcomes.	不幸的是，我们常常采取相反的方针：不关注结果的粗放型全国计划。


Consider the US Department of Agriculture’s Food and Nutrition Service.	以美国农业部的食品和营养服务（Food and Nutrition Service）为例。


Approximately 88% of its $82 billion in annual spending goes to direct aid (SNAP, or “food stamps”) while only 0.33% goes to providing people the skills they need to avoid government assistance.	其820亿美元的年度支出中有大约88%是直接补助（SNAP，或“食品券”），只有0. 33%用于为人们提供摆脱政府援助所需要的技能上。


Even worse, none of the skills-focused programs have data to evaluate them.	更糟糕的是，注重技能的计划中没有一项具备评估计划的数据。


A “progressive federalist” program would substantially increase this type of spending and rigorously evaluate it.	“进步的联邦主义”计划将大大增加这类支出并严格评估。


Such a program would set high federal standards but allow cities and states to innovate, then fund what works.	这一计划将树立很高的联邦标准，但允许各市和州创新，然后为起作用的项目提供资金。


It’s time to think differently and align our thinking – and our spending – with what actually works.	应该进行不同的思考并用真正起作用的结果来理顺我们的思路——以及我们的支出。


Fighting Terrorism Democratically	以民主对抗恐怖主义


Bombings in London and Turkey have brought to the fore the old ideas that authoritarian regimes are better equipped than democracies to combat terrorism, and that such attacks are the price we pay for liberty.	伦敦和土耳其的爆炸事件再一次把这样一个陈腐观念推到了人们的面前：那就是独裁政权能比民主制度更好地应对恐怖，而这些袭击是我们为自由付出的惨重代价。


For some, that is a price worth paying; for others, the costs seem too high.	对有些人来讲，付出这种代价还算值得，但对另外一些人来讲，这样的代价似乎就有些太高了。


But a look at the record shows that democracies possess more effective weapons to fight terror than do authoritarian regimes.	但认真研究一下从前的记录，就会发现民主国家比独裁政权拥有对抗恐怖的更为有效的武器。


Indeed, it is when democracies abandon their ethics and fail to resist the authoritarian temptation that they become weaker.	实际上，民主国家放弃道德、未能抵御住独裁诱惑之时，他们的力量才会削弱。


Of course, the logic behind calls to restrict our freedoms has a simplistic appeal: extremists use our freedoms to commit their crimes, so preventing the abuse of freedom requires curtailing freedom’s scope.	当然，片面地来看，呼吁限制自由背后的逻辑非常诱人：极端分子利用自由来从事犯罪，因此防止对自由权利的滥用需要缩减自由的范围。


The mistake, however, is to assume that open societies are more permissive and vulnerable to terrorism than those who live under authoritarian regimes.	但这种说法的错误在于假定与生活在独裁政权中的人们相比，开放社会的公民更纵容恐怖活动，也更容易遭受恐怖分子的袭击。


One need only look at today’s Russia, or recall Algeria in the 1990’s.	只需要看一看今天的俄国，或者回忆一下20世纪90年代的阿尔及利亚，就知道这样的想法有多么可笑。


True, democracy and the rule of law provide no foolproof security guarantee.	的确，民主和法治提供不了绝对的安全保障。


But such a guarantee is a mirage anyway, whereas respect for basic freedoms and due process when repressing terrorism is a powerful instrument to isolate extremists and diminish their legitimacy in the eyes of those that might identify with their cause.	但无论如何，这样的保障也只能在海市蜃楼中才能找到，而在对抗恐怖主义时尊重基本自由和既定程序却是孤立极端分子和削弱他们在同道心目中合法性的有力的武器。


It is because Britain is a democracy that respects the rule of law that it has been able to mobilize vast sectors of its Muslim community.	正因为英国是个尊重法治的民主国家，它才能够把国内多数的穆斯林人口动员起来，共同对抗恐怖主义。


By contrast, authoritarian regimes’ repression of civilians, and their non-differentiation between civilians and killers, provides extremists with fertile recruiting conditions by discrediting the government in the eyes of a significant part of its population.	与此形成鲜明对照的是，独裁政权对民众的压制以及他们把民众和凶手混为一谈的策略使得政府在很大一部分民众中毫无信誉可言，也为极端分子提供了肥沃的招募土壤。


An undifferentiated approach towards political Islamism that fails to distinguish between those who reject violence and those who resort to terror only facilitates the extremists’ work, for they emerge as champions of causes that do not reflect their true goals.	不分青红皂白地将伊斯兰政治混为一谈，将抵制暴力和使用暴力者同等对待只会有利于极端分子开展工作，因为这样他们就可以把自己装扮成正义事业的支持者，尽管这根本不是他们的真实目标。


Russia provides conclusive evidence of the impotence of authoritarian violence and disregard for the rule of law.	俄国为独裁暴力和轻忽法治政策的不堪一击提供了决定性的证据。


President Vladimir Putin undertook a scorched-earth policy in Chechnya, driving many Chechen nationalists straight into the extremists’ arms.	普京总统在车臣实行了焦土政策，将很多车臣民族主义者直接赶进了极端分子的怀抱。


Terrorist attacks on Russia did not cease or decline.	针对俄国的恐怖主义袭击既没有停止、也没有减少。


Indeed, recall the terrorism in Beslan in September 2004, in which a single attack on a school killed over 330 people.	实际上，人们时常回忆起2004年9月发生在别斯兰的恐怖事件，在那次恶梦中，一次针对学校的恐怖袭击就夺去了330多人的生命。


Iraq also is demonstrating the limits of illegitimate violence when combating terrorism.	伊拉克的局势同样可以证明非法暴力在遏制恐怖活动中的作用非常有限。


The Bush administration now seems to realize this.	布什政府现在似乎开始明白这一点。


It would be a mistake to believe that the deaths of thousands of civilians, along with arbitrary imprisonment and torture, do not contribute to the spread of terror in Iraq.	如果认为成千上万平民百姓的死亡、再加上强制监禁和折磨没有为伊拉克境内大肆蔓延的恐怖活动推波助澜，无疑将犯下致命的错误。


After all, torture victims are the best possible advertisement for terrorist recruitment.	毕竟，曾经深受其害的人会为恐怖分子招兵买马提供最有力的宣传。


When it comes to fighting terrorism, moreover, democracies are more effective both politically and operationally, particularly in terms of their intelligence services.	不仅如此，单就对抗恐怖主义而言，民主制度无论从政治还是实际操作角度都更为有效，尤其在情报搜集领域更是如此。


Intelligence forces in authoritarian states are either highly centralized or tend to become autonomous power centers.	独裁国家的情报力量要么高度集权，要么就可能成为权力自治中心。


In either case, they are subject to no public scrutiny and accountability.	而无论出现上述哪种情况，他们都拒绝接受来自公众的监督，也不对人民负责。


As a result, they lose their ability over time to evaluate critically their own actions and errors.	导致的结果是时间一长，他们就失去了用批判的眼光评估自身行动和错误的能力。


Intelligence services in democratic contexts usually have oversight mechanisms that serve to limit abuses of power, and to guarantee effective action by punishing top officials that fail to do their jobs properly.	民主环境中的情报部门通常都设立了监督机制，防止权力被人滥用，并通过对未能完成任务的高官进行惩戒来确保行动的有效性。


In the United States, a powerful bi-partisan Senate committee directly monitors the intelligence services.	在美国，由强大的两党参议院委员会直接监督情报部门的工作。


Its report on the inability of the intelligence services, notably the CIA and the FBI, to prevent the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks also contained a series of recommendations for restructuring these services to render them more effective.	参议院在有关情报部门，特别是中央情报局和联邦调查局，未能阻止2001年9月11日恐怖袭击事件的报告之中还提出了一系列的重组建议，旨在提高情报部门的效率。


Europe’s response to terror requires, first and foremost, strengthening its intelligence services so that they can detect and dismantle terrorist cells while respecting basic rights and due process.	欧洲对恐怖主义的回应所需的首要也是核心的因素是加强自身的情报力量，以便在尊重基本权利和既定程序的同时，能够发现和解除恐怖分子的武装。


It also requires greater coordination among all the European Union’s member states and their allies and partners.	这还需要所有欧盟成员国以及它们的盟友和伙伴进行更有效的合作。


At the same time, the rule-of-law approach to fighting terrorism must be a pillar of European cooperation with third countries, namely with those of the Mediterranean, or with Pakistan, thereby contributing to a security culture that is conducive to democratization.	与此同时，通过法治途径对抗恐怖主义必须成为欧洲与第三方，特别是地中海各国、或巴基斯坦合作的基石，以此来营造一种有利于民主的安全文化。


Deepening democracy in turn means allowing full civic participation, including non-violent Islamic groups.	而深化民主又意味着允许全体公民，包括非暴力伊斯兰团体的充分参与。


The right to public speech and peaceful assembly must be defended for those who feel marginalized and indignant at what they – and most Europeans – view as injustices committed against the Palestinians, the Chechens, and the Iraqis.	必须坚决捍��公众言论及和平集会的权利，这既是为了那些自觉被主流社会边缘化的团体，也是为了那些对巴勒斯坦、车臣和伊拉克民众所遭受的不公正待遇而义愤填膺的全体民众和大多数欧洲公民。


Last, but not least, combating identity-based extremism calls for a greater capacity to integrate all those who live within the EU.	此外还有同等重要的最后一点，那就是对抗基于种族身份的极端主义要求把所有居住在欧洲大陆的人团结在一起。


The response to terrorism should be to reaffirm the value of the rule of law over arbitrary repression, and of the diversity that is the hallmark of Europe’s cities, particularly London and Paris, but increasingly many others across the Union.	对恐怖主义的回应应当是再次强调法治而不是强力镇压，强调把多样化作为欧洲城市，特别是伦敦、巴黎和越来越多的其它城市的突出特色。


We cannot – indeed, must not – cede to terror by building walls around and within our societies.	我们不能¾实际上也不该¾在我们社会的内部和周围竖起围墙，向恐怖主义低头。


The best response to intolerant extremism is to cultivate an open and pluralistic society that treats all those who live within its borders as full citizens.	对于狭隘极端主义的最佳回应是创造一个开放、多元的社会，赋予所有在其境内生活的居民完整的公民待遇。


Europe turned diversity into one of its constitutional traits, and this is why it has had such an impact on the world.	欧洲将多元化变成了其固有的特征载入宪法，这也是它在全世界产生了巨大影响的原因。


Protecting that essence is the best way to honor the memory of the victims of terror, be they from London, Sharm el-Sheik, Madrid, Casablanca, or New York.	保护上述精髓是纪念恐怖活动牺牲者的最佳途径，无论曾经的受害者来自伦敦、沙母沙伊赫、马德里、卡萨布兰卡还是纽约。


Fighting the \	与\


As the US presidential heats up, critics argue that President George W. Bush's war in Iraq has made the problem of combating terrorism worse.	随着美国大选日益升温，很多评论家认为美国总统乔治·W·布什的伊拉克战争使反恐形式日益严峻。


It is a serious charge, because the world needs a broader strategy against terrorism.	上述指责非常严肃，因为世界各国需要更为广泛的反恐策略。


Terrorism is nothing new, nor is it a single enemy.	恐怖主义不是新话题，也不是什么单一对手，而是一种长期的冲突手段。


It is a longstanding method of conflict frequently defined as deliberate attack on the innocent with the objective of spreading fear.	通常情况下，它被定义为故意袭击无辜百姓，目的是传播恐怖情绪。


The attacks on New York and Washington of 2001 were dramatic escalations of an age-old phenomenon.	2001年对纽约和华盛顿的袭击就是这种古老现象的骤然升级。


Terrorism today, however, is different from what it was in the past.	然而今天，恐怖主义与过去已经有了很大区别。


Nowadays, instruments of mass destruction are smaller, cheaper, and more readily available.	现实社会里，大规模杀伤性武器更轻巧、廉价，也更容易得到。


Cellular phones were used as timers in the attacks in Madrid last March. Hijacking an airplane is relatively inexpensive.	手机在去年3月马德里恐怖袭击中被用作定时器，劫机的费用也并不昂贵。


Finally, the information revolution provides inexpensive means of communication and organization that allow groups once restricted to local and national police jurisdictions to become global.	最后，信息革命提供了价格低廉的沟通和组织方式，使以前限于本地和本国警力管辖的恐怖组织具备了全球性特征。


Al Qaeda is said to have established a network in fifty or more countries.	据称基地组织在50多个国家设立了恐怖网络。


Changes have also occurred in the motivation and organization of terrorist groups.	变化还集中在恐怖组织的动机和组织形式。


Terrorists in the mid-20th century tended to have relatively well-defined political objectives, which were often ill-served by mass murder. Governments supported many covertly.	二十世纪中期的恐怖分子一般具有相对明确的政治目的，而大规模屠杀常常是服务于这种目的的卑劣手段。


Toward the century's end, radical groups grew on the fringes of several religions.	恐怖活动得到政府的暗中支持。


Most numerous were the tens of thousands of young Muslims who fought against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, where they were trained in a wide range of techniques and many were recruited to organizations with an extreme view of the religious obligation of jihad .	临近世纪末，极端组织在宗教的边缘开始滋长，数量最大的是数以万计的青年穆斯林，他们曾反抗过苏联对阿富汗的占领，并在那里接受了多种技巧的培训。 很多人被持有极端观点的杰哈德宗教义务组织所吸纳。


These technological and ideological trends increased both the lethality and the difficulty of managing terrorism.	上述技术和意识潮流助长了恐怖主义的毁灭性，也使人们的应对更为困难。


Because of the unprecedented scale of Al Qaeda's attacks, the focus is properly on Islamic extremists.	由于基地组织袭击的规模史无前例，焦点自然集中在了伊斯兰极端主义者身上。


But it would be a mistake to limit our concern solely to Islamic terrorists, for that would ignore the way that technology is putting into the hands of deviant groups and individuals' destructive capabilities that were once limited primarily to governments and armies.	但仅限于关注伊斯兰恐怖分子是一个错误，因为这会忽略技术给叛乱组织和个人带来的破坏性力量，从前，这样的力量只有政府和军队才能掌握。


Deviant individuals and groups exist in all human societies, and they are now empowered in ways that were once unthinkable.	只要是人类社会就存在反叛组织和个人，如今他们具备前所未有的力量。


Think, for example of Timothy McVeigh, who bombed the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995, or the Aum Shinrykio cult that released poison gas in the Tokyo subway system the same year.	比如1995年炸毁俄克拉荷马城联邦大楼的蒂莫西·麦克维和同年在东京地铁站释放沙林毒气的奥姆真理教。


Lethality has been increasing.	20世纪70年代，恐怖活动的破坏性激增。


In the 1970's, the Palestinian attack on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics and attacks by groups like the Red Brigades galvanized world attention at the cost of dozens of lives.	巴勒斯坦恐怖分子在慕尼黑奥运会上袭击以色列运动员和红色旅实施恐怖进攻造成了数十人因此丧生，引起了世界范围的广泛关注。


In the l980's, the worst terrorist incident killed 300 people.	20世纪80年代，最可怕的恐怖事件夺去了300多条无辜的生命。


The attacks on America of September 2001 cost several thousand lives.	2001年9月对美国的袭击中，几千名无辜群众因此丧生。


This escalation occurred without using weapons of mass destruction.	所有这些骤然升级的惨剧都没有使用大规模杀伤性武器。


If one imagines a deviant group in some society gaining access to biological or nuclear materials, it is possible terrorists could destroy millions of lives.	如果像人们想象的那样，某些国家的叛乱组织已经拥有了生物或核材料，那么恐怖分子就可能摧毁数以百万计的无辜生命。


To kill so many people in the 20th century, a Hitler or Stalin required the apparatus of a totalitarian government.	要想在20世纪杀害这么多人，即便是希特勒或斯大林也需要借助集权政府的力量。


It is now easy to envisage extremist groups and individuals killing millions without government help	而现在，很容易设想极端组织和个人杀害数以百万计的无辜群众，而无须得到政府的帮助。


Politics has plagued efforts to agree on a common definition of terrorism at the United Nations.	为了在联合国达成界定恐怖主义的共识，人们付出了艰苦的政治努力。


Some skeptics argue that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter, and that treating suppression of terrorism as a global public good is thus merely the hypocrisy of the powerful trying to disarm the weak.	有些怀疑论者提出某人眼中的恐怖分子也许是别人眼中的自由战士，因此将镇压恐怖视作全球的公益事业不过是强者试图让弱者放下武器的虚伪借口。


That need not be the case.	但这绝不是必须的。


Not all struggles for national liberation turn to deliberate killing of innocents.	并非所有争取民族解放的斗争都会演变成对无辜平民的杀戮。


Deliberate killing of non-combatants (in war or not) is condemned by most major religions, including Islam.	故意屠杀非战斗人员（无论是否在战争之中）受到多数主要宗教的谴责，伊斯兰教也不例外。


Such behavior is unacceptable whether it is carried out by the powerful or the weak.	这样的行为无论强弱都无法容忍。


While any definition of terrorism has problems at the margins, the core of terrorism is clear enough to permit efforts to de-legitimize it.	尽管任何恐怖主义的界定都在边缘领域渐趋模糊，但其核心界定都非常清晰明了，足以为清除措施提供依据。


Indeed, many countries are parties to UN conventions that commit them to combating aspects of terrorist behavior, even though the UN has not agreed on a single formal definition.	实际上，虽然联合国还未就唯一正式定义达成一致，但很多国家都缔结了联合国公约，有义务与恐怖行为进行斗争。


Today, some states harbor terrorists in order to attack their enemies or because they are too weak to control powerful groups.	今天，有些国家为攻击对手而庇护恐怖分子，也可能因为他们国力太弱，无法控制实力强大的组织。


If a campaign to suppress terrorism is based on broad coalitions that focus on de-legitimizing attacks on innocent non-combatants, it has some prospect of success.	如果镇压恐怖的战斗以广泛的联盟为基础，专门制止对无辜非战斗人员的袭击，就很有可能获得成功。


Indeed, one lesson of the efforts since 2001 is that there is no way to avoid broad cooperation.	实际上，2001年后反恐努力的重要经验就是无法避免广泛的国际合作。


In that sense, the metaphor of war - with its emphasis on military force is - misleading.	从这个意义上，战争的比喻偏重于强调军事力量，因此��产生误导的作用。


The metaphor of war was understandable in the aftermath of the 2001 attacks, but creates as many problems as it solves.	战争的比喻出现在2001年恐怖事件后可以理解，但它造成的问题与解决的一样多。


How long will the war last and how does it relate to civil liberties and alliances?	战争要持续多长时间，与国内公民自由和国外联盟之间有什么联系？


Bombing is not an option for fighting terrorist cells in Hamburg, Singapore, or Detroit.	在汉堡、新加坡或底特律，炸弹都不是应对恐怖主义的选择。


Only close civilian cooperation in intelligence sharing, police work across borders, tracing financial flows, and working to pre-clear cargo manifests and passenger lists can cope with such a threat.	只有进行民间情报的密切交流、加强跨越国境的警察合作、跟踪资金流动、力争掌握前期的货物及人员流向，才有可能面对这样的威胁。


Countries cooperate out of self-interest, but a country's soft or attractive power, not only its military might, affects the degree of cooperation.	国家间出于自身利益进行合作，但一个国家的军事实力，还有它具备的软性或吸引力量，能对合作力度产生深远的影响。


That is why critics argue that Bush's policy in Iraq was a mistake.	这也是为什么评论家认为布什的伊拉克政策是个错误。


It squandered American soft power, diverted attention from Afghanistan and Al Qaeda, and created a danger that Iraq may become a haven for terrorists.	它挥霍了美国的软性力量，将注意力从阿富汗和基地组织转移开去，并增加了伊拉克成为恐怖避难所的危险。


But critics of Bush at home and abroad must also realize that, notwithstanding past mistakes, pursuing a common strategy is essential, because terrorism is here to stay.	但布什在国内外的批评者也必须意识到，尽管我们过去犯下了错误，如今也必须采取共同的策略，因为恐怖主义还会长久的存在下去。


Fighting Words and False Promises	向谣言和虚假誓言开战


For almost five years, the â€œwar on terrorâ€ has proved to be a false metaphor that has led to counterproductive and self-defeating policies.	几乎五年时间里，“反恐战争”已经成为了一个导致政策南辕北辙并且弄巧成拙的虚假比喻。


A misleading figure of speech has been applied literally to unleash a real war on several fronts, including Iraq, Gaza, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Somalia.	一个误导性的修辞得到了一字不差地执行，引发了多个战线的真实战争，包括伊拉克、加沙、黎巴嫩、阿富汗和索马里。


Thousands of innocent civilians have been killed, enraging millions around the world.	数以千计的无辜平民惨遭杀害，令全世界数百万人愤怒不已。


Yet al-Qaeda has not been subdued, as was shown by the recent plot to blow up United States-bound commercial flights from London.	然而最近炸毁从伦敦飞往美国的商业飞机的阴谋表明基地组织还没有屈服。


That plot, which could have claimed more victims than the 9/11 attacks, was foiled by the vigilance of the British intelligence authorities.	这个阴谋原本可能导致比9/11事件更多的人员伤亡，在英国情报部门的警惕之下流产。


Clearly, it wonâ€™t be the last.	很明显，这不会是最后一次。


Unfortunately, the American public accepted uncritically the war metaphor as the obvious response to 9/11.	不幸的是，美国公众全盘接受了战争比喻是回应9/11事件的说法。


Indeed, even now, when it is widely admitted that the invasion of Iraq was a blunder, the â€œwar on terrorâ€ remains the frame into which American policy has to fit.	实际上，即使到现在入侵伊拉克已经被广泛承认是一个错误的时候，“反恐战争”仍然是美国政策不得不适应的既定框架。


Most Democratic politicians, too, subscribe to it for fear of being branded as weak on defense.	大多数民主党政治人士因为担心被贴上防务不力的标签也对之赞成。


But continuing support for the war on terror makes it no less self-defeating.	但是继续支持反恐战争却无法减弱这场战争弄巧成拙的色彩。


By its very nature, war creates innocent victims, and this even more likely when it is waged against terrorists, because terrorists tend to keep their whereabouts hidden.	战争特有的性质就是伤害无辜平民，针对恐怖分子的战争这一特性表现的更加突出，因为恐怖分子常常行踪诡秘。


The deaths, injuries, and humiliation of civilians generate rage and resentment among their families and communities, in turn fueling support for terrorists.	平民死亡、受伤和蒙羞会引发他们的家庭和社区的愤怒和怨恨，这反过来又会促使他们支持恐怖分子。


Moreover, terrorism is an abstraction that lumps together all political movements that use terrorist tactics.	此外，恐怖主义是一个抽象的概念，包括所有使用恐怖战术的政治运动。


Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Sunni insurrection and the Mahdi army in Iraq are very different forces, but President George W. Bushâ€™s global war on terror prevents us from differentiating between them and dealing with them accordingly.	基地组织、哈马斯、真主党和逊尼派起义以及伊拉克的马赫迪军队之间存在着巨大的差异，但是布什总统的全球反恐战争阻止我们对此进行区分并分别对待。


It inhibits much-needed negotiations with Iran and Syria, because they are states that support terrorist groups.	它阻止了我们与伊朗和叙利亚进行急需的谈判，因为它们是支持恐怖集团国家。


At the same time, as the British have shown, groups like al-Qaeda are best dealt with by good intelligence.	同时，正如英国发生的事件所示，对付像基地组织这样的集团最好的方式是优质的情报。


The war on terrorâ€™s emphasis on military action merely increases the terrorist threat and makes the task of the intelligence agencies more difficult.	反恐战争强调军事行动仅仅增加了恐怖威胁并使得情报部分的任务更加艰巨。


Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are still at large, and we need to focus on finding them if we are to prevent attacks like the one foiled in England.	本·拉登和扎瓦希里现在仍然逍遥法外，如果我们想要防止如同在英国流产的攻击事件再次发生，我们需要集中力量找到他们。


Finally, the war on terror drives a wedge between â€œusâ€ and â€œthem.â€ We are innocent victims; they are perpetrators.	最后，反恐战争在“我们”和“他们”之间打进了一个楔子。 我们是无辜平民；


While we seem not to notice that we also become perpetrators in the process, much of the rest of the world does notice â€“ a gap in perception that has severely weakened Americaâ€™s international credibility and standing.	然而，尽管我们好像还没有注意到在此过程中我们也变成了作恶的罪犯，世界上其它大部分人却已经注意到了。 这是一个认知差异，它已经严重削弱了美国的国际信誉和声望。


Taken together, these factors ensure that the war on terror cannot be won.	综合这些因素，可以断定反恐战争不可能获胜。


On the contrary, an endless war waged against an unseen enemy is doing great damage not only to our authority and prestige in the world, but also to our own society.	相反，一场面对看不见的敌人的无休止的战争不仅仅严重损害我们在世界上的权威和声望，而且严重损害我们自己的社会。


It has led to a dangerous extension of executive powers, tarnished our adherence to universal human rights, and inhibited the critical process that is at the heart of an open society.	它已经导致了危险的行政权力扩张、削弱了我们对普遍人权的坚持，阻止了一个开放社会核心所在的批判过程。


It has also cost a lot of money.	它也耗费了大量的钱财。


Most importantly, the war on terror has diverted attention from other urgent tasks that require American leadership, such as finishing the job that we correctly began in Afghanistan, addressing the looming global energy crisis, and dealing with nuclear proliferation.	最重要的是，反恐战争已经将我们的注意力从其它需要美国发挥领袖作用的紧急任务中转移开来，如完成我们在阿富汗正确开展的工作、应对迫在眉睫的全球能源危机、处理核扩散问题。


With American influence at low ebb, the world is in danger of sliding into a vicious cycle of escalating violence.	随着美国影响力的衰退，世界正处于陷入暴力升级的恶性循环的危险境地。


We can escape it only if we Americans repudiate the war on terror as a false metaphor.	只有我们美国人批判反恐战争是一个错误的说法，我们才能避开这种恶性循环。


If we persevere on our current course, the situation will continue to deteriorate.	如果我们坚持现在的路线，局势将会继续恶化。


It is not our will that is being tested, but our understanding of reality.	正在经受考验的不是我们的意志，而是我们对现实的理解。


It is painful to admit that our predicaments are brought about by our own misconceptions.	承认我们面临的困境是我们自己的误解所导致的让人痛苦。


But not admitting it is bound to prove even more painful in the long run.	但是不承认这一点，长期来看它注定会让我们更加痛苦。


The strength of an open society lies in its ability to recognize and correct its mistakes.	一个开放社会的力量在于它有能力承认并改正自己的错误。


That is the test that now confronts us.	这正是我们面临的考验。


Can Fillon Beat Le Pen?	菲永能击败勒庞吗？


CAMBRIDGE – In the French Republican party’s presidential primary on Sunday, François Fillon soundly defeated frontrunner Alain Juppé, winning close to 67% of the votes.	剑桥——在星期天进行的法国共和党总统初选中，弗朗索瓦·菲永以赢得67%选票的成绩毫无争议地击败了领跑者阿兰·朱佩。


Two weeks ago, a landslide victory for the apparent underdog seemed out of the question.	仅仅两周前，明显处于劣势的候选人以绝对优势获胜似乎根本不可能。


It had long been expected that Juppé, the mayor of Bordeaux and a former prime minister under President Jacques Chirac, would beat the other frontrunner, former President Nicolas Sarkozy, in a second-round runoff.	人们一直认为曾在雅克·希拉克总统内阁担任波尔多市长及前总理职务的朱佩将在第二轮决选中击败前总统尼古拉斯·萨科齐，也是另一位党内竞争领跑者。


Instead, Fillon, a former prime minister under Sarkozy, emerged from the first round with a commanding lead, winning 44% of the vote.	菲永曾在前总统萨科齐手下担任总理，从首回合开始即以44%的选票处于绝对领先地位。


The outcome was a humiliating one for Sarkozy, who received just a little over 20% support, and effectively ended his political career.	结果对萨科齐而言是一种耻辱，萨科齐只赢得了20%多一点的选票，并实际导致自身政治生涯终结。


For many observers, the vote invoked the specter of June’s Brexit referendum and US President-elect Donald Trump’s victory earlier this month.	对许多观察家而言，此次投票令人联想起6月的英国退欧公投和美国当选总统唐纳德·特朗普本月早些时候的胜利。


Opinion polls placing Fillon as a distant third were proven wrong, partly because many voters seem to have made up their minds just days before the vote.	事实证明了显示菲永处于第三且与前两位差距巨大的民调结果错误，部分原因可能是许多投票者似乎是在投票前几天才做出决定的。


Social media were also credited, again, with playing a key role.	社交媒体再次被认为发挥了关键的作用。


In the last debates before the vote, Fillon presented himself as a credible alternative to Juppé and Sarkozy.	在投票前的最后一场辩论中，菲永向公众证明自己是朱佩和萨科齐可靠的替代者。


With incumbent President François Hollande’s approval ratings below 5% – the lowest ever for a French president – the big question now is whether Fillon can beat far-right National Front leader Marine Le Pen in the second round of the presidential election in May 2017.	因为现任总统弗朗索瓦·奥朗德的支持率低于5%——这创造了法国总统有史以来的最低支持率记录——现在的一个重大问题是将在2017年5月举行的第二轮总统大选中，菲永能否击败极右翼国民阵线领导人马琳·勒庞。


Juppé was seen as a sufficiently “soft” candidate, who would provide an alternative to Le Pen for left-wing voters.	朱佩被外界认为是足够“温和”的候选人，从而在左翼选民内部提供了勒庞的替代者。


Fillon, however, is much further to the right than Juppé, which means that left-wing voters might not see much difference between him and Le Pen, and could demand that a center-left third candidate enter the fray.	而菲永却远比朱佩更偏向右翼，这意味着左翼选民可能很难意识到他和勒庞之间的区别，并可能要求一位中左翼立场候选人加入到选战当中。


One contender is the centrist Emmanuel Macron, who says he will run but refuses to stand in the Socialist Party primary this January.	竞争者之一是中间派人士埃曼纽尔·马龙，马龙曾表示将会参选但拒绝参加今年1月社会党举办的初选活动。


Without major-party backing beyond his own En Marche! movement, however, Macron is unlikely to be able to muster the support needed to win the presidency (he currently has just 14% support).	在未能赢得除自身En Marche! 运动以外主要党派支持的情况下，马龙似乎不太可能集齐赢得总统竞选所需的票数（马龙目前仅赢得14%的选民投票）。


And, as a banker-turned-reformist economy minister under Hollande, Macron is an ideal target for Le Pen’s anti-elitist, anti-European rhetoric.	而且，作为奥朗德手下出身银行家并力主改革的经济部长，马龙为勒庞的反精英、反欧洲论提供了理想的目标。


Beyond Macron, the left is struggling to put forward a credible candidate.	除马龙外，左翼正竭力推出一位可信的竞选者。


Holland’s reelection chances are dismal; his loyal prime minister, Manuel Valls, is expected to announce his own candidacy this week, but is polling only marginally better than Hollande, at 9%.	奥朗德竞选连任的机会非常小； 其忠实总理曼努埃尔·瓦尔斯预计本周将公开宣布参与竞选，但其民调结果仅略高于奥朗德徘徊在9%。


That leaves only the far-left Jean-Luc Mélenchon (13%) and the photogenic but waffling Arnaud Montebourg, whom Macron succeeded as economy minister.	此外只剩下极左翼候选人让·吕克·梅朗雄（支持率13%）和表面光鲜但优柔寡断的蒙特布赫，后者曾担任马龙的前任经济部长。


If no leftist candidate makes it to the second round, voters on the left could cast their votes for “Republican unity,” as they did in 2002, when they handed Chirac a landslide victory over Le Pen’s father, Jean-Marie Le Pen.	如果没有左翼候选人进入第二轮，左翼选民有可能像2002年曾经发生的那样将票投给“共和党统一联盟”，当时他们曾拱手送给希拉克一次对勒庞父亲让-马里·勒庞的大胜。


Leftist voters would have preferred Juppé, and will likely tolerate Fillon, but they comprised only 15% of total voters in the first round of the Republican primary, so they may not have the same impact in 2017 as they did in 2002.	左翼选民或许更偏爱朱佩，也有可能容忍菲永，但他们仅占共和党初选首轮总票数的15%，因此对2017年总统竞选的影响力可能远不及2002年那样大。


Fillon’s political base is dominated by provincial, retired Catholic men, who turned out in force for both rounds of the primaries.	菲永的政治基础主要是外省退休的天主教民众，他们在两轮初选中几乎倾巢而出。


Fillon’s supporters seem to be united in their opposition to gay marriage, and Fillon, as an avowed Catholic, was the most socially conservative candidate on offer.	菲永的支持者似乎一致反对同性恋婚姻，而自称天主教徒的菲永是迄今为止本次大选中社会观念最保守的候选人。


While Fillon does not want to revoke same-sex couples’ legal right to marry, he opposes granting them the right to adopt children.	虽然菲永并不打算剥夺同性恋夫妇结婚的法定权利，但却对授予他们收养子女的权利持反对态度。


Geographically, Fillon won almost everywhere outside of Juppé’s Bordeaux bastion, including the southern Mediterranean Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur (PACA) region, which was originally Sarkozy’s strongest base of support.	从地域上看，菲永几乎在除朱佩波尔多大本营以外的所有地区获胜，包括地中海南部的普罗旺斯-阿尔卑斯-蓝色海岸（PACA），该地区原本是萨科奇的坚定支持者。


But PACA is also the National Front’s stronghold, which means that Fillon will have to distinguish himself from Le Pen as a right-wing candidate, lest voters decide they would prefer the original to the copy.	但普罗旺斯-阿尔卑斯-蓝色海岸同时也是国民阵线的据点，这意味着菲永必须将自己与同为右翼候选人的勒庞加以区分，以免选民认定他是勒庞的翻版而不愿给他投票。


There are a few areas where Fillon and Le Pen differ.	菲永在若干领域和勒庞确有不同。


For starters, Florian Philippot, one of Le Pen’s deputies, is openly gay, and Le Pen has been careful not to take a strong position on social issues.	首先，勒庞的副手之一菲利波是位公开的同性恋，而且勒庞一直对在社会问题上表达强硬立场持谨慎态度。


Fillon is also an economic liberal – and is often characterized as a French Margaret Thatcher – whereas Le Pen is a protectionist.	菲永也是一位经济自由主义者——常常被称为法国的玛格丽特·撒切尔——而勒庞则是位保护主义者。


And while Fillon wants to reduce the French civil service by 500,000, Le Pen favors a strong state.	而且菲永想要将法国公务员队伍减少500,000人，而勒庞则倾向于保留强大的政府。


Finally, Le Pen opposes France’s membership in the European Union and wants to return to the franc, while Fillon would prefer to delegate power back to national assemblies.	最后，勒庞反对法国加入欧盟并希望法郎回归，而菲永则更愿意将权力下放给国民议会。


Heading into the election campaign, Fillon may run on a pro-European platform, as evidenced by his pivot during the second-round debates, when he suggested that he favors forming a eurozone government.	菲永可能在亲欧平台上参与竞选，他在第二轮辩论期间赞成成立欧元区政府的核心观点就是证明。


Unlike Trump and the United Kingdom’s “Leave” campaign, the National Front already has a predictable core constituency, amounting to about one-quarter of the electorate.	不同于特朗普和英国的脱欧运动，国民阵线已经拥有了占选民总数约1/4的可以预见的核心选民。


Its coalition of the old French far right and disaffected working-class voters will not arrive unannounced or defy expectations, as happened in the US and the UK.	由国民阵线古老的法国极右翼势力和愤愤不平的工薪阶层选民组成的联盟像美英两国那样出人意料地不期而至将不太可能。


Fillon, for his part, can probably muster the same level of support, and he may even be able to skim votes from Le Pen, given that around 8% of primary voters described themselves as National Front backers.	鉴于约8%的初选投票者自我描述为国民阵线的支持者，菲永或许可以得到与勒庞同等水平的支持，甚至可以从勒庞那里夺走选票。


What’s more, political Catholicism still appeals to many French voters, and the Church itself wants to lure Catholics away from the National Front and back into its more traditionally conservative fold.	此外，政治天主教仍然吸引众多法国选民，而教会本身则希望诱使天主教民众远离国民阵线，回到更为传统的保守主义群体当中。


Meanwhile, a number of far-right organizations supported Fillon’s candidacy during the primaries, owing to his strong support for laws that would ban the burkini, a full-body bathing suit worn by Muslim women.	不仅如此，有几家极右翼组织支持菲永在初选期间的竞选资格，因为他对旨在禁止布基尼（即穆斯林女性穿着的全身泳衣）的立法持坚定的支持态度。


Given the current political field, Fillon will most likely face Le Pen in the presidential election’s second round next May.	考虑到目前的政治形势，菲永在明年5月举行的第二轮总统选举中将极有可能遭遇勒庞。


Polling after Fillon’s victory put his support at 26%, with Le Pen backed by 24% of respondents.	菲永获胜后的民调显示其支持率为26%，而勒庞则拥有24%被调查者的支持。


Fillon, however, is projected to win the second round with 67% of the vote.	但外界预测菲永将以67%的选票在第二轮中获胜。


We have been here before, and that second-round projection is based on “Republican unity,” which might not hold.	以前也曾出现过类似的情况，而第二轮预测的前提是“共和党统一”，而实际情况也许并不是那样。


Left-wing voters, put off by Fillon’s liberal economics and social conservatism, might stay home.	左翼选民囿于菲永的自由经济和保守社会主张可能放弃投票。


Given pollsters’ massive predictive failures elsewhere this year, no one should count on them to turn out until the votes themselves are counted.	鉴于今年其他地方民调专家的大规模预测失利，在计票完成之前人们不应过于相信这些民调专家的主张。


Finance Agonistes	收缩的金融业


LONDON – For at least a quarter-century, the financial sector has grown far more rapidly than the economy as a whole, both in developed and in most developing countries.	伦敦——至少在最近的二十五年中，发达国家以及大部分发展中国家的金融产业取得了比整体经济快得多的增长速度。


The ratio of total financial assets (stocks, bonds, and bank deposits) to GDP in the United Kingdom was about 100% in 1980, while by 2006 it had risen to around 440%.	1980年，英国金融资产总额（包括股票、债券和银行存款）与国内生产总值的比例约为100%，而到了2006年，这一比例上升到440%左右。


In China, financial assets went from being virtually non-existent to well over 300% of GDP during this period.	在同一时期内，中国的金融资产则从一无所有上升至GDP的300%以上。


As the size of the financial industry grew, so, too, did its profitability.	随着金融行业规模扩大，其盈利水平也随之提高。


The share of total profits of companies in the United States represented by financial firms rocketed from 10% in 1980 to 40% in 2006.	金融公司所获利润占美国各公司全部利润总额的比重从1980年的10%窜升至2006年的40%。


Against that background, it is not surprising that pay in the financial sector soared.	在这一背景下，金融领域薪酬的飙升便不足为奇了。


The City of London, lower Manhattan, and a few other centers became money machines that made investment bankers, hedge-fund managers, and private equity folk immoderately wealthy.	伦敦金融城、曼哈顿金融区以及其他一些金融中心化身为印钞机，使得投资银行家、对冲基金经理以及私人股本运作者赚得盆满钵满。


University leaders like me spent much of our time persuading them to recycle a portion of their gains to their old schools.	像我这样的大学领导便会花费大量时间，劝说这些人将收益的一部分回馈母校。


For the last two years, things have been different.	但在过去的两年间，情况发生了变化。


Many financial firms have shrunk their balance sheets dramatically, and of course some have gone out of business altogether.	许多金融公司的资产负债表出现了戏剧性的缩水，当然还有一些公司干脆关门大吉。


Leverage is down sharply. Investment banks with leverage of more than 30 times their capital in early 2007 are now down to little more than ten times.	金融杠杆大幅降低，在2007年早期，投资银行的杠杆超过其资本三十倍有余，现在则下降到十倍刚出头的水平。


Trading volumes are down, as is bank lending, and there have been major layoffs in financial centers around the globe.	交易量与银行信贷量一并萎缩，全球各地的金融中心都进行了大规模的裁员。


Is this a short-term phenomenon, and will we see an early return to rapid financial-sector growth as soon as the world economy recovers?	这只是一个短期现象吗？ 一旦世界经济开始复苏，我们会看到金融部门很快重返高速发展的局面吗？


Already the market is full of rumors that guaranteed bonuses are returning, that hedge funds are making double-digit returns, and that activity is reviving in the private equity market.	目前市场中关于年终奖金正卷土重来，对冲基金实现了两位数的收益以及私人股本市场的复苏等传闻已在满天飞。


Are these harbingers of a robust recovery for the financial sector, or just urban myths?	这些现象是金融部门强劲恢复的先兆，抑或仅仅只是都市神话？


There is no certain answer to that question, but perhaps economic history can offer some clues.	对于这个问题，我们并没有肯定的答案，但也许经济史可以为我们提供一些线索。


A recent analysis by Andy Haldane of the Bank of England of long-term returns on UK financial sector equities suggests that the last 25 years have been very unusual.	近期由英格兰银行的安迪·霍尔丹对英国金融部门股票长期收益情况所作的分析暗示人们：过去的二十五年极不寻常。


Suppose you had placed a long-term bet on financial equities in 1900, along with a short bet on general equities – in effect a gamble on whether the UK financial sector would outperform the market.	假设你在1900年对金融类股票投下了长期赌注，同时对一般股票下了短期赌注——实际上这就成了一场关于英国金融产业能否比市场其他行业表现得更为出色的赌博。


For the first 85 years, this would have been a very uninteresting gamble, generating an average return of only around 2% a year.	在起初的八十五年间，这场赌博会显得索然无味，年平均回报率仅在2%左右。


But the period from 1986 to 2006 was radically different.	但在1986年至2006年这一时段，情况与此前截然不同。


During those two decades, your annual average return would have been more than 16%.	在这二十年间，你的年均回报率将超过16%。


As Haldane puts it, “banking became the goose laying the golden eggs.”	按霍尔丹的话说：“银行业成了下金蛋的鹅。


Indeed, there is no period in recent UK financial history that bears any comparison to those jamboree decades.	”确实，在近代的英国金融史上，这狂欢一般的二十年可谓绝无仅有。


If you had unwound your bet three years ago, you would now be sitting pretty – as long as you had gone into cash, of course – because the period since 2006 has undone most of these gains.	如果你在三年前解除了赌注，那么现在你将处于很有利的位置——当然前提是你已经将之转为现金——因为2006年之后的时期，此前那些收益将大部分化为乌有。


So if you had held your bank stocks up to the end of last year, over 110 years your investment would have yielded an annual average return of less than 3%, still broadly a break-even strategy.	因此如果你一直到去年年底还持有银行股，那么你在这110年中的投资年均回报率将低于3%，仍然大体上属于不赚不赔的策略。


Why was this 20-year experience so unusual, with returns so much higher than at any time in the last century?	为何这二十年的经历如此不同寻常，会出现比上世纪任何时候都要高得多的回报？


The most straightforward answer seems to be leverage.	看起来，最直截了当的答案是杠杆。


Banks geared up dramatically, in a competitive race to generate higher returns.	在这场竞速比赛中，各家银行为了创造更高的回报，明显地开足了马力。


Haldane describes this as resorting to the roulette wheel.	霍尔丹将这一举动形容为进行轮盘赌博。


Perhaps that analogy is rather insulting to those who play roulette.	也许这一类比是对那些轮盘赌徒的巨大侮辱。


Indeed, the phrase “casino banking” tends to ignore the fact that casinos have a rather good handle on their returns.	确实，“赌场银行业”这一表述忽视了赌场对其收益情况有着相当不错的控制这一事实。


They are typically very astute at risk management, unlike many of the banks that dramatically increased their leverage – and thus their risks – during the last 20 years.	他们往往在风险管理方面非常精明，在这一点上，他们不同于许多在过去二十年间显著增加其杠杆（由此也增加其风险）的银行。


The conclusions that we might draw for the future depend heavily on how central banks and regulators react to the crisis.	对于未来而言，我们能总结出的结论在很大程度上取决于中央银行以及监管者是如何应对这一危机的。


At present, financial firms are learning the lessons for themselves, reducing leverage and hoarding capital and cash, whereas the authorities are trying to persuade banks to expand lending – precisely the strategy that led to the current crisis.	在现阶段，金融公司正在为自己吸取教训，削减杠杆、储备资本与现金，然而当局却正在试图说服银行扩大贷款规模——而这正是导致目前此次危机的原因。


Of course, we know that a different approach will be needed in the longer run.	当然，我们知道银行业发展的长期目标。


In effect, the authorities are following the approach first outlined by St. Augustine.	实际上，监管当局正沿着最早由圣奥古斯丁描绘出的道路前进。


They would like banks to be “chaste,” but not yet.	他们希望银行变得“贞洁”，不过不是现在。


But when growth does return, leverage will be far more tightly constrained than it was before.	但当银行业再次出现增长时，杠杆将受到比以往严格得多的约束。


Regulators are already talking about imposing leverage ratios, as well as limits on risk-weighted assets.	监管机构已经在商讨有关对金融杠杆征税以及对风险加权资产设限等议题。


If they follow through, as I expect, there will be no return to the strategies of the last two decades.	如果他们一直做的话，我估计，像过去二十年那样的飞速增长期将一去不复返。


In that case, finance will no longer be an industry that systematically outpaces the rest of the economy.	如果这样的话，金融业的整体表现也不再可能超过其他行业。


There will be winners and losers, of course, but systematic sectoral out-performance looks unlikely.	金融公司有的赔钱，有的盈利，所有金融公司都赚钱的现象几乎不可能出现。


What that will mean for financial-sector pay is a slightly more complex question, to which I will return.	这将对金融业薪酬水平影响有多大，这一问题略显复杂，我将在今后再行讨论。


Financing the Climate-Change Transition	为气候变化转型提供融资


POTSDAM, PARIS, ZURICH – Unless the world reduces greenhouse-gas emissions rapidly, humanity is likely to enter an era of unprecedented climate risks.	波茨坦、巴黎、苏黎世—除非世界迅速降低温室气体排放量，否则人类将进入前所未有的气候风险期。


Devastating extreme-weather events are already increasing in frequency, but much of the worst climate-related damage, such as a sustained rise in sea levels, will be recognized only once it is too late to act.	灾难性极端天气事件频率已经开始上升，但最糟糕的气候相关伤害，比如海平面持续升高，等我们认识到它们出现的时候已经太迟了。


Clearly, the climate system’s time horizon does not align well with the world’s much shorter political and economic cycles.	显然，气候系统的考虑时界很长，二政治和经济周期很短，两者恨不匹配。


Listed companies report on a quarterly basis, and recent regulatory changes, such as those mandating increased use of mark-to-market accounting, limit long-term thinking.	上市公司按季度披露报告，而最新监管变化，如越来越多的强制使用按市值计价会计规则，限制了长期思考。


Governments usually have legislative cycles of no more than four years, and they must also respond to immediate developments.	政府立法周期通常不超过四年，并且还必须对眼前的发展趋势立刻做出反应。


Yet stabilizing the climate requires sustained and consistent action over an extended period.	但稳定气候要求在相当长的时期内采取持续一致的行动。


AXA and UBS, together with the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project), and the EU’s Climate-KIC (Knowledge and Information Community) recently organized a conference in Berlin.	AXA和UBS，再加上波茨坦气候影响研究所（Potstam Institute for Climate Impact Research）、CDP（碳披露计划）以及欧盟气候-KIC（知识和情报协会）最近在柏林召开了一次会议。


There, they discussed with leading experts in green investments and fossil-fuel divestment how financial intermediaries can help to address climate risks.	会上，他们与绿色投资和减少化石燃料投资顶级专家讨论了金融媒介如何帮助解决气候风险。


The financial industry’s active involvement is urgently needed.	世界急需金融业的积极参与。


In the Paris climate agreement reached last December, countries worldwide agreed to limit global warming to well below 2° Celsius, thereby defining the track on which the world must progress rapidly.	在去年12月达成的巴黎气候协定上，世界各国同意将全球变暖幅度控制在2℃以内，这决定了世界必须做出快速进展的方向。


Over the next 15 years, an estimated $93 trillion will be needed for investments in low-carbon infrastructure.	在未来十五年中，据估计需要93万亿美元用于低碳基础设施投资。


Government funding alone cannot meet this demand, so the financial sector must help fill the gap.	光靠政府出资无法满足这一需求，因此金融业必须帮助弥补缺口。


By redirecting capital flows toward proactive efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change, financial institutions can protect client assets from global climate risks, and from the economic risks that will attend a warming planet.	金融机构可以引导资本流向减轻和适应气候变化的前瞻性计划，从而保护客户资产免收气候风险和与地球变暖有关的经济风险的影响。


They are also demonstrating their social responsibility for the wellbeing of future generations.	它们也在彰显对子孙后代福祉的社会责任。


But financing change requires changing finance.	但为变化融资需要改变金融。


And this process is already underway.	而这一过程已经“上路”。


Development institutions such as the World Bank are reconsidering their investment policies.	世界银行等开发机构正在重新考虑投资政策。


And, in the private sector, there is growing enthusiasm for “green” bonds, loans, indices, and infrastructure investments.	而私人部门越来越热衷于“绿色”债券、贷款、指数和基础设施投资。


Still, as the European Commission notes, less than 1% of institutional assets worldwide are invested in environmentally friendly infrastructure assets.	但是，欧盟委员会指出，全世界只有不到1%的机构资产投资于环境友好型基础设施资产。


Given historically low interest rates and the general lack of attractive investment options, this is an ideal moment to tap into investors’ growing appetite for green financial products.	目前利率处于历史低位，有吸引力的投资机会也全面短缺，因此这是利用投资者对绿色金融产品兴趣日涨的理想实际。


Many large financial institutions have recently joined a global initiative promoting fossil-fuel divestment.	许多大型金融机构最近联手参与了一个促进减少化石燃料投资的全球性计划。


Research findings indicate that global CO2 emissions must be restricted to less than one trillion metric tons between 2010 and the end of the century to comply with the Paris agreement and limit global warming to below 2°C. This means that most available coal, oil, and gas reserves must stay in the ground.	研究发现表明，要想满足巴黎协定，将全球变暖幅度限制在2℃之内，从2010年到本世纪末全球二氧化碳排放量必须限制在一万亿吨以内。 这意味着大部分可用煤炭、石油和天然气储量都必须留在地下。


As a result, investments in fossil-fuel energy sources will continue to lose value over time, eventually becoming stranded.	因此，化石燃料能源资源投资将继续逐渐丧失价值，最终被搁置。


Thus, the financial sector’s revaluation of such holdings not only helps to stabilize the climate, but also better protects its clients’ investments, and, by preventing the creation of a “carbon bubble,” helps to stabilize economies.	因此，金融业对这类投资进行重新评估不但有助于稳定气候，也能更好地保护客户的投资，还能通过防止“碳泡沫”卷土重来帮助稳定经济。


But selling off these holdings will not suffice; the freed-up assets must also be redirected to more sustainable businesses.	但甩卖这些投资仍然不够，所解放出来的资产必须重新引导流向更加可持续的企业。


For financial institutions and investors to do their part, they urgently need a better understanding of the relevant climate-related investment risks, which the Financial Stability Board (FSB) has divided into three categories: physical, transitional, and liability.	对于有志于此的金融机构和投资者来说，他们急切地需要更好地理解重要其后相关投资的风险，金融稳定局（FSB）将该风险分为三类：物理风险、过度风险和责任风险。


Informed investment decisions will require sound, scientifically grounded data and uniform standards to assess these risks, and to quantify opportunities against them.	消息灵通的投资决策需要有科学基础的可靠数据和统一的标准评估这些风险，并量化分析其中的机会。


Effective disclosure will hence be a key part of any new framework.	因此，有效的披露是新框架的关键部分。


An FSB taskforce – comprising representatives from banks, insurers, institutional investors, rating agencies, consultants, and auditors – is currently shaping voluntary standards, so that companies provide consistent and comparable climate-related financial disclosures to their stakeholders, whether investors or lenders.	一个由银行、保险、机构投资者、评级机构、咨询公司和审计机构代表组成的FSB小组目前正在制定自愿标准，以便公司向相关利益者（不管是投资者还是贷款人）提供一致和可比较的气候相关气候披露。


This will also allow companies to gain valuable insights into their own potential for change, reflecting a time-honored principle: what gets measured, gets managed.	这还将让公司能够获得关于自身变革潜力的宝贵洞见，体现一个经过时间考验的原则：可测量方可管理。


This is no easy task.	这绝非易事。


For example, carbon footprints on their own will not steer investments in the right direction.	比如，它们自身的碳足迹无法引导投资流向正确方向。


Instead of identifying the champions of environmentally friendly solutions, these figures merely reveal which companies currently emit the most greenhouse gases.	这些数字并不能识别最优秀的环境友好型解决方案，只能揭示哪些公司目前排放了最多的温室气体。


Meaningful disclosure standards must take account of sector-specific information and the impact on business strategies of the transition toward a low-carbon economy.	有意义的披露标准必须考虑因行业而异的信息，以及对低碳经济转型的商业战略的影响。


All the governments that signed the Paris agreement can now be expected to adopt a range of measures to enable them to implement their de-carbonization strategies.	所有签署了巴黎协定的国家我们，都可以期待它们采取各种措施以使其能够实施去碳化战略。


In this context, carbon pricing will be an essential part of the policy toolbox.	在这样的背景下，碳定价将是政策工具箱中的关键工具。


Some governments have already taken steps to promote the development of green products, via tax or market incentives.	一些政府已经采取措施，通过税收或市场激励促进绿色产品开发。


Overall, such changes to legal frameworks must support, not impede, the private financial sector’s efforts to tackle climate change.	总体而言，这些法律框架变化必须支持而不是阻挠私人金融部门对抗气候变化的努力。


Financing the infrastructure projects that are too expensive for some national governments to finance on their own, but that are essential to the transformation of our energy system – such as wind farms and long-distance power lines – will require a new class of global infrastructure bonds.	为对一些国家的政府来说过于昂贵、因而无法独力融资，但又对我们的能源体系转型至关重要的基础设施项目——比如风力发电厂和长途输电线——提供融资需要新类型的全球基础设施债券。


In the past, governments have encouraged investment in government bonds.	在过去，政府鼓励政府债券的投资。


Now, in order to increase private investment in building up clean infrastructure, investor-protection measures and dispute-resolution mechanisms must be considered.	如今，为了增加清洁基础设施的私人投资，必须考虑投资者保护措施和纠纷解决机制。


The financial sector is ready to spearhead the shift to sustainability.	金融业已经准备好引领向可持续性的转变。


When Germany takes over the G20 presidency next year, it will have the opportunity to convince its partners to create an adequate framework to encourage change in the financial sector that ensures a smooth adjustment to a low-carbon economy.	在未来一年中，德国将担任G20主席国，它将有机会说服合作伙伴成立完善的框架鼓励金融业发生能确保平稳过渡到低碳经济的转变。


For both public and private actors, the time to act is now.	对公共和私人行动方而言，现在正是行动良机。


Finance’s Crisis of Legitimacy	银行业的合法性危机


WASHINGTON, DC – The recent departure of Robert Diamond from Barclays marks a watershed.	华盛顿特区——巴克莱银行前CEO博达文（Robert Diamond）日前的辞职标志着一个分水岭。


To be sure, CEOs of major banks have been forced out before.	当然，大银行的CEO被迫辞职并非没有先例。


Chuck Prince lost his job at Citigroup over excessive risk-taking in the run-up to the financial crisis of 2008, and, more recently, Oswald Grübel of UBS was pushed out for failing to prevent unauthorized trading to the tune of $2.3 billion.	普林斯（Charles Prince）丢掉花旗集团CEO的工作，是因为在2008年金融危机的酝酿阶段，他的决策过于冒险。 瑞银集团前CEO郭儒博（Oswald Grübel）则由于没能防止规模为23亿美元的无授权交易而被扫地出门。


But Diamond was a banker supposedly at the top of his game.	可博达文是银行家中的翘楚。


Barclays, it was claimed, had come through the 2008-2009 crisis without benefiting from government support.	据说，巴克莱银行没靠政府支持就挺过了2008~2009年的危机。


And, while his bank had been found in violation of various rules recently, including on products sold to consumers and on how it reported interest rates, Diamond had managed to distance himself from the damage.	而且，即便这家银行近期被查出多项违规，包括违规向客户销售产品和虚报利率，博达文仍能将自己洗脱干系。


Press reports indicate that regulators were willing to give Diamond a free pass – right up to the moment when a serious political backlash took hold.	媒体报道认为，监管机构原本想放博达文一马——直到遭遇严重的政治反弹。


Diamond started to fight back, pointing an accusatory finger at the Bank of England.	博达文开始反击，指责起英格兰银行来。


At that point, he had to go.	事情到了这个份儿上，他非走不可了。


There are three broader lessons of Diamond’s demise at Barclays.	博达文在巴克莱的垮台，人们可以从中得出三个教训。


First, the political backlash was not from backbenchers or uninformed spectators on the margins of the mainstream.	首先，他遭遇的政治反弹并非来自后座议员或军方观察员（uniformed spectators）此类边缘角色。


Top politicians from all parties in the United Kingdom were united in condemning Barclays’ actions, particularly with regard to its systemic cheating on the reporting of interest rates, exposed in the Libor scandal.	英国各党派的顶尖政治家都众口一词谴责巴克莱的行径，尤其是谴责其在Libor丑闻中被暴露出来的系统性虚报利率一事。


(The London Interbank Offered Rate is a key benchmark for borrowing and lending around the world, including for the pricing of derivatives).	（Libor，伦敦银行同业拆放利率是全世界金融活动的一项关键指标，其作用包括为衍生品定价等等。 ）


Indeed, Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne went so far as to say, “Fraud is a crime in ordinary business; why shouldn’t it be so in banking?”	说真的，英国财政大臣欧思邦（George Osborne）甚至说：“在一般商业里，欺骗是一宗罪，为什么在银行业就不该是呢？


His clear implication is that fraud was committed at Barclays – a serious allegation from Britain’s finance minister.	”他这几乎是在明说巴克莱有欺诈行径——这可是来自英国财相的严重指控。


After five years of global financial-sector scandals on a grand scale, patience is wearing thin.	经过了金融行业丑闻大规模爆发的5年，人们的容忍度已被消磨殆尽。


As Eduardo Porter of The New York Times put it,	诚如埃德瓦多·波特（Eduardo Porter）在《纽约时报》上写的：


“Bigger markets allow bigger frauds.	“市场越大，孕育的欺诈越大。


Bigger companies, with more complex balance sheets, have more places to hide them.	公司越大，资产负债表越复杂，就有越多的地方去藏匿骗局。


And banks, when they get big enough that no government will let them fail, have the biggest incentive of all.”	而银行，一旦大到没有一个政府敢让它们垮掉的程度，就有最大的动机去行骗。 ”


Second, Diamond apparently thought that he could take on the British establishment.	其次，博达文显然认为，他可以挑战英国的权势集团。


His staff leaked the contents of a conversation he claimed to have had with Paul Tucker, a senior Bank of England official, suggesting that the BoE had told Barclays to report inaccurate interest-rate numbers.	巴克莱员工泄漏出来一段据称是博达文同英格兰银行副行长保罗·塔克（Paul Tucker）的谈话，其内容似乎意味着，是英格兰银行授意巴克莱虚报利率的。


Diamond apparently forgot that the continued existence of any bank with a balance sheet that is large relative to its home economy – and its ability to earn a return for shareholders – depends entirely on maintaining a good relationship with regulators.	博达文显然忘记了，任何一家银行，只要它的资产负债表同所在国经济高度相关，那么它的持续存在和为股东盈利的能力就全然依赖同监管者维持良好关系。


Barclays has total assets of around $2.5 trillion – roughly the size of the UK’s annual GDP – and is either the fifth- or eighth-largest bank in the world, depending on how one measures balance sheets.	巴克莱的总资产约有2. 5万亿美元，同英国的年均GDP规模相近，以不同的方式衡量，是世界第五大或第八大银行。


Banks at this scale benefit from huge implicit government guarantees; this is what it means to be “too big to fail.”	这个规模的银行都得仰赖巨大的隐性政府担保，这就是“大到倒不得”的意义。


Diamond apparently believed his own rhetoric – that he and his bank are critical to economic prosperity in the UK.	博达文显然被自己的修辞说服了——真的以为他和他的银行对英国的经济繁荣不可或缺。


The regulators called his bluff and forced him to resign.	监管者们将计就计，顺势把他赶下台。


Barclays’ stock price rose slightly on the news.	巴克莱的股价随之略有回升。


The final lesson is that the big showdowns between democracy and big bankers are still to come – both in the United States and in continental Europe.	最后一个教训是，不论是在美国还是在欧洲大陆，民主政治和银行巨头之间还会有一场大决战。


On the surface, the banks remain powerful, yet their legitimacy continues to crumble.	表面上看，银行依然强大，然而它们的合法性不断瓦解。


Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan Chase, presided this year over reckless risk-taking to the tune of nearly $6 billion (we might call it a “three Grübel” debacle), yet his job apparently remains secure.	摩根大通的CEO詹姆斯·戴蒙（James Dimon）今年早些时候由于轻率冒险导致将近60亿美元的巨亏（也许可以把那称为“三个郭儒博”的大失败），可他的工作显然还比较稳固。


Dimon even remains on the board of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, despite the fact that the New York Fed is deeply involved in the investigation not only of JP Morgan Chase’s trading losses, but also of its potential involvement in the broadening Libor scandal.	戴蒙甚至仍然保留了在纽约联储银行董事会的席位，尽管纽约联储不仅深度参与了对摩根大通交易亏损的调查，而且也参与了后者可能卷入Libor丑闻的调查。


As Dennis Kelleher, the president of the advocacy group Better Markets, documented in recent congressional testimony, two years after the passage of the Dodd-Frank legislation, the US banking system continues to fight hard – and effectively – to undermine meaningful reform.	正如游说机构Better Markets的主席丹尼斯·凯勒赫（Dennis Kelleher）在近期国会听证会上所言，多德—弗兰科法案已经通过两年了，可是美国的银行体系依然在不遗余力地瓦解���何实质性的改革，而且卓有成效。


(Kelleher’s testimony is a must-read assessment, as is his opening statement to the hearing).	（凯勒赫的证词及公开陈述都是必读的好材料。 ）


But progress is nonetheless being made.	但是，进步毕竟还是有的。


Dimon is the public face of megabanks’ resistance to reform; repeated and public egg on this particular face strengthens those who want to rein in these banks’ excessive and irresponsible risk-taking.	在公众眼里，戴蒙是大银行抵制改革的代表形象，反复而且公开地朝他“扔臭鸡蛋”可以大壮主张改革者的声势，后者主张节制银行过度且不负责任的冒险。


Meanwhile, the European situation looks explosive.	与此同时，欧洲的局势似乎是爆炸性的。


The European Union’s approach to bank regulation encouraged financial institutions to load up on government debt – supposedly a “risk-free” asset.	欧盟的银行监管手段鼓励金融机构囤积政府债券，所谓“无风险”资产。


Now, given the profound sovereign-debt crisis in the eurozone periphery, government defaults threaten to take down the big banks.	如今，鉴于欧元区外围国家的主权债务危机加深，政府违约有可能拖垮那些大银行。


The European Central Bank has provided a great deal of emergency “liquidity” funding to banks, which they use to buy even more government debt.	欧洲央行向银行注入了大量紧急“流动性”。 这些钱却被后者用来购买更多的政府债券。


This holds down interest rates on that debt in the short run, but creates even bigger potential losses in the case of potential default.	这虽然短期内压低了那些债券的利率，但也令一旦违约后的潜在损失变得更大。


Banks and politics are deeply intertwined in all advanced economies.	在所有发达经济体，银行和政治的关系都是剪不断理还乱。


Diamond discovered that, ultimately, politicians trump bankers – at least in the UK.	博达文最终发现，政治家的牌大过银行家——至少在英国是如此。


But what really matters is legitimacy and informed public opinion.	然而真正重要的是合法性和公众舆论。


Do you really believe the increasingly dubious notion that megabanks, as currently constituted, are good for the rest of the private sector, and thus for economic growth and job creation?	你当真相信以当前形式存在的大银行，对其他的私营部门是有益的，因此有助于经济增长和创造就业？ 这个想法似乎变得日益可疑。


Or do you begin to consider more seriously the increasingly mainstream proposition that global megabanks and their leaders have simply become too powerful and dangerous?	或者说，你已经开始认真思考一种日趋主流的论调——全球大银行和它们的领导，已经变得过于强大和危险了？


The Varoufakis Effect?	瓦鲁法基斯效应？


ATHENS – In his end-of-2015 missive, Holger Schmieding of the Hamburg investment bank Berenberg warned his firm’s clients that what they should be worrying about now is political risk.	雅典—汉堡贝伦堡（Berenberg）投资银行的霍格尔·施米丁（Holger Schmieding）在其2015年年终总结中警告客户，现在应该担心政治风险。


To illustrate, he posted the diagram below, showing how business confidence collapsed in Greece during the late spring of 2015, and picked up again only after my resignation from the finance ministry.	他拿出下面的图表来说明问题：该图标显示希腊商业信心在2015年春崩溃，直到我从财政部长任上辞职后才开始反弹。


Schmieding chose to call this the “Varoufakis effect.”	施米丁将这称为“瓦鲁法基斯效应”。


There is no doubt that investors should be worried – very worried – about political risk nowadays, including the capacity of politicians and bureaucrats to do untold damage to an economy.	毫无疑问，投资者应该担心当下的政治风险——非常担心才对，包括政客和官僚给经济造成巨大伤害的能力。


But they must also be wary of analysts who are either incapable of, or uninterested in, distinguishing between causality and correlation, and between insolvency and illiquidity.	但他们还应该担心既没有能力，也没有兴趣区分因果关系和相关性，或者资不抵债和流动性不足的分析师。


In other words, they must be wary of analysts like Schmieding.	换句话说，他们应该担心施米丁之流。


Business confidence in Greece did indeed plummet a few months after I became Finance Minister.	希腊商业信心确实在我担任财政部长后几个月发生了崩溃。


And it did pick up a month after my resignation.	并且在我辞职后一个月，它就反弹了。


The correlation is palpable.	相关性显而易见。


But is the causality?	但其中存在因果关系吗？


Consider the following example.	考虑以下例子。


Business confidence fell in September 2001 (following the terror attacks on New York and Washington, DC), while Paul O’Neill was US Treasury Secretary.	2001年9月（在纽约和华盛顿发生恐怖袭击后）商业信心有所下降，当时美国财政部长是保罗·奥尼尔（Paul O’Neill）。


Would Schmieding label a chart showing that decline the “O’Neill Effect”?	施米丁会因此拿出一张图表来证明这一下降是“奥尼尔效应”吗？


Of course not: the drop in business confidence had nothing to do with O’Neill and everything to do with fears about global security.	当然不会：商业信心的下降与奥尼尔毫无关系，完全是因为对全球安全的恐慌造成的。


The correlation with O’Neill’s tenure was irrelevant.	与奥尼尔任职的相关性完全不重要。


Similarly, in the case of Greece, the collapse in business confidence happened under my watch.	类似地，在希腊的例子中，商业信心的崩溃就发生在我的眼皮底下。


But the cause was that our creditors, the so-called Troika (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund), made clear that they would close down our banking system to force our government to accept a fresh extend-and-pretend loan agreement.	但原因是我国债权人，即所谓的三驾马车（欧盟委员会、欧洲央行和IMF）明确表示它们将关掉我国银行系统，以迫使我国政府接受新的“延期大吉”（extend-and-pretend）贷款协议。


Before these threats were issued, business confidence was actually picking up in Greece.	在做出这些威胁前，希腊的商业信心其实是上升的。


Indeed, the day after I presented my reform and fiscal proposals to the City of London investor community, stocks rallied impressively.	事实上，在我向伦敦金融城投资界展示我的改革和财政方案后的那一天，希腊股市大幅反弹。


(Indeed, during my tenure in the finance ministry, real GDP grew more than it had done during the last two quarters of 2014, which Schmieding identifies as a period of increasing confidence.)	（事实上，在我担任财政部长期间，真实GDP增长要快于2014年后两个季度，也就是施米丁定义为信心增加的时期。 ）


So, what caused the huge drop in business confidence during my tenure?	那么，是什么导致我的任期中商业信心的大幅下跌？


Was it my policy proposals – jointly authored with Jeff Sachs (with input from Norman Lamont, a former Tory Chancellor of the Exchequer in the United Kingdom, Harvard’s Larry Summers, and James K. Galbraith of the University of Texas) – that were responsible?	是我的政策方案——由我的杰弗里·萨克斯（Jeff Sachs）联合执笔（英国前保守党财政大臣诺曼·拉蒙特（Norman Lamont）、哈佛大学的拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）和特克萨斯大学的詹姆斯·加尔布雷斯（James K. Galbraith）等人亦有贡献）——造成的吗？


Or was it the Troika’s explicit threat of bank closures (which were actually imposed when we dared to put our creditors’ ultimatum to the Greek people in a referendum last July)?	还是由三驾马车明确的银行关门威胁造成的？ （在我们敢于在去年7月让全民公决决定我国债权人的最后通牒时真���实施了。


In other words, was it the “Varoufakis effect” or the “Troika effect”?	）换句话说，这是“瓦鲁法基斯效应”还是“三驾马车效应”？


To answer this question in ways that are helpful to investors, an analyst must at least make an effort to establish whether the observed correlation points to a causal link.	要以有助于投资者的方式回答这个问题，分析师必须至少研究一下观察到的相关性是否指向因果关系。


Reading our policy proposals and comparing them to the Troika’s program would have helped.	读一读我们的政策方案，并将之与三驾马车的计划相比较会有所助益。


Unfortunately, this would have required work that some analysts prefer not to do.	不幸的是，这需要艰苦的工作，一些分析师不愿意去做。


The relevant question is whether we were right to confront the Troika – a central plank in our January 2015 electoral platform – or whether we should have signed up to our creditors’ “Greek program.”	重要的问题是我们与三驾马车对着干——我国2015年1月选举的中心话题——是否正确，或者我国是否应该在债权人的“希腊计划”上签字。


My view is that we had no alternative but to resist the Troika’s plan.	我的关电视，我们别无选择，只能抵制三驾马车的计划。


The reason is simple: the Greek state became insolvent in early 2010.	原因很简单：希腊国在2010年初已经破产。


From May 2010, this insolvency was addressed by means of sequential extend-and-pretend loans on conditions that were guaranteed to shrink national income, investment, and credit.	从2010年5月开始，这一破产状态被一而再、再而三的“延期大吉”贷款所解决，这些贷款的条件是我国保证降低国民收入、投资和信用。


A case of insolvency was made increasingly worse by continuing to pretend that it was a mere liquidity problem.	一个偿债能力问题因为一直被装作仅仅是流动性问题而愈演愈烈。


Was the Greek economy on the mend in late 2014?	希腊经济在2014年底有所好转了吗？


Of course not.	当然没有。


Nominal GDP never stopped shrinking, public and private debt continued to become less and less sustainable, and all along investment and credit remained comatose.	名义GDP从未停止下跌，公共和私人债务越来越不可持续，投资和信用一直萎靡不振。


Without debt restructuring, a low target for the primary budget surplus (net of debt payments), a “bad bank” to deal with non-performing loans, and a comprehensive reform agenda that tackles the worst cases of rent seeking, Greece is condemned to permanent depression.	如果不进行债务重组，降低初级预算盈余（扣除债务偿付）目标，成立“坏银行”处理不良贷款，拿出全面改革日程解决最糟糕的寻租问题，希腊必将陷入持久萧条。


Alas, the Troika was in politically motivated denial and deeply uninterested in our policy proposals.	可惜，担架马车出于政治动机否定了我国的政策方案，对它们丝毫不感兴趣。


Time and again, they simply demanded capitulation.	一次又一次，它们所要的只是投降。