But this is impossible unless the “holdout” problem is solved: if a majority of creditors agree to reduce or postpone their claims, it is always tempting for an individual creditor to hold out for full payment by free riding on other creditors’ pain.	但除非解决“抵制”问题，否则不可能达到这样的目的：如果大部分债主同意减少或推迟收款，就会导致单个债权人借其他债权人的痛苦坚持要求全额偿付始终具有极大的诱惑力。


That is why bankruptcy courts and bonds with collective-action clauses (CACs) seek to impose on all bondholders, including potential holdouts, agreements accepted by a qualified majority of creditors.	这也是为什么破产法庭和集体行动条款（CAC）试图对所有债券持有者，包括那些潜在的不合作者，强制执行多数有资质债权人接受的协议。


Two things happened in Argentina.	阿根廷出现了两个问题。


First, the defaulted sovereign bonds did not have CACs, so there was no way to force holdouts to accept the initial deal.	首先，拖欠的主权债券不存在集体行动条款，因此没有办法迫使抵制者接受最初的协议。


More important, years later, US courts accepted a novel interpretation of the pari passu clause advanced by holdout creditors (and rejected by virtually all other mainstream participants and practitioners in sovereign finance).	更重要的是，数年后，美国法院接受了由抵制派债权人提出的平等权利条款的全新解释（几乎其他所有主权金融主流参与者及从业者都拒绝接受这一解释）。


As a result, Argentina was barred from making a current interest payment to holders of its restructured debt unless it simultaneously paid the holdouts the full amount of principal and interest contractually owed to them.	结果导致阿根廷被禁止向其同意重组的债权人支付现行利息款，除非它同时向所有抵制者支付合同规定拖欠的全部本金和利息。


Restructuring in the post-Argentina world is made more challenging because the holdouts’ success in that case means that bondholders inclined to negotiate a solution will have to explain to their own investors why they are not pursuing the potentially more lucrative holdout strategy.	后阿根廷世界重组难度进一步加大，因为上述案例中抵制者的成功意味着想要谈判的债券持有人必须向投资人解释为什么他们不采取可能更加有利可图的抵制策略。


Venezuela’s debt is different.	委内瑞拉的债务问题属于截然不同的性质。


About 60% of the country’s public foreign debt consists of bonds, with about half issued by the government and half by PDVSA.	该国约60%的公共外债由债券组成，其中半数左右的发行者是政府，另外半数是PDVSA。


With few exceptions, government bonds have CACs, making it somewhat easier to address the holdout problem.	政府债券几乎鲜有例外地全部带有集体行动条款，从而在某种程度上更加容易解决抵制问题。


PDVSA bonds have all been issued in the US and, as legally required of all corporate bonds, they do not contain CACs.	PDVSA债券则悉数在美国发行，且按照规范所有企业债券的法律规定，它们不包含集体行动条款。


PDVSA may nonetheless be entitled to bankruptcy protection both in Venezuela and in the US.	但PDVSA在委内瑞拉和美国同样有资格申请破产保护。


In this event, PDVSA could obtain a court-mandated standstill order with respect to legal action against it until a restructuring agreement is reached, thereby avoiding a disorderly seizure of assets.	在这种情况下，PDVSA可以取得法院授权的“停止令”，在达成重组协议前避开对其不利的任何法律行动，从而避免资产无序扣押等问题。


As an additional form of pressure to secure participation, PDVSA’s exclusive right to exploit Venezuela’s hydrocarbon reserves can be withdrawn or modified.	保障参与的另一种形式的压力是，PDVSA开发委内瑞拉油气储量的独家代理权可以被修改或撤回。


(Interestingly, both of these possibilities are highlighted as “risk factors” in the offering documents for PDVSA’s bonds.)	（有趣的是，在PDVSA债券的发行文件中，上述两种可能性都被归纳为“风险因素”。 ）


Both PDVSA and the government can also use “exit consents”: changing some of the bonds’ terms – the pari passu clause used by Argentina holdouts, as well as other significant provisions – through agreement with a simple majority of PDVSA bondholders and two-thirds of holders of most government bonds.	PDVSA和政府也可以引用“退出同意条款”：即通过与PDVSA债券持有者的简单多数和政府债券持有者的三分之二达成一致来修改债券的某些条款规定——包括阿根廷抵制者所引用的平等权利条款以及其他重要规定。


Venezuela could further distinguish itself from Argentina by committing to a strong reform program and seeking IMF support.	委内瑞拉可以通过采纳强力改革方案和寻求国际货币基金组织的帮助进一步区别自己和阿根廷。


Under the IMF’s exceptional access facility, Venezuela would potentially be eligible for more than $70 billion of new finance to support its reform program.	国际货币基金组织的特别融资便利规定，委内瑞拉最高有可能获得超过700亿美元的新增融资来支持其改革计划。


And this backing should help to win strong support from its creditors.	这样的后盾应当对赢得债权人的强力支持大有帮助。


In this context, the IMF and major governments should support Venezuela’s decision to treat would-be holdouts no better than creditors with which it reaches agreement.	在这样的情况下，基金组织和主要国家政府应当支持委内瑞拉平等对待抵制及达成协议的债权人的决策。


Defaults stemming from an unwillingness to pay do not deserve international support.	因为不愿付款而造成的违约不应当得到国际支持。


But when a debtor is unable to pay, nothing is gained by forcing payment.	但如果债务人无力付款，强制付款带不来任何好处。


When a significant number of holdouts insist on being paid in full, it becomes impossible to design an effective restructuring, unless other creditors reduce or defer their claims.	如果大量抵制协议的债权人坚持要求全额付款，除非其他债权人减少或延迟其付款要求，否则设计有效的债务重组方案就会成为不可能完成的任务。


This is the definition of free riding.	这是对“搭便车”概念的经典诠释。


No strategy to undermine holdouts can also mean no restructuring at all, which could mean chaos or even a failed state.	没有对付抵制重组者的策略也就意味着不可能重组，这可能带来混乱，甚至威胁到政府。


Neither outcome would serve the interests of the international financial community or the Venezuelan people.	无论哪种结果都与国际金融团体或委内瑞拉民众的利益不符。


Liberals to the Barricades	遇到南墙的自由主义


SANTIAGO – From Austria, France and the United States, to Poland, the Philippines, and Peru, illiberal populists are on the rise.	圣地亚哥—从奥地利、法国和美国到波兰、菲律宾和秘鲁，反自由民民粹主义者正在崛起。


Some blame runaway globalization; others blame income inequality; still others blame out-of-touch elites who simply don’t get it.	一些人将此归咎于失控的全球化，一些人归咎于收入不平等，还有一些人归咎于根本没有意识到这一点的高高在上的精英。


Such explanations – however plausible they may be – miss the larger point.	这些解释不管听起来多么合理，都没有切中要害。


The problem is political, not just economic.	问题在于政治，而不是经济。


Liberal democracy is humankind’s greatest political achievement.	自由民主是人类最伟大的政治成就。


Yet liberal democrats around the world are reluctant to make the case for it.	但放眼全球，自由民主派都不愿振臂高呼。


No wonder they are losing the battle for citizens’ hearts and minds.	无怪乎他们正在失去民心和思想之战。


The problem is far from new.	问题并不新鲜。


In fact, it is at the very root of liberalism.	事实上，这正是反自由主义的根源。


Wary of censorship or oppression, liberal thinkers have more often than not espoused moral neutrality: they do not advocate a single set of values, or a particular definition of what constitutes a good life.	担心审查或压迫的自由主义思想家多半支持道德中性：他们不支持简单的价值观，或关于好生活的特定定义。


A liberal society – almost by definition – enables its citizens to lead any life they wish, as long as third parties suffer no harm.	自由社会——几乎是顾名思义地——让公民能按照自己的心意过生活，只要没有第三方遭到伤害。


The problem is that politics everywhere is Aristotelian: concerned with virtue.	问题在于所有的政治都是亚里士多德政治：关注美德。


Americans refer to their presidency as a bully pulpit with good reason.	美国人不无道理地将他们的总统宝座称为“名望讲坛”（bully pulpit）。


When politicians advocate a particular set of values – or virtues – voters listen.	当政客支持某种特定类型的价值观——或美德时，选民都会聆听。


This can be done clumsily, as when John Kerry accepted the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination in 2004 with a speech that repeated the word “value” or “values” 32 times.	这可以十分笨拙，约翰·克里（John Kerry）接受2004年民主党总统候选提名时便是如此，他的讲话将“价值”一词重复了32次。


But it can also be done magisterially, as when Robert F. Kennedy Jr. chided Americans for surrendering “personal excellence and community values in the mere accumulation of material things.”	但这也可以充满威严，比如小罗伯特·肯尼迪斥责美国人“仅仅为了积累物质财富便拱手让出了个人美德和社会价值”。


GDP, he memorably added, “measures everything (...) except that which makes life worthwhile.”	GDP，他令人难以忘怀地继续说道，“衡量一切……就是无法衡量让生命有价值的东西。 ”


Philosophers from John Stuart Mill to John Rawls to Martha Nussbaum have sought a way out of liberalism’s quandary.	从约翰·穆勒到约翰·罗尔斯再到玛莎·努斯鲍姆（Martha Nussbaum）的哲学家找到了一条走出自由主义的困惑的道路。


It would be discriminatory and illiberal to promote, much less impose, a particular group’s values, religious or otherwise.	宣扬（远远没有到实施的成都）某个群体的价值观（不论宗教还是其他）是歧视性的，也是反自由的。


But governments and political leaders can and should advocate the shared values – what Rawls called the “overlapping consensus” – that define a liberal society.	但政府和政治领袖可以也 应该支持作为自由社会基础的共同价值观——罗尔斯称之位“重叠的共识”。


By commemorating Martin Luther King Jr.’s birthday, for example, the US both underscores and rededicates itself to the shared ideal of racial equality.	比如，美国纪念马丁·路德·金的生日，这强调了种族平等的共同理想，也表明美国将献身于这一理想。


It was King himself who arguably provided the best example of the passion with which such ideals can (and should) be defended.	金本人也许正是让这些理想能够（也应该）得到捍卫的热情的最佳写照。


There are too few like him.	像他一样的人太少。


Populists like Donald Trump and French National Front leader Marine Le Pen use passion in the service of a politics of fear and hatred.	唐纳德·特朗普和法国国民阵线领导人马琳·勒庞（Marine Le Pen）这样的民粹主义者将热情用于恐惧和厌恶的政治。


By contrast, liberal democrats, products of the Enlightenment all, advocate for their political ideals – which value human reason above base emotions – in a tone best suited to small, polite gatherings.	相反，作为启蒙运动产物的自由民主派以最适合小规模的礼貌集会的语调宣传他们的政治理想——将人的理性置于基本情绪之上。


This is a serious problem.	这是个严重的问题。


“Ceding the terrain of emotion-shaping to anti-liberal forces,” writes Nussbaum, “gives them a huge advantage in the people’s hearts and risks making people think of liberal values as tepid and boring.”	“将影响情绪的领域拱手让给了反自由力量，” 努斯鲍姆写道，“导致了他们在人心方面占尽优势，也有可能让人们认为自由主义价值观温吞又无聊。 ”


Reason and emotion, neuroscientists like Steven Pinker tell us, are two sides of the same mental coin.	神经科学家史蒂芬·平克（Steven Pinker）告诉我们，理性和情感是同一枚精神硬币的两面。


Likewise, cognitive linguist George Lakoff, drawing on work by psychologist Drew Westen, concludes that “emotion is both central and legitimate in political persuasion.	类似地，认知语言学家乔治·拉科夫（George Lakoff）借用心理学家德鲁·威斯腾（Drew Westen）的话，认为“情感在政治说服中是核心且合法的。


Its use is not an illicit appeal to irrationality, as Enlightenment thought would have it.	它的使用并非如启蒙运动思想那样属于非法诉求非理性。


The proper emotions are rational.”	恰当的情感是理性的。 ”


King understood this very well when he proclaimed his “dream” of a society in which his children would “not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character.”	金在宣扬他的“梦想”——一个他的孩子们“不会因为他们的肤色，而是因为他们的性格内容而获得平价”的社会时非常出色地理解了这一点。


Today, US President Barack Obama is the only liberal democratic leader who speaks the language of values and virtue.	如今，美国总统奥巴马是唯一的宣扬价值和美德的自由民主领导人。


Obama is often criticized for being cool and aloof, and yet there is nothing of the sort in his promotion of the capacity to live together in peace and mutual respect as the most admirable liberal virtue of all.	奥巴马常常被批冷酷，有拒人千里之外的感觉，但他在宣传和平和互相尊重的共同生活能力是最可敬的自由主义美德时完全不会有这种感觉。


“Each of us has deeply held beliefs,” he said in his victory speech in 2012. “And when we go through tough times, when we make big decisions as a country, it necessarily stirs passions, stirs up controversy,” which he called “a mark of our liberty.”	“我们每一个人都有坚定的信念，”他在2012年获胜演讲中说，“当我们经历艰难时光时，当我们作为一个国家做出重大决定时，都必然会激起热情，激起争议，”他将这称为“我们的自由的标志”。


And yet, “despite all our differences, most of us share certain hopes for America’s future...We believe in a generous America, in a compassionate America, in a tolerant America open to the dreams of an immigrant's daughter who studies in our schools and pledges to our flag.”	但是，“尽管我们存在各种差异，但我们大部分人都对美国的未来怀有共同的希望……我们信奉慷慨的美国，信奉激情四射的美国，信奉对在我们的学校中学习、在我们的国旗下宣誓的移民之女的梦想持开放态度的宽容的美国。 ”


That last line reveals that Obama is also aware of the other challenge liberal democracies must overcome: to shape a credible us.	最后一句话表明奥巴马也明白自由民主所必须克服的另一个挑战：形成一个可信的我们。


The populists’ example is again telling.	民粹主义的例子仍然很能说明问题。


Right-wing populists such as Trump engage in identity politics.	特朗普等右翼民粹主义者采取身份政治。


Left-wing populists such as Bernie Sanders engage in income politics.	伯尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）等左翼民粹主义者采取收入政治。


Whether it is Chinese exporters, Mexican immigrants, presumed Islamic terrorists, or greedy Wall Street bankers, “there is,” as Harvard’s Dani Rodrik recently stressed, “a clear ‘other’ toward which anger can be directed.”	哈佛大学的丹尼·罗德里克（Dani Rodrik）最近强调，“存在一个可以将愤怒引导过去的明确的‘他者’。 ”不管这个他者是中国出口商、墨西哥移民、推定的伊斯兰恐怖分子还是贪婪的华尔街银行家。


Liberal democrats need to make it clear that we get nowhere by blaming others, and that assuming shared responsibility is the only way to build a better shared future.	自由民主需要明确，指责他者无法把我们引导到任何地方，而认定共同责任是构建更好的共同未来的唯一方法。


Of course economic and political reforms that reduce inequality of income and power are indispensable, both for their own sake and to make appeals to shared sacrifice credible.	当然，降低收入和权力不平等的经济和政治改革对于我们自身的命运和做出可信的共同牺牲诉求来说都是不可或缺的。


Yet just as indispensable is the moral conviction, passionately expressed, that the “immigrant's daughter who studies in our schools” is a genuine member, with full rights, of that common us.	但同样不可或缺的是一种热情表达的道德信念，即“在我们的学校中学习的移民的女儿”是共同的我们中间的真正的一员，拥有完全的权利。


No social or political organization in human history has come closer than liberal democracy to realizing the ideal of equal opportunity for all.	在人类历史上，没有任何社会或政治组织比自由民主更加接近于实现人人机会平等的理想。


We are not there yet.	我们还没有达到这一步。


But we have come a long way, and by sticking with liberal-democratic values we will go a longer way yet.	但我们已经取得了很大的进步，而坚持自由民主价值观能让我们继续取得更大的进步。


No jihadist or bigot, no Trump or Le Pen, no Chávez, Maduro, or Putin, should be allowed to destroy this possible dream.	不要圣战和盲从者，不要特朗普和勒庞，不要查韦斯、马杜罗和普京，决不允许这些人破坏这个可能的梦想。


In Defense of Economic Populism	为经济民粹主义辩护


CAMBRIDGE – Populists abhor restraints on the political executive.	发自剑桥——民粹主义者厌恶那些对政治行为的限制。


Since they claim to represent “the people” writ large, they regard limits on their exercise of power as necessarily undermining the popular will.	在他们看来，既然自己就是“人民”这个庞大群体的代表，那么对他们行使权力的限制肯定就是破坏民意。


Such constraints can only serve the “enemies of the people” – minorities and foreigners (for right-wing populists) or financial elites (in the case of left-wing populists).	如此类推，这种限制只能服务于那些“人民公敌”——少数群体和外国人（对于右翼民粹主义者来说）或金融精英（就左翼民粹主义者而言）。


This is a dangerous approach to politics, because it allows a majority to ride roughshod over the rights of minorities.	这在政治上是种危险之举，因为它让大多数人凌驾于少数人的权利之上。


Without separation of powers, an independent judiciary, or free media – which all populist autocrats, from Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Viktor Orbán and Donald Trump detest – democracy degenerates into the tyranny of whoever happens to be in power.	一旦失去了那些所有那些民粹主义独裁者——从俄罗斯总统普京和土耳其总理埃尔多安，到匈牙利总理维克多·奥尔班以及美国总统特朗普——所痛恨的权力分立，独立司法机构或自由媒体，民主就会堕落为碰巧掌权者的暴政。


Periodic elections under populist rule become a smokescreen.	因此民粹统治下的定期选举也就成了遮羞布。


In the absence of the rule of law and basic civil liberties, populist regimes can prolong their rule by manipulating the media and the judiciary at will.	在缺乏法治和基本公民自由的情况下，民粹主义政权可以通过操纵媒体和司法机构来延长其统治。


Populists’ aversion to institutional restraints extends to the economy, where exercising full control “in the people’s interest” implies that no obstacles should be placed in their way by autonomous regulatory agencies, independent central banks, or global trade rules.	民粹主义者对制度约束的厌恶也扩展到了经济方面，在“为了人民利益”为名进行全面控制意味着各类自治监管机构，独立中央银行或全球贸易规则都不得为他们的横冲直撞设立任何障碍。


But while populism in the political domain is almost always harmful, economic populism can sometimes be justified.	而虽然政治领域的民粹主义几乎都有害无利，但经济上的民粹主义有时却是有道理的。


Start with why restraints on economic policy may be desirable in the first place.	让我们首先从人们为何希望对经济政策加以限制开始讨论。


Economists tend to have a soft spot for such restraints, because policymaking that is fully responsive to the push and pull of domestic politics can generate highly inefficient outcomes.	经济学家倾向于实施这样的限制，因为完全响应国内政治波动的政策制定可能会产生极为低效率的后果。


In particular, economic policy is often subject to the problem of what economists call time-inconsistency: short-term interests frequently undermine the pursuit of policies that are far more desirable in the long term.	尤其是经济政策往往受到经济学家称之为时间不一致性问题的困扰：短期利益经常会阻碍一些长期上更有益的政策的实施。


A canonical example is discretionary monetary policy.	一个典型的例子是那种所谓随机应变式货币政策。


Politicians who have the power to print money at will may generate “surprise inflation” to boost output and employment in the short run – say, before an election.	有权力随意印钞票的政客可能会在短期内产生“惊人的通货膨胀”以提振产出和就业，比如选举之前。


But this backfires, because firms and households adjust their inflation expectations.	但此举的不利之处在于企业和家庭都会调整其通胀预期。


In the end, discretionary monetary policy results only in higher inflation without yielding any output or employment gains.	最终应变式货币政策只会导致更高通胀而无从产生任何产出或就业收益。


The solution is an independent central bank, insulated from politics, operating solely on its mandate to maintain price stability.	对此的解决方案应该是独立的中央银行，与政治绝缘，完全依赖其维持价格稳定的政治授权而运作。


The costs of macroeconomic populism are familiar from Latin America.	宏观经济民粹主义的代价是拉丁美洲屡见不鲜。 正如杰弗里·D·沙斯（Jeffrey D.


As Jeffrey D. Sachs, Sebastián Edwards, and Rüdiger Dornbusch argued years ago, unsustainable monetary and fiscal policies were the bane of the region until economic orthodoxy began to prevail in the 1990s.	Sachs），塞巴斯蒂安·爱德华斯（Sebastián Edwards）和鲁迪格尔·多恩布什（Rüdiger Dornbusch）多年前所提出的那样，不可持续的货币和财政政策是该区域的灾难之源，而情况直到1990年代实现经济正规化后才开始改观。


Populist policies periodically produced painful economic crises, which hurt the poor the most.	民粹主义政策会周期性地带来痛苦的经济危机，而其中受害最深的莫过于穷人。


To break this cycle, the region turned to fiscal rules and technocratic finance ministers.	为了打破这一循环，该地区政府都纷纷转向制定财政规则并任命技术专家型的财政部长。


Another example is official treatment of foreign investors.	另一个例子是外国投资者所受到的官方待遇。


Once a foreign firm makes its investment, it essentially becomes captive to the host government’s whims.	一旦一家外国企业进行了投资，它就基本上只能任由东道国政府摆布了。


Promises that were made to attract the firm are easily forgotten, replaced by policies that squeeze it to the benefit of the national budget or domestic companies.	政府经常会忘记为吸引企业而做出的承诺，取而代之的则是一些为本国预算或国内企业的利益而压榨外资企业的政策。


But investors are not stupid, and, fearing this outcome, they invest elsewhere.	但投资方也不是笨蛋，它们会因担心这一结果而到别处投资。


Governments’ need to establish their credibility has thus given rise to trade agreements with so-called investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) clauses, allowing the firm to sue the government in international tribunals.	因此，政府需要建立自己的信誉，依据所谓的投资者-国家争端解决条款（investor-state dispute settlement）达成贸易协议，允许该企业在国际法庭上起诉相关政府。


These are examples of restraints on economic policy that take the form of delegation to autonomous agencies, technocrats, or external rules.	这都是一些以授权自治机构，技术专家或外部规则的形式实施经济政策限制的例子。


As described, they serve the valuable function of preventing those in power from shooting themselves in the foot by pursuing short-sighted policies.	如上所述，它们所发挥的宝贵作用就是防止当权者为追求短视政策而搬石头砸了自己的脚。


But there are other scenarios as well, in which the consequences of restraints on economic policy may be less salutary.	然而还存在其他一些经济政策限制措施出现反效果的情况。


In particular, restraints may be instituted by special interests or elites themselves, to cement permanent control over policymaking.	特别是那些由特殊利益集团或精英自身制定以巩固永久决策控制权的限制。


In such cases, delegation to autonomous agencies or signing on to global rules does not serve society, but only a narrow caste of “insiders.”	在这种情况下，委派自治机构或签署全球规则无法服务于社会，只会有利于一小撮“内部人士”。


Part of today’s populist backlash is rooted in the belief, not entirely unjustified, that this scenario describes much economic policymaking in recent decades.	当前的民粹主义反弹也部分根源于这一信念，而且不是完全没有道理的，这种情况解释了近几十年来的许多经济决策。


Multinational corporations and investors have increasingly shaped the agenda of international trade negotiations, resulting in global regimes that disproportionately benefit capital at the expense of labor.	跨国企业和投资者日益塑造了国际贸易谈判的议程，打造了一个以牺牲劳动者为代价来令资本过分得益的全球体制。


Stringent patent rules and international investor tribunals are prime examples.	严格的专利规则和国际投资者法庭是最好的例子。


So is the capture of autonomous agencies by the industries they are supposed to regulate.	自治机构被本应由它们管制的行业所占领。


Banks and other financial institutions have been especially successful at getting their way and instituting rules that give them free rein.	银行和其他金融机构在夺取控制权和制定让它们可以自由行事的规则方面极为成功。


Independent central banks played a critical role in bringing inflation down in the 1980s and 1990s.	独立的中央银行在1980年代和90年代的通货膨胀率下降中发挥了关键作用。


But in the current low-inflation environment, their exclusive focus on price stability imparts a deflationary bias to economic policy and is in tension with employment generation and growth.	但是在当前的低通胀环境下，它们对价格稳定的专注给经济政策带来了通缩倾向，同时也对就业的产生和增长造成了影响。


Such “liberal technocracy” may be at its apogee in the European Union, where economic rules and regulations are designed at considerable remove from democratic deliberation at the national level.	而这种“自由技术官僚”地位最高的地方可能是欧盟，因为在欧盟的设计中就是要在很大程度上将经济规则和条例从国家一级的民主审议中抽离出来。


And in virtually every member state, this political gap – the EU’s so-called democratic deficit – has given rise to populist, Euroskeptical political parties.	实际上在每一个成员国里，这个政治上的差距——也就是欧盟所谓的民主赤字——正是民粹主义和欧洲怀疑论政党兴起的原因。


In such cases, relaxing the constraints on economic policy and returning policymaking autonomy to elected governments may well be desirable.	在这种情况下，放松对经济政策的制约，将决策自主权归还给民选政府也是可取之举。


Exceptional times require the freedom to experiment in economic policy.	特殊的时代需要有在经济政策上进行试验的自由空间。


Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal provides an apt historical example.	为此富兰克林·D·罗斯福的新政就提供了一个恰当的历史事例。


FDR’s reforms required that he remove the economic shackles imposed by conservative judges and financial interests at home and by the gold standard abroad.	罗斯福的改革要求他去消除国内保守派法官和经济利益集团以及国外的金本位制度所施加的经济枷锁。


We should constantly be wary of populism that stifles political pluralism and undermines liberal democratic norms.	我们应该时刻警惕那些扼杀政治多元化并破坏自由民主规范的民粹主义。


Political populism is a menace to be avoided at all costs.	政治民粹主义是一种必须不惜一切代价去避免的威胁。


Economic populism, by contrast, is occasionally necessary.	相反，经济民粹主义偶尔也是必要的。


Indeed, at such times, it may be the only way to forestall its much more dangerous political cousin.	事实上，在这些时候，它可能是遏制其更为危险的政治分支崛起的唯一途径。


Demographics and Development	人口与发展


WASHINGTON, DC – Achieving the ambitious Sustainable Development Goals – which aim to end poverty, boost shared prosperity, and promote sustainability, between now and 2030 – will require overcoming some major obstacles, ranging from securing enough financing to addressing climate change to managing macroeconomic shocks.	华盛顿—实现宏大的可持续发展目标（SDG）——在今天到2030年间终结贫困、刺激共同繁荣、促进稳定——需要克服一些重大障碍，如保证足够资金应对气候变化、管理宏观经济冲击等。


But there is one potential obstacle that could turn out to be a blessing in disguise: the diverse demographic shifts that will take place in the coming years.	但有一个潜在障碍可能以福音的面貌出现：未来几年可能出现的人口变化分歧。


By the time the SDG agenda reaches its end date, there will be an estimated 8.5 billion people worldwide.	SDG日程到期时，全世界预计将有85亿人。


Twenty years later – just 34 years from now – there will be nearly ten billion, or nearly 2.5 billion more people than there are on Earth today.	二十年后——亦即距今34年后——可能会有近一百亿人，比今天的地球人口多出25亿。


What will such a world look like?	这将是一个怎样的世界？


Where will those additional people live?	多出来的人将生活在哪里？


How will they make their living?	他们如何生活？


Will they bolster or weigh down national economies?	他们将提振还是压垮国民经济？


For clues, we can look 35 years in the past, to the early 1980s.	要寻找线索，我们可以回顾过去35年，从20世纪80年代初开始。


US President Ronald Reagan, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, French President François Mitterrand, and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev dominated the world’s headlines.	美国总统里根、中国领导人邓小平、英国首相撒切尔夫人、法国总统密特朗以及苏联总统戈尔巴乔夫主宰着世界新闻头条。


Personal computer sales were miniscule.	个人电脑销量可以忽略不计。


And children competed over Rubik’s cubes, rather than augmented-reality Pokémon.	孩子们的热门游戏是魔方而不是增强现实游戏口袋精灵（Pokémon）。


At that time, the world’s population was about 4.5 billion, 42% of whom – almost two billion – lived in extreme poverty.	当是时，世界人口大约为45亿，其中42%——近二十亿——生活在极端贫困中。


Excessive population growth, it was feared, would outpace agricultural production and create yet more poverty.	人们担心，人口过度增长将超过农业生产速度，造成更多的贫困。


Yet the Malthusian predictions were wrong.	但马尔萨斯预言是错误的。


Although the world population has surged to 7.5 billion, only about 750 million people – just 10% of the total population – live in extreme poverty today.	尽管如今世界人口已大步攀升至75亿，但只有7. 5亿人——大约占总数的10%——生活在极端贫困中。


China and India, in particular, lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty in recent decades, increasing their citizens’ incomes and improving their health.	特别是中国和印度，近几十年中让数亿人摆脱了贫困，提高了公民收入，改善了他们的健康状况。


China and India achieved this partly by strengthening institutions and pursuing policies that supported strong, relatively inclusive growth.	中国和印度之所以有如此成就，部分要归因于加强机构建设和实施支持相对包容的强劲增长的政策。


China, for its part, also took advantage of a “demographic dividend”: fertility rates fell, and the labor force grew faster than the dependent population, freeing up resources to invest in people and capital.	中国还利用了“人口红利”：生育率下降，劳动力增长快于依赖人口（dependent population），解放资源用于人力和资本投资。


This produced higher growth and living standards.	这带来了更高的增长和生活水平。


Such a dividend can run for decades.	这一红利可以维持数十年。


And, for China, it has, though it is now reaching its conclusion.	中国即是如此，但现在这一红利正在接近结束。


For India and other developing countries, however, the demographic dividend is just starting to be felt.	但是，对印度和其他发展中国家而言，人口红利才刚刚上路。


In fact, fully 90% of global poverty is concentrated in countries with growing working-age populations, creating an important opportunity for rapid poverty reduction in the coming decades.	事实上，全球贫困的整整90%集中在工作年龄人口增加的国家中，这给未来几十年营造了迅速减少贫困的重要机会。


For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is currently plagued with high levels of extreme poverty, children under 15 years of age account for 43% of the total population.	比如，在目前饱受高水平极端贫困困扰的撒哈拉以南非洲，15岁以下儿童占总人口的43%。


When these children are old enough to enter the labor force, the proportion of income-earners in the economy could be increased substantially, boosting average per capita incomes.	当这些儿童长大进入劳动力大军时，经济中的赚钱劳动力比例将显著提高，刺激人均收入的增加。


But not all countries are set to benefit from a “youth bulge.”	但并非所有国家都能得益于“年轻人膨胀”。


Between now and 2030, several middle-income countries will experience a decline in the share of the working-age population.	从今天到2030年，一些中等收入国家将经历工作年龄人口比例下降。


Among other things, this reflects the tendency, supported by empirical evidence, for higher incomes to impel households to delay having children.	这反映了一个趋势：收入提高促使家庭推迟要孩子。 这一趋势有实证证据的支持。


Even here, however, the demographic news is not all bad – and not just because the shift from higher to lower fertility typically correlates with a shift from lower to higher life expectancy.	但是，在这方面，人口动向并非完全消极——一个原因是生育率由高转低常常伴随预期寿命由低转高。


History suggests that there is a second type of demographic dividend – one that actually lasts longer and is more durable than the first – which emerges when the accumulated savings of an aging population produce a surge in investment.	历史表明，存在第二类型的人口红利——这种人口红利实际上比第一类型人口红利更长、更持久——即老龄化人口的累积储蓄推动投资大幅增长。


Many wealthier countries have followed this path.	许多富裕国家就表现出这一模式。


But reaping a demographic dividend takes work.	但收获人口红利需要付出努力。


As the World Bank Group’s 2015/2016 Global Monitoring Report emphasized, countries’ policy responses make all the difference in how demographic trends affect the wellbeing of the population.	世界银行集团2015/2016 全球监测报告（Global Monitoring Report）强调，各国的政策应对措施的不同导致人口趋势对人口福利的影响大相径庭。


With the wrong approach, a surging youth population can be destabilizing, and a rapidly aging population can become a burden on economic growth and public budgets.	在错误方针下，激增的年轻人人口可能带来动荡，而迅速老龄化的人口可能成为经济增长和公共预算的负担。


For countries with a growing working-age population, the key challenge is to generate a large number of productive jobs.	对于工作年龄人口增加的国家，主要挑战是创造大量生产性工作。


For those with an aging population, it is to improve productivity and adapt social-welfare systems.	对于人口老龄化的国家，主要挑战是改善生产率，调整社会福利制度。


In both cases, investment in human capital and an enabling environment for businesses to boost employment are essential.	在两种情况中，通过投资人力资本和便利的营商环境提振就业都至关重要。


Furthermore, countries should take advantage of differences in their demographic situations with appropriate policies on cross-border capital flows, migration, and trade.	此外，各国应该实施适当的跨境资本流、移民和贸易政策利用不同的人口状况。


More capital should flow to countries with younger populations – with their growing manufacturing bases and consumer markets – to support investment and employment growth; and more labor should flow to countries with aging populations, to fill gaps in the workforce.	更多的资本应该流向人口较年轻的国家——它们的制造业基础越来越好，消费市场越来越大——以支持投资和就业增长； 而更多的劳动力应该流向人口老龄化国家，以填补劳动力缺口。


For all of these policies to work, countries need to improve the effectiveness and credibility of their civic and government institutions.	这些政策要起作用，各国需要改善效率和公民和政府机构的信誉。


Mitigating uncertainty, in order to avoid fueling instability, is also essential.	降低不确定性——从而避免助长动荡——也至关重要。


The last 35 years prove that a larger population does not have to be poorer.	过去35年证明，人口增加未必意味着更加贫困。


While the increasing concentration of the poor in fragile and conflict-affected countries will compound the challenge of poverty reduction over the next few decades, this is no excuse for not ensuring continued progress.	穷人日益集中于支离破碎和饱受冲突摧残的国家，这一局面让未来几十年的减贫挑战变得更加艰巨，但我们没有借口不去保证继续进步。


We have the resources and knowledge to achieve far greater prosperity, equity, and sustainability.	我们就被实现更大的繁荣、平等和可持续性的资源和知识。


The real challenge will be to use them effectively.	真正的挑战是如何有效地使用它们。


Understanding the Productivity Puzzle	破解生产力难题


LONDON – In all major economies, the so-called productivity puzzle continues to perplex economists and policymakers: output per hour is significantly lower than it would have been had the pre-2008 growth trend continued.	发自伦敦——一直以来，所谓的生产力难题都困扰着各主要经济体的经济学家和政策制定者们：当前的每小时产出显著低于（如果2008年前的增长趋势持续）所应该达到的水平。


The figures are stark, particularly so in the United Kingdom, but also across the OECD.	这些数字在经合组织国家中相当碍眼，而英国尤甚。


And while it goes without saying that economists have many ingenious explanations to offer, none has yet proved persuasive enough to create a consensus.	当然经济学家早已对此提出了许多精妙的解释，但仍然没有一个能具备足够说服力以达成共识。


According to the UK’s Office for National Statistics, output per hour in France was 14% lower in 2015 than it would have been had the previously normal trend growth rate been matched.	据英国国家统计署统计，2015年法国的每小时产出比以前正常趋势增长率下应得的产出水平低了14％。


Output was 9% lower in the United States and 8% lower in Germany, which has remained the top performer among developed economies, albeit only in relative terms.	美国低了9％，德国低了8％，但两国已经是发达经济体中表现最好的国家了（尽管只是相对而言）。


If this new, lower growth rate persists, by 2021 average incomes in the US will be 16% lower than they would have been had the US maintained the roughly 2% annual productivity gain experienced since 1945.	如果这个新的较低增长率持续下去，到2021年美国人的平均收入将比自1945年以来保持的约2％的年度生产力增长率下的收入水平低16％。


The UK exhibits a particularly chronic case of the syndrome.	而英国体现出的是关于该综合征的一项特殊慢性症状。


British productivity was 9% below the OECD average in 2007; by 2015, the gap had widened to 18%.	2007年英国的生产率比经合组织的平均水平低9％，到2015年，这一差距扩大到18％。


Strikingly, UK productivity per hour is fully 35% below the German level, and 30% below that of the US. Even the French could produce the average British worker’s output in a week, and still take Friday off.	令人震惊的是，英国的每小时生产力比德国低35％，比美国低30％，即便法国人都可以在周五休假的情况下达到英国工人一周的平均生产水平。


It would seem that, in addition to the factors affecting all developed economies, the UK has particularly weak management.	由此看来，除了影响所有发达经济体的因素之外，英国的管理尤为薄弱。


Some contributing factors are generally acknowledged.	人们已经认识到促成该状况的一些因素。


During the crisis and its immediate aftermath, when banks’ efforts to rebuild capital constrained new lending, ultra-low interest rates kept some firms’ heads above water, and their managers retained employees, despite making a relatively low return.	在金融危机及其余波期间，虽然银行的资本重建遏制了新贷款的发放，但超低利率使一些企业得以幸存，于是它们的管理层选择留用员工，尽管因此会拉低回报。


On the other hand, new, more productive, and innovative firms found it hard to raise the capital they needed to grow, so they either did not expand, or did so by substituting labor for capital.	另一方面，生产力更高的新创新企业却面临着难以筹集增长所需资本的局面，所以它们要么选择停止扩张，要么选择用劳动力取代资本的方式来实现扩张。


In other words, low interest rates held productivity down by allowing heavily indebted zombie companies to survive for longer than they otherwise would have done.	换句话说，低利率让那些负债累累的僵尸企业得以苟延残喘，从而拉低了生产力水平。


The Bank of England has acknowledged that trade-off, estimating that productivity would have been 1-3% higher in the UK had it raised interest rates to pre-crisis levels in the recovery phase. But they believe the consequences – slower income growth and higher unemployment – would have been unacceptable.	英国央行已经承认这方面的有所取舍，如果能在危急恢复阶段将利率上调至危机前水平，英国的生产力水平将比当前高出1~3%，但问题在于他们无法接受因此产生的后果——收入增长放缓和失业率上升。


This argument has now been extended beyond the banking system, to the capital markets themselves.	这个论点现在已经超出了银行体系，扩展到了资本市场本身。


Critics of central banks have claimed that a sustained policy of exceptionally low interest rates, reinforced by huge doses of quantitative easing, have caused asset prices to rise indiscriminately.	中央银行的批评者声称，大规模量化宽松政策推动下的持续低利率政策使得资产价格普遍无差别上涨。


That has not only had adverse consequences for the distribution of wealth; it has also muted the ability of capital markets to distinguish between productive, high-potential firms and others that deserve to fail.	这不仅对财富分配产生负面影响； 也降低了资本市场将高生产力高潜力企业和其他本应破产企业区分开来的能力。


According to this view, a rising tide lifts even fundamentally unseaworthy boats.	根据这一观点，这场大潮让某些不适合航海的船只都漂浮起来了。


This argument has some explanatory power, though it says little about the value added by highly paid asset managers and whether they really are prepared to put their money to work simply on the basis of a monetary-policy effect on relative prices, paying no attention to individual companies’ strategies and performance.	这个论点有一定的解释力，虽然其没有解释高薪资产管理人员的附加值，以及这些人的投资是否只是基于货币政策对相对价格的影响，而毫不关心个别公司的策略和绩效。


But the key question the argument raises is what to do about it.	但是该论点引出了一个关键问题：央行应该怎么办？


Would it really have been preferable to tighten policy far earlier, to kill off weaker companies in the interests of improving productivity?	为了提高生产力，是否就该提前收紧政策，让那些弱势企业一命呜呼？


The BoE has given an explicit answer, and the other major central banks implicit answers, to that question. They do not think so.	英国央行已经给出明确答复，其他主要中央银行也都回答了这个问题：他们可不这么认为。


A preferable approach to resolving the problem might be more vigorous use of the tools available to market regulators.	一个解决问题的较佳选项可能是让市场监管机构更大力地动用手边的工具。


These authorities tend to focus more on investor protection than on the allocational efficiency of the markets they oversee.	在这些机构眼中，对投资者的保护要比其所监管市场的分配效率更重要。


Investor protection is important, of course, but as the Nobel laureate Eugene Fama put it, “the primary role of the capital market is allocation of ownership of the economy’s capital stock.”	保护投资者固然应当，但正如诺贝尔经济学奖获得者尤金·法马（Eugene Fama）指出的那样：“资本市场的主要作用就是分配经济资本存量的所有权。 ”


A regulator focused on that objective would be especially rigorous in overseeing the transparent disclosure of information, and would seek to promote vigorous competition among companies and also, crucially for this objective, among investors.	专注于这一目标的监管机构会在监督信息披露透明度方面特别严格，并将努力促进企业以及投资者之间的激烈竞争——后者对这一目标的实现极为重要。


It should not be acceptable for asset managers to earn extravagant returns for following a market benchmark.	如果资产管理人员仅靠追踪市场基准指标就可以赚取巨额回报，这显然是不可接受的。


There are, no doubt, other dimensions to the productivity puzzle.	毫无疑问，生产力难题还存在着其他方面。


Maybe we are not measuring output well.	也许我们测量产出的方式有问题。


As developed economies become more service-based, our measures of output become less objective.	随着发达经济体越来越构建于服务之上，我们的产出测量也越来越不客观。


In many service industries, outputs are effectively measured by inputs.	在许多服务业中，产出是根据投入来有效衡量的。


Maybe we are not measuring enhancements in quality, which may mean that output increases are understated.	也许我们也没有衡量质量的提升，这可能意味着产出的增加遭到了低估。


Maybe we have reached a point at which the productivity boost from Internet-based technology has been cashed, and we need another technological leap to move forward again.	也许我们已经进入了一个基于互联网技术的生产力提升已被耗尽的阶段，因此需要另一场技术跃进来再次出发。


But one key challenge for central banks, as we edge toward the normalization of interest rates, will be to develop a framework for thinking about the impact of monetary policy on the allocation of capital.	但是随着利率逐步正常化，中央银行面临的一个主要挑战就是制定一个框架来考量货币政策对资本配置的影响。


The task is urgent, as the social and political implications of a prolonged period of no productivity or real wage growth may be very serious.	这个任务极为紧迫，因为生产力或实际工资增长的长期缺乏会产生非常严重的社会和政治影响。


Indeed, arguably they have been factors behind the political upheavals in the US and the UK already.	事实上，这可能就是美国和英国政治动荡背后的原因。


Why Build Financially Inclusive Economies?	为什么要构建普惠金融的经济？


SEATTLE – The theme of this week’s G20 summit in Hamburg, Germany, is “shaping an interconnected world,” and when leaders get down to business, many of the highest-profile topics – climate change, counter-terrorism, trade – will take center stage.	西雅图—本周的G20德国汉堡峰会的主题是“塑造联动世界”，当领导人们开始正式开会时，许多最高规格的话题——气候变化、反恐、贸易——将占据中心舞台。


But the attention received by a less well-known agenda item will be no less critical to ensuring global prosperity: digital financial inclusion.	但对于保证全球繁荣来说，关注一个不那么为人所知的议程项目同样关键，那就是数字普惠金融。


Today, some two billion adults still lack access to even the most basic financial services.	如今，有大约二十亿成年人无法获得哪怕是最为基本的金融服务。


Digital financial inclusion is about broadening access to the formal economy by making electronic financial tools – like debit accounts that people can access on their mobile phones – affordable and available on a large scale.	数字普惠金融就是要通过大规模普及平价的电子金融工具——如人们可以在手机上访问的借记账户，来扩大正式经济的普及度。


When the poor start using these services, two things happen.	当穷人开始使用这些服务时，将发生两件事。


First, they manage money more effectively – with new ways to save, make payments, access credit, or obtain insurance.	首先，他们能更有效地管理资金——用新的方法来储蓄、支付、获得信用或购买高线。


Second, they spend less time taking care of simple financial transactions and more on productive work or running a small business of their own.	其次，他们不需要花那么多时间照看简单的金融交易，可以将更多的时间用于生产工作或经营自己的小本生意。


Moreover, additional earnings and savings boost poor people’s resilience against financial shocks resulting from, say, an unexpected medical expense or a seasonal crop failure.	此外，收入和储蓄的增加将提高穷人面对（比如）意外医疗开支或庄稼歉收等事件所导致的金融冲击的恢复力。


There is no shortage of evidence for the transformative effect of digital financial inclusion on economies.	无数证据表明，数字普惠金融对经济可以起到变革效应。


In Kenya, for example, “mobile money,” which allows users to transfer funds by text message, has helped an estimated 194,000 households escape extreme poverty.	比如，在肯尼亚，“移动资金”让用户可以通过短信转账，该服务帮助大约194,000个家庭摆脱了极端贫困。


The breakthrough there was driven by changes in savings behavior and greater occupational choice, especially for women.	这方面的突破受到了储蓄行为的变化和更大的就业选择的推动，特别是对女性而言。


As more countries experience gains like these, the prospects for lasting economic growth improve dramatically.	随着更多国家从这类服务中获益，实现持续经济增长的前景大幅改善。


One recent study projected that broadening access to digital finance tools could increase developing countries’ GDP by an estimated $3.7 trillion by 2025.	一项最新研究预测，到2025年，扩大数字金融工具的普及能够让发展中国家GDP增加大约3. 7万亿美元。


But, in order to capitalize on the promise of greater financial inclusion, effective policies are needed at the national level.	但是，要想实现增进普惠金融的憧憬，需要有国家层面的有效政策。


Last year, the G20 published “High-Level Principles for Digital Financial Inclusion,” which focuses on eight of the most successful strategies adopted by national governments around the world.	去年，G20发布了《数字普惠金融高级原则》（High-Level Principles for Digital Financial Inclusion），重点提出了全世界国家政府所采取的八种最成功的策略。


A new G20 report published this spring probes those strategies further, and shows how to turn principles into action.	今年春天发布的新G20报告进一步阐述了这些策略，并给出了如何将原则转化为行动的指引。


China has been a leader in this regard, demonstrating how to strike a balance between innovation and risk.	中国是这方面的领导者，为我们树立了如何在创新和风险之间达到平衡的榜样。


When online payment services, like Alibaba’s Alipay, first emerged, regulators were faced with an entirely new category of financial provider.	当支付宝等在线支付服务刚刚出现时，监管者面临着一个全新的金融服务提供商类别。


Rather than impose a battery of rules up front, they watched and learned to see what types of regulations were needed.	他们没有匆忙抢先推出一系列规则，而是观察和了解需要进行哪些监管。


This gave providers a chance to find their footing and evolve.	这让服务提供商有机会站稳脚跟和发展。


That approach helped Alipay to become the world’s largest online payment platform.	这一方针使得支付宝成为全世界规模最大的在线支付平台。


Regulatory innovations elsewhere are solving another key challenge: the lack of personal identification for new account holders.	其他国家的监管创新正在解决一个重要挑战：缺少对新账户持有者的身份识别。


This is a common problem in many developing countries, and has prevented hundreds of millions of people from signing up for financial services.	这是许多发展中国家所面临的共同问题，也阻止了数亿人开立金融账户、获得金融服务。


To overcome this hurdle, Tanzania and Mexico implemented systems that require nothing more than a phone number to sign up for the most basic accounts.	为了克服这一障碍，坦桑尼亚和墨西哥实施了只需要一个手机号码就能开立最基本的金融账户的制度。


Programs in both countries have been successful; in Mexico, for example, more than nine million new accounts were opened in the first two years.	两国所实施的计划都取得了成功； 比如，在墨西哥，前两年就开立了九百万个新账户。


India, meanwhile, is launching a massive digital identification program that collects fingerprints and other biometric data.	与此同时，印度正在实施大一个大规模数字身份认定项目，收集指纹和其他生物识别数据。


More than one billion digital profiles have been created since the program began six years ago; today, more than one-third of those profiles are linked to bank accounts.	该项目实施六年来，已经收集到超过十亿组数字身份信息； 如今，这些身份信息中有超过三分之一与银行账户相关联。


Yet the most recent G20 report also highlights some challenges.	但最新的G20峰会也突出了一些挑战。


For example, “interoperability” – the ability of customers to transact with one another even if they are using different platforms – is the norm in only a few markets today.	比如，如今“互操作性”——让客户在彼此使用不同平台的情况下仍然能够互相交易——只在非常有限的市场中能够实现。


Government action to address this would help increase customer convenience and lower operating costs for providers.	解决这个问题的政府行动有助于增加客户方便度、降低供应商的经营成本。


Users with little or no experience navigating online payment systems would also benefit from the adoption of policies that improve financial literacy.	很少或完全没有使用在线支付系统的用户也能受益于改善金融知识普及的政策。


Overall, the G20 reports make clear that digital financial inclusion is a powerful tool for tackling poverty.	总体而言，G20报告清楚地指出，数字普惠金融是应对贫困问题的强大工具。


But wealthier countries can benefit as well, because digital financial inclusion, when rolled out well, increases consumer activity and trade.	但发达国家也能从中获益，因为数字普惠金融如果运转良好的话，可以增加消费活动和贸易。


The G20, under China’s presidency last year, made improving access to digital financial services a global priority, and it will remain so under Germany’s tenure.	去年，在中国的主持下，G20将普及数字金融服务列为一项全球重点，在德国担当轮值主席国时，仍然如此。


This focus will help improve access to the global economy for the billions who need it most — especially the poor, the elderly, and women in developing countries.	重视这项工作有助于让最需要进入全球经济的几十亿人能够更加方便地实现这一目标——特别是发展中国家的穷人、年长者和妇女。


The world is getting better at understanding the mechanics of financial inclusion, and the ways that digital technology can accelerate it.	世界越来越能够理解普惠金融的机制，以及数字技术如何推动普惠金融。


This is great news for the unbanked.	这对于没有银行账户的人来说是一个福音。


But placing the topic on a summit agenda is not enough.	但将这个议题列入峰会议程是不够的。


To keep the innovation going, global challenges need localized solutions.	要保持创新，全球挑战需要本地化的解决办法。


As leaders in China, Kenya, Mexico, and many other countries have already discovered, an economy that includes everyone benefits all.	中国、肯尼亚、墨西哥和其他许多国家的领导人已经认识到，能够将所有人包容进来的经济可以惠及所有人。


Disrupting Climate Change	打断气候变化


DENVER – After a season of record-breaking hurricanes in the United States and floods across Asia, it would be easy to despair about the accelerating pace of climate change.	丹佛—在美国经历了创纪录的飓风季，亚洲经历了泛滥的洪水季之后，我们很容易对气候变化的不断加速感到绝望。


Yet, despite the apocalyptic omens, an energy transformation big enough and fast enough to curb the spike in global temperature remains within reach.	然而，尽管末日预兆频现，我们仍然能够实现规模足够大、速度足够快的能源转型，从而遏制全球气温的升高。


Better still, we do not need to wait for new inventions to implement the changes we need; the transformation can happen right now, with profitable solutions delivered by businesses and driven by markets.	更妙的是，我们不需要坐等新发明的出现来落实我们所需要的变化； 转型可以立刻开始，由企业提供受市场推动的有利可图的方案。


Limiting the increase in global temperature to within 2º Celsius of preindustrial levels – the target set by the 2015 Paris climate agreement – will require decreasing reliance on fossil fuels, and changing how the world grows crops, harvests timber, and uses land.	将全球升温幅度限制在前工业水平以上2℃以内，这是2015年巴黎气候协定所制定的目标。 实现这一目标需要减少化石燃料依赖，改变农作物种植、木材采伐和土地使用的方式。


New research by the Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI) shows that both outcomes are possible, and that, together, the impact can “positively” disrupt the trajectory of climate change.	落基山研究所（RMI）的新研究表明，这两个结果都是可行的，它们所形成的合力可以“积极地”打断气候变化的进程。


According to our analysis, there are pathways for the future supply and demand of energy, and for how forests and land store carbon, that, if followed, will dramatically slow the pace of warming.	根据我们的研究，如果未来的能源供给和需求，以及森林和土地储存碳元素的方式，能够遵循一定的方法，就能大大降低变暖的速度。


By accelerating the clean-energy transition that is underway, it is possible to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions below what would be expected under current consumption patterns.	通过加快已经开始的清洁能源转型，有望将温室气体排放量降低到当前消费模式所隐含的水平之下。


This scenario is not as far-fetched as some might believe.	这一情景并不像有些人想象的那样遥远。


The world is already switching to cleaner energy, to electric mobility, and to smarter power and land-use systems faster than anyone, including experts, anticipated.	世界已经开始了朝向清洁能源、电力驱动和更加智能的电力和土地使用系统的转变，其速度之快超出了任何人——包括专家在内——的预测。


And it’s not the first time the pace of change has exceeded expectations.	而这不是第一次发生变化速度超过预期的情况。


In 1980, for example, AT&T hired McKinsey & Company to forecast the number of mobile phones that would be in use in the US within two decades.	比如，1980年，美国电话电报公司聘请麦肯锡公司对二十年内美国移动电话使用数量进行预测。


The consultants predicted that by 2000, the US mobile phone market would support about 900,000 devices.	麦肯锡的顾问预测，到2000年，美国移动电话市场规模将达到900,000台左右。


In fact, over 100 million phones were sold that year.	事实上，2000年有超过一亿台移动电话被售出。


Today, the planet has more phones than people.	如今，地球上的移动电话数量比其人口还要多。


Solar and wind energy have suffered similarly flawed projections.	太阳能和风能也经历过类似的错误预测。


For decades, experts at the International Energy Agency and the US Energy Information Agency underestimated how quickly supplies from these sources would grow.	几十年来，国际原子能机构和美国能源情报署（US Energy Information Agency）的专家们无不低估了来自这些资源的供给会以多快速度增长。


They consistently guessed low, increasing their forecasts only slightly every year, without ever catching up to reality.	他们的猜测总是低估，并且每年只是略微向上调整预测，从来没能跟上现实进度。


But as clean-energy businesses innovated, the cost of production from wind and solar declined.	但随着清洁能源企业不断创新，利用风能和太阳能的生产成本不断下降。


Energy became cheaper, and usage increased as a result.	能源变得更加廉价，用途则随之增加。


Government models typically do not account for such expanding returns.	政府模型通常无法抓住类似的回报递增现象。


Another reason for underestimating the speed of today’s energy transition is that the scale is different from previous conversions to new technologies.	低估当今能源转型的另一个原因是其规模与此前几次新技术转换有所不同。


When people switched from burning wood to burning coal, and then to burning oil, the “new” energy sources came from very large capital projects, like coalmines, offshore oil and gas fields, and refineries.	人们从烧木材到烧煤，再从烧煤到烧石油，“新”能源资源都来自规模非常巨大的资本项目，如煤矿、离岸油气田、炼油厂等。


The high costs of deploying these projects were then passed on to consumers.	部署这些项目成本高昂，并且要转嫁到消费者头上。


By contrast, in today’s energy market, consumers have more control.	相反，在今天的能源市场中，消费者拥有更大的控制权。


Consider how easy it is to install rooftop solar panels; it can be done in a single day.	想想看，在屋顶安装太阳能板是多么方便，只需要一天就能完成。


Millions of small machines – photovoltaic cells, wind turbines, batteries, and smart appliances – are driving today’s energy transformation.	数百万小机器——光伏电池、风力涡轮、电池和智能电器——推动着今天的能源转型。


Each new device in this distributed system is cheap and pays off quickly, so experimentation is affordable, and the technology can improve rapidly.	在这个分布式系统中，每个新设备都很廉价并且很快能够产生回报，因此实验成本很低，技术也能迅速得到改进。


The result is a huge field of global competitors, with faster innovation and new business models that are helping to achieve economies of scale.	结果是给全球竞争者带来了巨大的竞争舞台，产生更快的创新和新业务模式，达到规模经济。


The hardware of the clean-energy revolution has more in common with mobile phones and laptops than with mines and refineries.	清洁能源革命的硬件与移动电话和笔记本电脑，而不是矿山和炼油厂更加相近。


Because it can be sold in very large markets, with scalable production chains and still-maturing technologies, the transition to cleaner power is happening faster than many experts predicted it would.	它们可以在所有大型市场中出售，具备可扩展生产链和仍在不断成熟中的技术，因此，向更加清洁的电力的转型的速度比许多专家的预测都要快。


Still, not even a rapid shift toward “greener” energy will be enough to keep global average temperature within 2º of preindustrial levels.	尽管如此，即使是迅速实现“更加绿色”的能源转变，也不足以让全球平均气温限定在前工业化水平以上2℃以内。


To achieve that, the world will also need to take more greenhouse gases out of the atmosphere.	要想实现这个目标，世界还需要让更多温室气体离开大气层。


Fortunately, that, too, is possible.	幸运的是，这也是可能的。


By incorporating carbon-reducing strategies into agriculture and land conservation, more heat-trapping gases can be locked up in forests and soils.	在农业和土地保护中纳入减碳策略，就能将更多导致温室效应的气体锁定在森林和土壤中。


But while the techniques already exist, success will require increasing the use of no-till farming, adopting permaculture principles, better managing wetlands, and using rotational grazing techniques, among other measures.	然而，尽管这些技术已经存在，但要想取得成功，还需要推广免耕农业，采用永续栽种原则，加强湿地管理，使用轮牧技术等。


The power of markets to drive radical changes in energy and land use is great, but as the storm season of 2017 should remind us, the climate emergency we face requires vigorous and urgent action.	推动能源和土地使用发生重大变化的市场力量很强，但2017年风暴季提醒我们，我们所面临的气候紧迫性需要我们采取强力紧急行动。


Transforming the way people acquire and consume energy, and use land, will require strong incentives and policy frameworks to set the course for success.	改变人们获取和消费能源以及使用土地的方式需要很强的激励和政策框架推动成功。


But don’t despair: there is still time to save our climate.	但也不要绝望：我们仍有时间拯救我们的气候。


The transformation has already begun – and it will play out faster than most people expect.	转型已经开始——并且将以比大部分人预料的更快的速度展开。


The Madness of King Donald	唐纳德国王的疯狂


WASHINGTON, DC – Much of America’s capital has entered a state of near-panic.	华盛顿——美国首都已经近乎陷入恐慌。


In recent days, President Donald Trump has been acting more bizarrely than ever, and the question raised in the mind of politicians and civilians alike, though rarely spoken aloud, has been: What can be done with this man?	最近几天，唐纳德·特朗普总统比以往任何时候都更加怪异，尽管很少明说，但政治家和民众藏在心里的问题一直是：我们可以对这个人做些什么？


Can the United States really afford to wait for Special Counsel Robert Mueller to wrap up his investigation (on the assumption that he’ll find the president guilty of something)?	美国是否真的可以静候罗伯特·穆勒特别检察官结束调查（基于他会发现总统犯有某种罪行的假设）？


That could still take quite a while.	这可能还需要等待很久。


The question of timing has become increasingly urgent, given the heightened danger that the US will deliberately or accidentally end up in a war with North Korea.	鉴于美国有意或无意与朝鲜爆发战争的危险加剧，时机问题已经变得越来越紧迫。


That risk, coupled with Trump’s increasingly peculiar behavior, has made Washington more tense than I’ve ever known it to be, and that includes the dark days of Watergate.	这种风险，加之特朗普越来越奇特的行为，已经导致华盛顿的紧张情绪超过包括水门事件那段黑暗时期在内的以往任何时候。


To put it bluntly: the worry is that a mentally deranged president might lead the US into a nuclear war.	坦率地说：人们担心这位精神错乱的总统可能导致美国陷入核战争当中。


In just the past week, evidence of Trump’s instability has piled up.	就在上周，特朗普精神状态不稳的证据已经堆积如山了。


During an Oval Office ceremony to honor Native-American heroes of World War II, he offended them by issuing a racist comment.	在表彰美国二战本土英雄的椭圆形办公室纪念仪式上，他发表的种族主义言论激怒了接受表彰的英雄。


He picked an unprecedented and unnecessary fight with the prime minister of the United Kingdom, supposedly America’s closest ally, by retweeting a British neo-fascist group’s anti-Muslim posts.	他史无前例而且毫无必要地因为转发英国新法西斯集团的反穆斯林言论而挑衅英国首相，而英国首相本应是美国最亲密的盟友。


In an effort to win a Democratic senator’s vote for his pending tax-cut bill, he traveled to her state and told lies about her record (though the tax bill was so tilted to the richest 1% of Americans that no Democratic senator voted for it).	为争取赢得一名民主党参议员对其待决减税法案的投票，他专程前往这名参议员所在的州并就她的过往历史说谎（虽然减税方案如此偏向美国前百分之一的最富裕人群，以至于没有任何民主党参议员为其投票）。


And he continued to bait North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, who seems equally unstable.	而且他继续引诱朝鲜领导人金正恩，后者似乎同样处于不稳定的状态下。


At the same time, both the Washington Post and The New York Times ran articles containing disturbing stories about the president’s private behavior.	与此同时，华盛顿邮报和纽约时报都刊登了总统私人行为令人不安的相关报道。


Trump, it was reported, told people close to him that he considers the infamous “Access Hollywood”recording of him joking, off-camera, about grabbing women’s genitals to be a fraud, even though he admitted its authenticity and apologized after the Post released it in the final weeks of the presidential campaign.	据报导，特朗普曾告诉与他关系亲密的人他认为记录了他在镜头之外开玩笑抓住女性生殖器的臭名昭著的“接触好莱坞”的影像资料是一场骗局，尽管他在总统竞选活动最后几周华盛顿邮报发表这篇文章时曾承认其真实性并为此道歉了。


Trump has also been revisiting his mendacious claim about Barack Obama having not been born in the US – the bogus allegation that launched his political career, which, under pressure from advisers, he’d renounced prior to the election.	特朗普也在不断重提巴拉克·奥巴马并非美国出生的虚假言论——恰恰是依靠这样的虚假指控他才开启了自己的政治生涯，因为承受不住来自顾问的压力，他在大选之前就已经放弃了这一说法。


He said in a tweet that he had turned down Time magazine’s suggestion that it would name him “Person of the Year,” because it wasn’t definite.	他在一篇推文中表示他曾拒绝了时代杂志提名他为“年度人物”的建议，因为最终这一建议能否成行是不确定的。


(Trump sets great store by such appearances on Time’s cover).	（特朗普对在时代封面上的露面机会是极为珍视的）。


But a Time official said that no such thing had occurred.	但据一名时代杂志官员透露这样的事从未发生过。


The fact that Trump appears to have some mental disorder, or disorders, has created a dilemma for psychiatrists, politicians, and journalists alike.	特朗普似乎患有一种或几种精神障碍的事实导致精神科医生、政客和记者陷入两难的选择。


The American Psychiatric Association has a rule that its members may not offer diagnoses of people they have not examined.	美国精神病协会规定其成员不得在没有进行过检查的情况下对病人作出诊断。


But, given what some psychiatrists see as a national emergency, many have broken the rule and spoken or written publicly about their professional assessments of Trump’s mental state.	但鉴于某些精神病学家将此视为全国紧急情况，导致许多人已经打破规则公开谈论或撰文记录他们对特朗普精神状态的专业评估。


The most widely accepted view is that he suffers from a narcissistic personality disorder, which is far more serious than simply being a narcissist.	最被人广为接受的观点是他患有自恋型人格障碍，这种障碍比普通自恋要严重的多。


According to the Mayo Clinic, such a disorder “is a mental condition in which people have an inflated sense of their own importance, a deep need for excessive attention and admiration, troubled relationships, and a lack of empathy for others.”	按照梅约诊所的说法，这种疾病的特点是“患者对其自身重要性的认识严重膨胀，从心底里需要过度的关注和敬佩、与身边人的关系错乱并缺乏对他人的同情心。


Moreover, “behind this mask of extreme confidence lies a fragile self-esteem that’s vulnerable to the slightest criticism.”	”此外，“在这种极度自信的表象背后所隐藏的脆弱的自尊心容易受到最轻微的批评的影响。 ”


This definition is all too reflective of traits that Trump regularly exhibits.	这个定义完全贴合特朗普经常展示的人格特征。


Another view held by a number of medical professionals, based on how Trump spoke in interviews in the late 1980s and how he speaks now – with a far more limited vocabulary and much less fluency – is that the president is suffering from the onset of dementia.	基于特朗普在20世纪80年代末接受采访时的讲话和他现在讲话的对比——词汇量大大缩小且流利程度要低得多——还有几位医学专业人士所持的另外一种观点是总统患有早期痴呆症。


According to the highly respected medical reference UpToDate, a subscription-financed service used by professionals, the symptoms of dementia include agitation, aggression, delusions, hallucinations, apathy, and disinhibition.	据一本由医学专业订阅人员出资、广受尊敬的医学参考杂志UpToDate显示，痴呆的症状包括激动、侵略性、妄想、幻觉、冷漠或失控。


Numerous Republican members of Congress are deeply worried about Trump’s capacity to handle the presidency – an incredibly demanding job.	众多国会共和党议员非常担忧特朗普总统的执政能力——总统这份工作要求越来越高。


Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, rumored to be replaced soon, is said to have called Trump a “moron.”	据说很快就会被取代的国务卿雷克斯·蒂勒森曾用“白痴”一词来形容特朗普。


Trump’s heightened erratic behavior in recent days has been attributed to his growing anxiety about Mueller’s investigation into his and his campaign’s possible collusion with Russia in the Kremlin’s effort to tilt the 2016 election in his direction – an investigation that could end in a charge of conspiracy.	近日特朗普的反常行为日益严重应当被归结为因为穆勒针对特朗普及其竞选活动可能与俄罗斯相勾结，并由俄罗斯出面争取对其有利的2016年选举结果的调查所引发的焦虑情绪越来越强烈——这样的调查可能导致被控共谋罪。


(Trump appears to be the only significant figure in Washington who won’t accept that Russia interfered.)	（特朗普似乎是不接受俄罗斯干预大选的华盛顿唯一一位重要人物。


And that increasingly bizarre behavior came even before the news broke, on December 1, that Trump’s first national security adviser and close campaign aide, retired General Michael Flynn, had agreed to plead guilty to one count of lying to the FBI in exchange for his cooperation with the investigation.	）特朗普行为越来越怪异甚至是发生在12月1日有消息确认特朗普首位国家安全顾问兼亲密竞选助理退休将军迈克尔·弗林同意向法庭承认曾向联邦调查局说谎，以换取他配合调查之前的事。


What made this highly significant was that Flynn is far and away the highest former official whom Mueller has “flipped.”	这一事件极其重要，是因为弗林绝对是穆勒成功策反的曾担任官员的最高级别人士。


Indeed, the generous plea deal makes it clear that Flynn is prepared to name figures higher than he was in the campaign and the White House.	事实上，慷慨的认罪协议已经表明弗林已经准备供出竞选活动和白宫中比他更重要的人物。


That’s not very many people.	这样的人没有几个。


It has already been speculated, with reason, that Flynn will point a finger at Trump’s son-in-law and senior adviser, Jared Kushner.	人们有理由推测弗林将供出特朗普的女婿兼高级顾问贾里德·库什纳。


But Trump’s several earlier efforts to steer prosecutors away from Flynn were strong signals that Flynn knows something that Trump desperately hopes that prosecutors won’t find out.	但特朗普之前曾数次努力让检查人员放过弗林的事实已经发出强烈的信号，弗林知道特朗普拼命想要向检查人员掩盖的一些事。


We may learn what that is fairly soon.	我们可能很快就会知道究竟是什么事。


Meanwhile, American and the world nervously await Trump’s reaction to this latest very bad turn of events for him.	与此同时，美国和全世界民众都在焦急地等待特朗普将对最近事件的糟糕进展采取何种对策。


Trump’s Fiscal Follies	特朗普的财政讽刺剧


CAMBRIDGE – This year’s presidential election campaign in the United States is certainly unique.	坎布里奇—今年的美国总统选战毫无疑问是独特的。


Donald Trump has shaken up the way a campaign is run, how a nominee communicates with voters, and the Republican Party’s platform, with many of his positions deviating from GOP tradition.	唐纳德·特朗普动摇了选战的方式，改变了提名人与选民的沟通渠道，也颠覆了共和党平台，他的许多立场与大老党的传统格格不入。


But, on tax policy, Trump has toed the party line – and that’s not a good thing.	但是，在税收政策上，特朗普倒是遵循了共和党的传统——而这绝非好事。


Of course, any assessment of Trump’s declared positions risks being rendered meaningless within a few hours.	当然，任何对特朗普所宣称的立场的评价极有可能过了几分钟就变得毫无意义。


He changes his positions with head-spinning frequency, repeatedly disavowing statements soon after making them.	他改变立场比翻书还快，常常刚说出一番话转身就予以否认。


After two days of insisting, absurdly, that President Barack Obama “founded” the Islamic State, he finally tried to play the whole thing off as mere sarcasm.	他荒谬地声称奥巴马总统“建立”了伊斯兰国，不过，在坚持了两天后，他就将这番话描述为仅仅是一种讽刺，试图以此蒙混过关。


Even for a more typical candidate, promises made during a campaign rarely match actions taken once in office.	即使对于较为典型的候选人，在选战中所许下的承诺也很少会与上台后的行为完全匹配。


During his presidential campaign in 2000, George W. Bush promised to renounce nation-building adventures abroad, to maintain fiscal discipline, and to treat greenhouses gases as pollutants under the Clean Air Act.	2000年选战期间，小布什承诺放弃海外建国行动，保持财政纪律，并将温室气体作为污染物写入清洁空气法。


Once in office, he did precisely the opposite.	然而当选后，他的所作所为与此南辕北辙。


Nonetheless, we cannot simply ignore candidates’ policy promises.	尽管如此，我们仍不能完全忽视候选人的政策承诺。


Otherwise, the national discussion would focus entirely on the current week’s poll results, which is not particularly valuable for helping voters make informed decisions.	否则的话，国家讨论话题将完全集中在最近一周的民调结果上，而这对于选民做出信息充分的决定并无太大用处。


This is why it is important to examine Trump’s recent tax proposal, which has four salient features – all of which amount to tax cuts for the rich.	因此，考察特朗普最近的税收方案十分重要，他的方案四个首要方面——并且全部可以归结为为富人减税。


First, Trump proposes to abolish the estate tax – a long-cherished Republican goal.	首先，特朗普提出废除不动产税——这也是共和党长期以来的目标。


Trump, like his predecessors, tries to hide the fact that only the very wealthy would benefit from this change, because the tax does not apply to estates worth less than $5.45 million for an individual and $10.9 million for a married couple.	和他的前辈们一样，特朗普试图掩盖一个事实：只有巨富人群才能从这个变化中获益，因为该税收不适用于不动产价值低于545万美元的个人和1,090万美元的夫妻。


Second, Trump wants to cut America’s corporate tax rate sharply, to 15%.	其次，特朗普计划大幅削减美国公司税至15%。


In theory, there is some merit to reducing the rate, which, at 35%, is one of the world’s highest (and probably spurs companies to keep profits overseas).	理论上，降低这一税率有其合理性，目前的税率为35%，是世界上最高之一（并且可能促使公司将利润保留在海外）。


But, as most tax policy experts will tell you, a reduction in the overall rate should be accompanied by moves to broaden the base.	但是，大部分税收政策专家会告诉你，总税率的降低应该辅之以拓宽税基。


In particular, the US should abolish deductions, such as those designed to encourage corporate debt and oil drilling.	特别是，美国应该取消税收抵扣，比如为了鼓励公司债和石油钻井而实施的抵扣项目。


Third, Trump would reduce the highest rate for personal income tax from 39.6% to 33%.	第三，特朗普将把个人所得税最高税率从39. 6%调低到33%。


This is significant, but not nearly as large as the previous proposal to cut the rate to 25% – which, according to independent analysts, would have led to about $10 trillion in revenue losses over the course of just one decade.	这是一项重大举措，但相较此前将它削减到25%的方案已经温和了不少——据独立分析师分析，该项措施仅在未来十年就将导致10万亿美元的税收收入损失。


Finally, Trump has proposed tax deductions for average childcare costs.	第四，特朗普提出要将普通儿童医保支出纳入税收抵扣范围。


That might seem widely beneficial, but it would help only those in high enough tax brackets to itemize deductions – mostly households with annual income above $75,000 (median US household income was $54,462 in 2015).	这一措施也许惠及面甚广，但只有税级足够高的人才有机会上报抵扣——主要是年收入75,000美元以上的家庭（2015年而美国中位家庭收入为54,462美元）。


The question of whether Trump’s tax policies would benefit him directly remains unanswered, because, unlike all other presidential candidates since Richard Nixon, he has refused to release his income-tax records.	特朗普的税收方案是否能给他带来直接好处仍然是个问题，因为，与尼克松以来的所有其他总统候选人不同，他拒绝公布自己的所得税记录。


What is certain is that Trump’s tax policies are fiscally irresponsible.	可以肯定的是特朗普的税收政策在财政上是不负责任的。


Indeed, there is no indication how any of his tax policies would be financed, and every indication that they would sharply expand the budget deficit.	事实上，没有任何方案说明他的税收政策如何筹资，而所有指标都表明他的政策将大大增加预算赤字。


The budget balance equals government outlays minus revenues.	预算余额等于政府支出减去收入。


It’s a simple equation, but one that Republican presidential candidates, including Trump, have seemingly had trouble understanding since 1980.	这个等式很简单，但自1980年以来，包括特朗普在内的共和党总统候选人死后都很难理解它。


They propose large specific tax cuts, without specific spending cuts, and yet claim they will reduce the deficit.	他们提出庞大而具体的减税，而拿不出具体的减支，却仍然声称将减少赤字。


Instead, they have produced record increases in budget deficits, particularly during the terms of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush.	相反，他们制造了创纪录的预算赤字增量，特别是里根和小布什时期。


To be sure, Trump’s budget plans are still too vague – particularly with respect to discretionary spending, Social Security, and Medicare – to arrive at an informed estimate of their actual impact on the federal deficit and national debt.	平心而论，特朗普的预算计划仍然十分模糊——特别是在自由裁量支出、社会安全和医疗保险方面——因此无法对其对联邦赤字和国民债务的实际影响作出信息充分的测算。


But he may face pressure to become more specific as the election approaches.	但随着选举的临近，他可能面临预算计划具体化的压力。


And, judging by his tendency to offer pie-in-the-sky ideas, rather than realistic policies, it seems likely that he will respond to that pressure with more manipulation.	而他总是提出不切实际的想法而非务实可行的政策，照此判断，他可能用加强操纵来应对压力。


Fortunately for Trump, the self-proclaimed “fiscal conservatives” who preceded him have already established four magic tricks to use when making impossible fiscal promises – tricks that he is likely to imitate.	对特朗普来说，幸运他的自称为“财政保守派”的前辈们已经为他发明了四种魔法，可以在许下不可能的财政承诺时使用——而他可能效仿这些魔法。


· The “Magic Asterisk.”	·        “魔力通配符”。


The candidate promises to cut taxes while balancing the budget with as-yet-unidentified spending cuts.	候选人承诺削减税收，同时用尚不明确的减支来平衡预算。


(This is basically what Trump is already doing, as he has specified no spending cuts.)	（这基本上就是特朗普正在使用的伎俩，即不提出任何具体的减支措施。 ）


· The “Rosy Scenario.”	·       “美好场景”。


The candidate (or incumbent) forecasts an increase in tax receipts, based on forecasts that national income will grow faster.	候选人（或在任者）预测税收收入将增加，因为预计国民收入会增长得更快。


One of the three economists who have signed on as advisers to the Trump campaign has suggested that, with Trump in the White House, the rate of GDP growth will somehow double.	加入特朗普阵营充当其顾问的三名经济学家之一指出，特朗普入主白宫后，GDP增长率可以翻番。


· The “Laffer Proposition.”	·       “拉弗方案”。


Reagan, Bush, and others declared that their tax cuts would spur so much economic activity that total tax revenue would actually increase.	里根、布什和其他人宣称他们的减税能大大刺激经济活动，使总税收收入实际上还能增加。


This proposition has been disproved many times, and the economic advisers to those presidents have disavowed it.	这一方案已经被证伪多次，这几位总统的经济顾问也已经否定了它。


Still, the temptation to square the budgetary circle with this claim may prove too strong for Trump to resist.	但是，用这一说辞来说圆预算的逻辑对特朗普来说诱惑力太大，根本无从抵挡。


· “Starve the Beast.”	·       “饿死怪兽”。


After the other justifications for big tax cuts were proved wrong, Reagan and Bush fell back on the theory that the decline in tax revenue was actually a good thing, because it would force Congress to approve spending cuts.	当其他大幅减税的理由被证伪后，里根和布什祭出了税收收入下降其实是一件好事的理论。 他们的理由是这将迫使国会批准减支。


Again, the key to this gambit is that the president never actually gets around to proposing the cuts that Congress is supposed to approve.	这一招的要害仍然是总统从未真正准备提出国会应该批准的减支。


Perhaps it is inevitable for candidates to ignore the real-world constraints of domestic politics or international circumstances as they try to sell themselves to voters.	也许，候选人在向候选人推销自己时不可避免地会忽视国内政治或国际环境等现实约束。


But they shouldn’t be able to ignore the constraints of arithmetic, especially not when the same sleight of hand has been tried before – with profoundly adverse consequences.	但他们绝不应该忽视算术约束，特别是在同一招数早就已经被用过——并且带来了巨大的消极后果——的时候。


Flights of Unmanned Fancy	无人机飞行梦想


BOSTON – Few pieces of modern hardware have inspired as much excitement as the drone.	波士顿——几乎没有哪种现代硬件能像无人机那样令人们兴奋异常。


While nonmilitary unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were initially marketed as purely recreational gadgets, it has not taken long for entrepreneurs and industrial giants to seize on the endless possibilities they offer.	虽然非军用无人机（UAVs）最初被当作纯粹的娱乐用品上市销售，但企业家和工业巨头没过多长时间就抓住了无人机所提供的无穷无尽的可能。


Annual sales in the United States are expected to reach seven million units by 2020, and many are already predicting a future in which drones reshape our cities – through remote delivery of goods, airborne surveillance, or as yet unforeseen applications.	到2020年，美国的无人机年销售量预计将达到700万架，而许多人已经在预测无人机将通过远程送货、机载监控或现在仍然无法预见的应用方式重塑我们城市的未来。


Yet one possibility has captured our collective imagination more than any other: the idea that drones will soon be moving people over cities en masse.	但其中一种可能性更能吸引人类的集体想象力：那就是无人机将很快成为大量载人的工具。


Might flying taxis one day pluck us from our front gardens and delicately plop us down outside the cinema or our favorite restaurant?	飞的能否有一天将我们从花园里提起，而后在电影院或我们最心爱的餐厅前再将我们轻轻放下？


Before we mentally hail the next air cab, let’s consider what it would actually mean if the skies were filled with swarms of miniature helicopters ferrying people to their next destination.	在我们为下一代空中出租车心花怒放之前，我们先来思考一下如果天空充满了将人们运抵下一个目的地的成群结队的小型直升机实际将意味着什么？


Though drones will have many important uses in the future, I do not believe moving people around cities will, or should, be one of them.	虽然无人机在将来会有很多重要的用途，但我不相信民众的城市交通将会或者应当成为其中的一个。


The dream of unmanned aerial transportation is not new.	无人空中交通的梦想并不是现在才有的。


When Fritz Lang created the futuristic cityscape for his groundbreaking 1927 film, Metropolis, he filled its skies with vertiginous towers and compact flying vehicles.	当弗里茨·朗为其1927年的突破性影片《大都会》创作未来城市景观时，天空中布满了令人眼花缭乱的高楼和精巧的飞行器。


Then, in the early 1960s, the Hanna-Barbera animation studio produced The Jetsons, a cartoon series following the escapades of a futuristic all-American family.	而后，到了20世纪60年代初，汉娜-巴伯拉动画工作室制作了《杰森一家》，这是一部大胆描绘全美家庭未来派生活的卡通系列剧。


In the opening credits the family whizzes around Orbit City in a hover car that folds up into a briefcase, which George, the family patriarch, then carries into his office.	影片一开始这家人乘坐一辆能折叠成手提箱大小的悬浮车围绕轨道城市旋转，之后一家之主乔治将折叠好的悬浮车带进了他的办公室。


In 1982, the science-fiction blockbuster Blade Runner featured flying police cars called “spinners.”	1982年科幻大片《银翼杀手》中出现了被称为“旋转器”的飞行警车。


Today, a version of such make-believe futures would seem tantalizingly within reach.	今天，如此虚构版的未来似乎即将变成现实。


Uber is investing in flying car technology.	优步正在投资研发飞车技术。


Earlier this year, Airbus launched Pop.Up, a vertical takeoff and landing concept vehicle for personal mobility.	今年初，空客推出了Pop. Up ，这是一种用于个人交通的垂直起降概念车。


And in a venture that promises “flight for all,” German start-up Volocopter has designed the 2X, a miniature helicopter with 18 rotors that will begin test flights in Dubai later this year.	而Volocopter是一家承诺“为所有人制造飞机”的德国初创企业，这家企业设计了2X，这是一架有18扇水平旋翼的微型直升机，将于今年晚些时候在迪拜开始进行测试飞行。


All of this suggests that urbanites will soon be zipping around urban airspace like George Jetson, right?	所有这一切是否都表明都市人很快将像乔治·杰森那样飞行在城市上空？


Wrong.	事实恐怕并非如此。


Despite big investments and bigger promises, there are physical and practical reasons why it is highly unlikely that our cities will be filled with airborne people movers anytime soon.	尽管拥有巨额投资和远大前景，但我们的城市不太可能在短期内充满空中飞人却有着物理和现实的理由。


First, let’s consider the physics.	首先来看看物理规律。


Anyone who has stood near a helicopter taking off will understand that a lot of energy is required to lift a heavy object vertically into the air.	任何曾在直升机起飞前站在附近的人都会明白需要大量能量才能将重物垂直抬升到空中。


Drone rotors are essentially big fans, pushing air down to create upward propulsion.	无人机水平旋翼实际就是大型风扇，向下挤压空气才能实现飞行器向上抬升。


There is no way to achieve lift without creating a vast amount of both noise and air disturbance.	不产生巨大噪音和空气扰动实现起飞根本不可能。


Residents of New York City know this well.	纽约市民都很清楚这一点。


Complaints about noise from one of the city’s main helipads on the Hudson River led to increased regulation of tour operators.	人们对纽约哈德逊河上一座城市主要直升机停机坪的噪音投诉曾导致对旅游业经营者监管的增加。


Yet, even before that legislation, there were fewer than 5,000 tourist flights per month.	但即使在该法案出台前，每月游客的飞行次数也少于5，000次。


Imagine if all of the city’s eight million residents took even one flight every few weeks: the city would become unlivable.	现在想象一下如果纽约市800万居民哪怕每人每隔几周飞行一次：这座城市将会变得无法居住。


Other factors that should curb our enthusiasm are more technological.	限制我们热情的还有其他技术性因素。


Even with dramatically improved batteries extending drones’ range, the crush of vehicles needed to move large numbers of people overhead would present a daunting safety hazard.	即便电池性能大幅改良延长了无人机航程，但人们对大批人员空中运输车辆的迷恋会造成令人望而生畏的安全风险因素。


Modern cars may be dangerous, but a dead battery or a broken rotor blade in a flying taxi would cause a heavy vehicle to fall onto a densely populated area.	现代汽车可能充满了危险，但一架飞的电池耗尽或水平旋翼破坏将会导致沉重的车辆坠入密集居住区之中。


And we still don’t know whether such drones could be protected from hackers, terrorists, or other criminals, or how air traffic control systems might guide people safely.	而且我们还不知道这些无人机能否抵御黑客、恐怖分子或其他犯罪分子的进攻，也不知道空中交管系统将怎样为人们提供安全指引。


Drones will still have a transformative impact on how future populations live, do business, and interact.	但无人机仍将对未来民众的生活、交易和互动产生革命性的影响。


Small UAVs have already proven their potential across diverse fields – from humanitarian-aid delivery to security.	事实已经证明小型无人机在诸多方面拥有潜力——从人道主义援助物资运送到安全保障提供。


Drones transcend geographical barriers without the need for large-scale physical infrastructure, and can bring isolated communities into close contact with the rest of the world.	无人机无需大规模基础设施建设即可飞越地理障碍，而且可以将边远社区与世界其他地方密切联系起来。


In Brazil, for example, the government is deploying camera-equipped drones to inspect remote agricultural producers suspected of breaking labor laws.	比如在巴西，政府正在利用装有摄像头的无人机来对偏远农场是否违反劳动法进行检查。


And drones are already monitoring air quality and providing support during health emergencies.	而无人机已经在监测空气质量并为医疗突发事件提供援助。


But urban mobility is not an appropriate application for UAV technology.	但城市交通不属于无人机技术的适用范畴。


The problems of mass transportation can be fixed with our feet planted firmly on the ground – and long before flying taxis are even a viable alternative.	大众交通问题脚不用离开地面就完全可以解决——而且可能很久之后飞的才会成为可行的选择。


With improvements to digital networks and real-time data, autonomous cars, trucks, and boats – like the Roboat that colleagues and I are prototyping in Amsterdam – can be made fast and effective enough for all our needs.	随着数字网络和实时数据的不断改进，自动汽车、卡车和船舶——就像我和同事在阿姆斯特丹已经完成原型设计的Roboat那样——其快速和有效性完全可以满足我们的需求。


And staying on the ground will obviate the need for networks of new infrastructure, like costly “vertiports.”	不离开地面将能避免建设新的基础设施网，比如像昂贵的“垂直起降机场”项目。


Society’s enduring dream of whizzing over a city in private flying cars has long captured the imagination of filmmakers – and now even some investors.	人类社会乘坐私人飞车从城市上空掠过的梦想一直吸引着电影制作者的想象力——现在甚至吸引了某些投资者加入其中。


For practical reasons large and small, however, it is a vision that will remain the stuff of fantasy.	但由于大大小小的实际因素，这样的愿景仍将停留在梦想当中。


Bob Dylan and the Literary Idiot Wind	鲍勃·迪伦和文学白痴风


PARIS – Oh, the anger of the fusty at the announcement of Bob Dylan’s Nobel Prize!	巴黎——哦，宣布鲍勃·迪伦获得诺贝尔奖激起了守旧派何等的愤怒！


What an outcry from the academy – not the Swedish one, mind you, but that of the world church of literaturology.	学院派强烈抗议——记住，这绝非是来自瑞典文学院，而是世界文学殿堂的抗议。


The panic of the literary bureaucracy, ensnared in its certainties and steeped in its petty calculations, its half-baked prognostications, its crafty shifts of position, has been palpable.	文学官僚的恐慌浸透在确定性及琐碎的算计当中，已经可以明显察觉到它草率的预言和狡猾的立场变化。 选择迪伦是否出于政治原因？


Was the choice of Dylan political or non-political?	为什么诺贝尔文学奖得主是美国人？


Why an American? Why not a woman?	为什么获奖的不是女性？


Or a voice, any voice, of a visible minority?	或者是明确的少数族裔所发出的声音、任何声音？


Or this one, who’s been waiting 20 years?	为什么不给等了20年的作者？


Or that one, who’s given up hope?	或者授予已经放弃希望的人？


The truth, however unpleasant it may be for the fuddy-duddies, is that awarding the Nobel Prize in Literature to an author who has written just one book is no more surprising than giving it to Dario Fo or Winston Churchill.	但无论真相在守旧者看来多么残酷，事实是将诺贝尔文学奖授予某位只写过一部作品的作者并不比授予达里奥·佛或温斯顿·丘吉尔更令人震惊，他们两位也都没有写过多少作品。


And here’s the even greater truth: to bestow it on one of our last popular poets, the distant relative of Rutebeuf, Villon, and all the minstrels and songsters of solitude and dereliction; to consecrate a troubadour, a bard of the brotherhood of lonely and lost souls; to crown the author of ballads that have been, to borrow André Suarès’s phrase about Rimbaud, “a moment in the life” of so many people in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries makes a lot more sense than pulling out of a hat the obscure Rudolf Christoph Eucken or picking poor old Sully Prudhomme instead of Tolstoy.	为尊崇一位民谣歌手，一位有着孤独迷失灵魂的吟游诗人； 为颂扬借用苏亚雷斯有关兰波评价的民谣作者，二十及二十一世纪芸芸众生“生活中的一刻”比变戏法般地令鲁道夫·克里斯托夫·欧肯相形见绌或选择可怜的老普吕多姆而舍弃托尔斯泰有意义得多。


Of course, it’s wrong to respond priggishly to priggishness.	当然，以自命不凡来回应自命不凡是一种错误。


But, confronted with those who have been shouting, “That’s not literature!	但面对那些大喊，“这不是文学！ 根本就不是！


It’s just not!” one is tempted to side with Francis Ponge who, citing Lautréamont, defined the poet (he would say “proet”) as a bard or troubadour who, by expressing the “voice of things,” becomes “the most useful citizen of his tribe.”	”的老古董，任何人都不禁想加入弗朗西斯·松格的阵营，引述洛特雷蒙特的话用吟游诗人或民谣歌手来定义诗人（洛特雷蒙特将其称之为“proet”），这样一个特殊的群体通过表达“万物之声”而成为“部落中最有成就的公民。


And to whom does that definition apply better than to the author of “Chimes of Freedom” or “Long and Wasted Years,” which bring to life and to music what the critic Greil Marcus has called the “invisible republic” of American culture?	”还有谁能比“自由钟声”或“蹉跎岁月”的作者更能得起当这样的赞誉，是他为生命和音乐注入了批评家格雷尔·马库斯口中美国文化所谓的“隐性共和精神”？


One is tempted to side also with Mallarmé, who urged us, in more or less the same terms, to “give a purer meaning to the words of the tribe.”	不少人情愿赞同马拉美，这位诗人曾以大致相似的语言督促我们“赋予部落语言以更纯粹的含义。


Again, who better than this collage artist, this chameleon of citation and intertextuality, this laconic lyricist, this verbal alchemist who spent his life reinventing others’ words and his own, uncovering the embers of the era beneath the ashes of the day’s defeats, and transmuting into gold the lead he heard on the radio?	”再说，谁又能比这位拼贴画艺术家、引语和互文的变幻者、简洁的抒情诗人和穷其一生重塑自己和他人语言的文字炼金士更好地搜寻当今失败废墟下的时代灰烬，并将其合成为电波中听到的去芜存菁的美文？


Or consider the familiar distinction between scribes, who make instrumental use of language, and writers, who spin it into silk.	或者想想将语言作为工具的书吏和将语言织就为锦缎的作家之间并不陌生的不同。


Wasn’t Dylan alluding to something similar when, after years of struggle for civil rights, resistance to the war in Vietnam, and support for the feminist revolution, he titled one of his most beautiful songs “I’m Not There,” as in, I’m not here anymore, no longer your servant, goodbye to all that, so long?	迪伦难道不是在意有所指，即在多年的民权斗争、对越战的抵制、对女权主义革命的支持后，他将最美的一首歌命名为“我不在那里”，意指我不会继续待在这儿，不会再充当你的奴隶，再见了过去的一切，后会有期？


But the true question lies elsewhere.	但真正的问题却不在这里。


The most conclusive exercise would be to compare apples with apples and the author of “Blonde on Blonde” with those who were and remain his key contemporaries.	最有说服力的方法是同类与同类比较，也就是将“无数金发女歌手”的作者与知名的同代音乐人进行对比。


Dylan is a Kerouac who can sing. He’s a Burroughs who put to music the great parade of the Beat generation, with its wild parties and naked lunches.	迪伦是会唱歌的凯鲁亚克，是用狂野派对和裸体午餐赋予音乐“垮掉一代”鲜明特色的布鲁斯。


He is what Allen Ginsberg said in describing his shock upon first hearing “A Hard Rain’s A-Gonna Fall” in 1963, a song in which the accents and pacing, the abrupt changes in emphasis, the voyage to the very heart of words and the imagination all echo the best literature of the time – but with music as well!	他代表着艾伦·金斯伯格1963年用来形容首次听到“暴雨将至”时的震惊感，这首歌的音调与节奏、重音的突变、对语言核心因素的探索和想象力无不以音乐的形式辉映着那个时代最顶尖的文学作品。


Are we going to hold that against Dylan, charge him with the sin of having grafted the rhythms of the blues, soul, and country music onto those of the Bible, William Blake, and Walt Whitman?	难道我们要因此而责怪迪伦，指控他完成了蓝调、灵歌、乡村音乐与圣经、威廉·布莱克、沃尔特·惠特曼的嫁接？


Why should we withhold from the trouper of the Never Ending Tour (more than two thousand performances!) the dignity accorded without hesitation to the author of On the Road?	我们有什么理由拒绝把毫不犹豫地赋予《在路上》作者的尊重同样授予创作《永不结束的巡演》的超级巨星（迄今已累计超过2，000场演出！ ）


It was Louis Aragon, I think, who said that setting a poem to music was like moving from black and white to color.	我记得路易斯·阿拉贡说过将诗歌改编为音乐就像从黑白过渡到彩色。


Aragon, the poet sung by Léo Ferré and others, believed that a poem unsung was half dead.	备受雷欧·费亥和其他人歌颂的诗人阿拉贡认为从未改编成音乐的诗歌缺少生命力。


Well, then, it seems that Dylan was the only one of his era to have been able to embody fully the musicality that is essential to great poetry, the second voice that haunts every poet, but which he generally delegates to those who recite or read him, the power of song that is his ultimate and secret truth and that some have gone mad – literally and tragically mad – trying to pull from cage into canto.	那么，看来唯有迪伦在他那个时代充分体现了对伟大诗歌至关重要的音律性，这种隐藏的声音在每位诗人的脑海中挥之不去，但却往往只能留给背诵或朗诵诗歌的人，歌曲的力量是他终极的秘密谜底，为从语言改编为音律，有人甚至不惜走向疯狂——疯狂得既真实又具有悲剧性。


Bard and rhapsodist both.	既是吟游诗人又是狂想曲作者。


A poetico-musical revolution in one man and one body of work.	一个人、一部作品肩负着诗歌与音乐的革命。


I like to think that it is this tour de force – this prolonged stroke of genius that is forever young – that the Nobel committee has recognized in its selection.	我更愿认为这是只有他才能胜任的生命之旅——这是一种诺贝尔委员会在选择他获奖时充分认可的永远年轻的天赋才能。


Eastern Europe’s Authoritarian Return	东欧极权主义的回归


MADRID – The European Union is a remarkable achievement of modern statecraft.	马德里—欧盟是现代治国术的一个令人瞩目的成就。


By building on shared values, it created a space of peace, progress, and freedom that overcame national enmities rooted in decades, if not centuries, of conflict.	欧盟通过构建共同价值创造了一个和平、进步和自由的空间，克服了几十年甚至几百年来根深蒂固的民族对立。


But the emerging political rift between the EU’s Eastern and Western members, together with resurgent nationalism throughout the continent, is putting those values – and thus the future of European integration – to their most severe test yet.	但欧盟东部和西部成员国之间的新的政治分歧，以及民族主义在整个欧洲大陆的复兴，正在让这些价值——以及欧洲一体化的未来——经受前所未有的严重考验。


In Eastern Europe, democracy is becoming increasingly illiberal.	在东欧，民主越来越不自由。


Leading the way is Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has been implementing his declared vision of an “illiberal state” for the last six years.	“急先锋”是总理欧尔班治下的匈牙利。 过去六年中，欧尔班一直在实施他所谓的“不自由国家”。


Now Poland is following suit, with Jarosław Kaczyński’s right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party having moved swiftly to assert control over public broadcasting, the civil service, and the Constitutional Court since its election in October.	如今，波兰正在步匈牙利后尘，自10月份当选以来，卡钦斯基的右翼政党法律与正义党（PiS）迅速行转向主张控制公共广播、文官体系和宪法法院。


Already, the EU has launched an official inquiry into potential violations of its rule-of-law standards.	目前，欧盟官方已开始调查是否有违反其法治标准的情况。


The move toward authoritarianism in Eastern Europe has been accompanied by outright defiance of EU-wide quotas for migrants, aimed at easing the massive refugee crisis that Europe now faces.	东欧在转向极权主义的同时也极力反对旨在缓解欧洲所面临的大规模难民危机的泛欧盟移民配额制度。


Meanwhile, Germany registered about a million asylum-seekers last year alone.	而去年德国一国就注册了约一百万寻求庇护者。


This split reflects a fundamental divergence in the two sides’ response to history.	这一分歧反映了双方对历史的反应的根本分歧。


Germany’s enlightened approach in matters like migration and civil liberties amounts to a direct rejection of its actions during World War II.	德国对移民和公民自由等问题的开明态度是与其二战期间的行为的决裂。


Though, as the Yale historian Timothy Snyder points out, collaborators in the “bloodlands” between Berlin and Moscow often supported the Nazis’ crimes, these societies lack Germany’s guilt complex.	尽管如耶鲁大学历史学家蒂莫西·斯奈德（Timothy Snyder）所指出的，柏林和莫斯科之间的“鲜血地带”的合谋者常常支持纳粹的罪行，但这些社会缺少德国的负罪感。


One reason for this is that Eastern Europeans do not share in the legacy of colonialism.	一个原因是东欧人没有殖民主义遗产。


The stepchild of empire – migration – is thus a problem to be handled by those who produced it: the old European colonial powers.	因此，帝国的继子——移民——成为需要由始作俑者处理的问题：旧欧洲殖民势力。


The countries of Eastern Europe – insecure newcomers to the fragile economic progress offered by EU membership – do not believe that they have any obligations in this regard.	东欧国家——欧盟成员资格所提供的脆弱的经济进步的不安全的新来者——不认为自己有这方面的义务。


But Eastern Europe does not simply lack the will to welcome migrants; it is actively opposed to doing so, in line with Władysław Gomułka’s maxim that “countries are built on national lines, not multinational ones.”	但东欧并不只是缺少欢迎移民的意愿； 东欧积极地反对接收移民，瓦迪斯瓦夫·哥穆尔卡（Władysław Gomułka）的格言——“国家是民族的，不是多民族的。


This stance, too, stems at least partly from World War II, as first the Holocaust and then the postwar ethnic cleansing of more than 30 million people, including virtually all Germans in the region, reinforced an aversion to multiethnicity.	”很好地说明了这一点。 这一立场至少部分也来自二战，大屠杀以及清除3,000万人的战后种族清洗（包括几乎所有该地区的德国人）增强了对多元民族的厌恶。


Indeed, multinational states like Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia disintegrated without dictatorships to hold them together.	事实上，没有独裁统治的捷克斯洛伐克和南斯拉夫等多民族国家纷纷解体。


Historical memories die hard.	历史记忆很难消磨。


Poles and others who fell under Soviet rule after 1945 cannot forgive Western Europe for sacrificing them to Stalin at Yalta.	波兰人和其他1945年后被苏联统治的民族无法原谅西欧在雅尔塔会议上将他们牺牲给斯大林。


Nor do they see their liberation from totalitarianism as a Western European achievement.	他们也不认为从极权主义中获得解放是西欧的成就。


Eastern Europeans’ gratitude lies elsewhere.	东欧人的感激之情在别处。


The Jewish Hungarian Nobel laureate Imre Kertész spoke for many in the region when he admitted an inability to shake off his emotional attachment to the United States, which liberated him from Buchenwald and later helped to free Hungary from Soviet Communism.	犹太裔匈牙利诺贝尔奖获得者伊姆雷·凯尔特茨（Imre Kertész）在承认无法摒弃他对美国的归属感时说出了许多东欧人的心声。 美国人将他救出了布痕瓦尔德集中营，后来又帮助匈牙利摆脱苏联共产主义。


In Eastern Europe, the resurgence of authoritarianism – which prevailed in the region even before the Communist era – is propelled by an ingrained fear of being sandwiched between two traditional enemies, Germany and Russia, both of which are still viewed with apprehension.	在东欧，极权主义的复兴——极权主义在共产主义时代之前便已遍布该地区——受到夹在两大宿敌——德国和俄罗斯（至今仍让人担心）之间的恐惧的推动。


To the PiS and the Polish right, the new Poland’s foundations do not lie in the non-violent Solidarity movement’s struggle for freedom in the 1980’s, which caught the imagination of the West; it lies in Poles’ heroic fight against the Asian Bolsheviks and the German hordes during WWII.	对PiS和波兰右翼来说，新波兰的基础不在于20世纪80年代非暴力团结运动（Solidarity movement）的自由斗争（这抓住了西方的想象力）； 而在于波兰在二战期间与亚洲布尔什维克和日耳曼游牧民族的英勇斗争。


As Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski put it, the “Europe of cyclists and vegetarians,” with its naive culture of political correctness and liberalism, represents a threat, not a model.	波兰外交部长路托斯特·瓦斯基科夫斯基（Witold Waszczykowski）指出，“骑自行车和吃素的欧洲”，及其天真的政治正确和自由主义文化，是一个威胁而非榜样。


Conspicuously, when Germany’s EU Commissioner for the Digital Economy and Society Günther Oettinger first threatened to put Poland’s government under supervision for its takeover of the media and the Constitutional Court, Poland’s justice minister compared the scrutiny to the Nazi occupation.	显然，当德国的欧盟数字经济和社会委员君特·奥丁格尔（Günther Oettinger）首次威胁要调查波兰政府对媒体和宪法法院的接管时，波兰司法部长将这一调查比作纳粹占领。


And Kaczyński defiantly insisted on staying the course while dismissing threats, “particularly by Germans.”	卡钦斯基带着蔑视的态度坚持与这些威胁，“特别是德国人的威胁”，斗争到底。


This represents a sea change from the last several years, during which Poland emerged as the poster child for the EU’s eastern expansion.	这体现了过去几年所出现的剧烈变化。 在此期间，波兰成为欧盟东扩的典范。


If Poland leads an axis of wayward member states, the EU’s capacity to protect civil liberties within its borders, much less sway other countries, such as Russia – will be severely diminished.	如果波兰领衔组成一个任性成员国轴心，那么欧盟保护期内部公民自由的能力——更不用说辐射俄罗斯等其他国家——将严重受损。


And, given the lack of binding instruments to stop member states from moving toward authoritarianism, avoiding such an outcome will not be easy.	而由于缺少具有约束力的手段阻止成员国转向极权主义，避免这一结果绝非易事。


Europe is a continent saturated by history, and haunted by the specter of its repetition.	欧洲是一个背负历史包袱的大洲，重复历史的幽灵在它头上飘荡。


But if, as Mark Twain supposedly observed, history rhymes rather than repeating itself, the memory of the past should guide Eastern Europe, not take it hostage.	但是，如果如（据说是）马克·吐温所观察到的，历史总是重复而不是复制自己，那么过去的记忆应该指引而不是绑架东欧。


The past is a warning, not a destination.	历史是警告，而不是目的地。


An Economic Agenda for South Africa’s Next Government	下届南非政府的经济议程


CAPE TOWN – Almost two decades after Nelson Mandela was thwarted in his efforts to name Cyril Ramaphosa as his successor, African National Congress party members have now elected him as their leader. Of course, Ramaphosa is not yet president of South Africa.	发自开普敦——二十年前，纳尔逊·曼德拉（Nelson Mandela）试图将西里尔·拉马福萨（Cyril Ramaphosa）指定为自己的接班人，却未能遂愿，直到今天非洲国民大会党党员将其选举为领导人。


But expectations are already high that economic policy will take a new direction under his guidance.	虽然拉马福萨还不是南非总统，但外界对此已寄予厚望，认为经济政策将在他的指导下走向新方向。


So what will a Ramaphosa presidency have to do to restore growth and ensure social progress in Africa’s lagging economic powerhouse?	那么拉马福萨该如何让这个熄火的非洲经济引擎恢复增长并确保社会进步呢？


Since the 2008-2009 recession, South Africa’s economy has stagnated, held back by leadership failures and plummeting confidence.	自2008~09年经济衰退以来，南非经济在领导失误和信心下滑的拖累下陷入停滞。


Unemployment has increased to 27.7%, the highest rate in 13 years.	失业率爬升到27. 7％，创13年来新高。


GDP growth will amount to 0.7% this year, and stood at just 0.3% in 2016.	今年的GDP增长0. 7％，而2016年仅为0.


Public debt is rising, and real household income per capita has flatlined.	3％。 公共债务上升，人均实际家庭收入不见起色。


Inequality remains extreme, and social discontent is high.	不平等状况依旧极端，社会不满情绪日益高涨。


The necessary commitment to coherent policies remains elusive, despite publication of a National Development Plan in 2011.	尽管在2011年出台了《国家发展方略》，但对政策连贯性的必要承诺仍然难以落实。


Collaboration between business and government leaders to strengthen key reforms and forestall credit rating downgrades floundered when finance minister Pravin Gordhan was sacked from President Jacob Zuma’s cabinet in March.	自从财政部长普拉文·戈尔丹（Pravin Gordhan）在3月份被雅各布·祖马（Jacob Zuma）总统驱逐出内阁之后，商界和政府领导人之间合作强化关键改革并阻止信用评级下调的努力也就废弛了。


The worsening economic outlook has given rise to divergent prognoses.	恶化的经济前景引出了不同的走向预测。


Some insist that the hatches must be battened down: fiscal consolidation, curtailment of union power, deregulation of markets.	一些人坚持必须先堵漏洞：整顿财政，缩小工会权力，放松市场管制。


Others call for radical transformation: state-led industrialization, free tertiary education, land redistribution without compensation.	其他人则呼吁彻底改造：国家主导的工业化，免费高等教育，不设补偿的土地再分配。


In the past, despite South Africa’s strident political discourse, strong leadership and stakeholder engagement enabled social partners to find common ground.	虽然过去南非的政治争论也相当激烈，但强有力的领导层以及利益相关者的参与使社会伙伴关系找到了共同点。


Today, however, the debate about reform is shallow and polarized, amid revelations of large-scale corruption and fraud in both the public and private sectors.	到如今在公共和私营部门大规模腐败和欺诈行为被大幅曝光之后，关于改革的辩论已经变得浅薄而两极分化。


The resulting erosion of trust is jeopardizing already-complex nation-building and economic-recovery projects.	由此造成的信任受损已经危及到了本已复杂艰巨的国家建设和经济复苏项目。


In seeking to restore political and social cohesion, the new ANC leadership will not only have to reinforce ethical principles in public service. Achieving inclusive growth while avoiding self-defeating fiscal deterioration will require hard economic choices.	为了恢复政治和社会凝聚力，新的非国大领袖不仅要强化公共服务的道德原则，还得痛下决心制定经济决策以确保在实现包容性增长的同时避免弄巧成拙的财政恶化，而加速发展则需要出台一套非正统的政策组合以及在国家与市场之间的力量平衡方面实现重大转变。


Creating a more employment-intensive economy remains a primary objective.	创造更加劳动密集型的经济仍然是主要目标。


Persistently high unemployment signals inefficiency in mobilizing human resources. It is also an obvious barrier to reducing poverty and inequality.	居高不下的失业率意味着人力资源动员效率低下，也是减少贫困和不平等的明显障碍。


South Africa will introduce a statutory minimum wage next year, which will help to protect many vulnerable workers, and could lead to simpler and fairer outcomes than the current thicket of collective-bargaining agreements and sectoral determinations.	南非将在明年出台一份法定最低工资标准，这将有助于保护大量弱势劳动者，并催生出比现行集体谈判协议和部门决定更为简明公平的结果。


But, as the high-level panel chaired by former President Kgalema Motlanthe has recently argued, complementary measures are needed to support employment of young people and other vulnerable job seekers.	但正如前总统卡姆莱马·莫特兰特（Kgalema Motlanthe）主持的高级别小组最近所主张的那样，还需要一系列配套措施来支持年轻人和其他弱势求职者的就业。


The existing subsidy for young workers, which operates as a temporary tax incentive to employers, should be extended to all low-wage employees in registered employment.	当前作为暂时性雇主税收激励措施的年轻雇员补贴应扩大到所有注册在职的低薪雇员。


Originally proposed by Professor Sam Bowles of the University of Massachusetts to South Africa’s labor market commission 20 years ago, this remains the most compelling market-based option for addressing apartheid’s structural legacy of unemployment.	这是马萨诸塞大学的萨姆·鲍尔斯（Sam Bowles）教授在20年前首先向南非劳动力市场委员会提出的，至今仍然是解决种族隔离制度结构性失业遗毒的最具说服力的，以市场为导向的选择。


Moreover, locally managed public works and community-based employment programs should be expanded, subject to the minimum wage and basic work standards.	此外还应扩大地方管理下的公共工程和社区就业方案，并遵照最低工资标准和基本工作条件执行。


Household income support should run on twin tracks: cash transfers, already well-established, and basic employment assurance, which lags well behind needs.	对家庭收入状况的援助应该双线推进：一方面是业已成熟的现金转移支付，另一方面是目前远远落后于需求的基本就业保证。


Active labor market interventions and the envisaged public employment services should be structured as public-private partnerships, building on the demonstrated success of established independent initiatives.	积极的劳动力市场干预和想定的公共就业服务应以公私伙伴关系的方式体现，而这种关系则构建于多项完善独立动议的成功实践基础之上。


Similarly, planning, oversight, and financing of technical and vocational education require effective collaboration among business groups, the national government, and municipalities.	同样，技术和职业教育的规划，监督和筹资需要企业集团，国家政府和市政当局之间的有效合作。


Beyond these institutional reforms, South Africa needs more rapid investment in cities, urban infrastructure and housing.	除了这些体制改革之外，南非需要在城市，城市基础设施和住房方面加快投资。


Urbanization is a powerful determinant of productivity growth and improved livelihoods.	城市化是生产率增长和生活质量改善的强有力决定因素。


South Africa’s cities are still racially fragmented and spatially inefficient. Too many people still live in informal settlements, often far from available work opportunities.	南非的城市目前仍处于种族分割，空间效率低下的状况，大量民众仍然生活在非正式居住区，而这些地方往往跟用工地点相距甚远。


The revenue systems needed to invest in better housing, modern transport, communication networks, industrial hubs, and enterprise development require strengthening, but they are not dysfunctional.	投资于改善住房，现代交通，通讯网络，工业中心和企业发展所需的政府税收体系需要得到强化，但目前来说也算是运行正常。


South Africa’s cities are creditworthy. They have excellent universities and capable financial institutions.	南非的各个城市还是相当靠谱，拥有优秀的大学和实力雄厚的金融机构。


Bolder urban plans, more inclusive development strategies, and more streamlined business processes would catalyze investment and strengthen self-sustaining growth dynamics.	而更大胆的城市规划，更具包容性的发展战略，更简化的业务流程将促进投资和增强自我维系型的增长动力。


Expanded opportunities in urban housing markets are imperative, but access to rural land and livelihoods are also important.	扩大城市住房市场的供给势在必行，但获取农村土地和生计的渠道也很重要。


The Motlanthe high-level panel’s proposals include strengthening land administration systems in informal settlements and traditional council areas, and facilitation of the subdivision of agricultural land.	莫特兰特高级别小组的建议包括加强非正式居住区和传统城市议会管理区的土地管理体系，促进农地的细分。


South Africa’s agriculture sector could expand employment and contribute to food security by strengthening partnerships between established commercial operators and emerging farmers.	最终令南非的农业部门可以通过加强既有商业经营者与新农民群体之间的伙伴关系来扩大就业并提升粮食安全。


The energy sector and air and rail transport are still dominated by state-owned near-monopolies, whose balance sheets are in trouble amid rapidly rising costs.	能源和空运/铁路运输仍然由近乎垄断的国有企业所主导，而这些企业的资产负债表正面临着成本迅速上涨的挑战。


Competition and private ownership would relieve the state balance sheet of a large and troubling contingent liability.	对此竞争和私人所有权的引入将有助于分担国家资产负债表中庞大且令人忧虑的短期债务。


More rapid progress in regional economic cooperation, across the public and private sectors, is another imperative – one that would benefit both South Africa and its neighbors.	另一个必要条件则是更迅速地推进贯穿公共和私营部门的区域性经济合作——这也有利于南非及其邻国。


There are growing financial, trade, and migration links among southern African countries, as well as shared water, transport, electricity, and communication networks. And yet the region suffers from a dearth of infrastructure co-investment projects, weak collaboration in trade promotion, and slow-moving cooperation in financial and tax arrangements.	当前非洲南部国家之间的金融，贸易和移民联系，以及水、交通，电力和通信网络共享都日益密切，但该地区基础设施投资项目依旧匮乏，贸易促进合作薄弱，财税合作进展缓慢。


Reform of the Southern African Customs Union is long overdue.	可见非洲南部关税联盟的改革早该进行了。


But perhaps the toughest test facing the ANC’s new leadership will be to reverse the creeping dirigisme that the country has faced in recent years, while steering bold reform.	但也许非国大新领导层所面临的最严峻的考验将是扭转近年来国家面临的隐性种族统制，同时执掌大胆的改革。


For too long, both private investment and critical state programs have been impeded by misdirected bureaucratic efforts to promote black economic interests, and public management regulations that are impenetrable and impractical.	长期以来，私人投资和重大国家项目都被致力于推动黑人经济利益的误导性官僚行为以及令人费解且不切实际的公共管理规定所阻碍。


Of course, black socioeconomic advancement is central to more rapid and broad-based development.	黑人社会经济的进步无疑是实现更迅速和广泛发展的核心因素。


And rigorous rules and audit procedures are required for honest and transparent financial management.	诚实和透明的财务管理当然也得有严格的规则和审计程序来保障。


But South Africa needs instruments that facilitate activity and incentives that reward productivity, not barriers to investment or initiative.	但南非需要动用一些政策工具去推动那些鼓励生产的活动和激励因素，而不是对投资或动议设置障碍。


If the ANC’s new leadership opens up economic opportunity, while putting an end to self-serving deal-making, confidence and growth will return.	如果非国大的新领导层能开创经济机遇，同时结束那些只为自己谋私利的交易方式，那么信心和增长就将回归。


The Global Economy in 2018	2018年的全球经济


HONG KONG – Economists like me are asked a set of recurring questions that might inform the choices of firms, individuals, and institutions in areas like investment, education, and jobs, as well as their policy expectations.	香港—像我这样的经济学家，经常被人问到可能影响企业、个人和机构在经济、教育、就业以及政策预期等方面的选择的问题。


In most cases, there is no definitive answer.	在大多数情况下，这类问题没有明确的答案。


But, with sufficient information, one can discern trends, in terms of economies, markets, and technology, and make reasonable guesses.	但如果有足够的信息，我们能够辨认经济、市场和科技等方面的趋势，并做出合理的猜测。


In the developed world, 2017 will likely be recalled as a period of stark contrast, with many economies experiencing growth acceleration, alongside political fragmentation, polarization, and tension, both domestically and internationally.	在发达世界，2017年可能因为其鲜明的对比而被人铭记，许多经济体经历了增长加速，与此同时，国内和国际政治却发生了分裂、极化和紧张。


In the long run, it is unlikely that economic performance will be immune to centrifugal political and social forces.	从长期看，经济表现不可能免疫于政治和社会的离心力。


Yet, so far, markets and economies have shrugged off political disorder, and the risk of a substantial short-term setback seems relatively small.	但到目前为止，市场和经济对政治失序毫不在乎，发生重大短期挫折的风险似乎相对较小。


The one exception is the United Kingdom, which now faces a messy and divisive Brexit process.	一个例外是英国，目前它正面临混乱和分裂性的退欧过程。


Elsewhere in Europe, Germany’s severely weakened chancellor, Angela Merkel, is struggling to forge a coalition government.	在其他欧洲地区，德国总理默克尔遭受重大挫折，正在为组建联合政府而焦头烂额。


None of this is good for the UK or the rest of Europe, which desperately needs France and Germany to work together to reform the European Union.	所有这些对于英国或欧洲其他国家都不是好消息，欧洲急需法国和德国共同改革欧盟。


One potential shock that has received much attention relates to monetary tightening.	一个受到了广泛关注的潜在冲击与货币紧缩有关。


In view of improving economic performance in the developed world, a gradual reversal of aggressively accommodative monetary policy does not appear likely to be a major drag or shock to asset values.	从改善发达世界经济表现的角度，逐渐退出激进宽松的货币政策似乎并不会对资产估值造成重大拖累或冲击。


Perhaps the long-awaited upward convergence of economic fundamentals to validate market valuations is within reach.	也许人们期待已久的经济基本面向上趋同、从而确认市场估值的情景已经近在眼前了。


In Asia, Chinese President Xi Jinping is in a stronger position than ever, suggesting that effective management of imbalances and more consumption- and innovation-driven growth can be expected.	在亚洲，中国国家主席习近平获得了比以往任何时候都更加强大的地位，这意味着有效治理失衡和更多依靠消费和创新驱动的增长可期。


India also appears set to sustain its growth and reform momentum.	印度看上去也能够保持增长和改革势头。


As these economies grow, so will others throughout the region and beyond.	在这些经济体增长的同时，域内外的其他经济体也在增长。


When it comes to technology, especially digital technology, China and the United States seem set to dominate for years to come, as they continue to fund basic research, reaping major benefits when innovations are commercialized.	在科技方面，特别是在数字技术方面，中国和美国将在未来多年里起主导作用，这是它们不断地投资于基础研究，并从创新结果商业化中获得巨大收益的结果。


These two countries are also home to the major platforms for economic and social interaction, which benefit from network effects, closure of informational gaps, and, perhaps most important, artificial-intelligence capabilities and applications that use and generate massive sets of valuable data.	这两个国家也是主要经济和社会互动平台的“主场”，它们得益于网络效应、信息差距的填补，以及——也许这才是最重要的——利用和产生大量有价值的数据集的人工智能能力和应用。


Such platforms are not just lucrative on their own; they also produce a host of related opportunities for new business models operating in and around them, in, say, advertising, logistics, and finance.	这些平台不仅本身能够盈利，还为围绕它们开展的新商业模式创造了一系列相关机会，比如广告、物流和金融。


Given this, economies that lack such platforms, such as the EU, are at a disadvantage.	因此，欧盟等缺少这类平台的经济体处于劣势之中。