Any attempt by the Fed to impose caps on loan-to-value ratios would also excite Americans’ fears of concentrated financial power – fears that have intensified since the crisis.	如果美联储采取任何贷款-价值比上限政策，还将激起美国人对集中金融权力的担忧——这一担忧自危机以来便有所增强。


By seeming to favor one segment of society, such an initiative would merely provide more fodder to those who argue for greater political oversight of the Fed.	这一看上去有利于某个社会细分部门的政策，最后只能给要求对美联储加强政治监督的人提供更多的口实。


Policymakers should respond to these challenges by working hard not only to develop effective macroprudential tools, but also to demonstrate that they can be deployed evenhandedly.	为了应对这些挑战，决策者不但需要倍加努力开发有效的宏观审慎政策，还必须证明这些政策可以公证地实施。


But even with their best efforts, the process will take time.	但即使他们竭尽全力，整个过程仍需要时间。


In the meantime, situations may arise in which the interest rate is the only instrument available for limiting financial excesses.	与此同时，可能出现某些状况，此时利率是唯一可用的限制金融过度的工具。


And, as the recent crisis demonstrated, there are circumstances when central bankers should use it.	最近的危机表明，在一些环境下，央行行长应该使用利率工具。


Sometimes, the costs of inaction – of permitting financial risks to develop – are simply too high.	有时，不作为（放任金融危机发展）的成本实在太高。


There are two key conditions for using policy interest rates as a macroprudential tool.	将利率政策作为宏观审慎工具使用有两个重要条件。


The first – and most obvious – is that risks to financial stability must be substantial.	首先也是最显而易见的是金融稳定风险必须很大。


But the second condition is equally important: adjusting the interest rate should not jeopardize the central bank’s other key objective, namely achieving its inflation target.	但第二个条件也同样重要：调整利率不应该妨碍央行的其他政策目标，即通胀目标。


The Swedish Riksbank provides a cautionary case in point.	瑞典央行在这方面提供了警示例子。


In 2010, when it began raising its policy rate to contain financial excesses, it put price stability at risk.	2010年，瑞典央行开始提高利率以遏制金融过度，结果物价稳定告急。


Before long, Sweden had succumbed to deflation, from which it is still struggling to recover.	不久，瑞典就陷入了通缩，至今仍无法顺利复苏。


Similarly, after its policy of direct pressure failed in 1929, the Fed raised interest rates to rein in the stock market.	类似地，1929年，在直接压力政策失败后，美联储提高利率抑制股市。


Its attempt to prevent a bubble came at the cost of inducing a depression.	其阻止泡沫的努力的代价是引发了萧条。


The point of seeking more effective macroprudential policies is to avoid such tragic bargains.	寻找更有效的宏观审慎政策的要点是避免这些悲剧性代价。


Made in China Remade	重塑“中国制造”


SHANGHAI – “It’s a dying business,” said the owner of a garment factory I met in Zhuhai, a city in Guangdong province.	发自上海——“这是个夕阳产业，”一位广东珠海的制衣厂老板跟我说。


Like many in his line of business, he is packing up. Lured by abundant cheap labor, investors flooded to Zhuhai two decades ago.	正如当地许多同行一样，他的企业正准备关门大吉。


Gone, it seems, is the heyday of T-shirts, toys, plastic flowers, tiles, hooks, springs, and the like. Today, the costs of manufacturing such items are lower in countries like Bangladesh and Vietnam than in Guangdong.	20年前大量投资在充足廉价劳动力的刺激下涌入珠海，而今衬衫、玩具、塑料花、瓷片、挂钩以及弹簧这类产品的辉煌已成往事，在广东生产这些东西的成本也已经高于孟加拉和越南这些国家了。


As labor costs continue to climb, is China set to lose its coveted spot as the world’s workshop?	随着劳动成本持续攀升，中国会否丧失其令人羡慕的世界工厂地位呢？


Rising labor costs are inevitable.	事实上，劳动成本的提高是无法避免的。


China’s government introduced tough labor laws and a minimum wage in 2008.	中国政府在2008年颁布了新的劳动法以及最低工资标准。


Recent policies to improve rural economic conditions have slowed the flow of migrants from the countryside.	最近关于改善农村经济状况的相关政策则减少了农村人口向城市流动的规模。


Workers are demanding higher compensation to match the fast-rising cost of living in China’s cities, as manifested in an ongoing and high-profile labor strike at a Honda plant based in Guangdong. Salary was the major point of contention.	为了赶上中国城市不断上升的生活成本，工人都开始要求更多的劳动补贴，比如广东本田汽车零部件厂那场引人注目的罢工事件就是其中一个例子，而争论的重点就在工资上面。


Workers on strike demanded a raise in pay from the current 1500 renminbi ($234.00) to 2000-2500 renminbi ($373.13) per month.	事件中该厂的罢工工人要求将月薪从人民币1500元（约合234美元）提高到2000~2500元（373. 13美元）。


Clearly, Chinese factories can no longer offer dirt-cheap prices.	很显然，中国的工厂已经无法再提供以前那种极为低廉的报价了。


Apparel production is a prime example of China’s declining competiveness in markets dependent on low-cost labor.	此外，服装制造业也是中国在低劳动成本市场丧失竞争力的重要例子。


According to a study by the US consulting firm Jassin O’Rourke, labor costs in China are higher than in seven other Asian countries.	美国咨询公司Jassin O’Rourke所发布的研究报告指出，中国的劳动力成本已经高于其他七个亚洲国家。


The average cost for a worker is $1.08 per hour in China’s coastal provinces and $0.55-0.80 in the inland provinces.	中国沿海地区的平均劳动成本是1. 08美元每小时，内陆省份则为0.


India was in seventh place, at $0.51 per hour.	55~0. 88美元每小时。


Bangladesh offers the lowest cost, only one-fifth the price of locations like Shanghai and Suzhou.	而排名在中国之前的印度是0. 51美元每小时，成本最低的孟加拉的劳动力价格仅为上海和苏州的1/5。


Adding to China’s labor woes, the financial crisis during the last two years had a disastrous effect on foreign demand.	除了中国国内的劳动力困境之外，过去两年所爆发的金融危机还对国外需求造成了毁灭性的打击。


In 2009, China’s export value fell by 16 percent from 2008. Labor intensive industries were especially hard hit.	2009年中国的出口总额较2008年下跌了18%，而劳动密集型产业的受害尤其严重。


In the textiles industry, profits declined for the first time in ten years in 2008.	2008年，纺织行业在10年以来首次出现盈利下降的情况。


In March 2009, exports of electronics and IT products tumbled nearly 25% from the previous period.	2009年3月，电子和IT产品出口相比去年同期下降了25%。


Although Chinese exports have begun to recover in 2010, the impact of the financial crisis remains palpable.	虽然中国的出口在2010年开始复苏，但金融危机的影响依然非常明显。


By January 2010, the value of exports has returned to its previous level in the same period of 2008. But many factories have already perished.	即便2010年1月的出口总值已经恢复到2008年同期的水平，但许多工厂已经不复存在了。


For Chinese manufacturers, a long-term trend of rising costs coupled with a short-term export slump were unprecedented challenges.	对中国制造商来说，长期性的成本上升加上短期的出口暴跌状况是一场前所未有的挑战。


But the government and entrepreneurs are not idly sitting by as competitiveness slips.	但政府和企业家们并没有坐以待毙。


These adverse conditions have inadvertently propelled a long-delayed restructuring of China’s labor-intensive industries.	这种不利状况反而还无意中推动了中国劳动密集型产业长期滞后的产业转型进程。


As costs surge, Chinese producers are seeking higher value, new niches, and more influence over policymaking.	随着成本上升，中国制造商正在寻求更高附加值，新的市场空间以及对政策指定的更大影响力。


Along China’s dynamic coastal belt, local governments are drafting new economic blueprints to push their firms up the value-added chain.	在中国沿海经济带的地方政府正在描绘新的蓝图，力图将企业推向附加值更高的产业链环节。


Consider the case of a textiles manufacturing center in Jiangsu province, dubbed the “silk capital” of China. Three-quarters of the city’s GDP had been coming from textiles production.	比如被称为“丝绸之都”的中国纺织业中心江苏省，其3/4的本地GDP由纺织业贡献，但去年的出口额下降了15%。


Last year, however, exports fell by about 15%. For local planners, the export shock was a wake-up call for change.	这对当地政策制定者来说堪称一记警钟。


As a result, officials in Jiangsu are no longer content with sewing clothing.	有见及此，当地官员已经不再满足于成衣加工。


Leveraging a mixture of administrative guidance and monetary incentives, the city government plans to reduce the share of garments in the output of textiles products by 25% in three years and to increase the industrial applications of chemical fibers, which promise much higher returns than apparel production.  Already, according to local officials, the city’s factories have acquired the ability to mass-produce super-thin fibers first designed in Japan.	通过一系列行政指导和金融扶持政策，当地政府计划在3年内将服装占纺织品总产量的比例下降25%，同时增加化学纤维的制造机组数量以获得比服装生产更高的回报。 据当地官员介绍，本地企业已经具备了大规模生产超细纤维的能力，而这种技术本来是日本所独有的。


In fact, the global meltdown may turn out to be a blessing in disguise for industrial upgrading.	事实上，全球衰退可能会成为一个产业升级的良机。


Slumping orders devastated low-end producers, which barely survived on wafer-thin margins.	订单下滑压垮了那些利润极端微薄的低端制造商。


Half of China’s toy factories went bust by the end of 2008.	在2008年末有一半的中国玩具厂破产。


Though alarming in the short term, the eradication of small producers spells good news for those that survived the crisis.	虽然这在短期内是个坏消息，但对那些在危机中幸存下来的企业来说那些小制造商的消亡则堪称一个利好消息。


As firms consolidate market share, they gain economies of scale.	随着市场份额的不断巩固，企业都实现了规模经济效应。


Larger firms are more capable of pooling resources for research and development, which is the key to China’s aspirations to climb the value ladder.	大型企业有更多实力将资源投入到产品研发当中，而这也是中国实现向高端产业链迈进的关键。


Less fragmented industries also lobby better.	更加集约化的企业也更利于和对手讨价还价。


Traditionally, contract manufacturers in China are scattered and fiercely competitive. They have little if any say over domestic and international regulations.	从前，中国的合同生产商一般被认为是一盘散沙而且内斗严重，对国内和国际的相关产业规定也没有什么发言权。


Producers in Jiangsu, for example, were forced to adapt constantly to fickle product-safety and environmental standards in export markets.	比如江苏的生产商就总是要被迫适应出口市场上反复无常的产品安全和环保标准。


Compared to producers in the US and Europe, those in China are weakly organized and passive.	相比于美国和欧洲的制造商，中国制造商总是缺乏组织而且很被动。


This could change.	但是这种状况是可以改变的。


As surviving firms gain in size, Chinese businesses may exercise more bargaining power vis-à-vis the Chinese government and foreign firms.	随着那些存活下来的企业规模不断扩大，中国企业在面对本国政府和国外企业时也拥有了对更强的讨价还价能力。


Exercising a louder voice in politics at home and abroad could mean reduced uncertainty for Chinese exporters.	对国内外政治拥有更大发言权可以减少中国企业所面临的不确定性。


Consider the strategy of Lenovo, China’s largest computer manufacturer; it has hired a lobbyist in Washington D.C., reportedly the first Chinese company to do so.	在这方面可以参考中国最大的电脑生产商联想的战略，该公司在美国华盛顿特区雇佣了一个国会游说人，而此举在中国企业中尚属首次。


In decades to come, China can no longer sustain the cost advantages that defined its initial period of export success.	在未来的几十年内，中国将无法再维持从前那种创造了出口奇迹的成本优势。


But it is a mistake to think that China’s manufacturing will remain in the doldrums.	但���不意味着中国制造业的辉煌已经一去不返了。


Compared to many developing countries, China’s government is stable and embraces foreign investment.	相对于许多发展中国家，中国政府政权稳固而且欢迎外国投资。


Industrial clusters have been established in many parts of the country, where business connections can compensate for rising costs.	在国内各地都已经形成了产业集群，集群内部环环相扣的商业链条可以有效抵消升高的成本。


Domestic consumption is growing.	中国国内的消费规模也正不断扩大。


Further, as low-end, low-cost labor jobs morph towards higher-end, higher-cost jobs, China will move not only into more valuable manufactured goods, but also into the service industries, such as design.	此外，随着低端低成本劳动职位向着高端高成本职位转化，中国不但会向生产高附加值产品迈进，同时也会涉足类似设计这样的服务性行业。


This change, too, could give the US a difficult new run-for-its-money.	这种转变同时也将为美国提供一个全新的投资方向。


When China’s labor-intensive industries emerge from their metamorphosis, we should expect to see firms that are larger, that invest more in product innovation and design, and that hold more sway over business and trade policies.	当中国的劳动密集型产业最终实现转型的时候，我们将会看到规模更大的，向研发和设计方面投资更多，而且更能向商业和贸易政策施加影响的企业。


So “Made in China” is not losing international dominance yet. It is merely taking on a new – and possibly more formidable – shape.	因此“中国制造”还没有失去其国际地位，而仅仅正在向着某种全新的——甚至可能是更令人生畏的——形态转化。


Madonna and Child	麦当娜与儿童


In October, hundreds of millions of people all over the world learned about a one-year-old boy from Malawi called David.	10月份，全世界几十亿人都知道了马拉维的一岁男孩戴维。


A month before, it seems safe to assume, many of these people had never heard of his native land, a landlocked African nation of about 13 million people bordering Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania.	而仅仅一个月前，大概还有很多人从来没听说过戴维的祖国，一个与莫桑比克、赞比亚和坦桑尼亚接壤的仅有1300万人口的非洲内陆国家。


Suddenly, David became the world’s best-known Malawian because it was his good fortune to be adopted by Madonna, the pop star who is to TV cameras what honey is to bears.	而突然之间，戴维就变成了世界上最知名的马拉维人，因为他有幸被麦当娜领养，而电视镜头见了麦当娜就像狗熊见了蜂蜜一样疯狂。


But was it really good fortune?	但戴维确实好运吗？


David’s father, Yohane Banda, suddenly in the media spotlight, said he had not understood that his son no longer belonged to him and might never return to Malawi.	戴维的父亲尤罕·邦达（Yohane Banda）眨眼间成了知名人物，他说他原来不知道儿子将不再属于自己，也不知道儿子可能再也不会回到马拉维。


Madonna says that that is not what Banda said earlier, although she does not speak his language.	麦当娜说尽管她听不懂邦达的语言，但邦达当时绝对不是的这样的说法。


Was it good for the boy, people asked, to be separated from his father?	人们也开始询问，把孩子从父亲身边带走好吗？


Human rights advocates began court action to demand his return.	人权倡议者开始提起诉讼，要求戴维回到自己的祖国。


David’s mother is dead.	戴维的母亲已经离开了人世。


After her death, his father, a villager who grows vegetables and gets other work when he can, was unable to care for him, and placed him in an orphanage.	她去世后，戴维的父亲边种菜边干零活，根本无法照顾戴维，不得已把他送进了孤儿院。


There, until Madonna came into contact with him, he was living with about 500 other children.	在遇到麦当娜之前，小戴维与500多个孩子在孤儿院共同生活。


Largely due to Malawi’s HIV/AIDS epidemic, the country has a million such orphans.	因为马拉维国内HIV/艾滋病肆虐，使那里的孤儿人数超过了100万。


Resources at the orphanages are limited, and many of the children there do not live to their fifth birthday.	而孤儿院的条件非常有限，院里的很多孩子都活不过5岁。


Madonna said that when she met David, he had severe pneumonia and was breathing with difficulty.	麦当娜说他见到戴维时，他正患有严重的肺炎，连呼吸都非常困难。


Malawi is one of the world’s least developed countries, with an infant mortality rate of 94 per thousand and a life expectancy at birth of 41 years.	马拉维是世界最不发达的国家之一，那里的婴儿死亡率达到了千分之九十四，而民众的平均寿命只有41岁。


Of the adult population, about one in seven have HIV/AIDS.	七分之一的成年马拉维人口患有HIV/艾滋病。


Left in the orphanage, there is no reason to think that David would have done better than the average Malawian.	似乎没有理由认为生活在孤儿院里的戴维会比一般的马拉维人运气更好。


Most likely, he would have done worse.	实际上，他的情况可能更糟。


In an interview, David’s father did not deny that his son would be better off with Madonna, and he refused to support the human rights activists seeking David’s return.	接受采访时，戴维的父亲并没有否认儿子跟着麦当娜会生活得更好，他也拒绝为要求戴维回国的人权积极分子提供帮助。


That seems a wise decision.	他做出这样的决定是有道理的。


Admittedly, David will be cut off from his cultural roots.	无可否认的是，戴维将失去自己的文化根基。


Although Madonna has said that she will bring him back to Malawi to see his father again, he will scarcely be able to feel at home there.	尽管麦当娜承诺会让戴维回到马拉维去看望自己的父亲，但戴维却难以再次适应那里的生活。


His mother tongue will be English; if he ever learns to speak his father’s language, it will be as a foreigner.	英语将成为他的母语，如果他有机会接触自己父辈的语言，也只能是作为外语来学习。


Nor will he be entirely at home in London, especially in the circles in which Madonna moves.	戴维也很难完全适应伦敦的生活，而在麦当娜生活的圈子里尤其如此。


A black child in a largely white world, he will always be “the orphan Madonna adopted.”	一个生活在白人世界里肤色黝黑的孩子，永远要被打上“麦当娜收养的孤儿”的烙印。


The difficulties of living in such circumstances, however, are surely less daunting than the hazards David would have faced had he stayed in the orphanage – assuming that he would have survived at all.	但在这样的环境中生活的难度却远远不像继续在孤儿院生活那样令人望而生畏，而这种假设的前提是戴维在孤儿院里能够存活下来。


But there is a broader issue at stake in David’s case.	但戴维领养案的背后却牵扯到一个更大的问题。


In adopting a child from a poor country, Madonna is following an example set by other celebrities like Mia Farrow, Ewan McGregor, and Angelina Jolie. Do such adoptions achieve anything more than helping the individual children adopted?	麦当娜收养贫困国家的儿童是效法米娅·法罗（Mia Farrow）、伊万·麦格雷戈（Ewan McGregor）和安吉莉娜·茱丽（Angelina Jolie）等名人的榜样，而这些名人的收养除了解救被收养的孩子以外还有其他任何意义吗？


Adopting children from developing countries does not address the causes of poverty.	收养发展中国家儿童并没有消除贫困的根源。


Despite the high rate of HIV/AIDS infections, Malawi’s population, like that of many developing nations, is growing rapidly.	像其他许多发展中国家一样，尽管HIV/艾滋病的感染率居高不下，马拉维的人口依然经历着快速的增长。


It is projected to surpass 19 million by 2025. That will put more pressure on the country’s already limited stock of agricultural land.	预计到2025年，那里的人口总数将超过1900万，该国本已紧张的耕地资源将因此承受更大的压力。


Educating young Malawians, especially girls, and making contraceptives widely available, would do much more to slow population growth than a few inter-country adoptions.	教育年轻的马拉维人，特别是年轻女性，为她们提供避孕工具将比几次跨国收养更能有效地遏制人口增长。


To her credit, Madonna is doing more than adopting David.	值得赞赏得是，麦当娜在收养戴维以外还做了很多其他工作。 她所发起的项目“拯救马拉维”( http://www.


Her project, “Raising Malawi” ( www.raisingmalawi.com ), will help other orphans.	raisingmalawi. com/ )将帮助除戴维以外的其他孤儿。


More importantly, with other partners, Raising Malawi collects funds for agricultural assistance, medical care, and education for villagers as well.	更为重要的是，在合作伙伴的帮助下，拯救马拉维将筹集资金用于农业援助、医疗救护以及对马拉维普通村民进行教育。 与安吉莉娜·茱丽、伯诺（Bono）、乔治·索罗斯（George Soros）和其他名人一道，“拯救马拉维”在为“千年承诺” ( www.


Along with Angelina Jolie, Bono, George Soros, and many others, Raising Malawi is assisting Millennium Promise ( www.millenniumpromise.org ), an organization founded by the prominent Columbia University economist Jeffrey Sachs.	millenniumpromise. org )项目提供帮助，而千年承诺项目的发起者是哥伦比亚大学著名的经济学家杰佛里·萨克斯（Jeffrey Sachs）。


The promises of the United Nations Millennium Summit, signed by all the world’s leaders, included halving extreme poverty, halting the spread of HIV/AIDS, and providing primary education for all children by 2015.	世界各国领导人在联合国千年峰会上做出的承诺包括使极端贫困人口下降一半、制止HIV/艾滋病的传播以及到2015年前让所有儿童接受小学教育。


Although good progress in meeting these goals has been made in Asia, in Africa there are now 140 million more people living in extreme poverty than there were in 1990.	尽管亚洲国家在这方面已经有了长足的进步，但在非洲国家，生活在极端贫困中的人口却比1990年增长了1亿4千万。


Skeptics doubt that foreign aid really helps.	怀疑论者置疑国外援助是否真正起到了作用。


Millennium Promise seeks to respond to that skepticism one village at a time.	“千年承诺”计划则采用逐村扶贫的方式来回应上述怀疑。


By selecting particular villages and providing basic health care, bed nets to stop malaria, primary education, better seeds, and other agricultural assistance, the organization aims to show that well-designed, comprehensive aid plans can, at relatively modest cost, raise people out of poverty.	该计划为选定的村庄提供基本的医疗服务和蚊帐来防治疟疾，普及小学教育、提供优质种子和其他农业支持。 该机构目的是证明设计良好的综合援助计划可以在开支相对较小的情况下，帮助人们脱离贫困。


One can only regret that the media seem less interested in this exciting and momentous story, which has the potential to help millions of children, than in Madonna’s adoption of a single Malawian infant.	媒体对这种令人振奋的重大消息缺乏兴趣，却对麦当娜收养一名马拉维婴儿的事念念不忘，这的确是令人遗憾的，因为这样一项计划可能会帮助成百上千万的儿童。


Truth, Lies, and Venezuela	真相、谎言和委内瑞拉


CAMBRIDGE – Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has a problem with me again.	美国剑桥—委内瑞拉总统马杜罗又和我“杠上了”。


The government-controlled national television station recently broadcast an illegally taped private phone conversation in which I proposed a study to explore how to rescue the Venezuelan economy by leveraging the support of the international community.	政府控制的国家电视台最近播出了一段非法录制的私人电话对话，在这段对话里，我提出研究一下如何通过利用国际社会的支持拯救委内瑞拉经济。


The government unsuccessfully edited the recording to make what was said sound nefarious, lied about the conversation’s meaning and about me, and plans to prosecute me.	政府对录音进行了蹩脚的编辑，使它的内容显得十分邪恶，欺骗对话的意思，污蔑我个人并计划起诉我。


This got me thinking about the eternal problem of evil.	这让我开始思考邪恶的核心问题。


Is it entirely relative, or are there objective grounds to characterize a behavior or act as evil?	邪恶是完全相对的吗？ 有客观标准判定某种行为或行动是邪恶的吗？


Do all confrontations occur between legitimate parties – with, say, one person’s terrorist being another’s freedom fighter – or can we say that some fights really are between good and evil?	所有的冲突都发生在合法的各方之间吗——比如，我之恐怖分子，彼之自由斗士？ 我们可以说有些战斗真的是正义与邪恶之争吗？


As the son of Holocaust survivors, I have always had an intuitive aversion to moral relativism.	作为大屠杀幸存者的儿子，我对道德相对论一直抱有天生的厌恶。


But what objective grounds are there to say that the Nazis were evil?	但说纳粹邪恶有什么客观依据？


As Hannah Arendt famously pointed out, people like Adolf Eichmann were plentiful and “neither perverted nor sadistic”; rather, “they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal.”	汉娜·阿伦特指出，像阿道夫·艾希曼（Adolf Eichmann）这样的人有的是，“他们不是变态，也不是虐待狂”，相反，“他们曾经，现在也仍然是非常地、可怕地正常的人。


A similar normality emerges from Thomas Harding’s portrait of Rudolf Höss, the commandant of Auschwitz, a man proud of having excelled at his assigned task.	” 托马斯·哈丁（Thomas Harding）对鲁道夫·霍斯（Rudolf Höss）的描述也体现了类似的正常性。 霍斯是奥斯维辛集中营负责人，他为以出色完成任务而自豪。


So what do we mean by evil in the first place?	那么，从一开始，我们说的“邪恶”是什么意思？


Moral philosophy has taken two very different approaches to this question.	道德哲学对这个问题有两种截然不同的看法。


For some, the goal is to find universal principles from which to derive moral judgments: Kant’s categorical imperative, Bentham’s utilitarian principle, and John Rawls’s veil of ignorance are some of the best-known examples.	对一些人而言，目标是找到普世原则，并在此基础上形成道德判断：康德的无上命令、边沁的功利原则、罗尔斯的无知之幕都是其中著名的例子。


For others, the key is to understand why we have moral sentiments in the first place.	对其他人而言，关键是理解我们为什么从一开始就有道德感。


Why have our brains evolved to generate feelings of empathy, disgust, indignation, solidarity, and pity?	我们的大脑是如何演化而产生同情、厌恶、愤慨、团结和怜悯等感受的？


David Hume and Adam Smith pioneered this way of thinking, which eventually spawned the fields of evolutionary and moral psychology.	休谟和亚当·斯密是这一思想流派的先锋。 这一流派最终衍生出演化和道德心理学。


According to this latter view, moral sentiments evolved to sustain human cooperation.	根据后一派的观点，道德感演化出来是为了维持人类的合作。


We are programmed by our genes to feel concern for babies and empathy for people in pain.	我们被我们的基因设定为能感知婴儿的问题和同情人们的痛苦。


We seek others’ recognition and avoid their rejection.	我们寻求他人的承认、避免被他人拒绝。


We feel better about ourselves when we do good and worse when we do bad.	当我们做好事时，我们会感到好受，做坏事时感到不好受。


These are the underpinnings of our unconscious moral sense.	这些都是我们的潜意识道德感的基础。


As a consequence, I doubt that any modern society has ever broadly supported what they saw as evil.	因此，我认为现代社会绝不可能广泛支持他们视为邪恶的东西。


Events like the Holocaust or the genocides in Ukraine (1932-1933), Cambodia (1975-1979), or Rwanda (1994) have been based either on secrecy or on the dissemination of a distorted worldview designed to make evil appear good.	大屠杀和乌克兰（1932—1933）、柬埔寨（1975—1976）以及卢旺达（1994）种族灭绝要么是秘密进行的，要么是在传播扭曲的世界观、让恶魔看起来十分善良的情况下发生的。


Nazi propaganda blamed Jews for everything: Germany’s defeat in World War I, universal moral values that prevented the Aryan race from exerting its superiority, and both communism and capitalism.	纳粹宣传机器指责犹太人是一切的祸源：德国在一战战败、阻止雅利安人取得高人一等地位的普世道德价值、共产主义和资本主义，这些都是犹太人带来的。


Ukrainians were accused of being Polish spies, kulaks, Trotskyites, and whatever else Stalin could invent.	乌克兰人���指责为波兰间谍、富农、托派和其他所有斯大林想象的出来的东西。


The spread of evil requires lies, because lies form the basis of the worldview that makes evil seem good.	邪恶的传播需要谎言，因为谎言构成了让恶魔看起来变得善良的世界观的基础。


But the dependence of big evil on big lies gives us a chance to fight back.	但大恶需要依靠大谎，这就给了我们反击的机会。


The biologist Martin Nowak has argued that the only way humans have been able to sustain cooperation is by developing cheap ways to punish misbehavior.	生物学家马丁·诺瓦克（Martin Nowak）指出，人类能够保持合作的唯一方式是找到惩罚不当行为的低成本方法。


To discourage A from hurting B, the reaction of C can be important, because if A knows that C will punish him for what he does to B, he might think twice before hurting B.	要让A不去伤害B，C的反应可能十分重要，因为如果A知道C会因为他对B做的事而惩罚他，他就会在伤害B之前三思。


But if punishment is risky or costly for C, she may not do much to A, making A feel unconstrained.	但如果惩罚行为对C而言风险很高或代价很大，他可能不会对A大动干戈，于是A就会肆无忌惮。


But if C can punish A in a cheap and even enjoyable way, the threat to A may be more substantial.	但如果C可以以低成本甚至随心所欲地惩罚A，那么A所受到的威胁就相当大了。


According to this view, the need to solve this conundrum is the evolutionary basis of gossip and reputation.	根据这一观点，解决这一谜题的需要是流言和名誉的演化基础。


Humans love to gossip, and gossip can harm our reputation, which in turn affects how others treat us.	人类喜欢“嚼舌头”，而嚼舌头可能伤害我们的名誉，这反过来影响到被人如何对待我们。


So punishment through gossip is both cheap and pleasant – and A’s fear of becoming the subject of gossip by C may be enough to deter bad behavior toward B.	因此通过流言惩罚成本低又令人愉快——而A害怕成为C炮制的流言的对象可能足以阻止他对B采取恶行。


This opens an important avenue for the control of evil.	这打开了控制邪恶的重要途径。


As US Senator and Harvard professor Daniel Patrick Moynihan put it, “Everyone is entitled to his own opinions, but not to his own facts.”	美国参议员、哈佛大学教授丹尼尔·帕特里克·莫伊尼汉（Daniel Patrick Moynihan）说：“每个人都根据他自己的观点定论，而不是根据他自己的事实定论。


So one way to contain evil is by attacking the lies on which it is based and condemning those who propound them.	”因此，遏制邪恶的一个方法是攻击作为它的基础的谎言，谴责炮制这些谎言的人。


In the US, there is a natural tendency to punish political candidates when they lie, but mostly about their personal peccadillos.	在美国，惩罚说谎的政治候选人是一种自然倾向，但大部分情况下这只关乎个人过失。


It would be great, for example, if Donald Trump’s calumnies about Mexicans made him unelectable.	比如，如果唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）因为诽谤墨西哥裔而导致他无法当选，这就是一件好事。


If a country’s political culture is such that all agree on condemning intentional lies and liars, especially when their goal is to promote hatred, a country may avoid big evil.	如果一国的政治文化是所有人都同意应该谴责故意撒谎和撒谎者，特别是如果撒谎的目的是散播仇恨的话，那么这个国家就能避免大恶。


But this is not the case in Venezuela.	但委内瑞拉不是这样。


Its government has run the country’s economy and society into the ground, overseeing the world’s steepest decline in output, highest inflation rate, and second highest murder rate, not to mention shortages beyond compare.	委内瑞拉政府把国家经济和社会搞得一团糟，在他们的领导下，委内瑞拉是全世界产出下降最厉害的国家、通货膨胀率最高的国家，谋杀率第二高的国家，更不用说“无与伦比”的短缺情况了。


And now it is systematically lying about the causes of the mess it created and inventing scapegoats.	而如今，政府又在系统性地撒谎，给他们所创造的乱象捏造替罪羊。


Maduro’s government blames its economic collapse on an “economic war” led by the US, the oligarchy, and international financial Zionism, of which I am supposedly an agent.	马杜罗政府指责委内瑞拉经济崩溃是拜美国、寡头和国际金融锡安主义所领导的“经济战争”所赐，我则是他们的代理人。


The problem is that the government has paid almost no cost for its systematic lies, even when these involve scapegoating poor Colombians for Venezuela’s shortages, and illegally expelling hundreds of them, and destroying their homes.	问题在于，政府的系统性撒谎几乎毫无代价，即使这些谎言把可怜的哥伦比亚人污蔑为委内瑞拉短缺的罪魁，还非法驱逐了数百名哥伦比亚人，毁掉了他们的家园。


While Latin American former presidents have spoken out against this outrage, important leaders such as President Dilma Rousseff of Brazil and President Michelle Bachelet of Chile have remained quiet.	拉丁美洲的众多前总统纷纷发声谴责这一暴行，但巴西总统罗塞夫和智利总统巴切莱特等重要领导人仍然保持沉默。


They should heed Albert Einstein’s warning: “The world is in greater peril from those who tolerate or encourage evil than from those who actually commit it.”	他们应该注意爱因斯坦的警告：“容忍甚至鼓励邪恶的人对世界的造成的危险比实际作恶的人还要大。 ”


Magna Carta at 800	大宪章800年


PRINCETON – Fly out of London’s Heathrow Airport and you may pass over a grassy field called Runnymede.	普林斯顿—飞离伦敦西斯罗机场（Heathrow Airport）时，你可能会飞越一片叫做兰尼米德（Runnymede）的草地。


Eight hundred years ago this month, it offered a colorful spectacle, dotted with the tents of barons and knights, and the larger pavilion of King John of England, looking like a circus top with the royal standard fluttering above.	八百年前的这个月，这片草地色彩斑斓，遍布着男爵和骑士的帐篷，更有规模更大的英格兰约翰王（King John）的王帐，看上去像是飘荡着王旗的马戏团。


Despite the gathering’s pageant-like appearance, the atmosphere was undoubtedly tense.	这次集会看上去像是游园，但气氛无疑是紧张的。


The purpose was to settle a conflict between rebellious barons and their king, a ruler described by a contemporary as “brimful of evil qualities.”	集会的目的是调和反叛贵族和国王之间的冲突，用当时人的话说，国王“恶贯满盈”。


John’s efforts to raise money to regain lost lands in France exceeded the usual taxes and levies that the nobles had accepted from his predecessors.	约翰王想要筹集资金夺回在法国失去的土地，他的筹资金额超过了贵族从先人手中继承的常规税费规模。


The king seized the estates, and sometimes the person, of wealthy lords or merchants and demanded hefty payments for their release.	国王没收富裕贵族和商人的地产，有时连人一起劫持，要求巨额赎金。


If his years of amassing cash had led to victory, John might have got away with his arbitrary methods; but when he was defeated in France, a group of barons rose up against him and captured London.	如果连年敛财带来了胜利，约翰大概不会那么专断了； 但当他在法国落败而还时，一群贵族奋起反抗并占领了伦敦。


As part of a peace deal brokered by the Archbishop of Canterbury, the king accepted the baron’s demands, put to him in a document called Magna Carta, or “the Great Charter.”	作为坎特伯雷大主教居间调停的和平协议的一部分，国王接受了贵族的要求，即一份被称为Magna Carta或曰“大宪章”的文件。


Magna Carta was not the first charter to be granted by an English king.	大宪章不是英格兰王授权的第一份宪章。


A century earlier, Henry I, by issuing a Coronation Charter, had indicated that he would be more respectful of the nobles’ privileges than was his predecessor.	一个世纪前，亨利一世颁布加冕宪章（Coronation Charter），以示其将比前任更加尊重贵族特权。


But Henry’s successors soon returned to the arbitrary ways of kings in those times.	但亨利的继任者很快又回到了国王专断的老路上。


Magna Carta, too, looked like it might be short-lived.	大宪章看上去也不会维持多久。


It was soon annulled by Pope Innocent III, who had formed an alliance with the king.	很快，它就被与国王结盟的教皇英诺森三世（Innocent III）取消。


But John died the following year, and the nobles backing his successor, the nine-year-old Henry III, needed support against a rival claimant to the throne.	但第二年约翰驾崩，支持其继承人、年仅九岁的亨利三世的贵族需要支持以对抗觊觎王位者。


To gain that support, Henry’s government reissued its own version of Magna Carta, which remains part of the laws of England.	为了赢得支持，亨利政府重新颁布了其自身的大宪章，至今仍是英国法律的一部分。


Copies were made and dispersed to many of the great English cathedrals.	大宪章被复制多份，颁给大英格兰地区的多家教堂。


The Latin original was translated first into French, the language of the nobility, and then into English.	拉丁原文被翻译成贵族的语言——法语，然后再翻译成英语。


By the end of the century, peasants were citing it in a struggle against injustice.	到世纪末时，英国农民都开始引用大宪章与不公抗争。


The first printed edition was made in 1508.	第一份印刷版大宪章于1508年问世。


In the 1640s, parliamentarians saw in it a legal basis for their overthrow of King Charles I. Later rebels, including the American revolutionaries and Nelson Mandela, have similarly justified their actions by appealing to Magna Carta.	十七世纪40年代，议会从大宪章中寻找推翻查理一世的法律依据。 随后的起义，包括美国革命和纳尔逊·曼德拉，都援引大宪章论证他们的行为。


What these fighters for justice and freedom take from this 3,500-word document is the brief statements of general principles in response to John’s arbitrary seizure of his subjects’ property and person.	这些正义和自由斗士从这份3,500字的文件中获得的是应对约翰专断臣民物权和人权的关于普通原则的简短陈述。


In its 39th Chapter, Magna Carta states: “No free man is to be arrested, or imprisoned, or diseised [dispossessed], or outlawed, or exiled, or in any way destroyed, nor will we go against him, nor will we send against him, save by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land.”	大宪章第39章说：“自由民，如未经其同级贵族之依法裁判，或经国法裁判，皆不得被逮捕、监禁、没收财产、剥夺法律保护权、流放或加以任何其他伤害。


Chapter 40 states, concisely, another powerful principle: “To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny or delay, right or justice.”	”第40章简洁地表述了另一项强大的原则：“余等不得向任何人出售、拒绝或延搁其应享之权利和公正裁判。 ”


These two chapters have their modern echo in the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution, which decrees that no state shall deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property “without due process of law” or deny anyone “the equal protection of the laws.”	美国宪法第14修正案是这两章的现代回音——规定“如未经法律程序”各州不得剥夺任何人的生命、自由或财产， 或拒绝任何人“获得法律的平等保护”。


Yet Magna Carta is not a democratic document.	但大宪章不是一份民主文件。


Although it established the requirement of common consent to taxation, that consent was to be obtained from an assembly of earls, barons, bishops, and abbots – in the age of chivalry, not even knights were invited to participate.	尽管它规定税收必须以一致同意（common consent）为前提，但这一同意是通过高等和低等贵族、主教和修道院长的集会形成——在骑士制度时代，就连骑士也无资格与会。


The idea that towns such as London should be represented was voiced at the time, but it found no place in the final text.	当时，伦敦等城镇应该获得代表的观念已经产生，但在最终文本中难觅踪影。


What Magna Carta shows, therefore, is that “Who rules?” is one question, and “What, if any, are the limits to political power?” is another.	因此，大宪章表明，“谁统治”是一个问题，“如有，政治权力的界限在哪里”是另一个问题。


Because Magna Carta attempted to set limits to political power without grounding these limits in the sovereignty of the people, it demonstrated a problem with which philosophers have grappled for even longer than 800 years.	大宪章试图为政治权力规定界限，但又不把这一界限建立在人民主权的基础上，这造成了一个问题，让哲学家们纠结了800多年。


From where do the principles that constrain rulers come, if from neither the rulers nor their subjects?	既然约束统治者的原则既非来自统治者，也非来自臣民，那么它们来自何方？


The tradition of natural law offers an answer that was familiar to medieval scholars, for whom natural law was knowable to us by our natural reason (as opposed to those laws that could be discovered only through divine revelation).	自然法传统提供了一个中世纪学者所熟悉的答案。 对他们来说，自然法可以通过我们的自然理性（natural reason）理解，相反，另外一些法律只能通过天启（divine revelation）发现）。


Magna Carta’s key principles can be seen as derived from reason because the very idea of a law excludes arbitrary arrest and seizure, as well as the rendering of a verdict on any grounds other than the proper application of the law.	大宪章的关键原则可以视为为理性所启发，因为法律的思想排除了专断的逮捕和没收，也排除了以法律的合理应用之外的基础所做的裁决。


If A is legally bound to return B’s cow when she strays onto his land, and then C’s cow strays onto B’s land in relevantly similar circumstances, B must also be bound to return C’s cow.	如果A依法必须在B的奶牛进入他的土地时将它归还给B，而C的奶牛在基本类似的情况下进入了B的土地，B也由法律义务归还C的奶牛。


C need not bribe the judge to get his cow back.	C不需要贿赂法官才能要回奶牛。


There is nothing in Magna Carta that prevents the enactment and enforcement of unjust laws; but it does elevate the law above the ruler’s will.	大宪章没有阻止制定和实施不公正法律的内容； 但它确实让法律位于统治者的意志之上。


Unfortunately, that idea still is not accepted in many countries.	不幸的是，这一思想尚未被许多国家接受。


Moreover, as the continued existence of the US prison camp at Guantánamo Bay shows, even among countries that trace their political institutions to Magna Carta, perceived security threats have weakened the requirement that no one be arrested except under the law of the land, and that justice not be delayed.	此外，美国关塔那摩湾监狱一直存在，这表明，即使在以大宪章为政治制度源泉的国家，安全威胁感也削弱了除依法行动之外不得逮捕任何人、正义不得拖延的要求。


Mahmoud Abbas’s Bad Neighborhood	阿巴斯的恶邻


With Gaza poised on the brink of civil war, pity poor Mahmoud Abbas, who took over as president of the Palestinian Authority two and a half years ago, after the death of Yasser Arafat.	随着加沙地带滑向内战的边缘，令人不由得同情两年半以前接替去世的阿拉法特执掌巴勒斯坦权力机构的阿巴斯。


An academic by profession, Abbas has tried mightily to lead the Palestinian people with civility, adherence to democratic principles, and public disdain for violence.	作为一名学者出身的领导人，阿巴斯竭力以文人作风领导巴勒斯坦民众，恪守民主原则、鄙视暴力。


He never had a chance.	而他却从未获得机会。


Palestinian rivals, both from his own Fatah party and from the Islamists of Hamas, as well as the Israelis, perceived Abbas’s civility as weakness.	他的巴勒斯坦对手，既来自他自己的法塔赫党，也有来自伊斯兰主义的哈马斯，以及以色列人都将他的文人作风视为软弱。


Abbas introduced a totally different style of management from that of Arafat.	阿巴斯引入的管理风格与阿拉法特截然不同。


Dressed in his military suit until his last day, Abu Ammar (Arafat’s revolutionary nom de guerre) did not believe that it was time to become a civilian president while the Israeli occupation continued.	直到生命的最后一天都身穿军装的阿布•阿马尔（阿拉法特的革命化名）不认为在以色列占领仍然继续的时候自己应该以平民总统的姿态出现。


Dressed in a suit and tie, Abbas introduced professional Western-style management to the presidency, but had no idea what to do with grass-roots militants.	西装革履的阿巴斯将专业的西方式的管理引入自己的总统职位，但却全然不知应该如何应对草根的民兵武装。


One of the first comments I heard from journalists was that Abbas, a family man, went home at lunchtime and worked regular business hours.	我从记者们那里听到的关于阿巴斯的第一个评论就是：阿巴斯是个顾家男人，每天午餐时间会回家，他的工作时间也与普通人无异。


His other name, Abu Mazen, is not a revolutionary name but reflects the practice of naming a person as the father of his eldest son.	他的另一个名字—阿布•马曾不是一个革命的名字，而是反映了作为父亲将家姓贯与长子的寻常做法。


Abbas’s son, Mazen, runs a local advertising agency.	阿巴斯的儿子，马曾，经营一家本地的广告公司。


In his attempt to counter Arafat’s political corruption and micromanagement, Abbas lost whatever chance he had to maintain the loyalty of the Fatah leadership, newly appointed PA officials, security personnel, and, most importantly, local militants.	阿巴斯力图纠正阿拉法特的政治腐败和微观管理，但却失去了所有保持法塔赫领导层、新任命的巴勒斯坦权力机构官员、保安人员以及最重要的，地方武装人员忠诚度的机会。


Calling for national elections, while politically correct, was political suicide, for he lacked any idea of the possible outcome and did very little to ensure the discipline of Fatah.	呼吁进行全国大选虽然具有政治正确性，但却是一种政治自杀。 因为阿巴斯完全不明白这样做可能带来的后果并且在确保法塔赫的纪律方面也几乎无所作为。


An attempt at a primary to choose Fatah candidates backfired, owing to fraud and the losers’ refusal to honor the results.	由于舞弊和失败者拒绝接受选举结果，阿巴斯甄选法塔赫候选人的初衷取得了适得其反的结果。


Rival Fatah candidates then split the party’s vote, allowing Hamas an easy victory.	法塔赫竞选对手们随即分化了本党的选票，使得哈马斯乘虚而入，夺取胜利。


Negotiations with the Israelis was one area where Abbas, who led the Oslo process that saw the creation of the Palestinian Authority, thought he could do well.	作为领导奥斯陆进程，见证巴勒斯坦权力机构创建的人，阿巴斯认为在与以色列人谈判方面自己应该驾轻就熟。


But, unlike Oslo, when Abbas was working under Arafat and able to project power from that base, as Palestinian president he was both negotiator and supposedly the center of power.	但与奥斯陆的情况不同，当阿巴斯在阿拉法特麾下工作时他能以此为基础运用权力。 而作为巴勒斯坦总统，他既是谈判者，也应该是权力的中心。


The Israelis discerned Abbas’s weakness early on, and once Hamas was elected in a landslide, had little incentive to help him despite the prodding of the United States.	以色列人早就洞悉了阿巴斯的弱点，所以即便有美国在一旁敦促，一旦哈马斯以压倒性的姿态赢得了选举，他们就没有什么动力再帮助阿巴斯了。


Not only was Abbas politically weak, with few friends among Fatah militants, but he also didn’t show much interest in what was happening in Gaza.	阿巴斯不仅在政治上软弱，在法塔赫武装中少有朋党，他对加沙地带的形势也缺乏兴趣。


He spent as little time as he could there, preferring his Ramallah office on the West Bank and spending time with visiting politicians and meeting world leaders there or abroad.	他尽可能地少花时间到加沙，更乐意在其位于约旦河西岸拉马拉的办公室会见来访的政客并在此或出国会见世界政要。


And, while he was technically the commander-in-chief of the Palestinian forces, these forces lacked the will to stand up to Hamas’s growing power.	再者，虽然他名义上是巴勒斯坦部队的总司令，但这些军队却无意遏制羽翼日丰的哈马斯。


The economic siege on Palestine after the Hamas victory further weakened Abbas.	在哈马斯大选胜利以后对巴勒斯坦的经济围困进一步削弱了阿巴斯。


With no salaries to pay teachers (or even the security services), his ability to influence even his own presidential guard was severely limited.	由于无钱支付教师（甚至保安人员）的工资，使其对自己总统卫队的影响力也极为有限。


During a meeting, which I attended, with a delegation from the International Press Institute to obtain the release of the BBC journalist Alan Johnston, abducted in Gaza in March, Abbas explained the PA’s inability and weakness.	我参加了一次国际新闻研究院代表团与阿巴斯的会晤。 会晤的目的是为了争取今年三月在加沙被绑架的BBC记者Alan Johnston的获释。


Soldiers march on their stomachs, he said, and complained that his own forces have not been able to renew their equipment or obtain badly needed ammunition for seven years.	在会上，阿巴斯解释了巴勒斯坦权力机构的无能和软弱。 他说士兵们饿着肚子行军，并抱怨说自己的军队已经连续七年未能更新装备或获得急需的武器弹药了。


Ironically, the Israelis and the world community, which had basically frozen Palestinian finances, wanted Abbas to continue to control the security forces, despite Fatah’s loss in the parliamentary elections.	具有讽刺意味的是，尽管法塔赫在议会选举中败北，冻结了巴勒斯坦资金的以色列人和国际社会还是想让阿巴斯继续控制安全部队。


Israel and the US led a virtual blockade on Palestine, with Israel refusing to return collected taxes and the US pressing world banks not to recognize the signature of the Palestinian finance minister.	以色列和美国领导了对巴勒斯坦的事实性封锁。 以色列拒绝退税而美国则向世界各大银行施压让其拒绝承认巴勒斯坦财政部长的签名。


The nominal reason is Hamas’s refusal to recognize Israel.	表面上的原因是哈马斯拒不承认以色列。


But most Arab countries also don’t recognize Israel, and yet the banking world deals with them normally.	但大多数阿拉伯国家也不承认以色列，而这却并不妨碍银行界与它们的正常往来。


A compromise power-sharing agreement brokered by the Saudis initially seemed to be a solution.	一份在沙特斡旋下产生的妥协权力共享协议起初似乎是解决之道。


According to the Mecca agreement signed last February, Hamas would give up important ministries such as finance, interior, and foreign affairs, while Abbas would ensure the end of the economic siege.	根据去年二月在麦加签署的这份协议，哈马斯将交出财政、内政、外交等重要部门，而阿巴斯则会确保经济围困的终止。


Four months later, however, the siege has not been lifted, and the Hamas ministers (such as former Foreign Minister Mahmoud Zahhar and Interior Minster Said Siyam) who were forced out now feel betrayed and are demanding their jobs back.	然而，四个月以后，围困仍未解除，被迫下台的哈马斯的部长们（如前外交部长Mahmoud Zahhar和内政部长Said Siyam）深感受骗，正要求官复原职。


If the Israelis and the international community want Abbas to remain in power, they must change their approach dramatically, by lifting the economic siege and providing his presidency with military and political support.	如果以色列人和国际社会想让阿巴斯继续掌权，他们就必须彻底改变做法，解除经济围困并给予阿巴斯军事和政治上的支持。


And, if the Israelis are convinced that Abbas is too weak to do anything, they can help the Palestinians by releasing the Fatah strongman, Marwan Barghouti, from an Israeli jail.	如果以色列人确信阿巴斯软弱无能，那么他们就应该从监狱释放法塔赫的强势人物Marwan Barghouti，从而帮助巴勒斯坦人。


Otherwise, Abbas will be left with no alternative but to follow the advice of a leading Palestinian professor, Ali Jirbawi, who suggested simply that Abbas should dissolve the Palestinian Authority and return power to the Israelis, who remain legally and practically responsible for the areas they occupied in 1967.	否则阿巴斯就会别无选择地遵循一位知名巴勒斯坦教授Ali Jirbawi的建议，解散巴勒斯坦权力机构，并将权力交还给以色列人。 在法律上和现实中，以色列人仍然对这片他们在1967年占领的地区负责。


Bonds of the Diaspora	侨民债券


WASHINGTON, DC – The goals of the post-2015 development agenda cannot be achieved without strong programs and adequate funding.	华盛顿—若无强大的计划和重组的资金，2015年后发展日程目标就无从实现。


Official development assistance amounts to roughly $130 billion a year; though foreign-direct investment and portfolio inflows can help poor economies, additional sources of development finance must be found.	官方发展援助每年大约有1,300亿美元； 尽管外国直接投资和投资组合流入也可以帮助穷国，但必须找到新的发展融资源。


One under-exploited resource is diaspora financing – that is, the remittances and savings earned by nationals working abroad and sent home to family and friends.	一个没有得到充分开发的资源是侨民融资——即由海外工作的本国人寄回给家庭和朋友的侨汇和储蓄。


The challenge is to channel this income effectively.	挑战在于如何高效地让这笔收入流动起来。


There are more than 230 million international migrants worldwide, which is more than the population of the world’s fifth most populous country, Brazil.	全世界有2. 3亿移民，比世界第五大人口过巴西的人口还多。


The estimated $2.6 trillion that they earn annually exceeds the GDP of the United Kingdom, the world’s sixth-largest economy.	据估计，他们每年能赚取2. 6万亿美元，比世界第六大经济体英国的DGP还多。


Much of this income is taxed or spent in the host countries.	这笔收入中很大一部分在东道国被课税和消费掉了。


But, assuming a 20% saving rate (close to the average for developing countries), this implies total annual diaspora saving of more than $500 billion.	但是，假设储蓄率为20%（接近于发展中国家的平均水平），那么每年的侨民储蓄将超过5,000亿美元。


In 2013, migrants from developing countries sent home around $404 billion (excluding the vast unrecorded inflows that arrive through informal channels).	2013年，发展中国国家移民向国内汇去了4,040亿美元（不包括通过非正式渠道的未报告流入）。


India received $70 billion, more than the value of its exports of information-technology services.	印度得到700亿美元，比该国信息技术服务出口总值还高。


Remittances to Egypt were larger than the country’s earnings from the Suez Canal.	流入埃及的侨汇超过了苏伊士运河的收入。


And expatriate earnings accounted for more than one-third of Tajikistan’s national income.	塔吉克斯坦的侨汇收入占国民收入的三分之一以上。


These inflows tend to be larger in poor and small economies, and often provide the main lifeline in fragile or conflict-affected countries.	穷国和小国的侨汇流入通常会比较大，并且往往是脆弱或冲突影响地区的主要生命线。


Remittances also arrive first in times of economic hardship and in the aftermath of natural disasters.	在经济萧条时期或自然灾难发生初期，首先到达的也往往是侨汇。


They tend to be more stable than private capital flows, declining by a mere 5% during the recent global financial crisis and recovering rapidly to pre-crisis levels.	侨汇通常比死人资本流更加稳定，在最近的全球金融危机中，侨汇量只下降了5%，并且很快就恢复到了危机前水平。


Once the money is back in an expatriate’s homeland, it is put to good use.	资金回到侨民祖国后会得到很好的使用。


Remittances have reduced poverty in Bangladesh, Ghana, and Nepal.	侨汇帮助减少了孟加拉国、加纳和尼泊尔的贫困。


Children from recipient households in El Salvador have a lower school-dropout rate; in Sri Lanka, they have more access to private tutors.	在萨尔瓦多，有侨汇收入的家庭的儿童辍学率更低； 在斯里兰卡，这类家庭的孩子更容易得到家庭教育。


The money finances health care, housing, and businesses.	侨汇为医疗、住房和经商提供资金。


Micro-finance borrowers can even use remittance receipts as evidence of credit history.	微金融借款人甚至可以用侨汇收入作为信用历史记录。


However, despite remittances’ evident value in supporting development goals, it must be remembered that they are private funds and should not be considered a substitute for official aid.	但是，尽管侨汇在支持发展目标方面具有极高的价值，但必须记住，它们是私人资金，不应该作为官方援助的替代品。


Attempts by governments to earmark remittances for specific “productive” uses have failed, especially in countries with weak investment environments.	政府将侨汇归为具体的“生产性”用途的尝试以失败告终，特别是在投资环境疲软的国家。


Likewise, taxing remittances can hurt the poor disproportionately and drive the flows of money underground.	类似地，对侨汇课税会极大地伤害穷人，让资金流转入地下。


Conversely, improving the investment climate is likely to increase the share of remittances invested into businesses.	相反，改善投资气候有可能增加侨汇投入商业活动的比例。


Indeed, reducing high money-transfer charges – currently averaging more than 8% globally – has been shown to facilitate remittances and increase migrants’ savings.	事实上，资金转移成本目前的全球平均水平高达8%以上。 降低这一成本已被证明有利于侨汇和增加移民储蓄。


The G-20 is now working to cut these costs to 5% in five years; a more aggressive target of 1% by 2030 could – and should – be set.	二十国集团正在力争在五年内将这一成本削减5%； 更宏伟的目标是到2030年将这一成本削减至1%。


Mobile banking technology can help.	动员银行技术有所助益。


So can greater market competition, which has already lowered fees in major remittance corridors such as those linking the UAE to India and the Philippines, and the United States to Mexico.	加强市场竞争亦然。 加强市场竞争已经降低了从阿联酋到印度和菲律宾、从美国到墨西哥等主要侨汇通道的费用。


Some banks and businesses now offer zero-cost remittance services to attract customers.	一些银行和企业现在提供零成本侨汇服务以吸引客户。


Governments could also relax regulations for small remittance transactions.	政府还可以放松对小额资金转移的监管。


Exclusive partnerships between national postal systems and money-transfer companies should also be abolished.	国家邮政体系和资金转移公司之间的排他性合作也应该取消。


Another way to better use diaspora savings would be to create new “diaspora” financial instruments.	另一个更好地使用侨民储蓄的办法是建立新的“侨民”金融工具。


A low denomination security (of, say, $1,000), carrying a 3-4% interest rate, might be attractive to migrant workers who currently earn minimal interest on deposits held in host-country banks.	对目前只能将钱存在东道国银行赚取最低利息的移民工人来说，3—4%利率的低面额证券（如1,000美元）将很有吸引力。


A five-year diaspora bond would have a lower interest rate than a sovereign bond sold to foreign institutional investors, as diaspora investors’ perception of risk in their home country is likely to be lower.	五年期侨民债券将可以以比主权债券更低的利率发售给外国机构投资者，因为侨民投资者对母国的风险感知可能会低一些。


The bonds would also be more stable than non-resident foreign-currency deposits in developing countries, and registering the bonds with the appropriate authorities in major host countries would make them reasonably safe.	这种债券也将比发展中国家非居民外币存款更稳定，而将这一债券限制在主要东道国的有关当局范围内将使它相当安全。


But diaspora bonds will not be a feasible development instrument unless they are linked to development projects in places where there is sufficient trust in the government.	但除非侨民债券与发展工程联系起来，并且发行国政府拥有充分的信誉，否则侨民债券就不是可行的办法。


The bonds should be available to all investors, not just migrant savers, and be distributed widely, not kept on the books of a few investment banks.	侨民债券应该向所有投资者开放，而不仅仅对移民储蓄者开放。 侨民债券应该广泛分销，而不是只出现在少数投资银行账上。


That way, large sums could be mobilized for development at low, stable interest rates, without diminishing migrant workers’ incentive to save.	这样，大量资金就可以以稳定的低利率动员起来用于发展用途，同时也不会破坏移民工人的储蓄激励。


Data and Development	数据与发展


WASHINGTON, DC – Since the turn of the century, the international development community has rallied behind the Millennium Development Goals, which set specific targets in eight key areas, including poverty, child mortality, and disease, to be achieved by 2015.	华盛顿—世纪之交以来，国际发展界便团结在千年发展目标（MDG）背后。 千年发展目标为包括贫困、儿童死亡率和疾病在内的八个领域设定了应在2015年达到的具体目标。


In formulating the post-2015 development agenda, measuring the MDGs’ successes – and identifying where progress has lagged – is critically important.	为了设立2015年后的发展日程，评估MDG的成功以及总结进步不足之处是至关重要的。


And that demands more and better data.	而这需要更好的数据。


To be sure, international institutions and many developing countries have invested significantly in improving data collection to track better their performance against MDG targets.	平心而论，国际机构和许多发展中国家投资了许多资源用于改善数据收集以更好地追踪MDG方面的表现。


In 2003, only four countries had two data points for 16 or more of the 22 principal MDG indicators; by last year, that figure had soared to 118 countries.	2003年，只有四个国家在MDG22个主要指标中的16个或以上拥有两个数据点； 而在去年，这一数字增加到118个国家。


But development data remain a scarce resource in the developing world.	但发展数据仍是发展中世界的稀缺资源。


Given their value in measuring – and propelling – social and economic progress, this shortage must be addressed urgently.	这些数据在评估以及推动社会和经济进步方面具有很高的价值，必须马上解决数据稀缺的问题。


A catalyst is needed to expand the production and use of development data.	必须找出发展数据产生和使用的促进因素。


With this in mind, the high-level panel on the post-2015 development agenda is right to call for a global “data revolution.”	根据这一思想，2015年后发展日程高级委员会正确地呼吁进行全球“数据革命”。


The meteoric rise of digital technologies has changed the global landscape since 2000, when the MDGs were launched.	自2000年（MDG发布的当年）以来，数字技术的迅速崛起改变了全球面貌。


Remote sensing, information gathered from online activity, and crowd-sourced data from mobile phones can complement traditional methods of gathering statistics.	遥感、在线活动数据收集和来自移动电话的众包数据能够形成对传统数据收集方式的补充。


This technology-driven shift in the way people create, curate, share, and apply data should be reflected in development efforts for two reasons.	这一关于人们创造、整理、共享和运用的技术推动的变化理应反映在发展政策中，原因有二。


First, policymakers are eager to attain more up-to-date data that can guide their efforts.	首先，决策者急切地想获得最新数据以指导政策制定。


Second, these data can also help drive innovation and civic engagement, by enabling the development of new and more effective goods and services.	其次，这些数据还能让更新更有效的商品和服务的开发成为可能，从而帮助推动创新和公民参与。


However, there is a caveat.	但是，我们也要看到警示信号。


The size and complexity of these datasets require specialized analytical skills (which remain in short supply), as well as more research and experimentation.	数据集的规模和复杂性要求专业的分析技能（目前这类技能也处于短缺状态）和更多的研究与实验。


Increasing the quantity, quality, availability, and usability of data for development requires addressing the market failures that lead to gaps in data use and coverage in developing countries.	增加发展数据的数量、质量、可获得性和可使用性需要克服导致发展中国家数据使用和覆盖缺口的市场失灵。


This means that as technology, data, and data users and providers make rapid advances, cooperation among diverse actors – governments, national statistics offices, donor agencies, global and local NGOs, academic and research institutions, the private sector and others – will be needed.	这意味着，随着技术、数据以及数据用户和提供者取得快速进步，各种因素之间需要有所合作——包括政府、国家统计部门、出资机构、全球和地方非政府组织、学术和研究机构、私人部门及其他。


In this spirit of cooperation, the major multilateral development institutions – the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Islamic Development Bank, the United Nations, and the World Bank – have already begun to strengthen their joint efforts in producing and sharing development data.	在这一合作精神下，主要多边发展机构——非洲开发银行、亚洲开发银行、泛美开发银行、国际货币基金组织、伊斯兰开发银行、联合国和世界银行——已经开始加强在生产和共享发展数据方面的合作。


And the effort has already borne fruit.	并且已经开始产生成效。


But there is much more to be done.	但做得还远远不够。


Through new forms of collaboration, developing-country statistical agencies should aim to improve data coverage and quality, while leveraging technology to make data easier to manage, use, and access.	通过新形式的合作，发展中国家统计机构应该将目标定在改善数据的覆盖面和质量上，同时利用技术让数据变得更加易于管理、使用和接触。


More (and more reliable) data could also improve decision-making by helping policymakers to understand specific social, economic, and environmental issues.	更多（以及更可靠）的数据还有助于决策者理解具体的社会、经济和环境问题，从而改善决策。 更好的性别统计数字有助于更详细地了解女性获得正义、教育和金融服务的状况；


Better gender statistics could provide a more detailed understanding of women’s access to justice, education, and finance; improved measures of poverty and inequality could reveal how the benefits of economic growth are distributed; and natural capital accounting could uncover the value of resource endowments, thereby helping to ensure that they are used in a rational and sustainable manner.	改进减贫和治理不平等性的指标能够揭示经济发展的好处是如何分配的； 而自然资本的记录能揭示资源禀赋价值，从而有助于确保以理性、可持续的方式使用资源。


Obviously, data related to issues that directly affect the wellbeing of people and the planet are essential for effective policymaking.	显然，与直接影响人类福利和地球的问题相关的数据对有效决策来说至关重要。


Making such data open and accessible should be viewed as a basic condition of ensuring people’s ability to hold governments accountable and thus participate in decisions that affect their lives.	保证这类数据公开易得应该被视为确保人民有能力问责政府从而参与影响他们的生活的决策过程的基本条件。


The more resources that are devoted to achieving this goal, the more effective the post-2015 development agenda will be.	用于实现这一目标的资源越多，2015年后发展日程的效率就会越高。


Trading Up from Poverty	贸易脱贫


WASHINGTON, DC – A long-held tenet of international-trade theory is that, in the long run, increased trade correlates with faster GDP growth.	华盛顿——从长远看，贸易增长与GDP快速增长相关是国际贸易理论长期坚持的原则。


But the challenge – which my institution, the World Bank, is working to overcome – is to ensure that trade-driven growth benefits the poor.	但我所在的世界银行正着力解决的难题是确保由贸易驱动的增长能够惠及穷人。


That is why the heads of seven multilateral institutions, including the World Bank, strongly supported the push for the trade-facilitation agreement that was reached earlier this month at the World Trade Organization’s ministerial conference in Bali.	这也解释了包括世行在内的七大多边机构首脑为什么大力支持在本月初召开的世贸组织巴厘岛部长级会议上通过贸易促进协定。


To be sure, the incidence of poverty worldwide has reached an historic low, with the extreme-poverty rate (the share of the population living on less than $1.25 a day, in purchasing-power-parity terms) falling in 2010 by more than half since 1990.	可以肯定，全球贫困率已经达到历史低点，2010年极端贫困率（指按购买力平价计算生活费低于每天1. 25美元的人口比例）比1990年下降了半数还多。


But that still leaves more than one billion people worldwide living in extreme poverty.	但全球仍有超过十亿人生活在极端贫困之中。


Moreover, progress has been uneven, with poverty rates having declined far more in East Asia and Latin America than in Sub-Saharan Africa.	此外，脱贫工作的进展也很不均衡，东亚和拉美地区的脱贫率远高于撒哈拉以南非洲。


In order to cope with this changing global context, the World Bank has introduced a new objective to guide its poverty-reduction efforts: promoting sustainable, shared prosperity by monitoring the income growth of the poorest 40% of every country’s population.	为应对不断变化的全球环境，世行引入了通过监控各国后40%最贫困人口收入增长来指引脱贫行动、推动持续普遍繁荣的新目标。


Indeed, we are rethinking how we define success in development and how we provide trade-related support to developing countries.	事实上，我们正在思考发展成功的定义，以及怎样向发展中国家提供贸易相关支持。


Trade’s relationship with poverty is variable and complex.	贸易与贫困的关系复杂而又多变。


Increased trade benefits consumers by reducing the prices of goods and services.	贸易增长通过降低商品服务价格而惠及消费者。


It gives the poor access to a wider variety of commodities, while providing firms with a more diverse selection of inputs.	它使穷人买得起更多商品，同时为企业提供更多元化的投资选择。


But increased trade can also eliminate low-skill factory jobs and reduce agricultural prices – outcomes that disproportionately hurt the poor.	但贸易增长也能淘汰低技能的工厂工作，并降低农产品价格——这样的结果总是导致穷人受伤最多。


In India, for example, poverty has declined more slowly in areas where farmers face increased foreign competition.	比方说印度，在农民面临更多外来竞争的领域脱贫的进展更有难度。


Given constraints on inter-sectoral labor mobility, stemming from barriers to skills acquisition and rigid labor-market regulations, the poorest workers have few options when such changes occur.	由于技能学习障碍和劳动力市场规则僵化导致的跨部门人员流动限制，这样的情况发生时最贫困的工人几乎没有什么选择。


As a result, increased trade may demand difficult adjustments in the short term.	因此贸易增长可能需要在短期内做出艰难的调整。 个人可能需要改变消费习惯；


Individuals may need to change their consumption habits; labor may have to be reallocated across sectors; and some workers may have to adjust to lower wages, at least temporarily.	劳动力可能需要跨部门流动； 有些工人可能需要适应低工资，至少要暂时适应。


Some firms will grow, while others will contract.	有些公司将会成长，而有些则会萎缩。


Experience has demonstrated that, with forward-looking policies, governments can enhance trade’s benefits and mitigate its negative impact on the poor.	经验表明通过制定前瞻性政策，政府可以强化贸易带来的好处，同时减轻对穷人的不利影响。


Policymakers can promote retraining programs for displaced workers and remove regulatory obstacles that impede their flow into thriving, export-oriented sectors.	决策者可以推进下岗工人再培训计划，并消除妨碍他们流入繁荣出口行业的监管障碍。


And, in order to protect farmers, they can eliminate export restrictions and ensure that timely, accurate market information is accessible.	决策者可以取消出口限制，并为保障农民利益提供及时、准确的市场信息。


With such policies in place, the World Bank’s efforts to bolster developing countries’ trade linkages could facilitate substantial poverty reduction. For example, we help developing-country governments connect firms, farmers, and households to markets and supply chains, thereby fostering increased investment and boosting economic activity.	有了上述政策，世行加强发展中国家贸易联系的努力或许有助于实现大规模脱贫目标��比方说，我们帮助发展中国家政府在企业、农民、家庭和市场、供应链之间建立联系，从而促进投资增加并刺激经济活动。


Furthermore, we support infrastructure-development projects, enabling countries to build the roads, bridges, and ports that link traders to markets.	此外，我们出资基础设施开发项目，让各国修建连接商人与市场的桥梁、港口和公路。


For example, a $1.8 billion highway project in Kazakhstan is facilitating trade-related transport across the country, stimulating the economies of the country’s poorest provinces, and creating more than 30,000 jobs.	比方说，哈萨克斯坦耗资18亿美元的高速路项目可以促进全国范围内贸易相关运输，刺激国内最贫困地区经济，并创造30,000多份工作。


In Nepal, the Bank is financing reconstruction of the steep, dangerous, and busy road that carries most of the country’s exports to India, and it is supporting the government’s efforts to connect some of the country’s remotest districts to the main road network.	世行正在尼泊尔出资重建出口印度的交通要道，也是一条陡峭、险峻但却繁忙的公路。 世行还支持尼泊尔政府将该国某些最偏远省份纳入主要路网建设。


The World Bank also helps countries to establish clear customs rules that more effectively protect traders from inconsistent treatment or solicitations for bribes.	世行还协助各国制定明确的海关规定，更有效地保护投资者免受不一致待遇或被迫进行贿赂。


And we are working to address costly border inefficiencies.	我们正在竭力遏制代价昂贵的边境效率低下。


For example, we are helping to simplify and modernize trade procedures through Cameroon’s Douala port, and we have helped the government of Laos to establish an online portal that provides traders with access to all relevant laws, procedures, schedules, and forms from border-management agencies.	比方说，我们协助现代化及简化喀麦隆杜阿拉港的贸易程序，我们还协助老挝政府建立在线门户网站，为投资者提供各边境管理机构的所有相关法律、程序、安排和表格。


Moreover, since 2010, the International Finance Corporation, the Bank’s private-sector lending arm, has been promoting the integration of small and medium-size enterprises into global supply chains by increasing their access to capital.	不仅如此，自2010年后，世行的私营部门贷款机构国际金融公司就一直通过提供资金促进中小企业与全球供应链的整合。


The $500 million Global Trade Supplier Finance program, a joint investment and advisory initiative, is currently providing short-term finance to thousands of emerging-market SMEs.	价值5亿美元的全球贸易供应商融资计划（联合投资顾问计划）正在为成千上万新兴市场的中小企业提供短期融资服务。


In order to maximize the impact of such initiatives, world leaders should cooperate to build and maintain an open trading system.	为最大限度发挥这些举措的影响，各国领导人应合作建立维护开放的贸易体系。 世贸组织巴厘岛会议提供了制定加速边境站货物流动、放行、清关；


The WTO’s Bali conference provided an important opportunity to develop a new trade-facilitation agreement that expedites the movement, release, and clearance of goods at border stations; clarifies and improves trade-related rules; enhances technical assistance; and encourages cooperation among border-control agencies.	加强技术援助； 鼓励边境管制机构合作的全新贸易促进协定的重要机遇。


But the agreement that was reached in Bali cannot succeed unless wealthy countries and donors agree to support developing countries’ efforts to enact related policies and reforms.	但除非富裕捐助国同意支持发展中国家的相关政策及改革努力，否则巴厘岛协议不会取得成功。


Given this, it is crucial that developed-country policymakers recognize that a more efficient, better integrated, and more inclusive global trade regime will benefit all countries.	有鉴于此，发达国家决策者必须认识到更高效、统一、包容的全球贸易体制将惠及所有国家。


With genuine commitment from the international community and the appropriate domestic policies in place, trade can be a powerful force for poverty reduction.	有了国际社会的真实承诺和恰当的国内政策，贸易可以成为一种强大的扶贫力量。


Maintaining the Emerging-Economy Growth Engine	维护新兴经济体增长引擎


SEOUL – The world’s emerging economies seem to be losing their dynamism.	首尔—世界新兴经济体似乎正在失去活力。


Countries that only a few years ago were being hailed for their resilience in the face of a global economic meltdown are now facing myriad challenges, reflected in significantly slower GDP growth.	几年前面临全球经济衰退时恢复力满满的国家，如今面临着诸多挑战，反映在GDP增长的大幅降低中。


Is the emerging-economy growth engine breaking down?	新兴经济体增长引擎熄火了吗？


From 2000 to 2007, annual growth in emerging and developing economies averaged 6.5%.	从2000年到2007年，新兴和发展中经济体年增长率平均为6. 5%。


More impressive, from 2008 to 2010, when the advanced economies were in recession or struggling through a fragile recovery, they managed to sustain 5.5% growth.	更加令人印象深刻的是，从2008年到2010年，当发达经济体陷入衰退或复苏如履薄冰时，它们成功保持了5. 5%的增长率。


In fact, at the end of that period, average growth stood at a very healthy 7.5%.	事实上，在这段时期末，平均增长率为相当健康的7. 5%。


But then growth began to slow, with the annual rate falling to 4% in 2015.	但随后增长开始放缓，2015年年增长率下降到4%。


Even China, the largest and most dynamic emerging economy, recorded its lowest growth rate since 1990 (6.9%) last year, and the slowdown is forecast to accelerate this year.	甚至连最大、最有活力的新兴经济体中国，去年增长率也达到了1990年（6. 9%）以来的最低水平，预计今年减速之势还会加剧。


Many now argue that the emerging economies are settling into a “new normal” of slower growth, and that their days as the key driver of the global economy are over.	如今，许多人认为新兴经济体即将进入增长放缓的“新常态”，它们作为全球经济主要推动力的日子一去不返了。


Despite their current struggles, it would be premature to write off the emerging economies.	尽管面临着这些当前的困难，但现在就宣判新兴经济体“死刑”还为时过早。


For starters, even if these countries’ growth rates do not return to pre-crisis levels, their contribution to the world economy should remain substantial, given that their share of world GDP in purchasing-power-parity terms has increased significantly, from 43% in 2000 to 58% in 2015.	首先，即使这些国家的增长率没有恢复到危机前水平，它们对世界经济的贡献仍然相当巨大，因为它们占世界GDP的比重（用购买力平价衡量）有了显著提升，从2000年的43%增加到2015年的58%。


But the emerging economies have much more to offer.	但新兴经济体还可以做出很多贡献。


With the right policies, they can tap into as-yet-unexploited growth potential and continue their progress toward convergence with advanced-economy income levels.	如果有正确的政策，它们可以释放尚未开发的增长潜力，继续向发达经济体的收入水平看齐。


The key to determining what those policies must be is to understand why growth has slowed in the first place.	确定必须实施哪些政策的关键是理解一开始增长为何放缓。


At first, emerging economies were hit by external challenges, including weakening world trade, low commodity prices, and tight financial conditions.	首先，新兴经济体受到外部挑战的冲击，包括世界贸易疲软、大宗商品价格低迷和金融条件紧缩。


Global merchandise trade slowed considerably over the last four years; in the first half of 2015, it contracted for the first time since 2009.	过去四年来，全球商业贸易显著放缓； 2015年上半年出现了自2009年以来的首次萎缩。


Oil and metal prices have dropped more than 50% from their 2011 peaks.	石油和金属价格较2011年峰值水平下跌了50%以上。


Moreover, the US Federal Reserve’s monetary-policy reversal, which entails a long-delayed increase in interest rates, combined with the negative-interest-rate policies of the Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank, has caused financial-market fluctuations and left emerging economies vulnerable to capital flight.	此外，美联储货币政策逆转，这意味着姗姗来迟的利率提升，再加上日本银行和欧洲央行的负利率政策，导致金融市场波动，让新兴经济体难逃资本外流。


These external factors could be cyclical, but it remains to be seen how soon they will pass.	这些外部因素可能是周期性的，但要保持多久仍不得而知。


The recent emerging-economy slowdown is also the result of structural factors.	最近的新兴经济体放缓也是结构性因素的结果。


When the emerging economies’ growth stories began, the gap between their actual per capita incomes and long-run potential enabled rapid capital accumulation and strong technology-enabled productivity gains.	在新兴经济体增长故事的开头，它们的人均收入和长期潜力之间的差距使它们得以迅速完成资本积累，获得强劲的通过技术实现的生产率提升。


But after years of large-scale investment – which, in China in particular, has led to excess capacity and resource misallocation – capital accumulation has moderated.	但在经历了多年的大规模投资后——特别是中国，这导致产能过剩和资源配置不当——资本积累已经回归平庸。


Meanwhile, as countries move closer to the technology frontier, imitation and adaptation must give way to genuine innovation – no easy feat when innovative capabilities are lacking.	与此同时，随着各国向技术前沿迈进，模仿和适应必须让位给真正的创新——而当创新力仍有所欠缺时，这绝非易事。


So what can emerging economies do to improve their prospects?	那么，新兴经济体应该怎么做才能改善前景？


Though the particular policy mix will vary by economy, some priorities are clear.	尽管适合每个经济的政策组合各不相同，但一些重点是明确的。


For one thing, countries must strengthen their resilience against adverse external shocks, including through efforts to strengthen their own financial systems.	一方面，各国必须强化应对不利外部冲击的恢复力，包括强化自身金融体系的措施。


To reduce their vulnerability to volatile capital flows, they should promote exchange-rate flexibility, secure adequate international reserves, and adopt carefully designed capital controls.	要降低面对高波动资本流的脆弱性，它们应该推进汇率弹性，确保足够的国际储备，并实施谨慎制定的资本管制。


Emerging economies that rely excessively on exports need to rebalance their sources of growth toward domestic demand.	过度依赖出口的新兴经济体需要用内需实现增长源的再平衡。


Investment in public infrastructure, an improved investment climate, and social safety nets could all help to spur higher private-sector investment and household expenditure.	公共基础设施投资、改善的投资气候以及社会安全网都有助于刺激私人部门投资和家庭支出。


Greater priority must also be given to structural supply-side policies targeting productivity growth.	旨在提高生产率的结构性供给侧政策也应该作为重点。


First, to strengthen human capital, emerging economies must complement their progress in educational attainment with efforts to improve schools’ quality, especially at the secondary and tertiary levels.	首先，为了强化人力资本，新兴经济体必须完成教育程度进展，并改善教学质量，特别是初中和高中阶段。


Where necessary, education systems must be reformed to meet changing industry demand and skill requirements.	必要时，教育体系必须进行改革以满足变化的产业需求和技能要求。


Second, structural bottlenecks must urgently be addressed, through the streamlining of regulations, as well as reforms to promote competition in product markets and to increase the flexibility and efficiency of factor markets for labor, finance, and land.	其次，必须立刻解决结构瓶颈。 这可以通过理顺监管以及采取改革以推进产品市场竞争和增加劳动力、金融和土地等要素市场的弹性和效率实现。


Emerging economies must lower barriers to market entry, support business operations, and increase access to finance.	新兴经济体必须降低市场准入壁垒，支持企业经营，增加融资便利性。


Obstacles to trade and foreign direct investment must be removed as well.	贸易和外国直接投资障碍也必须清除。


Finally, emerging economies must work to strengthen their institutions.	最后，新兴经济体必须致力于强化制度。


As it stands, corruption – facilitated by complex and burdensome regulatory environments, inefficient tax regimes, and weak judicial systems incapable of protecting investor and property rights – is pervasive in many emerging economies, hindering sustained growth.	目前，许多新兴经济体腐败横生，拖累了潜在增长。 腐败因为复杂繁重的监管环境、低效率的税收制度以及无法保护投资者和财产权利的弱势司法体系而滋生。


Improving governance and bolstering the rule of law are essential to boosting productivity and long-term GDP growth.	改善治理和推动法治是提高生产率和长期GDP增长的关键。


The emerging-economy growth engine is not broken; it simply needs to be serviced.	新兴经济体增长引擎没有熄火； 只是需要保养。


With appropriate policies and structural reforms, the emerging economies can recapture their dynamism and move onto an even stronger growth path – taking the entire global economy with them.	如果能有合适的政策和结构改革，新兴经济体能够重新焕发活力，走上更加强大的增长道路——并带动整个全球经济。


Saudi Arabia’s Pilgrimage to Pakistan	沙特阿拉伯的巴基斯坦朝圣之旅


LONDON – Over the last few years, Saudi Arabia has become increasingly estranged from its long-time protector, the United States.	伦敦—过去几年来，沙特阿拉伯与其长期保护人美国渐行渐远。


It viewed America’s backing for Hosni Mubarak’s fall from power in Egypt – and its subsequent acceptance of the Muslim Brotherhood government – as a betrayal.	它把美国支持埃及人推翻穆巴拉克——以及随后接受穆斯林兄弟会政府——视为背叛。


Then came US President Barack Obama’s refusal to enforce his “red line” in Syria, after President Bashar al-Assad’s regime unleashed poison gas on its opponents.	接着，在叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德政权向反对派使用毒气后，美国总统巴拉克又拒绝在叙利亚实施“红线”。


But the final straw was America’s support for the recent interim agreement on Iran’s nuclear program.	但最令沙特切齿的是美国支持最近关于伊朗核计划的过渡协议。


Saudi Arabia’s mounting distrust of the US matters, because whenever the Kingdom has felt an existential threat – and it regards Iran’s regional ambitions as such a threat – it has relied on an external power to protect it.	沙特阿拉伯对美国日渐不信任影响很大，因为每当沙特王国感到生存受到威胁时——伊朗的地区雄心就让它有这种感觉——它就会寻求外部势力保护自己。


But if it can no longer rely on the US, where can the Kingdom turn for sufficient military muscle?	但如果美国不再可靠，沙特王国可以从哪里寻找足够的军事实力支持？


The answer seems to be Pakistan, a country that the rest of the world views as on the verge of becoming a failed state.	答案似乎是巴基斯坦，一个世界其他国家看来自己也站在崩溃边缘的国家。


Pakistan has previously served the Kingdom’s interests by sending military and security assistance during times of stress.	此前，在压力时期，巴基斯坦也通过输送军事和安全援助服务于沙特王国的利益。


Saudi Arabia received some 30,000 Pakistani soldiers in 1979, at the time of Iran’s Islamic Revolution.	1979年伊朗伊斯兰革命期间沙特阿拉伯得到过30,000巴基斯坦士兵。


And these troops remained in the Kingdom until the mid-1980’s.	这批军队在沙特王国一直呆到20世纪80年代中期。


The Saudis also employed thousands of Pakistani soldiers during the 1991 Gulf War.	1991年海湾战争期间，沙特也雇用过数千巴基斯坦士兵。


And, at the beginning of 2014, Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal and Crown Prince Salman visited Islamabad to renew the two countries’ military agreements on joint arms production.	而在2014年初，外交部长费萨尔亲王和萨勒曼王储访问了伊斯兰堡更新两国关于合作生产武器的军事协定。


The visit was also intended to lay the groundwork to bring 30,000 Pakistani soldiers and military advisers to the Kingdom.	这次访问的另一个目的是请兵——要求巴基斯坦向沙特王国派遣30,000名士兵和军事顾问。


Why Pakistan, and why now?	为什么是巴基斯坦？ 为什么是现在？


The Saudi rulers view Pakistan as one of three regional powers, along with Iran and Turkey, capable of having a decisive impact on the Middle East.	沙特统治者视巴基斯坦为三大地区大国之一（另两个是伊朗和土耳其），有实力在中东施加决定性影响。


An alliance with Shia Iran – the Kingdom’s supreme ideological enemy, and one with regional hegemonic ambitions – is out of the question.	与什叶派伊朗——觊觎地区霸权的沙特王国最大的意识形态敌人——结盟是不可想象的。


Turkey, for its part, is regarded as a competitor for the mantle of Sunni Muslim leadership – a position long held by the Ottoman Empire.	而土耳其被认为是沙特在争夺逊尼派穆斯林领导权方面的对手——奥斯曼帝国曾经长期是逊尼派领袖。


The frequent description of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as harboring “neo-Ottoman” ambitions for his country clearly implicates this rivalry.	土耳其总理埃尔多安经常被提及怀揣“新奥斯曼”雄心，这凸显出两国的对立。


It was the Ottomans who brought down two historical Saudi/Wahhabi states.	历史上，奥斯曼帝国灭掉过两个沙特/瓦哈比派国家。


The first such state (1745-1818) was destroyed by Egypt’s Mehmet Ali with Ottoman support; the second (1824-1891) was also defeated by the Ottomans.	第一个国家（1745—1818）由埃及的穆罕默德·阿里（Mehmet Ali）在奥斯曼帝国���支持下毁灭； 第二个国家（1824—1891）也由奥斯曼帝国打败。


By contrast, the Kingdom has no problematic history with Pakistan.	相反，沙特王国和巴基斯坦没有历史仇怨。


On the contrary, the Saudis have bankrolled the Pakistani state, and proved a generous host to its current prime minister, Mian Nawaz Sharif, during his long exile following the military coup that toppled his government in 1999.	相反，沙特人为巴基斯坦国提供过资金支持，并且在其现任总理沙里夫1999年被军事政变推翻后逃亡期间提供过慷慨的收容。


Indeed, Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in Pakistan since the early years of its independence.	事实上，沙特阿拉伯在巴基斯坦独立之初就在那里进行了大手笔投资。


Given that Pakistan was founded in 1947 on a religious basis, it is not surprising that its leaders sought support from the source of Islam, Mecca, then under Saudi rule.	1947年，巴基斯坦以宗教立国，其领导人向当时由沙特统治的伊斯兰教胜地麦加求助并不令人奇怪。


The Kingdom, in turn, exported its Wahhabi teachings to the “Land of the Pure,” ultimately fueling the Islamic extremism and sectarian violence of the Taliban and others.	反过来，沙特王国向“纯粹之地”输出了其瓦哈比派教义，最终助长了塔利班和其他伊斯兰极端主义和宗派暴力。


Saudi Arabia also invested in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, the so-called Sunni Bomb, by directly financing the research of A. Q. Khan, the father of the Pakistani effort.	沙特阿拉伯还投资于巴基斯坦的核武器计划——所谓的逊尼炸弹（Sunni Bomb），直接为巴基斯坦核武器之父可汗（A. Q.


The Kingdom’s hope of directly benefiting from Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities was blocked in 2003, when the US discovered the prospect of a transfer of knowledge and more.	Khan）提供资金。 沙特王国直接受益于巴基斯坦核实力的算盘在2003年因为美国发现可能存在理论和其他方面的转移而受阻。


Moreover, the forces that the Pakistan has sent to the Kingdom over the years have been perceived as generally loyal.	此外，多年来巴基斯坦向沙特王国派遣的军队总体上被认为相当忠诚。


Although up to 30% of the Pakistani army are Shia, the Saudis will only accept Sunni soldiers, and Pakistan has happily provided them as mercenaries, sent on rotation and treated as guest workers.	尽管巴基斯坦军队中有多达30%的什叶派，但沙特人只接受逊尼派士兵，巴基斯坦也乐于以雇佣兵的形式提供兵源，轮番派驻并接受外来务工人员待遇。


Part of the Saudi plan today is to use Pakistanis as the backbone for a new Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) joint military force.	如今，沙特阿拉伯的部分计划是以巴基斯坦作为新海湾合作委员会（GCC）联合部队的骨干。


Pakistani forces under Saudi command were used in operations to quell Shia uprisings in Bahrain in 2011, and the Saudis now want a standby force ready to put down Islamist and Shia provocations whenever and wherever they may appear in the Gulf.	沙特指挥的巴基斯坦军队曾在2011年镇压过巴林的什叶派起义，如今沙特希望得到一支准备就绪的军队随时随地在海湾地区扑灭伊斯兰和什叶派挑衅。


In the event of an existential threat in the region, in particular a confrontation with Iran, Pakistan would offer the Kingdom a form of deadly protection denied it by the West.	如若在地区内发生生存威胁，特别是与伊朗爆发冲突，巴基斯坦将为沙特王国提供西方拒绝提供的铁血护卫。


So to what extent can Pakistan really enhance Saudi Arabia’s security, particularly in a war against Iran?	那么，巴基斯坦可以在何种程度真正增强沙特阿拉伯的安全，特别是在与伊朗开战的情况下？


Pakistan is badly fractured, with domestic terrorism running rampant.	巴基斯坦正处于重重分裂中，多内恐怖主义猖獗。


Its military lacks the capacity to intervene in Saudi Arabia’s defense while maintaining not only domestic security, but also readiness for war against India (an obsession of Pakistani generals).	其军队没有能力在干预沙特阿拉伯防务的同时既维持国内安全，又时刻准备着对付印度（巴基斯坦将军们执着不放的敌人）。


Moreover, Pakistan’s substantial Shia population might join the ranks of the violently disaffected if the military backed the Saudis in a sectarian war.	此外，巴基斯坦有着大量什叶派人口，如若巴基斯坦军队在宗派战争中支持沙特人，他们可能加入暴动集团。


And the Pakistan People’s Party, now in opposition but still a powerful domestic force, shares interests with Iran.	目前处于反对党地位但仍是强大国内势力的巴基斯坦人民党则与伊朗有着共同利益。


So, although the strategic value of closer military ties with Pakistan seems highly questionable, Saudi Arabia has little choice.	因此，尽管加紧与巴基斯坦的军事联系的战略价值颇为可疑，但沙特阿拉伯别无选择。


The GCC is in fact disintegrating, following Qatar’s ouster for supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and Oman’s voluntary departure from the group.	GCC正处于事实上的分裂中，卡塔尔因为支持穆斯林兄弟会而被驱逐，阿曼则主动选择退出。


That, together with the Kingdom’s deepening distrust of the US, is fueling a growing sense of isolation.	这与沙特王国日渐不信任美国一起，助长着日益严重的孤立感。


Pakistan may not be anyone’s idea of an ally when facing an existential threat; for Saudi Arabia, however, it is an idea whose time has come.	在面临生存危机时，巴基斯坦或许不会是任何人所想到的盟友； 但对沙特阿拉伯来说，现在必须考虑它。


The Last of the Sudeiri Seven	最后的苏德里七兄弟


LONDON – Ever since the Al Saud clan established in 1932 the kingdom to which they gave their name, the exercise of power in Saudi Arabia has been shaped by the intrigues and intricacies of royal politics.	伦敦—自沙特（Al Saud）家族1932年建立由家族名字命名的王国以来，沙特阿拉伯的权力便一直由波诡云谲的宫廷政治左右着。


But never before has this internal struggle had such profound ramifications for the region and beyond.	但这场内部斗争从未像现在那样对地区内外产生如此深远的影响。


With some 22,000 members, competition is a way of life in the world’s largest ruling family – a dynamic set in motion by the Kingdom’s founder, Abdul Aziz Al Saud, as he sought to secure the role of his 43 sons as future rulers, and sustained today by King Abdullah’s succession strategy.	这个世界最大的统治家族有22,000左右成员，彼此之间的竞争十分激烈——这也是沙特王国创始者、阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹·沙特（Abdul Aziz Al Saud）的安排。 他意在确保他的43个儿子可以继续成为统治者。


A Saudi prince’s status is based on his mother’s tribe and his alliances with other male royals.	沙特王子的地位由母亲所属部族以及他和其他男性皇室成员的结盟关系决定。


From the outset, power was grouped on the basis of coalitions of full brothers, the most significant of whom were the “Sudeiri Seven,” Abdul Aziz’s sons with his wife Hissah Al Sudeiri.	从外部看，权力集团缔结的基础是嫡亲兄弟之间的结盟，其中最著名的便是“苏德里七兄弟”（Sudeiri Seven），他们都是阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹及其妻子西萨·苏德里（Hissah Al Sudeiri）所生。


With the assassination of King Faisal in 1975 by his nephew, the Sudeiri branch of the family became its dominant faction.	1975年，费萨尔（Faisal）国王被其侄子所刺杀，此后苏德里支系成为沙特王室的主宰者。


Fahd, the eldest Sudeiri son, ruled for 23 years, the longest reign for a Saudi king.	苏德里兄弟中的老大法赫德（Fahd）执政23年，为沙特王国之最。


Abdullah’s succession in 2005 posed a direct challenge to the Sudeiri brothers’ authority.	2005年，阿卜杜拉即位，对苏德里兄弟的掌权构成了直接挑战。


Indeed, following Fahd’s death, Sudeiri power was reduced significantly, with only Crown Princes Sultan and Naif holding key roles.	事实上，在法赫德死后，苏德里兄弟的权力被极大地削弱了，只有王储苏丹（Sultan）和纳伊夫（Naif）把持着关键职位。


Abdullah does not have a full brother.	阿卜杜拉没有嫡亲兄弟。


To block a Sudeiri restoration, he initially grouped together a number of marginalized, likeminded princes.	为了防止苏德里兄弟复辟，他最初和众多处于边缘地位但志同道合的王子结盟。


Though Abdullah’s “Allegiance Council” was subject to Sultan’s control, its inclusion of Abdul Aziz’s remaining sons and the sons of his deceased brothers – in particular, King Faisal’s sons – gave the non-Sudeiri princes an institutional base of power.	尽管阿卜杜拉的“忠诚委员会”（Allegiance Council）由苏丹控制，但该委员会接纳阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹尚在人世的儿子以及他死去的兄弟们的儿子加入——特别是费萨尔国王的儿子——这给非苏德里系王子们提供了权力的制度基础。


The shift in power from the Sudeiris to King Abdullah and his sons was accelerated by the death of the two Sudeiri crown princes within a period of eight months.	权力从苏德里兄弟转移到阿卜杜拉国王和及其儿子手中的过程因为两位苏德里王储在八个月内接连去世而加快了速度。


After Sultan (who served for decades as Minister of Defense) died in October 2011, Abdullah froze the Allegiance Council.	在苏丹（他担任国防部长数十年之久）于2011年10月去世后，阿卜杜拉冻结了忠诚委员会。


Following the death of Naif (who was Minister of Interior for 37 years) in June 2012, he removed Abdul Rahman, a Sudeiri, and appointed Salman as Crown Prince.	纳伊夫（担任内政部长37年）于2012年6月逝世，随后阿卜杜拉撤消了阿卜杜勒·拉曼（Abdul Rahman，苏德里七兄弟之一）的王储地位，替之以萨尔曼（Salman）。


Salman, too, is a Sudeiri, but his appointment represented a significant change, partly owing to his relative youth (78 years old).	萨尔曼也是苏德里七兄弟之一，但他被任命为王储代表了一项重大变化，部分是因为他相对比较年轻（78岁）。


Indeed, perhaps to satisfy the desire of the United States, a key ally, for a new generation of Saudi rulers, the 89-year-old Abdullah passed over his octogenarian brothers and appointed the youngest, 65-year-old Prince Migrin, as Second Deputy, putting him first in line to the throne after Salman.	事实上，也许是为了满足重要盟友美国对新一代沙特统治者的愿望，92岁的阿卜杜拉否决了所有耄耋之年的兄弟，而是任命最年轻的65岁的米格林（Migrin）王子为第二副王储，仅次于萨尔曼。


Nearly a decade after succeeding Fahd, Abdullah is using his absolute power in other ways as well.	阿卜杜拉继承法赫德已经将近十年，他已经获得了绝对的权力，也在使用这一权力。


For example, he has strengthened the National Guard’s position by raising its status to that of a ministry, led by his eldest son, Mit’ib.	比如，他将国民卫队的地位提高到部级，并任命长子米特易卜（Mit’ib）率领。


As a result of these and other changes, including the removal of key officials, such as Deputy Commander Badr Bin Abdul Aziz, the Guard’s power is now equal, if not superior, to that of the army.	此外，他还更换了关键官员，包括副副总司令巴德尔·本·阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹（Badr Bin Abdul Aziz），通过这些变化，国民卫队的实力已经不下于军队。


Likewise, it is believed that Abdullah’s son, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdul Aziz, will soon replace Saud al Faisal, the world’s longest-serving foreign minister.	类似地，据信阿卜杜拉之子、外交部副部长阿卜杜勒·���齐兹（Abdul Aziz）很快就将取代全球在任时间最长的外交部长沙特·费萨尔（Saud al Faisal）。


Abdullah also appointed his son Mish’al as Governor of Najran, before raising Mish’al’s profile further, in December 2013, by naming him Governor of Mecca, in place of Khalid Al Faisal.	阿卜杜拉还任命儿子米沙尔（Mish’al）为奈季兰（Najran）行政长官，随后又在2013年12月进一步提拔他为麦加行政长官，取代哈立德·费萨尔（Khalid Al Faisal）。


Meanwhile, Abdullah’s son Turki has been made Deputy Governor of Riyadh.	与此同时，阿卜杜拉之子图尔基（Turki）被任命为利雅得副行政长官。


Whatever Abdullah’s consolidation of power might mean domestically, the implications for the region are profound.	阿卜杜拉的权力整合或许只是内政，但对地区也有深远影响。


In personalizing Saudi politics to the extent that he has, Abdullah has also personalized foreign policymaking.	在将沙特政治大肆个人化的过程中，阿卜杜拉将外交政策也个人化了。


That has meant subordinating meritocracy to kinship and loyalty, which has inevitably weakened the regime’s capacity to respond effectively to regional developments.	这意味着才能将是次于出身和忠诚的次要考虑因素，这难免削弱了政权有效响应地区发展趋势的能力。


To be sure, the King and his courtiers are much relieved that the Arab Spring did not lead to the creation of functioning democracies in Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, or Syria.	平心而论，沙特国王及其近臣为阿拉伯之春并未在突尼斯、埃及、也门、巴林、利比亚和叙利亚带来运转良好的民主国家而大舒一口气。


Better still, from their perspective, rival Islamist regimes that emerged proved to be either incompetent and easily overthrown (as with Egypt’s President Mohamed Morsi), or without appeal to others (as in Tunisia).	更妙的是，在他们看来，崛起的敌对伊斯兰教政权要么没什么能力并被轻松地推翻（如埃及总统穆尔西），要么对其他国家没什么吸引力（比如突尼斯）。


Nevertheless, the Arab Spring revolutions did undermine the pillars of the regional status quo, whose construction and maintenance the Kingdom had underwritten with its petrodollars.	尽管如此，阿拉伯之春革命仍破坏了沙特王国用石油美元建立并维持的地区现状的支柱。


The uprisings ousted reliable old allies like Hosni Mubarak, and turned regimes such as Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s into implacable enemies.	暴乱推翻了穆巴拉克等可靠的旧盟友，也让叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德等政权成为不可调和的敌人。


Saudi Arabia’s initial response to the fracturing of the regional order was to increase its support for those of its allies – Jordan, Lebanon, and Bahrain – that were still standing, and to turn the Egyptian army into its proxy, leading to the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood’s government.	沙特阿拉伯对地区秩序破坏的最初反应是增加对仍没有到下的盟友的支持——包括约旦、黎巴嫩和巴林——并把埃及军方变为它的代理人，促使穆斯林兄弟会政府的倒台。


Since 2013, Syria has become the main focus of Saudi Arabia’s attention in the region.	2013年以降，叙利亚成为沙特阿拉伯在该地区的主要关注点。


Saudi rulers regard the battle between Assad and his opponents as part of the Kingdom’s existential struggle against its main adversary, Iran.	沙特统治者将巴沙尔及其反对者之间的战争视为沙特王国与其主要对手伊朗的存亡战的一部分。


Thus, Saudi Arabia has become the primary source of financing and weapons for Sunni rebel forces fighting Assad’s army, which is backed heavily by Shia Iran and its proxy, the Lebanon-based Hezbollah militia.	因此，沙特阿拉伯成为逊尼派起义部队的主要资金和武器来源，而战争的另一方——巴沙尔的军队则得到了什叶派伊朗及其代理人、黎巴嫩真主党军队的大力支持。


Despite its unusually activist foreign policy, the Kingdom has failed to bring down Assad’s regime, partly owing to US President Barack Obama’s refusal to enforce his “red line” concerning the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons.	尽管做出了不同寻常的外交政策，沙特王国还是没有推翻巴沙尔政权，这部分是因为美国总统奥巴马拒绝对其“红线”——即巴沙尔政权使用化学武器——采用强硬手段。


As a result, Saudi rulers no longer feel constrained to wait for US approval of their actions – or even to refrain from acting against American interests.	于是沙特统治者不再坐等美国批准再采取行动——甚至也不再把美国利益作为行动的约束条件。


Saudi Arabia feels a deep fear of abandonment by the US, and is acting accordingly.	沙特阿拉伯有一种被美国抛弃的深深的担忧，并正在据此展开行动。


The political transition at home, it seems, is being matched – for better or worse – by a diplomatic transition in the Kingdom’s stance toward the region.	似乎其国内政治过渡伴随着王国地区立场的外交转变——是好还是坏仍拭目以待。


Make Politics, Not War, in Iraq	伊拉克需要政治，不是战争


The United States is once again learning the limits of military power.	美国再一次认识到了武力的局限。


In Iraq, America has unrivaled control of the air, but can’t hold the ground.	在伊拉克，美国拥有绝对的制空权，但却不能控制地面。


Its mere presence incites violence.	它在伊拉克的介入只会引发暴力。


While President George W. Bush believes that he has protected Americans by “taking the war to the enemy,” more than 1,700 Americans have died in the Iraq war, which also has provoked terrorist attacks on US allies.	在布什总统认为他通过“向敌人发动战争”保护了美国人民时，有超过1700名美国士兵在伊拉克战争中死亡。 这场战争还引发了对美国盟友的恐怖袭击。


The horrific London bombings probably were inspired by Britain’s co-leadership of the war.	伦敦发生的恐怖爆炸很可能就和英国在战争中的协同领导地位有关。


The Bush administration’s mistake, of course, is to neglect politics in its war calculations, or to follow blindly the dictum that war is politics by other means.	当然，布什政府的错误是在对战争的算计中忽略了政治的因素，或者是盲目遵从所谓“战争是政治的另类表现形式”的格言。


In fact, most war is a failure of politics, a failure of political imagination.	实际上，大多数的战争都是政治的失败，是政治想象力的失败。


Given their self-righteousness and lack of historical and cultural awareness, Bush and his advisors believed that invading Iraq would be easy, that Saddam Hussein’s military would crumble, and that the US would be welcomed as a liberator.	鉴于他们自我标榜的正义和历史及文化意识的缺乏，布什及其顾问们相信入侵伊拉克是容易的，并认为萨达姆的武装会溃不成军，而美国会以胜利者的姿态受到欢迎。


They failed to comprehend that Iraq has long been an occupied and externally manipulated country.	但他们却未能了解伊拉克长期以来就是一个被占领和被外部势力操纵的国家。


As a result, Iraqis understandably regard the American-led occupation as just another episode of outside exploitation.	其结果是伊拉克人自然认为美国领导下的入侵只不过是另一次外来的剥削罢了。


It is widely accepted that oil, not terror, was the original motivation of the war – a war planned by Mr. Bush’s senior advisors during the 1990’s, and made possible by their accession to power in 2001.	人们普遍认为战争的原始动因是石油，而不是恐怖。 这场战争是布什的资深顾问们在1990年代就计划好，而在2001布什年掌权以后才得以发动的。


Through the 1990’s, US Vice President Dick Cheney and others made clear that Saddam’s reign threatened America’s oil security by forcing over-reliance on Saudi Arabia.	在整个1990年代，美国副总统切尼和其他一些人都明确指出萨达姆政权迫使美国对沙特阿拉伯过于依赖而威胁到美国的石油安全。


Iraq’s vast reserves, went the argument, could not be developed safely until Saddam was deposed.	这种观点认为，伊拉克巨大的石油储量在萨达姆掌权的情况下得不到安全的开发。


The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the US provided the green light, not the underlying motivation.	2001年9月11日在美国发生的恐怖袭击事件为出兵伊拉克打开了绿灯，但却并不是根本原因。


The Iraqis sense all of this.	伊拉克人明白所有的一切。


Bush’s refusal to set a deadline for withdrawing troops is not taken as a sign of resolve, but as a statement of America’s intent to remain in Iraq, establish a puppet regime, control the country’s oil and set up permanent military bases.	布什拒绝为撤军设置最后期限并不被认为是决心的表现，而被看作是美国企图继续驻军伊拉克，建立傀儡政权，控制该国石油和建立永久性军事基地的声明。


That won’t work.	但这是行不通的。


There are simply too many real political forces on the ground in Iraq for America to manage, and these forces are increasingly demanding a timetable for US withdrawal, as are legions of Iraqis in the course of public protests and mosque worships.	美国在伊拉克的国土上要应对太多真正的政治力量，就像在公共抗议和清真寺礼拜的成群结队的伊拉克人一样，这些政治力量日益强烈地要求美国给出一个撤军的时间表。


Every time the US reiterates its refusal to set a deadline for withdrawal, it simply stokes political opposition, not to mention the insurgency.	每当美国重申拒绝为撤军设置期限，就会引来政治上的对立，更不用说叛乱了。


There are too many Iraqis ready to fight and die to oppose the American presence.	有太多的伊拉克人准备好为反抗美国的存在而战斗、献身。


Only politics, not arms, can calm the scene.	只有政治，而不是武器，才能平息这种局面。


Vietnam is a true precedent here.	越南是真正的前车之鉴。


Vietnamese deaths and casualties outnumbered American deaths and casualties by perhaps 20 to one, but the US still could not subdue the nationalist adversary that they faced.	在越战中，越南的人员伤亡与美国相比大约是20比1，但即便如此，美国也未能征服其面对的民族主义敌手。


The US could bomb Vietnam’s cities to rubble, as it can Iraq’s cities, but this solves nothing, claims vast numbers of innocent lives, and confirms the view of Americans as occupiers.	美国可以将越南的城市炸成一片瓦砾，也能如此对付伊拉克的城市，但这样做不能解决任何问题，只能欠下许多的无辜命债，并使得侵略者的形象名符其实。


All of this has an economic angle as well.	所有的这一切还可以从经济角度来分析。


American foreign policy doctrine states that US national security rests on three pillars: defense, diplomacy, and development.	美国对外政策的原则指出美国的国家安全建立在三大支柱之上：防卫、外交和发展。


Economic aid for poor nations is crucial, because poverty provides the tinder for violence, conflict, and even terrorism.	对穷国的经济援助至关重要。 因为贫穷是暴力、冲突甚至恐怖主义的导火线。


Yet diplomacy and development take a distant second and third place behind defense – or more accurately, military – approaches in US foreign policy spending.	然而外交和发展只是远远位列防卫—或更确切地说是军事—手段之后的第二、三位。


The US will devote approximately $500 billion, or 5% of GNP, to military spending this year – half of the world’s total.	美国今年会将约5000亿美元，或说国民生产总值（GNP）的5%用于军事支出—占全世界军费总额的一半。


In other words, the US spends as much on arms as the rest of the world combined.	换句话说，美国的军费开支等于世界其他国家军事开支的总和。


By contrast, the US spends just $18 billion, roughly 0.16% of GNP, on development aid.	而美国所提供的发展援助仅180亿美元，约占其GNP的0. 16%。


In Europe, by contrast, military spending is roughly 2% of GNP, while development aid is around 0.4% of GNP and on a rising path to reach 0.7% of GNP by 2015.	相较之下，欧洲的军费约占其GNP的2%，而发展援助的支出却占GNP的约0. 4%，并且还继续增加，要在2015年达到GNP的0.


If the US would pursue politics rather than war, it would understand that more development spending and a commercial approach to Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, rather than the current military approach, would best serve American interests.	如果美国愿意诉诸政治而不是战争，它就会明白以更多的发展援助和商业手段而不是现行的军事手段来应对亚洲、非洲和中东，会更符合其利益。


Bombing Libya did not bring Muammar Qadaffi “in from the cold.”	轰炸利比亚并没有使卡扎菲“就范”。


Peaceful diplomacy did the job, showing Qadaffi that reopening diplomatic relations with the West and abandoning Libya’s nuclear ambitions would be advantageous for its own future and that of the country.	和平外交才取得了成果。 它使卡扎菲认识到重新开启与西方的外交关系并放弃利比亚的核野心，对他本人和国家的未来都是有利的。


The same approach would have been far less expensive and more promising vis-à-vis Saddam Hussein.	在面对萨达姆时，同样的方式本应代价更小，并更有希望。


Vast sums – and millions of lives – would have been saved if that approach had been tried with Ho Chi Minh in the 1950’s.	如果在1950年代用这种方式来应对胡志明，本可以节省大量的金钱和上百万的生命。


No one doubts that intelligence operations and police actions are needed to fight terrorists.	毋庸置疑，在对抗恐怖分子时需要情报工作和警方行动。


But the war in Iraq and enormous military expenditures are quite another matter.	但伊拉克的战争和巨大的军费支出则完全是另一回事了。


The American military can protect the US from conventional military attack, and it can keep the high seas open, ensuring the flow of oil and other vital commodities.	美国的军队可以保护美国免受常规军事攻击，也可以为石油和其他重要商品在远洋上的流通保驾护航。


But it can’t protect the US from politics.	但它不能保护美国免受政治（侵扰）。


For that, Americans need to be smarter, investing in peaceful development rather than military bases in long-abused lands.	就这一点，美国人应该更聪明一些，在和平发展上多投资，而不是投资于在长期麻烦不断的国家里的军事基地。


The US should leave Iraq quickly.	美国应该很快撤出伊拉克。


After that, it can and should use its political and economic weight to help manage a complex and difficult situation that is significantly, though not exclusively, of its own making.	之后，它可以也应该运用政治和经济实力来协助管理这个复杂而困难的局面—一个在很大程度上由它一手造成的局面。


America’s sway in Iraq will be limited, but leaving now would actually make it more effective than it is now, and at much less cost in terms of money and American, allied, and Iraqi lives.	美国在伊拉克的这种斡旋将会是有限的，但现在撤军实际上会使这种斡旋比现在的占领更有效，并且可以在金钱和美国、盟国及伊拉克人的生命方面付出低得多的成本。


Make the UN Stand for Freedom	让联合国代表自由


For Sweden, my homeland, the United Nations is a sacred cow.	我的家乡瑞典一直对联合国恭敬有加。


But today, many Swedes, like others around the world, are having second thoughts.	但是如今，和世界其他地方的人们一样，许多瑞典人却要再作考虑。


Three events incited these doubts.	三个事件引发了这种怀疑。


The first was the slaughter in Rwanda a decade ago of more than 800,000 people within 100 days – probably the fastest genocide ever.	第一件事就是十年前发生在卢旺达的大屠杀，100天内800,000多人惨遭杀戮，这恐怕是有史以来速度最快的种族屠杀。


The well-documented fact is that Kofi Annan, then the UN’s Deputy Secretary General, ordered UN soldiers in Rwanda not to intervene or protect the victims.	保存良好的纪录显示，那时的联合国副秘书长科菲·安南下令所有在卢旺达的联合国士兵不得干预或保护难民。


That Annan, after this enormous failure, was promoted to Secretary General of the UN remains a puzzle.	就在这个重大失误之后，那个安南被提升为联合国秘书长，这至今令人费解。


Doubts about the UN, and Annan personally, were compounded by the ongoing scandal within the UN administration concerning the Oil for Food program.	眼下的联合国石油换食品计划丑闻加重了人们联合国对联合国以及安南个人的质疑。


Although reports have so far not implicated Annan directly, his management failures are abundantly clear.	尽管目前为止相关报道并没有直接暗示安南，但是他的管理失策却显而易见。


The third – and perhaps the most disillusioning – scandal concerns the Commission on Human Rights, for it lays bare much about the structural and permanent lack of balance and morality within key UN agencies.	第三件——或许也是最能让人们幡然醒悟的——是有关联合国人权委员会的丑闻，它揭露了联合国内的重要组织长期结构不平衡和缺失道德的现象。


Most people assume that this Commission exists to promote human rights and democratic freedoms.	大多数人都认为这个委员会是为了推动人权和民主自由而存在的。


Yet some of the worst human rights violators are Commission members.	然而一些最坏的人权侵犯者却成为了该委员会成员。


These enemies of freedom are permanently silent about torture, oppression, and mass murder carried out by their fellow dictatorships, but are quick to rant against the world’s democracies, in particular the United States.	这些自由的敌人对他们的独裁主义同伙所实施的酷刑、镇压和大规模屠杀长期保持沉默，却总是迅速对世界民主政策，尤其是针对美国的民主政策高唱反调。


The recent “High Level Panel” report on the future of the UN was right when it said: “We are concerned that in recent years States have sought membership of the Commission not to strengthen human rights but to protect themselves from criticism or to criticize others.”	最近“高级别小组”在就联合国未来发展的报道中说道，“我们注意到最近几年来，联合国人权委员会寻求成员国并不是为了加强人权，而是保护自己不受批评也不批评别人。 ”它说得没错。


So, finally, the truth is emerging.	因此，真相最终浮出水面。


After more than a third of a century at the UN, even Annan has come close to admitting that the Commission on Human Rights is a source of shame.	经过三分之一个世纪，在联合国，即使是安南也不得不承认人权委员会是个耻辱之源。


Is it reasonable to elect a pyromaniac to the board of a fire department?	把纵火者选为消防局董事会成员合情合理吗？


Of course not.	当然不。


So why is it that tyrannies like Cuba, China, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe are members of this Commission?	那为什么古巴、中国、沙特阿拉伯、苏丹和津巴布韦能成为这个委员会成员呢？


Recent members also include Libya, Vietnam, Congo, and Syria – the Libyans were even elected chair-country.	最近加入的成员国还包括了利比亚、越南、刚果和叙利亚，利比亚甚至还被选为了主席国。


How can this be?	这怎么可以呢？


About half of today’s UN members are democracies, the other half non-democracies.	如今的联合国成员国中一半是民主体系，另一半是非民主体系。


So totalitarian or authoritarian states – more interested in hiding their own oppression than fairly judging other nations – can easily trigger a sort of political pogrom against any democracy that annoys enough tyrants.	因此，比起公正地评价其他国家，极权主义或者独裁主义国家更愿意花力气掩饰他们自己的镇压，更容易为了反对那些让诸多独裁者头痛不已的民主体制而发动某种政治屠杀。


Sadly, many free countries seem utterly indifferent to the ongoing campaign against Israel.	令人难过的是，许多自由国家看起来对当下反对以色列的运动却毫不动容、无动于衷。


To prevent such vicious absurdities from continuing, the world’s democracies must unite to prevent any country that systematically violates human rights from being allowed to be a member of the Commission on Human Rights.	为了防止这些错误的荒谬持续下去，全世界的民主国家们必须联合起来，以防任何计划性侵犯人权的国家成为人权委员会的成员国。


Ongoing democratization in regions that have known only dictatorship provides hope that the balance is tilting in a way that would enable it possible for at least one UN body should incarnate freedom.	在那些只知道专政统治的地方，正在进行之中的民主化带来了希望，即至少有一个联合国机构应当体现自由的可能性越来越大。


Who should decide if a country is democratic or not?	应当由谁来决定一个国家是否民主？


A tremendously respected independent think tank, Freedom House, is, like the UN’s headquarters, located in New York City.	与和联合国总部一样，一个德高望重、观点独立的智囊团，自由之家（Freedom House），坐落在纽约城。


Freedom House is led and advised by experts on 190 countries.	自由之家由来自190个国家的专家领导并提供意见。


Political rights and civil liberties are rated between 1 and 7 for each country, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free.	每个国家的政治权利和人权按照1到7分级，1代表自由程度最高，7代表自由程度最低。


The designation of countries as “free” (1-2.5), “partly free” (3.0 – 5.0), or “not free” (5.5-7.0) is determined by combining these ratings.	通过综合这些等级评定而确定这个国家是自由(1-2. 5)，部分自由(3.


Freedom House monitors developments over time and makes its conclusions public in its “Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties.”	自由之家在一段时间内监督各国的自由程度进展情况并在它的“年度政治权利和公民自由调查”中公布结论。


If there is one book that should be compulsory reading for anyone who makes public statements about human rights, this is it.	如果有一本书是任何要就人权进行公众演讲的人必须一读的话，那就是这本了。


So the goal of all free countries should be that only other free countries are allowed seats on the Commission for Human Rights.	因此，所有自由国家的目标应当是让所有其他的自由国家能在人权委员会获得一席之位。


Regimes that are “partly free” or “not free” should never be elected or appointed, for the only governments with the moral legitimacy to review and criticize human rights records are those that came to power through free elections and that can lose power when a new election defeats them.	那些“部分自由”或者“不自由”的政权不能被选举或指定为人权委员会成员，因为唯一能具备道德合法性来评论或批评人权纪录的国家是那些通过自由选举产生且一旦他们在新选举中失败就丧失权利的政权。


Those who have attained power through violence and fraud are not legitimate and should never more shame the UN by being members of this Commission.	那些通过武力和欺骗获得权利的政权是非法的，并且不应当再在这个委员会中呆下去以羞辱联合国了。


Unfortunately, most democracies are often unwilling to fight against the perversion of the UN Human Rights Commission.	不幸的是，大部分民主政体并不愿意抵制联合国人权委员会的倒行逆施。


The European Union represents 25 democracies and often inspires countries to seek their freedom, as it has in Ukraine and Lebanon.	欧盟代表了25个民主政体，并经常鼓励各国寻求他们自己的自由，就像对乌克兰和黎巴嫩一样。


But the EU’s habit is not to defeat the UN’s extremists, but to make strange compromises with them.	但是欧盟的习惯是，不反对联合国的极端主义分子，却与他们达成奇怪的和解。


As a result, rogue states make a few concessions to get the Europeans and others on board and then claim moral parity with the democracies.	结果，一些流氓国家作了一些让步以获得欧洲和其他国家的认同，然后宣布它们与民主体制拥有同样的道德标准。


Free peoples everywhere should remember that totalitarian forces and ideas cannot be defeated by being nice and accommodating.	世界各地的自由民族应当记住，仅靠慷慨随和是不能打败极权主义势力和思想的。


The Commission on Human Rights must rid itself of members that detest freedom.	人权委员会必须清除掉内部反对自由的成员。


Otherwise, the sole UN agency that concentrates on freedom will be nothing more than a handmaiden to tyranny.	否则的话，单单联合国内一个以自由为中心的机构只不过会成为苛政统治的协从者。


Making European Defense a Reality	欧洲防务成真


BRUSSELS – Anyone reflecting on the value, weight, and relevance of today’s European military forces for global affairs needs to keep two crucial questions in mind: Where do we want to go?	布鲁塞尔——任何人在思考当今欧洲军事力量在全球事务中的价值、关系和重要性时都需要时刻牢记两点：我们要向哪里发展？


What do we want to achieve?	我们要达到什么目的？


The EU’s goal is to be a global player with its own foreign policy, one shared by its 27 member states.	欧盟的目标是成为拥有独立外交政策的全球力量，这种独立的外交政策受到27个成员国的统一奉行。


Any effective foreign policy clearly needs to rely on effective military and civilian resources.	任何有效的外交政策显然需要有效的军事和民间资源作为后盾。


But this goal does not mean that the EU will compete with NATO.	但这一目标并不意味着欧盟将与北约展开竞争。


Whereas NATO is a political-military alliance, the EU endorses the development of a community of national destinies.	北约是一家政治军事组织，而欧盟则致力于追求国家命运。


Moreover, NATO benefits from the military might of a dominant nation, while the EU must depend on the shared voluntary efforts of its members.	此外，强权国家的军事实力令北约获益匪浅，而欧盟则有赖于其成员国共同的自愿努力。


For two key reasons, it would be more correct to say that NATO and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) are complementary.	由于两个重要原因，说北约和欧洲安全与防务政策（ESDP）互为补充恐怕更贴近现实。


First, certain countries turn specifically to Europe for help.	首先，某些国家指定寻求欧洲的帮助。


Whether in sub-Saharan Africa or the Middle East, their populations and governments are more inclined – for political, historical, or cultural reasons – to request European rather than NATO assistance.	无论是在撒哈拉以南的非洲还是中东地区，那里的民众和政府出于政治、历史或文化方面的原因，都更倾向于请求欧洲而不是北约来协助解决问题。


Conversely, there are certain long-term crises, such as those provoked by terrorism, for which NATO is better placed to act.	相反，同样也存在某些由北约处理起来更得心应手的长期危机，比如由恐怖主义所引发的问题。


For example, given its member states’ current resources, the EU, acting alone, would be unable to ensure a Western commitment in Afghanistan.	比如，考虑到成员国现有的资源状况，欧盟在单独行动的条件下，根本无法把西方在阿富汗的目标变为现实。


At the same time, the governments of Chad and the Central African Republic would never have accepted NATO’s intervention to help resolve the Darfur crisis.	与此同时，乍得和中非共和国政府永远也不会接受由北约采取的干预行动，协助解决达尔富尔危机。


Second, the EU is building its crisis management know-how on the basis of a global approach.	其次，欧盟正在采取一种全球化的方式来积累危机管理知识。


Military resources are only one tool among many others, and, generally speaking, their deployment is clearly defined, limited in time, and coordinated with civilian action.	军事资源不过是所有工具中的一种，而且一般来讲，它们的部署和利用有着明确的限制，不但在时间上有很高的要求，而且必须与民间行动协调一致。


As a result, the EU doesn’t need the articulated military structure that NATO possesses.	因此，像北约那样清晰明确的军事构架并不是欧盟的必需。


The recent creation in Brussels of the Civilian Planning Conduct Capability, based on a system comparable to that of a military chain of command, demonstrates – and, above all, guarantees – cohesive action.	最近在能与军事指挥链相媲美的系统基础上，在布鲁塞尔创办民间策划行为组织表明，而且最重要的是保证了行动的统一。