For starters, the UK accounts for just 3% of global GDP.	首先，英国只占全球GDP的3%。


By contrast, China (the world’s second-largest economy) accounts for 15% of world output and more than half of global growth.	相反，中国（世界第二大经济体）占世界产出的15%和全球增长的一大半。


Moreover, the European Union’s post-Brexit show of unity, together with the result of the Spanish election, calmed fears that the EU or the eurozone would fall apart in short order.	此外，欧盟在英国脱欧后表现出的团结，以及西班牙选举的结果安抚了欧盟或欧元区很快就会解体的担忧。


And the rapid government changeover in the UK has boosted hopes that the divorce negotiations with the EU, however bumpy, will lead to a settlement that maintains most trade links by combining substantial access to the single market with modest limits on migration.	而英国政府的迅速换届也让人们对英国和欧盟的“离婚”谈判有了希望，也许不管过程多么崎岖，结果将是一个通过大限度欧盟单一市场准入资格和有限的移民控制相结合保留大部分贸易联系的方案。


Most important, markets quickly priced in the conclusion that the Brexit shock would lead to greater dovishness among the world’s major central banks.	更重要的是，市场很快就将英国脱欧冲击将导致世界主要央行采取更加鸽派的立场体现在了价格中。


Indeed, as in the two previous risk-off episodes, central-bank liquidity backstopped markets and economies.	事实上，在前两次避险事件中，正是央行流动性支撑了市场和经济。


But the risk of European and global volatility may have been only briefly postponed.	但欧洲和全球波动的风险可能只是短暂地中止了。


Leaving aside other global risks (including a slowdown in already-mediocre US growth, more fear of a Chinese hard landing, weakness in oil and commodity prices, and fragilities in key emerging markets), there is plenty of reason to worry about Europe and the eurozone.	抛去其他全球风险不谈（包括已然相当平庸的美国增长的减速、中国硬着陆担忧增加、石油和大宗商品价格颓势以及重要新兴市场的脆弱性等），有充分地里有担心欧洲和欧元区。


First, if the UK-EU divorce proceedings become protracted and acrimonious, growth and markets will suffer.	首先，英国-欧盟离婚过程可能持久而激烈，增长和市场将因此蒙受损失。


And an ugly divorce may also lead Scotland and Northern Ireland to leave the UK.	而丑陋的离婚可能还将导致苏格兰和北爱尔兰脱离英国。


In that scenario, Catalonia may also push for independence from Spain.	果真如此的话，加泰罗尼亚可能也会推进脱离西班牙独立。


And without the UK, Denmark and Sweden, which aren’t planning to join the eurozone, may fear that they will become second-class members of the EU, thus leading them to consider leaving as well.	而没有了英国，不准备加入欧元区的丹麦和瑞典可能担心自己沦为欧盟二等成员，因此导致它们也考虑脱欧。


Second, upcoming elections promise to be a political minefield.	其次，即将到来的选举是一个政治雷区。


Austria will repeat its presidential election in September, the previous one having ended in a virtual tie, giving another chance to the far-right Freedom Party’s Norbert Hofer.	奥地利将在9月重新举行总统选举，上一次的结果基本上是平手，这意味着极右翼自由党（Freedom Party）的诺伯特·霍福尔（Norbert Hofer）又有了机会。


The following month, Hungary will hold a referendum, initiated by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, on overturning EU-mandated quotas on the resettlement of migrants.	接下来的一个月，匈牙利将举行由总理欧尔班发起的推翻欧盟收容移民配额指令的公投。


And, most important, Italy will hold a referendum on constitutional changes that, if rejected, could effectively jeopardize the country’s membership in the eurozone.	最重要的是，意大利将进行修宪公投，如果不通过，可能在很大程度上影响到意大利的欧元区成员资格。


Italy currently is the eurozone’s weakest link.	目前，意大利是欧元区最脆弱的一环。


Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s government has become politically shakier, economic growth is anemic, the banks are in need of capital, and EU fiscal targets will be hard to achieve without triggering another recession.	总理伦齐政府政局不稳，经济增长萎靡不振，银行急需资本，而若要实现欧盟财政目标，难免将引发又一场衰退。


If Renzi fails – as is increasingly possible – the anti-euro Five Star Movement (which recently did well in municipal elections) could come to power as early as next year.	如果伦齐失败——目前这种可能性越来越大——反欧元的五星运动（Five Star Movement，在最近的市政选举中表现出色）可能早在明年上台掌权。


Should that happen, the Grexit fears of 2015 would pale in comparison.	果真如此的话，2015年的希腊脱欧担忧简直是小巫见大巫了。


Italy, the eurozone’s third-largest member, is too big to fail.	意大利是欧元区第三大成员国，太大而不能倒。


But, with a public debt ten times larger than Greece’s, it is also too big to be saved.	但是，其公债水平十倍于希腊，因此也太大而不能救。


No EU program can backstop Italy’s €2 trillion ($2.2 trillion) of public debt (135% of GDP).	欧盟无法拿出能够支持意大利2万亿欧元（GDP的135%）公共债务的计划。


Moreover, elections in France, Germany, and the Netherlands in 2017 create additional uncertainties as weak growth and high unemployment in most of Europe boost support for anti-euro, anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, and anti-globalization populist parties of the right (in the eurozone core) and of the left (on the eurozone periphery).	此外，法国、德国和荷兰将在2017年进行选举，由于欧洲大部增长萎靡和失业高企导致了反欧元、反移民、反穆斯林和��全球化的民粹主义右翼（欧元区核心）和左翼（欧元区外围）政党的崛起，这些选举将进一步增加不确定性。


At the same time, Europe’s neighborhood is bad and getting worse.	与此同时，欧洲周边情况糟糕并且每况愈下。


A revisionist Russia has become more assertive not just in Ukraine, but also in the Baltics and the Balkans.	修正主义俄罗斯日益独断专行，不仅在乌克兰如此，在波罗的海和巴尔干地区亦然。


And the consequences of the continuing turmoil in the Middle East are at least twofold: renewed episodes of terrorism in France, Belgium, and Germany, which may over time dent business and consumer confidence; and a migration crisis that requires closer cooperation with Turkey, which itself has become unstable since the botched military coup.	而中东继续动荡的后果至少要从两方面看：法国、比利时和德国恐怖主义事件抬头，假以时日可能危及企业和消费者信心； 而移民危机需要加强与土耳其的合作，但土耳其本身因为未遂军事政变而变得不稳定。


Until the coming round of elections is over, the EU is unlikely to take any steps to complete its unfinished monetary union by introducing more risk-sharing and accelerating structural reforms to encourage faster economic convergence.	在这轮选举结束结束前，欧盟不可能采取任何措施通过引入更多的风险共担和加快结构改革鼓励更快的经济趋同来完成未竟的货币联盟。


Given the current slow pace of reforms (and population aging), potential growth remains low, while actual growth is on a very moderate cyclical recovery that is now threatened by post-Brexit risks and uncertainties.	考虑到当前改革节奏缓慢（以及人口老化）的状况，潜在增长将保持低迷，而实际增长正处于一个非常平庸的周期性复苏，现在这一复苏又受到英国脱欧后风险和不确定性的威胁。


At the same time, high deficits and debts, together with eurozone rules, constrain the use of fiscal policy to boost growth, while the European Central Bank may be reaching the limits of what even unconventional monetary policy can do to sustain the recovery.	与此同时，沉重的赤字和债务，再加上欧元区规则，限制了通过使用财政政策刺激增长，而欧洲央行的非常规货币政策对维持复苏的支持力可能也在达到极限。


The eurozone and the EU are unlikely to disintegrate suddenly.	欧元区和欧盟不会突然间分崩离析。


Many of the risks they face are on a slow fuse.	它们所面临的许多风险累积的十分缓慢。


And disintegration can of course be avoided by a political vision that balances the need for greater integration with the desire for some degree of national autonomy and sovereignty over a range of issues.	当然，可以通过平衡进一步一体化的需求和对一系列问题上的一定程度的国家自主和主权的渴望的政治愿景来避免解体。


But finding ways to integrate that are democratic and politically acceptable is imperative.	但找到民主和政治上可接受的一体化办法是当务之急。


Muddling through has resulted in an unstable equilibrium that will make disintegration of the EU and the eurozone inevitable.	得过且过已经造成了一个不稳定的均衡，让欧盟和欧元区的解体变得不可避免。


Given the many risks Europe faces, a new vision is needed now.	考虑到欧洲所面临的众多风险，现在需要一个新愿景。


Europe by Degrees	逐步一体化的欧洲


ROME -- A year ago, few people would have bet that the European Union, still reeling from the trauma of the Constitutional Treaty’s rejection in 2005, would be poised to ratify the new Reform Treaty, adopted in Lisbon last December.	罗马——一年前，当欧盟宪法在2005年被否的伤痛尚未平复的时候，几乎没有人敢断定欧盟会以如此平稳的姿态批准去年12月在里斯本通过的新《改革条约》。


For some, the fact that the United Kingdom might ratify it even earlier than traditionally “pro-European” countries like Italy merely underscores the Treaty’s lack of new and bold initiatives to accelerate European unification.	在一些人看来，英国甚至先于意大利这样有 “亲欧洲”传统的国家签署这项条约，只能进一步说明这项条约在加速欧洲的统一步伐方面缺乏新鲜而大胆的创意。


But they are wrong.	但是他们看错了。


To be sure, impatient dissatisfaction has been a driving force behind European integration since its initial years.	勿庸置疑，从欧盟成立初期起，对于现状的急切不满就是推进欧洲一体化的一种驱动力量。


But, as Robert Schuman wrote in his Declaration in 1950, Europe could not be built all at once.	但是，正像罗伯特·舒曼在他1950年发表的宣言中所写到的那样，大欧洲的建成不可能一蹙而就。


Likewise, Altiero Spinelli, another of the EU’s founding fathers, wrote late in life that without visionary Europeans there would be no Europe, but without pragmatic statesmen, the visionaries would have gotten nowhere.	另外一位欧盟之父阿尔蒂诺·斯皮内利在晚年同样写道，如果没有充满幻想的欧洲人就不会有大欧洲，但是如果没有脚踏实地的政治家，这些幻想也将无果而终。


The Reform Treaty’s shortcomings are obvious.	《改革条约》的缺陷显而易见。


Abandoning the name “Constitution” was probably necessary to bring all member states on board.	放弃“宪法”之名可能是将所有欧盟成员国招至麾下的必要做法。


But not equally necessary is the enduring uncertainty about the common political platform upon which Europe’s voice in foreign policy will have to rely.	但是，欧洲外交政策的口径需要有共同的政纲，而在这个问题上一直举棋不定就不是那么有必要了。


Moreover, the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice still requires unanimity for essential decisions in the fight against crime and terrorism and therefore, implying excruciating slowness.	除此以外，在公民自由，国家安全和司法等领域也需要达成一致，从而为打击犯罪和恐怖主义确定基本决策，但这些方面缓慢的进展却让人难以忍受。


Nor does the Treaty do enough to strengthen coordination of Europe’s economic and budgetary policies.	条约在加强欧洲各国经济和预算合作领域的力度也明显不够。


But it is equally obvious that, as the European Parliament’s Resolution of February 20 puts it, “the Treaty of Lisbon is a substantial improvement on the existing Treaties, which will bring more democratic accountability to the Union and enhance its decision making.”	然而，同样显而易见的是，正像《欧洲议会2月20号决议》所说的那样：“ 《里斯本条约》在已有条约的基础上迈进了一大步，这将强化欧盟的民主问责制度，同时也改善了欧盟的决策能力。


The adoption of EU legislation will be subject to a level of parliamentary scrutiny (both at the European and national levels) that exists in no other supranational or international structure.	”欧盟立法的通过将受到一定程度的议会审查（审查单位包括欧洲议会以及各国议会），这在其他超国家或国家间组织中是根本不存在的。


Moreover, agencies such as Europol and Eurojust will be similarly subject to greater parliamentary scrutiny, and the budgetary procedure will be simpler and more democratic.	此外，欧洲刑警组织以及欧洲司法组织等机构也同样要更多地接受议会的监督，而且预算制定的程序将会更加简洁，同时也更加民主。


The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights will become legally binding and the judicial protection of citizens will be enhanced by facilitating their access to the European Court of Justice and by extending the Court’s jurisdiction.	《欧洲联盟基本权利宪章》将具有法律效力，对公民的司法保护也将通过降低欧洲法院的门槛以及扩大该法院的司法裁决权而得到加强。


The Union’s capacity as a global actor will be enhanced by merging the High Representative with the Commissioner for External Relations and establishing a single diplomatic service.	将欧盟理事会的高级代表与对外关系委员会合二为一，并建立单一的外交机构将有利于加强欧盟发挥全球作用的能力。


The list could continue, but we already have reason enough to conclude that getting the best out of the new Treaty will be the best that the EU and its member states can do.	变化还有很多，然而我们已经有足够的理由认定对欧盟及其成员国来讲，最应该做的就是从新《改革条约》中获取最大的利益。


The first ingredients of a common collective identity have been injected into the EU’s enlarged membership, which is still marked by diverse positions, sensitivities, and expectations.	欧洲共同身份的第一剂要素已经注入到了扩大之后的欧盟实体，展现出了迥然各异的立场见解，敏感事务和期待解决的不同问题。


Asking everyone to do more than what everyone is unanimously ratifying would undermine Europe’s fragile harmony.	各成员国一致通过了新条约，在此时如果对每个成员国再提出更多的要求，将会损害欧洲原本就很脆弱的和谐关系。


Nothing, however, prevents smaller groups of member states from aiming at bolder goals through separate agreements, if their mutual trust and similarities encourage them to do it.	但是，如果成员国相互之间的信任以及相似性促使他们在较小范围内通过独立的协议实现更大胆的目标，这应该是完全可以实现的。


After all, this was how the Schengen Treaty – which later became part of the acquis communitaire (the body of EU law) – came into being.	毕竟，后来构成了《欧盟现行法》(欧盟法律主体)一部分的《申根条约》就是这样达成的。


More recently, the Prun agreement has elevated police cooperation to police integration among the participating states.	近期通过的《普朗协议》（Prun Agreement）已经将参与国之间的警务合作提升到了警务一体化的高度。


There is reason to hope that some of the EU’s member states will embark on this venture in fighting crime and terrorism, defense matters, or in financial and budgetary harmonization.	因此，完全有理由展望一些欧盟成员国在打击犯罪，反恐，国防或财政以及预算协调等领域将朝着这一方向迈进。


In whatever area, a group of more deeply integrated member states would give the Union a noyau dur (a hard core) , which might be very helpful in strengthening the EU as a whole.	无论在什么领域，一些相互更紧密融合的成员国将给欧盟带来核心凝聚力，从而有益于加强欧盟整体的统一。


But let them do it separately, and in the meantime let the Union be energized by the improvements that it has already adopted.	就让这些国家单独行动起来吧，同时欧盟通过已经实现的改进得到了更多的活力。


Fifty years later, this is the lesson for us of the Schuman’s declaration.	这是舒曼宣言发表五十年后给我们的一个启示。


Payback Time in Schengen Land	申根大地的报应时刻


FRANKFURT – The long-held dream of a borderless Europe, which became reality in the mid-1990s, is fading fast.	法兰克福—无国界欧洲之梦由来已久，在20世纪90年代中期曾经成为现实，现在正在快速消亡。


Italy is blocking a European Union decision to bribe Turkey to keep refugees from crossing over into Greece on their way to Germany, Sweden, or other northern European countries.	意大利正在阻挠欧盟收买土耳其让难民不要进入希腊进而进入德国、瑞典或其他北欧国家的决定。


In response, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble has called for solidarity, warning that otherwise the border guards might soon be back at their posts, beginning with the German-Austrian frontier.	而德国财政部长朔伊布勒（Wolfgang Schäuble）为此呼吁团结，警告说否则的话边境守卫很快就会恢复，首先是在德国-奥地利边境。


To be sure, the dissolution of the Schengen Agreement, which instituted passport-free travel within most of the EU starting in 1995, need not mark the end of the European project, at least not in principle.	诚然，申根协议的解体未必标志着欧洲工程的末日，至少在理论上如此。 申根协议始于1995年，规定大部分欧盟国家间可以免签旅行。


Economically, border controls act just like taxes; they distort activity, by increasing transaction costs and reducing cross-border flows of goods and services.	从经济上讲，边境控制和税收差不多； 它们增加交易成本，减少跨境商品和服务流，从而扭曲经济活动。


Without them – and, more important, with a single currency – a market is more effective.	没有边境控制——并且更重要地，引入共同货币——将让市场更加有效。


That does not mean, of course, that the single market cannot work with border controls or multiple currencies.	当然，这并不意味着单一市场不能在存在边境控制或多货币的情况下运转。


It simply means that such “renationalization” would carry enormous costs, in the form of substantially reduced productivity and significantly lower output.	这只是意味着这类“再国家化”会带来巨大的成本，包括生产率下降和产能大幅降低等。


Given these costs, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has rightly stressed that “killing” Schengen would undermine the EU’s foundational goal of “ever closer union” – an objective to which, admittedly, several EU members have signed up only reluctantly.	考虑到这些成本，欧盟委员会主席容克强调“杀死”申根协议将破坏欧盟“比以往更紧密的联盟”的创始目标是正确的。 实事求是地讲，一些欧盟成员国在签署这一目标时并不是心甘情愿的。


The United Kingdom is the most vocal skeptic, but Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and pretty much the rest of Eastern Europe have never been enthusiastic about shifting their focus from national prerogatives.	英国的怀疑声音最大，但波兰、匈牙利、斯洛伐克和其他许多东欧国家也从未放松关注国家特权。


The refugee crisis has thrown this discord into sharp relief.	难民危机让这一分歧突显。


As a result, Europe’s densely knit network of interdependencies is beginning to unravel.	因此，欧洲细密的互相依存网络开始解体。


The benevolent hegemon, which used to be the French-German couple, is missing.	曾经由法国-德国联盟构成的仁慈霸权正在消亡。


A focus on national (and in some places, like Catalonia and Scotland, regional) issues is gaining ground, in line with the incentives of policymakers, whose constituencies are national (or regional).	对国家（也包括一些地区，如加泰罗尼亚和苏格兰）问题的关注正在增加，决策者的激励也是如此，因为选民是有祖国（或地区出身）的。


Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s call for a quid pro quo – a loosening of the eurozone’s fiscal rules in exchange for accepting the deal with Turkey – is entirely understandable in this light.	从这一点看，意大利总理伦齐呼吁要交换——放松欧盟财政规则换取接受土耳其协议——完全是可以理解的。


But it puts the EU on a slippery slope.	但可能给欧盟带来危险。


The irony in all of this is that Germany, which was perceived as ruthless during the European sovereign (and private) debt crises, is now calling for solidarity.	所有这些的讽刺之处是德国现在在呼吁团结。 而在欧洲主权（和私人）债务危机期间，德国被广泛认为毫无情面。


Supported by other northern European creditors, Germany enforced its fiscal principles relentlessly, despite the systemic consequences for those it was pressuring (Greece and Spain, for example, now have different governments).	在其他北欧债权国的支持下，德国无情地强制实行其财政原则，尽管这样做的系统性后果是造成压力（比如，希腊和西班牙的政府都已经改变）。


Whether the adjustment policies have been successful remains a subject of heated debate; what is not in doubt is that they produced many losers – most notably among the most vulnerable, who now largely perceive the EU-Germany consensus as threatening.	调整政策是否成功仍是个热议话题； 毫无疑问的是这些政策制造了很多输家——尤其是那些最脆弱的国家，现在它们基本上都把欧盟-德国共识视为威胁。


Against this background, anti-establishment parties across Europe oppose policies that reflect this German-inspired approach.	在此背景下，全欧洲的反现状政党都反对体现这一德国喜欢的方针的政策。


This explains, for example, the similarity of the economic platforms offered by the far left and far right in France.	这解释了（比如）为何法国极左翼和极右翼提出的经济平台差不多。


Even mainstream parties are under pressure to cater to this insurgent sentiment; defending EU policy proposals is a surefire way to lose an election.	就连主流政党也在承压迎合这一反抗情绪； 为欧盟政策方案做辩护是输掉选举的不二法门。


That is why, as Germany struggles to cope with some 1.5 million refugees, Schäuble’s call for solidarity is falling on barren ground.	因此，当德国疲于处置150万难民时，朔伊布勒的团结呼声根本无人响应。


Everybody, beginning with France, is hiding.	从法国开始，所有人都躲了起来。


It’s payback time.	这是报应时刻。


Burden-sharing – that is, a “fair” allocation of refugees throughout the EU (to be hashed out politically) – appears to be a pipe dream.	负担共担——即“公平”地在整个欧盟（政治上分散地）分配难民——看上去只是痴人说梦。


Economically, accommodating refugees will be a challenge for quite some time.	从经济上讲，安置难民在相当长的时间内都是一项挑战。


But if one takes a longer view, absorbing the newcomers should be an opportunity – if it is appropriately handled.	但如果着眼于长期，吸收新来者应该是一个机会——如果处置得当的话。


In the meantime, however, not only Germany, but also Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, and others, are running up against what is deemed to be politically feasible.	但是，与此同时，不但德国，瑞典、荷兰、奥地利和其他国家都在反对被认定为政治可行的事。


This implies that no EU-wide response can be expected, and thus that Schengen is probably doomed.	这意味着无法指望形成泛欧盟的应对措施，因此，申根协议可能寿终正寝。


This would be more than a symbolic loss for European citizens.	对欧洲公民而言，这不仅仅是象征性损失。


And, of course, re-erecting national borders does nothing to address the underlying issue.	当然，重新建立国家边境无助于解决根本问题。


Refugees would just be pushed back to Greece, the most fragile and vulnerable link in the chain.	难民将会退回整个链条最脆弱的一环——希腊。


As uninspiring as this might sound, we must now consider the prospect of the end of the European Monetary Union and the EU as we have known it.	听起来也许令人沮丧，但现在我们必须考虑我们所熟悉的欧洲货币联盟和欧盟的末日。


The goal is not simply to highlight the lost opportunities associated with such an outcome; those would clearly be sizable, especially if the currency union had to be untied.	这样做的目标不仅仅是强调与这一结果有关的机会损失； 这些损失显然是巨大儿，特别是如果货币联盟不得不解体的话。


The point is also to show that the minimal conditions for the EU and the eurozone to work in their current form are lacking.	重点还在于证明，当前形式下的欧盟和欧元区缺乏起作用的最低条件。


Foremost among these conditions is a shared diagnosis of the EU’s problems and a common philosophy.	这些条件中最重要的是对欧盟问题和共同哲学的一致诊断。


Renzi and Schäuble, for example, have strikingly contradictory views on crucial issues, from fiscal policy to the banking sector.	比如，伦齐和朔伊布勒对于从财政政策到银行业的诸多关键问题有着截然矛盾的观点。


Renzi criticizes the EU, while laying the blame for the consequences of new creditor bail-in regulations squarely at Germany’s door.	伦齐批评欧盟，同时将新的债权人自救（bail-in）监管措施的后果的责任全部推给德国。


For the same reasons, French President François Hollande puts internal security first (possibly in line with the preferences of his electorate), and honors fiscal rules inconsistently.	出于同样的原因，法国总统奥朗德将内部安全摆在第一位（也许这和他的选民的偏好一致），对财政规则的支持前后不一。


It doesn’t help that applying German or EU proposals on refugee policy would not exactly strengthen his re-election chances in 2017.	这无济于事，应用德国或欧盟的难民政策方案根本不会增加他2017年连任的机会。


If EU member states were to pursue their enlightened self-interest, they would nurture ever closer union, with solidarity – fiscal and otherwise – between North and South.	如果欧盟成员国追求开明自利，就会支持更加紧密的联盟，让北欧和南欧（在财政和其他领域）更加团结。


Instead, they are increasingly scapegoating Europe and embracing a national discourse.	相反，它们日益拿欧洲当替罪羊，强调国家立场。


Once again, Europe seems to be sleepwalking into crisis.	欧洲似乎正在再一次梦游着走向危机。


One hopes that it wakes up in a safer place than it has in the past.	我们希望它能够在比上一次更安全的地方醒过来。


Europe’s Two Futures	欧洲的两个未来


PARIS – Once again, Europe seems to have reached a fork in the road.	巴黎—欧洲似乎又一次站在了岔路口。


In one direction lies the future as described by pessimists, who argue that rising populist movements and the plunge of the euro are evidence of the continent’s coming slide into geopolitical and economic oblivion.	一个方向上是悲观派所描述的未来，他们说，兴盛的民粹主义运动和欧元贬值是欧洲大陆滑向地缘政治和经济灾难的明证。


In the other direction lies a steep upward path to Europe’s integration and reemergence as a global power – the course, optimists say, that the continent will take as it wakes up and recognizes that it must have the capacity to weather the harshest storms.	另一个方向上是迈向欧洲一体化和重新崛起为全球力量的康庄大道——乐观派说，随着欧洲大陆的觉醒和认识到它必须能够抵御最恶劣的风暴，它一定会走上这条路。


There is no telling which future will be realized.	不知道未来会向哪条路发展。


Is Europe “a grandmother, no longer fertile and vibrant,” as Pope Francis put it when he addressed the European Parliament last November?	欧洲是“一个老太婆，已经不再丰润，活力尽失”P教皇方济各在去年11月的欧洲议会演讲上如是说）吗？


Or is it a phoenix, about to rise (yet again) from its ashes?	还是一只即将（再次）涅槃的凤凰？


The outcome depends, of course, on how Europeans respond to their current travails.	当然，结果取决于欧洲人对当前的艰难如何反应。


And as they contemplate their choices, they would be wise to consider how the continent is perceived from the outside.	而在他们思索选择时，最好考虑一下外部是如何看待欧洲大陆的？


For starters, it is important to acknowledge that the outlook looks bleak.	首先，很重要的一点是承认前景并不美妙。


Seventy years after the liberation of Auschwitz, Jews are still being attacked and murdered in European cities.	奥斯维辛集中营解放已经过去了七十年，但犹太人仍然在各大欧洲城市被袭击和谋杀。


More than 50 years after the end of the Algerian War, European Muslims face more discrimination than ever.	阿尔及利亚战争结束已经过去了50多年，欧洲穆斯林面临的其歧视比以往任何时候都要多。


With Russian-backed separatists – and maybe even Russian troops – battling government forces in Ukraine, the specter of war is once again stalking the continent.	俄罗斯支持的分裂主义者——甚至还有俄罗斯军队——正在乌克兰与政府军打仗，战争幽灵再一次飘荡在欧洲大陆上空。


And the election of a leftist government in Greece has raised the question of whether introducing the euro was a good idea.	而希腊极左翼政府的当选也引起了欧元到底是不是个好主意的质疑。


On the other hand, Europe has faced worse – much worse – and emerged stronger than ever.	另一方面，欧洲曾经面临过更糟糕的情况——比现在糟糕得多——并且也变得比以往更强大。


After the first half of the twentieth century – the bloodiest period of human history – the continent’s leaders returned from the battlefield to lay the foundations of lasting European peace.	二十世纪上半叶过去后——这是人类历史上最血腥的时期——欧洲大陆领导人从战场归来，为维持欧洲和平打下基础。


Europe may never regain its standing as the center of the world, but it can continue to be both an important actor and an attractive model for others.	欧洲也许永远都不能回到世界舞台的中央，但它可以继续成为重要行动方和有吸引力的榜样。


Indeed, with the benefit of distance, a broader picture emerges.	事实上，着眼于远处，我们可以看到一幅更广阔的图景。


Seen from China, Europe is first and foremost an attractive investment opportunity; and the euro’s spectacular fall now makes it a particularly tempting one.	从中国看来，欧洲是首先是一个极具吸引力的机会； 欧元的大幅贬值让它尤其诱人。


The continent may not be the island of stability it once was – Russian President Vladimir Putin and a few thousand European jihadists have seen to that.	欧洲大陆也许已不是昔日的稳定之岛——这就是俄罗斯总统普京和几千欧洲圣战者的目的。


But the risks it faces are mild when compared with the chronic instability and acute threats facing much of the rest of the world.	但与世界其他地区的长期动荡和尖锐威胁相比，欧洲所面临的风险并不大。


Europe’s bloodstained history also provides a useful warning for China and the rest of Asia, and can serve as an example for overcoming the region’s long-standing animosities.	欧洲血染的历史也给中国和亚洲其他地区提供了有用的警告，也可以作为克服地区长期恩怨的榜样。


Though tensions between China and its neighbors over territorial claims in the East and South China Seas have receded somewhat in recent months, the prospect of worsening Sino-Japanese relations, in particular, remains worrisome.	尽管中国及其邻国关于东海和南海的领土主张纠纷在近几个月中有所缓和，但（特别是）中日关系恶化的前景仍然令人十分忧虑。


Reconciliation along the Franco-German model may not yet be in the cards, but the two Asian powers would be well advised to learn from Europe’s experience.	遵循法德模式和解也许还不现实，但对亚洲两大强国来说，学习欧洲的经验不失为好建议。


The view from the United States is completely different.	从美国看来则一切都不相同。


From the American perspective, Europe is less a model than a historical relic.	从美国的角度看，欧洲与其说是榜样，不如说是古迹。


The continent’s national characteristics have returned to the fore: Germany with its economic power, France with its terrorists, Greece with its leftists, and so forth.	欧洲大陆的国家特征已经成为关注焦点：德国经济强，法国遍地恐怖主义，希腊的极左翼政党，等等。


From the perspective of the poorest parts of the world, Europe represents the weakest link in the coalition fighting radical Islam, a battle that is taking its highest toll – despite the impression created by Western media coverage – primarily in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa.	从世界最穷地区的角度看，欧洲是对抗极端伊斯兰教联盟中最弱的一环。 这场战争的代价主要由中东、南亚和非洲承担——尽管西方媒体报道造成的印象并非如此。


For many of those fleeing the conflicts in these regions, Europe is also the Promised Land – the object of the hopes and dreams of those risking their lives to reach the prosperous side of the Mediterranean Sea.	对许多因为冲突而逃离这些地区的人来说，欧洲也是迦南乐土——对冒着生命危险来到繁荣的地中海这一边的人来说，这里也是希望和梦想的目标。


In the end, how Europeans view themselves will determine their collective fate.	最后，欧洲人如何看待自己将决定他们的集体命运。


If they do not seize this decisive moment to define themselves – by beginning to institute the difficult reforms their countries so desperately need, for example – they risk ending up on a path they never intended to take.	如果他们不抓住定义自己的决定性时刻——比如，可以从实施国家所急需的改革开始——他们就有可能走上永远不想走的道路。


Europe Crosses the Rubicon	欧洲的重大决策


The so-called “European Neighborhood Policy” has, so far, been a curious thing.	截至目前，所谓的“欧洲邻居政策”稀奇古怪。


There is much talk about it in the European Union, but little practical effect.	欧盟内部对此议论纷纷，但是却没有什么实效。


It was meant as an alternative to the ever-increasing number of accession rounds, say, involving the countries in the southern Caucasus.	这一政策的目的在于成为不断扩大的入盟谈判的替代品。 这些谈判涉及到南高加索各国。


But the war in Lebanon and its consequences have caused a sudden and fundamental change in the leisurely pursuit of this policy.	但是，黎巴嫩战争及其后果对这一政策不紧不慢的实行产生了突如其来而又根本性的变化。


The Lebanon War has served as a harsh reminder to the European Union that it has “strategic interests” – security interests first and foremost – and that, should it choose to ignore them, the price will be high.	黎巴嫩战争严厉地提醒欧盟，它具有“战略利益”，首先而且最重要的是安全利益，而且，如果它有意回避这些利益，代价将是巨大的。


Moreover, the division of labor between the US and Europe isn’t functioning in the time-tested manner of old: the ongoing war in Iraq is gnawing at America’s military capabilities and resulted in a crisis of moral and political legitimacy of the US across the Arabic/Islamic world.	而且，美国和欧洲之间的分工在久经考验的方式下并不奏效。 伊拉克目前的战争正在侵蚀美国的军事能力，造成美国的道义和政治合法性在整个阿拉伯伊斯兰地区的危机。


With the decision of its member states to send several thousand soldiers to Lebanon to implement the UN cease-fire resolution 1701, the European Union has taken the most significant decision yet within its Neighborhood Policy.	欧盟各成员国决定向黎巴嫩派遣数千名士兵来执行联合国有关停火的1701号决议，由此，欧盟在其邻居政策范围内做出了最为重大的决定。


Can the EU in fact be able to emerge as a stabilizing political force in the most dangerous area of conflict within Europe’s immediate geopolitical neighborhood?	欧盟能否真的在紧靠欧洲的地缘政治邻居中最为危险的冲突地带成为一支稳定性的政治力量呢？


After the Balkan Wars of the 1990’s, the Near and Middle East is at once the most dangerous and also – given security considerations – the most important neighboring region for the EU today.	二十世纪九十年代的巴尔干战争后，近东和中东地区立即成为当今欧盟最为危险、并且鉴于安全考虑，也是最为重要的近邻。


Why?	为何如此？


Because the main threats to European security at the beginning of the 21st century stem from that region.	因为二十一世纪初叶欧洲安全的主要威胁来自那一地区。


The threats concentrated in the Middle East are diverse: regional conflicts, totalitarian religious ideologies, terrorism, nuclear armament programs, blockades to modernization, unstable regimes and hegemonic ambitions.	集中于中东的威胁五花八门，包括地区冲突、极权宗教意识形态、恐怖主义、核武计划、阻碍现代化进程、不稳定的政权以及霸权主义野心。


If one asks what interests the EU and its member states have in this crisis-riddled region, the answer is, that certainly European energy and economic interests are at stake, as well as the vital interests of Europe’s partners and allies (Israel in particular).	如果有人问，在这一危机四伏地地区中欧盟及其成员国的利益何在，答案就是，这显然忧关欧洲的能源和经济利益以及欧洲的伙伴和盟国(特别是以色列)的重大利益。


But first and foremost on the list are Europe’s.	但是，欧洲自身利益占据首位。


How the Middle East develops will determine the extent of the risks for, or even probable challenges to, Europe’s security.	中东局势如何发展将决定欧洲安全的风险程度，甚至对其安全构成可能的挑战。


Success in containing, or indeed resolving, the conflict there will have overwhelmingly positive consequences for Europe’s security.	成功地遏制或者解决那里的冲突将对欧洲安全产生极为积极的影响。


The Middle East today is defined by three central conflicts: the Israeli-Arab conflict, Iraq, and Iran.	当今，三场中心冲突缠绕着中东。 它们是以色列和阿拉伯世界的冲突、伊拉克以及伊朗。


The fusion of Iran’s nuclear program (and Iran’s hegemonic ambitions) with the situation in Iraq and with Hezbollah in Lebanon will lead to a “New Middle East” which, in all likelihood, will provoke a major confrontation.	伊朗核子计划及其霸权野心，连同伊拉克局势以及黎巴嫩的真主党将会导向“新的中东”局势。 这一局势很有可能挑起大规模对抗。


This will involve far more than just the usual regional actors and conflicts.	涉及范围远远超出该地区通常的势力和冲突。


The war in Lebanon has made it abundantly clear how far this dangerous process has already progressed.	黎巴嫩战争让这一危险的进程的进展程度一目了然。


The mission in Lebanon is a high-risk one for the UN force, and for Europe in particular.	对于联合国、特别是欧洲而言，黎巴嫩的使命充满风险。


The war did not bring forth a real decision.	这一战争并未带来实质性的决定。


Neither Hezbollah nor Syria, let alone Iran, have any interest in the UN mission’s success.	无论是真主党还是叙利亚，抑或是伊朗都不乐见联合国使命的成功。


The Security Council resolution presupposes – in addition to separating the combatants – the enforcement of the internal and external sovereignty of Lebanon’s elected government of Lebanon, without saying how this is to be accomplished with a politically strengthened Hezbollah, militarily superior to the Lebanese forces.	联合国安理会决议除了分隔战斗各方外，还假定切实执行黎巴嫩民选政府的对内对外主权，但是并未说明如何在真主党在政治上得到加强、军事上强于黎巴嫩军队的情况下实现这一目标。


Any attempt at disarming Hezbollah by the UN force would mean a war with Hezbollah (and with Syria and Iran in the background) -- a task the UN force cannot accomplish.	任何由联合国部队解除真主党武装的企图都将意味着同真主党(以及背后的叙利亚和伊朗)的战争。 联合国部队无法完成这一任务。


But were it to resign itself to mere observer status in Lebanon, the UN and Europe would lose all credibility.	但是，如果联合国部队甘于在黎巴嫩仅仅成为观察员，那么，联合国和欧洲都将会失去可信度。


Moreover, it is likely that, within a few months, UN soldiers would once again find themselves between the firing lines of the conflicting parties.	况且，联合国士兵有可能在几个月的时间内再一次处于冲突各方的交叉火力之中。


The mission therefore will have to walk the thin and risky line in pursuit of its robust mandate to stabilize the country.	联合国使命因此就将会在履行其稳定黎巴嫩国家的严峻使命中如履薄冰。


Failure will be a constant danger and the military risk will be high.	一旦失败就会危险四伏，充满军事风险。


Yet, in light of the situation there is no better alternative.	但是，鉴于局势，没有什么其他更好的办法。


In view of the risk to its troops, Europe will be compelled to influence and even proactively bring about strategic changes to the political environment in the entire Middle East.	鉴于欧洲士兵的风险，欧洲将不得不影响整个中东地区的政治环境，并且主动出击予以战略性的改变。


With its decision in favor of the mission in Lebanon, the EU crossed a military Rubicon.	欧盟决定支持黎巴嫩的使命，因而也就做出了重大军事决策。


It must now back up its growing weight in the Middle East with political initiative.	现在， 欧盟必须用政治行动来支撑其在中东日益增长的份量。


This must include three key elements: a negotiated solution for Syria; a resumption of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians; and a common strategic understanding with the US of the political strategy of the West for the region (which addresses the region’s most dangerous conflict, Iran).	这必须包括三大关键因素。 它们是：谈判解决叙利亚问题，巴以之间重开谈判以及同美国就西方在该地区的政治战略达成共同的战略谅解(它也解决伊朗问题，也是该地区最危险的冲突)。


This common understanding will be the pivotal challenge for the future of the transatlantic relationship.	这一共同谅解将会是跨大西洋关系未来的重大挑战。


For Europe and its troops, the stakes in Lebanon are very high.	对于欧洲及其部队而言，黎巴嫩充满风险。


But this is about vital European interests.	但是，这事关欧��的重大利益。


War and chaos in the Middle East or just a moral or political vacuum will directly affect and upset the security of the EU and all its member states.	中东的战争和混乱，或者仅仅是道义和政治真空都将会直接影响和破坏欧盟及其所有成员国的安全。


Europe therefore had to act, though that decision was obviously difficult.	因此，尽管做出决定明显是困难的，但是欧洲必须采取行动。


The key question in the near future will be whether Europe actually has the military and political capabilities, the political staying power, and the common will to act in accordance with its core interests in the Middle East.	近期的主要问题是，欧洲是否果真具有军事和政治能力、政治持久力量以及共同意愿来根据其在中东的核心利益采取行动。


We will see.	我们拭目以待。


In any case, one thing can already be said: Welcome to the real world.	无论如何，有一件事已经明白，那就是，崭新的世界来临了。


The Debate About Debating Islam	关于伊斯兰教辩论的探讨


PARIS – The argument began when the Algerian novelist and journalist Kamel Daoud wrote an article for the Italian newspaper La Repubblica about a spate of sexual assaults in Cologne, Germany, on New Year’s Eve, 2015.	巴黎——这场辩论是从阿尔及利亚小说家兼记者卡迈勒·达乌德为意大利《共和国报》撰写的一篇关于发生在2015年新年前夜德国科隆的一系列性侵事件的文章开始的。


The attacks were widely reported to have been carried out by groups of immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East, which Daoud explained by saying that many Muslims from the region suffer from extreme sexual deprivation, which, he wrote, generates an “unhealthy relationship with women, their body, and desire.”	据外界报道来自北非和中东的移民群体制造了这些性侵事件，而达乌德对此的解释是该地区众多穆斯林正遭受极端性剥夺，而在他笔下，这样的状况造成了“与女性及其身体和欲望的关系并不健康。 ”


Daoud seems not to have expected the reaction his article received, especially in France, where it was republished by Le Monde.	达乌德似乎并未预料到他这篇文章所造成的反应，特别是在其文章被《世界报》转载的法国。


After withering criticism accusing him of Islamophobia, Daoud announced that he would cease his journalistic work and focus on writing novels.	在遭到仇视伊斯兰教的令人难堪的指责后，达乌德宣布他将停止其新闻工作并专注于创作小说。


But putting Islam off limits to criticism not only deprives a voice to authors like Daoud; it perfunctorily halts a much-needed discussion.	但限制对伊斯兰教的批评不仅剥夺了像达乌德这样的作者讲话的权利； 还以敷衍的态度彻底扼杀了一场迫切需要的探讨。


There can be no doubt that Daoud’s decision to write the article took extraordinary courage.	毋庸置疑，达乌德决定写这篇文章需要非凡的勇气。


In 2014, shortly after the publication of his first novel, The Meursault Investigation, which retells Albert Camus’ The Stranger from the perspective of the murdered Arab’s brother, a Salafist imam declared a fatwa calling for Daoud’s death for apostasy and heresy.	2014年，在达乌德发表从被谋害阿拉伯兄弟的视角重新演绎阿尔贝·加缪作品《局外人》的首部小说《默尔索调查》后不久，一位萨拉菲派伊玛目就宣布了一道伊斯兰教令，呼吁以叛教和发表异端邪说的罪名判处达乌德死刑。


But that didn’t stop him from tackling a controversial subject.	但这并未阻止他对争议问题的探讨。


In the Muslim world, Daoud wrote, “Women are negated, rejected, killed, veiled, locked in, or owned,” their bodies denied the right to pleasure.	在穆斯林世界，达乌德写道，“女性遭遇否定、拒绝、杀害、蒙面、幽禁或拥有，”她们身体的快乐权利被剥夺。


In the preaching of Islamists seeking recruits, he notes, are “descriptions of a paradise more similar to a bordello than the reward for pious individuals, fantasies of virgins for suicide bombers, morality police chasing down women showing too much skin, the puritanism of dictatorship, veils, and burqas.”	他指出在招募伊斯兰教徒的布道中，“对天堂的描绘不像是对虔诚者的奖励而更像是一所妓院，自杀式炸弹袭击者对于处女的幻想、道德警察追捕肌肤裸露过多的妇女以及专政、蒙面和掀开面纱的清教徒习俗。 ”


In the Islamist view, the liberation of Western women is not an expression of freedom, but a sign of the West’s moral decay.	在伊斯兰教徒看来，西方的妇女解放并非是一种自由的表现，而是代表西方的道德沦丧。


Daoud concludes, “Islam is an outrage against desire.	达乌德总结道，“对欲望的愤怒构成了伊斯兰教。


And that desire is bound to explode from time to time in Western territory, where freedom is so naked.”	上述欲望注定会在西方领土上不时爆发，因为这里的自由是如此的赤裸。 ”


The response was quick and vicious.	这篇文章所引发的反应是迅速而凶狠的。


On February 12, a “collective” of anthropologists, sociologists, and historians published a virulent attack in Le Monde.	2月12日，一群人类学家、社会学家和历史学家联合在《世界报》上发表恶毒的攻击文章。


Entitled “Kamel Daoud’s Fantasies,” it accused him of “recycling much worn-out Orientalist clichés” and “feeding the Islamophobic fantasies of a growing segment of the European public.”	这篇题为《卡迈勒·达乌德的幻想》的文章指责他“重新翻出早已过时的东方主义陈词滥调”并“以此来迎合欧洲大众不断滋生的仇视伊斯兰教的幻想。 ”


To be sure, it is understandable that academics might question Daoud’s approach; his argument was based on a strain of “essentialism,” in which individual actions are reduced to cultural and religious forces, with no attention to the social, political, and economic conditions that might be at work.	可以肯定，学者们质疑达乌德的方法是可以理解的； 他的观点基于一系列“本质论”，即仅仅通过文化和宗教因素来解释个人行为，而不考虑社会、政治和经济条件发挥的影响。


And the critics were right to point out that Daoud omitted mentioning the many acts of violence with no connection to Islam that are carried out against women in Europe, Asia, and North America.	而且批评家们指出达乌德并未提及欧洲、亚洲和北美与伊斯兰教无关的针对妇女的许多暴力行为也是正确的。


But Daoud’s critics overstepped the boundaries of legitimate discussion of ideas, accusing him of “trivializing” racist criticism and dressing it up in “humanistic thought.”	但达乌德的批评者超越了合法思想探讨的界限，他们指责他“轻视”种族主义批评并将其装扮成“人本主义思想”。


Indeed, they questioned his right to wish for a much-needed change in the way the Muslim world treats women and a reexamination of its sexual taboos.	事实上，他们质疑他是否有权希望穆斯林世界在对待女性的方式和重新审视性禁忌方面进行迫切需要的变革。


“I still find it quite unethical,” Daoud responded, “that I was pushed into the role of sacrificial lamb to be brought on the altar of local hate, condemned for Islamophobia by today’s Inquisition.”	“我还是觉得这样做很不道德，”达乌德回应道，“我被当做祭祀的羔羊呈送到当地仇恨的祭坛上，并被今天的宗教法庭谴责为伊斯兰教的仇视者。 ”


The episode created such a commotion in France that several authors – as well as many Franco-Algerian bloggers – came to Daoud’s defense, criticizing the attacks against him by Salafists and academics intent on bullying him into silence.	这一事件在几位法国作家（及很多法国-阿尔及利亚博客写手）中造成了不小的轰动，他们站出来保护达乌德，对萨拉菲派和旨在迫使他陷入沉默的学者对他的攻击行为持批评态度。


Even French Prime Minister Manuel Valls weighed in, saluting Daoud’s “original hard thinking” and denouncing his critics.	就连法国总理曼纽尔·瓦尔斯也参与进来，表达对达乌德“原创性勤奋思考”的致敬并谴责他的批评者。


Referring to France’s national motto, Valls defended “liberty, that is, freedom to write and to think, equality among men and women, and fraternity and secularism, from which is derived our social unity.”	瓦尔斯利用法国的国家格言辩护道“自由是写作和思想的自由、是男女两性的平等、是友爱和世俗主义，以此为基础才能建立我们的社会团结。


As he put it, “Leaving this writer to fend for himself would be like giving up on who we are.”	”正如他所说的那样，“让这位作者孤军奋战就好比放弃自我。 ”


Sadly, Daoud’s travails are just one example of legitimate intellectual inquiry degenerating into political bickering over whether it is acceptable to criticize Islam.	可悲的是，达乌德的艰苦努力仅仅是合法的知识探索沦落为能否批评伊斯兰教的政治争吵的一个实例而已。


This has dangerous implications for free thought, as well as for the future of Islam itself.	这对自由思想和伊斯兰教自身的未来已经产生了危险的影响。


It is not uncommon today for political analysts to contort their arguments in order to avoid being denounced as Islamophobic.	今天常常可以见到政治分析家扭曲自己的观点以避免被指责为仇视伊斯兰教。


As a result, rather than examining the systemic role that Islam plays in radicalization, for example, they describe radicals as having somehow fallen haphazardly into Islam.	结果是人们并未研究伊斯兰教在激进行为中所发挥的系统性作用，比方说，他们将激进分子形容为莫名其妙地盲目陷入伊斯兰教。


For the sake of free thought alone, it is time to stop branding as a bigot anyone who dares discuss the religion critically.	哪怕仅仅为实现思想自由的缘故，现在停止为所有敢于对宗教进行批判性探讨的人贴上偏执的标签也正是时候。


Until we do, an honest debate about Islam in Europe will be impossible.	在实现这一目标之前，在欧洲展开对伊斯兰教的诚实探讨是不可能的。


Why Deflation is Good News for Europe	为何通缩对欧洲来说是好事?


BRUSSELS – In today's global economy, there is no price as important as that of crude oil.	发自布鲁塞尔——在当今的全球经济中，没有什么价格要比原油价格更重要。


More than 80 million barrels are produced (and consumed) daily, and a large part of that output is traded internationally.	每天有超过8000万桶原油被生产和消费掉，而且其中很大一部分都进入了国际贸易环节。


Thus, the sharp fall in the crude-oil price – from about $110 last year to around $60 today – is yielding hundreds of billions of dollars in savings for oil importers.	因此，油价的大幅下跌——从去年的110美元到近日的60美元/桶——为石油进口国节省了数千亿美元的资金。


For the European Union and the United States, the gain from that decline is worth about 2-3% of GDP.	对于欧盟和美国来说，从油价下跌中所取得收益相当于各自GDP的2~3%。


For Europe, the benefits of cheap oil might grow over time, because long-term gas-supply contracts are to a significant degree indexed to the oil price.	在欧洲方面，低油价的好处或会随着时间推移不断增加，因为长期天然气供应合同在很大程度上与油价挂钩。


This represents another advantage for Europe, where prices for natural gas were, until recently, several times higher than in the US, which had been benefiting from lower-cost shale energy.	同时这也意味着另一优势，欧洲当前的天然气价目前来说还是数倍于美国，因为后者受惠于低价的页岩油。


But many observers have argued that cheap oil also has a downside, because it exacerbates deflationary tendencies in the advanced countries, which already seem to be mired in a low-growth trap.	但许多观察家也指出低油价也有其不利之处，因为这会令发达国家的通缩趋势进一步恶化，令到本以似乎陷入低增长陷阱的状况雪上加霜。


The sharp fall in oil prices, according to this view, will make it even harder for these countries' central banks to achieve the 2% annual inflation rate that most have targeted in fulfilling their price-stability mandate.	根据这一观点，油价的迅速下跌会令那些国家的央行更难实现为维持价格稳定任务而设立的每年2%通胀目标


The eurozone, in particular, seems to be in danger, as prices are now falling for the first time since 2009.	欧元区则显得尤为危险，因为物价自2009年以来首度下跌。


This deflation is bad, it is argued, because it makes it harder for debtors, especially in the troubled economies of the eurozone's periphery (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), to pay what they owe.	据说通缩不是一件好事，因为它令那些负债国，尤其是欧元区外围的问题经济体（希腊、爱尔兰、意大利，葡萄牙和西班牙），更难以去偿还自身债务。


But this fear is unfounded, because it is based on a misunderstanding.	但这种担忧是毫无根据的，因为这其实构建于某种误解之上。


What matters for debt-service capacity is the debtors' income, not the general price level.	影响债务偿还能力的其实应该是负债者的收入状况，而非总体价格水平。


As oil prices fall, households' real (inflation-adjusted) income should rise, because they do not have to spend as much on fuel and heating.	随着油价下跌，家庭的实际（排除通胀因素）收入应当有所上升，因为油费和供暖费用减少了。


Lower oil prices make life easier, not harder, for highly indebted households in the US or the eurozone periphery.	对于美国和欧元区外围国家的高负债家庭来说，油价下跌缓解（而非增加）了一定的生活压力。


Falling consumer prices should thus be viewed as a good sign.	消费者价格的下降也应当被视为一个好的迹象。


Most manufacturing enterprises will also benefit from lower energy costs, improving their ability to service their debts.	大多数制造企业将从更低的油价中受益，并随之改善其债务偿还能力。


This, too, is particularly relevant in the eurozone periphery, where the non-financial sector accumulated too much debt during the credit boom that preceded the 2008 global financial crisis.	而这也与欧元区外围国家尤其相关，因为这些国家的金融部门在2008年全球金融危机前累积了过多负债。


Moreover, though most of the savings implied by lower energy costs might initially show up in higher profits, over time, competition will force companies to pass on some of these windfall gains in the form of lower prices or higher wages.	此外，虽然由低能源价格产生的节余或许首先会体现为更高的利润，但随着时间推移，竞争会迫使企业将这些飞来横财的一部分以更低价格或者更高工资的形式转移出来。


This is another important consequence of cheap oil: lower prices make it more difficult to judge the point at which wage pressure becomes inflationary.	低油价还有另一个重要后果：更低的价格使人更难以判定究竟工资压力将在哪个点位形成通胀压力。


Because wages can increase to a greater extent without fueling inflation, the US Federal Reserve Board might be inclined to delay hiking interest rates, which it is now widely expected to do this summer.	因为工资可以在不推高通胀的情况下出现一定程度的攀升，所以美联储委员会或许倾向于推迟提高利率，而外界本来预期它将在今年夏天推行这一措施的。


Public finances should also benefit from the deflation engendered by lower oil prices.	公共财政也会在低油价引发的通缩中受益。


Government revenues depend on the value of domestic output, not only consumption.	政府的收入不仅依靠消费，还依赖于国内产值。


Though lower oil prices depress consumer prices, they should boost production and overall GDP.	虽然低油价压制了消费者物价，也将刺激生产和整体GDP。


Absent large price changes for raw materials, the consumer price index evolves along with the GDP deflator (the price deflator for the entire economy).	如果原材料价格不出现大波动的话，消费者物价指数将随GDP紧缩指数（整体经济的价格紧缩指数）的变化而变化。


But that will not be true this year, because consumer prices are falling, whereas the GDP deflator (and nominal GDP) is still increasing.	但这种情况在今年度将不会发生，因为消费者物价正在下跌，而GDP紧缩指数（以及名义GDP）依然正在上升。


This should lead to solid government revenues, which is good news for highly indebted governments throughout the industrialized world, but particularly for the eurozone periphery.	这将为政府带来可靠的收入，不仅对那些债台高筑的发达工业国政府，尤其对欧元区外围国家有所裨益。


The fall in (consumer) prices that the eurozone currently is experiencing should thus be seen as a positive development for all energy importers.	欧元区目前经历的（消费者）物价下跌也可以因此被视为对所有能源进口国的积极进展。


The eurozone periphery, in particular, can look forward to an ideal combination of low interest rates, a favorable euro exchange rate, and a boost in real incomes as a result of cheap oil.	尤其是欧元区外围国家可以寄望于出现一个低利率，合理欧元汇率以及低油价带来的实际收入上升三者相结合。


In a deflationary environment, lower oil prices appear to make it more difficult for the European Central Bank to achieve its target of an inflation rate close to 2%.	在一个通缩环境中，低油价似乎令欧洲央行更难以实现其近2%的通胀目标。


In reality, lower oil prices represent a boon for Europe – especially for its most beleaguered nations.	事实上，更低的油价堪称对欧洲的恩惠——尤其是那些面临着内忧外困局面的国家。


Overcoming Europe’s Twin Growth Challenges	克服欧洲的双重增长挑战


MUNICH – As economic recovery finally begins to take hold in Europe, the imperative for policymakers is to ensure that growth can be sustained far into the future.	发自慕尼黑——随着经济复苏终于开始在欧洲占据上风，决策者的当务之急是确保增长可以持续到久远的将来。


Fiscal and monetary stimulus may have been appropriate at the peak of the crisis, but they will do little to address the biggest threat to the continent’s long-term prospects: a toxic twosome of weak demographics and low investment.	财政和货币刺激政策在危机高峰期可能是恰当之举，但却无助于应对欧洲大陆的长期发展前景的最大威胁：祸不单行的弱势人口结构和低投资额。


Even assuming a steady inflow of immigrants, the combined workforces of the 28 European Union countries are projected to shrink by 12-16 million people over the next 15 years, according to the OECD and the European Commission.	根据经合组织和欧盟委员会的计算，即使能实现移民的稳定流入，28个欧盟国家的总劳动人口仍会在未来15年中减少1200~1600万。


A sharper rise in the number of newcomers could help ameliorate the situation; but higher immigration is not, on its own, an adequate solution to the EU economy’s long-term problems.	新输入人口数量的更快速上升可以帮助改善这种情况； 但更多的移民在根本上也不是对欧盟经济长期问题的适当解决方案。


Europe’s only hope for sustained growth is to boost productivity, so that it can derive more value from its shrinking workforce.	实现欧洲可持续增长的唯一希望是推动生产力，并以此在不断萎缩的劳动力中获得更多的价值。


The trouble is that it has been many years since the continent last saw significant productivity gains.	但问题是欧洲大陆距离上一次生产率的显著提高已经很多年了。


In Western Europe, growth in labor productivity (output per hour worked) has been decelerating for decades.	在西欧，劳动生产率（每工作小时的产出）的增长已经停滞了几十年。


In the 1960s, labor productivity grew at a robust 4% annual rate, before slowing to 2% in the 1980s and dropping below 1% around the turn of the century.	在1960年代，劳动生产率实现了强劲的年均4％增长，然后放缓至1980年代的2％并在世纪之交之际跌破1％。


Today it crawls forward at about 0.5% a year.	如今则以0. 5％的速度匍匐前进。


Meanwhile, total factor productivity, which takes into account technological innovation, has been stagnant.	与此同时，包含技术创新在内的全要素生产率则一直停滞不前。


The EU desperately needs economic growth to enable its member states to sustain their social security and welfare systems as their societies get older – a challenge that other regions and countries are facing as well.	欧盟迫切需要经济增长，好让成员国在不断老龄化的同时以维持自身的社会保障和福利制度——其他国家和地区也都面临着类似的挑战。


But few confront Europe’s twin obstacles of anemic productivity growth and demographic decline.	但没几个国家会面临欧洲的生产率增长停滞和人口下降的双重阻碍。


China, for example, is facing a similar demographic challenge, as its labor force shrinks and the number of retirees rises rapidly. But China’s labor productivity has been growing by 9% a year, on average, over the last decade.	以中国为例，虽然该国也遭遇了劳动力减少和退休人员数量急剧上升的挑战，但中国的劳动生产率在过去十年实现了年均9％的增长。


The decline in productivity growth in the EU is surprising, given the rapid onset of digitalization – often described as the industrial revolution of the twenty-first century.	在数字化技术——常被描述为21世纪的工业革命——迅速推广的前提下，欧盟生产率增长下降的情况其实相当出人意料。


In fact, part of the perceived slowdown can be attributed to measurement issues: In Europe, as well as the United States, the technological changes being wrought by smartphones and the Internet simply are not showing up in the productivity data.	事实上，增速放缓的其中一部分原因可以归结为测量方法的问题：在欧洲还有美国，智能手机和互联网所引发的科技变革根本没有体现在生产率数据上。


Statisticians struggle, for example, to account for how consumers are benefiting from the increased quality and speed of delivery that often results from digitalization.	比如说，统计人员也在绞尽脑汁地思考如何统计消费者因数字化而实现的质量提升和传递速度加快所带来的益处。


Furthermore, in the digital age, many services are being provided free of charge, which means they are not being counted as consumption at all.	此外在数字时代许多服务都是免费提供的，这意味着它们并未被计算机在消费内。


Another factor that may be contributing to flat productivity is that many corporations run traditional physical business models parallel to new digital ones.	可能导致生产率增长数据波澜不惊的另一个因素是，许多企业的传统实体性经营与新的数字商业模式并不兼容。


Adding high-tech systems to traditional processes can temporarily increase costs and thus depress productivity, especially if the new and old businesses are not well connected.	在传统操作程序上增加高科技系统会在短时间内提高成本，从而抑制生产率，尤其是在新老模式无法良好衔接的情况下。


These issues should diminish with time; as that happens, part of the productivity lull should disappear.	这些问题应该会随着时间的推移而减少； 随着情况的不断好转，一部份生产力抑制因素也会消失。


But not all of the slowdown in productivity growth can be attributed to the cumbersome transition to a new technological era.	但并不是所有的生产率增长放缓都可以归因于向新技术时代的艰难过渡。


Even as the economy has started to recover, investment in Europe remains well below its level in 2008.	即便经济已开始复苏，对欧洲的投资额仍远低于2008年的水平。


Long-term economic health will depend, in large part, on whether investment recovers and by how much.	而长期的经济改善将在很大程度上取决于投资是否复苏以及规模大小。


And there are reasons for pessimism.	同时我们也有理由感到悲观。


Weak investment activity partly reflects a gloomy view of the European market.	疲软的投资活动在一定程度上反映了欧洲市场的悲观看法。


If workforces are stagnating or shrinking and growth is subdued, why spend on boosting output? Simply put, Europe’s problems have become intertwined.	如果劳动力停滞不前或继续萎缩，同时增长疲弱，那为何要花钱提高产量？


The continent needs productivity-enhancing investment in order to compensate for its shrinking workforce; but its demographic weakness is causing companies to hold back.	简而言之，欧洲的问题盘根错节：一方面需要投资提高���产力以弥补其劳动力萎缩； 另一方面其人口结构缺陷又导致企业踌躇不前。


Fortunately, there is much that can be done.	但幸运的是还存在很多施展的空间。


A renewed push to integrate European markets for services, digital goods, capital markets, and energy would remove barriers to business and bring new incentives to invest.	新一轮的欧洲市场针对服务，数字商品，资本市场和能源的一体化将消除企业所面临的障碍并催生新的投资积极性。


The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership that the EU is currently negotiating with the US would also create a larger market, with less burdensome regulation and more competition.	欧盟目前正在与美国进行谈判的《跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系协定》也将创造一个监管更少且竞争更大的更庞大市场。


On a national level, reform drives like those carried out in Ireland, Portugal, and Spain could improve business conditions and competitiveness across the continent.	在国家层面上，像在爱尔兰，葡萄牙和西班牙出现的改革动力可以改善整个欧洲大陆的企业经营状况和竞争力。


Finally, all European countries could redouble their efforts to educate and train their residents for the digital era.	最后，所有欧洲国家都可以加倍努力去教育和训练自己的国民去拥抱数字化时代。


Policymakers must not rest on the optimistic assumption that Europe’s economy will recover on its own.	政策制定者不能仅仅乐观地假设欧洲的经济将靠自身来实现复苏。


Rather, they should pursue policies that support investment, encourage innovation, and promote the development of skills.	相反，他们应该推动各项政策来支持投资，鼓励创新以及提升劳动者技能。


As workers and companies struggle to compete in a rapidly changing – and increasingly winner-take-all – global economy, the need for policies that will ensure long-term growth could not be more urgent.	随着工人和公司都要奋力在一个快速变化的——而且越来越赢家通吃——全球经济中进行竞争，推行确保长期增长的政策也变得刻不容缓。


The Europe Question in 2016	2016的欧洲难题


NEW YORK – At the cusp of the new year, we face a world in which geopolitical and geo-economic risks are multiplying.	发自纽约——新年伊始，我们却面对着一个地缘政治和地缘经济风险都成倍增加的世界。


Most of the Middle East is ablaze, stoking speculation that a long Sunni-Shia war (like Europe’s Thirty Years’ War between Catholics and Protestants) could be at hand.	中东大多数地区战火纷飞，让人不禁怀疑逊尼派和什叶派之间的长期战争（正如欧洲天主教徒和新教徒之间的三十年战争）可能就在眼前。


China’s rise is fueling a wide range of territorial disputes in Asia and challenging America’s strategic leadership in the region.	中国的崛起正催生大范围的亚洲领土争端，并挑战美国在该地区的战略领导地位。


And Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has apparently become a semi-frozen conflict, but one that could reignite at any time.	而俄罗斯对乌克兰的入侵显然已经进入半冻结状态，并可能在任何时候重燃。


There is also the chance of another epidemic, as outbreaks of SARS, MERS, Ebola, and other infectious diseases have shown in recent years.	此外还可能爆发其他流行病，正如近几年非典，中东呼吸综合症，埃博拉病毒和其他传染病所展现的那样。


Cyber-warfare is a looming threat as well, and non-state actors and groups are creating conflict and chaos from the Middle East to North and Sub-Saharan Africa.	网络战也是一个迫在眉睫的威胁，同时非特定国籍的破坏分子和团体正在中东及撒哈拉南北的非洲地区制造冲突和混乱。


Last, but certainly not least, climate change is already causing significant damage, with extreme weather events becoming more frequent and lethal.	最后（但显然并非最不重要的）气候变化已经造成了明显的破坏，极端天气事件已经变得越来越频繁和致命。


Yet it is Europe that may turn out to be the ground zero of geopolitics in 2016.	然而欧洲可能会在2016年变成地缘政治的爆点。


For starters, a Greek exit from the eurozone may have been only postponed, not prevented, as pension and other structural reforms put the country on a collision course with its European creditors.	首先希腊退出欧元区的进程可能只是被推迟，而非阻止，因为养老金和其他结构性改革使得该国与其欧洲债权人爆发了极大冲突。


“Grexit,” in turn, could be the beginning of the end of the monetary union, as investors would wonder which member – possibly even a core country (for example, Finland) – will be the next to leave.	对此“希退”可能是货币联盟走向尽头的开端，因为投资者会怀疑其他成员——甚至可能是核心国家（如芬兰）——是否会是下一个退出者。


If Grexit does occur, the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU may become more likely.	如果“希退”确实发生，英国退出欧盟可能会变得更加容易。


Compared to a year ago, the probability of “Brexit” has increased, for several reasons. The recent terrorist attacks in Europe have made the UK even more isolationist, as has the migration crisis.	“英退”的概率相较于一年前有所增加，原因如下：最近在欧洲的恐怖袭击以及移民危机令英国的孤立主义更加明显。


Under Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership, Labour is more Euroskeptic.	在杰里米·科尔宾（Jeremy Corbyn）的领导下，工党对欧洲的疑虑倾向大增。


And Prime Minister David Cameron has painted himself into a corner by demanding EU reforms that even the Germans – who are sympathetic to the UK – cannot accept.	而首相戴维·卡梅伦（David Cameron）则将自己逼到了角落，因为他对欧盟改革的要求即便是向来同情英国的德国人也无法接受。


To many in Britain, the EU looks like a sinking ship.	对许多英国人来说，欧盟就像一艘下沉中的邮轮。


If Brexit were to occur, other dominos would fall.	如果“英退”发生，其他的骨牌会随之倒下。


Scotland might decide to leave the UK, leading to the breakup of Britain.	苏格兰可能会决定脱离英国，导致联合王国解体。


This could inspire other separatist movements – perhaps starting in Catalonia – to push even more forcefully for independence.	这还可能刺激其他分离主义运动——或许从加泰罗尼亚开始——更强烈地要求独立。


And the EU’s Nordic members may decide that with the UK gone, they, too, would be better off leaving.	而欧盟的北欧成员国会觉得既然英国都走了，自己最好也随之离开。


As for terrorism, the sheer number of homegrown jihadists means that the question for Europe is not whether another attack will occur, but when and where.	至于恐怖主义，相当数量的土生圣战者意味着欧洲的问题不是下一次袭击是否会发生，而是何时何地会再次发生。


And repeated attacks could sharply reduce business and consumer confidence and stall Europe’s fragile economic recovery.	而且反复爆发的袭击将严重打击企业和消费者的信心，令欧洲脆弱的经济复苏陷入停滞。


Those who argue that the migration crisis also poses an existential threat to Europe are right.	这些认为移民危机会威胁到欧洲存续的人是正确的。


But the issue is not the million newcomers entering Europe in 2015. It is the 20 million more who are displaced, desperate, and seeking to escape violence, civil war, state failure, desertification, and economic collapse in large parts of the Middle East and Africa.	但问题不在于2015年进入欧洲的一百万新面孔，而是2000万以上在中东和非洲大部分地区流离失所，深陷绝望，并试图逃离暴力，内战，国家失败，荒漠化和经济崩溃的人。


If Europe is unable to find a coordinated solution to this problem and enforce a common external border, the Schengen Agreement will collapse and internal borders between the EU member states will reappear.	如果欧洲不能为这一问题找到一个协调性的解决方案，并强化共同的外部边界，申根协定将因此崩溃，欧盟成��国之间的内部边界也将重新树立起来。


Meanwhile, austerity and reform fatigue on the eurozone periphery – and among non-eurozone EU members such as Hungary and Poland – is clashing with bailout fatigue in the core.	与此同时，对紧缩及改革上疲于奔命的欧元区外围国家——与非欧元区的欧盟成员国（例如匈牙利和波兰）之间——与厌倦救助的核心国家冲突不断。


Populist parties of the left and right – with their shared hostility to free trade, migration, Muslims, and globalization – are becoming more popular throughout Europe.	左右两翼的民粹主义政党——两者一样敌视自由贸易，移民，穆斯林和全球化——在整个欧洲都更受欢迎。


Syriza is in power in Greece; a leftist coalition is in office in Portugal; and the Spanish election could lead to significant political and policy uncertainty.	激进左翼联盟已经在希腊掌权； 葡萄牙组建了左翼联合政府；


Virulent anti-migrant, anti-Muslim parties are becoming more popular in Europe’s core, including the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden.	西班牙大选可能会导致显著的政治和政策不确定性。 恶毒反移民反穆斯林的政党在欧洲核心国家——包括荷兰，丹麦，芬兰和瑞典——越来越受欢迎。


In France, the far-right National Front came close to winning power in several regions earlier this month, and its leader, Marine Le Pen, may do well in the 2017 presidential election.	在法国，极右的国民阵线在本月初差点夺得了一些地区的政权，其领导人，马琳·勒庞（Marine Le Pen），可能会在2017年总统大选中表现抢眼。


In Italy, moreover, Prime Minister Matteo Renzi is under attack by two anti-euro populist parties that have risen in opinion polls.	此外在意大利，总理马泰奥·伦齐（Matteo Renzi）正处于由两个民调支持率上涨的反欧元民粹主义政党的夹击之下。


And Chancellor Angela Merkel’s leadership is now under threat in Germany, following her courageous but controversial decision to allow almost a million asylum-seekers to enter the country.	目前默克尔对德国的领导也受到了威胁，因为正是她的勇敢但极富争议的决定使近百万寻求庇护者进入了该国。


In short, the distance between what Europe needs and what Europeans want is growing, and that gap could spell deep trouble in 2016.	简而言之，欧洲的需求和欧洲人的需求之间的距离正不断加大，这种差距可能会在2016年引发深层次危机。


The eurozone and the EU are facing multiple threats, all of which call for a collective response.	欧元区和欧盟都面临着多种威胁，而所有这一切都要求它们做出集体回应。


But what we are seeing is its member states increasingly adopting a national approach, thus undermining the possibility of Europe-wide solutions (the migration crisis is a tragic case in point).	但我们看到的是其成员国越来越多地通过本国的视角来考虑问题，从而破坏了寻求全欧洲级别的解决方案的可能性（难民危机就是一个悲剧性的经典范例）。


Europe needs more cooperation, integration, risk sharing, and solidarity.	欧洲需要更多的合作，整合，风险共担，以及团结。


Instead, Europeans appear to be embracing nationalism, balkanization, divergence, and disintegration.	相反，欧洲人似乎更欢迎民族主义，巴尔干化，分歧和分裂。


Doubling Down on European Energy Efficiency	加大欧洲能源效率力度


BRUSSELS – At the COP21 conference in Paris last December, world leaders made a binding pledge to set national targets, including energy-efficiency benchmarks, for reducing greenhouse-gas emissions.	布鲁塞尔—在去年12月的巴黎COP21会议上，世界领导人做出了制定包括能源效率基准在内的减少温室气体排放的国家目标的有约束力的承诺。


Now, the European Commission is nearing a moment of truth: Will it set ambitious but attainable energy efficiency targets that will force individuals and industry to make real changes?	如今，欧盟委员会正在接近真相时刻它会制订一套宏大但可实现的能源效率目标、迫使个人和产业做出真正的改变吗？


Or will it bend to political pressure and set meaningless targets that will be reached anyway, with no any additional effort?	或者，它是否会屈从于政治压力，制定总能实现但不会有任何新措施的毫无意义的目标》


The latter approach was taken in 2014, when European leaders agreed to improve energy efficiency by 27% before 2030.	2014年就出现过后一种情况，当时，欧洲领导人同意在2030年前将能源效率提高27%。


The European Council was applauded at the time for its leadership.	当时，欧洲理事会还因为在此事上的领导作用而大受赞扬。


Nobody bothered to mention that global energy efficiency was already likely to increase by around 35% on its own by 2030.	大家都懒得一提全球能源效率目标本身到2030年有望提高35%。


The COP21 agreement has given Europe a second chance to set an example and become the global standard-bearer for energy efficiency.	COP21协定给了欧洲第二次机会成为榜样和能源效率的全球标准制造者。


Environmentalists, business leaders, and academics are awaiting new targets from the European Commission, which will most likely be established in October, in a forthcoming revision to the Commission’s Energy Efficiency Directive.	环保主义者、商界领袖和学界正在等待欧盟委员会的新目标。 新目标有望在今年10月制定，写入欧盟委员会的新版能源效率指引。


So, what would be a meaningful target?	那么，什么才是有意义的目标？


If European leaders are serious about their COP21 commitment, they should embrace a 70% reduction on 2010 consumption levels by 2030 – more than double the European Council’s 2014 target.	如果欧洲领导人认真对待COP21承诺，就应该在2030年在2010年消费水平的基础上减少70%，这一目标比欧洲理事会2014年的目标宏大一倍。


A 70% reduction is ambitious, but not impossible.	70%的减少量相当大，但并非不可能。


There is both an economic and an environmental case to be made for it.	兑现这一目标既符合经济利益，也符合环境利益。


Economically, countries that reduce energy consumption also increase productivity, simply because using less energy costs less money.	经济上，减少能源消费的国家也提高了生产率，原因很简单，能源用得越少，钱花得也越少。


While implementing energy-efficiency measures may require heavy initial investments, these outlays will be offset by future productivity growth, which is the only way developed countries can sustainably improve living standards over time.	尽管实施能源效率措施需要大量初始投资，但这些支出可以由未来生产率增加弥补，这也是发达国家可持续地改善生活水平的唯一办法。


The environmental argument for an ambitious target is not that we need to “save the Earth.”	宏大目标的环境论据不是我们需要“拯救地球”。


But we do need to save the climate in which humans have evolved and prospered.	但我们确实需要拯救人类在其中演化和繁荣的气候。


Energy efficiency around the world is increasing at roughly 1.5% per year, which is a welcome development and a sign that 30 years of forward-leaning environmental policies have had some effect.	全球而言，能源效率以每年1. 5%左右的速度增长，这是一个值得欢迎的趋势，表明30年来的进步环境政策起到了一些效果。


Global energy consumption, however, is rising at around 3% per year, implying that we’re still digging our hole deeper, rather than filling it in.	但是，全球能源消费量以每年3%左右的速度增长，这意味着我们仍在继续给自己挖坑，而不是填坑。


Six of the world’s largest economies – China, the United States, Russia, India, Japan, and the European Union – remain the biggest polluters.	世界六大经济体——中国、美国、俄罗斯、印度、日本和欧盟——仍是最大的污染者。


But most growth today comes from developing countries that now participate in the global economy.	但今天的大部分增长来自目前参与到全球经济中的发展中国家。


Even if these countries make significant strides in reducing emissions, they will be the polluters of the future, at least in the near term.	即便这些国家在减排方面取得长足的进步，它们仍将是未来污染者，特别是在近期。


Globalization has increased life expectancy and improved living standards in many poor countries.	全球化增加了许多贫穷国家的寿命预期，也改善了那里的生活水平。


But it also poses new environmental problems that will require ambitious solutions.	但全球化也造成了新的环境问题，需要宏大的解决方案。


Seen in this light, a 70% improvement in energy efficiency is the minimum Europe – and the world – can aim for to reach real sustainability at current levels of global growth.	从这个角度讲，能源效率增进70%是欧洲——以及全世界——在当前全球增长水平上实现真正的可持续性的最低要求。


Fortunately, this is all within our grasp.	幸运的是，这一切完全可以做到。


A 2015 study published by Ecofys, Quintel Intelligence, and the Lisbon Council concluded that Europe already has the technologies available to double current energy-efficiency levels without sacrificing economic growth. These include heat pumps, smart grids, LED lighting, and energy-efficient household equipment.	Ecofys、Quintel Intelligence��里斯本委员会（Lisbon Council）发表的一份2015年研究认为，欧洲已经拥有了可用的技术，在不牺牲经济增长的情况下将当前能源效率水平提高一倍。


So why aren’t these technologies being implemented already?	那么，这些技术为什么还没有实施？


The reason isn’t that industry is holding Europe back; on the contrary, European industry’s environmental footprint has improved considerably in recent years.	原因不是产业界拖了欧洲的后腿； 相反，欧洲产业界的环境足迹近几年来大为改观。


Rather, the principal energy consumer in Europe is individual households, where energy efficiency can be tripled in the coming years with the right political leadership, sufficient investment, and long-term commitment from Europeans themselves.	但是，欧洲的首要能源消费者是个体家庭，如果有正确的政治领导、足够的投资和欧洲人自身的长期承诺，未来几年家庭能源效率可以提高两倍。


This takes us back to the Energy Efficiency Directive, where this work should begin.	这让我们回到了能源效率指引，这应该成为这项工作的起点。


The European Commission should set “moon-shot” standards that push us to higher achievements than we once thought possible.	欧盟委员会应该制定“登月”（moon-shot）式标准，鞭策我们取得曾经不敢想象的高成就。


If Europe can double its energy efficiency by 2030, Europeans will look back and wonder how they ever lived differently.	如果欧洲能够在2030年将能源效率提高一倍，欧洲人回首往事的时候会非常惊讶于过去的生活竟然如此不同。


Europe’s Three Fault Lines	欧洲的三条断层线


PARIS – Ten or 20 years ago, the existential question facing the European Union was whether it still had a purpose in a globalized world.	巴黎—十年或二十年前，欧盟所面临的生存问题是，在一个全球化的世界里，它是否仍有意义。


The question today is whether the EU can respond effectively to major external shocks.	如今，这个问题是，对于重大外部冲击，欧盟是否能够有效应对。


Europe’s neighborhood is poor and dangerous.	欧洲周边地区既贫穷又危险。


South of Gibraltar, income per capita drops more than fivefold.	从直布罗陀往南，人均收入要下降五倍多。


War has recently raged in Ukraine.	乌克兰已被战争席卷。


The Israel-Palestine conflict has continued for more than 50 years.	以色列-巴勒斯坦冲突持续了50多年。


And the war in Iraq barely ended before the mayhem in Syria commenced.	而伊拉克战争还未结束，叙利亚骚乱便已兴起。


For several decades after World War II, Europe could afford to overlook what went on beyond its borders: security was the business of the United States.	二战结束后的几十年里，欧洲能够忽视其边界外的发展趋势：安全归美国管。


But things have changed.	但形势已有所不同。


The US retreat from Iraq signaled the limits of its engagement, and the problems in the EU’s immediate neighborhood – not just in Syria, but also to the east and the south – are now knocking on its door.	美国从伊拉克撤军表明了它的参与限度，而欧盟近邻——不仅包括叙利亚，也包括东部和南部周边地区——的问题已经影响到欧盟自身。


So it would seem that the EU’s top priority should be to protect itself and help stabilize its environment.	因此，看起来欧盟最重要的重点应该是保护自身和帮助稳定其环境。


Yet three internal fault lines are making it difficult for the EU to achieve these ends.	但三条内部的断层线让欧盟难以实现这些目标。


Britain is wondering whether it should exit.	英国正在 犹豫是否应该退出欧盟。


Western and Eastern Europe are at odds over the refugee crisis.	西欧和东欧在难民问题上针锋相对。


And France and Germany differ on priorities.	法国和德国的重点也有所不同。


Britain’s torment over EU membership is rooted in history: In 1946, Winston Churchill famously advocated a United States of Europe – but without Britain.	英国因为欧盟成员资格而痛苦不堪，这尤其历史根源：1946年，丘吉尔提出了著名的欧罗巴合众国，但不包括英国在内。


Yet there is little substance to British Europhobia: nothing fundamental separates the United Kingdom from the rest of the continent.	但英国的仇欧心理没有什么实质内容：并无根本性的原因将英国和欧洲其余部分割离开来。


Tellingly, the British Foreign Office’s rigorous review of how the EU operates did not deliver an agenda for the repatriation of competences.	颇能说明问题的是，英国外交部关于欧盟如何运行的详细评估并未给出遣返能力（repatriation of competence）的日程。


The only significant demand expressed by Prime Minister David Cameron in his recent letter to the EU concerns internal migration.	英国首相卡梅伦最近致信欧盟，其中所提出的唯一一个重大要求是关于欧盟内部移民的。


Britain, the erstwhile champion of labor mobility, has now become wary of foreign workers and wants to limit their access to social benefits.	曾经的劳动力可移动性先锋英国如今对待外国工人的态度十分谨慎，希望限制外来工人获得社会福利。


This is a potential sticking point in the UK-EU relationship; but it is hardly a reason to end a four-decade-old partnership.	这是英国-欧盟关系的一个潜在分歧点； 但绝不是结束四十年伙伴关系的理由。


Polls suggest that Britain’s referendum on continued EU membership, which Cameron has promised to hold by the end of 2017, will be a close call.	民调显示，卡梅伦承诺于2017年年底前举行的欧盟成员资格全民公决目前差距很小。


But it would be both a blunder and a tragedy were Britons to vote for “Brexit” as a form of protection against tumult on the continent.	但如果英国人投票支持“英国退出”，将此作为保护英国免受欧洲大陆骚乱的形式，那将是一个愚蠢的错误和悲剧。


The second fault line appeared alongside the refugee crisis.	第二条断层线与难民危机有关。


By 2014, the EU’s “big bang” enlargement in 2004 could be hailed as a success story, having contributed significantly to swift and peaceful economic and political transition in Central and Eastern Europe.	直到2014年，欧盟在2004年所进行的“大爆炸”式扩张可谓成功，在中欧和东欧的经济和政治平稳快速转型中起到了重要作用。


True European unification seemed to be in the making.	真正的欧洲统一似乎正在向我们走来。


Yet the refugee crisis has revealed that the EU’s western and eastern members do not share the same concept of a nation.	然而难民危机揭示出，欧盟的西部和东部成员对国家（nation）的概念并不相同。


Most Western European countries have converged, at least de facto, on a non-ethnic, non-religious definition.	大部分西欧国家均——至少在���实上——趋向于非种族、非宗教的国家定义。


Most are home to significant ethnic and religious minorities.	大部分西欧国家是大量种族和宗教少数群体的家园。


This has not been an easy transformation, and there are differences in countries’ perceived ability to absorb more immigrants; but the change is irreversible.	这不是一个容易的转变，各国对于吸收更多移民的感觉也不尽相同； 但这一变化是不可逆转的。


Most Central and Eastern European countries, however, object.	但是，大部分中欧和东欧国家反对这一点。


Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has developed a fierce anti-Muslim rhetoric.	匈牙利总理欧尔班在言辞中表现出强烈的反穆斯林立场。


His Slovak counterpart, Robert Fico, announced in July that his country would accept only Christian refugees.	斯洛伐克总理费科在7月份宣布，他的国家只接受基督徒难民。


Earlier this month, Czech President Miloš Zeman addressed a group called the Bloc Against Islam, telling its supporters that they were “not extremists.”	本月早些时候，捷克总统泽曼向一个叫作“阻止伊斯兰”（Bloc Against Islam）的团体发表讲话，对支持者说，他们不是“极端分子”。


And Poland’s new European affairs minister, Konrad Szymanski, did not wait 24 hours after the Paris attacks before using them to denounce Europe’s flaws.	而波兰新任欧洲事务部长西曼斯基（Konrad Szymanski）在巴黎袭击发生不到24小时就用该事件指责欧洲的缺陷。


This is not a disagreement over policies. It is a divide over principles – the very principles of the EU’s treaties and Charter of Fundamental Rights.	这不是政策上的不一致，而是原则上的分歧——欧盟条约和《基本权利宪章》中的原则。


In Germany, especially, any person persecuted on political grounds has a constitutional right to asylum.	特别是在德国，任何以政治原因被迫害的人都有宪法赋予的避难权。


Contrary to common misperceptions, German Chancellor Angela Merkel acted on the basis of moral values, not demographic self-interest, in letting in about one million refugees this year.	与常见的误解不同，德国总理默克尔今年之所以让一百万左右的难民进入德国，不是基于人口因素上的自利行为，而是基于道德价值。


Germany rarely expects solidarity from its European partners.	德国几乎不抱希望能获得其欧洲伙伴国的团结。


At the height of the migrant crisis, it hoped, for once, to receive some.	在难民危机最严重的时候，它一度希望获得一些团结。


The public, categorical rejection of Germany’s silent plea by countries that continue to benefit massively from European solidarity will not be easily forgotten.	一直从欧洲的团结中获得巨大好处的国家公开断然拒绝了德国无声的恳求，这绝不会轻易遗忘。


The third fault line lies between France and Germany.	第三条断层线存在于法国和德国之间。


Since the November 13 attacks in Paris, security has become the overriding French objective.	11月13日巴黎袭击发生以来，安全成为法国压倒一切的目标。


Meanwhile, Germany is focused on organizing the reception and settlement of a massive influx of refugees.	与此同时，德国专注于组织接待和安置大规模涌入的难民。


This divide is more circumstantial than essential.	这一分歧更多地属于偶发分歧，而不是根本分歧。


Terrorism may spread to Germany, and refugees may move across borders.	恐怖主义可能蔓延到德国，难民也可以越国边境。


Yet, at least for the time being, public concerns and government priorities differ.	但是，至少在目前，两国的公共关注点和政府重点是不同的。


Both Merkel and French President François Hollande have expressed a commitment to mutual support.	默克尔和法国总统奥朗德都承诺要互相支持。


France will welcome some refugees, and Germany will dispatch some troops to Mali.	法国将欢迎一些移民，而德国将派遣一些军队到马里。


But symbolic gestures are not enough.	但象征性姿态是不够的。


The risk remains that each country feels that it has been left alone at a critical juncture.	风险仍在于法国和德国都觉得自己在关键时刻被孤立了。


More ambitious initiatives have been proposed.	德国和法国也提出了一些更有雄心的计划。


Sigmar Gabriel and Emmanuel Macron, the German and French economy ministers, recently called for a common fund to address Europe’s refugee and security challenges and to finance joint policies.	两国经济部长加布里埃尔（Sigmar Gabriel）和马克伦（Emmanuel Macron）最近呼吁成立一个共同基金解决欧洲的难民和安全挑战，并未共同政策提供融资。


The fund would serve as a concrete risk-sharing mechanism and would be a modest, yet meaningful step toward overcoming the deadlock over EU initiatives, if not toward mutualizing defense and security, as some scholars recommend.	该基金将作为具体的风险共担机制存在，并且，如一些学者所言，这将是克服欧盟计划的障碍——乃至通往共同化防卫和安全——的有意义的一小步。


Whatever form it takes, greater boldness is clearly needed.	不管采取什么形式，显然需要更加果断。


Otherwise, the failure to address common risks and challenges may well result in citizens placing exclusive faith in the nation-state, rejecting solidarity, and calling for the permanent restoration of national borders.	否则，无法解决共同风险和挑战极有可能导致公民转向排斥性的民族国家信念，拒绝团结，要求永久性恢复国家边界。


It is no accident that the EU’s three fault lines have appeared at the very moment when it is confronted with unprecedented challenges.	欧盟的三条断层线正好出现在其面临前所未有的挑战的时刻，这不是巧合。


External pressures reveal internal weaknesses.	外部压力暴露出内部弱点。


Europe can either overcome them or succumb to them.	欧盟要么克服这些弱点，要么屈服于这些弱点。


The EU’s twin refugee and security crises constitute its moment of truth.	欧盟的难民和安全双生危机构成了它的关键时刻。


Europe’s Politics of Dystopia	欧洲的反乌托邦政治


TOKYO – The recent victory of the conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party in Poland confirms a recent trend in Europe: the rise of illiberal state capitalism, led by populist right-wing authoritarians.	东京—最近，保守派的劳动和正义党（Law and Justice，PiS）在波兰选举中取得胜利，这确认了欧洲的一个最新趋势：不自由的国家资本主义在民粹主义右翼集权派的领导下崛起。


Call it Putinomics in Russia, Órbanomics in Hungary, Erdoğanomics in Turkey, or a decade of Berlusconomics from which Italy is still recovering.	在俄罗斯，这是普京经济学，匈牙利是奥班经济学，土耳其是厄尔多安经济学，还有意大利迄今还未爬出大坑的为期十年的贝卢斯科尼经济学。


Soon we will no doubt be seeing Kaczyńskinomics in Poland.	毫无疑问，用不了多久我们就将看到波兰的卡钦斯基经济学。


All are variations on the same discordant theme: a nationalist leader comes to power when economic malaise gives way to chronic and secular stagnation.	所有这些都是同一个不变主题的变体：一位民族主义领导人，在经济不振演变为慢性的长期停滞时上台掌权。


This elected authoritarian then starts to reduce political freedoms through tight-fisted control of the media, especially television.	接着，当选的极权派开始通过铁腕控制媒体特别是电视缩减政治自由。


Then, he (so far, it has always been a man, though France’s Marine Le Pen would fit the pattern should she ever come to power) pursues an agenda opposing the European Union (when the country is a member) or other institutions of supra-national governance.	接着，他（到目前为止，这些人都是男性，尽管法国的马琳·勒庞如果能够掌权的话也符合这一模式）开始追求反对欧盟（如果他的国家是欧盟成员的话）或其他超国家治理机构的日程。


He will also oppose free trade, globalization, immigration, and foreign direct investment, while favoring domestic workers and firms, particularly state-owned enterprises and private business and financial groups with ties to those in power.	他还会反对自由贸易、全球化、移民和外国直接投资，同时偏袒国内工人和企业，特别是国有企业和与掌权派关系密切的私营企业和金融集团。


In some cases, outright nativist, racist parties support such government or provide an even deeper authoritarian and anti-democratic streak.	在一些例子中，彻底的先天论种族主义政党支持这样的政府或表现出根深的极权主义和反民主倾向。


To be sure, such forces are not yet in power in most of Europe.	诚然，这些力量在大部分欧洲国家尚未取得权力。


But they are becoming more popular nearly everywhere: Le Pen’s National Front in France, Matteo Salvini’s Lega Nord in Italy, and Nigel Farage’s United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) all view Russia’s illiberal state capitalism as a model and its president, Vladimir Putin, as a leader deserving of admiration and emulation.	但它们在几乎所有国家都日益受到选民支持：勒庞的法国国民阵线、马迪奥·萨尔维尼（Matteo Salvini）的意大利北方联盟、尼格尔·法拉奇（Nigel Farage）的英国独立党（UKIP）都将俄罗斯的不自由国家资本主义及其总统普京视为值得敬仰和模仿的领袖。


In Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, Austria, and Sweden, too, the popularity of populist, anti-EU, anti-migrant right-wing parties is on the rise.	在德国、荷兰、芬兰、丹麦、奥地利和瑞典，民粹主义、反欧盟、反移民的右翼政党也在获得越来越多的支持。


Most of these parties tend to be socially conservative.	在社会政策上，这些政党大部分都倾向于保守。


But their economic policies – anti-market and fearful that liberal capitalism and globalization will erode national identity and sovereignty – have many elements in common with populist parties of the left, such as Syriza in Greece (before its capitulation to its creditors), Podemos in Spain, and Italy’s Five Star Movement.	但它们的经济政策——反市场、担心自由资本主义和全球化会破坏国家身份和主权——与左翼民粹主义政党有诸多共同之处，如希腊左翼联盟（在其向债权人屈服之前）、西班牙社会民主党以及意大利五星运动（Five Star Movement）。


Indeed, just as many supporters of radical leftist parties in the 1930s made a U-turn and ended up supporting authoritarian parties of the right, the economic ideologies of today’s populist parties seem to converge in many ways.	事实上，正如20世纪30年代大量支持极左政党的选民态度做出一百八十度大转弯、最终转而支持右翼极权主义政党，今天的民粹主义政党的经济思想看上去也在从多个角度殊途同归。


In the 1930s, economic stagnation and depression led to the rise of Hitler in Germany, Mussolini in Italy, and Franco in Spain (among other authoritarians).	20世纪30年代，经济停滞和萧条导致了希特勒在德国、墨索里尼在意大利、弗朗哥在西班牙崛起（还有其他极权主义者）。


Today’s brand of illiberal leaders may not yet be as politically virulent as their 1930s predecessors.	今天，不自由领导人的烙印也许不如他们20世纪30年代前辈那样政治恶劣。


But their economic corporatism and autocratic style are similar.	但他们的经济社团主义和专制风格是相似的。


The reemergence of nationalist, nativist populism is not surprising: economic stagnation, high unemployment, rising inequality and poverty, lack of opportunity, and fears about migrants and minorities “stealing” jobs and incomes have given such forces a big boost.	民族主义、先天论民粹主义的死灰复燃并不令人奇怪：经济停滞、高失业、不平等性和贫困增加、缺少机会、担心移民和少数群体“偷走”就业和收入，这些因素给了上述力量极大的提振。


The backlash against globalization – and the freer movement of goods, services, capital, labor, and technology that comes with it – that has now emerged in many countries is also a boon to illiberal demagogues.	针对全球化——以及随之而来的更自由的商品、服务、资本、劳动力和技术的移动——的抵制如今在许多国家大行其道���对于不自由煽动家来说，这也是有利条件。


If economic malaise becomes chronic, and employment and wages do not rise soon, populist parties may come closer to power in more European countries.	如果经济失衡变成长期，就业和工资无法迅速增长，民粹主义政党将在更多欧洲国家更接近掌权。


Worse, the eurozone may again be at risk, with a Greek exit eventually causing a domino effect that eventually leads to the eurozone’s breakup.	更糟糕的是，欧元区可能再次面临风险，希腊退出将引发多米诺效应，最终导致欧元区崩溃。


Or a British exit from the EU may trigger European dis-integration, with the additional risks posed by the fact that some countries (the UK, Spain, and Belgium) are at risk of breaking up themselves.	或者英国退出欧元区将触发欧洲解体，此外，一些国家（英国、西班牙和比利时）国内也存在分裂的可能，这进一步增加了风险。


In the 1930’s, the Great Depression brought to power authoritarian regimes in Europe and even Asia, eventually leading to World War II.	20世纪30年代，大萧条让极权主义者政权在欧洲甚至亚洲上台掌权，最终导致第二次世界大战。


Today’s resurgence of illiberal state capitalist regimes and leaders is nowhere close to inciting a war, because center-right and center-left governments still committed to liberal democracy, enlightened economic policies, and solid welfare systems still rule most of Europe.	今天，不自由国家资本主义政权和领袖的卷土重来距离引起战争还十分遥远，因为中右翼和中左翼政府仍致力于捍卫自由民主，开明经济政策和坚固的福利制度仍是大部分欧洲国家的做法。


But the toxic brew of populism now gaining strength may yet open a Pandora’s box, unleashing unpredictable consequences.	但民粹主义之毒正在获得优势，它可能开启一个潘多拉魔盒，释放出不可预测的后果。


This rising tide of illiberalism makes avoiding a break-up of the eurozone or the EU ever more vital.	不自由主义的崛起浪潮让避免欧元区或欧盟解体变得更加重要。


But, to ensure this, macro and structural economic policies that boost aggregate demand, job creation and growth, reduce income and wealth inequality, provide economic opportunity to the young, and integrate rather than reject refugees and economic migrants will be needed.	但是，要确保这一点，需要提振总需求、增加就业创造和增长、减少收入和财富不平等性、为年轻人提供经济机会，以及融合而不是拒绝难民和经济移民的宏观和结构性经济政策。


Only bold policies can halt Europe’s slide toward secular stagnation and nationalist populism.	唯有果断的政策能够阻止欧洲滑向长期停滞和民族主义民粹主义。


Timidity of the type witnessed in the past five years will only increase the risks.	过去五年所变现出来的谨小慎微只能让风险愈演愈烈。


Failure to act decisively now will lead to the eventual failure of the peaceful, integrated, globalized, supra-national state that is the EU, and the rise of dystopian nationalist regimes.	不能果断采取行动将导致和平、统一、全球化、超国家的欧盟的最终失败，以及反乌托邦民族主义政权的崛起。


The contours of such places have been reflected in literary work such as George Orwell’s 1984, Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, and Michel Houellebecq’s latest novel Submission.	这些政权的样子，我们可以通过乔治·奥威尔的《1984》、奥尔德斯·赫胥黎的《美丽新世界》以及米歇尔·维勒贝克（Michel Houellebecq）的最新小说《屈服》（Submission）等文学作品一窥端倪。


Let us hope that they remain confined to the printed page.	我们希望它们永远只存在于印刷品中。


Europe’s Stillborn Security Strategy	夭折的欧洲安全战略


MADRID – If a strategy is announced and nobody is listening, does it make a sound?	马德里—宣布战略而没有人听，这样的战略有用吗？


The European Union will find out the answer this June, when Federica Mogherini, its High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, presents a long overdue foreign and security strategy for Europe – just when all eyes will be on the United Kingdom’s referendum on EU membership.	欧盟将在6月份知道答案。 欧盟外交事务和安全政策高级代表费德里卡·蒙赫伊尼（Federica Mogherini）为欧洲提出了久违的外交安全战略——而此时所有人的注意力都集中在英国欧盟成员资格全民公决上。


The EU is adrift and desperately in need of a catalyst to renew its sense of purpose and dynamism.	欧洲已经失去了方向，急需刺激以重燃使命感和活力。


The global strategy could serve that purpose, but not if it is issued at a time when attention is squarely focused on another challenge, especially one that could bring about fundamental change for the EU.	全球战略有利于这一目标，但在注意力完全集中在另一项挑战，特别是这项挑战可能给欧盟带来根本性变化时绝非如此。


Given this, the strategy’s launch should be put on hold until after the referendum.	基于此，该战略的宣布应该推迟到全民公决之后。


In the United States, the president is legally required to issue a national security strategy annually.	美国法律规定总统每年都要发布国家安全战略。


Though the requirement is adhered to only loosely – President Barack Obama has released just two strategies in the last seven years – the intent is clear: to establish a set of concrete national security priorities informed by the administration in office and the country’s changing circumstances.	尽管这一要求遵守并不严格——奥巴马总统在过去七年中只发布过两次——但其意图是明确的：确根据政府和国家所处的变化环境而确定的具体的国家安全重点。


In Europe, the approach is broader.	在欧洲，这一方针要宽泛得多。


When the first – and only – strategy was launched in 2003, it was meant as a long-term guide, to endure through multiple European Commissions.	2003年，欧洲第一次也是唯一一次发布战略。 根据计划，这是一项长期指引，将跨越诸多欧洲委员会。


But it has lasted for too long, and is now well out of date – a reality that is apparent from its opening line: “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure, nor so free.”	但它持续时间太久，现在早已过时——这一点在其开头便已显而易见：“欧洲从未如此繁荣，如此安全，如此自由。 ”


Last June, the European Council recognized the need for an updated strategy, and called on Mogherini to prepare a new foreign and security policy, to be submitted within a year.	去年6月，欧洲理事会承认需要更新战略，并要求蒙赫伊尼准备新的外交和安全政策并在一年内提交。


To maximize their chances of success, Mogherini and the European External Action Service have kept the expert-led development process discreet, intentionally avoiding broad public debate.	为了尽量提高成功机会，蒙赫伊尼和欧洲对外行动局谨慎地推进着这一专家主导的制定流程，刻意避免公共争论。


Meanwhile, numerous difficult challenges – most notably, the ongoing refugee crisis – have buffeted Europe.	与此同时，诸多艰巨挑战——最主要是持续难民危机——摧残着欧洲。


This has not only sustained the lack of public awareness of the foreign and security strategy development process, but has also altered the environment in which the strategy is to be introduced.	这不仅导致公众对外交和安全战略制定流程缺乏了解，也改变了战略的实施环境。


A process that was intended to enable Europe to respond better to external changes now must be rethought to reflect the recognition that it is the EU which is now set to undergo a fundamental transformation.	本意是让欧洲能够更好响应外部变化的流程现在必须进行反思，以体现欧洲人认识到如今需要经历根本性转型的是欧盟本身。


Such change will occur regardless of whether British voters choose to exit the EU.	不管英国选民是否选择离开欧盟，这一变化都会发生。


If the UK leaves – taking its diplomatic, military, economic, and cultural prowess with it – the hit to the EU, in terms of its capacity to influence its external environment, is obvious.	如果英国带着外交、军事、经济和文化力量离开欧盟，那么欧盟影响外部环境的能力显然将大打折扣。


If the UK stays, it will require the formalization of a looser conception of the EU – one that will raise core questions about the future of European integration.	如果英国留在欧盟，它将要求松散的欧盟概念正式化——而这将对欧盟一体化的未来产生核心问题。


Seen in this light, the UK’s upcoming referendum is more momentous even than the failed referenda on an EU constitution in 2005.	从这个角度看，即将到来的英国全民公决要比2005年失败的欧盟宪法公投意义更加重大。


Releasing a new foreign and security strategy at the same moment will not just doom the plan to irrelevance; it will reinforce the perception that the EU institutions are out of touch with the real world, exacerbating the Union’s already-acute existential crisis.	同时公布新的外交和安全战略不但将让该计划变得无关紧要； 还会强化一种感觉，即欧盟机构已经不合于现实世界，从而加剧欧盟已然尖锐的生存危机。


Prolonging the plan’s development process would have the opposite effect, by helping to spur a broad – and attentive – discussion on what the new Europe, with or without the UK, should look like.	延长该计划的制定流程将适得其反，刺激大量受人关注的关于新欧洲（不论是否包括英国）应该是一副什么样子的讨论。


Beyond producing a relevant and useful foreign and security strategy, such a discussion can give the EU a new narrative, thereby invigorating public support for the European project.	这场讨论除了产生一个重要且有用的外交和安全战略，还将产生一个全新的欧盟叙事（narrative），从而重振公众对欧洲工程的支持。


To understand the need for such a narrative, one need look no further than the debate in the UK over its EU membership, which is focused almost exclusively on practical considerations and cost/benefit analyses.	要理解这一叙事的必要性，只需要看看英国关于其欧盟成员资格的争论即可。 这场争论的焦点几乎完全集中在现实的考虑和成本/收益分析上。


Principles, solidarity, and vision are nowhere to be found.	原则、团结和愿景都是细枝末节。


Timing is everything in politics.	对政治来说，实际就是一切。


Last June, Europe’s leaders made the right call.	去年6月，欧洲领导人发出了正确的要求。


If the strategy had been ready for release at that time, it might have served as a pole around which a discussion on Europe’s purpose in the world could have coalesced.	如果该战略在当时就准备好发布，就有可能成为一个中心，让关于欧洲在世界中的使命的讨论围绕它展开。


But events, both internal and external, have overtaken the process.	但内部和外部事件影响着这一流程。


It is time to adjust.	应该作出调整。


Releasing a new strategy that does not reflect Europe’s new reality would amount to an enormous missed opportunity – a tragedy, in fact, given how desperately the EU needs direction.	如果发布的新战略并未反映欧洲的新现实，就会带来巨大的机会成本——事实上，考虑到欧洲对方向的渴望，这将是一场悲剧。


The European Council and Commission should bear this in mind as the June 2016 deadline to submit the strategy approaches.	随着2016年截止期的临近，欧洲理事会和欧盟委员会应该时刻牢记职业点。


Sometimes patience truly is the companion of wisdom.	有时耐心确实是智慧的良伴。


Europe Against the Ropes	欧洲破网而出


MADRID – On November 8, as Donald Trump was sealing his shocking victory in the United States presidential election, a conference in Brussels commemorated the legacy of the late Václav Havel, the first post-communist president of Czechoslovakia (and later the Czech Republic).	马德里——11月18日，当唐纳德·特朗普在美国总统竞选中奠定令人震惊的胜势之际，布鲁塞尔正在举行纪念已故捷克斯洛伐克（后更名为捷克共和国）首任后共产主义总统瓦茨拉夫·哈维尔政治遗产的会议。


As the world enters the Trump era, that legacy could not be more important, especially for Europe.	随着世界进入到特朗普时代，尤其是在欧洲，这种遗产的重要性可谓无与伦比。


It is hard to imagine two figures more different than Havel and Trump.	很难想象两个人的不同能超过哈维尔和特朗普。


The former was an artist and intellectual who fought his entire life for truth, working tirelessly to bring out the best in people and societies.	前者是一生为真理而奋斗的艺术家和知识分子，不知疲倦地希望发掘民众和社会最好的潜质。


The latter is a self-obsessed huckster who rose to power by playing on people’s basest emotions.	而后者则是自恋的骗子，通过利用人们最原始的情绪来获得权力。


Havel’s values have much in common with those that drove, after World War II, the creation of the liberal world order, which has brought unprecedented peace and prosperity.	哈维尔的价值观与二战后带来前所未有和平及繁荣的推动自由世界秩序的发明创造非常相似。


Trump’s election, however, suggests that the US may no longer uphold those values, much less continue to fulfill its post-WWII role in maintaining international order.	但特朗普的当选表明美国可能不再奉行这些价值观，更不要说继续履行其在二战后维持国际秩序的义务。


The resulting strategic lacuna creates an opportunity – indeed, a desperate need – for some other global actor to take up the mantle of leadership.	由此带来的战略空白创造出由其他某种全球势力接过领导责任的机遇——事实上也是一种不顾一切的必需。


The European Union – which, more than any other global actor, has internalized and operationalized the ideals and principles that undergird the liberal world order – should be the one to do it.	欧盟能比其他任何全球势力更准确地把握和践行支撑自由世界秩序的理想和原则，因此应当成为接过自由世界衣钵的继任者。


The problem is that, for now at least, the EU does not look like it can.	问题在于，至少从现在的情况看，欧盟似乎无法完成这样的任务。


The EU has made valuable contributions to the liberal world order, from setting an example on climate change to helping push forward a workable deal to contain Iran’s nuclear program.	欧盟曾为自由世界秩序做出过宝贵贡献，从树立气候变化榜样到合作推进遏制伊朗核计划的可行协议。


But, so far, it has not shown a capacity for real global leadership.	但到目前为止，它还没有表现出真正的全球领导力。


Consider the disastrous 2009 Copenhagen climate-change conference, the bungled Libya intervention, or, most painful, its inadequate response to the ongoing migration crisis.	想想灾难性的2009年哥本哈根气候变化会议、拙劣的利比亚干预行动或者更痛苦的是，其对持续移民危机严重不足的反应能力。


In short, while Europe has been a solid team player, it has not been a very good team captain.	总之，虽然欧洲是位可靠的球员，但却从未出色地担任过队长职务。


This is not for lack of hoping.	究其原因，并不是因为缺少希望。


Establishing the EU as a pole of global power was the goal of the much-maligned 2003 EU security strategy, to cite one example.	举例来讲，确立欧盟全球权力的核心地位曾经是备受争议的2003欧盟安全战略目标。


Following Trump’s victory, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini declared that the EU is becoming an “indispensable power.”	特朗普获胜后，外交和安全政策高级代表费德里卡·莫盖里尼宣布欧盟正在成为“不可或缺的力量”。


But, as so often happens in Europe, there is a huge gap between rhetoric and reality.	但言论和现实之间差异巨大，这就是欧洲的实际情况。


The poorly attended emergency meeting of European foreign ministers following the US election is a stark reminder of just how far Europe has to go to fill the gaping hole that Trump’s abdication of America’s global responsibilities would create.	美国大选后参与积极性不高的欧洲外长紧急会议明确地提醒人们，欧洲需要付出多少努力才能填补特郎普放弃美国全球责任所造成的真空。


The truth is that the EU lacks both perspective and clout.	现实是欧盟缺乏远见和影响力。


To be a pole requires magnetism, produced by either hard or soft power.	成为世界核心需要以硬实力或软实力为基础的磁性支撑。


During the early 2000s, the heyday of EU enlargement, Europe had this pull.	在21世纪初欧洲扩张的鼎盛时期，欧洲曾经拥有过这样的影响。


And it may have had this pull as recently as the 2013 Euromaidan protests, when young Ukrainians died in the name of their country’s potential links with the EU.	就在2013年新欧盟示威期间欧盟或许仍拥有这样的影响力，当时年轻的乌克兰人为争取本国与欧盟的联系而勇敢地奉献生命。


Today, as the EU and its member states look inward, that attraction is gone.	今天，随着欧盟及其成员国将注意力转向国内，这种吸引力逐渐消失了。


Now, as Brexit plays out and the transatlantic partnership becomes unmoored, the EU could well unravel.	现在，随着英国脱欧展开和跨大西洋伙伴关系解体，欧盟很有可能陷入解体之中。


If not, the most likely alternative is that it becomes a platform on which its hegemon, Germany, can stand and lead.	就算没有，欧盟也最有可能成为其霸主国德国践行领导力的平台。


In some ways, the EU is already well down this road.	从某些方面讲，欧盟已经走上了这条道路。


It is a truism that nothing gets done in Brussels these days without the German government’s acquiescence.	现在一个不争的事实是如果没有德国政府的默许布鲁塞尔什么也做不成。


Chancellor Angela Merkel’s unilateral pledge to welcome refugees and the German-led EU deal with Turkey to stem refugee flows underscore this reality.	安格拉·默克尔总理单方面承诺欢迎难民和由德国主导与土耳其签署遏制难民协定就凸显了这样的现实。


This outcome would be highly problematic – even tragic.	这样的结果问题重重——甚至具有悲剧性。


The EU was supposed to be a supranational endeavor, shaped by the spirit of collective action for the common good that Havel championed.	欧盟本应是一次超国家尝试，主导它的是哈维尔所倡导的弘扬共同利益的集体行动精神。


Though Germany is surely a benign hegemon, mono-national domination of Europe controverts the very basis for the EU’s creation.	尽管德国肯定是个温和的霸主，但一国主导欧洲违反了创建欧盟的基本精神。


On a more practical level, Germany will not be a strong enough international champion for Europe.	从更实际的角度，德国也无法成为符合欧洲需要的足够强大的世界领袖。


In our increasingly Hobbesian world, demonstrations of conventional strength are needed.	在我们这个日益信奉霍布斯哲学的世界里，必须向世界展示常规力量。


Germany’s traditional aversion to hard power will hamper its ability to project its influence – and Europe’s – globally.	德国传统上对硬实力的厌恶将阻碍该国和欧洲在全球范围内投射影响力。


There are, to be sure, ways the rest of Europe can help.	可以肯定，欧洲其他国家能以某种形式贡献自己的力量。


Most notable, the long-stalled effort to coordinate and streamline European defense could be reinvigorated.	最值得注意的是，可以重振协调和精简欧洲防务这项长期工作。


Fortunately, there have been signs of life on that front in recent weeks, with European foreign and defense ministers agreeing to move forward on cooperation.	幸运的是，近几周在这方面出现了积极的迹象，欧洲外长和防长同意推动合作。


Placing those efforts under de facto German leadership is not optimal, but it may be the best possible outcome, given the circumstances.	将上述努力置于事实上的德国领导之下并不是最佳选择，但考虑到现实情况，它或许已经是最好的结果。


Ideal outcomes in Europe are not realistic.	期望欧洲取得理想成果是不现实的。


And, as Havel pointed out, clinging to optimism – the belief that things will end well – is pointless.	而且，如哈维尔所说，坚持乐观主义——相信事情会取得很好的结果——是毫无意义的。


Instead, we must find grounds for hope – the belief that things will eventually make sense.	相反，我们必须找到希望的理由——相信事情终将取得合理的结果。


The only way to do that is to be honest with ourselves and take a sober look at what we can and must do to ensure the most that can be achieved.	达到目的唯一的方法是诚实地对待自己、清醒地看待我们可以和必须做些什么，以确保取得最好的结果。


Europe has the potential to play a leading role in the world, but lacks the self-confidence and dedication to make it happen.	欧洲有能力在全球发挥领导作用，但缺乏实现目标所需的自信和专注。


It is time to recognize that, and to acknowledge the real threat that the liberal world order faces.	现在是时候认清这一点，认清自由世界秩序所面临的真正威胁。


Only then can we figure out how, realistically, to safeguard our interests and ideals in a challenging world.	只有这样，我们才能在充满挑战的现实生活中捍卫我们的利益和理想。


This, I believe, would be Havel’s message today.	我相信，这才是哈维尔今天要说的。


“Brexit,” which has thrown global markets into turmoil and raised serious questions about the Union’s future, has eclipsed the release of the security strategy, which barely got a mention in the conclusions of the latest European Council summit.	“英国退出”已经让全球市场陷入混乱，也提出了关于欧盟未来的严肃问题，它让新安全战略的发布黯然失色，在最近的欧洲理事会峰会决议中对后者几乎没有提及。


In uncertain times, Europe must decide how it will address the existential challenges it faces.	在不确定的时代，欧洲必须决定如何应对它���面临的生存挑战。


Europe’s Poisoned Chalice of Growth	饮鸠止渴的欧洲复苏


CAMBRIDGE – After a double-dip recession and an extended period of stagnation, the eurozone is finally seeing green shoots of recovery.	发自剑桥——在经历了一场双底型衰退以及比预想中更长的停滞之后，欧元终于看见了复苏的曙光。


Consumer confidence is rising.	消费者信心正在回升，零售额和新车注册量也掉头向上。


Retail sales and new car registrations are up.	欧盟委员会今年会有1.


The European Commission foresees 1.3% growth this year, which is not bad by European standards. But it could be very bad for European reform.	3%的增长，这在欧洲标准看来不坏，但对欧洲改革来说，这是一个非常糟糕的消息。


It is not hard to see why growth has picked up.	我们其实不难发现这种增长是如何实现的。


Most obviously, the European Central Bank announced an ambitious program of asset purchases – quantitative easing – in late January.	其中最明显的是，欧洲央行在一月底宣布实施了一项极为激进的资产购买计划——也就是量化宽松。


That prospect rapidly drove down the euro’s exchange rate, enhancing the international competitiveness of European goods.	这一手段所产生的预期当即压低了欧元汇率，令欧洲产品的国际竞争力有所提升。


But the euro’s depreciation is too recent to have made much difference yet.	但讨论欧元贬值所产生的巨大影响还为时过早。


Historical evidence, not to mention Japan’s experience with a falling yen, suggests that it takes several quarters, or even years, before the positive impact of currency depreciation on net exports is felt.	历史证据——更别提当年日元贬值的经验教训——表明在人们感知到货币贬值的积极影响之前往往要经历数个季度，甚至数年。


So other factors must be at work.	因此肯定还有其他因素在起作用。


One is that spending and growth are now under less pressure from fiscal consolidation.	其中一个就是如今财政巩固政策对支出和增长的压力有所减少。


The structural primary budget balance, the International Monetary Fund’s preferred measure of “fiscal thrust,” tightened by an additional 1-1.5% of GDP each year from 2010 to 2012, after which it remained broadly stable.	在2010~2012年间，国际货币基金组织所偏爱的“财政突击”手段——结构性基础预算平衡——令每年的GDP额外收缩了1%到1. 5%，直到其效果在很大程度上不再明显。


The subsequent two years of neutral fiscal policy has made a positive difference for economic performance.	随后两年财政政策则回归中性，为经济表现带来了改观。


And, however regrettable the uneven application of the EU’s fiscal rules, the European Commission’s recent decision to give France more time to reduce its budget deficit to 3% of GDP is welcome, coming as it did against the backdrop of a weak economy.	而与此同时，虽然本人对欧盟的财政管治无法一碗水端平表示遗憾，但欧盟委员会最近给予法国更多时间去将本国预算赤字降到相当于GDP3%的决定还是值得肯定的，因为该国的经济确实处于弱势。


Another factor behind the upturn is the meaningful progress that a number of European countries, such as Spain, have made on structural reform.	另外一个增长背后的因素，则是以西班牙为首的欧盟国家在结构性改革方面取得的切实进展。


Labor-market regulation has been loosened, and unit labor costs have come down.	劳动力市场管制得到了放松，单位劳动力成本也有所下降。


This, too, is showing up as further improvement in Europe’s competitiveness.	这同时也令欧洲的竞争力进一步改善。


A third driver of recovery is the fact that banks and financial markets are now better insulated from the turmoil in Greece.	复苏的第三个驱动力就是银行和金融市场如今都更好地隔绝于希腊危机之外。


French and German banks have been able to sell their holdings of Greek government bonds, largely to the ECB, which has acted as bond purchaser of last resort.	法国和德国的银行都得以出售自身持有的希腊政府债券，其中大部分卖给了欧洲央行这个最终债券采购者。


The ECB has also promised to support other countries’ bond markets in the event of a Greek accident.	欧洲央行同时也承诺：如果其他国家债券市场出现希腊这样的状况也会给予同样的支持。


Hence Europe’s recovery is less at risk of being derailed by instability in Athens.	因此欧洲的复苏也不太可能被雅典的危机所影响。


Fourth and finally, even dead cats bounce.	第四个也是最后一个因素，就算是只死鸡也会蹬蹬脚啊！


Economic growth heals many wounds. It strengthens banks’ balance sheets by reducing the volume of non-performing loans.	经济增长会有许多好处：通过减少呆坏账的规模改善银行的资产负债表；


It narrows government budget deficits by increasing tax revenues and limiting welfare spending.	通过增加税收收入并缩减福利支出来收紧政府预算赤字；


By raising the denominator of the debt/GDP ratio, it enhances confidence in debt sustainability.	通过增加债务/GDP比率的分母来提升债务稳定性。


And it produces these benefits automatically, without officials having to do anything more.	所有这些好处都是自动到来的，根本不需要官员们去做什么。


Unfortunately for Europe, growth also reduces the perceived urgency of action where action is urgently needed – for example, Greece.	但不幸的是，对欧洲来说，在这个急需实施行动的时候（比如对希腊）增长却减少了人们实施行动的紧迫感。


With the rest of Europe growing, other governments, believing themselves to be in a stronger economic position, are less inclined to compromise with Greece.	在欧洲其他国家都出现增长的情况下，各国政府都似乎对自身经济情况多了点底气，因此也越来越不愿和希腊有所妥协。


Everyone understands that compromise is preferable to the collapse of negotiations, disorderly default, and Greece’s forced exit from the eurozone. But the more confident the rest of Europe becomes of the sustainability of its recovery, the more it adopts a hard line – and the more likely a disorderly denouement becomes.	每个人都知道相对于谈判破裂，不可控违约，以及希腊被迫退出欧元区来说妥协是更好的选项，可随着欧洲对自身的可持续复苏越有信心，就越可能走强硬路线——也就越可能导向一个戏剧性的悲剧结局。


Similarly, the more that recovery and sustained growth strengthen banks’ balance sheets, the less urgency policymakers feel to address structural shortcomings, such as the implicit guarantees enjoyed by state banks and municipal savings banks in Germany, and the problems of family-controlled banks like Banco Espirito Santo in Portugal.	同理，复苏和持续增长越令各大银行的资产负债表得到改善，政策制定者就越缺少处理结构性的紧迫感——比如德国各州银行和城市储蓄银行从政府处享有的明确偿付保障，或者葡萄牙圣灵银行（Banco Espirito Santo）这种家族式银行的危机。


And even 2% growth will not render Europe’s triple-digit debt/GDP ratios sustainable.	而即便是2%的增长也无法让欧洲的双位数债务/GDP比率得以持续。


Europe still needs debt restructuring, though the continent’s leaders refuse to acknowledge this.	尽管领导人们都不愿承认，但欧洲依然需要债务重组。


Economic recovery merely enables them to delay the inevitable day of reckoning.	经济复苏只是推迟了末日审判的到来而已。


Finally, there are the more ambitious reforms – fiscal union and political union – that must complement monetary union if Europe is to avoid a similar crisis in the future.	最后，如果要避免欧洲再次爆发一场类似的危机，就必须以更具雄心壮志的改革——财政和政治联盟——来为货币联盟做补充。


If there is one lesson to be learned from Europe’s recent travails, it is that monetary union without fiscal and political union will not work.	如果说能在欧洲最近的苦痛挣扎中得到了一点教训的话，那就是财政和政治联盟的货币联盟是行不通的。


Yet, given intense opposition to further fiscal and political integration, progress, if it is to occur, will entail difficult and divisive negotiations.	但就算面对着对进一步财政和政治整合的强��反对，如果要实现进展的话就一定会有艰难且导致不和的谈判。


So any European growth that occurs without these measures will create an incentive to put them off.	因此任何在缺乏这类手段情况下出现的欧洲增长都将最终被其自身所阻碍。