Indeed, they could make the UN stronger than it has ever been.	事实上，这些建议将使得联合国比过去任何时候都更为强大。


A New Dawn for Chinese Journalism?	中国新闻业的新曙光


A remarkable incident has emboldened Chinese journalists.	一次重大事件激励了中国的新闻工作者。


Earlier this year, the government suspended publication of the newspaper Bing Dian Weekly , provoking unprecedented open protest, which received extensive media coverage worldwide.	今年初，政府勒令《冰点周刊》停刊，激起了公开抗议。 全世界媒体对此进行了广泛报导。


Even more surprisingly, the government, under the pressure of public opinion, has allowed Bing Dian to resume publication.	更令人惊讶的是，政府在公众舆论压力下，允许《冰点》复刊。


The editor-in-chief and deputy editor-in-chief were sacked, but the open questioning of the legitimacy of the government’s authority to regulate journalism is bound to have a profound impact.	尽管《冰点》主编和副主编被免职，但对政府管制新闻业的权力合法性进行公开质疑注定会带来深刻的影响。


Foreign observers are prone to associate the Bing Dian incident with other recent crackdowns on China’s mass media, and to conclude that Chinese journalism freedom is hopeless under the present autocratic regulation.	外国观察者总喜欢将《冰点》事件与最近对中国大众传媒的其它镇压事件联系起来，并得出结论，说在目前的官僚管制下，中国新闻自由无任何希望可言。


Undeniably, there has been no significant change in the government’s system of journalism’s regulation since China adopted its “open door” policy almost 30 years ago.	不可否认，从 30 年前中国政府开始实施改革开放政策以来，政府对新闻业的管制体系并无任何重大改变。


On the contrary, it has become more rigorous and covert.	相反，管制系统变得更为严厉，更具隐蔽性。


But I still have faith that subtle changes are occurring.	但我还是相信正在出现微妙的变化。


A prerequisite of effective control of the media is that the controlled accept the controller’s ideology.	对媒体有效控制的前提之一是被控制者接受控制者的意识形态。


After 1949, the Communist Party cultivated a stable of “theoretical experts” and other ideological servants to write lengthy articles propagating “Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought.”	1949 年后，中国共产党培养了一堆“理论专家”和其他意识形态仆从撰写长篇累牍的文章，宣传“马克思主义毛泽东思想”。


But nowadays, such writers are hard to find, and their work is received by readers with mockery and sarcasm.	但现在，很难看再看到这类写手的身影，他们的作品只会受到读者的讥笑与嘲讽。


In fact, the Central Propaganda Department’s ideological control can be maintained only through internal notices and telephone calls, which are widely scorned.	事实上，中央宣传部只能通过内部通知和电话，才能维持其对意识形态的控制。 这种做法广受讥讽。


More importantly, even the regulators themselves have ceased to believe in obsolete and rigid doctrines.	更重要的事，甚至连管制者自己都不再信奉僵化过时的教条。


I recently met an official working for a provincial Department of Propaganda and was impressed by his bold and straightforward comments on current affairs.	我最近曾与就职于省委宣传部的一名官员会面，他对时事直接大胆的评论给我留下了深刻的印象。


In private conversation, one might even take him for a liberal – one of a new breed of young and well-educated propaganda officials with an increasingly higher threshold of political sensitivity.	私下谈话中，你甚至可能会把他当成自由派成员——自由派是由受过良好教育的年轻宣传官员组成的新团体，这些官员政治敏感性的门槛正在不断提高。


For their part, producers of news have long since ceased to believe that news is propaganda.	对新闻出版者而言，他们早就不再相信新闻即宣传。 我的职业生涯始于 1979 年，那年我加入了《中国青年报》，经历了中国改革开放的整个过程。


I started my career with	到 80 年代中期，我们那一代的中国新闻工作者通过对西方新闻报道的广泛阅读，摆脱了传统的共产主义新闻观。 年轻一辈的新闻工作者因此得以从一开始便接触到了西方新闻理念。


Indeed, Western works are taught as “models for writing” to journalism students in China’s universities.	事实上，在中国的大学里，西方作品被当成“写作范本”传授给新闻专业的学生。


This is a crucial change, and it is the fundamental reason for an increasing number of genuine news items and commentaries in China’s media today.	这是一个至关重要的变化，是今天中国媒体真实新闻和真实评论数量不断增加的一个最根本原因。


Market pressure has also been important in pushing Chinese media to embrace change.	在推动中国媒体拥抱变革方面，市场压力也是一大重要因素。 与外国所认识到的相反，中国只有少数媒体——如《人民日报》、《光明日报》和《经济日报》——还依靠政府资金为生。


Contrary to foreign perceptions, only a handful of Chinese media – for example,	中央电视台主要依靠的是自己的广告收入，政府只象征性地为其巨额预算的一小部分买单。 绝大多数地方广播电台或电视台能否存活下去，全凭其能否在市场上取得成功。


To be sure, political information remains rigorously controlled, which puts a premium on “harmless” recreational, entertainment, and sports information – the reporting of which is basically free.	政治信息还依旧受到严格控制，这点毫无疑问。 这助长了“无害的”消遣、娱乐和运动资讯的发展——这类报道基本自由。


This has resulted, in the short run, in an embrace of low journalistic standards.	从短期来看，这种现象将导致对低新闻标准的信奉。


But many metropolitan newspapers that once thrived on infotainment have seen their circulation fall in recent years.	但近年来，很多曾一度靠着资讯娱乐红火兴旺的都市报的销量已经开始下滑。


Sooner or later, readers will start to buy newspapers that can truly inform them and give voice to their opinions.	读者迟早都会开始购买那些能够为他们提供真实信息，表达他们的观点的报纸。


In fact, it is these tabloids, responding to market pressure, that have started to take on responsibility as public watchdogs.	事实上，正是这些小报开始承担起了公众监督员的责任，以对市场压力做出回应。


On many occasions in recent years, they have been the first to break sensitive news.	近年来，他们曾多次首先捅出敏感新闻。


As a result, mainstream media are being marginalized, and the previously marginalized media are becoming mainstream.	结果是，主流媒体被边缘化，而以前处于边缘地位的媒体成为了主要媒体。


Thus, even without any change in the current system of regulation, extensive coverage of disasters, judicial abuses, and citizens’ pursuit of their statutory rights, along with the questioning of policies from public perspectives, is now common.	如此一来，即使当前的管制体系没有任何变化，对灾难、司法滥用、公民对自己法律权益的追求，以及从公众角度质疑政策的广泛报道，现在已经成为普遍现象。 比如，《南方都市报》的报道导致了国务院发布的旧房令的流产。


For example, reporting by the	《财经》杂志对 SARS 的连续报道让中国公众了解到了这一传染病的真相。 《中国青年报》的《冰点周刊》发表了台湾作家龙应台关于台湾民主发展的文章。


Such progress is slow and full of frustrations, for it reflects the incremental evolution of the system.	这些进步缓慢且充满挫折，反映了体制的逐渐演变。


But it is nonetheless real progress, indicating the growing influence of the Chinese media and pointing to China’s becoming a country of “free expression”.	但不管怎样，这种进步是真实的进步，暗示了中国媒体不断增长的影响力，并且指出中国正在演变为一个“自由表达”的国家。


According to an old Chinese saying, “a just cause enjoys abundant support, while an unjust cause finds scant support.”	中国有句老话，叫做“得道多助，失道寡助”。


A “just cause” resides in people’s hearts.	“道”存于民心。


Without the hearts of news producers – or, increasingly, of censors – the seemingly formidable edifice of journalistic regulation will, sooner or later, collapse like the Berlin Wall.	失去新闻出版者的人心——或者说，逐渐失去新闻审查人员的人心——，这一看起来让人望而生畏的新闻管制大厦迟早会像柏林墙一样崩塌。


A New Deal for Fragile States	援助脆弱国家《新政》


PARIS – Today, roughly one-quarter of the world’s population lives in conflict-affected and fragile states.	巴黎—如今，全世界大约有四分之一的人口生活在受冲突影响的脆弱国家中。


Despite vast sums of money spent aiding such states over the last 50 years, armed conflict and violence continue to blight the lives of millions of people around the world.	尽管在过去50年中人们投入了大量的资金用于援助这些国家，武装冲突和暴力还是在持续夺走数百万人的生命。


International and national partners must radically change the way they engage such states.	国际和国家伙伴必须彻底改变帮助这些国家的方式。


I experienced firsthand the need for a new approach in 2004 in Sri Lanka.	我在2004年的斯里兰卡获得了需要新方式的第一手体验。


Within the first two months of the devastating tsunami that struck that December, close to 50 heads of state and foreign ministers visited the island.	这一年12月，斯里兰卡遭受灾难性海啸袭击，两个月内，近50个国家的外交部长访问了这个岛国。


Each came with their own programs, their own civil-society organizations, and their own television crews.	每位部长都带来了本国的计划、本国的公民社会组织以及本国的电视媒体人员。


Few came with any deep understanding of the dynamics of the political conflict between militant Tamils and the Sri Lankan state.	而几乎没人对泰米尔军人和斯里兰卡国家质检的政治冲突动态有过深刻的了解。


Big mistakes were made, fueling further violence.	结果是犯下大错，助长了日后的暴力。


Our major challenge today is to move away from the model of partnership according to which priorities, policies, and funding needs are determined in donor capitals and development partners’ headquarters.	今天，我们的一项重大挑战是改变原来的伙伴模式，即优先级别、政策和融资需要由出资国和发展伙伴决定。


Conflict-affected states need to be able to determine their own destinies.	受冲突影响的国家需要能够决定自身的命运。


We should establish models of post-conflict transition like the one advocated by the g7+, a group of eighteen fragile states.	我们应该建立后冲突时代过渡模式，比如由十八脆弱国家集团g7+提出的方案。


The model is simple: Countries assess their own situation, using tools that they develop and that are appropriate to the context, in order to formulate a vision and a plan to consolidate peace and achieve prosperity.	这一模式很简单：各国自己评估自己的形势，使用它们所开发的适合环境的工具，以此来规划旨在巩固和平、实现繁荣的愿景和计划。


This may sound like pie in the sky, but we have already tasted it in Africa, where Sierra Leone’s Agenda for Prosperity 2013-2017 and the Liberia Vision 2030 exemplify the potential of such programs.	这听起来好像是天上的馅饼，但我们已经在非洲进行了尝试，塞拉利昂的2013—2017繁荣日程（Agenda for Prosperity 2013-2017）和利比里亚愿景2030（Liberia Vision 2030）向我们展示了如此规划的潜力。


Progress on meeting national priorities such as peace consolidation, expanding access to justice, or increasing security is monitored locally.	满足巩固和平、扩大公正面、增加安全度等国家当务之急的进展由本国进行监测。


Using local systems and capacities, it turns out, can strengthen them.	事实表明，动用本地制度和能力能强化进展。


The “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States,” which builds on a series of international commitments regarding aid and development, and was endorsed at the at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea in 2011, proposes just such a model.	《帮助脆弱国家新政》（New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States）建立在一系列关于援助和发展的国际承诺上，并在2011年韩国釜山第四届援助效率高规格峰会（High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness）获得了支持。


It enshrines what matters most in building peaceful states and societies: commitments – the Peace- and State-building Goals – to improve how national and international partners engage in conflict-affected and fragile contexts.	该计划提出了类似的模式，指出了建设和平国家和社会的最重要内容：关于改善国家和国际伙伴对冲突影响地区和脆弱地区的援助承诺——和平和国家建设目标（Peace- and State-building Goals）。


The New Deal recognizes what the history of peace-building teaches us: national leadership and ownership of agendas are key to achieving visible and sustainable results.	《新政���认为，和平建设的历史告诉我们，日程的国家领导和所有是实现明确而可持续成果的关键。


As Kosti Manibe Ngai, South Sudan’s finance minister, has put it, “Nothing about us without us.”	正如南苏丹财政部长诺盖（Kosti Manibe Ngai）所指出的：“没有我们参与的事情和我们无关。 ”


In many conversations with South Sudan’s president, Salva Kiir, we have discussed setting out a short list of clear priorities for the new state.	在与南苏丹总统基尔（Salva Kiir）的多次谈话中，我们讨论了为这个新国家设定明确优先事项短名单的事项。


But such goals are meaningful only if a fragile state’s partners are ready to accept the lead from a capital like Juba rather than from their own headquarters.	但这些目标只有在脆弱国的伙伴愿意接受朱巴（Juba）而不是自身总部领导的情况下才有意义。


More than 40 countries and institutions have endorsed the New Deal way of working, committing themselves to building better partnerships – and to investing the required resources and political capital.	超过40个国家和机构支持《新政》的运作方式，承诺建设更好的伙伴关系以及投资所需要的资源和政治资本。


This is why the New Deal model is innovative; it creates political support around issues that need to be addressed if countries are to make the transition from conflict and fragility to peace and stability.	这就是《新政》模式的创新之处； 它围绕实现一国从冲突和脆弱迈向和平和稳定所需要解决的问题创造政治支持。


Supporting inclusive political dialogue and ensuring that conflict is resolved through peaceful means are the highest priorities, as are security, access to justice, and a dynamic private sector that generates sufficient job opportunities.	支持包容性政治对话、确保冲突通过和平方式解决是最为紧要的任务，此外还有安全问题、获得公正的问题以及创造充分就业机会的私人部门活力问题。


Moreover, many fragile states are rich in natural resources, and must establish transparent resource management – aimed at curbing corruption and controlling illicit flows of money and goods – in order to raise the revenues needed to deliver services.	此外，许多脆弱国家富于自然资源，必须建立透明的资源管理——旨在抑制腐败、控制资金和商品的非法流动——从而提高提供服务所需要的收入。


A focus on these processes would ensure that fragile states take the lead and the responsibility.	专注于这些过程能够确保脆弱国家充当领导者和责任者。


As partners, we must accept this national leadership.	作为伙伴，我们必须接受这一国家领导。


After Haiti’s catastrophic earthquake in 2010, the country was dubbed “the republic of NGOs.”	2010年海地发生地震灾难后，该国成了“非政府组织共和国”（the republic of NGOs）。


Unable to create conditions in which Haitians themselves could take the lead in rebuilding their country, Haiti’s external partners undermined the establishment of a functioning internal governance system.	外部伙伴无法创造海地人民自己主导重建家园过程的条件，破坏了运转良好的内部治理体系的建立。


So, how can we translate our commitments and priorities into better lives for people who are affected by conflict and fragility?	那么，我们如何将我们承诺和当务之急转化为改善受冲突和脆弱性影响的人民的生活？


OECD countries need to lead by example and meet the commitments that they have made.	经合组织国家需要有榜样指引，并兑现它们所作出的承诺。


Our partners, through groupings like the g7+, must continue to demand the changes in policies and practices that have been promised.	我们的伙伴必须通过g7+等组织继续要求承诺政策和措施的改变。


We also must plan to change for the long term.	我们还必须做好长期变化规划。


As the Millennium Development Goals’ 2015 end date approaches, promotion of peace, security, and non-violent conflict resolution continues to be vitally important, and must be fully integrated into any future development agenda.	随着千年发展目标2015年截止期的临近，推进和平、安全和非暴力冲突解决方案继续有着关键重要性，并且必须充分地融合到未来发展日程中。


Recently, the members of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, the high-level political forum that produced the New Deal, met in Washington, DC, to assess our progress in changing how we work and in implementing the New Deal commitments.	最近，国际和平建设和国家建设对话（International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding，产生《新政》的高规格政治论坛）成员国在华盛顿举行了会晤，评估我们在改变工作方式、执行《新政》承诺方面的进展。


They agreed to the Washington Communiqué, which urges development partners, g7+ countries, and civil-society organizations to intensify their efforts to use the New Deal to deliver concrete results on the ground, and calls for a post-2015 development agenda that recognizes the universal importance of peace- and state-building.	它们通过了《华盛顿公告》（Washington Communiqué），敦促发展伙伴、g7+国家和公民社会组织进一步根据《新政》赢取扎实进展，并呼吁为后2015年时代制定考虑和平和国家建设普世重要性的发展日程。


Ultimately, our progress depends on the resolve of everyone to transform the lives of the 1.5 billion people whose lives are marred by violence, conflict, and insecurity.	说到底，我们的进步取决于人人有决心让15亿生活在暴力、冲突和不安全阴影下的人改变生活。


A New Deal for the Lisbon Strategy	里斯本战略的新协议


Whatever happened to the European Union’s Lisbon Strategy?	欧盟的里斯本协议究竟出了什么问题？


Not only is the public almost entirely ignorant of the EU’s policy agenda for boosting competitiveness, economic growth, and employment, but this ignorance extends to many intellectuals, academics, CEO’s, and even some MP’s.	不仅广大公众对欧盟增强竞争力、促进经济发展和增加就业的施政日程几乎全然不知，甚至连很多知识分子、理论学者、首席执行官甚至议员都所知寥寥。


For example, in all of the debates on the EU’s constitutional treaty, neither its supporters nor its opponents have so much as mentioned the Lisbon Strategy.	举例来讲，在就欧盟宪法协议展开的辩论中，无论支持者还是反对者都很少提到里斯本战略。


It is little wonder, then, that Euroskepticism – in France, the Netherlands, and elsewhere – is on the rise.	那么，法国、荷兰和其它地方愈演愈烈的“欧洲怀疑主义”就没什么可奇怪的了。


Despite the success and popularity of programs like ERASMUS, citizens don’t perceive the EU’s contribution to superior education or training.	尽管伊拉兹马斯等项计划取得了很大成功，也赢得了不小的知名度，但普通百姓还是感觉不到欧盟对高等教育或培训做出了哪些贡献。


Indeed, the last Eurobarometer survey on the Lisbon Strategy found that the European public sees little relation between EU policies and economic competitiveness.	实际上，欧洲民意调查中心最近一次有关里斯本战略的调查显示，欧洲公众认为欧盟政策和经济竞争力之间并没有多少关系。


Of course, some laboratories receive EU grants, but without recognizing a specific European mission in research policies.	当然，有些实验室领到了欧盟发放的补助，却没有在研究计划中确立相应的欧洲目标。


Europe is generally considered more a constraint than as a plan, more as an instrument than a vision nourished by a clear and credible idea.	欧洲被人们更多地视作限制而不是规划； 被更多地看作工具，而不是某种清晰理念孕育出来的目标。


The essential responsibility for this state of affairs lies with Europe’s ruling class and policymakers.	欧洲的统治阶级和决策者要为这种状况负起责任。


As a recent assessment by former Dutch prime minister Wim Kok pointed out, the EU’s member states generally have not made the Lisbon Strategy a high priority, and they balk at giving the EU the means to pursue more ambitious policies to offset this neglect.	前荷兰总理柯克斯最近进行的评估显示，总的来讲欧盟各成员国并没有把里斯本战略当作重点，而且也不愿赋予欧盟执行其雄心勃勃的策略，以纠正这种忽视所造成后果的必要的手段。


It is difficult to ask citizens to be enthusiastic about aims that their leaders ignore.	就连领导人都忽视的任务，很难要求民众付出热情。


At bottom, the problem is one of legitimacy.	归根结底，问题恐怕还是出在合理性方面。


The main targets – jobs, growth, and research – are considered legitimate from the standpoint of fairness when described in general terms.	而主要目标－就业、发展和研究，从公平的角度总体说来都具备合理的一面。


But the concrete policies needed to realize this aim are not, since reforming the welfare state and labor markets means more competition, which scares many citizens.	但实现目标所需的具体政策却并非如此，因为改革福利现状和劳务市场意味着竞争加剧，而这会让很多人感到恐慌。


Legitimacy is even more problematic regarding recognition, which implies a feeling of community and attachment.	欧盟在获得人们认可时更是问题重重，这种认可包含着人们对欧盟的归属和依恋。


When we are faced with conflicting choices – burden-sharing through taxation, the organization of the public sector, the status of public employees, etc. – the member states are considered to be the only bodies entitled to decide.	面对艰难抉择的时候－通过收税平衡负担、公共领域的组织形式、政府雇员的地位等－各成员国被视作有权决定的唯一实体。


In short, when the EU brings subsidies, it receives congratulations; but when it pushes for unpopular reforms, it becomes the scapegoat for political, social, and economic failures.	简言之，欧盟发放补助时，人们趋之若骛； 但一旦推行不受欢迎的改革，欧盟就成了政治、社会和经济弊政的替罪羔羊。


From an economic point of view, the Lisbon Strategy’s aim is to transform Europe into a power able to compete on equal terms with the US today and the great Asian countries.	从经济的角度，里斯本战略的目标是把欧洲改造成能与今日的美国和伟大的亚洲国家平等抗衡的经济力量。


But this aim does not appear to be creating a European identity, as the euro has.	但上述目标并没有像欧元那样让欧洲融为一体。


Within many states, “power” isn’t politically correct.	很多国家里，“权力”在政治上根本立不住脚。


Above all, there is no linkage between national power and European power.	毕竟在国家权力和欧洲权力之间找不到任何一缕联系。


If we want Europe to be more legitimate, we must explain how to tie these two dimensions of power.	如果我们希望欧洲变得更加合理，就必须说明怎样在这两个领域间建立联系。


Aside from ignorance of the Lisbon Strategy among the public and inaction on long-term reforms among the member states, a second problem concerns the lack of acceptance of the virtues of competition – the most effective way to ensure quality, innovation, and low prices for consumers.	除了公众不了解里斯本战略和成员国在长期改革领域无所作为外，另一个问题是人们缺乏对竞争优势的清醒认识－竞争是确保品质、创新和低价的有效法宝。


Competition also puts an end to rent seeking and protection of traditional corporate advantages.	竞争还能有效抑制寻租问题，取消对传统公司利益的保护。


Of course, we must limit the scope of competition: there is no reason, for example, to extend it to taxation.	当然，我们必须对竞争的范围严加限制：举例来讲，没有必要在税收领域引入竞争。


Similarly, while competition will improve the quality of research and education, this does not imply reduced public funding, a lower priority for basic research, or the elimination of scholarships.	与此相似，尽管竞争能改善研究和教育的质量，但也并不一定要削减公共投资、牺牲基础研究或取消研究基金。


Perhaps most importantly, competition is a powerful means to restore democracy and modernize political institutions by compelling policymakers to ensure transparency and accountability.	竞争可以迫使决策者确保透明和公正，从而成为恢复民主和实现政治机构现代化的有效手段，也许这才是最重要的。


Elites must give up their privileges, and regulations on corporate governance must limit collusion between managers and civil servants or politicians.	所谓的中坚分子必须放弃特权，而调整公司管理必须限制管理者、公仆或政客之间的勾结。


We must explain to citizens Europe’s contribution to public ethics, and the democratic virtues of fair competition in economic, political, and social life.	我们必须向人们说明欧洲要坚守公众信仰、在经济、政治和社会生活中坚守公平竞争的民主优势。


Consider one of the main purposes of the Lisbon Strategy: the organization of research and higher education.	如何组织研究和高等教育也是里斯本战略的主要目标之一。


It is impossible to change radically the way scholars and research workers are appointed in most member states, and to revise completely the criteria for funding of faculties and laboratories. But the EU can overcome national impediments by developing exemplary universities and research centers that would be properly European, serving as an incentive to quality and reform at the national level.	从根本上改变多数成员国任命学者和研究人员的方法，或是彻底改革资助教学和实验人员的标准是不可能的，但欧盟却可以通过建立欧洲示范大学和实验中心，使之成为各国品质和改革的催化剂，成功地逾越各国政府设置的障碍。


Emulation through excellence is the motor of competitiveness.	对优秀榜样的模仿将会成为竞争实力的核心。


A good place to start is an idea supported by French Socialist leader Dominique Strauss-Kahn, who has proposed that 0.25% of Europe’s GDP be dedicated to research and used to create a European Agency for Research.	法国社会党领袖史特劳斯卡恩提出的计划是个不错的开始，他提出欧洲国内生产总值的0. 25%用做科研经费，建立欧洲研究所。


Moreover, Europe must build up tools for strategic analysis, assessment, and forecasting to provoke and nourish public debate.	不仅如此，欧洲必须开发战略分析、评估以及预测激发和催生公众辩论的工具。


Such think tanks at the European level must remain free and independent, but leaders must learn to pay attention to and integrate their recommendations into the policy-making process.	上述整个欧洲范围内的思想家们必须保持自由和独立，而领袖们则需倾听他们的意见，���把他们的建议融入制定决策的过程。


In many matters pertaining to the Lisbon Strategy, the EU cannot avoid member states’ concerns.	在属于里斯本战略的很多领域，欧盟都无法回避成员国的忧虑。


But as the states won’t be able to do everything alone and won’t renounce maintaining political control, we must be able to link the Union’s policies and those of specific states.	但由于所有的国家都不可能自行其是，也不会拒绝保持政治控制，我们就必须把欧盟的政策与各成员国的政策很好地结合起来。


Otherwise, the Lisbon Strategy could merely empower an inefficient bureaucracy, rather than boosting the EU’s democratic legitimacy.	否则，里斯本战略可能只会造成低效官僚的膨胀，而不是促进欧盟民主的合理化。


In short, the Lisbon Strategy could lead Europe to become a real power in the coming decades, or it could fuel further growth of Euroskepticism.	简言之，里斯本战略要么会在未来数十年内使欧洲成为真正的巨人，要么会促进“欧洲怀疑论”的进一步滋生。


A New Democratic Agenda for Russia	崭新的俄国民主日程


MOSCOW – When Russian President Dmitri Medvedev delivered his annual address to the Federal Assembly I was struck by the fact that his speech seemed to be meant for an advanced, prosperous country, not the real Russia of today.	莫斯科——俄国总统德米特里·梅德韦杰夫面对联邦议会发表施政报告的时候，他的讲话似乎针对的是一个先进、繁荣的国家，而不是今天的俄罗斯，这着实令我感到惊讶。


Russia will hold a presidential election in 2012.	俄罗斯将在2012年举行总统选举。


What happens in 2011 will, in my opinion, be even more important than the election itself.	在我看来，2011年发生事件的意义将超过2012年的选举活动。


Indeed, the evolution of Russian society could transform Russian politics, despite those domestic opponents who deny change or those who unqualifiedly classify Russia as “incorrigibly authoritarian.”	事实上，尽管国内反对派拒绝改变，也有人不负责任地将俄罗斯划定为“不可救药的专制国家”，但社会的发展完全有可能改变俄罗斯的政治。


But, in order for that to happen, a new agenda for Russia must be developed this year.	但要想实现这一目标，必须在今年制定出新的计划。


A decade ago, defense of Russia’s territorial integrity and restoration of governability topped the list of priorities.	十年前，捍卫领土完整和恢复统治秩序曾经是俄国的当务之急。


People supported a president, Vladimir Putin, who was devoted to this “stabilization” agenda.	民众支持弗拉基米尔·普京总统，后者则致力于稳定俄国秩序。


We may debate the means by which it was pursued, and how successfully, but Russia’s “existential” challenges were largely overcome.	具体采用的手段和取得的结果虽然有值得商榷之处，但俄罗斯已经克服“生存挑战”却是不争的事实。


But progress on stabilization only highlighted Russia’s unresolved problems, which the global financial crisis exacerbated, but did not cause.	但稳定局势方面的进展进一步凸显出俄国从未解决的问题，虽然始作俑者不是全球金融危机，但这些问题在全球金融危机中却变得更为严重。


After all, Russia’s resource-based, de-industrializing, expenditure-driven economy is the result of purely domestic choices.	归根结底，俄国人自己选择了这种去工业化、以资源为基础、并依赖支出驱动的经济发展模式。


Nor was it the crisis that gave rise to corruption, which affects officialdom at all levels, or that caused Russia to lose its democratic dynamic.	影响各级官员并致使俄国失去民主动力的腐败现象随处可见，这些同样不能归咎于全球金融危机的爆发。


We Russians rode along on oil and gas, forgetting that these resources will not last forever.	我们俄国人继续依赖石油和天然气，而忘记了这些资源不是解决问题的永久方法。


But, even with favorable world market conditions, we did not manage to solve the problem of poverty, in which millions of Russians still live.	但即使在有利的世界市场条件下，我们也未能解决数百万俄国人所面临的贫困问题。


I am convinced that Russia’s troubles all come down to politics.	我相信俄国的所有麻烦都来自政治。


We need a democratic, competitive environment, initiative at all levels, an active civil society, and real public control.	我们需要的是竞争性的民主环境，各级官员的积极参与、充满活力的民间社会和真正意义上的公共控制。


Only under such conditions will difficult problems lend themselves to solution.	只有在这样的环境下才能找到困难问题的解决方案。


But, starting in 2005-2006, the authorities implemented measures that made responsiveness to acute problems practically impossible.	但从2005－2006年度开始，政府措施几乎杜绝了迅速解决尖锐问题的可能性。


The decisions to appoint, rather than elect, regional governors, to introduce party-list voting, to raise the electoral threshold for parties to enter the Duma, and to repeal the minimum-turnout requirement – all accompanied by rampant manipulation of elections and the mass media – created a political system closed to feedback from society.	以任命取代选举产生区域省长，实行政党排名制投票措施、抬高党派进入杜马的选举门槛，以及废止最低投票率的相关规定——所有这些伴随着对选举和公众媒体的疯狂操纵——形成了一套无视社会反馈的政治系统。


Not surprisingly, the political elite became self-absorbed and served only its own narrow interests.	在这种情况下，政治精英变得固执己见，只顾及自身的狭隘利益也就成了自然而然的事情。


This summer, with wildfires raging outside Moscow, the elite’s isolation took on a menacing nature.	今年夏天随着莫斯科城外的山林大火，政治精英们的高高在上越来越显示出其危险性。


But something else happened: society became more demanding, recognizing its own interests and knowing how to express them.	但同时起作用的还有其他因素： 社会民众的要求越来越高，他们在认识到自身利益的同时也知道如何表达自己的诉求。


Although the traditions of self-organization in Russian society are neither deep nor strong, real movement in this direction became visible for all to see.	尽管俄国自我管理的传统既不深厚也不强大，但朝着这一目标的真正进展我们每个人都可以看到。


Activists from public movements, journalists, ecologists, businessmen, and ordinary people who had suffered the tyranny and corruption of public officials began to join in.	经历过公职人员暴政和腐败的公众活动人士、记者、生态主义者、商人和普通民众都开始参与其中。


The authorities have recognized this, at least to some degree.	这一点也在某种程度上得到了政府的认可。


Medvedev's decision to suspend construction of a highway through the Khimki forest near Moscow in the face of widespread civic protest was important.	梅德韦杰夫面对大规模公众抗议决定暂停莫斯科附近科希姆基森林高速公路的修建就是一项具有重要意义的举措。


For many months, Moscow and federal authorities ignored the highway’s opponents, so Medvedev’s decision was a signal: contempt for the people is inadmissible.	几个月来，莫斯科和联邦政府一直对高速公路的反对者视若无睹，因此梅德韦杰夫的决策向人们发出信号： 不允许轻视民众的要求。


Yet right after that, the bureaucracy tried to turn the public hearings – called to give people and civil institutions a voice in solving such problems – into an empty formality.	但就在这项决策做出后不久，官僚机构就试图将公开听证会变成可有可无的形式，而召集听证会的本意是在解决类似问题时将发言权赋予公众和民间机构。


So the struggle between democratic and anti-democratic tendencies is becoming acute.	因此民主和反民主潮流之间的争斗正在愈演愈烈。


If the anti-democratic tendencies win out, all that we have accomplished in previous years will be jeopardized – including stability itself.	如果反民主潮流胜出，将会威胁到我们在前些年已经取得的成果——稳定本身也包含其中。


This threat evidently motivated Medvedev to speak out in November: “It is no secret,” Medvedev wrote in his blog, “that, as of a certain period, symptoms of stagnation have begun to appear in our political life, and the threat of turning stability into a factor of stagnation has appeared.”	正是在这样的威胁下，梅德韦杰夫才在11月公开表态： 他在自己的博客中写道，“到某个阶段为止，政治生活已经出现停滞的迹象，将稳定变为停滞因素的威胁也已经产生，这已经不是什么秘密了。 ”


The president’s statement was unexpected.	总统的表态有些出人意料。


Medvedev’s assessment attested to his understanding that Russia’s problems are rooted in its politics – in the degradation of the ruling party, in the absence of a real opposition, and in the lack of respect for the rights of political minorities.	梅德韦杰夫的看法佐证了他对俄国问题源于政治的理解——执政党派的堕落、反对力量的缺失、以及缺乏对少数政治势力的尊���。


I welcome Medvedev’s emphasis on social concerns and his anti-bureaucratic rhetoric.	我对梅德韦杰夫关注社会热点及其反官僚言论持欢迎态度。


But his statements are only a first step toward formulating a new Russian agenda, the first point of which must be a renewal and acceleration of movement toward real and effective democracy.	但他的表态不过是制定俄国新计划的第一步，其中首先是要恢复并加快朝着真正有效民主政体的发展速度。


It is vital that Russians believe that Medvedev’s words reflect his priorities, and that he is prepared to fight for them.	重要的是让俄国人相信梅德韦杰夫的言论反应了他的心声，相信他愿意为民众而奋斗。


Among these priorities, one of the most important is education.	在这些当务之急中间，教育无疑是最重要的项目。


We have approached the point when the constitutional requirement of universal, free education may become a fiction.	我们已经接近危险的边缘，宪法有关普及免费教育的规定很可能沦为一纸空文。


People are asking: How is it that, after World War II, the state had enough money to provide free education, whereas today’s Russian state does not?	人们在问： 为什么二战结束后国家都有钱提供免费教育，而今天的政府却做不到？


Society also demands effective mechanisms for combating corruption, which is turning into a serious political problem, precisely because it has widened the gap between the people and the authorities.	社会民众还要求建立对抗腐败的有效机制，这也正成为日益严重的政治问题，究其原因是这种要求拉大了政府和民众之间的差距。


Indeed, today’s elite cannot or will not solve the problem.	事实上，今天的精英人士不能也不会解决这一问题。


Only a serious presidential initiative, supported by civil society and brave new political forces, can do the job.	只有获得民间社会和勇敢政治新势力支持的严肃的总统计划有能力解决这一问题。


The new agenda must also include a strong economic component.	新计划还必须包含强有力的经济因素。


Patching up holes in the budget and individual initiatives are not enough to ensure economic renewal.	对预算方案和具体计划漏洞的修修补补不足以确保经济获得重生。


Russia needs a breakthrough toward an up-to-date, knowledge-based, and ecologically sustainable economy.	俄国需要取得突破，建设以知识为基础、能在生态领域持续发展的现代经济。


Here, I see a direct connection with the problem of education.	我认为这与教育问题有着直接的联系。


I am convinced that Medvedev must become the leader in the process of formulating the new Russian agenda, and he must act in the coming year.	我确信梅德韦杰夫必将成为制定俄国新计划的领袖，而他必须在即将到来的一年采取措施。


Society will support him.	他将获得社会民众的支持。


A New Era for Islamic Science?	伊斯兰科学的新时代？


For a few hundred years, when science and mathematics were enjoying a period of great invention, one region of the world stood out.	在数百年的时间里，当科学和数学正经历着一段伟大发明的时代，世界上的一个地区脱颖而出。


Masters of these disciplines were revered there, medicine advanced quickly, and the average person was curious about how nature worked.	这些学科的大师们在那里倍受尊崇，医药迅猛发展，普通人也对大自然的奥秘充满了好奇。


Not surprisingly, this region was globally respected.	如是，这一地区也毫不意外地得到全球来自全球的尊敬。


In the other half of the known planet, scientists were punished, even killed.	而在这个星球已知的另一半，科学家们却被惩罚，甚至惨遭杀戮。


Mathematics was outlawed as irreligious and alien, and was later made subservient to religion.	数学作为非宗教的异端被法律禁止，进而沦为宗教的附庸。


The standard of living was low.	那里的生活水平也甚为低下。


The prosperous region was the Islamic Middle East, while an ignorant Europe remained poor.	那片繁荣的地方是伊斯兰教的中东，而相形之下的就是陷于困顿的无知欧洲。


Both regions were religiously governed (historians differ about the role and natures of the religions in this context), but science flourished only in one of them.	两个地区都处于宗教统治之下（历史学家们对这样背景下宗教的作用和特点意见不一），但科学只在其中的一个地区得以兴旺。


Now, of course the roles of the Islamic Middle East and the West are reversed.	当然，现今伊斯兰教的中东和西方的角色发生了逆转。


Since World War II, the United States has been the world’s undisputed leader in science.	自二战以来，美国在科学领域就是毋庸置疑的世界领导者。


Throughout this period, the brightest students were drawn away from their native lands, attracted by superior research universities and opportunities.	这整个这一时期，世界上最聪明的学生在美国更优越的研究型大学和机遇的吸引下离开祖国。


Until recently, more than half of all mathematics, science, and engineering graduate students in the US were foreign-born.	直到最近，超过半数的美国数学、科学和工程专业的研究生都是外国出生的。


Many of these talents stayed after graduation, and both industry and government took advantage of this.	这些人才中的许多人毕业后留在了美国，而美国的业界和政府也乐得其所。


Meanwhile, Islamic cultures entered a historical phase in which science was equated with Western influence and eschewed.	与此同时，伊斯兰文化却进入了这样一个历史阶段：科学被等同为西方的影响而被疏远。


Even in countries where oil revenues could fuel a significant amount of research, Arab rulers did not encourage such investment, with the result that their societies have not prospered as much as they might have.	甚至在石油收入可以支持相当数量的科研的国家，阿拉伯的统治者们也不鼓励这样的投资。 其结果使这些社会没有达到其本应达到的繁荣程度。


Recently, a desire for greater political respect has spurred Islamic nations to invest in technology, which is most visible in Pakistani and Iranian nuclear ambitions.	最近，争取更多政治上的尊敬的愿望促使伊斯兰各国投资技术，其中最为显著的就是巴基斯坦和伊朗的核雄心。


But while such weapons carry political weight, the science behind them is mundane and old.	但是，尽管核武器有一定的政治分量，可支撑它的科学却是普通而陈旧的。


More meaningful is the respect that comes from incubating insights, rather than the products of past discoveries.	由培育真正的洞察力而获得的尊敬比用过去的科学发现制造的产品更有意义。


Imagine the influence that would be generated by a Pakistani institute that was the world leader in cancer research.	想象一个在癌症研究方面处于世界领先地位的巴基斯坦机构所能产生的影响力。


Would the political rhetoric shift if researchers in Oman discovered a key to suppressing AIDS?	如果阿曼的研究人员发现了抑制艾滋病的方法，该国的政治话语权又会发生怎样的变化呢？


This is one unclaimed opportunity.	这是一个被忽视的机遇。


But another exists, and not just for Islamic societies.	但另一个机遇也不仅仅只针对伊斯兰社会而存在着。


The US has made profound missteps recently.	美国最近步步皆错。


“Matters of faith” have been substituted for science across government, from the president down.	整个政府内部自总统而下，“事关信仰”替代了科学。


Top researchers have had their reports changed by political operatives when the facts contradicted official belief.	当事实与官方信念发生冲突时，顶尖研究者们的报告就被政治手段纂改。


Encouraged by a religiously influenced administration, school systems are shifting their focus from science to “values.”	在一届受到宗教影响的政府的鼓励下，学校系统也将关注的重点从“科学”转移到“价值观”。


Since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, entry visas are fewer and more difficult to obtain, stanching the flow of young talent into US universities.	自从2001年的恐怖袭击以来，美国的入境签证配额减少，获得签证也更为困难。 这就影响了年轻人才向美国各大学的流动。


Major scientific organizations have protested, without result.	主要的科学组织提出过抗议，但却于事无补。


At the same time, tax laws have been revised to make investors wealthier in the near term, discouraging long-term investment in research.	同时，修改后的税法使得投资者们在短期内变得更为富有，从而遏制了对科研的长期投入。


Half a trillion dollars was committed to the war in Iraq, an amount roughly equal to the sponsorship of all basic research for the last thousand years.	伊拉克战争获得了五千亿美金的拨款—这一数额几乎等于过去一千年以来在基础研究方面所获得的全部资金支持。


Even if the US avoids a fundamentalist dark age, it clearly risks losing its global research dominance.	即使美国能避免陷入一个原教旨主义的黑暗时代，它也显然面临着丧失全球科研主导地位的风险。


Japan recognized the link between political clout and science in the 1980’s.	日本首屈一指的实业家，索尼公司董事长盛田昭夫和右翼政客石原慎太郎发表过一系列的演讲，并在1986年以《日本可以说不》为书名，汇集出版。 他们勾划出了一种以科学领导力产生世界影响力的国家战略。


Japan’s chief industrialist, Akio Morita, the chairman of Sony, and the right-wing politician Shintaro Ishihara gave a series of speeches that were collected and published in 1986 as a book called	其中的关键理念是：如果军事技术的“食物链”被别国掌控，那么军事力量的概念就过时了。 该书的标题意指日本在掌握了关键军事技术之后就会对美国的军事影响力说“不”。


Building a knowledge-based economy using oil wealth is clearly possible.	以石油创造的财富来打造知识经济是完全可能的。


For example, Texas, like most southern US states, was once economically poor and declining.	例如，德克萨斯州和大多数美国南部各州一样，曾经一度经济落后，并不断恶化。


Although it had oil revenue, the flow of dollars into an economy, by itself, does not boost prosperity as much as one might think.	它虽然有来自石油的收入，但用美元来为经济输血，就其本身而言，对繁荣的促进程度可能并没有我们想象的那么大。


So Texas decided to devote its oil money to an educational endowment.	所以，德克萨斯决定将其石油收益投入一笔教育基金。


Today, that endowment is roughly equal to that of Harvard University and spread over 15 universities.	现在，这笔基金的数额可以媲美哈佛大学的家底，并由15所大学分享。


The effect has been staggering: aerospace manufacturing has almost disappeared from California, but is booming in Texas.	其效果也令人惊叹：航天制造业在加州已近绝迹，但在德克萨斯却方兴未艾。


Telecom research centers and consortia have flocked to Texas, even from the Canadian telecommunications giant Nortel.	电信研究中心和财团纷至沓来，甚至加拿大的电信巨擘北方电信也在此安营扎寨。


Although manufacturing in the US is in crisis, Texas has one of the strongest manufacturing economies in the world.	虽然美国的制造业处于危机之中，但德克萨斯的制造经济却是世界最强之一。


There is no reason that the same outcome could not be achieved in the Middle East.	同样的结果没有理由不能在中东出现。


First, however, the Islamic world must rediscover and embrace its proud heritage.	然而，伊斯兰世界必须首先重新发现并继承其引以为豪的传统。


A New European Growth Agenda	欧洲增长新日程


BRUSSELS – Austerity alone cannot solve Europe's economic and financial crisis.	布鲁塞尔—光靠紧缩无法解决欧洲的经济和金融危机。


Growth and jobs need to be promoted with equal zeal.	增长和就业需要双管齐下。


European Union leaders now recognize this: kick-starting growth in 2012 was high on the agenda at the European Council’s meeting on January 30.	欧盟领导人现在已经意识到了这一点，在2012年重振增长将是1月30日欧盟委员会会议的有限日程项目。


But the big question remains: How?	但仍有一个大问题没有解决：如何重振增长？


The need for immediate action is clear.	显然，我们需要立刻采取行动。


The eurozone’s economy contracted in the last three months of 2011; even Germany’s shrank.	欧元区在2011年第四季度出现了收缩，就连德国也未能幸免。


The new year is looking grim.	2012年看起来也不太妙。


France is flat-lining (as is Britain).	法国和英国步履维艰。


Italy and Spain have sunk into deep recession.	意大利和西班牙已经陷入了深度衰退。


Greece is in its fifth year of a slump.	希腊将步入第五个衰退之年。


And eurozone unemployment is at record highs, with nearly one in two young people jobless in Spain and Greece.	欧元区失业率创出了历史新高，在西班牙和希腊，每两个年轻人中就有一个找不到工作。


The economic headwinds are formidable: fiscal austerity, high interest rates outside AAA-rated countries, credit cutting by banks, deleveraging households, weak private-sector investment, and declining exports as the global slowdown undermines demand.	经济所面临的困难是巨大的：财政紧缩、AAA以下级别国家的高利率、银行信用的削减、家庭的去杠杆化、疲软的私人部门投资以及因全球减速影响需求而导致的出口下降。


Until growth resumes, any tentative financial stabilization will be extremely fragile.	除非增长获得重振，否则任何暂时性的财政稳定都是非常脆弱的。


Recession will hit banks’ and governments’ already-weak balance sheets, increasing pressure for faster deleveraging.	衰退将冲击银行和政府已然孱弱不堪的资产负债表，加剧去杠杆化的压力。


But, while gradual adjustment is essential, faster and deeper cuts are largely self-defeating: big reductions in private credit and government spending will cause a sharper slowdown – and thus a vicious downward spiral.	但是，尽管渐进调整才是关键之举，但过快过深的削减很可能会适得其反：私人信用和政府支出的大量削减将导致更剧烈的减速，从而造成衰退的恶性循环。


A big new push for growth is therefore vital.	因此，新的重磅增长措施必不可少。


So far, the growth agenda has consisted largely of structural reforms, which are essential for boosting future productivity and flexibility.	到目前为止，增长日程主要由结构性改革组成，这对于提振未来生产率和生产弹性是不必可少的。


The crisis does provide a political opportunity for bold moves on this front in many countries; but structural reforms generally will not generate growth and jobs immediately (one exception is permitting shops to open longer).	这场危机也确实为许多国家提供了在该方向上做大动作的政治机会； 但总体而言，结构性改革不会立刻产生增长和就业机会（除了允许商店延长营业时间这一措施）。


On the contrary, a shakeout of less productive jobs, for example, would at first raise unemployment, increase government outlays, and reduce private spending.	相反，像淘汰生产率低下的工作岗位这样的措施一开始会抬高失业率，增加政府支出，减少私人支出。


And, because demand is depressed, credit is in short supply, and barriers to enterprise are often high, it will take longer than usual for businesses to create more productive jobs.	此外，由于需求被压抑着，信用供给不足，而创业壁垒通常较高，因此企业创造高生产率岗位需要比平常耗费更长时间。


In short, structural reforms alone cannot be relied upon to stimulate growth in 2012.	简言之，光靠结构性改革是无法但其刺激2012年增长的重任的。


Instead, the immediate focus needs to be on boosting investment and exports in economies with a current-account deficit – such as France, Italy, and Spain (and the United Kingdom) – and stimulating consumption in surplus countries such as Germany and the Netherlands.	事实上，现在应该将注意力放在提振经常项目赤字国的投资和出口上，比如法国、意大利和西班牙（还有英国）； 同时刺激德国和荷兰等盈余国的消费。


The European Central Bank has acted decisively to prop up European banks; now it needs to support the real economy, too.	欧洲央行已经做出了果断的行动，提振欧洲银行； 现在，它应该同时支持实体经济。


While official interest rates are only 1%, solvent sovereigns such as Spain pay more than 5% to borrow for ten years, while creditworthy businesses in Italy can borrow only at punitive rates, if at all.	尽管官方利率只有1%，但并无偿债问题的西班牙等国家，其十年期债务利率高达5%，而在意大利，信誉卓著的企业也不得不以极高的利率借钱（如果借得到的话）。 因此，欧洲央行应该出手疏通货币政策的传递机制；


So the ECB should do more to unblock the transmission mechanism for monetary policy; the European Banking Authority should discourage excessive deleveraging by insisting that banks raise specific capital amounts rather than hit a uniform 9% ratio; and, where necessary, national governments should provide guarantees for bank lending to small and medium-size businesses.	欧洲银行局（European Banking Authority）应该组织过度去杠杆化，不同银行应该有不同的资本要求，而不是一刀切的9%； 此外，在必要时，国家级别的政府应该为流向中小企业的银行贷款提供担保。


While improving access to finance is vital, governments also need to do more to boost investment.	改善融资难的情况固然十分关键，但政府还需要做更多的事来提振投资。


They should prioritize measures to make it easier to start a business, lift barriers to venture capital, and introduce temporary 100% capital allowances to encourage businesses to bring forward investment.	它们需要尽快采取措施，让创业变得更容易，让风险资本不再受到各种壁垒的限制，让企业享受100%的暂时性资本免税额，以增进投资。


At the EU level, the (callable) capital of the European Investment Bank should be greatly increased, as European Commission President José Manuel Barroso suggested in his State of the Union speech last September, so that the EIB can finance a big wave of pan-European investment, notably in infrastructure.	在欧盟层面，正如欧盟主席巴罗佐在其去年9月的欧盟国情咨文中所建议的，欧洲投资银行（European Investment Bank）的（可赎回）资本应该大量增加，以便其为大量泛欧洲投资项目（特别是基础设施项目）提供融资。


Boosting exports is also essential.	提振增长也很重要。


Deficit countries need to become more competitive, increasing productivity while cutting costs.	赤字国需要增加竞争力、提高生产率，同时削减成本。


A more competitive currency would be welcome: just as the sterling’s collapse since 2008 has lifted UK exports, a weaker euro would help Mediterranean economies regain competitiveness for price-sensitive exports.	更具竞争力的货币是一种优势：自2008年以来，英镑的贬值就提振了英国的出口，同理，欧元的贬值也会有助于地中海国家重新获得高价格弹性出口品上的竞争力。


A fiscal devaluation – slashing payroll taxes and replacing the revenues with a higher VAT – would also help.	财政性贬值——降低工资税，替之以对收入收取的更高的增值税——也能有所助益。


Surplus countries, too, must do their part, which is in their own interest.	盈余国也应该完成自己的责任，这符合它们的自身利益。


Just as China needs to allow the renminbi to rise, so Germany – whose current-account surplus exceeds China's both as a share of GDP and in absolute terms – needs a higher real exchange rate.	正如中国需要允许人民币升值，德国也需要提高真实汇率——不管从绝对数量还是从占GDP的比重来看，德国的经常项目盈余均超过了中国。


That means that Germans need to earn higher wages, commensurate with their increased productivity, so that they can afford more Greek and Spanish holidays.	这意味着德国应该提高工资，让工资与其不断提高的生产率相符，从而让德国人民能够享受希腊人和西班牙人享受的假期。


If businesses will not oblige, an income-tax cut would do the trick.	如果企业不愿意如此做，可以采用减少所得税的方式实现。


That brings us to fiscal policy.	这就需要财政政策。


Governments that cannot borrow cheaply (or at all) from markets have no option but to tighten their belts.	无法以低利率从市场上借到钱（甚至无论如何也借不到钱）的政府别无选择，只能缩紧裤腰带过日子。


But they should pursue smart consolidation rather than unthinking austerity.	但它们应该寻求精明的财政整合，而不是不假思索的紧缩。


So they should maintain investment in skills and infrastructure, while cutting subsidies and transfer payments.	因此，它们应该维持在技能和基础设施方面的投资，同时削减补贴和转移支付。


They should also legislate now for future reforms, notably to encourage people to work longer.	它们还应该为未来改革立法，特别是鼓励人们延长工作时间。


Last but not least, governments that can borrow at unprecedentedly low rates – 0% in real terms over 10 years in the case of Germany – must play their role in supporting demand.	最后，能够以前所未有的低利率借钱的政府（比如，德国可以以0%的真实利率发行10年期以上的国债）应该承担起支持需求的责任。


Would it be really be so difficult to see VAT coming down ahead of the German election next year?	在明年德国大选以前看到增值税下降真的如此困难吗？


A New Holy Alliance?	是否是新的神圣联盟？


LONDON -- The recent meeting in the Vatican of the “Custodian of The Holy Places,” King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, and Pope Benedict XVI was a seminal event, particularly as it comes at a time when radical Muslims are decrying the role of “crusaders” in Middle East politics.	伦敦--沙特阿拉伯国王阿卜杜拉和教皇本笃十六世最近在梵蒂冈以“圣地监护人”的身份会见意义深远，特别是激进穆斯林正在责难在中东政治中“圣战者”发挥的作用之际尤其如此。


It was also the clearest sign yet of a rising “Holy Alliance” among the world’s conservative leaders.	这也是世界保守派领导人中正在上升的“神圣联盟”的最为清楚的迹象。


For the key audience for this meeting of Muslim king and Roman Catholic Pontiff was not their followers, but another conservative leader, President George W. Bush.	因为这次穆斯林国王和罗马天主教教宗会见的主要观众并非其追随者，而是另一位保守派领导人布什总统。


The first “Holy Alliance” was a creation of Austria’s Prince Metternich following the Napoleonic wars.	史上第一个“神圣联盟”是奥地利王子梅特涅在拿破仑战争之后建立的。


It was an attempt to preserve the peace (and the security of the relatively weak Austrian Empire) through a coalition of victors upholding shared values.	它意在通过坚持共同价值观的战胜者联盟维持和平(以及相对脆弱的奥地利帝国的安全) 。


Metternich’s “Holy Alliance” was the one original political idea to emerge from Napoleon’s defeat.	梅特涅的“神圣联盟”是发源于拿破仑战败的具有创意的政治观点。


Behind its exalted name lay an innovation of great diplomatic significance: the introduction of an element of calculated moral restraint into international relations.	在其崇高的名分之后是一个具有巨大外交意义的创新，也就是把经过算计的道德限制因素引入国际政治之中。


The vested interests that the Alliance members – Austria, Prussia, and Russia – had in the survival of their domestic institutions led each to seek to avoid conflicts that, in the past, they would have pursued as a matter of course.	其联盟成员奥地利、普鲁士和俄国在各自国内机制的生存上具有既得利益，从而引导它们寻求避免冲突。 在过去，这些国家将会理所当然地进行冲突。


Metternich’s system worked through much of the nineteenth century, because it protected a genuine balance of power between countries that shared common values.	梅特涅的体系在十九世纪的大部分都奏效，因为它保护了具有共同价值观国家间的实在的力量平衡。


But what “common values” do King, Pope, and American President share?	但是，沙特国王、教皇以及美国总统之间有什么“共同价值观”呢？


That such a meeting took place is a sign that both Pope and King believed that there was something to achieve.	这一会见本身就表明教皇和国王都相信应当有所作为。


Indeed, Abdullah, who believes himself to be the paramount leader of the Muslim world, is the first Saudi king to initiate a meeting with a leader of the Christian faith.	实际上，阿卜杜拉国王相信他自己是穆斯林世界的最高领导人，是第一位提议会见基督教领导人的沙特国王。


The two men met, seemingly as equals, not to express the common values of conservatism, but to confirm and promote their authority to uphold traditional values.	二人的会见看起来平起平坐，并不表达共同的保守主义价值观，而是确认并且促进其坚持传统价值观的权威。


Both agreed that reform must be slow, cautious and that it must never undermine established institutions, especially religion and the patriarchal family.	二人同意改革必须缓慢谨慎，并且不得破坏固有机制，特别是宗教和族长家族。


Abdullah sought the meeting because he believes that the world since 2001 has divided the fraternity of conservatives.	阿卜杜拉想要见面，是因为他相信2001年以来的世界分裂了保守派的团结。


Until then, he and Bush shared a common worldview, emphasizing the importance of religion, the traditional family (as both countries understood it), social discipline, and the state’s role in supporting these institutions.	在此之前，他和布什具有共同的世界观，强调宗教的重要性、传统家庭(正如两国所理解的那般)、社会纪律以及国家在支持这些机制上发挥的作用。


But Bush, following the terrorist attacks of 2001, turned his back on conservatism.  He sought to radically reinvent the Middle East, not only by overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, but also through his strident calls for democratization.	但是，布什自2001年恐怖袭击以来背离了保守主义。 他寻求改造中东，其途径不仅是推翻阿富汗的塔利班政权和伊拉克的萨达姆政权，而且还高声呼吁民主化。


American radicalism, however, resulted in increasing tensions between religious communities in the Middle East, and the rise of radical Iran with its bid for regional hegemony.	但是，美国的极端主义造成中东宗教社区之间的紧张升级，极端主义的伊朗崛起争取地区霸权。


Since 2001, Christian minorities have been targeted throughout the region, including even Lebanon’s Maronite Christian community.	从2001年以来，整个中东地区的基督教少数派都称为攻击目标，甚至包括黎巴嫩的马龙派社区。


And in Iraq, Sunni Muslims feel under siege from the country’s majority and now ruling Shia.	而在伊拉克，逊尼派穆斯林感觉受到该国占据统治地位的多数派什叶派的围攻。


Here is where the Holy Alliance concept of moral restraint comes in.	在这一背景下，要求道德限制的神圣联盟应运而生。


Abdullah, perhaps earlier than most others, understood that some code of restraint was needed if the entire region was not to descend into a war of all against all.	阿卜杜拉可能比大多数其他人更早地理解，为了不让整个中东地区陷于混战，就需要有某种限制准则。


Moreover, Abdullah understands that his wobbly regime will only be able to withstand the radical gales that are now blowing if it can forge the type of stability-seeking alliance that Metternich built.	而且，阿卜杜拉理解，其摇摇欲坠的政权如果能够建立起梅特涅建立的寻求稳定的联盟才能够抵御极端主义狂风大作。


The King, like Metternich and the Austrian Kaisers, understands de Tocqueville’s dictum that the most dangerous moment for a regime is when it starts to reform.	阿卜杜拉国王和梅特涅和奥地利皇帝们一样理解托克维克的理论，也就是政权最为危险的时刻是其开始改革之际。


Having begun, ever so carefully, to politically open his country, the King knows that he needs regional peace and a lowering of Islamic holy rage.	阿卜杜拉国王极为谨慎地开始在政治上开放，他知道他需要地区和平和减少伊斯兰神圣愤怒。


The problem is that Abdullah cannot rely on his domestic conservative allies to give him the time that the Kingdom needs.	问题是，阿卜杜拉无法依靠其国内的保守派盟友来给他王国所需要的时间。


The Wahhabi religious establishment, the Saudi state’s hidden co-rulers, could very well obstruct Abdullah’s attempts at regional religious reconciliation.	瓦哈比宗教机构是沙特国家的幕后共同统治者，很有可能破坏其地区宗教和解的企图。


Members of the religious police remain adamant that the country’s Christian guests must continue to live according to strict Wahhabi rules of behavior.	宗教警察成员坚持该国的基督教客人必须继续遵守严格的瓦哈比行为规范。


While the Wahhabis could yet be bribed again with oil money, the sect’s power-hungry judges eagerly await the next beheading, stoning, or lashing in Riyadh’s public square.	瓦哈比还是可以通过石油美元加以贿赂，这一教派追逐权力的法官们急迫地在利雅德的公共广场上等待下一个的斩首、乱石击死或者鞭击。


Thus, uniting the forces of status quo conservatism, even if some of those conservatives are Christian, is the only viable diplomatic strategy open to Saudi Arabia.	如此，联合现在的保守派力量就成为沙特唯一可行的外交战略，即使这些保守派的某些人是基督教派。


For conservative rulers usually fall when they fail to grasp their own vulnerability, especially when the revolutionary challenge is cloaked in conservative garb.	保守派统治者未能控制其自身弱点、特别是革命性的挑战以保守派的外衣包裹的时候就会倒台。


After all, few political systems can defend against those, like Saudi Arabia’s Islamic radicals, who claim that they can preserve the system and its religious values more effectively than the current rulers.	毕竟，很少有政治制度可以抵御这些，就像沙特的伊斯兰极端主义者那样。 他们宣称他们可以比当前的统治着更为有效地维持这一制度及其宗教价值。


Only an alliance of conservative leaders and powers (including a retreat by America from diplomatic radicalism), Abdullah believes, can restore some stability to the Middle East.	阿卜杜拉相信，只有保守派领导人和强国(包括美国从外交极端主义后撤)的联盟才能够在中东恢复某种稳定。


A Glimmer of Hope in Iran	伊朗的一线希望


BERLIN – No one could have reckoned with Hassan Rowhani’s victory in Iran’s presidential election.	柏林——哈桑·鲁哈尼在伊朗总统选举中获胜出乎所有人的预料。


Even Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was probably more than a little surprised by Rowhani’s first-round victory, following a campaign that began with eight candidates.	在八人参与的激烈竞选中，就连最高领袖哈梅内伊可能也对鲁哈尼的首轮获胜吃惊不小。


As a result, the negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, as well as the civil war in Syria, may well take on a new dynamic.	于是与伊朗的核计划及叙利亚内战谈判很有可能出现新的动态。


But that is how it is in the Middle East: you never know what lies around the corner.	但中东局势就是如此：你永远不知道接下来会发生什么。


This year marks the tenth anniversary of the launch, at the foreign-minister level, of negotiations between Iran and the European triumvirate of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom on Iran’s nuclear program.	今年是伊朗和德、法、英这欧洲三驾马车就伊朗核计划启动外长级谈判的十周年纪念日。


I was there, representing Germany; so was Rowhani, who led the Iranian delegation.	当时我代表德国见证了这一历史时刻，鲁哈尼则率领伊朗代表团参加。


The talks have continued until today – in an expanded format that includes Germany and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (the P5+1) – without any tangible results.	德国和联合国安理会五大常任理事国与伊朗的扩大会谈直到今天仍在继续，但没有取得任何切实成果。


Now Rowhani returns to the risky business of Iran’s nuclear program, though this time as President.	如今鲁哈尼重新面对伊朗的高风险核计划，只不过这次身份换成了总统。


What can we – and he – expect?	我们——和他应该抱有怎样的期望？


Based on my personal experience, Rowhani is a polite and open character.	根据个人经验，鲁哈尼的性格特点是礼貌而开放。


Unlike outgoing President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, he surrounds himself with very skillful and experienced diplomats.	不同于卸任总统马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪 - 内贾德，他身边从不缺少以技巧和经验见长的外交家。


But there should be no doubt that he is a man of the regime – a realist and moderate member of the Islamic Republic’s political elite – not a representative of the opposition.	但他与政府同仇敌忾应当没有疑问，他是现实而温和的伊斯兰共和国政治精英——而不是反对派代表。


And, of course, he backs Iran’s nuclear program.	而且毋庸置疑，他对伊朗核计划持支持态度。


If Rowhani wants to succeed in office, he will have to keep his promise to improve Iranians’ living conditions without endangering the Islamic Republic in the process.	要想在任内获得成功，鲁哈尼必须在不威胁伊斯兰共和国的情况下兑现改善伊朗人生活水平的承诺。


That will not be easy; in fact, it could amount to trying to square a circle.	做到这一点绝非易事，实际是一项不可能完成的任务。


The economic improvement that voters demanded in electing Rowhani can almost certainly be achieved only if Western and international sanctions are lifted.	鲁哈尼当选时选民要求的经济改善几乎肯定只有在解除西方和国际制裁的前提下才能实现。


But an end to international sanctions presupposes a breakthrough in the nuclear negotiations.	但结束国际制裁的前提是在核谈判中取得突破。


It may also presuppose at least a temporary settlement of the main regional conflicts.	经济发展还需要至少暂时解决主要地区冲突。


The Middle East has changed dramatically in the last ten years.	过去十年中东地区发生了巨大的变化。


America has reduced its involvement, having withdrawn its troops from Iraq and winding down its engagement in Afghanistan by next year.	从伊拉克撤军和明年撤离阿富汗使美国的力量有所削弱。


At the same time, we are witnessing the dissolution of the old Middle East created by France and Britain after World War I, when Europe’s two great colonial powers created territorial mandates in Palestine, Syria (including present-day Lebanon), Transjordan, and Iraq.	同时，我们正在见证一战后英法缔造的中东格局的土崩瓦解，当时欧洲这两大殖民强国在巴勒斯坦、叙利亚（包括今天的黎巴嫩）、约旦河外和伊拉克都凭空创造出领土要求。


A new regional order is not yet discernible, which points to a future fraught with risk and possible chaos.	新的地区秩序尚未形成，我们面对着充满危险和混乱的未来。


As Iran seeks to assert its influence and interests, as well as those of its Shia allies, its dispute with the Security Council over its nuclear program has become closely tied to its regional ambitions.	随着伊朗试图维护自身及什叶派盟友的影响和利益，它与安理会的核争端已经和它的区域野心紧密挂钩。


After all, the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran would most likely exacerbate violent conflict and a nuclear arms race in the region.	归根结底，伊朗的核前景极有可能加剧地区核军备竞赛和暴力冲突。


As a result, both issues may well have to be addressed successfully prior to any move to lift the sanctions.	因此，这两个问题必须在解除制裁前成功地解决掉。


Iran and its international interlocutors should learn from the past and manage expectations accordingly.	伊朗及其国际对话方应当汲取以往的教训，恰当地预期有可能取得的成果。


There will not be any quick solutions (if, indeed, there are any solutions at all), given the parties’ diametrically opposed interests, their respective domestic and alliance-related obstacles, and a profound lack of trust on all sides.	鉴于当事各方利益截然相反、各有各的国内及联盟阻力及各方信任严重缺失，对话不可能很快达成协议（甚至根本达不成协议）。


Moreover, aside from negotiating with the P5+1, Iran would be well advised to launch direct negotiations with the United States.	此外，除了与P5+1谈判外，直接和美国谈判对伊朗而言是很好的选择。


It will also most likely have to improve its relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, and change its behavior toward Israel, if a positive result is to be achieved.	要想取得积极成果，伊朗很可能要与沙特和海湾国家改善关系，并改变对以色列的态度。


Similarly, the West will have to understand that the Islamic Republic is not a monolithic dictatorship.	同样，西方国家必须理解伊斯兰共和国并非铁板一块。


The regime has multiple coexisting power centers, which influence and limit each other’s decisions.	伊朗政府多权力中心并存，在决策过程中相互牵制影响。


The office of the president is just one power center.	总统办公室仅仅其中之一。


The same applies to the Supreme Leader, who, despite his title, is not an absolute ruler.	最高领袖也同样如此，虽然拥有貌似绝对的头衔，但绝对统治权并不掌握在他的手上。


Iran has tried two political approaches in the last ten years: a reformist model, under President Mohamed Khatami, and hardline radicalism, under Ahmadinejad.	过去十年伊朗尝试了两条政治道路：穆罕默德·哈塔米总统的改革模式，以及内贾德统治下的强硬激进主义。


Both approaches failed.	这两条道路都走向了失败。


The reformers could not overcome conservative opposition, while the radicals could not defeat the domestic economic realities wrought by their foreign and nuclear policies.	改革者无法战胜保守反对派，而激进份子则无法战胜其外交及核政策所造成的国内经济现实。


Rowhani must seek a path that does not cost him the support of the majority of the regime’s power centers, yet that also allows him to fulfill the mandate he received from voters.	鲁哈尼必须争取多数权力中心的支持，同时还要完成选民赋予的任务。


At home, too, massive distrust will further complicate an inherently difficult task.	在伊朗国内，无所不在的信任缺失将使本已艰巨的任务变得更加错综复杂。


In America and the West, many will probably regard Rowhani as the friendly face of the Islamic Republic, whereas Ahmadinejad was its true – because more radical – embodiment.	美国和西方很多人将鲁哈尼视为伊斯兰共和国的温和派，因为艾哈迈迪内贾德更加激进而把他视作伊朗人的本来面目。


Many Iranians, in turn, regard Obama as the friendly face of a US that still seeks regime change in their country, whereas his predecessor, George W. Bush, was America’s more honest – because more radical – representative.	反过来，很多伊朗人把奥巴马视为力争颠覆伊朗政权的美国温和派，而将其前任乔治·W·布什视为美国最诚实、也最激进的代表人物。


Both perceptions distort reality, though both contain a kernel of truth.	这两种看法都歪曲了事实，但又都包含有现实的因素。


Despite these perceptions – or perhaps precisely because of them – Rowhani’s presidency offers an unexpected opportunity for both the nuclear negotiations and a political solution in Syria.	尽管上述印象不尽准确——也许恰恰因为不准确，鲁哈尼政府为核谈判和政治解决叙利亚问题提供了一个意想不到的机会。


Iran’s participation in an international peace conference is an absolute necessity, if only to test Rowhani’s seriousness.	就算仅仅为了测试鲁哈尼的重视程度，伊朗也必须出席国家和平会议。


During the Afghanistan conference in Bonn in 2001, Iran behaved in a pragmatic, results-oriented way – an approach that went completely unrewarded by the US.	2001年波恩阿富汗会议期间，伊朗采取了注重实效的务实的做法，而当时伊朗这种做法没有得到美国的任何回报。


As for the nuclear negotiations, the P5+1 will focus on objective guarantees that leave Iran no path toward military use of its nuclear capabilities.	至于核谈判，P5+1需要重点保证从客观上堵死伊朗军事利用核能的所有道路。


For Iran, the focal point of its efforts will be recognition of its right to civilian use of nuclear energy, in keeping with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its protocols.	而伊朗的重点则应是在遵守《不扩散协议》及其议定书规则的前提下，争取国际社会认可其和平利用核能的权利。


Both issues sound simpler than they are: the devil is in the details, and the details leave ample scope for disagreement over the definition, monitoring, and enforcement of terms.	这两个问题听起来都比实际简单：细节决定成败，而谈判中有足够的空间就条款的定义、监管和执行讨价还价。


Again, maintaining realistic expectations must be paramount.	需要再次强调重要的是设定现实的期望。


A successful outcome in the nuclear negotiations and resolution or even containment of the main regional conflicts will be difficult to achieve.	成功达成核谈判协议甚至成功控制主要地区冲突都是艰巨的任务。


But it would be the height of irresponsibility not to seize the unexpected opportunity created by Rowhani’s election with all the strength, good faith, and creativity we can muster.	但不以全部的力量、真诚和创造力抓住鲁哈尼当选这个意料之外的机会将是高度的不负责任。


A Second Chance for European Reform	欧洲改革的第二次机会


MUNICH – The European Central Bank has managed to calm the markets with its promise of unlimited purchases of eurozone government bonds, because it effectively assured bondholders that the taxpayers and pensioners of the eurozone’s still-sound economies would, if necessary, shoulder the repayment burden.	慕尼黑—欧洲央行用其无限制买入欧元区政府债券的承诺稳定了市场，因为这一承诺实际上是向债权人保证，欧元区依然坚挺的国家的纳税人和退休金领取者会在必要时承担偿债负担。


Although the ECB left open how this would be carried out, its commitment whetted investors’ appetite, reduced interest-rate spreads in the eurozone, and made it possible to reduce the funding of crisis-stricken economies through the printing press (Target credit).	尽管欧洲央行对于如何实施购买计划并未提及，但其承诺已足够刺激投资者的胃口，降低欧元区内部利差，并且使通过印钞（Target信用）降低受危机侵袭国家资金负担成为了可能。


This respite offers an ideal opportunity to push forward with reforms.	暂时缓和为推进改革提供了理想良机。


Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras must convince his countrymen that he is serious about implementing them.	希腊总理萨马拉斯必须让希腊人民相信，他实施改革的意图是严肃的。


Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy and Portuguese Finance Minister Vitor Gaspar deserve more support for their plans.	西班牙首相拉霍伊和葡萄牙财政部长加斯帕（Vitor Gaspar）的计划应该获得更大支持。


And one can only hope that Italy’s caretaker prime minister, Mario Monti, contests the next general election.	我们还应该希望意大利看守总理蒙蒂参与下一轮大选。


All of these leaders understand what must be done.	这些领导人知道必须做什么。


France, by contrast, does not appear to have noticed the writing on the wall.	相反，法国还没有注意到不祥之兆。


President François Hollande wants to solve his country’s problems with growth programs.	总统奥朗德希望用增长计划解决法国的问题。


But when politicians say “growth,” they mean “borrowing.”	但当政客说“增长”时，他们的实际意思是“借钱”。


That is the last thing that France needs.	而这是法国最不需要做的事情。


France’s debt/GDP ratio is already around 90%; even if its 2013 budget deficit does not exceed 3.5% of GDP, its debt/GDP ratio will have climbed to 93% by the end of the year.	法国的债务/GDP比率已经高达90%左右，即使其2013年预算赤字不超过3. 5%的GDP，其债务/GDP比率也会在当年年末升至93%。


The government’s GDP share, at 56%, is the highest in the eurozone and second highest among all developed countries.	政府的GDP比重56%为欧元区最高，在所有发达国家中名列第二。


It is not only film actors like Gérard Depardieu who are leaving the country to escape its high taxes; industry is fleeing as well.	不但像德帕迪约这样的影星移居国外躲避高税收； 产业界也有这样的感觉。


France’s once-proud carmakers are fighting for survival.	法国曾经引以为豪的汽车公司正在为生存挣扎。


Indeed, France’s manufacturing industry has shrunk to barely 9% of GDP, less than Britain’s manufacturing share (10%) and less than half of Germany’s (20%).	事实上，法国制造业占GDP比重已经下滑到9%，低于英国（10%），更是不及德国（20%）的一半。


Its current account is sliding into an ever-deeper deficit hole.	法国经常项目正在向更深的赤字黑洞滑落。


Unemployment is rising to record levels.	失业率也在创造历史记录。


France’s basic problem, like that of the countries most affected by the crisis, is that the wave of cheap credit that the euro’s introduction made possible fueled an inflationary bubble that robbed it of its competitiveness.	与受危机影响最重的国家相同，法国的基本问题是欧元诞生所带来的廉价信贷催生了通胀性泡沫，从而破坏了其竞争力。


Goldman Sachs has calculated that France must become 20% cheaper to service its debt on a sustainable basis.	高盛计算，法国必须降价20%才能可持续地维持债务。


The same is true of Spain, while Italy would have to become 10-15% cheaper and Greece and Portugal would need domestic prices to fall 30% and 35%, respectively.	西班牙也是如此，意大利需要降价10—15%，希腊和葡萄牙的国内物价分别需要下降30%和35%。


The OECD purchasing-power statistics paint a similar picture, with Greece needing to depreciate by 39% and Portugal by 32% just to reach the price level prevailing in Turkey.	经合组织购买力统计数字显示了相同的图景，希腊需要贬值39%，葡萄牙需要编制32%，才能达到土耳其的物价水平。


But, so far, virtually nothing has been done in this respect.	但是，到目前为止，在这方面几乎毫无进展。


Worse, some of the troubled countries’ inflation rates are still running higher than those of their trading partners.	更糟糕的是，一些受困经济体通胀率仍比贸易伙���更高。


Eurozone politicians tend to believe that it is possible to regain competitiveness by carrying out reforms, undertaking infrastructure projects, and improving productivity, but without reducing domestic prices.	欧元区政客总是相信通过实施改革、推出基础设施工程和改善生产率就可以重获竞争力，降低国内价格不是必须的。


That is a fallacy, because such steps improve competitiveness only in the same measure as they reduce domestic prices vis-à-vis eurozone competitors.	这是错的，因为这些措施之所以能改善竞争力，只是因为它们降低了相对于欧元区竞争者的国内价格。


There is no way around a reduction in relative domestic prices as long as these countries remain in the currency union: either they deflate, or their trading partners inflate faster.	只要这些国家留在欧元区，就无法降低相对国内价格：要么它们通缩，要么它们的贸易伙伴更快地通胀。


There is no easy or socially comfortable way to accomplish this.	要达到这一目标，没有轻松愉快的路可走。


In some cases, such a course can be so perilous that it should not be wished upon any society.	在某些情况下，这一目标的风险很大，甚至希望渺茫。


The gap is simply too large between what is needed to restore competitiveness and what citizens can stomach if they remain part of the monetary union.	重塑竞争力所需要做的和公民能够忍受的（在仍留在欧元的情况下）之间的差异太大了。


In order to become cheaper, a country’s inflation rate must stay below that of its competitors, but that can be accomplished only through an economic slump.	为了有序地贬值，一国的通货膨胀率必须低于其竞争者，但这只有通过经济衰退才能达到。


The more trade unions defend existing wage structures, and the lower productivity growth is, the longer the slump will be.	工会越是奋力维持现有工资结构，生产率增长就越低，衰退的时间也就越长。


Spain and France would need a ten-year slump, with annual inflation 2% lower than that of their competitors, to regain their competitiveness.	西班牙和法国将需要十年的衰退期，期间年通过膨胀率比竞争对手低2%，这样才能重获竞争力。


For Italy, the path toward competitiveness is shorter, but for Portugal and Greece it is substantially longer – perhaps too long.	对意大利来说，重获竞争力之路要短一些，但葡萄牙和希腊的道路就要长得多了——可能太长了。


Italy, France, and Spain should be able to regain competitiveness in the eurozone within a foreseeable period of time.	意大利、法国和西班牙应该能够在可预见的时间内重获欧元区内的竞争力。


After all, Germany cut its prices relative to its eurozone trading partners by 22% from 1995, when the euro was definitively announced, to 2008, when the global financial crisis erupted.	毕竟，从1995年（即明确宣布实施欧元计划之年）到2008年（全球金融危机爆发之年），德国相对其欧元区贸易伙伴价格降低了22%。


Ten years ago, Germany was like France is today – the sick man of Europe.	十年前，德国就像今天的法国，是欧洲病人。


It suffered from increasing unemployment and a lack of investment.	它经历了失业率的上升和投资不足。


Most of its savings were being invested abroad, and its domestic net investment share was among the lowest of all OECD countries.	大部分储蓄被投资于国外，国内净投资比例在经合组织国家中垫底。


Under growing pressure to act, Gerhard Schröder’s Social Democratic government decided in 2003 to deprive millions of Germans of their second-tier unemployment insurance, thus paving the way for the creation of a low-wage sector, in turn reducing the rate of inflation.	在增长压力下，施罗德的社会民主党政府在2003年决定取消数百万德国人的二等失业救济，从而扫清了形成低工资部门的道路，而这反过来又降低了通胀率。


Unfortunately, thus far, there is no sign that the crisis countries, above all France, are ready to bite the bullet.	不幸的是，到目前为止，危机国家——以法国为首——还没有任何迹象表明做好了咬紧牙关的准备。


The longer they cling to a belief in magic formulas, the longer the euro crisis will be with us.	它们对魔法程式抱有幻想的时间越长，欧元危机困扰它们的日子就越久。


A New Science	崭新的科学


An unusual meeting of scientists took place in Paris this summer, when scientists gathered to brainstorm about the need for a new science, one that could be as revolutionary as Einstein’s insights were a century ago.	今年夏天，一次不同寻常的科学家大会在巴黎召开，来自世界各地的科学家们汇聚一堂，共同探讨创立新科学的必要性，他们所讨论的新科学也许会像一个世纪前爱因斯坦的发现那样为人类带来革命性的突破。


Most scientists assume that the basics of science are known.	多数科学家认为基本的科学定律都已经为人类知晓。


In terms of big challenges, the conventional wisdom is that few things are left to discover.	而谈到大的挑战，传统的观念认为我们尚未发现的事物已经寥寥。


The remaining options are said to fall into three groups: “grand scientific quandaries” (such as uniting gravity and electricity into one theory) which require a huge investment and first world infrastructure; “data collection,” which is the field work associated with archeological digs and biological/genetic surveys; and “science-informed problems,” such as combating AIDS or addressing global warming.	仅剩的问题可以分为三类：“重要的科学难题”（比如重力学和电学的统一），这类研究不仅需要巨大的投资，也离不开一流的科研设备； “资料收集”，是与考古发掘和生物/基因调查相关的实际工作；


Beyond that, many believe the only hard work will be to use existing laws to benefit humankind in new technological ways.	除此之外，很多人认为如何利用现有法则使人类从全新的技术中获益是目前仅剩的艰苦工作。


Who can argue?	谁能提出不同意见呢？


After all, today’s models work.	归根结底，今天的模式是成功的。


But an emerging group of scientists points to phenomena that current theories do not address well.	但有的科学家开始指出现有的理论无法完全解释某些现象。


These problems are exceedingly common and artfully avoided because the science that would account for them just doesn’t exist.	这些问题其实极为普遍，人们只要碰到总是会巧妙地避开，因为能够解释它们的科学根本就不存在。


This missing science would describe processes, and how entire systems evolve.	这种缺失的科学法则是用来描述过程，以及整个系统如何演化。


Individual scientific disciplines are understood fairly well.	我们对单一学科都有了非常深入的了解。


Physics, at least the physics we encounter as ordinary humans, is well mapped.	比如物理，至少是我们普通人能够用到的物理，已经建起了完整的构架。


Chemistry and biochemistry are similarly solid -- there are some things we don’t understand about the body, but it is believed that the basic machinery of how cells and molecules interact is known.	化学和生物化学同样拥有坚实的基础¾虽然人体内还有我们未知的领域，但普遍的看法是我们已经掌握了细胞和分子反应的基本方法。


Slightly apart from these are the new social sciences, which deal with humans and societies.	稍微远一点的还有新的社会科学，人和社会是这门学科的研究领域。


In each of these areas -- physics, biochemistry and social science -- the theories are mature and largely uncontroversial.	在物理、生物化学和社会科学的任何一个领域，理论构架都已经比较成熟，也不存在太多的疑义。


Each discipline has its own language and its own separate machinery.	各学科都有自己的表达方式和学科机制。


Rarely is a scientist an expert in more than one area, because the worlds and languages are so different.	很少有科学家通晓多种领域，因为不同领域和表达方法都迥然不同。


This means that we can’t answer complex questions that depend on more than one field. Consider the brain, for example.	这就意味着我们无法对跨学科的问题做出回答。


This complex organ is composed of molecules that interact using the principles of physics. That information moves according to the laws of electricity.	就比如大脑，这个复杂器官是由按照物理定律相互作用的分子所构成的，而信息的传递则遵循电学的定律。


There is also a system of specialized cells, and these interact, exchanging chemicals that also convey information.	此外还有专用细胞体系，这些相互反应、相互交流的化学物质也承担着信息传递的任务。


The interaction between two brains adds another level: here, information is exchanged by means of languages, signs and ideas.	大脑之间的交互又增加了一个崭新的领域：在这里，信息通过语言、符号和思想进行传播。


Information is at work on each level and comfortable theories explain how the separate ones operate.	我们在每个层面上都掌握了非常丰富的信息，有相当完善的理论对各个层面做出解释。


But information is being exchanged between the levels as well.	但信息也在不同层面上得以传递。


There is no science that explains this, even at the most rudimentary level.	即便在最根本的领域，也没有任何科学能对此做出解释。


To cope with this deficiency, some scientists have tried to reinvent the tools of one level in order to apply them to another.	为了解决这个问题，有些科学家曾尝试将某个层面的理论进行重组，然后再应用到其它的领域。


This leads to such things as a “language” at the level of cells and “energy” behind organized societies.	于是细胞层面的“语言”和有组织社会背后的“能量”等术语就应运而生。


Sometimes the transplant works well enough, but it does not address the central problem: What is the nature of the information conveyed between each level, and how is it conveyed?	有些时候这种移植能够成功，但却解决不了核心的问题：能够在不同层次间传递的信息有哪些特性，它们又是如何进行传递的？


As it happens, nearly every system in the world is composed of such layers.	其实，世界上几乎所有的系统都有着不同的层面。


A similarly embarrassing lack of understanding about how the whole system works exists in every case.	因此在任何情况下，对整个系统的运作方式都存在着理解上的匮乏。


The group of interdisciplinary scientists that met in Paris is loosely affiliated under the banner “Foundations of Information Science.”	汇聚巴黎的跨学科科学家以“信息科学基金会”的名义松散地组织在一起。


They have been working in a distributed collaboration for eight years and come from a range of countries and specialties.	他们已经有过长达8年的分工合作，来自五湖四海和不同的专业。


As well as scientists from the relevant disciplines, art theorists, psychiatrists, language experts and philosophers are beginning to participate in the discussion.	和相关专业的科学家一样，艺术理论家、精神病专家、语言专家和哲学家们也开始加入到讨论中来。


Most of the group is banking on the “transplant” strategy, in which the basic science of one layer is placed in another, tweaked and supplemented in order to be functional.	大多数团体对“移植”策略寄与厚望，也就是将某个层面的基础科学移植到其它领域，同时进行调整或补充，以便能够发挥作用。


Others think that a whole new approach is required.	其它人则认为必须找到全新的方法。


They assume that many scientific conventions are accidents of history and new abstractions can be devised.	他们认为很多科学定理都是历史的巧合，可以有全新的提炼方式。


If the FIS group is lucky, there will also be some radical input from thinkers that do not presently have access to first world infrastructure.	如果信息科学基金会更加幸运，将会有目前无缘使用一流研究设备的思想家提出全新的想法。


Independent thinking is an underestimated factor.	独立思考的作用常常被低估。


Nearly all the activities collected under the banner of “science” have developed institutional tendencies that are similar to their economic counterparts.	几乎所有汇聚到“科学”大旗下的活动都与相应的经济活动存在着制度上的趋同。


It is usually assumed that developing economies need to build resources that emulate those in the developed world, but this could actually stifle the most creative thinking.	很多人认为发展中国家需要模仿发达国家的模式进行资源重组，但这样做可能会压制最富创造力的想象。


Many scientific disciples are going through a revolution, and a lot of those ideas -- sometimes revolutionary ideas -- are bubbling up from labs and research centers that are unaffiliated with large institutions.	很多信奉科学的人都在经历着一场革命，很多这样的想法，有时甚至是革命性的想法，正在从未与大型机构挂钩的实验室和研究中心蒸腾而出。


Twenty years of the most advanced thinking for mathematical algorithms came from a Soviet empire starved of computing power.	近20年来，数学运算方面最先进的思想全部来自根本没有计算能力的苏维埃帝国。


The cleverest, most literally earth-shattering notions of physics for two generations came not from the expected powerhouses of the day, but from Budapest.	近两代人最有智慧和冲击力的物理观念并非来自当今被寄与厚望的动力机构，而是布达佩斯的研究成果。


Iran has a tradition of architectural design that has revealed key insights to cognitive scientists.	伊朗从古至今就有着建筑设计的传统，带来过认知科学的重大发现。


Today, some of the most radical new ideas in second generation artificial intelligence (so-called “autonomous agents”) are incubating in Prague.	即便今天，第二代人工智能的最新思想（所谓的“自治代理”）仍然在布拉格进行孵化。


The most creative breakthroughs became famous events.	最富创造力的突破往往会一举成名。


When Einstein added new abstractions to the language of physics, the identity of space and time changed.	爱因斯坦将新概念融入物理学科的时候，时空的概念发生了巨大的改变。


The FIS meeting in July was the unheralded beginning of an attempt to remodel the universe in such a way.	信息科学基金会7月的会议就是以这种方式重塑宇宙的开始，这种努力是旷古未有的。


The group identified the gaps that need explanation. They will expand their pool of thinkers to include scientists from necessarily innovative regions.	科学家们找到了需要解释的差距，他们将吸纳更多的思想家，包括来自必要创新领域的科学家。


Following this, they will identify which problems might be solved if this new science is developed. Or if you wish, discovered.	在此之后，他们会确定新的科学可能解决哪些现有问题，��带来哪些新的发现。


A New Sino-American Relationship?	一种全新的中美关系？


NEW YORK – The Strategic and Economic Dialogue between the United States and China has now ended with the establishment of a felicitous new atmosphere between the two countries. But how can this “love-in” be made concrete?	随着中美战略经济对话的结束，两国之间形成了一种全新的氛围，但 两国的“蜜月期”是否真的到来了么？


The most logical and potentially fruitful area of collaboration is climate change.	本次会谈达成的最具有成效的成果是在全球气候问题上。


Here, the two US government officials best equipped to lead are Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke.	在此议题上美方的两名官员分别是能源部长朱棣文和贸易部长骆家辉。


Chu is a former Berkeley and Stanford professor of physics and head of the Lawrence Berkeley National Lab, while Locke is a former Washington State governor and a long-time supporter of US-China commercial exchanges.	朱棣文原先是伯克利大学和斯坦福大学的物理学教授，劳伦斯·伯克利国家实验室主任。 而骆家辉是前华盛顿州州长，长期以来一直致力于中美贸易关系正常化。


Each packs the kind of soft, utilitarian powers of persuasion that Chinese leaders are most willing to embrace: academic degrees from prestigious universities, advanced scientific and technological knowledge, high office, and a Nobel Prize. (Chu is one of five ethnic Chinese to have won a Nobel, although no winner has yet come from the PRC, a fact that gnaws at Chinese pride.)	两人都带有务实柔性的外交气质，这也是中国领导人希望接触的人选：名校出身的学术背景，先进的科技知识，高阶的政府职位，以及诺贝尔奖得主（朱棣文是五名华裔的诺贝尔奖得主之一，然而令中方尴尬的是，这五名都不具有中国国籍，）


China’s press was abuzz over Chu and Locke, the first ethnic Chinese men to become US Cabinet Secretaries.	由于他们是首次担任美国内阁部长的华裔人士，中国媒体都在热炒此二人。


Most major Chinese papers ran Chu’s photo on the front page, with Beijing Business Today running a cautionary headline: “Don’t Mistake the Visiting American Ministers as Relatives!”	绝大多数的中国报纸都将朱棣文的照片放在头版头条，《北京商报》却表示谨慎的乐观,文章的标题为“别把美华裔部长来访当成走亲戚”，并且进一步地警告说：“似乎在不少人的心里，骆家辉、朱棣文首先是“华裔”、其次是“部长”、最后才是“美国的”。


The paper went on to warn that, “In their own hearts, we are afraid that Chu and Locke put their priorities in exactly the opposite order.”	不过在这两位心里，恐怕是恰恰相反的一种排序。 ”


When Chu gave speeches on energy and climate change at Tsinghua University, China’s most elite institution for science and engineering (where his parents had been students), and then at Tianjin University (where his grandfather was once President), he was received with enormous enthusiasm, overflow crowds, and standing ovations.	当朱棣文在清华大学和天津大学做了关于能源和气候变化的演讲，清华大学是中国理工科的最高学府，朱棣文父母的母校。 朱棣文的爷爷曾任天津大学的校长。


So, the Chinese ended up embracing Chu and Locke in contradictory ways: as high-ranking representatives of the US government and as compatriots with whom they share the common bond of Chinese-ness.	在这两所学校，他受到了热烈地欢迎，到处是拥挤的人群和长时间的掌声。 于是，中国人对他们有两种相互矛盾的认知：美国政府高级官员和同根同种的中国人。


Both Chu and Locke are aware that the US and China are now the world’s largest emitters of greenhouse gases, and that, if there is any hope of remedying global climate change, the two countries must quickly find a way to collaborate.	朱棣文和骆家辉深知，中美两国目前是世界上最大的温室气体排放国家。 如果要解决这个问题，两国必须找到一个合作的方法。


Chu emphasized this point in his Tsinghua University speech, calling the global climate situation “very disturbing,” and stressing that we were “all in it together.”	朱在清华的演讲中指出，目前的全球气候问题“非常严峻”，并强调说，我们必须联合起来。


“The developed world did make the problem…I admit that,” he acknowledged to his rapt audience. “But the developing world can make it much worse.”	“我承认，发达国家确实是问题的制造者，”他对台下全神贯注的听众说道，“不过，发展中国家会使得问题雪上加霜。


In announcing a new Sino-US joint research effort, Chu described clean energy as “one of the great opportunities of our time” for Sino-US cooperation, saying that by “working together, we can accomplish more than [by] acting alone.”	在关于中美联合研究项目中，朱将清洁能源说成“我们这个时代中美合作关系中最大的一个机会”，并且说“联合起来比各自为战的效果要好很多”。


Still, one is left wonder if this new collaborative bonhomie and ethnic bonding will prove strong enough to cut through not only the long history of distrustful interactions between the US and China, but also the destabilizing effects of China’s sudden economic rise?	但是，我们不仅要问，这种新型的友好合作关系是否足够牢固？ 能否化解两国长期以来的相互之间不信任，以及由于中国经济迅速崛起带来的新的不平衡？


For, although the US has drawn strength from the ideal of a “melting pot” – and President Barack Obama’s cabinet does represent a new high-water mark for diversity – Americans have often shown a xenophobic distrust of immigrants who have drawn too close to power.	虽然，美国一直受益于“大熔炉”（奥巴马总统的内阁确实代表了更广泛的族群背景）的文化背景，但美国主流社会一直对外来移民进入权力中心保持警惕。


Especially in the case of Chinese, fears of divided national loyalties and “fifth columns” have been strong.	特别是对华裔而言，一直有着“忠于哪个国家”和“第五纵队”的疑虑。


One need only recall the recent case of Wen Ho Lee, the Los Alamos National Laboratory scientist who was unjustly accused of spying, to be reminded of how yin and yang are America’s feelings about minority members in sensitive positions.	一个近期的例子就是“李文和案件”，他是洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室的科学家，曾经被无端指控为间谍。 这更加说明了美国社会的“阴阳”两面性以及在少数族裔问题上的敏感立场。


There is a second obstruction as well: the US Congress refuses to face up realistically to the climate challenge, because China, as a developing country, is not obliged to accept compulsory carbon limits.	还有第二个问题：美国国会拒绝接受气候变化的新提案，理由是作为发展中国家的中国没有履行碳排放量的限制；


Then, because the US refuses to take responsibility for its cumulative and per capita greenhouse-gas emissions – which are, respectively, roughly four and three times greater than China’s – the Chinese leadership refuses to make concessions.	由于美国政府拒绝接受人均及总排放量的限制，（这个限制分别约为限制中国水平的三到四倍。 ），中国政府也拒绝让步。


A standoff ensues, which is where we are now.	目前僵局还没有打破。


China recently demanded that the US reduce its emissions by 40% from its 1990 baseline levels and subsidize emission reduction efforts in China and other developing countries to the tune of .05-1% of America’s GDP.	中国近期要求美国将碳排放量减少1990年排放水平的40%的同时，利用美国0. 5-1%的GDP来资助中国以及其他发展中国家减排。


But the recently House-passed Waxman-Markey bill proposes that the US only cut emissions by 3.6% of 1990 baseline levels.	但近期美国众议院通过的《瓦克斯曼-马凯气候变化议案》仅仅要求美国减少1990年排放水平的3. 6%。


So it is still far from clear what will actually work to bring about an understanding between the US and China that produces real results.	所以说，目前说美中之间的相互理解并真正达成确实可行的协定还为时过早。


Moreover, with India poking Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in the eye over her climate-change entreaties, the world could easily see an even more unified and unyielding bloc emerge among developing countries.	再加上印度反对美国国务卿希拉里在气候变化问题上的立场，这更加说明发展中国家在此问题上的立场是相当一致团结。


The next moment to watch is Obama’s trip to China in November.	接下来就要看今年11月奥巴马总统的北京之行了。


Here, if all the expressions of good feeling cannot be made concrete, an incomparable opportunity to recast Sino-US relations around the issue of climate change will have been lost.	如果所有的友好氛围都不能落在实处，中美两国之间来之不易的大好局面将会荡然无存。


A New Start for Non-Proliferation	核不扩散的新起点


VIENNA – US President Barack Obama has injected fresh momentum into efforts – stalled for a decade – to bring about nuclear disarmament.	维也纳——美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马已经为中止了十年的核裁军的努力注入了新的动力。


He has committed himself to the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and acknowledges the link between nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament by the nuclear-weapon states.	他许下了一个关于没有核武器世界的诺言，并且承认核不扩散与核能源和平利用存在着关联。


Obama has pledged to revitalize the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.	奥巴马表示，他将令于1970年签订的核不扩散条约（NPT）恢复活力，这一条约旨在防止核武器的扩散。


The non-proliferation regime, of which the NPT is the cornerstone, is in disarray. The main problems are easily identified.	由核不扩散条约作为基石的核不扩散体制正陷入混乱，其中存在的主要问题显而易见。


First, the five main nuclear-weapon states have not taken seriously their NPT obligation to work for nuclear disarmament.	问题之一在于，五个主要的核武器拥有国并没有认真对待他们所承担的核不扩散条约中关于进行核裁军的义务。


Instead, they have insisted that nuclear weapons are essential for their security and continued to modernize their nuclear arsenals.	相反，它们坚称核武器对于其安全至关重要，并且仍在对其核武库进行现代化升级。


This naturally robs them of the moral authority to persuade others not to acquire nuclear weapons, which continue to be perceived as a source of power and influence, and an insurance policy against attack.	这自然使其失去了说服他国不要获取核武器的道义权威，而核武器依旧被人们视为权力与影响力的一大来源，同时也是防止遭受进攻的一种保险政策。


Second, as we have seen in the case of North Korea, there is nothing to stop countries that sign the Treaty from simply walking out after declaring that “extraordinary events” have jeopardized their supreme interests.	问题之二在于，正如我们在朝鲜案例中所看到的那样，没有能阻止住条约签字国在宣布“非常事件”已对其至高利益构成威胁后、从不扩散体制中一走了之的办法。


Third, the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is supposed to police the non-proliferation system, is shamefully underfunded.	问题之三在于，被认为是不扩散机制维护者的国际原子能机构正处于资金不足的耻辱境地。


When it comes to determining whether or not a country is conducting a covert nuclear weapons program, IAEA inspectors often have their hands tied, either because they lack the legal authority to gain access to all the locations they consider necessary, or because the IAEA’s analytical laboratories are outdated, or because the Agency does not have adequate access to satellite imagery.	当国际原子能机构在判定一国是否正在从事秘密核武器计划时，该机构检查人员常常感到力不从心，这或是因为他们缺乏进入被其认为是必须检查的场所的法律权威，或是因为国际原子能机构的分析实验室已经过时，又或是因为该机构无法获取充足的卫星图片。


Fourth, export controls have failed to prevent the spread of sensitive nuclear technology, not least due to the sophisticated efforts of clandestine networks like the one run by Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan.	问题之四在于，出口管制未能阻止敏感核技术的传播。 这一点尤其源于秘密核网络所采取的复杂而老练的努力，由巴基斯坦核科学家卡迪尔·汗运作的网络便为其中一例。


Nine countries already have nuclear weapons, and it would be naive to presume that others, particularly in regions of conflict, will not try to get hold of them.	已经有九个国家拥有核武器，而假定其他国家，尤其是那些身处冲突地区的国家，对于核武器没有非分之想，这真是过于天真了。


In addition, a number of countries with nuclear energy programs have the capability, if they choose, to manufacture nuclear weapons within a matter of months if their security perceptions change, because they have mastered the critical technology – uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.	此外，一批开展核能项目的国家还拥有这种能力：当它们的安全认知发生改变时，只要愿意，便能在短短数月内生产出核武器，这是因为它们已经掌握了临界技术——铀浓缩与钚的再处理。


If more countries take this path, it could prove to be the Achilles’ heel of non-proliferation.	如果更多的国家进行效仿，这个问题将被证明是核不扩散体制的阿喀琉斯之踵。


Fifth, the international community, spearheaded by the United Nations Security Council, has more often than not been paralyzed in the face of challenges to international security and ineffectual in responding to suspected cases of nuclear proliferation.	问题之五在于，以联合国安理会为首的国际社会往往在国际安全面临挑战的情况下陷入瘫痪，对于疑似的核扩散事件也无法做出有效的回应。


These issues will not be resolved overnight.	这些问题不可能在一夜之间得到解决，但有很多工作却可以相对较快地完成。


But there is much that can be done relatively quickly.	美俄已经开启谈判，以对两国占全球27000枚核弹头总量95%的核武库进行大规模削减。


The United States and Russia have started negotiations on deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals, which together account for 95% of the world’s 27,000 warheads.	其他一些关键步骤包括：令全面禁止核试验条约生效； 通过谈判制定出一份可被验证的条约，以停止用于武器目的的裂变材料的生产；


Other key steps include bringing into force the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; negotiating a verifiable treaty to end production of fissile material for use in weapons; radically improving the physical security of nuclear and radioactive materials, which is vital to prevent them from falling into the hands of terrorists; and strengthening the IAEA.	极大地改善核物质与放射性物质的物理安全，这对于防止它们落入恐怖分子之手非常重要； 同时还要对国际原子能机构加以强化。


Last month, I proposed a key measure to strengthen non-proliferation to the IAEA’s Board of Governors – establishing an IAEA bank of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to guarantee supplies to countries that need nuclear fuel for their power reactors.	上个月，我向国际原子能机构理事会提出了关于强化不扩散机制的关键措施的建议——即创立一家国际原子能机构低浓缩铀 (LEU)银行，以保证对那些需要核燃料来维持其核能反应堆运转的国家的供应。


LEU cannot be used to make weapons.	低浓缩铀无法被用来制造武器。


Some such mechanism will be essential in the coming decades as more and more countries introduce nuclear energy.	随着更多的国家引入核能，这一类机制将在未来的几十年中发挥关键的作用。


My proposal is to create a physical stockpile of LEU at the disposal of the IAEA as a last-resort reserve for countries with nuclear power programs that face a supply disruption for non-commercial reasons.	我提议创立一座处于国际原子能机构支配下的低浓缩铀实体储备库，它将作为那些拥有核能项目的国家在面对并非由商业因素造成的供应中断时，所能求助的终极储备。


This would give countries confidence that they can count on reliable supplies of fuel to run their nuclear power plants, and therefore do not need to develop their own uranium-enrichment or plutonium-reprocessing capability.	这一措施将令各国产生信心，使其相信可以依赖可靠的燃料供给来维持其核电站的运转，由此，它们不再需要发展本国的铀浓缩或钚再处理能力。


This could help to avoid a repeat of Iran’s experiences after its 1979 revolution, when contracts for fuel and technology for its planned nuclear power program were not honored.	这一措施将有助于避免伊朗在1979年革命后的经历重演，当时有关该国计划中的核能项目的燃料与技术合同未得到履行。


Thirty years later, some of the consequences are still being felt.	三十年后，我们仍然能感受到这一事件的部分后果。


The LEU would be available to countries in need on the basis of non-political and non-discriminatory criteria.	低浓缩铀将在非政治性、非歧视性标准的基础上，向那些存在需求的国家开放。


It would be accessible at market prices to all states in compliance with their nuclear safeguards obligations.	所有遵守核保障义务的国家都能按市场价格获得这些材料。


No state would be required to give up the right to develop its own fuel cycle.	各国将不会被要求放弃发展本国燃料循环技术的权利。


The money needed to launch an LEU bank is in place, thanks primarily to a non-governmental organization – the Nuclear Threat Initiative – and initial funding from Warren Buffett.	低浓缩铀银行所需的启动资金已经到位，这主要归功于非政府组织——“核威胁倡议”，以及来自沃伦·巴菲特的初步资助。


But this can only be a first step. It should be followed by an agreement that all new enrichment and reprocessing activities will be placed exclusively under multinational control, and that all existing such facilities will be converted from national to multinational control.	但这仅仅还只是第一步，接下来应当签署一份协议，使得所有新的浓缩与再处理活动将被完全置于多国管制之下，而所有现存类似设施的管制权也将由一国转移到多国手中。


This is a bold idea, but bold ideas are needed now more than ever.	这是一个大胆的想法，但在今日，我们比过去任何时候都更需要大胆的想法。


The opportunity to put the nuclear fuel cycle under multinational control was missed 60 years ago because of the Cold War.	60年前，由于冷战的关系，人类错失了将核燃料循环置于多国管制下的机会；


The spread of nuclear technology and the growing risk of nuclear terrorism make it imperative that we get it right this time.	如今，核技术的散播与核恐怖主义风险的不断增长使得我们必须在这一次将它导向正轨。


A New-State Solution for Israel and Palestine	以色列和巴勒斯坦的新建国方案


PRINCETON – Imagine a two-state solution in Israel and Palestine in which Palestinians would have the right of return; Israelis could settle wherever they could purchase land in the West Bank; and Jerusalem need not be divided.	普林斯顿—考虑在巴以问题上提出这样一个两国方案：巴勒斯坦人有权回到家园，以色列人可以在约旦河西岸任何买得到土地的地方定居，而耶路撒冷不需要一分为二。


This is not a fanciful vision, but a creative and eminently sensible reinvention of twenty-first century statehood.	这并不是一个理想方案，但具有创造力，堪称21世纪建国明智样板。


And US President Barack Obama’s just-completed visit to Israel provides an opportunity to explore genuinely new thinking.	美国总统奥巴马刚刚结束的以色列之行就提供了探索真正新思维的机会。


Ever since Bill Clinton nearly succeeded in brokering a comprehensive settlement in 2000, the mantra among supporters of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has been that, while a solution exists, Israeli and Palestinian leaders who are willing to reach it do not.	2000年，比尔·克林顿几乎成功地促成了全面和解，至此以后，以巴和平进程支持者一直受一个咒语的困扰：尽管存在解决方案，愿意向这个方向靠拢的以色列和巴勒斯坦领导人从未获得成功。 解决方案正是克林顿所追求的协议：基于1967年边界的两个主权国家，土地交换的谈判反应现有和解模式。


The solution is a version of the deal that Clinton sought: two sovereign states based on the 1967 borders, with negotiated land swaps to reflect existing settlement patterns.	这一安排包括一个联系加沙和约旦河西岸的陆上走廊； 将耶路撒冷一分为二，保证所有人都能前往宗教场所；


The agreement would include a land corridor connecting Gaza and the West Bank; a divided Jerusalem with guaranteed access for all to religious sites; Palestinians’ renunciation of the right of return; Israel’s willingness to dismantle settlements outside the agreed borders; and recognition of both states across the Middle East.	巴勒斯坦放弃回家的权利； 以色列愿意拆除一致边界外的定居点；


But suppose that the reason that no Palestinians and Israelis willing to conclude such a deal have emerged is that the solution itself is domestically unsupportable on both sides.	但是，考虑一下，巴勒斯坦人和以色列人之所以愿意达成这样一个方案，其原因是这一方案本身在双方内部都得不到支持。


Suppose that as long as a version of this deal is the only game in town, the creeping physical expansion of the Israeli state and the demographic expansion of Israeli Arabs will continue to erode its foundation.	考虑一下，只要这一方案的某个版本是唯一的方案，则以色列国的逐渐蚕食土地和以色列阿拉伯裔人口的不断增加将持续破坏其基础。


For all the dire warnings that the window for a two-state solution is rapidly closing (or has already closed), it is the solution itself that is the problem.	两国方案的窗口正在迅速关闭（获悉已经关闭），之所以有这样的警告，是因为这一方案本是就是问题。


In 2008, a Princeton University graduate student in philosophy named Russell Nieli gave a talk at the Princeton Center for Jewish Life that was so well received that he later expanded it into an article for the US-based magazine Tikkun, founded by Rabbi Michael Lerner.	2008年，普林斯顿一名名叫罗素·尼利（Russell Nieli）的哲学研究生在普林斯顿犹太生活中心（Princeton Center for Jewish Life）做了一次演讲，这次演讲广受好评，以至于他后来将内容扩展为刊登在美国杂志Tikkun上的一篇文章（该杂志创始人是勒纳拉比（Rabbi Michael Lerner））。


The article, “Toward a Permanent Palestinian/Israeli Peace – the Case for Two-State Condominialism,” was published with the express aim of stimulating “productive thinking among a younger generation of Jews and Arabs not bound by the restricted vision and failed policies of the past.”	这篇题为《通向永久巴以和平——两国安全套主义方案研究》（Toward a Permanent Palestinian/Israeli Peace – the Case for Two-State Condominialism）发表的目的是刺激“犹太人和阿拉伯人年青一代的创造性思维，不要深陷过去的短浅目光和失败政策之囹圄。 ”


“Two-state condominialism” is as visionary as the name is clunky.	 “两国安全套主义方案”的名字颇为不雅，但相当有远见。


The core idea is that Israelis and Palestinians would be citizens of two separate states and thus would identify with two separate political authorities.	其核心观点是以色列人和巴勒斯坦人将是两个独立国家的公民，从而属于两个独立的正值当局。


Palestine would be defined as a state of the Palestinian people, and Israel as a Jewish state.	巴勒斯坦将是巴勒斯坦人民的国家，以色列将是犹太人国家。


Under “condominialism,” however, both Palestinians and Jews “would be granted the right to settle anywhere within the territory of either of the two states, the two states thus forming a single, binational settlement community.”	但是，在“安全套主义”下，巴勒斯坦人和犹太人“将被赋予在两国任意土地上定居的权利，这两个国家将形成一个单一的双民族定居社会。 ”


Think about that for a minute.	花点时间想想这一点。


As Nieli describes it, Palestinians “would have the right to settle anywhere within Israel just as Jews would have the right to settle anywhere within the territory of the Palestinian state.	正如尼利所描述的，巴勒斯坦人“有权在以色列内部任何地方定居，正如犹太人有权在巴勒斯坦国领土内任何地方定居。


Regardless of which of the two states they lived in, all Palestinians would be citizens of the Palestinian state, all Jews citizens of Israel.”	不管他们生活在哪个国家，所有巴勒斯坦人都是巴勒斯坦国公民，所有犹太人都是以色列公民。


Each state would have the authority and the obligation to provide for the economic, cultural, religious, and welfare needs of its citizens living in the other state’s territory.	”每个国家都有政府和满足生活在另一个国家领土内的公民的经济、文化、宗教和福利需要的义务。


These would be extraterritorial rights and responsibilities, just as the United States, for example, provides for its large numbers of expatriates, such as civilian dependents of US military personnel based abroad.	这些是超越国界的权利和责任，正如（比如）美国要满足驻外人员（比如海外军事基地的平民家属）的这些需要。


To make this work, the borders of each state would first have to be defined – presumably on the basis of the 1967 borders, with mutually agreed territorial swaps.	为了要让这个方案奏效，首先必须定义每个国家的边界——或许是以1967年边界为基础辅以互相同意的领土交换。


Israeli Arabs would then be required to transfer their citizenship, national identity, and national voting rights – but not their residence – to the new Palestinian state.	以色列阿拉伯人将被要求将国籍、国民身份和投票权——但不包括敌据点——转换至新的巴勒斯坦国。


They would have a permanent right to live in Israel and would retain the benefits to which they are currently entitled as Israeli citizens, but they would now vote as citizens of Palestine.	他们将拥有永久居住在以色列的权利，保有目前以以色列公民身份获得的福利，但他们将以巴勒斯坦公民的身份参与投票。


All other Palestinians living in Israel would have rights and benefits only under Palestinian law.	其他居住在以色列的巴勒斯坦人将只获得巴勒斯坦法律规定的权利和福利。


Condominialism recognizes the reality of the deep interconnectedness of Israeli settlers in the West Bank with the rest of Israel – through roads, water supplies, electricity grids, administrative structures, and economic relationships (just as Israeli and Palestinian parts of Jerusalem are interdependent).	安全套主义承认约旦河西岸以色列定居者和其他以色列之间具有深刻联系的现实——包括公路、供水、电网、政府结构和经济关系等（正如耶路撒冷的以色列区和巴勒斯坦区互相联系一样）。


Instead of trying to separate and recreate all of these structures and relationships, it makes far more sense to build on them in ways that benefit both states’ peoples and economies.	与隔离和重建所有这些结构和关系相比，在此基础上以让两国人民和经济都受益的方式进行建设更加有效。


And, in a world in which many citizens spend an increasing proportion of their time in virtual space, de facto condominialism is already happening.	此外，在许多公民将越来越多的时间用于虚拟空间的世界中，安全套主义实际上已经发生了。


In the 1950’s, after four decades of war across Europe, the idea of a European Union in which member states’ citizens could live and work freely across national borders while retaining their political allegiance and cultural identity seemed equally far-fetched.	20世纪50年代，欧洲在经历了四十年战争蹂躏后，形成了欧盟的思想，成员国公民可以自由地跨国工作，同时保留政治忠诚和文化身份，这一思想同样意义深远。


(Indeed, the name of the political process by which the EU was to be constructed, “neo-functionalism,” was every bit as abstract and cumbersome as “two-state condominialism.”)	（事实上，欧盟建立的政治过程的名字，“新功能主义”（neo-functionalism）之抽象和繁琐与“两国安全套主义”如出一辙。


Yet French and German statesmen summoned the vision and the will to launch a bold experiment, one that has evolved into a single economy of 500 million people.	）但法国和德国政治家带着远见和决心开启了大胆的实验，一个包括了5亿人民币的单一经济体实验。


Why shouldn’t another site of ancient enmities be the source of a new conception of statehood?	为何另一个古老对立不能成为建国新概念源头？


Interestingly, many young people in the 1950’s, like my Belgian mother, ardently supported the vision of a new Europe.	有趣的是，20世纪50年代的很多年轻人，比如我的比利时母亲，热烈支持新欧洲的愿景。


Today’s young Israelis and Palestinians pride themselves on their entrepreneurialism, with all the risk and vision that starting something new entails.	今天的年轻以色列人和巴勒斯坦人以他们的创业主义而自豪，尽管开创新事业包含着各种新风险，需要各种远见卓识。


Supporting and contributing to an innovative political start-up would be their generation’s defining act.	支持并为创新政治开端做出贡献将是这一代人的标志性行为。


A New US Agenda for Latin America	美国的拉丁美洲新议程


MEXICO CITY – For the next American president, fixing the international mess inherited from the Bush administration will be no simple task.	墨西哥城－对下一任美国总统来说，处理布什政府遗留下来的国际混乱状态不是一个简单的任务。


While Latin America will not be a priority for either an Obama or McCain administration, continuing the United States’ neglect of the last seven years is no longer viable.	虽然拉丁美洲对不管是奥巴马政府还是麦凯恩政府来说，都不是首要任务，但是，美国政府继续过去七年来对拉丁美洲的忽略态度不再可行了。


Two distinct political/diplomatic challenges stand out: Cuba’s imminent transition or succession crisis, and the continuing ascent of the region’s “two lefts,” one represented by Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez and the other by Brazil’s increasingly influential President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.	拉丁美洲有两个明显的政治/外交挑战突显出来：古巴即将到来的转变或继承危机，该地区“两种左派”力量的持续上升，其中一种是由委内瑞拉总统雨果·查韦斯代表的左派，另一种是由巴西影响力不断增强的总统卢拉·达席尔瓦所代表的左派。


The next US administration will only prove successful if it grasps that Latin America is living through a moment that combines the best and worst aspects of its history: the fastest economic growth since the 1970’s, with poverty and inequality diminishing, and more democratic and respectful of human rights than ever before, but becoming more politically polarized.	如果下一届美国政府领会到拉丁美洲正在经历一个结合了其历史上最好和最坏的方面的时刻：20世纪70年代以来最快的经济增长速度，贫困和不平等在逐渐减少，比以前任何时候都更民主和尊重人权，但是也在政治上变得更两极化了，它一定会成功。


In Cuba, Fidel Castro’s eventual passing from the scene represents an immense challenge.	在古巴，菲德尔·卡斯特罗最终从历史舞台上的消失代表着一个巨大的挑战。


The US cannot continue with the failed policies of the past half-century.	美国不能再继续过去半个世纪失败的政策。


Demanding a full-fledged democratic transition as a pre-condition for normalizing US-Cuban relations is both unrealistic and unpalatable to Latin America.	美国要求以完全的民主转变作为美国和古巴关系正常化的前提，对拉丁美洲来说是既不切实际又不受欢迎的。


Yet the US cannot set aside the question of democracy and human rights in Cuba while it awaits the departure of Fidel’s brother, Raúl.	然而，在其等待着菲德尔的弟弟劳尔继续统治的时候，美国不可能将古巴的民主和人权问题置之不理。


Realpolitik and fear of another exodus of Cuban refugees across the Florida Straits may tempt the US to pursue a “Chinese” or “Vietnamese” solution to Cuba: normalizing diplomatic relations in exchange for economic reform, while leaving the question of internal political change until later.	现实政治和对另一大批古巴难民通过佛罗里达海峡涌入的担忧，可能会吸引美国对古巴使用“中国”或“越南”解决办法：用外交关系的正常化换取经济改革，同时将内部政治变革的问题留待以后解决。


But the US should not succumb to this temptation.	但是，美国不应该在这种诱惑面前让步。


The US, Canada, Europe, and Latin America have constructed a regional legal framework, which must not be abandoned, to defend democratic rule and human rights in the hemisphere.	美国、加拿大、欧洲以及拉丁美洲已经建立了一个区域法律体制来保护该半球的民主统治和人权，这一体制不应该被抛弃。


Cuba needs to return to the regional concert of powers, but it must accept this concert’s rules.	古巴需要回归到地区强国的圈子，但是它必须接受该圈子的规则。


Holding free and fair elections may not be the primary issue, but nor are they issues that should be shelved in the interests of stability and expediency.	进行自由和公平的选举可能不是最主要的问题，但是，它们也不应该为了稳定和私利而被搁置一边。


Elections must instead be part of a comprehensive process of normalization: they should neither be a deal-breaker nor a non-issue.	选举反而应该是全面关系正常化进程的一部分：它们既不应该是达成协议的障碍，也不应该是一个不是问题的问题。


While the US should lift its trade embargo as soon as Cuba’s transition begins, everything else should be conditional on Cuba initiating a process of resolving all outstanding issues.	在古巴的转变一旦开始美国就应该解除其贸易禁运的同时，其他所有事情也应该以古巴开始解决一切突出问题的进程为条件。


But Cuba is just part of what might be called Latin America’s “left” problem.	但是，古巴仅仅是可以被称作拉丁美洲“左派”问题的一部分。


Indeed, much has been written recently about the ascent of the left in Latin America over the past decade.	确实，最近已经有大量关于在过去十年里拉丁美洲左派势力增强的文章。


In fact, there are two lefts in the region: a modern, democratic, globalized and market-friendly left, found in Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, parts of Central America, and, up to a point, in Peru; and a retrograde, populist, authoritarian, statist, and anti-American left, found in Mexico, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Cuba, Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, and, to a lesser extent, in Argentina, Colombia, and Paraguay.	事实上，在该地区有两种左派：一种是智利、巴西、乌拉圭、中美洲的一部分国家以及某种程度上的秘鲁的现代的、民主的、全球化的以及对市场友好的左派； 另一种是墨西哥、萨尔瓦多、尼加拉瓜、古巴、厄瓜多尔、玻利维亚、委内瑞拉以及阿根廷、哥伦比亚以及巴拉圭的不那么强烈的倒退的、民粹主义的、独裁的、中央经济统治的以及反美的左派。