For Asian countries, the policy prescription is clear: take care of disadvantaged populations and provide retraining and new employment opportunities for displaced workers.	对亚洲国家来说，政策药方是明确的：顾及后进人口，为失业工人提供再培训和新就业机会。


Of course, all societies should look out for their poorest members and maximize social mobility, while also rewarding entrepreneurship and challenging people to improve their lot.	当然，所有社会都应该关注最贫困的成员、实现社会流动最大化，同时奖励企业家精神、谴责只顾改善自己生活的人。


But focusing on such policies would not address the public disaffection underlying the populist uprising, because inequality is not its root cause.	但专注于这些政策无法解决民粹主义反动背后的群众不满，因为不平等性不是根源。


Feelings of lost control are.	感觉失去控制才是。


Even if countries closed their domestic income and wealth gaps and ensured social mobility for all their citizens, the forces fueling public dissatisfaction around the world today would remain.	即使各国填补了国内收入和财富差距，并确保了全体公民的社会流动性，如今在全世界助长群众不满的力量仍不会消失。 以美国为例。


Consider the US, where the inequality narrative’s poster child has become the displaced, older, less-educated, white working-class male.	在美国，不平等性叙事的主角已经变成失业、年长、教育程度低下的白人工作阶级男性。


Many people credit these voters for Trump’s victory, but the poster-child cohort did not actually have the biggest impact on the election outcome.	许多人将特朗普的胜利归因于这些选民，但这一主角群体其实并不是对选举结果影响最大的。


According to exit polls, Trump won 53% of white male college graduates, and 52% of white women (only 43% of the latter group supported Clinton); he won 47% of white Americans between the ages of 18 and 29, compared to 43% for Clinton; and he beat Clinton by 48% to 45% among white college graduates overall.	据出口民调，特朗普赢得53%的白人大学毕业男性和52%的白人女性（后者中只有43%支持克林顿）； 他赢得47%的18—29岁美国白人，而克林顿为43%；


These Trump supporters do not fit the stereotype at the center of the economic narrative.	在全体白人大学毕业生方面，他也以48%对45%击败克林顿。 这些特朗普的支持者并不符合作为经济决定论核心的刻板印象。


Meanwhile, more than half of the 36% of Americans who earn less than $50,000 annually voted for Clinton, and of the remaining 64% of voters, 49% and 47% chose Trump and Clinton, respectively.	与此同时，在年收入不到50,000美元的36%的美国人中，超过一半投票给克林顿，在剩余64%选民中，选择特朗普和克林顿的比例分别为49%和47%。


Thus, the poor were more favorable toward Clinton, and the rich toward Trump.	因此，穷人更偏向于克林顿，而富人更偏向于特朗普。


Contrary to the popular narrative, Trump does not owe his victory to people who are most anxious about falling off the economic ladder.	与流行的叙事相反，特朗普的胜利不是来自最焦虑于在经济阶梯上下滑的人群。


A similar story unfolded in the UK’s Brexit vote, where the “Leave” campaign asserted that the EU’s supposedly burdensome regulations and exorbitant membership fees are holding back the British economy.	英国退欧投票也有类似情况。 “脱欧”阵营主张欧盟繁琐的监管和高昂的会费拖累了英国经济。


This hardly amounts to an agenda to fight economic inequality and exclusion, and it is revealing that rich businessmen wrote the largest checks to support Leave.	这显然不构成遏制经济不平等和经济排斥的日程，并且表明富裕的商人才是支持脱欧的主力军。


Moreover, the street-level emotions that contributed to Leave’s victory were not rooted in income inequality or “the 1%”: alienated poor voters directed their anger at other alienated poor people – particularly immigrants – not at the rich. The Mayor of London’s office reported a 64% increase in hate crimes in the six weeks after the referendum, compared to the six weeks before it.	此外，导致脱欧派胜利的街头情绪并非植根于收入不平等或“1%”：异化的穷人选民将愤怒导向了其他异化人群——特别是移民——而不是富人。


So, while income equality may have been a part of the Brexit campaign’s background noise, it was not the first issue on Leave voters’ minds.	伦敦市长办公室报告，与公投前六周相比，公投后六周仇恨犯罪增加了64%。


What unites Trump and Leave supporters is not anger at being excluded from the benefits of globalization, but rather a shared sense of unease that they no longer control their own destinies.	将特朗普和脱欧支持者联系在一起的不是因为被排斥在全球化收益之外所引起的愤怒，而是一种他们不再掌控自身命运的共同的焦虑。


Widening income inequality can add to this distress, but so can other factors, which explains why people at all levels of the income distribution are experiencing anxiety.	收入不平等性的加剧可能会加剧这种忧虑，但其他因素也可以，这就解释了为何收入分布的各层次都在经历焦虑。


Indeed, many people in Eastern Europe felt a sense of lost control during the harsh socialist experiments of the post-war era, as did many Chinese during the Cultural Revolution, and these societies had minimal visible income inequality.	事实上，许多东欧人在战后的残酷社会主义实验时期也有一种失控感，许多中国人在文化大革命时期亦然，而这些社会的收入不平等性可以忽略不计。


Paradoxically, Brexit and Trump supporters might be feeling the effects of globalization because overall inequality has actually declined.	矛盾的是，英国退欧和特朗普的支持者之所以感受到全球化的影响，原因可能是不平等性总体水平其实有所下降。


Globalization’s largest effect has been to lift hundreds of millions of people in emerging economies out of poverty.	全球化最大的效应是让新兴经济体的数亿人民摆脱了贫困。


Throughout the 1990s, emerging countries’ combined GDP (at market exchange rates) amounted to barely one-third of the G7 countries’ combined GDP.	20世纪90年代，新兴国家GDP之和（按市场汇率衡量）大约只有G7国家GDP之和的三分之一。


By 2016, that gap had essentially vanished.	到2016年，这一差距已经基本消失。


Low international income inequality, rather than growing income inequality in individual countries, is putting unprecedented stress on the global order.	较低的国际收入不平等性，而不是个体国家日益加剧的收入不平等性，正在给全球秩序造成前所未有的压力。


There is a growing mismatch between what Western countries can provide, and what emerging economies are demanding.	西方国家能够提供什么与新兴经济体正在要求什么之间的错配整越来越严重。


The power of the transatlantic axis that used to run the world is slipping away, and the sense of losing control is being felt by these countries’ political elites and ordinary citizens alike.	曾经主宰世界的跨大西洋轴心的力量正在消退，失控感被这些国家的精英和普通公民所感到。


Trump and the Leave campaign appealed to voters by raising the possibility that transatlantic powers can reassert control in a quickly changing world order.	特朗普和脱欧阵营吸引选民的方法是提出大西洋两岸的力量有可能在迅速变化的世界秩序中夺回控制。


But with the geopolitical rise of emerging economies, especially in Asia, that order will have to achieve a new equilibrium, or global instability will persist.	但随着新兴经济体的地缘政治崛起（特别是亚洲），世界秩序必须实现新的均衡，否则全球动荡就会一直持续下去。


Closing the income gap can help the poor; but, in the developed countries, it will not alleviate their anxiety.	填补收入差距有助于穷人； 但是，在发达国家，这无法缓和他们的焦虑。


Populism, Past and Present	民粹主义的过去和现在


MADRID – It seems that practically no Western democracy nowadays is immune to right-wing populism.	马德里——现在看来，几乎没有哪个西方民主国家能够对右翼民粹主义免疫。


While populist rhetoric seems to be reaching fever pitch, with far-reaching consequences – most notably the United Kingdom’s vote to “Brexit” the European Union – the reality is that the strain of nativism that it represents has long bedeviled democratic politics.	尽管民粹主义言论看似已近白热化并由此带来严重后果——最明显的例子是英国退欧公投——但现实却是它所代表的本土主义一直困扰着民主政体。


Populist movements tend to focus on blame.	民粹主义运动往往侧重于指责。


Father Charles Coughlin, the 1930s-era Roman Catholic priest from Detroit who promoted a fascist agenda for America, consistently sought to root out the culprits for society’s problems.	20世纪30年代来自底特律的罗马天主教神父查尔斯·考夫林在美国推行法西斯计划，坚持不懈地企图根除造成社会问题的罪魁祸首。


Likewise, today’s right-wing populists have eagerly turned on the “establishment” and the “elites.”	同样，今天的右翼民粹主义分子急不可耐地攻击“体制”和“精英”。


In Europe, this has meant blaming the EU for everything that goes wrong.	在欧洲，这意味着将一切问题归咎于欧盟。


Addressing the complex roots of current economic and social challenges – the UK and France, for example, suffer substantially from hereditary privilege and frozen class systems – is a lot harder than decrying the EU as a villainous behemoth.	解决目前经济和社会挑战的复杂根源比单纯谴责欧盟这头恶毒巨兽难度大得多——举例来讲，世袭特权和阶级体系固化导致英法两国遭受到巨大损失。


Beyond blame, populist ideology relies heavily on nostalgia.	除埋怨外，民粹主义思想还在很大程度上依赖于怀旧之情。


Much of the current upheaval in Europe evokes Edmund Burke’s repudiation in 1790 of the French Revolution as the product of a misguided faith in ideas that defied people’s attachment to history and tradition.	欧洲目前绝大多数动荡令人联想起1790年埃德蒙·伯克驳斥法国大革命，将其称之为藐视民众对历史和传统依恋之情的被误导的信仰产物。


For the UK’s Brexiteers, the borderless world that the EU, with its commitment to globalization, represents is destroying the nation-state, which better protected their interests.	对英国退欧支持者而言，欧盟致力全球化所代表的无国界世界意味着摧毁保护他们利益的民主国家。


In their referendum campaign, they recalled a past when jobs were secure, neighbors were familiar, and security was assured.	在他们的公投宣传中，他们回忆一个工作稳定、邻里相熟、并且安全有保障的过去。


Whether that past ever really existed was irrelevant.	这样的过去是否真的存在过其实并无关系。


The last time European democracies were overtaken by radical political movements, in the 1930s, demagogues based their support largely on the old lower middle class, whose members feared being dispossessed and pushed into poverty by uncontrolled economic forces.	上一次欧洲民主国家被激进政治运动控制发生在20世纪30年代，当时的蛊惑人心者主要依赖老的下层中产阶级支持，这些人担心被失控的经济势力剥夺得一贫如洗并就此陷入贫困。


In the wake of the protracted euro crisis, and the painful austerity that followed, today’s populists have been able to play on similar fears, again primarily among older workers and other vulnerable groups.	矿日持久的欧债危机爆发及充满痛苦的紧缩政策接踵而至后，今天的民粹主义者同样利用了类似的恐惧心理，这样的恐惧心理主要存在于老年劳动者和其他的弱势群体当中。


Of course, Europe is not alone in being swept up by populism.	当然，欧洲并非唯一一个民粹主义风靡的地区。


The United States, where Donald Trump has secured the Republican nomination to be president, is also in serious danger.	唐纳德·特朗普得到共和党总统提名的美国同样面临着严重威胁。


Trump paints a bleak picture of life in the US today, blaming globalization (specifically, immigration) and the “establishment” leaders who have advanced it for the struggles of ordinary American workers.	特朗普将今天美国的惨淡归咎于全球化（尤其是移民）以及为赢得普通美国劳动者斗争竭力推进全球化的“体制”领袖。


His slogan, “Make America Great Again,” is the ultimate display of false populist nostalgia.	他的口号“让美国再次伟大”是虚伪民粹主义怀旧情绪的终极展示。


Moreover, just as Brexiteers want to withdraw from Europe, Trump wants to withdraw the US from international arrangements of which it is a part, if not the linchpin.	此外，就像英国脱欧支持者希望退出欧洲一样，特朗普希望美国从已经参加、甚至扮演关键角色的国际协议中退出。


He has suggested dispensing with NATO, declaring that US allies should have to pay for America’s protection.	他建议解散北约，宣称美国的盟友应当为美国保护付费。


He has also launched tirades against free trade and even the United Nations.	他还发表了反对自由贸易甚至联合国的激烈的长篇演说。


As elsewhere, Trump’s protectionism and national narcissism are sustained by the anxiety of those hit by the impersonal dark forces of the “market.”	就像在其他地方一样，特朗普的保护主义和民族自恋主义恰恰以遭受“市场”黑暗势力无情打击者所产生的焦虑为土壤。


The turn toward populism constitutes a revolt against intellectual orthodoxy, embodied by cosmopolitan professional elites.	朝民粹主义转向构成了对正统思想的反叛，而这种反叛恰恰体现在国际化的专业精英们身上。


In the Brexit campaign, “expert” became a slur.	在英国脱欧运动中，“专家”就意味着诽谤。


This is not to say that challenging the establishment is entirely without merit.	这并不是说挑战现有体制是完全没有依据的。


The establishment is not always in touch with the people.	体制并不总能响应民众的需求。


Populism can sometimes be a legitimate channel for aggrieved voters to make their frustrations known, and to call for a change of course.	民粹主义有时会成为愤愤不平的选民发泄不满情绪、并呼吁改变现状的合法渠道。


And in Europe, there are plenty of legitimate grievances: austerity, widespread youth unemployment, a democratic deficit in the EU, and an overloaded bureaucracy in Brussels.	现在在欧洲，民众的确存在着诸多合理的不满情绪：包括紧缩政策、大面积青年失业、欧盟民主赤字和布鲁塞尔超负荷的官僚机构。


But, rather than focus on real solutions, today’s populists are often appealing to people’s basest instincts.	但今天的民粹主义者并不关注真正的解决办法，却往往在吸引人们最低级的本能方面做文章。


In many cases, they are emphasizing feelings over facts, stoking fear and hate, and relying on nativist appeals.	在很多情况下，他们更多强调感情而非事实，煽动仇恨和恐惧，并完全依赖本土诉求。


And, in fact, they are less interested in tackling economic grievances than they are in using those grievances to win support for an agenda that would roll back social and cultural openness.	事实上，较之化解经济不满，他们对利用上述不满获取支持更感兴趣，其目的是要击退社会和文化开放。


This is most apparent in the immigration debate.	这在移民辩论中表现是最明显的。


In the US, Trump has won support with proposals to block Muslims from entering the US and to build a wall to keep out those crossing the border from Mexico.	在美国，特朗普阻止穆斯林入境并修建隔离墙阻挡墨西哥移民越境的提案已经赢得了认可。


Likewise, in Europe, populist leaders have capitalized on the influx of refugees fleeing conflicts in the Middle East to convince people that EU-imposed policies threaten not just Europeans’ security, but also their culture.	同样，在欧洲，民粹主义领袖利用逃离中东冲突的难民潮来说服民众欧盟强制执行的政策不仅威胁到欧洲安全，而且还威胁到他们的文化。


The fact that nearly all of the regions in Britain that voted for Brexit received massive EU subsidies supports this interpretation.	英国几乎所有投票赞成脱��的地区都在领取欧盟巨额补贴的事实也支撑了这种说法。


So do circumstances in Germany.	德国的情况也差不多。


Though the arrival of a million largely Muslim immigrants last year has not hurt the economy – which remains at full employment – many people are rejecting Chancellor Angela Merkel’s vision of a new, more multicultural Germany.	虽然去年百万穆斯林移民入境总体而言并未损害经济——德国经济仍然实现了充分就业——但仍有很多人反对默克尔总理提出的建设文化更加多元的新德国的目标。


Simply put, for many Europeans, immigrants represent less a threat to their livelihoods than a challenge to their national and tribal identities.	简言之，对很多欧洲人而言，与其说移民威胁到他们的生计，还不如说威胁到他们的民族和部落身份更为恰当。


Populist leaders like the UK Independence Party’s Nigel Farage have not hesitated to capitalize on this cultural anxiety, leading British voters ultimately to vote against their own interests.	英国独立党奈杰尔·法拉吉等民粹主义领袖毫不犹豫地利用了这种文化焦虑，诱使英国选民最终为反对自身利益投票。


And yet the grievances which populists like Farage and Trump manipulate are real.	但法拉吉和特朗普这样的民粹主义者操纵的不满是切实存在的。


To preserve the principles of openness and democracy on which continued social and economic progress depends, those grievances must be understood and addressed.	要想保持社会经济不断进步所依赖的开放性和民主原则，上述不满情绪必须得到理解并采取措施予以消除。


Otherwise, populists will continue to win support, with potentially severe consequences, as the Brexit debacle shows.	否则，民粹主义者将继续赢得支持，而这可能像英国脱欧灾难所显示的那样带来严重后果。


Fortunately, there is also precedent for escaping populist takeovers.	幸运的是，成功逃脱民粹主义控制的先例也曾经有过。


In the 1930s, as Europe drifted into the hands of either tyrants or banal democratic leaders, America’s Coughlins and others were overshadowed by President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal.	20世纪30年代，随着欧洲落入暴君或陈腐的民主领袖手中，美国的考夫林和其他人在弗兰克林·罗斯福总统新政的对比之下显得黯然失色。


And a new deal – one that corrects the EU’s yawning democratic deficit and puts an end to self-defeating austerity policies – is precisely what will save Europe today.	而纠正欧盟民主赤字并结束自我挫败的紧缩政策的新政今天恰恰能够拯救欧洲。


Pulling Europe Back from the Brink	把欧洲从悬崖边拉回来


DAVOS – In 2007, the United States caught a serious – and highly contagious – economic cold.	发自达沃斯 ——2007年，美国患上了一场严重——且具有高度传染性的 ——经济重感冒。


Eight years later, it is finally making a convincing recovery – so convincing that last month the US Federal Reserve raised the country’s base interest rate for the first time in almost a decade.	八年后，它终于令人信服地复原了——这场复原是如此有说服力，以至于上月美联储备在十年来首次调高了本国基准利率。


Europe, however, remains in bad shape.	然而欧洲的病情却依然严峻。


Not only has it not recovered from its post-2008 cold; beset by multiplying crises, it is now on the verge of developing pneumonia.	它非但没2008年后的感冒中恢复； 同时却在多重危机的困扰之下，俨然有发展成肺炎的趋势。


The best defense against pathogens is a strong immune system.	对病原体的最佳防御是一个强大的免疫系统。


And that is what Europe lacks today, in the form of political leaders who provide an inspiring and forward-looking vision to their people.	而这也是当今欧洲所缺乏的，因为政治领导人都无法为自己的人民描绘一个鼓舞人心和前瞻性的远景。


With political disenchantment reaching levels not seen since the continent’s darkest times in the 1930s, the risk that Europe will succumb to the destructive forces of populism looms ever larger.	随着国民政治冷淡程度达到了1930年代那段最黑暗时期以来的高点，欧洲屈服于破坏性民粹主义力量的风险也日渐增大。


But it is too soon to give up hope; on the contrary, Europe is well positioned to succeed in the long term.	但现在还不应太早放弃希望； 相反，欧洲正处于实现长期繁荣的有利位置。


To secure that future, Europe’s political class, rather than struggling to cope with crises as they arise, must begin to look at the big picture, anticipate and address challenges, and inspire people once again.	为了实现美好未来，欧洲的政治阶层不能只是疲于应付与他们的成长同时出现的各类危机，还必须开始关注宏观大势，预测和应对挑战，并再次鼓动起民众的信心。


Is this too much to ask?	那么这算是个过分的要求吗？


History tells us that the answer is an emphatic no.	纵观历史，答案是否定的。


Sixty years ago, with Europe’s economy reeling from the destruction caused by World War II, Europe’s leaders lifted their eyes above daily hardships to shape a more hopeful future, underpinned by European integration.	六十年前，与欧洲的经济因为二战的而满目苍翼，欧洲的领导人却把目光从眼前的艰难困苦中移开，放眼去塑造一个构建于欧洲一体化之上的光明未来。


That same vision and foresight is needed today, and the European Union, with its unmatched ability to facilitate regional cooperation, will remain essential.	如今我们也需要同样的理想和远见，而在促进区域合作方面能力无人能及的欧盟，则仍会是必要的存在。


Of course, there are some key differences between the circumstances that drove the EU’s creation and those that Europe’s leaders face today.	当然，当年推动欧盟建立的情景与这些欧洲领导人当前面临的状况之间存在着一些关键的差别。


Most notably, thanks to the EU, Europeans today have largely not endured war and absolute economic deprivation.	最明显的是，由于欧盟的存在，今日的欧洲基本上没有经历过战争和经济赤贫。


With the dangers of demagoguery not embedded in their living memories, they are far more vulnerable to fear-mongering and false promises – illustrated in the growing influence of nationalist narratives and populist movements.	因此那些没有类似生活经历的人们最容易受到煽动者的影响，更易被恐慌和虚假的承诺所蛊惑——这点可以用民族主义叙事与民粹主义运动的日渐发展壮大来印证。


Even worse, faced with an erosion of their voter base, many mainstream parties are playing catch-up with these destructive forces, engaging in EU-bashing of their own.	更糟糕的是，为了防止选民基础被不断侵蚀，许多主流政党都开始仿效这些破坏性力量，参与到对欧盟的抨击之中。


Clearly, the EU needs a new impetus that reflects twenty-first-century challenges and opportunities.	显然，欧盟需要一个反映21世纪挑战和机遇的新原动力。


But this will be virtually impossible to establish – and use to inspire people – until the EU and its member governments get a handle on the crises that are threatening to overwhelm them.	但是除非欧盟及其成员国政府足以应对那些威胁要压倒他们危机，否者这股力量几乎不可能确立——并用来激励人们。


That is why it is so urgent that Europe puts its economic house in order once and for all.	这就是为何欧洲迫切要一劳永逸地清理自身经济问题的原因。


Such a reckoning will not be quick or easy, not least because it will require us to address the many issues that have been swept under the carpet over the years, as half-baked projects were foisted on the EU to implement.	这种清理不会是一蹴而就的，尤其是因为它需要我们解决被强加给欧盟实施的很多半吊子计划所导致的许多被草草掩盖起来的问题。


The foremost example of this is the partial economic and monetary union that has been around for nearly two decades, and that must now become a full union if it is to be successful and deliver results.	其中最重要的例子就是已经存在了快二十年的局部经济和货币联盟。 如果真要取得成功并取得成效的话，它现在必须成为一个完整的联盟。


It is time for Europe’s leaders to break the decades-old habit of pursuing half-baked projects that blunt the symptoms of crises, and to implement real reforms that address the root causes.	现在也是欧洲领导人打破几十年来那种只为掩盖危机症状的半吊子项目的陋习，并从根源上实现真正的改革。


Only with a new approach – and tangible progress – can solidarity within Europe be regained.	只有实施新的方法——和切实的进展——才能重新让欧洲实现团结。


My call for a renewed commitment to the EU does not stem from some federalist mantra.	我对重申欧盟承诺的呼吁并非来自一些关于联邦制的陈词滥调。


I would be the first to emphasize that political actors at all levels have a role to play in Europe, to the extent that they are able to implement policy effectively.	我会首先强调各级政治行为者都在欧洲扮演一个角色，以使他们能够有效地执行政策。


And I would also recognize that EU institutions need reform, so that they manage the big picture, instead of the details.	而且我也认识到，欧盟机构需要改革，让他们管理大局，而非专注于细节。


Nonetheless, the EU and its institutions remain integral to efforts to respond to challenges that require a united front – challenges like those that Europe faces today.	尽管如此，欧盟及其机构依然在需要一个统一战线去应对挑战时不可或缺的存在——正如那些欧洲目前所面临的挑战。


If Europe’s leaders are to inspire their people to build a shared future, they must demonstrate an understanding of what that future has in store – and how to make the most of it.	如果欧洲的领导人希望鼓励自己的人民去建立一个共同的未来，他们必须首先展现出对这一未��面目的理解——以及如何最大程度地实现它 。


They should start by changing their attitudes and committing to working together to face present and future crises head-on.	他们应该改变自身态度，并承诺共同努力来直面现在和未来的危机。


While we cannot know for certain what the next 10-20 years will bring, we have a few important clues.	虽然我们无法确切知道未来10 ~20年将如何发展，但我们手里有一些重要的线索。


For one thing, there is the Fourth Industrial Revolution, which promises to transform our economies and societies in fundamental ways.	一方面，第四次产业革命将彻底改变我们的经济和社会。


Plenty of other transnational challenges – from addressing the root causes of the Middle East refugee crisis to implementing last month’s Paris agreement to mitigate climate change – are also in the cards.	其他许多跨国挑战——从解决中东难民危机的根源，落实上个月的巴黎协议以减缓气候变化——也都即将到来。


It would be ironic if Europeans, enthralled by illusory promises of blissful national self-containment, threw away 60 years of deep cooperation at a moment when such cooperation is needed more than ever.	如果欧洲人被自我封闭小国寡民的虚幻幸福承诺所迷惑，并在最需要深度合作的时刻抛弃了60年以来的深度合作，这将是非常讽刺的。


Of course, self-destructive national behavior is not new. But, more often than not, leaders have managed to pull back from the brink.	当然，自我毁灭的国家行为并不是今天才有，但更多的是领导者成功把自己的国家从悬崖边缘拉了回来。


The key for Europe will be to deliver a coherent and compelling vision that justifies our need for cooperation in the decades ahead.	对欧洲来说，关键是要提供一个连贯的和令人信服的远景，以证明我们需要在未来数十年间继续合作。


Populism for the Rich	富裕阶层的民粹主义


BUCHAREST – I recently joined a tour in Bucharest of the Palace of Parliament, the gigantic folly built in the 1980s on the orders of the late Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu, who was executed before he could see it finished.	布加勒斯特——最近我游览了布加勒斯特议会宫，这座奢侈靡费但却徒劳无功的建筑是二十世纪八十年代应已故罗马尼亚独裁者齐奥塞斯库的命令修建的，但齐奥塞斯库本人却在这座宫殿完工前就遭到了处决。


The statistics rehearsed by our guide were staggering: the third biggest edifice in the world, 220,000 square feet of carpet, one million cubic meters of marble, 3,500 tons of crystal.	导游所背诵的数据令人惊讶：世界第三大建筑、耗费高达220,000平方英尺地毯、100万立方米大理石、3，500吨水晶。


The enormous marble stairways had to be rebuilt several times to match exactly the steps of the dictator, who was a small man.	巨型大理石楼梯被迫数次改建，才恰好配合独裁者那矮小的身躯。


To construct this neoclassical monstrosity, an entire swath of the city, a beautiful area of eighteenth-century houses, churches, and synagogues, was razed, displacing 40,000 people.	为修建这座新古典主义的怪诞建筑，曾经星罗棋布着十八世纪住宅、教堂和犹太会堂的美丽的大片城市被夷为平地，导致4万人无家可归。


More than a million people worked on the project non-stop day and night.	100多万人为此日夜马不停蹄。


It pretty much bankrupted the state, even as Ceauşescu’s subjects had to do without heat and electricity for much of the time.	这座宫殿几乎造成政府破产，即使齐奥塞斯库的臣民们多数时候过着既不供暖也不用电的日子。


It still costs more than $6 million a year to maintain the palace, which now houses the Romanian parliament and an art museum, leaving 70% of the building unused.	现在每年的维护费用仍高达600万美元，目前只有罗马尼亚议会和艺术博物馆两家使用者，因此70%的面积处于空置。


Ceauşescu’s folly is a monument to megalomania.	齐奥赛斯库的浩大工程是一座妄自尊大者的纪念碑。


But it is by no means unique, except in its size (though Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has tried to rival it in scale with his new palace in Ankara).	但这绝不意味着它独一无二，当然唯一例外的是它的规模（尽管土耳其总统雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安曾试图在安卡拉修建规模能与之相媲美的新建筑）。


It is indeed remarkable how megalomaniacs of a certain kind think alike, or at least share a similar taste in architecture.	某种类型的妄自尊大者想法总是惊人的一致，至少在建筑方面的审美情趣几乎相同。


Hitler’s plans for the reconstruction of Berlin reflected the same neoclassical gigantism.	希特勒的柏林重建计划体现出一模一样的新古典巨型主义。


And the interior of the palace in Bucharest, a kind of Louis XIV style on steroids, is just a more extravagant version of Donald Trump’s living quarters in Florida and New York.	而布加勒斯特宫殿的内部装饰不过是唐纳德·特朗普在佛罗里达和纽约住所的升级豪华版，采用了令人心跳加速的路易十四风格。


These places are what you get when socially insecure outsiders dream of being the Sun King.	缺乏社会安全感的人梦想成为太阳王时往往会修建这样的住所。


To mention Trump in the same breath as Hitler and Ceauşescu is perhaps unfair.	将特朗普与希特勒和齐奥塞斯库相提并论或许是不公平的。


Trump is not a murderous tyrant.	特朗普不是嗜血暴君。


And his social background is more complicated.	他的社会背景是比较复杂的。


Hitler was the son of a minor customs official, and Ceauşescu was of poor peasant stock.	希特勒是个海关小吏的儿子，而齐奥塞斯库则是农民出身。


Both men felt small and provincial in their capital cities.	两者都在首都感受到自己微不足道的外地身份。


Their way of dominating the more sophisticated urban elites was to oppress them violently and rebuild the cities according to their own grandiose dreams.	他们都用暴力压迫的方式主宰世故的城市精英，并按照自己宏大的梦想来改造城市环境。


Trump, too, wants everything bearing his name to be bigger and shinier than everything else.	特朗普同样希望与自己名字相联的一切都宏大耀眼。


But he was born in New York and inherited a considerable amount of money from his father, Fred Trump, a real-estate developer with a somewhat shady reputation.	但他出生在纽约，从名声不甚完美的房地产开发商父亲弗雷德·特朗普那里继承了一大笔钱。


And yet he, too, appears to seethe with resentment against the elites who might look down on him as an uncouth arriviste, with his absurd golden skyscrapers and rococo mansions full of gilded chairs and massive chandeliers.	但他似乎也因为精英阶层可能将其视为粗俗暴发户而不满，他名下拥有荒诞的金色摩天楼，豪宅里摆放着全镀金的洛可可式椅子和吊灯。


Modern populism is often described as a new class war between the beneficiaries of a globalized world and those who feel left behind.	现代民粹主义往往被描述为全球化世界受益者与被抛弃者之间的全新阶级战争。


Supporters of Trump in the United States and of Brexit in the United Kingdom are, on the whole, less educated than the “establishment��� they oppose.	美国的特朗普支持者和英国的退欧支持者就总体而言受教育程度都远不及他们所反对的“体制势力”。


But they could never have gotten as far as they have on their own.	但他们仅凭一己之力可能永远对现在的地位望尘莫及。


The Tea Party in the US would have been relatively marginal without powerful backers and demagogues.	美国茶党身后如果没有手握重权的支持及煽动者根本不可能有目前的势力。


And these are often newly rich men who share their followers’ bitterness.	而这些人往往是新晋富豪，了解他们追随者的痛苦。


This was clearly the case in Italy, where former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, whose background is almost identical to Trump’s, managed to tap into the dreams and resentments of millions of people.	意大利的情况显然如此，该国前总理贝卢斯科尼背景与特朗普几乎相同，并成功利用了成百上千万民众的梦想和不满情绪。


Populist movements in other countries show a similar pattern.	其他国家民粹主义运动也出现了类似的模式。


In Thailand, the Sino-Thai business tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra, the son of a nouveau-riche father like Berlusconi and Trump, ran against Bangkok’s social and political elites, becoming Prime Minister with the backing of provincial and rural voters, before being ousted in a military coup.	泰国中泰商业大亨他信·西那瓦出身于像贝卢斯科尼和特朗普那样的暴发户家庭，因为站在曼谷社会和政治精英的对立面，军事政变爆发前在外省和农村选民的支持下当选总理。


In the Netherlands, a newly rich class of real-estate moguls backed the right-wing populist Pim Fortuyn and his cruder successor, Geert Wilders.	在荷兰，一帮新贵地产大佬支持信奉右翼民粹主义的皮姆·福图纳及其更粗俗的继任者威尔德斯。


The newly rich are as important a force in the rise of populism as the poorer and less educated people who feel neglected by the elites.	像教育程度不高、自觉遭到精英阶层忽视的贫民一样，新贵阶层在民粹主义崛起过程中是一股重要的势力。


Despite huge inequalities of wealth, they share a deep anger at those whom they suspect of looking down on them.	虽然财富高度不平等，但对怀疑藐视自己的人他们同样抱有难以消解的愤怒情绪。


And they are not entirely wrong.	他们也并非完全没有道理。


No matter how many palaces or yachts new money can acquire, old money will continue to despise the acquirer.	无论新晋资本可以买下多少宫殿和游艇，他们仍不免受到原有资本的歧视。


Likewise, the educated urban class tends to dismiss the voters who supported Brexit or back Trump as stupid and ill-bred.	同样，城市受教育阶层往往将支持英国脱欧或特朗普的选民斥之为愚蠢和粗野。


It is the fusion of resentments, felt by the newly rich as much as by the left behind, that drives right-wing populism.	新贵和被抛弃者的不满共同推动了右翼民粹主义。


In extreme circumstances, this can result in dictatorship, with the tyrant free to indulge bizarre fantasies at the expense of millions under their control.	极端情况下这或许会开启独裁统治，独裁者可以随意利用控制下的成百上千万民众将自己怪诞的幻想变为现实。


So far, in Europe and the US, the demagogues can only serve up dreams: taking back our country, making it great again, and so on.	迄今为止，欧美煽动家还只能用梦想来号召支持群体：夺回国家、重塑辉煌，诸如此类。


To stop such dreams from becoming political nightmares, something more is needed than technocratic expertise, or calls for civility and moderation.	要阻止这些梦想成为政治梦魇，除专业知识和呼吁文明节制外还需要提倡更多东西。


Angry people cannot easily be persuaded by luminous reason.	再睿智的理由也无法轻易说服愤怒的民众。


They must be offered an alternative vision.	我们必须为他们绘制另一种愿景。


The problem today, all over the world, is that such an alternative is not readily at hand.	现在，世界各地的问题是这样的替代愿景其实并不存在。


The French Revolution happened more than two centuries ago.	两个多世纪前爆发了法国大革命。


“Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity” is only a historic slogan today.	“自由、平等、博爱”今天已成为历史口号。


But this might be a good time to update it.	但现在是时候赋予它更多含义。


Managing the Economic Consequences of Nationalism	管理民族主义的经济后果


LAGUNA BEACH – The aftermath of the United Kingdom’s unexpected vote in June to leave the European Union is being monitored closely.	拉古娜海滩—6月份，英国出人意料地投票退出欧盟，此事的后续发展正在被密切关注。


People all over the world – and particularly in Europe – want to know how Brexit will unfold, not just to manage its specific effects, but also to gain insight into what is likely to happen if other upcoming votes tip in favor of nationalist agendas.	全世界人民——特别是欧洲人民——希望知道英国脱欧会如何展开，这不仅仅是为了管理此事的具体影响，也是为了以此来推断如果其他即将到来的投票也有利于民族主义日程的话会发生什么情况。


Those agendas are certainly making a political comeback.	这些日程显然正在制造政治倒流。


In Germany, which will hold a general election in 2017, support for the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) is on the rise, exemplified in the party’s strong showing in recent state elections.	德国将在2017年举行大选，如今，极右翼的德国另类党（AfD）正在崛起，在最近的州选举中表现抢眼就是明证。


In France, the National Front’s leader, Marine Le Pen, hopes to ride nationalism to power in next year’s presidential election.	在法国，国民阵线（National Front）领导人马琳·勒庞（Marine Le Pen）希望凭借民族主义在明年的大选中问鼎总统宝座。


The trend is not exclusive to Europe.	这一趋势并非欧洲所独有。


In the United States, Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump has promised to impose trade tariffs on China, build a wall on the border with Mexico, and bar Muslims from entering the country.	在美国，共和党总统候选人唐纳德·特朗普承诺要对中国实施贸易关税、在美墨边境建造一道隔离墙，并禁止穆斯林进入美国。


So what economic consequences would a vote for nationalism have?	那么，投票给民族主义会造成什么经济后果？


Judging by the Brexit referendum, the immediate effects could include financial-market turmoil and a shock to consumer and investor confidence.	从英国退欧公投看，即刻的影响可能包括金融市场动荡和消费和投资者信心冲击。


But this could give way rather quickly to an economic and financial calm.	但这很快就会让位给经济和金融冷静。


The real question is what comes next.	真正的问题是接下来会怎样。


To be sure, the calm that has set in in Britain is tenuous.	平心而论，英国的冷静相当脆弱。


Pre-referendum predictions that a vote for Brexit would lead to substantial economic pain and financial volatility remain likely to materialize.	公投之前的预测是支持退欧将导致经济剧痛和金融波动，这一预期仍有可能成为现实。


The severity of the effects will depend on how the UK and its European partners negotiate their tricky separation, particularly the extent to which free trade and financial passporting are upheld.	影响的严重性取决于英国及其欧洲伙伴如何谈判棘手的分离问题，特别是自由贸易和金融畅通可以在多大程度上得到保留。


But, for now, volatility remains contained.	但是，就目前而言，波动仍然可控。


That can be attributed partly to Prime Minister Theresa May’s new government, which has purposely adopted a gradual approach to the Brexit process.	这部分可归因于英国首相梅的新政府在退欧过程问题上有意采取了渐进方针。


May has also made it clear that she and her Cabinet members are not in the business of providing regular progress reports.	梅还明确地表明，她和她的内阁成员不会提供定期进展报告。


The Bank of England has also helped, by injecting liquidity into the economy almost immediately.	英格兰银行也起到了作用，几乎立即向经济注入流动性。


Moreover, the BoE has convincingly reassured market participants that it is committed to maintaining financial stability and avoiding the disorder that malfunctioning markets can cause.	此外，英格兰银行说服市场参与者相信它将致力于保持金融稳定并避免市场失灵可能导致的失序。


The BoE’s vigilance, together with the fact that economic and financial arrangements with Europe have yet to be altered, has convinced companies and households to postpone plans to change their behavior.	英格兰银行的警惕，加上对欧经济和金融安排尚未改变的事实，让公司和家庭放心地中止了改变行为的计划。


They are now waiting to see whether the UK negotiates a “soft” or “hard” Brexit before they make any significant moves.	现在，他们正在坐等英国谈判“软”还是“硬”退欧，然后在对行动作出重大改变。


Britain’s ability to restore a sense of calm amid far-reaching uncertainty about its economic and financial future shows how, with the right approach, political actors can manage shocks and surprises.	英国在影响深远的经济和金融未来的不确定性中重塑冷静的能力表明，政治行动者可以通过正确的方针管理冲击和意外。


Had Britain’s leaders rushed to dismantle long-standing trading systems and other economic and financial arrangements with the EU, before developing a credible and comprehensive alternative, the situation could be much more volatile.	如果英国领导人匆忙宣布存在多时的贸易体系和其他与欧盟的经济和金融安排不再有效，而没有制定出可信而全面的替代方案，情况可能远比现在更加波动。


Others aspiring to advance similarly inward-looking agendas – be they nationalistic European parties seeking to roll back international connectivity or US presidential candidates proposing tariffs that could well trigger retaliation from trading partners – should take note.	其他志在推动类似的内向日程的行动者应该引起注意——不管是寻求缩小国际连通性的欧洲民族主义政党，还是准备实施可能引起贸易伙伴报复的关税的美国总统候选人。


Of course, under the current circumstances, there are limits to the beneficial effects of sound UK leadership.	当然，在当前环境下，靠谱的英国领导层所带来的积极效应终究是有限的。


When the details of Britain’s divorce from the EU are eventually announced, companies and households will respond, particularly if the country’s trading, economic, and financial linkages with the EU change considerably.	当英国与欧洲“离婚”的细节最终公布时，公司和家庭将有所反应，特别是如果英国与欧盟的贸易、经济和金融联系发生重大变化的话。


That response, it seems almost inevitable, will hurt economic growth and spur financial volatility.	这一反应——目前看来几乎是不可避免的——将伤及经济增长、刺激金融波动。


But here, too, a measured and cautious approach can help.	但在这里，谨慎克制的方针仍有所助益。


The UK government should do its utmost to conduct the most sensitive parts of the negotiations with its European partners in secret.	英国政府竭尽全力就谈判的最敏感部分与其欧洲伙伴进行保密。


When it is time to announce changes, it should do so in the context of a larger program of credible domestic reforms that target strong, inclusive growth and improved financial stability.	当公布变化时，英国政府应该同时公布更大的、可信的、以包容性增长和改善金融稳定为目标的国内改革方案。


It is not easy to keep an airplane flying smoothly while changing the engines.	在飞机切换引擎时想要保持平稳飞行很难。


And that is precisely the challenge the May government faces.	而这正是梅政府所面临的挑战。


It is now preparing for this ultra-delicate maneuver by identifying and arranging the components of the new engine, and planning for their quick assembly; only then will it be able to dismantle the engine of European trade without risking heavy turbulence, or even a painful crash.	梅政府现在正在认识和组织新引擎的部件，并计划进行快速组装，以此来为这一极其精细的调整做好准备； 在此基础上，梅政府才能卸下欧洲贸易引擎而不引起剧烈颠簸甚至坠机的风险。


But even with a carefully sequenced plan in place, May’s government will need to show a level of resilience and agility far beyond what has been required of its predecessors, in order to manage the transition without veering off the path of growth and stability.	但即使有了精心排序的计划，梅政府仍需要表现出一定的恢复力和灵活性，并且要比其前任高得多，这样才能在不改变增长和稳定路径的情况下管理好转型。


The same would be true for any other nationalist political figure or party that came to power.	其他赢得权力的民族主义政治人物或政党亦然。


The question is whether any of them would be equal to such a complex challenge.	问题是他们中是否有人能够胜任这一复杂挑战。


The Blind Alley of Monetary Populism	货币民粹主义死路一条


SWARTHMORE – In the United States and elsewhere nowadays, populist politicians often claim that easy monetary policy is hurting ordinary workers, thereby exacerbating income inequality.	斯沃斯莫尔—如今，在美国和其他国家，民粹主义政客常常声称宽松的货币政策正在伤害普通工人，从而加剧收入不平等。


But while inequality is a problem, raising interest rates is no way to address it.	不平等固然是一个问题，但提高利率绝非解决之道。


To say otherwise is a strange claim for anyone to make, especially populists.	有不同意见是一件咄咄怪事，尤其对民粹主义者来说。


After all, low interest rates benefit debtors and hurt creditors, as does the inflation that can be spurred by monetary easing.	毕竟，低利率有利于债务人，有损于债权人，因为货币宽松可以刺激通胀。


Throughout most of US history, for example, populists have supported easy monetary policy as a way to help the little guy against distant bankers with hard hearts devoted to hard money.	比如，纵观美国历史，大部分时间里民粹主义者都支持宽松货币政策作为帮助草根对抗铁石心肠、一心向钱的差距遥远的银行家。


That was why the Andrew Jacksons of the nineteenth century fought the efforts of the Alexander Hamiltons to establish a national bank.	因此，十九世纪的安德鲁·杰克逊（Andrew Jackson）们要阻挠亚历山大·汉密尔顿（Alexander Hamilton）们成立国民银行。


It was also the argument William Jennings Bryan made during his 1896 presidential campaign, when he promised easier money to his core constituency: Midwestern farmers who had been hit hard by high interest rates and declining commodity prices.	威廉·杰宁斯·布莱恩（William Jennings Bryan）在1986年总统选战中向他的核心选区承诺放松货币时也是如此：他的票仓是饱受高利率和大宗商品价格下跌冲击的中西部农民。


And it was the argument made by supply-siders who opposed US Federal Reserve Chair Paul Volcker’s high-interest-rate policy in the early 1980s – an argument that spurred President Ronald Reagan to appoint two Fed governors to challenge Volcker in 1985.	20世纪80年代初反对美联储主席保罗·沃克尔（Paul Volcker）的高利率政策的供给派也是如此——他们的观点促使总统里根在1985年任命了两名美联储理事以挑战沃克尔。


Today, however, the script has switched – and not only fringe populists are working from it.	但是，现如今剧本有所改变——并且不仅仅只有边缘民粹主义者热衷于此。


British Prime Minister Theresa May, for example, declared earlier this month that low interest rates were hurting ordinary working-class people, while benefiting the rich.	比如，英国首相梅在本月早些时候宣称低利率正在伤害普通工人阶级而有利于富人。


Falling interest rates help push up the prices of securities – both stocks and bonds – which are disproportionately held by the wealthy.	利率下降推高了证券价格——包括股票和债券——而大部分证券持有在富人手中。


“People with assets have gotten richer,” said May.	“有资产的变得更富，”梅说，“没有资产的遭了秧。


“People without them have suffered.”	”


In a sense, May has a point.	从某种程度上说，梅不无道理。


In the US, stock prices have reached near-record highs.	在美国，股票价格已接近历史最高纪录。


And the Fed’s 2008 decision to reduce the policy interest rate virtually to zero, together with the subsequent economic recovery, surely contributed to the strong stock-market rebound that began in early 2009.	美联储在2008年决定将政策利率调整到几乎为零的水平，以及随后到来的经济复苏显然促使了股票市场从2009年初开始猛烈反弹。


But there is little evidence that low interest rates have been behind the continued rise in equity prices from 2012 to 2015 – a period when markets were anticipating an interest-rate hike.	但几乎没有证据表明低利率推动了2012—2015年股票价格的继续攀升——在此期间市场预期将会发生升息。


Populist arguments against easy monetary policy are flimsy, at best.	反对宽松货币政策的民粹主义观点不值一驳。


But so are populist arguments for tightening monetary policy – in the US, Donald Trump, following Ted Cruz and other Republican leaders, has advocated a return to the gold standard.	但支持收紧货币政策的民粹主义观点亦然——在美国，唐纳德·特朗普步泰德·科鲁兹（Ted Cruz）和其他共和党领导人后尘，支持回归金本位。


The truth is that monetary policy – which aims to promote overall economic growth, while maintaining price and financial stability – is not an appropriate lever for addressing income inequality.	事实是货币政策——其目的是促进总体经济增长，同时保持物价和金融稳定——并不是解决收入不平等的合理工具。


That is a job for progressive taxation, universal health insurance, financial reform, and other such tools.	解决收入不平等要依靠累进税制、全民健康保险、金融改革和其他诸如此类的工具。


This is not to say that monetary policy cannot affect inequality.	这并不是说货币政策不会影响不平等性。


An economy running hot enough to create jobs at a rapid rate – what some, most recently Fed Chair Janet Yellen, have called a “high-pressure economy” – will eventually lead to higher real wages and incomes for workers.	足够热、能够迅速产生就业岗位的经济——包括最近的美联储主席耶伦在内的一些人称之为“高压经济”——最终会给工人带来更高的实际工资和收入。


This happened in the late 1990s, with a high-pressure economy eventually pushing the unemployment rate below 4%.	20世纪90年代末就是如此——高压经济最终促使失业率降低到4%以下。


And it is happening now.	现在也是这样。


Since early 2010, US employment growth has been running well above the natural rate of labor-force growth, with the economy adding more than 15 million private-sector jobs in the longest continuous series of monthly employment increases on record.	2010年初以来，美国就业增长一直远高于劳动力自然增长率，月度就业连续增长创出记录，经济中增加了1,500万多个私人部门岗位。


This job growth brought the unemployment rate down to 5% last year, from above 9% in 2009-10, and is now pulling previously discouraged workers back into the labor force.	这一就业增长使失业率从2009—10年的9%以上下降到去年的5%，并且正在让此前已经绝望放弃的工人回归劳动力大军。


Thanks to increased demand for labor, workers’ real wages – up 2.5% in the last year – have risen in this business cycle at the fastest rate since the early 1970s.	拜劳动力需求增加所赐，本次商业周期工人实际工资——去年增长了2. 5%——为20世纪70年代初以来最快。


It was not until last month, however, that the full extent of these gains came to light, with the Census Bureau’s annual economic statistics showing that median household income had increased by a record 5.2% ($2,800) in 2015.	但是，直到上个月，这些收益才充分显露出来，人口普查局年度经济统计表明2015年中位家庭收入增长达到了创纪录的5.


These gains were felt at every level of the income distribution, with the largest percentage gains going to those in the bottom tier and the smallest gains going to those at the top.	2%（2,800美元）。 如此收益出现在收入分布的所有水平上，最大百分比增量属于底层，而顶层增量为最小。


These are big changes, and offer important confirmation that lower-income families are finally sharing in the economic recovery.	这是巨大的变化，并且为较低收入家庭终于开始分享到经济复苏的果实提供了重要的确认。


The unconventional monetary policies of recent years may also have some new effects.	近几年来的非常规货币政策也可能产生了一些新效应。


Low interest rates have lately been squeezing banks’ profits.	最近，低利率一直在压缩银行利润。


In Europe, this has become particularly pronounced, because banks are unable to pass negative interest rates on to depositors.	在欧洲，这一现象尤其显著，因为银行无法将负利率转嫁给存款人。


Any self-respecting populist should like this squeeze on banks, especially one who is still angry about the 2008 global financial crisis.	任何有自尊心的民粹主义者都应该喜欢银行承压，特别是仍然对2008年全球金融危机愤然不已的人。


Ultimately, easy money probably does more to reduce income inequality than to exacerbate it – an observation supported by econometric estimates.	最终，宽松的货币更多地降低了收入不平等而不是加剧它——这一观察有计量经济学测算的支持。


Nonetheless, it is not a particularly reliable tool for balancing income distribution.	尽管如此，它并非平衡收入分配的特别可靠的工具。


That should not be surprising: ensuring a more equitable distribution of income is not a central bank’s job.	这不足为奇：确保更加平等的收入分配不是中央银行的责任。


The Fed and other central banks are balancing rapid growth not against equality, but against the dangers of future overheating and financial instability.	美联储和其他央行正在平衡高增长，但平衡的对象不是不平等性，而是未来过热和金融动荡的风险。


They view their jobs as managing the overall economy.	他们认为自己的责任是管理总体经济。


They are right to do so.	这是对的。


Putting the Populist Revolt in Its Place	正确对待民粹主义反动


CAMBRIDGE – In many Western democracies, this is a year of revolt against elites.	坎布里奇—在许多西方民主国家，今年是反抗精英之年。


The success of the Brexit campaign in Britain, Donald Trump’s unexpected capture of the Republican Party in the United States, and populist parties’ success in Germany and elsewhere strike many as heralding the end of an era.	英国脱欧运动的成功、唐纳德·特朗普出人意料地拿下美国共和党，以及德国和其他国家民粹主义政党的成功让许多人感到震惊，惊叹要变天了。


As Financial Times columnist Philip Stephens put it, “the present global order – the liberal rules-based system established in 1945 and expanded after the end of the Cold War – is under unprecedented strain.	《金融时报》专栏作家菲利普·史蒂芬斯（Philip Stephens）说：“当前全球秩序——1945年建立起来并在冷战结束后扩大的基于规则的自由制度——遭遇到前所未有的压力。


Globalization is in retreat.”	全球化正在撤退。 ”


In fact, it may be premature to draw such broad conclusions.	事实上，下如此宽泛的结论可能为时尚早。


Some economists attribute the current surge of populism to the “hyper-globalization” of the 1990s, with liberalization of international financial flows and the creation of the World Trade Organization – and particularly China’s WTO accession in 2001 – receiving the most attention.	一些经济学家将目前民粹主义的兴起归因于20世纪90年代的“超级全球化”，其中国际金融流动的自由化和世界贸易组织的成立——特别是2001年中国的加入——最受关注。


According to one study, Chinese imports eliminated nearly one million US manufacturing jobs from 1999 to 2011; including suppliers and related industries brings the losses to 2.4 million.	据一项研究，从1999年到2011年，中国进口品消灭了近一百万个美国制造业岗位； 如果包括供应商和相关产业的话，就业损失高达240万。


As the Nobel laureate economist Angus Deaton argues, “what is crazy is that some of the opponents of globalization forget that a billion people have come out of poverty largely because of globalization.”	诺贝尔经济学奖得主安格斯·迪顿（Angus Deaton）指出，“疯狂的是，一些全球化反对者忘记了十亿人主要因为全球化而摆脱了贫困。


Even so, he adds that economists have a moral responsibility to stop ignoring those left behind.	”即便如此，他又说，经济学家有道德义务停止忽视这些落后的人。


Slow growth and increased inequality add fuel to the political fire.	慢增长和不平等性加剧让政治之火火上浇油。


But we should be wary of attributing populism solely to economic distress.	但我们谨慎将民粹主义完全归因于经济困难。


Polish voters elected a populist government despite benefiting from one of Europe’s highest rates of economic growth, while Canada seems to have been immune in 2016 to the anti-establishment mood roiling its large neighbor.	波兰选民也选择了民粹主义政府，尽管它是欧洲经济增长最高的国家之一，而加拿大在2016年成功地抵挡住了正在搅乱它的庞大邻国的反建制情绪。


In a careful study of rising support for populist parties in Europe, the political scientists Ronald Inglehart of the University of Michigan and Pippa Norris of Harvard found that economic insecurity in the face of workforce changes in post-industrial societies explained less than cultural backlash.	在一份对欧洲民粹主义政党支持率上升的仔细的研究中，密歇根大学政治学家罗纳德·英格尔哈特（Ronald Inglehart）和哈佛大学政治学家皮帕·诺里斯（Pippa Norris）发现，面临劳动力变化的后工业社会的经济不安全的解释力还不如文化抵制。


In other words, support for populism is a reaction by once predominant sectors of the population to changes in values that threaten their status.	换句话说，支持民粹主义是曾经的主流人口群体对于威胁到他们的地位的价值观变化的反应。


“The silent revolution of the 1970s appears to have spawned an angry and resentful counter-revolutionary backlash today,” Inglehart and Norris conclude.	“20世纪70年代的无声的革命似乎带来了今天愤怒和仇恨的反革命力量，”英格尔哈特和诺里斯认为。


In the US, polls show that Trump’s supporters are skewed toward older, less-educated white males.	在美国，民调显示特朗普的支持者多为年龄较大、受教育程度较低的白人男性。


Young people, women, and minorities are under-represented in his coalition.	年轻人、女性和少数族裔在对他的阵营中代表不多。


More than 40% of the electorate backs Trump, but with low unemployment nationally, only a small part of that can be explained primarily by his support in economically depressed areas.	超过40%的选民支持特朗普，但在全国失业不高的情况下，只有一小部分���以主要归因于他在经济萧条地区所受到的支持。


On the contrary, in America, too, there is more to the resurgence of populism than just economics.	相反，在美国民粹主义的复兴因素也不止于经济。


A YouGov poll commissioned by The Economist found strong racial resentment among supporters of Trump, whose use of the “birther” issue (questioning the validity of the birth certificate of Barack Obama, America’s first black president) helped put him on the path to his current campaign.	《经济学人》组织的YouGov民调发现，特朗普的支持者带有强烈的种族仇恨，特朗普的“出身论”（质疑美国首任黑人总统奥巴马出生证明的真实性）对于他走到今天这一步很有帮助。


And opposition to immigration, including the idea of building a wall and making Mexico pay for it, was an early plank in his nativist platform.	而反对移民，包括让墨西哥出钱筑墙的主张是其本土论的早期核心。


And yet a recent Pew survey shows growing pro-immigrant sentiment in the US, with 51% of adults saying that newcomers strengthen the country, while 41% believe they are a burden, down from 50% in mid-2010, when the effects of the Great Recession were still acutely felt.	但一份最新的皮尤（Pew）调查 表明美国亲移民情绪正在上升，51%的成年人认为新来者增强了经济，而只有41%认为他们是负担，而2010年年中（大衰退的影响仍能尖锐地感受到时）为50%。


In Europe, by contrast, sudden large influxes of political and economic refugees from the Middle East and Africa have had stronger political effects, with many experts speculating that Brexit was more about migration to Britain than about bureaucracy in Brussels.	相反，在欧洲，中东和非洲政治和经济难民的猛然大幅流入造成了更大的政治影响，许多专家猜测英国退欧与其说是因为布鲁塞尔的官僚主义，不如说是因为英国的移民问题。


Antipathy toward elites can be caused by both economic and cultural resentments.	反感精英可能是经济和文化双重怨恨造成的。


The New York Times identified a major indicator of Trump-leaning districts: a white-majority working-class population whose livelihoods had been negatively affected throughout the decades in which the US economy shed manufacturing capacity.	《纽约时报》发现偏向于特朗普的选区有一个主要特征：人口中白人工作阶级占主体，他们的生计在美国经济去除制造业产能的十年中遭到了负面冲击。


But even if there had been no economic globalization, cultural and demographic change would have created some degree of populism.	但即使没有经济全球化，文化和人口变化也会产生一定程度的民粹主义。


But it is an overstatement to say that the 2016 election highlights an isolationist trend that will end the era of globalization.	但就此认为2016年大选突显出一种将终结全球化时代的孤立主义趋势还是言过其实了。


Instead, policy elites who support globalization and an open economy will have to be seen to be addressing economic inequality and adjustment assistance for those disrupted by change.	相反，支持全球化和开放经济的政策精英必须要让人们看到他们正在解决经济不平等问题并为受变革影响的群体提供调整协助。


Policies that stimulate growth, such as infrastructure investment, will also be important.	刺激增长的政策，如基础设施投资，也十分重要。


Europe may differ because of heightened resistance to immigration, but it would be a mistake to read too much about long-term trends in American public opinion from the heated rhetoric of this year’s election campaign.	欧洲可能因为抵制移民情绪高涨而情况有所不同，但过度地从今年选战的激烈言辞中解读美国公共观点的长期趋势是一个错误。


While the prospects for elaborate new trade agreements have suffered, the information revolution has strengthened global supply chains and, unlike in the 1930s (or even the 1980s), there has not been a reversion to protectionism.	尽管精心构思新贸易协定的前景不乐观，但信息革命仍然加强了全球供应链，并且，与20世纪30年代（甚至80年代）不同，保护主义也没有回潮的趋势。


In fact, the US economy has increased its dependence on international trade.	事实上，美国经济对国际贸易的依赖程度增强了。


According to World Bank data, from 1995 to 2015, merchandise trade as a percentage of total GDP has increased by 4.8 percentage points.	据世界银行数据，从1995年到2015年，商品贸易战总GDP的百分比增加了4. 8个百分点。


Moreover, in the age of the Internet, the transnational digital economy’s contribution to GDP is rapidly increasing.	此外，在互联网时代，跨国数字经济对GDP的贡献正在快速增加。


In 2014, the US exported $400 billion in information and communication technologies (ICT)-enabled services – almost half of all US services exports.	2014年，美国出口了4,000亿美元的需要信息和通讯技术的服务——占美国服务出口总量的近一半。


And a poll released last month by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations found 65% of Americans agreeing that globalization is mostly good for the US, while 59% say that international trade is good for the country, with even stronger support among the young.	上个月，芝加哥外交关系委员会公布的一份民调表明，65%的美国人同意全球化总体对美国有利，59%说国际贸易对美国有利，年轻人的支持率还要高。


So, while 2016 may be the year of populism in politics, it does not follow that “isolationism” is an accurate description of current American attitudes toward the world.	因此，尽管2016年在政治上可能是民粹主义之年，但这并不意味着“孤立主义”是对当前美国世界观的正确描述。


Indeed, in crucial respects – namely, on the issues of immigration and trade – Trump’s rhetoric appears to be out of step with most voters’ sentiments.	事实上，在一些关键角度——即移民和贸易问题——特朗普的说辞似乎与大部分选民的情绪相左。


The disappearance of “good” manufacturing jobs cannot be blamed on immigration, trade, or technology.	“优质”制造业岗位的消失不能归咎于移民、贸易或技术。


The pretext was that taxes, welfare payments, and other government interventions impair incentives and distort competition, reducing economic growth for society as a whole.	他们的托辞是税收、福利支出和其他政府干预削弱了激励，扭曲了竞���，降低了社会整体的经济增长。


Populists Can be Right	民粹主义者也可能正确


Does the rise of left-leaning governments in Latin America, particularly the election of Evo Morales as President of Bolivia, presage a shift to the hard left across the continent?	左倾政府在拉丁美洲的崛起，特别是埃沃•莫拉莱斯（Evo Morales）当选为玻利维亚总统，是否预示着整个拉美政治在向强硬的左倾路线过渡？


Does it mark a repudiation of United States foreign policy in the region?	这是否标志着美国地区政策的失败？


Will it, for example, lead to a re-nationalization of Bolivia’s vast natural gas deposits?	这是否会，举例来讲，导致玻利维亚丰富的天然气资源重新被收归国有？


These are vital questions, but they miss the larger significance of the rise of someone like Morales, for he is Bolivia’s first indigenous elected head of state.	这些问题都至关重要，但没有考虑像莫拉莱斯这样的人当选的重要意义，因为他是玻利维亚第一位由国人民主选举的国家首领。


His victory marks a step forward in Latin America’s overall democratization, with positive long-term significance for economic and social development in the region.	他的胜利标志着整个拉丁美洲民主化进程迈出了重要一步，会对该地区经济和社会的长远发展都产生积极的影响。


To understand why, it is helpful to take a broad view of Latin America’s history and economic development.	想知道为什么，就必须先了解拉丁美洲的历史和经济发展。


The societies of the Americas were forged by European conquests of indigenous populations, and by the racial and ethnic divisions that followed.	欧洲人征服土著居民、而后建立起种族和民族壁垒，成就了美洲社会的基本特征。


Both the US and Latin America are still coming to terms with those historic divisions.	直到今天，美国和拉美都还需要适应这样的历史现象。


The Europeans who conquered and colonized the Americas after 1492 did not find vast empty lands, as they sometimes proclaimed, but rather lands populated by communities dating back thousands of years.	1492年征服美洲并实行殖民统治的欧洲人找到的并不是荒无人烟的广阔土地，这与他们自己的说法并不一致，相反，这里的土地上原来已经住着很多人，有些已经在这里生活了几千年之久。


A large portion of the indigenous populations quickly succumbed to diseases and hardships brought by the European colonizers, but many survived, often in dominant numbers, as in Bolivia and much of the highlands of the Andes mountain region.	土著居民中的很大一部分不久就死于欧洲殖民者带来的疾病和生活困难，但也有很多人活了下来，而且在数量上占据了绝对优势，玻利维亚和安第斯山区都属于这种情况。


Almost everywhere, these surviving indigenous populations became subservient members of European-led societies.	但无论身在何处，这些活下来的土著人口都成了以欧洲人为首社会的附属成员。


The Europeans then brought millions of African slaves to the Americas.	接着欧洲人就贩运成百上千万的非洲奴隶。


After emancipation in the nineteenth century, the African-American communities remained impoverished and largely bereft of political rights.	而在19世纪的黑人解放运动后，非洲裔美国人仍然饱受贫困，被剥夺了一切政治权利。


Thus, vast inequalities of power, social standing, and economic well-being were part and parcel of the forging of the Americas.	这样，权力、社会地位和经济福利的严重不平等就成了美洲社会的重要组成部分。


Indigenous, African-American, and mestizo (mixed) communities have been fighting for their social, political, and economic rights ever since.	从那以后，土著、非洲裔美国人和混血人种就开始争取他们的社会、政治和经济权利。


Democracy in Latin America has been a hard-won struggle.	拉丁美洲的民主来之不易。


Even in the US, a country that fancies itself as a model of democracy, African-Americans were not truly enfranchised until the mid-1960’s.	即便是在把自己标榜为民主模板的美国，非洲裔美国人也直到20世纪60年代才赢得了选举权。


In Latin America, democracy has similarly been incomplete, unstable, and often inaccessible to indigenous, African-American, and mixed populations.	拉丁美洲的民主同样并不完整、也不稳定，土著人、非洲裔美国人和混血人种面对民主只能望洋兴叹。


Moreover, given the vast inequalities of power and wealth in Latin America, and with a large part of the population bereft of land and education, the region has long been vulnerable to populist politics and rebellions, with leaders promising quick gains for the dispossessed by seizing property from the elites.	不仅如此，由于拉美权力和财富现状极不平等，很大一部分人被剥夺了土地和受教育的权利，这一地区一直受到民粹政治和叛乱的困扰，希望当权的领袖许诺从上层人士手中夺取财富赈济穷人。


The elites have fought back, often brutally, to protect their property.	这引起了上层社会的激烈反抗，他们拼命想要保护自己的财产。


Politics has therefore often been more a violent than an electoral struggle, and property rights have often been tenuous.	于是政治就更像是一场暴力角逐而不是选票斗争，而财产权则往往变得异常脆弱。


A dominant pattern in both the US and Latin America has been the resistance of the dominant white communities to sharing in the financing of public investments in the “human capital” (health and education) of the black and indigenous communities.	美国和拉美的主流模式一直是占优势地位的白人群体拒绝与黑人和土著人种共享医疗和教育领域的公共投资，这种公共投资也被形象地称为“人的资本”。


While European societies have developed social welfare states with universal access to public health and education services, elites throughout the Americas have tended to favor private-sector provision of health and education, in part reflecting white populations’ unwillingness to pay for social services for other ethnic and racial groups.	尽管欧洲社会已经建立了平等享有公共医疗和教育服务的社会福利体系，但全美洲的上层人士更倾向于由私有部门提供教育和医疗，这部分反应了美洲的白人不愿意承担其它民族和种族团体的社会服务开销。


Morales’ election in Bolivia – where indigenous groups are estimated to comprise around 55% of the population and mixed-race people account for another 30% – should be viewed against this historical backdrop.	莫拉莱斯在土著人口占55%、混血人口占另外30%的玻利维亚当选总统¾这个事件应该放到上面的历史环境中加以评价。


Moreover, Bolivia is not alone: the shift from military rule to democratic politics in Latin America during the past 20 years is gradually, fitfully, but consistently, broadening political empowerment beyond the traditional elites and dominant ethnic groups.	不仅如此，玻利维亚也不是什么特例：过去20年来，拉丁美洲从军事统治向民主政治的过渡虽然缓慢、却从未间断，把政治权力交付给了除传统上的精英阶层和优势种族以外的更广泛的群体。


In Peru, for example, Alejandro Toledo is that country’s first indigenous president.	比如在秘鲁，亚历杭德罗·托莱多（Alejandro Toledo）就当选为该国的第一任土著总统。


In the longer term, the spread of democracy in Latin America promises not only fairer societies, but also economically more dynamic societies, through increased public investments in health, education, and job skills.	从长远看，拉丁美洲民主的发展不仅会使社会更加公正，经济更为繁荣，还能够扩大在医疗、教育和职业技能等领域的公共投入。


The region’s chronic under-investment in education, particularly in science and technology, is partly responsible for its economic stagnation during the past quarter-century.	过去25年来，该地区对教育、特别是科技领域的投入不足是导致经济发展滞后的部分原因。


Unlike East Asia and India, most of Latin America did not make a breakthrough to high-technology industries, instead suffering a period of low GDP growth, debt crises, and macroeconomic instability.	与东亚和印度不同，多数拉美国家都没有在高科技领域取得突破，这些国家受到国内生产总值增长缓慢、债务危机和宏观经济不稳定等因素的困扰。


This can now change, at least gradually.	局面会有所改变，至少会逐渐改变。


Bolivia would do well to follow the example of its eastern neighbor, Brazil, which has experienced a surge in educational and scientific investments since its democratization in the 1980’s.	玻利维亚如果能以其��侧邻国巴西为榜样会取得不错的发展，巴西在20世纪80年代实现民主化后，教育和科技投资都有了长足的进步。


Rising educational attainment is helping to promote more technologically sophisticated exports as well.	提高教育水平也有助于促进高科技出口的发展。


Of course, Morales’ election also raises many important short-term doubts and questions.	当然，莫拉莱斯的当选也引发了很多重要的短期疑问。


Will the new government follow responsible economic policies, or will Bolivia flirt yet again with destabilizing populist measures, as it has done so often in the past?	新政府是否会执行负责任的经济政策？ 玻利维亚是否仍然会像以前那样，耍些民粹主义政策的花样，进而影响到国家的稳定？


Will Morales renegotiate the laws and contracts governing Bolivia’s vast natural gas reserves, as his government is rightly committed to do, in a way that does not scare away urgently needed foreign investment?	莫拉莱斯是否会行使政府的合法权力，重新谈判有关玻利维亚天然气矿藏管理的法律和合同，但又不把国家急需的外资吓跑？


Bolivia has entered a new era of mass mobilization of its long-suffering but now victorious indigenous communities.	玻利维亚备受折磨的土著人口现在已经取得了胜利，进入到全体总动员的时代。


The short-term outlook is uncertain.	短期的前景的确很难确定。


In the longer run, however, it’s right to bet on the economic benefits of democratization.	但从长远来看，相信民主化带来的经济利益无疑是正确的选择。


Two Blows Against Illiberal Democracy	不自由民主的双重打击


SANTIAGO – The number of elected governments competing to be the world’s worst has now fallen by two.	圣地亚哥—竞争世界最差的民选政府现在只剩下两个。


Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe remains in office, as does Hungary’s Viktor Orbán.	津巴布韦的穆加贝仍在掌权，匈牙利的欧尔班亦然。


Poland is slipping into illiberalism, and regimes stretching from North Africa to the Hindu Kush are already there.	波兰正在滑向不自由（illiberalism），而从北非到兴都库什的各个政权已经跻身不自由行列。


But 12 years of arrogant autarchy under Néstor and Cristina Kirchner have just ended in Argentina.	在阿根廷，内斯托和克里斯蒂娜·基什内尔夫妇12年的傲慢独裁刚刚结束。


And a stunning defeat in parliamentary elections surely marks the beginning of the end of 16 years of churlish chavismo in Venezuela.	而在议会选举中惨败必将成为脾气无常的查韦斯主义在委内瑞拉末日的开端。


That is cause enough for cheer.	这足以令人欢呼。


In Venezuela, all cards were stacked in favor of President Nicolás Maduro, Hugo Chávez’s hand-picked successor: arbitrary imprisonment of opposition leaders, intimidation of anti-government protesters by thuggish gangs, and what Human Rights Watch politely called “aggressive steps to reduce the availability of media outlets that engage in critical programming.”	在委内瑞拉，所有形势都对总统查韦斯钦定的继任者、总统马杜罗有利：随意关押反对派领导人、用黑道暗杀恐吓反政府示威者，以及人权观察组织（Human Rights Watch）委婉指出的“大力阻止媒体参与重要规划。 ”


Yet the opposition managed to win two-thirds of the seats in the single-chamber parliament.	但反对派仍在单院制议会中赢得了三分之二议席。


That gives Maduro’s opponents the qualified majority needed to amend the constitution, remove politicized judges and regulators, and, if it comes to it, hold a referendum to remove Maduro.	这使马杜罗的反对者有了足够多数修宪，撤掉政治化的法官和监管者，并且可能举行全民公决推翻马杜罗。


Two weeks earlier, voters in Argentina’s presidential election had also defied the odds, narrowly giving a second-round victory to Mauricio Macri.	两周前，阿根廷总统选举也曝出冷门，马克里在第二轮选举中险胜。


The Kirchners never went to the chavista extremes of locking up opponents or shutting down television stations.	基什内尔家族从未走向查韦斯主义的极端，关押反对者或取缔电视台。


But they did not hesitate to use the power of the state to perpetuate themselves in power, harassing opposition newspapers, manipulating judicial investigations, and abolishing the independence of the central bank.	但他们毫不犹豫地利用国家权力让他们自己的权力永久化，骚扰反对派报纸，操纵司法调查，并取消中央银行的独立性。


With the economy flat in Argentina and in free-fall in Venezuela, and inflation rates in both countries among the highest in the world, pocketbook issues obviously influenced these election surprises.	阿根廷经济萎靡，委内瑞拉更是一落千丈，两国通货膨胀率都名列世界最高之列，民生问题显然是影响这些选举冷门背后的因素。


The standard boom-and-bust cycle provides a plausible interpretation: incumbents could win elections only so long as commodity revenues remained high.	标准的枯荣周期提供了一种可靠的解读：只有在大宗商品收入保持高位时，在任者才可能赢得选举。


Once oil and soybean prices collapsed, according to this view, no anti-democratic antics short of suspending elections (which was intensely rumored in Venezuela) could save the populists from defeat.	根据这一观点，一旦石油和大豆价格崩盘，除了中止选举的反民主闹剧（在委内瑞拉，这样的传闻非常多）再无办法拯救民粹主义的失败。


Yet this interpretation is too simple.	但这样的解读太简单了。


Despite falling revenues, both governments spared little effort to spend their way to victory.	尽管收入下降，但两国政府仍然不遗余力地收买胜利。


In Argentina, the budget deficit is 7% of GDP.	在阿根廷，预算赤字为GDP的7%。


In Venezuela, no one is quite sure, though some believe it could be a whopping 24% of GDP.	在委内瑞拉，准确的数字没人知道，但有人认为预算赤字高达GDP的24%。


But voters would not let themselves be bribed.	但选民是无法收买的。


That is understandable.	这不难理解。


After all, no government handout could offset the feeling of insecurity at home and on the streets.	毕竟，政府救济不可能抵消家里和街上的不安全感。


Venezuela’s murder rate, at nearly 54 per 100,000 people, is more than twice that of Brazil and Mexico (both countries with frightening numbers of homicides).	委内瑞拉犯罪率接近每100,000人54起，是巴西和墨西哥的两倍多（后两者的自杀人数非常多）。


In Argentina, traditionally a tranquil country, drug-linked crimes have been on the rise.	阿根廷传统上是个平静的国家，但其与毒品相关的犯罪活动也在增加。


Defeating drug gangs was one of Macri’s three campaign mantras (zero poverty and ending corruption being the other two).	打击贩毒集团是马克里的三大竞选口号之一（其他两个是零贫困和结束腐败）。


But, again, no single issue can explain the election results.	但是，仍然没有单一的问题能够解释两国的选举结果。


In his influential 1997 essay “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Fareed Zakaria coined the term to describe countries that hold elections (of varying fairness) to choose their leaders, yet at the same time restrict civil liberties and democratic freedoms.	在其1997年的著名论文《不自由民主的崛起》（The Rise of Illiberal Democracy）中，法里德·扎卡里亚（Fareed Zakaria）创造了不自由民主一词形容举行（公平程度不一的）选举现则领导人，但与此同时又限制公民自由和民主自由的国家。


Under Chávez and Maduro, Venezuela became a fully illiberal democracy.	在查韦斯和马杜罗治下，委内瑞拉是一个完全不自由的民主国家。


Under the Kirchners, Argentina was on its way there.	在基什内尔家族治下，阿根廷正在朝这个方向迈进。


Yet the autocrat-wannabes were soundly defeated.	但潜在独裁者都被击败了。


In the end, what Argentina and Venezuela show – and this is bad news for the likes of Orbán and Russian President Vladimir Putin – is the inherent fragility of illiberal democracy as a political system.	最后，阿根廷和委内瑞拉证明——对于欧尔班和俄罗斯总统普京等人来说，这是个坏消息——不自由民主的政治制度具有内在脆弱性。


Under outright autocracy, public intellectuals, liberal parties, and the institutions of civil society are crushed; under illiberal democracy, they are harassed, but mostly survive.	在完全独裁的制度下，公共知识分子、自由派政党和公民社会机构都被镇压； 而在不自由民主中，它们只是受到干扰，但大多仍然存在。


Add to that modern technologies that make communicating and organizing cheap and easy, and an aspiring autocrat faces a volatile mix.	而现代技术让沟通和组织变得廉价而容易，有独裁志向的领导人面临着不确定的组合。


When objective circumstances and the correlation of forces (to use two old-fashioned concepts) permit, citizens spring into action.	当客观条件和不同力量的相关性（借用两个老派概念）允许时，公民就会采取行动。


That is exactly what happened in Argentina and Venezuela during the run-up to the recent elections.	阿根廷和委内瑞拉在最近的选举前的情况就是如此。


In Buenos Aires Province, home to nearly 40% of Argentina’s voters, María Eugenia Vidal, a 42-year-old from Macri’s party, soundly defeated Cristina Kirchner’s former chief of staff to become the province’s first woman governor.	在布宜诺斯艾利斯省（近40%的阿根廷选民居住在该省），与马克里同属一党的玛利亚·尤金尼亚·比达尔（María Eugenia Vidal）大胜克里斯蒂娜·基什内尔的前任幕僚长，成为该省首任女省长。


Neighborhood organizations proved key in defeating the local Peronist political machine, reputedly Argentina’s most potent.	社区组织成为击败地方庇隆主义政治机器（据说是阿根廷最强大的政治力量）的��键。


In Venezuela, university students and NGOs designed election-monitoring systems to make potential fraud by the government easier to detect.	在委内瑞拉，大学生和非政府组织设计了选举监控系统，让政府作弊行为更容易被揭发。


Attempts to make democracy illiberal are also foundering elsewhere in Latin America.	让民主失去自由的尝试在其他拉丁美洲地区也纷纷以失败告终。


Ecuadorian citizens took to the streets to protest President Rafael Correa’s attempt to have himself re-elected indefinitely.	厄瓜多尔人民走上街头抗议总统科雷拉让自己无限次连任的图谋。


In Nicaragua, Sandinista President Daniel Ortega’s alliances with questionable local businessmen and his deal with a mysterious Chinese entrepreneur to build a new canal through Central America are not going unchallenged.	在尼加拉瓜，桑地诺党（Sandinista）总统奥尔特加与有问题的地方商人勾结，并与神秘的中国企业家签订协议建设横穿中美洲的运河，这些行为都受到了挑战。


And Bolivia’s president Evo Morales, arguably the wiliest of the populist lot, is quietly switching camps.	而玻利维亚总统莫拉莱斯——他也许是最狡猾多端的民粹主义者——正在悄悄地转换阵营。


He played a friendly football match with Macri the night before the new president’s inauguration.	他在马克里成为新总统前一天晚上和他举行了一场足球友谊赛。


In Argentina and Venezuela, what plausibly mattered most in the end was voters’ desire to live in what one might call a normal country.	在阿根廷和委内瑞拉，最有可能最终起作用的或许还是选民对于生活在可称之为正常国家中的渴望。


That means a country where government institutions quietly do their work, presidents neither threaten citizens nor give three-hour speeches that television stations are forced to carry, people can walk down the street without fear, and the economy is not perennially teetering on the brink of financial collapse.	这意味着政府机构悄悄地做好它的工作，总统从不威胁公民或者发表电视台必须播出的三小时讲话，人民可以不必恐慌地走在大街上，经济也不会终日飘摇在金融崩溃边缘。


Beloved Argentine children’s songwriter María Elena Walsh once penned a ditty entitled “The World Upside Down,” in which thieves serve as judges, years last only a month, babies sport moustaches and beards, and dogs fall up, not down.	广受欢迎的阿根廷童谣作家玛利亚·伊莲娜·沃什（María Elena Walsh）曾经写过一首名为《世界颠倒》（The World Upside Down）的小曲，在这首歌中，盗贼成为法官，一年只有一个月的长度，婴儿长着胡须，狗腿长在背上而不是肚子上。


In Argentina and Venezuela, such a world could be coming to an end; for the sake of their citizens, may it right itself very soon.	为了阿根廷和委内瑞拉人民，这样的世界有望结束，但愿速度很快。


The Inclusion Imperative	包容是一种使命


WASHINGTON, DC – Great advances have been made toward meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) since they were initiated in 2000.	华盛顿—自2000年启动千年发展目标（Millennium Development Goals，MDGs）以来，我们在实现它们的方向上取得了重大进展。


But, unfortunately, many countries still remain far from achieving them, and, even in countries that have made substantial progress, some groups – including indigenous peoples, residents of slums or remote areas, religious or other minorities, and people with disabilities – are consistently left out.	但是，很不幸，许多国家距离实现这些目标仍然十分遥远，即使在取得了重大进步的国家，一些群体——包括原住民、贫民窟或边远地区居民、宗教或其他少数群体以及残疾人士——一直被排除在外。


As a recent World Bank report emphasizes, understanding the causes of exclusion is critical to ensuring that future development efforts are more effective and inclusive.	最新世界银行报告强调，弄清排斥的根源对于确保未来发展更加有效、更加包容至关重要。


Social and economic exclusion is not only a moral problem; it is also extremely costly.	社会和经济排斥并不只是道德问题； 它会带来极大的成本。


A 2010 World Bank report on the exclusion of the Roma from educational and economic systems in Europe estimated annual productivity losses of at least $172 million in Serbia, $273 million in the Czech Republic, and $660 million in Romania (using April 2010 exchange rates).	2010年世界银行报告估算，罗姆人被排除在欧洲教育和经济体系之外每年至少给塞尔维亚带来1. 72亿美元的生产率损失，给捷克带来2.


These losses reflect the far-reaching consequences of exclusion.	这些损失反映出排斥的深远影响。


The World Health Organization and the World Bank found that children with disabilities are less likely to enter school than their non-disabled peers – and that they also stay in school at lower rates.	世界卫生组织和世界银行发现，残疾儿童比无残疾儿童更加难以进入学校——在校成绩也比较差。


In Indonesia, there is a 60% discrepancy between the share of disabled and non-disabled children attending primary school and a 58% discrepancy for secondary school.	在印度尼西亚，残疾和非残疾儿童小学入学率存在60%的差距，初中入学率存在58%的差距。


The resulting feelings of exclusion and alienation can undermine social cohesion and even lead to unrest and conflict.	由此带来的排斥感和疏离感可能破坏社会凝聚，甚至导致动荡和冲突。


The emerging development agenda that will succeed the MDGs reflects a more acute awareness of the critical importance of inclusivity.	作为千年发展目标后继项目的新发展日程表现出对包容的关键重要性的更加敏锐的认识。


In its report on the post-2015 agenda, the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons emphasized inclusion, stating that “no person – regardless of ethnicity, gender, geography, disability, race, or other status – is denied universal human rights and basic economic opportunities.”	杰出人士高级别委员会（High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons）关于2015年后日程的报告强调了包容性，指出“任何人——不管他的民族、性别、身居何处、是否残疾、种族和其他情况怎样——都不能剥夺他的普世人权和基本经济机会。


The next development agenda, it asserts, must “end discrimination” and “tackle the causes of poverty, exclusion, and inequality.”	”报告认为，下阶段发展日程必须“结束歧视”并“着手治理贫困、排斥和不平等的根源。 ”


Given this, it is not surprising that inclusion is a cornerstone of the ambitious new proposal for the MDGs successor, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – beginning with the goal-selection process, in which developing countries are playing a leading role.	基于此，毫不奇怪包容性成了千年发展目标后继项目可持续发展目标（Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)）的基石——从目标选择开始，发展中国家正在这方面起到领导作用。


Achieving goals for social and economic inclusion will not be easy.	实现社会和经济包容性的目标决非易事。


Targets must be clearly defined, measurable, and actionable, and they must be supported by effective monitoring, evaluation, and shared frameworks of accountability.	目标必须明确定义、可以测量、可以实施，并且必须得到有效监督、评估和共同问责框架的支持。


Moreover, a system must be created to help countries transform the global goals agreed at the United Nations into concrete measures that suit their particular economic circumstances and social norms.	此外，必须建立一个系统帮助各国将联合国形成一致的全球目标转化为适合各自特殊经济环境和社会模式的实际措施。


To this end, Mexico’s government has hosted a series of workshops this year that have engaged representatives from governments, UN agencies, multilateral development banks, and academia to share visions, best practices, and methodologies to implement, measure, and monitor inclusive and sustainable goals.	在这方面，墨西哥政府今年主办了一系列研讨会，来自政府、联合国、多边开发银行和学界的代表分享了及实施、测量和监督包容性和可持续性目标的愿景、最佳实践和方法。


These discussions were informed by the international community’s commitment to tackling the structural causes of poverty, inequality, and environmental degradation.	这些讨论形成了国际社会对治理贫困、不平等性和环境恶化的结构性因素的承诺。


Social and economic inclusion lie at the heart of the World Bank Group’s goals of eliminating extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity.	社会和经济包容是世界银行集团消灭极端贫困、提振共同繁荣的目标的核心。


After all, these objectives cannot be achieved unless investment in development benefits everyone; ensuring this requires a focus on groups that have consistently been marginalized.	毕竟，如果发展投资不能惠及所有人，这些目标就无从实现，而要确保发展投资惠及所有人，就需要专注于一直被边缘化的群体。


That is why the World Bank Group established equality as a key theme of this year’s Annual Meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.	正因如此，世界银行集团和国际货币进组织将平等性作为今年年会的关键主题。


Policies and programs that seek to address social inclusion do not necessarily do more; rather, they do things differently.	试图解决社会包容性问题的政策和计划并不一定要做得更多； 而是需要做得不同。


With such an approach, South Africa has made considerable progress from institutionalized segregation toward an ideal of a “rainbow nation” in just two decades.	南非在这一方针的指导下，在短短二十年的时间里就在从制度性隔离转向“彩虹国”方面取得了极大的进步。


Similarly, Bangladesh has advanced inclusion by expanding participation in its once-exclusionary system of informal local justice, the shalish.	类似地，孟加拉国通过扩大曾经具有排斥性的非正式地方司法体系shalish推进包容性。


Vietnam’s Northern Mountains Poverty Reduction Project, created to provide improved social services and sustainable infrastructure to the region’s poor villagers, demonstrated the vital role that ethnic minority community members can play in development initiatives.	越南的北部山区减减贫工程（Northern Mountains Poverty Reduction Project）为该地区贫穷村庄提供改善的社会服务和可持续基础设施，彰显出少数社区成员也可以在发展项目中扮演关键角色。


Finally, Mexico’s Inclusive Early Childhood Development Compensatory Education Project, focused on expanding access to early-childhood-development services and improving learning outcomes in the most marginalized municipalities, has engaged with excluded groups to identify their specific needs.	最后，墨西哥的包容性早期儿童发育补偿性教育工程（Inclusive Early Childhood Development Compensatory Education Project）专注于在最边缘化的市镇扩大早期儿童发育服务的普及和改善学习效果，帮助被排斥群体认识其基本需要。


For example, it provides bilingual education, as requested by indigenous parents.	比如，应土著父母要求，该工程提供双语教育。


Of course, designing an inclusive post-2015 development agenda is only the first step.	当然，制定2015年后发展日程只是第一步。


Its successful implementation will require bold policies and strengthened global cooperation that address both the impact of inclusion and its underlying causes.	其成功的实施需要大胆的政策和强化的全球合作以解决包容的影响和根本原因。


Moreover, world leaders must apply the key lessons of the MDGs: clear targets, adequate financing, and better data are essential to evidence-based policy and monitoring its effectiveness.	此外，世界领导人必须应用千年发展目标的关键经验：明确的目标、充足的资金、更好的数据对于基于证据的政策和监督其效果至关重要。


With such an approach, the next development agenda can finally ensure that all groups gain in terms of economic opportunity and social progress.	在这样的方针下，下一个发展日程最终能够保证所有群体都能在经济机会和社会进步方面获益。


The Case for Muddling Through Brexit	蒙混过关的英国退欧


SANTA BARBARA – Panic is gripping markets – stocks and bonds are falling, the pound is plumbing new depths, fears of recession are rampant – all because a slim majority of voters in the United Kingdom decided that the country should leave the European Union.	圣芭芭拉——恐慌正席卷市场——股票和债券大跌、英镑创下新低、对经济衰退的恐惧甚嚣尘上——这些都是因为占微弱多数的英国选民决定该国应当脱欧。


The British public has spoken and the die is cast.	英国公众已经发话、骰子也已掷出。


The UK’s new prime minister, Theresa May, will have to invoke Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon.	英国新任首相特雷莎·梅将不得不行使《里斯本条约》的第50条。


Within two years, Britain will be officially out, like it or not.	两年内，不管人们是否愿意，英国必须正式退出。


But is all the market angst warranted?	但市场的担忧是否都有必要？


One could argue that the outlook is much less dire than most people realize.	有人可能会说前景比多数人设想的更加糟糕。


My advice is to take a deep breath and adopt the long view, because this story is far from over.	我的建议是在深吸一口气的同时把眼光放长远，因为这个故事还远远没有结束。


After all is said and done, the ending could in fact turn out to be surprisingly benign and, ironically, similar to what exists now.	在一切尘埃落定后，事实上的结果可能出人意料的并无多大害处，而且，讽刺的是，非常类似于现在的状况。


The challenges ahead are obvious.	未来的挑战是显而易见的。


The narrow majority for “Leave” implies that there are still many in Britain who deeply resent the idea of “Brexit.”	“脱欧派”的微弱优势意味着英国仍有许多人对“脱欧”的理念深恶痛绝。


Start with “the City,” London’s Wall Street, which, despite the UK’s use of the pound rather than the euro, has long served as the EU’s pulsing financial center and its gateway to the rest of the world’s markets.	从“首都”开始，伦敦的华尔街尽管使用英镑而非欧元，却一直发挥着欧盟活跃的金融中心及通往世界市场门户的作用。


With Britain out altogether, large sectors of the City’s business can be expected to migrate to new homes on the continent.	如果英国彻底脱欧，可以预料伦敦的大部分金融业将迁往欧洲大陆的新家。


The only question is which city will win the race to replace London.	唯一的问题是哪座城市将在取代伦敦的竞争中胜出。


The most logical choice would seem to be Frankfurt, the home of the European Central Bank, but Paris and Amsterdam are also in the running.	最合乎逻辑的选择似乎是法兰克福，那里是欧洲央行所在地，但巴黎和阿姆斯特丹也将同时参与竞争。


Britain’s exporters are also unhappy because half of their sales are to fellow EU members.	英国的出口企业同样深感担忧，因为他们半数的销量销往其他欧盟成员国。


Nor should we forget the Scots and the Northern Irish, who voted overwhelmingly against Brexit and are now prepared to go to great lengths to preserve their membership in the European club.	我们也不能忘记苏格兰和北爱尔兰，两地压倒多数的民众投票反对英国脱欧，现在似乎准备竭尽全力保住他们在欧洲俱乐部的成员资格。


Indeed, even some of the most enthusiastic Leave campaigners have shown signs of buyer’s remorse, now that the price of Brexit is becoming increasingly clear.	事实上，随着英国脱欧代价变得日益显著，就连某些最狂热的脱欧活动者也已经表现出懊悔的迹象。


Most notorious among them is Boris Johnson, the former London mayor who, just four days after the referendum, wrote a commentary in the Daily Telegraph titled: “I Cannot Stress Too Much That Britain Is Part of Europe – And Always Will Be.”	他们中最臭名昭著的当属鲍里斯·约翰逊，这位前伦敦市长在公投仅仅4天后就在《每日电讯报》发表了一篇题为《我无论怎样强调英国是欧洲的一部分都不为过——而且今后仍将是这样》的评论文章。


So, how can Britain uphold the democratic will of its voters and yet remain “part of Europe,” as the City and others would like?	那么英国如何秉承其选民的民主意愿并仍然保持是“欧洲的一部分”，就像伦敦和其他许多地方的民众所希望的那样？


The answer is simple: It should muddle through.	答案再简单不过：它应当蒙混过关。


This shouldn’t be too hard in the end.	最终理应不难实现这一目标。


This, after all, is the country that had, as the historian John Robert Seeley once wrote, “conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind.”	毕竟，就像历史学家约翰·罗伯特·西利曾经写到的那样，这个国家曾“心不在焉地征服了半个世界的民众。 ”


Fortunately, the EU itself also has a proud tradition of muddling through the challenges it faces, long relying on messy arrangements to accommodate its various members’ needs and demands.	幸运的是，欧盟本身也有着在挑战面前蒙混过关的优良传统。 长期以来，欧盟一直依赖乱七八糟的安排来满足其不同成员国的需要和要求。


The EU most likely would have collapsed early on had it not been for what The Economist has described as its “spirit of grubby compromise.”	如果不是靠被《经济学家》誉为“肮脏的妥协精神”的支撑，欧盟很有可能早已陷入崩溃。


Where divergent interests cannot be easily reconciled, the EU has mastered the techniques of obfuscation and ambiguity to keep the beast lumbering forward.	虽然各种不同利益很难轻易调和，但欧盟却精通混淆和模糊的技术来保证这头怪兽缓慢前行。


Can such an arrangement now keep Britain in Europe?	这样一种安排现在能否保障英国留在欧盟?


If I were a betting man, I would say yes.	如果让我下注，我会赌能。


Policymakers know that despite the definitive wording of the Brexit referendum, the choice was never a simple “in” or “out.”	决策者知道尽管英国脱欧公投措辞十分明确，但选择永远不是简单的“留下”或“退出”。


Between those two poles is a host of possible compromises that would leave Britain an informal partner of the EU, even if no longer a formal member.	在这两极之间存在一系列可能的妥协办法，能使英国成为欧盟的非正式伙伴，尽管不再是正式的成员国。


The most likely possibility that comes to mind is known as the “Norway option.”	“挪威方案”是首先想到的最有可能的选项。


Norway is a member of the European Economic Area, but it has access to the EU’s single market.	挪威是欧洲经济区的一员，但拥有欧盟单一���场的市场准入。


In return for that privilege, Norway contributes annually to the EU budget, agrees to play by all the bloc’s rules – even if it has no part in their formulation – and allows for the free movement of EU citizens.	为了换取这种特权，挪威每年向欧盟预算缴纳会费，并同意遵守欧元区的所有规则——尽管它自身在制定规则时没有发言权——并允许欧盟公民自由流动。


There is little reason to doubt that Britain could negotiate something along similar lines.	几乎没有什么理由怀疑英国脱欧谈判将遵循类似的原则。


The easiest part to negotiate would be the annual contribution, which need not be very different from what the UK transfers to the EU now.	谈判最容易的部分是每年缴纳会费，这笔钱只需大致保持英国现在每年转给欧盟的金额。


Nor should it be difficult to find some way to give Britain an opt-out on any new EU rules, similar to what it already enjoys outside the eurozone under the banner of “vital national interests.”	找到某种方法允许英国选择不执行欧盟任何新增规定也并非难事，这与英国打着“关键国家利益”的旗号在欧元区外已经享受到的待遇并无多大不同。


The biggest stumbling block is immigration, which motivated so many Leave voters.	最大的绊脚石是移民问题，正是移民问题促使那么多英国民众投票脱欧。


But even here it isn’t impossible to imagine that diplomats might be able to fudge things enough to reach an agreement that even the Leave camp can stomach.	但即便如此外交官们找到某种方式蒙混过关也并非不可想象，他们可以达成模棱两可的协议，协议的内容即便脱欧阵营也可以忍受。


In short, there is a good chance that in two or three years, after the smoke has cleared, little will have changed between the UK and the EU in practical terms.	总而言之，两三年后一切水落石出之际，有很大可能英国和欧盟的实际关系并没有太大变化。


As a strictly legal matter, Britain will no longer be an EU member.	从严格的法律意义上讲，英国将不再是欧盟成员国。


But, otherwise, life will go on much as it did before.	但除此以外，生活将像以前那样一切照旧。


The EU’s spirit of “grubby compromise” will have won out again.	欧盟“肮脏的妥协”精神将会再次胜出。


Should Britain Leave the EU?	英国应该退出欧盟吗？


STANFORD – In this, the 400th year since William Shakespeare’s death, the United Kingdom faces an existential question: To be or not to be “European.”	斯坦福—值此莎士比亚逝世400周年之际，英国面临一个生存问题：做还是不做“欧洲人”。


When Britons vote in June on whether to remain in the European Union, making the right choice will require them to cut through the hyperbole on both sides of the debate and consider carefully what so-called “Brexit” would really mean for their country.	6月份，当英国人投票表决是否留在欧盟时，要想做出正确的选择需要看清争论双方的夸张之词，认真考虑所谓的“英国退出”对他们的国家真正意味着什么。


The main issues that will shape voters’ decision relate to trade relations, regulation, and the budget; foreign policy and security; and domestic policies, such as welfare and immigration.	决定选民决定的主要问题包括贸易关系、监管及预算； 外交政策及安全；


Then there are questions about the substantive and emotional benefits and baggage that attend EU membership, with all of its rules, regulations, and bureaucrats.	以及福利和移民等国内政策。 接下来的问题包括保留欧盟成员地位，接收其规则、监管和官僚所带来的实质和心理上的利弊。


The choice is stark, but the questions at issue are not all black and white.	这是个重大选择，但所牵涉到的问题不是非黑即白。


The UK is deeply connected by trade to the rest of the EU, which accounts for the largest share of Britain’s total global exports and imports, each amounting to about 30% of British GDP.	英国通过贸易与欧盟其他国家深深地联系在一起，欧盟占英国全球进出口总量比重最大（各相当于英国GDP的30%）。


Brexit would therefore have significant consequences for trade flows not just between the UK and the EU, but also in the rest of the world.	因此，英国退出将给贸易流带来巨大影响，不仅是英国与欧盟之间的贸易流，也包括世界其他地区的贸易流。


What those consequences would be depends upon the terms and timing of new trade agreements.	这些影响会带来什么取决于新贸易协定签订的条件和时间。


When the EU’s predecessor, the European Economic Community, was created in 1957, it linked just six countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands).	1957年，当欧盟的前身欧洲经济共同体（EEC）成立时，只有六个国家（比利时、法国、德国、意大利、卢森堡和荷兰）。


Given high tariffs at the time, the EEC brought substantial gains.	当时关税水平很高，因此EEC带来的好处是巨大的。


Today, the EU has 28 members and is the world’s largest market, but tariffs generally are much lower.	今天，欧盟拥有28个成员国和世界上最大的市场，但总体关税已经低了很多。


The truth is that it is impossible at this point to know how post-Brexit UK-EU trade relations would shake out.	事实是，眼下无法知晓英国退出后的英国-欧盟贸易关系会如何发展。


After all, there is no real precedent – Greenland’s departure from the EEC can hardly be considered a comparable situation – and negotiating the details of the withdrawal alone could take up to two years.	毕竟，历史上没有实际先例——格陵兰脱离EEC很难作为可比的情况——光是退欧细节谈判就可能消耗高达两年时间。


During that time, the pound would be more volatile, trade flows may be diverted or delayed, and some investment in British trade-related industries would be put on hold.	在此期间，英镑将出现波动，贸易流可能散失或延迟，英国的一些与贸易相关的投资将暂停。


Britain might emerge from such a process in a situation resembling that of Norway: a member of the European Economic Area that pays most of the regular costs of EU membership to retain most of the same trade privileges.	这一过程可能让英国身处类似于挪威的境况：作为欧洲经济区成员国，承担欧盟成员国的大部分常规成本以获得大部分相同的贸易特权。


Or it might be like Switzerland, relying on bilateral trade agreements, as it pays to be part of the single market in goods but not services.	也有可能类似于瑞士，根据双边贸易协定付钱成为欧盟商品（但不包括服务）单一市场的一部分。


Another possibility would be to go it alone in the World Trade Organization.	另一种可能性是在世界贸易组织中“单飞”。


Or Britain could create an entirely new model for itself.	或者英国为自己创造一个全新的模式。


In any case, new trade agreements with non-EU countries would be inevitable.	无论如何，与非欧盟国家的新贸易协定是不可避免的。


The UK would also pay special attention to maintaining the City of London’s role as a global financial center – a status that a Switzerland-type arrangement could undermine, as UK trade in financial services with the single market would plummet.	英国也将特别关注维持伦敦金融城作为全球金融中心的地位——瑞士式的安排可能威胁到这一地位，因为英国与欧盟单一市场的金融服务贸易将暴跌。


And paying to retain trade preferences could expose Britain to future changes in EU policy.	而花钱保留贸易优惠待遇可能让英国受到未来欧盟政策变化影响。


For example, if the EU used future financial subsidies to support highly indebted periphery countries, the UK budget could also be affected.	比如，如果欧盟用未来金融补贴支持负债累累的外围国家，英国预算也可能受到影响。


In short, in the event of Brexit, the UK may face some very difficult decisions on trade.	简言之，如果英国退出，英国可能面临一些贸易方面的非常艰难的抉择。


But trade is just the beginning.	但贸易只是开始。


The Brexit referendum will also have political repercussions, particularly if the Conservative Party splits over the issue – a distinct possibility, regardless of the outcome.	英国退出公决还将具有政治反响，特别是如果保守党因为这一问题而分裂的话——不管结果如何，这个可能性很小。


What would that mean for future UK economic policy?	这对未来英国经济政策意味着什么？


How would it affect the strength of the UK economy or Britain’s defense budget?	它将如何影响英国经济的优势或英国防务预算？


On security and foreign policy, the British have not been much impeded by the ponderous EU.	在安全和外交政策方面，英国并没有因为行动缓慢的欧盟而受到很大影响。


While the EU imposed sanctions on Syria, the UK’s parliament voted against any military involvement there.	尽管欧盟对叙利亚采取了制裁，但英国议会投票反对任何军事介入。


The UK intelligence service is, by all accounts, far ahead of most of its EU counterparts and works closely with the United States.	英国情报机关全方位遥遥领先绝大部分欧洲同侪，并与美国合作密切。


In a Brexit scenario, the UK’s intelligence ties with the US would probably become even stronger, regardless of any new limitations on its access to intelligence from some EU member countries.	在英国退出情形中，英国与美国的情报联系可能进一步加强，尽管英国可能受到一些欧盟成员国的新的情报接触限制。


The one area where the situation is not quite so tangled, at least from the British perspective, is the euro, which the UK never joined.	一个情况不那么复杂（至少从英国角度是如此）的方面是欧元，英国从未加入欧元区。


(I advised former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher not to join the eurozone’s predecessor, the Economic and Monetary Union.)	（我曾经建议前首相撒切尔夫人不要加入欧元区的前身经济和货币联盟。


This was the right call, as it enabled the UK to retain full monetary-policy authority, and thus the ability to use the exchange rate to absorb shocks when domestic booms and busts do not synchronize with those in the rest of Europe.	）这是正确的决定，因为这让英国保留了完整的货币政策权力，从而能够在国���枯荣循环与欧洲其他部分不同步时通过汇率吸收冲击。


From the EU’s perspective, losing the UK could be a serious blow, forcing the Union to provide less for its members at a higher cost.	从欧盟的角度，失去英国可能是一次重大打击，迫使该联盟只能以更高的成本向成员国提供更少的好处。


By making it easier for other countries to insist on their own special exceptions – for example, to the deficit and debt “requirements” established in the Maastricht Treaty – Brexit could pose serious problems for the EU’s future evolution.	英国退出将使其他国家更容易坚持自己的特殊豁免权——比如免受马斯特里赫特条约中的赤字和债务“要求”约束——这可能给欧盟的未来发展造成严重问题。


Already, EU members – especially the eurozone countries – have been avoiding concrete action to resolve their interdependent economic, social, banking, debt, and currency crises.	目前，欧盟成员国——特别是欧元区国家——一直在避免采取具体行动解决共生的经济、社会、银行、债务和货币危机。


While both proponents and opponents of Brexit exaggerate their case, a review of the facts suggests that saying no to Brexit would be the better option for the UK as well.	英国退出的支持者和反对者都极尽夸张之词，而仔细评估事实表明，对英国退出说“不”对于英国也是更好的选择。


If it does not like how the EU – and the European Commission – evolves, it can attempt to renegotiate its membership terms, as Prime Minister David Cameron did in February, or it can exit.	如果英国不喜欢欧盟——以及欧盟委员会——发展的趋势，它可以重新谈判其成员资格条件（如首相卡梅伦在2月份所做的那样），或者退出欧盟。


But if the UK exits now, its options become severely limited.	但如果英国现在就退出，其选择就变得非常有限。


In particular, future changes to its relationship with the EU, especially a future re-entry, if desirable, would be difficult to negotiate (perhaps especially given European leaders’ desire to deter other member states from following the UK’s example).	特别是，如果未来英国渴望改变其与欧盟的关系，特别是重新入盟的话，谈判将十分困难（考虑到欧洲领导人想威慑其他意欲效仿英国的成员国，将特别困难）。


Indeed, it could entail worse terms than Cameron has secured for his country should it remain in the EU.	事实上，其条件可能比卡梅伦为英国争取到的留在欧盟的条件更加糟糕。


What Is the Pound Telling Us?	那些英镑告诉我们的事


LONDON – I know from my 32 years in finance that the weird world of foreign-exchange markets can sometimes defy comprehension, and that trying to estimate sterling’s baseline, equilibrium value can be an exercise in futility.	伦敦—32年的金融业经验告诉我，诡异的外汇市场有时候会让人无法理解，而如果你要估算英镑的基线，寻找均衡价值可能纯属徒劳。


Indeed, in the heady hour after the Brexit referendum polls closed on June 23, the British pound initially traded above a rate of £1.5/$1.	事实上，在6月23日英国退欧公投投定离手后的那几个小时里，英镑一开始在1. 5英镑/1美元以上的价格交易。


This exchange rate turned out to reflect the now-ridiculous assumption that the “Remain” side had won.	这一汇率表明人们预计“留欧”派将胜出，现在看来，这种想法简直荒谬。


The pound has since declined 20% from that initial peak, and it has declined similarly relative to the euro.	随后英镑从这一初始高位下跌20%，兑欧元汇率也有类似跌幅。


Despite these discrepancies, we do have ways to gauge the pound’s post-Brexit performance reasonably well.	尽管存在如此反差，我们确实有办法很好地估算英镑在英国退欧后的表现。


For starters, we can compare its value today to its average value during the referendum’s campaign period, from February to June.	首先，我们可以比较英镑现在的价值与公投进行期间（2月—6月）的平均价值。


Viewed from this perspective, the pound has declined by a still significant 13% since voters decided that the United Kingdom should leave the European Union.	从这个角度看，英镑在选民决定英国退出欧盟后仍然大跌13%。


Beyond looking at purchasing power parity, we also have models for estimating real-exchange-rate (RER) equilibrium, such as by identifying the exchange rate at which a country can achieve a sustainable current-account balance, or the rate that would allow an economy to reach full employment.	除了购买力平价，我们还有估算真实汇率（RER）均衡的模型，如将均衡汇率定为一国能够实现可持续经常项目平衡的汇率，或让经济达到充分就业状态的汇率。


These models include Goldman Sachs’s Dynamic Equilibrium Exchange Rate and the Peterson Institute for International Economics’ Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate.	这些模型包括高盛公司的动态均衡汇率（GSDEER）和彼得森国际经济研究所的基本均衡汇率（FEER）。 目前GSDEER估算值为1.


The GSDEER’s current estimated equilibrium rate is £1.44/$1.63, and the FEER’s is £0.88/€0.74, which implies that the pound is now undervalued – by anywhere from 14% to 24% against the dollar, and by as much as 20% against the euro – relative to its notional fair value.	88英镑/0. 74欧元，这表明英镑目前相较其理论公允价值被低估——兑美元低估了14—24%，兑欧元低估了高达20%。


These misalignments could be partly attributable to overvaluation of the other currencies.	这些不一致部分可以归因于其他货币高估。


But let us assume that these estimates are at least roughly accurate, and that the pound is now broadly undervalued relative to the currencies of its major trading partners.	但不妨认为这些估算至少只是粗略的正确，并且眼下英镑兑主要贸易伙伴货币大多都存在低估。


An optimistic interpretation is that, all things being equal, the pound’s decline implies an improved balance-of-payments position in the future, and that the UK economy will undergo a much needed rebalancing.	一个乐观的解读是，如果一切顺利，英镑贬值将使未来收支平衡状况改善，而英国经济将迎来急需的再平衡。


To be sure, economic data released since the referendum suggest bullishness in the manufacturing sector, and the National Institute of Economic and Social Research recently forecast that the UK’s balance of payments could achieve a small surplus by 2019.	诚然，公投后公布的经济数据表明制造业向好，而国家经济和社会研究局最近预测英国收支平衡将在2019年实现略有盈余。


Of course, all things are not equal, so another interpretation is that the current equilibrium exchange rates will decline further, reflecting the market’s pessimism about the UK economy’s supply-side outlook and future productivity growth.	当然，一切顺利是一种奢望，因此另一种解读是当前均衡汇率将进一步下跌，反映市场对英国经济共识侧前景和未来生产率增长持悲观态度。


Much will depend on whether the UK actually does leave the EU, and, if it does, on the government’s post-Brexit trade arrangements and economic policies.	很多东西取决于英国是否真的脱离欧盟，如果是的话，则要取决于政府的退欧后贸易安排和经济政策。


Another, complementary interpretation is that the pound’s weakness, notwithstanding its potential cyclical benefits, reflects a risk premium on the UK, owing to its tricky EU exit path and other policy uncertainties.	另一个互补性解读是英镑的弱势尽管能带来一些周期性收益，但它反映的是英国的风险溢价，而风险溢价来自退出欧盟的难度和其他政策不确定性。


We can estimate such risk premia by adjusting the RER equilibrium models to account for “normal” cyclical economic developments.	我们可以调整RER均衡模型，考虑“常态”周期性经济发展趋势，以此估算风险溢价。


Higher interest rates and low, stable inflation can give a country’s currency an edge over other currencies, so if we factor in the real-interest-rate differential, we can determine a notional price at which a currency should trade.	高利率和稳定的低通胀能给一国货币带来相较其他货币的优势，因此，如果我们考虑真实利率差异因素，就能确定货币的理论价格。


When we do this for the pound against the dollar and the euro, the pound’s notional exchange rate is still substantially weaker than its actual spot rate, which suggests that the market has indeed factored in a considerable risk premium.	如果我们就英镑兑美元和欧元进行这样的计算，则英镑的理论汇率仍要比当前实际现汇价格显著更低，这表明市场确实考虑了相当大的风险溢价因素。


These estimates have public-policy implications.	这些估算颇有公共政策含义。


For starters, British policymakers should acknowledge that a declining pound is helpful, but not sufficient, for improving the UK’s external position and rebalancing its economy.	首先，英国决策者应该承认英镑贬值是有益的，但不足以改善英国的外部处境和经济再平衡。


Second, the pound’s daily and weekly gyrations reflect a market assumption that a “hard” Brexit – whereby the UK forfeits its EU single-market access in order to restrict immigration – will negatively affect productivity growth.	其次，英镑的日和周波动反映出市场认为“硬”退欧——英国为了收紧移民政策而丧失进入欧盟单一市场的权利——将对生产率增长产生负面影响。


If the market is correct, then the UK’s future growth will depend even more on policymakers’ ability to boost post-Brexit trade.	如果市场正确，那么英国的未来增长将更加取决于决策者是否能够提振退欧后的贸易。


Moreover, policymakers will have to develop a sophisticated immigration strategy to attract high-skill workers, even as they restrict the movement of people overall.	此外，决策者必须制定成熟的移民战略以吸引高技能工人，即使他们要从整体上收紧人的流动。


Finally, if there is even a chance that foreign-exchange markets have built in risk premia for the UK (and it appears that there is), policymakers will have to be very careful not to suggest any other changes to the UK’s economic-policy framework.	最后，即使外汇市场有可能已经考虑了英国的风险溢价（貌似确实如此），决策者也必须慎之又慎，不能表现出英国经济政策框架还会有其他变化。


Any new threats to the Bank of England’s independence, in particular, could provoke a reckoning from the market.	特别是任何对英格兰银行独立地位的新威胁可能导致市场重新审视英镑。


Post-EU Depression	欧盟东扩后的消沉


The government of Poland collapsed first, followed by the Czech government.	先是波兰政府崩溃，接着是捷克政府，然后是匈牙利总理辞职。


Then the Hungarian prime minister resigned. The government of Slovakia lost its majority and is unstable.	斯洛伐克政府已经失去了大多数席位，现在很不稳定。


Within months, if not weeks, of realizing the long-sought goal of European Union membership, a wave of political instability surged through Central Europe.	在意识到欧盟成员国的长期目标之后，一场政治不安定在几个月内，如果不是几个星期，席卷了整个中欧。


Why should this historic event cause such political upheaval?	为什么这一历史性的事件会引起如此大的政治巨变？


Some argue that these countries are inherently unstable. Their political cultures are underdeveloped.	有一些人认为，这些国家本来就不稳定，它们的政治文化也不成熟。


They were admitted to the EU only fifteen years after the fall of communism, and not all of them had previous experience with democracy.	它们被欧盟接纳仅仅15年，是在共产主义垮台之后。 它们中不是所有国家先前都有民主的经验。


Unlike EU members admitted during earlier rounds of enlargement, the Central Europeans suffer from widespread corruption, political nepotism, fragile political parties with unclear identities, and weak civil societies.	和那些早期的欧盟扩大成员国不同，中欧遭遇过大范围腐败、政治裙带关系、身份不明的脆弱政党和软弱的民间社会等问题。


All of these problems were to some extent hidden due to the external pressure of EU accession, and have now erupted into full view.	所有这些问题在欧盟东扩的外部压力下被一定程度地掩盖了。 而现在完全地暴露了出来。


But there are more obvious causes for Central Europe's current problems.	不过，除了以上这些，中欧近来的问题还有其它一些更显然的原因。


Above all, every government that successfully led its country into the EU had to adopt-often under pressure and hastily-a range of unpopular steps.	每一个成功加入欧盟的国家都必须接受--经常是被迫和匆忙地--一系列不受欢迎的步骤。


Although most citizens in these countries supported EU membership, many thought that their governments paid too high a price.	尽管这些国家的大多数市民都愿意加入欧盟，但很多人认为他们的国家为此付出了太高代价。


This was partly because the EU was not as generous toward its newest members as it had been toward new members in the past.	这一部分是因为欧盟对待这些国家没有象对以前加入的成员国那样慷慨。


Moreover, only fifteen years ago, eight of the ten new members had state-controlled economies, which meant that a period of painful transition toward a market economy was followed by, or overlapped with, sometimes painful reforms necessary for EU membership.	而且，仅仅在15年前，这10个新成员国中的8个还是计划经济国家，这意味着它们随后要经历一段痛苦的由计划经济向市场经济转变的时期，或交叉地，进行一些对欧盟成员国来说必要的改革。


Even before attaining EU membership, all candidate countries' governments had to start adopting measures aimed at meeting the Maastricht criteria within several years, because the new members had committed themselves in their accession treaties to adopting the euro.	即使是在成为欧盟成员国之前，所有的候选国家政府必须在几年内开始接受马斯特里赫特标准。 因为新的成员国已经在它们的加入条约中同意使用欧元。


The most important measures required cutting budget deficits, often at the cost of lowering public expenditures.	最重要的标准就是降低预算赤字，而这通常是以减少公共开支为代价。


In the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, the task of completing such difficult reforms just before crossing the "finish line" fell to socialist parties, forcing them to betray their socialist identity in the eyes of leftist voters.	在捷克、匈牙利和波兰，在最后日期前完成如此艰难的改革任务，对社会主义政党来说，意味着他们不得不背叛他们在左翼选民眼里的社会主义者身份。


As a result, their historic mission doomed them.	结果是，他们的历史任务给他们带来了厄运。


In Poland, the Democratic Left Alliance fell apart shortly before accession, while the Czech Social Democrats came close to a similar split.	在波兰，民主左翼联盟在波兰成为欧盟成员国之前不久被分裂。 与此同时，捷克社会民主党也遭遇了同样的命运。


Ruling coalitions were at the same time in disadvantageous positions vis-à-vis opposition parties, which attacked the incumbents for failing to negotiate good membership terms, without themselves having to pass the test of negotiating better conditions.	而执政联合在和反对党的对抗中也并不处于有利位置。 反对党攻击他们在与欧盟进行谈判时没有为国家争取到更多好处，他们必须首先通过谈判技巧考试这一关。


Government parties were also hurt by the nationalistic rhetoric of center-right parties, which repeatedly warned against a betrayal of national interests.	政府党派也受到中右翼党派的国家主义言辞的伤害。 中右翼党派不断重复发出反对背叛国家利益的警告。


The overlap between the end of the accession process and heated discussions about the new European Constitution played into the hands of the opposition.	从加入程序结束到激烈的关于新欧盟宪法的讨论，都掌控在反对党手中。


The political right in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic warned against a possible loss of sovereignty should the Constitution be adopted.	在匈牙利、波兰和捷克，政治权利都警告说接受宪法可能会导致主权的丧失。


Such rhetoric resonates powerfully in former Soviet satellites that have only recently regained their sovereignty.	这种说法引起了最近才重新赢得主权的前苏维埃人造卫星的强烈共鸣。


Despite all this pressure, the ruling coalitions in the Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary held together, as the historical mission of attaining EU membership worked like a lid on a pressure cooker.	面对所有这些压力，波兰、捷克和匈牙利的执政联合决定联手，因为成为欧盟成员国的历史任务就象是压力锅上的盖子。


Addressing conflicts among government coalition parties, as well as within individual government parties, was postponed until after official EU entry.	指出政府联合政党之间的分歧，以及单个政府政党之间的分歧，都被延迟了，一直到正式加入欧盟以后才重新提及。


Not surprisingly, accession untied politicians' hands, and conflicts came to the fore.	毫不奇怪，加入欧盟后，政治家们握在一起的手松开了，冲突开始成为核心问题。


Polish Prime Minister Lezsek Miller resigned one day after his country's official admission to the EU.	波兰总理米勒在波兰加入欧盟的第二天就递交了辞呈。


Czech Prime Minister Vladimir Spidla was forced to resign by his own party several weeks later.	捷克总理弗拉迪米尔·什皮德拉在几个星期后被他自己的政党强迫辞职。


Hungarian Prime Minister Peter Medgyessy was pushed out in late August.	匈牙利总理彼德梅杰司在8月下旬被踢出政坛。


Even the center-right Slovak government was not spared.	即使是中右翼的斯洛伐克政府也没有逃掉。


It took it upon itself not only to meet EU membership criteria, but also push forward with other painful reforms.	它不但没有达到欧盟成员国的标准，还得继续进行另外一些痛苦的改革。


The comfortable role of criticizing the government fell into the hands of leftist populists, for a change.	批评政府、要求改革这一轻松的工作落在了左翼平民主义者身上。


The Slovak government is still in power, but it has lost its majority and could fall soon.	虽然斯洛伐克政府仍然具有权势，但它已经失去了大多数席位，可能很快就会倒台。


In Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, we will now witness a period of unabashed populism.	在波兰、匈牙利和捷克，我们将目睹一段并不羞愧的平民主义时期。