Businessmen and women become afraid that stocks, and the values of the machines and factories that back those stocks, may fall further.	商界人士担心，股票以及支撑股票的设备和厂房的价值会越跌越深。


Fear feeds on itself, and the prediction that stocks will lose value becomes self-fulfilling.	恐惧是一种自强化过程，股票价值会下跌将成为自我实现的预言。


The 2008 recession was triggered by the collapse of a real-estate bubble.	2008年衰退的触发因素是地产泡沫的破灭。


Housing wealth in the US has fallen by 34% since its peak in 2006, and is still declining.	在美国，住房财富从2006年峰值下跌了34%，且还在进一步下跌。


The stock market fell by almost 50% from its 2007 peak and remains down by nearly a third.	股市从2007年峰值下跌了近50%，至今距离前高仍有三分之一的距离。


This enormous loss of wealth caused a large and persistent drop in consumption demand, which has led to an increase in unemployment.	如此大幅度的财富缩水造成了消费需求剧烈且持久的疲软，从而导致了失业的增加。


Until we are willing to explore new solutions, the misery experienced by millions of unemployed workers will continue.	除非我们愿意尝试新解决方案，否则的话，几百万失业工人将继续在痛苦中挣扎。


A quantitative-easing policy in which a central bank buys risky assets can prevent price fluctuations and restore the value of financial wealth.	央行买入风险资产的量化宽松政策可以防止价格波动、重塑金融财富价值。


These purchases would need Treasury support, since this tactic is in effect a fiscal policy, not a monetary policy.	政府的买入行为需要财政部的支持，因为这一策略本质上是财政政策而非货币政策。


And, by involving the Treasury, the purchase of risky assets could be financed by issuing debt, rather than by printing more money, thereby attenuating inflationary fears.	此外，若能让财政部介入，买入风险资产的资金就可以通过发行债券融得，而不必印刷新钞进而引发通胀担忧。


The Great Recession did not turn into Great Depression II because of coordinated action by governments around the world.	大衰退不会变为第二次大萧条，因为全世界政府能够协调行动。


Although fiscal expansion may have played a role in this success, central bank intervention was the most important component by far.	尽管财政扩张在其中起到了一定效果，但到目前为止，央行干预才是最重要的。


Quantitative easing works by increasing the value of wealth.	量化宽松通过提振财富价值起作用。


In both the US and the UK, it reduced the real expected return on long-term government bonds, which in turn nurtured a recovery in the stock market.	不管是在美国还是在英国，量化宽松都减少了长期政府债券的实际预期回报，这有利于股市复苏。


We need not tolerate 9% unemployment as the new normal.	我们必须接受9%的失业率，它将成为新常态。


Confidence is a self-fulfilling prophecy, and we can, and should, manage it by direct intervention in asset markets.	信心是一种自我实现的预言，我能够也应该通过直接干预资产市场来管理信心。


The way ahead leads through science, not ideology, dogma, or failed theories.	指引我们前进的是科学，而不是意识形态、教条主义和失灵理论。


The Triumph of Fear	恐惧的胜利


PARIS – In May 1981, Pope John Paul II survived an assassination attempt.	巴黎—1981年5月，教皇保罗二世在一次暗杀行动中幸存。


Thirty years later, Osama bin Laden was killed by United States Special Forces.	三十年后，本·拉登被美国特种部队射杀。


But, looking at the world now, one could easily conclude that the inspirational leader whose credo was Franklin Roosevelt’s injunction to fear only “fear itself” has lost, and that the fanatic who wanted fear to dominate the world of the “infidels” has prevailed.	但是，看看当下的世界，我们可以轻易地看出，以富兰克林·罗斯福关于唯一的恐惧是“恐惧本身”的训喻为圭臬的鼓舞人心的领袖失败了，想要恐惧主导“异教徒”世界的狂热分子胜利了。


Today, fear is ubiquitous, and the bombings at the Boston Marathon must be understood in that context, for the attack both highlights and deepens our pervasive sense of insecurity.	如今，恐惧无处不在，波士顿马拉松爆炸案必须放在这一背景下解读，因为此次袭击凸显和深化了我们普遍的不安全感。


The scale of the Boston attack was, of course, much smaller than that of September 11, 2001.	当然，波士顿袭击的规模远小于2001年9月11日。


But Americans will remember this homegrown plot as a highly symbolic moment: an attack on a venerable international sporting event on Patriots’ Day.	但美国人会把这一本土出品的袭击铭记为具有高度象征意义的时刻：在爱国者日的盛大国际体育盛会上发生的袭击。


The marathon is a cherished event, for it reflects the peaceful values of a democratic society that seeks to transcend its challenges through sheer endurance.	波士顿马拉松是一项颇受欢迎的运动，它体现了以绝对的耐力战胜挑战的民主社会的和评价值。


Will an attack on such a symbol reinforce the prevalence of fear in an American society that was once defined by hope?	这样一次具有象征意义的袭击会在曾经以希望为标志的美国社会中扩散恐惧吗？


Fear of terrorism is only one segment of what might best be described as a multi-level structure of dread.	对恐怖主义的恐惧只是可以用多层次恐慌结构来予以最佳概括的东西的一个方面。


Domestically, there is fear of “spontaneous” massacres like the slaughter in December of schoolchildren in Newtown, Connecticut.	就国内而言，存在对“自发”大屠杀的恐惧，如12月发生在康涅狄格州纽顿市的屠杀。


Internationally, there is fear of civil wars in the Arab world; of social unrest in crisis-ridden Europe; and of war in Asia resulting from North Korea’s brinkmanship or the irresponsible escalation of territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas.	就国际而言，存在对阿拉伯世界内战的恐惧； 存在对饱受危机困扰的欧洲社会动荡的恐惧，存在对朝鲜边缘政策和东海和南海领土争端导致亚洲战争的恐惧。


And then there are global fears linked to climate change, epidemics, cyber wars, and more.	还有与气候变化、传染病、网络战等等有关的全球性恐惧。


The list seems endless.	这个名单似乎永远写不完。


Revisiting my 2009 book, The Geopolitics of Emotion: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are reshaping the World, it seems clear that fear has gained the upper hand.	在我2009年的著作《情感的地缘政治：恐惧、羞辱和希望文化如何改变世界》（The Geopolitics of Emotion: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are reshaping the World）中，我明确地指出，恐惧已经占了上风。


Does this mean that a fearful West has prevailed once again?	这意味着恐惧的西方会再次胜出吗？


And is fear in the rest of the world a response to the West’s strength, or to its new weakness?	世界其他地区的恐惧是对西方优势的反应，还是对其新劣势的反应？


Either way, the West has now spread its negative emotions, after having once imposed its mostly materialist values on the rest of the world.	不论如何，在给世界其他地区加上了它的物质主义价值后，如今西方散播了它的负能量。


It is, of course, too early to say whether this is a sign of deep change, or merely a passing trend, and reality is, no doubt, much less simple.	当然，现在就断言这是深刻变革的信号只是过境趋势还为时尚早，毫无疑问，现实远比这复杂得多。


But, to distill the essence of today’s mood, one could say that fear is the direct result of the process of globalization: the world is not necessarily flat, but it definitely feels smaller – and “others” appear more menacing than ever.	但是，论及当今情绪的本质，你可以说恐惧是全球化过程的直接后果：世界未必是平的，但毫无疑问变得小了很多——“他人”比以前任何时候威胁都大。


In the aftermath of World War II, a group of idealistic Frenchmen bent on reconciliation with their former enemy declared that France would have “the Germany she deserved.”	第二次世界大战后，一群理想主义法国人下决心与从前的敌人和解，他们说，“德国值得拥有”。


That is, German behavior would be a function of how France behaved toward its defeated neighbor.	也就是说，德国的行为将是法国如何对待其战败邻国的结果。


In the same vein, we will have the “other” we deserve.	同样地，我们也会有值得拥有的“他人”。


If our behavior is based on fear, we will look with suspicion on all those who are different from us, deepening the alienation of the millions inside and outside our countries who believe that they cannot integrate into even the most open societies.	如果我们把行为建立在恐惧的基础上，我们就会带着狐疑的目光打量所有与我们不同的人，加深我们祖国内外数百万认为自己无法融入哪怕是最开放的社会的人的疏离感。


Their response could, in turn, call into question that very openness.	而他们的反应反过来将让开放性变得可疑���


Of course, in today’s interdependent and transparent world, no society can protect itself fully.	当然，在当今互相依赖的透明世界中，没有哪个社会可疑完全实现自我保护。


There is no isolation from globalized markets, your neighbors’ identity crises, or the humiliation felt by those you have tried with so much (at times misguided) energy to integrate.	你不可能孤立于全球市场，独立于邻居的身份危机，或独立于你花了如此多（往往是被误导的）能量试图融入的群体所感到的羞辱感。


The simultaneity of unmanageable uncertainties – the crux of globalization itself – may lure some into seeking to reverse a process that has become inescapable and over which no one has control.	难以应对的不确定性的同时发生——全球化本身的缺陷——可能会导致一些人寻求扭转已变得不可逃脱、无法控制的过程。


Given that all alternatives to globalization are unrealistic, frightening, or both, how can we sublimate, transcend, or at least channel our fears?	全球化的所有替代方案要么不现实，要么令人害怕，要么两者兼具，那么，我们怎样才能升华、克服或至少疏导我们的恐惧？


Can Western societies remain what they are, or at least should be – open, tolerant, and respectful of difference – while responding to demands for greater protection against the multifaceted threats, whether imagined or real, that we face?	西方社会能继续保持原有——或者应该有的开放、容忍和尊重差异，与此同时又能响应针对我们所面临的多层次威胁——不管是想象的还是现实的——的更多保护的要求吗。


How we answer these questions will in large part determine whether, in a relentlessly globalizing world, fear has the last word.	我们对这些问题的答案将在很大程度上决定，在这个残酷地全球化的世界中，恐惧是否是最后的特征。


The Trapdoors at the Fed’s Exit	美联储的退出困局


MUMBAI – The ongoing weakness of America’s economy – where deleveraging in the private and public sectors continues apace – has led to stubbornly high unemployment and sub-par growth.	孟买——私有和公共部门的去杠杆化在美国经济持续疲软的背景下齐头并进，已经导致失业率居高不下和经济增长低于预期。


The effects of fiscal austerity – a sharp rise in taxes and a sharp fall in government spending since the beginning of the year – are undermining economic performance even more.	年初实行的紧缩财政政策导致在税收激增的同时政府开支急剧下降，从而进一步影响了经济效益。


Indeed, recent data have effectively silenced hints by some Federal Reserve officials that the Fed should begin exiting from its current third (and indefinite) round of quantitative easing (QE3).	事实上，近期的经济数据有效遏止了某些联储官员提出的理应立即退出目前的第三轮（不设上限）的量化宽松政策（QE3）的暗示。


Given slow growth, high unemployment (which has fallen only because discouraged workers are leaving the labor force), and inflation well below the Fed’s target, this is no time to start constraining liquidity.	鉴于经济增长缓慢、失业率居高不下（仅仅因为心灰意冷的工人退出就业大军失业率才有所降低）和通胀率远低于联储目标，现在并不是开始限制流动性的最好时机。


The problem is that the Fed’s liquidity injections are not creating credit for the real economy, but rather boosting leverage and risk-taking in financial markets.	问题在于美联储的流动性注入并没有为实体经济创造信贷，反而促进了金融市场的杠杆和冒险情绪。 利率过低且契约松散的高风险垃圾债券发行增加；


The issuance of risky junk bonds under loose covenants and with excessively low interest rates is increasing; the stock market is reaching new highs, despite the growth slowdown; and money is flowing to high-yielding emerging markets.	股票市场在经济增长放缓的同时新高迭起； 资金正在朝高收益新兴市场流去。


Even the periphery of the eurozone is benefiting from the wall of liquidity unleashed by the Fed, the Bank of Japan, and other major central banks.	即使欧元区的非核心国家同样从美联储、日本央行和其他主要央行释放的流动性中获益。


With interest rates on government bonds in the US, Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Switzerland at ridiculously low levels, investors are on a global quest for yield.	在美、日、英、德和瑞士政府债券低得离谱的情况下，投资者开始在全球市场寻找收益。


It may be too soon to say that many risky assets have reached bubble levels, and that leverage and risk-taking in financial markets is becoming excessive.	就此认定众多风险资产已经出现泡沫、并且金融市场杠杆泛滥、酷爱冒险或许为时尚早。


But the reality is that credit and asset/equity bubbles are likely to form in the next two years, owing to loose US monetary policy.	但因为美国宽松的货币政策，未来两年有可能形成信贷和资产/权益泡沫却是不争的事实。


The Fed has signaled that QE3 will continue until the labor market has improved sufficiently (likely in early 2014), with the interest rate at 0% until unemployment has fallen at least to 6.5% (most likely no earlier than the beginning of 2015).	美联储已经暗示QE3将一直延续到劳动力市场大幅改善（极有可能出现在2014年年初），且在失业率至少降至6. 5%（最有可能不早于2015年年初）之前零利率政策将一直持续下去。


Even when the Fed starts to raise interest rates (some time in 2015), it will proceed slowly.	即使2015年某一时刻美联储开始提高利率，它的加息举措也会非常谨慎。


In the previous tightening cycle, which began in 2004, it took the Fed two years to normalize the policy rate.	2004年开始的前一轮紧缩周期，美联储花了两年时间才实现政策利率正常化。


This time, the unemployment rate and household and government debt are much higher.	这次的失业率和家庭政府负债均与上次不可同日而语。


Rapid normalization – like that undertaken in the space of a year in 1994 – would crash asset markets and risk leading to a hard economic landing.	像1994年实施的那种快速正常化可能导致资本市场崩溃和经济硬着陆。


But if financial markets are already frothy now, consider how frothy they will be in 2015, when the Fed starts tightening, and in 2017 (if not later), when the Fed finishes tightening?	但如果金融市场已经出现泡沫，那么想想到2015年联储开始收紧和2017年（最早）收紧结束时泡沫该有多大？


Last time, interest rates were too low for too long (2001-2004), and the subsequent rate normalization was too slow, inflating huge bubbles in credit, housing, and equity markets.	上次出现利率过低、持续时间过长（2001－2004年），且其后正常化太过缓慢的情况直接导致了信贷、住房和股市的严重泡沫。


We know how that movie ended, and we may be poised for a sequel.	我们已经知道那个故事的结局，并且可能要为续集做好准备。


The weak real economy and job market, together with high debt ratios, suggest the need to exit monetary stimulus slowly.	疲软的经济就业市场和高负债率表明需要慢慢退出货币刺激政策。


But a slow exit risks creating a credit and asset bubble as large as the previous one, if not larger.	但缓慢退出可能造成与之前同样大的信贷资产泡沫。


Pursuing real economic stability, it seems, may lead again to financial instability.	现在看来，追求实体经济稳定可能导致金融动荡的危局。


Some at the Fed – Chairman Ben Bernanke and Vice Chair Janet Yellen – argue that policymakers can pursue both goals: the Fed will raise interest rates slowly to provide economic stability (strong income and employment growth and low inflation) while preventing financial instability (credit and asset bubbles stemming from high liquidity and low interest rates) by using macro-prudential supervision and regulation of the financial system.	主席伯南克和副主席珍妮特·耶伦等联储官员认为决策者可以同时实现这两大目标：美联储将缓慢提高利率，通过对金融体系的宏观审慎监管在防止金融动荡（高流动性和低利率引发的信贷和资产泡沫）的同时确保经济稳定（强劲的收入就业增长和低通胀）。


In other words, the Fed will use regulatory instruments to control credit growth, risk-taking, and leverage.	换言之，美联储将运用监管手段来控制信贷增长、风险偏好和杠杆应用。


But another Fed faction – led by Governors Jeremy Stein and Daniel Tarullo – argues that macro-prudential tools are untested, and that limiting leverage in one part of the financial market simply drives liquidity elsewhere.	但以杰里米·斯坦因和丹尼尔·塔鲁洛理事为首的另一派联储官员认为宏观审慎工具从未经过实际检验，限制金融市场某部分的杠杆只能把流动性赶到别处。


Indeed, the Fed regulates only banks, so liquidity and leverage will migrate to the shadow banking system if banks are regulated more tightly.	事实上，美联储只监管银行，因此如果银行系统监管更加严密，将迫使流动性和杠杆向影子银行系统转移。


As a result, only the Fed’s interest-rate instrument, Stein and Tarullo argue, can get into all of the financial system’s cracks.	斯坦因和塔鲁洛认为，只有美联储的利率工具才能渗入一切金融系统的缝隙。


But if the Fed has only one effective instrument – interest rates – its two goals of economic and financial stability cannot be pursued simultaneously.	可如果美联储只有利率一种有效工具，经济和金融稳定的两大目标就无法兼顾。


Either the Fed pursues the first goal by keeping rates low for longer and normalizing them very slowly, in which case a huge credit and asset bubble would emerge in due course; or the Fed focuses on preventing financial instability and increases the policy rate much faster than weak growth and high unemployment would otherwise warrant, thereby halting an already-sluggish recovery.	美联储或者通过长时间压低利率及缓慢正常化在实现第一个目标的同时制造出巨大的信贷和资产泡沫； 或者侧重于防止金融动荡，比增长乏力和失业率高企所能允许的限度更快地提升政策利率，从而导致本已缓慢的复苏陷入停滞。


The exit from the Fed’s QE and zero-interest-rate policies will be treacherous: Exiting too fast will crash the real economy, while exiting too slowly will first create a huge bubble and then crash the financial system.	美联储量化宽松和零利率政策的退出充满不确定性：退出速度过快将导致实体经济的崩溃，而退出过慢则将先制造巨大泡沫，再导致金融体系崩溃。


If the exit cannot be navigated successfully, a dovish Fed is more likely to blow bubbles.	如果不能成功实施退出，那么一个鸽派的美联储更有可能制造泡沫。


The Economist’s Stone	经济学家的点金石


CAMBRIDGE – This year marks the 100th anniversaries of two distinct institutional innovations in American economic policy: the introduction of the federal income tax and the establishment of the Federal Reserve.	发自剑桥——今年是美国两项重大经济政策制度创新的100周年纪念：开征联邦收入所得税以及成立美联储。


They are worth commemorating, if only because we are at risk of forgetting what we have learned since then.	这两项创新都是值得铭记的——哪怕只是因为我们很可能会忘却了当年学到的东西。


Initially, neither the income tax nor the Fed was associated with the explicit concepts of fiscal and monetary policy.	最初，所得税与美联储都与财政及货币政策的基本概念无关。


Indeed, it wasn’t until after the experience of the 1930’s that they came to be viewed as potential instruments for macroeconomic management.	事实上，直到经历了1930年代后它们才被看作是管理宏观经济的潜在工具。


John Maynard Keynes pointed out the advantages of fiscal stimulus in circumstances like the Great Depression.	约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯（John Maynard Keynes）指出在大萧条这类情况下财政刺激手段是有优势的。


Milton Friedman blamed the Depression on the Fed for allowing the money supply to fall.	而米尔顿·弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）则把大萧条的责任推到美联储的头上，因为当时它允许货币供给下降。


Keynes is associated with a belief in activist economic policy aimed at ensuring counter-cyclical responses to economic fluctuations – expansionary policies during recessions and policy tightening during upswings.	凯恩斯相信应该执行激进的经济政策来对经济波动现象作出逆周期回应——即在经济衰退期实施扩张政策，回升时实施紧缩政策。


Friedman, by contrast, opposed discretionary policymaking, believing that government institutions lacked the ability to get the timing right.	弗德里曼则相反，他反对任意的政策决定，他认为政府机构缺乏捕捉时机的能力。


But both opposed pro-cyclical policy, such as the misguided US fiscal and monetary tightening of 1937: before the economy had fully recovered, President Roosevelt raised taxes and cut spending, while the Federal Reserve raised reserve requirements, prolonging and worsening the Great Depression.	但两人都反对顺周期政策，比如误入歧途的美国1937年财政与货币紧缩：在经济尚未完全恢复前，罗斯福总统提高税收并削减开支，而美联储提高存款准备金率，结果这些举措延长并恶化了经济大萧条。


After World War II, students and policymakers internalized the lessons of the 1930’s.	在二战后，学生和政策制定者都吸收了1930年代的教训。


But episodes in recent decades – for example, high inflation in the 1970’s – overwhelmed much of what was learned.	但近几十年来发生的事情——比如1970年代的高通胀水平——压倒了过往的大部分经验。


As a result, many advanced countries today are repeating the mistake of 1937, despite facing similar macroeconomic conditions: high unemployment, low inflation, and near-zero interest rates.	因此很多发达国家现在都在重复1937年时所犯的错误——尽管面临着相似的宏观经济条件：高失业率，低通胀水平以及近乎零的利率。


The pros and cons of austerity nowadays have been thoroughly debated.	现在紧缩的优缺点已经被人们全面地讨论过了。


Austerity’s proponents correctly point out that permanently expansionary macroeconomic policies lead to unsustainable deficits, debts, and inflation.	紧缩的支持者准确地指出永久扩张性的宏观经济政策会导致不可承受的赤字、债务和通货膨胀。


Advocates of stimulus are right to note that in the aftermath of a recession, when unemployment is high and inflation is low, the immediate consequences of policy contraction are continued unemployment, slow growth, and rising debt/GDP ratios.	财政刺激的拥护者则正确地表明了在衰退余波影响下失业率高居不下、经济增长缓慢时，财政紧缩的后果是持久的失业率、低速增长及债务对GDP比率不断上升。


And pro-cyclicalists, both in the US and Europe, represent the worst of all worlds by pursuing expansionary policies during booms, such as in 2003-07, and contractionary policies during recessions, such as in 2008-2012.	推崇顺周期政策的人——无论是在美国还是欧洲，是全世界最差劲的，他们在繁荣期间——比如2003年到2007年——追求扩张政策，而在经济衰退期——比如2008年到2012年——却追求紧缩政策。


But, if counter-cyclicalists are right to favor moderating, rather than exacerbating, upswings and downswings in the economy, we still need to know what works best.	但如果逆周期政策的人是对的，是应该倾向于温和而不是剧烈的经济回升与衰退进程，我们仍然需要知道什么运行得最好。


Given recent conditions, is monetary or fiscal stimulus the more effective instrument?	在近期情况下，到底货币刺激还是财政刺激哪个才是更有效的政策工具呢？


John Hicks addressed this question clearly in a once-famous 1937 article called “Mr. Keynes and the Classics.”	约翰·希克斯（John Hicks）在曾经著名的1937年名为《凯恩斯先生与古典学派》的文章中清楚地解答了这个问题。


Under the conditions that prevailed then, and that prevail again now (high unemployment, low inflation, and near-zero interest rates), monetary expansion is relatively less effective, because it cannot push interest rates below zero.	在当时的情况下——现在也一样（高失业率、低通货膨胀及几近为零的利率），货币扩张相对没那么有效，因为它不可能把利率推到零以下。


Moreover, firms are less likely to respond to easy money by investing in new physical capital and labor if they cannot sell what they already produce in the factories they already have with the workers they already employ.	此外，如果公司无法卖出已雇佣员工在自家工厂里生产出来的产品，它们也不大可能利用低价货币投资新的实物资本与劳动力。


Fiscal stimulus is relatively more effective in these conditions, because it creates demand for goods without driving up those rock-bottom interest rates and crowding out private-sector demand (as it would in normal times).	财政刺激在这些情况下相对会更有效一些，因为它能在无需抬高处于最低点的利率和不压抑私人企业需求（一般情况下则会）的情况下创造对商品的需求。


None of this should be controversial.	以上这些都不应该有什么争议。


Introductory economics used to emphasize the Keynesian multiplier effect: recipients of government spending (or of consumer spending stimulated by tax cuts or transfers) respond to the increase in their incomes by spending more, as do the recipients of that spending, and so on.	入门经济学理论过去会强调凯恩斯的乘数效应：即政府支出（或者减税及转移支付刺激下的消费者支出）的受益者对收入增长的反应是花更多的钱，而这种花费的受益者也会因收入增加而花更多的钱，如此循环。


Again, the multiplier is much more relevant under current conditions, because it does not fuel higher inflation and interest rates (and thus crowd out private spending).	此外，这种乘数在当前情况下更为相关，因为它没有使通货膨胀加剧也没有刺激高利率（从而排挤了私人支出）。


Unfortunately, many economists and politicians have forgotten much of what they knew (or have been blinded by new theories of policy ineffectiveness).	不幸的是，很多经济学家和政治家忘了很多他们曾经学过的知识（或者说被政策失效的新理论所蒙蔽了）。


Indeed, by the time the 2008-2009 global recession hit, even advocates of fiscal stimulus had lowered their estimates of the multiplier.	事实上，在2008-2009年全球危机爆发时，即便是财政刺激的拥护者也调低了对乘数的估算。


But the continuing severity of recessions in the United Kingdom and other countries pursuing fiscal contraction has suggested that multipliers are not just positive, but greater than one – just as the old wisdom had it.	而英国以及其他追求财政紧缩国家的持续严重衰退，这表明了乘数不仅是正数而且还大于1——正如以往的经验所示。


The International Monetary Fund has responded by forthrightly confessing that official forecasts, including its own, had underestimated the multiplier’s size.	国际货币基金组织也坦率承认各地的官方预测——包括它自身的预测，都低估了乘数的效应。


Of course, the effects of fiscal policy are uncertain.	当然，财政政策的效果是不确定的。


One never knows, for example, when rising debt levels might alarm international investors, who then start demanding sharply higher interest rates, as happened to countries on the European periphery in 2010.	比如说，没有人会知道增加债务水平何时会使国际投资者受惊并开始追求高利率——一如2010年发生在欧洲外围国家的情况一样。


We are also uncertain about the magnitude of the negative long-term effects of high tax rates on growth.	同时我们也不能确定高税率对经济增长的长期消极影响有多大。


And monetary policy is much better understood than it was in the past.	而人们对货币政策的理解比以前要好得多。


Indeed, a much-admired recent paper characterized monetary policy as science and fiscal policy as alchemy.	确实，一份备受推崇的新报告把货币政策描述为科学，而财政政策则更像炼金术。


To be sure, the state of knowledge and practice at central banks is close to the best that modern society has to offer, whereas fiscal policy is set in a highly political process that is poorly informed by economic knowledge and largely motivated by officials’ desire to be re-elected.	可以肯定的是，央行的知识和实践水平都接近现代社会所能提供的最佳状态，然而财政政策发生在高度政治化的进程中，一方面缺乏经济知识，另一方面主要被官员寻求连任的渴望所驱动。


But the problem with the ancient alchemists and their search for the philosopher’s stone was not that they were stupid or selfish people.	但古代炼金术士及他们寻找点金石的问题并不在于他们是愚蠢或者自私的人。


Nor was their problem that political leaders refused to listen to them.	也不在于政治领导人拒绝听他们的。


Rather, the state of knowledge at the time simply fell far short of the modern science of chemistry.	相反仅仅在于当时的知识水平远及不上化学这门现代科学。


In this sense, the term alchemy could be applied to pre-Keynesians like US Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon, whose prescription at the start of the Great Depression was to “liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate farmers, [and] liquidate real estate” in order to “purge the rottenness out of the system.”	从这个意义上来说，点金术这个词适于凯恩斯主义之前的人，比如美国财政部长安德鲁·梅隆（Andrew Mellon），在大萧条开始时他的方案是用“清算劳工、清算股票、清算农民、清算房地产”来“清洗系统中腐烂的东西。


It could also be applied to those today who favor returning monetary policy to the pre-1914 gold standard.	”此举也适用于那些喜欢回到1914年前金本位货币政策的人。


This does not mean that either fiscal policy or monetary policy has graduated to the status of a science like chemistry, underpinned by natural laws that generate precisely foreseeable outcomes.	这并不意味着财政政策或货币政策就成熟到像化学一样能成为一门学科。 化学以产生精确可见结果的自然法则为基础。


But surely we have learned since 1913 that fiscal expansion is appropriate under some conditions, even if it is inappropriate under others.	但当然我们自1913年后就知道了财政扩张在某些情况下是比较恰当的，虽然它在另外一些情况下并不靠谱。


The Fed vs. the Financiers	美联储和金融家


In his August 31 address to the world’s most influential annual monetary policy conference in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, United States Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke coolly explained why the Fed is determined to resist pressure to stabilize swooning equity and housing prices.	美国联邦储备委员会主席伯南克8月31日在怀俄明州杰克逊荷尔向世界上最具影响力的年度货币政策会议发表讲话。 他冷静地解释了为什么美联储决心抵制稳定动荡不已的资本和房地产市场的压力。


Bernanke’s principled position – echoed by European Central Bank head Jean Claude Trichet and Bank of England head Mervyn King – has set off a storm in markets, accustomed to the attentive pampering lavished on them by Bernanke’s predecessor, Alan Greenspan.	伯南克坚持原则的立场得到了欧洲央行行长特里谢和英格兰银行行长金的响应。 他的这一立场引发了市场的风暴，而这一市场已经习惯了伯南克的前任格林斯潘的应时的放纵。


This is certainly high-stakes poker, with huge sums hanging in the balance in the $170 trillion global financial market.	这毫无疑问是风险极高的举动，全球金融市场1700亿美元系于一发。


Investors, who viewed Greenspan as a warm security blanket, now lavish him with fat six-figure speaking fees.	那些认为格林斯潘是温暖的安全毯子的投资者们现在给他高达六位数的丰厚的演讲费。


But who is right, Bernanke or Greenspan? Central bankers or markets?	但是，伯南克和格林斯潘以及中央银行和市场之间究竟谁对？


A bit of intellectual history is helpful in putting today’s debate in context.	了解一点知识历史有助于从历史的角度来进行今天的辩论。


Bernanke, who took over at the Fed in 2006, launched his policy career in 1999 with a brilliant paper presented to the same Jackson Hole conference.	伯南克与在2006年接管美联储，他1999年在同一会议上发表了一篇精彩论文，从而开始了他的决策事业。


As an academic, Bernanke argued that central banks should be wary of second-guessing massive global securities markets.	作为一名学术界人士，伯南克认为各国的中央银行不应当猜测庞大的全球证券市场。


They should ignore fluctuations in equity and housing prices, unless there is clear and compelling evidence of dangerous feedback into output and inflation.	它们应当置资本和房地产市场的波动于不顾，除非有明显和强烈的证据表明产出和通货膨胀危险的反馈。


Greenspan listened patiently and quietly to Bernanke’s logic.	格林斯潘对于伯南克的逻辑洗耳恭听。


But Greenspan’s memoirs, to be published later this month, will no doubt strongly defend his famous decisions to bail out financial markets with sharp interest rate cuts in 1987, 1998, and 2001, arguing that the world might have fallen apart otherwise.	他分别在1987年、1998年和2001年大幅度降低利率拯救金融市场。 下个月下旬即将出版的格林斯潘的回忆录将会毫无疑问地为他的著名的救市决定辩护，他说如果不是这样，世界经济就可能崩溃。


On the surface, Bernanke’s view seems intellectually unassailable.	在表面上看，伯南克的观点在学术上看起来是无懈可击的。


Central bankers cannot explain equity or housing prices and their movements any better than investors can.	中央银行行长们并不比投资者们更高明地解释资本或者房地产市场及其走向。


And Bernanke knows as well as anyone that none of the vast academic literature suggests a large role for asset prices in setting monetary policy, except in the face of extraordinary shocks that influence output and inflation, such as the Great Depression of the 1930’s.	而且，伯南克和任何人一样知道，除非像二十世纪三十年代大萧条那样非同寻常的、影响产出和通货膨胀的冲击面前，汗牛充栋的学术文献中没有什么东西可以表明资本价格在确定货币政策起到重要的作用。


In short, no central banker can be the Oracle of Delphi.	简而言之，没有一个央行行长是预言家。


Indeed, many academic economists believe that central bankers could perfectly well be replaced with a computer programmed to implement a simple rule that adjusts interest rates mechanically in response to output and inflation.	确实，许多学术经济学家相信，央行行长完全可以被执行简单指令、应对产量和通货膨胀机械地调整利率的电脑所取而代之。


But, while Bernanke’s view is theoretically rigorous, reality is not.	但是，尽管伯南克的观点在理论上颇有建树，但是现实并非如此。


One problem is that academic models assume that central banks actually know what output and inflation are in real time.	问题之一是，学术模型假定央行行长实际上知道即时的产出和通货膨胀信息。


In fact, central banks typically only have very fuzzy measures.	实际上，央行行长们一半只是有很模糊的数据。


Just a month ago, for example, the US statistical authorities significantly downgraded their estimate of national output for 2004!	例如，仅仅在一个月前，美国的统计当局大幅度地降低了对2004年全国产量的估计！


The problem is worse in most other countries.	这一问题在其他大多数国家更为严重。


Brazil, for example, uses visits to doctors to measure health-sector output, regardless of what happens to the patient.	例如，巴西采用看病数量来衡量医疗行业的产量，而不顾及病人的情况。


China’s statistical agency is still mired in communist input-output accounting.	中国的统计单位依旧沿用共产主义投入产出会计制度。


Even inflation can be very hard to measure precisely.	甚至是通货膨胀也是难以精确衡量的。


What can price stability possibly mean in an era when new goods and services are constantly being introduced, and at a faster rate than ever before?	当新的产品和服务不断推陈出新、快于以往的时候，价格稳定意味这什么呢？


US statisticians have tried to “fix” the consumer price index to account for new products, but many experts believe that measured US inflation is still at least one percentage point too high, and the margin of error can be more volatile than conventional CPI inflation itself.	美国统计人员曾经试图“确定”消费物价指数来统计新产品，但是许多专家相信计算出来的美国通货膨胀依旧高出一个百分点，而误差可能要比传统消费物价指数通胀本身更为起伏不定。


So, while monetary policy can in theory be automated, as computer programmers say, “garbage in, garbage out.”	因此，正如电脑程序员所说的那样，尽管在理论上可以自动制定货币政策，但还是“垃圾进，垃圾出”。


Stock and housing prices may be volatile, but the data are much cleaner and timelier than anything available for output and inflation.	股票和房地产价格可能起伏不定，但是其数据对于产出和通货膨胀来说却要比任何东西都更为干净和及时。


This is why central bankers must think about the information embedded in asset prices.	这就是为什么央行行长们必须考虑到资本价格中内含的信息。


In fact, this summer’s asset price correction reinforced a view many of us already had that the US economy was slowing, led by sagging productivity and a deteriorating housing market.	事实上，今年夏天的资产价格更正强化了我们许多人已经有的一种观点，那就是，美国经济正在减缓。 生产效率和日益恶化的房地产市场主导了这一减缓。


I foresee a series of interest rate cuts by the Fed, which should not be viewed as a concession to asset markets, but rather as recognition that the real economy needs help.	我预计，美联储将会采取一系列的降息措施。 这些措施并应当被看成是对资产市场的妥协，而是承认实际经济需要帮助。


In a sense, a central bank’s relationship with asset markets is like that of a man who claims he is going to the ballet to make himself happy, not to make his wife happy.	在某种意义上，中央银行与市场的关系就像是一个男子说他去看芭蕾为了让自己高兴，而不是让太太高兴。


But then he sheepishly adds that if his wife is not happy, he cannot be happy.	但是随后他胆怯地补充说如果他的太太不高兴，他就高兴不起来。


Perhaps Bernanke will soon come to feel the same way, now that his honeymoon as Fed chairman is over.	伯南克作为美联储主席的蜜月已经结束，他马上就会有同感。


The Fight for Pakistan’s Soul	为巴基斯坦精神而战


CAMBRIDGE – As its army confronts, ever more bloodily, the Taliban in the Swat Valley, Pakistan is fighting for its very soul.	发自剑桥——当巴基斯坦军队在斯瓦特谷地与塔利班浴血奋战之时，他们其实是在为巴基斯坦的精神而战。


The army appears to be winning this time around, in marked contrast to its recent half-hearted confrontations with Taliban forces in neighboring tribal areas.	而相对于其最近在邻近部落地区与塔利班交火时的心不在焉，巴军似乎对此次战役志在必得。


For now, the Taliban are on the run, some with shaved beards and some in burqas , to avoid being recognized and thrashed.	而该地区的塔利班则在四处逃窜，他们剃光了胡须并裹着女式长袍，以免被人认出并痛打一顿。


The reason is simple: increasingly, people across Pakistan support the army’s action.	原因很简单：越来越多的巴基斯坦人开始支持军队的行动。


This support persists despite the terrible humanitarian cost: more than 1.5 million internal refugees.	即使要付出150多万国内难民流离失所的巨大人道主义代价，这种支持也依然如故。


This round of fighting was preceded by a negotiated calm, as the government sought to quell militants in Pakistan’s tribal areas by striking a deal with the Taliban leader, Sufi Mohammad.	但这场鏖战其实是以谈判开场的：政府试图通过与塔利班领导人穆罕默德·苏菲达成一项协议来安抚部落地区的武装分子。


The deal, which instituted a version of Sharia law in the region in exchange for a commitment that militants would lay down their weapons, was blessed by the comparatively liberal Awami National Party (ANP), which governs the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), where Swat is located.	而这个以在该地区推行伊斯兰教法来换取武装分子承诺放下武器的协议，更得到了人民民族党（ ANP ）的认同——这个相对开明的党派正是斯瓦特谷地所在的西北边境省（NWFP）的统治者。


But the Taliban’s assurances of a lower profile were upended by two incidents that exposed its real face. First, private news channels broadcast across the country a video clip recorded on a cell phone of the public flogging of a 17-year-old Swat girl.	然而塔利班低调存在的承诺却最终宣告无效，因为有两个事件揭露了其真正嘴脸：一是私营新闻频道在全国广泛播放的一段手机视频，显示塔利班是如何公开鞭打一个17岁斯瓦特女孩的。


This gave the public a stark sense of what Taliban justice really meant.	这让公众彻底弄清了塔利班的所谓法律究竟是个什么东西。


Then, Mohammad was interviewed on GEO TV, where he explained his political views.	而另一件则穆罕默德·苏菲接受巴基斯坦GEO电视台采访时所阐述的政治主张。


According to Mohammad, democracy is un-Islamic, as are Pakistan’s constitution and judiciary, and Islam bars women from getting an education or leaving their homes except to perform the Hajj in Mecca.	在他看来，民主制度是非伊斯兰的，而巴基斯坦的宪法和法律体系也不例外，禁止女性接受教育，除了赴麦加朝圣之外，女性不得离开家门半步。


Religious conservatives were stunned. Leaders of the religious parties rushed to denounce Mohammad’s views.	他的观点把宗教保守主义者都吓了一跳。


The Pakistani media revisited a famous comment by Mohammad Iqbal, the poet-philosopher who devised the idea of an independent Muslim state in Pakistan. “The religion of the mullah,” he said, “is anarchy in the name of Allah.”	在各宗教政党的领导人齐声谴责穆罕默德之余，巴基斯坦媒体则再次引用当年曾经提出在巴基斯坦建立独立穆斯林国家构想的诗人哲学家——穆罕默德·伊克巴尔的名言：“这些伊斯兰学者的所谓宗教信仰，只不过是借真主之名施行乱政罢了。


Still, it’s not over until it’s over – and in the short term a lot depends on the state’s capacity to hold the Swat area and re-establish civilian institutions there. And, even if the state succeeds, re-asserting control over Swat will only be the first step.	行百里者半九十——目前很多事情的成败都将取决于政府是否能够守住斯瓦特地区，并在当地重建整套管制班子。


The Taliban is spread throughout the NWFP and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. “Punjabi Taliban” militants from the fighting in Kashmir against India continue to shuttle between the Punjab heartland and the Northwest Territories, posing another serious challenge to government authority.	而即使政府成功达成这一目标，对斯瓦特地区的重新控制也仅仅是第一步，因为塔利班的势力遍布整个西北边境省和联邦直辖部落地区，而在印控克什米尔冲突中活跃着的 “旁遮普塔利班”武装分子则频繁穿梭于印度旁遮普邦腹地与巴基斯坦西北地区之间，对巴基斯坦来说他们是另一个对政府权威的严重威胁。


In the long-term, however, what really matters is whether the Muslims of South Asia will be able to roll back the spread of Talibanization altogether.	而从长远来看，真正重要的则是南亚地区的穆斯林能否合力抵御不断蔓延的“塔利班化”趋势。


The answer to that question lies within the various Muslim communities of the region, not just in Pakistan.	这一问题的答案将有赖于该地区所有的穆斯林社会共同去解答，而不仅仅是巴基斯坦穆斯林的事。


Afghanistan faces an election later this year.	阿富汗大选在今年晚些时候即将拉开帷幕。


A clear and transparent vote will make a real difference in establishing the credibility of the Afghan government.	一场廉洁透明的投票选举将对阿富汗政府信誉的建立起到至关重要的作用。


In Pakistan, the democratic transition, after years of military rule, is still not complete. There is much hope, though, in the vibrancy of the Pakistani media, as well as in the energy that the legal community generated last March in restoring deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry to his seat on the Supreme Court.	而虽然巴基斯坦的民主进程在多年的军人统治之后仍然算不上圆满，但人们不仅从生机勃勃的巴基斯坦媒体身上，更从今年3月法律界在设法恢复被罢黜的首席大法官伊夫提哈尔·穆罕默德·乔杜里的最高法院职位这一事件中所迸发出的巨大能量上看到了希望。


Then there is the Pakistani army, the country’s “super political party.” To a large degree, Pakistan’s relations with India, Afghanistan, and the United States depend on the military.	另外还要注意的则是巴基斯坦军方这个“超级政党”，因为巴基斯坦与印度、阿富汗以及美国这三国的关系在很大程度上是建立在军事合作之上的。


Army commander Ashfaq Kiyani has shown no interest in taking over the state, as his predecessor, General Pervez Musharraf, did. But the army must accept its subservience to Pakistan’s political leadership.	虽然现任总司令阿什法克·克亚尼并不像他的前任佩尔韦兹·穆沙拉夫将军那样有着统治巴基斯坦的野心，但军队必须服从而不是凌驾于巴基斯坦的政治领导人。


The army command must finally recognize that repeated military interventions have not served the country well.	且军方领导层也必须最终认识到，反复的军人干政对国家并没有什么好处。


Most significantly, in the face of martial law and political assassination, Pakistanis have not given up their dream of democracy.	而最意义非凡的，则是军事戒严和政治暗杀阴影下的巴基斯坦人民并没有放弃自己的民主梦想。


A living example of this is Afzal Lala, a Pashtun politician associated with the Awami National Party who, despite all the threats from the bloodthirsty Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, remained in Swat through the recent fighting.	其中一个活生生的例子，就是阿夫扎尔·拉拉——一个在杀人如麻的巴基斯坦塔利班运动组织（Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan）的死亡威胁之下依然坚守在斯瓦特的人民民族党普什图族政治家


Democracy will be decisive because it generates investments in education, health, and economic empowerment that reward ordinary voters.	民主制度则是决定性因素，因为普通选民在通过它促进教育，医疗方面投资的同时还可以参与制订经济政策并从中获益。


Talibanization gains ground when people lose faith in the capacity of the modern state to improve their lives.	因此“塔利班化”势力只有在人民对现代政府改善民生的能力失去信心时才会借机发展壮大。


While poor law enforcement needs urgent attention, counter-terrorism is never solely a military affair.	反恐从来都不是单纯的军事事务，地方政府执法不力的问题迫切需要注意。


Financial pledges from the US and the “Friends of Pakistan” consortium (the European Union, China, and Japan) are important, but when it comes to investing wisely in development projects, Pakistan’s track record is nothing to be proud of.	而来自美国和“巴基斯坦之友”联盟（欧盟，中国和日本）的财政资助也非常重要，但当涉及到发展项目的投资实效性时，巴基斯坦的历史纪录却并不光彩。


Effective oversight from donors and Pakistan’s private sector will be critical.	因此捐助国和巴基斯坦第三方私营部门的有效监督至关重要。


Only one condition should be imposed on aid for Pakistan: the first money should be spent on rebuilding all the bombed-out girls’ schools in Swat.	而针对巴基斯坦的援助只需要设立一个条件，那就是第一笔钱要用于重建斯瓦特地区被炸毁的所有女子学校。


If need be, the army should guard these schools around the clock.	甚至在有必要的情况下，军队必须24小时护卫这些学校。


The Fiscal Crisis Down Below	眼下的财政危机


PALO ALTO – Sub-national governments – states, countries, cities, provinces, towns, and special districts – play different roles from country to country, but usually deliver important public services such as police and fire protection, transportation, education, health care, and welfare.	帕罗奥图 —— 次国家政府（州，村，市，省，镇及特区）职能虽然因国家而异，但通常都提供诸如警务、消防、交通、教育、医疗保健以及福利等重要公共服务。


In many countries, their fiscal position has collapsed under the combined weight of mismanagement and the global economic and financial crisis.	因管理不善以及全球经济金融危机的共同影响，许多国家的财政状况急转直下。


The relationship between sub-national and central governments includes the general division of responsibilities for providing and financing public services; national subsidies that at least partly pay for various services delivered locally; and tax collection.	次国家政府与中央政府之间存在着总体分配的关系，涉及出资提供公共服务、地方公共服务的国家补贴以及征税。


In the United States, the federal government has primary responsibility for defense, public old-age pensions (Social Security), and health care for the elderly (Medicare); sub-national governments are responsible for education and law enforcement.	在美国，联邦政府主管国防、公共养老金（ Social Security ）、老年医疗保健（ Medicare ），次国家政府负责教育和执法；


Health care for the poor (Medicaid) is a shared responsibility.	同时，贫困人口医疗保健由二者一同承担。


Matching funds flow from the federal government to state and local governments by formulae delineating the shared responsibilities. Some of these formulae allow sub-national governments wide discretion; others do not.	配对基金由联邦政府按计划下拨至州以及地方政府，明确了二者的共同权责，但次国家政府仅享有部分自由决断权。


The global economic and financial crisis has precipitated an immense expansion of central government spending, borrowing (and hence future taxing), lending, regulation, and mandates, some in “aid” to sub-national governments (about $200 billion in the US stimulus bill).	全球经济金融危机造成了中央政府的大量财政支出、债务（及随后的征税）、贷款，并出台了多项规章制度，部分以向次国家政府 “ 援助 ” 的形式存在（包括了美国经济刺激方案中的 2 千亿美元）。


A key question is whether central governments’ power worldwide will expand permanently – over not only the private economy, but also over sub-national governments.	而问题关键在于，中央政府对私营经济及次国家政府的影响是否会随之不断提高。


There is remarkable variability in the role of sub-national governments relative to central governments.	与中央政府相比，次国家政府的地位存在极大变数。


Prior to the current crisis, US government revenue was roughly 60% federal and 40% state and local.	危机爆发之前，美国政府收入中约有 60% 流向联邦政府，州和地方政府分得 40% 。


France was the most centralized of the major economies, with roughly a 80%-20% split between the national and sub-national governments, while the United Kingdom falls in between, at 75%-25%.	作为集权度最高的主要经济体，法国国家政府与次国家政府分别获得了 80% 和 20% ； 英国位居其中，为 75% 和 25% 。


China was the least centralized, at 30%-70%.   Argentina was the most balanced, at about 50%-50%.	中国的集权度最低，分别为 30% 和 70% 。 阿根廷最为均衡，二者各占 50% 。


Debates about government centralization run deep in the history and constitutions of most countries.	多数国家历来就对政府集权有着激烈的争论，其宪法也有所体现。


The US Constitution knitted together the thirteen original colonies, and its Tenth Amendment reserves to the states all powers not expressly delegated to the federal government.	美国的《宪法》统一了最早的 13 块殖民地，其《第十修正案》又将未明文规定赋予联邦政府的一切权利保留给了各州政府。


Even today, tensions over further centralization (e.g., to supranational authority, as in Europe) and devolution (e.g., for Scotland, Québec, or Kurdistan) are intense.	即使在今天，人们依旧对是否进一步中央集权（如欧洲实行的超国家权威）及权力下放（苏格兰、魁北克或库尔德斯坦问题）存在巨大分歧。


There are several reasons to favor a healthy dose of decentralization. US Supreme Court Judge Louis Brandeis famously argued for “the states as laboratories.”	妥善实行一定地方分权的要求自有其道理，美国最高法院法官路易斯 • 布兰戴斯就有过将各州比作实验室的著名比喻。


A recent example in the US was welfare reform.	美国最近的一个例子便是福利改革。


When states got waivers for time limits and work or training requirements for welfare recipients, they were so successful that federal welfare reform followed.	各州福利受领人不再受申报时限、工作以及培训要求的限制，结果令人满意，由此促成了联邦福利改革。


Competition among localities – for example, between states for businesses and workers, and between school districts for students – can lead to more efficient and effective allocation of public resources.	各地方之间的竞争（例如，各州和各学区争相吸引企业和员工以及优秀学生）能够提高公共资源分配的效能与效率。


If people are able to migrate, they will move to jurisdictions with the mix of taxes and services (e.g., quality schools) that they prefer.	如果人们能够迁移，那他们将选择那些拥有自己中意的税制及公共服务（如优质学校）的辖区。


As with competition in private markets, competition in government services leads to better outcomes.	政府服务的竞争能比在自由市场中取得更好效果。


Local authorities are closer to problems than national officials tucked away in a country’s capital.	与守在首都的中央政府官员不同，地方政府面对着更多的问题。


There are important differences among jurisdictions.	辖区之间存在巨大差异。


Hospitals are more important for some areas, while schools are more important for others.	正如医疗与教育一样，其重要性也因地区而有所不同。


Geographic cost-of-living differences are difficult to reflect in one-size-fits-all national programs.	在一体适用的国家项目中，不同地区的生活成本差异往往难以得到体现。


Some functions are better suited for central-government financing.	然而，中央政府却能通过融资来更好行使某些职能。


National defense is an obvious example, as are functions for which economies of scale are important.	国防便是很好的例子，有赖于规模经济的其它职能亦是如此。


Where localities try to offload support for the poor onto other localities, the central government must step in and either fund such programs directly or set minimum standards.	一旦地方政府推诿援助贫困人口的责任，中央政府必须介入，直接出资支持或设定最低标准。


In the US until the past three decades, local school districts were responsible for education.	三十年之前，美国的地方学区一直负责教育事宜。


Various court rulings have determined that this process allowed richer districts to spend more than poorer ones and ordered states to equalize spending.	但随后，法庭多次裁决此举使得富裕地区的教育经费超过了贫困地区，并要求各州协调此部分支出。


States from California to Texas now routinely collect previously local property taxes to fund schools, and then redistribute them to local school districts.	现在，加利福尼亚及德克萨斯之间的几个州通常将过去的地方财产税用于教育，并下发至各地方学区。


Many believe that the reduction of local control over the schools as a result of the elimination of local financing has been a major contributor to the poor performance of some American schools.	许多人认为，取消地方融资后地方政府对教育的掌控受到影响，这正是美国部分学校教学水平低下的主要原因。


California is an example of long-run fiscal folly meeting short-run national and global economic crisis, resulting in chaos.	加州正是长期不当财政政策与短期国家及全球经济危机相互作用而引发混乱的例子。


For many decades, Californians had rapidly rising living standards, great public K-12 and higher education systems, and unprecedented upward mobility.	过去几十年中，加州居民的生活水平节节攀升，公共教育的 K-12 体系大行其道，教育体系一路领先，大家的进取之心前所未有。


But California’s unemployment rate, 12.3% in November 2009, was tied for the nation’s third highest.	但是，加州的失业率（ 2009 年 11 月为 12. 3% ）却位列全国第三。


People and jobs are seeking better opportunities elsewhere. The state’s bond rating is dead last.	人们和企业为寻求更好发展一同出走加州，而加州的债券评级也已在全国垫底。


Excessive state spending, heavy regulation, and dangerously high taxes have helped create the state’s economic woes.	加州经济陷入困境，过多政府支出、严格监管以及冒险的高税率都难辞其咎。


The top personal income-tax rate (also levied on capital gains), the sales tax rate, the corporate tax rate, and the gas tax are all at or near the highest of any state.	加州的最高个人所得说（资本收益也在其中）、营业税、公司税以及天然气税的税率与其他州相比，均处前列。


The top 1% of the state’s income earners pay almost half the income taxes.	仅占加州人口 1% 的最高收入者竟在全州所得税中贡献了一半。


Thus, the state’s coffers (and hence spending) overflow during booms, but then collapse, forcing emergency retrenchment, during busts.	因此，加州的资金（即随后的支出）在经济景气时水涨船高，却在萧条时轰然倒下，只得实行缩减。


Ironically, California’s progressive tax and spending policies create such volatility that they destroy the state’s ability to fund everything, even basic services from education to health for its most vulnerable citizens.	具有讽刺意味的是，加州的累进税与支出政策引发了诸多不确定性，使加州无法提供任何经费支持，甚至无法向最为弱势的群体提供包括教育及医疗在内的基本公共服务。


Now facing another $20 billion deficit despite temporary tax hikes and spending cuts, California’s fiscal woes foreshadow those of many sub-national – or, indeed, national –governments globally.	加州虽然大力增税并削减开支，但仍面对 200 亿美元的财政赤字，其财政困境正是其他次国家或国家政府的先兆。


While all must first deal with the current emergency, sensible local fiscal, tax, and political reforms are vital to restore a balance of centralized and decentralized government.	解决当前的困境是当务之急，但要想在政府的集权和分权中再次取得平衡，合理的地方财政、税收及政治改革至关重要。


The Fiscal Cliff and US Foreign Policy	财政悬崖和美国的外交政策


PRINCETON – The world should be worried.	普林斯顿——全世界都应该忧心忡忡。


The possibility that US President Barack Obama and the Republicans in Congress will fail to reach a compromise before mandatory deep spending cuts and tax increases take effect on January 1 is very real.	美国总统奥巴马和国会共和党人无法在1月1日强制深幅削减开支和增加税收措施生效前达成妥协的可能性是真实存在的。


Global markets are well aware of the danger of the United States falling over the “fiscal cliff,” and are watching nervously.	全球市场都了解美国跌落“财政悬崖”的风险，并且都在紧张地注视着。


They know that this outcome could well throw the US – and the world – back into recession.	他们知道这样的结果完全可能将美国和全世界再次拖入衰退之中。


Foreign ministries around the world should be equally nervous.	世界各国的外交部也怀着同样的紧张情绪。


Unless the US can get its fiscal house in order, it will be forced to abdicate leadership on a wide range of critical global issues.	除非美国能理顺财政状况，否则将被迫让出一系列全球关键问题上的领导地位。


In the short term, Syria and its neighbors are already paying the price of America’s inability to focus on anything other than domestic politics since Obama’s re-election.	短期内，叙利亚及其邻国已经为奥巴马再次当选后无力关注国内政治以外的其他事务而付出了代价。


In my view, the Syrian crisis is at a tipping point: while it is now apparent that the opposition will eventually win and President Bashar al-Assad will fall, the endgame’s duration will be a key element determining who actually comes into power and on what terms.	我认为叙利亚危机已临近转折点：尽管巴沙尔·阿萨德总统显然将垮台而反对派将获胜，但最后阶段的持续时间将成为决定谁能以何种条件掌权的关键因素。


Syria’s implosion, and the chaos and extremism that are likely to breed there, will threaten the entire Middle East: the stability of Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Gaza, the West Bank, Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia hangs in the balance.	叙利亚局势的爆发及可能由此产生的混乱和极端主义将威胁整个中东地区的安全：包括黎巴嫩、约旦、土耳其、伊拉克、加沙、约旦河西岸、以色列、伊朗和沙特阿拉伯的稳定局势。


But we do not even know who will succeed Hillary Clinton as US Secretary of State when Obama’s second term formally begins in January, or who will be on the White House security team.	但我们不清楚奥巴马第二任任期在1月正式开始后谁将接替希拉里·克林顿担任美国国务卿，也不知道白宫安全团队将由哪些人组成。


In the medium term, the world abounds with tensions and potential crises that US leadership is likely to be indispensable to resolving.	从中期来看，世界充满了紧张局势和潜在危机，这些危机责无旁贷需要美国领导人去解决。


As events over the past two weeks in Egypt have demonstrated all too vividly, the Arab awakening is still only in its first act in many countries.	正像过去两周埃及局势已经证明的那样，阿拉伯觉醒在很多国家仅仅只是拉开了序幕。


Indeed, democracy is fragile, at best, across North Africa; and, in the Middle East, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia have only begun to feel the ripples of the tidal wave sweeping the region.	其实，北非地区民主充其量还十分薄弱； 中东地区的约旦、巴勒斯坦、科威特和沙特阿拉伯刚刚开始感受到民主浪潮席卷的涟漪。


Bahrain remains a flashpoint; Iraq is deeply unstable; and the simmering conflict between Iran and Israel could flare up at any time.	巴林问题仍是导火索； 伊拉克则非常动荡；


Even when the US is not on the front lines, it has played a vital role in behind-the-scenes diplomacy, nudging wary rivals closer to one another to create a united opposition, and working with regional leaders like Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to broker deals.	沸沸扬扬的伊朗和以色列冲突可能在任何时候爆发。 即便美国并不在第一线，但仍在幕后外交谈判中发挥着关键作用，推动充���戒心的对手相互联合成立反对同盟，并与土耳其、埃及和沙特阿拉伯等地区领导人合作推动协议的达成。


In Asia, the US has been playing a similar role in pushing for multilateral resolution of dangerous bilateral disputes between China and its many neighbors over territories in the East and South China Seas, while at the same time restraining US allies who might otherwise provoke crises.	美国在亚洲也扮演着类似的角色，推动多边解决中国及众多邻国间在东海及南海领土问题上危险的双边纠纷，同时约束美国的盟国防止他们挑起危机。


And, on big global issues like climate change, organized crime, trade, and prevention of atrocities, the absence of the US as a policy catalyst and active negotiator will be quickly and keenly felt.	在气候变化、有组织犯罪、贸易活动和预防暴力等全球重大问题上，如果没有美国积极参与谈判并起到政策催化剂的作用，国际社会将快速深切地感受到谈判的难度。


Avoiding this fate requires the US to “rebuild itself at home,” as the Obama administration’s 2010 National Security Strategy promises.	避免这样的命运要求美国像奥巴马政府2010年国家安全战略所承诺的那样 “完成自我重塑”。


But, if US politicians spend the next two years the way they have spent the last two – patching together temporary policy fixes while avoiding the hard issues that voters and markets expect them to face – America’s voice will grow fainter, and weaker, in international institutions and affairs.	但如果美国政界人士今后两年仍像过去两年一样忙于拼凑临时政策却不敢面对选民和市场希望他们解决的真正困难——美国在国际机构和事务中的话语权将越来越弱。


Equally worrisome is the prospect of deep, across-the-board cuts in the US defense budget at a time when many rising powers are increasing their defense spending.	在许多新崛起国家加大国防开支的同时全面深度削减美国防预算的前景同样令人担忧。


As much as many countries may dislike the US military, the availability and extraordinary capabilities of America’s soldiers, ships, aircraft, and intelligence assets often function as a global insurance policy.	尽管很多国家可能不喜欢美国军队，但美国士兵、军舰、飞机及情报资产的存在及非凡能力却往往起到全球保险的作用。


In the long term, the challenge is more vague, but deeper.	长期挑战虽然比较模糊，但却更为深刻。


The longer the US obsesses over its own political dysfunction and attendant economic stagnation, the less likely it is to bear the mantle of global responsibility and leadership.	被自身政治障碍及随之而来的经济停滞困扰的时间越长，美国承担全球义务和领导责任的可能性就越弱。


Openly isolationist political forces, such as the Tea Party and libertarians like Ron Paul, will grow stronger.	公开的孤立主义政治势力，比如像罗恩·保罗的茶党和自由论者将发展壮大。


A retreating US will, in turn, guarantee the emergence of what foreign-policy analyst Ian Bremmer describes as a “G-Zero world,” in which no country will take the lead and marshal the necessary economic and political coalitions to solve collective problems.	美国的撤退将反过来导致外交政策分析师伊恩·布雷默口中“G零世界”的出现，在这样的世界中，没有哪个国家能带头组建必要的经济和政治联盟来解决集体问题。


Individual presidents and secretaries of state will certainly try.	历任总统和国务卿一定会竭尽全力。


But, without Congressional support, they will bring fewer and fewer resources to the table and will suffer from an increasing credibility gap when they seek to negotiate with other countries.	但没有国会的支持，他们可利用的资源将越来越少，试图与其他国家进行谈判时的信任度也会越来越低。


Global leaders can do more than stand by and watch.	全球领导人不应只是袖手旁观。


Why not remind US politicians of their global responsibilities?	为什么不提醒美国政治家他们负有全球责任？


The G-7 or G-8 leaders could issue a statement, for instance, urging the US to get its fiscal house in order.	比方说，G-7或G-8集团领导人可以发表声明，敦促美国解决其财政问题。


NATO allies could make a similar statement.	北约盟国也应该发表类似声明。


Indeed, other regional organizations, such as the African Union or the Arab League, could weigh in.	其实，非洲联盟和阿拉伯国家联盟等其他区域组织也可以积极参与。


Even G-20 members, were they so moved, could make a statement.	就连G-20成员国如果有所感触，同样可以发表声明参与其中。


Of course, when we think about the G-20, we immediately wonder who, other than the US, could organize the issuance of such a statement.	当然，一提到G-20，我们就会担心除美国之外由谁来组织发布这样的声明。


That is precisely the problem, and it could get much worse.	这恰恰是问题的症结所在，并且存在大幅恶化的可能。


The Fish that Shrank	萎缩了的鱼群


A thousand years ago, the Norse settlers of my home city of York ate cod that weighed as much as eight kilograms.	一千年前，生活在我的家乡约克市的挪威人吃的鳕鱼重达八公斤。


We know this from archaeologists and the fascination they have for medieval waste heaps.	我们有幸得知这些是因为考古学家一向对中世纪的废物堆保持着浓厚兴趣。


But today you would be lucky to find a cod that weighs more than two kilograms.	但今天，能得见超过两公斤的鳕鱼就已经算是幸运了。


What have we done to our fish stocks to bring about changes like this, and does it matter?	人类做了什么，使鱼类发生如此变化？ 这一点是否关系重大呢？


Fisheries policy is designed to allow small fish to grow.	渔业政策旨在保护幼苗得以生长。


This is for the best of reasons - fish that are caught when they are too small will produce a small yield.	原因不证自明：捕捞幼鱼会导致重量上大幅减产；


Moreover, the fish will not have had a chance to reproduce, undermining the fish stock altogether.	而且鱼群也将因此失去繁殖机会，招致鱼类总储备量下降。


For example, the avowed intention of the EU Common Fisheries Policy is "to protect fish resources by regulating the amount of fish taken from the sea,  by allowing young fish to reproduce , and by ensuring that measures are respected."	例如， 欧盟共同渔业政策就是"通过调节海上捕捞数量、允许鱼苗繁殖和保证此类政策被切实执行来保护渔源"。


As it stands, however, we have "fished down" our stocks, until few large, old individuals remain.	然而，就目前情况看，我们已经破坏了鱼类储备。


To see this, consider North Sea cod.	存活下来的大鱼、成鱼寥寥无几。


Suppose you start with ten thousand individuals aged one year.	北海的鳕鱼就是很好的例证。


If there is only natural mortality, about one thousand of these individuals survive to reach age eight years.	假设选出一万条年龄一岁的鱼类个体作为研究对象，若只考虑自然死亡，大约有一千条能存活八年。


A moderate level of fishing mortality brings the number of survivors down to about one hundred individuals.	但捕捞造成的死亡把这个数字降到了一百条左右。


But the levels of fishing mortality we have been applying over the last twenty years bring the number of survivors down to about three.	而由于过去二十年里的过度捕捞，该数字已经降到了大约三条。


Mortality acts cumulatively, so, given the way we manage fisheries, few individuals survive to become big and old.	这种状况如果长期得不到改善，后果就会越来越明显，因此，考虑到我们的渔业治理现状，只有很少数的鱼类个体能够长大，长成。


Yet left to their own devices, cod are thought to live for at least thirty years.	如果让鳕鱼处于自然生态环境，它们至少能存活三十年；


It is a testament to the great efficiency with which we exploit living marine resources that fish like cod are now much more likely to die at the hands of fishermen than for all other reasons put together, once they get into the fisheries.	可是一旦进入渔场，它们死在渔民手里的可能性比其他所有导致死亡的原因累加起来都要大。 这可以说是人类开发海洋生物资源高效性的有力证明。


The absence of big, old individual cod and other fish is worrisome from the standpoint of the short-term ecological health of the stock, as well its longer-term genetic health.	无论从物种短期生态健康，还是长期遗传健康的角度来看，鳕鱼和其它鱼类个体中大鱼、成鱼的消失实在令人不安。


The short-term issue concerns egg production, which in many fish is proportional to body size: large individuals contribute far more to future generations than small individuals.	短期生态健康理念关注产卵问题，因为很多鱼类的产卵数量和它们的体格大小成正比。 体格较大的个体与体格较小的个体比较而言，对未来种群数量的影响也会更大。


In fact, first attempts at spawning can be relatively unsuccessful, so a fisheries policy that depends for the most part just on first-time spawners (which is what we are approaching now), could be especially flawed.	实际上，鱼类初次产卵的成活率相对较低。 因此，很大程度上依靠初次产卵鱼来维持产量（如果不改变现状，这种问题很快就会出现）的渔业政策是尤其存在缺陷的。


The policy is also suspect because the success of spawning is notoriously variable from year to year.	这一政策之所以令人怀疑还因为产卵的成活率每年都大不相同。


A bad year for recruitment in a fished-down stock means losing both the new cohort and most of the spawners, because the latter are caught before they can spawn again.	鱼类储备补充匮乏的年份意味着渔场会失去新的鱼群和大部分产卵鱼，因为产卵鱼在得以再次产卵之前就已被捕捞。


By contrast, a stock with lower mortality for large individuals at least maintains an adequate reserve of large individuals available as spawners next year.	与此相反，大鱼个体死亡率较低的鱼群至少可以保存足够数量的大鱼，为来年产卵作好准备。


The long-term concern is that fishing is intended to be selective; fishermen aim to harvest the most profitable species and the most profitable sizes within species.	我们长期关注的问题是捕渔应该具有选择性。 渔民的目的在于收获利润最大的鱼种和该鱼种中利润最大的个体。


Like all other forms of life, fish stocks change genetically when directional selection is applied.	和其他生命群一样，当我们有目的地对其进行人工选择时，鱼群生长会发生基因上的改变。


The effect of fishing-down is to give an advantage to genes causing slow growth but early adulthood.	过度捕捞给基因带来的后果是鱼群的增长速度减慢，个体的成熟期缩短。


Indeed, there is evidence from many fisheries of earlier maturation; such changes take place fast enough to be detected over the decades.	在很多渔场也确有鱼群提早成熟的实例。 这样的变化快到足可以在过去的几十年间得以见证。


For example, early in the twentieth century, you would not find a mature cod in the North Sea less than about 50 centimeters in length, whereas by the 1980's mature cod were as small as 15 centimeters.	比如，二十世纪初，在北海一条成熟的鳕鱼一般不短于五十厘米，而到了八十年代，一条成熟的鳕鱼就只有十五厘米那么长了。


So there is a lot of under-age sex out there in the sea.	所以海里有很多鱼没有足龄就开始交配。


By cherishing our large, old fish we would reverse the selection for early maturation while selecting for faster growth through the size classes most vulnerable to fishing.	通过保护大鱼、成鱼，人工选择的目的由缩短鱼类成熟期，转变为加快生长速度，安全渡过最不该被捕捞的阶段。


The genetic changes that we are bringing about in our fish stocks are going largely unrecognized.	由此给鱼类带来的基因改变很大程度上并没有被认识到。


Yet the precautionary principle places some responsibility on us to hand down the living resources of the marine realm in a form that can be used as much by future generations as by us.	而预防原则提示人类必须负起责任，把海洋界的生物资源传给后代，以使他们享受和我们同样丰富的资源。


Radical new thinking is needed in fisheries management to overcome the ecological and evolutionary problems generated by current practice.	我们需要根本性的新思想来指导渔业管理，以克服因当前不当行为造成的生态和进化问题。


If only one change in the prevailing mindset could be made, it should be to realize that, in the case of fish like cod, big is beautiful.	占主导地位的思维定式即使仅稍做改变，人们也该认识到对诸如鳕鱼这类鱼群而言，体格巨大便是一种美丽。


To reconstruct our approach to fisheries management with measures that increase the survival of large, old individuals would be good for the health of our stocks in the short term and would be appreciated by our descendants.	用增加大鱼、成鱼存活数量的措施来重新构建渔业管理的新方法，将对短期意义上的鱼群健康大有裨益。 我们的后代也会因此感激我们。


The Fog of Finance	金融之雾


Military leaders talk about the “fog of war” – the condition of fundamental uncertainty that marks combat.	军事指挥官谈论“战争之雾”，也就是标志战斗特征的扑朔迷离的情形。


The recent credit and liquidity crisis has revealed a similar condition in financial markets, because no one, not even central banks, seems to understand its nature or magnitude.	最近的信贷和流动性危机揭示了金融市场上这一相似的情况，因为无人、甚至连中央银行看起来也不理解其性质及其程度。


It is often suggested that what is called the “subprime” crisis was the result of lax monetary policies that led to excess liquidity in financial markets.	人们常说，所谓的“次级”危机是过于宽松的货币政策的结果。 这一政策导致金融市场上过多的流动性。


But there is an obvious paradox here, because how can an  excess of liquidity result ultimately in a  shortage of liquidity that has to be made up by central banks?	但是，这里就有一个明显的矛盾，因为流动性过度怎么会最终导致流动性短缺，结果不得不由中央银行来弥补呢？


In fact, monetary laxity can be a symptom not of excess liquidity, but of excess saving.	实际上，货币宽松或许不是过度流动性、而是剩余储蓄的表象。


This is reflected in increasing income inequality in much of the developed world, and the vertiginous surpluses of oil-producing countries and Asian nations.	这反应在大部分发达国家不断增加的收入不平等以及产油国和亚洲各国令人眼花缭乱的盈余之上。


The emergence of sovereign wealth funds like those of China and the Gulf states to invest the savings of these countries’ budget surpluses is but the tip of the global excess savings iceberg.	类似中国和海湾国家的国家财富基金将这些国家的预算盈余用于投资，只不过是全球剩余储蓄的冰山的一角。


Whereas excess liquidity is inflationary and calls for higher interest rates, excess saving is deflationary and calls for lower rates.	剩余流动性具有通胀性质，需要更高的利率，而剩余储蓄则是通货紧缩并需要低利率。


This brings us to the dilemma faced by central banks.	这就带来了中央银行所面临的困境。


When central bankers cannot avoid a crisis – or when they contribute to create one – their fundamental mission is to do  everything in their power to contain its impact.	当中央银行行长们无法回避危机的时候，或者推波助澜的时候，其根本使命就是竭尽全力遏制其影响。


Their actions, their every word or wink, suddenly assumes immense importance.	他们的行动、每一句话或者每一个眼神突然之间具有了巨大的重要行。


The central banker is not only a lender of last resort, but also a speaker of last resort.	中央银行不仅是最终借贷方，而且也是最终的发言人。


In both respects, the United States Federal Reserve has fared much better than the European Central Bank in this most recent crisis.	在这两方面，美联储在这一最近的危机中的表现要远远胜于欧洲央行。


If the problem is excess saving, and if uncertainty erodes confidence, a massive injection of liquidity such as the ECB’s in response to the subprime crisis may be necessary but not sufficient.	如果问题是胜于储蓄，而且如果不确定性破坏信心，那么，类似欧洲央行回应次级房贷危机而大量注入流动性或许是必要的，但确实不够的。


A rate cut also may be required to restore confidence.	也许还需要降息来恢复信心。


The Fed has understood that message.	美联储已经掌握了这一点。


Europe needs to know why the ECB has not.	欧洲需要知道为何欧洲央行还没有。


Moreover, the Fed’s efforts were ultimately stabilizing, because it stated its intentions clearly prior to taking action.	而且，美联储的行动最终发挥稳定作用，因为它在采取行动前明确表明其意图。


By contrast, in late August, the ECB’s governor, Jean-Claude Trichet, referred to the monetary-policy decision taken before the crisis to justify the possibility of a rate hike, then left rates on hold.	与此对照的是，八月末，欧洲央行总裁特里谢谈及危机前做出的货币政策决定来为可能的升息提供理由，然后又维持利率不变。


On September 6, Trichet said that the ECB had maintained the  status quo , leaving it unclear what he meant.	9月6日，特里谢说欧洲央行维持了现状，语焉不详。


Indeed, whereas the ECB seemed to have implicitly accepted an objective of economic growth, it maintained its hard line against inflation on October 4.	实际上，欧洲央行看起来隐含地接接受了经济增长的目标，它在10月4日重申了其反通胀的强硬立场。


The reason for the ECB’s inertia, obscurity, and rigidity is simple: the ECB is only incidentally in charge of economic growth in the euro area; its primary objective is “price stability.”	欧洲央行行动迟缓、神秘以及僵硬的原因很简单。 欧洲央行只是不经意地主管了欧元区的经济增长；


Yet the current crisis, like others that preceded it, shows that monetary policy governs anticipations, not only of inflation but also of growth, whether central banks like it or not.	其主要目标是“价格稳定”。 但是当前的危机就像先前的一样表明，无论中央银行是否愿意，货币政策既控制通胀的预期，也控制增长的预期。


So long as the ECB does not acknowledge the doubts now hovering around Europe’s economies, there is a risk of a crash.	只要欧洲央行不承认盘旋在欧洲各国经济上的疑惑，就存在溃泄的风险。


The ECB is convinced that benign neglect is the right exchange rate policy, and that the G7 is the right place to address currency volatility.	欧洲央行确信，善意的置之不理就是正确的汇率政策，而且西方七国集团应该是讨论货币浮动的地方。


But the euro is a European affair.	但是欧元是欧洲事务。


Why should a situation in which Europe is bearing the burden of weak currencies in the US and Asia be remedied in a global forum?	欧洲承担了美国和亚洲疲软货币的负担，为何这一局势要在全球论坛上加以解决呢？


In the middle of a financial crisis, the only thing worse than doubt is false certainty.	在金融危机过程之中，唯一比疑惑还要糟糕的事情就是虚假的确定性。


The paradox is that the ECB could have secured its independence by cutting interest rates on September 6, and again on October 4.	矛盾之处是，欧洲央行尚未通过在9月6日和10月4日降息而确定其独立性。


Now it will be forced to do so.	现在它将会被迫如此。


A victim of its backward-looking bias, the ECB chose to wait for the worst instead of preventing it.	欧洲央行是其向后看的偏见的受害者，它选择等待最为糟糕的事情，而不是预防。


As a result, the inevitable European rate cut, when it comes, will probably not have the stabilizing effect that it should.	结果，当不可避免的欧洲降息来临之际，可能不会具有应当具有的稳定的效果。


The Folklore of Buried Memories	话说隐藏的记忆


How victims remember trauma is the most controversial issue facing psychology and psychiatry today.	受害者们对创伤的记忆是当今的心理学和精神治疗领域所面临的最具争议的问题。


Many clinical trauma theorists believe that combat, rape, and other terrifying experiences are seemingly engraved on the mind, never to be forgotten.	许多临床创伤的学者们都认为战争、强暴和其他可怕的经历似乎会在人的精神上留下难以遗忘的印记。


Others disagree, arguing that the mind can protect itself by banishing memories of trauma from awareness, making it difficult for victims to remember their most horrific experiences until it is safe to do so many years later.	而另一些学者则持有不同意见。 他们认为（人的）头脑可以通过将创痛的记忆从意识中消除的方式来保护自身，从而使受害者很难回忆起他们最为可怕的经历。


While acknowledging that trauma is often all too memorable, these certain clinical trauma theorists assert that a condition known as “traumatic dissociative amnesia” leaves a large minority of victims unable to recall their trauma, precisely because it was so overwhelmingly terrifying.	这种机制会持续多年，直到这种记忆变得安全为止。 虽然也承认精神创伤常常是刻骨铭心的，但这些临床创伤学者们也声称有一种被称为“创伤离解性失忆症”（traumatic dissociative amnesia）的情况，让相当一部分受害者不能回忆起他们的创伤，这恰恰是因为这种创伤极为可怕。


However, these clinical trauma theorists do not argue that “repressed” or “dissociated” memories of horrific events are either inert or benign.	然而，这些临床创伤学者们却也并不认为“被压抑”和“被离解”的对恐怖事件的记忆是迟钝或良性的。


On the contrary, these buried memories silently poison the lives of victims, giving rise to seemingly inexplicable psychiatric symptoms, and therefore must be exhumed for healing to occur.	相反，这些深藏的记忆悄然地侵害受害者的生活，引发一些似乎难以解释的精神病症状，因而必须要发掘出来进行治疗。


This is no ordinary academic debate.	这绝非寻常的学术辩论。


The controversy has spilled out of the psychology laboratories and psychiatric clinics, capturing headlines, motivating legislative changes, and affecting outcomes in civil lawsuits and criminal trials.	这场论战已经从精神病实验室和精神病诊所中扩散开来，出现在头版头条，触动立法改革，并影响到了民事诉讼和刑事审判的结果。


Whether individuals can repress and recover memories of traumatic sexual abuse has been especially contentious.	性虐待的受害人能否压抑并恢复创痛的记忆也成为备受争议的问题。


During the 1990’s, many adult psychotherapy patients began to recall having been sexually abused during childhood.	在1990年代，许多接受精神疗法的成年病人开始回忆起在童年时遭受性虐待的经历。


Some took legal action against the alleged perpetrators, often their elderly parents.	一些人对所谓的施暴者采取了法律行动，被指控的通常都是年迈的父母。


While complaints against parents, based on allegedly repressed and recovered memories of abuse, have declined, those against large institutions, such as the Catholic Church, have increased.	随着针对父母的，基于所谓被压抑和被恢复的受虐记忆的指控的减少，那些针对诸如天主教会等大型机构的投诉却增加了。


Strikingly, both advocates and skeptics of the concept of traumatic dissociative amnesia adduce the same studies when defending their diametrically opposed views.	值得注意的是创伤离解性失忆症的鼓吹者和怀疑者在捍卫其截然相反的观点时，都从同样的研究中引证。


But it is the advocates who misinterpret the data when attempting to show that victims are often unable to recall their traumatic experiences.	但正是鼓吹者们在试图证明受害者常常不能回忆起创痛的经历时，对研究数据进行了错误的阐释。


Consider the following.	让我们来考虑下列事实。


After exposure to extreme stress, some victims report difficulties remembering things in everyday life.	在经受了极度的压力之后，一些受害者表示在记住日常琐事方面有困难。


Advocates of traumatic amnesia misconstrue these reports as showing that victims are unable to remember the horrific event itself.	创伤离解性失忆症的鼓吹者们将这些报告曲解为受害者们不能回忆起可怕的事件本身。


In reality, this memory problem concerns ordinary absentmindedness that emerges in the wake of trauma; it does not refer to an inability to remember the trauma itself.	而实际上，这种记忆问题与遭受创伤之后出现的一般性注意力分散有关，而并不意味着受害人不能回忆起创伤本身。


Ordinary forgetfulness that emerges after a trauma must not be confused with amnesia for the trauma.	决不能把创伤之后出现的一般性健忘和由于创伤而产生的失忆症混为一谈。


Consider, too, that one symptom of posttraumatic stress disorder is an “inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma.”	我们还应该考虑到，创伤后应激障碍(posttraumatic stress disorder)的症状是“不能回忆起创伤的重要方面。


This symptom, however, does not mean that victims are unaware of having been traumatized.	”然而，这一症状并不意味着受害者们意识不到所遭受的创伤。


Indeed, the mind does not operate like a video recorder, and thus not every aspect of a traumatic experience gets encoded into memory in the first place.	的确，头脑的工作机制不像录像机，因此并不是创伤经历的方方面面在一开始就会被编码写入记忆。


High levels of emotional arousal often result in the victim’s attention being drawn to the central features of the event at the expense of other features.	高度的情绪激发通常造成受害者的注意力过度集中于事件的核心特性而却忽略了其他特性。


Incomplete encoding of a trauma must not be confused with amnesia – an inability to recall something did get into memory.	对创伤的不完整编码决不能和失忆症混淆，后者是不能回忆起曾经进入记忆的事情。


Moreover, a rare syndrome called “psychogenic amnesia” is sometimes confused with traumatic amnesia.	再者，一种名为“心因性失忆症”的罕见综合症有时也被误诊为创伤性失忆症。


Victims of psychogenic amnesia suddenly lose all memory of their previous lives, including their sense of personal identity.	心因性失忆症的患者突然间失去了包括个人身份在内的，对以前生活的所有记忆。


Occasionally, this sudden, complete memory loss occurs after severe stress, but not invariably.	这种突然的，完全的记忆丧失间或在严重的应激之后发生，但却并不总是如此。


After a few days or weeks, memory abruptly returns.	在几天或几周之后，记忆突然间又恢复了。


In contrast, the phenomenon of dissociative amnesia supposedly entails victims’ inability to remember their traumatic experiences, not an inability to remember their entire lives or who they are.	相比之下，离解性失忆通常会使受害者回忆不起创伤的经历，而不会记不起自己以前的生活和身份。


Several surveys show that adults reporting childhood sexual abuse often say that there was a period of time when they “could not remember” their abuse.	有几份调查表明，报告在童年时期曾受过性虐待的成年人常常说有一段时期他们“记不住”曾经遭受的虐待。


Claims of prior inability to remember imply that they had attempted unsuccessfully to recall their abuse, only to remember it much later.	声称先前有记忆障碍意味着他们曾经试图回忆起所受的虐待但却没有成功，所以只有在相当一段时间之后才能回忆起来。


Yet if these individuals were unable to remember their abuse, on what basis would they attempt to recall it in the first place?	但如果这些人记不住曾经遭受的虐待，那么他们又凭什么能回忆起来呢？


Most likely, they meant that there was a period of time when they did not think about their abuse.	他们很可能是想说有一段时间他们不去想受虐的经历。


But not thinking about something is not the same thing as being unable to remember it.	但不去想某些事和不能记住某些事是不同的。


It is inability to remember that constitutes amnesia.	正是记忆障碍造成了失忆症。


Research conducted in my laboratory on adults reporting histories of childhood sexual abuse provides a solution to this bitter controversy.	在我的实验室中进行的对报告在童年时期曾受过性虐待的成年人的研究，为这一场激烈的争论提供了一个解决方案。


Some of our participants reported having forgotten episodes of nonviolent sexual abuse perpetrated by a trusted adult.	有一些参与者报告说曾经忘记了一些由他们所信任的成年人实施的非暴力的性虐待经历。


They described it as having been upsetting, confusing, and disturbing, but not traumatic in the sense of being overwhelmingly terrifying.	他们将这种经历描述为令人苦恼、困惑和烦乱的，但却并不是在极度可怕意义上的创伤。


Failing to understand what had happened to them, they simply did not think about it for many years.	由于不能理解发生在自己身上的这一切，他们就只能在相当长的时间里置之不理。


When reminders prompted recollection many years later, they experienced intense distress, finally understanding their abuse from the perspective of an adult.	当多年以后某些事物唤醒了他们记忆，让他们体验到了强烈的创痛，并最终从成年人的角度明白了曾经受过的虐待。


These cases count as recovered memories of sexual abuse, but not as instances of traumatic dissociative amnesia.	这些案例可以作为性虐待经历的记忆恢复，而不能被看作是创伤离解性失忆症。


That is, the events were not experienced as traumatic when they occurred, and there is no evidence that they were inaccessible during the years when they never came to mind.	也就是说，这些事件发生时并未给受害者造成创伤，也没有证据表明在事后的很多年里受害者从未想过这些经历，是由于他们回忆不起这些经历。


Sexual abuse is not invariably traumatic in the sense of being overwhelmingly terrifying.	从让人受到极度惊吓的意义上讲，性虐待并不总是创痛的。


Of course, it is always morally reprehensible, even when it fails to produce lasting psychiatric symptoms.	当然，即便是其没有造成持久的精神症状，这种行为也应该受到道德的谴责。


The Forgotten Genocide	被遗忘的大屠杀


NEW DELHI – It is exactly 40 years since the Pakistani military regime of Yahya Khan initiated “Operation Searchlight” in March 1971.	新德里——今年恰好是巴基斯坦叶海亚·汗军事政权执行1971年3月“探照灯行动”的40周年纪念日。


That military expedition was but the latest in a series of pogroms carried out to intimidate the restive population of what was then called East Pakistan – today’s independent Bangladesh.	那次军事远征行动不过是系列军事行动的一部分，目的是恐吓当时称为东巴基斯坦（也就是今天独立的孟加拉共和国）躁动不安的民众。


What followed was one of the worst massacres in human history, now all but forgotten by the international community.	随之而来的是人类历史上最恐怖的大屠杀，国际社会现在已经将这段历史几乎忘得干干净净。


Pakistan was created by the partition of British India in 1947, but its territory was divided into two enclaves separated by hundreds of miles.	巴基斯坦起源于1947年英属印度的分裂，但这一地区被分割成相距数百英里之遥的两块飞地。


While they shared a religion, Islam, there were major cultural and linguistic differences between East and West Pakistan.	尽管同样信仰伊斯兰教，但东西巴基斯坦之间存在相当大的文化和语言差异。


In the east, there was a strong sense of being Bengali, and a sizeable Hindu minority continued to live in the province.	东巴基斯坦民众具有强烈的孟加拉意识，那里还居住着庞大的印度教少数族裔。


There was, moreover, strong resentment that political power lay in the hands of western-based politicians and generals who were blatantly insensitive to Bengali demands.	此外，东巴基斯坦人对政治权力掌握在西巴基斯坦政客和将军手中非常不满，因为这些人明目张胆地无视孟加拉人的要求。


It seemed to many that, with the creation of Pakistan, East Pakistan had merely exchanged one form of colonialism for another.	在不少人看来，巴基斯坦建国后，东巴基斯坦不过是从一种形式的殖民主义变成了另一种形式的殖民主义。


And, as Bengali demands for autonomy gained momentum, the response became more repressive.	并且随着孟加拉自治要求愈演愈烈，只换来当权者越来越残酷的压制。


In November 1970, tropical cyclone “Bhola” struck East Pakistan, killing between 300,000 and 500,000 people.	1970年11月，热带气旋“波拉”袭击东巴基斯坦，造成300,000到500,000民众丧生的悲剧。


Bhola is still considered one of the worst natural disasters on record, and the military dictatorship’s lukewarm relief efforts incensed the Bengali population.	波拉迄今仍是有史以来最严重的自然灾害，军事独裁政府冷漠的救灾工作彻底激怒了孟加拉民众。


So, when Pakistan’s military leaders finally allowed elections in late December 1970, East Pakistan voted overwhelmingly for the Bengali-nationalist Awami League, which won 167 of 169 seats in the province.	于是，巴基斯坦军事领袖最终于1970年12月允许进行选举的时候，东巴基斯坦民众压倒性地把票投给了孟加拉民族主义人民联盟，致使该联盟赢得了该省169个席位中的167席。


Since East Pakistan was more populous than West Pakistan, the election’s outcome raised the prospect that the Bengalis would now rule the country as whole.	由于东巴基斯坦在人口方面多于西巴基斯坦，选举结果使孟加拉人全面接管政权成为可能。


This was not palatable to the Punjabi-dominated military brass or to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the leader of West Pakistan’s largest political party.	以旁遮普为主的军事要员或西巴基斯坦最大政党领袖佐勒菲卡尔·阿里·布托根本无法接受这样的结局。


The elections were “canceled,” and East Pakistan erupted in open revolt.	选举结果被“取消”，东巴基斯坦也因此爆发了公开起义。


Yahya Khan responded by sending in the troops.	叶海亚·汗派出了军队。


The result was a genocide in which as many as three million people, particularly minorities and intellectuals, were killed.	结果演变为一场大屠杀，导致约三百万人死于非命，特别是少数族裔和知识分子。


Dhaka University’s residential halls were particularly targeted.	屠杀目标特别锁定达卡大学宿舍。


Up to 700 students were killed in a single attack on Jagannath Hall.	仅对贾甘堂的一次袭击就导致700名学生丧生。


Several well-known professors, both Hindu and Muslim, were murdered.	几位印度教和穆斯林教的知名教授惨遭杀害。


Hundreds of thousands of women were systematically raped in the countryside.	乡下有数十万妇女被大规模奸淫。


By September 1971, ten million refugees had poured into eastern India.	1971年9月，一千万难民涌入东印度。


The world knew what was happening.	国际社会明白其中的是非曲直。


Time magazine’s August 2, 1971, issue quoted a United States official saying, “This is the most incredible, calculated thing since the days of the Nazis in Poland.”	1971年8月2日刊发的《时代》杂志引用一位美国官员的言论，“这是继纳粹时期的波兰之后最有预谋，也最令人发指的屠杀惨剧。


The article goes on to describe the streams of refugees:	” 这篇文章接着描写难民潮的状况：


“Over the rivers and down the highways and along countless jungle paths, the population of East Pakistan continues to hemorrhage into India: an endless unorganized flow of refugees with a few tin kettles, cardboard boxes, and ragged clothes piled on their heads, carrying their sick children and their old.	“沿着河边、高速路和难以计数的森林小径，东巴基斯坦难民不断涌入印度： 无边无际、毫无组织的难民，头上顶着水罐、纸盒和破衣服，领着老人和生病的孩子。


They pad along barefooted, with the mud sucking at their heels in the wet parts.	他们艰难地赤脚前行，脚上糊满了路上的湿泥。


They are silent, except for a child whimpering now and then, but their faces tell the story.	他们默默无语，只偶尔传出一两声儿童的哭泣，但他们的面孔在讲述着悲惨的故事。


Many are sick and covered with sores.	不少人都生了病，浑身上下长满了脓包。


Others have cholera, and when they die by the roadside there is no one to bury them.”	也有人得了霍乱，不时有人倒毙在路边，也没有人给他们收尸。


The international community’s response to the massacres was shameful.	国际社会对大屠杀的态度令人感到羞耻。


We now have copies of desperate cables sent by diplomat Archer Blood and his colleagues at the US consulate in Dacca (now Dhaka) pleading with the US government to stop supporting a military regime that was carrying out genocide.	我们现在掌握了时任美国驻达卡领事阿彻·布莱德外交官及其同事发给美国政府的绝望的电报，恳求美国政府停止支持实施种族屠杀的军政府。


Instead, President Richard Nixon concentrated on intimidating Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi into staying out.	相反，理查德·尼克松总统却忙于威胁印度总理英迪拉·甘地不要插手巴基斯坦局势。


He would even send the US Seventh Fleet to cow her.	尼克松甚至派遣美国第七舰队威胁甘地。


Fortunately, Gandhi held her nerve and began to prepare for war.	幸运的是，甘地下定决心，开始战前准备。


Strengthened by promises of support from the US and China, Pakistan’s military commanders ordered pre-emptive air strikes against India on December 3, 1971.	在美国和中国的承诺支持下，巴基斯坦军事指挥官于1971年12月3日命令率先对印度发起空中打击。


The Indian response was swift and sharp.	印度的反应迅速而敏捷。


With support from the civilian population, as well as from the Mukti Bahini, an irregular army of Bengali rebels, the Indian army swept into East Pakistan.	在民众和孟加拉叛军的非正规部队民族解放军的支持下，印度军队涌入东巴基斯坦地区。


Nixon was too bogged down in Vietnam to do more than issue threats.	尼克松在越南陷入困境，除威胁以外已无力采取进一步措施。


On December 16, the Pakistanis signed the instrument of surrender in Dacca.	12月6日，巴基斯坦在达卡签署投降文件。


Bangladesh was born.	孟加拉国由此诞生。


Having acquiesced in the genocide, the international community has conveniently forgotten it, and no Pakistani official has ever been brought to justice.	对大屠杀采取默许态度的国际社会顺理成章地忘掉了这场灾难，没有任何巴基斯坦官员受到应���的审判。


On the contrary, many of the perpetrators later held senior government positions.	恰恰相反，许多肇事者后来都在政府中身居要职。


It is as if the Nuremberg trials never happened after WWII.	就好像二战后纽伦堡审判从未发生过一样。


As the world watches Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi slaughter his own people, we should remember the human cost of international indifference.	在世界目睹利比亚的穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲屠杀国内民众的时候，我们不应该忘记国际冷漠所造成的人道主义损失。


The Forgotten Sick	被遗忘的病人


LIVERPOOL – The developed world is familiar with the global threats of viral infections that incite fear in both rich populations and poor.	利物浦——发达国家非常熟悉那些不分贫富贵贱都有可能罹患的病毒感染造成的全球性威胁。


The pandemics of SARS, avian, and swine influenza have cost the global economy an estimated $200 billion.	非典型肺炎、禽流感和猪流感的肆虐已造成全球经济约2000亿美元的损失。


These threats emerge frequently and unpredictably from human contact with animals.	这些威胁因人类与动物的接触而频繁发生，难以预料。


Rapid response is required of governments, United Nations agencies, regulatory authorities, and the pharmaceutical industry for coordination, surveillance, and vaccine production.	政府、联合国机构、主管部门和制药业必须迅速做出反应，进行协调、监督和生产疫苗。


But the poorest people – those who live on less than $2 per day – are often not considered important when a pandemic threat emerges.	然而，当流行病的威胁出现后，那些最为贫穷的人——每天收入不超过2美元——却常常无法引起重视。


They do not contribute significantly to the global economy, and their countries’ health systems function on a tiny fraction of what advanced economies devote to their populations’ health.	他们对世界经济没有重大贡献，其国家的卫生系统预算与发达国家用于本国国民的金额相比只是九牛一毛。


Conversely, the developed countries’ view of the diseases of the developing world is that only three are important: AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.	但是在发达国家看来，发展中国家的疾病只有三种值得重视：艾滋病、肺结核和疟疾。


This stems from the power of advocacy constituencies and the recognition that these diseases might threaten the developed world.	这种看法的产生在于宣传和这三种疾病可能威胁到发达国家的认知。


As a result, these diseases receive a disproportionate amount of funding for research and control, while other infections kill, blind, deform, and disable many more – the “bottom billion” – who have little access to health care.	结果，这三种疾病的研究和控制得到了多得不成比例的资金，而与此同时，更多的人——“最底层的十亿人”——因为其他疾病而死亡、致盲、畸形、残废，几乎无法得到治疗。


These infections are known as the Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs).	这些其他的疾病被称作“被忽视的热带病”（NTD）。


They are unfamiliar to the developed world, and their names are often difficult to pronounce: filariasis (elephantiasis), onchocerciasis (river blindness), schistosomiasis (bilharzia), and others, particularly intestinal worms.	发达国家对这些疾病知之甚少，其名称通常也比较拗口：丝虫病（象皮病）、盘尾丝虫病（河盲）、血吸虫病（裂体血吸虫病），等等，特别是肠虫病。


These are not familiar diseases to people lucky enough to live in the world’s richest countries, but they are household names to hundreds of millions of poor people, who are often infected with more than one of them.	有幸生活在世界上最富有的国家的人们很少听说这些疾病，但是对于数以亿计的穷人来说，这些却是家喻户晓的名词，很多人还同时患有不止一种。


They are long-lasting conditions, often contracted at an early age, and both the illnesses and their symptoms are progressive.	这些疾病是长期的，通常在孩童时期感染，病情和症状都会越来越严重。


Indeed, whereas the misery that worm diseases cause is extensive and the burden excessive – as much as tuberculosis or malaria – they do not kill immediately. Instead, they gradually erode children’s development prospects.	的确，蠕虫病造成的痛苦虽然范围广泛，负担沉重——不下于肺结核和疟疾——但却并不会立即致命，而是会逐渐破坏儿童的发育。


And symptoms accumulate: sight is gradually lost, genital lesions appear around puberty (sometimes increasing risk of HIV), and skin condition declines as millions of microscopic worms become intolerably itchy.	而且症状会逐渐增加：视力逐渐丧失，青春期开始出现生殖器病变（有时候会增加感染HIV的风险），皮肤因数百万微小的寄生虫而变得瘙痒难忍，状况恶化。


Blood loss, causing anemia, is the result of thousands of worms chewing at the wall of the gut.	成千上万的寄生虫啃噬内脏的脏壁，造成失血，引发贫血症。


Other diseases, such as sleeping sickness, transmitted by tsetse flies are fatal if untreated, as is leishmaniasis, if the parasites that cause it – transmitted by tiny sandflies – invade the liver and spleen.	其他疾病，例如采采蝇传播的昏睡病，如果不予治疗则会致人死命。 微小的白蛉传播的利什曼病也是如此，如果致病的寄生虫侵入肝脏和脾脏的话。


Again, the misery caused by these infections exceeds the burden of tuberculosis or malaria.	这些疾病造成的痛苦远大于肺结核和疟疾。


The good news is that NTDs can be treated, as quality drugs – donated by the major pharmaceutical companies – are made available.	好消息是，被忽视的热带病可以治愈，只要能获得大型制药公司捐赠的优质药品。


These drug donations for river blindness, trachoma (another blinding disease), leprosy, elephantiasis, worms, and bilharzia, as well as for sleeping sickness, give hope to millions.	这些治疗河盲、沙眼（另一种致盲的疾病）、麻风、象皮病、寄生虫病、裂体血吸虫病以及昏睡病的捐赠药品给数百万人带来了希望。


Moreover, the cost of the annual treatment recommended by the World Health Organization is often less than $0.50, and much less in Asia, with delivery carried out by communities or through schools.	世界卫生组织推荐的年度治疗费用一般低于0. 50美元，而在亚洲则更低，药品通过社区或学校发放。


The increase in treatment has been spectacular – more than 500 million people in 51 countries treated for elephantiasis in 2007, and 60 million in 19 countries have been treated for river blindness.	受治疗人数的增长非常可观——2007年，51个国家超过5亿人接受了象皮病治疗，19个国家的6000万人接受了河盲病治疗。


Guinea disease is now endemic in only four countries, and leprosy is a problem in only six.	几内亚病的流行现在只限于四个国家，麻风病则只限于六个国家。


These are impressive figures, and the expense is trivial compared to the anti-retroviral drugs needed to treat AIDS, which cost more than $200 annually and must be taken every day, not every year.	这些数字十分可观，而且相比治疗艾滋病所需的抗逆转录病毒药物，费用更是微不足道，后者每年的花费是200美元以上，而且必须每天服用，而不是每年一次。


Given that roughly one billion people are infected with NTDs, compared to 40 million with HIV, and that the drugs targeting them are donated and actually prevent disease and stop transmission, treating NTDs is a major opportunity to lift populations out of poverty.	鉴于感染NTD的病人约有10亿（感染HIV的病人有4000万），而且治疗这些疾病的药物是捐赠的，且的确能够起到预防和阻止传播的作用，可以说解决被忽视的热带病是消除贫困问题的重要机会。


The main challenge is to convince policymakers that there is more to reducing poverty than focusing on just three diseases.	主要的挑战在于如何让决策者相信，为减少贫困现象可做的事情远远不止关注三种疾病。


In fact, NTDs are “low-hanging fruit.”	事实上，被忽视的热带病就是“伸手可及的果实”。


If the international community is serious about alleviating poverty and achieving development goals, tackling the diseases so directly associated with economic misery should be a fundamental objective.	如果国际社会对减轻贫困问题和实现发展目标的态度是严肃的，那么，解决这些与经济困顿直接有关的疾病就应该被列为基本目标之一。


We can easily meet that objective, because we have drugs that are effective, free (or very cheap), that have low delivery costs, and that provide add-on benefits.	我们可以轻易地实现这样的目标，因为我们拥有免费（或低廉）的有效药物，施用的成本不高，而且还有附带的好处。


Now is the time to rethink our public-health investments and messaging, and evaluate whether we are getting the best value for our donor dollars, or whether we should do much more to tackle diseases that we have so far largely ignored.	现在是时候重新考虑我们的公共卫生投资和宣传，评价我们捐赠的善款是否发挥了最大的作用，思考我们是否应该加大对一直以来被我们忽视的疾病的力度。


The Forgotten Side of the War on Terrorism	对恐怖战争中被遗忘的一面


During the past decade – particularly since the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States – Westerners have generally considered international terrorism to be the most urgent threat to human security.	过去10年中，尤其是2001年9月11日对美国的袭击发生以来，西方人普遍把国际恐怖主义看成对人类安全最紧迫的威胁。


Accordingly, vast resources have been mobilized and expended to counter its many forms.	与此相对应，他们动用和耗费了大量的资源，来应对多种形式的恐怖主义。


Unfortunately, however, the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent invasion – without UN authority – of Iraq underscore the primacy of military solutions in the strategic thinking of affluent nations.	不幸的是，美国带头入侵阿富汗及其后未经联合国授权擅自侵入伊拉克越发突显了军事解决在富裕国家战略思想中所占的主导位置。


At the same time, developing countries have continued to grapple with the persistence of mass poverty, endemic disease, malnutrition, environmental degradation, and gross income inequity, all of which have caused a degree of human suffering that far exceeds what has been caused by terrorist attacks.	与此同时，发展中国家继续同大规模贫困、流行疾病、营养不良、环境恶化和收入不公进行斗争，这些因素造成的人类灾难是恐怖袭击根本无法比拟的。


We need, therefore, to revisit today’s global challenges from a Third-World perspective.	因此，我们需要从第三世界的角度来重新审视今天的全球挑战。


Indeed, a fundamental lesson of terrorist attacks and insurgencies, we now know, is that no nation, however self-sufficient, can afford to remain heedless of whether others sink or swim.	实际上，我们现在知道应该从恐怖袭击和暴乱中汲取的根本教训就是任何国家，无论它是多么自负，都不能毫不在意其它国家的成败浮沉。


For much of the developing world, the basic instability of international relations – owing to terrorist strikes, guerrilla warfare, and the preemptive wars that America threatens on its enemies – is aggravating socioeconomic anxieties and fueling doubts about the benefits of globalization.	对多数发展中国家来讲，恐怖袭击、游击战争和美国威胁对敌人发动的先发制人的战争是国际关系中最基本的不稳定因素，它们加剧了人们对社会经济的疑虑，为质疑全球化是否有益的论调火上浇油。


Certainly, we are all beginning to realize how precarious that process is – how easily market mechanisms can be rolled back by cultural resentments stemming from economic exploitation, political oppression, and social injustice.	当然，我们都逐渐认识到这样的过程是何其脆弱¾市场机制多么容易受到经济剥削、政治压迫和社会不公所滋生的文化怨恨的压抑。


People in the industrialized countries are already an estimated 74 times richer per capita than those in the poorest countries.	据估计，工业化国家的人均财富已经相当于最贫困国家的74倍。


Today, one-quarter of the world’s population still lives on the equivalent of less than one US dollar a day, and the World Bank says that the daily spending power of 1.2 billion people is roughly equal to the price of a hamburger, two soft drinks, or three candy bars in the West.	今天，世界人口的四分之一仍然以每天不到1美元为生，世界银行说12亿人口的日消费能力大约相当于西方人购买一个汉堡、两瓶软饮或三块糖果的价格。


According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, 815 million people, including 200 million children under the age of five, go to bed hungry each night.	据联合国粮农组织统计，全世界有8亿1500万成人、包括2亿儿童每天晚上都在饥饿中进入梦乡。


Obviously, there must be an intensification of efforts to reduce global poverty, which has become a breeding ground of resentment, envy, and despair – hence, a ready producer of violence and suicide bombers.	显而易见，必须加大力量消除贫困，因为贫困已经成为滋生不满、嫉妒和失望的温床¾以及暴力和自杀性爆炸现实的制造者。


The G-8 countries’ agreement last year to a debt write-off for the 18 poorest states – 16 in Africa and two in Latin America – is a splendid, but insufficient, beginning.	去年签署的八国集团协定同意免除18个最贫困国家的债务¾这18个国家中的16个来自非洲，另外两个来自拉美。 这份协议开了个好头，但是还远远不够。


The 100 most indebted countries still find the burden of servicing their collective $2.3 trillion in official debt increasingly hard to bear, leaving them hard put to finance national programs spelled out by the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDG’s), which seek to halve global poverty by 2015.	3万亿美元的官方债务，它们感到债务负担越来越重，这使它们在面对联合国千年发展目标（MDG）的国家财政计划时几乎陷入了困境。 这项计划力争在2015年实现将全球贫困减少一半的目标。


If we are to close the global gap in personal security and economic well-being, the community of nations will need to cultivate a new ethos of mutual responsibility.	如果想缩小个人安全和经济福利之间的差距，所有国家需要树立新的相互负责的风气。


The Philippine government has proposed that half of all scheduled debt payments be withheld for a specified period, to be invested in reforestation, clean water, housing, food production, primary healthcare, sanitation, basic education, farm-to-market roads, ecologically sound tourism, micro-finance, and related MDG projects.	菲律宾政府提出将所有待偿债务的一半暂时延缓一段时间，把它们投资到人工造林、清洁饮水、住宅建设、食品生产、基本医疗、卫生设施、基础教育、从农村到市场的道路建设、生态游览、微观金融和相关的联合国千年发展目标项目中。


For lenders, debt could be converted, wherever possible, into equity in MDG projects with earning potential, while building up poor countries’ capacity for self-reliance.	对债权国来讲，可以将债务尽量转化成具有盈利前景的联合国千年发展目标资产，这么做也能够培养贫困国家自力更生的能力。


But self-reliance will be impossible to achieve as long as the rich countries favor free markets and free trade only when it suits them.	但如果富裕国家只支持符合自身利益的自由市场和自由贸易，那自力更生永远都只能是天方夜谭。


Even UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has warned that the unrestrained tide of globalization might not raise all boats, but only the yachts – while overturning a lot of canoes.	就连联合国秘书长安南都警告说毫无节制的全球化浪潮不会托起所有的舰艇，只有那些轻便灵活的快艇才能在大浪淘沙中适者生存，而在全球化大潮的洗礼中，许多独木舟都难以逃脱倾覆的厄运。


The most glaring injustice in this respect has been the failure of the US and the European Union to deliver substantially on their promises of market access to agricultural exports from poor countries.	上述领域最引人注目的不公之处是美国和欧盟未能在实质上兑现它们在贫困国家农产品出口准入方面作出的承诺。


Bimal Ghosh, a former director of the UN Development Program, famously calculated that the daily subsidy for every cow in the EU – currently amounting to €2.50 – exceeds the daily income of millions of poor people around the world.	联合国开发计划署前署长Bimal Ghosh所做的计算广为人知，那就是目前欧盟每天每头牛的补贴为2. 50欧元¾超过了全世界成百上千万贫困人口的日收入。


The poor countries argue that broader liberalization in the EU, the US, and Japan alone would yield benefits worth up to $142 billion by 2015.	贫困国家提出如果欧盟、美国和日本三国能扩大贸易自由化，由此产生的利润到2015年为止将超过1420亿美元。


The G-8 nations and the global alliance that America leads must aim not merely to defeat terrorism.	美国领导8国集团和全球联盟的目标应该不仅仅是挫败恐怖主义。


They must address all aspects of human security, including people’s well-being and safety in their homes, neighborhoods, and workplaces.	它们必须解决人类安全的所有问题，包括确保在家庭、社区和工作场所的福利和安全。


And they must win people’s allegiance by the power of their values and their ideals – not only by isolating terrorists and extremists, but also by helping, in meaningful ways, poor countries to prosper.	它们必须靠价值观和理想的力量去赢得人们的忠诚¾不仅通过孤立恐怖和极端份子，而且通过采用有意义的方式协助贫困国家实现繁荣。


Above all, those who lead us today must create a genuinely new global order in which all peoples take part – with dignity and an assurance of fairness.	最重要的是，今天的领袖必须建立起让所有人参与的真正崭新的全球秩序，确保人类社会的尊严和公正。


The Forgotten Twentieth-Century	被遗忘的二十世纪


BERLIN – It has been 20 years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which for many historians marked the real end of the “short twentieth century” – a century that, beginning in 1914, was characterized by protracted ideological conflicts among communism, fascism, and liberal democracy, until the latter seemed to have emerged fully victorious.	柏林——苏联解体迄今已经20年了，对很多历史学家来讲，苏联的解体标志着“短暂的二十世纪”从真正意义上的结束——这个世纪始于1914年，其特色是共产主义、法西斯主义和自由民主之间旷日持久的思想冲突，最后似乎以自由民主大获全胜而告结束。


But something strange happened on the way to the End of History: we seem desperate to learn from the recent past, but are very unsure about what the lessons are.	但在历史终结的过程中似乎出了些问题：我们迫不及待地想从近代史中吸取经验，但却根本不清楚到底应该吸取什么。


Clearly, all history is contemporary history, and what Europeans, in particular, need to learn today from the twentieth century concerns the power of ideological extremes in dark times – and the peculiar nature of European democracy as it was constructed after World War II.	无疑所有历史都是当代史，而欧洲人今天特别需要从二十世纪汲取的教训则涉及黑暗年代中极端思想的力量——以及二战后建设的欧洲民主制度的特殊性。


In some ways, the great ideological struggles of the twentieth century now seem about as close and relevant as the scholastic debates of the Middle Ages – especially, but not only, for younger generations.	从某种角度看，这场二十世纪伟大的思想斗争现在似乎像中世纪的学术辩论一样远离现实，这种观点在民众中普遍存在，但在青年一代中尤为明显。


Who now remotely understands – let alone takes the trouble to try to understand – the great political dramas of intellectuals like Arthur Koestler and Victor Serge, people who risked their lives for and then against communism?	亚瑟·库斯勒和维克多·塞尔等学者冒着生命危险支持后来又反对共产主义，人们现在只是对他们伟大的政治作为一知半解，更遑论去深入理解他们的想法了。


Nevertheless, much more than most of us would care to admit, we remain enmeshed in the concepts and categories of the twentieth century’s ideological wars.	但是，虽然绝大多数人不愿承认，但我们仍然没有超出二十世纪意识形态之争的概念及范畴。


This was most obvious with the intellectual responses to Islamist terror: terms like “Islamo-fascism” or “third totalitarianism” were coined not just to characterize a new enemy of the West, but also to evoke the experience of the anti-totalitarian struggles that preceded and followed World War II.	这一点在对伊斯兰恐怖活动所采取的思想对策中体现得尤为明显：创造“伊斯兰法西斯主义”或“第三集权主义”这样的名词不只是为了描述西方世界新的敌人，也是为了唤起二战前后反极权主义的斗争经历。


Such terms seek to borrow legitimacy from the past and to explain the present – in a way that most serious scholars of either Islam or terrorism never found very helpful.	这样的名词试图借用过去的合法性来解释现在——多数严肃的伊斯兰或恐怖主义学者都认为这样做没有好处。


Analogizing in this way seemed more to reflect a desire to re-fight the old battles, rather than to sharpen political judgment about contemporary events.	这样的类比似乎更多地反映了重打老仗的愿望，而不是加强对当代事件的政治评价。


So how should we think about the ideological legacy of the twentieth century?	那么我们该如何看待二十世纪的思想遗产呢？


For one thing, we need to stop viewing the twentieth century as a historical parenthesis filled with pathological experiments conducted by crazed thinkers and politicians, as if liberal democracy had been there before those experiments and merely needed to be revived after they failed.	首先，我们不应再把二十世纪看作疯狂思想家及政治家进行病态试验的一段历史插曲，好像在上述试验之前自由民主制度已经存在，而我们只需要在试验失败后将之重新恢复。


It is not a pleasant thought – and perhaps even a dangerous one – but the fact remains that many people, not just ideologues, put their hopes in the twentieth century’s authoritarian and totalitarian experiments, viewing politicians like Mussolini and even Stalin as problem-solvers, while liberal democrats were written off as dithering failures.	尽管这并不是一个愉快的想法——也许甚至有些危险——但事实仍然是包括空想家在内的很多人都曾对二十世纪的专制和集权试验寄予厚望，他们将墨索里尼甚至斯大林这样的政客看成救世主，而自由民主制度却被当作犹豫不定的失败尝试而被抛到一旁。


This is not to make any excuses – it is not true that to comprehend is to forgive.	这样做并不是要找借口——理解也绝不等同于原谅。


On the contrary, any proper understanding of ideologies must reckon with their power to seduce and even genuinely convince people who care little about their emotional appeal – whether to pride or to hate – but who think they actually offer rational policy solutions.	相反，对意识形态的任何正确理解都必须考虑其诱使甚至真正说服那些并不关心其情感诉求者（无论是骄傲还是仇恨），而真正认为其提供合理政策方案者给予认同的力量。


We must remember that Mussolini and Hitler were ultimately brought to power by a king and a retired general, respectively – in other words, traditional elites, not street-fighting fanatics.	我们需要记住墨索里尼和希特勒最终分别是由国王和退休将军扶上政坛——换句话说他们的权力来源于传统精英，而不是街头的狂热份子。


Second, we need to appreciate the special and innovative nature of the democracy created by Western European elites after 1945.	其次，我们需要理解西欧精英1945年后所创立的民主制度的特殊及创新性。


In light of the totalitarian experience, they stopped identifying democracy with parliamentary sovereignty – the classic interpretation of modern representative democracy everywhere but in the United States.	有了极权主义的经验，他们不再将民主和议会独立混为一谈——这是除美国以外世界各国对现代代议制民主的经典解释。


Never again should a parliamentary assembly just cede power to a Hitler or a Pétain.	议会再也不会将权力拱手交给希特勒或贝当。


Instead, the architects of post-war European democracy opted for as many checks and balances as possible – and, paradoxically, for empowering unelected institutions to strengthen liberal democracy as a whole.	相反，战后欧洲民主的设计者选择尽可能多地纳入牵制及制衡因素——而且自相矛盾的是，授权非选举机构以便从整体上强化自由民主。


The most important example is constitutional courts – a different animal from the US Supreme Court, and one specifically tasked with ensuring respect for individual rights.	最重要的范例是宪法法院——宪法法院与美国的最高法院不同，确保尊重个人权利是它的特殊任务。


Eventually, even countries traditionally suspicious of “government by judges” – France being the classic case – accepted this model of constrained democracy.	最终，就连传统上对“法官政府”持怀疑态度的国家（经典案例是法国）都接受了这种受限制的民主模式。


And virtually all Central and Eastern European countries adopted it after 1989.	1989年后几乎所有的中东欧国家都接受了这种制度。


Importantly, European institutions – especially the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights – also fit this understanding of democracy through prima facie undemocratic mechanisms.	重要的是，欧洲法院及欧洲人权法院等欧洲机构也通过表面的非民主制度践行了这种民主理解。


Today, many Europeans are clearly dissatisfied with this conception of democracy.	今天，许多欧洲人显然不满足于这种的民主观。


Many have the impression that the continent is entering what the political scientist Colin Crouch has called a “post-democratic” era.	很多人认为欧洲大陆正在进入政治学家科林·克劳奇所谓的“后民主”时期。


Citizens increasingly claim that political elites do not properly represent them, and that directly elected institutions – national parliaments in particular – are forced to bow to unelected bodies like central banks. Passionate grassroots protest and surging populist parties across the continent are the result.	越来越多的民众声称政治精英无法代表他们的利益，而直接选举产生的机构——特别是国民议会——则被迫向央行等非选举机构低头���结果造成了遍布欧洲大陆的强烈的底层抗议和汹涌的民粹主义党派浪潮。


It will not do simply to reaffirm the post-war European model of democracy, as if the only alternative were totalitarianism of one sort or another.	单纯强调战后的欧洲民主模式是行不通的，就好像某种形式的集权主义是唯一的选择。


But we should be clear about where we are coming from, and why – and that there was no golden age of European liberal democracy, whether before World War II, in the 1950’s, or at some other mythical point.	但我们应该明确过去的历史和造成这些历史现实的原因——即无论是二战前、20世纪50年代还是其他童话时期欧洲自由民主的黄金期都从未有过。


Ordinary Europeans long trusted elites with the business of democracy – and often even seemed to prefer unelected elites.	普通欧洲人长久以来一直信任民主精英——甚至似乎经常偏好非选举产生的精英人物。


If they now want to modify the social contract (and assuming that direct democracy remains impossible), change ought to be based on a clear, historically grounded sense of which innovations European democracy might really need – and of whom Europeans really trust to hold power.	如果他们现在想要修改社会契约（同时假定直接民主仍不可能实现），应该基于欧洲民主可能真正需要的从历史出发的创新措施——由欧洲人真正信任的当权者来进行改革。


That discussion has barely begun.	这样的讨论才刚刚起头。


The Forgotten Virtues of Free Trade	自由贸易被遗忘的优点


LONDON – “Laissez-faire,” French President Nicolas Sarkozy recently declared, “is finished.”  Perhaps, but should we really be satisfied if he is right?	伦敦－法国总统尼古拉斯·萨科齐最近宣称，“自由主义结束了”。 或许是这样的，但是如果他的观点正确，我们真的应该感到满意吗？


If laissez-faire has run its course, what will possibly replace it as the foundation of an open, global society?	如果自由主义已经走到了尽头，那么，什么可能取代它成为开放的世界的基础呢？


Now more than ever, it is worth remembering that the last great financial crash not only inspired the New Deal in the United States, but also plunged the world into a new dark age of economic nationalism and imperialism.	现在比任何时候都更值得记住，上一次大金融危机不仅导致了美国的新政，而且使世界陷入了一个黑暗的经济民族主义和经济帝国主义时代。


Free trade is far from perfect, but the alternatives are worse.	自由贸易离完美很远，但是，其他的选择更糟。


Protectionism is bad for wealth, bad for democracy, and bad for peace.	贸易保护主义对财富、民主和和平都是有害的。


Yet a new wave of protectionism is a genuine danger.	然而，新贸易保护主义浪潮是一个真正的威胁。


Barack Obama, appealing to swelling protectionist sentiment among Americans, threatened during his presidential campaign to rewrite the North American Free Trade Agreement unilaterally.	巴拉克·奥巴马，为了迎合在美国民众中膨胀的贸易保护主义情绪，在其总统竞选期间扬言要单方面修改《北美自由贸易协定》。


This July, the World Trade Organization’s Doha trade round fell to pieces, partly because the US refused to lower its agricultural subsidies.	今年七月，部分因为美国拒绝降低其农业补贴的原因，世界贸易组织多哈回合谈判失败了。


The world is on a slippery slope toward nationalism and exclusion.	世界正在滑向民族主义和排外主义的泥沼。


If a government can step in to bail out failing banks, why not to protect its failing businesses or farmers as well?	如果政府能够介入援救危机中的银行，为什么就不能保护其处于危机中的商业或农民呢？


We need a new deal for trade.	我们需要一个贸易新政。


There is now widespread talk of a “Bretton Woods II” that would restructure global finance, promote sustainability, and offer developing countries “aid for trade.”	现在，有关于重建全球金融体系，提升可持续性和为发展中国家提供“贸易援助”的“布雷顿森林体系II”的广泛议论。