Indeed, it should be at the forefront of such change, by creating an environment that encourages private-sector innovation and creativity, while ensuring that citizens are equipped to compete.	事实上，政府应该站在这一变革的前沿——通过创造鼓励私人部门创新和创造力的环境，同时确保公民获得竞争力。


Of course, governments cannot always be ahead of the curve.	当然，政府不可能永远引领潮流。


They will also have to react and respond to new needs and demands, such as the expectation that public services meet the same level of high-tech efficiency and convenience that private companies offer.	它们也必须响应和应对新的需要和要求，比如公共服务达到与私人公司所提供的相仿的高科技效率水平和舒适度的期望。


Change may be frightening, but it is inevitable.	变革也许令人害怕，但它是不可避免的。


And, in fact, it is an important source of opportunity to improve our systems, our strategies, and ourselves.	事实上，它是改善我们的系统、战略和我们自身的重要机会源。


The latest wave of technological change is far from cresting.	最新的技术变革潮还远远没有见顶。


We should be excited – and filled with hope – by where it could take us.	我们应该对这股潮流将把我们引向何处而感到兴奋并且满怀希望。


Innovation and Its Discontents	创新及其引发的不满情绪


CAMBRIDGE – Technological innovation is often extolled for its power to overcome major development challenges, fuel economic growth, and propel societies forward.	坎布里奇——人们往往大肆赞美技术创新克服重大发展挑战、拉动经济增长以及推动社会前进的能力。


Yet innovations frequently face high barriers to implementation, with governments sometimes banning new technologies outright – even those that could bring far-reaching benefits.	但创新往往面临着很高的实施壁垒，政府甚至有时直接禁用新技术——就连那些可以带来深远利益的新技术也不例外。


Consider the printing press.	以印刷机为例。


Among other things, the new technology was a boon to world religions, which suddenly had an efficient means of reproducing and disseminating sacred texts.	除其他因素外，这项新技术是世界宗教的福音，宗教界突然间拥有了复制和传播经文的有效利器。


Yet the Ottoman Empire forbade the printing of the Koran for nearly 400 years.	但奥斯曼帝国禁止印刷古兰经长达近400年。


In 1515, Sultan Selim I is said to have decreed that “occupying oneself with the science of printing was punishable by death.”	1515年，苏丹塞利姆一世据说颁布法律，“专门从事印刷学可以判处死刑。 ”


Why oppose such a beneficial technology?	为什么要反对这样一种有益的技术？


As I argue in my book Innovation and Its Enemies: Why People Resist New Technologies, the answer is not simply that people are afraid of the unknown.	我曾在著作创新及其敌人：人们为什么抵制新技术中提出，答案并不仅仅是人们在面临未知时的恐惧。


Rather, resistance to technological progress is usually rooted in the fear that disruption of the status quo might bring losses in employment, income, power, and identity.	相反，抵制技术进步往往植根于担心破坏现状可能带来就业、收入、权力和身份的丧失。


Governments often end up deciding that it would be easier to prohibit the new technology than to adapt to it.	而政府往往最终认为与其费力适应新技术还不如干脆禁止。


By banning the printing of the Koran, Ottoman leaders delayed employment losses for scribes and calligraphers (many of whom were women who were glorified for their mastery of the art).	由于禁止古兰经的印刷，奥斯曼领导人延迟了誊写员和书法家（其中不少是因为掌握这门技艺而备受推崇的女性）的就业损失。


But protecting employment was not their main motivation; after all, beginning in 1727, they did allow non-religious texts to be printed, despite protests by calligraphers, who responded to the edict by putting their inkstands and pencils in coffins and marching to the High Porte in Istanbul.	但保护就业并不是他们的主要动机； 毕竟，从1727年开始，他们就不顾书法家的抗议允许非宗教文献采用印刷方法，后者则将墨水瓶和铅笔放进棺材抬到伊斯坦布尔拱门前游行抗议。


Religious knowledge was a different matter.	宗教知识则是另外一个问题。


It was both the glue that held society together and a pillar of political power, so maintaining a monopoly over the dissemination of that knowledge was critical to maintaining the authority of Ottoman leaders.	它既是社会各界的粘合剂又是政治权力的支柱，因此对宗教知识的传播保持垄断是维护奥斯曼领导人权威的必须。


They feared going the way of the Catholic pope, who lost considerable authority during the Protestant Reformation, when the printing press played a key role in spreading new ideas to the faithful.	他们害怕步天主教教皇的后尘，教皇在新教改革过程中失去了很大的权力，而印刷机在向信徒传播新理念的过程中发挥了关键作用。


Of course, the erection of barriers to technological innovation does not always start with the government.	当然，为技术创新设置障碍并不是政府的专利。


Those with a vested interest in the status quo may push their governments to impose bans.	那些在现状中的既得利益者可能促使政府出台禁令。


They may do so through protest, as the Ottoman calligraphers did, and as Irish opponents of genetically modified potatoes did in 2002, by marching in Dublin to express their opposition to the “death of good food.”	他们可能采用的手段包括像奥斯曼书法家那样组织示威游行，采取同样做法的还有2002年爱尔兰转基因土豆��反对者，他们在都柏林举行游行反对“优质食物的覆灭”。


Opponents of new technologies may also employ slander, misinformation, and even demonization – an approach that has certainly succeeded in the past.	新技术的反对者还可能采用诽谤、误导、甚至妖魔化等各种手段——上述手段过去无疑取得过成功。


In 1674, English women issued a petition against coffee, alleging that it caused sterility and thus should be consumed only by people over 60 – a very small market at the time.	1674年，英国妇女发布了反对咖啡的请愿书，声称咖啡会导致不育，因此只有超过60岁的人才能饮用——这在当时只是非常小的市场规模。


The following year, King Charles II ordered the suppression of coffeehouses, though he was probably motivated more by the desire to protect the market share of local beverages, such as alcoholic drinks and then-newly introduced tea, than by the infertility rumors.	第二年，国王查尔斯二世下令镇压咖啡屋，但他的动机与其说是相信不育的谣言，还不如说是想要保护酒精饮料和当时新引进的茶叶等当地饮料的市场份额。


In the 1800s, the American dairy industry spearheaded a similar misinformation campaign about margarine, claiming that it caused sterility, stunted growth, and male baldness.	19世纪，美国乳制品行业掀起了一场针对人造黄油的类似的抹黑运动，称人造黄油导致不孕不育、男性秃顶和发育不良。


Derided as “bull butter,” opponents claimed that margarine contained “diseased and putrid beef, dead horses, dead hogs, dead dogs, mad dogs, and downed sheep.”	反对者将人造黄油嘲讽为“牛油”，称其含有“病死和腐烂的牛肉、死马、死猪、死狗、疯狗和死羊。 ”


In response, the federal government introduced new restrictions on margarine, covering everything from labeling (as with genetically modified foods today), the use of artificial coloring, and interstate movement.	联邦政府因此对人造黄油出台了新的限制，涵盖从贴标签（就像今天的转基因食品一样）、添加人造色素和州与州之间运输等各式各样的领域。


New taxes reinforced butter’s primacy further.	新的税收政策进一步加强了黄油的市场地位。


In 1886, a Wisconsin congressman declared outright his “intent to destroy the manufacture of the noxious compound by taxing it out of existence.”	1886年，一名威斯康星州众议员公然宣布他“旨在通过高额税收彻底摧毁这种有毒化合物的制造。 ”


Resistance to tractors in the early 1900s took a slightly different form.	20世纪早期抵制拖拉机的运动采取了略微不同的形式。


Producers and traders of draft animals feared mechanization, which threatened their way of life.	役畜的生产商和贸易商害怕机械化，因为机械化威胁到他们的生活方式。


But they knew that they could not improve their product faster than engineers could improve theirs, and thus that blocking the spread of tractors would be impossible.	但他们知道他们改善产品的速度不可能比工程师更快，因此彻底阻断拖拉机的传播是不可能完成的任务。


Instead, they sought to prevent the displacement of farm animals, by pursuing a campaign touting their virtues.	相反，他们试图阻止农场动物被拖拉机所取代，发起一场规模浩大的运动来宣传它们的好处。


The Horse Association of America issued leaflets declaring that, “A mule is the only fool-proof tractor ever built.”	美国马业协会发布了宣称“骡子是有史以来唯一一款傻瓜型拖拉机”的小册子。


The group also pointed out that horses could reproduce themselves, whereas tractors depreciated.	该组织还指出马可以自我繁殖，而拖垃圾只会不断贬值。


People almost never reject technological progress out of sheer ignorance.	人们阻碍技术进步从不是单纯因为无知。


Rather, they fight to protect their own interests and livelihoods, whether that be operating a dairy farm or running a government.	相反，他们竭力保护的是自身的利益和生计，无论他们的生计是经营奶牛场还是运作政府。


As we continually attempt to apply new technologies to improve human and environmental wellbeing, this distinction is vital.	因为我们不断试图采用新技术改善人类和环境状况，因此上述区别的确是至关重要的。


Avoiding barriers to technological progress requires understanding and addressing its downsides.	避免技术进步壁垒需要了解并解决新技术存在的问题。


For example, as machines become increasingly capable, robots are replacing a growing number of workers.	举例来讲，随着机械能力的提高，机器人正在取代越来越多工人的位置。


It will not be long before those robots will be able not only to perform more complex tasks, but also to learn faster than workers can be trained.	不久以后，机器人不仅可以完成更复杂的任务，而且能够以比工人更快的速度完成培训。


The notion that some workers will not go the way of the draft animal is irrational.	认为某些工人不会步役畜后尘的想法并不理性。


But if we recognize these losses and address them head-on, we can avoid a backlash against potentially beneficial technological innovations, including advances in robotics.	但如果我们认识到上述损失并直面问题的存在，就可以避免对潜在有益技术创新的反对力量，包括推动机器人的使用。


The key will be to focus on “inclusive innovation,” ensuring that those who are likely to lose from the displacement of old technologies are given ample opportunity to benefit from new ones.	关键是要重点发展“包容性创新”，确保那些可能因淘汰旧科技而受损的人有充分的机会从新科技中获益。


Only then can we make the most of human creativity.	只有这样我们才能最大限度的发挥人类的创造力。


Humanizing an Inhuman Future	人化非人的未来


WASHINGTON, DC – The impact that groundbreaking technological advances like artificial intelligence will have on the functioning of our economies and labor markets has been a hot topic for a long time.	华盛顿—人工智能等划时代科技进步对经济和劳动力市场运行的影响将是一个长期的热门话题。


But Jerry Kaplan’s recent book Humans Need Not Apply: A Guide to Wealth and Work in the Age of Artificial Intelligence has impressed upon me the true size of the socioeconomic stakes.	但杰里·卡普兰（Jerry Kaplan）的新著《人类不需要申请：人工智能时代财富和工作指南》（Humans Need Not Apply: A Guide to Wealth and Work in the Age of Artificial Intelligence）给我留下了深刻的印象。 它讨论了社会经济成本的真正规模。


One relatively well-known example of the digital revolution’s impact on the workings of markets is the ability to earn huge returns in high-speed trading by being a microsecond “ahead” of everyone else.	关于数字革命对市场运行的一个相对著名的例子是通过“领先”其他所有人一微秒赢得巨大回报的高速交易。


Another is the capacity for price discrimination by new electronic market makers like Uber, which thus appropriate every penny of the old “consumer surplus” of microeconomic theory.	另一个例子是Uber等新电子做市商的价格歧视能力，它们能够榨取微观经济理论中的每一分钱“消费者剩余”。


Soon a new kind of enhanced Uber could emerge, integrating car, bus, ship, airplane travel, and hotel rooms into one super-app.	要不了多久就用可能冒出新型的加强版Uber，将汽车、公交、轮船、飞机旅行和饭店服务集合到一个超级应用中。


In fact, some car manufacturers are now working on exactly that.	事实上，一些汽车制造商正在朝这个方向努力。


A key question is why good old competition does not whittle away these profits rapidly.	一个关键问题是为何好的旧竞争没有迅速吞噬这些利润。


The answer often lies in the business model.	答案常常在于商业模式。


Companies borrow a lot to start up, accumulate large fixed costs, and offer such low prices at first that they lose money.	公司通过大量贷款启动，累积大量固定成本，并且一开始以亏本的低价进入市场。


This enables them to expand their businesses virtually competition-free until they have established what is essentially a monopoly.	这使得它们能够在几乎没有竞争的情况下扩张，直到建立起事实垄断。


At that point, they can hike prices and engage in price discrimination relatively freely.	然后，它们开始提高价格，相对自由地实施价格歧视。


As Kaplan points out, that is precisely what Amazon has done.	卡普兰指出，亚马逊就是这么做的。


It first achieved massive scale, enabling it to store unordered products at diffuse locations and thereby reduce transport costs.	它首先实现了庞大的规模，这使得它可以在各地储存尚未被订购的产品，从而削减运输成本。


Now it can offer fast and free delivery, which smaller companies cannot beat.	如今，它能够提供迅捷的免费送货，这是小公司无法与之竞争的。


Add to that complex algorithms that set prices in a way that maximizes profits, and the company’s dominance seems relatively secure.	此外亚马逊还拥有复杂的算法，可以制定利润最大化价格，并且其主宰地位相对稳固。


As this approach facilitates the rise of global super-firms, it creates serious problems for labor markets and societies, because it destroys mid-level jobs based on old skills faster than comparable jobs based on new skills can be created.	这一方法帮助许多世界级超级企业崛起，也给劳动力市场和社会带来了严重问题，因为它摧毁基于旧技能的中层岗位的速度快于基于新技能的同等岗位的创造速度。


Equally serious, it contributes to shocking levels of income inequality, with a few households not only enjoying massive wealth, but also wielding considerable political influence.	同样严重的是，它导致了令人震惊的收入不平等性，少数家庭不仅坐拥巨量财富，还具备巨大的政治影响力。


If income becomes too concentrated too quickly, desired investment will tend to fall short of available savings, creating a Keynesian macroeconomic imbalance.	如果收入过快地形成过于集中之势，合意投资就会赶不上可用储蓄，形成凯恩斯主义宏观经济失衡。


(Contrary to popular belief, what matters is not the actual amount of income flowing toward top earners, but the changes in that income.)	（与流行的观念相反，重要的不是流向顶层收入人群的实际收入量，而是这一收入的变化。 ）


As it stands, the impact of these technological disruptions remains relatively small in the advanced countries.	目前，这些技术破坏的影响在发达国家仍相对较小。


But it could affect some 20% of GDP and 40% of jobs by 2030.	但到2030年，它可能影响到20%左右的GDP和40%的就业岗位。


That is a huge shift, happening at an unprecedented speed.	这是一个巨大的变化，并且以前所未有的速度发生。


Though we are becoming accustomed to breaking records – in 2013, more than 90% of all data ever accumulated in human history had been accumulated in the previous two years – the reality is that the speed and scale of this transformation pose major challenges.	尽管我们正在习惯于打破纪录——2013年，人类历史上累积数据总量中的90%以上为最近两年所累积——但现实是这一转变的速度和规模构成了严重挑战。


If we fail to address them adequately, the outcome is unlikely to be a safer and more prosperous society, but rather one in which frustration and hopelessness increase, potentially leading to extreme behaviors.	如果我们不能充分克服这些挑战，结果绝不可能是更安全、更繁荣的社会，而是沮丧和失望日益增加、可能导致极端行为的社会。


One proposal, made by Kaplan, is to create a “job mortgage.”	卡普兰所提出的一个方案是建立“就业按揭”。


Companies with a future need for certain skills would become a kind of sponsor, involving potential future job offers, to a person willing to acquire those skills.	对某项技能有未来需求的公司是出资者（包括提供潜在未来岗位），愿意掌握这些技能的人则是接受者。


The worker could secure a loan against their projected future income to finance their studies.	工人能够确保获得贷款支付学费，并用预计未来收入作抵押。


The loans would be repaid once the job began.	贷款从工作后开始偿还。


If no job materialized, the individual would be held responsible for repaying only a fraction of the loan, with the balance absorbed by the company, which thus bears a share of the risk.	如果没有工作，个人只需要偿还一小部分贷款，余下部分由公司承担，因此公司需要承担风险。


There would also be a cap on repayments as a percentage of income.	偿还额占收入百分比应该有一个上限。


Other proposals focus on reforming legal frameworks to reflect more accurately new ways of working.	其他方案关注改革法律框架以更加准确地反映新的工作方式。


For example, those who are partly self-employed and partly employed by a third party would have to be better incorporated into social policies.	比如，部分自由职业，同时部分受雇于第三方的个人必须��好地体现在社会政策中。


Such changes would undoubtedly be useful.	这些变化毫无疑问是有用的。


But none of these proposals reflects the scale of the transformation that we are confronting.	但这些方案都没有体现我们所面临的转变的规模。


What we really need is fundamentally to transform the way our societies function – and fast.	我们真正需要的是从根本上改变社会的运行方式——并且迅速改变。


France Stratégie, which advises the French government, and the American entrepreneur Nick Hanauer have proposed social-policy reforms that share a similar conceptual foundation.	法国政府顾问法国战略公司（France Stratégie）和美国企业家尼克·哈瑙尔（Nick Hanauer）提出了概念基础相同的社会政策改革。


Individuals earn “claims” over their lifetimes, first by being legal residents, and then by, say, obtaining educational degrees, earning professional certifications, performing community service (including military service), and making money.	个体赚得对他们的生命的“权利”（claim），首先是通过身为合法居民，然后通过（比如）获得学历、执业资质、提供社区服务（包括服役）和赚钱。


These claims can be exchanged for various benefits, such as family leave, retraining, or supplementary retirement income.	这些权利可以用来交换各种福利，如产假、再培训和补充退休金。


The system would include all residents and be completely portable, with plenty of room for people to choose how and when to use their claims.	这套制度应该包括全体居民并且完全可转移，个人应该有足够的空间选择怎样和何时使用他们的权利。


Complementary arrangements – with, say, potential employers offering additional credits for retraining – could also be implemented.	互补性安排——比如由潜在雇主提供更多的再培训信用——也可以尝试。


At the same time, governments must upgrade competition policy to protect against the emergence of global monopolies.	与此同时，政府必须升级竞争政策，防止全球垄断的出现带来的威胁。


Here, new mega-regional trade deals, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, should prove invaluable, provided that today’s powerful players are not permitted to dictate terms that advance only their interests.	在这方面，新的大型贸易协定，如跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系和跨太平洋合作伙伴关系，应该能起到巨大作用，只要当今最强大行动方不只顾自身利益。


International cooperation should also be strengthened to prevent multinationals from avoiding taxes by shifting profits among jurisdictions.	国际合作也应该加强，以防止跨国公司通过在司法辖区间转移利润避税。


Such tax avoidance has reached hundreds of billions of dollars.	这些避税行为所涉金额已达数千亿美元。


Tinkering with existing systems will not be enough to prepare us for the technology-driven transformation that we are facing.	修补现有制度不足以让我们做好准备迎接我们正在面临的科技推动的变革。


We need a comprehensive strategy aimed at making markets – and politics – truly competitive, and ensuring that public policy works for the benefit of all.	我们需要全面的战略让市场——以及政治——具有真正的竞争性，并确保公共政策有利于所有人。


Is Our Economic Future Behind Us?	我们的经济未来已经落后了吗？


CHICAGO – With the global economy yet to recover from the 2008 economic crisis, concern about the future – especially of the advanced economies – is intensifying.	芝加哥—全球经济尚未从2008年经济危机中恢复，而关于未来——特别是发达经济体的未来——的担忧日益加剧。


My Northwestern University colleague Robert J. Gordon captures the sentiment of many economists, arguing in his recent book The Rise and Fall of American Growth that the enormous productivity-enhancing innovations of the last century and a half cannot be equaled.	我的西北大学同事罗伯特·戈登（Robert J. Gordon）说出了很多经济学家的心声，在他的新书《美国增长的兴衰》（The Rise and Fall of American Growth）中指出，此前一百五十年中的众多提高生产率的创新是无法逾越的。


If true, advanced economies should expect slow growth and stagnation in the coming years.	果真如此的话，发达经济体应该预计未来几年增长放缓和停滞。


But will the future really be so bleak?	但未来真的如此黯淡吗？


Probably not.	也许不是。


In fact, pessimism has reigned over economists’ outlooks for centuries.	事实上，几百年来，经济学家的展望几乎总是悲观的。


In 1830, the British Whig historian Thomas Macaulay observed that, “[i]n every age, everybody knows that up to his own time, progressive improvement has been taking place; nobody seems to reckon on any improvement in the next generation.”	1830年，英国辉格派历史学家托马斯·麦考莱（Thomas Macaulay）观察道，“在每个时代，每个人都知道，截止到他所生活的时期，进步性改进一直在发生； 没人会认为下一代还会发生任何改进。


Why, he asked, do people expect “nothing but deterioration”?	”——他问道，为什么人们会预测“只能走下坡路”？


Soon, Macaulay’s perspective was vindicated by the dawn of the railway age.	不久，麦考莱的远见就被铁路时代的黎明所证实。


Transformative advances in steel, chemicals, electricity, and engineering soon followed.	钢铁、化工、电力和工程的变革式进步接踵而来。


When it comes to our technological future, I would expect a similar outcome.	至于我们的技术未来，我预期也会有类似的结果。


Indeed, I would go so far as to say, “We ain’t seen nothin’ yet.”	事实上，我敢说“我们什么也预见不到。


Technological advances will create a tailwind of hurricane-like proportions to the world’s most advanced economies.	”技术进步将为大部分发达经济体掀起一场飓风当量的顺风。


My optimism is based not on some generalized faith in the future, but on the way science (or “propositional knowledge”) and technology (“prescriptive knowledge”) support each other.	我的乐观不是基于一些关于未来的一般化的信仰，而是基于科学（或“命题性知识”）和技术（“规范性知识”）的相辅相成。


Just as scientific breakthroughs can facilitate technological innovation, technological advances enable scientific discovery, which drives more technological change.	正如科学突破能够促进技术创新，技术进步也能促成科学发现，并由后者推动更多技术变革。


In other words, there is a positive feedback loop between scientific and technological progress.	换句话说，科学与技术进步之间存在正反馈环。


The history of technology is full of examples of this feedback loop.	技术市中充满了这一反馈环的例子。


The seventeenth-century scientific revolution was made possible partly by new, technologically advanced tools, such as telescopes, barometers, and vacuum pumps.	十七世纪科学革命部分是技术进步性新工具带来的，如望远镜、气压计和真空泵。


One cannot discuss the emergence of germ theory in the 1870s without mentioning prior improvements in the microscope.	要讨论19世纪70年代微生物理论的兴起，就无法绕过此前显微镜的改进。


The techniques of x-ray crystallography used by Rosalind Franklin were critical to the discovery of the structure of DNA, as well as to discoveries that led to over 20 Nobel prizes.	罗莎林·富兰克林（Rosalind Franklin）的X射线晶体成像技术对于DNA结构和其他产生了20多个诺贝尔奖的的发现至关重要。


The instruments available to science today include modern versions of old tools that would have been unimaginable even a quarter-century ago.	今天，科学能够使用的工具包括一些旧工具的现代版，哪怕在二十五年前，这样的版本更新也是不可想象的。


Telescopes have been shot into space and connected to high-powered adaptive-optics computers, to reveal a universe quite different from the one humans once imagined.	望远镜被发射到太空中，与高性能自适应光学计算机相连，揭示了一个与人类曾经想象的截然不同的宇宙。


In 2014, the builders of the Betzig-Hell microscope were awarded a Nobel Prize for overcoming an obstacle that had previously been considered insurmountable, bringing optical microscopy into the nanodimension.	2014年，贝齐格-赫尔（Betzig-Hell）显微镜被授予诺贝尔奖，因为它克服了曾经被认为不可逾越的障碍，让光学显微范围挺进到纳米级。


If that is not enough to quash technological pessimism, consider the revolutionary instruments and tools that have emerged in recent years – devices that would never even have been dreamed of a few decades earlier.	如果这还不足以击碎技术悲观论的话，我们再来看看近几年中涌现出来的革命性工具——几十年前的人类做梦都想不到还能出现这样的工具。


Start with the computer.	从计算机开始。


Economists have made valiant efforts to assess computers’ impact on the production of goods and services, and to measure their contribution to productivity.	经济学家花了巨大的力气评估计算机对商品和服务生产的影响，以及测量它们对生产率的贡献。


But none of these measures can adequately account for the untold benefits and opportunities computers have created for scientific research.	但所有这些测量手段都无法充分显示计算机为科学研究所带来的难以用语言形容的好处和机会。


There is no lab in the world that does not rely on them.	如今，没有一家实验室不依靠计算机。


The term in silico has taken its place next to in vivo and in vitro in experimental work.	在实验工作中，“硅片”的地位已经与“活体”和“试管”等量齐观。


And entire new fields such as “computational physics” and “computational biology” have sprung up ex nihilo.	全新领域，如“计算物理学”和“计算生物学”完成了从无到有的蜕变。


In line with Moore’s Law, advances in scientific computation will continue to accelerate for many years to come, not least owing to the advent of quantum computing.	根据摩尔定律，科学计算的进步将在未来多年中继续加速，原因之一便是量子计算的出现。


Another new tool is the laser.	另一个新工具是激光。


When the first lasers appeared, they were almost an invention in search of an application.	当第一束激光出现时，人们几乎不知道能用它来干什么。


Nowadays, they are almost as ubiquitous as computers, used for seemingly mundane daily uses ranging from document scanning to ophthalmology.	如今，它们与计算机一样无处不在，从文档扫描到眼科医学几乎所有日常应用中都有它的身影。


The range of research areas that now rely on lasers is no less broad, running the gamut of biology, chemistry, genetics, and astronomy.	目前需要依赖激光的研究领域也同样广泛，横扫生物、化学、遗传学和天文学。


LIBS (laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy) is essential to the protein analysis on which so much research in molecular biochemistry depends.	LIBS（激光诱导击穿光谱）是蛋白质分析的关键，而蛋白质分析又是大量分子生物化学研究的基础。


Recently, lasers enabled the confirmation of the existence of gravitational waves – one of the holy grails of physics.	最近，激光让人们确认了物理学的圣杯之一——引力波的存在。


Yet another technological innovation that is transforming science is the gene-editing tool CRISPR Cas9.	另一项正在改变科学的技术创新是基因编辑工具CRIPR Cas9。


Already, sequencing genomes is a fast and relatively cheap process, its cost having dropped from $10 million per genome in 2007 to under $1,000 today.	目前，基因测序已经是一个快速且相对廉价的过程，其成本从2007年的每基因组1,000万美元下降到今天的1,000美元。


CRISPR Cas9 takes this technology to a new, truly revolutionary level, as it enables scientists to edit and manipulate the human genome.	CRISPR Cas9将这一技术带到了一个新的、真正具有革命性的水平，并让科学家能够编辑和操纵人类基因组。


While that idea may give some people pause, the technology’s potential beneficial applications – such as enabling essential crops to withstand climate change and water salination – cannot be overestimated.	这一概念也许会让一些人就此放弃，但该技术的潜在受益应用——如使重要作物能够抵挡气候变化和水的盐化——是无法估量的。


Furthermore, digitization has lowered access costs for researchers substantially.	此外，数字化大大降低了研究者的获得成本（access cost）。


All research relies on access to existing knowledge; we all stand on the shoulders of the giants (and even average-size figures) who came before us.	所有研究都依赖于能否获得已有知识； 我们都站在前辈巨人（甚至普通人）的肩膀上。


We recombine their discoveries, ideas, and innovations in novel – sometimes revolutionary – ways.	我们以新奇的——有时是革命性的方式重组他们的发现、思想和创新。


But, until recently, learning what one needed to know to come up with scientific and technological innovations took a lot more work, with countless hours spent scouring libraries and encyclopedia volumes.	但是，直到最近，学习跟上科学和技术创新步伐所需要的知识需要耗费巨大的工作量，其中花在检索图书馆和百科全书中的时间就不可胜数。


Nowadays, researchers can find nanoscopic needles in information haystacks the size of Montana.	如今，研究者可以在蒙大拿州那么大的信息干草堆中找到纳米级别的细针。


They can access mega-databases, where they can find patterns and empirical regularities.	他们可以接入大型数据库，找到模式和经验性规律。


The eighteenth-century taxonomist Carl Linnaeus would be envious.	十八世纪分类学家林奈将对此艳羡不已。


Our scientific knowledge is surging forward, leading to innumerable new applications.	我们的科学知识正在大步向前，带来数不胜数的新应用。


There can be no doubt that technology will forge ahead as well, in scores of expected and unexpected areas.	毫无疑问，技术也将在众多预期和预期外的领域勇往直前。


It will bring economic growth, albeit perhaps not the kind that will register fully if we continue to rely on our outdated standards for national income accounting.	这将带来经济增长，尽管如果我们继续依赖于过时的国民收入统计方法，这种经济增长无法被充分认识到。


How Inequality Found a Political Voice	不平等性如何找到了政治声音


MILAN – It took a long time for widening inequality to have an impact on politics, as it suddenly has done in recent years.	米兰—不平等性的加剧用了很长时间，才突然在近几年中形成了政治影响。


Now that it is a central issue, national economic priorities will need to shift substantially to create more equitable, inclusive economies and societies.	如今，它已经成为一个核心问题，国家经济重点需要大幅调整，以打造更平等、更包容的经济和社会。


If they do not, people could embrace explosive alternatives to their current governments, such as the populist movements now sweeping many countries.	否则，人民可能接受替代当前政府的爆炸性方案，如目前正在横扫许多国家的民粹主义运动。


Political leaders often speak of growth patterns that unfairly distribute the benefits of growth; but then they do relatively little about it when they are in power.	政治领袖常常大谈增长模式不公平地分配了增长收益； 但接着他们并没有在任上为此做些什么。


When countries go down the path of non-inclusive growth patterns, it usually results in disrespect for expertise, disillusionment with the political system and shared cultural values, and even greater social fragmentation and polarization.	当各国走上了不包容的增长路径时，常常导致不尊重专业知识、政治制度和共同文化价值观的幻灭以及社会分裂和极化的加剧。


Acknowledging the importance of how economic benefits are distributed is of course not new.	承认经济收益如何分配的重要性当然不是新鲜事。


In developing countries, economic exclusion and extreme inequality have always been unconducive to long-term high-growth patterns.	在发展中国家，经济排斥和极端不平等从未有利于长期高增长模式。


Under these conditions, pro-growth policies are politically unsustainable, and they are ultimately disrupted by political dislocations, social unrest, or even violence.	在这样的条件下，支持增长的政策可能不可持续，最终被政治混乱、社会动荡甚至暴力所打断。


In the United States, rising inequality has been a fact of life at least since the 1970s, when the relatively equitable distribution of economic benefits from the early post-World War II era started to become skewed.	在美国，不平等性加剧成为一个事实至少可以追溯到20世纪70年代，从那时开始，二战后早期相对平等的经济收益分配开始出现倾斜。


In the late 1990s, when digital technologies began to automate and disintermediate more routine jobs, the shift toward higher wealth and income inequality became turbocharged.	20世纪90年代末，当数字技术开始让常规就业岗位自动化和脱媒化时，通往财富和收入不平等的变化更是如同快马加鞭。


Globalization played a role.	全球化在其中扮演了一定角色。


In the 20 years before the 2008 financial crisis, manufacturing employment in the US rapidly declined in every sector except pharmaceuticals, even as added value in manufacturing rose.	在2008年金融危机前的20年中，美国制造业就业几乎全面快速减少（只有制药业是例外），尽管制造业增加值在增长。


Net jobs loss was kept roughly at zero only because employment in services increased.	净就业损失之所以能够大体保持为零，唯一的原因是服务业就业增长。


In fact, much of the added value in manufacturing actually comes from services such as product design, research and development, and marketing.	事实上，制造业增加值的大部分实际上来自产品设计、研究开发以及营销等服务业。


So, if we account for this value-chain composition, the decline in manufacturing – the production of tangible goods – is even more pronounced.	因此，如果考虑到这一价值链成分，制造业的衰落——以有形产品的生产角度——更加剧烈。


Economists have been tracking these trends for some time.	经济学家追踪这些趋势已经有一些时日了。


Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist David Autor and his colleagues have carefully documented the impact of globalization and labor-saving digital technologies on routine jobs.	麻省理工学院经济学家大卫·奥拓尔（David Autor）及其同事仔细记录了全球化和劳动力节约型数字技术对常规就业岗位的影响。


More recently, French economist Thomas Piketty’s international bestseller, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, dramatically widened our awareness of wealth inequality and described possible underlying forces driving it.	随后，法国经济学家托马斯·皮凯蒂（Thomas Piketty）的国际畅销书《二十一世纪资本论》（Capitalism in the Twenty-First Century）大大拓宽了我们对财富不平等的认识，并给出了推动这一趋势的可能原因。


The brilliant, award-winning young economists Raj Chetty and Emmanuel Saez have enriched the discussion with new research.	年纪轻轻就获奖的出色经济学家拉伊·切蒂（Raj Chetty）和艾曼努尔·萨伊兹（Emmanuel Saez）用新研究进一步丰富了讨论。


And I have written about some of the structural economic shifts associated with these problems.	我也写了一些与这些问题相关的结构性经济变迁的文章。


Eventually, journalists picked up on these trends, too, and it would now be hard to find anyone who has not heard of the “1%” – shorthand for those at the top of the global wealth and income scales.	最后，记者也开始关注这些趋势，时至今日，已经很难找出水谁没有听说过“1%”——对位于全球财富和收入分布顶层的简称。


Many people now worry about a bifurcated society: a thriving global class of elites at the top and a stressed-out class comprising everyone else.	许多人现在担心社会分叉：顶层是欣欣向荣的全球精英阶层，以及由所有其他人组成的不堪压力阶层。


Still, despite these long trends, the political and policy status quo remained largely unchallenged until 2008.	但尽管存在这些长期趋势，政治和政策现状自2008年以来并未受到多大挑战。


To understand why it took politics so long to catch up to economic realities, we should look at incentives and ideology.	要理解政治为何要花如此漫长的时间才能赶上经济现实，我们应该从激励和意识形态着手。


With respect to incentives, politicians have not been given a good enough reason to address unequal distribution patterns.	在激励方面，政客并没有很好的理由纠正不平等分配模式。


The US has relatively weak campaign-finance limits, so corporations and wealthy individuals – neither of which generally prioritizes income redistribution – have contributed a disproportionate share to politicians’ campaign war chests.	美国的宣传献金限制相对较弱，因此公司和富豪——他们总体而言并不注重收入分配——在政客的选战基金中举足轻重。


Ideologically, many people are simply suspicious of expansive government.	在意识形态方面，许多人就是对扩张性政府表示怀疑。


They recognize inequality as a problem, and in principle they support government policies that provide high-quality education and health-care services, but they do not trust politicians or bureaucrats.	他们承认不平等性是一个问题，并且在原则上他们支持提供高质量教育和医疗服务的政府政策，但他们不信任政客或官僚。


In their eyes, governments are inefficient and self-interested at best, and dictatorial and oppressive at worst.	在他们看来，政府效率低下、自私自利，甚至可以说独裁和高压。


All of this began to change with the rise of digital technologies and the Internet, but especially with the advent of social media.	所有这些随着数字技术和互联网的崛起而开始变化，但社交媒体的兴起才是转折点。


As US President Barack Obama showed in the 2008 election cycle – followed by Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump in the current cycle – it is now possible to finance a very expensive campaign without “big money.”	美国总统奥巴马在2008年选举周期中证明——伯尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）和唐纳德·特朗普在当前选举周期中再次证明——如今，为非常昂贵的选战融资未必需要“大资金”。


As a result, there is a growing disconnect between big money and political incentives; and while money is still a part of the political process, influence itself no longer belongs exclusively to corporations and wealthy individuals.	因此，大资金和政治激励之间日益脱钩； 而尽管钱仍是政治进程的一部分，但影响力本身不再专属于公司和富豪。


Social-media platforms now enable large groups of people to mobilize in ways reminiscent of mass political movements in earlier eras.	如今，社交媒体平台能够让大量人群动员起来，其场面不亚于早前的群众政治运动。


Such platforms may have reduced the cost of political organizing, and thus candidates’ overall dependence on money, while providing an efficient alternative fund-raising channel.	这些平台可能已经降低了政治组织的成本，从而降低候选人对钱的总依赖程度，同时也提供了有效的替代筹资渠道。


This new reality is here to stay, and, regardless of who wins the US election this year, anyone who is unhappy with high inequality will have a voice, the ability to finance it, and the power to affect policymaking.	这一新现实已经形成并将持续，并且，不管谁赢得今年美国大选，任何对高企的不平等性感到不满的人都能获得一个声音，有能力为它融资，也有力量影响决策。


So, too, will other groups that focus on similar issues, such as environmental sustainability, which has not been a major focus in the current US presidential campaign (the three debates between the candidates included no discussion of climate change, for example), but surely will be in the future.	关注类似问题的其他团体亦然，如并非当前美国总统选战的重点关注（三次候选人电视辩论都没有讨论气候变化）、但未来肯定要成为重点关注的环境可持续性问题。


All told, digital technology is shuffling economic structures and rebalancing power relationships in the world’s democracies – even in institutions once thought to be dominated by money and wealth.	总而言之，数字技术正在对经济结构进行洗牌，重新平衡世界民主国家——甚至曾经被认为由金钱和财富主宰的机构——的权力关系。


A large, newly influential constituency should be welcomed.	庞大的新晋影响力选民应该值得欢迎。


But it cannot be a substitute for wise leadership, and its existence does not guarantee prudent policies.	但他们无法成为明智领导力的替代品，其存在也无法保证政策的审慎性。


As political priorities continue to rebalance, we will need to devise creative solutions to solve our hardest problems, and to prevent populist misrule.	随着政治重点继续再平衡，我们需要制定创造性方案解决最艰难的问题，并防止民粹主义暴政。


One hopes that this is the course we are on now.	但愿我们现在正在这一方向上前进。


Is Traditional Banking Unbreakable?	传统银行业坚不可摧吗？


NEW YORK – It is a rare industry nowadays that is not at risk of being upended by digital technology.	纽约—如今，不存在被数字科技颠覆的威胁的行业少之又少。


Amazon, having swept away bookshops, is now laying siege to the rest of the retail sector.	席卷书店业的亚马逊正在步步蚕食零售业的其他领域。


In transportation, Uber is outrunning traditional taxi companies, while Airbnb is undermining the foundations of the hotel industry.	在交通业，优步已经将传统出租车公司甩在了身后； 而Airbnb正在侵蚀饭店业的地盘。


Meanwhile, smartphones are transforming how we communicate and revolutionizing the way we discover and patronize businesses.	与此同时，智能手机正在改变我们的通信方式，掀起了 一场我们如何发现和惠顾企业的革命。


So it is no surprise that banking and financial-services companies are not safe from the immense transformations wrought by technological innovation.	因此，毫不奇怪，在科技创新所带来的巨大转变面前，银行和金融服务公司也不安全。


Indeed, for the last decade, digital startups have been penetrating areas traditionally dominated by the financial industry.	事实上，在过去十年中，数字创业企业已经渗透到了传统上由金融业主导的领域。


But there is reason to believe that finance will prove resilient.	但有理由相信，金融业不会伤及元气。


Today, money can be sent to the other side of a country – or the world – simply by tapping an app, without ever interacting with a traditional financial-services company.	如今，你只要简单地点击一下某个应用（app），就能把钱汇到国家——甚至世界——的另一头。


Migrants’ remittances alone, which the World Bank estimates will total $586 billion this year, represent a tremendous growth opportunity for companies competing with banks to move money.	世界银行估算，今年世界侨汇总额将达到5,860亿美元，对于与银行竞争资金转移业务的公司来说，光是侨汇便已是一个巨大的增长机会。


Meanwhile, would-be disrupters are offering opportunities to save and invest – the very heart of traditional banking institutions’ operations.	与此同时，潜在颠覆者正在提供储蓄和投资机会——这也是传统银行机构的核心业务。


Startups such as Acorns – an app that automatically allocates a proportion of everyday purchases to a pre-selected investment portfolio – are making rapid inroads into a very competitive marketplace.	Acorns是一个自动配置日常买入的一定比例给预先选定的投资组合的应用。 这类创业企业正在快速向竞争激烈的市场挺进。


Acorns, launched in 2014, already manages more than 650,000 investment accounts.	2014年上线的Acorns已经管理着650,000多个投资账户。


The company – and others like it – are not just moving into the market; the simplified investment and savings processes they offer are expanding and transforming it.	该公司——以及其他类似公司——不但正在进入市场，它们所提供的简单化投资和储蓄过程正在扩大和改变市场。


According to research by the digital ad agency Fractl, approximately 85% of millennials are saving a portion of their paycheck – a larger percentage than their predecessors.	据数字广告公司Fractl的研究，大约85%的千禧一代会把收入的一部分储蓄起来——这一比例要高于他们的前辈。


Lending, too, is being transformed by technology.	贷款业务也在被科技所改变。


Crowdsourced funding and peer-to-peer lending schemes give borrowers the opportunity to circumvent many of the hurdles of traditional banking – including, in some cases, collateral requirements and credit ratings.	众筹和点对点贷款机制让借款人有机会绕过传统银行贷款的诸多障碍——在某些例子中，甚至包括抵押品和信用评级。


According to the research firm Massolution, the crowdfunding market has grown exponentially, from $880 million in 2010 to $16.2 billion in 2014.	据Massolution研究公司的数据，众筹市场呈现出指数增长特点，其规模从2010年8. 8亿美元增加到2014年162亿美元。


Global crowdfunding volumes are expected to double this year, surpassing $34 billion.	预计今年全球众筹总量将实现翻番，超过340美元。


In 2016, crowdfunding is expected to provide more funding than traditional venture capital.	2016年，预计众筹所提供的资金量将超过传统风险资本。


Even financial services traditionally characterized by face-to-face dealings with clients, such as investment banking advisory services, have been affected.	甚至传统上以面对面与客户交易的金融服务——如投资银行咨询服务——也在受到影响。


When Google conducted its initial public offering in 2004, it chose to bypass the investment banking industry, which traditionally underwrites the process of taking a company public.	2004年谷歌完成其首次股票公开发行时，它选择绕传统上负责公司上市股票承销过程的开投资银行。


Instead, the company opted for an electronic auction in which anyone could participate.	相反，谷歌选择了人人都能参与的电子拍卖。


Other companies – like the financial research firm Morningstar – have followed suit.	其他公司——如金融研究企业晨星公司（Morningstar）——也效仿了谷歌的做法。


While these attempts to revolutionize the equity capital markets have yet to gain widespread traction, their very existence is evidence of the opportunities for disruption in this sector.	这些股票资本市场的“革命”尝试尚未形成燎原之势，但它们的存在已经证明该行业存在颠覆的机会。


But it would be premature to conclude that traditional banking has yielded to new financial platforms.	但断言传统银行业务已经屈服于新金融平台还为时过早。


Many of the new entrants have benefited from advantages that would be difficult to maintain were they to scale up in size and importance.	许多新进入者所拥有的优势在它们的规模和重要性日渐扩大后很难维持。


Traditional banking is subject to intense oversight, and regulations have only become more onerous in recent years, as regulatory authorities reacted to the 2008 global financial crisis by tightening rules on leveraging ratios and know-your-customer requirements.	传统银行业需要受到严格的监督，而监管在近几年变得更加严格，因为监管当局为了应对2008年全球金融危机，收紧了杠杆率规则和对客户了解程度的要求。


Many upstarts in the sector have carved out a competitive advantage by avoiding thresholds beyond which they would face substantial regulatory scrutiny and requirements.	许多该行业创业企业的竞争优势来自避免达到某个阈值，超过这个阈值，它们就必须面对大量监管检查和要求。


This places a significant constraint on the size and type of financial transactions these new companies can offer.	这意味着这些新公司所能提供的金融交易规模十分有限。


By steering clear of services that might draw the scrutiny of financial authorities, digital startups face a natural limit to the size of their market.	数字创业企业规避那些可能引起金融当局严格检查的服务，因此它们的市场存在天然极限。


Indeed, this arrangement – albeit informal – can be viewed as the way regulators manage the systemic risk posed by new entrants.	事实上，这一安排——尽管不正式——可视为监管者管理有新进入者带来的系统性风险的方法。


As the digital revolution evolves, much of the financial terrain in which technology companies are making the deepest inroads will come into much sharper regulatory focus.	随着数字革命的演化，许多科技公司进入最深的金融领域将迎来更多的监管关注。


This will favor the established players.	这有利于老牌金融企业。


As a result, the digital revolution’s assault on the traditional banking industry is by no means overwhelming.	因此，数字革命对传统银行业的冲击绝不是不可抵挡的。


In finance, at least, technology firms should not be viewed simply as a threat, but as a source of productivity-boosting innovation.	至少在金融业，高科技企业不应该仅仅被视为威胁，也应该被视为提高生产率的创新的源泉。


Where Will All the Workers Go?	所有工人何去何从？


NEW YORK – Technology innovators and CEOs seem positively giddy nowadays about what the future will bring.	纽约—如今，技术创新者和CEO们似乎对未来将带来什么感到“乱花渐入迷人眼”。


New manufacturing technologies have generated feverish excitement about what some see as a Third Industrial Revolution.	新生产技术让人们对被某些人所谓的“第三次工业革命”产生了狂热的兴奋。


In the years ahead, technological improvements in robotics and automation will boost productivity and efficiency, implying significant economic gains for companies.	未来几年，机器人和自动化方面的技术进步将提高生产率和效率，为公司带来巨大的经济收益。


But, unless the proper policies to nurture job growth are put in place, it remains uncertain whether demand for labor will continue to grow as technology marches forward.	但是，除非实施合适的政策提振就业增长，否则劳动力需求是否会随着技术长征的前进而继续增长还不得而知。


Recent technological advances have three biases: They tend to be capital-intensive (thus favoring those who already have financial resources); skill-intensive (thus favoring those who already have a high level of technical proficiency); and labor-saving (thus reducing the total number of unskilled and semi-skilled jobs in the economy).	最新技术进步有三个偏向：它们大多是技术密集型（因此有利于已经掌握了金融资源的人）、技能密集型（因此有利于已经掌握了高技术熟练度的人）、劳动力节约型（因此降低了经济中低技能和半技能型岗位的总数量）。


The risk is that robotics and automation will displace workers in blue-collar manufacturing jobs before the dust of the Third Industrial Revolution settles.	风险在于机器人和自动化在第三次工业革命尘埃落定前就取代了蓝领制造业就业岗位。


The rapid development of smart software over the last few decades has been perhaps the most important force shaping the coming manufacturing revolution.	过去几十年来，智能软件的快速发展也许是决定即将到来的制造业革命的最重要力量。


Software innovation, together with 3D printing technologies, will open the door to those workers who are educated enough to participate; for everyone else, however, it may feel as though the revolution is happening elsewhere.	软件创新，加上3D打印技术，将为拥有足够教育程度参与其中的工人打开大门； 但是，对其他所有人来说，这场革命好像发生在别处。


Indeed, the factory of the future may be 1,000 robots and one worker manning them.	事实上，未来工厂可能由1,000个机器人加上一名操纵它们的工人组成。


Even the shop floor can be swept better and cheaper by a Roomba robot than by any worker.	就连商场楼面，Roomba机器人也能比任何工人更好更廉价地打扫完毕。


For the developed countries, this may seem like old news.	对发达国家来说，这也许已不是新闻。


After all, for the last 30 years, the manufacturing base in Asia’s emerging economies has been displacing that of the old industrial powers of Western Europe and North America.	毕竟，在过去30年中，亚洲新兴市场的制造基础一直在取代西欧和北美等旧工业力量。


But there is no guarantee that gains in service-sector employment will continue to offset the resulting job losses in industry.	但没人能够保证服务业就业的增长能一直抵消因此造成的工业工作岗位流失。


For starters, technology is making even many service jobs tradable, enabling them to be offshored to Asia and other emerging markets.	首先，技术让许多服务业岗位也变为可贸易性质，因此可以离岸化外包给亚洲和其他新兴市场。


And, eventually, technology will replace manufacturing and service jobs in emerging markets as well.	而最终，技术还将取代新兴市场中的服务业岗位。


Today, for example, a patient in New York may have his MRI sent digitally to, say, Bangalore, where a highly skilled radiologist reads it for one-quarter of what a New York-based radiologist would cost.	比如，如今，纽约的病人可以将其核磁共振成像通过数字格式传给（比如）班加罗尔，由那里的高技能放射科医生来查看，其成本只有纽约放射科医生的四分之一。


But how long will it be before a computer software can read those images faster, better, and cheaper than the radiologist in Bangalore can?	但电脑软件能够以比班加罗尔放射科医生更快、更好、更廉价地查看成像还需要多久？


Likewise, in the next decade, Foxconn, which produces iPhones and other consumer electronics, plans to replace much of its Chinese workforce of more than 1.2 million with robots.	类似地，在未来十年，生产iPhone和其他消费电子产品的富士康计划用机器人代替120多万中国工人。


And soon enough voice recognition software will replace the call centers of Bangalore and Manila.	要不了多久，语音识别软件也将取代班加罗尔和马尼拉的所有呼叫中心。


Job-reducing technological innovations will affect education, health care, government, and even transportation.	减少就业岗位的技术创新将影响教育、医疗、政府甚至交通。


For example, will we still need so many teachers in the decades to come if the cream of the profession can produce increasingly sophisticated online courses that millions of students can take?	比如，如果顶尖教师可以提供日益成熟的在线课程供数以百万计的学生学习，我们��需要那么多教师吗？


If not, how will all of those former teachers earn a living?	如果答案是否定的，所有这些前教师到哪里去谋生？


Governments, too, are shedding labor – particularly governments burdened by high deficits and debts.	政府也在摆脱劳动力——特别是饱受高赤字和债务负担重压的政府。


And, by transforming how services are provided to the public, the e-government trend can offset the employment losses with productivity gains.	此外，通过改变向公共提供服务的方式，电子政府趋势可以凭借生产率的进步抵消雇用人数下降的影响。


Even transportation is being revolutionized by technology.	就连交通都在被技术革命。


In a matter of years, driverless cars – courtesy of Google and others – may render millions of jobs obsolete.	不消几年，无人驾驶汽车——来自谷歌和其他公司的好意——就将让数百万就业岗位成为历史。


And, of course technological innovation that is capital-intensive and labor-saving is one of the factors – together with the related winner-take-all effects – driving the rise in income and wealth inequality.	当然，资本密集型、劳动力节约型技术创新——加上与此相关的赢家通吃效应——也是收入和财富不平等加剧的原因。


Rising inequality then becomes a drag on demand and growth (as well as a source of social and political instability), because it distributes income from those who spend more (lower- and middle-income households) to those who save more (high-net-worth individuals and corporate firms).	而不平等性的加剧又会拖累需求和增长（并成为社会和政治动荡的来源），因为它将收入从支出更多的群体（较低收入和中等收入家庭）抽走，分配给储蓄更多的群体（高净财富个人和公司企业）。


Obviously, this is not the first time the world has faced such problems, and the past can help to serve as a model for resolving them.	显然，这不是世界第一次面临这样的问题，而历史可以作为解决它们的样板。


Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century leaders sought to minimize the worst features of industrialization.	十九世纪末、二十世纪初的领导人试图让工业化的副作用最小化。


Child labor was abolished throughout the developed world, working hours and conditions became more humane, and a social safety net was put in place to protect vulnerable workers and stabilize the (often fragile) macroeconomy.	童工已被发达世界彻底杜绝，工时和工作环境也越来越人道，还建立了社会安全网保护弱势工人、稳定（常常十分脆弱的）宏观经济。


As we begin to seek enlightened solutions to the challenges that the Third Industrial Revolution presents, one overall theme looms large: The gains from technology must be channeled to a broader base of the population than has benefited so far.	当我们开始寻找应对第三次工业革命带来的挑战的开明方案时，有一个总主题十分重要：来自技术的收益必须分给比目前的得益群体规模大得多的广大人口。


That requires a major educational component.	这主要要靠教育。


In order to create broad-based prosperity, workers need the skills to participate in the brave new world implied by a digital economy.	要建立广泛繁荣，工人需要技能参与数字经济带来的华丽新世界。


Even that may not be sufficient, in which case it will become necessary to provide permanent income support to those whose jobs are displaced by software and machines.	即便如此仍有可能不够，此时就必须为工作呗软件和机器取代的人提供永久收入支持。


Here, too, we should attend carefully to the lessons of the past.	在这方面，我们需要仔细关注历史经验。


King Ludd is Still Dead	路德国王仍未醒


CAMBRIDGE – Since the dawn of the industrial age, a recurrent fear has been that technological change will spawn mass unemployment.	美国剑桥—自工业化时代萌芽以来，一个一再发生的担忧是技术变革会导致大规模失业。


Neoclassical economists predicted that this would not happen, because people would find other jobs, albeit possibly after a long period of painful adjustment.	新古典经济学家预言这不会发生，因为人们会找到其他工作，只是痛苦调整的时间可能会比较长。


By and large, that prediction has proven to be correct.	总的来说，这一预言是对的。


Two hundred years of breathtaking innovation since the dawn of the industrial age have produced rising living standards for ordinary people in much of the world, with no sharply rising trend for unemployment.	自工业化时代以来，200多年的创新史为世界各地的普通人创造了更高的生活水平，与此同时，失业并没有出现大幅增加的趋势。


Yes, there have been many problems, notably bouts of staggering inequality and increasingly horrific wars.	但是，问题仍然很多，最突出的要数不平等性的波动和越来越可怕的战争。


On balance, however, throughout much of the world, people live longer, work much fewer hours, and lead generally healthier lives.	不过，平心而论，放眼全世界，人们的寿命更长了，工作时间更短了，生活也更健康了。


But there is no denying that technological change nowadays has accelerated, potentially leading to deeper and more profound dislocations.	但不可否认，当今技术变迁加速并从根本上深化了变革。


In a much-cited 1983 article, the great economist Wassily Leontief worried that the pace of modern technological change is so rapid that many workers, unable to adjust, will simply become obsolete, like horses after the rise of the automobile.	在一片被广为引用的1983年的文章中，著名经济学家里昂惕夫表达了一种忧虑：现代技术变迁的速度太快，以至于许多工人来不及做出调整，他们将会被时代抛弃，就像汽车的出现宣告马匹退出历史舞台一样。


Are millions of workers headed for the glue factory?	真有数百万计的工人会经历这一命运？


As Asian wages rise, factory managers are already looking for opportunities to replace employees with robots, even in China.	随着亚洲工资的提高，工厂管理者已开始寻求用机器人代替工人，即使在中国也是如此。


As the advent of cheap smartphones fuels a boom in Internet access, online purchases will eliminate a vast number of retail jobs.	正如智能手机的出现助长了互联网接入的繁荣，在线购物将让大批零售业岗位消失。


Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that, worldwide, technological change could easily lead to the loss of 5-10 million jobs each year. Fortunately, until now, market economies have proved stunningly flexible in absorbing the impact of these changes.	包络定理表明，从世界范围看，技术变迁可以轻而易举地造成工作岗位每年减少500—1000万个幸运的是，到目前为止，市场经济一直表现出惊人的弹性，足以吸收这些变迁带来的冲击。


A peculiar but perhaps instructive example comes from the world of professional chess.	一个特别但具有说明性的例子是职业象棋。


Back in the 1970’s and 1980’s, many feared that players would become obsolete if and when computers could play chess better than humans.	在20世纪七八十年代，很多人担心电脑迟早会压过人类棋手，到那时，象棋选手就要成为时代弃儿了。


Finally, in 1997, the IBM computer Deep Blue defeated world chess champion Gary Kasparov in a short match.	最终，在1997年，IBM的计算机“深蓝”在番棋赛中击败了国际象棋世界冠军卡斯帕罗夫。


Soon, potential chess sponsors began to balk at paying millions of dollars to host championship matches between humans.	很快，潜在象棋比赛赞助者就不再花费数百万美元组织人类象棋锦标赛了。


Isn’t the computer world champion, they asked?	世界冠军难道不是电脑吗？ 他们问道。


Today, the top few players still earn a very good living, but less than at the peak.	如今，顶尖象棋选手仍可以过上优渥的生活，但收入比顶峰期低了不少。


Meanwhile, in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, second-tier players earn much less money from tournaments and exhibitions than they did in the 1970’s.	与此同时，用真实值（经通胀调整）衡量，二流棋手在锦标赛和表演赛中互动获得的收入大大低于20世纪70年代。


Nevertheless, a curious thing has happened: far more people make a living as professional chess players today than ever before.	尽管如此，还是发生了很有意思的一幕：如今，以做职业棋手为生的人数比以前多了很多。


Thanks partly to the availability of computer programs and online matches, there has been a mini-boom in chess interest among young people in many countries.	许多国家对国际象棋产生兴趣的年轻人数量出现了迷你井喷，这部分要归功于电脑程序和在线比赛的普及。


Many parents see chess as an attractive alternative to mindless video games.	许多家长把下象棋视为脑残电子游戏的很好的替代品。


A few countries, such as Armenia and Moldova, have actually legislated the teaching of chess in schools.	亚美尼亚和摩尔多瓦等国还规定学校必须开设国际象棋课。


As a result, thousands of players nowadays earn surprisingly good incomes teaching chess to children, whereas in the days before Deep Blue, only a few hundred players could truly make a living as professionals.	结果，成千上万棋手如今出人意料地可以通过教小孩下棋获得很好的收入，而在“深蓝”诞生之前，只有几百人可以真正靠国际象棋为生。


In many US cities, for example, good chess teachers earn upwards of $100-$150 per hour.	比如，在很多美国城市，好的国际象棋老师时薪高达100—150美元。


Yesterday’s unemployed chess bum can bring in a six-figure income if he or she is willing to take on enough work.	昨天的失业棋手如今每年可以赚到数十万美元，只要他愿意。


In fact, this is one example where technology might actually have contributed to equalizing incomes.	事实上，这只是技术可以让收入更平等的一个例子。


Second-tier chess players who are good teachers often earn as much as top tournament players – or more.	善于教棋的二流国际象棋棋手通常收入不亚于顶级棋手，甚至更高。


Of course, the factors governing the market for chess incomes are complex, and I have vastly over-simplified the situation.	当然，决定象棋选手收入的市场因素十分复杂，我对情况作了大规模的简化。


But the basic point is that the market has a way of transforming jobs and opportunities in ways that no one can predict.	但基本要点是，市场自有一套没人可以预测的转变就业和机会的方法。


Technological change is not all upside, and transitions can be painful.	技术变迁并不一定是向上的，转型可能是痛苦的。


An unemployed autoworker in Detroit may be fully capable of retraining to become a hospital technician.	底特律的失业汽车工人也许完全可以胜任医院技术人员的工作。


Yet, after years of taking pride in his work, he could be very reluctant to make the switch.	但是，在多年以汽车为傲后，他可能不愿意做出这样的转型。


I know a chess grandmaster who, 20 years ago, prided himself on his success at winning money in tournaments.	我认识一位象棋大师，20年前就以在锦标赛中赢得奖金为傲。


He vowed that he would never end up teaching children “how horsey moves” (the reference is to the knight, also called the horse).	他发誓永远都不会去干教导小孩“怎样走马”的行当。


But now he does exactly that, earning more from teaching “how horsey moves” than he ever did as a competitive chess player.	但这正是他现在的工作，而教导孩子“怎样走马”所赚的钱比他当一位颇具竞争力的棋手还要多。


Still, it beats being sent to the knacker.	不过这总比去宰马场当屠夫好。


Of course, this time technological change could be different, and one should be careful in extrapolating the experience of the last two centuries to the next two.	当然，这次的技术变迁或许与以前不一样，在将过去两百年的经验推广到未来两百年时需要慎之又慎。


For one thing, mankind will be confronted with more complex economic and moral questions as technology accelerates.	一方面，随着技术的进步，人类总是会遇到更加附在的经济和道德问题。


Still, even as technological change accelerates, nothing suggests a massive upward shift in unemployment over the next few decades.	但是，即使技术变迁出现了加速，也不意味着未来几十年一定会出现失业的大幅增加。


Of course, some increase in unemployment as a result of more rapid technological change is certainly likely, especially in places like Europe, where a plethora of rigidities inhibit smooth adjustment.	当然，因技术的快速变迁而导致失业一定程度的增加是完全可能的，特别是在像欧洲这样的地方，在那里，处处是阻碍平稳调整过程的陈规陋习。


For now, however, the high unemployment of the past several years should be mainly attributed to the financial crisis, and should ultimately retreat toward historical benchmark levels.	不过，就现在而言，过去几年的高失业应该主要归咎于金融危机，迟早会回归历史基准水平。


Humans are not horsies.	人类可不是马。


Ten Consequences of Trump	特朗普的后果


LONDON – For those of us who were wrong about the United States’ presidential election, it is worth suppressing emotional reactions, at least for a month or two, and attempting a dispassionate judgment about what Donald Trump’s administration may mean for the world.	伦敦—对我们这些错判了美国总统大选的人来说，应该克制我们情绪上的反感，至少要克制一两个月，并尝试心平气和地判断特朗普执政对世界意味着什么。


So here are ten likely consequences of the Trump presidency, divided equally between the good and the bad.	这里列举十项特朗普担任总统的可能后果，基本上利弊对半。


The good news starts with US growth, which will almost surely accelerate well above the 2.2% average annual rate during President Barack Obama’s second term.	第一个好消息是美国的增长。 在奥巴马总统的第二个任期，美国增长率几乎肯定将加速至平均每年2.


This is because the Republican aversion to public spending and debt applies only when a Democrat like Obama occupies the White House.	2%以上。 这是因为共和党对公共支出和债务的憎恶只在奥巴马这样的民主党主持白宫时才表现出来。


With a Republican president, the party has always been glad to boost public spending and relax debt limits, as it was under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush.	如果总统是共和党，共和党总是乐于刺激公共支出、放松债务限制，里根和小布什时代就是明证。


Thus, Trump will be able to implement the Keynesian fiscal stimulus that Obama often proposed but was unable to deliver.	因此，特朗普将能够实施奥巴马屡次提出但始终无法实现的凯恩斯主义财政刺激。


The resulting deficits may be described as “supply-side economics,” rather than Keynesian stimulus, but the effect will be the same: growth and inflation will both increase.	由此导致的赤字可以被称为“供给侧经济学”，而不是凯恩斯主义刺激，但效果是一样的：增长和通胀双升。


As the US economy runs into the limits of full employment, additional growth will push inflation higher, but that bad news can wait until 2018 and beyond.	随着美国经济达到充分就业极限，增长的提高将推高通货膨胀，但坏消息可能要到2018年及以后才会出现。


Second, sensible tax reforms, such as an amnesty for multinational companies that repatriate foreign profits, will finally become law.	其次，明智的税收改革，比如大赦汇回海外利润的跨国公司，将最终成为法律。


The Republicans’ hegemony will enable easy agreement on tax cuts financed mainly by higher public borrowing, rather than by facing down special-interest lobbies’ resistance to the elimination of exemptions and loopholes.	共和党在国会中处于支配地位，因此将轻易达成减税方面的一致。 减税将主要通过增加公共借贷，而不是克服特殊利益游说集团对取消豁免和税收漏洞的抵制实现。


These tax reforms will create even bigger budget deficits, which in turn will stimulate more growth and inflation.	这些税收改革将造成更大的财政赤字，反过来刺激更高的增长和通胀。


A third boost to economic growth will come from deregulation.	第三个经济刺激因素将来自去监管。


While battles over energy and environmental laws may dominate the headlines, the biggest economic impact will come from reversing bank regulations.	围绕能源和环境法的斗争也许将占据媒体头条，但对经济影响最大的还是逆转银行监管。


As banks are encouraged to loosen lending standards, especially for middle-income households, an upswing in residential construction and debt-financed consumption should add further growth impetus.	随着银行被鼓励放松贷款标准，特别是对中产阶级家庭的贷款标准，住宅建设和债务融资消费的回升间更进一步刺激增长。


Excessive deregulation could cause a re-run of the 2007 financial crisis, but that, too, is a risk for 2018 and beyond.	过度去监管可能导致2007年金融危机卷土重来，但这也只是2018年及以后才有的风险。


Fourth, Trump could be good for geopolitical stability, at least in the short term.	第四，特朗普可能对地缘政治稳定有利，至少在短期如此。


Trump’s preference for transactional realpolitik over Obama’s liberal interventionism should stabilize relations with Russia and China as the world is divided into spheres of influence.	特朗普更偏好于带有交易性质的现实政治，而不是奥巴马的自由干预主义，在世界被划分为各个势力范围的时代，这将稳定美国与俄罗斯和中国的关系。


Trump could give Russia freer rein in Ukraine and Syria in exchange for restraint in Central Europe and the Baltics.	特朗普可以让俄罗斯在乌克兰和叙利亚更加“任性”，以换取后者在中欧和巴尔干半岛保持克制。


China’s inevitable dominance in Asia could be accepted, provided it avoids outright wars with Japan, Taiwan, and other countries whose security is, in theory, guaranteed by treaties with the US.	中国将不可阻挡地崛起于亚洲，这是可以接受的，只要它能避免与日本、台湾和其他理论上安全应该按照条约由美国负责保证的国家爆发全面战争。


The Middle East is bound to remain a cauldron of geopolitical unrest; but, even here, Trump’s preference for local strongmen over “democracy promotion” could restore a degree of stability (at the cost of human rights).	中东注定仍将是地缘政治动荡的大熔炉； 但是，即便在中东，特朗普对地区强人而不是“推进民主”的偏好也可以重新塑造一定程度的稳定（但要以人权为代价）。


Finally, Trump’s election could force Americans to recognize flaws in their own democracy, even as they abandon global “democracy promotion.”	最后，特朗普的当选能够迫使美国人认识到美国的民主的缺陷，即使他们放弃全球“民主推进”。


The fact that Trump lost the popular vote by more than two million could re-energize efforts to reform the Electoral College – efforts that already have resulted in the necessary legislation in states representing 61% of the required votes.	特朗普在普选中输给克林顿200多万票这一事实可能重新激发改革选举人制度的热情——这一热情已经导致占61%的所需选票的州进行了必要的立法。


And the overwhelming opposition to Trump in trend-setting states such as California and New York could encourage their voters to elect legislatures to counteract federal conservatism with progressive state laws on issues ranging from air quality and health care to abortion, treatment of immigrants, and gun control.	引领全国趋势的加利福尼亚和纽约等州压倒性地反对特朗普，这将鼓励这些州的选民选出在空气质量、医疗健康、堕胎、移民带有和枪支管制等问题上用进步主义州法律对抗联邦保守主义的立法机关。


Now for the bad news.	现在来看看坏消息。


For the first time since the 1930s, the US has a president who views trade as a zero-sum game.	20世纪30年代以来第一次，美国出现了一位将贸易视为零和博弈的总统。


Trump’s protectionist campaign rhetoric may not have been meant literally, but if he fails to deliver any of the trade curbs that he promised, Republicans will suffer a backlash from what is now their core voter constituency, voters in declining industries and regions.	特朗普的保护主义竞选基调也许并不代表他的本意，但如果他不能给出任何他所承诺的遏制贸易的措施，共和党将在他们现在的核心票仓——衰落行业和地区的选民——遭遇打击。


US global leadership is therefore bound to shift away from free trade, globalization, and open markets.	美国的全球领导力也因此必将从自由贸易、全球化和开放市场有所转变。


Nobody can predict the full effects of the biggest regime change in global economic management since the 1980s; but they will surely be negative for emerging economies and multinational companies, whose development models and business strategies have assumed free trade and open capital flows.	没人能够预测这场20世纪80年代以来最大规模的全球经济管理机制变化的全部影响； 但这些变化必然会给新兴市场和跨国公司带来不利影响，后两者的发展模式和商业战略都以自由贸易和开放资本流为前提。


A second, more immediate, threat stems from enacting large tax cuts and boosting public spending in an economy already nearing full employment, which implies accelerating inflation, higher interest rates, or probably some combination of the two.	第二个也是更��直接的威胁是在一个已经接近充分就业的经济中实施大规模减税和刺激公共支出，这将带来通胀加速、利率升高，或者两者兼而有之。


Given the likelihood of additional trade protectionism and measures to remove immigrant workers, the increase in inflation and long-term interest rates could be quite dramatic.	考虑到贸易保护主义抬头和采取打击移民工作者的措施的可能性，通胀和长期利率的升幅可能相当剧烈。


The impact on financial markets will be disruptive, regardless of whether the Fed aggressively tightens monetary policy to pre-empt rising prices or lets the economy “run hot” for a year or two, allowing inflation to accelerate.	对金融市场的影响将是破坏性的，无论美联储是大幅收紧货币政策以防止物价上涨还是坐视经济“火热”一两年，允许通胀加速。


With the US economy growing faster than expected and long-term interest rates rising, excessive strengthening of the dollar is a third major risk.	在美国经济比预期更快增长以及长期利率升高的背景下，美元过度升值成为第三个主要风险。


Even though the dollar is already overvalued, it could move into a self-reinforcing upward spiral, as it did in the early 1980s and late 1990s, owing to dollar debts accumulated in emerging markets by governments and companies tempted by near-zero interest rates.	即使美元已经高估，仍有可能进入自我加强的上升螺旋，一如20世纪80年代初和90年代末，原因就在新兴市场政府和没有抵挡住近零利率诱惑的公司大量积累美元债务。


Fourth, the combination of a dollar squeeze and protectionism spells big trouble for developing countries, with the possible exception of some relatively closed economies such as Brazil, Russia, and India, whose development strategies are less reliant on free trade and foreign financing.	第四，美元挤压和保护主义的合力将给发展中国家造成巨大的麻烦，也许巴西、俄罗斯和印度等相对封闭的经济体是例外，它们的发展战略较少依赖于自由贸易和外国融资。


Finally, the most dangerous consequence of Trump’s victory may be its contagion effect on Europe.	最后，特朗普胜选的最危险的后果可能是对欧洲的传染效应。


Just as Britain’s referendum proved uncannily predictive of Trump’s win, Trump looks like a leading indicator of populist upheavals in Europe, which could trigger another euro crisis and threaten the breakup of the European Union.	正如英国公投成为特朗普胜选的令人难以置信的先兆，特朗普看上去也像是欧洲民粹主义剧变的先行指标，如果发生剧变，欧元将再次爆发危机，欧盟也有可能解体。


The next anti-establishment victories, according to opinion polls, will be in Italy’s constitutional referendum and Austria’s presidential election.	根据民调，下一波反建制胜利可能来自意大利宪政公投和奥地利总统大选。


Globalists can only hope that the polls again turn out to be wrong – but in the opposite direction.	全球主义者也许只能寄望于民调再次出错——但这次方向相反。


Ten Reasons for Europe	看好欧洲的理由


PARIS – The euro, many now believe, will not survive a failed political class in Greece or escalating levels of unemployment in Spain: just wait another few months, they say, the European Union’s irresistible collapse has started.	巴黎—如今，很多人都相信欧元无法拯救希腊政坛乱象和西班牙失业高企：等着看吧，他们说，过不了几个月，欧盟不可避免的崩溃就会到来。


Dark prophecies are often wrong, but they may also become self-fulfilling.	黑暗预言通常不会是对的，但也不是没有自我实现的可能。


Let’s be honest: playing Cassandra nowadays is not only tempting in a media world where “good news is no news”; it actually seems more justified than ever.	坦白讲，如今扮演凶兆预言家不仅成为一直信奉“没消息便是好消息”的媒体的热衷之事，而且看上去前所未有地明智。


For the EU, the situation has never appeared more serious.	对欧盟来说，情况从来没有那样严重过。


It is precisely at this critical moment that it is essential to re-inject hope and, above all, common sense into the equation.	正是在这样一个关键时刻，重塑信心——以及最重要的，在考虑问题时坚守常识——至关重要。


So here are ten good reasons to believe in Europe – ten rational arguments to convince pessimistic analysts, and worried investors alike, that it is highly premature to bury the euro and the EU altogether.	有十大理由能够让我们相信，断言欧元以及整个欧盟的命运还为时过早。 这十大理由都是十分理性的观点，应能让悲观分析师和惊慌不已的投资者深信不疑。


The first reason for hope is that statesmanship is returning to Europe, even if in homeopathic doses.	第一个希望的理由的欧洲的政治家风度正在回归，尽管其势头只相当于顺势疗法的程度。


It is too early to predict the impact of François Hollande’s election as President of France. But, in Italy, one man, Mario Monti, is already making a difference.	想在就预测奥朗德当选法国总统的影响还为时过早，但蒙蒂在意大利已经带来了不同。


Of course, no one elected Monti, and his position is fragile and already contested, but there is a positive near-consensus that has allowed him to launch long-overdue structural reforms.	当然，蒙蒂并不是选出来的，他的地位并不巩固，并且已经产生了争议，但意大利存在积极的准共识，让他得以实施拖延已久的结构性改革。


It is too early to say how long this consensus will last, and what changes it will bring.	现在预言这一共识会持续多久、改革会带来什么样的挑战还为时过早。


But Italy, a country that under Silvio’s Berlusconi’s cavalier rule was a source of despair, has turned into a source of real, if fragile, optimism.	但意大利这个在贝卢斯科尼骑士治国之下让人绝望的国家已经转变成现实乐观之源——尽管这种乐观并不牢靠。


A second reason to believe in Europe is that with statesmanship comes progress in governance.	第二个相信欧洲的理由是治理方面政治家风度的进步。


Monti and Hollande have both appointed women to key ministerial positions.	蒙蒂和奥朗德都任命了女性担当关键部门一把手。


Marginalized for so long, women bring an appetite for success that will benefit Europe.	在经历了长期的边缘化后，女性给欧洲带来了大有裨益的成功可望。


Third, European public opinion has, at last, fully comprehended the gravity of the crisis.	第三，欧洲的公共观念终于完全理解了危机的逻辑。


Nothing could be further from the truth than the claim that Europe and Europeans, with the possible exception of the Greeks, are in denial.	没有什么比否定欧洲和欧洲人（希腊是例外）更离谱的错误了。


Without lucidity born of despair, Monti would never have come to power in Italy.	要不是绝望所带来的清醒，蒙蒂根本不可能在意大利掌权。


In France, too, citizens have no illusions.	法国人民同业也不再抱有幻想。


Their vote for Hollande was a vote against Sarkozy, not against austerity.	他们之所以支持奥朗德，其实是在反对萨科齐而不是紧缩。


They are convinced, according to recently published public-opinion polls, that their new president will not keep some of his “untenable promises,” and they seem to accept this as inevitable.	从最新发布的民意调查结果看，法国选民认为新总统并不会履行“不可靠的承诺”，并做好了接受这一不可避免的结果的准备。


The fourth reason for hope is linked to Europe’s creativity.	第四个希望的理由与欧洲的创造力有关。


Europe is not condemned to be a museum of its own past.	欧洲绝不是陈列古董的博物馆。


Tourism is important, of course, and from that standpoint Europe’s diversity is a unique source of attractiveness.	当然，旅游业是一个重要产业，从这个角度看，欧洲的多样化也是独特的吸引力之源。


But this diversity is also a source of inventiveness.	但多样化同样是创新力的源泉。


From German cars to French luxury goods, European industrial competitiveness should not be underestimated.	从德国车到法国奢侈品，欧洲工业竞争力不容低估。


The moment when Europe truly believes in itself, the way Germany does, and combines strategic long-term planning with well allocated R&D investments, will make all the difference.	只要欧洲像德国那样对自己坚信不疑，将长期战略规划和科学研发投资配置相结合，情况就会大为改观。


Indeed, in certain key fields, Europe possesses a globally recognized tradition of excellence linked to a very deep culture of quality.	事实上，在一些关键领域，欧洲拥有全世界公认的与其根深蒂固的质量文化相关的优良传统。


The fifth source of optimism is slightly paradoxical.	第五个乐观理由听起来有点似是而非。


Nationalist excesses have tended to lead Europe to catastrophic wars.	民族主义的泛滥曾经把欧洲拖入了灾难性的战争。


But the return of nationalist sentiment within Europe today creates a sense of emulation and competition, which proved instrumental in the rise of Asia yesterday.	但如今，欧洲内部民族主义情绪的回归造就了模仿和竞争的风潮，而这正是亚洲崛起的关键。


Koreans, Chinese, and Taiwanese wanted to do as well as Japan.	韩国、中国大陆和台湾都以日本为师。


In the same way, the moment will soon come when the French want to do as well as Germany.	同样地，很快，法国人也将以德国为师。


The sixth reason is linked to the very nature of Europe’s political system.	第六个理由与欧洲政治制度的性质有关。


Churchill’s famous adage that democracy is the worst political system, with the exception of all the others, has been borne out across the continent.	丘吉尔有一个著名的论断——民主是最坏的政治制度，除了比一切其他政治制度都好以外。 这一论断在欧洲大陆得到了证实。


More than 80% of French citizens voted in the presidential election.	80%的法国公民参与了总统大选投票。


Watching on their televisions the solemn, dignified, peaceful, and transparent transfer of power from the president they had defeated to the president they had elected, French citizens could only feel good about themselves and privileged to live in a democratic state.	在电视中，他们看到，权力郑重、庄严、和平地从被他们抛弃的总统移交到了被他们选择的总统手中，这不仅让他们感觉良好，更让他们感到自豪，可以生活在一个民主国家中。


Europeans may be confused, inefficient, and slow to take decisions, but democracy still constitutes a wall of stability against economic and other uncertainties.	欧洲人也许糊涂、低效、无法迅速决断，但民主将构成抵御经济和其他不确定性的长城。


The seventh reason to believe in Europe is linked to the universalism of its message and languages.	第七个相信欧洲的理由与欧洲语言的一致性有关。


Few people dream of becoming Chinese, or of learning its various languages other than Mandarin.	没人愿意欧洲像中国那样，不但要学普通话，还要学各种方言。


By contrast, English, Spanish, French, and, increasingly, German transcend national boundaries.	相比之下，英语、西班牙语、法语的使用范围都超越了国界，德语也有这一趋势。


Beyond universalism comes the eighth factor supporting the EU’s survival: multiculturalism.	在语言一致性的基础上可以看到支持欧盟不倒的第八个因素：文化多元主义。


It is a disputed model, but multiculturalism is more a source of strength than of weakness.	文化多元主义是一个颇具争议的话题，但它所带来的优势多于劣势。


The continent’s fusion of culture makes its people richer rather than poorer.	欧洲大陆对文化的融合让欧洲人民变得更富有，而不是更贫穷。


The ninth reason for hope stems from the EU’s new and upcoming members.	第九个���望的理由来自欧盟新成员和准成员。


Poland, a country that belongs to “New Europe,” is repaying the EU with a legitimacy that it had gained from Europe during its post-communist transition.	作为“新欧洲”的成员，波兰在后共产主义转型中从欧洲获益良多，现在正在回馈欧洲以正统性。


And the entrance of Croatia, followed by Montenegro and a few other Balkan countries, could compensate for the departure of Greece (should it come to that for the Greeks).	而克罗地亚的加入（继黑山和其他一些巴尔干国家之后）可以弥补希腊退出的缺憾（如果希腊真的退出的话）。


Finally, and most important, Europe and the world have no better alternative.	最后也是最重要的是，欧洲和世界找不到更好的替代方案。


The Greek crisis may be forcing Europe to move towards greater integration, with or without Greece.	希腊危机也许正在迫使欧洲走向更深层次的一体化（只是有没有希腊不得而知）。


The German philosopher Jürgen Habermas speaks of a “transformational reality” – a complex word for a simple reality: divided we fall, whereas united, in our own complex manner, we may strive for “greatness” in the best sense.	德国哲学家哈贝马斯曾提出过“转型现实”（transformational reality），这一复杂的称谓是对简单现实的概括：分则亡，合则能以我们自身的复杂方式尽力追求“伟大”。


Investors, of course, are hedging their bets.	当然，投资者考虑的是避险。


Having ventured successfully into emerging non-democratic countries whose frailty they are starting to fear, some, out of prudence, are starting to rediscover Europe.	他们曾今看好非民主新兴国家，并取得了成功，如今，他们对这些国家的弱点开始感到担心，出于审慎考虑，一些人已开始重新发现欧洲。


They may well be the wise ones.	他们将成为智者。


The Disenchantment of Iraq	伊拉克梦的幻灭


LONDON – Twenty-five years ago, on March 16, 1988, Saddam Hussein’s troops spread poison gas through the Kurdish town of Halabja.	伦敦——二十五年前，1988年3月16日，萨达姆·侯赛因的军队在库尔德人聚居的哈莱卜杰镇释放毒气。


The attack, which killed an estimated 5,000 people and injured up to 10,000 more, remains the largest chemical-weapons attack ever to target a civilian population.	那次袭击共造成约5，000人死亡，10，000多人受伤，迄今为止仍是历史上针对平民人口发动的最大规模的化学袭击行动。


In the light of the Halabja atrocity, and the regime’s broader genocidal Anfal campaign against the Kurds, and massive repression throughout the country, the question “Is Iraq better off now than it was under Saddam Hussein?” requires no great deliberation.	鉴于哈莱卜杰暴行、灭绝库尔德人的大规模安法尔行动和遍布全国的大规模镇压，对“现在伊拉克是否好过萨达姆治下？ ”的问题似乎不该有什么疑问。


Iraqis are rid of a dictator responsible for the deaths of at least one million Iraqis, a man who plunged the country into three wars in 24 years, and whose policies (with the international community’s complicity) kept ordinary Iraqis under the strictest sanctions ever imposed by the United Nations.	伊拉克人推翻了造成至少百万民众死亡的独裁者，此人的政策（在国际社会配合下）24年内三次将伊拉克拖入战争，并让普通百姓生活在联合国最严厉的制裁之中。


Yes, Iraq is better off without this absolute despot.	是的，伊拉克最好没有这个绝对的暴君。


But, for those of us who participated in the effort to reconstruct Iraq starting in 2003, this answer is far too glib.	但对我们这些2003年起就参与伊拉克重建的人来说，这样的回答未免有些避重就轻。


We set the bar far higher.	我们的标准应该比这高得多。


The success of the war must surely be measured by whether its goals – particularly the establishment of a constitutional democracy and the country’s economic reconstruction – have been achieved.	战争成功与否当然要看建立宪政民主和重建国内经济的目标是否达到。


By this standard, the war in Iraq was a monumental failure.	如果根据上述标准，伊拉克战争的失败令人刻骨铭心。


The United States-led Coalition Provisional Authority empowered a new group of political elites who fundamentally distrusted one another and, more important, failed to coalesce around a shared vision for governing the country.	美国领导的联军临时权力机构授权的新一批政治精英根本不信任彼此，更重要的是，他们未能就治理国家的共同目标达成妥协。


Rather than giving these new politicians time to broker compromises, the Americans imposed a divisive constitutional process that exacerbated existing fissures, leading to the civil war of 2006-2007.	美国人强制执行并引发不和的宪法进程不仅没有为新上台的政治家留出妥协的时间，反而加剧了现有分裂，从而导致2006-2007年内战爆发。


The Kurdish and Arab Shia religious parties sought a very weak central government in Baghdad, the latter because they feared a return to Sunni minority rule.	库尔德人和阿拉伯什叶派宗教人士希望在巴格达建立弱势的中央政府，什叶派这样做是因为害怕逊尼少数派重新执政。


The Sunni Arab parties initially rejected any notion of a confederated state, but in time they came to believe that the Shia parties would never share power voluntarily.	逊尼派阿拉伯政党起初不愿接受任何邦联国家理念，但随着时间推移，他们开始相信什叶派政党永远不会自愿分权。


The ongoing cycle of violence is a legacy of this struggle for control.	正是这种争夺控制权的斗争造成了持续不断的暴力循环。


Today, many Sunni Iraqis aspire to the same autonomy from Baghdad that the Kurds enjoy in the north of the country.	今天，许多逊尼派伊拉克人希望从巴格达得到与北部库尔德人相同的自主权。


The Shia parties, having tasted real power in Iraq for the first time, are now attempting to create a much more centralized state than either the Kurds or Sunni Iraqis – or the constitution, for that matter – will tolerate.	什叶派政党在首次真正尝到权力的滋味以后，现在正力求组建一个远超出库尔德人、逊尼派伊拉克人和宪法容忍限度的集权政府。


Indeed, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has largely succeeded in concentrating power in his own hands.	事实上，总理努里·马利基已基本成功地将权力集中到自己手中。


He has created a network of military and security forces that report directly to him, often outside the legal command structure.	他往往在法令结构以外组建直接向其汇报的军队和安全部队网络。


He has intimidated the judiciary into ignoring institutional checks on his power, so that constitutionally independent agencies, such as the electoral commission and the central bank, are now under his direct control.	他胁迫司法机构放弃对其权力的制度性检查，以致于选举委员会和央行等宪法独立机构均处于其直接控制之中。


Moreover, Maliki has used the criminal courts to silence his political opponents.	此外，马利基还利用刑事法庭对政治对手进行压制。


Iraq’s Sunni vice president is a fugitive in Turkey, with multiple death sentences rendered against him for alleged terrorist activities, though the judgments were based on the confessions of bodyguards who had been tortured (one died during the “investigation”).	伊拉克逊尼派副总统是一名土耳其逃犯，因其涉嫌恐怖活动而背负多项死刑判决，但判决所依据的仅仅是身受酷刑的保镖的供认（其中一人甚至在“调查”过程中死亡）。


An arrest warrant has now been issued against the former finance minister, also a Sunni, on similar charges.	基于类似指控同样对逊尼派前财政部长签发了逮捕令。


As for the economy, no one expected a replication of Germany’s post-1945 Wirtschaftswunder.	至于说经济领域，没有谁指望能复制德国1945年后的经济奇迹。


Still, Iraq has vast oil and natural-gas reserves, to which all of the major oil companies wanted access.	不过，伊拉克仍拥有丰富的石油和天然气储备，让所有大型石油企业都垂涎欲滴。


Everyone stood to benefit: the companies would profit handsomely, while Iraq would gain new technology and vast sums to rebuild the country’s devastated infrastructure.	所有人都会因此而获利丰厚：企业能够赚取大笔利润，而伊拉克则将得到大量资金和全新技术重建被摧毁的基础设施。


The reality has been far different.	现实情况已经完全不同。


After ten years, Iraq’s oil production has finally recovered to its pre-war level.	十年后，伊拉克石油产量终于恢复到战前的水平。


But Iraq’s government has not completed a single infrastructure project: no new hospitals, schools, roads, or housing whatsoever.	但伊拉克政府尚未完成一个基础设施项目：包��新医院、学校、道路和住宅等等。


Basic services such as electricity and waste collection have yet to be restored even in major urban centers like Baghdad.	供电和垃圾收集等基本服务即使在巴格达等主要城市中心也尚待恢复。


(By contrast, reconstruction in Iraqi Kurdistan is occurring at breakneck speed.)	（相比之下，伊拉克库尔德地区重建保持着很快的速度。


Iraqis are about to enter their 11th summer, when temperatures routinely exceed 50° C, with no more than sporadic power and running water.	）伊拉克人即将迎来第11个气温经常超过50 o C的夏天，但却只能享受到断断续续的供电和供水服务。


This lack of progress is truly remarkable, given that Iraq’s annual budgets for the last five years have totaled nearly $500 billion.	鉴于伊拉克近五年的年度预算总额将近5，000亿美元，这样的进展状况的确令人感到不可思议。


Incompetence and corruption are rampant: Iraq routinely scores among the bottom ten countries in Transparency International’s list of the most corrupt countries in the world.	无能和腐败泛滥成灾：伊拉克经常在透明国际世界最腐败国家名单中排名后10位。


Likewise, Iraq’s unemployment and underemployment levels remain among the highest in the Middle East.	同样，伊拉克失业及就业不足的比率在中东地区依然是最高的。


And, as Iraq observer Joel Wing has pointed out, public-sector employment doubled from 2005 to 2010, and now accounts for roughly 60% of the full-time labor force.	伊拉克观察家乔尔·韦恩指出，公共部门就业从2005到2010年翻了一番，现在占到全职劳动力约60%的份额。


The brain drain among Iraq’s educated youth has accelerated in the last ten years, because many of them simply see no future in the country.	伊拉克受教育青年10年来人才外流加剧，因为很多人根本看不到国家的未来在何处。


Amnesty International recently issued a report detailing the continued systematic abuse of fundamental human rights in Iraq.	国际大赦组织最近发表一份报告，详细介绍伊拉克继续全面侵犯基本人权。


Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.	万变不离其宗。


True, Maliki’s nascent dictatorship is lighter than that of Saddam at his worst, and perhaps that is some progress.	的确，马利基的新生专政再差也与萨达姆不可同日而语，也许这就代表着某种进步。


But what has been gained may be far outweighed by what has been lost: the hope that if Saddam and his tyranny could just be removed, decency, stability, and normalcy could be restored.	但我们的损失远远大于所取得的成就：我们曾希望萨达姆及其专政一旦被推翻，尊重、稳定和正常局势就可以恢复。


That, finally, is the true tragedy of Iraq in 2013.	归根结底，这才是2013年伊拉克真正的悲剧。


Ten Years after the Mouse Roared	被弱者袭击十年后的反思


CAMBRIDGE – Al Qaeda’s attack on the United States ten years ago was a profound shock to both American and international public opinion.	发自剑桥——基地组织十年前发动的恐怖袭击对美国乃至国际舆论都造成了极大冲击。


What lessons can we learn a decade later?	如今事隔十年，我们又能从中学到些什么呢？


Anyone who flies or tries to visit a Washington office building gets a reminder of how American security was changed by 9/11.	所有曾经乘坐美国航班或者希望进入华盛顿特区政府建筑的人都会体会到9·11事件后美国安保系统的极大变化。


But, while concern about terrorism is greater, and immigration restrictions are tighter, the hysteria of the early days after 9/11 has abated.	虽然对恐怖主义的警惕有所提高，移民限制也进一步收紧，但9·11事件发生初期那种草木皆兵的状态却也逐渐缓和。


New agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and an upgraded Counter Terrorism Center have not transformed American government, and, for most Americans, personal freedoms have been little affected.	新成立的国土安全部，国家情报总监以及行政级别提升的反恐中心并未改变美国政府，同时对大多数美国人来说个人自由只受到了微小的影响。


No more large-scale attacks have occurred inside the US, and everyday life has recovered well.	自那以后美国并未遭遇任何大规模袭击，人们的生活也恢复如常。


But this apparent return to normality should not mislead us about the longer-term importance of 9/11.	但这种显而易见的复原不应模糊了9·11事件本身的重大长期意义。


As I argue in my book The Future of Power, one of the great power shifts of this global information age is the strengthening of non-state actors.	正如笔者在拙作《权力的未来》一书中所论证的那样，信息时代其中一个最重大的权力转换就是非国家参与者的实力增强。


Al Qaeda killed more Americans on 9/11 than the attack by the government of Japan did at Pearl Harbor in 1941.	要知道基地组织所杀害的美国人数量比日本袭击珍珠港时还多。


This might be called the “privatization of war.”	这或许可以称之为“战争的私人化”。


During the Cold War, the US had been even more vulnerable, in technological terms, to a nuclear attack from Russia, but “mutual assured destruction” prevented the worst by keeping vulnerability more or less symmetrical.	以冷战为例，当时美国抵御苏联核袭击的能力显然比今天更为脆弱，但“确保相互毁灭”战使得双方都变得同样脆弱，从而避免了灾难发生。


Russia controlled great force, but it could not acquire power over the US from its arsenal.	苏联人虽然武力强大，但却无法利用手中的军火库从美国人处夺取任何权力。


Two asymmetries, however, favored Al Qaeda in September 2001.	然而有两种不对称状况却在2001年9月推了基地组织一把。


First, there was an asymmetry of information.	其一是信息不对称。


The terrorists had good information about their targets, while the US before September 11 had poor information about the identity and location of terrorist networks.	恐怖分子对自己的袭击目标了如指掌，但9·11事件前的美国却对恐怖网络的特征和地点知之甚少。


Some government reports had anticipated the extent to which non-state actors could hurt large states, but their conclusions were not incorporated into official plans.	有些政府报告预测到非国家参与者可能对大国造成破坏，但这些结论却并未在官方策略中得到采纳。


Second, there was an asymmetry in attention.	其二则是注意力的不对称。


A larger actor’s many interests and objectives often dilute its attention to a smaller actor, which, by contrast, can focus its attention and will more easily.	一个大型参与者拥有众多利益和目标，并因此稀释了放在某个小型参与者身上的注意力，反之小型参与者则更容易去集中自己的注意力和意愿。


There was a good deal of information about Al Qaeda in the American intelligence system, but the US was unable to process coherently the information that its various agencies had gathered.	其实美国情报部门早就收集了许多关于基地组织的信息，但美国却没能把这些来自诸多情报部门的情报进行系统整理。


But asymmetries of information and attention do not confer a permanent advantage on the wielders of informal violence.	但信息和注意力的不对称并不能赋予那些非正式暴力行使者们永恒的优势。


To be sure, there is no such thing as perfect safety, and, historically, waves of terrorism have often taken a generation to recede.	有一点可以确定——世界上没有绝对的安全，然后从历史的角度来看，恐怖主义浪潮往往需要一代人的时间才能消退。


Even so, the elimination of top Al Qaeda leaders, the strengthening of American intelligence, tighter border controls, and greater cooperation between the FBI and the CIA have all clearly made the US (and its allies) safer.	即便如此，基地组织首脑人物的陆续覆灭，美国情报部门的不断强化，更加严格的边境管制以及美国联邦调查局与中央情报局的更紧密合作也令美国（及其盟友）变得更加安全。


But there are larger lessons that 9/11 teaches us about the role of narrative and soft power in an information age.	但9·11事件给我们带来的更宝贵经验则是述事和软实力在信息时代中的作用。


Traditionally, analysts assumed that victory went to the side with the better army or the larger force; in an information age, the outcome is also influenced by who has the better story.	一般来说分析家们都会用武器精良程度和兵力对比来推测谁是胜者； 然而在信息时代，最终结果也会受到各方述事能力的影响。


Competing narratives matter, and terrorism is about narrative and political drama.	各执一词的述事题材以及恐怖主义都会涉及到述事和政治表演。


The smaller actor cannot compete with the larger in terms of military might, but it can use violence to set the world agenda and construct narratives that affect its targets’ soft power.	小型参与者或许无法在武力与大型参与者分庭抗礼，但却可以用暴力来制定全球议程并编造述事来削弱对方的软实力。


Osama bin Laden was very adept at narrative.	本·拉登就非常善于述事。


He was not able to do as much damage to the US as he hoped, but he managed to dominate the world agenda for a decade, and the ineptness of the initial American reaction meant that he could impose larger costs on the US than were necessary.	虽然他无法对美国造成自己想要的破坏，但他成功占据了全球议程近十年时间，而美国最初的笨拙反应也证明此人能令美国付出比预料中更大的成本。


President George W. Bush made a tactical error in declaring a “global war on terrorism.” He would have done better to frame the response as a reply to Al Qaeda, which had declared war on the US.	小布什总统宣布的“全球反恐战争”其实是个战术错误。 他本可以将其限定为“向对美国宣战的基地组织复仇”并取得更加良好的效果。


The global war on terror was misinterpreted to justify a wide variety of actions, including the misguided and expensive Iraq War, which damaged America’s image.	结果全球反恐战争被错误解读来为一系列行���开脱——包括导向错误，耗费昂贵而且最终毁了美国形象的伊拉克战争。


Moreover, many Muslims misread the term as an attack on Islam, which was not America’s intent, but fit Bin Laden’s efforts to tarnish perceptions of the US in key Muslim countries.	此外许多穆斯林又把这个词汇误读为向伊斯兰教宣战，这并非美国的本意，但却正中本·拉登下怀，使其得以在各大穆斯林国家抹黑美国。


To the extent that the trillion or more dollars of unfunded war costs contributed to the budget deficit that plagues the US today, Bin Laden was able to damage American hard power.	鉴于数万亿甚至更多的战争借款也是美国当今预算赤字的一部分，本·拉登已经成功削弱了美国的硬实力。


And the real price of 9/11 may be the opportunity costs: for most of the first decade of this century, as the world economy gradually shifted its center of gravity toward Asia, the US was preoccupied with a mistaken war of choice in the Middle East.	而9·11事件的真正代价则是机会成本：在本世纪第一个十年的大部分时间中世界经济的重心逐渐向亚洲倾斜，而与此同时美国却被一个错误的中东战争决策所困扰。


A key lesson of 9/11 is that hard military power is essential in countering terrorism by the likes of Bin Laden, but that the soft power of ideas and legitimacy is essential for winning the hearts and minds of the mainstream Muslim populations from whom Al Qaeda would like to recruit.	9·11的一个重要教训就是虽然军事硬实力在应对本·拉登这类恐怖分子方面必不可少，但也必须具备理念以及合法性这样的软实力来笼络主流穆斯林民众的心——这也是基地组织希望拉拢的。


A “smart power” strategy does not ignore the tools of soft power.	一个“巧实力”战略不能忽视软实力这样的工具。


But, at least for America, perhaps the most important lesson of 9/11 is that US foreign policy should follow the counsel of President Dwight Eisenhower a half-century ago: Do not get involved in land wars of occupation, and focus on maintaining the strength of the American economy.	但至少对美国人来说，或许9·11事件最大的教训就是美国的外交政策应当遵从前总统艾森豪威尔半个世纪前的忠告：不要卷入占领他国领土的战争，而是要把注意力放在增强美国经济之上。


The Sino-American Decade	中美十年


HONG KONG – The California summit between US President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping on June 7-8 comes at a time of heightened tension between the world’s two preeminent powers.	香港—6月7日到8日，美国总统奥巴马和中国国家主席习近平将在加利福尼亚州举行峰会，其时正逢世界两大超群大国紧张正盛时。


But divisive issues – from computer hacking to America’s “pivot to Asia” – must not claim all of the attention.	但决定性问题——从电脑黑客到美国的“返回亚洲”——并不是全部。


If Obama and Xi lift their heads above the parapets and begin charting a jointly agreed course through the coming decade, they may find that they have much in common.	如果奥巴马和习近平把目光放长远，着眼于未来十年中达成共识的方面，或许可以发现他们有很多共同之处。


The next ten years will be characterized by major structural adjustments and shifts in individual economies, and by a huge reconfiguration of the global economy as a whole.	下一个十年将以重大结构性调整和向个体国家的变迁为特征，全球经济作为一个整体将出现重大重新配置。


Above all, much depends on the policies adopted by the two largest economies, China and the United States, and their cooperation and leadership in creating global public goods and maintaining a stable and open economic environment.	最重要的是，很多将取决于两个最大经济体——中国和美国所采取的政治以及它们在创造全球公共品和维持稳定开放的经济环境方面的合作与领导。


Cooperation will be needed in many areas.	许多领域需要合作。


One is the management of natural resources and the environment.	其中之一是自然资源和环境管理。


The growth of China and the developing world will lead to a doubling of global output in 10-15 years, and probably a tripling in the 15 years after that.	中国和发展中世界的增长将让全球产出 在10—15年内翻番，并在又一个15年后再翻两倍。


The growth model on which both advanced and developing countries relied in the past will not work at two or three times the scale.	过去发达和发展中国家均依赖的发展模式不可能在规模增加一两倍后仍然有效。


Climate, ecology, food, water, energy, and livability will not withstand the pressure.	气候、生态、粮食、水、能源和生存率禁不起如此压力。


Global problems are hard to solve.	全球问题难以解决。


A productive starting point would be China-US collaboration on energy efficiency and security, greener growth, and climate change.	一个建设性的出发点将是中美联手解决能源效率和安全、绿色增长以及气候变化问题。


China’s 12th Five-Year Plan sets ambitious goals in this area.	中国的十二五规划在这一领域设定了雄心勃勃的目标。


In the US, progress is somewhat more decentralized, though new national policies have been adopted, including Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for automobiles.	美国的进展更加分散，尽管新的国家政策已被采纳，包括汽车行业公司平均燃料经济（CAFE）标准。


The US also is set to become energy independent, owing to the rise of shale oil and gas, with diminishing reliance on coal already bringing down per capita carbon emissions.	美国还计划借页岩油气增加之东风成为能源独立国，而对煤炭依赖程度的下降已经拉低了人均碳排放量。


The complementarity of the Chinese and US economies is changing rapidly, but it is not declining in significance.	中国和美国经济的互补性在快速变化，但程度之深并未下降。


In the past, the US brought a large open market, foreign direct investment, and technology, while China supplied low-cost labor-intensive components in key global manufacturing supply chains.	在过去，美国带来了一个大型开放市场、外国直接投资和技术，而中国在关键性全球制造供应链上提供廉价劳动密集型要素。


Today, China provides a large and rapidly growing market for a widening array of previously unaffordable goods, and will increasingly produce as well as absorb new technologies.	如今，中国提供了一个庞大且快速增长的商品需求种类繁多（很多是其从前负担不起的）的市场，还将产生和吸收新技术。


In the process, it will shed lower-value-added jobs in its export sector as production moves to lower-cost developing countries.	在此过程中，随着生产向成本更低的发展中国家转移，��出口部门的低附加值岗位将减少。


Depending on policies on both sides, China may also become a foreign direct investor in the US economy in a wide range of areas – including infrastructure.	根据双方的政策，中国还可能成为诸多领域的对美外国直接投资者，包括基础设施部门。


The US will continue to provide a large open market, even as China’s role in serving it will shift upward in value added and in global supply chains.	美国将继续提供大型开放市场，即使美国的服务角色将向增值链和全球供应链的高端转移。


The US will also provide, share, and absorb technology and human talent, remaining at the top end of the higher-education spectrum and in basic and applied research.	美国还将继续提供、分享和吸收技术和人才，继续成为高等教育及基础和应用研究的最尖端。


Of course, there is also a healthy element of competition.	当然，竞争也有健康要素。


The sharp differences in comparative advantage that were apparent two decades ago are diminishing as the gap in income, capital depth (including human capital), and capabilities narrows.	过去二十年中，比较优势的巨大差别随着收入、资本深度（包括人力资本）和产能差距的缩小而减小。


Chinese multinationals with recognized brands will begin to appear, just as they did in Japan and Korea.	中国知名跨国公司开始涌现，一如昔日的日本和韩国。


They will compete with multinationals from a wide range of countries, and will become architects of global supply chains.	它们将与其他多国的跨国公司竞争，并成为全球供应链的决定者。


Fair, rules-based competition in a rapidly expanding global economy is far from a zero-sum game.	在快速扩张的全球经济中，公平、基于规则的竞争绝非零和博弈。


The outlines of the structural changes needed to move toward a healthier, more sustainable growth pattern in the coming decade are relatively clear in China.	结构性变化的主要内容需要以未来十年的更健康、更可持续的增长模式为方向，中国的变化相对较为清晰。


The remaining questions concern policy implementation and institutional development – issues that will be clarified in the course of 2013, as China’s new leaders formalize and communicate their reform priorities.	剩下的问题包括政策执行和制度发展——这些问题将在2013年随中国新领导人正式敲定和公布改革重点而变得清晰。


The US economy, meanwhile, retains many elements of dynamism and flexibility.	与此同时，美国经济仍保持着诸多活力和弹性要素。


But, while GDP growth seems to be returning slowly to potential, the slow pace of recovery in employment and the residual secular shifts in income distribution remain causes of concern.	但是，尽管GDP增长在慢慢回归潜在水平，就业复苏之缓慢和收入分配的残余永久性变迁仍是问题之源。


In particular, the shift of income from those who save less to those who save more implies uncertainty about the restoration of aggregate demand.	特别是，收入变化——从储蓄更少者流向储蓄更多者——意味着重塑总需求面临不确定性。


Political polarization has become another source of uncertainty.	政治极化是另一个不确定之源。


Many centrists agree that an optimal fiscal policy would feature short-term stimulus, a multi-year medium-term deficit reduction plan, and measures to reduce long-term liabilities, especially if retrenchment protected growth-oriented public-sector investments.	许多中间派同意，最优的财政政策特征应是短期刺激、多年中期赤字削减极化以及削减长期负债的措施，特别是在节约保护增长导向公共部门投资的情况下。


But that is difficult to achieve in a context of deleveraging and fixation on debt.	但在去杠杆化和修正债务问题的环境下，这很难实现。


If current trends continue, with the US economy recovering slowly but steadily, the pattern of convergence with China will continue.	如果现有趋势持续，即美国经济缓慢而稳健地复苏，那么与中国的趋同之势将继续。


East Asia as a whole will surpass the US in terms of aggregate GDP by 2015, with China contributing the highest proportion of the total.	东亚作为一个整体，其总GDP将在2015年超过美国，而中国在其中的贡献比例最大。


China’s GDP is projected to catch up to that of the US and Europe in 10-15 years, at which point (if not sooner) both Chinese and US real GDP will exceed $25 trillion (in 2012 prices), more than three times China’s current GDP.	中国的GDP预计将在10—15年后赶超美国和欧洲，其时（如果不提前的话）中国和美国的真实GDP将超过25万亿美元（以2012年价格衡量），是中国当前GDP的三倍多。


Each will account for approximately 15% of global output.	中美两国将各占全球总产出的约15%。


And yet this shift will be accompanied by very substantial global economic challenges and uncertainties, underscoring the importance of Sino-US cooperation.	而这一变化将伴随重大全球经济挑战和不确定性，凸显中美合作的重要性。


A constructive, cooperative relationship can make a significant contribution to both countries’ efforts to adapt their policies and institutions to achieve sustainable, inclusive growth patterns.	建设性、合作性的关系可以极大地有利于两国调整政策和制度以实现可持续、包容性增长模式。


Beyond the bilateral benefits, the rest of the global economy is dependent on Chinese and US leadership – both in terms of growth and in matters concerning global economic governance and coordination.	除了双边好处，全球经济的其他部分依赖美国和中国的领导——不仅在增长和全球经济治理相关问题，也包括协调问题。


Trade and economic openness, financial stability and regulation, energy security, climate change, and many other issues confront the world collectively.	贸易和经济开放、金融稳定和监管、能源安全、气候变化和其他许多问题世界需要共同面对。


It is very difficult to imagine successful global rebalancing and progress without China and the US taking a leading role in the process.	如果中国和美国不在此过程中扮演领导角色，很难想象全球再平衡的成功和进步。


The Decline of the West Revisited	再论西方的衰落


LONDON – The terrorist slaughter in Paris has once again brought into sharp relief the storm clouds gathering over the twenty-first century, dimming the bright promise for Europe and the West that the fall of communism opened up.	伦敦—巴黎恐怖分子屠夫再次突显二十一世纪上空的阴云，让共产主义崩溃给欧洲和西方带来的希望之光黯淡下来。


Given dangers that seemingly grow by the day, it is worth pondering what we may be in for.	危险与日俱增，值得我们深思目前的情况。


Though prophecy is delusive, an agreed point of departure should be falling expectations.	尽管预言并不真实，但一致的出发点应该是下降的预期。


As Ipsos MORI’s Social Research Institute reports: “The assumption of an automatically better future for the next generation is gone in much of the West.”	莫利调查机构（Ipsos MORI）社会研究所报告称：“在西方大部，下一代人已不再将更美好的未来看成天经地义。 ”


In 1918, Oswald Spengler published The Decline of the West.	1918年，奥斯瓦尔德·史宾格勒（Oswald Spengler）出版了《西方的衰落》（The Decline of the West）。


Today the word “decline” is taboo.	如今“衰落”一词已成为禁忌。


Our politicians shun it in favor of “challenges,” while our economists talk of “secular stagnation.”	我们的出版商用“挑战”来代替它，而经济学家的说法则是“长期停滞”。


The language changes, but the belief that Western civilization is living on borrowed time (and money) is the same.	语言在变，但西方文明时间（和金钱）欠债不变。


Why should this be?	为什么会这样？


Conventional wisdom regards it simply as a reaction to stagnant living standards.	传统智慧认为这只不过是对生活水平停滞不前的反应。


But a more compelling reason, which has seeped into the public’s understanding, is the West’s failure, following the fall of the Soviet Union, to establish a secure international environment for the perpetuation of its values and way of life.	但更令人信服的原因是苏联解体后西方没能建立一个安全的国际环境让西方价值观和生活方式永久化。 越来越多的公众已经认识到这一点。


The most urgent example of this failure is the eruption of Islamist terrorism.	这一失败的最紧迫的例子便是伊斯兰恐怖主义的爆发。


On its own, terrorism is hardly an existential threat.	恐怖主义本身绝非生存威胁。


What is catastrophic is the collapse of state structures in many of the countries from which the terrorists come.	带来灾难的是作为恐怖分子来源地的许多国家国家结构的崩溃。


The Islamic world contains 1.6 billion people, or 23% of the world’s population.	伊斯兰世界拥有16亿人口，占全世界人口的23%。


A hundred years ago it was one of the world’s most peaceful regions; today it is the most violent.	一百年前，这里是世界上最和平的地区之一； 如今这里是最暴力的地区。


This is not the “peripheral” trouble that Francis Fukuyama envisioned in his 1989 manifesto “The End of History.”	这不是弗朗西斯·福山在其1989年的《历史的终结》宣言中所预见的“外围”问题。


Through the massive influx of refugees, the disorder in the Middle East strikes at the heart of Europe.	通过大规模难民涌入，中东的失序正在冲击欧洲的心脏。


This movement of peoples has little to do with the “clash of civilizations” foreseen by Samuel Huntington.	这一人潮迁徙运动和塞缪尔·亨廷顿所预见的“文明的冲突”没有什么关系。


The more mundane truth is that there have never been any stable successors to the defunct Ottoman, British, and French empires that used to keep the peace in the Islamic world.	更世俗的真理是，昔日维持伊斯兰世界和平的是奥斯曼、不列颠和法兰西帝国，在它们分崩离析后，一直没有稳定的继任者产生。


This is largely, though not entirely, the fault of the European colonialists who, in the death throes of their own empires, created artificial states ripening for dissolution.	这主要（尽管不完全）是欧洲殖民者的过错，在帝国主义的垂死挣扎中，这些殖民者建立了许多成熟后注定要解体的人为的国家。


Their American successors have hardly done better.	他们的继任者——美国做得并不比他们更好。


I recently watched the film “Charlie Wilson’s War,” which relates how the United States came to arm the Mujahideen fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan.	我最近看了电影《查理·威尔逊的战争》（Charlie Wilson’s War），影片讲述了美国如何武装阿富汗圣战组织和苏联对抗。


At the end of the film, as America’s erstwhile clients turn into the Taliban, Wilson, the American politician who got them the money, is quoted as saying “We won a great victory, but fouled up the end game.”	在影片末尾，美国昔日的被保护人演变为塔利班，而为他们提供资金的美国政客威尔逊说：“我们大获全胜，但也弄糟了结局。 ”


This “fouling up” is a continuous thread running through American military interventions since the Vietnam War.	“弄糟”是越南战争以来美国军事干预的一个永恒主题。 美国部署拥有压倒性优势的火力——或者是通过直接派兵，或者是通过武装反对组织；


The US deploys overwhelming firepower, either directly or by arming opposition groups, shatters local governmental structures, and then pulls out, leaving the country in shambles.	破坏地方��府结构； 然后抽身离去，任由这个国家自身自灭。


It is unlikely that US policymaking reflects the grip of some ideal view of the world, in which getting rid of dictators is the same thing as creating democracies.	美国的政策制定绝对没有体现理想的世界观，认为消灭独裁者和建立民主是一回事。


Rather, the belief in ideal outcomes is a necessary myth to cover an unwillingness to use force persistently and intelligently enough to achieve a desired result.	相反，坚信理想结果是用来掩盖不愿坚定明智地使用武力直到实现渴望结果的必要的神话。


However much military hardware a superpower owns, decay of the will to use it is the same thing as a decay of effective power.	不管超级大国拥有多少军事实力，缺乏使用军事实力的意愿和缺乏有效力量是一回事。


After a time, it ceases to overawe.	只要有过一次先例，就失去了威慑力。


That’s why Robert Kagan’s 2003 neo-conservative proposition, “Americans are from Mars, Europeans from Venus,” offered such a misleading guide.	因此，2003年罗伯特·卡甘（Robert Kagan）的新保守主义命题“美国来自火星，欧洲来自金星”提供了完全错误的指导原则。


True enough, the European Union has gone farther down the pacifist road than the US.	诚然，欧盟在绥靖主义的道路上比美国走的更远。


It is the weak nerve center of a flabby semi-state, with almost defenseless frontiers, where humanitarian rhetoric masks spinelessness.	它是一个松散的半国家实体的虚弱的神经中枢，这个实体边界形同虚设，用人道主义论调掩盖懦弱。


But America’s sporadic, erratic, and largely ineffective deployment of power is hardly of Martian quality.	但美国的出兵亦只是间或的，既不可靠，效果也差，远远够不上火星标准。


The decline of the West is juxtaposed with the rise of the East, notably China.	与西方的衰落一起出现的东方特别是中国的崛起。


(It is hard to tell whether Russia is rising or falling; either way, it is disturbing.)	（很难说俄罗斯是在崛起还是在衰落，但无论如何，它都令人不安。


Fitting a rising power into a decaying international system has rarely occurred peacefully.	）将崛起的力量纳入正在消亡的国际体系很少能够和平实现。


Perhaps superior Western and Chinese statesmanship will avert a major war; but this, in historical terms, would be a bonus.	也许超凡的西方和中国政治家能够避免一场大战； 但从历史上看，这只能作为意外之喜。


The increasing fragility of the international political order is diminishing the global economy’s prospects.	国际政治秩序日趋动荡正在破坏全球经济前景。


This is the slowest recovery from a major slump on record.	此次复苏是有史以来速度最慢的大崩盘后复苏。


The reasons for this are complex, but part of the explanation must be the weakness of the rebound in international trade.	个中原因十分复杂，但部分原因显然是国际贸易反弹无力。


In the past, trade expansion has been the world’s main growth engine.	在过去，贸易扩张一直是世界主要增长引擎。


But it now lags behind the recovery of output (which is itself modest), because the kind of global political order hospitable to globalization is disappearing.	但如今，国际贸易落后于产出复苏（而产出复苏本身亦很平庸），因为有利于全球化的全球政治秩序不再。


One symptom of this has been the failure after 14 years to conclude the Doha Round of trade negotiations.	这一局面的一个症候便是多哈回合贸易谈判在14年之后终告失败。


Trade and monetary agreements are still reached, but they increasingly take the form of regional and bilateral deals, rather than multilateral arrangements, thereby serving broader geopolitical goals.	贸易和货币协议总算仍有达成，但越来越多地以地区或双边协议的形式达成，而非有利于范围更广的地缘政治目标的多边协定。


The US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership, for example, is directed against China; and China’s New Silk Road initiative is a reaction to its exclusion from the 12-country TPP.	比如，美国所领导的跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）就是为了针对中国； 而中国的新丝绸之路计划则是对其被排斥在12个国家的TPP之外的反应。


Perhaps these regional bargains will prove to be a step toward wider free trade.	也许这些地区讨价还价只是迈向更广泛的自由贸易途中的一步。


But I doubt it.	但我对此持怀疑态度。


A world divided into political blocs will become a world of trade blocs, sustained by protectionism and currency manipulation.	一个分裂为多个政治板块的世界将出现多个贸易板块，通过保护主义和货币操纵维持。


And yet, even as trade relations become increasingly politicized, our leaders continue to urge us to gear up to meet the “challenges of globalization,” and few question the benefits of cost-cutting through automation.	而虽然贸易关系日益政治化，但我们的领导人仍在敦促我们抓紧应对“全球化的挑战”，并且很少有人质疑通过自动化削减成本的好处。


In both cases, politicians are trying to force adaptation on reluctant populations who crave security.	在这两方面，政客试图迫使渴望安全的最不情愿的人群作出调整。