But each now resents the behavior of the other.	但是各方都对对方的行为不满。


Americans find their patience tried by Europeans who are free with their advice and criticism yet reluctant to shoulder risks.	美国发现欧洲对其建议和批评置若罔闻但又不愿承担风险。


Moreover, the US learned from the Kosovo experience of “war by committee” to distrust NATO as a place to run operations, and now Afghanistan highlights the organization’s limitations as a mechanism for generating force contributions.	而且，科索沃“集体作战”经历让美国不把北约视为进行军事行动的场所，而现在，阿富汗突出表现了北约在提供军队机制上的局限。


As for Europeans, they are unhappy about pressure to participate in a US-led “global war on terror” that they regard as dangerous and misconceived, and to go along with policies seemingly designed to antagonize their more difficult neighbors like Russia and the Islamic world.	它们对迫于压力参与不满。 同时，它们也对不得不附和美国的某些要激怒俄国和伊斯兰世界这些难以应付的邻居的政策不满。


So what is to be done?	那么该如何行事呢？


None of the ideas for another dose of NATO rejuvenation looks like the answer.	再次激发北约好像并非良策。


All the talk of an improved NATO-European Union partnership is mainly wasted breath.	北约和欧盟改进伙伴关系的言论也大多无的放矢。


“Intensified strategic dialogue in Brussels” in practice boils down to the chilling specter of interminable joint committee meetings at which one nation’s ambassador to NATO explains his government’s position to a compatriot diplomat who is accredited to the EU, and vice-versa.	“强化欧洲内部的战略对话”实际上就是没完没了的联合委员会会议。 在这些会议中，某个国家驻北约大使向该国驻欧盟的外交官解释该国政府的立场，反过来也是如此。


The problem is not institutional relationships between the two organizations, except in the important but narrow case of Turkey and Cyprus, which remain bent on pursuing their bilateral feud without regard to the real risks to the personnel of their allies and partners deployed in Afghanistan and Kosovo.	问题并非是两个组织之间的机构关系，只有土耳其和塞浦路斯是重要的例外。 这两个国家不顾及驻扎在阿富汗和科索沃的盟国和伙伴国家人员的安危而坚持相互对立。


The real problem is relations between the US and European countries, 21 of which belong to both organizations.	真正的问题是美国和欧洲的关系。 有21个国家同时是这两个组织的成员。


Nor does the answer lie in developing an EU “caucus” within NATO.	在北约内部建立所谓欧盟“成分”也并非良策。


The 1990’s concept of a “European Defense Identity” within NATO proved to be unviable – and since then expansion of the alliance and proliferation of NATO “partners” has made the idea of a special collective role for EU members all the more improbable.	九十年代人们曾经设想在北约内部建立“欧洲防御成分”也不切合实际。 从那时以来，扩大北约“伙伴国家”已经使得欧盟成员发挥特殊集体作用变得更为难以实现。


A double layer of decision-making would only cause an already ponderous organization to seize up.	双层决策机制只会让原本已经笨拙的组织限于停顿。


There is nothing more dramatic to be done than to focus on upgrading the EU-US strategic dialogue.	努力提升欧盟和美国战略对话是最为巨大的措施。


The annual summits need to be made more substantial, and their focus shifted from transatlantic, bilateral issues to aligning EU and US global policies and actions.	年度高峰会议应当更为富有实效，其重点应该从跨大西洋的双边事务转向协调欧盟和美国的全球政策和行动。


The US president should keep an eye on the calendar of the European Council, which brings the EU presidents and prime ministers together four times a year, and solicit an occasional invitation.	欧盟理事会每年召开四次会议，欧盟各国总统和总理届时相聚。 美国总统应该关注这些会议日程安排并且设法获得邀请。


The US mission to the EU should be scaled up, and EU representation in Washington turned into a proper embassy.	美国驻欧盟使团应该升级，而欧盟驻美国代表处则应该升级为正式大使馆。


The more seriously the Americans show that they are willing to take the EU collectively, the more seriously the Europeans will take themselves.	美国越发表现愿意把欧盟作为整体看待，欧洲就会越发看重自己。


Winston Churchill once remarked that you could always count on the Americans to do the right thing, after having tried all the alternatives.	丘吉尔曾说，美国人犯下所有错误后总会做出正确的事情。


In the same way, the Europeans will eventually find themselves having to speak with one voice and act as one body in the wider world, if only because a globalized world will not allow them the luxury of doing anything else.	同样，如果由于全球化世界不允许欧洲另外行事的话，欧洲最终将不得不用一个声音说话并且在世界大舞台上采取统一行动。


As Charles de Gaulle forecast, “It is not any European statesman who will unite Europe. Europe will be united by the Chinese.”	戴高乐曾经预言：“欧洲不会被某个欧洲政治家联合，而是被中国联合”。


Only collectively can Europeans be effective contributors to global security, or achieve a robust transatlantic security partnership.	欧洲只有统一行动才能有效地为全球安全做出贡献，或者取得有力的跨大西洋安全伙伴关系。


As NATO enters its twilight years, the US should encourage the EU to grow into its global responsibilities.	在北约进入暮年之际，美国应该鼓励欧盟承担全球责任。


For, despite all their differences and mutual dissatisfactions, Europe and the US know that each is the best friend either is likely to have for the foreseeable future.	这是因为，尽管欧洲和美国存在分歧和相互不满，但是在可以预见的将来它们知道对方还是最好的朋友。


The Death of Russian Womanhood	俄罗斯女性之死


Valentina Tereshkova, the first female Soviet cosmonaut – indeed, the first woman to go into space – recently celebrated her 70th birthday.	苏联首位女宇航员瓦莲京娜捷列什科娃的确是进入太空的第一位妇女，她最近刚刚庆祝了她的70岁生日。


In an interview, she stated her only wish: to fly to Mars, even with a one-way ticket.	在一次采访中，她说出了她唯一的愿望，那就是飞到火星，即使是有去无回也在所不惜。


It was an implicit wish for a spectacular form of suicide, for a spectacularly prosaic reason: the loss, experienced by thousands of Russian women of her generation, of her life’s existential foundation.	这是隐含的、为了极为单调的理由的壮观自杀的愿望，也就是，她的年代数以万计的俄罗斯妇女所经历的、其生命存在基础的丧失。


Tereshkova’s generation, though it encompassed almost the entire era of Soviet rule, had been raised in the tradition of Russian womanhood.	捷列什科娃的一代人尽管包含了几乎整个苏联统治年代，但却是在俄罗斯妇女传统中长大的。 这一传统要比苏联政权还要悠久得多。


Much older than the Soviet regime, this tradition emphasizes a spirit of sacrifice – not just for loved ones, but also for great causes such as revolution, state, science, or art – that is deeply hostile to accumulation of money and material goods as the goal of life.	它强调一种牺牲精神，不仅为所爱的人牺牲，也要为革命、国家、科学和艺术等等伟大的事业牺牲。 这种精神与聚敛金钱和物质财富的生活目标格格不入。


After “perestroika” and the 1991 collapse of the USSR, these women did not change their lives and attitudes.	在“改革”和1991年苏联瓦解后，这些妇女并未改变它们的生活和态度。


They did not curse what they had glorified in the past and embrace what they had once condemned.	她们并不诅咒她们过去所赞美的东西，也不拥抱她们曾经谴责的东西。


They did not participate in “privatization” of state property or enter show business to make money.	她们并没有参与国家财产的“私有化”或者进入影视圈致富。


These women – and Tereshkova is undoubtedly among them – were shocked by the changes they saw before them.	捷列什科娃无疑是这些妇女中的其中一员。 她们惊讶于在她们眼前发生的变化。


Indeed, probably more horrifying to them than the collapse of the Soviet regime was the rampant prostitution of daily life, for it negated the meaning of Russia and of Russian womanhood.	确实，对于她们来说可能比苏联解体还要惊人的东西是日常生活中卖淫猖獗，因为这否定了俄罗斯和俄罗斯妇女的意义。


What, then, might a woman of Tereshkova’s generation think of the changes during Vladimir Putin’s presidency?	那么，捷列什科娃这一代妇女对于普京时代的变化又会如何考虑呢？


One should be fair to Putin’s regime.	人们应当对普京政权予以公道。


Along with its restraints on liberty and its dramatic increase in the power of the Kremlin bureaucracy, Putin has overseen the rise of a Russian middle class that has become increasingly similar to Western middle classes.	普京统治下，除了限制自由以及克里姆林宫官僚权力急剧扩大外，俄国的中产阶级崛起，日益类似于西方的中产阶级。


There has been no “return” to Soviet or pre-revolutionary times, despite the regime’s attempts to appropriate the symbols of Czarist Russia.	尽管该政权试图没收沙皇俄国的象征物，但是，还是无法“回归”苏联或者革命前的时代。


The prostitutes who lined up throughout downtown Moscow in the Yeltsin era have disappeared, and “dressing to kill” for a casual walk has gone out of fashion.	叶利钦时代莫斯科市中心站满的妓女现在已经消失，而且为了平常的散步而打扮得花枝招展已经过时。


But the Putin regime still bears greater resemblance to the Yeltsin era than to any prior period.	但是普京政权依然要比任何先前的时代都要更像叶利钦时代。


So do most of the new generation of Russian women (and men): in their modern, calculating minds, there is little place for sacrifice, whether for family, art, culture, or science.	大多数新的一代俄罗斯妇女和男子也是如此。 在她们现代和算计的头脑中已经没有了牺牲的位置，无论牺牲是为了家庭、艺术、文化或者科学。


As a result, the Putin era has become utterly sterile, producing no great works of science, literature, or art.	结果，普京年代变得十足得毫无生机，没有产生伟大的科学、文学或者艺术作品。


Such pursuits have simply become passé – something that has never happened in modern Russian history, not even in the darkest days of Stalin’s purges.	这些追求完全已经落伍。 这一现象在现代俄罗斯历史上从来没有发生过，即使是在斯大林清洗运动中最为黑暗的日子里也是如此。


This culturally desiccated world is much more alien than the red desert of the Martian landscape that Tereshkova and her cosmonaut friends – including her husband – dreamed of in their youth.	捷列什科娃和包括她的丈夫在内的宇航员朋友们年轻时梦想到了火星景观上的沙漠。 与这些沙漠相比，这一文化上干涸的世界还要更加怪异。


The collapse of the country for which she lived underscores her overwhelming sense of tragedy.	她为之生活的国家瓦解更加激化了她莫大的悲怆感觉。


This might seem strange to the Western mind, for which the great Soviet space achievements and the USSR existed as separate entities: while everyone praised Soviet science, very few admired the totalitarian USSR.	这对于西方思维而言可能有点离奇。 在西方眼中，苏联伟大的空间成就和苏联二者互不隶属。


But for Tereshkova and other women of her generation, the great Soviet state and the daring achievements of Soviet science were inseparable.	尽管每个人都赞扬苏联科学，但是几乎没有人崇拜专制的苏联。 但是对于捷列什科娃和其他同时代的妇女而言，伟大的苏维埃国家和苏联科技傲人的成就是不可分割的。


The grand expansion of the Soviet empire enabled humankind’s exploration of the cosmos and its potential expansion beyond Earth.	苏维埃帝国的大幅扩张使得人类可以探索宇宙以及研究向地球以外延伸。


It is understandable that the collapse of the country, and of the spirit that nurtured Russian intellectuals – regardless of their political beliefs – for generations, is unbearable for Tereshkova and people like her.	对于捷列什科娃及其志同道合的人而言，国家以及哺育了俄罗斯知识分子(无论政治信仰如何)的精神的瓦解是难以承受的。 这是可以理解的。


But Tereshkova’s dream about travel to Mars is not just suicidal nostalgia for a time when she was young and surrounded by people who were ready to sacrifice their lives for a greater cause.	但是捷列什科娃梦想飞往火星不仅仅是对一个时代自杀式的怀旧。 在当时，她风华正茂，周围的人都愿意为了更为伟大的事业而捐躯。


In fact, the allusion to space exploration has another dimension: the achievements of any great are not bound to one’s time or place of origin and can be transmitted to other cultures and generations.	实际上，提及空间探索还有一层含义，那就是，伟人的成就并不局限于时间或者来源地，而是可以传播到其他文化和年代之中。


Tereshkova’s dream is a symbol not only of her desperation, which is the desperation of the creative mind in today’s Russia, but also of continuing belief in the great potential of the human spirit.	捷列什科娃的梦想不仅仅是她个人以及当今俄罗斯创造性头脑的绝望的象征，而且还是坚信人类精神的巨大潜力。


The Death of the Globalization Consensus	全球化共识的死亡


CAMBRIDGE – The world economy has seen globalization collapse once already.	剑桥－世界经济已经见证了一次全球化的崩溃。


The gold standard era – with its free capital mobility and open trade – came to an abrupt end in 1914 and could not be resuscitated after World War I. Are we about to witness a similar global economic breakdown?	金本位制时代——伴随着资本自由流动以及开放贸易——在1914年突然终止，并且在第一次世界大战后也没能得到恢复。 我们将要见证另一个类似的全球经济崩溃吗？


The question is not fanciful.	这个问题并不是凭空想像的。


Although economic globalization has enabled unprecedented levels of prosperity in advanced countries and has been a boon to hundreds of millions of poor workers in China and elsewhere in Asia, it rests on shaky pillars.	虽然经济全球化已经使发达国家达到前所未有的繁荣水平，并惠及中国以及亚洲其他地区几千万的贫穷工人，但是它是建立在不稳固的基础上的。


Unlike national markets, which tend to be supported by domestic regulatory and political institutions, global markets are only “weakly embedded.”	和倾向依靠国内法律和政治制度的国内市场不同，全球市场的“根基是很虚弱的”。


There is no global anti-trust authority, no global lender of last resort, no global regulator, no global safety nets, and, of course, no global democracy.	没有全球性的反托拉斯机关，没有全球性的最终贷款人，没有全球性的调控者，没有全球性的安全网，以及当然没有的全球性的民主。


In other words, global markets suffer from weak governance, and therefore from weak popular legitimacy.	换句话说，全球市场的治理很无力，并因而使其缺乏公众正当性。


Recent events have heightened the urgency with which these issues are discussed.	最近的事件加强了讨论这些问题的紧迫性。


The presidential electoral campaign in the United States has highlighted the frailty of the support for open trade in the world’s most powerful nation.	美国的总统选举活动突显了世界上最强大的国家对开放贸易支持的脆弱性。


The sub-prime mortgage crisis has shown how lack of international coordination and regulation can exacerbate the inherent fragility of financial markets.	次级抵押贷款危机显示了缺乏国际协调和规则是怎样加剧金融市场固有的脆弱性的。


The rise in food prices has exposed the downside of economic interdependence without global transfer and compensation schemes.	食品价格的上涨暴露了没有全球转让和补偿安排的经济相互依赖具有的消极面。


Meanwhile, rising oil prices have increased transport costs, leading analysts to wonder whether the outsourcing era is coming to an end.	同时，不断攀升的油价提高了交通成本，导致分析家怀疑业务流程外包的时代是否正在终结。


And there is always the looming disaster of climate change, which may well be the most serious threat the world has ever faced.	而且，隐现的气候变化灾难一直存在，它极有可能是这个世界曾经面对过的最严重的威胁。


So if globalization is in danger, who are its real enemies?	所以，如果全球化处于危险之中，那么谁是它真正的敌人呢？


There was a time when global elites could comfort themselves with the thought that opposition to the world trading regime consisted of violent anarchists, self-serving protectionists, trade unionists, and ignorant, if idealistic youth.	曾有一段时间，全球的精英们可以用这种思想来安慰自己：反对世界贸易体制的人主要是暴力的无政府主义者，自私的贸易保护主义者，工团主义者以及无知而空想的青年。


Meanwhile, they regarded themselves as the true progressives, because they understood that safeguarding and advancing globalization was the best remedy against poverty and insecurity.	同时，因为他们明白保护和推进全球化是反对贫穷和不安全感的最好的方法，他们把自己看作是真正的进步人士。


But that self-assured attitude has all but disappeared, replaced by doubts, questions, and skepticism.	但是那种自信的态度现在几乎都消失了，取而代之的是疑惑，疑问以及怀疑主义。


Gone also are the violent street protests and mass movements against globalization.	暴力的街头抗议和大规模的反对全球化的运动也消失了。


What makes news nowadays is the growing list of mainstream economists who are questioning globalization’s supposedly unmitigated virtues.	现在制造新闻的是不断增加的主流经济学家对全球化想象的十足的优点的质疑。


So we have Paul Samuelson, the author of the postwar era’s landmark economics textbook, reminding his fellow economists that China’s gains in globalization may well come at the expense of the US; Paul Krugman, today’s foremost international trade theorist, arguing that trade with low-income countries is no longer too small to have an effect on inequality; Alan Blinder, a former US Federal Reserve vice chairman, worrying that international outsourcing will cause unprecedented dislocations for the US labor force; Martin Wolf, the Financial Times columnist and one of the most articulate advocates of globalization, writing of his disappointment with how financial globalization has turned out; and Larry Summers, the US Treasury chief and the Clinton administration’s “Mr. Globalization,” musing about the dangers of a race to the bottom in national regulations and the need for international labor standards.	因此，我们有了战后标志性的经济学教材的作者保罗·萨缪尔森，提醒经济学家同仁中国在全球化中的进步极有可能是以牺牲美国为代价的； 保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman），现在最重要的国际贸易理论家，论证说和低收入国家的贸易不再会因为太小而对不对平等没有影响；


While these worries hardly amount to the full frontal attack mounted by the likes of Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel-prize winning economist, they still constitute a remarkable turnaround in the intellectual climate.	虽然这些担心几乎没有达到像诺贝尔经济学奖��得者约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨这样的人进行的完全的正面攻击的程度，它们仍然表明了一个显著的学术氛围的转变。


Moreover, even those who have not lost heart often disagree vehemently about the direction in which they would like to see globalization go.	而且，即使那些没有失去信心的人，也经常对 他们想要看到的全球化前进的方向有非常不同的观点。


For example, Jagdish Bhagwati, the distinguished free trader, and Fred Bergsten, the director of the pro-globalization Peterson Institute for International Economics, have both been on the frontlines arguing that critics vastly exaggerate globalization’s ills and under-appreciate its benefits.	例如，杰出的自由贸易支持者贾格迪什·巴格沃蒂（Jagdish Bhagwati）和支持全球化的彼特森国际经济研究所所长弗雷德·伯格斯登（Fred Bergsten），都曾出面认为批评者极大地夸大了全球化的坏处，而且没有正确地评价其好处。


But their debates on the merits of regional trade agreements – Bergsten for, Bhagwati against – are as heated as each one’s disagreements with the authors mentioned above.	但是他们对区域贸易协定的价值的辩论－伯格斯登支持，巴格沃蒂反对－就像上面提到的作者互不同意对方观点一样的激烈。


None of these intellectuals is against globalization, of course.	当然，这些知识分子中没有人反对全球化。


What they want is not to turn back globalization, but to create new institutions and compensation mechanisms – at home or internationally – that will render globalization more effective, fairer, and more sustainable.	他们想要的不是使全球化倒退，而是要在国内或者在国际上创立新的体制和补偿机制，以使全球化更有效，更公平以及更可持续。


Their policy proposals are often vague (when specified at all), and command little consensus.	他们的政策建议通常很模糊（当需要明确的时候）并且很少一致。


But confrontation over globalization has clearly moved well beyond the streets to the columns of the financial press and the rostrums of mainstream think tanks.	但是，在全球化上的对抗已经很明显地超越了金融报纸的专栏和主流智囊团的讲坛。


That is an important point for globalization’s cheerleaders to understand, as they often behave as if the “other side” still consists of protectionists and anarchists.	这是全球化的拉拉队需要 明白的一个重要观点，因为他们常常表现得好像“另一边”仍然是由贸易保护主义者和无政府主义者组成的那样。


Today, the question is no longer, “Are you for or against globalization?” The question is, “What should the rules of globalization be?”	现在的问题不再是“你支持还是反对全球化”的问题，而是“全球化的规则应该是怎样的”的问题。


The cheerleaders’ true sparring partners today are not rock-throwing youths but their fellow intellectuals.	现在，拉拉队员真正的辩论对手不是投石攻击的年青人，而是他们的知识分子同仁。


The first three decades after 1945 were governed by the Bretton Woods consensus – a shallow multilateralism that permitted policymakers to focus on domestic social and employment needs while enabling global trade to recover and flourish.	在1945年后的最初三十年间，起主导作用的是布雷顿森林共识——一个允许决策者在关注国内的社会和就业需要的同时，能够使全球 贸易恢复和繁荣的肤浅的多边主义。


This regime was superseded in the 1980’s and 1990’s by an agenda of deeper liberalization and economic integration.	这个体制在20世纪80年代和90年代被一个更深入的自由化和经济一体化议程所取代。


That model, we have learned, is unsustainable.	我们已经知道那个模式是不可持续的。


If globalization is to survive, it will need a new intellectual consensus to underpin it.	如果全球化要继续下去，它需要一个新的学术共识来支持它。


The world economy desperately awaits its new Keynes.	全球经济急切地等待着新的凯恩斯理论。


The Debt Death Trap	债务死亡陷阱


NEW YORK – The Greek financial saga is the tip of an iceberg of problems of public-debt sustainability for many advanced economies, and not only the so-called PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain).	纽约——希腊财政危机的剧情曲折跌宕，但它还只是冰山一角，水面下，许多发达经济体的公债岌岌可危，绝不仅限于所谓的“欧猪五国”（葡萄牙、意大利、爱尔兰、希腊和西班牙）。


Indeed, the OECD now estimates that public debt-to-GDP ratios in advanced economies will rise to an average of around 100% of GDP.	说真的，经济合作与发展组织（OECD）目前评估，发达经济体的公债GDP占比将普遍升高，平均达到100%左右。


The International Monetary Fund has recently put out similar estimates.	国际货币基金组织（IMF）最近的评估也得出了相似的结论。


Within the PIIGS, the problems are not just excessive public deficits and debt ratios (in different degrees and measures in the five countries). They are also problems of external deficits, loss of competitiveness, and thus of anemic growth.	“欧猪五国”的麻烦不仅在于公共赤字过大、负债率过高（在这方面5个国家程度有所不同），还在于对外收支赤字、竞争力丧失和增长乏力。


These are economies that, even a decade ago, were losing market share to China and Asia, owing to their labor-intensive and low value-added exports.	这几个经济体出口的主要是劳动密集型、低附加值产品，打从10年前开始，它们的国际市场份额就在不断地被中国和亚洲蚕食。


After a decade that saw wages grow faster than productivity, unit labor costs (and the real exchange rate based on those costs) appreciated sharply.	过去10年中，它们的工资增长又快于生产率的提升，单位劳动成本（它是实际汇率的基础）急剧升高。


The ensuing loss of competitiveness manifested itself in large and growing current-account deficits and slowing growth.	竞争力随之丧失，从而体现为规模巨大且仍在扩大的经常项目赤字与低增长。


The final nail in the coffin was the appreciation of the euro between 2002 and 2008.	棺材上的最后一颗钉子则是2002年到2008年间欧元的升值。


So, even if Greece and other PIIGS had the political resolve to reduce massively their large fiscal deficits – and that is a big if, given the political resistance to spending cuts and tax increases – fiscal contraction may, at least in the short run, make the current recession worse as higher taxes and lower spending reduce aggregate demand.	所以，即使希腊和“欧猪五国”中的其他国家能够找到政治上的办法以大幅削减财政赤字——鉴于削减公共开支和增加税收面临很大的政治阻力，这本身都是一个很大的假设——财政紧缩将加重经济衰退，至少在短期内是如此，因为高税收和低支出会削弱总需求。


If GDP falls, achieving a certain deficit and debt target (as a share of GDP) becomes impossible.	如果GDP下滑，则会使控制赤字和负债GDP占比的任务变得无法完成。


This, indeed, was the debt death trap that engulfed Argentina between 1998 and 2001.	这正是1998年和2001年让阿根廷吃尽苦头的债务死亡陷阱。


Restoring sustained growth requires real currency depreciation.	要恢复经济的增长势头，就得让本币在实际上贬值。


There are only three ways that this can occur.	那只有在3种情形下会发生。


One is deflation that reduces prices and wages by 20-30%.	第一，发生通货紧缩，令价格和工资水平下跌20%~30%。


But deflation is associated with persistent recession (see Argentina again), and no country’s society and political system can accept years of recession and fiscal austerity to achieve real depreciation.	但通缩往往伴随着长期衰退（看看阿根廷），要达到本币实际贬值的效果，得承受多年的经济衰退和苛刻财政，世界上没有一个国家的社会和政治体系能够接受。


Default and an exit from the euro would occur well before that.	在这达到预期效果之前，这些国家早���国债违约并且退出欧元区了。


The second path is to follow the German model of accelerating structural reforms and corporate restructuring to increase productivity growth while keeping wage growth moderate.	第二条路是学习德国的榜样，加快经济结构改革，推动企业转型，一方面提高生产率，另一方面把工资维持在适当水平上。


But it took a decade for Germany to reduce its unit labor costs that way; if Greece or Spain were to start today, the short run costs of resource reallocation would be large, while the benefits in terms of higher growth would take too many years to achieve.	不过德国用那种办法花了整整10年才降低了单位劳动成本，如果希腊或西班牙从现在开始改革，短期内将付出资源再配置的高昂成本，而要等到多年之后才能收获经济增长的果实，看来它们是等不起了。


Finally, the euro could fall sharply in value.	最后一条路是欧元大幅贬值。


But the main beneficiary would be Germany.	但那样一来最大的获益者将是德国。


And, in order for the euro to fall far enough, the risk of default in Greece would need to be so large, and the contagion to sovereign spreads of PIIGS so severe that the widening of those spreads would cause a double-dip eurozone recession before currency depreciation could yield benefits.	而且，欧元要贬到位，先决条件是希腊的违约风险和及其对欧猪五国国债息差的传导风险极高，高得足以引发欧元区经济出现二次探底，这之后才谈得上收获贬值带来的利益。


Short of a miracle, Greece looks close to insolvency.	除非出现奇迹，否则希腊看来破产在即。


At the onset of its crisis, Argentina’s budget deficit, public debt, and current-account deficit (as a share of GDP) were about 3%, 50% and 2%, respectively.	当年阿根廷爆发债务危机之初，其预算赤字、公债和经常项目赤字的GDP占比分别在3%、50%和2%左右。


Those ratios for Greece are far worse: 12.9%, 120% and 10%.	希腊的情况更严重，分别为12. 9%、120%和10%。


So it will take a Herculean effort, luck, and support from the European Union and the IMF to reduce the probability of an eventual default and exit from the eurozone.	所以要降低违约并退出欧元区的可能性，希腊只能尽人事，听天命，并且取得欧盟和IMF的支持。


Greece is currently too interconnected to be allowed to collapse: since it has about $400 billion of public debt – three-quarters of which is held abroad, mostly by European financial institutions – a disorderly default would lead to massive losses and risk a systemic crisis.	希腊破产的后果不堪设想，它牵涉了太多的利益：约4000亿美元的公债，三分之一由外国债权人持有，其中主要是欧洲的金融机构——如果出现失控性违约，将导致巨额损失，引发系统性风险。


Moreover, the contagion to the sovereign spreads of the other PIIGS would be massive, tipping over several of these economies.	此外，它对其他“欧猪国家”国债息差的传导效应非常明显，已经让好几个国家如坐针毡了。


So, despite revulsion on the part of Germany and the European Central Bank at the idea of a “bailout,” Greece needs large official financial support this year at rates that are not unsustainable to prevent its current illiquidity from devolving immediately into insolvency.	所以，就算德国和欧洲央行（ECB）在“疏困”（bailout）议题上畏缩不前，希腊毕竟需要在年内获得大量官方资金援助，以防止其流动资金迅速耗尽，陷入无法偿债的局面。


But official support will only kick the can down the road until next year.	但官方的支援只不过是把皮球踢给明年。


The magic trifecta of sustainable debt and deficit ratios, a real depreciation, and restoration of growth looks unlikely to be achievable even with official financial support.	即使有了官方资金援助，要神奇地连下三城——将负债率和赤字率降低到可持续的水平，本币实际贬值以及重启经济增长恐怕也是很难完成的任务。


All successful rescues of countries in financial distress – Mexico, Korea, Thailand, Brazil, Turkey – require two conditions: the country’s credible willingness to impose the fiscal austerity and structural reforms needed to restore sustainability and growth; and massive amounts of front-loaded official support to avoid a self-fulfilling rollover crisis of maturing public and/or private short-term debts.	解救陷入金融危机的国家，一切成功的案例，如墨西哥、韩国、泰国、巴西和土耳其，都必须具备两个条件：该国有意愿加强财政约束，实施结构改革且这种意愿具有公信力； 大规模官方资金援助及早到位，以免到期公私债务的雪球越滚越大，把自己压垮。


Reform without money on the table does not work, as nervous and trigger-happy investors would rather pull their money out if the country lacks the foreign-currency reserves needed to prevent the equivalent of a bank run on its short-term liabilities.	没有资金作后盾的改革是做不成的，如果受困国缺乏外汇储备，那些神经紧张、动不动发飙的投资者会纷纷抽逃资金，就跟银行挤兑一样。


So, after a totally flawed plan that would have given money to Greece too late – only when the country risked a refinancing crisis – and at market rates that would make its debt unsustainable, the EU regained its senses and designed a new scheme that is closer to typical IMF conditionality: tranched support with some early front-loaded support and a semi-concessional interest rate.	欧盟最早搞出来的一个方案完全不对头，按照那个方案，除非希腊陷入再融资危机，否则不给它钱，那实在是太晚了，市场利率早就把希腊压垮了。 经过这一番折腾之后，欧盟终于恢复了理智，重新设计了一个类似于IMF贷款条件的方案：把信贷资金分批发放，一部分以优惠利率先期到位。


Only time will tell if this plan will work: i.e. whether Greece will turn out to be illiquid but solvent, conditional on credible fiscal austerity and structural reforms and with the help of large amounts of financial support.	这个计划能否奏效，一切等待时间检验：比如说，出台了具有公信力的财政约束和结构改革，再加上巨额官方支持，希腊能否在流动资金紧张的情况下避免偿？


But, as with Argentina, Russia, and Ecuador, Greece may also be insolvent if adjustment fails to restore debt sustainability and growth.	然而，正如阿根廷、俄罗斯和厄瓜多尔当年一样，如果这一系列整顿都未能恢复债务可持续性和经济增长，希腊仍会陷入破产境地。


For now, the official community has decided to stick with Plan A; if that fails, Plan B is default to reduce unsustainable debts and a Greek exit from the eurozone to allow depreciation and restoration of competitiveness and growth.	目前，希腊官方决心采用A计划； 如果A计划失败，B计划就是违约，以减少无法偿还的债务，并且退出欧元区，以让本币贬值，恢复出口竞争力和经济增长力。


The Debt Delusion	债务错觉


WASHINGTON, DC -- A second big American interest-rate cut in a fortnight, alongside an economic stimulus plan that united Republicans and Democrats, demonstrates that US policymakers are keen to head off a recession that looks like the consequence of rising mortgage defaults and falling home prices.	华盛顿特区--美国在两周之内第二次大幅度降息，并且共和和民主两党团结一致达成经济刺激计划，这表明美国的决策者们想要避免一场经济衰退。 这一衰退看起来就是房屋按揭贷款无力偿还不断上升以及住房价格下降的结果。


But there is a deeper problem that has been overlooked: the US economy relies upon asset price inflation and rising indebtedness to fuel growth.	但是人们还忽视了一个更为深刻的问题，那就是美国经济依赖于资产价格膨胀以及债务攀升来推动增长。


Therein lies a profound contradiction.	这里存在一个深刻的矛盾。


On one hand, policy must fuel asset bubbles to keep the economy growing.	一方面，政策必须推动资产泡沫来维持经济增长。


On the other hand, such bubbles inevitably create financial crises when they eventually implode.	另一方面，这样的泡沫最终破灭之时不可避免地造成金融危机。


This is a contradiction with global implications.	这一矛盾影响全球。


Many countries have relied for growth on US consumer spending and investments in outsourcing to supply those consumers.	许多国家的经济增长一直依赖于美国消费以及外包投资来供应消费。


If America’s bubble economy is now tapped out, global growth will slow sharply.	如果美国的泡沫经济现在破灭，全球经济增长就会大幅度减缓。


It is not clear that other countries have the will or capacity to develop alternative engines of growth.	现在还不清楚其他国家是否有意志或者能力形成替代增长引擎。


America’s economic contradictions are part of a new business cycle that has emerged since 1980.	美国的经济矛盾是从1980年形成的新的商业周期的一部分。


The business cycles of Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush share strong similarities and are different from pre-1980 cycles.	里根、老布什、克林顿以及小布什担任总统期间的商业周期具有很多相似之处并且与1980年以前的各个周期不同。


The similarities are large trade deficits, manufacturing job loss, asset price inflation, rising debt-to-income ratios, and detachment of wages from productivity growth.	相似之处在于庞大的贸易逆差、流失制造业工作岗位、资产价格膨胀、债务和收入比率上升以及工资与生产效率提高脱节。


The new cycle rests on financial booms and cheap imports.	新的商业周期依赖于金融繁荣和廉价进口商品。


Financial booms provide collateral that supports debt-financed spending.	金融繁荣提供了支撑债务融资消费的抵押品。


Borrowing is also supported by an easing of credit standards and new financial products that increase leverage and widen the range of assets that can be borrowed against.	信用标准放松、提高杠杆水平以及扩大资产范围的新的金融产品支撑了借贷。 这些资产反过来又可以再次作为抵押。


Cheap imports ameliorate the effects of wage stagnation.	廉价进口商品缓和了工资停滞的影响。


This structure contrasts with the pre-1980 business cycle, which rested on wage growth tied to productivity growth and full employment.	这一结构与八十年代以前的商业周期形成对比。 当时，商业周期依赖于和生产效率增长和充分就业挂钩的工资增长。


Wage growth, rather than borrowing and financial booms, fuelled demand growth.	工资增长而非借贷和金融繁荣推动了需求增长。


That encouraged investment spending, which in turn drove productivity gains and output growth.	这鼓励了投资消费，反过来推动了生产效率的提高和产量增长。


The differences between the new and old cycle are starkly revealed in attitudes toward the trade deficit.	新旧周期的区别在对待贸易逆差的态度上鲜明地反映出来。


Previously, trade deficits were viewed as a serious problem, being a leakage of demand that undermined employment and output.	以前，贸易赤字被视为是一个严重问题，认为它会削弱需求从而破坏就业和产量。


Since 1980, trade deficits have been dismissed as the outcome of free-market choices.	从1980年以来，贸易赤字被说成是自由市场选择的结果而不屑一顾。


Moreover, the Federal Reserve has viewed trade deficits as a helpful brake on inflation, while politicians now view them as a way to buy off consumers afflicted by wage stagnation.	而且，美联储认为贸易赤字有助于抑制通货膨胀，而政坛人物现在将贸易赤字视为收买受到工资停滞之苦的消费者的办法。


The new business cycle also embeds a monetary policy that replaces concern with real wages with a focus on asset prices.	新的商业周期还植根于用关注资产价格取代关注实际工资的货币政策。


Whereas pre-1980 monetary policy tacitly aimed at putting a floor under labor markets to preserve employment and wages, it now tacitly puts a floor under asset prices.	八十年代以前的货币政策心照不宣地力求保持劳动力市场的最低水平来维护就业和工资，而现在则心照不宣地维持资产价格。


This is not a matter of the Fed bailing out investors. Rather, the economy has become so vulnerable to declines in asset prices that the Fed is obliged to intervene to prevent them from inflicting broad damage.	这并非是美联储解救投资者的问题，而是经济极为容易受到资产价格下跌的影响，美联储不得不干预来防止它们造成大范围的破坏。


All these features have been present in the current economic expansion.	所有这些特点在当前的经济扩张中显现出来。


Wages have stagnated despite strong productivity growth, while the trade deficit has set new records.	尽管生产效率增长强劲，但是工资却停滞不前，而贸易赤字创下新的记录。


Manufacturing has lost 1.8 million jobs.	制造业已经损失了180万个工作岗位。


Prior to 1980, manufacturing employment increased during every expansion and always exceeded the previous peak level.	1980年以前，制造业就业在每次经济扩张的时候都得以增加并且总是超过原先的最高水平。


Between 1980 and 2000, manufacturing employment continued to grow in expansions, but each time it failed to recover the previous peak.	在1980年到2000年期间，制造业就业继续在扩张期间增长，但是每次都没有从上一次的高峰中复苏。


This time, manufacturing employment has actually fallen during the expansion, something unprecedented in American history.	这一次，制造业就业在扩张时期实际上下降了，这在美国历史上是前所未有的。


The essential role of asset inflation has been especially visible as a result of the housing bubble, which also highlights the role of monetary policy.	由于房地产泡沫带来的资产膨胀的核心作用尤其明显，而房地产泡沫又突出了货币政策的作用。


Despite the massive tax cuts of 2001 and the increase in military and security spending, the US experienced a prolonged jobless recovery.	尽管2001年大规模减税以及增加军费和国土安全开支，美国经历了长久的低就业复苏。


That compelled the Fed to keep interest rates at historic lows for an extended period, and rates were raised only gradually because of fears about the recovery’s fragility.	这就迫使美联储把利率在相当长的一段时间内维持在历史上最低水平，而由于担心复苏脆弱，利率只是逐步提高。


Low interest rates eventually jump-started the expansion through a house price bubble that supported a debt-financed consumer-spending binge and triggered a construction boom.	低利率最终猛然通过住房价格泡沫启动了扩张，这一泡沫支撑了通过债务融资的消费者狂购并且引发了建筑业繁荣。


Meanwhile, prolonged low interest rates contributed to a “chase for yield” in the financial sector that resulted in disregard of credit risk.	与此同时，长久的低利率促成了金融部门的“追逐收益”，把信用风险抛在脑后。


In this way, the Fed contributed to creating the sub-prime crisis.	这样，美联储对次级房贷危机起到了推波助澜的作用。


However, in the Fed’s defense, low interest rates were needed to maintain the expansion.	但是，美联储辩解说，需要低利率来维持扩张。


In effect, the new cycle locks the Fed into an unstable stance whereby it must prevent asset price declines to avert recession, yet must also promote asset bubbles to sustain expansions.	实际上，新的商业周期把美联储锁在了一个不稳定的立场之上，使得其必须防止资产价格下降来避免衰退，然而又必须促进资产泡沫来维系扩张。


So, even if the Fed and US Treasury now manage to stave off recession, what will fuel future growth?	所以，即使美联储和美国财政部现在能够避免衰退，什么东西会推动未来的增长呢？


With debt burdens elevated and housing prices significantly above levels warranted by their historical relation to income, the business cycle of the last two decades appears exhausted.	债务负担提高，房地产价格大大高于与收入相关的历史水平，过去二十年的商业周期看起来已经山穷水尽了。


It is not enough to deal only with the crisis of the day.	这还不足以仅仅应付当前的危机。


Policy must also chart a stable long-term course, which implies the need to reconsider the paradigm of the past 25 years.	政策必须制定出一个长期的路线，这意味着需要重新考虑过去25年来的模式。


That means ending trade deficits that drain spending and jobs, and restoring the link between wages and productivity.	这就意味着结束拖累开支和就业的贸易赤字，并且恢复工资和生产效率的联系。


That way, wage income, not debt and asset price inflation, can again provide the engine of demand growth.	这样，是工资收入而非债务和资产价格膨胀可以再一次提供需求增长的动力。


Debt Without Drowning	不会致溺的债务


LONDON – Since the 1970’s, economists have warned that a monetary union could not be sustained without a fiscal union.	伦敦—20世纪70年代以来，经济学家警告货币联盟无法再没有财政联盟的情况下维持。


But the eurozone’s leaders have not heeded their advice – and the consequences are becoming increasingly apparent.	但是欧元区领导人并没有遵循他们的意见——其后果正在变得日益明显。


Europe now faces a difficult choice: either fix this fundamental design flaw and move toward fiscal union, or abandon the common currency.	如今，欧洲面临着不同的选择：要么修正这一根本性设计缺陷、迈向财政联盟，要么抛弃共同货币。


Choosing the latter option would have devastating consequences.	选择后一个选项将导致灾难性后果。


Indeed, while the desirability of establishing a monetary union may have been open to question in the 1990’s, dismantling the eurozone now would trigger profound economic, social, and political upheaval throughout Europe.	事实上，尽管在20世纪90年代，建立货币联盟是否值得追求便已值得商榷，但现在解散欧元区会触发整个欧洲的深刻的经济、社会和政治剧变。


To avoid this outcome, Europe’s leaders must begin designing and implementing strategies aimed at bringing the eurozone closer to a fiscal union.	。 为了避免这一结果，欧洲领导人必须开始设计并实施旨在让欧元区向财政联盟靠拢的战略。


To be sure, a fiscal union such as that in the United States is a distant prospect that eurozone leaders should not expect to achieve any time soon – or even in their lifetimes.	平心而论，像美国那样的财政联盟是一个遥远的梦，不是欧洲领导人应该追求的近期目标——或许他们这辈子都不用想。


But that does not mean that establishing a fiscal union is a chimera.	但这并不意味着成立财政联盟是痴人说梦。


Small steps in the right direction now can make a significant difference.	现在开始向正确的方向迈出小步将带来极大的不同。


A successful strategy would have to address one of the eurozone’s main design flaws: member governments issue debt in euros, a currency that they cannot control.	成功的战略必须修正欧元区的主要设计缺陷之一：成员国政府用欧元发债，而欧元是它们无法控制的货币。


As a result, they cannot provide a guarantee to bondholders that the cash will be available to pay them at maturity.	结果，它们无法为债券持有人提供到期必能用现金偿还债务的保证。


The mistrust and fear that this elicits in the bond markets can lead to liquidity crises that, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, drive countries closer to default.	这在债券市场掀起了不信任和恐慌，这种不信任和恐慌可能导致流动性危机，流动性危机会造成自我实现的预言，将诸国推向违约。


They are then forced to implement austerity programs that lead to deep recessions and, ultimately, to banking crises.	接着，它们将被迫实施会导致深度衰退的紧缩计划，最终的结局是银行危机。


While austerity measures are appropriate in countries that have overspent in the past, the austerity that panic-stricken financial markets force upon a country can trigger a major social and political backlash.	紧缩措施对于过去花钱太多的国家是合理的，但金融市场恐慌迫使一国实施的紧缩可能导致重大社会和政治后果。


In fact, several southern European countries – such as Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain – are currently experiencing exactly that.	事实上，不少南欧国家——比如希腊、意大利、葡萄牙和西班牙——正在经历这一过程。


To overcome this fundamental design flaw, government debts must be pooled.	为了克服这一根本性设计缺陷，政府债务必须集中起来。


This would protect the weakest economies from destructive, panic-fueled movements in financial markets, which, in theory, can hit any member country – even those that are strongest today.	这样能够保护最疲软经济体免于遭遇恐慌驱动的毁灭性运动，理论上讲，这样的运动可能袭击任何国家，即使是今天看来最坚挺的国家。


In developing a strategy for pooling government debt, Europe’s leaders must address the possibility of moral hazard (the temptation for weaker countries to relax their debt- and deficit-reduction efforts in response to the increased credibility conferred by stronger countries).	在开发集中政府债务的战略时，欧洲领导人必须克服道德风险的可能性（即疲软国会受诱惑放松其债务和赤字削减行为，因为坚挺国会为它们提供更高的信誉）。


Indeed, given stronger economies’ unwillingness to be exploited in this way, the risk of moral hazard is the most significant obstacle to pooling debts in the eurozone.	事实上，由于坚挺经济体不愿意通过这种方式被利用，道德风险已成为欧元区债务集中的最大障碍。


But it is not the only obstacle.	但这不是唯一的障碍。


A debt-pooling scheme must also address the fact that the strongest countries will inevitably face higher interest rates on their own debts when they become jointly liable for the debts of less credit-worthy governments.	债务集中机制还必须解决一个事实——当最坚挺国家与信誉较低国家政府捆绑在一起共同负责债务时，它们难免会面临其自身债务利率升高的局面。


To overcome these obstacles, a eurozone debt-mutualization scheme must satisfy three crucial requirements.	为了克服这些障碍，必须有满足三大关键要求的欧元区债务共同化机制。


First, the share of government debt that can be pooled must be strictly limited, leaving each country responsible for a significant portion of its national debt, and therefore motivated to maintain sound public finances.	首先，可以集中的政府债务份额必须严格限定，各国将对国民债务的大头各自负责，从而驱使它们维持审慎的公共财政。


(Several initiatives have aimed to achieve this, notably Jakob von Weizsäcker and Jacques Delpla’s 2010 Blue Bond proposal.)	（一些方案已经着眼于达到这一目标，其中最令人瞩目的是魏茨泽克（Jakob von Weizsäcker）和戴普拉（Weizsäcker and Jacques Delpla）2010年的蓝色债券计划。 ）


Second, an internal transfer mechanism between eurozone member states is needed in order to ensure that less credit-worthy countries compensate, at least partly, their more economically sound counterparts.	其次，需要一个欧元区成员国之间的内部转移机制来确保信��较低国家至少为经济更坚挺成员国提供部分补偿。


Finally, a supervisory authority must be established to monitor governments’ progress toward achieving sustainable debt levels – and to create clear consequences for those that break the eurozone’s budgetary rules.	最后，必须成立一个监管当局来监控政府在实现可持续债务水平方面的进展，并澄清违反欧元区预算规则的国家会遭到怎样的后果。


The Padoa-Schioppa group recently proposed that rule-breaking governments should gradually lose control over their own national budgetary processes.	Padoa-Schioppa小组最近提出，违反规则的政府应该逐渐被剥夺控制其自身国民预算程序的权力。


Opponents of debt mutualization, especially in northern Europe, often argue that, in the absence of political unification, it amounts to putting the cart before the horse.	债务共同化的反对者，特别北欧的反对者，往往会指出，在没有政治统一的情况下，这意味着本末倒置。


But what other measures could be taken to bring the eurozone closer to a political union?	但还有什么措施能够让欧元区更接近于政治联盟？


Military force – so often used in the past to unite diverse nations under a single political umbrella – is out of the question.	军事力量自不待言——过去往往靠它把多元化的诸国统一在一个政治框架下。


And simply waiting will have no effect.	而消极等待不会有任何效果。


The only practical approach is to take small, sequential steps, starting with debt pooling.	唯一现实的办法是迈出微小、连续的步伐，债务集中就是起点。


In fact, Alexander Hamilton adopted this approach more than 200 years ago, when he decided to mutualize the debts that individual US states had incurred during the Revolutionary War – a decisive move toward further political integration.	事实上，200多年前亚历山大·汉密尔顿采用的就是这一办法，他决定将美国各州在独立战争期间发生的债务共同化——这是迈向日后政治一体化的决定性动作。


Rather than wait for political union to happen, Hamilton took action that eventually helped the US to become a full-fledged monetary, fiscal, and political union.	汉密尔顿没有坐等政治联盟发生，而是采取了最终帮助美国成为成熟的货币、财政和政治联盟的行动。


The eurozone is gripped by an existential crisis that is slowly, but inexorably, destroying the monetary union’s very foundations.	欧元区陷入了生存危机，这场危机发展缓慢，但冷酷无情，将摧毁货币联盟的基石。


The only way to stem the erosion is to take determined action that convinces financial markets that the eurozone is here to stay.	唯一抵抗侵蚀的办法是采取果断行动，让金融市场相信欧元区就在这里。


A debt-pooling scheme that satisfies the requirements outlined here would signal that the eurozone member countries are serious about sticking together.	这里所提出的的满足要求的债务集中机制将释放一个信号——欧元区成员国对于团结一致坚持到底是认真的。


Without this gesture, further market turmoil is inevitable – and the eurozone’s collapse will become only a matter of time.	如果不摆出这样的姿态，市场就免不了要发生进一步崩溃，而欧元区的解体也变成时间问题。


The Decent Work Imperative	体面工作的紧迫性


NEW YORK – Over the past decade, the ranks of the unemployed have swollen to close to 190 million worldwide.	纽约—在过去的十年里，世界失业人口已经逼近一亿九千万。


That number captures only a fraction of the problem, since 80% of the global workforce is in the informal sector, without any unemployment benefits or other social protection.	然而，这一数字仅说明了很小的一部分问题，因为全球80%的劳动力都在非正式的部门就业，这些人没有任何失业保障或者其他的社会福利。


It is estimated that at least 43.5% of workers – 1.3 billion people – do not earn enough to lift themselves and their families above the $2-a-day poverty line.	据估计，工人中至少有43. 5%的人——约13亿——收入甚微，无力让他们自己及其家人脱离每天2美元的贫困线之下的生活。


Recent World Bank poverty recalculations are expected to raise the number even higher.	最近，由世界银行进行的重新计算贫困的工作预计会使贫困人口的数量增加。


Evidently, the global economy’s growth in recent decades – including the last half-decade when many developing countries did quite well – has not created enough good jobs.	显而易见，全球经济最近几十年的增长——包括过去五年许多发展中国家的出色表现——并未能创造出足够的好工作岗位。


Nor have current economic and social policies compensated much for this shortfall.	而当前的经济和社会政策也没有弥补这一不足。


Beyond the rising number of unemployed and underemployed, conditions for many of the employed have been deteriorating as well in most countries, especially for workers with little education and few skills.	撇开不断增加的失业和未充分就业人口数不谈，在许多国家，许多有工作的人的状况也在恶化，特别是那些教育程度不高并缺乏技能的工人。


Globally, casual labor, outsourcing, and job contracting and subcontracting are becoming the norm, weakening entitlements for workers and creating more job insecurity.	在全球范围内，临时用工、外包以及合同承包和合同转包已经越来越成为通行的做法，这削弱了工人的权益及增加了工作的不稳定性。


According to a recent report by the United Nations, The Employment Imperative: Report on the World Social Situation , national policies aimed at counteracting these trends and lowering unemployment have largely failed.	根据联合国最近发布的一份报告——《就业的紧迫性：关于全球社会状况的报告》，旨在遏制这些趋势以及降低失业率的国家政策大体上都失败了。


The report shows that in their desire to remain or become more competitive, governments and employers around the world have taken many steps to increase labor market flexibility.	该报告显示，为了保持竞争力或者变得更具竞争力，世界各国政府和雇主们已经采取了许多措施来增加劳动力市场的弹性。


But this has merely contributed to greater economic insecurity and greater inequality, while failing to achieve either full or productive employment, as promised.	但是，这些措施只是导致了更大的经济不稳定以及更大的不平等，而没有达到其所承诺的充分就业或者生产性就业的目的。


Perhaps even more compelling, services’ share of total global employment reached 42.7% in 2007, well ahead of agriculture (34.9%) and industry (22.4%).	或许更引人注目的是，在2007年，全球总就业人口中在服务业工作的比例已经高达42. 7%，远高于农业的34.


Many service-sector jobs are low-paying, precarious, and not covered by formal mechanisms of social protection.	4%。 许多服务业的工作岗位都是报酬低，不稳定以及没有被正式的社会保障机制所覆盖。


Meanwhile, many more of the unemployed now have to demonstrate that they are “deserving” of unemployment assistance, which is increasingly given on a discretionary basis, contingent on fulfillment of specified behavioral obligations.	与此同时，更多的失业者现在不得不证明他们“应该”获得失业援助，而给予这种失业援助视完成指定的义务的情况而定，给予的基准也越来越随意。


In other words, entitlement to unemployment benefits is ceasing to be a social right.	换句话说，得到失业津贴的权利变得不再是一项社会权利了。


While recognizing the challenges in designing policies to address such problems, there is an urgent need to move beyond rhetoric.	在认识到制定解决这些问题的政策中的挑战的同时，我们急需采取实际的行动而不是在口头上说说。


Collective efforts by the international community, national governments, and civil society, including the private sector, are required to meet the employment challenge in the twenty-first century.	为了迎接21世纪的就业挑战，需要国际社会、国内政府以及包括私人部门在内的公民社会的共同努力。


At the international level, cooperation and coordination among countries are needed to counteract the pressures of the current “race to the bottom” in the global competition for investment and markets.	在国际层面上，为了缓解当前在投资和市场上的“竞相降低门槛”的全球竞争压力，需要国家之间的合作和协调。


At the national level, reform of social protection systems in developed countries, and the expansion of such systems in developing countries, should seek to ensure greater economic security as well as labor flexibility.	在国家层面上，在发达国家进行的社会保障体制改革以及在发展中国家进行的扩大社会保障范围的努力，应该在寻求保证更多的劳动力弹性的同时，保证更大的经济安全。


Governments have been promoting individual savings accounts for pensions, health, and unemployment insurance; often, these are either mandatory or subsidized through tax incentives.	各国政府已经在推广养老、健康以及失业保险上的个人储蓄账户； 通常，它们要么是强制性的，要么是通过税收优惠进行补贴的。


As individual savings accounts figure increasingly in social protection systems, governments need to provide adequate economic security for those who cannot benefit from such social protection schemes.	因为社会保障体系内的个人储蓄账户不断地增加，所以各国政府需要为那些不能从这样的社会保障计划中受益的人提供足够的经济安全。


Decent work – promoted by the International Labor Organization since 1999 – means productive, rewarding, and secure jobs that provide safe working conditions, fair income, and social protection for the employed and their families.	国际劳工组织从1999年开始推广“体面的工作”这一概念，其意思是提供安全的工作环境、合理的报酬以及为雇员及其家人提供社会保障的高产出、高回报以及稳定的工作。


Decent work also implies equality of opportunity and treatment as well as good prospects for both personal development and social inclusion.	“体面的工作”也意味着机遇和待遇的平等以及个人发展和社会接纳的良好前景。


This includes freedom for workers to express concerns, organize, and participate in decisions that affect their lives.	这包含了工人有对他们关心的问题发表意见、组织起来并参与影响其生活的各种决策的自由。


Ultimately, people will judge any change by what it means for their own lives.	最后，人们会通过对这些变化对他们自己的生活意味着什么来判断任何的变化。


Secure and decent employment is surely at the top of most personal agendas, as it should be with respect to national agendas.	稳定和体面的工作无疑是个人最关心的事情，这当然也应该成为国家最关注的事务。


Decent employment is the surest way for the poor to escape poverty, and must therefore be a priority of any serious effort to reduce poverty on a sustained basis.	“体面的工作”是穷人脱离贫困的最有效的途径，因此它也应该成为持续减轻贫困的每个认真的努力的优先考虑。


Decent work for all is not a policy option, but an imperative.	所有人的“体面的工作”不是一个政策选择，而是一个当务之急。


The Decline and Fall of America’s Decline and Fall	驳美国衰亡论


CAMBRIDGE – The United States is going through difficult times.	发自剑桥——美国正在经历一段困难时期。


Its post-2008 recovery has slowed, and some observers fear that Europe’s financial problems could tip the American and world economy into a second recession.	2008年后的复苏已经放缓，有些观察员甚至担心欧洲爆发的金融问题将令美国和世界经济陷入二次衰退之中。


American politics, moreover, remains gridlocked over budgetary issues, and compromise will be even more difficult on the eve of the 2012 election, when Republicans hope that economic problems will help them unseat President Barack Obama.	然而美国的政治却依然在预算事务上僵持不下，同时因为2012年总统大选将近，各方妥协也变得越发困难——共和党人都寄望于经济问题能助他们一臂之力，把奥巴马赶下台。


In these circumstances, many are predicting America’s decline, especially relative to China.	在这个情况下，许多方面都预测美国都将走向衰退——尤其是在中国的映照之下。


And it’s not just pundits who think so. A recent Pew poll found that in 15 of 22 countries surveyed, most people believe that China either will replace or has replaced America as “the world’s leading superpower.”	这可不仅仅是专家学者的观点，最近由佩尤研究中心在22个国家进行的调查显示，其中15个国家的大多数民众相信中国会取代美国成为“世界第一强国”。


In Britain, those putting China on top rose to 47%, from 34% in 2009. Similar trends are evident in Germany, Spain, and France.	在英国，将中国放在霸主位置的人从2009年的34%上升到如今的47%，而德国，西班牙和法国人也表现出同样的认知趋势。


Indeed, the poll found more pessimistic views of the US among our oldest and closest allies than in Latin America, Japan, Turkey, and Eastern Europe.	事实上，此次调查发现相对于拉美、日本，土耳其和东欧，我们那些最长久也最亲密的盟友们反而对美国的态度最为悲观。


But even Americans are divided equally about whether China will replace the US as a global superpower.	但实际上，即便是美国人内部也在中国是否将取代自身的问题上出现了50：50的分歧。


Such sentiments reflect the slow growth and fiscal problems that followed the 2008 financial crisis, but they are not historically unprecedented.	这些观点是对2008年金融危机后的缓慢增长和财政问题的体现，但在历史上也不是头一次了。


Americans have a long history of incorrectly estimating their power.	美国在历史上不乏错误估计自身实力的时候。


In the 1950’s and 1960’s, after Sputnik, many thought that the Soviets might get the better of America; in the 1980’s, it was the Japanese.	比如说1950和1960年代，苏联人造卫星升空使许多人认为苏联比美国优越； 到了1980年代这一对象换成了日本。


Now it is the Chinese.	如今参照物又变成了中国人。


But, with America’s debt on a path to equaling its national income in a decade, and a fumbling political system that cannot seem to address the country’s fundamental challenges, are the “declinists” finally right?	但随着美国的负债额在未来十年内几乎相等于其国民收入，而其政治系统似乎也无法应对这个国家所面对的根本挑战，“衰退论者”是否会最终得胜呢？


Much will depend on the uncertainties – often underestimated – brought about by future political change in China.	这在很大程度上要取决于中国未来政治变革中所产生的（并且往往被低估的）不确定因素。


Economic growth will bring China closer to the US in power resources, but that doesn't necessarily mean that China will surpass the US as the most powerful country.	经济发展会令中国在权力资源方面接近美国，但这并不一定意味着中国会超越美国成为第一强国。


China’s GDP will almost certainly surpass that of the US within a decade, owing to the size of its population and its impressive economic-growth rate.	得益于庞大的人口数量以及令人瞩目的增长率，中国的GDP几乎肯定会在十年内超过美国。


But, measured by per capita income, China will not equal the US for decades, if then.	但如果用人均收入计算的话，中国还需要几十年才能赶上美国。


Moreover, even if China suffers no major domestic political setback, many current projections are based simply on GDP growth.	此外，即便中国没有遭遇到任何重大内部政治危机，当前的许多预测都仅仅是简单基于GDP的增长。


They ignore US military and soft-power advantages, as well as China’s geopolitical disadvantages.	他们忽视了美国在军事和软实力上的优势以及中国在地缘政治上的弱点。


As Japan, India, and others try to balance Chinese power, they welcome an American presence. It is as if Mexico and Canada sought a Chinese alliance to balance the US in North America.	日本，印度以及其他试图制衡中国的国家都会欢迎美国的存在，正如身处北美的墨西哥或者加拿大会试图与中国结盟制衡美国那样。


As for absolute decline, the US has very real problems, but the American economy remains highly productive.	在绝对意义上的衰退来说，美国的确面临着许多非常现实的问题，但美国经济依然拥有高度的生产力水平。


America remains first in total R&D expenditure, first in university rankings, first in Nobel prizes, and first on indices of entrepreneurship.	美国在总研发支出、大学排名，诺贝尔奖获得者数量和企业家指数方面依然是全球第一。


According to the World Economic Forum, which released its annual report on economic competitiveness last month, the US is the fifth most competitive economy in the world (behind the small economies of Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, and Singapore). China ranks only 26th.	根据上月发布的世界经济论坛年度经济竞争力报告，美国的经济竞争力在全球排名第五，位居瑞士、瑞典，芬兰和新加坡这些小经济体之后，而中国只排第26位。


Moreover, the US remains at the forefront of such cutting-edge technologies as biotech and nanotechnology.	此外，美国在生物以及纳米技术这些尖端科技领域依旧维持世界前列。


This is hardly a picture of absolute economic decline.	在这方面可看不出任何的绝对经济衰退迹象。


Some observers worry that American society will become sclerotic, like Britain at the peak of its power a century ago.	许多观察家担心美国社会将逐渐固化，正如100年前正处权力顶峰的英国那样。


But American culture is far more entrepreneurial and decentralized than was that of Britain, where industrialists’ sons sought aristocratic titles and honors in London.	但与英国那种工厂主的后���转而在伦敦追逐贵族封号以及荣誉不同的是，美国文化更具有企业家精神而其权力也更为分散。


And despite recurrent bouts of concern throughout its history, America reaps huge benefits from immigration.	而虽然对移民问题的焦虑贯穿了整个美国历史，美国依然能从移民中获取巨大的利益。


In 2005, foreign-born immigrants had participated in 25% of technology start-ups in the previous decade.	据2005年的一项统计，此前10年创立的新企业中有25%都有外国移民参与。


As Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew once told me, China can draw on a talent pool of 1.3 billion people, but the US can draw on the world’s seven billion, and can recombine them in a diverse culture that enhances creativity in a way that ethnic Han nationalism cannot.	正如新加坡的李光耀曾经告诉我的那样，中国可以依靠13亿人的人才库，但美国却可以依靠全球70亿人，并且把这些人在一种多元文化下重新整合起来，而由此产生的创造力也是汉族民族主义所无法比拟的。


Many commentators worry about America’s inefficient political system.	许多评论员对美国低效的政治系统表示担忧。


True, America’s founding fathers created a system of checks and balances designed to preserve liberty at the price of efficiency.	没错，美国的创立者们建立了一个分权制衡的系统，牺牲效率来保障自由。


Moreover, the US is now experiencing a period of intense partisan polarization.	同时美国目前正经历着一个党派极端分裂的时期。


But nasty politics is nothing new to the US: its founding era was hardly an idyll of dispassionate deliberation.	但这种政治败坏在美国历史上也并不鲜见：它建国的岁月也不是一首舒缓平静的田园牧歌。


American government and politics have always experienced such episodes, and, though overshadowed by current melodramas, they were sometimes worse than today’s.	美国政府和政治经常都会经历类似的情况，而且虽然当前的恶劣态势仿佛前所未有，但当年的情况有时会比今天更糟。


The US faces serious problems: public debt, weak secondary education, and political gridlock, to name just a few.	美国正面对着一系列严重问题，其中包括公共债务，低水平中学教育以及政治停滞。


But one should remember that these problems are only part of the picture – and, in principle, they can be solved over the long term.	但请记住这些问题只是整个国家图景的一部分——而且它们基本上都能在长期内的到解决。


It is important to distinguish such problems from those that cannot, in principle, be solved.	把这些问题与那些基本无法解决的问题区分开来是很有必要的。


Of course, whether America can implement the available solutions is uncertain; several commissions have proposed feasible plans to change America’s debt trajectory by raising taxes and cutting expenditures, but feasibility is no guarantee that they will be adopted.	当然，美国是否能实施这些可行方案也是未知之数； 有几个委员会已经提交了利用增税和削减开支来改变美国债务上升轨迹的可行方案，但可行性不能保证这些方案就一定能被采用。


Still, Lee Kuan Yew is probably right to say that China “will give the US a run for its money,” but not surpass it in overall power in the first half of this century.	也正如李光耀说的那样，中国“将会与美国比肩”，但在总体实力上依然无法在本世纪上半叶超越美国。


If so, the gloomy predictions of absolute American decline will turn out to be as misleading as similar predictions in decades past.	如果这样的话，那些令人沮丧的关于美国绝对衰落的预测将被证明是与过去一样谬误。


And, in relative terms, while the “rise of the rest” means that America will be less dominant than it once was, this does not mean that China will necessarily replace the US as the world’s leading power.	同时在相对意义上，即便“世界其他地方的崛起”意味着美国统治力的减弱，也并不意味着中国一定会取代美国成为全球霸主。


The Decline of Ahmedinejad	内贾德的衰落


Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad may be gaining support across the Muslim world for his fervent criticism of the United States, but inside Iran, he is losing strength.	伊朗总统内贾德或许由于其对美国的强烈批评而在整个穆斯林世界赢得支持，但是在伊朗国内，他却在丧失实力。


His political rivals are gaining new positions of power, and the population is increasingly unhappy with the economy’s continuing decline.	他的政治对手们正在赢得新的实力，而且伊朗人们对于经济持续衰退越发不满。


Since its inception, the Islamic Republic has had a weak presidency; ultimate authority rests with the Supreme Leader, first Ayatollah Khomeini and now Ayatollah Khamenei.	伊朗伊斯兰共和国建立以来，一直都是弱势总统制度，最终的权力属于最高领导人，首先是霍梅尼，现在是哈梅内伊。


The Islamic Republic’s first president, Abolhassan Bani Sadr, was dismissed from office a year after his election.	伊朗的首位总统萨德尔当选后一年就被解职。


Ever since, the regime has been intolerant of a strong president, and has repeatedly demonstrated that the office is subservient to the Supreme Leader.	从那时以来，伊朗政权就不再容忍强势总统，而且还不断表明总统应当听命于最高领导人。


Ahmedinejad’s election two years ago came with great expectations, with the new president pledging to “bring oil prices to the dining table of all households in Iran,” and to crack down on corruption.	两年前内贾德当选总统，人们寄予厚望。 他保证“把石油价格下降到每个伊朗家庭都能承受的水平”，而且要打击腐败。


Yet many of his first appointments were rewards to his supporters and cronies in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basij militia, armed groups that mobilized voters on his behalf during the campaign.	但是，他的支持者以及在竞选时为他组织动员选民的伊斯兰革命卫队、动员队民兵以及武装团体的哥们首先得以加官晋爵。


For example, an the Oil Ministry gave a $1.3 billion no-bid contract to an oil company associated with the Revolutionary Guard, and Ahmedinejad appointed his brother-in-law as cabinet secretary.	例如，石油部将价值13亿美元、没有竞标的合同授予了革命卫队所属的一家石油公司，而内贾德任命他的姐夫为内阁秘书。


Steps like these may have been overlooked in better economic times.	在经济状况良好的时候，人们或许会对类似这样的举动视而不见。


But the Iranian budget is now running a 15%-of-GDP deficit, and foreign reserves are shrinking, despite the oil boom.	但是，伊朗国家预算赤字达到国内生产总值的15%，而且，尽管油价上升，外汇储备却在下降。


Instead of distributing oil revenues through a program of low-cost loans, as promised, the government has been forced to ration gasoline, as economic promise has given way to crisis.	政府原先保证通过低息贷款分配石油收入，但是，随着经济形势从前途光明变得危机重重，政府被迫对燃油实行配给制度。


Tensions have also been on the rise since Ahmedinejad fulfilled his campaign promise to enforce Islamic strictures on social life.	内贾德兑现了他的竞选诺言，把伊斯兰教议强加于社会生活之上，从此，紧张局势在上升。


For two years, police have waged an intense campaign against women and young people.	两年来，警察对妇女和年轻人大肆追查。


Last summer, more than 150,000 women were arrested in Tehran for wearing “bad veils,” and barber shops have been given specific instructions on acceptable hairstyles for young men.	去年夏天，德黑兰有15万多名妇女因为戴“坏头巾”而被捕，而理发店则收到具体的指令，告诉它们哪些是年轻男子可以接受的发型。


Demonstrations by bus drivers, school teachers, women’s rights activists, and students have been brutally suppressed, with dozens of arrests.	公交司机、学校老师、女权活动人士以及学生的示威被残酷镇压，几十人被捕。


Photos and video clips of police beating civilians in Tehran and other cities have been disseminated on the Internet.	互联网上流传着警察在德黑兰以及其他城市殴打平民的照片和录像带片段。


But now Ahmedinejad’s opponents are moving to reassert longstanding constraints on the presidency.	但是，现在内贾德的反对者们正在准备重新对总统职位实行长久以来的限制。


His foremost rival, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former president who Ahmedinejad defeated to win the post, has had a remarkable reversal of fortune, reemerging as leader of the Assembly of Experts, the powerful body that elects Iran’s Supreme Leader and that can even remove a Supreme Leader from office.	内贾德最大的对手、在总统竞选时败给内贾德的前总统拉夫桑贾尼时运大转，重新成为长老会的领导人。 长老会选举伊朗的最高领导人，位高权重。


Moreover, conservatives who had aligned themselves with Ahmedinejad are now criticizing him openly.	而且，曾经与内贾德结盟的保守派现在公开批评他。


Even Ayatollah Khamenei, who as Supreme Leader is also commander-in-chief of the armed forces, has taken steps to demonstrate his authority, recently firing the leaders of the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij militia.	甚至连最高领导人、武装力量的最高统帅哈梅内伊也采取步骤，通过最近将革命卫队和动员队民兵的领导人解职来显示他的权威。


Among Iran analysts, it is thought that these moves were intended to revitalize the military, particularly given the possibility of conflict with the US.	伊朗问题分析家们认为，这些举动意在重新振作军队，特别是鉴于可能与美国爆发冲突。


But experts also note that the former commanders were close to Ahmedinejad and had made a great effort over the last two years to help him implement his agenda.	但是专家们还注意到，从前的指挥官们与内贾德关系密切，而且在过去两年中帮助他实施他的计划不遗余力。


While Ahmedinejad continues his verbal attacks on the US, he does not control the policy-making apparatus that will decide about Iran’s nuclear program and its relations with the international community.	尽管内贾德继续对美国进行口头攻击，但是他并不控制决定伊朗核子项目及其同国际社会关系的决策机构。


The threat of sanctions remains potent, and the Iranian business community – not to mention the public – has felt the sting of isolation.	制裁的威胁依旧强大，而且，伊朗的商界，不要说公众已经感觉到了孤立的痛处。


Considering the tangled involvement of Iran’s leaders in the economy, the effect of sanctions should not be underestimated.	鉴于伊朗领导人与经济有着纠缠不清的联系，制裁的效果不容低估。


The economy remains the one area of Iranian life where Ahmedinejad retains considerable power.	经济是伊朗生活中内贾德保留大量权力的领域。


But here, his record is weak, and his pronouncements only exacerbate the problem by increasing Iran’s isolation from the global economy.	但是在这一领域，他乏善可陈，其豪言只会通过伊朗不断孤立于全球经济而加剧问题。


So, as disputes with the West come to a head, it is important to recognize the power shifts underway inside Iran’s opaque political system.	所以，当伊朗与西方的争议加剧之时，认识到伊朗不透明的政治制度内部正在进行的权力转移是重要的。


Ahmedinejad may be making increasingly challenging statements, but he does not have the authority to act on them.	内贾德或许在发出越发挑衅的言论，但是他并没有权力实施它们。


Indeed, only a military confrontation with the US can bring him back to the center of decision-making.	确实，只有与美国的军事冲突才会把他带回到决策中心。


American policymakers should bear that in mind.	美国的决策者应当知道这一点。


The Paranoid Style in Economics	经济学的偏执狂风格


NEW DELHI – Why do high-profile economic tussles turn so quickly to ad hominem attacks?	新德里—为何高水平经济争论会这么快演变为人身攻击？


Perhaps the most well-known recent example has been the Nobel laureate Paul Krugman’s campaign against the economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, in which he moved quickly from criticism of an error in one of their papers to charges about their commitment to academic transparency.	最著名的最新例子要数诺贝尔经济学奖获得者保罗·克鲁格曼抨击经济学家卡门·莱因哈特和肯尼斯·罗格夫了，克鲁格曼一开始批评的是他们论文中的一个错误，但很快，批评目标变成了他们对学术透明度的承诺。


For those who know these two superb international macroeconomists, as I do, it is evident that these allegations should promptly be dismissed.	对像我这样认识这两位大牌国际经济学家的人来说，显然这些指责应该立刻被打消。


But there is the larger question of why the paranoid style has become so prominent.	但一个更大的问题是为什么这一偏执狂风格如此流行。


Part of the answer is that economics is an inexact science, with exceptions to almost every pattern of behavior that economists take for granted.	部分答案在于经济学是一门不精确的科学，几乎所有经济学家视为理所当然的行为模式都存在例外。


For example, economists predict that higher prices for a good will reduce demand for it.	比如，经济学家预测商品价格的升高会减少对它的需求。


But students of economics will no doubt remember an early encounter with “Giffen goods,” which violate the usual pattern.	但经济学学生毫无疑问在学习生涯伊始就会遇到“吉芬商品”，这种商品就不符合这一规律。


When tortillas become more expensive, a poor Mexican worker may eat more of them, because she now has to cut back on more expensive food like meat.	当墨西哥玉米饼变得更贵时，贫穷的墨西哥工人 可能会吃更多的玉米饼，因为他不得不削减更贵的食品（比如肉类）的消费。


Such “violations” occur elsewhere as well.	这些“违反规律”在其他方面也会出现。


Customers often value a good more when its price goes up.	顾客常会因为价格上涨而认为一种商品价值更高。


One reason may be its signaling value.	一个原因可能是家价值信号。


An expensive handcrafted mechanical watch may tell time no more accurately than a cheap quartz model; but, because few people can afford one, buying it signals that the owner is rich.	昂贵的手工机械表并不比廉价的石英表走时准确； 但是，由于鲜有人买得起手工机械表，因此它成了富裕的象征。


Similarly, investors flock to stocks that have appreciated, because they have “momentum.”	类似地，投资者喜欢涨起来的股票，因为它们有“动能”。


The point is that economic behavior is complex and can vary among individuals, over time, between goods, and across cultures.	关键点在于经济行为是复杂的，假以时日会在人与人、商品与商品、文化与文化之间发生变化。


Physicists do not need to know the behavior of every molecule to predict how a gas will behave under pressure.	物理学家不需要知道每个分子的行为就可以预测气体受压之后的行为。


Economists cannot be so sanguine.	经济学家就没有这么乐观了。


Under some conditions, individual behavioral aberrations cancel one another out, making crowds more predictable than individuals.	在一定的条件下，个人行为的反常会彼此抵消，因此群体行为比个体行为更易预测。


But, under other conditions, individuals influence one another in such a way that the crowd becomes a herd, led by a few.	但是，在其他条件下，个体之间彼此的影响会导致群体成为听从少数人领导的乌合之众。


The difficulties for economic policymakers do not stop there.	经济决策者的困难不仅在于此。


Economic institutions can have different effects, depending on their quality.	经济机构的影响各不相同，取决于各自的质量。


In the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis, macroeconomists tended to assume away the financial sector in their models of advanced economies.	2008年金融危机爆发前，宏观经济学家的发达经济模型假设中并不包含金融部门。


With no significant financial crisis since the Great Depression, it was convenient to take for granted that the financial plumbing worked in the background.	自大萧条以来从未发生过金融危机，因此可以理所当然地认为是金融管道在背后起作用。


Models, thus simplified, suggested policies that seemed to work – that is, until the plumbing backed up.	被如此简化的模型建议的政策似乎有效果——直到金融管道内流向逆转。


And the plumbing malfunctioned because herd behavior – shaped by policies in ways that we are only now coming to understand – overwhelmed it.	管道失灵是因为被羊群效应所吞噬。 而政策如何造成羊群效应我们现在才开始理解。


So, why not let evidence, rather than theory, guide policy?	那么，为什么不让证据而不是理论来指导政策？


Unfortunately, it is hard to get clear-cut evidence of causality.	不幸的是很难得到明确无误的因果关系证据。


If high national debt is associated with slow economic growth, is it because excessive debt impedes growth, or because slow growth causes countries to accumulate more debt?	如果国民债务高企与经济增长缓慢有关，那么是因为债务过多妨碍了增长，还是因为增长缓慢导致国家积累了更多的债务？


Many an econometrician’s career has been built on finding a clever way to establish the direction of causality.	许多计量经济学家的职业生涯就是在寻找明智的构建因果方向之法。


Unfortunately, many of these methods cannot be applied to the most important questions facing economic policymakers.	不幸的是，这些方法大多不能用于经济决策者所面临的最重要的问题。


So the evidence does not really tell us whether a heavily indebted country should pay down its debt or borrow and invest more.	因此证据并不能真的告诉我们高度负债的国家应该多还钱还是借更多钱用于投资。


Moreover, what seem like obvious, commonsense policy solutions all too often have unintended consequences, because a policy’s targets are not passive objects, as in physics, but active agents who react in unpredictable ways.	此外，似乎显而易见、堪称常识的政策解决方案往往会产生意料之外的效果，因为与物理学不同，政策的目标并不是被动的对象，而是主动的行为人，他们的反应难以预料。


For example, price controls, rather than lowering prices, often cause scarcity and the emergence of a black market in which controlled commodities cost significantly more.	比如，价格管制而不是降低价格往往造成稀缺和黑市的产生，被管制商品在黑市上以高得多的价格出售。


All of this implies that economic policymakers require an enormous dose of humility, openness to various alternatives (including the possibility that they might be wrong), and a willingness to experiment.	所有这些意味着经济决策者需要高度的谦卑，对各种替代方案持开放态度（包括它们出错的可能性），并愿意进行试验。


This does not mean that our economic knowledge cannot guide us, only that what works in theory – or worked in the past or elsewhere – should be prescribed with an appropriate degree of self-doubt.	这并不意味着我们的经济学知识无法提供指导，这只是在说，理论上可行的政策——或在过去或他国有效的政策——在实施时应该经过适当的自我怀疑。


But, for economists who actively engage the public, it is hard to influence hearts and minds by qualifying one’s analysis and hedging one’s prescriptions.	但是，对于积极参与公众事务的经济学家来说，很难通过改进其分析、限制其政策建议来影响思想和观念。


Better to assert one’s knowledge unequivocally, especially if past academic honors certify one’s claims of expertise.	更好的办法是咬定一种主张不放松，特别是如果过去的学术成就证明了他的专家地位的话。


This is not an entirely bad approach if it results in sharper public debate.	这倒不是完全一无是处的办法，如果它能引���更激烈的公共争论的话。


The dark side of such certitude, however, is the way it influences how these economists engage contrary opinions.	但是，这样的弊端在于它如何影响这些经济学家接受相反观点。


How do you convince your passionate followers if other, equally credentialed, economists take the opposite view?	如果和你一样分量的经济学家与你观点相左，你如何说服你的狂热追随者？


All too often, the path to easy influence is to impugn the other side’s motives and methods, rather than recognizing and challenging an opposing argument’s points.	通常最简单的影响力之路时攻讦另一方的动机和方法，而不是承认和挑战相反理论的观点。


Instead of fostering public dialogue and educating the public, the public is often left in the dark.	公众往往看不到公开对话，无法受到教育，只能继续当睁眼瞎。


And it discourages younger, less credentialed economists from entering the public discourse.	这也不利于更年轻、名气更小的经济学家进入公众视野。


In their monumental research on centuries of public and sovereign debt, the normally very careful Reinhart and Rogoff made an error in one of their working papers.	莱因哈特和罗格夫是非常严谨的学者，但在他们对几百年公共和主权债务的里程碑式的研究中，他们的一篇工作论文出现了一个错误。


The error is in neither their prize-winning 2009 book nor in a subsequent widely read paper responding to the academic debate about their work.	这个错误既不在他们2009年的获奖著作中，也不再后来被广泛传阅的、回应对他们工作的学术争论的论文中。


Reinhart and Rogoff’s research broadly shows that GDP growth is slower at high levels of public debt.	莱因哈特和罗格夫的研究大体上证明GDP增长会在公债高企时减缓。


While there is a legitimate debate about whether this implies that high debt causes slow growth, Krugman turned to questioning their motives.	这是否意味着高债务导致低增长是一个值得探讨的质疑，但克鲁格曼却转而质疑他们的动机。


He accused Reinhart and Rogoff of deliberately keeping their data out of the public domain.	他指责莱因哈特和罗格夫故意让他们的数据不进入公众视野。


Reinhart and Rogoff, shocked by this charge – tantamount to an accusation of academic dishonesty – released a careful rebuttal, including online evidence that they had not been reticent about sharing their data.	莱因哈特和罗格夫被这一指责惊呆了——这不啻于指责他们学术不端——他们发表了严谨的反驳，包括提供了网络证据证明他们并没有在共享数据方面有所保留。


In fairness, given Krugman’s strong and public positions, he has been subject to immense personal criticism by many on the right.	公平地说，克鲁格曼有着很强的公共地位，他也受到了来自右翼的猛烈个人批评。


Perhaps the paranoid style in public debate, focusing on motives rather than substance, is a useful defensive tactic against rabid critics.	或许专以动机而不是实质为目标的偏执狂型公共争论是防御猛烈抨击的利器。


Unfortunately, it spills over into countering more reasoned differences of opinion as well.	不幸的是，它产生了溢出效应，也将有理有利的观点分歧排除在外。


Perhaps respectful debate in economics is possible only in academia.	也许经济学中值得尊敬的争论只可能在学术界出现。


The public discourse is poorer for this.	公众言论在这一点上有所欠缺。


The Delayed Promise of Health-Care IT	医疗卫生IT迟到的前途


WASHINGTON, DC – Because information technology (IT) has so quickly transformed people’s daily lives, we tend to forget how much things have changed from the not-so-distant past.	华盛顿—由于信息技术（IT）极快地改变着人们的日常生活，我们开始忘记事情与不久的过去相比改变了多少。


Today, millions of people around the world regularly shop online; download entire movies, books, and other media onto wireless devices; bank at ATMs wherever they choose; and self-book entire trips and check themselves in at airports electronically.	如今，全世界千百万人定期使用网络购物、用无线设备下载整部电影、书籍和其他媒体、随地使用ATM机完成银行业务、自助预订整个旅行过程、在机场通过电子值机方式登机。


But there is one sector of our lives where adoption of information technology has lagged conspicuously: health care.	但生活中有一个方面采取信息技术的步伐大大地落后了，这就是医疗卫生。


Some parts of the world are doing better than others in this respect.	在这方面，一些国家取得了领先。


Researchers from the Commonwealth Fund recently reported that some high-income countries, including the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, have made great strides in encouraging the use of electronic medical records (EMR) among primary-care physicians.	英联邦基金（Commonwealth Fund）的研究者的最新报告表明，英国、澳大利亚和新西兰等高收入国家在鼓励初等护理医生使用电子病历方面取得了重大进展。


Indeed, in those countries, the practice is now nearly universal.	事实上，在这些国家，这一做法已接近于全面推行。


Yet some other high-income countries, such as the United States and Canada, are not keeping up.	但其他高收入国家，比如美国和加拿大，并没有跟进。


EMR usage in America, the home of Apple and Google, stands at only 69%.	电子病历在苹果和谷歌的故乡——美国的使用率只有69%。


The situation in the US is particularly glaring, given that health care accounts for a bigger share of GDP than manufacturing, retail, finance, or insurance. Moreover, most health IT systems in use in America today are designed primarily to facilitate efficient billing, rather than efficient care, putting the business interests of hospitals and clinics ahead of the needs of doctors and patients.	美国的情况特别扎眼，因为该国医疗卫生行业占GDP的比重高于制造业、零售业、金融业和保险业。 此外，美国使用的大部分医疗IT系统主要用于协助提高缴费效率，而不是提高看护效率，将医院和诊所的商业利益置于医生和病患的需要之上。


That is why many Americans can easily go online and check the health of their bank account, but cannot check the results of their most recent lab work.	这就是为何大量美国人可以轻松地上网检查自己的银行账户健康状况，却不能检查他们最新拍片的结果。


Another difference between IT in US health care and in other industries is the former’s lack of interoperability.	IT在美国医疗卫生业和其他行业的另一个区别是，前者缺少互操作性。


In other words, a hospital’s IT system often cannot “talk” to others.	换句话说，一家医院的IT系统通常无法与其他医院的“对话”。


Even hospitals that are part of the same system sometimes struggle to share patient information.	即便同属一个系统的医院，有时也难以共享病患信息。


As a result, today’s health IT systems act more like a “frequent flyer card” designed to enforce customer loyalty to a particular hospital, rather than an “ATM card” that enables you and your doctor to access your health information whenever and wherever needed.	结果，如今医疗IT系统更像是为增加客户对某家医院忠诚度而设计的“常客飞行积分卡”，而不是让你和你的医生在需要时随时随地都能获得你的健康信息的“ATM卡”。


Ordinarily, lack of interoperability is an irritating inconvenience.	通常，缺少互操作性会带来令人气恼的不便。


In a medical emergency, it can impose life-threatening delays in care.	在紧急医疗事故中，它可能造成威胁生命的医疗延迟。


A third way that health IT in America differs from consumer IT is usability.	美国医疗IT与消费IT的第三个区别是可用性。


The design of most consumer Web sites is so obvious that one needs no instructions to use them.	大部分消费网站设计分明，完全可以在没有说明书的情况下上手。


Within minutes, a seven year old can teach herself to play a complex game on an iPad.	不消几分钟，七岁顽童便可以无师自通地在iPad上玩复杂游戏了。


But a newly hired neurosurgeon with 27 years of education may have to read a thick user manual, attend tedious classes, and accept periodic tutoring from a “change champion” to master the various steps required to use his hospital’s IT system.	但一个受过27年教育的新入职的神经外科医生可能必须读完厚厚的使用手册、上完乏味的培训课程，并接受“一日三变大师”（change champion）的定期辅导才能驾驭使用医院IT系统的众多步骤。


Not surprisingly, despite its theoretical benefits, health IT has few fans among health-care providers.	毫不奇怪，尽管在理论上能带来好处，但医疗IT在医疗服务提供者中间鲜有支持者。


In fact, many complain that it slows them down.	事实上，许多人抱怨医疗IT系统让他们的效率更低了。


Does this mean that health IT is a waste of time and money?	这意味着医疗IT纯属浪费时间和金钱吗？


Absolutely not.	绝非如此。


In 2005, colleagues of ours at the RAND Corporation projected that America could save more than $80 billion a year if health care could replicate the IT-driven productivity gains observed in other industries.	2005年，我们兰德公司的同事预测，如果医疗卫生业可以复制其他行业曾发生过的IT驱动生产率的过程，美国每年可以节约800亿美元。


The fact that the US has not gotten there yet is not a problem of vision, but of less-than-ideal implementation.	美国还没有到达这一步这一事实并非愿景问题，而是实施不理想的问题。


Other industries, including banking and retail trade, struggled with IT until they got it right.	其他行业，包括银行业和零售��易业，都曾与IT做过斗争，直到找到了正确的切合点。


The gap between what IT promised and what it delivered in the early days was so stark that experts called it the “IT productivity paradox.”	IT的美好愿景和它在早期所带来的结果之间的落差巨大，以至于专家称之为“IT生产率悖论”。


Once these industries figured out how to make their IT systems more efficient, interoperable, and user-friendly, and then realigned their processes to leverage technology’s capabilities, productivity soared.	一旦这些行业认清如何让其IT系统更高效、更具互操作性、更加用户友好，然后重组程序以利用技术能力，生产率就会大幅攀升。


In America, as in much of the world, health care is late to the IT game, and is experiencing these growing pains only now. But health-care providers can shorten the process of transformation by learning from other industries.	与世界大部分地区一样，在美国，医疗卫生业是IT游戏的后来者，目前还在成长的烦恼阶段。 但医疗服务提供者可以通过向其他行业取经缩短转型过程。


The US government is trying to help.	美国政府也在施以援手。


In 2009, Congress passed the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act.	2009年，国会通过了医疗信息技术促进经济和临床医疗法（Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act）。


HITECH has undeniably accelerated IT adoption among health-care providers.	毫无疑问，HITECH加快了医疗服务提供者对IT的采用。


Yet the problems of usability and interoperability persist.	但可用性和互操作性问题仍然存在。


Globally, the health IT industry should not wait to be forced by government regulators into doing a better job.	全球来看，医疗IT行业不应该坐等政府监管者的驱使以改进工作。


Developers can boost the pace of adoption by creating more standardized systems that are easier to use, truly interoperable, and afford patients greater access to and control over their personal health data.	开发者可以通过创造更加标准化、便于使用、真正具有互操作性的系统并让患者更容易获得和控制自己的个人医疗数据来刺激IT的采用。


Health-care providers and hospital systems can dramatically boost the impact of health IT by reengineering traditional practices to take full advantage of its capabilities.	医疗服务提供者和医院系统可以通过重组传统做法以充分利用IT的能力来大大刺激医疗IT的影响力。


If America is any indicator, the sky is the limit when it comes to potential gains from health IT.	如果以美国为指标，那么就医疗IT的潜在好处而言，天空才是尽头。


According to the Institute of Medicine, the US currently wastes more than $750 billion per year on unnecessary or inefficient health-care services, excessive administrative costs, high prices, medical fraud, and missed opportunities for prevention.	据美国医学研究所的护具，目前美国每年在无必要和低效率医疗服务、管理成本臃肿、价格高企、医疗诈骗和错失预防机会上要浪费7500亿美元以上。


Properly applied, health IT can improve health care in all of these dimensions.	应用得当的话，医疗IT可以改善医疗卫生行业的所有这些缺陷。


The payoff will be worth it.	医疗IT是得大于失的。


Indeed, as with the adoption of IT elsewhere, we may soon wonder how health care could have been delivered any other way.	事实上，和其他行业采用IT的效果一样，我们很快就会问，没有IT还怎么看病？


The Democratic Hopes of Iraqis	伊拉克人的民主希望


The escalating violence in Iraq gives a bleak impression of that country’s prospects.	伊拉克日渐升级的暴力事件使该国的前景一片暗淡。


Sectarian conflict seems to be increasing on a daily basis, with militias massacring hundreds of Sunnis and Shiites solely on the basis of their religious identities.	宗派冲突似乎也每天都在增多，成百的逊尼和什叶派穆斯林仅仅因为其宗教身份而被武装分子杀害。


Yet it would be a mistake to think that this bloodlust represents widespread sentiment among Iraqis.	但是如果有人认为这种杀戮欲代表了伊拉克人的广泛情绪，那么他就错了。


While neither American nor Iraqi security officials have yet found a way to tame the militias, the Iraqi public is increasingly drawn toward a vision of a democratic, non-sectarian government for the country.	虽然美国和伊拉克的安全官员都还没有寻找到一条驯服武装分子的有效途径，但伊拉克民众正越来越认同一个民主、非宗派的伊拉克政府的愿景。


In 2004 and 2006, I was involved in conducting two nationwide public opinion surveys in Iraq.	我在2004年和2006年两度参与了在伊拉克进行的全国性民意调查。


Contrasting the findings of these surveys demonstrates that over the two years when sectarian violence has increased, Iraqis increasingly view their fate in a national, rather than communal, context.	两次调查结果的比照表明在过去的两年中，随着宗派暴力的增加，伊拉克人开始越来越多地站在国家而不是宗派的立场上审视自己的命运。


Over this period, the number of Iraqis who said that it was “very important” for Iraq to have a democracy increased from 59% to 65%.	在此期间，认为伊拉克建立民主“非常重要”的伊拉克人数量从占被调查人口的59%增加到65%。


These same Iraqis saw a link between an effective democracy and the separation of religion and politics, as under a western system.	这部分伊拉克人看到了有效民主和政教分离之间的联系，正如在西方的政治体制中那样。


Overall, those who responded that they “strongly agree” that “Iraq would be a better place if religion and politics were separated” increased from 27% in 2004 to 41% in 2006.	总体而言，那些“非常赞同”“如果政教分离将更有利于伊拉克”的受调查者人数从2004年的27%增加到了2006年的41%。


Particularly significant were increases from 24% to 63% during this period among Sunnis and from 41% to 65% among Kurds.	具有特别意义的是，在此期间持这一观点的逊尼派人数从24%增加到了63%，库尔德人的人数从41%增加到65%。


Opinion on this question within the majority Shiite community remained stable, with 23% strongly agreeing in both 2004 and 2006.	这一问题上的民意在大多数什叶派族群中保持稳定，持“非常赞同”观点的人在2004年和2006年都占23%。


Similarly, the survey found declining support for an Islamic state.	同样，该调查发现对伊斯兰国家的支持率在下降。


Between 2004 and 2006, the number of Iraqis who said it was “very good to have an Islamic government where religious leaders have absolute power” fell from 30% to 22%.	在2004到2006年之间，非常认同“让宗教领袖拥有绝对权威的伊斯兰政府”的观点的伊拉克人数从30%下降到22%。


Declines occurred in all three leading ethnic communities: from 39% to 35% among Shiites, from 20% to 6% among Sunnis, and from 11% to 5% among Kurds.	这种下降在三个主要的族群之中都有发生：在什叶派中，从39%下降到35%，在逊尼派中从20%下降到6%，在库尔德人中从11%下降到5%。


There was some increase in the number of Shiites who thought that there should be a strong religious element in national laws, the majority still opposed this.	什叶派中认为国家法律中应该包含相当程度的宗教元素的人数有所增加，但大多数人仍对此持反对意见。


Nationalist sentiment is also increasing.	民族主义情绪也正在上升。


Asked whether they considered themselves “Iraqis, above all” or “Muslims, above all,” the 2006 survey found that 28% of Iraqis identified themselves as “Iraqis, above all,” up from 23% in 2004.	在被问道他们认为自己“首先是伊拉克人”或“首先是穆斯林”时，2006年的调查发现28%的伊拉克人认同自己“首先是伊拉克人”，比2004年时的23%有所上升。


In the capital, Baghdad, the center of so much sectarian violence, the numbers were even more impressive, with the share of the population who saw themselves as “Iraqis, above all” doubling, from 30% to 60%.	在宗派暴力活动的中心，首都巴格达，情况更是非同寻常：认为自己“首先是伊拉克人”的人数翻了一番，从30%上升到60%。


By contrast, similar surveys in other Arab capitals find a decided tilt toward a Muslim identity.	相比之下，类似的民意调查结果在其他阿拉伯国家的首都却显现出对穆斯林身份的坚决倾斜。


In Amman, Jordan, the most recent figure is 12% who put their national identity ahead of their Muslim identity.	在安曼和约旦，最新的调查数据表明只有 12%的人将民族身份置于穆斯林身份之上。


The figure is 11% in Cairo, Egypt, and 17% in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.	在埃及的开罗是 11%，在沙特阿拉伯的利雅得是17%。


Curiously, in Tehran, Iran, the choice is markedly in favor of Iranian, rather than Muslim, identity.	出乎意料的是，在伊朗的德黑兰，人们却选择更认同伊朗人的身份而不是穆斯林的身份。


Among residents of the Iranian capital, the share of “nationalists” soared from 38% in 2000 to 59% in 2005.	在伊朗的首都，“民族主义者”的比例从2000年的38%上升到了2005年的59%。


At the same time, Iraqi attitudes show a strong reaction to daily violence.	同时，伊拉克人对日常的暴力也有强烈的反应。


Between 2004 and 2006, the proportion who strongly agreed that life in Iraq is “unpredictable and dangerous” increased from 46% to 59%.	在2004至2006年间，认为在伊拉克的生活“不可预测和危险”的被访者比例从46%上升到59%。


The change was felt in all communities, rising from 41% to 48% among Shiites, from 77% to 84% among Sunnis, and from 16% to 50% among Kurds.	这种变化在所有族群之中都感受得到：在什叶派中从41%上升到48%，在逊尼派中从77%上升到84%，在库尔德人中从16%上升到50%。


At the same time, the surveys found little support among any of these three major groups for sectarian conflict.	与此同时，在调查中还发现在三大族群中对宗派冲突持支持态度的人几乎没有。


The violence has had a major effect on Iraqi attitudes toward foreigners.	暴力活动在伊拉克人对外国人的态度上产生了重大影响。


By 2006, distrust of Americans, British, and French had reached 90%, and attitudes toward Iraq’s neighbors were also tense.	在2006年，对美国人、英国人和法国人表示不信任的伊拉克人比例达到了90%。 伊拉克人对邻国的态度也十分紧张。


More than half of Iraqis surveyed said that they would not welcome Turks, Jordanians, Iranians, or Kuwaitis as neighbors.	半数以上接受调查的伊拉克人表示不欢迎土耳其人、约旦人、伊朗人或科威特人成为他们的邻居。


These feelings, it appears, are directly related to the violence gripping Iraq, and the role of foreigners in the country’s perilous security situation.	这些情绪似乎和伊拉克无法摆脱的暴力冲突和外国人在该国岌岌可危的安全状况中所扮演的角色有直接的关系。


So it appears that Iraqis are showing greater attachment to their national identity and are supportive of a non-sectarian approach to government.	因此伊拉克人似乎对其民族身份表现出更强的归属感，并且也支持以非宗派方式来组建政府。


These are the basic traits of a modern political order.	这些正是现代政治秩序的基本特点。


Among Sunnis, the decline in support for an Islamic state is most dramatic, and may have significant ramifications for the ability of religious extremists to recruit among them.	在逊尼派当中，对伊斯兰国家支持率的下降最为明显。 这对于宗教极端主义分子在该族群中招募人员的能力会产生重大影响。


Although Iraqis remain angry about the violence in their country, this anger has not undermined their sense of national identity.	虽然伊拉克人对发生在其国家的暴力冲突仍然感到愤怒，但这种愤怒并没有破坏他们的民族认同感。


At the same time, they appear to be holding onto important democratic values.	同时，他们似乎正坚持着重要的民主价值观。


The key question, of course, remains whether these values can be translated into a peaceful reality.	当然，关键的问题仍然是这些价值观是否能被转化为和平的现实。


Why India Slowed	印度为何减速


NEW DELHI – For a country as poor as India, growth should be what Americans call a “no-brainer.”	新德里—向印度这样的穷国，用美国的话说，增长应该是“易如反掌”的。


It is largely a matter of providing public goods: decent governance, security of life and property, and basic infrastructure like roads, bridges, ports, and power plants, as well as access to education and basic health care.	基本上，这事关公共品供给：良好的治理、生命和财产安全、公路、桥梁、港口和电站等基本基础设施，以及获得教育和基本医疗服务的权利。


Unlike many equally poor countries, India already has a strong entrepreneurial class, a reasonably large and well-educated middle class, and a number of world-class corporations that can be enlisted in the effort to provide these public goods.	与其他同等水平穷国不同的是，印度已经拥有了强大的创业家阶层、规模大、教育程度高的中产阶级，以及一大批可以动员起来提供这些公共品的世界级公司。


Why, then, has India’s GDP growth slowed so much, from nearly 10% year on year in 2010-11 to 5% today?	那么，为何印度GDP增长率减得如此之慢，年率从2010—11年的10%降低到了今天的5%？


Was annual growth of almost 8% in the decade from 2002 to 2012 an aberration?	2002—2012年这样的年增长率近8%的年代只是个例外吗？


I believe that it was not, and that two important factors have come into play in the last two years.	我认为答案是否定的，在过去两年中出现了两个重要因素。


First, India probably was not fully prepared for its rapid growth in the years before the global financial crisis.	首先，印度或许没有为全球金融危机爆发前两年的快速增长做好充分准备。


For example, new factories and mines require land.	比如，新工厂和矿山要求土地。


But land is often held by small farmers or inhabited by tribal groups, who have neither clear and clean title nor the information and capability to deal on equal terms with a developer or corporate acquirer.	但土地通常为小农或部落群体所有，他们既没有明确明晰的权利，也没有信息和能力与开发商和公司兼并方平等地做交易。


Not surprisingly, farmers and tribal groups often felt exploited as savvy buyers purchased their land for a pittance and resold it for a fortune.	毫不奇怪，农民和部落群体通常自认为被精明的买家糊弄，后者从他们手中低价获得土地，然后高价转手。


And the compensation that poor farmers did receive did not go very far; having sold their primary means of earning income, they then faced a steep rise in the local cost of living, owing to development.	而穷困农民所获得的补偿也确实不多； 在卖掉它们的主要收入来源后，拜开发所赐，他们要面临本地生活成本激增的局面。


In short, strong growth tests economic institutions’ capacity to cope, and India’s were found lacking.	简而言之，强劲的增长考验着经济制度的应对力，而印度的制度此能力低下。


Its land titling was fragmented, the laws governing land acquisition were archaic, and the process of rezoning land for industrial use was non-transparent.	其土地权十分分散，处理土地兼并的法律早已过时，将土地性质变更为工业用地的过程也不透明。


India is a vibrant democracy, and, as the economic system failed the poor and the weak, the political system tried to compensate.	印度是一个充满活力的民主社会，当经济制度让穷苦和弱势群体破产时，政治制度要站出来补偿。


Unlike in some other developing economies, where the rights of farmers or tribals have never stood in the way of development, in India politicians and NGOs took up their cause.	与其他发展中经济体体不同——它们的农民和部落权利从来不会构成开发的障碍——印度政客和非政府组织会挺身而出。


Land acquisition became progressively more difficult.	土地兼并变得日益困难。


A similar story played out elsewhere.	类似的故事在其他方面存在。


For example, the government’s inability to allocate resources such as mining rights or wireless spectrum in a transparent way led the courts to intervene and demand change.	比如，政府在配置资源——如采矿权和无线频段——方面无法做到透明导致了法院干预和需求变化。


And, as the bureaucracy got hauled before the courts, it saw limited upside from taking decisions, despite the significant downside from not acting.	此外，当官僚被诉诸法庭时，他们会发现做决定的好处有限，尽管不作为的坏处很大。


As the bureaucracy retreated from helping businesses navigate India’s plethora of rules, the required permissions and clearances were no longer granted.	由于不再帮助企业的官僚决定着印度繁复的法律，获得许可和批准不再是理所当然之事。


In sum, because India’s existing economic institutions could not cope with strong growth, its political checks and balances started kicking in to prevent further damage, and growth slowed.	总而言之，由于印度现有经济制度无法应对强劲增长，其政治制衡机制开始着眼于防止未来伤害，而增长放缓了。


The second reason for India’s slowdown stems from the global financial crisis.	印度减速的第二个原因来自全球金融危机。


Many emerging markets that were growing strongly before the crisis responded by injecting substantial amounts of monetary and fiscal stimulus.	许多此前增长强劲的新兴市场国家对危机的反应是注入大量货币和财政刺激。


For a while, as industrial countries recovered in 2010, this seemed like the right medicine.	这一度是正确的药方，比如，2010年工业国纷纷复苏。


Emerging markets around the world enjoyed a spectacular recovery.	全球新兴市场出现了强劲复苏。


But, as industrial countries, beset by fiscal, sovereign-debt, and banking problems, slowed once again, the fix for emerging markets turned out to be only temporary.	但是，和受困于财政、主权债务和银行问题的工业国再次减速一样，新兴市场问题的解决最后也只是暂时的。


To offset the collapse in demand from industrial countries, they had stimulated domestic demand.	为了抵消工业国需求崩溃的冲击，它们实施了内需刺激。


But domestic demand did not call for the same goods, and the goods that were locally demanded were already in short supply before the crisis.	但内需对象并非相同的产品，本地需求产品在危机前已经供给不足。


The net result was overheating – asset-price booms and inflation across the emerging world.	最后的净结果是过热——资产价格繁荣和通胀席卷各个新兴国家。


In India, matters were aggravated by the investment slowdown that began as political opposition to unbridled development emerged.	在印度，对着疯狂开发开始受到政治反对，投资也开始减速，这让问题更加严重了。


The resulting supply constraints exacerbated inflation.	由此导致的供给约束恶化了通胀。


So, even as growth slowed, the central bank raised interest rates in order to rebalance demand and the available supply, causing the economy to slow further.	于是，虽然增长在减速，中央银行还是提高了利率，以实现需求和可得供给的再平衡，导致经济进一步减速。


To revive growth in the short run, India must improve supply, which means shifting from consumption to investment.	为了在短期获得增长，印度必须改善供给，而这意味着从消费转向投资。


And it must do so by creating new, transparent institutions and processes, which would limit adverse political reaction.	且这一转向必须通过创造能限制消极政治反应的新的、透明的制度和过程实现。


Over the medium term, it must take an axe to the thicket of unwieldy regulations that make businesses so dependent on an agile and cooperative bureaucracy.	从中期看，必须向笨重繁琐的监管开刀，如此监管导致企业严重依赖于圆滑而合作的官僚。


One example of a new institution is the Cabinet Committee on Investment, which has been created to facilitate the completion of large projects.	新制度的一个例子是内阁投资委员会，该委员会成立的初衷是促进大型工程的完成情况。


By bringing together the key ministers, the committee has coordinated and accelerated decision-making, and has already approved tens of billions of dollars in spending in its first few meetings.	委员会集合了相关重要部门的部长，起到了协调和加快决策的作用，最初的几次会议就批准了数百亿美元的支出项目。


In addition to more investment, India needs less consumption and higher savings.	除了加大投资，印度需要减少消费、增加储蓄。


The government has taken a first step by tightening its own budget and spending less, especially on distortionary subsidies.	政府已经迈出了第一步——紧缩自己的预算、减少支出，特别是自由裁量补贴支出。


Households also need stronger incentives to increase financial savings.	家庭也需要更强的激励增加财务储蓄。


New fixed-income instruments, such as inflation-indexed bonds, will help.	新的固定收益工具，如通胀指数债券，能起到辅助作用。


So will lower inflation, which raises real returns on bank deposits.	降低通胀率亦然，这能提高银行存款的真实回报。


Lower government spending, together with tight monetary policy, are contributing to greater price stability.	削减政府支出并辅之以收紧货币利率能促进价格稳定。


If all goes well, India’s economy should recover and return to its recent 8% average in the next couple of years.	如果一切顺利，印度会在未来几年复苏并回到当前平均8%的增长水平。


Enormous new projects are in the works to sustain this growth.	大量新项目已经开工，它们有助于维持这一增长。


For example, the planned Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor, a project with Japanese collaboration entailing more than $90 billion in investment, will link Delhi to Mumbai’s ports, covering an overall length of 1,483 kilometers (921 miles) and passing through six states.	比如，规划中的日本合作项目德里-孟买工业走廊投资规模将超过900亿美元，它将德里与孟买港口连起来，总长度1483公里，途径六个邦。


The project includes nine large industrial zones, high-speed freight lines, three ports, six airports, a six-lane expressway, and a 4,000-megawatt power plant.	该项目包括九个大型工业区、高速货运路线、三个港口、六个机场、六车道高速公路和一个400万千瓦的电站。


We have already seen a significant boost to economic activity from India’s construction of its highway system.	我们已经可以从印度高速公路系统建设中看到经济活动的巨大提振。


The boost to jobs and growth from the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor, linking the country’s political and financial capitals, could be significantly greater.	连接印度政治和金融首都的德里-孟买工业走廊对就业和增长的提振可能还要大得多。


To the extent that democratic responses to institutional incapacity will contribute to stronger and more sustainable growth, India’s economic clouds have a silver lining.	对制度无能的民主反应有利于更强劲、更可持续的增长，因此印度经济前景是光明的。


But if India’s politicians engage in point-scoring rather than institution-building, the current slowdown may portend stormy weather ahead.	但如果印度政客只顾政绩，不顾制度建设，那么当前的减速之势可能意味着漫漫熊途。


The Democratization of Aid	援助的民主化


The outpouring of aid in response to the Indian Ocean tsunami brought hope to a troubled world.	关心印度洋海啸并为受灾地区提供经济援助的全球热潮给这个困难重重的社会带来了希望。


In the face of an immense tragedy, working class families around the world opened their wallets to the disaster’s victims.	大灾面前，全世界的工薪家庭都打开钱袋，援助受灾群众。


Former US President Bill Clinton called this response a “democratization of development assistance,” in which individuals lend their help not only through their governments but also through their own efforts.	美国前总体比尔·克林顿称之为“发展援助的民主化”，意思是个人不仅通过本国政府提供援助，自己也亲自参与其中。


But, while more than 200,000 people perished in the tsunami disaster, an equivalent number of children die each month of malaria in Africa, a disaster I call a “silent tsunami.”	尽管死于这场海啸灾难的达到200，000人之多，可每月还有同样数目的非洲儿童死于疟疾，我把这场灾难称之为“沉默的海啸”。


Africa’s silent tsunami of malaria, however, is actually largely avoidable and controllable.	但非洲这场沉默的疟疾海啸在很大程度上是可以避免、也能够控制的。


Malaria can be prevented to a significant extent, and can be treated with nearly 100% success, through available low-cost technologies.	疟疾在很大程度上是可以避免的，采用现有的低成本技术也百分之百地能够治愈。


Yet malaria’s African victims, as well as those in other parts of the world, are typically too poor to have access to these life-saving technologies.	可非洲的疟疾患者和世界其它地区一样，根本没钱使用这些救命的技术。


A global effort, similar to the response to the Asian tsunami, could change this disastrous situation, saving more than one million lives per year.	和援助亚洲海啸相似的行动能够改变这种灾难性的状况，每年可以拯救百万以上的生命。


Herein lies the main message of the new report of the UN Millennium Project, which was delivered in mid-January to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.	这正是一月中旬提交给联合国秘书长科菲·安南的联合国千年计划最新报告的主旨之所在。


The Project, which I direct on behalf of the Secretary General, represents an effort by more than 250 scientists and development experts to identify practical means to achieve the Millennium Development Goals to cut extreme poverty, disease, and hunger by the year 2015.	由我代表秘书长负责的这项计划涵盖了250名科学和发展专家探索有效方法实现在2015年消除极度贫困、疾病、饥饿的千年发展目标所进行的努力。 我们最新提交的报告名为 投资发展：实现千年发展目标的现实计划 （可登录 www.


Our new report, entitled Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals (available for download at www.unmillenniumproject.org ), shows that these goals can be achieved.	unmillenniumproject. org 进行下载），该报告表明这些目标是能够实现的。


The key to meeting the Millennium Development Goals in poor countries is an increase in investment in people (health, education, nutrition, and family planning), the environment (water and sanitation, soils, forests, and biodiversity), and infrastructure (roads, power, and ports).	贫困国家实现千年发展目标的关键在于加大对人的投资（医疗、教育、营养和家庭计划）、对环境的投资（水和卫生设施、土壤、森林和生物多样性）和对基础设施的投资（道路、能源和港口）。


Poor countries cannot afford these investments on their own, so rich countries must help.	贫困国家依靠自身的力量无法担负这些投资，因此富裕的国家必须给予帮助。


If more financial aid is combined with good governance in poor countries, then the Millennium Development Goals can be achieved on time.	如果把经济援助和穷国自身的良好管理结合起来，那么千年发展计划应该可以按时完成。


In short, our new Report is a call to action.	一言以蔽之，我们的最新报告是一份行动倡议书。


Rich countries and poor countries need to join forces to cut poverty, disease, and hunger.	富国和穷国需要携起手来，共同消除贫困、疾病和饥饿。


The reason that the Millennium Development Goals are feasible is that powerful existing technologies give us the tools to make rapid advances in the quality of life and economic productivity of the world’s poor.	千年发展目标可以实现的原因在于现有的技术力量赋予了我们迅速提高贫困国家生活质量和经济生产率的强大武器。


Illness and deaths from malaria can be reduced sharply by using insecticide-treated bed nets to stop the mosquitoes that transmit malaria, and by effective medicines when the illness strikes.	疟疾引发的疾病和死亡能够大幅度减少，方法是使用经过杀虫处理的蚊帐来防止蚊虫叮咬，以及在疾病流行时使用有效药物进行医治。


The total cost of battling malaria in Africa would be around $2 to $3 billion per year.	非洲对抗疟疾需要的总开支大约在每年20到30亿美元。


With around one billion people living in high-income countries, it would thus cost just $2 to $3 per person per year in the developed world to fund an effort that could save more than one million children annually.	生活在高收入国家的人口大约在10亿左右，也就是说发达国家每人每年只需捐出2到3美元就可以支持每年拯救百万儿童的花销。


When child mortality is reduced, poor families choose to have fewer children, because they are more confident that their children will survive to adulthood.	如果儿童死亡率能够降低，那些贫困家庭就会选择少生孩子，因为他们确信自己的孩子能够活到成年。


Thus, paradoxically, saving children’s lives is part of the solution to rapid population growth in poor countries.	令人感到不可思议的是，拯救儿童的生命却会变成贫困国家人口迅速增长的解决之道。


Malaria is an important example where specific investments can solve the problems of disease, hunger, and extreme poverty.	疟疾只是定向投资如何解决疾病、饥饿和极端贫困问题的一个重要实例。


Our report makes dozens of such practical recommendations.	我们的报告提出了几十条这样切实可行的建议。


Investments in soil nutrients and water harvesting could help African farmers double or triple their food yields.	投资土壤养分和水利设施可以使非洲农民的粮食产量翻两番或三番。


Anti-retroviral medicines can help save millions from death due to AIDS.	抗爱滋病毒药物能够使成百上千万的爱滋病患者免于死亡。


Rural roads, truck transport, and electricity could bring new economic opportunities to remote villages in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.	乡村道路、卡车运输和电力建设可以给拉丁美洲、非洲和亚洲的偏远乡村创造新的经济机会。


School meal programs using locally produced food could boost attendance by poor children, especially girls, and improve their ability to learn, while also providing an expanded market for local farmers.	学校用本地粮食提供正餐的计划能够促使贫困儿童，特别是女童前来上学，改善他们的学习能力，同时也扩大当地农民的销售市场。


These investments are an incredible bargain.	上述投资对富裕国家来讲不过是九牛一毛。


Rich countries have long promised to increase their aid levels to 0.7% of national income (from around only 0.25% today).	他们很久以前就承诺过要把援助水平提高到国民收入的0. 7%（而今天只有约0.


The promise of 0.7% means that the rich world would give developing countries a mere 70 cents out of each $100 of national income.	0. 7%���承诺意味着富国只需从每一百美元的国民收入中拿出区区70美分，用来援助发展中国家。


In recent weeks, many European countries have pledged to honor the 0.7% commitment, and five European countries (Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden) already do so.	近几个星期以来，很多欧洲国家都承诺要兑现0. 7%的许诺，其中五个国家（丹麦、卢森堡、荷兰、挪威和瑞典）已经付诸实施了。


It’s up to the US and Japan to follow through on their promises as well.	现在是美国和日本兑现承诺的时候了。


Moreover, with the “democratization” of aid now underway, we can look forward to increased private efforts alongside official development assistance.	不仅如此，随着目前援助的“民主化”进程，我们将在保持官方发展援助的同时期待更多的民间援助。


Of course, not all developing countries are sufficiently well governed to use an increase in aid in an honest, effective way.	当然了，不是所有的发展中国家都管理完善，能够诚实、有效地利用多出来的援助。


The world should therefore start this bold effort by focusing on the poor countries that are relatively well governed and that are prepared to carry out needed investments in an efficient and fair manner.	因此世界应该首先关注那些管理相对完善、能够公平、有效地利用资金的贫困国家。


Ghana, Senegal, Tanzania, Kenya, and Ethiopia are on that list.	加纳、塞内加尔、坦桑尼亚、肯尼亚都在此列。


It is urgent that we get started in these and similarly well governed poor countries this year.	我们在上述和类似管理较为完善的国家开始这样计划的确已经是当务之急。


America’s Blinders	蒙蔽的美国


SINGAPORE – The time has come to think the unthinkable: the era of American dominance in international affairs may well be coming to an end.	新加坡—是时候想象难以想象之物了：美国在国际事务中占主导地位的时代正在结束。


As that moment approaches, the main question will be how well the United States is prepared for it.	随着这一时刻的临近，主要问题将是美国对此如何做出准备。


Asia’s rise over the last few decades is more than a story of rapid economic growth.	过去几十年来，亚洲的崛起绝不仅限于快速经济增长。


It is the story of a region undergoing a renaissance in which people’s minds are re-opened and their outlook refreshed.	该地区经历了一场文艺复兴，其人民的心智被重新开启，眼光焕然一新。


Asia’s movement toward resuming its former central role in the global economy has so much momentum that it is virtually unstoppable.	亚洲迈向重温昔日全球经济核心之梦的运动动力十足，骎骎然已成不可阻挡之势。


While the transformation may not always be seamless, there is no longer room to doubt that an Asian century is on the horizon, and that the world’s chemistry will change fundamentally.	转型或许免不了会带来些许伤害，但毫无疑问，亚洲世纪已经出现在地平线上，世界的化学成分将发生根本性改变。


Global leaders – whether policymakers or intellectuals – bear a responsibility to prepare their societies for impending global shifts.	全球领袖——不管是决策者还是知识分子——承担着让其所在社会为全球变迁做好准备的重任。


But too many American leaders are shirking this responsibility.	但太多美国领导者逃避了这一责任。


Last year, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, two US senators, one member of the US House of Representatives, and a deputy national security adviser participated in a forum on the future of American power (I was the chair).	去年，在达沃斯世界经济论坛上，两位美国参议员、一位美国众议员和一位副国家安全顾问参加了我主持的美国实力未来论坛。


When asked what future they anticipated for American power, they predictably declared that the US would remain the world’s most powerful country.	当被问及他们对美国实力的未来作何观的时候，他们的说法一点都不出乎意料：美国将仍是世界最强大的国家。


When asked whether America was prepared to become the world’s second-largest economy, they were reticent.	当被问及美国是否做好了沦为世界第二大经济体的准备时，他们沉默了。


Their reaction was understandable: even entertaining the possibility of the US becoming “number two” amounts to career suicide for an American politician.	他们的反应不难理解：即使是开玩笑地提及美国沦为“第二名”的可能性，也足以敲掉他们作为美国政客的饭碗。