On the contrary, we long for interaction with the West.	相反，我们期待着与西方接触的一天。


If it can bring us more economic opportunities, as well as social and political freedoms, let us be ‘West-toxified.’”	如果这能给我们带来更多的经济机会和社会政治自由，那么我们宁愿“中西方的毒”。


Still, despite popular demand in Iran, and common strategic interests, it could be years before America and Iran sit down and make amends.	尽管缓和关系代表了伊朗的民意，美伊两国也有共同的战略利益，但美国和伊朗真正坐下来改变现状，恐怕还得要几年的时间。


After 25 years of living without each other, reconciliation will not come immediately.	在长达25年的相互隔绝后，两国关系不可能立刻和解。


When it does, there is good reason to believe that Iranians will greet their long lost friends with the same friendliness and exuberance that they did sixty years ago in Arak.	但和解真正到来的时刻，我们有理由相信伊朗人会用60年前在阿拉克时同样的友善和热情来欢迎这位失去已久的朋友。


Can We Increase Gross National Happiness?	我们能否提升国民幸福总值


PRINCETON – The small Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan is known internationally for two things: high visa fees, which reduce the influx of tourists, and its policy of promoting “gross national happiness” instead of economic growth.	普林斯顿——喜马拉雅小国不丹凭借旨在减少游客涌入的高额签证费和促进“国民幸福总值”而非经济增长的政策而在国际上享有盛誉。


The two are related: more tourists might boost the economy, but they would damage Bhutan’s environment and culture, and so reduce happiness in the long run.	这两项政策具有内在的关联性：游客增加可能推动经济发展，但同时会破坏不丹的环境和文化，从而影响民众的长期幸福。


When I first heard of Bhutan’s goal of maximizing its people’s happiness, I wondered if it really meant anything in practice, or was just another political slogan.	当我首次听到不丹把追求国民幸福当作目标的时候，曾经怀疑这样一种提法是否只是政治口号，还是具有实际的意义。


Last month, when I was in the capital, Thimphu, to speak at a conference on “Economic Development and Happiness,” organized by Prime Minister Jigme Y. Thinley and co-hosted by Jeffrey Sachs, Director of The Earth Institute at Columbia University and Special Adviser to United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, I learned that it is much more than a slogan.	上个月，我在不丹首都廷布举办的“经济发展和幸福会议”上讲话，才明白这不是口号而是实实在在的行动。 不丹首相吉格梅·廷莱和哥伦比亚大学地球研究所主任兼联合国秘书长潘基文的特别顾问杰弗里·萨克斯是此次会议的共同主办者。


Never before have I been at a conference that was taken so seriously by a national government.	此前我还从未参加过受到国家政府如此重视的会议。


I had expected Thinley to open the conference with a formal welcome, and then return to his office.	我以为廷莱会以一篇正式的欢迎辞宣布会议开幕，而后回到自己的办公室。


Instead, his address was a thoughtful review of the key issues involved in promoting happiness as a national policy.	相反，他在讲话中对以增强幸福感为国策所涉及的重要问题进行了深刻的反思。


He then stayed at the conference for the entire two and a half days, and made pertinent contributions to our discussions.	随后两天半的会议期间他一直留在现场，并对我们的讨论提出了中肯的建议。


At most sessions, several cabinet ministers were also present.	其中多数讨论还有几位内阁部长的参与。


Since ancient times, happiness has been universally seen as a good.	自古以来，幸福就被人们普遍认为是一种美德。


Problems arise when we try to agree on a definition of happiness, and to measure it.	但如何定义并衡量幸福却一直是人们争论不休的话题。


One important question is whether we see happiness as the surplus of pleasure over pain experienced over a lifetime, or as the degree to which we are satisfied with our lives.	一个重要问题是将幸福视为扣除一世痛苦之后剩余的快乐，还是对生活的总体满意度。


The former approach tries to add up the number of positive moments that people have, and then to subtract the negative ones.	前一种方法将普通人的积极感受次数加总求和，减去消极感受次数得到的一个结果。


If the result is substantially positive, we regard the person’s life as happy; if negative, as unhappy.	如果从大体上看积极感受的次数更多，我们就认为此人生活是幸福的，反之，则不幸福。


So, to measure happiness defined in that way, one would have to sample moments of people’s existence randomly, and try to find out whether they are experiencing positive or negative mental states.	因此要想按照这样的定义衡量幸福与否，我们必须随机抽取普通人的生存状态，并试图确定他们的心理状态是积极还是消极的。


A second approach asks people: “How satisfied are you with the way your life has gone so far?”	另一种方法是询问人们：“你对目前的生活状况究竟有多满意？


If they say they are satisfied, or very satisfied, they are happy, rather than unhappy.	”如果回答是满意或非常满意，他们就是幸福的，否则就不幸福。


But the question of which of these ways of understanding happiness best captures what we should promote raises fundamental questions of value.	但究竟对幸福的哪种理解最贴切地诠释了我们的追求向我们提出了价值观的根本问题。


On surveys that use the first approach, countries like Nigeria, Mexico, Brazil, and Puerto Rico do well, which suggests that the answer may have more to do with the national culture than with objective indicators like health, education, and standard of living.	在采用第一种方法进行的调查中，尼日利亚、墨西哥、巴西和波多黎各成绩不错，这样的结果表明答案可能与民族文化有关，而不取决于健康、教育和生活标准等客观指标。


When the second approach is taken, it tends to be the richer countries, like Denmark and Switzerland, that come out on top.	当采用第二种方法时，丹��和瑞典等富裕国家往往会脱颖而出。


But it is not clear whether people’s answers to survey questions in different languages and in different cultures really mean the same thing.	但我们并不清楚不同文化中的民众用不同语言回答的调查问题是否具有同样的含义。


We may agree that our goal ought to be promoting happiness, rather than income or gross domestic product, but, if we have no objective measure of happiness, does this make sense?	我们可以认同应该以提升幸福感而非收入或国内生产总值为目标，但如果对幸福没有客观的衡量标准，这样做是否真有意义？


John Maynard Keynes famously said: “I would rather be vaguely right than precisely wrong.”	约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯曾讲过一句名言：“我宁愿要模糊的正确也不要精确的错误。


He pointed out that when ideas first come into the world, they are likely to be woolly, and in need of more work to define them sharply.	”凯恩斯指出当世间最初产生思想的时候，这些思想可能模模糊糊，要想界定清楚还需要做很多工作。


That may be the case with the idea of happiness as the goal of national policy.	把幸福感作为国家政策目标可能就属于这种情况。


Can we learn how to measure happiness?	我们能否学会该如何衡量幸福？


The Center for Bhutan Studies, set up by the Bhutanese government 12 years ago, is currently processing the results of interviews with more than 8,000 Bhutanese.	不丹政府12年前成立的不丹研究中心正在处理针对8，000多名不丹民众的访问结果。


The interviews recorded both subjective factors, such as how satisfied respondents are with their lives, and objective factors, like standard of living, health, and education, as well as participation in culture, community vitality, ecological health, and the balance between work and other activities.	访问内容既包括受访者的生活满意度等主观因素，也包括像生活水平、医疗、教育和文化参与、社会活力、生态健康以及工作和其他活动平衡等客观因素。


It remains to be seen whether such diverse factors correlate well with each other.	目前尚不清楚如此多元化的因素能否很好地相互协调。


Trying to reduce them to a single number will require some difficult value judgments.	需要难度很大的价值判断才能简化上述因素。


Bhutan has a Gross National Happiness Commission, chaired by the prime minister, which screens all new policy proposals put forward by government ministries.	不丹设立了国民幸福总值委员会，由首相亲自领导对政府各部拟定的新的政策议案进行审查。


If a policy is found to be contrary to the goal of promoting gross national happiness, it is sent back to the ministry for reconsideration.	如果发现某项政策有悖于提升国民幸福总值的目标，就会发回部里重新拟定。


Without the Commission’s approval, it cannot go ahead.	没有委员会的首肯，任何政策都无法通过。


One controversial law that did go ahead recently – and that indicates how willing the government is to take tough measures that it believes will maximize overall happiness – is a ban on the sale of tobacco.	近来确实通过了一项禁止售卖烟草的争议法律，而这恰恰表明政府采取强硬措施提升全民幸福感的意愿是多么强烈。


Bhutanese may bring into the country small quantities of cigarettes or tobacco from India for their own consumption, but not for resale – and they must carry the import-tax receipt with them any time they smoke in public.	不丹人可以从印度带入少量香烟和烟叶供自己使用，但不允许进行销售——而且在公共场合吸烟时必须随时携带进口税完税凭证。


Last July, the UN General Assembly passed, without dissent, a Bhutanese-initiated resolution recognizing the pursuit of happiness as a fundamental human goal and noting that this goal is not reflected in GDP.	去年7月，联合国大会一致通过了一项由不丹提出的决议，承认人类根本目标在于追求幸福，而国内生产总值不能体现这一目标。


The resolution invited member states to develop additional measures that better capture the goal of happiness.	决议邀请各成员国制定能更好体现幸福目标的对策。


The General Assembly also welcomed an offer from Bhutan to convene a panel discussion on the theme of happiness and well-being during its 66th session, which opens this month.	联大还欢迎不丹在本月开幕的第66届联大会议上就幸福和福祉问题召集小组讨论的建议。


These discussions are part of a growing international movement to re-orient government policies towards well-being and happiness.	上述讨论是正在兴起的国际运动的组成部分，目的是把福祉和幸福作为政府政策追求的目标。


We should wish the effort well, and hope that ultimately the goal becomes global, rather than merely national, happiness.	我们应该衷心期待它取得成功，并希望幸福最终会成为全球而不只是某个国家的目标。


Can We Insure against Tsunamis?	我们能为海啸投保吗？


Most of the discussion surrounding how to respond to Asia’s tsunami disaster has focused on government relief programs and official schemes to implement early warning systems.	大部分围绕如何应对亚洲海啸灾难的讨论都把焦点放在政府赈灾项目和完善预警系统的官方计划上。


Little discussion has focused on the promotion of private risk management institutions, notably insurance.	很少有讨论关注个人风险管理制度，特别是保险制度。


This is unfortunate.	这真是不幸。


Insurance companies provide professional, finely detailed risk management that respects the complexity of the dangers to be hedged and responds creatively to individual needs.	保险公司提供专业且极为详细的风险管理方案，能在考虑各种须加防范的危险的复杂性基础上，针对个人情况提供创造性的解决方案。


Promoting private insurance may seem an indirect response to the tsunami disaster, but it is a rational – and powerful – response.	促进个人保险业的发展也许看起来是对海啸灾难的一种间接反应，但它却是一种理性且有力的反应。


Insurance companies have not penetrated many of the regions that suffered the greatest losses.	此次大灾的多数受灾地区都没有保险公司。


According to a study by the Insurance Information Institute, expenditures on non-life insurance in 2003 amounted to only 0.83% of GDP in Indonesia, 1.19% of GDP in Thailand, and 0.62% of GDP in India, compared with 5.23% of GDP in the United States.	保险资讯中心（Insurance Information Institute）的一份研究表明，与美国5. 23%的比例相比，2003年印度尼西亚财产保险支出仅占全国GDP的0.


Foreign aid is no substitute for insurance.	国外援助并不能代替保险。


Charity inspires, reassuring us of our humanity, but it is often capricious. You wouldn’t want to rely on it.	慈善活动鼓舞人心，使我们相信人心博爱，但它却没有规律，不能完全依赖。


Indeed, when deciding how much disaster aid to offer, countries often seem to be influenced mainly by their leaders’ concerns about how others will view them.	事实上，在考虑提供多少灾难援助的时候，看来各国主要受到领导人意志影响，因为他们更多考虑的是别人会如何看待他们的善举。


Charity responds to attention-grabbing events, often neglecting less sensational disasters.	而慈善活动只对那些众人关注的事件有所反应，对于那些非爆炸性的灾难通常忽略不顾。


Insurance, on the other hand, is a reliable and venerable institution, its modern form dating back to the seventeenth century.	保险，从另一方面来说，却是一种可靠可信的制度。


But insurance and other risk management institutions have been slow to develop, even in advanced countries.	现代保险形式起源于十七世纪，但即使是在发达国家，保险和其他的风险管理制度却发展缓慢。


In the US, most people still do not have flood or earthquake insurance.	在美国，大部分人至今还无洪灾或地震保险。


In California, one of the world’s most unstable geological regions, only one in six homeowners buys earthquake insurance.	在加利福尼亚——全世界地质条件最不稳定的地区之一，只有六分之一的家庭购买了地震保险。


A fundamental problem is that insurance is not a concept that comes naturally to most people.	造成这种情况的一个基本原因就是，保险是一个还未被广泛接受的理念。


In fact, as psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have shown, there is a systematic human tendency to downgrade the perceived probability of low-probability events, so that people go about their lives as if the probability of these events’ occurrence is zero.	事实上，正如心理学家Daniel Kahneman和Amos Tversky说得那样，人类总是系统性地倾向于降低低概率事件的发生概率，于是乎他们就可若无其事地继续生活，宛若视此事件发生概率为零一样。


Similarly, humans tend to accept large downside risks in order to avoid small certain losses, such as insurance premiums.	同样道理，人们愿意为了避免某些小损失而接受正呈下降趋势的巨大风险，譬如保费。


Insurance companies have faced a slow and difficult process in weaning the public from these tendencies.	保险公司面临着使公众逐步脱离这种倾向的过程，这一过程可谓漫长艰难。


Moreover, designing new risk-management products is not easy.	此外，设计新型风险管理产品并非易事。


Insurance companies face inherent difficulties in measuring risks, and they must tailor their policies creatively around the human foibles that limit uptake.	保险公司必须面对风险评估与生俱有的困难性，还必须根据种种限制人们投保的人性癖好创造性地修改方针政策。


Insurers must also be attentive to a wide array of possible moral hazards – perverse incentives to risky behavior – and to problems of selection bias in attracting clients.	它还不得不对各种各样可能出现的道德风险——不正当的投机行为动机加以防范，对吸引客户的选择性偏倚问题多加留心。


To deal with disasters more effectively, countries must find the will to create an environment in which a much more developed private insurance industry can flourish.	为了更有效率地处理灾难事故，各国必须达成一个共同意向，为私人保险业的进一步发展和欣欣向荣营造环境。


In the US, the National Flood Insurance Program of 1968 made it mandatory for those financing construction or improvement of structures within Special Flood Hazard Areas to buy flood insurance.	美国1968年通过的《国家水灾保险项目》规定，凡是在特别水灾危险区筹资建造房产或者改造建筑物的机构都必须购买洪灾保险。


If not made mandatory, insurance must at least be promoted effectively.	如果不实行强制，就必须要采取有效方法推广保险。


Otherwise, people will build on flood plains in the belief that their government, or the governments of the world, will feel obligated to bail them out, thereby insuring, in effect, bad risks that should not be taken.	否则的话，人们就会站在在洪汜平原，坚信他们的政府，或者世界各国政府，有义务来帮助他们摆脱困境，从而坚信根本不该为重大险情投保。


Many of the worst outcomes in Asia occurred in tsunami-prone areas, such as the low-lying coastal areas of Sri Lanka.	此次亚洲损失最为惨重的多为一些海啸高发地区，比如斯里兰卡的低沿海地区。


Private insurance would discourage construction in the most dangerous locations, owing to prohibitively high premiums, while encouraging the adoption of tsunami-resistant building standards in marginal areas.	但是，若由私人投保的话，那么就会鉴于私人保险的高额违约金，阻止在高危地点修建房屋，鼓励在边缘地区实施抗海啸的建筑标准。


Fortunately, our international risk-management institutions are steadily improving.	幸运地是，我们的国际风险管理制度正在日臻完善。


Various catastrophe bonds, covering earthquakes and other disasters, and weather derivatives have begun trading on financial markets in recent years.	各种各样的灾难保单，包括地震和其他各种灾难，以及气象灾害所引起的各种灾难，在近几年内已经开始进入金融���场交易。


The Kyoto Protocol created a mechanism for trading carbon dioxide emissions, which promises to manage the risks of an even bigger potential disaster: global warming.	《京都议定书》针对二氧化碳气体排放问题建立了一个机制，该机制允诺处理解决一个更大的潜在灾难——全球变暖问题的风险。


The markets for these products are still small, but they have strong growth potential, and their further development would enhance insurance companies’ ability to cover risks of major international disasters.	这些保险产品的市场还有待开发，但其成长潜力巨大，它们的进一步发展将提高保险公司处理国际重大灾难的能力。


Consider the absence of an early tsunami warning system in the worst affected countries.	想一想在那些受灾最重地区竟然没有先期海啸预警系统，你很容易责备那里的人们目光短浅。


It is easy to blame people for lack of foresight, but none of the nine hardest hit countries had developed one. They can’t all be bunglers.	但是九个受灾最重国家无一拥有此系统，他们不可能都如此冒失吧！


The problem is not individual error.	关键问题不在个人之错。


The failure was caused by the absence of appropriate international institutions that would be alert to the broad spectrum of potential disasters.	这种疏忽源于缺少适当的、且能预警各种潜在灾难的国际机制。


Discussion of early warning systems for tsunamis has focused on government programs. But early warning means more than ocean sensors and satellites; it also implies directing construction away from disaster-prone areas and prodding private businesses to develop effective safety and evacuation procedures.	许多有关海啸预警系统的讨论把焦点放于政府规划项目上，但是预警系统不仅仅意味着海洋传感器和卫星，它还包括避开灾难高发地区建造房屋以及刺激私营企业开发有效的安全和撤离程序。


These are normal activities of insurance companies.	这些都是保险公司的常规项目。


Indeed, one of the more striking features of the tsunami disaster was that it caught some of the most glamorous vacation resorts completely unprepared.	事实上，此次海啸灾难最触目惊心的是，某些高级度假胜地全无准备。


The lesson is clear: even high-class businesses are only as professional as the existing institutional infrastructure permits them to be.	这个教训发人深省：即使是高级产业，其专业程度也只能在现有机制下的基础设施允许范围内。


The ultimate reason for their lack of preparation is that our insurance industry was not covering their tsunami risks, and hence not offering up-to-date disaster-prevention guidance.	而他们被攻其不备的最根本的原因是，我们的保险业没有开发海啸风险项目，未能提供最新的防灾指导。


The insurance industry can, and should, respond to the tsunami disaster by accepting the moral imperative to take concerted action to expand risk coverage.	保险业可以，也应当，领受道德使命、步调一致采取行动以扩大保险范围，应对海啸。


To the extent that governments are involved, they can promote better risk management through responsive regulation and even subsidization of experiments with new private insurance products.	而政府可以做的，是通过制定反应迅速的规章制度，甚至是对新型私人保险产品的试验进行补贴，促进更佳的风险管理。


Can We Survive the “Anthropocene” Period?	我们能 在“人类世”时代存活么？


For the past three centuries, humans’ effects on the global environment have escalated.	在过去的三百年里，人类对全球环境的影响越来越大。


Most importantly, our emissions of carbon dioxide may cause global climate patterns to depart significantly from their natural course for many millennia to come.	尤其是我们排放的二氧化碳，这导致全球气候的改变，如果要是自然变化的话，可以要几万年时间才可能完成。


It seems appropriate to assign the term “Anthropocene” to the current, in many ways human-dominated, geological epoch, supplementing the Holocene – the warm period of the past 10–12 millennia.	看来，引入“人类世”的概念来描述现在的人类主宰的时代比较合适，作为一个地质时代，它是“全新世”的下一代。


The Anthropocene Period could be said to have started in the latter part of the eighteenth century, when analyses of air trapped in polar ice showed the beginning of growing global concentrations of CO2 and methane.	“全新世”是一个温暖的时期，时间跨度大约为1万-1万2千年之间。 全新世的概念是在18世纪后期开始出现的，科学家在分析了极地冰川的气候后发现，全球二氧化碳和甲烷的含量开始上升。


This date also happens to coincide with James Watt’s design of the steam engine in 1784.	与此不谋而合的是，同时代的詹姆斯·瓦特在1784年设计出第一台蒸汽机。


Mankind’s growing influence on the environment was recognized as long ago as 1873, when the Italian geologist Antonio Stoppani referred to the “anthropozoic era,” defined by a “new telluric force, which in power and universality may be compared to the greater forces of earth.”	早在1873年之前，人类就意识到自身对环境的影响。 意大利地质学家安东尼奥·斯托帕尼将它称为“人类世时代”，他的定义是“一个全新的地球力量，世界将被这种更伟大的能量主宰。


In 1926, V. I. Vernadsky similarly acknowledged the increasing impact of mankind on “[t]he direction in which the processes of evolution must proceed, namely towards increasing consciousness and thought, and forms having greater and greater influence on their surroundings.”	I. 韦尔兹基也把人类日益增长的影响力称为“进化发展的自然方向，对周围环境有意识影响的效果越来越明显。


Vernadsky and Teilhard de Chardin used the term “noösphere” – the world of thought – to mark the growing role of human brain-power in shaping its own future and environment.	” 韦尔兹基和德日进使用“人类圈”——世界的思想——这个概念来说明，人类大脑对我们未来和环境不断增加的影响力。


Humans’ rapid expansion in terms of population and per capita use of Earth’s resources has continued apace.	随着人口和人均使用地球资源的不断增加，人类正在不断飞速地发展。


During the past three centuries, the human population has increased ten-fold, to more than six billion, and is expected to reach 10 billion in this century.	在过去的300年中，人口数量已经增加了10倍，达到60多亿，预计到本世纪，世界人口将达到100亿。


As a result, 30–50% of the planet’s land surface is now exploited by humans.	地球30-50%的陆地资源已经被人类所占用。


At the same time, the methane-producing cattle population has risen to 1.4 billion, contributing to the increasing rate of destruction of tropical rainforests, which releases carbon dioxide and contributes to faster species extinction.	与此同时，人类饲养家畜的数量达到14亿，它们产生的甲烷也对热带雨林产生破坏作用，从而导致二氧化碳的增加和物种灭绝的加速。


Land conversion for grazing (and construction), together with crop tillage, has also caused soil erosion at 15 times its natural rate.	人类对土地的耕种和开发利用也加速了对土壤的侵蚀，这比自然速率要快15倍。


Indeed, at its current pace, anthropogenic soil erosion would fill the Grand Canyon in 50 years.	如果按照现在的速度，人类对土地的侵蚀将在50年内添满“大峡谷”。


Similarly, dam building and river diversion have become commonplace, as humans’ water consumption has risen nine-fold over the past century, to the point that mankind now uses more than half of all accessible fresh water – roughly two-thirds of it for agriculture.	同样的，水坝的修建和河流的改道目前非常普遍，人类对水资源的消费量已经比100年前增加了9倍。 也就是说，现在人类已经使用了超过半数的可用的水资源——其中大约有三分之二用在了农业上面。


Fisheries remove more than 25% of the primary production in upwelling ocean regions and 35% in the temperate continental shelf.	渔业已经扑杀了超过25%的浅海生物，35%的温带大陆架。


Moreover, energy use has grown 16-fold during the twentieth century, causing 160 million tons of atmospheric sulfur-dioxide emissions per year – more than twice the total of natural emissions.	此外，在20世纪，能源的消耗增加了16倍，导致每年1600万吨的二氧化硫排放到大气之中——比自然排放量的2倍多。


Likewise, more nitrogen fertilizer is applied in agriculture than is fixed naturally in all terrestrial ecosystems, and nitric-oxide production from the burning of fossil fuels and biomass also surpasses natural emissions.	氮肥料也大量运用在自然生态系统中。 由于化石生物的燃烧而产生的一氧化氮也超过了自然界释放的总量。


At the same time, of course, human consumption of fossil fuels, together with our agricultural activities, have caused substantial increases in concentrations of “greenhouse” gases – CO2 by 30% and methane by more than 100%.	与此同时，由于化石燃料的使用和农业活动导致“温室”气体显著增加——二氧化碳增加了30%，甲烷增加了100%。 这些现象在过去40万年中都没有过。


Indeed, these concentrations are higher than at any point in the past 400 millennia, with more growth to follow, because so far these effects have largely been caused by only 25% of the world population.	由于目前的现象还只是由25%的人口产生的，随着不断的发展，环境还将恶化。


The consequences are numerous and profound: acid precipitation, photochemical “smog” and global warming, among others.	由此看来，目前的后果非常严重：酸雨，烟雾和全球气候变暖等。


Hence, according to the latest estimates by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Earth will warm by 1.4–5.8 °C during this century.	根据政府间气候变化专门委员会（IPCC）的最近一项估算，本世纪地球的温度已经升高了1. 4–5.


Many toxic substances are released into the environment, even some that are not toxic but nonetheless are highly damaging – for example, the chlorofluorocarbons that caused the Antarctic ozone hole (and which are now regulated).	8 °C，很多有毒物质被释放在环境中，即便一些非有毒的物质，对大自然也是有危害的——例如氯氟碳导致南极臭氧层空洞。 （目前，我们已经采取行动来治理这个问题。


Things could have become much worse: the ozone-destroying properties of halogens have been studied since the mid-1970’s.	事态还在不断恶化之中。 从1970年代的中期，我们就已经开始研究臭氧层遭受破坏的问题。


If it had turned out that chlorine behaved chemically like bromine, the ozone hole would by then have been a global, year-round phenomenon, not just an event of the Antarctic spring.	结果发现，具有氯的化学属性，例如溴起到一定的作用。 臭氧空洞是一个全球性的问题，而且情况一年比一年恶化，这也不是南极洲春天事件。


More by luck than by wisdom, this catastrophic situation did not develop.	如果一直这么发展下去，灾难性的后果将不可避免。


Unless there is a global catastrophe – a meteorite impact, a world war, or a pandemic – mankind will remain a major environmental force for many millennia.	除非有灾难性的事件发生——例如流星撞击地球，世界大战或是瘟疫的流行——人类将在接下来的很长一段时间都是影响环境的主要力量。


As a result, scientists and engineers face a daunting task during the Anthropocene era: to guide us towards environmentally sustainable management.	因此，在这个“人类世”时代，科学家和工程师任务艰巨，他们将帮助我们解决问题，保持环境继续稳定发展。


This will require appropriate human behavior at all levels, and may well involve internationally accepted, large-scale geo-engineering projects to “optimize” climate. At this stage, however, we are still largely treading on  terra incognita .	这更需要我们所有人的努力，加强国际间的相互协调和利用大规模的生态工程项目来“优化”气候，不过，至少目前来说，我们对大部分领域还一无所知。


Piketty vs. Piketty	皮凯蒂对皮凯蒂


BERKELEY – In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, the French economist Thomas Piketty highlights the striking contrasts in North America and Europe between the Gilded Age that preceded World War I and the decades following World War II.	伯克利—在《二十一世纪资本论》（Capital in the Twenty-First Century）中，法国经济学家托马斯·皮凯蒂（Thomas Piketty）强调了北美和欧洲在一战之前的镀金时代和二战后的几十年之间的向明对比。


In the first period, economic growth was sluggish, wealth was predominantly inherited, the rich dominated politics, and economic (as well as race and gender) inequality was extreme.	在前一个时期中，经济增长缓慢，财富主要靠继承，富人主宰了政坛，经济（以及种族和性别）不平等畸高。


But after the upheaval of WWII, everything changed.	但经历了二战剧变后，一切都改变了。


Income growth accelerated, wealth was predominantly earned (justly or unjustly), politics became dominated by the middle class, and economic inequality was modest (even if race and gender equality remained a long way off).	收入增长加速，财富主要靠挣（不管公不公平），政治由中产阶级主宰，经济不平等也相当温和（即使种族和性别平等仍然大大落后）。


The West seemed to have entered a new era.	西方似乎进入了一个新时代。


But then, in the 1980s, these trends seemed to start shifting steadily back to the pre-WWI norm.	但是，到了20世纪80年代，这些趋势似乎开始稳步退回一战前的范式。


Piketty’s central thesis is that we shouldn’t be surprised by this.	皮凯蒂的中心思想是我们不必为这一变化感到惊奇。


Our reversion to the economic and political patterns of the Gilded Age is to be expected as the economies of North America and Europe return to what is normal for a capitalist society.	我们退回镀金时代的经济和政治模式是可以预期到的，因为北美和欧洲回归了正常资本主义社会。


In a capitalist economy, Piketty argues, it is normal for a large proportion of the wealth to be inherited.	皮凯蒂指出，在资本主义经济中，很大一部分财富被继承是常态。


It is normal for its distribution to be highly unequal.	财富分配高度不平等是常态。


It is normal for a plutocratic elite, once it has formed, to use its political power to shape the economy in a way that enables its members to capture a large chunk of a society’s income.	财阀精英一旦形成就将利用其政治权力影响经济，使其成员攫取社会收入的大部分，这是常态。 经济增长开始放缓也是常态；


And it is normal for economic growth to be slow; rapid growth, after all, requires creative destruction; and, because what would be destroyed would be the plutocrats’ wealth, they are unlikely to encourage it.	毕竟，高速增长需要创造性破坏； 而因为受到破坏的将是财阀的财富，因此他们不可能鼓励创造性破坏。


Since the publication of his book, Piketty’s argument has come under ferocious attack.	自该书出版以来，皮凯蒂的观点遭到了猛烈的抨击。


Most of the critiques are at best mediocre; they strike me less as serious acts of engaged intellect than reflections of the political and economic power of a rising plutocracy.	大部分批评都很平庸； 它们给我的印象不像是有鉴赏力的才智之士所为，倒像是崛起的财阀的政治和经济权力的表现。


Out of this cacophony, however, two lines of criticism suggest that Piketty may be wrong, both with respect to the normal characteristics of a capitalist economy and where we may be headed when it comes to inequality.	但是，在这些聒噪中间，有两个角度的批评表明皮凯蒂也许错了，两个角度都涉及到资本主义经济的正常特征以及不平等性问题的可能方向。


The modern champion of the first line of attack is Matthew Rognlie, a graduate student at MIT, though his argument has a long and impressive pedigree. It can be found in, among other places, John Maynard Keynes’s 1919 The Economic Consequences of the Peace and his 1936 The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money.	第一个抨击阵营的现代领军人物是麻省理工学院研究生马修·荣利（Matthew Rognlie），尽管他的观点可以追溯到很久以前，比如凯恩斯1919年出版的《和平的经济后果》（The Economic Consequences of the Peace）和1936年出版的《就业、利息和货币通论》（The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money）。


Rognlie agrees with Piketty (as Keynes would) that the normal operation of capitalism produces a class that accumulates wealth, which, as a result, takes on a sharp-peaked distribution.	资本主义的正常运行会产生一个积累财富的阶级，从而出现尖峰分布，在这一点上，荣利和皮凯蒂意见一致（凯恩斯亦然）。


But he disagrees about what happens next.	但荣利不同意接下来的内容。


Rognlie argues that the rising concentration of capital is to some extent self-corrective, as it produces a proportionately larger fall in the rate of profit.	他指出，资本集中度的增加在某种程度上是可以自我纠正的，因为这会导致利润率的更大比例的下降。


Unequal wealth distribution, in this view, produces what Keynes called “the euthanasia of the rentier, and, consequently, the euthanasia of the cumulative oppressive power of the capitalist to exploit the scarcity-value of capital.”	根据这一观点，不平等的财富分布会产生凯恩斯所谓的“食利者的安乐死，并由此导致资本家用于榨取资本的稀缺价值的累计压迫力的安乐死。


The result is an economy with relatively equal income distribution and a polity in which the wealthy have a relatively small voice.	”结果是经济出现相对平等的收入分布和一个富人话语权相对较小的政治体系。


My response to this line of reasoning is an unequivocal “perhaps.”	我对这套推理的评价是毫不含糊的“可能”。


The standard bearer for the second line of criticism is none other than Piketty himself – not in anything he has written, but in how he has behaved since becoming a celebrity and a public intellectual.	第二个抨击阵营则是以皮凯蒂之矛攻皮凯蒂之盾——并不是以他写得著作，而是以他在成为名人和公共知识分子后的行为。


Piketty’s book encourages a passive response.	皮凯蒂的书鼓励消极反应。


It portrays the forces favoring the formation of a dominant plutocracy as being so strong that they can be countered only by world wars and global revolutions – and even then, the correction is only temporary.	它描述了有利于主宰性财阀形成的力量，这些财阀如此强大，只有通过世界大战和全球革命��能遏制它们——即便如此，纠正仍只是暂时性的。


But Piketty is not behaving like a passive chronicler of unavoidable destiny.	但皮凯蒂的行为绝不像是记录不可避免的命运的消极编年史家。


He is acting as if he believes that the forces he describes in his book can be resisted.	他的行为让人相信他认为他在其书中所描述的力量是可以抵挡的。


If we look at what Piketty does – rather than what he writes – it seems evident that he believes we can collectively make our own destiny, even if the circumstances are not what he, or we, would choose.	如果我们看看皮凯蒂做了些什么——而不是看他写了些什么——似乎很明显他认为我们能够集体决定我们自身的命运，即便环境非他（或我们）所能选择。


Capitalism and Skepticism	资本主义和怀疑主义


BALTIMORE – As each new day brings word of another Wall Street bailout even more colossal than the last, one question presents itself with ever-increasing force: why does America’s economy perform so badly under Republican presidents?	巴尔的摩--每天华尔街都是救市的消息，愈演愈烈。 人们不禁要越发强烈地提出一个问题，那就是，美国经济为何在共和党总统时期如此糟糕？


The facts are hard to dispute; indeed, the historical record is now so stark that diehard Republicans are probably starting to wonder if there is a curse.	事实难以抵赖。 实际上，历史对比无比鲜明，乃至共和党人可能开始怀疑他们是否遭诅咒。


Over the period for which modern statistics are readily available, Democrats have outperformed Republicans by almost every traditional measure of economic performance (per capita GDP growth, unemployment, inflation, budget deficits).	在对美国经济进行现代统计的时期，民主党在经济表现的几乎所有方面都超过共和党(包括GDP增长、失业率、通货膨胀以及预算赤字)。


Democrats have even managed to beat the Republicans on their own turf.	民主党甚至在共和党的地盘上打败了他们。


Thanks to the profligacy of the current Bush administration (and the prudence of the Clinton administration), average Federal spending as a proportion of GDP under Republican presidents now exceeds that under Democrats during the measured period.	由于目前布什政府花销无度(以及克林顿政府的勤俭)，在进行统计的时间内，在共和党当政时期联邦开支占GDP的平均比例现在超过了民主党当政时期。


The pattern of Republican deficiency holds up when the span of historical analysis is extended by using stock returns to measure economic performance.	如果采用股票回报来衡量经济表现，那么，在延长历史分析的情况下，共和党的经济表现不足模式也是如此。


On average, since the inception of the Standard and Poor’s composite stock index in 1926, the reward for putting your money in the market has been about 16 percentage points lower per presidential term under Republicans than under Democrats.	平均而言，从1926年标准普尔综合股票指数开始以来，共和党当政时期的股市回报率要比民主党低大约十六个百分点。


Republican underperformance remains a stubborn fact even when the Great Depression and World War II are left out of the analysis (in the fond hope that they will prove to have been unique experiences).	即使把大萧条时期和二战排除在外，共和党表现不佳也是顽固不变。


With the current presidential term lurching to such a calamitous close that the incumbent is probably worried about being remembered as George Herbert Hoover Walker Bush, the correlation between presidential party and economic outcome demands some kind of explanation.	由于当下的总统马上就要大败而去，因此他可能担心在历史上留下恶名，把他同胡佛总统联系起来。 然而，总统党派与经济表现之间的关系还是需要一些解释研究。


The answer can’t be found in the specific policy proposals of Republicans or Democrats, which have evolved so much over the years that they defy meaningful generalization.	在共和党或民主党具体的政策纲领中无法找到答案。 多年来，这些纲领演变巨大，无法笼统而言。


Nor are there clearly identifiable differences in doctrine that should translate into a reasonable expectation of better economic performance under one party than the other.	而且，它们在原则上没有什么明显可以辨别的区别可以让人们合理地预计其中一个政党的经济表现要优于另一个。


Perhaps the best explanation has to do with attitudes, not ideology.	最好的解释可能是和态度有关，而非意识形态。


Maybe capitalism works better when skeptics restrain its excesses than when true believers are writing, interpreting, judging, and executing the rules of the game.	或许，在对资本主义笃信不疑的人制定、解释、评判以及执行游戏规则的时候资本主义的表现就比怀疑者限制资本主义过度膨胀的时候要差。


The Democrats are surely the more skeptical of America’s two parties.	民主党无疑就是两党中更为怀疑者。


Some evidence can be found in those features of the American economy that we believe others should emulate.	在美国经济特征中人们可以找到一些证据，我们相信其他人应该效仿。


There is now an overwhelming consensus that open, transparent, and accountable mechanisms of shareholder control are essential for the efficient functioning of public corporations.	现在绝大多数人的共识是，公开、透明以及责任担当的股东控制机制对于上市公司的有效运行十分重要。


Virtue is defined by good accounting rules.	良好的会计规则决定了公司管理要义。


But it is instructive to recall that many of those now-universally-admired rules were fiercely resisted when first proposed.	但是人们应该记住，当许多这些如今已经普遍受到推崇的规则最初提出来的时候遭到激烈的反对。


The options backdating scandal that recently caught Apple’s chairman, Steve Jobs, is a microcosm of innovation, prosecution, and reform; now that a rule has been written to prohibit backdating, this particular scam will not happen again.	苹果公司董事长乔布斯倒签股票期权丑闻代表了创新、追查以及改革的微观生态。 现在制定规则禁止倒签，这一特定的骗术就不会重演了。


Thus do accounting rules approach perfection.	因此，会计规则接近完美。


What do we learn from this example?	我们从这些事例中学到了些什么呢？


It’s hard to say.	这很难说。


Maybe that capitalism works better when it is being held accountable to some external standard than when left to its own devices.	或许是当资本主义受到某些外部标准问责之时要比放任自流要好。


As the twentieth century recedes in the rear-view mirror, it increasingly seems that, for better or worse, our era’s defining manifesto has been Milton Friedman’s book Capitalism and Freedom .	在二十世纪流逝之际，人们越发认识到，无论好坏，我们时代最为重要的著作是弗里德曼的<<资本主义与自由>>。


But that book’s potency originally derived from its fierce independence from contemporary orthodoxies.	但是该书的有力之处最初来自于其坚决独立于当代教条。 当时的统领观点是某种自满的半社会主义。


Friedman’s voice was a skeptical breath of fresh air at a time when the reigning viewpoint was a kind of smug pseudo-socialism that did not recognize the astounding power of markets to accomplish desirable aims.	这一观点并不认可市场可以实现有用的目标。 弗里德曼的声音在当时就是一股清风。


Today, however, the reigning Republican orthodoxy is a kind of smug pseudo-Friedmanism that believes that markets left to themselves can do no wrong.	但是如今，共和党的统领教条是某种自满的半弗里德曼主义。 这一教条相信放任市场运作不会有错。


Perhaps it is time for another breath of fresh air.	现在也许需要另一股清风。


The book for the new epoch has yet to be written, but I have a proposed title: Capitalism and Skepticism .	新时代的巨著还有待完成。 但是我提出一个书名，叫做<<资本主义与怀疑主义>>。


Skepticism might not be as bracing as freedom, but it’s something we could have used a bit more of in the past few years.	从观点角度而言，怀疑主义也许不如自由让人喜欢，但是在过去几年中我们应该多运用一点怀疑主义。


Capitalism’s Moral Bastards	资本主义的道德私生子


Recent revelations that many corporate executives have backdated their stock options, ensuring excessive compensation even when their companies perform poorly, are merely the latest in a stream of examples of bad business behavior.	最近，许多公司行政人员被披露将其股票期权的起算日期提早，以确保即使在公司业绩不佳的情况下也能获得超常丰厚的回报。 而这仅仅是新近层出不穷的不良商业行为之冰山一角。


In an era of evaporated pensions and benefits for the rank and file, piggish pay packets for CEO’s have led a cynical public to wonder where big business has gone wrong.	在这个养老金和普通职员的福利人间蒸发的时代，CEO们的贪得无厌让早已寒心的公众在愤懑之余不禁要问，大公司究竟怎么了？


The answer may be quite simple: too many bosses have abandoned basic human values and embraced the credo famously uttered by Gordon Gekko in the movie  Wall Street : “Greed is good.”	答案可能非常简单：太多的老板已经抛弃了基本的人类价值观并将Gordon Gekko在电影《华尔街》中叫嚣的那句著名台词奉为座右铭：“贪婪有理。 ”


But a growing body of research concludes that greed is  not always good, and that moral values are a necessary element in the conduct of business.	但越来越多的研究表明贪婪并不总是有理，道德观是商业行为中的必要元素。


The Gordon Gekkos are predators who take the quick payoff.	Gordon Gekko们是赚快钱的掠食者。


Although they do serve a useful purpose by keeping other players on their toes and raising efficiency through competition, market participants for the most part avoid them, preferring to do business with the Warren Buffetts – hard-driving businessmen, but known for fair play and creating long-term value.	虽然他们在通过竞争提升效率并让对手不敢掉以轻心方面起到了一些作用，但市场的参与者们在大多数情况下都避免与他们打交道，而更喜欢与沃伦▪巴菲特那样的人做生意—冲劲十足，但又以公平竞争和创造长期价值而著称的商人。


Consider the trip to the mall, where shoppers buy goods produced and shipped from around the world.	想象来到一个购物中心，购物者们在那里选购来自世界各地的商品。


This decentralized delivery of goods relies on employees working for two weeks before receiving a paycheck, companies offering each other lines of credit, and banks offering bridge loans.	这种分散式的交货需要雇员们在获得报酬之前工作两周，公司之间相互提供信用贷款，和银行提供的短期贷款才能实现。


Even though humans have engaged in exchange since before the birth of civilization, the impersonal system of trading is only around 1,000 years old.	虽然人类之间的交流早在文明诞生以前就已存在，但非个人的贸易体系却只有一千年的历史。


While legal remedies exist should this system break down, impersonal trading cannot occur unless most people share the values of fair play and reciprocal cooperation.	尽管这个体系如若崩溃我们可以用现行的法律手段进行补救，但非个人的贸易发生的前提必须是大多数人都奉行公平竞争和互利合作的价值观。


Even in impersonal market exchange, we cannot help but personalize transactions, say, with the grocery store cashier who smiles and thanks us, or the store greeter whose only purpose is to make us feel cared for.	即便是在非个人的市场交换中，我们也不可避免地将交易个人化。 比如在杂货店对我们微笑并道谢的收银员，或是仅仅为了让我们感到备受呵护而工作的商店迎宾人员。


This personalization draws upon regions of the brain that evolved when our trading partners were members of small kin-based groups where moral violations were immediately identified and remedied.	和这种个人化相关的大脑区域是从我们的贸易伙伴还是小型氏族团体成员的时候开始进化的。 在那样的情况下，违反道德的行为会被即时发现并加以纠正。


Research by primatologists Sarah Brosnan and Frans de Waal at Emory University has shown that monkeys also have what look like moral values.	Emory大学的灵长类动物学家Sarah Brosnan和Frans de Waal的研究表明猴类也有某种类似于道德观的体系。


When two monkeys work for food, a fair split is expected.	当两只猴子为食物付出劳动时，他们就期望食物的公平分配。


If a fair division is not received, it elicits cries of outrage and hurled food by the wronged partner.	如果分配不均，就会引发受委屈的一方怒吼并抛掷食物。


Moral values have powerful physiological representations in humans, too, and we feel them strongly when they are violated.	道德观在人类身上也有强烈的生理表现。 当它们受到违背时，我们会有强烈的意识。


The philosopher Josh Greene and his colleagues at Princeton University have shown that personal moral dilemmas (for example, whether you would directly kill one person to save seven others) use our emotions rather than higher cognition – to the chagrin of many philosophers who claimed otherwise.	哲学家Josh Greene和他普林斯顿大学的同事们揭示了个人的道德困境（例如，你会不会为救七个人的命而直接杀死一个人）所利用的是我们的情感，而不是更高的认知力—这让许多与其意见相左的哲学家们懊恼不已。


The personal aspect of such decisions makes our hearts speed up and our palms sweat.	这种决定的个人因素让我们心跳加速、手心出汗。


In neuroeconomics experiments that my lab has conducted, we have found that when a stranger places trust in another by making a considered monetary investment that can either be returned or stolen, our brains release an ancient mammalian hormone called oxytocin.	在我的实验室里所进行的神经经济学实验中，我们发现当某人通过进行既可能被偿还也可能被偷走的金钱投资将信任托付与另一个陌生人时，我们的大脑会释放一种远古的哺乳类动物荷尔蒙—后叶催产素（oxytocin）。


Oxytocin is what bonds mammals to their offspring, and in humans makes spouses care about and love each other.	后叶催产素是将哺乳动物与后代联系在一起的物质，在人类身上它使夫妻相互关爱。


We have found that trust causes a spike in oxytocin and begets reciprocation – the sharing of money.	我们发现信任引起后叶催产素分泌的峰值并由此引发回报行为—分享金钱。


We are “wired” to cooperate, and we find it rewarding in the same way that our brains identify eating a good meal or sex as rewarding.	我们“天生”就是要合作的，我们对它的价值认定和我们的大脑对一顿美餐和一场性爱的价值认定相同。


Oxytocin is active in evolutionarily old areas of our brain, outside of our conscious awareness.	后叶催产素活跃在我们大脑中较古老的进化区域，作用于我们的意识之外。


We simply have a sense that sharing with someone who has trusted us is the right thing to do.	我们仅仅感到与信任我们的人分享是正确的。


We have also found that about 2% of undergraduates we studied are pure non-cooperators.	我们还发现参加实验的大学生中有2%是纯粹的不合作者。


When they have an opportunity to share money with a stranger who has trusted him or her, non-cooperators keep all the money rather than share the largess.	当有机会和信任他（她）的陌生人分享金钱时，不合作者们独占所有的钱，而不与他人分享。


The technical term in my lab for these people is “bastards.”	在我们的实验室里对这些人的专用名词是“私生子”。


Our evidence suggests that bastards’ brains work differently.	我们的证据表明这些私生子的大脑有不同的工作机制。


Their character traits are similar to those of sociopaths.	他们的性格特征类似于那些反社会分子。


They simply do not care about others the way most people do, and the dysfunctional processing of oxytocin in their brains appears to be one reason for this.	他们完全不会像大多数人那样关心他人，他们的大脑不能正常处理后叶催产素似乎是原因之一。


Because bastards are out there, we still need government and personal enforcement of economic exchange.	因为私生子大有人在，所以我们仍然需要政府和经济交换在个人层面上的执行。


Nevertheless, too much government regulation may “crowd out” moral behavior.	不论如何，过度的政府管制可能将道德行为“排挤掉”。


When every offense has an associated penalty, transgressions cease to be moral violations, but are simply a way for wrongdoers to effectively “use the system” while facing some risk of getting caught and paying a fine.	当每一种违规行为都有相应的惩罚措施，那么违反规则就不再是违背道德，而仅仅是做坏事的人冒着事情败露，受到处罚的风险，有效地“利用这一系统”的方式了。


These external penalties can displace the internal sanctions we feel when we do wrong.	这些外部���惩罚可能取代我们做错事后的那种自责。


At Enron, this was accomplished by breaking down tasks into small chunks so that no one person was ultimately responsible for a decision and could claim ignorance when caught.	在安然事件中，通过将许多的任务化整为零，以至在最终丑闻曝光以后也找不到某位个人对某一无知的决策负责。 前安然的首席执行官Jeffrey K.


Former Enron chief executive Jeffrey K. Skilling excused his behavior at his trial by saying, “I’m not an accountant.”	Skilling在受审时为自己的行为辩解说：“我又不是会计。 ”


Many people have been convinced that market exchange diminishes our humanity.	许多人都认为市场交换使我们丧失人性。


Think of Charlie Chaplin’s film  Modern Times , in which the little tramp is literally a cog in the capitalist machine.	想想查理▪卓别林的电影《摩登时代》，片中的小流浪汉实际上就是资本主义机器上的一枚齿轮。


That view, a residue of Marxist thinking, is wrong.	这种观点，作为马克思主义思维方式的残余，是错误的。


On the contrary, working together, and trading with each other in markets, is morality in action.	相反，协同工作，在市场上相互贸易，正是活生生的道德。


Capitalism’s New Clothes	资本主义的新装


MELBOURNE – Is the global financial crisis an opportunity to forge a new form of capitalism based on sound values?	墨尔本-全球金融危机提供了一个机会以建立一种基于健康的价值观之上的新的资本主义形式吗？


So French President Nicholas Sarkozy and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair appear to think.	法国总统尼古拉·萨科齐和前英国首相托尼·布莱尔似乎是这么认为的。


At a symposium in Paris last month entitled “New World, New Capitalism,” Sarkozy described capitalism based on financial speculation as “an immoral system” that has “perverted the logic of capitalism.”	上个月在巴黎召开的主题为“新世界，新资本主义” 会上，萨科齐把基于金融投机之上的资本主义描述为一种“扭曲了资本主义的逻辑 ”的“不道德的制度”。


He argued that capitalism needs to find new moral values and to accept a stronger role for governments.	他认为，资本主义需要寻找新的道德价值观并承认政府能起更强的作用。


Blair called for a new financial order based on “values other than the maximum short-term profit.”	布莱尔则呼吁建立一种新的金融秩序，其基础是“价值观而不是短期利润的最大化。 ”


It is surprising how readily politicians of all parties – even strong ideological defenders of the unregulated market – accepted the idea that the state should bail out banks and insurance companies when they got into trouble.	令人感到惊讶的是，各政党的政治家们-甚至包括那些在意识形态上强烈捍卫市场不受干预的人们-是如此愿意接受这样的观念，即，当银行和保险公司遇到麻烦的时候，国家应给予解救。


With the exception of a small number of ideologically committed defenders of free enterprise, few were willing to take the risks inherent in letting major banks collapse.	除了少数意识形态上致力于捍卫商业自由的人们之外，很少有人愿意承担让大银行崩溃所带来的固有的风险。


Who knows what the consequences would have been?	如不这样做的话，谁知道会发生什么后果呢？


Many feared mass unemployment, a tidal wave of bankruptcies, millions of families evicted from their homes, the social safety net strained to the breaking point, and perhaps even riots and a resurgence of the political extremism that brought Hitler to power in Germany during the depression of the 1930’s.	很多人害怕会出现大规模的失业、破产潮、数百万家庭无家可归、社会安全网紧绷到断裂点，甚至暴乱以及如1930年代经济大萧条期间把希特勒送上权利顶峰的政治极端主义的死灰复燃。


The choice to save the banks from the financial consequences of their own errors indicates a shift in values away from belief in the wisdom of the market.	选择为银行由自己的错误所造成的财务后果买单，表明了相信市场智慧的价值观发生了改变。


Evidently, the market got some things – like the value of certain financial securities – horrendously wrong.	显然，市场在一些事情上犯了严重错误-如某些金融证券的价值。


But will the downturn also produce a deeper shift in the values of consumers?	但经济低迷会让消费者的价值观也产生更深的变化吗？


It is no accident that the “New World, New Capitalism” symposium was held in France, where some critics have seen the global financial crisis as necessary and desirable precisely because it is producing this change in values.	“新世界，新资本主义”专题会在法国举行并非偶然，在法国，正是因为它带来了这种价值观的变化，一些批评者视全球金融危机为必要和所需。


In the newspaper Le Figaro, a section on how to scale back one’s expenses predicted a “revolution in values” and claimed that people will put family ahead of work.	费加罗报上的关于如何缩减自己的开支的一个版面则预测“价值观革命” 的来临，并声称，人们将把家庭放在工作之前。


(Americans think the French, with their shorter working hours and longer summer vacations, already put family ahead of work.)	（美国人认为实行更短工作时间和更长的夏日休假的法国人，已经把家庭放在工作之前了。 ）


The French have always been less likely to go into debt – when they pay with plastic, they tend to use debit cards, drawing on funds they already have, rather than credit cards.	法国人一直以来不是很容易欠债-当他们用卡来消费的时候，他们使用的往往是借记卡，也就是花他们已有的钱，而不是用信用卡。


Now they see the current crisis as a vindication of the value of not spending money that you don’t have.	现在，他们视当前的危机是对他们价值观的认同，也就是不花你还没有拥有的钱。


That means, in many cases, less luxury spending – something that is hard to reconcile with the image of France as the country of fashion, perfume, and champagne.	在许多情况下，这意味着，削减奢侈消费-这和法国与时装、香水和香槟连在一起的国家形象很难相符。


But excess is out of style, and there are reports of cutbacks in luxury goods everywhere.	但过度挥霍已经过时了，有报道说，到处都在削减奢侈品消费。


Richemont, the Swiss luxury goods company that owns the Cartier and Montblanc brands, has said that it is facing “the toughest market conditions since its formation 20 years ago.”	Richmond里士满，这个瑞士拥有卡地亚和万宝龙品牌的奢侈品公司表示，它正面临着“自20年前成立以来最艰难的市场情况。


But does this mark an enduring change in values, or just a temporary reduction, forced upon consumers by investment losses and greater economic uncertainty?	”但是，这是否标志着价值观的持久的变化，还是仅仅是消费者因投资的损失以及对经济情况的越来越不确定而不得不采取的暂时削减？


In his inauguration speech, American President Barack Obama said, “The time has come to set aside childish things” and instead to choose the noble idea that “all are equal, all are free, and all deserve a chance to pursue their full measure of happiness.”	，美国总统奥巴马在其就职演说中说： “现在应该是抛弃幼稚的事情的时候了” ，而他没有选择崇高观点， 即“人人都平等自由，都应该有机会追求充分的幸福。


It would be an excellent thing if the global financial crisis restored a proper sense of what is important.	”如果全球金融危机能恢复人们对什么才是重要这一问题的恰当认识，这将是一件极好的事。


Could the crisis remind us that we buy luxury items more because of the status they bring than because of their intrinsic value?	危机是否可能提醒我们，我们购买奢侈品更多的是因为它们所带来的身份，而不是其内在的价值？


Could it help us to appreciate that many things are more central to our happiness than our ability to spend money on fashion, expensive watches, and fine dining?	它是否能有助于我们体会到，对我们的幸福感来说，很多事情比我们把钱花在时装、昂贵的手表和美食上的能力更重要？


Could it even, as Obama suggests, make us more aware of the needs of those who are living in real poverty and are far worse off than we will ever be, financial crisis or no financial crisis?	它甚至是否可以如奥巴马所提出的那样，让我们更清楚地意识到那些生活在真正的贫困中的人们的需求，他们不管有没有金融危机，都比我们将来所面临的情况要更糟糕得多？


The danger is that the potential for a real change in values will be co-opted, as has happened so often before, by those who see it as just another opportunity to make money.	危险的是，正如之前经常所发生得那样，真正的价值变化的可能性将被那些把它看作又一个赚钱的机会的人霸占。


The designer Nathalie Rykiel is reportedly planning to show the new Sonia Rykiel collection in March not in the usual vast rented area, but in the smaller space of her own boutique.	设计师Nathalie Rykiel据说正在筹划三月间Sonia Rykiel桑丽卡新时装的发布，她不会再租用面积巨大的场地，而是在她自己的较小的精品空间举行。


“It's a desire for intimacy, to go back to values,” she told the International Herald Tribune .	“这是对亲密关系和价值回归的渴望， ”她对国际先驱论坛报说。


“We need to return to a smaller scale, one that touches people.	“我们必须回归小规模，这样就能接触到人们。


We will be saying, ‘Come to my house.	我们等于在说,‘来我家吧，看看衣服，感觉一下衣服。


Look at and feel the clothes.’”	’”


Ah yes, in a world in which ten million children die every year from avoidable, poverty-related causes, and greenhouse-gas emissions threaten to create hundreds of millions of climate refugees, we should be visiting Paris boutiques and feeling the clothes.	每年有一千万儿童死于可避免的与贫穷有关的原因，温室气体的排放威胁着将数以亿计的人们变为气候难民，活在这样一个世界里，啊是的，我们是应该走进巴黎精品时装店亲手感觉一下服装。


If people were really concerned about defensible moral values, they wouldn’t be buying designer clothes at all.	如果人们真的为值得捍卫的道德价值而担心，那他们根本就不该去买名牌服装。


But what are the chances of Nathalie Rykiel – or the affluent elites of France, or Italy, or the United States – adopting those values?	但是，Nathalie Rykiel -或法国、意大利、美国富裕的精英们-有多少可能认同这些价值观呢？


Capitalist Meltdown	资本家溶化


PARIS – There is a strange foreboding in the world economy.	巴黎--人们对世界经济有着不详的预感。


Newspapers report downward revisions in growth estimates for all the major developed countries: the United States, Germany, France, Japan.	各家报纸对美德法日等所有主要发达国家都向下修正了经济增长预计。


No one, it seems, is being left out.	看起来没有哪个国家可以幸免。


Indeed, these estimates are roughly half a percentage point lower than those issued only last autumn.	确实，这些预计要比仅仅是在去年秋天发布的低大约半个百分点。


At the same time, newspapers report in bleak terms almost exclusively about banks and financial markets, with little attention to the real economy, as if today’s crisis were purely financial and bound to remain so.	与此同时，各家报纸几乎全是用悲惨的语言报导有关银行和金融市场的消息，而对世界经济状况几乎不关心，好像现今的危机仅仅是金融方面的，而且还必将持续如此。


Indeed, some experts, too, believe that the crisis can be resolved simply by refinancing banks, and that the impact on the real economy will be relatively limited.	确实，某些专家也相信只要通过对银行重新融资就可以解决这场危机，而且对实际经济的影响将会相对有限。


This is clearly the belief of the European Central Bank, which is pumping hundreds of billions of euros into the banking system to ensure liquidity.	这明显是欧洲央行的观点。 该行正在向银行系统注入数千亿欧元来保障流动资金的供应。


But, unlike the US Federal Reserve, it has not lowered key interest rates, which is what matters most to firms and households.	但是，与美国联邦储备委员会不同的是，它还没有降低利率，而这对企业和百姓而言恰恰是最为重要的。


Other experts, of course, believe that the real economy is in jeopardy, and that the threat of a recession is genuine.	当然，其他专家相信实际经济处于危险境地之中，而且经济衰退的危险是切实存在的。


But, unfortunately, hardly any experts can speak with confidence about both finance and macroeconomics.	但不幸的是，几乎没有任何专家可以抱有信心地评述金融业和宏观经济。


So what is a non-expert to think?	如此，不是专家的人该如何思考呢？


It is helpful to review where the world economy now stands.	回顾一下当今世界经济局面是有所帮助的。


The largest number of defaults on sub-prime mortgages will occur this spring.	今年春天将会发生最大规模的次级房屋贷款无力偿还个案。


So the full impact of the crisis remains ahead of us: 1.3 million American homeowners have already defaulted on their mortgages.	所以这一危机最为险峻的部分还在前面。 130万美国家庭已经无力偿还房屋贷款。


In 2008, another three million will join them.	在2008年，还会有三百万家庭加入这一行列。


Moreover, the size of the bad debt threatening banks remains unknown, and could amount to several hundred billion dollars.	而且，威胁银行的坏帐规模还不清楚，说不定会达到几千亿美元。


The total sum of assets now under threat is even more important, because mortgages have been mixed up with other kinds of securities, and these “packages” have been sold throughout the world.	受到威胁的资产总额更为重要，因为房屋按揭贷款已经和其他种类的证券混杂在一起，而这些“套餐”已经销售遍及全世界。


A US subsidiary of Deutsche Bank, for example, has been barred by an American court from foreclosing on a house because it could not demonstrate ownership.	例如，德意志银行的一家美国子公司由于无法证明对一所房产的所有权而已被一家美国法院禁止收回该房产。


The global economy is overrun with such poisoned packages.	全球经济充满了这种有毒套餐。


As a result, banks distrust one another and have mostly stopped lending to each other, which jeopardizes economic activity by severely reducing the availability of credit to businesses.	结果，银行互不信任，大多数都停止了相互拆借。 这样就由于大幅降低给企业的信贷而危及到了经济活动。


As a result, recession seems certain.	结果，经济衰退看来是躲不掉的了。


The quantity of liquidity in the world economy is surprising, and monetary expansion by central banks does not explain it completely.	世界经济中流动资金的数量令人惊讶，而各国中央银行的货币扩张并不足以解释这一现象。


For more than two decades, shareholders in all the developed countries, unorganized and passive from 1945 until 1975-1980, have recast themselves in the form of pension funds, investment funds, and hedge funds.	所有发达国家中的股东在1945年至1975年和1980年期间没有什么组织并且并不积极。 在过去二十多年，他们以养老基金、投资基金以及对冲基金的形式重新确立自己。


Now they are significant and active players (as majorities or strong minorities) in all the big companies of the developed world.	现在，他们在发达国家所有大公司中以多数股东或者强大的少数股东的角色发挥重要而又积极的作用。


To boost the value of their shares, these shareholders backed the drive to reduce the global volume of the payroll and the number of workers that companies employ.	为了提高其股价，这些股东支持公司裁员并且削减全球范围员工的工资。


Indeed, in the last 25 years, the share of direct and indirect wages as a percentage of GDP has fallen by 8% to 11% in all the countries involved.	实际上，在过去25年中，在所有有关国家中，直接和间接工资在GDP中占据的百分比从11%下降到8%。


As a result, precarious employment and job insecurity, which hardly existed between 1940 and 1970, now affect more than 15% of the developed world’s population.	结果，1940年至1970年期间几乎不存在的险峻的就业形势和工作不稳定现在影响到超过15%的发达国家人口。


The average real wage has been flat in the US for 20 years, with 1% of the population capturing all of the gains brought about by a 50% growth in GDP during this period.	过去20年中，美国的平均工资停滞不前，而在此期间，1%的人获取了一半的GDP增长成果。


This “liberated” a lot of liquidity for financial activities, gambling, and speculation.	这就“解放”了大量流动资金用于金融活动、赌博以及投机。


In France alone over the past 20 years, roughly 2.5 trillion euros have poured into the financial world, which suggests a total of 30-60 trillion dollars for the world economy as a whole.	过去二十年中仅仅在法国，大约两万五千亿欧元注入到了金融市场，也就是说，世界经济整体中总共是30万亿到60万亿之间。


This has been accompanied by a growing immorality of the system.	这就伴随着日益增长的不道德现象。


Remuneration of company bosses now reaches 300 to 500 times the average salary of rank-and-file employees, up from 40 to one for the century and a half before 1980.	企业老板的薪金现在达到普通工薪雇员的300倍到500倍，而1980年以前的一个半世纪里则是40倍。


Throughout the world, the number of companies facing legal problems for various types of fraud is growing dramatically.	在全世界，企业面临各种欺诈而带来的法律问题，其数量大幅度增加。


The worst, sadly, is yet to come.	不幸的是，最坏的还在后面。


Because most people’s incomes are stagnant and being eroded as their mortgage payments rise, consumption is bound to fall, yielding lower growth and employment.	由于大多数人的收入停滞不前，而且由于其房贷压力增加收入遭到侵蚀，消费必定下降，造成增长和就业更加缓慢。


A recession will only increase job precariousness and unemployment, creating social tensions that will not, of course, help to ease the financial crisis.	经济衰退只会让就业和工作更为险峻和不稳定，造成社会关系紧张。 而社会关系紧张当然无法帮助减轻金融危机。


All the ingredients seem to be in place for a long and powerful perfect storm of economic decline and social unrest.	看起来，所有的要素都已经就位，引发长久和剧烈的经济衰退和社会动荡。


We in the developed world live in democracies.	我们在发达国家中的人生活在民主制度之中。


Every four or five years, the legitimacy of the system needs to be confirmed by elections.	每隔四到五年，体制的合法性需要经过选举来加以确认。


But is the system being so delegitimized by the economic and social turmoil that elections will no longer be viable?	但是经济和社会动荡消除了这一制度的合法性，选举还能够维继吗？ 现在这一体制还具有合法性吗？


Of course, capitalism remains more compatible with personal freedom than communism ever was.	当然，资本主义从来要比共产主义更为符合个人自由。


But it is now blindingly obvious that capitalism is too unstable to survive without strong public regulation.	但是现在一清二楚的是，资本主义过于不稳定，没有强大的公共管治就难以维持。


That is why, after years of being neglected as a viable option, it is time for the social-democratic project to return to the political fore.	这就是为何社会民主在经过多年的冷遇之后应该作为可行的选择返回政治前沿。


Capital Shrugged	资本耸耸肩


LOS ANGELES – Capitalism’s greatest strength has been its resiliency – its ability to survive the throes and challenges of crises and business cycles to fuel innovation and economic growth.	洛杉矶—资本主义最大的优势在于其韧劲，即其在危机和商业周期的阵痛和挑战中生存下来、刺激创新和经济增长的能力。


Today, however, more than four years into a credit crisis, a conspicuous enigma calls this legacy into question.	然而，如今，资本主义进入债务危机已逾四年，却仍然不知所向，这不仅让人们开始质疑这一优势。


Despite recent hopes of recovery in the US, including an inventory catch-up in the fourth quarter of 2011, real US GDP growth has remained persistently below trend.	尽管美国经济最近颇有些复苏的希望（比如2011年第四季度的存货补充），但其真实GDP增长仍然持久地低于趋势增长率。


Moreover, although seasonally adjusted January employment data have brought the unemployment rate down to 8.3% (while total jobs were actually lost in January), the more realistic rate of “underemployment” remains over 15% and the labor-force participation rate is at a record 30-year low.	此外，尽管经季节调整的1月就业数据显示失业率下降到了8. 3%（但实际上1月份的实际就业数量仍在减少），但更现实的“失业率”仍高达15%以上，劳动力市场参与率更是处于30年来的最低值。


And the US is clearly not alone in its malaise, with the eurozone fighting a far more urgent sovereign-debt crisis.	美国显然不是唯一一个步履维艰的国家，欧元区就面临着远比美国紧迫的主权债务危机。


So, why is this time different?	那么，这一次为什么会不一样呢？


The answer lies in Ayn Rand’s rhetorical invocation of despair in her 1957 epic Atlas Shrugged: “Who is John Galt?”	安·兰德（Ayn Rand）用其1957年的名著《阿特拉斯耸耸肩》（Atlas Shrugged）中的绝望诅咒给出了答案：“谁是约翰·高特（John Galt）？


Simply put, when the state seizes the incentives and drivers of capital investment, owners of capital go on strike.	”简言之，当国家夺走了资本投资的激励和领导权的时候，资本所有者就会罢工。


Rand portrays innovative industrialists as akin to Atlas in Greek mythology, carrying on his back a dystopian world of growing and overbearing collectivist government.	兰德描绘了一批类似希腊神话中的阿特拉斯的创新性实业家，在他们背上背负着一个不断膨胀的傲慢的集体主义政府的反乌托邦世界。


The hero, John Galt, calls for them all to shrug, to “stop the motor of the world” by withdrawing from their productive pursuits, rather than promoting a world in which, under the guise of egalitarianism, incentives have been usurped in order to protect the politically connected from economic failure.	英雄约翰·高特呼吁实业家耸耸肩，收回他们的生产性活动，让“世界的马达停下”，不要让这个世界在平均主义的伪装下产生保护政治关系集团经济利益的激励。


Today, Rand’s fictional world has seemingly become a reality – endless bailouts and economic stimulus for the unproductive at the expense of the most productive, and calls for additional taxation on capital investment.	如今，兰德的虚构世界似乎变成了现实——以削弱生产率最高部门为代价给予生产率低下部门没完没了的救援和经济刺激、除此之外，还出现了向资本投资增税的呼声。


The shrug of Rand’s heroic entrepreneurs is to be found today within the tangled ciphers of corporate and government balance sheets.	当今世界充斥着错综复杂、相互关联的公司和政府资产负债表，需要兰德笔下的英雄创业家们的耸耸肩。


The US Federal Reserve has added more than $2 trillion to the base money supply since 2008 – an incredible and unprecedented number that is basically a gift to banks intended to cover their deep losses and spur lending and investment.	自2008年以来，美联储已经增加了超过2万亿美元的基础货币供应，这是前所未有的不可思议的巨额数字，实际上无异于给银行的大礼包，让它们覆盖巨额亏损、刺激借贷和投资。


Instead, as banks continue their enormous deleveraging, almost all of their new money remains at the Fed in the form of excess reserves.	然而，由于银行仍处于去杠杆化阶段，这些新增货币几乎全部被用作超额储备存在美联储那里。


Corporations, moreover, are holding the largest amounts of cash, relative to assets and net worth, ever recorded.	此外，公司也握有大量现金，如果用相对于资产和净值的标准衡量，公司现金持有量处于历史最高点。


And yet, despite what pundits claim about strong balance sheets, firms’ debt levels, relative to assets and net worth, also remain near record-high levels.	然而，尽管权威人士大谈资产负债表如何如何健康，但企业债务水平（相对应于资产和净值来说）也处于历史最高点附近。


Hoarded cash is king.	现金就是王道。


The velocity of money (the frequency at which money is spent, or GDP relative to base money) continues to plunge to historic lows.	货币流动速度（即货币支出的频率，以GDP与基础货币的比值衡量）仍然徘徊在历史最低水平。


No wonder monetary policy has had so little impact.	因此，货币政策收效甚微一点都没有什么好奇怪的。


Capital, the engine of economic growth, sits idle – shrugging everywhere.	作为经济增长引擎的资本被空置着——所有人都在耸肩。


Rand, perhaps better than any economic observer, underscored the central role of incentives in driving entrepreneurial innovation and risk-taking.	或许兰德比所有经济观察家都更好地指出了激励在激发企业家创新行为和风险承担行为中的核心作用。


Whittle away at incentives – and at the market’s ability to communicate them through price signals – and you starve the growth engine of its fuel.	激励的减少——以及市场通过价格信号传递激励信息的能力的下降——无异于收走增长引擎中的燃料。


Alas, central bankers, with their manipulation of interest rates and use of quantitative easing, patently neglect this fact.	可是，很显然，采取利率控制和量化宽松的央行忽视了这一事实。


Interest rates are more than a mere economic input that determines levels of saving and investment.	利率并不只是决定储蓄和投资水平的经济输入变量。


Rather, as the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises emphasized, they are a reflection of people’s aggregate time preference – or desire for present versus future satisfaction – not a determinant of it.	正如奥地利经济学家米赛斯所强调的，利率是人们总时间偏好（即牺牲现在满足将来的渴望）的反映，而不是它的决定因素。


Interest rates thus incentivize and convey to entrepreneurs how to allocate capital through time.	于是，利率激励并指导企业家如何在不同的时间间配置资本。


For example, lower interest rates and cost of capital raise the relative attractiveness of cash flows further in the future, and capital investment increases – the system’s natural homeostatic response to higher savings and lower consumption.	比如，低利率和资本成本增加了未来现金流的相对吸引力，从而增加了资本投资，这便是系统对高储蓄、低消费的自动平衡机制。


State manipulation of interest rates, however, does not influence time preference, even though it signals such a change.	然而，国家对利率的操控并不影响时间偏好，尽管它显示了这样的变化。


The resulting inconsistency creates distortions: as with any price control, capital receives an incentive to flow to investment that is inconsistent with actual supply and demand.	由此产生的不一致性导致了扭曲：如同一切价格管制一样，资本得到了流向与实际供求不一致的投资的激励。


The Fed is purposefully and insidiously distorting the incentive system – specifically, signals provided by the price of money – resulting in mal-investment (and, when public debt is monetized, inflation).	美联储在有目的地破坏激励系统——具体地说，是在扭曲资金价格所提供的信号——这将会导致投资不当（而当公债被货币化时，还会产生通货膨胀）。


This can continue for a time, rewarding unproductive investments and aspiring oligarch-speculators who presume that the Fed has eliminated risk.	这一过程将维持一段时间，奖励生产率低下的投资，刺激认为美联储已经消除了风险的寡头投机者。


But, as Rand reminds us, at some point the jig is up.	但是，正如兰德所提醒我们的，总有一天，一切都会玩完。 。


Today, after the largest credit expansion in history, that point has clearly been reached.	如今，在经历了史上最猛的信用扩张之后，引爆点显然已经被触发了。


Impassive capital now ignores deceptive market signals, and the liquidation of untenable mal-investment percolates through the system as immutable time preferences prevail.	现在，冷漠的资本已经对虚假的市场信号无动于衷了，而随着恒定的时间偏好被重新认识，越来越多的不当投资的清盘正通过系统渗透出来。


The state, in the long run, simply cannot direct entrepreneurs to lend, borrow, and invest; investment capital will inevitably shrug when faced with oppressive manipulation of free markets.	从长期看，国家无法规定企业家怎样借贷和投资； 如果对自由市场的操控压力太大，投资资本免不了要耸耸肩。


When that happens, we see the true result of loose monetary policy: not the creation of more economic activity, but the destruction of the natural mechanism of economic coordination and adjustment, robbing the system of its resilience.	当这一幕发生时，我们就会看到宽松货币政策的真正结果：它并没有创造出更多的经济活动，反而破坏了经济协调和调整的自然机制，削弱了系统的韧劲。


In effect, monetary policy has “stopped the motor of the world.”	总而言之，货币政策“停止了世界的马达”。


At the conclusion of Atlas Shrugged, Galt aims to restore the old system anew as the collectivist regime crumbles.	在《阿特拉斯耸耸肩》的末尾，集体主义机制分崩离析，高特将目标转为重建旧系统。


Will something like that, too, happen in our own dystopian world (in which all remaining Republican US presidential candidates seem to favor firing Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke)?	这一幕会在我们的反乌托邦世界（有希望成为美国总统候选人的共和党无不赞成炒掉美联储主席伯南克）重现吗？


How long must capital wait for the day when, free of distorted incentives, the engine of growth is fueled and humming again?	资本要等待多久才能等到激励不再扭曲、增长引擎重新注满燃料、开始轰然作响的那一天？


Capitals of Capital	首都的价值


NEW YORK – Recently, China’s government announced that it wants Shanghai to become a global financial capital equal to London and New York by 2020.	纽约——近期，中国政府宣称将在2020年之前将上海打造成全球金融中心， 类似于伦敦和纽约目前的地位。


An ambitious goal, which may or may not be achieved.	此项愿望能否成功还不可知。


But China’s aspirations also underscore a worrisome and increasingly pervasive new reality: political officials are making decisions normally left to markets on a scale not seen in decades.	中国政府如此的雄心也引发了一些担忧，同时也说明了一些新的事实：近些年来，一些政治人物开始介入原来由市场所决定的事情。


Like the financial crisis itself, this trend is now global.	如同近期的金融危机那样，目前这种现象有在全世界范围蔓延之势。


Political leaders in dozens of countries are making decisions that will drive the performance of local (and global) markets for the foreseeable future.	在全球的数十个国家中，政治人物已经开始介入，推动地方或是全球金融市场的发展。


In China, exports fell by more than 25% in February.	中国的出口在2月份已经下滑了25%。


Not to worry, said Premier Wen Jiabao: the Chinese government has “adequate ammunition” to add to its $586 billion stimulus package, a plan meant to create millions of jobs via enormous government investment in transportation, energy infrastructure, housing, and other large-scale projects.	中国的总理温家宝却不担心，他认为，中国政府有“充足的存货”来推进5,860亿美元的经济刺激方案，就是通过政府在交通，能源基础设施，房地产以及其他大型项目的投入来创造出数百万个工作机会。


In India, where government is more often considered a drag on commerce than a catalyst of growth, the decisions that move local markets are now more likely to come from bureaucrats in Delhi than from innovators in Mumbai.	在印度，政府通常被看作是阻碍商业发展的势力，而不是经济增长的催化剂。 然而现在，金融市场的推手更可能来自于德里的官僚，而不是来自孟买的创新者。


In fact, the Congress Party-led government, anxious to appear responsive to public demand for help during an election-year economic slowdown, has pushed forward three stimulus packages since December.	实际上，国大党领导的政府正逢选举年，他们迫切希望改善经济下滑的局面，自从去年12月份以来已经推出了三套经济刺激方案。


The bottom line: to find out how, when, and where assets will be allocated and wealth generated in dozens of countries across the developed and developing worlds these days, we must now look toward political, not financial, capitals.	问题的底线在于：我们要研究在数十个国家发达和发展中的国家，各国政府应该在何时，运用何种方式来配置什么样的资产，必须研究政治而非金融的资源。


This trend will spell trouble for longer-term global economic growth.	此种趋势将会给全球经济的长期发展带来不利因素。


First, it’s tough enough for leaders within the Chinese Communist Party elite to agree on economic-policy priorities.	要在中国共产党精英阶层的内部形成统一意见，这看来并不是一件容易的事情。


The challenges facing US President Barack Obama as he tries to win support for risky and expensive policy options from quarrelsome Democrats and obstinate Republicans will create some tortured legislative compromises.	对美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马来说，在推出新的一项冒险而昂贵的政策之前，如何获得喜欢争论的民主党人和固执的共和党人的支持，还要经过漫长磨人的法律流程后才能达成某种妥协，这未尝又不是一种挑战。


In Russia, Ukraine, Hungary, Pakistan, Turkey, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, and other states, battles among domestic political factions will yield often-incoherent responses to pressing economic problems.	此类情况同样发生在世界的其他地方，例如俄罗斯，乌克兰，匈牙利，巴基斯坦，土耳其，马来西亚，墨西哥，尼日利亚等国家。 国内不同的政策走向往往导致推出经济政策的不连贯性。


Second, if it’s difficult to forge consensus within one country on how best to promote growth, imagine the same argument on a global scale.	第二，如果在国内的经济问题上都不能达成一致意见，更不用说在全球范围了。


Most politicians craft policy to serve their local constituents and to protect their personal political capital.	绝大多数的政客都是为自己代言的利益集团牟利，以保护自己个人的政治资本。


Reinvigorating global growth runs a distant second.	而如何振兴全球经济往往被远远地放在了第二位。


In Washington, many Democrats will use these policy debates to capitalize on popular fury at Wall Street, while many Republicans look for an opening to capitalize on hoped-for public anger at the Democrats.	在华盛顿，许多民主党的议员利用政策辩论的机会将公众的愤怒引向华尔街的大佬,以此为自己谋求政治资本，而共和党人也在寻找机会将公众的愤怒情绪引向民主党人。


Some within the Chinese Communist Party leadership will support plans to engineer a shift from export-led growth to a model based on domestic consumption.	在中国共产党内部，一些领导人希望将经济增长的动力从以出口为导向转为拉动内需的模式。


Others will try to direct state funding toward their personal investment projects.	而其他一些人却希望通过政府直接投资来为自己个人的项目带来好处。


Factions within the Russian, Indian, Mexican, and South African governments have their own competing political priorities.	同样的，在俄罗斯，印度，墨西哥，南非，各国的政府都有自己难念的经。


With so many political officials crafting crisis responses to solve local problems or to create local opportunities, how likely are they to agree on a unified international approach?	看来，如此众多的政治人物应对经济危机的目的是为了解决本土问题或是为本地创造机会，怎么能够指望他们会有一个国际的视野观呢？


Our first glimpse of the trouble in coordinating an international response to the financial crisis came last November, during the emergency G-20 summit in Washington.	去年11月份，在华盛顿20国紧急峰会上，我们已经目睹参会各国在如何协调应对危机上的不协调之音。


To get the G-8 to agree on priorities is a complicated enough; building consensus within the G-20 is exponentially more difficult, not simply because of the larger number of players involved, but because many of them don’t agree on the most basic rules of the global economic game.	在随后的8国峰会上也是争论不断。 20国峰会上各国不可能达成共识的理由很多，不仅是由于如此众多的参会国家，更因为许多国家对国际经济的基本游戏规则都不认可。


While the April G-20 summit in London produced more economic-policy agreement than expected, this was largely because the most divisive issue – the US and British demand for more global stimulus spending – was removed from the table beforehand.	然而，4月举办的20国伦敦峰会出人意料地达成了一些经济政策协议，主要的原因是最具争论的话题——美英主张的全球各国经济刺激方案——被提前撤了下来。


As a result, the smiling presidents and prime ministers could afford to be more diplomatic than Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek, who, in his role as acting president of the European Union, had warned that Obama’s economic plan would lead others down a “road to hell.”	因此，各国的总统和总理才能微笑地握手言欢。 而捷克总理米雷克•��波拉内克在担任欧盟轮值主席时却表现的不同，他公开批评奥巴马的经济刺激方案，认为会使得其他国家“跌入地狱”。


Topolanek wasn’t at the G-20; his country is not a member.	因为捷克不是成员国，托波拉内克没有参加20国峰会。


And, while British Prime Minister Gordon Brown agrees with Obama that the world’s leading industrialized countries must stimulate their domestic economies as much as they can, Bank of England Governor Mervyn King has warned that Britain may already have taken on too much debt for another round of stimulus.	英国首相戈登·布朗却大加赞赏奥巴马，认为作为世界最大的工业化国家的美国必须尽可能地刺激国内经济。 然而，英国央行行长默文·金却警告说，如果再推行一次经济刺激方案的话，英国人就会背负太多的债务。


However frightening the global recession, a coordinated and coherent response to it by the world’s political leaders remains highly uncertain at best.	然而，在如何应对目前的全球经济萧条问题上，看来世界各国的领袖们还没有达成一个协调统一的意见。


And the increasingly heavy influence of political factors on market performance will likely weigh on global growth for years to come.	而且，政治过多干预市场对经济的影响将会在数年后才会显现出来。


Captured Europe	被绑架的欧洲


WASHINGTON, DC – Europe’s policy elite – the people who call the shots at the national and eurozone level – are in serious trouble.	华盛顿—能在国家和欧元区层面施加影响的欧洲政策精英陷入了大麻烦。


They have mismanaged their way into a deep crisis, betraying all of the lofty promises of unity and prosperity issued when the euro was created.	由于措置失当，欧洲正在滑向深度危机，创造欧元时信誓旦旦的统一和繁荣没了影儿。


The currency union may survive, but, for millions of people, the euro has already failed in its mission of sustaining growth and ensuring stability.	货币联盟可能最终能够得救，但对千百万人民来说，欧元维持增长、保证稳定的使命肯定是没有完成。


How did this happen?	为什么会这样？


The Greek, Portuguese, Irish, and Italian economies are reeling under fiscal austerity – with budget cuts and higher taxes as far as the eye can see.	希腊、葡萄牙、爱尔兰和意大利正在财政紧缩中举步维艰，在可以预见的未来，这些国家都将继续实施预算缩减和税收增加。


This policy mix will slow their growth, and that of the rest of Europe.	这一政策组合将使它们及欧洲其他地区的增长减缓。


But that is only part of the problem.	但这只是问题的一部分。


The bigger issue is the “debt overhang” that has forced European governments to pursue this course.	更大的问题是迫使欧洲各国政府做此下策的“债务宿醉”。


There are strong parallels to what happened in the United States in the past few years: many families felt crushed by their debts, so household consumption fell and has yet to recover.	美国在过去几年中所发生的事情也颇为相似：许多家庭被债务压得喘不过气来，因此家庭消费出现了下降，至今仍未好转。


The adjustment will be even more painful in Europe, because a sovereign-debt crisis has a depressing effect on everyone – consumers, investors, and the public sector alike.	欧洲的调整可能更加痛苦，因为主权债务危机对所有人都形成了抑制效应，消费者、投资者、公共部门，概莫能外。


There is a simple way to deal with a debt overhang: reduce payments by restructuring the debt.	对付债务宿醉有一个简单的办法：重组债务，从而减少偿付。


Many firms are able to renegotiate financing terms with their creditors – typically extending the maturity of their liabilities, which enables them to borrow more to finance new, better projects.	许多企业能够与债权人就融资条件展开谈判，通常是延长债务期限，从而让它们得以借入更多的钱来为更新更好的项目融资。


If such negotiation cannot be achieved voluntarily, US firms can use Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code, under which a court supervises and approves the reorganization of liabilities.	如果谈判不能通过自愿协商达成，那么美国企业将使用破产法第11章，由法院来监督和批准债务重组。


So you would think the same would be true for US households and embattled European governments.	你也许会认为，美国家庭和焦头烂额的欧洲各国政府也可以如法炮制。


But the restructuring of debt has been too little and has come too late.	但它们的债务重组情况发生得很少也很晚。


Why?	这是为什么呢？


In both cases, the main argument for not removing the debt overhang came from bankers, who claimed that it would create havoc in financial markets for two reasons.	不论是美国家庭还是欧洲政府，无法消除债务宿醉的主要障碍来自银行家，他们说，出于两个原因，这样会造成金融市场浩劫。


First, banks were the primary creditors, and the large losses that they would face in any restructuring was bound to trigger a domino effect, with waves of pessimism driving up interest rates and ruining other borrowers’ prospects.	首先，银行是主要债权人，任何重组都会给它们带来巨大的损失，必然会造成多米诺效应，悲观情绪的蔓延将导致利率升高、毁掉其他借款人的光明前景。


Second, banks would also suffer because they had sold insurance against default – in the form of credit-default swaps.	其次，银行也会因此遭难，因为它们出售了大量违约保险，即信用违约互换。


When these swaps were activated, the banks would incur potentially further crippling losses.	若这些互换被触发，银行将面临不堪设想的损失。


In the case of Greece, international bankers argued long and hard that debt restructuring would generate contagion far and wide within the eurozone – and perhaps more broadly.	国际银行家指出，长期和严厉的希腊债务重组将造成欧元区大范围的深度停滞，其影响甚至可能达到欧元区之外。


And yet, in the end, Greece had little choice but to restructure its debt, cutting the value of private claims by about 75% relative to their face value (although even this is probably not enough to make the country’s debt burden sustainable).	但最后，希腊别无选择，只能重组其债务，砍掉私人债权面值的75%（饶是如此，可能仍不足以让希腊债务负担变得可持续）。


This was deemed a “credit event,” so credit-default swaps were exercised: anyone who insured against default had to pay out.	这被认为是一起“信用事件”，将触发信用违约互换：所有为该事件投了保的人都可以获得赔付。


Did all hell break loose?	只是如此吗？


No.	不。


Banks have not failed, and there is no sign of tumbling dominoes.	银行并没有倒闭，也没有出现任何多米诺效应的迹象。


But that is not because banks prepared themselves by raising more capital.	但这并不是因为银行未雨绸缪留好了更多资本。


On the contrary, compared to their likely future losses, European banks have raised relatively little capital recently – and much of this has been creative accounting, rather than truly loss-absorbing shareholder equity.	相反，与潜在未来损失相比，欧洲银行最近留存的资本仍显太少——切这笔资本是通过会计花招变出来的，而不是真正的用于吸收损失的股本金。


Perhaps the risk that a Greek debt restructuring would cause a financial meltdown was always minimal, and quiescent markets were to be expected.	也许希腊债务重组引发金融崩溃的风险永远不会很高，市场并不会对此有多大的反应。


But, in that case, why all the fuss?	但是，既然如此，为何这一问题会引发如此关注？


The answer should be clear by now: interest-group politics and policy elites’ worldview.	答案现在已经很清楚了：利益集团政治和政策精英的世界观。


Even if the risk to the financial system was minimal, the impact on banks and bondholders was substantial.	就算金融体系的风险很小，对银行和债权人的冲击也会很大。


They stood to lose billions, and many financial-sector employees stood to lose their jobs.	它们可能因此损失数十亿美元，不少金融部门员工还将丢掉工作。


Not surprisingly, leading bankers lobbied against debt restructuring, both behind closed doors and publicly.	毫不奇怪，不管是公开还是暗地里，大银行都在游说反对债务重组。


For example, the Institute for International Finance, a preeminent Washington, DC-based lobbying group for large banks, consistently argues: bail us out, or else face the consequences.	比如，华盛顿有一个叫国际金融协会（Institute for International Finance）的机构，是代表大银行利益的游说集团。 该协会不断强调：援助我们，否则后果自负。


But, just as important as their storyline is their political power, which has risen greatly in recent years – to the point that all major policymakers in the US and Europe cater to banks’ fortunes even when there are no wider implications for the economy.	但是，这一说辞的背后是政治权力，这一权力近几年来膨胀迅速，已经到了美国和欧洲主要决策者都得唯银行财富马首是瞻的程度，就算这样做会给经济造成深远冲击。


Even now, many of the losses that bankers should have faced are being shouldered by the public sector, including through various forms of direct support and the extraordinary and risky actions of the European Central Bank.	即使是现在，大量本应由银行家承担的损失仍然被公共部门承担了——形式多种多样，包括直接支持和欧洲央行高风险的非常规举措。


The extent of subsidies in this sector is stunning and, under current policies, will only increase over time – thereby primarily supporting the lifestyles of the top 1% of people in very rich countries.	金融部门得到的补贴之巨令人咋舌，在现行政策下，补贴还将进一步增加——这些补贴的首要作用是支持了最发达国家最高端1%人群的生活方式。


The Greek default has turned out to be the proverbial dog that didn’t bark.	希腊的违约表明，咬人的狗不吠。


The lesson for Europe – and for the US – is clear: it is time to stop listening to what banks say, and start focusing on what they do.	欧洲——还有美国——能从中吸取的教训相当浅显：不要再听银行的鬼话，而应该开始关注它们的行动。


We must re-evaluate the distorted political economy of the financial sector, before the excessive power of the few imposes even larger costs on everyone else.	我们必须重新评估被扭曲的金融部门政治经济学，否则的话，少数人权力的过度膨胀将给其他所有人带来更大的负担。


Capturing the ECB	绑架欧洲央行


NEW YORK – Nothing illustrates better the political crosscurrents, special interests, and shortsighted economics now at play in Europe than the debate over the restructuring of Greece’s sovereign debt.	纽约—关于欧洲眼下的政治分歧、特殊利益和短视经济考虑，没有比重组希腊主权债务争论更好的写照了。


Germany insists on a deep restructuring – at least a 50% “haircut” for bondholders – whereas the European Central Bank insists that any debt restructuring must be voluntary.	德国坚持要实行深度重组，至少要债权人“牺牲”50%，而欧洲央行坚持债务重组必须是自愿的。


In the old days – think of the 1980’s Latin American debt crisis – one could get creditors, mostly large banks, in a small room, and hammer out a deal, aided by some cajoling, or even arm-twisting, by governments and regulators eager for things to go smoothly.	换做从前——比如20世纪80年代的拉美债务危机——急于平息事态的政府和监管者可以把债权人（主要是大型银行）关进小黑屋，威逼利诱一番，然后就达成了协议。


But, with the advent of debt securitization, creditors have become far more numerous, and include hedge funds and other investors over whom regulators and governments have little sway.	但是，随着债务证券化时代的到来，债权人数量比以前有了暴增，对冲基金等监管者和政府很难对其施加影响的投资者也被包括了进来。


Moreover, “innovation” in financial markets has made it possible for securities owners to be insured, meaning that they have a seat at the table, but no “skin in the game.”	此外，金融市场的“创新”使得证券所有者可以获得保险，这意味着他们也入了局，不再是“事不关己”了。


They do have interests: they want to collect on their insurance, and that means that the restructuring must be a “credit event” – tantamount to a default.	他们确实有利益在其中：他们想获得保险，这意味着重组必须是“信用事件”，也就是违约。


The ECB’s insistence on “voluntary” restructuring – that is, avoidance of a credit event – has placed the two sides at loggerheads.	欧洲央行坚持“自愿”重组——也就是说，避免了信用事件的发生——无异于站到了债权人的对立面。


The irony is that the regulators have allowed the creation of this dysfunctional system. 	其中的讽刺之处在于，监管者坐视这一怪胎体系的产生。


The ECB’s stance is peculiar.	欧洲央行的立场十分奇怪。


One would have hoped that the banks might have managed the default risk on the bonds in their portfolios by buying insurance.	你可能寄希望于银行通过买入保险设法消除了投资组合中的债券的违约风险。


And, if they bought insurance, a regulator concerned with systemic stability would want to be sure that the insurer pays in the event of a loss.	此外，如果它们购买了保险，那么关心系统稳定性的监管者将巴不得保险人在损失事件发生时予以偿付。


But the ECB wants the banks to suffer a 50% loss on their bond holdings, without insurance “benefits” having to be paid.	但欧洲央行又希望银行承担所持债券50%的损失而不获得任何保险“偿付”。


There are three explanations for the ECB’s position, none of which speaks well for the institution and its regulatory and supervisory conduct.	欧洲央行采取这一立场可能有三个原因，但没有一个能很好地为该机构及其监管和监督行为开脱。


The first explanation is that the banks have not, in fact, bought insurance, and some have taken speculative positions.	第一个原因是，银行事实上并没有买入保险，一些银行的头寸是投机性的。


The second is that the ECB knows that the financial system lacks transparency – and knows that investors know that they cannot gauge the impact of an involuntary default, which could cause credit markets to freeze, reprising the aftermath of Lehman Brothers’ collapse in September 2008.	第二个原因是，欧洲央行明白金融体系缺乏透明度，也知道投资者明白他们无法看清非自愿违约的影响，而这可能导致信用市场冻结，重现2008年9月雷曼兄弟倒闭后的乱象。


Finally, the ECB may be trying to protect the few banks that have written the insurance.	最后，欧洲央行可能在试图保护出售保险的几家银行。


None of these explanations is an adequate excuse for the ECB’s opposition to deep involuntary restructuring of Greece’s debt.	这三大理由都不足以成为欧洲央行反对希腊债务深度非自愿重组的借口。


The ECB should have insisted on more transparency – indeed, that should have been one of the main lessons of 2008.	欧洲央行应该坚持增加透明度——事实上，这一点正是2008年的主要教训。


Regulators should not have allowed the banks to speculate as they did; if anything, they should have required them to buy insurance – and then insisted on restructuring in a way that ensured that the insurance paid off.	监管者本不应该允许银行如此投机； 至少应该要求银行买入保险，然后坚持要求能够确保保险获得偿付的重组。


There is, moreover, little evidence that a deep involuntary restructuring would be any more traumatic than a deep voluntary restructuring.	但是，没有证据显示深度非自愿重组会比深度自愿重组造成更大的混乱。


By insisting on its voluntariness, the ECB may be trying to ensure that the restructuring is not deep; but, in that case, it is putting the banks’ interests before that of Greece, for which a deep restructuring is essential if it is to emerge from the crisis.	欧洲央行或许是想通过坚持自愿违约确保重组程度不至于很深，但是，这样一来，欧洲央行便将银行的利益置于希腊利益之前了，因为对希腊来说，深度重组是走出危机的必经之路。


In fact, the ECB may be putting the interests of the few banks that have written credit-default swaps before those of Greece, Europe’s taxpayers, and creditors who acted prudently and bought insurance.	事实上，欧洲央行可能把少数出售了信用违约互换的银行的利益置于优先于希腊、欧洲纳税人以及审慎债权人和保险购买者的利益的地位。


The final oddity of the ECB’s stance concerns democratic governance.	欧洲央行立场的最后一个诡异之处与民主治理有关。


Deciding whether a credit event has occurred is left to a secret committee of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, an industry group that has a vested interest in the outcome.	决定是否让信用事件发生的是一个国际互换和衍生品协会旗下的秘密委员会，而国际互换和衍生品委员会本身与决定结果有着千丝万缕的联系。


If news reports are correct, some members of the committee have been using their position to promote more accommodative negotiating positions.	如果新闻报道为真，则该委员会的一些成员正在利用职权推行更温和的谈判立场。


But it seems unconscionable that the ECB would delegate to a secret committee of self-interested market participants the right to determine what is an acceptable debt restructuring.	但欧洲央行将决定什么是可接受的债务重组的权利委托给一个本身也是自利市场参与者的秘密委员会，此举实在有些说不过去。


The one argument that seems – at least superficially – to put the public interest first is that an involuntary restructuring might lead to financial contagion, with large eurozone economies like Italy, Spain, and even France facing a sharp, and perhaps prohibitive, rise in borrowing costs.	一种（尽管只是名义上）将公众利益置于首位的观点是非自愿违约会导致财政问题的传染，意大利、西班牙甚至法国等欧元起大经济体将因此面临借贷成本急剧升高的局面，甚至因此引发危机。


But that begs the question: why should an involuntary restructuring lead to worse contagion than a voluntary restructuring of comparable depth?	但这又引出了另一个问题：为什么非自愿重组会引起比深度相仿的自愿重组更严重的传染？


If the banking system were well regulated, with banks holding sovereign debt having purchased insurance, an involuntary restructuring should perturb financial markets less.	如果银行体系有着很好的监管，持有主权债务的银行全部购买了保险，非自愿重组对金融市场的冲击应该没有这么大。


Of course, it might be argued that if Greece gets away with an involuntary restructuring, others would be tempted to try it as well.	当然，你可能会指出，如果希腊逃脱非自愿违约，那么其他国家也会试图依样画葫芦。


Financial markets, worried about this, would immediately raise interest rates on other at-risk eurozone countries, large and small.	金融市场将对此产生忧虑，造成其他欧元区风险国利率飙升，不管是大国还是小国。


But the riskiest countries already have been shut out of financial markets, so the possibility of a panic reaction is of limited consequence.	但风险最高的国家已然被金融市场排除在外了，因此产生恐慌的可能性后果有限。


Of course, others might be tempted to imitate Greece if Greece were indeed better off restructuring than not doing so.	当然，如果希腊在重组后境况确实有所改善，那么其他国家或许真的会群起仿效。


That is true, but everyone already knows it.	这诚然不假，但已是众人皆知的秘密了。


The ECB’s behavior should not be surprising: as we have seen elsewhere, institutions that are not democratically accountable tend to be captured by special interests.	欧洲央行的行为倒也不出人意料：放眼别处，不可被民主问责的机构往往会被特殊利益绑架。 2008年以前便是如此。


That was true before 2008; unfortunately for Europe – and for the global economy – the problem has not been adequately addressed since then.	不幸的是，对欧洲——以及对全球经济——来说，此后这一问题并未得到充分的解决。


The Sustainability Revolution in Finance	金融界的可持续革命


STOCKHOLM – A quiet revolution is taking place in the financial industry.	发自斯德哥尔摩——金融业界正在发生一场静悄悄的革命。


According to the United Nations Environment Programme, sustainable development is increasingly being integrated into financial decision-making.	根据联合国环境计划署所发布的报告，可持续发展正越来越多地被涵盖到财务决策的考虑因素之中。


The European Union has been rather passive so far in this transformation, but financial regulators in a number of countries are leading the charge.	迄今为止欧盟一直在这一转变中显得比较被动，而许多国家的金融监管机构则引领着潮流。


France recently introduced the world’s first mandatory climate disclosure requirements for institutional investors.	法国最近推出了面向机构投资者的全球第一个强制性气候信息披露要求。


Norway is divesting its sovereign wealth fund from coal.	挪威的主权财富基金正在逐步退出煤炭行业。


South Africa has embedded sustainable development into listing requirements on its stock exchange.	南非则将可持续发展纳入其证券交易所的股票上市要求之中。


Likewise, Brazil’s banking regulations now require accounting for environmental risk.	同样，巴西的银行法规现在要求对环境风险进行评估。


And the Swedish government is pushing an ambitious sustainability agenda featuring a series of proposals aimed at improving information for investors and determining which climate-related risks regulators and financial firms must address.	而瑞典政府正在推动一项雄心勃勃的可持续发展议程，其中列入了一系列旨在增加对投资者的信息披露并确定哪些与气候相关的风险必须由监管机构和金融企业进行解决的提案。


Private industry is also moving rapidly.	与此同时，私人部门也不遑多让。


The world’s largest asset manager, Blackrock, is launching a fossil-fuel-free index, and Axa, one of the world's largest insurance companies, has pledged to divest from coal.	全球最大的资产管理公司黑石（Blackrock）现推出非化石燃料指数（fossil-fuel-free index），而世界上最大的保险公司之一安盛（Axa）也已承诺从煤碳行业撤资。


Meanwhile, the divestment movement is snowballing, with faith-based communities, municipalities, celebrities, trade unions, universities, and institutional investors all pledging to unload their fossil-fuel assets.	这种撤资运动是滚雪球式的：宗教社区、城市政府、社会名人、工会，大学和机构投资者都表示要撤出化石燃料资产。


Altogether, institutions worth more than $2.6 trillion have committed to divest from fossil fuels.	总共已有管理超过$ 2. 6万亿美元市值的机构承诺要从化石燃料行业撤资。


The revolution may be quiet, but it is getting louder.	革命或许是寂静的，但它引发的震荡却日益扩大。


Fossil-fuel companies are increasingly being delegitimized; their current business model is irreconcilable with a climate-conscious investment portfolio.	化石燃料企业正在失去其合法性； 因为它们目前的经营模式与关注气候变化的投资组合背道而驰。


At the same time, investors are starting to understand that paying attention to climate risk is an integral part of a sound investment strategy that seeks to minimize risk and help to promote financial stability.	与此同时，投资者开始认识到，关注气候风险是合理投资战略的一个组成部分，可以最大限度地降低风险并有助于提升金融稳健程度。


Axa’s CEO Henri de Castries has endorsed such motives, stating that divesting from coal helps remove risk from investment portfolios and contributes to building a more sustainable society.	安盛首席执行官亨利·德·卡斯特（Henri de Castries）对这样的动机表示赞同，指出脱离煤炭行业有助于从投资组合中剔除风险，并有助于建立一个更加可持续发展的社会。


Bank of England Governor Mark Carney has been particularly frank in highlighting the dangers that climate change poses to financial markets.	英格兰银行行长马克·卡尼（Mark Carney）一直在大力强调气候变化可能带给金融市场的风险。


In a speech at Lloyd’s of London this September, he cautioned that a delayed transition to limit global warming to 2º Celsius would increase risks to financial stability.	在今年9月于伦敦劳合社（Lloyd’s of London）发表的演讲中，他警告如果继续拖延将全球变暖限制在摄氏2ºC以内的转型，则金融稳定性风险将增大。


A range of institutions has echoed his warning.	一系列机构也对他的警告做出了响应。


Meanwhile, McKinsey and the Carbon Trust have estimated that 30-40% of the value of fossil-fuel companies could be endangered because of a so-called “carbon bubble,” an overvaluation of fossil-fuel reserves.	与此同时，麦肯锡公司和碳信托基金估计化石燃料公司市值的30-40％可能会因为所谓“碳泡沫”——对化石燃料储量的高估——而受损。


According to the International Energy Agency, two-thirds of these reserves must be kept in the ground if the world is to avoid runaway climate change, which implies that companies may not be able to exploit their full economic potential.	据国际能源机构的统计，如���世界要避免气候变化失控的话，2/3的燃料储备必须留在地底不得开采，这意味着相关企业可能无法利用其全部经济潜力。


Given that the European financial sector has invested more than €1 trillion ($1.1 trillion) in fossil-fuel assets, the EU is particularly at risk of a carbon bubble.	鉴于欧洲金融部门在化石燃料资产上的投资超过1万亿欧元（约合 1. 1万亿美元），欧盟所面临的碳泡沫风险尤其巨大。


The issue has become serious enough that European Central Bank President Mario Draghi has asked the European Systemic Risk Board to investigate it.	事态严重，以至于欧洲央行行长马里奥·德拉吉（Mario Draghi）要求欧洲系统性风险委员会对此进行调查。


Financial regulators in Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are all studying the impact of climate change on financial markets.	此外瑞典，德国，荷兰和英国的金融监管机构都在研究气候变化对金融市场的影响。


The G-20 has also asked the Basel-based Financial Stability Board to convene a public-private inquiry into the carbon bubble.	G20集团还要求位于巴塞尔的金融稳定委员会召开针对碳泡沫的公私听证会。


Last September, European Commissioner Jonathan Hill published his long-awaited Capital Markets Union proposal.	去年九月，欧盟专员乔纳森·希尔（Jonathan Hill）发布了期待已久的资本市场联盟提案。


But while his call for more integrated and diversified capital markets in the EU is admirable, his proposal lacks both a roadmap for the integration of sustainable development into the financial system and a strategy for addressing the carbon bubble.	但尽管他建立更为整合且多元化的资本市场的呼吁令人钦佩，却缺乏一个可以将可持续发展融入金融体系的路线图以及应对碳泡沫的战略。


The European Parliament and the European Council have the opportunity to improve Hill’s proposal.	欧洲议会和欧洲理事会不乏机会去改进希尔的建议。


The parliament has already established an informal cross-party grouping, called the Carbon Group, which aims to tackle the carbon bubble and advance sustainable finance.	议会已经成立了一个名为碳素集团的非正式跨党派小组，其目的是解决碳泡沫和推进可持续金融。


And within the Council, a range of countries, most notably Sweden and France, are working for greater integration of sustainability metrics into financial markets.	在理事会内部，以瑞典和法国为首的几个国家正在为更加大程度地将可持续发展指标整合入金融市场而努力。


A range of institutions are starting to embrace sustainable development considerations in their financial decision-making.	此外一批机构也开始在它们的决策过程中引入可持续发展因素。


Policymakers – especially in the EU – have a responsibility to advance such forward-looking thinking and to protect the global economy from climate-induced financial distress.	而政策制定者们——尤其是在欧盟——有责任去推动这些前瞻性思维，并保护全球经济免受气候引发的财务危机。


A Carbon Price-and-Rebate Plan	碳定价和返现计划


PARIS – So far, international climate talks have failed to find a mechanism that will successfully reduce global greenhouse-gas emissions.	巴黎—目前，国际气候谈判没有能够找到可以成功降低全球温室气体排放的机制。


The 1997 Kyoto Protocol attempted to use a system of tradable quotas to establish a price on carbon-dioxide emissions, but foundered after the United States and several emerging countries refused to join.	1997年京都议定书尝试采用可交易配额系统为二氧化碳排放制定价格，但以失败告终，因为美国和一些新兴国家拒绝加入京都议定书。


The 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference introduced a pledge-and-review process, in which countries unilaterally decided how much they would cut.	2009年哥本哈根气候变化会议引入了承诺-评估程序，各国单方面决定减排多少。


As a result, the US and several emerging economies made commitments to reduce emissions for the first time.	结果，美国和一些新兴经济体首次做出减排承诺。


But this system, too, is badly flawed.	但这一系统也有极大的缺陷。


What it does not do is resolve the classical free-rider problem or guarantee reductions in developing countries.	它没有解决经典 的免费搭车问题，也无法保证发展中国家的减排。


Indeed, some countries may have been encouraged to do less than they otherwise would have in order to maintain a strong negotiating position.	事实上，一些国家为了维持强势谈判地位，被鼓励做得更少一些。


As world leaders meet in Paris from November 30 to December 11 for the United Nations Conference on Climate Change, they will have a new opportunity to forge an effective agreement.	11月30日—12月11日，全世界领导人将在巴黎出席联合国气候变化会议。 这次会议是一次形成有效协议的新机会。


To encourage governments to act in concert, it is essential to work toward a system of carbon pricing that is both straightforward and transparent.	为了鼓励各国政府一致行动，致力于构建一个直观而透明的碳定价系统至关重要。


We propose a carbon “price-and-rebate” mechanism, which simultaneously sets a price on emissions above a certain threshold and defines how the revenues raised should be used.	我们建议采取“定价和返现”机制，制定一个高于某个阈值的排放价格，同时明确所得收入如何使用。


Studies ahead of the Paris conference suggest that international cooperation could allow for rapid reduction of greenhouse gases.	巴黎会议前的研究表明，国际公司可以迅速减少温室气体排放。


They also highlight the knock-on benefits that taking quick action on climate change could have, including reduction of local pollution, greater energy and food security, and faster innovation.	它们还强调了迅速采取行动遏制气候变化所能带来的附带好处，包括减少地方污染、增强能源和粮食安全以及更快的创新。 要加速迈向低碳经济，就必须有适用于所有国家的国际协定；


To accelerate the move toward a low-carbon economy, an international agreement must be applicable to all countries; include a common and consistent system for monitoring, reporting, and verification; and provide strong economic incentives at a global scale.	包括一个共同的一致监测、报告和核实系统； 并提供全球范围的强经济激励。


Our price-and-rebate mechanism is inspired by the “bonus/malus” scheme in France, in which buyers of new cars are taxed or given a bonus depending on the vehicle’s CO2 emissions.	我们的定价和返现机制受欧洲的“奖惩”机制启发。 在奖惩机制中，新汽车的买家会被课税或获得补贴，视其所购买汽车的二氧化碳排量而定。


In our system, a country exceeding the worldwide average for per capita emissions would pay a specified amount on every ton of CO2 (or its equivalent) above a set threshold.	在我们的系统中，一国如果超过了世界人均排放量，就必须向其在规定量二氧化碳（及其等价物）以上的排量部分支付每吨若干美元。


Countries with lower-than-average emissions would be compensated for polluting less.	低于人均排放量的国家将因为污染较少而获得补偿。


This system would initially benefit countries with the lowest per capita emissions, meaning that most of the funds would flow towards the least-developed countries.	这一系统一开始有利于人均排量最低的国家，这意味着大部分资金将流向最不发达国家。


Once it is fully operational, the price-and-rebate mechanism would encourage all countries to reduce their per capita emissions, thereby reducing the gap between payments and rebates.	一旦得到充分执行，定价和返现机制将鼓励所有国家削减人均排放，从而降低支付额和返现额之间的距离。


The ideal carbon price would depend on the objectives of the agreement.	理想的谈价格将取决于协定的目标。


A price of $1-2 per ton would generate $14-28 billion, enough to fund the deployment of the monitoring, review, and verification process in developing countries.	每吨定价1—2美元可以带来140—280亿美元收入，足够在发展中国家部署监测、评估和核实程序。


The Copenhagen Accord included a commitment by rich countries to spend $100 billion a year after 2020 to help underdeveloped countries mitigate and adapt to climate change.	在哥本哈根协定中，发达国家承诺在2020年后每年拿出1,000亿美元帮助不发达国家减轻或适应气候变化。


A rate of $7-$8 per ton would generate enough revenue to deliver on this promise, with the money flowing to countries with low per capita emissions.	7—8美元一吨的定价便能够产生足以兑现这一承诺的收入，资金将流向人均排量较低的国家。


Of that $100 billion, a little over $60 billion would come from Western countries and Japan, and just under $20 billion would come from hydrocarbon-exporting countries (Russia and Saudi Arabia in particular) and high-growth Asian economies (including China and Korea).	在这1,000亿美元中，略多于600亿将来自西方国界和日本，只有不到200亿来自碳氢化合物出口国（特别是俄罗斯和沙特阿拉伯）和高增长亚洲经济体（包括中国和韩国）。


The introduction of a price-and-rebate system would thus redistribute funds among countries in conformity with the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”	因此，引入定价和返现系统将按照“共同但有差异的责任和各自能力” 原则重新分配各国的资金。


A price-and-rebate system would be both efficient and fair.	定价和返现系统将是高效而公平的。


Every citizen in the world would have the same right to emit greenhouse gas, and every country would face the same incentives at the margin to reduce emissions.	全世界所有公民都有同样温室气体排放权利，所有国家都获得同样的边际减排激励。


The main obstacle to be overcome in establishing such a system will be to convince donor countries’ governments to pay for their carbon emissions.	克服建立这样一套系统的主要障碍是说服出资国政府为其碳排放付钱。


This cost will be modest relative to the size of their economies, and any successful climate-change agreement will require similar commitments.	这一成本与他们的经济规模比起来十分微小，而任何成功的气候变化协定都需要一样的承诺。


If rich countries are unable to agree to pay even a modest price for carbon, the talks in Paris will surely be judged a failure.	如果发达国家不同意为碳支付一个十分有限的价格，那么巴黎谈判将肯定以失败告终。


The Path to Carbon Pricing	通往碳定价之路


WASHINGTON, DC – In just six weeks, world leaders will meet in Paris to negotiate a new global climate-change agreement.	华盛顿—区区六周后，世界领导人将齐聚巴黎协商新的全球气候变化协定。


To date, 150 countries have submitted plans detailing how they will move their economies along a more resilient low-carbon trajectory.	目前，150个国家已经递交了关于如何让本国经济走向恢复力更强的低碳轨迹的详细计划。


These plans represent the first generation of investments to be made in order to build a competitive future without the dangerous levels of carbon-dioxide emissions that are now driving global warming.	这些计划给出了第一批为了在不让二氧化碳排放量达到如今导致全球变暖的危险水平的情况下构建高竞争力未来而进行的投资。


The transition to a cleaner future will require both government action and the right incentives for the private sector.	通往更清洁的未来的转型将需要政府行动起来并未私人部门提供正确的激励。


At the center should be a strong public policy that puts a price on carbon pollution.	居于核心地位的应该是强有力的碳污染定价公共政策。


Placing a higher price on carbon-based fuels, electricity, and industrial activities will create incentives for the use of cleaner fuels, save energy, and promote a shift to greener investments.	给碳基能源、电力和工业活动定更高的价格将刺激人们使用更清洁的燃料、节约能量、促进向更绿色的投资的转变。


Measures such as carbon taxes and fees, emissions-trading programs and other pricing mechanisms, and removal of inefficient subsidies can give businesses and households the certainty and predictability they need to make long-term investments in climate-smart development.	碳税和碳费、排量交易安排和其他定价机制、取消低效补贴，这些措施能够给予企业和家庭它们所需要的确定性和可预测性，让它们为气候智能（climate-smart）发展做出长期投资。


At the International Monetary Fund, the focus is on reforming its member countries’ fiscal systems in order to raise more revenue from taxes on carbon-intensive fuels and less revenue from other taxes that are detrimental to economic performance, such as taxes on labor and capital.	在国际货币基金组织（IMF），注意力集中在改革成员国的财政制度，从碳密集型燃料的税收上获得更多收入，同时减少不利于经济表现的劳动和资本方面的税收。


Pricing carbon can be about smarter, more efficient tax systems, rather than higher taxes.	碳定价可以是更智能、更高效的税收制度，并不一定要提高税负。


Carbon taxes should be applied comprehensively to emissions from fossil fuels.	碳税必须针对源自化石燃料的排放全面收取。


The price must be high enough to achieve ambitious environmental goals, in alignment with national circumstances, and it must be stable, in order to encourage businesses and households to invest in clean technologies.	其价格必须足够高以实现宏大的环境目标，必须与国家的具体情况相结合，必须稳定以鼓励企业和家庭投资于清洁技术。


Administering carbon taxes is straightforward and can build on existing road fuel taxes, which are well established in most countries.	管理碳税并不复杂，可以基于目前在大部分国家都在征收的道路燃料税。


Carbon pricing will be in many countries’ best interests, owing to the many domestic environmental benefits.	碳定价符合许多国家的根本利益，因为它会带来诸多国内环境收益。


For example, burning cleaner fuels helps to reduce outdoor air pollution, which, according to the World Health Organization, currently causes about 3.7 million premature deaths a year.	比如，燃烧更清洁的燃料有助于减少室外空气污染。 据世界卫生组织的数据，目前室外空气污染每年导致约370万人过早死亡。


It is vitally important to address the impact of energy-price reforms on vulnerable groups in every society.	遏制能源价格改革对各国弱势群体的冲击至关重要。


So these reforms will need to be accompanied by adjustments to fiscal systems and safety nets, among other things, to ensure that the poor are not harmed.	因此，这些改革需要辅之以财政制度和社会安全网等方面的调整，以确保穷人不受伤害。


The World Bank Group is supporting countries and businesses as they develop climate-friendly public policies, invest in carbon markets, and explore financial innovations to ease into low-carbon transitions.	世界银行集团正在支持各个国家和企业制定环境友好型公共政策、投资碳市场、探索金融创新以便利低碳转型。


The Group is leveraging its experience and global reach for learning and knowledge exchange through programs like the Partnership for Market Readiness.	世界银行集团利用其经验和业务遍及全球的特点，通过市场合作准��计划（Partnership for Market Readiness）等项目促进学习和知识交流。


From that experience, we have developed, alongside the OECD, initial principles to help guide and inspire future carbon-pricing schemes.	从这方面的经验出发，我们与经合组织一起制定了帮助指引和启发未来谈定价机制的初步原则。


By drawing on these principles, countries, regions, states, and businesses can move faster to tackle the climate challenge confronting us all.	通过实施这些原则，各个国家、地区、行政区和企业能够更快地行动起来，解决我们所有人一起面临的气候挑战。


The principles are based on fairness; alignment of policies and objectives; stability and predictability; transparency; efficiency and cost-effectiveness; and reliability and environmental integrity.	这些原则以公平性、政策和目标的一致性、稳定性和可预测性、透明性、效率和性价比，以及可靠性和环境完整性为基础。