Proclaiming six meters of sea-level rise over this century contradicts thousands of UN scientists, and requires the sea-level rise to accelerate roughly 40-fold from today. Imagine how climate alarmists would play up the story if we actually saw an increase in the sea-level rise.	宣扬在本世纪内海平面上升6米与数以千计的联合国科学家的研究不符，而且意味着海平面上升要比当今的水平加快40倍。


Increasingly, alarmists claim that we should not be allowed to hear such facts.	惊世骇俗的人士们越发宣称不应当让我们听到这些事实。


In June, Hansen proclaimed that people who spread “disinformation” about global warming – CEOs, politicians, in fact anyone who doesn’t follow Hansen’s narrow definition of the “truth” – should literally be tried for crimes against humanity.	六月，韩森宣称那些宣扬有关全球气候变暖“谣言”的人，包括首席执行官们、政坛人物以及任何并不盲从其对“真相”狭隘定义的人士都应该接受反人类罪行的审判。


It is depressing to see a scientist – even a highly politicized one – calling for a latter-day Inquisition.	科学家、即使是这位极为政治化的科学家呼吁建立一个当今的宗教法庭是让人极为难过的事情。


Such a blatant attempt to curtail scientific inquiry and stifle free speech seems inexcusable.	这是明目张胆地压制科学探询和限制言论自由，是不可原谅的。


But it is perhaps also a symptom of a broader problem.	但是这背后可能存在更大的问题。


It is hard to keep up the climate panic as reality diverges from the alarmist predictions more than ever before: the global temperature has not risen over the past ten years, it has declined precipitously in the last year and a half, and studies show that it might not rise again before the middle of the next decade.	现实与惊世骇俗的预言差距越来越大，因此很难继续保持这种气候恐慌。 在过去十年中，全球气温并没有上升。


With a global recession looming and high oil and food prices undermining the living standards of the Western middle class, it is becoming ever harder to sell the high-cost, inefficient Kyoto-style solution of drastic carbon cuts.	研究结果表明，在下个十年中期以前气温不会再次上升。 当今全球经济面临衰退，高昂的油价和食品价格破坏了西方国家中产阶级的生活水平，因此也就越发难以推销代价巨大、没有什么效率的京都议定书风格的大幅度减少二氧化碳排放措施。


A much sounder approach than Kyoto and its successor would be to invest more in research and development of zero-carbon energy technologies – a cheaper, more effective way to truly solve the climate problem.	比京都议定书及其继任协定更佳的措施应当是对没有二氧化碳排放的能源技术加大研发力度。 这是解决气候问题更为便宜有效的方式。


Hansen is not alone in trying to blame others for his message’s becoming harder to sell.	在指责他人要对越发难以推销其观点负责上并不只是韩森一人。


Canada’s top environmentalist, David Suzuki, stated earlier this year that politicians “complicit in climate change” should be thrown in jail.	加拿大最为著名的环保主义者铃木在今年初说过，那些“在气候变化问题上成为从犯”的政坛人物应当被送入监狱。


Campaigner Mark Lynas envisions Nuremberg-style “international criminal tribunals” against those who dare to challenge the climate dogma.	环保主义运动组织者里纳斯设想一个类似纽伦堡审判那样的“国际罪行法庭”对付那些敢于质疑气候变化教条的人。


Clearly, this column places me at risk of incarceration by Hansen & Co.	很明显，这篇专栏也把我本人放在了被韩森等人囚禁的危险境地。


But the globe’s real problem is not a series of inconvenient facts.	但是当今世界现实问题并不是一系列不让人高兴的真相。


It is that we have blocked out sensible solutions through an alarmist panic, leading to bad policies.	正是我们自己用骇人听闻的恐慌阻挡了有意义的解决途径，从而导致了不良的政策。


Consider one of the most significant steps taken to respond to climate change.	让我们看一看针对气候变化所采取的最为主要步骤之一。


Adopted because of the climate panic, bio-fuels were supposed to reduce CO2 emissions.	作为由于气候变化恐慌而采纳的政策，生物燃料本应减少二氧��碳排放。


Hansen described them as part of a “brighter future for the planet.”	韩森把这些政策称为“地球光明未来”的一部分。


But using bio-fuels to combat climate change must rate as one of the poorest global “solutions” to any great challenge in recent times.	但是使用生物燃料来对付气候变化却是应该被评为在最近时代中针对任何全球性挑战的最为糟糕的所谓“解决途径”。


Bio-fuels essentially take food from mouths and puts it into cars.	生物燃料实际上从人的嘴里夺粮喂到汽车里。


The grain required to fill the tank of an SUV with ethanol is enough to feed one African for a year.	用酒精装满一辆运动型多用途汽车油箱所需要的农作物足够养活一个非洲人一年。


Thirty percent of this year’s corn production in the United States will be burned up on America’s highways.	今年美国玉米产量的百分之三十将会用来做汽车燃料。


This has been possible only through subsidies that globally will total $15 billion this year alone.	只有通过补贴才能形成这种局势，而在全世界范围内，仅仅是今年的补贴就达到150亿美元。


Because increased demand for bio-fuels leads to cutting down carbon-rich forests, a 2008 Science study showed that the net effect of using them is not to cut CO2 emissions, but to double them.	由于生物燃料需求增加导致砍伐大量吸收二氧化碳的森林，科学杂志2008年的一项研究表明使用生物燃料的净效益并不是减少二氧化碳的排放，而是让排放翻倍。


The rush towards bio-fuels has also strongly contributed to rising food prices, which have tipped another roughly 30 million people into starvation.	一股风地发展生物燃料还极大地推动了食品价格的上涨，造成大约另外三千万人陷入饥饿。


Because of climate panic, our attempts to mitigate climate change have provoked an unmitigated disaster.	由于气候变化恐慌，我们减轻气候变化的措施造成了无法减轻的灾难。


We will waste hundreds of billions of dollars, worsen global warming, and dramatically increase starvation.	我们将会浪费几千亿计美元，加快全球气候变暖并且大幅度增加饥饿。


We have to stop being scared silly, stop pursuing stupid policies, and start investing in smart long-term R&D. Accusations of “crimes against humanity” must cease.	我们应该停止愚蠢的害怕，停止追寻愚蠢的政策并且开始投资于长远的、聪明的研发项目。 “反人类罪”的指责必须停止。


Indeed, the real offense is the alarmism that closes minds to the best ways to respond to climate change.	实际上，真正的违反人类利益是那种对应付气候变化最佳途径视而不见的恐慌主义。


The Green Paradox	环境问题的悖论


The protesters have returned to their home countries, the injured are licking their wounds, the heads of state are back to business as usual, and Heiligendamm, the old spa on Germany’s Baltic coast, is resuming its dream of imperial beauty.	抗议者们回到了各自的国家，受伤者们在舔自己的伤口，各国元首照例又主持国政，而会议举办地德国巴尔干海岸古老的温泉浴场海利根达姆则又回到了其帝国美景的梦想之中。


And German Chancellor Angela Merkel achieved a substantial diplomatic success.	德国总理默克尔获得了实质性的外交成功。


With charm and unassuming clear-headedness, she wrought a compromise from the G8 countries that may help save the world from the most severe devastations caused by global warming.	她凭借魅力和谦虚的清醒头脑从八国集团中获得了妥协。 这一妥协有可能将世界从全球气候变暖所造成的最为严重的灾害中解救出来。


The world’s eight richest countries promised to “seriously consider” halving their CO2 emissions by 2050.	世界上最为富有的八个国家保证“认真考虑”在2050年以前将它们的二氧化碳排放减少一半。


The wording may sound vague, but, given the positions the countries held at the outset, the outcome was an important achievement.	这一措辞听起来可能有点模糊，但是，鉴于各国在会议开始所持立场，这一结果是一项重要成就。


The United States, in particular, shifted its stance significantly since its rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, even accepting that the United Nations will have to organize the future negotiations.	特别是美国从其拒绝京都议定书以来大为转变其立场，甚至接受联合国应该组织未来的谈判。


But, while the compromise is more than could have been hoped for at the outset, several important countries did not partake of it.	但是，尽管这一妥协要比在开始的时候指望的要好，几个重要的国家并没有参与其中。


To be sure, China, India, Brazil, South Africa, and Mexico signed on; but many countries, including the Asian tigers and most European countries, did not, despite their large contributions to polluting the world’s atmosphere.	的确，中国、印度、巴西、南非以及墨西哥附和其中。 但是，其他许多国家，包括亚洲经济强国和大多数欧洲国家尽管是地球大气的主要污染国家也都没有参与。


Moreover, the oil sheiks and other producers of fossil fuels who ultimately control the amount of carbon released to the atmosphere were not part of the deal.	而且，那些最终控制排向大气的二氧化碳数量的石油酋长国和其他矿物燃料的生产国并没有加入协议。


If major consumer countries and most producer countries do not join the agreement to reduce CO2 emissions, it could be useless.	如果主要的消费国家和大多数生产国家并不加入减少二氧化碳排放的协议，那么，这一协议就可能是一纸空文。


Many believe that aggregate CO2 emissions are the result of independent decisions in individual countries.	许多人相信二氧化碳的总体排放是各国独立决定的结果。


Thus, if a group of countries decides to have lower emissions, worldwide emissions will decline by the sum of these countries’ reductions.	因此，如果某些国家决定减少排放，那么，全球排放就会随之下降相应的数量。


Sure, it would be better if all countries curtailed their emissions, but it is already a great help if at least some countries do so.	的确，如果所有的国家都限制其排放就是再好不过的了，但是，即使某些国家这样做也是大有帮助。


Unfortunately, this view is too good to be true, because one country’s emissions are not independent from those of another.	不幸的是，这一观点好得难以成真，因为某国的排放并不孤立于其他国家之外。


If countries decide to cut their emissions, they will have to reduce their consumption of fossil fuels, in particular oil.	如果各国决定减少排放，它们就不得不减少其矿物燃料的消费，特别是石油。


This will reduce the world price of these fuels, inducing other countries to consume even more than they otherwise would.	这将会降低这些燃料在世界市场上的价格，引诱其他国家消费比正常情况下更多的燃料。


Countries that cut their emissions would, in effect, be subsidizing their competitors’ growth, not necessarily reducing the speed of global warming.	实际上，减少排放的国家将会给其竞争对手予以补贴，同时也并不一定减少全球变暖的速度。


The sacrifices of the participating countries would alleviate the CO2 problem only if their restraint meant that some of the fossil resources they do not consume remain underground.	这些协议参加国克制其消费，但是，只有让它们没有消费的矿物燃料留在地下才能使得这些国家做出的牺牲减缓二氧化碳造成的问题。


They must succeed in inducing the oil sheikhs and other producers of fossil fuels to throttle their pumps.	它们必须成功地让石油酋长国和其他石油生产国家减少石油生产。


If the sheikhs are stubborn and continue to extract as much as they had planned to extract without the G8’s restraint, the price of fuels will fall sufficiently to induce so much extra consumption among the non-participating countries that the net effect on aggregate CO2 emissions will be nil.	如果这些酋长国家固执己见并且继续在没有八国集团限制的情况下开采其计划的石油，那么，燃料价格将会大为下降，从而怂恿没有参加的国家们额外消费，进而让二氧化碳的总体排放净效果化为乌有。


Will the oil sheikhs reduce output of fossil fuels?	石油酋长国们会减少矿物燃料的生产吗？


At first glance, it seems natural to assume this, as most suppliers reduce production when the price falls.	乍一看，做这样的假定是自然而然的，因为大多数供应方在价格下降的时候会减少石油生产。


But the sheikhs are sitting on fixed stocks of oil.	但是，酋长们却坐拥固定数量的石油。


If they do not extract it today, they will have to do it in the future if they want to make a profit.	如果他们今天不开采，那么，如果他们想要获利的话也会在明天开采。


At best, it seems that the time path of extractions can be tilted toward the future.	最好的情况下，开采看起来会向后推延。


This would not solve the CO2 problem in the long run, but at least it would postpone the catastrophe.	这在长远上不会解决二氧化碳问题，但是至少会推迟灾难。


The oil sheikhs would likely be inclined to postpone extraction only if they could reasonably assume that the demand reductions of the signing countries and the comparative price reduction that this implies are stronger today than they will be in the future.	石油酋长们只有在合理地假定参加协议各国减少的要求和相对价格降低现在要比以后要强才会推迟开采。


This is not plausible.	这是不可能的。


Indeed, the sheikhs will know that, in all likelihood, concerns about global warming will increase over time.	确实，石油酋长们将会知道有关全球变暖的担忧很有可能会随着时间而增加。


They will therefore speed up rather than reduce production, in order to avoid selling their oil when anxiety about CO2 peaks and the artificial measures of the signing countries to reduce their consumption have dampened the oil price most.	他们因此会加速而不是降低生产从而避免在有关二氧化碳排放的忧虑达到顶点、参加各国降低消费的人工措施最大程度地降低了石油价格的时候再出售他们的石油。


Thus, green policies will paradoxically accelerate rather than mitigate global warming.	因此，环境政策将会自相矛盾地加速而不是减缓全球变暖。


Two lessons arise from these considerations.	从这些考虑中可以得出两个教训。


First, all polluters must sit at the negotiating table and be forced or induced to participate in reducing pollution.	首先，所有的污染方都必须坐在谈判桌旁，要末被迫、要末被引导参与减少污染。


The commitments of single countries like Germany to over-fulfill their duties are useless.	某些单个国家例如德国过度履行其责任的承诺是��济于事的。


Germany has already contributed three-quarters of the aggregate EU-wide reductions of CO2 emission from 1990 to 2008-2012 to which the EU committed in the Kyoto protocol.	德国已经为在1990年到2008年和2012年期间欧盟根据京都议定书承诺的欧盟范围的降低二氧化碳排放总量贡献了四分之三。


Such a policy simply subsidizes other polluters’ CO2 emissions, but does not alleviate the problem of global warming.	这样的政策只不过是补贴了其他污染国的二氧化碳排放，但是却并不减缓全球变暖的问题。


Second, and more difficult, the oil sheikhs and other producers of fossil fuels must be talked into postponing their extraction plans or, better yet, not to extract some of their resources at all.	第二，也是更为困难的是，必须说服石油酋长国们和其他矿物燃料生产国推迟其开采计划，或者更好的情况是根本就不开采其某些资源。


The best policy against global warming is to keep the CO2 imbedded in fossil resources deep underground.	针对全球变暖的最佳政策就是让包含二氧化碳的矿物资源深深地埋在地下。


The good news from Heiligendamm is that the UN will now have to organize a common solution.	海利根达姆会议的好消息是联合国现在将会组织共同方案。


The bad news is that this is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future, and that the owners of natural resources will therefore make every attempt to extract their resources and thus pump the fossil carbon into the atmosphere before the UN finds a way out of this impasse.	坏消息是在可以预计的将来这不大可能发生，而且自然资源的所有方将会因此竭尽全力在联合国找到解决困难的途径之前开采其资源并且因此将矿物二氧化碳排放到大气之中。


The Green Pseudo-Revolution	伪绿色革命


COPENHAGEN – With a worldwide recession advancing, strong action on global warming has been thrown into jeopardy.	哥本哈根-随着全球衰退愈演愈烈，在全球变暖上的强有力行动也陷入了危险之中。


This matters, because in little more than a year, the world will sit down in Copenhagen to negotiate the follow-on treaty to the failed Kyoto Protocol.	这是非常严重的问题，因为再过一年多时间，全世界的领导人将会在哥本哈根聚会，谈判京都议定书失败后的后续条约。


Yet, with people losing jobs and income, immediate economic help seems to matter more than temperature differentials 100 years from now.	然而，现在人们正在失去工作和收入，采取紧急的经济援助看起来比100年后的温差要重要的多。


Many green pundits have, however, started saying that the financial crisis only makes the need for action on climate change greater.	然而，许多环保问题的权威人士开始在说金融危机只会使对气候变化采取行动的要求更加强烈。


They urge America’s president-elect Barack Obama to pursue a “green revolution” with big investments in renewable energy, arguing that this could create millions of new “green collar” jobs and open huge new markets.	他们敦促美国当选总统奥巴马实施“绿色革命”，在再生能源进行巨额投资，因为他们认为这可以创造数百万个新的“绿领”职位并且打开巨大的新市场。


Such sentiments, no surprise, are strongly voiced by business leaders who live off such subsidies.	这种意见毫不奇怪地得到了依赖这些补贴的商界领袖们的强烈支持。


But are such pleas smart investments for society?	但是这种主张对社会来说真的是明智投资吗？


The problem with the green revolution argument is that it doesn’t trouble itself about efficiency.	绿色革命观点的问题在于它从来不考虑效率问题。


It is most often lauded for supplying new jobs.	它经常被称赞能提供新的就业岗位。


But billions of dollars in tax subsidies would create plenty of new jobs in almost any sector: the point is that many less capital-intensive sectors would create many more jobs for a given investment of taxpayers’ money.	但是几十亿美元的税收补贴几乎可以在任何一个部门创造大量的新岗位，关键在于同样是用纳税人的钱进行的投资，许多资本密集程度较低的部门能够创造更多的就业岗位。


Similarly, green initiatives will open new markets only if other nations subsidize inefficient technologies bought abroad.	同样地，绿色计划能够打开新的市场的说法只有当其他国家资助从国外购买的低效技术时才会成立。


Thus, the real game becomes which nations get to suck up other nations’ tax-financed subsidies.	因此，真正的游戏就变成了哪些国家能够吸收其他国家由税收资助的补贴。


Apart from the resulting global inefficiency, this also creates a whole new raft of industry players that will keep pushing inefficient legislation, simply because it fills their coffers.	除开会造成全球的低效率，它还会催生一帮全新的产业玩家，他们会持续推动低效的立法，只是因为这样可以填饱他们自己的金库。


A good illustration is Denmark, which early on provided huge subsidies for wind power, building thousands of inefficient turbines around the country from the 1980’s onwards.	丹麦就是一个很好的例子，它在很早以前就为风能提供巨额补贴，从二十世纪八十年代起在全国建造了数千座低效的涡轮机。


Today, it is often remarked that Denmark is providing every third terrestrial wind turbine in the world, creating billions in income and jobs.	今天，人们还是常常会提到丹麦提供了全世界三分之一的陆上风轮机，创造了价值几十亿美元的收入和就业岗位。


A few years ago, however, the Danish Economic Council conducted a full evaluation of the wind turbine industry, taking into account not only its beneficial effects on jobs and production, but also the subsidies that it receives.	但是在几年以前，丹麦经济委员会对风轮机行业进行了一次全面的评估，不仅考虑了它在就业岗位和生产上所产生的有益效应，同时也考虑了它所获得的补贴。


The net effect for Denmark was found to be a small cost , not benefit.	评估发现丹麦所获得的净效应是反而付出了低额的 成本 ，而不是获得了收益。


Not surprisingly, the leading Danish wind producer is today urging strong action on climate change that would imply even more sales of wind turbines.	丹麦领先的风能厂商今天毫不奇怪地敦促对气候变化采取强有力的行动，因为这样它们可以卖出更多的风轮机。


The company sponsors the “Planet in Peril” show on CNN, which helps galvanize public pressure for action.	由企业赞助的“处于危境中的星球”节目在CNN上播出，以刺激公众要求采取行动的压力。


The crucial point is that many green technologies are not cost-effective, at least not yet.	关键的问题在于许多绿色技术并不具有成本效益，至少到目前为止还不是。


If they were, we wouldn’t need to subsidize them.	如果它们是有成本效益的，我们也不需要为它们提供补贴了。


The standard reply is that green technologies seem more expensive only because the price of fossil fuels does not reflect their climate costs.	标准的回答是绿色技术看起来更昂贵是因为矿物燃料的价格并没有反映它们的气候成本。


That makes some sense.	这种说法有一定的道理。


Given that fossil fuels contribute to global warming, standard economic theory suggests we should tax them according to their cumulative negative effects.	鉴于矿物燃料推动了全球变暖，标准的经济理论建议我们应该根据它们的累积副作用对它们进行征税。


But this would make little difference to the inefficiency of most green technologies.	但是这并不能够改变大多绿色技术低效性的事实。


The most comprehensive economic meta-study shows that total future climate impacts justify a tax of €0.012 per liter of petrol ($0.06 per gallon in the US.)	大多数综合经济元研究显示考虑到未来整个的气候影响，应该对每升汽油征收0. 012欧元的税（在美国是每加仑应征收0.


This is dwarfed by the tax that many European countries already impose, and it is much less than in the European trading system.	06美元的税）。 这远远低于与许多欧洲国家已经征收的税，并且比欧洲贸易体系中征的���要低得多。


Yet it is argued that much higher taxes and subsidies are the best way to increase research and development in new, cheaper renewable energy sources.	然而有些人还是争辩说更高的税收和补贴是提高在新的、更便宜的再生能源资源上的研究和开发的最佳办法。


This is untrue.	事实并非如此。


During the massive investment associated with the Kyoto treaty, the participating countries’ investment in R&D as a percentage of GDP has declined , not increased.	在与京都议定书相关的巨额投资中，参与国在研发上的投资占其GDP的比例是 下降 了，而不是上升了。 显而易见的是如果你投巨资于低效的太阳电池板，那么你大部分的钱都会被用于购买电池板，只有很小一部分被用于研发。


It is rather obvious that if you invest massively in inefficient solar panels, most of your money will go to buy the physical panels, whereas only a very small part will go to R&D. If you want more R&D, you should spend your money directly on R&D. This could tackle global warming in the longer run.	如果你希望加大研发的力度，你就应该把钱直接投到研发上。 从更长远的角度来看，这能够解决全球变暖的问题。


Finally, it is often claimed that high CO2 taxes and subsidies for green technology will actually do good, and again Denmark is often taken as an example.	最后，有些人经常说对二氧化碳排放征收更高的税以及为绿色技术提供更高的补贴是绝对有益的，在这里丹麦又一次被拿出来当成了范例。


After all, it is argued, Denmark has kept its CO2 emissions flat while enjoying 70% economic growth since 1981.	然而，这种说法还有待探讨。 自从1981年以来，丹麦在保持二氧化碳排放量稳定的同时取得了70%的经济增长。


But could it have grown more if it had not restricted CO2 emissions?	但是如果它没有限制二氧化碳的排放是否能取得更高的经济增长呢？


During the same period, US emissions grew 29%, but its GDP grew 39% more than Denmark’s, indicating a simple truth: CO2 cuts and subsidies don’t necessarily mean no growth, but they probably do mean slower growth.	在同一时期，美国的排放量增加了29%，但是它的GDP增长率高出丹麦39%，这表明了一个简单的事实：降低二氧化碳排放量以及提供补贴并不一定意味着 没有 增长，但是它们可能会造成增长放缓。


President-elect Obama is now facing countless people who claim that subsidies for renewable energy and CO2 taxes are great ways to tackle global warming and forge a new green economy.	即将就任总统的奥巴马现在面临着无数的人主张为再生能源提供补贴以及对二氧化碳排放征税是应对全球变暖和形成一个新的绿色经济的好办法。


Unfortunately, this is almost entirely incorrect.	不幸的是，这种观点几乎完全是不正确的。


Taxes and subsidies are always expensive, and will likely impede growth.	税收和补贴总是代价高昂的，并且很有可能会阻碍经济增长。


Moreover, if we really want to tackle global warming, we shouldn’t spend vast sums of money buying inefficient green technology – we should invest directly in R&D to make future green technology competitive.	此外，如果我们真的想解决全球变暖问题，我们不应该花巨资购买低效的绿色技术，而是应该直接投资于研发工作以便使未来的绿色技术更有竞争力。


Obama should seize the initiative and make the meeting in Copenhagen next year not about bloated subsidies for inefficient technologies, but about lean investments in future breakthroughs.	奥巴马应该采取主动，使明年哥本哈根会议不再是讨论为低效的技术提供越来越高的补贴，而是把投资向未来的技术突破倾斜。


That is the way to tackle global warming and support a genuinely vibrant economy.	这才是解决全球变暖以及支持真正有活力的经济的正确方式。


Missing America	想念美国


BERLIN – Madeleine Albright, the former US secretary of state, once described the United States as the “indispensable nation.”	柏林——美国前国务卿马德琳·奥尔布赖特曾经用“不可或缺的国家”来形容美国。


Current developments around the world are proving her right.	全球目前的事态发展证明了她的正确性。


But the proof has been almost entirely negative: Today, America’s importance has become apparent from the absence of US leadership in one crisis after another – an absence that is most immediately obvious in Syria.	但当前的事态发展却几乎全部是反面证明：今天，一次又一次危机中美国领导作用的缺失彰显出美国的重要性——最显而易见的例子是叙利亚危机。


In fact, a post-American world is taking shape before our eyes, characterized not by a new international order, but by political ambiguity, instability, and even chaos.	实际上，以政治含糊、动荡甚至混乱，而非国际新秩序为特点的后美国世界正在我们眼前成形。


This is unfortunate, and could turn out to be so dangerous that even die-hard anti-Americans end up longing for the passé American century and the US role as a global force for order.	这种情况非常不幸而且充满危险，甚至连铁杆反美份子也开始怀念过时的美国世纪和美国维护全球秩序的作用。


Both subjectively and objectively, the US is no longer willing or able to play that role.	无论从主观还是客观方面，美国都不愿也不能再发挥这样的作用。


There have been many causes: a decade of war in the greater Middle East, with its enormous cost in “blood and treasure”; the financial and economic crisis; high public debt; reorientation toward internal problems; and a new focus on Pacific affairs.	个中原因非常复杂：比如说付出巨大“生命和财产”代价的十年大中东战争； 金融经济危机；


Add to this America’s relative decline in view of China’s ascendance and that of other large emerging countries.	以及太平洋事务成为新的焦点。 此外还有相对于中国和其他新兴大国崛起的美国相对衰落问题。


I am relatively certain that the US will successfully manage its reorientation and realignment, but the relative weight and reach of its power will nonetheless decline in the new world of the twenty-first century, as others grow in strength and catch up.	我比较确定美国将成功完成调整和重新定位，但由于其他国家实力增强并且迎头赶上，美国的相对地位和权力仍将在二十一世纪的新世界有所降低。


Certainly, America’s global role will not be called into question.	当然，美国的全球作用不会受到质疑。


China will be busy addressing its own internal contradictions for a long time yet.	中国将在很长时间内忙于解决其国内矛盾。


Nor is India or Russia likely to pose a serious challenge.	印度和俄国也不太可能构成严重的威胁。


And Europe’s din of conflicting voices appears to preclude it from claiming America’s mantle.	而欧洲自相矛盾的吵吵闹闹似乎会妨碍它接过美国的大旗。


But, while none of these powers represents a serious alternative to America’s global role, the US will no longer be able to act unilaterally, as it did after the Cold War’s end, and it will be weakened substantially.	但尽管这些国家还没有谁能真正取代美国的全球作用，美国也不能再像冷战后那样单方面行动，其实力也将受到大幅度削弱。


This change has become particularly obvious in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region.	上述变化在中东和亚太地区体现得尤其显著。


In the Middle East, the regional order created by the colonial powers, France and Britain, following World War I, was maintained throughout the Cold War and the brief era of unilateral US domination that followed; the convulsions of recent years, however, could well bring about its end.	英法殖民国家一战后创造的中东地区秩序在整个冷战时期和之后短暂的美国单边统治时期一直生效； 但近年来的动荡很可能造成旧秩序的坍塌。


The colonial borders are being called into question, and what will become of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan is difficult to forecast.	殖民边界正在遭受质疑，叙利亚、黎巴嫩、伊拉克和约旦将变成什么样子很难预测。


The potential for regional disintegration and reconstitution – a process that can unleash untold violence, as in Syria – is greater than ever.	有可能像叙利亚那样释放出无尽暴力的区域解体和重建的可能性比以往任何时候都大。


Moreover, while there is no new regional hegemon to follow America, there are numerous contenders for the role.	此外，虽然继美国之后还没有新的地区霸主，但许多国家已经加入到竞争之中。


But none – Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia being the most prominent – is strong enough to decide matters in its own favor.	还没有哪个国家（伊朗、土耳其和沙特阿拉伯实力最强）强大到可以按自己的利益做出决策。


Given the lack of a new force for order in the region in the foreseeable future, and the old one’s unwillingness to act, the danger of long-lasting violent confrontation is growing.	鉴于在可以预见的未来旧有势力不愿采取行动且该地区缺乏维护秩序的新的有生力量，长时间的暴力对抗正变得越来越有可能。


Even if America once again pursued military intervention in the region, its power would no longer be sufficient to enforce its will.	即便美国再次在该地区实施军事干预，其现有力量也不足以让各方按照它的意志执行。


Indeed, it is precisely because the US, after more than a decade of war, understands this only too well that any American administration will think twice before intervening militarily in the region again.	其实，恰恰因为十余年战争让人们明白了这个道理，任何美国政府再度对该地区实施军事干预都会三思而后行。


Things look different in Asia, where the US not only remains present, but has increased its commitments.	亚洲的情况又有所不同。 美国在这里不仅保持着军事存在，而且重视程度也与日俱增。


In East and South Asia, nuclear powers (China, Russia, India, Pakistan, and North Korea) or near-nuclear powers (Japan and South Korea) are all entangled in dangerous strategic rivalries.	东南亚的核大国（中国、俄罗���、印度、巴基斯坦和朝鲜）或准核大国的（日本和韩国）都被卷入了危险的战略竞争。


Add to this a regular dose of North Korean irrationality.	这还不算朝鲜一贯的非理性行动。


While the US presence in the region has so far prevented its numerous conflicts and rivalries from intensifying, sources of uncertainty are multiplying.	虽然美国的军事存在迄今为止成功防止了各种冲突和对立激化，但不确定性的来源却在成倍递增。


Will China be wise enough to seek reconciliation and partnerships with its neighbors, large and small, rather than aiming for regional domination?	中国是否会明智到与大大小小的邻国寻求和解及伙伴关系，而不是以区域统治为目标？


What will become of the Korean Peninsula?	朝鲜半岛局势将会如何发展？


And what implications does Japan’s nationalist turn – and its risky economic policy – hold for the region?	日本的民族主义势头及其危险的经济政策对亚太地区将产生怎样的作用？


Can India and China stem the deterioration in bilateral relations?	印度和中国能否阻止双边关系恶化？


Is state failure looming in Pakistan?	国家失败的惨剧是否会在巴基斯坦发生？


Imagine this situation without America’s military and political strength.	试想没有美国的军事和政治实力将会产生怎样的后果。


The region would be dramatically more dangerous.	亚太地区的危险性将会骤增。


At the same time, America’s straitened resources mean that its new global role will require more careful consideration of national interests in setting priorities.	同时美国资源吃紧表明其新的全球作用需要在确定优先任务前对国家利益进行仔细权衡。


Clearly, the Asia-Pacific region takes precedence in US calculations.	亚太地区显然是美国战略的重中之重。


This new, more focused and limited American role thus raises the following question for America’s European partners: Can they afford the luxury of being unable to defend themselves without US help?	针对性更强也更有限的全新美国作用也因此为美国的欧洲伙伴提出了这样的问题：它们能不能没有美国帮助就无法保护自身？


Certainly, America’s guarantee of its NATO allies’ security will not become worthless; but it will become far more difficult to redeem it in full.	当然，美国对北约盟国的安全保证不会一钱不值； 但要想完全兑现却会变得更有难度。


And, if a post-American world entails greater risk of chaos and its consequences than hope for a new, stable order – a risk that affects Europe in particular – then perhaps Europe should reverse course on its apparent determination to dismantle itself.	而且，如果后美国世界带来更大的混乱风险而不是新的稳定秩序（欧洲尤其受到这种风险的影响），那么欧洲或许应该改变其自我解体的决心。


Too Big To Handle	太大而管不了


WASHINGTON, DC – In the discussion of whether America’s largest financial institutions have become too big, a sea change in opinion is underway.	华盛顿—在论及美国最大金融机构是否太大时，各种观点莫衷一是。


Two years ago, during the debate about the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation, few people thought that global megabanks represented a pressing problem.	两年前，在多德-弗兰克金融改革法争论中，几乎无人认为全球大银行代表了紧迫的问题。


Some prominent senators even suggested that very large European banks represented something of a role model for the United States.	一些知名参议员甚至建议以超大型欧洲银行作为美国银行的模板。


In any case, the government, according to the largest banks’ CEOs, could not possibly impose a cap on their assets’ size, because to do so would undermine the productivity and competitiveness of the US economy.	无论如何，在大银行CEO们看来，政府都不能限制它们的资产规模，因为这样做会破坏美国经济的生产率和竞争力。


Such arguments are still heard – but, increasingly, only from those employed by global megabanks, including their lawyers, consultants, and docile economists.	这种观点至今仍不绝于耳，但大多只来自受雇于全球大银行者，包括这些银行的律师、顾问和豢养的经济学家。


Everyone else has shifted to the view that these financial behemoths have become too large and too complex to manage – with massive adverse consequences for the wider economy.	其他人都转变了观点，认为这些金融巨兽太大、太复杂，根本难以管理，对整体经济有太多的不良影响。


And every time the CEO of such a bank is forced to resign, the evidence mounts that these organizations have become impossible to manage in a responsible way that generates sustainable value for shareholders and keeps taxpayers out of harm’s way.	而每次这类银行的CEO被迫辞职，都会曝出各种各样的证据，表明这些组织已经无法可靠地进行管理，无法为股东带来可持续价值，无法让纳税人免于损失。


Wilbur Ross, a legendary investor with great experience in the financial services sector, nicely articulated the informed private-sector view on this issue.	传奇投资者威尔伯·罗斯（Wilbur Ross）在金融服务也有着丰富的经验，他通俗地讲出了消息灵通私人部门对此问题的观点。


He recently told CNBC,	最近，他告诉CNBC：


“I think it was a fundamental error for banks to get as sophisticated as they have, and I think that the bigger problem than just size is the question of complexity.	 “我认为，让银行变得如此复杂是一个根本性的错误，我还认为，比规模更大的问题是复杂性问题。


I think maybe banks have gotten too complex to manage as opposed to just too big to manage.”	我认为也许银行已经变得太复杂而无法管理，而不是太大而无法管理。 ”


In the wake of Vikram Pandit’s resignation as CEO of Citigroup, John Gapper pointed out in the Financial Times that “Citi’s shares trade at less than a third of the multiple to book value of Wells Fargo,” because the latter is a “steady, predictable bank,” whereas Citigroup has become too complex.	潘迪特辞去花旗集团CEO一职后，约翰·盖珀（John Gapper）在《金融时报》上撰文指出，“花旗的股价只有富国银行账面价值的三分之一，”因为后者是“稳健、可预测的银行”，而花旗太复杂了。


Gapper also quotes Mike Mayo, a leading analyst of the banking sector: “Citi is too big to fail, too big to regulate, too big to manage, and it has operated as if it’s too big to care.”Even Sandy Weill, who built Citi into a megabank, has turned against his own creation.	盖珀还援引银行业热门分析师麦克·马约（Mike Mayo）评论银行部门的话，说“花旗太大而不能倒（fail），太大而不能管（regulate），太大而不能治（manage），而从其经营模式看，它是太大而不用管（care）。 ”即使是一手将花旗打造成巨型银行的桑迪·维尔（Sandy Weill）也不再支持自己的孩子。


At the same time, top regulators have begun to articulate – with some precision – what needs to be done.	与此同时，最高监管层已开始（精确地）考虑需要做些什么。


Our biggest banks must become simpler.	我们的大银行必须变得更简单。


Tom Hoenig, a former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City and now a top official at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, advocates separating big banks’ commercial and securities-trading activities.	前堪萨斯城联邦储备银行主席、现任联邦存款保险公司高管之一的汤姆·霍尼格（Tom Hoenig）支持将大银行的商业银行和证券交易活动拆分。


The cultures never mesh well, and big securities businesses are notoriously difficult to manage.	这两种文化从未很好地融合，大型证券公司难以管理更是出了名的。


Hoenig and Richard Fisher, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, have been leading the charge on this issue within the Federal Reserve System.	霍尼格和达拉斯联储银行主席理查德·费希尔（Richard Fisher）是美联储内部该问题的主管者。


Both of them emphasize that “too complex to manage” is almost synonymous with “too big to manage,” at least within the US banking system today.	两人都强调，“太复杂而管不了”和“太大而管不了”基本上是同义词，至少对今天的美国银行系统是如此。


George Will, a widely read conservative columnist, recently endorsed Fisher’s view .	颇受欢迎的保守派专栏作家乔治·维尔（George Will）最近支持了费希尔的看法。


Big banks get a big taxpayer subsidy – in the form of downside protection for their creditors.	大银行获得了大笔纳税人补贴——以其债权人的损失保护为形式。


This confers on them a funding advantage and completely distorts markets.	这不啻给予它们融���优势和完全扭曲的市场。


These subsidies are dangerous; they encourage excessive risk-taking and very high leverage – meaning a lot of debt relative to equity for each bank and far too much debt relative to the economy as a whole.	这些补贴是危险的； 它们鼓励了过度承担风险和使用极高杠杆的行为——这意味着每个银行的股本都需要应付大笔债务，而整体经济的债务比率也实在太高。


Now these themes have been picked up by Dan Tarullo, an influential member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.	如今，这些问题被极有影响力的美联储董事会成员丹·塔鲁罗（Dan Tarullo）所提出。


In an important recent speech, Tarullo called for a cap on the size of America’s largest banks, to limit their non-deposit liabilities as a percentage of GDP – an entirely sensible approach, and one that fits with legislation that has been proposed by two congressmen, Senator Sherrod Brown and Representative Brad Miller.	在最近的一次重要演讲中，塔鲁罗呼吁为美国大银行施加规模上限，以限制它们的非存款负债占GDP的比重——这是非常明智的意见，也与参议员谢罗德·布朗（Sherrod Brown）和众议员布拉德·米勒（Brad Miller）所提出的立法方案相合。


Tarullo rightly does not regard limiting bank size as a panacea – his speech made it clear that there are many potential risks to any financial system.	塔鲁罗正确地没有将限制银行规模视为万灵丹——他在演讲中清楚地指出，任何金融系统都会有各种潜在风险。


But, in the often-nuanced language of central bankers, Tarullo conveyed a clear message: the cult of size has failed.	但是，塔鲁罗还是用中央银行家惯有的微言大义隐晦地表达了明确的信息：规模崇拜已经不灵了。


More broadly, we have lost sight of what banking is supposed to do.	从更广的角度讲，我们已经弄不清楚银行到底应该做什么了。


Banks play an essential role in all modern economies, but that role is not to assume a huge amount of risk, with the downside losses covered by society.	银行在所有现代经济中都有着举足轻重的地位，但其作用并不包括堆积大量风险，然后用社会来为损失买单。


Ross got it right again this week, when he said:	本周，罗斯又一次正确地指出：


“I think that the real purpose and the real need that we have in this country for banks is to make loans particularly to small business and to individuals.	 “我认为，在美国，我们的真正目的和真正要求是让贷款主要流向小企业和个人。


I think that’s the hard part to fill.”	我认为这是难以完成的任务。 ”


He continued,	他接着说，


“Our capital markets are sufficiently sophisticated and sufficiently deep that most large corporations have plenty of alternative ways to find capital.	 “我们的资本市场足够成熟、足够深化，大部分大企业有足够的替代方案寻找资本。


Smaller companies and private individuals don’t have really the option of public markets.	小公司和私人个人实际上并没有选择公开市场的权利。


They’re the ones that most severely need the banks.	他们是最需要银行的群体。


I think they’ve kind of lost track of that purpose.”	我认为他们是被这一目的遗忘的群体。 ”


Hoenig and Fisher have the right vision.	霍尼格和费希尔提出了正确的远见。


Tarullo is heading down the right path.	塔鲁罗走在正确的道路上。


Ross and many others in the private sector fully understand what needs to be done.	罗斯和私人部门的许多人完全明白什么才是需要做的。


Those who oppose their proposed reforms are most likely insiders – people who have received payments from big banks over the past year or two.	那些反对他们的改革方案的人大多是内部人——那些在过去两三年里从大银行获得丰厚报酬的人。


Two Dollar Fallacies	两大美元谬误


CAMBRIDGE – The United States’ current fiscal and monetary policies are unsustainable.	美国剑桥—美国当前的财政和货币政策是不可持续的。


The US government’s net debt as a share of GDP has doubled in the past five years, and the ratio is projected to be higher a decade from now, even if the economy has fully recovered and interest rates are in a normal range.	过去五年来，美国政府净债务占GDP的比重翻了一番，十年后预计比现在更高，即使经济完全复苏，利率进入常态范围也是如此。


An aging US population will cause social benefits to rise rapidly, pushing the debt to more than 100% of GDP and accelerating its rate of increase.	老化的美国人口将导致社会福利迅速增加，时债务超过GDP的100%，并加速债务增长率。


Although the Federal Reserve and foreign creditors like China are now financing the increase, their willingness to do so is not unlimited.	尽管美联储和中国等外国债权人现在还能为债务增加提供资金，但它们的意愿并不是无限的。


Likewise, the Fed’s policy of large-scale asset purchases has increased commercial banks’ excess reserves to unprecedented levels (approaching $2 trillion), and has driven the real interest rate on ten-year Treasury bonds to an unprecedented negative level.	类似地，美联储大规模购买资产的政策增加了商业银行的超额储备，达到了前所未有的水平（近2万亿美元），也把10年期国债的真实利率前所未有地压到了负水平。


As the Fed acknowledges, this will have to stop and be reversed.	美联储承认，这一趋势必须停止并逆转。


While the future evolution of these imbalances remains unclear, the result could eventually be a sharp rise in long-term interest rates and a substantial fall in the dollar’s value, driven mainly by foreign investors’ reluctance to continue expanding their holdings of US debt.	尽管这些失衡的未来走势尚不明朗，但结果最终或是长期利率飙升和美元价值暴跌，其主要原因在于外国投资者不再愿意继续扩大美国债务持有量。


American investors, fearing an unwinding of the fiscal and monetary positions, might contribute to these changes by seeking to shift their portfolios to assets of other countries.	由于担心财政和货币立场的放松，美国投资者可能会寻求将资产配置到别的国家，从而加速这一变局。


While I share these concerns, others frequently rely on two key arguments to dismiss the fear of a run on the dollar: the dollar is a reserve currency, and it carries fewer risks than other currencies.	我同意这些担忧，但其他人通常提出两点理由认为没必要担心美元遭遇挤兑：美元是储备货币； 并且比其他货币风险更低。


Neither argument is persuasive.	这两个理由均站不住脚。


Consider first the claim that the dollar’s status as a reserve currency protects it, because governments around the world need to hold dollars as foreign exchange reserves.	先说第一个理由：储备货币地位可以保护美元，因为全球各国政府需要持有美元作为外汇储备。


The problem is that foreign holdings of dollar securities are no longer primarily “foreign exchange reserves” in the traditional sense.	问题在于，外国持有的美元证券已不再是传统意义上的“外汇储备”。


In earlier decades, countries held dollars because they needed to have a highly liquid and widely accepted currency to bridge the financing gap if their imports exceeded their exports.	几十年前，各国持有美元的原因是它们需要高流动性、被广泛接受的货币弥补进口超过出口的差额。


The obvious candidate for this reserve fund was US Treasury bills.	显而易见的候选储备资金便是美国国债。


But, since the late 1990’s, countries like South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore have accumulated very large volumes of foreign reserves, reflecting both export-driven growth strategies and a desire to avoid a repeat of the speculative currency attacks that triggered the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis.	但是，20世纪90年代末以来，韩国、台湾和新加坡等国家和地区积累了为数巨大的外汇储备，这是出口驱动增长战略以及渴望避免触发1997—1998年亚洲金融危机的投机性货币袭击卷土重来的结果。


With each of these countries holding more than $200 billion in foreign-exchange holdings – and China holding more than $3 trillion – these are no longer funds intended to bridge trade-balance shortfalls.	这些国家和地区每个都持有超过2 000亿美元的外汇储备，中国更是达到了3万多亿，这笔几款已不再起到填补贸易余额不足的功能。


They are major national assets that must be invested with attention to yield and risk.	它们是重要的国民资产，必须以收益率和风险为考量进行投资。


So, although dollar bonds and, increasingly, dollar equities are a large part of these countries’ sovereign wealth accounts, most of the dollar securities that they hold are not needed to finance trade imbalances.	因此，尽管这些国家的主权财富账户大量投资于美元债券和越来越多的美元股票，但它们所持有的大部分美元证券并不是用来满足贸易失衡融资需要的。


Even if these countries want to continue to hold a minimum core of their portfolios in a form that can be used in the traditional foreign-exchange role, most of their portfolios will respond to their perception of different currencies’ risks.	即便这些国家想继续将最低限度的核心组合以可用作传统外汇用途的形式持有，它们的大部分组合将反映它们对不同货币的风险感知。


In short, the US no longer has what Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, as France’s finance minister in the 1960’s, accurately called the “exorbitant privilege” that stemmed from having a reserve currency as its legal tender.	简言之，美国不再是20世纪60年代法国财政部长季斯卡·德斯坦（Valéry Giscard d’Estaing）正确地所谓的拥有作为储备货币的法币的“过度特权”。


But some argue that, even if the dollar is not protected by being a reserve currency, it is still safer than other currencies.	但有人指出，即便美元以不再受储备货币地位保护，它仍比其他货币安全。


If investors don’t want to hold euros, pounds, or yen, where else can they go?	如果投资者不愿持有欧元、英镑和日元，它们能怎么做呢？


That argument is also false.	这一观点也是错误的。


Large portfolio investors don’t put all of their funds in a single currency.	大型资产组合投资者并不把所有资金押在一种货币上。


They diversify their funds among different currencies and different types of financial assets.	他们会在不同货币和不同金融资产类别之间实现资金的多样化配置。


If they perceive that the dollar and dollar bonds have become riskier, they will want to change the distribution of assets in their portfolios.	如果他们认为美元和美元债券风险增加，他们将改变组合内资产的配置。


So, even if the dollar is still regarded as the safest of assets, the demand for dollars will decline if its relative safety is seen to have declined.	因此，即使美元仍被视为最安全的资产，其需求也会人们认为其相对安全性下降而下降。


When that happens, exchange rates and interest rates can change without assets being sold and new assets bought.	当这一幕发生时，汇率和利率就可能在没有资产甩卖和新资产购入的情况下发生变化。


If foreign holders of dollar bonds become concerned that the unsustainability of America’s situation will lead to higher interest rates and a weaker dollar, they will want to sell dollar bonds.	如果外国美元债券持有者担心美国状况的持续性会导致利率上升、美元贬值，他们就会想卖掉美元债券。


If that feeling is widespread, the value of the dollar and the price of dollar bonds can both decline without any net change in the holding of these assets.	如果这一感觉蔓延开去，美元价值和美元债券价格就可能会在资产净持有量不变的情况下双双下跌。


The dollar’s real trade-weighted value already is more than 25% lower than it was a decade ago, notwithstanding the problems in Europe and in other countries.	美元的真实贸易加权价值已比10年前下降了25%以上，这还是在欧洲和其他国家问题频发的情况下发生的。


And, despite a more competitive exchange rate, the US continues to run a large current-account deficit.	尽管汇率竞争力提高了，但美国的经常项目赤字仍持续保持高位。


If progress is not made in reducing the projected fiscal imbalances and limiting the growth of bank reserves, reduced demand for dollar assets could cause the dollar to fall more rapidly and the interest rate on dollar securities to rise.	如果在减轻预期财政失衡和限制银行储备金增长方面无法取得进展，美元资产的下降将导致美元更快贬值和美元证券利率升高。


Democracy in Arabia?	阿拉伯的民主？


PARIS – In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville argued that the public’s trust alleviates pressure on the state, allowing it to function more effectively.	巴黎——亚历西斯·托克维尔在《论美国民主》一书中指出公众信任可以缓解政府压力，提高政府的运作效率。


This should give some comfort to governments in the Arab world, where a 2012 survey of young people showed 72% of the respondents expressing greater trust in their governments.	阿拉伯世界政府本当因此感到安慰，因为2012年以年轻人为对象的调查显示有72%的受访者表示更信任他们的政府。


But what, then, accounts for the continuing civil turmoil and government paralysis in the Arab-Spring countries?	但是，阿拉伯春天国家持续内乱和政府瘫痪的原因究竟是什么？


A more recent version of the survey provides some clues.	我们可以从最近一次调查中找到某些线索。


A large majority of Arab youths, around 70%, say that they are most influenced by parents, family, and religion, whereas only about a third report that elite groups – writers, business leaders, community leaders, and media outlets – have any influence on their outlook on life.	占总数70%的绝大多数阿拉伯青年表示受家长、亲属和宗教的影响最大，而只有约三分之一表示以作家、商界领袖、社团领袖和媒体为代表的精英群体对他们的人生观构成影响。


Indeed, just 16% reported that pop stars influenced their outlook.	事实上，表示人生观受明星影响的只有16%。


These figures provide some useful insights into the evolving social fabric of Arab societies.	通过这些数据我们可以更好地了解阿拉伯社会不断变化的社会结构。


Normally, people are open to influence from those whom they trust and wish to emulate.	一般来讲，信任并希望效仿者对人的影响最大。


The fact that a large majority of Arabs turns to family and religion is highly revealing.	绝大多数阿拉伯人选择家人和宗教颇能给人以启迪作用。


Arab societies, particularly those in turmoil, are regressing to what another French social theorist, Émile Durkheim, called “mechanistic solidarity.”	阿拉伯社会，尤其是动荡中的阿拉伯社会，正日渐回归到另一位法国社会理论家涂尔干所谓的“机械性团结”之中。


This is social solidarity that evolves along lines of kinship and religion, underpinned by a sense of belonging to the same “homogenous” group.	这是一种以“同质化”团体所带来的归属感为基础，依托亲情和宗教主线发展变化的社会团结结构。


Durkheim contrasts this phenomenon with the more progressive “organic solidarity” that evolves in modern societies according to people’s professional and functional relationships.	涂尔干把这种现象与更具进步意味的“有机团结”进行了对比，后者依托个人的专业和职能关系成为现代社会的主流。


In times of elevated risk, real or perceived, people begin to organize increasingly on the basis of homogenous identities.	在真实或臆想的危险环境里，人们借助同质化身份进行组织的倾向性越来越强。


As a result, “mechanistic solidarity” grows stronger at the expense of “organic solidarity.”	结果导致“机械团结”战胜“有机团结”而成为社会的主流现象。


The trend is often accelerated by the loss of jobs, which often leads people to abandon their professional and functional identities in favor of identities based on ethnicity, kinship, or religion.	上述趋势往往受到失业的强化，失业迫使人放弃专业和职能身份，而更重视种族、血缘或宗教。


In culturally diverse societies, such as Iraq and Lebanon, networks of social solidarity are based almost entirely on religious and ethnic affinity.	在伊拉克、黎巴嫩等多元文化社会里，宗教和种族关系几乎是社会团结网络的唯一主线。


In more homogenous societies, such as Libya, social solidarity tends to follow tribal and partisan lines.	而在利比亚这样更加同质化的社会，社会团结的主线往往是部族和党派。


In Tunisia, too, there has been a similar regression to mechanistic types of solidarity organized around tribal, regional, and religious identities.	围绕部族、地区和宗教身份构建的类似的机械团结回归现象同样也在突尼斯出现。


A dramatic manifestation of the mechanistic pattern of solidarity is now emerging in Syria, as well.	戏剧性的机械团结模式目前同样也在叙利亚出现。


While Syrians have been facing death, violence, and displacement for more than two years, the international community has been busy debating the nature of the Syrian rebels.	两年多来当叙利亚人面对死亡、暴力和流离失所时，国际社会一直在忙于辩论叙利亚反政府武装的性质。


Left to its fate, Syrian society began to disintegrate and reorganize on a sectarian basis.	孤立无援的叙利亚社会开始解体并依托宗派界线展开重建。


As the conflict intensified, established profession-based identities began to disappear, giving way to family, regional, and religious solidarities.	随着冲突不断加剧，原有的专业身份开始消失，家庭、地区和宗教团结则开始浮出水面。


Civil-society and professional groups have been unable to respond in a way that maintains organic social cohesion, owing to a lack of resources, weak capacity, or both.	由于资源匮乏、能力薄弱或者两者兼有，民间机构和专业团体一直无法采取措施保持有机社会凝聚力。


Mechanistic solidarity has emerged as a more effective means to mobilize people and resources.	于是机械团结逐渐成为人员及资源调配的更有效的方式。


At the heart of the crisis is a strong element of indifference.	坚不可摧的冷漠是危机的核心问题。


For example, the role of the Arab middle class has been notably muted in efforts to support Syrian refugees.	比方说，阿拉伯中产阶级在援助叙利亚难民的行动中几乎是无声无息。


The American actress Angelina Jolie’s highly publicized visits to Syrian refugee camps in Jordan and Turkey underscored the near-absence of similar awareness campaigns by Arab celebrities.	美国女演员安吉丽娜·朱莉高调访问约旦和土耳其的叙利亚难民营进一步凸显出阿拉伯名人对类似宣传活动的冷漠态度。


Indeed, while millions of Arabs tune in weekly to watch and vote for their favorite singers on the Arabic version of The Voice and Arab Idol, a fund-raising campaign for the benefit of Syrian refugees has yet to be organized.	事实上，尽管成百上千万阿拉伯人每周都会坐在电视机前观看《阿拉伯好声音》和《阿拉伯偶像》并为喜爱的歌手投票，但为叙利亚��民组织的募捐活动还从来没有过。


By contrast, TV channels with specific religious and sectarian affiliations have been very active, including on social media, in fundraising efforts.	相比之下，特定宗教及宗派背景的电视频道（包括社交媒体）却在筹集善款时表现得相当活跃。


It is perhaps not surprising, then, that most Arab youth do not see role models beyond their close social circles.	有鉴于此，绝大多数阿拉伯年轻人在自己所处的社交圈外找不到偶像并不值得大惊小怪。


In short, Arab countries are hemorrhaging social capital, which can significantly derail economic recovery and state-building.	总之，阿拉伯国家社会资本正在失血，这可以严重破坏经济复苏和国家建设。


As the Nobel laureate economist Kenneth Arrow argued in 1972, “much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence.”	正如诺贝尔经济学奖得主肯尼斯·阿罗在1972年指出的那样，“互信的缺失可以解释世界上绝大多数的经济落后。 ”


Against this background, the recently announced Arab Stabilization Plan, an Arab-led private-sector initiative aimed at creating tens of thousands of jobs through large-scale infrastructure investment, is exactly the type of action needed to preserve social cohesion.	在这种背景下，最近宣布的旨在通过大规模基础设施投资创造成千上万就业机会的由阿拉伯国家牵头的私营部门计划“阿拉伯国家稳定计划”恰恰是保持社会凝聚力所必须的行动。


International efforts, led by the World Bank and other international donors, have tended to focus on strengthening relations between the state and its citizens in order to achieve “Tocquevillian” gains – that is, operational democracy and effective government.	在世界银行和其他国际捐助者的领导下，国际援助计划为实现“托克维尔”收益（即可行的民主和有效的政府）把加强国家民众关系作为重中之重。


But what is urgently needed is a strong complementary focus on job creation to preserve and foster Durkheim’s organic solidarity.	但我们同时迫切需要强力关注创造就业机会，以便维护和促进涂尔干的有机团结。


The Gulag of the Russian Mind	俄罗斯的思想禁锢


It is now 15 years since the failed coup of August 1991 against Mikhail Gorbachev.	现在，2001年8月推翻戈尔巴乔夫的政变已经失败15年了。


At the time, Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika and glasnost were seen by Soviet hardliners as a sell-out of communist Russia to the capitalist West.	当时，戈尔巴乔夫的“改革和公开化”政策被苏联的强硬派视为将共产主义俄国出卖给西方资本主义。


But it is now clear that the KGB and the military who launched the coup were not defending the idea of communism.	但是现在很清楚的是发动政变的克格勃和军事强硬派当时维护的并不是共产主义思想。


Instead, they were protecting their idea of Russia’s imperial mission, a notion that had given the Kremlin commissars greater control of the vast Russian empire, and of Russia’s neighbors, than any of the Tsars had ever enjoyed.	相反，他们保护的是自己头脑中的俄罗斯帝国主义思想，这种思想给予了克里姆林宫当权者对广袤俄罗斯帝国和俄罗斯邻国极大的控制权，权力之大让任何一位沙皇都自愧不如。


Gorbachev’s reforms not only liberated ordinary Russians from the straitjacket of Marxism-Leninism, but also released the national aspirations of people who had been locked in the empire for centuries.	戈尔巴乔夫的改革不仅把普通俄罗斯人从马克思列宁主义中解放出来，而且解放了受控于这个帝国长达数个世纪的人民的民族渴望。


Having seen the peoples of Central Europe free themselves from Soviet domination just two years before, the constituent nations of the USSR were beginning to seek the same freedom for themselves.	见到中欧人民将自己从苏联统治下解放出来，苏联的各个加盟国也开始作同样的尝试。


The Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were the first to insist on traveling their own national path, and have since linked their fate to Europe as members of the European Union and NATO.	波罗的海诸国爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚、立陶宛率先坚持走自己的国家路线，并加入了欧盟和北约，从此将他们的命运与欧洲联系起来。


Others soon followed. By December 1991, the Soviet empire was no more.	其它国家很快纷纷效仿，到1991年12月，苏联帝国烟消云散。


But only the Baltics have secured the sort of independence dreamed of in 1991.	但是只有波罗的海诸国实现了1991年梦想的那种独立。


Georgia, which is both European and Asiatic, teeters on the edge of instability.	横跨欧亚大陆的格鲁吉亚还在动荡的边缘徘徊。


Traditionally Asian Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have resumed the tribal forms of autocracy they practiced throughout the centuries.	传统的亚洲国家乌兹别克斯坦和土库曼斯坦恢复了实行数个世纪的部落式独裁政治。


Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have in essence become their presidents’ wholly owned family fiefs.	阿塞拜疆和哈萨克斯坦实质上已经完全成为了总统所有的家族封地。


Ukraine’s break with Russia was perhaps the most wrenching, both for those in the Kremlin nostalgic for imperial control and for ordinary Russians who see Ukraine as the wellspring of Russian civilization.	对于克里姆林宫怀念帝国控制的人和那些把乌克兰视为俄罗斯文明之源的普通俄罗斯人来说，乌克兰脱离俄罗斯可能是最令人痛苦的。


The Orange Revolution of 2004, which overturned a rigged presidential election, proved that Ukraine was no longer a Malorossiya (a small Russia), an inferior and subordinate Slavic brother.	2004年的橙色革命推翻了非法操纵的总统选举，证明了乌克兰不再是“小俄罗斯”，一个劣等附属的斯拉夫兄弟。


Indeed, that peaceful revolution, led by Viktor Yushchenko and Yuliya Tymoshenko, was a reminder of how enlightened Kievan Rus had been before it was forced to give way to the despotic princes of Moscow.	事实上，这场尤先科和特莫申科领导的和平革命提醒了我们基辅在被迫让路给专制的莫斯科之前文明发展到多么高的程度。


Two years after the Orange revolt, Yushchenko (a politician who seems out of his depth) has now accepted the Kremlin placeman Viktor Yanukovych, the foe he had vanquished in 2004, as his new prime minister.	橙色革命两年后，尤先科作为一个政治家好像已经江郎才尽，接受了他2004年好像已经打败的对手亚努科维奇的任命，出任其新的总理。


Nonetheless, the Orange movement – now led by Yushchenko’s former partner and prime minister, Tymoshenko – has not fully lost its way, and still aims to preserve Ukraine as a truly independent and free country. Malorossiya , for the majority of Ukrainians, remains a thing of the past.	然而，橙色运动现在由尤先科的前合作伙伴和总理特莫申科领导，没有完全迷失方向，现在仍然致力于保护乌克兰作为一个真正独立和自由的国家。 “小俄罗斯”对于大多数乌克兰人来说已经成为了过去的事。


Despite all these epochal changes, Russians cannot accept the loss of their imperial role.	经过过所有这些划时代的变革之后，俄罗斯无法接受自己帝国地位的丧失。


The dream of empire is, indeed, the gulag that imprisons the Russian mind.	帝国梦实际上是禁锢俄罗斯人思想的牢笼。


Most Russians do not regard Europe’s approach to their country’s borders as a sign that they have, at long last, fully united with the civilization of which they are a part, but as a source of insecurity.	大多数俄罗斯人不把欧洲逼迫他们国家的边界当作是经过许久最终完全回归自己所属的文明的标志，而把它视为不安全之源。


Something more is at work here than mere nostalgia.	不仅仅是怀旧之情在起作用。


During the chaotic years of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency, it was perhaps understandable that Russians regretted their loss of great power status.	在叶利钦担任总统的混乱年代里，俄罗斯人对于丧失大国地位感到遗憾或许可以理解。


Something had to be blamed for their dire economic conditions.	这在某种程度上可以归结为他们糟糕的经济条件。


Yet under President Vladimir Putin, with the economy growing robustly, these feelings have hardened, not diminished.	然而，自从普京担任总统以来，经济增长强劲，这种情绪没有减弱，反而更加强烈。


Russians are reverting to the past – to the grand pronouncements of Russia as a unique great nation, destined to rule the world.	俄罗斯人正回归过去，也就是俄罗斯作为独一无二大国拥有显赫的权势，注定要统治全世界。


As before the advent of Gorbachev – indeed, restoring a centuries-old tendency – Russians yet again believe that the people should be willing to forfeit their freedoms for the sake of the greatness of the state, which wins wars and launches Sputniks.	戈尔巴乔夫实际上只是恢复一种历史悠久的趋向。 在此之前我们俄罗斯人再次相信人民为了成就国家的伟大应该愿意放弃他们的自由，这个国家赢得了战争并发射了人造地球卫星。


A free press, free speech, and free elections, it is feared, may diminish the brute power that is needed for Russia to assert itself.	���担心新闻自由、言论自由和选举自由可能会削弱俄罗斯耀武扬威所需的残暴力量。


Russians have long boasted of their various unique forms of greatness: first it was the holy Russian soul, so superior to Western practicality.	长久以来，俄罗斯人一直自夸他们国家独一无二伟大之处：首先是圣洁的俄罗斯精神义远远高于西方的实用主义。


In the fifteenth century, Moscow was declared a “Third Rome,” the savior of spiritual Christianity.	15世纪，莫斯科被宣称为“第三罗马”，基督教的精神救世主。


The seventeenth century united this spiritual mission with imperial expansion, which eventually encompassed a landmass spanning 11 times zones.	17世纪，这种精神使命与帝国扩张结合起来，最终出现了一个横跨11个时区的大帝国。


In the early twentieth century, the imperial and spiritual mission became one, as Russia became the bastion of world communism.	20世纪初，帝国任务与精神使命合二为一，俄罗斯成为了世界共产主义的堡垒。


All these forms of greatness, however, demanded that ordinary Russians accept their debasement and enslavement.	然而，所有这些伟大之处都要求普通俄罗斯人接受他们被压迫被奴役的命运。


Development is not seen as a means of improving people’s lives, but as helping Russia prove itself to be superior to everybody else.	发展不再被当作是一种改善人民生活的方式，而成为了一种帮助俄罗斯证明其比其它所有国家都优越的手段。


So, ultimately, the material achievements of Russian development always come with a body count.	因此，最终而言，俄罗斯发展取得的重要成就无一不是以累累白骨为代价。


Joseph Stalin’s industrialization killed millions – and became obsolete in only 30 years.	斯大林实行的工业化夺去了数百万人的生命，而仅仅30年之后就变得陈旧过时，遭到废弃。


Putin’s Russia doesn’t go in for mass killing, yet it has not lost the country’s “superiority” complex.	普京领导下的俄罗斯不会发生大规模的屠杀，但却还是没有摆脱这个国家的“优越”情结。


For Russia’s elite, a restaurant bill cannot be too expensive, and one can never have enough bodyguards waiting out front for you.	对于俄罗斯的精英来说，饭店的帐单越贵越好，等候自己的保镖越多越好。


On a grander scale, Putin’s Russia has become a great power in terms of energy production, but that looks to be temporary, as scant investment is being made to maintain and improve the oil and gas fields.	比较全面地说，普京领导下的俄罗斯在能源生产方面已经成为了一个大国，但是这看起来难以持久，因为用于维护和改善油田和天然气田的投资持续不足。


What matters is selling the reserves and being rich now, not finding more for later.	重要的是出售现有的储存，而不是为以后寻找更多。


So, as always, the trouble with Russia is that the state develops, but society doesn’t.	因为，正如一直以来的那样，俄罗斯的问题是国家发展而社会没有发展。


The good of the people is sacrificed for the good of the nation.	人民的利益牺牲给了国家的利益。


The dream of great Russia remains the gulag of the Russian mind.	大俄罗斯梦仍然是俄罗斯人的思想禁锢。


Erdoğan Is Not Turkey’s Only Problem	埃尔多安不是土耳其唯一的问题


PRINCETON – Türkan Saylan was a trailblazing physician, one of Turkey’s first female dermatologists and a leading campaigner against leprosy.	普林斯顿—途尔坎·萨伊兰（Türkan Saylan）是一位划时代的女性，她是土耳其第一批女皮肤科医生之一，也是打败麻风病运动的领袖。


She was also a staunch secularist who established a foundation to provide scholarships to young girls so they could attend school.	她还是坚定的世俗主义者，成立了一个基金会为年轻女孩提供奖学金使她们能够继续学业。


In 2009, police raided her house and confiscated documents in an investigation that linked her to an alleged terrorist group, called “Ergenekon,” supposedly bent on destabilizing Turkey in order to precipitate a military coup.	2009年，警方突击搜查了她的住处，没收了一批文档。 此次调查的原因是她被指与恐怖组织“土耳其右翼组织”（Ergenekon）有涉，该组织意欲在土耳其制造混乱，以便实施军事政变。


Saylan was terminally ill with cancer at the time and died shortly thereafter.	当时的萨伊兰已经罹患癌症晚期，不久便撒手人寰。


But the case against her associates continued and became part of a vast wave of trials directed against opponents of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his allies in the powerful Gülen movement, made up of the followers of the Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen.	但针对她同事的案件并未就此中止，反而演变成针对总理埃尔多安及其强大的葛兰运动（Gülen，由伊斯兰教牧师葛兰的追随者创立）盟友的反对者的审判潮。


The evidence in this case, as in so many others, consists of Microsoft Word documents found on a computer that belonged to Saylan’s foundation.	与其他许多案件一样，此案的证据包括一台属于萨伊兰基金会的电脑上发现的一批Word文档。


When American experts recently examined the forensic image of the hard drive, they made a startling – but for Turkey all too familiar – discovery.	美国专家最近考察了硬盘的法医图像，获得了令人吃惊的发现——但土耳其人早已习以为常。


The incriminating files had been placed on the hard drive sometime after the computer’s last use at the foundation.	入罪档案进入硬盘的时间要略晚于这台电脑在基金会的最后一次使用。


Because the computer had been seized by the police, the finding pointed rather directly to official malfeasance.	由于这台电脑被警方扣留，这一发现直接指向了官员渎职。


Fabricated evidence, secret witnesses, and flights of investigative fancy are the foundation of the show trials that Turkish police and prosecutors have mounted since 2007.	捏造证据、秘密目击者和花样百出的调查手段构成了2007年以来土耳其警方和检方花架子公审的基础。


In the infamous Sledgehammer case, a military-coup plot was found to contain glaring anachronisms, including the use of Microsoft Office 2007 in documents supposedly last saved in 2003.	在臭名昭著的严打案（Sledgehammer case）中，人们发现军事政变密谋存在重大漏洞，包括一份用Office 2007编辑的最后存盘时间在2003年的文档。


(My father-in-law is among the more than 300 officers who were locked up, and my wife and I have been active in documenting the case’s fabrications.)	（我岳父便是300多名被锁定的军官的其中之一，我妻子和我一直在积极地报告此案的莫须有性质。 ）


The list of revelations and absurdities goes on and on.	漏洞和荒谬之处数不胜数。


In one case, a document describing a plot directed against Christian minorities turned out to have been in police possession before the authorities claimed to have recovered it from a suspect.	在一个案件中，一份描述针对基督徒少数派密谋的文档在当局宣布从一位嫌疑人处发现之前便落在了警方手中。


In another, police “discovered” the evidence that they were seeking, despite going to the wrong address and raiding the home of a naval officer whose name sounded similar to that of the target.	在另一个案件中，警方“发现”了他们所寻找的证据，尽管他们前往突击搜查的地址根本是错误的，是一位名字发音与搜查目标相近的海军军官的住处。


Yet none of the trials has yet been derailed.	但这些审判没有一例得到平反。


Most have had the support and blessing of Erdoğan, who has exploited them to discredit the old secular guard and cement his rule.	其中大部分得到了埃尔多安的支持和庇护，他用这些案件破坏旧世俗捍卫者的名声，巩固他的统治。


Even more important, the trials have had the strong backing of the Gülen movement.	更重要的是，这些审判极大地支持了葛兰运动。


Gülen lives in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania, where he presides over a huge informal network of schools, think tanks, businesses, and media across five continents.	葛兰自我流放地生活在宾夕法尼亚州，并在宾夕法尼亚主持着一个由跨越五大洲的学校、智库、企业和媒体组成的巨大的地下网络。


His devotees have established roughly 100 charter schools in the United States alone, and the movement has gained traction in Europe since the first Gülen school was founded in Stuttgart, Germany, in 1995.	光是在美国，他的信徒就建立了约100所特许学校，1995年，第一所欧洲葛兰学校在德国斯图加特建立，宣告葛兰运动进军欧洲。


Back home, Gülen’s followers have created what is effectively a state within the Turkish state, gaining a strong foothold in the police force, the judiciary, and the bureaucracy.	在国内，葛兰的追随者建立了土耳其的国中之国，在警察、司法和官僚系统中拥有深厚的根基。


Gülenists deny that they control the Turkish police, but, as a US ambassador to Turkey put it in 2009, “we have found no one who disputes it.”	葛兰主义者否认他们控制着土耳其警方，但一位美国驻土耳其大使2009年指出，“我们发现没人对此有争议。 ”


The movement’s influence within the judiciary ensures that its members’ transgressions remain unchallenged.	葛兰运动在司法系统内部的影响力确保了其犯罪成员可以逍遥法外。


In one well-documented case, a non-commissioned officer at a military base, acting on behalf of the Gülen movement, was caught planting documents in order to embarrass military officials.	在一宗证据确凿的案件中，某军事基地的一位为葛兰运动卖命的无关军官因为印制意在抹黑其他军官的材料而被抓获。


The military prosecutor investigating the case soon found himself in jail on trumped-up charges, while the perpetrator was reinstated.	军事检察官很快因捏造证据被捕，而犯案者则官复原职。


A senior police commissioner who had been close to the movement and wrote an exposé about its activities was accused of collaborating with the far-left groups that he had spent much of his career pursuing; he, too, ended up in jail.	一位与葛兰运动关系���切、并著书披露过葛兰运动行为的高级警官被控与其长期追踪的极左翼组织合谋； 最终，他也被关进了监狱。


The Gülen movement uses these trials to lock up critics and replace opponents in important state posts.	葛兰运动利用这些审判关押批评者并替换国家重要岗位上的反对者。


The ultimate goal seems to be to reshape Turkish society in the movement’s own conservative-religious image.	其最终目标似乎是以该运动本身的保守主义宗教形象重新包装土耳其社会。


Gülenist media have been particularly active in this cause, spewing a continuous stream of disinformation about defendants in Gülen-mounted trials while covering up police misdeeds.	葛兰主义者在这方面特别活跃，一直在为许多葛兰提起的审判的被告捏造证据，并为警方掩盖罪行。


But relations between Erdoğan and the Gülenists have soured.	但埃尔多安和葛兰主义者之间的关系已开始恶化。


Once their common enemy, the secularists, were out of the way, Erdoğan had less need for the movement.	一旦其共同敌人——世俗主义者——被排挤出局，埃尔多安便不再那么需要葛兰运动了。


The breaking point came in February 2012, when Gülenists tried to bring down his intelligence chief, a close confidant, reaching perilously close to Erdoğan himself.	双方的决裂时刻是2012年2月，当时葛兰主义者试图扳倒埃尔多安的情报主管间亲信，危及到了埃尔多安本人。


Erdoğan responded by removing many Gülenists from their positions in the police and judiciary.	埃尔多安的应对措施是清除了一大批警方和司法系统中的葛兰主义者。


But Erdoğan’s ability to take on the Gülen movement is limited.	但埃尔多安对付葛兰运动的能力有限。


Bugging devices were recently found in Erdoğan’s office, planted, his close associates said, by the police.	最近，据埃尔多安的亲信助手透露，他的办公室中发现了警方安置的窃听装置。


Yet Erdoğan, known for his brash style, responded with remarkable equanimity.	但以桀骜不驯著称的埃尔多安对此的反应颇为平静。


If he harbored any doubt that the movement sits on troves of embarrassing – and possibly far worse – intelligence, the bugging revelation must surely have removed it.	如果他怀疑葛兰运动发现了大量令其难堪——甚至比这还要糟糕得多——的情报，那么窃听装置的发现让他彻底打消了这一疑虑。


The foreign media have focused mainly on Erdoğan’s behavior in recent months.	外国媒体主要关注埃尔多安最近几个月的动向。


But if Turkey has turned into a Kafkaesque quagmire, a republic of dirty tricks and surreal conspiracies, it is Gülenists who must shoulder much of the blame.	但如果土耳其如果陷入卡夫卡式的困境——成为充斥着超现实阴谋和卑鄙伎俩的共和国——那么葛兰主义者将承担大量责任。


This is worth remembering in view of the movement’s efforts to dress up its current opposition to Erdoğan in the garb of democracy and pluralism.	别忘了，葛兰运动试图用民主和多元主义的外衣掩盖其最近对埃尔多安的反对。


Gülenist commentators preach about the rule of law and human rights, even as Gülenist media champion flagrant show trials.	葛兰主义评论者大谈法治精神和人权，尽管葛兰主义媒体鼓吹着臭名昭著的过场式审判。


The movement showcases Fethullah Gülen as a beacon of moderation and tolerance, while his Turkish-language Web site peddles his anti-Semitic, anti-Western sermons.	葛兰运动将葛兰捧为温和和克制的化身，其土耳其语网站却在推行其反犹反西方的训示。


Such double talk seems to have become second nature to Gülenist leaders.	如此言论矛盾似乎已成为葛兰主义领袖的第二天性。


The good news is that the rest of the world has started to see Erdoğan’s republic for what it is: an increasingly authoritarian regime built around a popular but deeply flawed leader.	好消息是世界其他地区开始实事求是地看待埃尔多安的共和国：这是一个围绕广受支持但缺陷重重的领袖建立的日益独裁化的政权。


Indeed, his government’s crackdown on dissent may well have cost Istanbul the 2020 Olympics.	事实上，埃尔多安政府对持异见者的镇压是伊斯坦布尔输掉2020年奥运会主办权的重要原因。


What has yet to be recognized is the separate, and quite disturbing, role that the Gülen movement has played in bringing Turkey to its current impasse.	仍有待厘清的是葛兰运动在将土耳其引向当前僵局过程中所起到的独立的、令人深感不安的作用。


As Americans and Europeans debate the Gülen movement’s role in their own societies, they should examine Turkey’s experience more closely.	美国人和欧洲人正在争论葛兰运动对其自身社会的影响，与此同时，他们也应该更近距离地考察一下土耳其的经验。


The Haitian Miracle?	海地奇迹？


This spring’s presidential election in Haiti sadly re-enforced the country’s blighted reputation.	今春，海地的总统选举令人遗憾地使该国本已受损的声誉进一步蒙羞。


The paradox is that today Haiti has a chance, perhaps the best in its modern history, to escape from its long history of extreme poverty and turmoil.	看似矛盾的是，当前是海地现代史上摆脱长期赤贫和动荡的最佳时机。


A mere one-hour flight from Miami, the country struggles with poverty levels akin to the poorest parts of sub-Saharan Africa.	乘飞机到迈阿密只需一小时的海地，在与非洲撒哈拉以南最贫穷地区接近的贫困线上挣扎。


But, whereas many parts of the world are extremely poor because of their isolation, Haiti is extremely poor despite its proximity to the world’s largest market.	然而，和世界上许多因与外界隔绝而陷入赤贫的地区不一样的是，海地虽然就在世界上最大的市场旁边，却仍然极度贫困。


Now, Haiti can turn its geography into a competitive advantage, but only if the United States helps.	如今，海地有机会将地利转化为竞争优势，不过前提是美国出手相助。


Haiti recalls a famous lament once heard about another US neighbor, Mexico: “So far from God and so close to the United States.”	美国的另一个邻居墨西哥曾经发出一个著名的哀叹：“离上帝太远，离美国太近。


As with Mexico, Haiti’s proximity to the US has cut both ways in its history.	”和墨西哥一样，海地与美国的毗邻关系在其历史上的作用也有利有弊。


Proximity to the US should, of course, be an advantage for exports and attracting investment.	当然，靠近美国应该有利于出口和吸引投资。


However, proximity has also meant US meddling.	然而，地缘上的接近也意味着美国的指手画脚。


Haiti was the second country, after the US, to win its independence from Europe, following a slave rebellion in 1804.	在1804年的一场奴隶反抗运动之后，海地成为继美国之后第二个脱离欧洲控制赢得独立的国家。


But America regarded Haiti as a threat rather than as a colleague in freedom, refusing to extend diplomatic recognition until after the outbreak of the Civil War, which finally brought an end to slavery in the US.	但是，美国一直把海地视为一种威胁，而不是追求自由的同伴，并且在外交上不承认海地，直到最终废除了美国奴隶制度的内战爆发之后。


Even after recognition by President Abraham Lincoln in 1862, relations remained sour.	即便是在1862年得到林肯总统的承认之后，两国关系仍相互对立。


Haiti was exploited and occasionally occupied by US troops, rather than being regarded as a legitimate partner in trade and diplomacy.	海地没有被当作合法的贸易和外交伙伴，而是饱受美国剥削，偶尔还会被美国军队占领。


Meanwhile, Haiti’s ecological and demographic conditions posed huge development challenges that have never been overcome.	另一方面，海地的生态和人口状况给发展造成的巨大挑战从未被攻克。


The island is hit regularly by devastating hurricanes.	海地岛经常受到毁灭性的飓风袭击。


It has been massively deforested, and its soils have been depleted of nutrients.	岛上林地被大量砍伐，土壤的养分流失殆尽。


Tropical diseases remain killers to this day.	即使是今天仍有人死于热带疾病。


A devastating economic blow occurred in the mid-nineteenth century, when Europe learned to produce sugar from a temperate-zone crop, beets, rather than from tropical sugar cane.	19世纪中叶，欧洲人掌握了用温带作物甜菜制糖的技术，不再依赖热带的甘蔗，从而引起了一场毁灭性的经济打击。


World sugar prices collapsed, and Haiti fell into deeper disarray.	全球食糖价格暴跌，海地陷入更严重的混乱之中。


Extreme poverty bred illiteracy and miserable governance, which in turn intensified hunger, disease, and instability.	极度的贫困造成了文化程度的低下和可怕的政治环境，而这些又反过来加剧了饥荒、疾病和动荡。


Haiti’s recent economic history is marked by a remarkable and tragic downslide since the mid-1980’s, exacerbated by sometimes well-intentioned but typically disastrously executed US diplomacy.	海地近年来的经济从20世纪80年代中期开始经历了悲剧性的显著下滑，美国出于好意但基本上后果可怖的外交政策有时候还要雪上加霜。


In an attempt to push Haiti toward democracy, the US imposed economic sanctions, which crippled Haiti’s fragile and newly emerging export sector, especially apparel and other labor-intensive production. Unemployment soared.	为了促进海地的民主化，美国实行了经济制裁，结果削弱了海地脆弱的新兴出口产业，特别是服装和其他劳动密集型产业，导致失业率急剧升高，城市暴力不断增加。


The US then entered into a destructive 15-year relationship with Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who is massively popular among Haiti’s poor, but distrusted by most of the business sector and many leading US politicians.	之后，美国与让-贝尔特朗·阿里斯蒂德长达15年的破坏性关系开始了。 阿里斯蒂德深受海地穷人的爱戴，但为大多数商人和美国许多著名的政治人物所猜忌。


When Aristide came to power in 2001, the Bush administration cut off most international aid, thereby helping to send the economy into a freefall.	2001年阿里斯蒂德掌权后，布什政府切断了大部分国际援助，海地的经济一落千丈。


Aristide’s government was ousted under highly contested circumstances in 2004.	2004年，在高度争议的情况下，阿里斯蒂德政府被推翻。


The newly elected president, Rene Preval, is a highly talented and experienced agronomist, and thus has the perfect background to revive Haiti’s degraded rural economy.	新当选的总统普雷瓦尔是极有才能且经验丰富的农学家，因此，他的背景非常适合振兴海地落后的农村经济。


With the US market close by, Haiti could achieve a remarkable recovery of exports of horticulture, fruits, and other agricultural products, as well as tourism and light manufactured goods.	通过邻近的美国市场，海地有机会实现园艺、水果和其他农产品、以及旅游业和轻工业产品出口的极大复苏。


The key will be for the new government to provide a sound framework which combines key public investments – roads, power, soil nutrients, improved seed varieties, public health, safe water – with confidence-building outreach to the business community and fruitful relations with the US and other donor countries.	关键在于新政府要搭建一个合理的框架，将重要的公共投资——公路、电力、土壤肥料、种子品种优化、公共健康、安全用水——和增进国民信心的商业扩展项目、以及与美国及其他捐助国之间卓有成效的关系结合起来。


This time, the US has a strong interest in cooperating fully to promote economic progress: another round of failure would only provoke chaos, including massive numbers of new refugees to the US.	这一次，美国十分愿意通过充分的合作来促进海地的经济发展：再发生一连串的事故只能引起混乱，包括大量新的难民流入美国。


The gap between Haiti’s performance and its potential is now so large that great gains can be achieved in income levels, farming, health, education, and more.	目前海地的实际表现和潜力之间存在巨大的差距，因此在收入水平、农业、保健、教育等众多领域都有可能取得巨大的进步。


Crop yields are below one ton of cereal per hectare of farmland – far less than half of what is readily achievable if farmers are helped to gain access to fertilizers, improved seeds, and basic infrastructure.	现在的庄稼产量是每公顷不足一吨谷物——如果帮助农民获得���料、改良的种子和必要的基础设施，那么庄稼产量将比现在增加一倍还多。


Similarly, health conditions are horrendous, but could be improved dramatically just with immunization, de-worming, safe water, antibiotics, and anti-malaria bed nets.	同样，海地目前的健康状况糟糕透顶，但是只需引入人工免疫、杀虫剂、安全饮水、抗生素和预防疟疾的蚊帐，就可以极大地改善。


Community health workers could be trained in a matter of months to extend basic health care throughout rural areas, which could then be better mobilized to fend off the debilitating results of future hurricanes.	不出几个月就可以培养一批社区健康工作者，扩大整个农村地区的基本保健服务，而且可以更好地动员起来，避免将来飓风灾害损害人们的健康。


On the economic front, Haiti can become a profitable exporter of tropical crops such as groundnuts, mangos, cut flowers, string beans, and bamboo – a source of progress among Haiti’s Caribbean-basin neighbors.	经济方面，海地可以出口落花生、芒果、鲜切花、四季豆和竹子等热带作物——海地的加勒比海邻国就是靠这些产品取得进步的——，从中盈利。


Preval’s own hometown has successfully used a modest level of external donor support to create new rural cooperatives to market improved crops.	普雷瓦尔自己的家乡就成功地利用了不多的外国捐助，建立了新型的农村合作组织来销售改良的作物。


And, with its beautiful beaches and remarkable arts and music, Haiti could once again become a major tourist destination.	此外，海地拥有美丽的海滩和非凡的艺术、音乐，可以再次成为旅游热点。


Indeed, Haiti can become an inspiration for many other fragile and impoverished new democracies.	海地可以成为其他许多脆弱而贫穷的新生民主国家的榜样。


The US, France, Canada, and other major donor countries must not miss this historic opportunity to give vital help to Preval’s democratically elected new government.	美国、法国、加拿大和其他主要捐助国决不能错过这个历史性的机遇，向普雷瓦尔的民选新政府伸出重要的援助之手。


The Hamas Earthquake	哈马斯地震


Hamas’s crushing defeat of Fatah in this week’s elections brings the Palestinian people to a crossroads.	在本周举行的选举中，哈马斯一举挫败法塔赫，从而将巴勒斯坦人民带到了一个十字路口。


An Islamist political party that previously abstained from national politics and rejects Fatah’s policy of negotiations with Israel, is now in charge in Palestine.	作为一个伊斯兰政治党派，哈马斯以往缺席全国性政治并且拒绝法塔赫与以色列谈判的政策，现在执掌了巴勒斯坦。


Hamas won 76 of 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council, and can count on support from four independent deputies.	哈马斯在巴勒斯坦立法委员会的132个席位中赢得76个，而且可以得到四名独立代表的支持。


Overall, that’s 60% of the seats in Parliament, won in nearly every district in the West Bank and Gaza.	总体而言，那就是议会中60％的席位，几乎在西岸和加沙地带的每个区都赢得选举胜利。


Hamas entered electoral politics only recently, but its massive victory was preceded by wide success in municipal elections.	哈马斯直到最近才进入选举政治，但是其巨大胜利之前还在市政选举中获得大胜。


Hamas’s political moment has come.	哈马斯的政治时刻已经到来。


Under Palestinian law, Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, must now ask Hamas to form a new government.	根据巴勒斯坦法律，巴勒斯坦总统阿巴斯现在必须要求哈马斯组成新政府。


For their part, Fatah officials seem unwilling to join a Hamas-led government.	在法塔赫方面，官员们似乎不愿意加入由马哈斯领导的政府。


Although Hamas has said that it would seek such a coalition, Fatah’s humiliating defeat has left it with little credibility as a governing partner.	尽管哈马斯说过它将寻求建立一个联合政府，但是，法塔赫的惨败使得其没有了作为执政伙伴的可信度。


So far, Fatah’s senior leaders have declared that they will be a loyal opposition in Parliament, leaving governmental responsibility to Hamas.	目前，法塔赫的高级领导人已经宣布，他们将成为议会中忠实的反对派，将政府责任交给哈马斯。


Instead, they will have to focus on rebuilding and reenergizing Fatah.	实际上，他们将不得不将精力集中到重建和重振法塔赫上来。


Hamas is well aware of the shock that its victory has produced.	哈马斯非常清楚其获胜所产生的冲击。


If Fatah refuses to join a coalition, Hamas may opt for a government of independents and technocrats.	如果法塔赫拒绝加入联合政府，哈马斯可能会选择一个由独立人士和技术官僚组成的政府。


It is unlikely that Hamas will form a government composed of hardliners.	哈马斯不大可能组建一个由强硬派组成的政府。


The political, security, and economic circumstances of the Palestinians require a government focused on solving problems, not ideological purity.	巴勒斯坦人的政治、安全以及经济状况要求政府把精力集中到解决问题上来，而不是意识形态的纯洁。


The most urgent challenge facing the new government is rampant lawlessness and anarchy throughout Palestinian society.	新政府面临的最急迫的挑战是巴勒斯坦社会上下无法无天和无政府主义。


Murder, kidnapping, and extortion have reached record heights.	谋杀、绑架以及勒索达到空前高度。


Armed individuals resort to kidnapping to get jobs, free family members from prison, and exact revenge.	武装个人采用绑架来获得工作、从监狱解救家人以及实行报复。


Often, the people involved in these crimes belong to local gangs or even to the militias of large clans.	参与这些犯罪的人经常属于地方团伙甚至是大部落的民兵。


In opposition, Hamas adamantly refused to collect illegal weapons.	哈马斯作为反对派坚决拒绝收缴非法武器。


Now, it will have to deal with a Palestinian society that is armed to the teeth, with poverty rates reaching 70% and unemployment at 35% .	现在，它不得不应付一个武装到牙齿的巴勒斯坦社会，其贫困率达到70％，失业率35％。


Having benefited from overwhelming political rejection of Fatah, Hamas will now be judged by how it uses its new authority.	民众在政治上对法塔赫一举抛弃，马哈斯从中获益。 现在，人们将根据它如何运用新的权势来对它加以评判。


For the first time, a political clock is ticking for Hamas.	政治时钟第一次为哈马斯嘀嗒。


Senior Hamas officials are well aware of the challenge, and have promised a complete overhaul of Palestinian public services and administration.	哈马斯的高官们十分清楚挑战，并且保证对巴勒斯坦的公共服务和行政当局进行彻底改造。


More than anything else, Hamas’s success in the coming months will be measured by its response to these issues.	哈马斯如何应对这些问题将比其他东西更能够衡量其在未来几个月中的成功。


Will Hamas be able to root out corruption and incompetence, and deliver services fairly and efficiently?	哈马斯能否铲除腐败和无能，并且公平有效地提供服务呢？


How will its election affect Palestine’s foreign aid inflows, which form major component of the national budget?	巴勒斯坦的外国援助构成其国民预算的主要部分，这一选举如何影响外援？


Initial international reaction to the Hamas victory has been severe.	对哈马斯胜利的最初国际反应是严厉的。


The Bush administration has declared that it will not deal with a Hamas government, because Hamas remains committed to Israel’s destruction.	布什当局宣布，由于哈马斯仍旧致力于摧毁以色列，因此不会同哈马斯政府交往。


This, indeed, is the language of Hamas’s 1988 covenant.	而摧毁以色列的确是哈马斯1988年章程的语言。


Interestingly, however, Hamas’s election platform combined different approaches to the issue of a Palestinian state.	但是有趣的是，哈马斯的竞选纲领综合了在巴勒斯坦国问题上的不同立场。


On the one hand, Hamas agreed for the first time to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital.	一方面，哈马斯第一次同意在西岸和加沙地带建立以东耶路撒冷为首都的巴勒斯坦国。


On the other hand, the platform repeats Hamas’s refusal to relinquish even an inch of historic Palestine.	另一方面，该纲领重复哈马斯拒绝放弃哪怕是一寸历史上属于巴勒斯坦的土地。


Whether Hamas can actually be transformed into a more moderate organization is impossible to say right now.	哈马斯是否能够切实转化为一个更为温和的组织目前无法确定。


But it is clear that Hamas is now vulnerable to public opinion and, as a governing authority, will have to deal with the international response to its victory.	但是，哈马斯现在受制于舆论，而且，作为当权者，它不得不应付国际社会对其获胜的反应，这一点是清楚的。


Immediately after the election, a senior Hamas official, Mahmoud al-Zahar, said that Hamas would maintain the cease-fire with Israel begun last February, if Israel did the same.	哈马斯的一位高官在选举后马上说，哈马斯将维持去年二月开始的与以色列的停火协议，条件是以色列也这样做的话。


Hamas may be signaling that it will not provoke Israel.	哈马斯可能是在表示它不会触怒以色列。


Perhaps its governing responsibilities will push Hamas toward ongoing discussions with the United States and the international community.	也有可能其管制的责任将推动哈马斯朝向与美国以及国际社会持续不停的谈判。


In any case, despite the election results, and even without Fatah in government, Abbas remains in charge of negotiations with Israel.	在任何情况下，无论选举结果甚至是政府中没有法塔赫，阿巴斯都主管同以色列的谈判。


He has quickly called for a revival of peace talks, although Israel, like the US, has refused to deal with Hamas.	尽管以色列像美国一样拒绝同哈马斯打交道，但他已经立即呼吁复谈。


Palestinians have entered uncharted waters.	巴勒斯坦人已经步入了一个未知的领域。


They turned out in droves to vote in an election that former US President Jimmy Carter described as honest, fair and unmarked by violence.	他们成群结队地前往选举投票，美国前总统卡特成本次选举是诚实、公平而且没有暴力。


They elected a party which called for “reform and change” in response to a decade of violence and lawlessness.	他们所选举上来的政党呼吁在应对十年之久的暴力和无法无天上要“改革和革新”。


And Palestinians accepted Hamas’s view that negotiations based on the Oslo Accords could not achieve Palestinian rights and political ambitions.	而且巴勒斯坦人接受哈马斯的观点，即以奥斯陆协议为基础的谈判无法实现巴勒斯坦人的权利和政治诉求。


Victory achieved, Hamas will take on the responsibility for the Palestinian side in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.	哈马斯取得了胜利，将在巴以冲突中承担起巴方的责任。


With the Palestinians’ future at stake – not to mention the future of Israel and the Middle East – no one can say if Hamas is up to the task.	巴勒斯坦未来受到威胁，更不用说以色列和中东的未来，哈马斯是否能够担当任务无人可以断言。


The Hamas Veto	哈马斯的否决权


GAZA CITY – The resumption of direct peace talks between the Palestinians and Israelis has broken 20 months of stalemate, and marked the entry of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu into this round of diplomacy.	发自加沙——巴以和平谈判的重开打破了持续20个月的僵局，而以色列总理的内塔尼亚胡的参与也非常引人注目。


But these difficult talks face significant challenges from outside the negotiating room, particularly from Hamas, which is intent on ensuring that nothing happens without its approval.	但这场艰难谈判所面临的最大挑战其实是场外因素，尤其来自哈马斯，在该组织眼里，除非他们点头同意，否则一切目标都别想实现。


Hamas refuses all direct peace negotiations with Israel, and has vowed to derail the current talks through violence.	哈马斯拒绝与以色列展开任何直接和平谈判，并宣称要用暴力破坏当前进程。


Their first blow came on the eve of the talks, when the al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, carried out an ambush on Israeli settlers in Hebron, killing four people.	他们在谈判前夕发动了第一波攻势，其下属武装组织“卡桑旅”在希伯伦伏击了犹太定居者，造成4人死亡。


Hamas has vowed to continue launching its attacks from inside the West Bank, but not from Gaza.	哈马斯还宣称要继续在约旦河西岸发动袭击，但却不愿在加沙起事。


This follows from Hamas leaders’ frequent statements since the 2008 Gaza war that they do not want to provoke another Israeli attack, which could cost them their governing position.	类似的观点自2008年加沙战争之后就不断在哈马斯领导人嘴边出现，因为他们不想挑起另一次以色列袭击，进而削弱组织的在加沙的统治地位。


Israel does not recognize a distinction between Hamas-planned attacks from the West Bank and from Gaza.	但以色列可不认为来自西岸或是加沙的哈马斯进攻有何不同。


However, a large-scale Israeli assault on Hamas’s Gaza redoubt in response to the West Bank killings could bring the negotiations to a halt.	问题是倘若以方为报复西岸伏击事件而对加沙发动大规模袭击的话，就很可能令谈判再次中断。


Hamas’s strategy is to expose the Palestinian Authority’s weakness by demonstrating that it cannot control the West Bank, as it promises in negotiations.	实际上，虽然巴勒斯坦民族权力机构在谈判中承诺能控制西岸地区，但哈马斯的战略却是通过袭击来反证前者的无能。


Moreover, Hamas is well aware that their attacks cause Israel to insist even more strongly on security as the centerpiece of any agreement.	此外，哈马斯清楚地意识到袭击能令以色列更加坚持将安全问题设为所有协议的核心议题。


This, in turn, puts the spotlight on ongoing security cooperation between Israel, the PA, and the United States, again undermining the PA’s claims to represent the Palestinian people.	这反过来会令公众的焦点集中于以色列，巴民族权力机构和美国三方的安全合作之上，并再一次削弱巴民族权力机构“代表全体巴勒斯坦人民”的宣言。


Rhetoric aside, Hamas’s opposition to direct talks with Israel is intended to make clear to the US that Hamas is central to the political reality of the region and cannot be ignored.	撇开所有的政治宣传，哈马斯反对直接谈判的举措其实是想告诉美国：哈马斯才是该区域无法回避的政治现实。


If Hamas is not part of the process, there will be no process.	如果哈马斯不能参与和平进程的话，那么一切进程都是空话。


Hamas insists that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas does not have the legitimacy to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians, and that any deal he reaches with Israel is not binding.	哈马斯坚称巴民族权力机构主席阿巴斯根本没有代表巴人谈判的合法性，因此他与以色列达成的任何协议都是无效的。


Hamas claims to be the Palestinians’ true representative, having won the majority of seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in January 2006 (the PLC’s term expired in January 2010, but fresh elections have yet to be held).	哈马斯还自称是巴勒斯坦人的真正代表，因为该组织在2006年1月的巴勒斯坦立法委员会选举中赢得了大多数席位（该委员会任期于今年1月届满，却尚未举行重选）。


As Hamas knows, the US holds the key to ending the political isolation imposed on it after its victory in 2006.	哈马斯也明白，只有美国才能终结自身在2006年大选胜利之后所遭受的政治孤立。


Indeed, Hamas leaders recently acknowledged sending messages to the Obama administration calling for dialogue.	因此哈马斯领导人最近公开要求与奥巴马政府展开对话。


The most recent note, sent through a group of visiting American academics, asked the US government to take a more balanced position in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.	其中最新一条通过到访美国学者传达的信息要求美国政府在以巴冲突中采取一个更加中立的立场。


Hamas, for its part, has expressed its willingness to accept a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza, subject to a return of all refugees and Israel’s release of all Palestinian prisoners.	哈马斯表达了自身的意愿，同意在接收所有难民和以色列释放所有巴勒斯坦囚犯的前提下建立一个由约旦河西岸和加沙地区组成的巴勒斯坦国。


But Hamas has not taken what the US considers the critical step of recognizing Israel – and thus accepting a two-state solution.	但它却没有满足美国心目中的最关键因素，那就是承认以色列——并因此接纳一个两国方案。


For now, Hamas and the Palestinians of Gaza are excluded from the peace talks, which means that the negotiations will most likely not lead to an end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.	迄今为止，哈马斯和加沙地区的巴勒斯坦人依然被排除在和平谈判之外，这意味着谈判将无法为以巴冲突画上句号。


But every day that Gazans are left to stew in an unhealthy mix of siege, poverty, and unemployment is a day that strengthens the Hamas hardliners.	但只要加沙人在围困，贫困和失业等不健康因素中每度过一天，哈马斯强硬派的实力就会增长一分。


The US has invested much in shuttle diplomacy to bring Netanyahu and Abbas to the negotiating table and is not ready to see these talks collapse.	而美国已经在撮合内塔尼亚胡和阿巴斯的会谈方面付出了太多的外交努力，也不愿意眼睁睁地看着谈判破裂。


But the continuing US boycott of Hamas reinforces the logic of those who are trying to sabotage the negotiations.	但美国对哈马斯的持续抵制只能助长那些和谈破坏者的气焰。


What do they have to lose?	正所谓光脚的不怕穿鞋的。


The future of these direct peace talks thus depends not only on Netanyahu and Abbas, but also on how they relate to the extremists within their camps.	因此这类直接和谈的前景并不只有内塔尼亚胡和阿巴斯决定，而取决于两人如何与各自阵营内部的极端派别打好关系。


Will Netanyahu abandon his ideological rhetoric, negotiate seriously with the Palestinians, and make the needed concessions?	内塔尼亚胡能否最终抛开那些意识形态上的言论，认真与巴勒斯坦人展开和谈，并作出必要的让步？


Can the Palestinians rise to the political moment and take advantage of the pressure coming from US President Barack Obama?	巴勒斯坦人又能否把握好这个政治时机，并有效借助奥巴马对以方所施加的压力？


The stakes are high, and failure would be costly to Americans, Israelis, and Palestinians.	各方的期望都很高，而失败的后果是美国人，以色列人和巴勒斯坦人都难以承受的。


If the talks collapse, US foreign policy in the Middle East would be further discredited, and nothing would remain to keep the parties from launching another round of conflict.	如果谈判破裂，美国的中东政策将更加遭人唾弃，也再没有任何力量能阻止各方爆发另一轮冲突了。


For Palestinians, this is likely to be Abbas’s last chance.	在巴勒斯坦方面，这是阿巴斯的最后一次机会。


He is wagering his scant remaining authority on the talks’ success, and Palestinians will be counting down his days in office should he fail.	他以自己最后的一点政治权威作为谈判的筹码，一旦失败，那么下台的日子也不远了。


For Netanyahu, perhaps maintaining the status quo will be seen as a victory, at least in the short term.	对内塔尼亚胡来说，维持现状大概就算是一场胜利，至少短期来说。


But Israel’s margin for strategic error will shrink even further.	但留给以色列的战略回旋余地也更加狭小了。


Meanwhile, Hamas bides its time.	与此同时，哈马斯却正等待着时机的到来。


A failure of Palestinian-Israeli talks would only prove Hamas’s basic point: nothing moves forward without us.	巴以谈判的失败再次只能证明他们的基本观点：没有哈马斯，一切都是空话。


The Harsh Lessons of 2009	The Harsh Lessons of 2009


NEW YORK – The best that can be said for 2009 is that it could have been worse, that we pulled back from the precipice on which we seemed to be perched in late 2008, and that 2010 will almost surely be better for most countries around the world.	纽约——如果要为2009年说几句好话，我们顶多能说，情况本来会更糟，2008年下半年我们仿佛在悬崖边徘徊，后来总算没掉下去，而在2010年，世界上大多数国家的情况八成会有所改善。


The world has also learned some valuable lessons, though at great cost to both current and future prosperity – costs that were unnecessarily high given that we should already have learned them.	全世界也已经得到了一些宝贵的教训，尽管现在和未来的经济为此付出了巨大的代价——这代价原本未必会这么大，如果我们早点懂得那些道理的话。


The first lesson is that markets are not self-correcting.	第一个教训是，市场不会自动纠正错误。


Indeed, without adequate regulation, they are prone to excess.	事实上，如果规管不充分，市场倾向于走极端。


In 2009, we again see why Adam Smith’s invisible hand often appears invisible: it is not there.	2009年，我们又一次看清楚，为什么亚当·斯密所谓“看不见的手”常常真的看不见：它根本不存在。


The bankers’ pursuit of self-interest (greed) did not lead to the well-being of society; it did not even serve their shareholders and bondholders well. It certainly did not serve homeowners who are losing their homes, workers who have lost their jobs, retirees who have seen their retirement funds vanish, or taxpayers who paid hundreds of billions to bail out the banks.	银行家对自身利益的追求（贪婪）并未导致社会福利的增进，甚至都没有增进其股东和债权人的利益，更别说那些失去房产的业主、丢掉工作的劳动者、眼看着养老金泡汤的退休者以及为几千亿美元银行救助方案埋单的纳税人的利益了。


Under the threat of a collapse of the entire system, the safety net– intended to help unfortunate individuals meet the exigencies of life – was generously extended to commercial banks, then to investment banks, insurance firms, auto companies, even car-loan companies.	社会保障网的初衷是帮助不幸者渡过难关，如今却慷慨地扩大了覆盖面：先是救助商业银行，然后又救助投资银行、保险公司、汽车生产商乃至汽车贷款公司——据说这都是因为，整个金融体系面临崩溃风险。


Never has so much money been transferred from so many to so few.	这么多钱从多数人手里转移到少数人手里，这是破天荒第一次。


We are accustomed to thinking of government transferring money from the well off to the poor.	我们习惯性地认为，政府主导下的再分配是把富人的钱转给穷人。


Here it was the poor and average transferring money to the rich.	但如今是，穷人和中等阶层的钱在转给富人。


Already heavily burdened taxpayers saw their money – intended to help banks lend so that the economy could be revived – go to pay outsized bonuses and dividends.	纳税人已经不堪重负了，居然还要看着，他们的钱被拿去支付银行家的天价奖金和红利——据说这是为了确保银行能继续放贷，以促进经济复苏。


Dividends are supposed to be a share of profits; here it was simply a share of government largesse.	我们一直以为红利是利润的分成，如今它却是政府“大礼包”的分成！


The justification was that bailing out the banks, however messily, would enable a resumption of lending.	有人说，无论措施多么不完善，救助银行是必要的，因为这可以令信贷市场解冻。


That has not happened.	可实际上，信贷市场没有解冻。


All that happened was that average taxpayers gave money to the very institutions that had been gouging them for years – through predatory lending, usurious credit-card interest rates, and non-transparent fees.	现在所发生的一切，其实是把普通纳税人的钱输送给那些多年以来一直在盘剥他们的金融机构——盘剥手段包括，掠夺性贷款、跟高利贷没啥两样的信用卡罚息以及缺乏透明度的收费项目。


The bailout exposed deep hypocrisy all around.	银行救助行动暴露了美国社会无处不在的虚伪。


Those who had preached fiscal restraint when it came to small welfare programs for the poor now clamored for the world’s largest welfare program.	有些人，一说到那些扶助穷人的小小的福利项目，就开始念“财政约束”的紧箍咒，如今却在鼓吹世界上最大规模的“福利”项目。


Those who had argued for the free market’s virtue of “transparency” ended up creating financial systems so opaque that banks could not make sense of their own balance sheets.	有些人，曾经那么热情地歌颂自由市场的美德——“透明度”，最终却搞出这么不透明的一套金融体系，银行连自己的资产负债表是怎么样的都说不清。


And then the government, too, was induced to engage in decreasingly transparent forms of bailout to cover up its largesse to the banks.	而政府呢？ 它出台的救助措施越来越缺乏透明度，因为它不得不掩盖自己在救助过程中的大手大脚。


Those who had argued for “accountability” and “responsibility” now sought debt forgiveness for the financial sector.	那些曾经高调呼吁“负责任的政府”和“有担当的政府”的家伙，现在正在兜售为金融部门免除债务的政治膏药。


The second important lesson involves understanding why markets often do not work the way they are meant to work.	第二个教训是，我们理解了市场为什么经常失灵。


There are many reasons for market failures.	市场失灵的原因多种多样。


In this case, too-big-to-fail financial institutions had perverse incentives: if they gambled and succeeded, they walked off with the profits; if they lost, the taxpayer would pay.	这一回是，扭曲的激励鼓励一些“大到不能倒”的金融机构冒险赌博：如果它们侥幸赌赢了，大把利润就落入它们囊中； 如果赌输了，还可以等着纳税人来擦屁股。


Moreover, when information is imperfect, markets often do not work well – and information imperfections are central in finance.	此外，信息不充分也会导致市场失灵，而在金融市场上，信息不充分是一个核心问题。


Externalities are pervasive: the failure of one bank imposed costs on others, and failures in the financial system imposed costs on taxpayers and workers all over the world.	这里充斥着外部性：一家银行倒闭，其他银行跟着遭殃； 金融体系崩溃，纳税人和全世界劳动者就得跟着付出代价。


The third lesson is that Keynesian policies do work.	第三个教训是，凯恩斯主义政策的确有效。


Those countries, like Australia, that implemented large, well designed stimulus programs early emerged from the crisis faster.	有一些国家出台了规模大、水平高的刺激计划，从危机中恢复的就比较早，比如澳大利亚。


Other countries succumbed to the old orthodoxy pushed by the financial wizards who got us into this mess.	其他国家被一些财政巫师蛊惑，死抓着那些旧教条，才会落到这步田地。


Whenever an economy goes into recession, deficits appear, as tax revenues fall faster than expenditures.	每当一个经济体陷入萧条，税收下滑必然快于支出削减，因此自然会出现财政赤字。


The old orthodoxy held that one had to cut the deficit – raise taxes or cut expenditures – to “restore confidence.”	旧教条认为，必须削减赤字——提高税收或削减开支——以“恢复信心”。


But those policies almost always reduced aggregate demand, pushed the economy into a deeper slump, and further undermined confidence – most recently when the International Monetary Fund insisted on them in East Asia in the 1990’s.	但那样的政策几乎每次都会削弱总需求��把经济推入更深的深渊，进一步又会瓦解信心——20世纪90年代国际货币基金组织给一些东亚国家就是开了这种药方，你看后来怎么样？


The fourth lesson is that there is more to monetary policy than just fighting inflation.	第四个教训是，货币政策不仅仅是对抗通货膨胀。


Excessive focus on inflation meant that some central banks ignored what was happening to their financial markets.	过度关注通胀致使某些国家的中央银行忽略了该国金融市场的问题。


The costs of mild inflation are miniscule compared to the costs imposed on economies when central banks allow asset bubbles to grow unchecked.	央行放任资产泡沫无限膨胀会令经济付出高昂代价，相比之下，温和通胀的成本真是不足挂齿。


The fifth lesson is that not all innovation leads to a more efficient and productive economy – let alone a better society.	第五个教训是，并不是所有的创新都会提高经济效率和生产力，更别说是带来社会效益了。


Private incentives matter, and if they are not well aligned with social returns, the result can be excessive risk taking, excessively short-sighted behavior, and distorted innovation.	对私营企业施加什么样的激励是很关键的，如果这种激励违背社会利益，其结果将是过度冒险、过度短视和创新怪胎。


For example, while the benefits of many of the financial-engineering innovations of recent years are hard to prove, let alone quantify, the costs associated with them – both economic and social – are apparent and enormous.	比方说，近几年搞出来的许多金融工程创新，它们到底有没有带来好处都还是个问题，更别说带来多少好处了，而它们造成的经济和社会损失明明白白就在眼前，还大得很呢。


Indeed, financial engineering did not create products that would help ordinary citizens manage the simple risk of home ownership – with the consequence that millions have lost their homes, and millions more are likely to do so.	事实证明，金融工程创造出来的那些产品，帮不了普通老百姓管理贷款买房这么简单的风险，结果搞得几百万人丢了房子，还会有几百万人步其后尘。


Instead, innovation was directed at perfecting the exploitation of those who are less educated, and at circumventing the regulations and accounting standards that were designed to make markets more efficient and stable.	金融创新的真实效果是，发明了更好的手段，去剥削那些教育程度不太高的老百姓，去绕开规管和会计准则这些旨在保护市场效率和稳定的规范。


As a result, financial markets, which are supposed to manage risk and allocate capital efficiently, created risk and misallocated wildly.	结果，本该管理风险、有效配置资本的金融市场，反而成了大规模风险制造者和资本配置扭曲者。


We will soon find out whether we have learned the lessons of this crisis any better than we should have learned the same lessons from previous crises.	这次危机让我们记住这些教训了吗？ 会不会比从前历次危机之后记得牢一点呢？


Regrettably, unless the United States and other advanced industrial countries make much greater progress on financial-sector reforms in 2010, we may find ourselves faced with another opportunity to learn them.	我们很快就能看到了。 很遗憾，如果2010年，美国和其他发达国家在金融改革方面没什么太大长进的话，我们很快就会又有机会重温这些教训了。


The Healing of Taiwan	台湾的康复之路


BANGKOK – Last week, a Taiwanese court sentenced Chen Shui-bien, Taiwan’s president from 2000 until 2008, to life imprisonment for corruption.	发自曼谷——就在上星期，台湾台北市地方法院依贪污罪，判处曾于2000-2008年间任台湾总统的陈水扁无期徒刑。


Chen had been caught stealing millions of dollars of public funds.	陈水扁被控在公共基金中盗取了数百万美元。


He did not act alone. His wife (who also received a life sentence), children, and other relatives all helped to hide the stolen loot in overseas accounts.	不过他可不是单枪匹马犯下这些罪行的，他的妻子（同样被判处无期徒刑），儿女和其他亲戚都帮忙把这些脏款藏在了数个海外银行帐户里。


Taiwan’s former first family turned out to be a den of common thieves.	至此这个台湾前第一家庭摇身一变，变成了一群狼狈为奸的公贼。


Chen and his ruling Democratic Progressive Party camouflaged their personal and parochial financial interests behind the patriotic mask of ensuring the survival of a democratic Chinese society in an independent Taiwan.   For years, Chen was perceived as a brave David fighting the communist Goliath, and attracted many admirers around the world (including me at one point).	陈水扁及其领导下执政的民进党巧妙地为自己蒙上了一幅爱国的画皮，表面上说是为了在独立的台湾确保一个民主华人社会的生存，实际上却是为个人和小团体捞取经济利益。 数十年以来，陈水扁都被塑造为一个勇于和共产主义巨人歌利亚搏斗的牧羊人大卫（出自《圣经》的典故），并以此在全球吸引了无数追随者（甚至包括某一时期的作者本人）。


Presenting himself and his Party as champions of democracy, Chen sought to create the impression among Taiwan’s voters that their freedom would perish in the hands of the Kuomintang (KMT) or any party other than his own.	通过将自己及其党派自封为民主的拥护者，陈水扁试图在台湾选民中留下一种印象，那就是选民的自由将会在国民党及其他党派手中化为乌有。


But in fact, it was the late President Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who instituted the unprecedented democratic reforms that paved the way for the eventual electoral triumph of Chen’s formerly banned DPP.	但事实上正是蒋介石委员长的儿子，已故前总统蒋经国推动了一场空前的民主改革，最终为陈水扁及其遭到查禁的民进党最终获得选举胜利铺平了道路。


Chen’s personal wealth grew conspicuously shortly after he assumed office, but no one could produce hard evidence of his corruption back then.	而就在执掌政府之后，陈水扁的个人财富暴增，但当时没人能拿出特别有力的证据来证明他的贪污罪行。


His political supporters initially brushed aside the mushrooming rumors of his self-enrichment as opposition KMT propaganda.	陈水扁的政治支持者们起初也对陈大肆敛财的传闻不屑一顾，认为这只不过是反对党国民党的政治宣传而已。


But, one by one, most of the DPP’s founding fathers all left the party, accusing Chen of corruption and autocratic behavior even within his own party – which Chen dismissed as sour grapes from people who wanted their share of the political spoils.	但随后一个又一个民进党创始人宣布退党，并指责陈水扁的腐败和党内独裁作风——而陈水扁则反驳说这些人都是些试图从政治利益中分一杯羹，结果吃不了葡萄说葡萄酸的小人。


In fact, Chen was always more concerned with consolidating his own power than with defending Taiwan.	而实际上，陈水扁对巩固其个人权力的兴趣可比维护台湾利益大得多。


His most controversial political moves were aimed at his domestic opponents, not the Chinese government on the mainland.	此人最具争议的政治动作都是针对其岛内的对手，而不是海峡对岸大陆的北京当局。


He led a vicious campaign to portray all Taiwanese with mainland Chinese roots, even if born and bred in Taiwan, as untrustworthy carpetbaggers – wai shen ren , or “not native people” – as if they were aliens from a different culture.	他发动了一场极为恶毒的政治运动，把所有外省籍的台湾人——即便这些人是在台湾土生土长——都描绘成不可信任的阴谋作乱者——即所谓“外省人”或者“非原住民”——似乎这些人都是些来自异种文化的外族。


This official effort to portray native “Taiwanese” as a separate ethnic group, with scant relation to Chinese culture, was extended to language, as Chen favored using the Fujian dialect in lieu of the Mandarin spoken by 1.3 billion Chinese and taught all over the world.	扁政府努力将本地“台湾人”描绘成一种独立存在的，跟中国文化甚少瓜葛的族群，而陈水扁本人则喜欢用福建方言（闽南语）而不是13亿中国人都在使用并在全世界推广的普通话（国语）。


Meanwhile, the Ministry of Education sought to expunge all references to China in school textbooks.	而与此同时，台湾教育部则试图把一切跟有关中国的注释从教科书上抹个干净。


So insistent was Chen’s campaign that it reminded some people of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, a time when Chinese were divided into “us” and “them.”	陈水扁发动的这场运动是如此坚持不懈，甚至令某些人回想起了当年毛泽东发动的文化大革命，那时整个中国都被分裂成“敌”“我”两派。


Indeed, under Chen’s policy, Taiwan nearly became a rigidly divided society, where “local” and “not native” Chinese lived as potential enemies.	而事实上在陈水扁的政策之下，台湾社会几近分裂，变成一个“本地”和“非本地”华人互相视为潜在敌人的社会。


Taiwan ’s sole aboriginal parliamentarian once provided the logical rebuttal to Chen and the DPP, delivering a speech to a packed Congress entirely in his native tongue, which nobody else in the chamber could understand.	台湾唯一的原住民国会议员曾经对陈水扁和民进党进行了一次逻辑上的驳斥，此人在一次国会会议上专门用自己的方言发表了一通演讲，结果没有一个与会议员听得懂。


The message was obvious: his was the only group with a legitimate claim to being native Taiwanese.	他想传达的意思很明确：那就是只有他自己的族群才是全台湾唯一能合法自称为原住民的团体。


In the end, Chen’s effort was as futile as it was foolish.	最后，陈水扁这场愚蠢不堪的努力最终竹篮打水一场空。


The Chinese culture embodied in the daily lives of 23 million Taiwanese of whatever political beliefs was not so easily eliminated by decree.	因为中华文明深深地根植在2300万不同政治信仰的台湾人的日常生活当中，即便是政府的命令也难以轻易抹去。


Moreover, the attempt to do so angered the overwhelming majority of Taiwanese, who finally understood the stupidity of Chen’s policy, particularly how it led to economic stagnation at a time when mainland China was booming.	最后这一举措激怒了大多数台湾人，他们最终意识到了陈水扁政策的愚蠢之处，尤其是当大陆正在崛起之时，台湾经济却在陈的政策下陷入了泥潭。


Indeed, Taiwanese capital and know-how built much of China’s hi-tech industries, and well over a half-million Taiwanese live and work near Shanghai in a virtual replica of Hsin Chu, Taiwan’s Silicon Valley.	而实际上，正是台湾的资本和知识建立起了中国的高科技工业，而目前大概有超过50万台湾人在上海附近一个复制新竹工业园（台湾的矽谷）模式的工业园区工作和生活着。


But in Chen’s Taiwan, domestic squabbles took precedence over economic development.	但在陈水扁治下的台湾岛内，内部争端却压过了经济发展。


Chen invariably blamed the KMT for blocking sensible economic plans, but even some of his moneyed supporters knew better.	陈水扁总是指责国民党阻挠一系列明智经济计划的通过，但即使是他自己的一些富有的资助者都有对这些计划嗤之以鼻。


When it was finally proved that power had turned Chen into a common criminal, the KMT was voted back into power.	事实最终证明，是权力使陈水扁沦为阶下囚，而国民党则在大选中重新夺回政权。


But, while Chen’s legacy of lies and corruption has ended, the reborn KMT under President Ma Ying-jeou has much to do to convince a cynical public that Chen’s ways, reminiscent of KMT’s own darker past, have not become embedded in the system.	但当陈水扁的谎言和贪污走向尽头时，在现任总统马英九领导下重生的国民党则肩负重任，因为他们必须令选民们确信陈水扁的堕落之路，以及对国民党黑暗过去的回忆，并未渗入到现行政治系统的肌体深处。


Chen’s jail sentence should also serve to remind the DPP that it must become a party for all Taiwanese, “local” or not if it is to have any chance at a revival.	陈水扁的判刑同时亦提醒民进党，如果想要翻身的话它必须变成一个代表全台湾人的政党，无论这些民众是“本省人”还是“外省人”。


Taiwan’s people know that they cannot prosper as a democracy if ethnic divisiveness is allowed to hold sway.	台湾人业已意识到，一个族群分裂议题支配下的民主政体，是得不到繁荣的。


The Healthier Poor	更为健康的穷人


Life expectancy in the world’s high-income countries is now 78 years, while it is only 51 years in the least-developed countries, and as low as 40 years in some AIDS-ridden African countries.	目前，世界上高收入国家的预期寿命是78岁，最不发达国家是51岁，而某些艾滋病肆虐的非洲国家只有40岁。


For every 1,000 children born in rich countries, seven die before their fifth birthday; for every 1,000 births in the poorest countries, 155 children die before their fifth birthday.	富有国家每1000名出生的婴儿中有7个在5岁以前死亡； 而在最为贫穷的国家里，每1000名出生的婴儿有155个在5岁以前死亡。


These deaths are not only human tragedies, but also calamities for economic development, systematically reducing economic growth and helping to keep the poorest countries trapped in poverty.	这不仅仅是人类的悲剧，而且也是经济发展的灾难，因为这在体制上降低经济增长并且使得最贫苦国家无法摆脱贫困。


But a growing number of programs around the world are proving that the death and illness of the poor can be reduced sharply and rapidly with targeted investments in public health programs.	但是，全球越来越多的项目正在证明，可以通过在公共医疗项目上有的放矢的投资来大幅度降低穷人的死亡和疾病。


Big victories in recent years have come through the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.	近年来，通过全球抗击艾滋病、肺结核以及霍乱基金取得了巨大的胜利。


The Fund, established six years ago, has provided financing to more than 130 countries to scale up their programs against these three killer diseases.	这个基金建立于六年以前，已经向130多个国家提供融资来强化它们的抗击这三种致命疾病项目。


Since then, Global Fund programs have helped roughly one million Africans to receive anti-retroviral medicines to treat AIDS, financed the distribution of around 30 million bed nets to combat malaria, and supported treatment of around two million people with TB.	从那时以来，全球基金项目已经帮助了大约1亿非洲人接受了抗逆转录病毒药物来治疗艾滋病，提供资金分发了大约3000万顶蚊帐来抗击霍乱，并且为治疗大约2百万肺结核病人提供了支持。