Now Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull’s administration has responded to this activity, introducing legislation that bans foreign donations to political parties and activist groups, including some charities, and requires former politicians, lobbyists, and executives working for foreign interests to register if they are to be involved in Australian politics.	如今，澳大利亚总理特恩布尔政府已经对这些活动有所反应，立法禁止外国（包括某些慈善机构）捐助政党和活动组织，并要求为外国利益效命的前政客、游说者和高管若想继续参与澳大利亚政治，都必须进行注册。


The move is explicitly intended to prevent foreign – and, specifically, Chinese – interference in Australia’s democratic life.	这一动作显然是为了阻止外国——具体而言，就是中国——干预澳大利亚的民主生活。


Turnbull’s crackdown on foreign interference in domestic politics amounts to a bold attempt to strengthen Australia’s position in the global South.	特恩布尔镇压外国势力干预国内政治的措施是巩固澳大利亚在全球南方的地位的果断之举。


The country, Turnbull is making clear, is prepared to be a friend to China, but it will not be bullied or manipulated.	特恩布尔明确表示，这个国家准备和中国交朋友，但不容胁迫和操纵。


A united front of democracies would certainly help get that point across.	民主国家统一阵线显然有助于实现这些目标。


But, beyond failing to support Australia, Trump’s antics are actually undermining Turnbull’s effort.	但是，特朗普的滑稽动作非但无法支持澳大利亚，实际上还会掣肘特恩布尔的努力。


Australia, like so many other traditional allies, surely yearns for the day when Trump, with his crude and self-defeating nationalism, can no longer harm his own country and others.	和其他许多传统盟国一样，澳大利亚显然也向往着有一天特朗普——及其原始的、适得其反的民族主义——不再会伤害他自己的国家和其他国家。


A Chinese Model for Foreign Aid	中国的援外模式


SINGAPORE – Last month, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation released a status report tracking progress on the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).	新加坡——上个月，比尔和梅林达盖茨基金会发表了一份跟踪联合国可持续发展目标（SDGs）进展状况的报告。


The data, which were meant to highlight efforts to eradicate extreme poverty and reduce premature deaths, was also intended to cajole.	这些数据在凸显人们为消除极端贫困和减少过早死亡所付出努力的同时，也旨在转移人们的注意力。


Countries can, and must, do more to address the global development challenges that the planet collectively faces, the report concluded.	报告的结论是各国可以，而且应当为应对我们这个星球所共同面临的全球发展挑战而付出更多的努力。


No country was singled out in the Gates report for its potential to restore the “world’s commitment to development.”	在盖茨的报告中，并没有单独提到哪个国家有“恢复世界发展承诺”的潜力。


Rather, “leaders everywhere” bear responsibility for ensuring that the SDGs are met by 2030.	相反，各国领导人都有责任确保到2030年实现可持续发展目标。


But we believe there is one country that can do more than others to build the world envisaged by the SDGs: China.	但我们相信有一个国家可以在实现可持续发展目标时发挥更大的作用：这个国家就是中国。


Two years into the SDG program, international development is at a crossroads.	可持续发展目标计划实施两年来，国际发展已来到十字路口。


The United States, long the torchbearer of foreign aid, is retreating; so is Europe (albeit to a lesser extent).	长期领导援外工作的美国正在撤退； 欧洲的情况也差不多（尽管程度没那么严重）。


But China, with its newly articulated global ambitions, has an opportunity to reinvigorate the conception and delivery of humanitarian assistance.	但中国开始展现出全球抱负，有机会为援外概念注入新活力并提供人道主义援助。


Adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2015, the SDGs outline a vision for global development that targets poverty, education, public health, inequality, sustainability, and climate action over the next 15 years.	2015年联合国大会通过的可持续发展目标描绘了未来15年在贫困、教育、公共卫生、不平等、可持续发展和气候行动等一系列领域的全球发展愿景。


It presents a broad vision for development, whereby issues once viewed as country-specific are treated as challenges for the entire world to tackle collectively.	它明确了广义的发展目标，曾几何时人们眼中的国内问题现在则成为整个世界需要集体应对的挑战。


By contrast, the Millennium Development Goals, which ended in 2015, were more narrowly focused, and primarily targeted at issues affecting poor countries.	相比之下，2015年结束的千年发展目标涉及面相对较窄，其所针对的事务主要影响那些贫困国家。


But the Gates’ study suggests that some of the SDG targets are already in jeopardy.	但盖茨的研究表明某些可持续发展目标已处于危险当中。


For example, the health goal (SDG 3), which includes a target for eliminating preventable deaths among newborns and children, is unlikely to be achieved in the allotted timeframe.	例如目前来看，不太可能在规定时间内实现包括消灭新生儿及儿童可预防死亡的可持续健康目标（SDG 3）。


At the current pace, mortality reduction in South Asia and Africa will not be realized until mid-century.	以目前的速度，在本世纪中以前无法实现南亚和非洲地区死亡率的下降。


Clearly, more investment is needed globally in the types of interventions that have proven effective locally.	显而易见，更多投资于那些已经被证明有效的地方干预措施在全球范围内都十分必要。


Ethiopia’s Health Extension Worker program and Malawi’s Health Surveillance Assistant program have been proven to reduce child mortality.	埃塞俄比亚的卫生推广人员计划和马拉维的健康监督助理计划已经被事实证明能有效减少儿童死亡。


Aid dollars should be earmarked to help programs like these expand to other regions.	需要特别拨付援助资金协助这样的项目向其他地区推广。


Instead, the opposite is happening.	事实是正在发生相反的情况。


The growing isolationism associated with the populist backlash around the world is having severe consequences for foreign assistance.	因世界各国民粹主义回潮而愈演愈烈的孤立主义正在对国外援助造成严重的影响。


According to the OECD, bilateral aid to the world’s least-developed countries fell by nearly 4% in 2016.	据经合组织统计，2016年针对世界最不发达国家的双边援助出现了近4%的下降。


This is an alarming drop for these countries, given that official development assistance (ODA) accounts for more than two thirds of the aid they receive.	鉴于官方发展援助（ODA）占这些国家所获援助总额的超过2/3，目前情况对这些国家而言不啻于惊人的援助下降。


The US, which remains the world’s largest donor for nutrition programs and for maternal and child health initiatives, is leading the funding retreat.	现在依然是全球孕产妇及儿童健康营养计划最大捐助国的美国正在引领这样的资金撤退运动。


President Donald Trump’s 2017 budget proposal includes a staggering 45% cut to funding by the US Agency for International Development for water and sanitation projects, a 26% cut to global health funding, and the elimination of funds for family planning.	唐纳德·特朗普总统2017年的预算提案包括美国机构将提供给国际开发署供水及卫生项目的资金支持缩减令人震惊的45%，全球卫生资金缩减26%，同时将计划生育资金彻底取消。


While it is not clear whether Congress will support Trump’s budget request, which would amount to billions of dollars in lost aid, even a minor reduction in US aid spending would hurt many of the world’s poorest.	尽管还不清楚国会是否会支持特朗普的预算提案（该提案将导致国际社会失去数十亿美元的援助），哪怕是美国援助开支的小规模缩减也将损害世界众多最贫困国家。


The US is not alone in its foreign aid retrenchment.	美国并不是唯一一个缩减援外资金的国家。


The European Union’s 2018 draft budget proposes a €90 million ($106 million) cut to development spending, while Austria, Germany, and Italy have all diverted development assistance budgets towards migration crises viewed as imminent national security threats.	欧盟2018年预算草案提出将发展开支缩减9，000万欧元（合1. 06亿美元），而奥地利、德国和意大利等国都已经将发展援助预算款项转而用于应对移民危机，而后者则被其国内民众视为迫在眉睫的国家安全威胁。


These are troubling trends, because private philanthropy cannot replace aid withdrawn by governments.	这些都是令人不安的转变，因为私人慈善根本无法弥补政府援助的撤出。


The world needs a new champion for international development, and China should assume the role.	世界需要国际发展新的领军人物，而中国应当接过这一任务。


With weakening ODA commitments from traditional donors, China has a chance to lead in human development, poverty alleviation, and public health spending.	由于传统捐助国官方发展援助力度不断削弱，中国有机会领导人类发展、贫困缓解和公共卫生支出。


It is true that China’s aid model differs from the West’s.	现实是中国的援助模式与西方不同。


Europe and the US have historically focused on funding health care and education initiatives, while encouraging civil-society growth and participation.	欧美从历史上看一直侧重于在鼓励民间社会发展和参与的同时资助医疗保健和教育计划。


China, on the other hand, grants aid on a bilateral basis, and has typically targeted its funding toward infrastructure projects.	而另一方面，中国则以双边援助的形式作为基础，并往往将援助资金用于兴建基础设施项目。


But Chinese leaders have also recently shown interest in aid to strengthen civil society and improve livelihoods.	但中国领导人最近也有兴趣为加强民间社团和改善民生提供援助。


Although Chinese ODA is still a fraction of what OECD countries spend, China has signaled its interest in becoming a development leader, especially in the health sector.	尽管中国的官方发展援助仍然只是经合组织国家开支的一小部分，但中国已经表现出有兴趣在发展援助、尤其是卫生领域担负起领导角色。


At the 2015 UN Sustainable Development Summit in New York, China pledged $2 billion to help implement the SDG agenda, and China’s flagship “Belt and Road Initiative” includes health cooperation as part of its proposed strategy.	在2015年纽约举行的联合国可持续发展高峰会议上，中国承诺出资20亿美元协助实施可持续发展议程，而作为中国发展援助旗舰的一带一路计划在拟议战略中纳入了卫生领域的合作。


In 2014, China also committed $47 million to help contain the Ebola outbreak in West Africa.	2014年，中国也出资4，700万美元协助遏制西非埃博拉疫情的爆发。


While that was significantly lower than the US pledge of $1.8 billion, China was among the fastest to deliver on its commitment.	虽然这显著低于美国承诺的18亿美元，但中国履行承诺的速度却是最快的。


China’s geopolitical and economic influence is growing, and so, too, must its role in promoting international peace and development.	随着中国地缘政治和经济影响力的不断扩大，中国也必须在促进国际和平和发展方面发挥更大的作用。


Skepticism about China’s development intentions will no doubt emerge, given China’s political and ideological differences with the West.	鉴于中国与西方国家有着不同的政治和意识形态，出现对中国发展意图的怀疑情绪几乎是不可避免的。


But the skepticism could yield positive results, especially if it prompts Western powers to reevaluate their foreign aid retreat.	但这样的怀疑也可能产生积极效果，尤其如果它能促使西方强国重新评估他们撤出援外工作的决策。


Even if it does not, China has the tools to become a leader in international development.	即便西方国家继续坚持收缩援助，中国也有能力成为经济发展的领导者。


And, having lifted some 470 million of its own citizens out of extreme poverty between 1990 and 2005, it also has the experience.	而且中国也有这方面的经验，因为在1990和2005年间中国曾成功帮助约4. 27亿国内民众摆脱极端贫困。


But, more than anything, China now has the political opportunity.	但更重要的是，中国现在面临着政治机遇。


As the US and Europe turn inward, ensuring the SDGs’ success will increasingly depend on encouraging – and becoming accustomed to – Chinese leadership.	随着美国和欧洲更多关注国内事务，确保可持续发展目标取得成功将越来越取决于能否鼓励——并且习惯于接受——中国的领导。


The Global Economy’s New Rule-Maker	全球经济的新规则制定者


MILAN – In a recent commentary for the South China Morning Post, Helen Wong, HSBC’s chief executive for Greater China, shows that China’s rising generation of 400 million young consumers will soon account for more than half of the country’s domestic consumption.	发自米兰——在最近发表的一篇香港《南华早报》专栏文章中，汇丰银行大中华区首席执行官黄碧娟表示，中国新崛起的4亿年轻消费者将很快占据该国国内消费额的一半以上。


This generation, Wong notes, is largely transacting online, through innovative, integrated mobile platforms, indicating that it has already “leapt from the preweb era straight to the mobile Internet, skipping the personal computer altogether.”	她指出这一代人主要是通过创新且整合的移动平台在网上进行交易，这表明其已经“从 前网络时代一步跳跃到了移动互联网，完全越过了个人电脑这个环节”。


Of course, China’s rising middle class is not news.	当然，中国中产阶级的崛起早就不是什么新闻了。


But the extent to which digitally oriented younger consumers are driving rapid growth in China’s service industries has not yet received ample attention.	但数字网络化的年轻消费者究竟会在多大程度上推动中国服务业的快速增长，这点还未得到足够的重视。


Services, after all, will help drive China’s structural transition from a middle- to a high-income economy.	毕竟服务业将有助于推动中国从中等向高收入经济体的结构性转型。


Not too long ago, many pundits doubted that China could make the shift from an economy dominated by labor-intensive manufacturing, exports, infrastructure investment, and heavy industry to a service economy underpinned by domestic demand.	不久之前，许多权威人士还在怀疑中国能否从以劳动密集型制造业、出口，基础设施投资和重工业为主的经济转向由内需支撑的服务经济转型。


But even if China’s economic transition is far from complete, its progress has been impressive.	但即便中国的经济转型还远未完成，其进展也足以令人刮目相看。


In recent years, China has been offloading its labor-intensive export sectors to less-developed countries with lower labor costs.	近年来，中国一直在将其劳动密集型的出口部门转移到劳动力成本较低的其他欠发达国家。


And in other sectors, it has shifted to more digital, capital-intensive forms of production, rendering labor-cost disadvantages insignificant.	在其他行业，它已经转向了更为数字化、资本密集型的生产形式，极大缓解了劳动力成本的劣势。


These trends imply that supply-side growth has become less dependent on external markets.	这些趋势意味着供给侧的增长已不再依赖于外部市场。


As a result of these changes, China’s economic power is rapidly rising.	在这些变化之下，中国的经济实力正在迅速上升。


Its domestic market is growing fast, and could soon be the largest in the world.	它的国内市场正在快速增长，并可能很快成为世界上第一大市场。


And because the Chinese government can control access to that market, it can increasingly exert its influence in Asia and beyond.	同时由于中国政府控制了进入该市场的渠道，它可以在亚洲和其他地区施加更多的影响。


At the same time, China’s declining dependence on export-led growth is reducing its vulnerability to the whims of those who control access to global markets.	与此同时，中国对出口拉动型增长的依赖程度不断下降，使其在面对控制全球市场渠道者的反复无常行为时可以不那么脆弱。


But China does not actually need to limit access to its own markets to sustain its growth, because it can increase its bargaining power by merely threatening to do so.	但中国并不需要真正限制进入本国市场的渠道以维持增长，它只需要威胁这样做就可以增强其讨价还价的能力。


This suggests that China’s position in the global economy is starting to resemble that of the United States during the post-war period, when it, along with Europe, was the dominant economic power.	这表明中国在全球经济中的地位开始近似于二战后的美国，当时后者与欧洲一样是主要的经济力量。


For decades after World War II, Europe and the US represented well over half (and near 70% at one point) of global output, and they were not heavily dependent on markets elsewhere, other than for natural resources such as oil and minerals.	在二战后的几十年里，欧洲和美国在全球总产出中所占的比例超过了一半 (最高时将近70%)，但除了石油和矿产等自然资源外它们并不严重依赖其他地方的市场。


Now, China is rapidly approaching a similar configuration.	当今的中国也在迅速形成类似的格局。


It has a very large domestic market – to which it can control access – rising incomes, and high aggregate demand; and its growth model is increasingly based on domestic consumption and investment, and less on exports.	它有一个非常庞大的国内市场（且手握准入权），不断增加的收入以及极高的总需求； 其增长模式越来越多地以国内消费和投资为基础而非依赖于出口。


But how will China wield its increasing economic power?	但中国将如何发挥其日益增长的经济实力？


In the post-war period, the advanced economies used their position to set the rules for global economic activity.	在战后时期，发达经济体利用自己的优势地位来为全球经济活动制定规则。


They did so in such a way as to benefit themselves, of course; but they also tried to be as inclusive as possible for developing countries.	虽然它们这样做也是为了让自己受益； 但它们也试图尽可能地去包容发展中国家。


The post-war powers certainly did not have to take that approach. It was within their power to focus far more narrowly on their own interests.	当然，这些强国不一定非得采取这种做法，它们也可以随心所欲地着眼于自身的更狭隘利益。


But that might not have been wise.	但此举可能不是明智的。


It is worth remembering that in the twentieth century, following two world wars, peace was the top priority, along with – or even before – prosperity.	值得记住的是，在第二十世纪经历了两次世界大战之后，和平才是第一要务，其优先级与繁荣等同，甚至要高于繁荣。


China shows every sign of moving in the same direction.	中国展现了朝同一个方向前进的所有迹象。


It most likely will not pursue a narrowly self-interested approach, mainly because to do so would diminish its global stature and clout.	它很可能不会追求狭隘的利己主义，主要是因为这样做会削弱其全球地位和影响力。


China has shown that it wants to be influential in the developing world – and certainly in Asia – by playing the role of a supportive partner, at least in the economic realm.	中国已经表明它希望通过扮演一个支持性的伙伴 角色(至少在经济领域) 在发展中国家中 (当然也在亚洲) 发挥影响力。


Whether China can achieve that goal will depend on what it does in two key policy areas.	中国能否实现这一目标将取决于它在两个关键政策领域中的所作所为。


The first is investment, where China has moved aggressively by introducing a variety of multilateral and bilateral initiatives.	第一个是投资，中国在这方面步伐甚快，引入了多项双边和多边动议。


For example, in addition to investing heavily in African countries, it created the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in 2015, and, in 2013, announced the “Belt and Road Initiative,” meant to integrate Eurasia through massive investments in highways, ports, and rail transport.	例如除了大量投资于非洲国家以外它还在2015年创建了亚洲基础设施投资银行，并于2013年宣布了 “一带一路倡议”，目的是通过在公路、港口和铁路运输方面的大规模投资来整合欧亚大陆。


Second, how China manages access to its vast internal market, in terms of trade and investment, will have far-reaching consequences for all of China’s external economic partners, not just developing countries.	其次，在贸易和投资方面，中国管理进入其庞大内部市场渠道的手法将对该国所有外部经济伙伴（而不仅仅是发展中国家）产生深远的影响。


China’s domestic market is now the source of its power, which means that the choices it makes in this area in the near term will largely determine its global standing for decades to come.	国内市场是当今中国的力量源泉，这意味着它近期内在这一领域做出的决策将在很大程度上决定其未来几十年的全球地位。


To be sure, China’s current position on domestic-market access is less clear than its economic ambitions abroad.	无须讳言，中国目前在国内市场准入问题上的立场比其在海外的经济野心更为模糊。


But China will most likely move toward an open, largely rules-based multilateral framework.	但中国很有可能走向一个开放的，基本上基于规则的多边框架。


The lesson from the post-war period is that this approach will do the most good externally, and will thus enhance China’s international influence.	根据战后的经验教训，这种方法将发挥最大的外部作用，从而增强中国的国际影响力。


At this stage of China’s development, such an approach will have few if any costs, while most likely conferring many benefits.	在中国的这一发展阶段，这样的做法基本上是百利而无一害。


What remains to be seen is how China’s relationship with the US fares.	而有待观察的是中美关系的走向。


The US is suffering from non-inclusive growth patterns and related political and social upheavals. And it now seems to be departing from its historical post-war approach to international economic policy.	美国正遭受非包容性增长模式以及相关政治和社会动荡的困扰，如今其国际经济政策正在背离战后原则。


But even if the US is isolating itself under President Donald Trump, it is still too big simply to ignore.	即使美国在总统特朗普治下走向孤立，它仍然个无法被忽视的大块头。


If the Trump administration enacts aggressive policies directed at China, the Chinese will have no choice but to respond.	如果特朗普政府颁布了针对中国的激进政策，中国也别无选择，只能接招应对。


Still, in the meantime, China can continue to pursue a rules-based multilateral approach, and it can expect broad support from other advanced and developing countries.	与此同时，中国可以继续奉行以规则为基础的多边主义做法，并期望得到其他发达国家和发展中国家的广泛支持。


The key is not to be distracted by America’s descent into nationalism.	但关键是不要因为美国的民族主义而分心。


After all, it is anyone’s guess how long that will last.	毕竟谁也不知道这种状况将持续多久。


Soviet Lessons for Chinese Purges	中国清洗的苏联教训


CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA – On August 1, China’s People’s Liberation Army celebrated its 88th anniversary.	克莱蒙特，加利福尼亚—8月1日，中国人民解放军迎来建军88走周年。


But the country’s 2.3 million soldiers have little to cheer about.	但解放军230万将士没有什么好庆祝的。


On the eve of the anniversary, the PLA’s former top general, Guo Boxiong, was unceremoniously booted out of the Communist Party and handed over to military prosecutors to face corruption charges, including allegations that he took large bribes from fellow PLA officers in exchange for promotions.	建军节前夜，解放军前高级军官郭伯雄突然被开除党籍，移交军事司法机关处理，他将面临腐败指控，包括收受下级军官巨额贿赂换取提拔。


And Guo will not be the last PLA officer to face such charges.	郭伯雄绝不会是最后一位面临此类指控的解放军军官。


Guo, a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, was in charge of the military’s day-to-day affairs from 2002 to 2012.	身为中央军委副主席的郭伯雄在2002—2012年期间负责主管解放军的日常事务。


His arrest follows that of General Xu Caihou, who served on the commission from 2007 to 2012, in June of last year.	此前，去年6月，2007—2012年在任的军委副主席徐才厚也被逮捕。


Guo and Xu are not the only senior officers to have fallen since their commander-in-chief, President Xi Jinping, launched his war on corruption at the end of 2012.	自2012年底军委主席习近平发起反腐运动以来，郭伯雄和徐才厚并非仅有的落马高级军官。


Based on official data, 39 generals (including Guo’s son, a major general) have already been arrested.	从官方数据看，已有39位将军（包括少将军衔的郭伯雄之子）被逮捕。


And if there is merit to the allegations that a large number of generals bribed Guo and Xu for their promotions, it is reasonable to assume that the most wide-ranging purge of senior PLA officers since the Cultural Revolution will continue.	如果能证明大量将官依靠行贿郭伯雄和徐才厚获得升迁，那么可以推断这场子文化大革命以来范围最广的解放军高级军官清洗还将继续。


That is precisely the message Xi sent to the military in a recent speech to the 16th army group, for which Xu served as political commissar in the early 1990s.	这正是习近平在第16集团军发表的最新讲话所传递的信息。 20世纪90年代初，徐才厚在该集团军担任政委。


After vowing to eradicate Xu’s influence, “ideologically, politically, and also in terms of organization and work style,” Xi stressed that disobedience to the Party leadership would not be tolerated.	习近平要求“从思想上、政治上、组织上、作风上”彻底清除徐才厚案件的影响，强调绝不容忍违背党的领导。


The army must, Xi declared, “resolutely conform to orders from the party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission.”	习近平说，军队必须“坚决听从党中央、中央军委指挥”。


Anyone who has been watching Xi over the last two and a half years could discern his goal of consolidating Communist Party rule in China by strengthening his personal authority, reinvigorating domestic repression, and pursuing an assertive foreign policy.	只要你在过去两年中仔细观察习近平的作风，就能看出他的目标是通过强化其个人权威、重新开展国内镇压和追求独断外交政策巩固中共在中国的执政地位。


To achieve this goal, Xi needs to secure the PLA’s unimpeachable loyalty – and that requires the purge of unreliable or corrupt officers.	为了实现这一目标，习近平需要解放军的赤胆忠心——而这就需要清洗不可靠或腐败的军官。


On a personal level, the PLA’s loyalty is vital to make up for Xi’s lack of an institutional power base.	从个人层面，解放军的忠心对于弥补习近平在制度权力基础上的不足至关重要。


By contrast, when former President Jiang Zemin became General Secretary of the Communist Party following the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, he was able to rely on capable and loyal officials in Shanghai to run the bureaucracy; he then expanded his support base by co-opting other factions in the 1990s.	相反，1989年天安门事件后，前国家主席江泽民成为中共总书记时，他能够依靠有能力又忠心的上海官员支撑官僚体系； 接着，在20世纪90年代，他通过招安其他派系扩大自己的支持。


And Jiang’s successor, Hu Jintao, hailed from the Communist Youth League, which has alumni at all levels of the party-state.	而他的继任者胡锦涛则来自同志遍布党国各层级的共青团。


While Xi will work to build a strong power base by gradually appointing his supporters to key positions, he needs the PLA to defend his political authority in the interim.	习近平将通过逐步任命支持者担任要职构建强大的权力基础，在此期间，他需要解放军捍卫他的政治权威。


The most efficient way for Xi to secure the PLA’s loyalty is to replace its top generals – most of whom were promoted by previous presidents – with his own supporters.	对习近平来说，确保解放军忠心的最有效办法就是用自己的支持者出任最高军官（大部分由前任主席提拔）。


It seems that the lesson from the fall of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in 1964 was not lost on Xi.	看起来习近平没有忘记1964年前苏联领导人赫鲁晓夫倒台的教训。


Khrushchev was ousted in a palace coup sponsored by the KGB and blessed by the military.	赫鲁晓夫在由克格勃支持并得到军队认可的宫廷政变中被赶下台。


Had the Red Army been completely loyal to Khrushchev, the conspirators would not have succeeded.	如果苏联红军完全忠于赫鲁晓夫，政变阴谋是无法成功的。


But Xi’s plans extend beyond his personal authority – and so do the lessons of the Soviet Union.	但习近平的计划不只限于个人权威——而苏联的教训亦然。


Shortly after Xi’s assumption of power, he lamented to local officials in Guangdong that when the Soviet Union collapsed, the elite had lost the will to fight.	习近平掌权后不久，便向广东地方官员感叹道，苏联解体时精英早已失去了战斗精神。


At a time when the Chinese Communist Party’s political monopoly is increasingly being challenged, Xi will not make that mistake.	在中共政治垄断地位日益受到挑战的时候，习近平不会重蹈覆辙。


To avoid the Soviet Union’s fate, Xi and his colleagues have re-imposed ideological control and curtailed civil liberties.	为了避免苏联的命运，习近平和他的同事重新开始了对意识形态和公民自由的控制。


While the Party has so far employed only the police and Internet censors (and now wants to embed secret policemen within all Internet companies), its longer-term survival is inconceivable without a loyal PLA, especially if protests like that in Tiananmen Square in 1989 erupt again.	中共目前只动用了警察和互联网审查（现在希望在所有互联网公司安排秘密警察），但其长期生存在没有忠诚的解放军的情况下是不可想象的，特别是如果类似于1989年天安门事件的示威再次爆发的话。


The final pillar of Xi’s strategy for solidifying the Communist Party’s authority is to replace Deng Xiaoping’s cautious foreign policy with a muscular one.	习近平巩固中共权威的最后一个支柱是用强硬外交取代邓小平的谨慎外交。


Should China have to back its aggressive tactics in, say, the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait with force, its military must not be led by venal and perfidious generals.	如果中国不得不动用武力支持其在（比如）南海或台湾海峡的激进策略，那么解放军决不能由腐化不忠的将军领导。


If Xi’s efforts to root out corruption in the PLA can accomplish these three objectives, one must grudgingly admit that it will be a stroke of political genius.	如果习近平根除军中腐败的措施能够实现这三个目标，那么必须承认他绝对是一个政治天才。


But, to ensure that China is in the strongest possible position, Xi must learn one more lesson from the Soviets: Purges can easily lead to excesses.	但是，要确保中国占据最强势的可能位置，习近平必须从苏联身上汲取另一个教训：清洗极有可能过度。


Stalin annihilated the Red Army’s officer corps on the eve of Nazi Germany’s invasion.	斯大林在纳粹入侵前夕自断手脚清洗了大量红军军官。


Xi cannot afford to make the same mistake.	习近平决不能犯同样的错误。


China’s Solitary Development Model	中国的孤独发展模式


BERKELEY – It seems that China’s leaders have now forsaken Deng Xiaoping’s advice to tao guang yang hui (“keep a low profile”).	伯克利—看起来，中国领导人现在已经抛弃了邓小平的“韬光养晦”的建议。


In declaring a “new era” for China during October’s 19th National Congress in Beijing, President Xi Jinping presented the Chinese system of governance as a model for other countries to emulate.	在10月份在北京举行的中共十九大上，习近平主席宣布中国进入了“新时代”，将中国的治理体系作为可供其他国家效仿的模式呈现。


Leaders who “want to speed up their development while preserving their independence,” Xi said, should look to China as “a new option.”	习近平说，“希望加快发展、保持独立”的领导人，都应该将中国视为“新的选择”。


Developing countries, particularly in Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, seem awestruck by this possibility.	发展中国家，特别是东南亚和撒哈拉以南非洲地区，似乎对这一可能性敬畏不已。


China’s official news agency, Xinhua, has even suggested that as the West’s democracies falter, “enlightened Chinese democracy” could offer a path forward.	中国官方新闻机构新华社甚至提出，随着西方民主国家的式微，“开明的中国民主”能够提供一个前进方向。


Amid all the lofty rhetoric, it is worth asking: what, precisely, is the Chinese model of economic and political development?	在各种高调的叙事中，有些问题值得一问：什么才是经济和政治发展的中国模式？


And, is it actually preferable to the alternatives?	它真的是更可取的道路吗？


China’s model comprises a number of key characteristics, including authoritarian governance buttressed by the perception of stability; state-guided industrial policy and finance; massive infrastructure investments; rural industrialization backed by small-scale agriculture; and openness to foreign trade and technology.	中国模式包含了许多重要特征，包括以稳定感为支撑的极权治理； 国家引导的产业政策和金融；


This model has, no doubt, produced rapid economic growth in China over the last three decades, lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.	以及外贸和技术开放。 毫无疑问，这一模式在过去三十年里给中国带来的高速经济增长，让数百万人摆脱了贫困。


But the implication that the first ingredient – authoritarianism – is necessary for rapid development misses the mark.	但由此隐含的要义——第一项要素即极权主义对高速发展的不可或缺性没有切中要害。


In fact, it is this characteristic of the Chinese system that should give other countries the greatest pause.	事实上，这一中国制度的特征正是其他国家最应该避免的。


Consider China’s East Asian neighbors – in particular, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.	以中国的东亚近邻为例——特别是日本、韩国和台湾。


Each has achieved high growth through state-guided industrial policy, rural industrialization, and openness to trade.	它们都通过国家引导的产业政策、农村工业化和开放贸易实现了高增长。


But Japan achieved these objectives within the framework of its postwar democracy, while South Korea and Taiwan have been democracies for three decades.	但日本在其战后民主框架内实现了这些目标，而韩国和台湾民主化也已有三十年。


Authoritarianism, in other words, served no necessary modernizing role.	换句话说，极权主义绝非现代化的必要条件。


Democracy is, to be sure, exasperatingly slow and often contentious.	平心而论，民主步履缓慢得令人气恼，还常常充满争议。


But its deliberative and electoral processes help mitigate conflicts, especially in heterogeneous and conflict-ridden societies.	但其协商和选举过程有助于弥合冲突，特别是对于容易产生冲突的异质社会。


Even in a more homogeneous country like China, the absence of open public discourse does the opposite, as evidenced by the state’s mishandling of ethnic unrest among Tibetans and Uighurs.	即使是在中国这样的同质性较强的国家，缺少公开公共对话也会适得其反，中国对藏族和维吾尔族的压迫就是明证。


Without a strong civil society or an independent judiciary to check government power, Chinese leaders have, on many occasions, made catastrophic errors in judgment.	在没有强大的公民社会和独立司法来制衡政府权力的情况下，中国领导人多次犯下灾难性的判断错误。


Look no further than Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward or the Cultural Revolution.	毛泽东的大跃进和文化大革命就是明证。


Xi, too, has blundered.	习近平也犯过错误。


For example, his decision to order China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to prop up China’s falling stock market in 2015 was an epic miscalculation.	比如，2015年他决定让中国国有企业来支撑下跌的股市就是一次严重的失算。


Once foreign exchange reserves held by the People’s Bank of China stopped flowing to struggling SOEs, the market fell to the same low levels as before intervention.	一旦中国人民银行所持有的外汇储备不再流入难以为继的国企，市场立刻跌回了干预前的低位。


By that point, hundreds of billions of dollars had been wasted.	此时，数千亿美元已经付之东流。


The absence of political checks and institutional mechanisms for public scrutiny has also encouraged abuse of power and high levels of corruption, contributing to high inequality, arbitrary land grabs, unsafe working conditions, food safety scares, and toxic pollution, among other problems.	缺少政治制衡和制度性群众监督机制也鼓励了权力滥用，导致了大量腐败，带来了高不平等性、任性的土地掠夺、不安全的工作环境、食品安全恐慌和有毒的污染。


While Xi’s energetic anti-corruption efforts may stem some injustices, without fundamental political reform, his campaign against dishonest party officials is likely to be a Sisyphean task – when it is not merely a ploy to curb potential political rivals.	习近平的反腐运动有可能阻止了一定程度的不公，但如果不进行根本性的政治改革，其针对不诚实党员干部的行动有可能成为一个永远无法完成的任务——除非它仅仅是一个清洗政治对手的策略。


Economic management suffers from similar opacity.	经济管理也受到类似的不透明的影响。


At the moment, there are few, if any, checks on debt-fueled investment by SOEs or politically connected firms.	目前，国企或政治关系深厚的企业大肆举债投资而极少受到制约。


This shortcoming, to the extent that it results in massive misallocation of capital, is and will remain a source of major macroeconomic uncertainty for China.	这一缺陷造成大规模资本配置不当，它是——未来仍将是——中国宏观经济不确定性的一大源泉。


As China’s economy becomes more complex, the absence of transparent and accountable governance processes, combined with frequent crackdowns on civil society and efforts to enforce conformity and discipline, will ultimately stifle entrepreneurship and innovation.	随着中国经济变得越来越复杂，透明的可问责的治理程序的缺位，加上频繁镇压公民社会和加强一致性和纪律，将最终扼杀企业家精神和创新。


It does not help that, while China’s expenditure on research and development as a share of GDP is now quite high, much of it is in the public sector.	尽管目前中国研发支出占GDP之比很高，但这无济于事，因为大部分是公共部门支出。


If the SOEs remain too-big-to-fail, this will create a further drag on innovation.	如果国企一直“太大而不能倒”，就会给创新造成进一步的拖累。


As China graduates from the “catch-up” phase of economic development, addressing this constraint will only become more important.	随着中国完成了经济发展的“赶超”阶段，解放这一约束将变得更加重要。


The lack of openness and transparency could also test political stability.	开放和透明的缺失还有可能考验到政治稳定。


In the face of crisis, China’s leaders often overreact by repressing dissent.	在面临危机时，中国领导人常常反应过激，镇压持异见者。


Collective and pragmatic leadership in recent decades has done a reasonable job of managing the problem, but Xi’s consolidation of power, and the cult of personality surrounding him, could exacerbate instability.	最近几十年来的务实主义集体领导在治理这个问题上做得相当不错，但习近平对权力的巩固，以及对其个人崇拜的形成，有可能加剧动荡。


Democratic governments, for all their messiness, are less fragile, as they draw their legitimacy from pluralism and political contestation, rather than from high economic growth or nationalist appeals.	民主政府虽然“乱”，但没有那么脆弱，其合法性来自多元主义和政治论争，而不是高速经济增长或民族主义诉求。


Judicial decisions overturning President Donald Trump’s arbitrary travel bans in the United States, or similar rebukes of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attempts to criminalize dissent, are examples of how institutional autonomy strengthens the resilience of democratic political systems – resilience that China lacks.	美国驳回总统特朗普的任性的旅游禁令的司法裁决，或类似的对印度总理莫迪的异见入罪的批评，都是机构自治强化民主政治制度的恢复力的例子——而中国缺少这种恢复力。


Despite the official narrative, most of the features of the Chinese system of governance that Xi has championed have little to do with him.	尽管官方大肆宣传，但习近平所推行的中国治理体系的特征与他没有什么关系。 它们是中国封建时代或早期共产主义的遗留：一个基于绩效的贤能提拔体系；


They are vestiges of China’s imperial or early communist governments: a performance-based meritocratic promotion system; an organizational framework that ensures top-down loyalty without compromising the quality of local governance; and a unique system of political centralization combined with economic and administrative decentralization.	一个确保自上而下的忠诚并且在地方质量方面不让步的组织框架； 以及一个政治集中化与经济和行政分散化相结合的独特的制度。


In other words, for all its allure, the Chinese model is deficient in some basic respects, and not easily reproducible in others.	换句话说，中国模式不管多么诱人，其在一些基本方面存在缺陷，并且无法被他人轻易复制。


Any country that takes to heart Xi’s invitation to emulate China but does not have a similar organizational history will likely be unsatisfied.	对习近平所提出的模仿中国的做法真的感兴趣，但并不具备类似的组织历史的国家，很有可能会以失望告终。


Not only is China politically unique, but it also possesses a large and increasingly prosperous domestic market that enables it to lure foreign investment on its own terms.	中国不但在政治上非常独特，它还拥有一个巨大的、日益繁荣的国内市场，使其能够以自身条件吸引外国投资。


So, no matter what the Middle Kingdom’s newest emperor might claim, development with Chinese characteristics is really only for China.	因此，不管这个中央王国的新皇帝，怎么说，有中国特色的发展真的只适用于中国。


Moving From Debt to Equity in China	从依赖债务推增长转向依靠净股权资产创增值


HONG KONG – A spate of recent commentary has been warning of the vertiginous rise in China’s debt, which jumped from 148% of GDP in 2007 to 249% at the end of the third quarter of 2015.	香港— 诸多最新评论警告中国债务激增，从2008年占GDP的148%增加到2015年三季度末的249%。


Many are anxiously pointing out that China’s debt is now comparable to that of the European Union (270% of GDP) and the United States (248% of GDP).	许多人焦虑地指出，中国债务已经堪与欧盟（占GDP的270%）和美国（占GDP的248%）相当。


Are they right to worry?	他们的担忧正确吗？


To some extent, they are.	在某种程度上是正确的。


But while observers’ concerns are not entirely baseless, it is far too early to sound the systemic-risk alarm.	但尽管观察家们的担心并非完全毫无根据，敲响系统风险警报仍为时尚早。


As a recent HSBC report points out, the reasons for China’s rapid accumulation of debt, which is concentrated in the corporate and local-government sectors, suggest that the situation is not nearly as dangerous as many are making it out to be.	最新的汇丰银行报告指出，近期中国债务的迅速积累主要集中在公司和地方政府层面，整体情况并不像许多人所认为的那样危险。


For starters, China has a very high saving rate – above 45% over the last decade, much higher than in the advanced economies – which enables it to sustain higher debt levels.	首先，中国有非常高的储蓄率——在过去十年中超过45%，远远高于发达经济体——这使得它能够维持较高的债务水平。


Moreover, China’s banking system remains the primary channel for the deployment of the household sector’s savings, meaning that those savings fund corporate investment through bank lending, rather than equity financing (which accounts for only about 5% of net investment).	此外，中国银行系统仍是家庭部门储蓄的主要渠道，这意味着这些储蓄通过银行贷款支持公司投资，而不是用于股权融资（股权融资只占净投资的5%左右）。


Indeed, the sharp acceleration in the debt-to-GDP ratio is partly attributable to the relative underdevelopment of China’s capital market.	事实上，债务占GDP之比的上升有相当部分可归因于中国股权资本市场的相对不发达。


Once these factors are taken into account, China’s overall debt levels do not seem abnormally high.	考虑这些因素后，中国总体债务水平并未高得反常。


While debt might be a problem for Chinese companies with excess capacity and low productivity, companies in fast-growing, productive sectors and regions may not be in too much trouble.	尽管债务或许是产能过剩和生产率低下的中国公司的大问题，但快速成长的有效率部门和地区往往没有太多的麻烦。


More generally, China has made recent progress in boosting labor productivity, encouraging technological innovation, and improving service quality in key urban areas, despite severe financial repression and inadequate access to funding by small and medium-size private enterprises.	更一般地讲，中国最近在提高劳动生产率方面、鼓励技术创新和改善主要城市服务质量方面取得了显著进展，尽管中小型民营企业仍然面临严重的金融抑制和融资渠道不畅等问题。


Of course, China’s debt is still rising – a trend that, if left unchecked, could pose a mounting threat to financial and economic stability.	当然，中国的债务水平仍在上升——如果不加以遏制，这一趋势可能给金融和经济稳定带来威胁。


But the structure of China’s national balance sheet suggests that it still has plenty of room to mitigate the risks that escalating debt might bring.	但中国国家资产负债表的结构表明它仍有充足的空间遏制债务激增可能带来的风险。


Thanks to China’s high saving rate, the country’s banking system had a loan-to-deposit ratio of 74% at the end of 2015, with 17.5% in required reserves held at the central bank.	受益于中国的高储蓄率，2015年底中国银行系统贷款与存款之比为74%，存在央行的法定准备金率高达17. 4%。


The capital adequacy ratio was as high as 13.2%.	2%。 考虑到中国净对外贷款头寸高达1.


Given that China’s net external lending position amounts to $1.8 trillion, or 17.2% of GDP, the central bank has enough liquidity to reduce banks’ reserve requirements without resorting to unconventional monetary policy.	8万亿美元或GDP的17. 2%，央行有足够的流动性，不必推出非常规货币政策（极低利率），而只需降低银行的准备金率来应对可能的债务危机。


Furthermore, after more than three decades of rapid income growth, China has accumulated wealth (or net assets) in almost all sectors.	此外，在三十多年的高速收入增长后，中国几乎所有部门都已经积累起相当的财富（或净资产）。 不论以何种标准衡量，中国家庭部门杠杆率都十分低，其债务与存款之比为47.


By any standard, China’s household sector has very low leverage, with a debt-to-deposit ratio of 47.6%.	6%。 即使是公司部门，杠杆也不如许多报告所显示的那样夸张。


Even the corporate sector’s leverage is not as high as many reports suggest.	2016年3月底，家庭存款占146. 5万亿银行总存款的40.


Household deposits accounted for 40.1% of total bank deposits of CN¥146.5 trillion ($22.5 trillion) at end-March 2016, while non-financial corporations comprised 32.1% and the share of government deposits was 17.1%.	1%，非金融企业占32. 1%，政府存款占17.


The combined debt-deposit ratio of the non-financial corporate sector and the government sector was 97.6%, meaning that these sectors’ total deposits exceeded their debts to the banking system by CN¥1.7 trillion.	非金融企业部门和政府部门总债务占存款之比为97. 6%，这意味着这些部门的总存款比它们欠银行系统的债务多出1.


In addition, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences estimates that the central and local governments have accumulated net assets amounting to nearly 146% of GDP, mostly in real estate.	此外，按中国社会科学院一项研究测算，中央和地方政府所积累的净资产达到了GDP的近146%，其中大部分为房地产和基础设施。


In short, while China has a problem with inefficient capital allocation, it is nowhere near a solvency or liquidity crisis.	简言之，尽管中国存在资本配置效率低下的问题，但距离偿债或流动性危机还相距甚远。


Nonetheless, China does need to address its domestic debt overhang.	尽管如此，中国确实需要解决国内债务积压问题。


One option is higher inflation.	一个通常的政策选择是提高通胀。


But advanced countries have learned the hard way in recent years how difficult this approach can be, as their massive unconventional monetary policies have failed to overcome deflationary forces.	但近几年来发达国家以沉痛的教训领教了这类政策的困难性，它们大规模实施的非常规货币政策并没能克服通缩。


With much of the world facing very low inflation, and even the possibility of outright decline in the price level, the real burden of debt has been increasing.	世界上大部分发达经济体面临着极低的通胀，甚至有可能发生物价水平全面下跌的情况，在这样的通缩背景下，债务的真实负担其实在节节攀升。


A second option is to issue more equity.	第二个通常的政策选择是发行更多股票。


The banking system is the wrong channel for allocating resources to high-growth, high-risk sectors, which should hold equity as risk capital.	对于面向高增长、高风险部门的融资，银行系统并不是合适的渠道，而正确的做法是通过股票融资来持有风险资本。


But last year’s A-share debacle – when a price rout drove the government to suspend trading in more than half of A-share companies – underscored how difficult it is to build a strong equity market when the investment culture and tax system remain tilted toward debt.	但去年A股暴涨暴跌——跌幅之大曾导致一大半A股公司停盘——彰显出在投资文化和税收制度仍然偏向债务融资的情况下，构建强大的股市融资渠道的困难性。


But China still has options.	但中国仍有其他政策选择。


A substantial share of the corporations holding large debts are state-owned, and are thus more subject to policy than they are to markets.	持有大量债务的公司中有很大一部分为国企，因此更多地受到政策而非市场约束。


Simply put, the government has the power to bring about balance-sheet changes.	简言之，政府拥有改变资产负债表的权力和能力。


The key will be to encourage the reduction of bad debts and increases in the stock of safe assets, while taxing excess capacity and encouraging innovation, thereby improving total factor productivity.	关键是政府要鼓励减少不良债务和增加安全资产的存量，同时对过剩产能课税并鼓励创新，从而提高全要素生产率。


Giacomo Corneo of the Free University of Berlin has proposed that, in addition to taxing underused real estate, China should create a sovereign wealth fund to improve the management of public assets.	柏林自由大学的吉奥科莫·科尔尼奥（Giacomo Corneo）建议，除了对闲置房地产课税，中国还应该成立一个主权财富基金以改善公共资产的价值管理。


Given that those assets amount to an estimated $18 trillion, a higher return on capital would boost GDP and reduce debt.	据估计，这类资产高达18万亿美元，因此提高此类公共资产的资本回报率将刺激GDP增长、减少债务。


China’s bank regulators have already permitted experiments in debt-equity swaps, which the International Monetary Fund says should be incorporated in a comprehensive strategy to accelerate reform of state-owned enterprises.	中国银行监管部门已经允许债转股及其它国有资产改革试点，国际货币基金组织也说应该将这一方针纳入到加速国有企业改革的全面战略中去。


China has the savings to address its growing debt burden.	中国拥有解决债务负担不断增加这个问题的能力工具，及较高的储蓄率。


Amid slowing growth, however, its window of opportunity is narrowing.	但是，在增长减速的情况下，改革的机会窗口正在收窄。


The sooner China rebalances from debt to equity, the better off it will be.	中国越早实现从依赖债务增长到依靠净股权资产增值的再平衡，结果就将越好。


A New Front in Asia’s Water War	亚洲水战争的新前线


NEW DELHI – China has long regarded freshwater as a strategic weapon – one that the country’s leaders have no compunction about wielding to advance their foreign-policy goals.	新德里—中国将淡水作为战略武器由来已久——中国领导人毫无愧色地用它来推动他们的外交政策目标。


After years of using its chokehold on almost every major transnational river system in Asia to manipulate water flows themselves, China is now withholding data on upstream flows to put pressure on downstream countries, particularly India.	多年来，中国利用其扼住几乎所有亚洲主要跨国水系的优势，操纵河流流向，如今，中国又把持上游数据，以此向下游国家施压，特别是印度。


For decades, China has been dragging its neighbors into high-stakes games of geopolitical poker over water-related issues.	几十年来，中国一直在将邻国拖入代价极其高昂的水问题地缘政治博弈。


Thanks to its forcible annexation of Tibet and other non-Han Chinese ethnic homelands – territories that comprise some 60% of its landmass – China is the world’s unrivaled hydro-hegemon.	凭借强行吞并西藏和其他非汉族领土——占中国总国土面积的60%左右——中国是当之无愧的世界水霸权。


It is the source of cross-border riparian flows to more countries than any other state.	它的界河比其他任何国家都要长。


In recent years, China has worked hard to exploit that status to increase its leverage over its neighbors, relentlessly building upstream dams on international rivers.	近几年来，中国花大力气利用这一地位增加对邻国的博弈筹码，肆无忌惮地在国际河流上游建造大坝。


China is now home to more dams than the rest of the world combined, and the construction continues, leaving downstream neighbors – especially the vulnerable lower Mekong basin states, Nepal, and Kazakhstan – essentially at China’s mercy.	目前，中国拥有大坝数量比世界其他国家的总和还要多，并且其建坝工程还在继续进行，使得下游邻国——特别是下湄公河流域的脆弱国家尼泊尔以及哈萨克斯坦——需要仰仗中国的鼻息。


So far, China has refused to enter into a water-sharing treaty with a single country.	到目前为止，中国一直拒绝与其他国家签订水共享条约。


It does, however, share some hydrological and meteorological data – essential to enable downstream countries to foresee and plan for floods, thereby protecting lives and reducing material losses.	但它的确共享了一些水文和气象数据——这对于下游国家预测洪峰、做好计划，从而保护生命、减少物质损失至关重要。


Yet, this year, China decided to withhold such data from India, undermining the efficacy of India’s flood early-warning systems – during Asia’s summer monsoon season, no less.	但在今年，中国选择不与印度共享这些数据，这削弱了印度洪水早期预警系统的效率——在亚洲夏季季风时节也是如此。


As a result, despite below-normal monsoon rains this year in India’s northeast, through which the Brahmaputra River flows after leaving Tibet and before entering Bangladesh, the region faced unprecedented flooding, with devastating consequences, especially in Assam state.	结果，尽管今年印度东北部季风雨量低于正常水平，在布拉马特拉河（即雅鲁藏布江）流出西藏后、进入孟加拉国前的流域地区仍遭到了前所未有的洪水，形成了灾难性后果，尤其是阿萨姆邦。


China’s decision to withhold crucial data is not only cruel; it also breaches the country’s international obligations.	中国拒不共享关键数据不但堪称残酷； 更是对其邻国义务的践踏。


China is one of just three countries that voted against the 1997 United Nations Watercourse Convention, which called for the regular exchange of hydrological and other data between co-basin states.	中国是否决1997年联合国河道公约的仅有的三个国家之一。 该公约要求共流域国家之间定期交换水文和其他数据。


But China did enter into a five-year bilateral accord, which expires next year, requiring it to transfer to India hydrological and meteorological data daily from three Brahmaputra-monitoring stations in Tibet during the risky flood season, from May 15 to October 15.	但中国加入了另一个五年期的双边协议，这个将于明年到期的协议要求中国在洪水高发季，即每年5月15日至10月15日每日向印度传输三个雅鲁藏布江监测站的水文和气象数据。


A similar agreement, reached in 2015, covers the Sutlej, another flood-prone river.	2015年达成的另一个类似协定对萨特莱杰河（Sutlej，另一条经常泛滥的河流）做了相同的规定。


Both accords arose after flash floods linked to suspected discharges from Chinese projects in Tibet repeatedly ravaged India’s Arunachal and Himachal states.	两份协议都是在怀疑因来自中国西藏的工程的泄洪所导致的暴发性洪水反复摧毁印度印度阿鲁纳恰尔邦和喜马偕尔邦后签订的。


Unlike some other countries, which offer hydrological data to their downstream counterparts for free, China does so only for a price.	其他国家免费向下游国家提供水文数据，但中国是收费的。


(The Watercourse Convention would have required that no charges be levied, unless the data or information was “not readily available” – a rule that may also have contributed to China’s “no” vote.)	（河道公约要求，除非数据或信息“不是现成的”，否则不应该收费——这一规则可能也是中国投否决票的原因之一。 ）


But it was a price India was willing to pay.	但印度甘愿为此付钱。


And this year, as always, India sent the agreed amount.	和往年一样，印度也按照谈定的价格付了款。


Yet it received no data, with the Chinese foreign ministry claiming after almost four months that upstream stations were being “upgraded” or “renovated.”	但印度并没有收到数据，中国外交部在过了近四个月后才声称上游水文站在“升级”或“翻新”。


That claim was spurious: China did supply data on the Brahmaputra to Bangladesh.	这一借口显然是虚假的：中国向孟加拉国提供了雅鲁藏布江数据。


Three weeks earlier, the state-controlled newspaper Global Times offered a more plausible explanation for China’s failure to deliver the promised data to India: the data transfer had been intentionally halted, owing to India’s supposed infringement on Chinese territorial sovereignty in a dispute over the remote Himalayan region of Doklam.	三周前，国有报纸《环球时报》给出了一个更加靠谱的原因解释了中国为什么不向印度提供承诺的数据：数据传输被有意中止，因为所谓的印度侵占偏远的喜马拉雅山区洞朗的争议中国领土事件。


For much of the summer, that dispute took the form of a border standoff where Bhutan, Tibet, and the Indian state of Sikkim meet.	在今年夏天的大部分时间里，这一纠纷导致不丹、西藏和印度锡金邦三方接壤处发生边境对峙。


But even before the dispute flared in mid-June, China was seething over India’s boycott of its May 14-15 summit promoting the much-vaunted “Belt and Road” initiative.	但即使在6月中旬出现这一纠纷之前，中国因为印度抵制5月14—15日举行的推介其大肆吹嘘的“一带一路”计划的峰会而群情沸腾。


The denial of data apparently began as an attempt to punish India for condemning China’s massive, cross-border infrastructure agenda as an opaque, neocolonial enterprise.	中国拒绝向印度传输数据显然是为了惩罚印度批评中国的大规模跨境基础设施建设计划是不透明的新殖民主义作风。


China’s desire to punish India was then reinforced by the Doklam standoff.	中国对惩罚印度的渴望因为洞朗对峙而强化。


For China, it seems, international agreements stop being binding when they are no longer politically convenient.	对中国来说，只要国际协定引起了政治上的不便，便不再具有约束力。


This reading is reinforced by China’s violations of its 1984 pact with the United Kingdom, under which China gained sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997.	中国违反其于1984年与英国签订的、规定中国1997年收回香港主权的联合声明强化了这一解读。


China claims that the agreement, based on the formula “one country, two systems,” had lost “practical significance” over the last 20 years.	中国说，这一基于“一国两制”模式的协定已经在过去20年中失去了“实际意义”。


Were the roles reversed, a downstream China would have stridently accused an upstream India of exacerbating flood-related death and destruction by breaching its international obligations.	如果转换角色，位于下游的中国必会严厉指责上游的印度加剧了与洪水相关的死亡情况和践踏其国际义务所造成的破坏。


But just as China has unilaterally and aggressively asserted its territorial and maritime claims in Asia, it is using the reengineering of cross-border riparian flows and denial of hydrological data to deepen its regional power.	但正如中国单方面肆无忌惮地在亚洲主张陆上和海上领土权利，它也在利用改变跨境界河流向和拒绝传输水文数据来深化其地区力量。


In fact, China’s cutoff of water data, despite the likely impact on vulnerable civilian communities, sets a dangerous precedent of indifference to humanitarian considerations.	事实上，中国切断水数据尽管有可能会影响到脆弱的社区，也树立了对人道主义考虑无动于衷的危险先例。


It also highlights how China is fashioning unconventional tools of coercive diplomacy, whose instruments already range from informally boycotting goods from a targeted country to halting strategic exports (such as of rare-earth minerals) and suspending Chinese tourist travel.	这还突显出中国正在使用强权外交的非常规工具，其所动用的手段已经包括非正式地抵制来自目标国家的商品以及中止战略出口（如稀土元素）和叫停中国旅游团。


Now, by seizing control over water – a resource vital to millions of lives and livelihoods – China can hold another country hostage without firing a single shot.	如今，通过牢牢控制水——数百万人生命和生计的不可或缺的来源——中国就能不费一枪一弹绑架另一个国家。


In a water-stressed Asia, taming China’s hegemonic ambition is now the biggest strategic challenge.	在饱受水压力的亚洲，驯服中国的霸权野心是现在最大的战略挑战。


A ‘China First’ Strategy for North Korea	朝鲜的“中国优先”战略


LONDON – Most pundits agree that the least bad way to deal with North Korea’s nuclear saber rattling is a continued combination of tight containment and aggressive diplomacy.	伦敦—大部分专家都认为，应对朝鲜核武器的最不坏的方法，是坚持严厉遏制和积极外交相结合。


Fewer, however, have recognized that the least bad military option – the one implied by US President Donald Trump’s insistence that China take responsibility for its dangerous neighbor – is a Chinese invasion, or regime change forced through China’s threat to launch one.	但较少有人认识到，最不坏的军事选项——即美国总统特朗普坚持要中国为其危险的邻居负责所暗示的——是中国侵入朝鲜，或在中国的威胁下实现朝鲜的政权更迭。


This outcome, which would sharply shift East Asia’s strategic balance in China’s favor, is not as unlikely as most people think.	这一结果将极大地改变东亚战略平衡，而中国是最大赢家。 这一情景并不像大部分人认为的那样希望渺茫。


In fact, its very plausibility is one reason why it needs to be taken seriously, including by Chinese military planners.	事实上，它具有相当的合理性，因此，它需要认真对待，包括中国的军事策略家。


In Trumpian terms, this is a “China First” option that could help “Make China Great Again.”	用特朗普的话说，这是一个“中国优先”选项，有助于“让中国再次伟大”。


Any military intervention, Chinese or otherwise, would carry huge risks.	任何军事干预，不管由中国还是其他国家执行，都会带来巨大的风险。


But before dwelling on them, consider what a successful Chinese intervention would achieve.	但在思考这些问题以前，想一想中国干预获得成功能够实现什么。


For starters, it would put North Korea right where the country’s post-Korean War history suggests it belongs: under a Chinese nuclear umbrella, benefiting from a credible security guarantee.	首先，朝鲜将回到朝鲜战争后的历史地位：置于中国核保护伞治下，受益于可信的安全保障。


Mao Zedong used to say that his country and North Korea were “as close as lips and teeth” – a fitting description, given Chinese troops’ role in averting an American victory in the Korean War.	毛泽东曾说，中国和朝鲜“唇齿相依”——此话最为精辟，中国军队在朝鲜战争中阻止了美国的胜利就是明证。


But while Japan and South Korea have remained close allies of the United States during the six decades since then, hosting US bases and sheltering under US nuclear protection, China and North Korea have drifted ever further apart.	但在此后直至今日的六十年里，日本和韩国一直是美国的紧密盟友，有美军驻扎，置于美国的核保护下，而中国和朝鲜则渐行渐远。


As a result, China has little control over its neighbor and purported ally, and probably scant knowledge of what is going on there.	结果，中国很难控制这个邻国和所谓的盟友，甚至有可能对它的未来方向一无所知。


It could, it is true, tighten the existing siege on North Korea by cutting trade further and blocking energy supplies.	诚然，它可以通过进一步切断贸易、阻断能源供给来加紧对朝鲜的围困。


But this might achieve little beyond pushing Kim Jong-un’s cloistered regime to look for support from its other neighbor, Russia.	但这除了把失道寡助的金正恩推向另一个邻国——俄罗斯寻求支持之外，没有其他效果。


If, as is commonly assumed, North Korea wants some sort of credible security guarantee in exchange for curtailing its nuclear program, the only country capable of providing it is China.	如果如人们普遍认为的那样，朝鲜希望以可信的安全保障换取其停止核计划，那么唯一有能力提供安全保障的只有中国。


No American promise would remain credible beyond the term of the president who gave it, if even that long.	美国的承诺只限于许下承诺的总统给出的内容，甚至只能维持到这位总统下台。


So if China were to combine threats of invasion with a promise of security and nuclear protection, in exchange for cooperation and possible regime change, its chances of winning over large parts of the Korean People’s Army would be high.	因此，如果中国将入侵威胁和安全和核保护承诺相结合，换取朝鲜的合作以及可能的政权更迭，其争取到朝鲜人民军大部的机会很大。


Whereas a nuclear exchange with the US would mean devastation, submission to China would promise survival, and presumably a degree of continued autonomy.	尽管与美国进行核战争意味着灾难，但向中国屈服能够带来生存，可能还能保持一定程度的自主权。


For all except those closest to Kim, the choice would not be a difficult one.	除了金正恩及其亲信，这个选择并不难做出。


China’s strategic gains from a successful military intervention would include not only control of what happens on the Korean Peninsula, where it presumably would be able to establish military bases, but also regional gratitude for having prevented a catastrophic war.	对中国来说，成功的军事干预的战略收益不仅包括控制朝鲜半岛的局势——因为它将可以在朝鲜部署军事基地，还将因为阻止了一场灾难性战争而获得整个地区的感激。


No other action holds as much potential to make Chinese leadership within Asia seem both credible, and desirable, especially if the alternative is a reckless, poorly planned US-led war.	除此之外，再无其他行动有望让中国领导亚洲显得既可信又可求，特别是在除此之外的唯一选项只剩下鲁莽仓促的美国领导的战争的情况下。


What China needs, above all, is legitimacy, and intervention in North Korea would provide it.	毕竟，中国需要的是合法性，而干预朝鲜能够提供合法性。


Successful use of hard power would bring China, to borrow the distinction coined by Harvard’s Joseph S. Nye, huge reserves of soft power.	成功地运用硬实力将给中国带来——用哈佛大学的约瑟夫·奈（Joseph S. Nye）发明的区分讲——巨大的软实力储备。


But now to the 64 billion renminbi question: Could it work?	现在，有一个640亿元人民币的问题：这能成功吗？


We can’t know the answer for sure, and any military intervention carries great risks.	我们无法确知答案，任何军事干预都包含着巨大的风险。


The Chinese armed forces are now well equipped, but lack comparable battlefield experience.	如今，中国武装部队装备精良，但缺少可比的战场经验。


Their inferior opponents have leaders who might be prepared to use nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, if they did not simply accept Chinese terms and surrender.	而他们的处于弱势的对手有一个也许时刻准备使用核武器和其他大规模杀伤性武器的领导层——如果他们断然拒绝中国的条件和投向的话。


What we can say with near certainty is that a Chinese land and sea invasion, rather than an American one, would stand a better chance of avoiding Kim’s likely response: an artillery attack on the South Korean capital, Seoul, which lies just a few dozen miles south of the demilitarized zone.	我们几乎可以肯定的是，中国，而不是美国的陆路和海路入侵，更有机会避免金正恩有可能采取的反应：对距离非军事区只有几十英里的韩国首都首尔发动火箭攻击。


Why would North Korea slaughter its southern brothers and sisters in retaliation for a Chinese invasion that came with a promise of continued security, if not autonomy?	中国的入侵承诺会继续保障朝鲜的安全乃至自主，既然如此，朝鲜为什么还要报复性地屠戮南方邻国和姐妹？


Moreover, while the Kim regime’s nuclear restraint could hardly be taken for granted, China would be a less likely target than the US for North Korean missiles.	此外，尽管我们断不可想当然地认为金氏政权会保持核克制，但和美国相比，中国更不可能成为朝鲜导弹的目标。


Were a Chinese military option to be contemplated seriously, some intelligence and missile-defense collaboration with the US might be worth exploring.	如果认真考虑中国军事干预的选项，与美国进行一些情报和导弹防御合作或许就值得研究。


Given the risks, it would be hard for the US to refuse.	考虑到风险，美国很难拒绝这一建议。


This scenario may well never happen.	这一情景很可能永远不会发生。


But it is so logical that the possibility of it should be taken seriously.	但考虑其可能性是应有之义。


It is, after all, China’s best opportunity to achieve greater strategic parity with the US in the region, while removing a source of instability that threatens them both.	毕竟，这是中国在东亚地区实现更大的对美战略平价，同时移除威胁其北部的动荡源的最好的机会。


China’s Debt-Trap Diplomacy	中国的债务陷阱外交


NEW DELHI – If there is one thing at which China’s leaders truly excel, it is the use of economic tools to advance their country’s geostrategic interests.	新德里—有一件事是中国领导人真正擅长的，那就是用经济工具推进中国的战略利益。


Through its $1 trillion “one belt, one road” initiative, China is supporting infrastructure projects in strategically located developing countries, often by extending huge loans to their governments.	通过“一带一路”计划，中国支持了占据战略要冲的发展中国家的基建项目，手段一般是给予这些国家的政府巨额贷款。


As a result, countries are becoming ensnared in a debt trap that leaves them vulnerable to China’s influence.	于是这些国家纷纷跳入了债务陷阱，导致它们极易受到中国的影响。


Of course, extending loans for infrastructure projects is not inherently bad.	当然，贷款给基建项目天然不是坏事。


But the projects that China is supporting are often intended not to support the local economy, but to facilitate Chinese access to natural resources, or to open the market for its low-cost and shoddy export goods.	但中国所支持的项目通常不是为了支持本地经济，而是为了便利中国获得自然资源，或为低成本的劣质中国商品打开市场。


In many cases, China even sends its own construction workers, minimizing the number of local jobs that are created.	在许多例子中，中国甚至输出自己的建筑工人，从而让本地就业创造降到最低。


Several of the projects that have been completed are now bleeding money.	其中几个已经完成的项目目前处于亏损状态。


For example, Sri Lanka’s Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, which opened in 2013 near Hambantota, has been dubbed the world’s emptiest.	比如，2013年开张的位于汉班托塔（Hambantota）附近斯里兰卡的拉贾帕克萨国际机场（Mattala Rajapaksa）堪称世界最空机场。


Likewise, Hambantota’s Magampura Mahinda Rajapaksa Port remains largely idle, as does the multibillion-dollar Gwadar port in Pakistan.	类似地，汉班托塔的拉贾帕克萨港（Magampura Mahinda Rajapaksa Port）也基本处于闲置状态，耗资数十亿美元建造的巴基斯坦瓜达尔港也是如此。


For China, however, these projects are operating exactly as needed: Chinese attack submarines have twice docked at Sri Lankan ports, and two Chinese warships were recently pressed into service for Gwadar port security.	但是，对中国来说，这些项目的经营状态正是其所想要的：中国的攻击潜艇已经两次停靠斯里兰卡港口，两艘中国战舰最近驶入瓜达尔港执行港口安全保障任务。


In a sense, it is even better for China that the projects don’t do well.	从某种程度上讲，这些项目表现拙劣更加符合中国的利益。


After all, the heavier the debt burden on smaller countries, the greater China’s own leverage becomes.	毕竟，小国债务越沉重，中国自身可利用的优势就越大。


Already, China has used its clout to push Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand to block a united ASEAN stand against China’s aggressive pursuit of its territorial claims in the South China Sea.	目前，中国已经用实力让柬埔寨、老挝、缅甸和泰国阻挠东盟针对中国在南海的侵略性领土主张采取联合立场。


Moreover, some countries, overwhelmed by their debts to China, are being forced to sell to it stakes in Chinese-financed projects or hand over their management to Chinese state-owned firms.	此外，一些国家因为不堪对华债务重负，被迫向中国出售中资支持项目或将项目管理权拱手让给中国国有企业。


In financially risky countries, China now demands majority ownership up front.	在高金融风险国家，中国现在从一开始就要求多数股权。


For example, China clinched a deal with Nepal this month to build another largely Chinese-owned dam there, with its state-run China Three Gorges Corporation taking a 75% stake.	比如，本月中国与尼泊尔签订合同，在尼泊尔建造一座新的归中国所有的大坝，其国有企业长江三峡公司占股75%。


As if that were not enough, China is taking steps to ensure that countries will not be able to escape their debts.	但中国仍不知足，正在采取措施确保这些国家无法摆脱债务。


In exchange for rescheduling repayment, China is requiring countries to award it contracts for additional projects, thereby making their debt crises interminable.	作为偿付展期的交换，中国要求这些国家与其签订新项目，从而延长它们的债务危机。


Last October, China canceled $90 million of Cambodia’s debt, only to secure major new contracts.	去年10月，中国豁免了9,000万美元的柬埔寨债务，条件仅仅是保证与它签订新合同。


Some developing economies are regretting their decision to accept Chinese loans.	一些发展中国家后悔接受中国的贷款。


Protests have erupted over widespread joblessness, purportedly caused by Chinese dumping of goods, which is killing off local manufacturing, and exacerbated by China’s import of workers for its own projects.	普遍的失业导致示威游行爆发，矛头直指中国倾销商品扼杀本地制造业，而中国输入工人建设其自己的项目进一步恶化了失业。


New governments in several countries, from Nigeria to Sri Lanka, have ordered investigations into alleged Chinese bribery of the previous leadership.	从尼日利亚到斯里兰卡，一些国家的新政府下令对中国贿赂前任领导层的指控进行调查。


Last month, China’s acting ambassador to Pakistan, Zhao Lijian, was involved in a Twitter spat with Pakistani journalists over accusations of project-related corruption and the use of Chinese convicts as laborers in Pakistan (not a new practice for China).	上个月，中国驻巴基斯坦临时代办赵立坚卷入了一场与巴基斯坦记者的Twitter论战，争论的焦点是与项目有关的腐败指控和让中国囚犯赴巴务工（这是中国的新伎俩）。


Zhao described the accusations as “nonsense.”	赵立坚称些指控“子虚乌有”。


In retrospect, China’s designs might seem obvious.	时候来看，中国的意图是明显的。


But the decision by many developing countries to accept Chinese loans was, in many ways, understandable.	但许多发展中国家接受中国贷款的决定在很大程度上也是可以理解的。


Neglected by institutional investors, they had major unmet infrastructure needs.	它们被机构投资者所忽视，巨大的基建需求得不到满足。


So when China showed up, promising benevolent investment and easy credit, they were all in.	因此，当中国伸出“援手”，承诺慈善式投资和便利的信用时，它们纷纷接受。


It became clear only later that China’s real objectives were commercial penetration and strategic leverage; by then, it was too late, and countries were trapped in a vicious cycle.	随后才发现，中国的真正目的是商业渗透和战略杠杆，但那时一切都已经太迟，国家已经陷入了恶性循环。


Sri Lanka is Exhibit A. Though small, the country is strategically located between China’s eastern ports and the Mediterranean.	斯里兰卡是最显著的例子。 尽管国家很小，但占据中国东部港口和地中海之间的战略要冲。


Chinese President Xi Jinping has called it vital to the completion of the maritime Silk Road.	中国国家主席习近平称之为完成海上丝绸之路的关键点。


China began investing heavily in Sri Lanka during the quasi-autocratic nine-year rule of President Mahinda Rajapaksa, and China shielded Rajapaksa at the United Nations from allegations of war crimes.	中国大量投资斯里兰卡始于拉贾帕克萨总统九年的半独裁统治时期，并帮助拉贾帕克萨逃脱联合国的战争罪指控。


China quickly became Sri Lanka’s leading investor and lender, and its second-largest trading partner, giving it substantial diplomatic leverage.	中国很快就成为斯里兰卡的主要投资者和贷款人、第二大贸易伙伴，从中获得极大的外交影响力。


It was smooth sailing for China, until Rajapaksa was unexpectedly defeated in the early 2015 election by Maithripala Sirisena, who had campaigned on the promise to extricate Sri Lanka from the Chinese debt trap.	中国在斯里兰卡一帆风顺，直到2015年拉贾帕克萨出人意料地在选举中败给了西里塞纳，后者的竞选承诺是让斯里兰卡摆脱中国债务陷阱。


True to his word, he suspended work on major Chinese projects.	他说到做到，中止了多项中国大工程。


But it was too late: Sri Lanka’s government was already on the brink of default.	但为时已晚：斯里兰卡政府已经处于违约边缘。


So, as a Chinese state mouthpiece crowed, Sri Lanka had no choice but “to turn around and embrace China again.”	因此，一份中国喉舌媒体叫嚣，斯里兰卡别无选择，只能“回头再次拥抱中国。


Sirisena, in need of more time to repay old loans, as well as fresh credit, acquiesced to a series of Chinese demands, restarting suspended initiatives, like the $1.4 billion Colombo Port City, and awarding China new projects.	”西里塞纳需要更多时间偿还旧贷款和更新信用，只能默许中国的一系列要求，重启了中止的项目（如14亿美元的科伦坡港城），还与中国签订了新项目。


Sirisena also recently agreed to sell an 80% stake in the Hambantota port to China for about $1.1 billion.	西里塞纳最近还同意将汉班托塔港的80%股权作价11亿美元卖给中国。


According to China’s ambassador to Sri Lanka, Yi Xianliang, the sale of stakes in other projects is also under discussion, in order to help Sri Lanka “solve its finance problems.”	中国驻斯里兰卡大使易先良说，其他项目的股份出售事宜也在讨论中，只是为了帮助斯里兰卡“解决金融问题”。


Now, Rajapaksa is accusing Sirisena of granting China undue concessions.	如今，拉贾帕克萨指责西里塞纳无原则地对中国妥协。


By integrating its foreign, economic, and security policies, China is advancing its goal of fashioning a hegemonic sphere of trade, communication, transportation, and security links.	通过融合外交、经济和安全政策，中国正在推进其建立由贸易、通讯、交通和安全环节构成的霸权势力范围。


If states are saddled with onerous levels of debt as a result, their financial woes only aid China’s neocolonial designs.	如果各国因此背上了沉重的债务，那么它们的金融灾难将有助于中国的新殖民主义企图。


Countries that are not yet ensnared in China’s debt trap should take note – and take whatever steps they can to avoid it.	尚未跳入中国债务陷阱的国家必须小心——应该竭尽全力避免落入这一陷阱。


Taking the Politics Out of Development	将政治排除在发展之外


LONDON – Later this month, Chinese President Xi Jinping will host a summit for many of the leaders of the 65 countries engaged in his “one belt, one road” (OBOR) initiative, a pioneering program that will channel billions of investment dollars toward infrastructure projects across Asia, Africa, and Europe.	发自伦敦——本月晚些时候，中国国家主席习近平将迎接来自65个国家的多位领导人，共同围绕将向亚洲，非洲和欧洲的基础设施项目注入数十亿美元投资的开创性“一带一路”倡议召开峰会。


Despite a strong economic case for the project, reactions have been mixed.	虽然该项目主要集中在经济方面，但各方反应却不尽相同。


The main impulse driving the OBOR initiative is physical connectivity: efficient infrastructure enhances productivity, fosters investment, and lowers the costs of trade.	“一带一路”动议的主要推动力是物理上的连接：高效的基础设施可提高生产力，促进投资，并降低贸易成本。


With effective channels for the exchange of goods and well-connected information networks, growth accelerates, economic opportunity increases, and inequality narrows.	借助有效的货物交换渠道和连接通畅的信息网络，增长得益加速，经济机会因而增加，不平等现象也将缩窄。


The good news is that such infrastructure can be built in an efficient and cost-effective manner.	好消息是，这类基础设施是可以以高效高性价比的方式来建设的。


The key is cooperative efforts that exploit each country’s respective comparative advantage, be it capital, technological know-how, logistical or construction capabilities, raw materials, or even industrial goods.	而其关键则是充分利用各国各自拥有的比较优势——无论是资本、技术、物流或施工能力，原材料乃至于工业产品——展开合作努力。


Such an approach can jumpstart development in low-income countries, and help emerging economies bypass the dreaded middle-income trap.	这种手段可以启动低收入国家的发展，并帮助新兴经济体越过可怕的中等收入陷阱。


But making physical connectivity work requires not only massive amounts of funding; policy coordination and regulatory harmonization are necessary as well.	但进行物理连接工作不仅需要大量的资金； 还必须实现政策协调和监管协调。


In the short term, infrastructure investment can be impeded by significant political, sovereign, and financial risks.	在短期内，基础设施投资可能会遭受到严重政治，主权和财务风险的阻碍。


For starters, there is the risk that political leaders will prioritize short-term interests above a long-term vision.	首先，政治领导人有可能将短期利益凌驾于长期愿景之上。


For example, they may try to win votes with reductions in road tolls or water tariffs, causing otherwise good infrastructure projects to produce net losses.	例如他们可能会尝试以减少道路通行费或水费来赢取选票，导致原本运行良好的基础设施项目出现净亏损。


They may also lack motivation to raise funds for big projects, unless those efforts would translate into actual votes.	他们有时也缺乏为大项目募集资金的动力，除非这些努力能转化为实际选票。


It does not help that many countries are also grappling with public debt, which makes it difficult for them to borrow from multilateral development institutions.	与此同时，许多国家都背负着沉重的公共债务，这使得它们难以从多边发展机构借款。


With limited fiscal space, governments might need to resort to levying taxes – a politically difficult solution – to pursue infrastructure investment. They might also have to reduce investment in other critical areas, like education, health, or environmental protection.	在财政空间有限的情况下，这些政府可能转而求助于税收（一个在政治上相当棘手的解决方案）来推动基础设施投资，还可能要减少对教育，健康或环境保护等其他关键领域的投资。


Private investors, for their part, may be neither willing nor able to hold illiquid assets for the entire gestation and construction process.	而私人投资者在整个项目筹划和建设过程中既不愿意也无力持有流动性不足的资产。


That process is long in the best of times; in developing countries with weak institutional capabilities, it is often drawn out substantially, creating massive additional costs.	即便在最有利的情况下，整个建设进程依然需时较长； 而建设工期在体制动员能力薄弱的发展中国家中更是旷日持久，导致大量的额外费用。


Many national authorities are attempting to address this by improving governance and providing an enabling environment for infrastructure investment, including by promoting public-private partnerships.	许多国家当局正试图通过改善治理和为基础设施投资提供有利环境，包括促进公私伙伴关系来解决这个问题。


But successes have been far and few between.	但是成功的案例却极为鲜见。


China sees all of this.	中国看到了这一切。


It recognizes the urgency with which developing countries need investments in roads, railroads, power plants and grids, airports, and seaports, as well as the challenges they face in securing them.	它认识到发展中国家在道路，铁路，发电厂和电网，机场和海港方面投资的紧迫性，以及它们面临的挑战。


And it is well aware of the potential benefits of connectivity, particularly if it extends beyond the Asia-Pacific region.	同时中国也非常清楚连接的潜在好处，特别是如果能延伸到亚太地区之外的话。


Since introducing the OBOR initiative, China has often been accused of attempting to wrest greater control over the developing world, and even to replace the United States as the dominant global superpower.	自从引入“一带一路”倡议以来，中国经常被外界指控为试图进一步控制发展中国家，甚至想替代美国作为全球霸主。


Some, pointing to the historical record, warn of the “Thucydides Trap”: a rising power will eventually try to challenge an established one.	有些人拿出历史记录，警告说“修西狄底斯陷阱（Thucydides Trap）”即将再现：任何崛起的势力最终都将试图挑战现有的霸主。


But such warnings overlook a crucial lesson of that record: the challenges almost always end badly.	但是这一警告忽视了这一历史记录所带来的重要教训：挑战几乎总是以败局结尾。


China is well aware of how the Thucydides Trap has ensnared both the dominant power and the challenger, even after the challenger might seem to have won.	中国非常清楚，即使有时挑战者似乎已经击败霸主，修西狄底斯陷阱依然会令两者陷入困境。


This has not, however, stopped politicians from stoking fears about China and the OBOR initiative.	然而这并未能阻止政客们大肆煽动对中国和“一带一路”倡议的恐惧。


Sri Lanka is a case in point.	斯里兰卡就是一个例子。


Until recently, it had welcomed – and even sought – infrastructure investment from China.	直到最近，该国一直都欢迎——甚至寻求中国的基础设施投资。


When politicians began to attempt to win support by sowing doubts about China’s intentions, however, the prevailing mood vis-à-vis China turned from appreciation to indignation.	然而当政客们开始试图煽动对中国意图的怀疑来赢得支持时，民众对中国的观感也因此从赞赏转为愤慨。


Those politicians then accepted financial support from the US and India, but that money never came.	那些政客转而接受了美国和印度的财政支持，但那些钱却从未到帐。


Today, Sri Lanka’s government has little choice but to rekindle its relationship with China.	今天，斯里兰卡政府别无选择，只能尝试与中国重修旧好。


Fortunately for Sri Lanka – and other OBOR participants – China’s intentions are far from malicious.	幸运的是，对于斯里兰卡和其他“一带一路”参与者来说，中国的意图远非恶意。


Its real goal is to lead an inclusive and cooperative integration process that benefits all participants.	其真正的目标是引导构建一个包容性和合作的一体化过程，令所有参与者都能从中受益。


And, in fact, China may well be the best-equipped country for the job.	而事实上，中国可能是最适合承担这项工作的国家。


In the US, a major infrastructure upgrade is long overdue, with politics, among other factors, impeding progress.	在美国，重大基础设施升级久拖不决，政治正是其中一个阻碍因素。


By contrast, China has, in the words of Jeffrey D. Sachs, “proved itself highly effective at building large and complex infrastructure” that “complements industrial capital” and has “attracted foreign private-sector capital and technology.”	相比之下，按照杰弗里·萨斯（Jeffrey D. Sachs）的话来说，中国“在建设为产业资本做后盾的大型复杂基础设施方面效率极高”并因此“吸引了外国私营部门的资本和技术”。


Of course, China may be accused of advancing its own agenda for any action that it takes abroad.	当然，中国可能会被指责为利用各类海外行动来推进自身议程。


And, to some extent, such accusations would be true, just as they are whenever a global power intervenes abroad, whatever the motivation.	而在某种程度上这种指责也是合理的，正如任何全球大国无论何时以及出于何种动机在国外执行干预行动一样。


The US-led Marshall Plan was aimed not just at supporting the reconstruction of Western Europe after World War II, but also at reviving markets for US exports and containing the Soviet Union.	比如美国主导的马歇尔计划的目的不仅仅是支援二战后西欧重建，同时也是为了恢复美国的出口市场并抗衡苏联。


This is not to say that China could not have done anything better in pursuing the OBOR initiative.	这并不是说中国在追求“一带一路”倡议方面就没有提升的空间了。


On the contrary, it could have been more effective in making the economic case for physical connectivity.	相反，在实现物理连接所产生的经济案例方面可能会带来更好的效果。


And Chinese companies could have taken more care to understand and appreciate local customs and cultures, thereby avoiding unnecessary tensions with local people, as well as to ensure environmental sustainability.	而中国企业也将更加注重于理解和欣赏当地的习俗文化，从而避免与当地人爆发不必要的紧张关系，同时确保环境的可持续性。


But these lapses are fixable – and are being addressed, both by Xi’s administration and Chinese companies investing overseas.	但这些失误是可以修正的——也正在中国政府以及那些在海外投资的中国公司手中得到解决。


The bigger challenge lies in creating a designated institution to coordinate the many OBOR initiatives. On this front, success will be possible only if countries avoid allowing politics to cloud their judgment.	更大的挑战在于创建一个指定的机构来协调多项“一带一路”计划，而在这方面只有在各国避免让政治扰乱判断的情况下才能取得成功。


There is no defense for rejecting an economically sensible global initiative just because China is the one leading it.	切不可因为带头人是中国就拒绝一项在经济上合理的全球性举措。


What Does Xi Jinping Want?	新时代的新型强人


BEIJING – Most Western media have characterized the recent 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) as a pure power play, with President Xi Jinping entrenching his position.	北京—大多数西方媒体将最近召开的中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会(CPC)视为一场纯粹的权力游戏，在这场游戏中，习近平主席巩固了自己的地位。


But the accumulation of political capital in this case is a means to an end.	但是，就此事而言，政治资本的积累无非是达到目的的一种手段。


For Xi, that end is a smooth transition into modernity that cements the CPC’s long-term authority and ensures his own legacy as modern China’s most significant leader.	对于习近平主席来说，这个目的是中国向现代化的平稳过渡，既要巩固中国共产党的长期权威，又要确保他作为现代中国最重要的领导人能够留下的政治遗产。


Xi knows that if China is to continue to thrive in a fast-changing world, he will need to manage deftly a major social and economic transformation, while, even more important, improving state governance.	习近平主席知道，如果中国要在瞬息万变的世界中继续繁荣昌盛，他就必须巧妙地进行重大的社会和经济转型。 但是，对于他的第二任期来说，更重要的是改善国家治理。


And, in order to secure the long-term survival of China’s one-party system, he must reform state and Party institutions; indeed, political reform is, for Xi, a prerequisite for economic reform.	他充分意识到，为了保证中国一党制的长期生存，必须改善国家和党组织的管理，此外别无他法。 对于习近平主席而言，政治改革是经济改革的先决条件。


(And yet, he will carefully avoid what he considers the mistakes of the last Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachev.)	（然而，他将会谨慎从事，以避免他认为前苏联总统戈尔巴乔夫所犯的那些错误。 ）


Xi’s motive in pursuing modernity is not, as many in the West have wrongly inferred, to establish China as a superpower on par with the United States; on the contrary, Xi views his current challenge and mission as being primarily domestic.	习近平主席所追求的现代化，并不像许多西方人错误推断的那样，是要把中国建设成为一个与美国如出一辙的超级大国。 相反，习近平主席认为他当前的挑战和使命主要在于国内。


He is motivated by the knowledge that success in this area will define his place in history. That, not the amount of authority he wields today, is his primary concern.	推动他的那股动力，是他认识到他在这一领域的成功将奠定他在历史上的地位，这才是他最关心的问题，而不是他今天拥有多少权力。


Assuming otherwise sells Xi – and his political ingenuity – short.	如果作其他的假设，那就不能真正使人懂得习主席和他的政治智慧。


Now firmly established as China’s most powerful leader since Deng Xiaoping, Xi can shape his legacy according to his own vision.	作为中国自邓小平以来最强有力的领导人，习近平主席已经稳固了根基，可以根据自己的愿景来塑造自己的政治遗产。


Because his predecessor Hu Jintao lacked sufficient political capital to do likewise, China followed a largely passive path for a decade, pursuing conciliatory diplomacy (which enraged its citizens) and economically conservative strategies (which included suspending necessary reforms).	由于其前任缺乏足够的政治资本，无法像他那样敢作敢为。 其结果，中国在过去的近10年间基本上采取了比较被动的方式，外交政策上较为妥协 (民众为此非常生气)，经济上的策略又很保守 (包括改革停滞不前)。


No one, however, should mistake Xi’s enhanced powers for a personal dictatorship.	然而，任何人都不应该将习近平主席对权力的强化误认为个人独裁。


His choice of members for the Standing Committee of the Politburo, China’s highest authority, was an accommodation to the reality that there are limits to his power. Only half of the men named to the committee were his true confidantes.	他挑选的政治局常委--中国最高权力机构—也是对现实的迁就，说明自己的权力有一定的限制。


The legacy that Xi seeks comprises three key components.	习近平主席寻求的政治遗产由三个关键的部分组成。


The first is alleviation of growing social tensions.	首先是缓解日益加剧的社会紧张局势。


Beyond improving the provision of public goods, his promotion of the so-called China Dream of national rejuvenation has been aimed, in part, at encouraging people to seek fulfillment beyond material wealth.	除了改善公共产品的供给，他所推动的 “中华民族复兴之梦”，其部分目的也是为了鼓励人们超越对物质财富的追求。


Second, Xi wants to strengthen the CPC, not by force, but by reform.	第二，习近平主席想要通过改革而非高压手段来加强中国共产党的执政地位。


Over the last five years, Xi has led an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign, which has brought down one million Party officials, from low-ranking bureaucrats (known as “flies”) to the highest-level officials (“tigers”), throughout the country.	在过去的五年里，习近平主席领导了一场前所未有的反腐运动，致使全国从较低级别(被称为“苍蝇”)到最高级别(老虎)的近100万名官员纷纷落马。


Such a large-scale campaign, as some observers have portrayed it, was not a political purge in disguise.	正如一些观察员描述的那样，指控100万名官员不可能是一种伪装的政治清洗。


Rather, Xi knew that widespread corruption was undermining the CPC’s legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary Chinese.	相反，习近平主席知道，蔓延的腐败正在削弱中国共产党在普通民众眼中的合法性。


Only by cleaning up the Party’s behavior could Xi reestablish its credibility.	只有洗心革面，共产党才能重塑其公信力。


Now, Xi is ready for Act II of his CPC revival: improving state governance.	现在，习近平主席已经准备好开启他的中国共产党复兴的第二幕：改善国家治理。


Xi is well aware that a case-by-case approach will not address the root causes of widespread corruption.	他心里很清楚，那种就事论事，逐个处理的方式方法，已经无法解决从根本上消除广泛存在的腐败问题。


For that, the entire system needs an overhaul.	为此，整个系统需要“彻底检修”。


As he put it, “The Party needs to govern itself.”	这一概念被他概括为“党要管党”。


The first step is to improve the legislative framework.	第一步是完善立法机制。


For many years, the lack of accountability and transparency, and of clear decision-making processes, has impeded reform.	多年以来，由于党内问责制和透明度不足，决策过程不明确，阻碍了改革的进程。


Now, China needs institutionalized mechanisms for enforcing the rule of law – one aspect of Western political systems that Xi admires – among CPC officials, though the idea that the judiciary could be independent of the Party remains farfetched.	现在，中国共产党员需要制度化的机制来实施法治 - 习近平主席所欣赏的西方政治制度的一个方面，尽管司法机关可以独立于党的概念仍然是不可思议的。


But even the best-designed system cannot work if there is a dearth of competent personnel to run it – a limitation highlighted by Xi’s push for economic reforms in his first term as president.	但即使是最完善的制度，如果缺乏有能力的人才来管理，也是不起作用的。 习近平主席在第一个任期内极力推动经济改革，恰好说明了这一个局限性。


That is why Xi is placing a strong emphasis on cultivating a new generation of highly educated, loyal, and, most important, incorruptible Party leaders.	这就是为什么他特别重视培养新一代党的领导人，他们要有良好的教育背景，对党忠诚，并且最重要的是能够拒腐防变，廉洁奉公。


A key challenge here lies in stemming the migration of China’s top talent to the private sector.	这里还有一个关键的问题在于防止中国顶尖人才向私营部门的流失。


The third component of Xi’s legacy is also the most important – and already effectively secured.	习近平主席政治遗产的第三个部分也是最重要的一部分，并且已经稳稳落实。


At the 19th National Congress, CCP delegates agreed to add “Xi Jinping Thought” to the Party’s constitution, alongside “Mao Zedong Thought” and “Deng Xiaoping Theory.”	在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上，党代表同意将“习近平思想”写进《党章》，与“毛泽东思想”和“邓小平理论”共同成为《党章》的一部分。


Now that Xi’s eponymous political ideology, which proposes an alternative to liberal democracy, is part of the school of thought around which the CPC coalesces, challenging Xi is tantamount to challenging the Party’s very belief system.	以习近平命名的政治意识形态，是不同于自由民主派的另外一种选择，现在既然得以确立，成为中共思想体系的一部分，那么挑战习近平就无异于挑战共产党的信仰体系。


In short, Xi has made himself virtually unassailable – his rare political skill elevating him to the status of secular deity.	总而言之，习近平已经使自己几乎无懈可击 - 他罕见的政治技巧使他登堂入室，成为世俗社会之神。


The fact is that, as a leader, Xi has a lot going for him.	事实上，作为一名领导人，习近平主席还任重道远。


He is well-educated and experienced in international affairs.	他受过良好的教育，善于娴熟地处理国际事务。


He has weathered serious challenges and experienced firsthand the consequences of political and economic policies gone awry.	他经受住了严峻的挑战，并且曾经亲身经历了因为以前政治和经济政策走偏失误所造成的后果。


He has a vast political network, thanks not only to his own deftness, but also to his family: he is the son of a comrade of Mao.	此外，他有一个庞大的政治网络，这不仅要归功于他灵活多样的政治技巧，也得益于他的家族：他是毛泽东的一位同事的儿子。


And he now stands alongside Mao, as well as Deng, in modern China’s political pantheon.	他的父亲和毛泽东、邓小平一样，位于当代中国的政治先贤祠中。


But Xi is not Mao, and he will not govern China as Mao did.	但习近平不是毛泽东，他不会像毛泽东那样统治中国。


Instead, he will learn from Mao’s mistakes, so that he can lead China effectively into the next phase of its history – and secure the legacy that he so prizes.	相反，他将从毛泽东的错误中汲取教训，带领中国扎扎实实地迈进历史的下一个阶段，并牢牢地掌管好他珍视的政治遗产。


Has China’s Economic Growth Finally Stabilized?	中国经济增长终于稳定下来了吗？


BEIJING – For the last decade or so, China’s economy has been on something of a roller coaster ride.	北京—在过去十年中，中国经济一直在坐“过山车”。


As 2018 begins, is the country approaching a new ascent, a steep drop, or something in between?	2018年伊始，中国是在接近新的升势、陡然下降，还是介于两者之间？


Prior to the global economic crisis a decade ago, the Chinese economy was growing at a breakneck pace.	在十年前的全球经济危机爆发前，中国经济增长速度惊人。


But when the crisis hit, the growth rate fell relatively sharply.	但危机发生后，增长率下跌得也相对急剧。


Thanks to a $4 trillion stimulus package, growth soon reached its trough and began to climb again, reaching 12.2% year on year in the first quarter of 2010.	拜四万亿刺激计划所赐，增长很快便触底反弹，2010年一季度同比增长率达到了12. 2%。


Soon after, however, monetary tightening put economic growth back on a downward trajectory, spurring the government to loosen policy and introduce mini-stimulus packages in late 2011 and early 2012.	但随后不久，货币紧缩让经济增长回到了减速轨道，促使政府放松政策并在2011年年底、2012年年引入了微型刺激计划。


This produced a short-lived and moderate rebound, with economic growth again beginning to slide, albeit less steeply, soon after.	这带来了短暂而温和的反弹，随后不久经济增长再次下滑（但速度不快）。


Finally, in 2016, Chinese economic growth began to stabilize again, with the annual rate reaching 6.7% for three quarters in a row.	最终，到了2016年，中国经济增长再次开始稳定下来，年增长率连续三季度达到6. 7%。


The latest figures show that China’s economy grew by 6.8% in the third quarter of 2017, leading many economists to offer rather optimistic forecasts for the coming year.	最新数据表明，2017年三季度中国经济增长了6. 8%，这让许多经济学家对来年充满了乐观。


Though China’s financial system is fraught with worrying vulnerabilities, many Chinese economists believe that the country has at last entered a period of stable annual growth of about 6.5% – a level that is in line with potential.	尽管中国金融体系表现出令人担忧的脆弱性，但许多中国经济学家相信中国终于进入了年增长保持在6. 5%左右的稳定期——这一增长率与其增长潜力相符。


The International Monetary Fund has echoed this view in its latest World Economic Outlook, predicting 6.8% growth in 2017 and a 6.5% rate in 2018.	国际货币基金组织（IMF）的最新《世界经济展望》（World Economic Outlook）也同意这一观点，认为2017年中国经济将增长6. 8%，2018年将增长6.


I am less sanguine.	我则没有那么乐观。


For decades, fixed-asset investment was the main driver of growth, accounting for almost half of total demand.	几十年来，增长的主要推动力是固定资产投资，它几乎占了总需求的半壁江山。


Its share of China’s GDP today exceeds 50%, while investment calculated as residual capital formation accounts for some 45% of GDP.	目前，固定资产投资占GDP的比例超过50%，而算作剩余资本形成的投资占GDP的45%左右。


Yet, since late 2013, investment growth has been declining steadily, a trend that accelerated in the second half of 2017.	但是，自2013年年末以来，投资增长一直在稳步下降，这一趋势在2017年下半年有所加速。


In the first three quarters of 2017, fixed-asset investment grew at an average rate of just 2.19% year on year.	2017年前三季度固定资产投资平均年同比增长率只有2. 19%。


In the third quarter, investment growth was actually negative, at -1.1%.	第三季度投资出现了负增长，增长率为-1. 1%。


China has not seen such lows in decades.	如此低迷的形势为几十年所未见。


From the perspective of structural adjustment, China’s declining dependence on fixed-asset investment should be hailed as an achievement.	从结构调整的角度看，中国对固定资产投资依赖程度下降应该是一项值得庆贺的成就。


But, as the Financial Times’ Martin Wolf emphasized in 2016, it will be very difficult for China to sustain aggregate demand amid weakening investment growth.	但《金融时报》的马丁·沃尔夫（Martin Wolf）在2016年时强调，在投资增长萎靡的情况下，中国很难保持总需求。


Household consumption is unlikely to pick up the slack.	家庭消费无法填补空白。


In the first three quarters of 2017, private consumption grew by 5.9% in real (inflation-adjusted) terms – down 0.5 percentage points from 2016.	2017年前三季度私人消费真实（经通胀调整的）增长率为5. 9%——较2016年下降了0.


It is difficult to envisage a sudden surge in household consumption in 2018.	5个百分点。 2018年家庭消费突然猛增的可能性很小。


Growth in net exports, too, seems unlikely to offset declining investment, not least because US President Donald Trump continues to lean toward protectionism in his dealings with China.	净出口增长似乎也无法抵消投资的下降，因为美国总统特朗普的对华策略将继续偏向保护主义。


And while China probably will continue to use fiscal policy to shore up demand, the extent to which it can do so will be constrained by factors like local governments’ debt burden and a consequent clampdown on so-called local-government financing vehicles.	尽管中国有可能继续用财政政策来提振需求，但操作空间将受到地方政府债务负担和取缔所谓的地方政府融资平台等动作的制约。


The government probably will not allow the budget deficit to surpass 3% of GDP.	政府可能不会允许预算赤字超过GDP的3%。


China’s fixed-asset investment comprises three main categories: manufacturing, infrastructure, and real estate.	中国固定资产投资包括三个主要类别：制造业、基础设施和房地产。


Manufacturing investment accounts for the largest share – 30%.	制造业投资占比最大，为30%。


But it has been declining steadily since 2012, weakening overall investment growth.	但该项投资从2012年开始稳步下降，拖累了总投资增长。


And it is unlikely to pick up again, unless China achieves some technological or institutional breakthrough.	而其再度起势的可能很小，除非中国能够实现技术和制度突破。


Real-estate investment, meanwhile, has followed a cyclical pattern over the last two decades, recovering strongly in early 2016 before falling again in 2017.	与此同时，房地产投资在过去二十年中呈现出周期模式，2016年年初强劲复苏，2017年再度下降。


Given the government’s determination to contain housing prices – which have, at various times, stoked concern about local bubbles – there is little reason to expect that real-estate investment will rebound anytime soon.	政府决心要遏制住房价格——房价高企时常激起人们对地方泡沫的担忧——因此没有理由认为房地产投资能够迅速反弹。


This leaves only infrastructure investment, whose share of total investment has been increasing since 2012.	于是只剩下了基础设施投资，其占总投资之比自2012年以来不断上升。


But infrastructure investment has already reached such a high level that continued growth could worsen resource allocation – the opposite of the government’s stated objectives.	但基础设施投资已经非常高，继续提高有可能恶化资源配置——这与政府公开的目标背道而驰。


Add to that fiscal constraints and stricter financial regulation, and a further expansion of infrastructure investment would be difficult, to say the least.	此外，基础设施投资还面临财政约束和更严格的金融监管，因此进一步扩大难上加难。


All of this leads to a simple conclusion: unless I’ve read the official investment statistics wrong, optimism about China’s economic growth in 2018 is not warranted.	所有这些可以推出一个简单的结论：除非我看错了官方投资数据，否则2018年中国经济增长不容乐观。


But this does not mean that China’s prospects are altogether dismal.	但这并不意味着中国的前景黯淡无光。


If economic growth seems to be falling far below the 6.5% target, the government will employ macroeconomic stabilization tools, despite the high heavy future costs, while working to prevent financial vulnerabilities from turning into systemic financial risks.	如果经济增长有可能大大低于6. 5%的目标，政府将采用宏观经济稳定工具，哪怕这会给未来造成严重负担，同时，政府也将致力于防止金融脆弱性演变为系统性金融风险。


More promising, the Chinese government’s ongoing efforts to cultivate innovation and implement structural reforms are likely to produce major returns in the long term.	更令人憧憬的是，中国政府不断哺育创新、实施结构性改革，这有望带来巨大的长期回报。


All of this suggests that China’s economic roller coaster is headed for another climb, and that growth will eventually stabilize at a decent rate.	所有这些表明，中国经济的过山车正在迈向新的升势，增长最终将在一个较好的水平上稳定下来。


But, as with most popular attractions, its passengers may have to wait a while.	但就像大部分游乐项目一样，过山车上的乘客需要先等一会儿。


Why the Renminbi Won’t Rule	为什么人民币不会统治


TOKYO – In the dystopian fantasy Blade Runner 2049, Los Angeles 32 years from now looks a lot like China’s megacities today: grey, polluted, and dominated by tall towers emblazoned with flashing neon advertisements.	东京—在反乌托邦科幻片《银翼杀手2049》（Blade Runner 2049）中，32年后的洛杉矶看上去就像是今天的中国大都市：灰蒙蒙污染严重，到处都是霓虹灯广告闪烁的高楼大厦。


The viewer never learns much about the outside world, much less in what currency the advertised goods are traded.	观众从来不甚了解外部世界，甚至不知道广告中的商品用哪种货币交易。 美元仍然拥有主宰地位吗？


Is the US dollar still dominant, has the Chinese renminbi taken over, or has some other currency surged to global preeminence?	中国人民币取而代之了吗？ 还是有其他货币崛起为全球主导？


US President Donald Trump seems intent on ensuring that America retreats, at least partly, from its global leadership role.	美国总统特朗普似乎一定要让美国（至少部分地）从其全球领导角色上退出。


But, as was the case with the British pound in the interwar period, a currency can remain globally dominant even after its issuing country loses its economic, financial, and geopolitical hegemony.	但是，就像英镑在两次世界大战之间那样，一种货币可以在发行国失去了经济、金融和地缘政治霸权之后继续保有全球主导地位很久。


Today, too, the world should expect the US dollar to remain the key reserve currency, used to invoice and settle international trade, for a long time to come.	今天也是如此，在相当长的一段时间内，世界都应该认为美元可以继续保有关键储备货币地位，被用于结算国际贸易。


But, in terms of international financial diplomacy, the dollar’s position may not be as secure.	但从国际金融外交的角度，美元的地位可能不那么牢靠了。


The question is whether the end of “dollar diplomacy,” which the economist Barry Eichengreen predicts, will necessarily mean the rise of renminbi diplomacy.	问题在于，经济学家巴里·艾肯格林（Barry Eichengreen）预测的 “美元外交”的结束是否必然意味着人民币外交的崛起。


Chinese policymakers have been hoping to develop the renminbi’s role in international finance, in order to strengthen China’s geopolitical standing, since the 1990s.	自20世纪90年代以来，中国决策者一直希望发展人民币在国际金融中的作用，从而增强中国的地缘政治地位。


And, in recent years, the Chinese leadership has led a concerted effort to fulfill that ambition, especially by internationalizing China’s currency.	在近几年中，中国领导层领导了一场共同行动以实现这一野心，特别是通过中国货币的国际化。


Yet renminbi-denominated finance is nowhere near ready to compete with – let alone rival – dollar finance.	但人民币计价金融从未成为美元金融的竞争对手——更不用说敌人了。


In fact, the renminbi still trails other reserve currencies (the US dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen, and the British pound) in international finance by so much that a renminbi-led international monetary system by mid-century seems about as likely as a Blade Runner 2049-style dystopia.	事实上，人民币在国际金融中的角色仍然远远不及其他储备货币（美元、欧元、日元和英镑），人民币在本世纪中叶领导国际货币体系是和《银翼杀手2049》一样的反乌托邦景象。


One reason for the renminbi’s continued weakness in international finance is that, despite considerable progress since 2010, it remains a half-baked international currency.	人民币在国际金融中始终处于弱势的一个原因是，尽管自2010年以来取得了可观的进展，但它仍然只是半熟（half-baked）的国际货币。


The renminbi is illiquid and unconvertible outside designated offshore markets.	除了指定的离岸市场，人民币不具有流动性，也不能自由兑换。


As a result, its weight in international investors’ portfolios is miniscule.	因此，其在国际投资者投资组合中的比重可以微乎其微。


Even China itself uses the renminbi in only about a quarter of its international trade, and its international finance remains dollar-denominated.	甚至中国本身也只在其四分之一的国际贸易中使用人民币，其国际金融业仍然是美元计价。


China’s blue-chip firms – Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent – are listed in New York or Hong Kong, where they are priced either in US or Hong Kong dollars.	中国蓝筹企业——阿里巴巴、百度和腾讯——在纽约或香港上市，用美元或港币计价。


And most of China’s fast-expanding loans and overseas investments are in dollars.	中国迅速膨胀的贷款和海外投资大部分也是美元计价。


But the most compelling reason why one should not expect a renminbi-dominated international finance system to arise anytime soon is that China’s leaders have never shown any sustained commitment to developing the renminbi as a true alternative to the dollar.	但不必期待人民币在不久的将来主导国际金融体系的最令人信服的原因在于中国领导人从未表现出要让人民币成为美元的真正替代品的持久的决心。


Instead, they have pursued a cooperative approach to reform of the international monetary system, which they argue should not be dependent on any one currency.	相反，他们对国际货币体系改革采取合作方针，指出国际货币体系不应该只依赖任何一种货币。


For the Chinese, the future of the international monetary system should be one in which multiple national currencies provide choice – in terms of invoicing, payments, and asset allocation – thereby reducing the system’s exposure to national politics.	对中国人来说，国际货币体系的未来应该是在结算、支付和资产配置等方面有多种国家的货币提供选择，从而降低体系对国家政治的风险暴露。


Moreover, with more central banks creating liquidity, and international financial centers offering pools of it, such a system would entail a lower risk of cash crunches.	此外，有更多的央行创造流动性，国际金融中心提供流动性池，则这样一套体系发生现金动荡的风险更低。


Already, China has been experimenting with the development of offshore renminbi markets in key financial centers, as a way to overcome its currency’s limited liquidity.	目前，中国已开始试点在关键金融中心发展离岸人民币市场，以此作为克服人民币流动性局限的方法。


In order to build such a multi-currency system, however, the world would need to undertake far-reaching reforms of the international institutions.	但要构建这样一个多货币体系，世界需要采取深刻的国际机构改革。


This was precisely the point that Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of the People’s Bank of China, made in a 2009 speech challenging the view that only the US, through the dollar, could guarantee the functioning of the international monetary system.	这正是中国人民银行行长周小川在2009年的一次讲话中提出的看法。 这次讲话批驳了只有美国通过美元才能保证国际货币体系的运行的观点。


As Zhou pointed out, the US dollar’s monetary dominance is underpinned by the Bretton Woods institutions, created after World War II.	周小川说，美元的货币主导地位的基础是二战后创立的布雷顿森林机构。


Reforming the international monetary system, therefore, means reforming the governance of the multilateral financial institutions – an argument that China emphasized during its G20 presidency last year.	因此，改革国际货币体系就是要改革多边金融机构的治理——这也是中国在去年担任G20主席国时所强调的观点。


As the US retreats from the world stage and a multipolar global order emerges, the international monetary system may well be transformed – but probably not into a renminbi-led system.	随着美国退出世界舞台以及多极全球秩序的出现，国际货币体系也可能发生转变——但也许不是转变为以人民币为首的体系。


Whether because of the intrinsic weakness of China’s international finance or an understanding that a truly international currency must be more market-driven than the government-controlled renminbi could be, not even China expects the age of renminbi diplomacy to arrive anytime soon.	不管是因为中国国际金融的内在弱点，还是出于对真正的国际货币必须是市场驱动，因此是政府控制的人民币所无法充当的认识，就连中国也不认为人民外交的时代会很快到来。


China’s Soft and Sharp Power	中国的软实力和锐实力


CAMBRIDGE – China has invested billions of dollars to increase its soft power, but it has recently suffered a backlash in democratic countries.	发自剑桥——中国已经投入了数十亿美元来增加自身软实力，但最近却在民主国家遭到反弹。


A new report by the National Endowment for Democracy argues that we need to re-think soft power, because “the conceptual vocabulary that has been used since the Cold War’s end no longer seems adequate to the contemporary situation.”	美国国家民主基金会发布的一份新报告认为我们应当重新思考软实力，因为“冷战结束以来所使用的概念词汇已经不符合当代形势了”。


The report describes the new authoritarian influences being felt around the world as “sharp power.”	这份报告将世界各地所感受到新权威主义影响力称之为“锐实力”。


A recent cover article in The Economist defines “sharp power” by its reliance on “subversion, bullying and pressure, which combine to promote self-censorship.”	《经济学家》最近的一篇封面报道则将“锐实力”定义为对“颠覆，欺凌和压迫，并将这些相结合以促进自我审查”。


Whereas soft power harnesses the allure of culture and values to augment a country’s strength, sharp power helps authoritarian regimes compel behavior at home and manipulate opinion abroad.	软力量利用文化和价值的吸引力来增强一国的力量，而锐实力则可以帮助独裁政权去压制国内各界的行为并操纵海外的舆论。


The term “soft power” – the ability to affect others by attraction and persuasion rather than the hard power of coercion and payment – is sometimes used to describe any exercise of power that does not involve the use of force.	“软实力”——通过吸引和劝说而非强制和收买来影响他人的能力——有时被用来形容任何不涉及武力的权力行使——但这是错误的。


But that is a mistake. Power sometimes depends on whose army or economy wins, but it can also depend on whose story wins.	实力有时取决于谁的军力或经济更胜一筹，但也可以源自于谁的故事更动听。


A strong narrative is a source of power.	强大的述事是实力的源泉。


China’s economic success has generated both hard and soft power, but within limits.	中国的经济成就既造就了其软/硬实力，也带来了局限。


A Chinese economic aid package under the Belt and Road Initiative may appear benign and attractive, but not if the terms turn sour, as was recently the case in a Sri Lankan port project.	“一带一路”倡议下的中国经济援助一揽子计划似乎是良性且有吸引力的，可一旦开出的条件变得苛刻——就跟斯里兰卡近期的一个港口项目那样——就不讨人喜欢了。


Likewise, other exercises of economic hard power undercut the soft power of China’s narrative.	同样，经济硬实力的其他发挥也削弱了中国叙事的软实力。


For example, China punished Norway for awarding a Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo. It also threatened to restrict access to the Chinese market for an Australian publisher of a book critical of China.	例如中国因挪威授予刘晓波诺贝尔和平奖而对该国予以惩罚，还因一本批评中国的书籍而威胁要限制其澳大利亚出版社进入中国市场。


If we use the term sharp power as shorthand for information warfare, the contrast with soft power becomes plain.	如果我们用锐实力这个词来作为信息战的简称，其与软力量的对比就显得平淡无奇了。


Sharp power is a type of hard power.	锐实力是一种硬实力。


It manipulates information, which is intangible, but intangibility is not the distinguishing characteristic of soft power.	它所操纵的信息虽然是无形的，但无形性并不是软实力的显著特征。


Verbal threats, for example, are both intangible and coercive.	比如说口头威胁既是无形的，也是强制性的。


When I introduced the concept of soft power in 1990, I wrote that it is characterized by voluntarism and indirection, while hard power rests on threats and inducements.	当我在1990年引入软实力的概念时，我将它的特征是自愿性和间接性，而硬实力则依赖于威胁和诱惑。


If someone aims a gun at you, demands your money, and takes your wallet, what you think and want is irrelevant. That is hard power.	如果有人拿枪指着你，要你拿出钱包来，你的想法和意愿显然是无关紧要的，这就是硬实力。


If he persuades you to give him your money, he has changed what you think and want. That is soft power.	如果他劝说你给他钱，那他就是在改变你的所思所想，这就是软实力。


Truth and openness create a dividing line between soft and sharp power in public diplomacy.	真相与开放在公共外交中构成了软权力与强权的分界线。


When China’s official news agency, Xinhua, broadcasts openly in other countries, it is employing soft-power techniques, and we should accept that.	当新华社这个中国官方通讯社在其他国家公开广播时，它采用的正是软实力技术，也应该为我们所接受。


When China Radio International covertly backs 33 radio stations in 14 countries, the boundary of sharp power has been crossed, and we should expose the breach of voluntarism.	当中国国际广播电台暗中支持14个国家的33个广播电台时，这显然已经到达了锐实力的范畴，这种违背自愿主义的行为也应当被揭露。


Of course, advertising and persuasion always involve some degree of framing, which limits voluntarism, as do structural features of the social environment.	当然，广告和说服总是涉及到某种程度的故意引导，这限制了自愿主义，社会环境的结构特征也是如此。


But extreme deception in framing can be viewed as coercive; though not violent, it prevents meaningful choice.	但引导中的极端欺骗可以被看作是强制性的； 虽然并非暴力，但是阻止了有意义的选择。


Techniques of public diplomacy that are widely viewed as propaganda cannot produce soft power.	被广泛视为政治宣传的公共外交手段无法产生软实力。


In an age of information, the scarcest resources are attention and credibility.	在信息时代，最为稀缺的资源是关注和可信度。


That is why exchange programs that develop two-way communication and personal relations among students and young leaders are often far more effective generators of soft power than, say, official broadcasting.	这就是为什么促进学生和青年领袖之间双向沟通和个人关系的交流项目往往比官方广播更为高效。


The United States has long had programs enabling visits by young foreign leaders, and now China is successfully following suit.	美国长期以来有计划地邀请年轻的外国青年领袖前来访问，现在中国已经成功继承了其衣钵。


That is a smart exercise of soft power.	这是软实力的巧妙运用。


But when visas are manipulated or access is limited to restrain criticism and encourage self-censorship, even such exchange programs can shade into sharp power.	但是，当签证申请受到操纵或渠道被限制以压制批评和推动自我审查的时候，即使这类交流计划也可能成尖锐实力。


As democracies respond to China’s sharp power and information warfare, they have to be careful not to overreact.	那些对中国的权力和信息战争作出回应的民主国家也必须小心谨慎，不要过度反应。


Much of the soft power democracies wield comes from civil society, which means that openness is a crucial asset.	大多数民主国家所动用的软实力都来自公民社会，这意味着开放是一个至关重要的资产。


China could generate more soft power if it would relax some of its tight party control over civil society.	如能放松一些党对民间社会的控制，中国也可以产生更多的软实力。


Similarly, manipulation of media and reliance on covert channels of communication often reduces soft power.	同时操纵媒体和依赖隐蔽的沟通渠道往往会削弱软实力。


Democracies should avoid the temptation to imitate these authoritarian sharp-power tools.	而民主国家则应该抵制去仿效动用这些专制锐实力的诱惑。


Moreover, shutting down legitimate Chinese soft-power tools can be counter-productive.	此外关停合法的中国软实力工具可能会适得其反。


Soft power is often used for competitive, zero-sum purposes; but it can also have positive sum aspects.	虽然软力量通常被用于竞争性的零和目的； 但也可以有积极的总体效应。


For example, if both China and the US wish to avoid conflict, exchange programs that increase American attraction to China, and vice versa, would benefit both countries.	例如，如果中美都希望避免冲突，那么增加两国相互吸引力的交流计划对两国都是有利的。


And on transnational issues such as climate change, where both countries can benefit from cooperation, soft power can help build the trust and create the networks that make such cooperation possible.	而在气候变化等跨国问题上，两国都可以从合作中受益，软实力可以帮助建立信任，并创造出使这种合作成为可能的网络。


While it would be a mistake to prohibit Chinese soft-power efforts just because they sometimes shade into sharp power, it is also important to monitor the dividing line carefully.	只因中国的软实力举措有时会变成锐实力而对此加以禁止这是错误的，但仔细监测两者的分界线也极为重要。


For example, the Hanban, the government agency that manages the 500 Confucius Institutes and 1,000 Confucius classrooms that China supports in universities and schools around the world to teach Chinese language and culture, must resist the temptation to set restrictions that limit academic freedom. Crossing that line has led to the disbanding of some Confucius Institutes.	例如，管理500个孔子学院以及在全球各地的大学和学校教授汉语和文化的1000个孔子课堂的中国国家汉办必须抵制通过设定条款来限制学术自由的诱惑，因为越过这条线已经导致了一些孔子学院被解散。


As such cases show, the best defense against China’s use of soft-power programs as sharp-power tools is open exposure of such efforts. And this is where democracies have an advantage.	正如这种事件所表明的那样，对中国使用软实力项目作为锐实力工具的最佳防御措施就是公开曝光，而这也是民主国家有优势的地方。


China’s Creditor Imperialism	中国的债权人帝国主义


BERLIN – This month, Sri Lanka, unable to pay the onerous debt to China it has accumulated, formally handed over its strategically located Hambantota port to the Asian giant.	柏林—本月，斯里兰卡因为无力偿还拖欠中国的巨额债务，正式将位置具有战略意义的汉班托塔（Hambantota）港移交给了这个亚洲巨人。


It was a major acquisition for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – which President Xi Jinping calls the “project of the century” – and proof of just how effective China’s debt-trap diplomacy can be.	这是中国一带一路计划——其主席习近平称之为“世纪工程”的一次重大成就，也证明了中国的债务陷阱外交的效果。


Unlike International Monetary Fund and World Bank lending, Chinese loans are collateralized by strategically important natural assets with high long-term value (even if they lack short-term commercial viability).	和国际货币基金组织（IMF）和世界银行贷款不同，中国的贷款需要具战略重要性的自然资产作抵押，这些资产长期价值很高（即便不具备短期商业自生力）。


Hambantota, for example, straddles Indian Ocean trade routes linking Europe, Africa, and the Middle East to Asia.	比如，汉班托塔位于连接欧洲、非洲和中东与亚洲的印度洋航路的咽喉。