The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (which provide health insurance to pensioners and the poor) has just announced its second round of grants – $665 million to 28 states, three territories, and the District of Columbia – to encourage innovations in health-care delivery.	联邦医疗保险和医疗补助服务中心（The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services，为退休者和穷人提供医疗保险）刚刚宣布了第二轮资金分配——28个州、三个领地和哥伦比亚特区获得6. 65亿美元——以刺激医疗服务提供创新。


Of course, it is still too early to declare victory, but Obamacare seems to be working.	当然，现在就宣布胜利还为时尚早，但奥巴马医保似乎在起作用。


According to a recent analysis by the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), about ten million people gained health insurance coverage in 2014 as a result of the ACA – the largest increase in coverage in four decades.	根据经济顾问委员会（Council of Economic Advisers，CEA）的最新分析，2014年大约有1,000万人因为ACA而获得医疗保险覆盖——这是四十年来医疗覆盖面增加最大的一年。


But the real surprise is that growth in health-care spending slowed dramatically from 2010 to 2013, to roughly the same pace as GDP growth.	但真正的惊喜是医疗支出增长在2010—2013年出现大幅放缓，已与GDP增长速度相仿。


This represented a sharp break from the previous half-century; indeed, this period was characterized by the slowest growth in real per capita health-care spending on record.	这与此前半个世纪形成了鲜明对比； 事实上，这段时期创造了真实人均医疗支出增长最缓慢的记录。


To be sure, the ACA is only one factor in this promising trend; growth in health-care spending often slows in the wake of an economic downturn.	诚然，ACA只是这一令人欣喜的趋势的一个因素； 医疗支出增长常常随经济衰退而放缓。


But Medicare spending, which is not affected by recessions, has slowed along with private health-care spending.	但联邦医疗保险支出——该指支出不受衰退影响——也随着私人健康支出一起放缓。


In a recent study, the CEA concluded that the ACA’s Medicare reforms account for a significant share of the slowdown.	在最新研究中，CEA测算出ACA的联邦医疗保险改革贡献了医疗支出增长放缓的很大一部分。


The ACA is an example of how government can promote innovation to address major societal challenges by providing goals, directions, and incentives, rather than dictating solutions.	ACA是一个很好的范例，说明了政府如何能够通过提供目标、方向和激励而不是通过命令式方案促进解决重大社会挑战的创新。


The government plays a role akin to that of a venture capitalist providing seed money and financial support to foster innovation.	政府的作用就像是风险资本家，提供种子资金和金融支持促进创新。


In this scenario, different players – Medicare and Medicaid, state and local governments, private insurers, physicians, and social entrepreneurs – collaborate to hammer out effective solutions that can be scaled with government revenues.	在这一情形中，不同的行为人——联邦医保和联邦医疗补助、州和地方政府、私人保险商、医生和社会企业家——合作打造占政府收入一定比例的有效的解决方案。


For example, responding to the ACA’s incentives and flexibility, Arkansas and Oregon have launched bold experiments to revamp Medicaid, in part by rewarding health-care providers who deliver better outcomes and keep patients healthier.	比如，阿肯色州和俄勒冈州响应ACA的激励和灵活性，启动了大胆的实验性措施改造联邦医疗补助——奖励带来更好结果、让患者更健康的医疗服务提供商就是办法之一。


In Camden, New Jersey, Jeffrey Brenner, a family doctor, has pioneered strategies to reduce hospital stays by “super-utilizers,” a small share of Medicaid patients who are frequently admitted for expensive acute care.	在新泽西州坎登（Camden），家庭医生杰弗里·布伦纳（Jeffrey Brenner）率先试水通过“超级使用者”（super-utilizers）减少住院的战略。 超级使用者是一小部分联邦医疗补助病患，他们经常使用昂贵的紧急治疗。


Brenner mapped “hot spots” around Camden, and sought to find out why people in some areas ran up such huge bills.	布伦纳绘制了坎登周边的“热点”，并且试图找出为何某些地区的人医药费会如此巨大。


The problem was not fraud. It was an absence of coordinated medical care, especially basic primary care, and a lack of attention to people’s underlying risk factors.	问题不在于欺诈，而在于缺乏协作医疗特别是基本初级治疗和缺乏对人们基本风险因素的关注。


The most expensive 1% of patients, those with a tangle of issues, accounted for 30% of Camden’s public health-care spending.	最昂贵的1%病患往往一身是病，他们占据了坎登公共医疗支出的30%。


Brenner’s Camden Coalition of Healthcare Providers, founded in 2003, received its first funding from a philanthropy, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and a private insurer, United Health Care.	布伦纳的坎登医疗服务提供商联盟（Camden Coalition of Healthcare Providers）成立于2003年，首笔资金来自慈善机构罗伯特·伍德·约翰逊基金会（Robert Wood Johnson Foundation）和私人保险商联合医疗保险公司（United Health Care）。


The remarkable success in Camden has prompted the foundation to fund similar experiments in Boston, Cleveland, Cincinnati, western Michigan, and Humboldt County, California.	坎登的巨大成功促使该基金会又资助了波士顿、克利夫兰、辛辛那提、西密歇根和加州洪堡县（Humboldt County）的类似实验。


Now the government is providing additional support, with grants to similar programs in Maryland, Colorado, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina.	如今政府也开始提供更多的支持，马里兰州、科罗拉多州、宾夕法尼亚州和北卡罗来纳州的类似项目都获得了政府拨款。


Oregon has entered into a pay-for-success bargain with the federal government.	俄勒冈州与联邦政府进行了“成功后支付”（pay-for-success）谈判。


The state will receive $1.9 billion over five years to revamp its Medicaid services along the lines of Camden’s approach.	该州将在五年时间中获得19亿美元按照坎登的方法改造联邦医疗补助服务。


Oregon will get the money only if its per-person Medicaid costs climb substantially more slowly than other states’.	俄勒冈州只有在人均联邦医疗补助成本增速显著低于其他州的情况下才能获得这笔资金。


At the moment, Oregon is on track.	现在，俄勒冈州正在路上。


Arkansas has moved 20 different “episodes” of health-care delivery (including hip and knee replacements, pregnancy, colonoscopies, asthma, and congestive heart failure) from fee-for-service to paying for quality outcomes.	阿肯色州将20个不同的医疗服务提供“项目”（包括臀部和膝盖替换术、怀孕、结肠镜检查、哮喘和充血性心力衰竭）从按服务计费变为按高质量结果支付。


The results so far are promising – not just by reining in costs, but also by better aligning service delivery with best practices.	到目前为止，效果很好——不但降低了成本，也更好地将服务提供和最佳实践结合起来。


The government can spur innovation by offering incentives that tap many different players’ strengths.	政府可以通过提供集中多个行动方的优势的激励刺激创新。


In health care, that means taking advantage of the purchasing clout of Medicare and Medicaid, the risk-taking of social entrepreneurs and philanthropists, and the dynamism of markets and private business.	在医疗领域，这意味着利用联邦医疗保险和联邦医疗补助的购买力、社会企业家和慈善机构的风险承担力和市场和私人企业的活力。


And health-care reform is just one example in which government can deliver what the public wants by setting goals, encouraging creativity, and providing the resources to scale up what works.	而医疗改革只是政府可以通过设置目标、鼓励创新、提供扩大有用方案的资源带来公众想要的东西的一个例子。


Twenty-five years from now, we hope that historians look back on the ACA as the start of a new era of public-private collaboration to develop innovative solutions to complex social problems – and thus to restore trust in government itself.	我们希望，二十五年后的历史学家回顾ACA时会把它当做一个新时代的开端，在这个时代中，公共和私人部门合作开发复杂社会问题的创新性解决办法——从而也重塑了政府本身的信任。


An Unhinged Democracy in America	精神错乱的美国民主


NEW YORK – Alexis de Tocqueville, a liberal French aristocrat, visited the United States in 1831 ostensibly to write a study of its “enlightened” prison system (locking people up in solitary confinement like penitent monks was the latest modern idea).	纽约—1831年，法国自由派贵族托克维尔访问美国。 名义上，他是为了写一篇关于美国“开明”监狱系统（最新的概念是将犯人如同忏悔的僧侣那样关押在单间中）的研究。


Out of this trip came de Tocqueville’s masterpiece, Democracy in America, in which he expressed admiration for American civil liberties and compared the world’s first genuine liberal democracy favorably with Old World institutions.	结果，这次美国之旅造就了托克维尔的名著《论美国的民主》，在这部著作中，他对美国公民自由大加推崇，将这个世界上第一个正宗自由民主与旧世界的制度相比较，认为后者不如前者。


But de Tocqueville had serious reservations, too.	但托克维尔也有严重保留。


The biggest danger to US democracy, he believed, was the tyranny of the majority, the suffocating intellectual conformity of American life, the stifling of minority opinion and dissent.	他认为，美国民主的最大危险是多数人的暴政，美国式生活中令人窒息的思想顺从，令人压抑的少数派观点和异见。


He was convinced that any exercise of unlimited power, be it by an individual despot or a political majority, is bound to end in disaster.	他相信，任何无限权力，不管是个人暴君还是政治多数，都注定要在一地狼藉中结束。


Democracy, in the sense of majority rule, needs restraints, just like any other system of government.	从多数规则的角度讲，民主需要约束，一如其他所有制度的政府。


That is why the British have mixed the authority of elected politicians with that of aristocratic privilege.	因此，英国混合了当选政客的权力和君主特权。


And it is why Americans still cherish their Constitution’s separation of governmental powers.	同样因此，美国人至今仍珍视宪法对政府权力的分割。


By contrast, in the French republican system, the state represents the so-called will of the people.	相反，在法国共和制度中，国家代表所谓的人民的意志。


As a result, its authority is less constrained, which may explain the greater frequency in France of street demonstrations and even of mob violence.	结果，它的权威约束较小，这也许解释了法国街头示威乃至群众暴力更为频繁。


Indeed, these upheavals may act as informal checks on official power.	事实上，这些剧变是对正式权力的非正式制衡。


De Tocqueville identified another source of restraint in the US system: the power of religion.	托克维尔还指出了美国制度的另一个约束来源：宗教的力量。


Human greed, as well as the temptation of going to extremes, was tempered by the moderating influence of a shared Christian faith.	人类的贪婪，以及走极端的诱惑，被共同的基督教信仰的影响所中和。


Liberty, in the US, was inextricably entwined with religious belief.	在美国，自由与宗教信仰密不可分。


The spectacle of American politics today would seem to cast doubt on de Tocqueville’s observation.	今天的美国政坛景象似乎让人们质疑托克维尔的观察。


Or, rather, the rhetoric of many Republicans aspiring to be President sounds like a perversion of what he saw in 1831.	或者说，许多志在总统之位的共和党人的言论与托克维尔在1831年的所见所闻南辕北辙。


Religion and liberty are still mentioned in one breath, but often to promote extreme views.	宗教和自由仍然时时挂在嘴边，但常常是用来推动极端观点。


Religious minorities are denounced.	宗教少数群体遭到压迫。


Apocalyptic fears are stoked.	天启恐惧兴起。


Intolerance is promoted.	党同伐异被煽动。


All in the name of God.	所有这些打着上帝的名义。


Of course, the US is not the only country where fringe demagogues are now poisoning mainstream politics.	当然，美国并不是唯一的边缘煽动着正在毒害主流政治的国家。


Religious language is less often heard in Western Europe, but all the more in parts of Eastern Europe, Turkey, and Israel.	在西欧，宗教语言比以前更少听到了，但在东欧、土耳其和以色列的一些地方，情况正好相反。


And the message of populism is similar everywhere in the democratic world: Liberal elites are to be blamed for all our ills and anxieties, from Europe’s refugee crisis to the inequities of the global economy, from “multiculturalism” to the rise of radical Islam.	民粹主义的意义在民主世界各地都差不多：自由精英要为我们的所有问题和焦虑负责，不管是欧洲难民危机还是全球经济不平等性，不管是“多元文化主义”还是激进伊斯兰教的崛起。


Populism is causing considerable alarm, not least because mainstream politicians seem less and less capable of finding a convincing way to stop its rise.	民粹主义正在敲响警钟，因为主流政客越来越难以找到令人信服的方式阻止它的崛起。


Those who are rightly worried about the politics of fear like to assume that populism is a threat to democracy itself.	正确地担心恐惧政治的人喜欢假设民粹主义是民主本身的威胁。


Distrust of the elites fosters distrust of the system, and the longing for great leaders who will deliver us from the selfishness of professional politicians will lead to new forms of tyranny.	不信任精英导致不信任制度，而期盼伟大领袖让我们摆脱职业政客的自私将导致新形式的暴政。


That may turn out to be true.	这也许是真的。


But, in fact, it is not really democracy that is presently under siege.	但是，事实上，陷入重围的其实并不是民主。


In some ways, many societies are more democratic than they were before.	从某种角度讲，许多社会比从简更加民主了。


If nothing else, the Donald Trump phenomenon shows that old party establishments can be skirted by popular outsiders.	唐纳德·特朗普现象所表现的正是旧政党格局可以被当红外部人士颠覆。


Social media also make it possible to bypass the traditional filters of authority, such as serious newspapers or broadcasters, and publish any point of view directly.	社交媒体也让绕过传统权威滤网（如严肃的报刊或杂志）成为可能，直接发布任何观点。


The power of private fortunes to sway public opinion, especially in the US, also upsets the traditional order.	私人财富左右公共观点的力量也在干扰传统秩序，特别是在美国。


Anti-elitism can be fanned by vast individual wealth, because elitism is defined less by financial clout than by education.	反精英主义可以通过巨大的个人财富煽动，因为精英主义更大程度上由教育而非财力定义。


Angry people swayed by the populist message are angrier at liberal professors, clever bankers, or skeptical journalists than they are at multi-billionaires.	被民粹主义信念激怒的人民对自由派教授、聪明的银行家或怀疑派记者的愤怒要大于他们对亿万富翁的愤怒。


(It is both President Barack Obama’s elite education and the color of his skin – or, rather, the combination of the two – that has attracted so much rage.)	（总统奥巴马的精英教育和他的肤色——或者说，是两者的结合——给她带来了如此多的愤怒。 ）


At the same time, people have more power to elect power-hungry crooks than they did before.	与此同时，人民比以前有了更大的力量选举渴望权力的恶棍。


Like the wild and woolly views swirling around the Internet, such figures are no longer kept at bay by traditional party elites.	和充斥互联网的野蛮观点一样，这些人物也不再被传统政党精英压制。


What is steadily falling away is not democracy, but the restraints that de Tocqueville thought were essential to make liberal politics work.	稳步消退的不是民主，而是托克维尔认为是自由政治起作用的关键的约束。


More and more, populist leaders regard their election by the majority of voters as a license to crush all political and cultural dissent.	民粹主义领导人越来越把多数人选择了他们作为碾压一切政治和文化异见的通行证。


De Tocqueville’s nightmare is not yet the reality in the US, but it is close to what we see in Russia, Turkey, Hungary, and perhaps Poland.	托克维尔的噩梦还没有在美国的现实中出现，但俄罗斯、土耳其、匈牙利（也许还有波兰）的情况已经与此不远。


Even Israel, which, despite its many obvious problems, has always had a robust democracy, is moving in this direction, with government ministers demanding proof of “state loyalty” from writers, artists, and journalists.	甚至以色列——尽管它存在诸多显而易见的问题，但一直是强大的民主国家——也在走向这一方向，政府部长要求作家、艺术家和记者证明其“国家忠诚”。


It is hard to see how traditional elites are going to regain any authority.	很难说传统精英如何继续保留任何权威。


And yet I think de Tocqueville was right.	但我认为托克维尔是正确的。


Without editors, there can be no serious journalism.	没有编辑，就不会有严肃的新闻。


Without parties led by experienced politicians, the borders between show business and politics will disappear.	没有由经验丰富的政客领导的政党，娱乐和政治的界线就会消失。


Without limits placed on the appetites and prejudices of the majority, intolerance will rule.	不对大多数人的偏好和偏见加以限制，就会让党同伐异成为规则。


This is not a question of nostalgia or snobbery.	这不是怀旧或势利。


Nor is it a plea to trust anyone with a plausible air of authority.	这也不是恳求信任任何拥有权威“气场”的人。


Anger at the elites is not always unjust.	对精英的愤怒并非总是不公平的。


Globalization, immigration, and cosmopolitanism have served the interests of a highly educated minority, but sometimes at the expense of less privileged people.	全球化、移民和世界主义符合受到良好教育的少数群体的利益，但有时会牺牲没有特权的人的利益。


And yet, the problem identified by de Tocqueville in the 1830s is more relevant now than ever.	但是，托克维尔在19世纪30年代所发现的问题在今天的意义比以往更大。


Liberal democracy cannot be reduced to a popularity contest.	自由民主决不能退化为民粹主义竞争。


Constraints on majority rule are necessary to protect the rights of minorities, be they ethnic, religious, or intellectual.	对多数人统治的约束是保护少数群体的必要条件，不管是种族少数群体、宗教少数群体还是知识少数群体。


When that protection disappears, we will all end up losing the freedoms that democracy was supposed to defend.	当这一保护消失时，我们最终将失去作为民主应有之义的自由。


An American Political Tragedy	美国政治悲剧


BERLIN – US President Donald Trump’s nearly eight months in office have been characterized by a series of disturbing political developments.	柏林—美国总统特朗普上台已经将近八个月了，这段时间伴随着一系列令人不安的政治发展趋势。


But Trump is not entirely to blame.	但不能将错误全部归于特朗普。


His presidency is just the latest act in a long-running political tragedy.	他的总统生涯只是漫长的政治悲剧的最新一幕。


From a foreign-policy perspective, the problem began in the 1990s, when the United States squandered the post-Cold War peace dividend.	从外交政策角度，问题始于20世纪90年代，美国肆意挥霍冷战后的和平红利。


With regard to domestic policy, the failures began even earlier: from Reaganomics in the 1980s to Obamacare in the 2010s, major policies have often overpromised and underperformed, while failing to address underlying problems.	在国内政策方面，失败要开始得更早：从20世纪80年代的里根经济学到21世纪10年代的奥巴马医保，重大政策总是承诺过多、兑现过少，同时，根本性问题也没有得到解决。


Of course, US politicians are rarely short on lofty rhetoric – from Ronald Reagan’s “Morning in America” campaign to Barack Obama’s “Yes, we can” slogan to Donald Trump’s “America First” refrain.	当然，美国政客并不缺少高尚的言辞——从里根的“美国早晨”运动到奥巴马的“是的，我们能”的口号，再到特朗普的“美国优先”信条，莫不如是。


And, beginning with John F. Kennedy, presidents have likened the US to a “city upon a hill” – an example to the rest of the world.	而从肯尼迪开始，诸任美国总统都将美国称为“山巅之城”——是世界其他国家的榜样。


Yet it is hard to remember the last time the US produced a policy that could serve as a model for others to emulate.	但上一次美国拿出能够作为其他国家效仿榜样的政策是什么时候，已经很难让人记起了。


The country has not had a pro-active, forward-looking government since the 1960s.	自20世纪60年代以来，这个国家就再也没有出现过积极主动、远见卓识的政府。


Since the 1990s, it has not invested sufficiently in human capital to meet the fast-changing economy’s shifting skill requirements; undertaken no effective education, environmental, or labor-market reforms; and launched no new urban initiatives or future-proofing infrastructure policies.	自20世纪90年代以来，它也没有对人力资本进行足够的投资以满足日新月异的经济不断变化的技能要求； 没有实施有效的教育、环境和劳动力市场改革；


The list goes on.	也没有制定出新的城市建设计划或面向未来的基础设施政策。 这个清单可以一直列下去。


The reason is simple: Americans’ longstanding suspicion of “big government” morphed into a kind of political self-hatred, with policymakers and citizens alike led to believe that government is at its best when it does not govern.	原因很简单：长期以来，美国人一直对“大政府”持狐疑态度，这演变为一种政治自恨（self-hatred），不管是决策者还是公民，都相信政府不管政，才是最好的。


And, as the US government has retreated from society, the US has retreated from the rest of the world.	而随着美国政府从社会中撤出，美国也从世界其他地区撤出。


These trends have culminated in Trump, whose most popular policies focus on destruction, rather than creation.	这些趋势在特朗普上任后达到了顶峰，他最受民众支持的政策集中在“毁”而不是“建”上。


Deregulation will supposedly slay the “deep state” chimera, while enabling the US to achieve energy independence.	去监管化可能扼杀“深度国家”（deep state）的空想，尽管它也可能让美国实现能源独立。


A US-centered foreign policy focused not on reshaping America’s role in the world, but on reducing it.	以美国为中心的外交政策不注重美国在世界中的角色，而是以削弱这一角色为重点。


From the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy, Trump likes to reverse past policies, without devising anything to replace them.	从平价医疗法（奥巴马医保）到暂缓遣返青少年（DACA）政策，特朗普想要扭转过去的政策，但没有拿出任何取而代之的政策。


American conservatives have so far failed to read Trump’s intentions accurately.	到目前为止，美国保守派没能正确解读特朗普的意图。


In July, Robert W. Merry wrote that Trump had “yet to score anything approaching a serious legislative victory – or to demonstrate any serious political momentum.”	7月，罗伯特·梅里（Robert W. Merry）写道，特朗普“在取得重大立法胜利方面还没有任何得分——也没有表现出任何重大政治动能。


But the truth is that Trump’s agenda has plenty of momentum; it is just focused on demolishing Obama’s legacy.	”但真相是特朗普的日程充满了动能； 只不过它的重点是摧毁奥巴马的遗产。


As the international law expert Richard Falk has argued, it is Trump’s “demagoguery” that enables this approach, as it “blinds adherents to their true material self-interests and misidentifies their real social enemies.”	国际法专家理查德·福尔克（Richard Falk）指出，特朗普的“蛊惑”成就了这一方针，它“让追随者对真正的物质自我利益视而不见，混淆了他们的真正的社会敌人。


Trump’s rejection of “reasoned discourse, including commitments to truth and evidence,” has been accompanied by an unlimited “capacity to manipulate mass opinion and play on such repressed emotions as racism and class envy.”	”特朗普拒绝“理性的讨论，包括对真相和证据的评论”，是伴随着无限的“操纵大众观点、利用种族主义和阶级仇恨等压抑的情绪的能力”。


The result of Trump’s approach is that America’s existing problems are worsening and huge opportunities are being missed.	特朗普的方针的结果，是美国现有问题不断恶化，重大机遇被白白浪费。


But what can stop demons already unleashed?	但什么才能阻止已经被释放出来的魔鬼？


And, even if they are stopped, can the damage they have already wrought be reversed?	即使这些魔鬼被阻止，它们已经造成的伤害能够逆转吗？


There was some backlash against Trump when he failed to condemn clearly the white supremacist demonstrators in Charlottesville, Virginia, whose “Unite the Right” rally in August ended with the murder of a counter-protester.	当特朗普没有明确地谴责弗吉尼亚州夏洛特维尔（Charlottesville）的白人至上主义示威者时，他遭到了一些“炮轰”。 这些白人至上主义者在8月份举行了“联合右翼”的示威，最终导致一位反示威人士被杀。


But it has done little to weaken Trump’s destructive momentum: just a few weeks later, Trump announced his plan to end DACA, a policy that protected from deportation some 800,000 young immigrants who were brought to the US as children.	但特朗普的破坏动能并未就此削弱：不出几周，特朗普就宣布他计划取消DACA。 DACA是一项保护在青少年时代被带到美国的800,000年轻移民不受遣返的政策。


Beyond lamenting the astonishing depths to which a great political culture and system can fall, what can be done?	除了哀叹一套伟大的政治文化和制度能够堕落如斯，我们还能做些什么？


One obvious option, which Democrats largely seem to be taking, is to reject Trump and everything his administration stands for.	一个显而易见的选择——民主党也大多在这么做——是拒绝特朗普和他的政府的一切立场。


But that risks ensuring the persistence of the dysfunctional dynamics that brought the US to this point.	但这有可能导致把美国带到这一步的僵局持久化。


Another option, however unappealing at first glance, is to accept the Trump administration.	另一个选项——咋看上去，这个选项毫无吸引力可言——是接受特朗普政府。


The result of such a choice may well be the worsening of domestic problems and the weakening of checks and balances.	这一选择的结果很可能是国内问题恶化、制衡被削弱。


But it is also possible that checks and balances will hold until the next election, enabling America’s existing political parties to rebuild and new parties to emerge.	但也有可能，制衡能够维持到下一次选举，让美国现有政党获得重建、新的政党得到涌现。


The result, one hopes, would be a much-needed political realignment – indeed, a political renaissance.	我们希望，结果将是急需的政治整顿——事实上，是政治文艺复兴。


To be sure, such a shift would take time – time that, depending on how long Trump remains in office, parties may not have.	诚然，这样的改变需要时间，而政党可能并没有这么长的时间——取决于特朗普将执政多久。


Republicans may be politically handicapped for years, as they are forced to reckon with the Faustian bargain they struck for the sake of political power.	共和党可能会在多年的时间里在政治上一蹶不振，因为他们将被迫为了政治权力，而进行魔鬼交易。


Democrats, for their part, face a broad leadership vacuum and a lack of political vision, owing to their now-internalized fear of being labeled “big spenders.”	至于民主党，他们面临着广泛的领导力真空，也缺少政治愿景，因为他们现在有一种源自内心的对“大手大脚花钱”标签的恐惧。


And, as it stands, no third parties or candidates provide reasonable alternatives.	而从目前看，没有第三党或候选人能够拿出合理的替代方案。


Nonetheless, there are encouraging signs that some Republicans and Democrats are thinking outside the party box.	尽管如此，有令人鼓舞的信号表明，一些共和党和民主党正在跳出党派的桎梏考虑问题。


More must follow suit, recognizing that realigning the existing party system may be the only way to break the stalemate of US politics and, potentially, reverse decades of dangerous democratic underperformance.	必须有更多的人加入他们，认识到重整现有政党制度可能是打破美国政治僵局并从根本上扭转几十年来国内表现低迷的危险趋势的唯一办法。


The next act in America’s political drama, following the 2018 congressional midterm election, could be marked by a kind of reckoning, with the 2020 presidential campaign accompanied by civic breakdown and the escalation of violent confrontation that has lingered beneath the surface for years.	美国戏剧的下一幕——2018年国会中期选举——可能将标志着某种深思，而2020年总统选战将伴随着已经在地下发酵多年的民众决裂和暴力冲突升级。


To rewrite the plot before that scenario plays out requires reshuffling and revitalizing US politics, so that, in the words of the poet Seamus Heaney, “hope and history rhyme” once again in America.	在这一情景成为现实之前重写剧本需要对美国政治彻底洗牌，让其获得重生，从而，用诗人西莫斯·希尼（Seamus Heaney）的话说，“希望和历史的韵脚”再次在美国回荡。


Tracking Big Pharma’s Progress on AMR	追踪大型制药企业在抗菌素耐药性方面的进展


LONDON – This week, at the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting in Davos, the Access to Medicine Foundation (AMF) is launching an antimicrobial resistance (AMR) benchmark to “track how pharmaceutical companies are responding to the increase in drug-resistance.”	伦敦——本周，在达沃斯召开的世界经济论坛年会上，药品获取基金会（AMF）正在制定一套抗菌素耐药性标准，以“跟踪制药企业如何应对耐药性的增加。


The benchmark builds on recommendations made in the May 2016 final report of the British government’s Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, which I chaired, and on the important work being done by Chatham House, Drive-AB, the Global Union for Antibiotic Research and Development, the Pew Trusts, and the World Health Organization.	”制定这套标准的基础是2016年5月由我本人主持的英国政府抗菌素耐药性最终评估报告所提出的建议，以及由查塔姆研究所、 Drive-AB、全球抗菌药物研发联盟、皮尤信托和世界卫生组织等机构所取得的重要成果。


For the past ten years, the AMF, which is independent of the pharmaceutical industry, has published a highly regarded Access to Medicine Index, making it uniquely suited to quantify how various companies measure up in the fight against AMR.	过去十年来，独立于医药行业的药品获取基金会已经发布了一份备受推崇的药品获取指数，该指数特别适合量化各家企业在针对抗菌素耐药性斗争中所完成的工作。


In my view, the new benchmark will have many benefits, not least for equity analysts who might consider adjusting their stock recommendations on the basis of the AMF’s findings.	在我看来，新基准的制定将带来诸多好处，尤其是股票分析师，他们可以考虑根据药品获取基金会的研究成果来调整他们所推荐的股票。


During our Review, I learned that many in the investment community were not interested in pharmaceutical companies’ behavior on this issue, because there were no readily available data by which to make comparisons.	在评估过程中，我发现因为没有现成的数据可以进行比较，许多投资者并不了解制药企业在这方面所做的工作。


Well, now there are.	那么，现在有了。


As I have written previously, the Review issued Ten Commandments for confronting the AMR threat.	我之前曾经写道，评估报告发布了十条戒律，用于应对抗菌素耐药性方面的危险因素。


While the AMF’s benchmark isn’t designed to address all ten, it does touch on the areas that are most relevant to the health-care industry.	尽管药品获取基金会制定的标准并不完全针对这十条戒律，但它确实触及了那些与医疗保健行业关系最为密切的领域。


Two areas that would benefit from their own quantifiable benchmarks are diagnostics, to prevent antibiotics from being prescribed unnecessarily, and agriculture, where antibiotics are used excessively to promote livestock growth.	防止抗生素不必要使用的诊断和过度使用抗生素促进牲畜生长的农业是能够受惠于自身可量化基准的两大领域。


Ultimately, microbes will build a resistance to any new drugs that we create, so we also need to seek ways to reduce overall demand for antibiotics.	最终，微生物会对我们创造的任何新型药物产生抗体，因此我们也必须想方设法减少对抗生素的总体需求。


For its part, the AFM will calculate its benchmark separately for the eight major pharmaceutical companies that currently appear to be working on replacement drugs, generic producers, and firms focused solely on research and development.	就药品获取基金会而言，它将针对目前似乎正在从事替代药、仿制药生产和专注研发工作的八大药企分别展开基准运算工作。


The fact that only eight “Big Pharma” firms are even attempting to develop new antibiotics and vaccines is a cause for serious concern.	仅有“八家大型药企”试图研发新抗生素和疫苗的现实是引发人们严重关切的一个原因。


As the Review concluded, failure to create effective new drugs could result in ten million people dying from AMR-related diseases every year by 2050, at a cost of some $100 trillion.	评估结论指出，如果研制不出有效的新药，到2050年可能导致上千万人死于与抗菌素耐药性相关的疾病，并造成高达一百万亿美元的损失。


One of the more radical ideas we discussed during the Review concerned financial “pull” incentives to reward firms that successfully develop new drugs.	我们在评估中探讨的一个比较激进的观点是对成功研发新药的企业采用财务奖励“拉动”。


We determined that an effective market-entry reward could be funded by small levies on the sales of the other top-50 pharmaceutical firms that are not carrying their weight.	我们认为可以通过对其他前50家药企销售额小额征税的方式设立有效的市场准入奖励，因为这其他50家制药企业并没有承担他们应尽的义务。


The new benchmark’s overall score for a firm can be broken down into three separate categories: its commitment to research and development for new drugs; its manufacturing, production, and environmental standards; and its marketing and distribution practices, which should focus on ensuring access rather than excess.	制造、生产和环境标准； 以及具体的营销和分销操作，重点应当放在确保药物推广而非过度滥用。


Of the eight Big Pharma firms that are included, the British company GlaxoSmithKline currently scores the highest.	在八家正在进行研发的大型制药企业中，英国的葛兰素史克公司目前的得分最高。


For those of us who conducted the Review, this is no surprise.	对于我们这些实际进行评估的人来说，这并不是什么意外的结果。


Frankly, we would not classify all eight firms as being truly committed to the cause, but at least with the benchmark, they can now see clearly how they can improve.	坦率的讲，我们并不认为所有八家公司都真正致力于这项事业，但现在在基准的引导下，他们至少可以清楚地看到自己的不足。


Moreover, one hopes the benchmark will prod into action all of the firms that have not even bothered to join the fight against AMR.	此外，人们希望这项标准能够刺激那些甚至从未费心加入抗菌素耐药性斗争的企业。


It is worth remembering that at the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting in January 2016, more than 80 companies signed a declaration promising to work toward solutions.	值得一提的是，在2016年1月举行的世界经济论坛年会上，超过80家企业签署了一份承诺寻求解决方案的声明。


And yet more than 70 of those firms do not appear on the AMF’s new index.	而其中有70多家公司甚至从未登上药品获取基金会的新指数名单。


Talk is cheap; these companies need to put their money where their mouth is.	空口白话非常廉价； 这些企业应当在他们承诺的领域投入资金。


As for generic producers, the AMF’s scoring of pollution could prove most important, given that many of these companies operate in developing countries where environmental degradation is a major concern.	对通用生产商来说，鉴于多数企业都在以环境恶化为主要问题的发展中国家开展经营活动，最重要的可能是药品获取基金会的污染评分。


Policymakers and business leaders in these countries will want to pay attention to how their generic drug producers score, so that they can make improvements.	这些国家的决策者和商界领袖应当关注通用制药企业的得分状况，以便督促他们进行改进。


The benchmark’s third category concerns biotech firms, which conduct research into drugs that can combat the “priority pathogens” identified by the WHO.	第三类基准涉及生物技术企业，它们在世卫组织确定的可以对抗“优先病原体”的药物领域展开研究。


This category will be particularly helpful for financial analysts, or even for venture capitalists, given that specific advances could earn a future market-entry reward or have vast commercial potential.	因为具体进展可以获得未来的市场准入奖励或可能取得巨大的商业潜力，上述分类对金融分析师乃至风险投资家尤其管用。


And, of course, the new scoring will also be important to the companies themselves, and for policymakers who are trying to strike a balance between “pull” incentives and current priority-drug needs.	当然，新评分标准不仅对企业本身、而且对试图在“拉动”机制和目前的优先药物需求间达成平衡的决策者也非常重要。


It would be great to see similar benchmarks for the major food producers and makers of diagnostics.	为主要食品生产企业和诊断企业制定类似的基准也是很大的进步。


Indeed, I have long believed that diagnostics could be the single biggest game changer in the fight against AMR.	事实上，我一直认为诊断领域可能成为抗菌素耐药性斗争中唯一也是最大的变革因素。


But for now, let us hope the pharmaceutical benchmark gets the attention it deserves.	但现在，让我们希望制药基准能够获得应有的关注。


How to Fight Antimicrobial Resistance	如何遏制抗生素耐药性


ZURICH – Two weeks ago, G20 leaders committed to working together to address one of the world’s most pressing and perplexing security threats: antimicrobial resistance (AMR) – a fierce and evolving adversary against which conventional therapeutic weapons are of no use.	苏黎世—两周前，G20领导人承诺要合作解决全世界最紧迫的问题和最麻烦的社会威胁之一——抗生素耐药性（AMR），这是一个来势汹汹又不断变化的大敌，常规治疗手段对此束手无策。


The threat is straightforward: bacteria and other microbes are becoming resistant to available medicines faster than new medicines are being developed.	威胁是直接的：细菌和其他微生物对现有药物产生耐药性的速度快于新药的研发速度。


Every year, drug-resistant microbes kill about 700,000 people worldwide – more than three times the annual death toll from armed conflicts.	每一年，耐药微生物都会杀死全球700,000人——比每年死于 武装冲突的人数多两倍多。


In 2016, a special panel commissioned by the British government predicted that, by 2050, as many as ten million more people will die from drug-resistant microbes every year.	2016年，英国政府组成的一个特别委员会预测，到2050年，每年将有多达一千万人以上死于耐药微生物。


AMR now poses a clear and present danger to every person on the planet.	如今，AMR对地球上的每个人都是明确的威胁。


Unless we confront it head-on, we could return to a world in which it is common for people to die from basic infections.	除非我们直面这个问题，否则世界可能回到普通感染就能置人于死地的时代。


Beyond the cost in human lives, AMR could devastate the world’s economies.	除了人的生命的损失，AMR也破坏了世界经济。


In Europe alone, the annual health-care costs and productivity losses associated with AMR already total an estimated €1.5 billion ($1.7 billion).	光是在欧洲，每年与AMR有关的医疗成本和生产率损失预计可达15亿欧元。


The G20, for its part, has taken an important step forward.	G20迈出了非常重要的一步。


Each G20 country has promised to start implementing national plans to fight AMR in earnest, and to do more to promote new treatments against resistant microbes.	G20各国都承诺开始坚决实施减轻AMR的国家计划，并要增加投入推动解决耐药微生物问题的新疗法。


To that end, G20 leaders are calling for an international “R&D Collaboration Hub” to “maximize the impact of existing and new anti-microbial basic and clinical research initiatives.”	在这方面，G20领导人呼吁建立一个国际“研发合作枢纽”，以“实现现有和新抗生素基础和临床研究的效果最大化”。


And they have promised to explore how market incentives can be used to encourage new research.	他们还承诺探索如何用市场激励来推动新研究。


Beyond the G20, innovative public-private partnerships are emerging to deliver new treatments against drug-resistant killers such as tuberculosis.	除了G20，创新公私合作计划也在为等结核病等耐药杀手提供新疗法。


And some governments have already started filling critical roles in the global response to AMR, by collecting data on the spread of resistant strains of E. coli, salmonella, and other common pathogens.	一些政府已经开始在遏制AMR的全球行动东起到关键作用，收集大肠杆菌、沙门氏菌和其他常见致病菌耐药菌株蔓延的数据。


Now it is up to political leaders to follow through on their commitments.	现在，政治领导人也要拿出承诺来。


Because new treatments for multidrug-resistant microbes aren’t expected to generate much return on investment, it is incumbent upon governments to make research and development in this field more attractive to private companies, and, in order to stem the development of resistance, to ensure that new drugs are not overused.	由于多重耐药微生物的新疗法不可能产生很大的投资回报，因此，政府有义不容辞的责任让这一领域的研究对私营公司更具吸引力，此外，为了阻止耐药性的发展，还必须确保新药不被滥用。


When traditional market mechanisms fail, instruments such as “transferable market exclusivities” can help, by allowing drug makers to transfer an antimicrobial medicine’s intellectual-property benefits to another drug.	当传统市场机制失灵时，“可转移的市场排他性”等工具可以起到帮助作用。 这一机制允许制药公司将某种抗生素的知识产权转移到另一种药品身上。


In addition to policy innovations, more well-funded collaborations between governments and private institutions are needed.	除了政策创新，政府和私人机构之间还需要更多资金充裕的合作。


When private institutions enter into such collaborative efforts, they must be prepared to work outside of traditional boundaries, accept the challenges associated with complex public projects, and be willing to bring their skills, ideas, and experience to the table.	当私人机构加入这类合作计划时，它们必须做好在传统边界之外工作的准备，接受复杂的公共项目带来的挑战，并愿意拿出它们的技能、思想和经验。


In responding to AMR, we can learn some valuable lessons from other global public-health efforts.	在应对AMR方面，我们可以从其他全球公共卫生计划中汲取一些重要教训。


Malaria, which is caused by a parasite transmitted by more than 100 species of Anopheles mosquito, is a leading cause of death in many parts of the world.	疟疾是一种由寄生虫引起的疾病，而能传播这种寄生虫的包括100多种安蚊。 疟疾是世界上很多地区最主要的致死原因之一。


But now that many governments and private institutions have made fighting the disease a high priority, its death toll has been halved over the last 15 years.	但许多政府和私人机构都将消灭这种疾病列为工作重点，结果，疟疾致死数量在过去15年里减少了一半。


Still, the parasite that causes malaria is developing resistance to artemisinin, which forms the basis for the most effective treatment: artemisinin-based combination therapies.	但是，导致疟疾的寄生虫正在发展出青蒿素抗药性，而青蒿素是最有效的疟疾疗法——基于青蒿素的混合疗法的基础。


Artemisinin resistance first emerged in Cambodia just over a decade ago, and has since spread through Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar, and China.	青蒿素耐药性最早出现在十多年前的柬埔寨，随后蔓延到泰国、老挝、越南、缅甸和中国。


It is now approaching India, and experts are sure that it will eventually reach Africa.	如今，它正在接近印度，专家确定它迟早将抵达非洲。


According to one recent study, if artemisinin resistance is allowed to spread, malaria will kill at least 116,000 more people every year.	根据一份最新研究，如果放任青蒿素耐药性扩散，疟疾每年至少要多杀死116,000人。


Unless new treatments become available, the tremendous progress that the world has made against malaria will have been tragically short-lived.	除非发明新的疗法，否则，全世界所取得的针对疟疾的巨大进步将十分短暂，这是一个悲剧。


Fortunately, those engaged in the global response to malaria recognize that just as parasites are adapting, so must we.	幸运的是，参与全球疟疾应对的人员认识到，我们必须像寄生虫一样做出调整。


New efforts are underway to identify and minimize the spread of resistant malaria, while simultaneously developing new artemisinin-free treatments.	人们已经展开了新的行动，辨别和尽量降低耐药性疟疾的传播，同时开发新的不使用青蒿素的疗法。


For example, the Regional Artemisinin-Resistance Initiative is working to halt the spread of resistant malaria in the Mekong Delta region, by monitoring and sharing drug-resistance data and promoting proper use of antimalarial treatments.	比如，地区性青蒿素耐药性计划致力于阻止耐青蒿素疟疾在湄公河三角洲地区的传播。 该计划监控和共享耐药性数据，推广抗疟疾疗法的合理使用。


So far, the initiative has secured €110 million through the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, which is financed primarily by governments.	目前，该计划已经从对抗艾滋病、结核病和疟疾全球基金获得1. 10亿欧元资金，主要出资者是政府。


Moreover, Novartis and the Medicines for Malaria Venture (with support from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation) are starting a new clinical trial next month to test KAF156, a molecule that could form the basis of a new treatment against artemisinin-resistant malaria strains.	此外，诺华集团和 疟疾药品公司（Medicines for Malaria Venture，在比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会的帮助下）将于下个月开始新的临床试验，测试一种叫作KAF156的微粒，它有望成为耐青蒿素疟疾菌株的新治疗手段。


At the 2016 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, 100 companies (including Novartis) and industry associations signed the Davos Declaration on AMR.	在2016年瑞士达沃斯世界经济论坛上，100家公司（包括诺华集团）和行业协会签署了《达沃斯AMR宣言》（Davos Declaration on AMR）。


Under that commitment, we promised to work together with governments to slow the development of resistance, by increasing our investments in R&D and making high-quality antibiotics available to patients who need them.	在这个宣言中，我们承诺与政府合作，提高我们的研发投资，让需要的患者能够获得高质量的抗生素，以此遏制耐药性的发展。


The G20’s national action plans will, we hope, help us to meet these commitments.	我们希望，G20的国家计划能够有助于我们兑现这些承诺。


But political leaders, too, must marshal the will to turn words into action.	但政治领导人也应该用行动来证明言辞。


We urgently need more resources to monitor resistance, stronger incentives for R&D, and innovative financing mechanisms to ensure widespread access to accurate diagnoses and quality medicines.	我们急需更多的耐药性监控资源、更强的研发激励，以及确保普及精准诊断和品质医疗的创新性融资机制。


The world cannot afford to lose the fight against AMR.	世界决不能输掉与AMR的战争。


Winning it will require large-scale public-private cooperation, underpinned by political leadership that makes global public health a top priority.	赢得这场战争需要大规模公私合作，而其基础，就是将全球公共卫生置于重中之重的全球领导力。


The Shareholder Spring Continues	股东春天运动在继续


LONDON – It is annual general meeting season – the time of year when some of the world’s biggest companies gather to report to shareholders and have some semblance of a conversation with them.	伦敦——现在是一年一度的股东大会季——每年此刻世界某些规模最大的公司一起向股东报告，和他们展开类似对话的交流活动。


For the next couple of months, a succession of companies will talk about what influenced their performance over the previous year, what they are planning for the future, and the decisions that their boards have made.	之后几个月，一系列公司将分析前一年有哪些因素影响业绩，他们有怎样的未来计划以及董事会的决定。


There was a time when these meetings took place without much fanfare, mostly unnoticed by the public.	曾几何时股东会议并未如此大张旗鼓，很多时候公众都并不知情。


That has not been true for a couple of years.	近几年来这样的状况已经非常鲜见。


A worsening economy and widening inequality have spurred more people to become more engaged and take an interest in the activities of companies and those who run them.	经济日益恶化及不平等问题日益凸显促使更多人更多参与，更加关注公司及其管理者的一举一动。


And, with that change, attention has broadened from CEOs and executive teams to those who previously existed in a black box: the companies’ board members.	因此，注意力已经从首席执行官和管理团队，转向了之前鲜为人知的公司董事。


In 2012, shareholders and others started shining a bright light on boards, questioning their decisions and activities, and those of individual members, and thus was born the Shareholder Spring.	2012年，股东和其他人开始关注董事会，质疑董事会及其组成成员的决策和行动， 股东春天运动也因此诞生。


People grew tired of tone-deaf board directors operating in soundproof rooms, seemingly ignoring economic realities and the public’s mood.	人们已经厌倦董事会在隔音的会议室里暗箱操作，似乎根本无视经济现实和公众情绪。


They wanted to confront those who decide on executives’ often eye-popping compensation or approve companies’ decisions to undertake sophisticated tax engineering.	他们想要直接面对那些高管令人瞠目薪酬的决策者，或者质疑那些采取复杂手段操纵税收的人。


People wanted to know whether board members were actually doing their jobs or just filling seats and collecting a nice fee.	人们希望了解董事会成员是否实际完成了他们的任务，抑或只是尸位素餐，领到一大笔费用。


Many companies and company boards hoped that this heightened interest would pass quickly; instead, it has matured.	很多企业和企业董事会都希望这种关注能尽快过去；


Discontent has continued to mount, and investors, employees, politicians, and members of the public now want to know not only about executive compensation, but also about the frequently staggering discrepancy between what companies’ highest- and lowest-paid personnel earn.	但事实却是上述趋势的表现形式日益成熟。 不满情绪持续高涨，投资者、员工、政治家和公众现在不光想了解高管薪酬，还想了解公司最高和最低收入者令人惊讶的差异是怎么造成的。


They want to know about living wages and zero-hours contracts.	他们希望了解最低生活工资和零时工合同。


They want to know what companies are doing to address climate change, whether they are responsible community members, how they behave in conflict zones, and much more.	他们想了解企业采取哪些措施应对气候变化，它们是不是负责任的社会成员、以及他们在冲突地区的一举一动。


Those asking the questions are no longer content to protest outside.	质疑者不再满足于站在门外抗议。


They are becoming increasingly sophisticated about how to be heard, buying shares, stepping up to the microphone, and looking board members in the eye, so that their questions become part of the official minutes.	他们越来越善于表达自己的意见，买入股票，直视董事会成员的眼睛大胆发言，使自己的问题成为正式纪录的一部分。


And they are putting pressure on companies’ major investors to hold board members to account as well.	他们正在向公司主要投资者施加压力，让董事会成员为自己的行为负责。


The questions posed and statements made can sometimes be longwinded.	提出的质疑和做出的陈述有时可能会啰嗦跑题。


But many of them are legitimate, and they are an important reminder to boards that they must serve the company’s entire ecosystem – investors, employees, customers, and community alike.	但其中也有很多不仅合法，还提醒董事会必须服务于包括投资者、员工、客户和社会各界在内的完整的企业生态体系。


Indeed, these open meetings are a reminder that board members must ask the hard questions all year round, rather than simply rubber-stamping management proposals or going along to get along.	事实上，上述开放式会议提醒董事会成员必须时刻牢记困难的问题，而不是象征性地批准管理建议，或者为创造融洽气氛而随声附和。


Interestingly, just as the movement to hold boards to account has gained greater traction, some companies have adopted new ways of convening annual shareholder meetings.	有趣的是，就在董事会责任运动蔚然成风的同时，某些企业已经采取新的方式召开年度股东大会。


These were once fairly staid gatherings.	股东大会曾经相当古板。


The companies’ senior management would walk investors and board members through the reporting formalities step by step, present results, take questions, vote, and move on.	公司高管会一步步地投资者和董事会成员讲解报告形式，呈报结果，接受提问，投票，之后再进入下一个步骤。


There was tea, coffee, and biscuits, but nothing fancy.	会上准备了茶、咖啡、饼干，但没有华而不实的东西。


In recent years, however, there has been a trend toward a more carnival-like atmosphere, with companies bringing in big-name entertainers and turning the event into a feel-good pep rally.	但近年来已经出现了嘉年华式的聚会。 公司邀请大牌艺人，把股东大会转变为自我感觉良好的赛前动员活动。


Last year, Wal-Mart’s annual meeting featured Harry Connick, Jr., Robin Thicke, and Pharrell Williams.	去年，沃尔玛的年度会议主打小亨利·康尼克、罗宾·锡克和法瑞尔·威廉姆斯。


In 2013, Elton John performed.	2013年，埃尔顿·约翰曾登台表演。


In contrast, other companies have swung to the opposite extreme and embraced fully virtual meetings.	相比之下，其他公司纷纷走向另一个极端，即完全采用虚拟形式召开股东会议。


The board gathers in front of a camera for a live webcast to shareholders, takes questions submitted in advance, and avoids the protesters altogether.	董事会在镜头前向股东进行网络直播，回答提前搜集好的问题，这样就彻底避免了抗议者。


This year, HP joined Sprint and Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia down this road.	今年惠普也采用了这种方式，之前采取同样方式的还有Sprint和Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia。


There is a virtue to having a meeting with a virtual component: businesses are global, and so are their investors, who can participate without having to get on a plane.	虚拟股东会自有其可取之处：在企业及投资者全球化背景下，投资者不用登上飞机就可以参与股东大会。


But a webcast of a meeting with a live audience would be the ideal combination.	但网络直播加现场听众才是理想的组合。


And while companies might argue that entirely virtual meetings save money – which of course is true – investors do not need Robin Thicke.	尽管企业可能认为完全的虚拟会议可以节省开支——但投资者并不需要罗宾·锡克。


They will settle for good numbers, serious discussion, and a dry biscuit.	真实的数据、严肃的讨论和几块饼干就够了。


Boards and managers must take these meetings seriously.	董事和经理们必须认真对待上述会议。


Part of the job is facing those with something at stake.	他们工作的一部分是面对那些利益攸关人士。


Hosting circuses or hiding behind cameras will not keep tough questions from coming.	邀请马戏团或躲在摄像机后面无法避开棘手的问题。


A seat at the boardroom table comes with the responsibility to stand up and do this vital part of the job – in person and without musical accompaniment.	承担责任是董事席位的重要部分，董事们必须在没有音乐伴奏的情况下当面应对。


The Abdication of the Left	左派的退位


RONDA, SPAIN – As the world reels from the Brexit shock, it is dawning on economists and policymakers that they severely underestimated the political fragility of the current form of globalization.	隆达，西班牙——随着世界在英国退欧的余波冲击下动荡，经济学家和决策者渐渐明白他们严重低估了现有全球化形势的脆弱程度。


The popular revolt that appears to be underway is taking diverse, overlapping forms: reassertion of local and national identities, demand for greater democratic control and accountability, rejection of centrist political parties, and distrust of elites and experts.	正在席卷全球的民众反抗浪潮采取的形式相互重叠而多样化：重新强调地方和国家身份、要求加强民主控制和问责、拒绝中间政党和不信任精英与专家。


This backlash was predictable.	出现这样的反弹是可以预见的。


Some economists, including me, did warn about the consequences of pushing economic globalization beyond the boundaries of institutions that regulate, stabilize, and legitimize markets.	某些经济学家，包括我本人在内，的确警告过在现有的管理、稳定及合法化市场制度的边界以外推进经济全球化的后果。


Hyper-globalization in trade and finance, intended to create seamlessly integrated world markets, tore domestic societies apart.	金融贸易超级全球化本意是创造无缝衔接的世界市场，但却撕裂了国内社会。


The bigger surprise is the decidedly right-wing tilt the political reaction has taken.	更出人意料的是人们果断采取了右倾的政治对策。


In Europe, it is predominantly nationalists and nativist populists that have risen to prominence, with the left advancing only in a few places such as Greece and Spain.	欧洲各国主要是民族主义者和本土民粹主义者显露峥嵘，而左翼只在希腊和西班牙等少数地区有所斩获。


In the United States, the right-wing demagogue Donald Trump has managed to displace the Republican establishment, while the leftist Bernie Sanders was unable to overtake the centrist Hillary Clinton.	美国右翼煽动家唐纳德·特朗普成功地取代了共和党当权派，而左翼份子伯尼·桑德斯却未能打败中间派的希拉里·克林顿。


As an emerging new establishment consensus grudgingly concedes, globalization accentuates class divisions between those who have the skills and resources to take advantage of global markets and those who don’t.	正在崛起的新兴当权派极不情愿的达成共识：全球化加剧了阶级分裂，拉大了有资源和有能力利用世界市场者和不具备上述能力者之间的鸿沟。


Income and class cleavages, in contrast to identity cleavages based on race, ethnicity, or religion, have traditionally strengthened the political left.	收入和阶级分化，相对于以种族、民族或宗教身份为基础的分化，传统上会强化左翼政治势力。


So why has the left been unable to mount a significant political challenge to globalization?	那么左翼势力究竟为什么没能实现政治挑战全球化？


One answer is that immigration has overshadowed other globalization “shocks.”	答案之一是其他全球化“冲击”被移民问题掩盖了。


The perceived threat of mass inflows of migrants and refugees from poor countries with very different cultural traditions aggravates identity cleavages that far-right politicians are exceptionally well placed to exploit.	人们感受到来自文化传统截然不同的贫困国家的大批移民和难民涌入加剧了身份分化，而极右翼政客可以驾轻就熟地利用这样的现状。


So it is not a surprise that rightist politicians from Trump to Marine Le Pen lace their message of national reassertion with a rich dose of anti-Muslim symbolism.	因此从特朗普到马琳·勒庞等右翼政治家在重新确立国家地位的主张中掺入大量反穆斯林象征主义也就毫不奇怪了。


Latin American democracies provide a telling contrast.	拉美民主国家提供了一种很能说明问题的对照。


These countries experienced globalization mostly as a trade and foreign-investment shock, rather than as an immigration shock.	全球化在上述国家主要表现为贸易和外资冲击，而不是移民冲击。


Globalization became synonymous with so-called Washington Consensus policies and financial opening.	全球化几乎等同于所谓的华盛顿共识政策和金融开放。


Immigration from the Middle East or Africa remained limited and had little political salience.	中东和非洲移民问题仍十分有限，在政治上并不突出。


So the populist backlash in Latin America – in Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, and, most disastrously, Venezuela – took a left-wing form.	因此在巴西、玻利维亚、厄瓜多尔和最具灾难性的委内瑞拉等拉美国家，民粹主义回归是以左翼形式完成的。


The story is similar in the main two exceptions to right-wing resurgence in Europe – Greece and Spain.	欧洲右翼回归的两个主要除外特例——希腊和西班牙——情况是类似的。


In Greece, the main political fault line has been austerity policies imposed by European institutions and the International Monetary Fund.	在希腊，主要的政治断点是欧洲机构和国际货币基金组织所强制推行的紧缩政策。


In Spain, most immigrants until recently came from culturally similar Latin American countries.	而在西班牙，直到不久前多数移民还来自文化相似的拉美国家。


In both countries, the far right lacked the breeding ground it had elsewhere.	极右翼势力在其他地方快速发展的温床在上述两国都是不存在的。


But the experience in Latin America and southern Europe reveals perhaps a greater weakness of the left: the absence of a clear program to refashion capitalism and globalization for the twenty-first century.	但拉美和南欧的状况或许暴露了左翼势力一个更大的弱点：那就是缺少重塑21世纪资本主义和全球化的明确计划。


From Greece’s Syriza to Brazil’s Workers’ Party, the left has failed to come up with ideas that are economically sound and politically popular, beyond ameliorative policies such as income transfers.	从希腊的激进左翼联盟到巴西工党，左翼势力除收入转移等改良政策外，都未能提出经济上可行且政治上受欢迎的想法。


Economists and technocrats on the left bear a large part of the blame.	所以经济学家和技术官僚很大程度上要为此负责。


Instead of contributing to such a program, they abdicated too easily to market fundamentalism and bought in to its central tenets.	他们不仅没能为左翼改革计划作出贡献，反而很轻易地让位给市场原教旨主义并全盘接受了其核心原则。


Worse still, they led the hyper-globalization movement at crucial junctures.	更糟的是，他们在关键时间节点领导了超全球化运动。


The enthroning of free capital mobility – especially of the short-term kind – as a policy norm by the European Union, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the IMF was arguably the most fateful decision for the global economy in recent decades.	欧盟、经合组织和国际货币基金组织将资本自由流动——尤其是短期资本流动——奉为政策标准可能是近几十年来对全球经济最致命的政策。


As Harvard Business School professor Rawi Abdelal has shown, this effort was spearheaded in the late 1980s and early 1990s not by free-market ideologues, but by French technocrats such as Jacques Delors (at the European Commission) and Henri Chavranski (at the OECD), who were closely associated with the Socialist Party in France.	哈佛商学院教授艾儒蔚（ Rawi Abdelal）已经证明，20世纪80年代末及90年代初推动这项工作的不是自由市场理论者，而是像（欧盟委员会）雅克·德洛尔和（经合组织）亨利·沙夫兰斯基这样与法国社会党有紧密联系的法国技术官僚。


Similarly, in the US, it was technocrats associated with the more Keynesian Democratic Party, such as Lawrence Summers, who led the charge for financial deregulation.	同样，在美国完成这项工作的是与亲凯恩斯主义民主党有关的劳伦斯·萨默斯等大力推进放松金融管制的技术官僚。


France’s Socialist technocrats appear to have concluded from the failed Mitterrand experiment with Keynesianism in the early 1980s that domestic economic management was no longer possible, and that there was no real alternative to financial globalization.	法国社会党技术官僚似乎从20世纪80年代初密特朗未能成功的凯恩斯主义试验中得出结论，认为国内经济管理任务是不可能完成的，而且没有其他真正的措施能够取代金融全球化。


The best that could be done was to enact Europe-wide and global rules, instead of allowing powerful countries like Germany or the US to impose their own.	能够遵循的最佳路线图是制定欧洲及全球规则，而不是坐视德美等强国强制推行他们自己的规则。


The good news is that the intellectual vacuum on the left is being filled, and there is no longer any reason to believe in the tyranny of “no alternatives.”	好消息是左翼学术真空正在得到填补，现在已经没有任何理由相信“没有其他选择”的专制举措。


Politicians on the left have less and less reason not to draw on “respectable” academic firepower in economics.	左翼政界人士越来越没有理由不去借鉴“可敬的”经济学学术力量。


Consider just a few examples: Anat Admati and Simon Johnson have advocated radical banking reforms; Thomas Piketty and Tony Atkinson have proposed a rich menu of policies to deal with inequality at the national level; Mariana Mazzucato and Ha-Joon Chang have written insightfully on how to deploy the public sector to foster inclusive innovation; Joseph Stiglitz and José Antonio Ocampo have proposed global reforms; Brad DeLong, Jeffrey Sachs, and Lawrence Summers (the very same!) have argued for long-term public investment in infrastructure and the green economy.	托马斯·皮克特和托尼·阿特金森提出了各式各样的针对国内不平等的政策； 马里亚纳·马祖卡托和张夏准开创性地指出调动公共部门以促进包容性创新的方法；


There are enough elements here for building a programmatic economic response from the left.	约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨和何塞·安东尼奥·奥坎波共同提出了全球改革； 布拉德·迪隆、杰弗里·萨克斯和劳伦斯·萨默斯（就是同一个人！


A crucial difference between the right and the left is that the right thrives on deepening divisions in society – “us” versus “them” – while the left, when successful, overcomes these cleavages through reforms that bridge them.	左右翼势力最关键的差别在于社会越分裂右翼越壮大——右翼奉行“我们”和“他们”的逻辑——而左翼如果取得成功却能通过弥合鸿沟的改革来消除社会分裂。


Hence the paradox that earlier waves of reforms from the left – Keynesianism, social democracy, the welfare state – both saved capitalism from itself and effectively rendered themselves superfluous.	因此才有了早期左翼改革（凯恩斯主义、社会民主主义和福利国家政策）——所产生的悖论，在拯救资本主义的同时却让自身成为多余的。


Absent such a response again, the field will be left wide open for populists and far-right groups, who will lead the world – as they always have – to deeper division and more frequent conflict.	如果再不出现这样的对策，民粹主义者和极右翼团体就会趁虚而入，他们将像以前那样领导世界，而他们的领导只能加剧分裂和引发更多冲突。


Global Cooperation as a Life-and-Death Issue	全球合作问题生死攸关


LONDON – The uncertainty generated by the United Kingdom’s recent vote to leave the European Union – which has sent shockwaves through global markets – has been dominating headlines.	伦敦——最近英国投票脱欧所产生的不确定性已经严重冲击全球市场，而且一直牢牢占据着报纸的头版头条。


But, as we prepare to face new political trials, we must not lose sight of the challenges we already face, especially global health challenges like the rise of antimicrobial resistance (AMR), which has no regard for economic performance or political stability.	但当我们准备迎接新的政治考验时，绝不能忽视我们已经面临的挑战，尤其是与经济效益和政治稳定不相称的细菌耐药性上升（AMR）所带来的全球健康挑战。


As it stands, an estimated 700,000 people are losing their lives to drug-resistant infections each year.	现在的情况是，每年约有700,000人死于耐药菌感染。


By 2050, this figure could skyrocket to ten million per year, at a cumulative cost to world GDP of $100 trillion..	截止2050年，该数据可能上升到每年1000万，累计给世界GDP造成的损失高达100万亿美元。


To avoid that outcome, in May the Review on AMR that I lead published its strategy for tackling such infections, laying out proposals to ensure the development of the necessary new antibiotics, and to use existing antibiotics more efficiently in humans and agriculture.	为避免出现这样的后果，今年5月，我所领导的《细菌耐药性上升评论》公布了应对上述感染的策略，就确保必要的新抗生素开发和将现有抗生素更有效的用于人类健康和农业生产提出了建议性方案。


Of the ten major interventions we proposed, four are particularly important:	在我们所建议的十大干预措施中有4项尤为重要：


· Launch a global campaign, tailored for different regions, to improve public awareness of AMR.	·       发起一场针对不同地区特点的全球运动，以提高对细菌耐药性上升问题的公众认识。


· Address the market failure in the development of new antibiotics by introducing lump-sum market-entry rewards to developers of successful new drugs, while ensuring global access.	·       通过为成功新药的研发企业提供一次性市场准入奖励解决目前新抗生素研发领域的市场失灵现象，同时确保全球都能公平地享受到研发成果。


· Advance innovation and improve use of diagnostic technology to support more efficient use of antibiotics.	·       推进创新并改善诊断技术应用，以支持抗生素的高效应用。


· Implement country-level targets focused on reducing unnecessary use of antibiotics in agriculture and humans.	·       落实旨在减少农业及人类医疗领域抗生素不必要应用的国别目标。


With our final report complete, the Review will now continue to make the international case for action directly to political leaders.	随着最终报告的完成，评论将继续直接敦促国际政治领导人采取行动。


For example, in my capacity as the Review’s Chairman, I recently discussed our recommendations at the World Health Assembly in Geneva, and with United Nations and United States policymakers in New York and Washington, DC.	比方说，作为评论的主席，我最近在日内瓦召开的世界卫生大会上与纽约和华盛顿的联合国及美国决策者讨论了我们的建议。


In these discussions, policymakers’ growing awareness of the danger posed by AMR stood out.	在上述讨论中，引人瞩目的是决策者对细菌耐药性上升危险有着越来越清醒的认识。


Just two years ago, the topic of drug-resistant infections would usually be met with questions like “What is AMR?” or, “Why would a finance minister take charge of a health crisis?”	短短两年前，耐药菌感染的话题往往会遭遇像“AMR是什么？ ”或“财政部长为什么要负责一场医疗危机？


Few understood the scale and multifaceted nature of the challenge, and thus the need for a comprehensive approach.	”这样的提问。 很少有人理解这一挑战的规模和多面性；


I asked myself similar questions when British Prime Minister David Cameron first asked me to lead the Review on AMR.	以及全面采取措施的必要性。 英国首相戴维·卡梅伦最初邀请我领导《细菌耐药性上升评论》时我也曾经问过自己类似的问题。


The situation has changed considerably since then.	自那以后情况已经发生了很大改变。


Policymakers from countries with a wide variety of economic and political systems are engaging on the AMR problem, with some countries already taking steps to tackle it.	形形色色经济和政治体制国家的决策者正在参与解决细菌耐药性上升问题，其中某些国家已经在采取针对性措施。


All of this provides grounds for hope that 2016 may be the year when real change gets underway.	所有这些都给人们带来了希望，2016年可能会启动真正的变革。


But hope is one thing; action is another.	但希望是一回事； 行动则完全不同。


While high-level meetings and speeches about AMR send the right message, they will mean nothing if we do not manage to translate the current momentum into concrete action, beginning at the G20 and UN meetings this September.	虽然高层就细菌耐药性上升问题举行的会议和讲话传达了正确的精神，但如果从今年9月召开的二十国及联合国峰会开始，我们不能成功将现有势头转化为具体行动，那么会议和讲话就没有任何意义。


And while my most recent discussions suggest that agreements are likely to be reached at both of these meetings, it is far from certain that they will match the scale of the problem.	虽然最近的讨论表明上述会议很有可能达成协议，但上述协议能否匹配问题的规模仍具有极大的不确定性。


At the G20, the needed agreement should focus on developing a global mechanism to re-invigorate the market for new antibiotics that are globally affordable, accessible, and used as efficiently as possible.	在20国峰会上，必要的协议应着眼于制定一套全球机制，为经济实惠、使用方便高效的全球新抗生素市场重新注入活力。


At the UN, the goal should be to turn the mantra of “access, not excess” into a reality, with an agreement to reduce the unnecessary use of antibiotics in agriculture, and to spearhead a global awareness campaign.	而联合国的目标应当是真正落实“使用方便而非过剩”的口号，签署一份减少农业不必要使用抗生素的协议，并发起一场全球宣传运动。


Increased funding for research and development of new antibiotics and diagnostics to fight AMR is also vital.	为新抗生素及诊断方法研发投入更多资金以应对细菌耐药性上升同样至关重要。


Crucially, the agreements must have teeth.	重要的是，协议必须长出牙齿。


Countries should set their own objectives to fit their particular circumstances and needs, but there must be some provisions to ensure that all are pulling their weight.	各国应自主制定目标以适应自身独特的需求和环境，但必须加入某些条款，以确保各方尽到自己的努力。


For starters, efforts to fight AMR should be incorporated into broader economic-development strategies, including the implementation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals.	首先，应当把解决细菌耐药性上升问题纳入更广泛的经济发展战略，其中包括落实联合国可持续发展目标。


Moreover, progress should be measured, not only so that policymakers, companies, and health systems can be held accountable, but also so that others can emulate their successes.	此外，应定期衡量目标的进展状况，这不仅是要让决策者、企业和医疗系统各负其责，也是要让他们的成功可以被其他国家所仿效。


To this end, we may need new metrics for calculating the impact of AMR.	要想达到目的，我们或许需要计算细菌耐药性上升影响的全新指标。


While this sounds technical (and it is), the reality is that top AMR scientists think that agreeing on common measurements could change the way individual countries set their own targets and improve our capacity to measure progress in the coming years.	虽然这听上去技术性很强（事实也的确如此），但现实情况是最著名的细菌耐药性问题专家认为确定共同指标可以改变各国制定其自身目标的方法，并使我们在未来若干年内能够更好地衡量进步。


Finally, to account for changing political priorities and personalities, we need a constant champion in the fight against AMR.	最后，为了防止政治目标和人物变化，我们需要在抗击细菌耐药性上升过程中设置不变的倡导者。


For example, a UN envoy on AMR could be appointed, to continue making the international case for addressing the issue and to challenge countries to meet their targets.	比方说，可以指定一名联合国细菌耐药性上升问题特使，负责持续宣传解决问题的重要性以及监督各国完成自己的目标。


Without such a consistent reminder of the need to tackle AMR, not to mention transparency about progress, the world could become sidetracked and miss the rapidly closing window of opportunity to deliver the changes needed to stop the rise of drug-resistant infections.	没有这样对解决细菌抗药性上升问题一以贯之的提醒，更不要说及时公布进展状况，世界各国就有可能受到其他问题干扰，从而错失这次推进必要改革以阻止耐药菌感染上升的转瞬即逝的机遇。


Over the last couple of years, governments, industry, and international organizations have made important strides in meeting the AMR threat.	过去几年来，政府、企业和国际组织在应对细菌耐药性上升问题上已经取得了重大进步。


But the really hard decisions must be taken now.	但现在需要我们做出真正艰难的决策。


If we are to prevent the slow-motion car crash of rising AMR, our leaders must take evasive action now.	如果想要避免细菌耐药性上升这场慢动作车祸，我们的领导人必须立即采取规避行动。


We know what we have to do; now we must get on with doing it.	我们知道应该做些什么； 现在我们必须身体力行。


Tackling AMR With the IMF	和国际货币基金组织一起解决抗生素耐药性


LONDON – This month is the first anniversary of the United Nations High-Level Meeting on Antimicrobial Resistance, which the United Kingdom’s independent Review on AMR helped to bring about.	伦敦—本月是联合国抗生素耐药性（AMR）高级别会议召开一周年，该联合国会议由英国的独立AMR评估帮助组织。


That moment last year was very gratifying for me, as the chairman of the Review, as well as for my team and the UK’s Chief Medical Officer, Sally Davies.	对我来说，去年的这个时刻令人无比光荣。 因为我是AMR评估主席，也因为我的团队和英国总医务官萨利·戴维斯（Sally Davies）。


Last year’s High-Level Meeting resolved that member-state delegates are to reconvene for a progress assessment after two years – so, in September 2018.	去年的高级别会议决议，成员国代表将在两年后再次开会评估进展情况——因此，下一次会议是在2018年9月。


The meeting also called for the establishment of an Interagency Coordination Group to guide efforts in the fight against AMR during that two-year period.	会议还号召成立一个机构间协调小组，在两年的时间里指导遏制AMR的工作。


From what I have gathered, the group is being led by deeply committed individuals.	小组由我负责召集，由非常有责任心的人士领导。


And, more broadly, policymakers at the national and international levels have begun to pay more attention to the threat of AMR.	在更广的范围上，国家和国际层面的决策者也开始将更多注意力集中在AMR的威胁上。


In fact, since the UN High-Level Meeting, the G20 has also made notable commitments in the battle against AMR.	事实上，联合国高级别会议举行后，G20也做出了崇高的遏制AMR 承诺。


At the G20 summit in Hamburg, Germany, in July, governments agreed to establish an “R&D Collaboration Hub,” and to begin to phase out antibiotics in agriculture, where producers use them to promote animal growth.	在7月的G20德国汉堡峰会上，各国政府同意成立“研发合作中心”，着手逐步停止将抗生素应用于农业。 农业生产上使用抗生素促进牲畜生长。


The UK Review recommended that an additional $2 billion be earmarked for early-stage research into AMR, so the creation of an R&D hub is very welcome.	英国AMR评估建议增加20亿美元的AMR初期研究经费，因此，建立研发中心的措施非常值得欢迎。


But the agreement to limit the use of antibiotics in agriculture was even more significant.	但限制在农业中使用抗生素的协议意义更加重大。


In the past, key G20 member states have resisted such commitments.	在过去，G20主要成员国一致拒绝做出这样的承诺。


And in the texts that served as a foundation for the UN High-Level Meeting, agriculture wasn’t even mentioned, owing to fear that it would render any eventual agreement dead on arrival.	而在作为联合国高级别会议基础的文件中，农业也没有提及，原因是担心因此导致最终协议胎死腹中。


The steps that the UN and the G20 have taken are encouraging.	联合国和G20所迈出的步伐令人鼓舞。


But the fight against AMR is hardly over, and has probably only just begun.	但遏制AMR的斗争远远没有结束，反而可能才刚刚开始。


Looking forward, one of the biggest challenges will be holding to account individual countries and multilateral organizations, such as the UN itself.	放眼未来，最大的挑战之一在于个体国家和多边组织，比如联合国自身。


How will we confirm that governments and institutions have followed through on their lofty declarations?	我们如何确定政府和机构会兑现自己的豪言壮语？


For starters, we can look at the intersection of economics and public health.	首先，我们可以着眼于经济学和公共卫生的交叉互动。


There are many ways that international institutions can use economic-policy levers to reduce significantly the probability of infectious-disease outbreaks, and to increase vulnerable countries’ resilience to such risks.	国际机构有很多方式可以撬动经济政策杠杆，大大降低传染病暴发的概率，提高脆弱国家对这一风险的抵抗力。


To my mind, the International Monetary Fund should take the lead.	在我看来，国际货币基金组织（IMF）应该起到领导作用。


As Peter Sands and his colleagues show in a May 2016 study in The Lancet, infectious-disease outbreaks have far-reaching economic costs, and yet they are rarely, if ever, factored into assessments of macroeconomic risk.	彼得·桑兹（Peter Sands）和他的同事们在2016年5月的《柳叶刀》杂志上所发表的研究表明，传染病爆发会造成巨大的经济成本，但它们很少甚至没有作为评估宏观经济风险的因素被考虑到。


The IMF already conducts regular reviews of countries’ economic health, and financial markets give significant weight to its analyses.	IMF已经有了针对各国经济健康的定期评估，金融市场分析对此非常重视。


For the sake of economic as well as public health, the Fund would do well to start tracking countries’ progress in the fight against AMR as well.	为了经济健康，也为了公共卫生，IMF同样可以在追踪各国AMR进展方面做出出色表现。


The European Union declared more than ten years ago that it would fully phase out the use of antibiotics for animal growth promotion.	十年多前，欧盟便已经宣布将禁止将抗生素用于促进牲畜生长。


But who, other than the occasional investigative journalist, has ever actually delved into EU member states’ progress toward that goal?	但除了偶尔有调查记者关注此事，还有谁真正深入到各成员国，调查这一目标的进展情况？


In the UK, my Review colleagues and I were quite impressed by the government’s formal policy response to our recommendations, especially with respect to reducing antibiotic prescriptions, preventing hospital-acquired infections, and limiting the use of antibiotics in farming to 50 milligrams per kilogram of livestock.	在英国，我的AMR评估同僚和我们的建议所引起的政府反应引线深刻，特别是在减少抗生素处方、防止住院传染和将农业中的抗生素用量限制在50毫克/千克牲畜水平方面。


Over the past year, I have given public talks at some of the British universities that are actively working on the AMR threat.	在过去的一年中，我在一些积极研究AMR威胁问题的英国大学发表公开演讲。


I have been encouraged to see more academic researchers pursuing this topic than in the past.	们鼓励我比过去更多地去会见一些该问题的学术研究者。


But when I have quizzed my audiences, I have come to realize that hardly anyone knows about the government’s policy response.	但通过提问听众，我意识到很少有人了解政府的政策反应。


This could mean that my audiences are simply uninformed; but I doubt that.	这可能只是因为我的听众们不了解情况；


What is more likely is that the government has not yet followed through on its commitments.	但我对此有所怀疑。 更有可能的情况是政府没有兑现它的承诺。


The IMF is ideally suited to get to the bottom of this question as a part of its routine economic assessments.	IMF是非常理想的解决问题者，它可以将该问题列为其常规经济评估的一部分。


And its analyses would be even more valuable to less wealthy countries, where preventing outbreaks of infectious diseases could directly boost long-term economic growth.	它的经济分析对于不太富裕的国家价值更高，在这些国家，防止传染病暴发可以对长期经济增长起到直接提振作用。


One last concern that I have on this first anniversary of the UN High-Level Meeting is that policymakers still need to agree on a source of funding for the market-entry rewards intended to encourage the development of new drugs and diagnostics.	在联合国高级别会议迎来一周年之际，我的最后一项担忧是决策者仍然没有批准旨在鼓励开发新药和新诊断方法的市场进入奖励经费。


Such innovations will be crucial for preventing and detecting AMR, and an incentive mechanism to stimulate them is increasingly regarded as the right way to go.	这些创新将是防止和发现AMR的关键，而刺激这些创新的激励机制正日益被视为正确的方法。


That, too, is a topic on which the IMF could provide invaluable advice.	在这方面，IMF也能够提供非常宝贵的建议。


The Arab Autocracy Trap	阿拉伯独裁陷阱


TEL AVIV – It has been more than six years since the start of the Arab Spring, and life for most Arabs is worse than it was in 2011.	特拉维夫—阿拉伯之春爆发已经过去六年多了，而大部分阿拉伯人的生活水平要比2011年时更加糟糕。


Unemployment is rife in the Middle East and North Africa, where two thirds of the population is between the ages of 15 and 29.	中东和北非失业四肆虐，而那里的人口有三分之二年龄在15至29岁之间。


And throughout the region, regimes have closed off channels for political expression, and responded to popular protests with increasing brutality.	放眼整个地区，体制将政治表达渠道完全关闭，对于群众示威，体制的反应也越来越残暴。


The governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and, to some extent, Morocco, epitomize Arab regimes’ seeming inability to escape the autocracy trap – even as current circumstances suggest that another popular awakening is imminent.	埃及和沙特阿拉伯政府（在某种程度上，摩洛哥政府也是如此）可谓阿拉伯国家体制无力摆脱独裁陷阱的最佳写照——即使目前的局势表明又一场群众觉醒就在眼前。


Egypt offers a classic example of how revolution often ends in betrayal.	埃及是革命如何以背叛收场的经典案例。


President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s dictatorship is even more violent than that of Hosni Mubarak, the strongman whose 30-year rule was ended by the 2011 uprising.	总统西西的独裁甚至比强人穆巴拉克还要暴力，后者统治了埃及30年，在2011年的暴动中被推翻。


With the help of a police force that he himself describes as a “million-man mafia,” Sisi has made repression the paramount organizing principle of his regime.	在被他本人称为 “百万黑帮”的警察部队的协助下，西西将镇压变成了体制最突出的组织原则。


It would be a Herculean feat for anyone to reform Egypt’s economy so that it benefits the country’s 95 million people (plus the two million added every year).	改革埃及经济、使之能够受惠于其9,500万人口（外加每年新增的两百万人），对任何人来说都是一个异常艰巨的任务。


And it is a task that Egypt’s leaders cannot avoid, because the social contract of the Mubarak years, whereby Egyptians traded freedom for an expansive welfare state and generous subsidies, is no longer sustainable.	而这个任务又是埃及领导人无可回避的，因为穆巴拉克时代的社会契约——埃及人用自由换取不断扩张的福利国家和慷慨的补助——已难以为继。


With youth unemployment at 40%, only a bold reformist president could pull Egypt back from the brink of economic disaster.	埃及年轻人失业率高达40%，只有坚定的改革派总统能够将埃及从经济灾难的边缘拉回来。


Sadly, rather than providing hope to the younger generation of Egyptians who protested in Tahrir Square six years ago, Sisi has stifled individual initiative and made the army the primary actor in the economy.	悲哀的是，西西并未没有给六年前在开罗解放广场（Tahrir Square）示威的年轻一代埃及人带来希望，而是打击个人项目，让军队成为经济的主要行为方。


Perhaps fearing even greater social unrest, Sisi has yet to meet the conditions set last November by the International Monetary Fund as part of a $12 billion bailout.	也许是担心导致更大的社会动荡，因此西西至今仍未满足去年11月国际货币基金组织（IMF）所提出的作为其120亿美元援助计划的一部分的条件。


These include drastically reducing the wage bill for Egypt’s bloated public sector, which still employs six million people (not counting the army and police); and reducing subsidies, which still constitute 30% of the national budget.	这些条件包括大幅削减埃及臃肿的公共部门（目前仍有六百万雇员，不包括军队和警察）的工资以及减少补贴（目前仍占国民预算的30%）。


Moreover, Sisi has offered even fewer institutional channels for political expression than existed under the Mubarak-era one-party system.	此外，西西所提供的表达政治诉求的制度性渠道，甚至比穆巴拉克时代的一党制还要少。


According to the Egyptian Centre for Economic and Social Rights, there were five times more street protests in Egypt in 2016 than there were, on average, in the years preceding the Arab Spring.	据埃及经济和社会权力中心（Egyptian Centre for Economic and Social Rights），2016年埃及街头抗议数量比阿拉伯之春前的平均水平多五倍。


A social volcano is forming; sooner or later, it will have to erupt.	一座社会火山正在形成，迟早会爆发。


In Saudi Arabia, the monarchical-theocratic regime weathered the Arab Spring with relative ease, because it could lavish its citizens with largesse.	在沙特阿拉伯，神权君主制相对轻松地抵挡住了阿拉伯之春，因为体制能够用慷慨施舍收买公民。


But the kingdom’s social contract, like Egypt’s, has become unsustainable, owing to falling oil prices and a population that has grown by more than 25% in the last decade alone.	但由于石油价格下跌以及人口暴增（光是在过去的十年就增加了25%），沙特王国的社会契约——和埃及一样——已经难以为继。


Earlier this year, the Saudi government was forced to cut public-sector salaries and subsidies on basic goods.	今年早些时候，沙特政府被迫削减了公共部门薪资和基本公共品补贴。


This represents a major risk for the regime (indeed, the salary cuts were quickly restored, after protests were called in four cities), not least because the state is the largest employer of Saudi citizens.	这对体制来说是一个巨大的风险（事实上，在四个城市爆发了示威之后，薪资削减很快又被加了回去），原因之一是国家是沙特公民的最大雇主。


Many of the region’s autocrats have put their faith in the “China model” of non-democratic development.	该地区的许多独裁者信奉非民主发展的“中国模式”。


But that model has clearly failed them.	但这一模式显然让他们一败涂地。


It requires far too much socioeconomic and political regimentation to be workable under prevailing conditions in the Arab world.	这一模式的社会和政治体制化要求远远超过了阿拉伯世界所具备的条件。


This implies that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s ambitious plan to transform his country’s oil-based economy into a modern industrial economy will require a long and uncertain process.	这意味着沙特王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼（Mohammed bin Salman）的雄心勃勃的计划面临着一个漫长而不确定的过程。 萨勒曼王储意欲将基于石油的沙特经济转型为现代工业经济。


Economic reforms will succeed only if they are coupled with far-reaching political reforms, which would inevitably shake the regime’s foundation.	经济改革想要成功，就必须辅之以深远的政治改革，而政治改革又必然会震动体制的基石。


Like Saudi Arabia, Morocco, another monarchy, came through the Arab Spring largely unscathed.	和沙特阿拉伯一样，另一个君主国摩洛哥也在阿拉伯之春中基本安然无恙。


At the time, King Mohammed VI wisely responded to protesters by offering constitutional reforms and elections.	当时，穆罕默德六世国王回应示威者说将进行宪政改革和选举。


But Morocco is now facing its own “Tunisia moment,” reminiscent of the street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation in 2010, in protest against state harassment.	但摩洛哥现在面临着自己的“突尼斯时刻”——类似于2010年街头小贩博阿齐齐（Mohamed Bouazizi）为反对国家对自己的骚扰而自焚。


Bouazizi’s desperate act sparked the Arab Spring.	博阿齐齐的绝望之举点燃了阿拉伯之春。


And last year, Morocco experienced a gruesome echo of it when the merchant Mouhcine Fikri was crushed to death in a trash compactor while trying to retrieve fish confiscated by the authorities.	去年，摩洛哥也经历了可怕的类似一幕。 商人费克里（Mouhcine Fikri）在试图找回被当局没收的渔获时，被垃圾压缩机碾死。


Fikri’s death triggered a wave of protests across the northern Rif, a region with a long history of rebelliousness.	费克里致死引发了摩洛哥北部里夫（Rif，该地区有着长期叛乱史）的示威潮。


Revolutionary conditions often give rise to previously unknown leaders.	革命的条件常常让此前默默无闻的领导人横空出世。


In the Rif, a 39-year-old unemployed man named Nasser Zefzafi led protests that quickly spread to other parts of the country.	在里夫，一位名叫纳赛尔·泽夫扎菲（Nasser Zefzafi）的失业男子所领导的示威很快就蔓延到摩洛哥其他地区。


Through online videos, he delivered fiery speeches in the local vernacular against government corruption and Morocco’s “dictatorship.”	通过在线视频，他用方言猛烈抨击政府腐败和摩洛哥的“独裁”。


And on June 11, the capital, Rabat, was the site of the largest popular protest since the outbreak of the Arab Spring.	6月11日，首都拉巴特爆发了自阿拉伯之春以来最大规模的群众示威。


Unlike his father, King Hassan II, Mohammed has supported the region’s indigenous Berber culture, and made investments to turn the Rif coastal region into a manufacturing hub.	与其父哈桑二世国王不同，穆罕默德支持拉夫地区的本土柏柏尔（Berber）文化，并投入资金将里夫沿海地带改造为制造业枢纽。


But progress has been erratic, because the monarchy has maintained a tight grip on all government-led economic initiatives.	但进步一波三折，因为君主牢牢掌握着所有政府领衔的经济项目。


Investments that were promised in 2015 have yet to materialize.	2015年许下的投资承诺至今仍未兑现。


Still, Morocco’s monarchy has always been a step ahead of other Arab regimes when it comes to devising calculated responses to the popular mood.	尽管如此，摩洛哥君主制在用深思熟虑的方法应对公众情绪时仍然要胜其他阿拉伯体制一筹。


This political savvy, combined with the country’s improving economy, could help the regime weather today’s turbulence and the next violent upheaval.	这一政治技巧，再加上摩洛哥不断改善的经济，有助于体制抵挡住当下的动荡和未来暴力剧变。 但政府也必须落实其2011年所承诺的政治改革；


But the government will also have to follow through on the political reforms it promised in 2011; loosen its grip on the economy; and promote inclusive growth and prosperity, including by addressing deep regional disparities.	放松对经济的把持； 并促进包容性增长和繁荣，包括解决深刻的地区差异。


When complacent kings and “elected” autocrats do not respond to public protests with a controlled revolution from above, they inevitably face a much fiercer revolution from below.	当自鸣得意的国王和“民选”独裁者不用自上而下的可控革命应对群众示威，就难免会面临更加猛烈的自下而上的革命。


For the Arab regimes, neither the promise of subsidies nor the threat of repression can squeeze the political genie back into its bottle.	对阿拉伯各国来说，不管是补贴承诺，还是镇压威胁，都无法让政治的精灵重新回到瓶中。


How Can the Arab World Avoid the Abyss?	阿拉伯世界如何避免坠入深渊？


CAIRO – A series of startling events in November revealed the abysmal state of affairs in the Arab world.	开罗——11月发生的一系列令人震惊的事件凸显了阿拉伯世界的糟糕局面。


The Lebanese prime minister announced his resignation abroad, but reversed the statement later.	黎巴嫩总理在国外宣布辞职，但后来又宣布收回声明。


A missile was launched from Yemen toward Saudi Arabia’s capital, Riyadh. Saudi Arabia’s leadership carried out a major anti-corruption campaign that affected dozens of high-profile personalities.	一枚从也门发射的导弹射向沙特阿拉伯首都利雅得，沙特阿拉伯领导层展开了一场重大反腐运动并影响了数十位引人瞩目的人物。


Egypt, meanwhile, experienced its worst terrorist attack in living memory, with more than 300 civilians killed and injured.	与此同时，埃及经历了记忆中最可怕的恐怖袭击，导致多达300余名平民死亡和受伤。


Video footage of alleged slave auctions in Libya underscored the continuing chaos there amid the complete breakdown of the Libyan state.	从利比亚流出的据称是奴隶拍卖的录像凸显了利比亚政府全面崩溃后持续不断的混乱和动荡。


Military victories against the Islamic State and a rapprochement between Palestinian factions in Gaza and the West Bank have done little to ease a collective sense of anxiety in the region.	针对伊斯兰国的军事斗争胜利以及加沙和西岸地区巴勒斯坦各派的和解并未成功缓和该地区的集体焦虑意识。


Nor have these positive developments inspired much confidence that the Arab world will somehow pull itself back from the edge of the abyss.	上述积极的事态发展也未能激发人们的信心，让民众相信阿拉伯世界能够摆脱坠入悬崖的命运。


Foreign interference has become routine in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.	叙利亚、黎巴嫩、伊拉克和也门遭受外国干预也已成为家常便饭。


And ongoing debates over identity politics and borders in the Levant are a prelude to the grave, fundamental challenges ahead.	而有关身份政治和黎凡特边境问题的持续辩论仅仅标志着开始迎接未来严峻的挑战。


In fact, the situation in the Middle East is not surprising, given that in recent years no Arab country has led attempts to resolve the ongoing conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, let alone address the Palestine-Israel issue.	事实上，中东局势并不令人惊讶，因为近年来，不要说解决巴以问题，几乎没有哪个阿拉伯国家曾经试图解决利比亚、叙利亚和也门的持续冲突。


In many of these conflicts, foreigners have had far more influence than Arabs.	在许多冲突中，阿拉伯人的影响力还不如外国人大。


Historically, the Middle East has been the target of numerous foreign invasions, from the Crusades to European colonialism.	历史上，从十字军东征到欧洲殖民主义，中东一直是无数次外国侵略的目标。


Its natural resources have been greedily usurped, and it was a theater for proxy wars during the Cold War.	这里的自然资源遭到贪婪的掠夺，而且在冷战期间曾经是代理战争的演武场。


Even today, Arab territories remain under occupation.	即使今天，阿拉伯领土仍在被占领当中。


But while there are many reasons to blame foreign powers for the region’s parlous state of affairs, blaming others – or even one another – will solve nothing.	但尽管可以找到诸多理由指责外国势力应当对该地区的危险状态负责，但责怪别人——甚或相互责怪——却什么问题也解决不了。


After all, the Arab world has many homegrown problems, too, including inefficient and ineffective governance, unholy alliances, and undeveloped national capacities.	毕竟，阿拉伯世界自身也存在许多问题，包括低效和无效治理、邪恶联盟和国家能力不发达。


Disaster awaits any region that is helpless to shape its own future, in which a majority of citizens feel disenfranchised.	任何决定不了自己未来的地区只会面临灾难，绝大部分地区民众都感到自己的权利被剥夺。


Though the Arab world is traditionally conservative, almost 70% of its citizens are below the age of 35, and young people suffer from the highest rates of unemployment in most countries.	尽管阿拉伯世界在传统上态度保守，但近70%的民众年龄都在35岁以下，而年轻人在绝大多数国家都沦为超高失业率的受害者。


This constitutes not only a tremendous waste of resources, but also a serious long-term sociopolitical problem.	这不仅构成对资源的极大浪费，而且还成为造成严重、长期社会政治问题的源头。


And yet it is just one of the many domestic challenges facing the region.	而且这还仅仅是该地区所面临的诸多国内挑战中的一个。


Arabs must take charge of their own agenda, and become the primary force defining their future and that of their countries.	阿拉伯人必须掌控自己的未来计划，将自己和祖国的未来牢牢掌控在自己的手中。


They should, of course, continue to engage with the outside world and strengthen their strategic relationships and alliances.	当然，他们应继续与外界保持接触，并强化与外界的战略关系和联盟。


But they also must become less dependent on others.	但他们必须学会不那么依赖外国人。


For starters, the region’s governments need to develop their own national-security capacities, to defend against non-existential threats and hegemonic expansionism.	首先，各国政府需要发展各自国内的国家安全能力，以防范威胁和阻止霸权扩张。


This, in turn, will enhance their political influence, and give them more diplomatic tools for addressing regional problems and preventing military conflicts.	这反过来又会增强其政治影响力，并赋予他们更多的外交手段来解决地区问题和防止军事冲突。


Moreover, Arabs must defend their national identities.	此外，阿拉伯人必须捍卫自己的民族身份。


The Middle East’s nation-state system is not perfect, but it is far better than religious or ethnic sectarianism, which threaten to destabilize the region even further.	中东地区的民族国家体系仍有待完善，但却远远胜过有可能进一步威胁地区稳定的宗教或种族派别主义。


To avoid that outcome, the region’s existing nation-states will need strong institutions to provide for efficient governance and social inclusion.	为避免出现这样的结果，该地区现有的民族国家将需要强有力的机构来提供社会包容和有效治理。


Unfortunately, most Arab countries’ institutions are nowhere near being able to meet this imperative.	不幸的是，绝大部分阿拉伯国家机构根本不具备完成任务的能力。


Looking ahead, Arabs should recognize that domestic reform is the best way to prevent foreign interference and defend national interests.	展望未来，阿拉伯人应当认识到防止外国干预和维护国家利益的最佳途径是推行国内改革。


The Arab awakenings over the last few years revealed a centrist middle-class yearning for change.	过去几年来，阿拉伯民众的觉醒体现了中立的中产阶级对变革的渴求。


Opportunistic parties tried to benefit from the turbulent environment created by sudden change.	机会主义政党竭尽全力想从局势突变所造成的动荡环境中获益。


But this does not negate the fact that these movements were a response to perpetually bad governance and a failure on the part of Arab leaders to pursue gradual reforms.	但这却无法改变这样一个事实，那就是这些运动是长期治理不善所激起的反弹，民众借此表达对阿拉伯领袖未能推进渐进式改革所引发的愤怒。


Arabs also need to give themselves a larger variety of economic, political, and security options, so that they can adapt to changing circumstances.	阿拉伯人还需要制定更多经济、政治和安全方案，以此来适应不断变化的环境。


The world is no longer bipolar or Eurocentric.	现在的世界格局不再是两极模式或欧洲中心。


In fact, it is the Westphalian state system itself, not just the postwar geopolitical paradigm, which is being tested by rapid technological, economic, and social changes.	事实上，正在接受技术、经济和社会快速变化考验的不仅限于威斯特伐利亚国家体系本身，而且还包括战后建立的地缘政治模式。


Lastly, the Arab world needs to confront regional hegemonic attitudes and the illegitimate occupation of Arab lands.	最后，阿拉伯世界必须直面地区霸权和非法占领阿拉伯领土的问题。


Solutions to current problems must respect people’s aspirations for statehood and sovereignty, while going beyond tactical or transactional approaches that provide only short-term relief.	当前问题的解决必须尊重人们对国家和主权的期待，同时又不仅仅停留在缓解短期困难的技术和交易性方式。


Ultimately, any policy that fails to protect basic rights will not succeed.	归根结底，任何无法保护基本权利的政策都无法成功落实。


Arab countries, individually and collectively, will need a fully formed strategy to confront existential foreign and domestic threats to their sovereignty and security in the coming years.	无论是单独还是作为一个群体，阿拉伯国家都需要制定一套完整的战略来应对今后几年威胁其主权和安全利益的与生死存亡息息相关的国外和国内威胁。


It is high time for Arab leaders to outline a vision for the future of inter-Arab relations, and a plan for engaging with their non-Arab neighbors on regional opportunities and challenges.	阿拉伯领袖是时候描绘未来阿拉伯国家关系的愿景，并制定计划与非阿拉伯邻国合作迎接区域挑战和机会。


Last but not least, Arab leaders must also explain how they will provide better domestic governance for their people.	最后，但同样重要的是，阿拉伯领袖必须向外界表明他们如何为国内民众提供更好的国内治理。


If the Arab world wants to have a say in shaping its own future, it cannot remain complacent in the present.	如果阿拉伯世界想保留对自己未来的发言权，就不能对现状沾沾自喜。


Its leaders and people must start planning now.	阿拉伯世界的领导人和民众必须现在就着手进行计划的制定工作。


Springtime for Fascism?	法西斯主义的春天


NEW YORK – Are we seeing a new dawn of fascism?	纽约——我们是否正看到法西斯主义新的曙光？


Many people are beginning to think so.	许多人都开始这样想。


Donald Trump has been compared to a fascist, as has Vladimir Putin and a variety of demagogues and right-wing loudmouths in Europe.	唐纳德·特朗普一直被比作法西斯主义者，同样的还有弗拉基米尔·普京和欧洲各式各样的煽动者和右翼大嘴巴。


The recent tide of authoritarian bluster has reached as far as the Philippines, whose president-elect, Rodrigo (“The Punisher”) Duterte, has vowed to toss suspected criminals into Manila Bay.	最近这股气势汹汹的独裁浪潮已经远播菲律宾，该国的当选总统罗德里戈·杜特尔特（外号“惩罚者”）发誓要将犯罪嫌疑人扔进马尼拉湾。


The problem with terms like “fascism” or “Nazi” is that so many ignorant people have used them so often, in so many situations, that they have long ago lost any real significance.	“法西斯主义”或“纳粹”等词汇的问题是它们被太多无知的人频繁使用，以至于在太多情况下早就失去了任何实质意义。


Few still know firsthand what fascism actually meant.	没有多少人还能真正理解法西斯主义实际的含义。


It has become a catch-all phrase for people or ideas we don't like.	法西斯主义已经成为形容我们不喜欢的人或理念的包罗万象的短语。


Loose rhetoric has coarsened not only political debate, but historical memory, too.	随意的说法不仅粗化了政治辩论、而且粗化了历史记忆。


When a Republican politician compares US property taxes with the Holocaust, as one Senate candidate did in 2014, the mass murder of Jews is trivialized to the extent of becoming meaningless.	当2014年一位共和党参议员候选人将美国财产税比作大屠杀，对犹太人的大规模谋杀被轻视到几乎毫无意义。


The same is roughly true when Trump is compared to Hitler or Mussolini.	将特朗普比作希特勒或墨索里尼的情况也大致如此。


As a result, we are too easily distracted from the real dangers of modern demagoguery.	结果是我们太过容易被从现代煽动的真正危险中转移注意力。


After all, it is not hard for Trump – or the Netherlands’ Geert Wilders, or Putin, or Duterte – to refute accusations of being fascists or Nazis.	毕竟，特朗普——荷兰的威尔德斯、普京或杜特尔特——反驳法西斯分子和纳粹的指责并非难事。


They may be repulsive, but they are not organizing uniformed storm troopers, building concentration camps, or calling for the corporate state.	他们或许令人生厌，但他们并未组织身穿制服的冲锋队、建立集中营或呼吁成立企业政府。


Putin comes closest, but even he is not Hitler.	普京离纳粹差距最小，但即使他也不是希特勒。


Of course, forgetfulness or ignorance about the past goes both ways.	当然，对于过去的健忘或无知所起作用是双向的。


When a young Dutch writer, sympathetic to the new populist wave, expressed antipathy to his country’s “cultural elite,” for promoting “atonal music” and other arrogant forms of ugliness, instead of the wholesome beauty embraced by the common man, I wondered whether he knew about the Nazis’ attack on “degenerate art”?	当同情新民粹主义浪潮的一位年轻的荷兰作家对国内的“文化精英们”表达反感，指责他们宣传“无调音乐”和其他狂妄的丑恶形式而排斥普通人认可的健康美时，我不禁奇怪他是否知道纳粹曾对“堕落的艺术”发起攻击。


Atonal music, hardly the cutting edge today, was precisely the kind of thing that Hitler’s minions loathed – and ultimately banned.	没有曲调的音乐今天已算不上多么前卫，而这恰恰是希特勒的下属们厌恶——并且最终取缔的东西。


There are other echoes of our darkest history in contemporary political bombast, which a few decades ago would still have cast any politician who used it to the margins.	在当代政治夸夸其谈中还有些东西反映了我们最黑暗的历史，这样的元素在短短几十年前还注定会将敢于犯禁的任何政治家推向边缘化的境地。


Stoking hatred of minorities, fulminating against the press, stirring up the mob against intellectuals, financiers, or anyone who speaks more than one language, were not part of mainstream politics, because enough people still understood the dangers of such talk.	煽动对少数族裔的仇恨、怒斥记者、挑起群众反对知识分子、金融家或任何掌握不止一门语言者曾无法进入主流的政治思想，因为有足够多的人依然明白上述说法的危险性。


It is clear that today's demagogues don’t much care about what they derisively call “political correctness.”	很显然，今天的煽动者不太在乎他们以嘲笑的口吻所称谓的“政治正确”。


It is less clear whether they have enough historical sense to know that they are poking a monster that post-World War II generations hoped was dead but that we now know only lay dormant, until obliviousness to the past could enable it to be reawakened.	我们不太清楚他们是否有足够的历史常识，明白自己正在唤醒一个后二战一代希望已经死去、但现在我们知道只是休眠的魔鬼，直到遗忘过去可以让它重新醒过来。


This is not to say that everything the populists say is untrue.	我并不是说民粹主义者所说的一切都没有道理。


Hitler, too, was right to grasp that mass unemployment was a problem in Germany.	希特勒当时同样也正确指出了德国的大规模失业现象。


Many of the agitators’ bugbears are indeed worthy of criticism: the European Union’s opacity, the duplicitousness and greed of Wall Street bankers, the reluctance to tackle problems caused by mass immigration, the lack of concern for those hurt by economic globalization.	许多煽动者所恐惧的现象的确都值得批评：欧盟缺乏透明度、华尔街银行家贪婪狡诈、人们不愿直面大规模移民所造成的问题，以及对深受经济全球化伤害的人缺少关注。


These are all problems that mainstream political parties have been unwilling or unable to solve.	这些问题主流政党一直不愿或无法解决。


But when today’s populists start blaming “the elites,” whoever they may be, and unpopular ethnic or religious minorities, for these difficulties, they sound uncomfortably close to the enemies of liberal democracy in the 1930s.	但当今天的民粹主义者开始指责是“精英阶层”（无论精英阶层指的是什么）和不受欢迎的种族或宗教少数族裔造成了这些困难，他们的看法与20世纪30年代自由民主政体的敌人听上去惊人的相似。


The true mark of the illiberal demagogue is talk of “betrayal.”	谈论“背叛”是狭隘煽动者真正的特色。 国际化精英们在背后捅“我们”一刀；


The cosmopolitan elites have stabbed “us” in the back; we are facing an abyss; our culture is being undermined by aliens; our nation can become great again once we eliminate the traitors, shut down their voices in the media, and unite the “silent majority” to revive the healthy national organism.	我们的文化正在遭受外国人的破坏； 一旦我们消灭叛徒、不让他们在媒体上说话并团结“沉默的大多数”重振健康的国家肌体，我们的国家就可以再次复兴。


Politicians and their boosters who express themselves in this manner may not be fascists; but they certainly talk like them.	采用这种表达方式的政治家及其支持者或许不是法西斯主义者，但他们的论调却与真正的法西斯惊人的相似。


The fascists and Nazis of the 1930s did not come from nowhere.	20世纪30年代的法西斯和纳粹并非空穴来风。


Their ideas were hardly original.	他们的很多理念也不是原创的。


For many years, intellectuals, activists, journalists, and clerics had articulated hateful ideas that laid the groundwork for Mussolini, Hitler, and their imitators in other countries.	多年来，知识分子、活动人士、记者和神职人员不停地灌输仇恨理念，从而为墨索里尼、希特勒及其在其他国家的模仿者打下了基础。


Some were Catholic reactionaries who detested secularism and individual rights.	其中有些是厌恶世俗主义和个人权利的天主教反对派。


Some were obsessed with the supposed global domination of Jews.	有些则沉湎于所谓的犹太人统治全球。


Some were romantics in search of an essential racial or national spirit.	还有些是寻找不可或缺的种族或国家精神的理想主义者。


Most modern demagogues may be only vaguely aware of these precedents, if they know of them at all.	就算绝大多数现代煽动者知道这样的先例，他们的了解也大抵非常模糊。


In Central European countries like Hungary, or indeed in France, they may actually understand the links quite well, and some of today’s far-right politicians are not shy about being openly anti-Semitic.	在匈牙利这样的中欧国家、甚或是在法国，他们实际可能非常了解个中关系，而且今天某些极右翼政客毫不避讳地公然抨击犹太人。


In most West European countries, however, such agitators use their professed admiration for Israel as a kind of alibi, and direct their racism at Muslims.	但在多数西欧国家，煽动者利用对以色列毫不隐讳的钦佩作为某种托词，并将种族主义仇恨指向穆斯林民众。


Words and ideas have consequences.	语言和思想都能够产生后果。


Today’s populist leaders should not yet be compared to murderous dictators of the fairly recent past.	将今天的民粹主义领袖与并不遥远过去那些无情的独裁者相提并论到现在为止还并不恰当。


But, by exploiting the same popular sentiments, they are contributing to a poisonous climate, which could bring political violence into the mainstream once again.	但通过利用相同的民众情绪，他们正在营造一种有毒的氛围，并有可能因此令政治暴力再次成为社会主流。


Are Democrats Really Better for America’s Economy?	民主党真的对美国经济更好吗？


CAMBRIDGE – Hillary Clinton has repeatedly claimed in recent months that the US economy does much better when a Democrat is in the White House.	坎布里奇—近几个月来，希拉里·克林顿反复声称，在民主党入主白宫时，美国经济表现显著更好。


Coming from the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee, that probably sounds like political spin.	这话从推定民主党总统提名人口中说出来，可能显得有些像是政治伎俩。


But the truth is that she is absolutely right.	但真相是她的话绝对正确。


The president, no doubt, is but one of many factors shaping the economy, and some presidents have certainly been luckier than others.	毫无疑问，总统只是决定经济的诸多因素之一，一些总统也显然比其他总统更加幸运。


But that doesn’t mean that Clinton’s claim is only “half true,” as asserted by some media fact-checkers (including the Pulitzer Prize-winning PolitiFact).	但这并不意味着克林顿的说法如一些媒体事实考据机构（包括获得普利策奖的PolitiFact）所言只是“半对”。


The difference in economic performance under Democratic and Republican presidents is consistent and substantial, with the disparities clearly above the threshold for statistical significance.	民主党和共和党总统治下的经济表现区别是持久且显著的，并且差异显然要高于统计显著性阈值。


Princeton University economists Alan Blinder and Mark Watson confirm this Democratic dividend in a recent study.	普林斯顿大学经济学家艾伦·布林德（Alan Blinder）和马克·沃森（Mark Watson）在 一项最新研究中确认了这一民主党红利。


Their starting point is the observation that in the post-World War II period (from Harry Truman to Barack Obama), annual GDP growth has averaged 4.3% during Democratic administrations, compared to 2.5% under Republicans.	他们的研究起点是一项观察：二战以来（从杜鲁门到奥巴马），平均年GDP增长率在民主党执政时期为4. 3%，而共和党执政时期为2.


If one goes back further, to include Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt, the disparity is even larger.	5%。 在往上追溯，将胡佛和富兰克林·罗斯福也包括在内，那么差距还会更大。


The results are similar even if one assigns responsibility for the first three months – or the first few quarters – of a president’s term to his predecessor.	即使将总统任期的前三个月（或最初几个季度）的责任归于其前任，结果也是类似。


But there is more.	但这不是全部。


Over the 256 quarters in the 16 post-war presidential terms, the US economy was in recession for an average of 1.1 quarters during Democratic presidencies and 4.6 quarters during the Republican terms.	在16个战后总统任期的256个季度中，美国经济在民主党总统执政期间平均遭遇1. 1个季度的衰退，而在共和党执政期间遭遇4.


The odds that such a large difference is the result of mere chance are no more than one in 100.	6个季度的衰退。 如此大的差距为随机造成的可能性不到百分之一。


And the trend is not restricted to GDP.	并且这一趋势不仅仅局限于GDP。 1945年以降，平均而言民主党执政期间失业率下降0.


Since 1945, the unemployment rate fell by 0.8 percentage points under Democrats, on average, and rose by 1.1 percentage points under Republicans – a remarkable difference of 1.9 percentage points.	8个百分点，而共和党执政期间上升1. 1个百分点——其中的差距达到了令人瞩目的1.


The structural budget deficit has also been smaller under Democratic presidents (1.5% of potential GDP) than when Republicans have been in office (2.2%), though this has not stopped Republicans from criticizing Democrats for excessive spending.	结构性预算赤字在民主党总统执政期间（潜在GDP的1. 5%）也比共和党执政期间（2.


Even returns on the S&P 500 have been substantially higher under Democrats – 8.4% versus 2.7%.	2%）小，尽管这并没有阻止共和党批评民主党支出过度。 就连标准普尔500指数在民主党执政期间涨幅也显著更高——8.


(This differential is not as significant statistically, however, because equity prices are so volatile.)	7%。 （但股价波动太大，这一差异并不具有统计显著性）。


The likelihood that luck alone could have produced such large and consistent differences in economic performance is extremely low – a point that can be illustrated even without fancy econometrics.	在经济表现发面存在如此巨大而持久的差距，仅仅是运气造成的可能性极低——不需要深奥的计量经济学就可以说明这一点。


Take the recession record.	以衰退记录为例。


If the chances of a recession starting during a Democratic or a Republican president’s term were equal, the odds of four successive recessions beginning under Republicans would be 16 to one – the same as getting “heads” on four out of four coin-flips.	如果衰退始于民主党和共和党总统任期内的机会相等，那么连续四次衰退始于共和党执政期间的可能性是十六分之一——等于扔四次硬币，次次都是正面朝上。


That is not particularly likely, yet it is exactly what happened in the last 35 years.	这样的可能性很低，但过去35年正是如此。


If one were to go back ten business cycles assuming an equal chance of a recession starting under a Democratic or a Republican president, the odds become even longer.	如果你追溯十次商业周期，并假设衰退始于民主党和共和党总统任期内机会相等，可能性就更小了。


There is only a 100-to-one chance that nine out of the last ten recessions would have begun under Republican presidents.	过去十次衰退中有九次始于共和党总统执政期间，这样的可能性只有一百分之一。


Yet they did, as confirmed by the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee.	但事实就是如此，有NBER 商业周期日期确定委员会为证。


An even more startling fact emerges from a review of the last eight times an incumbent from one party was succeeded by a president from the other party.	而更令人震惊的事实来自过去八次两党总统轮替。


In the four transitions when a Republican took office, GDP growth slowed; in the other four transitions, when a Democrat moved in, the growth rate went up.	在共和党上台的四次转换中，GDP增长放缓； 在其他四次，即民主党上台时，增长加速。


That is as unlikely as getting heads on eight coin tosses in a row – a one-in-256 shot.	这相当于掷硬币八次，次次正面朝上——概率只有256分之一。


Democrats thus have not succeeded by luck alone.	因此，民主党的成功不是光靠幸运。


(In fact, Blinder and Watson also observe that the US economy performs better when Democrats control Congress or have appointed the Federal Reserve chair, though the main determinant remains the party of the president.)	（事实上，布林德和沃森还观察到，当民主党控制国会或任命美联储主席时，美国经济表现也更好，尽管主要决定因素仍是总统来自哪个党派。


So what accounts for the partisan performance gap?	）那么，是什么造成了党派表现差距。


Blinder and Watson suggest that five factors – oil shocks, productivity growth, defense spending, foreign economic growth, and consumer confidence – may together explain 56% of the growth gap.	布林德和沃森认为五个因素——石油冲击、生产率增长、防务支出、外国经济增长和消费者信心——加起来解释了增长差距的56%。


But it is impossible to know the extent to which these factors were influenced by the US president’s policies.	但无从知道这些因素在多大程度上受美国总统政策影响。


We know even less about the factors responsible for the other 44% of the performance gap.	更不为人知的是其余44%的表现差距是拜何种因素所赐。


In assessing Clinton’s statements on this topic, the fact-checkers make much of the finding by Blinder and Watson that, contrary to widespread assumptions, fiscal and monetary policies are not more “pro-growth” or expansionary under Democrats than under Republican presidents, and therefore cannot explain the performance differential.	在评估克林顿在这个话题上的主张时，事实考据者引用了布林德和沃森的许多发现：与流行的假设相反，财政和货币政策在民主党执政期间并不比共和党总统任期内更加“亲增长”或具有扩张性，因此不能解释经济表现差异。


But presidents make many policy decisions – concerning energy, anti-trust, regulation, trade, labor, and foreign policy, to name a few – beyond how much fiscal and monetary stimulus to pursue.	但除了采取多少财政和货币刺激，总统还要做出很多政策决定——能源、反垄断、监管、贸易、劳工、外交政策，等等。


There is no way to test econometrically this myriad of policies.	无法用计量经济学检验这些政策。


It is this uncertainty that has driven the fact-checkers to rate Clinton’s statements as half-true.	正是这一不确定性促使事实考据者将克林顿的主张称为半对。


But she never attempted to pinpoint particular policies to explain the performance gap.	但她从未试图通过特定的政策来解释表现差异。


All she said was that the US economy does better under Democratic presidents.	她说的只是美国经济在民主党总统执政期间表现更好。


That is 100% true.	这100%正确。


Mapping the Future of AI	勾勒人工智能的未来


BRIGHTON – Artificial intelligence already plays a major role in human economies and societies, and it will play an even bigger role in the coming years.	布莱顿—人工智能（AI）已经在人类经济和社会中起着重要作用，而在未来几年，它的作用还将更加重大。


To ponder the future of AI is thus to acknowledge that the future is AI.	因此，思考AI的未来就是要承认未来就是AI。


This will be partly owing to advances in “deep learning,” which uses multilayer neural networks that were first theorized in the 1980s.	这部分要归因于“深度学习”方面的进步。 深度学习使用20世纪80年代开始理论化的多层神经网络。


With today’s greater computing power and storage, deep learning is now a practical possibility, and a deep-learning application gained worldwide attention in 2016 by beating the world champion in Go.	有了当今更加强大的计算能力和储存容量，深度学习已经具备现实可行性。 2016年Go击败世界冠军，这让深度学习应用获得了全世界的关注。


Commercial enterprises and governments alike hope to adapt the technology to find useful patterns in “Big Data” of all kinds.	商业企业和政府都希望采用这项技术在各种“大数据”中寻找有用的模式。


In 2011, IBM’s Watson marked another AI watershed, by beating two previous champions in Jeopardy!, a game that combines general knowledge with lateral thinking.	2011年，IBM的沃森（Watson）标志了另一座AI分水平，它在“危险！ ”（Jeopardy!


And yet another significant development is the emerging “Internet of Things,” which will continue to grow as more gadgets, home appliances, wearable devices, and publicly-sited sensors become connected and begin to broadcast messages around the clock.	这项游戏需要结合一般知识和横向思考。 另一项更加重大的发展是“物联网”的出现，随着更多装置、家用电器、可穿戴设备和公共场合传感器连入网络、开始随时传播消息，物联网还将继续成长。


Big Brother won’t be watching you; but a trillion little brothers might be.	老大哥不会看着你，但万亿小大哥也许会看着你。


Beyond these innovations, we can expect to see countless more examples of what were once called “expert systems”: AI applications that aid, or even replace, human professionals in various specialties.	除了这些创新，我们还可以期待看到无数我们曾经称为“专家系统”的例子：AI应用在各种专业领域辅助乃至取代人类专业人士。


Similarly, robots will be able to perform tasks that could not be automated before.	类似地，机器人将胜任此前无法自动化的任务。


Already, robots can carry out virtually every role that humans once filled on a warehouse floor.	目前，机器人已经可以完成人类在仓储方面的几乎所有工作。


Given this trend, it is not surprising that some people foresee a point known as the “Singularity,” when AI systems will exceed human intelligence, by intelligently improving themselves.	考虑到这一趋势，毫不奇怪一些人预测将出现所谓的“奇点”，AI系统将超越人类智能，智能化地改善自身。


At that point, whether it is in 2030 or at the end of this century, the robots will truly have taken over, and AI will consign war, poverty, disease, and even death to the past.	到了这一步——不管是2030年还是本世纪末——机器人将真正接管，而AI将把战争、贫困、疾病甚至死亡抛入历史的垃圾堆。


To all of this, I say: Dream on.	对于所有这些，我要说的是：继续做梦。


Artificial general intelligence (AGI) is still a pipe dream.	人工一般智能（AGI）仍然是一个白日梦。


It’s simply too difficult to master.	它太难掌握。


And while it may be achieved one of these days, it is certainly not in our foreseeable future.	尽管它有朝一日可能会成为现实，但显然不会是可预见的未来。


But there are still major developments on the horizon, many of which will give us hope for the future.	但我们仍然可以看到不少重大发展，其中许多让我们对未来充满希望。


For example, AI can make reliable legal advice available to more people, and at a very low cost.	比如，AI可以为更多人提供可靠的法律建议，并且成本非常低廉。


And it can help us tackle currently incurable diseases and expand access to credible medical advice, without requiring additional medical specialists.	它可以帮助我们治疗目前不可治愈的疾病，扩大可信医疗建议的普及面，而不需要增加医学专家人数。


In other areas, we should be prudently pessimistic – not to say dystopian – about the future.	在其他领域，我们应该对未来保持审慎悲观——不是说反乌托邦。


AI has worrying implications for the military, individual privacy, and employment.	AI对军事、个人隐私和就业造成了令人担忧的影响。


Automated weapons already exist, and they could eventually be capable of autonomous target selection.	自动武器已经存在，并且最终将具备自动遴选目标的能力。


As Big Data becomes more accessible to governments and multinational corporations, our personal information is being increasingly compromised.	随着政府和跨国企业越来越容易获得大数据，我们的个人信息日益危险。


And as AI takes over more routine activities, many professionals will be deskilled and displaced.	而随着AI接管更多的常规活动，许多职业将被去技能化（deskilled）和取代。


The nature of work itself will change, and we may need to consider providing a “universal income,” assuming there is still a sufficient tax base through which to fund it.	工作本身的性质也将发生改变，我们可能需要考虑提供“全民收入”，如果税基仍然足够提供资金的话。


A different but equally troubling implication of AI is that it could become a substitute for one-on-one human contact.	AI的另一个不同但同样令人担忧的影响是它可能成为一对一人际联系的替代品。