In the case of enforcing the no-fly zone, Resolution 1973 allows the destruction, by aircraft or missile, of any loyalist jet or helicopter that takes off, any pro-Qaddafi forces’ anti-aircraft batteries or missile-launch sites, and the disabling of any airstrip.	在禁飞区问题上，1973号决议允许利用飞机或导弹摧毁任何敢于起飞的效忠卡扎菲的直升机或战斗机，支持卡扎菲的高射炮或导弹发射基地，以及简易机场和跑道等设施。


And, as for the wider mandate to protect civilians, the resolution allows airborne attacks to knock out tanks or troop columns advancing on Benghazi or other rebel-held towns, and – should they exist – concentrations of forces within those areas that pose a direct and immediate threat to Qaddafi’s opponents.	关于保护平民的广义任务，决议授权进行空中打击，摧毁向班加西或其他叛军城镇开进的坦克或地面部队，并允许在反对派控制区出现直接威胁卡扎菲对手的军事集结时一举将其消灭。


In both cases, some questions do arise at the margin.	无论上述哪种情况，都会涉及一些临界问题。


Is it within the scope of the no-fly zone to take out command and control centers that might direct aircraft?	摧毁可能指挥飞机的指挥控制中心是否在禁飞区的授权范围之内？


Can it possibly be legitimate to kill regime forces actually fleeing from a protected area, or in some other way posing no obvious or imminent threat to civilians?	袭击实际正在逃离保护区的政府军是否合法，以及是否允许袭击并未对平民构成显著伤害或者即将伤及平民的部队？


Should a line be drawn against any otherwise legitimate action against Qaddafi’s forces that would be likely to put innocent civilians at risk?	是否应该对可能造成无辜平民伤亡的针对卡扎菲部队的合法行动进行限制？


Beyond these questions, there is nothing to debate.	除上述问题外不存在其他的争议问题。


Military action expressly designed to kill Qaddafi or force him into exile, to ensure a rebel victory in a civil war, or to achieve a more open and responsive system of government in Libya is not permissible under the explicit terms of Resolution 1973.	第1973号决议明文规定，明确旨在杀死卡扎菲或迫其逃亡、协助叛军在内战中获胜、或在利比亚建立更灵活开放的政府体系的军事行动不在授权的范围之内。


Nor is it permissible under the moral first principles of the “responsibility to protect” doctrine unanimously endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2005 in an effort to end mass atrocities once and for all.	上述行为同样违背了联合国大会2005年一致通过的旨在永远结束大规模暴行的以“保护责任”为主旨的道德至上原则。


True, one or more of these results might, conceivably, be the effect of permissible military action, but they cannot be its objective.	当然，这些理所当然可能成为授权军事行动的结果，但却不应是授权军事行动的目的。


It also follows from these legal and moral first principles that once there are reasonable grounds for confidence that the threat to civilian populations has been removed or neutralized (as seems now to be largely the case, at least in the east), military action should cease.	法律和道德至上原则同样意味着一旦认为对平民构成威胁的合理前提不复存在（目前似乎就基本符合这种情况，至少在东部是这样），那么就应该停止军事行动。


Of course, a close watch should be maintained, so that enforcement action under Resolution 1973 can be very quickly reinstated.	当然还需要保持密切的观察，以便一旦出现紧急情况，1973号决议规定的执法行动可以迅速恢复。


But offshore-based airborne action, with a sharply defined and limited objective, is much less susceptible to the kind of mission-creep and quagmire problems that often beset intervening ground forces, especially those with an inherently confused mandate, as in Afghanistan.	但是明确规定目标和限制条件的境外空袭远不像地面部队介入（特别是像阿富汗行动那样从一开始目标界定就并不清晰的任务）那样容易偏离原来的目标，以致无法自拔地陷入两难的境地。


As the situation in Libya and the wider Middle East unfolds, policymakers are bound to face further acute dilemmas, not least in responding to continuing repression in Tripoli, or the similarly ugly and fragile situations in Bahrain and Yemen.	随着利比亚和中东其他地区局势的发展，决策者们注定会面临严重的困境，尤其是应对的黎波里的持续压迫，以及巴林和也门类似的丑恶和脆弱的形势。


Mustering the cross-cultural political will to give the responsibility to protect real – and consistent – teeth will always be difficult.	鼓起超越文化界线的政治勇气来履行保护平民义务从来就并非易事。


But, at least in the case of Libya, a vital precedent has been set.	但至少利比亚树立了一个至关重要的先例。


The Security Council has written the right script; we must now make sure that we follow it.	安理会制定了正确的规定，我们现在要做的是确保规定的严格贯彻。


Stimulating Equality	激发平等


NEW YORK – With unemployment climbing in the United States and other OECD countries, job creation is a key objective for policymakers.	纽约-随着美国和其他经合组织国家失业率的攀升，创造就业机会是决策者的一个重要目标。


In the US, President Barack Obama recently proposed to increase public spending by about $600 billion over the next two years to create an additional four million jobs.	在美国，总统奥巴马最近提议在未来两年内增加六千亿美元的公共开支以创造四百万个新的就业机会。


But Obama is also concerned with reversing a sharp rise in income inequality (which is now at an 80-year high).	但是，奥巴马同时还要关心扭转急剧恶化的收入不平等问题（现处于80年来的新高） 。


Is it possible for leaders to do both at the same time?	这些领导人有可能一石二鸟吗？


The answer is unequivocally yes, but only if they focus on government spending rather than reforming their tax systems.	答案毫无疑问是肯定的，但前提是他们须把重点放在政府开支上，而不是改革其税收制度上。


That lesson is even more powerful for other advanced countries like Germany and France, which spend a far higher percentage of GDP on public programs (35% and 43%, respectively, in 2005) than the US (only 25%).	这个教训对于其它先进国家如德国和法国，更是有着强大的警示作用，这两个国家在公共项目上的开支所占国民生产总值的比例（ 2005年分别为35 ％和43 ％ ，）远远超过了美国（只有25 ％ ） 。


America’s tax system has surprisingly little redistributional punch.	美国的税收制度的再分配作用很小。


Using a measure of “comprehensive income” – money income, total capital gains on wealth, imputed rent on owner-occupied housing, non-cash government benefits, and public consumption – income taxes are generally progressive.	美国使用的是“综合收入” 的衡量标准-货币收入、财富的资本总收益、业主自用住房的推算租金、非现金的政府福利和公共消费-因此一般都是累进所得税。


Federal income taxes as a proportion of income increase steadily from 2% at the 10th percentile (that is, a family ranked tenth from the bottom out of 100) to 14% at the 90th percentile, but then falls off slightly to 13% at the very top, reflecting the favorable treatment of capital gains and investment income under the Bush administration’s income-tax laws.	按收入比例征收的联邦收入税是从最底部开始稳步增加，从在第10百分位（即一个家庭排名从底部往上算排在最底层的10%的位置）的2 ％ ，到在90百分位的14 ％，但到了最高收入阶层的时候，略为减少到13 ％，这反映了布什政府的所得税法对资本收益和投资收入的优惠待遇。


On the other hand, social security taxes – the biggest tax for more than two-thirds of families – are mildly regressive.	另一方面，社会保障税-这是三分之二以上的家庭的最大的纳税部分-是以适度的递减税率来计算的。


Social security taxes as a proportion of income rise gradually from 5% at the 10th percentile to 9% at the 80th percentile, stay there at the 90th percentile, but then fall off sharply to 5% at the top.	社会保障税所占的收入中的比例从第10百分位的5 ％ ，逐步增加至80百分位的9 ％ ，一直到90百分位仍停留在此比例上，但到了收入最顶端的阶层又急剧下降至5 ％。


This decline reflects the wage cap on social security taxes (currently at $102,000).	这种下降反映了社会保障税有工资上限，（目前为十万二千美元） 。


The total tax burden on families also includes sales taxes, which are steeply regressive, and property taxes, which are progressive.	家庭的总纳税负担中还包括销售税，这是以大幅度递减税率来计算的，还有财产税，这是以累进税率来计算的。


Total personal taxes are mildly progressive, increasing steadily as a share of income from 14% at the 10th percentile to 28% at the 90th percentile, but then falling off sharply to 22% at the top, owing to the favorable treatment of capital gains and investment income, the wage cap on social security taxes, and the sharp regressivity of sales taxes.	总的个人税是温和地累进的，纳税额所占收入的比例从在第10百分位的14 ％直到在90百分位的28 ％不断增加； 但到了最顶级收入的时候，锐减至22 ％，这是由于对资本收益和投资收入的优惠措施和社会保障税的工资封顶，以及大幅度递减的销售税。


On the other hand, total transfers have a much bigger equalizing effect on incomes.	而另一方面，政府补贴总额则对收入的均衡化有更大的影响。


Cash transfers, like social security and unemployment insurance, are highly equalizing.	现金补贴，比如社会保险和失业保险，具有高度的均衡效果。


When the value of non-cash government benefits, like Medicaid, Medicare, and Food Stamps, are also included, total transfers become extremely progressive.	当非现金的政府福利的价值，比如医疗保险、医疗保险和粮食券也包括在内的话，总周转变得极其递增。


As a proportion of income, they fall almost continuously, from 50% at the 10th percentile to 2.5% at the very top.	其占收入的比例几乎持续地下降，从在第10百分位的50 ％降至最顶端的2. 5 ％ 。


But government spending on goods and services, like education, highways, police, and sanitation, has distributional consequences, too, and can be allocated to actual beneficiaries in much the same way as government transfers.	但是，政府在事项和服务如教育、公路、警察、卫生方面的开支，也有分配的效果，也可以以和政府周转非常类似的方式分配给实际受益人。


Educational expenditures are allocated on the basis of the number of schoolchildren in the family.	教育支出的分配是基于中小学生在家庭中的人数；


Highway spending is allocated in proportion to the number of cars owned by the family and estimated miles driven.	公路支出按家庭所拥有汽车数量和估计驾驶的里程分配；


Collective goods like fire and police protection are allocated on a per capita basis.	如消防和警察保护那样的集体事项的分配则按人头来计算。


Public consumption is just as progressive as transfer payments.	公共消费和补贴金额一样是累进式的。


As a proportion of income, it declines almost continuously, from 34% at the 10th percentile to 3% at the very top.	作为占收入的比例，它几乎不断下降，从在第10百分位的34 ％降至最顶端的3 ％ 。


The main beneficiaries of public spending are the poor and the middle class.	公共开支的主要受益者是穷人和中产阶级。


When you add together government transfers and public consumption and subtract taxes paid, you get a figure for net government expenditures. This is extremely progressive.	当你把政府周转额和公共消费相加，然后减去所付的税款，你会获得一个净政府开支额。 这是非常渐进的。


As a share of income, it declines sharply from 70% at the 10th percentile to -16% at the top (in other words, the top bracket pays more in taxes than it receives in government benefits).	作为占收入的份额，它在第10百分位上的70 ％ ，大幅下降至顶端的-16 ％（换句话说，顶端收入人群支付的税额比它收到的政府补助金更多） 。


In fact, the crossover point between positive and negative net government expenditures is at the 66th percentile.	事实上，正和负的政府支出净额之间的交叉点是在第66百分位。


The extremely progressive nature of net government expenditures comes about equally from government transfers and public spending; very little is contributed by taxes.	政府支出净额的极端的渐进性由政府周转和公共开支这两项几乎一样地产生的;而很少是因为税收的缘故。


It is not just the poor who benefit from net governmental expenditures.	不仅是穷人受益于政府支出净额。


The middle class is also a big beneficiary.	中产阶级也是一个大受益者。


Between 1959 and 2005, about half of the growth of the middle class’s income came from increased net government expenditures.	1959年和2005年之间，约有一半的中产阶级收入增长来自于的政府净支出的增长。


Indeed, from 2000 to 2004, the increase in net government expenditures accounted for 150% of income growth, as other sources of income shriveled up.	事实上，从2000到2004年，净政府开支额的增长占了收入增长的150 ％，而其它的收入来源枯竭了。


Net government spending also helped to reduce overall inequality over those years.	政府支出净额在这些年来也有助于降低整体的不平等现象。


As Obama and other leaders around the world implement stimulus packages in the months ahead, they should recognize that the question of who benefits goes beyond the number of jobs created.	当奥巴马和其他领导人在今后几个月中在世界各地执行刺激经济的计划时，他们必须把眼光放远，认识到谁将得益这个问题不仅仅是带来了多少个新的就业机会的问题。


Government spending, no less than government transfers, has actual beneficiaries.	不低于政府周转额的政府支出额，有着实际的受益者。


If these packages target education (very redistributive) or sanitation, fire, police, and highways (mildly redistributive), they can create jobs and reduce inequality.	如果这些计划的目标是教育（有非常强的再分配效果），或卫生、消防、警察和公路（有轻度的再分配效应） ，它们可以创造就业机会同时也会减��不平等现象。


Are Equities Overvalued?	股票高估了吗？


MILAN – Since the global economic crisis, sharp divergences in economic performance have contributed to considerable stock-market volatility.	米兰—自全球经济危机以来，经济表现的巨大差异导致了股票市场的剧烈波动。


Now, equity prices are reaching relatively high levels by conventional measures – and investors are starting to get nervous.	如今，从常规指标看，股价已经到达了相对较高的位置——投资者也开始紧张起来。


The question is whether stock valuations are excessive relative to future earnings potential.	问题在于，相对于未来盈利潜力，股票估值是否过高。


The answer depends on two key variables: the discount rate and future earnings growth.	答案取决于两大关键变量：贴现率和未来盈利增长。


A lower discount rate and/or a higher rate of expected earnings growth would justify higher equity valuations.	较低贴现率和/或较高预期盈利增长意味着股票估值也可以更高。


The S&P’s price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio for the trailing 12 months is close to 20, compared to a long-run mean of 15.53 and a median of 14.57.	标准普尔12个月前瞻市盈率接近20，而长期平均值和中位值分别为15. 53和14.


The Shiller P/E ratio – based on average real (inflation-adjusted) earnings from the last ten years – is at 27.08, with a mean and median of 16.59 and 15.96, respectively.	希勒市盈率——取决于过去十年的平均实际（经通胀调整的）盈利——为27. 08，平均值和中位值分别为16.


And, in February, the forward 12-month earnings P/E ratio, which uses managers’ future earnings guidance, reached an 11-year high of 17.1, with the five- and ten-year averages standing at about 14 and the 15-year average at 16.	此外，2月份12个月前瞻市盈率——根据经理人未来盈利指引算出——达到了11年来的高点17. 1，五年和十年平均水平为14左右，15年平均水平为16。


The stock market’s recent performance often is attributed to the unconventional monetary policies that many central banks have been pursuing.	股市的近期表现常常被归因于央行所采取的非常规货币政策。


These policies, by design, lowered the return on sovereign bonds, forcing investors to seek yield in markets for higher-risk assets like equities, lower-rated bonds, and foreign securities.	这些政策刻意降低了主权债券回报，迫使投资者进入股票、低评级债券和外国证券等高风险资产市场寻求高收益率。


According to the standard formulation, stock prices tend to revert toward the present value of estimated future earnings (including growth in those earnings), discounted at the so-called “risk-free rate,” augmented by an equity risk premium.	根据标准公式，股价总是趋向于估算未来盈利（包括这些盈利的增长）根据贴现而得的现值。 贴现率为所谓的“无风险利率”加上一个股票风险溢价。


More precisely, the forward earnings yield – that is, the inverse of the P/E ratio – is equal to the risk-free rate plus the equity premium, minus the growth rate of earnings.	更准确地说，前瞻盈利收益率——即市盈率的倒数——等于无风险利率加上股票风险溢价再减去盈利增长率。


(Of course, markets take detours along the way, driven by, say, irrational exuberance, temporary declines in the impact of value investors, or mistimed contrarian trades.)	（当然，拜（比如）非理性繁荣、价值投资者所带来的暂时性下跌或时机不当的逆向投资交易所赐，市场路径是波折的。 ）


Monetary policy may have bolstered stock prices in two ways, either lowering the discount rate by compressing the equity risk premium, or simply reducing risk-free rates for long enough to raise the present value of stocks.	货币政策可能通过两种方式支撑股价，或者抑制股票风险溢价进而降低贴现率，或者长时间降低无风险利率以至于股票现值升高。


In either case, equity prices should level off at some point, allowing earnings to catch up, or even correct downward.	无论哪种方式，股价都会在某个点上趋稳以等待盈利水平赶上来，或者出现向下修正。


But the monetary-policy story, while plausible, is not ironclad.	但货币政策的逻辑尽管在理，却并不可靠。


Indeed, other factors may explain – or at least contribute to – current stock-market trends.	事实上，其他因素也可以解释——或至少作用于——当前的股市趋势。


A key factor is earnings growth.	一个关键因素是盈利增长。


In the long run, it is reasonable to expect that revenue growth would be broadly consistent with economic growth – and, as it stands, there is little acceleration on this front.	在长期，预期收入增长将与经济增长大体一致是合理的——而从目前的情况看，经济增长几无增速可言。


Earnings can grow faster than revenues for a prolonged (though not indefinite) period, if companies cut costs or reduce investment – a trend that would, over time, lower depreciation charges.	盈利可能在相当长（但非无穷）的时间内以快于收入的速度增长，如果公司削减成本或降低投资的话——这一趋势随着时间的延长可以降低折旧。


In theory, corporate-tax cuts could have the same effect.	理论上，公司税削减也可以产生同样的效果。


Furthermore, the economy’s equilibrium conditions could change, so that aggregate earnings would capture a larger share of national income.	此外，经济的均衡条件可能发生变化，因此总盈利将占据国民收入的更大比例。


There is some evidence that this is now occurring in advanced economies, with the proliferation of labor-saving digital technologies and the globalization of supply chains suppressing income growth.	一些证据表明，发达经济体目前就出现了这种情况，劳动力节约型数字技术的繁荣和供应链的全球化抑制了收入增长。


That said, some trends may be having the opposite effect on expectations for earnings growth.	尽管如此，一些趋势也许与盈利增长预期背道而驰。


More than two-fifths of the S&P 500’s earnings come from external markets, some of which, like Europe and Japan, are barely growing, while others, like China, are slowing.	在标准普尔500指数公司的盈利中，超过五分之二来自外部市场，其中一些市场，如欧洲和日本，几乎毫无增长可言，而其他市场，如中国，也正在放缓。


The appreciation of the dollar exacerbates the situation for US markets, because it creates headwinds for exporters and causes companies’ foreign earnings, reported in dollars, to decline.	美元升值恶化了美国市场的局面，因为这不利于出口商，也导致公司以美元计价的海外盈利下降。


And a slowdown in productivity growth, together with excessive leverage and persistent public-sector underinvestment, may be undermining medium-term potential economic growth.	而生产率增长的放缓，以及过度负债和公共部门投资持续不足，可能阻碍中期潜在经济增长。


While expectations of faster earnings growth may well be contributing to elevated P/E levels, the current situation is complicated, to say the least.	尽管盈利增长加速可能大幅刺激了市盈率水平，但目前的情况很复杂。


What is certain is that expectations of high earnings growth would have a more durable positive effect on P/E levels than the suppression of the equity risk premium.	可以确定的是，高盈利增长预期比抑制股票风险溢价对市盈率水平所造成了更持久的正效应。


The other important factor affecting P/E is the risk-free rate.	另一个影响市盈率的重要因素是无风险利率。


As monetary policy normalizes – a process that has already begun in the United States – the risk-free rate is expected to rise to a level that is consistent with stable 2% inflation, which, in turn, corresponds with a level of unemployment.	随着货币政策的正常化——美国已开始进入这一阶段——无风险利率预期将上升至与稳定的通胀水平（2%）相一致的水平，这反过来对应着一定水平的失业率。


What precisely that rate is, however, remains uncertain – and extremely difficult to determine, given that it is affected by virtually every aspect of the unfolding growth patterns.	但是，这一利率到底是多少仍不确定——也极难确定，因为增长模式的几乎每一个方面都会对它造成影响。


Nonetheless, several features of current growth patterns stand out: excess productive capacity, persistent high leverage, declining labor content in goods-and-services production, and an increasingly unequal distribution of income both between labor and capital, and across labor-income segments, with their differential savings rates.	尽管如此，当前增长模式的有一些特别的特征：产能过剩、持续高杠杆、商品和服务生产所包含的劳动量下降、劳动力与资本之间以及劳动力收入细分群体（储蓄率不同）之间的分配不平等日益加剧。


Together, these patterns could lead to an extended period in which aggregate demand limits growth.	这些模式的合力可能导致在相当长的一段时间内总需求对增长形成遏制作用。


With growth not constrained on the supply side, there would be little inflationary pressure, and the neutral interest rate that is consistent with non-inflationary full employment could simply be lower than it used to be for an extended period.	由于增长的约束并非发生在供给端，通胀压力将非常小，与非通胀充分就业环境相一致的中性利率可能在相当长的一段时间内不同于过去的常见水平。


Where does this leave us?	这对我们意味着什么？


In my view, it is difficult to make a strong case for a significant sustained increase in earnings growth in this environment, meaning that growth alone would not justify current equity valuations.	在我看来，在这样的环境下，盈利增长保持持续大幅提高很难，这意味着光靠增长无法支撑目前的股票估值。


But the lower-discount-rate argument is more persuasive, and is consistent with underlying economic conditions and central banks’ mandates.	但“贴现率较低说”更有说服力，也与基本经济条件和央行使命一致。


That said, in such a complex environment, investors can be expected to reach widely disparate conclusions, which will sustain – if not increase – market volatility.	尽管如此，在如此复杂的环境中，投资者可能形成大相径庭的结论，而这将维持——乃至加剧——市场的波动。


Stock Market Fantasies	股票市场的幻想


Historically, the stock market has performed well.	纵观历史，股票市场一贯表现良好。


In his celebrated 2002 book Stocks for the Long Run , Jeremy Siegel shows that the American stock market returned 6.9% per year in real terms between 1802 and 2001.	Jeremy Siegel在其2002年的著作《长期投资股票》中说到美国股票市场在1802年至2001年期间每年实际汇报率达到6. 9%。


Though the return varied by decade, even turning negative in some decades, overall it performed fairly consistently.	尽管每十年的回报率都有所变动，甚至有某几十年还出现了负回报率，但总体来说它表现平稳。


This 6.9% annual average return has since been referred to as “Siegel’s constant,” as if Siegel had discovered a new law of nature.	这6. 9%的平均年回报率已经被认为是“Siegel衡量”，就好像Siegel发现了自然新规律一样。


The idea that stocks will perform well in the future has many promoters today, especially among those trying to sell investments in stocks.	股票市场未来将继续表现良好的观点受到众人追捧，尤其是那些准备出售股票投资的人。


In the United States, President George W. Bush’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security cited Siegel for its claim that the government should encourage people to invest in stocks.	在美国，总统乔治W·布什的加强社会安全委员会（Commission to Strengthen Social Security）在它的声明中引用Siegel的话，政府应该鼓励人们投资股市。


Bush has been traveling the country promoting a plan to introduce personal retirement accounts invested in stocks and bonds.	布什已经在全国范围内推广一种投资于股票和债券的个人退休账户计划，并预计该计划将在未来几十年内将达到6.


The plan assumes a 6.5% real return for stocks – only slightly below Siegel’s constant –in future decades.	5%的实质回报率——这只比Siegel的定律低了一点。


But most people don’t believe that the stock market will perform so well in the future.	但是大多数人不相信股票市场未来会有如此上佳表现。


Siegel himself recently projected only a 6% average real return for US stocks over the next four decades.	Siegel最近预测美国股票市场在今后四十年中回报率只有6%。


Others have lower expectations.	其他人的预计则更低。


I have been conducting surveys of US investors under the auspices of the Yale School of Management, asking what percentage change they expect for the Dow Jones Industrial Average.	在耶鲁大学管理学院的资助下，我已经开始调查美国的投资者情况，询问他们对道琼斯工业平均指数的改变有何期待。


The expected one-year increase in the Dow in 2005 averages 4.8% for institutional investors and 4.3% for individual investors.	投资机构希望道琼斯工业指数在2005年会提高4. 8%，而个人投资者则期待4.


On closer inspection, the idea that the market will yield a real 6.9% a year in the future appears suspect.	更仔细观察就会发现，未来股票市场每年实质利润达到6. 9%的想法令人怀疑。


Think about it: investing in the stock market at 6.9% a year, and reinvesting any dividends, means that, in a tax-free account, the real value of the investment will double every ten years.	想想看，如果股票市场的投资回报率每年达到6. 9%，加上再投资和分红，这意味着在一个免税账户中的投资每十年实际价值就翻一番。


At that rate, a 20-year-old who in 1960 invested $4,000 a year in a tax-free account in the US stock market would have one million dollars by age 65 today.	如果按照这个速度的话，一个于1960年在美国股票市场的免费账户中投资了4,000美元的20岁年轻人到今天65岁的时候就可以拥有一百万美元。


Should we expect to be able to do that in the future?	我们难道应该期盼我们能在将来做到这样吗？


Obviously, most people didn’t invest this way in 1960.	显然，很多人并没有在上世纪六十年代用这种方法投资。


But could most people have?	但是大多数人可以吗？


If so, how would the economy, with the labor and material resources at its disposal, provide the large houses, luxury cars, and high-end services that millionaires expect?	如果这样的话，能够随意支配劳力和物质资源的经济如何为百万富翁们提供他们所期待的大房子、豪华轿车和高端服务呢？


It is natural to suppose that it could not.	自然，那是不可能的。


In fact, statistics on past stock market performance mislead because of what statisticians call “selection bias,” which occurs when the sample from which a statistic is derived is not representative of all the data.	事实上，由于统计家们所谓的“选择偏误”，即当采取数据的样本无法代表所有数据，以往的股票市场行为的数据有误导之嫌 。


Several kinds of selection bias must be considered when we look at Siegel’s constant.	当我们看Siegel衡量的时候，我们必须把几种选择偏误列入考虑。


The most fundamental problem is that, in examining stock market investments, we are selecting an economic activity because it was a consistent success in the past.	最主要的问题是，在检验股票市场投资中，我们因为某种经济活动过去的一贯成功而选择它。


We are trying to extrapolate the past experience of a small fraction of the world population that we have chosen to examine because they made a lot of money.	我们试图从我们所选择检验的一小部分世界人口的经历做出推断，因为他们赚了很多钱。


Of course, if one looks at many different investment strategies and many different countries, one can find something that performed spectacularly in the past, even if there is no strategy that can be expected to do so well in the future.	当然，如果一个人着眼于许多不同的投资方案和许多不同的国家，那他就能找到某种过去表现卓越不凡的东西，即使还没有什么战术能够保证它在将来表现依旧优越。


The US had one of the world’s most successful stock markets in the twentieth century.	美国拥有二十世纪世界上最为成功的股票市场。


Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton wrote in their book Triumph of the Optimists that of 15 countries that have advanced economies today, the US stock market ranked fourth in its rate of return between 1900 and 2000, behind Australia, Sweden, and South Africa.	Elroy Dimson、Paul Marsh和Mike Staunton在他们的著作《乐观主义者的成功》中写道，在当今15个经济发达国家中，美国股票市场在1900年至2000年间的回报率排名位于澳大利亚、瑞典和南非之后，名列第四。


The geometric average real return of the US stock market was 6.7%, but the median geometric real return for the other countries was only 4.7%.	美国股票市场的几何平均实际回报率在6. 7%，但是其他国家的平均只有4.


But even this comparison involves a selection bias.	但是，就连这个比较也带有一定的选择偏误。


Countries with more successful markets are more likely to have complete data on both prices and dividends for a hundred years.	那些拥有较为成功的股票市场的国家更有可能拥有一个更完整的数据库，里面记录了一个世纪以来的价格和红利数据。


A study by Philippe Jorion and William Goetzmann found 39 countries with reliable stock price data – though not dividend data – for a good part of the twentieth century.	Philippe Jorion和William Goetzmann的研究发现，39个拥有可靠股票价格数据、尽管没有红利数据的国家成为了二十世纪值得称道的一部���。


Their sample included countries in Latin America and Asian countries beyond Japan.	他们中的代表包括日本之外的拉丁美洲国家和亚洲国家。


They found that the median real stock price appreciation from 1920 to 1996 for all these countries was only 0.8%, compared to 4.3% for the US.	他们发现，所有这些国家的股票价格的平均水平在1920年至1996年间之增值了0. 8%，相比之下，美国则增值4.


The US was actually ranked first among the 39 countries.	3%。 实际上，美国在39个国家中名列首位。


Of course, even looking at these countries entails selection bias, for it excludes countries without price data for much of the twentieth century, notably China and Russia, where communist revolutions terminated the stock markets, resulting in -100% returns for investors.	当然，即使对这些国家的观察也是带着选择偏见的，因为这种观察将那些没有二十世纪价格数据的国家排除在外，尤其是中国和俄罗斯，那里的共产主义革命结束了股票市场，结果投资者全盘皆输。


The particular problems that prevented us from observing the returns on these stock markets will never be repeated, but it is wrong to assume that problems of that scale will not recur.	阻止我们观察这些股票市场回报率问题的障碍永远也不会再出现了，但是如果以为那样的问题再也不可能重新发生，那就错了。


There is also the selection bias that we infer from looking at the twentieth century, the most successful in terms of economic growth in human history.	当我们回望二十世纪——人类历史上经济增长最为成功的阶段，并作出推断的时候，我们也有带着选择偏误。


The twenty-first century will be different in ways that we cannot fathom today.	二十一世纪的经济将以一种完全不同的方式出现，这是我们今日还无法领会的。


Of course, investing in stocks is not a bad thing.	当然，投资股票不是一件坏事。


Indeed, the stock market is an important component of any modern economy.	事实上，股票市场是任何现代经济不可或缺的重要部分。


But we should not make plans that rely on high returns, as many (including some governments) appear to be doing.	但是我们不应该像许多人（包括政府）那样已经开始制定那种依赖于高回报率的计划。


Stock Markets’ Fear of Falling	股市对下跌的担心


NEW HAVEN -- The sharp drop in the world’s stock markets on August 9, after BNP Paribas announced that it would freeze three of its funds, is just one more example of the markets’ recent downward instability or asymmetry.	NEW HAVEN——在法国巴黎银行宣布它将冻结其旗下的三只基金后，世界股市8月9日的暴跌只不过是又一个市场最近表现得越发动荡或不对称的例子。


That is, the markets have been more vulnerable to sudden large drops than they have been to sudden large increases.	也就是说，市场更容易遭受突如其来的大跌而非比突然的大涨。


Daily stock price changes for the 100-business-day period ending August 3 were unusually negatively skewed in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the United States and the United Kingdom.	截止8月3日前100个交易日的每日股价变化在阿根廷、澳大利亚、巴西、加拿大、中国、法国、德国、印度、日本、韩国、墨西哥、美国和英国都呈现出不寻常的负偏态。


In the US, for example, the Standard and Poor’s 500 index in July recorded six days of declines and only three days of increases amounting to more than 1%.	比如说，美国7月份的标准普尔指数涨跌幅超过1%的天数中，下跌的有6天，而上涨的只有3天。


In June, the index dropped more than 1% on four days, and gained more than 1% on two days.	而6月份，下跌超过1%的为4天，上涨超过1%的为2天。


Going back further, there was a gigantic one-day drop on February 27, 2007, of 3.5%, and no sharp rebound.	再往前，2007年2月27日暴跌了3. 5%，却没有像样的反弹。


The February 27 decline began with an 8.8% one-day drop in the Shanghai Composite, following news that the Chinese government might tax capital gains more aggressively.	2月27日的下跌是从上证综合指数单日暴跌8. 8%开始的，因为有消息说中国政府有可能征收更高的资本利得税。


This news should have been relevant only to China, but the drop there fueled declines worldwide.	本来这则消息只与中国有关，但是在那里的暴跌引发了席卷全世界的下跌。


For example, the Bovespa in Brazil fell 6.6% on February 27, and the BSE 30 in India fell 4% the next day.	比如，巴西的BOVESPA指数2月27日下跌了6. 6%，而印度的BSE指数第二天跌去了4%。


The subsequent recovery was slow and incremental.	随后市场出现了缓慢的反弹。


In the US, the skew has been so negative only three other times since 1960: at the time of the 6.7% drop on May 28, 1962, the record-shattering 20.5% plummet on October 19, 1987, and the 6.1% decline on October 13, 1989.	在美国，自从1960年以来只有3次出现过如此的负偏态：1962年5月28日下跌了6. 7%，1987年10月19日创纪录的单日20.


Stock markets’ unusually negative skew is not inconsistent with booming price growth in recent years.	股市不寻常的负偏态与近几年来物价的大涨并非是不相符的。


The markets have broken all-time records, come close to doing so, or at least done very well since 2003 ( the case in Japan) by making up for the big drops incrementally, in a succession of smaller increases.	自从2003年（日本的例子）暴跌后的报复性反弹，通过积累一点一点小的涨幅，市场已经打破了所有时期的纪录、接近于做到这点或者至少做得很不错。


Nor is the negative skew inconsistent with the fact that world stock markets have been relatively quiet for most of this year.	同样负偏态也并非与今年的大部分时间世界股市相对比较平静的事实不相符。


With the conspicuous exception of China and the less conspicuous exception of Australia, all have had low standard deviations of daily returns for the 100-business-day period ending August 3 when compared with the norm for the country.	除中国一枝独秀以及澳大利亚稍逊一些的表现外，与各国的标准相比，截止8月3日前的100个交易日各国市场的每日回报标准差其实都很低。


The February 27 drop in US stock prices was only the 31st biggest one-day drop since 1950.	美国股价2月27日的下跌也只不过是自1950年以来排名第31位的单日跌幅。


But all of the other 30 drops occurred at times when stock prices were much more volatile.	但是所有其他30次的大跌都发生在股价波动更大的时期。


Thus, the February 27th drop really stands out, as do other recent one-day drops.	因此，2月27日的下跌和其他一些最近的下跌一样就显得很引人注目。


Indeed, one of the big puzzles of the US stock market recently has been low price volatility since around 2004, amid the most volatile earnings growth ever seen.	事实上，美国股市最近一段时间很大的谜点之一就是自2004年左右以来，在收益增幅有史以来波动最大的情况下，价格波动却非常小。


Five-year real earnings growth on the S&P 500 set an all-time record in the period ending in the first quarter of 2007, at 192%.	纽约标准普尔500指数的5年实际收益增长在2007年的第一季度结束时创下了有史以来的最高纪录，达到192%。


Before that, between the third quarter of 2000 and the first quarter of 2002, real S&P 500 earnings fell 55% – the biggest-ever decline since the index was created in 1957.	在此之前，2000年第三季度至2002年第一季度，纽约标准普尔500指数实际收益下跌了55%，是自1957年该指数创建以来最大的跌幅。


One would think that market prices should be volatile as investors try to absorb what this earnings volatility means.	人们也许会认为当投资者试图理解这种收益的波动的含义时，股价的波动自然就会加大。


But we have learned time and again that stock markets are driven more by psychology than by reasoning about fundamentals.	但是我们看到的现象是，股市更多地是被人的心理而不是对基本面的推理所推动的。


Is psychology somehow behind the pervasive negative skew in recent months?	那么在最近几个月中弥漫市场的负偏态背后有心理因素在作祟吗？


Maybe we should ask why the skew is so negative.	也许我们应该问一下为什么会呈现如此的负偏态。


Should we regard it as just chance, or, when combined with record-high prices, as a symptom of some instability?	我们应该把它看作仅仅是一次偶然，或者，当把它与创历史新高的价格放在一起，是某种不稳定的症状呢？


The adage in the bull market of the 1920’s was “one step down, two steps up, again and again.”	二十世纪二十年代牛市中的谚语是“退一步，进两步，如此周而复始”。


The updated adage for the recent bull market is “one big step down, then three little steps up, again and again,” so far at least.	而最近牛市中被更新的谚语是“退一大步，然后进三小步，如此周而复始”，至少到目前为止是这样的。


No one is looking for a sudden surge, and volatility is reduced by the absence of sharp up-movements.	没人会寄望出现一次突然的暴涨，而市场的波动因为缺乏强烈的上涨而被大大减弱了。


But big negative returns have an unfortunate psychological impact on markets.	但是巨大的负收益对市场有非常不好的负面影响。


People still talk about October 28, 1929, or October 19, 1987.	人们仍然在谈论1929年10月28日和1987年10月19日的暴跌。


Big drops get their attention, and this primes some people to be attentive for them in the future, and to be ready to sell if another one comes.	暴跌总是会引起人们的关注，而这促使一些人对未来的下跌变得尤为警惕，并且准备在下一次暴跌来临时卖掉手里的股票。


In fact, willingness to support the market after a sudden drop may be declining.	事实上，股市突然下跌后支撑市场的意愿可能正在下降。


The “buy-on-dips stock market confidence index” that we compile at the Yale School of Management has been falling gradually since 2001, and has fallen especially far lately.	我们在耶鲁管理学院编制的“下跌买入信心指数”自2001年以来一直呈缓慢的下跌趋势，而最近下跌得尤其剧烈。


The index is the share of people who answered “increase” to the question, “If the Dow dropped 3% tomorrow, I would guess that the day after tomorrow the Dow would: Increase?	该指数指的是人们在被问到：“如果道琼��指数明天下跌3%，我认为后天道琼斯指数会：上涨？


Decrease?	下跌？


Stay the Same?”	平盘？


In 2001, 72% of institutional investors and 74% of individual investors chose “increase.”	”时回答“上涨”的人数的比例。 在2001年，72%的机构投资者和74%的个人投资者选择了“上涨”。


By May 2007, only 48% of institutional investors and 59% of individual investors chose “increase.”	但是在2007年5月，只有48%的机构投资者和59%的个人投资者选择了“上涨”。


Perhaps the buy-on-dips confidence index has slipped lately because of negative news concerning credit markets, notably the US sub-prime mortgage market, which has increased anxiety about the fundamental soundness of the economy.	也许最近“下跌买入信心指数”的下滑是由于来自信贷市场的负面消息，主要是美国的次级房屋抵押市场，这一市场加剧了对经济基本面健康的担忧。


But something more may be at work.	但是原因肯定不止是这一条。


Everyone knows that markets have been booming, and everyone knows that other people know that a correction is always a possibility.	所有人都知道市场出现了泡沫，并且所有人都知道其他人知道价格总是存在回归正常水平的可能性。


So there may be an underlying sensitivity to price drops, which could fuel a succession of downward price changes, amplifying public concerns about problems in the economy and heralding a profound change in investor sentiment.	所以大家对于价格的下跌都很敏感，这可能促使价格的持续下跌，放大人们对于经济中存在问题的担忧以及给投资者的情绪带来深远的变化。


Stocks and the Long Run	股票从长计


BERKELEY – After the second 40% decline in America’s Standard & Poor’s composite index of common stocks in a decade, global investors are shell-shocked.	伯克利—在美国的标准普尔成分股票指数十年里第二次跌幅超过40%之后，全球的投资者们已经见惯不惊了。


Funds invested, and reinvested, in the S&P composite from 1998-2008 have yielded a real return of zero: the dividends earned on the portfolio have been just enough to offset inflation.	在1998-2008年间被投资并再投资于标普的成分股的资金所产生的真实回报为零：该股票组合所收益的股息正好可以抵消通胀。


Not since 1982 has a decade passed at the end of which investors would have been better off had they placed their money in corporate or United States Treasury bonds rather than in a diversified portfolio of stocks.	自1982年以来的任何一个十年期里，投资者们投资于多种股票组合所获得的回报都不如他们（如果）投资于公司或美国国库券本可以获得的收益。


So investors are wondering: will future decades be like the past decade?	因此他们不禁茫然：未来的十年会一如过去的十年么？


If so, shouldn't investments in equities be shunned?	果真如此，难道不应该避免投资股票么？


The answer is almost surely no.	答案几乎必然是否定的。


At a time horizon of a decade or two, the past performance of stocks and bonds is neither a reliable guarantee nor a good guide to future results.	在十年或二十年的时间段中，股票和债券在过去的表现既不是一种可靠的保证也不是对未来结果的指南。


Periods like 1998-2008, in which stocks do relatively badly, are preceded by periods – like 1978-1988 and 1988-1998 – in which they do relatively well, and are in all likelihood followed by similar periods.	在股票相对表现欠佳的1998-2008年之前是股票表现相对较好的1978-1988年和1988-1998年两个时期。 而且当时看来它们之后的十年这种好的趋势很可能会持续。


Do the math.	自己算算吧。


At the moment, the yield-to-maturity of the ten-year US Treasury bond is 3.76%.	目前，十年期美国国债的到期收益率是3. 76%。


Subtract 2.5% for inflation, and you get a benchmark expected real return of 1.26%.	减去2. 5%的通胀率，你所得到的基准预期实际回报率是1.


Meanwhile, the earnings yield on the stocks that make up the S&P composite is fluctuating around 6%: that is how much money the corporations that underpin the stocks are making for their shareholders.	同时，标普成分股票所产生的收益率在6%左右波动：这就是支撑这些股票的公司为他们的股东所赚到的钱。


Some of that money will be paid out in dividends.	其中一部分将以股息的形式付给。


Some will be used to buy back stock – thus concentrating the equity and raising the value of the stock that is not bought back.	而有一部分则会用于回购股票—从而使资产集中并提升未被回购部分股票的价值。


Some will be reinvested and used to boost the company’s capital stock.	还有一部分将会被再投资并用于充实公司的股本。


You can argue that the corporate executives have expertise and knowledge that allows them to commit the funds they control to higher-return projects than are available in the stock market.	你可能会认为公司的高管们有能力和知识将他们所掌控的资金投入比股市回报更高的项目中。


Or you can argue that they are corrupt empire-builders who dissipate a portion of the shareholders’ money that they control.	或者你会认为他们是一群腐败的帝国建造者，浪费了手中属于股东们的一部分资金。


The sensible guess is that these two factors cancel each other out.	比较明智的猜测是这两种因素相互抵消。


Thus, the expected fundamental real return on diversified US stock portfolios right now is in the range of 6% to 7%.	因此，预期的多元化美国股票组合的基准实际收益率目前在6%-7%之间。


The expected market return is that amount plus or minus expected changes in valuation ratios: will stocks return more as price-earnings ratios rise, or return less as price-earnings ratios fall?	预期的市场回报率是这一数值加上或减去预期的估值比变化：股票收益会随着市盈率提升而增加，抑或随着市盈率降低而减少？


Once again, the sensible guess is that these two factors more or less cancel each other out.	对此的明智猜测又是这两种因素或多或少相互抵消。


Compare the 6% to 7% real return on stocks to a 1.25% real return on bonds.	将股票6%-7%的实际收益率与债券1. 25%的回报率作比较。


But aren’t stocks risky?	但股票难道不是有风险的么？


Couldn’t earnings collapse?	收益难道不会崩溃？


Couldn’t the market undergo another 40% decline in the near future?	在不远的将来股市难道不会出现另一次40%的暴跌？


Aren’t bonds safer?	债券难道不是更安全的么？


The answers to these questions are yes, yes, yes, and yes.	这些问题的答案都是肯定的。


Remember: we already had another 40% decline in 2000-2003, and are in another one right now.	请记住：在2000-2003年间我们已经有过一次40%的暴跌，而现在股市正处在另一次暴跌的过程中。


We also had the long slide from 1977-1982 that followed a 40% collapse from 1973-1975.	在1973-1975年的40%暴跌之后，我们也经受了1977-1982年的长期低迷。


Before that, we had declines in 1946-1949, 1937-1942, and the biggest of them all in 1929-1933.	在那之前，我们曾有过1946-1949年，1937-1942年的股市暴跌，而最惨烈的一次是1929-1933年。


But stock market declines that are not accompanied by steep and persistent collapses in earnings are by their nature temporary: they are provoked by steep rises in perceived risk, and if those risks turn out to be overblown, stocks rebound when the perception of risk falls.	但没有伴随着收益急剧崩溃、一蹶不振的股市下跌从本质上讲是暂时的：它们是由感知到的风险急剧升高而引发的。 如果最后证实那些风险是被夸大了，那么当所感知的风险回落时，股票就会反弹。


And how about stock market declines that are accompanied by a steep and persistent collapse in earnings – by depressions?	但那些伴随着收益急剧崩溃、一蹶不振（萧条）的股市下跌又会怎样呢？


In the pre-World War II era, when governments held fast to the gold standard, depressions were times of deflation.	在二战以前，当各届政府都严格遵循金本位制度，经济萧条就是通货紧缩的时期。


But in the post-World War II era, in which social democratic governments maintain welfare spending and Keynesian economic advisers seek to use fiscal policy to boost output, an earnings depression is much more likely to be accompanied by inflation.	但在二战之后，在各届社会民主政府维持福利开支及凯恩斯派的经济顾问们力图使用财政政策推动生产的情况下，收益的萧条更可能与通货膨胀为伴。


True, a steep and persistent collapse in earnings will erode wealth invested in stocks.	诚然，收益急剧崩溃、一蹶不振会侵蚀投资于股票中的财富。


But the inflation that accompanies it will produce a steeper and larger erosion of real wealth invested in nominal bonds.	但随之而来的通胀会造成对投资于名义债券中的真实财富的更剧烈、更大程度的侵蚀。 正如Edgar L.


As Edgar L. Smith wrote in The Atlantic Monthly back in 1924, when the principal risks are macroeconomic, bonds are no safer than diversified portfolios of stocks – in fact, they are riskier.	Smith在1924年的《大西洋月刊》中所写的，当首要的风险存在于宏观经济层面，���券比并不比多元化的股票组合更安全—事实上，它们更具风险。


All these arguments apply only to long-term investors who can afford to wait out another 40% decline in values and keep their money invested until perceived risk drops.	所有这些论点只适用于那些长期投资者。 他们能经得起另一次40%的股值暴跌，不改变投资策略直到市场认为风险降低。


(And if perceived risk never drops than you have worse things to worry about than the performance of your portfolio.)	（如果感知到的风险永不降低，那么你需要担心的后果就比你股票组合的表现严重得多。


For retirees and other people who need to spend soon, the year-to-year variability of the stock market commands caution.	）对于退休人士和其他即将需要开销的人，股市年年的变化莫测更需要他们谨慎从事。


But for those who do not need to spend soon, the recent decline in equity values is more an opportunity than a catastrophe.	但对于那些不急着用钱的人，最近的股值下跌则是机遇多过灾难。


We liked the stocks in our portfolio a year ago for their long-term prospects.	一年之前，我们着眼于长期前景选择了自己的股票组合。


Today’s short-term crisis does not materially alter their long-term prospects.	目前的短期危机没有在本质上改变它们的长期前景。


And now we have an opportunity to buy more, and cheaply.	而现在我们更有了一次低价补仓的机会。


Stop Coddling Belarus	停止娇惯白俄罗斯


Lenin once said that capitalists were so cynical that they would sell the Soviets the rope with which they would hang them.	列宁曾经说过，资本主义甚至会卖给苏联用来扼杀她的绳索，这样来形容资本主义的玩世不恭似乎再恰当不过。


Lenin and communism have passed away, but that cynical indifference to suffering when profits are involved remains.	如今，列宁和共产主义已经成为了历史，但资本主义在涉及利益问题时对苦难的冷漠却并未改变。


Belarus provides a glaring example.	白俄罗斯的例子再明显不过。


The European Parliament has consistently denounced Belarus as Europe’s last dictatorship, yet EU member governments continue business as usual with Aleksander Lukashenka, the country’s wayward and near lunatic despot.	欧洲议会一直谴责白俄罗斯是欧洲最后一个独裁政府，但欧盟各成员国政府却照常与亚历山大·卢卡申科这个任性到近乎疯狂的独裁者进行贸易。


This is especially true when there is a chance to save or make money.	如果有机会省钱或者赚钱就更是如此。


For example, for more than a decade, Germany’s police forces, customs service, and even the Bundeswehr have been ordering uniforms from a state-owned factory in the city of Dzherzinsky, named after the father of the Red Terror and founder of the Soviet KGB, Feliks Dzherzinsky.	比如过去10多年来，德国警察、海关甚至是边防部队一直从捷尔任斯基市的一家国营工厂里订购制服，该市是以红色恐怖之父和苏维埃克格勃创始人费利克斯·捷尔任斯基的名字命名的。


Similar examples of such indifferent cynicism abound.	与此相似的冷漠和玩世不恭随处可见。


By treating Lukashenka as a favored business partner at the same time that the EU is trying to isolate him as an international pariah, European hypocrisy stands naked.	一边把卢卡申科作为优先照顾的贸易伙伴，一边又把他作为国际无赖加以隔离，欧盟的做法处处显示出赤裸裸的伪善。


Instead of indirectly propping up Lukashenka’s regime through such cozy deals, Europe’s governments must begin to act in accordance with what Europe’s parliament has long understood: underwriting Lukashenka economically only prolongs his misrule.	欧洲政府应该按照欧洲议会早就明白的原则行事，认识到在经济上支持卢卡申科只会延长他的暴政，而不是以舒舒服服的现成交易来间接支持卢卡申科的政权。


So it is now more important than ever that European parliamentarians unite and make their position clear.	因此欧洲议会团结起来，表达自己观点的重要性前所未有。


The European Parliament has, indeed, taken the lead.	欧洲议会实际已经采取了行动。


Since last year it has been enlisting people with historic knowledge and understanding of totalitarian regimes to help guide its response to events in Belarus.	从去年开始，议会就开始招收既有历史知识又了解集权政府的员工协助指导对白俄罗斯事件做出的反应。


This advice helped shape the parliament’s strong stance against maintaining unnecessary economic engagement with Lukashenka and his henchmen.	这项建议对议会形成反对与卢卡申科及其党羽保持不必要经济联系的强硬态度起到了很大的作用。


But there are two radically different attitudes regarding Belarus’s participation in European activities.	但对于白俄罗斯参与欧洲事务却有两种截然不同的看法。


On one hand, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has denied Belarusian politicians even informal access to meetings in Strasbourg.	一方面，欧洲理事会议会大会剥夺了白俄罗斯政客非正式参与斯特拉斯堡会议的权利。


The Assembly condemned Lukashenka’s usurpation of power when he twisted the constitution to grant himself a virtual lifetime presidency, and it has denounced the disappearance of those Belarussians who have dared to think differently from the regime.	在卢卡申科歪曲宪法，实际上批准自己担任终身总统的时候，大会强烈谴责了卢卡申科的篡权行为，并对白俄罗斯持不同政见者的消失表示出强烈的不满。


The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has also taken a strong stand against the Belarusian dictator.	欧洲安全与合作组织（OSCE）也对白俄罗斯独裁者采取了强硬的立场。


As the Final Report of its 2004 mission to observe the Belarusian parliamentary elections clearly stated, the vote “fell significantly short of OSCE commitments.”	2004年白俄罗斯议会选举观察团的最终报告明确指出，投票数“大大低于欧洲安全与合作组织的规定。


Similarly, the 2004 referendum to eliminate term limits on the presidency “took place with unrestrained Government bias in favor of the referendum,” and without “the conditions, particularly freedom of expression and freedom of the media, to ensure that the will of the people serves as the basis of government authority.”	”与此相似，2004年解除总统任期限制的公民投票“过程中存在着以通过决议为目的的不受限制的政府干预，”而且不具备“言论和评论自由等确保政府当局贯彻人民意志的基本条件。 ”


But at the same time the OSCE is condemning these anti-democratic practices, its own Parliamentary Assembly maintains full-fledged cooperation with the Belarusian parliament.	但就在欧洲安全与合作组织谴责上述违反民主的做法时，其议会大会还与白俄罗斯议会保持着全面的合作关系。


Indeed, the OSCE treats the Lukashenka-controlled parliament in the same way it does any EU parliament. So real parliaments and sham parliaments are treated as equals.	事实上，欧洲安全与合作组织对待卢卡申科控制下的议会机构与对待其它欧洲议会没什么两样，这样真假议会就得到完全平等的待遇。


The idea would be laughable if it were not so tragic.	如果这种做法没有那么可悲，它甚至会让人觉得可笑。


This absurd situation must change.	必须改变这种荒唐的局面。


It is the duty of all members of EU national parliaments to reject this affront to their democratic dignity.	所有欧盟国家的议会有责任与这种侮辱民主尊严的做法对抗到底。


Only democratic parliaments should sit as equals in Europe’s democratic forums.	只有民主议会才能在欧洲民主论坛中享有平等的地位。


The goal is not to ensure Europe’s democratic purity, but to change the nature of Belarus’s government.	我们的目标不是要确保欧洲民主的纯洁性，而是要改变白俄罗斯政府的性质。


For that to happen, Europe’s democratic voice must be heard within Belarus.	为了达到这一目的，白俄罗斯国内必须能够听到欧洲的民主之声。


That won’t be easy.	但这绝非易事。


Of the 1,500 different media outlets in Belarus today, only a dozen or so retain any form of independence.	在白俄罗斯现有的1，500家各色媒体之中，只有12个左右还保留着一定程度的独立。


Even that small number is likely to diminish, as Lukashenka keeps up political, financial, and legal pressure on them.	即便是这不起眼的数字也还在日益缩小，因为卢卡申科仍不断向它们施加政治、金融和法律压力。


Indeed, Belarus’s last independent daily newspaper recently went out of business.	事实上，白俄罗斯最后一家独立日报不久前也被迫停刊。


The European Commission has allocated two million euros to establish an independent radio station for Belarus, which must operate outside of the country because of Lukashenka.	欧盟委员会划拨200万欧元创立了白俄罗斯唯一的一家独立电台，这家电台被迫设在国外，以躲避卢卡申科的迫害。


Working with the Belarusian association of journalists, this independent media outlet will broadcast from Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and perhaps Ukraine.	电台与白俄罗斯记者协会合作，从拉脱维亚、立陶宛、波兰、可能还有乌克兰境内进行广播。


This meager effort, however, is an insufficient response by Europe’s democracies to the full panoply of Lukashenka’s dictatorship: his docile courts, brutal jails, and corrupt police.	但作为欧洲民主国家对卢卡申科全部独裁行为（其驯服的法庭、野蛮的监狱和腐败的警察）所做出的回应，这样微弱的力量还远远不够。


Are a few hours of radio broadcasting really all Europe and the democratic west can muster?	这几个小时的电台广播是否就是所有欧洲国家和民主西方政府所能做的一切？


If so, Lukashenka must be laughing aloud.	如果真是这样，卢卡申科肯定会喜不自胜。


Parliamentarians across Europe and the West must join their voice together in a well-defined, united and ringing declaration that forces Western leaders to apply real pressure to Europe’s last dictator.	欧洲和西方的所有议员都必须团结起来，做出明确、一致和响亮的回答，迫使西方领导人对欧洲最后一个独裁国家施加真正的压力。


Such pressure brought results a year ago, with the success of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine.	这样的压力一年前曾经取得了成果，赢得了乌克兰橙色革命的胜利。


Nothing less than a united position against the despot of Belarus is necessary if Lukashenka – and his Russian backers – are to be forced to change their ways.	除了采取统一的立场，没有任何其它方法能够迫使卢卡申科及其俄罗斯支持者改变他们的行为方式。


Stopping America’s Federal Debt Explosion	阻止美国联邦债务突进


CAMBRIDGE – The US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has just delivered the bad news that the national debt is now rising faster than GDP and heading toward ratios that we usually associate with Italy or Spain.	坎布里奇—美国国会预算办公室（CBO）刚刚公布了一则坏消息，眼下美国国民债务增长比GDP更快，其比率正在向意大利和西班牙靠拢。


That confirms my view that the fiscal deficit is the most serious long-term economic problem facing US policymakers.	这印证了我的观点：财务赤字是美国决策者现在面临的最严重的长期经济问题。


A decade ago, the federal debt was just 35% of GDP.	十年前，联邦债务只占GDP的35%。


It is now more than double that and projected to reach 86% in 2026.	如今，这一比率上升了一倍，预计到2026年底，将达到86%。


But that’s just the beginning.	但这只是开始。


The annual budget deficit projected for 2026 is 5% of GDP.	2026年年预算赤字预计将达到GDP的5%。


If it stays at that level, the debt ratio would eventually rise to 125%.	如果保持这一水平，债务比率最终将升高到125%。


Even that projection assumes that interest rates on the national debt will rise slowly, averaging less than 3.5% in 2026.	甚至这一预测也需要假设国民债务利率增长将十分缓慢，到2026年平均不到3. 5%。


But if the US debt ratio really is on the fast track to triple-digit levels, investors in the US and abroad may rightly fear that the government has lost control of the budget process.	但如果美国债务比率果真一路突飞猛进达到三位数水平，美国和海外投资者可能会正确地担心政府将失去对预算流程的控制。


With debt exploding, foreign bondholders could begin to worry that the US will find a way to reduce its real value by stoking inflation or imposing a withholding tax on all government bond interest.	在债务突进的情况下，外国债权人将开始担心美国寻求提高通胀或对所有政府债券利息征收预扣税来降低债务的真实价值。


In that case, investors will insist on a risk premium: higher interest rates on Treasury debt.	果真如此的话，投资者将要求风险溢价：提高美国国债利率。


Higher interest rates, in turn, would increase the deficit – and thus the future level of the debt ratio – even more.	更高的利率反过来又将提高赤字——从而提高未来债务比率水平。


The high and rising level of the national debt hurts the US economy in many ways.	国民债务负担高企并且急需增加，这从许多方面伤害着美国经济。


Paying the interest requires higher federal taxes or a larger budget deficit.	支付利息需要提高联邦税或增加预算赤字。


In 2016, the interest on the national debt is equal to nearly 16% of the revenue from personal income tax.	2016年，国民债务利息相当于个人所得税收入的近16%。


By 2026, the projected interest on the national debt will equal more than 31% of this revenue, even if interest rates rise as slowly as the CBO projects.	到2026年，预计国民债务利息将等于这一收入的31%以上，即使利率如CBO预期那样缓慢上升。


Foreign investors now own more than half of net government debt, and that proportion is likely to keep growing.	如今，外国投资者拥有一大半净政府债务，并且这一比例有望继续升高。


Even if they are now willing to accept newly issued bonds when interest and principal on outstanding ones are due, the time will come when the US will have to pay the interest by exporting more goods and services than it imports.	即使现在他们愿意在未偿还债务本息到期时接受新发型债券，但终有一天，美国将不得不通过让出口商品和服务多于进口来支付利息。


And boosting net exports will require a weaker dollar to make US products more attractive to foreign buyers and foreign goods more expensive to US buyers, implying a loss in Americans’ standard of living.	而提振净出口需要美元贬值从而让美国产品对外国买家更具吸引力，让外国商品对美国买而言家更加昂贵，这意味着美国人生活水平下降。


Increased borrowing by the federal government also means crowding out the private sector.	联邦政府增加借款也意味着挤出私人部门。


Lower borrowing and capital investment by firms reduces future productivity growth and growth in real incomes.	企业借款和资本投资减少会降低未来生产率增长和真实收入增长。


So it is important to find ways to reduce the budget deficit and minimize the future debt ratio.	因此，设法减少预算赤字、让未来债务比率最小化十分重要。


The good news is that a relatively small reduction in the deficit can put the debt ratio on a path to a much lower level.	好消息是相对较小的减幅就可以大大降低债务比率。


Cutting the deficit to 2% of GDP, for example, would cause the debt ratio eventually to reach 50%.	比如，将预算赤字削减到GDP的2%能让2026年债务比率逐渐下降到只有50%。


Deficit reduction requires cutting government spending, increasing revenue, or both.	减少赤字需要削减政府支出、增加收入，或两者兼备。


Neither is politically easy; but neither should be impossible.	这两个条件在政治上都不容易实现，但也不是不可能。


Cutting spending is made more difficult by the reductions in relative outlays that have already occurred.	已经发生的相对开支的减少让削减支出变得更加困难。 防务支出占GDP之比从1966年的7.


The share of GDP devoted to defense has fallen from 7.5% of GDP in 1966 to 3.2% of GDP this year, and the CBO projects it to fall to 2.6% during the next decade.	5%下降到今年的3. 2%，CBO预计未来十年还将下降到2.


That would be the lowest GDP share since World War II, representing a level of spending that military experts believe is dangerously low.	6%。 这将是自二战以来的最低比例，军事专家认为这一水平已经低到了危险的程度。


Other spending is split between the annually appropriated amounts (known as non-defense discretionary spending) and the programs in which spending follows from established rules that are not subject to annual review (known as the “mandatory” spending programs, primarily Social Security retirement benefits and health-care spending).	其他支出分为年度拨款项目（被称为非防务自由裁量支出）和支出遵循不受年度审核约束的既定规则的项目（被称为“法定”支出项目，主要是社保退休金和卫生支出）。


The non-defense discretionary spending is also heading toward 2.6% of GDP – also the smallest share of GDP since WWII.	非防务自由裁量支出也直奔GDP的2. 6%——也是自二战以来占GDP的最低比例。


It is the mandatory programs that have grown rapidly, driving up the deficit.	快速膨胀、推高预算的法定项目。 法定项目占GDP之比在1996年时只有4.


The mandatory programs’ share of GDP, only 4.5% in 1966, is now 13.3% and projected to reach 15% in 2026.	5%，如今占13. 3%，预计到2026年将占15%。


These programs are largely benefits for middle-class seniors and not welfare programs targeted at the relatively poor.	这些项目主要是面向中产阶级老年人的福利支出，而非目标位相对较贫穷者的福利支出。


That’s why most experts agree that slowing the rise in these so-called “entitlement” programs has to be part of reducing future deficits.	因此，大部分专家都认为降低这些所谓的“权利”（entitlement）项目支出的增速必须成为降低未来预算的计划的一部分。


Federal taxes now take 18.3% of GDP and are projected to remain at that level for the next decade, unless tax rules or rates are changed.	目前，联邦税占GDP之比为18. 3%，预计未来几十年内将维持在这一水平，除非税收规则或税率发生改变。


The rate structure for personal taxation has changed over the past 30 years, with the top tax rate rising from 28% in 1986 to more than 40% now.	个人税税率结构在过去30年中有所变化，最高税率从1986年的28%增加到如今的40%以上。


The corporate rate of 35% is already the highest in the industrial world.	35%的公司税率已是工业化国家中最高的。


Higher marginal tax rates would weaken incentives and distort economic decisions.	提高边际税率将削弱激励、扭曲经济决策。


That’s why I and others who think about shrinking the deficit focus on changing tax rules to limit the special features known as “tax expenditures,” which represent government spending built into the tax code.	因此，我和其他考虑降低预算的人重���关注改变税收规则以限制被称为“税收支出”的特别项（即税法中的政府支出）。


These items range from small ones, like the $7,500 tax credit that goes to a buyer of an electric car, to large (for example, the deduction for mortgage interest and the exclusion from taxable income of employer payments for employee health insurance).	这些项目有些较小，如电动汽车购买者可享受7,500美元抵税额； 有些较大，如按揭利息抵税和雇主支付雇员健康保险免征所得税。


The mortgage deduction alone will reduce tax revenue in 2016 by $84 billion, or more than 5% of the personal income tax collected.	2016年，光是按揭抵税一项就减少840亿美元税收收入，相当于个人所得税总额的5%以上。


The exclusion of health insurance premiums from employees’ taxable income will reduce revenue by more than $200 billion, or about 15% of receipts from the personal income tax.	雇员所得税健康保险免征降低税收幅度高达2,000亿美元以上，相当于个人所得税总额的15%左右。


Nothing to start shrinking the deficit will happen before this year’s presidential election.	今年总统选举尘埃落定之前，不会开始减少赤字。


But tackling the spending and revenue components of deficit reduction should be high on the agenda when the new president takes office next year.	但在明年新总统履新后，梳理削减预算中的支出和收入成分应该成为日程重点。


Stop the Band-Aid Treatment	治标不治本必须停止


The Middle East is a tinderbox, with some key players on all sides waiting for every opportunity to destroy their enemies with bullets, bombs and missiles.	中东是一个危险地区，各方关键势力都在等待每个用子弹、炸弹和导弹摧毁其敌人的机会。 以色列特殊的弱点之一以及周而复始的暴力循环之源就是关押犯人。


One of the special vulnerabilities of Israel, and a repetitive cause of violence, is the holding of prisoners.	激进的巴勒斯坦以及黎巴嫩人知道，抓获一名以色列士兵或者平民要么导致冲突，要么就是交换战俘的有价值的谈判筹码。


Militant Palestinians and Lebanese know that a captured Israeli soldier or civilian is either a cause of conflict or a valuable bargaining chip for prisoner exchange.	这一假定建立在好几个此类交换的基础上，包括在1985年用1150名阿拉伯人，其中大多数是巴勒斯坦人交换三名以色列人；


This assumption is based on a number of such trades, including 1,150 Arabs, mostly Palestinians, for three Israelis in 1985; 123 Lebanese for the remains of two Israeli soldiers in 1996; and 433 Palestinians and others for an Israeli businessman and the bodies of three soldiers in 2004.	1996年用123名黎巴嫩人交换两名以色列士兵的遗体； 以及2004年用433名巴勒斯坦人和其他人交换一名以色列商人以及三名士兵的遗体。


This stratagem precipitated the renewed violence that erupted in June when Palestinians dug a tunnel under the barrier that surrounds Gaza and assaulted some Israeli soldiers, killing two and capturing one.	这一策略促发了今年六月份爆发的新的暴力。 当时，巴勒斯坦人在围绕加沙地带的边境障碍物下挖了地道，攻击一些以色列士兵，杀死两名并且俘虏一人。


They offered to exchange the soldier for the release of 95 women and 313 children who are among almost 10,000 Arabs in Israeli prisons, but this time Israel rejected a swap and attacked Gaza in an attempt to free the soldier and stop rocket fire into Israel.	他们提出用这名士兵交换以色列监狱中大约一万名阿拉伯人中的95名妇女和313名儿童，但是这一次以色列拒绝交换并且袭击了加沙，试图解救这名士兵以及停止射入以色列的火箭弹袭击。


The resulting destruction brought reconciliation between warring Palestinian factions and support for them throughout the Arab world.	随之而来的破坏让巴勒斯坦内部冲突各派别和解，并且为他们在整个阿拉伯世界带来了支持。


Hezbollah militants in south Lebanon then killed three Israeli soldiers and captured two others, and insisted on Israel’s withdrawal from disputed territory and an exchange for some of the several thousand incarcerated Lebanese.	黎巴嫩南部的真主党武装分子随后又杀死三名以色列士兵并且俘虏了其他两名士兵，并且坚持要求以色列从有争议的领土撤军以及交换几千名被关押的黎巴嫩人。


With American backing, Israeli bombs and missiles rained down on Lebanon.	在美国的支持下，以色列的炸弹和导弹在黎巴嫩倾盆而落。


Soon, Hezbollah rockets supplied by Syria and Iran were striking northern Israel.	马上，由叙利亚和伊朗提供的真主党火箭弹攻击以色列北部。


It is inarguable that Israel has a right to defend itself against attacks on its citizens, but it is inhumane and counterproductive to punish civilian populations in the illogical hope that somehow they will blame Hamas and Hezbollah for provoking the devastating response.	毫无疑问，以色列有权对其平民的攻击进行自卫，但是，惩罚平民、借此来不合逻辑地希望他们会不知怎地指责哈马斯和真主党挑起这些灾难性的回应是不人道、也是适得其反的。


The result instead has been that broad Arab and worldwide support has been rallied for these groups, while condemnation of both Israel and the United States has intensified.	相反，其结果是团结了广泛的阿拉伯地区以及世界各地对这些组织的支持，同时又加强了对以色列和美国的谴责。


Israel belatedly announced, but did not carry out, a two-day cessation in bombing Lebanon, responding to the global condemnation of an air attack on the Lebanese village of Qana, where 57 civilians were killed and where 106 died from the same cause 10 years ago.	以色列空袭黎巴嫩村庄加纳，造成57名平民死亡，而十年前这一村庄由于同样原因有106人死亡。 在全世界的谴责下，以色列迟迟宣布两天的停火轰炸黎巴嫩，但是并没有实施。


As before there were expressions of “deep regret,” a promise of “immediate investigation” and the explanation that dropped leaflets had warned families in the region to leave their homes.	正如以往一样，以色列表示“极为遗憾”，保证“立即调查”并且解释说空投的传单已经警告该地区的家庭离开自己的家园。


The urgent need in Lebanon is that Israeli attacks stop, that Lebanon’s regular military forces control the southern region of the country, that Hezbollah cease as a separate fighting force, and future attacks against Israel be prevented.	黎巴嫩局势的当务之急是以色列停止攻击，黎巴嫩的正规军控制该国的南部地区，真主党停止作为一支战斗力量并且防止将来对以色列的攻击。


Israel should withdraw from all Lebanese territory, including Shebaa Farms, and release the Lebanese prisoners.	以色列应当从包括舍巴农场的所有黎巴嫩领土撤军并且释放黎巴嫩犯人。


Yet Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has rejected such a cease-fire.	但是奥尔默特总理已经拒绝了这一停火。


These are ambitious hopes, but even if the UN Security Council adopts and implements a resolution that would lead to such an eventual solution, it will provide just another band-aid and temporary relief.	这些都是雄心勃勃的企望，但是，即使联合国安理会通过并实施最终导致该方案的决议，那也只不过是治标不治本。


Tragically, the current conflict is part of the inevitably repetitive cycle of violence that results from the absence of a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East, exacerbated by the almost unprecedented six-year absence of any real effort to achieve such a goal.	具有悲剧性的是，目前的冲突是必定周而复始的暴力循环的一部分，由于中东地区没有一个全面的解决方案，又由于几乎前所未有、长达六年之久的任何真正实现这一目标的努力而恶化。


Leaders on both sides ignore strong majorities that crave peace, allowing extremist-led violence to preempt all opportunities for building a political consensus.	双方的领导人忽视渴望和平的绝大多数人，允许极端分子领导的暴力先发制人，扼杀所有建立政治共识的机会。


Traumatized Israelis cling to the false hope that their lives will be made safer by incremental unilateral withdrawals from occupied areas, while Palestinians see their remnant territories reduced to little more than human dumping grounds surrounded by a provocative “security barrier” that embarrasses Israel’s friends and fails to bring safety or stability.	饱受折磨的以色列人抓住虚幻的希望不放，那就是通过从占领地区递增的单方面撤军，他们的生活将会更加安全，而巴勒斯坦人则看到，他们残余的领土变成了人体丢弃地，周围是富有挑衅性的、另以色列的朋友难堪而又无法带来安全或稳定的“安全隔离墙”。


The general parameters of a long-term, two-state agreement are well known.	一个长期的、巴以两国共存的协议总体范围是众所周知的。


There will be no substantive and permanent peace for any peoples in this troubled region as long as Israel is violating key UN resolutions, official American policy and the international “road map” for peace by occupying Arab lands and oppressing the Palestinians.	只要以色列还在违反关键性的联合国决议和美国的正式政策，以及通过占领阿拉伯土地和镇压巴勒斯坦人违反国际社会的和平“路线图”，这一饱受磨难的地区的任何人就都不会有实质性的和永久和平。


Except for mutually agreeable negotiated modifications, Israel’s official pre-1967 borders must be honored.	除了各方协商一致的改变外，以色列1967年以前的边界必须得到遵守。


As were all previous administrations since the founding of Israel, US government leaders must be in the forefront of achieving this long-delayed goal.	正如以色列建国后所有的前任政府一样，美国政府领导人必须一马当先，实现这一拖延良久的目标。


A major impediment to progress is the US administration’s strange policy that dialogue on controversial issues will be extended only as a reward for subservient behavior and will be withheld from those who reject US assertions.	进展的主要障碍是美国行政当局奇怪的政策，那就是有关有争议问题的对话只能作为是遵命服从行为的奖赏，而拒绝美国要求的人则不会得到。


Direct engagement with the Palestine Liberation Organization or the Palestinian Authority and the government in Damascus will be necessary if secure negotiated settlements are to be achieved.	要实现稳妥的、通过谈判达成的解决方案，就有必要与巴解组织或者巴勒斯坦权力机构以及大马士革政府直接对话。


Failure to address the issues and leaders involved risks the creation of an arc of even greater instability running from Jerusalem through Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad and Tehran.	无法处理这些问题以及领导人就可能有建立从耶路撒冷经过贝鲁特、大马士革、巴格达直到德黑兰的更不稳定的弧形的风险。


The people of the Middle East deserve peace and justice, and we in the international community owe them our strong leadership and support.	中东人民理应得到和平和正义，而我们国际社会欠他们强大的领导和支持。


Stopping the War on Children	阻止针对儿童的战争


LONDON – Twenty years ago this month, the United Nations General Assembly received a report by former Mozambican Education Minister Graça Machel detailing the effects of armed conflict on children.	伦敦——二十年前的这个月，联大收到了莫桑比克前教育部长格拉萨·马谢尔的一份报告，该报告详细阐述了武装冲突对儿童的影响。


Documenting a pattern of systematic and targeted attacks, including killing, rape, and forced recruitment into armed groups, Machel concluded: “This is a space devoid of the most basic human values….There are few further depths to which humanity can sink.”	这份报告记录了系统及有针对性的袭击模式，包括杀人、强奸和强制招募儿童进入武装组织，马谢尔总结道：“这里缺乏最基本的人类价值. .


Machel was wrong.	马谢尔说得不对。


A generation later, humanity is plumbing even greater depths of moral depravity.	一代人后，人类单就道德堕落而言正在沉沦得更深。


Children living in conflict zones are being targeted for violence on an unprecedented scale, and the elaborate system of UN human-rights provisions designed to protect them is violated with impunity.	生活在冲突地区的儿童正在面对规模空前的暴力，而旨在保护他们的煞费苦心的联合国人权规则的破坏者却依然不受惩罚。


On the twentieth anniversary of the Machel report, the international community must draw a line and stop the war against children.	在马谢尔报告二十周年纪念日之际，国际社会必须明确界限，阻止针对儿童的战争。


That war takes many forms.	这样的战争一般有多种形式。


In some cases, children are front-line targets.	某些情况下，儿童成为一线目标。


Rape, forced marriage, enslavement, and abduction have become standard tactics for groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, and their counterparts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia.	强奸、强制婚姻、奴役和绑架已经成为伊拉克和叙利亚伊斯兰国、尼日利亚北部博科圣地以及他们在阿富汗、巴基斯坦和索马里同行的标准集体战术。


Killing kids for attending school is viewed as a legitimate military strategy.	杀死上学的学生被视为一种合法的军事策略。


In other cases, children are under attack from both state and non-state actors.	在其他情况下，儿童受到来自国家和非国家主体的攻击。


In South Sudan, since the eruption of conflict in 2013, government and rebel forces have killed, raped, and recruited children into armed groups.	在南苏丹，自从2013年冲突爆发后，政府和反政府武装杀害、强奸和招募儿童加入武装集团。


So brutal, systematic, and widespread are the attacks that it seems highly likely that they are carried out with the highest level of political authorization.	上述袭击行为如此野蛮、系统和普遍，似乎很有可能得到了最高级别的政治授权。


And, indeed, according to a UN Human Rights Council report published earlier this year, South Sudanese government forces have been heavily implicated in such activities, which may explain why no one has been held accountable for the May 2015 murder of 130 children in Unity State.	而且事实上，今年早些时候公布的一份联合国人权理事会报告显示，南苏丹政府军已经被大规模牵连进这些活动，这或许可以解释为什么2015年5月在团结州谋杀130名儿童的嫌犯至今逍遥法外。


Children are also collateral damage, which stems from the relentless erosion of the laws and norms designed to protect civilians in conflict zones.	儿童同时是附带损失，是原本旨在保护冲突地区民众的法律和规范遭到无情侵蚀的受害者。


In Syria, children living in Aleppo, Homs, and other cities have been barrel-bombed and gassed by government forces acting in open defiance of international law.	在叙利亚，生活在阿勒颇、霍姆斯和其他城市的儿童成为公开藐视国际法的政府军桶装炸弹及毒气袭击的受害者。


The sanctity of schools and health centers is a dead letter: more than 25% of all schools in Syria have been destroyed or forced to close.	学校和医疗中心的神圣性成为一纸空文：叙利亚超过25%的学校被摧毁或被迫停课。


Political leaders in Saudi Arabia clearly regard the Geneva Convention, the legal pillar of protection for civilians, as irrelevant.	沙特阿拉伯的政治领袖显然认为保护平民的政治支柱日内瓦公约无关紧要。


Last August, a Saudi Arabian airstrike on a suburb of Saada, Yemen, hit a school and killed ten children.	去年8月，一次沙特对也门萨那市郊的空袭命中一所学校并杀死了十名儿童。


This was but one episode in a larger trend of attacks on schools, health centers, and markets.	这只不过是针对学校、医疗中心和市场大规模袭击趋势中的区区一幕。


Over the last year, the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen has struck four health facilities supported by the non-governmental organization Doctors Without Borders.	去年一年，以沙特为首的也门联军就袭击了非政府机构无国界医生组织所支持的四所医疗机构。


The current violence against children is a far cry from what Machel envisaged two decades ago.	目前针对儿童的暴力行为马谢尔在二十年前远远没有预料到。


Following her recommendations, in 1997 the General Assembly established a Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, to identify and report to the Secretary-General and Security Council on parties in conflicts that are responsible for persistent and egregious violations.	在她的建议下，联大于1997年设立儿童与武装冲突问题特别代表，负责搜集并向秘书长和安理会报告长期恶意违反规则的冲突方。


The special representative monitors six types of violations of children’s rights: killing and maiming, sexual violence, military recruitment, attacks on schools and health centers, abduction, and denial of humanitarian access.	特别代表监控六种类型的儿童侵权行为：致死和伤残、性暴力、征兵、袭击学校和医疗中心、绑架及拒绝人道主义援助。


Each is barred by international law, including the 1949 Geneva Convention, which requires parties in a conflict to protect civilians and maintain unimpeded humanitarian access, and the Convention of the Rights of the Child, the world’s most widely ratified human-rights treaty, which provides a comprehensive list of children’s rights.	这六种行为每种都遭到包括1949年日内瓦公约在内国际法的明文禁止，日内瓦公约要求各方在冲突中保护平民并维持人道主义援助通道畅通无阻，还有全世界批准范围最广的人权条约儿童权利公约提供了儿童权利的完整列表。


Violence against children persists not because of a deficit of rights, but because of what Eva Svoboda of the Overseas Development Institute describes as a crisis of compliance.	针对儿童暴力持续存在不是因为缺少权利，而是因为来自海外发展研究所的伊娃·斯沃博达所描述的守法危机。


The international community is failing to uphold the laws, norms, and rules that define civilized standards.	国际社会未能坚决奉行定义文明标准的法律、法规和规则。


To put it bluntly, killing, maiming, and terrorizing children has become a cost-free enterprise.	坦白地讲，杀戮、残害和恐吓儿童已经成为一项没有任何代价的事业。


The crisis of compliance starts at the top of the UN system and trickles down, through the Security Council, to the General Assembly and member governments.	守法危机始于联合国体系顶层并向下扩散，通过安理会直至联大及各成员国政府。


Consider the Saudi campaign in Yemen.	以沙特在也门的宣传攻势为例。


Earlier this year, Saudi Arabia was put on the UN secretary-general’s “list of shame” for bombing Yemeni civilian targets and killing children.	今年初，因为轰炸也门平民目标及杀害儿童，沙特阿拉伯登上了联合国秘书长的“耻辱名单” 。


By June, however, it had been removed from the list following intensive lobbying by the Saudi government and its arms-supplying American and European allies.	但到6月，在沙特政府及为其提供武器的美欧盟国的密集游说攻势后，该国却被移出了这份名单。


Regardless of these allies’ intent, the signal they sent is clear: protecting lucrative arms deals takes precedence over protecting children’s rights.	无论这些盟友有何意图，他们都传递了明确的信号：保护有利可图的武器交易比保护儿童权利更重要。


The endless cycle of reporting on violations of child rights is in danger of becoming a pantomime.	有关儿童权利侵害报告的无休止循环正有可能沦为作秀。


While the special representative’s office has done an excellent job exposing attacks on children – and in some cases negotiating the release of child soldiers – the punishments do not fit the crimes.	尽管特别代表办公室出色地完成了揭露儿童袭击事件的任务——而且在某些情况下还成功谈判了儿童士兵的释放——但侵害儿童权利却始终罚不抵罪。


As world leaders gather in New York this month for the 71st Session of the General Assembly, it is time to reassert the values underpinning UN human-rights provisions.	随着世界领袖本月齐聚纽约参加第71届联合国大会，是时候再次重申支撑联合国人权规定的价值观。


The only way to end impunity for heinous crimes against children is by enforcing genuine accountability – and by bringing the perpetrators to justice.	结束对儿童犯下令人发指罪行却不受惩罚的唯一方法是落实真正的责任追究制度——通过将肇事者绳之以法来制止侵害儿童权利的行为。


At a minimum, institutions such as the International Criminal Court in The Hague and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights should be collaborating far more closely with the UN special representative.	至少，海牙国际刑事法庭及非洲人权与民族权利法庭等机构应更紧密地与联合国特别代表合作。


But so vast is the scale of the problem, and so deeply embedded the culture of impunity, that bolder initiatives may be needed.	但问题的规模如此之大、不受惩罚的文化如此根深蒂固，人们可能需要采取更大胆的行动。


Given the failure of existing institutions, it may be time to establish a new one – an International Criminal Court for Children, authorized to investigate and prosecute state and non-state actors for war crimes against kids.	鉴于现有机构未能保护儿童权利，建立新的机构或许正是时候——我们可以成立国际儿童刑事法院，并授权该机构调查及起诉国家及非国家主体针对儿童的战争罪行。


We have collectively allowed human-rights laws to become irrelevant paper tigers.	我们集体坐视人权法律成为无关紧要的纸老虎。


But if there is one cause that can rally a divided world, it is surely the protection of children in warzones.	但如果有一项事业可以团结四分五裂的世界，这项事业肯定是保护战区的儿童。


Story Time for the World Economy	为世界经济讲故事的时间到了


NEW HAVEN - Since hitting bottom in early March, the world’s major stock markets have all risen dramatically.	纽黑文－全球主要股票市场在今年三月初见底以来，都涨幅巨大。


Some, notably in China and Brazil, reached lows last fall and again in March, before rebounding sharply, with Brazil’s Bovespa up 75% in May compared to late October 2008, and the Shanghai Composite up 54% in roughly the same period.	有些股票市场，特别是中国和巴西的股票市场，在大幅反弹之前——巴西Bovespa股指与2008年10月底相比上涨了75％，上证综指在同期大约上涨了54％——在去年秋天和今年三月份两次达到了低点。


But the stock market news just about everywhere has been very good since March.	然而，今年三月份以来，有关世界各地股票市场的消息，都是好消息。


Does this suggest that the world economic crisis is coming to an end?	股市的上涨意味着世界经济危机即将结束吗？


Could it be that everyone becomes optimistic again at the same time, bringing a quick end to all our problems?	这有可能是因为所有的人再次同时变得乐观起来，从而使我们面临的所有问题都快速结束了吗？


Speculative booms are driven by psychological feedback.	人类的心理反应推动了投机性繁荣。


Rising stock prices generate stories of smart investors getting rich.	股票市场的上涨，会制造出聪明的投资者在股票市场上发财的故事。


People become envious of others’ successes, and begin to wonder if rising prices don’t portend further increases.	人们开始嫉妒其他人的成功，并认为股票价格的上涨有可能预示着进一步的上涨。


A temptation arises to get into the market, even among people who are fundamentally doubtful that the boom will continue.	因此，进入股票市场对人们的吸引了增加了，这即使对那些从根本上怀疑股票市场的繁荣能否持续下去的人，也是如此。


So rising prices feed back into more rising prices, and the cycle repeats again and again – for a while.	所以，人们对股票价格上涨的反应反过来又会引起股票价格的进一步上涨，而且这个周期在一段时间里反复发生。


During a boom, people considering getting into asset markets weigh the fear of regret if they don’t against the pain of possible loss if they do.	在繁荣时期，考虑进入资产市场的人们，会在不进入资产市场带来的遗憾和进入资产市场可能遭受的损失造成的痛苦之间，进行权衡。


There is no authoritative answer about what the “right” decision is, and no consensus among experts about the proper level of exposure to these markets.	世界对什么是这个问题的“正确”决定，没有权威的答案，而且在专家中，也没有对参与这些市场到什么程度是恰当的的共识。


Should it be 30% in stocks and 70% in housing?	人们应该将资产的30％投资于股票，70％投资于房产呢？


Or the reverse?	还是将70％投资于股票，30％投资于房产？


Who knows?	谁知道呢？


So the ultimate human decision must be based on the relative salience of these discordant emotional factors.	所以，人们最终的投资决定，一定是建立在这些不一致的情感因素的相对重要性之上的。


In a boom environment, the emotional factors are biased toward getting into the market.	在股市繁荣的情况下，人们的情感因素偏向于进入股市。


But one must ask what would sustain such a movement now. There seems to be no dramatic fundamental news since March other than the price increases themselves.	但是，人们现在必须反问，有什么东西可以支持股票市场的这种趋势。


The human tendency to react to price increases is always there waiting to generate booms and bubbles.	今年三月份以来，除了股票价格上涨本身之外，似乎没有什么重要的基本面消息。


The feedback is only an amplification mechanism for other factors that predispose people to want to get into the markets.	人类对价格上涨的反应总是等待制造繁荣和泡沫，而这种反应只是使人们想进入股票市场的其他因素的一个放大机制而已。


The whole world can’t recover all of the enthusiasm of a few years ago from feedback alone, for there is a giant coordination problem: we are not all attentive to price increases at the same time, so we make decisions to buy at very different times.	世界不可能仅仅通过人们的反应，就使几年前所有的激情得到恢复，因为这里有一个巨大的协同问题：现在不是所有的人都在同时关注股票价格的上涨，所以，人们会在不同的时间作出购买股票的决定。


As a result, things happen slowly, and, meanwhile, more bad news may be revealed.	因此，事情的发展就很缓慢，同时，更多的坏消息也可能会被披露出来。


The only way world confidence can return dramatically is if our thinking coordinates around some inspiring story beyond that of the price increases themselves.	世界各国对经济的信心快速恢复的唯一途径是，我们的想法围绕着除了价格上涨这个故事本身之外的某个鼓舞人心的故事，协调一致。


In my 2009 book with George Akerlof, Animal Spirits , we describe the ups and downs of a macroeconomy as being substantially driven by stories .	在2009年出版的《动物精神》（Animal Spirits）一书中——这本书是由我和乔治·阿克尔洛夫（George Akerlof）共同创作完成的，我们认为，宏观经济的起落实质上是由 故事 推动的。


Such narratives, especially those fueled by accessible human-interest stories, are the thought viruses whose contagion drives the economy.	这样的故事，特别是由那些具有感染力的故事加以佐证的故事，是思想病毒，这些思想病毒的传播推动了经济的发展；


The contagion rate of stories depends on their relation to feedback, but plausible stories have to be there in the first place.	而且，故事的传染率取决于它们与人们对其反应的关系，然而，不管怎么说，世界上首先要有这样貌似合理的故事的存在。


The narratives have substantial persistence in that they affect our views.	因为这些故事会影响我们的观点，所有它们具有很强的持续性。


The story that drove the worldwide stock-market bubble that peaked in 2000 was complex, but, put crudely, it was that bright, aggressive people were leading the way to a new era of capitalist glory in a rapidly globalizing economy.	致使全球股票市场泡沫在2000年达到顶点的故事，是很复杂的，但是，大体说来，这个故事就是，聪明进取的人在经济快速全球化的过程中，引领通往资本主义壮丽新时代的道路的故事。


Such people became new entrepreneurs and world travelers on the way to prosperity.	这些聪明进取的人在通往繁荣的道路上，成为新型企业家和世界旅行者。


This narrative seemed plausible to casual observers, because it was tied to millions of little human-interest stories about the obvious successes of those – friends, neighbors, and family members – who had the vision to participate enthusiastically in the new environment.	这种故事对一般人来说貌似是真实的，因为它和几百万有关朋友、邻居和家庭成员——这些人具有在新环境中热情参与的远见——取得了明显的成功的富有感染力的小故事，连在了一起。


But it is hard today to re-create such a narrative, given so many stories of trouble.	但是，鉴于现在有许多有关经济存在问题的故事，所以人们很难再创造出像以前那样的故事了。


The stock markets’ rebound since March seems not to be built around any inspirational story, but rather the mere absence of more really bad news and the knowledge that all previous recessions have come to an end.	今年三月份以来股票市场的反弹，似乎不是围绕什么鼓舞人心的故事展开的，而仅仅是因为市场上没有更多真正的坏消息，以及人们认为以前的衰退都结束了而已。


At a time when the newspapers are filled with pictures of foreclosure sales – and even of surplus homes being demolished – it is hard to see any cause for the markets’ rebound other than this “all recessions come to an end sooner or later” story.	当报纸上满是销售抵押物抵债的照片——甚至是过剩的房屋被毁掉的照片的时候，除了“所有的衰退迟早都会结束”这样的故事之外，很难发现股票市场有任何反弹的理由。


Indeed, the “capitalists triumphant” story is tarnished, as is our faith in international trade.	事实上，“资本家胜利了”的故事已经黯淡无光了，我们对国际贸易的信心也是如此。


So, here is the problem: there isn’t a plausible driver of a dramatic recovery.	所以，现在的问题是：没有一个让经济快速复苏的貌似合理的驱动器。


Starting an economic recovery is like launching a new movie: nobody knows how people will react to it until people actually get to see it and talk about it among themselves.	经济开始复苏就像开拍一部新电影：在真正去看电影并互相谈论它之前，没有人知道人们会对它做出什么样的反应。


The new movie Star Trek , based on yet another remake of a television show from more than 40 years ago, surprised everyone by raking in $76.5 million on its first weekend.	根据翻拍于40多年前的一部电视剧的电影再次翻拍的《星际迷航》，在上映的第一个星期就取得了7650万的票房成绩，令所有的人感到吃惊。


That old story just got some excitement back with this new movie.	由于这部新电影的产生，《星际迷航》这个老故事又让人们感到激动。


Similarly, we have to hope that some of the same old stories that propelled us in the past – the rise of capitalism and its internationalization throughout the world economy – can somehow be dusted off and revived yet again to invigorate the animal spirits that drive economic recovery.	同样，我们应该希望，人们能够在某种程度上拂去那些过去激励过我们的老故事——资本主义的崛起和资本主义在世界经济中的国际化——上的尘埃，并让它们再次复活，以鼓舞驱动经济复苏的动物精神。


Our efforts to stimulate the economy should be focused on improving the script for those stories, making these stories believable again.	因而，我们现在刺激经济的努力应该集中在改进这样的故事的创造、以使它们再次变得可信上。


This means making capitalism work better, and making it clear that there is no threat of protectionism.	这意味着，我们要让资本主义更好地运行，让它更加透明从而免于保护主义的威胁。


But the rationale must be to get the world economy out of its current risky situation, not to propel us into yet another speculative bubble.	然而，现在我们最基本的工作，是使世界经济摆脱当前这种危险的境地，而不是将我们推进另一个投机泡沫。


Asia’s Game Without Frontiers	亚洲的无界博弈


NEW DELHI – Nowadays, many people seem to be more relaxed than ever about nationality, with the Internet enabling them to forge close connections with distant cultures and people.	新德里—如今，许多人国家问题越来越淡定了，因为互联网让他们能够与相去甚远的文化和民族构建联系。


But states remain extremely sensitive about their borders’ inviolability.	但国家对于边境动荡仍然极度敏感。 毕竟。


After all, territory – including land, oceans, air space, rivers, and seabeds – is central to a country’s identity, and shapes its security and foreign policy.	领土——包括土地、海洋、天空、河流和海床——是国家身份的核心，也决定着国家的安全和外交政策。


States can respond to territorial disputes either by surrendering some aspects of sovereignty, thus weakening their power and influence, or by adopting a more robust national-defense strategy aimed at fending off current challenges and precluding future threats.	对付领土纠纷，国家可以放弃某些主权（因而削弱实力和影响力），也可以采取更稳健的国防战略，以应对当前挑战、消除未来威胁为目标。


Today, many Asian countries are choosing the latter option.	如今许多亚洲国家选择了后一种战略。


Consider the territorial disputes roiling the Indian Ocean and other East Asian regions, sparked by China’s repeated – and increasingly assertive – efforts to claim sovereignty over vast maritime areas.	就拿印度洋和其他东亚地区的领土纠纷来说吧。 中国一再地——并且越来越坚决地——主张其广大的海洋国土面积。


As China’s incursions reignite long-smoldering disagreements and threaten to destabilize the regional status quo, countries throughout Asia are reconsidering their strategic positions.	中国的入侵再次点燃了动摇地区现状的分歧，整个亚洲的国家都在重新考虑战略立场。


For example, the Philippines is revamping its security strategy by enhancing cooperation with the United States – China’s counterweight in the region – only two decades after it closed two major American military installations, the naval base at Subic Bay and Clark Air Base.	比如，菲律宾正在修改其安全战略，增强与中国在该地区的制衡力量——美国的合作，而在二十年前，菲律宾才关闭了两个主要美国驻军点——苏比克湾海军基地和克拉克（Clark）空军基地。


Vietnam, too, has strengthened its ties with the US.	越南也加强了它与美国的关系。


And, after decades of absence, America has resumed training programs for Indonesia’s military.	而美国为印尼军队的训练计划也在中断了几十年后重新开启。


More significant, Japan’s leaders are now openly debating ways to transform the country’s post-World War II pacifism into a much more assertive nationalism.	更重要的是，日本领导人现在公开争论改变该国自二战以来的和平主义，采取更坚决的民族主义。


In fact, in August, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force unveiled the helicopter destroyer Izumo, whose structure and capabilities resemble those of an aircraft carrier, with possible offensive applications.	事实上，8月，日本海军自卫队直升机驱逐舰出云丸下水，其结构和能力与航空母舰相当，可以执行进攻任务。


This emerging strategic shift will likely have far-reaching consequences, raising the stakes of Sino-Japanese sparring over islands in the East China Sea.	这一新出现的战略变化可能引起深远的后果，增加中日两国在东海岛屿上的赌注。


But, while Japan’s tense relationship with China dominates headlines worldwide, the strategic rivalry between China and India is more likely to shape Asian power dynamics in the coming decades.	但是，在日本与中国的紧张关系占据了全球媒体焦点的同时，中国和印度之间的战略对峙才更有可能决定未来几十年中的亚洲实力动态。


And recent events suggest that China knows it.	最近的一系列事件表明中国对此心知肚明。


In April, a platoon of Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) border-security personnel crossed the so-called “line of actual control” into India’s Depsang Valley in Ladakh to erect an encampment, where they remained for almost three weeks.	4月，解放军边防部队一个排的兵力越过了所谓的“实际控制线”，进入了拉达克地区（Ladakh）的德普桑谷（Depsang Valley）扎营并停留了近三个星期。


China’s leaders have yet to explain what prompted the incursion – but there is no shortage of speculation.	中国领导人尚未解释是什么促成了这次入侵（但猜疑声从未停止）。


Some claim that the local PLA commander initiated the “stand-off,” while others contend that China’s new president, Xi Jinping, was using the transgression to assert his authority over the PLA.	有人认为是解放军地方指挥官下令挑起了这次“僵局”，也有人助长中国新主席习近平在借此宣布他在解放军中的权威。


The incursion has even been linked to the scandal surrounding Chongqing’s disgraced former Communist Party chief, Bo Xilai, who had close ties with high-ranking PLA and security-services officers.	此次入侵甚至与被抓的前重庆市委书记薄熙来联系在一起，薄熙来曾经试图与解放军和武警高级军官建立紧密联系。


But the most likely explanation is the simplest one: China was deliberately asserting its authority over the disputed border.	但最可能的解释是最简单的一个：中国在有意显示其对争议边界的主宰。


As it stands, India and China are openly competing for influence in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Nepal, and Bangladesh.	印度和中国还在公开竞争对斯里兰卡、缅甸、尼泊尔和孟加拉国的影响力。


So far, they have largely relied on economic and commercial mechanisms – especially rival port and pipeline projects – to secure their positions.	目前，它们的竞争仍基本依靠经济和商业机制，特别是建设港口和输油管道工程确保自己的地位。


China is not allowing its economic slowdown to derail its efforts to enlarge and modernize its navy and expand its commercial interests around Eurasia’s southern rim.	中国不会允许其经济减速导致其海军扩军和现代化以及扩大其在欧亚大陆南沿商业利益的努力流产。


It has been investing or demonstrating interest in deep-water port projects in Kenya, Tanzania, and Bangladesh, and it has been directly involved in financing and constructing Indian Ocean ports in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan.	中国还投资或显示出对肯尼亚、坦桑尼亚和孟加拉国的深水港工程的兴趣，也直接参与了融资和建设缅甸、斯里兰卡和巴基斯坦的印度洋港口。


Just as China is helping to develop Pakistan’s port of Gwadar, India is helping to develop Iran’s Chabahar port 70 kilometers (43.5 miles) away.	正如中国帮助巴基斯坦开发瓜达尔港，印度也在帮助伊朗开发伊朗的恰巴哈尔港，两者只相差70公里。


Chabahar is not useful only to counter China; it will serve as a vital link for India to transport goods to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and beyond.	恰巴哈尔不但可以用于制衡蒸锅，还可以成为印度将货物运往阿富汗、中亚和其他地区的重要节点。


India could even develop a major communication hub with the port as its nexus.	印度甚至可以以恰巴哈尔港为节点开发重要的通信枢纽。


Moreover, India is working to safeguard its naval superiority over China.	此外，印度还在努力捍卫其对中国的海军优势。


In August, the reactor aboard India’s first indigenously built nuclear submarine, INS Arihant, was activated, bringing the country one step closer to realizing its long-sought goal of a “nuclear triad” – the capability to launch nuclear weapons from land, air, and sea.	8月，印度第一艘本土制造的核潜艇歼敌号（Arihant）核反应堆点火，距离实现其长期追求的“核三位”（从陆地、空中和海中发射核武器）目标又近了一步。


Just three days later, India launched the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant.	三天后，印度第一艘航空母舰维克兰特号（Vikrant）下水。


But, as The Economist observed, “rarely does nemesis follow hubris so quickly.”	但是，《经济学人》（Economist）观察到，“狂妄导致失败的报应从未来得这么快。


Indeed, just two days after the Vikrant’s launch, explosions at the naval dockyard in Mumbai sank INS Sindhurakshak – one of the ten Kilo-class submarines that form the backbone of India’s aging conventional-submarine fleet – killing 18 crew members.	”事实上，维克兰特下水仅仅两天后，孟买海军船坞爆炸导致了Sindhurakshak号下沉，十八名船员丧生。 Sindhurakshak号是构成印度日益老化的常规潜艇力量基石的十艘基洛级潜艇之一。


Perhaps China’s apparent economic, strategic, and military advantages will prove less significant than many believe – especially given continuing uncertainty over the terms of America’s strategic “pivot” toward Asia.	也许中国显而易见的经济、战略和军事优势比很多人认为的更小——特别是考虑到美国战略性的亚洲“支点”计划所带来的不确定的情况下。


Indeed, with the US on their side, either Japan or India could conceivably tip the scales in its own favor.	事实上，与美国站在同一条战壕想必可以让日本和印度扭转形势，站在有利地位。


But one thing is clear: a great game is beginning among Asia’s great powers, and there are scant rules in place to manage how it will be played.	但有一点很清楚：亚洲大国之间正在展开大博弈，这场博弈如何发展，我们没有什么规则可以判断。


Euro Lessons for East Asia	欧元带给东亚的教训


SEOUL – East Asia could learn two valuable lessons from the eurozone crisis.	发自首尔——东亚可以从欧元危机中学到两个宝贵的教益。


First, do not rush the process of financial and monetary integration; and, second, develop adequate institutional frameworks before proceeding.	首先，不要过快推进金融以及货币整合的进程； 其次，在实施这一切之前先要制定出合适的体制框架。


In fact, East Asian countries are unlikely to move toward a regional fixed exchange-rate system or a monetary union with a single currency in the immediate future, owing to the region’s great diversity in terms of economic and political conditions.	事实上，由于东亚地区内部的经济和政治状况存在着极大的差异，因此各国都不太愿意在短期内向一个区域性的固定汇率体系或者单一货币联盟推进。


Perhaps, in a few decades, the region’s countries will develop institutions to promote financial integration, such as a single bank supervisory agency of the type that the European Union is now creating.	或许在几十年后该地区的国家会发展出一套推进财政一体化的体制，例如类似欧盟现在正在创设的那种单一银行监管机构。


Nevertheless, Asian policymakers should improve cooperation mechanisms designed to prevent and manage crises.	但即便如此，亚洲地区的政策制定者们应当携手改善旨在预防和管控危机的合作机制。


Most promising is the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) of the ASEAN+3 – the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus China, Japan, and South Korea.	而其中最有前景的则要数东盟+3——10个东南亚国家联盟会员国加上中日韩三国——所制定的《清迈倡议多边化协议》。


This $120 billion regional reserve pool was launched in 2010 to provide short-term liquidity to members in an emergency.	这个总额1200亿美元的区域性货币储备池在2010年启动以在紧急关头为成员国提供短期流动性。


The ASEAN+3 is now strengthening the CMIM by doubling the total fund size to $240 billion.	东盟+3集团现在正通过将资金池总规模翻倍到2400亿美元来强化该上述协议。


The group also agreed to enhance the CMIM’s flexibility by reducing the minimum portion of crisis lending to be tied to the International Monetary Fund’s lending program from 80% to 70%.	集团各成员国同时也同意把即将与国际货币基金组织借款计划挂钩的危机借款最低比例从80%降低到70%来增加协议的灵活性。


The CMIM has yet to be tested in a crisis.	清迈协议还需要经过一场危机的检验。


In its infancy, it might not be able to provide adequate emergency support in a timely and flexible manner.	在其初创之时，它或许无法足够及时和灵活地提供合适的紧急支持。


The $240 billion fund is small, amounting to only about 1.5% of the region’s GDP.	2400亿美元也相对较少，仅相当于东亚地区GDP总规模的1. 5%。


European experience suggests that large-scale systemic shocks call for greater financial support.	欧洲的经验告诉我们大范围额系统性冲击必须要有更大规模的金融支持来应对。


Unlike the IMF or the European Stability Mechanism, CMIM contributions are self-managed by the respective country’s authorities.	与国际货币基金组织或者欧洲稳定机制（European Stability Mechanism）不同的是，清迈倡议多边化协议的捐款由各国当局自行管理。


And countries may choose not to contribute to a swap request.	而各国也可以选择不向货币互换协议提供款项。


This suggests that the CMIM could be especially constrained amid a systemic shock or political disputes among member countries.	这意味着在系统性冲击期间或在成员国间发生政治冲突之时该协议都会尤其受到限制。


Moreover, an “IMF stigma” remains among those countries in the region that were discontented with the Fund’s role during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis.	此外，“国际货币基金组织恶名”依然在该地区的一些国家心中萦绕，因为它们都对该组织在1997-1998年亚洲金融危机宗所扮演的角色感到不满。


IMF conditionality for the activation of the majority of their borrowing could make countries reluctant to turn to the CMIM for support.	国际货币基金组织为各国大多数借款所设下的附加启动条件会令各国不愿向清迈协议寻求支持。


Another challenge is the CMIM’s limited capacity for economic surveillance and monitoring.	另一个挑战就是清迈协议有限的金融监控能力。


Last year, ASEAN+3 established a regional surveillance unit, the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), to monitor regional economies, detect emerging vulnerabilities, and support effective decision-making by the CMIM.	去年，东盟+3建立了一个区域监察机构——东盟+3宏观经济研究室——来监测区域经济，探测新出现的脆弱节点，并为协议的有效决策提供支持。


But it is unclear whether AMRO has sufficient capacity and expertise to monitor 13 countries effectively.	但还尚不清楚该研究室拥有足够的能力和专业水平去有效监测13个国家。


Indeed, East Asian countries may find it difficult to conduct candid surveillance of one another’s policies and enforce firm policy conditionality.	事实上，东亚国家或许会发现难以对各个国家的政策进行公正的监测并执行坚决的政策实施条件。


The example of Greece before and during the eurozone crisis shows that it is often hard for countries to be tough on their neighbors.	在欧元区危机之前和期间的希腊就表明让各国对邻国采取强硬往往都是非常困难的。


The ASEAN+3 must continue to increase its resources, enhance its independence and improve its operational procedures.	东盟+3集团必须持续增加其资源，强化自身独立性并优化运作程序。


A fully capable regional financial safety net could contain the contagion of financial shocks emanating from individual economies and prevent disruptions to the region’s key growth drivers – intra-regional trade and investment.	一个全力运作的区域金融安全网可以遏制那些来自单一经济体的金融冲击蔓延开来并防止对该区域关键推动力——区域内贸易和投资——的破坏。


The CMIM could help East Asian countries to reduce their reliance on accumulating, as a form of self-insurance, costly reserves that fuel global imbalances.	清迈协议可以帮助东亚国家减少对积累的依赖，而这种积累其实是一种助长全球不平衡的自保式且成本巨大的储蓄。


With greater resources and an improved governance structure, AMRO could play a more effective role in regional economic surveillance and monitoring, without which moral-hazard risks associated with financial safety nets would rise.	利用更多的资源和优化的治理架构，东盟+3宏观经济研究室可以在区域经济监测上扮演一个更加有效的角色，而且也无须承担一个可能由金融安全网相关的道德风险。


Enhanced regional control would contribute to better information-sharing and decision-making as well, implying that the IMF-linked portion of CMIM crisis lending could be reduced in step with the strengthening of AMRO’s capacity and performance.	强化的区域控制还将有利于更好地信息分享和决策，暗示着清迈协议的危机借款中与国际货币基金组织相关的部分能在增强经济研究室能力和表现的同时得到削减。


The ASEAN+3 should aim to develop the CMIM into a full-capacity regional financial safety net supported by AMRO as a capable and credible secretariat – a de facto Asian Monetary Fund, possibly with broader membership.	东盟+3应该致力于将清迈协议在经济研究室的这个得力而可靠的秘书支持下发展成为一个功能全面的区域金融安全网——也就是一个事实上的亚洲货币基金，而且或许能容纳更多的成员国。


But, until the CMIM and AMRO are fully developed, their close cooperation with the IMF is desirable.	但在协议和办公室两者完全成熟之前，它们与国际货币基金组织的紧密合作还是可取的。


Indeed, at the Cannes G-20 Summit in November 2011, leaders agreed on principles for cooperation between the IMF and regional financing arrangements, including open information-sharing and joint missions.	事实上，在2011年11月的嘎纳G2峰会上，领导人们都对国际货币基金组织和区域性金融协议之前的合作原则表示同意，其中就包括公开的信息分享和联合行动。


In particular, the IMF and ASEAN+3 financing arrangement should establish a regular channel of dialogue to facilitate information exchange and prepare concrete guidelines for cooperation and an appropriate division of tasks.	尤其是，国际货币基金组织和东盟+3金融协议应该建立一个长期性的对话渠道来促进信息交流并起草一份关于合作和任务合理分配的具体指引。


Establishing constructive and effective guidelines could help to prevent the sort of conflicts and confusion over lending conditions during crises that we have seen among the IMF, EU, and the European Central Bank in the eurozone.	制定建设性且有效的指引将有助于防止出现欧元危机期间我们在国际货币基金组织，欧盟和欧洲央行之间所看见的那些冲突和误会。


Given the “IMF stigma” in Asia, a co-financing facility that provides precautionary credit lines without policy conditionality to qualified member countries would be useful.	考虑到亚洲的“国际货币基金组织污名”，一个可以在不预设政策前提的情况下向合资格的成员国提供预先信贷额度的联合援助实体将非常有用。


Asian countries have learned from their region’s own crisis in the 1990’s, as well as from the eurozone’s ongoing crisis, that effective management of cross-border capital flows requires well-constructed national, regional, and global responses.	除了欧元区危机之外，亚洲国家也应当在本区域1990年代的危机中的得到教训，认识到对跨境资金流的有效管理需要构建完善的国家，区域和全球应对措施。


To respond effectively to crises, East Asian countries must continue to improve the regional financial safety net and surveillance mechanism, while strengthening their cooperation with the IMF.	为了有效应对危机，亚洲国家必须继续优化区域金融安全网络和监察机制，同时强化自身与国际货币基金组织的合作。


Strengthening IMF Surveillance	加强国际货币基金组织的监控


In today’s globalized economy, one country’s economic and financial policies can reverberate far beyond its borders.	在当今的全球化经济中，一国的经济和财政政策可能会对其他国家产生重大影响。


Be it the spread of inflation or the impact of currency devaluation half a world away, global economic forces can have a direct impact on every person’s livelihood.	无论是地球另一端的通货膨胀扩散或是货币贬值的影响，全球经济力量对每个人的生计都会产生直接的影响。


Under such circumstances, international cooperation is essential to ensure stability and growth and prevent disruptive crises.	在这种形势下，国际合作对于确保稳定和增长以及防止破坏性危机都是非常重要的。


But for such cooperation to be effective, the international community needs the right tools.	但是，要想这些合作具有效力，国际社会就需要具备适当的工具。


The International Monetary Fund provides one of the most important tools.	国际货币基金组织提供了最为重要的工具之一。


For many years, the IMF has engaged its member countries in a process known as “surveillance,” in which it monitors, analyzes, and consults on each country’s economic policies – both exchange rate policies and relevant domestic policies.	多年来，国际货币基金组织让其成员国参与到“监控”的进程之中。 在这一进程中，国际货币基金组织监视、分析并且会商各国的经济政策。


These regular checkups help to identify potential vulnerabilities and maintain economic stability.	这些经济政策既包括汇率政策，也包括相关的国内政策。


However, the increasingly complex policy challenges of the globalized economy demand a fresh look at this process.	这些定期的检查帮助确定潜在的弱点并且维持经济稳定。 但是，全球化经济日益复杂的政策挑战要求重新审视这一进程。


This June, the IMF’s Executive Board did just that, reaching a broad consensus on updating surveillance to make it more focused and effective.	今年六月，国际货币基金组织的执行委员会采取了这一步骤。 委员会打成一致意见更新监控，使得它更为具有针对性和有效。


This is one of the most important reforms to the Fund’s work in the 30 years since the surveillance process was designed.	这是设计出监控进程以来国际货币基金组织在30年中最为重要的改革。


Indeed, it is part of a much broader reform effort aimed at strengthening the IMF and will have implications extending well beyond the Fund’s boardroom.	的确，这也是更为大范围的改革努力的一部分，目的在于加强国际货币基金组织，并且将会产生深远的影响。


The new reform brings three critical changes.	新的改革带来三大关键变化。


First, it affirms that surveillance should focus on what matters for stability, and gives detailed guidance in this area.	首先，它确认监控应当针对对于稳定而言重要的事情，并且在这一领域提供详细的指导。


IMF advice should not be spread too thin.	国际货币基金组织的建议不应当过于宽泛。


Second, there is now clear advice to the Fund’s member countries on how they should run their exchange rate policies, and on what is acceptable to the international community.	第二，将在如何运行汇率政策以及能够为国际社会接受的措施上给国际货币基金组织的成员国提供明确的建议。


Finally, the reform sets out clearly for the first time what is expected of surveillance, and so should promote candor and evenhanded treatment of every country.	最后，这些改革第一次明确地规定了对于监控的期望，因而应当会促进对于每个国家都一视同仁。


In other words, the Fund must ensure that it deals with every country the same way, including delivering clear and sometimes difficult policy messages and sharing its views with the international community.	换句话说，国际货币基金组织必须确保以相同的方式对待各国，包括提供清晰而在某些时候是困难的政策信息，并且与国际社会分享它的观点。


The new approach to exchange rate policies represents one of the most significant advances.	有关汇率政策的新措施是最为重要的进步之一。


Under the IMF Articles of Agreement, members are required to collaborate to promote a stable system of exchange rates and to avoid manipulation with a view to gaining an unfair trade advantage.	根据国际货币基金组织的协议条款，各成员国应当协作促进稳定的汇率体系并避免意在获得不公平的贸易优势的操控。


Past guidance in this area was limited, focusing entirely on manipulation and on avoidance of short-term volatility.	这一领域过去的指导是有局限的，只是完全关注于操控并且避免短期动荡。


This guidance remains, but what we meant by manipulation is now clearer.	这一指导依旧保留，但是我们对于操控的解释现在更为明确了。


We have also addressed those policies that have caused the most harm to the system in recent years, including overvalued or undervalued exchange rate pegs maintained for domestic reasons.	我们还处理了那些近年来造成最大损害的政策，包括出于国内原因而维持过高或过低的联系汇率制度。


This change comes at a crucial time for the world economy.	这一改变发生于世界经济的关键时期。


Countries are experiencing strong growth, inflation is low, and the threat of crisis has receded considerably.	各国都在经历强劲的增长，通货膨胀很低，而且危机的威胁大幅减弱。


Few countries need to borrow from the IMF – a highly positive trend.	没有几个国家需要向国际货币基金组织借款，而这正是一个极为积极的趋势。


But improved surveillance is essential to ensure that the global economy remains on an even keel.	但是，加以改善的监控对于确保全球经济维持稳定十分关键。


By clarifying what surveillance entails, the new decision should help the IMF and its members see eye to eye on the Fund’s role, help those involved in surveillance do their job properly, and make the Fund more accountable for delivering on this key responsibility.	新的决定通过澄清监控的要求而将会帮助国际货币基金组织及其成员国在基金的作用上达成一致，帮助那些参与监控的人切实履行指责，并且让基金对落实这一关键责任承担负责。


This reform represents a victory for multilateralism that demonstrates ownership of how Fund surveillance will be strengthened and members’ willingness to live up to their responsibilities in the process.	这一改革是多边主义的胜利，表明本基金的监控将会得到加强，同时表明，各成员国愿意遵履行其在进程中的责任。


Of course, it is critically important that it received very broad support from industrial countries, emerging economies, and developing countries.	当然，这一进程得到工业化国家、新兴经济体以及发展中国家的广泛支持是极为关键的。


The international community needs a setting where it can debate the most sensitive economic issues, including – but certainly not limited to – exchange rate issues.	国际社会需要有一种能够辩论最为敏感的经济问题的环境，包括汇率问题。 但是当然不应当局限于此。


The IMF offers that venue.	国际货币基金组织提供了这一场合。


At the same time, it can provide the nonpartisan technical expertise that enables governments to define policies that will ensure continued economic stability.	与此同时，它还可以提供没有党派分歧的技术专业协助来使得各国政府制定可以确保持续经济稳定的政策。


The goal is to support policies that are good for each member country – but also for other countries – through dialogue and persuasion.	目标就是通过对话和劝导来支持对于各成员国以及其他国家有益的政策。


This is the very essence of international cooperation.	这就是国际合作的精髓所在。


How to Boost Foreign Investment	怎样提振外国投资


MADRID – Economic globalization, together with a rebalancing of power between the world’s north and south, has made developing countries, and many companies within them, key global economic actors.	马德里—经济全球化加上南北实力再平衡让发展中国家和其中的许多公司成为全球经济的关键行为人。


This provides a new rationale for strengthening the international framework to protect foreign investment.	这给了加强保护外国投资的国际框架新的理由。


Once upon a time, global foreign direct investment flowed from only a few sources: the traditionally wealthy states of Europe, North America, and Japan.	曾几何时，全球外国直接投资（FDI）来源国十分有限：欧洲的传统富国、北美和日本。


But cross-border investment from countries such as Brazil, India, and China is now flowing not just to other emerging and transitional economies, but also to the “old” FDI-exporting states.	但如今，来自巴西、印度和中国的跨境投资不但流向其他新兴和转型经济体，也流向“老”FDI出口国。


These changes have increased the complexity of the international investment regime, and should broaden interest in developing a more effective investment-protection framework.	这一变化让国际投资机制更加复杂化了，也扩大了开发更有效的投资保护框架的利益。


But just the opposite is happening: a progressive weakening of protection, with states increasingly flouting their treaty obligations and skirting or ignoring the outcomes of international dispute-resolution proceedings.	但事态的发展与此南辕北辙：保护在逐步削弱，各国越来越不把条约义务当回事，绕开或无视国际争端解决程序的结果。


At the heart of the current system of investment protection is the World Bank, which created the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 1966 in response to requests for arbitration by the Bank’s president.	当前投资保护体系的核心是世界银行。 1966年，应行长的仲裁要求，世界银行成立了国际投资纠纷调解中心（Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes，ICSID）。


But, institutionally, the ICSID has developed less successfully than other members of the World Bank Group – particularly the International Finance Corporation – owing to a deeply rooted organizational culture at the Bank that perceives the ICSID as an instrument serving Western companies’ efforts to prevail over developing states.	但是，从机构建设上说，ICSID不及其他世行集团成员机构成功，这要归咎于世界银行深层次的组织文化，它将ICSID当作便利西方公司压倒发展中国家的工具。


This internal fissure was a non-issue during the World Bank’s first decades, when the ICSID itself was a non-factor, with only 38 registered cases between 1966 and 1996.	这一内在矛盾在世界银行的最初几十年里并不成为问题，因为ICSID本身并未形成气候，1966—1996年间总共只有38个注册案件。


This began to change with the rapid proliferation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which typically granted private investors standing before the ICSID.	这一局面因双边投资条约（BIT）的迅速涌现而开始改变，BIT把私人投资者推向了ICSID。