And as the record bears out, continuous increases in both countries’ national debt since the crash have been accompanied by a fall in the cost of government borrowing to near zero.	而过往的记录也告诉我们，这两个国家在危机爆发后的国债持续增加其实伴随着政府借贷成本的下降，乃至接近零。


The other leg of the argument for reducing the national debt has to do with the “burden on future generations.”	国债削减论的另一个注腿则与“子孙后代的负担”有关。


US President Dwight Eisenhower expressed this thought succinctly in his State of the Union message in 1960: generating a surplus to pay back debt was a necessary “reduction on our children’s inherited mortgage.”	美国总统德怀特·艾森豪威尔曾在1960年的国情咨文中简明扼要地表达了这一观点：实现盈余去偿还债务可以极有必要地“减少孩子们从我们这继承的贷款”。


The idea is that future generations would need to reduce their consumption in order to pay the taxes required to retire the outstanding debt: government deficits today “crowd out” the next generation’s consumption.	人们担心子孙后代将被迫减少消费来缴纳因未偿还债务而征收的税金：政府当前的赤字会“挤压”下一代人的消费。


Although governments have endlessly repeated this argument since the 2008 crash as a justification for fiscal tightening, the economist A. P. Lerner pointed out its fallacy years ago.	虽然政府自2008年危机以来就不断重复这一说法作为财政紧缩的理由，经济学家A. P.


The burden of reduced consumption to pay for government spending is actually borne by the generation which lends the government the money in the first place.	Lerner）却早在几年前就指出了其谬误所在。 减少消费来支付政府开支的负担实际上首先都会由借钱给政府的那一代人来承担。


This is crystal clear if the government simply raises the money it needs for its spending through taxes rather than borrowing it.	只需假设一下如果政府只是通过征税而非借钱来支付自身所需支出的话，就很容易想通了。


Furthermore, the idea that additional government spending, whether financed by taxation or borrowing, is bound to reduce private consumption by the same amount assumes that no flow of additional income results from the extra government spending – in other words, that the economy is already at full capacity.	此外，额外的政府支出——无论是通过征税或借贷融资——势必减少相同数额私人消费的理念会假定政府的额外支出不会产出任何额外的收入流——换句话说就是经济已经处于满负荷生产状态。


This has not been true of most countries since 2008.	但自2008年以来大多数国家都未达到这一状态。


But in the face of such weighty, if fallacious, testimony to the contrary, who am I to persuade my elderly friend to ignore his gut when it comes to thinking about the national debt?	但在面对如此严肃而不谬误的反驳证明时，我是否就该劝我的老朋友在谈到国债时忽略他的直觉呢？


Greece, Argentina, and the Middle-Income Trap	希腊、阿根廷和中等收入陷阱


SANTIAGO – Aside from an established tradition of bad macroeconomics, what do Greece and Argentina have in common?	圣地亚哥—除了根深蒂固的坏宏观经济学传统，希腊和阿根廷有什么共同之处？


One answer is that they were the world’s longest-held captives of the so-called middle-income trap – and remain within its reach to this day.	一个答案是它们是全球陷入所谓的中等收入陷阱时间最长的国家——至今仍然没有摆脱这一陷阱。


With countries in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin American fearing that, having reached the international middle class, they could be stuck there, Greece and Argentina shed light on how that might happen.	亚洲、东欧和拉美国家如果担心一旦进入国际中产阶级行列将被固化在这一阶段，那么希腊和阿根廷很好地说明了可能发生什么。


A recent paper by economists from Bard College and the Asian Development Bank categorizes the world economy according to four groups – with the top two categories occupied by upper-middle-income and high-income countries – and tracks countries’ movements in and out of these groups.	巴德学院（Bard College）和亚洲开发银行经济学家的 最新文章将世界经济分为四个类别——顶层的两类属于中上收入和高收入国家——追踪各国在这四个类别的进出变化情况。


Which countries were stuck for the longest period in the upper-middle-income category before moving to high income?	哪些国家在步入高收入行列前在中上收入类别中呆的时间最久？


You guessed it: Greece and Argentina.	你已经猜到了：希腊和阿根廷。


Correcting for variations in the cost of living across countries, the paper concludes that $10,750 of purchasing power in the year 1990 is the threshold for per capita income beyond which a country is high income, while $7,250 makes it upper-middle income.	在修正了不同国家生活成本的差异后，该文章指出，1990年10,750美元购买力为迈入高收入行列国家的人均收入门槛，而中上收入门槛则为7,250美元。


(These thresholds may sound low, but the World Bank uses similar cutoffs.)	（这些阈值也许听上去很低，但世界银行也使用类似的标准。 ）


By these criteria, Argentina became an upper-middle-income country all the way back in 1970, and then spent 40 years stuck in that category before reaching high-income status in 2010.	根据这些标准，阿根廷在1970年便已成为中上收入国家，此后花了40年直到2010年才打到高收入标准。


Greece joined the international upper middle class in 1972, and then took 28 years to reach the top income group, in 2000.	希腊在1972年加入国际中上阶级行列，然后花了28年直到2000年才进入最高收入类别。


No other country that became upper middle income after 1950, and then made the transition, took nearly as long.	在1950年后成为中上收入然后成功进入高收入行列的国家中，没有一个国家经历的时长接近阿根廷和希腊。


In fact, the average length of that transition was 14 years, with economies such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong taking as little as seven years.	事实上，平均升级时间为14年，韩国、中国台湾和中国香港等经济体更是只花了七年时间。


Data in the paper stop at 2010, but the story may well be worse today.	文章数据截至2010年，今天的情况可能糟糕得多。


According to IMF figures, Greece’s never-ending crisis has cut per capita GDP (in terms of purchasing power parity) by 10% since 2010, and by 18% since 2007.	根据IMF的数据，2010年以来，希腊从未结束的危机让其人均GDP（以购买力平价衡量）下降了10%，2007年以来则下降了18%。


Indeed, Greece may have dropped out of the high-income category in recent years.	事实上，希腊在近几年中已经跌出了高收入类别。


Argentina’s per capita income has risen, albeit slowly, during this period, but the country was never far from a full-blown macroeconomic crisis that could reduce household incomes sharply.	在此期间，阿根廷人均收入有所上升（尽管十分缓慢），但该国从未远离可能大幅降低家庭收入的全面宏观经济危机。


So it seems fair to conclude that both countries are still caught in the middle-income trap.	因此极有可能两国至今仍陷在中等收入陷阱中。


What kind of trap is it?	这个陷阱是什么？


In Greece and Argentina, it is both political and economic.	在希腊和阿根廷，这个陷阱既是政治上的，也是经济上的。


Start with the politics.	先说政治。


In their book Why Nations Fail, Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson argue that societies with political arrangements that concentrate power in the hands of a few seldom excel at innovation and growth, because innovators have no guarantee they will keep the fruits of their labors.	在《国家为什么失败》（Why Nations Fail）一书中，达伦·阿西莫格鲁（Daron Acemoglu）和詹姆斯·罗宾逊（James A. Robinson）指出，政治安排让权力集中在一小撮人手中的社会往往不擅长创新和增长，因为创新者得不到获得劳动果实的保证。


And, to the extent that outsiders cannot generate wealth, they have few resources with which to challenge the power of insiders; as a result, exclusionary political arrangements are mostly self-sustaining.	此外，由于外部人士无法创造财富，因此他们得不到挑战内部人士权力所需要的资源； 结果，排他性政治安排最能自我维持。


That is a useful account of why there is a poverty trap – which is the question the book seeks to answer – but it does not clarify why there is a middle-income trap.	这个说法对于解释为何存在贫困陷阱很有用——这也是该书试图回答的问题——但并没有澄清为何会有中等收入陷阱。


Greece and Argentina are, after all, democracies, however imperfect, and so are most of the countries in Latin America or East Asia that worry about being stuck at middle-income level.	毕竟，不管如何不完美，希腊和阿根廷总归是民主国家，担心陷在中等收入水平上的拉美和东亚国家大部分也是如此。


The Acemoglu-Robinson account of a single small elite pulling all the strings needs to be replaced by a different narrative, in which an array of politically powerful groups exercise veto power over decisions that affect their economic interests.	阿西莫格鲁-罗宾逊的一小撮精英把持命脉的解释需要用不同的说辞来代替，在这套说辞中，政治强力集团对影响他们的经济利益的决策行使否决权。


Think of powerful business groups vetoing moves to improve tax collection or strengthen competition policy.	试想强大的商业集团否决改进征税或强化竞争政策的措施。


This helps explain why the Greek and Argentine governments are perennially in deficit (until borrowing options dry up and adjustment is inevitable), or why prices – and profits – are high in sectors (for example, transportation and telecoms) that provide would-be entrepreneurs with crucial (but often unaffordable) inputs.	这有助于解释为何希腊和阿根廷政府永远处于赤字状态（直到借钱途径用尽，不得不接受调整），或为何为潜在企业家提供关键（但常常负担不起的）投入品的部门（如交通业和通讯业）的价格——和利润——十分高企。


Or think of public-sector unions vetoing changes in benefits for their members.	或者，试想公共部门工会否决改变成员福利的情况。


That goes a long way toward explaining (add a bit of ideology to the mix) why the current Greek government has gone to the brink of default before agreeing to restrain public-sector pensions, as its European Union partners demand.	这非常有助于解释（在解释中加入了一丝意识形态意味）为何希腊中央政府要到违约边缘才同意按欧盟伙伴国要求抑制公共部门退休金。


It also helps explain why both Greece and Argentina have sizeable governments (public spending accounts for 46% and 39% of GDP, respectively) but puny public investment and outdated infrastructure.	这也有助于解释为何希腊和阿根廷政府规模都十分庞大（公共支出分别占GDP的46%和39%），但公共投资却微不足道，基础设施也陈旧不堪。


This is not a case of too much democracy, as conservative commentators sometimes claim, but of too little.	这不是民主太多的问题（保守主义评论家时常这样宣称），而是民主太少的问题。


Underdeveloped democratic institutions allow for decisions that are individually rational but collectively shortsighted and harmful.	不发达的民主机构让个体理性但集体短视和有害的决策得以成行。


And bad politics makes for bad economics.	而坏政治学带来了坏经济学。


To go from middle-income to high-income status, countries have to redeploy resources to high-productivity, knowledge- and skill-intensive sectors.	要想从中等收入步入高收入，各国必须将资源重新配置给搞生产率的知识和技能密集型部门。


That is a transition that Greece and Argentina, with their financial instability, poor infrastructure, and weak education systems, have never made.	希腊和阿根廷从未实现这一转型——它们的金融不够稳定，基础设施破败不堪，教育系统也十分孱弱。


Greece exports refined petroleum products, olive oil, raw cotton, and dried fruit.	希腊出口石化产品、橄榄油、原棉和干果。


Argentina exports corn, soybeans, fruits, and wine – as well as cars and auto parts to the rest of the regional Mercosur trade bloc, where it enjoys ample tariff protection against third-country competition.	阿根廷出口玉米、大豆、水果和葡萄酒——以及向其他南方共同市场国家出口汽车和汽车部件，对于这些国家，阿根廷享受巨大的针对第三国竞争的关税保护。


According to the Atlas of Economic Complexity, developed by Ricardo Hausmann and colleagues at Harvard University, the 2008 gap between Greece’s income and the knowledge content of its exports was the largest in a sample of 128 countries.	根据里卡多·豪斯曼（Ricardo Hausmann）及其哈佛大学同事的《经济复杂性的阿特拉斯》（Atlas of Economic Complexity），2008年希腊的收入与其出口的知识成分之间的缺口为128个样本国家中最大的一个。


By 2013, Greece ranked 48th in the Atlas’s index of complexity of exports – by far the lowest of any developed country in Europe – while Argentina ranked 67th.	2013年，希腊名列出口复杂性阿特拉斯指数的第48位——是目前欧洲发达国家的最低排名——而阿根廷名列第67位。


Sluggish exports mean slow growth, which in turn places limits on social mobility and the expansion of an entrepreneurial middle class.	萎靡不振的出口意味着低增长，这反过来限制了社会流动性和富于企业家精神的中产阶级的扩张。


That helps preserve the political power of entrenched veto-wielding players, closing the trap.	这有助于保护根深蒂固的行使否决权的行为人的政治权力，相当于给陷阱加上了盖子。


Perhaps a weighty tome entitled Why Middle-Income Nations Fail will tell the story in full.	也许把故事讲清楚需要一部名为《中等收入国家为什么失败》的皇皇巨著。


Societies will then understand why high-income status eludes them – and what they might do differently.	接着，社会才会明白为何高等收入类别会对它们避而远之——以及可以做一些怎样的不同的事情。


Lesbos’s Ghosts, Europe’s Disgrace	莱斯博斯的幽灵，欧洲的耻辱


ATHENS – In 2015, hundreds of thousands of refugees landed on Greece’s island shores.	雅典—2015年，数十万难民在希腊岛屿沿岸登陆。


Many had perished at sea.	许多人葬身鱼腹。


Today, the international public has been lulled into believing that Greece’s refugee crisis has abated.	如今，国际社会开始相信希腊难民危机已经过去。


In fact, it has become a permanent scourge blighting Europe’s soul and brewing future trouble.	事实上，这场危机已经成为长久影响欧洲的灵魂、酝酿未来麻烦的因素。


The island of Lesbos was, and remains, its epicenter.	莱斯博斯（Lesbos）曾经是，现在也依然是这场危机的震中。


The story of Shabbir demonstrates how starkly reality clashes with Europe’s official storyline.	沙比尔（Shabbir）的故事说明了现实如何与欧洲的官方叙事如此南辕北辙。


Shabbir, 40, lived with his wife and two young children in a midsize town in Pakistan, where he ran a car rental business.	今年40岁的沙比尔和他的妻子和两个年幼的孩子曾经住在巴基斯坦的一座中等规模的城镇里，以租车生意为生。


One night in December 2015, a local group of Islamist extremists petrol-bombed Shabbir’s neighbor’s home and waited outside for the fleeing family.	2015年12月的一个晚上，一群地方伊斯兰极端分子用汽油弹袭击了沙比尔邻居的家，等着房子里面的人跑出来。


Shabbir’s neighbors were Christian, and the extremists were keen to evict them and convert their home into a madrasa (religious school).	沙比尔的邻居是基督徒，极端分子急切地想要驱逐他们，然后将他们的家改为马德拉赛（宗教学校）。


Instinctively, Shabbir rushed to his Christian neighbors’ defense.	出于本能，他赶紧保护了他的基督徒邻居。


Designated an “apostate,” his business was burned down, his brother was brutally murdered, his wife and children fled to neighboring villages, and Shabbir, together with his elderly father, took the long, cruel road, via Iran and Turkey, to imagined safety in civilized Europe.	他被打为“叛教者”，租车店被付之一炬，兄弟惨遭杀害，妻儿逃到邻村，而他本人则与年迈的父亲历尽艰辛，穿越伊朗和土耳其来到想象中的文明的欧洲寻求安全。


Along the way, Shabbir’s father died of exhaustion on some snow-covered Turkish mountain peak.	逃亡途中，沙比尔的父亲因为衰竭而死于土耳其雪山山顶。


Months later, after managing to board a trafficker’s flimsy vessel on Turkey’s Aegean coast, he found himself shipwrecked, surrounded by dozens of drowned fellow refugees.	几个月后，他成功地登上了蛇头停靠在土耳其爱琴海岸的破船，却遭遇了颠覆，周围是几十名溺亡的难民同道。


Picked up off the coast of Lesbos, he was brought to the Moria camp.	他在莱斯博斯沿岸被救上岸，送入了莫利亚（Moria）难民营。


That is when his next ordeal began.	在这里，他的新磨难开始了。


No Westerner who saw Moria during the winter of 2016/2017 could do so without feeling dehumanized.	在2016/2017年的那个冬天目睹过莫利亚的西方人，都会认为这是人间地狱。


Mud, refuse, and human excrement formed a magma of misery, a hellscape surrounded by barbed wire and the official indifference reflected in the puny resources provided by the European Union and Greek authorities.	泥浆、垃圾和人的排泄物构成了苦难的岩浆，带刺铁丝网和官方的冷漠——欧盟和希腊当局提供的少得可怜的资源就是明证——构成了地狱界。


Refugees like Shabbir faced a minimum of nine months before their first encounter with any official who would receive their asylum application.	沙比尔这样的难民在遇到首个可能接受他们的避难申请的官员之前至少要熬过九个月。


Within the camp, a small makeshift office, surrounded by more barbed wire and hundreds of despairing refugees, would admit one or two per hour for their first interview.	在难民营里有一间临时办公室，四周围满了带刺铁丝网和成百上千难民。 在这里，每个小时有一两个人可以获得第一次面试。


“If you are a little ill, Afghani or Pakistani, it may take 12 months before you speak to an official,” one refugee told us.	“如果你有一点小病，是阿富汗人或巴基斯坦人，那么在你能够和官员说上话前，要等上12个月，”一位难民对我们说。


“We are ghosts roaming around without anyone noticing,” he remarked: “I wish we had died in the war instead.”	“我们是四处游荡的孤魂野鬼，没有人注意到我们，”他评论说，“我宁可我们已经死在了战争里。 ”


Wandering around the camp, segregation was in plain sight.	漫步难民营，你会发现隔离无处不在。


Some families were afforded the luxury of containers, guarded behind tall fences.	一些家庭有幸能分到集装箱，有高高的篱笆做保护墙。


Despite the absence of running water, heating, or any facilities to speak of, they were the privileged ones.	尽管没有自来水、暖气和通话设备，他们仍然是这里的特权分子。


Walking northwest up the hill was like experiencing the ascent of inhumanity.	沿西北方向上山就像是走在一条惨绝人寰的上坡路上。


First there was the Afghanis’ shantytown, enveloped in mud and an unbearable stench.	一开始你会遇见阿富汗人的棚户区，泥泞不堪，恶臭熏天。


On the hilltop were Pakistanis in the same dire conditions, burning anything they could find in order to cook.	山顶上是居住环境同样糟糕的巴基斯坦人，他们燃烧一切可以找到的燃料做饭。


Next to them were Algerians, feared by all the others and caged behind a triple row of barbed wire.	紧挨着他们的是阿尔及利亚人，他们被其他所有人所惧怕，被关在三重带刺铁丝网之后。


At the foot of the slope, just next to the appalling semi-open-air toilets, were the “Africans,” amidst whose tents runs filth from up the slope.	在山脚下，紧挨着条件恶劣的半露天厕所的地方住着“非洲人”，他们的帐篷时不时会承接山上掉下来的秽物。


A year after Shabbir arrived on Lesbos, and three months after his first interview, his asylum application was refused and a deportation order was issued.	沙比尔到达莱斯博斯一年、参加了第一次面试三个月后，他的避难申请被拒绝，并收到了驱逐令。


His appeal was unceremoniously rejected and, when he tried to seek refuge with supporters in a nearby village, the police mounted a manhunt. Eventually, he surrendered, before being taken back to Turkey.	他的上诉被粗暴拒绝，当他和支持者一起在临近的村子寻求庇护所时，警察实施了抓捕。


For weeks, we heard nothing of his fate. Then we learned that he was returned to Pakistan, where he had been located by the Taliban and shot.	最终，他屈服了，被遣送回土耳其。


Reportedly, he is still alive, though we do not know his condition.	此后我们就再也没有了他的消息。


Shabbir had imagined, he told one of us, that, “despite being Muslim,” Europe would give him asylum, “not least because I thought that defending Christians at my family’s expense would mean something here.”	沙比尔对我们其中一位说，他曾经想象，“尽管身为穆斯林，”欧洲仍然会让他避难，“因为我以为牺牲家庭保护基督徒在这里会有些用场。


But “Europe” had other ideas.	”但“欧洲”另有打算。


The EU deal with Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, negotiated in 2016 by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, had a single purpose: To stop the flood of refugees from Turkey to Greece at all cost.	欧盟与土耳其做了笔交易，2016年，德国总理默克尔和土耳其总统埃尔多安进行了谈判，目的很简单：不惜一切代价阻止难民从土耳其涌入希腊。


If that meant that the EU would end up bribing Erdoğan with several billion euros in order to violate international legislation protecting refugees like Shabbir, so be it.	如果这意味着欧盟将因此用数十亿欧元来贿赂埃尔多安去违反保护沙比尔这样的难民的国际法，也照做不误。


In September alone, another 2,238 refugees arrived in Lesbos, despite Turkey’s attempts to cut the flow.	尽管土耳其试图切断难民流，但光是在9月份，就有2,238名难民到达莱斯博斯。


A camp designed for 2,000 people now “houses” three times that number.	一座设计容量2,000人的难民营，目前“定居”着三倍于此的人数。


In early October, the first autumnal storms turned the Moria camp into a mud field again.	10月初，秋季的第一场风暴就让莫利亚难民营重新夷为一片泥地。


Europe pretends to itself that this crime against humanity is no one’s fault.	欧洲假装这场人道犯罪并不是谁的错。


The Greek authorities blame the EU for not providing funds, the EU blames Greece for not doing enough with available funds, and large NGOs are preoccupied with maintaining their own line of command and funding.	希腊当局指责欧盟没有提供资金，而欧盟指责希腊没有充分利用可用资金，而大型非政府组织在使命和资金方面各自为政。


The only survivors in this moral shipwreck are the local grassroots teams – comprising volunteers from all over the world and smaller NGOs – that have been keeping the spirit of humanity alive.	在这艘道德的沉船上，唯一能够独善其身的只有地方草根团队——他们由来自全世界的志愿者和小型非政府组织组成，并一直坚守着人道主义谨慎。


Meanwhile, the West in general, and the EU in particular, perpetuates the economic, environmental, and military factors driving the unfolding humanitarian disaster.	与此同时，西方特别是欧盟导致了引发人道主义灾难的经济、环境和军事因素始终难以根治。


Galrim, another Pakistani refugee in Lesbos, explained to us Europe’s blunder: “The Islamist extremists have a plan.	另外一名莱斯博斯的巴基斯坦难民加尔林（Galrim）向我们诉说了欧洲的愚蠢：“伊斯兰极端分子有一套计划。


By spreading fear and loathing,” he says, “they wish to ghettoize refugees in Europe, to cut them off from European societies, to make them victims of European xenophobia.	通过散播恐惧和憎恨，”他说，“他们想要让难民在欧洲集中，切断他们与欧洲社会的联系，让他们成为欧洲仇外主义的受害者。


It is their recruitment strategy by which to stoke the fires of East-West hatred and render them significant players.”	他们的招募策略煽动了东方-西方怨恨，也给了他们一手好牌。 ”


Galrim should know.	加尔林应该知道这些。


A democrat who opposed ballot rigging in his town, his body was broken by mafia networks in “safe” Turkey, in a succession of torture sessions for ransom.	身为一名反对地方选举被操纵的民主派，他在“安全”的土耳其被黑手党打残了身体。 他们为了获得赎金而折磨他。


On one occasion, he was dragged behind a speeding truck.	有一次，他被绑在一辆不断加速的卡车后面。


Galrim’s asylum application was also turned down, placing him on the deportation list.	加尔林的避难申请也被驳回，上了遣返名单。


Some 2,500 years ago, Sappho of Lesbos wrote:	大约2,500年前，莱斯博斯的萨福（Sappho）写道：


Their heart grew cold	他们的心已冷


they let their wings down	他们的翅已自折


To prevent that from happening to humanists across Europe, we need a new movement to campaign for refugees’ release from odious conditions and a swift asylum process.	为了让全欧洲的人道主义者免于这一命运，我们需要一场新的运动，将难民从令人作呕的环境中解放出来，并加快避难审批过程。


Beyond that, we need to end the policies that are contributing to their desperate flight.	除此之外，我们还必须结束导致他们绝望地逃亡的政策。


A State-Powered Green Revolution	国家支持的绿色革命


LONDON – Discussions about building a green future tend to focus on the need to improve the generation of energy from renewable sources.	伦敦—关于构建绿色未来的讨论往往着重于改进从可再生资源生产能源的需要上。


But that is just the first step.	但这只是第一步。


Better mechanisms for storing and releasing that energy – when the sun isn’t shining, the wind isn’t blowing, or when electric cars are on the move – are also critical.	改善储存和释放能源的机制——当太阳不再照耀，风不再吹或电动车在移动时——也很重要。


And, contrary to popular belief, it is the public sector that is leading the way toward effective solutions.	而与流行的见解相反，公共部门领导着通向有效方案之路。


Since the commercial development of lithium-ion batteries – the rechargeable batteries common in consumer electronics – in the early 1990s, the challenge of storing and releasing power effectively enough to make sustainable energy sources viable alternatives to fossil fuels has been a vexing one.	自20世纪90年代锂电池（电子消费品中常见的可重复充电电池）实现商业开发以来，足够有效地储存和释放电能从而让可持续能源资源成为化石燃料的可靠替代品一直是令人心焦的挑战。


And efforts by entrepreneurial billionaires like Bill Gates and Elon Musk to overcome this challenge have been the focus of much excited media speculation.	比尔·盖茨和伊隆·马斯克等企业家富豪对克服这一挑战的尝试一直是热门媒体预测的焦点。


So how many billionaires does it take to change a battery?	那么，要多少亿万富豪才能改变一块电池？


The answer, it turns out, is zero.	最后的答案是零。


This week, Ellen Williams, Director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy, part of the US Department of Energy, announced that her agency had beaten the billionaires to it.	本周，美国能源部下属高级能源研究计划局（ARPA-E）主任艾伦·威廉姆斯（Ellen Williams）宣布该机构已经打败了亿万富豪。


ARPA-E, she declared, had attained “some holy grails in batteries,” which will enable us to “create a totally new approach to battery technology, make it work, make it commercially viable.”	她说，ARPA-E已经找到了“电池的圣杯”，能让我们“创造全新的电池技术方法，让它起作用，并且在商业上可行。 ”


While praising Musk’s achievements, Williams drew a sharp distinction between their approaches.	威廉姆斯赞扬了马斯克的成就，与此同时，她认为他们的方法与马斯克截然不同。


Musk has been engaged in the large-scale production of “an existing, pretty powerful battery technology.”	马斯克一直着迷于大规模生产“令人振奋的强力电池技术”。


ARPA-E, by contrast, has been pursuing technological innovation in the purest sense: “creating new ways of doing” things.	相反，ARPA-E追求的是纯粹意义上的技术创新：“创造新方法做”东西。


And they “are pretty well convinced” that some of their technologies “have the potential to be significantly better.”	他们“相当自信地认为”他们的一些技术“有可能远远胜出”。


To many people, this development may seem surprising.	对许多人来说，这一发展令人惊喜。


After all, the private sector has long been regarded as an economy’s most important source of innovation.	毕竟，长期以来私人部门一直被认为是经济中最重要的创新源。


But this perception is not entirely accurate.	但这一观点并不完全准确。


In fact, history’s great entrepreneurial figures have frequently stood on the shoulders of the entrepreneurial state.	事实上，历史上伟大的创业家往往站在创业国家（entrepreneurial state）的肩膀上。


The late Apple founder and CEO Steve Jobs was a smart businessman, but every technology that makes the iPhone “smart” was developed with state funding.	已故的苹果公司创始人兼CEO史蒂夫·乔布斯是一位精明的商人，但让iPhone变得“智能”的每一项技术都是国家投钱开发的。


That is why Gates has declared that only the state, in the form of public institutions like ARPA-E, can lead the way to an energy breakthrough.	因此，盖茨称只有国家能够以ARPA-E等公共机构的形式领导能源突破之路。


It is critical to note here that it is not the state as administrator fulfilling this role; rather, it is the entrepreneurial state in action, creating markets, instead of just fixing them.	一个关键点是认识到不是作为政府的国家扮演着这一角色； 而是创业国家在行动，建立市场，而不只是调整它们。


With a mission-oriented approach and the freedom to experiment – with failure understood to be an unavoidable, and even welcome, feature of the learning process – the state is better able to attract top talent and pursue radical innovation.	采取任务导向方针和实验自由——认识到失败是难免甚至值得欢迎的学习过程特点——的国家更加能够吸引顶级人才和追求彻底创新。


But, of course, leading a green revolution will be no easy feat.	但是，当然，引领绿色革命绝非易事。


To succeed, public agencies will have to overcome significant challenges.	要想成功，公共部门必须克服艰巨的挑战。


Consider ARPA-E, which was founded in 2009 as part of US President Barack Obama’s economic-stimulus package.	以ARPA-E为例，该机构成立于2009年，是美国总统奥巴马的经济刺激计划的一部分。


Though still in its infancy, the agency – based on the model of the long-established Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) – has already shown major promise.	该机构基于成立已久的高级国防研究计划局（DARPA），尽管才刚刚成立，但已经表现出很大的前途。


And, following the commitment, made by Obama and 19 other world leaders at last December’s climate change conference in Paris, to double public investment in green-energy research, ARPA-E seems set to receive a welcome boost in funding.	此外，奥巴马和其他19位世界领导人在去年12月的气候变化巴黎大会上做出承诺，将绿色能源研究公共投资提高一倍，ARPA-E似乎必然能够获得令人振奋的资金支持。


But ARPA-E still lacks the capacity to create and shape new markets that, say, DARPA enjoys.	但ARPA-E仍然缺乏（比如）DARPA所拥有的创造和影响新市场的能力。


This represents a major challenge, because the agency is working in an industry that remains in its early stages.	这是一个巨大的挑战，因为该机构所处行业仍在早期阶段。


Though the development of wind- and solar-power technologies received a big push in the 1970s, both are still marked by market and technological uncertainty.	尽管风电和太阳能电即使的发展在20世纪70年代获得了巨大的推动，但两者仍面临市场和技术不确定性。


The embedded energy infrastructure retains strong incumbency advantages, and markets do not value sustainability adequately or price waste and pollution fairly.	已有的能源基础设施保留了强大的先发优势，而市场尚未给予可持续性充分的估值或为浪费和污染公平定价。


In the face of such uncertainty, the business sector will not enter the market until the riskiest and most capital-intensive investments have been made, or until coherent and systematic political signals have been communicated.	在这一不确定性面前，企业部门在风险最高、资本最密集的投资已经完成之前，或在出现清晰的系统性信号之前是不会进入市场的。


Governments must therefore act decisively to make the needed investments and provide the right signals.	因此，政府必须果断行动，做好必要的投资并提供正确的信号。


Crucially, governments must also install safeguards to ensure that the entrepreneurial state reaps an appropriate share of the rewards for its efforts.	关键是，政府还必须建立保护机制以确保创业国家能够从它们的努力中获得合理的回报比例。


In the past, this might have happened via tax spillovers.	在过去，这可以通过税收溢出效应（tax spillover）实现。


But the top marginal rate is nowhere near the level it was in the 1950s, when NASA, a foremost example of state-sponsored innovation, was founded in the US.	但20世纪50年代NASA（最著名的国家支持创新范例）成立时的最高边际税率与现在相去甚远。


(At that time, the highest marginal tax rate was 91%.)	（当时最高边际税率为91%。


Indeed, thanks to the lobbying of Silicon Valley venture capitalists, capital gains tax fell by 50% in five years at the end of the 1970s.	）事实上，拜硅谷风险资本家的游说所赐，20世纪70年代末资本利得税下降了50%。


The increased use of upstream patenting has weakened spillovers.	上游专利使用的日益增加——据称是出于“战略”原因——削弱了溢出效应。


Of course, private-sector players like Gates and Musk are essential partners in driving forward the green revolution.	当然，盖茨和马斯克等私人部门行动者是推动绿色革命的重要伙伴。


As they assume a greater role in the commercialization and deployment of battery-storage technology, they will earn their fair share of rewards.	随着他们在电池储存技术的商业化和部署方面起到更大的作用，他们也将赢得公平的回报比例。


But shouldn’t the ARPA-E (or its angel investors – US taxpayers) also get some return, for its early – and risky – investment?	但ARPA-E（或其天使投资人——美国纳税人）难道不应该也因为其早期和高风险的投资而获得一些回报吗？


In some countries, such as Israel (with its Yozma program) and Finland (with its Sitra fund), the government has retained a stake in state-funded innovation.	在一些国家，比如以色列（Yozma计划）和芬兰（Sitra基金），政府保留了国家出资的创新的部分股权。


This enables the entrepreneurial state to continue to invest, catalyzing the next wave of innovations.	这让创业国家能够继续投资，催化下一波创新。


Why are Western countries so resistant to this sensible idea?	西方国家为何如此抵制这一明智的概念？


The Right Question About Inequality and Growth	关于不平等和增长的正确问题


CAMBRIDGE – The belief that inequality hurts economic growth is gaining currency among policymakers.	发自剑桥——认为不平等损害了经济增长的理念已经赢得了越来越多政策制定者的青睐。


Some argue forcefully that high levels of inequality can make sustained growth impossible, and may even contribute to recessions.	有些人执着地认定高度的不平等水平会使持续增长变得不可能，甚至可能导致经济衰退。


This view stands in stark contrast to the traditional view that there is a tradeoff between equality and growth, and that greater inequality is a price that must be paid for higher output.	这一观点与传统观点形成了鲜明对比，即平等与增长之间存在权衡，而更大的不平等是更高产出所必须付出的代价。


Lost in the discussion, however, is whether any of this is actually germane to economic policymaking.	然而讨论中未能涉及的则是些状况是否与经济政策制定有着密切的关系。


I don’t believe it is.	对此我的答案是否定的。


Whether inequality is good or bad for growth should and will continue to concern social scientists.	社会科学家应该而且会继续关注不平等对于增长的正负面影响。


But those guiding an economy should focus on assessing outcomes and modes of distribution rather than on a puzzle that will never fully be solved.	但是那些引领一个经济体的人应该把重点放在评估结果和分配模式上，而不是关注一个永远无法彻底解决的难题。


Three developments make this refocusing necessary.	三方面的发展体现出了这一重新调整的必要性。


For starters, while recent studies have concluded that higher levels of inequality produce lower long-term growth, other data have challenged this assumption, making definitive claims that are impossible to support, partly because different sources and types of inequality likely have different impacts on growth.	首先，尽管最近的研究表明较高水平的不平等会导致较低的长期增长，但其他数据却对这一假设进行了挑战，提出了不可能支持该假设的明确主张，部分原因是不同来源和类型的不平等可能会对增长产生不同的影响。


Second, most research focuses on the impact of inequality on growth, rather than on how specific policies affect growth.	其次，大多数研究侧重于不平等对增长的影响，而不是特定政策如何影响增长。


The former is of interest to social scientists and historians, but it is the latter that is relevant for policymakers.	前者是社会科学家和历史学家所关心的，后者则与政策制定者有关。


And, finally, politicians generally defend their policies in terms of how they affect the middle class or the poor, not the arithmetic average of incomes across an economy – which gives equal weight to a $1 increase in the income of a poor person and that of a billionaire.	最后，政治家通常为自身政策辩护时都是从政策如何影响中产阶级或穷人的角度出发，而不是一个经济体的收入算术平均值——该值对所有人的收入增加都给予同样的权重，无论他是个穷人还是亿万富翁。


So, even if reducing inequality was bad for overall growth, it might still be good for social welfare in the relevant sense, if it made many households in the middle better off.	因此即使减少不平等对总体增长不利，但如果能使许多处于收入中层的家庭境况更佳，也许在相关程度上还是有利于社会福利的。


The fact is, economic policies in the real world are nuanced and site-specific, making the search for a single answer to the question of how – and how much – inequality affects growth a Sisyphean task.	事实上，现实世界中的经济政策是细微且具体到某一点的，而针对如何——以及多少——不平等会影响经济增长的问题去寻求一个唯一的答案显然就像推石上山的西西弗斯。


Rather than concerning themselves with how to balance growth and inequality, policymakers would do better to focus on how policies impact average incomes and other welfare indicators.	政策制定者如果想做出更好的成就，就该关注政策如何影响平均收入以及其他福利指标，而不是纠结于如何平衡增长和不平等。


Win-win policies – defined as distribution mechanisms that produce growth and reduce inequality simultaneously – are the easiest to evaluate, and the most advantageous to adopt.	双赢政策——能够同时产生增长和减少不平等的分配机制——是最容易评估且最采用之后有好处的。


Education is a classic example.	教育就是个典型的例子。


Reforms that cost little or no money, such as improving the quality of primary and secondary education, have been shown to encourage growth while ameliorating inequality.	例如改善中小学教育质量这类的花费不多甚至为零的改革都能在促进增长的同时改善不平等状况。


Even reforms that cost more – like expanding preschool education in the United States – generate economic benefits that far exceed the tax losses associated with funding them.	即使是某些花费更多的改革——比如扩大在美国的学前教育——所带来的经济利益也会远超为资助这类项目而产生的税收损失。


These types of approaches – what I call “all good things go together” policies – could be applied to other sectors of the economy that are being squeezed by imperfect competition.	这些类型的手段——我称之为“十全十美”的政策——可以应用于受到不充分竞争挤压的其他经济部门。


More vigorous antitrust policies, or increased consumer ownership of data, could strengthen competition and, in the process, boost efficiency and improve income distribution.	更有力的反托拉斯政策或强化消费者对数据所有权的做法可能会加剧竞争，并在此过程中提高效率和改善收入分配。


Any policy that promotes growth or lowers inequality without negatively affecting the other variable can also be classified as a win-win.	任何在促进增长或降低不平等的同时不会对其他变量产生负面影响的政策都可以被归为双赢。


A revenue-neutral reform of business taxes, for example, could raise the level of output with no meaningful impact on the distribution of income.	例如不影响财政收入的营业税改革可以提高产出水平，却不会对收入分配产生明显影响。


It is far more difficult to evaluate policies that involve a tradeoff between growth and inequality.	而评估那些涵盖增长与不平等之间权衡的政策则要困难得多。


For the sake of illustration, consider the effects of a hypothetical 10% reduction in labor taxes paid for by a lump-sum tax modeled using a neo-classical Ramsey growth model – a scenario that I detailed in a recent paper for the Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Summers series on Rethinking Macroeconomics.	为了说明这个问题，假设存在一个使用新古典拉姆齐增长模型建模的定额税来支付的10%劳工税减免——也是我在最近为奥利维尔·布兰恰（Olivier Blanchard）和劳伦斯·萨默斯（Lawrence Summers）的反思宏观经济学系列文献贡献的一篇论文中详细描述的情况。


This plan is good for growth, with average output increasing by 1%.	这个计划有利于增长，能令平均产出增长1％。


But to understand how this policy would actually play out for taxpayers, I applied the scenario to the real distribution of US household incomes in 2010.	但为了理解这个政策实际上会对纳税人产生何种影响，请让我将这一情景代入到2010年美国家庭收入的真实分布中。


Nearly all households in the model experienced an increase in pre-tax income.	模型中几乎所有家庭的税前收入都有所增加。


But taxes increased for two-thirds of households.	但2/3的家庭的交税额也增多了。


For middle-income households, the increased taxation was offset by earnings, but leisure also fell.	对于中等收入家庭来说增加的税收可以被收入所抵消，但工作时间也因而上升。


As a result, the tax change left around 60% of households worse off, even as average household income grew, driven by gains at the top.	因此即便家庭平均收入因顶层富人的收入增加而实现了增长，但这一税收变化令大概60％家庭的生活状况变得更糟。


This analysis does not answer the question of whether this illustrative tax policy is a good idea.	上述分析并未回答这一演示性税收政策究竟是不是个好主意。


But most policymakers would likely object if they understood that growth would be achieved by higher taxes on two-thirds of households, leaving the median household working harder to earn the same after-tax income.	但大多数政策制定者可能会表示反对，因为他们意识到这种增长是通过提高2/3家庭的税率，导致中等家庭只能更辛苦工作来获得相同税后收入来实现的。


Social scientists should continue to ask whether inequality is good or bad for economic growth. More research is needed on the variables that affect growth, such as median income.	社会科学家应该继续拷问不平等对经济增长究竟是好是坏，也需要对包括收入中位数在内的影响增长变量进行更多的研究。


Economists should also pay less attention to inequality in the aggregate, and more on the specific policies that might increase or reduce inequality.	经济学家们也应该更加关注总体上的不平等，更多地关注可能增加或减少不平等的具体政策。


But policymakers have different priorities than economists do.	但政策制定者的优先事项跟经济学家可不一样。


Rather than rethinking macroeconomics, policymakers must consider whether specific goals for social welfare and distribution can be achieved through win-win measures or through policies that make worthwhile tradeoffs.	政策制定者们不应去重新思考宏观经济学，而应该考虑是否可以通过双赢手段或有价值的权衡政策来实现社会福利和分配的具体目标。


The answer may be to obsess less over aggregate data, and to focus more on how policy decisions impact real people.	对应的方法则可能是减少一点对汇总数据的关注程度，而更多地关注政策决策会如何影响真实的人。


Will Palestinian Reconciliation Revive the Two-State Solution?	巴勒斯坦和解是否会恢复两国方案？


RAMALLAH – When representatives of the two major Palestinian factions, Fatah and Hamas, signed a new reconciliation agreement in Cairo on October 12, the focus was not on those actually doing the signing, Fatah Central Committee member Azzam al-Ahmad and Deputy Head of the Hamas Politburo Saleh al-Arouri.	拉马拉——10月12日巴勒斯坦两大主要派别法塔赫和哈马斯代表在开罗签署新的和解协议时，实际签约的法塔赫中央委员会委员艾扎姆·艾哈迈德和哈马斯政治局副局长萨利赫·阿鲁里并不是人们所关注的焦点角色。


Instead, all eyes were on the man standing behind them: Khaled Fawzy, the head of Egypt’s General Intelligence Directorate.	相反，所有眼睛都盯住他们身后的那个人：埃及情报总局局长哈立德·法兹。


The ceremony, held at the intelligence agency’s headquarters, was orchestrated entirely by the Egyptians, who view the reconciliation as a stepping-stone to a much larger goal.	在情报局总部举行的签约仪式完全由埃及人主导，他们将巴勒斯坦和解看作实现更宏伟目标的一块垫脚石。


As the agreement stated in its opening, it stemmed from Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s “insistence” on ending the divisions among Palestinians, “with the aim of creating an independent state” along pre-1967 borders.	就像协议在前言部分所表述的那样，协议的签署来源于埃及总统阿巴德·法塔赫·塞西对结束巴勒斯坦人分歧的“坚持”，“目标是沿1967年之前的边界实现独立建国”。


Egypt’s leadership in this process will raise the country’s standing in the Arab world, reinforcing its position as a regional heavyweight.	埃及领导和平进程将提高其在阿拉伯世界的地位，进一步确立其成为地区强国。


Already, the reconciliation agreement between Hamas and Fatah has gone some way toward achieving that, while providing a badly needed morale boost for Sisi’s government.	哈马斯和法塔赫之间的和解协议已经在这方面取得了一些进步，同时也为塞西政府提供了急需的士气提升。


The good news for Egypt is that the Palestinians have shown a renewed willingness not only to pursue reconciliation, but also to pursue a difficult negotiating process with Israel and its main strategic ally, the United States.	对埃及来讲，好消息是巴勒斯坦不仅愿意重新追求和解，而且愿意与以色列及其主要战略盟友美国开始艰苦的谈判进程。


This revival of Palestinian national politics largely reflects the recent shift in Hamas’ stance, which follows years of trials for the Sunni Islamist organization.	巴勒斯坦国家政治的这种复兴主要体现了哈马斯近期的立场转变，这种转变是这个逊尼派伊斯兰组织历经数年考验才最终取得的。


The troubles for Hamas began when it chose to back the wrong side in both Syria and Egypt.	因为选错了在叙利亚和埃及的支持对象，哈马斯的麻烦从此开始了。


Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s regime prevailed over the Hamas-supported Islamic rebels in Damascus, while the Hamas-backed Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt, led by Mohamed Morsi, fell after a year.	叙利亚独裁者巴沙尔·阿萨德的政权击败了哈马斯支持的大马士革伊斯兰叛乱分子，而哈马斯支持的由默罕默德·穆尔西领导的埃及穆兄会政府也在一年后垮台了。


Then, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain severed diplomatic relations with Qatar, causing Hamas to lose its Qatari and Iranian financial and political support.	此后，沙特阿拉伯、埃及、阿联酋和巴林与卡塔尔断绝外交关系，导致哈马斯原本来自卡塔尔和伊朗的财政和政治支持都逐渐丧失了。


With few friends and even fewer sponsors in the region, Hamas had little choice but to return to its fellow Palestinian.	因为在中东地区几乎找不到盟友和赞助者，哈马斯别无选择，只能重新靠拢巴勒斯坦阵营。


The group quickly and unconditionally accepted President Mahmoud Abbas’s three demands: to dissolve the Hamas-led administrative committee, to allow the Ramallah-based Palestinian government to resume its role in Gaza, and to allow presidential and parliamentary elections to take place in both Gaza and the West Bank.	该团体迅速而无条件地接受了马哈茂德·阿巴斯总统的三项要求：解散哈马斯领导的行政委员会、允许拉马拉邦的巴勒斯坦政府重新在加沙发挥作用、并允许总统和议会选举在加沙地带和西岸举行。


Reconciliation among the Palestinians will certainly open the way for peace, not least because the new elections will deliver the needed legitimacy to those tasked with handling negotiations with Israel.	巴勒斯坦和解必将开启和平进程，特别是因为新选举将为与以色列谈判人员提供所必须的合法性。


But the real work – for Egypt and the Palestinians – lies ahead.	但对埃及和巴勒斯坦人而言，真正艰巨的工作还有待完成。


In order to achieve an independent Palestinian state along pre-1967 borders, both actors will need to work with both the US, under President Donald Trump, and Israel, under Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu.	为实现巴勒斯坦沿1967年前边界独立建国的目标，法塔赫和哈马斯需要与唐纳德·特朗普总统领导的美国和内塔尼亚胡总理领导的以色列通力合作。


And, on this front, expectations are low.	而人们对这方面的期待一直不高。


Trump claims that he will deliver the “ultimate deal” to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict.	特朗普声称他将签署解决巴以冲突的“最终协议”。


But Trump and Netanyahu, feeding each other’s hawkishness, both remain unwilling to accept what the rest of the world views as the basic premise of any good deal: a two-state solution.	但特朗普和内塔尼亚胡相互助长对方的鹰派立场，仍然拒绝接受世界其他国家眼中两国方案这一任何真正协议的基本前提。


And the aging Abbas is unlikely to accept whatever bad deal the decidedly pro-Israel Trump administration offers.	而年纪渐长的阿巴斯也不太可能接受亲以色列的特朗普政府所提出的任何糟糕的协议。


Even that futile scenario might be optimistic, as it assumes that talks get off the ground – an impossible feat, if Israel continues its illegal construction of settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories.	即便这种徒劳状况也还属于乐观的估计，因为它假设谈判能够真正启动——而如果以色列继续在被占领土上非法建设定居点，启动谈判只能是一项不太可能实现的任务。 以色列这样的行为不仅有欠公正；


Such activities are not just unjust; they are a violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334, adopted nearly unanimously last year (the US, then led by Barack Obama, abstained).	而且违反了联合国安理会第2334号决议，该决议去年曾获得安理会所有成员国的几乎一致通过（当时巴拉克·奥巴马总统领导下的美国投了弃权票）。


That resolution demanded “that Israel immediately and completely cease all settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem” – activities that amount to a “flagrant violation under international law.”	该决议要求“以色列立即全面停止在包括东耶路撒冷在内的被占巴勒斯坦领土上的一切定居点兴建活动”——这样的活动实际相当于“公然违反国际法”。


Any agreement between Israelis and Palestinians will require deep concessions by both sides – concessions that leaders on both sides will need to convince their respective publics to accept.	以巴之间达成任何协议都需要双方做出真正的让步——而双方领导人必须说服各自国内民众接受这样的让步。


Trump’s son-in-law and adviser, Jared Kushner, who has been tasked with settling the conflict, and the Trump administration’s chief negotiator on the issue, Jason Greenblatt, seem to understand this.	负责冲突和解事务的特朗普的女婿兼顾问杰瑞德·库什纳和特朗普内阁在这个问题上的主要谈判代表杰森·格林布拉特似乎明白个中缘由。


Egypt certainly does, having made it clear that a divided Palestinian leadership without a public mandate, like the one to be delivered by new elections, will be unable to carry out serious negotiations or win popular support for any eventual agreement.	埃及无疑也了解这一前提，而且已经明确表示未经公开授权的分裂的巴勒斯坦领导层（就像新选举将要产生的政府那样）将无法展开任何真正的谈判，也无法让公众支持最终协议的签署。


The question is whether the Israelis will be willing to make such concessions, allowing either a two-state solution or a system of genuine and credible power-sharing within a single state.	问题在于以色列人是否愿意做出这样的让步，从而实现两国方案或在一国方案前提下建立真正可靠的分权制度。


If they aren’t, the recent Palestinian reconciliation, however positive, will not mark the beginning of the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.	如果他们做不到这一点，近期的巴勒斯坦和解无论多么积极，都不会标志着以巴冲突的最终结束。


It will merely be the start of a new chapter in the struggle for freedom for Palestinians.	这可能仅仅标志着巴勒斯坦人争取自由斗争新篇章的启动。


A Silver Lining for a Hard Brexit	硬脱欧的一线希望


LONDON – It is easy to forget that defense and security are not the same thing.	伦敦——很容易忘记防务和安全不是一回事。


Defense is what countries must resort to when their security breaks down.	防务是国家在安全失效时所必须采取的举措。


And during peacetime, countries spend money on defense precisely because they fear for their security.	而在和平年代，国家在防务上花钱恰恰是因为他们为自身的安全担忧。


Since 2014, the security environment for Britain and the European Union has deteriorated sharply.	2014年来，英国和欧盟的安全环境急剧恶化。


In March of that year, Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea.	那年3月，俄罗斯入侵乌克兰并吞并克里米亚。


It was the first time since World War II that a major European power sought to redraw its own borders by force of arms.	这是二战后第一次有某个欧洲大国试图以武力重新划定自己的边界。


In 1994, Russia agreed to defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity in exchange for Ukraine’s handover of the nuclear weapons it had inherited from the Soviet Union.	1994年，俄罗斯以乌克兰交出从苏联继承的核武器为条件同意捍卫乌克兰的领土完整。 但俄罗斯并没有止步于克里米亚；


But Russia didn’t stop with Crimea; since then, it has waged a low-intensity unconventional war against Ukraine in the country’s eastern Donbas region.	从那以后，它在乌克兰东部的顿巴斯地区对乌克兰发动了一场低烈度的非常规战争。


And Ukraine is not alone.	而乌克兰并不孤单。


Russia has also sent ships and warplanes to threaten the coasts of other Western countries, abducted an Estonian intelligence officer on NATO territory, and sustained an ongoing military buildup in Eastern Europe, the Arctic, and elsewhere.	俄罗斯还派出军舰和战机威胁其他西方国家的海岸，它在北约领土上绑架 了一名爱沙尼亚情报官员，并在东欧、北极其它地区持续进行军事集结。


Despite these deteriorating security conditions, a slim majority of Britons voted in June 2016 to withdraw from the EU – a decision that could fatally undermine the United Kingdom’s relationship with its European NATO partners.	尽管安全状况持续恶化，2016年6月略超过半数的英国人投票决定退出欧盟——这一决定可能会严重破坏英国与欧洲北约伙伴国的关系。


Making matters worse, in November of 2016, Donald Trump, who has long expressed admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin, was elected president of the United States.	更糟的是，2016年11月，长期以来一直对俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京表达敬意的唐纳德·特朗普当选美国总统。


Although Trump expressed disdain for NATO during the 2016 campaign, he appears to have been reined in by the many generals he has installed in top positions.	尽管特朗普在2016年竞选活动中曾对北约表示不屑，但他似乎已经被他自己安插在高层的多位将军成功控制住。


Still, he could always change his mind.	不过，他随时可能改变想法。


The Republican Party is in the throes of a deep internal schism that could end with the victory of its populist wing, led by Trump’s nationalist, anti-EU Svengali, Stephen Bannon.	共和党正在经历深刻的内部分裂阵痛，由特朗普的民族主义反欧盟催眠大师斯蒂芬·班农所领导的民粹主义派别的胜利可以结束这种痛苦。


If Bannon does manage to transform the Republican Party in accordance with his nationalist vision, and if the Republicans retain or regain power in the future, US security commitments to Europe will no longer be reliable.	如果班农真的按照自己的民族主义设想来设法改造共和党，而且如果共和党人未来继续掌握或重新夺回权力，美国对欧洲的安全承诺将变得不再可靠。


Continued Russian attacks on Western political systems, or even an outright military attack in Europe, could go unanswered by the US.	俄罗斯针对西方政治体制的持续攻击、甚至是彻头彻尾对欧洲发动军事袭击，都有可能不会招致美国的报复举措。


Without firm US support, a politically divided EU would be increasingly vulnerable to Russian political domination.	如果没有美国的坚定支持，一个在政治上分裂的欧盟将越来越容易受到俄罗斯政治统治的影响。


At the same time, a politically cohesive EU would be a bulwark of stability stretching from the English Channel to Ukraine’s Dnieper River.	与此同时，一个具有政治凝聚力的欧盟将成为从英吉利海峡一直延伸到乌克兰第聂伯河的稳定的城堡。


In the absence of US leadership, a stable and secure EU could thus become the most important pillar of the UK’s post-Brexit security strategy.	在缺乏美国领导的情况下，一个稳定和安全的欧盟可能因此成为英国后脱欧安全战略的最重要支柱。


But the stability of the EU is far from guaranteed, because a smooth and painless Brexit may tempt other member states to also quit the bloc.	但欧盟的稳定还远未得到保证，因为平稳无痛的英国脱欧可能会诱使其他欧盟成员国也退出欧盟。


Some argue that this outcome is unlikely, because it is impossible, in practice, for eurozone countries to leave.	有人认为这样的后果不太可能出现，因为实际上欧元区国家不太可能脱离欧盟。


If a eurozone country even suggested that it might withdraw from the euro and the EU, the resulting capital flight would devastate its economy.	如果欧元区国家哪怕透露出一点可能退出欧元和欧盟的消息，由此所导致的资本外逃将摧毁其经济稳定。


According to this view, the fact that two-thirds of EU member states belong to the euro is enough to prevent the EU from unraveling.	按照这样的观点，2/3欧盟成员国加入欧元的事实足以防止欧盟出现解体的后果。


If only that were so.	如果这是真的那该多好。


In reality, a number of important EU members remain outside the euro, including Poland, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Romania, and Sweden.	事实上，一些重要的欧盟成员国仍游离于欧元体系之外，包括波兰、捷克共和国、丹麦、罗马尼亚和瑞典。


Moreover, under favorable circumstances, eurozone countries with current-account surpluses – such as Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and Austria – could probably leave the euro without suffering catastrophic harm.	不仅如此，即使在有利的情况下，拥有经常账户盈余的欧元区国家——比如德国、荷兰、西班牙和奥地利——也很有可能离开欧元而不会承担灾难性的后果。


And lest we forget, Western electorates have demonstrated a unique capacity for self-harm.	而且我们不应忘记的是，西方国家选民表现出的独特的自我毁灭能力令人印象深刻。


Consider not just Brexit and the election of Trump, but also Catalan separatists’ game of economic Russian roulette over the past month and a half.	这里要提到的不仅仅是英国脱欧和特朗普当选，而且还有加泰罗尼亚分离分子过去一个半月以来在经济领域上演的俄罗斯轮盘赌。


As things stand, the UK still seems to be politically incapable of abandoning Brexit altogether, even though that would be the best course of action for all involved.	就目前的情况而言，英国似乎仍然在政治上无法彻底放弃脱欧，尽管彻底放弃本应是所有参与各方所能拥有的最佳选择。


But between the options of a “soft” and “hard” Brexit – in which Britain would leave the EU single market and customs union – the latter may have at least one advantage.	但在英国退出欧盟单一市场和关税联盟的“软”与“硬”脱欧方案之间——后者或许至少具备一个优势。


Namely, it would not further undermine European stability, which also happens to be Britain’s biggest security asset.	具体来讲，那就是它不会进一步威胁欧洲的稳定，而欧洲的稳定同样恰巧是英国最大的安全财富。


To be sure, a “hard” Brexit would come at a high economic cost for the UK.	可以肯定，硬脱欧或令英国付出重大的经济代价。


Industrial supply chains would be disrupted, the construction industry would be denuded of its EU workers, the City of London would lose international importance, the pound would continue depreciating, and the public sector – particularly the National Health Service – would be stretched thin.	工业供应链将会被打乱，而建筑业将会失去其欧盟劳动者。 伦敦这座城市将会失去国际重要性，英镑将继续贬值，而公共部门——尤其是国家医疗服务体系——将会遭遇能力严重透支的情况。


The EU, too, would incur costs, albeit much smaller as a share of its overall economy.	而欧盟也将会付出代价，尽管这种代价相对于其整体经济份额要小得多。


Despite the costs, a “hard” Brexit would, at a minimum, discourage other EU members from following the UK’s lead, thereby shoring up European stability and helping Britain maintain its national security, which may be the most important consideration in the long run.	尽管会付出代价，但硬脱欧至少能够阻止其他欧盟成员国仿效英国的榜样，从而巩固欧洲稳定并协助英国维护国家安全，这从长远来看或许是最重要的考量。


Such an outcome would be ironic, to say the least.	这样一种结果最起码颇具讽刺意味。


But even more ironic is the fact that those pushing for it are the very Brexiteers who would like to see the EU fail.	但更具讽刺意味的是，恰恰是那些希望看到欧盟失败的脱欧人士在竭尽全力推动这样的结果。


They are convinced that their vision of a buccaneering, global Britain can be achieved only with a clean break from Europe.	他们坚信只有彻底脱离欧洲，才能实现他们海盗般的全球英国设想。


They might soon find out if they’re right.	他们或许很快就会知道自己正确与否。


The Literary Magic of Harry Potter	哈利波特的文学魔法


PRINCETON – This summer, at literary festivals and bookstores around the world, readers celebrated the 20-year anniversary of the debut of the first book in J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter series – Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone (re-titled Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone in the United States) – and with good reason.	普林斯顿——今年夏天，在世界各地的文艺节和书店，读者们举办了J·K·罗琳《哈利波特》系列小说第一部——《哈利波特与魔法石》（在美国被更名为Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone）的首版20周年庆祝活动。 他们举办庆祝活动有着充分的理由。


Since the young wizard’s first appearance on June 26, 1997, the “Boy Who Lived” has become the “Icon Who Endures.”	自从1997年6月26日这位年轻的魔法师首次露面以来，这个“大难不死的男孩”已经成为“坚韧隐忍的象征”。


Over the last two decades, the Harry Potter series has expanded to include seven novels, with a total of 450 million copies in print, including translations into more than six dozen languages.	过去20年来，《哈利波特》系列已经拓展到包括七部小说，被翻译成70多种语言，并合计发行了4. 5亿册。


The eight films spawned by the books have grossed $7 billion, with Harry Potter-themed toys and merchandise garnering another $7 billion.	以这部书为原型的八部电影累计赚得70亿美元，而《哈利波特》主题玩具和商品又获得了另外70亿美元的收入。


For those of a certain age and literary mindset, it is difficult to recall a day when global audiences weren’t spellbound by Rowling’s creation.	对特定年龄和具有文学思维的人来说，很难想象哪一天全球观众没有被罗琳的著作所迷住。


That is why it is startling for me to recall the sour reception that my students gave Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone in the fall of 1999, when it appeared on the syllabus of my Princeton University course on popular literature, “American Best Sellers,” which I had been teaching since 1993.	因此，我每每回想起我的学生在1999年秋天对《哈利波特和魔法石》这部著作的糟糕反应就吃惊不已，当时我把这部著作选入了我在普林斯顿大学流行文学课程的大纲。 自1993年以来我一直在教授“美国畅销书”系列课程。


A survey of popular writing from the seventeenth century to the present, the course invites students to consider how and why particular best-selling works have captivated their audiences.	该课程研究从17世纪一直到现在的流行作品，邀请学生思索这些畅销作品为什么和以何种方式吸引了它们的观众。


At the end of each term, I let the students select the final book as an exercise in popular taste.	每学期期末，我都会让学生选择一本代表流行口味的最后著作。


In 1999, they chose that first Harry Potter novel.	1999年，他们选择了第一本《哈利波特》小说。


Potter-mania had hit America’s shores hard that year.	那一年波特热猛烈袭击了美国海岸。


In June, the series’ US publisher rushed the hardcover edition of the second book, Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets, to bookstores.	6月，这套系列著作的美国出版商紧急将《哈利波特》系列著作第二部的精装版《哈利波特与密室》推向了书店。


It published the third book, Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban, along with the paperback edition of Sorcerer’s Stone,on September 8.	该机构还于9月8日出版了这套系列著作的第三本《哈利波特与阿兹卡班的囚徒》，以及《哈利波特与魔法石》的平装版。


By the end of that month, Rowling’s novels held the first three slots on the New York Times fiction best-seller list, while the paperback Sorcerer’s Stone sat atop the paperback list.	到当月月末，罗琳的小说已经包揽了《纽约时报》畅销小说排行榜的前三名，而平装版《哈利波特与魔法石》则荣登平装版书籍销售榜的冠军宝座。


The magazine Time had even put the bespectacled wizard on its cover.	《时代》周刊甚至把这位戴眼镜的巫师印上了封面。


You couldn’t turn around without knocking into Harry.	目光所及之处哈利波特的形象随处可见。


My students were eager to see what all the fuss was about.	我的学生迫不及待地想知道这样的狂热究竟是为什么。


Boy, were they disappointed.	天哪，他们失望透顶。


For them, it was second-rate blather, nowhere near as worthy of their attention as the cherished series from their childhoods, such as The Chronicles of Narnia or The Lord of the Rings.	在他们看来，《哈利波特》系列不过是二流的胡言乱语，与他们童年记忆中珍藏的《纳尼亚传奇》或《指环王》等系列作品相比根本上不了台面。


Despite being only a few years removed from those childhoods, they laid into Harry Potter with the same fervor as many of the notoriously negative adult reviewers: “Derivative.” “Poorly written.”	尽管他们的童年刚刚过去短短几年，但他们却像许多臭名昭著的成人评论家那样指责《哈利波特》：“生编硬造”、“文笔糟糕”、“陈词滥调”、“令人厌烦”。


“Cloying.” For them, Harry held no wonder, no warmth, and no wit.	在他们看来，哈利身上既没有奇迹，也没有机智和温暖。


My students’ antipathy surprised me, but in hindsight, it should not have.	学生们的反感令我感到惊讶，但事后看来，这并没有什么值得大惊小怪。


Though adults comprised a significant portion of the Harry Potter audience from the start, these students were in precisely the wrong demographic to appreciate the phenomenon as it was unfolding.	尽管成年人从一开始就构成了《哈利波特》受众的很大一部分，但这些学生恰恰处在无法客观认识《哈利波特》现象的错误年龄段。


Too old for new children’s books, and too young to have children of their own (as I newly did at the time), they were quick to insist that despite its current popularity, the series would soon fade from memory.	他们已经过了接受新儿童读物的年龄，但同时又太年轻，还没有自己的孩子（当时我刚刚有了自己的小孩），他们迫不及待地坚持认为尽管哈利系列现在大受欢迎，但很快就将被人们抛诸脑后。


The following autumn, in 2000, the next cohort of students also picked Sorcerer’s Stone for the final text, and, like their peers, they confidently dismissed it.	第二年秋天，也就是2000年，下一批学生也选择了《哈利波特与魔法石》作为期末分析著作，就像之前的同龄人一样，他们自信地拒绝接受这部著作。


Fast-forward to the spring of 2007.	让我们快进到2007年的春天。


I was again teaching “American Best Sellers,” after having set the course aside for a few years.	在将课程搁置了几年后，我再次教授“美国畅销书”。


When it came time for the students to choose the final book, they went with Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone.	当学生选择期末分析著作时，他们选择了《哈利波特与魔法石》。


I braced myself for their criticisms.	而我则准备迎接他们的批判。


This time, however, the reviews were glowing.	但这次，他们的评论非常正面。


This new group, born between 1986 and 1989, had first read Rowling as pre-teens and early adolescents, not college students, which meant they had practically grown into young adults alongside Harry, Ron, and Hermione.	这是新一代学生，出生在1986和1989年之间，最初读到罗琳著作时并不是大学生，而是只有十几岁，刚刚步入青少年阶段。 这意味着他们是在哈利、罗恩和赫敏的陪伴下一起成长为青年。


The same thing happened in the fall of 2010.	2010年秋天又发生了同样的事。


For both of these groups, “We grew up with Harry Potter” was a motto, not a label.	对这些学生来说，“我们和哈利·波特一起长大”已经成为座右铭，而不是标签。


Would Harry fade from memory?	哈利会不会从记忆中消失？


Not on your life.	只要我们还活着，就不可能。


I’ve taught my Best Sellers course twice since 2010, and both times the students have chosen a non-Harry Potter novel to end the semester.	自2010年以来我两次教授畅销书课程，这两次学生们都选择非哈利波特小说来进行期末评论。


Is it Potter fatigue?	是对波特感到厌倦吗？


Not likely, judging from the reception the series continues to receive in the other course in which I teach Rowling’s work, “Children’s Literature.”	从哈利系列著作在我教授罗琳作品的另一门课“儿童文学”上所得到的评论来看这不太可能。


Here, it is my choice to put a Harry Potter novel on the syllabus. Instead of Sorcerer’s Stone, however, I assign Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban – my favorite book of the seven, which marks the series’ shift from children’s literature to young adult fiction, through its complex treatment of fidelity, betrayal, rage, and mercy.	现在，我选择将一部《哈利波特》小说放入教学大纲，但我没有选择《哈利波特与魔法石》，而是选择了《哈利波特与阿兹卡班的囚徒》——这是哈利波特系列七部小说中我最喜欢的一部，它标志着系列著作从儿童文学到年轻成人小说的转型，书中对忠诚、背叛、愤怒和悲悯进行了复杂的描述。


It is also the favorite of many of my students.	我的许多学生也最喜欢这本书。


But how long will Harry Potter’s popularity hold?	但《哈利波特》系列的人气能够持续多久？


Each time I teach “Children’s Literature,” I start with a poll: “Which books on the syllabus do you remember reading as a child?”	每次我讲授儿童文学，都要先进行一次民意测验：“你在儿童时期读过大纲中的哪些书？


In 2010, 86% had read Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban.	”2010年，86%的人读过《哈利波特与阿兹卡班的囚徒》。


In 2012, that figure rose to 94%.	2012年，这一数字上升到94%。


But in the years since, the percentage has dropped – to 87% in 2014, and to 81% in 2016.	但其后那些年，百分比则持续下降——2014年是87%，而2016年则下降到81%。


This is all unscientific, I know.	这些都不是科学，我知道。


But I’m curious: will it fall under 80% next spring, when I teach “Children’s Literature” again?	但我很好奇：明年春天当我再次教授“儿童文学”时，读过哈利波特的比率会不会降到80%以下？


Will my students from 1999 and 2000 be proved right, with Harry Potter fading from relevance, never to become an enduring classic?	事实会否证明1999到2000年的学生是对的，哈利波特的地位不断下降，永远不会成为永恒的经典著作？


Or is there an equilibrium point ahead, where the percentage holds steady without declining further?	还是前方有一个平衡点，百分比能够保持稳定而不再下降？


Perhaps Harry’s 40th anniversary will provide the answers.	也许哈利的40周年纪念日将告诉我们答案。


Until then, I’ll happily keep inviting him into my classroom.	直到那时，我很高兴一直邀请他进入到我的课堂。


The Psychology of Superstar Sex Predators	超级明星的性爱捕食心理


LONDON – The Harvey Weinstein sexual assault scandal shows no sign of winding down.	伦敦——哈维·韦恩斯坦的性攻击丑闻并没有表现出任何减弱的迹象。


Just the opposite: police in the United Kingdom are now investigating several allegations involving the Oscar-winning film producer.	恰恰相反：英国警方针对涉及奥斯卡获奖电影制作人的若干项指控正在进行调查。


While Weinstein has “unequivocally denied” allegations of non-consensual sex, and no arrests have been made, more than two dozen women – including the actors Angelina Jolie, Gwyneth Paltrow, and Rose McGowan – have publicly accused him of harassment.	尽管韦恩斯坦已“明确否认”非自愿性行为指控，且警方并未展开任何逮捕行动，但20多位女性——包括演员安吉丽娜·朱莉、格温尼斯·帕特洛和罗斯·麦高恩——都公开指控韦恩斯坦性骚扰。


The allegations stretch over nearly three decades.	指控的涉案时间长达30年左右。


Hollywood is struggling to explain how one of its most visible figures could have gotten away with such behavior for so long.	好莱坞拼命想要解释其最著名的人物之一为什么能在如此长的时间里进行这样的行为而不受惩罚。


Woody Allen offered an important clue.	伍迪·艾伦提供了一条重要的线索。


Despite working with Weinstein on several films, he claims that no one ever brought allegations of abuse to his attention.	虽然与韦恩斯坦在几部影片上进行过合作，艾伦声称他从未收到过性骚扰指控。


“And they wouldn’t, because you are not interested in it,” Allen told the BBC.	“他们不会那么做，因为你不感兴趣，”艾伦告诉英国广播公司记者。


“You are interested in making your movie.”	“你只对拍电影感兴趣。


Others who worked with Weinstein over the years have made similar statements.	”其他曾与韦恩斯坦合作过的明星也发表了类似的言论。


Is this the Hollywood equivalent of a police officer’s “blue wall of silence,” or is there something more clinical at work?	这是否相当于好莱坞版的警官“静默蓝墙”，还是涉及到其他的临床因素？


One possible answer may be found in the results of recent psychological research.	近期的心理研究成果或许可以揭示可能的答案。


According to scientists in the United States and Israel, there are certain personality traits – the “dark triad” of narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism – that are more commonly associated with sexually abusive behavior.	美国和以色列的科学家认为，有某些人格特质——自恋、精神变态和马基维雅里主义的“暗黑三要素”——往往与性虐待行为相关。


One intriguing finding from this research, published in 2016 in the journal Personality and Individual Differences, is that personality traits associated with a proclivity for harassment may be “specialized psychological adaptations” that allow individuals to exploit “niches” in society.	这项有趣的研究成果发表在2016年的人格与个体差异杂志上，揭示了与骚扰倾向相关的人格特质可能是“专业心理适应”，某些个体藉此对社会“特定细分领域”进行利用。


In other words, some sexual predators may seek careers in particular industries that allow them to exploit others.	换言之，某些性捕猎者可能寻求从事特定行业，从而为其利用行为进行掩护。


The researchers also found that the disposition that makes someone successful may also comprise the personality traits that explain their tendency to exploit.	研究人员还发现使某些人取得成功的特质可能恰恰是构成其利用倾向的个性特征。


The traits needed to win Academy Awards, for example, may be similar to the traits of an individual who pursues a large number of sexual partners and relationships requiring little commitment.	例如，获得奥斯卡奖所需的特质可能与追求大量性伴侣和几乎无需负太多责任性关系的特质是相似的。


Taken a step further, the research suggests that we should not be surprised to find a similar parallel in many others corners of society.	进一步研究表明，如果在社会其他角落发现类似情况我们也不应感到惊讶。


It is not just in Hollywood where the traits that make someone a star could make the same person an abuser.	使某人成为明星的特质让他同时沦为性虐待者的情况并不仅仅局限在好莱坞。


The “dark triad” study was published long before the allegations against Weinstein came to light, but it remains the most comprehensive investigation into the personalities of sexual harassers.	早在韦恩斯坦指控曝光前很久就发布了“暗黑三要素”的研究成果，但迄今为止，这项成果依然是对性骚扰者个性特质的最全面的调查。


The researchers – based at Oakland University and the University of Georgia in the US, and Sapir Academic College in Israel – surveyed more than 2,500 Israeli men and women.	来自美国奥克兰大学、佐治亚大学和以色列萨比尔学院的研究者对超过2，500名以色列男女展开了调查。


Subjects prone to exploiting others demonstrated a number of characteristics, including callousness, disagreeableness, deceitfulness, egocentrism, lack of honesty or humility, and an excessive interest in one’s personal talents and goals.	容易利用人的人表现出冷酷、难以相处、善于欺骗、自我中心、诚实和谦卑缺失、以及过度关注个人才能和目标等若干特质。


This last trait – also known as narcissism – is a key component of the dark triad.	最后这种特质——也被称为自恋——是暗黑三要素的关键组成。


Narcissists tend to be convinced of their own magnificence, and believe that other people should be flattered to be in their company – even if that involves unwanted sexual advances.	自恋者往往相信自己的伟大，并认为其他人应当在他们的陪伴下受宠若惊——即使这当中涉及到不受欢迎的性企图。


Machiavellians, meanwhile, believe that the best way to interact with others is to tell them what they want to hear.	同时，马基维雅里主义者认为与其他人最佳的相处之道是对他们说想听的话。


Their manipulative default can lead to a pattern of continually deceiving colleagues and friends, which may explain why a Machiavellian personality would engage in sexual harassment or pursue short-term sexual encounters.	他们不自觉的操纵行为可能导致不断欺骗朋友和同事，而这一点或许可以解释为什么这种人格的人会进行性骚扰或追求短期性关系。


They simply believe they are too cunning to get caught.	他们认为自己聪明到不会被抓住。


When abusers are unmasked, they often seek to deflect blame.	当虐待行为被曝光时，他们往往试图转移指责。


Claiming to be suffering from a disorder such as “sexual addiction,” or checking into a rehabilitation clinic for “treatment,” as Weinstein has reportedly done, fits with a classic Machiavellian response.	声称自己患有诸如“性成瘾”之类的疾病，或者就像媒体报道韦恩斯坦所做的那样进入某家康复诊所“接受治疗”，我认为他的所作所为与经典的马基雅维里反应完全相符。


If the allegations pan out, Weinstein would be an extreme example of a “dark triad” abuser.	如果最后证明指控有效，韦恩斯坦将成为“暗黑三要素”虐待者的极端例证。


But this combination of character traits is not all that rare.	但这种人格特质组合并非如此罕见。


In fact, powerful predators might be lurking around the nearest water cooler right now.	事实上，强大的捕食者现在可能就藏在冷饮水箱之后。


According to a 1994 survey of federal employees in the US, cited in the “dark triad” study, 44% of female workers, and 19% of male workers, reported being sexually harassed on the job within the two previous years.	1994年对美国联邦员工所进行的调查（调查结果存在“暗黑三要素”研究中进行过引用）显示，44%的女性员工和19%的男性员工报告曾在近两年的工作中遭受过性骚扰。


And, as the authors of the 2016 study remind us, sexual harassment is not always about trying to secure sex.	同时，2016年研究的作者提醒我们性骚扰并不总是以性行为目标。


Rather, psychological drives – including the need to boost one’s sense of self-esteem, attractiveness, or masculinity – may be driving predators’ abuse of power in dominating or degrading others.	相反，心理驱动力——包括提升自尊感、吸引力或男性气概的需求——可能是捕食者滥用权力主宰或侮辱他人的驱动因素。


What may be particularly relevant to the Weinstein case, whatever the outcome, is that Hollywood is itself a bubble of narcissistic power.	无论最终结果如何，与韦恩斯坦案尤其相关的或许是好莱坞本身就是一种自恋的泡沫。


Psychologists could argue that this feature explains the blindness some have demonstrated toward the alleged depraved behavior of one of their colleagues.	心理学家可能认为这一特点解释了某些人面对同事所谓堕落行为时所表现出来的视而不见的态度。


Sexual harassment is the immediate focus of the Weinstein case, as it should be, given the severity of the alleged crimes and the distress caused to the victims.	鉴于所控罪行的严重性和为受害者带来的痛苦，性骚扰行为成为韦恩斯坦案的直接焦点是恰如其分的。


But for psychologists seeking to understand the apparent nexus of success and abuse, Weinstein’s apparent downfall is just the tip of an analytic iceberg.	但对那些想要理解成功和虐待行为之间显性关系的心理学家来说，韦恩斯坦显而易见的垮台仅仅是揭开了分析冰山的一角。


How to Boost Access to Essential Medicines	如何促进基本药物的使用


DÜSSELDORF – Around the world, health security is increasingly being recognized as the foundation of economic growth.	杜赛尔多夫——在世界范围内，医疗安全越来越被公认为经济增长的基础。


Healthy populations are better able to produce, trade, and innovate, while unhealthy populations strain public budgets and create risks that discourage economic exchange.	健康人群能更好地从事生产、贸易和创新，而不健康人群则会压低公共预算，并带来危险阻碍经济交流。


This logic is written into countless European Union reports, and is even gaining traction in the United States, despite the “America First” approach to international affairs embraced by President Donald Trump’s administration.	尽管总统唐纳德·特朗普政府奉行“美国优先”的国际事务策略，但上述逻辑仍然被载入无数的欧盟报告，甚至在美国国内也引发了强烈的反响。


Against this backdrop, the World Health Organization (WHO), under its new Director-General, Tedros Ghebreyesus, has a unique opportunity to pursue urgently needed reforms.	在这样的背景下，世界卫生组织新任总干事泰德罗斯·杰贝耶斯拥有独一无二的机会进行人们所迫切需要的改革。


The WHO’s response to the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa was roundly judged a failure.	世卫组织对西非2014到2016年埃博拉疫情所做出的反应被认为是彻底失败的。


And with the emergence of new diseases such as Zika – and the revival of old foes like bubonic plague – there is no question that much of humanity remains at the mercy of biology.	而且随着寨卡等新型疾病的出现——以及鼠疫等老对手的重新兴起——绝大部分人无疑仍要受到生物科学的摆布。


Moreover, globalization has compounded the danger by facilitating the spread of communicable diseases.	此外，全球化通过促进传染病的传播加剧了这种危险。


A flu outbreak like that of 1918-1920, which killed between 50 and 100 million people, would be even more devastating today.	如果像1918到1920年那样导致5000万到1亿人口死亡的流感疫情在今天爆发，那么所造成的损失将更加惨重。


To prevent such catastrophic outcomes, we need a comprehensive approach for strengthening health-care delivery in low- and middle-income countries.	为防止发生这样灾难性的后果，我们需要全面加强中低收入国家的医疗服务。


In particular, these countries need help improving drug delivery and managing chronic diseases such as cancer and diabetes, which impose an immense burden on their economies.	尤其要强调的是，这些国家需要外界协助建立药物供给系统并管理癌症及糖尿病等慢性病，上述慢性病为它们的国内经济造成了巨大的负担。


Unfortunately, the WHO’s leadership, like much of the West, has not pursued this course of action, because it has been distracted by an ideological obsession with drug prices.	不幸的是，世卫组织领导层像多数西方国家一样，并没有采取这样的行动，因为他们的注意力被意识形态领域对药价的痴迷所吸引。


But drug prices are a vanishingly small part of the problem in countries struggling to build healthy, productive societies.	但药价问题在那些竭尽全力试图建设健康、高效社会的国家小到几乎可以忽略不计。


Of all the drugs on the WHO’s “Essential Medicines” list, 95% are already off-patent, meaning that cheaper generic versions are available worldwide.	世卫组织“基本药物”清单中95%已经是非专利药，也就是说相对廉价的仿制药在世界各国均有供应。


In cases where drugs aren’t reaching people who need them, the reason is not high prices, but rather dysfunctional health systems.	如果存在药物无法覆盖所需人群的情况，往往不是因为高昂的价格，而是因为运转不畅的医疗系统。


Fortunately, public-health analysts have identified a handful of structural reforms that would largely eliminate existing bottlenecks that are hindering the distribution of essential medicines.	幸运的是，公共健康分析人员已经明确了若干结构性改革，能够在很大程度上消除现有阻碍基本药物流通的瓶颈。


The first trouble spot is infrastructure.	首要的麻烦集中点是基础设施。


More than half of the world’s rural population lacks access to basic health care, compared to about a fifth of the urban population.	世界上有超过一半的农村人口缺乏基本医疗保障，而同等情况的城市人口仅有1/5。


Inadequate and unreliable transportation networks make accessing health-care services costly and time-consuming, and impede drug deliveries from supply centers.	交通运输网络发展不充分和不可靠导致获取基本医疗服务既昂贵又费时，并阻碍了供应中心的药物供给。


With better roads and more fully developed transportation systems, emerging economies could boost not just health outcomes, but also economic and educational opportunities.	有了更好的道路和更发达的交通运输体系，新兴经济体不仅可以提升健康成果，还可以提升经济和教育机遇。


A second problem, even in areas with adequate infrastructure, is the prevalence of bureaucratic and economic barriers that limit access to essential medicines.	另外一个主要问题是即使在基础设施充足的地区，仍然普遍存在限制基本药物获取的官僚和经济障碍。


According to a 2008 study of 36 developing countries, torturous registration and approval processes create frequent shortages of 15 of the most commonly used generic medicines.	一份2008年针对36个发展中国家的研究成果显示，折磨人的注册和批准程序造成了15种最常用非专利药物的频繁短缺。


For example, in South Africa it can take up to five years for new medicines to reach the market, owing to that country’s drug-registration and labeling regulations.	举例来讲，由于南非的药品注册和标签规定，可能导致新药需要花费长达五年时间才能进入该国市场。


By streamlining drug-approval processes, removing tariffs, and simplifying customs procedures, many countries could immediately increase the availability of dozens of essential medicines.	通过精简药物审批程序、取消关税和简化海关手续，许多国家可以立即增加几十种基本药物的供应量。


A third problem is that there are too few health-care workers.	第三个问题是医务工作者数量太少。


In many low- and middle-income countries, patients cannot get the drugs they need simply because there are no doctors or nurses to prescribe them, nor pharmacists to dispense them.	在许多中低收入国家，患者无法得到所需药物，仅仅因为没有开具处方的医生或护士，也没有配药的药剂师。


According to the WHO, the world suffers from a deficit of some seven million health-care professionals; by 2035, that number is expected to reach 13 million.	据世界卫生组织统计，全世界专业医务人员存在约700万的缺口； 截至2035年，这一数字预计将达到1300万。


Making matters worse, there is an even greater shortfall of specialists equipped to treat chronic diseases such as diabetes, which is spreading rapidly through the developing world, owing to changing diets and habits.	更糟糕的是，治疗糖尿病等慢性疾病的专家缺口更大，因为饮食及生活习惯的变化，糖尿病正在发展中国家迅速蔓延。


Flawed – or nonexistent – health-finance schemes are the fourth, and perhaps the largest, barrier to drug delivery in many countries.	第四个问题，或许也是许多国家药物供给最大的障碍，是医疗筹资计划根本没有建立——或者存在缺陷。


Even when generic-brand essential medicines are available, they often are unaffordable for low-income patients in countries with scant state subsidies and no risk-pooling insurance mechanisms.	即使存在仿制品牌的基本药物，但在缺少政府补贴及风险共担保险机制的国家，低收入患者往往也无力负担。


By one estimate, almost 90% of people in low- and middle-income countries will face impoverishment if they have to pay out of pocket for a single commonly used generic drug.	据估计，如果中低收入国家民众被迫自掏腰包承担某种常用仿制药物的费用，那么其中高达90%的人将会面临贫困。


Some of the countries that are most eager to strip patent protections are also notorious for skimping on health-care expenditures.	某些最急于取消专利保护的国家同样因为克扣医疗健康支出而臭名昭著。


The Indian government, for example, spends just around 1% of GDP on health care, well below the 5% needed to move toward universal health coverage.	比如印度政府在卫生保健方面的支出仅占国内生产总值的1%左右，远低于全民医疗覆盖所需的5%。


But expropriating drug makers’ intellectual property will do nothing to improve outcomes where crucial safety nets are missing.	但如果没有最重要的医疗安全网，剥夺药品制造企业的知识产权将无助于改善最终结果。


Increasing the availability of essential medicines is imperative for improving health-care outcomes for hundreds of millions of people around the world.	提高基本药物的可获得性对于改善世界各地数亿人的医疗健康结果至关重要。


When societies are not burdened by disease, they can focus on boosting productivity, consumption, and trade.	当社会没有疾病负担时，人们可以将注意力集中在改善生产率、消费和贸易上。


At the same time, neglecting the threat posed by communicable diseases in the developing world invites catastrophe not just in those countries, but in developed economies, too.	与此同时，忽视发展中国家传染病所造成的威胁不仅会在那些国家引发灾难，而且还会波及发达经济体。


We can do much to close the global health-security gap; but undermining patent protections for new drugs will do precisely the opposite.	我们可以做许多工作来弥补全球医疗安全差距； 但破坏新药的专利保护却会起到完全相反的效果。


The Right to Health Is Universal	健康权属于每个人


GENEVA – On this year’s World AIDS Day, on December 1, we should remember the 35 million people who have died of AIDS-related illnesses, and the 76 million who have been infected with HIV since reporting began.	日内瓦——在今年的世界艾滋病日，也就是12月1日，我们不应忘记已经有3，500万人死于艾滋病相关疾病，而且从报告开始以来已经有7，600万人感染了艾滋病病毒。


And we can celebrate the fact that nearly 21 million people living with HIV now have access to life-saving treatment.	我们还应当庆幸现在已有近2，100万艾滋病毒感染者能够得到救命的救治。


But we also must not lose sight of the fact that more than 15.8 million people are still awaiting treatment, while an estimated 11 million people do not even know they have the virus.	但我们同样不能忽视超过1，580万人仍在等候救治的现实，同时约有1，100万人甚至都不知道自己感染了这种病毒。


In the time it takes to read this commentary, three more young women will have contracted HIV.	在阅读这篇评论所需的短短时间里，就会有3名年轻女性感染艾滋病毒。


These figures represent an indefensible injustice: millions of people are being denied their right to health.	这些数字代表了一种无可辩驳的不公正：高达数百万人被剥夺了健康的权利。


The third United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG3) addresses health.	联合国可持续发展目标第三条（SDG3）涉及健康问题。 该目标旨在减少交通事故；


It aims to reduce road accidents; tackle non-communicable diseases; end AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and neglected tropical diseases; guarantee universal health coverage and access to sexual and reproductive health-care services; and substantially reduce deaths from environmental pollution – all by 2030.	确保民众健康全覆盖并提供性爱及生殖健康服务； 以及大幅度减少环境污染所导致的死亡案例——所有这一切都必须在2030年之前实现。


Although countries around the world have committed to this goal, countless people still inhale dangerous levels of toxic particles, and lack access to safe water and adequate sanitation.	尽管世界各国无不致力于实现这一目标，但无数民众仍在吸入危险的有毒颗粒物，同时缺乏安全的饮用水和充足的卫生设施。


Too many governments consistently fail to act on environmental and other regulatory issues, turn a blind eye to companies that profit from selling unhealthy and addictive products, and thus fail those whom they are supposed to protect and serve.	太多政府始终无法在环境和其他监管问题上采取行动，对销售使人上瘾的不健康产品并从中渔利的企业视而不见，并因此辜负了那些他们本应保护和服务的对象所交付的任务。


Health is neither a gift nor an act of charity.	健康既不是礼物也不是慈善行为。


It is a fundamental human right, encompassing both freedoms and entitlements.	它是一项基本人权，其中包含自由和权利。


Everyone is free to make decisions about their health, regardless of who they are, where they live, what they believe, or how they earn a living.	每个人都有权决定自身的健康状况，无论他们是谁，无论他们生活在哪里，无论他们秉承何种信仰，也无论他们采用何种谋生方式。


And everyone is entitled to affordable, quality health services and freedom from discrimination and coercion.	而且每个人都有权在免遭歧视和强制的情况下享受优质实惠的健康服务。


Enjoying the right to health means having one’s physical and mental integrity respected, and having the ability to participate and contribute to one’s community.	享有健康权意味着尊重身心健康，而且有能力参与社区生活并贡献自己的绵薄之力。


Today, we call on world leaders to confront health injustices wherever they see them, and to take action to respect, protect, and uphold the right to health for all people.	今天，我们呼吁全球领导人直面他们所目睹的健康不公，并采取行动尊重、保护和维护全体民众的健康权利。


The ambitious SDG agenda for 2030 has afforded all of us the opportunity to shape policies aimed at creating and empowering the “global health citizen.”	2030年雄心勃勃的可持续发展目标议程为我们所有人提供了旨在成就并赋权“全球健康公民”政策的机遇。


Who is this citizen?	全球健康公民是谁？


She is an individual who knows her rights and can voice her concerns, challenge injustices, and hold decision-makers accountable.	她了解自己的权利并能表达担忧，挑战不公现象，并追究决策者的责任。


He is an individual who does not just ask for but demands access to doctors, treatments, or preventive care.	他不仅要求有权接触医生、接受治疗，还要求接受预防性护理。


The global health citizen is one who becomes a part of the solution.	全球健康公民本身就是某种解决方式。


Empowering global health citizens will require progress in at least three policy areas: popularizing participation, democratizing data, and eliminating discrimination.	授权全球健康公民至少要在三个政策领域取得进展：普及参与、数据民主化和消除歧视。


As to the first, we must open up health programs and policies to meaningful public engagement.	首先，我们必须开展健康项目和政策，以实现有意义的公众参与。


In the 1990s, the disability-rights movement coined the phrase, “Nothing about us without us.”	20世纪90年代，残疾人权利运动提出的口号是“没有我们的参与就不关我们的事。


All global health citizens, and particularly health-care leaders, should adopt this mantra.	”所有全球健康公民，尤其是医疗保健领袖，都应当秉承这一理念。


To be sure, public and private corruption remains a significant obstacle to ensuring the right to health for all people.	可以肯定，公共和私人领域的腐败仍然是确保所有人健康权的重大障碍。


In many countries, health care is one of the most corrupt sectors.	在许多国家，最腐败的部门就包括医疗保健领域。


To address this, global health citizens will need both institutional support and better tools for demanding that their right to health be respected.	要想解决这个问题，全球健康公民不仅需要体制支持，还需要获得更好的工具，来要求各方尊重他们的健康权。


They should start demanding more measures to ensure good governance and transparency, improve “legal” literacy, fund civil-society organizations, and reinforce legal mechanisms for holding governments accountable.	他们应当开始要求采取进一步措施来确保透明度和良好执政，提高“法律”素养，资助民间社会组织并强化问责政府的法律机制。


The second policy area where progress is needed is access to data for every community.	急需取得进展的另一个政策领域是能够查阅各社区数据。


At UNAIDS, we follow the adage, “What gets measured gets done.”	在联合国艾滋病规划署，我们信奉这样一句格言，“能够衡量就能够完成任务”。


Data analysis has proven to be one of the most potent tools in the fight against the HIV epidemic, because it enables us to raise awareness, identify people being left behind, guide investment, and coordinate action.	事实已经证明，数据分析是防治艾滋病毒流行领域一件最有力的武器，因为它能使我们提高认识、找到哪些人需要加强工作、引导投资并协调行动。


We in the global health field have always been good at estimating mortality and morbidity rates.	我们的全球健康领域一直很善于估算死亡率和发病率。


But it is now time to look beyond epidemiological facts.	但现在必须要超越流行病学的现实来采取对策。


Guaranteeing the right to health will require us also to monitor the effects of discrimination and stigmatization, as well as laws and environmental factors that threaten people’s health and wellbeing.	保障健康权利还需要我们监控歧视和侮辱所产生的后果，并关注威胁人类健康和福祉的法律和环境因素。


Likewise, conducting thorough assessments of the health impact of key policies and investments must become the norm, rather than the exception.	同样，对主要政策和投资所产生的健康影响进行全面评估必须成为常态，而不是偶一为之的特例。


The global health sector needs far more independent advocacy and accountability, which the UN and civil-society groups, in particular, are in a strong position to provide.	全球健康领域需要更独立的宣传和问责制度，而提供相关制度恰恰是联合国和民间社会团体的优势。


The third policy area – eliminating discrimination in health-care settings – must become an international priority.	第三个政策领域——消除医疗环境中的歧视——必须成为国际关注的优先领域。


The central promise of the SDG agenda is to leave no one behind.	可持续发展目标议程的核心承诺就是不放弃任何人。


Discrimination creates de facto barriers to universal health coverage, and prevents many people from accessing health services of any kind.	歧视为健康全覆盖造成了事实上的障碍，并阻碍许多人获取任何形式的医疗服务。


For example, one in eight people responding to the HIV Stigma Index say they have been denied health care as a result of prejudice.	例如，对艾滋病毒耻辱指数作出回应的人有1/8认为他们的健康权因为外界的偏见而被剥夺。


It is clear that ending AIDS will require social – not just medical – breakthroughs.	显而易见，消灭艾滋病不仅需要医疗、而且需要社会突破。


Governments must redouble their efforts to protect individuals against discrimination, and create effective mechanisms for people to seek redress when private or state actors violate their right to health.	政府必须加倍努力保护个人不受歧视，并且建立有效的机制，允许民众在健康权遭到私人或国家行为侵害时寻求补救机制。


We call on all health-care practitioners and institutions to resist discriminatory laws, policies, or practices.	我们号召所有医疗保健行业的执业者和相关机构抵制歧视性法律、政策或行为。


Safeguarding the right to health provides the foundation needed to enable everyone to realize their potential and their dreams.	维护健康权提供了必要的基础，使每个人都能实现梦想并发挥潜力。


We should demand nothing less.	我们的目标不能比这更低。


Monopoly’s New Era	垄断的新时代


NEW YORK – For 200 years, there have been two schools of thought about what determines the distribution of income – and how the economy functions.	纽约—200年来，关于什么决定了收入分配——以及经济如何运行——的问题，有两大思想流派。


One, emanating from Adam Smith and nineteenth-century liberal economists, focuses on competitive markets.	其一滥觞于亚当·斯密和十九世纪自由主义经济学家，关注焦点是竞争市场。


The other, cognizant of how Smith’s brand of liberalism leads to rapid concentration of wealth and income, takes as its starting point unfettered markets’ tendency toward monopoly.	其二认识到斯密式的自由主义导致了财富和收入的迅速集中，将出发点放在了无限制的市场导致垄断的思想上。


It is important to understand both, because our views about government policies and existing inequalities are shaped by which of the two schools of thought one believes provides a better description of reality.	了解这两大流派很重要，因为我们关于政府政策和现存不平等性的观点取决于我们认为其中哪个流派能更好地描述现实。


For the nineteenth-century liberals and their latter-day acolytes, because markets are competitive, individuals’ returns are related to their social contributions – their “marginal product,” in the language of economists.	对十九世纪自由主义者及其追随者来说，因为市场是竞争性的，所以个体的回报与他们的社会贡献——用经济学家的话说，就是“边际产品”——有关。


Capitalists are rewarded for saving rather than consuming – for their abstinence, in the words of Nassau Senior, one of my predecessors in the Drummond Professorship of Political Economy at Oxford.	资本家因为储蓄而不是消费而获得回报——用我的牛津大学德鲁蒙德（Drummond）政治经济学讲席教授前辈拿骚·西尼尔（Nassau Senior）的话说，是因为他们的节制（abstinence）。


Differences in income were then related to their ownership of “assets” – human and financial capital.	因此，收入差异被归因于个人所拥有的“资产”——人力和金融资本。


Scholars of inequality thus focused on the determinants of the distribution of assets, including how they are passed on across generations.	因此，不平等性学者将焦点集中在资产的分配上，包括它们如何在代际间传递。


The second school of thought takes as its starting point “power,” including the ability to exercise monopoly control or, in labor markets, to assert authority over workers.	第二个思想流派以“权力”为起点——包括实施垄断控制或在劳动力市场上对工人的威权。


Scholars in this area have focused on what gives rise to power, how it is maintained and strengthened, and other features that may prevent markets from being competitive.	这一领域的学者将焦点集中在是什么导致了权力，权力如何维持和强化，以及可能阻止市场竞争的其他因素。


Work on exploitation arising from asymmetries of information is an important example.	对源于信息不对称的剥削的研究工作便是一个重要的例子。


In the West in the post-World War II era, the liberal school of thought has dominated.	在二战后的西方世界，自由派取得了主宰地位。


Yet, as inequality has widened and concerns about it have grown, the competitive school, viewing individual returns in terms of marginal product, has become increasingly unable to explain how the economy works.	但是，随着不平等性的加剧以及对此问题的担忧的加深，以边际产品的角度看待个人回报的竞争学派日益难以解释经济如何运行。


So, today, the second school of thought is ascendant.	因此，今天，第二个思想流派后来居上。


After all, the large bonuses paid to banks’ CEOs as they led their firms to ruin and the economy to the brink of collapse are hard to reconcile with the belief that individuals’ pay has anything to do with their social contributions.	毕竟，银行CEO导致企业倒闭、经济险些崩溃，但仍然获得丰厚奖金，这与个人收入必与社会贡献的信念无法调和。


Of course, historically, the oppression of large groups – slaves, women, and minorities of various types – are obvious instances where inequalities are the result of power relationships, not marginal returns.	当然，从历史上看，对大群体的压迫——包括奴隶、女性和各种少数群体等——都是不平等性源自权力关系而不是边际回报的显而易见的例子。


In today’s economy, many sectors – telecoms, cable TV, digital branches from social media to Internet search, health insurance, pharmaceuticals, agro-business, and many more – cannot be understood through the lens of competition.	在今天的经济中，许多部门——电信、有线电视、从社交媒体到互联网搜索的数字行业、医疗保险、制药、农企集团，等等——都无法用竞争角度理解。


In these sectors, what competition exists is oligopolistic, not the “pure” competition depicted in textbooks.	在这些部门中，竞争在寡头间进行，而不是教科书上所描述的“纯粹”竞争。


A few sectors can be defined as “price taking”; firms are so small that they have no effect on market price.	一些部门可定义为“价格接受”部门； 企业太小，对市场价格没有影响。


Agriculture is the clearest example, but government intervention in the sector is massive, and prices are not set primarily by market forces.	农业是最显而易见的例子，但政府对该部门的干预十分严重，价格主要不是由市场力量决定。


US President Barack Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers, led by Jason Furman, has attempted to tally the extent of the increase in market concentration and some of its implications.	贾森·福尔曼（Jason Furman）领导的美国奥巴马总统经济顾问委员会（CEA）试图厘清市场集中度的上升情况及其所造成的一些后果。


In most industries, according to the CEA, standard metrics show large – and in some cases, dramatic – increases in market concentration.	CEA指出，在大部分行业，标准指标表明市场集中度大幅——一些市场甚至可称为剧烈——提高。


The top ten banks’ share of the deposit market, for example, increased from about 20% to 50% in just 30 years, from 1980 to 2010.	比如，前十大银行占存款市场的比重在从1980年到2010年的区区30年里就从20%左右增加到50%。


Some of the increase in market power is the result of changes in technology and economic structure: consider network economies and the growth of locally provided service-sector industries.	市场权力的增加部分来自技术和经济结构的变化：网络经济和本地提供的服务业的增长就是一个例子。


Some is because firms – Microsoft and drug companies are good examples – have learned better how to erect and maintain entry barriers, often assisted by conservative political forces that justify lax anti-trust enforcement and the failure to limit market power on the grounds that markets are “naturally” competitive.	另一部分是因为企业——微软和制药公司是很好的例子——学会了如何更好地树立和维持进入壁垒，它们常常有保守派政治力量的支持，后者论证放松反垄断执法的合理性，并且不以市场“天然”是竞争的为由遏制市场权力。


And some of it reflects the naked abuse and leveraging of market power through the political process: Large banks, for example, lobbied the US Congress to amend or repeal legislation separating commercial banking from other areas of finance.	还有一部分则是通过政治程序赤裸裸地滥用和利用市场权力：比如，大银行游说美国国会修订或废除将商业银行业务和其他金融业务分离的立法。


The consequences are evident in the data, with inequality rising at every level, not only across individuals, but also across firms.	后果在数据中尽显无疑，各层次不平等性均在上升，不仅个人之间如此，企业之间亦如是。


The CEA report noted that the “90th percentile firm sees returns on investments in capital that are more than five times the median.	CEA的报告指出，“最顶尖的一成企业的资本投资回报是中位回报的五倍多。


This ratio was closer to two just a quarter of a century ago.”	这一比例在二十五年前只有近两倍。 ”


Joseph Schumpeter, one of the great economists of the twentieth century, argued that one shouldn’t be worried by monopoly power: monopolies would only be temporary.	二十世纪伟大的经济学家约瑟夫·熊彼特指出，我们不必为垄断权力担忧：垄断只能是暂时的。


There would be fierce competition for the market and this would replace competition in the market and ensure that prices remained competitive.	将出现为了市场的激烈竞争，并且这一竞争将取代市场中的竞争，并确保竞争性定价。


My own theoretical work long ago showed the flaws in Schumpeter’s analysis, and now empirical results provide strong confirmation.	我在很久以前所做的理论工作揭示了熊彼特分析中的漏洞，现在，实证结果为此提供了强有力的确认。


Today’s markets are characterized by the persistence of high monopoly profits.	今天的市场表现出高垄断理论持久的特征。


The implications of this are profound.	这一现象的影响是深远的。


Many of the assumptions about market economies are based on acceptance of the competitive model, with marginal returns commensurate with social contributions.	关于市场经济的假设有许多建立在接受竞争模型的基础上，认为边际回报总是与社会贡献相称。


This view has led to hesitancy about official intervention: If markets are fundamentally efficient and fair, there is little that even the best of governments could do to improve matters.	这一观点导致官方干预的犹豫不决：如果市场从根本上是有效而公平的，那么即使是最优秀的政府，对于改善状况也没什么可做的。


But if markets are based on exploitation, the rationale for laissez-faire disappears.	但如果市场是基于剥削，那么自由放任的理由就不再成立。


Indeed, in that case, the battle against entrenched power is not only a battle for democracy; it is also a battle for efficiency and shared prosperity.	事实上，在这一情形中，打击既得权力不但是民主的战争，也是效率和共同繁荣的战争。


The Rising Price of Trump’s Border Wall	日益高涨的特朗普边境墙代价


WASHINGTON, DC – As a candidate, Donald Trump insisted on one signature issue above all: the United States will build a wall along its border with Mexico, and Mexico will pay for it.	华盛顿—作为总统候选人时，特朗普坚持的最标志性问题是：美国将沿着美墨边境建造一道墙，建墙的钱由墨西哥出。


Seven months after taking office, however, Trump has made no progress on either front: political support for a new wall is diminishing, and the chance that Mexico will pay anything for it is essentially zero and seems to be off the agenda.	但是，上台七个月后，特朗普在任何一方面都没有取得进展：建造新墙的政治支持越来越弱，墨西哥出钱的可能基本为零，并且似乎已经不在特朗普的日程之中。


Now, Trump is doubling down – and threatening to shut down the government, or even default on the federal debt, unless Congress provides funding for a wall that he promised would cost US taxpayers nothing.	目前，特朗普正在加倍下注——还威胁要关闭政府，甚至赖掉联邦债务，除非国会为他承诺不会给美国纳税人造成任何成本的高墙拨款。


If Trump escalates this confrontation, the costs for Americans – in terms of economic uncertainty and slower growth – are likely to pile up.	如果特朗普让这一冲突继续升级，那么美国人民所遭受的成本——用经济不确定性和增长放缓衡量——也可能节节攀升。


The amounts of money involved are not large relative to the overall size of the US government.	所涉资金量相对美国政府的总规模而言并不大。


In Trump’s first full-year budget, initial spending on the wall was put at $1.6 billion, with the president estimating that the total cost will be $12 billion (although other estimates are considerably higher).	在特朗普的第一个全年预算中，筑墙的首批支出定在16亿美元，而总统估算的总成本为120亿美元（尽管其他估算要高得多）。


Compared to total US government spending of $3.9 trillion in 2016, that is a drop in the bucket.	与美国政府2016年的总支出3. 9万亿美元相比，这只是九牛一毛。


The argument here is about principles: what would a border wall really achieve from a practical standpoint, and what would it symbolize?	这里的关键问题在于原则：从实际角度看，一道边境墙到底能够实现什么，又象征着什么？


But the precise rules about purse strings determine how this argument will play out.	但具体的钱袋子规则决定了这一关键问题会如何演变。


The president does have some discretion on spending – and the Department of Homeland Security has already shifted funds from other programs to pay for the development of prototypes.	总统确实拥有一定的支出自主权——国土安全部也已经从其他项目上调拨款项支付了样板墙的开发。


But a fundamental principle of the US Constitution is that Congress controls the purse strings – meaning that discretionary spending, such as outlays for a border wall, is subject to the formal appropriations process.	但美国宪法的一个基本原则是国会控制钱袋子——这意味着自由裁量支出，比如建造边境墙的开支——要经过正式的拨款程序。


Building a border wall, or significantly extending what is already there, is not feasible without congressional approval.	建造边境墙，或大幅扩建已有规模的边境墙，不经过国会批准是不行的。


The appropriations process is complex and not always transparent to outsiders.	拨款程序十分复杂，对局外人也未必透明。


Regular appropriations are supposed to be enacted by October 1 (the beginning of the government’s fiscal year).	常规的拨款应该在10月1日实施（政府财年起点）。


But there is now a long tradition of “continuing resolutions,” which provide funding for just part of a year.	但如今有一个“继续拨款决议”的长期传统，即只为一年中的一段时间提供资金。


And supplemental appropriations bills can provide additional funding at any time in response to particular situations – such as the aftermath of a major hurricane.	补充拨款法案可以在任何时候提供更多资金，以应对特殊状况——比如超强飓风后的救灾。


The Republicans control both the Senate and the House of Representatives.	共和党控制着参议院和众议院。


And the House already granted approval for exactly what Trump wanted on the wall – the $1.6 billion was included in a broader $788 billion spending package, so the wall did not have to be debated separately.	众议院已经批准了特朗普想要的筑墙款项——这16亿美元包括在7,788亿美元的一揽子支出计划中，因此边境墙不需要单独讨论。


Under current rules, 60 votes would be needed in the 100-member Senate to fund the wall, and the Democrats, with 48 seats, already managed to exclude this item from the spending bill earlier this year, which funded the government through September 30.	根据当前规则，需要100位参议院中有60位支持给边境墙拨款，而在参议院中占据48席的民主党已经成功地将这项议案排除在今年早些时候的支出法案之外，该法案规定了直到9月30日的政府拨款。


Now Trump has issued an ultimatum: fund the wall, or face a shutdown of the federal government – meaning that he and the Republicans would refuse to conclude any appropriations deal by October 1.	现在，特朗普已经下达了最后通牒：掏钱修墙，否则联邦政府就关门——也就是说，他和共和党将拒绝10月1日的一切拨款议案。


Or perhaps the wall will become part of a showdown over how the debt ceiling for the federal government should be raised, with the deadline for doing so also likely to come around the end of September.	或者，边境墙可能成为如何提高联邦政府债务上限摊牌的一部分，该问题的最后期限可能也是在9月底前后。


Complicating the issue further, some congressional Republicans – such as Senator Paul Rand of Kentucky and Congressman Mark Meadows of North Carolina – seem not to oppose some form of partial default or other reneging on debt by the US government.	让问题进一步复杂化的是，一些国会共和党——如肯塔基州参议员保罗·兰德（Paul Rand）和北卡罗来纳州众议员马克·米道斯（Mark Meadows）——似乎并不反对美国政府以某种形式的局部违约或其他赖账方式。


And remember that John Boehner stepped down as Speaker of the House in 2015 in part over similar budget struggles with the right wing of his party.	并且不要忘了，2015年约翰·博纳（John Boehner）之所以失去众议长之位，部分原因就在于他的党派的右翼挑起了类似的预算纷争。


The impact of a debt default would be cataclysmic, and it seems unlikely that Trump would be foolish enough to go so far.	债务违约的影响将是灾难性的，特朗普不太可能会蠢到走到这一步。


But Goldman Sachs, a politically well-connected bank, puts the odds of a government shutdown at 50/50 – up from around 30% in May.	但政治关系深厚的银行高盛公司认为政府关门的机会高达五成——而在5月份时只有三成左右。


Government shutdowns are costly, impacting services and potentially payments to suppliers and citizens.	政府关门代价高昂，将影响到政府服务，还可能影响到对供应商和公民的支付。


But politicians never know exactly who will be blamed, and how much, until the shutdown happens.	但在关门发生之前，政客永远不会不知道谁会遭受谴责，遭受多么严重的谴责。


Although this approach didn’t go well for Republicans in 1995-96 or in 2013, there are clearly some people in the party who would like to try it again.	尽管这一伎俩在1995-96年以及2013年都没有让共和党讨到好果子，但显然仍有一部分共和党想要再试一次。


The costs to the economy of a shutdown are definitely negative.	政府关门给经济造成的代价绝对是消极的。


But, whereas a debt default by the federal government would amount to falling off a cliff, the costs of a shutdown build more gradually over time.	但是，联邦政府债务违约固然好比坠入悬崖，政府关门的成本则需要逐渐体现。


It seems entirely consistent with Trump’s personality and style that he would try such a maneuver and see how it plays with his (slowly dwindling) electoral base.	做一番尝试，看看会对他（缓慢缩小的）票仓造成什么样的影响，这倒是完全符合特朗普的个性和风格。


Of course, there are many wildcards – including the apparently bad relationship between Trump and Mitch McConnell, the Republican leader in the Senate.	当然，这其中也有很多变数——包括特朗普与参议院共和党领袖米奇·麦康奈尔（Mitch McConnell）之间显而易见的恶劣关系。


The massive flooding in Texas – and the important helping role that the federal government can play – may also convince the White House that now is not the time for further disruption.	德克萨斯州的特大洪水——以及联邦政府能够起到的重要的帮助作用——也许会说服白宫现在并非乱上加乱的时候。


One thing is certain: Mexico is not going to pay for the border wall.	有一件事是确定的：墨西哥不会为边境墙买单。


What is less clear is how much Americans will be forced to pay – with uncertainty, disruption, and even a government shutdown – if Trump’s version of the wall is ever built.	尚不清楚的是，如果特朗普所构想的边境墙被建造起来，美国将被迫付出多少——面对因此导致的不确定性、破坏乃至政府关门。


The Moral Identity of Homo Economicus	经济人的道德身份


CAMBRIDGE – Why do people vote, if doing so is costly and highly unlikely to affect the outcome?	坎布里奇—如果投票代价高昂，又很难改变结果，人们为什么还要投票呢？


Why do people go above and beyond the call of duty at their jobs?	人们为什要以比职责更高的标准和要求完成工作呢？


Two recent books – Identity Economics by Nobel laureate George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton and The Moral Economy by Sam Bowles – indicate that a quiet revolution is challenging the foundations of the dismal science, promising radical changes in how we view many aspects of organizations, public policy, and even social life.	两本新书，诺贝尔奖得主乔治·阿克洛夫（George Akerlof）和蕾切尔·克兰顿（Rachel Kranton）的《身份经济学》（Identity Economics）以及山姆·鲍尔斯（Sam Bowles）的《道德经济》（The Moral Economy）指出，一场静悄悄的革命正在挑战这门无聊科学的基础，我们看待组织、公共政策乃至社会生活的诸多方面都有可能发生彻底的变化。


As with the rise of behavioral economics (which already includes six Nobel laureates among its leaders), this revolution emanates from psychology.	这场革命发源于经济学，随着行为经济学而崛起（已有六位这方面的先驱获得了诺贝尔奖）。


But while behavioral economics relies on cognitive psychology, this one is rooted in moral psychology.	但行为经济学需要依靠认知心理学，这场革命却植根于道德心理学。


As with most revolutions, this one is not happening because, as Thomas Huxley surmised, a beautiful old theory has been killed by ugly new facts.	和大部分革命一样，这场革命之所以没有发生，就像赫胥黎（Thomas Huxley）所预言的那样，是因为美妙的旧理论被丑陋的新事实所扼杀。


The ugly facts have been apparent for a while, but people cannot abandon one mental framework unless another one can take its place: in the end, beautiful old theories are killed only by newer, more powerful theories.	这些丑陋的事实尽露无疑已经多时，但人们就是无法抛弃心理框架，直到一个新框架能够取而代之：最终，美妙的旧理论一定会被更新更有力的理论所杀死。


For a long time, economic theory aspired to the elegance of Euclidean geometry, where all true statements can be derived from five apparently incontrovertible axioms, such as the notion that there is only one line that connects two points in space.	长期以来，经济理论追求欧几里得几何之美。 在欧式几何中，所有真命题都可以从五个显然是无可争议的公理推得，比如空间中两点之间有且只有一条直线相连。


In the nineteenth century, mathematicians explored the consequences of relaxing one of those axioms and discovered the geometries of curved spaces, where an infinite number of longitudinal lines can pass through the poles of a sphere.	在十九世纪，数学家们探索放松这些公理之一的结果，并发现了弯曲空间几何，其中贯穿球面极点的纵线有无穷多条。


The axioms underpinning traditional economics embody a view of human behavior known as homo economicus: we choose among the available options that which we want or prefer the most.	作为传统经济学基础的公理将人类行为视为所谓的经济人：我们根据最想要或最偏好什么，在可选选项中进行选择。


But what makes us want or prefer something?	但是什么让我们想要或偏好于某物？


Economics has long assumed that whatever informs our preferences is exogenous to the issue at hand: de gustibus non est disputandum, as George Stigler and Gary Becker argued.	长期以来，经济学假定关于我们偏好的信息都是外生于所要研究的问题的：即乔治·施蒂格勒（George Stigler）和加里·贝克尔（Gary Becker）所提出的“青菜萝卜，各有所爱”（de gustibus non est disputandum）。


But with a few reasonable assumptions, such as the idea that more is better than less, you can make many predictions about how people will behave.	但在一些合理的假定下，比如更多总好于更少，你可以就人类如何做出行为的问题进行一些很好的预测。


The behavioral economics revolution questioned the idea that we are good at making these judgments.	行为经济学革命质疑我们擅长做出这些判断的思想。


In the process, they subjected the assumptions underlying homo economicus to experimental tests and found them wanting.	在这个过程中，它们用实验检验经济人假设，发现了其中欠缺。


But this led at most to the idea of nudging people into better decisions, such as forcing them to opt out of rather than into better choices.	但这最主要导致了助推人们做出更好决策的思想，如迫使他们选择不怎么做，而不是选择怎么做，从而实现更好的选择。


The new revolution may have been triggered by an uncomfortable finding of the old one.	这场新革命可能是由旧革命的一个令人不快的发现引发的。


Consider the so-called ultimatum game, in which a player is given a sum of money, say, $100.	考虑所谓的最后通牒博弈。 其中，一位参与者获得某个数量的钱，比如100美元。


He must offer a share of that money to a second player.	他必须将其中一部分与第二位参与者分享。


If the latter accepts the offer, both get to keep the money.	如果后者接受，两人都能得到钱。


If not, they both get nothing.	如果不接受，两人什么都得不到。


Homo economicus would give $1 to the second player, who should accept the offer, because $1 is better than zero dollars.	经济人会给第二个参与者1美元。 第二个参与者应该接受，因为1美元比零美元要好。


But people throughout the world tend to reject offers below $30.	但全世界的人都不会接受低于30美元的分配方案。


Why?	为什么？


The new revolution assumes that when we make choices, we do not merely consider which of the available options we like the most.	新革命界定，当我们做出选择时，我们并不只考虑我们最喜欢的可行选项。


We are also asking ourselves what we ought to do.	我们还会自问应该怎么做。


In fact, according to moral psychology, our moral sentiments, on which Adam Smith wrote his other famous book, evolved to regulate behavior.	事实上，据道德心理学，我们的道德情操——亚当·斯密就此写过一本名著——演化为行为控制器。


We are the most cooperative species on earth because our feelings evolved to sustain cooperation, to put “us” before “me.”	我们是地球上最有合作精神的物种，因为我们的感觉演化让我们保持合作，将“我们”置于“我”之前。


These feelings include guilt, shame, outrage, empathy, sympathy, dread, disgust, and a whole cocktail of other sentiments.	这些感觉包括负罪感、羞耻感、愤怒感、共鸣感、同情感、恐惧感、厌恶感，以及其他情操的大混合。


We reject offers in the ultimatum game because we feel they are unfair.	我们拒绝最后通牒博弈，是因为我们感觉它不公平。


Akerlof and Kranton propose a simple addition to the conventional economic model of human behavior.	阿克洛夫和克兰顿建议给常规人的行为的经济模型添加一样东西。


Besides the standard selfish elements that define our preferences, they argue that people see themselves as members of “social categories” with which they identify.	除了定义我们的偏好的标准的自私要素外，他们指出，人们将自己视为“社会分类”的成员。 他们从社会分类中获得身份。


Each of these social categories – for example, being a Christian, a father, a mason, a neighbor, or a sportsman – has an associated norm or ideal.	这些分类——比如身为基督徒、父亲、石匠、邻居、运动员——都有各自的相应的规范和理想。


And, because people derive satisfaction from behaving in accordance with the ideal, they behave not just to acquire, but also to become.	由于人从根据理想行动中获得满足，他们的行为不仅仅是为了获取（acquire），也是为了成为（become）。


Bowles shows that we have distinct frameworks for analyzing situations.	鲍尔斯指出，我们用不同的框架分析情景。


In particular, giving people monetary incentives may work in market-like situations.	特别是，给人们货币激励在类似于市场的情景中有用。


But, as a now-famous study of Haifa daycare centers showed, imposing fines on people who picked up their kids late actually had the opposite effect: if a fine is like a price, people may find that it is a price worth paying.	但是，一项现在名声大噪的对海法（Haifa）日托中心的研究表明，对接孩子迟到的家长课以罚款实际上产生了相反的效果：如果罚款就像是价格，那么人们可能认为这个价格是值得支付的。


But without the fine, coming late constitutes impolite, rude, or disrespectful behavior toward the caregivers, which self-respecting people would avoid, even without fines.	但如果没有罚款的话，迟到就构成了对日托中心工作人员的不礼貌、粗鲁和不尊重的行为，自尊的人应该避免这样做，即使没有罚款。


Unfortunately, this other-regarding view of behavior has been de-emphasized both in the corporate and the public domain.	不幸的是，这一关心他人（other-regarding）行为观在公司和公共领域都没有得到强调。


Instead, strategies have been derived from the view that all our behaviors are selfish, with the intellectual challenge being to design “incentive-compatible” mechanisms or contracts, an effort that has also been recognized with Nobel Prizes.	相反，人们在制定策略时所基于的观点是，我们所有的行为都是自私的、因此最大的智识挑战是设计出“激励相容”的机制或契约，该理论也获得了诺贝尔奖的承认。