Voters were promised an advantageous trade deal with Europe (Britain’s biggest market), lower immigration, and more money for the National Health Service and other cherished public goods and services.	选民得到的承诺是与（英国最大的市场）欧洲签订有利的贸易协议、降低移民人数，并节约资金用于国家卫生体系和其他稀缺的公共产品及服务。


Above all, Britain, it was said, would regain its “mojo,” the creative vitality needed to take the world by storm.	最重要的是，据说英国将就此恢复“魔力”，恢复曾风暴般席卷全球的创造性的生机勃勃。


One of the horrors that lie ahead will be the growing disappointment of “Leave” supporters as all of these lies are exposed.	随着谎言被一一戳穿，最可怕的将是“脱欧”支持者的失望情绪日益高涨。


The voters were told that they would “get their country back.”	选民们被告知他们将“夺回自己的国家”。


I do not believe they will like what it turns out to be.	我不相信他们会喜欢最后的结果。


A second reason for the disaster is the fragmentation of Britain’s two main political parties.	这场灾难的第二个原因是英国两大政党的分裂。


For years, anti-European sentiment has corroded the authority of Conservative leaders.	多年来，反欧情绪就一直侵蚀着保守党。


Moreover, any notion of party discipline and loyalty collapsed years ago, as the number of committed Conservative supporters dwindled.	此外，随着信仰坚定的保守党支持者锐减，任何党纪和忠诚的概念早在数年前就不复存在了。


Worse is what has happened in the Labour Party, whose traditional supporters provided the impetus behind the big “Leave” votes in many working-class areas.	更可怕的是工党阵营，他们的传统支持者是许多工薪阶层区域高票“脱欧”的始作俑者。


With Brexit, we have now seen Donald Trump-style populism come to Britain.	随着英国退欧，我们现在目睹了唐纳德·特朗普式的民粹主义来到英国。


Obviously, there is widespread hostility, submerged in a tsunami of populist bile, to anyone deemed a member of the “establishment.”	显而易见，人们对被民粹主义愤怒海啸裹挟而来的针对“体制成员”的敌意是十分普遍的。


Brexit campaigners like Justice Secretary Michael Gove rejected every expert as part of a self-serving conspiracy of the haves against the have-nots.	像司法大臣迈克尔·戈夫那样的退欧支持者将所有专家都斥之为有产阶级针对无产阶级的自私自利的阴谋。


So, whether it was the governor of the Bank of England, the Archbishop of Canterbury, or the President of the United States, their advice counted for nothing.	因此，无论英格兰银行行长、坎特伯雷大主教还是美国总统，他们的建议都是一文不值的。


All were portrayed as representatives of another world, with no relationship to the lives of ordinary British people.	所有人都被描绘成另一个世界的代表，那个世界丝毫无关于普通英国民众的生活。


That points to a third reason for the pro-Brexit vote: growing social inequity has contributed to a revolt against a perceived metropolitan elite.	由此推导出脱欧投票的第三个原因：日益严重的社会不公平现象已经导致了对所谓都市精英阶层的反叛运动。


Old industrial England, in cities like Sunderland and Manchester, voted against better-off London.	以桑德兰和曼彻斯特为代表的古老的工业英格兰对更加富裕的伦敦投了反对票。


Globalization, these voters were told, benefits only those at the top – comfortable working with the rest of the world – at the expense of everyone else.	这些选民认为全球化只惠及了顶层精英——他们与其他国家的民众合作导致其他人的利益受到损伤。


Beyond these reasons, it doesn’t help that for years hardly anyone has vigorously defended British membership in the EU.	此外，多年来几乎没人为英国的欧盟成员资格说话也没起到好作用。


This created a vacuum, allowing delusion and deception to blot out the benefits of European cooperation, and encouraging the view that the British had become the slaves of Brussels.	这种现象造成某种真空，人们坐视妄想和欺骗抹杀了欧洲合作的一切好处，并促使民众认为英国已经投靠布鲁塞尔为奴。


Pro-Brexit voters were fed a ludicrous conception of sovereignty, leading them to choose pantomime independence over the national interest.	脱欧选民被灌输了荒唐的主权概念，从而导致他们选择荒唐的独立而弃国家利益于不顾。


But moaning and rending one’s garments won’t do any good now.	但呻吟和撕心裂肺现在起不了任何作用。


In grim circumstances, concerned parties must honorably try to secure what is best for the UK.	在严峻的情况下，有关各方必须光明正大地为英国的利益服务。


One hopes the Brexiteers were at least half right, as difficult as that is to imagine.	人们希望退欧支持者至少有对的一面，尽管这种情况看似很难想象。


At any rate, one must make the best of the hand that has been dealt.	无论如何，人们必须尽一切可能面对现状。


Still, three immediate challenges come to mind.	不过，还需要面对三项直接挑战。


First, now that David Cameron has made clear that he will resign, the Conservative Party’s right wing and some of its sourer members will dominate the new government.	首先，现在戴维·卡梅伦已宣布将要辞职，保守党右翼和某些令人生厌的党员将主导新一届政府。


Cameron had no choice.	卡梅伦没有选择。


He could not possibly have gone to Brussels on behalf of his backstabbing colleagues to negotiate something he didn’t support.	他不可能前往布鲁塞尔代表口蜜腹剑的同事谈判他根本不支持的事务。


If his successor is a Brexit leader, Britain can look forward to being led by someone who has spent the last ten weeks spreading lies.	如果他的继任者是某位退欧领袖，那么英国将接受过去十周谎言传播者的领导。


Second, the bonds that hold the UK together – particularly Scotland and Northern Ireland, which both voted to stay in Europe – will come under great strain.	其次，将英国——特别是均已投票留欧的苏格兰和北爱尔兰——联系在一起的纽带将在很大程度上承压。


I hope the Brexit revolt will not lead inevitably to a vote for the breakup of the UK, but that outcome is certainly a possibility.	我希望英国退欧的反叛活动最终不会导致分裂英国的投票，但那样的结果无疑是有可能的。


Third, Britain will need to begin negotiating its exit very soon.	第三，英国将要很快开始谈判退出事宜。


It is difficult to see how it can possibly end up with a better relationship with the EU than it has now.	很难想象英国与欧盟的关系可能比现在更好。


All Britons will have their work cut out for them to convince their friends around the world that they have not taken leave of their moderate senses.	所有英国人都要说服世界各国的朋友，他们没有丧失最基本的常识。


The referendum campaign revived nationalist politics, which in the end is always about race, immigration, and conspiracies.	公投活动重振了民族政治，而民族政治归根结底关乎种族、移民和阴谋。


A task we all have in the pro-Europe camp is to try to contain the forces that Brexit has unleashed, and to assert the sort of values that have in the past earned us so many friends and admirers around the world.	我们亲欧盟阵营所有人面对的共同任务是遏制英国退欧所释放的力量，并宣扬过去曾赢得全球盟友和崇拜者尊重的价值。


All of this began in the 1940s, with Winston Churchill and his vision of Europe.	所有这些始于20世纪40年代温斯顿·丘吉尔的欧洲目标。


The way it will end can be described by one of Churchill’s more famous aphorisms: “The trouble with committing political suicide is that you live to regret it.”	可以用丘吉尔的另一句名言来描绘它的结束：“政治自杀的问题在于你会活着看到自杀的后果。 ”


In fact, many “Leave” voters may not live to regret it.	事实上，很多“脱欧”选民或许活不到后悔的时候。


But the young Britons who voted overwhelmingly to remain a part of Europe almost certainly will.	但那些压倒性投票支持留欧的年轻人却肯定能看到。


Football, Brexit, and Us	足球、英国退出和我们


CAMBRIDGE – Of the 24 teams that qualified for this year’s UEFA European Cup football (soccer) tournament, only one came from Germany.	坎布里奇—在24支晋级今年欧洲足球锦标赛的球队中，只有一支来自德国。


Three came from the United Kingdom: England, Wales, and Northern Ireland.	三支来自英国：英格兰、威尔士和北爱尔兰。


That seems rather odd.	这看起来相当奇怪。


After all, East and West Germans reunited only in 1991, and Bavarians united with Prussians only in 1871, whereas the annexations/unions of Ireland, Wales, and Scotland to the Kingdom of England go back to 1177, 1542, and 1707, respectively.	毕竟。 东西德1991年才重新统一，巴伐利亚和普鲁士1871年才统一，而爱尔兰、威尔士和苏格兰被英格兰王国吞并/统一分别是在1777年、1542年和1707年。


So why do Thuringians, Saxons, and Swabians root for the same German team, while UK citizens root for so many?	那么，为何图林根人、萨克逊人和斯瓦比亚人支持同一支德国队，而英国公民却支持这么多支球队？


(Scotland and even Gibraltar have their own teams as well.)	（苏格兰甚至直布罗陀也有自己的球队。


Wouldn’t they have a stronger team if they chose the best players to represent them all?	）如果他们选出最好的选手代表他们所有人，不是能够拥有一支更强的队伍？


Presumably, British citizens understand this, but they prefer to have their own national teams rather than a stronger UK team – even if this means losing to tiny Iceland.	英国公民想必也明白这一点，但他们更愿意拥有自己的国家队，而不是一支更强的英国队——即使这意味着输给蕞尔小国冰岛。


After all, if it is only about the strongest team, you might as well root for Barcelona.	毕竟，如果仅仅是为了组成最强球队，你也许还会支持巴塞罗那。


For a team to represent “us,” it somehow has to be us.	对于一支代表“我们”的球队，它无论如何必须是我们。


Seen in this light, the Brexit vote is less surprising.	从这个角度看，英国退出投票也不那么令人震惊了。


The “Remain” campaign focused on the economic benefits of staying in the European Union and the costs of leaving, some of which fell due immediately after the results were announced: the British pound plummeted and stock markets wiped out a couple of trillion dollars of wealth.	“留欧”阵营注重于留在欧盟的经济收益和脱离欧盟的成本，其中一些在公投结果宣布后立刻兑现：英镑崩盘，股市财富蒸发数亿美元。


And yet 52% of those who voted preferred a country where Poles and Romanians would not be permitted to live, work, and compete for a position on the economic team.	但那52%支持退欧的人更想要一个不允许波兰人和罗马尼亚人生活、工作和竞争经济队伍位置的国家。


Letting them in might produce a better team, but it would no longer be our team.	让他们进来也许能打造一支更好的队伍，但它已不再是我们的队伍。


From one perspective, this is just another case of emotion defeating economic logic.	从某种角度，这只是感情战胜经济逻辑的又一个例子。


But our emotions are the algorithms, bequeathed by evolution, by which we make most decisions, including political ones; economic cost-benefit analysis that does not connect to our emotional compass does not move the needle.	但我们的感情是算法（algorithms），是演化留给我们，我们用来做出大部分决定（包括政治决定）； 而不与我们的感情罗盘相接的经济成本-收益分析无法推动罗盘上的指针。


At the core of the issue is the sense of “us.”	这个问题的关键是“我们”这种感觉。


What does it mean to be a member of the EU, Nigeria, Iraq, Turkey, Switzerland, or any other political entity?	成为欧盟、尼日利亚、伊拉克、土耳其、瑞士或其他任何政治实体的一员意味着什么？


The sense of us is a subroutine of the brain based on the sense of self, which is one of our brain’s many creations: a sensation of being an ongoing entity that experiences things, remembers its history, can act, and has feelings and goals – what the eminent neuroscientist Antonio Damasio calls an autobiographical self.	我们的感觉是大脑的一个次级例行程序，它基于自我的感觉，而自我的感觉是大脑为数众多的创造物之一：一种身为可以体验事物、记忆它的历史、可以行动并具备感觉和目标的活动的实体的感觉——即著名神经科学家安东尼奥·达马西奥（Antonio Damasio）所谓的亲历式自我（autobiographical self）。


Our brain is also acutely aware of the existence of other selves, with their feelings and intentions, and it is particularly good at reading what others are thinking, feeling, and planning.	我们的大脑也敏锐地察觉其他自我的存在，以及他们的感觉和意图，并且尤其擅长阅读其他人在想什么，感觉什么，计划什么。


We use this same mental apparatus to develop a sense of “us”: the people we care about and root for.	我们用同样的心理装置发展出“我们”的感觉：我们所关心和支持的人。


We think of this “us” as if it were a person with an autobiography, a temperament, predispositions, and aspirations.	我们将“我们”看成是一个有历史、有性情、有癖性、有抱负的人。


We regard firms as legal persons, and we talk about countries as if they were a composite person with clear characteristics: Germans love order, Italians are passionate, and Brits possess a stiff upper lip.	我们将企业视为法人，我们谈论国家时将它们当作一个带有鲜明性格的组合人：德国人喜欢秩序，意大利人有激情，英国人表情僵硬。


And, obviously, the sense of “us” implies a sense of “them”: those whose welfare we consider less fundamental than our own.	而显然，“我们”的感觉隐含一种“他们”的感觉：我们认为他们的福利不如我们自己的福利那么重要的人。


As Joshua Greene, Director of Harvard University’s Moral Cognition Lab, has argued, our moral sentiments evolved to support human cooperation.	哈佛大学道德认知实验室主任约书亚·格林（Joshua Greene）指出，我们的道德情感的演化让我们支持人类合作。


Just as evolution gave us sexual desire, rather than rational arguments, to ensure procreation, so we have evolved feelings of empathy, affection, disgust, and rage to respond to one another’s behavior.	正如演化给予我们性欲而不是理性争论来确保繁衍，我们也演化出同情、爱情、憎恶和愤怒来反应彼此之间的行为。


Our moral sentiments both limit individuals’ abuse of the common good, expressed in the conflict between “me” and “us,” and maintain the coherence of the group, to support the competition between “us” and “them.”	我们的道德情感既限制个体滥用公益（common good），表现为“我”与“我们”之间的冲突； 也维持群体的凝聚力，支持“我们”与“他们”之间的竞争。


Technological and cultural development has required an ever-expanding sense of “us.”	技术和文化发展需要大大扩大的“我们”的感觉。


Over the past 10,000 years, as we moved from small hunter-gatherer bands to agricultural settlements, urbanization, and beyond, the network of people with whom we must interact and cooperate expanded, from small bands to nations-states and eventually to an entity like the EU.	在过去10,000年中，随着我们从小型狩猎-采集部落演化为农耕、城市化和更高级的形式，我们必须与之互动与合作的人的网络也有所扩大，从小部落演变为民族国家，最终又形成欧盟这样的实体。


When humans lived from subsistence agriculture, their radius of interaction was small: they did not have to talk to one another, and as a consequence, languages diverged.	当人类依靠温饱型农业过活时，他们的互动半径很小：他们不需要彼此交谈，结果是语言呈现多样性。


That is why Cameroon, a country slightly smaller than Spain, is home to 230 languages.	因此，面积略小于西班牙的喀麦隆存在230种语言。


By contrast, when the Industrial Revolution increased the value of larger markets, Italy (1861-1871) and Germany (1870-1871) were created by unifying smaller states on the basis of nationalist sentiment and a common language, both of which actually had to be created.	相反，当工业革命增加了更大的市场的价值时，意大利（1861—1871年）和德国（1870—1871年）通过在民族主义情绪和共同语言的基础上合并小国而得以建立，实际上，两国都必须被建立。


A shared sense of us obviously makes life much easier for political entities.	显然，共同的我们的感觉让政治实体的存在变得容易了许多。


Without it, on whose behalf would the state – which is supposed to make decisions, define and protect rights, and impose obligations – be acting?	没有这种感觉，国家——应该由它来做出决定、定义和保护权利并规定义务——代表谁行动？


If “us” includes only, say, the Alawites in Syria, the Kikuyu in Kenya, or Han Chinese in China, everyone else has an incentive to rebel.	如果“我们”只包括（比如）叙利亚的阿拉维派、肯尼亚的吉库尤人或中国的汉族，那么所有其他人都有动力起义。


Clearly, countries that have a shared language and religion may develop a sense of “us” more easily than others.	显然，有共同语言和宗教的国家比其他国家更容易发展出“我们”的感觉。


But the world is full of states that are very diverse in these two dimensions, in which an alternative sense of “us” evolves and is constantly redefined by politics.	但世界上也存在众多在这两方面呈现出多样性的国家，在这些国家，另一种“我们”的感觉演化出来并一直由政治来定义。


In the United States, for example, the sense of “us” initially included only white Anglo-Saxon Protestants, not Irish, Italian, or Polish Catholics or Jews – and especially not African-Americans.	比如，在美国，“我们”的感觉最初只包括盎格鲁-萨克逊新教徒，而不包括爱尔兰人、意大利人或波兰天主教徒和犹太人——尤其不包括非洲裔美国人。


Largely through politics, a more inclusive sense of “us” developed.	基本上是通过政治，一个更加包容的“我们”的感觉发展形成。


In the absence of a common language and religion, the EU’s sense of “us” must be based on shared values and culture, born of centuries of interaction.	在缺少共同语言和宗教的情况下，欧盟的“我们”的感觉必须基于共同的价值和文化，它们产生自数百年的互动。


And what a heritage it is: the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, several industrial revolutions, fantastic science, art, and most sports.	这是一个遗产：文艺复兴、启蒙运动、多次工业革命、梦幻般的科学、艺术和大部分体育。


One wonders why euro bills are adorned with indistinct motifs, rather than with figures of universal appeal – da Vinci, Newton, Voltaire, Rembrandt, Cervantes, Chopin, or Beethoven – who best represent Europe’s cultural patrimony.	你也许会奇怪为何欧元钞票上印的是朦胧的花纹，而不是人人敬仰的人物——达芬奇、牛顿、伏尔泰、伦勃朗、塞万提斯、肖邦或贝多芬这些欧洲文化遗产的最佳代表。


The European project will succeed only when it creates a European sense of “us” so powerful that it feels right that, say, Bulgarians should be permitted to live and work in Birmingham.	欧洲工程要想成功，就必须创造一个欧洲的“我们”的感觉，这种感觉要强大到让人觉得保加利亚理所当然应该被允许在伯明翰生活和工作。


When all are European, all may live wherever in Europe they please.	当所有人都是欧洲人时，所有人都可以在他们喜欢的任何欧洲地点生活。


They might even become the team to beat.	他们甚至还可能组成一支球队参赛。


Brexit and the Special Relationship	英国退出与特殊关系


NEW YORK – The decision whether to remain part of the European Union is obviously one for the British people and their elected representatives to make.	纽约—是否继续成为欧盟的一部分的决定显然应该由英国人民和他们所选出的代表做出。


But more than British and European interests will be affected by the outcome, so it is both legitimate and appropriate for other parties to weigh in.	但其结果所影响到的将不只是英国和欧洲的利益。 因此，让其他方面参与进来合情合理。


So let me exercise my right as an outsider with a stake in what happens to express a clear opinion: From my perspective (and that of many other Americans), a decision by the United Kingdom to exit the EU would be undesirable – indeed, highly undesirable.	因此，让我行使作为利益相关外部人士的权利，表达我的明确观点：从我（以及其他许多美国人）的角度讲，英国做出退出欧盟的决定令人讨厌——事实上，是非常令人讨厌。


I am aware of the irony some are sure to note in this, given that the United States’ own independence came about when the American colonies exited Great Britain.	我知道，有人会指出这一观点的讽刺之处：美国本身就是脱离大英帝国美洲殖民地而 成立的。


But that was then, and this is now, and the UK’s exit from Europe would be greeted with equal parts regret and concern by its closest ally.	但今时不同往日，英国退出欧盟将让双方后悔，并引起其紧密盟友的担忧。


There are several reasons for this.	原因有很多。


One reason why the US values its ties to the UK as much as it does is the UK’s role in Europe.	美国之所以如此重视与英国的关系，原因之一便是英国在欧洲的角色。


Britain is important not just as a bilateral partner, but because more often than not it can be counted on to argue for and support positions in Brussels consistent with, or at least not far from, those of the US.	英国很重要，不仅因为它是一个双边伙伴，也因为（这个原因更加重要）美国可以依靠它来主张或支持布鲁塞尔与美国一致（或至少不严重偏离）的立场。


The so-called “special relationship” has already become considerably less so in recent years, with Parliament’s refusal until December to support military action in Syria taking a particularly heavy toll in this regard.	所谓的“特殊关系”在近几年中大大弱化，国会在12月之前一直拒绝支持军事干预叙利亚令这一关系雪上加霜。


Britain has become – and is widely perceived to be – a less dependable and less capable ally, and reality and perception would intensify if the UK were to take a step that would marginalize its role on the continent.	英国已经变成——并且被广泛认为是——一个不再那么可靠、不再那么有能力的盟友，而如果英国采取让其在欧洲的角色边缘化的举动，将进一步加剧现实和感觉。


It is hard to envision Brexit resulting in anything other than a more parochial and less influential UK.	除了让英国变得更加狭隘、影响力更小，难以想象英国退出还能有什么效果。


In addition, an EU without the UK would be one in which Germany would have even more influence that it does now.	此外，没有英国的欧盟将让德国拥有比现在还要大的影响力。


Such a preponderance of power cannot be healthy in the long run, as it will fuel resentment of Germany and likely leave the EU less willing and able to act together on the world scene.	从长期看，如此实力优势绝非好事，它将助长对德国的敌对情绪，并可能让欧盟不再那么愿意在世界舞台上统一行动。


The result would be a weaker Europe at a time when the US needs a stronger one.	其结果将是欧洲孱弱化，而美国需要的是更加强大的欧洲。


Even worse, it is highly probable that Americans advocating for a reduced US role in the world would seize on Brexit as further evidence that traditional allies were not doing their fair share, and that a US facing growing deficits and massive domestic needs should not be expected to make up the difference.	更糟糕的是，极有可能鼓吹弱化美国的世界角色的美国人将抓住英国退出作为进一步的证据证明传统盟友不再起到应有的作用，而面临日益增加的赤字和大量国内需求的美国不应该去填补这个空白。


A simple reality must be kept in mind: The European integration project that began in the wake of World War II has helped to bring unprecedented stability and prosperity to much of the continent for nearly three-quarters of a century.	必须时刻铭记一个简单的现实：始于第二次世界大战后欧洲一体化工程给欧洲大部带来了近四分之三个世纪的前所未有的稳定与繁荣。


A British decision to sue for divorce would add to centrifugal forces already in evidence.	英国决定“离婚”将让已经形成气候的离心力锦上添花。


Nationalism and populism, already on the rise for both economic and social reasons, would gather even more momentum.	民族主义和���粹主义因为经济和社会原因兴起，它们将获得更大的动力。


It is difficult to feel confident of the outcome, however uncertain that may be.	如此结果难以让人安心，不管它们仍具有高度不确定性。


A decision by the British people to leave the EU would also put the question of Scotland’s independence squarely back on the agenda.	英国人民做出离开欧盟的决定还会让苏格兰独立问题走向日程核心。


Indeed, many in Scotland would argue for independence in order to remain an EU member – a popular refrain that could well result in a vote to secede from the UK.	事实上，许多苏格兰人将号召为了保留欧盟成员资格而支持独立——这一流行的口号可能导致苏格兰人投票脱离英国。


To say the least, Americans would not welcome a difficult, controversial public debate with Scotland’s leaders over the stationing of nuclear weapons and submarines on their territory at a time when Russia is again seen as a threat to Europe.	从最低程度上说，当俄罗斯再次被视为欧洲的威胁的情况下，美国人不会欢迎和苏格兰领导人就在苏格兰部署核武器和潜艇的问题进行艰难的争议性公共争论。


Fragmentation would be unlikely to stop there.	分裂绝不会仅限于此。


What happened in Scotland could well have ripple effects across what remained of the disunited United Kingdom.	苏格兰的情况极有可能在分裂后的英国的其他部分造成余波。


In particular, Great Britain’s departure from the EU and Scotland’s departure from the UK would add to tensions in Northern Ireland between pro-UK Unionists and Republicans seeking to join Ireland.	特别是，英国脱离欧盟和苏格兰脱离英国将加剧北爱尔兰亲英国的统一党（Unionist）和想要加入爱尔兰的共和党（Republican）之间的对立。


Raising the profile of “final status” issues at a time when the two sides have shown themselves unable to face up to the past, or work together in the present, is not a recipe for progress.	如今，双方都无法直面过去或在当下进行合作，在这样的情况下升级“最终地位”问题绝不是进步之道。


Finally, Great Britain’s decision about its relationship with the EU will not happen in a vacuum.	最后，英国关于其与欧盟的关系的决定不可能在真空中做出。


In fact, the timing could hardly be worse.	事实上，现在绝非做出这一决定的良机。


Europe is already facing a perfect storm of fiscal strains, anemic economic growth, massive inflows of migrants and refugees, and renewed Russian aggression.	欧洲已经面临着财政困难、经济增长萎靡、大规模移民和难民流入以及俄罗斯侵犯再现的“完美风暴”。


As if that weren’t enough, there is the unraveling Middle East, advancing climate change, terrorism, and now a new disease – the Zika virus – on the march.	如果这还不够的话，还可以加上分崩离析的中东、严峻的气候变化形势、恐怖主义，还有最新的新疾病——寨卡病毒。


There will also be a new US president elected this year.	今年还将迎来美国新总统选举。


The last thing he or she will need is to have America’s closest partner distracted and drained by a difficult divorce.	美国新总统最不想要的局面是美国最紧密的伙伴因为一场艰难的“离婚”而分心和拖累。


And that is what will happen if Brexit moves from possibility to reality.	而如果英国退出让可能性成为现实，那么就会发生这样的情况。


Nietzsche and the British Referendum	尼采和英国全民公决


CAMBRIDGE – Terrorist attacks.	剑桥—恐怖袭击。


Tensions over religious and ethnic minorities.	宗教和种族少数群体紧张。


Growing support for extremist political parties.	极端政党支持率日增。


A widening North-South divide.	南北分歧加大。


A powerful German chancellor.	强大的德国总理。


An aggressive Russia expanding its territorial reach.	扩张领土范围的进击的俄罗斯。


A United Kingdom embroiled in distant wars, asking itself whether it should disengage from continental Europe.	卷入遥远的战争、自问是否应该与欧洲大陆决裂的英国。


A young political order, born of a series of devastating international wars, threatening to implode.	诞生于一系列灾难性国际战争的年轻的政治秩序可能分崩离析。


The list of problems facing Europe today is long, but this is not unprecedented.	今天，欧洲面临的问题清单很长，但并非前所未有。


Indeed, in many respects, contemporary conditions look strikingly similar to those confronting Otto von Bismarck’s Germany.	事实上，从许多角度，现在的情况像极了俾斯麦的德国。


At that time, the fear was that southern Catholic minorities would undermine the unity of the newly founded German empire, intended to bring stability in the face of a rising radical socialist party, after a series of bloody wars (most recently against the French) and assassination attempts on the Kaiser.	当时，令人担心的是南方天主教少数派可能威胁到新成立的德意志帝国的统一，打算面对在一系列流血战争（最近一次是与法国）和刺杀德国皇帝图谋之后崛起的激进社会主义政党建立稳定。


Germany was sandwiched between an imperialist Russia and a vengeful France.	德国被夹在帝国主义俄国和卧薪尝胆的法国之间。


Meanwhile, Britain was entangled in military adventures in Asia and the Middle East.	与此同时，英国陷入了亚洲和中东的军事冒险。


Today, as Europe faces difficult questions about its future, exemplified in the UK’s upcoming referendum on its European Union membership, perhaps Germany’s experience in the late nineteenth century can be brought usefully to bear.	如今，欧洲面临着自身未来的艰难问题，一个例子便是英国即将到来的欧盟成员资格全民公决。 在这样的情况下，也许十九世纪末的德国经验大有裨益。


If so, there are few better guides to that experience – and our own – than Friedrich Nietzsche, one of the most perceptive thinkers of his time.	果真如此的话，对于这一经验——以及我们自身——恐怕没有比弗雷德里希·尼采更好的指导了。 尼采是他所在的时代最有洞察力的思想家。


Nietzsche was a fearsome critic of the “blood and iron” power politics by which Bismarck had brought about German unity.	尼采是俾斯麦在德国统一中所采取的“铁血”权力政治的最可怕的批评家。


He called it an example of the “slave morality” that he lambasts in his great work On the Genealogy of Morality – a “lowly” approach to morality, focused simply on relieving suffering.	他将之称为他在名著《道德谱系学》（On the Genealogy of Morality）中猛烈抨击的“奴隶道德”的一个例子。 奴隶道德是“低级”道德方法，只注重减少痛苦。


Nietzsche knew what he was talking about: he had volunteered as a cavalry officer during the Franco-Prussian War.	尼采指导他在说什么：在普法战争期间，他志愿参军，担任骑兵队长。


Though a bad fall kept him from combat, he did serve as a medical orderly – and gained first-hand experience of the trauma of war.	尽管一次摔伤让他上不了战场，但他仍然担任了卫生员——并且获得了关于战争伤害的第一手经验。


The militaristic Germany that emerged from that war, in Nietzsche’s view, had lost touch with its original cultural mission.	在尼采看来，从这场战争中崛起的军国主义德国已经与其最初的道德使命南辕北辙。


In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche went further, exploring how a superior political system – based on “master morality,” which transcends simplistic notions of “good” and “bad” to develop values from a position of nobility and strength – would look.	在《超越善恶》（Beyond Good and Evil）中，尼采更进一步，探索了超政治体系——基于超越简单的“好”与“坏”的概念、从高尚和力量的立场发展价值的“主人道德”——应该是怎样的。


He envisioned a united Europe, led by a trans-European cultural elite focused not on grandeur, but on the development of a new European culture.	他构想了一个统一的欧洲，由泛欧洲文化精英领导，他们不注重堂皇，而注重新欧洲文化的发展。


Only through unification, Nietzsche argued, could continental Europe have a strong voice in world affairs, which at that time meant being on an equal footing with the British and Russian empires in their strategic “great game,” the winner of which would control Afghanistan and northern India.	尼采指出，只有通过统一，欧洲大陆才能在世界事务上发出强音，在当时，这意味着在与大英帝国和俄罗斯帝国的战略“大博弈”中获得同等地位，赢家将控制阿富汗和北印度。


The alternative – the power politics in which Bismarck was engaged – was “petty,” as it was premised upon European fragmentation and disintegration.	另一条路——俾斯麦所采取的权力政治——则是“微不足道”（petty），其前提是欧洲分裂和瓦解。


Nietzsche thought hard about how his new politics might come about, speculating that a growing threat from Russia could spur unification.	尼采冥思苦想他的新政治学将如何出现，预测来自俄罗斯的日益增加的威胁可能刺激统一。


He also believed that continental Europe would have to “come to an understanding” with Britain, whose colonies were important trade partners for Europe.	他还相信欧洲大陆将“谅解”英国，英国殖民地是欧洲的重要贸易伙伴。


The details may have changed, but many of the core issues – from the threat posed by Russia to the strategic benefits of European integration – remain the same.	细节也许已经改变，但许多核心问题——从俄罗斯的威胁到欧洲一体化的战略好处——都仍然不变。


As for Britain, while it no longer has an empire, it remains hugely important to Europe’s economy; indeed, the logistics of trade following a British exit from the EU is a key issue in the debate surrounding the referendum.	至于英国，它已不再是帝国，但仍对欧洲经济有着巨大的重要性； 事实上，英国退出欧盟后的贸易物流是英国全民公决争论的一个关键问题。


And, though Nietzsche could not have predicted the level of integration between the UK and continental Europe, he did warn against precisely the kind of fragmentation that the British referendum threatens to advance.	而尽管尼采不可能预测到英国和欧洲大陆的一体化，但他确实警告了英国全民公决有可能助长的分裂。


Much of the debate about the UK’s “Brexit” referendum has little relation to Nietzsche’s ideas.	关于“英国退出”全民公决的大部分争论与尼采的概念没有什么关系。


But, with the political, economic, and social cases from both sides having so often been guided by fear, it seems that that debate would benefit from some more philosophical depth.	但是，公决双方的政治、经济和社会立场都常常受到恐惧的引导，因此加强哲学深度有益于争论。


With Nietzche’s ideas in mind, British voters might recognize that the real question they must answer on June 23 is whether to endorse petty and divisive power politics or the great and noble politics of unification.	将尼采���概念铭记在心，英国选民就有可能认识到，他们在6月23日所要回答的真正问题是支持微不足道和分歧的权力政治还是伟大高贵的统一政治。


The Causes and Consequences of Brexit	英国退出的原因和后果


MADRID – The prospect of a British exit from the European Union is well and truly upon us.	马德里—英国退出欧盟的前景是实实在在的。


It seems increasingly likely that the upcoming European Council meeting will result in a deal on the conditions of the United Kingdom’s EU membership – a deal that will be put before British voters in a referendum, possibly as early as this summer.	看起来，即将到来的欧洲理事会会议越来越有可能形成关于英国欧盟成员资格的条件的协议——这个协议将在英国选民举行公决（至早在几年夏天进行）前生效。


But, just as everything rushes forward, Britain and the EU need to take a moment to think carefully.	但是，不论怎样展开，英国和欧盟都需要仔细思考。


After all, despite assurances from both sides, no one knows how the referendum will unfold, much less how to navigate the aftermath if British voters chose to leave.	毕竟，尽管双方彼此做出了保证，但没人知道公决结果会如何，更不用说如果英国选民选择离开欧盟该怎么办了。


The referendum is the most immediate unknown.	公决是最紧迫的未知之事。


Past experience shows that, when voters make such decisions, they rarely focus on the issue at hand.	过去的经验表明，当选民做出这类决定时，他们很少关注当下的问题。


In referenda on the EU’s draft constitution in 2005, for example, the Dutch focused on the euro, while the French worried that Polish plumbers would take their jobs.	比如，在2005年欧盟宪法草案全民公决中，荷兰人关注的是欧元，而法国人担心被波兰水管工抢了工作。


So far, the signs indicate that the upcoming British referendum will follow the same pattern, with voters focusing more on simplistic ideas, prejudices, and emotions than pragmatic considerations.	到目前为止的信号表明，即将到来的英国全民公决也将遵循同样的模式，选民们更关注简单化的概念、偏见和情绪，而不关注务实考虑。


And the anti-EU camp has been by far the more passionate – and the more inflammatory in its rhetoric – side.	目前，反欧盟阵营更受欢迎，他们的论调也更具煽动性。


From a European perspective, this is deeply worrying.	从欧洲角度讲，这实在令人担忧。


It is well known that a British departure would deal a devastating blow to European integration, possibly causing an already-fragile process to unravel.	众所周知，英国退出将是对欧洲一体化的重大打击，可能导致已经岌岌可危的一体化进程分崩离析。


But the British should also be worried about the consequences of withdrawal, if only because of how little is known about what it would entail.	但英国人也应该担心退出欧盟的后果，谁也不知道这到底意味着什么。


The problem is that most Britons have little awareness of the turbulence that “Brexit” would generate.	问题在于大部分英国人不知道“英国退出”会带来怎样的动荡。


Beyond the impact on Scotland’s independence movement, Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement, and the UK’s “special relationship” with the United States, there are important questions regarding the future of UK-EU relations.	除了对苏格兰独立运动、爱尔兰受难日协议（Good Friday Agreement）以及英国与美国的“特殊关系”外，还有其他与未来英国-欧盟关系有关的重要问题。


Many advocates of withdrawal cherry-pick policies and regulations, such as provisions of the EU’s free-trade agreements with Canada and Singapore, to cobble together a vision of what life would like be for the UK outside of Europe.	许多支持英国退出的人搬出一些政策和监管规则——比如欧盟与加拿大和新加坡的自由贸易协定——胡乱拼凑出一幅身在欧洲之外的英国的图景。


They want Britons to believe not only that the City of London would remain Europe’s top financial center, but also that the UK would retain access to the EU’s single market, even without free movement of labor.	他们希望英国人相信，不但伦敦金融城将仍然是欧洲顶级金融中心，英国也能继续进入欧盟单一市场，甚至连劳动力的自由流动也能保留。


This is pure fantasy.	这完全是痴人说梦。


Although the UK would retain its strong international standing in terms of defense and foreign policy, its clout in negotiating trade and investment agreements – including with the EU itself, which accounts for half of British trade – would be severely diminished.	尽管英国将保持其在防务和外交政策方面的强势国际立场，但其在投资和贸易协定的谈判能力——包括与占其贸易量的一半的欧盟本身的协定——将严重受损。


That has been the experience of non-EU countries like Switzerland and Norway.	非欧盟国家，如瑞士和挪威都有类似经验。


In fact, EU leaders are already unhappy with Switzerland’s access to the single market; the idea that they would give the UK such access, especially after being slapped in the face, is not convincing.	事实上，欧盟领导人对于瑞士能够进入单一市场已经十分不满； 很难让人相信他们会给予英国同样的待遇，尤其是在自己遭遇“打脸”之后。


Some claim that a Brexit could resemble Greenland’s easily negotiated 1985 withdrawal from the European Economic Community (EEC), the only such withdrawal that has ever taken place.	有人说，英国退出可以仿照1985年格陵兰轻松退出欧洲共同体的谈判，这也是历史上唯一一次退出事件。


But the circumstances could not be more different.	但两者的环境大相径庭。


The limited EEC of 30 years ago does not compare to the robust EU of today, just as Greenland pales in comparison with the UK in economic size or political significance.	30年前的欧共体规模有限，无法与今天强大的欧盟相比，正如格陵兰在经济和政治影响力上无法与英国相提并论。


Furthermore, Greenland’s withdrawal was eased considerably by its constitutional ties with EEC member Denmark, which continued to represent its interests in European bodies.	此外，格陵兰的退出之所以很容易，很大原因是因为它与欧共体成员丹麦的宪法联系，丹麦能够在欧洲机构中继续代表格陵兰的利益。


With no equivalent patron to smooth the way for the UK, negotiations following a vote for withdrawal would be complicated and acrimonious, dragging out over a number of years.	英国则没有类似的保护人来充当“润滑剂”，退出欧盟公决后的谈判将是复杂而激烈的，可能耗时多年之久。


All of this uncertainty would take its toll, on both businesses and ordinary citizens.	所有这些不确定性都会给企业和普通百姓造成损失。


Who would commit to a long-term investment in the UK without knowing what legal arrangements will be in place?	如果弄不清楚法律安排会是怎样，谁还会去英国进行长期投资？


To avoid this outcome, the European Council should affirm the UK’s far more stable prospects as an EU member, while demonstrating Europe’s fundamental flexibility.	要避免这一结果，欧洲理事会应该保证英国保留欧盟成员资格将得到媛媛更稳定的前景，同时证明欧洲的基本灵活性。


Already, the UK has been allowed to opt out of the Schengen Area, the euro, and justice and home affairs.	目前，英国已经被允许不加入申根区和欧元区，其司法和内政也保持独立。


Now the EU has shown its willingness to seek reasonable compromises on British Prime Minister David Cameron’s demands.	欧盟已经证明了它愿意寻求向英国首相卡梅伦的要求作出合理妥协。


In some areas, such as boosting competitiveness and streamlining regulation, consensus will be relatively easy to achieve.	在一些领域，比如提高竞争力和改善监管，共识相对比较容易达成。


Agreement is also possible on giving national parliaments a greater role in guiding EU legislation.	在给予国家议会更大的欧盟立法指导作用方面也有可能达成一致，尽管卡梅伦提出的允许国家议会对欧盟法律亮“红牌”的建议走得太远了。


As for Cameron’s demand to end Britain’s treaty obligation to work toward an “ever-closer union,” the key to compromise may be nuance.	至于卡梅伦所要求的取消英国致力于“更加紧密的联盟”的条约���务，达成妥协的关键比较微妙。


Rather than moving to integrate member states more deeply, perhaps the EU should shift its focus to uniting, increasingly closely, the peoples of Europe.	欧盟也许应该将其关注焦点从更深层次地整合成员国上转移到日益紧密地统一欧洲各民族上。


The final issue may be the thorniest: immigration and welfare.	最后一个问题也许最为棘手：移民和福利问题。


Cameron has called for a four-year “timeout” on in-work and child benefits for EU migrants working in the UK – an approach that many agree is discriminatory.	卡梅伦要求“暂停”四年在英工作欧盟移民的在职和儿童福利——许多人认为这一方针带有歧视性。


One shift that may ease the way toward a compromise on this highly fraught topic would be to enforce a clear division between this discussion and debates on the ongoing refugee crisis.	对于这一让人高度焦虑的问题，一个可能能够促进妥协的方法是在这场讨论和关于发酵中的难民危机的争论中间画一条明确的界限。


The focus must remain on Poles and Latvians, not Syrians.	重点必须放在波兰人和拉脱维亚人身上，而不是放在叙利亚人身上。


In 1953, Winston Churchill famously declared, “We are with Europe, but not of it; we are linked, but not compromised.”	1953年，丘吉尔说过一句名言：“我们和欧洲站在一起，但我们不属于欧洲； 我们互相联系，但是不妥协。


If the upcoming European Council can achieve a compromise that reflects this sentiment, Brexit may be avoided, benefiting everyone.	”如果即将到来的欧洲理事会形成反映这一情绪的妥协，那么英国退出可能得到避免，所有人都能从中获益。


But, with the referendum looming, even a good deal may not be enough.	但是，公决临近，只有好的理想是不够的。


With fantasy and manipulation continuing to dominate the British debate, the UK – and Europe – may be in for a very sobering surprise.	幻想和操纵依然是英国争论的核心，而英国——以及欧洲——可能遭到当头棒喝。


The Brexit Balance Sheet	英国退欧的资产负债表


BRUSSELS – Prime Minister David Cameron’s offer to British citizens to hold a referendum on whether to leave the European Union might have seemed like a reasonably safe gamble just a few years ago.	布鲁塞尔——戴维·卡梅伦首相提议英国公民举行公投决定是否退出欧盟或许在几年前还貌似一个有一定安全性的赌博。


Most people then probably would have voted to stay.	当时大多数人可能会投票留在欧盟内部。


That was before the Greek crisis created havoc in the eurozone, and the arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees caused the EU (although not the United Kingdom) to lose control of some of its borders.	但那是在希腊危机对欧元区造成严重破坏之前，此外，数十万难民的到来也导致欧盟（虽然不是英国）在某种程度上失去了对边界的控制。


Cameron might actually get other European leaders to agree to his demands for reform, without which he has said he would not campaign to keep his country in the EU.	卡梅伦实际可能让欧洲其他领导人赞同他的改革要求，若非如此，他表态不会推动他的国家留在欧盟。


They are not extreme: a guarantee that non-eurozone members gain full access to the single market; less red tape at the EU level; a British exemption from “ever-closer union.”	改革要求并不极端：保证非欧元区成员国自由进入单一市场； 减少欧盟层面的繁文缛节；


His last demand – fewer benefits for EU migrants – will be the hardest for EU leaders to accept.	免除强制英国加入“日益紧密联盟”的要求。 他最后的一项要求——减少欧盟移民福利——让欧盟领导人最难接受。


Despite this reform push, some British Euroskeptics have criticized Cameron for being too soft.	尽管力推上述改革，但英国某些欧盟怀疑论者仍然批评卡梅伦太过软弱。


The temptation in Britain simply to abandon what appears to be a sinking ship and go it gloriously alone is growing stronger.	英国人越来越难以抗拒彻底放弃这艘沉船并光荣地独自发展的诱惑。


This is understandable.	这完全可以理解。


The question is whether “Brexit” would be as glorious as its proponents like to imagine.	问题在于“英国退欧”是否像支持者想象的那般光荣。


Unleashed from the rule of Brussels, the sirens of Brexit promise, Britain would once again be a beacon of freedom in the world, respected by China, tied to the United States in the bilateral “special relationship,” and all the while retaining friendly commercial ties with the European continent.	摆脱来自布鲁塞尔的控制，英国退欧鼓吹者承诺英国将籍此再次成为世界自由的灯塔，受到中国的尊敬、借助“特别双边关系”与美国联合，同时还能与欧洲大陆保持友好的商业关系。


Business would boom, the City of London would prosper, and Britons never would be slaves, not of the EU or anyone else.	商业蓬勃发展、伦敦城兴旺繁荣，英国人永远不会成为任何人的奴隶，无论是其他国家还是欧盟。


In fact, things might not work out so well.	事实上，现实可能远非如此理想。


As Cameron himself stated after a recent visit to Iceland, the Norwegian option of engaging in free trade with the EU as a non-member is far from ideal.	正如卡梅伦本人最近出访冰岛后所指出的那样，挪威以非成员国身份与欧盟自由贸易的条件远非那么理想。


Norway, like Switzerland, still has to abide by EU single-market rules, without having any say in formulating them.	挪威像瑞士一样仍需遵守欧盟单一市场规则，但却对规则的制定没有发言权。


Norway also pays large amounts of money to the EU budget, and must accept free movement of people (including refugees) across its borders.	挪威还需支付大量资金用于欧盟预算，同时必须接受人员（包括难民在内）的跨境自由流动。


As far as the US is concerned, President Barack Obama has already said that he would take Britain more seriously inside the EU than outside it.	就美国方面而言，奥巴马总统表示英国在欧盟内部比退欧后得到的重视更多。


Similarly, US Trade Representative Michael Froman recently observed that the US would not be interested in negotiating a separate free-trade deal with Britain.	同样，美国贸易代表迈克尔·弗罗曼最近表示美国没有兴趣与英国单独谈判自由贸易协定。


All this, by the way, assumes that post-Brexit Britain would still be Britain.	顺便说一下，所有这一切的假设前提是后退欧时代的英国仍然是英国。


The Scots would almost certainly want to break away from England and rejoin the EU as an independent member, giving further encouragement (as if that were needed) to separatists in Catalonia and other frustrated European regions.	苏格兰人几乎肯定会想脱离英国并以独立成员国身份重新加入欧盟，加泰罗尼亚和其他失意欧洲地区的分离主义份子会因此而倍受鼓舞（这种情况完全不符合我们的要求）。


England would be left to wave its flag of St. George over Wales and Northern Ireland, a rather sour prospect.	只剩下英国对威尔士和北爱尔兰挥舞圣乔治大旗，这样的画面相当酸楚。


But there are more potential supporters of Brexit: some keen European Unionists who have found the UK’s often-obstructive membership increasingly annoying.	但英国退欧也不乏潜在的支持者：某些狂热的欧盟主义者越来越讨厌英国所扮演的阻碍性角色。


Good riddance, they might say, once the divorce finally comes through; now the true Europeans can finally unite in peace.	太好了，他们可能会说，一旦这次真的离婚，真正的欧洲人终于可以和平地结成联盟。


This, too, strikes me as misguided.	我认为这样的想法也是误读。


A Brexit would most likely be as damaging to the EU as it would be to Britain itself.	英国退欧对欧盟的伤害不亚于对英国。


Contrary to popular perception, the EU is not ruled by the European Commission in Brussels.	与普通人的认识相反，统治欧盟的不是布鲁塞尔的欧盟委员会。


National governments still make the most important decisions in the European Council, where leaders wheel and deal to advance their countries’ interests.	各国领袖为争取本国利益而讨价还价，欧洲理事会最重要的决定依然由各国政府做出。


Germany, Britain, and France, as the EU’s three major powers, form a crucial balance.	德、英、法作为欧盟三大强国构成一种关键的平衡。


Without Britain, the EU becomes a Franco-German enterprise, with Germany very much the dominant partner, and all the smaller member states squeezed between the two.	没有英国，欧盟就会成为法德合资企业，其中德国占绝对主导地位，所有规模较小的成员国都被夹在法德当中。


This is not really what anybody wants, not even the Germans, who are reluctant hegemons.	这并不符合任何人的��愿，其中甚至包括并不甘心充当霸主的德国。


Moreover, Britain and Germany are natural allies in balancing the statist tendencies of France.	此外，英国和德国一直是平衡法国中央集权倾向的天然盟友。


Britain has in fact had a largely positive impact on the EU.	其实英国对欧盟的影响主要是积极的。


Europe has benefited from Britain’s democratic traditions, its openness to the rest of the world, its impatience with bureaucratic obstruction, and even its skepticism toward abstract utopian schemes.	欧洲得益于英国的民主传统、对其他国家的开放、对官僚障碍的缺乏耐心、甚至是它对抽象乌托邦计划的怀疑态度。


If any city feels like a European capital now, it is not Brussels, Berlin, or even Paris, but London, home to almost a half-million French citizens, as well as millions of other foreigners.	如果说现在哪一座城市感觉更像欧洲的首都，那么它不是布鲁塞尔、柏林，甚至不是巴黎，而是五十万法国民众和数百万外国人居住的伦敦。


There is one more reason, however, why Brexit would be a disaster for Europe.	英国退欧会成为欧洲的灾难还有一个原因。


It is generally agreed that European countries cannot cope alone with the major problems of our time, such as climate change, immigration, the challenges of a globalized economy, and, above all, security.	人们普遍认为欧洲国家无法独自解决我们这个时代的重大问题，包括气候变化、移民、全球化的经济挑战以及最重要的安全。


Since 1945, Pax Americana has papered over Europe’s incapacity to manage its own security.	1945年来，美式和平掩盖了欧洲管理自身安全方面的无能。


Europeans like to talk about the values of peace and compromise, while US military might takes care of their safety.	欧洲人喜欢谈论和平与妥协的价值观，而由美国的军事力量为他们的安全负责。


This has created a degree of dependency that should be redressed, if only to relieve the Americans of their burden and give Europe the political influence to match its economic clout.	这就导致了一定程度的依赖，哪怕仅仅为了减轻美国人的负担、赋予欧洲与其经济地位相称的政治影响力这个问题也必须得到解决。


For this to be achieved, the EU must establish a common security policy and military force.	为实现这一目标，欧盟必须建立共同的安全政策和军事力量。


This will be a long and difficult process.	这个过程将艰苦而又漫长。


Germany, for obvious reasons, will not take the lead.	由于显而易见的原因，德国不会出面领导。


Only France and Britain have enough military strength to provide a sound basis for European defense.	只有英法两国拥有足够的军事实力为欧洲防务奠定坚实的基础。


Britain could, in this vital matter, be the savior of Europe.	英国可以在这个关键问题上成为欧洲的救世主。


Without it, there is no hope.	没有英国就没有希望。


Alas, Cameron is singularly ill equipped to make such a positive argument.	唉，只靠卡梅伦一个人无法确立这种积极的论调。


He leads a party that is increasingly opposed to any European project apart from trade.	他所领导的政党越来越反对除贸易以外的任何欧洲项目。


And he would have to battle a folk memory that has lasted several generations: the last time Britain helped to save Europe, it stood very much, and very proudly, alone.	他还必须抗衡几代人共有的民间记忆。 上次英国单枪匹马骄傲地拯救了欧洲。


Where Europe Still Lives	欧洲依然活在这里


LVIV – The outcome of the United Kingdom’s Brexit referendum shocked populations across Europe.	利沃夫——英国退欧公投的结果震惊了欧洲全体民众。


But watching the response in Lviv, in Western Ukraine – a hub of enthusiasm about the European Union – was particularly jarring.	但西乌克兰利沃夫——这个热情洋溢地想要加入欧盟的中心——的反应尤其不和谐。


At a time when irresponsible opportunists and populists in the UK are taking a wrecking ball to their country’s own institutions, and those of Europe, Ukrainian reformers are trying to build something new.	值此英国不负责任的机会主义者和民粹主义者毫不留情地摧毁本国和欧洲制度之际，乌克兰的改革者却正在试图建设新的制度规则。


Whereas the UK’s “Leave” campaign peddled trumped-up dangers from immigration to make its case, activists in Ukraine are facing very real threats as they work toward a civil-society framework that can stand up to internal pressure from the oligarchs and external influence from Russia.	尽管英国的“退欧”运动竭力兜售莫须有的移民风险来证明自己的观点正确，但乌克兰的活动人士却在努力建设可以承受住寡头和来自俄罗斯外部影响的公民社会框架时面临着真正的威胁。


Historically, Lviv, perhaps more than any city, reminds us of Europe’s capacity to self-destruct.	从历史上看，利沃夫或许比任何其他城市更能让我们想起欧洲的自我毁灭。


Around its picturesque squares, every cobblestone and ornamental façade has borne silent witness to the bloodletting that accompanied empires’ rise and fall.	环绕着利沃夫风景如画的广场，每一块鹅卵石和雕刻着纹饰的建筑物外墙都曾默默见证着伴随帝国兴衰的杀戮。


Yet Lviv is also where one can find hope for the promise of Europe.	但能够找到欧洲希望的地方同样是利沃夫。


Lviv is a deeply anti-Russian and pro-European city; but, for five days each summer, it hosts the Alpha Jazz Festival, sponsored by a Russian bank.	利沃夫是一座根深蒂固的反俄亲欧城市； 但每年夏天，这里都会举行为期5天的由俄罗斯银行赞助的阿尔法爵士乐节。


At a time when Russia and Ukraine are still very much at war, policymakers, local citizens, members of the Ukrainian diaspora, and even some Russians pack the streets of Lviv to celebrate world-class jazz.	在这样一个和乌克兰仍然处于交战状态的时刻，决策者、当地居民、流散在外的乌克兰人甚至有些俄国人都会涌上利沃夫街头欣赏世界级的爵士乐。


Beyond its vital cultural life and geographical location, Ukraine is strategically important to the West.	除了生机勃勃的文化生活和地理位置，乌克兰的战略利益对西方极为重要。


It is a key front in the global confrontation between democracy and autocracy.	这里是全球民主和独裁对峙的主战场。


For Europe, it represents a unique opportunity to promote the rule of law, transparency, free trade, and good governance beyond its borders.	对欧洲而言，这里代表着在境外推动法治、透明、自由贸易和良好执政的独特机会。


Ukraine is a large country, with ample human capital, natural resources, and growth potential in many sectors.	乌克兰是个大国，在众多领域都拥有充足的人力资本、自然资源和增长潜力。


More important, successful reforms in Ukraine make positive developments in Russia more likely.	更重要的是，乌克兰成功实施改革可以加大在俄罗斯取得积极进展的几率。


Still, Ukraine’s economy has shrunk by two-thirds (in dollar terms) since 2006, making it the poorest country in Europe.	尽管如此，乌克兰经济（以美元计价）依然在2006年后缩水了2/3，使之成为欧洲最穷的穷国。


After the 2014 ouster of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych, the European dream suddenly seemed less remote for many Ukrainians, who had hoped for visa-free travel and employment opportunities in the EU sometime in the near future.	在2014年推翻亲俄罗斯总统亚努科维奇后，欧洲梦突然之间对许多乌克兰人变得不那么遥远了，他们渴望在不远的将来不需要签证就能旅行和在欧盟国家找到工作。


With the Brexit vote, that hope is now diminished, as is a European model that has long inspired societies emerging from the post-Soviet fog.	随着英国公投退出欧盟，这种希望现在已经变得非常微弱，曾经长期激励从后苏联时代迷雾中走出来的社会的欧洲榜样也逐渐暗淡下去。


There was a palpable sense of despair and disbelief among Ukrainians enjoying jazz in Lviv as they watched Europe self-destruct once again.	因为再次亲眼目睹欧洲的自我毁灭，在利沃夫欣赏爵士乐的乌克兰人难以掩饰绝望和难以置信的情绪。


Brexit gives the forces of autocracy an undeserved boost.	英国退欧不应当地促进了专制势力。


Europe’s ability to project soft power is weakened, as is its appetite to do so.	欧洲投射软实力的能力遭到削弱，它投射软实力的心情也同样如此。


The benefits of a post-Arab Spring and post-European world are not lost on its dictators, who can now rest easier.	独裁者们现在可以放心，因为他们并未错过后阿拉伯之春以及后欧洲时代世界的各种利益。


Still, there is reason for hope.	但仍有理由对未来抱有希望。


Meaningful reforms in Ukraine can still succeed, and more has been achieved in the last two years than was accomplished in the preceding 20.	乌克兰有意义的改革能够取得成功，而且过去两年比之前20年取得了更大的成就。


For starters, the economy has at least stabilized, and the fighting in the east has receded.	首先，乌克兰经济至少已趋于稳定，而且东部的战斗已经逐渐退去。


Ukraine’s current prime minister, Volodymyr Groysman, is committed to pushing through additional reforms to combat corruption, including abolishing energy subsidies and shifting to a more transparent monetary policy (from exchange-rate targeting to inflation targeting).	乌克兰现任总理弗拉基米尔·格罗伊斯曼决心落实进一步改革来战胜腐败，包括取消能源补贴并转而实施（从以汇率为目标到以通胀为目标的）更加透明的货币政策。


To the east, Russia’s economy is suffering from low energy prices and Western sanctions, neither of which will change any time soon.	在乌克兰东部，能源价格低迷和西方制裁损害了俄国经济。 短时间内，这两种因素都将持续下去。


Even without these external conditions, Russia’s economy was plagued by rising costs and a lack of productivity growth.	即使没有上述外部条件，成本上升和生产率停滞依然困扰着俄罗斯经济。


But at least some close to the inner circle of Russia’s leadership have hinted at a new willingness to discuss matters of regional or global concern.	但至少某些贴近俄国领导层的内部人士已经暗示俄领导人现在愿意探讨地区及全球问题。


To the west, the EU can still regain its composure, provided it moves quickly to resolve the current post-Brexit uncertainty.	在乌克兰西部，只要欧盟迅速行动解决当前后英国退欧期的不确定性，欧盟仍然可以重新掌握主动。


If it succeeds in this, it can pursue investment opportunities in Ukraine and southeast Europe that stand to replenish its political capital and renew its productivity growth.	如果欧盟能成功解决英国退欧问题，就可以抓住乌克兰和东南欧国家的投资机会，并以此来补充其政治资本及再次提高生产率。


The EU should recognize Brexit as an opportunity to move forward with its own fundamental reforms, which have stalled in part because of UK opposition.	欧盟应当将英国退欧视为推进过去部分因英国反对而陷入停滞的根本性改革的一次机会。


Opinion polls show that EU citizens understand the need for a Europe-wide framework to control the financial sector (particularly cross-border banking), manage refugee flows, and implement measures to fight climate change and mitigate its effects.	民意调查显示欧盟民众理解有必要在欧盟范围内建立控制金融行业（尤其是跨境金融行业）的框架、管理难民潮并落实应对气候变化及减轻其影响的各项措施。


For the citizens of Lviv, the European project provides a model not only for rebuilding their own society, but also for joining something bigger.	对利沃夫的民众而言，欧洲计划不仅提供了重建社会的榜样，还提供了加盟更大规模事业的机会。


That larger vision is one the UK’s “Remain” campaign, with the notable exception of former Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s “Lead – Not Leave” speech, did not offer to its own constituency.	那种更大的目标是英国的“留欧”宣传除前首相戈登·布朗的“引领——而非退出”的主题演讲外，未能为其国内选民提供的东西。


Even pro-Europeans in the UK questioned if it was worth voting to remain, given such weak engagement by the UK government in leading the EU.	就连英国的亲欧派也在质疑投票留欧是否值得，因为英国政府严重缺乏领导欧盟的能力。


What the UK needed – and still needs – is a vision, put to the people, of how to make itself better by making the EU better.	英国需要——而且仍然需要——能让民众接受的目标，告诉人们如何能够通过建设欧盟来改善自己的生活。


As Ukrainian reformers bravely continue to build new institutions, they are looking to the EU, and especially to the UK, for blueprints.	在乌克兰改革者勇敢地继续建设新的体制时，他们指望欧盟、尤其是英国能为他们提供蓝图。


One hopes that we will someday look to Lviv – where every citizen feels a sense of ownership over every stone – for inspiration as well.	我们希望有一天在审视普通民众对一砖一瓦都具有强烈归属感的利沃夫时，也能够从他们的经历中得到启示。


Brexit, Trump, and Globalization’s Have-Nots	英国退出、特朗普和全球化输家


CAMBRIDGE – Two political events that are attracting global attention these days – the vote in the United Kingdom to leave the European Union and Donald Trump’s presidential campaign in the United States – have much in common.	坎布里奇—近几天来，两起政治事件吸引着全球目光——英国投票脱离欧盟议会唐纳德·特朗普的美国总统选战。 这两起事件颇有些共同点。


Just over half of UK voters chose “Brexit,” a result that has cast a long shadow over their country’s political system and economic prospects.	略多于一半的英国选民选择“英国退出”，其结果将对英国政治制度和经济前景造成漫长的影响。


Perhaps understanding the parallels between the two campaigns will help US voters avoid taking a similar path in November.	也许理解这两起事件的共同点有助于美国选民避免在11月份重蹈覆辙。


One parallel is that both campaigns were thoroughly underestimated, especially by experts and establishment figures.	一个共同点是两起事件都被彻底低估了，特别是专家和建制派。


Just as the possibility of Brexit was initially dismissed, few political elites, Republican and Democratic alike, took seriously Trump’s bid for the Republican nomination.	正如英国退出的可能性在一开始没有引起重视，美国共和党和民主党的政治精英们也极少有人从一开始就认真对待特朗普要争取共和党提名的企图。


Another similarity is that both campaigns have been based largely on implausible, even absurd, promises.	另一个类似之处是两起事件都主要以不靠谱甚至荒谬的承诺为基础。


In the UK, “Leave” campaigners assured voters that the UK could maintain access to the single market after withdrawing from the EU, while limiting the entry of European workers to the UK.	在英国，“脱欧”阵营向选民保证英国在脱离欧盟后能够继续进入单一市场，同时又可以限制欧洲工人流入英国。


They also declared that the £350 million ($465 million) supposedly sent to the EU each week would be reallocated to the cash-strapped National Health Service.	他们还宣称，据估计每周必须向欧盟缴纳的3. 6亿英镑可以转而用于饱受缺少现金之苦的国民医疗服务体系。


Within hours of the referendum result, the “Leave” campaign’s leaders began to backtrack, spurring anger among many voters, particularly those whose support for Brexit had been driven by the desire to cut immigration.	公投结果出来后不出几小时，“脱欧”阵营领导人就开始“反水”，激起了许多选民的愤怒，特别是那些因为渴望削减移民而支持英国退出的人。


Yet Trump’s own implausible promises – including his pledges to construct a wall between the US and Mexico and bring back manufacturing jobs from overseas – still seem credible to many voters.	但特朗普本人的不靠谱承诺——包括在英国和墨西哥之间建设一道墙以及让制造业岗位从海外回到美国——仍令许多选民深信不疑。


These parallels point to one conclusion: many working- and middle-class voters, who feel left behind by globalization, are far angrier than establishment leaders realized.	这些共同之处指向了一个结论：许多感觉被全球化抛下的工人和中产阶级选民的怒气远比建制派领导人所意识到的更深。


They can no longer be dismissed; instead, leaders must figure out how to address their concerns.	他们已不再可以忽略； 相反，领导人必须找到如何解决他们的担忧。


There are winners and losers in globalization.	全球化有赢家和输家。


But a fundamental proposition in economics holds that when individuals are free to engage in trade, the size of the economic pie increases enough that the winners could, in theory, compensate the losers, leaving everyone better off.	但经济学基本主张认为，当个体可以自由地参与交易时，经济蛋糕的规模就会扩大，大到赢家在理论上可以补偿输家，让所有人的境况都得到改善。


Globalization skeptics are right that, in practice, the compensation tends to remain hypothetical.	全球化怀疑派正确地指出，在实践中，这一补偿始终只是假说。


But the suggestion that we should try to roll back globalization is problematic for a simple reason: globalization can’t be undone.	但就此认为他们应该抵制全球化是站不住脚的，原因很简单：全球化无法抹杀。


Any effort to put the genie back in the bottle might not only trigger trade wars, with serious consequences for economic growth, but would also fail to reduce trade to the levels of 50 years ago.	任何将精灵捉回瓶子中的尝试不但可能触发贸易战，对经济增长造成 严重后果，也无法让贸易退回到50年前的水平。


No national leader could restore, say, steel-industry employment to what it was in 1966.	比如，没有哪个国家领导人能够让钢铁业就业量回到1966年的水平。


Fortunately, there is a better option.	幸运的是，有一个更好的选项。


We can take globalization as a given, and adopt measures to help compensate those who might naturally lose out.	我们可以将全球化视为给定条件，并采取措施帮助补偿可能被全球化自然淘汰的群体。


In the US, measures that could help to achieve that include Trade Adjustment Assistance, a program aimed specifically at helping those who have lost their jobs due to trade.	在美国，有助于实现这一目标的措施包括贸易调整补助（Trade Adjustment Assistance），这是一个旨在专门帮助因为贸易而失去工作的人的计划。


More important programs – which could help those left behind by trade, technology, or something else – include an expanded Earned Income Tax Credit and health insurance.	更重要的计划——帮助那些因为贸易、技术或其他原因而落后的人的计划——包括扩大的劳动收入税收优惠（Earned Income Tax Credit）和医疗保险。


Democrats, including President Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, the presumptive Democratic nominee to succeed him, largely support these policies.	民主党，包括总统奥巴马及其推定继任提名人希拉里·克林顿，大体上支持这些政策。


Yet Republicans have opposed them.	但共和党反对这些政策。


It seems likely that Trump would reject such efforts as well, even as he claims to be the savior of the working class.	有可能特朗普也将拒绝这些计划，即使他宣称自己是工人阶级救世主。


Trump’s rise reflects the extent to which political polarization in the US has deepened during the last eight years.	特朗普的崛起反映出美国政治极化在过去八年已经深化到了什么程度。


As political moderates have been pushed out, policy gridlock has worsened, with presidential initiatives routinely blocked by congressional Republicans, even when such proposals were consistent with Republican ideas.	随着政治温和派被排挤出局，政策僵局恶化，总统的方案总是被国会中的共和党所阻挠，即使这些方案与共和党的理念相符。


None of this bodes well for the losers of globalization; they need leaders – of both parties, in Congress and the executive branch – who can come together to protect their interests.	所有这些都不利于全球化的输家； 他们需要领导人——国会和行政机构中的两党领导人——团结一致保护他们的利益。


Until recently, the British electoral system seemed to represent an admirably balanced approach.	直到最近，英国选举制度似乎都表现出一种令人羡慕的平衡方针。


The two largest parties largely operated under competent and consistent leadership and represented relatively well-defined policy stances – center-right for the Conservatives, and center-left for Labour.	最大的两党基本上都由胜任并一致的领导层领导，代表着相对合理的政策立场——保守党中右翼和工党中左翼。


In this environment, voters could base their choices on the issues at hand.	在这一环境下，选民可以根据当前问题做出选择。


And, under the parliamentary system, victorious prime ministers could work to carry out the policies on which they had campaigned.	此外，在议会制度下，获胜的首相可以致力于兑现他在选战中宣传的政策。


Yet even Britain’s “competent” leaders sometimes made fatefully ill-advised decisions.	但即便是英国的“胜任”领导人有时也会做出命中注定的拙劣决定。


From Margaret Thatcher’s introduction of a poll tax to Tony Blair’s support for the US-led invasion of Iraq, to David Cameron’s decision to hold the Brexit referendum, such decisions have undermined the British system.	从撒切尔夫人引入人头税到布莱尔支持美国领导的支持伊拉克战争，再到卡梅伦决定举行英国退出公投，这些决定破坏了英国的制度。


What is left now, after Cameron, is a mess.	卡梅伦身后留下的是一地狼藉。


The new crop of politicians shows little clarity or consistency.	新的政客群体身上很难看到明确性和一致性。


When the next election is held, voters could well be asked to choose between parties that do not correspond in any clear way to the relevant policy decisions that Britain must make – mainly, whether to seek to negotiate a relatively close association with the EU or to separate completely.	当下一次选举举行时，选民很可能需要在英国所必须做出的重要政策决定上——主要是寻求与欧盟展开相对紧密的协作的谈判还是完全脱离——都没有清晰思路的两党中间做出选择。


In this sense, American voters might still be better off than their British counterparts.	从这个角度，美国选民可能仍然比他们的英国同道境况好一些。


Though Trump’s appearance indicates that the US political system has also deteriorated markedly, the Democrats still favor policies like wage insurance and universal health insurance, and the Republicans still oppose them.	尽管特朗普的出现表明美国政治制度也遭到了严重的扭曲，但民主党仍然支持工资保险和全民医疗保险等政策，而共和党依然反对这些政策。


So, in November, American voters are still making a choice about one of the leading issues on their minds: whether to address the reality of globalization by helping those who have been left behind, or to tilt at windmills, like the Brexiting British.	因此，在11月，美国选民仍能根据自己的观点在主要问题之一上做出选择：通过帮助那些落后的人纠正全球化的现实，还是像退出欧盟的英国一样望风披靡。


The BRICS Fallacy	“金砖国家”的谬误


MADRID – The recent downgrade of Brazil’s credit rating to junk status was followed by a raft of articles heralding the crumbling of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).	马德里——最近巴西信用评级被下调至垃圾级后有大量文章预测金砖五国（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非）将就此摇摇欲坠。


How predictable: schadenfreude almost always follows bad news about the BRICS, whose members were once hailed as the world’s up-and-coming economic powerhouses and next major political force.	多么准确：幸灾乐祸总是出现在金砖国家传出噩耗之后，金砖国家曾一度被誉为世界未来的经济强国和今后主要的政治力量。


There is something deeper going on here.	这里面有着更深层次的因素。


The world’s seeming obsession with the BRICS’ perceived rise and fall reflects a desire to identify the country or group of countries that would take over from the United States as global leader.	世界对金砖国家起起落落的痴迷反映出想要找到哪个或哪些国家能取代美国成为全球领袖的愿望。


But, in searching for the “next big thing,” the world ignores the fact that the US remains the only power capable of providing global leadership and ensuring some semblance of international order.	但在搜索“明日之星”时，世界忽略了美国仍然是有能力领导世界并确保一定国际秩序的唯一强国。


The story of the BRICS is a familiar one.	金砖国家的故事非常熟悉。


It began as a technical grouping in 2001, when the British economist Jim O’Neill lumped them together (without South Africa) and gave them their catchy name for the sole reason that they were all large, rapidly growing emerging economies.	2001年其最早以技术分类的形式出现，英国经济学家吉姆·奥尼尔把上述国家（不包括南非）集中起来，并因为它们都是快速发展的新兴经济体而起了这个朗朗上口的名字。


But, recognizing that economic power could translate into political influence, the BRICS held their first informal meeting in 2006, and their first leaders’ summit in 2009.	但金砖国家认识到经济实力可以转化为政治影响，于是在2006年召开了首次非正式会议，并在2009年召开了首次领导人峰会。


The bloc was going places – or so it seemed.	金砖集团取得了成功——至少当时看似如此。


But seven years, seven summits, and one new member (South Africa joined in 2010) later, the significance of the BRICS remains hotly debated.	但在7年7次首脑会议和吸收一个新的成员国后（南非于2010年加入金砖组织），金砖国家的重要性仍在被外界热议。


The disparities among the BRICS are well known.	金砖国家间的差距众所周知。


China’s economic output is nearly twice that of the rest of the BRICS combined, and roughly 30 times that of South Africa.	中国的经济产量几乎是金砖集团其他国家的两倍，约为南非的30倍之多。


Their governance models are vastly different, from India’s robust democracy to Russia’s illiberal model to China’s one-party system.	它们的治理模式有着很大不同，既有印度的强大民主，也有俄罗斯的非自由模式和中国的一党专政。


Russia and China, both permanent members of the UN Security Council, have offered, at best, lukewarm support for the other BRICS’ aspirations to join them.	俄罗斯和中国都是联合国安理会常任理事国，对其他金砖国家入常热情的支持顶多可以用三心二意来形容。


And then there are its members’ bilateral disagreements, including a heated territorial dispute between India and China.	而且金砖成员国间还存在双边分歧，包括印度和中国间激烈的领土争端。


Nonetheless, the BRICS have acted in concert on more than one occasion.	尽管如此，金砖国家仍不止一次携手合作。


Last March, amid near-universal condemnation of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the country’s BRICS counterparts – even those that had long supported the inviolability of borders and non-intervention – abstained from a UN General Assembly resolution affirming Ukraine’s unity and territorial integrity.	去年3月，在俄罗斯吞并克里米亚遭到普遍谴责时，该国的金砖同盟国——就连那些一直支持边界和非干预不可侵犯的国家也不例外——拒绝支持联合国大会确认乌克兰统一和领土完整的决议。


Three months later, the BRICS released their “Leaders’ Summit Declaration” condemning the imposition of economic sanctions on Russia by the European Union and the US.	三个月后，金砖国家发布 “领导人峰会宣言”，谴责欧盟和美国对俄实施经济制裁。


Most concretely, the long-anticipated New Development Bank, run jointly and equally by the five BRICS countries, opened its doors in Shanghai in July.	最为具体的是，金砖五国联合平等运营的期待已久的新发展银行7月在上海成立。


Clearly, the BRICS are a thing.	金砖集团显然是新生力量。


They are just not the thing.	只不过不能取代美国领导世界。


The BRICS arose at a time when much of the world, especially the advanced economies, was mired in crisis.	金砖集团崛起于世界多数国家，尤其是发达经济体深陷危机的时刻。


The “fall of the West” narrative ran alongside that of the “rise of the rest.”	“西方衰落”的故事伴随着“其他国家的崛起”。


But the story has not played out quite as anticipated.	但故事的发展并不符合人们的预期。


Economically, the BRICS are facing serious challenges.	经济上，金砖国家正面临着严峻的挑战。


In addition to a well-documented growth slowdown, China has lately experienced considerable stock-market turmoil and currency devaluation.	除了有明确证据的增长放缓，中国最近经历了相当大的股市动荡和货币贬值。 巴西和俄罗斯的经济正在萎缩；


The Brazilian and Russian economies are contracting; South Africa’s growth has slowed; and India, though maintaining relatively strong growth, must undertake important reforms.	南非的增长已经放缓； 而印度虽然保持了相对强劲的增长，也必须要推行重要的改革。


The BRICS have also failed to fulfill their promise of international leadership.	金砖国家也未能兑现领导国际事务的承诺。


At the beginning of the decade, Brazil showed a certain aspiration, along with Turkey, to press ahead with an alternative nuclear deal with Iran.	最新一个十年开始时，巴西联手土耳其表现出了一定程度的推进伊朗核协议的愿望。


But that proposal fell apart, and, amid pressure from corruption scandals and falling commodity prices, Brazil left the global stage.	但腐败丑闻和大宗商品价格下跌导致该提案崩溃，巴西也就此退出了全球舞台。


South Africa and India also continue to punch below their apparent weight internationally (notwithstanding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visibility).	（尽管印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪非常有名），但南非和印度仍然未能发挥他们应有的国际影响。


As for Russia, the only traditional world leader of the bunch, the Kremlin’s Ukraine policy has done severe damage to the country’s international profile – damage that not even its possible diplomatic coup in Syria can undo.	至于传统世界领袖中唯一的俄罗斯，克里姆林宫的乌克兰政策已经严重损害了该国的国际形象——就连俄国在叙利亚可能的外交政变也无法挽回他们的形象。


Only China has displayed an inclination to lead, as exemplified by President Xi Jinping’s visit to Washington, DC last week, which produced major announcements on climate action, cyber security, and international development.	上周习近平主席对华盛顿的访问表明，只有中国表现出了领导世界事务的倾向。 习奥会谈达成了气候行动、网络安全和国际发展等领域的重要公告。


China has also been pursuing initiatives like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the revitalization of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.	亚洲基础设施投资银行和上海合作组织复兴也一直是中国追求的目标。


But China’s growing assertiveness, particularly in the South China Sea, has fueled the perception that it is more of a threat than a leader.	但中国日益增长的自信，特别是在南中国海，让人觉得它与其说是领袖还不如说是威胁。


All in all, the BRICS no longer seem to be rising.	总而言之，金砖国家的崛起似乎已经告一段落。


At the same time, the core of the West no longer seems to be declining.	与此同时，西方核心国家似乎已经停止继续衰落。


Although Europe remains mired in crisis and existential self-doubt, and Japan is still finding its feet after two decades of economic stagnation, the US is as relevant as ever.	尽管欧洲深陷危机和对自身存在价值充满怀疑、日本经历二十年经济停滞后仍在试图站稳脚跟，但美国的影响力仍然和过去一样。


Indeed, no major global challenge – from conflict in the Middle East to climate change to global financial regulation – can be confronted without American engagement.	事实上，从中东冲突到气候变化到全球金融监管——没有哪个重要的全球挑战可以在没有美国参与的情况下得到解决。


America’s enduring dominance will rile many, and with good reason.	美国的长期统治地位会激怒很多人，而且理由非常充分。


A quarter-century after the Cold War’s end, the world should have arrived at a more equitable and balanced way of getting things done.	冷战结束后25年已经过去，世界本应以更为公平和平衡的方式解决现有问题，但实际却没有。


But it has not, and no other single power is in a position to take America’s place.	欧洲太过关注其自身问题； 中国引起的怀疑太多；


Europe is too inward looking; China inspires too much suspicion; and India, despite showing signs that it is preparing for a greater global role, lacks enough international authority on its own.	而尽管有迹象表明印度准备在全球发挥更大作用，但却不具备足够的国际权威。


As a result, nearly 20 years after former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright dubbed her country “indispensable,” it remains so.	结果是在前美国国务卿奥尔布赖特声称自己的国家“不可或缺”20年后，美国的地位仍然未能动摇。


The imperative now is for the US and the world to recognize this.	当务之急是美国和世界必须认识到这一事实。


Rather than focusing our attention on alternatives to US leadership, we should be emphasizing its importance – an approach that would help to spur the US to rededicate itself to its international responsibilities.	我们应该强调美国领导地位的重要性，而不是关注谁能替代美国——这样有助于刺激美国重新承担起国际责任。


There have been hints that this impulse still exists – notably, the Iranian nuclear deal – but they remain inadequate to the challenges confronting the world.	有迹象表明上述冲动依然存在——最明显的当属伊朗核协议——但解决世界所面临的挑战仍然远远不够。


The international order is at a crossroads.	国际秩序正处在十字路口。


It needs the US to guide it – with ingenuity, initiative, and stamina – in the direction of peace and prosperity.	它需要美国拿出独创性、主动性和耐心来加以引导，才有可能实现和平和繁荣。


Obsessing about who might eventually replace America is bound to get us all lost.	沉湎于猜测哪些国家最终可能取代美国势必让我们都蒙受损失。


Indeed, although he has made some small improvements in regulation, privatization, and cash transfers to the poor, bolder land and labor-market reforms remain elusive.	���实上，尽管他在监管、私有化和面向穷人的转移支付等方面取得了一些小进展，但在更大手笔的土地和劳动力市场改革上仍然没有拿出明确动作。


China’s BRICS Balancing Act	中国的金砖国家平衡法


BEIJING – As much of the world focuses on Greece’s travails, the BRICS countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – have been working to advance their own economic agenda, most recently at their seventh annual summit in the Siberian city of Ufa. But, though Russia hosted the meeting, it is China that was viewed as dominating the grouping.	北京—当世界大部分目光集中在希腊问题上的时候，金砖国家——巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非——一直在致力于推进自身的经济日程，西伯利亚城市乌法（Ufa）举行的第七届年度峰会便是最新动作。


Indeed, the BRICS has already proved to be a force multiplier for Chinese diplomacy, and can remain so if China is careful not to push its national interests too hard.	事实上，金砖国家已成为中国外交的力量放大器，只要中国在推进其国家利益的过程中不过于强硬，就能继续利用这一放大器。


So far, China has played a pivotal role in driving progress toward real cooperation among the BRICS countries.	目前，中国在推进金砖国家迈向真正合作方面起着关键作用。


In recent weeks, its members have each pledged $10 billion to their New Development Bank, which should start lending next year; released a common strategy for economic and trade cooperation; and agreed to a $100 billion contingency fund to provide temporary assistance to members facing balance-of-payments pressures.	最近几周，金砖国家各自承诺向定于明年开始贷款业务的新开发银行投入100亿美元、制定了经济和贸易合作的共同战略，并同意成立规模1,000亿美元的应急基金向面临收支平衡压力的成员国提供临时援助。


But the BRICS’ future remains uncertain, owing to strong economic headwinds.	但金砖国家的未来仍充满了未知数，这是拜巨大的经济不利形势所赐。


Brazil is wracked by corruption scandals and stagnating output.	巴西陷入了腐败丑闻和产出停滞。


Russia is probably in recession, owing largely to Western sanctions imposed in response to its intervention in Ukraine.	俄罗斯也许已经陷入衰退——在很大程度上是因为其干预乌克兰而遭到了西方的制裁。


India has been suffering from a depreciating currency and soaring public debts.	印度一直饱受货币贬值和公债高企困扰。


China’s GDP grew by only 7.4% last year, the lowest rate in 24 years.	中国去年GDP增长率仅为7. 4%，为24年来的最低值。


And South Africa’s growth has been weak, not least due to energy shortages.	而由于能源短缺等原因，南非的增长也十分疲软。


Given these developments, many Western observers have come to believe that the BRICS are broken.	在这样的背景下，许多西方观察者认为金砖国家已经破产。


Morgan Stanley’s Ruchir Sharma has emphasized that the winners of the last decade may not continue to win in this one.	摩根士丹利的莎尔玛（Ruchir Sharma）强调，上个十年的赢家也许无法在这个十年继续成为赢家。


Even Jim O’Neill, who coined the term “BRIC,” has turned his attention to the “MINT” economies – Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey – the BRICS’ key emerging-country competitors.	就连“金砖”一词的创造者奥尼尔（Jim O’Neill）也将注意力转向了“薄荷”（MINT）经济体——墨西哥、印度尼西亚、尼日利亚和土耳其——它们都是金砖国家主要的新兴国家竞争对手。


But not everyone is bearish about the BRICS’ prospects and global influence, whether taken individually or as a grouping.	但并非所有人都对金砖国家的全球影响力前景感到悲观，不管是个人还是集体观点。


The journalist Gideon Rachman has suggested that “the rise of non-Western economies is a deeply rooted historic shift that can survive any number of economic and political shocks.”	记者拉赫曼（Gideon Rachman）指出，“非西方经济体的崛起有深刻的历史变革根源，可以应对任何数量的经济和政治冲击。


China seems to be counting on that being true.	”中国似乎很渴望拉赫曼是正确的。


In fact, the BRICS countries remain an economic force to be reckoned with, accounting for 25.7% of world GDP, 42% of the global population, and 17% of total trade.	事实上，金砖国家仍然是不容小觑的经济力量，它们贡献了世界GDP的25. 7%、人口的42%、贸易总量的17%。


They attract more than 18% of the global total of foreign investment, hold 40% of all foreign-exchange reserves, and account for 30% of total foreign holdings of US Treasury bonds.	它们吸引着全球外国投资总量的18%，持有外汇储备总量的40%和美国国债海外持有总量的30%。


Moreover, the BRICS consumption markets are worth more than $4 trillion, equivalent to those of the eurozone.	此外，金砖国家消费市场价值超过4万亿美元，与欧元区等量齐观。


And, according to Goldman Sachs, about 85% of the world’s middle class will be living in the BRICS and other developing countries by 2030.	而根据高盛的数据，到2030年，大约85%的全球中产阶级将生活在金砖国家和其他发展中国家。


Moreover, with many of the factors that have fueled the BRICS’ rapid growth – including relatively low labor costs, rising productivity, trade liberalization, and the free flow of information and capital – still in play, writing off the BRICS would be premature.	此外，许多助推金砖国家高速增长的因素——包括相对较低的劳动力成本、生产率的提高、贸易自由化以及信息和资本的自由流动——仍然有效，现在就宣判金砖国家已是明日黄花还为时过早。


Still, the BRICS have work to do.	但是，金砖国家还必须倍加努力。


By delaying structural reforms, they have allowed their economies to accumulate risks and imbalances that have eroded their long-term health.	推迟结构改革让它们的经济积累了风险和失衡，破坏了长期健康。


In particular, the BRICS suffer from considerable income inequality, with their average Gini coefficient (where zero signifies absolute equality and one is absolute inequality) ranging from 0.37 to 0.50 in 2010-2013.	特别是，金砖国家面临着巨大的收入不平等，2010—2013年平均基尼系数（零表示绝对平等，一表示绝对不平等）在0. 37到0.


Working together, the BRICS have a better chance of implementing the reforms needed to boost their economies’ resilience – an opportunity that they have already identified.	如果精诚合作，金砖国家有更大的机会实施提振经济恢复力所需要的改革——它们已经意识到了这一机会。


Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration has sought massive support from China in implementing its national manufacturing policy and overcoming obstacles to developing infrastructure.	印度总理莫迪政府寻求从中国获得大量支持实施国家制造政策和克服开发基础设施的障碍。


The Chinese government is now going further, urging the rest of the BRICS to institutionalize their cooperation, not just pursue domestic reform.	中国政府走的更远，不仅追求国内改革，还敦促其他金砖国家将合作制度化。


China contends that a stronger BRICS grouping would help to safeguard the interests of all developing countries.	中国认为，加强金砖国家合作有助于捍卫所有发展中国家的利益。


To that end, the country is also spearheading the effort to reform the global economic architecture, including by pushing for reforms to the International Monetary Fund’s weighted voting system.	在这方面，中国带头推进全球经济机构改革，包括促使国际货币基金组织（IMF）做出加权投票制度改革。


But despite such efforts’ potential benefits for emerging and developing economies, they have provoked considerable anxiety among China’s BRICS partners, which fear that its leadership could quickly morph into domination.	但尽管这些政策可以给新兴和发展中国家带来诸多好处，但它们也造成了中国的金砖国家伙伴国的巨大焦虑，担心中国领导很快就会转化为主宰。


Beyond fundamental differences in the BRICS’ countries political systems, social values, and cultural traditions – factors that undermine trust and cohesion – there is the obvious fact that China’s economy (not to mention its military) dwarfs the others’.	金砖国家除了在政治制度、社会价值和文化传统——这些因素是信任和凝聚的基础——存在巨大差异外，另一个显而易见的特征是中国经济（更不用说军师了）一家独大。


Indeed, bilateral trade between China and the other four BRICS accounts for 85% of total intra-BRICS trade.	事实上，中国与其他四个金砖国家的双边贸易占了金砖国家内部贸易总量的85%。


Furthermore, China’s BRICS partners face keen competition from cheap Chinese-manufactured goods (intensified by what many view as China’s undervalued currency).	此外，中国的金砖国家伙伴国还面临来自廉价中国制造品的激烈竞争（而许多人认为人民币低估，这进一步增加了担忧）。


Most trade-related complaints against China in the World Trade Organization in recent years were lodged by developing countries, including India and Brazil.	最近几年来你，大部分与贸易相关对华世贸组织投诉来自发展中国家，包括印度和巴西。


China’s relationship with India is particularly fraught, owing to their seemingly intractable territorial dispute, as well as disagreements over the reform of the United Nations Security Council.	中国与印度的关系尤其令人担忧，两国之间存在着棘手的领土纠纷，在联合国安理会改革上也存在分歧。


If China wants the BRICS to continue to deepen their ties, it should seek to act as a guiding hand within the grouping, adopting an approach that is more prudent than pushy.	如果中国希望金砖国家继续加强合作，就应该寻求扮演组织内部的引导者角色，采取更加审慎而非固执的方针。


That means, above all, curbing its geopolitical competition with India and Russia.	这意味着首先要遏制其与印度和俄罗斯的地缘政治竞争。


At the same time, in dealing with its advanced-country counterparts, it should be open and pragmatic, championing an inclusive global policy agenda that connects the developed and developing worlds.	与此同时，在处理与发达国家对手的关系时，中国应该采取开放和务实的方针，倡导将发达国家和发展中国家联系在一起的包容的全球政策日程。


A united anti-West bloc would not serve China’s interests any more than a grouping characterized by antagonism and divisions.	联合反西方阵线和结成以对立和分裂为特征的集团都不符合中国的利益。


What China – and the rest of the emerging and developing economies – needs is a nimble and cohesive BRICS grouping with a strong reputation as a leading provider of global public goods.	中国——以及其他新兴和发展中经济体——需要的是灵活团结的金砖国家集团，并获得全球公共品领先提供者的强大声誉。


Bridging the Infrastructure Gap	缩小基础设施差距


SAINT PETERSBURG, RUSSIA – Every day, millions of people across the developed and developing world inch through gridlock or squeeze into packed subway cars to get to and from work.	俄罗斯圣彼得堡——每天，发达和发展中世界都有成百上千万人在交通拥堵中缓慢移动或挤上已经塞得满满的地铁列车上下班。


And that is likely to be only one of many frequent – if not daily – confrontations with infrastructure systems that are bursting at the seams.	而这只是被撑爆的基础设施系统必须频繁、甚至每天面对的难题。


In advanced and emerging economies alike, roads and bridges need repair, water systems are aging or inadequate, and power grids are overburdened, leading to blackouts.	发达国家和新兴国家的道路和桥梁同样需要修缮，供水系统老化或能力不足，并因电网负担过重导致大面积停电。


Too many countries have been underinvesting in infrastructure for decades, resulting in everyday inconveniences and, worse, creating roadblocks to economic growth.	近几十年来太多国家基础设施投资不足，造成日常生活不便甚至妨碍到经济发展。


While a major infusion of funding is needed to address infrastructure gaps, finding the money is only part of the solution.	虽然需要大笔资金注入才能解决基础设施不足的问题，但找到资金来源也还仅仅是解决方案中的一环。


Governments also need to reform infrastructure planning and oversight.	各国政府需要改革基础设施规划和监督工作。


The public can no longer afford to accept projects with costs that spiral out of control.	公众再也不能接受成本失控的项目。


Infrastructure projects’ unique ability to create jobs in the short term and boost productivity in the long term is well known to policymakers.	决策者非常清楚基础设施项目能在短期创造就业机会，并在长期推动生产效率的提升。


Yet talk has rarely translated into action, despite the record-low interest rates of the past eight years.	但尽管过去8年利率一直处于历史低位，空谈却很少转化为实际行动。


The world needs to increase investment in transportation, power, water, and telecom systems from $2.5 trillion a year to $3.3 trillion every year through 2030 just to support projected economic growth, according to new estimates from the McKinsey Global Institute.	根据麦肯锡全球研究院的最新估计，到2030年世界各国需要将交通、电力、供水和电信系统投资从每年的2. 5万亿增加到3.


But despite the obvious need for action, infrastructure investment has actually declined in 11 of the G20 economies since the 2008 global financial crisis.	3万亿，才能为预期的经济增长提供支撑。 但尽管采取行动的必要性显而易见，但20国集团中却有11个国家的基础设施投资实际从2008年全球金融危机后就持续下降。


The conventional wisdom is that fiscal concerns make it impossible to marshal enough public funding.	传统观点认为财政问题使政府不可能调动足够的公共资金。


In fact, there is substantial scope to increase public infrastructure investment, particularly while borrowing costs remain historically low.	事实上，有充分的余地增加公共基础设施投资，尤其当借贷成本一直维持在历史低位的情况下。


In some cases, funding can be found without raising taxes: governments can create revenue streams by instituting user charges, capturing increases in property value, or selling existing assets and recycling the proceeds.	某些情况下，甚至可以不通过加税来获得资金：政府可以通过收取使用费创造收入流，捕捉财产升值或出售现有资产并实现利润回收。


Public accounting standards also could allow infrastructure assets to be depreciated over their life cycle, rather than immediately adding their costs to fiscal deficits during construction.	公共会计准则同样可以允许基础设施资产在完整的生命周期内实现逐渐贬值，而不是要求在建设阶段立即将成本计入财政赤字。


Governments can also do much more to encourage private investment, starting by providing regulatory certainty and the ability to charge prices that produce an acceptable risk-adjusted return.	政府还可以采取多项措施鼓励私人投资，其中最基本的是确保监管确定性并允许收取可以接受的经风险调整的回报价格。


Even more broadly, they can take steps to create a market that more efficiently connects institutional investors seeking stable, long-term returns and projects that need financing.	从广义角度看，他们可以采取措施创造将寻求长期稳定回报的机构投资者和有融资需求的项目联系在一起的市场。


Given that these investors have some $120 trillion in assets under management, the bottleneck is not a shortage of capital, but rather a dearth of well-prepared, bankable projects.	鉴于这些投资人管理着120万亿美元左右的资产，因此产生制约作用的瓶颈绝不是缺乏资金，而是缺少准备充分且值得投资的项目。


One way to clear it would be to develop the regulatory and institutional groundwork needed to enable funding to flow more smoothly from institutional investors in advanced economies to projects in the emerging world, where huge populations still need access to essential infrastructure services.	解决方式之一是制定必要的监管和体制基础，协助发达国家的资金从机构投资者顺利流向新兴国家的项目。 新兴国家的海量人口仍然需要享受基本的基础设施服务。


Beyond financing, making the infrastructure sector more efficient represents an even bigger opportunity.	除融资外，提高基础设施行业效率所能带来的机遇更大。


Delays stretching into years, and cost overruns soaring into the billions of dollars, are a sadly familiar story in public works.	以年为单位的延误和高达数十亿美元的成本超支都是公共工程领域令人心酸的共同现象。


And when bridges turn into boondoggles, the public grows more reluctant to invest.	而且当桥梁变为无用的废物，公众的投资意愿无疑也将受到影响。


Every dollar allocated to infrastructure needs to stretch much further.	用于基础设施投资的每一块钱都要发挥更大的效用。


Part of that effort involves demanding better performance from the construction industry, where productivity growth has been flat for decades.	这不仅要求建筑业要拿出更好的业绩（该行业生产率增长近几��年都没有任何变化）。


There are some positive signs of innovation, from accelerated bridge building to pre-fabrication and modular construction techniques. But the sector as a whole needs a major push in terms of modernization, technology adoption, and standardization.	虽然存在从加速桥梁建设到预制模块化施工技术等某些积极的创新现象，但建筑业作为一个整体需要在现代化、技术应用和标准化方面得到有力的推动。


Governments must also transform the institutions and processes under their direct control.	推动直接控制的机构和流程转型是政府的任务。


Our work with governments around the world has demonstrated that stronger governance and oversight of infrastructure projects can lower infrastructure costs by as much as 40%.	我们与世界各国政府合作的经验表明加强对基础设施建设的管理和监督可以降低基础设施成本达40%左右。


This starts with taking a systematic and data-driven approach to choosing the right projects.	首先是要采用系统和数据驱动的方法来选择合适的项目。


Top-performing countries such as Singapore and South Korea do not consider projects in isolation; they consider how each supports their policy objectives, and they weigh it against other projects that might yield better returns.	新加坡和韩国等基础设施搞得最好的国家并不是以孤立的观点来思考项目； 他们考量每个基础设施项目能为政策目标提供怎样的支持，并与其他可能产生更好回报的项目进行权衡比较。


As projects move down the pipeline toward realization, it is critical to tighten management of the delivery and execution stages.	随着项目逐一进入实施阶段，在交付和执行期加强管理就显得至关重要。


Accelerating environmental reviews, approval processes, and land acquisition can minimize the costs and delays that mount before ground is ever broken.	加速环境审核、审批程序和土地收购可以最大限度地控制破土动工前的成本和工期延误。


Meeting best practices could unlock huge value: as it stands, the price tags for similar projects can vary by 50-100% from country to country.	采用最佳的施工方法可以释放出巨额价值：目前的状况是，类似项目的标价在不同国家可以相差50%到100%之多。


“Kicking the can down the road” is not a viable strategy for dealing with the world’s infrastructure needs.	“得过且过”绝非满足世界基础设施需求的可行之策。


It’s up to us to avoid leaving a legacy of deferred costs and deteriorating fundamentals for the next generation.	我们有义务避免为下一代留下一大堆递延成本以及基本面的不断恶化。


The money is available.	资金就在那里。


Let’s put it to use.	我们要做的而是将其付诸使用。


Scotching the Eurozone	挫败欧元区


LONDON – Which of the following events is more likely to happen this year: Scotland votes to secede from the United Kingdom in its September referendum, or at least one country decides to leave the eurozone?	伦敦—下列哪些事件在今年更容易发生？ 苏格兰在9月的全民公投中决定脱离英国独立，还是至少一个国家决定离开欧元区？


Conventional wisdom suggests that Scottish independence is possible, albeit not very likely, while any country’s departure from the single currency is fanciful.	传统智慧表明，苏格兰独立存在可能性，但不大，而由国家脱离单一货币的可能性几乎不存在。


But the decisions that Scotland would have to make about its monetary arrangements in the months following a vote for independence are at least as likely to be confronted by some eurozone countries over the next couple of years.	但苏格兰在决定独立后几个月内就要决定其货币安排，一些欧元区国家也将在未来几年中面临相同的货币决策。


In fact, there is a natural link between the two situations.	事实上，这两个局面之间有着天然的联系。


An independent Scotland’s continued use of the British pound – the Scottish government’s official position – could be approached in two ways.	如果苏格兰决定继续使用英镑——苏格兰政府的官方立场正是如此——那么可以有两种实现方式。


The first possibility, which First Minister Alex Salmond appears to have in mind, would entail a monetary union under a central bank accountable both to Scotland and the rump UK.	第一种可能是第一部长萨尔蒙德（Alex Salmond）所构想的，即成立一个货币联盟，其中的央行同时对苏格兰和没有了苏格兰的英国负责。


But the UK government could – and undoubtedly would – veto any such adaptation of the Bank of England’s responsibilities for monetary policy, financial stability, and banking supervision.	但英国政府可以——也必定会——否决如此改变英格兰银行的货币政策、金融稳定和银行监督责任。


Any other conceivable model of monetary union – including one based on a central bank as unaccountable as the European Central Bank – would be subject to the same rejection.	其他任何想得到的货币联盟模式——包括基于如欧洲央行那样的不可问责的中央银行的模式——也将遭到拒绝。


As the journalist Martin Wolf noted recently, “the rest of the UK has surely not escaped the horrors of the eurozone only to create similar horrors for itself at home.”	正如记者沃尔夫（Martin Wolf）最近所指出的，“要建立自己的货币肯定会让英国其他部分想起对欧元区的恐慌”。


The alternative for a fully sovereign Scotland would be to continue using the pound without retaining any influence over interest rates or the exchange rate.	对于实现充分主权的苏格兰来说，另一种方法是继续使用英镑而放弃对利率或汇率的影响力。


This was the path taken by the Irish Free State (later the Republic of Ireland), which used the sterling-pegged “Irish pound” (the punt) for several decades.	这是爱尔兰自由国（Irish Free State，后来成为爱尔兰共和国）曾经用过的办法，爱尔兰自由国使用盯住英镑的“爱尔兰镑”长达数十年之久。


Even if the UK disapproved of the arrangement, it could not stop Scotland from adopting it – much as the European Union deplores but cannot stop Montenegro’s unilateral use of the euro.	即使英国拒绝这一安排，也不能阻止苏格兰这样做——正如欧盟只能谴责但无法阻止黑山单方面使用欧元。


While the decision would have a significant political downside – that is, immediately diluting Scotland’s newly acquired sovereignty – its economic implications are mixed.	尽管这一决定会造成相当大的政治麻烦——即立刻稀释苏格兰刚刚赢得的主权——但其经济影响很难立刻看清。


Borrowing the credibility of an established monetary authority – especially one that issues a global reserve currency – would be tactically advantageous for a post-independence Scotland; but the new country would be exposed to the risk of an inflation shock and sterling crisis stemming from the Bank of England’s expansionary monetary policy.	借助老牌货币当局的信誉——特别是发行全球储备货币的当局——在策略上是后独立时代苏格兰的更优选择； 但这个新国家将因此面临通胀冲击和来自英格兰银行的扩张性货币政策的英镑危机的风险。


From a fiscal perspective, the case is similarly balanced.	从财政角度看，这样做也面临类似的权衡。


The interest-rate premium that the market would inevitably demand from a young sovereign like Scotland could be minimized by issuing debt in sterling, thereby protecting investors from additional devaluation risk.	对于像苏格兰这样的新成立的主权国家，市场免不了会要求利率溢价，通过发行英镑债券能够让这一溢价最小化，从而保护投资者免遭贬值风险。


But, without its own currency-issuing central bank, Scotland would forego seigniorage (profits from central-bank operations that typically benefit the national treasury).	但是，由于没有自己的货币发行央行，苏格兰将放弃铸币税（央行操作给国库带来的利润）。


Perhaps more important, it would have no lender of last resort capable of stabilizing the banking and financial system in a crisis.	也许更重要的是，如果爆发危机，将没有最后贷款人能够稳定银行和金融系统。


All things considered, an independent Scotland would be best served by issuing its own national currency from the outset, empowering the National Bank of Scotland to set interest rates according to domestic economic conditions.	考虑各种因素后，独立的苏格兰的最优策略是从一开始就发行其自身的国家货币，授权苏格兰国民银行（National Bank of Scotland）根据本国经济情况设定利率。


By allowing for exchange-rate flexibility, this approach would also enable the central bank to avoid the twin hazards that arise in a currency union: undervaluation, which produces inflationary pressure, and overvaluation, which demands wrenching internal devaluations (driving down real wages).	这一方针还能通过灵活的汇率安排让央行避免货币联盟所面临的的双重风险：低估（带来通胀压力）和高估（需要扭曲性的内部贬值，造成实际工资下降）。


To see just how difficult the latter can be, consider the eurozone.	要想知道后一种风险有多高，可以看看欧元区。


The agony of internal devaluation in the currency union’s weaker economies is increasingly driving voters and financial markets alike to call for a return to their national currencies – a trend that may well come to a head in May’s European Parliament election.	货币联盟中的疲软经济体所经历的内部贬值痛苦让越来越多的选民和金融市场要求回归国家货币——这一趋势极有可能在今年5月的欧洲议会选举中达到高潮。


Italy is perhaps the prime candidate to lead an exit from the eurozone, though a political shock could also arise in France, spurring it to negotiate with Germany the dissolution of the monetary union.	意大利是最可能退出欧元区的国家，尽管法国也可能受到政治冲击，促使其与德国商讨停止货币联盟。


But, regardless of who leaves first, any countries trading in the euro for their defunct national currencies would, like an independent Scotland, have to determine the right degree of exchange-rate flexibility.	但是，不管谁先离开，所有用欧元取代其国家货币的国家都将和独立的苏格兰一样需要决定正确的汇率灵活度。


For example, while a fully floating currency would create a beneficial combination of discipline and flexibility, it might best be delayed in favor of an adjustable (“crawling”) peg to some anchor currencies.	比如，尽管完全浮动的货币能带来纪律和灵活的好处，但极有可能最好的做法还是推迟完全浮动，代之以可调整（“爬行”）盯住锚货币。


This would buy time to build credibility and, more important, to help keep public debt under control.	这能为建立信誉争取时间，更重要的是，也有助于将公债限制在可控水平。


An instructive precedent is Slovakia, whose “velvet” divorce from the Czech Republic at the beginning of 1993 led to the creation of a new national currency.	一个颇具说明性的先例是斯洛伐克，1993年伊始，它通过“天鹅绒革命”脱离捷克独立，并决定使用新的国家货币。


The Slovak koruna was initially kept within pre-defined fluctuation bands around target parities with the Deutsche Mark and the US dollar, before moving to a fully floating exchange rate in 1998.	一开始，斯洛伐克克朗在事先确定的范围中围绕对德国马克和美元的目标平价波动，直到1998年才变为完全浮动汇率。


Furthermore, Slovakia, unlike most of its regional peers, has fulfilled its legal obligation to join the eurozone – an obligation that an independent Scotland would have to take on when, as expected, it sought EU membership.	此外，斯洛伐克与该地区的大部分国家不同，实现了加入欧元区的法定义务——如果独立的苏格兰如人们预料那样寻求加入欧盟，也需要满足这些义务。


But a sovereign Scottish government might try to negotiate an exemption to this rule – and, in so doing, join the tide of other European countries seeking a way out of the great blunder that Europe’s monetary union has turned out to be.	但有主权的苏格兰政府可能会商量取得豁免——这样做将让它加入其他寻求走出欧洲货币联盟犯下的大错的欧洲国家的行列。


Bringing China into the Climate Change Fold	让中国加入应对气候变化的行列


POZNAN – The current economic crisis cast a pall over climate change talks held this month in Poland.  While negotiators hoped for concrete progress towards an international climate agreement, the world’s two largest polluters were distracted – the US with preventing a collapse of the financial system in the midst of a presidential transition, China with a slowdown in domestic investment and weakening foreign demand for its manufactured goods.	波兹南—现今的经济危机给本月在波兰举行的气候变化谈判蒙上了一层阴影。 当谈判者希望能够就达成国际气候协议取得具体进展时，世界上两个最大的污染排放国则不够专心—美国在操心防止总统换届期间发生金融体系的崩溃，中国在关注国内投资的下滑和国外对其制造产品的需求减少。


With American home values and retirement savings falling and Chinese unemployment numbers rising, observers worry that neither America nor China will have much appetite to cut emissions.	在美国的房屋价格和退休储蓄下降而中国的失业人数上升之时，观察家们担心无论美国还是中国都不太愿意削减它们的排放。


The paradox here is that the crisis presents a unique opportunity for the United States and China to strike a deal that would lay the groundwork for a global climate agreement.	这里的矛盾之处在于这场危机向中美两国展示了一个达成协议的特殊机会。 这个协议将为达成全球性的气候协议奠定基础。


Indeed, one of the main goals of the most recent biannual meeting of the US/China Strategic Economic Dialogue (held the week before the climate talks began) was to begin work under the “Ten Year Energy and Environment Cooperation Framework” created earlier this year.	实际上，最近美中之间一年两度的战略经济对话（在气候会议开始的前一周已经举行）的主要目标之一就是开始在“十年能源和环境合作框架”下进行工作，这一框架是本年早些时候建立起来的。


This bilateral initiative comes on the heels of a decade in which America abstained from international efforts to address climate change, concerned that if it acts but China doesn’t, the world will fail to meet its emission-reduction targets and US industry will be disadvantaged.	在双边采取主动之前，有整整十年美国避免参与国际间处理气候变化的尝试，担心如果它采取了行动而中国按兵不动，世界就无法实现减排目标，美国的工业也会陷于不利之境。


China has countered that its historic and per capita emissions remain well below US levels, and that to cap aggregate national emissions at the same level as the US would imply a personal carbon budget in San Francisco five times greater than in Shanghai.	中国则反击说它的历史和人均排放量都远远低于美国水平； 就算把国家的总排放水平和美国拉平，旧金山的人均碳预算也比上海高出五倍。


The Strategic Economic Dialogue sidestepped this disagreement on burden sharing and focused instead on what the two countries have in common.	战略经济对话规避了两国在责任分担上的差异，相反，它关注二者的共同之处。


Both depend on imported oil for transport and on domestic coal for power generation.	两国的交通都依赖进口的石油，发电则依靠国内的煤炭。


Both have strong state-level governments and balkanized regulatory and energy supply systems.	两国都拥有强力的国家政府，拥有各自为政的规章制度和能源供应系统。


But the structure of the two countries’ economies, and what drives their energy needs – and thus greenhouse gas emissions – are very different.  It is this difference that offers the best chance for addressing climate change head-on.	但是两国的经济结构，以及推动能源需求的因素—于是包括温室气体的排放—却大相径庭。 正是这种差异为正面处理气候变化提供了最佳时机。


Economically, the US and China are mirror images, opposite sides of a massive global imbalance.	从经济的角度来看，中美两国互为镜像，在大规模的全球失衡中处在相对立位置。


Americans spend too much and save too little, leaving a $250 billion trade deficit financed by other countries.	美国花费太多储蓄太少，面对其他国家的贸易赤字达到2500亿美元。


Much of this credit comes from China, where firms and citizens save too much and consume too little, leaving a surplus of both goods and capital that flows abroad.	其中的大部分信贷来自中国，这里的公司和公民储蓄太多而消费太少，多余的货物和资本流往国外。


This macroeconomic imbalance is reflected in the two countries’ carbon footprints.	宏观经济的不平衡从两国的碳排放量就可见一斑。


In the US, more than 70% of CO2 emissions come from consumer-related activities, whether gas-guzzling SUVs or power-hungry McMansions.	在美国，超过70%的二氧化碳排放来自于和消费者相关的活动，无论是耗油的SUV还是耗电的大型独栋别墅。


In China, more than 70% of emissions come from industry. Steel production alone consumes 18% of the country’s energy resources, nearly twice as much as all Chinese households.	而中国的二氧化碳排放中有超过70%来自工业，光是钢铁生产就消费了国家能源资源的18%，几乎是全中国所有家庭消费量的两倍。


The chemical industry consumes more energy than all private transportation, and aluminum production rivals the commercial sector in terms of electricity demand.	化工行业比所有私人交通耗费的能源还多，铝业生产在耗电量上和商业部门不相上下。


In terms of brokering a climate deal, this imbalance is good news.	从为达成气候协议进行谈判的角度来看，这种不均衡是个好消息。


It suggests a framework for reducing emissions that respects the development needs of China’s households, addresses US firms’ competitiveness concerns, and adheres to the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” embedded in international negotiations.	它可能促成这样一种减排体系，这一体系既尊重中国家庭的发展需求，又处理美国公司关心的竞争力事宜，同时还能坚持植根于国际谈判中的“共同但有区别的责任”的原则。


In recognition of its outsized historic and per capita emissions, the US should agree to economy-wide emissions reductions in line with domestic climate legislation currently being considered.	意识到自身超大的历史排量和人均排量，美国应该同意就整个经济展开减排，这和和现在正在考虑的美国国内气候立法相一致。


China should be excused of consumer-related obligations for the time being, but assume commitments on industrial production based on the recognition that effectively reducing emissions in these sectors requires coordinated international action.	中国应该暂时免于承担和消费者相关联的责任，但在认识到这些部门实施有效减排需要相应的国际行动后，也应该承担自身在工业生产上的责任。


China’s leaders are already eager to rein in energy- and pollution-intensive industry for reasons of national security, air and water quality, and simple economic efficiency.	考虑到国家安全，空气和水的质量，以及单纯的经济效益方面的原因，中国领导人已经渴望控制高能耗高污染的工业了。


Production of steel, cement, chemicals, paper, and aluminum alone account for nearly half of China’s energy needs and generate nearly half of the air pollution that claims over 300,000 lives and costs the economy close to $100 billion each year.	仅仅生产钢铁，水泥，化学制品，纸张，铝就耗费了中国能源需求的几乎一半，还制造了将近一半的空气污染。 这种污染每年夺去了超过三十万人的生命，还造成了将近一千亿美元的经济损失。


Yet these five industries combined employ only 14 million people out of a total labor force of 770 million and fewer people than they did a decade ago.	但在中国的7. 7亿劳动力大军中，这五种行业合计来也只雇用了1400万人而已，少于他们十年前的雇用人数。


For a country in an employment crisis, investing in energy-intensive industry is a losing strategy.	对于一个面对用工危机的国家来说，投资高能耗产业是一种失策。


Using climate policy to discipline these industries would help rebalance the economy while taking a bite out of China’s emissions.	利用气候政策来规范这些行业将有助于重新平衡经济，同时减少中国的排放量。


If China imposes a carbon price for its energy-intensive manufacturing industries, the US won’t need to do so at its border, lowering risks to the international trading system on which both countries rely.	如果中国向其高能耗制造业征收碳价格，美国将不必在更大范围内冒更小的风险针对国际贸易机制采取同样的做法，这种机制是中美双方都依赖的。


The current crisis is already unwinding some of the imbalances that drive both countries’ energy and environment challenges.	目前的危机已经化解了部分不均衡，这些不均衡刺激了两国能源和环境方面的提出的挑战。


US oil demand has fallen 8% as consumers tighten their belts, and electricity demand in China is down by 10% as energy-intensive industries cut production.	美国的石油需求已经滑落了8%，因为消费者紧缩开支； 中国的电力需求则下滑了10%，因为高能耗产业削减了生产。


A smart response to the crisis can perpetuate these trends.	机智应对危机能够让这些趋势长久保持。


Future US consumption will be greener, and the cost of climate policy reduced, if the US recovery package includes money to weatherize homes, upgrade the electricity grid, and help the auto industry improve fuel efficiency.	如果美国的复苏计划包括提供资金来增加房屋的御寒性能，升级电网和帮助汽车行业提高燃料效能，未来的美国消费将更加绿色，气候政策付出的代价也会变小。


If China consolidates its energy-intensive manufacturing, thereby freeing up investment capital for lighter manufacturing and services, then it will emerge from the crisis with a growth model that pollutes less and employs more.	如果中国加强控制高能耗的制造业，从而解放投资资本，将其用于轻型制造业和服务业，就将伴随一种污染降低，雇工增多的增长模式从危机从解脱出来。


If the US and China can find agreement on these issues in the midst of crisis, they will pave the way for success when climate negotiators meet again next year in Copenhagen.	如果美国和中国能够在危机当中就这些事宜达成一致，它们将为明年在哥本哈根举行的气候变化谈判铺平成功之路。


Bringing Down the Wall	推倒柏林墙


A quiz for history buffs.	给历史发烧友们出道题。


Twenty years ago – on June 4, 1989 – three events shaped a fateful year.	20年前的1989年6月4日，有三件大事书写了那一年的历史。


Which do you remember most vividly, and which most changed the world?	你对其中哪一件印象最深刻，又是哪一件最显著地改变了世界？


a) The bloody denouement of the protests on Tiananmen Square.	a) 天安门广场抗议活动的血腥结局。


b) The death of Iran’s revolutionary cleric, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.	b) 伊朗革命教士阿亚图拉·鲁霍拉·霍梅尼去世。


c) The Polish elections.	c) 波兰选举。


Few would answer c).	相信很少有人会选择c)。


The victory of the famed opposition trade-union movement, Solidarity, in Eastern Europe’s first free election since 1946 was eclipsed by the violent crackdown in Beijing and Khomeini’s tumultuous passing.	波兰著名的团结工会在1946年以后东欧举行的首次自由选举中获胜相比于北京的暴力镇压和霍梅尼的动荡逝世显得有些相形见绌。


Yet no single event did more to bring down communism in Europe – and thus to re-shape the post-war international order.	但在欧洲共产党垮台的过程中没有哪件事起了更大的作用，因此团结工会胜选也重新塑造了二战以后的国际秩序。


The next few months will bring all sorts of commemorations of communism’s end, particularly of the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989.	今后几个月会举办各式各样纪念共产主义灭亡，特别是1989年11月柏林墙倒塌的活动。


To many, it was a glorious moment, emblematic of the West’s victory in the Cold War, and one that seemed to come out of the blue.	很多人把这看作一个光荣的时刻，标志着西方在冷战中获胜，而这次胜利似乎在人们意料之外突然降临。


But if you watched the Eastern Bloc’s disintegration from the ground, you would know that the process was far longer and more complex than most people realize.	可是如果你从头至尾观看了东方集团的解体，你就会知道这个过程远比人们所意识到的更加长期和复杂。


The Polish election was a point of no return, the moment when forces for change became irreversible.	波兰选举根本没有退路，在那一刻我们拥有了不可逆转的变革力量。


They gathered momentum after a summer of labor strikes, when Poland’s communist chief, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, concluded that the country’s economic troubles were too grim to face alone.	整整一夏天的罢工为变革积蓄了力量，当时的波兰共产党领袖沃依切赫·雅鲁泽尔斯基将军认定国家的经济困难无法由共产党独自承当。


Why not enlist the help of Poland’s opposition, he reasoned, if not to solve the problems, then at least to share the blame for them?	他想当然地认为为什么不能让波兰的反对党伸出援手，这样即使不能解决问题，至少也可以帮他们分担一些指责？


And so, after six months of bargaining, a historic deal was struck.	因此，一项历史性的协议在6个月的谈判之后达成。


Poland would hold free and fair parliamentary elections, and Solidarity would compete.	波兰将举行自由公正的议会选举，而团结工会将参与竞争。


It never occurred to the ruling communists (or to Solidarity) that they might lose.	执政的共产党人做梦也没有想到过他们会输（这一点团结工会同样没有想到）。


Never in their wildest dreams did they imagine being driven from power altogether.	共产党人做梦也没有想到会彻底丧失执政地位。


Yet that is what happened.	但事实就这样发生了。


In retrospect, it is astonishing that there should have been any doubt.	现在回想起来，哪怕存在任何一点点的疑虑都是令人吃惊的。


Solidarity’s campaign was all chutzpah.	团结工会在竞选中无所不用其极。


An iconic campaign poster captured the public mood: a picture of a gun-slinging Gary Cooper as the sheriff in the classic western High Noon .	一张标志性的竞选海报抓住了公众的视线：海报上印着经典西部片《正午》中背着枪的治安官加里·库柏的照片。


June 4 was the day of reckoning in Dodge City East.	6月4日是东方道奇城的最后审判日。


On that bright Sunday morning, as spring turned to summer, voters wasted little time in dispatching Poland’s communists to the abattoir.	在那个春末夏初晴朗的周日上午，选民们毫不犹豫地把波兰共产党赶进了屠宰场。


On their dying day, Poland’s communists managed one last perversity, a final and unwitting act of utter self-humiliation.	垂死时，波兰共产党干了最后一件怪事，他们最后一次在不知不觉中进行了彻底的自我羞辱。


They devised an electoral system whereby Poles would not vote for candidates of their choice, but would cross out those they did not want – which is to say, each and every communist.	在他们设计的选举制度中选民不直接给选中的候选人投票，而是划掉那些未被选中者——也就是每一个共产党员。


Everywhere you looked, people were excising hated autocrats.	无论走到哪里，都能看到人们勾掉独裁者。


Here, at long last, was Poland’s long-awaited popular uprising, revenge for December 1980, when Jaruzelski declared martial law, banned Solidarity, and threw its leaders in jail.	期盼已久的波兰人民起义终于到来了。 这是对1980年12月雅鲁泽尔斯基宣布戒严令、取缔团结工会并将其领导人投入监狱的报复。


Revolution by deletion!	抹杀的革命！


The pen, at last mightier than the sword, became a weapon of glorious retribution, wielded with style.	最终人们手中的笔比枪更有力量，因为人们能够优雅地挥舞着这件武器进行光荣的报复。


Some voters slashed their ballots boldly, decapitating the old regime with flourishing strokes.	有些选民在选票上大胆勾掉共产党人的名字，用夸张的勾画动作推翻了原来的政府。


Others savored the moment, perhaps puffing a cigarette as they reveled in this or that deletion.	还有人尽情享受这样的时刻，也许在勾掉共产党候选人名字时洋洋自得地吞云吐雾。


“Oh yes, he jailed my cousin.” Pfft!	“是他把我的亲人投入了监狱。


“Oh, that sponging apparatchik, living high on our penury.” Pfft!	”“那个揩油的共产党当官的，在我们贫困潦倒的时候却过着奢侈的生活。


Pfft!	”


By contrast, the communists’ campaign was all but invisible.	反之，共产党的竞选努力几乎让人觉察不到。


In all of Warsaw, only a couple government candidates bothered to put up posters.	在整个华沙，只有寥寥几个政府候选人费力制作了海报。