On the demand side, market commentators are finally waking up to something that has been pretty clear for most of 2017: the world economy has gained momentum, and is now probably growing at a rate of 4% or higher.	在需求侧，市场评论家们终于猛然意识到某些在2017年大部分时间已经表现得极为明朗的形势：世界经济增长势头强劲，目前可能正在以4％或更高的速度增长。


With the exception of India and the United Kingdom, eight of the ten largest economies are expanding at the same time.	除印度和英国外，全球前十大经济体中有8个都在扩张。


And even as many countries try to wean themselves off oil, that transition will not happen overnight.	即便许多国家都在试图摆脱对石油的依赖，但这种转变也不会在一夜之间发生。


Accordingly, oil markets are adjusting to stronger demand.	因此石油市场正在调整以迎接更强劲的需求。


On the supply side, the world’s most important marginal supplier of oil, Saudi Arabia, has suddenly drawn a lot of wary eyes.	在供给侧，全球最重要的石油边际供应国沙特突然吸引了许多充满疑虑的目光。


The Saudi government has been implementing radical changes, both domestically and in its foreign policy, and its reasons for doing so are not entirely clear.	沙特政府在国内和外交政策上都实施了根本性的变革，但其做出这一系列举动的原因却尚不明确。


Not surprisingly, market participants suddenly want to add a premium to the price of oil.	不出所料，市场参与者们一时间都觉得有必要给油价上点保险。


In my two speeches at ADIPEC, I shared a slide with trend lines for the Brent crude oil spot price and the five-year forward price.	在阿布扎比石油展览会的两场演讲中，我分享了布伦特原油现货价格和五年远期价格的走势。


I have long defaulted to watching the five-year forward price for lack of a more fundamentals-based approach to thinking about the equilibrium price of oil.	在缺乏与基本面更为相关的手段来思考石油均衡价格的情况下，我一直默认看五年远期价格。


As I explained in January 2015, the Brent crude oil spot price is less subject to speculative fluctuations, and is thus a purer approximation of underlying commercial supply and demand factors.	正如我在2015年1月所解释的那样，布伦特原油现货价格较少受到投机性波动的影响，因此也是一个更为纯粹地反映基本商业供求因素的近似指标。


The chart I prepared – which was made before the latest oil-price acceleration in early November – shows the five-year forward oil price picking up after a period of some stability.	我准备的图表是在11月初最新一轮石油价格上涨之前做出的，显示五年远期油价在经历一段时间的稳定之后回升。


With the spot price having now moved above the five-year forward price, one could conclude that a trend change is underway.	随着现货价格已经超过五年远期价格，人们可以得出趋势正在发生变化的结论。


For my part, I’m unsure; but I wouldn’t be surprised if it happened.	对我而言还不太确定； 但如果真的发生了，也是意料之中。


Let us return to Sedgwick’s question.	让我们回到塞齐维克的问题。


While oil prices could be around $60 per barrel in November 2018, my guess is that they will have risen to around $80 per barrel in the meantime.	虽然2018年11月的油价可能会在每桶60美元左右，但我的猜测是，在此期间油价会涨到每桶80美元左右。


Sedgwick also asked me how oil companies might be able to make their investment and operational decision-making less beholden to cyclical factors.	塞齐维克还问石油企业如何才能使自身投资和经营决策不受周期性因素的影响。


Is it possible for oil companies to temper their excitement during periods of rising prices, and not to fall into a malaise when prices are low for lengthy periods?	它们是否有可能在价格上涨时保持镇定，而在长时间价格低迷的情况下避免过度消沉？


It’s a tough question.	这是一个棘手的问题。


My answer is that oil companies need to complete the commodity-analysis quest that I started but never finished.	我的答案是，石油企业需要完成那个由我开启但从未完成的商品分析任务。


They must come up with a credible method for estimating the underlying equilibrium price of oil.	它们必须找到一个可靠的方法来估算石油的潜在均衡价格。


Then, as soon as the oil price exceeds two standard deviations of that equilibrium, they should start to ignore the fashionable advice of colleagues, analysts, and industry insiders.	一旦石油价格超过这个均衡的两个标准差，就可以无视各同僚，分析师和业内人士那些跟风式的所谓建议了。


China’s Imperial Overreach	中国的帝国主义透支


HONG KONG – Chinese President Xi Jinping’s tenure has been marked by high ambition.	香港—中国国家主席习近平带着巨大的野心走上权力高峰。


His vision – the “Chinese dream” – is to make China the world’s leading power by 2049, the centenary of communist rule.	他的愿景——“中国梦”是让中国在2049年中共执政一百周年时成为世界最强力量。


But Xi may be biting off more than he can chew.	但习近平可能有贪心不足蛇吞象之嫌。


A critical element of Xi’s strategy to realize the Chinese dream is the “one belt, one road” (OBOR) initiative, whereby China will invest in infrastructure projects abroad, with the goal of bringing countries from Central Asia to Europe firmly into China’s orbit.	习近平实现中国梦的一个关键要素是“一带一路”计划，在这个计划中，中国将投资于海外基础设施项目，其目标是将从中亚到欧洲的国家牢牢地掌握在中国的控制中。


When Xi calls it “the project of the century,” he may not be exaggerating.	习近平说这“是世纪工程”，也许并不夸张。


In terms of scale or scope, OBOR has no parallel in modern history.	就规模和范畴而言，一带一路在现代史上无可匹敌。


It is more than 12 times the size of the Marshall Plan, America’s post-World War II initiative to aid the reconstruction of Western Europe’s devastated economies.	它比二战后美国协助西欧发达经济体复兴的马歇尔计划规模大11倍以上。


Even if China cannot implement its entire plan, OBOR will have a significant and lasting impact.	即使中国无法全部完成一带一路，它仍将产生巨大而持久的影响。


Of course, OBOR is not the only challenge Xi has mounted against an aging Western-dominated international order.	当然，一带一路不是习近平对日益老化的西方主导的国际秩序所提出的唯一挑战。


He has also spearheaded the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and turned to China’s advantage the two institutions associated with the BRICS grouping of emerging economies (the Shanghai-based New Development Bank and the $100 billion Contingent Reserve Arrangement).	他还牵头成立了亚洲基础设施投资银行，并利用中国在两大金砖国家集团机构（位于上海的新开发银行和应急储备安排）的优势。


At the same time, he has asserted Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea more aggressively, while seeking to project Chinese power in the western Pacific.	与此同时，他在南海更加激进地主张领土主权，同时寻求让中国力量深入西太平洋。


But OBOR takes China’s ambitions a large step further.	但一带一路让中国的野心大大地进了一步。


With it, Xi is attempting to remake globalization on China’s terms, by creating new markets for Chinese firms, which face a growth slowdown and overcapacity at home.	习近平通过一带一路宣布了以中国为中心的全球化，它为面临国内增长减速和产能过剩的中国企业创造了新市场。


With the recently concluded OBOR summit in Beijing having drawn 29 of the more than 100 invited heads of state or government, Xi is now in a strong position to pursue his vision.	在刚刚结束的北京一带一路峰会上，100多个受邀政府首脑有29个到场，习近平也有了推行他的愿景的有利条件。


But before he does, he will seek to emerge from the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party later this year as the country’s most powerful leader since Mao Zedong.	但在此之前，他将在今年晚些时候举行的中共十九大上寻求成为自毛泽东以来权力最大的中国领导人。


Since taking power in 2012, Xi has increasingly centralized power, while tightening censorship and using anti-corruption probes to take down political enemies.	自2012年掌权以来，习近平日益集中权力，同时收紧审查，利用反腐调查清除政敌。


Last October, the CCP bestowed on him the title of “core” leader.	去年10月，中共开始用领导“核心”来形容习近平。


Yet Xi has set his sights much higher: he aspires to become modern China’s most transformative leader.	但习近平的眼光要高得多：他志在成为中国最具改革精神的领导人。


Just as Mao helped to create a reunified and independent China, and Deng Xiaoping launched China’s “reform and opening up,” Xi wants to make China the central player in the global economy and the international order.	就像毛泽东建立了重新统一的独立的新中国、邓小平开启了中国的“改革开放”，习近平希望让中国成为全球经济和国际秩序的“领衔主演”。


So, repeating a mantra of connectivity, China dangles low-interest loans in front of countries in urgent need of infrastructure, thereby pulling those countries into its economic and security sphere.	因此，中国高举互联互通的大旗，用低息贷款引诱急需基础设施的国家，让这些国家走近中国的经济和安全势力范围。


China stunned the world by buying the Greek port of Piraeus for $420 million.	中国用4. 2亿美元买下希腊比雷埃夫斯港，震惊全世界。


From there to the Seychelles, Djibouti, and Pakistan, port projects that China insisted were purely commercial have acquired military dimensions.	从希腊到塞舌尔、吉布提和巴基斯坦，这些中国坚持属于纯商业性质的港口项目都具有军事性质。


But Xi’s ambition may be blinding him to the dangers of his approach.	但习近平的野心也许让他看不见这一方针的危险。


Given China’s insistence on government-to-government deals on projects and loans, the risks to lenders and borrowers have continued to grow.	中国坚持在项目和贷款商走政府-政府交易，这导致贷方和借方风险不断增加。


Concessionary financing may help China’s state-owned companies bag huge overseas contracts; but, by spawning new asset-quality risks, it also exacerbates the challenges faced by the Chinese banking system.	优惠融资可能有助于中国国有公司拿下巨额海外合同； 但这也埋下了新的资产质量风险，从而加剧了中国银行系统所面临的挑战。


The risk of non-performing loans at state-owned banks is already clouding China’s future economic prospects.	国有银行不良贷款风险已经令中国未来经济前景蒙上一层阴影。


Since reaching a peak of $4 trillion in 2014, the country’s foreign-exchange reserves have fallen by about a quarter.	中国外汇储备在2014年达到4万亿美元的顶峰，此后下降了约四分之一。


The ratings agency Fitch has warned that many OBOR projects – most of which are being pursued in vulnerable countries with speculative-grade credit ratings – face high execution risks, and could prove unprofitable.	评级机构惠誉警告说，许多一带一路项目——大部分在信用评级为投机级的脆弱国家开展——面临非常高的执行风险，可能无法盈利。


Xi’s approach is not helping China’s international reputation, either.	习近平的方针也并没有提高中国的国际声誉。


OBOR projects lack transparency and entail no commitment to social or environmental sustainability.	一带一路项目缺少透明度，也不包括社会和环境可持续性方面的内容。


They are increasingly viewed as advancing China’s interests – including access to key commodities or strategic maritime and overland passages – at the expense of others.	它们被越来越多的人视为中国将自己的利益——包括获得重要大宗商品或战略性海路和陆路通道——建立在它人的代价上。


In a sense, OBOR seems to represent the dawn of a new colonial era – the twenty-first-century equivalent of the East India Company, which paved the way for British imperialism in the East.	从某种程度上讲，一带一路似乎是新殖民时代的黎明——一个二十一世纪的东印度公司，后者为英帝国主义进入东方铺平道路。


But, if China is building an empire, it seems already to have succumbed to what the historian Paul Kennedy famously called “imperial overstretch.”	但是，如果说中国正在缔造一个帝国，那么它似乎已经陷入了历史学家保罗·肯尼迪（Paul Kennedy）的著名的“帝国过度扩张”。


And, indeed, countries are already pushing back.	而事实上，一些国家已经开始反击。


Sri Lanka, despite having slipped into debt servitude to China, recently turned away a Chinese submarine attempting to dock at the Chinese-owned Colombo container terminal.	斯里兰卡监管陷入了中国的债务奴役，最近拒绝一艘中国潜艇进入中国所有的科伦坡集装箱码头。


And popular opposition to a 15,000-acre industrial zone in the country has held up China’s move to purchase an 80% stake in the loss-making Hambantota port that it built nearby.	该国一个占地15,000英亩的工业园区也遭到群众反对，导致中国购买建于该园区附近的亏损的汉班托塔港80%股权的计划无从继续。


Shi Yinhong, an academic who serves as a counselor to China’s government, the State Council, has warned of the growing risk of Chinese strategic overreach.	学者、中国国务院顾问时殷弘已经警告中国战略透支的风险日益增加。


And he is already being proved right.	他的论点正在被证实。


Xi has gotten so caught up in his aggressive foreign policy that he has undermined his own diplomatic aspirations, failing to recognize that brute force is no substitute for leadership.	习近平完全沉溺于他的激进外交政策，已经威胁到他本人的外交抱负，没能认识到蛮力绝不是领导力的替代品。


In the process, he has stretched China’s resources at a time when the economy is already struggling and a shrinking working-age population presages long-term stagnation.	在此过程中，他透支了中国的资源，而中国经济已经开始蹒跚，工作年龄人口的下降更预示着长期停滞。


According to a Chinese proverb, “To feed the ambition in your heart is like carrying a tiger under your arm.”	中国有句谚语，培养野心就像养虎为患。


The further Xi carries OBOR, the more likely it is to bite him.	习近平在一带一路上走得越远，就越有可能遭到一带一路的反噬。


Measuring the Internet for Freedom	为了自由测量互联网


ROME – Last year, during a wave of deadly political protests in Ethiopia, the government blocked more than 15 media websites and the smartphone chat application WhatsApp.	罗马—去年，在埃塞俄比亚可怕的政治示威风潮中，埃塞俄比亚政府封禁了超过15家媒体网站以及智能手机聊天应用WhatsApp。


Sites promoting freedom of expression and LGBTQ+ rights, as well as those offering censorship-circumvention tools, such as Tor and Psiphon, were also suppressed.	宣扬新闻自由和LGBTQ+权利的网站，以及Tor和Psiphon等规避审查的工具也被封禁。


All of this was uncovered through the use of software called ooniprobe, which is designed to measure networks and detect Internet censorship.	所有这些都是通过一个叫作ooniprobe的软件曝光的。 这个软件是为了测量网络、侦测网络审查而设计。


Ooniprobe was developed more than five years ago by the Tor-supported Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), with which I work, in order to boost transparency, accountability, and oversight of Internet censorship.	它在五年多前由Tor支持的互联网干预开放观察（Open Observatory of Network Interference，OONI）为了促进互联网审查的透明度、问责和监督而开发。 我是其中的工作人员。


The software is free and open source, meaning that anyone can use it.	该软件是一个免费的开源软件，这意味着任何人都可以使用它。


And, indeed, tens of thousands of ooniprobe users from more than 190 countries have already done just that.	事实上，目前ooniprobe在190多个国家拥有数十万用户。


Those users have contributed to the collection of millions of network measurements, all of which are published on OONI Explorer, arguably the largest publicly available resource on Internet censorship.	这些用户帮助收集数百万个互联网测量指标，全部通过OONI浏览器发布，它可能是可以公开获得的最大的互联网审查情况信息源。


Thanks to their use of ooniprobe, we uncovered the extent of last year’s wave of censorship in Ethiopia, as well as details of many other cases of censorship elsewhere in the world.	感谢他们使用ooniprobe，让我们得以掌握去年埃塞俄比亚审查风潮的规模，以及世界其他地区的许多互联网审查的细节。


In Uganda, local groups used ooniprobe during last year’s general election, when the government blocked social media.	在乌干达，一些当地组织在去年大选期间使用了ooniprobe。 在此期间，社交媒体被政府封禁。


Ooniprobe’s network-measurement data not only confirmed the government’s action; it also uncovered which sites were blocked and the different methods used by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to implement censorship.	Ooniprobe的网络测量数据不但确认了政府存在封禁行为，还揭示了哪些网站被封禁，以及互联网服务提供商（ISP）用了哪些不同的方法实施审查。


Ooniprobe also came in handy in Malaysia in 2015.	Ooniprobe在2015年的马来西亚也大显神威。


Facing accusations that he had transferred nearly $700 million from the state investment fund 1MDB to his personal bank accounts, Prime Minister Najib Razak attempted to block news outlets and blogs that reported on the scandal.	马来西亚总理纳吉被控将近7亿美元从国家投资基金1MDB转移到其个人账户，为此他试图封禁报道这一丑闻的新闻媒体和博客。


It was ooniprobe’s network-measurement software that enabled Malaysian civil-society groups to collect data that serve as evidence of the blocking.	Ooniprobe的网络测量软件让马来西亚公民社会组织得以收集到可作为封禁证据的数据。


Of course, censorship is not always carried out to protect the politically powerful; it can also be used to reinforce social and cultural norms.	当然，审查并非总是为了保护政治权势人物； 它也可以用来加强社会和文化规范。


In Indonesia, for example, low social tolerance for homosexuality may have played a role in the blocking of numerous LGBTQ+ websites, even though the country does not officially restrict LGBTQ+ rights.	比如，在印尼，同性恋的社会容忍度很低，这是其封禁众多LGBTQ+网站的原因之一，虽然该国官方并不限制LGBTQ+权利。


Similar factors may have influenced efforts to block sites perceived as overly critical of Islam.	类似的因素可能也影响到对伊斯兰教持过度批判态度的网站的封禁行为。


In Thailand, ISPs have, in the last three years, blocked access to a number of sites that are perceived to be offensive toward the country’s royal family.	在泰国，ISP在过去三年中封禁了一大批被认为对王室有冒犯行为的网站。


But, here, there is a legal justification: Thailand’s strict prohibition against lèse-majesté protects the royal family’s most senior members from insult or threat.	但这个例子也有其法律正当性：泰国严禁大不敬行为，王室最高成员不可冒犯或威胁。


Other cases of legally justified Internet censorship include the blocking of sexually explicit websites in countries where pornography is prohibited.	其他具有法律正当性的互联网审查包括禁止色情内容的国家封禁有赤裸裸性形象的网站。


Then there are cases where the motivation for censorship is unclear.	也有不少审查，背后的动机不明。


Why, for example, has an online dating site been blocked in Malaysia?	比如，马来西亚为什么要封禁一家在线约会网站？


In some countries, ISPs appear to be censoring sites at their own discretion.	在一些国家，ISP似乎可以随心所欲地审查网站。


According to ooniprobe data, multiple Thai ISPs simultaneously blocked access to different types of websites – from news outlets to Wikileaks to pornography – indicating that they likely received vague orders from authorities.	据ooniprobe的数据，多家泰国ISP联手封禁了多种网站——从新闻媒体到维基解密和色情网站——这表明它们可能收到了当局的指令。


Before ooniprobe, such censorship was difficult to detect, leading to a lack of accountability, with governments and ISPs often denying any and all involvement.	Ooniprobe诞生前，这些审查很难被侦测到，这导致了难以问责，政府和ISP常常否认一切与审查有关的指控。


Even in cases where governments announce official lists of blocked sites, they may leave some targets off.	即使有时政府会公布官方封禁网站名单，也会网开一面。


Likewise, ISPs may not always comply with official orders to lift blocks.	类似地，ISP也不会一直遵守官方的封禁指令。


Vimeo and Reddit, for example, were recently found to be blocked in some networks in Indonesia, even though the official ban on those sites was lifted more than two years ago.	比如，Vimeo和Reddit最近被发现遭到了印尼一些社交网络的封禁，尽管官方在两年多前就将它们移出了封禁名单。


With ooniprobe, users are not only able to expose Internet censorship; they can also acquire substantial detail about how, when, where, and by whom the censorship is being implemented.	有了ooniprobe，用户不但能够曝光互联网审查； 还可以了解关于审查如何实施、何时实施、由谁实施的大量细节。


OONI’s Web-Connectivity Test, for example, is designed to examine whether access to websites is blocked through DNS tampering, TCP/IP blocking, or a transparent HTTP proxy.	比如，OONI的网络连通性测试可以检查网站接入是否通过DNS削弱、TCP/IP封禁或透明HTTP代理封禁。


Other ooniprobe tests are designed to examine the accessibility of chat apps – namely, WhatsApp, Telegram, and Facebook Messenger – within networks, as well as that of censorship-circumvention tools, such as Tor, Psiphon, and Lantern.	其他ooniprobe测试可以检查聊天应用在网络中是否畅通，比如WhatsApp、Telegram和Facebook Messenger，以及规避审查的工具是否可用，比如Tor、Psiphon和Lantern。


OONI also provides software tests that uncover the presence of systems (“middle boxes”) that could potentially be responsible for censorship or surveillance.	OONI还提供软件测试，以发现是否有可能造成审查或监控的系统（“中间盒”）的存在。


The depth of OONI data supports much-needed accountability and oversight.	OONI数据的深度支持急需的问责和监督。


Lawyers can use OONI data to assess the legality of Internet censorship in their countries, and potentially introduce it as evidence in court cases.	律师可以援引OONI数据评估互联网审查的合法性，并可以作为呈堂证供。


Journalists, researchers, and human-rights defenders can use the data to inform their work as well.	记者、研究者和人权卫士可以使用OONI数据了解他们的工作情况。


And censorship-circumvention projects like Tor can use OONI findings on emergent censorship events to shape their tools and strategies.	Tor等审查规避项目可以使用OONI数据提前发现审查，据此改进它们的工具和策略。


OONI data can help enrich public discourse about the legality, necessity, and proportionality of Internet censorship.	OONI数据有助于丰富关于互联网审查的合法性、必要性和适当性的公共讨论。


That makes it a critical tool for safeguarding human rights on the Internet and beyond.	它是一个在互联网捍卫人权的重要工具。


The EU’s Mafia State	欧盟的黑手党国家


BUDAPEST – Following the collapse of communism, many of us in Central and Eastern Europe had hoped that the region would steadily move toward liberal democracy, and that any obstacles en route to that goal could be overcome.	发自布达佩斯——在共产政权垮台后，许多中东欧地区的人们都希望该地区能稳步向自由民主迈进，并克服在实现这一目标的道路上所遇到的一切障碍。


But in many former communist countries, older systems of patronage and corruption have survived, and taken new forms.	然而在许多前共产主义国家，旧的政治利益交换和腐败制度得以保全，并演化出了新的形式。


What we thought was a transitional phase has become a permanent state of affairs.	人们原本认为的过渡阶段如今已经成为了一种永久性的状态。


Consider Hungary, which has become a mafia state during the seven years of Viktor Orbán’s rule as prime minister.	以匈牙利为例，在维克多·欧尔班担任首相的七年中，该国已经沦为一个黑手党国家。


Hungary is unique in that it moved toward liberal democracy and joined the European Union before changing course and heading toward autocracy.	匈牙利的独特之处在于它在改变国家走向迈向独裁之前就直接向自由民主迈进并加入了欧盟。


The rest of the region’s mafia states, such as Russia, Azerbaijan, and other Central Asian former Soviet republics, either passed through a period of oligarchic flux, or took a direct path from communist dictatorship to criminal enterprise.	而该地区的其他黑手党国家，如俄罗斯、阿塞拜疆和其他中亚前苏联加盟共和国，要么经历了寡头统治的时期，要么直接从共产主义独裁转为国家犯罪集团。


In these countries, oligarchs and the organized underworld have not captured the state; rather, an organized “upperworld” of elites have captured the economy, including the oligarchs themselves.	在这些国家，寡头和有组织的黑社会未能窃取国家；


The result is a mix between a criminal organization and a privatized, parasitic state.	相反，一个有组织的“上层”精英占据了包括寡头在内的整个经济体，最终造就出一个犯罪集团和私有化寄生性国家的混合体。


Most analyses of post-communist autocracies tend to focus on the political institutions and ideologies underpinning the state.	大多数针对后共产主义专制政体的分析往往集中在国家的隐含政治体制和意识形态上。


But while these regimes make populist appeals, they are not driven by ideology. Their primary concern is to consolidate the ruler’s power and personal wealth through whatever means necessary.	但虽然这些政权大肆鼓吹民粹主义，却并非由意识形态所驱动，而是为了动用一切必要的手段去巩固统治者的权力和个人财富。


In today’s mafia states, key decisions are made through informal mechanisms created by the regime, instead of through formal institutions.	在当今的黑手党国家中，关键性决策不是通过正式机构制订，而通过政权创立的非正式机制来形成。


In terms of structure and culture, these arrangements resemble an adopted family, which the regime creates by systematically replacing political and economic elites.	在结构和文化方面来说，这些安排类似于一个统治者通过系统地替换政治和经济精英而创立的寄养家庭。


In a democracy, these elites would be autonomous actors.	在民主国家，这些精英都是自主行为人。


But in a mafia state, their position is subsumed in a system of patron-client dependency, often through regime-led corporate raiding and rent-seeking.	但在黑手党国家，他们往往通过一个政权主导的企业劫掠和寻租行为而被纳入了一个政治依附体系。


The classic mafia technique of physical coercion is thus replaced with a bloodless, “legal” form of compulsion overseen by public authorities.	经典的黑手党式人身威胁也因此被一个公共当局操纵下的，杀人不见血的“法律”强制形式所取代。


To be sure, corruption is endemic in other post-communist countries that have joined the EU, such as Romania and Bulgaria.	诚然，腐败也是罗马尼亚和保加利亚等前共产主义欧盟成员国的通病。


But because these countries have proportionate election systems and divided executive power, no central patronage network has emerged.	但由于这些国家具备相对应的选举体制和行政分权，也杜绝了任何集中性的政治依附网络的出现。


Unlike Jarosław Kaczyński, Poland’s fanatically ideological de facto leader, Orbán is a cynic.	跟雅罗斯瓦夫·卡钦斯基（Jarosław Kaczyński）这个波兰狂热意识形态的实际领导人不一样的是，欧尔班是一个犬儒主义者。


The type of autocratic regime that he is trying to establish in Hungary is very different from Kaczyński’s in Poland, despite the ideological similarities.	他试图在匈牙利建立的独裁政权类型与卡钦斯基的波兰版本之间尽管有意识形态上的相似之处，可实际上大相径庭。


Whereas Orbán’s regime seeks wealth, and is sustained by an adopted political family that operates outside the constraints of formal institutions, Kaczyński is conducting a conservative-autocratic experiment that is driven as much by ideology as by the quest for power.	欧尔班的政权贪恋财富，并由一个不受正式体制约束的政治寄养家庭来维持，而卡钦斯基进行的则是一场保守独裁实验，这一试验背后的意识形态推动力跟对其权力的追求不相上下。


In Hungary’s 2010 parliamentary election, Orbán’s Fidesz party won 53% of the vote, and 263 of the National Assembly’s 386 seats.	在2010年举行的匈牙利议会选举中，欧尔班的青年民主主义者联盟党（简称民盟）赢得了53%的选票以及国民议会386席位中的263个。


Orban used this strong position to alter the constitution, appoint loyal followers to democratic institutions that otherwise would have checked his power, and manipulate election laws to cement his rule.	欧尔班借助这一强势地位来修变宪法，安插其忠诚追随者到可以制衡其权力的民主机构，并操纵选举法以巩固自身统治。


In the 2014 parliamentary election, Fidesz needed just 44% of the votes to maintain control.	在2014选举中，民盟只需要获得44% 的选票就能继续控制议会。


Orbán’s mafia state will be very hard to dismantle.	欧尔班的黑手党政权极难被撼动。


Its pyramidal patronage network, similar to that created by Vladimir Putin in Russia, appears to be nearly indestructible.	其金字塔式的政治依附网络与普京在俄罗斯创造的类似，看上去似乎坚不可摧。


In Ukraine, it should be noted, revolutions have been required – first under Leonid Kuchma, and then under Viktor Yanukovych, to prevent such a system from being established (whether a third attempt is currently underway today remains to be seen).	应该指出的是，在乌克兰，人们被迫发动一次又一次的革命——先是推翻总统列昂尼德·库奇马（Leonid Kuchma），接着把维克托·亚努科维奇（Viktor Yanukovych）赶下台——以防止这种体制的确立 (第三次革命是否正在酝酿之中尚待观察)。


It will be impossible to vote Orbán out of power as long as he can manipulate Hungary’s elections.	只要欧尔班能继续操纵匈牙利的选举，就不可能通过投票让他下台。


Fidesz has tightened its control over the judiciary and politicized law enforcement, by turning the Chief Prosecutor’s office into what is essentially an arm of the party.	通过将首席检察官办公室变成一个类似下属部门，民盟成功加强了对司法部门的控制并将执法部门政治化。


Moreover, most newspapers and radio stations are now owned by oligarchs close to Orbán, and state television has become a vehicle for government propaganda.	此外，眼下大多数报纸和广播电台都属那些欧尔班身边的寡头所有，国家电视台已经沦为政府的宣传工具。


The common values that the EU was established to uphold have been fatally undermined in Hungary.	前人建立通过欧盟来维护的共同价值观念在匈牙利遭到了致命的破坏。


In response, the EU could have the European Court of Human Rights investigate Hungary’s violations of EU rules, or an EU-level prosecutor could bring civil or criminal actions against Hungary’s misuse of EU funds.	作为回应，欧盟可能让欧洲人权法院调查匈牙利违反欧盟规则的行为，或者指派欧盟一级的检察官对匈牙利滥用欧盟基金的行为提起民事或刑事诉讼。


But, so far, the EU has been reluctant to take serious punitive action against Orbán’s regime, because it does not want to risk pushing Hungary further into Russia’s embrace.	但到目前为止，欧盟一直不愿对欧尔班政权采取严厉的惩罚行动，因为它不想冒险将匈牙利进一步推向俄罗斯的怀抱。


And the EU’s tacit acceptance of a “multi-speed Europe” implies that it can live with a buffer zone of semi-autocratic member states on its eastern border.	欧盟对“欧洲（民主）发展不同步”状况的默许意味着它可以容忍在其东部边境存在一个由半独裁成员国构成的缓冲区。


Accordingly, Orbán now presides over what he proudly calls an “illiberal democracy” that is spearheading an “Eastern opening.”	相应地，欧尔班现在执掌着他自豪地称之为“非自由民主”的“东部开放”领头羊。


His strategy vis-à-vis the EU is tantamount to blackmail.	他对欧盟的战略无异于讹诈。


He demands that EU funds be provided with no strings attached, while signaling that he would gladly sell his loyalty to Russia.	他一方面要求欧盟提供无任何附加条件的资金，另一方面又暗示自己很乐意向俄罗斯效忠。


As the Hungarian writer Miklós Haraszti has said, Hungary is “drifting in a Western boat propelled by an Eastern wind.”	正如匈牙利作家米克洛斯· 哈拉兹蒂（Miklos Haraszti）所说，匈牙利是“坐在一艘由东风推动的西方船上四处漂流。


Now that the law of rule has supplanted the rule of law, Hungary’s democratic ship may have already sailed.	如今治法已经取代了法治，匈牙利的民主之船可能已经渐行渐远了。


Dealing with Damaging Institutional Inertia	应对有害的机构惰性


LONDON – Deeply rooted, credible, accountable, and effective institutions have long been deemed crucial for a society’s lasting wellbeing and prosperity.	伦敦—长期以来，根基深厚、可信、可问责、有效的机构一直被视为一个社会保持幸福和繁荣的关键。


They shield countries from frequent and unsettling volatility, be it economic, political, or social, and they reduce the risk of costly shocks.	这些机构让国家不会出现频繁的、令人不安的波动，不管是在经济上，政治上还是社会上；


But, nowadays, key political and economic institutions are being pressured by unusual fluidity in their operating environments and the effects of a cumulative loss of trust on the part of their constituencies.	也降低了代价高昂的冲击的风险。 但如今，关键性政治和经济机构正因为它们的运转环境反常的波动，以及管辖区内累积的信任缺失，而承受压力。


The implications vary, with a much higher probability of adaptation, including through a relatively orderly process of creative destruction and re-creation, for private entities compared to public ones.	影响是多变的，相对于公共实体，私人实体进行调整适应的概率要高得多，包括通过相对有序的创造性破坏和再造过程来实现。


The latter require an intensification of reform efforts, lest they constitute another obstacle to the global economy’s ability to deliver high and inclusive growth on a lasting basis.	公共实体需要加强改革措施，这样才能免于变成妨碍全球经济实现持续的包容性高增长的新障碍。


Like a well-designed, well-functioning road network, strong institutions empower economies by ensuring a stable operating environment, smoother transmission mechanisms, less costly and less risky economic interactions, a credible set of property rights, and respect for the rule of law.	强大的机构就像是一张设计合理、运转良好的道路网，它们确保稳定的运行环境、更加平稳的传递机制、成本和风险更低的经济互动、可信的财产权利，以及对法治的尊重，从而让经济变得强大。


They act not only as enablers of a wide range of win-win relationships, but also as trusted gatekeepers.	它们不但是各种双赢关系的促成因素，更是受到信任的看门人。


Accordingly, for decades such institutions were widely viewed as the main feature differentiating advanced economies from developing countries that are still subject to a much larger array of damaging cyclical and structural shocks.	因此，几十年来，这些机构被广泛视为将发达经济体和发展中国家区别开来的主要特征。 发展中国家仍然极易受到更大范围的破坏性周期和结构性冲击。


In recent years, however, this characterization has been challenged, as the standing of private and public institutions with significant systemic influence has declined.	但是，近几年来，这一界定受到了挑战，拥有巨大系统性影响力的私人和公共机构的地位衰落了。


For an expanding set of private firms, the main source of pressure has been technological, particularly those advances underpinned by the increasingly powerful mix of artificial intelligence, big data, and mobility.	对越来越多的私人企业来说，主要压力源一直是技术，特别是以日益强大的混合了人工智能、大数据和移动性的技术进步。


The challenge has proven particularly severe, if not fatal, for those facing intense competition from entrants able to combine disruptive content and big platforms – the most notable examples being Amazon, Facebook, Google, Netflix, and Uber.	对于面临来自能够结合颠覆性内容和大平台的新来者的激烈竞争的企业来说，挑战尤其艰巨，甚至是致命的——显著的例子包括亚马逊、Facebook、谷歌、奈飞和优步等。


As illustrated by the increased regulatory interest they are now attracting, as well as the increased media attention devoted to various controversies (such as those relating to “fake news” and internal corporate cultures), these companies must adapt and remain agile as they gain greater systemic influence and notice.	从它们越来越吸引监管部门的兴趣，以及越来越多的媒体开始关注各种争议（如与“假新闻”和内部公司文化的争议）来看，这些公司必须在赢得更大的系统性影响力和关注的同时有所调整，保持灵活。


The adjustment process is even trickier for public institutions, especially given their wide-ranging roles as gatekeepers, enablers, and regulators.	对于公共机构来说，调整的过程更加艰巨，特别是考虑到它们还要充当各种看门人、促进因素和监管部门的角色。


Often embodying the properties of “natural monopolies,” they are not only shielded from disruption but can also repress and delay beneficial innovations.	它们常常具备“自然垄断”性质，不仅仅能抵挡破坏，也会抑制和推迟有益的创新。


Internal inertia, incomplete information, risk aversion, and conscious and unconscious biases combine to impede recognition of the urgency and importance of adaptation.	内在惰性、不完全信息、风险厌恶和有意无意的偏见所形成的合力阻碍了对调整适应的紧迫性和重要性的认识。


Even more benign shortcomings – such as slowness in modernizing laws to catch up to changing realities – detract from economic wellbeing.	即使是不那么恶劣的缺陷——如法律现代化速度跟不上变化的现实——也会有损于经济福祉。


The visible and persistent failure of education systems to adopt exciting technological breakthroughs is a well-known example of this inertia.	教育系统在引入令人振奋的技术突破方面的显然而持续的失败是这一惰性的最佳写照。


Less obvious is the lag among economic institutions in updating policy approaches, including through faster incorporation of important insights and tools from behavioral science, AI, neuroscience, and other disciplines. Then there are the persistent slippages in skill acquisition programs.	不那么显而易见的是经济机构在更新政策方针方面的滞后性，包括通过更快地采纳重要洞见和来自行为科学、人工智能、神经科学和其他学科的工具实现政策方针更新。


As a result, there has been a notable erosion of trust in the effectiveness of public institutions.	这大大损害了人们对公共机构的效力的信任。


And the damage to their credibility risks further undermining their effectiveness and perpetuating a vicious circle set in motion by their failure to generate high and inclusive growth.	而信誉的受损有可能进一步影响它们的效果，让因它们没能实现包容性高增长而产生的恶性循环持久化。


Our understanding of how public institutions should adapt and reform is still evolving. As such, a complete solution is yet to emerge.	我们对于公共机构如何调整适应以及改革的认识仍在不断演化，尚不能产生一个完整的方案。


But a few imperatives are already clear.	但一些重点已经水落石出。


·         Limit harm, including by resisting the natural inclination to promulgate increasingly ineffective, albeit established approaches, entities, and mindsets.	·         限制伤害，包括克制推广日益低效但现成的方针、实体和思维的天然倾向。


·         Be much more open to the lessons that can be learned from external disruptors, and be willing to revisit the underpinnings of processes and entire business models.	·         对于可以从外部破坏者身上学到的教训保持更加开放的态度，并愿意反省过程的基础和全部业务模式。


·         Enhance public-private interactions, not just for direct content, but also as a way to broaden the scope for greater cross-fertilization of best practices.	·         加强公私互动，不仅仅是为了直接内容，也是作为打开最佳实践“杂交”的空间的方法。


·         Improve methods of public communications, lest continued information failures, aging channels, and the cumulative erosion of trust compound operational shortcomings.	·         改善公共沟通方法，杜绝持续信息失灵、渠道老化和积重难返的信任缺失加剧运行缺陷。


Up to now, too many inherently influential institutions have lagged in identifying and implementing reforms.	目前，太多具有内在影响力的机构在认识和落实改革方面大大滞后了。


This has amplified the disappointment, alienation, and marginalization felt by segments of the population vis-à-vis governments that do not hear or respond to a deeply entrenched fear of economic insecurity.	这加剧了细分人口群体因为政府对根深蒂固的经济不安全的担忧充耳不闻、无动于衷而产生的失望感、梳理感和边缘化感。


It is a phenomenon that has been many years in the making, that cannot be eliminated overnight, and that increasingly fuels social and political disruptions.	这种现象已经孕育了多年，不可能一夜之间得到根除，并在不断助长社会和政治破坏。


Institutions matter, especially in a period of economic, political, and social fluidity.	机构很重要，特别是在经济、政治和社会瞬息万变的时期。


The longer it takes to restore confidence in key public and, to a lesser extent, private institutions, the greater the impediments to our wellbeing and that of our children.	重塑对关键公共机构——以及在较小的程度上，对私人机构——的信心耗时越久，我们和子孙后代的福祉所受到的威胁就越大。


The Pakistani Mecca of Terror	巴基斯坦的恐怖麦加


BERLIN – Almost seven decades after it was created as the first Islamic republic of the postcolonial era, Pakistan is teetering on the edge of an abyss.	柏林—巴基斯坦作为后殖民地时代第一个伊斯兰共和国已经成立了将近七十年，如今，巴基斯坦正在滑向深渊。


The economy is stagnant, unemployment is high, and resources are scarce.	经济停滞，事业高企，资源紧缺。


The government is unstable, ineffective, and plagued by debt.	政府缺乏稳定，效率低下，债务累累。


The military – along with its rogue Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, comprising the country’s spies and secret policemen – is exempt from civilian oversight, enabling it to maintain and deepen its terrorist ties.	军方——包括由间谍和秘密警察组成的流氓化的三军情报局——逍遥于文职监督之外，导致其得以保持和深化与恐怖分子的联系。


Nuclear-armed Pakistan is now at risk of becoming a failed state.	如今，拥有核武器的巴基斯坦有可能沦为失败之国。


But even if it does not fail, the nexus between terrorist groups and Pakistan’s powerful military raises the specter of nuclear terrorism – a menace so large that the United States has prepared a contingency plan to take out the country’s fast-growing nuclear arsenal should the need arise.	但即使它没有失败，恐怖集团和巴基斯坦炙手可热的军方之间的关联也带来了核恐怖主义的幽灵——这一威胁如此巨大，以至于美国准备了一套如有必要消除巴基斯坦迅速膨胀的核武库的应急计划。


Make no mistake: Pakistan is “ground zero” for the terrorist threat the world faces.	毫无疑问，巴基斯坦是全世界所面临的恐怖主义威胁的“零点”（ground zero）。


The footprints of many terrorist attacks in the West have been traced to Pakistan, including the 2005 London bombings and the 2015 San Bernardino killings.	西方的多起恐怖袭击可以追本溯源到巴基斯坦，包括2005年伦敦爆炸案和2015年圣贝纳迪诺屠杀。


Two key actors behind the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States – Osama bin Laden and Khalid Sheik Mohammed – were found ensconced in Pakistan.	2001年9月11日美国遭遇的恐怖袭击的两大背后主谋——本·拉登和穆罕默德（Khalid Sheik Mohammed）——均在巴基斯坦被发现。


In the recent Manhattan and New Jersey bombings, the arrested suspect, Ahmad Khan Rahami, was radicalized in a Pakistan seminary located near the Pakistani military’s hideout for the Afghan Taliban leadership.	在最近的曼哈顿和新泽西爆炸案中，被捕的嫌犯拉哈米（Ahmad Khan Rahami）亦是在坐落于巴基斯坦军方为阿富汗塔利班领导层提供的藏身之所附近的巴基斯坦神学院极端化的。


But it is Pakistan’s neighbors that are bearing the brunt of its state-sponsored terrorism.	但这一国家支持的恐怖主义的主要受害者是巴基斯坦邻国。


Major terrorist attacks in South Asia, like the 2008 Mumbai strikes and the 2008 and 2011 assaults on the Indian and US embassies in Afghanistan, respectively, were apparently orchestrated by the ISI, which has reared terrorist organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and the Haqqani network to do its bidding.	南亚的主要恐怖袭击，如2008年孟买袭击案以及2008年和2011年印度和美国驻阿富汗大使馆分别被袭案显然是由巴三军情报局组织策划。 巴三军情报局支持着虔诚军（Lashkar-e-Taiba）、穆罕默德军（Jaish-e-Mohammad）、哈卡尼（Haqqani）网络等恐怖组织进行这些恐怖袭击。


This is no hearsay; former Pakistani military dictator Pervez Musharraf has largely acknowledged it.	这绝不是道听途说； 前巴基斯坦军事独裁者穆沙拉夫基本承认这一点。


In India, in particular, the Pakistani military – which, despite being the world’s sixth largest, would have little chance of winning a conventional war against its giant neighbor – uses its terrorist proxies to wage a clandestine war.	特别是，在印度，巴基斯坦军方——尽管其规模名列世界第六，但它能够打赢与其巨人邻邦的传统战争的希望渺茫——利用其恐怖主义代理人挑起了一场秘密战争。


This year alone, Pakistani military-backed terrorists have crossed the border twice to carry out attacks on Indian military bases.	光是在今年，巴基斯坦军方支持的恐怖分子两次穿越边境，袭击印度军事基地。


In January, Jaish-e-Mohammad struck India’s Pathankot air base, initiating days of fighting that left seven Indian soldiers dead.	1月份，穆罕默德军袭击了印度帕坦科特（Pathankot）空军基地，挑起一场为期数天的战斗，导致七名印度士兵死亡。


Last month, members of the same group crossed the border again to strike the Indian army base at Uri, killing 19 soldiers and prompting India to carry out a retaliatory surgical strike against militant staging areas across the line of control in disputed and divided Kashmir.	上个月，该组织成员再次穿越边境，袭击了位于乌里（Uri）的印度军事基地，杀害19名士兵，促使印度越界对争议和分裂的克什米尔控制线周边军事集结区采取报复性精准打击。


Afghanistan and Bangladesh also accuse ISI of undermining their security through terrorist surrogates.	阿富汗和孟加拉国也谴责巴基斯坦三军情报局通过恐怖主义代理人破坏国家安全。


They blame Pakistan for the recent grisly attacks in their respective capitals, Kabul and Dhaka, in which a university and a café were among the targets.	它们指责巴基斯坦要为各自首都喀布尔和达卡最近发生的骇人听闻的袭击事件负责，袭击目标包括一所大学和一家咖啡馆。


Such activities have left Pakistan isolated.	这些行动导致巴基斯坦陷入孤立。


Just recently, its regional neighbors – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka – pulled the plug on a South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation summit that was scheduled for early next month in Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad.	最近，其域内邻国——阿富汗、孟加拉国、不丹、印度、尼泊尔和斯里兰卡——叫停了原本定于下个月初在巴基斯坦首都伊斯兰堡举行的南亚区域合作联盟（SAARC）峰会。


Sri Lanka’s prime minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, has warned that “cross-border terrorism” imperils the very future of SAARC.	斯里兰卡总理维克勒马辛哈警告“跨境恐怖主义”对SAARC的未来构成了威胁。


But diminished international standing and growing regional isolation have been insufficient to induce Pakistan’s dominant military to rethink its stance on terrorism.	但国际地位的削弱和区域孤立的增强不足以让主宰巴基斯坦的军方反思其在恐怖主义问题上的立场。


One reason is that Pakistan retains some powerful patrons.	一个原因是巴基斯坦仍拥有一些强大的保护国。


Beyond receiving financial support from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan has, in some ways, become a client of China, which provides political protection – even for Pakistan-based terrorists – at the United Nations Security Council.	除了从沙特阿拉伯获得金融支持，巴基斯坦在某种程度上说已经沦为中国的被保护国，由后者在联合国安理会为其提供政治保护——不啻保护位于巴基斯坦的恐怖分子。


This month, China torpedoed, for the fifth time in two years, proposed UN sanctions on Masood Azhar, the Pakistan-based head of Jaish-e-Mohammed, which the UN designated as a terrorist outfit years ago.	本月，中国两年内第五次否决了联合国制裁位于巴基斯坦的穆罕默德军头目阿扎尔（Masood Azhar）的制裁提案。 联合国在多年前便已将巴基斯坦军列为恐怖组织。


The sanctions were backed by all other members of the Security Council’s anti-terror committee, not least because India had presented evidence linking Azhar to the terrorist killings at its two military bases.	该制裁受到了其他所有安理会反恐委员会成员的支持，因为印度展示了证明阿扎尔与两起印度军事基地恐怖主义杀戮案有关的证据。


In terms of financial aid, however, it is the US that serves as Pakistan’s biggest benefactor.	但是，在金融援助方面，美国才是巴基斯坦最大的金主。


Yes, even after finding the likes of Bin Laden on Pakistani soil, the US – the country that has spearheaded the so-called War on Terror – not only continues to deliver billions of dollars in aid to Pakistan, but also supplies it with large amounts of lethal weapons.	诚然，即使在巴基斯坦的土地上找到了本·拉登等人，但美国——所谓的反恐战争的急先锋——不但继续为巴基斯坦提供数十亿美元的援助，还为其提供巨量致命武器。


US President Barack Obama’s administration also opposes a move in Congress that would officially brand Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism.	美国总统奥巴马政府还反对国会正式将巴基斯坦列为恐怖主义支持国的动作。


This approach reflects Obama’s commitment to using inducements to coax the Pakistani military to persuade the Taliban to agree to a peace deal in Afghanistan.	这一方针反映出奥巴马决心要利诱巴基斯坦军方说服塔利班同意阿富汗和平协议。


But that policy has failed.	但这一政策已经失败。


The US remains stuck in the longest war in its history, as a resurgent Taliban carries out increasingly daring attacks in Afghanistan with the aid of their command-and-control structure in – you guessed it – Pakistan.	复兴的塔利班在阿富汗的袭击行动越来越大胆，美国仍然深陷其历史上历时最久的战争之中，而塔利班的指挥和控制结构正是受到了——你没有猜错——巴基斯坦的支持。


No counterterrorism campaign has ever succeeded when militants have enjoyed such cross-border havens.	当恐怖分子能够获得如此跨境避风港时，反恐行动绝无可能成功。


Achieving peace in Afghanistan, like stemming the spread of international terrorism, will be impossible without making the Pakistani military accountable to the country’s civilian government.	实现阿富汗和平与阻止国际恐怖组织蔓延一样，如果无法让巴基斯坦军方接受文职政府的问责，永远是不可能的任务。


The US has a lot of leverage: Pakistan has one of the world’s lowest tax-to-GDP ratios, and is highly dependent on American and other foreign aid.	美国可以起到巨大的作用：巴基斯坦的税收-GDP之比为世界最低之一，并且高度依赖美国和其他外国援助。


It should use that leverage to ensure that the Pakistani military is brought to heel – and held to account.	美国应该利用这一点确保牵制巴基斯坦军方——并承担责任。


The War on Secrecy	向秘密宣战


LONDON – What do the recently released Panama papers, ExxonMobil, and a Canadian mining company operating in Guatemala have in common?	伦敦—最近曝光的巴拿马文件、埃克森美孚公司以及某家在危地马拉经营的加拿大矿业公司之间有何共同之处？


They are all cases in which powerful individuals and organizations tried to obfuscate, deceive, or hide behind a front.	在这三个例子中，都有权势个人和组织试图混淆、欺骗或隐藏在幕后。


And they are all cases in which that effort didn’t work.	在这三个例子中，努力（efforts）不管用。


The global uproar triggered by the Panama Papers – 11.5 million files taken, apparently by computer hackers, from the world’s fourth-largest offshore law firm, Panama’s Mossack Fonseca – is likely to continue for some time.	巴拿马文件包括1,150万份资料，显然是电脑黑客从全球第四大离岸法务公司、巴拿马的Mossack Fonseca律师事务所获得。 这些文件所引起的全球反响可能还会持续一段时间。


The files’ release has revealed the extreme, and sometimes costly, lengths that individuals go to hide their assets and avoid taxation.	这些资料的曝光揭示了个人为了隐藏资产和规避税收可以走多大的极端（有时还要付出高昂成本）。


What has been uncovered thus far ranges from legal but ethically suspect use of tax loopholes to efforts to stash or launder money gained through corruption or other illegal activities.	目前所披露的情况包括合法但道德上可疑地利用税收漏洞以及藏匿和清洗得自腐败或其他非法活动的资金。


The reaction has been swift, harsh, and almost universally excoriating.	反响来得迅速、猛烈，几乎是一边倒地严厉指责。


Already, the prime minister of Iceland has been forced to resign, after it was revealed that he held stakes in offshore companies with his wife.	目前，冰岛首相已经在被披露与其妻持有离岸公司股份后被迫辞职。


Relatives of senior Chinese officials, including President Xi Jinping, as well as members of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle, have been implicated as well.	中国高官（包括习近平）的亲属，以及俄罗斯总统普京的小团体成员也牵涉其中。


Xi and Putin may have little to worry about.	习近平和普京没什么好担忧的。


But the sheer hypocrisy of government officials proclaiming the need for austerity and encouraging public sacrifice for the sake of long-term prosperity, while secretly avoiding that effort, is a galling violation of trust in democratic countries.	但政府官员在大谈紧缩的必要性，鼓励公众为了长期繁荣而做出牺牲，自己却秘密地避免这样做，如此赤裸裸的伪善令人发指地违背了民主国家的信任。


If their offshore shell companies and bank accounts are legal, why go to so much trouble to be secretive?	如果他们的离岸壳公司和银行账户是合法的，那么为何要费如此周折保密？


And if secrecy is legal, what is wrong with it?	而如果保密是合法的，那么会有什么问题？


Meanwhile, corporate secrecy has placed ExxonMobil in the crosshairs of the attorneys general of New York, Massachusetts, and the Virgin Islands, and many more states are waiting in the wings.	与此同时，公司机密让埃克森美孚成为纽约州、马萨诸塞州和维京群岛检察长的目标，许多其他州也在蓄势待发。


The investigation is focusing on whether the company knowingly made false statements about climate change, starting from the 1980’s.	调查集中在该公司是否从20世纪80年代开始在知情的情况下做出关于气候变化的虚假陈述。


Internal documents indicate that Exxon, and later ExxonMobil, knew about the damaging effects of climate change but revealed no information to investors or the public.	内部文件表明，埃克森公司，以及日后的埃克森美孚公司，明知气候变化的破坏效应，但没有向投资者或公众披露任何信息。


In fact, the company’s public statements – including as recently as last year – routinely dismissed the risk of climate change.	事实上，该公司的公开报表——近到去年——一贯否认气候变化的风险。


When given an opportunity to come clean and operate transparently, ExxonMobil opted for obfuscation.	每一次有机会澄清和透明经营时，埃克森美孚都选择混淆视听。


In Canada, Hudbay Minerals is embroiled in a lawsuit that could open the door to real consequences for companies that offload onto subsidiaries all responsibility for their overseas operations.	在加拿大，哈德湾矿业公司（Hudbay Minerals）卷入了一场法律诉讼，这场诉讼可能开启让将海外经营责任全部推卸给分支机构的公司承担真正后果的大门。


Instead of applying their home countries’ ethical requirements and standards in the countries where they operate, Western companies draw a veil of subsidiaries, contractors, and supply chains over behavior that consumers and investors would consider reprehensible.	西方公司在经营所在国不采用母国道德要求和标准，而是通过各种分支机构、承包商和供应链掩盖消费者和投资者可能认为不道德的行为。


Hudbay Minerals is being sued over an episode of mass rape and property destruction in Guatemala, after soldiers and people claiming to be security officials from the company that owned a local mine arrived in a small village with orders to evict its residents.	哈德湾矿业公司在危地马拉遭到起诉是因为大规模掠夺和破坏财产，声称是来自拥有一家地方矿产的该公司的安全官员的人和士兵来到一个小村庄，奉命将居民赶走。


The case is seemingly complex, as it involved multiple owners, numerous subsidiaries, and an array of jurisdictions.	该案看似复杂，因为牵涉许多所有者，众多分支，以及多个司法辖区。


But the principle at stake is simple: A parent company must be held responsible for overseeing the actions of those representing it.	但适用原则很简单：母公司必须负责监督代表它行动的人的行为。


Creating layer upon layer of ownership to preserve secrecy must not continue.	设置层层所有权以保持神秘不容继续。


And it will not if a three-prong approach is embraced.	如果采取三管齐下的方针可以有效阻止这一现象。


Call it the carrot, the stick, and fresh air.	可称之为胡萝卜、大棒和新鲜空气方针。


The carrot – the inducement to behave ethically – should be to recognize and reward those who admit past mistakes and demonstrate the will and an effective strategy to correct them.	胡萝卜——引导合乎道德的行动——应辨别和奖励承认过去的错误、表示纠正错误的决心并拿出有效策略的公司。


The stick – punishment of misconduct – requires stricter enforcement of legal and ethical requirements, whether concerning tax avoidance and evasion, or the ability to hide behind subsidiaries.	大棒——对不当行为的惩罚——需要更加严格地执行法律和道德要求，不管是对偷漏税行为，还是隐藏在分支机构身后的手段。


And fresh air takes the form of reporting, whether drawing attention to wrongdoing in local communities or deep investigative reports, like the extraordinary global effort by the hundreds of journalists who cooperated in bringing the Panama Papers to light.	而新鲜空气则是指报告，不管是让错误行为吸引本地社区注意，还是调查报道——如数百位记者合作让巴拿马文件曝光于天下的卓越的全球行动。


This approach must not be turned into a marketing exercise by companies, government officials, or media companies.	这一方针不可让公司、政府官员或传媒公司变为营销手段。


Instead, the repudiation of secrecy should resemble a truth and reconciliation process, with wrongdoers providing a full public account of their behavior, perhaps accompanied by testimony from victims.	相反，对保密的批判应该类似于真相和妥协过程（truth and reconciliation process），由做出错误行为者充分承担公共责任，并可伴随受害者的证词。


Most important, if corporate boards – and the lawyers, bankers, and accountants who advise companies and individuals – are to be vigilant about legal and ethical compliance, they must believe that they will be held accountable for their actions.	最重要的是，要想让公司董事会——以及为公司和个人提供咨询的律师、银行家和会计师——严格对待法律和道德合规性问题，必须让它们相信它们将因为自己的行为而被问责。


Once everyone gets the message that secrecy carries unacceptably large risks, they will act in ways that minimize those risks.	只要所有人都知道秘密会带来不可接受的巨大风险，它们就会以最小化这些风险的方式行动。


Whether they like it or not, it is time for our leaders to behave in ways that are good for them – and us.	不管他们是否喜欢，我们的领导人应该以有利于他们——以及我们——方式行动。


The Paris Approach to Global Governance	全球治理的巴黎方针


WASHINGTON, DC – As a former president of the American Society of International Law, I should bemoan the recent Paris agreement on climate change as a failure.	华盛顿—作为美国国际法协会（American Society of International Law）前主席，我应该沉痛宣布最新的气候变化巴黎协定是一场失败。


By the standards of a traditional treaty, it falls woefully short.	用传统条约的标准衡量，它可以说是一无是处。


Yet its deficits in this regard are its greatest strengths as a model for effective global governance in the twenty-first century.	但它在这方面的弱点正是其作为二十一世纪有效全球治理模式的最大优势。


The international legal gold standard is a treaty, a binding document that can be enforced by courts and arbitration tribunals.	国际法律金本位是这样的条约：它是可以通过法庭和仲裁庭执行的具有法律约束力的文件。


Such agreements comprise more than expressions of intent; they contain codified, enforceable rules, along with sanctions for non-compliance.	这样的协定不仅要包含意图表达； 还需要法典化，包含可执行的规则以及对不遵守的制裁。


Indeed, they must be ratified by national parliaments, so that they become a part of domestic law.	事实上，它们必须获得国家议会的批准，从而成为本国法律的一部分。


The Paris agreement is none of these things.	巴黎协定没有这些内容。


In the United States, as a matter of domestic law, it is an executive agreement, binding only on President Barack Obama’s administration.	在美国，作为国内法，它是一项执法协定，只能约束总统奥巴马的政府。


An executive-legislative agreement would have the same status as a treaty, except that a treaty must be ratified by two-thirds of the Senate, whereas an executive-legislative agreement must be adopted by the Senate and the House under the same rules that apply to all domestic legislation.	执法-立法协定具有与条约同样的地位，但条约必须得到三分之二参议员批准，而执法-立法条约必须根据适用于一切国内立法的规则被参议院和众议院批准。


An executive agreement made by one administration is not necessarily binding on its successor, but it would have to be explicitly repudiated.	由一届政府签订的执法协定未必对下一任政府具有约束力，但必须明确驳回。


Moreover, unlike in a traditional international treaty, the obligations of the Paris agreement are not fixed.	此外，和传统国际条约不同，巴黎协定的义务不是固定的。


The point of carefully negotiating international agreements is that once they become law, they cannot be changed, except through formally agreed amendment processes.	谨慎谈判国际协定的要点是，一旦它们成为法律，就不能改变，除非通过正式规定的修订程序。


That permanence gives them authority.	这一持久性让条约获得了权威性。


Yet the 195 signatories to the Paris agreement created a non-binding system for raising their individual obligations every five years.	但巴黎协定的195个签名构成了一套非约束性的制度，每五年提高一次个体义务。


In other words, the parties are encouraged – but not required – to submit increasingly stringent revisions of their so-called Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), based on their own judgment.	换句话说，协定各方被鼓励——而不是被要求——逐步更加严格地修订其基于自身判断决定的所谓的国家自定贡献预案（Intended Nationally Determined Contributions，INDC）。


The Paris agreement also abandons the idea of “compliance” as a stamp of legality or illegality.	巴黎协定还放弃了用“遵守”作为合法还是不合法标志的概念。


The historic job of international lawyers and tribunals has been to determine whether a signatory to an international agreement is complying with its obligations.	国际律师和法庭的历史指责是确定某个国际协定的某个签署国是否遵守了它的义务。


The Paris agreement essentially substitutes transparency for compliance, creating an “enhanced transparency framework” designed “to build mutual trust and confidence and to promote effective implementation.”	巴黎协定实际上用透明度代替了遵守，创造了一套“强化透明度框架”，旨在“构建互信和信心和促进有效实施”。


A subsequent article of the agreement does create a compliance mechanism, but specifies that it will be “expert-based” – meaning that assessment teams will include climate scientists and policy experts, as well as lawyers.	协定其中一条内容确实创造了一套遵守机制，但具体规定了它是“基于专家的”——这意味着评估团队将包括气候科学家和政策专家以及律师。


Furthermore, it will be “facilitative,” functioning in a manner that is “transparent, non-adversarial, and non-punitive.”	此外，它还是“辅助性的”，以“透明、非对立、非惩罚”的方式运行。


That sounds more like a support group than a disciplinary committee.	这更像是一个支持团队，而非纪律委员会。


In short, by traditional international legal standards, the Paris agreement is essentially a statement of good intentions, setting forth aspirational goals to limit global temperature rise to 2° Celsius – or, ideally, 1.5°C – above pre-industrial levels.	简言之，根据传统国际法标准，巴黎协定充其量只是良好意愿的陈述，制定了一个将全球升温幅度控制在前工业化水平以上2℃——最好是1.


It is as far as could be from the Treaty of Vienna, the Treaty of Versailles, or even the treaties banning landmines and establishing the International Criminal Court.	5℃——以内的宏伟目标。 它和维也纳条约、凡尔赛和约甚至禁止地雷和成立国际刑事法庭的条约差不多。


And that is precisely why it has a good chance of working.	而这也是它很有机会取得成效的原因。


For starters, tackling a problem as complex and fast-moving as climate change would be impossible with permanent, binding commitments.	首先，处理像气候变化这样的情况复杂、变化迅速的问题，不可能通过永久性、约束性的承诺解决。


By the time an agreement could be hammered out – if it could be hammered out – the scale and features of the problem, not to mention the technologies that could be used to address it, would have changed.	当协定最终形成时——如果有这种可能的话——问题的规模和性质，更不用说可用于解决问题的技术，已经发生了很大的变化。


The new kind of global governance that the Paris agreement exemplifies, which substitutes rolling processes for fixed rules, is far better suited to the kinds of global problems we face today.	巴黎协定彰显出一种新的全球治理，它用滚动程序代替固定规则，远比固定规则更加适合我们现在面临的各种全球问题。


Likewise, in a world of 195 diverse countries – from the desperately poor or conflict-ridden to the highly developed – top-down obligations can never be uniform enough to work.	类似地，在一个由195个多样化的国家组成的世界中——从极度贫穷国家、饱受冲突蹂躏的国家到高度发达国家——自上而下的义务永远不可能实现可运行的均匀非配。


Relying on bottom-up INDCs, which require the citizens and governments of each individual country to come together to determine what they can reasonably achieve, is far more promising.	自上而下的INDC要求每个国家的公民和政府聚在一起确定他们能够合理承担的义务，成功的希望要大得多。


But perhaps the most important shift made in the Paris agreement is from selective coercion to collectively supported competition.	但也许巴黎协定所做出的最重要的转变是从选择性胁迫转向集体支持的竞争。


Instead of suing one another for failure to comply with a legal obligation, countries will try to outdo one another in their efforts to help address a shared problem.	各国不再相互指责没有遵守法律义务，而是竞相做出更大的努力解决一个共同问题。


The transparency mechanism supports this shift, by allowing journalists, activists, scientists, concerned citizens, and climate-friendly businesses to engage in debates, publicize successes and failures, solicit help and advice, and offer support to lagging countries.	透明度机制支持这一转变，它让记者、活动家、科学家、热心公民和气候友好企业参与到争论中，公布成功和失败情况，动员帮助和建议，并为落后国家提供支持。


This highlights the final crucial feature of the new global governance model exemplified by the Paris agreement: The deal reached earlier this month, like the Conference of the Parties itself, is not only for governments.	这突显出巴黎协定所表现的全球治理新模式的最后一个关键特征：本月初所达成的这一协定，以及巴黎大会本身，不仅仅面向政府。


Although the agreement calls on governments to continue providing public finance through the official Green Climate Fund, individuals and entities are also playing a major role.	尽管协定呼吁政府继续通过官方绿色气候基金提供公共资金，但个人和企事业单位也扮演着重要角色。


For example, Bill Gates made global headlines during the negotiations when he announced a $2 billion fund to invest in clean energy, financed by the Breakthrough Energy Coalition, a group of 26 global philanthropists and the University of California.	比如，比尔·盖茨在协定谈判期间宣布投入20亿美元资金用于清洁能源投资，吸引了全世界的目光。 这笔资金由26位全球慈善家和加州大学组成的突破能源联盟（Breakthrough Energy Coalition，BEC）提供。


The BEC heralds a new level of public-private partnership, with the investors working with the governments of some 20 countries – including the China, India, and the US – that already account for roughly 80% of global investment in clean energy and have now pledged to double their investments.	BEC也标定了公私合作的新高度，其投资者与20个左右的国家政府合作——包括中国、印度和美国——它们占据了全球清洁能源投资的80%左右，现在已承诺要将投资翻番。


Negotiators in Paris recognized that business, philanthropy, civil society, academia, and ordinary people all have a role to play in addressing a major global challenge.	巴黎的谈判员们认识到，企业、慈善机构、公民社会、学界和普通人都能在解决重大全球挑战方面起作用。


Change is happening even on the government side, with municipal authorities often significantly outpacing their national counterparts, operating through vehicles like the C-40, a “network of the world’s megacities committed to addressing climate change.”	即使是政府端也在发生变化，市政府常常遥遥领先于国家政府，通过C-40（致力于解决气候变化问题的世界超级都市网）等载体采取行动。


The Paris agreement is a sprawling, rolling, overlapping set of national commitments brought about by a broad conglomeration of parties and stakeholders. It is not law.	巴黎协定是由为数众多的方面和相关利益方形成的一组混杂、滚动、重叠的国家承诺。


It is a bold move toward public problem solving on a global scale.	它是迈向解决全球层面公共问题的一大步。


And it is the only approach that could work.	它也是唯一可能有效的方针。


A Climate Cure Worse than the Disease	气候治疗方案比疾病本身更糟


JAIPUR – Two years after the Paris climate agreement was signed, the French capital this month again attracted the world’s good and great, who gathered for President Emmanuel Macron’s One Planet Summit.	斋普尔——在巴黎气候协定签署两年后，法国首都本月再度吸引了世界各国的良善人士，这些人济济一堂参与伊曼纽尔·马克龙总统的同一个星球峰会。


In turns blasting US President Donald Trump for withdrawing from the Paris accord and telling each other that it remains on track, politicians formed a self-congratulatory huddle with celebrity campaigners and business leaders.	各路政客轮流谴责美国总统唐纳德·特朗普退出巴黎协定并相互安慰气候协定仍未脱离正轨，从而与名流活动家和商界领袖一道组成了一个自我庆幸的小圈子。


We should treat such smug bonhomie with caution.	我们应当以谨慎的心态去看待这些沾沾自喜的善良人。


Goodwill isn’t enough to stop climate change, and history is littered with well-meaning policies that turned out to be unhelpful, or even worse than the problems they were meant to address.	好心并不能阻止气候变化，而且历史上原本善意的政策没有带来好效果的例子比比皆是，有些政策所产生的效果甚至还比不上它们本来想要解决的问题。


One particularly harrowing example was Mao Zedong’s attempt to improve crop yields and health by eradicating sparrows.	一个特别令人痛心的例子是毛泽东通过消灭麻雀来提高作物健康和粮食产量的尝试。


The population of locusts ballooned, contributing to a famine that claimed around 30 million lives.	结果导致蝗虫数量激增，造成约3，000万人死亡的饥荒惨剧。


But no government is immune.	但没有哪个政府能完全免疫。


US President Bill Clinton admits that his landmark  “three strikes” crime law in 1994 backfired by jailing so many people “there wasn’t enough money left to educate them, train them for new jobs, and increase [their] chances when they came out.”	美国总统比尔克·林顿承认其1994年标志性的“三击出局法”产生了事与愿违的后果，因为监禁的人太多，以致“没有剩下足够的资金为其提供教育，培训他们适应新的工作并在他们出狱时增加[他们的]机会.


In the following decade, it seemed prudent for the United States to keep its worst Iraqi prisoners in one camp – but this is now blamed for helping future Islamic State leaders learn how to plot.	”接下来的十年里，美国将最恶劣的伊拉克战俘集中关押在一个战俘营似乎十分明智——但现在人们却指责这项政策协助未来的伊斯兰国领导人学习如何策划行动。


Often, policy flaws become apparent only in retrospect.	通常，政策缺陷只有在往回看的时候才能体现出来。


To identify them in real time, we need to be able to undertake a calm analysis of costs and impacts.	要想及时找出这些缺陷，我们需要对成本和影响进行冷静的分析。


No topic requires this more than climate change.	这方面要求最迫切的莫过于气候变化政策。


Consider this month’s summit in Paris, where attention focused either on the Trump administration’s absence, or on other world leaders’ defiance of him.	以本月的巴黎峰会为例，人们把关注焦点放在特朗普政府的缺席，或者其他世界领导人对他的敌意。


Nowhere have we heard about the Paris agreement’s actual costs and effects.	对巴黎协议实际的代价和效果却没有得到任何分析。


Economic science helps us establish the scale of the problem. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the UN’s climate panel, estimates that in about 60 years, global warming will cost the planet between 0.2% and 2% of GDP.	经济学能帮助我们确定问题的范围。 联合国气候机构政府间气候变化委员会（IPCC）估计大约60年后，全球变暖将消耗掉地球0.


That’s a problem, but it’s not the end of the world.	2%到2%之间的GDP。 这的确是个问题，但却谈不上世界末日。


Right now, the net cost of global warming is actually close to zero.	现在，全球变暖的净成本实际接近于零。


This seems untrue, because we hear an onslaught of terrible climate-related news.	这似乎不是真的，因为我们正受到可怕气候消息的大规模冲击。


But we don’t get the full picture.	但我们所看到的并不是全貌。


A drought in Syria understandably makes news.	叙利亚旱灾成为新闻无疑可以理解。


But global warming overall means more precipitation.	但全球变暖整体而言意味着更多降水。


Globally, an overview by the journal Nature finds that droughts have been decreasing since 1982.	自然杂志一篇评论指出1982年以来，旱灾一直在减少。


Thus, while global warming might have contributed to some droughts, overall it has reduced more drought; but an absence of droughts hardly generates headlines.	因此，尽管全球变暖可能导致了某些干旱，但从总体来看它减少的干旱更多； 但不发生旱灾却很难成为新闻。


Similarly, we hear concern that tropical forests are being stripped.	同样，很多人担忧热带雨林的消失。


But while this deserves attention, the bigger story is that, because more carbon dioxide fertilizes vegetation, climate change has actually increased the world’s green matter (plants of all sorts) since 1982 by the equivalent of an entire continent.	虽然这一点值得注意，但大背景是因为更多二氧化碳为植被提供营养，气候变化导致世界自1982年来实际增加了相当于一整块大陆的绿色物质（各类植物）。


The best estimates thus show that global warming right now has about a zero net cost.	因此最乐观的估计是全球变暖目前约为零成本。 （最悲观的研究认为成本占GDP的0.


(The most pessimistic study finds a cost of 0.3% of GDP, the most optimistic a net benefit of 2.3%.)	3%，最乐观的研究认为反而产生了2. 3%的净收益。


That will rise to 2% in a half-century, and to 3-4% early in the twenty-second century, if we don’t act.	但如果我们不采取行动，这一数据将在半个世纪内上升至2%，而在22世纪初将达3~4%。


But the climate policies lauded in Paris are essentially high-cost, low-effect gestures.	但巴黎崇尚的气候政策实际却是高成本、低效益的象征之举。


The European Union will devote 20% of its budget this year to climate-related action.	欧盟今年将把预算的20%用于气候相关行动。


Taking into account the total cost to the economy, the EU’s bill will likely be around €209 billion ($240 billion).	如果考虑到经济为此付出的总成本，欧盟的法案成本很可能约为欧元2090亿（合美元2400亿）。


The benefit will be vanishingly small.	但这份方案的收益却可谓微不足道。


Accounting for the EU’s commitments to reduce CO2 emissions under the Paris accord up to 2030, my peer-reviewed analysis shows that in the most optimistic scenario, emissions targets, fully achieved and adhered to throughout this century, would prevent just 0.096°F (0.053°C) of global warming by 2100.	考虑到欧盟截至2030年巴黎协议规定的二氧化碳减排承诺，我本人经同行评议的分析表明在最乐观情况下，如果排放目标在本世纪内百分百实现并得到遵守，那么到2100年将仅能防止区区0. 096华氏度的全球温度上升。


That small impact is not a sufficient reason to dump the EU’s emissions-reduction policy.	如此微不足道的影响力尚不足以成为放弃欧盟碳减排政策的理由。


But it should force us to consider whether the cure is costlier than the disease – and ask what other approaches might be better.	但它却应当迫使我们思考治疗方案是否比疾病本身还要昂贵——并询问还有没有更好的解决办法。


Another peer-reviewed study shows that each dollar spent on EU climate policies will generate a total long-term climate benefit of just three cents.	另外一项经同行评议的研究表明欧盟气候政策所花的每一美元将仅产生三美分的长期气候收益。


And, despite the cheer coming from France, the Paris accord is just as off-balance: at a $1-2 trillion annual cost, the United Nations itself estimates that it is on track to achieve 1% of what would be needed to keep temperature rises under 2°C.	而且，尽管来自法国的欢呼之声不断，但巴黎协定也同样不平衡：每年花费1到2万亿美元，而据联合国自己评估这笔钱仅能覆盖将温度上升控制在两摄氏度以下所需资金的百分之一。


We need smarter, cheaper options.	我们需要更明智、更廉价的选择。


My think tank, the Copenhagen Consensus, asked 27 of the world’s top climate economists to explore all the feasible policy responses, and we concluded that the best long-term investment is in green energy research and development.	我所在的智库机构“哥本哈根共识”要求27位世界顶级气候经济学家研究所有可行的对应政策，我们得出的结论是，最好的长期投资是绿色能源研发。


For every dollar spent, $11 of climate damage would be avoided.	在这方面，每花费一美元，就能避免11美元的气候损失。


That makes much more sense than spending a fortune on CO2 cuts that do next to nothing.	这比在几乎不起任何作用的二氧化碳减排方面耗费大量财富要有意义得多。


Countries should ease up on their current, inefficient climate policies and instead increase spending on green R&D. Only innovation can shift the price of future green energy below fossil fuels, thereby impelling everyone to switch.	各国应放松他们当前低效的气候政策，转而增加投入绿色研发。 只有创新才能让未来的绿色能源价格低于化石燃料，从而推动所有人改弦更张。


We also need cheap, effective adaptation, to avoid the worst climate damage.	我们还需要廉价、有效的适应政策，以避免最严重的气候损失。


And the main source of vulnerability to future climate damage is poverty: the poor will be hit the hardest, as they are by every other global challenge.	贫穷是未来气候损失脆弱性的主要来源：就像所有其他全球挑战一样，穷人将承受最大的打击。


So, lifting people out of poverty will help more than anything else.	因此，帮助民众摆脱贫困比其他任何措施都更有意义。


Despite lofty rhetoric from Paris, all the best intentions on the planet will count for little if it turns out that our climate “solution” was just another policy that cost the planet far more than it gained.	尽管巴黎传来各种各样的高尚议论，但如果事实证明我们的气候“方案”仅仅是让地球付出远大于收益的另一项政策，那么这个星球上哪怕再好的意愿都没有多大意义。


Radical Realism About Climate Change	关于气候变化的激进现实主义


BERLIN – Mainstream politics, by definition, is ill equipped to imagine fundamental change.	柏林—顾名思义，主流政治在想象根本性变革方面存在先天缺陷。


But last December in Paris, 196 governments agreed on the need to limit global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels – an objective that holds the promise of delivering precisely such a transformation.	但在去年12月的巴黎，196家政府同意必须将全球变暖幅度限制在前工业化水平以上1. 5℃以内——这一目标很有希望带来这样的转变。


Achieving it will require overcoming serious political challenges, reflected in the fact that some are advocating solutions that will end up doing more harm than good.	实现这一目标需要克服严重的政治挑战，这反映在一个事实上：一些人所鼓吹的解决方案其实弊大于利。


One strategy that has gained a lot of momentum focuses on the need to develop large-scale technological interventions to control the global thermostat.	一个势头很猛的战略强调必须进行大规模技术干预控制全球恒温器。


Proponents of geo-engineering technologies argue that conventional adaptation and mitigation measures are simply not reducing emissions fast enough to prevent dangerous warming.	地质工程技术支持者认为，常规适应和缓解措施根本无法让排放下降速度快到足以阻止危险的变暖。


Technologies such as “carbon capture and storage” (CCS), they argue, are necessary to limit damage and human suffering.	他们说，“碳捕捉和储存”（CCS）等技术是限制伤害和人道灾难的必要条件。


The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change seems to agree.	气候变化国际委员会似乎也同意这一点。


In its fifth assessment report, it builds its scenarios for meeting the Paris climate goals around the concept of “negative emissions” – that is, the ability to suck excess carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere.	其第五版评估报告围绕“负排放”的概念——即吸收大气中的过多二氧化碳的能力——构建了实现巴黎气候目标的情景。


But this approach ignores serious problems with the development and deployment of geo-engineering technologies.	但这一方法忽视了与开发和部署地质工程技术有关的严重问题。 以CCS为例。


Consider CCS, which is the process of capturing waste CO2 from large sources like fossil-fuel power plants and depositing it in, say, an underground geological formation, thereby preventing it from entering the atmosphere.	CCS是一个从化石燃料发电站等大型二氧化碳废弃来源捕获二氧化碳并将其存放于（比如）地下地质构造中的过程，从而阻止二氧化碳进入大气层。


It sounds good.	听起来很不错。


But what makes it economical is that it enables enhanced oil recovery.	但它之所以划算，是因为它能加强石油回收。


In other words, the only way to make CCS cost-effective is to use it to exacerbate the problem it is supposed to address.	换句话说，让CCS具有性价比的唯一办法是加剧它应该解决的问题。


The supposed savior technology – bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) – is not much better.	所谓的救世主技术——碳捕捉和储存生物能源（BECCS）——也没有好多少。


BECCS begins by producing large amounts of biomass from, say, fast-growing trees which naturally capture CO2; those plants are then converted into fuel via burning or refining, with the resulting carbon emissions being captured and sequestered.	BECCS的起点是用（比如）快速生产的树生产大量生物质，而树是二氧化碳的天然吸收器； 接着，这些植物通过燃烧和精炼转化为燃料，产生的碳排放被捕捉和隐藏。


But bioenergy is not carbon neutral, and the surge in European demand for biomass has led to rising food commodity prices and land grabs in developing countries.	但生物能不是碳中性的，而欧洲生物质需求的激增导致了粮食商品价格上涨和发展中国家的土地掠夺。


These realities helped persuade the scientists Kevin Anderson and Glen Peters recently to call carbon removal an “unjust and high-stakes gamble.”	这些现实帮助说服了凯文·安德森（Kevin Anderson）和格伦·彼得斯（Glen Peters）等科学家最近将除碳称为一场“不公平的高赌注赌局”。


What about other geo-engineering proposals?	其他地质工程方案呢？


Solar Radiation Management (SRM) aims to control the amount of sunlight that reaches the Earth, essentially mimicking the effect of a volcano eruption.	太阳辐射管理（SRM）旨在控制到达地球的太阳光量，本质上是模仿火山喷发效应。


This may be achieved by pumping sulphates into the stratosphere or through “marine cloud brightening,” which would cause clouds to reflect more sunlight back into space.	这可以通过向平流层输入硫酸盐或“海洋云层亮化”（从而让云将更多阳光反射回太空）实现。


But blasting sulphates into the stratosphere does not reduce CO2 concentrations; it merely delays the impact for as long as the spraying continues.	但向平流层添加大量硫酸盐并不减弱二氧化碳的集中； 它仅仅是将影响推迟，只要添加不停止，影响就不会显现。


Moreover, sulphate injections in the northern hemisphere could cause serious drought in the Africa’s Sahel region, owing to dramatic reductions in precipitation, while some African countries would experience more precipitation.	此外，在北半球注入硫酸盐可能导致非洲萨赫勒地区严重干旱（因为降水急剧减少），而一些非洲国家将经历更多降水。


The effect on the Asian monsoon system could be even more pronounced.	对亚洲季风系统的影响可能更加显著。


In short, SRM could severely damage the livelihoods of millions of people.	简言之，SRM可能严重危害数百万人的生计。


If geo-engineering can’t save us, what can?	如果地质工程无法拯救我们，什么能？


In fact, there are a number of steps that can be taken right now.	事实上，现在可以采取很多措施。


They would be messier and more politically challenging than geo-engineering.	它们比地质工程更加凌乱，政治上的阻力也更大。


But they would work.	但它们有效。


The first step would be a moratorium on new coal mines.	第一项措施是关停新煤矿。


If all currently planned coal-fired power plants are built and operated over their normal service life of 40 years, they alone would emit 240 billion tons of CO2 – more than the remaining carbon budget.	如果当前计划燃煤发电站全部建成并按通常的服役年限40年生产，那么光是这些煤电站就将排放2,400亿吨二氧化碳——远远多于剩余碳预算。


If that investment were re-allocated to decentralized renewable-energy production, the benefits would be enormous.	如果这些投资转而用于分散化的可再生能源生产，将产生巨大收益。


Moreover, with only 10% of the global population responsible for almost 50% of global CO2 emissions, there is a strong case to be made for implementing strategies that target the biggest emitters.	此外，10%的全球人口制造了近50%全球二氧化碳排放，因此，实施以最大排放者为目标的战略是很有裨益的。


For example, it makes little sense that airlines – which actually serve just 7% of the global population – are exempt from paying fuel taxes, especially at a time when ticket prices are at an historic low.	比如，航空公司——它们实际上只服务于7%的全球人口——免于缴纳燃料税是没有道理的，特别是在机票价格处于历史地位时。


Changes to land use are also needed.	此外还需要改变土地用途。


The 2009 International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development charts the way to a transformed agricultural system – with benefits that extend far beyond climate policy.	2009年农业发展知识、科学和技术国际评估（International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development）提出了一条农业系统革命之路——其好处远不止局限于气候政策。


We must apply this knowledge around the world.	我们必须将这一知识用于全世界。


In Europe, the waste sector could make a significant contribution to a low-carbon economy.	在欧洲，废物利用部门可以为低碳经济做出重大贡献。


Recent research, commissioned by Zero Waste Europe, found that optimal implementation of the European Commission’s “circular economy package” waste targets could save the European Union 190 million tons of CO2 per year.	由欧洲零废物组织（Zero Waste Europe）做出的最新研究发现，优化实施欧盟委员会的“循环经济方案”废物目标每年能为欧盟减少1.


That is the equivalent of the annual emissions of the Netherlands!	9亿吨二氧化碳。 这一数字等于荷兰的年排放量！


Available measures in the transport sector include strengthening public transportation, encouraging the use of railways for freight traffic, building bike paths, and subsidizing delivery bicycles.	交通业的可行措施包括加强公共交通、鼓励铁路货运、建设非机动车道、补贴非机动车送货等。


In Germany, intelligent action on transport could reduce the sector’s emissions by up to 95% by 2050.	在德国，智能交通可以让交通业排放量到2050年减少95%。


Another powerful measure would be to protect and restore natural ecosystems, which could result in the storage of 220-330 gigatons of CO2 worldwide .	另一项强力措施是保护和重建自然生态系统，这样可以储存2,200—3,300亿吨二氧化碳。


None of these solutions is a silver bullet; but, together, they could change the world for the better.	所有这些方案都不是万灵丹； 但是，它们形成的合力能让世界变得更好。


Geo-engineering solutions are not the only alternatives.	地质工程方案不是唯一的选择。


They are a response to the inability of mainstream economics and politics to address the climate challenge.	它们是对主流经济学和政治学无法解决气候挑战的反应。


Instead of trying to devise ways to maintain business as usual – an impossible and destructive goal – we must prove our ability to imagine and achieve radical change.	我们不应该试图找到办法保持原来的做法——这是一个不可能并且毁灭性的目标——而是必须证明我们有能力想象并实现彻底改变。


If we fail, we should not be surprised if, just a few years from now, the planetary thermostat is under the control of a handful of states or military and scientific interests.	如果我们失败，几年后我们不必惊讶于地球恒温器掌握在一小撮国家或军事和科学利益集团手中。


As world leaders convene for the 22nd United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to bring the Paris agreement into force, they should repudiate geo-engineering quick fixes – and demonstrate a commitment to real solutions.	在世界领导人齐聚第22界联合国气候变化框架会议、让巴黎协定真正生效之际，他们应该批判地质工程的速效药——并表现出致力于真正的解决方案的决心。


Why Renewables Are Not Enough	光有可再生能源是不够的


NEW DELHI – At the United Nations in New York on April 22, world leaders ratified the global climate agreement reached in Paris last December.	新德里—4月22日，在纽约联合国，世界领导人签署了去年12月在巴黎达成的全球气候协定。


One hundred ninety-five countries, ranging from richest to poorest, have now agreed to limit global warming to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, with the goal of not exceeding 1.5°C. They have also committed to “intended nationally determined contributions” (INDCs) to limit or reduce greenhouse-gas emissions by 2030.	从最富裕国家到最贫穷国家在内的一百九十五个国家同意将全球变暖幅度限制在前工业化水平以上2℃以内，目标则是不超过1. 5℃。


This is a major achievement, but it is far from sufficient.	他们还承诺做出“各国自主确定贡献”（INDC）以限制或减少2030年温室气体排放。 这是一个重大成就，但还远远不够。


In fact, even if all INDC targets were achieved, the world would still be heading toward eventual warming of some 2.7-3.4°C above pre-industrial levels.	事实上，即使INDC目标实现，世界的最终变暖幅度将达到前工业化水平个以上2. 7-3.


To keep warming well below 2°C, emissions in 2030 must be more than 30% below those envisaged in the INDCs.	4°C 。 要将升温幅度限制在2℃以内，2030年排放量就必须比INDC的目标水平减少30%。


This will be an enormous challenge, given the need for major strides in economic development over the same period.	考虑到在此期间经济发展所需要实现的重大跨越，这是一个艰巨的挑战。


Before this century is over, we should seek to enable all the world’s people – probably more than ten billion by then – to achieve the standards of living currently enjoyed only by the wealthiest 10%.	在本世纪结束前，我们应该让全世界人民——也许当时已经超过一百亿——实现目前只有最富裕的10%人口所享有的生活水平。


That will require a huge increase in energy consumption.	这意味着能源消费量的巨大增加。


The average African, for example, today uses about one-tenth of the energy used by the average European.	比如，如今普通非洲人的能源使用量只有普通欧洲人的十分之一。


But by 2050, we must reduce energy-related emissions by 70% from 2010 levels, with further cuts needed to achieve net zero emissions by 2060.	到2050年，我们必须在让能源相关排放在2010年水平的基础上减少70%，而要实现2060年净零排放，则需要进一步减少。


Meeting those objectives will require both an improvement in energy productivity (the amount of income produced per unit of energy consumed) of at least 3% per year and the rapid decarbonization of energy supply, with the share of zero-carbon energy increasing by at least one percentage point each year.	实现这些目标需要能源生产率（每单位能源消费量所产生的收入量）每年至少改善3%，并且能源供给迅速实现去碳化，零碳能源比重每年至少要提高一个百分点。


This implies a massive acceleration of national efforts.	这意味着需要大大加快国家措施。


Over the last decade, energy productivity has grown by only 0.7% annually, and the share of zero-carbon energy rose by only 0.1 percentage point per year.	在过去十年中，能源生产率每年只能提高0. 7%，零碳能源比重每年只能提高0.


Moreover, even if the INDCs were fully implemented, these annual growth rates would reach only 1.8% and 0.4 percentage points, respectively.	1个百分点。 此外，即使INDC得到充分实施，两大指标的年增长率也只能分别到达1.


Impressive progress is already being made in one crucial area: electricity generation.	在一个关键领域已经出现了令人印象深刻的进步：发电。


Solar power costs have fallen 80% since 2008.	自2008年以来，太阳能发电成本下降了80%。


In some places, new supply contracts have set prices as low as $0.06 per kilowatt hour, making solar power fully competitive with coal and natural gas.	在一些地区，新供电合同的定价为每千瓦时0. 06美元，太阳能电已经具备与煤电和天然气电的充分竞争力。


Between now and 2030, the INDCs indicate that renewable-power capacity will grow four times faster than fossil-fuel capacity, with 70% of this new renewables investment in emerging and developing economies.	从现在到2030年，INDC意味着可再生发电容量增速比化石燃料发电容量快四倍，其中70%的新可再生能源投资将发生在新兴和发展中经济体。


That investment needs to be matched by accelerated progress in battery technology, or by other tools to match electricity demand to intermittent supply.	这一投资需要电池技术的加速进展与之配合，或者其他匹配电力需求和间歇性供应的工具。


But there is no doubt that, by mid-century, the world can build a cost-effective zero-carbon electricity system.	但毫无疑问，到本世纪中叶，世界能够建立起高性价比的零碳电力系统。


And yet zero-carbon power, though hugely important, is insufficient, because electricity currently accounts for only 20% of global energy consumption.	但零碳电力尽管非常重要，仍然不够，因为电力目前只占全球能源消费的20%。


Broader changes to the global energy system are needed.	全球能源体系需要更加广泛的变化。


Road transport and aviation, which currently rely almost entirely on liquid fossil fuels, account for 30% of total energy consumption.	目前几乎完全依靠液态化石燃料的公路运输和航空业占了能源总消费的30%。


Decarbonization of these activities will require either electrification or the use of hydrogen or biofuels.	这些活动的去碳化要求电力化或使用氢能或生物燃料。


This is certainly feasible, but it will take time.	这完全是可能的，但需要时间。


Heating buildings is another area where major changes are needed.	建筑取暖是另一个需要发生重大变化的领域。


Here, the more widespread use of zero-carbon electricity, instead of fossil-fuel-based energy, could have a major impact.	在这方面，零碳电力取代基于化石燃料的能源的更广泛的使用将形成重大影响。


But there are also important opportunities to design and construct buildings and cities that are substantially more energy-efficient.	但其他重要机会尊在于设计和建设能源效率大大提高的建筑和城市。


With the world’s urban population expected to increase by 2.5 billion by 2050, it is vital that we grasp them.	到2050年，世界城市人口预计将增加25亿，抓住这一机会十分重要。


Energy use by heavy industry energy, however, presents challenges that are often ignored.	但是，重工业所用能源是常常被忽略的挑战。


Metals, chemicals, cement, and plastics are vital building blocks of the modern economy, and involve processes that cannot be easily electrified.	金属、化工、水泥和塑料等材料是现代经济的重要基石，它们的生产工艺难以电力化。


Decarbonization may instead require the application of carbon capture and storage technologies, while newly designed building materials could reduce demand for carbon-intensive inputs.	因此，去碳化可能需要应用碳捕捉和储存技术，同时新设计的建筑材料可以降低碳密集投入品的需求。


Given these challenges, fossil fuels will undoubtedly play a role in transport and heavy industry for some time to come, even as their role in electricity generation declines.	考虑到这些挑战，在未来一段时间，化石燃料毫无疑问仍将在运输和重工业中起重要作用，即使它们在发电领域的作用日益衰减。


And, even in electricity generation, emerging economies’ INDCs imply significant new investments in coal or gas capacity.	此外，即使是在发电领域，新兴经济体的INDC仍表明将出现煤电和天然气电的重大投资。


Taken together, the INDCs suggest that coal could still account for 35% of global electricity generation in 2030.	从总量看，INDC表明，到2030年，煤炭仍将占全球发电总量的35%。


But that level of coal generation is likely to be incompatible with the below-2°C target.	但这一煤电水平可能与2℃以下的目标不相容。


And, because coal- and gas-fired power stations last 50 years or more, such investments raise the risk of either locking in emission levels incompatible with the climate target, or forcing major asset write-offs.	此外，由于煤电和天然气电电厂动辄持续50年或以上，这些投资要么将导致排放量达不到气候目标要求，要么导致重大资产减记。


The challenge now is to find an economically sensible path that enables emerging economies to fulfill their growing energy needs, while ensuring that the world meets its climate objectives.	现在的挑战是找到一条经济上可行的方法让新兴经济体能够满足其日益增长的能源需求，同时又确保世界满足气候目标。


It is technologically possible.	在技术上，这是可行的。


But it will require action by many very different actors.	但这需要许多风马牛不相及的行动方共同行动。


Governments have a vital role to play, but so, too, do incumbent fossil-fuel-based energy companies and new-entrant companies deploying or developing new technologies.	政府需要扮演关键角色，但许多现有化石燃料能源公司和部署或开发新技术的新晋公司也能起到重要作用。


NGOs can help to identify required policies and hold governments and companies to account.	非政府组织能够帮助辨别需要的政策、问责政府和公司。


Individual consumers are also important, because their behavior shapes energy demand.	个人消费者也很重要，因为他们的行为构成了能源需求。


Despite their varied backgrounds, economic interests, and points of view, all of these actors must engage in an informed debate that recognizes all of the complexities of the challenge ahead.	所有这些行动方的背景、经济利益和观点各不相同，但它们都必须充分了解信息，参与到这场认识到未来一切复杂性和挑战的争论中。


The shared objective is clear: to build a low-carbon economy that can keep global temperatures well within 2°C of pre-industrial levels, while delivering prosperity for a world of ten billion people or more.	共同目标是明确的：建设一个能让全球气温保持在前工业化水平以上2℃以内的低碳经济，同时为一百亿人口以上的世界带来繁荣。


The Climate-Change Fight Returns to Paris	回归巴黎的气候变化斗争


PARIS – Nearly two years have passed since France’s then-foreign minister, Laurent Fabius, struck his gavel and declared: “The Paris agreement for the climate is accepted.”	巴黎——距离时任法国外交部长的洛朗·法比尤斯（Laurent Fabius）一锤定音地宣布“巴黎气候协议已获通过”已有差不多两年了。


Next week, President Emmanuel Macron and the French government will host world leaders and non-state actors for the One Planet Summit.	下周法国埃马纽埃尔·马克龙及其政府将在同一个星球峰会上迎来世界各国首脑以及非政府行动者。


The purpose of this gathering is to celebrate climate gains made since 2015, and to boost political and economic support for meeting the goals and targets of the Paris agreement.	而这次聚会的目的就是为了庆祝自2015年以来在气候方面取得的成就，并为实现巴黎协定所设立的目的和指标提供政治和经济支持。


The Paris climate agreement, a historic feat of diplomacy that ushered in a new era of international climate collaboration, was facilitated by a number of political and social forces.	巴黎气候协定这一开创了国际气候合作新纪元的历史性外交活动得到了许多政治和社会力量的推动。


One of the most influential of these was a group of more than 100 countries known as the “high ambition coalition,” which helped finalize the deal in the waning days of the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP21).	其中最有影响力的是一个由100多个国家组成“雄心联盟”，也正是在该组织的帮助下才最终得以在2015年联合国气候变化大会的最后几天敲定协议。


This diverse coalition of leaders – from the richest countries to the most vulnerable Pacific island states – broke a political deadlock that had impeded climate progress for years, if not decades.	这个多元化联盟的领导成员涵盖了最富有的国家到最脆弱的太平洋岛国，并打破了阻碍气候进步多年（甚至可能是几十年）的政治僵局。


As we reflect on that success, one thing is abundantly clear: the need for ambitious coalitions has returned.	当我们回顾这一成功时，有一点是非常清楚的：我们依然需要这类雄心联盟。


Strong global leadership on climate change scored a diplomatic victory two years ago, and today, new economic and political alliances are needed to turn those commitments into action.	两年前我们在针对气候变化问题的强有力全球领导下实现了外交胜利。 如今我们也需要新的经济和政治联盟来将这些承诺成为现实。


The diplomatic success of the Paris accord is worthy of praise in its own right; it was a remarkable leap forward in the fight against climate change.	巴黎协定的外交成功本身就是值得赞扬的； 这是对抗气候变化方面的一次了不起的飞跃。


But we must not rest on our laurels.	但我们不能光守着过去的成就裹足不前。


With the United States, the world’s largest historical emitter of greenhouse gases, dismissive of the accord, the rest of the global community must reaffirm its commitment to reducing carbon dioxide emissions. Dramatic, meaningful, and immediate steps must be taken.	既然美国这个最庞大的温室气体历史排放国对该协定置之不理，国际社会中的其他成员必须重申其减少二氧化碳排放的承诺，也应当迈出显著，有意义且直接的步伐。


The best available science estimates that the world has only three years to begin a permanent reduction in greenhouse-gas emissions if there is to be any hope of achieving the Paris accord’s goal of keeping warming to “well below 2°C” relative to pre-industrial levels.	当前最为精确的科学研究估计，如果想要实现巴黎协定将全球平均气温相对工业化前水平的升高幅度控制在“远低于2oC之内”的目标，那么留给全球启动长期性温室气体减排的时间只有三年。


And, whatever urgency science cannot convey is being communicated by the planet itself – through a ferocious display of hurricanes, floods, wildfires, and deadly droughts.	同时科学数据无法传达的紧迫性也已经被地球本身所表现出来了——通过肆虐的飓风，洪水，野火以及致命的干旱。


Given the immediacy of the challenge, what can and should be done to avert crisis?	鉴于挑战已经迫在眉睫，我们可以和应该做些什么才可以避免危机呢？


Solutions start with money, and a main objective of the One Planet Summit is to mobilize public and private financing to fund projects that can reduce climate-changing pollution today.	兵马未动，粮草先行，同一个地球峰会的主要目标就是动员公共和私人资金来资助那些可以减少当前气候变化污染的项目。


During the summit’s “Climate Finance Day,” companies, banks, investors, and countries will announce new initiatives to help fund the costly transition to a carbon-free future.	在峰会的“气候融资日”期间，各大企业，银行，投资者和国家将宣布新的举措以资助那些迈向一个无碳化未来的高成本过渡措施。


Hollow promises will have no place at this gathering; only real commitments of real money for tangible projects will be discussed.	空洞的许诺在本次峰会上是无立锥之地的； 只有那些拿出真金白银支持实际项目的真实承诺才会被讨论。


As a result, we hope to see hundreds of millions of dollars committed by governments to fund solutions across all fronts of the climate-change battle.	因此，我们希望各国政府能掏出数亿美元的资金来支持各条应对气候变化战线上的解决方案。


Plenty will go to renewable-energy projects, but money will also be committed to clean transportation, agriculture, infrastructure, and urban systems. Funding will also be earmarked for projects that help protect communities that are most vulnerable to the impact of global warming.	大量资金将被投入到可再生能源项目，但也将致力于清洁交通，农业，基础设施和城市系统，还会专门拨款去帮助保护最容易受到全球变暖影响的社区。


The One Planet Summit will be an occasion for countries, companies, and private institutions to forge concrete strategies to shift away from fossil fuels.	同一个地球峰也为国家，企业和私营机构提供了一个制定具体战略来摆脱化石燃料的机会。


At the UN climate talks in Bonn, Germany, last month, 20 countries, led by Canada and the United Kingdom, announced plans to phase out coal from electricity generation.	在上个月在德国波恩举行的联合国气候谈判中，以加拿大和英国为首的20个国家都宣布了淘汰燃煤发电的计划。


The gathering in Paris will provide an opportunity for other countries to join the Powering Past Coal Alliance, which aims to formalize a deliberate transition from coal, and to help companies achieve net-zero emissions.	而在巴黎举行的本次峰会也为其他国家提供一个加入废除燃煤发电联盟的机会，该联盟旨在确立实现有序去煤炭化转型的规范，并帮助企业实现零净排放。


Ultimately, next week’s summit should be a place where governments, businesses, investors, and other key stakeholders collaborate and share ideas, showcase successful projects, and coordinate goals.	最终，下周的峰会应成为政府，企业，投资者和其他关键利益相关方合作和分享各自想法，展示成功项目并协调实现目标的平台。


This event should not stand alone, but rather serve as a springboard for international meetings that will take place over the next few years.	这场峰会不应只是一个孤立事件，而是要成为迈向未来各项国际会议的跳板。


After all, it is during this short timeframe that the fate of the Paris accord’s temperature targets will be determined.	毕竟决定巴黎协定温度控制目标命运的时间已经不多了。


Two years after the adoption of a groundbreaking climate agreement, global leaders are set to reconvene in the City of Light.	在一项开创性的气候协定通过两年之后，全球领导人将在巴黎这座光明之城重聚。


When they arrive, their collective ambition will be needed once more.	他们需要在到来时再次展现其集体野心。


This time, however, the goal must be to ensure that past agreements amount to more than just words on a page.	但这次的目标则必须是要确保过去的协议不仅仅停留在纸面上。


Ukraine’s Imperiled Press Freedom	岌岌可危的乌克兰新闻自由


NEW YORK – On July 20, 2016, Pavel Sheremet, a prominent Belarusian-born journalist, was heading to work at the studios of Radio Vesti in Kyiv when the Subaru he was driving blew up at a busy intersection.	纽约—2016年7月20日，出生于白俄罗斯的著名记者帕威尔·谢里梅特（Pavel Sheremet）驾驶一辆斯巴鲁汽车，前往基辅的俄罗斯新闻广播台（Radio Vesti）上班。


Nearby windows shook, and birds scattered into the air.	汽车在一个繁华的十字路口发生了爆炸。


Sheremet, 44, died almost instantly, and the Ukraine Prosecutor’s Office quickly confirmed that a bomb had caused the explosion.	临近的窗户被震碎，鸟儿们也被纷纷惊起。 44岁的谢里梅特几乎立刻丧生，乌克兰检方很快确认，爆炸系由炸弹引起。


But one year later, Sheremet’s murder remains unsolved.	但一年过去了，谢里梅特被杀一案仍然悬而未决。


Had this been a random car bombing, my organization, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), would not have spent the last year investigating it or pushing the Ukrainian government for a full inquiry.	如果这只是一场随机发生的汽车炸弹爆炸事件，那么我的组织——保护记者委员会（CPJ）就不会耗费一整年进行调查或敦促乌克兰政府彻查。


But Sheremet was a tireless advocate for transparency and democracy, working as a journalist first in his native Belarus, then in Russia, and most recently, in Ukraine.	但谢里梅特生前为透明度和民主不懈奔走，先在其祖国白俄罗斯，后在俄罗斯，最后在乌克兰从事记者工作。


Until his murder is solved, the truth that he sought in life will elude his countrymen in his death.	在他被杀一案真相大白之前，他一生不懈追求的真相将让他的同胞们永远无法接触到他的死亡。


Murder is the ultimate form of media censorship.	谋杀是媒体审查的终极形式。


When journalists are slain, self-censorship seeps into the work of others.	当记者们染上杀身之祸时，其他人就会开始自我审查。


And when a country – especially a country like Ukraine, which aspires to European Union membership – fails to bring the killers to justice, its stated commitment to democracy and the rule of law rings hollow.	而当一个国家——特别是渴望加入欧盟的乌克兰这样的国家——不能将杀手绳之以法时，其所谓的致力于民主和法治的誓言就会信誉扫地。


That is where things stand with Sheremet’s case.	这就是形势有利于谢里梅特案的原因。


Over the last year, Ukrainian officials have made many pledges, but have made no arrests, identified no suspects, and presented no convincing motive for the killing.	在过去的一年中，乌克兰官员多次做出承诺，但没有进行任何抓捕行动，没有辨别任何嫌犯，也没有拿出令人信服的作案动机。


As CPJ found during a recent weeklong advocacy mission to Kyiv, the lingering impunity has hurt the media’s ability to cover sensitive issues, including corruption, abuse of power, and the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine.	CPJ在最近为期一周的基辅行动中发现，凶手长期逍遥法外已经影响到媒体报道敏感事件的能力，包括腐败、滥用权力和东乌克兰的持续冲突等。


Indeed, press freedom in Ukraine has come under increasing attack in the year Sheremet was murdered.	事实上，在谢里梅特被杀以来的一年中，乌克兰言论自由受到的攻击日益严重。


Investigative journalism is branded unpatriotic, and reporters who challenge official policies, as Sheremet did every day, are threatened, harassed, or placed under surveillance.	调查报道被贴上了不爱国的标签，挑战官方立场的记者——即谢里梅特每天都在做的事——饱受威胁，身心俱疲，还要受到监视。


Ukrainian officials insist they are still working Sheremet’s case.	乌克兰官员坚持说，他们仍然在为谢里梅特案努力。


President Petro Poroshenko, who met with a CPJ fact-finding delegation on July 11, said he remains committed to bringing the killer(s) to justice.	总统波罗申科在7月11日接见了CPJ真相调查代表团，说他仍然承诺要将杀手绳之以法。


Poroshenko even proposed adding an international partner to his government’s investigation, which could invigorate the probe.	波罗申科甚至提出邀请国际合作方参与乌政府的调查中，这理应是一个振奋人心的消息。


But while this is a welcome move, it comes very late, and after months of missteps that have shaken the public’s trust.	但这一姿态固然值得欢迎，却可谓为时已晚，几个月来的处置失当已经动摇了公众的信任。


Factually incorrect statements from top officials, including Ukraine’s interior minister, Arsen Avakov, have undermined the credibility of the investigation.	包括乌克兰内政部长阿尔森·阿瓦科夫（Arsen Avakov）在内的高官谎话连篇，令调查信誉扫地。


Avakov has alleged Russian involvement in Sheremet’s murder and suggested that the case is unlikely to be solved.	阿瓦科夫指责俄罗斯与谢里梅特案有关，暗示案件不可能得到解决。


But in meetings with investigating agencies, the CPJ was told that Avakov has limited access to investigation files, and that his statements are unsupported by evidence.	但在与调查机关的会面中，CPJ被告知，阿瓦科夫只能有限接触调查卷宗，他的声明没有证据支持。


Our delegation was also told that the authorities are examining several motives, but have not ruled out – or pinpointed – any single one.	我们的代表团还被告知，当局正在研究几种动机，但没有排除——或指明——任何一种。


Why, then, does Avakov continue to make contradictory statements and indulge in poorly sourced conjecture?	那么，阿瓦科夫为什么要不断地放出互相矛盾的口风，沉迷于没有确证的猜测？


Equally worrying are reports that the investigation has been plagued by shoddy police work, including a failure to question key witnesses, check surveillance camera footage, or adequately explain the presence of a former internal security officer at the scene the night before the murder.	同样令人担忧的是，有报告表明调查因为警方工作不力而大受影响，包括没有质询重要证人、检查监控录像，以及充分解释为何谋杀案前一晚有一位前内部安全官员出现在现场。


The editor-in-chief of Ukraine’s leading independent news website, Ukrainska Pravda, told CPJ that in the months before his death, Sheremet and his partner, Olena Prytula, the site’s co-founder, had been under surveillance.	乌克兰最重要的独立新闻网站Ukrainska Pravda的总编辑告诉CPJ，在谢里梅特死前几个月里，他和他的搭档、该网站的联合创始人奥伦纳·普里图拉（Olena Prytula）一直受到监视。


Moreover, the staff had received threats clearly meant to stop them from reporting on specific, sensitive stories.	此外，网站工作人员收到过一些威胁，其目的显然是要阻止他们报道具体的敏感事件。


Yet Ukrainian authorities have not adequately responded to CPJ’s questions about their investigation of these allegations.	但乌克兰当局尚未对CPJ关于他们在调查的这些指控的质疑做出回应。


Taken together, these omissions and unexplained events raise serious questions about the integrity and legitimacy of the Ukrainian-led investigation.	综合看来，这些疏漏和未解释的事件足以严重质疑乌克兰领导的调查的正当性和合法性。


If Poroshenko is serious about solving Sheremet’s murder, changes are needed.	如果波罗申科关于解决谢里梅特案的说法是认真的，那么乌克兰必须做出改变。


Ukrainian officials must establish a clear hierarchy and assign someone to be responsible for resolving the case.	乌克兰官员必须确立明确的层级，指派专人负责解决案件。


Moreover, Poroshenko should publicly commit more resources to the investigation, and forcefully condemn any attack on journalists.	此外，波罗申科应该公开承诺加大调查力度，并强烈谴责一切针对记者的攻击。


And, most challenging of all, a new investigative ethos is needed to reduce the risk of departmental bias, especially if evidence points toward official or government entities, as some suggest it might.	此外，最难办到的是，需要更新调查的氛围，以降低部门偏见（departmental bias）的风险，特别是当证据指向官方或政府实体的时候（这种可能性相当大）。


Despite the president’s renewed engagement, we are not yet convinced that the Ukrainian government will pursue this case with the vigor it demands.	尽管有总统的重新介入，我们仍无法确信乌克兰政府会拿出应有的力量调查该案。


That is why external pressure is also needed.	因此，需要施加外部压力。


The European Union is in a unique position to apply it.	欧盟在这方面拥有独一无二的优势。


The EU, in declaring Ukraine a priority partner for deeper political and economic ties, has the leverage to hold the Ukrainian government to account.	欧盟宣布乌克兰是深化政治和经济关系的重点合作伙伴，它有手段问责乌克兰政府。


In 2014, the bloc pledged €12.8 billion ($15 billion) to Ukraine to bolster several key sectors, including law and civil society.	2014年，欧盟承诺为乌克兰提供128亿欧元改善多个关键部门，包括法律和公民社会。


Progress in both fields would be set back significantly by a failure to reach a conclusion in the Sheremet case.	这两大领域的进步将因为无法就谢里梅特案形成定论而受到重大挫折。


Sheremet spent more than two decades reporting in three post-Soviet countries, and was relentless in uncovering corruption wherever he reported.	谢里梅特在三个前苏联国家工作逾二十年，不懈地揭发他所在地区的腐败现象。


For his tenacity, CPJ awarded him our International Press Freedom Award in 1998.	为了表彰他的坚韧，CPJ授予他1998年国际新闻自由奖。


But he was also threatened, imprisoned, attacked, and stripped of his citizenship in Belarus.	但他也曾经在白俄罗斯受到过威胁，身陷囹圄，遭到袭击，还被剥夺了公民权。


Indeed, while Sheremet had many friends, who adored his charismatic personality, wit, and contagious optimism, he also had his share of enemies, who detested his uncompromising journalism.	事实上，谢里梅特有很多朋友，他们都敬仰他的个人魅力、智慧和有感染力的乐观精神； 但谢里梅特也有很多敌人，他们忌惮他不妥协的新闻精神。


Five years ago, Sheremet moved to Ukraine because he thought he would find a freer, safer environment in which to work.	五年前，谢里梅特来到乌克兰，因为他认为在这里能遇到更加自由、更加安全的工作环境。


Today, as attacks on the media continue in his adopted homeland, and with his own murder unsolved, the faith he placed in Ukraine is not being repaid.	如今，他的第二故乡的媒体仍然在遭受攻击，他本人的被谋杀案件也迟迟得不到解决，他对乌克兰的信念没有获得回报。


Education Cannot Wait	教育不能等待


LONDON – “Recall the face of the poorest and weakest man you have seen, and ask yourself if this step you contemplate is going to be any use to him.”	伦敦——“想想你所见过的最贫困虚弱的面孔，扪心自问你所思考的这项举措是否对他们有益。


These words, spoken by Mahatma Gandhi in 1948, should be taken as a test of our sincerity, and as a challenge to our complacency, when considering the fate of the 30 million children displaced from their homes by civil wars and natural disasters.	”1948年圣雄甘地的这段话应当视为对我们自身诚意的检验和对自满的挑战，因内战和自然灾害而背井离乡的3，000万儿童的命运有赖于此。


More boys and girls have been uprooted by crisis than at any time since 1945.	1945年来因危机而流离失所的男孩和女孩数量达到历史之最。


They are likely to spend their school-age years without entering a classroom, their talents undeveloped and their potential unlocked.	他们很可能在入学年龄无法走进教室，导致才华得不到开发、潜力也得不到挖掘。


There are now 75 million young people whose education has been interrupted by conflict and crisis.	现在因冲突和危机而中断教育的年轻人已达7，500万。


Yet urgency – and international law, which mandates the education of all displaced children – fails to inspire action.	但如此急迫的问题——以及强制规定所有流离失所的儿童必须接受教育的国际法——仍然未能敦促各方行动起来。


Displaced children are more likely to become the youngest laborers in the factory, the youngest brides at the altar, and the youngest soldiers in the trench.	流离失所儿童很可能会成为工厂里最年轻的劳动者、祭坛上最年轻的新娘和战壕里最年轻的战士。


Without opportunity, children are vulnerable to extremists and radicalization.	缺乏机遇的儿童很容易感染极端和激进主义。


Every year, close to a half-million girls are trafficked and vanish.	每年有近50万女童被贩卖后就此消失。


The fate of these dispossessed is tethered to the thinnest of lifelines.	流离失所者的命运就靠一根最细的生命线维持。


When disaster strikes, what can only be described as a begging bowl is handed around the world’s donor community.	当灾难来袭时，会有一只讨饭碗在世界捐助团体间传来传去。


Voluntary contributions are then administered by refugee agencies, charities, and NGOs, which heroically help refugees scrape by with the bare essentials – food, water, shelter, and protection.	之后再由难民机构、慈善机构和非政府组织对自愿捐款进行管理，难民们就靠上述捐款购买的食物、水、住所和保障等基本生存物资勉强维持。


In such circumstances, the right to education becomes an unaffordable “luxury.”	在这样的生存条件下，受教育权成了一种无法承担的“奢侈品”。


While UN Peacekeepers are funded by assessed contributions levied on member countries, the millions of children displaced by crises have no guarantee that anyone will fund their schooling.	联合国维和部队所需经费由各成员国分摊，但因危机而流离失所的成百上千万儿童却无法保证有人会为他们资助学费。


Indeed, less than 2% of humanitarian aid reaches education.	事实上，仅有不到2%的人道主义援助会被用于教育。


Syria’s civil war, now entering its sixth year, and the first anniversary of Nepal’s devastating earthquake – two disasters that have forced millions more children into the streets – serve as painful reminders that we lack the means to return children to the classroom in the wake of such tragedies.	叙利亚内战现在已经进入第六个年头，且正值尼泊尔特大地震一周年纪念日——迫使成百上千万儿童流落街头的这两次特大灾难时时提醒人们，面对这样的悲剧，我们缺乏必要的手段让孩子们重新上学。


A permanent fund securing education for children in emergency situations is long overdue.	为处在紧急状况的儿童设立永久教育基金的举措早已姗姗来迟。


Instead of wasting months begging for aid, such a reserve fund would be capable of delivering it immediately.	这样的储备基金能立即提供所需援助，而不必在灾难发生后耗费几个月的时间四处筹集。


At the onset of an emergency, the fund would swiftly assess where dispossessed children are, develop a strategy, and put in place a plan to provide education for them.	紧急情况发生后，基金能迅速评估哪里有流离失所的孩子，制定对策和相应计划为他们提供教育。


Now, for the first time, we are in a position to deliver on this promise.	现在，我们能够兑现这一承诺，这的确是有史以来第一次。


Under the leadership of UNICEF Executive Director Anthony Lake, UNESCO Director-General Irina Bokova, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi, Chair of the Global Partnership for Education Julia Gillard, and World Bank President, Jim Yong Kim – and with the support of the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon – an unprecedented humanitarian fund for education in emergencies is about to be established.	在联合国儿童基金会执行主任安东尼·雷克、联合国教科文组织总干事伊琳娜·博科娃、联合国难民事务高级专员菲利波·格兰迪、全球教育伙伴关系主席朱莉娅·吉拉德、世界银行行长金墉（Jim Yong Kim）——及联合国秘书长潘基文的支持下——一个前所未有的紧急人道主义教育基金即将成立。


The new “Education Cannot Wait” fund will respond to new realities and requirements.	全新的“教育不能等待”基金将响应新要求、适应新现实。


Most child refugees are likely to spend more than a decade out of their own countries, so their plight cannot be considered temporary.	多数难民儿童滞留国外的时间可能长达十年以上，因此不能将他们的困境归结为暂时。


The breakthrough fund will support the education of refugees for up to five years, instead of the mere months of patchwork provisions that are presently on offer.	这一突破性基金将支持长达5年的难民教育，而不是像现在这样东拼西凑出短短几个月的补给。


No longer will humanitarian, security, and development needs be split into silos with their own addresses and agendas.	人道主义、安全和发展需求不再被分割成不同的时间和地址。


A single fund will now meet these needs at once.	这些需求将由单一基金一次性予以满足。


After all, when refugee children find a place in school, they are more secure, their parents are more hopeful, and their states are more stable.	毕竟，当难民儿童重新走进学校，他们本人更安全、他们的父母更有希望、他们的国家也更稳定。


The fund will not be bound by old World Bank rules that, until recently, excluded the education of refugee children in middle-income countries from concessional loans.	该基金将不受世界银行原有规则的约束，直到不久前，上述规定还不允许中等收入国家的难民儿童通过优惠贷款接受教育。


The initiative will be the first official humanitarian fund for education.	该计划将成为首只官方背景的人道主义教育基金。


And a parallel UN-led fund will have distinct windows through which businesses, foundations, and individuals can contribute.	另一只平行设立的基金将由联合国主导，企业、基金和个人均可通过明确的窗口进行捐助。


To be sure, delivering an education to displaced children demands a departure from pure voluntarism: a shift toward assessed contributions collected by levies from wealthy countries.	可以肯定，为流离失所儿童提供教育需要摒弃纯粹的志愿主义：逐步过渡到由富裕国家分摊教育成本。


But, until this shift occurs, we will ask individual philanthropists, corporations and charities – as well as new and old aid donors – to come together to catalyze the venture.	但在上述转变实现之前，我们请求个人慈善家、企业和慈善机构——以及新老捐助者——齐心协力推动这次创业。


Our sense of urgency, coupled with the requisite funds, promises to have a significant impact.	我们的紧迫感、再加上必要的资金，可能会带来巨大的影响。


When it comes to securing schooling, no price tag is too steep.	在涉及教育的问题上，无论付出多大代价都在所不惜。


The fund will harness today’s passions and key innovations.	该基金将对今天的激情和重要创新善加利用。


We want technology firms to play a central role in providing new ideas and disruptive thinking.	我们希望科技公司能在提供新理念和破坏性思维过程中发挥核心作用。


We want firms that already offer refugees an online education, internet access and IT hardware to drive the provision of education to displaced and isolated girls and boys.	我们希望已经在为难民提供在线教育、互联网接入和IT硬件的企业推动流离失所及孤立儿童的教育工作。


In establishing this fund, we are ending the era of the formulaic crisis response.	通过设立上述基金，只能对危机进行公式化响应的时代已经结束。