But, for a combination of political and personal reasons, America lost time under the two presidencies of Bill Clinton.	但是，由于政治原因和自身因素的作用，在比尔·克林顿两次执政期间，这样的机遇被美国白白浪费掉了。


Indeed, during this necessarily short and fragile “unipolar moment,” Clinton probably had an intuition of what America’s new responsibilities should be, but he did not deliver.	实际上，在这短暂脆弱而又不可避免的“单极时刻”，克林顿或许已经意识到美国所肩负的全新责任，但他却没有能够将其付诸实施。


The defeat of the Democrats in the mid-term elections in 1994, followed by the Monica Lewinsky affair, hampered the effectiveness of one of America’s most energetic and gifted Presidents.	民主党在1994年中期选举中的失利，再加上接踵而至的莫妮卡·莱温斯基事件，使这位精力最为充沛、也最有天分的美国总统效率大打折扣。


That failure was epitomized by the inability to impose a peace agreement on Palestinians and Israelis in 2000.	克林顿的失败集中体现在未能促使巴勒斯坦和以色列在2000年达成和平协议。


By contrast, George W. Bush did not lose time.	与此形成鲜明对照的是，乔治·W·布什没有白白浪费时间。


He did worse: he simply took a wrong turn – and he took it before 9/11, a traumatic event that reinforced, but did not create, America’s Manichean view of itself and its role in the world.	他做得更糟：从根本上选择了错误的方向¾这样的错误在九一一事件之前就已经存在，那次给人们留下巨大创伤的事件并不是美国在全世界扮演摩尼教徒的开始，而只是又一次强化了这种已经存在的趋势。


Three recent examples illustrate what went wrong with America, its loss of unique status, and its growing image as a partisan and unethical, if not destabilizing, force in the world.	不久前发生的三个实例生动地表明了美国的问题所在，美国失去了独一无二的地位，在世人的心目中，美国越来越成为党同伐异、缺乏道德的典范，甚至成为全球稳定的一种破坏力量。


Consider, first, the recent nuclear agreement signed between the US and India.	先来看看不久前美国和印度签署的核问题协定。


In strictly legal terms, there is nothing wrong, since India never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.	从严格的法律意义上讲，这份协议的签署无可挑剔，因为印度从未在此前签署过《核不扩散条约》。


But in psychological and political terms, the deal signed could only be perceived as legitimizing for Iran’s nuclear ambitions, not to mention North Korea’s.	但从心理和政治的角度，它却只能为伊朗的核抱负提供合理的借口，更不要说一直怀有勃勃野心的北朝鲜了。


It was the ultimate proof that the Bush administration does not believe in universal norms.	这份协议最终证明了布什政府根本不认为应当奉行统一的标准。


A “good” country would be treated with extreme leniency, whereas a “bad” country would not.	“好的”国家可以受到极端宽松的对待，而“坏的”国家却不能。


Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib, and more recent war-crimes scandals have done much worse damage to America’s stature.	关塔纳摩、阿布·格莱布和最近发生的更多有关战争犯罪的丑闻对美国声望所造成的影响更为严重。


Regimes that systematically violate human rights have been quick to seize on every episode of US wrongdoing.	每一次令人发指的暴行背后，都隐藏着对人权进行系统性破坏的政治制度。


With its own human rights record in question, the US, which had been the democratic teacher of the post-war world, is in a much weaker position to give lessons and set standards.	随着自身的人权记录受到世人的广泛质疑，二战结束后就一直自诩为世界民主教师的美国早已失去了发号施令和制定标准的资格。


Nor does the appearance of hypocrisy end there.	但表面装出的伪善并未结束。


At a time when “democracy” and “democratization” have become the watchwords of US foreign policy, normalization of diplomatic relations with Gaddafi’s Libya, not to mention leniency towards Egypt and Saudi Arabia hardly boosts America’s credibility.	在这样一个“民主”和“民主化”已经成为美国外交政策口号的年代，与卡扎菲领导的利比亚实现外交关系正常化，更不用说对埃及和沙特阿拉伯的姑息迁就很难对美国的可信度产生任何帮助。


In global terms, the contrast between what America says and what it does has become glaring.	在全球范围内，美国“言”与“行”之间的鲜明反差已经显得极为刺目。


In February 2005, in a major speech in Paris during her first foreign trip as Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice stated America’s ambition in the world.	2005年2月，当选国务卿的康多莉扎·赖斯在巴黎首次发表重要讲话时，道出了美国的全球目标。


She said essentially the following: “The role of the world is to improve the world.	她的讲话大意如下：“世界的未来将会越变越好。


America, as the most powerful and ethical country in the world, has a unique responsibility to perform.”	美国作为世界上最强大、也最合乎道德标准的国家，对此肩负着独一无二的责任。 ”


Eighteen months later, the results are falling far short of the goal.	8个月后的结果距离赖斯的目标相去甚远。


On the contrary, the failures of US policy have contributed to reduce the legitimacy of America’s power further.	恰恰相反，美国政策的失败进一步削弱了美国权力的合法性。


Despite the recent death of Zarqawi in Iraq, the situation there, and in Afghanistan, does not justify the continued Bush administration’s optimism.	尽管前不久扎卡维被美军在伊拉克击毙，但伊拉克和阿富汗的局势发展根本不能为布什政府的乐观看法提供理由。


As America’s legitimacy diminishes, new actors are appearing on the world stage – or returning for an encore.	随着美国合法性的不断减退，新的演员已经登上了世界舞台¾或者说再次回到了舞台的中心。


Russia and China today are united not only by their energy deals, but also by both countries’ conviction that their time has come, and that the outside world needs them more than they need the outside world, particularly the US.	今天，将俄国和中国联系在一起的已经不仅仅是两国的能源协议，这两个国家都认定，属于他们的时代已经到来。 世界需要他们更甚于他们需要世界，而美国尤其如此。


In strategic terms, the waning influence of a paralyzed Europe is also very bad news for America.	从战略角度看，陷入瘫痪的欧洲影响力日趋下降，这对美国也十分不利。


The US needs allies now more than ever, for the world is reverting to its pre-war multi-polar state.	美国现在比任何时候都更需要盟友，因为世界已经恢复到了战前的多极化状态。


Of course, given America’s objective military superiority, I would call it “asymmetrical multi-polarity.”	当然，因为美国在客观上拥有军事优势，我把目前的状况称之为“不对称的多极世界。


But the US is no longer the country that others seek to emulate, or that they look to for global leadership.	”但美国已经不再是别国争相仿效的对象，也不再是它们心目中的全球领导者。


It is too early to dismiss America and proclaim the end of an imperial moment.	现在就把美国撇在一边，宣告霸权时代的结束还为时过早。


America retains unique qualities – particularly its ability to rebound.	美国仍然拥有独一无二的素质¾尤其是再次崛起的力量。


The next US president should be able to capitalize on Americans’ fundamental optimism, pragmatism, and activism.	下一任美国总统应该能够充分调动起美国人最根本的乐观主义、实用主义和积极行动的精神。


But he or she will face an uphill struggle to prove to the world that America can be a force for good, a democratic beacon that cares for the planet and that lives up to the standards that it sets for others.	但他或她将会面对一场艰苦的战斗，向世人证明美国可以成为一种正义的力量，一座点亮全球的民主灯塔，忠实地奉行着为其他国家制定的行为标准。


What We Owe Egypt	我们欠埃及什么？


CAMBRIDGE – The question that still underlies much thinking about economic development is this: What can we do to kick-start economic growth and reduce poverty around the world?	剑桥——直到现在仍然引发关于经济发展思考的问题是，我们可以做些什么来推动经济增长，减少世界各地的贫困问题？


The “we” is sometimes the World Bank, sometimes the United States and other rich countries, and sometimes professors of development economics and their students huddled in a seminar room.	“我们”有时指的是世界银行，有时指美国和其他富裕国家，有时指发展经济学教授和学生挤在一间会议室上课讨论。


It is on this question that the entire development-aid complex is based.	整个发展援助复杂体系的基础都是集中在这个问题上。


But what has transformed Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya over the last two years has not been efforts by the outside world to improve these societies or their economies, but grassroots social movements intent on changing their countries’ political systems.	但是，过去两年中改变突尼斯、埃及和利比亚的并不是外界为改善这些社团或经济状况而进行的努力，而是旨在改变各自国家的政治制度的基层社会运动。


It started in Tunisia, where the revolution swept President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s repressive regime out of power. It then spread to Egypt and Libya, ending Hosni Mubarak’s and Muammar el-Qaddafi’s even more repressive and corrupt regimes.	这项运动开始于突尼斯，该国爆发的革命将总统宰因·阿比丁·本·阿里的专制政权赶下台来，随后蔓延到埃及和利比亚，结束了穆巴拉克和卡扎菲更残暴、更腐败的政权统治。


The people who poured into the streets and risked their lives were fed up with the repression and the poverty that these regimes caused.	那些冲上街道，冒着生命危险示威游行的人受够了这些制度造成的压迫和贫困。


The average Egyptian’s income level, for example, is just 12% of the average American’s, and Egyptians can expect to die 10 years sooner.	例如，埃及的人均收入水平仅为美国的12％，埃及人的寿命比美国人短10年。


Fully 20% of the population lives in dire poverty.	20％的人口生活极度贫困。


The protesters in Tahrir Square perceived the cause of Egypt’s poverty in its non-responsive, repressive political system, its corrupt government, and the general lack of equality of opportunity in every sphere of their lives.	塔里尔广场的抗议者认为镇压性的政治制度、腐败的政府以及生活的每个领域普遍缺乏平等机会是导致埃及贫困的原因。


They saw their current leaders as part of the problem, not part of the solution.	他们认为现任领导者是问题的一部分，而不是解决方案的一部分。


By contrast, most outsiders, asking “What can we do?”, emphasized geographic or cultural factors, or some purely economic “poverty trap,” whose effects should be countered by foreign aid and advice.	相比之下，大多数外国人问：“我们能做些什么？ ”，强调了地域或文化因素或一些纯粹的经济“贫困陷阱”，其影响应由外国援助和建议应对。


There should be no illusion that the transformation that the protesters started will be smooth.	我们不应该有任何幻想，认为示威者开始的转型将会一帆风顺。


Many previous revolutions have deposed one set of corrupt rulers only to bring in a new bunch who are equally corrupt, vicious, and repressive.	以往的许多革命废黜了腐败的统治者，结果带来的是新的同样腐败、狠毒和镇压的政府。


There is also no guarantee that the previous elites will not be able to re-constitute similar regimes.	同样没有保证以前的精英将无法重新组建类似的政权。


Indeed, the military, the bulwark of Mubarak’s regime, is now in charge in Egypt, and has been repressing, jailing, and killing protesters who dare to stand up.	事实上，穆巴拉克政权的军事堡垒现在控制着埃及，镇压、监禁和杀害敢于站出来的示威者。


Most recently, it has unveiled plans to write a new constitution before the presidential election, and its electoral commission has disqualified 10 of the 23 presidential candidates on flimsy grounds.	最近，在总统大选前，它已经推出了计划准备写一部新宪法，选举委员会以站不住脚的理由将23名总统候选人中的10位取消了资格。


And, if the military loosens the reins, the Muslim Brotherhood could take over and form its own authoritarian, non-representative regime.	而且，如果该军事政权放松缰绳，穆斯林兄弟会将可能接管并组建自己的不代表民众利益的权威政府。


But there are also grounds to be optimistic.	但是也有乐观的理由。


The genie is out of the bottle, and people know that they have the power to topple governments, and, more generally, that their political activism has consequences.	魔鬼已经出了瓶子，人们都知道他们有能力推翻政府。 更普遍的是，他们的政治行动会产生严重的后果。


That is why people have continued to fill Tahrir Square whenever the military has tried to consolidate its power and suppress dissent.	这就是为什么每次军方试图巩固其权力和压制异议者的时候，人们总会涌向塔里尔广场的原因。


Though it is ultimately the Egyptian people who will decide the country’s fate, and whether it can finally take decisive steps towards more inclusive political institutions, this does not mean that outsiders can do nothing.	虽然最终埃及人民将决定国家的命运，埃及政府是否能够采取决定性的步骤，最终走向更加包容性的政治机构，但这并不意味着外人无能为力。


In fact, there is much that “we” can do – even if none of it will be central to the outcome.	事实上，我们可以做的事情有很多——即使这些做法对最终结果起不了多大作用。


For example, the US will again give more than $1.5 billion of aid to Egypt this year.	例如，美国今年将再次给埃及提供超过15亿美元的援助。


But who is receiving that aid?	但是接受援助是对象是谁？


Unfortunately, it is not the people who are trying to change their country’s future, but the Egyptian military and the same politicians who ruled Egypt under the previous regime.	不幸的是，并不是正在试图改变自己国家未来的埃及人民，而是埃及军方和政治家。


The least we owe to the Egyptian people is to stop supporting their repression.	我们坚决不能向埃及人民提供支持，停止本国镇压。


That does not mean cutting foreign aid.	这并不意味着削减外援。


On the contrary, though foreign aid will not by itself transform Egypt’s society or economy, and though some of it will inevitably be wasted and fall into the wrong hands, it can still do some good.	相反，尽管外援本身不会改变埃及的社会或经济状况，虽然有些将不可避免地被浪费，落入坏人之手，但是它仍然可以发挥一些积极作用。


More important, the US and the international community can work to ensure that the bulk of the funds go not to the military and to business-as-usual politicians, but to grassroots causes and groups.	更重要的是，美国和国际社会可以共同努力，确保大量资金不是流向军方和政治家手中，而是基层事业和团体中。


In fact, foreign aid can also be used as a small inducement for national dialogue in Egypt.	事实上，外援也可以用来作为埃及全国对话的一个诱因。


For example, foreign aid could be placed under the stewardship of a committee of representatives from different social factions, including the civil-society groups at the center of the uprising and the Muslim Brotherhood, with the clear understanding that if the committee fails to agree, the aid will not be disbursed.	例如，外援可以一个由不同社会派别组成的管理委员会管理，包括在本次起义中发挥重要作用的民间社会团体和穆斯林兄弟会，人们可以清醒地认识到，如果委员会不同意，援助将不会发放。


This would force the military and the elites to work together with opposition groups that they often attempt to sideline.	这将迫使军方和精英与他们向来不和的反对派团体合作。


Beyond bringing important but politically marginalized groups to the table, such a committee might also produce a demonstration effect, with successful power-sharing in a small setting possibly encouraging power-sharing writ large.	除了带来重要的但政治上被边缘化的群体，这样的一个委员会也可能产生示范效应，成功地在小范围内分享权力，可能��励更大范围内的权力分享。


That may not be the sort of outside intervention that could cure the ills of centuries of repression and underdevelopment overnight, but “we” need to stop searching for a non-existent panacea, and instead do something better than feeding the Egyptian military.	这可能不是那种外部干预，可以彻底消除数世纪以来积累的镇压弊病，但我们需要停止搜寻一种不存在的灵丹妙药，而是做一些比供给埃及军队更好的事情。


When Democracies Collide	民主国家间的碰撞


BERLIN – The multipolar nature of today’s international system will again be on display at the upcoming G-20 summit in Los Cabos, Mexico.	柏林— 当今国际制度的多极性质将在即将到来的墨西哥洛斯卡沃斯G20峰会上再次显现。


Global problems are no longer solved, crises managed, or global rules defined, let alone implemented, the old-fashioned way, by a few, mostly Western, powers.	全球问题的解决、危机的治理、全球规则的制定（更不用说执行了）由一小撮强国（绝大部分是西方国家）决定的日子已经一去不复返了。


Incipient great and middle powers, such as India, Brazil, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and South Africa, also demand their say.	崛起的大国和中等国家，比如印度、巴西、印尼、韩国、土耳其和南非，无不要求获得话语权。


Some of these powers are still emerging economies.	这些强国中不乏新兴经济体。


Politically, however, most of them have crossed the threshold that has long limited their access to the kitchen of international decision-making.	但是，从政治上说，这些国家绝大部分已经跨越了长期横亘在它们面前、阻挠它们进入国际决策层的门槛。


The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (the “P-5”) still defend their right to veto resolutions, and their military power is unmatched.	联合国安理会五大常任理事国（“五常”）仍保有否决权，它们在军力上的优势也依然不容撼动。


But they can no longer dispose of sufficient resources, competence, and legitimacy to cope with global challenges or crises on their own.	但它们已不再能够随心所欲地动用充分的资源、能力和哈发行来按自己的路子应对全球性挑战和危机了。


Bipolarity is a thing of the past, and it is unlikely to re-emerge in a new Sino-American “G-2.”	两极时代早已过去，新的中美“G2”复现只是一个传说。


It is equally unlikely for the foreseeable future that any one club of countries, such as the G-7 or G-8, will again assume a quasi-hegemonic position.	同样，在可以预见的未来，形成由一组国家——比如G7和G8——占据准霸权的局面也是不可能的。


Even the G-20 in its current composition may not really represent the forces that can and will shape the twenty-first century.	从现有组成情况看，即使是G20也不能真正代表能够也将决定21世纪地球的力量。


For the Unites States, the European Union, Japan, and other members of the “Old West,” the good news is that most of the emerging powers that are positioning themselves for a more active global role are also democracies.	对美国、欧盟、日本和其他“旧西方”成员来说，好消息是大部分追求更活跃全球角色的新兴强国同样也是民主国家。


Within the G-20, only two states – China and Saudi Arabia – explicitly do not want to be liberal democracies, while a third, Russia, has developed into an autocracy with a democratic façade.	在G20中，只有中国和沙特两个国家明确不希望走自由民主道路，而俄罗斯实行的是独裁为体、民主为表。


The not-so-good news is that these new democratic powers do not necessarily share the Old West’s political agenda.	不太妙的消息是这些新的民主强国并不与旧西方政治日程天然相容。


For example, they differ about climate policies, seeing a threat to development.	比如，它们实施着不同的气候政策，这给发展蒙上了一层阴影。


Similarly, while new middle and great powers do not always agree, they are generally more skeptical of both international sanctions and military interventions.	类似地，尽管新兴中型和大型强国未必同意，但它们从总体上说对国际制裁和军事干预持怀疑态度。


Moreover, some of the most important of these states differ substantially with the US, and often also with the EU, about the right approach toward regional conflicts, especially in the Middle East.	此外，这些国家中最重要者与美国（通常与欧洲也是这样）在关于地区冲突（特别是中东地区）的正确解决之道的问题上存在重大分歧。


Thus, in 2010, the US found itself in a serious diplomatic dispute with Turkey and Brazil about how to resolve the conflict with Iran over its nuclear program.	因此，2010年，在研究怎样化解伊朗核计划导致的冲突时，美国与土耳其和巴西出现了严重的外交争论。


Without actually admitting it, the US was clearly unhappy that these two states tried to play a diplomatic role of their own in the dispute.	美国虽然没有明说，但显然对土巴两国试图在争论中扮演独立角色的做法很不满。


Differences are also apparent where new democratic middle or great powers have formed new groups or clubs, such as the BRICS, together with non-democratic powers.	在新兴中型和大型民主强国与非民主强国形成新集团（如金砖国家）的领域，分歧也显而易见。


India, Brazil, and South Africa are using such formats in a pragmatic way to pursue their interests, or simply to demonstrate their increased international weight.	印度、巴西和南非采取了实用主义，利用这种方式追求自己的利益或用以表明自己日益增加的国际分量。


There is little agreement between them and Russia or China – both P-5 members – with regard to political values or to fundamental questions of international order.	在政治价值和国际秩序的基本问题等方面，它们与俄罗斯和中国（均在五常之列）并无多少共同语言。


Along with many other states in the global South, however, Russia and China tend to defend the principle of non-interference, and they are generally reluctant to support any US or European attempts to project democracy or defend human rights in other countries.	但是，俄罗斯和中国与众多南方国家一道捍卫着不干涉的原则，一般而言，它们对任何美国或欧洲在别国推进民主、捍卫人权的行动都不支持。


Not a few policymakers in the US and in Europe have reacted with astonishment, or even annoyance, to these emerging democratic powers’ attempts to pursue their own agendas on the world stage.	不少美国和欧洲政客对这些新兴民主强国在国际舞台上追求自身利益感到惊讶甚至有些恼怒。


Such reactions partly reflect old thinking rooted in the Cold War, when democratic countries might differ over details, but would agree about the main questions of international politics.	这样的反应部分体现了植根于冷战的旧思维——民主国家尽管在细节上可能存在分歧，但在国际政治的主要问题上保持一致。


Those who pursued a different agenda on substantial matters were either not part of the “democratic camp” or were not important international players.	在本质性问题上追求不同利益者要么不属于“民主阵营”，要么地位无关紧要。


By contrast, a central feature of today’s globalized, multipolar world is that shared democratic values do not guarantee agreement about substantial questions of international politics.	相反，当今全球化、多极化世界的一大核心特征是共同的民主价值并不能保证国际政治本质问题上的一致性。


The more democracies there are, the more conflicts of interests and differences are likely to emerge between democratic countries.	民主国家越多，民主国家之间产生利益冲突和分歧的可能性就越大。


There is little reason to react with anger when states like Turkey, Brazil, and South Africa set priorities different from those of Europe or the US, or have different views about how to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iran, development aid, democracy promotion, or environmental protection.	当土耳其、巴西和南非等国家的优先考虑项与欧洲或美国出现不同，或在如何处理阿拉伯-以色列冲突、伊朗、发展援助、促进民主以及环境保护等问题的观点上出现分歧时，没有必要反应过激。


The US example shows clearly that democratic great powers often pursue their interests with little regard for a global common good that others have defined.	美国的例子清晰地表明，民主强国不顾其他国家眼中的全球共同利益一意孤行乃是家常便饭。


In other words, the international order is becoming more pluralistic.	换句话说，国际秩序正在朝多元化发展。


The task for established Western democracies is to accept and cope with such “democratic differences” on the international level, and to seek multilateral coalitions to manage or solve problems.	成熟的西方民主需要接受和处理好国际层面的这些“民主分歧”，寻求多边联盟治理和解决问题。


In principle, the EU is better positioned than the US (and certainly than China) to take on this task.	从原理上说，欧盟比美国更能承担这一任务（比中国更能承担是肯定的）。


Europeans are well practiced in dealing with differences and shaping consensus among principally like-minded states.	欧洲人在解决分歧、形成原则无甚差异的国家间的共识方面有着更丰富的经验。


That said, Europe needs to learn to be clearer and more transparent about the interests underlying its own policies, rather than suggesting that its positions on a specific subject represent the only rational implementation of democratic values and norms.	欧洲需要学着更明确、更透明的表达自身政策背后的利益诉求，而不是声称自己在某个具体问题上代表着唯一的民主价值和范式的理性实施之道。


When France Says No	当法国说“不”


Not long ago, an American political analyst compared France’s loss of influence in Europe following its “No” vote in the 2005 referendum on the EU constitutional treaty with France’s surrender in 1940.	不久以前，一位美国的政治分析家将法国在2005年的全民公决对欧盟宪法公约说“不”以后在欧洲丧失影响力的情况与其在1940年的投降相提并论。


A provocative analogy, but is it apt?	这一类比颇具争议，但它是否贴切呢？


The collapse in 1940 revealed the fragility of France’s democracy and its loss of confidence in the country’s capacity to face outside threats.	1940年的崩溃揭示了法国民主的脆弱和其对自己国家面对外来挑战的信心的丧失。


In rejecting the European constitution, France expressed its fear of, among other things, globalization.	而否决欧盟宪法至少反映了法国对全球化的恐惧。


A better analogy for the No vote was the rejection in 1954 of the treaty to establish a European Defense Community (EDC).	更好的类比是在1954年对建立欧洲防御共同体(EDC)的否决。


In both cases, a major historical mistake was made.	法国在两个案例中都犯了历史性错误。


France had to a large extent initiated both treaties, had managed to get them accepted by its European partners, but in the end vetoed its own undertakings.	在很大程度上，法国都是两个公约的发起国，并成功地使其欧洲伙伴接受了它们，但在最后又用否决票令自己功亏一篑。


Why, in both 1954 and 2005, did the French – in one case the National Assembly, in the other the electorate – reject proposals that France itself had conceived?	为什么，在1954年和2005年，法国—一次是国民会议，一次是选民—否决了法国自己构想的提案呢？


Both projects sought to construct a genuinely supranational Europe.	两个项目都试图建立一个真正超国家的欧洲。


The EDC would have created a European army, in which even German troops would have been included.	EDC本可以建立一支甚至包括德国部队在内的欧洲军队。


The proposed defense treaty was also to be buttressed by plans for a European political community whose main features were to be defined by a constitutional commission made up of members of national parliaments.	提议中的防御公约本来还要通过一个欧洲政治共同体计划来加强。 该共同体的主要特点将会通过一个由各国议会组成的宪法委员会来明确。


In effect, this commission would have been the precursor to the 2003-2004 Convention for the Future of Europe, which, presided over by former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing drafted the constitutional treaty.	实际上这一委员会本来会是2003-2004年“欧洲未来大会”的前身。 该大会在法国前总统Valéry Giscard d’Estaing的主持下起草了宪法公约。


The political community of the 1950’s that France had persuaded its five European partners to accept was supposed to absorb both the European Coal and Steel Community and the EDC.	1950年代，法国劝说其五个伙伴接受的政治共同体本来应该吸纳欧洲煤钢共同体和EDC。


It was to have both diplomatic and military powers, as well as a legislative assembly much like today’s European Parliament – just as the 2005 EU constitutional plan would have extended the European Parliament’s powers and created a European minister of foreign affairs.	它本应同时具备外交和军事权力，以及一个与今天的欧洲议会相似的立法会议—正如2005年欧盟宪法计划本应该扩展欧洲议会的权力，并设立欧洲外交部长那样。


But now, as back then, fear and doubt won the day.	但现在，正如当初一样，恐惧和怀疑占了上风。


Political parties and others who mobilized opposition to the EDC feared a remilitarized Germany and a threat to France’s sovereignty.	反对EDC的政党和其他团体担心德国的再军事化和法国的主权受到威胁。


Today, those in France who opposed the EU constitution succeeded in stigmatizing “Europe” as the threat.	当今，在法国反对欧盟宪法的人成功地将“欧洲”打上了威胁的烙印。


They trumpeted France’s invasion by “Polish plumbers,” calling into question Europe’s two principal achievements: the introduction of a single market, which has undeniably boosted the French economy, and EU enlargement, which has done so much to foster democratic transition in new member states.	他们极力渲染法国被“波兰管子工”入侵，质疑欧洲的两项主要成就：单一市场的引入（它毋庸置疑地促进了法国的经济发展）和欧盟扩大（扩盟对新成员国的民主转型提供了强大的推动力）。


But the failure of the referendum in France carries more serious consequences than the EDC’s rejection.	但法国全民公决的失败比否决EDC的后果更为严重。


Back in the 1950’s, the founding nations’ foreign ministers promptly turned to their Belgian colleague, Paul-Henri Spaak, for fresh proposals.	回到1950年代，六个发起国的外交部长很快便转向他们的比利时同僚Paul-Henri Spaak寻求新的提案。


After intensive discussion among the six, and especially between France and Germany, the Treaty of Rome was drawn up and signed within two years of the EDC debacle.	在六国之间，特别是法德之间的激烈讨论之后，起草了《罗马公约》，并在EDC彻底失败的两年之内签署了该公约。


By contrast, two years after the French and Dutch No votes, there is no sign of a Plan B, despite the claims of the French politicians who helped mobilize the No vote.	相比之下，在法国和荷兰投否决票之后的两年，尽管推动否决的那些法国政客们一再要求，也还没有任何迹象表明有后备计划出台。


Europe’s Franco-German locomotive has broken down and ratification has stopped, even though member states that had yet to ratify the treaty could have completed the process of ratification.	就算还没有批准该公约的成员国本可以完成批准程序，但由于欧洲的法德火车头停车，批准程序也会陷入停滞。


France’s loss of influence in Europe is no longer at stake today, because the notion of influence presupposes that the overriding preoccupation of EU member states is to advance their own national interests.	现今法国在欧洲影响力的丧失已成定论。 因为这种影响力概念的预设前提是欧盟各成员国压倒一切的要务是争取自身的国家利益。


If Europe were only about gaining the upper hand, it would generate perpetual conflict.	如果欧洲只是让各国争强斗狠，那么它就会产生持续不断的冲突。


The reality is that Europe does manage to move ahead, but step by step through mutual compromise.	而现实是虽然要通过彼此妥协来逐步实现，但欧洲还在往前走。


The real question has more to do with France’s credibility and its capacity to remain a driving force in Europe.	真正的问题更多在于法国的公信力和它继续作为欧洲驱动力的能力。


A journalist recently expressed the view that France’s special role in Europe was due to its “centrality,” meaning that the French are, in equal measure, both open to the world and attached to their nation.	一位记者最近表达观点认为法国在欧洲的特殊作用是源于其“中心性”，即法国人同等地对世界开放而又执著于本国。


They also participate successfully in a market economy while seeking to preserve an egalitarian social model.	他们成功地参与了市场经济，同时又试图保持一种平等主义的社会模式。


The No vote sullied this image of a balanced France.	否决票玷污了法国的平衡形象。


Indeed, the French themselves are among the first to lament their bleak situation, inventing a new concept – “la déclinologie” – to describe this loss of self–confidence.	的确，法国人自己也最先开始哀悼这种凄凉处境，他们发明了一个新概念--“la déclinologie”—来描述这种自信心的丧失。


Moreover, the No vote has given a new legitimacy to euro-skepticism in other member states.	另外，这张否决票还给予了其它国家的欧洲怀疑主义新的合法性。


To be sure, the rise of populism in Europe was not caused by the French; nationalism is deeply rooted in Europe’s history and has many causes.	确切地说，欧洲民粹主义抬头并不是法国引起的； 民族主义在欧洲历史中有深刻的根源，其产生也有多种原因。


But France’s referendum result fueled other European governments’ fears that any new proposal they might put forward to re-launch the EU constitution would fail in the face of domestic and Europe-wide opposition.	但法国全民公决的结果加重了欧洲其它国家政府的担忧。 它们担心提出的任何旨在重新恢复欧盟宪法的新议案都会再次在国内及欧洲范围内的反对势力面前遭遇惨败。


But reducing European aspirations to the goals of Realpolitik is no answer to today’s crisis.	但是削弱欧洲对现实政治目标的渴望并不是当今危机的化解之道。


Europeans need to recognize that strength lies in unity, and that Europe’s integration cannot be guaranteed without a common constitutional framework that promotes a common identity.	欧洲人需要承认团结才有力量。 没有一个推进共同身份的统一宪法框架，欧洲的一体化就得不到保证。


Until we think in terms of European sovereignty, rather than fret over risks to national sovereignty, the present crisis cannot be overcome.	只有我们以欧洲主权的方式来考虑问题，而不是为国家主权而烦恼，目前的危机才能被克服。


When India Votes	印度选举之时


KERALA, INDIA – Beginning this month, the largest exercise of the democratic franchise in history will take place, as India n voters head to the polls to elect a new national parliament.	印度，喀拉拉邦－从本月开始，当印度选民走向投票站选举新一届国会的时候，人类历史上规模最大的民主选举活动就开始了。


They have done this 14 times since India gained its independence.	自印度独立以来，印度人已经进行了14次选举。


Each time India has voted has been the world’s largest exercise in electoral democracy.	印度的每一次投票选举，都成为当时世界上规模最大的民主选举活动。


India’s growing population keeps breaking its own record.	印度不断增长的人口不断地刷新着自己以前创下的纪录。


This time, the electorate includes 714 million voters, an increase of 43 million over the previous general election in 2004.	本次的印度选举，选民人数高达7. 14亿人，比2004年的前一次普选增加了4300万人。


Votes will be cast in 828,804 polling stations scattered throughout the country for over 5000 candidates from seven national political parties and several state and other parties.	印度选民要在分布在全国的828804个投票站中，为来自七个全国性政党和几个地方性政党的超过5000名候选人投票；


The process involves four million electoral officials and 6.1 million police and civilian personnel.	整个选举过程涉及400万名负责选举的官员和610万名警察和文职人员。


The numbers involved are so huge that the elections will be staggered over five phases, ending only on May 13, with electoral and security personnel being moved from state to state as polling is concluded in each place.	因为印度选举涉及的人口数量非常庞大，所以被安排分五个阶段进行，于5月13日结束； 并且在一个地方的选举结束之后，负责选举的官员和安全人员会从印度的一个邦转移到另一个邦。


Despite the phased voting, the counting takes place nationwide immediately after the last phase, and the results of the elections everywhere will be announced on May 16.	尽管选举是分阶段进行的，但是，在选举的最后阶段结束之后，印度全国范围的选票计算工作将会立即开始，并且各个地区的选举结果都会在5月16日宣布。


A new parliament will be convened on June 2 to elect a national government to succeed the outgoing administration of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.	在6月2日，新一届议会会被召集起来选举新一届政府，以接替即将结束任期的总理曼莫汉·辛格的政府。


India’s elections, conducted by the autonomous (and all-powerful) Election Commission of India , are an extraordinary event, and not just because of their sheer scale.	由独立的（而且是全权的）印度选举委员会组织的印度选举是一项了不起的活动，这样说不仅仅是因为选举的规模巨大，而且还有其他的原因。


It takes the felling of a sizeable forest to furnish enough paper for 714 million ballots, and every election has at least one story of officers battling through snow or jungle, or traveling by elephant and camel, to ensure that the democratic wishes of remote constituents are duly recorded.	为了供应制作7. 14亿张选票所需的纸张，印度砍伐了相当多的树木，并且，在每一场选举中，都至少有一个关于负责选举的官员，为了保证边远选区选民的民主愿望得到实时的反映，冒着风雪或穿越密林，或者骑着大象和骆驼开展选举工作的故事。


(There is even one polling booth for a single voter, who lives too far from civilization to travel to another polling station.)	（印度甚至有一个为一名居住在远离现代交通设施而无法到其他投票站进行投票的选民准备的投票站。 ）


Nor is any Indian election complete without the media publishing at least one picture of a female voter whose enthusiasm for the suffrage is undimmed by the fact that she is old, blind, crippled, toothless, purdah-clad, or any combination of the above.	在印度的选举过程中，也总有媒体发表有关女选民的照片：尽管这个女选民年事已高、眼睛失明、身体残疾、牙齿已经掉光、深居简出或者有前述情况中的某几种，但是，其行使选举权的热情并没有因为这些情况而减弱。


The exotica do not end there.	印度选举中的新奇事物到此还没有结束。


Because so many voters are illiterate, India invented the party symbol, so that voters who cannot read the name of their candidate can vote for him or her anyway by recognizing the symbol under which they campaigned.	因为印度有许多选民不识字，所以印度发明了党派标志，以便那些无法阅读候选人名字的选民，能够通过辨认候选人竞选中的标志的方式，来为他或她投票。


Symbols range from the open palm of the ruling Indian National Congress to the lotus of the Bharatiya Janata Party and variants of the hammer and sickle for India’s profusion of Communist parties.	印度选举中的标志包括执政党国民大会党的张开的手掌，人民党的荷花以及多个共产党的锤子和镰刀。


Independent candidates can choose from an assortment of alternatives, ranging from a cricket bat to images of various large animals.	印度的独立候选人可以从许多不同的替代物中选择竞选标志，选择的范围包括了从板球球拍到各种大型动物图片的各种不同的标志。


(Small ones were removed from the list when one candidate, running against another whose symbol was a parrot, wrung the neck of a live parrot at a public meeting to signify what he would do to his rival.)	（因为以鹦鹉为标志的候选人的竞争对手，可以在公开集会中拧断一只活鹦鹉的脖子，以此来表明他要如此这般地击败其竞争对手，所以小型动物被从可选标志的名单中删除了。 ）


India was also the first country to use an indelible stain on the voter’s fingernail to signify that he has already cast his ballot.	印度也是第一个在选民的指甲上使用难以擦掉的痕迹来表明该选民已经投过票的国家。


At every election, someone “discovers” a new chemical that will remove the stain and permit one to vote twice, though this is unlikely to make a great difference in constituencies the size of India’s, where each MP represents more than two million people.	在每一场选举中，总会有人 “发现”一种可以清除这种痕迹的化学物质，从而使有些人投两次票，尽管这不大可能对每个议员代表超过200万人口的印度选区的选举结果产生很大的影响。


Likewise, some distinguished voter invariably claims that his name is missing from the rolls, or that someone has already cast his vote (but usually not both).	同样，也总会有些知名的选民声称其名字不在选民名单之中，或者声称有人已经冒用他的名字投了票（但是，通常这都不是事实）。


In any case, India’s elections have a reputation for honesty.	无论如何，印度的选举是可信的。


In this election, as in previous ones, votes will be cast on electronic voting machines invented in India, which combine the virtues of simplicity, reliability, and ruggedness.	这次选举和以前的选举一样，选票是投到印度发明的电子投票机中的，这种投票机具有简单、可靠和耐用的优点。


The electoral rolls carry photographs of every individual voter, as does each voter’s identity card.	印度选民名单和选民的身份证一样，贴着选民的照片。


The elections have also been increasingly free of violence.	印度选举中的暴力活动也日益减少了。


There was a time when, in certain parts of India, workers could stuff ballot boxes for a candidate and political parties could “capture” polling booths. Electronic voting machines and strict security arrangements have largely eliminated that possibility.	过去，在印度的某些地区，工人可以在投票箱里塞满选一个候选人的选票，政党可以“占领”投票站，但是，现在的电子投票机和严格的安全安排已经基本上消除了这种可能性。


It has been some time since there were reports of the occasional election worker, candidate, or voter being assaulted, kidnapped, or shot.	有关选举中的临时工作人员、候选人或者选民被袭击、绑���或者遭到枪击的报道，已经有一段时间没有见诸报端了。


Nothing (short of the death of a major contender) interrupts the franchise.	已经没有什么（除了主要候选人死亡）能够中断印度的选举了。


Elections are an enduring spectacle of free India, and give foreign journalists the opportunity to remind the world that India is the world’s largest democracy.	选举是自由印度恒久的景观，印度选举也给了外国记者让世界注意到印度是世界上最大的民主国家的机会。


Indeed, Indians now take for granted that elections will take place, that they will be free and fair, and that they will result in actual transfers of power.	事实上，印度人现在理所当然地认为，印度会进行选举，并且选举是自由和公正的，而且会导致真正的权力转移。


There are few developing countries in the world where this is true, and fewer still where poverty and illiteracy are both rife.	在世界上，只有很少的发展中国家有真正自由而公正的选举，而在贫穷且文盲普遍的国发展中国家中，进行自由公正的选举的国家就更少了。


That may be the real miracle of what will occur in India over the next few weeks.	印度接下来几个星期发生的事情，可能是真正的奇迹。


The Myth of Khaki Democracy	军事民主的神话


NEW YORK – Egypt and Thailand have little in common, except for one thing.	纽约——埃及和泰国几乎没有什么共同之处，只有一点除外。


In both countries, at different times, educated people who pride themselves on being democrats have ended up applauding military coups against elected governments.	在这两个国家的不同时期，一直以民主人士自居的高学历人士都对推翻民选政府的军事政变击掌称赞。


They had resisted oppressive military regimes for many years.	他们多年来一直苦苦抵制压迫性的军事政权。


But, in Thailand in 2006, as in Egypt last month, they were happy to see their political leaders ousted by force.	但2006年在泰国和上个月在埃及，他们都很乐于看到政治领袖被武力推翻。


This perversity is not without reason.	这种反常也并非毫无道理。


The elected leaders in both countries, Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand and Mohamed Morsi in Egypt, were good examples of illiberal democrats: they tended to view their electoral success as a mandate to manipulate constitutional norms and behave like autocrats.	两国的当选领袖（泰国的他信·西那瓦和埃及的穆罕默德·穆尔西）都符合非自由民主的特征：他们似乎认为选举成功就有权操纵宪法并实行独裁。


They are not alone in this respect.	他们的例子并非绝无仅有。


In fact, they are probably typical of leaders in countries with little or no history of democratic government.	事实上，他们也许是典型的非民主国家领袖。


Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is in the same camp.	土耳其总理雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安也属于这一阵营。


And if the leaders of Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) had been allowed to take power in 1991, after their early success in a democratic election, they would almost certainly have been illiberal rulers.	如果1991年阿尔及利亚伊斯兰拯救阵线（FIS）领袖获准在赢得首轮民主选举后执掌权力，他们几乎也肯定会进入非自由统治者的阵营。


(Instead, they were crushed by a military coup, before a second round of elections could take place, triggering a brutal eight-year civil war in which an estimated 200,000 people died.)	（相反，他们在第二轮选举开始前就被一场军事政变所粉碎，由此引发八年的残酷内战导致约200,000人丧生。 ）


The aftermath of the 2006 coup in Thailand was not nearly so bloody.	2006年的泰国政变远没有那么血腥。


But the bitterness lingers among Shinawatra’s supporters – even now, when his sister, Yingluck, is Prime Minister.	但西那瓦支持者心头的痛苦依然挥之不去——即使现任总理职务是的妹妹英拉。


Street violence is a constant threat.	街头暴力的威胁永远存在。


Only the frail and ailing 85-year-old King Bhumibol Adulyadej still functions as a symbol of national cohesion.	只有85岁高龄且体弱多病的普密蓬·阿杜德国王依然是国家团结的象征。


Without him, fighting between the rural poor and the urban elites could quickly erupt again.	没有他，农村贫困人口和城市精英之间也许很快将再次爆发内战。


This does not bode well for Thai democracy.	泰国民主也因此变得凶多吉少。


Another military intervention is the last thing the country needs.	这个国家最不需要的就是再次出现军事干预行动。


In Egypt, things look far worse at the moment.	埃及目前的局势远比泰国更糟。


The leader of the military coup, General Abdul-Fattah al-Sisi, has promised to confront Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood with maximum force.	军事政变领袖阿卜杜勒·法塔赫·艾尔西西将军承诺要竭尽全力与穆尔西的兄弟会对抗。


In two separate incidents in July, security forces opened fire on supporters of the Brotherhood as they peacefully protested against Morsi’s ouster and arrest, killing almost 200 people.	7月发生了两起安全部队向和平抗议推翻并逮捕穆尔西的兄弟会支持者开火的独立事件，导致近200人丧生。


Secret-police units that were active under former President Hosni Mubarak (and known for their frequent use of torture) are being reconstituted for the first time since the 2011 revolution.	2011年革命后首次对前总统胡斯尼·穆巴拉克手下的秘密警察部队（曾因频繁使用酷刑而闻名于世）进行了重组。


None of this is either democratic or liberal.	上述做法既不民主也不自由。


And yet many Egyptians, including some human-rights activists, have endorsed it.	但却得到了很多埃及人，包括人权活动家的赞同。


One man, who was savagely stomped by a member of the armed forces in Tahrir Square in 2011, now claims that the Egyptian people should “stand together” with the military, and that all Muslim Brotherhood leaders should be arrested.	2011年曾在解放广场（Tahrir Square）遭受军队成员野蛮践踏的某人现在声称埃及人民应当与军队“站在一起”，逮捕所有穆斯林兄弟会领导人。


A prominent democracy activist, Esraa Abdel Fattah, has denounced Morsi’s party as a gang of foreign-backed terrorists.	著名民主活动家以斯拉·阿卜杜尔·法塔赫用受国外操纵的恐怖势力来谴责穆尔西的政党。


The army leadership is saying the same thing: Special measures, maximum force, and revived security units are all necessary to “fight terrorism.”	军方领导人也遵守同样的口径：特别措施、最大力量和死灰复燃的安全部队在“与恐怖主义的对抗”中都很有必要。


Some foreign commentators have been as deluded as Egyptians who back the coup.	某些外国评论家也像支持政变的埃及人一样受到迷惑。


A well-known Dutch novelist voiced a rather typical response, saying that he didn’t care much what happened to Morsi’s supporters, for they were all “Islamo-fascists” anyway.	一位著名荷兰小说家的反应非常典型，说他根本不在意穆尔西支持者所遭受的待遇，因为反正他们都是“伊斯兰法西斯”。


And foreign governments, including that of the United States, are averting their eyes.	而包括美国在内的外国政府也对暴力行为视而不见。


President Barack Obama’s administration refuses to describe what happened as a “coup.” US Secretary of State John Kerry even claimed that the military was “restoring democracy.”	奥巴马政府拒绝把发生的事件称之为“政变”，美国国务卿约翰·克里甚至称军队是在“恢复民主”。


There is no doubt that Morsi’s government was inexperienced, often incompetent, and showed little interest in listening to views other than those of its supporters, which were often far from liberal.	穆尔西政府无疑既欠缺经验也欠缺能力，而且对听取支持者（这些人往往与开明想去甚远）以外群体的意见兴趣不大。


But Morsi’s people are not foreign-backed terrorists.	但穆尔西的民众绝不是受外国操纵的恐怖势力。


Nor was Morsi an Egyptian version of Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.	穆尔西本人也不是埃及版的霍梅尼最高领袖。


The election that brought Morsi to power gave a political voice for the first time to millions of people, many of them poor, uneducated, and religious.	让穆尔西掌权的选举首次让成百上千万贫困、没有文化、笃信宗教的民众有权利进行政治表达。


They may not have been very good democrats, or even particularly tolerant of different views.	他们或许不是合格的民主人士，甚至对不同见解都不懂得宽容。


Many of them had opinions – for example, on the role of women, on sex, and on the place of Islam in public life – that secular liberals find abhorrent.	很多人对妇女地位、性和伊斯兰在公共生活中所起作用的看法在世俗自由主义者眼中都非常可怕。


But silencing these people by force, and calling them foreign-backed terrorists, can have only one result: more violence.	但用武力让这些人闭嘴并将其称为受外国操纵的恐怖分子只能导致暴力这一个结果。


If the outcomes of democratic elections are not respected, people will seek other means to make themselves heard.	如果民主选举的结果得不到尊重，民众只能寻求其他途径来进行表达。


Morsi’s autocratic inclinations may have damaged democracy; taking him out in a coup deals it a mortal blow.	穆尔西的专制倾向可能已经损害了民主，但用政变的形式将其推翻才是民主的致命伤。


How to bridge the gap in developing countries between secular, more or less Westernized urban elites and the rural poor is an old question.	怎样弥合发展中国家相对西化的世俗城市精英和农村贫困人口间的鸿沟恐怕已经是老生常谈了。


One solution is to enforce secular modernization by oppressing the poor and their religious organizations.	方案之一是通过压迫穷人及其宗教团体的方式实现世俗现代化。


Egypt has already endured the harsh rule of secular police states, of both the right and the left.	埃及已经受够了左右两派世俗警察国家的残暴统治。


The other solution is to give democracy a chance.	给民主一次机会则是另外一种解决办法。


This is not possible without allowing some form of religious expression in public life.	不在公共生活中留出某种形式的宗教表达空间是不可能的。


No democracy in the Middle East that fails to take account of Islam will work.	不承认伊斯兰教的民主制度在中东根本行不通。


But, without the freedom to express other views and beliefs, democracy will remain illiberal.	但如果不能自由地表达其他的意见和信仰，民主政体依然不等同于自由。


This is hard for Islamist parties to accept.	这在伊斯兰政党看来很难接受。


Many Islamists may in fact prefer an illiberal to a liberal democracy.	很多伊斯兰教徒可能宁可接受不自由的民主。


But liberals who truly favor democracy must accept that Islamists are entitled to play a political role, too.	但真正热爱民主的自由主义者必须接受伊斯兰教徒也有权发挥政治作用。


The alternative is to revert to illiberal autocracy.	另外一种选择是允许非自由的专制制度复辟。


Applauding the military coup against Morsi makes this the more likely outcome.	为推翻穆尔西的军事政变击节叫好让这种结果变得更有可能。


When Marijuana is Legal	当大麻合法化之时


BRISBANE – What will happen if Californians votes this November to legalize marijuana use by any adult over the age of 21 years?	发自布里斯班——如果美国加利福尼亚州全民公决最终通过大麻合法化的提案，允许任何21岁以上成年人吸食大麻的话，那将会是何种状况？


Let’s ignore for the moment the vexed constitutional issues that will be raised if a US state enacts legislation that conflicts with federal law. Let’s focus instead on what may happen if the law changes as the referendum proposes.	让我们把那些关于各州与联邦之间法律冲突的棘手宪政问题暂时放在一边，并将目光聚焦在大麻合法化所可能引发的结果之上。


If we are to believe the referendum’s supporters, all Californians will be winners.	在支持者看来，这项提案将令所有加利福尼亚人得益。 由于大麻的使用在加州1996年第215号提案（又称“同情性使用法案”，允许某些患者在医生许可下私自种植和使用大麻）通过之后已经取得了某种实质性的合法地位，如今这项法律修改只不过是最终将其写在纸上而已。


The change will legitimize marijuana’s de facto legal status since passage of Proposition 215 in 1996.	而此举将为政府节省在查禁大麻方面的执法开支； 使大麻的种植和交易公开透明化；


It will thus reduce state expenditure on enforcing a widely violated law; remove marijuana growing and selling from the black market; enable any adult who wishes to use marijuana to do so; and introduce a tax on legal marijuana sales that will fill state coffers with revenue that formerly went to illegal growers (so long as there is no large-scale tax evasion).	满足所有成年吸食者的需求； 而对合法大麻征收的销售税则能令从前那些流入非法种植者腰包的钱变成州政府的财政收入（只要不发生大规模逃税现象的话）。


By contrast, opponents predict that the change will increase rates of marijuana use, and thus magnify the harm arising from that use.	与此相反，反对者们则预计这项法案将增加人们的大麻使用量，而该行为所引发的负面效应也会大大增加。


The adverse consequences of greatest concern include more marijuana-related road traffic accidents and deaths; more psychoses and other serious mental health problems among heavy users; and heavier marijuana use by young people, negatively affecting their life chances.	后果主要集中在更多与大麻有关的交通事故和伤亡； 大麻滥用者患上精神病以及其他精神疾病的概率增加；


These effects, they argue, will more than offset any gains from tax revenue and savings from law enforcement.	以及滥用大麻的青少年前途的影响。 反对者们认为，如果将这些效应的坏处与增加财政收入和节省执法开支的益处相比的话，显然是弊大于利的。


It is difficult to know who is right, because no other country has adopted this policy.	我们很难去分辨孰是孰非，因为至今还未有任何国家通过类似的政策。


The Netherlands, which is popularly believed to have legalized cannabis use along these lines, has in fact tolerated only small-scale retail sales of marijuana in a limited number of coffee shops in its larger cities.	一直被人们视为大麻合法国度的荷兰实际上只允许在其大城市的有限几个咖啡店中小规模地销售大麻。


Marijuana cultivation remains illegal and coffee shop sales are regulated – more strictly in recent years in response to complaints from neighboring countries about “drug tourism.”	大麻种植依然是非法的，而咖啡店的销售则受到管制——且在周边各国纷纷抱怨本国公民赴荷兰享受“毒品之旅”之后，管制也有逐渐收紧之势。


Nevertheless, some broad predictions can be made.	但即便无法借鉴别国经验，某些大概的情况还是可以推测出来的。


First, openly tolerating a market in a previously illegal commodity will expand the number of users, especially if the retail price is lower than the black-market price (as is proposed in the Ammiano Bill currently before the California legislature). Use may not increase immediately, but it will over time, because marijuana will become more freely available, much cheaper (in order to discourage the persistence of a black market), and its use will be implicitly condoned.	首先，让某种非法产品在市场上公开交易的行为将增加该产品使用者的数量，尤其是在零售价低于黑市价之时（早前由加州议会议员阿米亚诺提交给州立法机关的大麻合法化法案也提到了这一点），大麻使用量不会在短期内急剧增加，但会随着时间增长，因为获得大麻不仅更容易，而且更廉价了（为了压倒黑市交易），而大麻的使用无疑也会得到其他人的认可。


Experience with alcohol suggests that marijuana will be available to underage users (as it is now), whatever the minimum legal age.	在酒类管制方面的经验告诉我们，不管将法定年龄定得多低，大麻都将最终蔓延到那些不符合年龄的人群当中（正如现在这样）。


Thus, legally available cheaper marijuana will probably mean more use by more young people, and probably more daily use later into adulthood.	因此更廉价的合法大麻将会导致更多青年人吸食大麻，并将这种习惯带到成年之后。


In general, the more people who use a drug, the larger the number of problem users there will be (on the reasonable assumption that problem users comprise a fixed proportion of all users).	总的来说，越多人使用一种毒品，那么滥用者的数目也会随之增加（这是基于一种合理假设：全体吸食者中必定存在有特定比例的滥用者，其数量随总吸食者的增加而增加）。


If current estimates are correct, around 10% of users (and one in six who start in adolescence) may become dependent on marijuana – that is, find it difficult to control or discontinue their use.	如果目前的估计是正确的话，大概有10%的使用者（其中1/6在青少年时期就开始吸食）将发展为大麻成瘾——这意味着他们将难以自我控制或者戒除大麻。


A minority of these problem users will seek professional help to quit.	而其中只有一小部分会寻求专业人士的帮助。


Dependent marijuana users are more likely to experience road and workplace accidents (if they drive or work while intoxicated); increased respiratory disease (if they smoke marijuana); exacerbations of some serious mental disorders; and impaired school and work performance.	大麻成瘾者更可能发生交通意外或者工伤（如果他们在吸食大麻后驾车或者工作的话），呼吸道疾病的可能性也会增加（如果他们使用吸烟的方式来吸食大麻）； 诱发某些严重精神疾病的可能性剧增；


It is uncertain how far these adverse effects can be mitigated by preventive measures such as implementing roadside drug-testing programs, persuading users to use vaporizers rather than smoke joints, discouraging young people from using marijuana, and encouraging early treatment for problem users.	目前还不清楚类似公路毒品测试，说服使用者用蒸馏而不是吸烟方式吸食大麻，阻止青年人使用大麻并鼓励滥用者尽早求医等方式能在多大程度上消除这些负面效应。


Experience with alcohol suggests that these approaches may modestly reduce, but not eliminate, the harms associated with use, especially if sellers are allowed to promote their wares.	酒类管理方面的经验表明这些手段将虽然能在一定程度上减少吸食所带来的坏处，且无法完全消灭它，尤其是当大麻销售者被允许推广自己的商品的时候。


Indeed, the scale of any increase in marijuana use will critically depend on how tightly regulated marijuana sales are – how many licensed growers there are, the number of sales outlets, their locations and trading hours, eligibility requirements for use, content of THC (marijuana’s psychoactive ingredient), and how much promotion and advertising is allowed.	事实上，大麻吸食范围的增减与大麻销售的管制力度密切相关——究竟有多少种植者，销售点的数量，营业地点和时间，适度的需求量，大麻所含有的THC（四氢大麻酚，大麻的主要活性致幻成分）成分比例。


If marijuana were allowed to be marketed much like alcohol is now, we could expect more problem users than if it were regulated more like pharmaceutical drugs (say, by requiring users to be licensed; restricting the number of sales locations, hours of sale, and licensed growers; and imposing high rates of taxation on higher-THC marijuana).	如果大麻可以像酒类那样进行市场推广的话，我们将会发现比药房药物管制（比如说要求吸食者出示处方，限制销售点数量，销售时间，为种植者发放执照，并对高THC含量的大麻征重税）更多的滥用者。


It will be a major policy challenge to get this balance right.	在管制和市场之间中找到某个平衡点是非常考验政治智慧的。


Greater restrictions would provide incentives for illegal operators to remain, while less restrictive regulation would discourage black marketeers, but at the price of increasing the number of users and problem users. 	更严厉的管制措施固然会给非法大麻经营者可乘之机，而更宽松的管制虽然能遏制黑市交易，代价却是大麻吸食者和滥用者数量的不断增加。


Marijuana policy involves a choice between the evils of current repressive policies and the evils of increased use under a legal market.	加利福尼亚州其实正面临着一个两难困境：一面是当前过分严厉的政策带来的巨大政府开支和社会犯罪，二是合法交易后吸食者增加所带来的负面影响，而大麻政策则试图两害相权取其轻。


Californians will have to decide how much weight to give to respect for adult liberty, protection of minors, avoidance of a large-scale black market, fiscal considerations, and protection of marijuana users’ health.	加利福尼亚人必须要在成年人自由权，对少数群体的保护，防止大规模黑市交易，财政因素以及保护大麻使用者的健康之间作出取舍。


If they vote for legalization, it will probably be 20 years or more before anyone can say whether, on balance, they decided wisely.	如果他们最终投票通过这项法案的话，那么至少要等到20年或者更长时间之后，才能下结论说他们的决定是否明智。


When Prevention is Better than Relief	当防灾胜于救灾


PRINCETON – When the earthquake and tsunami hit Japan in March, Brian Tucker was in Padang, Indonesia.	普林斯顿——当地震和海啸三月袭击日本时，布莱恩·塔克正待在印尼的巴东。


Tucker was working with a colleague to design a refuge that could save thousands of lives if – or rather, when – a tsunami like the one in 1797 that came out of the Indian Ocean, some 600 miles southeast of where the 2004 Asian tsunami originated, strikes again.	塔克正与同事合作设计一个避难所，如果，或者说一旦印度洋再次发生像1797年那样的海啸，这座避难所有可能挽救数以千计的生命。 1797年海啸的源头位于2004年亚洲海啸源头东南方约600英里处。


Tucker is the founder and president of GeoHazards International, a nonprofit organization whose mission is to reduce death and suffering due to earthquakes in the world’s most vulnerable communities.	塔克是地质灾害国际的创始人兼领导者，地质灾害国际是一家非营利性机构，其目标是减轻世界最弱势群体在地震中遭受的伤亡和痛苦。


Padang is one of those communities.	巴东就属于这样的弱势群体。


Just to its northwest, in Banda Aceh, 160,000 lives were lost in the 2004 tsunami.	就在巴东西北方的班达亚齐，160，000人在2004年海啸中丧生。


Now, geologists say, the fault that triggered that tsunami is most likely to rupture farther south, putting low-lying coastal towns like Padang, with a population of 900,000, at high risk of a major earthquake and tsunami within the next 30 years.	现在地质学家认为导致那次海啸的地质断层最有可能继续向南断裂，致使拥有900,000人口的巴东这样的低洼沿海城镇很可能在未来30年发生海啸和大地震。


In Banda Aceh, the tsunami killed more than half the city’s population.	在班达亚齐，海啸夺去了多半城市居民的生命。


In Padang, according to an estimate by the director of the city’s disaster management office, a similar tsunami could kill more than 400,000 people.	据巴东城镇灾害管理办公室估计，巴东类似规模的海啸可能杀死超过400,000人。


Tucker says that he has stood on the beach in Padang, looking out at the ocean and trying to imagine what it would be like to see a five-meter-high wall of water stretching across the horizon, bearing down on the city.	塔克说他曾经站在巴东的海滩上遥望大海，想象一堵高达5米的水墙在地平线上伸展并向这座城市逼近。


Now that we have seen the footage of the tsunami that hit Japan, the demands on our imagination have been lessened – except that we have to imagine away the sea walls that Japan had built to reduce the impact of the tsunami.	看过日本海啸的镜头之后，想像的难度已经大大降低——只有一点，我们必须想像没有日本修建的海啸防波堤会是什么样子。


True, those walls did not work as well as had been hoped, but Japan was nonetheless much better prepared for a tsunami than Padang is.	没错，那些防波堤是没有起到人们预想的作用，但即便如此日本的海啸预防工作也远比巴东充分。


In Padang, even with advance warning of a tsunami, higher ground is too far away, and the narrow streets too choked with traffic, for many people to get to safety in time.	即使巴东成功发布了海啸预警，高地也距离太远，狭窄的街道交通太过堵塞，以致很多人无法安全脱身。


GeoHazards International is therefore working on a more practical idea, which it calls a Tsunami Evacuation Raised Earth Park (TEREP).	地质灾害国际因此也在积极寻找可行的对策，这就是启动海啸避难高地公园（TEREP）项目。


The idea is to build small hills in low-lying parts of the city, with level tops that could be used as parks or sports fields.	具体地讲就是在城市的低洼地带堆起小山，并将小山的平顶用作公园或者运动场所。


With the few minutes’ warning that an earthquake’s strong shaking would automatically provide, people could walk to a TEREP and be safe above the highest level a tsunami could reach.	这样在地震的剧烈晃动提前几分钟自动发出警报之后，人们就可以走到海啸避难高地公园，在海啸无法波及的地方安然度过灾难时刻。


Such raised earth parks are a low-cost solution to the tsunami danger in low-lying coastal areas.	这样的高地公园是沿海低洼地区应对海啸危险的低成本办法。


They use only local materials, provide a valuable community resource in normal times, and have the potential to save hundreds of thousands of lives when a tsunami strikes.	这种办法只需用到当地的材料，它们平时作为一种宝贵的社会资源，而海啸来袭时则可以挽救几十万条生命。


Nevertheless, GeoHazards International lacks the resources to build anything like enough TEREPs to meet the need.	但地质灾害国际却无力修建足够数量的高地公园满足避难需求。


After 20 years of operation, the organization remains tiny, especially when compared to organizations like the Red Cross, which primarily do disaster relief work.	在运营20年后，这家机构相比主要从事救灾工作的红十字会等机构规模依然很小。


People are willing to donate hundreds of millions of dollars to help people after a disaster – even after a disaster in a wealthy country like Japan – but are unwilling to invest anything like the same amount to save lives before a predictable disaster strikes.	即使灾难发生在日本这样的富裕国家，人们也愿意在灾后捐款数百万帮助受灾群众，但他们却不愿在可以预见的灾难来袭之前为避免伤亡投资同样的金额。


One reason for this is that preventing a disaster does not make good television.	原因之一是防灾工作并不引人注目。


People give to identifiable victims.	人们愿意为明确的受害者提供帮助。


If we build raised earth parks, we will never see the people who, but for our aid, would have died; no orphans in desperate need will appear on the nightly news.	但如果修建高地公园，我们永远也不会看到若非我们的援助就可能死去的受害者； 晚间新闻里也不会出现嗷嗷待哺的孤儿。


But isn’t it much better to keep parents safe than to help orphans after their parents have been killed?	但保护父母的安全难道不比在父母死后帮助孤儿要好得多？


This is a situation in which we must stretch our imagination, to understand and be motivated by the good that we are doing.	这种情况下我们必须发挥自己的想像，理解自己的善举并为之感到鼓舞。


Unfortunately, not everyone can do that.	遗憾的是，并不是所有人都会这样做。


Another reason why we do not give to prevent disasters should be familiar to anyone who has ever delayed going to the dentist because the prospect of serious pain in the coming weeks or months just wasn’t as motivating as the reluctance to face some more immediate slight discomfort.	如果你曾有过甘冒今后几周或几个月可能剧烈牙痛的危险也不愿立即承受轻微的不适而推迟去看牙医的经历，你或许能够理解人们为什么不愿为防灾工���进行捐助。


We tell ourselves that maybe we won’t get a toothache after all, even though we know that the odds are that we will.	我们告诉自己也许最终不会牙痛，即使我们明明知道牙痛的几率很大。


Most of us are not very good at giving proper weight to future events, especially if they are uncertain.	尤其当未来事件无法确定时，大多数人并不擅长为它们授予适当的权重。


So we may tell ourselves that the geologists could be wrong, and perhaps no tsunami will hit Padang in the next 30 years, and by then perhaps we will have new and better technologies for predicting them, giving people more time to get to higher ground.	于是我们可能告诉自己地质学家也会预测错误，未来三十年中巴东也许不会发生海啸，而真到那时我们可能已经掌握了更新更好的预测技术，让人们有更多时间到高地躲开海啸。


Instead, we should be guided by the best estimates of the chances that an intervention will save lives, as well as by the number of lives that would be saved, and the cost of saving those lives.	我们真正该做的恰恰相反，即以某项措施挽救生命的最佳预估机会、挽救生命数量及挽救生命代价为决策基础。


The evidence suggests that building raised earth parks in places like Padang is very good value indeed.	有证据显示在巴东这样的地区修建高地公园是一项很有价值的举措。


When Technophobia Becomes Toxic	当技术恐惧症变得有害之时


STANFORD – During the late 1990’s, a singular phenomenon appeared in countries around the world.	发自斯坦福——1990年代末期在全球范围内出现了一个特殊的现象。


One after another, food and beverage companies capitulated to activists opposed to a promising new technology: the genetic engineering of plants to produce ingredients.	众多食品与饮料生产企业一个接一个地屈服于抗议分子的压力之下，向一个充满前景的新技术——通过基因工程使植物生产出特定成分——说不。


They are still capitulating to this day.	而时至今日，这种状况还依然在持续。


The Japanese brewer Kirin and the Danish brewer Carlsberg eliminated genetically engineered ingredients from their beers.	日本酿酒商麒麟和丹麦酿酒商嘉士伯都将基因改造成份排除在自产的啤酒之外。


In the United States, the fast-food giant McDonald's banned them from its menu; food manufacturers Heinz and Gerber (then a division of Switzerland-based Novartis) dropped them from their baby-food lines; and Frito-Lay demanded that its growers stop planting corn engineered to contain a bacterial protein that confers resistance to insect predation.	在美国，快餐连锁巨头麦当劳的餐单中，食品生产商亨氏还有盖博（当时还是瑞士Novartis公司的一部分）的婴儿食品系列里都不见基因改造成份的身影； 零食生产商Frito-Lay也要求为其供应原料的种植者停止种植某一品种的玉米，因为其含有一种通过基因工程改造过的用以防止害虫侵袭的细菌蛋白。


These measures were rationalized in various ways, but the reality is that by yielding to the demands of a minuscule number of disingenuous activists, the companies opted to offer less safe products to consumers, thereby exposing themselves to legal jeopardy.	人们列举了许多种理由来证明上述措施是有必要的，但事实上在向一小撮狡猾的抗议分子屈服的同时，这些企业转而选择向消费者提供更不安全的食品，并因此将自身暴露在法律风险之下。


Every year, innumerable packaged-food products worldwide are withheld or recalled from the market due to the presence of “all natural” contaminants like insect parts, toxic molds, bacteria, and viruses.	每一年都有无数的包装食品因为含有昆虫尸体、有毒霉菌，细菌和病毒等“全天然”成份而被暂停上市或者召回。


Because farming takes place outdoors and in dirt, such contamination is a fact of life.	这是因为种植业大多在尘土飞扬的露天环境中进行，自然也无法避免这类污染。


Over the centuries, the main culprit in mass food poisoning often has been contamination of unprocessed crops by fungal toxins – a risk that is exacerbated when insects attack food crops, opening wounds that allow fungi (molds) to get a foothold.	几个世纪以来，大规模食物中毒事件的最大元凶往往是真菌毒素对未处理谷物的污染——当昆虫侵袭农作物并造成伤口，令真菌（霉菌）得以附着之时，这一风险也随之急剧扩大。


For example, fumonisin and some other fungal toxins are highly toxic, causing esophageal cancer in humans and fatal diseases in livestock that eat infected corn.	比如说，伏马菌素（fumonisin）以及其他真菌都拥有极强毒性，不但会使人类罹患食道癌，还能令其他食用玉米的牲畜患上致命性疾病。


Fumonisin also interferes with the cellular uptake of folic acid, a vitamin that reduces the risk of neural tube defects in developing fetuses, and thus can cause folic acid deficiency – and defects such as spina bifida – even when one’s diet contains what otherwise would be sufficient amounts of the vitamin.	伏马菌素还会阻止细胞对叶酸（一种维生素）的吸收，增加发育中的胎儿出现神经管缺陷的风险，一旦摄入了这类毒素，即便一个人的日常食谱中已经含有足量的该类维生素，也会出现叶酸缺乏症——甚至脊柱裂这样的缺陷。


Many regulatory agencies have therefore established recommended maximum fumonisin levels permitted in food and feed products made from corn.	许多监管机构都因此设立了玉米制食品和饲料中允许存在的伏马菌素最高含量。


The conventional way to meet those standards and prevent the consumption of fungal toxins is simply to test unprocessed and processed grains and discard those found to be contaminated – an approach that is both wasteful and failure-prone.	而达到这些标准并防止摄入真菌毒素的常规做法仅仅是对那些已经/未经处理的谷物进行检查，并抛弃受污染的那部分——但该办法一方面效率很低，另一方面也经常出现纰漏。


But modern technology – specifically, the genetic engineering of plants using recombinant DNA technology (also known as food biotechnology or genetic modification) – offers a way to prevent the problem.	而当今科技——尤其是借助DNA重组技术（也就是植物生物技术或者基因改造）的基因工程改造植物——为这个问题找到了一条解决的途径。


Contrary to the claims of food-biotech critics, who insist that genetically modified crops pose risks (none of which has actually occurred) of new allergens or toxins in the food supply, such products offer the food industry a proven and practical means of tackling the fungal contamination at its source.	虽然那些食品生物技术反对者们对基金改造作物大肆抨击，认为它们存在引入新变应原或者毒素的风险（即便无一得到证实），但这类产品却能令食品工业切实有效地从源头上杜绝真菌污染。


An excellent example is corn that is crafted by splicing into commercial varieties a gene (or genes) from a harmless bacterium.	其中一个绝佳例子就是那些被植入了来自某种无害细菌的一个或多个基因的商业化玉米品种。


The bacterial genes express proteins that are toxic to corn-boring insects, but that are harmless to birds, fish, and mammals, including humans. As the modified corn fends off insect pests, it also reduces the levels of the mold Fusarium, thereby reducing the levels of fumonisin.	这些细菌基因的表达会生成一些只对玉米害虫有毒，却对鸟类鱼类以及包括人类在内的哺乳动物无害的蛋白，当这类玉米将害虫拒之门外的时候，自然也能降低镰孢霉菌的感染程度，从而减低伏马菌素的含量。


Indeed, researchers at Iowa State University and the US Department of Agriculture have found that the level of fumonisin in the modified corn is reduced by as much as 80% compared to conventional corn.	事实上，艾奥瓦州立大学以及美国农业部的研究人员都发现这类改造玉米的伏马菌素含量最高能实现80%的下降。


Similarly, an Italian study of weaned piglets that were fed either conventional corn or the same variety modified to synthesize a bacterial protein that confers resistance to insect predation found that the modified variety contained lower levels of fumonisin.	同样一项意大利研究也发现，用可以生成抗害虫细菌蛋白的基因改造玉米喂养的断奶小猪，与那些用未经过改造的同一品种喂养的小猪相比，体内的伏马菌素水平更低。


More importantly, the piglets that consumed the modified corn achieved a greater final weight, a measure of overall health, despite no difference in feed intake between the two groups.	更重要的是，在进食量相同的情况下，改造玉米喂大的小猪体重更重，说明其健康状况更佳。


Given the health benefits – to say nothing of the often higher and more reliable yields – governments should introduce incentives aimed at increasing use of such genetically engineered grains and other crops.	考虑到基因改造农产品在健康方面的好处——更不用说其更高也更可靠的产量——各国政府都应当引入法案促进这类基因改造谷物以及其他作物的推广。


In addition, one would expect public-health advocates to demand that such improved varieties be cultivated and used for food, not unlike requirements that drinking water be chlorinated and fluoridated.	此外也希望公共卫生倡导者们能呼吁种植这类作物并将其加工成食品，就像用氯来为自来水消毒并加入少量氟（以防止儿童蛀牙）那样。


And food producers that are committed to offering the safest and best products to their customers should be competing to get genetically engineered products into the marketplace.	那些致力于向消费者提供更安全更优质食品的生产商也应该努力让基因改造产品进入市场。


Alas, none of this has come to pass.	但遗憾的是，上面没有任何一件事情能成为现实。


Activists continue to mount vocal and tenacious opposition to genetically engineered foods, despite almost 20 years of demonstrated, significant benefits, including reduced use of chemical pesticides (and thus less chemical runoff into waterways), greater use of farming practices that prevent soil erosion, higher profits for farmers, and less fungal contamination.	抗议分子继续将嘈杂而挥之不去的反对之声施加于基因改造食品上——虽然他们20多年的抗议也无法阻止这些技术带来的极大好处：人们得以减少化学杀虫剂的使用（冲刷入河的化学物也随之减少），更多地使用农业技术操作来防止土壤退化，农民收入增加，真菌污染程度也有所降低。


Responding to the bleating of activists, policymakers have subjected the testing and commercialization of genetically engineered crops to unscientific and draconian regulations, with dire consequences.	为了回应这些抗议分子的奇谭怪论，政策制定者们将基因工程农作物的测试和商业化都置于毫无科学依据且异常严厉的监管之下，并导致了可怕的后果。


A groundbreaking study of the political economy of agricultural biotechnology concluded that over-regulation causes “delays in the global diffusion of proven technologies, resulting in a lower rate of growth in the global food supply and higher food prices.”	一项对农业生物技术的政治经济影响的突破性研究发现过度监管导致“得到证实的技术在全球范围内的扩散速度减慢，引发世界食品供应量增速偏低以及更高昂的食品价格”。


Current policies also create “disincentives for investing in further research and development, resulting in a slowdown in innovation of second-generation technologies anticipated to introduce broad consumer and environmental benefits.”	当前的政策同时也“阻碍了对进一步技术研究和发展的投资，因此减缓了预计将为消费者和环境带来更广泛好处的第二代技术方面的创新。 ”


Everyone involved in food production and consumption has suffered: consumers (especially in developing countries) have been subjected to avoidable health risks, and food producers have placed themselves in legal jeopardy for selling products known to have “design defects.”	每个牵涉到食品生产和消费的人都因此而受害：消费者们（尤其是发展中国家）面临着本可避免的健康风险，食品生厂商们则只能销售那些有“设计缺陷”的产品并随时可能背上官司。


Public policy that discriminates against and discourages vital innovations in food production is not policy that has the public’s interest at heart.	由此可见，那些敌视并压制在食品生产方面的重要革新的公共政策并不是真心维护民众利益的政策。


The World When the Fed Raises Rates	美联储提高利率之后的世界


VIENNA – The United States Federal Reserve is the world’s most powerful bank, and its most powerful component is the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), the twelve men and women who meet eight times a year to determine – essentially by setting interest rates – the monetary policy of the world’s largest economy.	发自维也纳——美联储是全世界最具权势的银行，而其最内部权势最大的部门则是联邦公开市场委员会，委员会的八名成员每年召开8次会议来决定（主要是通过设定利率的方式）这个全世界最大经济体的货币政策。


The last time the Fed raised interest rates was in 2006, before the growth-sapping impact of the global financial crisis persuaded it and other central banks to lower rates effectively to zero and to employ so-called quantitative easing (QE) to pump money into advanced economies.	上次美联储调高利率的时候还是2006年，但随后爆发的全球金融危机导致增长乏力，使其及各国央行只得将实际利率降为0并实施所谓量化宽松政策，将货币注入各发达经济体。


But this year, for the first time since 2007, every advanced economy in the world is growing – including America’s.	但就在今年，也就是2007年以来首次，全球所有发达经济体都同时出现了增长——包括美国。


And that means that the FOMC, fearful of asset bubbles, will at some point decide that America’s interest rates must rise.	而这也意味着在资产泡沫的阴影下，联邦公开市场委员会在某个时点决定调高美国的利率。


That may (or may not, depending on the timing) be good for the US economy, but what will it mean for the rest of the world?	这或许会（或者不会，取决于当时的时机）有益于美国经济，但这对世界其他国家来说又意味着什么呢？


Our research shows why the world, especially emerging countries, will be paying nervous attention.	我们的研究发现了为何全球各地，尤其是新兴经济体，会对此忐忑不安。


In mid-2013, when the Fed announced that it would gradually reduce its unconventional monetary-policy measures (for example, large-scale purchases of mortgage-backed securities), emerging markets suffered large capital outflows.	在2013年中，当美联储宣布将逐渐减少其非常规货币政策手段（例如大规模购买有抵押证券）之时，新兴市场立刻爆发了大规模资金外流。


In other words, when the Fed even hints at tightening monetary policy, other countries suffer. Depending on just how much the FOMC decides to tighten at a future meeting, we foresee negative effects on world GDP in the medium term, not only for emerging markets but also for industrialized economies.	换言之，就算美联储只是暗示会在未来的会议中收紧政策，人们也会预期会对世界GDP产生中期负面效应，无论是新兴经济体还是发达工业国都概莫能外。


Since the Fed started to curb its QE program, there has been constant speculation over just when its current accommodative monetary policy will end.	自从美联储开始收紧其量化宽松政策以来，外界就持续怀疑前者的宽松货币政策将在何时终结。


Market participants, be they lenders or borrowers, know that “easy money” has an expiry date.	市场参与者，无论是放贷者还是借贷者，都知道这些“快钱”迟早要收回。


They can see that after three large asset-purchase programs, the Fed’s balance sheet has more than quadrupled since 2007, totaling about $4.5 trillion in February 2015.	他们发现在三次大规模资产收购之后，美联储的资产负债表规模已经是2007年的四倍，在2015年达到了4. 5万亿美元。


However, when assessing what the FOMC intends to do, it is important to bear in mind that the Fed’s mandate is to advance America’s national economic goals.	然而在猜度公开市场委员会的的意图之时，也一定要记住美联储的任务就是推动美国的国家经济目标。


This means that it has to consider not just the desirable rate of inflation (the target is a 2% annual rate), but also the state of the labor market – and its judgment has global implications.	这意味着它不仅仅要考虑合适的通胀率（目标是每年2%），还得顾及劳动力市场——以及其判断的全球影响。


That is why the Fed’s talk in mid-2013 about a gradual exit from unconventional monetary policy led to a so-called “taper tantrum” among investors, triggering a surge in global volatility and a shift in market sentiment against emerging markets.	这也是为何美联储在2013年中关于逐渐退出非常规货币政策的讲话在投资者中引发了一个所谓“减债恐慌”，导致全球流动性大减以及对新兴市场的负面情绪。


The question now is whether future changes by the FOMC in the federal funds rate (the interest rate at which banks lend each other their overnight money deposited at the Fed) will have similar, or indeed worse, effects.	如今问题在于公开市场委员对联邦基金利率���各银行互相拆借自身在美联储存款的隔夜利率）的变更会否存在类似（或者实际上更糟糕）的效应。


To narrow any gap between its expectations for the economy and those of the public, the Fed publishes each FOMC member’s view of the range of interest rates that should be expected over the next few years.	为了缩小自身与公众之间对经济的预期差异，美联储公布了每位公开市场委员会成员对未来几年的预期利率范围。


A member with a positive assessment of the US economy’s growth prospects will expect a rise in the federal funds rate; a pessimist will expect the rate to stay close to zero for a longer period.	一位对美国经济增长存在正面预期的委员将会预计联邦基金利率上升； 而持悲观态度的则会让更长时期内的利率接近零。


Using information released by the Fed in March, we have constructed two scenarios: “lift-off” is based on the maximum projected interest rates, while “delayed lift-off” is based on the minimum.	利用美联储 在3月公布的信息，我们设想了两个情境：“（火箭）发射”是基于最大的预期利率，而“延迟发射”则基于最低预期。


To see the impact beyond America on GDP, consumer prices, exchange rates, and interest rates, we then apply the scenarios to a total of 36 emerging and advanced economies that together account for 90% of global output.	为了研究对美国之外地区GDP、消费者指数，汇率和利率的影响，我们将这两大情境应用在占全球产出90%的36个新性和发达国家身上。


Assuming a phased rise in the federal funds rate to 4% by 2017, we believe that economic growth in all regions except Latin America will slow in 2016, and then slow even more in 2017.	试想如果在2017年联邦基金利率被阶段性调高到4%，那么除拉丁美洲之外的全球经济增长将在2016年放缓，接着在2017年进一步降速。


The cumulative loss in this “lift-off” scenario is about ten times as large as any lost economic output under the “delayed lift-off” alternative of only minimal changes to rates over the next couple of years.	而这一“发射”情境所带来的累计损失要比尽量减少利率变化的“延迟发射”选项在未来几年内造成的任何GDP损失都大十倍。


Our research shows that any monetary tightening by the Fed will affect the rest of the world, but to differing degrees.	我们的研究证明美联储的任何货币紧缩都将对世界其他地区造成影响，但程度会有所不同。


Those emerging markets that were hit severely during the “taper tantrum” episode – for example, Brazil, Indonesia, and Turkey – will certainly suffer.	那些在“减债恐慌”中受灾最重的新兴市场国家——比如巴西，印尼和土耳其——必定将再次受灾。


But the greatest negative impact will be on countries such as Canada and Mexico, which have close trade links with the US economy or those, like Germany, Japan, and Singapore, that are deeply integrated into the global economy.	但最大的负面效应将出现在加拿大和墨西哥这类与美国有紧密经济联系的国家，或者是德国，日本和新加坡这类深度整合进全球经济的国家。


In other words, though emerging markets – through their dependence on capital inflows – will be at risk when America’s monetary policy eventually returns to “normal,” the same will be true for advanced economies.	换言之，虽然新兴市场国家——由于其对资本流的依赖——会在美国货币政策逐渐恢复“常态”后面临风险，但发达国家也不太可能置身事外。


This commentary reflects the authors’ personal views, not those of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank or the Eurosystem.	本文仅代表作者本人观点，与奥地利国民银行或欧元系统无关。


Ready for a US Rate Hike?	美国加息，你准备好了吗？


MANILA – The possibility that the US Federal Reserve could raise the interest rate for the first time in a decade sent jitters across emerging markets for weeks.	发自马尼拉——美联储可能在近十年来首次加息的消息让一批新兴市场国家连续几周不得安宁。


Though the Fed has now decided to keep its policy rate unchanged, it also stated that a rate hike is still on the table for 2015.	虽然美联储已经决定维持政策利率不变，但表示加息仍在2015年的日程上。


The concern is that countries that are dependent on foreign financing could be hit by sudden outflows of international capital, or that currency depreciation following the Fed hike could raise debt-servicing costs for countries and businesses.	值得关注的是，依赖外国资金的国家可能会受到国际资本突然外流的冲击，或者说美联储加息后的货币贬值可能会提高各国和企业的偿债成本。


Governments in the developing world would be wise to worry less about interest-rate changes in the United States – which, in any case, they cannot control – and think more about policy changes they can make at home to strengthen their economies’ resilience.	对于发展中国家的政府来说，最好少去担心美国利率变化——毕竟谁也没法控制美国怎么做，把思考重点放在调整国家内部政策以加强经济抗波动性才是明智的。


An increase in US interest rates is not necessarily bad news for emerging countries.	美国利率提高对新兴国家来说并不一定是坏消息。


Many developing countries – especially in Asia – are in much better macroeconomic shape than they were just before the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s or at the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis.	如今许多发展中国家——尤其是亚洲各国——的宏观经济形势都比1990年代末亚洲金融危机或是2008年全球金融危机爆发前要更好。


And the Fed is likely to raise rates only if it judges US economic growth to be strong and sustainable, which would be a positive sign for the global economy in general.	美联储只有在判断美国经济增长将保持强劲且持续时才可能提高利率，因为这是全球经济总体表现积极的反映。


Furthermore, a delay in raising rates carries its own dangers, encouraging yield-hungry investors to take larger risks – possibly necessitating a sharper or more abrupt change in interest rates in the future.	此外延迟加息也有其风险，因为这会鼓励渴望收益的投资者冒更大的风险——而这可能会在未来造成更剧烈或更突然的利率变化。


Emerging countries can enhance their resilience to fluctuations in global interest rates by pursuing sound fiscal and monetary policies, continuing necessary structural reforms, and strengthening their financial systems.	新兴国家可以通过追求稳健的财政和货币政策，继续进行必要的结构性改革以及巩固金融体系来增强其对全球利率的抗波动能力。


In particular, recent research suggests four key policy areas in which governments should consider intervening.	特别是最近的研究表明，政府应该考虑在以下四个关键政策领域进行干预。


For starters, countries should embrace policies that favor foreign direct investment (FDI) over inflows that can be withdrawn more quickly, such as foreign bank loans, debt, or equity investments.	首先，国家应该施行有利于那类资金流入可以更迅速撤回的外国直接投资的政策，如外国银行贷款，债务或股权投资。


My research with Hui Tong of the International Monetary Fund shows that countries whose capital inflows that are mainly in the form of FDI tend to be more resilient to foreign financial shocks.	笔者与国际货币基金组织经济学家童晖的研究成果表明，以外国直接投资为主要资本流入形式的国家往往更能抵御外国金融冲击。


When the global financial crisis erupted, countries with high FDI relative to total capital flows tended to experience a less severe liquidity crunch.	当全球金融危机爆发时，外国直接投资相对总资本流动额较高的国家流动性紧缩情况一般不太严重。


Second, exchange rates need to reflect economic fundamentals.	其次，汇率需要反映经济基本面。


But while theory suggests that flexible exchange rates should blunt foreign monetary or financial shocks, in practice, such a currency regime rarely works on its own.	但尽管有理论认为弹性汇率应该可以弱化货币或金融冲击，但在实践中这种汇率制度却很少能自行运作。


Indeed, my research with the Asian Development Bank’s Xuehui Han has shown that when the US raises or lowers interest rates, most developing countries tend to follow suit, even when they have a flexible exchange rate.	事实上，笔者与亚洲开发银行的韩雪辉研究表明，当美国提高或降低利率时，大多数使用弹性汇率的发展中国家往往也会跟风。


The key reason is that they want to avoid large swings in the value of their currency.	关键原因是他们要避免本国币值出现大的波动。


Appreciation can harm competitiveness, while depreciation increases the cost of servicing foreign-currency debt, erodes market confidence, and leads to higher inflation.	升值会损害竞争力，而贬值会增加外币债务的偿还成本，削弱市场信心，并导致更高的通货膨胀。


The notable exceptions to this trend are countries that manage cross-border capital flows, especially the corporate sector’s exposure to foreign-currency debt.	而这一趋势的显著例外是那些管理跨境资本流动，尤其是监管企业部门承担外币债务的国家。


Indeed, certain types of capital-flow management – including limiting domestic debt denominated in foreign currency for both firms and households – have been shown to increase resilience.	事实上，某些类型的资本流动管理——包括限制企业和家庭以外币计价的国内债务——都被证明能增加抗冲击能力。


Third, domestic macroprudential and microprudential policies increase resilience.	第三，国内宏观和微观调控政策可以增加抗冲击能力。


These policies should aim at reducing or eliminating the wedge between activities that are good for individuals, banks, and firms, and those that benefit society as a whole.	这些政策应该是减少或消除对个人、银行、企业和那些有利于社会整体利益的活动之间的脱节状况。


One example of such a policy is to link banks’ mandatory reserve ratios to the speed at which credit is expanding or to the stage of the business cycle.	这类政策的其中一个例子是将银行的法定存款准备金率与信贷业务扩大的速度或商业周期的不同阶段联系起来。


Thus, during periods of expansion, when banks are eager to fund ever more risky borrowers, the reserve ratio rises, curbing potentially disruptive asset bubbles or overinvestment.	因此，在扩张期间，当银行急于向偿付风险更大的借款人贷款时，提升存款准备金率，抑制潜在的破坏性资产泡沫和过度投资。


For those countries capable of designing and implementing prudential regulations, management of cross-border capital flows becomes less useful and less desirable.	对于那些能够设计和实施审慎监管的国家来说，跨境资本流动管理就显得不那么有用也不太可取。


Finally, it is no longer appropriate to judge whether a country’s foreign-currency reserves are adequate based on how many months of imports they can cover.	最后，以覆盖多少个月的进口额来判断一个国家的外汇储备是否足够已不再恰当。


Instead, the question to ask is whether the reserves can comfortably service the public and private sectors’ debt denominated in foreign currencies.	取而代之是要问外汇储备是否可以妥善偿付公共和私营部门以外币计价的债务。


The US will normalize its interest rate policy sooner or later according to its need.	美国按照自身需要来实现利率政策正常化是迟早的事情。


For other countries, it is important to focus on policies that can strengthen resilience to foreign financial or monetary shocks.	因此对其他国家而言，重要的是要把重点放在能增强抵御外国金融或货币冲击的政策上面。


When the Yankees Go Home	洋基人回家


ISLAMABAD – Relations between the United States and Pakistan have continued to fray since a US Special Forces team killed Osama bin Laden in a comfortable villa near a major Pakistani military academy.	伊斯兰堡——美国一支特种部队小组在一所知名巴基斯坦军校附近一栋舒适的别墅里杀死奥萨马·本·拉登后，美国和巴基斯坦之间的关系开始不断恶化。


But the tit-for-tat retaliation that has followed the raid reflects deeper sources of mistrust and mutual suspicion.	但袭击后针锋相对的报复行动反应了双方之间更深层次的猜疑和不信任。


The latest round has focused on the alleged activities of the Pakistani military’s powerful intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), in the United States.	在美国，巴基斯坦强大的军方情报机构——三军情报局的所作所为成为新一轮摩擦的焦点。


ISI is accused of watching over the Pakistani diaspora and of sponsoring unregistered lobbyists working to shape congressional opinion.	三军情报局被指监督巴基斯坦人移民，并且出资赞助未经注册的说客影响国会意见。


Indeed, this is not the first time that Pakistan’s relations with the US have been on a slippery slope.	实际上，巴基斯坦和美国关系下滑也不是第一次了。


In 1965, after helping the country to build up its economy and its military strength, the US walked out over the war with India that Pakistan had provoked by sending “freedom fighters” into Kashmir.	1965年，在帮助巴基斯坦提高经济和军事实力后，巴基斯坦派遣“自由战士”进入克什米尔挑起印巴战争导致美国退出。


In 1989, following the Soviet Union’s exit from Afghanistan, the US lost interest in what it now calls AfPak – Afghanistan-Pakistan.	1989年，随着苏联撤出阿富汗，美国对目前所谓的阿富汗巴基斯坦区域失去了兴趣。


The Americans began returning to Pakistan until, in 1998, the Pakistani government decided to follow India in testing an atomic bomb.	直到1998年巴基斯坦政府决定步印度后尘试验原子弹，美国才开始对巴基斯坦的回归。


This led to the imposition of US sanctions – and America’s third exit from Pakistan.	巴基斯坦核试验决策招致美国制裁——以及美国第三次从巴基斯坦撤出。


That situation remained unchanged when Afghanistan-based Al Qaeda struck America on September 11, 2001.	直到2001年9月11日驻阿富汗的基地组织袭击美国之前，一直维持着这样一种形势。


After receiving a “you are either with us or against us” warning from President George W. Bush’s administration, General Pervez Musharraf’s Pakistan decided to side with the US.	在接到乔治·W·布什总统“要么与我们为友、要么为敌”的最后通牒后，巴基斯坦的穆沙拉夫将军决定和美国站在一起。


It severed relations with Afghanistan’s Taliban regime, which it had helped to install five years earlier, and allowed America to use its air space to launch strikes on Afghanistan.	穆沙拉夫政府切断了五年前建立的与阿富汗塔利班组织的联系，并允许美国使用其空军基地对阿富汗发起攻击。


For more than a decade, Pakistan and the US were close allies.	10多年来，巴基斯坦和美国形成了亲密的盟友关系。


Pakistan let the US use its air bases to launch drone attacks on Taliban fighters in Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan; allowed its territory to be used as a supply route for NATO forces in landlocked Afghanistan; and, less enthusiastically than the US wished, launched military operations against Taliban sanctuaries on the Pakistani side of the porous border with Afghanistan.	巴基斯坦允许美国用其空军基地对阿富汗及巴基斯坦西北部的塔利班战机发动无人机攻击，并允许本国领土被用作北约军队在内陆国家阿富汗的补给线，而且虽然没有表现出美国所希望的那种热情，巴基斯坦依然发动了针对漏洞百出的巴阿边境巴方一侧塔利班避难所的军事袭击。


In return for its help, Pakistan received large doses of economic and military assistance.	作为这种帮助的回报，巴基斯坦得到了大量的经济和军事援助。


According to the US Congress, Pakistan was provided $20 billion in aid between 2001 and 2011.	据美国国会统计，2001到2011年间巴基斯坦得到了200亿美元的援助。


In addition, Congress passed the Kerry-Lugar bill, which promised $7.5 billion in economic aid from 2009-2014.	此外，国会还通过一项克里－卢格法案，承诺从2009－2014年间提供75亿美元的经济援助。


The US also encouraged the International Monetary Fund to give Pakistan emergency financial assistance equivalent to $11 billion, to be disbursed starting in late 2008.	美国还鼓励国际货币基金组织给予巴基斯坦合计110亿美元的紧急财政援助，从2008年下半年开始分批拨付。


This cozy relationship created a “moral hazard” in Pakistan, as the generous flow of US aid insulated the government and military from any sense of urgency about economic reform: some foreign friend would always rescue the country from its perennial shortage of cash.	这种亲密关系在巴基斯坦催生出“道德风险”，因为美国援助的慷慨流入使政府和军方不再着急推进经济改革：某些外国朋友总能解决巴基斯坦持续出现的现金短缺问题。


So far, that friend has been America, but the US could well pull out of Pakistan for the fourth time in the countries’ turbulent relationship – a threat that several influential figures in the US Congress have already made.	截至目前为止，美国一直扮演着那个朋友的角色，但美国很可能在目前的动荡关系中第四次撤出巴基斯坦——美国国会几位颇有影响的人物已经威胁要这么做。


The dynamic that has brought Pakistan-US relations to this point arguably began on December 1, 2009, when President Barack Obama, announcing a surge in the number of US troops in Afghanistan, also indicated his intention to start pulling back American troops beginning in July 2011 – a pledge that he reiterated two months ago.	导致巴美关系发展到目前地步的事态始于2009年的12月1日，当天巴拉克·奥巴马总统宣布增加驻阿富汗的美军人数，并同时明确他从2011年7月开始撤出美军的意图——他在两个月前又重申了这一承诺。


This alerted Pakistan to the fact that, with the imminent departure of US troops, it would be left alone to fight the insurgency on both sides of its border with Afghanistan.	于是巴基斯坦意识到随着美军撤离迫在眉睫，它将不得不与巴阿边境两侧的叛乱分子独自战斗。


To do that, Pakistan would need help from some of the Afghan Pashtun tribes with which it had developed strong relations during the war against the Soviet Union.	要想独自对抗这些叛乱分子，巴基斯坦需要得到某些阿富汗普什图族的帮助，巴方在对抗苏联的那场战争中与这些普什图部族的关系非常牢固。


The Jalaluddin Haqqani group, which was allowed to base itself in a sanctuary in Pakistan’s North Waziristan tribal agency, was one such ally that Pakistan’s government thought could be used to further its interests in Afghanistan.	被获准驻扎在巴基斯坦北部北瓦济里斯坦的部落机构庇护所的贾拉鲁丁·哈卡尼部落是巴基斯坦政府打算用来维护其在阿富汗利益的盟友。


But the Haqqanis were also the group that threatened the Americans the most.	但哈卡尼同时也是对美国人构成最大威胁的部落。


The US pressed Pakistan to move against them. Pakistan resisted.	美国向巴基斯坦施压对他们采取行动，但遭到巴方的抵制。


And, in the midst of this tussle, the US sent Navy Seals to find Bin Laden at a compound deep in Pakistani territory, informing Pakistan’s government only after the raid was over.	而且在这次争斗同时，美国派遣海豹突击队在深入巴基斯坦境内的一栋建筑中找到本·拉登，而且只在袭击行动结束后才通知了巴基斯坦政府。


Pakistan’s embarrassed military pressed the government to begin distancing itself from the US.	倍感尴尬的巴基斯坦军队迫使政府开始疏远美国。


After the identity of the CIA’s station chief in Pakistan was exposed (probably by Pakistani military officials), America made it known that it had good evidence that a prominent Pakistani journalist was ordered murdered by ISI.	在中情局驻巴基斯坦站长的身份暴露之后（揭发他的可能是巴基斯坦军官），美国公开宣称自己掌握充分证据，即著名的巴基斯坦三军情报局下令谋杀了一位著名的巴基斯坦记者。


This time around, the break between the US and Pakistan might not be easily repaired.	这一次，美国和巴基斯坦之间的分歧已经不太可能轻易得到修复。


Pakistan has turned to China for economic and military help, clearly hoping for a less volatile relationship than the one that it has with America.	巴基斯坦已经转而寻求中国的经济和军事援助，显然希望与中国之间的关系能比巴美关系更为稳固。


On one hand, Pakistan is seeking large investments from China to improve its physical infrastructure and exploit its considerable mineral wealth.	一方面，巴基斯坦正在寻求大量的中国投资用以改善本国的基础设施并开发其可观的矿产财富。


On the other hand, the Chinese have been invited to develop Gwadar port on the Balochistan coast, and to use it as a base for their fast-expanding navy.	另一方面，中国应邀在俾路支省海岸修建瓜达尔港，并将该港用于其快速扩张的海军的基地。


While China has not responded to these overtures with the degree of enthusiasm that accompanied them, the Chinese would be happy to fill the strategic vacuum likely to be created by America’s accelerated departure from AfPak.	尽管中国尚未对围绕他们的热情提议做出反应，但他们非常乐于填补美国加速撤离阿富汗巴基斯坦后留下的战略真空。


A major realignment of forces in the region is looming, and, with it, a new round of Asia’s old Great Game.	该地区即将发生重大的力量调整，随着这次力量调整，又会上演新一轮亚洲博弈的戏码。


When Women Lead	当女性掌权


MUNICH – Would the world be more peaceful if women were in charge?	慕尼黑—如果让女性来领导，世界会变得更和平吗？


A challenging new book by the Harvard University psychologist Steven Pinker says that the answer is “yes.”	哈佛大学心理学家斯蒂芬·平克（Steven Pinker）的新书对此的回答是“是”。


In The Better Angels of Our Nature, Pinker presents data showing that human violence, while still very much with us today, has been gradually declining.	在《天性善良的天使》（The Better Angels of Our Nature）一书中，平克用大量数据证明，人身暴力虽然仍然困扰着世界，但已呈现出逐渐减少之势。


Moreover, he says, “over the long sweep of history, women have been and will be a pacifying force.	此外，他还宣称“从历史长河看，女性一直是、将来也会继续是和平的动力。


Traditional war is a man’s game: tribal women never band together to raid neighboring villages.”	传统战争是男性之间的游戏：部落中的女成员从来不会联合起来扫荡相邻部落。


As mothers, women have evolutionary incentives to maintain peaceful conditions in which to nurture their offspring and ensure that their genes survive into the next generation.	”作为母亲，女性具有进化性动力维系和平环境，以便更好地哺育后代，确保自己的基因传递下去。


Skeptics immediately reply that women have not made war simply because they have rarely been in power.	质疑者马上就可以反驳说，女性之所以不曾引发战争，只是因为她们很少掌权。


If they were empowered as leaders, the conditions of an anarchic world would force them to make the same bellicose decisions that men do.	如果她们能获得领袖之位，得到权力，那么这个弱肉强食的世界将迫使她们采取与男性一致的好战决策。


Margaret Thatcher, Golda Meir, and Indira Gandhi were powerful women; all of them led their countries to war.	撒切尔夫人、梅厄夫人和英迪拉·甘地都是掌权的女性； 在她们的任期内，她们的国家无不对别国开战了。


But it is also true that these women rose to leadership by playing according to the political rules of “a man’s world.”	但不可否认的是，这些女性是顺着“男性世界”的政治规则爬到领导人的位子上的。


It was their success in conforming to male values that enabled their rise to leadership in the first place.	她们首先满足了男性的价值观，这是她们获得领导权的第一步。


In a world in which women held a proportionate share (one-half) of leadership positions, they might behave differently in power.	如果女性能够在领导岗位上顶半边天，那么她们掌权后的行为也许会有所不同。


So we are left with the broader question: does gender really matter in leadership?	因此，我们需要面临更广泛的问题：性别真的能影响领导行为吗？


In terms of stereotypes, various psychological studies show that men gravitate to the hard power of command, while women are collaborative and intuitively understand the soft power of attraction and persuasion.	很多心理学研究表明，男性渴望发号施令的硬权力，而女性更具合作精神，在本能上更理解吸引和说服的软权力。


Americans tend to describe leadership with tough male stereotypes, but recent leadership studies show increased success for what was once considered a “feminine style.”	在美国传统中，领导人总是硬朗的男性形象，但最新的领导力研究表明，曾经被认为是“娘娘腔”的做派，其成功的可能性正在增加。


In information-based societies, networks are replacing hierarchies, and knowledge workers are less deferential.	在一个基于信息的社会中，网络正在代替层级，脑力工作者更加难以驯服了。


Management in a wide range of organizations is changing in the direction of “shared leadership,” and “distributed leadership,” with leaders in the center of a circle rather than atop a pyramid.	大量组织的管理正在朝“共同领导”和“分散领导”的方向转变，其领导层处于圆心，而不是金字塔塔尖。


Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt said that he had to “coddle” his employees.	前谷歌首席执行官施密特（Eric Schmidt）说，他必须“骄纵”手下的雇员。


Even the military faces these changes.	就连军队也面临着这种改变。


In the United States, the Pentagon says that Army drillmasters do “less shouting at everyone,” because today’s generation responds better to instructors who play “a more counseling-type role.”	在美国，五角大楼宣称陆军教官“动辄大吼的情况更少了”，因为新新一代对“更多扮演导师角色”的教官反应更好。


Military success against terrorists and counterinsurgents requires soldiers to win hearts and minds, not just break buildings and bodies.	从军事上战胜恐怖主义以及反暴动要求士兵能够赢得心理战，而不仅仅是摧毁敌人的工事和肉体。


Former US President George W. Bush once described his role as “the decider,” but there is much more to modern leadership than that.	前美国总统乔治·W·布什曾经将他的角色描述为“决定者”，但现代领导工作的范围远不止这一点。


Modern leaders must be able to use networks, to collaborate, and to encourage participation.	现代领导人必须能够使用网络，能够协调并鼓舞参与者。


Women’s non-hierarchical style and relational skills fit a leadership need in the new world of knowledge-based organizations and groups that men, on average, are less well prepared to meet.	女性的非层级制风格和公关技巧更适合在当今新涌现的基于知识的组织和团体中担任领导职位，男性（平均而言）还没有做好适应这一变化的准备。


In the past, when women fought their way to the top of organizations, they often had to adopt a “masculine style,” violating the broader social norm of female “niceness.”	过去，当女性奋斗在爬向组织最高宝座之路的时候，她们通常不得不采取一种“阳刚风格”，打破女性“温柔”的常规社会范式。


Now, however, with the information revolution and democratization demanding more participatory leadership, the “feminine style” is becoming a path to more effective leadership.	但是，如今，信息革命和民主化要求更具参与性的领导，因此“娘娘腔”正在成为更有效率的领导方式。


In order to lead successfully, men will not only have to value this style in their women colleagues, but will also have to master the same skills.	为了获得成功，男性不但必须理解女性同事处事风格的价值，还必须掌握这一技巧。


That is a trend, not (yet) a fact.	这是一个趋势，而（尚）不是既成事实。


Women still lag in leadership positions, holding only 5% of top corporate positions and a minority of positions in elected legislatures (just 16% in the US, for example, compared to 45% in Sweden).	女性仍然在领导职位的竞争中处于劣势，公司首脑中只有5%是女性，议员选举中当选女性也只是少数（比如，美国只有16%，而瑞典达到了45%）。


One study of the 1,941 rulers of independent countries during the twentieth century found only 27 women, roughly half of whom came to power as widows or daughters of a male ruler.	一项研究表明，在20世纪独立国家的1 941名执政者中，只有27名女性，其中还有一半是以男性执政者的遗孀或女儿身份问鼎权力的。


Less than 1% of twentieth-century rulers were women who gained power on their own.	整个20世纪，只有不到1%的执政者是完全靠自己获得成功的。


So, given the new conventional wisdom in leadership studies that entering the information age means entering a woman’s world, why are women not doing better?	那么，既然领导力研究中的新传统智慧表明进入信息时代等于进入女性时代，那么为什么女性的表现没有起色呢？


Lack of experience, primary caregiver responsibilities, bargaining style, and plain old discrimination all help to explain the gender gap.	因为女性缺乏经验，其首要角色是看护者，其谈判风格尚不为人所接受，且旧歧视顽固不化，这些都能解释性别差异。


Traditional career paths, and the cultural norms that constructed and reinforced them, simply have not enabled women to gain the skills required for top leadership positions in many organizational contexts.	传统职业道路及其形成和加强的文化范式使得女性无法在组织环境中获得最高领导职位所必须的技能。


Research shows that even in democratic societies, women face a higher social risk than men when attempting to negotiate for career-related resources such as compensation.	研究表明，即使是在民主社会中，女性在进行与职业生涯资源有关的谈判（比如薪资谈判）时所面临的社会风险也要高于男性。


Women are generally not well integrated into male networks that dominate organizations, and gender stereotypes still hamper women who try to overcome such barriers.	女性总的来说无法很好地融入主导组织的男性网络，而顽固的性别观念仍然是女性克服这些障碍的绊脚石。


This bias is beginning to break down in information-based societies, but it is a mistake to identify the new type of leadership we need in an information age simply as “a woman’s world.”	这一歧视在基于信息的社会中正开始被打破，但把我们在信息时代所需要的新的领导风格简单地归为“女性世界”是不对的。


Even positive stereotypes are bad for women, men, and effective leadership.	即便是积极的顽固观念，对女性、男性和高效领导也是不利的。


Leaders should be viewed less in terms of heroic command than as encouraging participation throughout an organization, group, country, or network.	领袖应该更多地在组织、团队、国家或网络中承担鼓励参与的角色，更少地扮演英雄式的主宰者。


Questions of appropriate style – when to use hard and soft skills – are equally relevant for men and women, and should not be clouded by traditional gender stereotypes.	什么才是合适的风格——什么时候硬，什么时候软——对男性和女性同样重要，我们不应该被传统的性别顽固旧观念蒙蔽了双眼。


In some circumstances, men will need to act more “like women”; in others, women will need to be more “like men.”	在某些情形中，男性需要表现得“像个娘们”，而女性在某些情形中需要表现得“像个爷们”。


The key choices about war and peace in our future will depend not on gender, but on how leaders combine hard- and soft-power skills to produce smart strategies.	我们的未来是战争还是和平，关键的选择并不取决于性别，而取决于领袖如何软硬兼施来构造巧妙的战略。


Both men and women will make those decisions.	不论是男性还是女性，都可以做出决策。


But Pinker is probably correct when he notes that the parts of the world that lag in the decline of violence are also the parts that lag in the empowerment of women.	但平克指出，从世界范围看，暴力消解不力的地区往往也是女性掌权情形落后的地区，或许，他是对的。


When Yes Means No	当“是”意味着“不”


Most commentators routinely assume that a Yes vote in the May 29 French referendum on the proposed European Union Constitution would be good for Europe and the EU.	大部分评论家都例行公事地以为，若5月29日法国公民投票结果赞成正在审议中的欧盟宪法，这将对欧洲和欧盟都有好处。


But there is reason to doubt the conventional wisdom.	但是，我们却有理由对这些想当然的观点表示质疑。


The French referendum will determine the political fate of French President Jacques Chirac – not France’s commitment to Europe, which is fixed and immutable.	法国公投将决定的不是法国对欧洲永恒不变的义务，而是法国总统雅克·希拉克的政治命运。


If the French vote No, M. Chirac is finished.	如果法国投了反对票，那么希拉克先生就完蛋了。


If they vote Yes, he is re-empowered.	如果他们投了赞成票，那么希拉克将东山再起。


Europe clearly would be better off with Chirac weakened than strengthened, even if it means a temporary slowing of the pace of integration.	显然，势力削弱的希拉克比势力强大的他对欧洲更为有利，即使这意味着欧洲整合的进程将暂时放缓脚步。


Chirac practices the politics of “scapegoatism” and excuses.	希拉克善于在政治上寻找“替罪羊”和运用借口托词。


According to Chirac, France’s exports are lagging not because France is losing its international competitiveness – although it is, especially to Germany – but because of the strong euro.	他辩称，法国出口下降并不是因为法国失去了它的国际竞争力——尽管事实的确如此，尤其是法国对德国的出口——而是因为走势强劲的欧元。


Likewise, France’s economic growth is waning not because France has failed to undertake necessary structural reforms, but because European interest rates are too high.	同样地，法国的经济增长衰退并不是因为法国没有能够采取必要的结构性改革，而是因为欧洲的利率太高了。


Who does Chirac think is at fault?	那希拉克认为究竟是谁的错呢？


The European Central Bank, of course, for allowing the euro to appreciate too much and for not cutting interest rates enough.	当然是欧洲中央银行，因为是它默许欧元升值过快，却没有降低利率。


Unfortunately, this is typical of Chirac’s leadership style: blame others, excuse yourself, and ignore reform.	不幸的是，这正是典型的希拉克领导风格：责怪他人，原谅自己，无视改革。


This is hardly the type of leadership Europe needs to survive and prosper in the modern world.	欧洲若要在现代世界中生存并繁荣，这可不是它需要的领导风格。


But Europe will get more of it if the French vote Yes.	但是如果法国投了赞成票，那么欧洲就更有的受了。


Europe also would continue to be dominated by the interests of the big countries, with the small countries in the back of the bus.	由于小国的胆小懦弱，欧洲还将继续受到大国利益的控制。


The fate of the Franco-German axis, in particular, hinges on the outcome of the referendum.	法-德轴心的命运尤其与此次公投的结果休戚相关。


A Yes invigorates the axis; a No weakens it.	法国的赞成票将加强该轴心，否决票则将削弱它。


“Who would follow Chirac if the French vote No?” asked one EU ambassador in a recent interview.	“若法国投否决票，谁会跟在它的后面呢？ ”一位欧盟大使在最近一次采访中这样发问，“就连柏林也有自己的选择。


“Even Berlin has options.” But Berlin would not like a No vote.	”但是柏林并不希望看到一张否决票。


If Chirac goes down, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder loses face as well.	如果希拉克下台，德国总理格哈德·施罗德也会脸上无光。


Two birds would be wounded with one stone.	正所谓一石可伤二鸟。


The prospect of a re-energized Franco-German axis is why the Dutch – who are traditionally pro-European but do not want a Europe that marginalizes small countries – might vote No in their referendum (which follows shortly upon France’s) if the French vote Yes.	重新注入生机的法-德轴心的前景解释了为何一旦法国投出否决票，荷兰——这个历史上一向亲欧、反对欧洲边缘化小国的国家——可能会在它（紧随法国公投之后）的公民投票中投出反对票。


A Dutch No would signal rejection of a corporatist Europe dominated by French and German interests, as well as representing a protest against the unpopular conservative and moralistic policies of the Balkenende government.	荷兰的否决票是他们反对法国和德国利益控制下的合作主义欧洲的一个信号，也表达了他们对鲍肯内得（Balkenende）政府不得人心的保守说教政策的抗议。


France is not the only EU country with an unpopular leader.	法国并非欧洲唯一一个领导人不受拥戴的国家。


Eastern Europe also has a big stake in the outcome of the French referendum.	东欧和法国公投的结果也利害彼关。


Chirac made it perfectly clear how he feels about the new smaller countries when he told them to “shut up” when they disagreed with him over Iraq.	当那些小国对希拉克的伊拉克政策表示不同意见时候，希拉克通过让他们“闭嘴”明确地表示出了他对这些小国的态度。


More recently, Chirac’s foreign minister, Michel Barnier, chastised the Romanian President Traian Barescu for lacking a “European reflex,” because Barescu plans to align Romania with Anglo-Saxon liberal economic policies, and wants a special relationship with the US and UK to improve security in the Black Sea region.	就在前不久，法国外长米歇尔·巴尼耶（Michel Barnier）严厉谴责罗马尼亚总统特拉扬·伯塞斯库（Traian Barescu）缺乏“欧洲反应”，因为伯塞斯库准备在罗马尼亚实施盎格鲁-萨克逊自由经济政策，并欲与英国及美国建立特殊关系以加强黑海地区的安全。


Rather than buckle to France’s will, however, the Romanian president warned France’s leaders to stop lecturing his country – a sure sign that French influence is on the wane even in countries with which it has had close historical ties.	罗马尼亚总统没有顺从法国的意思，相反他警告法国领导人不要再对罗马尼亚指手画脚地说教——这明确表明，即使在那些与它历史渊源深厚的国家，法国的影响力也在不断下降。


A French No would sit well with the Union’s newer members from Eastern Europe, who know Chirac is not their friend, and who are more attracted by promises of rapid economic growth than social protection and corporate state mischief.	法国的否决票将正合那些来自东欧的新欧盟成员国之意，他们知道希拉克并非善友，比起社会保障和合作主义国家这些招数，他们对快速经济增长更感兴趣。


Finally, the referendum contains an unstated question about the future of European Monetary Union (EMU) and the euro.	最后，公民投票包含了一个未说明的问题，即欧洲货币联盟(EMU)和欧元的未来。


The Yes camp argues that rejecting the Constitution would damage the European Central Bank (ECB) and the euro.	支持宪法的阵营坚称，反对欧盟宪法将会损害欧洲中央银行（ECB）和欧元。


But why would the EU fall into chaos and the euro wilt if the Treaty of Nice remains in force.	但是，如果尼斯条约仍然有效的话，为什么欧盟会陷入混乱，欧元会疲软呢？


In the area of monetary integration, the European Constitution doesn’t change anything, other than the voting procedures in the Governing Council if EMU grows beyond 15 member countries.	在货币整合时代，欧盟宪法除了在欧洲货币联盟的成员国超过15个的情况下改变管理委员会内的投票程序，并不能改变其他任何事情，


A Yes vote, on the other hand, would encourage a reassured Chirac to continue his policy of no reform and scapegoating the ECB.	从另外一方面来说，一张赞成票，将会鼓励一个重整旗鼓的希拉克继续他的无改革政策，继续把责任推卸给欧洲中央银行。


External political pressure on the ECB and its president, Jean-Claude Trichet, to lower interest rates and talk the euro down surely would increase.	施加于欧洲中央银行及其行长让·克洛德·特里谢（Jean-Claude Trichet）身上、要求降低利率并且降低欧元的外部政治压力肯定还会加强。


This is more likely to bring the euro down than a No vote.	比起一张否决票，这看起来也许更能有效降低欧元。


Where are the Global Problem Solvers?	全球问题的解决者到哪去了？


NEW YORK – One odd and disturbing aspect of global politics today is the confusion between negotiations and problem-solving.	发自纽约——当今全球政治的一个奇怪和令人困扰之处是对谈判协商和解决问题的混淆。


According to a timetable agreed in December 2007, we have six months to reach a global agreement on climate change in Copenhagen.	在2007年12月份在哥本哈根制定的时间表，我们本还有6个月的时间在气候变化问题上达成全球一致的协议。


Governments are engaged in a massive negotiation, but they are not engaged in a massive effort at problem-solving.	然而各国政府却都把心思放在了大规模谈判而非不遗余力地解决问题之上。


Each country asks itself, “How do I do the least and get the other countries to do the most?,” when they should be asking instead, “How do we cooperate to achieve our shared goals at minimum cost and maximum benefit?”	每一个本应自问“该如何合作以最低成本和最大收益实来现共同目标”的国家，却反而在算计“该如何让自己承担最少而让其他国家做的更多？ ”


These might sound like the same thing, but they are not.	上述两个问题虽然都跟国家利益最大化有关，但却有着天渊之别。


Addressing the problem of climate change requires reducing emissions of carbon dioxide from fossil fuels, which in turn involves choices in technology, some of which already exists and much of which needs to be developed.	事实上，解决气候变化问题需要减少燃烧化石燃料所排放的二氧化碳，但这反过来又涉及到相关技术的选择问题，虽然其中一些技术已经成熟，但还有一大部分仍有待发展。


For example, coal plants, if they are to remain a major part of the energy mix, will need to capture and store their CO2, a process called “carbon capture and sequestration,” or CCS for short. Yet this technology remains unproved.	举例来说，如果那些燃煤发电厂希望自己能继续作为能源供给结构的重要组成部分存在的话，那么就要应用捕获并储存二氧化碳的技术，这个技术过程被称为“碳捕捉和封存”（简称CCS），但却还未经研究证明有效。


Similarly, we will need renewed public confidence in a new generation of nuclear power, with plants that are safe and reliably monitored.	同样，我们需要公众对新一代的核电厂重新树立信心并安全可靠地监控其核反应堆的运作。


We will need new technologies to mobilize large-scale solar power, wind power, and geothermal power. We might try to tap bio-fuels, but only in forms that do not compete with food supplies or with precious environmental assets.	我们还需要发展能够大规模利用太阳能、风能和地热资源的新技术，甚至可以尝试开发生物燃料，只要不威胁到粮食供给和稀有环境资源就行了。


We will need improved energy efficiency, through “green buildings” and more efficient appliances. We will need to switch from cars with internal-combustion engines to hybrids, plug-in hybrids, battery-powered, and fuel-cell-powered vehicles.	此外世界各国还需要利用“绿色建筑”和节能家用电器来提高能源利用率，并引进以混合动力，充电式混合动力，充电电池以及燃料电池等新技术驱动的汽车来取代那些传统内燃机汽车。


Achieving a new generation of electric vehicles will require a decade of public and private partnership to achieve basic technological development (such as improved batteries), a more robust electric grid, new infrastructure for re-charging the automobiles, and much more.	但实现电动汽车的更新换代就要求公共和私人部门通力合作，耗费10年时间来发展基础技术（如电池改良），架设更加强大的电网，建造为汽车充电的新基础设施以及更多其他方面的措施。


Similarly, it will take a decade of public and private investments to demonstrate the feasibility of coal-fired plants that capture their carbon dioxide.	同样，我们也将需要10年的公共和私人合作投资来进行燃煤发电厂捕捉二氧化碳技术的可行性研究。


The switchover to new technologies is not mainly a matter of negotiation but of engineering, planning, financing, and incentives.	而上述这些新技术的转换不仅涉及谈判协商，更涉及到工程，规划，融资和激励机制。


How can the world most effectively develop, demonstrate, and then spread these new technologies?	试问全世界如何才能最有效地开发，展示，然后推广这些新技术？


Where the benefits are unlikely to accrue to private investors, who should pay for the early demonstration models, which will require billions of dollars?	当投资收益吸引不了私人投资者时，谁又应该为建造早期示范工程的数十亿美元买单？


How should we preserve private incentives for research and development while committing to transfer successful technologies to developing countries?	如何既维护私人部门研究发展这些技术的积极性，又确保能将技术成功转让给发展中国家？


These are pressing, unsolved questions.	这些问题都非常紧迫而尚未解决。