They immediately connect on many levels and, yes, “fall in love.”	他们立刻在很多方面产生了共鸣，于是开始“坠入爱河”。


He quickly proposes, and she accepts, but Elsa refuses to give her blessing.	他随即求婚，她也欣然接受，但艾尔莎却拒绝给他们祝福。


It then takes Anna most of the movie to figure out that Hans is evil – set on getting rid of both her and her older sister in order to take over the kingdom.	之后安娜在影片中花了很长时间才弄清楚汉斯是邪恶的代名词——他的目的是杀掉她和她的姐姐，并接管她们的王国。


Luckily for her, there is a wonderful commoner – Kristoff – whom she has gotten to know during the course of her adventures.	幸运的是她在冒险过程中认识了善良的平民克里斯托夫。 与汉斯截然不同的克里斯托夫既真诚又可靠；


Unlike Hans, he is genuine and dependable; they end up together.	他们最后喜结连理。


After many decades of Disney movies, we have been conditioned to expect princesses to fall in love quickly with their charming princes and “live happily ever after.”	看了几十年的迪斯尼电影，我们已经习惯性地认为公主会很快爱上迷人的王子并“从此过上幸福的生活”。


And when there are challenges or obstacles (mostly in the more recent movies), these are quickly overcome (and with humor).	就算遇到挑战和障碍（主要是在相对近期的电影中），王子和公主一般也能很快克服（而且情节风趣幽默）。


Similarly, for many years market participants have been richly rewarded for falling in love – quickly and decisively – with the new policy measures adopted by America’s Federal Reserve.	同样，多年来，市场参与者因为迅速果断地与美联储全新政策措施共坠爱河而获利丰厚。


Indeed, the romance has overwhelmingly followed the Disney script.	事实上，两者的浪漫关系大多沿袭了迪斯尼风格。


Yes, there may have been some bumps along the way, but they have been overcome quickly.	没错，其间可能会遇到坎坷，但往往都能够很快克服。


And the romance has resulted in both parties living happily: the Fed feels better positioned to pursue its dual mandate of high employment and stable inflation, while investors feel that they have the opportunity for sizeable financial rewards.	这种恋爱关系让双方都心情愉快：美联储自认能更好地推行高就业率和稳定通胀的双重任务，而投资者则有机会获得可观的经济回报。


This relationship has been so comfortable that market participants have adopted the mantra “Never fight the Fed” – and for good reason. The Fed is the world’s most powerful central bank.	这种关系舒适到让市场参与者学会了“永远不要跟美联储作对”的口头禅，并且理由也十分充足。


It owns the printing press that produces the world’s main reserve currency. It enjoys a significant amount of political independence.	美联储是世界最强的中央银行，掌握着制造世界主要储备货币的印钞机，而且拥有强大而独立的政治地位。


And it has not been shy about using its considerable operational autonomy.	美联储从不羞于使用其可观的经营自主权。


Market participants also know that the Fed needs them to leverage its policy influence and deliver on its mandate, which, in recent years, has rightly been broadened in practice to incorporate the goal of financial stability.	市场参与者们也知道美联储需要他们利用政策影响力完成其使命，近年来美联储的现实使命不断拓展，保障金融稳定开始被涵盖其中。


To this end, the Fed has become much more “transparent” with markets in the last few years, sharing more readily the minutes and transcripts of its policy discussions.	为此美联储过去几年已变得更加“透明”，非常乐于与市场共享其政策讨论会的备忘和记录。


The Chair of the Federal Reserve Board has even taken to holding periodic press conferences that are closely watched on trading floors around the world.	美联储主席甚至在世界各地交易所的注视下定期举办新闻发布会。


Since the 2008 global financial crisis, the romance has become particularly intense, especially as the Fed has been compelled to use a range of unconventional measures to overcome the capital-market disruptions that almost tipped the world economy into a deep depression.	2008年全球金融危机后恋情变得格外热烈，因为美联储一直被迫动用一系列非常规手段遏制几乎令世界经济陷入衰退的天翻地覆的资本市场波动。


In doing so, the Fed has become more involved in how markets function, the valuation of assets, and fluctuations in their prices.	在此过程中美联储更多地参与市场运作、资产估值及其价格波动。


And the markets have come to depend much more on the Fed, expecting more frequent attention and support from it (and throwing a short tantrum when they feel disappointed, as was the case a year ago).	而市场也已开始更多依赖美联储，要求得到更多的关注和支持（每当感到失望就开始大发脾气，类似的例子是一年之前）。


Initially, central bankers were keen to cultivate this romance as a means of meeting their broader policy objectives of growth, employment, stable inflation, and financial stability.	起初，央行官员热衷利用这种恋情作为实现其增长、就业、维持通胀和金融稳定等宏观政策目标的手段。


More recently, however, some have become less comfortable, warning that the codependence is encouraging excessive risk-taking and, in some cases, bubbly valuations.	但近来有人的热情已有所减退，有人警告相互依赖鼓励过度冒险和在某些情况下的泡沫估值。


Some worry that it may even undermine the Fed’s political independence.	甚至有人担心影响美联储的独立政治地位。


And, only two weeks ago, an outgoing Fed governor, Jeremy Stein, declared that the Fed is in the middle of a policy transition that renders its guidance to markets “more qualitative,” “less deterministic” and, therefore, less precise.	就在两周前，即将卸任的美联储理事杰里米·斯坦宣布联储正在实施“增加定性化”“减少干涉”、“降低准确性”的市场指导的政策过渡。


Like Princess Anna in Frozen, it will take time for markets to recognize that their relationship with the Fed is changing (and should change); and, similar to the movie, some sort of shock may be involved in socializing the new understanding.	就像《冰雪奇缘》中的安娜公主一样，市场需要时间才能认识到与联储的关系变化（而且这种变化是应该的）； 而且，就像电影中一样，将这种新认识运用于实际交往可能要经历某些震动。


Having said that, the outcome will certainly not be as dramatic as in the movie – if only because, unlike Hans, the Fed is not out to take over the markets.	话虽如此，结局肯定不会像电影那样戏剧化，因为美联储不像汉斯那样以接管市场为目标。


So the romance will survive, but it is unlikely to be as intense, and it is unlikely to be unconditional.	因此这段恋情将会延续下去，但热度可能有所减退，而且会出现附加条件。


The hope is that, by that time, a more vibrant real economy will perform the role that Kristoff played in the movie.	我们希望真到那时，更加活力四射的实体经济将扮演克里斯多夫在影片中的角色。


The best and most sustainable love story for markets is one based on a healthy and dynamic real economy that creates jobs and opportunities for many more people.	市场最热烈持久的爱情只能以为更多人创造就业和机会的健康而有活力的实体经济为基础。


Unfortunately, on that count, it is too soon to predict whether we will live happily ever after.	不幸的是，因为这个原因，现在还无法预测我们能否从此过上幸福的生活。


Markets’ Rose-Tinted World	粉饰太平的市场


LAGUNA BEACH – This has been an unusual year for the global economy, characterized by a series of unanticipated economic, geopolitical, and market shifts – and the final quarter is likely to be no different.	发自加州拉古纳海滩——对全球经济来说这都是不寻常的一年，充斥着一系列意料之外的经济，地缘政治和市场动荡——而最后一个季度也是如此。


How these shifts ultimately play out will have a major impact on the effectiveness of government policies – and much more.	而这些动荡的最终进展将对政府各项政策的效力——以及其他许多事件——产生重大影响。


So why have financial markets been behaving as if they were in a world of their own?	那为什么各金融市场却依然可以仿佛置身事外般地自行其事呢？


Apparently unfazed by disappointing growth in both advanced and emerging economies, or by surging geopolitical tensions in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, equity markets have set record after record this year.	即便发达国家和新兴经济体的增长都不如人意，即便东欧和中东的地缘政治危机不断升温，股票市场却似乎不闻不问地屡创新高。


This impressive rally has ignored a host of historical relationships, including the long-established correlation between the performance of stocks and government bonds.	这一令人瞩目的走势甚至无视了许多历史性关联，比如股票市场与政府债券两者表现之间的长期关联。


In fact, correlations among a number of different financial-asset classes have behaved in an atypical and, at times, unstable manner.	事实上，多种不同金融资产类别之间的相关性也呈现出一种非典型，甚至有时不稳定的走势。


Meanwhile, on the policy front, advanced-country monetary-policy cohesion is giving way to a multi-track system, with the European Central Bank stepping harder on the stimulus accelerator, while the US Federal Reserve eases off.	与此同时，在政策方面，发达国家的货币政策一致性也正在让位给一个多轨道体系，欧洲央行进一步加速刺激政策，而美联储则逐步退出。


These factors are sending the global economy into the final quarter of the year encumbered by profound uncertainty in several areas.	这些因素都正把全球经济带入一个被多领域深刻不确定性所困扰着的第四季度。


Looming particularly large over the next few months are escalating geopolitical conflicts that are nearing a tipping point, beyond which lies the specter of serious systemic disruptions in the global economy.	对未来几个月来说，最大的阴云就是不断升级乃至临近爆点的地缘政治冲突，其中萦绕着全球经济严重系统性分裂的阴魂。


This is particularly true in Ukraine, where, despite the current ceasefire, Russia and the West have yet to find a way to ease tensions definitively.	这点在乌克兰显得尤为突出，即便最近实现了停火，但俄罗斯和西方依然未能找到一个最终缓解紧张局势的出路。


Absent a breakthrough, the inevitable new round of sanctions and counter-sanctions would likely push Russia and Europe into recession, dampening global economic activity.	如果继续僵持下去，无可避免的新一轮制裁和反制裁将让俄罗斯和欧洲陷入衰退，削弱全球经济活跃度。


Even without such complications, invigorating Europe’s increasingly sluggish economic recovery will be no easy feat.	即便没有这些复杂事务，重振欧洲逐渐停滞的经济复苏也不是一件容易的事。


In order to kick-start progress, ECB President Mario Draghi has proposed a grand policy bargain to European governments: if they implement structural reforms and improve fiscal flexibility, the central bank will expand its balance sheet to boost growth and thwart deflation.	为了启动增长，欧洲央行主席马里奥·德拉吉（Mario Draghi）向欧洲各国政府推出了一个庞大的政策交换条件：如果后者能实施结构性改革并改善财政灵活性，中央银行将扩大自身的资产负债表去促进增长及遏制通缩。


If member states do not uphold their end of the bargain, the ECB will find it difficult to carry the policy burden effectively – exposing it to criticism and political pressure.	如果成员国不支持与自身有关的交换条件，欧洲央行就将难以有效承担起政策责任——导致其处于批评和政治压力之下。


Across the Atlantic, the Fed is set to complete its exit from quantitative easing (QE) – its policy of large-scale asset purchases – in the next few weeks, leaving it completely dependent on interest rates and forward policy guidance to boost the economy.	在大洋彼岸，美联储正致力于在为来几周内完成退出量化宽松——其大规模资产购买政策，因此也只能完全依靠利率和预先政策导向来刺激经济。


The withdrawal of QE, beyond being unpopular among some policymakers and politicians, has highlighted concerns about the risk of increased financial instability and rising inequality – both of which could undermine America’s already weak economic recovery.	退出量化宽松，除了不受某些政策制定者和政客欢迎的原因之外，也体现出了对金融不稳及不平等状况加剧风险的担心——这两者都将削弱美国本已疲软的经济复苏。


Complicating matters further are the US congressional elections in November.	十一月的美国国会选举使事情变得更加复杂。


Given the likelihood that the Republicans will continue to control at least one house of Congress, Democratic President Barack Obama’s policy flexibility will probably remain severely constrained – unless, of course, the White House and Congress finally find a way to work together.	由于共和党人将可能继续控制参众两��的其中之一，民主党总统巴拉克·奥巴马（Barack Obama）的政策灵活性可能会继续受到严重限制——当然，除非白宫和国会最终找到一个合作的方法。


Meanwhile, in Japan, the private sector’s patience with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s three-pronged strategy to reinvigorate the long-stagnant economy – so-called “Abenomics” – will be tested, particularly with regard to the long-awaited implementation of structural reforms to complement fiscal stimulus and monetary easing.	与此同时，在日本，私营企业对首相安倍晋三重振长期停滞经济的三项战略——所谓的“安倍经济学”——的耐性将受到挑战，特别是期待已久的用来补强财政刺激和宽松货币政策的结构改革。


If the third “arrow” of Abenomics fails to materialize, investors’ risk aversion will rise yet again, hampering efforts to stimulate growth and avoid deflation.	如果安倍经济学的第三支“箭”不能成功，投资者的风险厌恶程度将再次提升，阻碍刺激经济增长，导致避免通缩的努力付诸东流。


Systemically important emerging economies are also subject to considerable uncertainty.	主要的新兴经济体也受到相当大的不确定性。


Brazil’s presidential election in October will determine whether the country makes progress toward a new, more sustainable growth model or becomes more deeply mired in a largely exhausted economic strategy that reinforces its stagflationary tendencies.	十月的巴西总统选举将决定这个国家是否会走向一个新的更可持续的增长模式，还是更加深陷于很大程度上已经筋疲力尽的，加强自身滞胀倾向的经济战略。


In India, the question is whether newly elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi will move decisively to fulfill voters’ high expectations for economic reform before his post-victory honeymoon is over.	在印度，问题是新当选的总理纳伦德拉·穆迪（Narendra Modi）是否会在他的胜利蜜月结束之前采取果断行动来满足选民的对经济改革的高期望。


And China will have to mitigate financial risks if it hopes to avoid a hard landing.	而中国如果希望避免硬着陆，就得着手化解金融风险。


The final source of uncertainty is the corporate sector.	不确定性的最后来源是企业部门。


So far this year, healthy companies have slowly been loosening their purse strings – a notable departure from the risk-averse behavior that has prevailed since the global financial crisis.	今年到目前为止，健康的公司已经在慢慢地松开钱袋——这是对全球金融危机爆发后盛行的规避风险行为的显著逆转。


Indeed, an increasing number of firms have started to deploy the massive stocks of cash held on their balance sheets, first to increase dividends and buy back shares, and then to pursue mergers and acquisitions at a rate last seen in 2007.	事实上，越来越多的企业开始更有效的使用资产负债表上持有的大量现金，首先是增加股息和回购股票，然后是以自2007年以来不曾有的规模进行兼并和收购。


The question is whether companies also will finally devote more cash to new investments in plant, equipment, and people – a key source of support for the global economy.	问题是公司是否也将投入更多的资金在厂房，设备投资和人才方面——这是全球经济支持的主要来源。


This is a rather weighty list of questions.	这是一串相当重要的系列问题。


Yet financial-market participants have largely bypassed them, brushing aside today’s major risks and ignoring the potential volatility that they imply.	然而，金融市场参与者在很大程度上绕过这些问题，忽视当前的主要风险及其暗示的潜在波动。


Instead, financial investors have trusted in the steadfast support of central banks, confident that the monetary authorities will eventually succeed in transforming policy-induced growth into genuine growth.	相反，金融投资者对中央银行的坚定支撑能力极为信任，有信心货币当局最终会成功地将政策诱导性增长转化为真正的增长。


And, of course, they have benefited considerably from the deployment of corporate cash.	当然，他们还极大受益于企业现金的使用。


In the next few months, the buoyant optimism pervading financial markets may prove to be justified.	在接下来的几个月里，金融市场弥漫的乐观明朗可能被证明是合理的。


Unfortunately, it is more likely that investors’ outlook is excessively rosy.	不幸的是，那更可能是投资者的期望过于乐观。


Achieving Escape Velocity	达到逃逸速度


NEWPORT BEACH – It is not often that one can confidently claim that a single remedy could make billions of people around the world significantly better off; do so in a durable and mutually supportive manner; and thus improve the well-being of both current and future generations.	发自纽波特滩——很少有人可以充满信心地宣布某种单一措施可以显著改善全球数十亿人的生活； 以持久和双方互相拥护支持的方式去实践；


Yet that is the case today.	并因此提高当前以及未来几代人的福祉。 而这就是今天我要说的事情。


The remedy I have in mind, of course, is faster economic growth – the one thing that can raise living standards, reduce excessive inequalities, improve job prospects, alleviate trade tensions, and even moderate geopolitical pressures.	我脑海中的这项措施，很显然，就是更快速的经济增长——它可以提升生活水平，缩小过度贫富差距，改善工作前景，缓解贸易摩擦，甚至还能缓和地缘政治压力。


And most forecasters – including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – are now predicting that global growth will pick up in 2014, and that it will be more balanced among the world’s major economic regions.	而大多数预测者——包括来自国际货币基金组织和世界银行的那批——如今都预测全球增长会在2014年上扬，而且在全球主要经济区域中变得更加均衡。


Such forecasts reflect three welcome developments.	这一预测反映出三个令人欣慰的发展。


For starters, Europe will exit recession, with the peripheral economies benefiting from the strongest relative improvement in growth prospects.	首先，欧洲将摆脱衰退，其外围经济体将在增长前景方面出现相对来说最大幅度的改善。


Meanwhile, 3% annual GDP growth is no longer out of reach for the United States.	与此同时，3%的年增长率对美国来说不再是遥不可及。


And emerging economies will be anchored by China’s slower but still-robust 7% annual growth.	新兴经济体则将因为中国有所放缓但依旧强劲的7%年增长率而稳固下来。


But, while the prospect of faster global growth is indeed good news, especially given still-high unemployment in many countries and the associated pressures on social safety nets, it is too early to celebrate.	但虽然全球增长加速的前景确实是个好消息，尤其考虑到许多国家依旧高昂的失业率及其对社会安全网带来的压力，现在还不是庆祝胜利的时候。


There is a risk that, by tempting policy complacency, this year’s economic upturn could end up being counterproductive.	这里还存在这一项风险，如果实施的政策过于自负的话，本年度的经济上扬可能是最后会是削弱生产力的。


This is not because the predicted acceleration in growth is still quite modest.	这不是因为预测的增长加速依然相当温和。


After all, even a limited uptick can make a significant difference if it is part of an encouraging medium-term growth dynamic.	毕竟如果作为一个鼓舞人心的中期增长动力的一部分，即便是有限的提升都可以带来显著的区别。


Rather, the risk lies in the manner in which this growth is likely to materialize – namely, by depending too much on old and exhausted growth models, rather than by comprehensively embracing new ones.	相反，风险存在于增长如何实现的方式上——换句话说，过度依赖于过时且消耗性的增长模式，而不是全面采用新的模式。


In Europe, growth this year will largely reflect the impact of financial stabilization, not deep structural reforms.	在欧洲，本年度的增长将在很大程度上反映出财政稳定政策的影响，而不是深度的结构性改革。


With interest-rate spreads having compressed sharply, and with the threat of a meltdown averted, both domestic and foreign investors continue to return to peripheral economies, thereby alleviating severe credit rationing.	随着利率波动范围被大幅压缩，同时经济崩溃的威胁解除，国内外投资者都在持续重返外围经济体，并因此缓解了严峻的信贷紧缩状况。


That is certainly good news, especially if the source of stabilization is shifted from the European Central Bank’s unconventional policies to more durable endogenous balance-sheet healing among a broader set of financial institutions, non-financial firms, and households.	这显然是好消息，尤其如果稳定政策的来源不再是欧洲央行的非常规政策，而转化为一个更为持久的内生性资产负债表修复，并广泛涵盖金融机构，非金融企业和家庭。


But few of these economies are prepared to embark on the type of internal reforms that promise sustained high growth rates and a substantial reduction in unemployment, which has been at alarming levels for young people and in terms of duration.	但只有为数不多的经济体准备好去实施那种可以确保可持续高增长率以及切实减少失业率——对年轻人以及就业持续时间来说已经处于警报水平——的内部改革。


Meanwhile, exchange-rate appreciation is beginning to undermine exports in the eurozone’s core countries, particularly Germany, which has been the regional growth engine in recent years.	与此同时，汇率上涨已经开始威胁欧元区核心国家的出口，尤其是德国这个多年来的区域增长引擎。


The predicted acceleration in US growth this year is more notable, because it reflects the positive impact of a multi-year process of economic and financial healing.	对本年度美国增长加速的预测则更加值得留意，因为它反映出了持续多年的经济和财政修复进程所产生的积极影响。


We are also starting to see the macro-level impact of certain productivity revolutions – particularly in the energy and technology sectors – that, so far, have mainly been industrial and sectoral phenomena.	我们同时也开始看到特定生产力革命对宏观层面的影响——尤其是在能源和科技部门——而这目前来说主要是工业和某些部门的现象。


Yet America’s actual economic growth in 2014 will remain well below potential.	但美国2014年的实际经济增长将维持在低于其真实潜力的水平。


Moreover, the US economy’s performance remains overly dependent on the Federal Reserve’s experimental monetary policies, courageously adopted in the absence of adequate measures by other economic policymakers.	此外，美国经济的表现依旧过于依赖美联储的实验性货币政策——这是在其他经济政策制定者缺乏合适手段的情况下大胆采取的政策。


The US economy is certainly capable of reaching the “escape velocity” that the country needs if unemployment is to fall in a more definitive and lasting manner.	如果失业率能以一个更为决定性和持续性的方式下降的话，美国经济当然有能力 去达到国家所需的“逃逸速度”。 但这要求国会在三个领域支持奥巴马政府：改善提升总需求的构成状况和水平；


But this requires Congress to support President Barack Obama’s administration in three areas: improving the composition and level of aggregate demand; enhancing the economy’s supply responsiveness; and removing residual debt overhangs that continue to inhibit economic activity.	增强该国的供应响应能力； 去除持续抑制经济活动的残余过剩债务。


Only decisive progress on these fronts will unlock the trillions of corporate dollars that, rather than being invested in new plants and equipment, remain stranded on companies’ balance sheets or are handed over to shareholders via higher dividends and share buybacks.	只有上述这些方面的决定性进展能够释放出囤积在企业中的数万亿美元。 这些钱没能投资于新工厂和设备，而是滞留在公司资产负债表上或是通过高分红和股票回购发给了股东。


The issues in the emerging world are more complex and diverse.	新兴世界的问题更加复杂和多样化。


Some countries are making consistent efforts to revamp exhausted growth models.	一些国家正在努力改造其乏力的增长模式。


In China, for example, this involves less reliance on exports and public investment, and more on the private components of domestic aggregate demand.	以中国为例，这举包括减少对出口和公共投资的依赖，增加国内总需求的私有成分。


Other countries, however, have responded to their growth slowdown in 2012 and 2013 by reverting to old practices that offer the temptation of immediate expansion at the cost of growth-dampening outcomes down the road.	然而其他国家对2012和2013年增长放缓所做出的反应则是回到老做法上，以牺牲未来的增长为代价来获取短期扩张。


This is the case, for example, in Brazil and Turkey.	这些国家包括巴西和土耳其。


All of this implies that the emerging world as a whole is unlikely in 2014 to resume its role as a major engine of the global economy, and that the quality of what growth there is will be far from optimal.	这一切都意味着新兴世界作为一个整体将难以在2014年重新扮演全球经济主要驱动引擎的角色，而其增长的质量将远远称不上理想。


Indeed, the more detailed one’s analysis of today’s global growth dynamics is, the more likely one is to conclude that this year’s brighter prospects are just that – brighter prospects for 2014.	事实上，对当今全球增长动力分析得越细化，就越可能得出结论说今年的更光明前景就只是个光明前景。


There is still much that can (and should) be done if this year’s predicted upturn is to provide a springboard for a meaningful medium-term growth spurt that improves prospects for current and future generations.	如果本年度的上升预测要成为一个可以改善当代和未来几代人前景的有意义中期增长激励因素的跳板的话，那就还有很多事情可以（并必须）去做到。


Unless policymakers keep in mind the larger tasks at hand, they risk falling into a trap of comfortable underachievement.	除非政策制定者们时刻牢记手中还有更宏大的任务，否则他们就可能落入安逸而无所成就的陷阱。


America’s Partisan Peril	美国的党派危险


NEWPORT BEACH – The United States’ reputation for sound economic policymaking took a beating in 2013.	纽波特海滩—美国经济决策的“靠谱”声誉在2013年遭到重创。


Some of this was warranted; some of it was not.	从某种程度上说这是自找的，从某种程度上说又不是。


And now a related distorted narrative – one that in 2014 could needlessly undermine policies that are key to improving America’s economic recovery – is gaining traction.	如今，一套相关的扭曲辞令——2014年将毫无必要地破坏对美国经济复苏具有关键意义的政策——日嚣尘上。


The 2008 global financial crisis left the US economy mired in a low-level equilibrium, characterized by sluggish job creation, persistently high long-term and youth unemployment, and growing inequalities of income, wealth, and opportunity.	2008年全球金融危机让美国经济陷入了低水平均衡，其特征是就业创造不力、长期和年轻人失业居高不下，以及日益恶化的收入、财富和机会不平等。


Many Americans started 2013 with high hopes that congressional leaders would overcome, even if only partly, the polarization and political dysfunction that had slowed recovery.	许多美国人带着希望进入2013年，认为国会领袖们将克服——至少部分地克服——抑制复苏的党派分化和政治瘫痪。


Expectations of less political turbulence were enhanced at the start of 2013 by a bipartisan agreement that avoided the so-called fiscal cliff (though at the last minute and with much rancor) and a deal reached later in January to raise the debt ceiling (albeit temporarily).	2013年伊始，两党达成了避免所谓的财政悬崖的协议（尽管直到最后一刻才颇不情愿地达成了一致），1月晚些时候又达成了提高债务上限的协议（尽管只是一个临时性协议），这使人们更加期待政治动荡会有所平息。


With expectations of less political brinkmanship and lower policy uncertainty ahead, consensus projections foresaw faster, more inclusive economic growth.	在更少政治边缘政策、更低未来政策不确定性的预期下，人们一致预测会出现更快、更包容的经济增长。


In turn, faster growth was expected to revitalize the labor market, counteract worsening income inequality, mollify concerns about debt and deficit levels, and enable the Federal Reserve to start normalizing monetary policy in an orderly fashion.	反过来，人们又预期更快的增长能复兴劳动力市场，抑制恶化的收入不平等性，平息关于债务和赤字水平的担忧，并让美联储能够开始实施有序的货币政策正常化。


It would also facilitate a return by Congress to more normal economic governance – whether passing an annual budget, something not accomplished in four years, or finally taking steps to enhance rather than impede growth and job creation.	这还有助于让国会回归正常时期的经济治理——不管是通过年度预算（国会已有四年没能完成这一任务）还是最终采取提振而不是妨碍增长和就业创造的措施。


But optimism foundered over the course of 2013, and frustration soared.	但随着2013年的深入，乐观渐退，沮丧日增。


Growth has again fallen short of expectations.	增长再一次落后于预期。


With another year of uneven job creation, the problems associated with long-term and youth unemployment have become more deeply embedded in the economy’s structure.	2013年，就业创造仍不平均，与长期和年轻人失业相关的问题更加深入地楔入了经济结构。


Inequalities remain too high, and continue to grow.	不平等性居高不下并且继续恶化。


Congressional paralysis has reached levels unparalleled in recent history.	国会瘫痪达到了近期历史所罕见的程度。


And, again, lawmakers have not enacted an annual budget.	立法者再一次没有能够通过年度预算。


This is not to say that there has been no economic or financial progress in 2013.	这并不是说2013年在经济和金融方面没有任何进步可言。


After all, economic growth, while unnecessarily held below potential by Congress (and vulnerable to decline if Congress is not careful), has again outpaced that of Europe.	毕竟，尽管国会毫无必要地让经济增长处于潜在水平之下（如果国会不谨慎行事，极有可能进一步下降），但仍然再一次胜过了欧洲。


The budget deficit has fallen markedly, while companies and households, too, have continued to strengthen their balance sheets.	预算赤字大幅下降，而公司和家庭也在继续增强资产负债表。


Many segments of the equities market have bounced back strongly, with price indexes hitting record highs.	许多股市板块大幅反弹，股价指数创出新高。


And Americans are on the verge of obtaining much better access to health care.	美国��也即将获得更多更好的医保。


What is frustrating is that the country could have – and should have – done a lot better.	令人沮丧之处在于美国可以也应该做得更好。


Recognizing this, Americans are not hesitant to blame a Congress that seems more eager to manufacture problems than to enable the economy to reach its considerable potential.	意识到这一点的美国人不吝于指责国会——国会似乎更热衷于制造问题，而不是让经济实现其可观的潜力。


Rather than building on some of the fledgling bipartisanship from earlier in the year, Congress decided to produce a mid-year government-financing drama.	国会并未在今年早些时候初步形成的两党合作局面的基础上更进一步，而是上演了一场年中政府融资大戏。


Even immigration reform – a bipartisan pro-growth issue with considerable support from much of American society – has languished unnecessarily.	甚至移民改革——广受美国社会欢迎的两党一致的促增长措施——也遭到了不必要的拖延。


More broadly, Congress took no significant action to avoid headwinds that impose a drag on growth and discourage companies and individuals from investing in their future.	从更广的角度看，国会没有拿出任何大动作避免拖累增长、鼓励公司和个人为未来投资。


According to a survey based on data from the Office of the Clerk of the US House of Representatives, the current 113th Congress has delivered the lowest legislative activity “since at least 1947, when the data collection began.”	根据美国众议院办公室（Office of the Clerk of the US House of Representatives）的数据所做的调查表明，目前的第113界国会在立法方面的活动是“自1947年开始收集数据以来最差的”。


And Americans know it.	美国人对此心知肚明。


According to Gallup, the 9% approval rating for Congress is the lowest level in the survey’s 39-year history.	根据盖洛普的数据，9%的国会批准率是该调查39年历史上最低的。


Partisan polarization in Congress has also undermined the executive branch, unduly blocking government appointments – including routine and essentially uncontroversial ones – and placing unwarranted obstacles in the way of implementing even the most sensible and seemingly bipartisan legislative proposals.	国会中的党派分化也妨碍了行政系统，不恰当地驳回了政府任命——既有常规任命，也有事实上的非常规任命——也给实施最明智的、看似能够超越党派分歧的立法批准制造了不必要的阻挠。


The resulting sense of political drift and dysfunction has been exacerbated by the poor rollout of the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) – a massive, avoidable distraction that has been allowed to cast doubt on this landmark initiative.	由此造成的政治飘忽不定和功能失调因为平价医疗法案（奥巴马医保）的拙劣表现而加剧了。 在评价医疗法案展示期间，大量完全可以避免的干扰动作让人们对这一里程碑式的方案产生了怀疑。


Yes, 2013 was not a good year for public-sector decision-making, especially given that most of the slippages were “own goals.”	是的，2013年对于公共部门决策来说绝不是好年份，特别是考虑到大部分公共决策问题都是“自摆乌龙”。


In the process, the US damaged the reputation for effective economic management that it had earned during the global financial crisis, when bold and timely measures prevented a period of reckless private risk-taking and financial leverage from ending in Great Depression II.	在此过程中，美国在全球金融危机期间所赢得的高效经济管理的声誉遭到了破坏。 金融危机爆发时，美国采取了果断而及时的措施防止了鲁莽的私人冒险和金融杠杆演变为大萧条II。


The Congress-imposed government shutdown and near-default in October were particularly harmful to the country’s global standing.	而今年10月因国会导致的政府关门和几近违约给美国的全球地位造成了特别严重的伤害。


As a result, the popular narrative is shifting to the danger of “government failure.”	因此，流行话题开始转向“政府失灵”的危险。


More and more Americans are being led to forget how, just a few years ago, a united US government reacted decisively to “market failures” and thus helped to avoid a global economic meltdown that would have devastated millions of lives and undermined future generations’ prospects.	越来越多的美国人受此影响，忘记了区区几年前团结的美国政府是如何果断地应对“市场失灵”，从而帮助避免可能毁掉数百万人的生活、破坏子孙后代前景的全球经济崩溃的。


Now, as the pendulum swings back, it risks overshooting the optimal combination of private and public activity and ending up at a simplistic view of government as the problem and the private sector as the solution.	此一时彼一时，如今，公私行为的最优组合有被过度调整的危险，导致形成一种一刀切的观点——政府是问题，而私人部门是答案。


If this occurs, the outlook for faster, more inclusive growth would be weakened further.	果真如此的话，更快、更包容的增长前景将被进一步削弱。


Government has a long pro-growth to-do list heading into 2014.	2014年，政府的促增长待办清单很长。


The top priorities include modernizing the country’s transport and energy infrastructure, reforming an underperforming education system, improving the labor market, bringing order to an overly-fragmented fiscal structure, enhancing the provision of public goods, and safeguarding America’s interests abroad.	最当务之急包括美国交通和能源基础设施的现代化、改革落后的教育系统、改善劳动力市场、为过度分散的财政结构注入秩序、增强公共品的供给，以及捍卫美国的海外利益。


It is tempting for politicians and analysts to overplay simple narratives that place the blame entirely on one side or the other.	政客和分析家容易过度简化论点，把责任完全推到一边或另一边。


The truth is more nuanced and complex.	事实要更加微妙、更加复杂。


America is in desperate need of a Congress that encourages, rather than impedes, better partnerships between the public and private sectors.	美国急切地需要一个鼓励而不是妨碍公私部门合作的国会。


Constantly pitting one side against the other may make for entertaining roundtables on cable television and energizing political rallies.	不断地相互指责只能让有线电视台的娱乐圆桌更加热闹，刺激政治示威。


But it comes at the cost of undermining an economy that could – and therefore should – be performing much better.	但这样的代价是破坏可以——因此也应该——表现更好的经济。


Mexico’s Breakout Moment?	墨西哥的爆发时刻？


MEXICO CITY – Less than two years into Enrique Peña Nieto’s presidency, Mexico is implementing an ambitious structural-reform package designed to lift its economy out of a multi-decade low-growth trap and create new opportunities for its citizens.	墨西哥城—总统涅托（Enrique Peña Nieto）不到两年，墨西哥实施了雄心勃勃的结构改革计划，旨在将墨西哥经济带出多年的低增长陷阱并为公民创造新机遇。


The reforms involve restructuring economic sectors once deemed politically untouchable, and are backed by constitutional amendments and a bold legislative agenda.	改革包括重组此前被认为在政治上不可染指的经济部门，并受到了宪法修订和激进立法日程的支持。


Indeed, thanks to the “Pact for Mexico,” much of this agenda has the support not only of Peña Nieto’s government, but also of the two main opposition parties.	事实上，由于“墨西哥契约”（Pact for Mexico），这一日程中的很多内容不但有涅托政府的支持，也得到了两大主要反对党的支持。


This unique arrangement soon will be tested as the reforms begin to bite, and the outcome could have important and lasting consequences for efforts to implement structural reforms elsewhere around the world.	这一独一无二的安排很快就将受到考验——改革的阵痛将开始浮现，其结果可能对世界其他地区的结构性改革方案造成重要而持久的影响。


Such reforms are never easy to initiate and are usually difficult to complete.	这类改革向来不易实施，通常也难以完成。


Politicians advocate them when they are in opposition, but rarely embrace and sustain them when in government.	政客总是在处于反对党地位时支持改革，一旦执政，就很少会持续它们。


The reason is simple: front-loaded costs and back-loaded benefits make structural reforms politically perilous.	原因很简单：前置成本和后置收益意味着结构改革的政治风险巨大。


Governments that do embark on structural reform often find it frustrating to wait for that often-elusive “critical mass” of revitalized sectors to materialize; and economists find it very difficult to predict the timing and magnitude of the growth liftoff that should follow.	实施了结构改革的政府往往不得不沮丧地等待部门复兴的“临界值”的产生，而这一临界值为多少很难界定； 此外，经济学家也很难预测随之而来的增长腾飞的时机和程度。


Complicating matters further, the inevitability of unanticipated developments, whether homegrown or external in origin, means that course corrections often are needed.	更加复杂的是，意料之外的情况难免会发生，不管来自国内还是国外，这意味着往往会有修正阶段。


As a result, there are only a few good historical examples – including China, Poland, and South Korea – of successful structural reforms.	因此，历史上只有少数国家——包括中国、波兰和韩国——成功地实施了结构改革。


And many dismiss countries that succeed as “special” or “unique” – and thus of little value as a model for other countries to emulate.	许多人称成功国是“特殊”的或“独特的”——因此对其他国家没有多少模仿价值。


Against this background, it is fascinating to observe what is happening in Mexico.	在这样的背景下，墨西哥的走向就有着相当的吸引力。


The “why,” “how,” and “what” of the country’s ambitious structural-reform efforts could – and should – have important signaling effects around the world.	墨西哥雄心勃勃的结构改革措施的“为何做”、“如何做”和“做什么”问题或许——也应该——对全世界都具有重要的信号效应。


Mexican officials are the first to point out their country’s relatively poor economic performance over the last 33 years.	墨西哥官员首先指出了该国在过去33年中经济表现相对低迷。 平均年增长率只有2.


Average annual growth, at only 2.4%, is well below what is needed and possible for a country with such enormous human and natural endowments, a prime location on the United States’ doorstep, and considerable catch-up potential.	4%，远远不足以满足人力和自然禀赋如此雄厚的国家的需要，不足以体现其潜力。 墨西哥占据着与美国相邻的有利区位，拥有巨大的赶超潜力。


Moreover, Mexico’s growth record is far inferior to that of some other countries that started with a lot less and yet leap-frogged it (and other Latin American economies).	此外，墨西哥的增长记录也远远不如一些起点比它低得多但仍然超过了它的国家（以及其他拉美国家）。


Policymakers could easily dodge responsibility for Mexico’s middling performance by hiding behind the various emerging-market crises, Latin America’s “lost decade,” and the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession.	决策者可以轻松地为墨西哥的不佳表现寻找托辞——各种新兴市场危机、拉美的“失去的十年”、2008年全球危机及随后的大衰退的影响，等等。


But Mexico’s officials are not looking for excuses.	但墨西哥官员没有寻找借口。


Instead, they point to domestic indicators showing poor productivity and competitiveness, both over time and relative to other countries.	相反，他们指出，国内指标显示生产率低迷、竞争力低下，不管从时间角度还是从横向比较角度看都是如此。


They also note that Mexico’s impressive accomplishments in terms of macroeconomic stabilization, while necessary, have not proved sufficient to unleash the country’s growth potential.	他们还指出，墨西哥在宏观经济稳定方面的令人印象深刻的成就虽然必要，但并不足以释放该国的增长潜力。


Yes, Mexico has built strong domestic and foreign financial buffers, put its fiscal house in order, opened up its economy to the outside world, and concluded many free-trade arrangements, led by the North American Free Trade Agreement.	诚然，墨西哥已经建立起强大的国内和国外金融缓冲，其财政状况十分有序，经济对外开放，还签订了许多自由贸易协定（首屈一指的便是北美自由贸易协定）。


But now the time has come to build on this progress by simultaneously reforming five large and influential sectors: education, energy, finance, telecommunications, and the labor market.	但如今，墨西哥应该将进步建立在同时采取五大影响力部门的改革上——教育、能源、金融、通信和劳动力市场。


And Peña Nieto’s government has worked hard – and successfully – in recent months to adopt the necessary constitutional amendments and enact initial legislation.	最近几个月中，涅托政府工作十分努力——也十分成功——采取了必要的宪法修正，推动了初步立法。


At least three of these areas – education, energy, and the labor market – were long deemed untouchable or nearly so.	至少有三个部门——教育、能源和劳动力市场——长期以来都被认为不可撼动。


Indeed, I remember my own experience in Mexico in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when I was part of the International Monetary Fund’s team working with officials there to assist with the country’s recovery from the Latin American debt crisis.	事实上，我还记得自己20世纪80年代末到90年代初在墨西哥的经验看（当时我是国际货币基金组织团队的一员，协助墨西哥官员让该国从拉美债务危机中复苏）。


Any mention of energy reforms was met with immediate resistance, including references to national sovereignty and constitutional protections.	只要提到能源改革，就会立刻遭到抵制，其原因包括国家主权和宪法保护。


Today, Mexico is seeking long-term foreign investors to support ambitious and comprehensive reform efforts, with foreign participation particularly important for infrastructure investments in telecom networks, toll roads, gas pipelines, and, down the road, the oil sector.	如今，墨西哥正在寻找长期外国投资者支持其雄心勃勃的全面改革计划，而通信网络、收费公路、输气管道以及一段时间之后的石油部门的基础设施投资的外资参与尤其重要。


All of this is anchored by a clear political mandate, as well as by Peña Nieto’s stated personal commitment to overcome three decades of inadequate growth and productivity deficits.	所有这些都有明确的政治权力为锚，涅托个人也承诺要克服三十年的增长萎靡和生产率落后情况。


Given the possibility of a domestic political backlash, the inherent complexities of implementing a multi-dimensional reform package, and the cyclical headwinds implied by still-sluggish growth in the US (which accounts for roughly 80% of exports), Mexico may need both anchors if it is to sustain reform momentum.	考虑到可能产生的国内政治阻力、实施多部门改革计划的内在复杂性以及美国（占 墨西哥出口的80%）增长依然萎靡所带来的周期性影响因素，墨西哥要想维持其改革动力，就需要双重锚。


Fortunately, the government has room for countercyclical policy, and has already responded with more accommodating fiscal and monetary policies.	幸运的是，墨西哥政府还有空间实施反周期政策，并且已经采取了适应性更强的财政和货币政策作为应对。


Mexico has a good chance to realize its impressive structural-reform agenda.	墨西哥有很大的机会实现其令人印象深刻的结构改革日程。


Doing so would give the rest of the world an important example of how such programs can be designed and implemented for the long term, thereby enabling a critical mass of strong sectors – and thus faster growth and greater prosperity – to be achieved and citizens’ legitimate aspirations to be met.	如若成功，将给世界其他国家一个重要的例子，示范怎样设计和在长期实施这些项目，从而实现强势部门——以及更快的增长和更大的繁荣——的临界值，满足公民的合理雄心。


Wallets Wide Shut	大开钱界


NEWPORT BEACH, CALIFORNIA – Some economists, like Larry Summers, call it “secular stagnation.”	纽波特海滩，加利福尼亚—拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）等经济学家称之为“长期衰退”。


Others refer to it as “Japanization.”	其他人称之为“日本化”。


But all agree that after too many years of inadequate growth in advanced economies, substantial longer-term risks have emerged, not only for the wellbeing of these countries’ citizens but also for the health and stability of the global economy.	但他们都同意，在经历了太长时间发达经济体增长不足后，已经出线了巨大的长期风险，不但影响到这些国家的公民，也影响到全球经济的健康与稳定。


Those looking for ways to reduce the risks of inadequate growth agree that, of all possible solutions, increased business investment can make the biggest difference.	寻找降低增长不足风险者都同意，在所有可能的方案中，增加商业投资可以带来最大的不同。


And many medium-size and large companies, having recovered impressively from the huge shock of the 2008 global financial crisis and subsequent recession, now have the wherewithal to invest in new plants, equipment, and hiring.	许多大中型公司已经令人注目地从2008年全球金融危机及其后的衰退所带来的巨大冲击中复苏，目前手握可投资于新厂房、设备和人员的资金。


Indeed, with profitability at or near record levels, cash holdings by the corporate sector in the United States have piled up quarter after quarter, reaching all-time highs – and earning very little at today’s near-zero interest rates.	事实上，在盈利能力处于或接近纪录水平的情况下，美国公司部门所持现金每个季度都在增加，达到了创纪录的高峰——在如今近零利率水平下几乎产生不了回报。


Moreover, because companies have significantly improved their operating efficiency and lengthened the maturities on their debt, they need a lot less precautionary savings than they did in the past.	此外，由于公司大大改善了经营效率、延长了债务期限，因此他它们所需要的预防性储蓄也比以前要低。


However one looks at it, the corporate sector in advanced economies in general, and in the US in particular, is as strong as it has been in many years.	不管你如何看待，总体而言，发达经济体公私部门和多年来一样强健，美国就更不用说了。


Non-financial firms have achieved a mix of resilience and agility that contrasts sharply with prevailing conditions for some households and governments around the world that have yet to confront adequately a legacy of over-leverage.	非金融企业实现了恢复力和灵活性兼具，这与世界范围内不少家庭和政府所面临的的情况——过度杠杆留下的后遗症——形成了鲜明对比。


But, rather than deploy their abundant cash in new investments to expand capacity and tap new markets – which they have been very hesitant to do since the global financial crisis erupted – many companies have so far preferred (or have been pressured by activist investors) to give it back to shareholders.	但是，许多公司并没有把冗余现金用于新投资以扩大产能、占领新市场——自全球金融危机爆发以来它们便对此犹豫不���——而是宁愿把它们还给股东（积极投资者的施压也起到了作用）。


Last year alone, US companies authorized more than $600 billion of share buybacks – an impressive amount by any measure, and a record high.	光是在去年，美国公司就实施了6,000多亿美元的股票回购——不管用何种指标衡量都是令人惊讶的数字，也是历史之最。


Moreover, many companies boosted their quarterly dividend payouts to shareholders.	此外，许多公司提高了季度股利分红。


Such activity continued in the first two months of 2014.	这一趋势在2014年前两个月依然存在。


But, while shareholders have clearly benefited from companies’ unwillingness to invest their ample cash, the bulk of the injected money has been circulating only in the financial sector.	但是，尽管股东显然因为公司不愿将充足的现金用于投资而蝴蝶了好处，但注入资金大部分只是在金融部门中流动。


Little of it has directly benefited economies that are struggling to boost their growth rates, expand employment, avoid creating a lost generation of workers, and address excessive income inequality.	这些资金极少能够直接有利于疲于提振增长率、增加就业、避免造成工人的失落一代以及解决收入不平等性过高问题的经济体。


If advanced economies are to prosper, it is necessary (though not sufficient) that the corporate sector’s willingness to invest match its considerable wallet.	发达经济体要想实现繁荣，一个必要（但不充分）条件是公私部门的投资必须与它们腰包的鼓囊程度相配。


Six factors appear to pose particularly important constraints.	六个因素组成了重要的约束。


First, companies are concerned about future demand for their products.	首先，公司担心产品的未来需求。


The recent economic recovery, as muted as it has been (both in absolute terms and relative to most expectations), has been driven by the experimental policies that central banks have pursued to sustain consumption.	当前的经济复苏相当无力（不管从绝对水平衡量还是从相对大多数预期角度衡量），并且主要推动力来自央行出于维持消费目的推出的实验性政策。


Now, with the US Federal Reserve beginning to withdraw monetary stimulus, and with growth in emerging countries slowing, most companies are simply unable to point to massive expansion opportunities.	如今，美联储开始回收货币刺激，新兴国家增长也开始减速，许多公司无法找到比较大的扩张机会。


Second, with China such an influential driver of global demand (both directly and indirectly through important network effects), the outlook for the world’s second-largest economy has a disproportionate impact on projections of global corporate revenues.	其次，中国已成为最主要的全球需求动力源（不管是直接需求还是通过重要的网络效应形成的间接需求），这个世界第二大经济体的前景对全球公司收入的影响巨大无比。


And, as China’s excessive domestic credit growth and shadow-banking system attract increased attention, many companies are becoming anxious.	而中国国内信用增长过快和影子银行系统问题正在日益受到关注，许多国家对此标识担忧。


Third, while companies recognize that innovation is a key comparative advantage in today’s global economy, they are also humbled by its increasingly winner-take-all nature.	第三，尽管公司知道创新是当今全球经济的一大关键比较优势，但也惮于日益明显的赢家通吃效应。


Successful innovation today is a lot less about financing and much more about finding the “killer app.”	如今，成功的创新与资金的关系日小而与寻找“杀手应用”的关系日大。


As a result, many companies, less convinced that “normal” innovation yields big payoffs, end up investing less overall than they did before.	结果，许多公司已不相信“正常”创新能带来大回报，因此总体投资水平不如从前。


Fourth, the longer-term cost-benefit analysis for would-be investors is clouded by legitimate questions about certain operating environments.	第四，潜在投资者的长期成本效益分析受某些经营环境的合法性问题的影响。


In the US, many companies expect major budgetary reform; but they are not yet able to assess the impact on their future operating profits.	在美国，许多公司都期待着重大的预算改革，但它们尚无法评估预算改革对未来经营利润的影响。


In Europe, politicians are aware of the need for major structural reforms, including those required to solidify regional integration; but companies lack adequate clarity about the components of such reforms.	在欧洲，政客们都明白重大结构性改革的需要，包括那些需要加强地区一体化的改革； 但公私对于这些改革的具体内容无从确知。


Fifth, the scope for risk mitigation is not as large as financial advances would initially suggest.	第五，减少风险的空间并不像金融进步一开始所表现的那么大。


Yes, companies have more hedging tools at their disposal.	诚然，公司手上有更多的对冲工具。


But the ability to manage downside risk comprehensively is still limited by incomplete longer-term markets and public-private partnerships that cannot be sufficiently leveraged.	但综合管理下行风险的能力仍受到不完整的长期市场和无法充分利用的公私合作的限制。


Finally, most corporate leaders recognize that they owe a large debt of gratitude to central bankers for the relative tranquility of recent years.	最后，大部分公司领导人知道，这几年的相对平静都要归功于中央银行的慷慨。


Through bold policy experiments, central bankers succeeded in avoiding a global multi-year depression and buying time for companies to heal.	央行通过大胆的政策实验成功地避免了为期多年的全球萧条，为公私复苏赢得了时间。


But, working essentially alone, central banks have not been able to revamp properly the advanced economies’ growth engines; nor do they have the tools to do so.	但是，单枪匹马的央行无法恰到好处地更新发达经济体的增长引擎，它们也没有工具这样做。


Though many corporate leaders may still be unable to grasp the precise threats, they seem uneasy about the longer-term collateral damage implied by running modern market economies at artificially repressed interest rates and with bloated central-bank balance sheets.	尽管许多公司领打动人仍无法精确把握风险，但都很担心在人为压低的利率和央行资产负债表大扩张条件下运行的现代市场经济可能带来的长期附带伤害。


The good news is that each of these constraints on investment can – and should – be addressed; and recent US business investment data suggest some progress.	好消息是，分开看，这些投资约束的每一个都可以——也应该——得到解决； 最新的美国商业投资数据就表现出一些改善。


The bad news is that it will take a lot more time, effort, and global coordination.	坏消息是解决起来会需要大量时间、精力和全球合作。


In the meantime, the corporate sector will only gradually take on more of the heavy lifting.	与此同时，公私部门只能逐渐承担更多的重担。


That will be enough to keep the advanced economies growing this year; unfortunately, it will not be enough to attain the faster growth that their citizens’ wellbeing – and that of the global economy – urgently requires.	对于在今年保持发达经济体增长来说，这已经足够； 不幸的是，对于发达经济体人民——以及全球经济——所急需的更快的增长来说，这还不够。


The Fragmentation of Bretton Woods	布雷顿森林的崩溃


LAGUNA BEACH – The world has changed considerably since political leaders from the 44 Allied countries met in 1944 in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to create the institutional framework for the post-World War II economic and monetary order.	拉古娜海滩—1944年，44个同盟国的政治领导人齐聚新罕布什尔州布雷顿森林，建立了二战后国际经济和货币秩序框架。 至此以后，世界发生了巨大的变化。


What has not changed in the last 70 years is the need for strong multilateral institutions.	在这70年里，不变的是对强大的多边机构的需要。


Yet national political support for the Bretton Woods institutions – the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – seems to have reached an all-time low, undermining the global economy’s ability to meet its potential and contributing to geopolitical insecurity.	但对布雷顿森林机构——国际货币基金组织（International Monetary Fund，IMF）和世界银行（World Bank）——的国家支持似乎滑落到历史最低水平，制约了全球经济实现潜力，也导致了地缘政治不安全。


When the Bretton Woods conference was convened, its participants understood that the IMF and the World Bank were integral to global stability.	布雷顿森林会议召开时，参与者都知道IMF和世界银行事关全球稳定。


Indeed, both institutions were designed to discourage individual countries from adopting short-sighted policies that would harm other economies’ performance, incite retaliatory action, and ultimately damage the entire world economy.	事实上，这两个机构就是为了阻止个体国家采取可能伤害其他国家表现、导致报复政策并最终伤害世界经济整体的短视政策而设计的。


In other words, they were intended to prevent the kind of beggar-thy-neighbor policies that many major economies adopted during the Great Depression of the 1930s.	换句话说，它们的成立是为了防止众多主要经济体在大萧条和20世纪30年代所实施的以邻为壑政策。


Moreover, by encouraging better policy coordination and the pooling of financial resources, the Bretton Woods institutions boosted the effectiveness of international cooperation.	此外，通过鼓励更好的政策协作、集中金融资源，布雷顿森林机构增进了国际合作的效果。


And they enhanced stability by offering collective insurance to countries facing temporary hardship or struggling to meet their development-financing needs.	它们还通过为面临暂时困境或难以满足发展融资需求的国家提供集体保险强化了稳定。


It is difficult to identify more than a small handful of countries that have not benefited in some way from the IMF or the World Bank.	很难找出没有以各种方式从IMF和世界银行获益的国家。


Yet countries seem hesitant to contribute to the reform and strengthening of these institutions.	但个股似乎对促进改革、加强这些机构颇感犹豫。


In fact, a growing number of systemically important countries have taken measures that are undermining the Fund and the Bank, albeit largely inadvertently.	事实上，越来越多的系统重要性国家采取了妨碍IMF和世界银行的措施，尽管本意未必如此。


In recent years, mounting domestic political pressure has driven Western governments to adopt increasingly insular policies.	近几年来，日益增加的国内政治压力促使西方政府采取日益孤立的政策。


And, just a few weeks ago, the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) acted to bolster a currency-reserve pool to help ease short-term liquidity pressures and to establish their own development bank – a direct challenge to the IMF and the World Bank.	而就在数周前，金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非）采取行动，建立货币储备池以缓解短期流动性压力并建立其自身的开发银行——这是对IMF和世界银行的直接挑战。


Indeed, unlike existing parallel arrangements, which have always been regional in nature and intended to complement the work of the IMF and the World Bank, the BRICS’ New Development Bank and contingent reserve agreement are not based on cultural, geographical, or historical links.	事实上，与一直地区性质、以补充IMF和世界银行作用为初衷的现行类似安排不同，金砖国家的新开发银行和应急储备协议并不以文化、地缘政治或历史渊源为基础。


Instead, they are founded on a shared frustration with the outmoded entitlements to which the US and Europe are clinging – entitlements that are diminishing the Bretton Woods institutions’ credibility and effectiveness.	相反，它们的基础是因为对美国和欧洲所坚持的过时特权的共同不满——这些特权降低了布雷顿森林机构的信誉和效率。


Most important, Europe and the US continue to resist the full dismantling of a nationality-based appointment system that favors their citizens for the highest leadership positions at the IMF and the World Bank, despite offering the occasional promise of change.	最重要的是，尽管间或做出改革承诺，但欧洲和美国仍然抵制完全以国籍为标准的人任命制度，这一制度有利于它们的公民把持IMF和世界银行最高领导位置。


Moreover, they have stifled efforts to recalibrate the balance of representation even marginally.	此外，它们还扼杀重新平衡代表权的努力，哪怕只是微小的调整。


As a result, Western Europe enjoys a massively disproportionate level of representation, and emerging economies, despite their increasing systemic importance, barely have a voice.	结果，西欧享有不成比例的代表权，而新兴经济体尽管系统重要性日益突出，却仍然难以发声。


And, during the eurozone’s debt crisis, European leaders showed little hesitation in bullying the IMF into flouting its own lending rules.	而在欧元区债务危机期间，欧洲领导人毫不犹豫地强迫IMF践踏其自身的贷款规则。


In this sense, it is the countries that spearheaded the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions that pose the greatest threat to their legitimacy, impact, and, ultimately, relevance.	照此看，给布雷顿森林机构的合法性、影响力以及最终的重要性带来最大威胁的正是创建这些机构的先驱国家。


After all, emerging economies cannot reasonably be expected to support institutions that offer unfair advantages to countries that so often preach the importance of meritocracy, competition, and transparency.	毕竟，你不会指望新兴经济体来支持这些为经常鼓吹精英治理、竞争和透明度的国家提供不公平优势的机构。


That is why they are now determined to use their collective economic weight to circumvent these institutions.	正因如此，如今它们决心团结起来，依靠其自身经济实力绕过这些机构。


Another challenge to the international monetary system lies in the proliferation of bilateral payment agreements.	国际货币体系的另一个挑战在于双边支付协议的兴起。


By bypassing more efficient and inclusive structures, these arrangements undermine multilateralism.	这些协议绕过更高效、更包容的结构，破坏了多边主义。


In some cases, they even conflict with countries’ obligations under the Bretton Woods Articles of Agreement.	有时它们甚至与各国的布雷顿森林协议章程（Bretton Woods Articles of Agreement）所规定的义务冲突。


The consequences of this gradual process of fragmentation extend well beyond lost economic and financial opportunities, to include weaker political cooperation, reduced interdependencies, and, in turn, growing geopolitical risks.	这一逐渐崩溃的过程所带来的后果绝不止错失经济和金融机会，也包括了政治合作减弱、互相依存度降低，并反过来增加了地缘政治风险。


One need look no further than the current turmoil in Ukraine or Iraq to understand what can happen in the absence of credible multilateral structures capable of shaping developments in crisis situations.	只需要看一看当前乌克兰和伊拉克的乱象就可以明白，没有可信得的多边结构在危机情形中充当发展的定海神针会带来什么后果。


So much for the problems.	问题就是这些。


What about the solutions?	那么解决办法呢？


Simply put, the IMF and the World Bank urgently need self-reinforcing reforms.	简言之，IMF和世界银行继续自我强化的改革。


With a few key measures – none of which is technically complicated – the Bretton Woods institutions can move beyond the mindset of 1944 to reflect today’s realities and enhance tomorrow’s opportunities.	只要采取几项关键措施——从技术上说，没有一项算得上复杂——布雷顿森林机构就可以超越1944年思维，反映当今现实并增加未来机会。


Such reforms include the elimination of nationality-based hiring; adjustments to representation, with emerging economies gaining more influence at the expense of Europe; and more equality and evenhandedness in lending and economic-surveillance decisions.	这些改革包括废除基于国籍的任命、代表权调整（减少欧洲代表权，增加新兴经济体代表权）以及增加贷款和经济监督决定上的平等与公平。


The challenge will be to overcome political resistance – no small feat at a time when domestic polarization has made politicians wary of publicly supporting economic multilateralism.	挑战在于克服政治阻力。 如今，国内政治极化导致政客害怕公开支持经济多边主义，这是个不小的障碍。


The repeated rejection by the US Congress of a much more limited set of reforms – which was approved by most other countries in 2010-12, imposes no incremental financial obligations on the US, and implies no reduction in America’s voting power or influence – is a case in point.	美国国会一再拒绝程度极为有限的改革方案就是明证。 该改革方案在2010—2012年间已获得大部分其他国家的批准，并不会实质性增加美国的金融义务，也不会减少美国的投票权和影响力。


Enlightened self-interest must overcome such political obstacles.	开明自利必须克服这些政治障碍。


The longer that world leaders resist the overwhelming need for reform, the worse the world’s future economic and financial prospects – not to mention its security situation – will be.	世界领导人越是抵制紧迫的改革需要，世界未来经济和金融前景就越是暗淡——更不用说所安全局势了。


Egypt’s Monster in the Making	演进的埃及“恶魔”


BRUSSELS – On December 15, Egypt’s draft constitution is due to be put to a referendum.	布鲁塞尔——12月15日，埃及宪法草案进入公投阶段。


A year ago, Egyptians were thrilled to know that finally their country’s constitution would reflect their democratic hopes and aspirations.	一年前，令所有埃及人激动的是，他们的国家宪法终于可以体现他们的民主愿望和希冀了。


Yet the document that they will now vote on is more likely to dash those hopes and dim Egyptians’ prospects for democracy.	然而，他们将要进行投票的这部宪法更有可能将那些愿望化为泡影，同时，也使埃及的民主之路暗淡无光。


The constitutional drafting process was rushed, without the input of liberals, non-Muslims, and women, all of whom boycotted the process, owing to the preponderance of Islamists.	整个宪法起草过程很是仓促，这一切都归因于伊斯兰教徒的绝对优势，因为他们人数众多。 起草过程没有自由主义者、穆斯林及妇女的参与，但同时他们也联合抵制了这一过程。


The Muslim Brotherhood, and primarily President Mohamed Morsi, is banking on the assumption that the strength of Egypt’s Islamist vote will earn him enough support among “regular Egyptians,” and that the opposition will have little impact on the referendum’s outcome.	穆斯林兄弟会及首席主席默罕默德﹒莫尔西则指望着埃及伊斯兰教徒的投票可以使他在“平常的埃及人”中赢得更多的支持。 同时，反对派也会对公投结果产生些许影响。


One political adviser for the ruling Freedom and Justice Party – the Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing – even boasted that the Brothers could easily mobilize 20 million supporters.	自由正义党，穆斯林兄弟会的一个政治派别，同时也是埃及的执政党。 它的一个政治顾问甚至吹嘘道，动员起2000万的支持者对于兄弟会来说不费吹灰之力。


The Brothers dismiss those who have demonstrated in the streets during the past three weeks as Mubarak sympathizers.	在过去的三周里，兄弟会遣散了那些在街头示威的穆巴拉克支持者。


Morsi’s decision on November 22 to grant himself absolute authority for the spurious purpose of defending the revolution is not new for Egypt.	11月22日，穆尔西借着捍卫革命之名，给自己赋予了绝对权力，当然这对于埃及来说并不新鲜。


A succession of dictator-presidents ruled the country under a state of emergency for more than 40 years.	一个接一个的独裁总统使这个国家在危急状态下渡过了40余年。


While Morsi has now bowed to pressure to annul a decree granting him powers without judicial oversight, it seems only yesterday that people were prepared to put their fears aside and trust that Morsi was ready to rule in the interests of all Egyptians.	然而，迫于压力，穆尔西废除了一项法令，这项法令可以使他在没有司法监督的情况下赋予自己权力。 埃及人民将他们的恐惧放在一旁，并相信他们的总统穆尔西将为埃及人的利益来统治国家，这似乎只有在昨天。


Eric Trager of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy notes that Morsi’s previous role in the Muslim Brotherhood’s Guidance Council sheds some light on the motives behind his current behavior.	埃里克•特拉，来自华盛顿近东政策研究所，指出穆尔西之前在穆斯林兄弟会指导委员会的角色表明了他隐藏在当前行为之下的动机。


In the past, Morsi advocated a platform that excluded Christians from political life and granted Islamic scholars oversight authority to ensure that all legislation complied with Sharia law.	之前，穆尔西提供了一个平台，排除基督徒从事政治生活以及授予伊斯兰学者监督权，这确保了所有的立法均符合伊斯兰教教法。


He also worked to expunge young members of the Freedom and Justice Party that he deemed to hold dissenting views.	他同时也致力于排除一些自由正义党年轻党员，因为在他看来这些年轻人属于异己分子。


While the draft constitution does contain positive provisions, many are causing concern.	尽管宪法草案的确包含一些积极的规定，其中的一些也引起了担忧。


For example, Article 11 authorizes the state to “safeguard ethics, public morality, and public order, and foster a high level of education and of religious and patriotic values.”	例如，第十条规定“国家有权保障伦理、公共道德并维护公共秩序，促进高水平的教育和宗教价值、爱国价值”。


This leaves plenty of room for interpretation by the government.	这就使得政府有更大的宪法解释空间。


In addition, the mosque of al-Azhar is promised an advisory role in Islamic legislation.	此外，艾资哈尔清真寺则被赋予了在伊斯兰立法上的咨询权。


The Brothers’ political opponents have not been silent.	穆斯林兄弟会的政治对手并非无动于衷。


On December 8, the National Salvation Front announced that the draft “does not represent the Egyptian people.”	12月8号，救国阵线宣称宪法草案并没有代表埃及人民。


Moreover, ordinary Egyptians have responded viscerally and swiftly to Morsi’s moves, perhaps more so than he had anticipated.	此外，埃及民众对穆尔西的举动做出了发自内心的快速回应，或许比穆尔西本人所预计的要多的多。


Strikes were called, newspapers halted publication, and fears of widespread insurrection remain high.	工人罢工，报纸停止发行，对于不断蔓延的暴动，恐怖情绪依然高涨。


Hundreds have been injured in street clashes in Cairo.	在开罗，数百人在街头冲突中受伤。


The president’s supporters have declared that “defending Morsi is defending Islam.”	总统支持者宣称，“保卫穆尔西就是保卫穆斯林”。


Today, Morsi seems as besieged as Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad.	今天，穆尔西似乎面临叙利亚总统巴沙尔•阿萨德一样的困境。


The military has barricaded the presidential palace and, until the results of the referendum are announced, they are under orders to protect Egypt’s state institutions.	军队已经包围了总统府邸，他们奉命捍卫埃及国家机构直到公投结果公布。


Outside the Middle East, the United States has scaled back its relations with Egypt since the government’s weak response to the attack on the US embassy in September, which signaled a rapid deterioration in bilateral relations.	中东之外，美国已然稍微拉远了与埃及之间的关系，这是由于埃及政府在9月份的美国驻埃及大使管遭遇袭击问题上的微弱回应，同时这也预示着美埃双边关系的严重恶化。


America’s main priority now is to ensure that the peace treaty with Israel is maintained.	目前看来，美国最先考虑的事情就是要确保与穆斯林之间的和平条约的稳固性。


The European Union cannot afford to engage in wishful thinking when it comes to Morsi’s ambitions and the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda.	当涉及到穆尔西的野心及穆斯林兄弟会的日程问题上，欧盟不可能打得起它的如意算盘。


The EU’s “more for more” policy has made human rights a cornerstone of its foreign policy toward states in the Union’s neighborhood.	欧盟“更多换更多”的政策使得人权成为欧盟与周边国家外交政策的基石。


And, though Morsi’s recent role in mediating discussions between Hamas and the Israeli government was invaluable in preventing a serious regional conflict, his government’s actions are undermining prospects for further cooperation with Europe.	此外，尽管穆尔西在哈马斯与以色列政府调停谈判上的作用非同小可，避免了一系列严重的地区冲突，穆尔西政府的举动正在破坏与欧洲进一步合作的前景。


No matter how Morsi attempts to sideline his domestic opponents, Egypt is in no shape to ignore the rest of the world.	无论穆尔西怎样试图排挤他国内的政敌,埃及是决不会忽视世界其它的地区。


It lacks a stable economy, relying heavily on tourism and imports to feed the country’s more than 80 million people.	它缺乏稳定的经济来源，严重依赖旅游业和进口来哺育这个国家的8000多万人。


Power cuts and public-service strikes are a regular feature of daily life.	断电和公共服务罢工是日常生活中常见的事情。


Egypt’s government needs to secure consistent foreign financing to keep the country afloat, providing leverage for international opposition to Morsi’s efforts to impose an agenda that runs contrary to Egyptians’ fundamental rights.	埃及政府需要维持稳定的外国融资,以支撑整个国家,并以此来平衡国际上对穆尔西施行的有违埃及基本人权 的措施的反对之声。


Egypt can thrive only on the basis of honest adherence to a democratic process.	只有老实地坚持民主化进程，埃及才能兴盛。


The current constitutional crisis has caused many to wonder how Egypt will face future political tests.	目前的宪法危机已经使得许多人担忧埃及将如何面临未来的政治考验。


The referendum’s outcome will prove an important guide regarding the direction the country is likely to take.	公投结果将是国家未来走向的重要指南。


Will it embrace a new Islamic authoritarianism, or build the democracy that Egyptians have risked their lives to secure?	它会接受一个新的伊斯兰专制,还是建设埃及人誓死捍卫的民主政治？


Egypt’s Democratic Dictator?	埃及的民主独裁者？


CAIRO – Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s first-ever elected civilian president, recently granted himself sweeping temporary powers in order, he claims, to attain the objectives of the revolution that overthrew Hosni Mubarak’s dictatorship.	开罗—埃及有史以来首位民选总统穆罕默德·穆尔西最近授权自己暂时掌握一切大权，他声称这样是为了实现推翻穆巴拉克独裁的革命的目标。


But the decrees incited strong opposition from many of the revolutionary forces that helped to overthrow Mubarak (as well as from forces loyal to him), with protests erupting anew in Cairo’s Tahrir Square.	但这一指令煽起了在推翻穆巴拉克过程中做出贡献的诸多革命力量（包括忠于他的力量）的强烈反对，开罗解放广场爆发新的游行示威。


Morsi has thus been put in the odd position of having to defend his decision against the protesters while simultaneously making common cause with them.	于是，穆尔西陷入了奇怪的境地：他不得不捍卫自己受示威者反对的决定，与此同时，他又要与示威者志同道合。


“I share your dream of a constitution for all Egyptians and with three separate powers: executive, legislative, and judicial,” he told his opponents.	“我和你们一样，梦想有一部属于全体埃及人民的宪法和行政、立法、司法的三权分立。


“Whoever wants Egyptians to lose this opportunity, I will stop him.”	”他对反对者说，“不管是谁，若他希望埃及人失去这一机会，我将阻止他。


So, was Morsi’s “auto-coup” necessary to realize the revolution’s avowedly democratic goals?	”那么，穆尔西的“自动政变”（auto-coup）是实现革命的公开目标——民主的必要条件吗？


The new Constitutional Declaration, the Revolution Protection Law, and the new presidential decrees have several aims:	新宪法宣言、革命保护法（Revolution Protection Law）和新总统令的目标包括：


·         To remove the public prosecutor, a Mubarak-era holdover who failed to convict dozens of that regime’s officials who had been charged with corruption and/or abuse of power;	·         解除公诉人职务，他是穆巴拉克时代的遗留官员，没能证明受腐败和/或滥用权力指控的穆巴拉克政权官员的罪行。


·         To protect the remaining elected and indirectly elected institutions (all of which have an Islamist majority) from dissolution by Constitutional Court judges (mostly Mubarak-era holdovers);	·         保护尚存的选举和间接选举机构（均由伊斯兰教徒占多数）不被宪法法院法官（大多为穆巴拉克时代遗留官员）宣布解散。


·         To bring about retrials of Mubarak’s security generals;	·         对穆巴拉克的安全将官进行复审。


·         To compensate and provide pensions for the victims of repression during and after the revolution.	·         为革命期间和革命之后被压迫的受害者提供补偿和养老金。


While most Egyptians may support Morsi’s aims, a dramatic expansion of presidential power in order to attain them was, for many, a step too far.  Given Egypt’s extreme polarization and distrust between its Islamist and secular forces, Morsi should have anticipated the protests.	大部分埃及人或许支持穆尔西的目标，但在很多人看来，为了达到这些目标而大幅扩张总统权力步子迈得太大了。 埃及伊斯兰教徒和世俗势力之间严重两极分化，彼此互不信任，穆尔西应该料到会造成示威。


Suspicion of the powerful, after all, has been one of the revolution’s animating factors.	毕竟，怀疑权力一直是革命活力的来源之一。


Another is a “zero-sum” attitude: any achievement by Morsi is perceived by his opponents as a loss.	另一个因素是“零和”观点：穆尔西的成就在反对者看来就是损失。


The anti-Morsi forces are sharply divided ideologically and politically.	反穆尔西阵营的思想和政见是显著分裂的。


Nobel laureate Mohamed ElBaradei, a liberal reformer, has little in common with Ahmed El-Zind, the head of the Judges Club and a Mubarak loyalist.	诺贝尔奖获得者、自由派改革者巴拉迪与法官俱乐部（Judges Club）头目、忠于穆巴拉克的辛德（Ahmed El-Zind��几无相同之处。


But the anti-Morsi forces that backed the revolution regard the price of cleansing the judiciary as too high, arguing that the constitutional declaration will lead to dictatorship.	但支持革命的反穆尔西阵营认为清洗司法系统的代价太大，他们指出，宪法宣言将导致独裁。


Indeed, the declaration protects presidential decrees from judicial review (although Morsi stipulated that it pertains only to “sovereignty” matters, and stressed its temporary nature).	事实上，宪法宣言保护总统指令不受法官裁决影响（尽管穆尔西表示这只包括“主权”问题，而且只是权宜之计）。


It also gives the president emergency-like power to fight vague threats, such as those “endangering the life of the nation.”	宪法宣言还授予总统类似紧急情况的权力应对模糊的威胁，比如那些“威胁国家安全”的活动。


Only if the new draft constitution is upheld in a popular referendum on December 15 will these provisions be annulled.	只有在新宪法草案于12月15日的公投中获得群众支持，这些权力才会被取消。


But the opposition factions have not been adhering to democratic principles, either.	但反对派也不符合民主原则。


Mostly comprising electoral losers and remnants of Mubarak’s regime, some aim to topple Morsi, not just get him to backtrack on his decree.	他们大部分是选举中的失败者和穆巴拉克政权遗老，其中一些人的目标是推翻穆尔西，而不仅仅是要他收回成命。


ElBaradei, for example, “expects” the army to do its national duty and intervene if “things get out of hand” – hardly a compelling democratic stance, given the army’s track record.	比如，巴拉迪“希望”军队行使其国家责任，在“事态失控”时予以干预——给定埃及军队的历史记录，这绝非令人瞩目的民主立场。


Morsi’s decrees have undoubtedly polarized Egyptian politics further.	穆尔西的指令毫无疑问让埃及政坛进一步两极分化了。


The worst-case scenario is street clashes between pro- and anti-Morsi hardliners.	最坏的情况是支持和反对穆尔西的强硬分子发生街头火并。


Historically, such clashes have often sparked civil war (for example, Spain in 1936 or Tajikistan in 1992) or brutal military coups (as in Indonesia in 1965 and Turkey in 1980).	从历史上看，这类火并通常导致内战（比如1936年的西班牙和1992年的塔吉克斯坦）或残酷的军事政变（比如1965年的印尼和1980年的土耳其）。


For Morsi and his supporters, it was imperative to neutralize the Constitutional Court judges, whose ruling last June dissolved the first freely elected, post-revolution People’s Assembly (the parliament’s lower house).	对穆尔西及其支持者来说，中立宪法法院法官是必要的，他们在去年6月的判决解散了革命后首个自由选举选出的国民大会（议会下院）。


According to the Morsi camp, the politicized Court intended to dissolve the Consultative Council (the upper house) and the Constitutional Assembly, as some of its judges publicly hinted.	据穆尔西阵营的说法，政治化的宪法法院倾向于解散咨询委员会（议会上院）和制宪大会，这是一些法官公开暗示的。


Likewise, the sacked public prosecutor had failed to present any solid evidence against those of Mubarak’s security chiefs and officers who were accused of killing protestors, leading to acquittals for almost all of them.	类似地，被解职的公诉官没有拿出任何有力证据证明被指控杀戮示威者的穆巴拉克的安全主管和官员的罪行，导致他们几乎全被无罪释放了。


As a president who was elected with only a 51.7% majority, Morsi needs to be sensitive to the demands of his supporters, mainly the Islamists and revolutionaries victimized by the security forces.	穆尔西仅以51. 7%的多数优势当选总统，他应该对支持者的需求颇为敏感，其支持者大部分是伊斯兰教徒和受安全部队迫害的革命者。


But, for many revolutionaries, there were other ways to sack a tainted prosecutor and cleanse the judiciary.	但是，对许多革命者来说，解除腐化检察官、清洗司法系统还有别的方式。


For example, a new law regulating the judiciary has been a demand of the revolution since its early weeks.	比如，革命从最初几周提出了建立新的监督司法部门的法律的要求。


For Morsi, the dilemma was that the Constitutional Court could strike down the law, rendering the effort meaningless.	对穆尔西来说，困难在于宪法法院可以宣布法律无效，让其努力泡汤。


He had already backed off twice: once in July 2012, when he abandoned his effort, under pressure from the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, to reinstate the elected parliament; and once when he tried to remove the public prosecutor by making him Egypt’s ambassador to the Holy See.	他已经两次遭遇阻击：一次是2012年7月，他在武装部队最高委员会的压力下放弃了恢复民选议会的努力； 另一次是他试图通过任命公诉官为埃及驻罗马教廷大使解除其职务时。


Morsi’s “Constitutional Declaration” was a decisive – though undemocratic, polarizing, and thus politically costly – step to break the impasse.	穆尔西的“宪法宣言”是打破僵局的决定性步骤——尽管这一步不民主、可能造成两极分化，从而政治代价沉重。


And, while such decrees have led to dictatorships, not democracies, in other countries undergoing political transition, none had a politicized judicial entity that played the role of spoiler in the democratization process.	此外，尽管这样的指令在其他经历政治过渡的国家导致了独裁而不是民主，但没有一个国家存在破坏民主化进程的政治化的司法实体。


Indeed, almost two years after the revolution began, Egypt’s security forces have not been reformed in any meaningful way.	事实上，在革命爆发几近两年后，埃及安全部队仍没有发生有意义的改革。


Now, Morsi, in his effort to force out the prosecutor, will have to avoid opening another front with the Mubarak-era security generals, whom he will need to protect state institutions and maintain a minimum level of public security.	如今，试图逼退公诉官的穆尔西将不得不避免向穆巴拉克时代遗留安全将官二次开战，他需要他们保护国家制度、维持最低水平的公共安全。


The security sector may, it seems, emerge from this crisis as the only winner.	安全部门也许是此次危机中唯一的赢家。


It will enforce the rule of law, but only for a price.	它将推行法治精神，但这样做不是没有代价的。


That price will be reflected in the constitution, as well as in the unwritten rules of Egypt’s new politics.	这一带价将反映在宪法中，也将反映在埃及新政局的不成文规定中。


This constitutes a much more serious and lasting threat to Egypt’s democratization than do Morsi’s temporary decrees.	与穆尔西的暂时性指令相比，这是埃及民主化进程所面临的更严峻、更长久的威胁。


The End of the Two-State Solution	两国方案的结束


BANGALORE – US Secretary of State John Kerry’s valiant effort to save the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is about to end in failure.	班加罗尔—美国国务卿约翰·克里拯救以色列-巴勒斯坦和平进程的勇敢行为快要以失败收场了。


Though achieving a substantive settlement was always a pipe dream, this latest disappointment will render the United States unable to preserve even the façade of a “peace process” that was all process and no peace.	尽管达成实质性和解一直是一个遥远的梦，但最新的失望结果意味着美国连为这一其实一点都不和平的进程保留“和平进程”的外表也无法做到。


And that might not be such a bad thing.	而事情本不必如此糟糕。


The negotiations are failing for several reasons, beginning with Israel’s continued colonization of lands occupied in 1967, despite opposition from the international community, including the US.	谈判失败原因是多样的，首先是以色列一直在1967年所占领的土地登上定居，完全不顾包括美国在内的国际社会的反对。


If anything, Israel has accelerated settlement construction since the latest round of talks began, while escalating its demands, especially regarding the stationing of Israeli troops in the Jordan Valley.	反之，自最近的谈判开始以来，以色列还加速了定居点建设，提高了要求，特别是要求在约旦河谷（Jordan Valley）驻扎以军。


Releasing a few dozen Palestinian prisoners is no substitute for genuine concessions on these contentious issues.	释放几十名巴勒斯坦囚犯称不上在这些争议问题上的实质让步。


Making matters worse, the US has continually refrained from using its substantial leverage to compel Israel to change course, owing to the domestic political strength of the pro-Israel lobby, especially the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.	更糟糕的是，美国一直没有打好手上的牌迫使以色列改变主意，原因就在于美国国内的亲以色列游说集团，特别是美国以色列公共事务委员会（American Israel Public Affairs Committee，AIPAC）政治力量太强。


Tellingly, Kerry appointed Martin Indyk – a British-born Australian citizen, who began his political career in the US working for AIPAC in the early 1980s – as the principal US facilitator.	这可以从克里任命出生在英国的澳大利亚公民、在20世纪80年代初以AIPAC为政治生涯起点的马丁·因迪克（Martin Indyk）为美国首席谈判促进员上一窥端倪。


Another obstacle to a peace agreement has been the division between Hamas-controlled Gaza and the Fatah-controlled West Bank.	和平协议的另一大障碍是哈马斯控制的加沙地带和法塔赫控制的约旦河西岸之间的分裂。


This, too, is rooted in American and Israeli intransigence – specifically, their refusal to accept Hamas’s victory in the 2006 election and recognize the group as the legitimate Palestinian representative.	而这一局面同样要归因于美国和以色列的顽固——即它们拒绝接受哈马斯在2006年选举中获胜、承认其为合法的巴勒斯坦代表组织。


This policy encouraged Fatah not to cede any power to Hamas in the West Bank, engendering the split in occupied Palestine.	这一政策促使法塔赫拒绝将任何约旦河西岸权力交给哈马斯，从而引起巴勒斯坦被占地区的分裂。


In the latest round of negotiations, however, this division has not been a major obstacle, because Hamas remained on the sidelines – neither participating nor seeking to play a spoiler role.	但是，在最近的谈判中，这一分歧并不是主要障碍，因为哈马斯仍然处于边缘地位——既没有参与，也没有试图搅局。


This decision may have stemmed from an assumption that the talks would collapse, thereby discrediting the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority.	这一决定或许机遇谈判必将破裂的假设，从而可以进一步削弱法塔赫主宰的巴勒斯坦权力机构的权威。


Regardless, the division among Palestinians cannot be blamed for the talks’ failure this time.	无论如何，巴勒斯坦人中间的分歧绝非此次谈判失败的原因。


This brings us back to Israel’s continued colonization of Palestinian land, which all but excludes the possibility of a two-state solution.	因此我们又回到了以色列在巴勒斯坦土地上的定居问题，这彻底扼杀了两国方案的可能性。


Add to that the Israeli right’s insistence that no concessions are possible on territorial issues, Jerusalem, or the Palestinians’ right of return, and it is clear that Kerry never really had a chance.	除了以色列右翼坚持绝不可在领土问题、耶路撒冷和巴勒斯坦人回归权利等问题上有半点让步，显然克里从来没有获得过真正的机会。


Perhaps the clearest indication of Israel’s obstinacy came from its economy minister, Naftali Bennett, last July.	或许以色列采取顽固立场的最明确信号来自其经济部长纳福塔里·本尼特（Naftali Bennett）在去年7月所说的话。


“The idea that a Palestinian state should be established within the Land of Israel has reached a dead end,” he declared.	“巴勒斯坦国应该在以色列之地（Land of Israel）上建立的观点已经没有任何存在的意义。


“The most important thing for the Land of Israel is to build and build and build [Jewish settlements].”	”他宣布，“对以色列之地来说，最重要的东西便是建设、建设再建设[犹太人定居点]。 ”


Paradoxically, the discerning Palestinian observer may find comfort in America’s failure to stop Israel from expanding its settlements (and thus effectively annexing a growing share of Palestinian land), for it ends the charade on which the peace process has been based.	矛盾的是，敏锐的巴勒斯坦观察者可能会因为美国没能阻止以色列扩张其定居点（从而日益蚕食巴勒斯坦领土）而舒一口气，因为这结束了已成为和平进程基础的猜谜游戏。


The most likely outcome now is the establishment of a single unified country within the borders of the 1922 British Mandate for Palestine, including all of present-day Israel and the occupied territories.	如今最有可能的结果是在1922年英属巴勒斯坦境内建立一个统一的单一国家，包括当今以色列的全部及其占领地区。


In other words, Israel and Palestine are moving inexorably toward the establishment of a binational state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.	换句话说，以色列和巴勒斯坦正在不可阻挡地走向建立一个约旦河和地中海之间的双民族国家。


Such a state will be based on one of two mutually exclusive principles: equal rights for all of its inhabitants or some form of apartheid, characterized by Jewish control and Palestinian subordination.	这样一个国家将建立在两个互斥原则之一的基础上：所有居民权利平等，或以犹太人主宰、巴勒斯坦人屈服为特征的种族隔离。


The problem for Palestinians is that Jewish Israelis would have more clout in directing this unified state’s development, and they are unlikely to choose equality on their own.	巴勒斯坦人的问题在于以色列犹太人在决定这个统一国家的发展日程上尽占上风，他们无法依靠自己赢得平等。


After all, granting equal political and civil rights to all citizens would diminish the country’s exclusivist Jewish character, reversing Zionist goals and achievements – an outcome that most of Israel’s Jewish population would reject.	毕竟，授予全体公民平等的政治和民事权利将削弱这个国家排他性的犹太特征，损害犹太复国主义者的目标和成就，而这一结果是大部分犹太人口不会接受的。


Calling the country “Israel” would be inadequate to moderate this resistance.	称这个国家为“以色列”也不足以平息反对。


The international community would probably respond to the emergence of an apartheid state with opprobrium and ostracize Israel, regardless of American protests.	国际社会或许会以谴责迎接这个种族隔离国家并排斥以色列，不管美国是否反对。


Moreover, conflict within such a country would be bound to spill over its borders, possibly sparking a major regional conflagration.	此外，这个国家内部的冲突也将必然溢出到国界线外，并有可能引起重大地区冲突。


This would have serious consequences for the US and other staunch Western supporters of Israel that have major strategic and economic interests in the region.	这将给美国和其他坚定地西方以色列坚定着带来严重后果，他们在该地区有着重大战略和经济利益。


It is time, therefore, for the US to rethink its policy toward the Israel-Palestine conflict.	因此，美国应该反思其对以色列-巴勒斯坦冲突的政策。


Instead of pursuing the mirage of a two-state solution, the US should use its leverage in the region to clear the way for the emergence of a binational, democratic state that guarantees full political and civil equality for all of its inhabitants.	美国不应该追求两国方案这一海市蜃楼，而应该动用其在该地区的资源扫清障碍、建立一个双民族民主国家，并确保所有居民都获得完全的政治和民事平等。


This may not be an ideal solution for any of the parties to the Israel-Palestine conflict, but it is far better than the alternative: an apartheid state that is likely to further destabilize the Middle East and lead to a never-ending cycle of conflict in the region.	这或许对以色列-巴勒斯坦冲突双方来说都不是理想方案，但远远好于替代方案：一个可能进一步动摇中东地区病导致无尽的地区冲突循环的种族隔离国家。


The Intellectual Battle Against ISIS	与ISIS的思想战


DUBAI – The global financial crisis taught the world how profoundly interdependent our economies have become.	迪拜—全球金融危机让世界知道了我们的经济相互依存度有多高。


In today’s crisis of extremism, we must recognize that we are just as interdependent for our security, as is clear in the current struggle to defeat ISIS.	在今天的恐怖主义危机中，我们必须认识到我们的安全相互依存度同样高，与ISIS的斗争充分说明了这一点。


If we are to prevent ISIS from teaching us this lesson the hard way, we must acknowledge that we cannot extinguish the fires of fanaticism by force alone.	如果我们要想避免付出沉重代��让ISIS教会我们这一课，就必须承认我们无法光靠蛮力扑灭狂热信仰之火。


The world must unite behind a holistic drive to discredit the ideology that gives extremists their power, and to restore hope and dignity to those whom they would recruit.	世界必须团结在统一的方针下——让给予极端主义者力量的意识形态身败名裂； 并为受这一意识形态蛊惑的人们重新带去希望和尊严。


ISIS certainly can – and will – be defeated militarily by the international coalition that is now assembling and which the UAE is actively supporting.	ISIS当然可以——也将会——被目前正在组建、阿联酋积极支持的国际联盟在军事上打败。 但军事遏制只是局部方案。


But military containment is only a partial solution.	持续和平需要其他三个方面：赢得思想战争；


Lasting peace requires three other ingredients: winning the battle of ideas; upgrading weak governance; and supporting grassroots human development.	升级孱弱的治理； 以及支持草根人力发展。


Such a solution must begin with concerted international political will.	这样一套方案必须从集中国际政治意愿开始。


Not a single politician in North America, Europe, Africa, or Asia can afford to ignore events in the Middle East.	北美、欧洲、非洲和亚洲的政治家都无法忽视中东所发生的事情。


A globalized threat requires a globalized response.	全球化的威胁需要全球化的应对。


Everyone will feel the heat, because such flames know no borders; indeed, ISIS has recruited members of at least 80 nationalities.	每个人都能感受到热度，因为ISIS之火没有边界； 事实上，ISIS从至少80个国家募集成员。


ISIS is a barbaric and brutal organization.	ISIS是一个野蛮而残忍的组织。


It represents neither Islam nor humanity’s most basic values.	他不代表伊斯兰教或人类的基本价值。


Nonetheless, it has emerged, spread, and resisted those who oppose it.	尽管如此，他还是兴旺、传播并抵挡住了反对它的人。


What we are fighting is not just a terrorist organization, but the embodiment of a malicious ideology that must be defeated intellectually.	我们现在的斗争对象并不仅仅是一个恐怖组织，而是邪恶意识形态的化身，他必须在思想上被击溃。


I consider this ideology to be the greatest danger that the world will face in the next decade.	我认为，这一意识形态是全球未来十年将面临的最大威胁。


Its seeds are growing in Europe, the United States, Asia, and elsewhere.	其种子正在欧洲、美国、亚洲和其他地区茁壮成长。


With its twisted religious overtones, this pre-packaged franchise of hate is available for any terrorist group to adopt.	它包含扭曲的宗教色彩，任何接受它的恐怖组织都能够获得预先包装好的仇恨经营权（franchise of hate）。


It carries the power to mobilize thousands of desperate, vindictive, or angry young people and use them to strike at the foundations of civilization.	它煽动成千上万绝望、怀恨和愤怒的年轻人，利用他们冲击文明的基石。


The ideology fueling ISIS has much in common with that of Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Nigeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, North Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula.	助长ISIS的意识形态和基地组织及其尼日利亚、巴基斯坦、阿富汗、索马里、也门、北非和阿拉伯半岛同伙有着诸多相似之处。


What most worries me is that a decade ago, such an ideology was all that Al Qaeda needed to destabilize the world, even from a primitive base in the caves of Afghanistan.	让我最担心的是，十年前，这种意识形态是基地组织撼动世界所需要的唯一凭借，哪怕他们需要在阿富汗的原始山洞中完成这一“壮举”。


Today, under ISIS, adherents have access to technology, finance, a huge land base, and an international jihadist network.	如今，在ISIS组织下，追随者可以获得技术、资金、大型地面基地和国际圣战网络。


Far from being defeated, their ideology of rage and hate has become stricter, more pernicious, and more widespread.	它们的愤怒和憎恨的意识形态不但没有被击溃，反而变得更加严格、更加凶险、更加普遍。


The destruction of terrorist groups is not enough to bring lasting peace.	捣毁恐怖组织不足以带来持续和平。


We must also strike at the root to deprive their dangerous ideology of the power to rise again among people left vulnerable by an environment of hopelessness and desperation.	我们还必须斩草除根，直击其危险的意识形态，使其无法在无助和绝望中存活的脆弱人群中死灰复燃。


And, on this note, let us be positive.	而在这一方面，我们需要积极一些。


The solution has three components.	解决办法包括三个方面。


The first is to counter malignant ideas with enlightened thinking, open minds, and an attitude of tolerance and acceptance.	首先是启蒙思想、开放思维和兼容并包的态度制衡邪恶思想。


This approach arises from our Islamic religion, which calls for peace, honors life, values dignity, promotes human development, and directs us to do good to others.	这一方法来自我们的伊斯兰教。 伊斯兰教呼吁和平、崇尚生活、注重尊严、促进人类发展，教导我们与人为善。


Only one thing can stop a suicidal youth who is ready to die for ISIS: a stronger ideology that guides him onto the right path and convinces him that God created us to improve our world, not to destroy it.	只有一样东西能阻止决心为ISIS而死的自杀青年：将他引向正确道路、让他相信神创造我们是为了改善而不是摧毁世界的更强大的意识形态。


We can look to our neighbors in Saudi Arabia for their great successes in de-radicalizing many young people through counseling centers and programs.	我们可以从沙特阿拉伯邻居身上看到这方面的巨大成功：通过咨询中心和咨询计划让许多年轻人不再走极端。


In this battle of minds, it is thinkers and scientists of spiritual and intellectual stature among Muslims who are best placed to lead the charge.	在这场思维之战中，精神和思想声誉卓著的穆斯林思想家和科学家才是最合适的领袖人选。


The second component is support for governments’ efforts to create stable institutions that can deliver real services to their people.	第二个方面是支持政府建立能为人民带来真正服务的稳定机构的努力。


It should be clear to everyone that the rapid growth of ISIS was fueled by the Syrian and Iraqi governments’ failings: the former made war on its own people, and the latter promoted sectarian division.	所有人都应该清楚，ISIS的迅速发展受到叙利亚和伊拉克政府无能的极大提振：前者向本国人民选战，后者促成了宗派分裂。


When governments fail to address instability, legitimate grievances, and persistent serious challenges, they create an ideal environment for hateful ideologies to incubate – and for terrorist organizations to fill the vacuum of legitimacy.	当政府不能解决动荡、合法的不满和持续性严重挑战时，就为憎恨的意识形态创造了理想的温床，也为恐怖组织填补合法性空白创造了条件。


The final component is to address urgently the black holes in human development that afflict many areas of the Middle East.	最后一个方面是尽快解决折磨中东许多地区的人力发展黑洞。


This is not only an Arab responsibility, but also an international responsibility, because providing grassroots opportunity and a better quality of life for the people of this region is guaranteed to ameliorate our shared problems of instability and conflict.	这不仅是阿拉伯国家的责任，也是国际社会的责任，因为为草根提供机会和为该地区人民提供更高质量的生活必然能够减轻动荡和冲突这一共同问题。


We have a critical need for long-term projects and initiatives to eliminate poverty, improve education and health, build infrastructure, and create economic opportunities.	我们的一个至关重要的需求是实施战胜贫困、改善教育和卫生、建设基础设施、创造经济机会的长期工程。


Sustainable development is the most sustainable answer to terrorism.	可持续发展是恐怖主义问题的最为可持续的解决办法。


Our region is home to more than 200 million young people.	我们的地区是2亿多人民的家园。


We have the opportunity to inspire them with hope and to direct their energies toward improving their lives and the lives of those around them.	我们有机会激发他们的希望，引导他们将精力用于改善自身和周边人群的生活上。


If we fail, we will abandon them to emptiness, unemployment, and the malicious ideologies of terrorism.	如果我们失败，就会让空虚、失业和恐怖主义的邪恶意识形态往他们身上压。


Every day that we take a step toward delivering economic development, creating jobs, and raising standards of living, we undermine the ideologies of fear and hate that feed on hopelessness.	我们在创造经济发展和就业机会、提高生活水平方面每进一步，都能削弱滋生绝望的恐惧和憎恨的意识形态。


We starve terrorist organizations of their reason to exist.	我们可以让恐怖组织的思想饿死。


I am optimistic, because I know that the people of the Middle East possess a power of hope and a desire for stability and prosperity that are stronger and more enduring than opportunistic and destructive ideas.	我很乐观，因为我知道，中东人民拥有希望的力量和比机会主义和破坏性观点更加强大和持久的对稳定和繁荣的渴望。


There is no power stronger than that of hope for a better life.	没有什么力量能够比对更美好生活的希望更强大。


The Brain Regain	人才回流


DUBAI – In 1968, while studying at the Mons Officer Cadet School in the United Kingdom, I needed to visit a hospital.	迪拜 ——1968年，在英国蒙斯见习军官学校学习时，我去过一趟医院。


There I met a doctor who, to my surprise, spoke fluent Arabic.	出乎我意料的是，我遇到了一位医生，能讲一口流利的阿拉伯语。


I learned that he was new to the UK, so I asked if he intended to stay long or return home.	我了解到他才来英国，所以问他是打算回国还是留下。


He replied with an Arabic saying that translates as: “My home is where I can eat.”	他用一句阿拉伯谚语回答了我的提问：“哪里能谋生，哪里就是我的家。 ”


That doctor’s words stayed with me for many years, because they underscored the contradiction between our idealized view of “home” and the harsh realities of life that push talented people to leave their homes.	那位医生的回答让我沉思了好久，因为它凸显了理想化的“家园”和迫使人才背井离乡的残酷现实之间的冲突。


The doctor was a classic case of the “brain drain” phenomenon that has afflicted developing countries for decades.	这位医生是困扰发展中国家几十年的“人才外流”现象的经典案例。


These countries spend scarce resources educating doctors, engineers, and scientists, in the hope that they will become engines of prosperity.	这些国家耗费稀缺资源教育医生、工程师和科学家，希望他们成为繁荣的推动力量。


Then we watch with dismay as they migrate to the West, taking with them the promise of their talent.	之后我们灰心丧气地看着他们移民西方，同时带走的还有国家的发展前途。


It is, of course, everyone’s right to choose a better life, wherever in the world they wish.	当然，选择更好的生活是每个人的权利，无论他们想去世界上的任何地方。


We understand why they go.	我们理解他们为什么离开。


Talent is drawn – like a magnet – to opportunity.	机遇就像磁铁一样吸引着人才。


For the countries left behind, however, it feels like an endless vicious cycle: they need talent to create opportunity; but without opportunity, talent gravitates to the bright lights of the West.	但对人才流失的国家而言，就好比陷入了无休止的恶性循环当中：他们需要人才来创造机会； 但没有机会，人才就会涌向西方的光明前途。


Indeed, the United Nations and the OECD report that migration for work has risen by one-third since 2000.	事实上，联合国及经合组织数据显示工作移民自2000年后上升了三分之一。


One in nine university graduates from Africa now lives and works in the West.	现在九位非洲大学毕业生中就有一位工作生活在西方。


Many will not return: skilled workers are six times more likely to stay away.	很多人永远不会回国：熟练工人出国的比例比普通人高六倍。


But now something remarkable is happening.	但现在情况出人意料。


In some countries, the brain drain has reversed its flow.	某些国家的人才流失状况已经得到了逆转。


The causes are fascinating, and there is reason to be optimistic that the vicious cycle can be broken, transforming the balance of hope and opportunity between developing and developed economies.	原因无疑非常引人入胜，人们有理由对打破恶性循环、改变发展中及发达国家希望和机遇平衡的前景感到乐观。


A new study by LinkedIn, the world’s largest online professional network and recruitment platform, has measured the net international movement of talent among its members.	全球最大的在线专业网络及招聘平台LinkedIn一项全新研究评估了注册人才的国际净流动状况。


Topping the list as a destination for talent is my own country, the United Arab Emirates, with a net talent gain of 1.3% of the workforce in 2013.	排在首位的人才流向地是我的祖国阿联酋，2013年人才净流入达到1. 3%。


Other net “talent magnets” include Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, South Africa, India, and Brazil.	其他“人才磁铁”包括沙特阿拉伯、尼日利亚、南非、印度和巴西等国。


Most interesting, fewer than one-third of net talent importers are developed countries.	最有趣的是，人才净流入国中发达国家还不到三分之一。


In fact, the top talent exporters in this study are Spain, the UK, France, the United States, Italy, and Ireland.	事实上，研究显示最大的人才流出国是西班牙、英国、法国、美国、意大利和爱尔兰。


Rich countries that until recently had been tempting away our brightest minds are now sending us their own.	那些不久前还在吸引我们最聪明头脑的富国现在正把自己的人才输送给我们。


Of course, this is only one study, and many poor countries still suffer from a chronic talent exodus.	当然，这仅仅是一项研究，许多贫穷国家仍然因为长期的人才流失而损失惨重。


OECD data show that many countries in Africa and Latin America have migration rates for graduates above 50%.	经合组织数据显示许多非洲和拉美国家毕业生的移民率都在50％以上。


We do know that brain drain is often a function of safety and security as much as economic opportunity.	我们知道人才流失往往既是经济机遇也是安全保障问题。


Part of the tragedy playing out in Middle Eastern countries beset by conflict and instability is that if only their most talented sons and daughters could apply their skills at home, they would become part of the solution: agents of peace through development.	备受冲突和动荡困扰的中东国家上演的部分悲剧是如果他们最有才华的儿女能在国内施展自己的才干，就可以在一定程度上解决问题：他们就会成为和平发展的动力。


This makes it all the more important to examine how some developing countries succeeded in reversing the outward flow.	这就使研究某些发展中国家如何成功扭转人才外流趋势显得愈加重要。


The basic ingredient is opportunity.	机遇是基本要素。


Talent flows naturally to countries that create an environment for economic growth; that make life easy for enterprise; that attract and welcome investment; and that nurture a culture of achievement.	人才自然而然地流向能创造经济增长环境、为企业提供方便、吸引和欢迎投资并营造成功文化的国家；


Skills are attracted to challenge and possibility.	挑战和机遇能吸引人才加盟。


Opportunity on this scale is becoming a scarce commodity in many parts of the West.	如此规模的机遇在很多西方国家正逐渐变得稀缺。


But this is not the case in the developing world – at least among countries with the appetite and determination to deploy strong governance and continually raise their competitiveness.	但发展中国家却并非如此——至少在有愿望和决心推行强力治理并继续提升竞争力的国家。


Second, quality of life matters greatly.	其次，生活质量至关重要。


A generation ago, many talented individuals would consider working outside the West a “hardship posting.”	我们父母那代很多有才能的人会将在西方以外工作视为战斗在“艰苦的岗位上”。


Today, standards of living in the UAE, for example, are among the highest in the world.	今天，举例来讲，阿联酋的生活标准已经跻身世界一流之列。


We have shown that the business of reversing brain drain is also the business of creating a better life for citizens and residents.	我们已经表明扭转人才流失的过程和为公众和居民创造更好生活是一回事。


Building happiness is, after all, the primary business of good government everywhere.	毕竟，建设幸福生活是各国政府最主要的执政目标。


Ours is a story of great hope for the Middle East in particular, where generations of conflict and despair have driven high levels of outward migration.	我们的故事蕴含着中东巨大的希望，连续几代人的冲突和绝望导致移民盛极一时。


I have always argued that, besides good governance, the best solutions to the divisions and strife of the Arab world lie in grassroots development and economic opportunity.	我一直认为除了高水平执政，解决阿拉伯世界分裂和冲突的最佳办法在于基层发展和经济机遇。


Now, we have shown that it is possible to reverse the forces that had driven away our most talented young people.	现在，我们已经证明扭转赶走我们最有才华年轻人的因素是完全可能的。


Another source of hope is that this turnaround can happen remarkably quickly.	另一项希望源泉是这样的转变能够迅速发生。


Research shows that small countries suffer disproportionately from brain drain.	研究表明小国人才外流问题尤其严重。


But we have shown that even for a small country like the UAE, and even in a region divided by conflict, it is worth building an island of opportunity.	但我们已经证明即使是像阿联酋这样的小国，即使在被冲突撕扯得四分五裂的地区，建设机遇绿洲也同样有必要。


But let me be clear: reversing brain drain is about more than plugging a leak.	但我必须明确指出：扭转人才外流不止是堵住漏洞。


It means turning a vicious cycle into a virtuous one.	它意味着恶性循环向良性循环的转变。


By attracting the best talent from around the world, we can create a vibrant and diverse society that fuels innovation and prosperity – which in turn attracts still more talent.	通过吸引世界各地最优秀的人才，我们可以创建充满活力和多元化的社会，激发创新和繁荣——这反过来又吸引更多的人才回流。


To make this work, we must believe in people.	要想实现这一目标，我们必须信任民众。


Human beings – their ideas, innovations, dreams, and connections – are the capital of the future.	人类的思想、创新、梦想和联系——是未来的资本所在。


In this sense, the “brain regain” is not so much an achievement in itself as it is a leading indicator of development, because where great minds go today, great things will happen tomorrow.	从这个意义上讲，“人才回流”与其说是一种成就，还不如说是发展的首要指标，因为今天优秀的人才流向哪里，明天哪里就会创造出惊人的成就。


Africa’s Search for Law	寻求法律的非洲


LONDON – My career as a businessman in Africa has turned me into an activist for better, cleaner government and for the rule of law.	伦敦—在非洲经商的经历让我成为一名追求更好、更清廉的政府和法治精神的活跃分子。


But promoting good governance is not just a matter of encouraging good leadership at the top (although I believe that definitely helps); it also requires all of us to be able to fulfill our responsibilities as citizens, and realize our rights.	但追求好治理并不仅仅是鼓励最高层的好领导（尽管我相信这毫无疑问是大有裨益的）； 还要求我们所有人能够承担起作为公民的责任、实现作为公民的权利。


In several African countries, there are impressive legal instruments in terms of independent court systems; but the challenge consists in impartial implementation.	不少非洲国家都拥有令人印象深刻的法律武器——独立的法院系统； 但挑战在于不偏不倚的执行。


Democratic accountability requires that citizens can use the law, as well as be subject to it.	民主问责要求公民能够使用法律，也受法律约束。 比如，这些国家都有禁止在未经正当程序和补偿所有者的情况下征收土地的法律；


For example, these countries have laws that prohibit seizures of land without due process and compensation for the owner; that bar public servants from accepting bribes; and that require government funds to be spent on the public good, not for private gain.	有禁止公职人员收受贿赂的法律； 也有要求政府资金用于公共品而不是个人利益的法律。


In the countries that currently do well on the Ibrahim Index of African Governance – Botswana, Ghana, South Africa, and others – citizens can use the law to protect themselves and their property from illicit encroachment, and to resolve their disputes in an impartial setting.	在最新的易卜拉欣非洲治理指数（Ibrahim Index of African Governance）中名列前茅的国家——博茨瓦纳、加纳、南非等——公民可以使用法律保护自己和他们的产权不受非法侵占，也可以得到公正的纠纷解决。


For those at the bottom – Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic – the rule of law is a fiction that must be made real.	在该指数垫底的国家——索马里、民主刚果和中非共和国——法治精神仍是一个神话，有待走进现实。


This work is already being carried out in places: in Sierra Leone, a country recovering from a brutal civil war, community-based paralegals are helping villagers to settle disputes peacefully; in Malawi, they are helping to reduce unnecessary imprisonment.	这方面的工作已经在多地展开：在从残酷内战中恢复过来的塞拉利昂，基于社区的法律助手帮助村民和平解决争端； 在马里，他们帮助减少了不必要的羁押。


In Mozambique, local legal experts have helped villagers draw up proper titles to their communal lands, helping to secure their economic future.	在莫桑比克，地方法律专家帮助村民主张对公共土地的产权，帮助确保他们的经济前景。


In Kenya, community groups have used freedom-of-information laws to ensure that money earmarked for local school construction is properly disbursed.	在肯尼亚，社区组织用信息自由法确保地方学校建设拨款用在了该用的地方。


This is the rule of law in action at the local level, and it is building, often from scratch, a culture in which disputes are settled peacefully and benefits distributed transparently.	这是法治精神在地方层面的活跃情况，非洲正在从无到有地建立一种和平解决纠纷、透明分配利益的文化。


The alternative – recourse to violence in the face of unequal access to resources – has led to a cycle of political instability in many countries, with the consequent lack of economic development that has come to characterize much of Africa’s recent history.	相反的做法——在面临资源可获得性不平等时诉诸暴力——导致许多国家反复出现政治动荡，由此带来的经济发展不力已成为非洲当代史的一大特征。


As the debate on the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals unfolds at the United Nations this year, it is my fervent hope that African governments will endorse the inclusion within these goals of measurable targets for access to justice.	今年，联合国将就2015年后的可持续发展目标（Sustainable Development Goals，SDG）展开讨论，我强烈地希望非洲政府能够支持纳入这些追求公正的可测目标。


To be sure, the dominant themes that are emerging in the UN discussions – jobs, economic growth, infrastructure development, and poverty reduction – are all still desperately needed across the continent.	平心而论，联合国讨论的主要主题——就业、经济增长、基础设施开发和减贫——也是非洲大陆急需的东西。


But the rule of law is a fundamental principle that does more than promote economic growth, and it would be a serious mistake not to include it in the SDG agenda.	但法治精神是一种根本原则，比促进经济增长更重要，不把它纳入SDG日程将是一个严重错误。


Indeed, acknowledging that all must be equal in the eyes and practice of the law is a prerequisite for strengthening the social contract between the state and its citizens.	事实上，认识到所有人都必须在法律及其实践中一律平等是强化国家及其人民之间的社会契约的先决条件。


Without greater fidelity to the rule of law, too many African citizens will continue to see their futures blighted and their countries’ resources wasted.	不尽忠于法律精神，就会有太多非洲人民继续面临暗淡无光的前途和国家资源的浪费。


If we are to build grassroots respect for the institutions and processes that constitute democracy, the state must treat its citizens as real citizens, rather than as subjects.	如果我们要建立草根阶层对构成民主的制度和程序的尊重，国家就必须把人民真正当成人民而不仅仅是对象。


We cannot expect loyalty to an unjust regime.	我们不能期待人民对不公的政权保持忠诚。


The state and its elites must be subject, in theory and in practice, to the same laws that its poorest citizens are.	不管在理论上还是实践中，国家及其精英都必须和最穷的公民一样受到同一部法律的约束。


The BIS Bashers	国际清算银行抨击者


PRAGUE – It might seem an unlikely proposition, but central banking has become exciting.	布拉格—听起来这是个不可思议的说法，但中央银行业务已变得令人兴奋。


This is not necessarily a welcome development.	这未必是值得欢迎的发展趋势。


Decisions taken by the leading monetary authorities since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis have been unorthodox, creative, and at times risky.	主要货币当局自2008—2009年全球金融危机以来的决策是非常规、创新性的，往往也存在高风险。


Their high-stakes choices today will affect the global economy for decades to come.	他们今天的冒险选择将影响未来数十年的全球经济。


Moreover, central bankers have become more vocal in expressing strongly held positions in the mass media, as if seeking to win over popular opinion.	此外，中央银行高官越来越热切地在大众媒体面前表达自己强烈坚持的立场，好像在寻求公共支持似的。


It is a potent and dangerous mix.	这是一个强势而危险的组合。


In this environment, sober, informed voices, like that of the Bank for International Settlements, the central bank of central banks, should also be given a fair hearing.	在这样的环境中，洞晓一切的冷静声音，比如央行的央行——国际清算银行（Bank for International Settlements）的声音也应该被大众所听到。


Unfortunately, many central bankers have sought to marginalize the BIS rather than engage with it.	不幸的是，许多央行行长选择边缘化而不是鼓励国际清算银行。


One of the most contentious debates has been over when to end the “unconventional” monetary-policy measures that were introduced in the aftermath of the financial crisis to ensure that banks continued to lend, thereby stimulating growth and averting deflation.	最有争议的话题之一是何时结束金融危机后为了确保银行继续贷款从而刺激增长、避免通缩而采取的“非常规”货币政策措施。


Some central bankers now worry that ending these measures prematurely will tip the economy back into recession.	如今，一些央行行长担心过早结束这些措施会让经济回归衰退。


Yet others fear that the current strategy, though originally intended to prevent an economic collapse, is now sowing the seeds of future instability, including the emergence of another asset-price bubble.	但也有一些人担心，目前的战略虽然初衷是防止金融崩溃，但正在给未来动荡埋下祸根，包括新一轮资产价格泡沫的产生。


In their efforts to resolve such dilemmas, policymakers are also wrestling over whether to focus on traditional monetary tools such as interest rates, or make greater use of so-called “macro-prudential measures,” such as capital add-ons and buffers or adjustments to banks’ loan-to-value ratios.	在解决这些难题的过程中，决策者也在为专注于利率等传统政策工具还是更多地使用所谓的“宏观审慎措施”（如增加资本和缓冲或调整银行贷款比率等）争论。


At the heart of the debate – currently being conducted within leading economies’ treasuries and central banks, as well as in supranational bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and the BIS – is the relationship between monetary policy and financial stability.	目前，主要经济体财政部和央行内部以及国际货币基金组织和国际清算银行等超国家机构所进行的争论的核心是货币政策与金融稳定之间的关系。


The BIS, for example, has suggested that financial stability is closely connected with monetary policy, and has advised policymakers to start weaning their economies off of easy money sooner rather than later.	比如，国际清算银行认为金融稳定与货币政策息息相关，并建议决策者开始尽快让经济摆脱宽松货币依赖。


Central bankers, however, seem to want to try macro-prudential tools first (and sometimes exclusively).	但是，央行行长似乎想先试一试宏观审慎工具（有时甚至只想使用宏观审慎工具）。


It is unusual to witness a clash of views among monetary policymakers that is so radical and clear-cut that it has grabbed wider political and media attention.	货币决策者之间出现如此清晰彻底的观点对立，以至于引起了更广泛的政治和媒体关注，这是极不寻常的。


And, under the public spotlight, some central bankers have sought to downplay the BIS’s assessment, arguing that it is all too easy to issue far-reaching policy recommendations when one suffers none of the consequences should one’s prescription turn out to be wrong.	而在公共聚光灯下，一些央行行长试图贬低国际清算银行的评估，指出如果你不会因为药方开错而承担后果，你就会相当草率，制定不出深远的政策建议。


To be sure, a country’s domestic economic circumstances, and the tools available to policymakers, should guide policy.	平心而论，一国的国内经济环境，以及决策者可以动用的工具确实应该成为政策指导。


And, though monetary tightening may well be advisable in some economies, it might be inappropriate in others.	但尽管货币紧缩在某些国家可能是值得建议的措施，在另一些国家未必如此。


But the harsh reactions to the BIS’s analysis seem misplaced and unfair.	但对国际清算银行分析的猛烈反应似乎既不合理，也不公平。


It is always difficult to find the right monetary-policy stance for any given economy at a given moment.	对于任何一个给定的经济和给定的时点，要找到正确的货币政策立场永远是十分困难的。


Central banks employ an army of experts to try to get it right, and other institutions are seldom so well resourced to present equally sophisticated counter-arguments.	中央银行聘用大量专家尝试做好这件事，而其他机构很少能够拥有足够的资源给出同样成熟的反对意见。


The BIS, however, is one of the few organizations that not only has the necessary research and analytical capabilities, but also a track record of making good calls.	但是，国际清算银行就是极少数这样的组织之一，它既拥有必需的研究和分析能力，也具备给出合理建议的良好历史记录。


One should not forget – as many central bankers appear to have done – that the BIS was one of the first to warn of the dangers of financial excesses, several years before the 2008 crisis.	我们不应该忘记——许多央行行长似乎已经忘记——国际清算银行是第一家警告金融过度危险的机构之一，2008年危机爆发前几年就提出了警告。


The BIS has a right to be heard.	国际清算银行有权利让自己的声音被听到。


It exists not just to represent central banks, but also to offer ideas and intellectual feedback.	它的存在不仅仅是为了代表中央银行，也是为了提供思想和知识反馈。


Indeed, it serves policymakers well by challenging, debating, and perhaps swaying opinion.	事实上，它挑战、争论甚至动摇决策者，以此起到很大的作用。


Rather than bash the BIS, monetary authorities should be grateful for the informed perspectives that it provides.	货币当局不应该抨击国际清算银行，而英爱感谢国际清算银行所提供的有洞见的观点。


Moldova Comes in From the Cold	绝处逢生的摩尔多瓦


CHISINAU – Today, “color revolutions,” which a few years ago were seen as promising developments in the post-Soviet space, seem to be out of fashion.	发自摩尔多瓦首府基希讷乌——当年在前苏联势力范围内被视为灵丹妙药的“颜色革命”如今似乎已经落伍了。


Around the world, disappointment with democracy promotion is widespread.	对推广民主制的沮丧情绪正在全世界范围内不断蔓延。


Instead, consolidation of authoritarian regimes appears to be the prevailing trend.	反过来，中央集权政体似乎又开始流行起来。


Roughly a year ago, Moldova, a country few know about, seemed to confirm this.	而就在大概一年之前，摩尔多瓦这个不起眼的小国恰好印证了这一点。