Broad access to deep and liquid international debt markets has enabled policymakers to bypass some of the most challenging aspects of democratic governance.	通往大规模高流动性国际债务市场的广阔渠道使得政策制定者们得以绕过某些最具挑战性的民主治理问题。


Rather than tackle thorny questions about how to allocate limited resources, democratic governments seem to believe that they can have it all: low taxes and ample debt finance to fund wars or electorate-pleasing programs.	比起处理那些关于如何分配有限资源的棘手问题，民主政府似乎觉得自己可以独占全部好处：一面维持低税率，一面依赖充足的债务融资来发动战争或者推动社会项目取悦选民。


Growing debt burdens suggest that this form of cheap politics has run its course.	但不断增大的债务负担表明这种形式的廉价政治已经走到了尽头。


But the problem runs deeper than that.	然而问题也比这严重得多。


Excessive reliance on debt finance has undermined basic tenets of democracy, with government finance increasingly determined not by electoral cycles and political deliberation, but by repayment schedules.	过度依赖债务融资已经腐蚀了民主的基本原则，因为政府财政逐渐由还债时间表所决定，而非取决于选举周期和政治决策。


In times of economic growth, debt finance provides an easy escape from difficult choices. When the economy falters, however, creditors – and those who are willing to entertain the prospect of default – can impose their will on everyone else.	在经济增长时债务融资可以让人轻易逃避那些艰难选择，一旦经济出了问题，债主们——以及那些在违约预期中得利的人——就可以把自己的意愿强加在任何人身上。


This power follows from the nature of debt.	这个力量来自于债务的本质。


A tax is a quasi-equity claim of the government on its citizens’ financial expectations.	税款是政府对其公民财政预期的准权益要求。


Gaining the consent of the majority of citizens to raise taxes can be a tall order politically, and has become more difficult as capital mobility has narrowed the tax base and triggered a race to the bottom on rates.	在提税方面获得大多数公民的共识在政治上是极难办到的事，并随着资本流动缩小了税基并引发各国政府争相降低税率而变得越来越困难。


Debt, by contrast, is a contractual commitment to repay creditors who are largely oblivious to how the money is spent.	相比之下，债务是一个答应偿还的契约承诺，但债主们大多都不知道这些钱都花到哪里去了。


By incurring debt, states trade an element of sovereignty – the flexibility to alter course over time in response to the electorate’s demands – for the ability to fund expenditures without being compelled to navigate the political minefield of raising taxes.	通过发债，国家放弃了主权的其中一个部分——为回应选民需求而随时间调整政策进程的灵活性，换来了不用被迫踏入征税这个政治雷区而又能维持支出的能力。


Creating viable institutions for managing public debt in a democracy is difficult.	在一个民主政体中创设切实可行的体系去管理公共负债是相当困难的。


The mechanisms currently on offer are treaty-based, constitutional, and statutory debt ceilings, pegged as a ratio of GDP, or, as in the US, established in nominal terms.	目前提供的机制是一个以协议为基础，符合宪法的法定债务上限，以GDP的特定比率为限，或者像美国那样基于名义条款。


Treaty-based debt ceilings are largely toothless, as Europe’s experience suggests.	欧洲的经验表明，以协议为基础的债务上限基本上没什么强制力。


Constitutional debt limits have yet to be tested in times of emergency, when new funding is needed quickly.	宪法规定的债务上限还需要等到迫切需要新资金的危急时刻才能检验。


And, as the recent impasse in the US demonstrates, political minorities with effective veto power can abuse statutory ceilings in an economic downturn, when dependence on external debt finance increases.	而正如美国最近这次僵局所体现的那样，在对外部债务融资的需要增加的情况下，拥有有效否决权的政治上少数派可以在经济不景时滥用法定债务上限。


Indeed, to the extent that reliance on debt finance undermines self-governance, debt-ceiling abuse for partisan gain becomes more likely.	事实上，在债务融资腐蚀自我管治的方面，为党派利益而滥用债务上限的行为变得越来越常见。


The problem is that democracies have yet to learn how to manage debt effectively.	问题在于民主体制还未找到有效管理债务的方法。


While political union may stabilize the euro, it will not sustain or strengthen democracy unless Europe’s leaders address this critical failing.	虽然政治联盟或许可以稳定欧元，但除非欧洲领导人们能够解决这一重大缺陷，否则就无法维持和加强民主制度。


Even the world’s oldest continuous democracy is not immune to the erosion of self-governance.	即使世界上存续时间最长的古老民主制度也无法避免自我管治的腐蚀。


Commitments never to raise taxes have left the US dependent on debt finance – and, more frightening, on those who are ready to veto refinancing it.	永不加税的承诺导致美国只能依赖债务融资——更可怕是的是，依赖于那些时刻准备否决再融资的人。


Central Banking’s New Club Class	央行的新俱乐部阶层


NEW YORK – In the wake of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the world’s central banks played a critical role in rescuing the global financial system.	纽约—2007—2008年金融危机爆发时，全球央行在捍卫全球金融系统方面起到了关键作用。


They stepped in when private markets froze, acting as lenders and dealers of last resort, and provided additional liquidity to grease the wheels of finance.	它们在私人市场冻结时出手干预，承担了最后贷款人和最后交易人的角色，并提供了额外的流动性润滑金融之轮。


These central banks offered their services primarily to domestic actors, but they also extended their largess to foreign private entities.	这些央行主要为国内行为人提供服务，但它们的慷慨也惠及了外国私人实体。


Indeed, even foreign states benefited after central banks entered into swap agreements, giving one another unlimited access to their respective currencies.	事实上，就连外国也从央行的互换安排中得到了好处。 货币安排使其范围的各国可以无限制地获得各自的货币。


This has created a worrying precedent.	这开启了令人担心的先例。


Originally created as a temporary fix in 2007, the swap lines established at that time connecting the US Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and the Swiss National Bank have been extended each time a new crisis has unsettled the markets.	始于2007年的互换安排最初是临时性措施，在美联储、欧洲央行和瑞士国民银行间建立了联系，但每逢新危机动摇市场，这一安排就会扩大一次。


More recently, however, six central banks announced that they had made their swap lines permanent.	但是，最近六大央行宣布将把互换安排永久化。


But did these central banks have the legal authority to do so?	但这些央行有法定权力这样做吗？


And, even if they did, should they have used it?	如果有，它们应该如何使用这一权力？


The original swap lines might fairly be classified as emergency measures.	最初的互换安排应该被归于紧急措施。


But what may be permissible and justifiable in a financial emergency may not be appropriate as standard practice during normal times.	但在金融紧急状态中可许可行的措施未必适合成为正常时期的标准行为。


Central bankers might argue that we have entered a state of permanent market crisis analogous to the never-ending “war on terror.”	央行行长可能会说，我们进入了持久市场危机状态，类似于永无止境的“反恐战争”。


But even this frightening analogy does not answer the question of whether central banks should assume positions of power in international relations.	但即使是这一耸人听闻的类比也没有回答央行是否应该效仿国际关系中的实力结构的问题。


Of course, a central bank’s mandate is price stability in the national economy that it serves, and price stability is influenced by exchange rates.	当然，央行的使命是所在国国民经济的价格稳定，而价格稳定受汇率的影响。


So a case can be made that central banks should have the power to intervene in foreign-exchange markets, and that this power should – at least in times of crisis – include commitments to foreign central banks to provide unlimited liquidity in the domestic currency.	因此央行应该有权力干预外汇市场的看法不无道理，并且这一权力应该——至少在危机时期应该——包括向外国央行承诺无限制供应本币流动性。


What is less clear, though, is whether the same justification can be used by central banks to create permanent swap lines with just a few other central banks of their choosing.	但是，并不如此明确的是同样的论证是否适用于央行与一小撮由它们选定的其他央行建立永久的互换通道。


This is akin to an announcement on a cruise ship approaching an iceberg that the crew will definitely rescue first-class passengers but not necessarily others.	这就好比是在邮轮撞向冰山时宣布肯定会救助一等舱乘客，其他乘客就听天由命吧。


Not every country’s central bank – not even every “friendly” country’s central bank – has been invited to join the swap-lines club.	并不是所有国家的央行——甚至不是所有“友好”国家的央行——都被邀请进入这一互换俱乐部。


Membership is restricted to the United States Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Swiss National Bank, and the Bank of Canada.	其成员只限于美联储、英格兰银行、欧洲央行、日本银行、瑞士国民银行和加拿大银行。


There may be a legal rationale for this neo-imperial elitism.	这一新帝国主义精英论或许有其法律上的合理性。


The so-called C-6 might argue that, given their price-stability mandate, only central banks of countries whose economic fate might destabilize domestic prices should receive privileged access to domestic currency.	所谓的C-6会说，在价格稳定使命的前提下，只有经济前景可能破坏国内价格稳定的国家的央行才应该拥有获得本币的特权。


But the choice of monetary partners is nonetheless a matter of judgment.	但货币合作伙伴的选择仍只是判断问题。 比如，为何是加拿大而不是墨西哥？


For example, why Canada and not Mexico?	这两个国家不都是北美自由贸易区成员吗？


Aren’t both members of NAFTA?	为何是瑞士而不是巴西？


Why Switzerland and not Brazil, one of the largest emerging markets?	后者可视最大的新兴市场国家之一？


Picking partners is an inherently political act.	挑选合作伙伴自然是一种政治动作。


It bestows access to high-demand currencies on a select few, relatively strong, countries precisely when the weakest countries are at their most vulnerable.	它把需求程度高的货币给予一小撮选定的相对坚挺的国家，而此时最疲软国家才是最脆弱的。


Having been left outside the club, these countries have no option but to self-insure by accumulating foreign-exchange reserves.	由于被排除在这一俱乐部之外，这些国家别无选择，只能通过囤积外汇储备来保护自己。


Indeed, empirical research suggests that countries without explicit or implicit access to liquidity tend to hold much higher reserves than the privileged few – only to be blamed by the same privileged few for contributing to global imbalances by hoarding excess reserves.	事实上，实证研究表明，无法直接或间接得到流动性的国家倾向于囤积比少数特权国更多的储备，而这样做又会让少数特权国指责通过囤积外汇储备加剧了全球失衡。


The C-6 swap club’s members may be correct in thinking that global finance requires more proactive central banking.	C-6互换俱乐部成员认为全球金融需要更具前瞻性的央行业务，这是对的。


But is it fair or right that they should be allowed to take matters into their own hands and determine a system of international monetary management designed to serve their own interests, with little regard for other, equally exposed, countries?	但这就能证明应该允许它们大权独揽、决定国际货币管理体系了吗？ 这一体系难道是为了保护它们的自身利益、而不顾及其他风险同样大的国家的吗？


The joint announcement by the C-6 cements the great divide between first-class and coach economies.	C-6的联合声明坐实了一等舱经济体和大通铺经济体之间的巨大分歧。


We are being asked to trust that these select central banks will do the right thing.	我们被要求相信这些被选定的央行会做出正确的决定。


Trust is important.	信任十分重要。


But when it comes to political decision-making, democratic control and accountability are essential.	但当问题来到政治决策时，民主控制和问责才是至关重要的。


The False Promise of Digital Democracy	数字民主的假承诺


MUNICH – Most people used to think of the Internet as a force for good.	慕尼黑—大部分人都把互联网看成是好力量。


It was supposed to allow us not only to shop, stay in touch with former classmates, and find a new sushi restaurant; it was also supposed to empower us politically by allowing the disenfranchised to make their voices heard, help activists mobilize supporters, and enable ordinary citizens to publicize evidence of official corruption or police brutality.	互联网不但可以让我们购物、和老同学取得联系、找到新开的寿司店，还能让被剥夺公民权的人发出声音从而让我们得到更多的政治力量、帮助活动家动员支持者、让普通民众能够公布官员腐败或警察暴力行为的证据。


But doubts have crept in – and not only since the revelations of government agencies’ use of the Internet to spy on us, our leaders, and one another.	但质疑声也接踵而至——并非在政府机构利用互联网监控彼此、我们和我们的领导人被曝光后才是如此。


The Internet’s impact on politics is deeply ambiguous.	互联网对政治的影响是非常模糊的。


Unless and until it becomes a space where rules and rights apply like they do in the real world, that is unlikely to change.	除非在我们可以在像现实生活中那样在互联网上行使规则和权利，否则就无法改变这一点。


Early enthusiasts dreamed that mere access to the Internet would help spread democracy.	早期拥趸梦想着靠接入互联网就能帮助传播民主。


This did not happen.	这并没有发生。


At the end of the 1990’s, 4% of the world’s population was using the Internet; today, almost 40% do.	20世纪90年代末，只有4%的世界人口在使用与联网。 如今这一比例是40%。


But the share of countries classified as “not free” or “partly free” by the democracy watchdog Freedom House has hardly changed over the same period.	但被民主观察机构自由之家（Freedom House）归类为“不自由”或“部分自由”的国家比例在同一时期并未发生多大变化。


In the battle between networks and hierarchies, the hierarchies seem to be winning more often than not.	在网络和层级之间的战争中，更常获胜的是层级。


One reason is that governments have become as skillful at using the Internet and modern communications technology as activists.	一个原因是政府越来越擅长利用活跃的互联网和现代通信技术。


Autocratic governments use it to track down protest and opposition leaders, as we have recently seen in Ukraine.	专制政府利用它追踪抗议活动和反对派领袖，最近的乌克兰就是如此。


They employ armies of people to vet and skew online conversations.	它们部署网络水军判断和引导网络话语。


Some people even argue that the Internet acts as a political release valve that helps dictators stay in power.	一些人甚至认为互联网是一种政治减压阀，有助于独裁者掌权。


But even the most determined autocrat cannot fully control political activity online.	但即使是最强大的独裁者也无法完全控制网络活动。


Tech-savvy young people tend to circumvent attempts at official censorship.	长于技术的年轻人总是能够绕过官方审查措施。


And yet Internet activists are not necessarily gaining power.	但互联网活跃分子并不一定能够赢得力量。


Internet-inspired movements usually have lasting impact only if they generate traditional political activity, such as street protests or the establishment of political parties.	互联网推动的运动往往只有在产生了传统政治活动时——如街头抗议或建立政党等——才能形成持续影响。


For this, they need leadership, which net activists tend to reject, because they view themselves as pure grassroots movements.	因此，它们需要领袖，而这往往被网络活动家所拒绝，因为他们视自己为纯草根运动。


In the absence of viable strategies and clear direction, most Internet-aided uprisings have dissipated quickly.	大部分互联网支持的骚乱没有可行的战略和明确的方向，很快就消散了。


The Internet has thus turned out to be less potent than expected in the fight against tyranny.	因此，就与暴政的斗争而言，互联网并不像预期的那样给力。


Nor is its effect on established democracies straightforward.	其对建立民主的影响力也没有那么直观。


While democracies have arguably become more vibrant, their politics have become more volatile.	尽管民主国家变得更有活力，但它们的政治也变得日益波动。


Consider the media.	以媒体为例。


Only 16% of Americans in their 40’s read (print) newspapers these days; the share among 20-somethings is 6%.	如今只有16%的40—50年龄段美国人读（印刷）报纸； 20岁以下人群比例更是只有6%。


Digital media offer great diversity, easy access, and opportunities to comment.	数字媒体提供了充分的多样性、轻易的获取渠道和评论机会。


But they encourage people to retrieve only information and commentaries that fit their existing views.	但它们也鼓励人们只接受符合既有观念的信息和评论。


While traditional media can present their readers with balanced coverage, digital media can fuel political polarization.	传统媒体可以为读者呈现平衡的报道，数字媒体则可能助长政治两极分化。


Moreover, political firebrands, populists, and radicals, from Italy’s Beppe Grillo to American Tea Party members, use social media and the blogosphere to appeal directly to potential supporters.	此外，政治煽动者、民粹主义者和激进分子——从意大利的格里洛（Beppe Grillo）到美国的茶党成员——利用社交媒体和博客圈直接面向潜在支持者。


The Internet allows many political upstarts to amass a large following quickly, only to disappear just as fast.	互联网让许多政治新星迅速地集结大量追随者，但来得快去得也快。


But the ebb and flow can unsettle established politics – for example, when centrist parties move to the right to lure voters away from more extreme parties.	然则如此兴衰更替可能动摇现行政治——比如当中间派政党转为右倾以吸引更为极端的政党的选民时。


At the same time, young people seem to think that they have exhausted their civic duties by tweeting and blogging.	与此同时，年轻人可能认为发几条微博和博客就算行使了他们的公民责任。


They no longer join political parties, trade unions, and other interest groups.	他们不再参与政党、工会和其他利益集团。


The average age of party members in Germany is over 50.	德国的政党成员平均年龄超过了50岁。


In the United Kingdom, a retiree over 60 is more likely to be a trade-union member than a worker under 30 is.	在英国，60多岁的退休者比不到30的工人更有可能是工会成员。


Without civil-society organizations, politics becomes more fragmented and less cohesive – and finding workable compromises becomes harder.	没有公民社会组织，政治变得更加支离破碎，凝聚力更小，更难找到可行的承诺。


The revelations of snooping by the US National Security Agency (NSA) will hasten a more realistic assessment of the Internet’s effect on politics, providing a welcome opportunity to consider what has gone wrong and what could be put right.	美国国家安全局监控丑闻的曝光将加快对互联网政治影响的更加现实的评估，提供难得的机会思考是什么出了问题以及怎样做对的事。


A multitude of small steps could help – such as giving pro-democracy movements the technology needed to evade autocrats, presenting digital media in a balanced way, and making political parties more responsive to their members.	一系列小步骤可以有所助益——如给予亲民主运动躲避专制所必须的工具、以平衡的方式呈现数字媒体，以及提高政党对其党员的响应度。


But the fundamental challenge is to suffuse the Internet with the same rules, rights, and values that pervade our democracies.	但根本挑战是用我们的民主中的相同规则、权利和价值充实互联网。


Freedom cannot be absolute, whether online or offline.	自由永远不是绝对的，不管在线上还是在线下。


Human rights, and not only the right to personal privacy, must be respected in cyberspace.	人权——不仅仅是个人隐私权——在网络空间中叶必须得到尊重。


Because no single body or government sets rules for the entire Internet, any digital code of conduct would have to emerge from the grassroots – and thus would be highly imperfect.	由于没有个人和政府为整个互联网制定规则，因此任何数字行为规范都必须来自草根——也因此必然是极不完美的。


But perhaps the NSA has helped start the discussion: though we may not know which rules we want, we may now have gained a much better idea of which rules we do not want.	但也许美国国安局帮助我们开启了讨论：尽管我们可能不知道想要什么规则，但至少已经有了关于我们不想要什么规则的好主意。


Reason and the End of Poverty	推理和贫困的终结


WASHINGTON, DC – The World Bank has set two new goals for itself: ending extreme and chronic poverty in the world by 2030, and promoting shared prosperity, defined in terms of progress of the poorest 40% of the population in each society.	华盛顿—世界银行给自己制定了两个新目标：2030年终结全世界的极端和长期贫困，并促进共同繁荣——衡量标准是各个社会最贫困40%人群的改善。


Now that the United Nations General Assembly Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals has endorsed the Bank’s anti-poverty target, debate about how to achieve it has revived an old question: Will the benefits of economic growth trickle down on their own, reaching all, or will we need targeted redistributive policies?	联合国大会可持续发展目标开放工作组（Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals）支持世行的减贫目标，而关于如何实现的争论让我们重新面对了一个老问题：经济增长的好处会自动向下流动、触及所有人，还是需要定向的分配政策？


Many people remain in the growth-only camp only because of an error in deductive reasoning; unlike committed ideologues, they can be weaned from their position.	许多人站在唯增长论阵营，之所以如此，唯一原因是演绎推理的错误； 与坚定的空想家不同，他们可以转变立场。


That is why the World Bank’s second goal of promoting shared prosperity is important not only in itself, but as an essential complement to the goal of ending poverty.	正因如此，世界银行的第二个目标——促进共同繁荣的重要性不但在于其本身，也在于其是终结贫困目标的不可缺少的部分。


Recognizing that some “frictional” poverty will inevitably persist over the next two decades, the World Bank’s formal target is to reduce the percentage of people living below the poverty line – defined as daily consumption of less than $1.25 (in purchasing-power-parity terms) per person – to less than 3%.	世界银行认识到一些“摩擦性”贫困在未来二十年是不可避免的，因此其正式目标让生活在贫困线以下的人的比重低于3%。 贫困线的标准是每人每天消费少于1.


World Bank research predicts that if all countries grow at the same rates that they did over the past 20 years, with no change in income distribution, world poverty will fall to 7.7% by 2030, from 17.7% in 2010.	世行研究预测，如果所有国家都以与过去20年相同的速度增长，且收入分配情况不变，则2030年世界贫困率将从2010年的17. 7%降至7.


If they grow faster, at the average rates recorded in the 2000’s, the poverty rate will fall to 5.5%.	7%。 如果增长得更快，达到2000年代的平均增长率，则贫困率将下降至5.


These numbers suggest that growth alone is unlikely to get us to the 3% target.	这些数字表明光靠增长无法达到3%的目标。


But this is mere suggestion.	但这仅仅是“表明”。


One can argue that we should nonetheless rely on growth and simply adopt measures that encourage more of it.	你可以说，我们应该依靠增长，只是要采取进一步提振增长的手段。


In a new paper, David Dollar, Tatjana Kleineberg, and Aart Kraay analyze empirically the relationship between growth and poverty.	在一篇新论文中，多拉（David Dollar）、克莱因伯格（Tatjana Kleineberg）和库雷（Aart Kraay）从实证角度分析了增长和贫困的关系。


Their comprehensive study draws on high-quality survey data from 118 countries and reaches a clear conclusion: the bulk of poverty eradication that took place in recent decades was driven by economies’ overall income growth.	他们的全面研究建立在118个国家的高质量调查数据之上，并得出了明确的结论：近几十年以来的减贫成就大部分要归功于经济的总体收入增长。


More specifically, 77% of the cross-country variation in the income growth of the poorest 40% of the population reflects differences in average income growth.	更具体地说，最贫困的40%的人口的收入增长的77%的跨国差异反映了平均收入增长的差异。


Findings like these lead many people to conclude that eradicating poverty requires us to rely on overall growth, and that direct government policy interventions have little merit.	此类发现让许多人认为减贫要求我们依赖总体增长，直接政府政策干预没有什么效果。


But this is a wrong conclusion, which illustrates a lapse of logic.	但这一结论是错误的，它体现了错误的逻辑。


To see why, suppose that in 1930 an economist conducted an empirical study of what cured infectious diseases, and, analyzing masses of data from previous years, concluded that 98% of all treatable illnesses were cured by non-antibiotic medicines – “tradicines,” which include all traditional medicines of various schools.	我们来看看为什么。 假设1930年有一位经济学家做了什么治好了流行病的实证研究，在分析了大量往昔年份数据后，他认为98%的可治疗治病是通过非抗生素——即各种各样的“传统药物”——治好的。


This conclusion would most likely be valid, because the use of antibiotics before 1930 – just two years after Alexander Fleming discovered penicillin and years before it was fully workable as a cure – was rare and mostly inadvertent.	这一结论很有可能是成立的，因为在1930年以前——此时弗莱明刚刚发现盘尼西林两年，距离盘尼西林的全面使用还有多年时间——很少使用抗生素，即使用了也往往不是有意为之。


But now suppose that the economist goes on to argue that, therefore, it would be silly to give patients penicillin, because we know that 98% of all treatable diseases were cured by tradicines, and penicillin is not a tradicine.	但再假设这位经济学家继续指出，因此，给病人使用盘尼西林是愚蠢的，因为我们知道98%的可治疗疾病是通过传统药物治愈的，而盘尼西林不属于传统药物。


That is a wrong deduction, based on evidence that does not exist.	这是错误的演绎，它的基础是子虚乌有的证据。


What the economist’s study in 1930 showed is that tradicines accounted for 98% of the cases that were successfully treated.	这位1930年的经济学家的研究表明了传统药物在98%的被治愈疾病中起了作用。


It does not show that penicillin does not work.	它并没有标明盘尼西林起不了作用。


This is a common mistake.	这是个常见错误。


We often hear assertions like, “We must rely on the private sector to create jobs, because studies show that 90% of past jobs were created by the private sector.”	我们经常听到这样的论断：“我们必须依靠私人部门创造就业，因为研究表明90%的昔日岗位是私人部门创造的。


If we accepted this reasoning, we would have to accept a Soviet researcher’s assertion in the late 1980’s that we must rely on the state to create jobs, because 90% of past jobs were created by the state.	”如果我们接受这一推理，我们同样也必须接受1980年代末一位苏联经济学家的论断——我们必须依靠国家创造就业，因为90%的昔日岗位是由国家创造的。


On job creation, there is both theory and evidence to support the conclusion that the private sector is the main driver of sustainable expansion (which is not to deny that there may be scope for tweaking public policies to make the private sector more employment-friendly).	在就业创造方面，理论和证据都支持私人部门是可持续扩张的主要动力的结论（这并没有否认存在让私人部门变得更加利于就业的公共政策空间）。


But on poverty eradication, theory and evidence show that policy interventions, when skillfully designed, can play a significant role.	但在减贫方面，理论和证据表明政策干预——如果设计合理的话——可以扮演重要角色。


Some of these policies already exist; some have to be crafted – the antibiotics of our time.	一些政策已经存在，一些则需要构思——它们就是现时代的抗生素。


In India, the government has tried for decades to get cheap food to the poor.	在印度，政府尝试为穷人提供廉价食品已有数十年。


Cost-benefit analysis has led many to declare it a failed policy.	成本收益分析让许多人认为这是项失败的政策。


But the fault lies with the program’s method, which is to rely on the state both to collect the food from farmers and to deliver it to the poor.	但问题在于该计划的方法——从农民手中收集食品和把食品送到穷人手中的过程都依赖国家。


Around 45% of food grain leaks out and disappears in this process.	大约45%的食用谷物在此过程中漏出并下落不明。


This means that the program’s leaks need to be repaired, not that the entire scheme should be abandoned.	这意味着该计划需要填补漏洞，而不意味着应该抛弃整套机制。


A carefully designed public-private partnership – in which the state gives a subsidy directly to the poor, who then buy food from private farmers and traders – would benefit all.	谨慎设计的公私合作——国家直接向穷人发放补贴，然后穷人从私人农民和贸易商手中购买粮食——能让所有人受益。


Obviously, when the poor have more (and healthier) food, their nutrition improves; when better-nourished people go to school, they become more productive; the same is true of health services.	显然，当穷人拥有更多（更健康）的食物时，营养就能得到改善； 当营养更好的人们进入学校时，他们的生产率就会得到提高；


Overall economic growth is important, but the poor should not have to wait until its benefits trickle down to them; with the right anti-poverty policies, governments can encourage trickle-up growth as well.	总体经济增长十分重要，但穷人不能坐等好处渗透到自己身上； 在正确的减贫措施的帮助下，政府也能够鼓励自下而上渗透的增长。


A Radioactive Bank to be Welcomed	值得欢迎的放射性元素银行


CANBERRA – One of the many things the world has learned from the Iran nuclear saga is that its leaders made a mistake, when negotiating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the 1960s, in not doing anything to constrain uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.	堪培拉—世界从伊朗核传奇中学到的众多教训之一是其领导人在20世纪60年代谈判核不扩散条约式犯了一个错误，没有做任何事情约束铀浓缩和钚再处理。


This failure apparently stemmed from the belief – long since proven wrong, certainly in the case of uranium – that the only states ever likely to possess that technical capability already possessed nuclear weapons, or (like Germany) were totally committed never to acquire them.	这一错误显然源自一个早就在铀问题上被证明错误的信念——仅有的那些有可能拥有这一技术能力的国家要么已经拥有了核武器，要么（如德国）承诺永远不会拥有该能力。


As a result, any member state can argue for its “inalienable right” under the NPT to pursue any stage of the nuclear fuel cycle.	结果，任何成员国都可以主张根据核不扩散条约拥有追求核燃料循环任何阶段的“不可侵犯的权利”。


Although any such right extends only to activities for “peaceful purposes,” the loophole is gaping.	尽管这一权利只适用于“和平目的”活动，但存在巨大的漏洞。


Any technically capable state – and there are now dozens of them – can build uranium enrichment facilities with the official purpose of producing fuel for nuclear power or research reactors, but which are nonetheless inherently capable of producing the much higher-grade fuel needed for nuclear weapons.	任何有技术能力的国家——目前有几十个之多——都可以建造核浓缩设施，只要官方目的是为核能或研究性反应堆生产能源，但它们当然都有能力制造核武器所需要的更高级别的燃料。


It is not for nothing that such facilities have been described as “bomb starter kits,” and that Iran’s progress down that path – whether deliberately designed to give it a latent weapons breakout capability or not – has spooked so many others in the international community.	这些设施被称为“核弹发射装置”不是没有道理，伊朗在这方面取得进展——不管是否有意设计成具有潜在武器突破能力——让国际社会的许多国家恐慌不已。


That is why there was so much pressure to produce the deal now on the table, which dramatically limits Iran’s enrichment capability.	因此才会有如此大的压力促成了现在摆到台面上的协议，该协议极大地限制了伊朗的核浓缩能力。


While renegotiating the NPT itself to close the enrichment loophole seems for now a lost cause, there are other ways to address this proliferation risk.	如今，重新谈判核不扩散条约本身、补上浓缩漏洞纯属出新妄想，但又其他办法可以遏制这一核扩散风险。


One of the most important, and long-advocated, strategies is to demonstrate to countries that rely on nuclear power, or are planning to develop it, that they do not need their own uranium-enrichment program to ensure their fuel supply’s security.	最重要的办法之一、也得到长期支持的战略是向依赖或计划发展核能的国家证明，它们不需要拥有自己的核浓缩计划来确保能源供给安全。


Concern about fuel-supply security has always been Iran’s main publicly stated justification for acquiring its enrichment capability – a justification that its critics assert was manufactured simply to conceal a covert weapons agenda.	担心燃料供给安全一直是伊朗为获得铀浓缩能力厄尔提出的主要公开理由——批评者指出，这一理由纯粹是为了掩盖武器日程而捏造的。


Whether or not that is the case, all current and would-be nuclear power producers are entitled to be anxious about having an absolutely assured fuel supply, given the major economic and social consequences they would face in the event of a disruption.	无论是否真的如此，所有当前和潜在核能生产商都有权利担忧有绝对保障的燃料供给，因为一旦发生干扰，将带来巨大的经济和社会后果。


Yes, until now, the commercial nuclear-fuel market has worked well: no power reactor has had to shut down because of fuel-supply disruptions.	诚然，到目前为止，商业核燃料市场运转良好：没有一个核反应堆因为燃料供给干扰而关闭。


But the cut-off of the supply of other energy resources (notably Russia’s disruption of natural-gas supplies to Ukraine and, by extension, to Western Europe) has raised legitimate concerns about whether this could happen with nuclear fuel.	但切断其他能源资源的供给（令人关注的有俄罗斯干扰乌克兰进而影响西欧的天然气供给）引起了关于核燃料是否也会发生类似事件的合理担忧。


Although the issue has been much debated, until now there has been only modest progress in developing fuel-supply assurance arrangements that would meet this concern.	尽管这一问题经过了大量争论，但到目前为止，在制定燃料供给保障安排以解决这一担忧方面，进展十分有限。


Russia, with the support of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), maintains a sizeable reserve of low-enriched uranium (LEU) at its international center in Angarsk; but, in the current security environment, there has been understandable international reluctance to rely on it.	在国际原子能机构的支持下，俄罗斯安加尔斯克（Angarsk）国际中心保留了大量低浓缩铀储备； 但是，在当前的安全环境下，不难理解国际社会不愿意依赖这些能源。


The United Kingdom has proposed a supply guarantee of its own, though it has so far attracted little attention.	英国已提出其自身的供给保障安排，尽管到目前为止没有受到多少关注。


Now, in an important new development, to be officially launched this month (on August 27), Kazakhstan is establishing a major new international fuel bank, which it will operate on behalf of the IAEA.	如今，在一项将在本月（8月27日）正式启动的计划中，哈萨克斯坦将成立一家新的国际燃料银行，并代表国际原子能机构经营它。


The new facility should once and for all remove the main excuse that has been advanced, sincerely or not, for building and maintaining homegrown enrichment capability.	该新银行理应一劳永逸地消除一直以来为了维持本国铀浓缩能力而有意或无意地宣传的借口。


Scheduled to commence operations in 2017, the Kazakh fuel bank will store up to 90 tons of LEU, sufficient to refuel three typical power-producing light water reactors.	按计划，哈萨克燃料银行将在2017年开张营业，它将储存90吨低浓缩铀，足以为三个典型的发电用轻水反应堆提供燃料补给。


While Kazakhstan will physically operate the bank, the uranium will be owned and controlled by the IAEA, and made available to non-nuclear-weapon states if, for any reason, they cannot secure the LEU they need from the commercial market.	该银行由哈萨克斯坦实际经营，但铀将由国际原子能机构所有和控制，并且只能用于无核武器国家，条件是（不管出于什么原因）它们无法从商业市场上获得它们所需要的低浓缩铀。


Provided the state in question is in compliance with its comprehensive non-proliferation safeguards agreement with the IAEA, it can draw the required fuel from the bank and transfer it to a fuel fabricator to make fuel assemblies for the reactors involved.	如果问题国家遵守其与国际原子能机构的全面核不扩散安全保障协议，它���以从该银行获得所需要的燃料，运送至燃料生产商为相关核反应堆制作燃料组件。


The Kazakh fuel bank has very wide and high-level international backing, helped by the country’s credentials.	哈萨克燃料银行获得了十分广泛的高级别国际支持，这要归功于哈萨克斯坦的国家信誉。


A former nuclear test-site state, Kazakhstan willingly gave up the nuclear weapons on its territory when the opportunity arose with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and it has been a strong and consistent advocate of nuclear arms control and disarmament ever since.	作为前核试验场地所在国，哈萨克斯坦愿意在苏联解体时放弃拥有核武器的良机，并且此后一直强烈支持核武器控制和裁军。


The bank has been funded by voluntary contributions, including $50 million from the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a United States-based NGO, $49 million from the US government, up to $25 million from the European Union, $10 million each from Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, and $5 million from Norway.	该银行通过自愿捐款筹集资金，包括来自美国非政府组织核威胁计划（Nuclear Threat Initiative）的5,000万美元、来自美国政府的4,900万美元，来自欧盟的最多2,500万美元，来自科威特和阿联酋的1,000万美元以及来自挪威的500万美元。


Aside from the Iran deal, good news on nuclear weapons has been sparse in recent years.	除了伊朗协议，关于核武器的好消息在近几年里鲜有耳闻。


The new Kazakh fuel bank is a significant step toward achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.	新的哈萨克燃料银行是迈向无核世界的重大进步。


Those who have worked to establish it deserve the world’s gratitude.	致力于成立这家银行的人应该获得全世界的感谢。


Keeping Africa\u0027s Turnaround on Track	把非洲的复兴之路保持下去


MONROVIA – For more than a decade, much of Africa has been moving forward.	发自蒙罗维亚——近十多年以来，大部分非洲国家都取得了进步。


Economic growth is rising, poverty is falling and democratic governance is spreading.	经济增长持续增加，贫困人口不断下降，而民主管治的范围则不断得到延伸。


But the global financial crisis threatens to undo this progress by reducing investment, exports and aid just as they should be expanding to build on these successes.	然而这一进程如今却因全球经济危机而面临中断，因为本应不断扩大以实现上述发展的投资，出口和援助额都残遭削减。


While international attention has been understandably focused on events in Darfur, Somalia and Zimbabwe, countries across the continent including Ghana, Tanzania, Mozambique and Liberia have been quietly turning their economies around.	当国际社会的目光还停留在达尔富尔、索马里和津巴布韦的问题之上时，加纳、坦桑尼亚，莫桑比克和利比里亚等一批非洲国家的经济形势已经悄悄发生了逆转。


Economic growth rates regularly exceed 5% in many nations.  The key to this progress is stronger African leadership and more accountable governance.	许多非洲国家的经济增长率一般都会超过5%，而实现这一点的关键则是更有力的非洲人领导和更可靠的政府管治。


Today, more than 20 African countries are democracies, up from just three in the 1980’s.	事实上相较于1980年代非洲只有3个民主国家的尴尬境况，如今已经有超过20个非洲国家实现了民主政治。


They have competitive elections and improved human rights, and a much freer media.	这些国家都拥有更具竞争性的选举，人权也获得了改善，且媒体也更为自由。


These efforts have been supported by increasingly effective development assistance.	而上述进步都是拜逐渐增加的有效发展援助所赐。


Consider what has happened in my country, Liberia.	让我们看看利比里亚所发生的一些情况。


After 14 years of devastating war, we faced enormous challenges.	在持续14年的毁灭性战争中走出来的人们面临着巨大的挑战。


Our democratically elected government has worked with international partners and a growing number of private investors to turn things around.	我国的民选政府因此也连同国际合作伙伴以及接踵而来的私人投资者，大家共同携手希望把局面扭转过来。


In the past three years, we have doubled primary school enrollment nationwide, refurbished hundreds of health facilities, begun rebuilding roads and restoring electricity.	在过去三年中，利比里亚全国的小学生入学率翻了一番，政府还重修了数百所卫生机构，并着手重建道路和电力系统。


We have taken steps to root out corruption and remove unscrupulous officials.	我们也正在逐步根除腐败并撤换品行不良的官员。


Growth has exceeded several percent per year.	全国每年的增长率都要比上一年额外增加了几个百分点。


And, most critical, we are at peace.	更关键的是，我们维持住了和平的局面。


We are restoring our once-vibrant nation, and the crucial component -- hope -- has already been revived.	我们正在重整这个曾经动荡不安的国度，连希望——这个至关紧要的元素——也开始回到了人民心中。


Without international support, we would not have made this progress and would be at much greater risk of returning to war.	而如果没有国际支援的话，我们将难以取得上述的成就，甚至很可能重新沦落到战火当中。


The global economic crisis threatens the progress in my country and elsewhere on our continent.	全球经济危机正威胁着我们国家及其他非洲国家的发展。


Declining remittances from overseas workers, shrinking trade flows and investment could undermine new businesses, throw thousands out of work, and increase tensions and instability.  The crisis -- which Africa did nothing to cause -- demands a strong response.	海外劳工汇款减少，贸易和投资资金流的萎缩将威胁到某些新兴行业，导致数千人失业并激发社会矛盾和不稳定性。


African nations must do their part by continuing to address corruption, eliminate red tape and reduce obstacles to private-sector growth.	如果说这场跟非洲完全无关的危机需要得到强而有力回应的话，那么非洲国家必须尽自己的一份努力去杜绝腐败和官僚主义，并减少对私人部门增长所设置的障碍。


But just as industrialized countries need a stimulus, African economies need a boost to keep their progress on track.	但正如发达工业国家需要采取经济刺激计划那样，非洲经济体也需要某些措施去启动经济，以保证整个发展势头得以保持。


The G8 nations meeting in Italy this week have a useful role to play.  Among other measures, they must keep their promises to increase aid and make it more effective by reducing bureaucratic delays, speeding disbursements and better aligning programs with African priorities.  Effective aid is certainly not the only answer, but it has an increasingly vital role to play as other sources of finance dry up.	本周在意大利举办的8国集团（G8）会议将可以扮演一个有用的角色。 除了其他措施以外，这些国家都必须得遵守它们增加对非洲援助的诺言，并通过减少行政拖延，加速支付程序并以非洲优先的原则来令这些诺言更好地实现。


It is needed to lay the foundations to help stimulate private sector growth.	当然，虽然援助并不是唯一的药方，但当其他经济来源面临枯竭之时它就是最为现实和关键的一环。 而这些援助款项将可以为刺激私人部门增长的计划提供一个坚实的基础。


It would be a cruel irony if, just as Africa begins to succeed, its prospects are cut short by a crisis beyond its control.	如果当非洲在开始走向成功，但它的发展前景却被一场与之无关的危机所荼毒的话，那么整个事件将堪称是一个莫大的讽刺。


Strong action by African governments and robust support from the international community can keep Africa's recovery on track.	非洲的复兴之路只有在非洲国家政府的强有力手段和国际社会源源不断的援助下才能得到保证。


Both must continue to do their part.	而这也意味着双方都必须继续履行好自己的责任，缺一不可。


Keep the IMF Out of Europe	IMF不应该介入欧洲事务


BUENOS AIRES – A short-lived rumor recently suggested that the International Monetary Fund was putting together a €600 billion ($803 billion) package for Italy to buy its new government about 18 months to implement the necessary adjustment program.	布宜诺斯艾利斯——最近，一则短命流言说，IMF正在为意大利筹集6000亿欧元资金，目的是给意大利新政府赢得18个月的时间实施必要的调整计划。


Except for the magnitude of the package, this sounds no different from a standard IMF adjustment program – the kind that we are accustomed to seeing (and criticizing) in the developing world.	除了资金规模之外，这一举动与标准的IMF调整计划——那些我们发展中国家早已熟识（和一再批评）的措施——别无二致。


But there is one crucial difference: Italy is part of a select club that does not need outside rescue funds.	但有一个关键不同点：意大利是不需要外部援助资金的精英俱乐部的一员。


So far, programs for the eurozone periphery have been spearheaded and largely financed by European governments, with the IMF contributing financially, but mainly acting as an external consultant – the third party that tells the client the nasty bits while everyone else in the room stares at their shoes.	到目前为止，为欧元区外围国家制定的计划均由欧洲政府牵头并提供主要资金，IMF会在财务上有所支持，但主要扮演外部顾问的角色——即在房间里的所有人都自顾自时告诉客户房间里有恶棍的第三方。


By contrast, the attempt to crowd multilateral resources into Europe was made explicit by eurozone finance ministers’ call in November for IMF resources to be boosted – preferably through debt-generating bilateral loans,– so that it could “cooperate more closely” with the European Financial Stability Facility.	相比之下，欧元区各国财长在11月呼吁IMF增加资源——最好是通过产生债务的双边贷款——以便其“更紧密地”与欧洲金融稳定基金“合作”，大量向欧洲注入多边资源的想法昭然若揭了。


That means that the short-lived story of Italy’s jumbo IMF package, which was to be funded largely by non-European money, can be regarded as a game changer: while Italy may never receive such a package, Europe, it seems, is determined to resolve its problems using other people’s money.	这意味着短命的IMF意大利融资计划流言——这笔资金将主要来自非欧洲资源——可视为博弈变化器：意大利也许永远不会收到这笔钱，但欧洲似乎已下定决心要用他人的钱来解决自己的问题。


There are at least three reasons why the IMF should resist this pressure, and abstain from increasing its (already extremely high) exposure to Europe.	IMF至少有三大理由抵制这一要求，并拒绝增加其（已然极高的）对欧洲的风险暴露。


First, and most obviously, Europe already has its own in-house lender of last resort.	首先，也是最为显而易见的是，欧洲已经有了其自身的最后贷款人。


The European Central Bank can make available all the euros needed to backstop Italy’s debt.	欧洲央行可以提供支撑意大利债务所需要的所有欧元。


And printing them would only offset, through mild inflation, the effects of the otherwise Draconian relative price adjustment that is taking place under the corset of the common currency.	印刷这笔钱将通过温和通胀抵消替代方案——在共同货币的束缚下所发生的严厉的相对价格调整——的影响。


So it is puzzling that some observers have saluted the IMF’s involvement as a virtuous effort by the international community to bring the listing European ship to port.	因此，某些观察者赞扬IMF的介入行为，称其为国际社会力助欧洲巨船不沉的善举，这实在令人奇怪。


Why should the IMF (or, for that matter, the international community) do for Europe what Europe can but does not want to do for Italy?	为何IMF（或国际社会）应该替欧洲帮助欧洲能够而不愿意帮助的意大利？


Why should international money be mobilized to pay for European governance failures?	为何要动员国际资金为欧洲治理失买单？


And if, as appears to be the case, Germany is playing a dangerous game of chicken with some of its eurozone partners, why should the cost be shifted to the IMF for the benefit of Europe’s largest and most successful economy?	此外，正如实际情形所显示的，如果德国是在和其欧元区伙伴玩一场危险的胆小鬼博弈，那么为何要把成本转移给IMF，而使欧洲最大最成功的经济体获益？


Letting the ECB off the hook in this manner would simply validate for Europe as a whole the same moral hazard feared by German and other leaders who oppose ECB intervention.	用这种方式让欧洲央行脱身只能将整个欧洲置于德国和其他反对欧元区干预的领导人所担心的道德风险之中。


The second reason to avoid IMF intervention in Europe is that lending to a potentially insolvent country has serious implications for the Fund.	避免IMF干预欧洲的第二个理由是，向本质上已经破产的国家提供贷款会对IMF造成严重影响。


For starters, taking the IMF’s preferred-creditor status at face value, an IMF loan would entail substituting its “non-defaultable” debt for “defaultable” debt with private bondholders, because the Fund’s money is used primarily to service outstanding bonds.	从IMF的优先债权人地位看，IMF贷款将意味着用其“不可违约”债务替代私人债权人的“可违约”债务，因为IMF的资金将首先用于��还现有债务。


As a result, a group of lucky bondholders would be bailed out at the expense of those that became junior to IMF debt and remained highly exposed to a likely restructuring.	结果，幸运的债权人将得到援助，但这是以那些沦为低于IMF债务一等且仍需面临重组风险的债权人的牺牲为代价的。


Since a “haircut” can be imposed only on whatever is left of the defaultable private debt, the larger the IMF share, the deeper the haircut needed to restore sustainability.	因为损失只会落到可违约的私人债务头上（取决于偿还了IMF债务之后还有多少资金能够偿还这些债务），因此IMF债务的比重越大，重建可持续性所需的损失就越深。


For the same reason, IMF loans can be a burdensome legacy from a market perspective.	出于同样的理由，IMF贷款可能被市场视为负担。


Because they represent a massive senior claim, they may discourage new private lending for many years to come.	由于它们代表着巨额的优先求偿权，因此将在多年内抑制新的私人贷款。


This brings us to the third reason why the IMF should stay out of Europe’s crisis: what if Fund seniority fails?	由此产生了IMF应该之身欧洲事务之外的第三大理由：IMF债务失去了优先地位会怎样？


The implicit preferred-creditor status is based on central-bank practices that establish that the lender of last resort is the “last in and first out.”	默认的优选债权人地位是建立在确定最后贷款人“后进先出”的央行行为的基础上的。


It is this seniority that enables the IMF to limit the risk of default so that it can lend to countries at reasonable interest rates when nobody else will.	这一优先地位使得IMF得以限制违约风险，从而让其以合理利率在找不到其他贷款者的情况下向各国提供贷款。


This works when the IMF’s share of a country’s debt is small, and the country has sufficient resources to service it.	这只有在IMF贷款占一国债务比重较低时、且该国有足够资源偿还IMF贷款时才有效。


But seniority is not written in stone: poor economies that are unable to repay even the IMF are eligible for debt reduction under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries program, and 35 have received it since the program was established in 1996.	但这一优先地位并非铁板一块：连IMF贷款都无力偿还的贫困经济体可以获得在重债穷国（Heavily Indebted Poor Countries）计划的框架下进行债务削减的资格，自该计划于1996年实施以来，共有35个国家走过这一程序。


What would happen if, in five years, Italy were heavily indebted to the IMF?	如果5年后意大利成为对IMF的重债国会怎么样？


What if private debt represented a share so small that no haircut would restore sustainability, forcing multilateral lenders to pitch in with some debt relief?	如果私人债务的比例是如此之低，以至于损失再大也无法重塑可持续性，逼迫多边贷款人接受某种程度的债务豁免会怎么样？


The IMF’s seniority is an unwritten principle, sustained in a delicate equilibrium, and high-volume lending is testing the limit.	IMF的优先地位并没有写成白纸黑字，只能在微妙的均衡中得以维持，大额贷款在考验它的极限。


From this perspective, the proposal to use the IMF as a conduit for ECB resources (thereby circumventing restrictions imposed by European Union’s treaties), while providing the ECB with preferred-creditor status, would exacerbate the Fund’s exposure to risky borrowers.	从这一点看，将IMF用作欧洲央行资源管道（从而绕过欧盟条约的限制），同时给予欧洲央行有限债权人地位，将增加IMF对高风险借款人的风险暴露。


This arrangement could be seen as an unwarranted abuse of Fund seniority that, in addition, unfairly frees the ECB from the need to impose its own conditionality on one of its members.	这一安排可视为对IMF的无保险措施的滥用，也不公平地让欧洲央行逃脱了制约某个成员的需要。


It makes little sense for the international community to assume that unnecessary risk.	国际社会没有必要假设非必须的风险。


Let us hope that the IMF’s non-European stakeholders will be able to contain the pressure.	但愿IMF的非欧洲相关利益方能够顶住压力。


The solution for Europe is not IMF money, but its own.	欧洲的问题不应该由IMF的资金解决，它们必须自力更生。


Northern Europe’s Drag on the World Economy	北欧对世界经济的拖累


MADRID – In recent years, China’s current-account surpluses – which have averaged almost $220 billion annually since 2000 – have attracted much criticism from the rest of the world.	马德里—近几年来，中国的经常项目赤字——自2000年以来平均每年可达近2200亿美元——招致世界其他国家的猛烈批评。


But Germany’s similar-size surpluses – which have averaged about $170 billion since the euro’s introduction in 1999 – have, until recently, largely escaped scrutiny.	但德国的盈余与中国规模相当——自1999年引入欧元以来平均每年1700亿美元——却一直没有引起多少关注，直到最近才有所改变。


The difference, it was argued, was monetary union.	人们指出，区别就在于货币联盟。


So long as the eurozone as a whole was relatively balanced, Germany’s surpluses were considered irrelevant – just as, say, Texas’s surpluses have never been considered an issue in the United States.	只要欧元区作为一个整体相对平衡，德国的盈余就被视为无关紧要——正如（比如）得克萨斯州的盈余从来不会被认为是美国的问题。


Chinese surpluses, by contrast, were seen as a cause of global imbalances.	相反，中国的盈余被视为全球失衡的源头之一。


This argument is correct in the sense that it is the current-account surplus or deficit of a monetary union as a whole that can be expected to have exchange-rate implications.	作为整体的货币联盟的经常项目盈余或赤字可以预期带来汇率影响，从这一点上看，区别对待中国和德国是正确的。


And, unlike China, Germany no longer has a “national” exchange rate that can adjust in response to its current-account surplus.	此外，与中国不同，德国不再拥有可以根据经常项目盈余调整的“国家”汇率。


These factors – together with the lack of trade data for regions within countries – have led economists only rarely to consider countries’ internal surpluses or deficits.	这些因素——以及缺少国家内地区的贸易数据——导致经济学家很少考虑国家内部的盈余或赤字。


But, in net terms, a region within a country – or, like Germany, a country or sub-region within a monetary union – still “subtracts” from national and global aggregate demand if it exports more than it imports.	但是，从净值角度讲，一国内部地区——或者向德国那样的货币联盟内部的一国或次级地区——如果出口多于进口，仍然是国家或全球总需求的“减少”项。


Witness how expenditure cuts by US state governments – many of which are constitutionally required to balance their budgets – frustrated, to some degree, America’s massive federal-government stimulus in 2010-2011.	看看2010—2011年间美国州政府——根据宪法，许多州政府必须平衡预算——的减支如何在一定程度上阻碍了联邦政府的大规模刺激。


For this reason, it is relevant to ask whether a country as large as Germany – or even a large state like California or Texas – augments or depletes global aggregate demand.	出于这个原因，有必要问一问，像德国这样的大国——甚或像加州或得州这样的大州——增加还是减少了全球总需求。


(In fact, as sovereign countries, California and Texas would have been the world’s 12th and 14th largest economies, respectively, in 2012 – ahead of the Netherlands, Mexico, and South Korea.)	（事实上，若作为主权国家，加州和得州分别是2012年世界第12大和第14大经济体，位于荷兰、墨西哥和韩国之前。 ）


That question is all the more important, because the Netherlands and Austria, two of Germany’s Northern European eurozone neighbors, continue to run current-account surpluses, while the Southern European crisis countries have reversed their previously large deficits, as austerity has squeezed domestic demand and made room for an increase in exports.	这一问题非常重要，因为德国的两个北欧欧元区邻国——荷兰和奥地利一直有经常项目盈余，而随着紧缩挤压了内需、为出口增长创造了空间，南欧危机国也扭转了此前的巨额赤字。


As a result, the eurozone as a whole will produce a surplus close to $260 billion this year, which represents a new global imbalance that is more directly comparable to China’s in the past decade.	结果，欧元区作为一个整体今年将有近2600亿美元的盈余，这将带来可以与过去十年的中国直接比较的新的全球失衡。


Europe’s non-eurozone surplus countries – Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, and Norway (all of which tie their exchange rates to the euro to some degree) – magnify this global imbalance.	欧洲的非欧元区盈余国——瑞典、丹麦、瑞士和挪威（所有这些国家都在一定程度上将汇率盯住欧元）——放大了这一全球失衡。


Northern Europe – including these four countries and Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria – is running a massive current-account surplus of about $550 billion.	北欧——包括上述四国和德国、荷兰和奥地利——的经常项目盈余高达5500亿美元。


Meanwhile, China’s surplus is unlikely to exceed $150 billion this year.	与此同时，中国的盈余今年不可能超过1500亿美元。


In fact, the highest level that China’s annual surplus has ever reached was around $400 billion in 2007-2008 – when the US was poised to introduce trade sanctions against the country, because it viewed this imbalance as a threat to the stability of the US and the world economy.	事实上，中国年度盈余的最高水平为2007—2008年间的4000亿美元左右，当时美国甚至意欲对中国采取贸易制裁，因为它认为这一失衡已威胁到美国和世界经济的稳定。


What is most problematic about the eurozone’s situation is that unemployment in some of the crisis countries – Spain and Greece – remains above 20%.	欧元区局面问题最大的地方在于一些危机国——西班牙和希腊——的失业率仍在20%以上。


These countries are trying to achieve a difficult “internal devaluation” – that is, a reduction in their domestic unit labor costs relative to the eurozone’s stronger economies – while the overall eurozone surplus caused by Northern Europe puts upward pressure on the exchange rate, undermining their competitiveness outside the monetary union.	这些国家正在试图实现艰难的“内部贬值”，即降低其相对于欧元区坚挺经济体的国内单位劳动力成本，但北欧造成的欧元区整体盈余给汇率造成了升值压力，破坏了它们在欧元区之外的竞争力。


Spain and Greece have managed to achieve an internal devaluation of about 5% this year vis-à-vis Germany, but their competitiveness vis-à-vis the US and dollar-linked countries has not improved, because the euro has appreciated by more than 5% against the dollar.	西班牙和希腊在今年设法实现了约5%的（相对德国的）内部贬值，但它们相对美国和美元相关国家的竞争力并未得到改善，因为欧元相对美元升值了5%以上。


And, indeed, the euro should appreciate, because the eurozone as a whole is now running a large current-account surplus.	事实上，欧元应该升值，因为欧元区作为一个整体存在巨大的经常项目盈余。


One can only pity the Southern European countries.	我们只能对南欧国家表示同情。


They should almost thank the French for their inability to impose effective austerity measures and thereby still run a small current-account deficit, which has prevented the eurozone surplus from becoming even larger.	它们应该感谢法国，因为法国没能采取有效的紧缩措施，因此仍保持经常项目略有赤字的状态，阻止了欧元区盈余的进一步扩大。


But an abundance of pity alone will not help.	但光有同情泛滥无济于事。


Northern European countries, which have ample room to increase wages and implement expansionary policies, must do so.	北欧国家有充足的空间提高工资和实施扩张性政策，也必须这样做。


This would directly benefit Northern European citizens themselves, while helping to keep the euro down and stimulate growth and adjustment in Southern Europe and the global economy as a whole.	这将直接有利于北欧公民本身，同时有助于拉低欧元币值，刺激南欧和整个全球经济的增长和调整。


A Great Breakdown?	大崩溃？


ISTANBUL – This month – the centenary of the outbreak of World War I – is an opportune time to reflect on big risks.	伊斯坦布尔—本月是一战爆发一百周年纪念，也是深刻思考大风险的良机。


As Michael Spence recently warned, the international order’s widening security deficit, reflecting the weakening of whatever global governance we have, is fast becoming the biggest risk facing the world economy.	正如迈克尔·斯宾塞（Michael Spence）最近所警告的，国际秩序的安全赤字日益扩大，这反映出我们所具备的全球治理正在日益衰落，这一问题正在快速成为世界经济所面临的最大风险。


The same point could have been made a century ago.	一个世纪以前也是如此。


On July 30, 1914, Austrian warships bombarded Belgrade, five weeks after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo.	1914年7月30日，在斐迪南大公于萨拉热窝遇刺五周后，奥地利军舰开始炮轰贝尔格莱德。


By mid-August, the world was at war.	到8月中旬，全世界都卷入了战争。


The armistice that was agreed four years later, after about 20 million people had died, amounted only to an interlude before the horror of World War II.	四年后，当停战协议最终达成时，已有2,000万人失去了生命，而在短暂的停战期后爆发了更加恐怖的第二次世界大战。


In the years preceding August 1914, until the assassination of the archduke, the global economy performed relatively well: trade expanded worldwide, financial markets seemed healthy, and the business community shrugged off political problems as either temporary or irrelevant.	在1914年8月之前的几年中，直到斐迪南大公遇刺之前，全球经济表现相对来说相当出色：贸易在全球扩张，金融市场看起来十分健康，商界对政治问题不太关心，认为即便不是暂时性的也与商业无关。


It was a political breakdown that led to three terrible decades for the world economy.	一场政治崩溃把世界经济拖入了可怕的三十年。


Markets and economic activity can withstand a great deal of political stress and uncertainty – up to the point that the international order breaks down.	市场和经济活动可以战胜大量政治压力和不确定性——直到国际秩序崩溃。


Today, for example, the economic mood is rather upbeat.	比如，如今的经济情绪十分高涨。


The International Monetary Fund forecasts 4% growth for the world economy in 2015, while stock-market indices are up in many parts of the world; indeed, the Dow Jones reached an all-time high in July.	国际货币基金组织（IMF）预测2015年世界经济可以增长4%，世界各地的股市也纷纷上涨，道琼斯指数更是创出历史新高。


In the last few months, however, a civilian airliner was downed in eastern Ukraine by a sophisticated Russian-made missile, tensions have increased around disputed islands in the South and East China Seas, and chaos in the Middle East has continued to spread.	但是，在过去几个月中，民航班机在东乌克兰被先进的俄罗斯制导弹击落，中国东海和南海的争议岛屿紧张局势升级，中东的乱局也在继续蔓延。


The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in one of its worst phases in decades, with the renewed frustration unleashed by the massive loss of civilian life in Gaza likely to encourage extreme reactions.	以色列-巴勒斯坦冲突进入了几十年来最糟糕的阶段，加沙平民大量伤亡的坏消息有可能鼓励极端反应。


Terrorists may be on the verge of designing much less detectable weapons.	恐怖分子也许很快就能获得极难侦测到的武器。


There are other, less “political” dangers.	还有其他不那么“政治”的危险。


West Africa is afflicted by a terrible outbreak of the deadly Ebola virus, which will kill thousands of people.	西非正在经历可怕的埃博拉致命病毒大爆发，数千人将因此丧命。


The outbreak has so far remained regional, but it serves as a reminder that in an age of air travel by millions, no one is safe from the spread of infectious disease.	埃博拉病毒的爆发目前仍是地区性的，但它提醒我们，在这个数百万人坐着飞机满世界飞的时代，在传染病大爆发面前，没有人是安全的。


Containing a disease or a terrorist threat by curtailing international travel or transport would devastate the world economy.	通过切断国际旅行或交通战胜一种疾病或恐怖威胁会摧毁世界经济。


Thinking about August 1914 should remind us that great catastrophes can materialize gradually.	反思1914年8月可以提醒我们，大灾难可能是逐渐积累起来的。


Leaders can be “sleepwalkers” who fail to manage risk by, say, establishing institutions that can channel the rival interests and claims that fuel international conflict.	领导人可能成为“梦游者”，无法通过（比如）建立能够协调导致和助长国际冲突的对立利益的机构遏制风险。


Such sleepwalking by policymakers caused the financial meltdown of 2008 as well.	这种��策者的梦游情况也正是2008年金融崩盘的原因。


Its consequences were not as deadly, though the political effects of mass unemployment and the heightened perception of economic insecurity are still with us.	金融危机的后果不那么致命，尽管大规模失业和经济不安全感的政治影响仍然挥之不去。


These examples should spur the world to find ways forward for cooperative action.	这些例子应该刺激世界寻找合作行动的办法。


But the opposite appears to be happening.	但局面指向了相反的方向。


The United Nations seems more paralyzed than ever.	联合国似乎陷入了前所未有的瘫痪状态。


The US Congress still has not approved the IMF reform package agreed in 2010, weakening one of the most important international institutions.	美国国会至今仍未批准2010年达成一致的IMF改革计划，这削弱了最重要的国际机构之一。


Partly because the United States makes capital increases and governance reforms in global financial institutions so difficult, the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have launched their own development bank, to be based in Shanghai.	部分地因为美国让全球金融机构的增资和治理改革变得如此困难，金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非）另起炉灶在上海成立了它们自己的开发银行。


Likewise, instead of providing a shining example of supranational cooperation and pooled sovereignty for the twenty-first century, the European Union remains mired in rather petty disputes.	类似地，欧盟没有为二十一世纪超国家合作和主权集中树立积极的榜样，而是仍然在细枝末节的纠缠中裹足不前。


While it still cannot fully agree on the design of its banking union, it is allowing Prime Minister Viktor Orbán of Hungary, a member country, to denigrate the democratic and liberal values upon which the EU rests.	欧盟至今仍无法一致通过银行联盟设计方案，甚至还放任其成员国之一匈牙利总理欧尔班（Viktor Orbán）诋毁作为欧盟基石的民主和自由的价值。


The way forward cannot be a return to the past, with its clashing nation-states.	前进之路不能开道车，欧洲不能倒退回民族国家互相碰撞的状况。


The future can be secured only by strong cooperation among all those committed to liberal democracy and the rule of law, with no double standards or excuses, and by patient strengthening of international institutions that embody these values and can translate them into practice.	唯有所有致力于自由民主和法治精神的国家展开强有力的合作，杜绝双重标准和各种借口，耐心地强化坚持这些价值并能将它们转化为实践的国际机构，才能保障我们的未来。


Whenever a global or regional power acts in a way that contradicts these values, or allies itself closely with those who do, it undermines the international order, which should deliver security and increasing prosperity (and to some degree has).	每当全球和地区强国与这些价值背道而驰，或与这样的国家建立紧密盟友关系时，本应带来安全和日益繁荣（从某种程度上说也的确如此）的国际秩序就会遭到破坏。


The global economy holds great promise, but it is a promise that can be realized only in an international system based on rules, consent, respect, and a shared sense of justice.	全球经济许下了重大的承诺，但这一承诺只有在基于规则、同意、尊重和共同的正义感的国际制度下才能实现。


The fact that neither the mayhem in the Middle East nor the crisis in Ukraine seem to touch financial markets should not lull us into complacency.	中东的重大创伤和乌克兰危机都没有波及金融市场，决不能让这一事实导致我们的自满。


The memory of August 1914 should remind us how the world stumbled into catastrophe.	1914年8月的经验应该提醒我们，世界灾难是如何产生的。


As we know – or should know – from the example of climate change, big risks must be managed, even if the probability of worse-case outcomes is low.	从气候变化的例子中，我们知道——也应该知道重大风险必须得到很好地管理，即使糟糕结果出现的概率很低。


Catching Up at Different Speeds	不同的赶超速度


PARIS – With weak demand in advanced countries now impeding growth in emerging economies, including major players in Asia and Latin America, many are arguing that the era of income convergence has come to an end.	巴黎—如今，发达经济体需求不振正在影响亚洲和拉美大国在内的新兴经济体的增长，据此，许多人指出收入趋同时代已经走向了结束。


Nothing could be further from the truth.	大错特错。


As I have argued before, convergence of emerging countries’ real average incomes, in the aggregate, with advanced countries’ incomes is likely to continue into the 2020’s.	正如我此前所指出的，新兴国家实际平均收入向发达国家趋近的总体趋势可能会一直持续到21世纪20年代。


That process started in the late 1980’s, and continued unabated, except in the years around the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998.	这一过程始于20世纪80年代，其势头一直不减，只在1997—1998年亚洲金融危机期间略有衰退。


The pace of convergence accelerated further during, and just after, the global financial crisis of 2008-2009: the aggregate average differential in per capita income growth increased to more than four percentage points in the 2008-2012 period, from a little more than two percentage points in the two decades before.	趋同的速度在2008—2009年全球金融危机期间及稍后有所加快：2008—2012年，人均收入增长率的总体平均差异扩大到四个百分点以上，而二十年前为两个百分点。


As the advanced economies recover, however weakly, the growth differential is likely to narrow again, perhaps to about two percentage points, which still implies steady convergence at a decent pace.	随着发达经济体的复苏（不管其势头多么虚弱），增长差异可能再度缩小，也许会回到两个百分点的水平，但仍是相当可观的稳定趋同速度。


In that sense, it is not “the end of the party” for emerging markets, as some claimed early last summer, when US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke’s suggestion of a possible “taper” of the Fed’s policy of quantitative easing triggered a “mini-crisis” in several of the more vulnerable emerging markets.	照此看，这决非新兴市场“派对结束”。 在过去的这个夏天，美联储主席伯南克暗示可能“逐渐收缩”美联储量化宽松政策，这在几个较脆弱的新兴市场引起了“迷你危机”，从而导致一些人迫不及待地放出了“派对结束”论。


These economies have since recovered a significant part of the lost ground in terms of exchange rates and asset prices.	从汇率和资产价格角度看，这些经济体纷纷收复了迷你危机中的失地。


A major part of the economic-convergence process that has been taking place since the late 1980’s has been due to “catch-up” growth.	20世纪80年代末以来的经济趋同过程很大程度上要归因于“赶超”增长。


The emerging markets developed the institutions and the skills base needed to import and adapt technology, which is easier than generating new technology from scratch.	新兴市场发展了进口和适应技术所需要的制度和技能基础，这比自主开发新技术容易得多。


The pace of catch-up growth declines only gradually over time, as the less advanced economies slowly move closer to the technological frontier.	随着技术较不发达经济体慢慢地接近技术前沿，赶超增长速度也随时间的推移而渐渐下降。


The catch-up process also takes place within countries, as labor moves from low-productivity rural activities to higher-productivity urban activities, and as low-productivity firms in all sectors emulate their more advanced domestic counterparts.	赶超过程也存在于国家内部——劳动力从低生产率的农村活动转向高生产率的城市活动，各部门的低生产率企业纷纷模仿更先进的国内同行。


Moreover, the transfer and diffusion of technology has been facilitated greatly over the last few decades by increased foreign direct investment, the information revolution, which has facilitated access to knowledge, increased trade, and the globalization of financial markets.	此外，在过去几十年中，技术的转移和扩散也增加了外国直接投资，带来了促进知识普及的技术革命，增加了贸易，推进了金融市场全球化，从而起到了极大的助力作用。


These factors apply to emerging countries generally.	这些因素对于所有新兴国家都适用。


Why, then, do Latin American economists seem to share a cautious – even pessimistic – mood about future growth and convergence in the region, whereas most Asian economists, while conceding that further structural reforms are needed, believe strongly that Asia will continue to converge rather rapidly?	那么，为什么拉美经济学家对未来增长和地区趋同无不表示谨慎（甚至悲观），而大部分亚洲经济学家尽管也承认需要进一步的结构性改革，但都坚信亚洲将继续以较快的速度趋同？


Beyond global factors that apply to all, rapid catch-up growth requires sufficient investment in both physical and human capital.	除了适用于所有国家的全球因素，快速赶超增长还需要对实物和人力资本进行充分的投资。


New manufacturing techniques and new products or product improvements are usually embodied in new machines and skills.	新制造技术和新产品或产品改良往往包含在新机器和新技能中。


China has invested about 43% of its GDP, on average, during the 2000-2013 period.	2000—2013年，平均而言中国GDP中有43%被用于投资。


Emerging Asia, excluding China but including India, has invested about 28% of GDP over the same period, while the investment share for Latin America has been just 21%.	新兴亚洲（不含中国但包括印度）的同期水平是28%，而拉美的投资比例只有21%。


That alone probably explains much of the difference among China, in a category of its own, emerging Asia, and Latin America.	光是这一点就可以解释独树一帜的中国、新兴亚洲和拉美之间的大部分差异。


The quality of skills and education cannot be measured as easily by a single figure, but there is ample evidence that Latin America has also lagged behind most of Asia when it comes to skills accumulation.	技能和教育的质量无法用一个简单的数字来轻易地衡量，但有充分的证据表明拉美���技能积累方面也落后于大部分亚洲国家。


Many other factors, of course, influence growth and convergence: macroeconomic stability, the efficiency and robustness of the financial sector, the terms of trade, the quality of public administration, demographic factors, and political factors.	当然，还有许多其他因素也影响着增长和趋同：宏观经济稳定性、金融部门效率和稳健性、贸易条件、公共管理质量、人口因素和政治因素等。


There also is variation within regions, including among provinces of China.	此外还有地区内差异，如中国各省之间的差异。


(Likewise, Africa’s growth performance has improved spectacularly since the turn of the century, but variance within the continent is even larger than elsewhere.)	（类似地，自世纪之交以来，非洲的增长表现颇为亮眼，但非洲大陆内部的差异比其他地区都要大。


Nonetheless, in terms of the likely strength of the convergence process that globalization has facilitated, it is important to distinguish between Latin America and Asia, and, within Asia, to distinguish China from the rest of the continent.	）尽管如此，从得力于全球化的趋同过程的可能优势的角度看，区分拉美和亚洲以及在亚洲内部区分中国和其他国家是十分重要的。


China’s economy will most likely continue to converge rapidly, though its annual growth rate may fall from 9% to 7%.	中国经济最可能继续快速趋同过程，尽管其年增长率可能从9%下降至7%。


The rest of emerging Asia will also converge reasonably quickly, though not as quickly as China.	其他亚洲新兴国家也将以较快速度趋同，但不如中国。


Latin America, however, will likely converge only very slowly in the absence of major structural reforms that increase its ability to invest and improve the quality of education.	但是，拉美若无法通过重大结构性改革增强器投资能力、改善其教育质量，其趋同速度可能将相当缓慢。


There will surely be exceptions to this general trend, but there are some stable regional characteristics.	当然，这一总体趋势难免会出现些许例外，但有些地区特征十分稳定。


Overall, however, basic economics, which has always stressed the need to save and invest in order to grow, still explains a lot.	但是，总体而言，经济学基础——一贯强调储蓄和投资对提振增长的重要性——仍具有强大的解释力。


Latin America and Asia operate in the same global economy, with access to similar technology and markets.	拉美和亚洲存在于一个共同的全球经济中，面临相似的技术和市场。


If Latin America invests around 20% of its national income in a sustained manner, while emerging Asia invests close to 30% – including investments in education – emerging Asia will converge significantly more rapidly.	如果拉美一直将20%左右的国民收入用于投资，而亚洲这一比例接近30%——包括对教育的投资——那么新兴亚洲的趋同速度将显著快于拉美。


Democracy in Europe	欧洲的民主


ROME – A real struggle over who will preside over the European Commission has begun.	罗马—争夺谁领衔欧盟委员会的现实斗争开始了。


Though the center-right European People’s Party won only a narrow plurality of 221 seats in the 751-seat European Parliament, center-left, green, and liberal MEPs have all rallied behind the EPP’s candidate, Jean-Claude Juncker, as the “legitimate” choice.	尽管中右翼的欧洲人民党（European People’s Party）只获得了欧洲议会751个议席中的221个，但中左翼政党、绿党和MEP都在背后支持欧洲人民党候选人让-克劳德·容克（Jean-Claude Juncker）为“合法”选择。


The opposition, led by British Prime Minister David Cameron with the support of “sovereignists” across Europe, particularly in Scandinavia, but also in Hungary, contends that someone whom the majority of European citizens hardly know, cannot claim any kind of political legitimacy.	反对派则由英国首相大卫·卡梅伦领衔，背后有全欧洲（特别是斯堪的纳维亚国家，也包括匈牙利）“主权主义者”的支持，主张大部分欧洲公民都没有听说过的名字无法获得任何政治合法性。


German Chancellor Angela Merkel is now in a bind.	德国总理默克尔现在陷入了两难。


Though she endorsed Juncker before the election, she never really backed the notion that the European Parliament should have a decisive part in selecting the Commission’s president.	尽管在选举前她支持容克，但她从未支持欧洲议会应该在选择欧盟委员会主席方面起到决定性作用这一观点。


She was certain that no party would win an absolute majority, but she did not foresee that almost all representatives from moderate parties would back whichever candidate won a plurality, making it difficult to appoint anyone else.	她笃定地认为没有一个政党能够获得绝对多数，但她没有预料到几乎所有来自温和政党的代表不论谁获得多数都会支持他，这使得任命其他人变得十分困难。


The larger issue at stake is whether Europe is prepared to establish the common political space that is needed to manage the monetary union and strengthen the European Union’s influence in world affairs.	更大的问题是欧洲是否准备好了建立一个管理货币联盟、强化欧盟在世界事务上的影响力所必须的共同政治空间。


Most economists agree that in the absence of advanced fiscal-policy coordination and a real banking union, Europe’s monetary union cannot succeed.	大部分经济学家都同意，没有高级财政政策协作和真正的银行联盟，欧洲的货币联盟就不可能成功。


This does not bother the United Kingdom, which has no desire to join the eurozone.	英国对此并不担心，因为它本无意加入欧元区。


Among eurozone members, however, the need for greater political integration is broadly accepted, and not just by the economic and political elites.	但是，在欧元区国家中间，加强政治一体化的必要性已被广泛接受，并且不仅仅局限于经济和政治精英中间。


Moreover, as Russia’s recent assertions of power in Ukraine and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union demonstrate, European countries need to deepen their security cooperation and develop a common energy policy.	此外，俄罗斯最近在乌克兰和其他前苏联地区耀武扬威，这表明欧洲国家需要深化安全合作、发展共同能源政策。


And, though cooperation in areas such as of data privacy, financial-sector regulation, and climate change may not require the degree of political integration that a common currency does, it would benefit greatly from stronger political cohesion and a more profound sense of shared European identity.	而尽管在数据隐私、金融部门监管和气候变化等领域的合作并不需要如共同货币那么深的政治一体化程度，但加强政治团结、深化欧洲身份的认同感能够带来巨大的裨益。


The pan-European parties’ nomination of Spitzenkandidaten for the Commission presidency – and the three direct debates among the nominees – marked the start of building a genuine supranational European political space.	泛欧洲政党所提名的欧盟委员会主席首席候选人——以及被提名者之间的三次直接争论——标志着开始建立真正的超国家欧洲政治空间。


Indeed, the endorsement of Juncker by the Social Democrats, the Greens, and the Liberals reflects their belief in the need for such a space.	事实上，社会民主党、绿党和自由派支持容克反映出他们认为需要有这样一个空间。


The candidates, particularly Martin Schulz, the leader of the Party of European Socialists, campaigned beyond their national borders.	候选人——特别是欧洲社会党（Party of European Socialists）领袖马丁·舒尔茨（Martin Schultz）——的竞选活动也超越了国界。


But Europe still has a long way to go, which is apparent from the fact that only a minority of European citizens followed the campaign.	但欧洲仍有很长的路要走，这一点从只有少数欧洲公民跟进了竞选活动这一事实便可一览无余。


A supra-national political space can develop only if European politics gains visibility, influence, and credibility.	超国家政治空间只有在欧洲政治获得透明度、影响力和信誉的情况下才有可能获得发展。


For this reason, Europe’s leaders should reach a compromise on the next Commission president quickly and transparently, thereby dispelling the impression among ordinary citizens that European politics is shaped by a dysfunctional process of behind-the-scenes horse-trading.	因此，欧洲领导人应该就下任欧盟委员会主席的人选问题迅速形成妥协，从而打消普通公民关于欧洲政治仍被幕后扯皮左右的印象。


As usual, Merkel has a critical role to play.	与往常一样，默克尔在其中作用十分关键。


Her endorsement of a candidate whom she knew Cameron would vehemently oppose was a serious mistake, because it strengthened the hand of those in the UK who want to leave the EU.	她支持明知卡梅伦强烈反对的候选人是一个严重错误，因为这让想脱离欧盟的英国人底气更足了。


Merkel must now determine how to forge a compromise that does not discredit the Europe-wide democratic process, which currently has more support in Germany than in any other large European country.	现在，默克尔必须决定如何制造一个妥协不令泛欧洲民主进程失去信誉。 目前，欧洲民主进程在德国所获得的支持多于任何一个其他欧洲大国。


To this end, support from Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi – whose party won 41% of his country’s vote, arguably making him the only real winner at the national level – could help.	在这方面，来自意大利总理伦齐的支持——他的政党在意大利获得了41%的选票，这意味着他很有可能是硕果仅存的货真价实的国家层面赢家——是大有裨益的。


The stakes are high – and not just for Europe.	这是一场豪赌——不仅对欧洲是如此。


The world needs a thriving, cohesive EU to advance democratic principles, facilitate conflict resolution, protect the global commons, promote peace, and build trust across borders.	世界需要繁荣、团结的欧洲推进民主原则、促进冲突解决、保护全球平民、推广和平、建立国家间信任。


The alternative – already gaining traction – is the resurgence of naked power politics and dangerous xenophobia.	否则——可能性越来越大——迎接我们的将是赤裸裸的权力政治和危险的排外主义的复兴。


Without a shared European political space, everyone will be much worse off.	没有共同的欧洲政治空间，所有人都会大大受损。


Revamping Europe’s Tattered Social Contract	改造欧洲破坏的社会契约


WASHINGTON, DC – For most of the beginning of 2014, the eurozone seemed to be in a state of recovery – weak and unsteady, but nonetheless real.	华盛顿—在2014年初的大部分时间里，欧元区似乎进入了复苏状态——疲软又踉跄，但确实是复苏。


In April, the International Monetary Fund estimated that overall GDP growth would reach 1.2% this year, with slowly declining unemployment, up from its previous forecast of 1% growth.	4月，国际货币基金组织（IMF）估计今年总体GDP增长将达1. 2%，失业率将缓慢下降，较此前的预测（增长1%）有所提高。


With the threat of unsustainably high interest rates in the countries of the eurozone periphery having disappeared, the path to moderate recovery was supposedly open, to be followed by some acceleration in growth in 2015.	欧元区外围高得不可持续的利率开始下降，人们因此认为温和复苏的大门已经打开，增长将在2015年出现加速。


While it is important not to overreact to quarterly figures, recent data, as well as some of the revised data for the first quarter, are deeply disappointing.	尽管对季度数据不必过度反应，但最新数据以及一些一季度的修正数据令人大失所望。


The pessimism of two years ago has returned – with good reason.	两年前的悲观情绪开始回潮——理由相当充分。


Italy is in an outright recession, and, far from showing hoped-for signs of vitality. French growth is close to zero.	意大利已经陷入了彻底的衰退，并且远远没有表现出人们所盼望的活力信号。


Even Germany’s GDP declined in quarterly terms in the first half of the year.	法国增长率接近于零，甚至德国GDP季度表现也在今年上半年有所退步。


Finland, a staunch supporter of firm austerity policies, is in negative territory for the first half of the year.	紧缩政策的坚决支持者芬兰今年上半年更是出现了负增长。


Nominal interest rates for periphery countries’ sovereign debt have remained extremely low, and, even when taking into account expectations of very low inflation (or even deflation), real interest rates are low.	外围国主权债务名义利率仍然非常低，而即使将极低的通胀预期（甚至通缩预期）考虑在内，实际利率仍然很低。


The eurozone now is facing not only a financial crisis, but a stagnation crisis.	如今，欧元区不仅面临金融危机，也面临停滞危机。


Tensions with Russia may make recovery even more difficult, and it is unlikely that the eurozone can attain 1% growth in 2014 without major policy changes.	与俄罗斯的紧张局面让复苏变得更加困难，没有重大政策变化，2014年欧元区增长不可能大到1%。


The European Central Bank has announced that it will offer new monetary-policy support and has decided to use all instruments short of direct quantitative easing (it is still not buying sovereign bonds).	欧洲央行宣布将提供新的货币政策支持，并决定使用除量化宽松之外的一切工具（它仍然没有购买主权债券）。


But it is far from clear whether the proverbial horse led to water will actually drink.	但是否能有效果还远未可知。


If growth and employment expectations remain dismal, it will be difficult to rekindle demand, particularly private business investment, no matter how low interest rates are, or how many resources banks have for potential lending.	如果增长和就业预期继续萎靡，就很难重振需求，特别是私人商业投资，不管利率多么低，也不管银行拥有多么大的潜在贷款资源。


ECB President Mario Draghi’s message in his speech last month in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, as well as at his September press conference was a clear call for more fiscal support to boost effective demand.	欧洲央行行长德拉吉在上个月的怀俄明州杰克森霍尔（Jackson Hole）的讲话以及9月记者招待会上的发言都在明确呼吁采取更多的财政支持以提振有效需求。


The essential economic problem is clear: there is an almost desperate need for more fiscal space in the eurozone to boost aggregate demand, including more investment in Germany.	根本的经济学问题很清楚：欧元区极度渴望增加财政空间以提振总需求，包括增加德国的投资。


But there is also a persistent need for deep structural reforms on the supply side, so that fiscal stimulus translates into sustainable long-term growth, not just temporary spurts and further increases in countries’ debt ratios.	但在需求端，还存在持久的深刻结构性改革需要，以使财政刺激转化为可持续长期增长而不仅仅是暂时性的爆发和国家债务比率的进一步上升。


What the “best” structural reforms actually are remains a matter for debate.	什么是“最佳”结构性改革还有待争论。


But in most countries, they include some combination of tax, labor-market, service-sector, and education reforms, as well as reforms in territorial administration, particularly in France.	但���大部分国家，税收、劳动力市场、服务业和教育改革多管齐下，同时进行国土改革是必不可少的，特别是在法国。


These reforms should seek to achieve a thoroughly revamped social contract that reflects the realities of twenty-first-century demographics and global markets, but that also remains sensitive to Europeans’ commitment to distributive fairness and political equality, and insures citizens against shocks.	这些改革的目标应该是彻底改造社会契约，使其反映二十一世纪人口和全球市场的现实，同时也要顾及欧洲分配公平和政治平等的承诺，并保护公民免受影响。


It is easy to call for “reforms” without specifying their content or taking into account the social, historical, and political context.	呼吁“改革”而不具体指明内容或考虑社会、历史和政治因素是很容易的。


At the same time, it will not be possible to design this new social contract country by country.	与此同时，各国逐一设计这一新社会契约是不可能的。


Europe has become too interwoven in myriad ways – not just in purely financial and economic terms, but also psychologically.	欧洲以各种方式水乳交融——不仅仅在纯粹的金融和经济上，在心理上也是如此。


It must have come as a surprise to many that it was a German court, not a French one, that banned Uber, the mobile app that is revolutionizing the taxi business.	对许多人来说，德国而不是法国法庭禁止给出租车行业带来革命的移动应用Uber令人震惊。


If the new social contract cannot be forged Europe-wide, it must at least apply to the eurozone to enable the necessary structural reforms.	如果不能在全欧洲水平上建立新的社会契约，也必须在欧元区使用以使必须的结构性改革得以进行。


Otherwise, given that the politics and economics of eurozone reform are inseparably linked, fiscal expansion could prove to be as ineffective as efforts by monetary policymakers to foster growth.	否则，由于欧元区改革的政治和经济之间存在不可分割的联系，财政扩张将与货币决策者的努力一样对提振增长毫无效果。


Italy’s finance minister, Pier Carlo Padoan, is rightly pushing for a eurozone “reform scorecard,” which would enable direct comparison among national reforms.	意大利财政部长帕多安（Pier Carlo Padoan）正确地指出应该采取欧元区“记分牌”，直接比较各国的改革。


But, beyond such a scorecard, the will to overcome the stagnation trap must be more than a sum of national wills.	但是，除了记分牌之外，克服停滞陷阱的意愿应该比各国意愿的总和更强。


Germany must be reassured by what is happening in France and Italy; conversely, Southern Europeans must be able to trust that their efforts will gain additional traction from greater investment throughout the region, particularly in Germany.	德国看到法国和意大利的情形想必不会再担心； 反之，南欧人必须要能相信他们的努力能从整个地区（特别是德国）的投资增加中获得新动力。


A new social contract will not appear out of thin air.	新社会契约不会凭空产生。


Now is the time for the new European Commission to propose – and the new European Council and European Parliament to endorse – a political pact to legitimize and sustain the reforms needed to solve Europe’s economic problems.	新欧洲委员会应该提出一个新的政治契约以使解决欧洲经济问题所需要的改革合法化并得以维持，同时新的欧洲理事会和欧洲议会应该批准这一契约。


Good Governance and Economic Performance	良好治理与经济成效


BERLIN – The debate about emerging countries’ growth prospects is now in full swing.	发自柏林——对于新兴市场国家增长前景的讨论如今已经呈现两极化。


Pessimists stress the feared reversal of private capital flows, owing to the US Federal Reserve’s tapering of its purchases of long-term assets, as well as the difficulties of so-called second- and third-generation structural reforms and the limits to “catch up” growth outside of manufacturing.	悲观主义者们对美联储收缩长期资产购买规模所导致的私人资金恐慌性回流忧心不已，再担心所谓第二代和第三代结构改革的艰巨性以及在制造业以外实现“赶超性”增长的局限性。


Optimists argue that the potential for rapid growth remains immense, owing to better macroeconomic fundamentals and the promise of best-practice technology spreading throughout the emerging world.	乐观主义者则认为还存在极大的快速增长空间，因为宏观经济基本面已经大有改善，而且最先进技术也被广泛引入各国，带来更可靠的前景。


So who is right?	那谁才是对的？


Recent events point once again to the importance of good governance and responsive political systems, a familiar topic in studies of long-term economic growth.	最近的事件再一次显示出了良好治理和灵活反应政治体制的重要性，这也是研究长期经济增长中的一个常见议题。


Countries that appeared successful for a long time, such as Turkey or Thailand, suddenly seem to face obstacles related to governance and the ability to forge domestic political compromises.	像土耳其或者泰国这类国家看似长期繁荣，但突然就遭遇了与治理以及实现国内政治妥协有关的桎梏。


The resulting divisiveness and dysfunction are surely bigger threats than the Fed’s tapering.	因此而导致的派系分裂以及国家失能很显然也要比美联储的收缩威胁更大。


It is the nature of governance that determines whether people deploy their talents and energy in pursuit of innovation, production, and job creation, or in rent seeking and lobbying for political protection.	治理的本质就是决定人们是把自己的聪明才智用在创新，生产及制造就业领域，还是花在权力寻租和寻求政治庇护之上。


And here the contrast between Egypt and Tunisia may turn out to be an object lesson in what makes the difference between success and failure.	而埃及和突尼斯之间的差别就成为了定义成功和失败国家之间区别的真实课程。


In Egypt, the old regime under Hosni Mubarak, having failed to democratize, collapsed in the face of massive protest.	在埃及，未能实现民主化的胡斯尼·穆巴拉克旧政权最终在大规模示威下倒台。


A low-turnout election gave a plurality of the popular vote to the Muslim Brotherhood, which came to power alone and proceeded to ignore good governance and alienate all except its most fervent followers.	一场投票率低下的大选让穆斯林兄弟会夺得了多数，随后该党派独立执政并开始忽略良好治理，疏远除了自身狂热支持者之外的所有人。


The Brotherhood’s approach to governance also explains the mess it made of the economy.	兄弟会的治理方式同时也解释了他们为何会把经济搞得一团遭。


Instead of trying to build non-partisan and competent regulatory institutions, all positions were stacked with political followers.	他们不去建立一个中立而称职的监管机构，而是把所有位置都分给了自己的政治支持者。


Unfortunately, the military intervention last July gave rise to yet another regime that seems unable to build durable institutions that could foster political reconciliation and deliver inclusive growth.	不幸的是，去年7月的军队干涉也仅仅是扶持了另一个无力构建长期性机制的政权，自然也无法去孕育政治和解并实现包容性增长。


Tunisia may give us an example of the opposite scenario: a real constitutional compromise supported by an overwhelming majority (reflected in a 200-16 vote in the National Constituent Assembly).	而突尼斯则呈现给我们另一片景象：一场由绝大多数议员所支持的真正的宪法妥协（制宪会议中200票赞成对16票反对）。


If that compromise holds, stability will take hold, markets will function, Tunisia will attract investment, and tourism will thrive again.	如果这一妥协能维持下去，国家就将实现稳定，市场恢复运作，突尼斯也将在再次成为投资和旅游热点。


At the heart of the difference between the two cases is a vision of governance that makes such compromise possible.	而这两个国家的核心区别就是是否拥有一个可以实现政治妥协的治理理念。


Such a vision presupposes an assurance that a winner-take-all system will not be established, as well as broad agreement that regulatory institutions should be reasonably non-partisan and staffed with competent professionals.	这一理念的存在意味着确保不会出现一个赢家通吃的政治体制，同时也广泛认同监管机构应当保持合理中立而其成员高度专业的理念。


China’s long-lasting success is sometimes given as a counterexample to the importance of good governance for economic performance.	但中国的长期繁荣却在某种程度上提供了一个良好治理对经济成效重要性的反例。


The Chinese example certainly calls into question a strong correlation between multi-party democracy and economic growth.	中国显然令人对那些多党制民主和经济增长之间的强相关关系产生了怀疑。


Democracy is of course something valuable in itself and can be desired independently of its effect on economic growth.	民主制度显然本身就具有某种价值，而且不管对其对经济增长的有无作用都值得追求。


But, in the context of economic performance, it is important to emphasize that there is a huge difference between dictatorial regimes, where a single individual monopolizes all power – à la Mubarak or Syrian President Bashar al-Assad – and China, where there has been competition and contestability within a large communist party.	但在经济表现的语境下，应该重点强调那些一人霸占所有权力的独裁政权——比如埃及的穆巴拉克和叙利亚的阿萨德——与中国这样一个在庞大的共产党内部存在竞争和讨论的体制。


And it is the party, operating as a fairly inclusive and meritocratic institution, not an autocratic leader, that has governed in the post-Mao period.	在毛泽东时代过去后，中共是作为一个相当包容而且精英的体制在运作，而不是一人之下万人之上。


Lack of reasonably independent regulation and competent public administration – or, worse, one-person dictatorships – lead inexorably to economic waste and inefficiency, and eventually to political turmoil.	缺乏适当独立的监管和称职的公共行政机构——或是更糟糕的一人专制��—无可避免地导致经济上的浪费和低效，最后引发政治风波。


This is true even in cases like Venezuela, where large oil revenues masked the underlying weakness for a while.	这在委内瑞拉这样在短期内用巨额石油收入掩盖了潜在缺陷的国家也是如此。


In the complex global economy of the twenty-first century, sustained good economic performance requires a panoply of well-functioning institutions that do not fall within a single leader’s purview.	在21世纪的复杂全球经济下，长期持续的良好经济成效取决于一整套运作良好的机制，不可被一个单一领导人所左右。


For example, successful economies require a reasonably independent central bank, and competent bank supervision that does not get dragged into short term politics.	比如说，成功的经济体育要一个相对独立的央行，以及一个不会陷入短期政治的称职银行银行监管机制。


They also need regulatory agencies in sectors such as telecommunications and energy that can pursue policies in accordance with broad goals established by the political process, but with appointees selected according to nonpartisan criteria who then exercise their authority in a way that fosters competition open to all.	它们同时还需要在电信或能源部门建立一些监管机构，这些机构既可以执行一些与政治进程宏大目标相适应的政策，但又必须拥有一批不被党派左右，可以利用自身的权力去促进公开竞争的官员。


When credit decisions, public procurement, construction contracts, and price determination reflect only short-term and purely political goals, good economic performance becomes impossible – even in countries with large natural-resource endowments.	当信贷决策，政府采购，建设合同和价格设定仅仅是短期和单纯政治目的的体现，良好的经济成效就不可能实现——即便是在那些资源资源丰富的国家。


In countries with little or no such endowments – where innovation, competitive efficiency, and a focus on production rather than rents is all the more important – the lack of good governance will lead to failure more rapidly.	在那些资源缺乏的国家——创新，竞争效率和对生产力的关注在这里变得更为重要——没有好的治理就只会堕落得越快。


All of this implies that analyzing the determinants of economic success is a subject not just for economists.	所有这一切都意味着分析力经济成功地决定因素并不仅仅是经济学家的任务。


Why do some societies achieve the compromises needed to sustain an independent judiciary and a modern regulatory framework – both necessary for an efficient modern economy – while others perpetuate a partisan, winner-take-all approach to governance that weakens public policy and erodes private-sector confidence?	为什么某些社会能达成一个支撑现代高效经济体所必需的司法独立和现代监管框架的妥协，而其他国家则长期党同伐异，赢者通吃，最终损害了公共政策并令私人投资者失去信心？


The contrast is starkest in emerging countries, but differences also exist among the advanced economies.	这些对比在新兴市场国家最为明显，但差别同样出现在发达国家之间。


Perhaps Germany’s ability to reach sociopolitical compromise – again demonstrated by the formation of a right-left coalition after the 2013 elections – has been more fundamental to its recent economic success than the details of the fiscal and structural policies it has pursued to achieve it.	或许相对于一些细节性的财政和经济结构政策，德国实现社会政治妥协的能力——在2013年大选后左右联合政府上再度体现出来——才是实现最近一系列经济成就的更基础性因素？


Social Choice and Social Welfare	社会选择与社会福利


CAMBRIDGE – Human beings have always lived in groups, and their individual lives have invariably depended on group decisions.	剑桥—人类一直生活在群体中，他们的个体生活总是取决于群体选择。


But the challenges of group choice can be daunting, particularly given the divergent interests and concerns of the group’s members.	但群体选择的挑战也许令人畏缩，特别是考虑到群体成员之间利益与关注点的分歧。


So, how should collective decision-making be carried out?	那么，集体决策应该如何进行？


A dictator who wants to control every aspect of people’s lives will seek to ignore the preferences of everyone else.	希望掌握人们生活方方面面的独裁者会寻求忽略所有其他人的偏好。


But that level of power is hard to achieve.	但如此水平的权力很难获得。


More important, dictatorship of any kind can readily be seen to be a terrible way to govern a society.	更重要的是，任何类型的独裁都天生被视为恐怖的治理社会方式。


So, for both ethical and practical reasons, social scientists have long investigated how the concerns of a society’s members can be reflected in one way or another in its collective decisions, even if the society is not fully democratic.	因此，出于伦理和实际理由，社会科学家长期以来一直在研究社会成员的关注点如何以某种方式反映于集体决策中，即使该社会非完全民主的社会。


For example, in the fourth century BC, Aristotle in Greece and Kautilya in India explored various possibilities of social choice in their classic books, Politics and Economics, respectively (the Sanskrit title of Kautilya’s book, Arthashastra, translates literally as “the discipline of material wellbeing”).	比如，在公元前四世纪，希腊的亚里士多德和印度的考底利耶（Kautilya）就分别在各自的经典著作《政治学》（Politics）和《经济学》（Economics）中探索了社会选择的各种可能性。 （考底利耶著作的梵文标题为Arthashastra，直译过来就是“关于物质财富的学科”）。


The study of social choice as a formal discipline first came into its own in the late eighteenth century, when the subject was pioneered by French mathematicians, particularly J. C. Borda and Marquis de Condorcet.	社会选择研究第一次步入正式学科是在十九世纪末，先驱式法国数学家，主要包括波尔达（J. C.


The intellectual climate of the time was greatly influenced by the European Enlightenment, with its interest in reasoned construction of a social order, and its commitment to the creation of a society responsive to people’s preferences.	Borda）和马奎斯·孔多塞（Marquis de Condorcet）。 当时的知识界气候受欧洲文艺复兴的巨大影响，人们对理性的社会秩序的构建兴趣浓厚，开始致力于创建响应人民偏好的社会。


But the theoretical investigations of Borda, Condorcet, and others often yielded rather pessimistic results.	但波尔达、孔多塞和其他人的理论研究常常指向悲观结果。


For example, the so-called “voting paradox” presented by Condorcet showed that majority rule can reach an impasse when every alternative is defeated in voting by some other alternative, so that no alternative is capable of standing up to the challenge of every other alternative.	比如，孔多塞提出的所谓的“投票悖论”表明多数统治可能陷入僵局，出现每一种方案都被其他方案在选举中击败的情况，以至于没有一种方案能够战胜其他所有方案的挑战。


Social choice theory in its modern and systematic form owes its rigorous foundation to the work of Kenneth J. Arrow in his 1950 Columbia University PhD dissertation.	现代、系统性的社会选择理论的一个主要基础是肯尼斯·阿罗（Kenneth J. Arrow）在其1950年哥伦比亚大学的博士论文中做出的工作。


Arrow’s thesis contained his famous “impossibility theorem,” an analytical result of breathtaking elegance and reach.	阿罗的论文包括了著名的“不可能定理”，这一分析结果优美无比，也深邃无比。


Arrow’s theorem shows that even very mild conditions of reasonableness in arriving at social decisions on the basis of simple preference rankings of a society’s individuals could not be simultaneously satisfied by any procedure.	阿罗的定理证明，对于以社会中个人的简单偏好排序为基础形成社会决策这一问题，即使是弱理性条件也无法通过任何程序（procedure）同时获得满足。


When the book based on his dissertation, Social Choice and Individual Values, was published in 1951, it became an instant classic.	以其博士论文为基础的《社会选择与个人价值》（Social Choice and Individual Values）出版于1951年，立刻就成为经典著作。


Economists, political theorists, moral and political philosophers, sociologists, and even the general public rapidly took notice of what seemed like – and indeed was – a devastating result.	经济学家、政治理论家、道德和政治哲学家、社会学家、甚至普罗大众很快就注意到了这个似乎——也确实是——灾难性的结果。


Two centuries after visions of social rationality flowered in Enlightenment thinking, the project suddenly seemed, at least superficially, to be inescapably doomed.	在社会理性观点借助文艺复兴思想发展了两个世纪之后，这项大工程突然走向了无可避免的倒塌——至少从表面看是如此。


It is important to understand why and how Arrow’s impossibility result comes about.	理解阿罗不可能定理为何会出现、如何出现十分重要。


Scrutiny of the formal reasoning that establishes the theorem shows that relying only on the preference rankings of individuals makes it difficult to distinguish between very dissimilar social choice problems.	对建立该定理的正式推理的仔细审读表明，只依赖个体偏好顺序导致很难区分截然不同的社会选择问题。


The usability of available information is further reduced by the combined effects of innocuous-seeming principles that are popular in informal discussions.	易得信息的可用性因为在非正式讨论中十分流行的看似无伤大雅的各种原则的组合效应而进一步削弱了。


It is essential, particularly for making judgments about social welfare, to compare different individuals’ gains and losses and to take note of their relative affluence, which cannot be immediately deduced only from people’s rankings of social alternatives.	比较不同个体的利益和损失、注意他们的相对丰裕程度（这无法通过人们对社会方案的排序立刻推得）是至关重要的，特别是在做出关于社会福利的判断方面。


It is also important to examine which types of clusters of preference rankings are problematic for different types of voting procedures.	同样重要的是考察哪些类型的偏好排列窜（cluster）对于不同类型的投票程序有问题。


Nonetheless, Arrow’s impossibility theorem ultimately played a hugely constructive role in investigating what democracy demands, which goes well beyond counting votes (important as that is).	尽管如此，阿罗的不可能定理最终在研究民主要求什么的问题上扮演了巨大的建设性角色，这一问题远远超过了点算票数的范围（尽管这也很重要）。


Enriching the informational base of democracy and making greater use of interactive public reasoning can contribute significantly to making democracy more workable, and also allow reasoned assessment of social welfare.	丰富民主的信息基础、让互动型公共推理排上更大用场可以极大地增强民主的可运作性，也让社会福利的理性评估成为可能。


Social choice theory has thus become a broad discipline, covering a variety of distinct questions.	因此，社会选择理论是一门广阔的科学，覆盖了大量不同问题。


Under what circumstances would majority rule yield unambiguous and consistent decisions?	在何种环境下多数同志能产生不含糊的一致性决策？


How robust are the different voting procedures for yielding cogent results?	产生令人信服结果的不同投票程序的鲁棒性如何？


How can we judge how well a society as a whole is doing in light of its members’ disparate interests?	我们如何判断社会作为一个整体在其成员利益完全不相干的情况下运行的如何？


How, moreover, can we accommodate individuals’ rights and liberties while giving appropriate recognition to their overall preferences?	此外，我们能够在协调个人权利与自由同时给予他们的总体偏好以恰当的承认？


How do we measure aggregate poverty in view of the varying predicaments and miseries of the diverse people who comprise the society?	我们如何在度量总贫困水平时顾及组成社会的不同的人所经历的不同窘况和苦难？


How do we arrive at social valuations of public goods such as the natural environment?	我们如何形成对自然环境等公共品的社会评估？


Beyond these questions, a theory of justice can draw substantially on the insights and analytical results emerging from social choice theory (as I discussed in my 2009 book The Idea of Justice).	除了这些问题，关于正义的理论可以深刻影响来自社会选择理论的洞见和分析结果（我在2009年的著作《正义观念》（The Idea of Justice）中讨论了这一点）。


Furthermore, the understanding generated by social choice theorists’ study of group decisions has helped some research that is not directly a part of social choice theory – for example, on the forms and consequences of gender inequality, or on the causation and prevention of famines.	此外，来自社会选择理论家对群体决策的研究的理解帮助了一些并非直接属于社会选择理论的研究——比如对性别不平等的后果的形式的研究、对饥荒的成因和预防的研究等。


The reach and relevance of social choice theory is extensive.	社会选择理论的深度和重要性是巨大的。


Rather than undermining the pursuit of social reasoning, Arrow’s deeply challenging impossibility theorem, and the large volume of literature that it has inspired, has immensely strengthened our ability to think rationally about the collective decision-making on which our survival and happiness depend.	形成深刻挑战的阿罗不可能定理及其所启发的大量文献并未阻碍对社会理性的追求，而是大大增强了我们理性地思考作为我们的生存和幸福基础的集体决策的能力。


The Exaggerated Death of Inflation	夸大其词的通胀之死


CAMBRIDGE – Is the era of high inflation gone forever?	发自剑桥——高通胀时代已经一去不复返了吗？


In a world of slow growth, high debt, and tremendous distributional pressures, whether inflation is dead or merely dormant is an important question.	在一个增长缓慢，债务高企，分配压力巨大的世界，通货膨胀究竟是死了还是仅仅休眠是一个重要问题。


Yes, massive institutional improvements concerning central banks have created formidable barriers to high inflation.	没错，大量有关中央银行的制度改革针对高通胀建立了巨大的屏障。


But a significant part of a central bank’s credibility ultimately derives from the broader macroeconomic environment in which it operates.	但中央银行信誉的一个重要组成部分最终来自于其运作的宏观经济环境。


In the first half of the 1990s, annual inflation averaged 40% in Africa, 230% in Latin America, and 360% in the transition economies of Eastern Europe.	上世纪90年代前半期，非洲国家年通胀率平均为40%，拉丁美洲为230%，东欧转型经济体为360%。


And, in the early 1980s, advanced-economy inflation averaged nearly 10%.	而在80年代初，发达经济体的通胀率平均接近10%。


Today, high inflation seems so remote that many analysts treat it as little more than a theoretical curiosity.	今天，高通货膨胀看起来那么遥远，许多分析人士只把它当成一个理论上的玩意儿。


They are wrong to do so.	他们这么想是不对的。


No matter how much central banks may wish to present the level of inflation as a mere technocratic decision, it is ultimately a social choice.	无论中央银行如何希望显示出通胀水平仅仅是一个技术性的决定，但它最终还是一个社会选择。


And some of the very pressures that helped to contain inflation for the past two decades have been retreating.	而某些在过去二十年中有助于遏制通货膨胀的压力已经消退。


In the years preceding the financial crisis, increasing globalization and technological advances made it much easier for central banks to deliver both solid growth and low inflation.	在全球金融危机爆发前的几年，越来越多的全球化和技术进步使中央银行更易于实现硬增长和低通胀。


This was not the case in the 1970s, when stagnating productivity and rising commodity prices turned central bankers into scapegoats, not heroes.	这跟上世纪70年代不一样，当时停滞不前的生产力和上涨的商品价格使得中央银行成为替罪羊而非大明星。


True, back then, monetary authorities were working with old-fashioned Keynesian macroeconomic models, which encouraged the delusion that monetary policy could indefinitely boost the economy with low inflation and low interest rates.	毫无疑问，那时，货币机构用老派的凯恩斯主义宏观经济模型来工作，该模型鼓励产生这样一个错觉：货币政策可能会无限期在低通胀和低利率条件下刺激经济。


Central bankers today are no longer so naive, and the public is better informed.	中央银行今天已不再那么天真，公众也了解得更多。


But a country’s long-term inflation rate is still the outcome of political choices not technocratic decisions.	但是，一个国家的长期通胀率仍然是政治选择而非技术专家的决策结果。


As the choices become more difficult, the risk to price stability grows.	当选择变得更加困难，价格稳定的风险也不断增加。


A quick tour of emerging markets reveals that inflation is far from dead.	对新兴市场的快速浏览显示，通货膨胀远远没有��束。


According to the International Monetary Fund’s April 2014 World Economic Outlook, inflation in 2013 reached 6.2% in Brazil, 6.4% in Indonesia, 6.6% in Vietnam, 6.8% in Russia, 7.5% in Turkey, 8.5% in Nigeria, 9.5% in India, 10.6% in Argentina, and a whopping 40.7% in Venezuela.	国际货币基金组织2014年4月的《世界经济展望》指出，2013年巴西的通货膨胀率达到6. 2%，印度尼西亚6.


These levels may be a big improvement from the early 1990s, but they certainly are not evidence of inflation’s demise.	7%。 这些水平比起上世纪90年代初可能是一大进步，但它们肯定不是通胀已死的证明。


Yes, advanced economies are in a very different position today, but they are hardly immune.	是的，今天的发达经济体处于不同的位置，但它们也在劫难逃。


Many of the same pundits who never imagined that advanced economies could have massive financial crises are now sure that advanced economies can never have inflation crises.	许多专家从未想过发达经济体会遭受大规模的金融危机，同样，专家现在也确信发达经济体可以没有通货膨胀危机。


More fundamentally, where, exactly, does one draw the line between advanced economies and emerging markets?	更重要的是，在哪里，确切地说，有谁为发达经济体和新兴市场之间划出了界线？


The eurozone, for example, is a blur.	例如，欧元区，是一个模糊的界限。


Imagine that there was no euro and that the southern countries had retained their own currencies – Italy with the lira, Spain with the peseta, Greece with the drachma, and so on.	试想如果那些南欧国家从未加入欧元并保留了自己货币——意大利的里拉，西班牙的比塞塔，希腊的德拉克马等等。


Would these countries today have an inflation profile more like the United States and Germany or more like Brazil and Turkey?	这些国家现在的通货膨胀形势究竟会更像美国和德国，还是更像巴西和土耳其？


Most likely, they would be somewhere in between.	最有可能的是，它们会在两者之间。


The European periphery would have benefited from the same institutional advances in central banking as everyone else; but there is no particular reason to suppose that its political structures would have evolved in a radically different way.	欧洲外围国家将和其他人一样受益于中央银行制度的进步； 但是没有特别的理由认为其政治结构会往一个完全不同的方向发展。


The public in the southern countries embraced the euro precisely because the northern countries’ commitment to price stability gave them a currency with enormous anti-inflation credibility.	南部国家的公众接受欧元正是因为北部国家对物价稳定的承诺给予了他们一个有着强大反通胀信誉的货币。


As it turned out, the euro was not quite the free lunch that it seemed to be.	事实证明，欧元并不是像它看起来那样是免费的午餐。


The gain in inflation credibility was offset by weak debt credibility.	在通货膨胀方面的信誉增益被不良的债务信誉所抵消。


If the European periphery countries had their own currencies, it is likely that debt problems would morph right back into elevated inflation.	如果欧洲外围国家有自己的货币，那么债务问题将很有可能会引发通胀上涨。


I am not arguing that inflation will return anytime soon in safe-haven economies such as the US or Japan.	我不认为通胀将很快回归经济安全港如美国和日本。


Though US labor markets are tightening, and the new Fed chair has emphatically emphasized the importance of maximum employment, there is still little risk of high inflation in the near future.	尽管美国的劳动力市场正在收紧，以及新任美联储主席着重强调就业最大化的重要性，但在不久的将来，高通货膨胀的风险依然很小。


Still, over the longer run, there is no guarantee that any central bank will be able to hold the line in the face of adverse shocks such as continuing slow productivity growth, high debt levels, and pressure to reduce inequality through government transfers.	然而从长远来看，没有人能保证任何中央银行将能够在面对不利冲击时保持通胀水平，例如持续的生产力增长放缓，高负债水平，以及通过政府转移支付减少不平等的压力。


The risk would be particularly high in the event of other major shocks – say, a general rise in global real interest rates.	风险会在遭受其他重大冲击时变得特别高——例如说，全球实际利率的上升。


Recognizing that inflation is only dormant renders foolish the oft-stated claim that any country with a flexible exchange rate has nothing to fear from high debt, as long as debt is issued in its own currency.	认识到通胀率仅仅是休眠了，我们将看到“任何国家只要拥有灵活的汇率制度，以本国货币发行债务，就不必担心高负债”的通常想法是愚蠢的。


Imagine again that Italy had its own currency instead of the euro.	再次想象一下，如果意大利有自己的货币而不是欧元。


Certainly, the country would have much less to fear from an overnight run on debt.	当然，这个国家不用太担心一夜之间产生的债务。


Nevertheless, given the huge governance problems that Italy still faces, there is every chance that its inflation rate would look more like Brazil’s or Turkey’s, with any debt problems spilling over faster price growth.	然而，由于巨大的治理问题，意大利仍然很有可能因为债务问题溢出快于价格增长而面临像巴西或土耳其那样的通胀率。


Modern central banking has worked wonders to bring down inflation.	现代中央银行已经在降低通胀上创造了奇迹。


Ultimately, however, a central bank’s anti-inflation policies can work only within the context of a macroeconomic and political framework that is consistent with price stability.	然而最终，央行的反通胀政策只能在符合价格稳定的背景下，在宏观经济和政治框架内运作。


Inflation may be dormant, but it is certainly not dead.	通货膨胀可能处于休眠状态，但它肯定并未消亡。


The 4% Non-Solution	4%不是灵药


PARIS – For some time now, there has been concern that central bankers have “run out of bullets.”	巴黎—一段时间以来，有一种声音认为央行行长们已经“黔驴技穷”。


Having lowered their policy rates to near zero, they have engaged in increasingly extravagant measures such as “quantitative easing” and “forward guidance.”	他们已将政策利率降至近零水平，越来越多地采取了“量化宽松”和“前瞻性指引”等“大招”。


Given the fog cast over real economic activity by the financial crisis, it is difficult to offer a definitive assessment of just how well or badly those measures have worked.	考虑到金融危机让实体经济活动状况不甚明了，很难确定地评估这些措施效果的好坏。


But it is clear that there must be a better way to do things.	但显然这些措施不是最好的办法。


There is no longer any reason to let the zero bound on nominal interest rates continue to hamper monetary policy.	让名义利率为零的下限羁绊货币政策早已毫无道理。


A simple and elegant solution is to phase in a switchover to a fully electronic currency, where paying interest, positive or negative, requires only the push of a button.	一个简单又优美的解决方案是逐步向完全电子化的货币靠拢，使用电子货币后，支付利息（正或负）只要按个按钮就行了。


And with paper money – particularly large-denomination notes – arguably doing more harm than good, currency modernization is long overdue.	而若使用纸币——特别是大面额钞票——实际上弊大于利，货币现代化可谓姗姗来迟。


Using an electronic currency, central banks could continue to stabilize inflation exactly as they do now.	使用电子货币，央行能够如同现在所做的那样稳定通胀。


(Citigroup’s chief economist, Willem Buiter, has suggested numerous ways to address the constraint of paper currency, but eliminating it is the easiest.)	（花旗集团首席经济学家威廉·布伊特（Willem Buiter）给出了多种解决纸币造成的不便的方法，但取消纸币是最简单的。 ）


A second, less elegant idea is to have central banks simply raise their target inflation rates from today’s norm of 2% to a higher but still moderate level of 4%.	其次，还有一种不那么优美的办法，即让央行将目标通胀率从今天的标准水平2%提高到仍属温和水平的4%。


The idea of permanently raising inflation targets to 4% was first proposed in an interesting and insightful paper led by IMF chief economist Olivier Blanchard, and has been endorsed by a number of other academics, including, most recently, Paul Krugman.	将通胀目标永久提高到4%的方案首先由IMF首席经济学家奥利佛·布兰查德（Olivier Blanchard）在一篇有趣又深邃的论文中提出，并获得了其他许多学者的支持，包括最近的保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）。


Unfortunately, the problem of making a smooth and convincing transition to the new target is perhaps insurmountable.	不幸的是，实现平稳而有说服力地向新目标转变可能是无法实现的任务。


When Blanchard first proposed his idea, I was intrigued but skeptical.	布兰查德第一次提出他的方案是，我感到非���新鲜，但也有所怀疑。


Mind you, two years previously, at the outset of the financial crisis, I suggested raising inflation to 4% or more for a period of a few years to deflate the debt overhang and accelerate wage adjustment.	请注意，两年前金融危机爆发时，我建议在几年的时间里将通胀提高到4%以实现债务积压的再通胀并加速工资调整。


But there is a world of difference between temporarily raising inflation to address a crisis and unhinging long-term expectations.	但暂时提高通胀解决危机和改变长期预期是完全不同的两码事。


After two decades of telling the public that 2% inflation is Nirvana, central bankers would baffle people were they to announce that they had changed their minds – and not in some minor way, but completely.	二十年来，央行行长们一直告诉公众，2%的通胀是最佳状态，因此人们会产生困惑，难道他们在宣布他们改变主意了吗？ 并且主意还不是略有改变，而是全盘改变。