Mashal has more than one option. He may reemerge as the head of a newly established Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, or as a leader of a new Islamist political party under the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organization.	玛沙尔可以选择的道路很多：他可以凭新成立的穆斯林兄弟会巴勒斯坦分支首脑的身份重新崛起，又或者在打着巴勒斯坦解放运动名号的新伊斯兰政党担任领导人。


Such a merging of Hamas with the established Palestinian political organizations would signify Hamas’s formal acceptance of a two-state solution, and would mark an important step in transforming the movement.	而哈马斯与业已建立的巴勒斯坦政治组织的整合将意味着该组织对两国方案的正式承认，也会在整个运动的转型方面迈出重要一步。


For the West, using the opportunity to influence Hamas’s future course requires modifying the failed policy of all-encompassing rejection.	对西方来说，利用这个影响哈马斯未来进程的机会意味着要修改那种失败的全方位抵制政策。


As in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, Islamist moderates in the Palestinian territories need to be engaged as a legitimate political force.	就跟埃及，摩洛哥和突尼斯一样，巴勒斯坦地区的伊斯兰改革派需要被当作一个合法的政治势力来看待。


Leaders such as Mashal, who has expressed a readiness to forsake alliances with Syria and Iran and to accept a two-state solution with Israel, should be bolstered rather than boycotted.	像马莎尔这类愿意与叙利亚及伊朗决裂并接受两国方案的领导人应当受到支持而非压制。


That means supporting the ongoing effort to form an interim Palestinian government of technocrats, as stipulated in the Qatar agreement.	而这也意味着支持当前为建立一个技术官员领导下的巴勒斯坦临时政府的所有努力，正如卡塔尔协定所列明的那样。


At times, such an approach will be challenging; Hamas will undoubtedly prove to be a difficult counterpart.	有时这样一种方式可能会极富挑战性；


But the United States, European governments, and Israel should take this opportunity to engage Hamas’s moderates and test their flexibility.	哈马斯无疑会是一个极难合作的同路人，但美国，欧洲各国政府以及以色列都应当抓住这个机会与哈马斯改革派接触并试探他们的可塑性。


In the new Middle East, the West’s current approach will only strengthen the hardliners in Gaza and elsewhere.	因为在这个新的中东地区，西方当前所采取的手段只能反过来增强加沙以及其他地区伊斯兰强硬派的力量。


Hamas, Fatah, and the Palestinian Dilemma	哈马斯、法塔赫和巴勒斯坦困局


GAZA CITY – With dueling authorities running Gaza and the West Bank, the Palestinian people find themselves in the middle of an experiment.	加沙城——由于管理加沙和西岸地带的管理机构相互仇视，巴勒斯坦民众感觉自己被当成了试验品。


In Gaza, where Hamas is in charge, the high price of armed resistance to Israel has discredited any attempts to revive the conflict.	在哈马斯管理的加沙地带，武装反抗以色列的高昂代价让重新挑起战端的企图失去了市场。


In the West Bank, under Fatah rule, negotiations have gone nowhere.	而在法塔赫领导的西岸地区，谈判没有取得任何进展。


Neither track of Palestinian politics – resistance or negotiation – offers hope of achieving independence.	巴勒斯坦政治的两条路线——抵抗和谈判——都无法点燃人们独立的希望。


As a result, Palestinians face their most difficult challenge since 1948.	巴勒斯坦人也因此面临着1948年以来最为艰巨的挑战。


Israeli threats of renewing its war on Hamas in the Gaza Strip are taken very seriously.	以色列在加沙地带对哈马斯重启战端的威胁引起了人们的重视。


The scenes of devastation are still vivid in the streets and neighborhoods of Gaza, and Hamas is taking no chances of provoking Israel into a new war.	加沙街道和周边地区的狼籍景象至今仍历历在目，哈马斯不愿冒险刺激以色列发起一场新的战争。


The fighting cost Hamas two of its top leaders, Saeed Siyam and Nizar Rayan, and significantly weakened its military capabilities.	赛义德·西亚姆和尼扎尔·拉扬等两名哈马斯高级领导人在那场战争中丧生，严重削弱了哈马斯的军事实力。


Only recently have these been rebuilt.	哈马斯的军事实力不久前才刚刚恢复。


Hamas finds itself in a difficult position, since its policy calls for strong resistance, alongside politics.	哈马斯发现自己陷入了非常尴尬的境地，因为在政治斡旋的同时进行强力抵抗是它的既定政策。


Yet this policy has failed.	但这项政策遭到了失败。


Hamas has put pressure on all resistance groups in Gaza to refrain from provoking Israel.	哈马斯已对加沙地带的所有抵抗组织施压，要求它们避免刺激以色列。


In an unprecedented statement, Mahmoud al-Zahar, a top Hamas leader, said any missiles fired at Israel from Gaza would be “betrayal missiles.”	哈马斯高级领导人马哈茂德·扎哈尔在一次史无前例的演讲中宣称，从加沙地带向以色列发射的任何导弹都将是“背叛的导弹”。


Instead, Hamas has turned its attention to the West Bank, where it has no political authority.	相反，哈马斯将注意力转向了自己没有设立政治机构的西岸地区。


It has called on Palestinians there to launch a new intifada against Israel, even while insisting on calm in the Gaza Strip.	哈马斯呼吁那里的巴勒斯坦人发动反抗以色列的新的起义，同时却坚持要求加沙地带的局势保持稳定。


Fatah, which runs the West Bank, wants no part of another Palestinian uprising.	管理西岸地带的法塔赫根本不希望发生新的巴勒斯坦起义。


President Mahmoud Abbas has made no secret of his objection to such a strategy.	马哈茂德·阿巴斯总统公开反对所谓的起义策略。


But, with their government unable to do anything about the expansion of Israeli settlements, including in East Jerusalem, as well as continued conflicts over holy sites in Hebron, Bethlehem, and the Al-Aksa mosque, West Bank Palestinians are extremely frustrated.	但由于阿巴斯政府面对以色列定居点在东耶路撒冷的扩张和希伯伦、伯利恒及阿克萨清真寺等地持续不断的冲突无能为力，让生活在西岸的巴勒斯坦民众感到失望之极。


Recent street demonstrations could easily turn into an outbreak of ongoing resistance to Israeli rule.	最近发生的上街游行随时都可能演变成反对以色列统治的持续抵抗运动。


The Palestinian Authority, which runs the West Bank, is afraid that a popular, non-violent intifada might quickly turn violent.	管理西岸地区的巴勒斯坦当局担心吸引很多民众参加的非暴力起义可能迅速演变成暴力起义。


If so, Israel might use it as a pretext to crush the Palestinians and their newly built institutions.	如果真是这样，以色列可能把这作为镇压巴勒斯坦民众及其新组建机构的一项托辞。


This has happened before, during the last intifada in 2002.	2002年上次起义期间，这样的情况就曾经发生过。


There is another scenario that also terrifies Fatah leaders.	法塔赫领导人也害怕出现另外一种情况。


An outbreak of violence could strengthen Hamas and its military wing, Al-Qassam Brigades, in the West Bank.	暴力冲突的爆发很可能加强哈马斯及其军事机构卡桑旅在西岸的势力。


This, in turn, could produce a repeat of the scenario that brought Hamas to power in Gaza in June 2007, when all Fatah authority in the area collapsed after the Israeli withdrawal.	而这反过来又可能重复2007年6月哈马斯掌权的那幕场景，当时区域内所有的法塔赫机构都在以色列撤军后土崩瓦解。


Yet the peace process has been stalled for more than a year, greatly reducing Fatah’s credibility in the West Bank.	但和平进程已经搁置了一年以上，这种现状严重影响了法塔赫在西岸地区的声誉。


Abbas has repeatedly described peace as a strategic choice for the Palestinians.	阿巴斯已经一再强调和平是巴勒斯坦人的战略选择。


But, 17 years since the signing of the Oslo agreement and the launch of bilateral talks between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel, there has been very little movement toward a Palestinian state.	但在《奥斯陆协议》签订以及巴解组织和以色列双边会谈开始17年后，巴勒斯坦建国目标却仍然遥不可及。


In popular opinion, negotiations have reached a dead end.	人们普遍认为谈判已经走进了死胡同。


Arab diplomats also show few signs of optimism.	阿拉伯外交家也没有任何乐观的表示。


At its recent summit in Libya, the Arab League rejected the proximity talks proposed by the United States’ Middle East peace envoy, George Mitchell.	在不久前刚刚举行的利比亚峰会上，阿拉伯联盟拒绝了美国中东和平特使乔治·米切尔提出的举行亲近会谈的提议。


The Arab position is that no proximity talks can be held until Israel freezes its settlement activity in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.	阿拉伯联盟的立场是除非以色列停止在西岸及东耶路撒冷地区兴建定居点的行为，否则不会接受任何亲近会谈的提议。


Palestinian and Arab opinion is waiting for the US, as Israel’s ally, to intervene and press for concessions.	巴勒斯坦和阿拉伯联盟的态度是等待以色列的盟友美国进行干预，迫使其做出让步。


Though the Palestinian economy in the West Bank has improved greatly under Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, this is no substitute for serious peace negotiations.	尽管西岸地区的巴勒斯坦经济在萨拉姆·法耶兹总理的领导下出现了明显的好转，但���然无法取代严肃的和平谈判。


In August 2009, Fayyad declared his vision of a Palestinian state in two years.	2009年8月，法耶兹宣布将在两年内建立巴勒斯坦国。


Under his blueprint, which has received strong financial support from the US and the European Union, the political, economic, and security infrastructure of the Palestinian state would be ready by August 2011.	按照他已得到美国和欧盟强力财政支持的建国计划，巴勒斯坦国的政治、经济和安全基础将在2011年8月得以确立。


Fayyad has also gained the backing of Fatah and most other Palestinian groups in the West Bank.	法耶兹同样争取到了法塔赫和西岸地区其他多数巴勒斯坦团体的支持。


Fayyad’s strategy for international recognition of a Palestinian state is to fight a legal battle against Israel in the United Nations Security Council and other international bodies.	法耶兹争取对巴勒斯坦国国际承认的战略就是要在联合国安理会和其他国际组织中发动针对以色列的法律战役。


He is convinced that establishing a Palestinian state would serve the interest of all parties, and that the odds favor the Palestinians in international political struggle.	他坚信成立巴勒斯坦国符合所有各方的利益，而巴勒斯坦人在国际政治斗争中会赢得多数国家的支持。


Hamas does not share this view, and Palestinian reconciliation efforts have reached an impasse.	哈马斯并不同意这样的观点，导致巴勒斯坦和平事业目前陷入僵局。


The Arab League has given Egypt the lead role in bringing the two sides together, but Hamas has spurned Egypt’s proposals.	阿拉伯联盟把争取双方会谈的领导权赋予了埃及，但哈马斯却拒绝理睬埃及提出的建议。


Now, with questions about President Hosni Mubarak’s successor in the air, Egypt has put aside these talks.	在现在有关胡斯尼·穆巴拉克总统的问题依然悬而未决的情况下，埃及也已无暇顾及会谈的问题。


Palestinians are looking instead to Iran, Hamas’ ally, for signs of any revival in discussions between Fatah and Hamas.	巴勒斯坦人于是寄希望于哈马斯的盟友伊朗，寻找法塔赫和哈马斯恢复谈判的蛛丝马迹。


Palestinians’ choices are limited, and there is no consensus among them on how to proceed.	巴勒斯坦人的选择非常有限，并且他们也没有就下一步的措施达成一致。


But there is a growing sense that the waiting game cannot last much longer.  Whatever comes next will most likely come soon.	但越来越多的人开始意识到，坐等时机的策略不能再继续下去。   无论下一步会采取什么措施，都会很快见分晓。


Hamas in Power	哈马斯执掌政权


The victory of the fundamentalist Hamas in the Palestinian elections will have far-reaching consequences for the region, some totally unexpected.	原教旨主义的哈马斯在巴勒斯坦选举中获胜将给该地区带来深远的影响，某些完全是没有预料到的。


Two aspects, however, are already visible.	但是，两个方面已经清楚了。


The Hamas victory is, first and foremost, an indication of the total failure of the traditional Palestinian leadership to create a body politic.	首先，哈马斯的胜利表明，传统的巴勒斯坦领导阶层建立国家完全失败了。


Palestine is not yet a state, but it is already a failed one.	巴勒斯坦还没有建国，但是它已经是个失败国家了。


Since the Oslo Accords of l993 between Israel and the PLO, the Palestinians enjoyed limited transitional autonomy.	以色列和巴解组织1993年签署奥斯陆协议以来，巴勒斯坦人享有了有限的过渡期自治。


To be sure, the new Palestinian Authority (PA) took power under difficult conditions, but which new liberation movement does not face serious challenges when it finally must govern?	的确，巴勒斯坦权力机构在困难的情况下执政，但是，又有哪一个新的解放运动在最终必须执政管理的时候不是面临严重的挑战呢？


The PA had an opportunity to lay the institutional foundations for a functioning state.	巴勒斯坦权力机构有机会为一个正常运转的国家奠定机制性基础。


But, but instead of supplying the population with the necessary infrastructure – economic development, education, welfare, medical services, housing, and refugee rehabilitation – Yasser Arafat’s Fatah-led PA spent more than 70% of its meager budget on a dozen competing security and intelligence services, neglecting all other spheres of activity.	但是，阿拉法特的法塔赫运动领导的巴勒斯坦权力机构并没有为巴勒斯坦人提供经济发展、教育、福利、医疗、住房以及难民安置等必要的基础设施，而是将其并不宽裕的预算的70％花在了相互钳制的安全和情报部门上，对其他所有方面的活动漠不关心。


It created what is called in Arabic a Mukhabarat (security services) state, very much like what is prevalent in almost all Arab countries – Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, republics and monarchies alike.	它建立了在阿拉伯语中所谓的安全情报国家，与几乎所有类似遍及埃及、叙利亚、沙特等共和制以及君主制的阿拉伯国家非常类似。


The vacuum that the PA left elsewhere, including the social sphere, was filled by Hamas.	巴勒斯坦权力机构在别处、包括在社会领域所留下的真空被哈马斯所填补。


Indeed, its popularity is due not only to its fundamentalist Islamic ideology and its commitment to the destruction of Israel.	事实上，哈马斯广受欢迎不仅仅是由于其原教旨主义伊斯兰意识形态及其致力于消灭以色列。


The high esteem in which Palestinians hold Hamas also grew out of what Hamas actually did for them while the PA squandered its resources.	巴勒斯坦人崇拜哈马斯也是由于当巴勒斯坦权力机构大肆荒废其资源时哈马斯为巴勒斯坦民众所作的实事。


It was not only the endemic corruption of the official Palestinian leadership that turned so many Palestinians from it.	这不仅仅是由于巴勒斯坦领导层腐败横行而使得众多巴勒斯坦人对其敬而远之。


Hamas set up better schools, kindergartens, crèches for mothers, medical centers, welfare services, and programs for youth and women – all of this in addition giving special grants to the families of suicide bombers.	哈马斯建造了更好的学校、幼儿园、育婴堂、医疗中心、福利机构以及针对年轻人和妇女的项目，而且，还给人肉炸弹的家属发放特别抚恤金。


In the elections, Hamas received its dividend for doing what the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority failed to do.	在选举中，哈马斯由于做了法塔赫领导的巴勒斯坦权力机构所没有做的事情而获益。


It is still an open question whether Hamas in government will become more pragmatic and less committed to terrorism: it certainly is a possibility, and one should not prejudge the outcome.	执政后的哈马斯是否会变得务实而且减低从事恐怖主义目前不得而知。 这当然有可能，但是我们不应该提前判断结果。


But nor, on the other hand, is it clear that the existing organs of the Palestinian Authority – especially the security services at its disposal – will allow a peaceful transfer of power.	但是，另一方面，巴勒斯坦权力机构现有的机关，特别是其掌控的安全部门是否会允许权力和平转移目前也并不明朗。


Indeed, no such precedent exists: there has never been a peaceful transfer of power in any of the Arab League’s 22 member states.	实际上，并没有这样的先例。 在阿拉伯联盟的22个成员国中从来就没有过权力的和平转移先例。


Israel’s response to Hamas’s victory will obviously be complicated by its own elections on March 28, and by a government headed by an interim prime minister, Ehud Olmert, owing to Sharon’s incapacitation just weeks after leaving Likud and founding a new, centrist party, Kadima (Forward).	沙龙在脱离利库德党、组建新的中间路线政党-前进党几周后一病不起，临时总理奥尔穆特领导政府。 这些都使得以色列对哈马斯获胜的反应明显地复杂化了。


Despite Sharon's absence, Kadima maintains its lead in public opinion polls – the most recent gave it 44 of the Knesset’s 120 seats, compared to 21 for Labor and 14 for the right-wing rump-Likud, under Binyamin Netanyahu.	尽管沙龙缺席，前进党仍然在民意调查中领先。 最新的调查显示，该党将获得以色列议会120个席位中的44个，工党21个，而内塔尼亚胡领导的右翼残余的利库德党有14个席位。


Kadima’s success is due to Sharon’s main innovation in Israeli politics: the successful unilateral disengagement from Gaza.	前进党的成功是由于沙龙在以色列政治中开创先河，也就是成功地单方面从加沙地带撤军。


That withdrawal was based on the conviction that the gaps between the Israeli and Palestinian positions are too wide to enable meaningful negotiations.	沙龙相信，巴以之间的立场分歧巨大，无法进行有意义的谈判，因此决定撤军。


Hence, Israel must start deciding the future boundaries of the country unilaterally, hoping for eventual negotiations at a later stage.	所以，以色列必须开始单方面决定该国的未来边界，同时希望在未来阶段最终开启谈判。


This is also the line adopted by Olmert.	这也是奥尔穆特的立场。


But Hamas’s victory suggests that the gaps between the Israeli and Palestinian sides will grow even wider, and that the chances for a negotiated settlement will recede even farther into the future.	但是，哈马斯获胜意味着巴以之间的分歧将更为巨大，而谈判解决问题的机会将进一步退缩到未来。


This leaves further unilateral Israeli moves – such as a partial set of withdrawals from selected areas in the West Bank – as the only feasible option.	这样，以色列进一步的单方面行动，例如从西岸特定地区部分撤军就成为唯一可行的选择。


Realistic conflict management will replace utopian hopes for conflict resolution.	现实的冲突管理将取代对解决冲突的乌托邦式的希望。


In a region full of paradoxes, the Hamas victory may have added another one: usually, when extremists on one side become stronger, it plays into the hands of extremists on the other side, producing a dangerous spiral effect.	在中东这一充满自相矛盾的地区，哈马斯获胜将增添另一个矛盾。 通常，当一端的极端主义者变得更为强大之时，就会让另一端的极端主义者坐收渔利，产生危险的螺旋效应。


In this case, however, the victory of the extremist Hamas may strengthen not the extremists of Likud, but, surprisingly, the more moderate centrists of Kadima.	但是，在这一情况下，极端的哈马斯获胜可能不会增强利库德党的极端份子，而是令人惊讶地增强更为温和的前进党中的中间份子。


One cannot be certain of such an outcome, of course, but it is now the best that one can realistically hope for.	当然，我们无法确信这样的结局，但是，这也是我们可以现实地所希望的最佳结局。


Hamas’s Real Enemies	哈马斯真正的敌人


JERUSALEM – In Iran, elements from within the regime are reportedly offering a $1 million reward for the assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak because of his opposition to Hamas in the Gaza Strip.	耶路撒冷－据报道，因埃及总统胡斯尼·穆巴拉克反对加沙地带的哈马斯，伊朗政权内部机构出价一百万美元，作为对暗杀他的奖赏。


In Lebanon, the leader of Hezbollah, backed by Iran and Syria, merely calls for the Egyptian government’s overthrow.	在黎巴嫩，得到伊朗和叙利亚支持的真主党领导人，直接号召推翻埃及政府。


In response to this, Tariq Alhomayed, a Saudi who is editor-in-chief of the newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat , describes Hamas as Iran’s tool, and argues that “Iran is a real threat to Arab security.”	作为对此的回应，《阿沙尔克奥萨报》（ Al-Sharq al-Awsat） 主编，沙特人塔利克·艾哈迈德（Tariq Alhomayed）将哈马斯称为伊朗的工具，并且认为“伊朗是对阿拉伯世界安全的真正威胁”。


Egypt’s foreign minister, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, agrees – and he is not alone.	埃及外交部长艾哈迈德·阿布·盖特（Ahmed Aboul Gheit）对此表示同意——并且不只他一个人表示同意。


When Arab states met to discuss the Gaza crisis, Saudi Arabia vetoed any action.	当阿拉伯国家开会讨论加沙危机时，沙特阿拉伯否决了所有的行动。


Even the Palestinian Authority (PA) blames Hamas for the fighting.	即使是巴勒斯坦当局（PA），也认为哈马斯应该对战争负责。


Activists in Fatah, Hamas’s nationalist rival which runs the PA, make no secret of their hope that Hamas loses the war.	哈马斯的民族主义竞争对手，掌管着巴勒斯坦当局的法塔赫的活动家，毫不掩饰他们希望哈马斯输掉战争。


Welcome to the new Middle East, characterized no longer by the Arab-Israeli conflict, but by an Arab nationalist-Islamist conflict.	欢迎来到新中东，它再也不是以阿拉伯－以色列冲突为特征了，而是以阿拉伯民族主义－伊斯兰主义冲突为特征了。


Recognizing this reality, virtually all Arab states – other than Iran’s ally, Syria – and the PA want to see Hamas defeated in the Gaza Strip.	意识到这一现实，几乎所有的阿拉伯国家-——除了伊朗的盟友叙利亚之外——以及巴勒斯坦当局都希望哈马斯在加沙地带被击败。


Given their strong self-interest in thwarting Islamist revolutionary groups, especially those aligned with Iran, they are not inclined to listen to the “Arab street” – which is far quieter than it was during previous conflicts, such as the 1991 war in Kuwait, the 2000-2004 Palestinian uprising, or the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war.	鉴于他们自身在挫败伊斯兰革命团体——特别是那些和伊朗结盟的团体——中的利益，他们不想关注“阿拉伯街”了，它比在以前发生的冲突中——例如1991年的科威特战争，2000年到2004年的巴勒斯坦起义，以及2006年的以色列真主党战争，要安静得多。


Today’s Middle East is very different from the old one in many significant ways.	当前的中东和过去的中东在许多重要的方面有很大的不同。


First, the internal politics of every Arab country revolves around a battle between Arab nationalist rulers and an Islamist opposition.	首先，每个阿拉伯国家的内部政治都是以阿拉伯民族主义当权者和伊斯兰主义反对派间的斗争为中心的。


In other words, Hamas’s allies are the regimes’ enemies.	也就是说，哈马斯的盟友是这些政权的敌人。


An Islamist state in the Gaza Strip would encourage those who seek to create similar entities in Egypt, Jordan, and every other Arab country.	一个位于加沙地带的伊斯兰主义国家，对那些寻求在埃及、约旦以及其他阿拉伯国家建立类似实体的人来说，是一种鼓舞。


Already, a tremendous price has been paid in lives and treasure for this conflict.	人们已经为这次冲突在人员和财产方面付出了巨大的代价。


The violence has included civil wars among Palestinians and Algerians; the bloodshed in Iraq; and terrorist campaigns in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.	暴力活动包括了巴勒斯坦和阿尔及利亚的内战，伊拉克流的血冲突，以及埃及和沙特阿拉伯的恐怖活动。


In the Palestinian case, after winning an election victory and making a deal with Fatah for a coalition government, Hamas turned on its nationalist rivals and drove them out of Gaza by force.	在巴勒斯坦这一个案中，在获得选举胜利以及和法塔赫达成组成联合政府的协议以后，哈马斯激怒其民族主义竞争对手并使用武力将他们赶出了加沙。


In return, the PA has been repressing Hamas in the West Bank.	作为对此的回应，巴勒斯坦当局在约旦河西岸镇压哈马斯。


In Lebanon, Hezbollah has been trying to bully its more moderate Sunni Muslim, Christian, and Druze rivals into submission.	在黎巴嫩，真主党设法压迫其更为温和的逊尼派穆斯林，基督教以及德鲁兹派（Druze）竞争对手，使他们顺从。


Second, because Arab states confront an Iran-Syria alliance that includes Hamas and Hezbollah, in addition to internal conflicts, there is a regional battle between these two blocs.	其次，因为阿拉伯国家对抗的是一个包括哈马斯和真主党在内的伊朗－叙利亚联盟，除了内部冲突之外，在这两大集团之间还有区域争斗。


An aspect of this is that the largely Sunni Muslim-led states face a largely Shia Muslim-led competitor for regional hegemony.	这个争斗的一个方面是，大部分逊尼派穆斯林领导的国家面临着主要是由什叶派穆斯林领导的竞争对手建立区域霸权的挑战。


These two problems pose far greater dangers to the existing states than does any (largely fabricated) Israeli threat, and the region’s rulers know it.	这两个问题比其他任何以色列威胁（这在很大程度上是虚构的），对现有国家的威胁都要大得多，并且该地区的领导人很清楚这一点。


On the other side of the divide, Iran and its allies have put forward the banners of jihad and “resistance.”	在对立的另一面，伊朗及其盟友打出了圣战和“抵抗”的旗帜。 他们的纲领包括：在所有国家进行伊斯兰革命；


Their platform includes: Islamist revolution in every country; Iran as the region’s dominant state, backed up by nuclear weapons; no peace with Israel and no Palestinian state until there can be an Islamist one encompassing all of Israel (as well as the West Bank and Gaza Strip); and the expulsion of Western influence from the region.	以核武器作后盾的伊朗是该地区的主导国家； 不与以色列媾和，在建立一个完全包围以色列（以及约旦河西岸和加沙地带）的国家之前，不建立巴勒斯坦国；


This is a very ambitious program, probably impossible to achieve.	这是一个非常雄心勃勃的计划，或许根本就不可能实现。


Nevertheless, it is a prescription for endless terrorism and war: both pro- and anti-Iranian revolutionary Islamists believe that, because God is on their side and their enemies are cowardly, they will win, and they are quite prepared to spend the next half-century trying to prove it.	然而，这是对无休止的恐怖主义和战争开出的一个处方：支持和反对伊朗革命伊斯兰主义的人都认为，因为真主是站在他们那一边的，他们的敌人很懦弱，所以他们一定会取得胜利，而且他们对用接下来的半个世纪的时间来证明这一点，作好了充分的准备。


While this seems to be a very pessimistic assessment of the regional situation, the radical Islamist side has many weaknesses.	虽然这看起来似乎是对该地区局势的一个非常悲观的评估，但是，激进的伊斯兰主义一方有许多弱点。


Launching losing wars may make Islamists feel good, but being defeated is a costly proposition, for their arrogance and belligerence antagonizes many who might otherwise be won over to their cause.	进行会输掉的战争可能会让伊斯兰主义者感觉良好，但是，被打败是一个代价沉重的命题，因为他们的傲慢和好斗，使原本可以争取过来支持其事业的人对他们产生了反感。


In addition, the situation provides a good opportunity for Western policymakers.	而且，这种局面为西方政策制定者提供了良好的时机。


The emphasis should be on building coalitions among the relatively moderate states that are threatened by radical Islamist forces, and on working hard to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons – a goal that is in the interests of many in the region.	西方政策的重点，应该放在在受到激进伊斯兰主义势力威胁的相对温和的国家间建立联盟，以及努力防止伊朗获得核武器上——这是一个符合该地区许多人利益的目标。


The worst mistake would be to follow the opposite policy – an inevitably futile effort to appease the extremists or seek to moderate them.	在这里，最糟糕的错误就是实行相反的政策——即进行安抚极端分子或��试图软化他们的必定徒劳无益的努力。


Such a campaign actually disheartens the relative moderates who, feeling sold out, will try to cut their own deal with Tehran.	这样的活动事实上会使设法切断自己和德黑兰联系的相对温和派失望，并感到被出卖了。


The current crisis in Gaza is only one aspect of the much wider battle shaking the region.	当前加沙的危机，仅仅是在该地区引发混乱的更广泛的战斗的一个方面。


Helping Hamas would empower radical Islamism and Iranian ambitions, while undercutting the PA and everyone else, not just Israel.	帮助哈马斯会增强激进的伊斯兰主义以及伊朗的野心，同时削弱巴勒斯坦当局以及其他国家的力量，而不仅仅是以色列的力量。


Arab states don’t want to help their worst enemy. Why should anyone else?	阿拉伯国家都不愿意帮助他们最坏的敌人，其他人为什么要这样做呢？


Italy’s Downward Spiral	意大利的下降螺旋


MUNICH – Italy is now in a triple-dip recession.	慕尼黑—意大利目前陷入了三次探底衰退。


But it didn’t get there by itself.	但这不是它自身造成的。


Yes, the economy’s long slide reflects Italian leaders’ failure to confront the country’s loss of competitiveness; but it is a failure that is widely shared in Europe.	是的，意大利经济的长期下滑反映出意大利领导人没能直面该国竞争力下降的局面，但这是欧洲的普遍问题。


When the financial crisis erupted in the fourth quarter of 2007, Italy’s GDP plummeted by 7%, then picked up by 3%, dropped again by 5%, rebounded by a measly 0.1%, and lately, during the first half of this year, shrank again, this time by 0.3%.	2007年四季度，当金融危机爆发时，意大利 GDP下跌7%，随后反弹3%，然后再下跌5%，再略微反弹了0. 1%，而最近，在今年上半年，再一次出现下跌，幅度为0.


Altogether, Italian GDP has contracted by 9% during the past seven years.	3%。 综合言之，意大利GDP在过去七年中收缩了9%。


Industrial production, moreover, has plunged by a staggering 24%.	此外，工业产出降幅达到了惊人的24%。


Only thanks to stubbornly persistent inflation has Italy’s nominal GDP managed to remain constant.	感谢顽固高企的通胀，意大利名义GDP仍能保持不变。


Overall unemployment has climbed to 12%, while the rate for youth not attending school has soared to 44%.	总体失业率攀升至12%，未在校年轻人比率暴增至44%。


Italy has tried to counteract the economic contraction by increasing its public debt.	意大利试图通过增加公共债务抵御经济收缩。


With the European Central Bank and intergovernmental rescue operations keeping interest rates low, Italy’s public debt has been able to rise by one-third from the end of 2007 to the spring of 2014.	欧洲央行和跨政府援助操作保持了低利率，意大利公共债务水平得以在2007年底到2014年春期间增加三分之一。


Italy’s new prime minister, Matteo Renzi, wants to stimulate growth.	意大利新总理伦齐想要刺激经济。


But what he really intends to do is accumulate even more debt.	但他的真正做的是积累更多债务。 诚然，债务刺激需求；


True, debt spurs demand; but this type of demand is artificial and short-lived.	但这种类型的需求是人为创造的，也是短命的。


Sustainable growth can be achieved only if Italy’s economy regains its competitiveness, and within the eurozone there is only one way to accomplish this: by reducing the prices of its goods relative to those of its eurozone competitors.	意大利经济只有重新获得竞争力，才能实现可持续增长，而要想在欧元区内部增强竞争力，只有一条路：降低意大利商品相对于欧元区竞争对手的价格。


What Italy managed in the past by devaluing the lira must now be emulated through so-called real depreciation.	过去，意大利可以通过贬值里拉实现这一点，如今则必须通过所谓的真实贬值。


The era of low interest rates that followed the decision in 1995 to introduce the euro inflated a massive credit bubble in southern eurozone countries, which was sustained until the end of 2013.	1995年引入欧元的决定带来了低利率时代，也给欧元区南部国家带来了巨大的信用泡沫，一直维持到2013年末。


During this time, Italy became 25% more expensive (on the basis of its GDP deflator) than its eurozone trading partners.	在此期间，意大利相对其欧元区贸易伙伴变贵了25%（以GDP平减指数衡量）。


Seventeen percentage points of this rise can be accounted for by higher inflation, and eight percentage points through a revaluation of the lira conducted prior to the introduction of the euro.	这一增长中有十七个百分点可以用更高的通胀解释，八个百分点可以用引入欧元前的里拉升值解释。


Relative to Germany, Italy became a whopping 42% more expensive.	相对德国，意大利变贵幅度达到了惊人的42%。


That price differential – and nothing else – is Italy’s problem.	这一价格差，而不是其他，才是意大利的问题所在。


There is no other solution for the country than to correct this imbalance by means of real depreciation.	意大利就别无办法，只能通过真实贬值纠正这一失衡。


But accomplishing that is easier said than done.	但说起来容易做起来难。


Raising prices is almost never a real problem.	价格升高几乎永远都不是真正的问题。


Lowering them or making them rise more slowly than prices in competing countries is painful and unnerving.	降低价格或使其比竞争对手国更慢地上涨是痛苦且令人焦躁的。


Even if a country’s trade unions enable such a policy through wage moderation, debtors would run into difficulties, because they borrowed on the assumption that high inflation would continue.	即使一国工会通过降薪让这一政策成为可能，债务国也会陷入困境，因为它们基于高通胀会持续的假设借贷。


Many companies and households would go bankrupt.	许多公司和家庭将走向破产。


Given that disinflation or deflation leads through a valley of tears before competitiveness improves, there is reason to doubt whether election-minded politicians, with their short-term orientation, are capable of staying the course.	在竞争力改善之前，经济将跌入无通胀或通缩的泪水之谷，因此有理由怀疑以当选为目标的目光短浅的政客是否能够坚持住。


Former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi wanted to solve the problem by withdrawing Italy from the eurozone and devaluing the new currency.	前总理贝卢斯科尼试图通过让意大利退出欧元区然后贬值新货币解决问题。


He conducted exploratory conversations with other eurozone governments in the autumn of 2011, and had sought an agreement with Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou, who proposed a referendum that effectively would have meant choosing between strict austerity and exiting the eurozone.	2011年秋，他与其他欧元区国家政府开展了试探性交流，并与希腊总理帕潘德里欧达成了一致，后者建议举行实质上是在严格的紧缩和退出欧元区两个选项中做选择的公投。


But both leaders had to resign, only three days apart, in November 2011.	但2011年11月，会晤结束短短三天后，两位领导人不得不辞职。


Higher political considerations, as well as the interests of the banking system, militated against an exit.	更高的政治考虑，以及银行系统的利益扼杀了退出选项。


The economist Mario Monti, who followed Berlusconi as Prime Minister, attempted a real depreciation, introducing greater flexibility into the labor market in order to force the unions into wage concessions.	继贝卢斯科尼出任总理的蒙蒂试图采取真实贬值，他给劳动力市场注入了更大的灵活性，目的是迫使工会在工资问题上让步。


But Monti’s efforts came to naught; among other problems, the ECB, with its generous financial help, removed the pressure from both unions and companies.	但蒙蒂的努力毫无效果； 除了其他问题，原因在于欧洲央行慷慨的金融援助缓解了工会和公司的压力。


Enrico Letta, who followed Monti as the head of Italy’s government, lacked a clear concept for reform, and in turn was followed by the charismatic Renzi.	蒙蒂的继任者莱塔缺乏明确的改革概念，而在他之后出任意大利政府首脑的就是魅力超凡的伦齐了。


But, though Renzi expends much verbal energy on the economy, so far he has given no indication that he understands the nature of Italy’s problem.	但是，尽管伦齐口头上给经济打了很多气，到目前为止尚未证明他能够理解意大利问题的性质。


Renzi is not alone in this.	在这方面，伦齐不是孤家寡人。


On the contrary, virtually the entire European political elite, from Brussels to Paris to Berlin, still believes that Europe is suffering from a mere financial and confidence crisis.	相反，几乎在整个欧洲政治精英圈，从布鲁塞尔到巴黎再到柏林，人们都仍然认为欧洲所经历的只是金融和信心危机。


The underlying loss of competitiveness is not discussed, because that is a problem that discussion alone cannot resolve.	竞争力的根本性缺失根本没有得到讨论，因为这是个光靠讨论无法解决的问题。


Free-Trade Pitfalls	自由贸易陷阱


MUNICH − The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, currently the subject of intense negotiations between the European Union and the United States, is making big waves.	慕尼黑——目前欧盟和美国紧张谈判的跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系主题正在产生巨大的影响力。


Indeed, given the scale of the two economies, which together account for more than 50% of world GDP and one-third of global trade flows, the stakes are high.	事实上，鉴于两大经济体规模合计超过全世界GDP的50%及全球贸易总量的三分之一，谈判涉及的利益巨大。


In order to ensure that the TTIP benefits consumers on both sides of the Atlantic, those negotiating it must recognize and avoid several key traps – some more obvious than others.	为确保跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系（TTIP）惠及大西洋两岸的消费者，那些谈判专家必须看到并避开几个关键的陷阱——虽然其中有些明显但有些不太容易识别。


Bilateral trade agreements have been gaining traction lately.	双边贸易协议最近呈现了蓬勃发展的势头。


For example, the EU and Canada recently concluded a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, which is likely to become the basis for the TTIP.	比方说，欧盟和加拿大最近签署了一份全面经济贸易协定，该协定很可能为跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系奠定基础。


This is not surprising, given the repeated failure of attempts to reach a global agreement via the World Trade Organization.	鉴于世贸组织订立全球协议的努力一再失败，这种情况并不令人惊讶。


The Doha Round of WTO talks was a flop, and the agreement reached in Bali last year, despite being sold as a success, does little more than accelerate the collection of customs duties.	世贸多哈回合谈判无疾而终，而去年在巴厘岛达成的协议尽管被吹捧为成功的范例，却仅仅起到加速关税征收的作用。


As it stands, fear of insufficient consumer protection, distorted by vested interests, is dominating the TTIP debate.	既然如此，对消费者保护不力的担心在既得利益的扭曲下正主宰着跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系辩论。


Consider the disagreement over the differing treatment of chicken.	以肉鸡不同处理方法所引发的分歧为例。


In the US, chicken meat is washed in chlorinated water; in Europe, chickens are stuffed with antibiotics while alive.	美国用氯化水来洗涤鸡肉； 而欧洲则在肉鸡屠宰之前饲喂各种抗生素。


In an effort that can be described only as absurd, European producers are attempting to convince their customers that the former method is worse for consumers.	欧洲生产商试图说服顾客美式做法对消费者更加不利只能用荒唐两字来形容。


In reality, consumer protection in the US is considerably better and stricter than in the EU, where, following the European Court of Justice’s Cassis de Dijon decision, the minimum standard applicable to all countries is set by the country with the lowest standard in each case.	现实是美国消费者保护较欧盟更加严格完善，因为欧洲法院的卡西斯第戎决议生效后，所有国家适用的最低标准由特定情况下国家的最低标准决定。


By contrast, the US Food and Drug Administration enforces the highest product standards, meaning that, under the TTIP, European consumers would gain access to higher-quality products at lower prices.	相比之下，美国食品和药物管理局强制执行最高的产品标准，也就是说在跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系下，欧洲消费者将以更低的价格获得更高质量的产品。


The main benefit of trade facilitation is that it enables countries to specialize in the areas in which they are most capable.	贸易促进的主要好处是使各国专注发展自己最为擅长的领域。


As Ralph Ossa showed in a working paper for the US National Bureau of Economic Research, if Germany did not have access to international markets, its standard of living would be half of what it is now.	正如拉尔夫·奥萨向美国国家经济研究局提交的工作报告所显示的那样，如果德国没有利用��际市场，其生活水平可能只有现在的一半左右。


The TTIP, according to the Ifo Institute’s Gabriel Felbermayr, could improve German living standards by 3-5%.	德国经济研究所的Gabriel Felbermayr表示跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系可以让德国生活水平提高3-5%。


But these benefits are far from guaranteed.	但上述收益并不是肯定会有。


One major risk of trade facilitation is trade diversion – that is, a reduction in customs duties between two countries leads consumers to avoid less expensive products from third countries.	贸易促进的主要风险之一是贸易转移——即两国间征收关税的减少导致消费者拒绝选择来自第三国的更为廉价的产品。


If consumer savings do not outweigh the decline in countries’ customs revenue, the end result is reduced welfare.	如果消费者节省下来的金额赶不上国家降低的关税，那么最终结果是民众福利将因此受损。


Avoiding such an outcome requires provisions enabling a wider set of countries, in particular China and Russia, to participate in the trade-facilitation process on equal terms.	规定必须允许更多国家，特别是中国和俄国以平等条件加入贸促进程才能避免出现类似的结果。


Indeed, building a sort of “economic NATO” that excludes powers like Russia and China would be inadvisable both economically and politically.	事实上，成立将俄中两国排除在外的某种形式的“经济北约”无论在经济还是政治方面都不是明智的选择。


Instead, these countries should be included in the negotiation process.	相反，谈判进程理应寻求这些国家的加入。


Another potential risk concerns investment protection.	另一个潜在风险是投资保护。


As it stands, it is acceptable for the EU to assume responsibility when its own health and environmental-protection measures function as de facto trade barriers.	目前的情况是，在欧盟自身健康及环境保护措施实际起到贸易壁垒作用的情况下欧盟承担责任可以接受。


EU directives capping the CO2 emissions of cars, for example, are actually a kind of industrial policy aimed at protecting small French and Italian automobiles.	比方说，欧盟设定汽车二氧化碳排放上限的指令实际是某种意在保护法意小型车的行业政策。


Investment protection would limit this kind of abuse.	投资保护能限制这种权力滥用。


But it is not acceptable for the EU to offer foreign investors protection from a European country’s inability to meet its obligations, in particular to service its debt.	但欧盟因欧洲国家无法履行其义务，特别是无法偿债而向外国投资者提供保护并不可取。


Such a move, as Handelsblatt’s Norbert Häring recently pointed out, would transform the TTIP into a mechanism for mutualizing liability within the EU.	正如《德国商报》的Norbert Häring 最近指出的那样，此举可能把跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系变成债务责任共有化的工具。


EU-wide investment guarantees would artificially reduce the rate of interest under which single EU countries could borrow and thus encourage these countries to take on more debt, effectively suspending the self-correcting mechanism of the capital markets.	欧盟范围内的投资担保将会人为降低某个欧盟国家的借贷利率，因此鼓励这些国家承担更多债务，从而在实际上中止了资本市场的自我修正机制。


That would lead to the next act in the European debt disaster, with consequences that far outweigh the TTIP’s benefits.	这会将欧债灾难拖入下一幕，由此产生的后果远大于跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系带来的好处。


The TTIP undoubtedly has considerable potential to boost economic performance on both sides of the Atlantic.	跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系无疑在提高大西洋两岸经济表现方面颇具潜力。


But it will mean nothing if the agreement is allowed to serve as a back door to European debt mutualization through what effectively might come close to Eurobonds.	但如果通过实际接近于欧洲债券的机制允许该协议沦为欧债共同化的后门，那么这项协议就没有任何意义。


Europe’s Next Moral Hazard	欧洲的下一个道德风险


MUNICH – The euro crisis has passed through six phases so far.	慕尼黑—到目前为止，欧元危机已经过去了六个阶段。


It is worth recalling them, because they show how policymakers stumbled along, trying to put out fires without keeping an eye on where their chosen path was leading them.	回顾一下是值得的，因为这显示了决策者是怎样蹒跚而行、试图扑灭大火又不去关注他们所选择的道路的去向的。


Currently, markets remain calm, but this is only the beginning of a seventh phase of the crisis, during which Europe will become mired in debt.	目前，市场已经冷静下来，但这只是危机第七阶段的开端，在这个阶段中，欧洲将深陷债务泥淖。


The sequence so far has been as follows:	到目前为止的事情发展过程是这样的：


The limiting of creditors’ and investors’ liability to a mere 8% of the balance-sheet total of banks in the context of Europe’s new banking union – a measure aimed at ensuring more private international lending to stricken banks.	欧元区南部国家依靠印钞机代替私人国际融资，之所以能够如此，是因为欧元区国家中央银行同意银行以低标准抵押品获得再融资信用。 欧洲央行通过证券市场计划（Securities Markets Program）购买公债，这样做的目的正是维持这些抵押品的价值。


The seventh phase of the crisis is one of enhanced moral hazard, stemming from a run-up in debt.	欧洲央行通过直接货币交易（OMT）计划框架许下无限量购买公债承诺，以鼓励更多私人资本流向南欧，因为财政救援还不足以解决问题，并且在政治上限制太多。 在欧洲新的银行联盟条件下，债权人和投资者负债被限制在银行资产负债表总规模的8%，这样做是为了确保更多的私人国际贷款流向受困银行。


With investment risks largely collectivized by the bailout measures instituted by the ECB and the eurozone’s member governments, investors are once again accepting low yields, and borrowers are seizing the new opportunities.	危机的第七阶段是道德风险加剧的阶段，起因在于债务的急剧增长。 投资风险大体上被欧洲央行和欧元区成员国政府创造的援助措施集体化了，因此投资者再一次接受了低收益率，借款人也在抓住新机会。


To be sure, in 2011 a so-called fiscal compact was agreed in order to avoid precisely this consequence.	平心而论，2011年达成的所谓的财政契约正是为了避免这一结果。


The compact, signed by all European Union member states except the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, obliges governments among other things to reduce their (smoothed) debt/GDP ratio annually by one-twentieth of the difference between the actual debt/GDP ratio and the Maastricht limit of 60%.	这份由所有欧盟成员国（英国和捷克除外）签署的契约要求政府承担每年降低（经平滑后的）债务/GDP比率，降低幅度为实际债务/GDP比率与马斯特里赫特条约所规定的60%上限差额的二十分之一。


However, the exceptions foreseen in the compact have effectively removed theses constraints.	���是，该契约所预见的例外实际上取消了这一约束。


Had the compact been enforced, Italy would have had to reduce its debt/GDP ratio from 121% in 2011 to 112% in 2014.	如果该契约被强制实施，那么意大利应该在2011年到2014年间将其债务/GDP比率从121%降至112%。


Instead, Italy’s debt ratio has skyrocketed, with a forecast by the European Commission projecting it to reach 134% at the end of this year.	相反，意大利的债务比率却大幅上升，根据欧盟委员会的预测，到今年年底这一比率将达到134%。


Likewise, Spain’s debt ratio should have fallen from 71% to 69%, but will probably increase to 99%.	类似地，西班牙的债务比率应该从71%降至69%，但却有可能升至99%。


Greece’s debt ratio will rise from 170% to 177% (despite a 58-percentage-point debt-relief scheme in 2012), Portugal’s will surge from 108% to 127%, and France’s will rise from 86% to 96%.	希腊的债务比率将从170%升至177%（尽管在2012年获得了58个百分点的债务纾困），葡萄牙的债务比率将从108%升高到127%，法国将从86%升高到96%。


But, instead of ruefully admitting their failures, the governments in question are now going on the offensive by rejecting austerity categorically.	但是，这些问题国家的政府并没有沮丧地承认失败，反而叫嚣着断然拒绝紧缩。


Italy’s new prime minister, Matteo Renzi, came to power on that platform.	意大利新总理兰奇就是这样问鼎宝座的。


Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras is trying to counter his leftist rival Alexis Tsipras in the same way.	希腊总理萨马拉斯正在用同样的手段反制其左派对手齐普拉斯（Alexis Tsipras）。


Portugal’s Constitutional Court has thwarted the country’s fiscal-consolidation efforts.	葡萄牙宪法法院驳回了该国的财政整合计划。


And France’s new prime minister, Manuel Valls, is also moving against austerity.	法国新总理瓦尔斯也反对紧缩。


Supposedly, everyone just wants more growth; unfortunately, when politicians talk about growth, what they usually mean is that they should be permitted to incur more public debt.	想必人人都希望增长能够提高，但不幸的是，当政客言及增长时，他们的意思通常是应该允许他们背负更多的债务。


An increase in public debt causes a short-term surge in demand, helping to increase the degree of capacity utilization and keep unemployment in check.	公债的增加在短期可以带来需求上升，有助于提高产能利用率、维持就业稳定。


However, new debt is nothing but a form of dope, reducing pressure to take painful measures that would improve competitiveness and capacity growth.	但是，新债务只不过是麻醉剂，缓解了采取痛苦措施提高竞争力和产能增长的压力。


de facto debt mutualization that has prompted creditors to accept lower interest rates, and it is only lower interest rates that have permitted Renzi, Samaras, Valls, and the others to distance themselves from austerity policies.	这一新出现的债务纪律松弛现象反映了潜在破产成本的社会化，所有欧元区国家都在通过建立联合责任机制走这条道路。 正是这一债务共同化的现状鼓励了债权人接受低利率，而只有低利率才能让兰奇、萨马拉斯、瓦尔斯和其他人对紧缩政策敬而远之。


There is nothing surprising about this: When a decision-maker can claim full credit for a policy’s benefits and collectivize the costs, he will pursue the policy sooner, more quickly, and to a larger extent than he would if he had to bear the costs alone.	这些都不足为奇：政策若成功，功劳都是决策者的； 若失败，成本可以集体化，在这样的情况下，决策者自然会又早又快地追求这这一政策，并且手笔比他需要独自承担责任时更大。


What is remarkable is how matter-of-factly Europe’s transgressors succeed in cloaking themselves with the mantle of a new social breakthrough.	值得注意的是事实上的欧洲违规者成功地为自己披上了新社会突破的外衣。


One only needs to look at the United States to see how dangerous – and indeed unsustainable – the eurozone’s path has become.	只要看看美国你就能明白，欧元区的道路有多危险并且不可持续。


When one of the US states runs up too much debt, creditors become jittery and austerity measures are introduced to avert the risk of bankruptcy – as has happened in the past few years in California, Illinois, and Minnesota.	当美国某个州债务过多时，债权人就会感到紧张，该州就会采取紧缩措施以防止破产成本——过去几年，加州、伊利诺伊州和明尼苏达州都发生过这样的情况。


But all of that occurs while the debt/GDP ratio is still minimal and clearly below 10%, because creditors know that no one will come to their aid.	但所有这些情况都发生在债务/GDP只有不到区区10%的时候，因为债权人知道没人会出手援助。


The Federal Reserve will not buy their government bonds, and the federal authorities will not issue any guarantees.	美联储不会购买州政府债券，联邦当局也不会给予任何担保。


In Europe, by contrast, easy access to the local printing presses before and after the foundation of the ECB, together with the new fiscal rescue mechanisms, ensure that investors start to become nervous only when debt ratios are 10-20 times as high.	相反，在欧洲，欧洲央行成立前后本国印钞机随时待命，更有新的财政救援机制确保投资者只有在债务比率比美国高出10倍20倍时才会开始担心。


As a result, the debt level rises until it spirals out of control.	结果，债务水平会一直增加到失控的程度。


The critical limit beyond which creditors become anxious has been raised significantly by the bailout architecture put in place over the last two years.	过去两年所实施的援助机制让债权人的焦虑阈值大大提高了。


This will bring a few years of calm as debt levels climb steadily to that limit.	这将带来几年的平静期，在此期间债务水平会稳步升高到这一阈值。


Then the storm will come, battering ordinary citizens, while today’s leaders remain high and dry, drawing pensions.	然后，风暴将不期而至，重创普罗大众，而今天的领导人们可以拿着退休金高枕无忧。


Happiness, Money, and Giving It Away	幸福、金钱以及散财


Would you be happier if you were richer?	如果你有更多钱的话你是不是会更加幸福呢？


Many people believe that they would be.	许多人认为是的。


But research conducted over many years suggests that greater wealth implies greater happiness only at quite low levels of income.	但是多年来的研究显示，更多财富意味着更多幸福的现象只存在于极低收入水平的人群中。


People in the United States, for example, are, on average, richer than New Zealanders, but they are not happier.	比如，美国人从总体上来看要比新西兰人富裕，但是他们并不更加幸福。


More dramatically, people in Austria, France, Japan, and Germany appear to be no happier than people in much poorer countries, like Brazil, Colombia, and the Philippines.	更加戏剧性的是，奥地利、法国、日本和德国的人民似乎并不比那些要贫穷得多的国家，比如巴西、哥伦比亚和菲律宾的人更幸福。


Comparisons between countries with different cultures are difficult, but the same effect appears within countries, except at very low income levels, such as below $12,000 annually for the US.	要在不同文化的国家之间进行对比会比较困难，但是同样的结果也出现在一个国家的内部，除开那些极低收入水平的人，比如在美国年收入低于12000美元的人。


Beyond that point, an increase in income doesn’t make a lot of difference to people’s happiness.	比这收入高的，收入的增加对于人们的幸福并没有多大区别。


Americans are richer than they were in the 1950’s, but they are not happier.	美国人比起50年代的时候要富裕多了，但是他们并没有更加幸福。


Americans in the middle-income range today – that is, a family income of $50,000-$90,000 – have a level of happiness that is almost identical to well-off Americans, with a family income of more than $90,000.	今天美国的中产阶级，就是说家庭年收入在5万到9万美元之间，其幸福水平几乎与那些富有的美国人，即家庭年收入高于9万美元的一模一样。


Most surveys of happiness simply ask people how satisfied they are with their lives.	许多关于幸福的调查只是问人们对他们的生活的满意程度。


We cannot place great confidence in such studies, because this kind of overall “life satisfaction” judgment may not reflect how much people really enjoy the way they spend their time.	我们对于这种研究不能抱以太大的信任，因为这种整体“生活满意度”的评价也许不能反映人们到底在多大程度上真正对他们生活的方式感到满意。


My Princeton University colleague Daniel Kahneman and several co-researchers tried to measure people’s subjective well-being by asking them about their mood at frequent intervals during a day.	我在普林斯顿大学的同事丹尼尔·卡尼曼和几个合作研究者试图通过在一天中多次询问人们的心情来衡量他们个人的主观幸福程度。


In an article published in Science on June 30, they report that their data confirm that there is little correlation between income and happiness.	在科学杂志6月30日刊登的一篇文章上，他们发表观点称，他们的研究数据证实在收入和幸福之间几乎没有什么关联。


On the contrary, Kahneman and his colleagues found that people with higher incomes spent more time in activities that are associated with negative feelings, such as tension and stress.	恰恰相反，卡尼曼和他的同事发现，高收入者更多的时间花费在与负面情绪，比如紧张和压力相关的活动上。


Instead of having more time for leisure, they spent more time at and commuting to work.	他们更多的时间不是花在休闲上，而是花在工作或是上班的路上。


They were more often in moods that they described as hostile, angry, anxious, and tense.	他们说，他们更多的时候的情绪为敌视、愤怒、焦躁和紧张。


Of course, there is nothing new in the idea that money does not buy happiness.	当然，钱不能买来幸福的说法并不新鲜。


Many religions instruct us that attachment to material possessions makes us unhappy.	许多宗教教导我们，迷恋物质占有会使我们不幸福。


The Beatles reminded us that money can’t buy us love.	披头士乐队提醒我们金钱不能给我们买来爱。


Even Adam Smith, who told us that it is not from the butcher’s benevolence that we get our dinner, but from his regard for his self-interest, described the imagined pleasures of wealth as “a deception” (though one that “rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind”).	甚至那个告诉我们吃到肉并不是出于肉贩的恩惠、而是因为他的自身利益的亚当·史密斯也把想象中财富的快乐称为一种“幻象”（尽管“它激励人们并使人们奋发努力”）。


Nevertheless, there is something paradoxical about this.	然而，这其中有自相矛盾的地方。


Why do governments all focus on increasing per capita national income?	为什么政府总是致力于提高国民人均收入呢？


Why do so many of us strive to obtain more money, if it won’t make us happier?	如果它不能使我们更幸福的话，为什么我们许多人还是努力地要获得更多金钱呢？


Perhaps the answer lies in our nature as purposive beings.	也许答案在于我们天性是有目的的人。


We evolved from beings who had to work hard to feed themselves, find a mate, and raise children.	我们的先祖是必须依靠努力劳动来养活自己、找到伴侣以及把孩子养大成人，我们由此演化而来。


For nomadic societies, there was no point in owning anything that one could not carry, but once humans settled down and developed a system of money, that limit to acquisition disappeared.	在游牧社会，拥有无法搬运的东西毫无必要，但是一旦人们定居下来并且发展起了金钱机制，这种物质占用的限制消失了。


Accumulating money up to a certain amount provides a safeguard against lean times, but today it has become an end in itself, a way of measuring one’s status or success, and a goal to fall back on when we can think of no other reason for doing anything, but would be bored doing nothing.	积累金钱到一定数目可以确保人们安然度过困难期，但是今天它自身已经变成了目的，一种衡量人们地位和成功的方式，以及当我们想不出其他理由要去做什么事情，但是不做事情又会觉得无聊时给我们提供的一个现成的目标。


Making money gives us something to do that feels worthwhile, as long as we do not reflect too much on why we are doing it.	挣钱会促使我们去做一些我们感觉很值得的事情，只要我们不去更多地思考为什么我们要去做这件事。


Consider, in this light, the life of the American investor Warren Buffett.	在这一点上，可以对照一下美国投资家巴菲特的生活。


For 50 years, Buffett, now 75, has worked at accumulating a vast fortune.	巴菲特今年75岁，50年来一直努力积累巨额财富。


According to Forbes magazine , he is the second wealthiest person in the world, after Bill Gates, with assets of $42 billion.	根据福布斯杂志的统计，他是位列盖茨之后世界上第二富有的人，总资产达420亿美元。


Yet his frugal lifestyle shows that he does not particularly enjoy spending large amounts of money.	然而他节俭的生活方式揭示他并不特别喜欢大手大脚。


Even if his tastes were more lavish, he would be hard-pressed to spend more than a tiny fraction of his wealth.	即便他是一个挥霍无度的人，也很难使他把他财富的极小一部分花费掉。


From this perspective, once Buffett earned his first few millions in the 1960’s, his efforts to accumulate more money can easily seem completely pointless.	根据这种观点，当巴菲特在60年代挣到他的一开始的几百万美元后，他积累更多金钱的努力似乎可以很轻易地被看作是完全没有意义的。


Is Buffett a victim of the “deception” that Adam Smith described, and that Kahneman and his colleagues have studied in more depth?	那么巴菲特是亚当·史密斯所描述的、以及卡尼曼和他的同事进行更深入研究的那个“幻象”的牺牲品吗？


Coincidentally, Kahneman’s article appeared the same week that Buffett announced the largest philanthropic donation in US history – $30 billion to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and another $7 billion to other charitable foundations.	巧合的是，在卡尼曼的文章发表的同一周巴菲特宣布了美国历史上最大一笔的慈善捐赠，捐款300亿美元给比尔和美琳达·盖茨基金会，另外捐赠70亿美元给其他慈善基金。


Even when the donations made by Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller are adjusted for inflation, Buffett’s is greater.	即便把卡内基以及洛克菲勒的捐赠去除通货膨胀的因素加以考虑，巴菲特的捐赠也比他们的大得多。


At a single stroke, Buffett has given purpose to his life.	一个简单的举动，巴菲特给他的人生注入了目的。


Since he is an agnostic, his gift is not motivated by any belief that it will benefit him in an afterlife.	因为他是一个不可知论者，所以他的捐款绝对不是出于要使他的来世有所得益的目的。


What, then, does Buffett’s life tell us about the nature of happiness?	那么，巴菲特的人生告诉了我们有关幸福本质的什么内容呢？


Perhaps, as Kahneman’s research would lead us to expect, Buffett spent less of his life in a positive mood than he would have if, at some point in the 1960’s, he had quit working, lived on his assets, and played a lot more bridge.	也许，根据卡尼曼的研究会我们会想象，如果巴菲特在60年代的某个时候停止了工作，然后完全靠他的财富生活，每天打打桥牌，那么他生活中一定会拥有更多的正面情绪。


But, in that case, he surely would not have experienced the satisfaction that he can now rightly feel at the thought that his hard work and remarkable investment skills will, through the Gates Foundation, help to cure diseases that cause death and disability to billions of the world’s poorest people.	但是，如果那样的话，那么他现在就不可能体验到他的辛苦工作和杰出的投资本领，通过盖茨基金会，可以最终帮助世界上数十亿最贫穷的人治愈会导致死亡和残疾的疾病的那种满足感。


Buffett reminds us that there is more to happiness than being in a good mood.	巴菲特提示了我们有比处于好心情更大的幸福感。


The Political Logic of Hard Brexit	硬退欧的政治逻辑


PARIS – Little more than three months after the United Kingdom’s decision in June to leave the European Union, Brexit politics are careening out of control in the UK.	巴黎—6月英国做出退欧决定刚过三个月，英国退欧政治呈现出失控之势。


An almost revolutionary – and very un-British – dynamic has taken hold, and, as British Prime Minister Theresa May indicated in her “Little Englander” speech at the Conservative Party conference this month, the UK is heading for a “hard Brexit.”	一股革命性的——并且相当不“英国”的——潮流已经形成，而英国首相梅本月在保守党会议上的《英国本土论》（Little Englander）演讲表明，英国正在迈向“硬退欧”。


That outcome would run counter to British public opinion, which remains moderate on the question of fully breaking with the EU.	这一结果将与英国公众观点相悖，英国公众对于完全脱离欧盟的态度并不热烈。


According to a July BBC/ComRes poll, 66% of respondents considered “maintaining access to the single market” to be more important than restricting freedom of movement.	据7月BBC/ComRes民调，66%的受访者认为“保证能够进入单一市场”比限制迁徙自由更加重要。


In an ICM poll the same month, only 10% of respondents said they would prioritize ending free movement over maintaining access to the single market, while 30% viewed the two as equally important and 38% considered maintaining full access to the single market the priority.	在同一个月的ICM民调中，只有10%的受访者说应该优先停止自由迁徙，在考虑进入单一市场的问题，而由30%受访者认为两者同样重要，38%的受访者认为保证能够充分进入单一市场才是重点。


These findings will surprise only those who buy into the narrative that the West is confronting a large-scale xenophobic revolt against the elites.	这些结果并不足为奇，只有听信西方正面临针对精英的大规模仇外抗议的说法的人才会感到奇怪。


While the “Leave” camp certainly included many hard Brexiteers whose primary motivation was to end free movement, it also comprised people who believed Boris Johnson, the former London mayor and current foreign secretary, when he promised (as he still does) that the UK could have its cake and eat it.	“退欧”阵营显然包括了许多硬退欧派，他们的主要动机是结束自由迁徙，但同时也包括一些相信前伦敦市长、现任外交大臣鲍里斯·约翰逊（Boris Johnson）所承诺的（他现在仍然做着这个承诺）英国将获得自己的蛋糕并吃下去的人。


In fact, despite Leave’s large faction of angry white working-class voters, middle-class trade-friendly Brexiteers, together with the “Remain” camp, constitute a clear majority of everyone who voted in the June referendum.	事实上，尽管退欧派争取到大多数愤怒的工人阶级白人选民，但对贸易持友好态度的中产阶级退欧派加上“留欧”派显然占了6月公投中的绝大多数。


Under normal circumstances, one would expect the government’s policy to reflect the majority’s preference, and to aim for a “soft Brexit.”	在常规环境下，你会认为政府政策反映了大部分人的偏好，以“软退欧”为目标。


Instead, a classic revolutionary pattern has emerged.	实际上相反，出现了经典的革命模式。


According to the Brexiteers, the people have spoken, and it is the government’s duty to deliver a “true” Brexit.	按照退欧派的说法，人民发出了声音，而政府有责任实行“真”退欧。


But the government must overcome the spoilers, such as senior civil servants and the Remain majority in the House of Commons, who favor a Brexit in name only – a “false” version that could never deliver the benefits of the real thing.	但政府必须克服干扰，如高级公务员以及下议院占多数的留欧派，他们支持仅在名义上退欧——这是“假”退欧，可能无法带来任何现实好处。


In this revolutionary narrative, the worst elements of Europe’s political tradition have crowded out British pragmatism.	根据这一革命叙事，欧洲政治传统中最糟糕的要素挤掉了英国务实主义。


What a majority of British voters want is considered irrelevant.	大部分英国选民想要的东西被认为无关紧要。


With a hard Brexit, the Leave camp can avoid being seen by voters as the supplicant in negotiations with the EU – which it inevitably would be, no matter how often May denies it.	在硬退欧中，脱欧派可以避免在于欧盟的谈判中被选民视为乞求者——而退欧派难免沦为这一角色，不管梅多么频繁地否定这一点。


The EU will have the upper hand in negotiations for two simple reasons.	欧盟将在谈判中占据上风，这有两个很简单的原因。


First, the UK has more to lose economically.	首先，英国在经济上的损失更大。


While other EU countries’ total exports to the UK are double what the UK exports to the rest of the bloc, its exports to the EU amount to three times more as a share of its GDP.	其他欧盟国家对英国总出口是英国对其他欧盟国家总出口的两倍，但英国对欧盟出口占GDP之比是后者的三倍。


Likewise, the UK has a services surplus, which matters far less to the rest of the EU than it does to Britain.	类似地，英国存在服务业盈余，而这对欧盟其他国家的重要性远远不及对英国。


Second, just like the EU’s Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada, any negotiated arrangement between the EU and the UK will have to be unanimously accepted by all EU member states.	其次，正如欧盟-加拿大全面经济和贸易协定，欧盟和英国所谈判的一切安排都必须经所有欧盟成员国一致接受。


Thus, the negotiation will not really be between the UK and the EU, but rather among EU members.	因此，谈判实际上不是在英国和欧盟之间进行，而是欧盟成员国之间进行。


The UK, without a presence at those talks, will simply have to accept or reject whatever the EU offers.	英国在所有谈判中都没有话语权，只能接受或拒绝欧盟所提供的条件。


This would be true even if the UK pursued a prepackaged arrangement such as membership in the European Economic Area or the EU Customs Union; it will be all the more true if the UK seeks a “bespoke” deal, as May has indicated she will.	即使英国寻求重新制定安排，如寻求欧洲经济区或欧盟关税联盟成员资格，这一点仍然成立； 而如果英国寻求“定制”协议，就更是如此，梅已经表态她将采取后一种方案。


If British voters recognized their country’s weak negotiating position, the Brexiteers, who won the referendum on their promise to “take back control,” would face a political disaster.	如果英国选民认识到英国在谈判中的弱势地位，以“赢回控制权”的承诺赢得公投的退欧派将面临政治灾难。


Walking away from substantive negotiations is the simplest way to avoid such an embarrassing unmasking.	摆脱实质性谈判是避免这一令人尴尬的揭面的最简单的方法。


Thus, politically, a hard Brexit is actually the soft option for the government.	因此，从政治上讲，硬退欧实际上是政府的软选择。


Economically, however, hard Brexit will come at a high price, which the UK will have to pay for years to come.	但从经济上讲，硬退欧将带来高昂的代价，而英国将为此还债多年。


The only consolation is that Brexit’s revolutionary momentum may not be sustainable.	唯一的慰藉是退欧的革命势头也许是不可持续的。


Shortly after the Leave camp labeled bureaucrats in her Her Majesty’s Civil Service “enemies of the people” – a typical statement in the early stages of a revolution – pro-Brexit Foreign Trade Minister Liam Fox derided British exporters, calling them “too lazy and too fat” to succeed in his brave new free-trading Britain.	退欧阵营给英国公务员贴上“人民公敌”标签——这是革命早期阶段的典型用语——后不久，支持退欧的外贸大臣连姆·福克斯（Liam Fox）嘲笑英国出口商“太懒太胖”，无法在他的自由贸易新英国中取得成功。


Such rhetoric is a symptom of desperation.	如此出言不逊乃是绝望的表征。


It carries echoes of the declining years of the Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev, when Marxist apologists insisted that there was nothing wrong with communism, except that humanity wasn’t yet mature enough for it.	它让人想起勃列日涅夫治下江河日下的苏联，马克思主义卫道士坚持共产主义没有错，只是人类还不够成熟，配不上共产主义。


If developments continue at this pace, the revolutionary zeal we see among British politicians may burn itself out before “hard Brexit” is consummated.	如果形势继续按照这个节奏发展下去，我们在英国政客身上所看到的革命热情将在“硬退欧”完成之前反噬其身。


Hard Financial Questions about Soft Development Money	关于软性发展资金（Soft Development Money）的难题


Achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDG’s) by 2015 is a tremendous challenge facing the international community, and there is widespread agreement that additional external aid is required to meet it.	在2015年实现《千年发展目标》(MDG)是国际社会所面临的一个巨大挑战。 就达成该目标需要额外的外部援助这一点，国际社会已达成广泛共识。


So the question now is not whether to increase aid, but how best to finance it.	所以现在的问题不在于是否增加援助，而是如何以最佳方式为其提供财政支持。


The search for additional and more stable funding to meet the MDG’s has led to various proposals for innovative financing mechanisms and debt relief, in particular by British Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown.	为实现MDG寻求额外的和更稳定的财政支持的努力促成了在创新的财政机制和减免债务方面的不同提案。 英国财政大臣戈登·布朗在提议方面尤为积极。


But the broad range of proposed schemes to bolster resources for development assistance raises hard questions about the appropriate balance between objective needs and sound and effective financing.	但这些旨在支持发展援助资源的覆盖面颇广的提案又引出了关于保持目标需求和健全而有效的财政机制之间平衡的难题。


Donors as well as recipients must ensure consistency between financing and absorptive capacity.	捐助者和受援者必须保证财政支持和吸纳能力之间的一致性。


They must also ensure that additional official financing and debt relief will not distort incentives or create moral hazard.	他们还必须保证额外的官方援助和债务减免措施不会扭曲受援方的动机或造成道德危险。


New money should go to good performers, not just to those who are experiencing debt distress.	新的资金应该流向表现良好的而不只是那些正经历债务困境的受援方。


In addition to these issues, financing proposals to achieve the MDG’s should be discussed from a central banker’s perspective.	除了这些问题以外，实现MDG的财政提案还应该从中央银行的角度去探讨。


The best solutions include sufficient increases in rich countries’ foreign aid allocations and more ambitious trade liberalization.	最佳解决方案包括富国对外援助资金的足够增加和更大手笔的贸易自由化。


But such policies seem politically untenable in the short term, even though – according to the World Bank’s estimation – an appropriate conclusion of the current trade round under the auspices of the World Trade Organization could contribute $350 billion a year to developing countries by 2015.	但这些政策似乎在短期内还不能政治实现，虽然—根据世界银行的估计—如果在世贸组织主持下的现一轮贸易谈判圆满结束，到2015时会每年为发展中国家作出3500亿美元的贡献。


Similarly, when it comes to increasing foreign-aid budgets, politicians want solutions that are not “felt” by taxpayers (that is, voters) and that can remain outside of national budgets.	同样，每当要增加对外援助预算时，政治家们都希望有能不让纳税人（即投票人）“察觉”的，与国家预算泾渭分明的解决方案。


However, opaque solutions designed to avoid critical public scrutiny do not seem particularly democratic.	然而，为了避免公众质询而设计的不透明方案就显得不够民主了。


“Innovative” financing solutions might also undermine the clear assignment of responsibilities for raising and using public money.	“创新”的财政方案还可能会破坏在募集和使用公共资金上的职责分工。


Indeed, the term “innovative financing mechanism” conjures the idea that there is an easy way to meet the MDG’s.	的确，“创新的财政机制”一词令人推想实现MDG有一种捷径。


But, in the end, there are only three ways to secure additional financing for development aid or debt relief: higher taxes, increased indebtedness (that is, higher taxes for future generations), and/or monetary expansion.	但最终，确保对发展援助或债务减免的额外财政支持只有三条途径：更高的税收，更多的债务（即对未来世代的更高税收），和/或货币扩张。


One proposal calls for taxing national and international financial transactions.	有一种提案呼吁对国内和国际的金融交易征税。


Others call for allocating Special Drawing Rights (SDR’s) from the IMF, or for using the IMF’s gold resources.	其它的方案或呼吁国际货币基金组织分配特别提款权(SDR)，或呼吁使用该组织的黄金储备。


But none of them appears desirable.	但似乎没有一个提案令人满意。


To be effective, any tax on financial transactions would have to be implemented on a global scale, which currently does not seem realistic.	为确保有效性，对金融交易的征税必须在全球范围内实施，而这在目前似乎是不切实际的。


Moreover, taxation would increase costs (passed on to borrowers) and reduce the volume of transactions, thereby fueling market volatility amid decreasing liquidity.	另外，税收会增加成本（转嫁给借款人）并减少交易量，从而在流动性降低的同时增加市场的不稳定性。


Allocating new SDR’s also is inappropriate.	分配新的SDR也是不合适的。


Above all, SDR’s represent liquidity and can be allocated only if and when there is a “global need,” which would currently be difficult to prove given highly liquid and “easy” international capital-market conditions.	首先，SDR’s代表着流动性并且只有在存在“全球需求”时才能被分配。 而就现在具有高度流动性和“容易”的国际资本市场的情况来看，要证明这种需求的存在是困难的。


Even if a “global need” were recognized, SDR’s, as a component of countries’ official foreign-exchange reserves, should not be available for budgetary spending.	即便我们承认这种“全球需求”的存在，SDR作为各国官方外汇贮备的组成部分也不应该用作预算支出。


Financing development aid with SDR’s – or even to replace budget-financed aid with such allocations – is comparable to financing budget deficits with central bank money.	用SDR对发展援助进行财政支持—或甚至以此代替以预算为财政支持的援助—就如同用中央银行的资金来填补财政赤字。


In any case, new SDR allocations require the support of 85% of votes within the IMF’s board, which appears unachievable in the foreseeable future, as major shareholders are opposed.	在任何情况下，实行新的SDR分配都需要国际货币基金组织董事会85%的票数支持。 由于主要股东都反对，这一提案在可以预见的将来还不能实现。


Even the special one-time issuance of SDR’s, agreed upon in 1997 to ensure that all Fund members receive an “equitable” share of cumulative SDR allocations, has still not been activated, owing to insurmountable opposition.	就连在1997年协议实行的特别一次性SDR的发行，由于反对派的阻力也至今尚未实行。 这次发行的目的本是为了确保该组织的成员国都能获得一份“公正”的累计SDR分配。


Finally, the proposed “better use” of the IMF’s gold holdings to finance the costs of debt relief seeks to raise up to $8 billion.	最后，关于“更好使用”国际货币基金组织的黄金储备来为减免债务的成本融资的提议，其目标是筹措高达80亿美元的资金。


At the current market price, this would require selling about a quarter of the Fund’s holdings of 103.4 million fine ounces.	按现行的市场价，这将需要该组织将其1. 034亿盎司的黄金储备出售约四分之一。


However, these reserves represent an important “hidden” asset that lends strength to the Fund’s balance sheet.	然而，这些储备代表了一项重要的“隐藏”资产，它在该组织的资产负债表中发挥着重要作用。


The IMF’s creditors consider it a necessary safeguard against increased risks in the Fund’s credit portolio.	该组织的债权人将这一项储备看作是防范信贷组合中日益增加的风险的必要手段。


This is because the Fund has experienced exceptionally high access and prolonged use of its resources by a few large economies in the last decade.	这是因为国际货币基金组织的资源在过去十年中被几个大的经济体长期而频繁地使用。


Moreover, the IMF’s share in crisis countries’ total external debt has reached unprecedented and systemically problematic levels.	此外���该组织在危机国家总外债中的份额已达到了前所未有的，造成全局性问题的水平。


As a result of both tendencies, there is a high concentration of credits on a few large borrowers.	上述的两种趋势使得信贷向少数几个借款国高度集中。


To use IMF gold for further debt relief in the face of increased risk threatens the Fund’s financial integrity and contradicts the recent decision to increase the IMF’s precautionary balances.	在风险增加的情况下使用该组织的黄金储备来进一步减免债务会威胁到其财务安全，也违背了最近关于增加该组织预防性余额的决定。


Development aid has to be financed in “real terms,” or in a reputable manner, not by spending central bank money or by jeopardizing the IMF’s financial integrity.	发展援助必须通过“实实在在”的或规范的方式融资，而不是通过花中央银行的钱或损害国际货币基金组织的财务安全来实现。


Aid should preferably be financed out of donor countries’ national budgets in a transparent, democratically accountable way.	援助融资最好是通过捐助国的国家预算，以透明及民主而负责的方式实现。


“Innovative” must not become a euphemism for non-transparent, ineffective, or unsound.	“创新”决不能成为不透明、低成效或不健全的婉言。


Hard Truths About Global Growth	全球增长的残酷事实


NEW YORK – The world’s high-income countries are in economic trouble, mostly related to growth and employment, and now their distress is spilling over to developing economies.	发自纽约——世界上的高收入国家正陷入主要与经济增长及就业有关的经济困境之中，同时这些危机还在逐步向发展中国家扩散。


What factors underlie today’s problems, and how appropriate are the likely policy responses?	究竟是什么因素构筑了当前的经济问题，而可能出台的政策回应又能在多大程度上起作用？


The first key factor is deleveraging and the resulting shortfall in aggregate demand.	第一个关键因素是去杠杆化以及由此导致的总需求短缺。


Since the financial crisis began in 2008, several developed countries, having sustained demand with excessive leverage and consumption, have had to repair both private and public balance sheets, which takes time – and has left them impaired in terms of growth and employment.	自2008年爆发经济危机以来，几个持续依赖过度杠杆效应和消费来维持需求的发达国家不得不修复其私营部门及公共资产负债表——这需要时间——使得它们在经济增长和就业方面表现不佳。


The non-tradable side of any advanced economy is large (roughly two-thirds of total activity).	任何发达国家经济中的非贸易部分都相当庞大（约占总体经济活动的的2/3）。


For this large sector, there is no substitute for domestic demand.	而对于这一大块来说，没有什么可以替代国内需求。


The tradable side could make up some of the deficit, but it is not large enough to compensate fully.	其他可贸易部分能够弥补一些，但依然不足以完全抵消流失的部分。


In principle, governments could bridge the gap, but high (and rising) debt constrains their capacity to do so (though how constrained is a matter of heated debate).	原则上政府可以弥合这一差距，但高昂（且仍在上升的）负债限制了政府这样做的能力（尽管这种限制究竟到达了何种程度还是个极富争议的议题）。


The bottom line is that deleveraging will ensure that growth will be modest at best in the short and medium term.	最重要的一点就是去杠杆化令经济在中短期内最多只能适度增长。


If Europe deteriorates, or there is gridlock in dealing with America’s “fiscal cliff” at the beginning of 2013 (when tax cuts expire and automatic spending cuts kick in), a major downturn will become far more likely.	如果欧洲的情况恶化，或者2013年初（到时减税会终止，自动削减开支生效）在处理美国“财政悬崖”（fiscal cliff）的问题上出现僵局，那么出现严重衰退的可能性就会更大。


The second factor underlying today’s problems relates to investment.	构成当今问题的第二个因素与投资有关。


Longer-term growth requires investment by individuals (in education and skills), governments, and the private sector.	经济的长期增长需要来自个人（在教育和技能上），政府及私人部门的投资。


Shortfalls in investment eventually diminish growth and employment opportunities.	投资不足最终会削弱经济增长并减少就业机会。


The hard truth is that the flip side of the consumption-led growth model that prevailed prior to the crisis has been deficient investment, particularly on the public-sector side.	残酷的事实是：在危机爆发前盛行的消费拉动型经济增长模式的另一面就是在投资上的不足——尤其是来自公共部门的投资。


If fiscal rebalancing is accomplished in part by cutting investment, medium- and longer-term growth will suffer, resulting in fewer employment opportunities for younger labor-market entrants.	如果在某种程度上通过削减投资达到财政再平衡，中长期的经济增长就得承担此举带来的不良后果，从而导致给进入劳动力市场的年轻一代就业机会更少。


Sustaining investment, on the other hand, has an immediate cost: it means deferring consumption.	而另一方面，持续投资也会导致立刻降临的代价：它意味着推迟消费。


But whose consumption?	但问题是推迟谁的消费？


If almost everyone agrees that more investment is needed to elevate and sustain growth, but most believe that someone else should pay for it, investment will fall victim to a burden-sharing impasse – reflected in the political process, electoral choices, and the formulation of fiscal-stabilization measures.	如果几乎所有人都同意提振并保持经济增长需要更多投资，但大部分人都认为为此付出代价的应该是别人，那么投资就会成为推卸责任僵局的牺牲品——这一点早就在政治进程，选举选择和财政稳定措施的规划中表现了出来。


The core issue is taxes.	其中的核心问题就是税收。


If public-sector investment were to be increased with no rise in taxation, the budget cuts required elsewhere to avoid unsustainable debt growth would bein implausibly large.	如果想在不加税的情况下增加公共部门投资的话，那么预算削减就必须避免其他方面的非可持续负债膨胀到难以置信的程度。


The most difficult challenge concerns inclusiveness – how the benefits of growth are to be distributed.	最困难的挑战涉及包容性——经济增长的收益将会如何被分配。


This is a longstanding challenge that, particularly in the United States, goes back at least two decades before the crisis; left unaddressed, it now threatens social cohesion.	该挑战长期存在（尤其对美国来说），而且至少可以追溯到经济危机爆发之前的20多年； 之前被晾在一边未被解决，现在则危及到了整个社会的凝聚力。


Income growth for the middle class in most advanced countries has been stagnant, and employment opportunities have been declining, especially in the tradable part of the economy.	在大部分发达国家，中产阶级的收入增长早就停滞不前了，而且就业机会也一直在减少，尤其是经济中的可贸易部分。


The share of income going to capital has been rising, at the expense of labor.	收入中流向资本的份额一直在上升，而且是以劳动所得的减少为代价的。


Particularly in the US, employment generation has been disproportionately in the non-tradable sector.	尤其是在美国，非贸易经济所创造的就业数量与其在整体经济活动中所占的比例是不相称的。


These trends reflect a combination of technological and global market forces that have been operating over the last two decades.	这些趋势反映出过去20多年来科技和全球市场力量的结合。


On the technology side, labor-saving innovations in network-based information processing and transactions automation have helped to drive a wedge between growth and employment generation in both the tradable and non-tradable sectors.	在科技方面，基于网络的信息处理和交易自动化催生了众多节省劳力的创新，因此在可贸易和非贸易两方面导致了经济增长和创造就业之间的逐渐错位。


In the tradable part of advanced economies, manufacturing automation – including expanding robotic capabilities and, prospectively, 3D printing – has combined with the integration of millions of new entrants into rapidly evolving global supply chains to limit employment growth.	在发达经济体中的可贸易部分，制造业自动化——包括不断提升的机器人技能以及预计即将出现的的3D印刷术——已经与成千上万新进入者融入高速演化的全球供应链的形势相结合，并因此限制了就业的增长。


Multinational companies’ growing ability to decompose these global supply chains by function and geography, and then to reintegrate them at ever lower transaction costs, removes the labor-market protection that used to come from local competition for workers.	跨国公司不断增强的通过功能和地理位置分解全球供应链并以更低交易成本将其重新整合的能力破除了劳动力市场的保护——这种保护过去来自于当地对工人的竞争。


This challenge is particularly difficult, because economic policy has not focused primarily on the adverse distributional trends arising from shifting global market outcomes.	应对这一挑战尤其困难，因为经济政策并未将关注重点放在由全球市场不断变迁所引起的不良分配趋势上。


And yet the income distributions across advanced economies, presumably subject to similar technological and global market forces, are, in fact, startlingly different, suggesting that a combination of social policies and differing social norms does have a distributional impact.	而现今各大发达国家的收入分配状况——据推测应该服从于相似的技术及全球市场力量——实际上存在着惊人的差异，这表明了社会政策与不同社会规范的结合依然会对分配产生影响。


Although the theory of optimal income taxation directly addresses the tradeoffs between efficiency incentives and distributional consequences, the appropriate equilibrium remains a long way off.	尽管最优所得税理论直接解释了效率激励和分配结果之间的权衡关系，但距离实现适当的平衡还有很长的路要走。


A healthy state balance sheet could help, because part of the income flowing to capital would go to the state.	一个健康的国家资产负债表将对情况有所帮助，因为一部分流向资本的收入会落入国家手中。


But, with the exception of China, fiscal positions around the world are currently weak.	然而除了中国以外，目前全世界的财政状况都较为窘迫。


As a result, deleveraging remains a clear priority in a range of countries, reducing growth, with fiscal countermeasures limited by high or rising government debt and deficits.	因此在一些国家中去杠杆化仍是一个优先选项，导致增长放缓，而财政对策则受到政府高负债率及高赤字水平的限制。


Thus far, there is little evidence of willingness on the part of politicians, policymakers, and perhaps the public to reduce current consumption further via taxation in order to create room for expanded growth-oriented investment.	但迄今为止，没有太多迹象表明政客，政策制定者以及公众愿意通过税收来进一步减少消费从而为扩大以增长为目的的投资创造空间。


In fact, under fiscal pressure, the opposite is more likely.	实际在财政压力下更有可能出现相反的状况。


In the US, few practical measures that address the distributional challenge appear to be part of either major party’s electoral agenda, notwithstanding rhetoric to the contrary.	在美国，虽然两大政党都对此表达了长篇大论，但在其选举议程中却很少提到应对这一分配挑战的实际措施。


To the extent that this is true of other advanced economies, the global economy faces an extended multi-year period of low growth, with residual downside risk coming from policy gridlock and mistakes in Europe, the US, and elsewhere.	在这方面其他发达国家的情况也一样，全球经济面临着一个延续多年的低增长期，并伴随着由欧洲，美国及其他地方的政策僵局和失误所导致的残余风险。


That scenario implies slower growth – possibly 1-1.5 percentage points slower – in developing countries, including China, again with a preponderance of downside risk.	这种情形意味着在包括中国在内的发展中国家将出现增长放缓——增速可能会降低1~1. 5%——同时伴随着极大的经济下行风险。


Hard Turkey	强硬的土耳其


JERUSALEM – The recent surge in Turkey’s military actions against the Kurds in northern Iraq is an indication that, somewhat surprisingly – but not entirely unpredictably – Turkish foreign policy has undergone a 180-degree turn in less than two years.	耶路撒冷——最近，土耳其对伊拉克北部的库尔德人展开了大规模军事行动，这表明土耳其的外交政策在不到两年的时间里来了一个180度的大转弯——有些令人意外，但也不能说完全不在情理之中。


The Turkish offensive is also an indication that these changes go beyond the current tensions between Turkey and Israel, which are just one facet of much deeper trends.	土耳其的攻势还表明，这些变化已经超越了近期土耳其-以色列紧张局势的范畴，后者只是更深层趋势的一小部分。


Just a couple of years ago, after the European Union slammed the door in Turkey’s face (despite some significant military and penal reforms by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government), Turkey re-oriented its policy away from Europe towards its immediate region.	几年前，在欧盟的大门朝土耳其砰然关闭后（尽管土耳其正义与发展党（Justice and Development Party ，AKP）已经做出了一系列重大军事和刑法改革），土耳其的外交政策就从欧洲转回了近邻。


Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “zero conflicts with neighbors” approach gave this re-orientation its strategic and theoretical foundation.	其外交部长达乌特奥卢（Ahmet Davutoğlu）提出了“与邻国零冲突”的政策，后来成为土耳其政策转向的战略和理论基础。


Opening an impressive new page, Turkey reached out to Armenia; softened its position on Cyprus; tried to draw Iran into a positive dialogue with the West; convinced Syria to settle the two countries’ simmering border dispute; and, as a crowning achievement, launched peace talks between Syria and Israel under Turkish mediation.	说服叙利亚一起解决两国由来已久的边境问题； 而最大的成就则是牵线搭桥让叙利亚和以色列展开和平对话。


Yet these good-neighborhood policies did not work out as intended.	但这些睦邻友好政策并没有达到预期的目的。 与亚美尼亚的复交进程停滞不前；


Rapprochement with Armenia stalled; no significant progress was made on Cyprus, especially after a less-accommodating leader was elected in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (an entity that only Turkey recognizes); the opening to Iran did not soften the mullahs’ position on nuclear development (and strained relations with the United States); the Syria-Israel talks failed; and Turkey’s participation in the 2010 flotilla to Gaza, and Israel’s brutal response to it, signaled an end to decades of close Israeli-Turkish cooperation.	塞浦路斯问题迟迟得不到大的进展——特别是在北塞浦路斯土耳其共和国（Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus，一个只有土耳其承认的实体）选出了立场更顽固的领导人之后； 向伊朗敞开怀抱并没有让诸毛拉的核发展立场有所软化（从而导致与美国的关系更紧张了）；


To top it all off, Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, ostensibly Turkey’s closest new ally, emerged as the most oppressive and bloody regional tyrant.	最糟糕的是，土耳其表面上的新紧密盟友、叙利亚总统阿萨德露出了他中东地区最反动、最血腥暴君的真实面目。


Assad has now spent the better part of 2011 killing his own people as they demonstrate for liberalization and reform.	在2011年的大部分时间里，阿萨德都在忙于屠杀进行自由化改革游行的本国人民。


Notwithstanding these failures, Turkey’s strategic stature did not suffer, partly because the diminution of US engagement under President Barack Obama enabled Turkey to fill the ensuing regional power vacuum.	尽管诸事不利，但土耳其的战略形象并未因此受损，这部分是因为在奥巴马治下，美国干预中东不像以前那样深入，使得土耳其得以填补随之而来的地区全力真空。


The Arab Spring, despite its still-inconclusive outcome, greatly weakened Egypt’s role in regional politics and made it possible for Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to position Turkey – and himself – as the leader of a Muslim bloc and a model of co-existence between Islam and democracy.	阿拉伯之春虽然还没有产生决定性的结果，但也极大地削弱了埃及在中东地区的政治影响力，也使得总理埃尔多安能够让土耳其——以及他自己——成为穆斯林阵营的领导者，引领让伊斯兰教义与民主制度共存的新模式。


Last but not least, the AKP’s victory in recent parliamentary elections has encouraged Erdoğan to embrace Putinesque ambitions.	最后，AKP在最近的议会选举中获胜，这给了埃尔多安普京式的野心。


All of this exposed the built-in ambivalence in Davutoğlu’s “zero conflict” policy.	所有这些暴露了达乌特奥卢“零冲突”政策的内在矛盾。


While initially viewed as pacific and moderate, it was underpinned by an overarching view of Turkey as the hegemonic regional power – as an arbiter of conflicts, but ultimately also as an enforcer of its own views on lesser players.	“零冲突”政策乍一看是一种温稳健的政策，但其基础观点是土耳其乃中东霸权，是冲突的裁决者，说到底，其他较次要的中东国家都得照土耳其的指令行事。


It may be incorrect to call Turkey’s behavior “neo-Ottoman,” but some neighboring countries, after expecting a mediator and facilitator, may now feel faced by a possible bully.	将土耳其的行为称为“新奥特曼帝国（neo-Ottoman）”也许并不合适，但一些原本指望土耳其充当调停者和促进者的邻国最后可能发现自己面对的是一个恶霸。


Erdoğan’s policy re-orientation vis-à-vis Israel can be understood as an attempt not only to overcome traditional Arab suspicion of Turkey, given its imperial past, but also to present a more moderate Islamic alternative to theocratic Iran and its unpredictable president.	埃尔多安针对以色列的政策重新定位可以理解为他不但要打消阿拉伯世界对土耳其的传统怀疑心理（由土耳其帝国主义的历史所致），还要打造一个更为温和的伊斯兰形象，以替代伊朗的神权政府及其不可捉摸的总统。


But Erdoğan’s threat to consider using the Turkish navy as a military escort for further flotillas to Gaza already borders on saber rattling, as does his declared willingness to use force to prevent the Republic of Cyprus from exploring for gas in its continental shelf.	但埃尔多安威胁考虑动用土耳其海军为更深入的加沙航行护航之举已经与武力挑衅别无二致，与此类似的还有他宣称不惜动用武力阻止塞浦路斯共和国在其大陆架上勘探天然气。


Indeed, Erdoğan’s has warned of a diplomatic rupture with the EU if Cyprus accedes to the Union’s rotating presidency in 2012.	事实上，埃尔多安已经发出警告，如果塞浦路斯成为2012年欧盟轮值主席国，土耳其将与欧盟断交。


At the same time, renewed violent incursions into northern Iraq in pursuit of alleged guerillas suggest a reversion to hardline anti-Kurdish policies.	与此同时，土耳其以追剿所谓的游击队为由再度武力入侵伊拉克北部表明，强硬的反库尔德政策卷土重来了。


The withdrawal of US forces from Iraq only seems to have encouraged Turkey’s will to create a cordon sanitaire on the Iraqi side of the border – and possibly to establish a counterweight to Iran’s influence on a Shia-led government in Baghdad.	美国从伊拉克撤军似乎助长了土耳其在土伊边境的伊拉克一侧建立防疫地带的决心——可能还准备与伊朗一争高下，争夺对巴格达什叶派政府的影响力。


And, while Turkey’s agreement to host NATO anti-missile radar facilities, and its recent seizure of a Syrian-registered arms ship, may please the West, here, too, its policies are focused on “hard” military power.	此外，尽管土耳其同意北约在其国内部署反导弹雷达系统，最近还扣留了一艘叙利亚注册的武装船只，这可能会取悦西方，但在这些事件中，土耳其的政策仍以“硬”军力为焦点。


Similarly, Erdoğan’s recent visit to Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia brings out the ambivalence of Turkey’s new claim to regional hegemony.	类似地，埃尔多安最近对���及、利比亚和突尼斯的访问表明了土耳其新地区霸权主张的矛盾性。


While Egypt’s shaky military junta welcomed Erdoğan, many Egyptians were not happy about his hectoring them – and other Arabs – to follow Turkish policies and to regard Turkey as their Muslim leader.	在埃及根基尚未稳固的军政府欢迎埃尔多安的到访，但埃及人民对于埃尔多安威逼他们（以及其他阿拉伯人民）遵从土耳其的政策并视土耳其为穆斯林领袖感到十分反感。


A new sultanate?	一个新的苏丹帝国？


Erdoğan as the new Saladin?	埃尔多安是萨拉丁再世？


Turkey has an enormously important role to play in the region.	土耳其在中东地区拥有十分重要的地位。


It could be a bridge between the West and the East, between Islam and modernity, and between Israel and the Arabs.	它可以作为东西方沟通的桥梁，作为伊斯兰世界和现代世界的桥梁，作为以色列和阿拉伯世界的桥梁。


But it runs the danger of succumbing to the arrogance of power, which has corrupted and sidelined many strong states in the past.	但它正在玩火，醉心于实力的傲慢，而历史表明，众多帝国因此走上了腐化和崩溃之路。


What Enabled Bretton Woods?	什么成就了布雷顿森林？


PRINCETON – The proximity of the 70th anniversary of the Bretton Woods conference, which established the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to historical anniversaries like the Allied landings in Normandy highlights just how ambitious its organizers were.	普林斯顿—产生了世界银行和国际货币基金组织的布雷顿森林会议70周年纪念日与盟军诺曼底登陆等历史纪念日如此接近，这彰显出组织者的雄心。


Indeed, amid considerable tumult, the conference aimed to create a stable international monetary framework that could serve as a cornerstone of a peaceful global order.	事实上，在大量争吵中举行的这次会议，目标是建立稳定的国际货币框架作为和平的全球秩序的基石。


And it succeeded – at least for a while.	会议获得了成功——至少是暂时的成功。


Bretton Woods retains a powerful fascination, with at least three recent books on the subject having achieved considerable commercial success.	布雷顿森林仍有着强大的魅力，至少三部关于这一主题的近著获得了巨大的商业成功。


What makes an event in which a group of mostly men talk about money so intriguing?	是什么让这个一群人（其中绝大部分是男性）讨论钱的事件变得如此有趣？


Of course, there are some juicy incidentals, such as the dance of John Maynard Keynes’s wife, a Russian ballerina, that kept the US Treasury Secretary awake, and charges of espionage for the Soviet Union against the main American negotiator, Harry Dexter White.	当然，其中不乏劲爆八卦，比如凯恩斯的俄罗斯芭蕾舞演员妻子的舞蹈让美国财政部长目不转睛，苏联指控美国主谈判员怀特（Harry Dexter White）从事间谍活动等。


But the real drama of the conference lay in the systematic evolution of an institutional structure that underpinned global stability and prosperity for at least three decades.	但这场会议真正的重要情节在于一个成为全球稳定与繁荣基础至少三十年的制度结构的系统演化。


The institutional vision was linked to a global security system.	这一制度视角与全球安全体系息息相关。


Indeed, in the original agreement, the five large powers that would be represented permanently on the IMF Executive Board were the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, and France – the same countries with permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council.	事实上，在最初的协定中，IMF执行委员会五大常任成员将由美国、英国、苏联、中国和法国代表——与联合国安理会的常任理事国安排相同。


Even within this framework, the negotiations were challenging.	即使在这一框架之内，谈判也是剑拔弩张。


So how did 44 disparate powers, each seeking to protect its own national interests, manage to agree on a new global monetary system?	那么，44个寻求捍卫本国利益的不同强国是如何统一意见成立一个新的全球货币体系的呢？


According to Keynes, the key was a process of international deliberation and planning, led by “a single power or like-minded group of powers.”	根据凯恩斯的说法，关键在于以“一个强国或一个思想类似的强国集团”为首的国际审议和计划过程。


By contrast, a 66-country “pow-wow” like the abortive World Economic Conference, held in London in 1933, could never be expected to produce an agreement.	相反，一场66个国家参与的“座谈会”——类似于1933年在伦敦举行的无果而终的世界经济会议（World Economic Conference）——是绝没有可能产生协定的。


Keynes’s rival, Friedrich Hayek, went further, asserting that a successful, enduring order could not be negotiated at all; it had to be spontaneous.	凯恩斯的对手哈耶克的观点更加激进，他认为一个成功的、持续的秩序根本无法通过谈判产生； 而必须是自然产生的。


The experience at Bretton Woods lends significant credence to Keynes’s assessment.	布雷顿森林的经验让凯恩斯的主张名声大噪。


While 44 countries were formally represented at Bretton Woods, the UK and especially the US were the dominant players.	尽管44个国家都正式出席了布雷顿森林会议，但只有英国和（特别是）美国才是主导者。


In fact, bilateral negotiations have enabled every major success of large-scale financial diplomacy.	事实上，双边谈判成就了所有大规模金融外交的成功。


In the early 1970s, when the fixed exchange-rate regime established at Bretton Woods collapsed, the IMF seemed to have outlived its function.	20世纪70年代初，当布雷顿森林会议所建立的固定汇率制度崩溃时，IMF似乎已经完成了使命。


But, by renegotiating the Fund’s Articles of Agreement, the US, seeking greater flexibility, and France, which sought the kind of predictability that the gold standard had provided, were able to revive it.	但是，通过重新谈判IMF协议章程（Articles of Agreement），寻求更大灵活度的美国和寻求金本位所提供的可预测性的法国成功地让IMF起死回生。


Later that decade, efforts by France, Germany, and the UK to confer on monetary policy failed miserably.	随后，在20世纪70年代，法国、德国和英国在货币政策问题上的协商以悲剧收场。


But discussions between France and Germany – which remain the leading voices in debates on European monetary issues – were far more effective.	但法国和德国之间的讨论——两国一直是欧洲货币问题争论的主要声音——效果要好得多。


Likewise, in the mid-1980s, when exchange-rate volatility gave rise to calls for protectionist trade measures, the US and Japan found a solution involving exchange-rate stabilization.	类似地，在20世纪80年代中期，当汇率波动导致保护主义贸易政策呼声渐高时，美国和日本找到了包括汇率稳定在内的解决方案。


Nowadays, international economic diplomacy is centered on the US and China.	如今，国际经济外交的中心是美国和中国。


In recent years, an emerging debate has focused on whether the global economic system of the 2000s – in which export-oriented emerging economies essentially pegged their currencies to the dollar to obtain faster growth and accumulate foreign-exchange reserves at spectacular rates – effectively created a sort of “Bretton Woods II.”	近几年来，新争论集中在21世纪初的全球经济体系——出口导向型新兴经济体本质上将本国货币盯住美元以获得更快的增长并以惊人的速度积累外汇储备——是否实际建立了“布雷顿森林II”。


Could China and the US formalize such a system, with the renminbi playing a greater role?	中国和美国可能让这一体系正式化、让人民币扮演更重要角色吗？


The bilateral nature of the negotiations certainly implies that they have a chance.	显然，谈判的双边性质意味着机会是存在的。


But there was another critical factor underpinning the success of the Bretton Woods conference: the global political and security environment.	但促成布雷顿森林会议成功的还有另一个关键因素：全球政治和安全环境。


For starters, the conference occurred the month after the D-Day landings in Normandy, when the end of World War II seemed far closer than it turned out to be.	首先，布雷顿森林会议举行之日距离登陆诺曼底的D日不过一个月，其时第二次世界大战何时能够结束还远未可知。


There were also domestic considerations at work.	还有一些国内因素也在其作用。


As US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr. stated in advance of the conference, “We felt that it was good for the world, good for the nation, and good for the Democratic Party, for us to move.”	正如美国财政部长小摩根索（Henry Morgenthau, Jr. ）在会议前夕所指出的，“我们感到这次会议对世界有利，对国家有利，对民主党有利，因此我们上了。


In order to achieve an agreement of similar scale and influence, world leaders – especially in the US and China – would need to be under similarly high pressure.	为了达成规模和影响力相当的协定，世界领导人——特别是美国和中国领导人——需要类似的高压。


A global pact would have to be an urgent necessity, rather than an attractive possibility.	全球契约必须是一项紧迫的任务，而不是一种有吸引力的可能。


What would convince Chinese leaders that they must rapidly reinforce the open global economy that enabled China’s export-driven economic rise?	怎样让中国领导人确信他们必须快速推动全球经济开放、成就中国的出口推动型经济崛起？


One such catalyst might be a financial crisis emanating from the country’s risk-laden shadow-banking system.	一个催化剂可能是一场源自不断聚集风险的中国影子银行体系的金融危机。


A contest for global leadership might serve that purpose as well.	全球领导力竞争也有可能有利于这目标。


Or perhaps the stimulus will be fear that the world is sliding toward protectionism, with bilateral and regional trade agreements like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership deepening divisions between their participants and the rest of the world.	又或者刺激因素可能来自对世界正滑向保护主义的恐惧——跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系（Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership）等双边和地区贸易协定深化了参与方与世界其他国家的分歧。


Bretton Woods demonstrated that it takes a major crisis to produce a political dynamic of reform.	布雷顿森林证明了需要重大危机才能产生改革的政治动态。


Today’s world, for all of its troubles, is simply not dangerous enough – at least not yet – for the countries at the helm of the global economy.	当今世界虽然麻烦重重，但对全球经济的掌舵国家的危险程度还远远不足——至少目前是如此。


Who Should Lead the Global Economy?	谁应该领导全球经济


PRINCETON – In terms of global economic leadership, the twentieth century was American, just as the nineteenth century was British and the sixteenth century was Spanish.	普林斯顿，说道全球经济领袖，二十世纪是美国人，正如十九世纪是英国人，十六世纪是西班牙人。


Some Chinese and Europeans think that they are next.	一些中国人和欧洲人认为他们是下一个。


Are they?	果真如此吗？


And should they even want to be?	他们真的想成为全球经济领袖吗？


The most important prerequisite for global economic leadership is size.	全球经济领袖的最重要先决条件是规模。


The bigger an economy, the greater its systemic importance, and the more leverage its political representatives have in international decision-making.	一个经济，其规模越大，其系统重要性就越高，其政治代表在国际决策中的分量也越重。


The United States is the world’s largest economy, with a GDP of roughly $16.7 trillion.	美国式世界最大的经济体，GDP约为16. 7万亿美元。


The eurozone’s $12.6 trillion output puts it in second place, and China, with a GDP of around $9 trillion, comes in third.	欧元区以12. 6万亿美元产出屈居次席，中国排名第三，GDP为9万亿美元左右。


In other words, all three economies are conceivably large enough to serve as global economic leaders.	换句话说，这三个经济体都大到了足以成为全球经济领袖的程度。


But an economy’s future prospects are also crucial to its leadership prospects – and serious challenges lie ahead.	但一个经济的未来前景对领导力前景也很重要——而前路充满了严峻挑战。


No one thinks that the eurozone will grow more quickly than the US in the coming years or decades.	没人认为在未来几年甚至几十年欧元区可以比美国增长得更快。


While China is expected to overtake the US in terms of output by 2020, decades of rigid population-control measures will weaken growth in the longer run, leaving the US economy as the most dynamic of the three.	2020年，中国的产出预计将超过美国，但几十年的僵化人口控制政策会破坏其长期增长，这意味着美国经济仍是三强中最有活力的。


Another key requirement for global economic leadership is systemic importance in commercial, monetary, and financial terms.	全球经济领袖的另一个重要要求是在商业、货币和金融方面的系统重要性。


Unlike China, a large trade power with underdeveloped monetary and financial capabilities, the eurozone meets the requirement of systemic significance in all three areas.	中国是贸易大国，但货币和金融能力欠发达，与此形成对比的是，欧元区在所有这三个领域都满足系统重要性要求。


There is also a less concrete aspect to leadership.	关于领导力还有一个不那么有形的方面。


Being a true global leader means shaping and connecting the global economic structures within which states and markets operate – something the US has been doing for almost 70 years.	成为真正的全球领袖意味着决定和联结市场赖以运行的全球经济结构——美国承担这一角色已接近70年。


At the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, the US crafted the post-World War II international monetary and financial order.	在1944年的布雷顿森林会议上，美国起草了后二战时代的国际货币和金融秩序。


The basic framework, centered around the US dollar, has survived financial crises, the Soviet Union’s dissolution, and several developing countries’ integration into the world economy.	以美元为中心的基本框架经历了金融危机、苏联解体和不少发展中国家融入全球经济的考验。


Today, American leadership in global trade and financial and monetary governance rests on inter-related strengths.	如今，美国在全球贸易和金融和货币治理方面的领导力存在于其环环相扣的优势中。


The US provides the world’s key international currency, serves as the linchpin of global demand, establishes trends in financial regulation, and has a central bank that acts as the world’s de facto lender of last resort.	美国提供了关键的国际会比，它是最关键的全球需求者，决定着金融监管的趋势，还拥有事实上扮演着世界最后贷款人角色的中央银行。


Beyond delivering a global public good, supplying the world’s central currency carries substantial domestic benefits.	除了提供全球公共品，供应全球核心货币也带来了巨大的国内好处。


Because the US can borrow and pay for imports in its own currency, it does not face a hard balance-of-payments constraint.	由于美国可以用本币借款和支付进口品，因此不会面临收支平衡硬约束。


This has allowed it to run large and sustained current-account deficits fairly consistently since the early 1980’s.	这使它能够从20世纪80年代初就开始持续维持巨额经常项目赤字。


These deficits raise persistent concerns about the system’s viability, with observers (mostly outside the US) having long predicted its imminent demise.	这笔赤字引起了对于这一体系可行性的持久疑虑，长期以来，一直有观察者（主要是美国之外的观察者）预测这一体系马上会崩溃。


But the system survives, because it is based on a functional trade-off, in which the US uses other countries’ money to act as the main engine of global demand.	但这一体系活了下来，因为它建立在能起作用的权衡之上——美国用其货币扮演全球需求主引擎的角色。


In fact, export-oriented economies like Germany, Japan, and China owe much of their success to America’s capacity to absorb a massive share of global exports – and they need to keep paying America to play this role.	事实上，德国、日本和中国等出口导向型经济的成功很大程度上要归功于美国吸收大部分全球出口的能力——它们也需要继续花钱请美国扮演这一角色。


Given this, the big exporters have lately come under intense pressure to “correct” their external surpluses as part of responsible global citizenship.	基于此，最近出口大国纷纷受到了巨大的压力“纠正”其外部盈余，以承担全球公民的责任。


While this has contributed to a sharp contraction of the Chinese and Japanese surpluses, the eurozone’s current-account surplus is growing, with the International Monetary Fund expecting it to reach 2.3% of GDP this year (slightly less than the Chinese surplus).	这导致中国和日本盈余的剧烈减少，但欧元区经常项目盈余仍在增加，IMF预计今年将达到GDP的2. 3%（略低于中国的盈余水平）。


A global economy led by a surplus country seems more logical, given that creditors usually dictate terms.	由盈余国领导的世界经济似乎更加合乎逻辑，因为债权人往往才是主宰者。


At the time of the Bretton Woods conference, the US accounted for more than half of the world’s manufactured output.	在布雷顿森林会议的时代，美国占据着世界制造业产出的一半强。


The rest of the world needed dollars that only the US could supply.	世界其他地区需要外汇，而只有美国能够提供。


Chinese or European leadership would probably look more like the pre-World War I Pax Britannica (during which the United Kingdom supplied capital to the rest of the world in anticipation of its own relative economic decline), with the hegemon supplying funds on a long-term basis.	中国或欧洲的领导力看上去更像是一战前的英国统治下的和平（在此期间，尚未相对衰落的英国向世界其他地区供应资本），由霸权国家提供长期资金。


But this scenario presupposes a deep and well-functioning financial system to intermediate the funds – something that China and the eurozone have been unable to achieve.	但这一情景需要有深化的、功能良好的金融系统作为资金媒介——这是中国和欧元区都无法提供的。


Despite the 2008 financial crisis, the US remains the undisputed leader in global finance.	尽管爆发了2008年金融危机，美国仍是全球金融无可争议的领袖。


Indeed, American financial markets boast unparalleled depth, liquidity, and safety, making them magnets for global capital, especially in times of financial distress.	事实上，美国金融市场拥有无与伦比的深度、流动性和安全性，这让它称为吸引全球资本的磁石，特别是在金融危机时期。


This “pulling power,” central to US financial dominance, underpins the dollar’s global role, as investors in search of safe, liquid assets pour money into US Treasury securities.	这一“牵引力”正是美国金融主宰力的核心，也是美元全球作用的基础，因为寻找安全、流动的资产的投资者纷纷把钱投向美国国债。


The belief that a common currency and a common capital market would buttress financial institutions and deepen markets was a driving principle behind the eurozone’s formation.	共同货币和共同资本市场能够支持金融机构、深化市场的思想是推动欧元区形成的原理之一。


But, given the lack of a single debt instrument equivalent to a US Treasury bill, the crisis caused eurozone member states’ public-debt yields to diverge.	但是，由于缺少类似美国国债的单一债务工具，金融危机导致了欧元区成员国公债收益率的分化。


Bank lending subsequently withdrew to national borders, and the idea of a European capital market disintegrated.	银行贷款纷纷退回国境线以内，欧洲资本市场的思想也随之泡汤。


Likewise, in China, the absence of currency convertibility – together with a weak financial supervisory framework, which reflects a broader problem related to poor implementation of the rule of law – is impairing the economy’s prospects for leadership.	类似地，在中国，货币缺乏可兑换性——此外金融监督框架也相当无力，这反映出法治精神实施不力有关的更深层次的问题——破坏了其经济的领导力前景。


Europeans and Chinese should question whether they really want to assume the risks associated with a position at the center of a large and complex global financial system.	欧洲人和中国人都应该问一问，他们是否真的愿意承担成为全球金融体系复杂大舞台中心所伴随的风险。


Control of the system is the chalice of global leadership; but, for economies that are not adequately prepared for it, what should be an elixir may turn out to be poison.	控制金融体系是全球领导力的圣杯； 但是，对于对此尚未准备充分的经济体来说，这杯美酒可能会成为毒药。


Soccer Lessons for Europe’s Economy	足球给欧洲经济的启示


PRINCETON – Though a solution to the euro crisis continues to elude European leaders, the foundations of one are not difficult to discern.	普林斯顿——虽然欧洲领导人至今仍未想出欧债危机的解决方案，但却不难想见方案的基础。


In fact, Europe’s recent soccer experience – specifically, in the EURO 2012 tournament and this year’s World Cup – provides insight into how to revive Europe’s economy and address its deeper identity problem.	事实上，欧洲不久前的足球经验 ——特别是2012年欧锦赛和今年的世界杯——启迪人们如何重振欧洲经济并打造深层次的认同感。


On June 28, 2012, as European political leaders met in Brussels, amid growing uncertainty about the eurozone’s survival, to negotiate the design of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), Germany was playing Italy in a semifinal match in Warsaw.	2012年6月28日，欧洲政治领袖在欧元区生存忧虑不断加重的背景下汇集布鲁塞尔，谈判欧洲稳定机制的设计构造； 与此同时，德国队和意大利队正在华沙打半决赛。


Two goals by Mario Balotelli cinched the win for Italy – and propelled Balotelli to superstar status.	马里奥·巴洛特利的两粒进球为意大利锁定了胜利——同时也造就了巴洛特利的超级巨星生涯。


At such a politically sensitive moment, a German victory could have sparked a bitter nationalist reaction in southern Europe.	在这样一个政治敏感度颇高的时刻，德国的胜利有可能激起南欧苦涩的民族主义情绪。


Instead, encouraged by his country’s victory, Italy’s new technocratic prime minister, Mario Monti, in alliance with Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, pressed German Chancellor Angela Merkel for easier access to ESM support – and scored another major victory for his country.	相反，在这场胜利的鼓舞下，意大利新任技术派总理马里奥·蒙蒂与西班牙总理马里亚诺·拉霍伊合作，迫使德国总理默克尔降低了欧洲稳定机制的门槛——为自己的国家赢得了又一次重大胜利。


For a brief moment, Monti joined Balotelli in becoming a national hero.	那一瞬间，蒙蒂和巴洛特利共同扮演了民族英雄的角色。


The Italian media eagerly linked the two “Super Marios,” with photomontages showing the prime minister with the soccer player’s idiosyncratic mohawk hairstyle.	意大利媒体热情地将两位“超级马里奥”联系在一起，电脑合成照片里总理和球星一样留着特殊的莫霍克发式。


The message from both the soccer field and the negotiating room was that there was a quick and easy route to victory, complex issues could be solved by a brilliant argument, and individual superstars were the key to success.	足球场和谈判桌显示可以通过快捷简便的方法取得胜利，精彩的论点能够解决复杂的问题，而巨星个人是能否取得成功的关键。


The World Cup championship in Brazil was another matter altogether.	巴西世界杯冠军则完全是另外一回事。


This time, the Germans won, with a spectacular display of power in a 7-1 semifinal erasure of the host country, Brazil, and a 1-0 triumph over Argentina in the final.	这次是德国人获胜，他们半决赛7-1大胜东道主巴西、决赛1-0小胜阿根廷显示出超强的实力。


The disappointed supporters of the defeated teams viewed the games in terms of personalities.	失利队大失所望的球迷就比赛进行了个性分析。


Brazil and Argentina had long histories of superstars: Pelé, Garrincha, Ronaldo, Alfredo di Stéfano, and Diego Maradona.	巴西和阿根廷常年盛产巨星：贝利、加林查、罗纳尔多、斯蒂法诺和马拉多纳。


In the semifinal, Brazil appeared to be paralyzed without its hero, Neymar, who wore the same number as Pelé but had been badly injured in the previous match.	半决赛中，失去英雄内马尔的巴西队似乎陷入了瘫痪，内马尔和贝利球衣号码相同，但在之前那场比赛中严重受伤。


In the final, Argentineans believed that the world’s best player, Lionel Messi, would surely carry the national team to victory.	决赛中，阿根廷人相信全世界最好的球员梅西肯定能率领国家队走向胜利。


Of course, the German team had plenty of good players.	毋庸置疑，德国队也有众多优秀球员。


But, instead of behaving like superstars, they worked together, passing consistently and creating opportunities for one another to score.	但他们密切合作，不断传球为队友创造进球机会，而不是表现得像巨星一样。


Germany’s World Cup performance was a brilliant demonstration of the importance of deep, long-term reforms.	德国在世界杯上的表现显示出长期、深层次改革有多么重要。


In the early 2000s, German soccer was boring.	21世纪初，德国足球异常沉闷。


Germany’s heroes were from the distant past.	人们只能从遥远的过去寻找德国足球的英雄。


It was easy to draw an analogy between ineffective and mundane performance in the stadium and the general state of the country.	很容易把球场内的低效和沉闷与国家的总体状况进行比较。


At the time, Germany was regarded as the sick man of Europe, with a proclivity for highly protected labor markets.	那时的德国被视为欧洲病夫，有着高度受保护的劳动力市场。


Something needed to be shaken up.	有些机制需要进行重组。


In 2004, the German national team’s new trainer, Jürgen Klinsmann, did just that.	2004年，德国国家队新任主教练克林斯曼正是这样做的。


Beyond more aggressive tactics, his radical new strategy entailed a fundamental revolution in sports education and training, with programs that identified and propelled promising young players through the teams in Germany’s domestic league.	除采用更具侵略性的战术外，他激进的新战略启动了体育教育及培训领域的根本性变革，在德国国内联赛发掘并激励有前途的年轻球员。


In other words, it was a long-term strategy.	换句话讲这是一项长期战略。


Fortunately, the team’s management understood this and persevered, despite the lack of a short-term payoff.	幸运的是，球队管理层理解这项长期战略，并在缺少短期收益的情况下坚持贯彻。


Klinsmann’s assistant trainer, Joachim Löw, succeeded him, and became the architect of the 2014 championship bid.	助理教练勒夫接替克林斯曼担任主教练，正是勒夫主持了2014年世界杯冠军的争夺。


Germany’s soccer revolution was mirrored in the economy.	德国的足球革命也在经济领域有所映射。


Beginning in 2003, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, a Social Democrat, launched a series of reforms aimed at increasing labor-market flexibility and, more generally, laying the foundations for long-term prosperity.	2003年起，社会民主党总理施罗德启动了一系列改革措施，目的是提高劳动力市场灵活性，为经济领域的长期繁荣打下基础。


But this future-oriented approach had serious short-term political consequences, with Schröder losing the next election and his party’s popularity diminishing considerably.	但上述面向未来的措施产生了严重的短期政治后果。 施罗德在接下来的选举中落败，其党派的受欢迎程度也大受影响。


Neither Schröder nor Klinsmann attained superstar status, but they carried out the reforms that mattered.	施罗德和克林斯曼都没能成为超级巨星，但他们进行了至关重要的改革。


There are other lessons that Germans and Europeans can derive from these experiences.	德国人和欧洲人还可以从中汲取其他的经验教训。


One concerns the integration of foreigners.	比方说与外国移民的融合。


All of the major European teams, including Germany’s, depend on players of foreign descent.	所有重要的欧洲球队，包括德国队，都依赖外国血统的球员。


In the Brazil game, Miroslav Klose, whose family hails from Poland, became the highest-scoring player in World Cup history.	在对阵巴西队的比赛中，来自波兰移民家庭的克洛泽成为世界杯历史上得分最多的球员。


The half-Ghanaian Jérôme Boateng was a pillar of the German defense.	拥有半数加纳血统的博阿滕是德国防线的支柱。


And Mesut Özil, who is of Turkish descent, executed many beautiful sweeping passes.	而土耳其后裔厄齐尔则贡献了众多有威胁的传球和助攻。


Even Balotelli, Italy’s EURO 2012 superstar, is the son of Ghanaian immigrants.	就连意大利2012年欧锦赛超级巨星巴洛特利也来自加纳移民家庭。


But the most important lesson is that there are no quick fixes or magic bullets.	但最重要的经验是不存在灵丹妙药和速效对策。


An exceptional performance by a superstar soccer player can be beautiful – even inspiring – just as rescue mechanisms and stimulus packages can rally markets and raise hopes.	超级球星的卓越表现或许是出色——甚至鼓舞人心的——正如救援机制和经济刺激方案能凝聚市场、提升人们的期望值。


But their impact is fleeting.	但影响大都转瞬即逝。


Consistent, reliable, long-term success requires forward-thinking measures that focus on building strong fundamentals.	长期、可靠、始终如一的成功需要注重夯实基本面的有远见的策略。


Europe needs such an approach, one that includes microeconomic adjustments and programs that encourage mobility, flexibility, and innovation.	欧洲需要这样的改革，包括微观经济调整，以及鼓励流动性、灵活性和创新的计划。


If other Europeans emulated the German model, Europe would begin to look – and play – like a championship team.	如果其他欧洲人效仿德国模式，欧洲将开始像冠军队般的表现。


The Secret History of the Financial Crisis	金融危机秘史


PRINCETON – Balzac’s great novel Lost Illusions ends with an exposition of the difference between “official history,” which is “all lies,” and “secret history” – that is, the real story.	普林斯顿—巴尔扎克在名著《幻灭》结尾中阐释了“官方历史”——其中“全是谎言”和“秘史”——即真实的历史之间的差别。


It used to be possible to obscure history’s scandalous truths for a long time – even forever.	长期——甚至永远混淆历史的阴暗事实在过去是常有的事。


Not anymore.	但今时不同以往。


Nowhere is this more apparent than in accounts of the global financial crisis.	关于这一点，没有比全球金融危机更能说明问题的了。


The official history portrayed the US Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and other major central banks as embracing coordinated action to rescue the global financial system from disaster.	在官方历史中，美联储、欧洲央行和其他主要央行采取了联合行动力挽狂澜，救全球金融体系于将倾。