Perhaps the most astonishing thing about the ECB’s monochromatic price-stability mission and utter disregard for financial stability – much less for the welfare of the workers and businesses that make up the economy – is its radical departure from the central-banking tradition.	欧洲央行一根筋地专注于价格稳定，完全不顾金融稳定性，更不用说组成经济的员工和企业的福利了，或许其中最令人惊讶的地方是它完全脱离了中央银行的传统。


Modern central banking got its start in the collapse of the British canal boom of the early 1820’s.	现代央行发轫于19世纪20年代英国运河繁荣崩溃时期。


During the financial crisis and recession of 1825-1826, a central bank – the Bank of England – intervened in the interest of financial stability as the irrational exuberance of the boom turned into the remorseful pessimism of the bust.	在1825—1826年的金融危机和衰退中，一家中央银行——英格兰银行——出手干预了金融稳定性，平息了因繁荣转入由泡沫破裂导致的悲观懊悔所引起的非理性动荡。


In his book Lombard Street, Walter Bagehot quoted Jeremiah Harman, the governor of the Bank of England in the 1825-1826 crisis:	沃尔特·白芝浩（Walter Bagehot）在《伦巴第街》（Lombard Street）中引用了1825—1826年危机期间时任英格兰银行行长耶利米·哈尔曼（Jeremiah Harman）的话：


“We lent...by every possible means and in modes we had never adopted before; we took in stock on security, we purchased exchequer bills, we made advances on exchequer bills, we not only discounted outright, but we made advances on the deposit of bills of exchange to an immense amount, in short, by every possible means consistent with the safety of the Bank, and we were not on some cases over-nice.	 “我们……以所有可能的方式以及从前从未使用过的模式放贷； 我们买入安全事务股，我们买入国库券，我们为国库券预付款，我们为汇票预付巨额款项，简而言之，我们使用了所有不会危及银行安全性的手段，这并不是妇人之仁。


Seeing the dreadful state in which the public were, we rendered every assistance in our power...”	看到公众在窘境中苦苦挣扎，我们竭尽全力予以帮助……”


The Bank of England’s charter did not give it the legal authority to undertake such lender-of-last-resort financial-stability operations. But the Bank undertook them anyway.	当时的英格兰银行章程并未给予英格兰银行实行这一最后贷款人金融稳定操作的法定权力，但英格兰银行还是这么做了。


Half a generation later, Britain’s Parliament debated whether the modifications of the Bank’s charter should give it explicit power to conduct lender-of-last-resort operations.	多年后，英国议会就是否修订英格兰银行章程给予其明确的最后贷款人操作的权力展开了争论。


The answer was no: granting explicit power would undermine confidence in price stability, for already there was “difficulty restrain[ing] over-issue, depreciation, and fraud.”	答案是否定的：给予其明确的权力有损于人们对价格稳定性的信心，因为当时已经“难以抑制滥发、贬值和欺诈”。


Indeed, granting explicit lender-of-last-resort powers to the Bank of England would mean that the “millennium of the paper-mongers would be at hand.”	事实上，给予英格兰银行明确的最后贷款人权力将意味着“票据贩子的黄金时代”。


But the leaders of Parliament also believed that the absence of a codified authority to act as lender of last resort would not keep the Bank of England from doing so when necessity commanded.	但英国议会领袖们也认为，缺乏充当最后贷款人的法定权力并不会影响英格兰银行在必要时这么做。


As First Lord of the Treasury Sir Robert Peel wrote: “If it be necessary to assume a grave responsibility, I dare say men will be willing to assume such a responsibility.”	正如第一财政大臣罗伯特·皮尔（Robert Peel）所写的：“在需要勇敢地承担责任的时候，我敢说，人们会乐于站出来承担责任的。 ”


Our current political and economic institutions rest upon the wager that a decentralized market provides a better social-planning, coordination, and capital-allocation mechanism than any other that we have yet been able to devise.	如今，我们的政治和经济机构在进行一场豪赌，赌去中心化的市场能比其他任何我们尚未想到的办法提供更好的社会规划、协作和资本配置机制。


But, since the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, part of that system has been a central financial authority that preserves trust that contracts will be fulfilled and promises kept.	但是，自工业革命发端以来，这一体系的一部分就一直是确保人们相信契约会被执行、承诺会得到兑现的中央金融当局。


Time and again, the lender-of-last-resort role has been an indispensable part of that function.	一次又一次的历史证明，最后贷款人角色是这一功能不可或缺的一部分。


That is what the ECB is now throwing away.	而这正是欧洲央行正在抛弃的东西。


Saving Europe’s Real Hegemon	拯救欧洲的真正霸权


MUNICH – Last June, the European Commission announced its about-face on bank restructuring.	慕尼黑—去年6月，欧盟委员会宣布其对银行重组的观点全面逆转。


The money for recapitalizing distressed banks would now come primarily from creditors, not European taxpayers, with a pecking order to specify which lenders would be repaid first.	如今，重组受困银行的资金将主要来自债权人而不是欧洲纳税人，根据啄序规定哪些贷款人将首先得到偿付。


All of this is welcome, at least in principle.	这整套方案都值得欢迎，至少在理论上是如此。


In practice, however, the scheme leaves much to be desired.	但是，在实践上，这一制度距离完美还相去甚远。


The problem is that a very long list of exceptions reduces the recoverable assets to such an extent that in many cases it will still be impossible to make do without public money.	问题在于极长的里外名单使得可回收资产规模被极度压缩，以至于在很多情形中仍不得不依靠公共资金。


The long-term plan is that this money should come from a fund created by European banks themselves.	长期的计划是，这笔钱应该来自由欧洲银行本身设立的基金。


But the Eurogroup (a meeting of eurozone finance ministers attended by the European Union’s economic and monetary affairs commissioner and the European Central Bank president) is suggesting that, until then, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) – and thus the taxpayers – will fill the gap.	但欧元集团（由欧元区财政部长组成，并有欧盟经济和货币事务委员和欧洲央行行长出席的会议）暗示，在此之前，将由欧洲稳定性机制（ESM）填补空白，换句话说，就是由纳税人掏钱。


Given that taxpayers are thus supposed to finance guarantees for deposits up to €100,000 ($133,000) – the median level of Dutch household wealth and twice the German median – the Eurogroup’s proposal boils down to a massive redistribution of wealth in Europe, the dimensions of which are not understood by the public.	纳税人因此将对10万欧元以下的存款提供担保资金——相当于荷兰家庭财富中位值，或德国中位值的两倍——换句话说，欧元集团的方案无异于在欧洲实行大规模财富再分配，且其细节不为公众所理解。


The idea of exempting banks’ secured debt from the pecking order for repayment is extremely problematic as well.	将银行的有担保债务剔除出偿付啄序之外的观点也有很大问题。


While this proposal may sound harmless and almost self-evident, it is not; secured debt needs no further protection, because it is already secured.	该方案听起来无甚危害，且不言而喻，但其实并非如此； 有担保债务不需要进一步的保护，因为它已经有了担保。


Viewed from this perspective, the additional protection afforded by the exemption is highly surprising.	从这个角度看，将其剔除这一附加保护着实令人震惊。


The exemption for secured debt undoubtedly concerns mainly the refinancing loans that the ECB has extended to commercial banks against increasingly weak collateral.	有担保债务的豁免毫无疑问主要事关欧洲央行以日益劣质的抵押条件贷给商业银行的再融资贷款。


For the eurozone’s crisis-ridden economies (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), the combined total is €732 billion.	对欧元区受危机冲击的经济体来说（塞浦路斯、希腊、爱尔兰、意大利、葡萄牙和西班牙），这类贷款总额为7320亿欧元。


These loans extend far beyond providing the liquidity that these countries need for internal circulation, for which a maximum of €335 billion – their available stock of central-bank money – would have sufficed.	这些贷款远远超过了这些国家内部流通所需要的流动性，这些国家最多需要3350亿欧元——它们可以获得的央行货币存量——便已足够。


Instead, by weakening safety standards, bailing out foreign investors, and financing current-account deficits, the ECB has undercut and replaced the private European interbank market.	相反，通过削减安全标准、援助外国投资者和为经常项目赤字融资，欧洲央行削弱并取代了私人欧洲银行间市场。


With several banks in the crisis countries on the verge of bankruptcy, many of these loans have now turned toxic.	危机国的不少银行处于破产边缘，因此这些贷款中有不少已成为有毒资产。


After all, if one takes the average of estimates reported by reputable sources, the write-off losses of the six crisis countries’ banks amount to about €670 billion.	毕竟，来自信誉卓著机构的估计的平均值表明，六大危机国银行的减记损失将高达6700亿欧元。


Participating in these write-offs would put huge strain on the Eurosystem (the ECB and the central banks of the eurozone member states), which has only around €500 billion in equity capital.	参与这笔减记将给只有5000亿欧元左右资本的欧元系统（欧洲央行和欧元区成员国央行）造成严重掣肘。


The riskiness of the ECB’s strategy of using the printing press to bail out banks, including their public and private clients, would become apparent to everyone.	欧洲央行开动印钞机援助银行及其公私客户的风险将成为众所周知的秘密。


Thus, it is clear how the losses incurred by the ECB’s de facto regional fiscal policy are to be avoided: the write-off costs will be transferred from the ECB to the ESM.	因此，欧洲央行事实上的地区性财政政策所导致的风险应该如何避免是一目了然的：减记成本应该从欧洲央行转移到ESM。


This makes no difference to taxpayers, who will have to pay for both institutions’ losses in the same manner.	这对纳税人来说没有区别，反正他们必须以同样的方式为这两个机构的损失掏钱。


But it has the advantage of allowing the ECB to present itself as having a clean balance sheet, thereby enabling it to maintain its current policy.	但这样有利于欧洲央行保持健康的资产负债表，从而能够维持其当前政策。


Ultimately, this is merely a new round of the eurozone’s old game of financial hide-and-seek, whereby losses are obscured by distributing them among different institutions and time horizons.	最终，这将无非是欧元区金融捉迷藏的老戏新演，通过将损失分散到不同机构和时限来迷惑众人。


The game started with the bailout fund for Greece, which was followed by the European Financial Stability Facility, the European Financial Stability Mechanism, and the International Monetary Fund, which in turn were relieved by the ESM.	这场游戏始于希腊援助资金，继之以欧洲金融稳定基金、欧洲金融稳定机制和IMF，最后是ESM救场。


In each case, a major objective was to reduce the burden on the ECB, which had advanced the money by printing it and would have run into serious difficulties without help.	在每一阶段，重大目标之一都是减轻欧洲央行的负担，后者用印钞来提供资金，如果得不到帮助，将陷入加大的麻烦。


The entire arrangement is highly problematic from the standpoint of democracy, because the initial decisions about undercutting the capital markets by means of public credit were taken by the ECB’s Governing Council, in which large countries like France or Germany have the same voting power as Cyprus or Malta.	从民主的角度看，这一整套安排问题重重，因为用公共信用削弱资本市场的初始决定是由欧洲央行理事会做出的，法国和德国等大国与塞浦路斯和马耳他等小国的投票权是一样的。


Indeed, the national central banks’ allocation of emergency liquidity assistance required approval by only one-third of the Governing Council’s members, and the six crisis countries had these votes.	事实上，各国央行紧急流动性援助配额只要求三分之一理事会投票赞成即可通过，六个危机国已经拥有这一能力。


According to the Eurogroup’s proposal, these self-awarded loans, too, are now to be secured by ESM funds.	根据欧元集团的方案，这些自我颁发的贷款现在由ESM资金担保。


While the European Union’s national parliaments must still decide on the scheme, they essentially have no option but to assent, because to do otherwise would severely harm the ECB.	欧盟各国议会仍需要就该机制做出表决，但实际上它们除了赞成之外别无选择，因为不这么做将严重伤害欧洲央行。


When they finally get to vote on the matter – years after the ECB’s risky credit maneuvers – they will have no choice but to bail out the ECB, the true hegemon of the eurozone.	当它们最终对此事进行投票时——距离欧洲央行危险的信贷动作已过去了多年——它们将别无选择，只能援助欧洲央行这一欧元区的真正霸权。


The ECB’s Honeymoon is Over	欧洲央行的蜜月结束了


The honeymoon for the European Central Bank is over.	欧洲央行的蜜月已经结束了。


Because European interest rates no longer are clearly out of whack with the fundamentals of the euro-zone economy, monetary policy has become more complex.	由于欧洲的利率不再明显地与欧元区经济基本面脱节，因此货币政策已经变得更为复杂。


At the same time, France has given a strong mandate to its new president, Nicolas Sarkozy, who is without question the most formidable political adversary the ECB has had to face in its brief history.	同时，法国给了新总统萨尔科奇强大的授权。 萨尔科奇无疑是欧洲央行在其短暂历史上所要面对的最为强大的政治对手。


Sarkozy stands ready to pounce on any mistakes the Bank may make in this more difficult policy environment.	萨尔科奇准备好对欧洲央行在这一更为困难的政策环境中可能做出的任何错误予以重击。


With European interest rates up 200 basis points since late 2005 and the euro near a record high, Sarkozy wants the ECB to stop raising rates now.	自从2005年底以来，欧洲利率上升了200个基点，欧元将近历史最高点。 在这一情况下，萨尔科奇想要让欧洲央行现在停止提高利率。


ECB president Jean-Claude Trichet and the Governing Council strongly disagree.	欧洲央行行长特里谢及其管理委员会强烈反对。


At the ECB press conference in early July, Trichet signaled at least one more rate hike—either in September or October.	在六月上旬的欧洲央行记者会上，特里谢暗示至少还有一次加息，要么在九月，要么在十月。


Some Council members are known to support two more rate hikes before year-end.	人们知道，某些委员会成员支持在年底以前两次加息。


What makes monetary policy tricky at this point is that the German economy—which has been Europe’s locomotive during the current cyclical upturn—may be reaching a turning point.	德国经济让货币政策在这一结骨眼上很为难。 德国经济是当前欧洲经济周期上升的火车头，现在可能到达了一个转折点。


Surveys of business and investor confidence have softened—the respected IFO index of German business sentiment fell from 107.0 to 106.4 in Julyamp#45;amp#45;and the so-called “hard data”—industrial production, retail sales, etc.amp#45;amp#45;- has been mixed.	企业和投资者信心调查变软，受人尊重的德国企业感觉IFO指数在七月从107. 0下降到106.


Second quarter German GDP has stalled after a surprisingly strong first quarter.	而所谓的“硬性数据”，即工业生产以及零售等等则好坏参半。 德国第二季度GDP在第一季度令人惊讶地强劲以后放缓。


The jury is out but there is reason to be concerned.	判断已经做出，但是还是有担忧的理由。


The euro is at record levels, oil prices are surging and interest rates are expected to go higher.	欧元处于创记录的高度，油价上升，而利率则预计会上升。


The euro-zone economy—including Germany’samp#45;amp#45;is not bulletproof though the hawks in the Governing Council often talk as if it were.	欧元区的经济包括德国在内并非像管理委员会的鹰派认识经常所谈论的那样固若金汤。


Just as last year when there was unwarranted growth pessimism in Europe, this year there is unwarranted growth euphoria.	正如去年对欧洲经济增长抱有不切实际的悲观那样，今年则有不切实际的增长乐观。


Many Germans, in particular, are in denial that the cyclical upturn may be coming to an end.	特别是许多德国人否认周期性的上升可能正在结束。


Were the Governing Council to miss the coming turn in the European economy while blithely raising interest rates, they would be portrayed as drunken sailors on a rate-raising binge.	如果管理委员会错失欧洲经济这一即将到来的转折而毫无顾虑地提高利率，那么，他们就会被描绘成为加息胡闹中的喝醉的海员。


The roar for greater political control over Europe’s central bank would be deafening—and not only from France.	而对欧洲央行实现更大的政治控制就会震耳欲聋，而且不仅仅来自于法国。


The political costs for the ECB of making this type of mistake could be exorbitant.	欧洲央行犯下这样的错误的政治代价将会是非常高的。


This is why the ECB must be very prudent as it considers whether to maintain the current pace of rate hikes, in which case it would raise rates by 25 basis points in September, or slow the pace down a bit, in which case the next rate hike would come in October at the earliest.	这就是为什么欧洲央行必须在考虑是否维持目前加息进度的时候十分小心谨慎。 按照这一进度，它将会在九月份加息25个基点，或者稍微放缓，在这种情况下下一次加息最早在十月份。


In the current political environment, the dangers to the ECB from outside political interference are much greater from raising rates too fast than too slowly.	在目前的政治环境中，由于加息过快而对欧洲央行进行外部政治干预的危险要远远超过加息过慢。


If it goes too slow, the ECB has earned sufficient credibility as an inflation fighter to make up for it in the future with little if any economic or political cost.	如果加息过慢，欧洲央行也就赢得了将来弥补通货膨胀斗士的足够的信誉度，而经济和政治代价则几乎没有。


But if it goes too fast, the political cost could be substantial and irreversible.	但是如果加息过快，其政治代价将会是巨大而无可挽回的。


Politicians will push for more control and probably get it, Maastricht treaty or no Maastricht treaty.	政坛人物们将会推动进行更多的控制，并且有可能无论是否受到马斯特里赫特条约的约束而得逞。


Waiting until October for the next move up is like buying insurance against a catastrophic loss.	等到十月份在决定下一步就像是为防止灾难性的损失而购买保险。


But will the ECB see it this way?	但是欧洲央行会这样看问题吗？


As a matter of principle, the hawks refuse to consider the political costs of their actions.	作为一个原则问题，鹰派们拒绝考虑其行为的政治代价。


In earlier times with no formidable adversaries in the political arena, this was a harmless affectation.	在早先的时候政治舞台上没有什么巨大的对手，这就是一个无关痛痒的做作。


But it is an extremely dangerous attitude with people like Sarkozy ready, willing and able to impose high political costs upon the bank should it stumble.	但是，由于有了像萨尔科奇那样准备、愿意而且有能力在欧洲央行犯错的时候实行高昂的政治代价的人物，这一态度就是极为危险了。


There is more interest in Sarkozy’s populist ideas about currency intervention and adding a new political dimension to monetary policy decisions than is commonly realized.	人们对萨尔科奇有关货币干预并且在货币政策决定上加上新的政治因素的民粹主义观点抱有兴趣，其份量要比人们通常认识到的要大。


The hawks also suffer from what can be called a “catch up” complex.	鹰派人物们还受到所谓的“追赶”情结之苦。


No matter how high rates go, they think they’re behind.	无论利率多高，他们总是认为落后。


They want to go in September so that they can go again in December (even before knowing the data)—and they won’t stop there either.	他们想要在九月份加息，这样就可以在十二月在此加息(甚至在知道数据之前)，而且他们不会就此罢休。


Even the doves might support a rate hike in September to counter-act the charge that they are being bullied out of a September hike by Sarkozy.	甚至是鸽派人物也可能会支持在九月份加息以便回击他们被萨尔科奇吓唬而不在九月份加息的指控。


There is no doubt that Sarkozy’s attacks on the ECB are having a counter-productive effect in this regard.	毫无疑问，萨尔科奇对欧洲央行的攻击正在这方面适得其反。


They are pressuring the ECB to raise rates sooner than later.	他们正在给欧洲央行施加压力尽早而非尽晚加息。


But a September rate move also serves Sarkozy’s interests, as it will give him more ammunition to portray the ECB as out of control and in need of political disciplining.	但是九月份加息也符合萨尔科奇的利益，因为这会给他以口实，将欧洲央行描绘成为失控以及需要加以政治约束。


For the ECB to protect itself from such charges, far better to wait until October when the bank can go to the public and say in effect; “Look, do you see how reasonable we have been.	对于欧洲央行来说，未来保护自己不受此类指控的攻击，再好不过的就是等到十月份，那时，欧洲央行就可以走向公众并说：“你们看，我们是多么地合情合理。


Now we must raise rates.”	现在我们必须加息了。 ”


In the final analysis, whether the next rate increase comes in September, October or whenever—and it looks like September notwithstanding current warning signs like IFO that suggest a possible slowdown in the coming monthsamp#45;amp#45; the data will determine how far the ECB goes with its rate hikes if the bank is savvy enough to keep the politicians at bay.	总而言之，下一次的加息是否在九月、十月还是任何时候，而且，尽管目前有像IFO的警告说未来几个月内有可能经济放缓，看起来九月份加息还是要来。 如果欧洲央行采取明智之举避免政坛人物的干预，那么，数据就会决定欧洲央行在加息的道路上走多远。


But this is a big “if”.	但是这还是一个巨大的未知数。


The fight is on between the two French titans—Trichet and Sarkozy—with the fate of Europe’s central bank hanging in the balance.	法国两大巨人，也就是特里谢和萨尔科奇之间的争斗开始了。 欧洲央行的命运与此紧密攸关。


The ECB’s Path Not Taken	欧洲央行没有选择的道路


It is now clear that the European Central Bank views higher interest rates as the right response to rising oil prices.	现在看来，欧洲中央银行显然把提高利率看作是对油价提高的正确回应。


As a result, the ECB risks painting itself into a corner, for the logic behind this week’s interest-rate hike implies that more increases will follow – a series of policy mistakes that will cost the Eurozone economies heavily.	其结果是，欧洲央行面临将自己逼入绝境的风险，因为本周利率提升的背后隐藏的逻辑暗示今后利率还将多次提升——一连串会让欧元区经济体付出沉重代价的政策错误。


Despite statements to the contrary, no central bank, including the ECB, can simply focus on inflation and ignore what happens to economic activity.	尽管嘴上不说，但实际上没有一家中央银行，包括欧洲央行在内，能够单纯地集中解决通胀，而忽视对经济活动的影响。


Suppose, for the sake of argument, that stabilizing prices came at the cost of a 30% unemployment rate. Surely nobody would want that.	假如——仅仅是打个比方——稳定物价的代价是30%的失业率，肯定不会有人喜欢。


The ECB’s defenders would say that such an outcome is purely hypothetical – and irrelevant – for there is no conflict between stabilizing inflation and sustaining the appropriate level of economic activity.	替欧洲央行辩护的人会说，这样的结果纯粹是假想——而且毫无根据——因为稳定物价和保持适当的经济活动水平之间不存在冲突。


Price stability, according to this view, reduces uncertainty, thereby enabling firms and individuals to take the right decisions, so it is good, not bad, for economic activity.	在这种人看来，物价稳定可以减少不稳定因素，从而使公司和个人得以做出正确的决定，因此对经济活动有益无害。


This argument is true – most of the time.	这种论点没错——大多数时候如此。


But when an economy faces a major adverse shock, such as a sharp increase in oil prices, then the twin goals of stabilizing inflation and maintaining economic activity conflict, and the central bank’s job becomes more difficult.	但是如果经济体面临重大的不利打击，例如油价的飙升，则稳定物价和保持经济活动这两个目标就会发生冲突，而中央银行的任务就变得更加棘手。


Think about what stabilizing inflation means in such a context.	想想在这样的情况下稳定物价意味着什么。


Firms are likely to pass the increase in energy costs on to consumers by raising their prices.	公司可能通过涨价把能源成本的增加转嫁给消费者。


In response, workers are likely to demand higher nominal wages.	反过来，工人可能要求提高名义工资。


If the central bank is to avoid an inflation spiral, it must ensure that the “first round” effects of higher energy prices on inflation do not fuel such “second round” effects.	如果央行要避免螺旋上升的通胀，就必须防止能源价格提高对通胀的“第一波”影响推动这样的“第二波”影响。


In an environment where productivity gains and wage growth are already weak, as in Europe today, persuading workers to accept a cut in real wages may be tough.	在今天的欧洲这样一个生产力和工资的增长已经很微弱的环境里，要想说服工人接受实际工资的削减可能不太容易。


The interest-rate increase decided this week will soon appear insufficient, and will have to be followed by further hikes and a large increase in unemployment.	本周决定的提高利率的政策很快就会变得力有不逮，接下来就不得不一次又一次地提高利率，从而引起失业率的猛增。


In order to achieve its inflation goal, the ECB may have to contract activity until workers are, in effect, beaten into submission.	欧洲央行为了实现控制通胀的目标，可能不得不缩减经济活动，直到工人基本上被迫服从。


Is there a better way to respond to adverse shocks?	那么有没有更好的方法应付不利打击呢？


The answer from monetary theory is an unambiguous “yes”: give workers a chance to adjust to higher energy prices, allow for some pass-through of higher prices to wages over time (so that wages adjust more gradually), and make clear that inflation will return to its target range within, say, a year or two.	按照货币理论，答案是毫不含糊的“有”：给工人机会适应提高后的能源价格，留出一定的时间让物价上涨的部分影响逐渐转嫁到工资上（以便工资能够逐渐调整），同时宣布通胀将会在（比如说）一两年内恢复到目标范围以内。


Such a policy will limit the increase in unemployment, at the cost of only temporarily higher inflation.	这样的政策可以限制失业率的上升，其代价仅仅是通胀水平暂时较高。


So, why is the ECB set on a tougher course?	那么，为什么欧洲央行要选择一条更艰难的道路呢？


There are three plausible reasons.	表面上合理的原因有三个。


First, there has been little wage pressure so far.	首先，迄今为止工资压力还不太高。


So the ECB may not have to increase interest rates very much in order to contain inflation.	因此欧洲央行可能不需要将利率提高太多就能控制通胀。


If this scenario plays out, the impact on economic activity and employment will be minimal.	如果此梦能圆，那么经济活动和就业率受到的影响就能降到最低。


But there are good historical grounds for thinking that it won’t.	然而从历史上来看，我们有充分理由认为这个梦圆不了。


What we are seeing in Europe today is more likely to be delayed adjustment rather than passive acceptance of real wage cuts by workers and unions.	我们在今天的欧洲更有可能看到延迟的调整，而不大可能看到工人和工会被动接受实际工资的削减。


The ECB should not delude itself into thinking that a small increase in interest rates will be enough.	欧洲央行不应该幻想小幅度地提升一点利率就够了。


If and when wage pressure comes, the ECB, to remain true to its word, may be forced to increase interest rates much more than it now expects.	一旦出现工资压力，为了不食言自肥，欧洲央行很可能被迫将利率提升到远远超过现在设想的水平。


The second argument is that if the ECB stands firm, workers will not demand higher nominal wages, for they will understand that this would only lead to higher interest rates and higher unemployment.	第二个理由是如果欧洲央行立场坚定，工人就不会要求提高名义工资，因为他们会理解这样做只能导致利率和失业率升高。


This argument is not irrelevant; monetary policy probably has some effect on wage bargaining.	这个理由并非毫无道理； 经济政策或许的确对工资谈判有一点影响。


But one should not expect too much from a tough ECB stance.	但是我们不应该对欧洲央行的强硬立场抱有太多希望。


Think of the limited success of the ECB’s advocacy of greater labor-market flexibility: there has been no dramatic increase in the pace of reforms.	想想欧洲央行倡导提高劳动力市场灵活性取得的有限成绩吧：改革的步伐并没有出现戏剧性的加速。


The third argument is that higher inflation today would endanger the ECB’s credibility in the future.	第三条理由是当前较高的通胀水平会危及欧洲央行将来的信誉。


This argument, too, is hardly irrelevant: higher inflation today must not be permitted to change inflation expectations in the medium run.	这个理由同样不无道理：绝对不能允许当前较高的通胀水平改变人们的中期通胀预期。


Leaving interest rates on hold in the face of adverse price shocks thus requires a convincing explanation by the ECB of its underlying policy.	因此，在面临不利的价格冲击时如果不动利率的话，欧洲央行就必须对自己这样做的政策做出让人信服的解释。


Here, the ECB’s task is all the more difficult because, having focused so narrowly on inflation stabilization, markets would read adoption of a more flexible stance as a change in position.	而这个任务对欧洲央行来说益发困难，因为，在目不暇顾地专注于稳定通胀之后，市场会把他们采取更加灵活的姿态当作是立场的改变。


Moreover, because the ECB has actually exceeded its inflation target in recent years, its credibility is already in doubt.	而且，由于欧洲央行在最近几年里实际上已经超越了自己的通胀目标，他们的信誉其实已经岌岌可危。


True, adopting the appropriate policy would require the ECB to articulate its rationale with great care.	不错，采取适当的政策要求欧洲央行异常谨慎地解释自己的思路。


Here it can take lessons from its British and American counterparts: credibility does not require dogmatism, but rather clarity of purpose.	这方面，他们可以吸取英国和美国央行的教训：信誉需要的不是固执己见，而是目标明确。


What is at stake is too important to ignore.	然而赌注太重要了，不能忽视。


On its current policy path, unless oil prices fall, the ECB risks being forced to commit to substantially higher interest rates, and thus to a further increase in Eurozone unemployment.	沿��目前的政策道路走下去，除非油价下跌，否则欧洲央行将面临被迫大幅度提高利率的危险，从而引起欧元区的失业率进一步上升。


The ECB’s Tone-Deaf President	欧洲央行的音盲总裁


PALO ALTO – Once upon a time, European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet communicated effectively with the outside world.	PALO ALTO—曾几何时，欧洲中央银行（ECB）行长特里谢能够与外界有效沟通。


Not anymore.	但好景不再。


More than a few eyebrows were raised after the ECB’s January Governing Council meeting, when Trichet threatened that the Bank would act “preemptively” if labor unions tried to embed higher energy and food prices into new contracts, risking a wage-price spiral.	在一月份的ECB治理委员会会议上，特里谢的言行令人颇为不快。 他威胁说如果工会试图将更高的能源和食品价格写入新合同带来工资物价螺旋上升的风险，那么央行就会采取“先发制人”的行动。


This threat took a heavy toll on the ECB’s credibility, since an interest-rate hike in the midst of the most serious financial crisis in decades was obviously absurd.	这一威胁使ECB的公信力大打折扣，因为在面临数十年来最为严重的金融危机的情况下大幅提升利率是明显不合时宜的。


No one believed it, and the ECB not only withdrew its clumsy threat the next month, but it adopted a policy of interest-rate neutrality.	没人相信这一套。 ECB不但在二月份收回了这一笨拙的威胁，还采取了利率中立的政策。


But the announcement of this policy change at the February meeting also did not go smoothly.	但这一政策变化在二月会议上的宣布也并非一帆风顺。


Trichet somehow garbled the Council’s message in his press conference, making it sound as if the ECB wanted to shift to an easing bias instead of “wait and see” neutrality.	特里谢在记者见面会上对这一消息断章取义，令人听起来似乎是ECB想要将政策转变为准备降息（easing bias）而不是“等着瞧”的中立。


European fixed-income markets rallied strongly as a result, only to reverse course days later when Trichet and his colleagues made it clear that the markets had “misread” him.	这一表态使得欧洲固定收益市场强力反弹，直到数天后特里谢和他的同事出面澄清说市场“误读”了他的话后才恢复正常。


So there was unwelcome and unneeded market volatility because Trichet couldn’t get the message out straight.	因为特里谢不能直白地传达信息导致了抵触情绪和不必要的市场异动。


Indications that Trichet’s communicative skills were slipping already had become evident last September, when the Governing Council could not follow through with the rate increase the ECB president had promised the previous month.	特里谢的沟通技巧下降的迹象在去年九月就已经十分明显了。 当时治理委员会未能通过这位ECB总裁在上一个月所承诺的升息。


For some unknown reason, Trichet is keen not to surprise markets over the very short term.	不知出于什么原因，特里谢致力于不给市场短期的意外。


He tips them off about what he plans to do one month in advance, using code words like “vigilance” to signal policy change, all the while maintaining with a straight face that the bank never “pre-commits” its policy stance.	他提前一个月向市场透露行动计划，使用“警惕”一类的暗号来提示政策变动。 同时他又总是一脸严肃地表示ECB从不“预先承诺”其政策立场。


Many on the Governing Council object to this childish game of code words, because it eliminates their freedom of action once the Council commits itself to a course of action.	治理委员会的许多人都反对这种幼稚的暗号游戏，因为一旦该委员会需要采取行动这种做法将会极大限制其自由。


The Council may then be forced to choose between doing the right thing and preserving the credibility of the ECB’s communications.	它可能会被迫在采取正确的行动和保持ECB与外界沟通的公信力之间做出选择。


This is precisely what happened in September, when the financial crisis made it impossible for the ECB to proceed with the interest-rate hike that it had “announced” in August.	这恰恰是九月份发生的情况。 当时的金融危机使得ECB不可能实行其在八月“宣布”升息。


Code word communications, which only work in a stable and crisis-free economic and financial environment, had damaged ECB credibility.	只有在稳定和无危机的经济和金融环境中才有效的暗语通信已经损害了ECB的公信力。


Calm economic waters had given the ECB and Trichet a honeymoon until last fall.	直到去年秋天之前都波澜不兴的平静经济环境给了ECB和特里谢一段蜜月期。


But, with financial markets now in turmoil and likely to stay that way, the time has come for the ECB to jettison its use of code words – a poor substitute for real central bank transparency in any case.	但随着金融市场现在陷入动荡并会继续如此，ECB必须抛弃其暗号体系—它在任何情况下都是真正的央行透明度的蹩脚替代品。


What also needs to be jettisoned from the ECB’s communications policy is its obsession with the short run.	应该从ECB的沟通政策中剔除的还有对短期的迷恋。


With the United States now in recession (and the possibility of a deep recession not that remote), it is striking how positive ECB officials sound about the European economy: Europe’s “economic fundamentals are sound,” the economy is “robust,” economic performance is “just below potential,” and so on.	随着美国经济陷入衰退（而且可能不久还会陷入更深的衰退），ECB的官员们对欧洲经济的乐观令人吃惊：欧洲的“经济基本面是好的”，经济本身是“健康的”，经济表现“只是未发挥出潜力”等等。


The ECB’s policymakers are not blind, merely shortsighted.	ECB的政策制定者们并非失明，而仅仅短视。


They fear that honesty about Europe’s economic prospects over the next year or so might cause markets to force it into an unwanted rate cut now.	他们害怕对未来一年左右欧洲经济前景的诚实预测会导致市场施压迫使他们降息。


So they exaggerate and tell stories about how the European economy is fundamentally different from the US economy.	因此他们便夸大其词，描述欧洲经济与美国经济是多么的根本性的不同。


This is a major mistake, for which the ECB could pay dearly.	这是一个严重的错误，ECB可能会为此付出高昂的代价。


Yes, today the European economy is not doing badly.	是的，目前欧洲经济还不错。


But how long is this likely to last with the US falling into a deep slump?	但随着美国经济深陷衰退这种情况还会持续多久呢？


The ECB should be preparing Europeans for what many of its own officials admit in private: Europe has not “de-coupled” from the US.	ECB应该让欧洲人接受一个其官员在私下里都承认的事实：欧洲并没有和美国“脱钩”。


On the contrary, America’s current economic difficulties will hit Europe hard, but with a time lag – the best guess being 2009.	相反，美国目前的经济困境会给欧洲造成强烈冲击，但有一个时间差—最乐观的估计是到2009年。


This is not to argue, of course, that the ECB should cut interest rates now.	当然，这并不是说ECB应该现在就降息。


On the contrary, the Bank’s current policy of fighting inflationary pressures by slower growth, a stronger euro, and the credit crunch seems just about right for the time being.	相反，它现在所实施的通过更缓慢的经济增长、更强的欧元和信贷紧缩来应对通胀压力的政策暂时还是有效的。


But, after all the happy talk about the European economy, how much credibility will the ECB have if Europe eventually succumbs to recessionary pressures from abroad?	但是在对欧洲经济一派歌舞升平的描述之后，如果欧洲最终遭遇来自外部的衰退压力，ECB还能有多大的公信力呢？


The ECB’s independence is still a contentious political issue in Europe.	在欧洲，ECB的独立性仍然是个颇具争议的政治问题。


It is more prudent that it voice concern for Europe’s future economic prospects today than face a deceived and angry public tomorrow.	更为审慎的做法是现在就表示对欧洲经济前景的担忧而不是在未来面对被欺骗的、愤怒的公众。


The ECB’s Two Pillars - A Success	欧洲央行的两个支柱，一个成功的范例


In October 1998, just before the start of the European Monetary Union, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) adopted a stability oriented monetary policy strategy.	1998年10月，就在欧洲货币联盟启动前，欧洲中央银行管理委员会（ECB）采纳了面向稳定的货币政策战略。 这一战略由三个要素组成。


This strategy comprises three elements: First and foremost it contains a clear commitment to the primary goal of the ECB, which is to safeguard price stability.  Price stability was defined as an annual increase in the price level of below two percent over the medium term.	第一个也是最重要的是它包含了欧洲央行首要目标的明确责任，即保护价格的稳定。  价格稳定就是 在一个中期阶段内每年的价格水平增长不超过2%。


The other two elements, which soon became famous under the headline of “two pillars”, serve as a means to  assess the risks to the goal of price stability .	其他两个要素很快因为其“两个支柱”的名头而闻名。 它们是 评估影响价格稳定目标的风险 的一种手段。


The monetary analysis pillar comprises all information coming from various monetary and credit aggregates and serves to figure out the risks to price stability over the  medium- to long-run .	货币分析支柱由来自各种各样的货币和信贷合计信息所组成，用来指出 中期和长期阶段内 影响价格稳定的风险因素。


The economic analysis pillar is based on a wide set of domestic and international economic indicators from the real and financial sectors (wages, import prices, interest and exchange rates etc.).	经济分析支柱基于来自基础和财政部门的一组广泛的国内和国际经济指数（工资、进口价格、利率和汇率等）。


It provides a basis for the assessment of  short- to medium-term price developments.	它为对于 短期到中期阶段内的 价格发展的评估提供基础。


This two pillar approach constitutes a framework for cross-checking indications from the shorter-term economic analysis with those from the longer-term monetary analysis in order to obtain a robust view about the risks to price stability.	这两种支柱方法组成了对于来自短期经济分析与那些来自长期货币分析的指数进行反复核对的框架，以便得出对于影响价格稳定的风险因素的一个坚实的观点。


In the standard model of the neo-keynesian approach, which has become more and more “state-of-the-art”, the usefulness of money to monetary policy analysis is challenged; there is no need for monetary cross-checking, monetary analysis has no value-added and is superfluous.	在已经变得越来越优良的新凯恩斯主义法的标准模型中，货币对于货币政策分析的作用受到了挑战； 不需要用货币来进行核对，货币分析增添不了价值并且是多余的。


I am not convinced by these arguments.	我并认为这些看法是对的。


Customary inflation forecasts and economic analysis alone are not a sufficient basis for monetary policy decisions.	单单依靠习惯的通货膨胀预测和经济分析无法为货币政策的决策提供足够的基础。


While such decisions must not ignore longer-term developments, the time horizon for inflation forecasts is usually only one to two years, beyond it gets highly uncertain.	因为这些决策不能忽略长期的发展，所以通货膨胀预测的时间范围常常只有一到两年，超出这个范围就变得十分不确定了。


Moreover, while monetary policy has always to be conducted under uncertainty, the ECB was confronted with a situation of extreme uncertainty.	此外，因为货币政策常常是在不确定的情况下被执行，欧洲央行面临着极大的不确定性。


There was uncertainty concerning the state of the economy.	经济状况常常是不确定的。


The data situation around the start was very unsatisfactory.	在启动阶段的数据情况非常糟糕。


Unobservable indicators like the output gap, which plays e.g. a central role in neo-keynesian recommendations for monetary policy, are generally known to be very difficult to estimate in real time.	像产量缺口在新凯恩斯主义推荐货币政策使用的指数中扮演着中心角色，这样一些无法观测的指数，大家都知道是很难被实时预测的。


Estimates for the output gap of the euro area at that time were especially doubtful with data coming from different international institutions varying widely, and being revised substantially at later stages.	在那个阶段要对欧盟区域内的产量缺口作出预测尤其令人怀疑，因为来自不同的国际机构的数据相互差别非常大，并且后来作了很大的修正。


Nor was it clear which models provide the most reasonable account of the functioning of the economy, especially in a case where more or less heterogeneous countries were to form a monetary union.	而到底哪一个模型提供了对于经济活动最合理的计算也不清楚，尤其在这个货币联盟是由经济上参差不齐的国家组成的情况下。


This was compounded by strategic uncertainty related to how markets, investors and consumers would react to the replacement of national currencies with the Euro.	这些又因为市场、投资者和消费者对于欧元取代各自国家的货币将作何反应的战略上的不确定性而变得更加复杂。


In this highly uncertain environment, monetary policy decisions which did not rely on a solid framework could have been misguided.	在这个高度不确定的环境下，并不依赖于一个坚实的框架的货币政策的决策可能会被误导。


This posed a risk of substantial policy errors, which would have constituted a deadly blow on reputation, the most important capital of any central bank.	这可能会造成巨大的政策错误的危险，从而对于名声这个任何一个中央银行最最重要的资产带来致命的打击。


Thus the ECB needed to rely on the few robust results theory and experience can provide.	因此欧洲央行需要依靠能够提供的很少一些坚实的结果理论和经验。


The long-run connection between money and price developments is among the most robust economic relationships.	货币和价格发展长期阶段内的联系是最最坚实的经济关系之一。


“Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon”.	“通货膨胀总是并且在任何地方都是一个货币现象。


This statement by the late Nobel laureate Milton Friedman has never lost its validity.	”诺贝尔经济学奖获得者米尔顿·弗里德曼的这一观点从未失去它的有效性。


And who would deny that monetary policy has to do with money?	而谁又能否认货币政策一定是与货币有关的呢？


Certainly, monetary analysis is no easy task, though this is true for all relevant economic explanations.	当然，货币分析并不是件容易的事情，尽管它对于所有相关的经济解释都是正确的。


No question, the neo-keynesian approach is useful for a central bank’s policy analysis.	毫无疑问，新凯恩斯主义法对于中央银行的政策分析是有用的。


But including monetary analysis in a monetary policy strategy is vital to the central bank’s decision making process.	但是把货币分析包含进货币政策战略中对于中央银行的决策过程是非常重要的。


It would be strange to suggest that any central bank could ignore the information from money.	建议任何一家中央银行忽略来自货币的信息是件非常古怪的事情。


Many studies have also shown that there is hardly any major asset price inflation episode which was not accompanied if not preceded by strong growth of money and/or credit.	许多研究也显示很少有哪个主要资产价格上涨的时期不是伴着，如果不是跟着的话，货币和/或信贷的强劲上升。


The question is not whether or not to include monetary analysis in the monetary policy strategy, but how to reconcile the results from the monetary and the economic analyses to achieve a comprehensive and consistent assessment of the risks to price stability.	问题不是是否应该把货币分析包含进货币政策战略中，而是怎样调节来自货币和经济分析的结果以得出一个对于影响价格稳定的因素的综合和连贯的评估。


In the strategy of the ECB this is the role of crosschecking.	在欧洲央行的战略中反复核对就扮演了这样的角色。


It is not surprising that in a world of low inflation central banks as well as academics have lost interest in “money”.	在一个低通货膨胀的世界里中央银行还有科研机构失去对“货币”的兴趣并不令人感到奇怪。


One can only hope that the world does not have to go through the same process of pathological learning via high inflation which followed the neglect of money during the fifties and sixties of the last century.	人们只是希望世界不会再重新经历上个世纪五、六十年代因为对货币的忽略而导致的高通货膨胀而付出的高昂学费。


After all, is it not premature – if not plainly arrogant- to claim that all this evidence collected over many centuries and across numerous countries has lost any meaning for the present and the future?	不管怎样，认为从几个世纪和无数国家收集来的所有这些证据对于现在和将来的状况已经失去任何意义了，如果不是太傲慢的话，是不是有点太早了呢？


Can models without an explicit, well developed financial sector be expected to explain an economic world in which financial markets play an ever-increasing role?	没有一个清晰、发展得很好的金融部门的模型能被期待去对一个金融市场扮演着一个越来越重要角色的经济世界作出解释吗？


How could central banks, which depend on these financial markets to serve as the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, possibly rely on such models?	依靠这些金融市场作为货币政策的转化机制的中央银行又怎么能依赖这些模型呢？


The ECB has never claimed that its strategy is the ultimate solution to the challenges monetary policy is confronted with.	欧洲央行从未说过它的战略就是货币政策所面临的挑战的终极解决方案。


But, it has recognised the need to include monetary analysis – in a very broad sense – into its policy considerations.	但是，它已经认识到了把在一个很广泛的范围内的货币分析包含进其政策考虑因素的必要性。


And the strategy was flexible enough to integrate the broadening and deepening of both the monetary and economic analysis.	而这个政策足够灵活，在宽度和深度上把货币和经济分析都包容了进去。


The two pillar strategy responds to the fact that we (still) lack a model which encompasses both dimensions, the economic or real and the monetary, in a consistent and robust manner.	两个支柱战略是对我们（依然）缺乏一个连贯并且坚实地包含了经济或基础部门以及货币因素的模型的事实的一个回应。


As long as such a “one-pillar-approach” is unavailable, there is no convincing reason why the ECB should change a strategy which has served it well and allowed it to establish a remarkable track record.	只要我们还缺乏这样一种“一个支柱的方法”，那么就没有理由要欧洲央行改变其运作得很好、并且使它建立了一个令人瞩目的历程记录的战略。


The Economic Benefits of Disease Control	疾病控制的经济利益


SAN FRANSISCO – Large parts of the world have not enjoyed the remarkable global progress in health conditions that have taken place over the past century.	旧金山--世界的大部分地区并没有享受到过去一个世纪以来全球在医疗条件上取得的巨大进步。


Indeed, millions of deaths in impoverished nations are avoidable with prevention and treatment options that the rich world already uses.	实际上，富有国家已经使用的防治和治疗手段是可以避免贫穷国家数以百万计的人的死亡的。


This year, ten million children will die in low- and middle-income countries.	今年，中低收入国家将会有一千万儿童死亡。


If child death rates were the same as those in developed countries, this figure would be lower than one million.	如果儿童的死亡率和发达国家一样，这一数字将会低于一百万。


Conversely, if child death rates were those of rich countries just 100 years ago, the figure would be 30 million.	相反，如果儿童死亡率仅仅是发达国家100年前的水平，这一数字将会是三千万。


The key difference between now and then is not income but technical knowledge about the causes of disease, and interventions to prevent disease, or at least the most pernicious symptoms.	现在和当时的一个主要区别并不在于收入，而是有关疾病根源的技术知识以及防止疾病、或者至少防治最为有害的症状的干预手段。


Today’s tools for improving health are so powerful and inexpensive that health conditions could be reasonably good even in poor countries if policymakers spent even relatively little in the right places.	如今改善医疗的工具强大无比而且低廉，如果决策者把即使是一点钱用在该用的地方，穷国的医疗条件也可以是不错的。


Recent research for the Copenhagen Consensus identifies six highly cost-effective options that would tackle some of the planet’s most urgent health problems.	为哥本哈根共识最近所做的研究确定了六个花钱少效果大的选择。 这些选择将会处理地球上某些最为急迫的医疗问题。


The most promising investment is in tuberculosis treatment.	最为有前途的投资是在于治疗肺结核。


Some 90% of the 1.6 million tuberculosis deaths in 2003 occurred in low- and middle-income countries.	2003年因肺结核死亡的160万病例发生在中低收入国家。


Because tuberculosis affects working-age people, it can be a trigger of household poverty.	由于肺结核影响工作年龄的人们，它会引发家庭的贫困。


The cornerstone of control is prompt treatment using first-line drugs, which doesn’t require a sophisticated health system.	控制的基石是使用第一线药物迅速治疗，这并不要求有现金的医疗制度。


Spending $1 billion on tuberculosis treatment in a year would save one million lives.	在肺结核治疗上每年花费10亿美元将会挽救一百万人的生命。


Because good health accompanies higher levels of national economic welfare in the long run, the economic benefits are worth $30 billion.	由于身体健康长远而言带来国民经济状况的改进，其经济利益达到300亿美元。


The second most cost-effective investment is tackling cardiovascular disease.	第二个花钱少、效果好的投资是解决心血管疾病。


Heart disease might not seem like a pressing issue for poor nations, but it represents more than a quarter of their death toll.	对于贫穷国家而言心脏病或许并非是一个急迫的问题，但是它占据这些国家死亡总数的四分之一。


Measures to reduce risk factors other than smoking – high intake of saturated animal fat, obesity, binge drinking of alcohol, physical inactivity, and low fruit and vegetable consumption – have had little success.	除了吸烟之外的风险因素包括食用饱和的动物油、肥胖、大量饮酒、缺乏运动以及缺乏食用水果和蔬菜。 减少这些风险因素的措施迄今没有什么成效。


Treating acute heart attacks with inexpensive drugs is, however, cost-effective.	但是，使用便宜的药物治疗急性心脏病却成本小、效果大。


Spending $200 million could avert several hundred thousand deaths, yielding benefits that are 25 times higher than the costs.	花费两千亿美元可以防止几十万人死亡，产生的效益高于成本25倍。


The third option is prevention and treatment of malaria.	第三个选择是防治和治疗霍乱。


A billion dollars would expand the provision of insecticide-treated bed-nets and facilitate provision of highly effective treatment.	十亿美元将会提供经过杀虫处理的蚊帐以及极为有效的治疗。


This would save more than a million child deaths and produce economic benefits worth $20 billion.	这将会挽救一百万儿童的性命并且产生两百亿美元的经济效益。


The nascent Affordable Medicines Facility-malaria (AMFm) is a particularly attractive mechanism for committing resources to malaria control.	刚刚建立的用于霍乱的廉价医药机构是一个极为有吸引力的、将资源投入到霍乱控制的机制。


The fourth alternative for policymakers is to focus on child health initiatives.	第四个选择是让决策者关注于儿童医疗倡议。


The best measures are familiar ones: expanding immunization coverage, promoting breastfeeding, increasing the use of simple and cheap treatments for diarrhea and childhood pneumonia, ensuring widespread distribution of key micronutrients, and spreading the use of anti-retroviral drugs and breastfeeding substitutes to prevent mother-to-child HIV transmission.	最好的措施也是人们所熟知的，也就是夸大免疫覆盖面、推广母乳喂养、推广使用简单便宜的腹泻和儿童肺炎治疗、确保大范围使用主要的微量营养素、扩大使用反转录病毒药物和哺乳替代品来防治艾滋病毒的母婴传染。


Expanding immunization and micronutrient coverage are perhaps the most critical measures.	扩大免���和微量营养素覆盖面或许是最为关键的手段。


Spending a billion dollars on such initiatives could save one million lives annually and create economic benefits worth more than $20 billion a year.	在这些项目上花费十亿美元可以每年挽救一百万人的生命并且每年创造两百多亿美元的经济效益。


The next option is to reduce the number of tobacco-related deaths.	下一个选择是减少与烟草有关的死亡数量。


On current patterns, cigarette smoking will account for 10 million deaths per year by 2030.	根据当前的模式，吸烟死亡到2030年将会每年达到一千万人。


Most will occur in poor countries.	大多数发生在贫穷国家。


Some 100 million of China’s 200 million young male smokers and about 40 million of India’s 100 million young male smokers will eventually die from tobacco-related causes.  A multi-faceted approach to smoking control is one of the few proven approaches to prevention of heart disease and cancer.	中国两亿年轻男子中的一亿烟民，印度一亿年轻男子中的四千万烟民将最终死于与烟草有关的疾病。 多种手段控制吸烟是防止心脏病和癌症不多的行之有效的几个手段之一。


A tobacco tax is particularly effective, with a 10% increase in price reducing consumption by 4-8%.	烟草税尤其有效，价格提高10%会减少消费4%到8%。


Arresting the spread of HIV/AIDS is the sixth option.	控制艾滋病的传播是第六个选择。


For dozens of countries around the world, the AIDS epidemic threatens every aspect of development.	对于全世界几十个国家而言，艾滋病传播威胁到发展的各个方面。


But there is some good news: HIV infection rates are slowing in large parts of Asia and Latin America, which appears to reflect a (very uneven) increase in prevention programs.	但是还是有好消息，那就是在亚洲和拉美的大部分地区，艾滋病感染都在下降。 这好像反映了防治项目非常不均衡的增加。


The greatest successes in prevention involve what has been called “combination prevention,” involving simultaneous and substantial scaling up of multiple interventions, including condom distribution, treatment of sexually transmitted disease, male circumcision, and peer interventions among sex workers.	在防治上最大的成功是所谓的“综合防治”，包括同时大量提高多种干预手段，包括发放避孕套、治疗通过性传播的疾病、男子包皮手术以及性工作者间的同僚干预。


Preventing two million HIV infections each year would be relatively expensive, at $2.5 billion, but would yield benefits twelve times higher.	每年防止两百万艾滋病感染相对便宜，只要25亿美元，但是会产生十二倍更高的效益。


The changes that we are advocating are designed to target specific areas of need instead of strengthening health system capacity.	我们在此呼吁的改变目的在于瞄准需要的领域，而不是加强医疗体系能力。


But there is an important exception: strengthening surgical capacity, particularly in local hospitals, can inexpensively (and often decisively) address abdominal conditions.	但是还有一个重要的例外，那就是加强特别是当地医院的手术能力可以便宜地(而且经常是决定性地)解决腹腔问题。


Long-neglected investments in surgical capacity would yield high returns.	长期以来忽视在手术能力上的投资将会产生高回报。


Even if the costs of all these initiatives were two or three times higher than we estimate, these efforts would still provide amazing opportunities to reduce health inequality and do good in the world.	即使所有这些项目的成本高于我们预计的两倍到三倍，这些工作依旧可以为减少医疗不平等并且造福世界提供令人惊讶的机遇。


Water Risk on the Rise	水风险上升


WASHINGTON, DC – Water is never far from the news these days.	华盛顿—近来，关于水的新闻层出不穷。


This summer, northern India experienced one of its heaviest monsoon seasons in 80 years, leaving more than 800 people dead and forcing another 100,000 from their homes.	今年夏天，北印度经历了80年来最猛烈的季风，造成800多人死亡，10万人流离失所。


Meanwhile, Central Europe faced its worst flooding in decades after heavy rains swelled major rivers like the Elbe and the Danube.	与此同时，大雨让易北河和多瑙河河水暴涨，中欧面临几十年来最大的洪水。


In the United States, nearly half the country continues to suffer from drought, while heavy rainfall has broken records in the Northeast, devastated crops in the South, and now is inundating Colorado.	在美国，几乎一般的国土饱受旱灾困扰，而东北部降雨量创下了历史记录，南部农业收成暴降，而科罗拉多一片汪洋。


Businesses are starting to wake up to the mounting risks that water – whether in overabundance or scarcity – can pose to their operations and bottom line.	企业开始意识到日渐增加的水可能对经营和利润带来的风险——有的是太多，有的是太少。


At the World Economic Forum in Davos this year, experts named water risk as one of the top four risks facing business in the twenty-first century.	在本年度的达沃斯世界经济论坛上，专家将水风险列为21世纪企业面临的四大风险之一。


Similarly, 53% of companies surveyed by the Carbon Disclosure Project reported that water risks are already taking a toll, owing to property damage, higher prices, poor water quality, business interruptions, and supply-chain disruptions.	类似地，据碳披露项目（Carbon Disclosure Project ）的调查，53%的公司表示水风险已经在起作用，带来了资产损失、价格升高、水质下降、业务停顿和供应链破坏。


The costs are mounting.	代价正在越来越大。


Deutsche Bank Securities estimates that the recent US drought, which affected nearly two-thirds of the country’s lower 48 states, will reduce GDP growth by approximately one percentage point.	德银证券测算，在影响了美国下48州的近三分之二面积的最近的旱灾中，GDP增长将因此减少约1个百分点。


Climate change, population growth, and other factors are driving up the risks.	气候变化、人口增加和其他因素正在推高风险。


Twenty percent of global GDP already is produced in water-scarce areas.	全球GDP的两成产生于水稀缺地区。


According to the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), in the absence of more sustainable water management, the share could rise to 45% by 2050, placing a significant portion of global economic output at risk.	根据国际粮食政策研究所（IFPRI）的数据，如果没有更加可持续的水管理，这一比例将在2050年升高到45%，让世界经济产出的很大一部分置于危险之中。


Companies know that sound risk-management strategies depend on solid data.	公司知道，可靠的风险管理战略依赖可靠的数据。


When it comes to financial risks, data crunchers have access to vast amounts of information.	对于金融风险，数据分析者要能获得海量数据。


But that has not been the case with water – until now.	但至少在眼下，在水风险上并非如此。


The World Resources Institute has joined with companies like Goldman Sachs, General Electric, and Shell to develop an online platform, called Aqueduct, to help measure and map water risks.	世界资源研究所（World Resources Institute）与高盛、通用电气和壳牌集团等公司合作开发了一个被称为“沟渠”（Aqueduct）的在线平台，用于帮助测量和勾勒水风险。


Aqueduct uses the latest data and state-of-the-art modeling techniques to offer a rich, granular picture of water risks worldwide.	“沟渠”使用最新数据和最先进的建模技术提供内容丰富的世界水风险点状图。


Empowered with this data, companies can make better and more informed decisions.	有了这些数据，公司可以获得更好的信息做出决策。


For example, CERES, a non-profit organization, has combined Aqueduct’s water-stress maps with hydraulic fracturing data (from FracFocus.org) to find that nearly one-half of shale oil and gas wells in the US are located in areas with high water stress.	比如，非营利组织CERES将沟渠的水压地图与液压致裂数据（来自FracFocus. org）结合起来，发现美国近一半的页岩油和页岩气井位于高水压地区。


Early next year, Aqueduct will offer future projections of water stress based on the latest scientific analysis, including predicted effects of climate change.	明年初，沟渠将提供基于最新科学分析（包括气候变化的预计影响）的未来水压预测。


Major companies are already seizing on water-risk data.	大公司已开始追逐水风险数据。


McDonald’s, for example, has asked more than 350 of its top supply-chain facilities to report on their water-risk exposure, using data from the Aqueduct tool.	比如，麦当劳要求其最大的350多家供应链成员使用来自沟渠工具的数据报告水风险暴露情况。


Incorporating water risk into McDonald’s Environmental Scorecard is an important step in engaging suppliers not only on water efficiency, but also in overall stewardship, including cooperation with local watershed stakeholders.	将水风险纳入麦当劳环境记分牌是一个重要步骤，考量供应商不仅考虑用水效率，也考虑总体管理水平，包括与当地水文相关利益方的合作。


The international clothing company H&M is working to reduce water-quality risk in its supply chain.	国际服装公司H&M正在致力于供应链的水质风险。


Through its Cleaner Production Program, the company works with NGOs in Bangladesh and China to implement cost-saving improvements that reduce their fabric mills’ impact on local water quality.	通过其更干净产品计划（Cleaner Product Program），该公司与孟加拉国和中国的非政府组织合作实施了成本节约型改进，降低了面料工厂对本地水质的影响。


Similarly, the beverage company SABMiller is targeting a 25% reduction in the water intensity of its beer production between 2008 and 2015, and is now enhancing its water resilience throughout its global operations.	类似地，饮料公司SABMiller制定了在2008—2015年期间将生产过程的水密集度降低25%的目标，并且现���正在全球经营中全面强化水恢复力。


Through its Water Futures Partnership, the company has identified which of its facilities are located in areas facing water-security risks and has created partnerships in the local watersheds to address these risks.	通过其期水合作伙伴计划（Water Futures Partnership），该公司研究哪些工厂位于面临水安全风险的地区，并与当地水文部门合作解决风险。


The message is clear: water-risk management is shifting into the mainstream of business practices.	其中的含义是明确的：水风险管理已经进入了商业活动的主流。


More than 90 signatories of the United Nations Global Compact’s CEO Water Mandate have pledged to develop, implement, and report on water-sustainability policies and practices in both their own and their suppliers’ operations, and to work with stakeholders beyond their own operations to address water risk.	联合国全球盟约的CEO水使命（CEO Water Mandate）已征集到90多个签名，该计划旨在开发、实施和报告其自身和其供应商经营活动中的水可持续性政策和实践，并与经营活动之外的相关利益方合作解决水风险。


Leading companies are showing that sustainable water management benefits all involved.	领先公司证明，可持续水管理能让所有人受益。


While many executives have traditionally underappreciated the risks from climate change and resource degradation, understanding water risk – and acting to minimize it – is just one way that businesses are starting to incorporate natural-resource management into their core strategy and operations.	众多CEO往往不能充分认识气候变化和资源退化的风险，但理解水风险——并行动起来使其最小化——只是企业开始将自然资源管理纳入核心战略和经营的一种方法。


Smart business leaders are investing in new tools that can provide comprehensive and up-to-date data, and companies are increasingly moving beyond recognition of natural risks to developing strategic responses to them.	明智的商界领袖投资于可以提供全面最新数据的新工具，公司则在日益超越仅仅承认自然风险，开始开发应对这些风险的战略。


As more companies do so, laggards will be at a growing competitive disadvantage.	随着更多的公司加入其中，落后者将日益处于竞争劣势。


They, too, will have to act before the next flood or drought strikes.	它们也将不得不在下一次洪水或旱灾来临前采取行动。


Read more from "Fragility and Resilience"	Andrew Steer is President and CEO of the World Resources Institute.


The Economic Costs of Fear	畏惧带来的经济代价


BERKELEY – The S&P stock index now yields a 7% real (inflation-adjusted) return.	伯克利——标准普尔指数S&P股票指数今日得到了百分之七（通货膨胀调整后）实质性的回报。


By contrast, the annual real interest rate on the five-year United States Treasury Inflation-Protected Security (TIPS) is -1.02%.	相比之下，美国五年通货膨胀保值国债（简称为TIPS）的实质性年利率为负1. 03%。


Yes, there is a “minus” sign in front of that: if you buy the five-year TIPS, each year over the next five years the US Treasury will pay you in interest the past year’s consumer inflation rate minus 1.02%.	的确，在百分比之前有个“负号”，若你购买了五年制通胀保值国债，每一年美国财政部会以上一年消费者通胀率减去1. 02%的利率给你支付利息。


Even the annual real interest rate on the 30-year TIPS is only 0.63% – and you run a large risk that its value will decline at some point over the next generation, implying a big loss if you need to sell it before maturity.	甚至30年TIPS的实质性年利率只是0. 63%，它的价值会在下一年度有某种程度的减少而让你承受颇大的风险，暗示着若你在股票成熟前将其抛售将会面临巨大损失。


So, imagine that you invest $10,000 in the S&P index.	因此，假设你投资给S&P一万美元。


This year, your share of the profits made by those companies will be $700.	这一年，那些涉及的公司给你的投资带来700美元利润。


Now, imagine that, of that total, the companies pay out $250 in dividends (which you reinvest to buy more stock) and retain $450 in earnings to reinvest in their businesses.	现在，想象一下在这总共的700美元当中，有250美元是由这些公司以股息（你用它来购入更多股票再作投资）的形式来支付，而剩下的450美元则由它们保留作为对它们企业的再投资。


If the companies’ managers do their job, that reinvestment will boost the value of your shares to $10,450. Add to that the $250 of newly-bought shares, and next year the portfolio will be worth $10,700 – more if stock-market valuations rise, and less if they fall.	如果公司的经营者开展工作让公司继续运营，那么这一笔再投资就会让你所持股票的价值攀升到10450美元，在加上新购买的250美元股票，下一年度你的股票投资组合总值会是10700美元——若股市股价增高，总值随之增加，反之，总值减少。


In fact, over any past period long enough for waves of optimism and pessimism to cancel each other out, the average earnings yield on the S&P index has been a good guide to the return on the portfolio.	事实上，在过去，积极因素与消极因素这两股浪潮经历了足够长的时间才相互抵消，度过了任何一个这样的时期，S&P指数的平均收入输出便会持续对投资组合的回报起着良好的引导作用。


So, if you invest $10,000 in the S&P for the next five years, you can reasonably expect (with enormous upside and downside risks) to make about 7% per year, leaving you with a compounded profit in inflation-adjusted dollars of $4,191.	所以，如果你在下一个五年对S&P投资一万美元，你就有充分的理由期待着（冒着稍微正面的与反面的巨大风险）每一年得到约为7%的利润，这利润是经过通胀调整后4190美元的累积利润。


If you invest $10,000 in the five-year TIPS, you can confidently expect a five-year loss of $510.	若你把这一万美元投资给TIPS，你就铁定将会面临五年后510美元的损失。


That is an extraordinary gap in the returns that you can reasonably expect.	你可以合理的预算处这两种投资的回报所存在的巨大差异。


It naturally raises the question: why aren’t people moving their money from TIPS (and US Treasury bonds and other safe assets) to stocks (and other relatively risky assets)?	问题油然而生：为何人们不把钱从TIPS（还有美国国库债券和其他安全性资产）中转投给股市（以及其他相对有风险的资产）？


People have different reasons.	人们的原因各有不同。


And many people’s thinking is not terribly coherent. But there appear to be two main explanations.	许多人的想法并不十分统一，但普遍存在着两张主要的解释。


First, many people are uncertain that current conditions will continue.	第一，大多数人并不确定现实的状况会否持续下去。


Most economists forecast the world a year from now to look a lot like the world today, with unemployment and profit margins about the same, wages and prices on average about 1.5% higher, total production up roughly 2%, and risks on both the upside and the downside.	大多数经济学家预言一年后的世界经济与如今的状况相差不大，前后两年的事业率和利润几乎相同，平均的工资与物价水平大约上升1. 5个百分点，总生产量增加两个百分点，喜忧参半。


But many investors see a substantial chance of 2008 and 2009 redux, whether triggered by a full-fledged euro crisis or by some black swan that we do not yet see, and fear that, unlike in 2008 and 2009, governments would lack the power and will to cushion the economic impact.	然而许多投资者认为像2008与2009这样重大的机会，不论它是由充分发张后的欧元危机所引发的还是由我们未能发现的潜在“黑天鹅”所带来的，都会重来，而且人们担心，政府并不会像它们在2008年和2009年的时候那样做，而是缺乏权利和意志去减缓经济的消极影响。


These investors do not view the 7% annual return on stocks as an average expectation, with downside risks counterbalanced by upside opportunities.	这些投资者没有把7%的年收益率看做普通的期望，这期望中附带的负面风险会被正面基于所抵消。


Rather, they see a good-scenario outcome that only the foolhardy would trust.	确切地说，他们认为只有有勇无谋的人才会相信这种预设的完美结果。


Second, many people do see the 7% return on stocks as a reasonable expectation, and would jump at the chance to grab it – plus the opportunity of surprises on the upside – but they do not think that they can afford to run the downside risks.	第二，不少人把这7%的股票回报看得理所当然，加上有带来意外收入的机会，他们还会急切地抓住机会去取得报偿，但他们不认为自己能抵御负面风险。


Indeed, the world seems a much more risky place than it seemed five or ten years ago.	事实上，世界看起来比五年或者十年前的世界存在更多的风险。


The burden of existing debts is high, and investors’ key goal is loss-avoidance, not profit-seeking.	现有债务的负��沉重，投资者的主要目标是避损失，而不是求利润。


Both reasons reflect a massive failure of our economic institutions.	第三，两种原因都反映出经济机构的的极度失败之处。


The first reason betrays a lack of trust that governments can and will do the job that they learned how to do in the Great Depression: keep the flow of spending stable so that big depressions with long-lasting, double-digit unemployment do not recur.	第一个原因显示出人们不再信任政府可以并将会履行他们从经济大萧条中学习到的职责：去保持消费资金稳定以便抑制伴有持续久，两位数字失业率的经济衰退再次出现。


The second reveals the financial industry’s failure adequately to mobilize society’s risk-bearing capacity for the service of enterprise.	第二个原因反映了金融行业为了服务企业而动用社会承受风险的能力是个十足的失败。


As individuals, we appear to view a gamble that has a roughly 50% chance of doubling our wealth and a roughly 50% chance of halving it as worthy of consideration – not a no-brainer, but not out of the question, either.	作为个人，我们似乎认为有约一半机会加倍财富并有约一半机会让财富减半的赌博值得一试。 ——这不是一件容易之事，但也不是根本不可能。


Well-functioning financial markets would mobilize that risk-bearing capacity and put it to use for the benefit of all, so that people who did not think that they could run the risks of stock ownership could lay that risk off onto others for a reasonable fee.	功能充分发挥的金融市场会转移承受风险的能力，为了所有人的利益而将其利用，因此那些认为自己没能力度过股市风险的人会通过付一笔合理的费用把风险转移到别人身上。


As an economist, I find this state of affairs frustrating.	作为经济学者，我发现这种现状令人沮丧。


We know, or at least we ought to know, how to build political institutions that accept the mission of macroeconomic stabilization, and how to build financial institutions to mobilize risk-bearing capacity and spread risk.	众所周知，或者我们应该知道，要如何建立可以接受维持个体经济稳定局面任务的政治体系以及如何建立金融机构去动用承受风险能力分散风险。


Yet, to a remarkable degree, we have failed to do so.	然而，从某种明显的程度上看，我们没有做到。


The Economic Governance the EU Needs	欧盟需要什么样的经济治理


BRUSSELS – Two lessons have emerged from Europe’s financial crisis. First, there is no substitute for timely and coordinated action when the single currency is under pressure.	发自布鲁塞尔——欧洲金融危机带给了我们两个教训：其一，当欧元这个单一货币面临巨大压力时，及时且多方协调的应对行动是必然之举。


Second, all eurozone countries are effectively in the same boat. If the boat springs a leak, everyone sinks.	其二，欧元区各国其实都坐在同一条船上，一荣俱荣，一损俱损。


A quicker and more concerted response might have limited the fall-out from the crisis, and thus its cost.	迅速的协同应对将有助于缩小危机的影响范围，从而降低损失。


The European Financial Stabilization Facility (EFSF), hurriedly established in May 2010 in an effort to stop the rot, will shortly be able to call on some €500 billion in the event that any more eurozone countries face serious liquidity problems.	在2010年为防止金融形势继续恶化而紧急成立的欧洲财政稳定基金（EFSF）将很快具备筹集500亿欧元资金的能力，足以帮助那些遭遇严重流动性问题的国家渡过难关。


And eurozone member states have agreed to perpetuate this financial-stability mechanism from 2013 onwards, and even to amend the Lisbon treaty to avoid any legal ambiguity.	此外欧元区成员国已同意将该财政稳定机制在2013年后转为常设，甚至愿意修订《里斯本条约》以避免出现任何法律上的歧义。


Despite all this, markets remain unconvinced by the eurozone’s shows of solidarity.	但虽然欧元区国家展示了共同应对困境的决心，市场却并不买账。


Greek sovereign debt has been downgraded to below that of Egypt.	希腊主权债券的评级甚至还不如埃及；


Portugal has had to ask for assistance from the EFSF and the International Monetary Fund.	葡萄牙不得不向EFSF和国际货币基金组织（IMF）求援；


Irish banks reportedly need an additional €24 billion to stay afloat.	爱尔兰各大银行汇报说还需要24亿欧元才能维持基本运营；


And Spain is doing all it can to avoid the contagion.	而西班牙则不惜一切代价避免危机爆发。


The irony is that the euro has been a hugely successful project, bringing considerable stability to participating countries.	而讽刺的是欧元原本是一个对欧元区国家起到极大稳定作用的壮举。


Indeed, without the single currency, many of these countries would have succumbed to a downward spiral of devaluation, default, and recourse to the IMF.	事实上如果没有了这个单一货币，区内许多国家早就跌入了一个货币贬值，债务违约，IMF求助，接着又再贬值的螺旋下跌通道之中。


The European Central Bank has played a crucial role in preventing a worst-case scenario, but the obvious lacuna in Europe’s economic and monetary union (EMU) remains: EMU established only a monetary union and largely omitted the economic union that has proven so closely linked to the euro’s strengths and weaknesses.	虽然欧洲央行在阻止形势恶化上发挥了重要的作用，但欧洲经济和货币联盟（简称EMU）的明显缺陷依然存在：EMU仅仅建立了一个货币联盟，却在很大程度上忽略了建立经济联盟的重要性，而后者已被证明是与欧元的优缺点紧密相连在一起的。


The real crisis facing Europe is one of economic governance.	同时经济治理结构也已成为欧洲面临的真正危机之一。


Eurozone member states have increasingly gone their own way, even overtly defending nationalist economic policies that harm the eurozone as a whole.	各成员国越来越着眼于自己那一亩三分地，甚至置整个区域的总体利益于不顾，公然袒护本国的国家主义经济政策。


This is not to say that a single economic policy should be imposed on everyone; but Europe does need a higher degree of coordination and convergence to ensure that everyone is at least heading in the same direction.	当然，笔者并非要求各成员国都执行同一经济政策。 但欧洲确实需要更高度的协调与聚合以确保各国至少都向着同一方向努力。


Like cars on a highway, some may drive more slowly than others, but there are minimum and maximum speeds and all must go with the flow of traffic.	这就好比是高速公路上的车，有些人开得比别人慢，但路上的最高和最低限速使得所有车辆都有序前进。


Moreover, all motorists must respect the rules of the road, and anyone who breaches them must be held to account, and possibly penalized, because even one rogue driver will most likely cause a major pile-up if not stopped.	此外所有的驾驶者都必须遵守道路交通规则，任何违法行为都必须被追究处罚，因为任何一个逍遥法外者都可能造成交通堵塞。


So it is with economic governance: anarchy would be devastating.	经济治理的原理也一样：混乱无序的行动将带来毁灭性的后果。


Agreement is needed on both the rules and the impartial body to enforce them.	为此必须就治理规则达成共识，并承诺公正地执行这些规则。


European Union leaders have in recent summits come close to identifying a number of economic-policy areas where closer coordination would improve competitiveness, including sustainability of pensions, wage-to-productivity ratios, corporate taxation, investment in research and development, and the financing of major infrastructure projects.	在近期的峰会上，欧盟各国领导人已经确定在一系列经济政策领域展开更紧密合作以提升整体竞争力，其中包括退休金的可持续运营，工资/生产力比率，企业税收，研究经费投资以及主要基础设施项目的融资。


Yet the same EU members have failed to endow the European Commission with overall responsibility for holding member governments to their commitments and, where necessary, imposing penalties for breaches.	但这些欧盟成员国也未能赋予欧洲委员会全面职权，使之能督促各成员国政府遵守承诺，并在出现违反协议情况时进行处罚。


This intergovernmental approach lay behind the Lisbon Agenda’s failure to deliver the results needed to make Europe more competitive and dynamic by 2010, and the same shortcomings will bedevil its successor, the new “Europe 2020” strategy.	也正是这种跨政府的做法导致里斯本议程无法在2010年之前实现为欧洲注入更大竞争力和更多活力的效果，而这一缺陷还将遗传给其后续项目：新的“欧洲2020”战略。


Indeed, it is a failure of governance that has characterized the Stability and Growth Pact, designed (largely by Germany) to ensure sound macroeconomic policy by limiting national debt and deficit ratios.	很显然，《欧洲稳定和增长公约》这一主要由德国设计，通过限制国家债务和赤字比率以确保执行合理宏观经济政策的条约已经打上了治理失败的烙印。


Most eurozone members are now in breach of the Pact, yet none has been subjected to the penalties envisaged by its architects.	当前绝大多数欧元区国家都违反了这一公约，却鲜见任何一方受到预想中的惩罚。


Recently adopted changes create a more sensible and graduated system for sanctioning recalcitrant countries, but still leave the decision to initiate an excessive deficit procedure to member states, rather than establishing the more automatic mechanism sought by the European Commission.	最近公约又进行了一些修订来建立一个更为合理并区分违约层级的制度来制裁违约国，却未能如欧洲委员会希望的那样建立一个硬性机制，而是依然把启动超额赤字程序的决定权留在了各成员国手里。


Meanwhile, the Commission already polices the internal market – one of Europe’s major policy successes – by monitoring member states’ compliance with the single market’s rules. It also launches infringement proceedings against member states that have not implemented valid directives on time, or in the correct manner.	与此同时，欧洲委员会已经通过检查各成员国是否遵循单一市场（这也是欧洲的成功政策之一）规则的方式来监察欧盟内部市场，此外还启动了针对成员国不按时或不按正确方式执行欧盟指令的违规处理程序。


Similarly, EU competition policy has stood firm for many years against monopolies and abuse of dominant market positions.	同样，欧盟竞争政策多年来在反垄断和反滥用市场支配地位行为上都发挥了重要作用。


Here, too, the Commission plays the role of neutral judge.	欧盟委员会在该领域同样扮演了中立的裁判角色。


There may be disputes in some cases, but the system has brought a degree of legal certainty across the single market that the EU’s member states could not have achieved on their own.	虽然在某些案例上会出现分歧，但该制度为欧洲单一市场带来了一定程度的法律稳定性，也是任何一个成员国都无法单独实现的。


The challenge now for EU leaders is not to repackage old policies, but to express a collective vision and will to act together.	由此可见，当前欧盟领导人面临的挑战不是将旧政策重新包装一遍，而是要展示出共同的愿景以及同心协力的意志。


I have been arguing for a Community Act that would bring together all elements of economic governance under a single framework, with the European Commission at its center.	笔者一直以来都认为一个以欧洲委员会为中心的共同法案可以构建一个包含所有经济治理结构要素的单一框架。


As with the single-market program of the 1980’s, the Commission could be in charge of overseeing a convergence of national economic policies, within certain parameters, throughout the EU.	正如1980年实施欧洲单一市场项目一样，欧洲委员会可以采用特定指标来检查欧盟内部各国的国家经济政策。


Straying outside of those parameters would lead to warnings and sanctions, but otherwise there would be some flexibility for member states to pursue the EU’s collective goals at a pace adapted to their national circumstances.	超出了这些指标的行为将受到警告和制裁，但在指标之内各成员国则拥有一定自主权，使之可以依据本国具体情况来决定实现欧盟共同目标的进度。


A cluster of EU commissioners holding economic-related portfolios could even be made responsible for guiding the process forward, providing it with direction and momentum.	那些拥有相关经济资历的欧盟委员还可以被授予相关责任来指导和推动整个进程的前进方向。


If European countries are to emerge stronger from the current crisis, they need to think bigger and put more faith, not less, in the collective enterprise that is the EU.	如果欧洲各国希望借助当前的危机变得更加强大，那么就必须具备更开阔的思路并对整个集体——也就是欧盟——表现出更大的向心力。


After all, European unification was conceived as a project of pooled sovereignty, not surrendered prosperity.	毕竟当年欧洲统一构想正是致力于实现主权的自愿让渡与合并，而非强迫服从后的繁荣。


The GM Reactionaries	转基因反动分子


PALO ALTO – People everywhere are increasingly vulnerable to the use of what Nobel Prize-winning chemist Irving Langmuir dubbed “pathological science” – the “science of things that aren’t so” – to justify government regulation or other policies.	帕罗奥图—世界各地的人们越来越容易受到诺贝尔化学奖得主兰米尔（Irving Langmuir）所谓的“病态科学”的影响，病态科学是指“事情不是这样的科学”，现在被用来证明政府监管或其他政策的重要性。


It is a specialty of self-styled public-interest groups, whose agenda is often not to protect public health or the environment, but rather to oppose the research, products, or technology that they happen to dislike.	这是自称代表公共利益的集团的特长，这些人的目的通常不是保护公共卫生或者环境，而是为了反对他们不喜欢的研究、产品或技术。


For example, modern techniques of genetic engineering – also known as biotechnology, recombinant DNA technology, or genetic modification (GM) – provide the tools to make old plants do spectacular new things.	比如，现代基因工程技术——亦被称为生物技术、DNA重组技术或转基因——提供了用旧作物实现重大新用途的工具。


Yet these tools are relentlessly misrepresented to the public.	但这些工具受到了公众的严重误解。


More than 17 million farmers in roughly three dozen countries worldwide are using GM crop varieties to produce higher yields with fewer inputs and lower environmental impact. Most of these new varieties are designed to resist crop-ravaging pests and diseases, so that farmers can adopt environmentally friendlier no-till practices and use more benign herbicides.	三十多个国家的1700多万农民正在使用转基因作物用更低的投入和环境影响生产更高的产量。 这些作物大部分被设计成抗病虫害作物，因此农民可以采取对环境更友好的免耕技术，更少地使用除草剂。


Critics of GM products insist that they are untested, unsafe, unregulated, unnecessary, and unwanted.	转基因产品的批评者坚持认为这些产品未受检验、不安全、不受监管、毫无必要而且有害。


But the facts show otherwise.	但事实证明并非如此。


For starters, there is a broad and longstanding consensus among scientists that recombinant DNA techniques are essentially an extension, or refinement, of earlier methods for genetic modification, and that gene transfer using these precise, predictable molecular techniques does not present any risk per se.	首先，科学家早就形成了广泛的一致，DNA重组技术从本质上说是对早先转基因方法的扩展而不是精炼，使用这种精确、可预测的分子技术完成的基因转换本身不会形成任何风险。


After the cultivation of more than a billion hectares of GM crops worldwide – and the consumption in North America alone of more than two trillion servings of foods that contain GM ingredients – not a single case of injury to a person or disruption of an ecosystem has been documented. Meanwhile, the benefits of GM-crop cultivation include higher yields, lower use of chemical pesticides, and biofuel production.	全世界转基因作物种植面积超过十亿公顷，且光是在北美，含转基因成分的食品消费量就超过了两万亿份，没有造成任何人身伤害或生态系统破坏。


Far from being under-regulated, GM plants (and other organisms) have been subjected to expensive, discriminatory, and unscientific over-regulation that has limited the commercial success of maize, cotton, canola, soybeans, and papaya, among other crops.	转基因作物（和其他有机作物）绝非监管不足，它们需要接受昂贵的、歧视性的、不科学的过度监管，因而极大地限制了玉米、棉花、油菜籽、大豆、木瓜和其他作物的商业前景。


In fact, opponents often assert that commercial cultivation of GM crops has been a disappointment, because it has offered little direct benefit to consumers.	事实上，反对者通常认为转基因作物的商业推广令人失望，因为消费者从中得到的好处甚少。


But many advantages have already been realized.	但许多优点已经被人们所认识。


And GM crops currently in development will deliver even more direct and easily identifiable consumer benefits.	目前开发中的转基因作物将给消费者带来更直接、更容易感受道德好处。


Consider, for example, that, because GM crops require less chemical pesticide, fewer farmers and their families risk being poisoned by runoff into waterways and ground water.	比如，由于转基因作物不需要施那么多的化学杀虫剂，因此��水流和地下水受污染而中毒的农民家庭越来越少了。


From 1996 to -2009, the amount of pesticide that was sprayed on crops worldwide fell by 393 million kilograms – 1.4 times the total amount of pesticide applied annually to crops in the European Union.	从1996年到2009年，全世界庄稼杀虫剂用量减少了3. 93亿公斤，相当于欧盟每年庄稼杀虫剂总用量的1.


Furthermore, lower levels of mycotoxins in pest-resistant corn mean fewer birth defects, such as spina bifida, and less toxicity to livestock.	此外，抗虫玉米中的真菌毒素水平较低，这可以降低脊柱裂等新生儿缺陷，对牲口的毒性也降低了。


Such staple food crops also can be modified to contain additional nutrients.	主要粮食作物还可以通过转基因使其包含更多的营养素。


No-till farming techniques, in which the soil is not plowed, mean less soil erosion, less runoff of agricultural chemicals, and lower fuel consumption and carbon emissions by mechanized farm equipment.	免耕技术——即不需要犁地——意味着更少的水土流失、更少的农业化学元素流失以及农用机械更少的燃料使用和温室气体排放。


From 1996 to 2009, the shift to biotech crops reduced carbon emissions by 17.6 billion kilograms, the equivalent of removing 7.8 million cars from the road for a year.	从1996年到2009年，生物技术作物的使用降低了176亿公斤碳排放量，相当于每年减少780万辆汽车。


GM crops also have significant economic benefits.	转基因作物也有无穷的经济益处。


Higher yields and lower production costs have reduced global commodity prices (corn, soybeans, and derivatives), resulting in higher farm income, enhanced supplies of food and feed products, and more readily available high-quality calories.	更高的产量和更低的生产成本降低了全球商品价格（玉米、大豆及其衍生品），增加了农场收入，提高了粮食和饲料产品供给，也提高现成高质量卡路里的产量。


Indeed, farm income grew by nearly $65 million from 1996 to 2009, as biotech crops increased global corn and soybean production by 130 million and 83 million tons, respectively, owing to higher yields and, in Argentina, second cropping of soybeans.	事实上，从1996年到2009年，农场收入增加了近6500万美元，因为生物技术作物通过提高亩产和（在阿根廷）实现双季种植将玉米和大豆产量分别提高了1.


As a result, by 2007, global corn and soybean prices were nearly 6% and 10% lower, respectively, than they would have been had farmers not embraced these crops.	3亿吨和8300万吨。 结果，到2007年时，全球玉米和大豆价格分别较农民使用转基因作物之前降低了近6%和10%。


Given their benefits, GM crops’ “repeat index” – the proportion of farmers who, after trying a GM variety, choose to plant it again – is very high.	由于存在这些好处，转基因作物的“重复指数”——即试种后选择再次种植的农民比例——相当高。


The boost to farm incomes and farm security – which translates into higher household incomes and improved standards of living – is particularly important in developing countries, where income levels are lowest but per-hectare benefits from planting GM varieties have been greatest.	农场收入和农产保障方面的改善——这反过来又提高了家庭收入，改善了生活标准——对于发展中国家尤其重要，那里的收入水平较低，但转基因作物种植的每公顷收益最高。


But GM crops do not benefit only those who grow and consume them.	但转基因作物的受益者并不局限于种植者和消费者。


According to a 2010 study, fields of insect-resistant GM corn have an “area-wide suppression effect” on insects, benefiting neighboring fields containing conventional corn varieties.	根据2010年的一份研究，抗虫转基因玉米田会产生对害虫的“区域抑制效应”，相邻的种植传统作物的田地也能受益。


The researchers calculated that, from 1996 to 2010, cultivating GM varieties increased farmers’ profits in three US states by roughly $3.2 billion – $2.4 billion of which accrued to farmers whose nearby fields had not been planted with GM varieties.	研究者称，从1996年到2010年，转基因作物的推广将美国农民的收益提高了大约32亿美元，其中24亿美元好处产生于未种植转基因作物的相邻地块。


The farmers planting the conventional varieties benefit disproportionately, because they do not have to buy the more expensive GM seeds.	种植传统作物的农民得到了大部分好处，因为他们不需要购买价格更高的转基因种子。


Future generations of GM crops will bring even more benefits – but only if they are allowed to flourish.	未来转基因作物将产生更大的好处——但这得以允许推广为前提。


To that end, consumers must understand that GM crops hold great potential, while posing negligible risks, and governments must adopt regulatory policies that face facts and reject pathological science.	在这方面，消费者必须明白，转基因作物潜力无穷而风险微不足道，政府必须采取实事求是的监管政策，拒绝病态科学。


The Economic Imperatives of the Arab Spring	阿拉伯之春的经济使命


WASHINGTON, DC/ISTANBUL – Almost a year has passed since revolution in Tunisia and protests in Cairo’s Tahrir Square toppled ossified authoritarian regimes and ignited a much wider – and still raging – storm in the Arab world.	华盛顿/伊斯坦布尔——突尼斯革命已经过去了一年，开罗解放广场的游行推翻了腐朽的独裁体制，同时也点燃了如今已成燎原之势的阿拉伯世界之火。


No one can safely predict where these events will eventually take the Arab people and nations.	没人能够百分百地确定这些时间最终会将阿拉伯人民和国家引向何方。


But one thing is certain: there is no turning back.	但有一点是肯定的：没有回头路。


New social and political movements and structures are emerging, power is shifting, and there is hope that democratic processes will strengthen and spread across the Arab world in 2012.	新的社会和政治运动和结构正在浮现，权力正在转移，2012年，民主进程很有可能在整个阿拉伯地区加强和传播。


Events in the Arab world in 2011 recall other far-reaching regional transitions, such as in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.	2011年在阿拉伯世界所发生的事件激起了人们对其他影响深远的地区转型的会议，比如1989年柏林墙倒塌后的东欧剧变。


There are differences, of course, but the upheavals’ sweeping and contagious nature is strongly similar to that of the revolutions that brought communism to an end in Europe.	当然，阿拉伯和东欧是不同的，但阿拉伯剧变的势头之猛、蔓延之快与当年终结欧洲共产主义的革命不相上下。


So, too, is the debate about the relative contributions of political and economic factors to the eventual eruption of popular protest.	关于激起人民反对最终爆发的政治和经济因素的争论也是如此。


While the yearning for dignity, freedom of expression, and real democratic participation was the driving force underlying the Arab revolutions, economic discontent played a vital role, and economic factors will help to determine how the transition in the Arab world unfolds.  Here, three fundamental and longer-term challenges are worth bearing in mind.	对尊严、言论自由和真正的民主参与的渴望是阿拉伯革命的推动力，但经济不满才是关键原因，而且将有助于决定阿拉伯世界的转型如何展开。 在这里，有三大长期基本挑战值得思考。


First, growth will have to be much more inclusive, especially in terms of job creation.	首先，增长必须是普惠性的，特别是就业岗位的创造。


The youth employment-to-population ratio was about 27% in the Arab countries in 2008, compared to 53% in East Asia.	2008年，阿拉伯国家年轻人就业-总人口比率为27%，东亚是53%。


Moreover, income inequality has widened, with the global phenomenon of increasing concentration of wealth at the top very pronounced in many Arab countries.	此外，收入不平等也在加剧，全世界财富向最高端人群集中的状况在许多阿拉伯国家中尤为显著。


Top incomes in these countries have resulted largely from political patronage, rather than from innovation and hard work.	这些国家的最高端收入主要源自政治恩庇，而不是创新和努力工作。


While Tunisia was an extreme case of a regime furthering the economic interests of a small clique of insiders, the pattern was widespread.	突尼斯是一小撮体制内攫取广大经济利益的极端例子，但这一模式是普遍的。


That is why a knee-jerk, simplistic “Washington Consensus” prescription of more liberalization and privatization is inappropriate for the Arab world in 2012.	这就是问什么下意识的简单“华盛顿共识”药方——自由化和私有化——不适合2012年的阿拉伯世界的原因。


There is a clear political need for a growth strategy in which inclusion is the centerpiece, not an afterthought.	在阿拉伯世界的增长战略中，普惠是核心问题，不能留到以后解决，这是显而易见的政治需要。


Neither the old statist left, nor the rent-seeking, crony-capitalist right had policies to respond to the yearning for inclusion.	不管是老一代中央集权左派，还是寻租权贵资本主义右派，都没有对普惠政策的呼声有所反应。


New political forces in the Arab world, Islam-inspired or social-democratic, will have to propose policies that do not just perpetuate rent-seeking capitalism or reliance on a discredited state bureaucracy.	阿拉伯世界的新政治推动力，不管是伊斯兰式的还是社会民主式的，都必须出台不以使寻租永久化和声名狼藉的国家官僚主义为基础的政策。


It will be necessary to harness grass-roots dynamism and entrepreneurial potential to achieve social solidarity and equity.	驾驭草根动力和企业家潜能以达到社会团结公正是十分必要的。


While a truly competitive private sector has to be unleashed, the state must not be weakened but transformed, to become one that is at the service of citizens.	必须真正地释放竞争性的私人部门，但国家也不能削弱，只能转型为服务型国家。


Generous but targeted and performance-oriented social transfers, conditional on participation in health and basic education programs, will have to replace the old, largely untargeted subsidies.	慷慨而定向的以表现为导向的社会转移支付（以参与健康和基本教育计划为条件）必须取代旧的非定向的补贴。


Public development finance will have to focus on large-scale access to housing and a people-oriented infrastructure.	公共开发财政必须专注于大规模住房和以人为本的基础设施建设。


All of this has to be achieved within a sustainable budget framework, requiring both funds and comprehensive administrative reforms.	所有这些都必须在可持续预算框架内达到，这既要求资金，也要求综合的政府改革。


Accompanying inclusive growth, the second challenge is skill development, for which a performance-oriented education system must become a top priority.	伴随普惠增长的第二大挑战是技能发展，在这一点上，必须以表现导向的教育体系为重中之重。


Many Arab countries have spent huge sums on education; the problem is that the return on these investments has been dismal.	许多阿拉伯国家已对教育投入了巨资，但问题是这些投资回报甚微。


Arab students, for example, score well below average on international mathematics and science tests.	比如，阿拉伯学生在数学和科学测验上的得分大大低于国际平均水平。


Deep reforms – focused on quality and performance, rather than on enrollment and diplomas – are needed to transform the learning process and unleash the productivity growth that a young labor force requires.	深入的改革——专注于质量和表现，而不是入学和毕业——实属转变学习过程、释放青年劳动力所要求的生产率增长之所必须。


The third challenge, instrumental to meeting the first two, will be to strengthen regional Arab solidarity.	作为克服前两大挑战的需要，第三大挑战将是强化地区性阿拉伯团结。


Many outsiders underestimate or purposefully minimize the “Arabness” of the Arab world.	许多外部人士低估或故意贬低阿拉伯世界的“阿拉伯性”。


But the revolutions of 2011 demonstrated that a strong sense of identity, a common language, and much shared history bind Arabs together, despite huge differences in natural-resource endowments, political circumstances, and average per capita incomes.	但2011年的革命表明，尽管在自然资源禀赋、政治环境和人均收入方面存在巨大差异，但强烈的身份认同感以及共同的语言和历史让阿拉伯人民拧成了一股绳。


How else can one explain that an act of revolt in Tunisia led to popular revolts from North Africa to the Arabian Peninsula?	除此之外，还有什么能够解释为何突尼斯的反抗行为会引起北非和阿拉伯半岛的群众运动风暴呢？


One implication of this is that the oil-rich states and leaders cannot expect to remain isolated and protected from the unfolding events.	由此可以看出，富油国和领导层别想指望能孤立于风起云涌的事件之外不受影响。


The future of the region is also their future; the transition that started in 2011 unleashed forces that cannot be stopped.	阿拉伯地区的未来也是他们的未来，从2011年开始的转型释放了不可阻挡的能量。


But the transition can be more orderly, more peaceful, and less disruptive if states that command immense resources and wealth generously support the poorer countries – and back the reforms that all Arab countries need.	但转型可以更有序、更和平、更少破坏，只要手握巨大资源和财富的国家支持较贫困的国家——同时也支持所有阿拉伯国家所需要的改革。


Existing institutions with proven track records, such as the Arab Fund, can help, but this requires scaling up their funds dramatically.	有着成功记录的现有机构，比如阿拉伯基金，可以起到作用，但基金规模必须大大扩大。


Prosperity and peace in the region will depend on thinking big and acting fast.	阿拉伯地区的繁荣与和平将取决于远见卓识和快速行动。


The revolutions of 2011 are a historic opportunity for all Arabs.	2011年的革命对所有阿拉伯人来说都是一次历史性机会。


Making the most of it will require realism, courage, willingness to change, and a readiness to support change, particularly among those who have the greatest means to do so.	抓住这次机会要求认清现实、勇气、变革的意愿，以及做好支持变革的准备，特别是对于握有如此行动的资源的人来说。


The Economics of Happiness	幸福经济学


NEW YORK – We live in a time of high anxiety.	纽约——我们生活在一个焦虑的年代。


Despite the world’s unprecedented total wealth, there is vast insecurity, unrest, and dissatisfaction.	尽管世界财富总量前所未有，但不安全、不稳定和不满足的情绪仍然随处可见。


In the United States, a large majority of Americans believe that the country is “on the wrong track.”	绝大部分美国人相信国家“走错了路”。


Pessimism has soared.	悲观情绪急剧蔓延。


The same is true in many other places.	其他很多地方的情况也大同小异。


Against this backdrop, the time has come to reconsider the basic sources of happiness in our economic life.	在这样的背景下，我们应该开始重新思考经济生活中基本的幸福来源。


The relentless pursuit of higher income is leading to unprecedented inequality and anxiety, rather than to greater happiness and life satisfaction.	对高收入的不懈追求带来了前所未有的不平等和焦虑，而没有带来更多的幸福和人生满足感。


Economic progress is important and can greatly improve the quality of life, but only if it is pursued in line with other goals.	经济发展不仅重要而且能显著改善生活质量，但只有当经济发展与其他目标并重时这样的目标才能实现。


In this respect, the Himalayan Kingdom of Bhutan has been leading the way.	在这方面，喜马拉雅的不丹王国走在了世界的前面。


Forty years ago, Bhutan’s fourth king, young and newly installed, made a remarkable choice: Bhutan should pursue “gross national happiness” rather than gross national product.	四十年前，不丹的第四任年轻国王刚刚登基，就做出了一个异乎寻常的决定：不丹不应追求国民生产总值，而要把“国民幸福总值”作为追求的目标。


Since then, the country has been experimenting with an alternative, holistic approach to development that emphasizes not only economic growth, but also culture, mental health, compassion, and community.	从那以后，这个国家就不懈地试验全局性的替代发展方针，在强调经济发展的同时突出文化、心理健康、同情和群体等因素。


Dozens of experts recently gathered in Bhutan’s capital, Thimphu, to take stock of the country’s record.	几十位专家不久前会聚不丹首都廷布，总结不丹的发展之路。


I was co-host with Bhutan’s prime minister, Jigme Thinley, a leader in sustainable development and a great champion of the concept of “GNH.”	我和不丹首相吉格梅·廷莱共同主持会议，后者是可持续发展领袖，“国民收入总值”理念的伟大捍卫者。


We assembled in the wake of a declaration in July by the United Nations General Assembly calling on countries to examine how national policies can promote happiness in their societies.	我们这次会议在联合国大会7月的一次宣言后紧接着召开，该宣言呼吁各国研究如何依靠国家政策促进全社会的幸福感。


All who gathered in Thimphu agreed on the importance of pursuing happiness rather than pursuing national income.	廷布的与会者们一致认同追求幸福的重要性胜于追求国民收入。


The question we examined is how to achieve happiness in a world that is characterized by rapid urbanization, mass media, global capitalism, and environmental degradation.	我们探讨的问题是如何能在快速城市化、海量资讯、全球资本主义和环境恶化的今天求得幸福。


How can our economic life be re-ordered to recreate a sense of community, trust, and environmental sustainability?	我们应该如何改革经济秩序，才能重建信任、集体观念和环境可持续性。


Here are some of the initial conclusions.	下面讲几个初步的结论。


First, we should not denigrate the value of economic progress.	首先不应贬低经济发展的价值。


When people are hungry, deprived of basic needs such as clean water, health care, and education, and without meaningful employment, they suffer.	当人们饿着肚子、被剥夺净水、医疗和教育等基本需求，而且找不到有意义的工作时，他们一定不好过。


Economic development that alleviates poverty is a vital step in boosting happiness.	减轻贫困的经济发展是推动幸福的关键步骤。


Second, relentless pursuit of GNP to the exclusion of other goals is also no path to happiness.	其次，不顾其他目标无节制地追求国民生产总值也绝非通往幸福之路。


In the US, GNP has risen sharply in the past 40 years, but happiness has not.	美国的国民生产总值40年来显著提高，但幸福指数却没有。


Instead, single-minded pursuit of GNP has led to great inequalities of wealth and power, fueled the growth of a vast underclass, trapped millions of children in poverty, and caused serious environmental degradation.	相反，一心追求国民生产总值导致财富和权力的不平等加剧、催生了庞大的底层社会、致使数百万儿童身陷贫困，同时导致环境严重恶化。


Third, happiness is achieved through a balanced approach to life by both individuals and societies.	第三，个人和社会对待生活的和谐态度是通往幸福之门的钥匙。


As individuals, we are unhappy if we are denied our basic material needs, but we are also unhappy if the pursuit of higher incomes replaces our focus on family, friends, community, compassion, and maintaining internal balance.	作为个人，如果满足不了基本的物质需求我们固然不幸福，可如果对高收入的追求取代了我们对于家庭、朋友、集体、同情心和保持内心平衡的关注，幸福也同样无从谈起。


As a society, it is one thing to organize economic policies to keep living standards on the rise, but quite another to subordinate all of society’s values to the pursuit of profit.	从全社会的角度，协调经济政策确保生活水平提高是一码事，但要求所有社会价值观完全为利润服务则是另外一码事。


Yet politics in the US has increasingly allowed corporate profits to dominate all other aspirations: fairness, justice, trust, physical and mental health, and environmental sustainability.	但美国政治越来越纵容企业利润主导其他所有目标：包括公平、正义、信任、身心健康和环境保护。


Corporate campaign contributions increasingly undermine the democratic process, with the blessing of the US Supreme Court.	在美国最高法院的保护下，企业竞选捐赠对民主进程造成了越来越严重的破坏。


Fourth, global capitalism presents many direct threats to happiness.	第四，全球资本主义在很多方面直接对幸福构成威胁。


It is destroying the natural environment through climate change and other kinds of pollution, while a relentless stream of oil-industry propaganda keeps many people ignorant of this.	上述趋势通过气候变化和其他污染破坏自然环境，而与此同时石油行业永无休止的宣传攻势导致很多人被蒙在鼓里。


It is weakening social trust and mental stability, with the prevalence of clinical depression apparently on the rise.	全球资本主义削弱社会信任和心理稳定，导致临床抑郁患者数量显著增加。


The mass media have become outlets for corporate “messaging,” much of it overtly anti-scientific, and Americans suffer from an increasing range of consumer addictions.	大众传媒已经成��企业“信息”的载体，其中大部分信息公然违背科学，而美国人越来越身陷消费成瘾而无法自拔。


Consider how the fast-food industry uses oils, fats, sugar, and other addictive ingredients to create unhealthy dependency on foods that contribute to obesity.	想想快餐业怎样用油、脂肪、糖和其他致瘾成分炮制对于导致肥胖食品的病态依赖。


One-third of all Americans are now obese.	目前三分之一的美国人都已跨入肥胖的行列。


The rest of the world will eventually follow unless countries restrict dangerous corporate practices, including advertising unhealthy and addictive foods to young children.	除非对企业的危险行为进行限制，否则世界其他国家早晚也会陷入相同的困境，应当严格限制向少年儿童宣传病态及成瘾食物。


The problem is not just foods.	问题还不仅限于食品。


Mass advertising is contributing to many other consumer addictions that imply large public-health costs, including excessive TV watching, gambling, drug use, cigarette smoking, and alcoholism.	大众广告促成了其他众多消费癖好，而看电视时间过长、赌博、药物滥用、吸烟和酗酒会大幅增加公共健康成本。


Fifth, to promote happiness, we must identify the many factors other than GNP that can raise or lower society’s well-being.	第五，为增进幸福感，我们必须找到国民生产总值以外能提升或降低社会福祉的其他多种因素。


Most countries invest to measure GNP, but spend little to identify the sources of poor health (like fast foods and excessive TV watching), declining social trust, and environmental degradation.	多数国家为调节国民生产总值不惜投资，但在找出健康状况不佳（如快餐和过度观看电视）、社会信任度下降和环境恶化的原因方面却鲜有投入。


Once we understand these factors, we can act.	了解这些因素后，我们就可以对症下药。


The mad pursuit of corporate profits is threatening us all.	企业对利润的疯狂追求为所有人都带来威胁。


To be sure, we should support economic growth and development, but only in a broader context: one that promotes environmental sustainability and the values of compassion and honesty that are required for social trust.	我们当然应该支持经济增长和发展，但这种发展必须具有更加广泛的背景：经济发展必须促进环境保护和同情诚实的价值观，因为上述因素是社会信任的前提。


The search for happiness should not be confined to the beautiful mountain kingdom of Bhutan.	对幸福的追求不该是美丽的山地王国不丹的专利。


The Unstarvable Beast	饿不死的巨兽


CAMBRIDGE – As the world watches the United States grapple with its fiscal future, the contours of the battle reflect larger social and philosophical divisions that are likely to play out in various guises around the world in the coming decades.	发自剑桥——整个世界都在看着美国为其财政前景努力挣扎，而这场斗争的形态也反映了很可能在未来几十年内以各种形式在世界各地上演的，更为宏大的社会与哲学分歧。


There has been much discussion of how to cut government spending, but too little attention has been devoted to how to make government spending more effective.	当前已经有许多关于如何减少政府开支的议论，但其中只有很少能将焦点放在如何使政府支出变得更有效上。


And yet, without more creative approaches to providing government services, their cost will continue to rise inexorably over time.	虽然没有更具创造性的方法来提供政府服务，但其成本依然将随时间不断攀升。


Any service-intensive industry faces the same challenges.	所有服务密集型产业都面对着同样的挑战。


Back in the 1960’s, the economists William Baumol and William Bowen wrote about the “cost disease” that plagues these industries.	早在20世纪60年代，经济学家威廉·鲍莫尔（William Baumol）和威廉·鲍恩（William Bowen）就撰文讨论过困扰这些行业的“成本弊病”。


The example they famously used was that of a Mozart string quartet, which requires the same number of musicians and instruments in modern times as it did in the nineteenth century.	他们使用的最著名例子是莫扎特的弦乐四重奏，这种四重奏今时今日和19世纪一样要求同样数量的音乐家和乐器。


Similarly, it takes about the same amount of time for a teacher to grade a paper as it did 100 years ago.	同样地，对老师来说现在给一篇论文打分所花的时间跟100年前所花的时间是一样的。


Good plumbers cost a small fortune, because here, too, the technology has evolved very slowly.	好的水管工雇佣成本很高，因为在这方面技术也发展得很慢。


Why does slow productivity growth translate into high costs?	为什么缓慢的生产率增长转化成了高成本呢？


The problem is that service industries ultimately have to compete for workers in the same national labor pool as sectors with fast productivity growth, such as finance, manufacturing, and information technology.	关键在于服务业最终得和高速生产率增长的金融业、制造业和信息技术行业在同一个国家的劳动力市场里争夺劳动力。


Even though the pools of workers may be somewhat segmented, there is enough overlap that it forces service-intensive industries to pay higher wages, at least in the long run.	尽管这些市场的劳动力可能会被分割成不的领域，但是中间依然有足够的重叠迫使服务密集型行业不得不支付更高的工资来雇佣员工——至少从长远来看是如此。


The government, of course, is the consummate service-intensive sector.	当然政府就是一个纯粹的服务密集型行业。


Government employees include teachers, policemen, trash collectors, and military personnel.	政府雇员包括教师、警察、垃圾清洁工和军人。


Modern schools look a lot more like those of 50 years ago than do modern manufacturing plants.	现代学校跟50年前的差别似乎没有现代工厂与50年前的变化大。


And, while military innovation has been spectacular, it is still very labor-intensive.	而且，虽然在军事方面的创新成果惊人，它仍然是极度劳动密集型的。


If people want the same level of government services relative to other things that they consume, government spending will take up a larger and larger share of national output over time.	如果人们想要得到与自身消费的其他事物同���水平的政府服务，那么政府支出将逐渐占据国民产出越来越大的份额。


Indeed, not only has government spending been rising as a share of income; so, too, has spending across many service sectors.	确实，不仅仅是政府支出在收入中所占份额一直在上升； 在其他许多服务部门上的支出也在上升。


Today, the service sector, including the government, accounts for more than 70% of national income in most advanced economies.	今时今日，服务业（包括政府）在大部分发达国家中都占据了国民收入的70%以上。


Agriculture, which in the 1800’s accounted for more than half of national income, has shrunk to just a few percent.	农业在19世纪占国民收入的一半以上，现在已经缩减到只剩几个百分点了。


Manufacturing employment, which accounted for perhaps a third of jobs or more before World War II, has shrunk dramatically.	制造业就业在二战前占全部就业的三分之一或以上，如今也已显著下降。


In the US, for example, the manufacturing sector employs less than 10% of all workers.	比如在美国，制造业就业在全部劳动力中不到10%。


So, even as economic conservatives demand spending cuts, there are strong forces pushing in the other direction.	所以，即使经济保守人士要求削减开支，还是有许多强大的力量在推动事情向相反方向发展。


Admittedly, the problem is worse in the government sector, where productivity growth is much slower even than in other service industries.	诚然，这个问题在政府部门更为严重，政府部门的生产率增长比其他服务行业要慢得多。


Whereas this might reflect the particular mix of services that governments are asked to provide, that can hardly be the whole story.	虽然这可能也反映了政府所须提供的服务特别繁杂，但这远非事实的全部。


Surely, part of the problem is that governments use employment not just to provide services, but also to make implicit transfers.	当然问题的部分原因是政府制造就业并不仅仅是为了提供服务，同时也为了实施隐性的转移支付。


Moreover, government agencies operate in many areas in which they face little competition – and thus little pressure to innovate.	此外，许多领域的政府机构并未面临多大的竞争——从而也就没有创新的压力。


Why not bring greater private-sector involvement, or at least competition, into government?	为什么不在政府部门引进更多私营企业的参与呢，或者至少引进竞争？


Education, where the power of modern disruptive technologies has barely been felt, would be a good place to start.	教育这个不怎么能感觉得到现代颠覆性技术力量的领域，有可能是一个尝试的好领域。


Sophisticated computer programs are becoming quite good at grading middle-school essays, if not quite up to the standards of top teachers.	复杂的计算机程序，即使还比不上优秀教师的标准，也已经很擅长给中学论文打分了。


Infrastructure is another obvious place to expand private-sector involvement.	基础设施是另一个明显可以扩大私营企业参与的领域。


Once upon a time, for example, it was widely believed that drivers on privately operated roads would constantly be waiting to pay tolls.	比如曾经人们普遍认为司机在私营道路上会需要不断排队支付通行费。


Modern transponders and automatic payment systems, however, have made that a non-issue.	然而现代自动放行设备和自动支付系统已经解决了这个问题。


But one should not presume that a shift to greater private-sector provision of services is a panacea.	但我们不能认为让民营企业的参与到政府服务就是解决所有问题的灵丹妙药。


There would still be a need for regulation, especially where monopoly or near-monopoly is involved.	一切都需要一定的监管，尤其是在那些垄断或接近垄断的行业。


And there would still be a need to decide how to balance efficiency and equity in the provision of services.	而且也仍然需要政府机构来决定在提供服务的过程中如何兼顾效率与公平。


Education is clearly an area in which any country has a strong national interest in providing a level playing field.	教育显然是一个所有国家都会基于强烈国家利益考虑而愿意提供公平竞争环境的领域。


As US President in the 1980’s, the conservative icon Ronald Reagan described his approach to fiscal policy as “starve the beast”: cutting taxes will eventually force people to accept less government spending.	作为保守派标志性人物，罗纳德·里根（Ronald Reagan）在其20世纪80年代担任美国总统期间将其财政政策描述为“饿死官僚巨兽”：减税将最终迫使人们接受更少的政府开支。


In many ways, his approach was a great success.	从很多方面来说，他的措施确实取得了巨大的成功。


But government spending has continued to grow, because voters still want the services that government provides.	但政府支出仍在上升，因为选民们依然需要政府提供的服务。


Today, it is clear that reining in government also means finding ways to shape incentives so that innovation in government keeps pace with innovation in other service sectors.	现在很明显遏制政府（开支膨胀）也意味着要寻找新的激励，好让政府内部创新跟得上其他服务领域的创新脚步。


Without more ideas about how to innovate in the provision of government services, battles such as one sees playing out in the US today can only become worse, as voters are increasingly asked to pay more for less.	如果没有更多关于在政府提供服务方面如何创新的想法，那么当前人们看到在美国的斗争只会变得更糟糕，因为选民们逐渐被要求为更少的服务支付更多的钱。


Politicians can and will promise to do a better job, but they cannot succeed unless we identify ways to boost government services’ efficiency and productivity.	政客们可以并将承诺把工作做得更好，但他们无法做到，除非我们找到能提高政府服务效率和生产率的方法。


The Economics of Peace in Afghanistan	阿富汗和平经济学


KABUL – Suicide bombings, assassinations of top Afghan leaders, brutal attacks on Charikar and other places close to Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital, and a rapid increase in civilian deaths from drone attacks are jeopardizing the withdrawal of American and NATO forces from the country.	发自喀布尔——自杀式炸弹，高官遇刺，对首都喀布尔附近恰里卡尔等地的大肆进攻，以及持续袭击导致的平民死伤大增都令美国与北约盟军的撤军行动蒙上了阴影。


So pervasive has the violence become that Ahmed Rashid, the renowned expert on the Taliban, has concluded that speeding up the peace process through dialogue with the insurgents is the only option.	这些暴力行动是如此猖獗，以致塔利班研究专家艾哈迈德·拉什德都觉得只有通过与武装分子谈判加速和平进程才能找到出路。


The economics of what an Afghanistan at peace would look like must be a critical part of any negotiations.	但一个和平的阿富汗在经济学上究竟是何种状态必须成为任何谈判的一个关键部分。


But what, precisely, does the economics of peace entail, and why is it so important?	但这种和平经济具体要由哪些元素构成，又为何如此重要呢？


One main objective should be to transform Afghanistan’s vast underground economy, which has thrived, despite the large number of NATO forces, by creating profitable opportunities for Taliban and other groups involved in the fighting.	尽管北约陈兵数万，但为塔利班及其他武装组织提供财源的阿富汗庞大地下经济却依旧兴旺发达，因此我们要实现的一个主要目标就是这类经济的转型。


To reintegrate these fighters into the productive economy will require a change in policies, including a rapid reactivation of rural development schemes and the promotion of local entrepreneurship, public works, and other legal activities.	而将这些武装人员整合到一个生产性经济中则需要转变一系列政策，包括迅速重启农村发展计划并鼓励当地小企业，公共服务以及其他合法经营行为的发展。


In particular, the United States, together with other donors and NATO troop contributors, should heed “Ten Commandments” during and after the negotiations.	而美国以及其他援助者和北约部队资助者尤其应当在谈判过程遵从下列“十诫”。


First, apply the dictum of T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) that it is better to let “them” do it than it is to try to “do it better” for them.	首先，经典影片《阿拉伯的劳伦斯》主角，英国军官T·E·劳伦斯曾说过，让“他们”自己动手要比尝试代替他们去“做得更好”更加明智。


Thus, let national negotiators, local leaders, and communities determine what their economic needs and priorities are, and let insurgents determine their preferred venue for reintegration.	因此最好让中央政府谈判代表，地方领袖和社区自己决定其经济利益和优先事项，并让武装人员决定推动重新整合的领域。


Unless the participants are empowered and take ownership, programs will not be sustainable, resources will go to waste, and peace will not endure.	因为只有将权力和所有权赋予了这些参与者，才能使发展项目得以持续，资源不致浪费，并实现长久和平。


Second, ensure integration – rather than merely coordination – of economic factors into the political and security agenda.	其二，确保将经济因素整合——而不仅仅是并列——到政治与安全议程当中。


This would entail using reintegration and other economic programs as a carrot to support the negotiations, and would also support peace and stability in the long run.	这意味着重新整合项目以及其他经济项目将成为胡萝卜，一方面鼓励谈判，另一方面也可用来维持长期和平与稳定。


Third, support a peace agreement designed in accordance with the country’s financial and technical capacity to implement it.	第三，该和平进程必须与阿富汗本国的财政和技术水平相适应。


This requires reasonable projections for domestic tax revenue and aid, as well as the right mix of foreign expertise to support the process.	为此需要对本地的税务收入和援助金额做出合理评估，并适当引入国外相关专业知识来支持这一进程。


Avoid overly optimistic projections that lead to unworkable plans and unreasonable expectations, which the government will not be able to fulfill, as happened in Guatemala, for example, when its civil war ended.	必须避免做出那些导致空中楼阁计划以及非理性预期的过度乐观估计，因为刚刚摆脱内战的当地政府将无力完成这些项目，当年在危地马拉发生的一切就是一个例子。


Fourth, channel aid through the central government budget, or through local authorities, so that officials can acquire legitimacy by providing services and infrastructure, and provide subsidies and price-support programs to replace poppies with licit crops such as cotton, which was produced in the past.	第四，通过中央政府预算或者当地权威机构来安排援助，这样官员就能通过提供服务和基础设施来获得管制合法性，同时对棉花等合法农作物提供补贴和价格支持，使之能够取代阿富汗地区的罂粟种植。


Fifth, ensure that such aid moves quickly from short-run humanitarian purposes – to save lives and feed those giving up war – to reconstruction activities aimed at creating investment, productivity growth, and the sustainable employment that will enable people to live dignified lives.	第五，确保这类援助能迅速从短期人道主义目的——救助和养活放下武器的人——转向旨在创造投资，提高生产力和持续就业的重建活动方面——只有这些才能给予人们有尊严的生活。


What needs to be avoided is a failure – such as occurred in Haiti following its devastating earthquake – to move from the first stage to the second.	而必须避免的则是在从前者与后者之间的转型失败，正如大地震后的海地所发生的那样。


Sixth, establish well-planned and synchronized programs for demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration, which are sine qua non for making the transition from war to peace irreversible.	第六，解散武装，上缴武器和重新整合计划必须在精心策划下同步进行，因为这才是彻底实现从战争向和平转化的先决条件。


In doing so, remember that the “vagueness versus specificity” dilemma also applies to economic issues.	在执行的过程中要避免陷入经济学中的所谓“模糊-特异”困境。