But Gaddafi now seems to want to reconcile his teachings and rule with a more open economy, including foreign direct investment and market-based competition.	但是，卡扎菲现在似乎想在他的教义和统治与更开放的经济——包括外国直接投资和基于市场的竞争——之间进行调和。


Internally, Libya has launched a “Go East” policy, so that development does not become clustered only in its oil and gas regions and around the capital of Tripoli.	在国内，利比亚已经启动了一项 “向东部发展”的政策，该政策使发展不仅仅集中在其石油和天然气富庶地区以及首府的黎波里的周边地区。


It wants, in particular, to ensure that the people and tribes in its Eastern “Cyrenaica” territories centered in Benghazi have a chance to develop equally with the rest of the country.	利比亚特别想保证以班加西为中心的东部“昔兰尼加”地区的人们和部族有和该国其他地区平等发展的机会。


A bulwark of secular government and anti-fundamentalism in a North Africa that is struggling to contain the spread of Islamic extremism, Libya is of strategic importance to Europe and the US beyond its oil riches, notwithstanding the overwhelming significance of its energy resources.	在一个竭力遏制伊斯兰极端主义扩散的北非，作为一个世俗政府和反原教旨主义的堡垒，除了其丰富的能源资源的极大的重要性之外，利比亚对欧洲和美国具有除石油财富之外的重要的战略地位。


Fully aware of its growing importance in an oil-starved world, Libya will use that advantage to the full and it will no doubt guard, with Gaddafi at the forefront, its sovereign rights vociferously and assiduously.	利比亚已经充分意识到了其对这个对石油如饥似渴的世界日渐增长的重要性，它将充分利用这一点，并且毫无疑问，它会以卡扎菲作为排头兵，声嘶力竭不遗余力地捍卫自己的主权。


Nevertheless, drawing Libya deeper into international discourse, despite the possibility of roadblocks along the way, is a strategic decision that, now that it has been taken, the West must pursue with patience, perseverance, and constant nurturing.	然而，尽管前方可能存在障碍，将利比亚进一步纳入国际对话是一个具有战略意义的决定。 现在西方已经作出了这个决定，它们必须有足够的耐心，韧性以及给予其持续的呵护来让它得到实现。


In that process, underestimating Libyan diplomacy, shrewdness and negotiating skills is the folly of the ignorant.	在这个过程中，低估利比亚的外交手段、精明程度和谈判技巧都是愚昧无知的。


Libya’s Defeated Islamists	利比亚伊斯兰主义者遭遇重创


TRIPOLI – “We certainly did not expect the results, but...our future is certainly better than our present and our past,” said Sami al-Saadi, the former ideologue of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and the founder of the political party al-Umma al-Wasat, which finished third in Central Tripoli during Libya’s recent parliamentary election.	的黎波里—“我们当然没有料到会出现这个结果，但是……我们的未来肯定会比现在和过去更好，”前利比亚伊斯兰战斗组织（Libyan Islamic Fighting Group，LIFG）思想家、刚刚在利比亚最新议会选举中获得第三多选票的中间道路党（al-Umma al-Wasat）创始人萨米·萨迪（Sami al-Saadi）说。


The man whom Taliban leader Mullah Omar once called the “Sheikh of the Arabs,” and who authored the LIFG’s anti-democracy manifesto The Choice is Theirs, accepted the apparent victory of Libya’s more liberal forces.	萨迪被塔利班领导人奥马尔称为“阿拉伯酋长”，也是LIFG反民主宣言《选择是他们的》（The Choice is Theirs）的执笔者，如今，他也接受了利比亚自由力量获得了胜利这一显而易见的事实。


Indeed, the results raised eyebrows, even of those analysts who did not expect an Islamist landslide.	事实上，利比亚的选举结果即使是那些并不期待伊斯兰主义者会获得压倒性胜利的分析家也要大跌眼镜。


In the electoral district that includes Derna, commonly viewed as an Islamist stronghold, the liberal-leaning National Forces Coalition (NFC), a grouping of more than 60 parties and hundreds of local civil-society organizations, won 59,769 votes, while the Justice and Construction Party (JCP) of the Muslim Brothers (MB) received only 8,619.	在包括了被普遍视为伊斯兰主义者根据地的德尔纳（Derna）的选区中，倾向自由的全国军事联盟（National Forces Coalition，NFC，由60多个党派和数百家地方公民社会组织组成）赢得了59 769张选票，而穆斯林兄弟会（Muslim Brothers，MB）的正义与建设党（Justice and Construction Party，JCP）只赢得了8 619张选票。


The liberal-leaning Central National Trend (CNT) finished third, with 4,962 votes.	倾向自由的中央全国潮流党（Central National Trend，CNT）位居第三，赢得4 962张选票。


In the impoverished western district of Abu Selim, where many Islamists are seen as local heroes due to their sacrifices under Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi’s regime, the NFC swept the field with 60,052 votes, defeating all six Islamist parties, which received a combined total of less than 15,000 votes.	在西部贫困区阿布斯莱姆（Abu Sleim），许多伊斯兰主义者因他们在推翻卡扎菲政权时所作出的牺牲而被视为地方英雄。 在阿布斯莱姆，NFC大获全胜，赢得60 052票，击败了所有六大伊斯兰党派，后者加起来总共只获得了不到15 000张选票。


Overall, liberal-leaning parties finished first in 11 of Libya’s 13 electoral districts, with the NFC winning ten and the CNT taking one.	总的来看，倾向自由的党派在13个利比亚选区中的11个拔得头筹，其中NFC在10个选区中问鼎，CNT赢得了1个选区。


To be sure, the results will affect only 80 of the 200 seats in the constituent assembly, whose mandate is to appoint a prime minister, government, and a committee to draft the constitution.	坦白说，选举结果只能影响制宪大会200个议席中的80席。 制宪大会将任命总理、政府以及宪法起草委员会。


The other 120 seats are assigned to individual candidates, who are likely to be local notables, independents with strong tribal affiliations, and, to a lesser extent, a mix of Islamist and liberal politicians.	其他120个席位将被指派给个人候选人，包括地方名流、拥有强大部落关系的独立候选人以及一小部分伊斯兰主义和自由主义混合派。


Moreover, while the Islamists were soundly defeated, they performed quite well in many districts.	此外，尽管伊斯兰主义者遭遇了重创，但他们在许多选区表现相当出色。


Across Libya, they took second place in ten districts (the JCP in nine and the Salafi-leaning Originality Coalition in one).	从利比亚全国来看，他们在10个选区位居第二（JCP在9个选区屈居次席，倾向于萨拉菲派（Salafi）的原住民联盟（Originality Coalition）在1个选区中位列第二）。


In Misrata, the JCP finished second, after the local Union for Homeland Party, but still managed to win almost three times as many votes as the NFC, which came in fourth.	在米苏拉塔（Misrata），JCP最终位列第二，仅次于当地的家乡党联盟（Union for Homeland Party），得票数是位列第四的NFC的近三倍。


Nevertheless, the question remains: what happened to the Islamists?	尽管如此，问题依然存在：伊斯兰主义者到底怎么了？


They spearheaded the opposition to Qaddafi, were advised by their Tunisian and Egyptian brethren, and larded their rhetoric with religious symbolism in a conservative Muslim country.	他们是反卡扎菲的先锋队，有突尼斯和埃及同胞成功先例可循，且在利比亚这个保守穆斯林国家拥有宗教象征的宣传优势。


For many, however, this was not enough.	但是，对许多人来说，有这些仍然不够。


A striking difference between Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Tunisia’s Ennahda, on the one hand, and Libya’s Islamists on the other is the level of institutionalization and interaction with the masses.	一方面，利比亚伊斯兰主义者与埃及穆斯林兄弟会和突尼斯复兴运动党（Ennahda）有一个显著不同——制度化水平和群众互动。 在卡扎菲四十年的统治生涯中，利比亚伊斯兰主义者无法建立地方支持网络；


In Qaddafi’s four decades in power, Libya’s Islamists could not build local support networks; develop organizational structures, hierarchies, or institutions; or create a parallel system of clinics and social services, as their counterparts in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan were able to do.	没能发展组织结构、层级和制度； 也没有建立起诊疗和社会服务体系，而这些东西埃及、突尼斯、摩洛哥和约旦都做到了。


As a result, Libya’s Islamists could not unite in a coalition as large as that of Mahmoud Jibril, the former prime minister under the National Transitional Council, who heads the NFC.	因此，利比亚伊斯兰主义者无法形成一个联盟，如同NFC领导人、前总理吉布利勒（Mahmoud Jibril）的全国过渡委员会那样。


Instead, their votes were divided between several parties, six of which are significant.	相反，他们的选票分散于多个党派，其中较大的有六个。


But another reason for the strong “liberal” turnout is the “blood” factor.	但另一个“自由”力量崛起的原因是“流血”因素。 “我不会把家族的票投给MB。


“I am not giving my family’s votes to the MB.	我有两位表兄弟就死在MB手上。


Two of my cousins died because of them,” Mohamed Abdul Hakim, a voter from Benghazi, told me.	”来自班加西的选民穆罕默德·阿卜杜勒·哈基姆（Mohamed Abdul Hakim）这样对我说。


He agrees that Islam should be the source for legislation, and his wife wears a niqab.	他也同意伊斯兰教本应是合法性的源泉，他的妻子也身着面纱。


Nonetheless, he voted liberal: his cousins were killed in a confrontation in the 1990’s, most likely between the Martyrs Movement (a small jihadist group operating in his neighborhood at the time) and Qaddafi’s forces.	但是，他还是把票投给了自由派：他的表兄弟在20世纪90年代的一场冲突中被杀，这场冲突的双方极有可能是殉道运动（Martyrs Movement，当时在他家附近地区活动的小型圣战组织）和卡扎菲军队。


But many average Libyans, including Hakim, do not distinguish between Islamist organizations and their histories.	但包括哈基姆在内的许多普通利比亚人民并不区分伊斯兰主义组织和它们的历史。


For them, all Islamists are “Ikhwan” (MB).	对他们来说，所有的伊斯兰主义者都是“Ikhwan”（兄弟）。


The “stain” of direct involvement in armed action, coupled with fear of Taliban-like laws or a civil war like Algeria’s in the 1990’s harmed Islamists of all brands.	选区卷入武装行动的“污点”以及对塔利班式法律和阿尔及利亚20世纪90年代内战的恐惧伤害了所有伊斯兰主义者。


A third reason for the Islamists’ defeat had to do with their campaign rhetoric.	伊斯兰主义者败北的第三个原因与他们的竞选口号有关。


“It is offensive to tell me that I have to vote for an Islamic party,” Jamila Marzouki, an Islamic studies graduate, told me.	“他们对我说，我必须投票给伊斯兰政党，这令我很不爽。 ”伊斯兰教研究生贾米拉·马尔佐基（Jamila Marzouki）对我说。


Marzouki voted liberal, despite believing that Islam should be the ultimate reference for Libyan laws.	马尔佐基把票投给了自由派，尽管他认为伊斯兰教应该成为利比亚法律的最终参考基准。


“In Libya, we are Muslims.	“在利比亚，我们是穆斯林。


They can’t take away my identity and claim that it’s only theirs.”	他们不能剥夺我的身份，宣布这是他们的禁脔。 ”


Others factors had to do more with the liberal side.	其他因素也偏向于自由派。


Jibril’s international legitimacy, his tribal affiliation (the Warfalla tribe includes about one million of Libya’s 6.4 million people), and leadership style, coupled with a broad coalition, served the country’s liberal forces well.	吉布利勒以其国际正当性、其所拥有的部落关系（瓦尔法拉（Warfalla）部落拥有利比亚640万人口中的100万）以及其领导风格再加上广泛的联盟，形成了利比亚自由力量坚强后盾。


So did a clever electoral campaign, which focused on incentives and hope (while also exaggerating the repercussions of an Islamist takeover).	聪明的选举宣传也起了作用——以激励和希望为核心（当然也对伊斯兰主义掌权的后果进行了夸张）。


The result was yet another paradox of the Arab Spring: a country that seemed to meet all of the conditions for an Islamist victory produced the sort of election results that liberals in Egypt and Tunisia could only dream about.	结果产生了另一个阿拉伯之春悖论：在一个看似满足了伊斯兰教全面获胜的所有条件的国家，却产生了埃及和突尼斯自由派梦寐以求的选举结果。


Libya’s Jihadist Minority	利比亚的圣战少数派


DOHA – “They are armed, I am not going to fight a losing battle and kill my men over a demolished shrine,” said Fawzi Abd al-‘Aali, the former Libyan interior minister, before he “resigned” last August.	发自多哈——利比亚前内政部长法齐·阿卜杜拉·阿里(Fawzi Abd al-‘Aali)在其去年八月“辞职”前宣称：“对方全副武装，我不会为了一座倒塌的神殿打一场毫无胜算的仗，让自己的弟兄丧命。


He was referring to the armed Salafi groups that were accused of destroying Sufi shrines.	”他所提到的“对方”是那些被控毁坏了伊斯兰苏菲派神殿的沙拉菲武装组织。


One of the accused groups was the Ansar al-Shariah Brigade, which was quick to support the demolition, but denied any responsibility for it.	其中一个组织是安萨尔·沙里亚旅（Ansar al-Shariah Brigade，阿拉伯语意为“教法支持者”）——它在第一时间表示了对拆毁苏菲派神殿的支持，却拒绝对此事承担任何责任。


Ahmed Jibril, Libya’s deputy ambassador to London, has now accused the Brigade, headed by Muhammed Ali Al-Zahawy, of perpetrating the attack on the US Consulate in Benghazi, which killed the American ambassador, Christopher Stevens, and three other US personnel, as well as Libyan guards.	利比亚驻英国副大使艾哈迈德·贾比尔（Ahmed Jibril）指控是穆罕默德·阿里·扎哈维（Muhammed Ali Al-Zahawy）率领的安萨尔·沙里亚旅袭击了班加西的美国领事馆——这场袭击杀死了美国大使克里斯托夫·史蒂文斯 （Christopher Stevens）、另外三名美国大使馆工作人员以及若干利比亚守卫。


Others have quickly embraced and promoted Jibril’s allegation.	其他人则迅速接受了贾比尔的说法并加以宣扬。


But the picture is more complex.	但是实际情况比这复杂得多。


The Brigade denied responsibility in a written statement, as well as in a brief interview with its spokesperson, who at the time was in charge of guarding Al Jala Hospital in Benghazi.	该组织在一份书面声明以及与其发言人——该发言人当时负责班加西艾尔杰拉医院（Al JalaHospital）的保卫工作——进行的采访中否认对这次袭击负责。


Like its statement on the destruction of Sufi shrines, it denied involvement in the attack on the US Consulate, but stressed the gravity of the insult against the Prophet that putatively triggered it.	一如它在苏菲派神殿事件上所做的声明那样，该组织否认参与对美国领事馆的袭击，并强调引发此次袭击的主要是侮辱先知的行为。


The Brigade attracted public attention last June as well, when around 300 armed members staged a rally in Benghazi, sparking outrage among Libyans.	这个组织在去年六月也引起过公众的注意——300名全副武装的成员在班加西游行，煽动利比亚人民的愤怒情绪。


“We wanted to send a message to the General National Council members,” according to Hashim Al-Nawa‘, one of the Brigade’s commanders. “They should not come near the Shariah.	该组织指挥官之一哈希姆·那瓦（Hashim Al-Nawa）的说法是，“我们想要给全国委员会成员传达一条信息，他们不应该触碰伊斯兰教法。


It should be above the constitution, and not an article for referendum.”	伊斯兰教法应该凌驾于宪法之上，不能作为（宪法）全民公决项目的其中一条。 ”


But was the Ansar al-Shariah Brigade really behind the attack on the US Consulate?	可安萨尔·沙里亚旅真的是袭击美国大使馆的幕后黑手吗？


The nature of Libya’s post-revolution armed Islamist forces is by no means straightforward.	利比亚后革命时代的伊斯兰武装力量的本质决不是这么简单就可以理解的。


Salafi jihadism is not an organization, but an ideological trend based on the core belief that armed tactics of all kinds are the most effective – and, in some versions, the most legitimate – method of bringing about social and political change.	沙拉菲圣战主义并不是一个组织机构，而是一个基于“各种形式的武装斗争策略都是最有效的——在某些说法中也是最具合法性的——社会和政治变革方式”这一核心信念的思潮。


Last year, its adherents did play an important role in the removal of Libya’s brutal dictator, Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi.	去年其追随者在推倒残暴的独裁者穆阿迈尔·埃尔·卡扎菲（Muammar el-Qaddafi）上校一事上的确起了很重要的作用。


Many subsequently matured politically, revised their worldview, and shifted from armed to unarmed activism, forming political parties and contesting elections.	很多人之后都在政治上成熟起来并修正了自身的世界观，从武装转变为非武装行动，组建政党并参加选举。


The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, for example, has produced two main political parties.	例如，利比亚伊斯兰战斗组织（LIFG）已经产生了两个主要的政党。


Al Watan (The Homeland) is led by former LIFG and Tripoli Military Council commander Abd al-Hakim Belhaj.	祖国党（Al Watan）由前利比亚伊斯兰战斗组织及黎波里军事委员会的指挥官阿卜杜·哈金姆·贝勒哈吉（Abd al-Hakim Belhaj）领导。


The other, Al Umma al-Wasat (The Central Nation), is led by Sami al-Saadi, the group’s former chief ideologist, and Abd al-Wahad Qaid, an LIFG military commander and the brother of the deceased Al Qaeda commander Hasan Qaid (Abu Yahya al-Libi).	另外一个中央国家党（Al Umma al-Wasat )由该组织前首席思想家萨米·萨阿迪（Sami al-Saadi）以及军事指挥官——同时也是已故基地组织指挥官哈桑·卡伊德(化名Abu Yahya al-Libi)的哥哥��—阿卜杜·瓦哈德·卡伊德（Abd al-Wahad Qaid）共同领导。


Both parties fared poorly in the election in July of a new General National Congress, with only Qaid winning a seat.	两个政党在七月新国民议会的选举中都表现欠佳——仅仅以瓦哈德赢得一席告终。


Indeed, the GNC elections were in many ways a defeat for Libya’s non-violent Salafi parties(such as Al Asala), as well as for the post-jihadists.	的确，这次国民议会选举在很多方面对利比亚非暴力沙拉菲政党（比如阿沙拉）以及后圣战主义者来说都是一个打击。


Other armed Islamist formations, including Salafi groups, accepted integration into Libya’s new state institutions, such as the Supreme Security Committee (interior ministry) and the Libyan Shield Force (defense ministry).	其他伊斯兰武装组织——包括沙拉菲组织——都愿意被整合进利比亚新的国家机构，比如最高安全委员会（内政部）以及利比亚防御力量（国防部）。


The National Guard, headed by the former LIFG deputy leader, Khaled al-Sharif, absorbed more than 30 brigades, mostly from the west and southwest.	由前LIFG副统帅卡勒德·沙里夫（Khaled al-Sharif）领导的国民警卫队则吸收了主要来自西部和西南地区的30多个武装组织。


But several armed formations, such as Ansar al-Shariah and the Imprisoned Sheikh Omar Abd al-Rahman Brigades, still reject the transition to party politics and integration into state institutions.	然而有几个武装组织，比如安萨尔·沙里夫组织（Ansar al-Shariah）及现今仍在狱中的奥马尔·阿卜杜·拉赫曼（Omar Abd al-Rahman）的队伍仍然拒绝向党派政治过渡，也不愿意被整合到国家机构中。


These organizations are numerous, but small.	这样的组织有很多，但规模都很小。


Some were not invited – or given sufficient incentive – to join official bodies.	有一些没有被邀请——或者给予足够的激励——去加入官方体系。


“Nobody asked us to join the army or the police,” Sufian bin Qumu, Ansar al-Shariah’s commander in Derna and a former Guantánamo detainee, said in an interview last April. “They did not even give me or any of my men a reward for fighting.”	在去年四月的一个采访中，德尔纳地区的安萨尔·沙里夫组织指挥官，前关塔纳摩监狱囚犯苏菲安·本·库目（Sufian bin Qumu）说：“没有人叫我们加入军队或警队”，“他们甚至没有给我或我的部下一点参加战斗的报酬。


Bin Qumu has a small paramilitary force training in the Bou Musafir forest on the outskirts of Derna.	”本·库目在德尔纳郊区的布穆萨尔森林里有一个的准军事力量训练基地。


He insists that if the head of the boy scouts or the city’s clan leaders asked him to disband the training camp, he would do so.	他坚持认为即使童子军的头或城市的宗族首领下令要求他遣散该训练营，他也一定会照办的。


The tragic death of Stevens and his colleagues has engendered wide public outrage in Libya, adding to the isolation and de-legitimization of the armed groups.	史蒂文斯及其同僚的惨死已经在利比亚引起了众怒，也因此加快了对武装组织的孤立及去合法化。


Dozens of Libyan activist groups have uploaded videos paying tribute to Stevens, as well as issuing statements against terrorism and Al Qaeda.	许多利比亚激进主义组织上传了向史蒂文斯致敬的视频并发表了反对恐怖主义和基地组织的声明。


One of the Muslim Brothers’ Web sites includes such a statement, and Libya’s Grand Mufti, Sheikh Sadeq al-Gheriani, also condemned the attack.	穆斯林兄弟会的其中一个网站里就有一个这样的声明，而利比亚的大穆夫提——萨德克·盖里亚尼（Sadeq al-Gheriani）也谴责了这次袭击。


Two issues remain critical in Libya to prevent future tragedies.	有两个问题对于防止这类悲剧在利比亚重演极为关键。


The first is the need to capitalize on public support and continue the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process that started under the National Transitional Council but was never completed.	一个是它需要利用公众支持继续裁军，遣散武装组织并且重新整编——这个进程由全国过渡委员会发起但从未完成过。


Second, the government must enhance its communication strategy.	第二个是政府必须改善其沟通策略。


Arab Spring governments condemned the outrageous movie smearing the Prophet of Islam, but they should have stressed that American official and unofficial bodies had nothing to do with the film’s production.	阿拉伯之春后诞生的政权都谴责抹黑伊斯兰先知穆罕默德的离谱电影，但他们本应该同时强调美国官方及非官方组织与这部电影的制作没有任何关系。


Collective punishment and targeting the innocent is forbidden in the Koran in more than 20 verses: “That no burdened person (with sins) shall bear the burden (sins) of another” (The Star Chapter 53:38).	《古兰经》里有不止20行经文禁止集体惩罚以及攻击无辜者：“一个负罪的人，不负别人的罪”（53：38）


Libya’s Shadow on Sovereign Wealth Funds	主权财富基金头上的利比亚阴影


NEW YORK – As Libya’s citizens rebuild their lives and economy, undoing the corruption in the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), the sovereign wealth fund in which Muammar el-Qaddafi’s regime allegedly stashed and misused Libya’s oil wealth, is becoming a priority.	纽约——随着利比亚人民重建他们的生活和经济，消除利比亚投资局（Libyan Investment Authority，LIA，由卡扎菲政权成立的主权财富基金，被认为用于隐匿和滥用利比亚的石油财富）的腐败成了优先项目。


The National Transitional Council is debating who should take over Libya’s Central Bank and the LIA’s assets – an especially important decision, given that oil production is not expected to return to pre-war levels for several years.	利比亚国家过渡委员会正在讨论由谁接手利比亚央行和LIA的资产。 这一决定非同小可，因为据估计，利比亚的石油产量在近几年内都不会回到战前水平。


Regardless of how the Libyan government eventually handles the LIA, all sovereign wealth funds – and their advisers and fundraisers – can learn several important lessons.	不论利比亚政府最终决定如何处置LIA，世界所有主权财富基金（及其顾问和筹资人）都能从中吸取重要教益。


Of course, no one should infer from the Libyan case that other SWFs across the board are riddled with corruption and conflicts of interest.	当然，我们不能从利比亚的例子中得出其他主权财富基金中也充满了腐败和利益冲突的结论。


The LIA has always been exceptional; indeed, several indices that rank SWFs on transparency, accountability, and governance issues have traditionally given only Iran a lower ranking.	LIA永远是个特例； 事实上，不少追踪各主权财富基金透明度、责任和治理的指数表明，比LIA还不如的只有伊朗了。


Yet, while hard cases tend to make bad law and it is too early to judge, the LIA should be a wake-up call for corporations and funds both in the Middle East and around the globe.	但是，尽管疑难案例总是倾向于开启恶例，且现在下结论还为时过早，但LIA对中东和全世界的公司和基金来说仍不啻为一次警示。


First, governments should better clarify the sources of funding behind each particular investment.	首先，政府应该更好地检查每个特定投资项目背后的资金来源。


Private funding that turns out to be public funding tied to the ruling family or government ministers presents different political and financial risks and should therefore be valued differently.	套着公共资金外衣、实际上来自统治家族或政府高官的私人资金具有不同的政治和财务风险，因此应该用不同的方法评估。


Second, the Libyan crisis has crystallized the problem of corporate shares owned by sovereign governments.	其次，利比亚的危机表明，主权政府持有公司股份会造成很大问题。


When the United States and the European Union decided to impose sanctions on the Libyan regime, including freezing shares owned by the LIA in European and American companies, many executives at these companies were surprised by how dramatically their firms were affected by the ownership structure.	当美国和欧盟决定对利比亚政权予以制裁的时候——包括冻结LIA所持有的欧洲和美国公司股份——许多涉案公司高管对所在公司所有权结构受到的影响大惊失色。


Clearly, the liquidity of the shares and the perception of a lack of diligence on the part of corporate managers matters mightily.	显然，这些股份的流动性以及人们对公司管理层不胜任的觉察绝不是小事。


Third, the LIA saga highlights SWFs’ potential cumulative effect on the stability of global markets.	第三，LIA案例凸显了主权财富基金对全球市场稳定性的潜在积累效应。


All SWFs can respond to global political events by quickly withdrawing funds invested abroad.	对于全球政治事件，所有主权财富基金的反应可能完全一样：迅速撤回海外投资资金。


As one of the WikiLeaks documents revealed, American diplomats lobbied the Libyan government during the financial crisis to keep funds in US banks, and to invest directly in a troubled US financial institution.	维基解密所披露的一份文件表明，金融危机期间，美国外交官游说利比亚政府不要抽离投资于美资银行的资金，还鼓动后者直接投资一家受困的美国金融机构。


In this case, the Libyans did not respond by withdrawing a large amount of funds, but that could happen in the future.	在这个案例中，利比亚并没有大量抽回资金，但并不意味着未来不会出现主权财富基金大量撤资的情形。


Some argue that SWFs’ home governments and host countries have too many mutual interests – including the stability of the financial system and maintaining the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency – to threaten global markets.	有人指出，主权财富基金的母国政府和东道国有着太多的共同利益——包括金融体系的稳定性和维持美元的世界储备货币地位——因此它们不会反应过度从而威胁到全球市场。


That is true, on average and in normal times, but what happens if many SWFs, responding to sudden uncertainty and volatility, pull back at the same time for diplomatic or commercial reasons?	这不无道理，在常态时大体上正是如此，但如果各国主权财富基金为了应对突发不确定性和市场波动，从而出于外交和商业原因同时撤资，事情又会如何？


Individually rational behavior is often collectively suicidal.	个体的理性行为经常会造成集体的自我毁灭。


Finally, the Libyan case and the Dubai debt crisis of 2009 might increase suspicion in the developed world and lead to protectionism against SWFs, especially those from North Africa and the Gulf.	最后，利比亚案例和2009年的迪拜债务危机可能会增加发达国家的疑虑，导致针对主权财富基金（特别是来自北非和海湾地区者）的保护主义。


The free flow of capital from these regions’ SWFs to corporations in the advanced countries is crucial in order to balance the global economy and provide liquidity to financial markets, especially given the prospect of another recession in the West.	资本从这些地区向发达国家公司的自由流动是平衡全球经济、为金融市场提供流动性的关键，特别是在西方面临着另一场衰退的当口。


Both home and host states will have to make sure that the current conflict over the LIA will not impede this important process.	母国和东道国都必须确保当前在LIA身上的冲突不会阻碍这一重要过程。


But are we being fair by comparing the various regions’ SWFs and expecting them to adhere to Western standards?	但我们这样比较不同地区的主权财富基金并要求它们遵循西方标准公平吗？


The current efforts to restructure Libya’s Central Bank and LIA will affect markets’ perceptions of other sovereign players in the region.	当前重组利比亚央行和LIA的举措将影响市场对该地区其他主权财富基金的感觉。


Bahrain and Dubai come to mind.	巴林和迪拜将受到怀疑。


Although recent reports of the International Working Group of sovereign funds have indicated the difficulties in applying uniform governance standards, several measures are needed in order to bring Libya back to global capital markets.	尽管主权财富基金国际工作组的最新报告表明，使用统一治理标准尚有诸多困难有待克服，但我们仍然需要一些措施，把利比亚重新纳入全球资本市场。


Despite the unique status of Libya’s economy and political system today, scrutinizing the process of investment in foreign companies, as well as defining the nature of the relationships between the Libyan regime and fund management, is necessary to ensure healthy commercial relations between sovereigns and their portfolio investments.	如今，利比亚经济和政治体系有着独一无二的地位，但详细审查投资外国公司的过程、厘清利比亚政权与基金管理之间关系的性质对于确保各主权财富基金与其投资组合之间保持健康商业关系来说是必不可少的。


Large allocations based on pragmatic political concerns, such as Libya-Italy relations, or cronyism should be reevaluated in the light of better and stronger governance practices.	基于实用主义政治考虑（比如利比亚-意大利关系）或裙带主义的大资金分配应该被重新评估，并要以更好更强的治理实践作为标准。


Both governments and corporations should internalize the message and learn from the Libyan example.	政府和公司都应该认真消化利比亚案例并从中汲取教益。


The alternative may be too expensive for shareholders and citizens alike.	若非如此，股东和公民将付出沉重代价。


Libya’s Transition to Transition	利比亚，为转型而转型


SIRTE, LIBYA – Although Libyans are now celebrating the first anniversary of the revolution that toppled Muammar el-Qaddafi, they are increasingly frustrated with their new leaders.	发自利比亚苏尔特——虽然利比亚人正在庆祝推翻卡扎菲革命的第一个周年纪念，但他们对新领导层的失望与不满也与日俱增。


Libyans complain that the interim government, known as the National Transitional Council (NTC), has not moved quickly enough to purge and prosecute senior Qaddafi officials, or to rein in the militias that overthrew his regime.	人们抱怨临时政府（国家过渡委员会）在肃清和起诉前卡扎菲政府高官方面进度太慢，也未能对曾参与革命的武装人员严加管束。


Though the NTC is dedicated to implementing Libyans’ demands, it lacks the technical capacity and time necessary to do so before the elections tentatively scheduled for this coming summer.	虽然国家过渡委员会也努力想满足民众的要求，但却缺乏在计划今夏举行的选举前实现这一点所需的技术力量和时间。


Facing such constraints, it must concentrate on a small number of important initiatives, before turning power over to an elected government.	有见及此，它必须在把权力移交给一个民选政府之前把精力集中在一小部分重要的动议上。


Political experience has never been a prerequisite for NTC membership.	对于过渡委员会的人来说，从政经验一直都不是一个先决条件。


One representative was named to the Council because he defected with his MIG fighter plane 20 years ago.	一名代表可能因为曾在20年前驾驶米格战斗机叛逃而入选。


Other members were previously political prisoners or exiled dissidents.	另一名则可能是前政治犯或者流亡异见分子。


Unseasoned in the art of politics, the NTC frequently lacks the foresight needed to make critical decisions.	没有经过政治的洗礼，委员会经常会缺乏做出关键决策所需要的远见卓识。


During last year’s eight-month revolution, the NTC concentrated on overthrowing Qaddafi, gaining international recognition, and securing access to frozen Libyan assets. Those tasks left little room for attention to planning a post-Qaddafi Libya.	在去年整整八个月的革命中，委员会一心想着怎样才能推翻卡扎菲，如何争取国际承认并接收被冻结的利比亚资产，因此也没有时间为一个后卡扎菲时代的利比亚构建蓝图。


Today, the NTC simply does not have the human resources to consolidate the transition.	如今委员会根本没有足够的人才资源去巩固这些转变。


Libya has never been blessed with a professional bureaucracy like that of neighboring Egypt.	利比亚从来不像邻国埃及那样拥有一个职业官僚阶层。


Qaddafi frequently farmed out power to municipalities and citizens in an attempt to bypass the civil servants who consistently thwarted his grandiose plans.	过去卡扎菲总觉得公务员碍手碍脚，于是经常把权力下放到地方自治当局和市民身上去实现自己的宏伟大计。


And almost two decades of international sanctions prevented a generation of Libyans from gaining the necessary technical skills by studying at Western universities.	而持续近20年的国际制裁也使整整一代利比亚人无法通过就读西方大学来获取所需的相关技能。


Even the oil sector – the lifeline of the Libyan economy, accounting for 95% of the country’s foreign-currency earnings – suffers from a shortage of professional managers.	即便是石油部门——决定着利比亚95%外汇来源的经济命脉——也缺乏足够的专业管理人员。


According to an American diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks, “Libyans put forward for employment with foreign (oil) companies often lack formal qualifications or applicable practical experience.”	一份由维基解密披露的美国外交电文称：“前来应聘外国（石油）公司的利比亚人往往缺乏正式资质或合格的操作经验。 ”


Instead of injecting new blood into senior government posts during his 42 years in power, Qaddafi merely shuffled cronies between ministries.	在执政的42年间，卡扎菲不是向政府高级职位注入新鲜血液，而是让自己的亲信在各部之间频繁调职。


His last foreign-intelligence chief, Abu Zayd Dorda, epitomizes this trend.	其最后一任对外情报部长阿布·扎伊德·多尔达堪称这种现象的一个缩影。


During his 30-year political career, Dorda held numerous cabinet portfolios, ranging from agriculture to economics to municipalities. Dorda later served as Speaker of Parliament, Prime Minister, and Ambassador to the United Nations.	在30年的政治生涯中多尔达曾就任过包括农业，经济以及地方自治当局在内的各类内阁职位，后来还先后晋身为国会议长，总理和驻联合国特使。


Today, the NTC is hard-pressed to find competent, politically untainted bureaucrats to fill its ministries.	如今过渡委员会在苦苦寻找有能力且政治清白的官员来担任政府要职。


But that does not concern most Libyans, who are clamoring for the dismissal of Qaddafi loyalists.	不过那些强烈要求罢免卡扎菲支持者的利比亚民众对此却毫不知情。


One name on the tip of many tongues here is Central Bank Governor Sadiq al-Kabir.	许多人推举中央银行行长萨迪克·卡比尔（Sadiq al-Kabir）。


Others, such as Libya’s former ambassador to France, Omar Brebesh, were found dead, apparently tortured by a militia that spearheaded the campaign to overthrow Qaddafi.	其他人选还有利比亚前驻法大使奥马尔·布里贝什（Omar Brebesh），不过此君后来被证实死亡，而且显然是被一位带头推翻卡扎菲的民兵头目折磨致死的。


Lack of skilled civil servants is also making it difficult for the NTC to push through the changes that Libyans are demanding.	得力行政官员的缺乏也使国务委员会无法推进民众所需要的变革。


The Council is not ready to try senior Qaddafi officials, many of whom are now in the custody of militias, because the existing justice system was never tasked with prosecuting political cases.	由于现有的司法系统从未有过起诉政治罪行的经验，因此委员会也没准备好去审判那些卡扎菲政府高官，只好让他们继续呆在民兵设置的监狱里。


Such trials were held in revolutionary courts staffed by Qaddafi zealots and operating outside the formal judiciary.	从前这类审判都是由卡扎菲的忠实走狗在正式司法系统之外的革命法庭内审判的。


With no prospect for a fair trial in the foreseeable future, Qaddafi officials languish in jails.	而那些卡扎菲政权官员们自觉无望在可见的未来得到公正的审判，只好在监狱里消极度日。


Such bureaucratic inertia does not sit well with the many Libyans who are still undecided about the revolution.	对于许多对革命依然持怀疑态度的利比亚人来说，这样的行政僵局令他们感到不满。


But it is not only a shortage of capable public servants that hamstrings the NTC. Just as pressing are the time constraints under which it is operating.	但削弱过渡委员会权威的可不仅仅是得力公务人员的缺乏，还有自己日渐减少的施政时间。


Since its inception last February, the NTC has consistently declared itself to be a transitional body that would cede power to an elected government once the country was liberated.	自去年2月成立以来，委员会就一直声明自己只是一个过渡性实体，一旦实现解放就将把权力移交给民选政府。


With elections set to be held no later than June 23, the Council has less than four months to prepare Libya for its first free vote in sixty years.	而选举原定要在7月23日前举行，这意味着委员会还有不够4个月的时间来筹备利比亚60年来的首场自由选举。


As a result, the NTC simply does not have the time necessary to implement the changes the Libyan people expect.	结果过渡委员会根本没有足够的时间去推行利比亚民众所希望的变革。


It will not be able to disband the myriad militias that are destabilizing the country, because it cannot find their fighters the vocational training that it hopes will entice them to return to civilian life. It will fall on an elected government to carry out these reforms.	它无力去解散那些给国家带来不稳定局势的大量民兵组织，因为它无法为这些武装人员提供职业技能培训并使其回归正常生活，最终只好把这些改革任务留给民选政府来执行。


With the NTC confronting so many dilemmas with so little time, it must concentrate on a small number of key issues that can be resolved before it hands over power.	在时间苦短矛盾众多的情况下，过渡委员会必须把注意力集中在少数几个能在权力移交之前完成的关键事务之上。


The Council needs to focus on establishing some degree of rule of law, and on curbing militia abuses. It must respect and protect individual rights in order to demonstrate to Libyans that the type of arbitrary justice that characterized the Qaddafi era will not be tolerated.	它应当努力建立某种程度的法治，并遏制武装分子的胡作非为，还必须尊重和保护人权，以便向利比亚民众表明卡扎菲时代特有的司法滥权是不能被容忍的。


The NTC may not be able to solve all of Libya’s problems.	过渡委员会并不能解决利比亚的所有问题。


But, by chipping away at the mountain of challenges that the country faces, it can ease the burdens that will confront the elected government that emerges from the popular vote in June.	但通过一点点解决这个国家所面对的堆积如山的挑战，它将有助于减轻7月产生的民选政府所承受的负担。


Libya’s Unwilling Revolutionaries	利比亚之被迫进行革命者


TRIPOLI – Egypt is not the only place where the bright hopes of the Arab Spring are fading.	的黎波里——“阿拉伯之春”光明的希望正逐渐消退，其地区不仅仅是在埃及。


From attacks against Western governments to ethnic clashes in remote desert oases, Libya’s revolution is faltering.	从对西方政府的抗争到遥远的沙漠绿洲里的种族冲突，利比亚革命的势头正在逐渐衰弱。


The blame for Libya’s current travails rests largely with the interim government that led the uprising.	目前利比亚困境重重，这在很大程度上归咎于临时政府领导的起义。


The National Transitional Council refuses to make difficult decisions, instead palming them off to a future elected government.	全国过渡委员会（NTC）很难作出抉择，只是假装要成立一个民选政府。


The NTC has preserved much of the institutional paralysis and knee-jerk behavior typical of Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi’s overthrown regime.	被推翻的穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲上校所领导的政府的典型特征是机构内部瘫痪以及依赖下意识行事，而NTC依然保留了很多诸如此类的问题。


If the Libyan revolution is to succeed, the country’s new leaders must make a clean break with the spirit of the past.	利比亚革命若想取得成功，新一代国家领导人就必须要彻底打破过去的思想。


During his 42 years in power, Qaddafi surrounded himself with advisers who were companions from his youth, supplemented by a small coterie of technocrats.	在执政的42年间，卡扎菲身边的顾问一直是自己年轻时的玩伴，然后就是一些技术专家。


As a result, the leaders of the revolt that overthrew him have little government experience.	结果，推翻其政府的领导人所具备的政府经验微乎其微。


And, in a country where any political activity was considered treasonous, many expected the neophyte NTC to stumble early and often.	此外，在一个将任何政治活动均视为叛逆行为的国家，很多人预测刚成立的NTC从开始就会遭受重重困难。


And so it has.	而事实上也的确如此。


Indeed, the revolution was never a smooth affair.	事实上，革命从来都不是一帆风顺的。


When fighters failed to defeat loyalist forces on their own, outside powers were compelled to intervene.	当革命人士未能击败政府军时，外部力量就会被迫介入。


Later, the NTC was unable to impose discipline on the myriad militias that formed to fight Qaddafi’s troops, or even to direct foreign weapons efficiently to the fledgling Libyan National Army.	大量民兵都参与进来同卡扎菲军队进行作战。 之后，NTC无法向这些民兵施加纪律，甚至无法将外国武器有效地运用于刚刚成立的利比亚国家军队。


When the military chief of staff was assassinated in July under mysterious circumstances, the NTC could not offer concrete answers to an angry public.	7月份，军事参谋长被秘密暗杀，而NTC却无法给愤怒的公众提供任何确凿的解释。


With no access to Libyan assets frozen abroad, it frequently paid salaries weeks in arrears.	因无法动用利比亚的任何国外冻结资产，它经常将工资拖欠几周之久。


While the battle against Qaddafi was still raging, Libyans considered it unpatriotic to point out the NTC’s weaknesses.	虽然对抗卡扎菲的斗争依然十分激烈，但是利比亚人认为，指出NTC的弱点是不爱国的行为。


Today, however, those flaws have been magnified by its paralysis.	然而，在今天，政府机构的瘫痪状态放大了这些缺陷。


The NTC deliberates rather than decides.	这是NTC反复审议的结果，并非一项简单的决策。


The two-thirds majority required to pass legislation means that many bills die after extensive debate.	按照规定，立法需要有三分之二的人数通过，这意味着很多法案在经过广泛的辩论后最终会消亡。


Many NTC members believe that the Council lacks the legitimacy to make tough choices.	NTC的很多委员都认为，安理会缺乏合理性，因而对于一些比较艰难的决定它无法做出抉择。


They argue that the NTC should limit itself to serving as a caretaker government, implementing only the most essential decisions until elected officials take office.	他们认为，NTC只是一个代理政府，仅负责实施那些最重要的决议，直至民选官员上任。


As a result, the NTC and the cabinet that it appointed, known as the executive committee, merely want to pass the baton of authority.	因此，NTC和其任命的内阁（即执行委员会），只是想尽快移交权利。


Hesitant to leave a large imprint in their wake, some ministries have no budgets, and ministers are reluctant to sign deals with foreign firms.	一些部门不愿留下大量的遗留问题，因此他们没有预算，而且各部长也不愿同外国公司签署协议。


But, beyond the question of the proper role of custodian governments lies the indecisiveness of the NTC’s leaders, who simply prefer to defer to others.	然而，除了代理政府应当充当怎样的角色这个问题以外，另一个问题是NTC领导人的优柔寡断，他们总是倾向于听从他人。


When a colonel recently asked NTC Chairman Mustafa Abdel-Jalil why he has not moved to merge the militias into a national army, Abdel-Jalil replied, “I head the legislative branch.	最近一名上校问NTC主席穆斯塔法·阿卜杜勒-加里尔为什么不将广大民兵合并成一支国家军队，阿卜杜勒-加里尔答道：“我可以负责立法部门。


You must speak with the executive (committee).”	而你必须要同执行（委员会）进行商讨。 ”


Other senior Libyan officials suffer from the same managerial torpor.	利比亚的其他高级官员也面临同样的管理问题。


The NTC’s first prime minister, Mahmud Jibril, was praised by the international community for his vision.	NTC的第一任总理马哈茂德·贾布里勒因其远见卓识而受到国际社会的高度赞扬。


But much like Abdel-Jalil, Jibril proved unable to make decisions.	但是，他同阿卜杜勒-加里尔十分相似，事实证明，他也没有决策能力。


The NTC’s paralysis is clearly reflected in the trial of Qaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam el-Qaddafi.  Though considered the most prized captive of the ancien regime, the Council has made little progress in prosecuting him.	NTC的无能在对卡扎菲的儿子赛义夫·伊斯兰·卡扎菲的审判上反映地尤其明显。 虽然安理会被视为“旧制度”最忠诚的守护者，但是在对他的起诉方面理事会的进展甚微。


Ahmad Jihani, Libya’s representative to the International Criminal Court, recently told me that, “we as Libyans cannot begin Saif’s trial.	国际刑事法院利（IVCC）比亚代表艾哈迈德最近告诉我说：“我们利比亚人不能开始对赛义夫的审判。


There is no central power to prosecute him.”	利比亚没有可以起诉他的中央权力。


The ICC prosecutor echoed his sentiments in a June 5 legal brief, noting that “the Government of Libya may be unable to move the case forward.”	”6月5日的法律简报中，国际刑事法院检察官也呼应了他的这一观点，他指出：“也许，在这一案件上利比亚政府不会取得多大进展。


With no progress toward trying Qaddafi for war crimes, the NTC is holding him on the innocuous charge of failure to possess a camel license.	”若在对卡扎菲的战争罪行所作的审判不能取得进展，NTC的指控将不会对他产生任何威胁，这也说明NTC无力处理刑事案件。


Bureaucrats lament ministerial dithering.	 政府官员对部长们的优柔寡断十分感慨。


“Everyday people come with ideas to demobilize the fighters and integrate them into society,” notes an official in the Labor Ministry, referring to the most pressing problem facing the NTC.	“每天人们都想着要战士们复员，令其融入社会。 ”劳动部的一位官员指出这是NTC所面临的最迫切的问题，“但是，若没有人作出决议的话，所有一切的计划就只能被搁浅。


“But, with no one to make a decision, all of these plans just sit on our desks.”	”


One reason for this inertia can be found in Libya’s prevailing political culture.	政府无能的原因之一可以在利比亚的主流政治文化中找到根源。


For decades, Qaddafi personally reviewed every agreement worth more than $200 million and often chose which foreign firms would receive contracts.	几十年来，对于每项价值超过2亿美元的协议，卡扎菲都���自审阅，而且他往往会选择那些外国公司会接收合同的协议。


When he devolved ministerial planning to bureaucrats in 2008, many were not pleased.	2008年，他将部长级规划移交给政府官员后，很多人都十分不开心。


“Unused to planning and possessed of limited human capacity, senior officials in the ministries are very nervous,” an American diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks reported.	维基解密所发布美国外交电报报道：“由于不习惯做规划，而且个人能力又十分有限，因而各部委的高级官员都十分焦虑。 ”


Libya’s new leaders suffer from something worse than foot-dragging.	利比亚的新领导人所面临的困境比拖拉懒散还要糟糕。


They are falling back on the same facile, prefabricated responses that Qaddafi used to demonize his domestic and international opponents for four decades.	40年来，卡扎菲一直都是草率、临时地丑化各种国内和国际对手。 而现在，新的领导人又是在重蹈覆辙。


For example, when eastern Libyans recently announced the formation of an interim regional council as a first step toward declaring a federalist state, Abdel-Jalil alleged “the beginning of a conspiracy against Libya” in the brewing crisis between the country’s provinces.	例如，利比亚东部的民众最近宣布成立了一个临时区域市政局，作为成立一个联邦国家的第一步。 阿卜杜勒-加里尔声称在全国各省间滋生的危机中“衍生了一个反对利比亚的阴谋。


“Some Arab nations, unfortunately, have supported and encouraged this to happen,” he said.	”他说：“不幸的是，有些利比亚国家支持并鼓励这种情况的发生。


But Abdel-Jalil named no specific foreign powers and offered no proof to support his allegations, which sounded much like Qaddafi’s frequent rants against “imperialist-Zionist plots.”	”但是，阿卜杜勒-加里尔没有指明具体的外国势力，也未提供任何证据来支持其指控。 这听起来特别像是卡扎菲频繁地高声痛斥“帝国主义-犹太复国主义者阴谋。


After an eight-month revolution that devastated the country, Libyans are demanding real reforms.	历时8个月之久的革命摧毁了整个国家。 革命之后，利比亚人要求进行真正的变革。


But, without a new leadership that is willing to implement them, it will be a long time before Libya turns a new page.	然而，如果没有一个愿意实行改革的领导集团，利比亚若想翻开新的一页尚需经历一段很长的时间。


Life after Darwin	达尔文之后的生命


MARSEILLE – Many Greek philosophers perceived the world to be in perpetual motion – a process of constant evolution.	发自马赛——许多希腊哲学家认为世界处于永恒的运动之中——也就是一个不断进化的过程。


In Charles Darwin’s world, however, creationism set the rules for science.	但在查尔斯·达尔文的世界里，为科学设定规则的则是上帝创世论（creationism）。


So, underpinning his theory of evolution is the literal interpretation of the Bible that dominated his era, combined with Aristotle’s vision of nature as definitively fixed.	因此进化论的支柱其实就是对主宰他那个时代的《圣经》的直接转译，再与亚里士多德认为自然是绝对稳定的观点结合在一起。


Darwin, together with J. B. Lamarck, promoted a vision of a changing world, while upholding the idea that organisms evolved from a single root – a position held by Adam and Eve in the creationist worldview, and taken over in the modern era by the Last Universal Common Ancestor (LUCA).	B. 拉马克一道，一方面宣扬世界处于不断变化状态的观点，同时也坚信生物是由一个单一的根源进化而来——也就是创世论者世界观中亚当和夏娃所处的位置，并由当代的物种共同祖先（Last Universal Common Ancestor，LUCA）理论继承了下来。


And from that remnant of the Biblical story of creation sprung the notion of a tree of life, alongside major concepts such as gradualism (the view that speciation does not occur abruptly) and the idea that minor selection pressures can, over time, have a profound effect on improved fitness.	他们的理论包含了圣经造物故事中催生生命树这一概念的零散篇章，加上类似渐变论（gradualism，认为物种并非突然形成）这样的主要概念，还有微小的选择压力可以——随着时间推移——对物种的改良产生深刻影响的理论。


Darwin’s vision of the world deeply influenced biology in the twentieth century, despite persistent questions posed by factors such as lateral gene transfer, neutral evolution, and chaotic bottlenecks in natural selection.	而尽管遭到自然选择中横向基因转移，中性进化和混乱进化瓶颈等因素的不断质疑，达尔文的世界观依然深刻影响了20世纪的生物学。


But recent genetic research unequivocally refutes this worldview.	但近来的基因研究却明白无误的驳斥了他的观点。


Life is primarily the expression of the information contained in genes.	生命基本上就是基因内部蕴含信息的表达。


All living organisms appear as mosaics of genetic tissue, or chimeras, suggesting that no two genes have the same evolutionary history.	所有生命体都表现为基因组织或者各部分镶嵌在一起产物，也因此表明没有两个基因是拥有同一个进化史的。


This framework is incompatible with the “tree of life” representation.	这个理论框架根本无法与“生命树”的理念共存。


Rather, it resembles a rhizome – an underground stem that sends out roots and shoots that develop into new plants.	而前者更像一棵植物的块状球茎——深埋于地下并发散出根和茎，最终发展成为新的植物。


Indeed, we now know that the proportion of genetic sequences on earth that belongs to visible organisms is negligible.	事实上，我们如今知道地球上属于可见生物体的基因序列所占比例是极为微小的。


Furthermore, only 15% of the genetic sequences found in the samples from the environment and from feces analyzed in metagenomic studies belong to the three domains of microbes currently recognized in the tree-of-life framework – bacteria, archaea, and eukaryotes.	此外，在环境中采集的样本以及宏基因组（metagenomic）研究分析的微小碎屑中，只有15%的基因序列属于生命树概念框架当前认可的三个微生物类别——细菌，古生菌和真核细胞。


Viruses contain another 15-30% of these genetic sequences.	而病毒则包含有这些基因序列中的另外15%~30%。


The unidentified genetic sequences pose a problem, because it is not known whether vehicles other than viruses, bacteria, archaea, and eukaryotes exist.	那些未能定义的基因序列也因此带来了一个问题，因为不知道除了病毒、细菌，古生菌和真核细胞之外是否还有其他载体存在。


Conversely, we know that new genes, designated ORFans (“orphan genes”), are commonly created by gene duplication, fusion, or other unknown mechanisms.	相反，我们知道新基因，特定的“孤儿基因”（orphan genes），经常会在基因复制，融合或者其它未知机制中产生。


Yet, according to Darwin’s tree of life concept, this phenomenon would be impossible.	但依照达尔文的生命树概念，这种现象是不可能出现的。


Human cells comprise genes of eukaryotic, bacterial, archaean, and viral origin.	人类细胞中包含有来自于真核细胞，细菌，古生菌和病毒的基因。


As this chimerism increases, it occasionally integrates genes from microbes that live within the human body – as happens when a human is infected by herpesvirus 6.	随着这种嵌合现象（chimerism）不断增加，它也偶尔会把生活在人体内的微生物基因整合进来——正如人感染疱疹病毒。


Once integrated in a person’s genome, these genes can be transmitted from parent to child – making microbial genes their “grandfathers.”	一旦整合进了人的基因组中，这些基因就可以由父母传播给儿童——使微生物基因成为了这些孩子的“教父”。


This transfer of genetic sequences from parasites to hosts could involve hundreds of genes for a bacterium in different hosts.	这些从寄生物到寄主的基因序列转移可以让一个附着于不同寄主的细菌演化出数百种不同的基因。


For example, if the bacterium Wolbachia’s genes are integrated by different hosts, such as spiders, insects, or worms, the hosts’ offspring are also descendants of Wolbachia.	比如说，如果沃尔巴克氏（Wolbachia）菌的基因被不同的寄主——比如蜘蛛，昆虫或者蠕虫——整合了，那么寄主的后代同样也会是沃尔巴克氏菌的后代。


Moreover, certain viruses’ size and genetic repertoire is comparable with that of bacteria, archaea, or small eukaryotes.	此外，某些病毒的尺寸和基因内容是可以与细菌，古生菌或者小型真核细胞相提并论的。


Indeed, the life of giant viruses is as complex as that of like-sized microorganisms.	事实上，大型病毒的生命是与类似尺寸的微生物同样复杂的。


But the current classification of the domains of life is based on the ribosome – the production apparatus of proteins – which does not exist in these viruses.	但目前对生命类别的分类依然基于核糖体——合成蛋白质的场所，但核糖体是不存在于这些病毒中的。


Without ribosomes, traditionalists say, viruses cannot be considered biological entities comparable to other microbes.	传统主义者认为，没有了核糖体，细菌不能为认为是可以与其它微生物相提并论的生命体。


But that is pure dogma; these viruses are akin to the other microbes.	但这简直是赤裸裸的教条主义，因为这些细菌与其它微生物是有亲缘关系的。


Darwin’s theory is further used to support the belief that ancient humans – Neanderthal, Cro-Magnon, and Denisova – did not mix.	达尔文理论被进一步用于支持一种理念，认为远古人类——尼安德特人（Neanderthal），克鲁马努人（Cro-Magnon）和丹尼索瓦人（Denisova）——并不是混合在一起的。


In fact, based on Darwin’s assumptions, most anthropologists claim that modern humans were simply descended from Cro-Magnons, who had exterminated their less-fit adversaries.	事实上，基于达尔文的假设，大多数人类学家声称现代人类仅仅是克鲁马努人的后裔，因为后者消灭了其它更不适应竞争的对手。


Given this supposition, a single name (Homo sapiens) is used for both modern humans and the preferred ancestor, Cro-Magnon.	基于这一推测，现代人和他们心目中的祖先克鲁马努人都共同享有一个单一学名，智人（Homo sapiens）。


But we now know that modern humans are chimeras of these three ancient humans.	但我们现在发现现代人其实是三种远古人类的组合体。


This understanding also refutes the legend of “Mitochondrial Eve,” the woman from whom all humans supposedly descend on their mother’s side.	这些发现同时也驳斥了“线粒体夏娃”（Mitochondrial Eve）——所有人类遗传自其母亲一方的一个始祖女性——的传说。


Research on the human leukocyte antigen genes, which are involved in the human immune response, shows that such a common ancestor could not have existed; this group of genes derives from those of all three known ancient humans.	对人类白细胞抗原基因的研究——作为人类免疫反应的一部分——显示这一个共同祖先不可能存在； 这个基因组源自于已知的三种古人。


Genetic research, in particular, must be free to find new models to explain, and enhance, twenty-first-century scientific discovery.	我们的研究，尤其是在基因研究方面，必须让人可以自由寻找新的模型去解释，并提升21世纪的科学发现。


Today, Darwin’s theory of evolution is more a hindrance than a help, because it has become a quasi-theological creed that is preventing the benefits of improved research from being fully realized.	如今，达尔文的进化论与其说是个帮助，不如说是一种阻碍，因为他已经变成了一个准理论教条，妨碍了我们改善研究方式并获得随之产生的好处。


Life by the Numbers	用数字影响生命


NEW YORK – Last week, I learned that I don't have cancer.	发自纽约——上星期，我逃过了一劫。


My doctor called and said, “I have some good news!”	我的医生看了结果之后打电话给我，说：“告诉你一个好消息！


Fortunately, we were in the middle of a fire drill in my office at the time, so no one noticed as I blinked back tears of relief.	”幸好当时办公室正在进行防火演习，所以没人注意到我因如释重负而涌出的泪水。


I had found the lump almost two weeks earlier, while at a conference in South Africa.	事情发生在两星期前，那时我在南非开会，却意外发现了乳房中的肿块。


I returned home early to have a biopsy, but the pathology lab was achingly slow; days passed with no word.	我提前赶回家来进行组织活检，但病理实验室的检测却慢得让人心烦意乱；


Clearly they were working hard to figure out exactly how bad my condition was.	好几天过去了都没有出个结果。 显然他们正努力弄明白我的情况究竟有多坏。


In fact, they were working hard not to miss anything before they concluded that my tumor was rare but benign.	而其实工作人员花了很多心思去小心检查各个细节，最终判定我身上的瘤子虽然罕见，但却是个良性的。


I had been preparing for the diagnosis for more than a week…and to some extent for years, as I turned my investing focus from “all things Internet” to all things health-related.	我已经为这个诊断结论准备了一个多星期……在某种程度上可以说是许多年，因为我将自己的投资目标从“互联网”转向了一切跟健康有关的项目。


It turns out that understanding and promoting health is a great application of information technology.	而了解并促进自己的健康其实是信息科技的一项伟大应用。


Health increasingly involves numbers.	因为健康正逐渐与数字紧密联系起来，这些数字不仅显示了某种医学概率；


Many of those numbers aren't just medical probabilities; they concern daily life choices that you can make before you get sick (or are threatened, as I was).	它还能让你在生病之前（或者像我这样受威胁之前）规范你的日常行为。


As a director of 23andMe, a consumer genetics start-up, and a participant in the Personal Genome Project research study (http://www.personalgenomes.org/public/3.html#Data_Sets), I have been studying how genes affect one's chances of getting various diseases, and how much impact behavior can have on those chances.	作为基因创业企业“23对染色体与我”的董事，以及个人染色体项目研究计划的参与者(http://www. personalgenomes.


For most people and for most conditions, the genetic chances of becoming ill are well below 20%.	org/public/3. html#Data_Sets)，我正逐渐了解到基因是如何影响一个人罹患各类疾病的可能性，而行为又会对这些可能性产生多大影响。


Moreover, regardless of your genotype, you can raise or lower those chances through diet, exercise, avoidance of stress, and engagement with friends.	对于大多数人来说，在一般情况下由基因致病的概率不足20%。 但不管你属于何种基因型，你对食物的选择，自身的运动习惯，如何减压以及和朋友相处都会提升或者降低上述概率。


Yet there is some emerging thinking – and statistics – about how the toxins we encounter in the modern world affect our immune system, which in turn affects our bodies’ ability to combat cancerous cells.	最近有种理念——以及统计数据——正逐渐流行，其关注点就是我们在现代社会中日常接触到的毒素是如何影响自身免疫系统，也就是如何影响我们身体抵御癌细胞的能力的。


Everyone has cancer cells every day, but usually the body deals with them, using strength gained from eating right, exercise, and social engagement.	每个人每天都携带着癌细胞，但身体一般会消灭它，原动力则来自于合理的饮食，运动以及社会交往。


When the body gets overloaded or weakened, cancer has an extra chance of winning, especially if you have a genetic vulnerability to a particular cancer.	而当身体超负荷或者遭到削弱的时候，癌细胞就额外获得了蔓延的机会，尤其是当你在基因上特别容易受到某种癌症侵袭的时候。


Before finding out that I would get a free pass – this time, at least – I had already started considering my options.	在确认自己逃过一劫之前——至少是这次——我已经开始关注自己的日常行为选择了。


I have no particular risk for breast cancer – no family history, and no known genetic markers.	我本人并不是乳腺癌高发人群——没有家族病史，也没有基因特征。


But that is true for many of the one-in-eight women who get breast cancer over their lifetimes in the United States.	但在美国却有1/8患乳腺癌的妇女拥有上述致病因素。


Given that I'm almost 60, it's probably not life-threatening (or not that much more so than being 60 itself!).	考虑到我已经年近60，这个病可能并不会危及生命（其实60岁这把年纪才是最要命的！


Even without cancer, I have perhaps 30 years left, 40 if I’m lucky.	）而就算没有癌症，我大概还有30年活，或者40年，如果幸运的话。


If I were a young mother, I would trade almost anything for the chance to see my kids grow up, but, as an older person, I'm more concerned with quality of life than length.	如果我是一位年轻的母亲，我就算拼了命也要争取多点时间，看着自己的孩子长大。 但作为一位年长者，我更关注生命的质量而非长度。


Of course, if the cancer was aggressive, I would take more treatment now just to stay alive.	当然如果癌症迅速蔓延的话，我会接受更多治疗来保命。


If it was slow-growing, I’d remove the tumor and engage in what is called “watchful waiting.”	而倘若其缓慢发展的话，我会做手术切除肿瘤，然后参与到“观察性等待”的进程当中。


Perhaps the most important thing to understand is statistics – whether for cancer or health in general.	而对此最需要了解的东西，很可能就是统计数据——不管针对癌症还是总体健康状况而言。


In my case, they could have gone something like this: assume you have a 70% chance of survival (defined as no recurrence for five years) if you simply have the tumor removed.	在我这个病例中，他们可能会这样做：假设你在切除肿瘤后有70%的存活率（5年内不复发）。


Radiation and chemotherapy treatments can reduce recurrence by a further 30%.	放疗和化疗还能将复发概率额外降低30%。


That sounds like a lot, until you realize that it means your “survival” chances go up only nine points, from 70% to 79%, because it is the 30% recurrence rate that drops 30%, to 21%.	这个数字看上去很乐观，直到你意识到这意味着你的“生存”概率只会增加9%，从70%到79%，因为复发概率是30%，减掉其中30%，还有21%。


That is not such a great increase in odds, given that there may be better treatments available by the time the cancer recurs, and that costs of treatment – in time, pain, and side-effects such as heart disease and cognitive impairment (“chemo brain”), as well as money – are high.	这在数字上来说可能增加不大，甚至说不定复发之时可能会有更好的治疗方案，但是治疗的成本——花费的时间，遭受的痛苦，类似心脏病和大脑认知功损害（所谓“化疗脑”）等副作用，还有金钱——可是非常庞大。


Was I willing to take on three years of aggressive treatment and potential long-term side-effects for a 10-point increase in my chances of being alive and cancer-free for five years, especially since no one really knows what the chances of recurrence in 10 or 20 years are?  Meanwhile, five years from now there may be new drugs that are more effective and less toxic, mitigating the downside of a later recurrence.	那么我是否能用3年的积极治疗以及长期的副作用，换取10%的生存率还有5年内不复发，尤其是在没人知道未来10年/20年内复发率的情况下？ 与此同时，从此5年后可能会研制出更有效而且毒性更小的药物，从而减低了复发的危害性。


These numbers may be perplexing, but they are useful to understand.	这些数字可能会让人感到困惑，但它们是能帮助理解病情的。


Almost everyone is faced at some point with decisions about treatments and side-effects, for themselves and for loved ones.	几乎每个患者都面对着治疗和副作用之间的抉择，而且无论对自己还是家人都影响重大。


Indeed, you are probably facing such choices right now – if you pay attention to them.	事实上，你可能正在面对这样的选择——如果你注意到它们的话。


A large number of painful, dangerous conditions are more likely if you are overweight, under-exercised, a big drinker, lonely, or stressed.	如果你体重超标，缺乏锻炼，酗酒无度，孤独自闭或者压力过大的话，一大堆痛苦而危险的疾病将可能缠上你。


Even if you’re not and get such a disease anyway, you will be better able to cope and undergo treatment if your health is good.	即便是你没有上述症状却依然罹患这类疾病的话，一副好身板也能帮你经受住治疗的过程。


It may be that the main value of services such as 23andMe (at least until researchers use its data and others to learn a lot more about genetics) is not the specific genetic details, but the way that it makes us focus on the numbers.	可以说，像“23对染色体与我”这些企业所提供的服务（至少研究者利用它以及其他企业提供的数据进一步了解了基因）最有价值的地方，并不是某些特定的基因细节，而是令我们开始将目光聚焦在数字之上。


Whether we are choosing what to eat or how much to exercise, or trying to assess our chances of a specific condition, the numbers make it feel real and immediate.	不管是我们选择吃些什么，还是进行多少锻炼，或者评估身体遇到某种特殊状况的可能性，在数字上都可以真实而迅速的反应出来。


For example, a vague warning against diabetes is a lot easier to ignore than the fact that your risk of diabetes is 22% (as mine is, slightly above normal), but that you can lower it substantially (as I have) by eating right, exercising, and so forth.	比如说，人们经常会忽略一些关于糖尿病的笼统警告，但当你发现自己的糖尿病风险是22%时（跟我一样，稍高于正常值），就会留下深刻印象并像我那样通过控制饮食，运动等行为来降低这个比率。


Yet many people are afraid of knowing these numbers; they don’t realize that they are a guide, and something that they can change, rather than an immutable destiny. Just as a student can improve his grades by studying or an athlete can improve his performance by practicing, so you can change many of the numbers that define your health prospects.	但许多人也非常害怕知道这些数字，他们不知道数字其实是个向导，而且数字是会变化的，正如学生可以通过努力提高成绩或者运动员通过训练刷新纪录，你也可以付出自己的努力，去改变那些定义你健康状况的数字。


Life Made to Order	定制生命


MELBOURNE – In the sixteenth century, the alchemist Paracelsus offered a recipe for creating a living being that began with putting sperm into putrefying “venter equinus.” This is usually translated as “horse manure,” but the Latin “venter” means abdomen or uterus.	发自墨尔本——早在16世纪，一位叫巴拉塞尔西斯的炼金术士就提出了一个创造新生命的秘诀，那就是把精子注入腐烂的“venter equinus”里面，这个词通常被翻译为“马粪”，但拉丁文的“venter”其实是腹部或者子宫的意思。


So occultists now will no doubt have a fine time with the fact that Craig Venter was the driving force behind the team of scientists that last month announced that they had created a synthetic form of life: a bacterium with a genome designed and created from chemicals in a laboratory.	而如今那些江湖术士们无疑会感到欣慰，因为一个叫克雷格·温特（Craig Venter）的人所资助的科学家团队刚刚在上月宣布成功创造了一个人造生命：这是一个细菌，而它携带的基因则是在实验室里设计并化学合成出来的。


The new bacterium, nicknamed “Synthia,” replicates and produces proteins.	这个被昵称为“辛西娅（Synthia，意为‘人造人’）”的细菌拥有复制和制造蛋白质的能力。


By any reasonable definition, it is alive.	不管用何种定义，这都是一个活生生的东西。


Although it is very similar to a natural bacterium from which it was largely copied, the creators put distinctive strings of DNA into its genome to prove that it is not a natural object.	虽然这个细菌的绝大部分结构都是复制自另一个天然细菌，但创造者向其基因组中嵌入了一组特别的DNA序列来证明它不是一个自然产物。


These strings spell out, in code, a Web site address, the names of the researchers, and apt quotations, such as Richard Feynman’s “What I cannot build, I cannot understand.”	把这些基因序列转译成字符编码之后就是几位研究者的名字，还有一些诸如理查德·费曼所说的“只有我理解不了的东西，没有我造不出来的东西”之类的名言。


For some years now, synthetic biology has been looming as the next big issue in bioethics.	这些年来，人造生物技术正逐渐凸显为生物伦理学领域的下一个重大议题。


The scientists at the J. Craig Venter Institute expected to be told that they were “playing God,” and they were not disappointed.	J·克雷格·温特研究小组的科学家们都希望自己能被人认为是在“扮演上帝”，而他们也确实得到了这样的称号。


Yes, if one believes that life was created by God, then this comes as close to “playing God” as humans have come, so far.	没错，如果一个人相信生命都是由上帝创造的话，那么迄今为止这些科学家的举动就是与“上帝”最相近的行为。


Well-known University of Pennsylvania bioethicist Art Caplan says that the achievement ranks as a discovery of historic significance, because it “would seem to extinguish the argument that life requires a special force or power to exist.”	而宾夕法尼亚大学的著名生物伦理学家阿特·凯普兰则把这一成果视为一个历史性的重大发现，因为它“似乎已经将生命是借由某种特殊的力量或者权力才得以存在的观点彻底推翻了。


Asked about the significance of what the team had done, Venter described it as bringing about “a giant philosophical change in how we view life.”	”而在被问到这个科学家小组的成就的重要性的时候，研究资助人温特则认为此举“为我们的生命观带来了重大的哲学意义上的变革。 ”


Others have pointed out that, although the team produced a synthetic genome, they put it into a cell from another bacterium, replacing that cell’s DNA.	也有其他人认为，虽然这个研究小组制造出了一个人造基因组，但他们也只是将其放进了来自另外一个细菌的细胞之中，代替了原有细胞的DNA。


We have yet to build a living organism entirely from bottles of chemicals, so anyone who believes in a “life force” that only a divine being could imbue into inert matter will no doubt continue to believe in it.	我们依然未能成功在实验室里完完全全地创造出一个活的有机体，因此那些相信只有一个类似于神明的存在才能将“生命力量”注入到一个躯壳里面的人无疑将继续坚持自己信仰。


At a more practical level, Venter said, the team’s work has produced “a very powerful set of tools” for redesigning life.	在更加实用的层面上，温特声称该小组已经制造出了“一套非常强大的工具”来重新设计生命。


He has been criticized for the fact that the research was funded by Synthetic Genomics, a company that he cofounded, which will hold the intellectual property rights resulting from the research – and has already filed for 13 patents related to it.	不过外界对他也有诸多批评，因为资助该小组的正是他参与创立的一家名为“人造基因”的公司，而且还掌握着这项研究的知识产权——并已提交了13份相关专利。


But the work has taken 20 scientists a decade to complete, at an estimated cost of $40 million, and commercial investors are an obvious source for such funds.	不过这个研究可是花了20位科学家10年时间才宣告完成，总费用估计高达4000万美元，因此很显然只有商业投资者才是最主要的资金来源。


That battle was lost in 1980, when the United States Supreme Court decided that a genetically modified micro-organism designed to clean up oil spills could be patented. (Obviously, given the damage caused by the BP spill in the Gulf of Mexico, there is still some work to be done on that particular organism.)	也有一些人提出反对，认为不应该拿活着的东西来申请专利，不过他们在1980年时就吃了败仗，当年美国联邦最高法院裁定一个被设计用来清除泄漏石油的转基因微生物可以申请专利（考虑到英国石油公司墨西哥湾漏油事故所造成的破坏，相关的微生物显然大有前途）。


Patenting life was taken a step further in 1984, when Harvard University successfully applied for a patent on its “oncomouse,” a laboratory mouse specifically designed to get cancer easily, so that it would be more useful as a research tool.	用生命体申请专利的行为在1984年又进了一步，当时哈佛大学成功为他们的“oncomouse”申请了专利，这种在实验室生产出来的老鼠经过设计之后非常容易罹患癌症，因此会成为一种非常有用的实验工具。


There are good grounds for objecting to turning a sentient being into a patented laboratory tool, but it is not so easy to see why patent law should not cover newly designed bacteria or algae, which can feel nothing and may be as useful as any other invention.	虽然有很多正当的理由去反对将一个有知觉的生物变成一个专利实验工具，但也不那么容易去说明白为什么专利法不能涵盖新设计的细菌或者藻类：它们既无知觉，也能像其他任何发明一样有用。


Indeed, Synthia’s very existence challenges the distinction between living and artificial that underlies much of the opposition to “patenting life” – though pointing this out is not to approve the granting of sweeping patents that prevent other scientists from making their own discoveries in this important new field.	事实上，“辛西娅”的现实存在挑战了生命体和人造产品之间的界限，而这也是大多数反对“将生命申请专利”的呼声的依据——虽然指出这一点并不是在赞成某些人申请一些宽泛的专利，并以此来阻止其他科学家在这个重要的新领域取得自己的发现。


As for the likely usefulness of synthetic bacteria, the fact that Synthia’s birth had to compete for headlines with news of the world’s worst-ever oil spill made the point more effectively than any public-relations effort could have done.	对于人造细菌可能的利用领域来说，“辛西娅”的诞生必须和墨西哥湾这场世界最严重的漏油事故争夺新闻头条的事实比任何公关行动都更有说服力。


One day, we may be able to design bacteria that can quickly, safely, and effectively clean up oil spills.	总有一天我们会设计出可以快速，安全和有效地清除漏油的细菌。


And, according to Venter, if his team’s new technology had been available last year, it would have been possible to produce a vaccine to protect ourselves against H1N1 influenza in 24 hours, rather than several weeks.	此外，依温特所言，如果他的团队的新技术能在明年面世的话，那就有可能制造出一种可以在24小时内生效的H1N1流感疫苗，再也不用等待几个月才能实现免疫。


The most exciting prospect held out by Venter, however, is a form of algae that can absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and use it to create diesel fuel or gasoline.	但温特所提出的最令人兴奋的前景，是一种可以从大气中吸收二氧化碳并将其利用来生产柴油或者汽油的藻类。


Synthetic Genomics has a $600 million agreement with ExxonMobil to obtain fuel from algae.	对此人造基因公司已经和埃克森美孚公司签订了的一份价值6亿美元的藻类炼油协议。


Obviously, the release of any synthetic organism must be carefully regulated, just like the release of any genetically modified organism.	很显然，任何人造有机体的散播必须得到极为谨慎的规管，正如任何转基因生物的散播一样。


But any risk must be weighed against other grave threats that we face.	但任何的风险都必须与我们所面对的其他严重威胁相衡量。


For example, international climate-change negotiations appear to have reached an impasse, and public skepticism about global warming is rising, even as the scientific evidence continues to show that it is real and will endanger the lives of billions of people.	比如国际气候变化谈判似乎陷入了僵局，而公众对全球暖化的质疑也不断增加，即便已经有科学证据证明了该现象是真的而并危及数十亿人的生命。


In such circumstances, the admittedly very real risks of synthetic biology seem decisively outweighed by the hope that it may enable us to avert a looming environmental catastrophe.	由此看来，人造生命的种种显而易见的风险，相对于其可以帮助我们避免一场不断逼近的环境大灾难的作用来说，都是微不足道的了。


The Real Lima Deal	真正的利马协议


LIMA – It was the agreement that everyone wanted, yet that no one much likes.	利马—这是一个所有人都想要，但没有人会很喜欢的协议。


This year’s annual United Nations climate-change conference in Lima, Peru, finally concluded in the early hours of Sunday morning, more than 24 hours after the scheduled close, after fierce argument in the final days.	今年的秘鲁 利马联合国气候变化会议在星期日上午早些时候、超过预期日程24个多小时、经历了最后几天的激烈争论后终于结束了。


Negotiators from 196 countries patched together a compromise that keeps the world on course to a new global climate agreement in Paris next year; but almost everyone was left unhappy with some provision or another.	来自196个国家的谈判员最终形成了一个让世界在明年巴黎达成新全球气候协定的方案； 但几乎所有人都对某些条款感到不满。


Many critics of the deal, however, have missed the point.	但是，许多对这一协议的批评都是无的放矢。


The Lima deal is weak in many respects.	利马协议从许多角度看都很弱。


But it also represents a fundamental breakthrough for shaping a comprehensive global climate regime.	但它仍代表了迈向全面全球气候机制的根本突破。


The Lima conference had two goals.	利马会议有两个目标。


The first was to adopt an outline of the text of the 2015 Paris agreement.	第一是为2015年巴黎协定制定纲领。


This goal was achieved – but only by creating a huge 37-page document containing every possible option that countries may want to see in next year’s deal.	这一目标实现了——但只是形成了长达37页的文件，其中包括了各国在明年的协议中希望看到的所有可能选择。


Delegates did not attempt to negotiate between the various options, taking to heart the old maxim “Why do today what you can put off until tomorrow?”	代表们没有尝试就不同选项进行谈判，大家都对古老的格言心照不宣——“能拖到明天的事情何必在今天做掉呢？ ”


That negotiation has been left to the five sessions of talks scheduled for 2015, starting in February.	这方面的谈判留给了2015年的五次谈判日程，第一次将从2月开始。


Given the divergence among the positions included in the Lima text, arriving at a draft fit for signing in Paris next December will be a huge task.	利马文件中的立场分歧较大，因此为明年12月的巴黎形成一个待签署草案将是一个艰巨任务。


The second goal was to agree on the terms under which countries will devise their national commitments – officially, their “intended nationally determined contributions” (INDCs) – in 2015.	第二个目标是就2015年各国做出国家承诺的条款达成一致——正式的名称叫做“国家自定贡献预案”（INDC）。


Here, the compromises were sharply felt.	在这方面，我们可以深刻感觉到妥协的意味。


Developing countries wanted the INDCs to include plans for adaptation to climate change as well as emissions cuts, and they wanted developed countries to include financial support for poorer countries.	发展中国家希望INDC包括适应气候变化的计划，也包括减排计划，并希望发达国家纳入给贫穷国家的支持。


Instead, no commitments to new money were made, and the inclusion of adaptation plans will be optional, not compulsory.	但是，并没有新资金承诺达成，适应计划也只是个选项而不是强制性要求。


Meanwhile, developed countries wanted all countries to provide standardized information on their emissions targets and plans, to ensure transparency and comparability.	与此同时，发达国家希望所有国家都提供关于排放目标和计划的标准化信息，以确保透明度和可比性。


The key elements were agreed on, but only in the form of guidance, not as requirements.	关键要素已经形成一致，但只是指导原则而不是要求。


Likewise, the proposal by the European Union and the United States that countries’ plans be subject to some kind of assessment was dropped from the final text.	类似地，欧盟和美国提出的方案——各国的计划应受到某种形式的考核的约束——也没有写入最终文件。


But the aggregate effect of all countries’ plans will be calculated, allowing evaluation next year of whether the world has done enough to limit average global warming to the agreed ceiling of 2º Celsius.	但仍可以计算所有国家的承诺的总效应，这样，明年就可以评估世界是否做了足够的事情将全球变暖程度控制在2℃的上限之内。


It almost certainly will have not.	这一点几乎不可能实现。


For many of the agreement’s critics, particularly those in the environmental movement, these compromises made the Lima deal an excessively “bottom-up” agreement.	对许多协议的批评者来说——特别是环保运动成员——利马所形成的妥协让利马协议过于“自下而上”。


Countries have too much latitude to make whatever commitments they want, relatively unconstrained by a common set of “top-down” rules imposed by the agreement.	各国有太多的空间按自己的意愿许下承诺，相对而言，协议所施加的“自上而下”的共同规则约束太松。


Such critics worry that this will make it harder to persuade countries to cut emissions further when it becomes clear that their collective efforts are not enough, and that it may even allow some countries to use irregular accounting methods.	这些批评者担心，这将导致集体努力不够充分时说服各国进一步削减排放的难度增加，甚至让一些国家采用不合规的测量方法。


But this overlooks the Lima agreement’s greatest accomplishment: It ends the longstanding division of the world into only two kinds of countries, developed and developing.	但这忽略了利马协议的最大成就：它结束了长期存在的将世界分为两类国家——发达国家和发展中国家的情况。


Ever since the original UN Framework Convention on Climate Change was signed in 1992, countries’ obligations have been defined according to their level of development in that year.	自1992年签署联合国气候变化框架公约以来，各国的义务一直根据当年发展水平决定。


The rich so-called “Annex 1” countries have had compulsory obligations, while poorer “non-Annex 1” countries merely have been required to make voluntary efforts.	富裕国家，即所谓的“附件1”国家有强制性义务，而较穷的“非附件1”国家只要求采取自愿措施。


Over the last 22 years, that binary distinction has looked increasingly obsolete, as the larger developing countries, such as China and Brazil, have emerged as economic superpowers and major greenhouse-gas emitters.	在过去22年中，这一两分法越来越不合时宜，因为中国和巴西等发展中大国已成为经济超级大国和主要温室气体排放国。


For this reason, the developed world has long wanted to replace the “firewall” between the two historic groupings with a form of differentiation that better reflects the contemporary world.	因此，发达国家一直希望取消这两个历史分类类别之间的“防火墙”，替之以更好地反映当代世界的区分方式。


But the developing countries – including major powers like China – have insisted that it remain.	但发展中国家——包括中国等主要强国——坚持认为自己仍处于发展中阵营。


No longer.	不会再如此了。


The Lima agreement creates obligations for countries without regard for the distinction between Annex 1 and non-Annex 1.	利马协议中的各国义务不再根据附件1和非附件1区分。


Rather, it uses a new phrase drawn from the recent agreement between the US and China: countries’ responsibilities will be based on “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in light of different national circumstances.”	它使用了来自最近的中美协议的方法：各国的责任将基于“体现共同但有区别的责任和各自能力原则”。


The firewall has been breached.	防火墙已经被推倒。


In theory, the Lima agreement on INDCs does not determine the shape of the long-term Paris agreement.	理论上，利马的关于INDC的协议并没有决定巴黎的长期协定。


So another fierce battle on this issue can be expected next year.	因此，可以预期明年在这一问题上还将有激烈争论。


But the vast majority of developing countries – including China and Brazil – are happy with the new regime.	但绝大多数发展中国家——包括中国和巴西——乐于见到新机制。


So it is impossible to imagine the binary model being restored – and those countries that opposed the change know it, which is why the final two days in Lima were so fiercely fought.	因此，难以想象会重新建立二分模型——反对变化的国家也知道这一点，这也是利马会议的最后两天争论如此激烈的原因。


The Lima conference has shown just how hard the negotiations in Paris next year will be, despite recent optimism about global progress.	利马会议表明了明年的巴黎谈判将会有多激烈，哪怕最近人们对全球进展保持乐观。


But one highly significant decision has now effectively been made.	但如今一个高度重要的决策实际上已经做出了。


Abandoning the rigid distinction between developed and developing countries paves the way toward an agreement that all countries, including the US and China, can sign.	抛弃呆板的发达和发展中国家二分法为一个包括美国和中国在内的所有国家都愿意签署的协定铺平了道路。


The Limits to Green Growth	绿色增长的极限


BERLIN – In recent years, the push to build a “green economy” that can deliver the world from continual environmental and economic crisis and usher in a new era of sustainable growth has been gathering force.	柏林—近几年来，建设“绿色经济”的推动力正在日益积聚。 绿色经济可以让世界摆脱持续环境和经济危机，带来可持续发展的新时代。


But the push has been a source of unexpected controversy, with many predicting little more than business as usual with a coat of green paint.	但这一推动力也造成了意料之外的争议，许多人预测绿色经济无非是披着绿色外衣的常规经济。


Will reconciling environmental and economic imperatives be harder than we think?	协调环境和经济当务之急会比我们想象中更加困难吗？


In a word, yes.	一言以蔽之，是的。


The mainstream perception is that the green economy will enable us to break free from our dependence on fossil fuels, without sacrificing growth.	主流感觉是绿色经济能让我们摆脱化石燃料依赖而不影响增长。 许多人认为，转向绿色经济甚至可以刺激新增长。


Many argue that the shift to a green economy can even spur new growth. But, as appealing as this idea is, it is not realistic, as we show in our new book Inside the Green Economy.	但是，这一概念尽管很有吸引力，但并不现实，我们在我们的新书《绿色经济探秘》（Inside the Green Economy）中说明了这一点。


To be sure, it is possible for a genuinely “green” economy to be prosperous.	诚然，真正的“绿色”经济也有繁荣的可能。


But the model that prevails today focuses on quick and easy solutions.	但今天的主流模型都关注快速轻松的剞劂方案。


Moreover, it reasserts the primacy of economics, thereby failing to recognize the depth of the transformation that is required.	此外，主流模型强调经济的主导地位，从而无法认识到所需要的转型的深度。


Instead of rethinking our economies with a view to adapting their functioning to environmental limits and imperatives, today’s green economy seeks to redefine nature, in order to adapt it to existing economic systems.	今天的绿色经济并不是以反思经济学，将经济运行与环境极限和当务之急相适应，而是试图改造自然，让它来适应现有经济体系。


We now attach a monetary value to nature and add it to our balance sheets, with the protection of “natural capital,” such as ecosystem services, offsetting environmental degradation, gauged by the global abstract currency of carbon metrics.	如今我们用货币价值衡量自然，并把它计入我们的资产负债表，在其中考虑对抵御环境破坏的“自然资本”（如生态系统维持）的保护，用全球碳指标抽象货币（abstract currency）计价。


New market-based mechanisms, such as the trading of biodiversity credits, exemplify this approach.	新的市场机制，如生物多样性信用交易，就是一例。


None of this prevents the destruction of nature; it simply reorganizes that destruction along market lines.	这种方法无法阻止大自然的破坏，只是用市场方法认识这一破坏。


As a result of this narrow approach, current conceptions of the green economy have so many blind spots that the entire enterprise should be regarded as largely a matter of faith.	拜这一狭隘方法所赐，目前的绿色经济概念存在诸多盲点，整套内容应该主要看成是信仰。


The most powerful talisman is technological innovation, which justifies simply waiting for a cure-all invention to come along.	其最强大的护身符是技术创新，技术创新证明了只要简单地坐等万灵丹式的发明的出现。


But, though new ideas and innovations are obviously vital to address complex challenges, environmental or otherwise, they are neither automatic nor inevitable.	但是，尽管新概念和创新显然对于解决复杂挑战十分重要，不管是环境还是其他挑战，但它们既不是自动发生的，也不是必然出现的。


Innovation, particularly technological innovation, is always shaped by its protagonists’ interests and activities, so it must be judged in its social, cultural, and environmental context.	创新，特别是技术创新，永远受其先驱的利益和活动的影响，因此，必须在放在社会、文化和环境中判断创新。


If the relevant actors are not working to champion transformative technologies, the results of innovation can reinforce the status quo, often by extending the life of products and systems that are not fit to address society’s needs.	如果相关行动者没有致力于推进转型性技术，那么创新可能强化现状，并且通常是通过延长产品和系统的生命实现，而这些产品和系统并不适合社会的需要。


Consider the automotive industry.	以汽车业为例。


Though it produces increasingly fuel-efficient engines, it puts them in larger, more powerful, and heavier vehicles than ever before, eating up efficiency gains through the so-called “rebound effect.”	尽管它生产的发动机燃油效率日益提高，但汽车比从前更大、动力更猛、更重，通过所谓的“反弹效应”吞噬效率收益。


And it faces the temptation to spend more energy learning to manipulate emissions readings, as Volkswagen did, than on developing genuinely “green” vehicles.	并且该行业还可能将更多地额能量投入学习操纵排放读数，而不是开发真正的“绿色”车辆，比如大众公司的做法。


Biofuels are not the answer, either.	生物燃料也不是答案。


In fact, the use of biomass wreaks ecological and social havoc in developing economies, while de facto extending the lifetime of an obsolete combustion technology.	事实上，生物质的使用在发展中经济体制造了生态和社会浩劫，同时也在事实上延长了过时燃烧技术的生命。


Clearly, the automotive industry cannot be blindly trusted to spearhead the radical reorganization, away from private vehicles, that is needed in the transport sector.	显然，不能盲目相信汽车业能领衔运输业所需要的彻底重组运动——减少私家车。


And that is exactly the point.	而这正是重点。


If we are to decouple economic growth from energy consumption and achieve real resource efficiency in a world of nine billion, much less ensure justice for all, we cannot let the economy lead the way.	如果我们要让经济增长与能源消费脱钩，在拥有九十亿人口的世界中实现真正的资源效率，更不用说保证所有人的公平，就不能让经济挂帅。


Instead, we must view the green transformation as a political task.	相反，我们必须将绿色转型视为政治任务。


Only a political approach can manage, through genuinely representative institutions, differences of opinion and interest, guided by the kind of open debate, engaging civil society, that is vital to a pluralistic democracy.	唯有政治方针，在对多元化民主至关重要的、有公民社会参与的公开争论的指导下，能够通过真正的代议机构管理不同的观点与利益。


Of course, not all countries are pluralistic democracies.	当然，不是所有国家都是多元化民主国家。


In many that aren’t (and even in some that claim to be), those who campaign for a more socially, economically, and ecologically equitable world face severe repression.	在许多不是多元化民主的国家（甚至包括一些自称是多元化民主的国家）中，鼓吹社会上、经济上和生态上更平等的世界的人面临着严重压迫。


If they are to fulfill their indispensable role in driving forward the transformation that is needed, democratic countries must put respect for basic human rights, such as freedom of speech and peaceful assembly, at the top of their foreign-policy agendas.	如果它们要实现在推动必要的转型中的不可或缺的作用，民主国家就必须尊重基本人权，如言论和和平集会的自由，将它们置于外交政策日程之上。


These basic rights are the normative foundation upon which transformative strategies will have to be negotiated.	这些基本权利构成了规范性基础，转型性战略必须在这些基础上协商。


After all, the biggest obstacle to the socio-ecological transformation that the world needs is not, in the end, technological; much of what is required, from organic farming to networked mobility systems that don’t rely on private vehicles, is already within reach.	毕竟，社会-生态转型的最大障碍在于世界的需要说到底不是技术上的； 许多需要的条件，从有机农业到不依赖私家车的网络化移动系统，都已经可以实现。


The real problem is the lack of political will to implement and scale up those innovations opposed by vested economic interests.	真正的问题在于缺乏政治意愿实施和扩大这些被既得经济利益反对的创新。


The challenge is thus to overcome these minority interests and ensure the protection of the broader public good – a task that is often left to civil society.	因此，挑战在于克服这些少数利益，确保对更广泛的公共利益的保护——这一任务常常由公民社会承担。


Some might argue that calling for radical transformation, rather than incremental change, is inappropriate.	一些人可能会认为，要求彻底转型而不是渐进式变化是不合适的。


At a time when the world faces so many pressing challenges, from economic stagnation to political upheaval to massive refugee flows, any progress toward sustainability should be viewed as a victory.	如今，社会面临众多紧迫挑战，包括经济停滞、政治剧变和大规模难民流等，任何在可持续性方面的进步都应该被视为胜利。


Pragmatic, politically feasible solutions to the environmental crisis should be celebrated, not criticized.	务实的、政治上可行的环境危机解决方案应该得到赞誉而不是批评。


But this view implicitly underestimates the seriousness of the environmental crisis that the world faces, and assumes linear change when the needed transformation will be non-linear.	但这一观点间接低估了世界所面临的环境危机的严重性，在需要非线性转型的时期赞同线性变化。


While some features of the green economy – resource conservation, the transition to renewable energies, specific technological innovations, and effective economic incentives, such as taxes – are undeniably important, they do not add up to the large-scale change needed to protect the interests of present and future generations.	绿色经济的一些特征——资源保护、转向可再生能源、具体的技术创新以及有效的经济激励（如税收）——具有不容否认的重要性，但它们加起来都不如保护当前和未来世代利益所需要的大规模变化重要。


The task that the world’s democracies face today is to continue the project of modernity, embracing the latest knowledge about planetary boundaries, while advancing broad democratic participation and reducing poverty and social injustice.	如今，世界民主国家所面临的任务是继续现代性工程，领会地球极限的最新知识，同时拖动广泛的民主参与、减少贫困和社会不公。


This is no small undertaking, and requires passion and tenacity.	这不是简单的任务，需要激情和韧性。


But it is not beyond our capacity.	但这也不在我们的能力范围之外。


The first step is to recognize the constraints that the “green economy” places on thought and action.	第一步是认识到“绿色经济”给思想和行动带来的束缚。


Lincoln, Roosevelt, Churchill...Obama?	林肯、罗斯福、丘吉尔…奥巴马？


PARIS – Exceptional circumstances – namely, the depth and urgency of the financial and economic crisis – have contributed to bringing an exceptional man, Barack Obama, to the American presidency.	巴黎——特殊的环境——也就是深重而急迫的金融和经济危机——已经为巴拉克·奥巴马这位特殊人物当选美国总统做出了贡献。


But will they also prevent him from succeeding?	但同样的外部环境是否也会阻止他取得成功？


Will the spirit of hope that brought Obama to power triumph over the winds of economic and social despair, or will fear in the West of the looming global recession spread to Asia and destabilize its giants, China and India?	让奥巴马当选总统的“希望精神”能否击败经济和社会的绝望风气，抑或是西方国家对日趋迫近的全球衰退的恐惧会蔓延到亚洲，破坏中国和印度这两个大国的稳定局势？


These are the major questions looming before us as the president-elect prepares the American people for what can only be a rough ride ahead.	在当选总统努力让美国人民做好准备，迎接未来困难的时候，这些是我们必须面对的主要问题。


The same Americans who cried with joy on the night of November 4 are now seized with apprehension as economic hardship becomes more real by the day, as they witness the consequences of the crisis for their neighbors, if not themselves.	随着经济困难一天天变得更加真实，11月4日晚因喜悦而哭泣的那些美国人，如今却陷入了深深的忧虑，因为就算他们还没有承受过这场危机的切肤之痛，他们也亲眼目睹了左邻右舍所承受的危机。


Faced with the urgent necessity of alleviating so many Americans’ suffering, Obama knows only too well that the “audacity of hope” will not be sufficient to the immensity of the challenges confronting him.	面对着缓解这么多美国人所受苦难的迫切需要，奥巴马心里再清楚不过，只靠“希望的力量”根本不足以应对他所面临的巨大的挑战。


As the world slowly moves from elation to sober realism, it is important to maintain a balanced view of what’s happening and avoid the dual risks of underestimating the truly revolutionary nature of what took place and overestimating the ability of Obama’s team to find miracle solutions.	随着世界逐步从兴高采烈过渡到清醒地面对现实，重要的是必须平衡地看待所发生的一切，在避免对所发生情况真正的革命性认识不足的同时，还要避免高估奥巴马团队找到奇迹般解决方案的能力。


On the positive side, a tragic legacy of American history has been transcended.	从积极的一面看，我们已经把美国历史上一个充满悲剧色彩的传统抛在了身后。


The “color wall” has fallen nearly 20 years after the collapse of the Wall that divided Germany and Europe.	“肤色墙”在隔离德国和欧洲的高墙倒塌近二十年之后也已经不复存在。


The pride that Americans – and Africans – have felt since Obama’s election is important and, one hopes, will bring long-term benefits.	美国人——和非洲人——在奥巴马当选之后的自豪感非常重要，希望它能为我们带来长期的利益。


America has not only re-consolidated at least part of its “soft power” abroad; it has done so at home as well.	美国不仅在国外成功地巩固了至少部分“软实力”，在国内的情况也同样如此。


Unemployment and the housing crisis are affecting Americans without regard to their color or origins.	失业和住房危机正在对不同肤色、不同出身的美国人造成影响。


Dignity may not provide you with a roof or a job, but it helps in maintaining hope in hard times.	尊严也许不能为你提供住房和工作，但却能帮助你在困难时期保留住希望。


You can ask for greater sacrifices and require greater patience from people whose trust and full support you have managed to gain.	如果你赢得了人们的信任和全力支持，你就可以请求他们做出更大的牺牲、保持更多的耐心。


We are also witnessing the establishment of a new balance between state and market.	我们还目睹了国家和市场之间新的平衡关系的建立。


But this should not go too far, for there are limits to what the state can do, and the strength of private initiative constitutes one key aspect of America, which became the world’s leading nation thanks to its dynamism, flexibility, and individual inventiveness.	但这不应该走得太远，因为国家的所作所为应该有限度，而个人的积极性才是美国成功的关键，美国正是凭借这样的活力、灵活性和个人创造力才占据了世界各国领袖的位置。


More importantly, beyond the decline of the market and the re-legitimization of the state, we may be witnessing a rehabilitation of politics and politicians, if not of idealism.	更重要的是，除市场作用衰落、国家地位巩固之外，就算我们无法看到理想主义的重新活跃，我们也有可能亲眼目睹政治和政治家影响的重新崛起。


For the first time in America since John F. Kennedy’s presidency, politics is seen as a potentially noble venture.	从约翰·F·肯尼迪当选总统之后，政治在美国第一次被看作一项潜在的伟大事业。


The idea that you can make a difference not only for yourself but for your country and the world, that self-interest and personal enrichment are not the only possible goals in life for the “best and the brightest,” has slowly and irresistibly been gaining ground in the Obama generation.	你不仅可以改变自己的命运，也可以改变国家和世界的命运、以及那种自我利益和个人充实并不是“最出类拔萃者”生活中唯一目标的想法，已经缓慢但却不可阻挡地在奥巴马那一代人中占据了一席之地。


On the night of November 4, countless Americans and non-Americans felt that ideals could indeed become facts.	在11月4日那天夜晚，无数的美国人和非美国人感觉到理想真的可以成为现实。


But this renewal of idealism is as much a product of hope as of fear.	可是这种理想主义的延续是希望和恐惧的双重产物。


The moment young people became tempted to join Obama’s quiet revolution was also the moment the doors of Wall Street began closing on them.	年轻人希望在奥巴马静悄悄的革命中占据一席之地的同时，华尔街的大门也开始对他们关闭。


There are no new openings in a world of banking and finance brought low by the greed and hubris of some of its key members.	在一个受累于重要人物的贪婪和野心勃勃而陷入低谷的银行和金融世界里，已经不再有新的位置。


Wall Street is now facing one of the worst contractions in history.	华尔街正在进入历史上最严重的收缩期。


Obama has a unique combination of intellect, character, and – so far – luck, but can he prove able to channel Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill at the same time?	奥巴马是独特的智慧与个性的结合体，而且到目前为止，他也不缺乏运气。 但事实能否证明他可以集亚伯拉罕·林肯、富兰克林·罗斯福和温斯顿·丘吉尔的品质于一身？


It may be too much to ask from one man.	要求一个人同时具备所有这些素质可能不太现实。


Yet the cards Obama is holding should not be underrated.	但我们也���要低估了奥巴马手中的资本。


Unlike Roosevelt, he has a perfect understanding of the nature of the economic challenges facing him, and, like Churchill, he benefits from the support of a population ready to follow him in a climate of national unity, at least in the short run.	与罗斯福不同，他完全理解所面临的经济挑战的性质，而且像丘吉尔一样，他同样拥有了民众的支持，他的人民愿意在民族团结的大背景下追随他的脚步，至少在短期内确实如此。


The Two Rabbits of International Trade	国际贸易的两只兔子


SEOUL – If you chase two rabbits at once, the old saying goes, both will escape.	首尔—老话说得好，如果你想同时抓住两只兔子，最后你一只都抓不到。


And yet this is precisely what many governments are required to do: pursue both growth and distributional fairness.	而这正是许多政府被要求做到的：既要让经济增长，又要让分配公平。


The two objectives, though not incompatible, are entirely different from one another, and few policy tools can simultaneously help to achieve both.	这两个目标虽然算不上不相容，但也大不相同，几无政策工具可以同时有助于达到两个目标。


This idea matters a lot in trade policy.	在贸易政策中，观点很重要。


Much theoretical and empirical research demonstrates that opening trade can spur a country’s GDP growth.	许多理论和实证研究表明，开放贸易可以刺激一国GDP增长。


But increasing a pie’s size does not guarantee that it will be shared fairly.	但做大蛋糕并不能保证蛋糕可以分得公平。


Often, the incremental growth that comes with a trade opening is unevenly shared; moreover, in many cases, some receive a smaller share than they did before.	通常，贸易开放带来的增量增长并不是均匀分配的； 更普遍的情况是，在许多例子中，一些人分到的份额比以前下降了。


Here is where government must intervene using its traditional tools, taxation and redistribution, as well as complementary policies such as social safety nets and adjustment assistance.	此时政府必须以其传统工具进行干预，即税收和再分配以及社会保障网和调整性援助等补充性政策。


Similarly, from a global perspective, opening trade can contribute to the world’s overall economic growth, but does not guarantee that the benefits will be fairly distributed among countries.	类似地，从全球角度看，开放贸易有助于世界总体经济增长，但并不能保证好处可以在各国之间公平分配。


Some say that no country loses, in absolute terms, from opening trade; otherwise, they would not participate in free-trade deals.	有人说，从绝对值看，没有国家会因开放贸易损失； 否则的话，它们不会参与到自由贸易协议中。


Still, the uneven distribution of the benefits created by a global trade opening means that some countries, especially the least developed, gain little in comparative terms, and are possibly even hurt.	但是，全球贸易开放所带来的不平等好处分配意味着一些国家——尤其是最不发达国家——几乎不能获得竞争性条件，甚至有可能受到伤害。


This explains growing concern about the role of trade in development, despite the obvious fact that increased global trade has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty in recent decades.	这解释了在关于贸易在发展中的角色上争论日渐增加的原因，尽管显而易见的事实是几十年来全球贸易的增加让数亿人走出了贫困。


Unlike individual countries, there is no central authority that can enforce redistribution of wealth around the globe, so the problem of fairness must be addressed through the development mandates embedded in trade negotiations.	与个体国家不同，就全球而言，不存在能强制实行财富再分配的中央当局，因此公平问题必须通过贸易谈判中的发展条款解决。


A key aspect of these development concerns is identifying the appropriate balance in any trade agreement.	在这些发展问题中，一个关键方面是在所有贸易协定中找到合适的平衡。


“Special and differential treatment” is the technical term used in trade negotiations to indicate that the balance must be tilted toward developing countries, with the extent of this treatment to be decided by the parties to the talks.	“特殊和差别待遇”是贸易谈判中的术语，用于表示平衡必须偏向发展中国家，至于偏向到什么程度，由谈判各方决定。


But, while the tendency in current trade negotiations to allow developing countries to open their markets less than others helps to achieve more balance, it may undermine the original goals of enhancing efficiency and boosting growth.	但是，尽管当前贸易谈判中有允许发展中国家较少开放市场以获得更多好处的趋势，但这可能破坏提高效率、提振增长的初衷。


Furthermore, it fails to encourage more South-South trade.	此外，这也无助于鼓励更多的南南贸易。


And, in the end, this focus on the defensive side of trade liberalization makes negotiations more difficult.	此外，如此关注贸易自由化的防卫方最终会让谈判难以为继。


For example, one of the critical issues blocking progress on the World Trade Organization’s Doha Development Agenda of global free-trade talks centers on the extent to which major developing countries should open their markets.	比如，自由贸易谈判的世贸组织多哈发展日程所遇到的关键阻挠集中在主要发展中国家应该将市场开放到何种程度。


A better method of seeking balance is to give developing countries greater access to global markets, including those of other developing countries.	更好的寻找平衡的做法是让发展中国家更容易接触全球市场，包括其他发展中国家的市场。


Yet, as of now, there is neither the will nor the energy to adopt this approach.	但是，目前我们既没有意愿也没有能量采取这一做法。


And, for developing countries that lack supply-side capacity, greater access to the global market is a moot point, as they remain far from even considering what size their share of it should be.	而对缺乏供给面能力的发展中国家来说，更容易接触全球市场仍是个有争议的问题，因为它们远远不知道它们应该在其中占据多少份额。


This raises another concern.	这就引起了另一个问题。


Because “aid for trade” – assistance for developing countries that aims to ease their trade-related constraints – takes the form of financial support, a practical issue is whether donors can maintain their level of funding, given today’s economic difficulties.	由于“贸易援助”——旨在放松贸易相关约束的对发展中国家的援助——以金融支持的形式实现，因此就有一个实践问题：在当下的经济困局下，出资者是否可以维持出资水平。


Moreover, an intrinsic and often neglected problem is how to divide management of aid-and-trade schemes among international and domestic institutions.	此外，一个常被忽视的固有问题是如何实现国际和国内机构中援助和贸易（aid-and-trade）机制管理的分离。


Among the major multilateral institutions, the WTO maintains jurisdiction over trade.	世贸组织（以及其他多边机构）仍是贸易仲裁机构。


It is the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund that are better equipped to deal with aid issues.	但更适合处理援助问题的是世界银行和IMF。


Within member governments, relations with the WTO are usually the responsibility of the trade or foreign ministry, while multilateral financial institutions, including the regional development banks, are generally the responsibility of the finance ministry.	在成员国政府内部，与世贸组织的关系通常由贸易部或外交部主管，而多边金融机构——包括地区性开发银行——通常由财政部负责。


Thus, aid for trade, one of the key tasks on the WTO agenda, has weak institutional links to trade negotiations.	于是，作为世贸组织日程关键任务之一的贸易援助与贸易谈判之间的机构联系十分微弱。


In fact, it might be more accurate to say that it is wholly separate.	事实上，还不如说它们是完全分离的。


The practicable solution is more effective coordination among the relevant institutions.	现实的解决方案是相关机构之间进行更有效地合作。


The Marrakesh Agreement, which established the WTO as the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1994, sets out the purpose of achieving greater coherence between the WTO and other international agencies.	马拉喀什协定——1994年该协定成立了世贸组织作为关贸总协定的继承者——提出了加强世贸组织和其他国际机构凝聚力的目标。


One particularly noteworthy initiative is the Enhanced Integrated Framework for least-developed countries, which encompasses extensive engagement and coordination among partner agencies, including the IMF, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the World Bank, and the WTO.	一个尤其可贵的方案是针对最不发达国家的强化综合框架（Enhanced Integrated Framework），该框架包括了伙伴机构——IMF、联合国贸易和发展会议、世界银行和世贸组织均在其中——加强参与和合作的内容。


A more ambitious approach would be to link aid and trade explicitly.	一个更有魄力的方案是将援助与贸易明确联系起来。


A concrete funding mechanism in trade agreements warrants serious consideration, particularly in areas such as the WTO’s trade-facilitation negotiations, where capacity-building in developing countries is a key issue.	贸易协定中的具体融资机制能保证严肃的考虑，特别是在世贸组织的贸易促进谈判等关键问题在于发展中国家能力建设的领域。


Nonetheless, requiring donations from member countries would be a step in the wrong direction; the WTO is not an aid agency.	尽管如此，要求成员国出资是一个错误的步骤； 世贸组织不是援助机构。


Rather, WTO trade agreements could establish effective links with multilateral and regional development banks, thereby helping to realize the principle of closer international coordination set out in the Marrakesh Agreement.	相反，世贸组织贸易协定可以建立多边和地区开发银行的有效联系，从而有助于实现马拉喀什协定所提出的加强国际合作的原则。


The two rabbits of international trade can be caught.	国际贸易的两只兔子都可以抓住。


But doing so requires innovative approaches that help to ensure that trade serves developing countries, rather than vice versa.	但这样做需要有助于保证贸易有利于发展中国家而不是恰恰相反的创新性方法。


The Liquidity Time Bomb	流动性定时炸弹


NEW YORK – A paradox has emerged in the financial markets of the advanced economies since the 2008 global financial crisis.	纽约—自2008年金融危机以来，发达经济体金融市场出现了一个悖论。


Unconventional monetary policies have created a massive overhang of liquidity.	非常规货币政策造成了巨量流动性堆积。


But a series of recent shocks suggests that macro liquidity has become linked with severe market illiquidity.	但最近的一系列冲击表明，宏观流动性已经与严重的市场无流动性挂钩。


Policy interest rates are near zero (and sometimes below it) in most advanced economies, and the monetary base (money created by central banks in the form of cash and liquid commercial-bank reserves) has soared – doubling, tripling, and, in the United States, quadrupling relative to the pre-crisis period.	大部分发达经济体的政策利率目前处于近零水平（有时甚至低于零），货币基础（中央银行创造的、以现金和高流动性商业银行准备金为形式的货币）激增——或者两倍，或者三倍，美国更是达到了相对于危机前时期的四倍。


This has kept short- and long-term interest rates low (and even negative in some cases, such as Europe and Japan), reduced the volatility of bond markets, and lifted many asset prices (including equities, real estate, and fixed-income private- and public-sector bonds).	这让短期和长期利率保持低位（有时甚至出现了负利率，比如欧洲和日本），降低了债券市场波动，也让许多资产价格上涨（包括股票、房地产、固定收益私人和公共部门债券）。


And yet investors have reason to be concerned.	但投资者仍有理由保持担心。


Their fears started with the “flash crash” of May 2010, when, in a matter of 30 minutes, major US stock indices fell by almost 10%, before recovering rapidly.	他们的恐慌始于2010年5月的“闪崩”，当时，在30分钟内，美国各大股指暴跌近10%，然后又快速收复失地。


Then came the “taper tantrum” in the spring of 2013, when US long-term interest rates shot up by 100 basis points after then-Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke hinted at an end to the Fed’s monthly purchases of long-term securities.	接着是2013年春的“锥形暴涨”，美国长期利率在时任美联储主席伯南克（Ben Bernanke）暗示将结束月度长期证券购买操作后应声走高100个基点。


Likewise, in October 2014, US Treasury yields plummeted by almost 40 basis points in minutes, which statisticians argue should occur only once in three billion years.	类似地，2014年10月，美国国债收益率在几分钟内暴降近40个基点，统计学家认为这现象三十亿年才会发生一次。


The latest episode came just last month, when, in the space of a few days, ten-year German bond yields went from five basis points to almost 80.	最近一次事件发生在上个月，在几天的时间里，十年期德国债券收益率从五个基点暴涨至近80个基点。


These events have fueled fears that, even very deep and liquid markets – such as US stocks and government bonds in the US and Germany – may not be liquid enough.	这些事件激发了人们的恐慌，认为即使是深度和流动性非常好的市场——如美国股市和美国和德国政府债券市场——也会变得流动性不足。


So what accounts for the combination of macro liquidity and market illiquidity?	那么，宏观流动性和市场无流动性并存的现象是怎么形成的？


For starters, in equity markets, high-frequency traders (HFTs), who use algorithmic computer programs to follow market trends, account for a larger share of transactions.	首先，在股市，高频交易员用算法计算机程序追踪市场趋势，他们导致了股票交易量的增加。


This creates, no surprise, herding behavior.	毫不奇怪，这引起了羊群效应。


Indeed, trading in the US nowadays is concentrated at the beginning and the last hour of the trading day, when HFTs are most active; for the rest of the day, markets are illiquid, with few transactions.	事实上，如今美国市场的交易集中在每个交易日的开盘和收盘的半小时，这时高频交易最活跃； 在其他时段，市场流动性很差，没有什么交易。


A second cause lies in the fact that fixed-income assets – such as government, corporate, and emerging-market bonds – are not traded in more liquid exchanges, as stocks are.	第二个原因是以下事实：固定收益资产——如政府、公司和新兴市场债券——不像股票那样在流动性较好的交易所中交易。


Instead, they are traded mostly over the counter in illiquid markets.	相反，它们大多在流动性较差场外市场交易。


Third, not only is fixed income more illiquid, but now most of these instruments – which have grown enormously in number, owing to the mushrooming issuance of private and public debts before and after the financial crisis – are held in open-ended funds that allow investors to exit overnight.	第三，固定收益政权不但流动性更差，它们——拜金融危机前后如春笋般茁壮发展的私人和公共债务发行，它们的数量急剧增加——大部分都持有在允许投资者随时退出的开放式基金手中。


Imagine a bank that invests in illiquid assets but allows depositors to redeem their cash overnight: if a run on these funds occurs, the need to sell the illiquid assets can push their price very low very fast, in what is effectively a fire sale.	想象一下，一家银行投资于低流动性资产但允许存款人随时提现：如果这些基金发生挤兑，甩卖低流动性资产的需要将让它们的价格暴跌，马上出现“跳楼价”。


Fourth, before the 2008 crisis, banks were market makers in fixed-income instruments.	第四，2008年危机前，银行时固定收入工具的做市商。


They held large inventories of these assets, thus providing liquidity and smoothing excess price volatility.	它们持有大量这类资产的存货，因此提供了流动性、平滑了过度价格波动。


But, with new regulations punishing such trading (via higher capital charges), banks and other financial institutions have reduced their market-making activity.	但是，新监管规则惩罚这类交易（以提高资本要求的方式），银行和其他金融机构降低了它们的做市活动。


So, in times of surprise that move bond prices and yields, the banks are not present to act as stabilizers.	因此，在影响债券价格和收益率的冲击发生时，银行不再起到稳定器的作用。


In short, though central banks’ creation of macro liquidity may keep bond yields low and reduce volatility, it has also led to crowded trades (herding on market trends, exacerbated by HFTs) and more investment in illiquid bond funds, while tighter regulation means that market makers are missing in action.	简言之，尽管央行创造的宏观流动性或许可以维持债券收益率低水平并降低波动，但也导致了拥挤式交易（对市场趋势趋之若鹜，高频交易放大了这一效应）和低流动性债券基金投资增加，而监管规则趋紧意味着市场做市商不再积极行动。


As a result, when surprises occur – for example, the Fed signals an earlier-than-expected exit from zero interest rates, oil prices spike, or eurozone growth starts to pick up – the re-rating of stocks and especially bonds can be abrupt and dramatic: everyone caught in the same crowded trades needs to get out fast.	结果，当冲击发生时——比如美联储放出信号将比预期更早退出零利率政策、油价上涨，或欧元区增长开始复苏——股票以及（尤其是）债券的价值重估将来得突然而猛烈：困在同一种拥挤式交易的所有人都需要快速退出。


Herding in the opposite direction occurs, but, because many investments are in illiquid funds and the traditional market makers who smoothed volatility are nowhere to be found, the sellers are forced into fire sales.	反向羊群效应由此产生，但是，由于许多投资困在了低流动性基金中，而平滑波动的传统做市商又不见了踪影，卖家将被迫挂出跳楼价。


This combination of macro liquidity and market illiquidity is a time bomb.	这一宏观流动性和市场无流动性的组合是一颗定时炸弹。


So far, it has led only to volatile flash crashes and sudden changes in bond yields and stock prices.	目前，它只是造成了高波动性的闪崩和债券收益率和股票价格的突变。


But, over time, the longer central banks create liquidity to suppress short-run volatility, the more they will feed price bubbles in equity, bond, and other asset markets.	但是，假以时日，央行制造流动性以抑制短期波动的时间越长，所催生的股票、债券和其他资产市场的泡沫就越大。


As more investors pile into overvalued, increasingly illiquid assets – such as bonds – the risk of a long-term crash increases.	随着更多投资者涌入价值高估、流动性日益缺失的资产——比如债券——长期崩溃的风险也在增加。


This is the paradoxical result of the policy response to the financial crisis.	这是对金融危机的政策响应带来的矛盾结果。


Macro liquidity is feeding booms and bubbles; but market illiquidity will eventually trigger a bust and collapse.	宏观流动性孕育了繁荣和泡沫，但市场无流动性最终将导致泡沫破裂和崩溃。


What is Italy Saying?	意大利想表达些什么？


NEW YORK – The outcome of the Italian elections should send a clear message to Europe’s leaders: the austerity policies that they have pursued are being rejected by voters.	发自纽约——意大利大选的结果应该是向欧洲领导人传达了一个明确的信息：他们一直以来追求的紧缩政策已经遭到了选民的唾弃。


The European project, as idealistic as it was, was always a top-down endeavor.	虽然相当理想化的欧洲一体化宏愿一直都是个自上而下推动的。


But it is another matter altogether to encourage technocrats to run countries, seemingly circumventing democratic processes, and foist upon them policies that lead to widespread public misery.	然而鼓励技术官僚来管理国家——似乎绕过了民主程序——并将导致民众怨声载道的政策强加在这些国家身上却是另外一回事。


While Europe’s leaders shy away from the word, the reality is that much of the European Union is in depression.	当欧洲的领导人们可以回避欧洲一体化这个词的时候，现实却是欧盟大部分地区都处于经济不景气之中。


The loss of output in Italy since the beginning of the crisis is as great as it was in the 1930’s.	意大利自危机爆发以来所导致的产出损失跟1930年大萧条时相当。


Greece’s youth unemployment rate now exceeds 60%, and Spain’s is above 50%.	当前希腊的青年人���业率超过了60%，而西班牙则超过了50%。


With the destruction of human capital, Europe’s social fabric is tearing, and its future is being thrown into jeopardy.	由于人力资本被破坏，欧洲的社会构造也随之出现了撕裂，而其未来正被推入险境。


The economy’s doctors say that the patient must stay the course. Political leaders who suggest otherwise are labeled as populists.	经济专家说受创的国家必须将紧缩政策坚持到底，而持有其他主张的政治领导人都被贴上了民粹主义的标签。


The reality, though, is that the cure is not working, and there is no hope that it will – that is, without being worse than the disease.	但实际上这种解决方案并不起作用，而且将来也依然无效——也就是说紧缩政策将会导致比目前更糟糕的问题。


Indeed, it will take a decade or more to recover the losses incurred in this austerity process.	事实上，这个紧缩过程所造成的损失可能需要花上十年或更长的时间才能挽回。


In short, it is neither populism nor shortsightedness that has led citizens to reject the policies that have been imposed on them.	简而言之，既不是民粹主义也不是短视导致公民拒绝那些强加在自己身上的政策。


It is an understanding that these policies are deeply misguided.	而是人们意识到这些政策都被严重误导了。


Europe’s talents and resources – its physical, human, and natural capital – are the same today as they were before the crisis began.	今天欧洲的人才及资源——其物质、人力和自然资本——与危机发生前并无二致。


The problem is that the prescriptions being imposed are leading to massive underutilization of these resources.	问题在于当前的解决方案导致了对这些资源的大规模低效利用。


Whatever Europe’s problem, a response that entails waste on this scale cannot be the solution.	不管欧洲的问题是什么，造成大规模浪费的应付方式可不会是解决办法。


The simplistic diagnosis of Europe’s woes – that the crisis countries were living beyond their means – is clearly at least partly wrong.	对欧洲灾难病因的简单诊断——即危机国家过去一直入不敷出——显然至少有部分是错误的。


Spain and Ireland had fiscal surpluses and low debt/GDP ratios before the crisis.	西班牙和爱尔兰在危机之前都有着财政盈余以及较低的债务对GDP比率。


If Greece were the only problem, Europe could have handled it easily.	如果希腊是欧洲惟一的问题，那么它肯定可以很容易得到处理。


An alternative set of well-discussed policies could work.	另一种经过仔细讨论的政策可能会起作用。


Europe needs greater fiscal federalism, not just centralized oversight of national budgets.	欧洲需要更强大的财政联邦制，而不只是对国家预算进行集中监管。


To be sure, Europe may not need the two-to-one ratio of federal to state spending found in the United States; but it clearly needs far more European-level expenditure, unlike the current miniscule EU budget (whittled down further by austerity advocates).	诚然，欧洲也许不需要美国那样联邦与州之间2对1的支出比率； 但显然它需要更多全欧层面上的支出，而不是目前这样微乎其微的欧盟预算（而且还被紧缩主张进一步削弱了）。


A banking union, too, is needed.	同时还需要建立一个银行联盟。


But it needs to be a real union, with common deposit insurance and common resolution procedures, as well as common supervision.	但必须是真正的联盟，要有共同存款保险、共同决议过程以及共同监管。


There will also have to be Eurobonds, or an equivalent instrument.	还必须发行欧元债券或者与之类似的金融工具。


European leaders recognize that, without growth, debt burdens will continue to grow, and that austerity by itself is an anti-growth strategy.	欧洲领导人意识到，没有增长，债务负担将会继续加重，而紧缩政策本身就是反增长的策略。


Yet years have gone by, and no growth strategy is on the table, though its components are well known: policies that address Europe’s internal imbalances and Germany’s huge external surplus, which now is on par with China’s (and more than twice as high relative to GDP).	然而几年过去了，至今还没有制定出任何的增长策略，尽管其组成部分是众所周知的：解决欧洲内部失衡及德国巨大的外部盈余——现在的水平与中国一样（相对GDP而言是其两倍有余）——的相关政策。


Concretely, that means wage increases in Germany and industrial policies that promote exports and productivity in Europe’s peripheral economies.	具体来说，这意味着德国的工资增长以及欧洲周边国家出台促进出口和生产力的产业政策。