So the silver lining in this fracas is that it showed that economics can progress by the rules of science.	此次争吵的益处在于表明经济学可以按照科学定律来进行演化。


No matter how far apart their political views may have been, the two sides shared a common language about what constitutes evidence and – for the most part – a common approach to resolving differences.	无论政治观点有多大分歧，争议双方在证据的选择上有共同语言，这基本可以理解为有解决分歧的共同方法。


The problem lies elsewhere, in the way that economists and their research are used in public debate.	问题不在这里，而在于在公众辩论中以何种方式运用经济学家及其研究成果。


The Reinhart/Rogoff affair was not just an academic quibble.	莱因哈特/罗格夫事件也不仅是学术诡辩那样简单。


Because the 90% threshold had become political fodder, its subsequent demolition also gained broader political meaning.	因为90%的临界值已成为一种政治素材，其随后被推翻也就具有了更广泛的政治意义。


Despite their protests, Reinhart and Rogoff were accused of providing scholarly cover for a set of policies for which there was, in fact, limited supporting evidence.	虽然引起两人的强烈抗议，但仍有人指责莱因哈特和罗格夫为现实证据有限的一系列政策提供了学术掩护。


One clear lesson is that we need better rules of engagement between economic researchers and policymakers.	而我们至少可以吸取一个明确的教训，那就是力争让经济研究人员以更合理的规范与决策者接触。


A solution that will not work is for economists to second-guess how their ideas will be used or misused in public debate and to shade their public statements accordingly.	一种不合理的方式是让经济学家凭空猜测他们的理论将如何在公众辩论中被运用甚至滥用，并在公开声明时采取相应的防范措施。


For example, Reinhart and Rogoff might have downplayed their results – such as they were – in order to prevent them from being misused by deficit hawks.	比方说，莱因哈特和罗格夫可能故意对自己的研究成果轻描淡写（他们实际也是这样做的），以防止它们被赤字鹰派所利用。


But few economists are sufficiently well attuned to have a clear idea of how the politics will play out.	但没有多少经济学家能准确判断政治博弈的结果。


Moreover, when economists adjust their message to fit their audience, the result is the opposite of what is intended: they rapidly lose credibility.	此外，当经济学家根据受众来调整信息时，往往会取得截然相反的效果：他们会以惊人的速度丧失公信力。


Consider what happens in international trade, where such shading of research is established practice.	我们来看遮遮掩掩已成常规做法的国际贸易领域。


For fear of empowering the “protectionist barbarians,” trade economists are prone to exaggerate the benefits of trade and downplay its distributional and other costs.	贸易经济学家由于担心“保护主义野蛮人”有机可乘而更愿意夸大贸易的好处，并淡化其分配和其他费用。


In practice, this often leads to their arguments being captured by interest groups on the other side – global corporations that seek to manipulate trade rules to their own advantage.	这种做法在实践中往往导致他们的观点被对立面利益群体，也就是企图操纵贸易规则为自己牟利的全球企业所利用。


As a result, economists are rarely viewed as honest brokers in the public debate about globalization.	公众因此很少把经济学家视为全球化公众辩论中诚实的中间人。


But economists should match honesty about what their research says with honesty about the inherently provisional nature of what passes as evidence in their profession.	但经济学家除应对自身的研究成果直言相告外，还应当直言不讳地说明经济学证据所固有的假定性。


Economics, unlike the natural sciences, rarely yields cut-and-dried results.	经济学不同于自然科学，其结果几乎无法预先设定。


For one thing, all economic reasoning is contextual, with as many conclusions as potential real-world circumstances.	一来所有经济推理都属于情境推理，真实世界有多少种可能情况就会推演出多少种结论。


All economic propositions are “if-then” statements.	一切经济主张均属于“如果 －那么”陈述。


Accordingly, figuring out which remedy works best in a particular setting is a craft rather than a science.	因此，确定哪种方法在特定环境中效果最佳与其说是一门科学，还不如说是一种艺术。


Second, empirical evidence is rarely reliable enough to settle decisively a controversy characterized by deeply divided opinion.	二来，单凭经验证据的可靠性几乎无法在意见严重分歧的争论中得出确定的结论。


This is particularly true in macroeconomics, of course, where data are few and open to diverse interpretations.	具体到宏观经济层面当然尤其如此，因为宏观数据非常有限，解读方式还各不相同。


But even in microeconomics, where it is sometimes possible to generate precise empirical estimates using randomization techniques, the results must be extrapolated in order to be applied in other settings.	即使在有时能够借助随机法得出准确经验估算的微观经济领域，结果也必须进行外推才能适用于其他环境。


New economic evidence serves at best to nudge the views – a little here, a little there – of those inclined to be open-minded.	新经济证据最多也就能对思想相对开放者的观点起到些微调作用。


In the memorable words of the World Bank’s chief economist, Kaushik Basu, “One thing that experts know, and that non-experts do not, is that they know less than non-experts think they do.”	世行首席经济学家巴苏的观点令人记忆犹新，“有一个问题专家清楚，而非专家不清楚，那就是专家们所了解的并不像非专家们所以为的那样多。


The implications go beyond not over-selling any particular research result.	”这句话的涵义远不限于不要过分吹嘘某项研究成果。


Journalists, politicians, and the general public have a tendency to attribute greater authority and precision to what economists say than economists should really feel comfortable with.	记者、政治家和一般公众都有一种倾向，那就是对经济学家的研究成果加之以超乎实际的权威和准确性。


Unfortunately, economists are rarely humble, especially in public.	不幸的是，经济学家在公众面前很少表现出谦虚的态度。


There is one other thing that the public should know about economists: It is cleverness, not wisdom, that advances academic economists’ careers.	关于经济学家公众还需要了解一点：那就是推动经济学者事业发展的是聪明而不是智慧。


Professors at the top universities distinguish themselves today not by being right about the real world, but by devising imaginative theoretical twists or developing novel evidence.	顶尖大学教授今天要想脱颖而出并非依靠对真实世界的正确判断，而是靠想象力来扭曲理论、或者发掘新的证据。


If these skills also render them perceptive observers of real societies and provide them with sound judgment, it is hardly by design.	如果这些雕虫小技碰巧让他们对真实社会做出有见地的观察和正确的判断，这恐怕也并非他们的本意。


The Public and Its Problems	公众及其自身的问题


CHICAGO – On a recent visit to Europe, I found economists, journalists, and business people thoroughly frustrated with their politicians.	发自芝加哥——在近期访欧期间，我发现似乎所有的经济学家，媒体和商界人士都对本国政界深感绝望。


Why, they ask, can’t politicians see the abyss that yawns before them, and come together to resolve the euro crisis once and for all?	他们百思不得其解：政治家们为何敢无视横亘在身前的万丈深渊，为何不能团结起来一鼓作气解决当前的欧元危机。


Even if there is no consensus on what a solution might be, can’t they meet and thrash out a plan that goes beyond their repeated half-measures?	即便在解决方案上未能达成共识，那么那些政治家们何不抛弃那些治标不治本的方案，一起开会制定一个超越一切的全面性计划？


It is only because of the European Central Bank’s bold decision to lend long term to banks that we have seen some respite recently, or so their argument goes.	只有在欧洲央行最近做出向银行发放长期贷款的勇敢决定后他们才看到了一丝困难缓解的景象。


Politicians, in contrast, are failing Europe by being forever behind the curve.	相比之下政治家们却总是跟不上形势，而这样下去只能搞垮欧洲。


Why do they find it so hard to lead?	领导国家真有那么难吗？


One answer that can be easily dismissed is that politicians simply don’t understand the gravity of the situation.	其中一个很容易被排除的答案就是政治家们根本没意识到事态的严重性。


Political leaders need not be economic geniuses to understand the advice that they hear, and many are both intelligent and well-read.	政治家们无需具备经济学家的头脑就能理解他们所听到的建议，更可况其中许多人还是博学多才，饱读诗书之辈。


A second answer – that politicians have short time horizons, owing to electoral cycles – may contain a kernel of truth, but it is inadequate, because the adverse consequences of timid action often become apparent well before they are up for re-election.	另一个答案——政治家们都是短视的，被选举周期所主导——可能有些道理，却也不甚充分。 因为即便一个微小的政治动作所产生的反作用都会在连任选举来临之前彻底显现。


The best answer that I have heard comes from Axel Weber, the former president of Germany’s Bundesbank and an astute political observer.	而我所听到的最佳答案来自德国联邦银行前行长阿克塞尔·韦伯（Axel Weber）——此人同时也是一位敏锐的政治观察家。


In Weber’s view, policymakers simply do not have the public mandate to get ahead of problems, especially novel ones that seem small initially, but, if unresolved, imply potentially large costs.	在韦伯看来原因很简单，政策制定者显然无法从公众那里获得提前应对问题的授权，尤其是那些一开始看似非常微小，一旦爆发却需要花费极大成本才能解决的新问题。


If the problem has not been experienced before, the public is not convinced of the potential costs of inaction.	由于从未经历过这些问题，公众也就无从得知不作为的话将产生多少潜在成本。


And, if action prevents the problem, the public never experiences the averted calamity, and voters therefore penalize political leaders for the immediate costs that the action entails.	因为不知道灾难的后果究竟有多严重，公众甚至会惩罚那些防患于未然的政治家，因为后者的果断行为带来了某些额外支出。


Even if politicians have perfect foresight of the disaster that awaits if nothing is done, they may have little ability to persuade voters, or less insightful party members, that the short-term costs must be paid.	即便政治家们完全意识到不作为将引发极大的灾难，他们也很难去说服选民或者那些短视的政党成员去支付一些短期成本。


Talk is cheap, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the status quo usually appears comfortable enough.	任何说辞都是廉价的，更何况还缺乏证据，相比之下现状往往令人感觉一切正常。


So leaders’ ability to take corrective action increases only with time, as some of the costs of inaction are experienced.	因此领导人只能等待，等到人们吃过了苦头才能采取正确的行动。


Calamity can still be averted if the costs of inaction escalate steadily.	而如果不作为所付出的成本逐渐增加的话也能有助于避免灾难的发生。


The worst problems, however, are those with “inaction costs” that remain invisible for a long time, but increase suddenly and explosively.	但最可怕的莫过于那些“不作为成本”长期处于不可见状态，但却突然出现爆发式飙升的情况。


By the time the leader has the mandate to act, it may be too late.	当领导人随之获得行动授权时，一切往往都已经太晚了。


A classic example was Winston Churchill’s warnings against Adolf Hitler’s ambitions.	这方面的一个经典案例就是丘吉尔对希特勒野心的警告。


Hitler’s plans were outlined in Mein Kampf for all to read – and he did not disguise them in his speeches.	希特勒的计划在《我的奋斗》一书中早有描述——甚至在其演说中也毫不掩饰。


Yet few in Britain wanted to give them credence, and many thought that communism was the greater threat, especially in the bleak years of the Great Depression.	但只有很少英国人相信这一切会发生，许多人甚至认为共产主义才是更重大的威胁，尤其是在大萧条的那段死气沉沉的时期。


The Nazis’ dismembering of Czechoslovakia in 1938 made the sincerity of Hitler’s ambitions all too clear.	纳粹1938年肢解捷克斯洛伐克的行为使得希特勒的野心暴露无疑。


But it was only after the invasion of Poland the following year that Churchill was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty, and he became Prime Minister only after the invasion of France in 1940, when Britain stood alone.	但直到第二年闪击波兰之后丘吉尔才被任命为海军大臣，随后在1940年德军挥师入侵法国之后才升任首相，可那时的英国已经完全陷入孤立了。


Britain might well have been better off had Churchill held power earlier, but that would have meant costly rearmament, which was unacceptable so long as there was a chance that Hitler proved to be a paper tiger.	如果丘吉尔能提前上台的话英国的日子或许会好过很多，但却意味着要提前付出大量金钱来重整军备，这对那些心存侥幸，认为希特勒不过是只纸老虎的人来说是无法接受的。


And, of course, it would also have meant entrusting Britain’s fate to a politician who, though now regarded as an indomitable leader, was widely distrusted at the time.	与此同时，这还意味着将英国的命运托付给一个如今以绝不屈服闻名，当年却根本不受大众信任的政治家。


Non-linear costs of inaction are most obvious in the financial sector.	而非线性增加的不作为成本在金融部门显得尤为突出。


At the same time, financial-sector problems may be particularly difficult to address: if politicians emphasize the need for action too strongly in order to get a mandate, they might precipitate the very turmoil that they seek to contain.	同时金融部门的问题可能尤其棘手：如果政治家们过度强调行动的紧迫性以换取授权，结果往往非但没能遏制危机，反而加速其爆发。


Between the Bear Stearns crisis and the failure of Lehman Brothers, the United States government could do little to get ahead of the growing problem (though, of course, the government-backed mortgage underwriters Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed under conservatorship in the interim).	在贝尔斯登危机直到雷曼兄弟破产的那段中间时期，美国政府在遏制危机发展方面确实没有多少行动空间（虽然房地美和房利美这两个政府撑腰的抵押贷款担保人都被临时保护了起来）。


It took the post-Lehman panic for Congress to authorize the Troubled Asset Relief Program, which threw a financial lifeline to banks and the auto industry, among others.	只有在经历了雷曼兄弟的阵痛之后国会才通过问题资产救助计划，最终在财政上救了银行和汽车行业一命。


And only frenetic action by the Federal Reserve and Treasury (with authorities around the world joining) prevented a systemic meltdown.	于是我们看到的是美联储和财政部（还有全球各国当局联手）只有很短的时间去手忙脚乱地安排如何防止一场系统性崩溃。


A subprime-mortgage problem that was initially estimated to imply losses of a few hundred billion dollars imposed far higher costs on the entire world.	一场原本估计只会造成几千亿美元损失的次级抵押贷款问题最后为全球带来了极大的处理成本。


Similarly, eurozone politicians have obtained a mandate to take bolder action only as the markets have made the costs of inaction more salient.	同样，欧元区的政治家们只有在市场更加关注不作为成本时才能获得授权。


Even setting aside Germany’s understandable attempt to limit how much it would have to pay, it is difficult to see how politicians could have gotten ahead of the problem.	你很难看见政治家们如何能先一步解决问题，更别提德国试图限制自己援助出资额的（即使负面但却可以理解的）做法了。


While the ECB has bought the eurozone some time, the calming effect on markets may be a mixed blessing.	当欧洲央行为欧元区争取了一点时间的时候，市场的镇定效应可能会带来好坏参半的影响。


Have Europeans seen enough of the abyss to tolerate stronger action by their leaders?	欧洲人是否受够了其领导人不愿采取更强硬行动的状况？


If not, markets might have to deteriorate further to make possible a comprehensive resolution to the eurozone crisis.	如果答案是否定的话，那么市场将进一步恶化以促成一个欧元区危机综合性解决方案的出台。


Similarly, with government bond yields as low as they are in the US, the public has little sense of urgency about its fiscal problems, though some doomsayers, like Peter Peterson of the Blackstone Group, have been trying their best to awaken it.	同样，随着政府债券收益变得像美国一样低下，即使像黑石集团创始人彼得·皮特森（Peter Peterson）这类末日预言家一直在大声疾呼，公众照样会对财政问题失去紧迫感。


One hopes that the coming US presidential election will lead to a more enlightened public debate about tax and entitlement reform.	有人希望接下来的美国总统选举将在税务和授权改革方面激起一场更为理性开明的公众讨论。


Otherwise, a rapid escalation of yields in the bond market might be necessary for the public to accept that there is a problem, and for politicians to have the room to resolve it.	否则的话就只有靠债务市场收益的迅速上升来使公众意识到事态严重，并留给政治家们足够的空间来解决问题。


Don’t blame the leaders for appearing short-sighted and indecisive; the fault may lie with us, the public, for not listening to the worrywarts.	因此请不要指责政治家的短视和犹豫不决； 真正有错的可能是我们，一群不愿聆听忠言的公众。


Whose Economic Reform?	谁的经济改革？


PARIS – Together with fiscal consolidation, structural reform is the new European mantra.	巴黎—结构性改革和财政整合一起成了欧洲新咒语。


International organizations and European Union bodies regard such reform as a prerequisite of economic recovery, growth, and alleviation of the unemployment plague.	国际组织和欧盟机构将结构性改革视为经济复苏、增长和缓和失业之痛的先决条件。


Indeed, the agreement reached between the Greek government and the “troika” (the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, and the European Commission) includes a 48-page list of detailed reforms.	事实上，希腊政府和“三驾马车”（IMF、欧洲央行和欧盟委员会）之间达成的协议包括了一份48页的详细改革清单。


Not all countries are given such a long to-do list, but, since new EU legislation was adopted in 2010, specific recommendations are addressed to all.	非所有国家都有如此之长的待办清单，但自从2010年欧盟新立法被采纳以来，所有国家都收到了具体建议。


For example, the brief addressed to Italy includes recommendations on the efficiency of public administration, the fight against corruption, corporate governance in the banking sector, the labor market, schools, taxation, opening up the services sector, and infrastructure.	比如，意大利收到的提要包括了关于公共管理效率、反腐斗争、银行部门公司治理、劳动力市场、学校、税收、开放服务部门以及基础设施等方面的建议。


To be sure, European countries urgently need to implement deep reforms.	平心而论，欧洲国家迫切地需要实施深度改革。


Poor productivity growth and stubborn unemployment are evidence that their economies require comprehensive transformation.	萎靡的生产率增长和顽固的失业证明，它们的经济需要全面转变。


But if this observation provides the rationale for reform, it does not provide a firm enough basis for drawing up effective economic-revival plans.	但如果说这给出了改革的理由，那么它并没有给出勾勒有效经济复苏计划的足够的基础。


The design of a reform strategy requires solving two problems.	设计改革战略要求解决两个问题。


The first is one of purpose.	一是目的问题。


Successful societies are a diverse lot.	成功的社会是多元化的。


Some are unequal, and others are egalitarian.	有的地方不平等，有的地方平等。


Some cherish large welfare states, and others starve them.	有的地方珍视大型福利国家，有的地方缺少福利。


Some rely on extensive collective agreements, and others exclude them altogether.	有的地方依赖全面集体一致，有的地方根本不考虑这一点。


Some are based on arm’s-length transactions, and others rely on recurring relationships.	有的地方以公平交易为基础，有的地方依靠回头客。


Scholars refer to “varieties of capitalism” to highlight the absence of a single template for success.	学者用“五花八门的资本主义”来刻画不存在单一成功模板的现象。


But if there are different models, what should the priorities for reform be?	但既然存在不同的模式，那么改革应该以何为先？


International organizations generally point out – rightly – that in most cases a country can improve economic efficiency without changing its economic model.	国际组织通常（正确地）指出，在更多情形中，一国可以在不改变经济模式的情况下改善经济效率。


For example, there is often ample room for achieving the same income redistribution at lower budgetary cost, or for ensuring that collective wage agreements take into account the interests of those without a job.	比如，通常总是存在以更低的预算成本达到相同的收入在分配效果的充足空间，或者确保集体工资协定考虑无工作人员的利益。


So national models can be reformed while retaining arrangements that meet social preferences.	因此，可以在改革国家模式的同时保留满足社会偏好的安排。


This answer, however, is somewhat facile.	但是，这个回答在某种程度上并不严谨。


Countries are not only inefficient; often, they are also inconsistent.	国家的问题不仅在于效率低下，通常还有不一致的问题。


For example, they pretend to become global hubs but do not welcome foreigners, which is what prevented Japan’s emergence as a world financial center in the 1990’s; or they hope to develop as knowledge-based economies but dislike academic freedom; or they aim to nurture innovation but do not want innovators to become rich.	比如，它们装作要成为全球枢纽，但却不欢迎外国人，这正是20世纪90年代阻止日本成为全球金融中心的因素。 它们希望发展成为知识经济，但又厌恶学术自由；


Such inconsistency is often a major impediment to development.	这一不一致问题通常会成为发展的障碍。


By contrast, the success of the United States as an innovation powerhouse relies on a high degree of consistency across fields ranging from education and immigration to taxation and the labor market.	相反，美国作为创新天堂的成功取决于从教育和移民政策到税收和劳动力市场的诸多领域的高度一致性。


So pro-growth reform not only requires substituting efficient arrangements for inefficient ones; it also demands confronting hard choices, which is, at bottom, a political endeavor.	因此提振增长的改革不但要求用高效率的安排替换低效率的安排，也要求直面艰难选择，即，政治努力。


For this reason, it is not something that any international organization can even suggest in lieu of a country’s voters.	因此，这绝非国际组织可以代替选民做出的选择，即使建议也不行。


The second problem in designing structural reform is one of strategy.	设计结构性改革的第二个问题是战略问题。


As the economist Dani Rodrik has pointed out, standard analysis generally results in a laundry list of desirable reforms that does not tell governments where to begin.	经济学家罗德里克（Dani Rodrik）指出，标准分析通常通常会产生一份详细的欲改革清单，但不会告诉政府从哪里开始。


Apprehensive leaders start with the most politically expedient items, while bold leaders start with the most challenging prescriptions; but there is no guarantee that either of these approaches will deliver the expected result.	心存疑虑的领导人会从政治上最方便的项目开始，而激进的领导人会从最有挑战性的内容开始； 但哪种方法能产生预期效果，谁也打不了包票。


Even a seemingly rational strategy of correcting the largest inefficiencies first is not necessarily the appropriate one.	即使首先纠正效率最低之处的看似理性的战略也未必就是最合理的战略。


One reason is that the effectiveness of reform may depend on conditions prevailing in other sectors: good universities, for example, cannot remedy the consequences of poor secondary education.	一个原因是改革的有效性可能取决于其他部门的条件：比如，优质的大学无法纠正初等教育质量低下的后果。


Moreover, eliminating one distortion may be ineffective or even counterproductive: in an economy plagued with rents, partial reform may simply result in shifting them across sectors and agents, rather than reducing them to the benefit of consumers.	此外，消灭一项扭曲可能效果并不好甚至产生反作用：对于一个问题在租的经济，局部改革的唯一后果可能是让租在不同的部门和行为人之间游走，而不是将之减少从而有利于消费者。


As a result, considerable political energy may be consumed in pushing through measures that deliver very little.	因此，可能你花了很大的政治能量，推动的却是收效甚微的措施。


Instead, reform should start with the most binding constraint to performance (which one that is depends on the whole set of hindrances that confront the economy).	相反，改革应该从对表现束缚最大的约束开始（即全方位妨碍经济的项目开始）。


In addition, outcomes may depend on cyclical conditions.	另外，改革结果可能取决于周期性因素。


Advocates of structural reform generally claim that they aim to increase output and welfare in the medium term, and that the short term does not matter.	结构性改革的支持者通常认为他们的目标是中期增加产出和福利，短期是无关紧要的。


But, while some reforms – for example, those improving access to credit or eliminating rents that harm consumers – can indeed help to boost growth during a demand shortfall like the one that Europe is now experiencing, others can have the opposite effect.	但是，虽说一些改革——比如改善信用可获得性和消灭伤害消费者的租的改革——确实可以在需求不足（比如当下的欧洲）时提振增长，但也有一些改革会适得其反。


For example, labor-market reforms that make it easier for companies to reduce staff may weaken demand further, underscoring the importance of considering reforms’ short-term effects.	比如，让公司裁员更方便的劳动力市场改革可能会进一步削弱需求，从而加强考虑改革短期效果的紧迫性。


What all of this suggests is that an economic-reform agenda cannot result from a mechanical exercise.	所有这些表明，经济改革日程不可能来自机械的实践。


At some point, hard choices about priorities and sequencing must be made.	在某一点上，你必须做出什么是当务之急、各个项目孰先孰后的艰难选择。


This is not to say that international organizations and the EU are of no help.	这并不是说国际组织和欧盟无济于事。


On the contrary, these bodies can be very valuable insofar as they carry out international comparisons and point out deficiencies.	相反，这些机构可以起到关键作用，如果它们进行国际比较然后指出不足的话。


But there is a line in the sand beyond which only governments can set priorities and act.	但它们不能越界，有的事项只有政府才能设定优先级别并据以行动。


That, after all, is what voters elect them to do.	毕竟，这正是选民选出政府的目的。


The Quality of Mercy	慈悲的品质


PRINCETON – The recent release of Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi, the only person convicted of blowing up Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988, sparked outrage.	发自普林斯顿——最近，因制造了1988年洛克比空难而被判刑的唯一一人，阿布德尔·巴赛特·梅格拉希获释出狱，引起了极大的愤慨。


Around the same time, the Philadelphia Eagles, an American football team, offered a second chance to former star Michael Vick, who was convicted of running a dog-fighting operation in which unsuccessful fighters were tortured and killed.	就在差不多同时，美国橄榄球队——费城鹰队——为前球星迈克尔·维克提供了第二个机会。 维克曾因经营非法斗狗交易被判刑，斗狗比赛中战败的狗被折磨并杀死。


And William Calley, who commanded the platoon that massacred hundreds of Vietnamese civilians at the village of My Lai in 1968, has now broken his media silence and apologized for his actions.	还有威廉·卡雷，曾在1968年越战中指使自己手下的一个排大肆屠杀越南美莱村村民的美军中尉也终于打破对媒体的沉默，并为他的行为道歉。


When should we forgive or show mercy to wrongdoers?	我们什么时候才需要去原谅或者宽恕做错事的人？


Many societies treat crimes involving cruelty to animals far too lightly, but Vick’s penalty – 23 months in prison – was substantial.	许多国家对虐待动物罪行的判罚都很轻，但对维克所受的惩罚——服刑23个月——则是实实在在的。


In addition to imprisonment, he missed two years of his playing career, and millions of dollars in earnings.	除了坐牢之外，他还损失了两年的运动员生涯，以及数百万美元薪金。


If Vick were never to play football again, he would suffer punishment well beyond that imposed by the court.	如果维克此生不能重回赛场，那么他所遭受的痛苦将比法庭的判罚有过之而无不及。


Vick has expressed remorse.	维克已经表示了他的忏悔。


Perhaps more importantly, he has turned words into deeds, volunteering at an animal shelter and working with the Humane Society of the United States to oppose dog fighting.	可能更重要的是，他并不只是嘴上说说，而是在一间动物保护站当了义工，并和美国动物保护协会联手反对斗狗行为。


It is hard to see what good would come from not allowing him to complete his rehabilitation and return to doing what he does best.	可见如果不让他得以恢复名誉并一展所长的话，也就难以看到一些可喜的结果。


Megrahi was convicted of murdering 270 people, and sentenced to life imprisonment.	梅格拉希被判定谋杀了270人，判处无期徒刑。


He had served only seven years when Kenny MacAskill, the Scottish Justice Minister, released him on compassionate grounds, based on a medical report that Megrahi has terminal cancer, and only three months to live.	但在只坐了7年牢之后，他就被苏格兰司法部长肯尼·麦克阿斯基尔基于同情的立场释放了，因为一份检查报告说梅格拉希患了末期癌症，只剩3个月命了。


The question of remorse has not arisen, because Megrahi has never admitted guilt, and did not drop an appeal against his conviction until just before his release.	关于忏悔自责的问题都没有下文，因为梅氏从来都没有认罪，甚至到被释放之前都没有放弃上诉。


Doubts have been raised about whether Megrahi is really near death.	有人质疑梅格拉希是否真的是病入膏肓。


Only the prison doctor, it seems, was prepared to say that he did not have more than three months to live, while four specialists refused to say how long he might have.	因为似乎只有驻监狱的大夫确认此人只有3个月命，而另外4名专家都不愿说明梅格拉希还有多少日子。


There has also been speculation that Megrahi’s release was related to negotiations over oil contracts between Britain and Libya.	还有质疑说梅格拉希的获释其实是和英国利比亚两国的石油合同有关。


Finally, some question whether Megrahi really was the perpetrator of the crime, and this may have played a role in MacAskill’s decision (although, if so, that would have been better left to the courts to resolve).	最后还有人质疑梅格拉希是否就是空难的真正制造者，而这可能对麦克阿斯基尔的决定有点影响（但这问题还是留给法庭判定比较好）。


But let us leave such questions aside for the moment.	不过让我们暂时把这些答案放在一边。


Assuming that Megrahi was guilty, and that he was released because he has only a short time to live, does a prisoner’s terminal illness justify compassionate release?	假设梅格拉希被判有罪，然后因为他小命不长而被释放，那么是不是一个囚犯得了末期重症就意味着一定要本着同情心而释放他呢？


The answer might depend on the nature of the crime, the length of the sentence, and the proportion of it that remains to be served.	答案可能要依据犯罪的性质，刑期的长短，以及还有多少刑期没有服完来决定。


For a pickpocket who has served half of a two-year sentence, it would be excessively harsh to insist on the sentence being served in full if that meant that he would die in prison, rather than with his family.	对于一个判了两年也服了一年刑的扒手来说，如果在得知此人命不久矣的情况下还坚持让他蹲够两年而不是和家人共度残生，那显然是不近人情的。


But to release a man who served only seven years of a life sentence for mass murder is a very different matter.	但如果一个人因屠杀罪而被判终身监禁，却在7年牢狱之后就获准出狱，情况就复杂得多。


As the victims’ relatives point out, in planning his crime, Megrahi showed no compassion. Why, they ask, should we show compassion to him?	正如洛克比空难遇难者的家属指出，梅格拉希在策划整场屠杀时都毫无怜悯之心，那我们又凭什么去宽恕他？


MacAskill, in a statement to the Scottish Parliament defending his decision, refrained from quoting from the best-known speech on mercy in the English language – that of Portia in Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice – but Portia’s words would have fitted the core of his statement.	麦克阿斯基尔在一份呈交苏格兰议会，为他的决定辩护的声明中，没有引用英语世界中关于仁慈的最有名的名言——出自莎士比亚名剧《威尼斯商人》中的女主人公波蒂亚——但波蒂亚的话显然最符合麦氏声明的核心内容。


Portia acknowledges that Shylock is under no obligation to show mercy to Antonio, who is in breach of his agreement to him.	在剧中，波蒂亚承认犹太商人夏洛克根本没义务去饶恕安东尼奥，因为后者违反了和夏洛克订下了协议。


“The quality of mercy is not strained” – that is, constrained, or obligatory – she tells Shylock, but rather something that falls freely, like rain.	“慈悲不是能强求的”——确切地说，不是强迫的，也不是什么义务——波蒂亚对夏洛克如是说，在她看来慈悲是某些像雨点一样，只能自发从天而降，可遇而不可求的东西。


MacAskill acknowledged that Megrahi himself showed no compassion, but rightly points out that this alone is not a reason to deny him compassion in his final days.	麦克阿斯基尔承认梅格拉希本人至今对空难都还毫无忏悔，但认为这并不是人们因此拒绝怜悯一个病入膏肓，时日无多的老人的理由。


He then appeals to the values of humanity, compassion, and mercy as “the beliefs we seek to live by” and frames his decision as being true to Scottish values.	他接着指出人道、怜悯和宽恕才是“支撑我们生命的信仰”，并表明他的决定是忠于苏格兰价值观的。


We can reasonably disagree with MacAskill’s decision, but we should acknowledge that – unless there is more going on than appears on the surface – he was motivated by some of the finest values we are capable of exercising.	我们有理由去否定麦克阿斯基尔的决定，但我们同时也必须承认——除非事情另有隐情——他是被我们所能实践的某种最崇高的价值所感召。


And, if we believe that Megrahi was not sufficiently punished for his crime, what are we to make of the treatment of former Lieutenant William Calley?	此外，如果我们都认为梅格拉希所受的惩罚根本不能偿还他的罪孽，那么对于前美国陆军中尉威廉·卡尼所受到的待遇，我们将作何反应？


In 1971, Calley was convicted of the murder of “no less than 22 Vietnamese civilians of undetermined age and sex.”	在1971年，卡雷被判犯屠杀“不少于22名性别、年龄不明的越南平民”罪名成立。


He was also convicted of assault with intent to murder a Vietnamese child.	同时成立的还有企图谋杀一名越南儿童的罪名。


Yet three days – yes, days – after his conviction, President Richard Nixon ordered that he be released from prison and allowed to serve his sentence in a comfortable two-bedroom house.	但仅仅宣判在三天之后，理查德·尼克松总统却宣布将卡梅移出监狱，转而在一间拥有两个睡房的舒适大屋内服刑。


There he lived with a female companion and a staff to assist him.	他在屋内甚至还有一位女性同伴和一个助手。


After three years, he was released even from this form of detention.	在三年之后，甚至对卡雷的这种软禁方式都被解除了。


Calley always claimed that he was following orders.	卡雷总是坚持说他只是在执行命令。


Captain Ernest Medina, his commanding officer, ordered him to burn the village down and pollute its wells, but there is no clear evidence that the order included killing non-combatants – and of course if such an order were issued, it should not have been obeyed.	他的上级恩内斯特·梅迪纳上尉命令他焚毁整条村子并污染水井，但没有明确证据证明这条命令还包括屠杀非武装人员——而就算有这么一条，卡雷也应该不予执行。


(Medina was acquitted of murder.)	（梅迪纳被判谋杀罪名不成立）


After decades of refusing to speak publicly, Calley, who is now 66, recently said that “not a day goes by” when he does not feel remorse “for what happened that day in My Lai.”	在对外界保持了数十年的沉默之后，现年66岁的卡雷最近说，他“在生命中的每一天”都对“在美莱村发生的一切”感到无比自责。


One wonders if the relatives of those murdered at My Lai are more ready to forgive Calley than the relatives of those killed at Lockerbie are to forgive Megrahi.	只是不知道那些美莱村大屠杀受害者的亲属对卡雷的宽恕，是否会比洛克比空难遇难者的亲人们对梅格拉希的宽恕更加仁慈？


The Quest for Investment	寻找投资


The Hong Kong meeting of the Doha Round of trade negotiations has left a palpable sense of frustration in the developing world over the slow pace of agricultural liberalization agreed to by the rich countries.	多哈回合贸易谈判香港会议的结果令发展中国家感到万分沮丧，因为富裕国家在农业自由化问题上的进展极为缓慢。


It may thus appear naive and counterproductive to raise the bar and suggest that we need to go beyond trade and move investment to the top of our priority list.	因此进一步提高要求，要求跨过贸易而把投资作为我们首要议题的想法显然不仅天真、而且有害。


Yet can any “development round” worthy of its name ignore this challenge?	但真正名副其实的“发展回合”能否忽视这样的挑战？


It had originally been intended that the Doha Round would address investment, but the developing countries chose to downgrade the issue and concentrate on agriculture instead.	多哈回合谈判本打算探讨投资问题，但发展中国家却选择降低议题等级，把重点转移到农业问题上。


This tactic has proven to be a two-edged sword.	事实证明，这样的策略利弊参半。


In China, Brazil, Malaysia, and Mexico, foreign direct investment (FDI) accounts for 8% to 12% of gross fixed capital formation – without generating debt.	在中国、巴西、马来西亚和墨西哥，国外直接投资（FDI）占到了固定资产构成总额的8%到12%¾而且不增加任何债务负担。


Although the least developed countries attract less than 3% of north-south investments, these flows account for more than 3% of their GDP, a level higher than the average for developing countries.	尽管最不发达国家吸引的投资还不到北南投资总数的3%，但这些投资在其国内生产总值中所占的比例却达到了3%以上，高于发展中国家的平均水平。


In hopes of stimulating FDI, bilateral agreements have multiplied, but they rarely lead to balanced commitments.	为了鼓励直接外资，双边协议大量出现，但发达国家和发展中国家所做的努力却极不平衡。


Competition among countries to attract investors is intense, and only a few, such as China or India, are able to negotiate on equal terms with the industrialized world.	各国之间吸引投资者的竞争异常激烈，但只有少数几个国家，比如中国或印度，能够与工业化国家进行平等的谈判。


The developing countries, therefore, have an interest in calling for multilateral dialogue on investment conditions in order to obtain certain collective guarantees.	因此，发展中国家呼吁就投资条件开展多边对话，以便得到一些适用于所有国家的保证。


Indeed, without returning to the illusion of economic planning, these countries need to be able to set conditions for foreign investors that aim to maximize the local impact on employment, technological diffusion, strategic partnerships, and so forth.	的确，这些国家需要为国外投资者创造条件，但却不能重蹈计划经济梦想的覆辙。 国外投资者的目标是尽可能扩大对当地就业、技术传播以及战略合作的影响。


At the same time, developing countries may need to promote local private sectors and “infant industries” through temporary protectionist measures, which would help them to upgrade their output on the road to liberalization.	与此同时，发展中国家可能要采取临时保护措施，促进当地私有部门和“稚嫩工业”的发展，这可以让他们在自由化的道路上逐渐扩大生产规模。


There is nothing heretical about such proposals.	这样的建议丝毫不值得大惊小怪。


After all, the developed countries have done much the same thing.	归根结蒂，发达国家也经历过类似的阶段。


In the nineteenth century, the United States restricted foreign investment in several sectors, including finance.	19世纪时，美国对若干行业的外资进行了限制，金融行业也名列其中。


Today, both the US and the European Union keep a close watch on international acquisitions. The emerging countries of Asia similarly depart from the pure liberal model.	今天，美国和欧盟都对国际兼并进行严格的兼管，而亚洲新兴国家也放弃了纯粹的自由发展模式。


Even Ireland, the champion of economic liberalization, has now turned to a more selective approach.	即便是经济自由化之王爱尔兰现在也开始更有选择地进行吸收。


Refusal to recognize the legitimacy of such strategies caused the collapse of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment in 1998, after three years of negotiations between the OECD countries.	拒绝承认这种策略合理的一面使经合组织国家在经历为时3年的谈判后，还是在 1998年宣告《多边投资协定》的失败。


The project was perceived – rightly so – as amounting to a surrender of sovereignty, because it introduced a rigid principle of non-discrimination between foreign and local companies that would eliminate the host country’s room for maneuver without offering anything in return.	很多国家理所当然的认为推行这项计划就意味着放弃主权，因为它要求对国外和当地公司严格执行非歧视性政策，使东道国完全丧失腾挪的空间，却根本得不到任何回报。


Such a prospect would be even less acceptable to developing countries.	这样的计划对发展中国家来讲更加难以接受。


Under what conditions can one reasonably hope to restart a multilateral agreement on investment?	在什么样的条件下，人们可以对重新制定《多边投资协定》进行合理的期盼？


To be viable, such an agreement must recognize the legitimate need for some regulation. It would also need to help poor countries cope with the quasi-generalization of “social and environmental responsibility” standards that are increasingly shaping corporate practices and consumer demand.	要想真正贯彻下去，这份协议就必须承认存在合理的管理需求，还必须帮助贫困国家适应对企业行为和消费者需求影响越来越大的“社会环境义务”标准。


It should incorporate an investor code of ethics, as well as a formula for sharing the costs of implementing such standards among the state, foreign operators, and local sub-contractors.	《协议》还应该制定投资者道德准则，以及要求国家、国外经营者和当地分包商共同承担标准执行费用的具体办法。


Of course, imposing the same investment conditions in all countries could take away the incentive to invest in the least attractive of them.	当然，要求所有国家创造同样的投资条件可能会扼杀在最缺乏吸引力国家进行投资的积极性。


But an agreement could be reached to establish categories of countries, the most important aim being to prevent dumping between countries that are at the same stage of development.	但我们可以达成协议，把国家划分为不同的类别，这样做最重要的目的是防止处在同一发展阶段的国家相互展开倾销。


To succeed, a multilateral negotiation would also need to address the expectations of foreign operators, who want assurances that their investments are safe.	要想取得成功，还需要进行多边谈判，以满足国外经营者的需求，确保他们的投资安全。


An agreement should contain provisions to improve the business environment – its transparency and predictability – by setting a framework for state intervention without stripping government of its prerogatives.	协议应该含有改善商业环境的条款¾提高它的透明度和可预见性，具体的方法是建立国家干预构架，而不剥夺政府拥有的特权。


This would reduce the probability of crises while putting in place mechanisms for cost-sharing should they occur.	这样做会在有朝一日采纳费用共担机制的时候，降低爆发危机的可能性。


No multilateral investment agreement will be able to address all of the institutional problems and market failures that prevent capital from flowing to developing countries.	没有哪个多边投资协定能彻底解决阻碍资金流入发展中国家的制度问题、弥补市场缺陷。


Some economists point to imperfect information, which precludes companies from considering the higher returns on investment available in the developing world.	有些经济学家指出信息搜集还很不完善，这使很多企业认为在发展中国家不存在取得高额投资回报的机会。


If this view is correct, an agreement could create new instruments for disseminating information, while signaling poor countries’ commitment to welcoming FDI.	如果这种说法正确，那么这份协议能够成为传播信息的最新工具，同时，这份协议也表达了贫困国家迎接国外直接投资的决心。


Other analysts point to the increasing returns that accompany greater concentration of investment – a force that works to the disadvantage of poor countries.	其它分析家指出集中投资会带来更多利润，这一点对贫困国家非常不利。


At the very least, a multilateral negotiation would provide an occasion to recognize the existence of the problem, reflect on how best to coordinate investments, and help move development assistance accordingly.	至少，多边谈判应该承认这一问题的存在，思考如何才能更好地加以协调，并对调动发展援助给予相应的帮助。


Despite the complexity involved and the need for technical assistance to the weakest nations in the negotiation, a multilateral investment agreement should be among the top priorities on the international agenda.	尽管这项谈判非常复杂，需要为最弱小的国家提供技术援助，但多边投资协议仍然应该是国际日程表上的一项首要任务。


Indeed, whereas agricultural trade issues put rich and poor countries’ national interests on a collision course, promoting investment flows to the developing world could unify all countries around a shared objective.	事实上，尽管农业贸易问题使富国和穷国的利益趋于对立，但促进资金向发展中世界流动却能够让所有国家团结在共同的目标周围。


The Questions of Europe	欧洲的问题


In the weeks since France and the Netherlands rejected the European Union’s proposed Constitutional Treaty, the EU’s leaders have been busy pointing fingers at each other or blaming French and Dutch citizens for misunderstanding the question they were asked.	在法国和荷兰对欧盟提议的宪法条约表示反对后的几周内，欧盟领导人忙于相互埋怨或责备法国和荷兰公民误解了他们需要解决的问题。


But no pan-European statesman has emerged, and no major European institution has even had the courage to provide its own analysis of the current situation, much less propose a strategic scenario for the future.	但是还没有一位能代表全欧洲声音的政治家出现，也没有任何欧洲主要组织有勇气对当前形势发表自己的见解，更不用说对将来提议一个战略性计划。


To be sure, French and Dutch citizens did not respond to the question that they were supposed to answer.	当然，法国和荷兰公民并没有对他们应该回答的问题作出回应。


Their vote was a protest against globalization, a rejection of the contemporary world, with its distant and incomprehensible governing mechanisms.	他们的反对是对全球化的抗议，是对当今世界不近人情且不可理喻的管理体制的反抗。


Like the anti-globalization movement, the new anti-Europeanism can be regarded as a demand for a different European model – an “alter-Europeanism.”	正如反全球化运动一样，新反欧洲主义可以被看作对一个不同的欧洲模式的需求——一种“改变欧洲主义”。


The issue, therefore, is not what Tony Blair, in his inaugural speech to the European Parliament, called a crisis of leadership.	因此，问题并非托尼·布莱尔在他对欧洲议会的就职演说中所说的领导能力危机。


No statesman has emerged because the crisis runs deeper.	没有政治家出头是因为这个危机更深了。


The two world wars and the Cold War shaped European integration as a project of peace, a defense of the West’s fundamental values, and common economic prosperity.	两次世界大战和冷战将欧洲整合进程塑造为一个和平计划，一种对西方基本价值观的防卫手段以及共同的经济繁荣。


This phase culminated with the collapse of communism in 1989, but the chance to overcome the Continent’s historical divisions now required a redefinition of the European project.	这种状态随着1989年共产主义崩溃而达至巅峰，但是克服欧洲大陆历史性分裂的机遇现在需要重新定义欧洲计划。


The treaties of Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam (1997) created a new organizational structure for the EU and laid the foundations for political institutions equal to Europe’s economic power.	马斯特里赫特条约（1992年）和阿姆斯特丹条约（1997年）为欧盟创立了一个新组织结构并将政治体制的基础等同于欧洲的经济力量。


When politicians debated the EU’s future, they spoke of “finality” – the end formula of European integration, as defined in a famous lecture by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in 2000.	当政治家们为欧盟的将来辩论时，他们谈到“最终”——欧洲整合的最终方案，正如德国外交部部长约施卡·菲舍尔(Joschka Fischer)在其2000年著名的演讲中所定义的那样。


The accompanying intellectual debate, inaugurated by the philosophers Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, defined the nature of European identity, above all, against the foil of the United States, but also in terms of the challenges posed by globalization.	伴随而至的、由哲学家Jürgen Habermas和Jacques Derrida发起的知识界辩论首先从反对美国进犯、但同时也根据全球化带来的挑战角度定义了欧洲身份的特性。


That debate must continue, even if the French and Dutch referenda appear to have killed the Constitutional Treaty.	辩论必须继续，即使从表面看来法国和荷兰的公投已经扼杀了宪法条约。


The EU will continue to be governed under the Nice Treaty of 2000, but this leaves no room for further political integration (or enlargement), nor does it ensure the effective functioning of the Union’s institutions.	欧盟将继续受到尼斯条约的治理，但是这却没有给进一步的政治整合（或者扩大）留下丝毫空间，也不能保证欧盟各种制度的有效运行。


Drafting a new constitutional treaty would probably require even more time than was needed for the current proposal, and it is also unlikely that the necessary changes could be introduced through an intergovernmental conference.	起草一份新的宪法条约可能比起草现行提议需要更多时间，而且也不太可能通过一个跨政府会议引进一些必要改变。


The only viable course, then, is to use today’s “pause for reflection” to revive the existing Constitutional Treaty.	那么，唯一可行的办法是使用今天“停顿以反省”的方法以恢复现存的宪法条约。


This would require prolonging the ratification deadline until 2008.	这将要求把批准宪法的最后日期延缓至2008年。


It also requires specifying a common date for ratification (through simultaneous referenda or parliamentary votes) for all countries that have not yet done so, including France and the Netherlands.	它也要求为所有还没有通过宪法的国家定下一个共同批准日期（通过同时举行的公民投票或国会投票），包括法国和荷兰在内。


In other words, the current “pause for reflection” is not the time to change the draft’s text (although the intergovernmental conference could move the third part, which harmonizes the earlier treaties, to an annex).	换而言之，目前“停顿以反省” 并非改变草案内容之时（尽管跨政府会议能够将协调先前条约的第三部分移至附属条约）。


Rather, the task is to alter the political and socio-psychological context of the ratification process by addressing key questions.	现在的任务就是通过解决那些主要问题来改变宪法批准进程的政治和社会-心理环境。


First, how should relations between national and common European interests be defined?	首先，该如何定义国家与欧洲共同利益之间的关系？


At issue is not only the allocation of competencies, but also the more fundamental matter of when to rely on intergovernmental institutions and when to turn to the European people as a whole.	争论的焦点不仅仅在于各国能力的分配，更为基本的问题是何时依赖于跨政府机制以及它们何时能够作为一个整体来面对欧洲人民。


The European Council, which represents member states in the structures of the Union, could be given a more public character.	在欧盟框架内代表了各成员国的欧洲理事会，也许将被赋予更多的公共性质。


It could then be seen, in a bicameral system, as a kind of “Chamber of Nations” within the framework of what Jacques Delors called a “federation of nation states.”	那么，在一个两院制体系内，它可能被看作Jacques Delors所称的“国家联邦”框架内的某种“国家议会”。


The second question concerns the EU’s scope.	第二个问题有关欧盟的范围。


Europe is a peculiar combination of geography and history, but the boundaries of the EU – and thus the prospects for its further enlargement – are determined by its absorptive capacity and the adaptive abilities of candidate countries.	欧洲是一个地理和历史的独特结合体，但是欧洲的边界——以及它未来扩大的前景——是由成员国的容纳能力和适应能力所决定的。


Is enlargement the only effective policy of stabilization and peace?	欧盟扩大是唯一有效的保持稳定和和平的政策吗？


Or can the “neighborhood policy” become an instrument for supporting development and stabilization, much as the Marshall Plan once was for Western Europe?	抑或“睦邻政策”可以成为一个支持发展和稳定的手段，就像马歇尔计划曾经对西欧那样帮助良多吗？


Third, instead of futile opposition between “liberal” and “social” models of economic development, we need a confrontation of the experiences of Great Britain and Sweden, on the one hand, and Germany and France, on the other.	第三点，我们需要的不是“自由主义”与“社会主义”经济发展模式之间的无效对立，我们需要的既有英国和瑞典、也有德国和法国的经验之间的一次碰撞。


Are these experiences mutually exclusive, or is convergence possible?	这些经验互为排斥还是有可能融会贯通？


What policies reduce unemployment?	何种政策能够降低失业率？


Which measures can ensure the EU’s global competitiveness?	何种措施才能保证欧盟的全球竞争力？


How can we narrow the existing differences in development and material welfare within Europe?	我们如何能够缩小欧洲境内目前在发展和物质福利方面的差距？


Fourth, the EU’s aspiration for a common foreign and security policy must be addressed.	第四点，必须着手实现欧盟对一个拥有共同外交和安全政策的期望。


The threats facing the world today are supranational, so counteracting them must be supranational, too.	今日全球面临的威胁是超民族的，因此也必须采取超民族的方式来应对。


But this is impossible without a clear European identity – and thus a common interest to be asserted and defended.	但是如果没有一个明确的欧洲身份，这点就难以做到——因而也不能断言或保卫共同利益。


In the aftermath of the French and Dutch referenda, the European Commission and the European Parliament have sketched plans for a Europe-wide debate on these issues.	在法国和荷兰公投后期，欧洲委员会和欧洲议会已经草拟了一份在全欧洲内开展辩论这些问题的计划。


But such a debate also demands an organizational framework to engage European civil society, national parliaments, and pan-European mass media.	但是这样一种辩论也需要一个组织性的框架以使欧洲民间、国家议会以及全欧洲的媒体参与其中。


Democracy carries certain costs, but they are always lower than the costs of evading popular participation.	民主需要一定的代价，但是这种代价总是不及逃避大众参与的代价来得大。


Only a new European debate that embodies the common action of European citizens and institutions can combat “alter-Europeanism” effectively.	只有一个全新的、能代表欧洲公民及组织行动的欧洲辩论才能有效抵御“改变欧洲主义”。


The time may not have come for a true European constitution, but confronting, rather than evading, the fundamental issues that the EU faces could create the proper context for reviving the constitutional treaty and preparing the Union for the challenges of our time.	或许制定一部真正的欧州宪法尚未“时机成熟”，但直面、而非逃避欧盟所面临的基本问题可以创造出一个恢复宪法条约的合适环境并使得欧盟为这个时代的挑战做好准备。


The Rape of Freedom in Burma	缅甸的自由遭到奸污


Gender-based sexual violence obstructs peace and development, particularly when it is a weapon used by military dictatorships against their own peoples.	基于性别的性暴力阻碍和平和发展，特别是当军事独裁者把它作为镇压自己人民的武器时尤其如此。


Burma is now permeated by such state-sponsored violence.	而此类由国家扶持的暴力正在缅甸漫延。


Systematic sexual violence became visible in Burma when the Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN) and the Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) published Licence to Rape , which documents 625 cases of rape committed by the military in eastern Burma between 1996 and 2001. The report noted that nobody had been prosecuted.	当掸族妇女行动网络(SWAN)和掸族人权基金会(SHRF)发表“强奸许可”一文，记述1996年至2001年间军队在缅甸东部犯下的625个强奸案例时，缅甸的系统化性暴力就昭然若揭了。


Burma is suffering the impact of decades of civil war.	缅甸正在遭受数十年之久的内战影响。


Civilians have become the main victims of a strategy aimed at undermining the guerrillas, which has resulted in forced labor, the use of human minesweepers, and massive relocations of entire villages.	平民成为削弱游击队战略的主要受害者，结果造成强制劳工、使用人体扫雷以及大规模的整座村庄的迁徙。


There are now an estimated 600,000 to one million internal refugees.	现在估计有60万到一百万的国内难民。


SWAN and SHRF argue that rape is used as a weapon in the Burmese military’s war against ethnic minorities.	SWAN和SHRF认为，缅甸军队正在把强奸作为武器来对付少数族裔。


Women and girls are particularly vulnerable – owing to gender as well as ethnicity – to a horrific practice whose aim is to demonstrate the army’s power and punish those who confront it.	由于性别和种族原因，妇女和女孩特别容易受到这一可怕做法的伤害。 这一做法的目的是展示军队的力量，并且惩罚那些敢于抵制的人。


When the army enters a village, chaos erupts.	当军队进入一个村庄的时候，骚乱就会爆发。


Villagers are killed or ordered to pack their belongings and leave.	村民们遭到杀戮，或者被命令收拾行装离开。


Several of the reported rapes took place under such conditions, or when women are taken for forced labor.	几个得到报导的强奸案就是这样发生的，或者当妇女们被带走强迫劳工之时发生。


Many victims have fled Burma.	许多受害者逃离了缅甸。


SWAN and SHRF learned of many cases from women who arrived in Thailand.	SWAN和SHRF从一些抵达泰国的妇女那里了解到许多这样的案例。


In February 2006, we visited a refugee camp on the Thai-Burma border and learned first hand of war and abuse.	2006年2月，我们访问了泰缅边境的一个难民营，了解到了有关战争和奸污的第一手情况。


Licence to Rape has attracted wide attention in Southeast Asia.	“强奸许可”一文在东南亚引起广泛关注。


Kraisak Choonhavan, Chairman of the Thai Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee and Vice Chairperson of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus (AIPMC), called for an investigation by the United Nations.	泰国参议院外交关系委员会主席和东盟议会间缅甸党团(AIPMC) 副主席Kraisak Choonhavan呼吁联合国进行调查。


So did the UN General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Commission.	联合国大会和联合国人权委员会也发出了同样的呼吁。


Rape brings stigma, shame, and reluctance on the part of victims to speak out about what happened to them.	强奸带给受害者的是耻辱、羞愧以及不情愿，让她们说出她们的经历。


But an increasing number of women and girls from Burma have begun to tell of their experiences of rape and other forms of sexual violence in the country’s war-torn areas.	但是，越来越多的缅甸妇女和女孩子们已经开始讲述她们在该国饱受战乱之苦的地区被强奸的经历和其他形式的性暴力。


Army deserters confirm that rapes have occurred.	陆军的逃兵们证实强奸确实发生过。


And the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women has published material that corroborates information in Licence to Rape and adds numerous new cases from Burma.	联合国针对妇女暴力特别汇报员发表材料，证实了“强奸许可”一文并且增加了许多来自缅甸的案例。


Nevertheless, four years on, a UN investigation has yet to take place, because the military junta refuses to grant the UN access to the country.	但是，四年以来，联合国调查一直没有进行，因为缅甸军人集团拒绝允许联合国进入该国。


Incidents of rape continue to be reported, and the Burmese military surely must know what is happening.	强奸事件继续得到报道，而缅甸军队当然知道所发生的事情。


But the junta engages in Orwellian doublethink.	但是，军人集团却进行奥威尔式的双重考虑。


It has rejected the reports, instead launching its own investigations whose conduct and staffing leave no room for confidence in their credibility.	它拒绝报告，却开展自己的调查，而调查的行为和人员组成却无法让人对其可信度抱有信心。


National governments and the international community have an obligation to protect women and children against abuse.	各国政府和国际社会有义务保护妇女和儿童不受欺辱。


In 2000, the UN Security Council recognized that gender-based violence thwarts security and adopted Resolution 1325, which calls on parties in conflict to respect the rights of women and children, and particularly to prevent gender-based violence.	2000年，联合国安理会认识到基于性别的暴力破坏安全并通过1325号决议。 该决议呼吁冲突各方尊重妇女和儿童的权利，特别是防止基于性别的暴力。


In 2004, the governments of ASEAN vowed to end the impunity states like Burma have enjoyed and signed the Declaration to Eliminate Violence Against Women in the ASEAN Region.	2004年，东盟国家发誓结束像缅甸那样的国家当豁免，并且签署了在东盟地区消除针对妇女的暴力宣言。


Burma is failing miserably to live up to the standards of decency that the Southeast Asian region is setting for itself.	缅甸根本没有达到东盟各国为其自己制定的情理标准。


It has ratified the UN Convention to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.	缅甸批准了联合国消除歧视妇女公约以及联合国儿童权利公约。


Moreover, a national committee exists for the advancement of women. But such measures are of no use when the military remains firmly in control, the rule of law is absent, and the government refuses to admit to the systematic sexual violence committed by its soldiers as they terrorize the population.	但是，如果军人牢牢掌权、没有法制并且政府拒绝承认其士兵所犯下的有系统的性暴力、恐吓人民时，这些措施就形同虚设。


ASEAN cannot afford to stand by idly. Neither can the international community.	东盟和国际社会都不能袖手旁观。


Such abuse of power is inadmissible, and we expect ASEAN to address the military’s use of rape in the conflict in Burma.	这种滥用权力是无法接受的，我们希望东盟处理在缅甸的冲突中军队使用强奸的问题。


We urge the UN Security Council to raise the issue.	我们敦促联合国安理会过问此事。


All of Burma’s people deserve security, and refugee women and girls who have experienced gender-based violence need the world’s solidarity and support.	缅甸的所有人都应得���安全，经历了基于性别的暴力的难民妇女和儿童需要世界的团结和支持。


Whose Central Bank?	谁的中央银行?


BERKELEY – Broadly speaking, for at least 115 years (and possibly longer) – that is, at least since the publication of the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell’s Geldzins und Güterpreis (Interest and Prices) in 1898 – economists have split into two camps with respect to what a central bank is and the purposes it should serve.	伯克利—从广义上说，关于什么是中央银行以及中央银行应该服务于什么目的这个问题，经济学家分裂为两个阵营至少已经有115年（或许还要长）的历史了，也就是说，至少从瑞典经济学家维克塞尔的《利息和价格》（Geldzins und Güterpreis）一书出版时就开始了。


One camp, call it the Banking Camp, regards a central bank as a bank for bankers.	其中一方可以称为银行阵营，它认为中央银行是银行的银行。


Its clients are the banks; it is a place where banks can go to borrow money when they really need to; and its functions are to support the banking sector so that banks can make their proper profits as they go about their proper business.	中央银行客户是银行； 银行可以在真正需要时向中央银行借钱，而中央银行的功能是支持银行部门，使银行可以在合理的业务经营中获得合理的利润。


Above all, the central bank must ensure that the money supply is large enough that mere illiquidity, rather than insolvency, does not force banks into bankruptcy and liquidation.	总而言之，中央银行必须确保货币供给足够大，仅仅出现流动性不足而非资不抵债情形不会迫使银行破产、走向清盘。


The other camp, call it the Macroeconomic Camp, views central banks as stewards of the economy as a whole.	另一方可以称为宏观经济阵营，它认为中央银行需要管理作为一个整体的经济。


A central bank’s job is to uphold in practice Say’s Law – the principle that output is balanced by demand, with neither too little demand to purchase what is produced (which would cause unemployment) nor too much (which would cause inflation) – because Say’s Law certainly does not hold in theory.	中央银行的责任是支持萨伊定律的实践——即产出由需求来平衡，使需求既不能太少以至于无法买走生产出来的东西（这会造成失业），也不能太多（这会造成通胀）——因为萨伊定律在理论上肯定是无法维持的。


In other words, a central bank’s primary responsibility is not to preserve the health of the firms that make up the banking sector, but rather to maintain the robust functioning of the economy as a whole.	换句话说，中央银行的首要责任不是保护企业健康、造就银行部门，而是维持作为一个整体的经济的鲁棒运行。


In the United States, from September 15, 2008 – the day that the investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy – until then-US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner announced in May 2009 that in his judgment the major US banks either had or could quickly raise adequate capital cushions, the two camps’ interests and conclusions were identical.	在美国，从2008年9月15日——投资银行雷曼兄弟倒闭破产的日子——到2009年5月时任美国财政部长盖特纳宣布据他判断美国各大银行要么已经、要么可以马上筹得足够的资本缓冲期间，这两大阵营的倾向和结论都是相同的。


For both, reducing the imbalance between aggregate supply and aggregate demand required, first and foremost, preserving the banking system; and preserving the banking system required boosting aggregate demand to bring it closer to aggregate supply.	不管哪个阵营都认为，减少总供给和总需求之间的失衡首先需要保护好银行系统； 而保护好银行系统需要提振总需求使其更接近总供给。


There was a lot of bank rescue in economic stimulus; and there was a lot of economic stimulus in rescuing banks.	在经济刺激中包括了大量银行援助； 在银行援助中包括了大量经济刺激。


Thereafter, the two camps’ interests and conclusions diverged sharply.	此后，这两大阵营的倾向和结论急剧分歧。


A prolonged and sustained central-bank policy of keeping short-term Treasury nominal interest rates low is essential to keeping the many interest rate-sensitive components of aggregate demand from falling even further below potential aggregate supply.	长期而持续地维持短期美国国债名义利率低水平的央行政策是维持许多利率敏感型总需求成分不会进一步萎靡、跌至潜在总需求之下的关键。


But, for investment banks, shadow banks, and especially commercial banks (with their expensive networks of branches and ATMs), such a policy makes it very difficult to report regular and healthy operating profits on their quarterly income statements and regular and healthy gains in their clients’ portfolios.	但是，对投资银行、影子银行、以及（特别是）商业银行来说（后者拥有昂贵的分支机构和ATM系统），这一政策时它们很难在季度利润表上报告稳定、健康的营业利润，也无法给它们的客户的投资组合带来健康的收益。


A prolonged and sustained central bank policy of purchasing ever-increasing quantities of long-term assets is essential to encourage a wary financial sector to use some of its risk-bearing capacity for its proper purpose: reducing the risk burden on entrepreneurship and enterprise.	购买不断增加的长期资产的长期、持续的央行政策对于鼓励心存疑虑的金融部门使用一些风险承担能力来实现合理目的——减少企业家精神和企业的风险负担来说至关重要。


But such a policy diminishes, and may even eliminate, financiers’ ability to take the easy route by riding the duration yield curve for profits.	但这一政策降低甚至消灭了金融家通过借助久期收益率曲线轻松地收获利润的能力。


From the standpoint of balancing aggregate demand and potential aggregate supply, the central bank should start by simply issuing a straightforward statement that, five years after the crisis began, a 0-2% target for annual inflation clearly runs unwarranted downside employment risks, and a 2-4% target is called for.	从平衡总需求和潜在总供给的角度看，中央银行应该从发布直接简单的目标开始——危机爆发五年后，0—2%的年度通胀目标显然不能保证就业风险下降，人们需要的是2—4%的通胀目标。


But, while such an announcement is an obvious no-brainer for those in the Macroeconomic Camp, it would make all bankers who hold nominal assets or who think in nominal terms physically ill.	但是，尽管如此宣告对于宏观经济阵营来说理所当然，但持有名义资产、以名义角度看问题的银行家就要如坐针毡了。


In terms of the US public interest – and that of the world – it is very important that whoever President Barack Obama nominates to succeed Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke when his term expires at the beginning of 2014 is from the Macroeconomic Camp.	从美国——以及全世界——公众利益角度讲，不管总统奥巴马任命谁接任伯南克出任美联储主席，一个极为重要的要点是他在2014年初的卸任是以宏观经济阵营成员的身份。


The world does not need a bankers’ central banker any more today than it did five years ago.	与五年前相比，世界已不再需要银行的中央银行。


The Real Danger of Global Warming	全球变暖的真正危险


PRAGUE – I am surprised at how so many people nowadays in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere have come to support policies underpinned by hysteria over global warming, particularly cap-and-trade legislation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and subsidies for “green” energy sources.	布拉格——看到今天在欧洲、美国和其他国家有这么多人开始支持由对全球变暖歇斯底里般的关注所支撑的政策，特别是降低温室气体排放的配额贸易法案和针对“绿色”能源的补贴，我感到非常诧异。


I am convinced that this is a misguided strategy – not only because of the uncertainty about the dangers that global warming might pose, but also because of the certainty of the damage that these proposed policies aimed at mitigation will impose.	我坚信这是一项受到误导的政策——这不仅因为我无法确定全球变暖可能带来的危险，还因为这些拟议中旨在减少排放的政策确定会带来损失。


I was invited to address this issue at a recent conference in Santa Barbara, California.	我应邀在加利福尼亚圣塔芭芭拉最近召开的一次会议上谈论这个话题。


My audience included business leaders who hope to profit from cap-and-trade policies and from subsidies for renewable energy and “green” jobs.	听众中包括希望从配额贸易政策、可再生能源补贴和“绿色”就业机会中获利的企业领袖。


My advice to them was to not get caught up in the hysteria.	我给他们的建议是不要过分关注这样的歇斯底里。


Europe is several years ahead of the US in implementing policies intended to mitigate global warming.	欧洲先于美国数年执行旨在缓解全球变暖的政策。


All of the European Union’s member countries have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and adopted a wide range of policies to lower their emissions and meet their Kyoto targets.	欧盟所有成员国都批准了《京都议定书》，并采取了一系列政策措施来降低排放，实现《京都议定书》的规定目标。


These policies include a cap-and-trade initiative known as the Emissions Trading Scheme, steep fuel taxes, and ambitious programs to build windmills and other renewable energy projects.	上述政策包括被称为排放贸易计划的配额贸易方案，高额的燃油税，以及建造风车和其他可再生能源项目的雄心勃勃的计划。


These policies were undertaken at a time when the EU economy was doing well and – one hopes – with full knowledge that they would have significant costs.	这些政策实行时欧盟经济状况还算不错——至少人们这样期望——当时人们就完全清楚这些政策将带来重大的开支。


With the global financial crisis and the sudden economic downturn, two things are becoming clear.	随着全球金融危机的爆发和经济的骤然下滑，有两个问题变得更加明确。


First, it will be difficult to afford these expensive new sources of energy.	首先，我们不具备使用这些昂贵新能源的经济能力。


Second, energy rationing policies like cap-and-trade will be a permanent drag on economic activity.	其次，像配额贸易这样的能源限额配给政策将成为对经济活动的一种永久性拖累。


Ironically, emissions have not decreased as a result of these policies, but are doing so now as the world economy moves into recession.	颇具讽刺意味的是，这些政策并没有成功地降低排放，而世界经济陷入衰退却达到了减排的目的。


This is not a surprise to someone like me, having been actively involved in my country’s transition from communism to a free society and market economy.	这在我这样的人看来算不得什么新鲜事，我曾经积极参与了我的祖国从共产主义到自由社会和市场经济的过渡。


The old, outmoded heavy industries that were the pride of our Communist regime were shut down – practically overnight – because they could not survive the opening of the economy.	曾经是共产主义政权骄傲的老的、过时的重工业几乎在一夜之间被关闭，因为它们无法适应开放的经济。


The result was a dramatic decline in CO2 emissions.	这导致了二氧化碳排放急剧下降的结果。


The secret behind the cut in emissions was economic decline.	经济衰退是减排背后的秘密。


As the economies of the Czech Republic and other central and eastern European countries were rebuilt and began to grow again, emissions have naturally started to increase.	随着捷克共和国和其他中东欧国家的重建和经济恢复，排放自然而然又开始增加。


It should be clear to everyone that there is a very strong correlation between economic growth and energy use.	人们必须认识到在经济增长和能源使用间存在着极强的关联度。


So I am amazed to see people going along with the currently fashionable political argument that policies like cap-and-trade, government mandates, and subsidies for renewable energy can actually benefit an economy.	因此每当看到有人赞同目前流行一时的政治口号，鼓吹像配额贸易、政府授权和可再生能源补贴这样的政策能够真正让经济受益时，我都会感觉惊讶不已。


It is claimed that government, working together with business, will create “a new energy economy,” that the businesses involved will profit, and that everyone will be better off.	有人声称政府将与企业界合作打造“新能源经济”，而参与其中的企业将会从中获利，每个人都会更加富裕。


This is a fantasy.	但这不过是幻想而已。


Cap-and-trade can only work by raising energy prices.	配额贸易只能通过提高能源价格发挥作用。


Consumers who are forced to pay higher prices for energy will have less money to spend on other things.	被迫为能源付出高价的消费者花在其他东西上的钱将会减少。


While the individual companies that provide the higher-priced “green” energy may do well, the net economic effect will be negative.	尽管提供高价“绿色”能源的公司能够过得不错，但净经济效果必然是负数。


It is necessary to look at the bigger picture.	我们有必要认清总体状况。


Profits can be made when energy is rationed or subsidized, but only within an economy operating at lower, or even negative, growth rates.	当能源实行配额或者补贴时仍然可以产生利润，但前提是经济陷入低速增长，甚至是负增长之中。


This means that over the longer term, everyone will be competing for a piece of a pie that is smaller than it would have been without energy rationing.	这意味着从长远来看，每个人都会为争得一块实行能源配给后缩水的馅饼而拼命竞争。


This does not auger well either for growth or for working our way out of today’s crisis.	这对经济发展和走出今天的危机都不是什么好兆头。


The Reality of Virtual Power	虚拟实力的现实


DAVOS – As Arab regimes struggle with demonstrations fueled by Twitter and Al Jazeera, and American diplomats try to understand the impact of WikiLeaks, it is clear that this global information age will require a more sophisticated understanding of how power works in world politics.	发自达沃斯——当阿拉伯国家政权在Twitter和半岛电视台推动的民众示威浪潮中苦苦挣扎，而美国外交官们则尝试理解维基解密网站的巨大威力之时，有一点是显而易见的，那就是在这个全球信息时代，我们需要更深刻地了解权力是如何在世界政治中运行的。


That is the argument of my new book, The Future of Power.	而这也是笔者在新书《权力的未来》中想要阐述的观点。


Two types of power shifts are occurring in this century – power transition and power diffusion.	21世纪正进行着两种关于权力的变革——一种是权力的转移，另一种则是权力的扩散。


The transition of power from one dominant state to another is a familiar historical pattern, but power diffusion is a more novel process.	前者意味着权力从一个占统治地位的国家转移到另一个，这在历史上早已屡见不鲜了，而后者则是个更为新颖的过程。


The problem for all states today is that more is happening outside the control of even the most powerful of them.	但当今所有国家所共同面对的问题，就是连最强大的国家都无法完全控制政治生活的方方面面。


As for power transition, much attention nowadays is lavished on a supposed American decline, often with facile historical analogies to Britain and Rome.	在权力转移方面，人们将过多的精力浪费在了假想中的美国衰退上，并常常将其比作历史上的英国和罗马。


But Rome remained dominant for more than three centuries after the apogee of its power, and, even then, it did not succumb to the rise of another state, but suffered a death by a thousand cuts inflicted by various barbarian tribes.	须知罗马在到达权力巅峰后的三个世纪内还依然保持着统治地位，它也并非陷落于另一个国家的崛起之中，而是在无数野蛮部落的蚕食下走向了灭亡。


Indeed, for all the fashionable predictions that China, India, or Brazil will surpass the United States in the coming decades, the greatest threats may come from modern barbarians and non-state actors.	事实上，相对于那些预言中国，印度或者巴西将在未来几十年内压倒美国的时髦论调，真正的威胁其实来自那些当代的“野蛮人”以及非国家参与者。


In an information-based world of cyber-insecurity, power diffusion may be a greater threat than power transition.	在这个缺乏网络安全的信息化世界上，权力的扩散要比转移威胁更大。


What will it mean to wield power in the global information age of the twenty-first century?	那么在这个21世纪的全球信息化时代，权力的运用意味着什么？


Which resources will produce power?	权力的来源又是什么呢？


Every age produces its own answers.	在16世纪，西班牙靠着对殖民地以及黄金的控制占了上风； 17世纪的荷兰则从贸易和金融中大获其利；


In the sixteenth century, control of colonies and gold bullion gave Spain the edge; seventeenth-century Holland profited from trade and finance; eighteenth-century France gained from its larger population and armies; and nineteenth-century British power rested on industrial and naval primacy.	18世纪的法国凭借庞大的人口和军队独占鳌头； 而19世纪的英国则借助以工业和海军建设为先的手段。


Conventional wisdom has always held that the state with the largest military prevails.	传统观念认为那些拥有最强大军事力量的国家将夺得优势。


In an information age, however, it may be the state (or non-state) with the best story that wins.	但在信息时代，真正的赢家是那些最会讲故事的国家（或非国家组织）。


Today, it is far from clear how to measure a balance of power, much less how to develop successful survival strategies for this new world.	如今早已没有什么可靠手段足以衡量各方实力消长，更谈不上如何在这个新世界中指定成功的生存策略了。


Most current projections of a shift in the global balance of power are based primarily on one factor: projections of countries’ GDP growth.	大多数与全球权力均衡转换有关的预测都主要基于一个指标：对某国GDP发展的预测。


They thus ignore the other dimensions of power, including both hard military power and the soft power of narrative, not to mention the policy difficulties of combining them into successful strategies.	但这一方法也忽视了权力的其他方面，比如军事硬实力和述事的软实力，更不用说将这两大因素整合到国家战略中的政策难度了。


States will remain the dominant actor on the world stage, but they will find the stage far more crowded and difficult to control.	虽然国家依然是国际舞台上的主角，但他们会发现这个舞台正变得日渐拥挤并难以控制。


A much larger part of their populations than ever before has access to the power that comes from information.	前所未有的大量人口将通过信息的传播而被赋予权力。


Governments have always worried about the flow and control of information, and the current period is not the first to be strongly affected by dramatic changes in information technology.	各国政府从来都对信息的流动和控制忧心不已，其实这已经不是第一个被信息技术革命强烈震撼的年代了。


What is new – and what we see manifested in the Middle East today – is the speed of communication and the technological empowerment of a wider range of actors.	而新的内容——正如我们目前在中东地区看到的——则是信息沟通的加速以及技术向许多参与者赋予权力的事实。


The current information age, sometimes called the “Third Industrial Revolution,” is based on rapid technological advances in computers, communications, and software, which in turn have led to a dramatic fall in the cost of creating, processing, transmitting, and searching for information of all kinds.	这个某些人称之为“第三次工业革命”的信息化时代是基于电脑，通信和软件的飞速发展，并随之导致创造，处理，发射和搜索所有信息的成��急速下降。


And this means that world politics can no longer be the sole province of governments.	这意味着国际政治将不再是政府的专利。


As the cost of computing and communication comes down, the barriers to entry decline.	随着电脑和通信成本的下降，准入门槛也不断降低。


Individuals and private organizations, ranging from corporations to NGOs to terrorists, have thus been empowered to play a direct role in world politics.	包括企业，非政府组织到恐怖分子在内的个人和私人组织因此也被赋予了直接参与国际政治的权力。


The spread of information means that power will be more widely distributed, and informal networks will undercut the monopoly of traditional bureaucracy.	信息的传播意味着权力将被广泛地分配，而非正式网络将打破传统官僚组织的垄断。


The speed of Internet time means that all governments will have less control over their agendas.	互联网的速度意味着所有的政府都将对他们的议程拥有更少的控制力。


Political leaders will enjoy fewer degrees of freedom before they must respond to events, and then will have to compete with an increasing number and variety of actors in order to be heard.	政治领袖们的自由度将减少，且必须在短时间内对各种事务做出回应，还要与越来越多的参与者共同争夺群众们的耳朵。


We see this as American policymakers struggle to cope with today’s Middle East disturbances.	我们可以从美国政策制定者们忙于应付中东乱局的事件中发现这一点。


The fall of the Tunisian regime had deep domestic roots, but the timing caught outsiders, including the US government, by surprise.	突尼斯政权的崩溃是有其深刻根源的，但它爆发的时间点则令外界（包括美国政府）措手不及。


Some observers attribute the acceleration of the revolution to Twitter and WikiLeaks.	对此某些观察家将这场革命的加速爆发归因于Twitter和维基解密网站。


As the Obama administration formulates policy towards Egypt and Yemen, it faces a dilemma.	因此在奥巴马政府制定埃及和也门政策时也陷入了困境。


In Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime has provided important assistance in dealing with the threat from Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorism.	在也门，阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫的政权在应对与基地组织相关的恐怖威胁方面提供了极其重要的协助。


In Egypt, Hosni Mubarak’s rule helped to moderate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and balanced Iranian power in the region.	在埃及，胡斯尼·穆巴拉克的统治有助于缓和以巴冲突并抗衡伊朗在该地区的势力。


Simplistic endorsement of democracy by George W. Bush’s administration was costly both in Iraq and in Gaza, where elections gave rise to a hostile Hamas-led government.	小布什政府过分简单粗暴的民主实践在伊拉克和加沙地区都造成了恶果，加沙地区的选举甚至导致了敌对的哈马斯政府上台。


In an information age, smart policy combines hard and soft power.	在信息时代，明智的政策都同时糅合了软硬两种实力。


Given what the US is, the Obama administration cannot afford to neglect the soft-power narrative of democracy, liberty, and openness.	考虑到美国目前所处的地位，奥巴马政府不能忽略对民主，自由和开放的软实力述事。


Thus, Obama and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have issued public as well as private appeals for reform and change in Egypt and the wider Arab world, while also urging limits to violence by all parties.	于是奥巴马和美国国务卿希拉里都以公开或私人的方式呼吁埃及和阿拉伯世界的变革，同时也要求事件各方限制使用暴力。


Moreover, they have aligned themselves with freedom of information in the face of efforts by the Egyptian regime to block Internet access.	此外面对埃及政权限制互联网的举动，他们则站在了维护信息自由的立场上。


How events in the Middle East will play out is anyone’s guess, but in today’s information age, upholding the freedom to access it will be an important component of smart power.	中东局势的走向依然是未知之数，但在当今这个信息时代，维护获取信息的自由将成为巧实力的重要组成部分。


Open-Access Economics	开源经济学


CANBERRA – The brouhaha over Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff’s article “Growth in a Time of Debt” may be the most conspicuous and incendiary scholarly controversy since 1974, when two earlier economists, Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman, published a notorious book, Time on the Cross, defending the efficiency of American plantation slavery.	发自堪培拉——由卡门·莱茵哈特（Carmen Reinhart）和肯尼斯·罗格夫（Kenneth Rogoff）的论文《债务时期的增长》引发的骚动也许是自1974年以来最引人注目并最具煽动性的学术争议。 1974年，两位更早期的经济学家罗伯特·福格尔（Robert Fogel）和斯坦利·恩格曼（Stanley Engerman）发表了一部臭名昭著的著作——《拐角时代：美国黑奴制度经济学》来为美国奴隶制的效率辩护。


As with Time on the Cross, the Reinhart/Rogoff controversy, while ostensibly stemming from the authors’ statistical procedures, is actually rooted in the purposes to which others put their study.	正如《拐角时代》一书所面临的争议一样，对莱恩哈特和罗格夫文章的争议表面上是源于对作者统计方法的怀疑，但根源其实在于其他人利用这项研究所可能达到的目的。


Some of the results reported by Fogel and Engerman were used – not by the authors themselves, it should be noted – to challenge affirmative action and question the civil-rights movement.	福格尔和恩格曼的一些报告结果被用来——要注意的是并不是被作者本人使用——挑战平权法案和质疑民权运动。


Similarly, some of the results reported by Reinhart and Rogoff have been used by politicians and others to justify fiscal austerity.	同样地，莱恩哈特和罗格夫的一些报告结果也被政客和另外一些人用来证明财政紧缩政策的合理性。


When the problems with the Reinhart/Rogoff analysis came to light, the critics were aghast.	当莱恩哈特和罗格夫的研究失误之处被曝光时，批评者们都惊呆了。


The authors had inadvertently omitted data, used a questionable weighting scheme, and employed an erroneous observation on GDP growth.	两位作者居然都粗心地忽略了某些数据，使用了有问题的加权方法，并采用了错误的观察方法来评定GDP增长。


This raised uncomfortable questions not only about the efficacy of austerity, but also about the reliability of economic analysis.	这不仅引发了令人不安的关于财政紧缩有效性的问题，也令人开始担忧经济分析是否依然可靠。


How could a flawed study have appeared first in the prestigious working-paper series of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and then in a journal of the American Economic Association?	一个有缺陷的研究怎么能现身于著名的美国国家经济研究局工作文件系列文献之中，随后还被刊登在美国经济学会发布的期刊上？


And, if this was possible, why should policymakers and a discerning public vest any credibility in economic research?	如果这是有可能的，政策制定者以及有辨别能力的公众又如何能够赋予经济研究任何可信度？


It was possible because economists are not obliged to make their data and programs publicly available when publishing scientific research.	而之所以可能出现这种情况，是因为经济学家发表其科研成果时并不需要公开其数据和研究手法。


It is said that NBER working papers are even more prestigious than publication in refereed journals. Yet the Bureau does not require scholars to post their data and programs to its Web site as a condition for working-paper publication.	据说发表在美国国家经济研究局的工作文件比发表在期刊上的更加权威，但该机构并未要求学者在其网站上公布其数据和研究程序。


Independent scholars seeking to replicate these studies’ findings must first replicate the data and then replicate the programs.	试图复制这些研究发现的独立学者首先必须复制数据然后复制研究程序。


And, as empirical economics has progressed, the difficulty of doing so has grown.	而且，随着经济学经验研究的发展，这种复制研究发现的难度不断加大了。


Reinhart and Rogoff may have used a relatively small set of mostly publicly available data, but the profession as a whole is using ever-larger tailor-made data sets.	莱恩哈特和罗格夫可能使用了一组相对较小且大部分公开的数据，但整个行业都在使用不断增大的定制数据组。


Big data promises big progress.	大数据能带来大成果。


But large data sets also make replication impossible without the author’s cooperation.	但与此同时若没有作者的配合，庞大的数据组也使复制变得不大可能。


And the incentive for authors to cooperate is, at best, mixed.	而对作者来说，与他人展开合作也大多是半推半就的。


It is therefore the responsibility of editorial boards and the directors of organizations like the NBER to make open access obligatory.	由此可见，美国国家经济研究局这种机构的编委会和主管有责任将研究的开放调用变成强制性的。


Moreover, in a discipline that regards ingenuity as the ultimate virtue, those who engage in the grunt work of data cleaning and replication receive few rewards.	此外，在视独创性为最高美德的学科里，那些从事数据清理和复制等简单工作的人得到的回报也较小。


Nobel prizes are not awarded for constructing new historical estimates of GDP that allow policy analysis to be extended back in time.	诺贝尔奖并不会授予那些构建新GDP历史估计值来让政策分析向过去延伸的人。


Then there is the fact that correlation is not causation.	而且事实上相关性并不等于因果性。


In the case of Reinhart and Rogoff, the observation that highly indebted countries grow more slowly, even if true, does not tell us anything about whether high debt causes slow growth or vice versa.	在莱恩哈特和罗格夫的研究中，他们观察到高度债务国家经济增长得比较缓慢，即使这是真的，也不能告诉我们高负债会降低还��促进增长。


These are difficult questions, but they have simple solutions.	这些都是困难的问题，而解决方案却很简单的。


What is needed is not more sophisticated statistical methods, but serious historical analysis of the political and economic particulars of specific historical cases in which countries were burdened with heavy debts.	我们所需要的并不是更复杂的统计方法，而是要认真分析那些高负债国家在特定历史事件中的政治和经济细节。


A proper historical analysis would help to identify cases in which debt was incurred for reasons other than the state of the economy, so that causality arguably runs from debt to growth, rather than the other way around.	一个适当的历史分析能帮助确认那些在经济因素之外发生债务的原因，从而得出债务与经济增长之间的因果关系，而不是颠倒过来。


Economic historians have shown how this can be done.	经济史学家已经展示过这样做的方法。


My Berkeley colleagues David and Christina Romer, for example, faced an analogous problem when seeking to determine whether monetary-policy shocks affect economic growth.	比如，笔者在伯克利大学的同事大卫和克里斯蒂娜夫妇在试图确定货币政策冲击是否会影响经济增长时就面临了类似的问题。


They used careful historical analysis to identify and focus on cases in which the policy stance changed for reasons not having to do with the current state of the economy.	他们使用了仔细的历史分析方法来辨认并集中关注那些出于与经济状况无关的因素而改变了政策立场的案例。


Doing so allowed them to isolate the impact of monetary shocks on growth.	这使他们得以分离出冲击对增长的影响。


Statistics are helpful. But in economics, as in other lines of social inquiry, they are no substitute for proper historical analysis.	统计是有帮助的，但在经济学上——像在其它的社会调查一样，它们并不能代替合理的历史分析。


In impugning the authors’ motives and criticizing the uses to which others have put their research, critics of Reinhart and Rogoff have taken their eye off the ball.	忙于抨击作者的动机并批评某些人对这个研究的利用，针对莱恩哈特和罗格夫的批评家已经无暇顾及其它了。


The real problem is scholarly procedures and priorities, not motives.	但真正的问题是学术程序和优先权，而不是动机。


If the problem of procedures and priorities is addressed, the fact that politicians are tempted to misuse scholarly analysis for their own ends will take care of itself.	如果程序和优先权的问题解决了，那么政客试图滥用他们研究结果的事实也就不会成为问题了。


In other words, what is true of the economy is equally true of economic analysis.	换言之，经济上正确的在经济分析上同样也正确。


A crisis is a terrible thing to waste.	而面对危机无所作为则是一件可怕的事情。


The Real Route to Democracy at the IMF	IMF实现民主的必由之路


Emerging market countries from Chile to China have been arguing for some time that the International Monetary Fund – the nerve center of the international financial system – needs to become more “democratic.”	从智利到中国， 许多新兴市场国家一段时间以来都在呼吁国际货币基金组织—国际金融体系的神经中枢—需要变得“民主”。


They want more policy influence the next time the Fund decides to bail out a fellow emerging-market country like Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, and Turkey.	他们需要在下一次该组织对如阿根廷、巴西、印度尼西亚和土耳其等某一新兴市场国家实施援助时对政策有更大的影响力。


(Unfortunately, benign as current market conditions may seem, there will surely be a next time for some countries.)	（不幸的是，虽然现在的市场环境良好，但对于某些国家而言肯定会有下一次。


In the meantime, as a new “Washington Consensus” of best-practice economic policies inevitably emerges, developing countries want to feel that they helped design it, for better or worse.	）同时，随着集最佳经济政策之大成的新“华盛顿共识”浮出水面，发展中国家需要觉得在其设计中有自己的一份努力，不论是功劳还是苦劳。


I couldn’t agree more.	我对此完全赞同。


The IMF’s perceived “democratic deficit” is a serious challenge to the Fund’s political legitimacy and to its ability to effectively stabilize crisis situations.	IMF公认的“民主赤字”是对该组织的政治合法性和在危机中保持稳定的能力的严峻挑战。


But let’s recognize that real democracy is only going to come when middle-income developing countries are prepared to back up their lofty rhetoric with hard cash.	但是让我们都要明确一点，即只有当中等收入的发展中国家准备好用硬钱来兑现其高谈阔论时，真正的民主才会到来。


Right now is precisely the time to do so, given that the United States has become, without rival, the world’s most reckless borrower.	由于美国已当仁不让地成为世界上最不计后果的债务国，IMF的民主化正当时。


The US is draining a whopping 75% of the world’s surplus savings.	美国挥霍了全世界75%的储蓄余额。


Today, even formerly bankrupt governments from Korea to Russia to Mexico are awash in dollars.	现今，甚至连从韩国到俄罗斯再到墨西哥的一度破产的政府手里也攥着大把的美元。


Why not put some of those dollars to good use?	为什么不让这些美元物尽其用呢？


These countries need to understand that calls to cut rich-country voting shares at the IMF, unless they are backed up by real money, are naïve, if not downright hypocritical.	这些国家必须明白，如果没有真金白银作后盾，那么削减富国在IMF投票权的呼吁即便不是彻底的虚伪，也是异想天开。


At the end of the day, as long as the IMF is in the lending business, it needs to keep its creditors happy.	毕竟，只要IMF仍在借出，它就必须让债权人满意。


Otherwise, they will pull up stakes, and the Fund (and its sister organization, the World Bank) will have a debt crisis of its own.	否则他们就会撤股，这样IMF（及其姊妹组织世界银行）就会陷入自身的债务危机之中。


Right now, the US, Europe, and Japan put up the lion’s share of the capital, so they have disproportionate power.	现在，美国、欧洲和日本提供了绝大部分资本，因而也拥有非同一般的权力。


It doesn’t have to be this way.	形势本可以不必如此。


Many middle-income countries’ central banks are hoarding dollars today in order to prevent their currencies from appreciating too much against the sinking dollar.	许多中等收入国家的央行为了不让本国货币过快升值而囤积美元。


China alone, with over $600 billion in reserves, holds more than enough dollars to recapitalize the IMF four times over.	仅中国一家，以其超过6000亿美金的外汇储备就足以将IMF的资本结构调整4次。


Even Latin American governments now hold enough dollar reserve assets to buy out Europe’s shares in the Fund.	甚至连拉美各国的政府现在也有足够的美元资产将欧洲在IMF的股份买下。


It may seem strange to make middle-income countries pay for their own bailout insurance, but it isn’t.	让中等收入国家为自己买救援保险听起来有些奇怪，但事实却不然。


They have much more at stake in IMF policies than do rich countries.	与富国相比，IMF的政策对他们的影响要大得多。


Many people have forgotten that the Fund was originally conceived as a cooperative – it bailed out England only a few decades ago, and almost had to bail out France.	许多人已经忘记IMF建立的初衷是一个合作组织—就在数十年以前，它还救英国于危难之中，并几乎要对法国实施救援。


People forget these episodes because the Fund’s resources have not kept pace with the explosion of global capital markets so that today, the IMF lacks the capacity to bail out an Italy or a Japan (though the issue may well arise one day.)	人们之所以会忘记这些事件，是因为IMF的资源没有与全球资本市场的爆炸性增长同步增加，所以时至今日，IMF已没有能力对意大利或日本这样的国家实施援助（虽然这样的情况可能会发生）。


So, if the Fund is to resume its identity as a cooperative, it makes sense to shift its center of gravity.	因此，如果要IMF恢复其建立之初的合作组织的性质，它就有必要转移工作重心。


Would middle-income developing countries actually change things if they were big creditors at the Fund?	如果中等收入国家成为IMF的大债权人，他们能改变现状吗？


I wonder.	很难说。


Admittedly, no developing country ever seems to vote against a big bailout for one of its brethren, no matter how ill conceived.	诚然，不论计划有多糟糕，似乎也没有一个发展中国家会对其兄弟国家的援助投否决票。


But would such indiscriminate largesse persist if middle-income countries knew that their votes really counted, and that they were spending their own money?	但如果他们知道自己的投票能够影响结果，且他们花的是自己的钱，那么这种不加选择的慷慨还会继���吗？


I doubt it.	我表示怀疑。


On the whole, I expect that the bailout policies of a more “democratic” IMF would look much as they do now.	总而言之，我预期一个更为“民主”的IMF所出台的救助政策会与现行政策相差无几。


After all, the laws of economics are always going to force prodigal debtor countries into adopting austerity measures.	毕竟，经济法则会迫使挥霍无度的债务国采取节俭则措施。


If a country that has been borrowing like a drunk suddenly sees its credit dry up, it will tighten its belt – raise taxes, cut spending, or do both – with or without an international lender of last resort.	如果一个像醉汉一样借款的国家突然发现其信用正消失殆尽，他还是会勒紧裤带—增加税收、减少支出，或双管齐下—而不论有没有国际债权人这最后一根救命稻草。


Perhaps the IMF’s bedside manners would improve, perhaps not.	IMF对受援国的态度可能会改善，也可能不会。


In any case, greater political legitimacy would likely make the Fund’s crisis leadership smoother and more credible, potentially shortening crises and minimizing their pain.	无论如何，更高的政治合法性会让IMF在危机中的领导能力更为稳定和可靠，从而有可能缩短危机并将其造成的痛苦降到最低限度。


The big question is whether the rich countries that have long ruled the roost at the Fund would actually surrender some of their power.	最大的问题是长期以来在IMF当家的富国们是否会让出一部分权力。


They might, and they should, even if global financial markets take time to adjust to a slightly smaller role for the dollar.	他们或许会，也应该这样做，即使全球金融市场需要时间来调整适应美元地位稍降的情况。


They really have little to lose and much to gain.	他们真地会失少得多。


So there is an upside to today’s massive US fiscal and current account deficits.	因此，现今美国庞大的财政和经常账目赤字也有好的一面。


The structure of global imbalances, with the US the big borrower and emerging markets the creditors, presents a rare opportunity to finance a change in governance at the IMF.	美国作为大债务国，新兴市场国家作为债权国的全球不平衡结构为改变IMF的治理提供了一个绝好的机会。


Let’s do it now before the chance slips away when the next round of crises hits.	让我们在下一次危机来袭而让机遇流失之前立刻行动吧。


Fulfilling the Genomic Promise	兑现基因组承诺


VIENNA – For most people, a promise is a reason to expect something, a well-founded hope without hype.	维也纳—对大部分人来说，承诺是期望获得某物的理由，是不言自明的合理希望。


And it is a promise in this sense that connects science to society: the public trusts that scientific and technological advancement are the keys to navigating the uncertain road to a better world, in which future generations can live longer, healthier, and happier lives.	我们来看一个这种类型的承诺，它将科学与社会联系在一起：公众相信，科学和技术进步是迈向更好世界的不确定性之路上的指南针，未来子孙后代能活得更长、更健康、更幸福。


This promise originated almost 400 years ago, with the institutionalization of modern science.	这一承诺的起源可以追溯到近400年前现代科学实现制度化之时。


After discovering that mathematics could be applied to understanding the physical world, a small group of natural philosophers turned toward experimental empiricism with practical objectives.	在发现数学可以用来理解物理世界后，一小撮自然哲学家转向了带实用目标的实验经验主义。


Spearheaded by this minority, the scientific revolution swept through Europe and, later, spread to the rest of the world.	在这一小撮人的带领下，科学革命横扫欧洲，并在随后传向全世界。


In his Instauratio Magna, Francis Bacon, one of modern science’s most articulate proponents, conveyed a vision of a new world, transformed through the systematic inquiry of natural phenomena.	现代科学最坚定的支持者弗朗西斯·培根在其著作《大复兴》（Instauratio Magna）中描绘了一个新世界，这个世界来自对自然现象的系统性研究。


By imitating and twisting nature, he declared, its secrets would be revealed – and could be manipulated to improve humans’ lives.	培根说，通过效仿和改变大自然，它的秘密会被披露——并能加以操纵从而改善人类生活。


Bacon’s pragmatic objective of using a scientific understanding of natural causes to “effect all things possible” – what is now called innovation – was science’s original promise to society, and formed the core of the Age of Enlightenment.	培根对利用自然原因的科学理解来“影响所有可能的事物”——即现在所谓的创新——的务实目标是科学对社会的最初的承诺，后来成为启蒙时代的核心。


While many of science’s promises have been fulfilled – notably, the dramatic extension of the human lifespan and of leisure time – many others have been only partly achieved, or not at all.	许多科学承诺已经兑现——特别是人类寿命和闲暇时间的大幅提高——但还有很多只是部分兑现（如果不是完全没有兑现的话）。


And yet society’s trust in science has not wavered.	而社会对科学的信任从未减弱。


While specific objectives have changed, the overarching belief that scientific knowledge transforms people’s lives – as cultural, educational, and institutional factors converge with technological and industrial dynamics – has remained strong.	尽管具体的目标发生了变化，但最重要的信念——随着文化、教育和制度因素随技术和工业动态而趋同，科学知识改变人类生活——依然坚挺。


Today, genetics is the leading source of scientific promise.	如今，遗传学是最重要的科学承诺。


Since James D. Watson and Francis Crick uncovered DNA’s structure in 1953, a massive amount of available genetic data has been identified, and novel forms of scientific organization and modes of working have emerged.	自沃森和克里克于1953年发现DNA结构以来，人们识别了大量的遗传学数据，涌现了超乎想象的科学组织形式和工作模式。


As a result, genetics has brought science to the brink of a new era of enlightenment, in which individuals are understood in terms of the relationships among their unique genomic data.	遗传学也因此把科学带向了新启蒙时代的门槛上，在新时代，个体将以其独一无二的基因组数据关系的形式被理解。


This movement – the latest incarnation of the endless quest for human advancement – poses new challenges to the relationship between science and society.	这场运动——人类进步的无穷尽的追求的最新形式——给科学和社会的关系带来了新挑战。


As the American Museum of Natural History provocatively asked at the 2001 opening of its genetics exhibition: “The genomic revolution is here – are you ready?”	美国自然历史博物馆在其举办的2001年遗传学展览会开幕式上提出了一个挑战性的问题：“基因组革命已经来了，你准备好了吗？ ”


For example, this revolution will undoubtedly lead to the engineering of life through synthetic biology, a prospect that remains controversial.	比如，这场革命必将带来通过合成生物学实现的生命工程，其前景目前还众说纷纭。


Likewise, epigenetics (the study of heritable changes in gene function that occur without altering the DNA sequence) has reshaped the old nature-versus-nurture debate by highlighting the multi-dimensional character of the relationship between biological and social development.	类似地，试验胚胎学（研究不改变DNA序列的基因功能的可遗传变化）强调生物和社会发展关系的多维度特征，从而改变了先天后天之争的旧性质。


The growing understanding of transgenerational epigenetic modifications, whether nutritional or neurological, has opened new perspectives on the plasticity of the phenotype (an organism’s observable characteristics), and the factors that might affect it.	对代际后天修正（epigenetic modification，不管是营养方面还是神经方面）的日益理解开启了表型（器官的可观察特征）可塑性及其可能影响因素的新角度。


As a result, it is now clear that people’s lifestyles do not concern only themselves.	因此，很显然，现在人类的生命已不再只是自己的事情了。


These developments – and the questions that they raise – underscore the need to redraw the map of the sciences.	这些发展——以及它们所引起的疑问——表明需要重新绘制科学地图。


A more integrated research agenda that includes the social sciences is crucial to ensuring that the promise of genetic research benefits all.	包括自然科学在内的更具综合性的研究日程对于确保遗传学研究让全人类收益是至关重要的。


In fact, such research is integral to improving upon the factors that contribute most to a society’s wealth: health, education, and ethics.	事实上，这类研究对于改进社会财富的最重要贡献因素是至关重要的，包括健康、教育和伦理。


Indeed, more encompassing knowledge of personal genomics can engender a new sense of commonality.	事实上，关于个人基因组的更全面的知识能造成新的共性。


With a better understanding of people’s relationships to each other – from the impact that one’s lifestyle could have on the health of future generations to the corrosive effects of existing inequalities and the concomitant risk of a new genetic divide – a healthier, more equal society could be created.	有了对人与人关系的更好的理解——从个人生活方式对子孙后代健康的影响，到现存不平等性腐蚀性作用和新的遗传分化所伴随的风险——我们才可以创造更健康、更公平的社会。


But realizing this vision requires accounting for the different choices that people make within a pluralistic society.	但实现这一愿景需要衡量人们在多元社会中所做的不同选择。


To this end, the collaboration of social and scientific institutions would help to break down language and cultural barriers, ensuring that the genomic revolution aids, rather than alienates, the public, and thereby passes the true test of any scientific advancement: relevance to everyday experience.	在这方面，社会和科学机构的合作有助于打破语言和文化壁垒，确保基因组革命有益于公众而不是制造隔离，从而战胜任何科学进步的真正考验：与日常经验的相关性。


In a world characterized by multiple, overlapping crises, people need to see, understand, and identify with what genetics has to offer.	在一个危机多重多发的世界，人们需要看到、理解和识别遗传学所能提供的东西。


When asked what should keep us awake at night, the economist Amartya Sen answered, “The tragedies that we can prevent, the injustice that we can repair.”	在被问及需要对什么问题时刻保持清醒时，阿玛蒂亚·森（Amartya Sen）回答说：“我们可以防止的悲剧，我们可以修正的不公正。


Applying scientific advances to the prevention of tragedy and the redress of injustice fulfills science’s core promise.	”将科学进步运用于防止悲剧和纠正不公就是兑现科学的核心承诺。


Strengthening the real-world role of genetics is an essential step in that direction.	加强遗传学在真实世界中的作用是这个方向的关键步骤。


The Re-Birth of Utopia	乌托邦的复生


Franz Müntefering’s resignation as chairman of Germany’s Social Democrats in the face of a challenge from his party’s leftwing has, like the divisive French referendum on the European Constitution this past May, exposed deep ideological cleavages – divisions not only about Europe, but about the very foundations of society and the economy.	德国社民党主席弗郎茨·穆特夫瑞面临本党左翼挑战而辞职，正如今年五月法国欧盟宪法全民公决的决定性结果一样所揭示的意识形态分歧并非仅仅有关欧洲信念，而是有关整个社会经济基础信念。


Behind the critiques directed at the EU and national governments as “not being social enough,” lurks an image of the Union as a trap that is forcing its members to bend to the fateful disciplines of the market, thus depriving national leaders of their ability to realize important social goals.	潜伏在针对欧盟以及欧盟成员国政府的“社会福利不足”的评论背后的是对欧盟的印象，即欧盟是一个强使成员国顺从于致命的市场戒律、并剥夺国家领导人实现重要社会目标的能力的陷井。


This cleavage now seems set to shape not only Germany’s future coalition government, but the future of politics across Europe.	看起来，这一分歧不仅会决定德国的未来的联合政府，而且是真个欧洲的政治未来。


In France, this division is evident not only on the extremes of right and left, and in traditionally nationalist Gaullist circles, but also among most socialist voters, who decided to spurn the party leadership’s pro-European stance.	在法国，不仅极左极右势力和传统上民族主义的戴高乐主义派别明显持有这一看法，而且在大多数社会党选民中也是如此。 这些选民决定摒弃社会党领导层的亲欧洲立场。


This fundamental debate is not about to abate.	这一重大辩论不会消退。


On the contrary, as the German election shows and with a presidential election looming in France, the debate has intensified.	相反，正如德国大选所显示的那样，并在法国总统选举呼之欲出之际，这一辩论愈演愈烈。


In France, this intensity is particularly visible within Socialist ranks.	这一情形在法国的社会党成员中尤为如此。


With preparations for the party’s November congress in full swing, a conflict that goes back to the party’s founding is reappearing.	该党十一月大会正在紧锣密鼓之时，一个可以追溯到建党之初的冲突重又显现。


On one side is a social-democratic vision, which basically favors the market economy but seeks to alleviateits harsher effects; on the other side stands a radical vision that extols a revolutionary “break with capitalism.”	一方基本上赞成市场经济但是寻求降低其较为残酷影响的社会民主思想，另一方则颂扬“与资本主义彻底决裂”的激进观念。


With the disappearance of the communist world and the failure of its collectivist policies, one would think that this debate had been resolved in favor of the reformist vision.	共产主义世界的消亡和集体主义政策的破产会令人以为这一辩论以改革者观念胜利而告终。


But the surprise of the last few months is that an important part of the Socialist electorate and party leaders back radical change.	但是令人惊讶的是，过去数月中，社会党选民和领导人的重要部分支持激进变革。


Moreover, a substantial portion of the broader anti-liberal left, composed of communists, ecologists, union activists, and adherents of the movement Attac accuse the reformists of subordinating themselves to liberal globalization and advocate, instead, a radical transformation of society and the economy.	尤为重要的是，由共产主义者、生态保护主义者、工会活动分子和阿塔克运动信仰者组成的广泛反自由化左翼中的一大部分指责改革人士听命于自由主义经济全球化，并且主张对社会和经济进行激进的转变。


The media success of Olivier Besancenot, a 31-year-old representative of the most intransigent section of the Trotskyist Revolutionary Communist League, reflects the power of this dream.	托洛茨基主义革命共产主义同盟中最为强硬势力的代表、年仅31岁的奥利维尔·贝尚斯诺获得媒体青睐，反映出这一梦想的力量。


Having received over 4% of the vote during the first round of the presidential election of 2002, Besancenotis now, according to opinion polls, the 38th most popular person in France.	他在2002年总统选举首轮投票中取得超过4％的选票； 根据民意调查，贝尚斯诺如今在法国知名人物中名列第38位。


Interestingly, an echo of the ideas mooted by radical anti-globalists can be found in someinitiatives coming from the right.	有趣的是，激进的反全球化人士提出的观点可以在右翼倡议中找到回音。


President Jacques Chirac of France, but also Brazil’s leftist president, Lula da Silva support a tax on airline tickets designed to finance poor countries’ development.	法国总统雅克·希拉克以及巴西左派总统卢拉·达席尔瓦都支持对航空机票征税用来资助穷国发展。


Similarly, the centrist leader François Bayrou, has proposed imposing a “Tobin tax” (named after its creator, the Nobel laureate economist James Tobin) on financial transactions, with the proceeds to be used to support socially worthy causes.	类似的是，中间派领导人弗郎索瓦·贝胡保证对金融交易征收“托宾税”（根据该税的倡导者、诺贝尔经济学奖得主詹母斯·托宾的名字命名），其收益用于支持具有社会价值的事业。


How do we explain this resurgent radicalism, which seems to ignore European and international political realities?	激进主义的复苏看似不顾欧洲和国际的现实，对此我们如何解释呢？


One might suspect the influence of French political traditions which, on the right as much as on the left, always prefer purity of principle to messy compromise.	人们可能怀疑法国政治传统的影响。 这一影响总是置原则纯洁性于杂乱妥协之上，左右两翼概莫能外。


Add to this the congenital French mistrust of liberalism – indeed, French is one of the rare languages in which the word “liberalism” has a pejorative connotation – joined to an equally deep-rooted perception of the state (again, on both the right and the left) as the defender of the general interest par excellence.	此外，法国民众天生对自由主义不信任，实际上，法语是少数对“自由主义”含有贬义的语言之一。 加之对国家作为整体利益卓越捍卫者的观念同样根深蒂固（左右两翼又如出一辙）。


While pragmatism has come to dominate northern Europe’s socialist parties since the 1930’s – and, after the 1957 Congress of Bad Godesberg, the Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) as well – a preference for revolutionary ideology has always prevailed, at least on the rhetorical level, among French socialists.	尽管二十世纪三十年代以来，实用主义已经统领北欧的社会党派，德国社会民主党1957年拜德哥德斯堡大会后亦是如此，而法国社会党人中，至少在言辞层面上对于革命性意识形态的偏好总是占据上风。


But this cannot be the whole explanation, because a similar radicalization is occurring within German’s left, where the alliance of the post-communist PDS – still powerful in the Länder of what was East Germany – and SPD dissidents led by Oskar Lafontaine promotes equally radical proposals.	但这并非全部解释，因为类似的激变也在德国左翼政党发生。 在那里，后共产的民主社会主义党在原东德州内依然强大。


With the evident failure of both leftist and rightist governments to stem the rising wave of unemployment, a growing part of the French and German electorates no longer seems to believe in traditional solutions.	该党和由奥斯卡尔·拉方戴内领导的社会民主党异议人士结盟，鼓吹同样激进的提议。 由于左右两翼政府对失业大潮均无计可施，越来越多的法德两国选民似乎不再相信传统的解决方案。


The welfare state, largely associated with the reformist social-democratic movement, is now reaching its limits in the form of uncontrolled public deficits and unsupportable levels of taxation.	大体上与改革派的社会民主运动联系在一起的福利国家目前因无法控制的公共赤字和无以支撑的税收水平而难以为继。


Similarly, the social mobility once fostered by the welfare state has suffered serious reverses.	相似地，一度被福利国家扶持的社会流动发生严重逆转。


Globalized markets are viewed as bringingmore inequalities, austerity, and insecurity than the promised benefits of economic growth.	相比承诺的经济增长的益处，全球化的市场被认为带来更多的不平等、紧缩和不安全。


In this disenchanted environment, dreams of utopia thrive.	幻想破灭之中，乌托邦之梦日盛。


But it is a fundamental characteristic of utopias that they cannot be implemented.	但是不要忘记，乌托邦的基本特征是，其梦想无法实现。


What is now needed is a more modest debate about how to reconcile the deficiencies of the market with the demands of solidarity.	现在需要的是更为适度地辩论如何调和市场缺陷和全民共济的要求。


Should the state confine itself to creating an economic environment favorable to private enterprise?	国家是否应该将自身限于创造有利于私营企业的经济环境？


How extensively should it contribute to security, education, research, innovation, and protection of the poor?	国家应在多大范围内促进安全、教育、研究、创新和保护穷人？


But such debates can be fruitful only if they recognize the economic and political constraints under which modern states operate.	但是只有认识到现代国家运行中的经济和政治局限，这些辩论方可富有成果。


Indeed, the role of the state is made more complicated by the fact that market regulation is becoming less national and more transnational.	实际上，国家的作用由于市场规范的国家界限愈发模糊而跨国成份愈发明显而变得愈发复杂。


Instead of throwing up our hands in despair, we should adhere to a distinction dear to the great German sociologist Max Weber, for now is a time when the ethics of responsibility must prevail over the ethics of conviction.	我们不应垂头丧气，而应遵循德国社会学大家麦克斯·韦伯所珍视的一项区别，因为责任伦理优先于信仰伦理之上，现在恰逢其时。


The Re-Education of Hong Kong	对香港的再教育


HONG KONG – After less than 100 days in office, C.Y. Leung, Hong Kong’s new Chief Executive, is already in political intensive care. In record time, he has managed to lose his veneer of competence, credibility, and steely leadership.	发自香港——上任还不到100天，香港新一任行政长官梁振英就成为了政治焦点，更以前所未有的速度丧失了原本精明强干，诚实可信及铁腕领袖的形象。


One of his cabinet appointees was arrested for corruption within two weeks of Leung’s assumption of his official duties.	梁振英上任还不到两周就有一名内阁官员因贪污被捕。


Another was found to have been a slumlord who owned illegal cage-like flats that he blamed entirely on his wife, denying any involvement whatsoever.	另外一名内阁官员则被发现曾是一所非法笼屋的无良房东——他把一切责任都推给自己的妻子并矢口否认参与该事。


Leung himself was caught with several illegal structures in his house, a violation that he exploited successfully against his rival, Henry Tang, in the election campaign.	梁振英自己也陷入了家中几处违法建筑物的事件当中——他正是利用类似丑闻击败了选举对手唐英年的。


Leung has also distinguished himself by inciting a large swathe of school teachers and students to stage massive street protests against his hasty effort to insert a “national education” program into the school curriculum in order to “reconnect” Hong Kong’s young people with the motherland.	令梁振英名声大噪的还有其引发大量教师和学生走上街头大规模抗议的草率决定——在学校课程中增设“国民教育课”来将香港年轻一代与祖国大陆“重新连接”起来。


For tens of thousands of student protesters, many with their parents in tow, the potential death of an honest education was too much to bear.	对成千上万的学生抗议者来说（许多人的父母也尾随其后），失去客观公正立场的教育是无法承受的。


The goal of the program, inherited from the previous administration, is a good one: expand knowledge among the young about modern China.	从上届政府延续下来的该项计划原本拥有一个善意的目的——拓展香港年轻一代对于当代中国的认识。


But, as Tang correctly pointed out in response to a question about the protests, the “devil is in the details.”	然而，正如唐英年在回答一个关于抗议的问题时正确指出的那样——“魔鬼就在细节中”。


What triggered the uproar was the appearance of a “model” textbook, financed by the government and published by a pro-China think tank.	引发骚乱的是由政府提供经费并由一个亲中智囊团发行的“示范”教科书。


The textbook contains mostly propaganda, including assertions that China’s one-party system is wonderful, whereas multiparty democracy as practiced in the United States has created harmful social turbulence.	该书的内容多半是政治宣传：其中包括断言中国的一党制极为先进，而美国实行的多党制民主已经造成了负面的社会动荡。


It offers no discussion of the lethal policies since 1949 that led to the persecution and starvation of tens of millions of Chinese.	该教科书并未探讨自1949年起实施的导致数以百万计中国人遭受迫害和饿死的致命政策。


Nor does it mention the fratricidal political movements from the Great Leap Forward to the Cultural Revolution.	它也没有提及从大跃进到文化大革命期间相互残杀的政治运动。


The program was clearly meant to indoctrinate, not educate.	这一计划的用意显然在于灌输思想而不是进行教育。


Massive protests forced Leung to withdraw a deadline to implement the new curriculum. He has also given the schools flexibility concerning when and perhaps how to introduce it.	大规模的抗议活动迫使梁振英取消推行这一新科目的最后期限，并在推行时间以及如何推行上给予了学校一定的灵活性。


Since nearly all schools are dependent on government subsidies, the grant of flexibility is widely perceived to be a tactical delay.	但由于几乎所有学校都依赖政府津贴，赋予学校灵活处理权的举措普遍被认为是一种策略性的推迟。


With the job security of schoolmasters at risk, most are sure to implement the program.	因为各校校长都可能因此丢掉饭碗，大部分学校肯定会推行这一科目。


The protesters, led by a 15-year-old student, now a folk hero, have retreated, but that, too, is a tactical decision.	由一名15岁学生——如今已经是一名草根英雄——带领的抗议者们也已经撤退了，但这也是一个策略型决策。


The students have promised to continue to fight the program until it is scrapped.	学生们已经承诺会继续斗争直到该课程被废除。


But why does China’s government seek to impose the curriculum in the first place?	但起初中国政府为何会试图强制推行这一科目？


After all, Hong Kong has one of the world’s most educated populations: the city has, in per capita terms, perhaps more graduates of the world’s top 20 universities than anywhere outside of Manhattan.	毕竟香港是世界上民众教育程度最高的地方之一：就人均水平而言，这里大概是除曼哈顿以外拥有最多世界前20名大学的毕业生的城市。


Nevertheless, after more than 60 years in power, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to retain a deep sense of insecurity.	但是，在执政60多年以后，中国共产党仍然有着深深的危机感。


The Internet may be ubiquitous in modern China, but YouTube and Facebook, so accepted as a part of normal life around the world, are still banned, and the Public Security Bureau has built a vast Internet monitoring system to filter and censor whatever China’s leaders believe they must fear.	也许互联网在当代中国无处不在，但被全世界视为日常生活一部分的YouTube 和 Facebook网站仍然是被禁止的。 中国的公安部门建立了一个巨大的互联网监控系统来过滤和审查那些中国领导人认为对自己不利的信息。


While dissent is the lifeblood of any open society, for China it is a dangerous poison.	异议是开放社会的命脉，然而对中国来说却是危险的毒药。


Moreover, China fears that Hong Kong, with a population of less than eight million, might present a systemic problem as an alternative form of government, even though many Communists and their allies hold key positions in Hong Kong’s private and public sectors.	此外，中国担心人口不到八百万的香港可以被作为一种可替代的政府形式并引发一个系统性问题——尽管许多共产党员及其拥护者都在香港的私人部门及公共部门中担任要职。


Instead of accepting that “love” cannot be enforced and must be won, Hong Kong’s over-zealous “patriots” cannot wait to show their loyalty by trying to mandate primitive propaganda.	与其接受“爱国”不能被强加而只能感召的观点，过分热情的香港“爱国者们”迫不及待地设法用低劣的宣传手段来表忠心。


Few in Hong Kong are buying the political elite’s mantra that the national education program is the “right” thing to do.	香港人很少相信政治精英的那套说辞——即国民教育计划是“正确”的事。