But this resilience should not hide a deeper evolution.	但是这一韧性却不能掩盖一个更为深刻的变革。


The US is no longer alone.	美国不再特立独行。


America no longer qualifies, if it ever did, as a “hyper power,” to use former French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine’s term, though it is still far from being a “normal” power.	美国不再是法国前外长维德林所称的“超级强国”，尽管它还远远不是“正常”国家。


America’s inadvertent “passivity” in the Clinton years and the wrong directions of the Bush years coincided with the rise of China and India, as well as Russia’s renewed international clout as a result of high oil prices.	美国在克林顿时期不介意的“消极”以及布什年代的错误方向与中国和印度的崛起以及俄罗斯由于高油价恢复国际声望同步。


These developments ushered in the slow, imperfect return of an unbalanced multi-polar system.	这些进展带来了一个缓慢、并非完美的不平衡的多极体系的回归。


The world in which we live may be moving toward the multi-polarity wished for by French President Jacques Chirac, but not necessarily in a successful and stable way.	我们所生活的世界可能正在向法国总统希拉克所希望的多极世界发展，但是其过程并不一定是成功和稳定的。


If, contrary to the traditional “Gaullist” vision, multi-polarity is not bringing stability, but instead generating chaos, there are two reasons for this outcome.	如果与传统的戴高乐主义观念相反，多极世界并未带来稳定，而是产生混乱，那么，这一结果有两个原因。


First, key emerging actors – China, Russia, and India – are not ready, willing, or even capable of performing a stabilizing international role.	首先，主要的新兴国家中国、俄罗斯以及印度还没有准备、不愿意甚至是无力发挥稳定化的国际作用。


They are either too cynical or timid in their vision of the world, or they have others priorities, or both.	它们对于世界的观念要么过于玩世不恭，要么谨小慎微，或者它们还有其他优先事项，或者两者兼而有之。


They probably contemplate with barely disguised pleasure the difficulties currently encountered by the US in Iraq and elsewhere, but they do not feel any sense of a “compensating responsibility” for global stability.	它们可能窃喜于美国在伊拉克和世界其他地方遭遇的困境，但是它们并不对全球稳定感到有任何的”补偿性责任“。


The common good is not their cup of tea.	它们对共同利益并不热衷。


They have too much to catch up with, in terms of national ego and national interest, to care for others.	它们在国家自我意识以及民族利益上难以自拔，无瑕顾及他人。


Second, the EU is the only natural American ally in terms of values.	第二，在价值观问题上，欧盟是美国的唯一盟友。


It is the EU that can make multi-polarity work if it plays its role positively.	欧盟如果积极发挥作用就会让多极世界运转起来。


If the EU appears more concerned with the best ways to avoid the responsibilities that may befall it as a result of America’s new and enforced modesty, then multi-polarity will result – by default, not by design – in a more chaotic world, rather than leading to greater stability.	如果欧盟更加关心如何避免由于美国新近迫不得已的谦虚谨慎而带给它的责任的话，那么，多极世界就将会更为混沌，而不是导向更大的稳定。 这一结果并非出于主动规划，而是弃权。


Europe has a unique chance to demonstrate that it can make a difference in America’s post-unipolar moment.	欧洲具有独一无二的机会来展示它可以在美国的后单极世界时代中有所建树。


It starts right now in the Middle-East.	它现在就从中东开始。


The world that Europe has called for is coming closer, and it can fail abysmally without the EU or improve at the margin thanks to it.	欧洲所呼吁的世界正在逼近，如果没有欧盟或者欧盟的帮助在边际得以改善，那么，这个世界就会一败涂地。


In some ways, the end of a unipolar world could truly be the “Hour of Europe.”	在某种程度上，单级世界的终结可能就是“欧洲时刻”。


But that can happen only if the EU regains its confidence and steps into a positive role – one that it must play with, not against, the US.	但是，只有欧洲重新树立信心并且发挥积极的作用，这一时刻才有可能。 而这一作用必须与美国协力，而非与之作对。


The Rupee’s Wake-Up Call	印度卢比的警钟


PRINCETON – The Indian rupee has weakened rapidly in recent months, with the exchange rate against the US dollar dropping by 11%, to around 60 rupees, since early May.	发自普林斯顿——近几个月以来印度卢比汇率迅速走弱，自五月初以来，其对美元汇率下跌了11%，约为1美元对60卢比。


As a symbol of India’s economic strength, the rupee’s fall has provoked more than the usual hand-wringing and angst at home and abroad.	作为印度经济力量的象征，卢比的贬值状况在印度国内外都引发了比往常更严重的绝望和焦虑。


There is indeed reason to be worried, but not because the rupee’s value has declined.	人们确实有理由感到担心，但这并不是因为卢比的价值下降了。


In fact, the slide has been long in coming, and recent market uncertainty has merely been a wake-up call.	事实上这种下滑蓄势已久，而近期的市场不确定性仅仅是一记警钟罢了。


The real reason to worry is that India has lost international competitiveness and has been buying time by borrowing from fickle lenders.	真正令人担心的原因是印度已经丧失了国际竞争力并一直通过四处借贷来拖延时间。


Growth momentum has fizzled and, with inflation persistently high, Indian producers are struggling to compete in world markets.	由于增长势头已然萎蘼，通胀又居高不下，印度生产商只能在全球市场上苦苦挣扎。


The current-account deficit is increasing relentlessly, owing to a widening trade deficit (now at 13% of GDP), raising the danger of a balance-of-payments crisis.	贸易赤字不断上升（现为GDP的13%）导致经常帐户赤字持续扩大，使得爆发国际收支危机的风险日渐增加。


Indian GDP grew at heady rates of 8-10% per year between 2004 and 2007, a period that seemed to herald a decisive break from the anemic “Hindu rate of growth.”	2004到2007年间印度GDP年增长率实现了以令人振奋的8~10%，而这一时期似乎预示着原本缓慢的“印度式经济增长率”取得了决定性的突破。


Reforms had unleashed new entrepreneurial energies and the prospect of a brighter future lifted people’s aspirations.	改革释放了新的创业活力，而光明的未来前景则令所有人都踌躇满志。


With foreign manufacturers piling in to satisfy a new hunger for consumer durables, India turned its gaze outward.	随着国外制造商进入并满足了人们对耐用消费品的新需求，印度将其目光转向出口。


The global economy – in a phase of buoyant expansion – welcomed India’s information technology services.	在强劲扩张时期的全球经济都曾欢迎过印度的信息技术服务。


Bangalore (the information-technology hub), Bollywood, and yoga became symbols of India’s soft power.	班加罗尔（信息技术中心），宝莱坞以及瑜伽都成为了印度软实力的标志。


That was the moment to invest in the future.	那确实是个投资未来的大好时期。


But the opportunity was wasted.	但这一机遇却被白白浪费了。


Infrastructure did not keep pace with the economy’s needs.	其基础设施建设未能跟上经济需求的脚步。


And, more deplorably, educational standards lagged.	而更可悲的则是其教育水平的落后。


For a country positioning itself as a leader in the global knowledge economy, neglecting investment in education was a grave error, with other countries now staking a claim to the role to which India aspired.	对于一个把自己定位为全球知识经济领导者的国家来说，在教育投资上的忽略堪称一个重大失误，而其它国家则纷纷占据了印度所向往的地位。


And, even when times were good, India never gained a foothold in the global manufactured-goods trade.	与此同时，即使是经济向好的时候，印度也从未在全球生产产品贸易中获得立足之地。


Today, domestic investment has plummeted, exports are languishing, and GDP growth is down to around 4.5% per year.	现在，国内投资已经骤然跌落，出口萎缩，而GDP增长也下降到每年4. 5%左右.


Moreover, India has developed a tendency for chronic inflation, owing to an unhappy combination of supply bottlenecks (caused by poor infrastructure) and excessive demand (thanks to persistent public deficits).	此外,由于供应瓶颈(由基础设施落后引起的)和过度需求(源自于持续的公共赤字)的不幸结合，印度已然显现出长期通货膨胀的迹向。


Budget deficits offered what appeared to be a free lunch, as the resulting inflation eroded the real value of public debt, while the government had privileged access to private savings at near-zero real interest rates.	预算赤字所提供了一顿看似免费午餐的东西，但由此引发的通货膨胀将侵蚀公共债务的实际价值，而政府却拥有特权来以几乎为零的实际利率来获得私人的储蓄。


With so much largesse to spread around, the government became a source of contracts with annuity-like earnings, which offered robust returns for those with political access.	在如此大笔的支出之下，政府就成为了那些像养老金收益一样（轻易获得）的合同来源，这就为那些有政治后台的人提供了丰厚的回报。


That weakened the incentives for entrepreneurship.	而这却削弱了对创业精神的激励。


And, as India’s external position deteriorated, the rupee became significantly overvalued between early 2009 and late 2012, trading in a narrow range while domestic inflation galloped ahead in a global environment of relative price stability.	随着印度的外部经济地位不断恶化，卢比在2009年初到2012年底之间就已经被过度高估了，此时国内通货膨胀在全球价格相对稳定的环境下提前出现，以至于这种货币只能在一个狭窄的范围内交易


Amid weakening competitiveness, the rupee was propped up by increasingly unstable foreign sources of funds.	在竞争力削弱的同时，卢比只能依靠日益不稳定的外国资金来源来支撑。


Traditionally, nearly half of India’s trade deficit has been financed by remittances from Indian expatriates.	长期以来，近一半的印度贸易逆差都由印度侨民的汇款来补足。


Part of this flow is steady, because it supports families at home; but much of it is opportunistic investment seeking real returns.	这些资金流的其中一部分是相当稳定的，因为它们主要用来满足国内家庭支出； 但也有很大一部分是追求回报的机会主义投资。


According to recent data, remittances have slowed or even fallen slightly.	根据目前的数据，这类汇款的增长速度有所减慢甚至稍有下降.


Similarly, long-term foreign investors have had reason to pause.	同样地,长期的外国投资者有充分的理由暂停其投资。


This is not surprising, given the slowdown in consumption growth (car sales, for example, are suffering a prolonged decline).	这并不奇怪,考虑到消费增长(比如汽车销售量正面临长期下降)放缓。


India has been left to finance its external deficit increasingly through short-term borrowing, the most capricious form of international capital.	现在印度要自己想办法为其外部赤字融资，只能越来越多地借助短期借贷这一最不稳定的国际资本形式。


As Rudi Dornbusch, the late MIT economics professor, once warned, a crisis takes longer than expected to arrive but moves faster than anticipated when it does.	正如已故麻省理工学院经济学教授鲁迪·多恩布什（Rudi Dornbusch）曾经警告过的那样，危机的酝酿时期比我们预想的要长，可危机一旦爆发其传播的速度却比预计要快得多。


India may be particularly vulnerable, because all players there have been complicit in a silent conspiracy of denial.	但印度经济可能是尤其脆弱的一个，因为所有的参与者都在一个否认危机的沉默阴谋中串通一气。


An overvalued exchange rate strengthens repayment capacity, so international bankers cheer it on – until they cut and run.	被高估的汇率加强了其偿债能力，所以国际银行家们为此拍手叫好——直到有一天他们撤资逃走。


And the Indian government played a large part in fueling rupee appreciation by easing companies’ ability to borrow abroad.	而印度政府通过放纵国内企业向国外借款而在加速卢比升值中起着很大作用。


Indeed, at a time when restricting access to short-term international funds has acquired intellectual respectability, the government’s reluctance to enforce curbs has been puzzling.	事实上，在限制短期国际融资的举动完全符合理智的时候，印度政府在这方面��裹足不前一直都很令人费解。


The International Monetary Fund, which now supports selective imposition of capital controls, seems unconcerned: the rupee, its annual review concludes, is fairly valued.	对此目前支持选择性实施资本管制的国际货币基金组织（IMF）似乎并未察觉：在其发布年度总结回顾中还认为卢比被恰当地估价的。


This benign assessment is consistent with the IMF’s record of overlooking gathering crises.	而这种正面的评估结论恰恰与IMF忽略累积性危机的传统不谋而合。


With an overvalued rupee, there are no good policy choices.	由于卢比被过度高估，政府就没有什么好的政策选择。


To avert a disorderly fall, short-term macroeconomic management requires officially engineered depreciation through administrative methods and restraints on external borrowing.	为避免无序下跌，就需要实施短期的宏观经济管理，采取行政手段推动官方计划中的贬值步骤并对外部借贷进行限制。


A depreciated rupee should help revive Indian exports and lift growth.	而贬值后的卢比应该有助于恢复印度的出口并提升增长。


But, in the absence of complementary action, depreciation – whether engineered or market-driven – will make matters worse.	但由于缺乏相应的补偿措施，贬值——不管是人为设计的还是由市场趋动的——都只能让情况变得更糟。


To dampen the additional inflationary pressures implied by a weaker rupee, more aggressive fiscal retrenchment is needed.	为抑制由卢比贬值引起的额外通货膨胀压力，印度政府需要采取更激进的财政紧缩措施。


Even so, a depreciated rupee will increase the burden of repaying foreign debt, and deepen the woes of domestic companies and banks.	即使如此，贬值的卢比还是会增加外债还款压力，并深化印度国内企业和银行的困境。


To reclaim its promise, India must foster a new generation of productivity growth. The time for action is now.	为了兑现其承诺，印度必须促进新的生产率增长，如今是采取行动的时候了。


Unfortunately, a serious crisis may be required to initiate that response.	但不幸地是，要触发这样的响应，需要首先爆发一场严重的危机。


A Post-Growth World?	后增长世界？


PRINCETON – In a provocative recent paper, Robert Gordon of Northwestern University concludes that the rate of technological progress has slowed sharply, and that the rise in standards of living (at least in the world’s rich countries) is thus set to decelerate.	普林斯顿—在其煽动性的最新论文中，西北大学的罗伯特·戈登（Robert Gordon）指出，技术进步的速度已急剧放慢，因此生活标准的提升（至少在发达国家）即将减速。


In the twentieth century, he says, per capita income in the United States doubled about every 25-30 years.	他说，在20世纪，美国人均收入大约每20—25年翻一番。


But the next doubling will likely occur only over 100 years, a pace last seen in the nineteenth century.	但下一个一番可能要过100年才能发生——这是19世纪的翻番速度。


Long-term growth considerations, while recognized as crucial, seem distant from the here and now of financial repair and restoration of confidence.	长期增长的考虑尽管十分关键，但为时尚早，当务之急是修复金融和重塑信心。


So the commentary on Gordon’s paper has been largely dissociated from the policy discussions addressing the ongoing Great Recession.	因此，对戈登论文的评论大部分都偏离了纠正进行中的大衰退的政治讨论。


But a realistic assessment of growth prospects is precisely what is needed right now to design appropriate and feasible policies.	但对增长前景进行现实评估正是当前所需要做的事，这样才能为未来制定合理可行的政策。


Gordon’s point is not that growth will decelerate in the future, but rather that underlying productivity growth moved to a sharply lower trajectory around the year 2000.	戈登的观点并不是增长会在未来减速，而是基础生产率增长将在远低于2000年水平的轨道下运行。


We lived the better part of the subsequent decade with a misguided sense of extended prosperity and inflated a financial bubble.	在此后十年的好光景中，被繁荣扩大和金融泡沫引入了歧途。


Worse, we are treating the present as if the bubbly growth from 2000 to 2007 will return.	更糟糕的是，我们对待当下的态度好像2000—2007年的泡沫增长会回来似的。


Consider the International Monetary Fund’s regular projections of world growth.	就拿IMF的定期世界增长预测来说吧。


In April 2010, about 18 months after the Lehman Brothers meltdown, the crisis seemed over.	2010年4月，在雷曼兄弟倒闭18个月后，危机似乎结束了。


The forecast was for world GDP to grow at about 4.5% annually until 2015, which is slightly higher than the pace during the pre-crisis decade, while the average annual inflation rate was projected to be lower, at 2.9%.	IMF预测世界GDP将在2015年之前保持4. 5%的年增长率，略高于危机前十年的速度，而平均年通货膨胀率预计会有所降低，为2.


The future looked bright.	9%。 看起来未来一片光明。


Instead, after successive revisions, world GDP in 2012 is now expected to grow by only 3.3% while inflation is forecast to reach 4%, signaling much weaker global economic momentum than was anticipated.	然而，在连续的修正后，2012年世界GDP增长预期被调整到了3. 3%，而通胀预测达到了4%，表明全球增长动力比预料的要弱得多。


Lower-than-expected growth and higher-than-expected inflation have affected most economies.	低于预期的增长和高于预期的通胀影响了大部分经济体。


In 2011 and 2012, the United Kingdom stood out among the advanced economies in this regard; but the pattern holds even for Germany.	2011和2012年，发达国家中英国尤其如此； 而即使是德国也没有独善其身。


The shine has similarly worn off the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China).	同样的状况也出现在金砖国家中（巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国）。


Although projections by the IMF and others have been persistently optimistic, each setback has been treated as a temporary deviation, associated with its own unique cause: the Greek bailout, the tragic tsunami in Japan, the spike in volatility following Standard & Poor’s downgrade of US debt, and so on.	尽管IMF和其他人的预测总是偏于乐观，但每一次回撤都被视为暂时性的偏离，各有各的独特原因：希腊援助啦，日本悲剧性的海啸啦，标普对美国国债降级后造成的波动性飙升啦，如此等等。


The return to 4.5% world growth has merely been pushed back – in the latest forecasts to 2015.	回归世界增长率4. 5%仅仅被略微推迟了几年——最新的预测是2015年。


Faith in renewed growth is an ill-advised policy strategy.	增长复兴的信心是有欠考虑的政策策略。


At its core, the global economic crisis is a growth crisis.	其要害在于全球经济危机是一次增长危机。


Financial institutions and markets assumed productivity would continue to grow at the pace of the late 1990’s, which fostered an asset-price boom that conveyed an illusion of well-being; those not directly involved in the financial bubble were coopted through buoyant international trade.	金融机构和市场认为生产率会继续以20世纪90年代末的速度增长，这铸成了资产价格繁荣，从而带来了繁荣幻觉； 没有直接参与金融泡沫的也通过繁荣的国际贸易被拖下了水。


European growth, with its heavy dependence on trade, received a special boost, as did emerging markets.	欧洲的增长——严重依赖于贸易——受到了特别大的提振，新兴市场亦然。


Once the Great Recession began, this process operated in reverse, unwinding the excesses.	而一旦大衰退拉开序幕，这一过程也被逆转，开始消灭过剩。


But policymakers continued to benchmark recovery prospects to pre-crisis growth performance.	但决策者仍将危机前增长表现作为复苏前景基准。


When reality proved otherwise, the return of the past was not abandoned, but merely postponed.	当现实证明并非如此时，回到过去的想法并没有被放弃，而只是推迟。


Continuing to assume the resumption of pre-crisis growth was necessary to justify postponing hard decisions.	继续追求回到危机前增长成了推迟艰难决策的借口。


For example, a growth rebound underpins the expectation that the European periphery will not restructure or inflate away its sovereign debt.	比如，一次增长反弹会让人们产生欧洲外围国不需要重组或以通胀解决主权债务问题。


The assumption that the German economy will accelerate out of its current crawl is essential to confidence in Europe’s financial safety net, and to a banking union that credibly shares risks across the eurozone.	假设德国经济会摆脱当前的缓慢爬行状态对于欧洲金融安全网的信心和可信地在整个欧元区分担风险的银行联盟来说是关键的。


Resumption of robust world economic growth is the basis for delaying the implementation of the Basel III bank rules.	世界经济重回稳健增长是推迟实施巴塞尔III银行规则的基础。


And, if the BRICs slow down, they may be more prone to debt and currency crises.	此外，如果金砖国家放缓，它们也许更容易发生债务和货币危机。


What is to be done?	应该怎样做？


Because the elixir of growth in policymakers’ forecasts cannot be counted on to solve the problems, dealing with financial excesses becomes even more urgent.	由于决策者预测的增长万灵丹不可能解决问题，因此对付金融过剩就成为更加紧迫的问题。


That means more debt restructuring and more bank closures now, rather than watering down proposals to rein in freewheeling markets.	这意味着在今天进行更多的债务重组，让更多的银行关门，而不是不把约束自由市场的方案当回事。


Looking ahead, as Robert Shiller of Yale University has repeatedly emphasized, public policy must help to forge futures markets that hedge risks better and more reliably align incentives.	放眼未来，正如耶鲁大学的罗伯特·希勒（Robert Shiller）所一再强调的，公共政策必须有助于在未来形成更好地规避风险、更可靠地协调激励的市场。


There is no magical path to higher productivity growth.	提高生产率增长没有魔法。


Even if Gordon’s pessimism is excessive, the timing of the next breakthrough in technology is impossible to predict.	即使戈登过度悲观了，下一次技术突破会在什么时候发生也难以预料。


So-called “structural” reforms may help, but the likely gains are small and uncertain.	所谓的“结构性”改革也许有帮助，但潜在收益既小又不确定。


It may simply be time to learn how to live with less.	也许现在是时候学会与“更少”和谐相处了。


The Second Coming of Zhu Rongji?	朱镕基再临？


SHANGHAI – The recent release of a book of speeches by former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji has refocused attention on his bold – and often highly controversial – economic reforms of the 1990’s, which included reining in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and overhauling the banking system.	上海—最近发行的中国前总理朱镕基演讲集让人们的注意力重新集中到他1990年代常常饱受争议的大胆改革，包括约束国有企业和清理银行系统。


But the discussion has taken an unexpected turn, with Chinese media adopting a far less critical stance than that which has prevailed for the last two decades.	但讨论发生了意想不到的转折，中国媒体所采取的批评立场远远弱于过去二十年的普遍程度。


Given the apparent parallels between the challenges that Zhu faced and those that current Premier Li Keqiang is now attempting to address, not to mention their shared commitment to economic transformation, this shift could signify rising support for structural reform.	当年的朱镕基所面临的挑战和现任总理李克强所要解决的问题显然具有相似之处，更不用说他们在经济转型方面的共同承诺了，基于此，这一转变可能意味着对结构性改革的支持。


But are Zhu and Li really so much alike?	但朱镕基和李克强真的如此相似吗？


Today, as in the 1990’s, China is experiencing skyrocketing local-government and commercial-bank debt, rising fiscal and financial risk, uncertainty over institutional reform, and declining central-government revenue.	与1990年代类似，如今的中国面临着如山积的地方政府和商业银行债务、不断升高的财政和金融风险、制度改革的不确定性以及下降的中央政府收入。


According to Bloomberg, Li will be the first Chinese premier not to fulfill the official annual growth target since Zhu.	根据彭博社的说法，李克强将是朱镕基之后第一个不能实现官方年度增长目标的总理。


Despite these apparent similarities, however, China’s situation today is fundamentally different from 20 years ago.	尽管有这些相似之处，但如今中国的局面与20年前有着根本性的不同。


In the 1990’s, Zhu’s core mission was to address the consequences of former Premier Zhao Ziyang’s flawed fiscal-decentralization efforts.	1990年代，朱镕基的核心任务是解决前总理赵紫阳财政集中化失败的烂摊子。


By pursuing fiscal reform one sector at a time, Zhao left room for local governments to form alliances with SOEs, which provided subsidies to local bodies and enabled them to withhold income from the central government.	赵紫阳试图在各部门之间逐一进行财政改革，这给了地方政府与国企形成勾结的空间，地方机构因此获得了补贴，并可以截留中央政府的收入。


This led to the build-up of national public debt, which, in turn, compelled the central bank to over-issue currency, fueling inflation.	这导致了国家公共债务高企，反过来迫使中央银行过度发行货币，造成通货膨胀加速。


In this context, Zhu’s reform strategy was aimed primarily at reestablishing a sound fiscal relationship between the central and local governments, rather than at increasing the GDP growth rate.	在这样的背景下，朱镕基的改革目标主要是重新建立可靠地中央和地方政府关系，而不是提高GDP增长率。


In fact, though Zhu’s reforms were piecemeal, they could easily have led to double-digit GDP growth.	事实上，尽管朱镕基的改革是碎片化的，但本可以轻松地带来两位数的GDP增长。


But Zhu recognized that allowing such rapid growth probably would have done more harm than good, given persistent inflation and macroeconomic instability.	但朱镕基认识到，由于持续的通胀和宏观经济不稳，让经济以如此高速增长可能弊大于利。


Critics assert that Zhu’s 1994 tax reform led to the current real-estate bubble, because it drove local governments to use land sales to boost their incomes.	批评者称，朱镕基的1994年税制改革导致了目前的房地产泡沫，因为改革让地方政府通过出售土地提高收入。


But the fact is that replacing the income-sharing system with a tax-sharing system stabilized China’s economy and reversed the relative decline of central-government revenue.	但事实是用分税制代替收入分配制稳定了中国经济并扭转了中央政府收入的相对下降。


Indeed, it was essential to China’s economic development.	事实上，这对中国经济发展起到了关键作用。


By weakening the alliances between local governments and SOEs, Zhu’s tax-sharing system facilitated the strategic restructuring of the state-owned economy.	通过破坏地方政府和国企之间的勾结，朱镕基的分税制推动了对国有经济的战略性重组。 此外，通过鼓励地方政府将地方国企（以及房地产和某些公共服务部门）私有化，朱镕基的改革加快了中国融入全球经济。


And, by galvanizing local governments to privatize local SOEs (as well as housing and some public services), Zhu’s reform hastened China’s incorporation into the global economy.	如今，中国国有经济虚肿的情况轻了许多； 中央和地方政府的相容问题也更少了；


China’s state-owned economy is far less bloated today; the central and local governments have fewer compatibility problems; the country’s fiscal position is strong; and relative macroeconomic stability prevails.	中国财政状况十分健康； 宏观经济也一直呈现相对稳定之势。


Zhu’s success means that Li must focus on a different challenge.	朱镕基的成功意味着李克强必须专注于不同的挑战。


Li must ensure that China’s economy, which still boasts significant growth potential, does not sink into lethargy and fall into the so-called “middle-income trap.”	李克强必须确保仍以巨大增长潜力自豪的中国经济不会陷于沉寂并跌落所谓的“中等收入陷阱”。


A developing economy may slow prematurely when external factors alter the conditions supporting growth.	发展中国家可能会在支持增长的外部条件尚未改变时过早出现减速。


Wages continue to rise, reducing competitiveness vis-à-vis low-income economies, but the growth model is not yet equipped to support competitiveness in high-skill industries, leading to stagnation.	工资继续上升，这导致相对低收入经济体的竞争力下降，但增长模式还不能支持其在高技能产业的竞争，从而导致经济停滞。


In order to avoid such an outcome, Li must adapt China’s growth model to current conditions, which include intensifying trade friction with the European Union and the United States, greater pressure to allow the renminbi to appreciate, an aging population, slowing urbanization, and rising labor costs.	为了避免这一结果，李克强必须改变中国经济模式以适应当前环境，包括与欧盟和美国的贸易摩擦的日益激烈、允许人民币升值的压力的日渐增加、人口的日渐老化、城市化的日渐放缓以及劳动力成本的日渐上升。


The “new normal” that has emerged from the global financial crisis, characterized by sluggish GDP growth and diminished import demand in the West, makes reform even more urgent.	产生于全球金融危机、以西方GDP增长停滞和出口下降为特征的“新常态”使得改革更加迫切了。


Li should begin by redistributing industrial capital from high-productivity coastal areas.	李克强应该从对来自高生产率的沿海地区的产业资本进行再分配开始。


This would instantly augment growth in less-developed regions and boost overall productivity.	这将立刻提振欠发达地区的增长，增加总体生产率。


But, with competition in the global supply chain fiercer than ever, China will need more than capital transfer to achieve high-income status.	但是，由于全球供应链竞争前所未有地激烈，要想进入高收入行列，中国需要的不止是资本转移。


It will need policies and mechanisms that encourage and guide technological and industrial upgrading.	它还需要鼓励和指导技术和产业升级的政策和机制。


Fortunately, Li seems to understand this.	幸运的是，李克强对此心知肚明。


Indeed, industrial and technological upgrading forms the core of “Likonomics.”	事实上，产业和技术升级构成了“克强经济学”的核心。


But significant uncertainty remains over how to achieve it within the constraints of China’s state-led economy.	但如何在中国以国有为主导这一约束条件下实现这个目标依然存在巨大的不确定性。


Over the last decade – especially since 2008 – China’s central government has been tightening its grip on industrial policy, while enhancing the State Council’s dominance over local governments.	在过去十年中——特别是2008年以来——中国中央政府一直在收紧对产业政策的掌控，同时增强国务院对地方政府的控制力。


By contrast, Li seems intent on returning power to local governments and the market, transforming vertical control into horizontal coordination.	相反，李克强似乎倾向于将权力还给地方政府和市场，将纵向控制转变为水平协调。


Thus, instead of trying to control technological and industrial upgrading with central mandates, Li is giving local governments and the market the space to drive China’s economic transformation.	因此，李克强没有试图通过中央指令控制技术和产业升级，而是给予地方政府和市场推动中国经济转型的空间。


Zhu and Li do have one thing in common: they both came to power at a critical juncture in China’s development.	朱镕基和李克强确实有一个共同��：他们都是在中国发展面临关键点时上任的。


But, whereas Zhu had to grapple with local officials to increase the central government’s authority and revenue, thereby stabilizing the economy and unleashing China’s growth potential, Li must cooperate with local governments to create a system that fosters and protects new sources of innovation and economic dynamism at all levels.	但是，朱镕基需要和地方官员角力以增加中央政府的权威和收入，从而稳定经济、释放中国的潜力； 而李克强必须与地方政府协调以创造在各个层面培养和保护创新和经济活力新源泉的制度。


Just as Zhu’s reforms two decades ago laid the foundation for today’s growth, whether Li succeeds may well determine China’s economic trajectory for the next 20 years.	正如朱镕基二十年前的改革奠定了今日增长的基础，李克强是否能够成功在很大程度上决定了未来20年中国经济的轨迹。


The False Promise of Debt Relief	减免债务的虚假承诺


With debt relief for poor countries shaping up as a focal issue at the July G-8 summit in Scotland, it is a shame that so few people appreciate what a farce such measures could turn out to be.	随着贫困国家的债务减免成为7月在苏格兰举行的八国峰会的焦点事件，理解上述举措会成为怎样一部闹剧的人寥寥无几，这实在令人感到耻辱。


Unfortunately, most of the public, egged on by well-meaning rock stars, religious leaders, and other popular figures, seem brainwashed into believing that debt relief is a giant step on the road to ending world poverty.	不幸的是，受到原本善意的摇滚歌星、宗教领袖和其它知名人士的蛊惑，绝大多数民众似乎都相信债务减免是消除世界贫困道路上的巨大飞跃。


But forgiving poor countries’ debts without agreeing on a better framework for future aid flows is an empty gesture.	但实际上，如果无法改善未来援助流动的框架，减免贫困国家的债务其实毫无用处。


At first glance, it seems incredibly generous and statesman-like for G-8 leaders to endorse debt relief for the world’s poorest nations.	乍看上去，八国集团领袖批准减免世界最贫困国家的债务似乎慷慨大度得令人难以置信。


But no one really expects the debts to be paid anyway.	但实际上，没有人真的认为这些债务最终能够得到偿还。


Indeed, thanks to ongoing grants and future loans from national aid agencies and multilateral lenders like the World Bank, most of the poor “debtor” countries look set to receive considerably more money than they pay back, with no end in sight.	事实上，幸亏有了像世界银行这样的国家援助和多边贷款机构不断提供赠款和远期借贷，使得大多数贫困的债务国收到的贷款肯定要比偿还能力多得多，这种状况循环往复，没有尽头。


Citizens of rich countries may be self-centered and self-indulgent, but things are not quite as horrible as some would have us believe.	富裕国家的公民也许自私自利、放荡不羁，但情况并不像有些人想让我们相信的那样糟糕。


True, the ultra-rich United States does only give a pathetic 0.2% of its income in aid.	没错，极端富裕的美国的确只拿出收入的区区0.


But at least it doesn’t tax poor countries, as rich-country imperialists did until well into the twentieth century.	2%用于对外援助，但至少美国从未像20世纪前夕富裕的帝国主义国家那样对贫困国家收税。


Besides, it is not like there is huge profit for G-8 leaders in trying to collect coins from impoverished peoples living on a dollar a day.	除此之外，八国集团领袖从一天以一美元为生的贫困人口那里搜刮聚敛似乎也发不了大财。


What would the G-8 leaders do, station troops in Africa to seize coffee beans and peanuts?	那么他们该怎么办，派兵到非洲掠夺咖啡豆和花生？


Re-colonize Africa?	还是重新把非洲变成殖民地？


Debt collection from poor nations is an absurdity, now and into the distant future.	无论是现在还是遥远的未来，向贫困国家讨债本身就荒唐得可以。


The real issue is how much money rich-country governments will be giving poor-country governments, not vice versa.	真正的问题是富国政府能给贫困国家多少援助，而不是能获得多少利益。


Third-world debt burdens are little more than a scorecard for past development failures.	第三世界国家的债务负担不过是从前发展失误的真实记录。


Generously interpreted, past loans reflected naïve optimism that with a bit of seed money, politically and economically backward countries would generate majestic growth and effortlessly repay their loans.	往好里说，过去的贷款反映了人们天真的乐观想法，认为只要有了种子基金，政治和经济领域的落后国家就可以实现真正的发展，并毫不费力地偿还贷款。


A not-so-generous interpretation of modern aid history is that rich countries’ legislatures were too cheap to give outright grants to the poorest countries, and could be persuaded to help out only if they were told that the money would be repaid.	还有不那么宽容的解释，那就是现代援助史中的富国议会吝啬到不愿为贫困国家直接提供赠款，而只有得到还钱的许诺后才可能同意帮忙。


Of course, I am focusing mainly on official loans, but private-sector lending to the world’s poorest countries is generally a relatively minor issue.	当然，我谈论的重点是官方贷款，而私有部门向世界贫困国家的借贷总体说来是个次要问题。


So now rich countries want to feel magnanimous for “forgiving” debts that should have been given as outright grants in the first place.	于是现在富裕国家想借着减免债务让人们觉得宽宏大量，而这些所谓的“债务”原本就应该作为赠款提供给穷国。


As all but the most belligerent critics of US President George W Bush will acknowledge, America has taken an important lead in trying to make things marginally better.	除了美国总统乔治·W·布什最疯狂的批评者，恐怕所有人都承认美国在改变现状方面起了重要的带头作用。


The Bush administration has put outright grants at the center of its foreign-assistance policy, a commitment that is embodied in its new aid agency, the “Millennium Challenge Account.”	布什政府把直接赠款作为起对外援助政策的核心，这种原则在新的援助机构“千年挑战帐户”中得到了充分的体现。


Moreover, following recent changes at the World Bank, the US is aiming to follow the classic doctor’s dictum: “First, do no harm.”	不仅如此，随着不久前世界银行的改革，美国正在把遵循经典的医生格言作为自己的目标：“首要的是不能造成损害。


It is increasing aid, but it is trying to focus the benefits on countries that are reasonably well governed.	”美国是在增加援助，但同时尽量让管理较为有效的国家从中受益。


The aim is praiseworthy: to ensure that aid will be unambiguously beneficial, and won’t merely be exploited by bad governments to extend their hold on power.	这一目标很值得称颂：那就是确保援助肯定会起到正面作用，而不仅仅是被腐败政府用作延续独裁的一种工具。


Admittedly, there is still a fierce debate over the right way to assist poor countries, and this will play out behind the scenes at the G-8 summit.	无可否认，在为穷国提供援助的正确方法上至今还存在激烈的争论，本届八国集团峰会将为这些辩论画上圆满的句号。


Many Europeans believe that aid agencies like the World Bank will shrivel and die if left to depend on grants for income.	很多欧洲人认为如果完全依赖各国捐赠，世界银行这样的组织将很快走向枯萎和死亡。


But I believe that the problem could easily be solved by, say, giving the World Bank an endowment of rich-country bonds and permitting it to expend the interest.	但我认为这个问题可以轻而易举地解决，比如允许世界银行持有富国债券，并允许它自由支配由此产生的利息收入。


The United Nations Development Program has championed the position that all countries should get significant aid, regardless of how they are governed, on the grounds that thousands of children die every day and there is no room for sanctimonious extremism.	联合国开发计划署支持无论管理状况是否尽如人意，所有国家都应该获得大笔援助，理由是每天都有成千上万的儿童死亡，没有时间再去推行冠冕堂皇的极端主义。


I beg to differ; my reading of the evidence suggests that donors really do need to take extreme care not to make things worse, and that this is far more difficult to achieve in corrupt countries than the UN suggests.	这种说法恕我无法苟同。 我所了解的事实说明捐赠国确实需要小心谨慎，防止把事情搞得更糟，在腐败国家实现上述目标比联合国所说的要困难得多。


In short, the fundamental problem with the debt-relief mantra is that it looks backward rather than forward.	简言之，免债魔咒的根本问题在于它着眼过去、而不是未来。


If the G-8 leaders are serious about helping poor countries, finding a reliable way to support grant aid and promote accountability for donors and recipients, not debt relief, is the place to start.	如果八国集团领袖真的想对贫困国家施以援手，就应该找到支持无偿赠款的可靠方法，提高捐助国和受援国的责任感，而不是减免什么债务。


If the political will were there, it would be neither difficult nor expensive to restructure aid agencies like the World Bank and the regional development banks as grants-only agencies.	如果有了这样的政治意愿，把世界银行和地区发展银行改组为只提供赠款的机构并不困难，代价也不高昂。


For example, Professor Jeremy Bulow of Stanford University and I have shown that by endowing the World Bank with $100 billion dollars, it could carry out the tasks that it performs best more effectively and with greater transparency than it does today through borrowing and lending.	比如，斯坦福大学教授吉米·布鲁（Jeremy Bulow）和我已经证明，只要给世界银行1000亿美元的资本，它就完全可以通过借贷，把一向擅长的工作做得比今天更有效率，也更加透明。


Given today’s exceptionally low long-term interest rates, the annual cost would be, well, peanuts.	由于今天得长期利率非常之低，因此每年的实际成本可以说只是小菜一碟。


The Electric Car’s Short Circuit	短路的电动汽车


PRAGUE – For decades, the idea of the electric car has captured the imaginations of innovators – including Henry Ford and Thomas Edison more than a century ago.	布拉格—几十年来，电动汽车的概念一直紧紧地抓住了创新者的想象力，甚至包括一百多年前的亨利·福特和托马斯·爱迪生。


Celebrities, pundits, and political leaders alike have cast these vehicles as the apotheosis of an environmentally responsible future.	名人、专家、政客纷纷将电动汽车描述为环境友好型未来的典范。


German Chancellor Angela Merkel has proclaimed that there will be a million electric cars on the Autobahn by 2020.	德国总理默克尔声称，到2020年，德国高速公路上将有一百万辆电动汽车飞驰。


President Barack Obama has likewise promised a million electric cars in the United States – but five years sooner.	美国总统奥巴马也承诺美国会有一百万辆电动汽车，而且时间比德国还要早五年。


Someday, the electric car will, indeed, be a great product – just not now.	总有一天，电动汽车会成为伟大的产品，但不是现在。 它成本太高；


It costs too much; it is inconvenient; and its environmental benefits are negligible (and, in some cases, non-existent).	它太与众不同； 它的环境好处可以忽略不计（对于某些车型，根本没有环境好处）。


Many developed countries provide lavish subsidies for electric cars: amounts up to $7,500 in the US, $8,500 in Canada, €9,000 ($11,700) in Belgium, and €6,000 even in cash-strapped Spain.	许多发达国家为电动汽车提供大量补贴：美国最多7500美元； 加拿大8500美元；


Denmark offers the most lavish subsidy of all, exempting electric cars from the country’s marginal 180% registration tax on all other vehicles.	囊中羞涩的西班牙也能拿出6000欧元。 丹麦的补贴最为慷慨，电动汽车可以免缴其他所有类型汽车必须缴纳的高达180%的边际注册税。


For the world’s most popular electric car, the Nissan Leaf, this exemption is worth €63,000.	全球最畅销电动汽车日产Leaf的免税额高达63000欧元。


Yet this is clearly not enough.	但这显然是不够的。


In Denmark, there are still only 1,224 electric cars.	丹麦至今只有1224辆电动汽车。


In Germany, car sales totaled 3.2 million in 2011, but only 2,154 were electric.	在德国，2011年汽车总销量为320万辆，其中只有2154辆是电动车。


The numbers have forced Obama and Merkel to reconcile their projections with reality.	惨淡的数字迫使奥巴马和默克尔根据现实修正预期。


The US Department of Energy now expects only about 250,000 electric cars by 2015 – 0.1% of all cars on America’s roads.	目前，美国能源部预计2015年将只有250000辆电动汽车——占美国汽车总量的0. 1%。


Merkel recently admitted that Germany will not get anywhere near one million electric cars by 2020.	默克尔最近也承认，德国断然无法在2020年达到100万辆电动车的目标。


No one should be surprised.	这丝毫不奇怪。


According to an analysis by the US Congressional Budget Office, a typical electric car’s lifetime cost is roughly $12,000 higher than a gasoline-powered car.	根据美国国会预算办公室的一份分析，典型电动车生命期总陈本比汽油动力紫车高出12000美元。


Recent research indicates that electric cars may reach break-even price with hybrids only in 2026, and with conventional cars in 2032, after governments spend €100-150 billion in subsidies.	最新研究表明，电动汽车价格要到2026年才能与混合动力车相当，到2032年才能等同于常规汽车，到时政府补贴总量将达到1000—1500亿欧元。


Costs and subsidies aside, electric cars have so far proven to be incredibly inconvenient.	除了成本和补贴因素，到目前为止，电动汽车的舒适性极差。


A BBC reporter drove the 778 kilometers (484 miles) from London to Edinburgh in an electric Mini, and had to stop eight times to recharge – often waiting six hours or more.	一位BBC记者驾驶一辆电动Mini轿车从伦敦开往爱丁堡（距离778公里），途中八次停下充电——每次至少需要六小时。


In total, he spent 80 hours waiting or driving, averaging just ten kilometers per hour – an unenviable pace even before the advent of the steam engine.	开车和等待总共花了他80小时，相当于平均每小时跑了10公里——即使在前蒸汽机时代，这也算不上快速。


Electric cars also fail to live up to their environmental billing.	电动汽车也没带来多少环境好处。


They are often sold as “zero emissions” vehicles, but that is true only when they are moving.	它们往往顶着“零排放”的噱头，但这一说法只在它们跑起来时才成立��


For starters, the manufacturing process that produces electric cars – especially their batteries – requires an enormous amount of energy, most of it generated with fossil fuels.	首先，制造电动汽车的生产过程——特别是电池的生产过程——需要大量能量，其中大部分来自化石燃料。


A life-cycle analysis shows that almost half of an electric car’s entire CO2 emissions result from its production, more than double the emissions resulting from the production of a gasoline-powered car.	生命周期分析表明，电动汽车的二氧化碳排放总量中有近一半产生于生产过程，是汽油动力汽车生产过程排放量的两倍多。


Moreover, the electricity required to charge an electric car is overwhelmingly produced with fossil fuels.	此外，电动汽车需要充电，而电绝大部分来自化石燃料。


Yes, it then emits about half the CO2 of a conventional car for every kilometer driven (using European electricity).	诚然，电动汽车每公里二氧化碳排放量只有常规汽车的约一半（使用欧洲电力）。


But, given its high CO2 emissions at the outset, it needs to be driven a lot to come out ahead.	但是，由于生产过程的高二氧化碳排放量，电动汽车需要跑相当高的里程，其总排放量才会下降。


Proponents proudly proclaim that if an electric car is driven about 300,000 kilometers (180,000 miles), it will have emitted less than half the CO2 of a gasoline-powered car.	支持者骄傲地宣称，如果电动汽车跑过300000公里，其二氧化碳排放量将只有汽油动力汽车的一小半。


But its battery will likely need to be replaced long before it reaches this target, implying many more tons of CO2 emissions.	但其电池寿命远远不足以支撑300000公里里程，而换电池意味着增加好多吨二氧化碳排放量。


In fact, such distances seem implausible, given electric cars’ poor range: the Nissan Leaf, for example, can go only 117 kilometers on a charge.	事实上，如此长的里程根本不可能达到，因为电动汽车的电池太不给力：比如，日产Leaf每充一次电只能跑117公里。


That is why most people buy an electric car as their second car, for short commutes.	这就是为什么大部分人购买电动车只是充当备选车做短途之用。


If the car is driven less than 50,000 kilometers on European electricity, it will have emitted more CO2 overall than a conventional car.	如果电动汽车行驶距离不超过50000公里（用欧洲电力），那么其二氧化碳总排放量将高于常规汽车。


Even if driven much farther, 150,000 kilometers, an electric car’s CO2 emissions will be only 28% less than those of a gasoline-powered car.	即使大大延长里程，达到150000公里，电动汽车的二氧化碳排放量也仅比汽油动力汽车少28%。


During the car’s lifetime, this will prevent 11 tons of CO2 emissions, or about €44 of climate damage.	在汽车的整个生命期内，这可以减少11吨二氧化碳排放量或相当于44欧元的气候损害。


Given the size of the subsidies on offer, this is extremely poor value.	考虑到巨额补贴，电动汽车价值不可不谓小。


Denmark’s subsidies, for example, pay almost €6,000 to avoid one ton of CO2 emissions.	比如，丹麦的补贴相当于用近6000欧元减少1吨二氧化碳排放量。


Purchasing a similar amount in the European Emissions Trading System would cost about €5.	在欧洲排放交易系统购买同样数量的排放量只消花费5欧元。


For the same money, Denmark could have reduced CO2 emissions more than a thousand-fold.	用同样多的钱，丹麦可以减少的二氧化碳排放量千倍于电动汽车。


Worse, electric cars bought in the European Union will actually increase global CO2 emissions.	更糟糕的是，在欧盟购买电动汽车实际上会增加全球二氧化碳排放量。


Because the EU has a fixed emission target for 2020, it will offset emissions elsewhere (perhaps with more wind power), regardless of the type of car purchased: 38.75 tons of CO2 from a gasoline car, and 16 tons from the electricity produced for an electric car.	因为欧盟有一个固定的2020年排放目标，它将抵消别的排放（也许是用更多风能），不管你购买哪种类型的汽车：38. 75吨/汽油汽车；


But, while EU emissions stay the same, most electric batteries come from Asia, so an extra 11.5 tons of emissions will not be offset.	16吨/为电动汽车购买的电力。 但是，尽管欧盟排放量维持不变，但大部分电池来自亚洲，因此会有新增的11.


The electric car’s environmental transgressions are even worse in China, where most electricity is produced with coal.	电动汽车的环境伤害在中国更加厉害，中国的电力大部分来自煤炭。


An electric car powered with that electricity will emit 21% more CO2 than a gasoline-powered car.	用这种电力驱动的电动汽车，将比汽油动力汽车多排放21%的二氧化碳。


And, as a recent study shows, because China’s coal-fired power plants are so dirty, electric cars make the local air worse.	最新研究表明，由于中国火电厂污染严重，电力汽车的使用会让当地空气质量恶化。


In Shanghai, air pollution from an additional million gasoline-powered cars would kill an estimated nine people each year.	在上海，新增100万汽油动力汽车所造成的空气污染每年会杀死9个人。


But an additional million electric cars would kill 26 people annually, owing to the increase in coal pollution.	但新增100万辆电动汽车每年会杀死26人，因为煤炭污染会随之增加。


The electric-car mantra diverts attention from what really matters: a cost-effective transition from fossil fuels to cheaper green energy, which requires research and innovation.	电动汽车诅咒使人们的注意力从真正重要的东西上移开：从化石燃料向更廉价的绿色能源的低成本转型，而这需要研究和创新。


Electric cars might be a great advance for that purpose in a couple of decades.	几十年后，电动汽车或许是这一方向的一大突破。


But lavish subsidies today simply enable an expensive, inconvenient, and often environmentally deficient technology.	但今天的慷慨补贴只能助长昂贵、不便且通常对环境有消极作用的技术。


The False Promise of Financial Liberalization	金融自由化的虚幻前景


Something is amiss in the world of finance.	当今金融世界中出了问题。


The problem is not another financial meltdown in an emerging market, with the predictable contagion that engulfs neighboring countries.	问题并不是某个新兴市场再次发生金融危机，并且其可以预料得到的传播危及到邻国。


Even the most exposed countries handled the last round of financial shocks, in May and June 2006, relatively comfortably.	即使是风险最大的国家在2006年5月和6月发生的上一轮金融突发事件中也相对比较轻松。


Instead, the problem this time around is one that relatively calm times have helped reveal: the predicted benefits of financial globalization are nowhere to be seen.	相反，相对平缓的时期却暴露了现今的问题，那就是，人们所预想的金融全球化所带来的利益无处可见。


Financial globalization is a recent phenomenon.	金融全球化是一个新现象。


One could trace its beginnings to the 1970’s, when recycled petrodollars fueled large capital inflows to developing nations.	其起源可以追溯到七十年代，当时，石油美元循环促使大量的资本向发展中国家流动。


But it was only around 1990 that most emerging markets threw caution to the wind and removed controls on private portfolio and bank flows.	但是，只是到了九十年代左右大多数新兴市场体才摈弃谨慎，解除了私有投资组合以及银行资金流动的控制。


Private capital flows have exploded since, dwarfing trade in goods and services.	从此以来，私有资本流动剧增，令货物贸易和服务贸易相形见绌。


So the world has experienced true financial globalization only for 15 years or so.	因此，当今世界经历真正的金融全球化只不过有15年时间左右。


Freeing up capital flows had an inexorable logic – or so it seemed.	表面上而言，解除资本流动的限制具有坚实的逻辑。


Developing nations, the argument went, have plenty of investment opportunities, but are short of savings.	这一理论认为，发展中国家具有大量的投资机会，但是却缺少储蓄。


Foreign capital inflows would allow them to draw on the savings of rich countries, increase their investment rates, and stimulate growth.	外国资本流入可以让这些国家利用富国的储蓄，提高其投资比率，并且刺激经济增长。


In addition, financial globalization would allow poor nations to smooth out the boom-and-bust cycles associated with temporary terms-of-trade shocks and other bouts of bad luck.	此外，金融全球化还将让穷国平稳渡过与进出口货价比率巨变以及其他时运不济相联系的繁荣破灭的周期。


Finally, exposure to the discipline of financial markets would make it harder for profligate governments to misbehave.	最后，承受金融市场戒律将会让某些无所顾忌的政府有所收敛。


But things have not worked out according to plan.	但是，实际情况并非如此。


Research at the IMF, of all places, as well as by independent scholars documents a number of puzzles and paradoxes.	国际货币基金组织以及独立学者所作的研究表明了几个疑点和窘境。


For example, it is difficult to find evidence that countries that freed up capital flows have experienced sustained economic growth as a result.	例如，难以发现证据表明解除资本流通管治的国家因此经历了持续不断的经济增长。


In fact, many emerging markets experienced declines in investment rates.	实际上，许多新兴市场的投资比率出现了下降。


Nor, on balance, has liberalization of capital flows stabilized consumption.	总体而言，资本流通的自由化也并没有稳定消费。


Most intriguingly, the countries that have done the best in recent years are those that relied the least on foreign financing.	最为有趣的是，最近几年中表现最佳的国家却是依赖外国融资最少的国家。


China, the world’s growth superstar, has a huge current-account surplus, which means that it is a net lender to the rest of the world.	中国是当今世界经济增长的超级明星，拥有巨大的经常帐户盈余，这就意味着中国是向世界其他各地的净贷方。


Among other high-growth countries, Vietnam’s current account is essentially balanced, and India has only a small deficit.	在其他高增长国家中，越南的经常帐户基本持平，印度则只有些许赤字。


Latin America, Argentina and Brazil have been running comfortable external surpluses recently.	在拉美，阿根廷和巴西在最近几年中一直有较高的对外盈余。


In fact, their new-found resilience to capital-market shocks is due in no small part to their becoming net lenders to the rest of the world, after years as net borrowers.	实际上，历经多年的净借款国，它们成为净贷方，而对近年来的资本市场突发事件能够从容应付。


To understand what is going on, we need a different explanation of what keeps investment and growth low in most poor nations.	为了理解所发生的事情，我们需要对在大多数穷国保持投资和经济增长有一个不同的解释。


Whereas the standard story – the one that motivated the drive to liberalize capital flows – is that developing countries are saving-constrained, the fact that capital is moving outward rather than inward in the most successful developing countries suggests that the constraint lies elsewhere.	标准的情形是发展中国家储蓄受到限制，促使资本流动自由化，而事实是资本却是在最成功的发展中国家中，资本向外输出，而非流入。 这一情况表明限制存在于其他地方。


Most likely, the real constraint lies on the investment side.	最为可能的是，真正的限制在于投资方面。


The main problem seems to be the paucity of entrepreneurship and low propensity to invest in plant and equipment – what Keynes called “low animal spirits” – especially to raise output of products that can be traded on world markets.	主要的问题看起来是缺乏创业精神以及投资工厂和设备的倾向低下，特别是提高可以在国际市场中进行交易的产品产量。 凯恩斯称之为“低下的动物精神”。


Behind this shortcoming lay various institutional and market distortions associated with industrial and other modern-sector activities in low-income environments.	这一缺点之后隐藏的是与低收入环境中产业和其他现代部门活动相关的各种体制和市场扭曲。


When countries suffer from low investment demand, freeing up capital inflows does not do much good.	当国家遭受低下的投资需求之时，允许资本自由流入无济于事。


What businesses in these countries need is not necessarily more finance, but the expectation of larger profits for their owners.	这些国家中的各行各业所需要的并不一定是更多的融资，而是各企业所有者对更多利润的预期。


In fact, capital inflows can make things worse, because they tend to appreciate the domestic currency and make production in export activities less profitable, further weakening the incentive to invest.	实际上，资本流入可能适得其反，因为，这可能使得本国货币升值并且使得出口活动的生产利润减少，从而进一步削弱投资的激励。


Thus, the pattern in emerging market economies that liberalized capital inflows has been lower investment in the modern sectors of the economy, and eventually slower economic growth (once the consumption boom associated with the capital inflows plays out).	这样，允许资本自由流入的新兴市场经济体的模式就是经济中的现代部门投资变低，最终经济增长减慢(一旦由资本流入所带来的消费繁荣结束)。


By contrast, countries like China and India, which avoided a surge of capital inflows, managed to maintain highly competitive domestic currencies, and thereby kept profitability and investment high.	与此相反，像中国和印度等避免资本大量流入的国家力保具有高度竞争力的本国货币，从而维持了利润率和较高的投资水平。


The lesson for countries that have not yet made the leap to financial globalization is clear: beware.	对于那些还没有跃向金融全球化的国家而言，教训是很明显的，那就是防患于��然。


Nothing can kill growth more effectively than an uncompetitive currency, and there is no faster route to currency appreciation than a surge in capital inflows.	没有任何东西比没有竞争力的货币更能够扼杀经济增长，也没有任何途径比资本流入激增更能够导致货币升值。


For those countries that have already made the leap, the choices are more difficult.	对于做出转变的国家而言，选择更为困难。


Managing the exchange rate becomes much more difficult when capital is free to come and go as it pleases.	当资本自由流通之时，管理汇率就变得更为困难。


But it is not impossible – as long as policymakers understand the critical role played by the exchange rate and the need to subordinate capital flows to the requirements of competitiveness.	但是这并非没有可能，只要决策者理解汇率所扮演的重要角色以及把资本流动置于竞争力的要求之下就可以了。


Given all the effort that the world’s “emerging markets” have devoted to shielding themselves from financial volatility, they have reason to ask: where in the world is the upside of financial liberalization?	鉴于世界上的“新兴市场”为了避免金融波动所投入的工作，它们有理由提出这样的问题，那就是，金融自由化的益处究竟何在？


That is a question all of us should consider.	这是一个我们大家都应该考虑的问题。


The False Promise of Global Governance Standards	全球治理标准的虚假承诺


Cambridge – In the wake of last year’s global financial meltdown, there is now widespread recognition that inadequate investor protection can significantly affect how stock markets and economies develop, as well as how individual firms perform.	剑桥－在去年的全球金融危机过后，人们现在普遍认识到，对投资者保护的不足不仅会极大地影响股票市场和经济的发展，也会对单个公司的表现产生很大的影响。


The increased focus on improving corporate governance has produced a demand for reliable standards for evaluating governance in publicly traded companies worldwide.	人们对改善公司治理日益增多的关注，已经需要世界上有评估全球上市公司治理的可靠标准了。


World Bank officials, shareholder advisers, and financial economists have all made considerable efforts to develop such standards.	世界银行官员、股东顾问以及金融经济学家都对发展这样的标准，作出了重要的努力。


The notion of a single set of criteria to evaluate the governance of publicly traded firms worldwide is undoubtedly appealing. Both investors and publicly traded firms are operating in increasingly integrated global capital markets.	因为投资者和上市公司都在日益一体化的全球资本市场上进行活动，所以，主张对全球上市公司治理的评估实行单一的一套标准的观点，无疑是很吸引人的。


But the quest for a single set of global governance standards is misguided.	但是，追求单一的一套全球治理标准却是具有误导性的。


Yes, over the last decade, there has been growing use of global governance standards, largely developed in the United States, to assess how countries and companies around the world protect minority investors.	是的，在过去十年里，人们越来越多地使用全球治理标准——这些标准主要是在美国发展起来的——来评估世界各国和公司是怎样保护小投资者利益的。


But these efforts have overlooked fundamental differences between controlled companies, which have a controlling shareholder, and widely held firms that lack such a controller.	但是，这些努力忽略了拥有一个控股股东的股权受控公司（controlled companies）和没有这样的控股股东的股权分散的公司间的根本差异。


While widely held firms dominate the capital markets of the US and the UK, controlled companies dominate in most other countries.	虽然股权分散的公司在美国和英国的资本市场上占主导地位，但是，在其他大部分国家里，占主导地位的却是股权受控的公司。


Widely held and controlled companies differ considerably in the governance problems their investors face.	股权分散的公司和股权受控的公司的投资者面临的公司治理问题，有很大的不同。


In widely held firms, the concern is about opportunism by managers, who exercise de facto control; in controlled firms, the concern is about opportunism by the controlling shareholder at the expense of minority shareholders.	在股权分散的公司，投资者担心的是行使着实际上的控制权的经理们的投机取巧行为； 在股权受控的公司，投资者担心的是控股股东牺牲小股东利益的投机取巧行为。


Because the basic governance problems in the two types of firms are considerably different, arrangements that benefit investors in widely held firms might be irrelevant or even counterproductive in controlled firms, and vice versa.	因为这两种公司的基本治理问题差别很大，所以，有利于股权分散公司投资者的安排，在股权受控的公司中可能无关紧要，甚至是适得其反，反之亦然。


As a result, applying a single standard for assessing investor protection worldwide is bound to miss the mark with respect to widely held firms, controlled firms, or both.	结果，对全球的股权分散公司和股权受控公司，或者对同一个国家的这两种公司，在投资者保护方面适用单一的标准，注定是达不到目的的。


Consider, for example, the Corporate Governance Quotient system, developed by the US firm RiskMetrics, the world’s dominant shareholder advisory firm.	例如，想一想由全球主要的股东咨询公司美国RiskMetrics公司开发的公司治理系数系统（Corporate Governance Quotient system）；


RiskMetrics’ system, which is used by institutional investors around the world, attaches considerable weight to the arrangements governing contests for control.	这个被全世界的机构投资者使用的系统，对调控控制权争夺的安排十分重视。


These arrangements are, indeed, important for investors in widely held firms.	这些安排对股权分散公司的投资者确实非常重要。


When a company has a controlling shareholder, however, control contests are not possible, and the arrangements governing such contests are thus irrelevant.	但是，在一家公司存在一个控股股东的情况下，控制权之争就不太可能发生，因此，在股权受控的公司里这样的控制权争夺安排就无关紧要了。


Investors and public officials in countries where controlled companies dominate should stop using global governance standards based on the designers’ experience with widely held firms in the US. Rather, they should strive to develop standards appropriate for controlled firms.	股权受控公司占主导地位的国家的投资者和政府官员，应该停止使用美国的设计者根据他们处理股权分散公司治理问题经验建立起来的全球治理标准，努力发展适合股权受控公司的治理标准。


Most obviously, assessments of controlled companies should not give significant weight to arrangements governing contests for corporate control.	最显而易见的是，对股权受控公司的评估不应该过于关注有关调控公司控制权争夺的安排。


Similarly, arrangements that make the firm’s board of directors more responsive to the wishes of a majority of shareholders, such as making it easier for shareholders to replace directors, can serve the interests of investors in widely held firms, but are counterproductive for investors in controlled firms.	同样，使公司的董事会更加响应小投资的愿望的安排——例如让股东可以更容易地更换董事，可以为股权分散公司的投资者的利益服务，但是，这种安排对股权受控公司的投资者来说，却适得其反。


In controlled firms, where the concern is diversion from minority shareholders, making directors even more responsive to the controller will likely make minority investors still more vulnerable.	在股权受控的公司，投资者担心的问题是小投资者的分散，而让董事更加响应控股股东的要求，可能使小投资者的利益更加容易受到损害。


Moreover, in countries that have many controlled firms, close attention should be paid to related-party transactions and to the taking of corporate opportunities – the main ways in which value may be diverted from minority investors in such firms. To address such problems, arrangements that enable a minority of shareholders to veto related party transactions – arrangements which are not warranted in widely held firms – could well be valuable.	而且，在拥有许多股权受控公司的国家里，人们应该密切关注关联交易和公司高管获得本应属于公司的机会的行为——在这样的公司里，这是从小投资者那里转移利益的主要方式��为了应对这样的问题，使少数股东可以否决关联交易的安排——这种安排在股权分散的公司里是不被允许的——可能是非常有价值的。


Finally, when assessing controlled companies, the independence of directors should not be judged largely by looking at the extent to which they are independent of the company on whose board they serve. Rather, considerable attention should be given to their independence from the controlling shareholder.	最后，在评估股权受控的公司的时候，不应该主要通过看董事相对于其担任董事的公司的独立程度，来判断董事的独立性，而应该更加关注他们对控股股东所具有的独立性。


To improve corporate governance and investor protection, public officials and investors in countries whose capital markets are dominated by controlled companies should be wary of global governance standards developed for US companies. They should focus on the special problems of controlled companies and on the rules that would work best for protecting smaller investors in such companies.	为了改善公司治理和提高对投资者的保护程度，资本市场上股权受控公司占主导地位的国家的政府官员和投资者，应该对针对美国公司发展起来的全球治理标准保持警惕，对股权受控公司的特殊问题以及那些对保护该类公司的中小投资最行之有效的规则，给予更多的关注。


The False Promise of Private Pensions	个人养老金保证不切实际


One of the strangest claims made in the debates about social insurance now roiling the world’s richest countries is the that government-funded defined-benefit pension programs (such as America’s Social Security system) are outmoded.	有关社会保险问题辩论的最为奇怪的观点之一令世界最为富裕的国家莫衷一是。 这一观点认为，由政府资助的、固定金额的养老金体制（例如美国的社会保险体系）过时了。


These programs were fine, the argument goes, for the industrial economy of the Great Depression and the post-World War II generation, but they have become obsolete in today’s high-tech, networked, post-industrial economy.	这些观点认为，对经济大萧条和二战后年代中的工业化经济体而言，这些养老金体制是不错的，但是，在当今高科技、网络化以及后工业化经济体中，他们已经落伍了。


Advocates of this argument propose a different model.	这些观点的鼓吹者提出一个不同的模式。


Just as corporations today are much happier supporting workers’ pensions by contributing to employees’ private accounts, so governments today should offer (or require) contributions to privately owned accounts.	正如当今企业非常愿意通过分摊雇员们的私人帐户而支持工人们的养老金一样，如今的政府应当为雇员们的私人帐户提供分摊金，或者应当如此要求。


The value of these accounts would fluctuate with the market rather than resting on a defined-benefit scheme that guarantees a fixed real sum of resources available upon retirement.	这些帐户的价值将会随着市场的变化而起伏，而不是依赖于金额确定的、保证在退休时提供固定实际收入的养老金体制。


This argument is strange because it gets the economics of the situation backward.	这一观点很奇怪，因为它把形势的经济学向后逆转。


When there are lots of companies offering workers long-term defined-benefit retirement pensions, there are fewer advantages to the government in setting up a parallel defined-benefit scheme and requiring workers to participate in it.	在有许多公司为给人们提供长期的、确定金额的退休养老金之时，政府建立一个平行的、确定金额的体制并且要求工人们参加就没有什么优势可言了。


After all, in such a world, workers who set great value on a defined-benefit pension can go to work for firms that offer such pensions.	毕竟，在这种情况下，看重确定金额养老金的工人们可以为提供这些养老金的公司工作。


The major benefits that arise from the government’s requiring that workers also participate in a national Social Security system accrue to those workers who really ought to value a defined-benefit pension highly but have not been able to figure out what their true preferences are.	政府要求工人们也参加全国性的社会保险体系的主要益处是累积于那些确实应该重视确定金额的养老金但是还没有搞清楚他们究竟偏好哪个的工人们。


They also accrue to relatively poor workers who lack the bargaining power to induce bosses to offer the pensions they really want – and need.	这些益处还累积于相对贫困的工人们，这些工人们缺乏讨价还价的力量来使得老板们提供他们所的确想要、而且需要的养老金。


But there aren’t a lot of companies today that are willing to offer long-term defined-benefit pension schemes.	但是，如今并没有很多公司愿意提供长期的、固定金额的养老金计划。


One reason is that companies nowadays are much more aware of their own long-run fragility than they were in the post-World War II decades.	一个原因是，各公司如今和后二战几十年相比，更为清楚其自身的长期脆弱性。


Not even America’s IBM – which prides itself on stability – wants to take the risk of offering defined-benefit schemes.	甚至连以稳定自豪的美国IBM公司也不想承担提供固定金额计划的风险。


The risk from defined-benefit pensions used to be offset by two benefits for companies that offered them.	以往提供固定金额养老金的公司具有两项好处可以抵消这种养老金的风险。


First, the fact that leaving the company usually meant cashing in one’s pension at a discount increased worker loyalty.	首先，从公司辞职往往意味着在打折后提取养老金，这样就增加了员工的忠诚度。


Second, complaisant accountants’ optimistic assumptions about returns on pension reserves, together with large firms’ greater risk-bearing capacity, brightened the financial picture that companies could report to investors.	第二，顺从听命的会计门对养老储备金的回报给与乐观的假定，加之大公司风险承受能力较大，使得公司们向投资者汇报时可以展示一个明亮的财务状况。


Today, the risks are seen to be much greater, and the benefits are seen to be less.	今天，风险被认为更为庞大，而利益则较少。


As a result, an ever-smaller slice of employers are offering anything like defined-benefit pensions.	结果，越来越少的雇主提供固定金额的养老金了。


This fall-off in private defined-benefit pensions all across the rich core of the world economy is a bad thing, because the configuration of asset prices suggests that young and middle-aged workers value defined-benefit pensions extremely highly.	这种席卷全球富裕经济体的私人固定金额养老金的衰减是一件坏事，因为资产价格构成表明，年轻以及中年工人们极为重视固定金额的养老金。


Historically, the gap between expected returns on low-risk assets like government or investment-grade bonds and high-risk assets like stocks and real estate has been very high.	从历史上说，像政府或者投资级别的债券等那样的低风险资产以及类似股票和房地产等那样的高风险资产之间的预期回报率差异非常高。


To some degree, as economists like Harvard’s Robert Barro and mathematicians like Benoit Mandelbrot argue, this may be because high-risk investments are in reality much more risky than the theories and math of standard finance techniques suggest.	正如哈佛大学经济学家巴罗以及像蒙德布罗特那样的数学家所主张的那样，在某种程度上，这可能是由于高风险投资实际上要比理论以及标准金融技术所表明的远更为风险。


In my opinion, at least, this is partly because the memory of years like 1930 and 2000, when stocks performed very badly, occupies too large a place in investors’ minds.	依我来看，这至少是由于对1930年和2000年的记忆占据了投资者头脑中过大的位置。 当时，股票业绩极差。


Workers and other asset holders place a very high value on safety, security, and predictability, so a defined-benefit pension plan is extremely valuable.	工人们以及其他资产拥有者非常看重的是安全、稳妥以及可预测性。 所以，固定金额养老金计划非常有价值。


But in today’s world, only national governments are large enough to be able to do so with any assurance that the pension assets will actually be there when workers retire.	但是在当今世界，只有各国政府才有实力这样做，并且保证，当工人们退休的时候，养老金资产会安然无恙。


I am enough of a social democrat to believe that if there is an economic service or benefit that citizens value extremely highly and that only the government can provide, then the government should provide it.	我是一个社会民主派人士，我相信，如果说公民极为重视某一种经��服务或者利益而且只有各国政府才能够提供的话，那么，政府就应责无旁贷地予以提供。


We economists know that there are many drawbacks to expanding government beyond its basic role of providing true public goods like defense, public safety, and justice, as well as providing citizens with incentives to counterbalance the effects of true market failures.	我们经济学家知道，政府的基本职能是提供真正的公共利益，例如国防、公共安全、司法以及向公民提供激励以制衡市场机制失败的影响。 超越这些职能，就会产生很多缺点。


If the private market has the flexibility of two hands, government bureaucracy has at best two thumbs.	如果私有市场机制具有两只手的灵活性，那么，政府官僚最多只有两个拇指。


But the collection of payroll taxes from tens of millions of workers and the writing of tens of millions of pension checks is the kind of routine, semi-automatic task that government can do well.	但是，从数以千万计的工人中征收工资税并开具数以千万计张的养老金支票是政府所可以做得好的例行公事以及半自动化的任务。


With private companies backing away from defined-benefit programs, it is even more important and valuable that government do it in our post-industrial network-age society than it was in the past.	私有企业从固定金额养老金计划中退出，政府在我们这个后工业化网络时代社会从事这件事要比在过去甚至更为重要和有价值。


Balancing the Technocrats	与技术专家之间的平衡


ISTANBUL – A simplistic (actually, naive) view of markets is that they exist almost in a “state of nature,” and that the best of all worlds is one where they are free to operate without government interference.	发自伊斯坦布尔——有种对市场的简单化（实际上是幼稚）观点就是市场几乎还处于一个“原始状态”，而且最好的方法就是任由其自由运作而不被政府干预。


An equally simplistic view of democracy is that it is a political system in which periodic competitive elections give the winner the right to govern without constraint.	同样在政治上也存在着简单化的民主观念，即它是一个举行定期选举，赋予胜出者治理权而不会对其进行约束的政治体系。


The reality is far more complex, of course.	当然实际情况远比这个要复杂。


Markets can function only within an institutional and legal framework that includes property rights, enforcement of contracts, quality and information controls, and many other rules to govern transactions.	市场只有在制度及法律框架下才能起作用，其中包括产权、合同的强制执行、质量和信息控制及许多其它用来管理交易的法规。


Similarly, while competitive elections are essential to any democratic system, a “winner-take-all” attitude to electoral outcomes, with the victor concentrating power, is incompatible with democracy in the long term.	类似地，虽然竞争性选举对所有民主体系来说都是必不可少的，而选举结果导致的“赢者通吃”且权力集中的局面却是无法与民主政治长期相容的。


Well-functioning democracies are embedded in complex constitutional and other laws that separate executive, legislative, and judicial power, and that protect freedom of speech, assembly, and peaceful dissent by those who lose elections.	运作良好的民主国家根植于复杂的宪法和其它法律之中，这些法律使行政、立法和司法权力独立开来，并保护言论自由、集会自由以及那些选举落败者和平发表异议的权利。


Regulatory institutions – such as bank supervisory agencies and bodies that oversee the telecommunications, food, and energy industries – play a vital role by maintaining the always-delicate balance between “free” markets and the actions of elected governments and legislatures.	监管机构——比如银行监管机构和监督电信、食物和能源行业的机构——在维护“自由”市场与民选政府和立法机关的行为之间的微妙平衡中扮演着重要的作用。


The central bank is perhaps the most important of these institutions, for it conducts monetary policy (and sometimes serves as the financial-sector regulator).	央行也许是这些机构中最重要的一个，因为它实施货币政策（有时候也会履行金融监管机构的职责）。


The policy and regulatory mistakes that contributed to the subprime mortgage crisis – and thus to the US financial system’s near-meltdown and the eurozone’s travails – have brought the issue of optimal economic regulation and its relation to democracy to the fore once again.	导致了次贷危机——从而也导致了美国金融系统几近崩溃及欧元区蒙难——的政策和监管失误再次突显了最佳金融监管及其与当前民主制度之间关系的问题。


In the US, a significant share of the Republican Party favor abolishing not only the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency, but also the Federal Reserve!	在美国，绝大多数共和党人不仅支持废除能源部门和环境保护署，也支持废除美联储。


In their view, markets and private initiative require no significant regulation.	他们认为市场和私企的主动性并不需要什么监管。


The role of politics is to elect majorities that can abolish regulations and regulatory bodies.	政治的作用是选举出可以废除这些法规和机构的多数派。


Others around the world similarly oppose regulatory institutions, but for very different reasons.	在世界其他地方也有人反对监管机构，但理由却并不相同。


They argue that politicians can regulate and supervise without intermediate bodies that have some degree of autonomy.	他们提出政治家并��需要那些有一定程度自治权的中间机构来管理并监督国家。


In their minds, these bodies merely impede and constrain realization of the people’s will.	在他们看来，这些机构只会妨碍并约束公众意志的实现。


If an elected government wants a bank to offer cheap credit to a group of enterprises so that they can hire more people, why should a supervisor be able to obstruct this democratic will?	如果民选政府想要银行向一些企业提供低息贷款以使其能创造更多就业，那为什么要让一个监管机构来阻挠这种民众意愿呢？


If these enterprises are told to hire the governing party’s supporters as an implicit condition of obtaining subsidized credit, that, too, is the expression of electorally legitimized popular will.	如果这些企业被要求雇佣执政党的支持者作为获得补贴信贷的隐含条件，那这也是选举合法化的公众民意表达。


At the other end of the spectrum are technocratic super-defenders of regulatory bodies who believe that politicians and electorates are hopelessly confused, uneducated, and often corrupt.	另一方面则是技术官僚对监管机构的极力捍卫，他们认为政治家和选民都糊涂得无可救药、无知且腐败缠身。


Management of the economy should be entrusted to competent and independent experts, a group of “Platonic Guardians” empowered to act in the state’s higher interests, regardless of electoral outcomes or public opinion.	经济管理应该委托给那些有能力胜任且独立的专家们——即一群被授权以国家最高利益行事而无需顾及选举结果或公众意见的“柏拉图守护者”。


The International Monetary Fund, the European Commission, and the European Central Bank are often viewed as such technocratic institutions – and as supporting the technocratic element within states and societies around the world.	国际货币基金组织、欧盟委员会和欧洲央行通常被看作这样的技术官僚机构——以及全球各国和社会中类似技术派别的支持者。


At the height of the eurozone crisis, the IMF, the EC, and the ECB (not to mention financial markets) warmly welcomed the economists Mario Monti and Lucas Papademos as highly respected “technocratic” prime ministers for Italy and Greece, respectively.	在欧元区危机最严重的时候，国际货币基金组织、欧盟委员会和欧洲央行（更不用说金融市场）热烈欢迎经济学家马里奥·蒙蒂（Mario Monti）和卢卡斯·巴帕德莫斯（Lucas Papademos ）分别担任意大利和希腊两国备受尊崇的“技术型”总理。


Experience in recent decades has shown that a balanced and “moderate” approach is needed on these matters.	近几十年来的经验表明人们处理这些事情需要平衡且“稳健”的方法。


Electoral cycles (and the accompanying political pressures) are such that monetary policy, banking, and many other areas of policy and economic activity must be overseen by those with professional competence and a much longer time horizon than that of politicians.	选举周期（及随之而来的政治压力）的性质注定了货币政策、银行业和很多其它领域的政策和经济活动必须由那些具备专业能力的人用比政客在位时间更长的时间尺度来进行监管。


Day-to-day politics cannot dominate the regulation that markets need.	日常政治不能主导市场所需的监管。


The single most important institutional reform underlying price stability throughout the world has been the stronger independence of central banks.	全球物价稳定背后最重要的机构改革就是央行要取得更大的独立性。


But, if independent technocrats are allowed to determine long-term policy and set objectives that cannot be influenced by democratic majorities, democracy itself is in serious jeopardy.	但如果独立的技术官员有权决定长期政策并设定目标——且不会被多数派民主所影响，那民主本身就受到了严重的威胁。


I find it undemocratic, for example, that the ECB can set the eurozone-wide inflation target unilaterally.	比如说，我觉得欧洲央行可以单方面设定整个欧元区通胀目标的现状并不民主。


How much inflation a society finds desirable or tolerable (taking into account other important variables, such as employment, GDP growth, or poverty) is an inherently political question that should be debated in parliament.	一个社会的通胀水平多少才是理想或者说可以接受（这里考虑其它变量，比如就业、GDP增长，或者贫困水平）本质上是一个政治问题——应该在议会上进行讨论的问题。


The central bank should be consulted, but its role should be to implement the objective without political interference: independence in terms of policy tools, not goals.	人们应当咨询央行的意见，但其作用不应该是在不进行政治干预的情况下实现这些目标：也就是说我们要追求央行作为政策工具方面的独立性而非目标实现上的独立性。


Globalization and the increasing complexity of financial and other markets make it imperative that the domains of private activity, political decision-making, and regulation be clarified.	全球化和金融及其它市场的日益复杂使得有必要阐明私人经济活动、政策决策和监管的定义。


The challenge is even greater because some regulatory agencies must be multilateral, or at least intergovernmental, given the global nature of much economic activity.	考虑到大部分经济活动的全球化，一些监管机构必须是多边的、至少是政府间的，这就给我们带来了更大的挑战。


The difference and the distance between markets and politics must be clear – and, for the sake of both effectiveness and legitimacy, it must be based on rules that are well understood and on popular consent.	市场和政治之间的差别和距离必须划定清楚的界线——而且为了有效性和合法性，这一切必须基于那些能充分得到民众认同并能被理解的规则之上。


The Transparency Conspiracy	透明度阴谋


SOFIA – One of the most troubling outcomes of the ongoing financial crisis has been a collapse of trust in democratic institutions and politicians.	索菲亚—当前金融危机的最严重后果之一是对民主制度和政治的信任崩溃。


Indeed, in 2012, the global public-relations firm Edelman’s “Trust Barometer” survey registered the biggest-ever decline when it comes to government.	事实上，2012年，全球公共关系公司埃德尔曼公司（Edelman）的《信任晴雨表》（Trust Barometer）调查显示，对政府的信任出现了有史以来最大的下降。


Can greater “transparency” – the new political mantra of civic activists and an increasing number of democratic governments – reverse this trend?	更大的“透明度”——公民活动家和越来越多的民主国家政府的新政治口号——能扭转这一趋势吗？


The hope is that a combination of new technologies, publicly accessible data, and renewed civic engagement can help people control their representatives more effectively.	希望在于新技术、公开数据和公民的重新参与能够有助于人们更有效地控制他们的代表。


But the idea that transparency will restore public trust in democracy rests on several problematic assumptions, primarily the belief that “if only people knew,” everything would be different.	但透明度可以重塑民主国家的公共信任这一观点建立在几个颇有疑问的假设之上，最主要的假设是“只要人们知道”，一切都会不同的思想。


Unfortunately, matters are not so simple.	不幸的是，事情并不那么简单。


The end of government secrecy does not mean the birth of the informed citizen; nor does more control necessarily suggest more trust in public institutions.	政府不再有秘密并不意味着公民万事皆知； 更多的控制也不意味着对公共制度的更多新人。


For example, after American voters learned that President George W. Bush had led the United States into a war with Iraq without proof of weapons of mass destruction, they re-elected him.	比如，当美国选民得知小布什对伊拉克动武时根本没有确认后者拥有大规模杀伤性武器时，他们仍选了他连任总统。


Likewise, Italians kept Silvio Berlusconi in power for more than a decade, despite a steady stream of revelations about his wrongdoings.	类似地，意大利人让贝卢斯科尼执政超过十年，尽管关于他举措不当的报道不绝于耳。


In politics, “knowing everything” still means knowing different things, which means that compelling governments to disclose information does not necessarily mean that people learn more or understand better.	在政治上，“知道一切”仍能让事情有所不同，这意味着迫使政府披露信息并不一定意味着人们能更好地了解和明白。


On the contrary, as soon as government information is designed to be immediately open to everybody, its value as information declines and its value as an instrument of manipulation increases.	相反，只要政府信息立刻向所有人公开，其作为信息的价值就会下降，而其作为操纵工具的价值则会上升。


Consider how gangsters in crime movies talk when they know that the police are listening.	想想犯罪电影中的黑帮在得知被警察监听时的对话吧。


They speak clearly and offer banalities while exchanging notes under the table.	他们一边口齿清楚地扯淡，一边在桌子下面交换纸条。


That is government in the age of transparency.	这就是透明时代的政府。


In his study of truth-telling in ancient Greece, the philosopher Michel Foucault pointed out that the act of truth-telling cannot be reduced to citizens learning something that they did not know before.	米歇尔·福柯（Michel Foucault）在研究古希腊人如何讲真话时指出，讲真话这一行为不能降格为让公民获知他们此前不知道的东西。


Paradoxically, truth in politics is something that everybody knows, but that few dare to express.	相反，政治中的真相是众所周知但鲜有人敢于挑明之事。


People hardly need additional data to recognize, say, a rise in inequality or mistreatment of immigrants.	有些事情人们不需要更多的数据就能察觉，比如不平等性的上升或是歧视移民。


The WikiLeaks cables did not teach us anything qualitatively new about America’s policies.	维基解密上的电文并没有带给我们关于美国政策的任何高质量的新东西。


Living in truth cannot be reduced to having access to full information.	生活在真相中不能降格为可接触完全信息。


It is people’s willingness to take personal risks and confront the powerful by daring to speak the truth, not the truth itself, that ultimately leads to change.	真正推动变革的是人们不惜承担个人风险、直面权贵而敢于说出真相，而不是真相本身。


Moreover, information never comes without interpretation.	此外，信息的传播从来免不了各种解读。


Reading the same raw data, Republicans and Democrats in the US, or secularists and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, will spin it differently, because policymaking cannot be divorced from decision-makers’ interests and values.	面对同样的原始数据，美国的共和党和民主党，或埃及的世俗派和穆斯林兄弟会，会以不同的方式将其进行包装，因为决策离不开决策者的利益和价值。


As the anthropologists Jean and John Comaroff put it, ours “is an age in which people almost everywhere seem preoccupied, simultaneously, with transparency and conspiracy.”	正如人类学家让·科马罗夫和约翰·科马罗夫（Jean and John Comaroff）所指出的，我们的时代是“一个不管你身居何处，都在被透明和阴谋同时困扰的时代”。


To see the ambiguity of the politics of trust, consider Russia’s recent experience.	要想了解信任政治的波诡云谲，请看俄罗斯最近的经验。


In December 2011, the country’s parliamentary election triggered a civic explosion.	2011年12月，俄罗斯议会选举引爆了公民抗议。


Hundreds of thousands of people poured into the streets of Moscow and other big cities to demand a fair vote and real choices in the subsequent presidential election.	数十万人涌向莫斯科和其他各大城市街头，要求公正选举并在随后的总统大选中拥有真正的选择权。


The escalating crisis of legitimacy forced the government to invent imaginative ways to justify its power.	合法性危机的发酵迫使政府发明了极具想象力的方法来证明其权力。


The central proposal was ingenious: the Kremlin proposed to guarantee the election’s fairness by installing webcams at all polling stations; every citizen could personally monitor the voting process.	核心方案可谓独具匠心：克里姆林宫计划通过在所有��票站安装网络摄像头来保证选举的公正； 每个公民都可以自己监控投票过程。


As China’s Xinhua news agency enthusiastically reported: “From Kamchatka to Kaliningrad, and from Chechnya to Chukotka, more than 2.5 million net surfers registered to view live streaming from at least 188,000 webcams installed in more than 94,000 polling stations on Russian territory.”	正如新华社所热情报道的：“从堪察加半岛到加里宁格勒，从车臣到楚科奇，250多万网民注册观看了俄罗斯国土上94 000多个投票站的至少188 000个网络摄像头的现场影像。


In the words of one Finnish observer, it was “a landmark in the history of democracy and democratic elections.”	”一位芬兰观察者指出，这是“民主和民主选举历史上的里程碑。 ”


But, in a regime like Vladimir Putin’s, where the government decides who may be a candidate, the webcams would be farcical were they not also so intimidating.	但是，在一个普京式的政权中，政府决定了谁可以称为候选人，网络摄像头根本就是一场闹剧，不能让任何人害怕。


Viewed from the West, they were perceived as a tool to keep the government under control by enabling people to watch what it was doing.	从西方的观点看，这些摄像头是通过让人们观看正在发生什么而使政府受到控制的工具。


But, from the point of view of a post-Soviet voter living in the countryside, the webcam sent a different message: the government knows how you vote.	但是，从后苏联时代乡村选民的角度看，这些摄像头传递了不同的信息：政府知道你怎样投票。


In a way, Putin succeeded twice: he looked transparent to the West and menacing to most of his own citizens.	普京此举可谓一石二鸟：面对西方，他显得透明； 面对大部分俄罗斯公民，他显得令人害怕。


The installation of the webcams was an act of simultaneous transparency and conspiracy.	网络摄像头的安装便是透明和阴谋的同时发生体。


The broader issue is transparency advocates’ insistence that open government can be reconciled with citizens’ privacy.	更大的问题是，透明支持者坚持开放政府应该与公民隐私兼容。


But might wholly transparent government imply a wholly transparent citizen?	但完全透明的政府可能意味着完全透明的公民吗？


As a rule, governments monitor people.	作为一条规则，政府监视着人民。


When that becomes transparent, so do those citizens who spoke with or were monitored by the government.	当这变得透明时，与政府对话和被政府监视的公民也变得透明了。


Contrary to the expectations of transparency advocates, greater disclosure of government information does not make public discourse more rational and less paranoid.	与透明支持者的预期相反，政府信息的更多披露并不会让公共披露更多理性、更少偏执。


If anything, it fuels conspiracy theories (there is nothing more suspicious than the claim of absolute transparency).	如果说这有什么效果的话，那就是助长了阴谋论（没有什么比宣称绝对透明更令人怀疑的了）。


Who can honestly say that public debate has become more rational and less paranoid when our governments have become more transparent?	谁能拍胸脯保证公共争论会随着我们的政府变得更透明而变得更多理性、更少偏执？


Rather than restoring trust in democratic institutions, the transparency movement could accelerate the transformation of democratic politics into the management of mistrust.	透明度运动无法重建对民主制度的信任，倒是可能加快民主政治向不信任治理的转变。


In that case, one could imagine the replacement of representative democracy with political regimes that limit citizen control to the executive.	果真如此的话，你可以想象限制公民对执政官的控制的政治体制取代代议制民主的情景。


None of this is to deny that transparency in government is a worthy goal.	所有这些都不是在否定透明应该作为政府的一个值得追求的目标。


But let’s not fool ourselves by thinking that achieving it will restore citizens’ faith in their political institutions.	但我们不能因为认定达到这一目标会重塑公民对政治制度的信任而蒙蔽了自己的双眼。


The End of Hunger and Malnutrition	消除饥饿和营养不良


ROME – Sometimes something happens that can have a fundamental impact on mankind, but passes largely unnoticed at the time.	罗马 – 有时发生的某些事情会给人类带来根本性的影响，但却常常被忽视。


Such an event occurred in December in Rome.	罗马在12月就就发生了这样的事情。


The Council of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization decided that the FAO’s goal should no longer be merely to reduce hunger, but to eradicate hunger, food insecurity, and malnutrition.	联合国粮食及农业组织（粮农组织）理事会决定，粮农组织的目标将不再仅仅是减少饥饿，而是消除饥饿、粮食不安全和营养不良。


The next step will be to confirm this change in June 2013 at the FAO Conference, in which all FAO member countries participate.	下一步将是把这一变更提交2013年6月由所有成员国参加的粮农组织大会批准。


To many, this small change of wording must seem trivial.	对许多人来说，这个措辞上的小小变化似乎微不足道。


Critics will also say that adopting such a goal without setting a target date for achieving it is largely meaningless.	批评者会说，设立这种没有时限的目标意义不大。


Others may claim that even the idea of eradicating hunger is nonsense, because we lack the means to do it.	其他人可能会认为，消除饥饿的想法本身便是无稽之谈，因为我们无法做到。


For the last 12 years, the Millennium Development Goal of halving hunger by 2015 has been the driving force for hunger reduction.	过去12年来，到2015年将饥饿人口减半这一千年发展目标是减少饥饿运动的主要驱动力。


The proportion of hungry people in developing countries has declined significantly – from 23.2% in 1990-92 to 14.9% today.	发展中国家饥饿人口的比例已显著下降 - 从1990-1992年的23. 2％降至目前的14.


However, this decrease owes more to a rise in the world’s population than it does to the slight reduction in the actual number of hungry people (from about 980 million to 852 million today).	然而，下降的主要原因是世界人口的增加，而不是实际饥饿人数的略有减少（从大约9. 8亿减少到今天的8.


A “halving” goal has only slight political appeal, as it implicitly condemns the excluded half to a life on the fringes of society, exposed to illness and premature death.	“减半”的目标体现出较低的政治诉求，而且无疑会迫使另一半沦为生活在社会边缘和遭受疾病和过早死亡威胁的人。


Brazil’s Zero Hunger strategy, by contrast, has shown that adopting the absolute goal of hunger eradication provides a powerful means of galvanizing government departments into large-scale coordinated action, and of mobilizing society in a truly national effort to end one of the greatest injustices of our time.	相比之下，巴西的零饥饿战略说明，将消除饥饿作为一项绝对目标，为激励政府各部门开展大规模协调行动和动员全社会参与一项真正意义上的国家行动来结束我们时代最不公平现象之一提供了强有力的手段。


To be sure, it will be increasingly difficult – though far from impossible – to meet the world’s growing demand for food, and to do this in sustainable ways.	可以肯定的是，满足全球不断增长的粮食需求并以可持续方式做到这一点，虽然不是完全不可能，但将会越来越困难。


Additional food must be produced using technologies that do not damage the natural resources that future generations will need in order to feed themselves; that do not fuel climate change, which weighs heavily on farmers; and that do not accelerate the disintegration of the delicate fabric of rural society.	必须利用技术来生产更多的粮食，而这些技术必须无损于我们子孙后代未来养活自己所需的自然资源； 不会加剧给农民造成严重影响的气候变化进程；


But the challenge may not be as daunting as it seems.	然而，这一挑战可能没有想象的那样令人生畏。


The rate of population growth will be much slower than over the past 50 years, and there is much room for reducing the vast quantities of food that are now wasted.	人口增长速度��大大低于过去50年的水平； 仍有很大空间来减少目前大量的粮食浪费。


Moreover, as people’s incomes rise, they might more easily be persuaded to adopt healthier and more environmentally friendly diets than those taken up in the developed world.	此外，希望随着人们收入的提高，他们更易于被说服，选择比发达国家的人更加健康和环保的膳食。


The double burden of malnutrition – with hunger existing alongside obesity, diabetes, and other diseases of overconsumption – clearly shows the increasing importance of global dietary rebalancing.	营养不良带来双重负担 ，即饥饿与肥胖和因过度消费造成的另一种疾病糖尿病并存，这清楚地说明重新平衡全球饮食的重要性日益增加。


There is nothing really new about a commitment to hunger eradication.	消除饥饿并不是一个全新的承诺。


Indeed, the FAO was created in 1945 to bring about a world in which there would be “freedom from want,” which, in the words of its founders, “means the conquest of hunger and the attainment of the ordinary needs of a decent, self-respecting life.”	事实上，联合国粮农组织于1945年创建，其宗旨就是要建设一个“免于匮乏”的世界，而用其创始人的话来说，这“意味着消除饥饿并满足体面、自尊生活的一般需要”。


Because of the widespread fear in the postwar years of emerging global food shortages, the FAO, and the international community as a whole, focused mainly on food production – a focus that remained essentially the same in the following decades.	鉴于对战后几年出现的全球粮食短缺问题的普遍担忧，粮农组织和整个国际社会将重点主要放在粮食生产方面，而这一重点在接下来的几十年里基本上保持未变。


Those investments yielded good returns: despite staggering global population growth, from 2.5 billion in 1945 to seven billion today, food availability per person has risen by more than 40%.	所付出的努力取得了良好的回报：尽管世界人口增长速度惊人，从1945年的25亿增至今天的70亿，但是人均粮食供应量增加了40％以上。


The problem is that hunger still persists on a vast scale; so, our focus must now shift to ensuring universal access to adequate food.	但问题是，饥饿现象依然普遍存在； 因此，我们现在必须将工作重点转移到确保人人都能获得充足食物方面。


This should be a top priority for governments and a goal embraced by citizens everywhere.	这要成为各国政府工作的重中之重，并成为全社会追求的共同目标。


Breaking the vicious cycle of hunger and malnutrition requires complementing the focus on agriculture and rural development (more than 70% of the food-insecure population lives in rural areas of developing countries) with investment in other social and productive programs, including modest but predictable financial transfers to the poorest families.	若要打破饥饿和营养不良的恶性循环，就需要利用对其他社会和生产计划的投资来辅助农业和农村发展（超过70％粮食无保障的人口生活在发展中国家的农村地区），包括向最贫困家庭调拨少量但可预见的资金。


With the right policies in place, the incremental food demand created by these transfers, as well as by school meals programs and nutrition supplements for mothers and infants, could create opportunities for small-scale farmers to expand their output and improve their livelihoods.	如果政策得当，由诸如资金调拨，以及学校供膳计划、母幼营养补充剂等措施等支撑的粮食需求增长将为小农提高产量，从而改善生计创造机遇。


In June, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon launched the Zero Hunger Challenge at the Rio+20 Sustainable Development Conference.	6月份，联合国秘书长在里约+20可持续发展会议上发起了“零饥饿挑战”。


The FAO has accepted this challenge, and is formally setting its sights on hunger eradication.	粮农组织已接受了这项挑战，并正式将消除饥饿作为其努力方向。


I look forward with confidence to a progressive expansion in the number of member governments that commit themselves to moving as quickly as possible toward ending hunger and malnutrition within their borders – and to helping other countries to achieve the same goal.	我满怀信心地期待着有越来越多的成员国政府作出承诺，以最快的步伐，朝着消除本国饥饿和营养不良的目标迈进并帮助其他国家实现同样的目标。


It is never the wrong moment for the world to set its sights on ending hunger, once and for all.	任何时候将目标设定为彻底消除饥饿都是明智的。


Now is the time.	现在是时候了。


The Vision and the Fantasy	愿景和幻想


JERUSALEM – Israel, an audacious vision that came true, is now celebrating its 65th anniversary with a sense of well-deserved satisfaction at its extraordinary domestic achievements.	耶路撒冷—以色列正在庆祝建国65周年，作为一个成为现实的大胆构想，以色列因为其卓著的国内成就而踌躇满志。


In its relations with the outside world, however, the Jewish state still has a long way to go.	但是，在对外关系上，这个犹太国家仍然有很长的路要走。


Historically, the Jewish experience in international relations has not been particularly edifying.	历史上，犹太人的国际关系经验并没有太多助益。


A Jewish state has existed for only short periods in Judaism’s history, and it twice committed political suicide.	在犹太教历史上，犹太国家的存在时期很短，而且两次走上过政治自杀。


The reasons were always the same: politico-religious fanaticism and the blunder of challenging the prevailing world powers – hence modern Zionism’s obsessive quest for a binding alliance with a superpower.	原因永远是相似的：政治-宗教狂热以及不自量力地挑战现有世界列强——于是现代锡安主义（犹太复国主义）沉迷于寻求与超级大国的紧密联盟。


Ethnocentrism is bound to distort a people’s relations with the rest of the world, and Israel’s doctrine of power was drawn from the depths of Jewish experience, particularly the eternal, unforgiving hostility of a Gentile world.	民族优越感必然会扭曲一个民族与世界其他部分的关系，以色列的实力迷信来自犹太人历史的深层经验，特别是非犹太世界永恒的、冷血的敌意。


The role of the Holocaust as the constituent myth of the Zionist meta-narrative reinforced Israel’s tendency to face “the world,” an amorphous but imposing construct with which the Jews wage a dispute that cannot be resolved through the traditional tools of international relations.	大屠杀在锡安主义元叙事中扮演着基本神话元素的角色，这强化了以色列直面“世界”的倾向，这是一个没有定型但又蔚为壮观的构造，犹太人据此发动了无法用国际关系的传统工具解决的争端。


It was through Zionism, an essentially secular nationalist movement, that the Jews were returned to political action and developed the necessary diplomatic tools.	通过锡安主义——从本质上说，这是一种世俗民族主义运动——犹太人回归了政治活动，并发展出必要的外交工具。


But, while early Zionism was blessed with pragmatism and diplomatic savoir-faire, the preponderance of the military ethos of the nation in arms has relegated Zionism’s extraordinary foreign-policy achievements to a remote corner of Israelis’ collective memory.	但是，尽管早期锡安主义拥有得天独厚的务实主义和外交机智，但犹太民族的尚武精神占了压倒性优势，把锡安主义杰出的对外政策成就深深地压抑在以色列人集体记忆的偏远角落。


A crucial moment in the history of Israel’s oscillation between diplomatic and military “activism” took place on the eve of the 1967 war.	以色列在外交和军事“活跃主义”间震荡的关键时期发生在1967年战争前夜。


That crossroads exposed a deep cleavage between the young, self-confident Israeli-born generals, who were spiteful of the older generation’s “submissive” attitude, and the Diaspora-born politicians who, haunted by Holocaust memories and existentially fearful of international isolation, resisted making a break with the old politics of diplomatic Zionism.	这个十字路口制造了显而易见的分歧，一方是年轻自信的以色列出生的将军，他们痛恨老一辈人的“驯服”态度； 另一方是流散时期（Diaspora）出生的政客，大屠杀的回忆在他们心中萦绕不去，存在主义使他们害怕国际孤立，不愿意与外教锡安主义的老政治套路决裂。


The pragmatic wisdom of early Zionism is easily explained: in contrast to the anti-Semitic cliché about “Jewish power,” Zionism was the national movement of a weak people, decimated by oppression and genocide – a people that might face annihilation if it made the wrong choice at a moment of decision.	早期锡安主义的务实智慧很容易解释：与反闪族的“犹太势力”的陈词滥调相反，锡安主义是弱势民族的民族主义运动，这个民族因为压迫和大屠杀而饱受摧残，如果在抉择时刻做出了错误的选择，可能遭遇灭族之灾。


Admittedly, the Zionist leaders never really abandoned wider territorial dreams; but they would never have considered delaying the establishment of the Jewish state for the sole reason that it would not have access to the Western Wall or the Temple Mount.	诚然，锡安主义领袖从来没有真正放弃领土梦想； 但他们永远不会仅仅因为无法到达哭墙和圣殿山而考虑推迟建立犹太国家。


The positive ethos of building a new society was supposed to compensate for the poverty of the territorial solution.	建立新社会的积极呼声被认为可以补偿领土解决方案的贫乏。


The 1967 war, however, represented an ominous watershed.	但是，1967年战争是一座不吉的分水岭。


Israel’s lightning victory  recalls Hegel’s dictum about “the impotence of the winners.”	以色列闪电般的胜利让人们想起了黑格尔的名言——“赢者的虚萎”。


Military victories are never final and definitive.	军事胜利永远不是最终的、决定性的胜利。


In 1980, in a famous open letter entitled “The Homeland Is in Danger,” the historian Jacob Talmon tried to share this simple lesson with Prime Minister Menachem Begin.	1980年，在一封名为《祖国在危险中》（The Homeland Is in Danger）的公开信中，历史学家雅各布·塔尔蒙（Jacob Talmon）试图与总理贝金（Menachem Begin）分享这个简单的教训。


Talmon criticized the Israeli right’s belief that one major “event”would radically and permanently change the situation in Israel’s favor, and he repudiated the “religious sanction” used to justify unrealistic policies in the Occupied Territories.	塔尔蒙批评了以色列右翼的信念——一次重大“事件”将彻底而永久地改变局面，使之有利于以色列，他批驳了用于论证占领区（Occupied Territories）不现实政策的“宗教制裁”。


He explained the Messianic illusions that were reborn with the Six-Day War as false compensation for the martyrdom of the Shoah.	他解释了随六日战争重生的救世主幻想是对大屠杀受害者的错误补偿。


There was nothing mysterious about Israel’s victory, he claimed; it was the result of a simple concatenation of circumstances.	他说，以色列的胜利没有任何神秘之处； 只是环境的简单串联而已。


A small country like Israel, lacking a serious demographic foundation or favorable geopolitical conditions, could never perpetuate its presence in occupied territories, Talmon argued.	像以色列这样缺少强大的人口基础和有利地缘政治条件的小国不可能永久维持占领区，塔尔蒙说。


Hence, the danger to Israel lay in the Sisyphean effort to subjugate the Palestinians.	因此，以色列的危险在于徒劳地试图征服巴勒斯坦人。


“Blind is the leader who does not see that a war of races is what lies ahead,” he wrote.	“领导人瞎了眼，看不见前方等待我们的是种族战争。 ”他写道。


Israel’s annexationist right would dismiss its “defeatist” detractors with the claim that the entire Zionist enterprise was an unrealistic dream that miraculously came true.	以色列兼并主义右派反驳其“失败主义”批评者，说整个锡安主义大厦是一个��现实的梦，实现纯属奇迹。


In fact, Israel materialized because historical and political conditions favored it, and because Zionist diplomacy successfully navigated the international-relations challenges that it encountered.	事实上，以色列之所以成为现实，是因为历史和政治条件有利，也是因为锡安主义外交成功地处理了它所遇到的国际关系挑战。


But the victory of June 1967 was not a license for Israel to set utterly unrealistic objectives for itself.	但1967年6月的胜利绝非以色列可以为自己设定极不现实的目标的通行证。


Not every fantasy is a vision.	并非所有的幻想都是愿景。


The ethos of Israel’s far right consists in its insistence on blurring this distinction.	以色列极右翼的说辞建立在将两者的区别模糊化的基础上。


The right’s fatalism about the chances of peace is a useless adviser in foreign policy.	右翼关于和平机会的宿命论对外交政策毫无用处。


Political positions are not eternal; they are always susceptible to change.	政治立场不是永久的； 而永远应该随变化调整。


Nor is it true that nothing can sway the Arab world from its hostility to Israel.	无论如何都无法改变阿拉伯世界对以色列的敌意的说法也不正确。


The Arabs might never accept the moral justice of Zionism, but, as the Arab Peace Initiative indicates, they would consider accepting the political legitimacy of a Jewish state.	阿拉伯人可能永远不会接受锡安主义的道德正确性，但是，阿拉伯和平计划（Arab Peace Initiative）表明，他们会考虑接受以色列国的政治合法性。


Not even Israel’s staunchest allies will risk an indefinite confrontation with the entire international community by supporting Israel’s territorial ambitions.	即使是以色列最坚定的盟友，也不会因为支持以色列的领土野心而甘冒月整个国际社会决然相对的风险。


Reasonable border modifications are one thing; legitimizing a Jewish empire is quite another.	合理的边界修订是一回事； 以色列帝国的合法化是完全不同的另一回事。


Indeed, international acquiescence to the situation created by Israel’s victory in 1967 proved to be extremely short-lived.	事实上，国际社会对以色列1967年胜利所创造出的局面的默许为时甚短。


When a war of salvation and survival turned into a war of conquest, occupation, and annexation, the international community recoiled and Israel went on the defensive. It has remained there ever since.	当一场拯救和生存之战转变为征服、占领和吞并之战时，国际社会强烈反弹，以色列也转主动为被动，并在此后一直处于被动。


The Fear Factor in US-China Relations	美中关系中的担忧因素


Opinion polls indicate that one-third of Americans believe that China will “soon dominate the world,” while nearly half view China’s emergence as a “threat to world peace.”	民意调查显示，三分之一的美国人相信中国将会“马上统治世界”，而将近一半的人把中国的崛起视为“对世界和平的威胁”。


In turn, many Chinese fear that the United States will not accept their “peaceful rise.”	反过来，许多中国人担心美国将不会接受他们的“和平崛起”。


Americans and Chinese must avoid such exaggerated fears.	美国人和中国人必须避免这样过度的担忧。


Maintaining good US-China relations will be a key determinant of global stability in this century.	维持良好的美中关系将会成为本世纪全球稳定的一个关键性决定因素。


Perhaps the greatest threat to the bilateral relationship is the belief that conflict is inevitable.	或许，对双边关系最大的威胁是相信冲突是不可避免的。


Throughout history, whenever a rising power creates fear among its neighbors and other great powers, that fear becomes a cause of conflict.	纵观历史，一旦崛起的大国造成邻国以及其他大国的担忧，那么，这一担忧就变成冲突的原因。


In such circumstances, seemingly small events can trigger an unforeseen and disastrous chain reaction.	在这种情形下，看似微不足道的事件会引发不可预测以及灾难性的连锁反应。


Today, the greatest prospect of a destabilizing incident lies in the complex relationships across the Taiwan Strait.	如今，最有可能破坏稳定的事件在于错综复杂的台海关系。


China, which regards Taiwan as an integral part of its territory that has sheltered behind the US navy since the days of the Chinese civil war, vows that any Taiwanese declaration of independence will be met by force.	中国认为台湾是其领土不可分割的一部分，而台湾则在中国内战以后就躲避在美国海军背后得以保护。 中国誓言，台湾宣布独立就会兵戎相见。


The US does not challenge China’s sovereignty, but it wants a peaceful settlement that will maintain Taiwan’s democratic institutions.	美国并不质疑中国的主权，但是它想要维护台湾民主机制的和平解决方案。 在台湾岛内，民族认同越发强烈。


In Taiwan itself, there is a growing sense of national identity, but a sharp division between pragmatists of the “pan-blue alliance,” who realize that geography will require them to find a compromise with the mainland, and the ruling “pan-green alliance,” which aspires in varying degrees to achieve independence.	“泛蓝联盟”的务实派认为台湾的地理位置要求他们与大陆妥协，而执政的“泛绿联盟”则渴求在不同的程度上实现独立。 两派之间分歧深重。


The two sides in Taiwan will face off in a presidential election on March 22.	台湾的两派将在3月22日的总统大选中决一雌雄。


Current polls suggest that former Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang (KMT) leads Frank Hsieh of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).	目前的民意调查显示，前任台北市长、国民党的马英九领先于执政民进党的谢长庭。


But some observers fear that the incumbent DPP President Chen Shui-bian will seek a pretext to prevent a defeat for the pro-sovereignty camp.	但是某些观察家担心在任的民进党总统陈水扁将会寻找借口防止倾向独立阵营的败落。


He is currently advocating a referendum on whether Taiwan should join the United Nations, which China views as provocative.	他目前正在鼓吹入联公投，中国视其为挑衅。


Chen replies that it is China “that is acting provocatively today.”	陈水扁回应说正是中国“如今在挑衅”。


America is clearly concerned.	美国无疑对此担忧。


Recently, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told a news conference that “we think that Taiwan’s referendum to apply to the UN under the name ‘Taiwan’ is a provocative policy.	最近，美国国务卿莱斯在一个记者会上说，“我们认为台湾的入联公投是一项挑衅性的政策。


It unnecessarily raises tensions in the Taiwan Strait and it promises no real benefits for the people of Taiwan on the international stage.”	这一政策毫无必要地加剧台海紧张局势，对台湾人民在国际舞台上没有实际利益”。


She also reiterated the administration policy opposing “unilateral threat by either side to change the status quo.”	她还重申布什当局反对“任何一方单方面改变现状的威胁”。


The same day, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates criticized China for unexpectedly curtailing American ship visits to Chinese ports because of American arms sales to Taiwan.	同一天，美国国防部长盖茨批评中国由于美国向台湾的军售而突然禁止美国军舰停留中国港口。


According to Gates, he had told Chinese officials that American arms sales were consistent with past policy and that “as long as they continued to build up their forces on their side of the Taiwan Strait, we would continue to give Taiwan the resources necessary to defend itself.”	盖茨说，他告诉中国官员，美国的军售是与以往的政策一致的，而且，“只要他们继续在其台湾海峡的一方增加军队，我们就会继续给台湾必要的自卫手段”。


Gates added, however, that despite China’s rising defense budget, “I don’t consider China an enemy, and I think there are opportunities for continued cooperation in a number of areas.”	但是盖茨补充说，尽管中国军费增加，但是“我并不视中国为敌，而且我认为双方有机会在多个领域继续合作”。


In principle, the Taiwan issue need not lead to conflict.	在原则上，台湾问题并不一定导致冲突。


With increasing change in China and growing economic and social contacts across the strait, it should be possible to find a formula that allows the Taiwanese to maintain their market economy and democratic system without a placard at the UN.	中国日益变革，海峡两岸经济和社会交往增多，应该有可能找到一种让台湾在没有联合国席位的情况下保持其市场经济和民主制度的方式。


Thus far, the US has tried to allow for this evolution by stressing two bright lines: no independence for Taiwan and no use of force by China.	目前为止，美国试图强调两点来允许局势演进，也就是台湾不独立以及中国不动武。


But, given the danger of incidents that could grow out of political competition in Taiwan or growing impatience in the Peoples’ Liberation Army on the mainland, the US would be wise to encourage more active contacts and negotiations by the two sides.	但是，由于台湾政治竞争或者大陆解放军越发不耐烦而可能引发的事件的危险性，美国鼓励两岸更积极的接触和谈判应该是明智的。


The US has a broad national interest in maintaining good relations with China, as well as a specific human rights interest in protecting Taiwan’s democracy.	美国维持与中国的良好关系符合其自身国家利益，而保护台湾的民主也符合其具体的人权利益。


The US does not have a national interest in helping Taiwan become a sovereign country with a seat at the UN, and efforts by some Taiwanese to do so present the greatest danger of a miscalculation that could create enmity between the US and China.	帮助台湾成为独立主权国家并在联合国拥有席位并不符合美国的国家利益。 某些台湾人这样做会带来误算的最大危险，有可能造成美中两国的敌对。


Already, some Chinese suspect the US of seeking an independent Taiwan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” for use against a future Chinese enemy.	有些中国人已经怀疑美国寻求让台湾独立作为“不沉的航空母舰”来对付未来的中国敌人。


They are wrong, but such suspicions can feed a climate of enmity.	他们错了，但是这样的怀疑会造成敌意的环境。


If America treats China as an enemy today, it will ensure future enmity.	如果今天美国把中国以敌人对待，那么今后就会有敌对。


While we cannot be sure how China will evolve, it makes no sense to foreclose the prospect of a better future.	我们无法确定中国如何演进，但是，破坏良好未来的前景是毫无道理的。


America’s current policy combines economic integration with a hedge against future uncertainty.	美国目前的政策把经济融入与防患未来不确定性相结合。


The US-Japan security alliance means China cannot play a “Japan card.”	美日安全联盟意味着中国无法打“日本牌”。


But, while such hedging is natural in world politics, modesty is important for both sides.	但是，尽管这样的防患措施在国际政治上是自然而然的事情，对于双方而言节制是重要的。


If the overall climate is one of distrust, what looks like a hedge to one side can look like a threat to the other.	如果整体环境是不信任，那么，在一方看来是防患措施在另一方看来就是威胁。


There is no need for the US and China to go to war in this century.	美中两国没有必要在本世纪作战。


Both sides must take care that an incident concerning Taiwan does not lead in that direction.	双方都必须确保事关台湾的事件不要朝这一方向演进。


Americans and Chinese must avoid letting exaggerated fears create a self-fulfilling prophecy.	美中两国人民必须避免让过度的担忧造成自我实现的预言。


The Fear Factor	恐惧因素


LOS ANGELES – The debate over fiscal expansion versus consolidation continues to divide the developed world.	洛杉矶——关于财政扩张还是财政整合的争论在发达世界愈演愈烈。


In response to the global recession of 2008, the United Kingdom embarked on an austerity program while the United States enacted an $800 billion fiscal stimulus.	为了应对2008年的全球衰退，英国实施了财政紧缩，而美国抛出了8 000亿美元财政刺激。


Despite a softening economy, British Prime Minister David Cameron is promising to stay the austerity course.	尽管经济疲软，但英国首相卡梅伦仍然承诺将把紧缩进行到底。


Obama, too, is sticking to his guns with his recent proposal for an additional $450 billion of government expenditure and tax cuts to help boost employment.	奥巴马则继续着财政刺激，在最新的方案中提出追加4 500亿美元政府支出和减税，以帮助提振就业。


Unemployment in the US has remained above 9% for 22 of the last 24 months.	在过去24个月中，美国的失业率有22个月高于9%。


While some are supporting additional stimulus, others are calling for UK-style austerity.	有些人支持进一步实施刺激以，但其他人要求实施英国式的紧缩计划。


But would either of these approaches reduce unemployment most effectively, or would a new round of  “quantitative easing” (an unconventional form of economic stimulus by which the central bank purchases financial assets) work better?	这两种做法可以有效地使失业降下来吗？ 再来一轮“量化宽松”（通过央行买入金融资产实现的非常规经济刺激）效果会更好吗？


With Nobel prize-winning economists on both sides of the current debate about how to solve the unemployment problem, the public is rightly confused.	诺贝尔经济学奖获得者在如何解决失业问题上也分裂为两个阵营，这让公众无所适从。


Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz are calling for an even larger fiscal stimulus to target government spending on education and infrastructure investment.	保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）和约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨（Joseph Stiglitz）认为应该扩大财政刺激，以教育和基础设施投资上的政府支出为目标。


On the other side, Robert Mundell, Myron Scholes, and Reinhard Selten have called for “draconian measures” to tame debt levels.	另一方面，罗伯特·蒙代尔（Robert Mundell）、迈仑·斯科尔斯（Myron Scholes）和莱茵哈德·泽尔腾（Reinhard Selten）认为应该采取“严厉措施”来控制债务水平。


The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) that Obama passed barely three weeks after his inauguration was disappointing.	奥巴马在正式就任总统大约三周后就出台了美国复苏和再投资法案（ARRA），但该法案令人失望。


An $800 billion stimulus did not have the effect for which its proponents hoped, largely because it was accompanied by a big increase in private savings.	8 000亿美元的财政刺激并未达到支持者所希望看到的效果，主要原因是该投入的资金都被私人储蓄大增所抵消了。


Backers of the stimulus plan now claim that things would have been much worse without ARRA.	如今，刺激计划支持者声称，如果不是ARRA，将会糟糕得多。


I am skeptical.	我对此不敢苟同。


A better approach to reducing unemployment would be a new and expanded round of quantitative easing.	就减少失业而言，更好的办法是新一轮扩大的量化宽松。


I am heartened by calls for this in the UK, and that the talk is now turning to the purchase of risky assets, such as corporate bonds or bundles of loans to the private sector, as opposed to long-term government securities.	英国已经出现了这样的声音，而且有人提出应该购买风险资产（比如公司债券和流向私人部门的贷款束）而不是长期政府证券，这令我倍感欣慰。


This is a step in the right direction that I have been advocating for the past three years.	这一举措与我过去三年来所呼吁采取的措施不谋而合。


But I would go even further.	但我还要更进一步。


My work provides a new and coherent approach to macroeconomics that explains how a lack of confidence can lead to persistent unemployment.	我的研究提出了一种崭新且一致的宏观经济学观点，可以解释信心缺失为何会导致持久失业。


It supports the purchase of equities by central banks to reduce asset-price volatility, restore the value of wealth, and prevent a future market crash.	该观点支持央行买入股票以降低资产价格波动、重塑财富价值并防止市场进一步崩溃。


When businessmen and women are afraid, they stop investing in real assets.	当商界人士感到恐惧的时候，他们就会停止投资实物资产。


Lack of confidence is reflected in low and volatile asset values.	信心缺失将反映在资产价值的低水平和高波动上。


The environment of fear that arises has little to do with bad government policies, although bad policy may exacerbate the situation.	恐惧氛围的产生与政府政策失当并无多少关系，不过后者可能会使情况进一步恶化。