It is heartening to see wealthy individuals defying these attacks, not only by openly acknowledging the economic and social damage caused by extreme inequality, but also by criticizing a system that, despite enabling them to prosper, has left too many without opportunities.	令人振奋的是看到一批富有者无视这些攻击，不仅公开承认极端不平等所造成的经济和社会破坏，还批评这样一个尽管使他们发家致富，却剥夺了太多人上升机会的体制。


In particular, some wealthy Americans are condemning the current tax legislation being pushed by Congressional Republicans and President Donald Trump’s administration, which offers outsize cuts to the highest earners – people like them.	特别是一些富有美国人挺身而出谴责国会共和党人和特朗普政府试图推行的，为他们这类顶层收入者提供过度减税的税务立法。


As Jack Bogle, the founder of Vanguard Group and a certain beneficiary of the proposed cuts, put it, the plan – which is all but guaranteed to exacerbate inequality – is a “moral abomination.”	正如先锋投资集团（Vanguard Group）创始人，减税建议的当然受益者杰克·博格（Jack Bogle）所指出的那样，这个必定会加剧不平等的计划是一种“道德上的恶行”。


Yet recognizing the flaws in current structures is just the beginning.	然而认识当前架构中的缺陷只是一个开始。


The greater challenge is to create a viable blueprint for an equitable society. (It is the absence of such a blueprint that has led so many well-meaning movements in history to end in failure.)	更大的挑战在于为平等社会规划一个可行的蓝图（历史上许多善意运动都因缺乏这样一个蓝图而以失败告终）。


In this case, the focus must be on expanding profit-sharing arrangements, without stifling or centralizing market incentives that are crucial to drive growth.	在这种情况下必须将重点放在扩大利润分享安排上，同时不能扼杀或集中控制对推动增长至关重要的市场激励措施。


A first step would be to give all of a country’s residents the right to a certain share of the economy’s profits.	第一步是让一国的所有居民能享有一定比例的经济利益。


This idea has been advanced in various forms by Marty Weitzman, Hillel Steiner, Richard Freeman, and, just last month, Matt Bruenig.	包括马蒂·魏茨曼（Marty Weitzman），希勒尔·斯坦纳（Hillel Steiner），理查德·弗里曼（Richard Freeman）和上月发表相关论文的马特·布吕尼希（Matt Bruenig）在内的学者都已经以各种形式提出了这一想法。


But it is particularly vital today, as the share of wages in national income declines, and the share of profits and rents rises – a trend that technological progress is accelerating.	但在当下这一点尤为重要，因为在科技的加速下国民收入中的工资份额正逐步下降，利润和租金的份额则不断上升。


There is another dimension to profit-sharing that has received little attention, related to monopolies and competition.	还有另外一个利润分享方面的问题，它与垄断和竞争有关但很少受到关注。


With modern digital technology, the returns to scale are so large that it no longer makes sense to demand that, say, 1,000 firms produce versions of the same good, each meeting one-thousandth of total demand.	随着现代数字技术的发展，规模经济的回报如此之大，以至于那种让1000个企业生产各类版本的相同产品，每个产品满足总需求的1/1000的要求已经不再合理了。


A more efficient approach would have 1,000 firms each creating one part of that good.	更有效的方法则是让这1000个企业各自去制造该商品的一个部件。


So, when it comes to automobiles, for example, one firm would produce all of the gears, another producing all of the brake pads, and so on.	以汽车为例，一家公司生产所有的齿轮，另一家生产所有的刹车片，如此类推。


Traditional antitrust and pro-competition legislation – which began in 1890 with the Sherman Act in the US – prevents such an efficient system from taking hold.	传统的反托拉斯和促进竞争立法（始于美国1890年的《谢尔曼法案》）遏制了这种高效制度。


But a monopoly of production need not mean a monopoly of income, as long as the shares in each company are widely held.	但垄断生产其实并不一定意味着垄断收入——解决方案是将每个企业的股份广泛分散持有。


It is thus time for a radical change, one that replaces traditional anti-monopoly laws with legislation mandating a wider dispersal of shareholding within each company.	因此是时候进行彻底的改变，用一种立法来取代传统的反垄断法，要求在每个企业内更广泛地分散持有股份。


These ideas are largely untested, so much work would need to be done before they could be made operational.	这些想法在很大程度上是未经过检验的，在开始运作之前需要做很多工作。


But as the world lurches from one crisis to another, and inequality continues to deepen, we do not have the luxury of sticking to the status quo.	但随着世界从一个危机陷入到另一个危机，不平等状况继续恶化，我们也无法奢求再去坚持现状。


Unless we confront the inequality challenge head on, social cohesion and democracy itself will come under growing threat.	除非我们直面不平等的挑战，否则社会凝聚力和民主本身就会受到越来越大的威胁。


Facing the Four Structural Threats to US Democracy	面对美国民主的四大结构性威胁


BERKELEY – It has been one year since Donald Trump was elected president of the United States, and America’s democratic institutions are clearly under strain.	伯克利—特朗普当选美国总统已经一年，美国的民主制度显然处于压力之下。


A mere 20% of Americans now trust the federal government to “do the right thing,” while trust in Congress has fallen below 9%.	目前，只有20%的美国人相信联邦政府在“做正确的事情”，而对国会的信任已经下降到不足9%。


Among congressional Republicans, in particular, a “take-no-prisoners” extremism is undermining the federal government’s capacity for action, which is precisely what many on the far right want.	特别是，在国会民主党中间有一种“不择手段”极端主义正在破坏联邦政府的行动力，而这正是许多右翼人士所希望的。


According to some pessimists, the US Constitution was not designed to address the challenges of a country so sharply divided by income, race, and partisanship.	一些悲观派认为，美国国会成立的初衷，绝不是为了解决一个被收入、种族和党派搞得如此割裂的国家的挑战。


Yet state and local governments are still trusted by most voters, and they have the power under the Tenth Amendment of the US Constitution to strengthen democratic institutions.	但州和地方政府仍然受到了大部分选民的信任，并且根据美国宪法第十修正案，它们拥有强化民主制度的权力。


Already, many states and cities are adopting reforms to encourage political compromise and improve democratic governance.	目前，多个州和市正在采取改革措施促进政治妥协，改善民主治理。


Better yet, some of these reforms have national implications, because they will clean up the process by which members of Congress are elected.	更令人振奋的是，其中一些改革产生了全国性影响，因为它们清理了国会成员的选举程序。


State and local reform movements are focused on four structural threats to democracy: gerrymandering; poorly designed primary processes; money in politics; and legislative procedures that impede compromise.	州和地方改革运动集中在民主的四大结构性威胁上：选区划分不公正、初级选举流程设计不合理； 政治献金；


Gerrymandering, whereby state legislators redraw congressional districts to favor their own party, allows politicians to choose voters, rather than the other way around.	选区划分不公正是指州立法者重新划分国会选区，以利于本党，让政客选择选民而不是相反。


While the practice dates back to at least 1812, when then-Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry oversaw the redrawing of his state’s senatorial districts, it has been perfected in recent decades, mainly by Republican-dominated state legislatures.	这种行为可以追溯到1812年，时任马塞诸塞州州长埃尔布里奇·格里（Elbridge Gerry）主导重划了本州参议员选区。 但其日臻完美还是在近几十年，主要发生在共和党主导的州立法机关。


Republican-drawn districts in Texas and the six swing states of Ohio, Florida, Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia had a clear influence in elections to the US House of Representatives in 2016.	共和党划定的德克萨斯州以及俄亥俄、佛罗里达、密歇根、北卡罗来纳、宾夕法尼亚和弗吉尼亚六个摇摆州的选区对2016年美国众议院选举产生了显而易见的影响。


Now, almost all of these states’ electoral maps are being challenged as unconstitutional.	如今，几乎所有这些州的选举地图都被控违宪。


And in Gill v. Whitford, a landmark case from Wisconsin, the US Supreme Court will soon issue its first ruling in a decade on the constitutionality of gerrymandering.	而在威斯康星州标志性案件吉尔对威特福德案（Gill v. Whitford）中，美国最高法院即将做出其十年来的首个关于选区划分不公正的合宪性裁决。


Elsewhere, state governments have taken the more radical step of establishing special redistricting commissions that are independent of the two dominant political parties.	其他州政府采取了更加果断的措施，成立了独立于两大主要政党的选区重划特别委员会。


And in 24 states, voters can propose ballot initiatives to change districting rules and limit the impact of gerrymandering.	在24个州，选民可以发起投票运动来改变选区划分规则，限制不公正划分的影响。


Voters in California and Arizona have already done so, and similar measures will likely be on the ballot in other states in 2018 or 2020.	加利福尼亚州和亚利桑那州的选民已经这么做了，其他州也将在2018或2020年就此发起投票。


But even with independently drawn districts, elections in many parts of the country will not be competitive, because voters from the same party often live in close proximity.	但即使能够实现独立划分选区，美国许多地区的选举仍将是非竞争性的，因为来自同一个政党的选民常常住得很近。 为了解决这个问题，政治学家安东尼·奎因（T.


To address this, the political scientists T. Anthony Quinn and R. Michael Alvarez recommend reforming the primary process to “give voters more choices, which in turn can stimulate increased voter turnout.”	Anthony Quinn）和迈克尔·阿尔瓦雷兹（R. Michael Alvarez）建议改革初级选举程序，“给选民更多的选择，进而反过来刺激选民改换阵营。


By opening up party primaries to more candidates, or by using ranked-choice voting (RCV) – which allows voters to list as many candidates as they want, in order of preference – we can ensure that elected officials represent the full spectrum of voters.	通过让党内初选向更多候选人开放，或通过利用排序选择投票（rank-choice voting，RCV）——即选民根据偏好顺序列举所有他们想要的候选人——我们能够确保当选政客代表了全体选民。


RCV has already been adopted by a number of American cities and the state of Maine, and one hopes it will continue to spread in the years ahead.	RCV已在多个美国城市以及缅因州实施，我们希望它能够在未来几年得到继续推广。


A third necessary reform concerns money in politics.	第三项必要的改革涉及到政治献金。


Ideally, we should have strict limits and transparency requirements for all political donations.	在理想情况下，对于一切政治捐赠，我们都应该有严格的限制和透明度要求。


But the Supreme Court made achieving that much harder with its controversial Citizens United decision in 2010, when it held that campaign donations – even from corporations – are a protected form of free speech.	但最高法院在2010年所做出的争议性裁决《公民联盟》（Citizens United）使这一目标实现的难度大大增加。 该裁决认定，选战捐赠——即使来自公司——是受保护的言论自由的一种形式。


The court’s ruling not only invalidated existing campaign-finance law; it also overturned several prior Supreme Court decisions.	这不但宣布了现有选战融资法的无效； 也推翻了此前的多次最高法院裁决。


Not surprisingly, hidden spending by big donors has skyrocketed in the past seven years.	毫不奇怪，过去七年中大金主的暗中支出一飞冲天。


Ballooning undisclosed political spending and social-media advertising – by both domestic and foreign entities – has made increased transparency an urgent necessity.	不断膨胀的未披露政治支出和社交媒体宣传——包括国内和国外实体所做的——让增加透明度成为一个迫切的需要。


With details continuing to emerge about how Russia used social media to influence the outcome of the 2016 election, a growing chorus is calling for stronger legislation to regulate online activities.	俄罗斯如何利用社交媒体影响2016年大选结果的细节仍在不断挖掘之中，但一个日益形成的共识是要求加强立法监管在线行为。


Currently, platforms such as Facebook and Twitter are not subject to the Federal Election Commission’s transparency rules.	目前，Facebook和Twitter等平台不受联邦选举委员透明度规则的约束。


The regulation of political spending is substantially different at the state level.	对政治支出的监管在州层面大大不同。


All 50 states require disclosure for contributions to campaigns for state offices, 39 states have a cap for individual contributions, and 22 states prohibit corporations from contributing to political campaigns altogether.	所有50个州都要求披露州官员的选举献金，39个州规定了个人捐赠上限，22个州完全禁止公司为选举捐赠。


Furthermore, many states are exploring the possibility of making disclosure rules permanent through constitutional amendments.	此外，许多州都在探索通过修宪让披露规则永久化的可能性。


And 13 states already offer a public-financing option for candidates running for state office, with many more poised to follow suit in response to grassroots pressure.	13个州已开始为竞选州官员的候选人提供公共融资选项，而在草根压力的推动下，有更多州准备跟进。


A final structural threat to American democracy is the partisan manipulation of legislative procedures.	美国的民主的最后一个结构性威胁是党派操纵立法流程。


When the majority party in either house of Congress routinely changes the rules to suit its own ends, crafting bipartisan solutions becomes almost impossible.	当国会两院之一的多数党总是会修改规则以利于本党时，形成跨党派方案便成为几乎不可能的任务。


Similarly, at the state level, legislative supermajorities, arbitrary thresholds for passing budget and tax measures, and ballot initiatives financed by special interests can all impede bipartisan problem solving.	类似地，在州层面，立法绝对多数制、通过预算和税收政策的专断权阈值，以及由特殊利益集团提供资金支持的投票运动都有可能妨碍跨党派问题解决方案。


But as California has shown, structural barriers to good governance can be eliminated through citizen-driven reforms.	但加利福尼亚州证明，妨碍好治理的结构性壁垒可以通过公民推动的改革消除。


In recent years, the California legislature has cleaned up redistricting, introduced “top two primaries” and an aggressive disclosure system, reformed term limits, eliminated a supermajority rule for state budgetary measures, and improved the ballot-initiative process.	在最近几年中，加州立法机关清理了重划选区问题，引入了“初选前两名”和一套咄咄逼人的披露制度，改革了任期限制，取消了州预算政策的绝对多数制，并改善了投票运动程序。


As a result, the legislature has become dramatically more effective, and its approval rating has gone from just 14% seven years ago to 57% today – its highest level since 1988.	结果，加州立法机关效率大大加强，满意度从七年前的14%上升到今天的57%——是1988年以来的最高水平。


There is little reason to believe that Congress will reform itself.	没有理由相信国会会改革自己。


But if the movement for progressive federalism continues to gain momentum and push through meaningful state- and local-level reforms, federal lawmakers will not be able to maintain the status quo indefinitely.	但如果进步联邦主义运动通过有意义的州和地方层次的改革继续保持动力和推动，联邦立法者就无法永远维持现状。


With a renewed confidence in democracy, citizens can take action to ensure that elected officials are governed by the right incentives, and motivated to pursue bipartisan solutions to the country’s problems.	对民主重建信心的公民能够采取行动确保当选官员受正确的激励的推动，有动力为美国面临的问题追求跨党派方案。


If California can do it, so can other states.	加州能做到，其他州也能做到。


America’s founders created the Tenth Amendment precisely because they worried about dysfunction in the capital.	美国开国元勋们之所以制定第十修正案，正是因为他们担心首都陷入功能瘫痪。


It’s time we used it.	是时候使用第十修正案了。


How Federalism Can Trump Populism	特朗普民粹主义下的联邦制


BERKELEY – America remains deeply divided on many economic and political issues.	发自伯克利——美国国内在许多经济和政治问题上依然存在重大分歧。


Just as US President Donald Trump was touting the accomplishments of his first 100 days in office, a federal court, responding to a legal complaint brought by several jurisdictions, temporarily blocked his executive order to strip federal funding from “sanctuary” states and cities.	就在美国总统唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）大肆吹嘘自己上任首100天的成就之时，一所联邦法院针对几个司法管辖区提出的法律诉讼作出了判决，临时禁止了他停止向非法移民“庇护”州和城市拨付联邦财政拨款的行政命令。


According to the ruling, Trump’s order violates the Constitution’s separation of powers clause, due-process guarantees, and the Tenth Amendment, which states that, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”	根据裁决，特朗普的命令违反了宪法分权条款，程序正当保障以及宪法第十修正案，其规定：“没有被宪法赋予联邦的权利，或者并未由宪法禁止授予各州的权利，由各州及其人民自主保留。


In other words, states and cities may cooperate with the federal government by carrying out federal policies; but the Tenth Amendment provides the constitutional basis for them to challenge or resist federal policies that conflict with their own goals (in this case, shielding undocumented immigrants from arrest and possible deportation).	”换言之，各州及城市可以通过执行联邦政策来与联邦政府合作； 但第十修正案为它们提供了挑战或抵制与自身目标相抵触的联邦政策的宪法基础（在本案例中则是为无证移民提供庇护，防止其被联邦政府逮捕和驱逐出境）。


Citizens’ needs vary widely across the country, and federalism helps to ensure that they are addressed.	全美各地公民的诉求各不相同，联邦制则有助于确保这些诉求得到回应。


State and municipal governments can implement policies more efficiently when they are free to source local ideas and enter into local partnerships with non-governmental actors.	而在自由征求本地民众意见并与非政府行为方构建地方伙伴关系的情况下，各州和市政府将能更有效地实施政策。


Local-level pilot programs and policy experiments also accelerate innovation, with authorities able to close ineffective programs quickly and expand those that work.	地方一级的试点项目和政策实验有助于加快创新进程，因为地方当局可以迅速叫停无效的项目并扩大实施那些卓有成效的方案。


And, because a federalist approach encourages transparency and accountability in how policies are implemented, it also bolsters the public’s trust in government institutions and elected officials.	同时，由于联邦主义的做法推动了政策执行方面的透明度和问责制，它也加强了公众对政府机构和民选官员的信任。


This is why most Americans have maintained their confidence in state and local governments, even as their trust in the federal government has reached all-time lows.	这也是为何即使大多数美国人对联邦政府的信任已达历史最低点，却依然对州和地方政府保持信心的原因。


State and municipal officials are often responsible for implementing federal policies – concerning health care, education, employment, law enforcement, and environmental protection – that directly affect people’s lives.	州和市政府的官员往往负责实施一系列与人们生活息息相关的联邦卫生保健，教育，就业，执法和环境保护政策。


And the federal government, for its part, uses a variety of tools to encourage innovation among state and local governments, including waivers, pay-for-performance contracts, and challenge grants.	而联邦政府自身也会动用各种政策工具来鼓励州和地方政府层面的创新，包括提供豁免，绩效回报合同和挑战性项目拨款。


Waivers and state flexibility in Medicaid are at the heart of the fractious political showdown over health care.	比如在医疗补助制度这场尖锐的医保政治对决中，对豁免资格的认定以及各州的执行灵活性就是核心议题。


During the past decade, many state and local governments have focused their attention on environmental policy.	近十年来，许多州和地方政府都把注意力集中在环境政策上。


In 2006, 12 states sued the Environmental Protection Agency for its failure to classify greenhouse gases as pollutants, and to regulate them accordingly.	2006年，12个州向法院起诉美国国家环境保护局（Environmental Protection Agency），因其未能将温室气体定义为污染物并进行相应监管。


In 2007, the Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision, siding with the states; and in 2009, the EPA concluded that certain greenhouse gases endanger public welfare.	2007年，联邦最高法院大法官以5票赞成4票反对的比数作出裁决，支持州一方。 而在2009年，美国国家环境保护局得出结论，认定特定种类的温室气体会危及公共福利。


That finding provided a basis for the Obama administration’s new auto-emissions standards and Clean Power Plan, which were established to help America meet its commitments under the 2015 Paris climate agreement.	这一发现为奥巴马政府的新汽车排放标准和《清洁能源计划》提供了依据，也有助于美国履行其在2015年巴黎气候协议中许下的承诺。


Trump has now signed an executive order to roll back the Clean Power Plan, claiming, ironically, that he wants to weaken federal regulations as a way to return power to the states.	特朗普现在已经签署了一份行政命令来推翻《清洁能源计划》，讽刺的是，他声称这样做的目的是要弱化联邦监管，以便让权力回归各州。


Still, many states are already on track to meet the plan’s emissions targets, and have established their own standards for emissions and renewable energy, as well as their own cap-and-trade systems.	然而许多州早已实现了按照计划制定了排放目标，并各自建立了排放和可再生能源标准以及排放限额及交易系统。


And many municipal governments have joined the fight against carbon emissions by expanding mass transit and making government buildings more energy efficient.	许多市政府都通过扩大公共交通营运范围并使政府建筑更加节能来参与到减少碳排放的斗争中。


California is leading the way in these efforts.	加利福尼亚州在其中起到了表率作用。


It has implemented the strictest CO2 emissions standards in the US, and it is a leader in the Under U2 Coalition, a group of 170 national and subnational governments (representing 37% of the global economy) that are committed to achieving the Paris agreement’s emissions targets.	它实施了美国国内最严格的二氧化碳排放标准，它是低于2联盟（Under2 Coalition，致力于在2050年实现人均温室气体排放量低于2公吨）的领导成员之一，该联盟由170个国家和地方政府（占全球经济总量的37％）组成，致力于实现巴黎协议的排放目标。


In addition to pursuing their own environmental policies, state and local governments can also resist or undermine federal policies.	除了追求自身的环境政策外，各州和地方政府还可以抵制或弱化联邦政策。


For starters, they can simply abstain from taking action, as we have seen with some states’ reaction to federal education reforms.	首先，他们可以直接放弃行动，正如我们看到一些州对联邦教育改革的反应那样。


Or they can withhold the state-level resources needed to enforce federal laws, as states that have decriminalized marijuana have done, and as sanctuary states and cities are now doing.	或者他们可以截留执行联邦法律所需的州级别资源，比如那些已经对大麻进行非刑罪化的州，以及非法移民庇护州和城市目前的行动。


The immigration showdown will ultimately be adjudicated in the court system; and Trump has already lost his first battles there.	关于移民的对决最终将在法庭体系中展开； 而特朗普已经在那里输了第一仗。


Under federalism – whether cooperative or “uncooperative” – it is often assumed that state and local governments are pursuing the same goals.	在联邦制下——无论是合作还是“不合作”——通常假定州和地方政府都在追求同样的目标。


In fact, there is a deep divide between left-leaning “blue” cities and the right-leaning “red” states where many are located.	事实上，许多左倾的“蓝色”城市与其所在的右倾“红色”州之间存在着深刻的分歧。


And there are many ways that state governments can thwart progressive federalism at the municipal level. Cities, for their part, often lack the information and resources necessary for developing and implementing effective policies.	州政府有许多办法可以阻止市一级的进步型联邦制，而各市往往缺乏制定和实施有效政策所需的信息和资源。


A number of organizations have now emerged to strengthen the policy-making capacity of city governments including Michael Bloomberg’s Government Innovation Program, Fuse Corps, Results for America, Social Finance, Third Sector Capital Partners, and USAFacts.	但目前已经出现了一些可以协助市政府强化其决策能力的组织，包括迈克尔·布隆伯格（Michael Bloomberg）旗下的政府创新项目，FUSE Corps，Results for America，Social Finance，Third Sector Capital Partners和USAFacts等等。


There have been several legal fights recently between city governments and state legislatures over the principle of preemption, which holds that state laws override local laws.	最近各市政府和州立法机关之间就围绕法律优先适用原则展开了几场法律斗争——该原则认为地方法律应服从于州法律。


According to Preemption Watch, in 2016 alone, at least 36 state governments – most of them Republican-led – preempted cities by introducing laws on a wide range of issues, from minimum wage to environmental protection, gun control, fracking, immigration, and anti-discrimination ordinances.	据优先适用观察组织统计，仅在2016年，至少有36个州政府——其中大多数由共和党领导的——在包括最低工资到环保，枪支控制，水力压裂法开采天然气，移民和反对歧视条例等诸多事务方面制订了优先于地方的法律。


And 42 states have set limits on the taxes and expenditures of their cities.	42个州对其下属城市的税收和支出设定了限制。


The political struggle between red states and blue cities will continue to play out in judicial and legislative battles, while giving rise to new citizen-led initiatives.	红色州和蓝色城市之间的政治斗争将继续在司法和立法层面上延续，同时也会催生新公民主导型动议的兴起。


A new movement of grassroots progressive federalism, reflecting the powers conferred on citizens by the Tenth Amendment, has already begun to emerge.	一场提现出第十修正案赋予公民的权力的新的基层进步型联邦制运动已经开始出现。


It is apparent in huge citizen marches, and in coordinated civil-society initiatives advocating for a national popular vote, congressional redistricting, automatic voter registration, and a higher minimum wage.	这在那些大型公民游行以及一系列倡导全国民众投票直选总统，重新划分国会议员选区，自动选民登记和更高最低工资标准的公民社会动议中都有明显体现。


Trump did not accomplish much in his first 100 days.	特朗普在就任首100天内并未取得多少成就。


But he did unwittingly remind many Americans that the US Constitution delegates substantial political authority to states, cities, and individual citizens.	但他已经无意中提醒了许多美国人：美国宪法将大量的政治权力授予了各州，城市和公民个人。


And his administration has only further highlighted the importance of an independent judiciary, where the coming years’ battles among local, state, and federal government entities will be fought.	而他的行政部门又进一步强调了独立司法机构的重要性，因为在未来几年，这将是地方，州和联邦政府实体之间鏖战的战场。


The Public Sphere’s New Enemies	公共空间的新敌人


NEW YORK – Before November’s terrorist attacks in Paris, it was legal to stage a demonstration in a public square in that city.	纽约—11月巴黎恐怖袭击发生前，在巴黎公共广场举行示威是合法的。


Now it isn’t.	现在是非法的。


In Uganda, although citizens campaigning against corruption or in favor of gay rights often faced a hostile public, they didn’t face jail time for demonstrating.	在乌干达，从前即使公民发起反对腐败或支持同性恋权利的运动常常面临怀有敌意的公众，也不会因为示威而面临监禁。


But under a frighteningly vague new statute, now they do.	但根据模糊得令人恐惧的新法规下，现在他们会面临监禁。


In Egypt, government authorities recently raided and shut down prominent cultural institutions – an art gallery, a theater, and a publishing house – where artists and activists once gathered.	在埃及，政府当局最近突袭并关闭了一些艺术家和活动家以往常常聚会的重要的文化机构——一间画廊、一所剧院和一家出版社。


All around the world, it seems, the walls are closing in on the space that people need to assemble, associate, express themselves freely, and register dissent.	放眼世界，看起来人民集会、结社、自由言论和表明异议所需要的空间正在关闭。


Even as the Internet and communications technology have made speaking up publicly technically easier than ever, ubiquitous state and commercial surveillance has ensured that expression, association, and protest remain constrained.	即便互联网和通讯技术在技术上让公开喊话变得比以往任何时候都更加容易，但无处不在的国家和商业监控确保了言论、结社和游行仍然受到约束。


In short, speaking up has never required more courage.	简言之，发声从未需要如此多的勇气。


For me, this shift could not hit closer to home.	对我来说，这一转变可谓就发生在眼前。


In November, the Open Society Foundations (the global philanthropies of George Soros, which I lead) became the second organization blacklisted under a Russian law, enacted in May, that allows the country’s prosecutor general to ban foreign organizations and suspend their financial support of local activists.	11月，开放社会基金会（Open Society Foundations，乔治·索罗斯的慈善机构，由我负责管理）成为5月生效的一部俄罗斯法律的第二家黑名单上榜组织。 该法律允许俄罗斯检察长禁止外国组织并中止它们对本地活动家的财务支持。


Because anyone who engages with us is subject to possible prosecution and imprisonment, we have had no choice but to cut off relations with the dozens of Russian citizens we supported in their efforts to preserve some fragment of democracy in their country.	只要和我们有合作的人都有可能受到起诉和监禁，因此我们别无选择，只能切断我们与数十位俄罗斯公民的关系。 此前我们支持他们努力保护俄罗斯支离破碎的民主。


Of course, there is nothing wrong with regulating public space and the organizations that use it.	当然，监管公共空间以及使用公共空间的组织没有什么错误。


In the early 1990s, some new governments in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Latin America, underestimating the power of an active citizenry and civil society, failed to regulate adequately advocacy organizations and the space in which they work.	20世纪90年代初，一些东欧、非洲和拉丁美洲的新政府低估了活跃公民和公民社会的力量，没有充分监管宣传组织及其运营空间。


But over the last two decades, as active citizens have toppled regimes in dozens of countries, governments have moved too far in the opposite direction, imposing excessive regulations on those organizations and that space.	但在过去二十年中，随着活跃公民成功颠覆了几十个国家，政府开始矫枉过正，对这些组织和空间实施了过度监管。


In the process, they are criminalizing the most basic forms of democratic practice.	在此过程中，它们将最基本的民主实践形式列为犯罪行为。


In some cases, governments do not even bother to create a legal precedent for their actions.	在一些例子中，政府甚至懒得为它们的所作所为树立法律先例。


Last spring in Burundi, President Pierre Nkurunziza assumed a third term in office, despite the two-term limit enshrined in the constitution.	去年春天，布隆迪总统恩库伦齐扎第二次连任，丝毫不顾宪法规定的只能担任两个任期的限制。


When citizens took to the streets to protest, they were violently suppressed.	走上街头示威的公民遭到了暴力镇压。


Even countries with some of the world’s most robust democratic traditions have been cracking down.	就连一些世界上民主传统最强大的国家也纷纷沦陷。


After the Paris attacks, France and Belgium (where the plot was planned and organized) suspended civil liberties indefinitely, transforming themselves overnight into what are, at least by statute, police states.	巴黎袭击发生后，法国和比利时（恐怖袭击预谋和组织的地方）无限期中止公民自由，一夜之间摇身一变成为（至少是法律意义上的）警察国家。


In both countries, demonstrations have been banned; places of worship have been closed; and hundreds of people have been detained and interrogated for having voiced an unconventional opinion.	两国都禁止示威游行，关闭了宗教场所，数百人因为观点特立独行而被逮捕或审问。


This approach is exacting a heavy toll.	这一方针正在造成沉重代价。


Thousands of people who had planned to protest at the United Nations climate talks last month had to settle for leaving their shoes.	成千上万人原本计划在上个月的联合国气候谈判期间举行示威，结果只能扔鞋表示不满。


It was a startling image, illustrating how fear can overrun the commitments needed to maintain open societies and political freedoms even in Europe, the birthplace of modern citizenship.	这是一个令人震惊的景象，说明了恐惧是如何扼杀保持开放社会和政治自由所需要的承诺的，即便是现代文明诞生之地欧洲也不能免俗。


There is no simple formula for regulating public space or safeguarding peaceful political dissent in an age of terrorism and globalization.	在恐怖主义和全球化时代，监管公共空间或捍卫和平政治异见没有简单的套路可循。


But two basic principles are clear.	但两个基本原则是明确的。


First, the world needs stronger international governance of the movement of people and money, and fewer restrictions on speech, association, and dissent.	首先，世界需要更强的人员和资金流动国际监管，并减少对言论、结社和异见的限制。


Lately, governments have been moving in the wrong direction.	最近，各国政府正在倒行逆施。


But 2016 offers plenty of opportunities for correction, in areas ranging from trade to migration.	但2016年在从贸易到移民的诸多领域提供了大量纠正机会。


Second, non-profit organizations working to improve public policy need the same rights to secure international funding as for-profit entrepreneurs seeking to provide goods and services.	其次，致力于改善公共政策的非营利组织需要与营利企业寻求提供商品和服务一样的确保国际资金的权利。


Foreign direct investment should be encouraged, not hindered, regardless of whether it will support goods production and job creation or stronger public policies and more active citizenship.	外国直接投资应该得到鼓励而不是遏制，不管它是为了支持商品生产和就业创造还是更强的公共政策和更活跃的公民。


The responsibility for changing course does not fall exclusively on governments.	改变局面的责任并不只限于政府。


All of us who value open public space must stand shoulder to shoulder in support of the policy frameworks and institutions that safeguard it.	我们珍视开放公共空间的所有人应该肩并肩支持捍卫它的政策框架和制度。


Now is a time for solidarity across movements, causes, and countries.	现在，各项运动、各个目标、各个国家应该团结起来。


When simply taking up the activism of a concerned citizen can land you in jail and fear of surveillance encourages mass passivity, single-issue politics is not a winning strategy.	当心系天下的公民仅仅因为行动活跃就会被送入监狱时，当对监控的担忧导致群体消极时，单一问题政治就不是制胜策略。


The best way to defend public space is to occupy it, even if you are championing a cause different from that of the person standing next to you.	捍卫公共空间的最佳方式是占领它，哪怕你所支持的目标不同于你的左右。


In 2016, we must fill – and thus protect – that space together.	2016年，我们必须共同占据——从而保护——这一空间。


PROMESA’s Dangerous Premises	波多黎各债务援助法案的危险前提


NEW YORK – Puerto Rico’s economy is in deep trouble.	纽约——波多黎各的经济深陷困局。


More than a decade of recession has made the public debt unsustainable and is fueling migration outflows to the United States mainland, affecting the lives of thousands of families and imposing a higher burden on those who stay.	十多年的经济衰退导致公共债务不可持续，并正在促使更多移民向美国大陆流动，从而影响到成千上万家庭的生活并加重了留在岛上民众的负担。


Reversing this destabilizing dynamic will require a debt restructuring that provides the relief needed to implement pro-growth policies.	目前必须进行债务重组才能扭转这种不稳定的趋势，相关重组措施必须为落实增长政策提供所需的救济。


Unfortunately, what is being offered isn’t nearly enough.	但不幸的是，现在所提供的比起真正需要的还差得很远。


Puerto Rico’s debt is to be restructured under a framework established by the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA).	波多黎各的债务即将在波多黎各监管、管理和经济稳定法案（PROMESA）所确定的框架下进行重组。


That federal law, enacted in June 2016, also established an Oversight Board with fiscal decision-making authority for the US commonwealth.	2016年6月颁布的联邦法律也成立了一个监督委员会，负责行使美国联邦领土的财政决策权。


The restructuring process started on May 3, when the Board filed a petition in federal court.	监管委员会5月3日向联邦法院提交申请标志着重组过程的开始。


But many crucial decisions have yet to be taken, such as how much overall debt relief will be provided, and how the “haircut” will be distributed among holders of different types of bonds.	但许多关键决策仍有待作出，如需要提供多少债务总额减免以及如何在不同类型债券的持有者之间分配“估值折扣”。


These decisions will determine which policies are feasible to boost Puerto Rico’s economic prospects – and thus how much it can pay its creditors.	上述决策将决定能够采取哪些政策来促进波多黎各的经济增长——并进而决定波多黎各能向债权人偿债的数额。


At the center of any effort to resolve the debt crisis must be the understanding that just as today’s debt restructuring affects Puerto Rico’s future growth, Puerto Rico’s future growth affects how much debt restructuring is needed.	解决债务危机一切工作的核心必须是理解就像今天的债务重组将影响波多黎各未来的经济增长那样，波多黎各未来的经济增长同样将影响所需的债务重组规模。


Yet the ten-year fiscal plan approved by the Board for the 2017-2026 period – which inevitably will form the basis of debt-restructuring discussions – seems to ignore this circularity.	但监管委员会所批准的2017到2026年十年期财政计划——虽然不可避免地将会构成探讨债务重组的基础——但却似乎忽视了这样的循环影响。


The plan itself recognizes that its adoption implies another “lost decade” of economic activity and will weaken the island’s debt sustainability, thus perpetuating a crisis that all parties would like to end .	该计划本身承认计划的实行意味着经济活动另一个“失去的十年”，并将削弱岛上的债务持续性，从而导致各方都希望结束的危机永久化（参见下图）。


Unfortunately, the Board’s already-deep projected fall in real GNP is highly optimistic, because it relies on a number of implausible and/or controversial assumptions.	不幸的是，委员会预测的实际国民总收入已经可观的大幅下降仍然高度乐观，因为这样的预测取决于若干不可信和/或有争议的假设。


Five flaws in the Board’s fiscal plan stand out.	委员会制定的财政计划主要存在五大缺陷。


First, the projected fiscal multipliers – the amount by which GNP will fall as a result of each dollar of fiscal contraction – used for the GNP forecast assume that a contraction of one dollar in the primary fiscal deficit will be associated with a $1.34 contraction of GNP.	首先，国民生产总值预测中所用的预期财政乘数——也就是主要财政赤字每一美元的财政收缩将会带来1. 34美元的国民生产总值下降。


That value lies on the lower end of the range of estimated fiscal multipliers for countries or regions experiencing recessions.	该数值处于陷入经济衰退的国家或地区预期财政乘数范围的下限左右。


The value of fiscal multipliers depends on how the economy is performing.	财政乘数的数值取决于经济的实际表现。


Point estimates of multipliers associated with non-defense spending for regions or countries in recessions range from 1.09 to 3.5.	与衰退国家和地区非国防支出相关的预期乘数点阵往往处于1. 09到3.


And, because Puerto Rico is not in any ordinary recession, it is not enough (or even appropriate) to analyze what to expect in the best-case scenario.	5左右。 而且，因为波多黎各不是普通的经济衰退，因此用这样的财政乘数来分析最乐观情况都仍然不够（甚至不恰当）。


A proper assessment of the consequences of the fiscal policies demanded by the plan should focus not on a single value, but on a range of values based on plausible scenarios from an optimistic to a pessimistic bound.	对计划所要求的财政政策后果的适当性评估不应只关注单一数值，而应关注从乐观到悲观预期范畴内可能出现的一系列财政乘数状况。 比方说，与财政计划7.


For example, simply using a multiplier of 2.0 and maintaining all of the plan’s other (unrealistic) assumptions causes a 9.4% projected cumulative fall in real GNP during fiscal years 2018 and 2019, compared to the fiscal plan’s estimate of 7.2%.	2%的预期值相比，单纯使用2. 0的财政乘数并维持计划所有其他（不现实的）假设不变将导致2018到2019财年实际预期国民生产总值出现9.


A second flaw is that the plan’s GNP projections ignore the endogenous feedback effects that declining economic activity will have on fiscal revenues.	第二个缺陷是上述计划的国民生产总值预测忽视了经济活动衰退将对财政收入所造成的内源性反馈影响。


A reduction in public spending that depresses economic activity also reduces the tax base.	抑制经济活动的公共开支减少同时将降低税基。


Thus, the government would need to do more than what the plan foresees to achieve the revenue targets.	因此，政府需要做得比计划预测的更多才能实现原定的收入目标。


Third, whereas the plan’s contractionary policies push the economy below the Board’s baseline GNP estimates, a number of structural reforms, mostly meant to affect aggregate supply, allegedly push it above.	第三，在计划的紧缩政策推动经济低于委员会所批准的国民生产总值预估的同时，若干主要旨在影响供给总量的结构性改革据称会将估值推高。


Indeed, these reforms seem to be the only force driving the (nominal) recovery that the plan projects after 2022.	事实上，这些改革似乎是推动计划预测的2022年后（名义）复苏的唯一驱动力量。


But this simply is not credible.	但这根本不具备可信度。


Puerto Rico’s economy is in a demand-constrained regime, and there is no reason to expect this to change in the foreseeable future.	波多黎各经济属于有限需求体制，而在可以预见的将来没有理由预期这一点会发生变化。


Thus, economic recovery in the short term requires aggressive government stimulus, particularly given that any structural reform that reduces spending (such as a decrease in pensions) will be more likely to have a contractionary effect in an economy that is demand-constrained.	因此，短期经济复苏需要政府实施积极的刺激政策，尤其鉴于任何削减支出的结构性改革（如削减养老金）均更有可能对需求有限的经济产生紧缩效果。


Other measures, such as cutting funding for public education, are likely to reduce demand now and lower aggregate supply over the long run.	其他措施，如削减公共教育资金，可能会减少当前需求，而且从长远看，总体供应也会相应减少。


Fourth, the plan’s assumption about outward migration is controversial at best.	第四，即使从最乐观的角度看，该计划的对外移民假设也是充满争议的。


Puerto Rico’s population has declined from approximately 3.8 million in 2000 to a little more than 3.4 million in 2016.	波多黎各人口已经从2000年的约380万下降到2016年的340万多一点。


Between 2010 and 2016, the annual rate of population contraction exceeded 1%, and reached 1.8% in 2016.	在2010到2016年间，波多黎各人口以每年超过1%的比例收缩，并在2016年扩大到1.


A deeper recession – as anticipated by the Board’s plan – will further decrease opportunities in the island, fueling more migration to the mainland.	8%。 更深层次的经济衰退——就像委员会计划所预期的那样——将进一步减少岛内机会，从而促使更多移民流向大陆。


And yet the plan assumes that the migration flows will taper off, with the population declining by only 0.2% per year over the 2017-2026 period.	而该计划假设移民数量将逐渐减少，还假设2017到2026年间岛内人口每年仅有0. 2%的下降。


Given the destabilizing dynamics that the fiscal plan will trigger, out-migration will be higher than the plan assumes, the size of the economy will shrink, and the per capita debt burden on those remaining will increase.	鉴于该财政计划将引发的不稳定性，移民外流数量将高于计划假设，从而导致经济规模收缩，而留在岛上的人人均债务负担将会增加。


Finally, instead of specifying a comprehensive debt-restructuring proposal, the plan simply specifies the amount that will be repaid to creditors during the next decade.	最后，该计划没有确定全面的债务重组方案，而仅仅规定了今后十年将要偿还给债权人的金额。


But future macroeconomic dynamics cannot be assessed without an estimate of the debt relief that will be provided.	但如果没有对未来将要提供的债务减免状况的预测，就无法评估未来的宏观经济发展状况。


Indeed, the lack of a restructuring plan heightens uncertainty and thus impedes the investment needed to restore economic growth.	事实上，缺乏重组计划加剧了不确定性，并进而阻碍了投资恢复经济增长。


Filing for what is essentially bankruptcy was a sensible move.	申请实质破产是一项合理的举措。


Otherwise, Puerto Rico would have been exposed to massive litigation that would have undermined restructuring efforts and lengthened the road to economic recovery.	否则，波多黎各将面临大规模诉讼，而诉讼将破坏重组工作，并使通往经济复苏的道路更加漫长。


But what the plan should have done is to define the policies Puerto Rico needs to recover, and simultaneously present a restructuring proposal that grants enough relief to make those policies feasible.	但该计划本应确定波多黎各经济复苏所需的政策，并同时提出重组方案，授权足够的债务救济以促使能够实行上述政策。


Instead, by approving the 2017-2026 fiscal plan, the PROMESA Oversight Board put itself in a difficult position.	相反，通过批准2017到2026年财政计划，波多黎各监管、管理和经济稳定法案监管委员会让自己陷入两难的境地当中。


Using that plan as the basis for calculating Puerto Rico’s relief needs risks leading to the flawed conclusion that Puerto Rico can manage a recovery with a much smaller haircut than it needs.	利用该计划为基础来计算波多黎各所需的救济规模有可能得出有缺陷的结论，让人们错误地以为波多黎各实现经济复苏所需的资产减记规模比实际小的多。


Unless the plan is urgently redefined on the basis of credible assumptions, Puerto Rico will not recover, debt sustainability will not be restored, and the Board will have failed in its mission.	除非该计划在更加可靠的假设基础上得以重新构建，否则波多黎各将没有经济复苏，债务可持续性将不会恢复，而委员会也将无法完成自己的任务。


What Puerto Rico Needs	波多黎各需要什么


WASHINGTON, DC – President Donald Trump and the US Congress are coming under mounting pressure to increase assistance to Puerto Rico.	华盛顿—特朗普总统和美国国会正在受到越来越大的压力，要求他们增加对波多黎各的援助。


The devastation caused there last week by Hurricane Maria has only exacerbated severe longer-term problems resulting from deferred maintenance on the island’s critical infrastructure.	上周的玛利亚飓风给波多黎各带来的灾难让波多黎各严重的长期问题——重要基础设施维护不力雪上加霜。


Puerto Rico needs more than short-term assistance (although this is also urgent); it needs bipartisan support to rebuild, with an initial and essential focus on a more robust and cheaper supply of electricity.	波多黎各所需要的不仅仅只有短期援助（尽管这也颇为紧急）； 还需要两党共同支持它重建，其中，首要的重点是建立更稳定、更廉价的电力供应。


The existing electricity grid has substantially collapsed, with the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) estimating that up to 90% of the transmission system may have been destroyed by the hurricane.	现有电网已经处于基本瘫痪的状态，联邦经济管理局（FEMA）估算，高达90%的输电系统可能已经被飓风损坏。


A major dam is at risk.	一座大坝状态危险。


Damage to the air traffic control infrastructure has severely limited flights to and from the island.	空中交通控制基础设施受损严重限制了进出波多黎各的航班数量。


As Governor Ricardo Rosselló has stated publicly, there is now a real risk of a major humanitarian disaster.	执政官里卡多·罗赛洛（Ricardo Rosselló）公开表示，波多黎各极有可能爆发重大人道灾难。


Donations are flowing in, but the total will be small relative to what is needed.	捐赠正在涌入，但数量跟不上需要。


The Trump administration says that FEMA is working hard and effectively.	特朗普政府说，FEMA正在进行努力而有成效的工作。


Let’s hope they are right.	但愿他们说得对。


There will be a lot of questions about whether Puerto Rico’s roughly 3.4 million US citizens receive the same support as Texas and Florida (and other parts of the 50 states) when natural disaster strikes.	波多黎各有大约340万美国公民，但愿他们能够在自然灾难来袭时获得和德克萨斯州和佛罗里达州（以及其他50个州）同样的支持。


But the bigger question is this: What will be done – and by whom – to help Puerto Rico really recover?	但更大的问题是：怎样，以及由谁来帮助波多黎各真正恢复？


Puerto Rico – a dependent territory of the US – needs major investment in its essential infrastructure to bring it at least to the level of the 50 states.	波多黎各是美国的独立领地，它需要大手笔基本基础设施投资才能赶上美国50州的最低水平。


After the humanitarian situation is stabilized, policymakers should focus on providing Puerto Rico with stable, reliable, and cost-effective electric power, generated primarily by renewables and distributed over a smart, resilient grid.	在人道状况稳定下来后，决策者应该将重点放在为波多黎各提供稳定、可靠、高性价比的电力上，这些电力应该主要通过可再生资源产生，并通过可靠的小型分布式电网输送。


Ensuring energy availability will be indispensable for stability and sustained economic growth.	确保能源普及对于稳定和持续经济增长是不可或缺的。


Merely propping up aging infrastructure will not be effective.	仅仅对年代久远的基础设施进行修补无法起到效果。


Cheaper and more resilient electricity benefits everyone – from the sidewalk vendor to the most sophisticated pharmaceutical operation.	更廉价、更可靠的电力将让所有人受益——不管是街头小贩，还是最先进的制药公司。


And all the technology needed to provide it is available in the US today.	而所需要的技术，今天的美国已经具备。


Ironically, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA), the bankrupt incumbent energy provider, has been effective primarily in building its own competition.	讽刺的是，破产的现任能源提供商波多黎各电力局（PREPA）把主要效率都用在了构建自己的竞争力方面。


Electricity prices on the island are higher than anywhere else in the US (except Hawaii), and service is unreliable.	波多黎各岛电价比美国其他任何地方（除夏威夷外）都要高，而服务很不可靠。


As a result, an ever-growing number of customers have shunned PREPA’s offerings, relying instead on their own diesel-powered generators.	结果是越来越多的客户拒绝从PREPA购买电力，而是依靠自己的柴油发电机。


Noel Zamot, who serves as Revitalization Coordinator under the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, has suggested that a smart, resilient grid would be designed from the ground up, and would rely on distributed generation to mitigate the impact of future natural disasters or human attacks.	波多黎各金融监督和管理委员会复苏协调员（Revitalization Coordinator）诺伊尔·查莫特（Noel Zamot）指出，可以从零开始设计一个职能可靠的电网，该电网基于分布式发电，以减轻未来自然灾害或人为袭击的影响。


Smaller, more agile power-generation units would be linked to a sophisticated monitoring and control system to ensure immediate startup and generation following outages.	更小更灵活的发电单元接入先进的监测和控制系统，以确保发生停电事故后能立即启动发电。


Moreover, at least 50% of all energy could come from renewables (solar, wind, tidal, and more), including through the use of advanced storage technologies, some of which are currently under development.	此外，至少50%的能源可以来自可再生资源（太阳能、风能、潮汐能等），包括通过先进的储存技术（一些技术目前还在开发阶段）实现。


The bulk of long-haul transmission lines would be shielded or buried, and an information strategy that deploys sensors appropriately would detect losses, whatever their source.	大部分长途输电线将实现屏蔽和埋设，合理部署传感器的信息策略能够更好地监测损失，不论来自什么原因。


Such a grid would stabilize costs for existing businesses, likely reducing the single biggest cost for most small and medium-size enterprises.	这样一套电网将稳定现有企业的成本，有望减轻大部分中小企业的最大成本负担。


And it would create conditions for truly innovative future scenarios.	它也能为真正的创新性未来情景创造条件。


Imagine Puerto Rico becoming the electric vehicle capital of the world, with well-apportioned recharging stations, near-zero emissions, and car sharing for the tourism sector.	想象一下，波多黎各将成为世界电力资本之都，遍布充电站，几乎零排放，旅游业可共享汽车。


Puerto Rico could even become an energy exporter, supplying excess capacity to nearby neighbors in the US and British Virgin Islands.	波多黎各甚至可能成为能源出口国，向临近的美国和英属维京群岛输出过剩产能。


All of this (with the exception of large-scale storage for renewables) is achievable with existing technology.	所有这些（除了可再生资源的大规模储存）都可以用现有技术实现。


The key issues are strategic, organizational, and regulatory.	关键问题在于策略、组织和监管。


With government support, and an understanding of the proper governance structure and processes for effective regulation, this vision could be executed within the coming decade.	有了政府的支持，并认识到有效的监管需要怎样的合理治理结构和流程，这一愿景可以在十年内实现。


And building this grid would generate plenty of good jobs.	而建设这一电网还可以产生大量优质工作岗位。


The federal government’s role should be to make Puerto Rico a hub for investing in clean, renewable energy that is resilient to weather shocks.	联邦政府应该确保波多黎各成为不惧天气冲击的清洁、可再生能源的投资枢纽。


New technology that results from this investment could be commercialized and sold to a world that is struggling to adapt to climate change and extreme weather.	投资所产生的新技术可以商业化，出售给疲于适应气候变化和极端天气的世界。


The Trump administration would have trouble passing such a package of long-run investment through Congress with only Republican support; various ideological objections would no doubt be raised.	特朗普政府很难只凭借共和党的支持就让国会通过长期投资方案； 出现各种意识形态上的反对是必然的。


But this is a perfect opportunity for Trump to reach out to the Democrats, and to demonstrate that both sides can cooperate on rebuilding and updating essential national infrastructure.	但对特朗普来说，这是一次向民主党示好的良机，也是一次证明双方能够合作重建和更新重要国家基础设施的良机。


The Last Silovik?	最后的强力集团？


MOSCOW – President Vladimir Putin’s regime is as sphinxlike as any that has ever ruled Russia, and now there is a new mystery afoot.	莫斯科——弗拉基米尔·普京总统政府像统治过俄罗斯的任何政府一样具有神秘气质，而现在又浮现出一个新的谜团。


Is Igor Sechin – perhaps the most powerful of the St. Petersburg siloviki who helped establish Putin’s regime 18 years ago – about to fall?	18年前曾协助创立普京政权的也许是势力最强的圣彼得堡强力集团代表人物伊戈尔·谢钦是否即将倒台？


The siloviki, the grey men who emerged from the security and military apparatus, have ruled the roost in Russia for the last generation.	强力集团通常指来自安全和军事机构的灰色人物，这些人已经在长达一代人的时间里统治俄罗斯。


Sechin had a more substantial KGB career than Putin himself, and has held many of the key posts in his patron’s administration.	谢钦本人比普京的克格勃经历更为丰富，并在其庇护者的政府中担任过众多关键职务。


Since 2012, he has been CEO of the state-owned oil giant Rosneft, Russia’s third-largest company (after Gazprom and Lukoil), whose board chairman since September is former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder.	2012年来，他一直担任俄罗斯第三大国有石油巨头俄罗斯石油公司的首席执行官（排名第一和第二位的分别是俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司和卢克石油公司），前德国总理格哈德·施罗德从9月起担任俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司的董事长。


Under Sechin’s leadership, Rosneft has become a state within a state, with a quarter-million employees, $65 billion in revenue, and 50 subsidiaries at home and abroad – as many as Gazprom.	在谢钦的领导下，俄罗斯石油公司已经成为国中之国，拥有25万名雇员、650亿美元营收和遍布国内外的50家下属企业——俄罗斯石油公司的下属企业与俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司一样多。


And Rosneft, even more than Gazprom, has pioneered the modus operandi of the Putin system since 2004, when it took over the assets of Yukos, following the imprisonment of the company’s head, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a Putin opponent, on fraud and embezzlement charges.	而2004年后，俄罗斯石油公司甚至比俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司更能代表普京体系的办事风格，因为它在尤科斯负责人米哈伊尔·霍多尔科夫斯基身陷囹圄后出面接管了尤科斯的资产。 霍多尔科夫斯基是普京的反对者，他被起诉的罪名是诈骗和挪用公款。


Sechin has always had a direct line to Putin.	谢钦一直与普京有直接联系。


Many Russians have long assumed that he is also the eyes and ears of the KGB’s successor, the Federal Security Service (FSB), in the natural-resource sector, which forms the core of Russia’s economy and is the hub of the country’s corrupt power networks.	许多俄国人一直认为他也是克格勃继任机构联邦安全局（FSB）在自然资源领域的耳目，而俄罗斯经济核心以及该国腐败权力网络的枢纽恰恰是自然资源领域。


Yet, today, Sechin is involved in a very public – and symbolically significant – courtroom fight.	但今天，谢钦被卷入了一场完全公开——而且具有重大象征意义的——法庭争斗。


He has been summoned three times by a Moscow criminal court to testify in a case against Alexei Ulyukaev, a former minister of economic development.	他已经三次被一家莫斯科刑事法庭传唤在一起事涉阿列克谢•乌卢卡耶夫（Alexei Ulyukaev）的诉讼中作证，乌卢卡耶夫曾担任经济发展部部长。


But Sechin has consistently failed to appear, with his office recently telling the court that he wouldn’t be available until next year.	但谢钦一直没有出面，其办公室最近告知法庭他在明年之前都不会有空。


Sechin’s excuses for not showing up have been pretty standard: the summons was lost, and his schedule – which included big government trips to Vietnam and Turkey – did not allow it.	谢钦拒绝出面的借口也非常普通：传票没有寄到，他的时间安排——包括对越南和土耳其进行高层政府访问——也不允许他这样做。


But there is nothing standard about a Russian court ordering a figure of Sechin’s stature to testify publicly.	但俄罗斯法庭命令谢钦这种级别的人物出面作证原本就不正常。


On the contrary, in the world of Kremlin politics, the move is as bizarre as it gets.	恰恰相反，在克林姆林宫政界，这样的举动是相当奇怪的。


It all began a year ago, when Ulyukaev was detained at Rosneft’s Moscow headquarters, where he was allegedly attempting to secure a $2 million bribe from Sechin, in exchange for his support for Rosneft’s planned acquisition of a majority of state shares in Bashneft, a regional oil company.	所有这一切都开始于一年前，当时乌卢卡耶夫在俄罗斯石油公司的莫斯科总部遭到扣押，据控他在那里试图向谢钦索要两百万美元的贿赂，以换取他投票支持俄罗斯石油公司收购巴什石油公司国家多数股权的计划。


Sechin had, after a previous conversation on the topic, reported Ulyukaev to the FSB, who were waiting to take the minister into custody.	在就此话题进行过初步讨论后，谢钦向联邦安全局举报了乌卢卡耶夫，联邦安全局正打算拘留这位部长。


Yet bribery is how Russia operates, so the decision to pursue a bribery case against a powerful player is never just about the rule of law.	但贿赂是俄罗斯运营体系的有机组成部分，因此法治决不能解释对一位有权有势的参与者提起受贿诉讼的决策。


In this case, the real motivation behind Sechin’s decision to go after Ulyukaev is uncertain.	在本案中，谢钦决定举报乌卢卡耶夫背后的动机是不确定的。


Perhaps he felt that the minister needed reminding of his place in the rigid Kremlin hierarchy.	也许他觉得应当提醒这位部长他在僵化的克里林姆层级中所处的位置。


Or perhaps, as has been rumored, Ulyukaev was working with other officials to rein in Sechin by stopping Rosneft from acquiring the Bashneft shares.	或者根据传言，乌卢卡耶夫正在与其他官员合作控制谢钦，阻止俄罗斯石油公司收购巴什石油公司的股票。


In any case, Sechin’s plan – about which Putin may well have known nothing – soon backfired, as the legal proceedings became public.	无论如何，因为普京很可能根本不知道谢钦的计划，随着法律诉讼程序的公开，这项计划很快就产生了适得其反的效果。


Particularly damning, transcripts of Sechin’s secret recordings of his conversation with Ulyukaev – part of a sting operation in which Sechin played a leading role – were disclosed in September.	更糟的是，谢钦秘密录制的自己与乌卢卡耶夫的谈话记录——在这次诱捕行动中谢钦发挥了主要作用——在今年9月对外界公布。


Sechin called the court’s decision to open the case to the public “professional cretinism.”	谢钦将法院决定向公众公开此案称之为“职业痴呆病”。


He claims that “cases like this should be closed from all sides,” because “they contain state secrets.”	他声称“这样的案件应当对各方保密”，因为“它们包含国家机密内容”。


But the truth is that Sechin was both arrogant and a fool to assume that he would not get dragged into the case.	但真相是谢钦认定自己不会被卷入案件既傲慢又愚蠢。


Of course, given Sechin’s role in entrapping Ulyukaev, logic dictates that he should have been the first witness called.	当然，鉴于谢钦在诱骗乌卢卡耶夫过程中所扮演的角色，逻辑要求他应当成为接到传唤的第一个证人。


But, in Russia, powerful or famous figures – such as, for example, Khodorkovsky – do not become embroiled in legal cases without the Kremlin’s explicit approval.	但在俄罗斯，如果没有克里姆林宫的明确点头，像霍多尔科夫斯基这样有权有势同时又名声在外的角色根本不会被卷入到法律案件当中。


No low-level Moscow court judge or prosecutor could possibly have summoned Sechin unilaterally.	没有哪个低层莫斯科法院法官或检察官能有权单方面传唤谢钦。


So when Sechin was called as the last witness – unlucky number 13 – there was only one logical conclusion: Putin, who has already ousted a number of the leading siloviki who brought him to power, had decided to take Sechin down a peg or two.	因此，当谢钦作为最后一名证人——也是倒霉的第13名证人——被传唤时，只能得出一个合乎逻辑的结论：已经推翻了几位曾经助他上台的知名强力集团成员的普京决定要灭一灭谢钦的威风。


The gray cardinal of Rosneft had stepped too far out of line.	俄罗斯石油公司的灰衣大主教有些事做的太过分。


As in the Khodorkovsky case, the Kremlin seems to be using the courtroom as a platform for clarifying the positions of the Russian elite.	在霍多尔科夫斯基案中，克林姆林宫看似在利用法院这个平台来明确俄罗斯精英的等级顺序。


This is particularly important in the run-up to the 2018 presidential election, not least because it is rumored that Putin is seeking a trusted flunky to take over his post, at least temporarily.	这在2018年总统大选前夕尤为重要，这不仅因为谣传普京正在寻找一名忠实的走狗来接替他的职位，至少是暂时接替。


Even if Putin does run again – the more likely outcome, given his penchant for total control – he will be seeking a subservient prime minister.	即使普京的确再次参选——鉴于他对全盘控制的绝对嗜好，出现这样的结果非常有可能——他也需要寻找一位唯命是从的总理。


The current one, Dmitri Medvedev, has been discredited as inefficient and – to a public that views him as a political pygmy – unworthy of the level of personal corruption that has been exposed.	现任总理德米特里·梅德韦杰夫已经被外界认定为效率低下——对将其视为政治侏儒的公众来说——他不配达到已经被揭露出来的个人腐败水平。


By going after one of Putin’s ministers, Sechin appeared to be flexing his muscles, perhaps believing that this would prove his readiness as a prime-time political player.	通过诱骗普京的一位部长，谢钦似乎是在炫耀自己的肌肉，也许他认为这能证明他已经做好准备成为一位重要的政治参与者。


Instead, the episode has merely shown, yet again, that there is no real “number two” in Russia; there is only Putin, controlling the FSB, the courts, and the commanding heights of the economy.	但事实却恰恰相反，这一幕仅仅再次表明在俄罗斯没有真正的“二号人物”，只有普京一个人控制着联邦安全局、法院和经济领域的最高指挥权。


Whether Putin decides to remain president or temporarily to fill the post with a puppet, as he did in 2008 with Medvedev, his message could not be clearer: I, and only I, am in charge.	无论普京最终决定留任总统还是像2008年那样找一位梅德韦杰夫那样的傀儡来暂时担任总统，他的意思已经非常清楚：掌权的是我，而且只能是我。


Is Vladimir Putin Losing His Grip?	普京正在失去掌控吗？


MOSCOW – In 1984, just before Mikhail Gorbachev’s ascent to power, there was a sense in Moscow that the Soviet Union was petrified, and nothing could change.	莫斯科—1984年，在戈尔巴乔夫掌权前夕，莫斯科出现了一种苏联已经“石化”，再也不可能改变的感觉。


Then everything did change, exposing the extent of the transformation that had occurred beneath the surface.	后来，所有东西都变了，表面之下所发生的转型的程度之大，可见一斑。


Today, a similar mood pervades Moscow, with President Vladimir Putin’s regime appearing stable, even unbreachable.	如今，似曾相似的情绪再次弥漫莫斯科，普京政权看似坚如磐石，不可撼动。


But, as was the case back then, a closer look reveals a number of chinks in the armor.	但就像当年一样，更加靠近一些就能看到坚甲上已经有了大量裂纹。


In many ways, Russia has been moving backward in recent decades.	从很多角度讲，俄罗斯近几年中一直在退步。


In the 1990s, Russia was a freewheeling place, where virtually everything was allowed.	20世纪90年代，俄罗斯是一片随心所欲的土地，几乎一切都是允许的。


Moscow had 20 daily newspapers, with views ranging from liberal to Stalinist.	莫斯科有20份日报，观点涵盖了自由主义和斯大林主义。


Today, Russian civil society is severely stifled, and to watch television in Moscow is to find 20 channels controlled by the Kremlin.	如今，俄罗斯公民社会受到了严重压制，莫斯科的电视上只能看到20个被克里姆林宫控制的频道。


In 1991, Boris Yeltsin, in one of his first actions as President, broke up the old KGB into several agencies, cut its staff by half, and slashed its budget.	1991年，叶利钦成为总统后的第一批动作之一便是将老克格勃拆分为多个机构，削减了一半人手，并大大压缩预算。


Today, the KGB’s successor, the Federal Security Service (FSB), has seized complete control over Russia’s security apparatus, including by arresting high-level generals in other law-enforcement agencies.	如今，克格勃的继任者联邦安全局（FSB）完全控制了俄罗斯的安全机构，其所动用的手段包括逮捕其他执法机关的高层。


The result is a single security service that is more powerful than at any time since Stalin – and viewed as independent from the Kremlin.	结果是一家安全局拥有了比斯大林以来任何其他时期都更大的权力——并且被视为脱离克里姆林宫的独立存在。


On the economic front, too, Russia has backtracked.	在经济方面，俄罗斯也在退步。


In 2003, Russia’s private sector produced 70% of the country’s GDP.	2003年，俄罗斯私人部门创造了该国70%的GDP。


Today, the state sector generates most of the country’s output, squeezing out small and medium-size enterprises, and five big state banks dominate the financial market.	如今，国有部门贡献了该国大部分产出，中小企业受到排挤，五大国有银行主宰了金融市场。


Moreover, Putin’s policy of “de-offshoring” has imposed such cumbersome controls on the business leaders of the 1990s that most have sold off their assets in Russia and decamped to London or Monaco.	此外，普京的“去离岸化”政策令20世纪90年代的商界领袖感到窒息，以至于他们大部分人都卖掉了在俄资产，逃到了伦敦或摩纳哥。


This trend has been accelerated by Russia’s lack of any real property rights, which has enabled the Kremlin to cut Russia’s wealthy down to size at will, often targeting the most law-abiding among them.	这一趋势因为俄罗斯不存在真正的财产权利而加剧，因为这样一来，克里姆林宫可以任意宰割俄罗斯富人，而最遵纪守法的人，往往会成为目标。


Small wonder that forecasts for annual GDP growth are stuck at 1.5-2%.	毫不奇怪，人们对俄罗斯GDP年增长率的预测值只有1. 5—2%。


The regime wants to change this pattern.	普京政权希望改变这一模式。


In May 2016, Putin asked three expert groups to recommend economic-reform programs: a liberal group led by former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin; a technocratic group led by Economy Minister Maxim Oreshkin; and the more statist Stolypin Club led by Putin’s business ombudsman Boris Titov.	2016年5月，普京请三个专家团队做出经济改革计划建议：以前财政部长库德林（Alexei Kudrin）为首的自由派团队； 以经济部长奥雷什金（Maxim Oreshkin）为首的技术官僚团队；


Each group has delivered thousands of pages of expert reports.	以及以普京的商业巡视员蒂托夫（Boris Titov）为首的、更偏向国家主义的斯托利平俱乐部（Stolypin Club）。 每个团队都递交了几千页厚的专家报告。


But any shift toward respecting the rule of law would be incompatible with the kleptocratic character of Putin’s regime, implying that genuine reform is out of the question.	但任何以尊重法治为方向的转变，都与普京政权的强盗统治（kleptocratic）性质不相容，这意味着真正的改革只能是痴人说梦。


The mandate given to the three groups thus appears to have been little more than therapy for social scientists, a way to keep them busy – and out of the opposition.	因此，给这三个团队指派的任务大概只是为了治理社会科学家——让他们保持繁忙，不要想着反对。


Far from embracing change, Putin will seek a fourth term in next year’s presidential election – a race he will surely win, given the Kremlin’s control over the media and the courts.	普京不会接受改变，他将寻求在明年的选举中第四度出任总统。 这场选举他必定能够胜出，因为克里姆林宫控制着媒体和法院。


But, to render his victory credible, Putin needs Russia’s dispirited population to show up to vote.	但是，要让他的胜利令人信服，普京需要士气低落的俄罗斯人多多投票。


It is rumored that Sergei Kiriyenko, the Kremlin’s first deputy chief of staff, is targeting 70% turnout, with 70% of those votes going to Putin.	据说克里姆林宫的第一副幕僚长谢尔盖·基里延科（Sergei Kiriyenko）将目标定在实现70%的投票率，其中70%的选票支持普京。


That won’t be easy to achieve.	这绝非易事。


In the State Duma elections in September 2016, only 47.8% of registered voters turned out.	在2016年的国家杜马选举中，只有47. 8%的注册选民投了票。


In local elections last month, even fewer bothered to participate, with Vladivostok reporting just 13% turnout.	上个月举行的地方选举更是应者寥寥，符拉迪沃斯托克报告的投票率只要有13%。


If voters are going to show up for next year’s presidential election, they will need to believe that real change is possible.	要让选民们参与明年的总统选举，就需要让他们相信会有真正的变化。


Putin needs a credible rival, not the same old Kremlin-linked candidates – the communist Gennady Zyuganov, the nationalist buffoon Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and the purported liberal Grigory Yavlinsky – to join the race.	普京需要有一位令人信服的对手，而不是让从前那些与克里姆林宫关系密切的候选人参加竞选——比如共产党员久加诺夫（Gennady Zyuganov）和所谓的自由派格里高利·亚夫林斯基（Grigory Yavlinsky）等。


The socialite Ksenia Sobchak, who announced her candidacy after meeting with Putin, may seem able to inject some life into the campaign.	社会名流克塞尼亚·索伯查克（Ksenia Sobchak）在与普京会面之后宣布她将参选，这或许能够为选战注入一丝活力。


But there is only one real option to secure a large voter turnout: the anti-corruption campaigner and vocal Kremlin critic Alexei Navalny.	但要想确保高投票率，只有一个现实的选择：反腐运动领导者、大声批评克里姆林宫的阿列克谢·纳瓦尔尼（Alexei Navalny）。


In September 2013, when Navalny ran for mayor of Moscow, he received 27% of the vote.	2013年9月，纳瓦尔尼竞选莫斯科市长，赢得 27%的选票。


But the independent pollster Levada Center reckons that, despite strong support for Navalny in Moscow, he would not obtain more votes today.	但独立民意调查机构Levada Center认为，尽管纳瓦尔尼在莫斯科支持率很高，但现在他无法获得更多的选票。


Given this, some Kremlin advisers want to let Navalny run, while keeping him off national television.	因此，一些克里姆林宫顾问希望让纳瓦尔尼加入竞选，但不让他在全国电视节目上露脸。


And it seems that the Kremlin may be considering just that, as it has allowed Navalny to hold large campaign meetings with up to 10,000 people in 100 cities.	克里姆林宫可能正如此盘算，它已经允许纳瓦尔尼在100个城市举行多达10,000人的大型竞选集会。


But others in Putin’s inner circle would prefer to lock up Navalny for the fourth time this year – no surprise, given his proven capacity to disrupt the Kremlin’s authority.	但普京内部圈子中也有一些人想要今年第四次拘禁纳瓦尔尼——这一点都不令人惊奇，因为他早已证明了自己有能力扰动克里姆林宫的权威。


Last March, for example, Navalny produced a 50-minute documentary on corruption, revealing that Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev had used $1.3 billion in bribes to purchase six palaces and two vineyards.	比如，去年3月纳瓦尔尼制作了一部50分钟长的反腐纪录片，曝光总理梅德韦杰夫用13亿贿款购买了六座大宅和两个庄园。


The film, watched on YouTube by some 25 million people, effectively killed Medvedev’s political career.	该片在YouTube上已经有了2,500万次观看，基本扼杀了梅德韦杰夫的政治生涯。


Now, Putin will need to consider who should succeed Medvedev.	如今，普京需要考虑让谁接替梅德韦杰夫。


In the past, he has usually installed a loyal non-entity in that position, and he has many possible candidates, such as the remarkably ineffective Gazprom Chairman Alexei Miller.	过去，他常常在这个位置上安插一位忠诚的傀儡，可行的候选人有很多，比如毫无作为的俄天然气董事长亚历克谢·米勒（Alexei Miller）。


The question is whether the next prime minister will be more closely allied with Putin or the FSB.	问题在于下一任总理与普京还是与FSB关系更密切。


The United States may play an unexpected role in this drama.	在这场大戏中，美国可能会扮演出乎意料的角色。


The recently enacted Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, which calls for a report on Russian “oligarchs and parastatal entities” within 180 days, offers the US a unique opportunity to influence the Kremlin before the presidential election.	最新实施的《通过制裁反击美国的敌人法案》（Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act）要求在180天内做出关于俄罗斯“寡头和办过有实体”的报告，这让美国拥有一个独一无二的机会在俄罗斯总统选举前影响克里姆林宫。


Many of Russia’s wealthy have already fled Russia in fear of the FSB.	许多俄罗斯富豪因为害怕FSB而逃离了俄罗斯。


Now, Russia may see another wave of departures, with those close to the Kremlin fearing that Putin can no longer protect them.	如今，俄罗斯可能会爆发新一波逃离潮，与接近克里姆林宫的人士担心普京无法继续保护他们。


Putin may be guaranteed another presidential term, but a regime that cannot satisfy even its rulers is hardly sustainable.	普京也许肯定能够赢得新一个总统任期，但一个连统治者都无法满足的政权，是很难维持的。


The History of Russia’s Future	俄罗斯未来的历史


MOSCOW – Strategic vision has never been a Russian attribute, and it certainly was absent in 2012.	莫斯科—战略愿景从来不是俄罗斯的习惯，2012年，俄罗斯显然没有战略愿景。


Russia’s vast territory continually seems to obscure for its leaders the need to plan for the future, while its seemingly infinite supply of natural resources convinces them that the country can handle any contingency.	俄罗斯广袤的领土似乎一直打消着其领导人做未来规划的需要，而其无穷无尽的自然资源供给让他们确信，俄罗斯可以度过任何意外。


As a result, Russia is perpetually unprepared for the future.	结果，俄罗斯对未来从来不做准备。


Indeed, just as its leaders failed to prepare for the fall of communism, the softening of the Russian economy shows that they are poorly equipped for the coming decades, which will be characterized by depleted resources, a declining population, and shrinking territory.	事实上，正如其领导人对共产主义的倒台措手不及，俄罗斯经济的萎靡表明他们对未来几十年无甚准备，未来将伴随着资源的逐渐匮乏、人口的逐渐减少和领土的逐渐缩小。


Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency this year marked a new low for Russian strategic vision.	今年，普京重返总统宝座，这标志着俄罗斯战略愿景的新低潮。


After all, the past is the only future that Putin has ever wanted for the country.	毕竟，过去是普京所唯一希望的俄罗斯的未来之路。


When the Soviet Union collapsed, the Kremlin lost not only control of vast portions of territory, but also half of the USSR’s nearly 300 million people.	苏联解体时，克里姆林宫不但丢掉了广大领土，也失去了苏联近3亿人口的一半。


Since then, the population has fallen by millions more, owing to Russia’s high mortality rate, especially among men.	此后，由于（特别是男性的）高死亡率，俄罗斯人口又下降了100多万。


Over the same period, the population of the United States has grown from 248 million to more than 300 million.	与此同时，美国人口从2. 48亿增加到3亿多。


Despite calls by the Russian public for reform – from modernization of the military and decrepit and corrupt legal institutions to diversification of the economy beyond natural-resource extraction and the military-industrial complex – Putin has stuck to his autocratic guns.	尽管俄罗斯公众渴望改革——从实现军事和陈腐的司法制度的现代化到实现经济超越自然资源提取和军工的多样化——普京仍死抱着独裁主义枪杆子不放。


When Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov tried to reform Russia’s armed forces – by expanding the military’s training in modern defense techniques, cutting costs, and boosting efficiency – he was replaced by Sergei Shoigu, Moscow’s former governor and a die-hard Putin loyalist, who restored the outdated system.	当国防部长谢尔久科夫试图改革俄罗斯武装部队时——通过扩大军队的现代防御技术培训、削减成本和提高效率——他被撤了职。 接替他的是前莫斯科市长、普京死忠谢尔盖·萧依古（Sergei Shoigu），恢复了过时的体系。


Even the army’s new uniforms, which border on the comic with their eighteenth-century epaulets and World War II jackets, invoke the past, rather than provide the comfort and efficiency needed in modern warfare.	就连新军装——二战时期的衣服配以十八世纪的肩章——也在追求复古，而没有提供现代战争所要求的舒适和实用。


More ominously, in a move reminiscent of Stalin, Putin has initiated a new anti-extremism law, according to which anyone can be accused of terrorism, espionage, being a foreign agent, or disseminating hatred.	更加凶险的预兆是，普京推出了新反极端主义法，根据该法，任何人都可以以恐怖主义、间谍、身为外国特工或传播仇恨等罪名被捕，这让人想起了斯大林时代。


The law has proven to be a powerful tool in stifling dissent, which can include mass protests against election fraud, journalists working to expose corruption, or a librarian in Siberia fulfilling a patron’s request for a banned book.	该法已被证明是清除异端的有力工具，“异端”可以包括反对选举欺诈的游行群众、揭露腐败的记者，或是满足来客阅览禁书要求的西伯利亚图书管理员。


Likewise, Putin’s foreign policy remains mired in old Russian obsessions, beginning with restoring the empire in whatever form possible.	类似地，普京的外交政策也完完全全属于俄罗斯旧传统，其开端是尽一切可能重建帝国。


In his effort to prove that losing its imperial status has not diminished Russia’s global role, Putin has meddled relentlessly in international decisions, opposing sanctions against Iran and supporting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, even as it slaughters its own citizens.	普京试图证明，失去帝国地位并不妨碍俄罗斯的全球角色，他在国际事务中到处乱管闲事，反对针对伊朗和叙利亚总统巴沙尔的制裁，尽管后者的屠刀挥向的是自己的人民。


Furthermore, while Russia has finally joined the World Trade Organization, doubts about the country’s human-rights record persist.	此外，尽管俄罗斯最终加入了世贸组织，但对俄罗斯人权纪录的质疑并未停止。


In 2009, for example, Sergei Magnitsky, a lawyer, was accused of embezzlement after uncovering a fraudulent tax-refund scheme run by Russian officials.	比如，2009年，一名叫谢尔盖·马格尼茨基（Sergei Magnitsky）的律师在揭露俄罗斯官员的退税欺诈后被控盗用公款。


He died in prison after he was badly beaten and denied medical treatment.	他受尽折磨，得不到治疗，最终死在狱中。


In response, the US Congress has just enacted the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act, which prohibits anyone implicated in Magnitsky’s detention or death – or others suspected of gross human-rights abuses – from entering the US or using its banking system.	对此，美国国会刚刚通过了法律责任法的马格尼茨基规则（Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act），禁止任何与马格尼茨基被捕和死亡有关的人士（或其他被疑有严重侵犯人权行为的人士）进入美国或与美国银行系统有往来。


Similar laws have been adopted in Canada and across Western Europe.	加拿大和西欧也出台了类似法律。


But, instead of admitting the crime and working to bring the perpetrators to justice, Russia’s leaders have fought back, declaring that certain Europeans and Americans will, in turn, be barred from visiting Russia.	但是，俄罗斯领导人并不承认罪行，也没有将行凶者绳之以法，反而反咬一口，宣布禁止某些欧洲人和美国人进入俄罗斯。


Putin’s unwillingness to heed popular discontent, and his failure to develop relations with the West during his 12 years in power, has backed him into a corner – and he is running out of ideas.	普京根本不屑于群众的不满，他在掌权的12年中也没有与西方发展好关系，这让他走进了死胡同，而他也正在计穷。


In his most recent attempt to restore Russia’s empire, he announced the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan.	在最近的重塑俄罗斯帝国的努力中，他宣布和白俄罗斯和哈萨克斯坦共同成立欧亚经济联盟（Eurasian Economic Union）。


(Putin is courting the other ex-Soviet Central Asian countries, as well as Ukraine and Georgia).	（普京也在讨好其他前苏联中亚国家以及乌克兰和格鲁吉亚。 ）


But, even here, the President is bullying the very leaders he seeks to woo.	但是，即使在这方面，普京的示好也是以恃强凌弱的方式进行的。


Given that Ukraine’s participation would significantly enhance the union’s legitimacy, Russia is using all available tactics – from lower gas prices to trade sanctions – to persuade its leaders to join.	乌克兰的加入将极大增强欧亚经济联盟的合法性，因此俄罗斯竭尽一切策略——从降低天然气价格到贸易制裁——说服其领导人加入其中。


But Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych, who nurtures his own thuggish reputation, wants no part of it.	但乌克兰总统亚努科维奇也是独断专行之辈，他希望与俄罗斯保持距离。


Putin’s effort to unify the ex-Soviet states is hardly the only initiative that exemplifies his flawed vision.	普京联合前苏联国家的举动并不是彰显其存在漏洞的愿景的唯一动作。


In order to appeal to the leaders of East Asia’s fast-growing economies – which Putin has called the most important factor for Russia’s long-term success – the government spent billions of dollars this year to modernize the dilapidated port of Vladivostok.	为了吸引东亚高增长国家——普京称之为俄罗斯长期成功的最重要因素——俄罗斯政府今年花费数十亿美元对其年久失修的符拉迪沃斯托克港进行了现代化改造。


But, given that Asian leaders view Russia as little more than a natural-resource milk cow, it is far from clear that the investment will pay off, particularly given the absence of a comprehensive economic-development plan for the region.	但是，在亚洲领导人眼里，俄罗斯无非只是头自然资源奶牛，普京的这笔大手笔投资能否见效还远未可知，特别是考虑到没有完整的东亚经济开发计划的情况下。


Putin hopes that harsh policies, at home and abroad, will allow him to maintain a stranglehold on Russia.	普京希望，国内外的严酷政策能够让他继续掌控俄罗斯。


But they have merely ensured the country’s decline.	但事实上它们只能确保俄罗斯的衰落。


As 2013 begins, Russia is back on the hamster wheel of history, treating the past as prologue – and thus wasting its resources and blighting its people’s lives.	随着2013年的到来，俄罗斯又回到了历史的仓鼠滚轮上，把过去当作新的开端，浪费自己的资源，苦了俄罗斯百姓。


What’s Wrong With Executive Compensation?	高管薪酬有什么问题？


LONDON – It’s annual general meeting (AGM) season for public companies around the world, and, as in previous years, one issue has been moving company news from the business section to the front page: executive pay.	伦敦——现在正是世界各地上市公司一年一度的股东大会季（AGM），而且，和往年一样，高管的薪酬问题导致公司新闻从商业栏目转到了头版头条。


Companies continue to announce compensation packages for their top managers that leave people agape, not just because the gap between companies’ highest- and lowest-paid workers is so wide, but also because the compensation bears so little relation to firms’ performance.	企业不断公布令公众目瞪口呆的高管薪酬方案，令人震惊的不仅是企业最高和最低薪酬员工之间差距如此之大，而且更因为薪酬与企业业绩之间几乎没有任何关联。


Nonetheless, a concerted pushback has begun, led by a group that companies and their boards might actually pay attention to: their largest and most influential investors.	尽管如此，协调一致的对抗行动已经展开，而且是由企业及其董事会可能真正需要关注的规模及影响力最大的投资人团体所主导。


Hedge funds, pension funds, and sovereign wealth funds are stating that they are looking closely at C-suite remuneration, and that it is time to take reform seriously.	对冲基金、养老基金和主权财富基金声明他们正密切关注着最高管理层薪酬的变化，而且现在采取严肃改革措施的时机已经成熟。


Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, worth $870 billion, has said that it is setting its sights on pay structures.	价值超过8，700亿美元的挪威主权财富基金已经表示其正在关注薪酬结构。


Aberdeen Asset Management and Royal London Asset Management were among a group of shareholders who strongly objected to BP’s proposed 20% increase in compensation for CEO Bob Dudley in a year when BP made record losses, and they joined 59% of investors in rejecting the package.	安本资产管理公司和皇家伦敦资产管理公司会同其他股东组织一道强烈反对英国石油公司提出的为CEO鲍伯·达德利在企业亏损创下纪录的一年增加20%的薪酬，它们同其他59%的投资者共同否决了这一薪酬包。


Though the BP vote was non-binding, it was a clear signal to the company and its board.	虽然BP的投票结果不具约束力，但却向企业及其董事会发出了明确的信号。


Similarly, 54% of Renault SA’s shareholders, which include the French state, opposed CEO Carlos Ghosn’s €25 million ($28 million) remuneration package at the company’s AGM in April.	同样，雷诺汽车公司54%的股东，其中包括法国政府，在今年4月举行的企业年度股东大会上对CEO卡洛斯·戈恩2，500万欧元（合2，800万美元）的薪酬方案投了反对票。


It, too, was a non-binding vote, and the board chose to disregard it.	此次投票同样不具约束力，而董事会则选择无视投票的结果。


But ignoring shareholder sentiment is becoming untenable.	但无视股东情绪变得越来越难以持久。


Discontent cuts across all sectors, from banking, with calls for a review at Lloyds Bank, to media and advertising, with an outcry, yet again, about the pay awarded to WPP’s Martin Sorrell; at £70.4 million, his latest package makes him the United Kingdom’s highest-paid CEO.	不满情绪遍及所有行业，从呼吁审核劳埃德银行的银行业蔓延到媒体广告业，人们再次大声疾呼审核WPP公司马丁·索瑞尔高达7040万英镑的薪酬，索瑞尔最新的薪酬方案使得他成为英国收入最高的CEO。


At Berkshire Hathaway’s AGM in April, Warren Buffett advocated for compensation plans that fit the needs of the business, rather than vice versa.	在四月举行的伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司年度股东大会上，沃伦·巴菲特倡导实行适合企业需求的薪酬计划，而不是反过来。 这一切的发生是因为一个“非常贪婪的首席执行官.


This happens when a “very greedy chief executive…designs a pyramid so that a whole bunch of other people down the line get overpaid… just so it doesn’t look like he’s all by himself, in terms of that fantastic pay-off he’s arranged for himself.”	而这样做仅仅是为了让自己为自己所安排的梦幻般的薪酬方案看起来显得不那么突出。 ”


Part of the issue is that executive remuneration packages have become too complex.	部分问题在于高管薪酬方案已经变得过于复杂。


Gone are the days when CEOs did the job and were paid a wage.	CEO完成本职工作并领取工资的日子已经一去不复返了。


It is almost as if remuneration committees have taken a leaf from Sun Tzu's The Art of War: “The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real intent.”	现在的情况几乎变成薪酬委员会已经吸取了孙子兵法的策略：“全部的秘诀在于迷惑敌人，从而使其无法摸清我们的真正意图。


Explanations for remuneration calculations can run for pages, and often board members who aren’t on the remuneration committee cannot unravel them.	”薪酬计算说明可以长达很多页，没有进入薪酬委员会的董事会成员往往无法真正读懂。


Moreover, bonus targets are fundamentally flawed.	此外，奖励目标存在着根本上的缺陷。


Markets are fraught with “unknown unknowns.”	“不解的未知之谜”充斥着市场。


Boards often don’t know now what will need to happen later.	董事会往往不知道下一步该怎么做。


And that means goals based on the past or the supposed future reward what we currently think rather than actual performance.	而这意味着目标是基于过去或我们现在认为的所谓的未来业绩而不是真实的业绩表现。


When pay is driven by strict adherence to targets set 12 months before, CEOs look back, instead of focusing on the present and on what comes next.	因为薪酬受12个月前制定目标的严格驱动，导致CEO们总是回首过去，而不是关注现在和未来。


Compensation needs to reflect whether the CEO won all the battles but lost the war.	薪酬需要反应CEO们是否赢得了所有的战役但却输掉了这场战争。


But avoiding what might be called the “Dudley Paradox” – a CEO is paid a huge bonus for hitting targets, even as the company suffers major losses – requires boards to stop delegating the entire pay discussion to the compensation committee and waiting for the decisions to arrive, fait accompli, tied up in a bow.	但避免所谓的“达德利悖论”——即CEO因为达标而获得巨奖，但同时公司却遭受到重大损失——要求董事会停止将整个薪酬讨论计划委托给薪酬委员会，同时自己却打着领结坐等决策的到来。


The full board should review the company’s operations and strategy thoroughly; only then should the compensation committee set about creating the program to act on it.	全体董事应仔细审议企业的经营和战略； 只有在审议过后薪酬委员会才能采取行动制定薪酬计划。


Having such a program in place is especially important when a new CEO or senior executive is hired.	在聘请新任CEO或高管人员时制定这样的方案尤为重要。


At a time of great hope and a desire to woo the candidate, desperation or enthusiasm can lead to poor judgment and badly formulated packages, which, once negotiated, are not subject to shareholder vote.	在满是希望急于吸引高管候选人时，绝望或热情可能会导致判断力下降和制定出存在问题的薪酬计划，而且一旦诉诸谈判，上述计划就不再受到股东投票的掌控。


A prime example is Yahoo’s firing of Henrique De Castro in 2014.	2014年，雅虎解雇恩里克·德·卡斯特罗就是一个典型的例子。


After only 15 months on the job as COO, De Castro walked away with $109 million.	在担任首席运营官仅15个月后，德·卡斯特罗带走了1. 09亿美元的薪酬。


Lastly, CEOs should show leadership in how they manage their own compensation negotiations.	最后，CEO们应当在自身薪酬谈判中展现出领导力。


If they are responsible for all aspects of the company, then they cannot abdicate responsibility with a “Because I’m worth it” attitude when news of their large pay packages becomes public.	如果他们要负责公司的方方面面，那就不能在自己的巨额薪酬方案为外界所知时仅仅凭借一句“我值这么多钱”来逃避责任。


More important, they need to recognize that no law obliges them to take what they can get.	更重要的是，他们必须认识到没有哪项法律规定他们应当拿到可能的最高薪酬。


They could hit the targets and earn the pay, but look at the company’s results and choose to adjust the total accordingly.	他们可能实现目标并拿到报酬，但也可能要根据公司的绩效选择调整薪资总额。


The CEO needs to be talking about the business of the company to its workforce, investors, and the wider world, not be stuck at the AGM defending the executive team’s salaries.	CEO需要面对员工、投资人和外界来谈论公司业务，而不是仅仅忙于在股东周年大会上辩解高管团队的薪酬。


The revolt against large pay packages won’t go away.	人们对巨额薪酬方案的反抗不会就此消失掉。


For all the reported cases, many more are simmering beneath the surface of public scrutiny.	虽然已经有很多公开的案例，但还有很多隐藏的案例没有得到公众的监督。


Unless these companies address head-on the quiet hand-wringing among board members and grumbling among investors, they will find themselves on the front pages next.	除非这些企业直面董事会成员沉默的束手无策和投资人的抱怨，否则他们将会发现自己将下一个登上报纸的头版头条。


Can Ramaphosa Fix South Africa?	拉马福萨能改变南非吗？


WASHINGTON, DC – Cyril Ramaphosa’s victory in December’s contest to lead South Africa’s ruling African National Congress (ANC) was a resounding repudiation of President Jacob Zuma.	华盛顿—拉马福萨（Cyril Ramaphosa）在12月的南非执政党非国大党领导人竞争中胜出，这是总统祖玛遭到否定的明确标志。


Ramaphosa will now almost certainly be elected South Africa’s president in 2019 – if not before.	拉马福萨几乎肯定会在2019年当选为南非总统——只会更早，不会更迟。


He has promised to stimulate the country’s moribund economy and implement a wide-ranging anti-corruption agenda.	他承诺要刺激死气沉沉的南非经济，并实施范围甚广的反腐运动。


The key question, however, is how much impact change at the top will have on South Africa’s troubled democracy.	但关键的问题是顶层的变化能够在多大程度上影响到困难重重的南非民主。


Ramaphosa is unlikely to be a miracle worker.	拉马福萨不可能成为奇迹创造者。


First, he faces the challenge of reforming his own party.	首先，他面临着改革本党的挑战。


The ANC’s identity as the party that liberated South Africa from the scourge of apartheid in 1994 has delivered it every election since.	1994年，非国大党将南非从种族隔离的桎梏中解放出来，这一政党身份让它能够赢得此后的每一次选举。


Yet today the ANC stands accused of both fecklessness and moral decay, and it suffered unprecedented losses to the opposition Democratic Alliance in urban areas in local elections in 2016.	但如今，非国大党被指执政无能、道德败坏，在2016年的地方选举中，反对党民主联盟（Democratic Alliance）在城市地区赢得前所未有的大胜。


Disillusioned ANC members can be strong allies for Ramaphosa’s reform attempts; they were powerful enough to elect him over Zuma’s preferred candidate, his ex-wife and former African Union Commission chair Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.	幻灭的非国大党党员可能成为拉马福萨改革计划的强力盟友； 他们足够强大，能让他击败祖玛所偏向的候选人、他的前妻、非盟委员会前主席德拉米尼-祖玛（Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma）成为党领导人。


But, as in many countries, from Iran to Russia, young urban voters pushing for change run up against older rural voters, the core of the ANC’s base.	但和从伊朗到俄罗斯的许多国家一样，年轻城市选民要求变革，与非国大党的“票仓”、年长的农村选民针锋相对。


These voters are unlikely to turn against the party, thus buffering any existential threat to its dominance at the ballot box and putting a damper on reform efforts.	这些票仓选民不会反对非国大党，因此，非国大党的选举主宰地位不会受到生存威胁，这也构成了阻碍改革措施的力量。


The larger challenge facing Ramaphosa comes from the state itself.	拉马福萨所面临的更大的挑战来自国家本身。


He must tackle the structural decay fostered under Zuma.	他必须处理好祖玛执政期间产生的结构性崩坏。


South Africa’s networks of patronage and corruption have become so endemic that the term “state capture” – coined by the World Bank to describe central Asian post-Soviet states where oligarchs coopted public institutions for personal profit – has entered widespread use.	南非的庇护和腐败网络根深蒂固，以至于“国家俘获”（state capture）一词已经耳熟能详——这个词来自世界银行，原本是用来描述寡头把持公共机构谋取私利的亚洲前苏联国家的。


South Africa’s state capture is deeply embedded.	南非的国家俘获根深蒂固。


The country is a democracy, for all its flaws, with complex institutions.	尽管缺陷重重，南非终究是民主国家，有着复杂的制度机构。


Unlike in a tightly controlled dictatorship, cutting off the head will not kill the monster.	和一手遮天的独裁统治不同，即使人头落地也无法祛除魔鬼。


In order to coopt so many interests, Zuma’s tentacular patronage networks must reach through many layers of bureaucracy and business hierarchies.	为了协调如此众多的利益，祖玛的四通八达的庇护网络必须深入官僚和商业界的各个层级。


Dissolving this lucrative conglomeration at a time when the economy has little else to offer multitudes of civil servants and workers – unemployment currently stands at almost 28% – will be difficult and unpopular.	要在经济已经拿不出更多油水供养多如牛毛的公务员和工人时——当前失业率高达近28%——打破这一利益丰厚的团块将非常困难且不得人心。


Moreover, Zuma is weakened but not gone.	此外，祖玛尽管被削弱，但并没有完蛋。


Ramaphosa won the leadership contest by a slim margin, and his elected deputy, David Mabuza, and ANC secretary-general, Ace Magashule, are Zuma acolytes.	拉马福萨以微弱优势赢得了党权之争，而他的当选副手马布扎（David Mabuza）和非国大党总书记马加舒勒（Ace Magashule）都是祖玛的党羽。


Zuma’s faction has also notionally retained control of the ANC’s 86-member National Executive Committee.	祖玛系理论上还控制着非国大党的86个国家执行委员会（NEC）席位。


Although some members’ allegiances now appear to be in flux, the NEC was vital in shielding Zuma from previous attempts to remove him.	尽管其中一些成员忠诚看起来已经动摇，但NEC过去在祖玛化解推翻他的图谋中起着关键作用。


Finally, Ramaphosa himself may well be conflicted.	最后，拉马福萨本人也颇具争议。


As a key architect of the deal that ended the apartheid regime, he proved himself to be a formidable negotiator.	作为结束种族隔离制度的协议的重要缔造者之一，他证明了自己是一个可怕的谈判对手。


He was tipped to be Nelson Mandela’s deputy when Mandela became South Africa’s first post-apartheid president, but he stepped aside when asked, demonstrating pragmatism and patience.	曼德拉成为南非后种族隔离时代首位总统时，他是众望所归的副手人选，但在曼德拉提名他时，他没有接受，表现出务实的态度和耐心。


But he is also very much a product of the ANC system.	但他同样也是典型的非国大党系统的产物。


His large fortune was tantamount to a gift from the ANC’s Black Economic Empowerment programs in the 1990s.	他的巨额财富等同于来自20世纪90年代非国大党黑人经济赋权计划的礼物。


While he is viewed as clean despite his lavish lifestyle, he has certainly benefited from ANC patronage.	尽管他生活奢侈，但仍被认为是清廉的，但他显然从非国大党的庇护中获益。


Assuming Ramaphosa has the determination, political savvy, and support to drive sweeping change, he will not be alone.	假设拉马福萨有决心、有政治智慧，也能获得支持来推动横扫一切的改革，那么他将不是一个人在战斗。


Some of South Africa’s institutions – including the judiciary and the public protector – have proven resilient in the face of immense pressure to capitulate to Zuma’s agenda.	一些南非机构——包括司法部门和公护人（public protector）——已经证明能够面对祖玛的巨大压力而不屈服。


On December 29, the Constitutional Court delivered a shot in the arm to those who want to see Zuma removed before the end of his term in 2019.	12月29日，南非宪法法院给了希望祖玛能够在2019年任期届满前下台的人一剂强心剂。


The court ruled that Parliament had failed to hold the president accountable in a scandal concerning diverted state funds.	法院裁定议会没有能够在一宗挪用国家公款的丑闻中问责总统。


The judges demanded the National Assembly consider impeachment.	法官要求国民大会考虑弹劾。


The courts’ moral stature makes them an important ally in efforts to clean up South African politics.	法院的道德地位使其成为清理南非政坛的重要盟友。


But impeachment, a lengthy and fraught process, would be unlikely to lead to Zuma’s removal much before the end of his term.	但弹劾是一个漫长而纠缠的过程，不可能让祖玛在任期结束前就下台。


The other path to consolidate Ramaphosa’s position is a no-confidence vote within the NEC.	巩固拉马福萨地位的另一个办法是NEC内部举行不信任投票。


But, in a clear sign of his current weakness, Zuma was able to keep a no-confidence motion off the NEC agenda earlier this month, only by making a major concession: permitting an inquiry into state capture that he had been blocking for more than a year.	但祖玛尽管最近明显表现出弱势，仍能够在本月早些时候扼杀NEC不信任投票——他只是做出了一个重大让步：允许他阻挠了一年多的一宗国家俘获调查继续进行。


His own links with the scandal-plagued Gupta family will feature prominently.	他与陷入丑闻的古普塔（Gupta）家族的个人关系将十分碍眼。


The ANC’s national executive committee has debated establishing a process to secure Zuma’s resignation, which Ramaphosa supporters want within weeks.	非国大党的国家执行委员会就确保祖玛辞职的流程进行了争论，拉马福萨的支持者希望在几周内完成。


But no timeline has yet been specified.	但目前尚未制定具体的时限。


Given Zuma’s political acumen, he could well prolong the process for many months.	祖玛是政坛老手，肯定会将这个过程拖延多月。


Nonetheless, his days are numbered.	尽管如此，他的日子已经进入了倒数。


Ramaphosa, for his part, has cautioned that Zuma should never be humiliated.	至于拉马福萨，则发出告诫说祖玛不应该遭遇羞辱。


His acknowledgement that power within the ANC is “a very delicate matter” is telling.	他承认非国大党内部的权力是“一件非常微妙的事情”很能说明问题。


He understands all too clearly the constraints he faces.	他太明白他所面临的约束了。


The international community can play a role in supporting Ramaphosa.	国际社会也可以助拉马福萨一臂之力。


The classic scenario is to expect too much of a new leader and then to become disillusioned when he fails to deliver quickly.	经典的情形是对新领导人期待过大，而如果他没能迅速带来变化，期望就会幻灭。


If international investors and stakeholders who support his agenda are too impatient, he will be unable to bring about the economic growth that will bolster his support among South African voters.	如果支持拉马福萨的国际投资者和相关利益者过于迫不及待，他就无法带来能提高他在南非选民中的支持率的经济增长。


Ramaphosa’s victory is an important sign that many within the ANC understand that they must change or risk being remembered as the party that allowed an avaricious few to sell off the country.	拉马福萨的胜利是一个重要信号，表明非国大党内部的很多人认识到他们必须做出改变，否则非国大党就会因为窃国者侯的政党而被历史铭记。


But change will be slow and hard.	但变化将是缓慢且艰难的。


Ramaphosa is expected to win a high-stakes game with a middling hand.	预计拉马福萨需要用一手差强人意的牌去赢得一个高赌注牌局。


South African voters and the watching world must understand that his opponents are unlikely to fold quickly.	南非选民和“围观”的全世界必须明白，他的反对者可不会马上盖牌投降。


Why Do Cities Become Unaffordable?	为何城市让人望而却步？


NEW HAVEN – Inequality is usually measured by comparing incomes across households within a country.	纽黑文—通常，衡量不平等性的方法是比较一国国内家庭之间的收入。


But there is also a different kind of inequality: in the affordability of homes across cities.	但还有另一种不平等性，存在于城市住房的平价程度之间。


The impact of this form of inequality is no less worrying.	这种类型的不平等性的影响同样令人担忧。


In many of the world’s urban centers, homes are becoming prohibitively expensive for people with moderate incomes.	在全球许多中心城市，住房对收入一般的群体而言越来越不堪重负。


As a city’s real-estate prices rise, some inhabitants may feel compelled to leave.	随着一座城市房地产价格的上涨，一些居民将被迫离开。


Of course, if that inhabitant already owned a house there that they can sell, they may regard the price increase as a windfall that they can claim by departing.	当然，如果这位居民已经拥有了可售住房，那么他可能认为价格上涨等于是天降横财，可以卖了房子带着这笔横财离开。


If not, however, they may be forced out with no compensation.	但若非如此的话，他就有可能被迫两手空空一走了之。


The consequences are not just economic.	其影响不仅在于经济上。


People may be forced out of cities where they have spent their entire lives.	人们可能被迫离开生活了一辈子的城市。


Leaving amounts to losing lifelong connections, and therefore can be traumatic.	离开意味着失去这辈子建立起来的关系，堪称一场灾难。


If too many lifelong inhabitants are driven out by rising housing prices, the city itself suffers from a loss of identity and even culture.	如果太多在城市里生活了一辈子的居民因为房价上涨而被迫离开，这座城市自身也将蒙受身份乃至文化损失。


As such people depart, an expensive city gradually becomes an enclave of high-income households, and begins to take on their values.	随着这些人群的离开，一座昂贵的城市将逐渐变成属于高收入家庭的飞地，突显出其价值。


With people of various income levels increasingly divided by geography, income inequality can worsen and the risk of social polarization – and even serious conflict – can grow.	随着不同收入水平的人群日益被地理隔离，收入不平等可能出现恶化，社会也有可能两极分化，甚至可能出现严重的严重的冲突。


As this year’s Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey shows, there are already massive disparities across major global cities (measured by the ratio of median home prices to median household income).	今年的人口统计公司（Demographia）国际住房平价性调查表明，全球主要城市已经出现了巨大的差异（用中位住房价格与中位家庭收入之比衡量）。


A high ratio correlates with high pressure for people to leave.	比例越高说明人们被迫离开的压力也越大。


This year’s survey, which covered 92 cities in nine countries, showed that, as of late 2016, Hong Kong had the least affordable housing, with a price-to-income ratio of 18.1.	今年的调查覆盖了九个国家的92个城市。 截至2016年底，香港是住房价格最高的城市，其价格-收入比达到了18.


That means that paying off a 30-year mortgage on a median-price home would cost a median-income buyer more than half of their income – and that is without interest.	1。 这意味着，负担中位价格的住房的30年按揭，需要花费中位收入买房者一大半的收入——还是在不计利息的情况下。


Mortgage rates are low in Hong Kong, but not zero, suggesting it is just about impossible for a median-income household to purchase a home there without access to additional funds from, say, a parent, or, if the buyer is an immigrant, from abroad.	香港的按揭利率很低，但也没有低到零利率的程度，这意味着，中位收入家庭如果无法获得来自（比如）父母的资助，或者移民购房者如果无法获得海外资金的资助，几乎不可能买得起房。


After Hong Kong, the list continues with Sydney (12.2), Vancouver (11.8), Auckland (10), San Jose/Silicon Valley (9.6), Melbourne (9.5), and Los Angeles (9.3).	2）、温哥华（11. 8）、奥克兰（10）、圣何塞/硅谷（9.


Next come London and Toronto – at 8.5 and 7.7, respectively – where housing is extremely expensive, but incomes are also high.	5）和多伦多（7. 7）——这两个城市房价非常高，但收入也高。


Meanwhile, some attractive world cities are quite affordable, relative to incomes.	与此同时，一些很有吸引力的世界城市住房相对收入而言可谓平价。


In New York City, the median home price stands at 5.7 times median household income.	纽约市的中位住房价格为中位家庭收入的5. 7倍。


In Montreal and Singapore, that ratio is 4.8; in Tokyo and Yokohama, it is 4.7; and in Chicago, it is 3.8.	在蒙特利尔和新加坡，这一比率为4. 8；


Maybe the figures for these outlier cities aren’t precise.	些许关于这些异常（outlier）城市的数据不够准确。


They are hard to check, and there must be inconsistencies across cities, countries, and continents.	这些数据难以核实，而且必然会因为城市、国家和洲的不同而出现不一致。


For example, the geographical boundaries of the areas used to compute median price and median rent may vary.	比如，用于计算中位价格和中位租金的地理边界可以有多种划法。


In some cities, higher-priced homes may tend to turn over more rapidly than in others.	在一些城市里，价格较高的住房可能更加容易转手。


And some cities may be inhabited by larger families, implying bigger houses than in other cities.	而在一些城市，家庭规模更大，这意味着这些城市的房子也比其他城市更大。


But it seems unlikely that the errors could be so significant that they would change the basic conclusion: home affordability around the world is highly variable.	但误差不可能大到能够推翻基本结论的程度，即全球住房平价性存在高度差异。


The question, then, is why residents of some cities face extremely – even prohibitively – high prices.	接下来的问题是为何某些城市的居民会面临畸高——甚至无法负担——的价格。


In many cases, the answer appears to be related to barriers to housing construction.	在许多情况中，答案与住房建设的壁垒有关。


Using satellite data for major US cities, the economist Albert Saiz of MIT confirmed that tighter physical constraints – such as surrounding bodies of water or land gradients that make properties unsuitable for extensive building – tend to correlate with higher home prices.	麻省理工学院的阿尔伯特·赛兹（Albert Saiz）用美国各大城市的卫星数据确认，较严格的物理限制——有水体环绕或土地存在梯度导致无法大量建房——与更高的房价之间存在相关性。


But the barriers may also be political.	但壁垒也有可能是政治性的。


A huge dose of moderate-income housing construction would have a major impact on affordability.	大规模建设中低收入住房能够极大地影响住房平价性。


But the existing owners of high-priced homes have little incentive to support such construction, which would diminish the value of their own investment.	但现有高价房的房主根本没有动力支持这样的建设计划，这会降低他们自己的投资的价值。


Indeed, their resistance may be as intractable as a lake’s edge.	事实上，他们的抵制就像湖岸一样难以克服。


As a result, municipal governments may be unwilling to grant permits to expand supply.	因此，市政政府可能不愿意颁发扩大供给的许可。


Insufficient options for construction can be the driving force behind a rising price-to-income ratio, with home prices increasing over the long term even if the city has acquired no new industry, cachet, or talent.	建设选项不足可能是推高房价-收入比的因素，住房价格长期总会上涨，即便城市无法吸引到新的产业、声望或人才。


Once the city has run out of available building sites, its continued growth must be accommodated by the departure of lower-income people.	一旦城市可供建房用地告罄，其后续增长就必须通过较低收入人群的离开来协调。


The rise in housing prices, relative to income, is unlikely to be sudden, not least because speculators, anticipating the change, may bid up prices in advance.	房价相对收入的上涨不可能是突然发生的，因为预料到价格变化的投机客会抢先抬价。


They may even overshoot, temporarily pushing the ratios even higher than necessary, creating a bubble and causing unnecessary angst among residents.	他们可能会漫天要价，导致房价-收入比率暂时升高到比必要程度还要高，形成房价泡沫，在居民中间造成不必要的焦虑。


But this tendency can be mitigated, if civil society recognizes the importance of preserving lower-income housing.	但如果公民社会认识到保护低收入住房的重要性，这种趋势就会得到遏制。


Many of the calls to resist further construction, residents must understand, are being made by special interests; indeed, they amount to a kind of rent seeking by homeowners seeking to boost their own homes’ resale value.	居民必须明白，许多抵制加大建设的呼声，来自特殊利益集团； 事实上，这是一种房主寻求提高自己的房子的转手价值的寻租活动。


In his recent book The New Urban Crisis, the University of Toronto’s Richard Florida decries this phenomenon, comparing opponents of housing construction to the early-nineteenth-century Luddites, who smashed the mechanical looms that were taking their weaving jobs.	多伦多大学的理查德·佛罗里达（Richard Florida）在他的新书《新城市危机》（The New Urban Crisis）描述了这一现象，将反对建房者与19世纪初砸毁夺走他们的饭碗的机械纺纱机的卢德分子相提并论。


In some cases, a city may be on its way to becoming a “great city,” and market forces should be allowed to drive out lower-income people who can’t participate fully in this greatness to make way for those who can.	有时，城市可能正在迈向“伟大城市”的途中，应该允许市场力量驱逐不能充分参与到这一伟大进程的低收入人群，为有能力的人让路。


But, more often, a city with a high housing-price-to-income ratio is less a “great city” than a supply-constrained one lacking in empathy, humanitarian impulse, and, increasingly, diversity.	但是，更常见的情况是，一个住房价格-收入比率很高城市，与一个缺乏同理心、人道主义使命感以及日益增加的多样性的，并且供给受限的城市相比，更加不像是“伟大城市”。


And that creates fertile ground for dangerous animosities.	而这会为危险的憎恨创造温床。


The Real Risk to the Global Economy	全球经济的真正风险


WASHINGTON, DC – One of the great mysteries of today’s global markets is their irrepressible enthusiasm, even as the world around them appears on the verge of chaos or collapse.	华盛顿—当今全球市场的最大的谜题之一是无法抑制的热忱，即便周围的世界正处在混乱或崩溃的边缘。


And yet, investors may be more rational than they appear when it comes to pricing in political risks.	但投资者在为潜在风险定价方面，可能要比表面看上去更加理性。


If investing is foremost about discounting future cash flows, it’s important to focus precisely on what will and will not affect those calculations.	如果投资首先是对未来现金流的贴现，那么精准关注什么会影响这一计算、什么不会非常重要。


The potential crises that may be most dramatic or violent are, ironically, the ones that the market has the easiest time looking through.	讽刺的是，潜在危机也许是最剧烈、最暴力的，但同时也是市场最容易看穿的。


Far more dangerous are gradual shifts in international global institutions that upend expectations about how key players will behave.	更加危险的是国际性全球机构的逐渐变化，这些变化可以让关于重要行动方如何行动的预期彻底颠倒。


Such shifts may emerge only slowly, but they can fundamentally change the calculus for pricing in risks and potential returns.	这些变化也许发展缓慢，但能够从根本上改变风险和潜在回报的定价计算。


Today’s market is easy to explain in terms of fundamental factors: earnings are growing, inflation has been kept at bay, and the global economy appears to be experiencing a broad, synchronized expansion.	今天的市场，从根本面因素来看很容易解释：收益在增长，通胀完全掌控，全球经济看上去正处于全方位的同步扩张之中。


In October, the International Monetary Fund updated its global outlook to predict that only a handful of small countries will suffer a recession next year.	10月，国际货币基金组织（IMF）更新了其全球展望，预测明年将只有少数小国可能出现衰退。


And while the major central banks are planning, or have already begun, to tighten monetary policy, interest rates will remain low for now.	而尽管主要央行无不在计划或已经开始了货币政策紧缩，目前的利率水平仍然很低。


Political crises, however sensational they may be, are not likely to change investors’ economic calculus.	政治危机听上去再耸人听闻，也很难改变投资者的经济计算。


Even after the greatest calamities of the twentieth century, markets bounced back fairly quickly.	即使遭到了二十世纪最糟糕的灾难，市场也能非常快地收复失地。


After Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, US stock markets fell by 10%, but recovered within six weeks.	日本偷袭珍珠港后，美国股市下跌了10%，但不出六周便涨了回去。


Similarly, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, US stocks dropped nearly 12%, but bounced back in a month.	类似地，2001年9月11日恐怖袭击后，美国股市下跌了近12%，但一个月后也收复了失地。


After the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, stock prices fell less than 3%, and recovered the next day.	肯尼迪总统遇刺后，股票下跌了不到3%，第二天就全部收回了跌幅。


Yes, each political crisis is different.	诚然，每场政治危机都是不同的。


But through most of them, veteran emerging-markets investor Jens Nystedt notes, market participants can count on a response from policymakers.	但老牌新兴市场投资者延斯·奈斯迪特（Jens Nystedt）指出，最常见的情况是市场参与者能够依靠决策者的应对。


Central banks and finance ministries will almost always rush to offset rising risk premia by adjusting interest rates or fiscal policies, and investors bid assets back to their pre-crisis values.	央行和财政部几乎每次都会用利率调整和财政政策来非常快地抵消不断上升的风险溢价，而投资者对资产的出价也随之恢复到危机前的价值。


Today, a conflict with North Korea over its nuclear and missile programs tops most lists of potential crises.	如今，与朝鲜因其核和导弹计划发生冲突的可能性是最大的潜在危机源。


Open warfare or a nuclear incident on the Korean Peninsula would trigger a humanitarian disaster, interrupt trade with South Korea – the world’s 13th largest economy – and send political shockwaves around the world.	朝鲜半岛公开打仗或核事故将引发人道主义灾难，破坏对韩贸易（韩国是世界第十三大经济体），并在全世界造成政治余波。


And yet such a disaster would most likely be brief, and its outcome would be clear almost immediately.	但如此灾难很有可能只是暂时性的，其结果几乎立刻就会显露殆尽。


The world’s major powers would remain more or less aligned, and future cash flows on most investments would continue undisturbed.	世界主要力量或多或少将保持一致，大部分投资的未来现金流不会受到干扰。


The same can be said of Saudi Arabia, where Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman just purged the government and security apparatus to consolidate his power.	沙特阿拉伯也是如此，王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼刚刚清洗了政府和安全部门，以巩固自己的权力。


Even if a sudden upheaval in the Kingdom were to transform the balance of power in the Middle East, the country would still want to maintain its exports.	即使沙特王国突然爆发剧变，改变了中东的实力平衡，沙特仍将尽力保持出口。


And if there were an interruption in global oil flows, it would be cushioned by competing producers and new technologies.	而如果全球石油流动真的受到了干扰，其影响也有产油国竞争对手和新技术提供缓冲。


Similarly, a full-scale political or economic collapse in Venezuela would have serious regional implications, and might result in an even deeper humanitarian crisis there.	类似地，委内瑞拉政治和经济全面崩溃将产生严重的地区性后果，并由可能给这个国家带来更深度的人道主义危机。


But it would most likely not have any broader, much less systemic, impact on energy and financial markets.	但除此之外很难带来更广泛、更具系统性的的能源和金融市场影响。


Such scenarios are often in the headlines, so their occurrence is less likely to come as a surprise.	这些情景经常会登上媒体头条，因此它们的发生不太可能被视为意外。


But even when a crisis, like a cyber attack or an epidemic, erupts unexpectedly, the ensuing market disruption usually lasts only as long as it takes for investors to reassess discount rates and future profit streams.	但即使是意外爆发的危机，如网络攻击或传染病，所引起的市场扰动常常也只能持续到投资者重新评估贴现率和未来利润流为止。


By contrast, changes in broadly shared economic assumptions are far more likely to trigger a sell-off, by prompting investors to reassess the likelihood of actually realizing projected cash flows.	相反，如果被广泛接受的经济假设发生改变的话，就很有可能引发甩卖潮，因为投资者将重新评估实现预期现金流的实际可能性。


There might be a dawning awareness among investors that growth rates are slowing, or that central banks have missed the emergence of inflation once again.	投资者之间可能会形成初步意识，认为增长率正在放缓，或央行再次没有能够注意到通胀抬头的迹象。


Or the change might come more suddenly, with, say, the discovery of large pockets of toxic loans that are unlikely to be repaid.	或者这些变化回来得更加突然，比如发现了大量不可能得到偿还的有毒贷款。


As emerging-market investors well know, political changes can affect economic assumptions.	新兴市场投资者早已熟知，政治变化可能影响经济假设。


But, again, the risk stems less from unpredictable shocks than from the slow erosion of institutions that investors trust to make an uncertain world more predictable.	但不要忘记，来自不可预测的冲击的风险，要少于投资者相信能够让不确定的世界变得更加容易预测的机构逐渐变质。


For example, investors in Turkey know that the country’s turn away from democracy has distanced it from Europe and introduced new risks for future returns.	比如，土耳其投资者知道土耳其背叛民主使它与欧洲渐行渐远，并给未来回报带来了新风险。


On the other hand, in Brazil, despite an ongoing corruption scandal that has toppled one president and could topple another, investors recognize that the country’s institutions are working – albeit in their own cumbersome way – and they have priced risks accordingly.	另一方面，在巴西，尽管持续发酵的腐败丑闻已经让一位总统惨遭弹劾，并有可能让第二位总统也黯然下台，但投资者认为巴西的机构仍在起作用——尽管相当笨拙——并且他们会据此对风险进行定价。


The greatest political risk to global markets today, then, is that the key players shaping investor expectations undergo a fundamental realignment.	因此，如今全球市场最大的政治风险是影响投资者预期的重要行动方正在经历根本性的调整。


Most concerning of all is the United States, which is now seeking to carve out a new global role for itself under President Donald Trump.	最令人关注的是美国，目前，在总统特朗普的带领下，它正在寻求重塑自己的全球角色。


By withdrawing from international agreements and trying to renegotiate existing trade deals, the US has already become less predictable.	退出国际协定并试图重新谈判已有贸易协议表明，美国变得更加难以预测了。


Looking ahead, if Trump and future US leaders continue to engage with other countries through zero-sum transactions rather than cooperative institution-building, the world will be unable to muster a joint response to the next period of global market turmoil.	放眼未来，如果特朗普和美国的未来领导人继续用零和交易，而不是合作性机构建设来与外国打交道，世界将无法构建对下一个全球市场动荡期的联合应对之道。


Ultimately, a less reliable US will require a higher discount rate almost everywhere.	总而言之，不太可靠的美国意味着几乎所有国家的贴现率都将因此提高。


Unless other economic cycles intervene before investors’ expectations shift, that will be the end of the current market boom.	除早非投资者的预期发生变化之前发生新的经济周期，否则这就将是本次市场繁荣的终点。


Rebuilding the Asylum System	重建避难制度


NEW YORK – The European Union needs to accept responsibility for the lack of a common asylum policy, which has transformed this year’s growing influx of refugees from a manageable problem into yet another political crisis.	纽约—欧盟需要接受共同庇护政策缺位的责任。 共同庇护政策的缺位导致今年不断增加的难民流入从一个可管理的问题演变为又一场政治危机。


Each member state has selfishly focused on its own interests, often acting against the interests of others.	每一个成员国都自私地关注自身利益，常常采取与其他成员国利益相悖的行动。


This precipitated panic among asylum seekers, the general public, and the authorities responsible for law and order. Asylum seekers have been the main victims.	这在寻求庇护者、公众和为法律和秩序负责的有关部门制造了日积月累的恐慌。


The EU needs a comprehensive plan to respond to the crisis, one that reasserts effective governance over the flows of asylum-seekers so that they take place in a safe, orderly way, and at a pace that reflects Europe’s capacity to absorb them.	欧盟需要一个全面的计划应对这场危机，这个计划应该重申对寻求庇护者进行有效治理，以使他们能以安全有序的方式和与欧洲吸收能力相应的速度流入。


To be comprehensive, the plan has to extend beyond the borders of Europe.	一个全面的计划决不能局限在欧洲边界之内。


It is less disruptive and much less expensive to maintain potential asylum-seekers in or close to their present location.	让潜在寻求庇护者留在当前所在位置或周边地区能降低破坏性，成本也低廉得多。