But, as George Price showed long ago, Darwinian evolution may have made us altruistic, at least toward people we perceive as members of the group we call “us.”	但乔治·普莱斯（George Price）早就指出，达尔文式的演化可能让我们变得利他，至少对于我们认为属于被我们称为“我们”的群体的成员的人是如此。


The new revolution in economics may find a place for strategies based on affecting ideals and identities, not just taxes and subsidies.	经济学新革命为以打动人的理想和激励，而不仅仅是税收和补贴为基础的策略留了一席之地。


In the process, we may understand that we vote because that is what citizens ought to do, and we excel at our jobs because we strive for respect and self-realization, not just a raise.	在这个过程中，我们会明白，我们投票是因为这是公民应该做的事，而我们出色完成工作是因为我们从中获得尊重和自我实现，而不仅仅是升职加薪。


If successful, the new revolution may lead to strategies that make us more responsive to our better angels.	如果成功的话，新革命可能会带来让我们更积极地响应我们的天使的一面的策略。


Economics and our view of human behavior need not be dismal.	经济学和我们的人的行为观未必是无聊的。


It may even become inspirational.	它们可以是鼓舞人心的。


Keep Hong Kong Free	保持自由的香港


HONG KONG – Visiting Hong Kong is a true pleasure.	香港—访问香港着实令人高兴。


With its modern architecture towering around the busy harbor, that great and exciting city must rank among the world’s most enjoyable urban destinations.	在这里，现代高楼大厦环绕着繁忙的港口，这个令人兴奋的伟大城市绝对名列全世界最令人心旷神怡的都市。


But Hong Kong is now under stress, as it finds itself at the center of a number of issues and challenges – including how best to balance economic and political freedom and how to engage with an increasingly assertive and ambitious China – that will define its prospects in the century ahead.	但如今的香港正在承受压力，成为众多问题和挑战的中心——包括如何平衡经济和政治自由，以及如何与坚定性和企图心日益上升的中国周旋——这将决定它在未来一百年的前景。


Fundamentally, Hong Kong’s prospects depend on the implementation of the “one country, two systems” principle, conceived by Deng Xiaoping to serve as the basis for Hong Kong’s eventual return to China in 1997.	从根本上说，香港的前景取决于“一国两制”原则的落实情况。 邓小平将一国两制作为1997年香港回归中国的基础。


The idea – which Milton Friedman thought amounted to an impossible balancing act – was that Hong Kong would keep its way of life, liberties, and laws.	这一思想——米尔顿·弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）认为它需要不可能实现的平衡——说，香港可以保留其生活方式、自由和法律。


Its people were perfectly capable of running their city; they simply had to do so as a part of China.	香港人民完全有能力管理好他们的城市； 他们只是必须作为中国的一部分。


One country, two systems brilliantly balanced the aspirations, anxieties, and difficulties posed by the change in sovereignty from Britain to China.	一国两制巧妙地在香港主权由英国转移到中国所造成的渴望、焦虑和困难中实现平衡。


For China, there was the smarting humiliation of having ceded its own territory to a colonial power during the Qing dynasty.	对中国而言，清朝将领土割让给殖民列强是奇耻大辱。


Imperialists from all over the world gave China a hard time, behaving in a way that no one today would or should seek to justify.	全世界各地的帝国主义者给中国带来了一段艰难时期，他们犯下的罪行是无可辩驳的。


Forcing China to open up to the opium trade formed one of the most disreputable chapters in Britain’s imperial history.	强迫英国开放鸦片贸易也是大英帝国史上最有争议的段落之一。


But what must have rankled the Chinese Communist Party most was that the colonial power had been so successful in building, with China’s own people in Hong Kong, a hugely prosperous and contented city – one that became a magnet for many Chinese men, women, and children.	但最激怒中国共产党的是殖民列强在建设方面做得如此成功，依靠香港的中华民族，建立了一个无比繁荣舒适的城市——这个城市成为一块吸引大量中国男女老少的磁石。


If Chinese communism was the wave of the future, why did so many flee from it, clambering over fences topped with razor wire and swimming through hazardous waters, to live under colonial rule?	如果中国共产主义代表未来浪潮，那么为什么会有这么多人逃离它，翻越顶部架设了铁丝网的隔离带，渡过危机四伏的水域，来到这里生活在殖民统治之下？


On the British side, there were equally implacable challenges.	在英国方面，也存在同样难以调和的挑战。


Britain needed to determine how best to establish a constructive relationship with a China intent on weaponizing trade, while standing up for the rights and promised freedoms of Hong Kong’s people.	英国需要决定如何与日益将贸易武器化的中国建立建设性关系，同时捍卫香港人民的权利和许诺的自由。


In this respect, the handover raised essential and complex questions about political morality.	在这方面，香港主权的交接产生了重要而复杂的政治伦理问题。


Just before I left Hong Kong in 1997, after departing from my post as the city’s last British governor, I visited a hospital for the mentally ill, where an in-patient asked me an eminently sane question.	1997年，我在卸任末代港督、离开香港前夕，访问了一家精神病医院，一位住院病人问了我一个精神非常健全的问题。


How, he wanted to know, could a country that prided itself on its deeply rooted democracy hand Hong Kong over to the world’s last big Communist tyranny, without asking its citizens for their opinion?	他想知道，一个以民主根基深厚而自豪的国家，如何能把香港交给全世界最大的共产主义暴君，而根本不问一问市民的想法？


The answer is that such questions were never an option, if we were to fulfill our treaty obligations and avoid a catastrophic repeat of nineteenth-century colonialism.	答案是这样的问题永远不是一个选项，如果我们想要兑现我们的条约义务并避免灾难性地重演十九世纪殖民主义的话。


Yet we should certainly have done as much to introduce and entrench democratic institutions in Hong Kong as we did to secure the rule of law and the protection of civil liberties.	但我们绝对应该像我们捍卫法治、保护公民自由那样不遗余力地在香港引入和巩固民主制度。


One reason why we moved more slowly on democracy was that China’s leaders had made clear that they feared Hong Kong’s people would think the road was being cleared to become an independent state, like Singapore.	我们在民主方面动作缓慢的一个原因中国领导人明确表示他们担心香港人民认为香港像新加坡那样，已经扫清了独立建国之路。


For the first few years after 1997, “one country, two systems” seemed to work pretty well, though China did break its promises by blocking democratic development.	对1997年后的最初几年，“一国两制”运行的相当漂亮，尽管中国果真违反了承诺，阻挠民主发展。


But more recently – and especially since 2012, when President Xi Jinping came to power – China has been tightening its grip on Hong Kong.	但后来——特别是2012年国家主席习近平掌权后——中国开始收紧对香港的控制。


This is probably related to the government’s broader crackdown on dissidents; China’s growing economic heft, which makes an open Hong Kong seem less important to its future prosperity; and a lack of understanding of what Hong Kong’s system really means.	这也许与政府扩大镇压异见分子； 中国经济的日益增长让开放的香港对其未来繁荣变得不再那么重要，以及对香港的制度的真正含义缺乏理解有关。


The question now is whether “one country, two systems” will devolve into “one country, one and a half systems” or, worse, “one country, one system.”	现在的问题是“一国两制”会演变为“一国一个半制”还是“一国一制”。


There is no doubt that China has increasingly been interfering in Hong Kong’s domestic affairs.	毫无疑问，中国对香港内部事务的干预日益加强。


Most recently, concerns have focused on the treatment of some of the leaders of Hong Kong’s 2014 pro-democracy demonstrations: three of the city’s most influential activists were sentenced to up to eight months in prison for their activities, and have been prohibited from seeking public office for five years.	最近的关注点集中在对香港2014年民主示威的一些领导者的对待上：三位最有影响力的活跃分子因为他们的行为被判处最多八个月监禁，五年内不得担任公职。


Three years may seem like a long time to wait before cracking the whip, but there is no doubt that Hong Kong’s judicial system has acted according to the law.	大棒等了三年才落下，这似乎是很长一段时间，但毫无疑问，香港的司法体系是在依法行动。


The trouble is that the convictions have taken place against a background of fear and divisiveness, stoked by the Chinese government’s behavior.	麻烦在于裁决系在因中国政府的行为而产生的恐慌和分歧中做出。


China has, for example, attacked the independence of Hong Kong’s judiciary, with Rimsky Yuen, Secretary for Justice of Hong Kong, calling for the review of already-served sentences that he deems too lenient.	比如，中国打击香港律政司的独立性袁国强，司长袁国强要求审议已经开始刑期的裁决，认为量刑畸轻。


And, even as officials like Yuen purport to be defending the rule of law, Chinese security operatives have apparently abducted Hong Kong residents, including several booksellers.	尽管袁国强等官员宣称要捍卫法治，但中国国安部门公然劫持香港居民，包括多位书商。


To ease fears and allow Hong Kong to move forward, three things are required.	要想减轻恐慌，让香港继续进步，需要做好三件事。


First, China must make clear through its actions that it can be trusted to keep its promises to Hong Kong.	首先，中国必须通过行动澄清，可以相信它会兑现对香港的承诺。


To help ensure that outcome, the international community should vigorously remind it of the broader ramifications of being viewed as an untrustworthy partner.	要确保这一结果，国际社会应该有力地提醒中国，被认为是不可靠的伙伴会引来什么后果。


Second, democracy activists in Hong Kong should not allow their campaign for democracy to morph into a call for independence.	其次，香港的民主活跃分子不能让他们的民主运动演变为要求独立。


For its part, the government should open a dialogue with them, characterized by mutual respect and transparency.	而政府应该在共同尊重和透明的基础上开放对话。


Finally, the people of Hong Kong should not give up hope, as the Chinese communists hope they will.	最后，香港人民不应该放弃希望，放弃希望就中了中共的下怀。


If its people remain resolute in their commitment, Hong Kong will remain a great free city, choosing those who govern it under the rule of law.	如果香港人民对目标坚定不移，香港将一直是一个伟大的自由城市，选择根据法治治理它的人。


Hong Kong is a shining example to the rest of the world about what Chinese men and women can achieve with the sort of freedom that millions of others take for granted.	香港是一个光辉的榜样，让世人看到中国人如果拥有千百万其他人视为理所当然的自由的话，能够实现怎样的成就。


Its people must not – and, I believe, will not – give up on it.	香港人民决不能——我相信，也绝不会——放弃它。


Hoping for the Best Against Trump	在特朗普当选的情况下，抱以最大希望


NEW YORK – Is there any reason for liberals to feel optimistic after a year of political disasters?	纽约—自由派能找到在政治灾难的一年后保持乐观的理由吗？


Is there even a shred of silver lining to be found in the tatters of Brexit, Donald Trump’s election, and European disunity?	在英国退欧、唐纳德·特朗普当选和欧洲离心离德所有下的一地狼藉中，能够找打哪怕一丝曙光吗？


Christians believe that despair is a mortal sin, so one might as well try to find a glimmer of hope.	基督徒认为绝望是一种道德犯罪，因此他们会竭尽全力寻找希望的微光。


In the United States, many liberals console themselves with the belief that the obvious dangers of being governed by an ignorant, narcissistic, authoritarian loudmouth backed by billionaires, ex-generals, peddlers of malicious fake news, and neophytes with extreme views will help to galvanize a strong political opposition.	在美国，许多自由派用这样的信念聊以自慰：被一位由亿万富翁、前高级将领、恶毒假新闻炮制者和观点极端的新来者支持的无知、自恋、极权的大嘴总统统治显然充满了危险，这一危险有助于刺激强烈的政治反对。


Trump, it is hoped, will concentrate the minds of all who still believe in liberal democracy, be they left or even right of center.	他们希望，特朗普将把所有信奉自由民主的人的观点统一起来，不管他们是左翼、右翼还是中间派。


In this scenario, civil-rights groups, NGOs, students, human-rights activists, Democratic members of Congress, and even some Republicans, will do everything in their power to push back against Trump's worst impulses.	在这一情形中，公民权利组织、非政府组织、学生、人权活动家、国会民主党，甚至一些共和党，将竭尽全力反对特朗普最糟糕的冲动。


Long-dormant political activism will erupt into mass protest, with resurgent liberal idealism breaking the wave of right-wing populism.	蛰伏依旧的政治积极主义将爆发为群众示威，复兴的自有理想主义将打破右翼民粹主义浪潮。


Well, perhaps.	好吧，这些都只是可能。


Others seek comfort in the expectation that Trump’s wildly contradictory plans – lower taxes, while raising infrastructure spending; helping the neglected working class, while slashing welfare and repealing the Affordable Care Act – will suck his administration into a swamp of infighting, incoherence, and incompetence.	也有人从这样的期望中寻找安慰：特朗普强烈自相矛盾的计划——降低税收同时增加基础设施支出； 帮助被忽视的工作阶级同时削减福利并废除平价医疗法——将让他的政府陷入内斗、分裂和无能。


All these things might happen.	所有这些都有可能发生。


But protest alone won’t be of much help.	但仅仅是示威无济于事。


Anti-Trump demonstrations in big cities will no doubt annoy the self-loving new president, and the moral glow of joining the resistance will warm the protesters.	大城市的反特朗普示威毫无疑问将困扰这位自恋的新总统，而加入抵抗的道德光芒将温暖示威者。


But without real political organization, mere protest will go the way of Occupy Wall Street in 2011; it will peter out into ineffectual gestures.	但如果没有真正的政治组织，仅仅示威无非是2011年“占领华尔街”的翻版； 最终将沦为毫无意义的姿态。


One of the most dangerous ideas of contemporary populism is that political parties are obsolete, and should be replaced by movements led by charismatic leaders who act as the voice of “the people.”	当代民粹主义最危险的思想之一是政治政党已是明日黄花，应该取而代之以作为“人民”的声音的魅力领袖领导的运动。


By implication, all dissenters are enemies of the people.	其隐含之义是一切异见者都是人民的敌人。


That way lies dictatorship.	这是独裁。


Liberal democracy can be saved only if mainstream parties can regain voters’ trust.	要想拯救自由民主，唯一的办法是主流政党重新赢得选民的信任。


The Democratic Party must get its act together.	民主党必须保持有条不紊。


“Feeling the Bern” (the mantra of Bernie Sanders’ leftist campaign) will not suffice to stop Trump from inflicting great harm to institutions that were carefully constructed more than two centuries ago to protect American democracy from demagogues like him.	“感受伯恩”（伯尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）的左翼竞选口号）不足以阻止特朗普对美国的制度造成重创。 这套两百多年前精心设计的制度正是用来保护美国的民主不受他这样的煽动家影响。


The same thing is true of international arrangements and institutions, whose survival depends on the willingness to defend them.	国际安排和机构也是如此，它们的生存取决于我们捍卫它们的意愿。


Trump has expressed his indifference to NATO, and US security commitments in East Asia.	特朗普已经表示对北约和美国的东亚安全承诺“无所谓”。


His election will further erode Pax Americana, already battered by a succession of foolish wars.	他的当选将进一步破坏美国治下的和平（一系列愚蠢的战争已经令这一状态受到巨大影响）。


Without the US guarantee to protect its democratic allies, institutions built after World War II to provide that protection would not survive for very long.	没有美国保证保护其民主盟友，二战后建立起来的提供这一保护的机构将无法持久。


Perhaps there is a tiny ray of hope in this gloomy prospect.	也许在这一黯淡的前景中仍有一丝希望。


Europe and Japan, not to mention South Korea, have become too dependent on US military protection.	欧洲和日本——更不用说韩国了——过于美国的军事保护。


The Japanese have fairly large armed forces, but are hampered by a pacifist constitution written by Americans in 1946.	日本人已经具备相当规模的武装力量，但受制于1946年美国人制定的和平宪法。


Europeans are completely unprepared to defend themselves, owing to inertia, complacency, and lassitude.	而拜惰性、自满和倦怠所赐，欧洲人完全没有做好自己捍卫自己的准备。


It is just possible that Trump’s blustering “America first” rhetoric will galvanize Europeans and East Asians into changing the status quo and doing more for their own security.	很有可能，特朗普叫嚣的“美国第一”口号将刺激欧洲和东亚改变现状，对自己的安全更加“上心”。


Ideally, European countries should build an integrated defense force that would be less dependent on the US.	在理想状况中，欧洲各国应该构建较少依赖美国的一体化防卫力量。


And the countries of Southeast and East Asia could construct a Japanese-led variant of NATO to balance the domineering might of China.	东南亚和东亚国家可以建立一个以日本为首的亚洲版北约以制衡专断的中国。


But even if these arrangements came to pass (a huge if), it would not happen soon.	但即使这些安排能够成真（可能性很高），也需要很长时间。


Europeans are unwilling to pay higher taxes for their own defense.	欧洲人不愿意为自己的国防支付高税收。


Germany has neither the wherewithal, nor the will to lead a military alliance.	德国既没有财力，也没有意愿领导军事联盟。


And most Asians, including many Japanese, would not trust Japan to lead such a coalition in Asia.	而大部分东亚人，包括许多日本人，根本不信任让日本来领导亚洲防卫联盟。


The current Japanese government, under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, would like to revise the pacifist constitution, as a necessary first step toward weaning the country off its total dependence on the US.	首相安倍晋三领导的现任日本政府或将修订和平宪法，以此作为摆脱完全依赖美国的必不可少的第一步。


But Abe’s revisionism is rooted in a nationalist ideology, which is prone to justifying historical atrocities instead of drawing lessons from them.	但安倍的修正主义植根于民族主义思想，他更想证明日本的历史暴行的合理性，而不是从中汲取教训。


This alone disqualifies Japan from leading others in a military pact.	仅仅这一点就决定了日本无法领导其他国家达成军事契约。


So, while it might be time to rethink the world order built by the US on the ruins of WWII, the Trump presidency is unlikely to bring this about in a careful and orderly manner.	因此，尽管我们应该反思二战后由美国所建立的世界秩序，但特朗普总统不可能谨慎有序地完成这一任务。


His election is more like an earthquake, unleashing forces no one can control.	他的当选更像是一场地震，释放出人们无法控制的力量。


Instead of encouraging the Japanese to think about collective security in a responsible way, Trump's indifference is more likely to play to the worst instincts of panicky Japanese nationalists.	特朗普的“无所谓”更有可能激发焦虑不安的日本民族主义者体内最邪恶的本能，而不是鼓励日本以负责任的方式考虑集体安全。


Europe is in no shape to rise to the challenge of Pax Americana’s erosion, either.	欧洲也无法站出来应对美国治下的和平衰落的挑战。


Without a greater sense of pan-national European solidarity, European institutions will soon become hollow, and perhaps even cease to exist.	如果不能形成更强的泛民族（pan-national）欧洲凝聚力，欧洲机构很快就会土崩瓦解甚至烟消云散。


But this sense is precisely what the demagogues are now undermining with such conspicuous success.	但如今煽动家大获全胜所威胁到的正是这一凝聚力。


If there is reason for confidence, it is not in the liberal democratic world, but in the capitals of its most powerful adversaries: Moscow and Beijing.	如果说有人对此充满信心的话，这些人不在自由民主世界，而在它的最强大的对手：莫斯科和北京。


Trump, at least in the short term, seems to be good news for Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping.	至少在短期，特朗普当选对于俄罗斯总统普京和中国国家主席习近平来说是个好消息。


Without credible American leadership, or a strong alliance of democracies, there won’t be much left to restrain Russian or Chinese ambitions.	失去了可信的美国领导力或强大的民主国家联盟，就不再有力量能够遏制俄罗斯和中国的野心。


This might not lead to catastrophe in the next few years.	未来几年，这未必会导致灾难。


Russia and China are more likely to test the limits of their power slowly, bit by bit: Ukraine today, perhaps the Baltics tomorrow; the South China Sea islands now, Taiwan later.	俄罗斯和中国更有可能缓慢地、逐步地试探它们的实力极限：今天在乌克兰，明天可能在巴尔干半岛； 今天在南海岛屿，随后可能是台湾。


They will push, and push, until they push too far.	它们会推进再推进，直到极限。


Then anything may happen.	接下来才会发生些什么。


Great powers often blunder into great wars.	大国常常在无意间爆发大战。


This is no reason for despair, as we begin the New Year, but no reason to be optimistic, either.	步入新的一年，我们不必绝望，但也没有理由乐观。


How to End Hunger	如何终结饥饿


ISTANBUL/KUALA LUMPUR – Last September, world leaders made a commitment to end hunger by 2030, as part of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).	伊斯坦布尔/吉隆坡—去年9月，世界领导人承诺在2030年终结饥饿，这是联合国可持续发展目标（SDG）的一部分。


It sounds like a massive undertaking.	这看似一个大手笔。


In fact, the world already produces enough food to feed everyone.	事实上，世界已能够生产足以养活所有人的粮食。


So why does the problem persist?	那么，为何这个问题会持续存在？


Poverty and hunger are intimately connected, which is why the SDGs target elimination of both.	贫困和饥饿密切相因，这也是SDG要同时根除两者的原因。


For someone living at the World Bank’s poverty line of $1.90 per day, food would account for some 50-70% of income.	如果你生活在每天1. 90美元的世界银行贫困线上，那么粮食将消耗你的收入的50—70%。


The Bank estimates that almost four-fifths of the world’s poor live in rural areas, though those areas account for less than half of the world’s population.	世界银行估算，全世界近五分之四的贫困人口生活在农村地区，尽管这些地区占世界人口的比例不到一半。


The obvious conclusion is that raising rural incomes sustainably is required to eradicate hunger.	显而易见的结论是显著提高农村收入是消除饥饿的必要条件。


That will not be easy.	这绝非易事。


Most developing countries nowadays are burdened by high rates of unemployment and underemployment.	如今，大部分发展中国家深受失业和办失业率高企的困扰。


And with current economic prospects bleak, especially given low commodity prices, and insistence on fiscal austerity continuing in most places, downward pressure on rural incomes is likely to worsen.	而目前经济前景黯淡（特别是因为低迷的大宗商品价格），大部分国家还在坚持财政紧缩，因此农村收入的下行压力可能还会恶化。


But even if countries do manage to achieve inclusive growth, it will not be enough to eliminate hunger by 2030.	但即使各国成功实现包容性增长，也不足以在2030年消灭饥饿。


The only way to do that will be to implement well-designed social protection and scale up pro-poor investments.	唯一的可行之道是实施设计巧妙的保护和扩大支持穷人的投资。


According to the World Bank, one billion people in 146 low- and middle-income countries currently receive some form of social protection.	剧世界银行，146个中低收入国家的十亿人目前能获得某种形式的社会保护。


Yet 870 million of those living in extreme poverty, mainly in rural areas, lack coverage.	但生活在极端贫困中的8. 7亿人（主要为农村人口）没有得到覆盖。


Unsurprisingly, the greatest shortfalls are in low-income countries, where social protection covers less than one-tenth of the population, 47% of which lives in extreme poverty.	毫不奇怪，最严重缺口存在于低收入国家，这些国家的社会保护覆盖度还不到人口的十分之一，而有47%生活在极端贫困中。


In the lower-middle-income countries, social protection reaches about a quarter of those living in extreme poverty, leaving about a half-billion people without coverage.	在中低收入国家，社会保护大约能覆盖四分之一极端贫困人口，大约有五亿人得不到覆盖。


In the upper middle-income countries, about 45% of those living in extreme poverty receive social-welfare benefits.	在中上收入国家，大约45%的极端贫困人口能获得社会福利。


This is clearly not good enough.	这显然不够好。


Improved social protection can help to ensure adequate food consumption and enable recipients to invest in their own nutrition, health, and other productive capacities.	改善社会保护有助于确保充足的粮食消费，让受益人能投资于自身营养、健康和其他生产力。


As such investments sustainably raise incomes, they enable further increases in productive personal investments, thereby breaking the vicious cycle of poverty and hunger.	这些投资能持续提高收入，因此能够进一步增加生产性个人投资，从而打破贫苦和饥饿的恶性循环。


Governments, too, have investments to make, in order to ensure that those who are currently mired in poverty reach the point where they can invest in themselves.	政府也要进行投资，以确保目前深陷贫困中的人群能够投资自己。


An early big investment push would generate additional incomes sooner, reducing longer-term financing costs.	早期的大规模投资推动能更快产生收入增加，降低长期融资成本。


Moreover, it would boost aggregate demand in a world economy that badly needs it.	此外，这样还能带来世界经济急需的总需求提振。


The world can afford the needed investment.	世界能够负担所需要的投资。


According to estimates by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the World Food Programme (WFP), it would cost the equivalent of 0.3% of the world’s 2014 income.	据世界粮农组织（FAO）、国际农业发展基金（IFAD）和世界粮食计划（WFP）估算，这些投资成本相当于2014年世界GDP的0. 3%。


All that is needed is for wealthier countries to provide budgetary support and technical assistance to the low-income countries that need it.	所需要的全部只是富裕国家向有需要的低收入国家提供预算支持和技术援助。


(Most middle-income countries can afford the needed financing themselves.)	（大部分中等收入国家能自力更生筹集资金。 ）


It should not be difficult to generate the political will to provide the needed support, at least in theory.	产生提供所需帮助的政治意愿应该不难，至少理论上是如此。


After all, it has been more than a half-century since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which treats the material needs of all persons as a fundamental human right.	毕竟，《世界人权宣言》及其经济、社会和文化权利公约将所有人的物质需要列为基本人权，而它们的实施已经超过半个世纪。


A few years earlier, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt called “freedom from want” – which, presumably, includes freedom from hunger – one of four essential freedoms of which people “everywhere in the world” should be assured.	几年前，美国总统富兰克林·罗斯福称“免于匮乏的自由”——相比包括免于饥饿的自由——是“世界所有地区”人民都应该确保的四大基本自由之一。


Now, with the adoption of the SDGs, governments everywhere are obliged to take responsibility for ending poverty and hunger, as well as for creating the conditions for ensuring that both are permanently overcome.	目前，随着SDG的实施，各国政府都有义务承担终结贫困和饥饿的责任，以及为确保两者被永远克服创造条件的责任。


The upcoming High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development presents an important opportunity to forge the path ahead, setting near- and medium-term priorities.	几件到来的可持续发展高级别政治论坛提供了一个重要的确定路线、指定短期和中期重点的机会。


Ending hunger and poverty in a sustainable way is morally right, politically beneficial, and economically feasible.	以可持续办法终结饥饿和贫困在道德上正确，在政治上有益，在经济上可行。


For world leaders, inaction is no longer an option.	对世界领导人来说，不作为已不再是一个选项。


How Fake News Wins	假新闻如何胜出


WASHINGTON, DC – In response to the wave of fake news that inundated the recent presidential election campaign in the United States, much attention has been devoted to those who produce or spread those stories.	华盛顿—在最近的美国总统选战中，假新闻层出不穷，为此，人们的大量注意力集中在炮制和传播这些报道的人身上。


The assumption is that if news outlets were to report only the “facts,” readers and viewers would always reach the right conclusion about a given story.	其中的假设是，如果新闻机构只报道“事实”，读者和评论者就永远能够从他们获得的故事中得出正确的结论。


But this approach addresses only half of the equation.	但这个观点只是问题的一半。


Yes, we need news organizations to deliver reliable information; but we also need those receiving it to be savvy consumers.	是的，我们需要新闻组织提供可靠的消息； 但我们还需要获得这些消息的人是明智的消费者。


For decades, the US government has supported programs to foster independent media in authoritarian, resource-deprived, or dysfunctional countries.	几十年来，美国政府支持在极权主义、资源匮乏或不正常运转的国家培养独立媒体的计划。


But these programs tacitly assume that the US itself is immune to the problems people in other countries encounter when they create or consume information.	但这些计划在策略上都有一个前提：美国本身不会沾染上其他国家人民在创造或消费信息时所遇到的问题。 我们美国人还假定，依靠广告维持的美国媒体将一直繁荣；


We in the US also assume that American media, sustained by advertising, will continue to thrive; that independent journalism is the norm; and that most people are capable of thinking critically and making sound judgments about the information they receive.	独立新闻是规范； 大部分人有能力对他们所获得的信息进行批判性思考和做出可靠判断。


In fact, some of the lessons that we have learned while supporting vibrant information gathering and distribution abroad are equally relevant to the US.	事实上，我们在支持外国的有效信息收集和传播的过程中所学到的教训对于美国也同样重要。


In the 2016 election, the personal beliefs that drove millions of voters’ decisions were based not only on each person’s experiences and the information they accessed, but also on how they processed those experiences and that information.	在2016年大选中，促使数百万选民做出选择的个人信念不是基于各人的经验和他们所获得的信息，而是基于他们如何处理这些经验和信息。


Voters’ own relationships with content producers, their motivation to believe or disbelieve facts, and their critical thinking skills all determined how they interpreted and acted on information.	选民本人与内容制造者的关系、他们相信或不相信事实的动机，以及他们的批判性思考的能力都决定了他们如何解读信息并据以行动。


In the election, most mainstream pundits did not seem to “get” millions of Americans’ beliefs or viewpoints, so it is little wonder that those millions of Americans were turned off by the pundits’ incessant chatter.	在大选中，大部分主流专家似乎并没有“得到”数百万美国人的信念或观点，因此，毫不奇怪，这数百万美国人对于专家的聒噪嗤之以鼻。


To these voters, the pundits were simply information peddlers with no attachments to the issues that matter.	对这些选民来说，专家只不过是信息贩子，根本不懂什么才是关键。


Men and women talking in front of TV cameras are too far removed from the factories, offices, bars, churches, schools, and hospitals where viewers form the relationships that determine how they process information.	端坐在电视镜头前的人与工厂、办公室、酒吧、教堂、学校和医院距离太远，而那些地方才是观众形成决定他们如何处理信息的关系的地方。


The so-called digital revolution did not render superfluous the importance of human connection in shaping people’s interpretation and response to the information they receive.	所谓的数字革命并没有让人际关系在决定人们对所获信息的解读和反应上产生过多的重要性。


Relationships are built on trust, which is essential for ensuring that consumers accept information that challenges their closely held beliefs.	关系建立在信任的基础上，这是确保消费者接受挑战他们的坚定信念的信息的关键。


But, according to Gallup, only 32% of Americans have a “great deal” or “fair amount” of trust in traditional media outlets – an all-time low.	但是，据盖洛普的调查，只有32%的美国人对传统媒体机构有“极大”或“相当大”的信任——这一比例为历史最低。


That is deeply problematic, and it suggests that many citizens are throwing out the good information with the bad.	这是个很大的问题，它表明许多公民将好信息与坏信息一并抛弃。


As with any other good, how information is consumed reflects economic and political opportunities, personal incentives, and institutional or cultural norms.	与其他商品一样，如何消费信息反映了经济和政治机会、个人激励和制度或文化规范。


Workers in Ohio whose wages have stagnated, or unemployed voters in Michigan whose jobs have migrated overseas, will consume information in a way that reflects their economic situation.	工资停滞不前的俄亥俄州的工人，或就业岗位移往海外的密歇根州失业选民消费信息的方式也将反应他们的经济状况。


Not surprisingly, they will often select sources – whether credible or not – that are critical of globalization and current fiscal and economic policies.	毫不奇怪，他们常常认同——不论可不可信——批判全球化和当前财政和经济政策的信息。


An ample supply of sound information is not sufficient to make good choices; news consumers need critical-thinking skills.	充足的可靠信息供给不足以让人们做出好选择； 新闻消费者需要批判性思维。


Information is much like the food we eat: we need to understand its ingredients, and where and how it is produced, and the effects of overconsumption.	信息很像我们吃的食物：我们需要了解它的成分、产地、生产方法，以及过多摄入可能造成的影响。


It will probably take decades to rebuild trusting relationships between consumers and mainstream news media.	重建消费者与主流新闻媒体间的信任关系可能需要几十年之久。


Information consumers will always have biases and incentives to select one piece of information over another.	信息消费者总是会带有偏见，总是会有激励选择某个信息而不是另一个。


Even so, we can improve critical-thinking skills so that citizens know how to pick trustworthy sources, and resist their own biases.	即便如此，我们仍然能够通过改善批判性思维来让公民知道如何遴选有价值的新闻源，克服自身的偏见。


Cultivating critical-thinking skills takes time and practice, which is why it is more important than ever to invest in education.	培养批判性思维需要时间和耐心，因此，投资于教育比以往任何时候都要重要。


Some of the models that have been used abroad may work in the US, too.	一些海外所使用的模式可能同样适用于美国。


For example, in Ukraine, a recent initiative carried out by IREX mobilized librarians in an effort to neutralize the detrimental effects of Kremlin-funded propaganda.	比如，在乌克兰，IREX所发起的一项最新计划动员图书管理员参与中和克里姆林宫支持的宣传机构的有害影响。


Fifteen thousand Ukrainians were taught concrete skills in avoiding emotional manipulation, verifying sources and credentials, detecting paid content and hate speech, and debunking fake videos and photos.	一万五千名乌克兰人学到了如何避免情绪操纵、核实信息源和资质、辨别收钱发布和仇恨言论、揭穿假视频和照片的具体技巧。


The results were impressive: participants improved their ability to distinguish trustworthy news from false news by 24%.	结果令人印象深刻：参与者区分有价值的新闻和假新闻的能力改善了24%。


Better yet, they then trained hundreds more people to detect disinformation, thus multiplying the initiative’s overall impact.	更好的是，他们随后又训练了更多的人发现不良信息，从而将该计划的总效果成倍放大。


With a rather modest investment, we can make teaching these skills a standard practice in school curricula.	只需要相当有限的投资，我们就可以让教授这些技巧进入学校的标准课程中。


Philanthropists can also create or support grassroots organizations that work with citizens to strengthen their ability to consume information critically.	慈善机构也可以建立或支持草根组织，与公民合作加强他们批判性地消费信息的能力。


Accurate information and critical-thinking skills are indispensable to democracy.	准确的信息和批判性思维是民主的不可或缺的条件。


We cannot take them for granted, even in America.	我们不能把它当成理所当然，哪怕在美国也不行。


That is how fake news wins.	这就是假新闻的胜出之道。


Counting What Counts in Development	注重发展中真正重要的因素


NEW YORK – To most people, “development” is best measured by the quantity of change – like gains in average income, life expectancy, or years spent in school.	纽约—对大多数人来说，衡量“发展”最好的办法是变化的数量，比如平均收入、预期寿命、教育年限等。


The Human Development Index (HDI), a composite measure of national progress that my office at the United Nations Development Programme oversees, combines all three statistics to rank countries relative to one another.	人类发展指数（HDI）由我在联合国开发规划署的办公室主管，它全面地衡量国家的进步情况，结合了所有这三个统计指标为各国做出相对的排名。


What many do not realize, however, is that such metrics, while useful, do not tell the entire story of development.	但是，很多人没有意识到，这些指标尽管很有用，但并不能勾勒发展的全景。


In fact, to understand how developed a country is, we must also grasp how people’s lives are affected by progress.	事实上，要理解到底何谓发达国家，我们必须抓住人们的生活如何受到进步的影响。


And to understand that, we must consider the quality of the change that is being reported.	而要理解这一点，就必须考虑报告记录的变化的质量。


When statisticians compare countries, they require commensurate data.	统计学家在比较不同的国家时，会要求相称数据（commensurate data）。


To compare school attendance, for example, researchers would count the number of registered students in each country, relative to all school-age children (although even this can be a challenge in many developing countries, where record keeping is not always standardized).	比如，要比较入学率，研究者需要统计各国在册学生数量，将其与所有学龄儿童比较（尽管即便是是这样的方法，在许多发展中国家仍然存在困难，这些国家的记录未必是标准化的）。


But to gauge the relative quality of a country’s education system, researchers would want to determine whether students are actually learning.	但要评估一国教育体系的相对质量，研究者需要确定学生是否真的在学习。


For those numbers, statisticians would need to test students across a range of subjects, a project that is far more ambitious than simply taking attendance.	对这些数字而言，统计学家需要对学生进行多科目测验，这项工程比仅仅坐在课堂里要宏大得多。


Statisticians have always recognized that comparing quantities is far easier than comparing quality.	统计学家始终发现，比较数量比比较质量容易得多。


But, because existing measures are all we have, the weaknesses are often overlooked when ranking relative gains or making policies, even though “progress” according to a given indicator is not necessarily genuine.	但是，由于我们所拥有的只有现有衡量指标，因此在给相对收益排位或制定政策时，其缺点常常被忽视，尽管根据某个指标所表现出来的“进步”未必是真正的进步。


If the world is ever to reach parity in development, we must change how we gauge and catalogue the quality of policy initiatives.	我们要想实现真正的整齐发展，就必须改变对政策方案的质量进行评估和分类的方法。


Consider the statistics measured by the HDI – life expectancy, education, and per capita income.	以HDI所衡量的统计指标为例，即寿命预期、教育和人均收入。


Life expectancy statistics suggest that the world is getting healthier, and data show that people are living longer than ever before; since 1990, average life expectancy has increased by around six years.	寿命预期数字表明，世界正在变得更加健康，人类比以往任何时候都活得更加长久； 1990年以来，平均寿命预期增加了大约六年。


But the increase in quality of life has not been as dramatic.	但生命的质量的上升就没有那么巨大了。


Those extra years are often accompanied by illness and disability – such as dementia, which the World Health Organization now estimates affects 47.5 million people worldwide.	多活的这几年，常常伴随着病痛和残疾——比如痴呆症，据世界卫生组织测算，全球有4,750万痴呆症患者。


While life expectancy can be calculated based on birth and death records, indices that measure quality of life, like the WHO’s disability-adjusted life year estimates, require considerable amounts of information on a wide range of illnesses and disabilities in every country.	寿命预期可以根据出生和死亡记录计算，但生命质量指数，如世卫组织的经残疾调整的生存年份，需要大量关于各国的各种疾病和残疾的信息。


And, unfortunately, the difficulty of gathering such data means that many life-quality datasets are incomplete or infrequently compiled.	而不幸的是，收集这些数据十分困难，这意味着许多生命质量数据库不够完整，或不能做到频繁更新。


It’s a similarly mixed picture for education.	教育的情况也是喜忧参半。


The world is no doubt making progress in extending access to schools, with more children are enrolled and attending than ever before.	毫无疑问，在普及入学率方面，世界正在不断进步，如今注册和入学的儿童数量比以往任何时候都要多。


But how do we measure the gaps in educational quality?	但我们如何衡量教育质量差距？


Some 250 million children worldwide do not learn basic skills, even though half of them have spent at least four years in school.	全球而言，大约2. 5亿儿童学不到基本技能，即使其中有一半至少在学校中学习了四年。


It will come as no surprise that in most countries, schools in wealthier neighborhoods typically have better facilities, more qualified teachers, and smaller class sizes.	在大部分国家，富裕社区的学校总是拥有更好的设施、更好的教师、更小的班级规模，这并不令人惊奇。


Addressing inequality requires measuring educational outcomes, rather than school enrollment rates.	解决不平等性需要衡量教育的结果，而不是入学率。


The OECD’s Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), which relies on tests not directly linked to curricula, is one approach to making cross-country comparisons.	经合组织的国际学生评估项目（PISA）基于不与课程直接挂钩的测验，它是进行跨国比较的一个方法。


The results for 2015 paint a much richer picture of educational performance across participating countries, while highlighting stark disparities.	2015年的结果勾勒了一幅内容丰富的各参与国的教育表现图景，差异明显。


For example, PISA found that “socio-economically disadvantaged students across OECD countries are almost three times more likely than advantaged students not to attain the baseline level of proficiency in science.”	比如，PISA 发现，“在经合组织国家中，经济社会较劣势的学生，相较经济社会较优势的学生，无法达到科学熟练程度基本水平线的可能性要高近两倍。 ”


Data on employment – critical for policymakers, as they prepare for the future – tell a similar story.	就业数据——该数据对于为未来做筹划的决策者至关重要——的情况也是如此。


The 2015 Human Development Report recognized that as the world moves toward a knowledge economy, low-skill or marginal workers are at greater risk of losing their jobs, and opportunities for exploitation of informal or unpaid workers increase.	2015年人类发展报告发现，在全世界向知识经济演进的同时，低技能或边缘工人失去工作的风险更高，剥削非正式或无薪工人的机会也越多。


To put this in perspective, consider employment projections for the European Union, which foresee the addition of 16 million new jobs between 2010 and 2020.	要了解这一问题，可以考虑欧盟就业预测。 该预测认为，2010年到2020年将新增1,600万个工作岗位。


But over the same period, the number of jobs available for people with the least formal education is anticipated to decline, by around 12 million.	但在同一段时间里，正规教育程度最低的人所能获得的工作岗位数量预计将出现下降，将减少1,200万个左右。


“Not everything that can be counted counts.	“不是所有能统计的东西都有意义。


Not everything that counts can be counted,” the sociologist William Bruce Cameron wrote in 1963.	不是所有有意义的东西都能被统计，”社会学家威廉·布鲁斯·卡梅伦（William Bruce Cameron）在1963年时写道。


His dictum remains true today, though when it comes to measuring human development, I would suggest a slight revision: “Not everything that is counted counts for everything.”	他的这句名言在今天依然成立，尽管在衡量人类发展方面，我认为可以把这句话精简一下：“不是所有被统计的东西对所有东西都有意义。 ”


Equitable human development requires that policymakers pay more attention to the quality of outcomes, rather than focusing primarily on quantitative measures of change.	平等的人类发展需要决策者更加关注结果的质量，而不是专注于变化的定量衡量。


Only when we know how people are being affected by development can we design policies that bring about the most valuable improvements in their lives.	只有当我们知道了人们如何受到发展的影响，我们才能设计能给人的生活带来最有价值的改善的政策。


“The intention to live as long as possible isn’t one of the mind’s best intentions,” the author Deepak Chopra once observed, “because quantity isn’t the same as quality.”	“尽可能地活得长的意图未必是最好的意图，”作家迪帕克·乔普拉（Deepak Chopra）曾经观察道，“因为数量和质量不是一回事。 ”


Charting Our AI Future	勾勒我们的AI未来


OXFORD – Galileo viewed nature as a book written in the language of mathematics and decipherable through physics.	牛津—伽利略认为自然是一部用数学写就、可以通过物理学译读的书。


His metaphor may have been a stretch for his milieu, but not for ours.	他的比喻兴许是他所处文化环境的引申，但不是我们的。


Ours is a world of digits that must be read through computer science.	我们的世界是一个数字的世界，必须通过计算机科学来译读。


It is a world in which artificial-intelligence (AI) applications perform many tasks better than we can.	在这个世界中，人工智能（AI）应用在许多任务上表现都要比我们人类更加出色。


Like fish in water, digital technologies are our infosphere’s true natives, while we analog organisms try to adapt to a new habitat, one that has come to include a mix of analog and digital components.	数字技术才是信息域的真正土著居民，就像水里生活的鱼，而我们更像是适应混合了模拟和数字成分的新栖息地的生物。


We are sharing the infosphere with artificial agents that are increasingly smart, autonomous, and even social.	我们与日益智能、自动甚至社会化的人造物（artificial agents）共享着信息域。


Some of these agents are already right in front of us, and others are discernible on the horizon, while later generations are unforeseeable.	其中一些人造物已经领先于我们人类，一些刚刚兴起，而更新的人造物尚未被我们意识到。


And the most profound implication of this epochal change may be that we are most likely only at the beginning of it.	这一划时代变化的最深远的影响也许是我们极有可能才刚刚上路。


The AI agents that have already arrived come in soft forms, such as apps, web bots, algorithms, and software of all kinds; and hard forms, such as robots, driverless cars, smart watches, and other gadgets.	已经出现的AI物体既有软形式，如app、网络机器人、算法和其他各种软件，也有硬形式，如机器人、无人驾驶汽车、智能手表和其他硬件。


They are replacing even white-collar workers, and performing functions that, just a few years ago, were considered off-limits for technological disruption: cataloguing images, translating documents, interpreting radiographs, flying drones, extracting new information from huge data sets, and so forth.	它们正在取代（甚至是）白领工人，它们所发挥的功能几年前还被认为是技术破坏不可企及的范围：图像编目、文档翻译、医学影像解读、无人机、从海量数据集中提取新信息等。


Digital technologies and automation have been replacing workers in agriculture and manufacturing for decades; now they are coming to the services sector.	几十年前，数字技术和自动化便已开始取代农业和制造业工人； 如今它们又进入了服务业。


More old jobs will continue to disappear, and while we can only guess at the scale of the coming disruption, we should assume that it will be profound.	未来还将有更多岗位消失，而尽管我们对于未来破坏的规模只能猜测，但不妨假设它们的影响将非常深远。


Any job in which people serve as an interface – between, say, a GPS and a car, documents in different languages, ingredients and a finished dish, or symptoms and a corresponding disease – is now at risk.	只要是由人来做界面的工作——比如GPS和汽车之间、不同语言的文档之间、食材和菜肴之间，或症候和对应疾病之间——现在都有危险。


But, at the same time, new jobs will appear, because we will need new interfaces between automated services, websites, AI applications, and so forth.	但与此同时，也会有新工作岗位出现，因为我们需要新的界面——自动化服务、网站、AI应用等之间。


Someone will need to ensure that the AI service’s translations are accurate and reliable.	需要人来确保AI服务的解读准确且可靠。


What’s more, many tasks will not be cost-effective for AI applications.	此外，许多任务由AI应用来完成性价比不高。


For example, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk program claims to give its customers “access to more than 500,000 workers from 190 countries,” and is marketed as a form of “artificial artificial intelligence.”	比如，亚马逊公司的土耳其机器人（Mechanical Turk）计划宣称要让客户“能获得190个国家的500,000多工人的服务，”并打出了“人工人工智能”的宣传口号。


But as the repetition indicates, the human “Turks” are performing brainless tasks, and being paid pennies.	但正如重复的用词所表明的“土耳其人”从事的是非常简单的工作，并且薪资很低。


These workers are in no position to turn down a job.	这些工人没有选择工作的余地。


The risk is that AI will only continue to polarize our societies – between haves and never-will-haves – if we do not manage its effects.	风险是AI将继续让我们的社会极化——在拥有者和永远一无所有者之间——如果我们不对其影响进行管理的话。


It is not hard to imagine a future social hierarchy that places a few patricians above both the machines and a massive new underclass of plebs.	不难想象这样一个未来社会层级：一小撮参与者凌驾于机器和为数众多的新社会底层平民之上。


Meanwhile, as jobs go, so will tax revenues; and it is unlikely that the companies profiting from AI will willingly step in to support adequate social-welfare programs for their former employees.	与此同时，随着工作岗位的流失，税收收入也将流失，从AI中获利的公司亦不可能甘愿为它们的前雇员们提供充分的社会福利。


Instead, we will have to do something to make companies pay more, perhaps with a “robo-tax” on AI applications.	相反，我们必须采取措施让公司支付更多，也许可以通过针对AI应用征收“机器税”（robo-tax）。


We should also consider legislation and regulations to keep certain jobs “human.”	我们还应该考虑用立法和监管保证一些工作属于人类。


Indeed, such measures are also why driverless trains are still rare, despite being more manageable than driverless taxis or buses.	事实上，这些措施也是无人驾驶火车仍然十分罕见的原因，尽管无人驾驶火车比无人驾驶出租车或公交车更容易管理。


Still, not all of AI’s implications for the future are so obvious.	但是，并非所有未来AI影响都是那么显而易见。


Some old jobs will survive, even when a machine is doing most of the work: a gardener who delegates cutting the grass to a “smart” lawnmower will simply have more time to focus on other things, such as landscape design.	一些旧岗位将生存下来，即使机器接管了大部分工作：将剪草工作交给“智能”除草机的园丁将有更多时间专注于其他事情，比如景观设计。


At the same time, other tasks will be delegated back to us to perform (for free) as users, such as in the self-checkout lane at the supermarket.	与此同时，也有一些任务会重新委派给人充当用户去（免费）完成，比如超市里的自助结算通道。


Another source of uncertainty concerns the point at which AI is no longer controlled by a guild of technicians and managers.	另一个不确定性来源是AI发展到什么程度后将不再受到技师和管理者的控制。


What will happen when AI becomes “democratized” and is available to billions of people on their smartphones or some other device?	当AI变得“民主化”，数十亿人可以通过智能手机和其他设备获得AI时会发生什么？


For starters, AI applications’ smart behavior will challenge our intelligent behavior, because they will be more adaptable to the future infosphere.	首先，AI应用的智能行为将挑战我们的智力行为（intelligent behavior），因为它们将更加适应未来信息域。


A world where autonomous AI systems can predict and manipulate our choices will force us to rethink the meaning of freedom.	如果自动AI系统能够预测和操纵我们的选择，我们就将被迫反思自由的意义。


And we will have to rethink sociability as well, as artificial companions, holograms (or mere voices), 3D servants, or life-like sexbots provide attractive and possibly indistinguishable alternatives to human interaction.	我们也必须反思社会性，因为人工同伴、全息影像（或仅仅是声音）、3D仆人或仿生型性机器人能为人际互动提供极具吸引力、可能足以乱真的替代品。


It is unclear how all of this will play out, but we can rest assured that new artificial agents will not confirm the scaremongers’ warnings, or usher in a dystopian science-fiction scenario.	这一切将如何发生目前尚不清楚，但我们可以放心，新的人造物不会让恐慌制造者的警告变成现实，也不会带来反乌托邦科幻小说中的情景。


Brave New World is not coming to life, and the “Terminator” is not lurking just beyond the horizon, either.	《美丽新世界》（Brave New World）不会成为现实，“终结者”也不会出现在地平线。


We should remember that AI is almost an oxymoron: future smart technologies will be as stupid as your old car.	我们需要记住，AI近乎一种矛盾修辞：未来智能技术将和你的老爷车一样愚蠢。


In fact, delegating sensitive tasks to such “stupid” agents is one of the future risks.	事实上，将敏感任务托付给如此“愚蠢”的物体是未来的一个风险。


All of these profound transformations oblige us to reflect seriously on who we are, could be, and would like to become.	所有这些影响深远的变革要求我们严肃反思我们是谁，可以是谁，想变成谁。


AI will challenge the exalted status we have conferred on our species.	AI将挑战我们授予人类的至高无上地位。


While I do not think that we are wrong to consider ourselves exceptional, I suspect that AI will help us identify the irreproducible, strictly human elements of our existence, and make us realize that we are exceptional only insofar as we are successfully dysfunctional.	我不认为我们自视卓越是错误的，但我怀疑AI将帮助我们认识我们的存在中的不可衍生的、严格具有人性的要素，并让我们意识到我们的卓越正是因为我们成功地无能（successfully dysfunctional）。


In the great software of the universe, we will remain a beautiful bug, and AI will increasingly become a normal feature.	在宇宙这一伟大软件中，我们将仍然是一个美丽的漏洞（bug），AI也将日益变成一个普通的特征。


The Hungarian Government’s Failed Campaign of Lies	匈牙利政府失败的谎言运动


NEW YORK – In October, Hungary’s government mailed questionnaires to all four million of the country’s households asking for peoples’ views on seven statements describing my alleged plan to flood Europe, and Hungary in particular, with Muslim migrants and refugees.	纽约——今年10月，匈牙利政府向全国400万户家庭发送调查问卷，要求民众就我以穆斯林移民和难民淹没欧洲、尤其是匈牙利的所谓计划的七点声明发表看法。


The government made seven assertions about what it calls the “Soros Plan.” I rebutted each and every one based on my published statements or the lack of any published statements that could substantiate them.	政府就所谓“索罗斯计划”得出了七点结论，而我则基于过去曾公开发表的声明或没有公开发表过任何能证实政府说法的声明而进行了逐一的反驳。


Now, the government has released the supposed results of its “national consultation” on my phantom plan, claiming that the exercise was an unprecedented success.	现在，政府已经发布了关于我所谓虚拟计划进行“全国咨询”得到的成果，声称此次行动取得了前所未有的成功。


I leave it to the Hungarian public to decide whether and to what extent the figure of 2,301,463 participants (out of a population of 9.8 million) was inflated.	我把决定2,301,463名参与者（匈牙利总共有980万人口）数量是否真实以及在多大程度上被夸大的任务留给匈牙利公众。


It should be possible to inspect the list of those who took part and check if they did indeed participate.	审核参与者名单，确定他们是否真的参与过这项活动应当是可能的。


Instead, I want to focus on the campaign’s substance.	但我不想这样做，相反，我想把讨论重点放在这次活动的本质上。


The national consultation and the release of the results are the latest elements of a massive ongoing propaganda campaign funded by Hungarian taxpayers to benefit a deeply corrupt government seeking to deflect attention from its failure to fulfill Hungarians’ legitimate aspirations, particularly in education and health care.	全国意见调查以及公布结果是一场大规模宣传运动的最新组成部分，这场运动由匈牙利纳税人出资，受益者却是深陷腐败的政府，此次运动的目的是转移匈牙利人民对合理期待（尤其是教育和医疗期待）未能实现的注意力。


The campaign started in the summer by flooding public spaces with posters featuring a close-up of my grinning visage with the words “Don’t let Soros have the last laugh.”	此次运动从今年夏天开始，公共场合到处张贴着我咧嘴微笑的大幅招贴画，旁边写的是“不要让索罗斯笑到最后。 ”


Other posters portrayed me as the puppet-master of opposition politicians.	还有些招贴画形容我是反对派政治势力的幕后主使。


As many have pointed out, the entire campaign carries the unmistakable odor of anti-Semitism.	就像许多人所指出的那样，整场运动都带有明显的反犹太主义味道。


The government would have you believe that I am an enemy of the Hungarian people.	政府想让你相信我是匈牙利人民的敌人。


Nothing could be further from the truth.	他们是彻头彻尾在说谎。


I first opened my philanthropic foundation in Hungary in 1984, when the country was still under the domination of the Soviet Union.	1984年我首次在匈牙利设立了慈善基金，当时这个国家仍然处在苏联的统治之下。


Since then, it has provided more than $400 million to strengthen and support the country of my birth.	从那以后，这家基金已经提供了超过4亿美元，用来巩固和支持我所出生的国度。


In the 1990s, as ordinary Hungarians struggled with the transition from communism to a market economy, the foundation funded free milk for elementary school children in Budapest and supplied the first sonogram machines for Hungarian hospitals.	20世纪90年代，随着普通匈牙利人拼尽全力从共产主义向市场经济转变，这家基金会为布达佩斯小学生免费提供牛奶，并为匈牙利医院提供超声检查仪。


More than 3,200 Hungarians have received academic scholarships from the foundation.	超过3，200名匈牙利人曾经获得过基金会的学术奖学金资助。


Many of them have completed their graduate studies at the Central European University (CEU), which I established in Budapest in the early 1990s.	其中许多人已经完成了在中欧大学（CEU）的研究生学业，这所大学是我在20世纪90年代初期在布达佩斯设立的。


CEU now ranks among the top 100 universities in the world in the social sciences – a remarkable achievement for an academic newcomer.	中欧大学现在已经跻身社会科学领域全球前一百名大学之列——这对于学术领域的新加入者是一种令人惊叹的成就。


Another element of the propaganda campaign has been to twist the meaning of “open society.”	这场宣传运动的另外一个目的是扭曲“开放社会”的含义。


So allow me to clarify what I mean when I use the term.	因此，请允许我澄清我在使用这个词时含义是什么。


I do not mean open borders and mass migration aimed at destroying the supposedly Christian identity of Hungary, as the government contends.	我并不是指旨在摧毁所谓匈牙利基督教身份的开放边界和大规模移民，就像政府所反对的那样。


The open society is based on the idea that nobody is in possession of the ultimate truth, and that to live together in peace we must respect minorities and minority opinions.	开放社会基于没有人掌握终极真理的理念，要想和平共处，我们必须尊重少数族裔和少数看法。


Above all, it is a society based on critical thinking and vigorous public debate about public policies.	最重要的是，批判性思维和激烈的公共政策辩论是开放社会的基础。


That is why today my foundation – among many others including the European Union – supports groups such as the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union and the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, which protect and promote the values and principles on which the EU was founded.	这解释了为什么今天我的基金会——还有包括欧盟在内的许多其他组织——支持像匈牙利公民自由联盟和匈牙利赫尔辛基委员会这样的机构，他们所保护和推动的是欧盟赖以建立的价值观和原则。


The government also claims that I control the European institutions in Brussels, and that I am using that control to impose the nefarious “Soros Plan” on EU member states.	政府还声称我掌控了布鲁塞尔的欧洲机构，而且我正利用这样的控制对欧盟成员国强制推行邪恶的“索罗斯计划”。


This is nonsense.	这纯属无稽之谈。


Decisions about how to address the migration crisis are made by the EU’s member states, including the Hungarian government.	如何解决移民危机的决策是由包括匈牙利政府在内的欧盟所有成员国政府所共同作出的。


It insults the intelligence of the Hungarian people to suggest otherwise.	编造其他谎言对匈牙利人民的智慧是一种侮辱。


I do have deeply held beliefs about how Europe and the rest of the developed world should respond to the refugee crisis, and I have been a vocal advocate of those views.	对欧洲和其他发达国家应如何应对难民危机我的确有深信不疑的看法，而且我也一直积极宣传这些看法。


My beliefs are born out of personal experience.	我的信念来源于个人经历。


I arrived in Britain from Hungary in 1947 as a refugee.	1947年，我以一名难民的身份从匈牙利抵达英国。


I have never encouraged others to become refugees.	我从来没有鼓励过其他人成为难民。


My parents, together with 200,000 Hungarians, left the country after the defeat of the 1956 revolution, and they received asylum in the United States.	我的父母与200,000匈牙利民众一起，在1956年革命失败后离开匈牙利，并在美国得到了庇护。


I first published my ideas on the refugee crisis in September 2015, and I have revised them over time, as the facts on the ground have changed.	2015年9月我首次发表了对难民危机的看法，随着时间的推移，这些看法不断修正，因为事实已经发生了变化。


In 2015, I asserted that the developed world should be able to accept at least a million refugees annually; later I reduced that global figure to 500,000, of which I suggested Europe could take 300,000.	在2015年，我提出发达国家应当每年接受至少一百万名难民； 后来我把这个全球数字降低到 500,000，我建议其中300,000可以由欧洲国家接纳。


My guiding principle is that the allocation of refugees within the EU should be entirely voluntary.	我的指导原则是欧盟内部的难民分配应当是完全自愿的。


Member states should not be forced to accept refugees whom they don’t want, and refugees should not be forced to settle in countries where they are not wanted.	不应强迫成员国接受他们不想要的难民，同时也不应强迫难民定居在他们不想居住的国家。


Member states that refuse to accept refugees can make an appropriate contribution in many other ways, but the refugee crisis is a European problem, so it needs a European solution, not 28 separate solutions.	拒绝接受难民的成员国可以通过其他多种方式做出恰当的贡献，但移民危机是一个全欧洲问题，因此它需要全欧洲范围内的方案，而不是28个各自为战的解决办法。


It is this set of policy recommendations that the Hungarian government has deliberately distorted and labeled the “Soros Plan.”	恰恰是这套政策建议被匈牙利政府肆意歪曲并被标称为“索罗斯计划”。


Unfortunately, the EU has not adopted my ideas, and the toxic political atmosphere created by Hungary (and Poland) has reduced Europe’s capacity to receive and integrate refugees.	遗憾的是，欧盟并没有采纳我的想法，而且，匈牙利（和波兰）所创造的有毒的政治氛围已经导致欧盟接受和融入难民的能力大幅削弱。


I do not blame the Hungarian and Polish governments for refusing to accept refugees they do not want; but I do hold them largely responsible for impeding a European solution.	我不会指责匈牙利和波兰政府拒绝接受他们不想要的难民； 但我确实认为他们在很大程度上阻碍了欧洲的统一计划。


I remember what happened during World War II, when another group was scapegoated for Europe’s problems.	我还记得二战时发生的故事，当时另外一个团体成了欧洲问题的替罪羊。


The wounds of the past have left deep scars that have not yet healed, and which today are being reopened.	过去的伤口留下了至今仍未愈合的深深伤痕，而今天这个伤疤重新被揭开了。


The true purpose of the government’s propaganda campaign is to stoke fear and hatred in the Hungarian people and render them indifferent to the suffering of others.	政府宣传运动的真正目的是要引起匈牙利民众的恐惧和仇恨，令他们丝毫不关心其他人所遭受的痛苦。


I am pleased to report that the government’s propaganda campaign has been a dismal failure.	我很高兴的宣布政府的宣传运动经历了令人沮丧的失败。


Despite the Hungarian government’s concerted efforts, the public was not taken in.	尽管匈牙利政府部门齐心协力，但公众却并不买账。


My short speech on Hungarian television attracted more than a million viewers, and social media platforms were flooded with outpourings of sympathy and support.	我在匈牙利电视台发表的短暂讲话吸引了超过一百万名观众，而社交媒体平台则被同情和支持的言论充满了。


I am greatly heartened by this response.	民众的反馈令我异常振奋。


I pledge to devote the remaining years of my life to supporting free thought and expression, academic freedom, and the protection of minorities and minority opinions – not only in my native Hungary, but all over the world.	我保证会用我的余生来支持自由思想和表达、学术自由以及保护少数族裔和少数看法——我这样做不仅会是在我的祖国匈牙利，而且会是在世界各国。


Anatomy of Illiberal Capitalism	反自由资本主义剖析


BUDAPEST – Populists such as US President Donald Trump and de facto Polish leader Jarosław Kaczyński, and authoritarians such as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin, do not just share Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s brand of so-called “illiberal democracy.” Each also espouses a form of “illiberal capitalism.”	布达佩斯—美国总统特朗普和波兰的事实领导人卡钦斯基（Jarosław Kaczyński）鞥民粹主义者，以及土耳其总统埃尔多安和俄罗斯总统普京等极权主义者，他们不但都具备匈牙利总理欧尔班的所谓“反自由的民主”的特征，还各自孕育了一种形式的“反自由资本主义”。


But what does illiberal capitalism entail, and how compatible is it with illiberal democracy?	但反自由资本主义的具体含义是什么？ 与反自由的民主的相容性如何？


For starters, as nationalists, Trump, Kaczyński, Erdoğan, Putin, and Orbán regard the market economy not as a means of boosting dynamism, efficiency, prosperity, and individual freedom, but mainly as an instrument for strengthening state power.	首先，作为民族主义者，特朗普、卡钦斯基、埃尔多安、普京和欧尔班不是将市场经济视为提高活力、效率、繁荣和个体自由的手段，而是主要将它视为增强国家实力的工具。


Historically, there have been various schools of authoritarian right-wing thought about the relationship between the market and the state.	历史上，关于市场和国家的关系，出现过众多极权主义右翼思想流派。


At one extreme, the Nazis established a command economy while maintaining private property and a high level of income inequality.	纳粹是一个极端，它建立了一个指令经济，同时保持私有产权和高度收入平等。


At the other extreme, early twentieth-century social Darwinists in Europe and the United States called for unfettered domestic free markets in which only the “fittest” would survive, leading to a stronger country.	另一个极端是二十世纪初的欧洲和美国社会达尔文主义者，他们要求不受约束的国内自由市场，在这个市场中，只有“最适者”才能生存，从而让国家更加强大。


Today, Russia sits at one end of the illiberal-capitalist spectrum.	如今，俄罗斯代表了反自由资本主义的一个极端。


Putin views the collapse of the Soviet Union as largely an economic failure, and he recognizes that private property and the market can make the Russian economy more resilient in the face of Western sanctions.	普京将苏联解体主要视为经济失败，他认为私有产权和市场能让俄罗斯经济在西方制裁面前更有韧性。


But he also believes that private-property rights come second to the needs of the Russian “security state,” which means that ownership is always conditional.	但他也相信，私有产权的地位不如俄罗斯“国家安全”需要那么重要，这意味着所有权永远是有条件的。


As befits a former KGB officer, Putin also believes that the Russian state has “ultimate ownership rights” to its citizens’ private assets not just in Russia, but also abroad.	与其前克格勃官员的身份相符，普京还相信俄罗斯国家对其公民的国内外私有资产，拥有“终极所有权”。


Russian oligarchs and companies operating internationally – such as those that have interacted with The Trump Organization – are thus potential instruments of Russian foreign policy.	因此，跨国经营的俄罗斯寡头和企业——比如与特朗普组织打过交道的那些——都是俄罗斯外交政策的可用棋子。


Hitler famously quipped that while the Bolsheviks had nationalized the means of production, the Nazis had gone further by nationalizing the people themselves.	希特勒曾经嘲笑道，布尔什维克只是将生产手段国有化了，而纳粹更进一步，把人民本身也国有化了。


This is similar to – albeit more “total” than – Putin’s own understanding of the relationship between capitalists and the state, according to which even the richest Russian oligarch is essentially a serf of the state.	这接近于——尽管要更加“极端”——普京本人对资本家和国家之间的关系的理解，在普京看来，哪怕是最富有的俄罗斯寡头，其本质亦不过是国家的农奴。


Under Russia’s highly concentrated ownership structure, the Kremlin’s control of wealth is synonymous with political control.	在俄罗斯高度集中化的所有权结构下，克里姆林宫对财富的控制和对政治的控制本质是一回事。


Rather than trying to control millions of bourgeoisie, the state can deploy secret police to manage just a few dozen oligarchs.	国家不必试图控制千百万资产阶级，可以只部署秘密警察管理几十位寡头。


Trump is at the other end of today’s illiberal-capitalist spectrum: no less comfortable than Putin with deep income inequalities, but not as inclined to use the state to favor particular businesspeople (other than himself).	特朗普则是当今反自由资本主义的另一个极端：他和普京一样对深度收入不平等深恶痛绝，但他不准备用国家来为特定的商人（他自己除外）谋利。


As a result, his administration has been using executive orders to roll back many of the regulations that former US President Barack Obama introduced.	结果，他的政府一直在用行政命令推翻诸多前总统奥巴马所引入的监管。


Still, there are exceptions to Trump’s support for free-market policies.	尽管如此，特朗普对自由市场政策的支持仍有例外。


He is in favor of protectionism and cheap money, presumably because these positions play well with his core political constituency – white working-class voters.	他支持保护主义和廉价资金，原因想必是这些条件十分有利于他的核心票仓——白人工作阶级。


If Trump goes down the protectionist road, however, US trade partners will retaliate, often with measures targeted directly at his base, as when the European Union recently threatened tariffs against Kentucky bourbon.	但是，如果特朗普沿着保护主义的道路继续走下去，美国贸易伙伴会发动报复，通常是采取直接针对其票仓的手段，比如，欧盟最近威胁要对肯塔基波旁酒征收关税。


Given that threat, Trump’s economic populism will most likely manifest itself through abstinence – avoiding pro-market measures that clearly hurt the white working class.	在这样的威胁下，特朗普的经济民粹主义极有可能表现得相当节制——避免显然会伤及白人工作阶级的亲市场政策。


In Turkey, Erdoğan came to power in 2003 as the champion of devoutly Muslim Anatolian entrepreneurs.	在土耳其，2003年埃尔多安以虔诚的穆斯林安托纳里亚企业家的形象问鼎权力。


Opposing the traditional statism of Turkey’s Kemalist ruling elites, Erdoğan introduced pro-market reforms and feigned a commitment to the EU-accession process by supporting Turkish democratic institutions.	埃尔多安一反土耳其凯末尔派执政精英的传统国家主义，引入了亲市场的改革，通过支持土耳其民主制度，假装致力于土耳其加入欧盟的进程。


Having achieved his political aims, Erdoğan is now dispensing with his commitment to democracy.	在实现了自己的政治目的后，如今的埃尔多安正在远离其民主承诺。


But it remains to be seen if he will do the same with market capitalism.	但他对市场资本主义是否也会这样，还有待观察。


Even when he first came to power, Erdoğan’s support for free markets never stopped him from denouncing imaginary economic conspiracies.	即使在刚刚问鼎权力的时候，埃尔多安对自由市场的支持也从未阻止他攻讦想象的经济阴谋。


But if he tries to usher in a return to statism, Turkey’s rising entrepreneurial class may well turn on him.	但如果他试图重走国家主义的老路，土耳其崛起的企业家阶层可能会与他反目。


In Hungary, Orbán’s approach to capitalism has been more complex.	在匈牙利，欧尔班对资本主义的方针要更加复杂。


Although he is often called a “populist” in the West, his approach combines social Darwinism and nationalism.	尽管他常常被西方称为“民粹主义者”，但他的方针其实是社会达尔文主义和民族主义的结合。


On the one hand, he has introduced a flat income tax that favors the wealthy and a child tax credit that benefits only higher-income households; on the other hand, like Putin, he maintains a coterie of “friendly” oligarchs who help shore up his power, not least by controlling the Hungarian media.	一方面，他引入了有利于富人的单一所得税和只有较高收入家庭才能获益的儿童税收优惠； 另一方面，和普京一样，他维持着一个“友好”寡头小团体，通过控制匈牙利媒体等手段，助其巩固权力。


Kaczyński is the most economically populist of the illiberal capitalists.	卡钦斯基是反自由资本家中在经济上最民粹主义的。


He started out as a social Darwinist, once introducing a child tax credit that would later inspire Orbán.	他以社会达尔文主义者起家，曾经引入了日后启发欧尔班的儿童税收优惠。


But since his Law and Justice Party (PiS) returned to power in 2015, Kaczyński’s flagship policy has been monthly cash payments of €115 ($138) to Polish families for each child after the first.	但自从他的法律和正义党（PiS）于2015年重获权力以来，卡钦斯基的旗舰政策是每个月向所有波兰家庭从第二个开始的每个孩子发放115欧元现金。


Moreover, Kaczyński has pushed for raising the minimum pension – rather than all pensions – and for lowering the retirement age, which plays well among rural, lower-income voters, even if it renders the pension system less sustainable.	此外，卡钦斯基还要求提高最低退休金——而不是所有退休金——并降低退休年龄，这一政策在农村低收入选民中间反响热烈，即使退休金体系变得更加难以为继了。


When it comes to trade, Kaczyński’s government loudly protests protectionism directed against Poland’s interests, as in the case of changes to the regime for delegated workers proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron.	至于贸易，卡钦斯基政府大声反对直接有悖于波兰利益的保护主义，比如法国总统马克龙所提出的改变工人代表（delegated workers）机制。


Today’s examples of illiberal capitalism range from toleration of extreme inequality to favoring heavy redistribution, and from overweening statism to broad deregulation of markets.	如今，反自由资本主义的例子包括容忍极端不平等到支持彻底再分配，从一家独大的国家主义到广泛的市场去监管化。


Beyond a shared inclination toward protectionism, they do not seem to have much in common.	除了保护主义这一共同倾向，它们似乎没有什么共同点。


But far more important than each government’s economic policies is its political orientation.	但比每个政府各自的经济政策更重要的是其政治导向。


It is no coincidence that all five leaders discussed here have attacked the independence of their country’s judiciary.	本文所讨论的所有五位领导人都批评本国司法独立，这不是巧合。


To be sure, Putin’s and Erdoğan’s crackdowns have been far more effective than Trump’s tweets or PiS’s stalled attempt at judicial reform this summer.	诚然，普京和埃尔多安的镇压要比特朗普的推特和PiS今年夏天中止的司法改革尝试更加有效。


But in each case, independent judges are viewed as rival power holders.	但在每一个例子中，独立的法官都被视为对立的掌权者。


When politics comes first, there is a temptation to bend the law toward one’s own ends.	在政治第一的情况下，就会有一种让法律屈服于个人意志的诱惑。


But without the rule of law, businesses lose confidence that contracts and private-property rights will be enforced or independently arbitrated, and the economy cannot sustain strong long-term growth.	但如果没有法治，企业就会担心合同和私人产权得不到执行或独立的仲裁，经济无法保持强劲的长期增长。


That is why illiberal democrats who place politics first will ultimately undermine the prosperity and strength of their countries, and thus their own legitimacy.	因此，政治第一的反自由民主最终将破坏繁荣和国家的优势，从而也破坏自己的合法性。


Illiberal Stagnation	非自由停滞


NEW YORK – Today, a quarter-century after the Cold War’s end, the West and Russia are again at odds.	发自纽约——今天，在冷战落幕了1/4个世纪之后，西方和俄罗斯又再次爆发了冲突。


This time, though, at least on one side, the dispute is more transparently about geopolitical power, not ideology.	但这一次，至少在一方面，冲突更加明确地涉及地缘政治权力，而非意识形态。


The West has supported in a variety of ways democratic movements in the post-Soviet region, hardly hiding its enthusiasm for the various “color” revolutions that have replaced long-standing dictators with more responsive leaders – though not all have turned out to be the committed democrats they pretended to be.	西方以各种手段支持前苏联地区的民主运动，毫不掩饰对各种“颜色”革命的热忱，让盘踞多年的独裁者让位给那些更能为人民负责的领导人——虽然不是所有人都能被最终证实为坚定的民主主义者。


Too many countries of the former Soviet bloc remain under the control of authoritarian leaders, including some, like Russian President Vladimir Putin, who have learned how to maintain a more convincing façade of elections than their communist predecessors.	目前依然有许多前苏联集团国家陷于俄罗斯总统普京这类专制领导人之手，而这些人也已学会了如何维护比其共产主义前辈更具说服力的选举假象。


They sell their system of “illiberal democracy” on the basis of pragmatism, not some universal theory of history. These leaders claim that they are simply more effective at getting things done.	他们在实用主义（而非一些普适性历史理论）的基础上兜售自己的“非自由民主”制度，并声称自己在完成工作方面更具效率。


That is certainly true when it comes to stirring nationalist sentiment and stifling dissent. They have been less effective, however, in nurturing long-term economic growth.	他们在挑动民族主义情绪和绞杀异议时确实高效，但在培育长期性经济增长方面却效率较低。


Once one of the world’s two superpowers, Russia’s GDP is now about 40% of Germany’s and just over 50% of France’s.	曾贵为世界两大超级大国之一的俄罗斯目前GDP相当于德国的40％，比法国的50％多一点。


Life expectancy at birth ranks 153rd in the world, just behind Honduras and Kazakhstan.	预期寿命排在全球第153位，排在洪都拉斯和哈萨克斯坦后面。


In terms of per capita income, Russia now ranks 73rd (in terms of purchasing power parity) – well below the Soviet Union’s former satellites in Central and Eastern Europe.	在人均收入方面，俄罗斯目前排名第73位（按购买力平价计算）——远低于前苏联的中东欧卫星国。


The country has deindustrialized: the vast majority of its exports now come from natural resources.	该国的工业已经破产：其出口绝大部分来自自然资源。


It has not evolved into a “normal” market economy, but rather into a peculiar form of crony-state capitalism.	它并未演化出一个“正常”的市场经济，而是成为一种特殊形式的裙带资本主义。


Yes, Russia still punches above its weight in some areas, like nuclear weapons.	俄罗斯无疑在一些领域（如核武器）依然拥有高于其国力的影响力。


And it retains veto power at the United Nations.	它也依然在联合国拥有否决权。


As the recent hacking of the Democratic Party in the United States shows, it has cyber capacities that enable it to be enormously meddlesome in Western elections.	正如最近美国民主党遭黑客入侵的事件所表明的那样，该国所具备的网络实力使其对西方各国选举拥有极大的干预能力。


There is every reason to believe that such intrusions will continue.	我们有充分的理由相信这种黑客入侵将持续下去。


Given US President Donald Trump’s deep ties with unsavory Russian characters (themselves closely linked to Putin), Americans are deeply concerned about potential Russian influences in the US – matters that may be clarified by ongoing investigations.	鉴于美国总统特朗普与某些声名狼藉的俄罗斯人（这些人本身与普京密切相关）的深层关系，美国人开始深切关注俄罗斯在美国的影响力——某些正在进行的调查可能会搞清楚这些问题。


Many had much higher hopes for Russia, and the former Soviet Union more broadly, when the Iron Curtain fell.	当铁幕崩塌时，许多人对俄罗斯和更广大的前苏联地区报有极高期望。


After seven decades of Communism, the transition to a democratic market economy would not be easy.	在经历了七十年的共产主义后，向民主市场经济过渡绝非易事。


But, given the obvious advantages of democratic market capitalism to the system that had just fallen apart, it was assumed that the economy would flourish and citizens would demand a greater voice.	但鉴于民主市场资本主义相对于刚刚崩溃的社会主义制度具有明显优势，人们假设经济会蓬勃发展，公民也会要求更大的话语权。


What went wrong?	那么究竟是哪里出了问题？


Who, if anyone, is to blame?	如果该有人为此负责，那又是谁？


Could Russia’s post-communist transition have been managed better?	俄罗斯的后共产主义过渡是否本可以实现更好的交接？


We can never answer such questions definitively: history cannot be re-run.	我们永远无法为这些问题给出确切答案：历史无法重来。


But I believe what we are confronting is partly the legacy of the flawed Washington Consensus that shaped Russia’s transition.	但我相信我们正在面对的在某种程度上是塑造俄罗斯过渡进程的有缺陷“华盛顿共识”的遗产。


This framework’s influences was reflected in the tremendous emphasis reformers placed on privatization, no matter how it was done, with speed taking precedence over everything else, including creating the institutional infrastructure needed to make a market economy work.	这个框架的影响反映在改革者对私有化的极大重视中，不管用何种手段实现私有化，速度都凌驾于其他一切，包括建立市场经济运行所需的体制基础设施。


Fifteen years ago, when I wrote Globalization and its Discontents, I argued that this “shock therapy” approach to economic reform was a dismal failure.	十五年前，当我撰写《全球化的许诺与失落》一书的时候，我认为这种“休克疗法”的经济改革方式是一个令人沮丧的失败。


But defenders of that doctrine cautioned patience: one could make such judgments only with a longer-run perspective.	但这一教条的辩护者提醒我要耐心一点：这样的判断只能靠更长远的视角来形成。


Today, more than a quarter-century since the onset of transition, those earlier results have been confirmed, and those who argued that private property rights, once created, would give rise to broader demands for the rule of law have been proven wrong.	今天，自转型发生已经过去了25年有余，这些早期的论断也已经得到证实，那些认为私有财产权一旦产生就必将催生更广泛的法治要求的人被证明是错误的。


Russia and many of the other transition countries are lagging further behind the advanced economies than ever.	俄罗斯和许多其他转型国家比以往任何时候都落后于发达经济体。


GDP in some transition countries is below its level at the beginning of the transition.	一些转型国家的GDP甚至依然低于转型开始时的水平。


Many in Russia believe that the US Treasury pushed Washington Consensus policies to weaken their country.	许多俄罗斯人认为美国财政部推动一系列“华盛顿共识”政策来削弱他们的国家。


The deep corruption of the Harvard University team chosen to “help” Russia in its transition, described in a detailed account published in 2006 by Institutional Investor, reinforced these beliefs.	《机构投资者》于2006年发表的详细报告中所描述的获选“协助”俄罗斯过渡的哈佛大学团队的深层次腐败更是强化了这些信念。


I believe the explanation was less sinister: flawed ideas, even with the best of intentions, can have serious consequences.	我认为答案其实并不那么险恶：如果理念有缺陷，那么再好的心肠也会产生严重后果。


And the opportunities for self-interested greed offered by Russia were simply too great for some to resist.	而俄罗斯所提供的贪婪自肥机会是如此巨大，对于某些人来说根本无法抗拒。


Clearly, democratization in Russia required efforts aimed at ensuring shared prosperity, not policies that led to the creation of an oligarchy.	显然，俄罗斯的民主化需要努力确保共同繁荣，而不是导致寡头丛生的政策。


The West’s failures then should not undermine its resolve now to work to create democratic states respecting human rights and international law.	因此，西方过去的失败不应该削弱其现在致力于建立尊重人权和国际法的民主国家的决心。


The US is struggling to prevent the Trump administration’s extremism – whether it’s a travel ban aimed at Muslims, science-denying environmental policies, or threats to ignore international trade commitments – from being normalized.	美国正在努力遏制特朗普政府极端主义的正常化——无论是针对穆斯林的旅行禁令，无视科学事实的环境政策，还是忽视国际贸易承诺的威胁。


But other countries’ violations of international law, such as Russia’s actions in Ukraine, cannot be “normalized” either.	但其他国家违反国际法的行为，如俄罗斯在乌克兰的行为，也不能被“正常化”。


Imagining a New Bretton Woods	想象一个新布雷顿森林


AUSTIN, TEXAS – The financial meltdown of 2008 prompted calls for a global financial system that curtails trade imbalances, moderates speculative capital flows, and prevents systemic contagion.	奥斯汀，德克萨斯—2008年金融崩盘要求全球金融体系降低贸易失衡、遏制投机性资本流、防止系统性传染。


That, of course, was the goal of the original Bretton Woods system.	当然，这正是最初的布雷顿森林体系的目标。


But such a system today would be both untenable and undesirable.	但这一体系如今无法生存，也不值得追求。


So, what might an alternative look like?	那么，可能的替代方案是怎样的？


The 1944 Bretton Woods conference featured a clash of two men and their visions: Harry Dexter White, President Franklin Roosevelt’s representative, and John Maynard Keynes, representing a fading British Empire.	1944年的布雷顿森林会议上，两个人和他们的观点发生了碰撞：美国总统罗斯福的代表哈里·德克斯特·怀特（Harry Dexter White）和代表衰落的大英帝国的约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯。


Unsurprisingly, White’s scheme, founded on the United States’ post-war trade surplus, which it deployed to dollarize Europe and Japan in exchange for their acquiescence to full monetary-policy discretion for the US, prevailed.	怀特提出的机制基于战后美国的贸易盈余，美国用这一盈余让欧洲和日本美元化，作为交换，欧洲和日本默认美国货币政策的完全自由裁量权。 毫不奇怪，这一机制取得了胜利。


And the new post-war system provided the foundation for capitalism’s finest hour – until America lost its surplus and White’s arrangement collapsed.	新的战后体系奠定了资本主义全盛时代的基础——直到美国失去了盈余、怀特的安排崩溃。


The question asked periodically during much of the last decade is straightforward: Would Keynes’s discarded plan be more appropriate for our post-2008 multipolar world?	在过去十年，有一个直观的问题被反复提及：凯恩斯被否定的计划会更适合2008年后的多极世界吗？


Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of China’s central bank, suggested so in early 2009, lamenting that Bretton Woods had not embraced Keynes’s proposal.	中国人民银行行长周小川在2009年初提出了这一问，痛惜布雷顿森林没有采取凯恩斯的方案。


Two years later, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, then-Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, was asked what he thought the IMF’s post-2008 role ought to be.	两年后，时任国际货币基金组织（IMF）总裁多米尼克·斯特劳斯·卡恩（Dominique Strauss Kahn）被问及如何看待IMF在2008年后的角色。


He replied: “Keynes, 60 years ago, already foresaw what was needed; but it was too early.	他回答说：“凯恩斯在60年前就预见到我们需要什么，但他太早了一点。


Now is the time to do it.	现在是时候了。


And I think we are ready to do it!”	并且我认为我们已经准备好这样做了！ ”


Within weeks, however, Strauss-Kahn fell from grace, without ever explaining what he meant.	但是，不出几周，斯特劳斯·卡恩便失势，甚至没有来得及解释“这样”是什么。


But it is not too hard to sketch out what “it” might be.	但要大体明白“这样”到底是什么并不太困难。


Above all, the new system would reflect Keynes’s view that global stability is undermined by capitalism’s innate tendency to drive a wedge between surplus and deficit economies.	首先，新体系将反映凯恩斯的观点：资本主义具有让盈余和赤字经济体对立的内在倾向，这破坏了全球稳定。


The surpluses and deficits grow larger during the upturn, and the burden of adjustment falls disproportionately on debtors during the downturn, leading to a debt-deflationary process that takes root in the deficit regions before dampening demand everywhere.	盈余和赤字在上升期增加，而下降期的调整的负担严重向债务人倾斜，这导致在所有地区需求都受到抑制之前，赤字地区便出现根深蒂固的债务-通缩过程。


To counter this tendency, Keynes advocated replacing any system in which “the process of adjustment is compulsory for the debtor and voluntary for the creditor” with one in which the force of adjustment falls symmetrically upon debtors and creditors.	为了遏制这一趋势，凯恩斯提出用调整的压力在债务人和债权人之间对称分担的体系取代“调整过程对债务人来说是义务，对债权人来说是志愿”的体系。


Keynes’ solution was an international clearing union (ICU) to which all major economies would subscribe.	凯恩斯的方案是一个由所有主要经济体支持的国际清算联盟（ICU）。


While keeping their own currencies and central banks, members would agree to denominate all payments in a common accounting unit, which Keynes named the “bancor,” and to settle all international payments through the ICU.	各成员国将保持自己的货币和央行，同时同意以共同记账单位来为所有支付项计价，凯恩斯将这一记账单位成为“班科”（bancor），并通过ICU来清算所有国际支付。


Initially, each member state’s reserve account with the ICU would be credited with a sum of bancors proportionate to its relative share of world trade.	一开始，每个成员国在ICU的储备账户将被授予一笔班科信用，规模与该成员国占世界贸易的比重相符。


Thereafter, each would be credited with extra bancors in proportion to its net exports.	然后，各成员国可以获得按净出口规模配比的额外班科信用。


Once established, the ICU would tax persistent surpluses and deficits symmetrically, to annul the negative feedback mechanism between unbalanced capital flows, volatility, inadequate global aggregate demand, and unnecessary unemployment distributed unevenly around the world.	成立后，ICU将对称地向持续盈余和赤字课税，以此消除不平衡的资本流、波动性、全球总需求不足和不均匀地分布在世界各地的不必要的失业之间的负反馈机制。


Keynes’s proposal was not without problems.	凯恩斯的方案并非没有问题。


It envisaged fixed currencies, which would require limited overdraft facilities for countries in chronic deficit and would entail constant haggling between finance ministers about re-setting exchange and interest rates.	它设想汇率固定，而这要求为长期赤字国提供有限的透支便利，并会导致财政部长间关于重定汇率和利率的持续讨价还价。


And rigid financial controls, which lend bureaucrats inordinate discretionary power over capital transfers, amount to a fatal flaw.	而僵化的金融控制将导致官僚获得过大的资本转移自由裁量权，这将是一个致命缺陷。


But there is no reason why an ICU cannot be designed with variable exchange rates and simple, automated rules which minimize politicians’ and bureaucrats’ discretionary power, while preserving the benefits of Keynes’s original idea for keeping global imbalances in check.	但没有理由表明ICU不能兼容可变汇率和能让政客和官僚的自由裁量权力最小化的简单自动的规则，同时保留凯恩斯控制全球失衡的初衷的好处。


A new ICU, or NICU, would be as Keynes had envisaged it.	一个新的ICU，或NICU，将与凯恩斯所设想的相同。


But, in place of the abstract bancor, it would feature a common digital currency – say, Kosmos – to be issued and regulated by the IMF.	但是，它用共同数字货币——如宇宙币（Kosmos）——代替抽象的班科。 宇宙币将由IMF发行和监管。


The Fund would administer Kosmos on the basis of a transparent digital distributed ledger and an algorithm that would adjust total supply in a pre-agreed manner to the volume of world trade, allowing for an automatic countercyclical component that boosts global supply at times of a general slowdown.	IMF将以透明的数字分布式总账和以预先确定的方式根据世界贸易量调整总供给的算法来管理宇宙币，从而实现能在总体减速时刺激全球供给的自动反周期功能。


Foreign-exchange markets would function as they do now, and the exchange rate between Kosmos and various currencies would vary in the same way that the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights do vis-à-vis the dollar, euro, yen, pound, and renminbi.	外汇市场将和现在一样运行，宇宙币和各种货币之间的汇率将以目前IMF的特别提款权兑美元、欧元、日元、英镑和人民币汇率一样的方式波动。


The difference, of course, would be that, under NICU, member states would allow all payments to one another to pass through their central bank’s NICU Kosmos account.	当然，区别在于，在NICU下，成员国彼此之间的所有支付往来都将通过其央行的NICU宇宙币账户进行。


To exploit the scheme’s full potential for keeping imbalances in check, two stabilizing transfers would be introduced.	要充分利用该机制遏制失衡的潜力，需要引入两种起稳定作用的转移支付机制。


First, a trade-imbalance levy would be charged annually to each central bank’s Kosmos account in proportion to its current-account deficit or surplus and paid into a common NICU fund.	首先，每年向每个央行的宇宙币账户征收贸易失衡税，规模由一国经常项目赤字或盈余规模决定，这笔税收将注入一个共同的NICU基金中。


Second, private financial institutions would pay a fee into the same NICU fund in proportion to any surge of capital flows out of a country, reminiscent of the price hike that companies like Uber impose during peak traffic.	其次，如果出现一国资本流出激增的情况，该国私人金融机构向该NICU根据流出规模缴纳费用，就像Uber在交通高峰时段增加用车费用一样。


The trade-imbalance levy is intended to motivate surplus countries’ governments to boost domestic spending and investment while systematically reducing deficit countries’ international spending power.	贸易失衡税旨在刺激盈余国政府刺激国内支出和投资，同时系统性地降低赤字国的国际支出能力。


Foreign-exchange markets will factor this in, adjusting exchange rates faster in response to current-account imbalances and canceling out much of the capital flows which today support chronically unbalanced trade.	外汇市场将考虑这些因素，更快地调整汇率以响应经常项目失衡，消除大部分在今天支撑长期失衡贸易的资本流。


Likewise, the “surge” charge will automatically penalize speculative, herd-like capital inflows or outflows, without increasing bureaucrats’ discretionary power or introducing inflexible capital controls.	类似地，“激增”费用将自动惩罚投机性跟风资本流入或流出，而不会增加官僚的自由裁量权力或引入僵化的资本管制。


Suddenly, the world will have acquired, without the need for subscribed capital, a global sovereign wealth fund.	一夜之间，世界将在不需要实收资本的情况下获得一个全球主权财富基金。


This would enable the transition to a low-carbon energy system to be financed on a global scale and in a manner that stabilizes the global economy through investments in research and development dedicated to green energy and sustainable technologies.	这将让低碳能源体系转型获得全球规模的融资，并且融资方式能通过投资致力于绿色能源和可持续技术的研发来稳定全球经济。


Keynes was ahead of his time: His proposal necessitated digital technologies and foreign-currency markets that did not exist in the 1940s.	凯恩斯领先于他的时代：他的方案需要20世纪40年代不存在的数字技术和外汇市场。


But we have them today, along with institutional experience with international clearing systems.	但今天我们 已经拥有了这些条件，并且还拥有国际清算体系的制度经验。


We also have a desperate need for the global green transition fund that a Keynesian Bretton Woods would automatically create.	我们也急切地需要凯恩斯式布雷顿森林能够自动建立的全球绿色转型基金。


All that we lack is the political process, indeed a Roosevelt, to convene the players and catalyze change.	而我们所需要的是一个政治过程——实际上是一位罗斯福——召集各行动方并推动变革。


Inconvenient Truths About Migration	关于移民的令人不安的真相


LONDON – Sociology, anthropology, and history have been making large inroads into the debate on immigration.	伦敦—社会学、人类学和历史学正在大肆影响关于移民问题的争论。


It seems that Homo economicus, who lives for bread alone, has given way to someone for whom a sense of belonging is at least as important as eating.	似乎活着就是为了面包的经济人已经让位给了归属感至少和吃一样重要的人。


This makes one doubt that hostility to mass immigration is simply a protest against job losses, depressed wages, and growing inequality.	这让人怀疑，对大规模移民的敌意无非是针对就业损失、工资低迷和不平等性恶化的反对。


Economics has certainly played a part in the upsurge of identity politics, but the crisis of identity will not be expunged by economic reforms alone.	经济学在身份政治的兴起中显然起到了一定作用，但身份危机无法单靠经济改革解决。


Economic welfare is not the same as social wellbeing.	经济福祉和社会福利并不相同。


Let’s start, though, with the economics, using the United Kingdom – now heading out of the EU – as a case in point.	不过，还是让我们从经济学开始，用英国——目前它正在退出欧盟——作为案例。


Between 1991 and 2013 there was a net inflow of 4.9 million foreign-born migrants into Britain.	1991—2013年间，有490万外国出生的移民涌入英国。


Standard economic theory tells us that net inward migration, like free trade, benefits the native population only after a lag.	标准经济学理论告诉我们，移民流入就像自由贸易，在经过一定的时滞后，有利于本土人口。


The argument here is that if you increase the quantity of labor, its price (wages) falls.	这里的论点是，如果你增加了劳动的数量，其价格（工资）就会下降。


This will increase profits.	于是利润就增加。


The increase in profits leads to more investment, which will increase demand for labor, thereby reversing the initial fall in wages.	利润的增加带来更多投资，从而提高劳动的需求，扭转一开始的工资下降趋势。


Immigration thus enables a larger population to enjoy the same standard of living as the smaller population did before – a clear improvement in total welfare.	因此，移民能够让更多人口享受到此前较少人口才能享受到的生活水平——总福祉显然获得了改善。


A recent study by Cambridge University economist Robert Rowthorn, however, has shown that this argument is full of holes.	但剑桥大学经济学家罗伯特·罗索恩（Robert Rowthorn）的最新研究表明，这一观点漏洞百出。


The so-called temporary effects in terms of displaced native workers and lower wages may last five or ten years, while the beneficial effects assume an absence of recession.	所谓的暂时效应——本土工人被取代、工资下降——可能保持五年甚至十年，而收益只是不发生衰退。


And, even with no recession, if there is a continuing inflow of migrants, rather than a one-off increase in the size of the labor force, demand for labor may constantly lag behind growth in supply.	此外，即使没有衰退，如果移民持续流入，因而劳动力规模并非一次性扩大，那么劳动需求可能一直滞后于供给的增长。


The “claim that immigrants take jobs from local workers and push down their wages,” Rowthorn argues, “may be exaggerated, but it is not always false.”	“移民夺走了本地人工人的工作，并拉低了他们的工资，”罗索恩说，“这样的说法可能有夸张之嫌，但未必是错的。 ”


A second economic argument is that immigration will rejuvenate the labor force and stabilize public finances, because young, imported workers will generate the taxes required to support a rising number of pensioners.	第二个经济观点是移民能让劳动力年轻化、稳定公共财政，因为年轻的输入工人能产生支持越来越多的退休者所需要的税收。


The UK population is projected to surpass 70 million before the end of the next decade, an increase of 3.6 million, or 5.5%, owing to net immigration and a surplus of births over deaths among the newcomers.	在下一个十年结束时，英国人口预计将超七千万，即增加360万或5. 5%，原因就在于移民净流入并且新来者的出生人口比死亡人口更多。


Rowthorn dismisses this argument.	罗索恩反驳了这一观点。


“Rejuvenation through immigration is an endless treadmill,” he says. “To maintain a once-and-for-all reduction in the dependency ratio requires a never-ending stream of immigrants.	“通过移民实现人口年轻化是一个无底洞，”他说，“要保持赡养比一次性的下降需要移民永无止尽地保持流入。


Once the inflow stops, the age structure will revert to its original trajectory.”	一旦流入停止，年龄结构就会最初的轨迹相反的方向发展。


A lower inflow and a higher retirement age would be a much better solution to population aging.	”减少流入人口和提高退休年龄是应对人口老龄化的更好的办法。


Thus, even with optimal outcomes, like the avoidance of recession, the economic arguments for large-scale immigration are hardly conclusive.	因此，即使在最优结果中——比如避免了衰退——大规模移民流入的经济学论据也很难令人信服。


So the crux of the matter is really its social impact.	因此，这个问题的难点其实在于其社会影响。


Here, the familiar benefit of diversity confronts the downside risk of a loss of social cohesion.	在这方面，我们所熟悉的多元化的好处要碰上社会凝聚力损失的风险。


David Goodhart, former editor of the journal Prospect, has argued the case for restriction from a social democratic perspective.	《展望》（Prospect）杂志前编辑大卫·古德哈特（David Goodhart）从社会民主角度支持采取限制措施。


Goodhart takes no position on whether cultural diversity is intrinsically or morally good or bad.	古德哈特不预设文化多样性是否具有内在或道德上的优劣。


He simply takes it for granted that most people prefer to live with their own kind, and that policymakers must attend to this preference.	他简单地假定大部分人更愿意和同类人生活在一起，因此决策者必须顾及这一偏好。


A laissez-faire attitude to the composition of a country’s population is as untenable as indifference to its size.	对一国人口构成持自由放任的态度和对其人口规模漠不关心一样站不住脚。


For Goodhart, the taproot of liberals’ hostility to migration controls is their individualist view of society.	在古德哈特看来你，自由派对控制移民的敌意的根源在于他们的个人主义社会观。


Failing to comprehend people’s attachment to settled communities, they label hostility to immigration irrational or racist.	他们不理解人们对所居住的社区的归属感，而给对移民怀有敌意的人一概贴上不理性或种族主义的标签。


Liberal over-optimism about the ease of integrating migrants stems from the same source: if society is no more than a collection of individuals, integration is a non-issue.	自由派对于融合移民的难易程度的过度乐观也源自同样的根源：既然社会不过是个体的集合，因此融合根本不是问题。


Of course, says Goodhart, immigrants do not have to abandon their traditions completely, but “there is such a thing as society,” and if they make no effort to join it, native citizens will find it hard to consider them part of the “imagined community.”	当然，古德哈特说，移民不必完全放弃自己的传统，但“有一个叫做社会的东西，”如果他们不努力加入其中，本土公民就很难将他们视为“想象的共同体”的一部分。


A too-rapid inflow of immigrants weakens bonds of solidarity, and, in the long run, erodes the affective ties required to sustain the welfare state.	移民涌入过快会削弱团结的纽带，从而在长期侵蚀维持福利国家所需要的情感关系。


“People will always favor their own families and communities,” Goodhart argues, and “it is the task of a realistic liberalism to strive for a definition of community that is wide enough to include people from many different backgrounds, without being so wide as to become meaningless.”	“人们永远偏向自己的家庭和社区，”古德哈特指出，“现实的自由主义面临着一个任务，即给出一个社区的定义，它要足够广泛，以包含来自各不相同的众多背景的人，但也不能过于广泛以至于失去意义。 ”


Economic and political liberals are bedfellows in championing unrestricted immigration.	经济和政治自由派在支持不受限的移民方面是好伙伴。


Economic liberals view national frontiers as irrational obstacles to the global integration of markets.	经济自由派认为国界是全球市场大融合的不理性的障碍。


Many political liberals regard nation-states and the loyalties they inspire as obstacles to the wider political integration of humanity.	许多政治自由派将民族国家和由此激发的忠诚视为更广泛的人类政治大融合的障碍。


Both appeal to moral obligations that stretch far beyond nations’ cultural and physical boundaries.	这两类人都要求远远超越国家的文化和物理边界的道德义务。


At issue is the oldest debate in the social sciences.	这就引出了最古老的社会学争论。


Can communities be created by politics and markets, or do they presuppose a prior sense of belonging?	社区可以通过政治和市场建立吗？ 或者，社区是归属感的先决条件吗？


It seems to me that anyone who thinks about such matters is bound to agree with Goodhart that citizenship, for most people, is something they are born into.	在我看来，任何对这些问题有所思考的人都必然同意古德哈特的观点，即对大部分人来说，公民身份是与生俱来的。


Values are grown from a specific history and geography.	价值观成长自具体的历史和地理。


If the make-up of a community is changed too fast, it cuts people adrift from their own history, rendering them rootless.	如果一个社区的构成变化得过于迅速，就会让人们与自己的历史割裂，让他们成为无根之人。


Liberals’ anxiety not to appear racist hides these truths from them.	自由派的不可表现出种族主义的焦虑让他们看不到这些真理。


An explosion of what is now called populism is the inevitable result.	现在被称为民粹主义的大爆发是难以避免的结果。


The policy conclusion to be drawn is banal, but worth restating.	由此可以得出的政策结论是老生常谈，但值得再说一遍。


A people’s tolerance for change and adaptation should not be strained beyond its limits, different though these will be in different countries.	一个民族对于变化和适应的宽容不可过度挤压，尽管不同的国家有着不同的“度”。


Specifically, immigration should not be pressed too far, because it will be sure to ignite hostility.	具体而言，移民问题不应该过度压制，因为这肯定会点燃敌意。


Politicians who fail to “control the borders” do not deserve their people’s trust.	无法“控制界线”的政客不值得人民的信任。


New Light on Income Inequality	收入不平等的新视角


ABU DHABI – Speeches by politicians on inequality tend to be short on facts and long on ideological assertion.	阿布扎比—政客论及不平等问题是往往大谈意识形态主张而回避事实。


In developing and emerging economies, one charitable explanation for the poor quality of public discourse about income inequality is that data on income distribution are often unavailable or dubious.	在发展中和新兴经济体，一个关于收入不平等公开披露质量低劣的善意解释是收入分配数据常常难以获得或质量可疑。


On this most important of subjects, debates tend to generate more heat than light.	在这些最重要的主题上，争论常常是激烈有余，启发不足。


A new set of studies could help put an end to all that.	一些新研究有助于为这一现象画上句号。


Led by Nora Lustig, a professor of economics who specializes in Latin America, a team at Tulane University’s Commitment to Equity Institute created comprehensive databases on both the state of income distribution and the effects of government policies on that distribution.	在专长研究拉美的经济学教授诺拉·卢斯蒂格（Nora Lustig）的领导下，杜兰大学平等性承诺研究所（Commitment to Equity Institute）的团队构建了涵盖收入分配状况和政府政策对收入分配影响情况的完整的数据库。


Crucially, the figures are comparable across a large set of middle- and low-income countries and also with data available for advanced countries.	最关键的是，数据库中的数字可以在大量中低收入国家间比较，也可以与发达国家的可得数据比较。


Preliminary conclusions emerging from these studies will illuminate political debates – and likely annoy ideologues of both the right and the left.	来自这些研究的初步结论将给政治争论带来新视角——也可能惹恼左翼和右翼的空想家。


Start, Lustig argues in a recent paper, with the fact that world income inequality is not rising.	首先，卢斯蒂格在一篇最新文章中指出，世界收入不平等没有在上升。


Consider the Gini coefficient, the most common measure of inequality, which runs from a value of zero for perfect equality to 100 for perfect inequality (one person receives all the income).	以最常用的额不平等性衡量指标——基尼系数为例。 基尼系数位于0到100之间，0代表完全平等，100代表完全不平等（所有收入都归一人所有）。


The average Gini score (not weighted by population) in countries for which there are data declined slightly in the 2000-2010 period, from 39 to 38.	有数据国家的平均基尼系数（未经人口加权）在2000—2010年间略微下降，从39降到了38。


Yes, the score rose in rich countries over the same period – from 29.8 to 30.4.	但是，富裕国家的基尼系数在同期有所上升——从29. 8上升到30.


But it fell precipitously in Latin America, from a scandalous 55.1 in 2000 – which made the continent the world’s most unequal region – to a still-very-high 50.2 a decade later.	拉美国家基尼系数大幅下降，2000年时高达55. 1——因此成为世界上最不平等的地区——十年后为50.


The Gini score also dropped in South Asia.	2，仍然很高。 南亚的基尼系数也出现了下降。


In Sub-Saharan Africa, where data are more fragile, it seems to have remained roughly constant.	在数据更加分散的撒哈拉以南非洲，基尼系数似乎保持恒定。


Moreover, inequality seems to be dropping precisely where it was most acute to begin with.	此外，不平等性在下降的地方，正是一开始最尖锐的地方。


This is true both for regions, particularly Latin America, and for countries, such as Brazil and South Africa.	不管是地区（特别是拉美）还是国家（如巴西和南非）都是如此。


So the often-heard assertion that rising inequality is the central economic fact of our times is probably due to a disparity of a different kind: the outsize impact of rich-country pundits and news outlets on international debates.	因此，我们耳熟能详的主张——不平等性加剧是现时代的核心经济事实——也许是因为另外一种差异：在国际争论中，发达国家专家和新闻媒体影响太大。


Another set of findings is sure to upset zealots from the right: tax-and-transfer schemes can have, and are having, a significant impact in reducing inequality.	另一组发现足以令铁杆右翼不安：税收和转移支付机制可能——也正在造成——巨大的降低不平等性的效应。


In one comparison of middle-income countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Lustig shows that Gini coefficients after taxes and transfers (including the cash value of education and health services) are significantly lower than those for initial market incomes.	卢斯蒂格比较了亚洲、非洲和拉美的中等收入国家，表明税收和转移支付（包括教育和卫生服务的现金价值）后基尼系数比初始市场收入基尼系数略低。


The average drop for the nine emerging countries – including the still hugely unequal South Africa – that she compares is more than three points (55.7 to 52.5).	在她所比较的九个新兴国家——包括不平等性情况仍然十分严重的南非——基尼系数平均下降幅度超过3点（55. 7至52.


The same exercise, which treats pensions as deferred consumption and therefore abstracts from the redistributive role of pensions among the older populations of the advanced economies, yields a drop of seven points in the United States and a bit more than nine points in the European Union.	5）。 同样的计算——将退休金处理为延迟消费，因此从发达经济体老龄人群退休金的再分配效应中提取——表明美国的基尼系数香江了7点，欧盟下降了略多于9点。


So emerging countries are doing better – but could improve considerably.	因此，新兴国家表现更好——但仍能大量改进。


But this does not mean that activists should demand higher taxes and public spending under all circumstances.	但这并不意味着活动家应该要求不论怎样都要提高税收和公共支出。


The quality of government programs makes a big difference.	政府计划的质量能造成很大的不同。


Brazil has a public sector that is roughly twice the size of Chile’s – total tax revenue is approximately 20% of GDP in the latter and somewhere around 40% (estimates differ) in the former.	巴西的公共部门大约是智利的两倍——总税收收入占智利GDP比例为20%左右，巴西则为40%（各种估算结果不同）。


And social expenditure (again treating pensions as deferred consumption) is also twice as large in Brazil: 16% versus 8% of GDP.	巴西的社会支出（同样将退休金处理为延迟消费）也是智利的两倍，分别占GDP的16%和8%。


But, according to Lustig, the effect of government redistribution on inequality is the same in both countries: a nearly four-point drop in the Gini score.	但是，根据卢斯蒂格的数据，政府再分配对不平等性的影响在两国的是一样的：基尼系数下降近4点。


What Lustig does not explore is that the contrast is even sharper if one recalls that Brazil’s government spends a great deal less than Chile’s on infrastructure, relative to GDP.	卢斯蒂格没有深入研究的是，当考虑到巴西政府在基础设施方面的支出远低于智利（相对GDP水平而言），这一对比更加鲜明了。


It is hard to escape the conclusion that some public expenditure in Brazil serves little purpose other than keeping certain political constituencies conveniently quiet.	你很难不认为，巴西的某些公共支出的唯一目的是让某些政治选区保持安静。


A case also worth noting is that of Bolivia, where left-wing administrations have significantly expanded social-welfare spending.	另一个值得关注的案例是玻利维亚。 在玻利维亚，左翼政府大幅扩大了社会福利支出。


But, because cash transfers are universal, rather than targeted at the poor, the overall effect is not progressive but neutral, another paper finds.	但是，另一篇文章发现，由于这些现金转移支付为全民性质而非专门面向穷人，其总体效应不是累进的，而是中性的。


Crucially, taxes and transfers are not the only way to fight inequality.	最关键的是，税收和转移支付并不是遏制不平等性的唯一办法。


Earlier work by Lustig and her coauthors found that a declining wage premium – that is, a drop in the wage gap between workers with high and low education – explained part of the decline in the Gini coefficient in Latin American countries.	卢斯蒂格及其合作者的早期研究发现，递减的工资溢价——即教育程度高低不同的工人工资差距缩小——可以部分解释拉美国家基尼系数的下降。


It is not easy to disentangle the role of supply and demand factors in the reduction of the wage premium, but both seem to have played a role.	厘清供求因素在工资溢价下降中的作用很困难，但这两个因素似乎都起着作用。


On the demand side, exchange-rate devaluations made non-traditional exports more competitive and helped boost demand for relatively unskilled labor.	在需求端，汇率贬值让非传统出口更具竞争力，并有助于提振技能相对较低的劳动力的需求。


On the supply side, a sharp increase in years of schooling, and especially in access to higher education, swelled the ranks of professionals and other skilled workers and helped lower their relative wages.	在供给端，学习年限的大幅增加（特别是高等教育入学率的增加）扩大了专业人士和其他高技能工人的队伍，拉低了他们的相对工资。


This is all good for income distribution, but the resulting politics remains fraught.	这对于收入分配都是好消息，但由此导致的政治仍然令人忧虑。


Student activists demanding (along with the rest of society) a fairer distribution of resources may not wish to hear that the growing numbers of professionals often resulted from the rapid and controversial expansion of private – and sometimes for-profit, universities – and that this accounts for part of the drop in inequality.	（和其他社会群体一起）要求更公平的资源分配的学生活动家也许不愿接受，专业人士数量的增加常常来自私立——有时甚至是盈利性——大学的快速和有争议的扩张，并且这是不平等性下降的部分原因。


Similarly, young men and women who worked hard to get to university with the expectation of very high relative compensation are not happy to find that the wages of, say, journalists and psychologists, are rising much more slowly than those of computer technicians or machine operators.	类似地，带着能获得较高相对报酬期望努力想进入大学年轻人不高兴地发现，（比如）记者和心理学家的工资增长要比电脑技师或机械操作员慢得多。


Indeed, this frustration is behind (though not always overtly) many of the recent university student protests in Latin America and elsewhere.	事实上，如此令人沮丧的状态是近期拉美和其他地区学生游行频繁背后的原因（尽管未必那么明显）。


So income inequality is bound to prove politically controversial when it is worsening, and also when it tends to decline.	因此，收入不平等如果恶化，必然会引起政治争议，收入不平等趋于下降时也是如此。


Studies like those led by Lustig can illuminate the inevitable controversies, so that they yield better policies rather than simple acrimony.	卢斯蒂格所领导的研究可以说明这些难以避免的争议，因此也能带来更好的政策而不是简单的激烈争吵。


The Siege of the Taj Mahal	对泰姬陵的围攻


NEW DELHI – In a country where politics has turned toxic, leading virtually everything – from festival firecrackers to animal husbandry – to take on a “communal” religious coloring, perhaps it should not be surprising that even one of the world’s most famous monuments has become a target. But that doesn’t make it any less tragic – or destructive.	发自新德里——在一个政治已然变得有毒的国家，几乎所有的事情——从节日烟花爆竹到畜牧业——都会被染上一个“共同的”宗教色彩，因此有人将世界上其中一个最著名的历史古迹视为斗争目标也就不足为奇了，而这并不会减轻这一事件的悲剧性——或破坏性意义。


The Taj Mahal is India’s most magnificent architectural wonder.	泰姬陵是印度最壮观的建筑奇迹。


Built nearly four centuries ago by the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan as a mausoleum for his beloved wife, the marble monument was hailed by Rabindranath Tagore, India’s only Nobel Prize-winning writer, as “a teardrop on the cheek of Time.”	这座大理石纪念碑在将近四个世纪前由莫卧儿皇帝沙贾汗建成，作为他爱妻的陵墓，而印度唯一一位获得诺贝尔文学奖的作家拉宾德拉纳特·泰戈尔（Rabindranath Tagore）则将其誉为“永恒面颊上的一滴眼泪”。


But the tears this time are for the Taj itself.	但如今要流泪的却是泰姬陵自己。


Its gleaming white surface is yellowing, owing to air pollution from nearby factories and cottage industries.	在临近地区工厂和家庭手工业的空气污染影响下，其原本熠熠生辉的白色表面逐渐发黄。


Repairs are needed so frequently that scaffolding often obscures its famous minarets. The town of Agra in the state of Uttar Pradesh, where the Taj is located, is crowded and grimy.	频繁的修理工作使其著名的尖塔经常都在脚手架的包围之下，而泰姬陵所在的北方邦阿格拉镇则极为拥挤而肮脏。


Unsurprisingly, tourism is down: the number of foreign visitors to the Taj Mahal fell by 35% from 2012 to 2015, and domestic tourism has also declined.	不出所料，旅游业因此下滑：前往泰姬陵的外国游客数量在2012~2015年间下降了35％，国内游客数量也有所减少。


Those who do still show up are bowled over by the Taj, but often appalled at what they see around it.	那些依然前来的人们都会惊叹于泰姬陵的华美壮丽——但也会被其周边的脏乱差状况吓倒。


This past summer, the American basketball player Kevin Durant sparked a row with his graphic descriptions of the monument’s surroundings.	今年夏天，美国篮球运动员凯文·杜兰特（Kevin Durant）对建筑周边状况的图文描述就激起了一连串的争论。


But now the Taj is being rejected even by India’s own government.	但如今泰姬陵甚至遭到了印度本国政府的抵制。


Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which now rules Uttar Pradesh, has apparently decided that it wants as little to do with it as possible.	总理纳伦德拉·莫迪（Narendra Modi）所属的印度人民党（也是目前北方邦的执政党）显然已经决定尽可能不和泰姬陵扯上关系。


The reason comes down to religious chauvinism.	而原因则是宗教沙文主义。


Uttar Pradesh’s new chief minister, a saffron-robed Hindu monk named Yogi Adityanath, initiated the assault on the Taj by condemning the state government’s former practice of offering models of the Taj as gifts to visiting foreign dignitaries.	北方邦的新任首席部长尤吉·阿迪提亚纳（Yogi Adityanath）——他本身是位身着红袍的印度教僧人——通过谴责州政府过往向外国贵宾赠送泰姬陵模型的手法发起了对泰姬陵的袭击。


Declaring that the monument does not “reflect Indian culture,” Adityanath announced that the government would hand out copies of the Hindu holy book, the Bhagavad Gita, instead.	他宣称这座纪念碑并未“体现印度文化”，并宣布以后的政府礼品都将以印度教圣典《博伽梵歌》的复制品取而代之。


Furthering this erasure, the Uttar Pradesh tourism department issued a brochure of the state’s main attractions, but left out the Taj Mahal, the state’s (and the country’s) main tourism destination.	除此之外，在北方邦旅游部门发行的本地主要旅游景点手册也将泰姬陵这个该州（以及该国）的主要旅游目的地排除在外。


The government, preferring to promote Hindu religious tourism, such as the attractions of the holy city of Varanasi, has denied any cultural heritage funding to the Taj Mahal in the current fiscal year.	政府大力推广瓦拉纳西圣城这类的印度教景点，同时在本财政年度内拒绝给予泰姬陵任何文化遗产资助。


To outsiders, the BJP’s campaign against the Taj Mahal might seem bizarre.	对局外人来说，印度人民党反对泰姬陵的运动看起来相当怪异。


Why would anyone, let alone a country’s ruling party, want to undermine a universally admired – and revenue-generating – architectural marvel?	试问怎么会有人（更别提一个国家的执政党）会想要抹煞一个全球知名——且不断创造旅游收入——的建筑奇迹？


And yet anyone familiar with the BJP knows that its attacks on the Taj are just one manifestation of the party’s politics of hatred toward anything connected to the history of Muslim rule in India.	然而熟悉人民党的人都知道，它对泰姬陵的袭击只不过是该党仇恨政治方针的体现：这些人反对与穆斯林统治印度历史有关的一切事物。


To BJP true believers, the Muslims who ruled India for centuries were foreign invaders who despoiled a prosperous land, destroyed temples and palaces, enslaved and discriminated against Hindus, assaulted Hindu women, and converted millions to Islam.	在印度人民党的忠实信徒看来，统治印度数百年的穆斯林是外来侵略者，他们掠夺了富饶的土地，摧毁了寺庙和宫殿，奴役和歧视印度教徒，奸淫印度教妇女，并迫使数百万人皈依了伊斯兰教。


In this telling, this sordid saga of assault on Hindus culminated in the 1947 Partition of India by the British, which created Pakistan.	按他们的说法，这一连串对印度教徒的亵渎性攻击最终导致了1947年英国实施印巴分治的分裂局面。


This is a highly simplistic interpretation of a complex history – one characterized far more by assimilation and co-existence than by religious conflict.	但完全是对一段复杂历史的过度简单化解读——与其说这段历史是一段宗教冲突史，不如说它更具有同化和共存的特征。


But that doesn’t matter to the Hindu chauvinists who constitute the bulk of the BJP’s electoral base.	但对于构成人民党的大部分选票来源的印度教沙文主义者来说这并不重要。


They agree with the hardline Hindu chauvinist and BJP legislator Sangeet Som, who last month called the Taj Mahal “a blot on Indian culture” that had been “built by traitors” and “should have no place in Indian history.”	他们赞同强硬派印度教沙文主义者和人民党议员苏格特·桑姆（Sugeet Som）上个月的说法，称泰姬陵是“印度文化的一个污点”，“由叛徒所建造”，“不应在印度历史上占据任何地位”。