During the Cold War, ideological competition limited US-Soviet cooperation, but both sides’ awareness of nuclear destructiveness led them to develop a crude code of conduct to avoid military confrontation.	冷战时期，意识形态竞争限制了美苏合作，但双方对于核破坏性的认识促使他们制定了避免军事对抗的初步行为准则。


These basic rules of prudence included no direct fighting, no first use of nuclear weapons, and crisis communication, such as the Moscow-Washington hotline and the Accidents Measures and Incidents at Sea agreements.	上述基本的审慎原则包括不直接交战、不率先使用核武器和 莫斯科-华盛顿热线等危机沟通机制，以及签署事故评估和海上事故协议。


The first formal arms-control agreement was the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which can be considered mainly an environmental treaty.	1963年的部分核禁试条约是首份正式的军控协议，该协议主要可以被视为一份环保条约。


The second major agreement was the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which aimed at limiting the spread of nuclear weapons.	1968年的核不扩散条约是第二份主要协议，限制核武器扩散是该协议的主要目的。


The US and the Soviet Union perceived both agreements as positive-sum games, because they involved nature or third parties.	因为上述两份协议都涉及自然界和第三方，美苏两国将这两份协议均视为正和博弈。


Similarly, the most promising areas for early international cooperation on securing cyberspace are problems posed by third parties such as criminals and terrorists.	同样，保护网络安全的早期国际合作最有希望解决由犯罪份子和恐怖份子等第三方造成的问题。


Russia and China have sought a treaty for broad United Nations oversight of the Internet.	俄罗斯和中国一直寻求签署联合国监管互联网条约。


Though their vision of “information security” could legitimize authoritarian governments’ censorship, and is therefore unacceptable to democratic governments, it may be possible to identify and target behaviors that are illegal everywhere.	虽然两国的“信息安全”愿景因为可能令独裁政府审查制度合法化而不被民主政府所接受，但或许可以识别和打击随处可见的违法行为。


Limiting all intrusions would be impossible, but one could start with cyber crime and cyber terrorism.	限制所有入侵是不可能的，但人们可以从打击网络犯罪和网络恐怖主义开始。


Major states would have an interest in limiting damage by agreeing to cooperate on forensics and controls.	主要国家可能同意就取证和控制展开合作，从而控制违法行为所造成的损失。


Of course, historical analogies are imperfect.	当然，历史类比往往并不完美。


Obviously, cyber technology is very different from nuclear technology, particularly because non-governmental actors can exploit it much more easily.	显然，网络技术与核技术有很大不同，尤其因为非政府力量可以轻松对其加以控制。


Nonetheless, some institutions, both formal and informal, already govern the basic functioning of the Internet.	尽管如此，某些机构，包括正式和非正式机构，已经对互联网的基本功能构成了制约。


The US wisely plans to strengthen the non-governmental Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) by having it supervise the Internet “address book.”	美国明智地计划加强非政府机构“域名及号码分配互联网公司（ICANN）”的力量，并授权其对互联网“地址簿”进行管理。


There is also the Council of Europe’s 2001 Convention on Cybercrime, with Interpol and Europol facilitating cooperation among national police forces.	此外还有欧洲理事会的2001年 网络犯罪公约，由国际刑警组织和欧洲刑警组织协调各国警方进行合作。


And a UN Group of Government Experts has been analyzing how international law relates to cyber security.	同时某联合国政府专家组一直在分析国际法如何影响网络安全形势。


It is likely to take longer to conclude agreements on contentious issues such as cyber intrusions for purposes like espionage and preparing the battlefield.	就以间谍等活动为目的网络入侵和战场准备等争议问题达成协议可能还需要更长时间。


Nonetheless, the inability to envisage an overall cyber arms-control agreement need not prevent progress on some issues now.	尽管如此，短期内无法想象整体达成网络军控协议并不一定会阻碍现在在某些问题上取得突破。


International norms tend to develop slowly.	国际规则的制定一般都非常缓慢。


It took two decades in the case of nuclear technology.	制定核技术规则用了20年时间。


The most important message of the recent Dutch conference was that massive cyber vulnerability is now nearing that point.	最近荷兰会议最重要的信息是大规模网络漏洞已接近临界点。


The Olympics’ Lesser Gods	奥利匹克山上的小恶神


BERLIN – The Summer Olympic Games are in full swing in Rio.	发自柏林——第31届夏季奥林匹克运动会正在巴西的里约热内卢如火如荼地进行着。


Every time the world’s top athletes gather for the Games, people everywhere have the opportunity not just to root for their countries, but also to become engrossed by stories of sacrifice and success, of broken bones and broken records.	每一次世界顶尖运动员云集奥运会，全世界的人们不仅能为自己的国家呐喊助威，还会被诸多拼搏与胜利的故事，力拼受伤的悲壮和破记录的喜悦所吸引。


Beyond the incredible feats of athleticism are powerful triumphs of the spirit, like that of the Syrian refugee swimmer Yusra Mardini, who less than a year ago jumped into the Mediterranean to help push her broken-down dinghy, containing 19 other refugees, to safety in Greece.	而超越体育运动非凡技艺之外的则是强大的精神力量，正如叙利亚难民游泳运动员尤斯拉·马迪尼（ Yusra Mardini）那样：差不多一年前正是他奋力跃入地中海，推着载有 19 名难民的破旧小艇安全到达希腊。


In this sense, the Olympic Games are as much about inspiration as they are about competition.	在这个意义上说，奥运会里包含着与竞技同等重要的精神含义。


But, thanks to the International Olympic Committee, the Games are also about something much darker.	但由于国际奥林匹克委员会的存在，这场盛会也展露出了它的黑暗面。


In fact, the IOC – together with its national branches, as well as the associations representing particular sports – embodies some of the most prominent problems the world is facing today, from inequality to exploitation to sheer hypocrisy among our leaders.	事实上，国际奥委会——及其在各国的分支机构以及代表各单项运动的协会——都是当前全球面临的一些最突出问题的化身：不平等，剥削，以及领导人的伪善。


Over the years, the IOC and its national branch organizations have been accused of everything from poor governance to corruption.	多年来，关于治理不善和腐败的诸多指责以及围绕着国际奥委会及其各国分支机构。


Most recently, a Washington Post analysis damningly depicted the chasm between the earnings of the executives who run the show and the athletes who make it.	最近由《华盛顿邮报》发表的一篇分析文章则令人沮丧地展现了奥委会高管们和运动员之间的收入鸿沟。


Many, if not most, athletes perform for little or no money.	很多（甚至可能是大多数）运动员只有很少甚至没有收入。


Sponsorships can provide funds, but they also include restrictive rules that limit athletes’ ability to raise more money for their training.	赞助商可以提供资金，但也会限制运动员通过其他方式为自身训练筹措资金。


As the Olympic sailor Ben Barger noted, the money that the “Olympic Movement” produces “goes to executives first, then administrators, then coaches, and then athletes.”	正如奥运水手本·巴格尔（Ben Barger）指出的那样，“奥林匹克运动”产生的收入“首先会在奥委会高管手里过一道，然后交给管理层，接着转给教练，最后才到运动员手上。 ”


So, for example, while IOC President Thomas Bach luxuriates rent-free in a lavish hotel suite in Switzerland, US Olympic medalist rower Megan Kalmoe lives close to the poverty line.	因此当国际奥委会主席托马斯·巴赫（Thomas Bach）不花一分钱享用位于瑞士的奢华酒店套房时，美国奥运赛艇运动员梅根·卡尔穆（Megan Kalmoe）却在贫困线附近挣扎。


Such extremes cast a pall of exploitation over the whole affair.	而这种极端差距则让整场奥运盛事蒙上了剥削的阴影。


And the exploitation is not only financial.	但这种剥削不仅仅是金钱层面的。


The IOC and its partners have a history of ignoring the perils that arise from the relationship between coaches and the young athletes they train – a relationship that has provided fertile ground for manipulation and abuse.	国际奥委会及其合作伙伴一直以来都无视各国教练与他们训练的年轻运动员之间存在的危险关系——这些关系为操纵和肆意侵犯运动员的行为提供了肥沃的土壤。


Coaches can use their position of authority to lead young athletes to start doping or to take advantage of them sexually.	教练可以使用他们的权威引导年轻运动员使用兴奋剂或对她们实施性侵犯。


As a recent Indianapolis Star report on US women’s gymnastics has revealed, such conduct is rampant, and the national federation overseeing the sport – an Olympic organization – has consistently failed to address it.	美国《印第安纳波利斯星报》最近发表的一篇报道就揭露出这类行为在女子体操界极为猖獗，而监督这项运动的美国全国体操联合会——一个奥运组织——却始终未能处理这一问题。


But the athletes are not the only ones the IOC disregards; the Committee is also apparently indifferent to how host cities and countries comes to be host cities and countries.	但运动员并非是遭到国际奥委会忽视的唯一一个群体； 奥委会在如何确定奥运会主办城市和国家方面也是模棱两可。


What exactly it takes to win an Olympic bid is fuzzy, though gifts, junkets, and wining and dining clearly factor into it.	赢得奥运主办权的标准极为模糊，而礼品、 旅游和宴会显然是考量因素。


Whether Tokyo’s winning bid for the 2020 Olympics was aided by payments to a company linked to the son of the disgraced former world athletics chief Lamine Diack is currently under investigation.	例如东京赢得2020 年奥运会主办权是否涉及到指向某公司的一笔汇款，而该公司又和名誉扫地的前国际田联主席拉明·戴亚克（Lamine Diack）的儿子有何关系，目前正在调查。


The process may be murky, but the results are clear. In Rio, tens of thousands of Brazilians were displaced to make room for Olympic infrastructure, some of which has been criticized for posing safety hazards.	申办进程可能不明朗，但结果相当清晰：在里约热内卢，为了给奥运场馆设施腾出空间，成千上万的巴西人流离失所，还有其中一些设施被批评为存在安全危害。


There is something deeply jarring about the glittering new projects that sit cheek by jowl with the poverty of the favelas and the juxtaposition of extravagant ceremony and the depth of the political and economic crises facing Brazil.	那些恢宏华丽的新项目与贫民窟比肩而立，奢侈的开幕式和巴西面临的深刻政治和经济危机共存，都令人们产生深深的错位感。


The party goes on, while its host edges toward the abyss.	狂欢在继续，而其主办者却在向深渊迈步。


Clearly, the IOC’s priorities are badly skewed.	很明显，国际奥委会的工作重点被严重扭曲了。


Can the Olympic Movement be redeemed?	那么我们可以对奥林匹克运动进行整改吗？


To answer that question, it is worth considering the experience of FIFA, another non-profit sports organization beset by corruption.	我们可以参考国际足联——另一个受到腐败困扰的非营利体育组织——的经验来回答这个问题。


In the two years since the truth about FIFA came to light, the rumblings of change can be heard, as what seemed to be an impenetrable system begins to crumble under the pressure of activists, sponsors, and soccer associations.	在关于国际足联丑闻被曝光后的两年以来该组织实施了持续的变革。 这个看似雷打不动的体系也在社会活动家、 赞助商和足球协会的压力下土崩瓦解，也表明变革不是不可能发生的。


The first step is exposure.	首先是要把问题揭露出来。


The good news is that, nowadays, it is harder than ever to keep such large-scale wrongdoing under wraps, not least because of the efforts of committed journalists and brave whistleblowers.	而好消息是在记者和勇敢告密者矢志不渝的努力之下，这种大规模的不当行为是越来越难以保密了。


The testimony of the runner Yuliya Stepanova was the key to exposing Russia’s state-run doping program.	例如赛跑运动员尤利娅·斯蒂潘诺娃（Yuliya Stepanova）的证词就成为了揭露俄罗斯官方指导运动队服用禁药事件的关键。


The bad news is that the IOC simply ignored the World Anti-Doping Agency’s report on Russia’s official scheme and stopped well short of banning its national team.	但坏消息是国际奥委会忽略了世界反兴奋剂机构报告对俄罗斯官方插手该计划的报告，而仅仅是禁止其国家队参赛。


As FIFA’s experience showed, once sponsors become concerned about their reputations, their interests shift.	国际足联的经验表明，一旦赞助商开始关注这些机构的声誉，这些机构的利益诉求也会随之转变。


Now that they have been revealed, the enrichment schemes – which benefit, above all, the sponsors, executives, and a couple of superstar Olympians – are hurting profits. So, too, will continuing to turn a blind eye to powerful countries’ efforts to cheat.	正如当前所揭示的那样，这个仅对赞助商、 执行高管和几个超级奥运巨星有利的层层盘剥体制是会损害利润的，而这个体制也会继续对那些强势国家的欺骗行为视而不见。


Sponsors must show themselves to be responsive and responsible, saving face by recalling the Olympic spirit.	赞助商们必须表明自己是个重视民意及负责任的企业，通过召唤最初的奥林匹克精神来挽回颜面。


The rule of law and ethics, built into the fabric of corporate governance, must now take center stage.	而那些融入了公司治理的法治和道德精神如今也必须占据中心舞台。


The Olympic Games reflect not just who we are, but also who we hope to be.	奥林匹克运动会不仅反映了我们是谁，也反映了我们希望能成为谁。


The system that underpins them has widened the gap between the two.	而维持这一盛会的体系却在不断扩大两者之间的差距。


The IOC has become a monument to some of humanity’s worst tendencies – the greed, hypocrisy, and exploitation that have led so many to distrust institutions.	国际奥委会如今已经成为了一座展现某些人类最低贱品行——贪婪、 虚伪和剥削——的屈辱柱，也正是这些导致很多机构丧失了人们的信任。


One hopes that the example of FIFA will help to mark a path to redemption for the IOC, and that the Olympic Movement’s governing body embarks upon it before the flame of what is worthy and inspiring about the Games is snuffed out.	我们希望国际足联的例子能为国际奥委会及根植于其上的奥林匹克运动管理机构的救赎之路指明路径，令无数人为之奋斗和欢呼的奥运之火免于湮灭。


Has Interpol Become a Tool of Oppression?	国际刑警组织是否已演变为镇压工具？


LONDON – Arrests of journalists in Spain and Ukraine on the basis of Interpol notices have raised serious questions about the methods of the international police agency.	伦敦——以国际刑警组织通报为依据逮捕西班牙和乌克兰记者已经引发对国际警察机构行事方法的严重质疑。


For media professionals in particular, the trends are deeply worrying.	尤其对于职业媒体人来说，这样的趋势令人深感忧虑。


The cases in Spain and Ukraine are not isolated incidents.	西班牙和乌克兰发生的案例绝非孤立事件。


Countries opposed to a free press are increasingly using Interpol’s “wanted person” alerts to target and silence journalists who have fled.	反对新闻自由的国家正越来越多地利用国际刑警组织的通缉令来压制逃亡记者。


Since July, Fair Trials and Reporters Without Borders (RSF) have responded to a number of cases in which reporters have been arrested and detained on the basis of Interpol information.	7月以来，公平审判和记者无国界组织（RSF）已对一系列以国际刑警组织信息为依据逮捕和拘留记者的案件采取了措施。


Countries circulating these orders include Azerbaijan, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan.	上述逮捕令流通的国家包括阿塞拜疆、土耳其、乌兹别克斯坦和哈萨克斯坦。


The circulation of wanted person alerts, which include “notices” and “diffusions,” is one of Interpol’s key functions.	发布“通缉令”和“协查通报”等是国际刑警组织的主要职能之一。


These alerts, transmitted to police databases worldwide, identify the subject as a wanted criminal.	这些通缉令被传送到世界各地的警方数据库，将被通缉者定性为受到通缉的刑事犯。


These notifications have far-reaching consequences, and as we have learned, can easily be abused.	上述通报能产生深远的影响，而且正如我们所看到的那样，它们有可能很容易地遭到滥用。


For example, in recent months, journalists like Hamza Yalçin, Fikret Huseynli, Narzullo Akhunzhonov, and Can Dündar, targeted by their governments for simply doing their jobs, have all been flagged by Interpol.	例如，近几个月，国际刑警组织已经标记了像Hamza Yalçin、Fikret Huseynli、 Narzullo Akhunzhonov和Can Dündar这样的记者，他们仅仅因为忠于职守而遭到政府的通缉。


When used properly, an Interpol alert is a critical tool for fighting global crime.	如果使用得当，国际刑警组织的通缉令是打击全球犯罪的重要工具。


The subject of an Interpol alert can face lengthy periods in detention while challenging extradition.	国际刑警组织所通缉的对象在挑战引渡要求的同时可能面临漫长的拘留期。


Clearing your name can be difficult.	证明清白可能会非常困难。


Even when an alert is removed from Interpol’s databases, you can continue to face the threat of arrest when traveling, or be refused visas in a never-ending cycle of persecution.	即使通缉令被从国际刑警组织的数据库中删除，你同样可能在旅行时面临被捕的危险，或者在无休无止的迫害循环中面临签证被拒。


Wanted person alerts are not the only way that Interpol’s mechanisms are being abused.	人员通缉令并不是国际刑警组织机制被滥用的唯一方式。


In September 2016, Syrian journalist Zaina Erhaim had her passport seized by British border authorities at London’s Heathrow Airport after it was falsely reported stolen in the Interpol system.	2016年9月，叙利亚记者Zaina Erhaim所持护照在伦敦希思罗机场遭英国边境当局查扣，因为国际刑警组织系统错误地报告该护照被窃。


Similar efforts to use Interpol to restrict the travel of unfriendly journalists have been reported elsewhere.	其他地方也曾报道过利用国际刑警组织限制不友好记者出行的努力。


Interpol was created in 1923 to help countries coordinate in the fight against cross-border crime and terrorism.	国际刑警组织成立于1923年，旨在帮助各国协调打击跨境犯罪和恐怖主义。


Its mission is simple: to “make the world a safer place.”	它的使命非常简单：“让世界成为更加安全之地。


But while the goal is noble, not all of its 192 member countries stick to the rules.	”虽然目标高尚，但其192个成员国却并非都守规矩。


Interpol’s members include some of the world’s most oppressive governments, whose leaders routinely misuse their own criminal justice systems to silence free speech and political opposition.	国际刑警组织成员国包括世界某些最具压迫性的政府，其领导人经常滥用国内的刑事司法体系来遏制言论自由和政治反对。


These authoritarian regimes think nothing of using Interpol to target reporters in exile.	这些专制政权并不认为利用国际刑警组织来对付流亡记者是多大的事。


When Interpol alerts are misused in this way, oppression gains an international stamp of approval.	如果国际刑警组织通辑令以这种方式遭到滥用，镇压就等于得到了国际许可。


This is why tackling abuse of the Interpol system is so crucial.	这充分解释了防止滥用国际刑警系统为什么如此重要。


While it is lamentable that countries like Turkey, China, and Egypt persecute journalists at home, we must not allow Interpol to become complicit in such behavior.	虽然土耳其、中国和埃及等国在国内迫害记者的行为令人遗憾，但我们决不能允许国际刑警组织参与这样的行动。


The international community must show its commitment to free speech by making it clear that reporters forced to flee their homelands will be protected and allowed to continue their work.	国际社会必须明确表达对言论自由的承诺，并明确指出逃往国外的记者将会受到保护并被允许继续工作。


Interpol has the tools to strengthen its notification systems.	国际刑警组织拥有强化其通报系统的工具。


The agency has shown an impressive commitment to change, introducing new rules to protect refugees, for example, and creating a more robust complaints mechanism.	该机构表现出强烈的改革意愿，例如实行保护难民的新规则，同时建立起更加有力的投诉机制。


Moreover, the agency’s constitution, which each member country must sign, requires that Interpol not engage in political cases and that its actions respect the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which includes the right to freedom of expression.	不仅如此，所有成员国必须签署该机构章程，上述章程规定国际刑警组织不介入政治案件并且其所作所为必须尊重联合国世界人权宣言，其中也包括言论自由。


And yet countries continue to use Interpol as a means of silencing journalists, and the agency’s leaders aren’t managing to stop them.	尽管如此，各国仍继续利用国际刑警组织来压制记者，而该机构的领导人并没有成功加以阻止。


Part of the challenge is procedural.	部分挑战是程序性的。


Every year, Interpol issues more than 11,000 “Red Notices” – alerts that ask member countries to locate and arrest an individual pending extradition.	国际刑警组织每年都会发布11,000多份“红色通缉令”——警示并要求各成员国搜索和逮捕被引渡者。


Interpol has started to review these notices before they are sent out.	国际刑警组织已经开始在发出红色通缉令前对其开展审查工作。


But countries can get around this by using Interpol to circulate “diffusions” – requests for police cooperation that are less formal than notices, but often produce a similar result.	但各国可以要求国际刑警组织发布“协查通报”来绕过相关审查——协查通报不像通缉令那么正式，但往往能产生类似的结果。


They are sent to police forces around the world before any formal review is undertaken.	协查通报在正式审核前就被发往世界各地。


And while Interpol does eventually conduct a review before uploading a diffusion to its database, by then, any damage has already been done.	虽然国际刑警组织在将协查通报上传到数据库之前最终要进行一次审核，但到那时，损害就已经造成了。


Clearly there is a need to balance speedy police work with mechanisms that discourage abuse.	显然，在高效警务工作和阻止滥用的机制之间达成平衡是非常有必要的。


But, beyond increased vigilance by the agency itself, what can the international community do?	但除国际刑警组织自身要提高警惕外，国际社会还能做些什么？


For starters, member countries should demand that Interpol dedicate resources and funding to an urgent review of the thousands of alerts sitting on its system.	首先，成员国应要求国际刑警组织投入资源和经费，对其系统中数千份通缉令进行紧急审核。


Interpol also needs to reform the diffusion system.	国际刑警组织还需要改革协查通报制度。


If it cannot recall abusive diffusions from member countries’ databases, it must review them before they are circulated in the first place.	如果它无权从成员国数据库中将滥发的协查通报撤回，那么就必须在通报下发前对其进行审核。


Countries that abuse, or try to abuse, Interpol’s systems, must also be held to account.	必须追究滥用或试图滥用国际刑警组织系统的国家的责任。


And police departments around the world should exercise more caution before acting on an alert they receive through Interpol.	而世界各国的警察部门应当在针对国际刑警组织下发的通报采取行动之前采取更加谨慎的态度。


Interpol’s credibility is at stake.	国际刑警组织的信誉正处在危急关头。


As any newspaper editor knows, audiences will eventually tune out if they are continually bombarded with inaccurate or misleading content.	任何报纸编辑都知道，如果公众不断受到不准确或误导性消息的轰炸，他们会选择不再理睬这样的内容。


The same is true for Interpol’s information.	国际刑警组织的信息也不例外。


In an increasingly globalized world, international mechanisms like Interpol are essential to keeping us safe.	在日益全球化的世界里，像国际刑警组织这样的国际机制对于保障我们的安全至关重要。


But if these organizations are hijacked by those committed to silencing free speech, they risk becoming part of the problems they were created to solve.	但如果这些机构被那些竭尽全力压制言论自由的群体所劫持，它们就有可能成为问题的一部分而非解决之道。


Could the Iranian Economy Sink Rouhani?	伊朗经济会埋没鲁哈尼吗？


CAMBRIDGE – For a “managed democracy,” Iran holds remarkably unpredictable presidential elections.	坎布里奇—对一个“管理的民主国家”（managed democracy）来说，伊朗的总统选举以难以预测闻名。


And the upcoming election on May 19 is no exception, given that the incumbent, Hassan Rouhani, is facing a tough conservative challenger.	即将在5月19日举行的此次选举也不例外，因为现任总统鲁哈尼面临两位强硬保守派挑战者。


Rouhani’s opponent, Ebrahim Raisi, is a high-ranking cleric who is considered to be a possible successor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.	鲁哈尼的对手是伊布拉西姆·莱西（Ebrahim Raisi），他是一位高级别神职人员、被认为有可能继哈梅内伊之后成为下一任伊朗最高领袖的伊布拉西姆·莱西（Ebrahim Raisi）。


Raisi’s campaign has received a boost following the withdrawal of another hardliner, Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, the mayor of Tehran, who garnered one-third as many votes as Rouhani in the 2013 election.	此前还有一位强硬派候选人——德黑兰市长穆罕默德·巴格尔·卡利巴夫（Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf），他在2013年的选举中获得票数是鲁哈尼的三分之一。 卡利巴夫的退选对莱西阵营来说是一个提振。


When Rouhani was elected in 2013, Iran was suffering from 35% inflation, the national currency had depreciated by two-thirds in the previous year, and international sanctions were crippling the economy.	2013年鲁哈尼当选上台时，伊朗正遭遇35%的通胀，伊朗货币在此前一年中贬值了三分之二，还有国际制裁压得经济喘不过气来。


Oil exports and output of automobiles – Iran’s leading manufacturing industry – had each declined by two-thirds, and restless industrial workers were demanding back pay.	石油出口和伊朗最重要的制造业——汽车产量都下跌了三分之二，焦躁不安的产业工人要求偿还欠薪。


Rouhani had campaigned against former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s populist policies, promising to put jobs and production before redistribution.	鲁哈尼提出要反前总统内贾德的民粹主义政策而行之，承诺先考虑就业和生产，再考虑再分配。


He said that he would control inflation, negotiate a deal with the West to end the sanctions, and restore macroeconomic stability.	他说他会控制通货膨胀，与西方谈判结束制裁，并重建宏观经济稳定。


By any reasonable standard, he delivered: inflation is in the single digits for the first time in three decades; sanctions have been lifted in accordance with the 2015 nuclear deal; and the exchange rate has been stable for four years.	从一切合理的标准看，他都做到了承诺：通货膨胀三十年来第一次降到一位数； 制裁根据2015年的核协议被取消；


But, unfortunately for Rouhani, many Iranians who had expected their living standards and employment prospects to improve as a result of these successes are now feeling disappointed.	汇率也已经稳定了四年。 但是，对鲁哈尼来说不幸的是许多期待生活水平和就业前景因为这些成就而得到改善的伊朗人现在感到失望。


To be sure, the economy has started to grow again, after contracting for two years.	平心而论，经济已经开始在经历了两年的收缩之后再次增长。


But there is disagreement about the current recovery’s breadth and durability.	但对于当前复苏的强度和持续时间，众说纷纭。


Because much of the recent growth has come from a doubling in oil production, it has not increased most household incomes, or created new employment opportunities.	目前的增长大部分来自石油产量 翻番，因此，大部分家庭收入并未增加，也没有创造新就业机会。


Thus, International Monetary Fund monitors who visit Iran twice a year have projected 6.6% growth for the 2016-2017 fiscal year, but only half that for the 2017-2018 fiscal year.	因此，每年访问伊朗两次的国际货币金组织（MIF）监督员预测2016—2017财年伊朗经济将增长6. 6%，但2017—2018财年将降到3.


Survey data show that, outside of Tehran, average real (inflation-adjusted) household expenditures fell during the first two years of Rouhani’s term, while poverty rose.	调查数据表明，德黑兰以外的平均真实（经通胀调整的）家庭支出在鲁哈尼任期的头两年有所下降，而贫困有所增加。


In the 2015-2016 fiscal year, there were almost one million more people below the poverty line than when Rouhani took office.	2015—2016财年，生活在贫困线以下的人数比鲁哈尼上台时增加了近一百万人。


And yet these outcomes do not necessarily amount to broken promises.	但这些结果未必意味着承诺破产。


When voters rallied behind Rouhani’s call for lower inflation, they may not have realized that prices rising at a slower rate would also mean slower income growth.	当选民们追随鲁哈尼要求降低通胀时，他们可能没有意识到物价涨幅下降也意味着工资增长放缓。


And the lay public was not alone: even one of Rouhani’s economic advisers initially boasted that people were 20% better off because the rate of inflation had declined by 20 percentage points.	而公众不是唯一的“受害者”：就连鲁哈尼的一位经济顾问一开始也夸耀说，人们的境况改善了20%，因为通货膨胀率下降了20个百分点。


Moreover, Rouhani has pursued a tight fiscal policy that deepened the recession and delayed the recovery.	此外，鲁哈尼采取的紧缩财政政策加深了衰退，也推迟了复苏。


He has kept the government’s rate of fixed investment at around 5% of GDP, which is twice what it was under Ahmadinejad, but still too low.	他将政府固定资产投资率保持在GDP的5%左右，比内贾德执政时期高了一倍，但仍然太低。


Government fixed investment is the traditional driver of economic growth in Iran, and has been as high as 20% of GDP in good times.	政府固定资产投资是伊朗经济的传统增长动力，在景气时期可以高达GDP的20%。


Making matters worse, Iran has a major investment bottleneck, owing to collapsing real-estate values and a frozen banking system.	更糟糕的是，拜房地产价值崩盘和银行系统冻结所赐，伊朗存在巨大的投资瓶颈。


Iran’s banks are still saddled with bad loans forced on them by Ahmadinejad to finance his populist projects.	伊朗银行仍然背负着沉重的不良贷款包袱，这些不良贷款是内贾德为了给其民粹主义计划融资而强迫银行背上的。


And the Central Bank of Iran has failed to get credit flowing again, even though it has been pumping money into the economy and increasing liquidity by 26% per year.	伊朗中央银行没能使信用再次流动起来，尽管它一直在向经济中注入资金，每年都要增加26%的流动性。


As a result, real interest rates have risen to above 10%, choking off private investment.	结果是真实利率上升到10%以上，扼杀了私人投资。


With the state unwilling to spend, and the private sector unable to borrow, total investment fell by 9% in the first nine months of the 2016-2017 fiscal year, after falling by 17% during the same period the previous year.	国家不愿支出，私人部门又无法得到贷款，因此总投资在2016—2017财年的前九个月下降了9%，而此前财年前九个月更是猛降17%。


Despite renewed economic growth, unemployment actually increased in the last four years.	尽管经济增长已经复苏，但在过去四年里，失业实际有所增加。


Although the economy created more than a half-million jobs each year, new entrants to the labor force pushed up the unemployment rate, from 10.1% to 12.1% – and from 24% to 29% for workers aged 15-24.	尽管伊朗经济每年可以创造五十万以上的工作敢为，但新晋劳动力大军仍然将失业率从10. 1%推高到12.


Khamenei has led the charge against Rouhani’s record on jobs.	哈梅内伊也抨击了鲁哈尼在就业方面的成绩。


In a speech in March marking the Iranian new year, he called for a year of “production and employment,” and urged the next president to create jobs with local resources, rather than look for assistance abroad.	在3月份的伊朗新年演讲中，他号召要让今年成为“生产和就业”年，并敦促下任总统利用本土资源而不是寻求外部援助来创造就业。


Rouhani’s economic strategy has clearly failed younger Iranians, who account for 60% of the unemployed, and who generally favored him in the 2013 election.	鲁哈尼的经济战略显然在伊朗年轻人中间是失败的，他们占了失业人口的60%，并且大多在2013年的选举中支持鲁哈尼。


But Iran’s youth will likely overlook Rouhani’s economic-policy shortcomings, and vote for him again, because they prefer his more relaxed social-policy positions to his conservative rival's stern moralizing.	但伊朗年轻人可能忽视鲁哈尼的经济政策不足，再次投票支持他，因为相比鲁哈尼的保守派对手的严厉的道德说教，他们更喜欢鲁哈尼较为灵活的社会政策立场。


Older Iranians, however, might not be so forgiving.	但年长伊朗人可能不会那么容易原谅。


Youth unemployment affects everyone, but particularly the adults who must house and feed the jobless.	年轻人失业影响着所有人，但必须为失业者提供食宿的打大人受到的影响尤其严重。


According to 2015-2016 survey data, of the 65% of men under the age of 35 who lived with their parents, 85% were single, and 24% were unemployed.	据2015—2016年调查数据，65%的35岁以下男性与父母同住，其中85%为单身，24%为失业。


Marriage and employment are the two defining elements of adult life in Iran.	婚姻和就业是伊朗定义成年的两大要素。


Without them, many young people have turned to crime and drugs, which has had far-reaching adverse effects.	没有工作、没有婚姻让许多年轻人转向了犯罪和毒品，带来了严重的负面影响。


Rouhani has also hiked energy prices by 50%, without increasing cash transfers to the poor.	鲁哈尼还将能源价格提高了50%，但没有增加对穷人的现金转移支付。


We do not know the extent to which the poor supported Rouhani in 2013; but they are less likely to do so this time.	我们不知道有多少穷人在2013年支持了鲁哈尼； 但这一回他们不太会这么做了。


Rouhani severely criticized Ahmadinejad’s cash-transfer policy, which was designed to compensate for lost bread and energy subsidies.	鲁哈尼严厉批评内贾德的现金转移支付政策。 该政策是为了补偿失去的面包和能源补贴。


But even if Ahmadinejad’s overzealous attempt to deliver “the oil money to peoples’ dinner tables” added to inflationary pressures, it also seems to have reduced poverty and inequality significantly.	但就算内贾德在“把石油换来的用在人民的餐桌上”方面用力过猛导致了通胀压力，好歹大幅降低了贫困率和不平等性。


Still, Rouhani is expected to win re-election, not least because every president of the Islamic Republic has served two terms.	但是，鲁哈尼仍有望赢得连任，因为伊朗伊斯兰共和国的每位总统都能得到两个任期。


But if he loses, his economic policies – which delivered too little, too late – will be to blame.	但如果他输了，他的经济政策——实现的太少太晚——必须“背锅”。


Trump Is Strengthening Iran’s Radicals	特朗普在助伊朗激进派一臂之力


STANFORD – The United States and Iran have rarely agreed on how to proceed with nuclear talks or other elements of their bilateral relations.	斯坦福—美国和伊朗对于如何进行核对话和处理其他双边关系问题很少有一致的时候。


But synergies and similarities between two factions – Iranian hardliners and the hawks of the current US administration – are as counterintuitive as they are profound.	但两个派别——伊朗强硬派和现任美国政府中的鹰派——之间的的协同和相似性反常地高，并且影响深远。


Indeed, Donald Trump’s new Iran strategy has given radicals in Tehran reason to celebrate, as they have found in the US president an unwitting ally in their quest for political dominance.	事实上，特朗普的新伊朗战略让德黑兰的激进派欢呼雀跃，美国总统成了他们寻求政治主宰地位的意外帮手。


For years, Iran’s “conservative radicals” – a concept that combines extreme conservatism in matters of faith and philosophy with radical views on violence – have argued that negotiation and rapprochement with the US are foolish and futile.	多年来，伊朗的“保守激进派”认为与美国进行谈判和和解是愚蠢而徒劳的。 保守激进派在信仰和哲学问题上极端保守，而在暴力问题上又非常激进。


The US, these hardliners believe, is interested only in regime change, and to fight Islam in the region.	这些强硬派认为，美国唯一的兴趣点在于颠覆伊朗政权和打击域内伊斯兰教。


This view has led Iran to align more closely with Russia and China.	这一观点让伊朗与俄罗斯和中国立场更加接近。


But as crippling nuclear-related sanctions in recent years brought the Iranian economy to the verge of collapse, Iran’s conservatives were forced to negotiate in good faith with the international community.	但由于近几年中令人窒息的制裁让伊朗经济濒临崩溃，伊朗保守派也被迫怀着良好的意愿与国际社会进行谈判。


Even without sanctions, the Iranian economy would have been under severe strain.	即使没有制裁，伊朗经济也会遭到严重制约。


Corruption and mismanagement, along with structural and external challenges – such as falling oil prices, water shortages, and an aging unemployed population – had already weakened economic growth.	腐败和管理不善，加上结构性和外部挑战——如油价下跌、水短缺和老龄化的失业人口——让经济增长十分萎靡。


The fact that China and Russia joined the most recent round of sanctions had made the radicals’ position less tenable.	中国和俄罗斯也加入到最新的制裁中，这一事实让激进派的立场更加站不住脚。


But if Iran’s hardliners were frustrated by previous negotiations, their disappointment vanished yesterday.	但如果说伊朗强硬派因为此前的谈判而被压得抬不起头的话，那么昨天他们终于扬眉吐气了。


Trump’s move to challenge the 2015 nuclear deal – formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA – has given them an unanticipated victory.	特朗普挑战2015年核协议——正式名称是全面联合行动计划，简称JCPOA——的举动让他们赢得了天上掉下来的胜利。


While the most effective sanctions had already been lifted, and are unlikely to be re-imposed, Iran’s conservatives have gained political points that they can use against their opponents at home.	尽管最有效的制裁已经取消，并且不可能重新实施，但伊朗保守派仍然赢得了能够用来打击国内反对者的政治“子弹”。


Within Iran, a powerful coalition of moderate forces – ranging from reformists and dissidents to civil-society actors – has long advocated for a more engaged foreign policy.	在伊朗国内，温和力量——包括改革派、异见分子和公民社会活动家等——所组成的强大联盟长期以来一直要求采取积极参与的对外政策。


Wary of Russia’s influence and uncertain of China’s intentions, these forces have supported a continued Western orientation in economic and political ties.	这些力量担心俄罗斯的影响力和中国意图的不可捉摸性，支持在经济和政治关系方面坚持西方导向。


Moderates advocated for more responsible foreign policy and caution on the country’s nuclear program.	温和派要求采取更加负责的外交政策，谨慎对待伊朗核计划。


And they sought to deepen ties to the Iranian diaspora, in the hope that closer relationships could help solve some of Iran’s most daunting economic challenges.	他们还寻求深化与伊朗侨民的关系，希望加强这一关系能够帮助解决伊朗最严峻的经济挑战。


Iranian moderates understood that the nuclear deal reached with the international community was flawed.	伊朗温和派明白，与国际社会达成的核协议是有缺陷的。


But they supported it nonetheless, hoping to leverage it for more freedom at home.	但他们仍然支持这个协议，希望利用它来争取更多的国内自由。


President Hassan Rouhani famously promised a domestic version of the deal to heal Iran’s political wounds, and to further address its economic woes.	总统鲁哈尼做出了著名的承诺：该协议能弥合伊朗的政治创伤，进一步解决经济问题。


That pledge reflected Rouhani’s broader effort to challenge and curtail the power of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is rooted in the IRGC’s control of large swaths of the Iranian economy.	这一承诺反映了鲁哈尼更大的算盘：挑战和制约伊斯兰革命卫队（IRGC）的权力，这一权力的根基是IRGC控制着伊朗经济的大部分。


Now, with Trump’s move, Rouhani’s agenda, and that of the entire moderate coalition, is in jeopardy.	如今，在特朗普的举动下，鲁哈尼的日程，以及整个温和派联盟的日程，都岌岌可危了。


Most of those in the US who supported the nuclear deal were also aware of its flaws.	支持核协议的美国人，也清楚它的缺陷。


But they saw the deal as an opportunity to engage Iranians who oppose the conservative radicals.	但他们将该协议视为一个吸引反对保守激进派的伊朗人的机会。


American supporters believed that the vibrancy of Iranian civil society and social media boded well for the country, and hoped an Iran that was open to global markets would become more liberal politically.	美国支持者相信，伊朗公民社会和社交媒体的活跃有利于这个国家，希望一个向全球市场开放的伊朗在政治上也变得自由。


Critics of the deal object that Iran’s testing of ballistic missiles has continued unabated after the JCPOA was enacted.	该协议的批评者反对说，伊朗在JCPOA生效后仍在继续试射弹道导弹。


But it is folly to think that the US can curb Iran’s nuclear and regional activities by unilaterally walking away.	但认为美国凭借单方面撕毁协议就能遏制伊朗的核和域内动作简直愚不可及。


In fact, the deal’s ultimate goal – to slow enrichment of uranium and halt nuclear testing – appears to have worked.	事实上，伊朗核协议的终极目标——减缓核浓缩、中止核试验——是有效的。


Whatever problem Trump has with the agreement, it is worth remembering that no country can fix what it has rejected.	不管特朗普对协定有什么问题，都必须记住，不论什么国家，都无法解决它所拒绝的问题。


And rejecting the JCPOA would only encourage the Iranian regime to resume the very activities that the deal was meant to contain or curtail.	而拒绝JCPOA必将鼓励伊朗体制重新开展协议意在遏制或影响的活动。


Trump’s challenge to the JCPOA will most likely encourage other egregious behavior as well.	特朗普对JCOPA的挑战极有可能还会引起其他糟糕的行为。


One reason for the radicals’ regional shenanigans – such as supporting militias in Yemen, Palestine, and Lebanon – is the belief that confrontation with the US or Israel is inevitable.	伊朗激进派在域内搞小动作——如支持也门、巴勒斯坦和黎巴嫩的军阀——原因之一是他们相信与美国或以色列的对抗是不可避免的。


Proxy forces like Hezbollah are, from this perspective, a tool either for deterring aggression or for deployment when fighting begins.	从这个角度讲，真主党等代理力量是阻止侵略，或在爆发战斗的情况下阻止军事部署的工具。


It is true that Iran’s proxies have not holstered their guns as a result of the nuclear agreement.	诚然，伊朗的代理们并没有因为核协议就刀枪入库。


But tensions with the US did diminish.	但与美国之间的紧张的确有所消弭。


Now, following Trump’s about-face, the possibility of confrontation between Iran and the US has returned, which will only embolden the resolve of Iran’s proxy forces.	如今，因为特朗普的突然翻脸，伊朗和美国发生对抗的可能性死灰复燃，而这必然会加强伊朗代理力量的决心。


Unilateral US abrogation of the JCPOA is, in short, the worst of all policy options.	简言之，美国单方面废除JCPOA是所有政策选项中最糟糕的一个。


No matter what Trump says, there are plenty of people in Iran, and the US, who share this view.	不管特朗普说什么，伊朗和美国都会有很多人同意这一观点。


What’s Driving Iran’s Protests?	什么推动了伊朗的示威


LONDON – The rapid spread of civil unrest in Iranian towns and cities that began in late December has taken nearly everyone – President Hassan Rouhani’s reform-minded government, many citizens, and observers – by surprise.	伦敦—12月底，骚乱开始在伊朗各大城镇迅速蔓延，这几乎让所有人都震惊不已，包括总统鲁哈尼的改革派政府、许多伊朗公民以及观察家。


Starting in Mashhad, a large religious city in the country’s northeast and a stronghold of Rouhani’s conservative foes, the protests engulfed a number of smaller towns with a speed and ferocity that few could have predicted.	这场骚乱始于位于伊朗东北部、鲁哈尼的保守派对手的重镇马什哈德（Mashhad），以出乎所有人意料的速度和烈度席卷了大量小城镇。


The protests, fueled by the rising cost of living and widening economic and social disparities, quickly morphed into a repudiation of the regime itself.	示威源于生活成本的上涨和经济和社会不平等的加剧，但很快便演变为否定政权本身。


While much of the anger has been directed at the clerical establishment led by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, reformists have as much at stake as their hardline rivals.	相当一部分愤怒指向了由伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊领导的神权，但改革派和他们的强硬派对手一样岌岌可危。


Iranian reformists are not accustomed to being targets of popular frustration, as they are now.	伊朗改革派很少像现在那样成为群众失望的对象。


In the country’s presidential elections, political reformers have repeatedly channeled popular discontent into promises of a more hopeful future.	在伊朗总统选举中，政治改革派总是将群众不满引导为对充满希望的未来的憧憬。


That historic role is at odds with reformers’ current responsibility to restore law and order to Iran’s urban areas.	这一历史角色和改革者重塑伊朗城市地区法律和秩序的当前使命相冲突。


Rouhani was elected to a second term barely seven months ago, securing an outright majority of 57% of the vote amid high turnout.	伊朗在七个月前刚刚赢得第二个任期，在高投票率的情况下，获得了57%的压倒性优势。


Recent events seem to suggest that many young Iranians doubt if Rouhani can deliver greater prosperity and a more moderate version of Islamist rule than that offered by his hardline rivals.	最近一些事件似乎表明，许多伊朗年轻人质疑鲁哈尼是否能够较其强硬派对手带来更大的繁荣和更温和的伊斯兰统治。


Perhaps the biggest risk posed by the wave of unrest concerns Rouhani’s planned economic reforms.	或许，骚乱潮所带来的最大风险在于鲁哈尼的经济改革计划。


The protests erupted despite two years of modest improvement in the Iranian economy.	示威是在两年来伊朗经济略有改善的情况下爆发的。


Though squeezed by low world oil prices and anemic inflows of foreign investment, economic indicators have been moving in the right direction since January 2016, when, in the wake of the 2015 deal limiting Iran’s nuclear program, many international sanctions were lifted.	尽管受制于国际油价和外国投资低迷的局面，但自2016年1月以来，经济指标一直向好。 此前，伊朗在2015年签订了核协议，许多国际制裁就此取消。


According to the International Monetary Fund, Iran’s GDP is growing at an annual rate of just over 4%, with encouraging indications that in the post-sanction era, growth is broadening to the non-oil sectors.	据国际货币基金组织（IMF），伊朗GDP年增长率略高于4%，此外，令人鼓舞的指标显示，在后制裁时代，增长扩大到了非石油部门。


Last year, growth reached 12.5%, mainly owing to a rebound in oil output and exports.	去年，增长达到了12. 5%，主要是石油产出和输出复苏所赐。


While inflation remains high, at around 10%, this represents a strong improvement from the heights scaled when sanctions were in place.	通货膨胀仍然高达10%左右，但较之制裁时期，仍然可谓改善巨大。


There is, of course, no linear relationship between economic indicators and public sentiment.	当然，经济指标和公共情绪之间并非线性关系。


While conventional wisdom attributes political turmoil and instability to economic hardship, reality is rarely so neat.	传统智慧将政治骚乱和动荡归因为经济困境，但现实很少如此简单。


In the Middle East, for example, both Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution and the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 were preceded by unprecedented oil-price booms, implying greater prosperity in the region.	比如，在中东，1979年伊朗伊斯兰革命和2011年阿拉伯之春动乱之前都发生了前所未有的油价牛市，地区繁荣前景看好。


Still, the improvements to Iran’s economy following the 2015 nuclear deal have fallen well short of expectations.	尽管如此，2015年核协议后的伊朗经济改善速度仍远低于预期。


The biggest disappointment seems to be that growth has failed to make a dent in Iran’s staggering levels of unemployment.	最大的失望也许是增长没有给伊朗高企的失业水平带来任何改善。


The total unemployment rate stands at nearly 13%, while youth unemployment – officially measured at 29%, but likely closer to 40% – is among the highest in the world.	总体失业率接近13%，年轻人失业率——官方数据为29%，大门但实际可能接近40%——堪称世界最高。


Today, this grievance sits at the heart of popular frustration, particularly among disaffected urban youth, who helped ignite the latest round of unrest.	如今，这一怨气成为群众不满的核心，特别是愤愤不平的城市青年，他们点燃了最近的骚乱。


Unemployment is highest among those with university education, particularly women.	有大学文凭者的失业情况最为严重，特别是女性。


While more young Iranian women now enter Iran’s universities compared to their male counterparts, Iran’s rate of female labor-force participation was a paltry 15% last year, down from 20% a decade ago.	如今，伊朗女大学生比例有所提高，但去年女性劳动参与率只有15%，还不如十年前的20%。


Job creation will remain a principal challenge for Rouhani’s government.	就业创造仍然是鲁哈尼政府所面临的头号挑战。


Because some 840,000 people are expected to enter the labor market next year alone, simply stabilizing unemployment in the short term will be a tall order.	光是未来一年，预计就有大约840,000 人进入劳动力市场，在短期内稳住失业是一个非常艰巨的任务。


With more than 40% of the population between the ages of 15 and 34, adding enough jobs in the longer term will be no easier.	超过40%的伊朗人口年龄在15岁到34岁之间，从长期看，要增加足够的工作岗位也不容易。


Viewed in this context, the recent protests have weakened Iran’s reformers by eroding their monopoly on hope and driving a wedge between the government’s neoliberal policies, intended to address Iran’s economic problems, and its goal of deepening popular support.	从这一背景看，最近的示威削弱了伊朗改革派对希望的垄断，在政府的新自由主义政策（旨在解决伊朗的经济问题）及其深化群众支持的目标之间钉入了一枚楔子。


And Iran’s reformers also risk losing political ground to their hardline rivals, who can be expected to adopt an iron-fisted approach to security, at the expense of Rouhani’s gradual loosening of restrictions.	伊朗改革派还有可能将政治优势拱手让给强硬派对手，可以预期后者会采取铁腕安保手段，鲁哈尼逐步放松限制的措施将成为牺牲品。


There is, however, a silver lining for reformers.	但改革派仍有一丝希望。


While many Iranians yearn for economic empowerment, many more fear a possible slide into anarchy and chaos.	许多伊朗人渴望经济赋权，但更多伊朗人担心陷入无政府状态和混乱。


Unlike during the protests of 2009, and mindful of the generally disappointing outcome of the Arab Spring uprisings, Iran’s middle class has so far exercised caution, observing the demonstrations apprehensively and from a distance.	伊朗中产阶级已与2009示威时不同，也知道阿拉伯之春动乱的结果令人失望，因此到目前为止，他们显得相当谨慎，保持相当的距离忧心忡忡地观察示威情况。


Paradoxically, it is that fear factor – rather than the hope for change among disaffected Iranians – that may yet rescue Rouhani’s agenda.	矛盾的是，正是这一恐惧因素——而不是失望的伊朗人对变化的希望——可能成为鲁哈尼日程的救星。


The Best Hope for the Iranian People	伊朗人民的最好的希望


LONDON – One of the most extraordinary things about the current protests in Iran – the largest since the Green Movement in 2009 – is that the very people that they are directed against may well have been the people who started them.	伦敦—对于最近的伊朗示威——这是自2009年大运动（Great Movement）以来规模最大的示威——有一件事相当不同寻常，那就是示威者所针对的人，也许就是发动示威的人。


Iran’s ultra-conservative theocrats appear to have thought that by stoking anger over the economy in their political heartlands, they would undermine the moderate President Hassan Rouhani.	伊朗的极端保守神权领袖似乎认为，通过在他们的核心地带煽动针对经济的愤怒情绪，就可以破坏温和派总统鲁哈尼。


But, if that is the case, they failed to anticipate the depth of the dissatisfaction of the Iranian people with the status quo – especially their own role in it.	但是，果真如此的话，那么他们没有预料地奥伊朗人民对于现状、特别是他们在其中所扮演的角色的深深的不满。


To be clear, despite the massive scale of the protests, they are very unlikely to bring down the regime.	必须明确一点，尽管示威规模巨大，但要想推翻体制根本不可能。


Iran’s security forces are too strong and have too much at stake in the current system, which gives them control of vast swaths of the Iranian economy.	伊朗安全部队太强大，系于当前制度的利益太巨大——当前制度让他们能够控制伊朗经济的巨大部分。


Moreover, the protesters are essentially leaderless and lack clear objectives.	此外，示威者基本上是乌合之众，且没有明确目标。


No matter how much encouragement Western powers give them, the protests seem all but certain to end with Islamist hardliners retaining their power bases and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps retaining control of most of the state’s assets and security activities.	不管西方力量给予他们多大的鼓励，示威的必然结局是伊斯兰教强硬派能够捍卫自己的权力基础，伊斯兰革命卫队能够捍卫对伊朗大部分国家资产和安全动作的控制。


But that doesn’t mean that nothing will change.	但这并不意味着什么都不会改变。


Nor does it mean that the West has no leverage to exercise.	也不意味着西方没有可以作为的地方。


It is possible, for example, that Rouhani will end up stepping down, whether by force or choice.	比如，有可能鲁哈尼将最终下台，或者被迫，或者出于主动选择。


But this would hardly count as success for the protesters.	但这并不能算是示威的成功。


After all, Rouhani is the supposedly moderate administrator of a state whose constitution is not, in the eyes of the clerical elite, derived from this earthly realm.	毕竟，鲁哈尼被认为是伊朗的温和统治者，而在宗教精英眼中伊朗的宪法并不来源于世俗。


If protecting their government’s religious purity – and their own ill-gotten gains – required brutally repressing their own people and returning Iran to the dark ages, the extremists who would be left in charge would eagerly do it.	如果保护政府的宗教纯洁性——以及他们的不义之财——需要残酷镇压自己的人民并让伊朗回到黑暗时代，那么将因此成为统治者的极端分子肯定会迫不及待地这样做。


Whether Rouhani steps down or not, it is now apparent that the status quo cannot continue indefinitely – indeed, perhaps not for very much longer.	不管鲁哈尼是否下台，很显然现状无法永远维持下去——事实上，可能维持不了多久了。


Iranians were told that the nuclear deal concluded in 2015 would lift them out of economic hardship.	伊朗人民被告知，2015年达成的核协议将结束经济困境。


But, thanks partly to persistent corruption – Iran ranks in the lowest quartile globally in this area – annual inflation exceeds 10%, and youth unemployment stands at 25%.	但是，部分由于持续腐败——伊朗在腐败方面位列全球最严重的四分之一国家行列，伊朗年通货膨胀率超过10%，年轻人失业率高达25%。


According to Gallup, only citizens of Iraq and South Sudan are more pessimistic about their future.	据盖洛普（Gallup），只有伊拉克和南苏丹人民对未来比伊朗还要悲观。


So far, Rouhani has been unwilling or unable to use the power of the presidency to reform Iran.	到目前为止，鲁哈尼一直不愿或无法利用总统权力来改革伊朗。


But, amid the protests, he is more motivated than ever to improve domestic economic conditions.	但在示威中，他有比以往更大的动机改善国内经济状况。


Should he fail, Iran may face a larger wave of protests, with stronger leadership and clearer objectives.	如果他失败的话，伊朗可能会面临更大的示威潮，涌现出更强大的领袖和更明确的目标。


Any effort to reform Iran’s economy must recognize the costly absurdity of the country’s expansionist foreign policies.	伊朗的任何经济改革措施都必须认识到伊朗扩张主义外交政策的荒谬性所带来的昂贵代价。


Funding a proxy war in Yemen, propping up a political party and terrorist group in Lebanon, and seeking to dominate Syria and Iraq cost billions of dollars annually.	资助也门代理战争、支持黎巴嫩政党和恐怖组织、以及寻求主宰叙利亚和伊拉克让伊朗每年都要付出几十亿美元。


It should not have come as a surprise when protesters shouted, “Let go of Syria; think about us.”	因此，示威者喊出“随叙利亚去吧，想想我们自己”的口号也就不足为奇了。


Iranian citizens are not alone in taking issue with their country’s foreign policy.	伊朗人民不是唯一对国家外交政策质疑的人。


Most Western and Middle Eastern governments are also highly concerned about Iran’s behavior, which reflects a rejection of international norms such as respect for national sovereignty.	许多西方和中东政府也高度关注伊朗的行为，这表明国际规范不认可这是尊重国家主权的行为。


Iran’s public threats to destroy America and the Gulf states certainly don’t help matters.	伊朗公开威胁要摧毁美国和海湾国家显然是无助于事的。


Iran’s problematic foreign policy is the result not of mismanagement, but of toxic ideology.	伊朗问题重重的外交政策不是管理不善的结果，而是不良意识形态的结果。


Indeed, two fixed notions underpin it.	事实上，其根源是两个根深蒂固的概念。


First, Iran’s leaders are convinced that global geopolitics is a zero-sum game – a belief shared with Russian President Vladimir Putin.	首先，伊朗领导人认定全球地缘政治是零和博弈——这和俄罗斯总统普京不谋而合。


(That commonality perhaps explains the close alliance that has formed between Russia and Iran.)	（这一共同性也许能够解释为何俄罗斯和伊朗之间能够结成紧密联盟。


Second – and more dangerous – Iran’s leaders believe that they have a God-given right to unite Shia Muslims under a single caliphate.	）其次——也是更危险的是——伊朗领导人相信他们拥有将什叶派穆斯林统一在一个哈里发之下的神授权利。


The result is a hostile regime that views its neighbors’ success as a threat – and is willing to wage war over it.	这导致了一个敌意政权，将邻国的成功一概视为威胁——并不惜发动战争。


Iran’s leadership will be extremely reluctant to withdraw from the forward positions the country has gained across the Middle East over the past decade, beachheads which regime hardliners regard as crucial national-security and foreign-policy assets.	伊朗领导层将极不情愿放弃伊朗在过去十年中所获得中东的主动权（forward position），体制中的强硬派将这些“桥头堡”视为至关重要的国家安全和外交政策资产。


Amid the current protests, however, the West has an opportunity to push Iran to suspend its regional ambitions and focus on its desperate domestic situation.	但在当前的示威潮中，西方有机会促使伊朗收起地区野心，专注于令人绝望的国内局势。


If an agreement is reached, existing sanctions can be reduced; if Iran’s leaders refuse to budge, new sanctions could be introduced.	如果达成协议，现有制裁可以缓和； 如果伊朗领导人拒绝让步，可能增加新的制裁。


To be sure, if religious extremists take control of all levels of Iran’s government, appeals based on Iranians’ economic prospects will fall on deaf ears.	平心而论，如果宗教极端拍控制伊朗政府各层，基于伊朗经济前景的诉求便不啻对牛弹琴。


But if Rouhani retains the presidency – or another moderate takes his place – there is a chance that such pressure would provide sufficient cover to scale back Iran’s foreign adventurism and reform the domestic economy.	但如果鲁哈尼不下台——或由另一位温和派取代他——那么这些压力有望提供足够的掩护，让伊朗收回外交冒险主义并改革国内经济。


This would minimize the risk of severe violence in Iran, while galvanizing opposition to religious extremists.	这将让伊朗内部爆发严重暴力的风险最小化，同时也能刺激对宗教极端派的反对情绪。


Iran is at a turning point.	伊朗正站在一个转折点上。


The world must now send its regime a clear message: stop destabilizing the region and help your own people to prosper.	世界必须向其政权传递一个明确信号：停止动摇中东地区，帮助自己的人民实现繁荣。


The Turn of the Kurds	库尔德人的转折


NEW YORK – Returns show a high percentage of Iraq’s estimated eight million Kurds turned out to vote in a referendum on independence for the Kurdistan Region and other areas of the country with a substantial Kurdish population.	纽约—反馈表明，在伊拉克的大约八百万库尔德人中，大部分人参加了库尔德斯坦地区和其他有大量库尔德人居住的地区的独立公投。


An even higher proportion of voters – reported to be above 90% – voted yes.	更大部分的投票者——据报道高于90%——投了赞成票。


Much of the world, though, is unsympathetic, and statehood in today’s world depends on recognition by other states.	进团如此，世界大部分国家对此并不同情，而在当今世界，建国取决于其他国家的承认。


So what happens now?	那么，现在发生了什么？


To be sure, there is not and should not be any automatic right of self-determination.	平心而论，不存在，也不应该存在自动的自决权。


It was one thing for people in colonies ruled by governments thousands of miles away and deprived of many of their rights to opt for independence in the wake of World War II.	被几千英里之外的政府所殖民统治，被剥夺许多权利，这样的民族在二战后选择独立是一回事。


It is something else altogether for a region to secede from an existing independent country.	一个地区脱离一个已经存在的独立国家，这是完全不同的另一回事。


A world of frequent secession would be in even greater disarray than the world we already have.	频繁发生脱离事件的世界，要比现在状态还要无序。


The question then naturally arises: under what circumstances should leaders and populations seeking to leave one country and establish their own be supported?	由此，自然产生了一个问题：在怎样的环境下，我们应该支持领导人和人民离开一个国家，建立一个自己的国家？


There is no universally accepted set of standards, but let me suggest some that should be applied:	没有放之四海而皆准的标准，但我可以提出一些应该被采用的标准：


·         A history that indicates a clear collective identity for the people in question.	·         有历史能证明相关民族具有明确的集体身份。


·         A compelling rationale, in the sense that the population must be able to demonstrate that the status quo is imposing a large political, physical, and economic price.	·         有令人信服的理由，其人民必须能够证明现状正在造成巨大的政治、人身和经济代价。


·         The population makes clear that it strongly favors a new and separate political status.	·         其人民明确表现出强烈希望获得新的、不同的政治地位。


·         The new state is viable (the last thing the world needs are more failed states).	·         新国家具有自生能力（世界最不需要的就是更多失败之国）。


·         Secession does not jeopardize the viability of the rump state or the security of neighboring states.	·         脱离不会破坏被分裂国家的自生能力和邻国的安全。


By these standards, there is a persuasive case for Kurdish independence.	根据这些标准，库尔德独立是令人信服的。


The Kurds have a strong sense of collective history and national identity, and failed to achieve statehood after WWI through no fault of their own – even though the case for it was as persuasive as those of other groups whose national hopes were satisfied.	库尔德人有强烈的集体历史和民族身份感，他们在一战后没能实现立国，错不在自身——尽管这一理由的说服力不亚于其他民族建国愿望得到了满足的群体。


The Kurds of Iraq suffered greatly (including being attacked with chemical weapons) at the hands of Saddam Hussein’s regime.	伊拉克库尔德人饱受萨达姆政权压迫（包括遭到化学武器袭击）。


An independent Kurdistan has the potential to be economically viable, given its energy reserves.	独立的库尔德斯坦拥有能源储备，有潜力实现经济自生。


And Iraq without Kurdistan would still be viable, as would other neighboring countries.	并且失去了库尔德斯坦的伊拉克也仍具备自生能力，其他邻国也是如此。


Nonetheless, the desire of the Kurds in northern Iraq for a country of their own is mostly being resisted.	尽管如此，伊拉克北部库尔德人对拥有自己的国家的渴望遭到了巨大的阻挠。


Iraq’s central government, worried about the loss of territory and significant oil reserves, strongly opposes Kurdish secession.	伊拉克中央政府担心失去领土和大量石油储量，强烈反对库尔德人脱离。


Turkey, Iran, and Syria all oppose Kurdish independence anywhere, fearing that their own Kurdish minorities could be “infected” by the “virus” of Kurdish statehood and seek to break away and create a state of their own or join the new Kurdish entity carved from Iraq.	土耳其、伊朗和叙利亚也反对任何地区的库尔德人独立，担心本国的库尔德少数群体可能被库尔德建国的“病毒”所“传染”，寻求分裂并建立自己的国家或加入从伊拉克裂土而立的库尔德实体。


Iraq’s central government has threatened to close its airspace to planes flying to or from the Kurdish region.	伊拉克中央政府威胁要关闭进出库尔德地区的空中航线。


And Turkey has threatened to cut off the pipeline on which Kurdistan relies to export oil.	土耳其威胁要切断库尔德斯坦石油出口所依靠的管道。


The danger in such moves is that the viability of the new entity (which would be landlocked) could be jeopardized, not to mention the risk of military clashes.	这些行动的危险之处在于新实体（内陆国）的自生能力将因此被削弱，更不用说爆发军事冲突的风险了。


The United States opposes Kurdish independence, concerned that the opposition of the neighboring states could fuel further turmoil in an already turbulent Middle East.	美国反对库尔德人独立，担心邻国的反对可能进一步让已经混乱不堪的中东需上加霜。


But it is also true that the Kurds meet many of the criteria for statehood, operate a political system with democratic features, and have been a loyal and effective ally against the Islamic State in both Iraq and Syria.	但库尔德人满足建国的许多标准、运营着一个具备民主特征的政治制度，并且一直是一个忠诚又有效的反击伊拉克和叙利亚境内伊斯兰国的盟友也是事实。


And the opposition of an illiberal Turkey, an imperial Iran, an Iraq heavily influenced by Iran, and a Syrian regime that owes its survival to Iranian and Russian military intervention strengthens the geopolitical argument for Kurdish statehood.	而反自由的土耳其、帝国主义的伊朗、深受伊朗影响的伊拉克，以及自身生存需要依靠伊朗和俄罗斯军事干预的叙利亚的反对更强化了库尔德人建国的地缘政治立场。


One option for the US and the European Union (which has been similarly cool to the idea of Kurdish independence) would be to support or participate in negotiations between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Iraqi government in Baghdad.	美国和欧盟（它们对库尔德人独立的概念反应都相当冷静）的一个选择是支持或参与库尔德斯坦地区政府（KRG）和伊拉克政府在巴格达的谈判。


Such talks could aim for a compromise over how resources and territory might be divided or shared.	谈判的目标可以是就资源和领土如何分割或共享问题达成妥协。


Parallel talks involving Turkey and the KRG could address both economic and security concerns.	同时，土耳其和KRG的谈判可以解决经济和安全顾虑。


The US and the EU should also make clear that any support on their part for Kurdish separatism is not a precedent for others.	美国和欧盟还应该明确表示，它们对库尔德分离的任何支持，都不构成其他人的先例。


There are already more than 190 countries, and the emergence of new ones is neither simple nor straightforward.	世界已经有了190多个国家，建立新国家既不简单，也不直接。


Each situation needs to be judged on its merits.	所有状况都必须进行评估。


Groups have every right to participate in the determination of their future, but not to decide it by themselves.	群体绝对有权利参与自身未来的决定，但这个决定不能由他们自己来做出。


The Kurds of Iraq have made their preference known; it is neither fair nor sustainable to refuse to take their goal seriously.	伊拉克库尔德人已经让世界知道了自己想要什么； 拒绝认真对待他们的目标既不公平，也不可持续。


Is Evidence-Based Medicine Broken?	基于证据的医学破产了吗？


LONDON – Evidence-based medicine, as David Sackett and his colleagues wrote in 1996, is “the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients.”	伦敦—基于证据的医学，如大卫·萨克特（David Sackett）及其同事在1996年所写，“有意识地、明确地、明智地使用当下最佳证据做出个体病人的医疗方案。


At first glance, this seems entirely logical; indeed, many would say that this simply could be called “medicine.”	”乍一看，这完全合乎逻辑； 事实上，有许多人都说，这已足以称为“医学”。


But the approach is generating considerable controversy, with many asserting that it is “broken.”	但这一方法正在引起巨大的争议，许多人认为它已“破产”。


Last month, when the British Medical Journal asked its readers whether evidence-based medicine is malfunctioning, the responses were almost evenly split: 51% answered positively, and 49% negatively.	上个月，《英国医学杂志》（British Medical Journal）做了一次读者调查，询问基于证据的医学是否出了问题，回答几乎是五五开：51%的人表示肯定，49%的人表示否定。


The controversy stems from the kind of evidence that is used.	争议来自什么样的证据被使用。


Sackett implies, but does not stipulate, that epidemiological evidence (findings from randomized controlled trials and large-cohort studies carried out over many years) should underpin doctors’ decisions about patients – and, one hopes, in consultation with them.	萨克特暗示（但并不确定）流行病学证据（从随机控制实验和多年期大群体研究中发现）应该成为医生诊疗病人的决策基础——人们希望咨询病情亦是如此。


Epidemiological research studies address questions like, “If 1,000 people with type 2 diabetes were randomly allocated to four groups of 250 people that each received either no treatment (or a placebo), drug A, drug B, or drug C for ten years, how would it impact survival rates, and what, if any, complications and side effects would there be?”	流行病学研究回答类似于这样的问题：“如果1,000个患有2型糖尿病的人随机地分为四个组，每组250人并在十年的时间里分别不治疗（或使用安慰剂）、使用药物A、使用药物B和使用药物C，存活率将会受到什么影响？ 副作用和并发症（如有）情况又会如何？


If the trial is conducted properly – it is large enough; people are allocated in a truly random way; and “blind” assessments of the outcomes are conducted – the results should be reliable.	”如果实验设计合理——规模足够大、人群真正以随机方式分组、结果为“盲”测——那么其结果应该是可靠的。


Consider the following scenario: Ten-year survival rates for the four groups are 70%, 71%, 80%, and 82%, respectively, and the proportion of people developing troublesome side effects is 1%, 2%, 5%, and 50%.	考虑以下情形：四个组别的十年存活率分别为70%、71%、80%和82%，并且出现棘手副作用的人数比例分别为1%、2%、5%和50%。


Most people trade a small reduction in the chance of survival for a large reduction in the chance of adverse effects; in other words, they would opt for drug B.	大部分人会用生存机会的小幅下降换取副作用的大幅下降； 换句话说，他们会选择药物B。


In short, evidence-based medicine uses the science of epidemiology to create a clear and structured set of decisions about tests and treatments for individual patients, with the evidence often – and increasingly – being summarized in the form of clinical guidelines.	简言之，基于证据的医学利用流行病科学为个体患者的测试和治疗做出明确的结构性决定方案，其证据通常——并且越来越多地——从临床指引中总结而来。


This is problematic for two main reasons.	出于两大原因，这很有问题。


For starters, the emphasis on randomized controlled trials as the “gold standard” of evidence has meant that any drug that has outperformed a competitor in a trial may now be classified as “evidence-based.”	首先，强调随机控制实验作为证据的“黄金标准”意味着任何在实验中胜过竞争对手的哇哦唔都被归为“基于证据的”。


Look no further than the glossy ads in medical journals to discover drugs you did not know you needed for diseases that you never knew existed, such as “female sexual arousal disorder” and “adult attention deficit disorder.”	看看医学杂志上的光鲜广告，你就能发现一些你从未听说过的病所需要的你从未听说过的药物，比如“女性性兴奋失调”和“成人注意力缺失”。


And how many drugs are tested against more natural non-drug therapies – yoga for high blood pressure, for example, or brisk walking for diabetes – before being licensed?	而有多少药物在拿到执照之前与更自然的非药物疗法——比如用瑜伽治疗高血压，用健步走治疗糖尿病——做过对比实验？


In a sense, evidence-based medicine has been a victim of its own success, having fueled an exponential increase in research trials in the 20 years since it began.	从某种程度上说，基于证据的医学是其自身成功的受害者，自产生以来的20年中，它催生了研究实验的指数增长。


One does not need a PhD in cognitive psychology to recognize that overloading doctors working in a high-stress, time-constrained environment with a mass of guidelines and research results will lead to errors.	你不需要认知心理学博士学位就能意识到，在需要时间紧迫的高压环境下超负荷工作、与大量指引和研究结果打交道的医生必然会产生错误。


And the attempted solution – hard-wiring the guidelines into computerized “decision support tools” – has been largely a flop, given computer models’ inability to accommodate messy, real-world clinical practice.	而尝试性解决办法——将指引与计算机化的“决策支持工具”进行硬连接——基本宣告失败，因为计算机模型无法协调混乱的真实世界临床实践。


For example, generations of medical students have memorized the textbook features of celiac disease for their examinations.	比如，几代医学学生都要记住教科书上的乳糜泻病特征，以便通过考试。


But your Aunt Nora’s celiac disease has not read the textbook.	但书上的乳糜泻病和你姨妈的乳糜泻病并不完全相同。


Indeed, only Aunt Nora can tell you how her celiac disease behaves.	事实上，只有你姨妈可以告诉你她的乳糜泻病有何症状。


She also happens to be opposed to taking blue-colored pills.	碰巧她还反对附庸蓝色药丸。


And she insists that, years ago, when she took drug x, it made her feel like a new woman – despite the fact that, in 1,000 patients, drug x has demonstrated, on average, no effect.	她还坚持，如果服用药物x，她就会有一种新女人（new woman）的感觉——尽管在现实中平均而言药物x在每1,000个病人中都不会引起一例副作用。


The computer model’s treatment recommendations would probably not work for Aunt Nora.	计算机模型治疗建议也许并不适合你姨妈。


But this does not mean that evidence-based medicine is broken; it simply lacks the needed maturity.	但这并不意味着基于证据的医学破产了； 它只是缺少必须的成熟性。


High-quality randomized trials are as important now as they were at the time of the evidence-based movement’s founding.	如今，高质量随机实验和基于证据运动刚刚兴起时一样重要。


But the system must be shaped by the doctor’s judgment and the patient’s individual experience.	但该系统必须以医生的判断和病人的个体经验为准。


It is time to stop overloading doctors with evidence and deploying fast-talking industry salespeople to manipulate them with clever marketing pitches.	应该停止让面对证据的医生超负荷工作，停止让口若悬河的行业销售员用营销诡计操纵他们。


Instead, researchers must optimize the presentation, summarization, processing, and application of epidemiological evidence, using good visualization techniques that improve doctors’ understanding of complex statistics.	相反，研究者应该优化流行病学证据的展示、总结、处理和应用，使用能够改善医生对复杂数据的理解的优秀的可视化技术 。


At the same time, research-derived facts about the average patient must not outweigh individual patients’ observations of their own bodies and illnesses.	与此同时，研究获得的关于普通患者的事实不能压倒个体患者对自己的身体和病症的观察。


New processes for capturing and accommodating patients’ personal experiences – which are typically idiosyncratic, subjective, and impossible to standardize – would go a long way toward ensuring that each patient receives the right treatment.	捕捉和协调患者个人经验的新程序——通常具有异质性和主观性，难以标准化——还需要走很长的路才能确保每个患者都获得正确的治疗。


The medical community must develop the science of shared decision-making, in which epidemiological evidence informs conversations about what matters to the patient and how best to achieve those goals.	医学界必须发展共享决策科学，通过流行病学证据进行关于对患者什么才重要、如何最好地达到这些目标的对话。


In doing so, we can take evidence-based medicine beyond its current limits and develop a holistic approach that accounts for patients’ experience of illness and promotes good clinical practice.	这样做可以让基于证据的医学打破当前局限，发展出考虑到患者患病经验、促进优良临床实践的全面方法。


Is the TPP Good for America?	TPP对美国是好事吗？


WASHINGTON, DC – The Trans-Pacific Partnership, the far-reaching trade and investment agreement that the United States has negotiated with 11 other countries, including Canada, Mexico, Japan, Malaysia, Australia, and Vietnam, is now up for debate.	华盛顿—美国与加拿大、墨西哥、日本、马来西亚、澳大利亚、越南等11个国家谈判的影响深远的贸易和投资协定——跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）就要进入争论阶段了。


In order to enter into effect, the US Congress must approve the TPP, which is not likely until enough members make up their minds about the merits of the case.	要想生效，就必须让美国国会批准TPP，而这必须让足够多的国会议员认识到TPP的好处。


So, what does the TPP mean for US voters now and in the future?	那么，TPP对现在和未来的美国选民意味着什么呢？


For starters, while the TPP would most likely generate some overall gain for the US economy, measured in terms of GDP and people’s incomes, that gain is very small and comes mostly from providing greater opportunities for US exports – by reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers in other countries.	首先，尽管TPP非常有可能为美国经济带来一些总体利益（以GDP和人民收入衡量），但这一收益很小，主要来自美国出口机会的增加——通过其他国家降低关税和非关税壁垒实现。


Some imports would become cheaper as well, benefiting American consumers.	一些进口品也将变得更便宜，有利于美国消费者。


In analytical work favored by President Barack Obama’s administration, the projections suggest that approval of the TPP could cause the total size of the US economy to be 0.5% higher in 2030 than it would be otherwise.	有利于美国总统奥巴马政府的分析指出，预测表明，批准TPP将让美国经济总规模在2030年扩大0. 5%（与没有TPP相比）。


Note that this estimate is of the TPP’s effect on the level of aggregate income after 15 years, not of its impact on the annual growth rate.	注意，这一估算衡量得失TPP对15年后总收入的影响，而不是对年增长率的影响。


Given that this assessment is advanced by TPP supporters, it seems reasonable to suppose that it represents the higher end of what they regard as plausible.	这一评估是TPP支持者所提出的，因此有理由认为它反映了作者所认为的合理区间的上限。


(I am a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, under whose auspices the study was published, but I had no part in its preparation.)	（我是彼得森国际经济研究所高级研究员，这项研究就正是在该所支持下进行，但我没有参与。


Unfortunately, the models used in this field do not generate error bands or confidence intervals.	）不幸的是，这里所使用的模型没有给出误差范围或置信区间。


In fact, given the complexity of the trade agreement – including the emphasis on hard-to-quantify non-tariff barriers – these estimates are likely to be highly imprecise.	事实上，考虑到贸易协定的复杂性——包括对难以量化的非关税壁垒的强调——这些估算可能非常不准确。


Second, such models ignore key issues that belong in any quantitative analysis.	其次，这些模型忽略了任何量化分析都会产生的关键问题。


For example, when imports surge, there are significant negative effects on employment.	比如，当进口猛增时，就业会受到巨大的负面影响。


Compelling evidence on this point comes from outstanding research by Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson, and Brendan Price, who found that “total job losses from rising Chinese import competition over 1999-2011” were in the range of 2-2.4 million.	达伦·阿西莫格鲁（Daron Acemoglu）、大卫·奥拓尔（David Autor）、大卫·多恩（David Dorn）、戈登·汉森（Gordon Hanson）和布伦丹·普莱斯（Brendan Price）的杰出研究以令人信服的证据证明了这一点。 他们发现，“1999—2011年中国进口品竞争力上升所造成的总就业损失”在200—240万之间。


People who lose high-paying jobs in manufacturing can find alternative work – but typically at a much lower wage in a low-productivity part of the service sector.	丢掉高薪制造业工作的人可以找到其他工作——但常常是工资低得多的低生产率私营部门工作。


In principle, they could be compensated for this loss of lifetime income; but such compensation is very limited in the US.	理论上，他们可以获得终身收入损失补偿； 但这一补偿在美国极为有限。


In reality, there are long-lasting or even permanent effects on some communities – and particularly on people with less education in places where prosperity was based on manufacturing that is now exposed to more competition from imports.	在现实中，一些社区会受到长期甚至永久的影响——特别是依靠制造业繁荣、现在不得不面临更加激烈的进口竞争的地方的教育程度较低的人。


In addition, the pro-TPP model assumes that wages rise with productivity.	此外，支持TPP的模型假设工资随生产率增长。


This used to be the case in the US; but the relationship has been greatly weakened in recent decades – precisely as globalization has deepened.	在美国，曾经确实如此； 但这一关系在近几十年中已经大大削弱）—这正是全球化深化带来的。


As a result, the model’s estimates regarding how unskilled workers will benefit from the TPP thus seem like a stretch.	因此，模型对低技能工人能从TPP中获得多少利益的估计水分很大。


Third, basing any policy decision on models alone is fraught with danger.	第三，将政策完全建立在模型的基础上是非常危险的。


The TPP will change many other dimensions of public policy, including the protections afforded to foreign investors (making it easier for them to sue governments) and access to affordable medicines (for low-income countries but also potentially for Americans).	TPP将改变其他许多公共政策维度，包括向外国投资者提供的保护（让他们更容易起诉政府）和获得平价药（对低收入国家，对美国人来说可能也是如此）。


And it is striking that the TPP currently does essentially nothing to discourage currency manipulation – sustained one-way intervention in the foreign-exchange market, aimed at devaluing a currency and gaining a competitive advantage.	一个引人注目之处是TPP最近其实对于遏制货币操纵毫无效果。 货币操作是指持续的货币市场单向干预，旨在货币贬值和获得竞争优势。


In the 1980s, imports of goods and services into the US were about 10% of GDP; now that figure is about 17%, and the TPP would presumably push it higher (so the models say).	20世纪80年代，美国商品和服务进口约占GDP的10%； 如今这一数字在17%左右，而TPP很可能将它进一步推高（模型如是说）。


But as the US trades more with the world, it becomes more vulnerable to job loss caused by currency manipulation.	但随着美国与世界贸易量的增加，它更有可能因为货币操纵而蒙受就业损失。


Based on available evidence, it seems fair to conclude the following about the TPP: It would result in a very small increase in total GDP; it would increase at least some measures of inequality; and it would increase the number of jobs at risk, without providing a commensurate safeguard against currency manipulation.	根据可获得的证据，关于TPP的一个相当合理的推论是：它将带来极小的总GDP增加； 它将至少带来一些不平等性指标的增加；


The International Trade Commission is conducting an in-depth assessment of the TPP, which should be ready in a few months.	国会国际贸易委员会（ITC）正在对TPP做深入评估，可能需要几个月时间。


One hopes that the ITC will provide a more complete and granular analysis – including of potential downsides for various sectors – than is currently available.	我们希望ITC能带来比当前分析更完整、更具体的分析——包括给不同部门带来的潜在风险。


An objective assessment will find that the TPP is no “slam dunk” that should be approved automatically.	可观的评估将发现，TPP并非“稳操胜券”之事。


Much greater scrutiny and discussion of the agreement’s details is warranted.	该协定的细节应该进行更加详细的检查和讨论。


The good news is that this process of careful assessment is now underway.	好消息是这一仔细评估的过程现在正在进行。


The Electoral Fate of Italy’s Banks	意大利银行的选举命运


LONDON – As Italy approaches what promises to be one of its most contentious general elections since 1945, banks are the elephant in the room.	伦敦—意大利正在接近很有可能是自1945年以来最有争议的大选，而银行就是“屋子里的大象”。


Too big and cumbersome to be ignored, they are a constant source of embarrassment for the parties that have been in government since the global financial crisis of 2008, especially for former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, who hopes to rekindle his political career in March.	银行规模庞大而笨重，因此无法忽视，2008年全球金融危机后，它们一直是执政党的噩梦，特别是希望在3月份东山再起的前总理伦齐。


They are also an inviting anti-establishment target for the populists of the Five Star Movement.	它们也是五星运动（Five Star Movement）的民粹主义者的现成的反建制目标。


Indeed, Italy’s banks epitomize all the problems that the financial crisis brought to the country, and on which the populists are capitalizing: a double-dip recession followed by sluggish GDP growth, high unemployment, especially among the young, and a collapse of domestic demand.	事实上，意大利银行体现了金融危机带给这个国家、并为民粹主义者所利用的所有问题：二次探底衰退，并继之以GDP增长停滞、失业高企（特别是年轻人失业）以及国内需求崩溃。


Banks also embody the tangle of vested interests, malpractice, and even corruption that, together with la dolce vita, have come to be associated with Italy.	银行也是既得利益乱斗、玩忽职守甚至腐败的缩影，这些东西和甜蜜的生活一起伴随着意大利。


Despite the bail-in of four local banks, the bailout of Monte dei Paschi (one of Italy’s systemically important banks), the liquidation of two regional banks, and the market-led rescue of the mid-size banking group Carige – all within two years – the banking system has yet to be stabilized.	尽管发生了四家本地银行的自救（bail-in），对意大利商业银行（Monte dei Paschi，意大利具系统重要性的银行）的援助（bailout）、谅解地区银行的清盘，以及市场领导的对中型银行集团卡里奇（Carige）的救援——所有这些都在两年内发生——但银行体系仍然稳定。


Will the underlying economic recovery – this year and next, the Italian economy should grow in real terms by 1% – assist Italy’s banking sector by keeping a lid on a stock of non-performing loans (NPLs) totaling nearly €180 billion ($220.9 billion)?	基础经济的复苏——今年和明年，意大利经济应该能实现1%的真实增长——能够遏制不良贷款存量（目前高达近1,800亿欧元）的上升吗？


Or should the recovery be used to clean up wobbly banks’ balance sheets, by bundling their NPLs and selling them at a discount?	或者，应该利用复苏来清理不稳银行的资产负债表，将它们的不良贷款打包然后折价出售吗？


Before the global financial crisis, Italy was described as a country of solid banks that were rooted in the local economy and never played with exotic financial instruments such as derivatives.	在全球金融危机前，意大利被描述为银行可靠、深耕本地经济、从未涉足衍生品等有毒金融工具的国家。


It was also said to be a country of prudent savers, who buttressed the profligate public sector and its expanding debt.	人们还说意大利人是一个审慎的储蓄者支撑着铺张浪费的公共部门及其日增的债务的国家。


In the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, Italy’s then-finance minister Giulio Tremonti famously endorsed the health of the country’s banking system.	2008年9月雷曼兄弟公司（Lehman Brothers）倒闭后，意大利时任财政部长朱利奥·特里蒙蒂（Giulio Tremonti）还为该国银行体系的健康背书。


As a result, a major recapitalization of Italian banks and the creation of a “bad bank” to absorb NPLs were deemed unnecessary.	结果人们认为意大利不需要大幅重组银行并成立“坏银行”来吸收不良贷款。


Ten years later, Italy is no longer that imagined land of prosperous banks and happy savers.	十年后，意大利不再是那个想象中的银行繁荣、储户快乐的国度。


The prolonged recession and economic malaise have dented the individual savings rate, while banks no longer have the resources to provide peace of mind to many retail investors, whose trust has been severely eroded.	长时间的衰退和经济萎靡拖累了个人储蓄率，而银行也不再有资源让许多零售投资者感到安心，他们的信任被严重地损害了。


The implicit pact between banks and savers was broken in late 2015, when four troubled local banks were bailed in and the shareholders took the hit.	银行和储户之间的隐性契约在2015年年底被打破，当时，四家陷入麻烦的地方银行获得了自救，由股东承担损失。


For years, this pact had underpinned Italian-style financial repression, whereby risk-adverse savers traded safety, implicitly assuming that banks could not fail, and accepted relatively low real returns.	多年来，这一契约一直是意大利式金融抑制的基础，在这一金融抑制机制中，风险厌恶的储户交易安全性，隐含的假设是银行不会倒闭；


The political backlash that ensued from the bail-in triggered a blame game between the government and the opposition parties, and even between politicians and regulators, with all blaming the European Union and its banking regulations.	同时，他们接受相对较低的真实回报。 随自救而发生的政治反响引发了政府和反对党之间，乃至政客和监管者之间的相互指责，而欧盟及其银行监管更是成为众矢之的。


The government that emerges on March 4 will have to make the banking sector a high priority.	3月4日所形成的新政府将需要把银行业摆在工作重点日程上。


In order to restore confidence among savers and investors, it will have to find a solution to clear banks’ balance sheets of NPLs, which are undermining credit, making capital more expensive, and thus acting as a drag on the economy.	为了重塑储户和投资者的信心，政府必须找到办法清理银行不良贷款账目，这些不良贷款遏制了信用，让资本变得更加昂贵，从而对经济形成拖累。


The solution must be market-led, as the volume of NPLs is far too big, and the recovery far too slow, for this debt to be gradually absorbed.	解决方案必须以市场为领导，因为不良贷款数量过大，而复苏节奏远远不够，因此不足以逐渐吸收这些债务。


The new government thus may need to identify cases where NPLs hinder banks’ normal functioning, sell this debt, and prop up the capital of the affected banks.	因此，新政府需要辨别不良贷款如何妨碍银行的正常运行，出售这些债务，巩固受影响银行的资本。


At the same time, civil bankruptcy procedures will need to be reformed, to ensure the reasonably fast action on defaulted borrowers’ assets.	与此同时，民事破产程序需要改革，以确保对违约借款人的资产采取适当的快速行动。


If confidence and credibility are to be restored, sound governance has to be put at the core of the next government’s plans for banks.	要想重塑信心和信誉，就必须把可靠的治理作为下届政府银行计划的核心。


Over the years, regulatory lapses, lack of board independence, and a good dose of financial repression turned many banks into channels to fund family members, friends, and political associates.	多年来，监管漏洞、董事会缺乏独立性，以及各种金融抑制让许多银行沦为家族成员、亲朋好友以及政治利益集团的金库。


Monte dei Paschi, for example, was long associated with the center-left Democratic Party, which has been in government since 2013.	比如，意大利商业银行长期以来与中左翼的民主党关系暧昧，2013年后，民主党一直参与组建政府。


This political association may have prolonged the bank’s saga for several years, until it had become so battered by inconsistent piecemeal interventions that a market solution became impossible.	这一政治关系也许给这家银行续了几年性命，直到前后矛盾的零碎干预导致市场方案已经无从下手。


Following last year’s bailout, Italy’s Treasury owns about 70% of the bank.	在去年的援助后，意大利财政部拥有了该银行的70%。


Restoring market credibility also means clarifying banks’ role in the economy.	重塑市场信誉还意味着澄清银行在经济中所扮演的角色。


If they provide a public good – that is, credit to the real economy – should they be part of a broad-based long-term economic policy strategy for the country?	如果它们提供了公共品——即给实体经济的信用——那么它们是否应该成为意大利广义长期经济政策战略的一部分？


And, in an economy with approximately 600 small independent banks and too many branches, should consolidation be encouraged and supported?	此外，意大利经济中有大约600家独立小银行和多如牛毛的分行支行，在这样的情况下，是否应该鼓励和支持整合？


Any effort to put Italy’s banking sector on a sounder footing will require a stable majority government, consistent determination to put economic growth at the center of the political agenda, and willingness to confront Italy’s many vested interests.	任何想让意大利银行部门根基更稳的措施都需要一个稳定的多数派政府、一贯的将经济增长列为政治日程核心的决心，以及面对意大利的各种既得利益的意愿。


Unfortunately, none of the parties has so far come out with a comprehensive, credible economic agenda.	不幸的是，到目前为止，没有一个政党提出过全面可信的经济日程。


And none so far seems capable of winning or delivering a parliamentary majority.	也没有一个政党表现出有能力赢得或实现议会多数。


The most likely scenario, then, is that Italy’s zombified banks will continue to feed the populist electoral narrative.	因此，最有可能的情形是，意大利的僵尸银行们将继续为民粹主义选举叙事“添砖加瓦”。


And if that narrative fuels a populist victory in March, reform of the banking sector will again be postponed, raising the eventual cost still further.	而如果这一叙事在3月份让民粹主义赢得胜利，那么银行部门的改革将再次停止，最终的代价将进一步提高。


The Bunga-Bunga Party Returns to Italy	Bunga-Bunga派对重回意大利


LONDON – Now that Italy’s next general election has been set for March 4, the main contestants are limbering up for a tough eight-week campaign.	伦敦—意大利新大选已经定在3月4日，目前，主要竞争者正在为艰苦的八周选战摩拳擦掌。


The outcome is expected to be messy and inconclusive, but one thing already seems clear: the pacesetter may not be the 31- or 42-year-old sprinters heading the two leading parties, but rather an 81-year-old marathon runner.	预计选情将是一场乱战，结果难以预料，但有一点已经很清楚：决定大局的人或许不是领导两大领先政党的31岁和42岁的短跑选手，而是81岁的马拉松选手。


Yes, as shocking as it is, the kingmaker in this election could be none other than Silvio Berlusconi, the three-time prime minister who popularized the term “bunga-bunga party.”	是的，听上去令人震惊，但此次选举的造王者逃不出贝卢斯科尼之手。 贝卢斯科尼层三度出任意大利总理，他创造了一个流行词“bunga-bunga派对”。


Berlusconi, who last left office ignominiously in 2011, when the euro sovereign-debt crisis threatened to engulf Italy, cannot yet aspire to a fourth term – or to any public office – owing to a tax-fraud conviction in 2013, yet the center-right coalition he leads has the most momentum going into the election.	他的最后一次总理任期在2011年黯然收场，当时，欧元主权危机眼看就要吞噬意大利，而由于2013年因为税务欺诈被定罪，他无法觊觎第四个任期——或任何公职——但他所领导的中右翼联盟进入选战时的势头最猛。


Italy’s last general election, in February 2013, was also messy and inconclusive.	意大利的上一次大选在2013年进行，也是一场没有结果的乱战。


Since then, the country has been governed by coalitions led by the center-left Democratic Party (PD).	此后，领导意大利的是由中左翼的民主党（PD）领衔的联合政府。


And now, heading into the campaign, Italy is experiencing its fastest economic growth in more than a decade, though unemployment remains stubbornly high, at more than 11% (and roughly 35% for younger workers).	而如今，在选战开始之际，意大利正处于十多年来最迅速的经济增长期，尽管失业率仍然畸高，超过了11%（年轻人失业率更是高达35%左右）。


Yet that isn’t helping the PD.	但这并没有对PD起到帮助作用。


While serving as prime minister from February 2014 to December 2016, Matteo Renzi, the PD’s youthful and charismatic leader, cast himself as a rottamatore (scrapper) who would dismantle the old ways of the political establishment.	2014年2月—2016年12月间担任总理的魅力超凡的年轻的PD领导人伦齐说自己是一个拳击手（rottamatore），将打破政治建制派的老路。


But he ended up alienating more people than he impressed.	但到头来，他反而让对他寄予厚望的人离心离德。


His signature achievement was legislation to reform Italy’s sclerotic labor markets – hardly a vote-winner.	他的招牌式成就是立法改革意大利僵化的劳动力市场——这绝不是赢得选票的窍门。


Since peaking in 2015, with 40% of the vote in European Parliament polls, support for the PD has slipped to only 20-25%, and the party’s left wing has split off.	2015年是PD的顶峰，其在欧洲议会选举中赢得40%的选票，此后，PD支持率下降到只有20-25%，并且党内的左翼也发生了分裂。


Today, the leading single party in opinion polls is the insurgent, populist Five Star Movement (M5S), led by the comedian Beppe Grillo (though its official prime ministerial candidate is an inexperienced 31-year-old, Luigi Di Maio).	如今，领先民调的第一大党是叛逆的民粹主义政党五星运动（M5S），其领导人是喜剧演员格里洛（Beppe Grillo，但其正式总理候选人缺乏经验的31岁新人迪马伊奥（Luigi Di Maio））。


M5S has matured since its founding five years ago, when its central message boiled down to “a plague on all your houses.”	自五年凭借前可归结为“所有人家都有麻烦”的口号成立以来，M5S成熟了不少。


It has since moderated its opposition to the euro.	它缓和了对欧元的反对。


And with support at around 26-29%, it remains popular despite its poor performance running the city council of Rome.	尽管在执政罗马期间表现拙劣，但其仍保持了26—29%左右的支持率。


The problem for M5S is that, owing to a new electoral law, it will have to win roughly 40% of the total vote to secure a parliamentary majority.	M5S的问题在于，根据新选举法的规定，它需要赢得大约40%的选票总数才能确保议会多数。


Whereas proportional representation will determine two-thirds of seats in the lower house, one-third will be decided by first-past-the-post voting in single-member constituencies, where the M5S will likely lose out, because it is neither willing nor able to form the electoral alliances needed to secure majorities.	比例代表将决定三分之二的下议院席位，其余三分之一将通过单一席位选区的简单多数投票决定，M5S可能在这些选区中失利，因为它既不想，也无法形成确保多数所需要的选举联盟。


In fact, the party grouping that will benefit the most from the current electoral system will be the only one that has managed to forge a pre-election pact with other parties: the Berlusconi-led center right.	事实上，在现行选举制度下，最有利的政党类型只能是与其他政党达成选举前契约的政党，即贝卢斯科尼领导的中右翼。


As he demonstrated with his election victories in 1994, 2001, and 2008, Berlusconi’s greatest strength has always been building coalitions.	他在1994年、2001年和2008年的选举胜利表明，贝卢斯科尼最大的优势一向是构建同盟。


And, as in those elections, his own party, Forza Italia, will have as its main partner the separatist, anti-immigrant, and Euroskeptic Northern League.	而和这几次选举一样，他本人的政党意大利前进党（Forza Italia）的主要合作伙伴将是分离主义、反移民、疑欧派的北方联盟（Northern League）。


Of course, it will not be all smooth sailing for Berlusconi.	当然，贝卢斯科尼也不会一帆风水。


He will have to navigate the tricky process of agreeing to joint candidates with the Northern League’s energetic and ambitious leader, Matteo Salvini – who has his own eye on the center-right leadership – and with the group’s third, smaller partner: the right-wing Brothers of Italy.	他必须排除万难，与北方联盟的精力充沛又雄心勃勃的领导人萨尔维尼（Matteo Salvini）——萨尔维尼也在觊觎中右翼领导权——和联盟集团中排在第三位的较小合作党、右翼的意大利兄弟党（Brothers of Italy）就联合候选人达成一致。


Still, things are looking good for Berlusconi so far.	尽管如此，目前的形式对贝卢斯科尼有利。


Forza Italia is polling at around 16%, which is slightly higher than the Northern League’s support, even if it is well below the party’s heyday, when it polled above 25%.	意大利前进党的民调支持率在16%左右，略高于北方联盟，尽管比本党顶峰时期25%以上的支持率低很多。


And the center right will likely benefit from voter anger over inflows of refugees and migrants, and from the public’s fear of M5S’s disruptive potential.	中右翼还有望因为选民对难民和移民的而流入的愤怒，以及公众对M5S的破坏潜力的担忧而获益。


The wind is at their backs.	他们处于顺风位。


For his part, Berlusconi has cast himself as an elder statesman – even a safe pair of hands.	贝卢斯科尼将自己包装为长者政治家——甚至是一手安全牌。


He has softened his image, by speaking up for pensioners and professing a new interest in animal rights.	他软化了自己的形象，为退休者说话，并表示了对动物权利的新兴趣。


And, last but not least, he is still a stellar campaigner who happens to own the country’s major commercial TV stations.	此外，他仍然是明星竞选者，又正好拥有意大利主要商业电视频道。


Securing an absolute majority would be a tall order for Berlusconi’s group; but it is not impossible.	确保绝对多数对于贝卢斯科尼集团来说有些过于苛刻； 但也不是没有可能。


At any rate, a strong showing would be quite a comeback for the old showman – which is precisely what he has always relished.	无论如何，强势出镜对于老牌表演者来说是很好的咸鱼翻身之道——而贝卢斯科尼更是一直深谙此道。


If his center-right coalition wins a majority, he will directly choose the prime minister; more likely, he will be the key player in negotiations over a grand coalition government of center-right and center-left parties.	如果他的中右翼联盟赢得多数，他将直接选择总理的人选； 更有可能的是，他将在中右翼和中左翼的大执政联盟谈判中扮演关键角色。


Most remarkable of all, either scenario would be widely regarded as a stable and respectable outcome, compared to the most likely alternative: a minority government led by M5S.	最引人注目的是，相较于最有可能的其他情形——由M5S领导的少数派政府——这两种情形都被广泛认为是稳定的、可期待的结果。


Could Berlusconi end up being Italy’s political savior?	贝卢斯科尼会成为意大利的政治救星吗？


Don’t rule it out.	不要排除这一可能。


Japan’s Demographic Lessons for Europe	日本人口构成状况对欧洲的教益


BRUSSELS – Demography is not destiny, at least not entirely.	发自布鲁塞尔——某个地方的人口构成状况并不意味着必然会走向某种定局，或者至少并不完全如此。


Over centuries, policy can affect fertility decisions, and migration can transform a country, as the experience of the United States shows.	几个世纪以来，政策经常会影响人们的生育决策，而移民也可以像美国那样改变一个国家。


Over shorter time horizons, however, demographic trends must be taken as given, and can have a profound impact on growth.	然而在较短时间范围内人口趋势必须被视为给定的，同时可能对增长产生深远影响。


Yet demographic factors are often neglected in economic reporting, leading to significant distortions in assessments of countries’ performance.	但在经济报告中人口因素往往会被忽视从而导致对各国经济表现评估结果的严重扭曲。


Nowhere is this more apparent than in Japan.	其中受影响最大的国家莫过于日本了。


With real output – the key measure of economic performance – having risen by only about 15% since 2000, or less than 1% per year, Japan easily seems the least dynamic of the worlds’ major economies.	由于实际产出——经济业绩的关键衡量标准——自2000年以来仅增长了约15%，相当于每年不到1%，日本似乎很容易被视为全球主要经济体中最不活跃的国家。


But given Japan’s demographics – the country’s working-age population has been shrinking by almost 1% per year since the start of this century – this result is remarkable.	但考虑到日本的人口统计数据——自本世纪初以来该国的劳动适龄人口年均减少近1%——上述经济数据却是相当不错的。


In fact, Japan’s growth rate per working-age person was close to 2% – much higher than in the US or in Europe.	事实上，日本的劳动适龄人口人均产出增长率接近2%——远高于美国或欧洲。


Though the US economy grew more than 35% since 2000, its working-age population also grew markedly, leaving the annual growth rate per working-age person at only about 1%.	尽管自2000年以来美国经济规模增长了35%以上，但其劳动适龄人口数量也显著增长，使得每个劳动适龄人口的人均产出年增长率仅为1%。


That indicator – growth rate per working-age person – is not widely used by economists, who instead focus on GDP per capita.	这一指标——每个劳动适龄人口的产出增长率——并未被经济学家所广泛使用，而是以人均 GDP 为重点。


By that measure, Japan is doing about as well as Europe and the US.	从这一尺度上看日本的表现跟欧美相当。


But, while per capita indicators are useful for assessing a country’s consumption potential, they do not provide an adequate picture of growth potential, because they include the elderly and the young, who do not contribute to production.	但尽管各类人均指标有助于评估一个国家的消费潜力，却并不足以充分体现其增长潜力，因为它们把不会为生产作出贡献的老人小孩都涵盖在内。


Even in Japan, with its high life expectancy, those over the age of 70 do not contribute much to output.	可即使在预期寿命较高的日本，70 岁以上的人对产出的贡献也是微不足道的。


So, given its rapidly declining potential, Japan has been extraordinarily successful.	因此考虑到日本迅速下降的增长潜力，它已经取得了非凡的成功。


A key reason is that it has put a growing proportion of its working-age population to work: unemployment is today at a record low of less than 3%, and almost 80% of those who could work have a job, compared to about 70% for Europe and the US.	一个关键的原因是日本的劳动适龄人口参与就业比例不断增加：目前失业率处于不到3%的历史低点，几乎80% 的劳动者都能找到工作，而欧洲和美国大约只有70%。


Japan’s achievement of full employment and high job growth over the last two decades is all the more noteworthy in view of near-permanent deflation during this period (most prices are still lower today than they were 15-20 years ago). This should give food for thought to those who maintain that deflation imposes unbearable economic costs.	日本在过去20年中实现的充分就业和高就业增长在这一近乎长期性通缩 (当前多数价格仍然低于15~20 年前)的时期非常亮眼，也值得让那些坚称通缩会带来经济难以承受之重的人有所思考。


The Japanese experience holds important lessons for Europe, where the demographic future looks a lot like Japan’s past.	日本的经历对欧洲有极大的借鉴意义，因为目前看来后者的人口构成走向与过去的日本非常相似。


The eurozone’s working-age population has not grown at all in recent years, and will soon start to decline at a rate similar to Japan’s over the last generation.	近年来欧元区的劳动适龄人口数量并未增长，而且将很快以与上一代日本人相近的速度开始下滑。


It seems unlikely that immigration will alter the trend. In recent years, Europeans, like Japanese, have proven to be highly resistant to large-scale immigration, which is what would be required to offset demographic decline.	本可以用来抵消人口下滑的移民措施似乎不太可能改变这一趋势，因为近年来欧洲人跟日本人一样对大规模移民进行了极力抵制。


Moreover, the eurozone has now settled on a current-account surplus of around 3% of GDP.	此外，欧元区目前拥有相当于 GDP 3% 左右的经常账户盈余。


That is similar to the level long seen in Japan (except for the short period in the aftermath of the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear meltdown).	这与日本长期以来的水平相近（除了2011年福岛第一核电站事故后的那段时期）。


A first lesson of Japan’s experience is that, despite the eurozone’s difficulty generating inflation in an aging society characterized by excess savings, growth is not necessarily out of reach.	日本经验的第一个教训是，尽管欧元区在以储蓄过剩为特征的老龄化社会中难以实现通胀，但经济增长并不一定是遥不可及的。


Rather, given Japan’s record of growth without inflation, the European Central Bank should recognize that its target of “close to 2%” inflation might not be so important after all.	相反，鉴于日本在无通胀情况下的经济增长记录，欧洲央行应该认识到，其“接近 2%”的通胀目标可能并不那么重要。


In any case, the particularities of the eurozone’s structure mean that the ECB will have no choice but to halt its bond-buying operations in a year or so.	无论如何，欧元区架构的特殊性意味着欧洲央行别无选择，只能在大概一年后停止其债券购买行动。


This means that the ECB will not be able to follow in the footsteps of the Bank of Japan, which continues to purchase large volumes of government bonds, without any visible pick-up in inflation.	这意味着欧洲央行无法追随日本央行的脚步，继续在不出现明显的通胀抬头迹象的情况下大量购买政府债券。


Another lesson from Japan is that a country with a large savings surplus can handle a large public debt, because it can be financed internally. That does not necessarily mean that it is desirable to run up the debt.	日本的另一个教训是，一个拥有巨额储蓄盈余的国家有能力应付大量的公共债务，因为它可以实现内部融资，但这并不一定意味着提升负债就是可取的。


Japan’s debt-to-GDP ratio now exceeds 150% of GDP (taking into account the large financial assets of the government-owned savings institutions), and continues to rise, owing to large fiscal deficits.	日本的债务/GDP比率目前已经超过 150% (计入政府控股储蓄机构的庞大金融资产)并在巨额财政赤字的压力下继续上升。


This brings us to a final key lesson from Japan: in a low-growth economy, the debt-to-GDP ratio can quickly spin of out control.	这就引出了日本的最后一个关键教训：在一个低增长经济体中，债务/GDP比率好比脱缰野马。


Fortunately, it seems that this lesson already has been learned, with the average deficit in the eurozone now amounting to only around 2% of GDP.	但幸运的是欧洲似乎已经吸取了这一教训，欧元区的平均赤字现在仅相当于 GDP 的2% 左右。


The deficit cap imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact (3% of GDP) seems to have had at least some impact in terms of stabilizing the debt ratio.	《稳定与增长协定》所规定的赤字上限（相当于GDP3%）似乎至少在稳定债务比率方面产生了一定的影响。


The structure of the eurozone imposes limits on the use of both fiscal and monetary policy.	欧元区的架构对财政和货币政策的使用施加了限制。


This should prevent the excessive build-up of debt, ultimately making it easier for the eurozone to manage a future in which the only way to sustain growth is to capitalize fully on the economy’s declining demographic potential.	这应该能防止债务的过度积累，最终使欧元区更容易去管理自己的未来，而维持增长的唯一途径就是充分挖掘经济体中不断下降的人口潜力。


Why Is Japan Populist-Free?	日本为什么没有民粹主义？


TOKYO – Even as a wave of right-wing populism is sweeping Europe, the United States, India, and parts of Southeast Asia, Japan has so far appeared to be immune.	东京——即使在右翼民粹主义浪潮席卷欧洲、美国、印度和东南亚部分地区时，迄今为止日本也似乎没有受到影响。


There are no Japanese demagogues, like Geert Wilders, Marine Le Pen, Donald Trump, Narendra Modi, or Rodrigo Duterte, who have exploited pent-up resentments against cultural or political elites.	没有像吉尔特·威尔德斯、马琳·勒庞、唐纳德·特朗普、纳伦德拉·莫迪和罗德里格·杜特尔特那样的日本煽动者利用民众对文化和政治精英阶层压抑已久的怨恨。


Why?	这究竟是为什么？


Perhaps the closest Japan has come was the former mayor of Osaka, Toru Hashimoto, who first made his name as a television personality and then disgraced himself in recent years by commending the use of wartime sex slaves by the Imperial Japanese Army.	也许日本最接近民粹主义的元素是前大阪市长桥本彻，他最早出名是作为一名电视人，最近几年因为赞扬日本帝国陆军在战时使用性奴而蒙羞。


His ultra-nationalist views and loathing of liberal media were a familiar version of right-wing populism.	桥本的超民族主义观点和对自由媒体的厌恶是右翼民粹主义十分熟悉的版本。


But he never managed to break into national politics.	但他从未能够成功打入国家级政治圈。


Hashimoto now gives Prime Minister Shinzo Abe free advice on tightening national-security laws.	桥本现在为安倍晋三首相免费咨询收紧国家安全法律方面的事务。


And therein lies one explanation for the apparent lack of right-wing populism in Japan.	这也许能够部分解释日本右翼民粹主义显而易见的缺乏。


No one could be more identified with the political elite than Abe, the grandson of a wartime cabinet minister and later prime minister, and son of a foreign minister.	没有人比安倍更像政治精英，这位现任首相既是战时内阁部长及后来首相的孙子，其父又曾担任外交部长。


And yet, he shares right-wing populists’ hostility to liberal academics, journalists, and intellectuals.	但他与右翼民粹份子一样敌视记者、知识分子和自由派学者。


Postwar Japanese democracy was influenced in the 1950 and 1960s by an intellectual elite that consciously sought to distance Japan from its wartime nationalism.	战后日本民族深受20世纪五六十年代有意试图拉开日本与战时民族主义距离的知识精英阶层的影响。


Abe and his allies are trying to quash that influence.	安倍及其盟友正竭尽全力抹杀这种影响。


His efforts to revise Japan’s pacifist constitution, restore pride in its wartime record, and discredit “elitist” mainstream media, such as the left-of-center newspaper Asahi Shimbun, have earned him the praise of Donald Trump’s former strategist, Stephen Bannon, who called Abe a “Trump before Trump.”	他试图修改日本和平宪法、重新让人们为战时历史感到自豪并诋毁中左派新闻媒体《朝日新闻》等主流精英媒体的努力为他赢得了唐纳德·特朗普前战略顾问斯蒂芬·班农的赞扬，班农曾称安倍是“特朗普之前的特朗普”。


In some ways, Bannon was right to think so.	班农在某种程度上没有错。


In November 2016, Abe told Trump: “I’ve been successful in taming the Asahi Shimbun.	2016年11月，安倍告诉特朗普：“我已经成功地控制了《朝日新闻》。


I hope you will likewise be successful in taming The New York Times.”	希望你也能成功地控制《纽约时报》。


Even as a joke between two supposedly democratic leaders, this was disgraceful.	”即便这只是两位所谓民主领导人之间的玩笑话也是可耻的。


So one might say that elements of right-wing populism are at the heart of the Japanese government, embodied by a scion of one of the country’s most elite families.	因此你可以说右翼民粹主义元素一直存在于日本政府的核心，体现在这个国家最精英的家族后代身上。


This paradox, however, is not the only explanation for the absence of a Japanese Le Pen, Modi, or Wilders.	但这一悖论并不是缺少日本勒庞、莫迪和威尔德斯的唯一一种解释。


For demagogues to be able to stir up popular resentments against foreigners, cosmopolitans, intellectuals, and liberals, there must be wide and obvious financial, cultural, and educational disparities.	煽动者要想挑起针对外国人、世界主义者、知识分子和自由人士的民众仇恨，必须存在明显的财政、文化和教育差距作为保障。


This was the case in Japan in the mid-1930s, when military hotheads staged a failed coup aimed at bankers, businessmen, and politicians who in their view were corrupting the Japanese polity.	20世纪30年代中的日本就是如此，当时的军事狂热分子发动了一场以失败告终的军事政变，打击那些在他们看来正在腐化日本政治的银行家、商人和政治家。


The coup was supported by soldiers who had often grown up in poor rural areas.	政变得到了广大在贫困农村地区长大的士兵的支持。


Their sisters sometimes had to be sold to big city brothels for their families to survive.	他们的姐妹有时不得不被卖给大城市的妓院以换取全家人的生存。


The Westernized cosmopolitan urban elites were the enemy.	西化的大都市精英是他们的敌人。


And public opinion was largely on the side of the rebels.	而公众舆论则主要同情反叛者。


Contemporary Japan may have its flaws, but it is now much more egalitarian than the US, India, or many countries in Europe.	现代日本可能自有其缺陷，但却比美国、印度或欧洲其他国家要平等得多。


High taxes make it hard to pass on inherited wealth.	高税率导致财富难以传承。


And, unlike in the US, where material prosperity is flaunted, not least by Trump himself, the most affluent Japanese tend to be discreet.	而且，最富裕的日本人往往非常谨慎，而不像美国人、尤其是特朗普那样大肆炫耀物质利益的繁荣。


Japan has surpassed the US as a country of the middle class.	日本已经超越美国成为中产阶级之国。


Resentment feeds off a sense of humiliation, a loss of pride.	羞辱感和自尊心的丧失滋生了怨恨。


In a society where human worth is measured by individual success, symbolized by celebrity and money, it is easy to feel humiliated by a relative lack of it, of being just another face in the crowd.	在以名望和金钱为代表的个人成功为人类价值衡量标准的社会里，这些元素的相对缺乏、或仅仅成为普通人中的一员很容易令人感到耻辱。


In extreme cases, desperate individuals will assassinate a president or a rock star just to get into the news.	在极端情况下，绝望的人们会暗杀总统或摇滚明星来登上新闻头条。


Populists find support among those resentful faces in the crowd, people who feel that elites have betrayed them, by taking away their sense of pride in their class, their culture, or their race.	民粹主义者在那些愤怒的群体中找到支持，这些人感觉他们被精英阶层所背叛，剥夺了他们对阶级文化或种族的自豪。


This has not happened in Japan yet.	这一切尚未发生在日本。


Culture may have something to do with it.	文化可能是其中一种理由。


Self-promotion, in the American style, is frowned upon.	美式风格的自我推销令人不悦。


To be sure, Japan has a celebrity culture, driven by mass media.	可以肯定，日本盛行由大众媒体所推动的名人文化。


But self-worth is defined less by individual fame or wealth than by having a place in a collective enterprise, and doing the job one is assigned as well as one can.	但定义其自我价值的更多的是找到在集体企业中的一席之地，并尽可能做好分配给你的工作，而不是追逐个人的名誉和财富。


People in department stores seem to take genuine pride in wrapping merchandise beautifully.	在百货商店工作的人似乎对精美地包装商品感到真正的自豪。


Some jobs – think of those uniformed middle-aged men who smile and bow at customers entering a bank – appear to be entirely superfluous.	有些工作——想想那些微笑着向进入银行的客户鞠躬的身着制服的中年男子——似乎完全没有必要。


It would be naive to assume that these tasks give huge satisfaction, but they offer people a sense of place, a role in society, however humble.	认为这些工作赋予人们巨大的满足感未免太过天真，但他们却为人们提供了自己的社会角色，无论这些角色卑微与否。


Meanwhile, the domestic Japanese economy remains one of the most protected and least globalized in the developed world.	同时，日本国内经济在发达国家仍然全球化程度最低、受保护程度最高。


There are several reasons why Japanese governments have resisted the neoliberalism promoted in the West since the Reagan/Thatcher years: corporate interests, bureaucratic privileges, and pork-barrel politics of various kinds.	有几个理由导致日本政府一直抵制西方从里根/撒切尔时代就一直崇尚的新自由主义理念：它们是企业利益、官僚特权和各种各样的分肥政治。


But preserving pride in employment, at the cost of efficiency, is one of them.	但牺牲效率而保持就业的自豪感就是其中之一。


If this stifles individual enterprise, then so be it.	如果这扼杀了个人进取心，那么这是必须付出的代价。


Thatcherism has probably made the British economy more efficient.	撒切尔主义可能导致英国经济更有效。


But by crushing trade unions and other established institutions of working-class culture, governments have also taken away sources of pride for people who often do unpleasant jobs.	但通过打击工会和其他既有的工人阶级文化机构，政府也剥夺了那些往往做着不愉快工作的民众的自豪。


Efficiency does not create a sense of community.	效率不会带来归属感。


Those who now feel adrift blame their predicament on elites who are better educated and sometimes more talented – and thus better able to thrive in a global economy.	那些现在觉得失去方向的人将他们的困境归咎于受过更好教育、有时也更有才能，并因此更能在全球经济中发展壮大的精英阶层身上。


One of the more ironic consequences is that many such people in the US have chosen as their president a narcissistic billionaire who brags about his wealth, personal success, and genius.	其中一个更具讽刺意味的结果是许多这样失败者选择吹嘘财富、个人成功和天才的自恋的亿万富翁来担任他们的总统。


Nothing like that is likely to happen in Japan.	这样的情况在日本不太可能发生。


We might learn something valuable from reflecting on the reasons why.	我们可以从对原因的反思中学到某些有价值的经验教训。


The Conscience of a Conservative?	保守者的良心？


CAMBRIDGE – In a recent speech that received much attention in the United States and abroad, US Senator Jeff Flake, a Republican from Arizona, announced that he would not seek reelection.	剑桥——在美国和海外近期引发高度关注的一次演讲中，来自亚利桑那州的共和党参议员杰夫·弗莱克（Jeff Flake）宣布将不会寻求连任。


To agree with the reasoning Flake offered in defense of his decision, one must believe that a US senator’s highest duty is to speak truth to power, repudiate the president for “reckless, outrageous, and undignified behavior” that is “undermining our democracy,” and then quit.	如果你同意弗莱克为弃选决定辩护的理由，那么你一定认为一位美国参议员的最高职责是向当权者讲真话，批判总统“破坏国内民主”的“鲁莽、粗暴和不体面的行为”。


Many mainstream media outlets apparently believe just that, lavishing praise on Flake’s impassioned jeremiad.	许多主流媒体显然都相信这就是事实，不遗余力地赞扬弗莱克充满激情的壮举。


According to a CNN political analyst, it was “the most important political speech of 2017 – and one of the most powerful political speeches in the modern era of the Senate.”	据CNN政治分析人士透露，弗莱克的演讲是“2017年最重要的政治演讲——也是现代参议院最强有力的政治演讲之一。


Both The New York Times and The Washington Post featured the speech prominently in front-page stories.	”纽约时报和华盛顿邮报都在头版头条为此刊发了特写。


But if we take Flake at his word that he is acting on principle, we must ask: what principle?	但如果我们相信弗莱克坚持原则的说法，我们必须问问自己：“他坚持的是什么原则？


If Flake is right that democracy itself is in peril unless we all “stand up and speak out,” then what good does it do to throw in the towel?	如果弗莱克有关我们必须“站出来大声疾呼”，否则民主本身就会受到威胁的说法是正确的，那么现在扔毛巾又会带来什么好处？


In his speech, Flake began by pointing out that President Donald Trump’s words and actions are consistently beyond the pale, bringing disgrace to the office of the presidency.	在演讲中，弗莱克一开始就指出唐纳德·特朗普总统的言行根本无法接受，令总统办公室为此蒙受耻辱。


But Trump’s coarse behavior isn’t news to anyone who has been paying attention.	但特朗普的粗鲁行为对所有关注情况的人早已不是什么新闻了。


Flake then announced that he would “no longer be complicit or silent.”	弗莱克随后宣布他将“不再串通一气或保持沉默。


We can certainly applaud him for that, but then we should ask what took him so long.	”我们当然可以为此送上掌声，但之后我们应当问问他为什么等了这么长时间才做出这样的决策？


All Americans have a right – indeed, a duty – to speak out against threats to their country.	所有美国人都有权——实际上是有责任——不对威胁国家的行为保持沉默。


But a senator is more than just another citizen.	但参议员并不仅仅是普通公民。


Flake is one of 100 members of America’s highest legislative body.	弗莱克是美国最高立法机构百名成员中的一份子。


He shares with his fellow senators the power to vote yes or no on proposals made by the president.	他和参议员同僚们共同享有赞成或否决总统提案的权力。


He can draft and help shape legislation that he believes to be in the public interest.	他可以起草和协助制定他认为符合公共利益的立法。


And if at some point the US House of Representatives brings impeachment charges against Trump, he would be one of 100 judges presiding over that fateful case.	如果美国众议院在某个时点对特朗普提出弹劾指控，他将成为主持这一重大事件的百名法官之一。


It is understandable that a senator who regards a sitting president as a serious threat to the Republic would sound the alarm.	可以理解一位认为现任总统严重威胁共和国安全的参议员会拉响警报。


But for that senator simultaneously to announce that he is quitting makes no sense at all, especially given a senator’s unique power to act as well as to talk.	但如果这位参议员同时宣布他放弃竞选却根本不合逻辑，尤其考虑到参议员拥有发言和行动的独特权力。


Flake’s dire warning suggests that he should stay, not run away.	弗莱克恐怖的警告表明他应当留下而不是退缩。


Of course, Flake’s unstated reason for choosing flight over fight is hiding in plain view.	当然，弗莱克选择逃跑而不是战斗的潜在原因其实并不难看到。


Polls showed that he would have had a tough time getting reelected in 2018.	民调结果显示他在2018年寻求连任将会是一场艰苦的战斗。