Moreover, Trump’s actions will be challenged in court, and he will almost surely lose.	不仅如此，特朗普的所作所为将在法庭受到挑战，几乎肯定他将会输。


He will pump up a few voters in West Virginia and receive praise from Koch Industries.	他将在西弗吉尼亚吸引少数选民并得到科赫工业的赞誉。


But he will not be able to overturn the EPA’s regulation of CO2 emissions.	但他却无法推翻环保局对二氧化碳排放的监管规则。


Those standards are protected by the Clean Air Act, and Trump lacks the votes in Congress – by a wide margin – to change that legislation.	上述标准受到“清洁空气法案”的保护，特朗普很难在国会获得足够多的支持从而修改这项立法——他离所需的票数相差很多。


And American voters, by a wide margin, favor a shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy.	而且美国选民绝大多数赞成从化石能源转向可再生能源。


Even with America’s corrupt politics, the voters’ views still matter.	即使美国的政治像今天这样腐败，仍然不得不听取选民的看法。


Nor can Trump revive the dying coal sector.	特朗普也无法让垂死的煤炭工业起死回生。


Coal has everything against it these days.	今天所有人都反对煤炭使用。


It causes lung disease among miners and the public living near coal-fired power plants.	它导致矿工和生活在燃煤电厂附近的民众患上肺病。


It releases more CO2 per unit of energy than oil and gas, and it – and all the fossil fuels – is increasingly being outcompeted by wind, solar, hydropower, and other zero-carbon energy sources.	单位煤炭比单位石油和天然气释放更多的二氧化碳，煤炭和所有化石燃料越来越多的面临来自风能、太阳能、水电和其他零碳能源的竞争。


As for jobs, coal mining is becoming so automated that the entire sector employs just a few tens of thousands of workers in a labor force of more than 150 million.	至于工作机会，煤矿开采的自动化已经导致整个行业在1. 5亿的劳动大军中仅雇用百八十万采矿工人。


Coal mining will play no significant role in future US employment trends, Trump or no Trump.	无论有没有特朗普，采矿业在未来美国就业趋势中都将不会发挥重要的作用。


For the same reason, my bet is that the Keystone XL Pipeline, which would cost several billion dollars, will never be built.	出于同样原因，我打赌耗资数百亿美元的基斯顿输油管道将永远不会开工。


The world does not need Canada’s oil sands, given the urgent global need to move to zero-carbon energy sources.	世界不需要加拿大的油砂，因为世界迫切需要向零碳能源转型。


Canada’s oil sands are expensive to exploit, highly polluting, and far from markets.	加拿大的油砂开采非常昂贵、污染程度高且远离市场。


Regardless of Trump’s approval, investors are likely to reject a pipeline that would probably go bankrupt well before the planned horizon for its use.	尽管得到特朗普的批准，但投资者很有可能拒绝投资一条在使用年限远未结束前就很可能破产的管道。


China, Europe, and even the Gulf region will not be swayed by Trump’s moves.	中国、欧洲甚至海湾地区都不会被特朗普的举所作所为所动摇。


China is intent on lowering CO2 emissions, cleaning its air, and becoming the twenty-first-century leader in low-carbon technologies such as photovoltaics and electric vehicles.	中国决意降低二氧化碳排放，清洁空气，并成为21世纪光伏和电动汽车等低碳技术的领导者。


Europe is well on its way to a zero-emission economy.	欧洲正在快速走向零排放经济。


The Gulf countries are deploying large new capacity in renewable energy, especially solar energy.	海湾国家正在部署新的大规模可再生能源生产能力，尤其是太阳能。


In the end, we can be amazed at the foolishness of America’s president and the corruption of the US Republican Party.	归根结底，我们可以为美国总统的愚蠢和美国共和党的腐败而感到惊讶。


But we should not believe that Trump’s climate fantasies will change global reality or alter the implementation of the Paris climate agreement.	但我们不应相信特朗普的气候幻想将改变全球现实或改变巴黎气候协定的执行状况。


The Perils of a Trumped Fed	特朗普治下美联储的危机


ITHACA – While he attempts to overhaul American tax, trade, and immigration policies, President Donald Trump is mulling over a set of decisions that could prove even more consequential for the US economy.	发自纽约州伊萨卡——本来已经对美国的税收，贸易和移民政策大动手术的特朗普总统如今正研究一系列可能为美国经济引来更多后果的决策。


With Federal Reserve Vice Chair Stanley Fischer having retired this month, three of the seven seats on the Fed Board of Governors are now vacant.	随着美联储副主席斯坦利·费舍尔（Stanley Fischer）本月退休，美联储理事会的七个席位中已经出现了三个空缺。


And in February 2018, Fed Chair Janet Yellen’s first term will end, giving Trump a unique opportunity to stamp his brand on the institution.	而到2018年2月美联储主席珍妮特·耶伦（Janet Yellen）的第一个任期也将结束，给特朗普造就了一个特殊的机会去给该机构贴上自己的标签。


Trump’s nominees to fill these positions, and how he goes about choosing them, could have an enduring impact not just on the Fed, but also on the US economy and its central position in the global financial system.	而特朗普究竟会提名谁以及这些人选的产生过程不仅涉及到美联储的长期运作，还会对美国经济及其在全球金融体系中的核心地位产生持续的影响。


The Fed’s credibility has been methodically and painstakingly established over the course of many decades.	美联储的信誉是人们花费数十年时间按照一定程序精心树立起来的。


A case in point is former Fed Chair Paul Volcker’s decision, in the early 1980s, to hike interest rates and accept a temporary increase in unemployment.	一个例子就是美联储前主席保罗·沃尔克（Paul Volcker）在1980年代初决定加息以提升利率并接受暂时性的失业率增加。


Had Volcker not acted, the US would have suffered from spiraling inflation.	如果当年沃尔克未能采取行动，美国就会陷入螺旋式通货膨胀。


Volcker’s move induced the short-term pain; but it also bolstered the Fed’s long-term credibility.	沃尔克的举动引发了短期的痛苦； 而且也巩固了美联储的长期信誉。


Inflation is driven by many factors that the Fed cannot control, including productivity, foreign prices, and government deficits. But expectations about the future can also play a key role.	通胀是由美联储无法控制的多种因素驱动的，包括生产力，外国商品价格和政府赤字，但对未来的期望也可以发挥关键作用。


When firms and workers think the Fed is not committed to holding down inflation, inflation tends to rise.	当企业和劳动者们认定美联储不愿承诺抑制通胀时，通胀往往会上升。


The same is true for deflation.	通货紧缩也是如此。


At first blush, falling prices for goods and services may sound like a good thing.	起初商品和服务的价格下跌可能听起来像是件好事。


But deflation can be disastrous.	但通缩也可能是灾难性的。


When prices are expected to fall, consumers will hold off on making purchases, and businesses will postpone investments.	一旦预计物价将继续走低，消费者将停止购买，企业将推迟投资。


These decisions can then create a vicious cycle in which falling demand leads to reduced employment, growth, and prices, causing demand to fall further.	这些决定可能会造成恶性循环，因为需求下降导致就业，增长和价格三者纷纷下降，导致需求进一步萎缩。


After the 2008 global financial crisis, many countries faced the specter of deflation.	2008年全球金融危机导致许多国家陷入了通缩的困境。


But, thanks to the Fed, the US avoided both severe deflation and inflation, and recovered faster than most other advanced economies.	但在美联储的努力下美国同时避免了严重通缩和通胀，而且恢复速度比其他发达经济体更快。


The Fed managed to ward off deflation in the US by aggressively loosening monetary policy.	美联储通过激进式宽松货币政策成功阻止了美国通缩。


At the time, many economists feared that a rapidly expanding money supply and sharply rising government debt would fuel inflation and weaken the dollar.	当时许多经济学家都担心货币供应量的急剧增长以及政府债务的急剧上升会刺激通胀并削弱美元。


But these fears proved unfounded, and the Fed’s credibility was bolstered once again.	但这些恐惧最终被证明是毫无根据，美联储的信誉也再度得到了巩固。


The Fed’s credibility is what underpins the US dollar’s dominance in international finance.	美联储的信誉也是美元国际金融主导地位的基石。


About two-thirds of global central banks’ foreign-exchange reserves – that is to say, their rainy-day funds – are invested in dollars.	约2/3的全球央行外汇储备——也就是各国的应急基金——都投资在美元上。


And foreign investors, including central banks, hold more than $6 trillion in US government securities, up from $3 trillion a decade ago.	目前包括各国中行在内的外国投资者累计持有价值超过6万亿美元的美国政府债券，远超10年前的3万亿美元。


The dollar’s status as the main global reserve currency has helped to keep US interest rates low, thus reducing borrowing costs for US consumers and the US government.	美元作为主要全球储备货币的现状也有助于维护美国的低利率政策，从而降低美国消费者和美国政府的借款成本。


The Fed’s independence, along with the US’s institutionalized system of checks and balances and its adherence to the rule of law, is crucial for sustaining investors’ confidence in the dollar.	美联储的独立性，还有美国制度化的权力制衡体系以及对法治的遵守都对维持投资者对美元的信心至关重要。


Yet the Trump administration is weakening the checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches of government, and his indifference to the rule of law could pose a direct challenge to the judicial branch.	但如今特朗普政府正在削弱行政和立法部门之间的制衡，而他对法治的漠然可能对司法部门构成直接的挑战。


Under these circumstances, any act that undermines the Fed’s independence could seriously damage the institutional framework upon which US economic strength rests.	在这种情况下，任何破坏美联储独立性的行为都可能严重侵蚀美国经济实力所倚仗的制度框架。


The Fed has international credibility precisely because it is independent from any political master.	美联储之所以能享有国际信誉，正是因为它独立于任何政治操纵。


But the Fed also has legitimacy, because it is accountable to the government and to the people.	但美联储也拥有合法性，因为它对政府和人民负责。


That accountability is, or at least should be, based on pre-established economic targets – namely, low inflation and unemployment – rather than on the political whims of whoever is in power at a given moment.	这个问责制至少应该是基于既定的经济目标——即低通货膨胀和低失业率——而不是某个时期某位执政者的心血来潮。


From this perspective, Trump could seriously damage the Fed’s credibility.	从这个角度来看，特朗普可能严重损害美联储的信誉。


He need only appoint political loyalists instead of the best available technocrats; or appoint competent technocrats whom he has cajoled into professing personal loyalty to him, rather than to their mandates as Fed governors.	他只需要任命自己的忠诚追随者而非最优秀的技术官员； 或是任命技术过关但只对总统本人而非美联储长官这个职位效忠的技术官员。


A Fed dominated by Trump acolytes might prioritize economic growth over other objectives, such as maintaining financial stability and low inflation.	由特朗普追随者主掌的美联储可能会将经济增长置于其他目标（比如维持金融稳定和低通胀）之上。


But while this approach may boost GDP growth for a brief period, it would hurt growth in the long run, by fueling inflation and financial-market instability.	但这种做法虽然可能在短时间内推动GDP增长，但由于通货膨胀和金融市场的不稳定性增加，长远来看将会对经济增长造成损害。


Another danger is that Trump will get his wish for a weaker dollar – permanently.	另外一个风险是特朗普将实现自己那个让美元走弱的愿望——而且是长期性的。


Even the mere possibility of reduced faith in the dollar, alongside higher inflation, could push up interest rates, leading to larger budget deficits, lower growth, and an inflationary spiral.	只要有一点点削弱对美元信心的可能性，在加上通货膨胀率上升，就可能会推高利率，导致更庞大的预算赤字，更低的增长率和螺旋式通货膨胀。


If Trump does try to press the Fed into the service of his own political agenda, he could do irreparable harm to an institution that ensures financial stability, low and stable inflation, and sustainable growth.	如果特朗普确实试图让美联储为自己的政治议程服务，那么他将会对这个确保金融稳定，稳定低通胀和持续增长的机构造成不可弥补的损害。


Rather than putting “America first,” he would be undercutting the dollar’s status as the dominant global reserve currency, and clearing the way for others to fill its role in global financial markets.	最终得到的不是“美国优先”，而是削弱美元作为全球主要储备货币的地位，并为其他国家填补其在全球金融市场中留下的空白铺平道路。


Breaking Bannon	爆发的班农


WASHINGTON, DC – The just-released book about Donald Trump and his dysfunctional presidency (Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump White House) has left much of Washington reeling.	华盛顿 – 最近发行的关于特朗普和他的不健全总统行为的新著（《火与怒：特朗普白宫内幕》（Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump White House））在华盛顿掀起了轩然大波。


Despite the White House’s constitutionally dubious threat to try to quash the book, the publication date was moved up four days.	尽管白宫发出了在宪法上站不住脚的禁止本书的威胁，但其发行日期仍然提前了四天。


But the bulk of Fire and Fury’s disclosures, though deeply disquieting, aren’t all that surprising.	但《火与怒》所披露的内容，尽管让人深感不安，到并不那么出人意料。


It’s not yet clear how Michael Wolff, the book’s controversial author, obtained some of his information, but it must be assumed that he taped many of his interviews, particularly those used for the long conversations found throughout the book.	饱受争议的作者迈克尔·沃尔夫（Michael Wolff）如何获得某些信息仍不清楚，但想必他对很多采访录了音，特别是那些用在书中的长对话。


What Wolff has achieved is to get attributed quotes from high officials about how the president functions, or doesn’t.	沃尔夫做到的是获得高官关于总统干的怎样或不怎么样的评论。


But the book mostly tells us what most of political-journalistic Washington already knew: that Trump is unqualified to be president and that his White House is a high-risk area of inexperienced aides.	但书中告诉我们的内容，大部分是华盛顿政治口记者早已知道的东西：特朗普根本不够格当总统，他的白宫是充斥着缺乏经验的助手的高风险地区。


The only surprise is that more calamities haven’t occurred – at least not yet.	唯一的意外是——至少到目前为止——没有发生更大的灾难。


A good portion of what was released before the book’s publication concerns a battle between two of the most talkative, argumentative, self-regarding braggarts US politics has ever seen: Trump and his one-time chief strategist, Stephen Bannon.	在本书发行之前，人们所熟知的信息中有很大一部分是美国政坛前所未见的两位最“话痨”，最好辩，最利己主义的夸夸其谈者——特朗普及其曾经的首席策略师史蒂芬·班农（Stephen Bannon）之间的战争。


In the summer of 2016, with his campaign lacking a leader, Trump made Bannon – a scruffy, scrappy former businessman who was then the executive chair of Breitbart News, a website preaching white nationalism – the campaign’s chief executive.	2016年夏天，为选战阵营物色领军人物的特朗普让班农做他的团队执行主席。 班农是个不修边幅的泼皮无赖，此前是个商人，当时是布莱巴特新闻（Breitbart News，宣扬白人民族主义的网站）的首席执行官。


Bannon was full of big ideas about what a right-wing “populist” campaign would look like.	班农对于右翼“民粹主义”选战阵营应该如何组织充满了大概念。


In many ways, however, Bannon’s ideal campaign closely resembled what Trump was already saying and doing: appealing to blue-collar workers by attacking immigration – for example, saying that he’d build “a big, beautiful wall” along the border with Mexico, for which the Mexicans would pay – and trade agreements that Trump alleged were unfair to the US.	但是，从很多方面看，班农的理想选战十分接近特朗普已经在说和在做的：通过抨击移民——比如说他要沿着美墨边境建造一座“巨大美丽的墙”，建墙的钱让墨西哥人来出——以及特朗普指责对美国不公平的贸易协议来吸引蓝领工人。


These voters came to form the core of Trump’s base, and his success in wooing them, combined with Hillary Clinton’s stunning failure to do so, goes a long way toward explaining why he is president and she is not.	这些选民形成了特朗普基本盘的核心，而他在吸引这些蓝领工人方面的成功——以及希拉里·克林顿（Hillary Clinton）在这方面的惨败——可以有力地解释为什么是他而不是她成为了美国总统。


The problem for Trump is that the citizens he was wooing have never added up to a near-majority of voters.	特朗普的问题在于他所吸引的公民从未接近选民的多数。


His famous “base” is well under 40% of the public.	他的著名的“票仓”远远不到群众的40%。


But Trump and Bannon apparently preferred not to think about that.	但特朗普和班农显然不喜欢这样想。


Trump is prone to taking out his frustrations on others – he is never to blame for his failures – and inevitably these landed on Bannon, who bragged more than was good for him about his power in the White House and asserted more than he should have.	特朗普常常把自己的不满发泄到别人身上——他从来不将失败归咎于自己——班农当然也免不了受到波及，他对自己在白宫的能量吹嘘过头，索要也太多。


Bannon was ousted from the administration and left in August.	8月份，班农被逐出白宫班子。


Though he and Trump stayed in touch, in retrospect, an eventual falling out seems to have been inevitable.	尽管他和特朗普仍然保持联系，但最终的出局早已不可避免。


Trump and Bannon were like two overweight men trying to share a single sleeping bag.	特朗普和班农就像是两个胖子想共用一个睡袋。


Their political world wasn’t big enough for both.	他们的政治世界不够大，容不下两个人。


They disagreed bitterly over whom to back in the race to fill a Senate seat from Alabama; but, at Bannon’s urging, Trump ultimately backed the erratic former state Supreme Court judge Roy Moore, who’d been removed from the bench twice, and who lost the race.	他们为应该在亚拉巴马州参议员竞选中支持谁而闹得不可开交； 但在班农的敦促下，特朗普最终支持了反覆无常的前州最高法院法官罗伊·摩尔（Roy Moore），他曾经被两次剥夺法官职位，并且输掉了竞选。


Bannon was seeking to shake up the Republican “establishment” by backing similar “outsider” candidates in this year’s midterm elections, which, if successful, could make it all the harder for Trump to obtain victories in Congress.	班农寻求在今年的中期选举中支持类似的“局外人”候选者，以此来撼动共和党“建制派”，如果成功的话，特朗普想在国会中取得胜利将会更加困难。


Despite his denials, it was Trump who more or less agreed to allow Wolff, whose reputation for slashing his subjects Trump presumably would have known from his years in New York City, to interview the White House staff for a book.	尽管他本人矢口否认，但特朗普或多或少认可沃尔夫为了写书而采访白宫工作人员。 沃尔夫以鞭挞写作对象而闻名，特朗普在纽约的时候想必已经领教过这一点。


Some aides say they believed they were talking to Wolff “off the record,” meaning that they wouldn’t be publicly associated with their remarks.	一些助手说，他们以为与沃尔夫的对话是“不做记录”的，这意味着他们不会公开和他们的评论对应起来。


But, even if that were true, it was hardly soothing to a furious president: they had said these things.	但即使这是真的，也很难让一位狂怒的总统平息下来：他们说了这些东西。


In Trump’s view, Bannon’s great sin with regard to Wolff’s book was to say highly negative things about the president’s family.	在特朗普看来，对于沃尔夫的书，班农最大的罪名是说了一些关于总统家庭的“大不敬”的话。


Trump was particularly infuriated by Bannon’s description of a now-famous meeting that his son, Donald Jr., and other senior campaign staff held in Trump Tower in June 2016 with some Russians who said that they had “dirt” on Hillary Clinton.	尤其让特朗普生气的是，班农描述了一场现在众人皆知的会面，这场会面发生在2016年6月的特朗普大厦，他的儿子小唐纳德（Donald Jr. ）和其他选战阵营高级官员与几个俄罗斯人碰头。


Bannon told Wolff that the meeting was “treasonous.”	俄罗斯人说他们“脏了”希拉里·克林顿。


But, depending on what actually transpired in that meeting, Bannon might not have been so far off.	班农对沃尔夫说，这场会面堪称“叛国”。 但是，就这场会面实际泄露出来的信息看，班农的话并不夸张。


(Trump himself participated in a meeting aboard Air Force One, as he returned from his second presidential trip abroad, to draft a statement to cover up what happened in that Trump Tower meeting.)	（特朗普本人也参与了一场在空军一号上举行的会议，当时他正从上任总统后的第二次出访中回国，会议起草了一份掩盖特朗普大厦会晤内容的声明。 ）


Trump was also reportedly furious that Bannon had described the president’s favorite child, Ivanka, as “dumb as a brick.”	据说特朗普还恼怒于班农说总统最钟爱的孩子伊万卡（Ivanka）“笨得像块砖头”。


Wolff also reports that Ivanka and her husband, White House senior adviser Jared Kushner, had agreed that after their expected smashing success at the White House, it would be Ivanka who would run for president.	沃尔夫还报道说，伊万卡和她的丈夫、白宫高级幕僚贾雷德·库什纳（Jared Kushner）还商定，在实现了预期中在白宫的成功后，让伊万卡来当总统。


Overstating matters, as is his wont, Trump claimed, in effect, that Bannon had had nothing to do with his election victory, and that the two had almost never talked one on one.	夸张很重要，这也是特朗普的习惯。 特朗普说，其实班农对他的选举胜利毫无功劳，他们俩也几乎不说话。


And, as is his wont, Trump threatened to sue Bannon.	正如他惯用的计量，特朗普还威胁要起诉班农。


Trump has a long track record of threatening lawsuits without ever filing them, but even the threat can be costly to the putative target.	特朗普经常会发出诉讼威胁而其实并不采取行动，但即便是威胁，也能让推定的目标付出巨大代价。


Yet the momentary obsession with the feuding within the Trump camp shouldn’t obscure other realities.	但短暂沉迷于特朗普阵营内斗不应该遮蔽自他现实。


Behind the drama, Trump has certain clear goals, and cabinet and agency heads who share them – and who don’t get distracted by the publication of a juicy account of the president’s behavior.	在这出大戏背后，特朗普有着确定的清晰目标，以及所见略同的内阁和部门首脑——还有并没有因为被曝光的总统行为“猛料”而分散注意力的人们。


While much of Washington and its press corps were discussing the latest revelations, the Department of Justice, which is supposed to be somewhat independent of the White House, was being turned into a partisan instrument for pursuing the president’s grudges.	华盛顿及其媒体圈大部分都在谈论最新被曝光的材料，与此同时，司法部——它理应具有一定的脱离白宫的独立性——正在演变为追逐总统怨气的党派工具。


Indeed, last week, it was disclosed that the DoJ was reopening an investigation into the already thoroughly investigated matter of Hillary Clinton’s emails.	事实上，上周有消息披露司法部正在重启已经得到彻底调查的希拉里·克林顿电子邮件事件。


The FBI, it was also disclosed, would be looking into the Clinton Foundation.	消息还披露，联邦调查局也将盯上克林顿基金会。


The use of a government agency to punish a president’s previous opponent recalls the behavior for which Richard Nixon was impeached, and suggests a very different form of government than a democratic one.	用政府机关来惩罚总统的前对手让人想起了尼克松被弹劾的原因，它所表明的政府形式绝非不民主。


Who Wants to Deregulate Finance?	谁想要金融去监管？


LONDON – Since a revolving door was installed at the entrance to the West Wing of the White House, it has been difficult to keep track of the comings and goings in America’s corridors of power.	伦敦—白宫人事流动频繁，记录美国权力走廊的进出情况也变得困难起来。


Anything written about the Trump administration’s personnel and policies may be invalid before it is published.	你写好关于特朗普政府人事和政策的内容，也许在发表之前就变成了废纸。


At least for the time being, however, the key economic-policy actors remain in place.	但是，至少到目前为止，关键的经济政策人物仍然在位。


Steve Mnuchin is still Treasury Secretary and has not been mentioned in dispatches during the latest power struggles.	史蒂夫·努钦（Steve Mnuchin）仍然是财政部长，并且在最近的权力斗争的认识转换中独善其身。


Gary Cohn continues to chair the National Economic Council, though he is reported to be unhappy about some of the president’s statements on non-economic issues.	加里·科恩（Gary Cohn）仍然是国家经济委员会主席，尽管据说他对总统在一些非经济问题上的言论感到不快。


And of course Janet Yellen is still at the helm at the Federal Reserve, at least until February next year.	当然，珍妮特·耶伦也仍然是美联储主席，至少要当到明年2月。


But this stability does not seem to indicate a single settled view on economic and financial policy, particularly the future framework of financial regulation.	但这一稳定性未必表明经济和金融政策观点已经大局已定，特别是在未来金融监管的问题上。


A remarkable recent interview in the Financial Times with Fed Vice Chairman Stanley Fischer laid bare some major disagreements.	《金融时报》最近对美联储副主席斯坦利·费舍尔（Stanley Fischer）的采访相当引人注目，因为它揭露了一些重大分歧。


Central bankers typically make a virtue of understatement and ambiguity.	央行行长们通常以口风保守和模糊而闻名。


Fed watchers need to analyze minute differences in wording and tone to identify shifts in thinking.	美联储观察家门需要仔细分析用词和语气的细微差异，来识别思路的变化。


As Alan Greenspan famously told a Congressional committee, “if I turn out to be particularly clear, you have probably misunderstood what I said.”	格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）曾经在对国会委员会说，“如果我说得太清楚，你反倒有可能误解我说的话。


So the language used on this occasion by Fischer, normally the mildest and most courteous of men, should cause us to sit up and take notice.	”因此，费舍尔在这次采访中的说辞应该让我们正襟危坐，严重关注。 平时他可是以平易近人、礼貌周到著称的。


He argued that the United States’ political system “may be taking us in a direction that is very dangerous.”	费舍尔说，美国的政治制度“可能正在将我们引向非常危险的方向。


Referring to moves to roll back elements of the new regulatory order established in response to the debacles of 2008-9, he lamented that “everybody wants to go back to the status quo before the great financial crisis.”	”他提到，美国政府要开倒车，取消为了应对2008—2009年大崩溃而建立起来的新监管秩序的一些要素，哀叹“所有人都希望回到金融大危机前的状态中。


And he declared that “one cannot understand why grown intelligent people reach the conclusion that you should get rid of all the things you have put in place in the last ten years.”	”他还宣称，“难以理解为何成熟的聪明人会认为应该将你在过去十年中所实施的一切全部推翻。 ”


This is remarkable language, which merits deconstruction.	这些说辞引人注目，值得进行解构。


Fischer cannot possibly mean literally that “everybody” wants to return to the status quo ante.	费舍尔不可能真的认为“所有人”都希望退回原状。


The academic community is mainly in favor of even tighter regulation of banks, with higher capital requirements.	学术界大多支持更进一步收紧银行监管，提高资本要求。


With few exceptions, the press is even more hawkish.	除了及少数例外，新闻界要更加激进。


Furthermore, I do not know a single bank chairman who thinks that going back to leverage ratios above 40, and tier 1 capital of 2%, would make any sense at all.	此外，我也不知道有哪位银行主席认为回到杠杆率超过40、一级资本充足率只有2%的状态有任何理智可言。


So who is “everybody” in this formulation?	那么，在费舍尔的话语中，“所有人”指的是谁？


The phrase reminds me of my mother’s frequent observation that “somebody,” unnamed, had not tidied his bedroom (I was an only child).	这个用词让我想起我母亲常常看到“有人”——不点名——没有整理好他的房间（我是独生子）。


But here the suspect is not so obvious.	但在这里，嫌疑人并不那么显而易见。


The only concrete proposals to emerge from the administration so far are in a thoughtful paper published in June by the US Treasury.	目前，政府所提出的仅有的具体建议，都写在6月份美国财政部公布的一篇文章中。


It is true that the paper’s title, “A Financial System that Creates Economic Opportunities,” has a political flavor; but the specific ideas it floats are not exactly those found on the wilder shores where “free banking” advocates roam.	诚然，这篇文章的标题《创造经济机会的金融体系》有一丝政治的味道； 但它所提出的具体概念，与“自由银行业”鼓吹者经常提到的内容并不完全相同。


The authors of the paper – which was signed by Mnuchin himself – want to reform the complex, incoherent, and overlapping patchwork of regulatory agencies left in place since the crisis.	这篇文章由努钦本人签署，其作者希望对危机后留下的错综复杂、互相掣肘、叠床架屋的监管结构进行改革。


Former Fed Chair Paul Volcker, hardly a lobbyist for investment banks, has been making the same argument for some time.	美联储前主席沃尔克（Paul Volcker）绝非投资银行的游说者，但他一段时间以来一直持有相同的论点。


The paper also recommends some rationalization of the extremely complex rule books, relieving some simpler banks of the most burdensome and costly processes, and reducing the number of required regulatory submissions and stress test exercises.	文章还建议梳理某些极端复杂的规则，将一些功能单一的银行从最繁重、成本最高的流程中解放出来，并减少必须的监管备案和压力测试数量。


One can argue about the details, but, overall, this does not look like a return to a pre-crisis free-for-all.	你可以就细节进行争论，但总体而言，这看上去不像是要回归危机前的自由放任状态。


There is no suggestion in the paper that capital requirements should be significantly lowered, though it does recommend that the capital surcharge for systemically important banks should be “reevaluated.”	文章中没有提出资本要求应该大大降低，尽管文章确实建议应该重新评估对具系统重要性的银行的额外资本要求。


The one worrying section, for a non-US reader, concerns international standards, which should be accepted and implemented only if they “meet the needs of the US financial system and the American people.”	对非美国读者来说，文章中令人担忧的内容是关于国际标准的。 文章说，只有当国际标准“满足美国金融体系和美国人民的需要”时，才应该接受和实施。


Exactly how the latter will be consulted on the calibration of risk weights in the Basel accord is not spelled out.	至于如何征求后者对巴塞尔协议风险权重调整的意见，文章没有提及。


It is, nonetheless, hard to see why this document should have so rudely disturbed Fischer’s equipoise.	尽管如此，很难解释为何这篇文章为何会让儒雅的费舍尔如此激动。


Perhaps he was giving us a glimpse of more fundamental disagreements on financial regulation at the heart of the administration.	也许他是在向我们暗示，政府核心层对于金融监管问题存在更为根本性的分歧。


Or perhaps the Fed itself fears that regulatory rationalization is code for some cutback in its own responsibilities, which have been expanded remarkably since the crisis.	也许美联储本身担心监管合理化意味着要对其本身的责任进行一定程度的削减，危机爆发后，美联储的责任大大扩大了。


It would be unfortunate if the Fed’s opposition to change prevented a debate on whether, ten years on, every one of the changes made – often in a tearing hurry – make sense, both individually and collectively.	如果美联储的反对变革扼杀了一场对十年来的每一个变化——常常是在仓促中做出——意义的争论，那将是不幸的。


After all, many changes in the competitive environment within which banks operate – new payment systems, peer-to-peer lenders, shadow banks, and the rest – require careful analysis and thought.	毕竟，许多银行经营所处的竞争性环境中发生的变化——新支付系统、点对点（peer-to-peer）贷款、影子银行和其他变化——需要仔细的分析和思考。


So the US Treasury is surely right to open a debate.	因此，美联储开启争论绝对是正确的。


And it has done so in a thoughtful fashion.	并且它以相当深思熟虑的方式开启了争论。


Central bankers should take care not to suggest that there is nothing to discuss, that nanny knows best and the children should not ask awkward questions, like “Why?”	央行应该保持谨慎，不要断言没有什么可讨论的，或者认为老奶奶什么都知道，而小孩子不应该问诸如“为什么？ ”这样的令人难堪的问题。


That was never a good way to persuade a teenage boy to keep his room tidy.	这绝不是说服十几岁的男孩将房间收拾得井井有条的好办法。


It will not work for lawmakers or banks, either.	这也不是对付立法者和银行的好办法。


The Trump Deficit	特朗普赤字


CAMBRIDGE – It is a post-financial-crisis myth that austerity-minded conservative governments always favor fiscal prudence, while redistribution-oriented progressives view large deficits as the world’s biggest free lunch.	坎布里奇—带紧缩思维的保守派政府总是偏好财政审慎，而再分配导向的进步派将赤字视为世界上最大的免费午餐，这是后金融危机时代的一个神话。


This simplistic perspective, while perhaps containing a grain of truth, badly misses the true underlying political economy of deficits.	这一简单化的视角也许包含着一丝真理，但它完全没有抓住赤字的政治经济学的真正核心。


The fact is that whenever one party has firm control of government, it has a powerful incentive to borrow to finance its priorities, knowing that it won’t necessarily be the one to foot the bill.	事实是，只要某一政党牢牢控制了政府，它就有很大的激励借钱推行它的重点日程，知道它未必要为此买单。


So expect US President-elect Donald Trump’s administration, conservative or not, to make aggressive use of budget deficits to fund its priorities for taxes and spending.	因此，大可以期待美国当选总统特朗普的政府——不管它是否保守——将积极地使用财政赤字来为它的税收和支出重点项目融资。


The most accurate framework for thinking about government budget deficits in democracies was proposed in the late 1980s by the Italian scholars Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini, more or less simultaneously with two Swedes, Torsten Persson and Lars Svensson.	思考民主国家政府预算赤字的最准确的框架由意大利学者阿尔贝托·阿莱西纳（Alberto Alesina）和圭多·塔贝里尼（Guido Tabellini），以及几乎同时的两位瑞典人托尔斯腾·佩尔森（Torsten Persson）和拉尔斯·斯文森（Lars Svensson）在20世纪 80年代末提出。


While their approaches differ slightly in detail, the basic idea is the same: You give money to your friends while you can.	他们的方法在细节上有些许不同，但基本思想是一致的：你在有能力的时候借钱给你的朋友。


If there is less money to go around later, when the opposition party gets its turn in power, well, that’s just too bad.	如果后继乏钱，那么轮到反对党上台执政时，呃，一切都太糟糕了。


One only has to recall recent US economic history to confirm the insight of the Italian/Swedish model – and to see the absurdity of claims that Republicans always aim to balance the budget while Democrats always try to spend beyond the country’s means.	只要回忆一下最近的美国经济史，就能确认意大利/瑞典模型的洞见——并看穿共和党一直在宣称的平衡预算目标和民主党总是在尝试的不择手段地花钱的荒谬之处。


Back in the 1980s, conservative hero Ronald Reagan was willing to tolerate enormous deficits to fund his ambitious tax-cutting plans, and he did so in an era when borrowing wasn’t cheap.	20世纪80年代，保守派英雄罗纳德·里根不惜忍受巨额赤字为其雄心勃勃的减税计划融资，并且他是在借贷成本一点都不便宜的时期这么做的。


In the early 2000s, another Republican president, George W. Bush, essentially followed Reagan’s playbook, again slashing taxes and sending deficits soaring.	21世纪初，另一位共和党总统小布什事实上照抄了里根的策略，再次猛砍税收，导致赤字飙升。


In 2012, at the height of the standoff between the Republican-controlled Congress and Democratic President Barack Obama over deficits and the national debt, Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney proffered an economic plan that featured eye-popping deficits to finance tax cuts and higher military spending.	2012年，共和党控制的国会于民主党总统奥巴马在赤字和国民债务问题上的僵局达到顶峰，共和党总统候选人米特·罗姆尼（Mitt Romney）提出了一个用令人咋舌的赤字来为减税和提高军事支出融资的经济计划。


On the other side of spectrum, Democratic President Bill Clinton, during what most academic economists consider to have been an extremely successful presidency, actually put the government into surplus.	在另一个极端，民主党总统比尔·克林顿果真让政府实现盈余。 他的任期也被大部分学界经济学家认为是非常成功的。


Indeed, at the end of the 1990s, some researchers actually wondered how international markets would function if the US government gradually retired all of its debt.	事实上，20世纪90年代末，一些研究者真的开始疑惑，如果美国政府逐渐消灭所有债务，国际市场将如何运转。


Bush’s subsequent tax cuts and unfunded wars ensured that this never became a problem.	随后的小布什的减税和捉襟见肘的战争确认了这永远不是一个问题。


What, then, prevents deficits from spiraling upward as parties alternate power and borrow to help their supporters?	那么，在各政党轮流执政并借钱相助支持者的情况下，是什么阻止了赤字节节攀升？


In high-functioning democracies such as the United States or the United Kingdom, there is enough collective memory of the problems caused by high debt to allow some support for periodic reduction of debt/GDP ratios.	在运转良好的民主国家，如美国和英国，有足够多的关于高债务导致问题的集体记忆让人支持债务/GDP比率的周期性下降。


But even in the US and the UK, budget deficits are not sterile and neutral forms of economic stimulus, as in the classroom Keynesian model.	但即便是美国和英国，预算赤字也不是凯恩斯主义模型中的无害和中性的经济刺激形式。


Instead, deficits are almost always the product of fierce political infighting over fiscal priorities.	相反，赤字几乎总是关于财政重点的激烈政治内斗的产物。


Of course, in a constantly changing world, the costs of carrying a large debt burden can shift over time.	当然，在一个持续变化的世界，承担庞大债务负担的成本可能随时间而变化。


After falling for decades, interest rates are suddenly starting to rise.	在经历了几十年的下降后，利率正突然开始上升。


Different attitudes toward risk are a central factor in the perennial controversy over how much stimulus is optimal.	不同的风险态度是关于多大刺激可算最优刺激的长期争论的核心因素。


Until recently, many left-leaning economic commentators have been arguing for massive fiscal stimulus in the US, though they seem to have changed their position overnight (the night Trump was elected, to be precise).	直到最近，许多左倾经济评论家一直在争论美国采取大规模财政刺激的问题，随后在一夜之间就改变了立场（准确地说，就是特朗普当选的那一夜）。


No one quite knows what a reasonable middle ground between debt and stimulus would be.	没人清楚债务和刺激之间的合理中间地带在哪里。


The Nobel laureate economist Thomas Sargent and others recently argued that the optimal level of debt for the US is in fact very close to zero, though he does not recommend trying to get there anytime soon, given that US government debt is now over 100% of GDP.	诺贝尔经济学奖得主托马斯·萨金特（Thomas Sargent）和其他人最近指出，美国最优债务水平事实上非常接近于零，尽管考虑到美国政府债务现在超过GDP的100%，他没有建议要尽快达到这一水平。


Sargent’s recommendation contradicts the view (espoused most recently in an Economist magazine leader) that instead of stabilizing debt, all advanced countries should be aiming to emulate Japan (where net debt is more than 140% of GDP, the highest ratio among the advanced economies).	与萨金特的建议相对的观点（最近《经济学人》杂志的“领导者”栏目支持这一观点）认为，所有发达国家不应该追求债务稳定，而应该以日本为榜样（日本的净债务在GDP的140%以上，这一比率是发达经济体中最高的）。


What matters is not only the level of debt, but also how it is managed – a question I examined in a recent commentary focusing on the right mix of long-term and short-term government borrowing.	重要的不仅仅是债务水平，也在于如何管理——我在最近的评论中考察了这个问题，其核心是长期和短期政府借贷的正确配比。


Some, including Robert Skidelsky, seem to think that discussion of how the maturity structure of government debt should be managed is somehow a stalking horse for tight budgets and austerity.	一些人，包括罗伯特·斯基德尔斯基（Robert Skidelsky），似乎认为讨论政府债务的期限结构应该如何管理从某种程度上说就是在表示要收紧预算和紧缩。


But if interest rates shoot up in the Trump era (as well they could), the US government will wish that it had opted for less short-term borrowing and more long-term borrowing.	但如果利率在特朗普时代升高（可能性很大），美国政府将后悔当初没有选择更少短期借贷、更多长期借贷。


If a Trump presidency does entail massive borrowing – along with faster growth and higher inflation – a sharp rise in global interest rates could easily follow, putting massive pressure on weak points around the world (for example, Italian public borrowing) and on corporate borrowing in emerging markets.	如果特朗普的任期确实进行大规模借贷——并且发生更快的增长和更高的通胀——那么全球利率的大幅升高很有可能接踵而来，给全世界弱环（比如意大利公共债务）和新兴市场的公司借贷造成巨大压力。


Many countries will benefit from US growth (if Trump does not simultaneously erect trade barriers).	许多国家将受益于美国的增长（如果特朗普没有同时提高贸易壁垒）。


But anyone counting on interest rates staying low because conservative governments are averse to deficits needs a history lesson.	但认为保守派政府厌恶赤字，因而利率将保持低位的人需要历史的教训。


Trump’s Unrealpolitik	特朗普的不现实政治


NEW YORK – Some in the United States have praised President-elect Donald Trump for his supposed realism.	纽约—一些美国人赞扬当选总统唐纳德·特朗普，说他现实。


He will do what is right for America, they argue, without getting caught up in thorny moral dilemmas, or letting himself be carried away by some grand sense of responsibility for the rest of the world.	他们认为，他会做出有利于美国的事情，不会陷入棘手的道德困境，或因为要为世界其他国家负责的大责任而分心。


By acting with the shrewd pragmatism of a businessman, he will make America stronger and more prosperous.	他将奉行商人的敏锐的务实主义，将让美国变得更加强大，更加繁荣。


This view is, to be frank, delusional.	坦白说，这一观点完全是幻想。


It is certainly true that Trump will not be caught up in questions of morality.	特朗普不会受制于道德性问题，这显然是正确的。


He is precisely what the Greek historian Thucydides defined as an immoral leader: one of “violent character” who “wins over the people by deceiving them” and by exploiting “their angry feelings and emotions.”	他正是希腊历史学家修昔底德所定义的不道德领袖：一个“强力人物”，他“赢得人民是通过欺骗他们”以及利用“他们的愤怒感和情绪。 ”


But immorality is neither desirable nor a necessary feature of realism.	但不道德性既不可取，也不是现实主义的必要条件。


(Thucydides himself was an ethical realist.)	（修昔底德本人是一位道德现实主义者。


And there is little to suggest that Trump has any of the other realist qualities that his supporters see.	）也没有什么证据表明特朗普具备他的支持者所看到的其他任何现实主义品质。


How could anyone expect the proudly unpredictable and deeply uninformed Trump to execute grand strategic designs, such as the Realpolitik recommended by Harvard’s Niall Ferguson, Henry Kissinger’s biographer, following the election?	你如何期望桀骜无常又极度无知的特朗普执行宏大的战略设计，如同亨利·基辛格的传记作者、哈佛大学的尼尔·弗格森（Niall Ferguson）在选举后所提出的现实政治（Realpolitik）建议那样？


Ferguson, like Kissinger, believes that true Realpolitik under Trump should begin with an alliance among the US, China, and Russia, based on a mutual fear of Islamic extremism and a shared desire to exploit lesser powers to boost their own economies.	和基辛格一样，弗格森相信，在特朗普治下，真正的现实主义首先是美国、中国和俄罗斯基于对伊斯兰恐怖主义的共同担忧和利用次要力量提振自身经济的共同渴望而结盟。


These countries would agree to prevent Europe from attaining great-power status (by destroying the European Union), and to ensure that populist or authoritarian governments control the United Nations Security Council’s five permanent members.	这些国家将同意防止欧洲获得超级大国地位（通过破坏欧盟），以及确保民粹主义或极权主义政府控制联合国安理会五大常任理事国。


To this end, Trump could work with Russian President Vladimir Putin to help Marine Le Pen, the leader of France’s anti-EU nationalist right, win April’s presidential election.	在这方面，特朗普可以与俄罗斯总统普京合作帮助法国反欧盟民族主义右翼领导人马琳·勒庞（Marine Le Pen）赢得4月份的总统竞选。


Moreover, in order to consolidate a post-EU Anglo-Atlantic sphere, Trump could transform the North American Free-Trade Agreement into a North Atlantic arrangement, replacing Mexico with the United Kingdom.	此外，为了巩固后欧盟时代的盎格鲁-大西洋势力范围，特朗普可以将北美自由贸易协定转变为北大西洋协定，用英国取代墨西哥。


Finally, he could put pressure on NATO members to pay more for defense – a move that would surely undermine the security of the Baltic states and Ukraine.	最后，他可以施压北约成员国支付更多的防务费用——这一举动将肯定会削弱巴尔干半岛国家和乌克兰的安全。


Achieving these goals would require more than an ability to avoid moral impediments.	实现这一目标所需要的不止是规避道德障碍的能力。


Like all statecraft, it would require an aptitude for careful diplomatic engineering, respect for facts and truth, historical knowledge, and a capacity for cautious examination of complex situations when formulating (or revising) policies.	和一切治国术一样，这需要小心引导外交的天赋，需要尊重事实和真相、历史知识和在制定（或修改）政策时仔细考察复杂情况的能力。


Yet Trump is the most anarchic, capricious, and inconsistent individual ever to occupy the White House, and all he has to help guide him is a cabinet full of billionaire deal-makers like him, preoccupied with calculable immediate interests.	但特朗普是有史以来最无政府主义、最任性、最反复无常的白宫主人，作为他的幕僚的内阁里全是和他一样的亿万富翁交易家，充斥着对眼前利益的算计。


For them, casting off allies might seem like an easy way to streamline decision-making (and boost share prices).	对他们来说，脱离盟友时理顺决策（和提振股价）的速效药。


But repudiating America’s role as a global beacon – and thus the idea of American exceptionalism – is a bad bet for the future.	但否认美国作为全球灯塔的角色——因此也否认了美国例外论——绝不是对未来的好下注。


Scrapping free-trade deals with Asia and Latin America, for example, could provide a short-term gain for the US economy; but doing so would ultimately undercut the projection of American power there, paving the way for penetration by China.	比如，废除与亚洲和拉丁美洲的自由贸易协议可以为美国经济带来一些短期收益； 但这样做最终将影响到美国实力在这些地区的投射，为中国的渗透创造条件。


The US should be aiming to curtail China’s influence without incurring its wrath.	美国应该着眼于遏制中国的影响力而不激怒它。


Another lesson from Thucydides – reinforced by historical experience – is that rising, not established, powers tend to upset the international order.	另一个来自修昔底德——并由历史经验强化——的教训是，崛起的力量，而不是老牌力量，往往是国际秩序的扰乱者。


Protecting that order requires the main global power to uphold the institutions that underpin it, in order to prevent revolutionary behavior by lesser powers.	保护这一秩序需要主要全球力量坚守作为这一秩序基础的机构，从而防止次要力量“闹革命”。


Yet Trump has criticized and disregarded international institutions to such an extent that it is now China that is defending global governance – including the Paris agreement on climate change and the nuclear deal with Iran – from a revolutionary US.	但特朗普对国际机构大加批评和蔑视，如今反而是中国在捍卫全球治理——包括巴黎气候变化协定和伊核协议——抵抗美国闹革命。


Worse, Trump has seemingly abandoned all caution with regard to China.	更糟糕的是，特朗普在在对华问题上抛弃了所有的谨慎。


On the diplomatic front, by speaking directly with the president of Taiwan after the election, he violated a protocol maintained for four decades, by Democratic and Republican presidents alike.	在外交方面，他在当选后与台湾“总统”直接通话，打破了四十多年来民主党和共和党总统无不谨守的默契。


On the economic front, he has leveled reckless (and plainly wrong) accusations that China is manipulating its currency to gain an unfair trade advantage.	在经济方面，他鲁莽（也完全错误地）指责中国操纵人民币以赢得不公平的贸易优势。


Provoking China, doubting NATO, and threatening trade wars is nihilism, not strategy.	挑衅中国、怀疑北约、威胁贸易战，这些都属于虚无主义，而不是战略。


At this point, Trump seems set to do on a global scale what former President George W. Bush did to the Middle East – intentionally destabilize the old order, and then fail to create a new one.	眼下，特朗普似乎要将小布什总统在中东所做的事推广到全世界——有意识地动摇旧秩序，然后又无法建立一个新秩序。


The first step would be a deal with Putin on Syria – a move that, like Bush’s defeat of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, would amount to handing a victory to Iran.	第一步将是与普京就叙利亚问题达成协议——就像是布什在伊拉克打败萨达姆，这个动作将把胜利拱手让给伊朗。


This is not to say that none of the Realpolitik envisioned by Ferguson will come to fruition.	这并不是说弗格森所提出的现实政治将毫无成效。


But what elements of it do emerge will likely be driven more by Putin than by Trump – with dangerous outcomes.	但其中哪些要素最终会浮现有可能更多地由普京而不是特朗普决定——这将带来危险的结果。


Already, Putin has begun work on dismantling the EU.	目前，普京已开始着手分解欧盟。


After Le Pen was refused credit from French banks, Russian banks saved her campaign.	在勒庞被法国银行授予信用后，俄罗斯银行拯救了她的选战。


And Russian state-sponsored propaganda is helping to drive former Soviet republics away from the EU.	俄罗斯国有宣传结构也在帮助鼓动前苏联共和国脱离欧盟。


Trump, a vocal Putin fan, is unlikely to redress the tilting balance of power as part of, let alone as a condition for, a diplomatic “reset” with Russia.	特朗普直言自己是普京“粉丝”，他不可能将纠正这个倾斜的实力平衡作为与俄罗斯的外交“重置”的一部分——更不用说作为条件了。


What kind of a realist would not use a united Western alliance to limit a Russia that is trying to engineer a return to Cold War spheres of influence?	怎样的现实主义者才不会利用统一的西方联盟遏制试图回归冷战势力范围的俄罗斯？


And, for that matter, what kind of a realist sends to Israel an ambassador whose pro-settlement rhetoric threatens to inflame the entire Muslim world against the US?	并且，就此而言，怎样的现实主义者才会派出一位出言支持定居点、有可能让整个穆斯林世界都反对美国的人来当驻以色列大使？


What is so realistic about a war of annihilation against the Islamic State that is not backed by a plan for engagement with the broader Middle East?	针对伊斯兰国的歼灭战没有与大中东的合作计划的支持，这算什么现实主义？


Trump might have some realistic instincts.	特朗普也许有一些现实主义本能。


But they will not be enough to ensure measured responses to even the slightest provocation, much less to underpin a sweeping and consistent strategy.	但它们不足以确保特朗普能够对哪怕最轻微的挑衅采取克制的反应，更不用说支持大范围的一致战略了。


The Global Leadership Vacuum	全球领导力真空


MADRID – Germany and China are chief among the countries whose economic policies have drawn US President Donald Trump’s ire.	马德里—德国和中国是美国总统特朗普抨击经济政策的主要对象。


While the United States has the largest current-account deficit in the world, Germany and China are running the largest surpluses, and that irritates Trump and his advisers to no end.	美国的项目赤字是世界之最，而德国和中国则拥有最大的经常项目盈余，这不断地刺激着特朗普和他的幕僚们。


Trump’s top trade adviser, Peter Navarro, insists that China is suppressing the value of its currency, the renminbi.	特朗普的首席贸易顾问彼得·纳瓦罗（Peter Navarro）坚称中国压低人民币币值。


More surprisingly, Navarro has also accused Germany, an American ally, of “exploiting” the US and its European partners through an undervalued euro.	更令人惊奇的是，纳瓦罗还指责身为美国盟友的德国通过低估的欧元“剥削”美国和它的欧洲伙伴。


Most economists agree that Navarro’s accusations are largely unfounded.	大部分经济学家都认为，纳瓦罗的指控完全是子虚乌有。


Trump himself has flip-flopped on these issues, contradicting Navarro on occasion, even as he remains openly suspicious of US trade partners’ policies generally.	特朗普本人在这些问题上持不同观点，时不时反驳纳瓦罗，尽管他总体而言仍在公开之一美国贸易伙伴的政策。


Since Trump was elected last year, Germany and China have also been chief among the countries expected to supplant US global leadership.	自特朗普去年当选以来，德国和中国也一直是取代美国成为全球领导者的主力候选。


But Germany and China are profoundly different, and there is no consensus on whether either country can or will fill America’s shoes.	但德国和中国的情况大相径庭，关于它们中是否能有一个取美国而代之，人们也没有共识。


In a case of curious timing, both German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Chinese President Xi Jinping are approaching domestic political events that are widely expected to solidify their leadership positions in the coming years.	一个时间上的巧合是德国总理默克尔和中国国家主席习近平都即将面临国内政坛大事，人们广泛预计，他们将借此巩固未来几年的领导地位。


In Germany, Merkel is favored to win a fourth term as chancellor in the upcoming federal election on September 24.	在德国，默克尔很有希望在9月24日举行的联邦大选中赢得第四个总理任期。


A victory will put her on track to match Helmut Kohl’s 16 years in office – a tenure exceeded only by Otto von Bismarck.	如果胜利，她将和科尔一样执政16年——比俾斯麦的任期还要长。


Campaign-season debates in Germany have centered on Merkel’s “open doors” policy in response to the refugee crisis in 2015.	德国选战辩论集中在2015年默克尔对难民危机的“开门”政策。


Merkel’s welcoming of refugees has exposed her to ferocious attacks – including from Trump himself – and energized the German far right, which, through the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, will probably elect representatives to the Bundestag for the first time since World War II.	默克尔欢迎难民的决定让她遭到了猛烈的口诛笔伐——包括来自特朗普本人的批评——也助长了德国的极右翼，他们的德国另类选择（AfD）党有望赢得二战以来第一个德国联邦众议院席位。


Fortunately for Merkel, her relentless defense of humanitarian values does not seem to have cost her much support among those who voted for her previously.	对默克尔来说，幸运的是她不懈地捍卫人道主义价值观的做法并没有让她失去众多此前投票给她的人。


She and her party, the Christian Democratic Union, experienced a backlash in polls and state elections after the summer of 2015, but that storm has blown over.	2015年夏天之后，她和她的政党基督教民主联盟经历了民调和州选举失利，但这场风暴已经过去。


In fact, Merkel’s refugee policy has actually reinforced her popularity among younger voters.	事实上，默克尔的难民政策加强了她在年轻选民中间的受欢迎程度。


Toward the end of the twentieth century, former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright defined the US as the “indispensable nation.”	二十世纪末，美国前国务卿奥尔布赖特（Madeleine Albright）将美国定义为“不可或缺的国家”。


Now, almost 20 years later, The Economist magazine has deemed Merkel the “indispensable European.”	如今近20年过去了，《经济学人》（The Economist）认为默克尔是“不可或缺的欧洲人”。


But as Merkel herself has warned, it would be “grotesque and absurd” to expect that she could carry the standard of liberal internationalism.	但正如默克尔本人所警告的，期待她引领自由国际主义标准是“怪诞荒谬的”。


Germany, owing to its history, is reticent about reclaiming a leading role on the world stage.	拜其历史所赐，德国从不主张在世界舞台上扮演领导角色。


But at the European level, Merkel can and should use a fourth term to establish an international legacy that measures up to her political stature.	但在欧洲层面，默克尔可以利用其第四个任期建立一项配得上她的政治地位的国际遗产。


With the election behind her, and with a potential partner in French President Emmanuel Macron, she will have a prime opportunity to pursue measures to rebalance and strengthen the European Union.	赢得选举之后，以及有法国总统马克龙作为潜在合作伙伴，她将获得一次黄金机会采取再平衡和强化欧盟的措施。


Meanwhile, Xi’s legacy is also at stake.	与此同时，习近平的遗产也很重要。


In mid-October, China’s political elite will convene for the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), an event that will inevitably center on Xi.	10月中旬，中国的政治精英阶层将召开中共十九大——肯定将以习近平为核心。


As of last year, Xi has been officially declared the “core leader” of the CCP, a designation that his predecessor, Hu Jintao, never achieved.	去年，习近平已正式宣布为党的“核心领袖”，这是其前任胡锦涛不曾实现的。


At the Congress, CCP delegates will elect a new Central Committee, which will then fill the highest positions in the Party.	在十九大，中共党代表们将选出新一届中央委员会，再在其中产生党的最高职位。


Xi’s reelection as CCP General Secretary is seen as a fait accompli, and most analysts expect that he will continue to surround himself with faithful allies and oust potential rivals, as he has already done through a much-publicized anticorruption campaign.	习近平连任总书记被视为既成事实，大部分分析家预计他将继续提拔信任的盟友，罢免潜在对手，正如他通过广为报道的反腐运动所做的那样。


In 2015, Wang Qishan, Xi’s right-hand man who has been leading the anticorruption campaign, raised the question of the CCP’s “legitimacy” in a statement that previously would have been taboo.	2015年，习近平的左右手、反腐运动主帅王岐山在一份文件中提出了中共“合法性”的问题。 这在此前一直是一个禁忌。


With China’s economy slowing down in recent years, the CCP knows that it can no longer rely on growth alone to guarantee its political standing in the eyes of ordinary Chinese.	随着最近几年中国经济的放缓，中共明白它无法再只靠增长保证其在中国老百姓眼中的政治地位。


Xi’s anticorruption campaign is a central component of the CCP’s new legitimizing narrative.	习近平的反腐运动是中共新合法化叙事的核心要素。


So, too, is nationalism, which the CCP has been fostering through a highly visible and more assertive foreign policy.	另一个核心要素是民族主义，中共通过显而易见的更加咄咄逼人的外交政策彰显出这一点。


According to CCP tradition, Xi’s second five-year term should also be his last.	按照中共传统，习近平的第二个五年任期应该是他的最后一个任期。


But whether he will use his newly secured position to push for ambitious economic reforms remains to be seen.	但他是否会利用新巩固的地位推动宏大的经济改革仍有待观察。


His role within China after 2022 is also not yet known.	他在2022年后的中国扮演什么角色现在也无法获知。


On the foreign-policy front, Xi has signaled that he might be ready to fill the leadership vacuum created by Trump’s “America First” approach.	在外交政策方面，习近平表现出他或许已准备好填补特朗普的“美国优先”方针所留下的领导力真空。


But China cannot hope to replace the US unless it vastly increases its “soft power” and cultivates alliances and partnerships that it currently lacks.	但在中国大幅提升其“软实力”并扶植其目前所欠缺的盟友和伙伴之前，它没有希望取代美国。


The CCP’s stoking of Chinese nationalism does not make either of those tasks any easier.	中共的中华民族主义运动不利于这两项任务。


The ongoing North Korea crisis implies that the US-China relationship during the Trump-Xi era will be one of intense strategic competition.	持续发酵的朝鲜危机暗示，特朗普-洗金品时代的美中关系将是激烈的战略竞争。


Will other actors, such as Merkel’s Germany or the EU as a whole, step in to ensure that great-power cooperation does not deteriorate beyond a point of no return?	其他行动方，比如默克尔的德国或作为一个整体的欧盟，会不会介入确保大国合作不会超越界限导致得不偿失？


The answer to that question will likely determine whether the international order retains any order to speak of in the years ahead.	这个问题的答案很有可能决定了国际秩序在未来几年中能否保留现有顺序。


Trump’s 3% Growth for the 1%	特朗普的1%的人的3%的增长


CAMBRIDGE – US President Donald Trump has boasted that his policies will produce sustained 3-4% growth for many years to come.	坎布里奇—美国总统特朗普自夸说，他的政策可以为未来多年创造3—4%的持续增长。


His prediction flies in the face of the judgment of many professional forecasters, including on Wall Street and at the Federal Reserve, who expect that the US will be lucky to achieve even 2% growth.	他的预测与许多职业预测家——包括华尔街和美联储工作人员——完全背道而驰，后者预期美国能达到2%的增长就谢天谢地了。


But is there any chance that Trump might be right?	但有没有这样的可能，特朗普也许是对的？


And if he is, to what extent will his policies be responsible, and will faster growth entail grave long-term costs to the environment and income inequality?	如果是这样的话，那么有多大程度上要归功于他的政策？ 更快的经济增长是否意味着环境和收入不平等等方面的巨大的长期代价？


The stock market may care only about the growth rate, but most Americans should be very concerned about how growth is achieved.	股市也许只关注增长率，但大部分美国人应该关切增长如何实现的问题。


Trump’s forecast for the United States’ overall economic-growth rate is hardly wild-eyed.	特朗普对美国总体经济增长率的预测不能算激进。


A steady stream of economic data suggests that the annual rate has now accelerated to 2.5%, roughly splitting the difference between Trump and the experts.	稳定的经济数据表明，增长年率现在已经加速到2. 5%，大致介于特朗普和专家之间。


Moreover, employment gains have been robust during the first six months of Trump’s presidency, with more than a million jobs created, and stocks are soaring to new highs, both of which are fueling higher consumption.	此外，就业进展情况在特朗普任期的第一个半年中表现稳健，新增岗位超过一百万，而股市频创新高，这两者正在助力消费增长。


Given this performance, getting to 3% annual growth would hardly be a miracle.	从这样的表现看，实现3%的年增长并非奇迹。


And achieving Trump’s target would be even more likely if his administration suddenly became more coherent (which could indeed require a miracle).	而如果特朗普政府突然变得更加团结的话（这倒确实需要出现奇迹才行），实现特朗普的目标的可能性还会更大。


Of course, growth this year is in many ways a continuation of that achieved during Barack Obama’s presidency.	当然，今年的增长在很大程度上是奥巴马总统任期成果的延续。


Altering the course of a giant ship – in this case, the US economy – takes a long time, and even if Trump ever does manage to get some of his economic agenda through the US Congress, the growth effects are not likely to be felt until well into 2018.	要改变巨船的航向——就本文而言，就是美国经济——需要很长时间，即使特朗普真的让国会通过了他的经济日程的一些方案，对于增长的影响也可能要到2018年才会感觉得到。


To be sure, Trump has eviscerated the Environmental Protection Agency (which has helped coal mining), softened financial oversight (great for bank stocks), and has shown little interest in anti-trust enforcement (a welcome development for tech monopolies like Amazon and Google).	诚然，特朗普架空了环境保护署（这有助于煤炭采掘业），弱化了金融监督（利好银行股），对反垄断执法表现得意兴阑珊（对亚马逊和谷歌来说，这是值得欢迎的趋势）。


But his main policy initiatives for corporate tax reform and infrastructure spending remain on the drawing board.	但他的主要政策计划——公司税改革和基础设施支出仍在勾勒阶段。


Moreover, Trump’s plans to increase protectionism and sharply reduce immigration, if realized, would both have significant adverse effects on growth (though, to be fair, the proposal to have the composition of immigration more closely match the economy’s needs is what most countries, including Canada and Australia, already do).	此外，特朗普加强保护主义和大幅减少移民的计划如果实现，都将给增长带来巨大的负面作用（尽管平心而论，让移民的成分更加契合经济的需要的方案，正是包括加拿大和澳大利亚在内的大部分国家正在做的）。


Perhaps the single most important decision Trump will make on the economy will be his choice of who should replace Janet Yellen as Chair of the Federal Reserve Board.	也许特朗普将会做出的最重要的经济决定是选择由谁来接替耶伦担任美联储主席。


In other appointments, Trump has preferred generals and businesspeople to technocrats.	在其他任命中，特朗普偏好于军人和商人，而不是技术官僚。


By and large, the most successful bankers in recent years have been exactly the types of experts Trump seems to avoid.	到目前为止，近几年来最成功的银行家正是特朗普最为回避的专家类型。


Whoever Trump appoints is likely to face major challenges immediately.	不管特朗普任命谁，都有可能立即面临重大挑战。


Subdued wage growth in the face of a tightening labor market is unlikely to continue, and any big rise in wages will put strong upward pressure on prices (though this might not happen anytime soon, given the relentless downward pressure on wages coming from automation and globalization).	劳动力市场趋紧而工资增长滞后的局面不会延续下去，而一旦工资大幅增长，将带来强大的物价上涨压力（尽管考虑到自动化和全球化带来的无情的工资下降压力，这一幕在近期可能不会发生）。


How the Fed handles an eventual transition to higher wage growth will be critical.	美联储如何处理工资增长终于抬头的局面将十分关键。


If policymakers raise interest rates too briskly, the result will be recession.	如果决策者过快提高利率，结果将是衰退。


If they raise rates too slowly, inflation could become uncomfortably high and ingrained.	如果他们过慢提高利率，通胀可能会变得令人难以忍受并经久不降。


So, yes, Trump just might get his growth number, especially if he finds a way to normalize economic policymaking (which is highly uncertain for a president who seems to prefer tweet storms to patient policy analysis).	因此，特朗普固然可能得到他想要的增长数字，特别是如果他找到办法实现经济决策正常化的话（这对于喜欢推特治国甚于耐心的政策分析的总统而言，充满了不确定性）。


But even if the US hits the 3% target, it might not be the panacea the Trump hopes it will be.	但即使美国实现3%的目标，也未必是特朗普所期许的特效药。


For starters, faster growth is unlikely to reverse the current trend toward inequality, and a few small, targeted presidential interventions into the actions of specific states or companies are hardly going to change that.	首先，更快的增长无法扭转当前的不平等趋势，而总统对具体州和公司行为的少量小规模的定向干预也很难改变什么。


On the contrary, there is no reason to presume that owners of capital will not continue to be the main beneficiaries.	相反，没有理由认为资本的所有者将不再是主要受益人。


Eventually, that trend could reverse, but I wouldn’t bet on it happening just yet.	最终，这一趋势可能逆转，但我现在绝不会押注于此。


If environmental degradation and rising inequality make economic growth such a mixed blessing, is the US government wrong to focus on it so much? Not entirely.	如果环境破坏和不平等性加剧意味着经济增长的结果喜忧参半，那么美国政府如此专注于经济增长是否错了？


Higher growth rates are particularly good for smaller businesses and startups, which in turn are a major contributor to economic mobility.	提高增长率对于小企业和初创公司来说尤其有利，而它们反过来又是经济流动性的重要贡献因素。


Recent low growth rates have made potential entrepreneurs far more reluctant to move across states or to change jobs, and have reduced economic mobility in general.	当前的低增长率让潜在企业家不愿意跨州迁徙或换工作，这降低了总体经济流动性。


And if the US economy were to weaken substantially for a prolonged period, it could bring forward considerably the day when the US no longer has significant military superiority over its rivals.	而如果美国经济将在一个漫长的时间里保持相当疲软的状态，美国丧失对其对手的巨大军事支配优势的日子也可能大大提前。


Those who, like Trump, want to reduce US military involvement overseas may argue that this is nothing to worry about, but they are wrong.	特朗普等想减少美国的海外军事参与的人可能会说，这没什么好担心的，但他们是错误的。


Still, policies that produced more broadly shared and environmentally sustainable growth would be far better than policies that perpetuate current distributional trends and exacerbate many Americans’ woes.	说到底，能形成惠及面更广泛、环境上更可持续的增长的政策，要比将当前分配趋势永久化、加剧许多美国人的灾难的政策好得多。


Even if Trump hits his growth targets in 2018 and 2019 – and he just might – only the stock market may be cheering.	即使特朗普在2018和2019年实现其增长目标——很有可能——也只有股市会为此欢欣雀跃。


Trump’s Alternative Ethical Universe	特朗普的另类道德世界


LONDON – From the moment Donald Trump entered the US presidential race, the potential for an unprecedented array of ethics violations, stemming from his global business interests, has been a ticking time bomb, set to detonate on January 20, 2017.	伦敦—从唐纳德·特朗普加入美国总统行列那一刻开始，史无前例的道德大败坏——源自他的全球商业利益——便一直是一颗定时炸弹，它将在2017年1月20日爆炸。


Boom.	碰！


Plenty of other liberal democracies have experienced elements of authoritarian leadership, including nepotism, limits on freedom of speech or of the press, overtly discriminatory policies, and the abuse of public office for personal gain.	有许多自由民主国家曾经经历过极权主义领导的要素，包括任人唯亲、限制言论和新闻自由、赤裸裸的歧视性政策，以及以权谋私等。


But the United States has mostly avoided these traps, owing largely to term limits and a reliable system of checks and balances.	但美国避免了大部分这些陷阱，主要原因就在于任期限制和可靠的制衡制度。


Enter Trump.	特朗普来了。


Upon assuming a powerful position, no effective leader – in government, business, or anywhere else – publicly excoriates future staff; lashes out in response to any and all criticism; disparages highly regarded public figures; or refuses to learn about the issues he or she will have to address.	在就任要职时，真正的领导人——不论在政府、企业还是其他组织——不会公开苛责未来人选； 不会用骂声回应任何批评；


Trump has done all of this and more.	也不会拒绝了解他必须解决的问题。 特朗普则把所有这些事都干了一个遍。


Trump’s transition team sent surveys to the US Department of Energy, seeking the names of employees who have worked on climate-change policy.	特朗普的过渡团队在美国能源部搞了一个调查，希望找出哪些员工参与了气候变化政策制定。


He has offered a key White House role to his son-in-law, Jared Kushner.	他给他的女婿贾雷德·库什纳（Jared Kushner）安排了一个关键性的白宫职位。


And he has consistently refused intelligence briefings, dismissed the concerns of the intelligence community about Russian meddling in the election, and even likened the release of information about those concerns to Nazi Germany.	他一直否认情报简报，驳斥情报机构关于俄罗斯操纵大选的质疑，甚至将这一质疑信息的泄露与纳粹德国相提并论。


Of course, Trump’s distrust of experts is far from unique nowadays.	当然，特朗普对专家的不信任在当今绝非独此一家。


But using experts’ missteps or uncertainties to justify disregarding facts is irresponsible.	但用专家的失误和不可靠来证明蔑视事实的合理性是不负责任的。


For the US president – a person tasked with serving and protecting people all over the world – it’s downright dangerous.	对美国总统来说——他负有服务和保护全世界人民的任务——这是非常危险的。


The danger is all the more acute when the president is taking advantage of skepticism about facts to manipulate perceptions and create space for his own unethical behavior.	当美国总统利用对事实的质疑操纵人们的感觉、为其自身的不道德行为创造空间时，这一危险就变得尤其突出。


Trump has claimed that he will disentangle himself from his business to avoid conflicts of interests, while offering no credible plan for doing so.	特朗普宣称他将不再担任自己企业的任何职位，以避免利益冲突，但并未给出如何做的可信计划。


Trump’s team has been consistent about little except its insistence on the notion that being powerful is equivalent to being right.	特朗普的团队几乎在所有问题上都存在分歧，除了坚持有权即正确这一点。


When asked about Trump’s behavior, Kellyanne Conway, Trump’s campaign manager and now a White House counselor, replied, “He’s the president-elect, so that’s presidential behavior.”	在被问及特朗普的行为时，特朗普的竞选经理、现任白宫律师的凯丽安妮·康威（Kellyanne Conway）回答说：“他是当选总统，因此这是总统的行为。


Trump himself has responded to questions about his campaign rhetoric with a simple “I won.”	”特朗普本人对其竞选纲领的质疑的回答很简单：“我赢了。 ”


Congressional Republicans seem to be on board with this demagogic approach.	国会共和党似乎是其煽动方针的一丘之貉。


The party’s caucus in the House of Representatives made it their order of business to try to gut an independent ethics committee established in the wake of scandals a decade ago.	该党的众议院核心小组制定的议事日程包括取消一个因为十年前的丑闻而成立的独立道德委员会。


The backlash was swift, and they had to back off.	此举引起轩然大波，他们不得不有所收敛。


But they may yet try again: Trump criticized the move, but only its timing, and called the ethics committee “unfair.”	但他们可能再次做出尝试：特朗普批评了这一举动，但只是说时机不恰当，并称道德委员会“不公平”。


The attack on ethics does not end there.	对道德的攻击不仅于此。


Senate Republicans have pushed forward confirmation hearings for Trump’s cabinet picks, even though proper vetting and financial disclosures have not yet taken place.	参议院共和党积极推进特朗普内阁人选的确认听证，尽管适当审查和财务披露都还尚未进行。


Efforts have been made to counter – or, at least, highlight – the ethics violations that Trump and his team are accumulating.	对于特朗普及其团队愈演愈烈的违反道德的行为，人们已经做出了反击——或至少是突出他们的所作所为。


Walter Shaub, Director of the independent Office of Government Ethics, which was established after Watergate, spoke out on the subject.	水门事件后成立的独立的政府道德办公室主任沃尔特·肖博（Walter Shaub）就该问题发声。


(Trump’s chief of staff responded with a veiled threat, warning the director to “be careful.”)	（特朗普的幕僚长应之以隐晦的威胁，警告肖博主任“小心”。


The Washington Post has created a new team devoted specifically to covering conflicts of interest within the Trump administration and possible violations of the Emoluments Clause of the US Constitution, which prohibits anyone holding public office from accepting money or gifts from foreign officials.	）《华盛顿邮报》成立了新的团队专门负责报道特朗普政府内部的利益冲突和可能的违反美国宪法薪酬条款的行为。 宪法薪酬条款禁止任何公职人员接受外国官员的钱财或礼物。


But, for now, Trump and his enablers seem committed to continuing down their current path – an approach that is already weakening America’s moral authority.	但是，目前特朗普和让他问鼎总统宝座的人似乎铁了心要沿着当前道路走到底——他们的方针已经开始对美国的道德权威形成了削弱作用。


While many world leaders are concerned about Trump’s behavior, many others are probably thinking that they now have tacit permission to do likewise.	许多世界领导人关注着特朗普的一言一行，也有许多领导人也许在想他们已经获得了效而仿之的默许。


Business leaders, too, may conclude that they can flout ethical rules.	商业领导人也可能认为他们可以蔑视道德规则。


This logic, while understandable, is flawed.	这一逻辑不难理解，但有缺陷。


Trump won’t be US president forever.	特朗普不能永远当美国总统。


Right-wing populist movements like his will eventually tear themselves apart, not least because their leaders are not committed to policies that will actually help their constituents.	像他这样的右翼民粹主义运动最终会反噬自身，因为领导人的心不在真正能够帮助支持他的选民的政策上。


On the contrary, Trump and congressional Republicans are moving fast to dismantle the Affordable Care Act – President Barack Obama’s signature health-care policy – claiming that its as-yet-undefined replacement will maintain the popular elements and drop the unpopular ones.	相反，特朗普和国会共和党迫不及待地要废除奥巴马总统的招牌医保政策——平价医疗法，宣称他们的尚未有定论的替代方案将保留平价医疗法中广受支持的部分，删除不受欢迎的部分。


In reality, this will be impossible.	现实是这根本不可能。


Those who take advantage of the current ethical fugue for personal or shareholder gain will have to answer for it when the political pendulum swings back to sanity.	那些利用当前针对个人和股东收益的道德赋格（ethical fugue）的人，当政治钟摆重新回到理智时必须对此负责。


So will those who, while not jumping aboard the venality train themselves, hold the doors open for others, by failing to defend ethical standards.	那些尽管自己不曾同流合污、但因为没能捍卫道德标准而为唯利是图者打开方便之门的人亦然。


Politicians and businesspeople must now decide whether they will be known as opportunists and enablers or as true leaders, adhering to the ethics and principles that they have publicly espoused.	眼下，政客和商人必须决定他们是要做机会主义者和推波助澜者，还是做真正的领袖，严守他们公开信奉的道德和原则。


The World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos, Switzerland, which focused on “responsible and responsive leadership,” presented an early opportunity to draw a line in the sand.	今年的瑞士达沃斯世界经济论坛的主题是“应势而为、勇于担当的领导力”，这是一次划清界限的良机。


In the future, those who remained on the right side of it will be glad they did.	在未来，坚守正确阵营的人将笑到最后。


Don’t Cry for Corporate America	无须为美国企业喊冤


NEW HAVEN – Corporate tax cuts are coming in the United States.	发自纽黑文——美国的企业税减免政策已是箭在弦上。


While this push pre-dates last November’s presidential election, President Donald Trump’s Make-America-Great-Again mantra has sealed the deal.	虽然推动该项措施的力量在去年11月总统大选之前已经存在，但却是唐纳德·特朗普总统“让美国再次伟大起来”的咒语将其一锤定音。


Beleaguered US businesses, goes the argument, are being squeezed by confiscatory taxes and onerous regulations – strangling corporate earnings and putting unrelenting pressure on capital spending, job creation, and productivity, while sapping America’s competitive vitality.	该政策的支持者认为，那些举步维艰的美国企业在没收性赋税及繁重法规的挤压下苦苦坚持——企业收益被锁死，资本支出，创造就业机会和生产力都遭受无情重压，还削弱了美国的竞争活力。


Apparently, the time has come to give businesses a break.	很显然现在是让企业喘口气的时候了。


But this argument raises an obvious question: If the problem is so simple, why hasn’t this fix already been tried?	但该论点引出了一个显而易见的问题：如果问题的症结如今简单，为什么就从未尝试过这一修复方案？


The answer is surprising.	而答案也是出人意料的。


For starters, it is a real stretch to bemoan the state of corporate earnings in the US.	首先，哀叹美国企业收入低迷的论调本是言过其实。


Commerce Department statistics show that after-tax corporate profits (technically, after-tax profits from current production, adjusted for inventory and depreciation-accounting distortions) stood at a solid 9.7% of national income in the third quarter of 2016.	美国商务部统计数据显示，2016年第三季度的税后公司利润（技术上说，就是计入库存和折旧减扣后的当前生产税后利润）处于占国民收入9. 7％的稳定水平。


While that is down from the 11% peak hit in 2012 – owing to tepid economic growth, which typically puts pressure on profit margins – it hardly attests to a chronic earnings problem.	虽然这相对于2012年11％的高点有所下滑——因为经济增长趋缓通常会给利润率带来压力 ，但不能据此将其称之为一个长期性收入问题。


Far from anemic, the current GDP share of after-tax profits is well above the post-1980 average of 7.6%.	目前税后利润占GDP的比例远高于1980年代后的7. 6%的平均水平，远未达到严重的程度。


Trends in corporate taxes, which stood at just 3.5% of national income in the third quarter of 2016, support a similar verdict.	2016年第三季度公司税的走势（只占国民收入的3. 5％）也支持类似的判断。


Yes, the figure is higher than the post-2000 level of 3% (which represents the lowest 15-year average tax burden for corporate America since the 2.9% reading in the mid-1990s); but it is well below the 5.2% average share recorded during the boom years of the post-World War II era, from 1950 to 1969.	虽然这个数字确实高于2000年后3％的水平（这是自1990年代中期2. 9％开始最低的美国企业15年平均税负数），但却远低于1950~69年二战后繁荣时期5.


In other words, while there may be reason to criticize the structure and complexities of the US corporate tax burden, there is little to suggest that overall corporate taxes are excessive.	2％的平均份额。 换句话说，虽然或许可以批评美国公司税负过度复杂繁琐，但说公司总体税负过重就没什么理由了。


Conversely, the share of national income going to labor has been declining.	相反，劳动收入占国民收入的份额一直在下降。


In the third quarter of 2016, worker compensation – wages, salaries, fringe benefits, and other so-called supplements such as social security, pension contributions, and medical benefits – stood at 62.6% of national income.	在2016年第三季度，工人薪酬——工资，薪金，附带福利和其他各式补贴（如社会保障，养老金缴款和医疗福利）——占了国民收入的62. 6％。


While that represents a bit of a rebound from the 61.2% low recorded in the 2012-2014 period, it is two percentage points below the post-1980 average of 64.6%.	虽然这一数字较2012~14年期间的61. 2％低点有所反弹，但比1980年后的平均64.


In other words, the pendulum of economic returns has swung decisively away from labor toward owners of capital – not exactly a compelling argument in favor of relief for purportedly hard-pressed American businesses.	6％的水平低两个百分点。 换句话说，经济回报的摆锤已经彻底偏离了劳动者而摆向资本所有者一方——这对那些鼓吹要将美国企业从所谓重压下解放出来的人来说可不是个好论据。


But what about the seemingly chronic weakness in capital spending and job creation, widely thought to be additional manifestations of overly burdened US companies?	那么又如何解释资本支出和创造就业的长期疲软状况（被广泛认为是美国企业负担过重的额外表征）？


Yes, both business investment and employment growth have been glaring weak spots in the current recovery. There is a distinct possibility, however, that this is due less to onerous taxes and regulatory strangulation, and more to an unprecedented shortfall of aggregate demand.	商业投资和就业增长无疑都是当前复苏的明显软肋，但在此存在一个突出的可能性，这些状况更多源自于总需求的巨大缺口，而非繁重税收和监管限制。


Economists long ago settled the debate over what drives business capital spending: factors affecting the cost of capital (interest rates, taxes, and regulations) or those that influence future demand.	经济学家很久以前解决了关于商业资本支出背后驱动因素的争论：影响资金成本（利率，税收和法规）或未来需求的因素。


The demand-driven models (operating through so-called “accelerator” effects) won hands down.	需求驱动型模式（通过所谓“加速器”效应来操作）无可争议地成为首选。


This is logical.	这是合乎逻辑的。


Businesses can be expected to expand capacity and hire workers only if they anticipate that their markets will grow in the future.	只有当企业预期自身市场在未来会有所增长之时才会扩产和雇人。


For the US, that may also be a stretch.	但对于美国来说这也可能也有所夸张了。


Since the first quarter of 2008, inflation-adjusted personal consumption expenditures in the US have grown by just 1.6% annually, on average – fully two percentage points below the 3.6% norm in the 12 preceding years.	自2008年第一季度以来，计入通胀因素后的美国个人消费支出额年均增长1. 6％，比前面12年3.


In fact, the current period is the weakest 35 quarters of real consumption growth in post-WWII history.	6％的水平整整低了两个百分点。 事实上，当前时期是二战后以来实际消费增长最弱的35个季度。


If past is prologue – as it is for many businesses as they frame their expectations – the focus on tax relief and deregulation could ring hollow, without addressing weak consumer demand.	如果过去就是未来的序言——因为它是许多企业制定未来预期的框架——减税和放松管制的强调可能就是缘木求鱼，没有解决消费者需求走弱的问题。


It’s the same story with competitiveness.	在竞争力方面也是如此。


Trump repeatedly bemoans the loss of America’s once-dominant competitive position.	特朗普反复抨击说美国失落了其曾占主导的竞争地位。


To restore it, Trump’s “America first” campaign is framed around an explicit endorsement of protectionism, underscored by the haunting words of his inaugural address: “Protection will lead to great prosperity and strength.”	为了重拾荣光，特朗普的“美国优先”运动围绕着明确的保护主义承诺来制定，并在其就职演说中留下一句让人玩味的话：“保护将带来繁荣富强。


But Trump’s narrative of a once-great America that has supposedly lost its competitive edge is at odds with the best available evidence: an annual compendium published by the World Economic Forum (WEF), which provides a detailed assessment of 114 individual competitive metrics for some 138 countries.	但是，特朗普口中那个曾经伟大的美国已经失去了竞争优势的说法可与目前最有力的证据（世界经济论坛发表的年度概要）不一致——该概要用114个独立竞争性指标对138个国家进行了详细评估。


In the WEF’s 2016-17 Global Competiveness Report, the US came in third in terms of overall international competitiveness (behind Switzerland and Singapore) – maintaining pretty much the same position it has held over the past decade.	在世界经济论坛的《2016~17年全球竞争力报告》中，美国在总体国际竞争力方面排名第三（居瑞士和新加坡之后）——且在过去十年中保持了同样的位置。


Yes, the US scores poorly on corporate tax rates, regulation, and government bureaucracy; but it more than compensates for those shortcomings with exceedingly high rankings for capacity for innovation (2/138), company spending on research and development (2/138), and availability of scientists and engineers (2/138).	纵使美国在公司税率，法规和政府官僚机构上得分不高； 但在创新能力（138国中排名第二），公司研发支出（第二名）以及科学家和工程师数量（第二名）方面的极高排名却完全填补了轻松地填补了上述缺陷。


Impressive scores on financial-market development, labor-market efficiency, and several aspects of business sophistication are also big pluses for America’s consistently high rankings in the WEF’s global tally.	另外在金融市场发展，劳动力市场效率以及关于商业成熟度的几个指标的令人印象深刻的高分也是美国在世界经济论坛全球统计中始终保持高排名的原因。


In short, the US has hardly lost its competitive edge.	简而言之，美国几乎没有丧失其竞争优势。


In an ideal world, it would be nice to streamline, simplify, and even reduce tax and regulatory burdens on US businesses.	在理想状态中，理顺，简化甚至减少美国企业的税收和监管负担是好事。


But business is not the weak link in the US economic chain; workers are far more vulnerable.	但企业并不是美国经济链中的薄弱环节； 工人才是更脆弱的节点。


Economic returns have shifted dramatically from the providers of labor to the owners of capital over the past 25 years.	在过去25年中经济回报从劳动提供者处急剧转向资本所有者。


That, more than anything, speaks to the need for an urgent reordering of the priorities in America’s national economic-policy debate.	这比任何论据都有力地表明我们需要立刻重新对美国国家经济政策辩论中的优先事项进行排位。


The Dangers of Nuclear Bombast	核高调的危险


MADRID – In the summer of 2012, the international relations theorist Kenneth N. Waltz published an article titled “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,” in which he argued that a nuclear-armed Iran would reestablish a desirable balance of power in the Middle East, by acting as a counterweight to Israel.	马德里—2012年夏天，国际关系理论家肯尼斯·瓦尔茨（Kenneth N. Waltz）发表了一篇题为《为什么伊朗应该得到炸弹》（Why Iran Should Get the Bomb）的文章，在这篇文章中他指出，有核武器的伊朗能够成为制衡以色列的力量，从而重新建立有利的中东实力平衡。


Later that year, Waltz also argued that the strategy of combining sanctions with diplomacy was unlikely to dissuade Iran from developing its nuclear capacity.	当年晚些时候，瓦尔茨又指出，制裁与外交相结合的策略不可能说服伊朗放弃发展核能力。


“Short of using military force,” he wrote in Foreign Affairs in September 2012, “it is difficult to imagine how Iran could be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons if it is determined to do so.”	“如果不使用武力，”他在2012年9月号的《外交事务》（Foreign Affairs）杂志上写道，“很难想象如何防止伊朗在它下定决心的情况下获得核武器。 ”


Waltz was wrong in two ways.	瓦尔茨犯了两个错误。


First, by defending nuclear weapons as a source of regional or global stability, he profoundly underestimated the danger that they could fall into the hands of terrorists or be used because of a miscalculation.	首先，他为核武器辩护，认为它是地区或全球稳定之源，这大大低估了核武器落入恐怖分子之手或因为误算而使用的危险。


Second, Waltz failed to foresee the success of the nuclear negotiations with Iran (or their “failure” from the perspective of those who actually wanted a nuclear-armed Iran).	其次，瓦尔茨没有预见到对伊核谈判的成功（或者这些谈判从真的希望伊朗有核的人的角度“失败”）。


Waltz died in 2013, but if he were alive today, he would undoubtedly point out the loose ends of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that Iran, the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, plus Germany), and the European Union adopted in 2015.	瓦尔茨在2013年逝世，但如果他活到今天，肯定会指出伊朗、P5+1（联合国安理会五大常任理事国加上德国）以及欧盟在2015年所达成的联合全面行动计划（Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action，JCPOA）的弱点。


Yet he also would have to recognize that the JCPOA goes further than what he and many others had thought possible, demonstrating the power of diplomacy, especially to those who had advocated military means.	但他也必须承认，JCPOA要比他和许多其他人所认为的可能情况更进了一步，（尤其是向鼓吹军事行动的人）证明了外交的力量。


The JCPOA was a landmark of multilateralism.	JCPOA是多边主义的一个里程碑。


Despite that – or, perhaps, because of his disregard for multilateralism in all forms – US President Donald Trump has called it the “stupidest deal of all time,” and predicted that it would “lead to a nuclear holocaust.”	尽管如此——或者，正因为他蔑视任何形式的多边主义——美国总统特朗普称之为“有史以来最愚蠢的协议”，并预言它将“导致核毁灭”。


Countless analysts, such as Stephen M. Walt of Harvard University, have shown these claims to be completely unfounded and hyperbolic in the extreme.	大量分析家，包括哈佛大学的史蒂芬·沃尔特（Stephen M. Walt），都指出这样的言论完全是无稽之谈，极尽夸张之能事。


But that didn’t stop Trump from refusing in October to “recertify” the JCPOA.	但这并没有阻止特朗普在10月份拒绝“重新评定”JCPOA


Trump’s move leaves it up to the US Congress to decide whether to re-impose nuclear-related sanctions on Iran, which would amount to a violation of the agreement.	特朗普此举意味着需要由美国国会来决定是否重启针对伊朗的核相关制裁，目前，这样的制裁违反了协议。


Even if Congress decides to do nothing on this front, Trump’s anti-Iran rhetoric and other Republican initiatives in Congress have strained the JCPOA and left it vulnerable.	即使国会决定在这方面不做出改变，特朗普的反伊朗论调和其他国会的共和党计划也制约着JCPOA，使其岌岌可危。


The JCPOA’s collapse would generate significant risks for the Middle East and the world.	JCPOA的崩溃将给中东和全世界带来巨大的风险。


A newly restarted Iranian nuclear program would add a worrisome dimension to Iran’s strategic rivalry with Saudi Arabia.	伊朗重启核计划将给伊朗与沙特阿拉伯的战略性对峙平添一个令人担忧的维度。


In fact, the two countries’ cold war already seems to be heating up.	事实上，两国的冷战眼看就要升温。


Saudi Arabia – whose audacious young crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, has Trump’s full support – recently accused Iran of an “act of war” after a missile was launched from Yemen toward Riyadh.	沙特阿拉伯——其初生牛犊不怕虎的王储默罕默德·本·萨勒曼（Mohammed bin Salman）获得了特朗普的全力支持——最近在也门朝利雅得发射导弹事件后指责伊朗的“战争行为”。


At a time when the US is already in a nuclear standoff with North Korea, the last thing it needs is to raise a similar risk in the Middle East.	在美国已经与朝鲜陷入核僵局的情况下，它绝不应该在中东煽动类似的风险。


Fortunately, Germany, China, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and the EU have all committed to defending the JCPOA, distancing themselves from the Trump administration’s reluctant stance.	幸运的是，德国、中国、法国、英国、俄罗斯和欧盟都承诺要捍卫JCPOA，与特朗普政府的对立立场划清界限。


Trump’s foreign policy is adding to a long list of perverse incentives in the area of nuclear proliferation.	特朗普的外交政策可以说给核扩散制造了大量消极激励。


Consider the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, which was launched on the pretext that Saddam Hussein was hiding weapons of mass destruction.	以2003年美国入侵伊拉克为例。 美国发动这场战争的借口是萨达姆·侯赛因隐藏了大规模杀伤性武器。


He wasn’t.	并没有。


And when he was brought down, the other two members of US President George W. Bush’s so-called axis of evil, Iran and North Korea, concluded that not having nuclear arms made them vulnerable to American attempts at regime change.	萨达姆被推翻后，另两个小布什总统所谓的邪恶轴心的成员——伊朗和朝鲜认定，没有核武器使它们成为美国政变刀俎上的鱼肉。


This conclusion was further reinforced in 2011, with the US-assisted overthrow of Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi, who had abandoned his nuclear program eight years earlier.	这一结论在2011年得到了强化，在美国的支持下，利比亚领导人卡扎菲被推翻，而他在八年前放弃了核计划。


In North Korea, Kim Jong-un came to power a few weeks after Qaddafi’s summary execution at the hands of rebel fighters, which undoubtedly influenced his approach to international relations.	卡扎菲被叛军草草处决后几周，金正恩在朝鲜上台掌权，卡扎菲的下场显然影响了他的国际关系方针。


Rather than making Kim back down, Trump’s threats of “fire and fury” have further convinced the North Korean leader that his survival and that of the Kim dynasty depend on nuclear weapons.	特朗普的“火与怒”的威胁并没有让金正恩就范，反而让这位朝鲜领导人确信，他和金氏王朝的生存就取决于核武器。


Punishingly tight sanctions alone will not change his mind.	光靠令人窒息的制裁无法改变他的想法。


Kim seems perfectly willing to subject the North Korean people to privations of every kind in order to remain in power.	看起来，只要能够保持权力，金正恩完全愿意让朝鲜人民蒙受一切形式的困顿。


Of course, there are notable differences between North Korea and Iran.	当然，朝鲜和伊朗之间有着重大不同。


The most obvious is that Iran’s nuclear program did not take off, whereas North Korea – which, unlike Iran, withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty – already has an estimated 60 nuclear warheads, and seems to be making progress toward a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the US mainland.	最明显的不同是伊朗的核计划还没有起步，而朝鲜——与伊朗不同，它已经推出了核不扩散条约——已经拥有了大约60枚核弹头，并且正在朝拥有能打到美国本土的装有核弹头的战略弹道导弹迈进。


In short: an all-out military conflict with North Korea would entail immediate global risks.	简言之：与朝鲜爆发全面军事冲突将立刻产生全球风险。


Trump may have begun to realize that increasing pressure on North Korea does not preclude sitting down to negotiate with Kim.	特朗普可能已经开始认识到，向朝鲜增加压力和坐下来与金正恩谈判未必冲突。


In fact, combining both methods is the most sensible alternative.	事实上，两手抓才是最明智的方案。


But giving diplomacy a chance will require Trump to abandon his incendiary rhetoric and maximalist positions, and work constructively with Chinese President Xi Jinping.	但为外交赢得机会需要特朗普放弃他的煽风点火式发言和最高纲领式立场，而与中国国家主席习近平进行建设性合作。


Having recently consolidated his power at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xi will probably assume a more proactive role in international conflict resolution, especially in areas that affect China directly.	习近平最近在中共十九大中巩固了自己的权力，有望在解决国际冲突，特别是直接影响中国的国际冲突中扮演更加积极主动的角色。


An effective global leader must be able to confront his ally and offer a hand to his adversary when circumstances call for it.	一位有效的全球领导人必须能够在环境需要的时候反对自己的盟友，向对手伸出橄榄枝。


Finding a strategy that credibly contains the North Korean threat is the only way to ensure that South Korea and Japan do not make the regrettable choice of joining the nuclear club.	找到能够可信地遏制伊朗威胁的策略是确保韩国和日本不会令人遗憾地加入核俱乐部的唯一办法。


As Waltz observed, nuclear arms have a tendency to spread.	正如瓦尔茨所观察到的，核武器有蔓延的倾向。


But that does not mean we should resign ourselves to proliferation, let alone play down its catastrophic potential.	但这并不意味着我们应该放弃核不扩散，更不用说降低其灾难性后果了。


International security depends on preserving diplomatic success stories such as the JCPOA, which are crucial to avoid contagion and to put an end, once and for all, to dangerous spirals of antagonism and polarization.	国际安全取决于我们能够捍卫JCPOA这样的成功外交故事，它们是避免蔓延、一劳永逸地解决对抗和极化的恶性循环的关键。


“America First” and Global Conflict Next	“美国优先”以及随之而来的全球冲突


NEW YORK – Donald Trump’s election as President of the United States does not just represent a mounting populist backlash against globalization. It may also portend the end of Pax Americana – the international order of free exchange and shared security that the US and its allies built after World War II.	发自纽约——唐纳德·特朗普当选美国总统不仅是反对全球化的民粹主义反弹，也可能预示着美国治下的和平（Pax Americana）——美国及其盟国在二战后建立的自由交换及共享安全的国际秩序——即将走向终结。


That US-led global order has enabled 70 years of prosperity.	美国领导的全球秩序造就了过去70年的全球繁荣。


It rests on market-oriented regimes of trade liberalization, increased capital mobility, and appropriate social-welfare policies; backed by American security guarantees in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, through NATO and various other alliances.	它奠基于以市场为导向的贸易自由化制度，资本流动性的提升以及适当的社会福利政策； 而其后盾则是由美国通过北约和各种其他联盟组织向欧洲，中东和亚洲提供的安全保障。


Trump, however, may pursue populist, anti-globalization, and protectionist policies that hinder trade and restrict the movement of labor and capital.	然而特朗普却可能追求阻碍贸易并限制劳动力和资本流动的民粹主义，反全球化和保护主义政策。


And he has cast doubt on existing US security guarantees by suggesting that he will force America’s allies to pay for more of their own defense.	他还对现有的美国安全保障体系提出质疑，声称会迫使美国的盟国承担更多的本国国防支出。


If Trump is serious about putting “America first,” his administration will shift US geopolitical strategy toward isolationism and unilateralism, pursuing only the national interests of the homeland.	如果特朗普真心要推行“美国优先”原则，他的政府就将把美国的地缘政治战略转向孤立主义和单边主义，只以本国利益为重。


When the US pursued similar policies in the 1920s and 1930s, it helped sow the seeds of World War II.	当美国在1920~30年代采取类似政策时，它其实帮助播下了第二次世界大战的种子。


Protectionism – starting with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, which affected thousands of imported goods – triggered retaliatory trade and currency wars that worsened the Great Depression.	保护主义——从影响成千上万进口商品的斯穆特-荷雷关税（Smoot-Hawley Tariff）开始，引发了报复性贸易和使大萧条进一步恶化的货币战争。


More important, American isolationism – based on a false belief that the US was safely protected by two oceans – allowed Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan to wage aggressive war and threaten the entire world.	更重要的是美国的孤立主义——基于一个错误的信念，认为美国被两个大洋安全地保护着——坐视纳粹德国和日本帝国发动侵略战争并威胁整个世界。


With the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the US was finally forced to take its head out of the sand.	直到1941年12月日本突袭珍珠港，美国才终于被迫把头从沙子里拔了出来。


Today, too, a US turn to isolationism and the pursuit of strictly US national interests may eventually lead to a global conflict.	今天，美国转向孤立主义且一味追求本国利益可能会最终引发一场全球性冲突。


Even without the prospect of American disengagement from Europe, the European Union and the eurozone already appear to be disintegrating, particularly in the wake of the United Kingdom’s June Brexit vote and Italy’s failed referendum on constitutional reforms in December.	即便美国脱离欧洲还八字没一撇，欧盟和欧元区也似乎已经在瓦解，特别是在英国6月公投同意脱欧和意大利12月份关于宪法改革的公投失败之后。


Moreover, in 2017, extreme anti-Europe left- or right-wing populist parties could come to power in France and Italy, and possibly in other parts of Europe.	此外，在2017年，几个极端反欧洲的左/右翼民粹主义政党很可能会在法国和意大利乃至欧洲其他地区成功夺权。


Without active US engagement in Europe, an aggressively revanchist Russia will step in.	没有美国对欧洲的积极参与，一个野心勃勃期待复兴旧日威风的俄罗斯将趁机介入。


Russia is already challenging the US and the EU in Ukraine, Syria, the Baltics, and the Balkans, and it may capitalize on the EU’s looming collapse by reasserting its influence in the former Soviet bloc countries, and supporting pro-Russia movements within Europe.	俄罗斯已经在乌克兰，叙利亚，波罗的海地区和巴尔干地区对美国和欧盟发出了挑战，它可以利用欧盟的即将崩溃来重夺对前苏联集团国家的影响力，同时在欧洲内支持亲俄罗斯运动。


If Europe gradually loses its US security umbrella, no one stands to benefit more than Russian President Vladimir Putin.	如果欧洲逐渐失去了美国的安全伞，那么最大的受益者必定是俄罗斯总统普京无疑了。


Trump’s proposals also threaten to exacerbate the situation in the Middle East.	特朗普的提议还可能令中东局势恶化。


He has said that he will make America energy independent, which entails abandoning US interests in the region and becoming more reliant on domestically produced greenhouse-gas-emitting fossil fuels.	他声称将令美国实现能源独立，这就意味着美国将放弃在该地区的利益，并更加依赖本国开采的那些排放温室气体的化石燃料。


And he has maintained his position that Islam itself, rather than just radical militant Islam, is dangerous.	他坚持认为伊斯兰教本身——而不仅仅是激进伊斯兰教武装分子——是危险的。


This view, shared by Trump’s incoming National Security Adviser, General Michael Flynn, plays directly into Islamist militants’ own narrative of a clash of civilizations.	这一观点得到了特朗普新任命的国家安全顾问，迈克尔·弗林（Michael Flynn）将军的响应，也跟伊斯兰激进分子口中的文明冲突论并无二致。


Meanwhile, an “America first” approach under Trump will likely worsen the longstanding Sunni-Shia proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran.	与此同时，特朗普的“美国优先”做法可能会令沙特和伊朗之间长期存在的逊尼-什叶派代理战争继续恶化。


And if the US no longer guarantees its Sunni allies’ security, all regional powers – including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt – might decide that they can defend themselves only by acquiring nuclear weapons, and even more deadly conflict will ensue.	如果美国不再保证其逊尼派盟国的安全，所有区域力量——包括伊朗，沙特，土耳其和埃及——可能只好通过获取核武器来保卫自己，甚至会陆续爆发更致命的冲突。


In Asia, US economic and military primacy has provided decades of stability; but a rising China is now challenging the status quo.	在亚洲，美国的经济和军事优势确保了几十年的稳定局势； 但是一个崛起的中国正对此发出挑战。


US President Barack Obama’s strategic “pivot” to Asia depended primarily on enacting the 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Trump has promised to scrap on his first day in office.	美国总统奥巴马对亚洲的战略“枢纽”主要依赖于颁布包含12个国家的跨太平洋伙伴关系协定（英文缩写为TPP），但特朗普则声称在他上任第一天就会废除此协议。


Meanwhile, China is quickly strengthening its own economic ties in Asia, the Pacific, and Latin America through its “one belt, one road” policy, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank (formerly known as the BRICS bank), and its own regional free-trade proposal to rival the TPP.	与此同时，中国正通过“一带一路”政策，亚洲基础设施投资银行，新开发银行（前身为金砖国家银行）迅速加强其在亚洲，太平洋和拉丁美洲的经济关系，并推出一套自己制定的区域自由贸易提案与TPP相抗衡。


If the US gives up on its Asian allies such as the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan, those countries may have no choice but to prostrate themselves before China; and other US allies, such as Japan and India, may be forced to militarize and challenge China openly.	如果美国放弃其亚洲盟国，如菲律宾，韩国和台湾，这些国家可能别无选择，只能对中国俯首称臣； 而如日本和印度这类美国盟国，可能被迫走上军事化并与中国公开对阵。


Thus, an American withdrawal from the region could very well eventually precipitate a military conflict there.	可见美国从该地区撤军可能最终会在那里造成军事冲突。


As in the 1930s, when protectionist and isolationist US policies hampered global economic growth and trade, and created the conditions for rising revisionist powers to start a world war, similar policy impulses could set the stage for new powers to challenge and undermine the American-led international order.	在1930年代，当奉行保护主义和孤立主义的美国政策阻碍了全球经济增长和贸易，并为不断膨胀的复辟势力创造了发动世界大战的条件时，类似的政策冲动将为新势力挑战并破坏美国主导的国际秩序创造条件。


An isolationist Trump administration may see the wide oceans to its east and west, and think that increasingly ambitious powers such as Russia, China, and Iran pose no direct threat to the homeland.	孤立主义的特朗普政府的目光局限于东西两岸的广袤大洋，并认为那些野心不断膨胀的势力，如俄罗斯，中国和伊朗无法对本国构成直接威胁。


But the US is still a global economic and financial power in a deeply interconnected world.	但美国仍然是这个深度相关联的世界中的一支全球经济和金融力量。


If left unchecked, these countries will eventually be able to threaten core US economic and security interests – at home and abroad – especially if they expand their nuclear and cyberwarfare capacities.	但如果放任不理的话，某些国家将最终威胁美国的核心经济和安全利益———无论是在国内还是国外———尤其是在它们强化自身核战和网络战能力之后。


The historical record is clear: protectionism, isolationism, and “America first” policies are a recipe for economic and military disaster.	历史的记录无比清晰：保护主义，孤立主义和“美国优先”政策是一条通往经济和军事灾难之路。


The EU Must Recognize the Palestinian State	欧盟必须承认巴勒斯坦国


MADRID – Once again, US President Donald Trump has taken a unilateral approach to foreign policy – this time, by recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.	马德里—美国总统特朗普再一次采取了单方面外交政策——这一次，他承认耶路撒冷为以色列首都。


And once again, Trump has misinterpreted the realities of the Middle East.	再一次，特朗普算错了中东的现实。


Given that his latest move – which effectively blew up more than 70 years of international consensus – could precipitate a rapid deterioration in the region, it is imperative that the European Union step up.	他的最新举动——事实上颠覆了70多年来的国际共识——可能导致地区局势迅速恶化，欧盟必须站出来。


The Trump administration’s Middle East policy rests on a reinvigorated alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia.	特朗普政府的中东政策的基础是美国和沙特阿拉伯重新确立的联盟关系。


Every American president since John F. Kennedy has made his first foreign visit either to Mexico, Canada, or Europe.	自肯尼迪以来，历任美国总统履新后的第一次出访目的地都是墨西哥、加拿大或欧洲。


Not Trump.	特朗普不是。


He made a beeline to Riyadh, where he participated in a summit with 54 Muslim-majority countries and delivered an inflammatory speech vilifying Iran, which he asserted should be shunned by the international community.	他径直飞去了利雅得，在那里和54个穆斯林多数国家召开峰会，发表了一篇诋毁伊朗的煽动性演说，说国际社会应该对伊朗唯恐避之不及。


After Saudi Arabia, Trump paid a visit to Israel, where he launched another fusillade of anti-Iran rhetoric.	在沙特阿拉伯之后，特朗普又访问了以色列，在那里再次抛出火力齐开的反伊朗言论。


Saudi Arabia and Israel do not maintain diplomatic relations, but they are both US allies, and they have a shared opponent in Iran.	沙特阿拉伯和以色列没有建立外交关系，但都是美国的盟国，并且都反对伊朗。


In November, the head of the Israel Defense Forces, Lieutenant General Gadi Eisenkot, even expressed openness to sharing intelligence with Saudi Arabia to counter Iran.	11月，以色列国防军首脑、陆军中将艾森克特（Gadi Eisenkot）甚至表达了与沙特阿拉伯开放共享情报以遏制伊朗的意思。


“With President Trump,” Eisenkot told the Saudi publication Elaph, “there is an opportunity to build a new international coalition in the region.”	“与特朗普总统合作，”艾森克特对沙特媒体Elaph说，“有机会形成新的域内国际联盟。 ”


The Saudi-Israeli rapprochement has been helped along by Saudi Arabia’s new crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), who is pursuing a program of modernization, both domestically and in foreign-policy terms.	沙特阿拉伯新王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼（MBS）也在力推沙特-以色列恢复邦交，他在追求内政和外交的现代化。


Earlier this month, MBS was rumored to have proposed an Israeli-Palestinian peace plan that would have been highly favorable to Israel, although the US and Saudi governments have since denied those reports.	本月早些时候，据说MBS还提出了一个非常有利于以色列的以巴和平计划，但美国和沙特政府随后都否认了这一报道。


In any case, Trump has clearly wanted to take advantage of these circumstances to deliver a diplomatic coup.	无论如何，特朗普显然想要利用这些环境因素实现外交“政变”。


And yet his decision on Jerusalem forces the Saudis to confront a dilemma: whether to place a higher priority on defending the Palestinian cause, or on normalizing ties with Israel as a means to contain Iran.	但他的耶路撒冷决定迫使沙特面临一个困境：是以捍卫巴勒斯坦人的事业为重，还是以实现对以关系正常化以遏制伊朗为重。


Some Saudis seem to hope for the latter, proposing to leave aside thorny questions about the status of Jerusalem and the Palestinians in general.	一些沙特人似乎更希望看到后者，他们提出将耶路撒冷和巴勒斯坦人的地位这些棘手问题搁置不顾。


Trump, too, attempted to add nuance to his declaration, asserting that he was not taking a position on the specific geographical boundaries of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem, and that the US embassy would not be moved from Tel Aviv immediately.	特朗普也试图解释他的政策的微妙之处，说他的立场并不是具体划定以色列在耶路撒冷的主权边界，并且美国大使馆不必立即搬离特拉维夫。


But, as former US special envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations Martin Indyk put it, the Americans “can try to limit the damage all they want, but they won’t be able to, because Jerusalem is such a hot-button issue.”	但正如美国前以巴谈判特使马丁·因迪克（Martin Indyk）所言，美国人“能够尝试遏制伤害，但无法成功，因为耶路撒冷这个问题是在太敏感了。


That reality was reflected in the eruption of street protests across the Middle East soon after Trump’s announcement, though the large-scale violence that some feared has not occurred.	”特朗普话音刚落，中东街头就爆发了示威游行（尽管一些人担心的大规模暴力事件并未发生），这便是这一现实的体现。


More telling, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation held an extraordinary summit in Istanbul, where its members reaffirmed “the centrality of the cause of Palestine and Al-Quds Al-Sharif [Jerusalem] to the Muslim Ummah,” recognized East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, and strongly condemned Trump’s actions.	更能说明问题的是，伊斯兰合作组织在伊斯坦布尔举行了一次特别峰会，其成员国重申了“巴勒斯坦和耶路撒冷在穆斯林心目中的核心地位”，承认东耶路撒冷为巴勒斯坦首都，并强烈谴责特朗普的举动。


No Muslim, it seems, is prepared to forget that Jerusalem is home to the Al-Aqsa mosque, the third most sacred site in Islam.	看起来，没有穆斯林会忘记耶路撒冷是伊斯兰教第三圣地阿克萨（Al-Aqsa）清真寺所在地。


Saudi Arabia’s King Salman referred to the mosque when he warned Trump just how harmful the Jerusalem decision would be.	沙特阿拉伯国王萨勒曼在警告特朗普其耶路撒冷决定的危险性时也提到了这座清真寺。


And when Trump announced the decision anyway, the Kingdom derided it as “unjustified” and “irresponsible.”	而在特朗普最终宣布了这一决定时， 萨勒曼批评这是“不公平”和“不负责”的。


The simple truth is that Saudi Arabia cannot distance itself from the Palestinian cause and allow other countries like Turkey and even Iran to carry the banner.	简单的事实是沙特阿拉伯无法弃巴勒斯坦问题于不顾，让土耳其甚至伊朗等其他国家领衔。


That would amount to a tactical mistake akin to severing ties with Qatar a few months ago.	这将重蹈几个月前与卡塔尔断交的策略覆辙。


It would also be difficult, if not impossible, for the Saudis suddenly to support a plan that was radically different from the Arab Peace Initiative, known as the “Saudi Initiative,” which was approved in 2002 and endorsed by the Arab League this year.	让沙特猛然之间去支持严重偏离阿拉伯和平动议（Arab Peace Initiative，被称为“沙特动议”）也十分困难，该动议在2002年被批准，并在今年赢得阿拉伯联盟的支持。


So Trump’s dream scenario – in which Saudi Arabia sides with Israel to pressure the Palestinians to make peace – is not going to materialize.	因此，特朗普的梦想情景——沙特阿拉伯与以色列一起施压巴勒斯坦人来创造和平——不会实现。


First, Saudi Arabia is not in a position to waive Arab claims on Jerusalem.	首先，沙特阿拉伯不会放弃阿拉伯对耶路撒冷的主张。


Second, a strategy that gives the Palestinians no say in their fate, and the fate of Jerusalem, will never succeed.	其次，剥夺巴勒斯坦人对自己以及耶路撒冷的命运的话语权的战略永远不会成功。


And, third, Trump’s administration – including his son-in-law Jared Kushner, to whom Trump has entrusted the US role in the Arab-Israeli peace process – is staffed with businesspeople, not politicians, as Kushner himself recently pointed out.	第三，特朗普政府——包括他的女婿库什纳（Jared Kushner特朗普委任他负责美国在阿拉伯-以色列和平进程中的角色）——由商人而不是政客充任，这是库什纳本人最近所指出的。


But Jerusalem, and the Israel-Palestine conflict more broadly, is far too fraught to be treated like a business deal.	但耶路撒冷，以及更广义的以巴冲突问题，非常复杂，不能像商业交易那样对待它们。


Though Trump has not ruled out the two-state solution – the approach endorsed by the United Nations – he may have put the final nail in its coffin.	尽管特朗普并未排除两国方案——联合国也支持这一方案——但他或许已经钉下了棺材板上的最后一颗钉子。


The only way to save it, or even to get the Israelis and the Palestinians to return to the negotiating table, is to work toward a more level playing field.	唯一拯救两国方案的办法，甚或唯一让以色列和巴勒斯坦回到谈判桌前的办法，是致力于形成更加公平的环境。


Here, the EU must take the lead and send a message that is as forceful as it is necessary, by immediately recognizing – as over 70% of UN member states have already done – the State of Palestine.	在这方面，欧盟必须起到领导作用，释放出应有的强硬信号，立即承认巴勒斯坦国——就像70%多的联合国成员国已经做过的那样。


The path toward a two-state solution should start with the Arab Peace Initiative, which stipulates that the Arab League would recognize Israel if it were to retreat into its pre-1967 borders, though an alternative, more gradual approach could be considered.	通往两国方案之路应该从阿拉伯和平动议开始，该动议规定阿拉伯联盟将在以色列撤回1967年前边界的情况下承认以色列，但也可以考虑更加渐进性的替代方案。


The two-state solution – which would allow Israel to retain its Jewish and democratic character, and should guarantee the viability of the Palestinian state – still represents the most credible way out of the Arab-Israeli quagmire.	两国方案——以色列可以保持其犹太和民主性，并应该保证巴勒斯坦国的可行性——仍是打破阿拉伯-以色列僵局的最可信的方法。


But if we are to achieve the “separation because of respect” that Yitzhak Rabin envisioned in the 1990s, there is no time to lose: the point of no return is inching closer with each passing day.	但如果我们想要实现拉宾（Yitzhak Rabin）在20世纪90年代所设想的“出于尊重的分离”，就决不能在浪费时间：每过一天，我们距离不归路就近了一步。


Trump, to Jerusalem and Back	特朗普，耶路撒冷归去来


TEL AVIV – US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger famously singled out Israel as a country whose entire foreign policy is actually domestic.	特拉维夫—美国国务卿有一句名言，他说，以色列这个国家的全部外交政策其实都是国内政策。


Yet the same is true of the United States, particularly when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.	但美国也是这样，特别是在以巴冲突的问题上。


All US presidents attempting to resolve that conflict have faced massive – indeed, insurmountable – domestic political obstacles.	历任试图解决这场冲突的美国总统都面临着巨大的——事实上是无法克服的——国内政治障碍。


With his recent decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, Donald Trump has taken this trend to the next level, though the result may well be more of the same stagnation.	特朗普最近作出决定承认耶路撒冷为以色列首都，这将这一趋势带到了新的阶段，但结果仍然很有可能是耳熟能详的停滞。


Trump’s Jerusalem declaration is the latest manifestation of the unlikely president’s quest for domestic legitimacy, which has made him almost obsessed with fulfilling his extreme and self-defeating campaign promises, including withdrawal from or renegotiation of major international treaties such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris climate agreement.	特朗普的耶路撒冷决定是这位不受欢迎总统追求国内合法性的最新尝试，为了获得国内合法性，他竭尽全力要实现极端的、弄巧成拙的竞选承诺，包括退出或重新谈判跨太平洋合作伙伴关系和巴黎气候协议等国际条约。


Likewise, the Jerusalem decision was meant to appease the messianic dreams of his massive evangelical constituency.	类似地，耶路撒冷决定是为了安抚他的大量福音派选民救世主之梦。


Yet Trump’s actions have wider diplomatic implications, which he seems incapable of calculating.	但特朗普的行为会产生更广泛的外交影响，而他似乎没有算到这一点。


Understandably, Trump’s declaration has been met with rage from Palestinians, with President Mahmoud Abbas asserting that “from now on” he would not accept “any role” for the US in the peace process, and even calling for the world to reconsider its recognition of Israel.	不难理解，特朗普的决定令巴勒斯坦人十分愤怒，其总统阿巴斯说“从此以后”他不会接受美国在和平进程中的“任何角色”，甚至呼吁世界重新考虑是否承认以色列。


Moreover, anti-American powers – Hezbollah, Iran, Russia, and Turkey – have taken Trump’s divisive decision as an opportunity to enhance their own regional influence, at the expense of the US and its allies.	此外，反美力量——真主党、伊朗、俄罗斯和土耳其——利用特朗普的离间性决定作为加强自身地区影响力、削弱美国及其盟友影响力的机会。


They hope to position themselves as the champions of a great Arab and Muslim cause supposedly betrayed by the feeble reaction of Israel’s newfound Arab friends, particularly Saudi Arabia.	它们希望把自己包装为伟大的阿拉伯和穆斯林运动的先锋，它们的事业被以色列的新晋阿拉伯朋友特别是沙特阿拉伯所背叛。


This response won’t help the Palestinians any more than it will help the US.	这样的反应对巴勒斯坦人无济于事，一如对美国。


Anger is not a strategy – a lesson that Palestinians have learned the hard way in the past.	愤怒不是战略——巴勒斯坦在过去以沉重的代价领教过这一点。


Abbas is presumably also still waiting for the United Kingdom to apologize for the 1917 Balfour declaration, the centenary of which Israel recently celebrated.	阿巴斯想必也仍然在等待英国就1917年巴尔弗决定进行道歉。 以色列刚刚庆祝了该决定一百周年。


The fact is that, despite being demoralized by years of futile “peace processes,” the Palestinian masses are in no mood for a third intifada.	事实上，尽管巴勒斯坦人民因为“和平进程”多年来徒劳无功而感到沮丧，但他们并不想发动第三次暴动。


And they blame their plight not just on the occupier, but also on their own unelected and utterly unpopular leaders, who offer them no sense of direction or achievable objectives.	他们不但将他们的窘境归咎于占领者，也把它们归咎于自己的非民选、完全没有群众基础的领导人，这些人没有带给他们任何方向和可实现的目标。


The incendiary rhetoric of Palestine’s supporters in the Arab world has never done much for the Palestinian people, either.	巴勒斯坦的阿拉伯支持者的煽动性言辞也从未给巴勒斯坦人带来多少好处。


Trump’s Jerusalem declaration is not “the beginning of the end of Israel,” as Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, has promised.	特朗普的耶路撒冷决定不是真主党领导人哈桑·纳斯鲁拉（Hassan Nasrallah）所承诺的 “以色列末日的开始”。


Hezbollah is simply attempting to distract attention from its disgraceful war in support of Bashar al-Assad’s genocidal regime in Syria.	真主党只是为了让人们不再关注他们为支持叙利亚的巴沙尔·阿萨德的大屠杀政权而进行的可耻的战争。


Likewise, by committing itself to the Palestinian “Islamic Resistance Forces,” Hezbollah’s patron, Iran, is simply recycling a policy that it has pursued since long before that declaration, with the goal of advancing its regional hegemonic designs.	类似地，真主党的保护人伊朗要致力于巴勒斯坦“伊斯兰抵抗力量”，这也无非是回收了其在特朗普的决定前便早已开始实施的政策，目标是推动其地区霸权。


And, in fact, while the move has probably reinforced Iran’s claim to be the true defender of Jerusalem and Palestine, the biggest gains for Iran will likely be emotional.	事实上，尽管该举动或许强化了伊朗自称为耶路撒冷和巴勒斯坦守护神的定位，但对其最大的收益可能只是情绪而已。


After all, the Sunni Middle East – led by a Saudi Arabia for which the quest for regional dominance amounts to a struggle for regime survival – will not accept being led by the rising Shia empire, especially if that means clashing head-on with Israel and the US.	毕竟，逊尼派中东——以沙特阿拉伯为首，对它来说，寻求地区主宰地位是一场政权的生存之战——不会接受由崛起的什叶派帝国所领导的事实，特别是如果这意味着与以色列和美国闹翻的话。


Palestine also should not expect much from Russia.	巴勒斯坦也不应该指望俄罗斯。


President Vladimir Putin is a realist; he knows that heeding the call for Russia to assume a leadership role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would damage his relationships with both parties, without bringing them any closer to a settlement.	俄罗斯总统普京是一个现实主义者； 他知道，让俄罗斯应声而出，在以巴冲突中充当领导者不利于他和双方的关系，也不会让它们走向和解。


Russia’s calling is not – and has never been – that of a peacemaker.	俄罗斯的使命不是——也从未是——和平缔造者。


So, in many ways, Trump’s Jerusalem declaration will not change much.	因此，从诸多方面看，特朗普的耶路撒冷决定并不会带来多大改变。