The US and China are not solely responsible for these imbalances, but their relationship is certainly at the center of it.	美国和中国虽然不能为此承担所有的错误，但他们之间的关系应该是问题的核心所在。


Prior to the crisis, there was plenty of talk, including high-level meetings brokered by the International Monetary Fund, but only minimal action.	在危机发生之前，虽然包括IMF组织的在内，全球进行了多次高层对话，但所取得的成效甚微。 目前，危机已经蔓延到全球范围。


Now, the risks have spilled out to the entire world.	我们希望，这次不能再停留在口头上了。


Let’s hope that this time there is more than talk.  If US and Chinese policymakers instead surrender to the temptation of slipping back to the pre-crisis imbalances, the roots of the next crisis will grow like bamboo.  And that would not be good news for the US and China, or anyone else.	如果美中两国政府还不能吸取教训，重复以往的错误，下一次危机肯定不能避免。 这对于包括美中两国的全世界来说，都不是一个好的消息。


Re-Booting DDT	重启DDT


PALO ALTO – Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates is fascinating.	帕洛阿尔托—作为微软的创始人之一的比尔·盖茨令人着迷。


So is the 19-page annual letter that describes the work of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the world’s largest philanthropy.	同样令人捉摸不透的还有比尔·盖茨和梅林达盖茨基金会，这个全球最大的慈善机构那封19页的年度述职信。


But for someone as smart as Gates, who can afford to hire experts on any subject under the sun, some of his foundation’s strategies are baffling.	但对于盖茨这个可以聘用专家研究任何课题的聪明人，其基金会的某些战略却令人费解。


Consider his foundation’s approach to malaria, which focuses on bed nets, a low-tech, only modestly effective intervention, and on the development of a vaccine, a high-tech solution that has eluded intensive efforts for decades.	看看他的基金会应对疟疾的方法：在低技术层面上专注于使用蚊帐，一种有一定效果的干预方式； 在高技术层面上，则顷力研发疫苗，费时数十载却无斩获。


This approach dismisses an old, cheap, and safe way to control the vector – the Anopheles mosquito – that spreads the disease: the chemical DDT.	这种方法排除了一种古老、廉价又安全的控制病媒疟蚊的举措：化学农药滴滴涕(DDT)。


Malaria is a scourge, particularly for inhabitants of poor tropical countries.	疟疾是一种折磨，对于生活在贫穷的赤道国家的居民而言更是如此。


Forty-one percent of the world's population live in areas where malaria is transmitted, with 350-500 million cases each year.	全世界有41%的人口生活在疟疾的疫区，每年有3. 5-5亿人罹患此病。


The disease imposes substantial costs on individuals, families, and governments.	疟疾令个人、家庭和政府付出了高昂的代价。


Costs to individuals and their families include drugs, travel to and treatment at clinics, lost time at work and school, and expenses for preventive measures.	对于个人和家庭而言，他们的代价包括药物、往返医院和接受治疗的费用、误工和缺课以及相关预防措施的支出。


Costs to governments include maintenance of health facilities, purchases of drugs and supplies, public-health interventions such as spraying insecticide or distributing insecticide-treated bed nets, and lost revenue from taxes and tourism.	对于政府而言则包括维护医疗设施、采购药品和装备、喷洒杀虫剂或分发经杀虫剂处理的蚊帐等公共卫生干预和来自于税收和旅游业的收入减少等。


Such costs are a huge economic burden on malaria-prone countries and impede their development.	这种成本对于疟疾区的国家而言是一项巨大的经济负担，并阻碍了它们的发展。


It has been estimated that annual economic growth in countries with a high incidence of malaria is 1.3 percentage points lower than that of other countries.	据预测疟疾发病率高的国家其年经济增长率比其他国家要低1. 3个百分点。


Drugs called artemisinins are safe and exhibit potent, rapid anti-malarial activity.	一种名为青蒿素的药物药性安全并显现出强力而快速的抗疟效果。


In combination with other anti-malarials, they have been used effectively for several years to treat multiple-drug-resistant malaria.	过去几年以来，该药已经和其他抗疟疾药物联用，为多重耐药性疟疾提供有效治疗。


But resistance has arisen and will surely increase, so that in the absence of a vaccine, elimination of the mosquitoes that spread the disease is the key to preventing epidemics.	但耐药性还是在增强并会持续，因此在没有疫苗的情况下，消灭传播疟疾的蚊子就是防止此病流行的关键。


Unfortunately, flawed public policy limits the available options.	不幸的是，公共政策的缺陷限制了我们的选择。


In 1972, on the basis of data on toxicity to fish and migrating birds (but not to humans), the United States Environmental Protection Agency banned virtually all uses of DDT, an inexpensive and effective pesticide once widely deployed to kill disease-carrying insects.	1972年，以对鱼类和候鸟（而非对人类）的毒性研究为依据，美国环境保护署全面禁止使用DDT，一种曾被广泛使用来杀灭致病虫害的廉价而有效的杀虫剂。


DDT was subsequently banned for agricultural use worldwide under the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, which stigmatized the chemical and effectively constituted a prohibition.	此后在《2001斯德哥尔摩持久性有机污染物公约》的框架下，DDT在全球农业中被禁用。 该公约使这种农药污名化，造成了全球禁用的实际效果。


A basic principle of toxicology is that the dose makes the poison.	毒性学的一个基本原则是剂量造就毒药。


Although DDT is a (modestly) toxic substance, there is a world of difference between applying large amounts of it in the environment – as farmers did before it was banned – and using it carefully and sparingly to fight mosquitoes and other disease-carrying insects. (When it is used at all now, it is now sprayed indoors in small amounts to prevent mosquitoes from nesting.)	虽然DDT是一种（较为）有毒的物质，但大量使用于环境中（就如同禁用前农民的使用方式）和小心谨慎地用来杀灭传播疾病的蚊虫（现今被极少量地喷洒于室内防止蚊虫孳生），其效果是完全不同的。


The regulators who banned DDT also failed to take into consideration the inadequacy of alternatives.	禁用DDT的监管者们还没有考虑到替代方案的缺失。


Because it persists after spraying, DDT works far better than many pesticides now in use, some of which are toxic to fish and other aquatic organisms.	因为喷洒后的持久性，DDT的效果比许多现在使用的杀虫剂要好得多。


With DDT unavailable, many mosquito-control authorities are depleting their budgets by repeated spraying with short-acting, marginally effective insecticides.	而许多这样的杀虫剂对鱼类和其他水生物是有毒性的。 没有了DDT，许多控蚊机构花费巨资，反复喷洒药效短、效果差的杀虫剂。


Moreover, even if mosquitoes become resistant to the killing effects of DDT, they are still repelled by it.	另外，即便蚊子对DDT的杀灭作用产生了耐药性，也仍然会被药力驱赶。


An occasional dusting of window frames and doorframes is extremely effective.	偶尔在窗框和门框上喷洒一些就非常有效。


Bill Gates’s experts seem not to know that; the foundation’s annual letter contains the following single mention of DDT: “The world hoped in the 1950s and 1960s that [malaria] could be eliminated by killing mosquitoes with DDT, but that tactic failed when the mosquitoes evolved to be resistant to the chemical.”	比尔盖茨的专家们似乎并不了解这一点； 基金会的年度信件如是提及DDT：“在1950和1960年代，全世界都希望（疟疾）能够通过用DDT杀灭蚊子的方式被消灭，但这种策略由于蚊子逐渐产生耐药性而失败。


Since DDT was banned, insect-borne diseases such as malaria and dengue have been on the rise.	自从DDT被禁用，疟疾和登革热等昆虫传染病的发病就呈上升趋势。


In fact, the huge toll of diseases spread by mosquitoes has led some public-health officials to rethink DDT’s use.	实际上，蚊虫传播疾病所带来的严重后果已经让一些公共卫生官员重新考虑DDT的使用。


In 2006, after roughly 50 million preventable deaths, the United Nations’ World Health Organization reversed course and endorsed the use of DDT to kill and repel Anopheles mosquitoes.	2006年，在付出了5000万宗本可预防的疟疾死亡的代价之后，联合国所属世界卫生组织逆转禁令，批准将DDT用于杀灭和驱赶疟蚊。


Arata Kochi, the WHO official in charge of malaria said, “We must take a position based on the science and the data.	世界卫生组织疟疾部门负责人Arata Kochi说：“我们必须基于科学和数据来确定立场。


One of the best tools we have against malaria is indoor residual spraying.	我们对抗疟疾的最佳武器之一就是室内滞留喷洒。


Of the dozen or so insecticides WHO has approved as safe for house spraying, the most effective is DDT.”	在世卫组织批准的可用于家庭喷洒的十数种杀虫剂中，DDT是最有效的。 ”


But policies based on science and data have a short half-life at the UN.	但是基于科学和数据的政策在联合国的半衰期很短。


With a notable absence of fanfare, in May 2009 the WHO, together with the UN Environment Program, reverted to endorsing less effective methods for preventing malaria, announcing that their goal is “to achieve a 30% cut in the application of DDT worldwide by 2014 and its total phase-out by the early 2020s, if not sooner.”	2009年5月，世界卫生组织和联合国环境署刻意低调地转向推广一些效果较差的防疟措施，并宣称他们的目标是“在2014年将DDT在全世界的使用量减低30%并最晚于2020年全面淘汰DDT。


In the absence of effective vaccines or new anti-malarial drugs – and the funding and infrastructure to deliver them – this decision is tantamount to mass murder, a triumph of radical environmental politics over public health.	”在有效疫苗或新的抗疟疾药物（以及分派资金和体系）缺失的情况下，这一决策就等同于大屠杀，一场激进的环境政策之于公共卫生的胜利。


How can we drain the public-policy swamp?	如何才能抽干公共政策的沼泽？


First, governments should re-evaluate the voluminous data on DDT that have been compiled since the 1970’s, and they should make DDT available immediately for mosquito control indoors.	首先，各国政府应该重新评估自1970年代以来关于DDT的海量数据，并立刻批准DDT用于室内防蚊。


Second, governments should oppose international restrictions on DDT and withhold all funding from UN agencies that oppose the use of the “best available technology” (including DDT) to control mosquito-borne diseases.	其次，各国政府应该反对针对DDT的国际限制并截留所有来自反��使用“最佳现有技术”（包括DDT）来防控蚊子传播疾病的联合国机构的资金。


Third, public-health officials should embark on a campaign to educate local authorities and citizens about the DDT.	再者，公共卫生官员们应该发起一场宣传攻势来教育地方政府和公民正确认识DDT。


People now hear only the reflexively anti-pesticide drumbeat of the environmental movement, the lamentable legacy of the benighted Rachel Carson and her acolytes.	人们现在只能听到环境运动人士反杀虫剂的条件反射式的鼓噪，那是愚昧的Rachel Carson及其门徒的不幸遗产。


And oh, yes, it would be helpful if the world’s greatest philanthropist were to throw his weight behind removing the stigma on DDT.	哦还有，如果全世界最伟大的慈善家能施展影响力为DDT正名就更好了。


Re-Booting NATO-Russia Relations	重新启动北约—俄罗斯关系


MOSCOW – The crisis in Georgia last August tested Europe’s security system, and the system failed to fulfill its core task of ensuring common security for the continent as a whole.	莫斯科—去年八月发生在格鲁吉亚的危机考验了欧洲的安全体系，该体系没有能够完成其确保欧洲大陆共同安全的核心任务。


As a result, Europe must re-examine its current security arrangements, analyze what happened, and take this analysis into account in reforming those arrangements.	因此，欧洲必须重新审视其目前的安全安排，分析过往，并将这种分析纳入对那些安排措施的改革之中。


Even before the Georgia crisis, Russia already saw a need to revisit the mechanisms of European security, including its international and regional institutions and their functions.	早在格鲁吉亚危机之前，俄罗斯已经认识到有必要重新评估包括国际和地区机构及其职能在内的欧洲安全机制。


We suggested a new, legally binding treaty system of mutual security guarantees to ensure equal security throughout Europe.	我们建议采用一种新的、合法的相互安全保证公约体系来确保整个欧洲的同等安全。


The European Union believes that the Russian initiative is well grounded and has shown interest in launching such a project.	欧盟相信俄罗斯这一努力的必要性并对实施这一项目表现出兴趣。


There are leaders in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) who are also willing to take part.	欧洲安全与合作组织(OSCE)的一些领导人也愿意参与其中。


NATO, however, has stood aside.	但北约却作壁上观。


I was supposed to put forward Russian proposals on the new security concept to the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) last September.	我本来负责在去年九月将关于该新安全理念的俄方提案呈交北约—俄罗斯委员会(NRC)。


But the Alliance refused to hold the scheduled meeting following the Georgia crisis.	但在格鲁吉亚危机之后北约拒绝举行既定的会晤。


When the NRC was created in 2002, it was devised as a mechanism for dialogue, cooperation, and joint decision-making on issues of mutual interest, including non-proliferation and arms control, the fight against terrorism, civil emergency planning, and military-to-military cooperation.	当NRC在2002年创立时，它是作为一种针对双方共同利益相关事务的对话、合作与共同决策机制，其中包括（核）不扩散与军备控制、反恐、民事应急预案和军事合作。


The NRC also was supposed to act as a forum for “holding prompt consultations” in crisis situations and to prevent such crises by “early identification of emerging problems.”	NRC本来还应该成为一个论坛，在危机中“提供即时的咨询”并通过“尽早发现问题的苗头”来预防危机。


Unfortunately, the Georgian crisis demonstrated that Russia’s dialogue with NATO was less substantial than it should have been.	不幸的是，格鲁吉亚危机显示俄罗斯与北约的对话并没有预想中那样的实际意义。


Yet NATO-Russia cooperation is of the outmost importance to global security.	然而北约—俄罗斯的合作对全球安全而言又至关重要。


We need NATO and NATO needs us in order to face common threats and challenges.	为了应对共同的威胁和挑战，我们需要北约，北约也需要我们。


On the other hand, Russia will not go cap in hand to NATO.	但另一方面，俄罗斯又不会对北约毕恭毕敬。


We are not interested in the illusion of partnership.	我们对伙伴关系的幻想不感兴趣。


Indeed, Russia’s foremost foreign-policy goal is a real, strategic partnership with the West in which we work together to solve the multitude of modern security problems.	的确，俄罗斯首要的外交政策目标是与西方建立一种真实的战略伙伴关系并藉此解决诸多重大的现代安全问题。


I don’t have a crystal ball, but I’m certain that several years from now we should be able to look back at the Georgian crisis as a turning point.	我没有预知未来的水晶球，但我确信几年之后再回首，我们将把格鲁吉亚危机看作一个转折点。


Already we can name three “growth factors” that will help the new security system to mature – the development of the European Security and Defense Policy, the transformation of NATO, and Russia’s return to its rightful position on the world stage.	我们已经能够识别将会有助于新的安全机制成熟的三个“成长因子”—“欧洲安全和防务政策”的发展、北约的转变和俄罗斯回归其在世界舞台上应有的地位。


Russia is not becoming assertive, aggressive, or imperial, as many observers claim.	俄罗斯并没有像许多观察家们所称的那样，正变得刚愎自用、富于进攻性或帝国主义。


We are only claiming what is rightfully ours – a place in the front row of international relations.	我们只是在要求应有的东西—在国际关系前排的一席之地。


The world will have to get used to the fact that Russia is no longer a feeble country.	世界将不得不接受俄罗斯不再是个软弱的国家这一事实。


Is it so incomprehensible that we have strategic interests and national security concerns?	我们有战略利益和国家安全考虑就这么难以理解么？


Russia has tried for years to get away from Cold War thinking and to persuade our partners to drop their stereotypes.	俄罗斯多年来一直努力摆脱冷战思维并劝说我们的伙伴放弃他们的成见。


After the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, Russia quickly extended a helping hand to the Americans.	在2001年九月十一日恐怖袭击之后，俄罗斯很快向美国人伸出了援助之手。


But the West did not appreciate this gesture.	但西方并不欣赏这一姿态。


Military bases have been impetuously established along Russia’s perimeter.	（西方）军事基地在俄罗斯周边无所顾忌地建立起来。


The United States plans to establish part of its global missile defense system in the Czech Republic and Poland.	美国还计划将其全球导弹防御体系的一部分建立在捷克和波兰。


The Warsaw Pact ceased to exist 20 years ago, but NATO still proceeds eastward, adding new member states for reasons other than enhancing security and democracy.	虽然《华沙条约》在二十年前就终止了，但北约依然东扩，纳入新的成员国，而其目的绝不是促进安全与民主。


Russia is not interested in confrontation; we want to focus on our own development, prosperity, and stability.	俄罗斯不希望对抗； 我们想要专注于我们自身的发展、繁荣和稳定。


But successful development is possible only in the context of transparent and equal international relations, together with stability and security in our neighborhood.	但只有在透明与平等的国际关系中以及我们邻邦的稳定和安全的前提下，成功的发展才有可能实现。


Thus, we are interested in a strong and independent Europe.	因此，我们需要一个强大而独立的欧洲。


And the development of EU military capacities and EU security policy is an important factor in European and global security.	而欧盟的军事实力和安全政策则是欧洲和全球安全中的一个重要因素。


It is time for Europe to stop acting like an occupied continent and start displaying its own political will.	是时候让欧洲停止如一块被占领的大陆一般行事，而展现自己的政治意愿了。


The action taken by the EU in the course of the Georgian crisis proved that Europeans have such an aspiration and are willing to fulfill their role as a global player, which will become increasingly apparent in the coming years.	欧盟在格鲁吉亚危机过程中所采取的行动证明欧洲人有这样的愿望并愿意担负起他们全球性的责任。 这一点在未来若干年将会更加明朗。


As for NATO, we in Russia think it should adapt and transform itself to suit the new environment.	至于北约，身在俄罗斯的我们认为它应该调整并转变自身以适应新的环境。


During this transformation, NATO must keep in mind that the primary responsibility for global peace and security lies with the United Nations.	在这一转型过程中，北约必须牢记全球和平与安全的首要责任在于联合国。


For the moment, though, NATO and its leaders have no clear answer to the question: where do we go from here?	尽管目前北约及其领导人对于“我们何去何从”的问题并没有一个明确的答案。


The Alliance’s strategic concept is outdated, yet it cannot even agree on when to start preparing a new one.	该联盟的战略理念已经过时，然而它甚至不能就何时着手准备一个新理念达成共识。


Its forces are overstretched in Afghanistan, and its members are using it to advance their own goals.	其军力在在阿富汗的战线拖得过长，其成员国正利用它来��进各自的目标。


A real, working NATO-Russia relationship could provide the Alliance with solutions to problems that it cannot tackle on its own.	一种真实有效的北约-俄罗斯关系将为一些该联盟无法单独解决的问题提供解决之道。


It would also give new impetus to the European security system.	它还会给欧洲安全体系提供新的动力。


This is what we want to see in the future – and it is a future that is not possible without Russia.	这是我们想要看到的未来—一个没有俄罗斯就无法实现的未来。


To see why, simply compare the importance of combating international terrorism with the value of nurturing Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s personal ambitions; things soon fall into place.	问其原由，只需要将打击国际恐怖主义和满足格鲁吉亚总统萨卡什维利个人野心这两者的重要性做一个比较； 事情不言自明。


Europe needs an integrated, solid, and indivisible system of comprehensive security.	欧洲需要一个统一、坚实和不可分割的综合安全体系。


We are not calling for abolishing everything and starting from scratch.	我们并不是在呼吁要推倒一切，从头开始。


On the contrary, we must build on existing institutions.	相反，我们必须对现有机制加以改造。


In short, we need to retain the hardware, but update the software.	简言之，我们需要保留硬件但更新软件。


Russia’s initiative for a pan-European security treaty should be the new operating system.	俄罗斯所致力于的一个泛欧洲安全公约应该成为一种新的操作系统。


Rebuilding Libya	重建利比亚


BENGHAZI – Six months after Libyan rebels took up arms against the country’s leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, they have finally toppled him. But, while victorious on the battlefield, they have not been triumphant in political and economic terms. If the rebels are to ensure their revolution’s long-term success, they will have to overcome the weaknesses that plague them.	发自班加西——在经历了整整六个月的武装斗争后，利比亚反对派终于成功推翻了卡扎菲。 但他们虽然在军事上节节胜利，在政治和经济方面却依然陷于苦战。


In the days following the start of the uprising in February 17, the rebels formed a political body known as the National Transitional Council (NTC) and a cabinet known as the Executive Committee. Though drawn from across Libyan society and staffed by people with technical skills, the groups have been hamstrung by several problems.	在今年2月17日发动起义后，利比亚反对派随即成立了名为全国过渡委员会的政治实体以及名为执行委员会的内阁班子。 虽然这些机构的成员来自于利比亚社会各阶层并富有经验，却依然受到了众多问题的制肘和困扰。


Critics have derided the NTC’s lack of transparency and complained about its opaque decision-making. They have also questioned the criteria used to select its members.	有批评认为过渡委员会运作缺乏透明度并有黑箱决策之嫌，同时也质疑其成员的甄选标准。


Libyans say the Council’s chairman, Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, favors dissidents who spent time in Qaddafi’s prisons over those with the training and skills needed to rebuild the country. If the NTC does not address these concerns, it is difficult to see how it will manage the complex challenges ahead.	利比亚人认为委员会主席穆斯塔法•阿卜杜勒-贾利勒不喜欢任用对国家重建有用的专业人才，却偏爱那些蹲过卡扎菲大牢的前政治犯。 而如果过渡委员会连这些质疑都无法平息的话，可能也难以应对将来所遇到的种种复杂问题。


It is not only the NTC’s policies that could imperil the success of the Libyan uprising. Though admired in parts of eastern Libya under rebel control, Abdel-Jalil is a dour figure who lacks the charisma characteristic of revolutionary leaders. Indeed, he is a provincial player who so far has been unable to communicate a compelling vision of a new Libya.	虽然在反对派控制的东部部分地区广受尊敬，但阿卜杜勒-贾利勒不苟言笑，缺乏革命领导所特有的魅力。 事实上他目光狭隘，至今都未能推出一个令人信服的国家新远景。


A shortage of politically savvy leaders plagues the rebel-controlled East. Shortly after assuming the chairmanship of the NTC in March, Abdel-Jalil announced that its members would not run for office in future elections. But there has since been very little activity on the political front. Because activists were reluctant to begin campaigning while rebels were still fighting, they held back on forming political parties. As a result, only two parties have been created in a country that has no experience with pluralist democracy. At this point, there are very few voices consistently advocating the changes needed to secure the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime.	因为政治活动家们都不愿意在反对派依然战斗的同时开展竞选活动，于是他们退一步开始组建政党。 结果在这个没有任何多党制民主经验的国家至今只成立了两个政党。


Other problems loom for the NTC. In July, their military chief of staff, Abdul Fattah Younis, was killed in murky circumstances after the Council issued an arrest warrant for him. His tribe has demanded answers that the NTC does not have. People close to the case say that senior NTC officials were implicated in Younis’s death.	在今年7月，反对派武装力量总司令阿卜杜·法塔赫·尤尼斯在过渡委员会对其签发逮捕令后离奇被杀。 尤尼斯所属部落要求委员会对此作出解释却没得到任何回音。


Although the investigation into the  murder of Younis has been muted by the rebels’ recent military successes, his tribe is demanding justice and is prepared to seek retribution if the NTC cannot resolve the matter. Such an outcome could split the rebels’ ranks and risks plunging Libya into renewed violence at the very moment that hostilities should have ended.	尤尼斯所属的部落依然在不断要求得到公正合理的解释，并准备在委员会无法解决问题的情况下独立实施报复行动。 而这样的结果将导致反对派的内部分裂，甚至可能在各派都应该放下敌意的关键时刻将利比亚再次拖入暴力的深渊。


The danger of civil bloodshed imperils a post-Qaddafi Libya more generally. Already, Libyan rebels in the east have exacted revenge on Qaddafi loyalists, many of whom worked for his feared revolutionary committees. In western Libya, human-rights workers have reported that the Qaddafi’s supporters have been shot in the hand to mark their treachery. With the NTC unable to impose discipline on its soldiers, such violence is likely to increase as army soldiers and militias evacuate Qaddafi strongholds.	东部地区的反对派已经对那些卡扎菲支持者们实施了报复——大部分被清算者都曾任职于令人谈之色变的利比亚安全机构“革命委员会”。 而在西部地区，人权组织成员报告说凡是卡扎菲支持者都要在手掌上挨一枪以惩罚其背叛行为。


The NTC faces a number of economic dilemmas as well. Before the revolution, Libya produced nearly 1.6 million barrels of oil per day, accounting for 96% of the country’s export earnings. But, since February, the taps have run dry, owing to disruption and damage to the oil infrastructure. In the interim, the NTC has largely survived on international aid and from the unfreezing of Libyan assets by foreign governments.	但自2月以来，由于相关设施不断遭到骚扰和破坏，石油生产近乎停滞。 在这段时间，过渡委员会主要依赖国际援助以及各国解冻的利比亚资产来维持运作。


But these funds have been unable to fuel the economy of rebel-controlled territories. Libyans complain that they have not been paid their monthly salaries. Nightly power outages have left many in the dark in cities like Tobruk, and even the rebel capital of Benghazi has experienced sporadic electricity cuts.	许多比利亚人抱怨说无法领到工资。 电力短缺使得托布鲁克等城市夜晚一片漆黑，甚至连反对派的大本营班加西也不时遭遇停电。


The war’s costs extend far beyond repairing oil installations and turning on the electricity. Cities such as Misurata have been ravaged by the fighting and will have to be rebuilt. But Libya lacks the technical capacity to tackle these problems. Short on skilled experts, a post-Qaddafi Libya risks becoming dependent on foreign assistance, much like the Palestinians, who live largely from international aid rather than from their own economic activity.	但利比亚却缺乏相关技术能力去解决这些问题。 由于缺乏相关技术专家，后卡扎菲时代的利比亚严重依赖外国援助，就像巴勒斯坦那样无法依靠内部经济活动，只能等待国际输血。


The fall of Qaddafi and his authoritarian regime holds great promise for a people bereft of freedom for 42 years. But, with the NTC having stumbled so far, it will have to redouble its efforts to ensure that it wins the peace that it fought so hard to secure.	与对那些失去自由整整42年的人们来说，卡扎菲及其专制政权的倒台使他们看到了光明的前途。 但从过渡委员会目��磕磕绊绊的状况看来，它还需加倍努力才能保证不会葬送自己血战赢来的和平果实。


Barak Barfi is a research fellow at the New America Foundation.	巴拉克·巴尔菲现为智库机构“新美国基金会”研究员。


This could be added to the amount of long-term bonds issued to support asylum-seekers in Europe.	这些资金不包括为支持欧洲寻求庇护者而发行的��期债券。


Rebuilding the Brain	重建大脑


For many years, it was thought that all of our brain cells (neurons) are produced before birth, or exceptionally, up to one or two years after birth, but then the process supposedly stopped.	许多年来，大家一直认为我们的脑细胞（神经细胞）是在出生前产生的，也有一些例外的是在出生后一两年产生的，但是其后这一进程就被认为是终止了。


From then on, most brain scientists believed, brain circuits could only be modified by altering the synapses, or contacts between existing cells.	大多数脑科学家认为，从那时起，大脑回路只能通过改变突触或者已有的细胞之间的联系来得以修改。


In this view, the total complement of cells, anatomically organized by function and forming major pathways, constituted the brain’s “hardware.”	按照这种观点，所有用来补充的细胞按照功能在结构上被组合在一起并形成主要的路径，组成大脑的“硬件”。


The detailed nature of the relation between cells, the modifiable synapses, was the software.	而细胞之间具体的联系性质以及可以改变的突触是软件。


Starting in the 1960s, evidence suggested that new neurons might be added beyond this early period and even in adulthood.	从二十世纪六十年代起，证据显示新的神经细胞可以在这一早期过后，甚至在成年期被添加进来。


This evidence became compelling in the 1980s, based on observations made while studying parts of the songbird brain involved in the acquisition and production of learned song.	到了八十年代，在研究歌鸟的大脑与获取和产生学来的歌曲相关的部分时所获得的一些发现使这一证据变得更有说服力。


The original observations were met with skepticism, but the birdsong data proved compelling.	这一发现一开始受到了质疑，但是歌鸟的数据证明这是可信的。


How does one prove that a neuron was born at a particular time?	那么如何来证明一个神经细胞是在某个特定时间产生的呢？


Each cell in the body contains DNA, which is responsible for producing the proteins that are necessary for a cell’s functioning.	身体内每个细胞都包含有DNA，它负责产生细胞要形成其功能所必需的蛋白质。


Though all cells in the body have the same DNA, only a subset of the genes encoded by the DNA is expressed in each cell type, thus accounting for the difference between, say, a skin cell, a liver cell, and a brain cell.	尽管身体内的所有细胞的NDA都是相同的，但是不同的细胞类型只含有带有DNA密码的某个基因子集，这样就产生了皮肤细胞、肝细胞和脑细胞之间的区别。


When a cell is about to divide, as happens when tissue grows, the DNA in the mother cell has to be doubled, that is, new DNA is synthesized.	当一个细胞要开始分裂时，比如在组织生长的时候，母细胞内的DNA必须被复制，就是说，新的DNA是被合成的。


It is possible to supply the cell with one of the building blocks of the new DNA, and to put a little radioactive tag on that building block.	这样我们就有可能给细胞加入新DNA的某个积木，而在那个积木上贴上一些放射性的标签。


Later, scanning through the brain, every time we find a tagged cell we know that it was born at the time we furnished the DNA.	然后，通过扫描大脑，每次当我们发现一个带有标签的细胞，我们就可以知道它是在我们在个DNA添加积木时产生的。


When we gave adult canaries the tagged DNA building block and then looked for tagged neurons that would have been born one or two days earlier, we found none.	当我们给成年金丝雀加入带有标签的DNA积木，并且寻找本该早一两天产生的带标签的细胞时，我们没有发现这样的细胞。


But if we waited longer – for example, 1-3 weeks, depending on part of brain – we found quite a few tagged neurons.	但是如果我们再等一段时间，比如说，一到三个星期（这根据具体是大脑的哪一部分来定），我们就能许多带有标签的细胞。


This told us that the new neurons were not born by division of existing neurons, but were born elsewhere in the brain and went through a migratory stage during which they were not recognized as neurons.	这表明新的神经细胞不是通过已有的细胞的分裂产生的，而是在大脑的其他地方产生，然后迁徙过来的，而在迁徙过程中，它们并没有表现出是神经细胞。


It took at least a week for the first new neurons to reach their destination and acquire the looks of an adult neuron.	最初的新神经细胞至少需要一周时间才会到达其目的地，并表现出是成年的神经细胞。


We then learned how to identify the future neurons during their migratory journey.	然后我们试图识别处于其迁徙途中、将成为神经细胞的那些细胞。


They were, at that stage, much smaller and had an elongated shape that allowed them to slip between other cells.	在过程中，它们的形状非常小并且被拉长了，这样可以使它们穿过其他的细胞。


It came as a great surprise when we discovered that the cells giving birth to the new neurons were a type called radial glia, which were thought not to occur in adulthood and were not known to give birth to neurons.	当我们发现产生新的神经细胞的那些细胞是一种神经干细胞时感到非常惊讶，因为我们一直认为这不可能在成年期发生，并且神经干细胞一只被认为是不会产生神经细胞的。


One of the paradoxes of this process is that in adult birds and mammals the total number of brain cells remains remarkably constant.	这一进程的一个不可思议之处在于在成年鸟和哺乳动物的大脑中脑细胞的总数一直是恒定的。


The new neurons replace older ones of the same kind that die – a process of natural rejuvenation.	新的神经细胞会替代死去的同一类型的老细胞——一个自然复壮的过程。


There are no hospitals in nature.	这里并没有什么医院存在。


The sudden loss of many brain cells as a result of strokes or injuries must have serious effects on an animal’s survival.	因为中风或受伤而突然损失许多脑细胞会严重影响动物的生存。


It seems likely that the replacement of neurons in the adult brain did not evolve to make up losses due to illness or lesion, but as a process of constant renewal, a few cells being replaced every day.	看起来似乎成年大脑内神经细胞的替代并不会弥补因为疾病或损伤而产生的损失，而只是一个持续的更新过程——每天都有一些细胞被替代。


This idea is so novel that it needs further elaboration.	这一观点是如此新奇，需要进一步的详细阐述。


In the adult songbird brain, we can find at any moment many little migrating neurons ready to replace cells that have died.	在成年的歌鸟大脑中，在任一时期我们都可以发现许多小的迁徙神经细胞正准备替代死去的细胞。


Only one of every three job seekers finds a job, but the overproduction is probably worthwhile, for it ensures that as a replaceable neuron dies, there will already be, in its vicinity, a younger one ready to take its place.	每三个迁徙来的神经细胞中只有一个会替代死细胞，但是这种过量繁殖也许是有价值的，因为它能保证当一个可被替代的细胞死去时，在其附近，总有一个年轻的新细胞准备替代它的位置。


As far as known, only a small fraction of all brain cells fall into the replaceable class; when other kinds of neurons die, they are not replaced.	就目前所知的情况，在所有脑细胞中，只有很小一部分是可以被替代的； 而其他神经细胞死去的时候，它们并不会被替代。


We now know that the brain has the potential to grow new brain cells to replace others that have died.	我们现在知道了大脑有潜力产生新的脑细胞来替代死去的细胞。


This potential could be used to repair damaged circuits.	这种潜力可以被用来修补受伤的回路。


Laboratories around the world are trying to develop ways to bring this knowledge to clinical situations.	世界各地的实验室正致力于研究如何把它用到临床上去——就是说诱导大脑产生所需要的任何种类的神经细胞并把它们送到正确的位置上去。


The trick will be to induce the brain to produce and deliver to the correct destination any kind of neuron that might be needed, so that regardless of cell class, new cells of the required kind can replace others of the same type that have died.	这样不管是哪种类型的细胞，我们都可以有新的同一类型的细胞去替代死去的细胞。 要实现这一目标还有相当长的路要走。


Rebuilding the Ruins of Qaddafi	重建卡扎菲留下的废墟


TRIPOLI – With the creation of a new government, Libya’s leaders should finally be able to focus on organizing the transition from the authoritarian state that they inherited to the more pluralistic one they envisage.	的黎波里——新政府成立后，利比亚领导人终于可以集中精力实现从接手的专制政府到理想中的多元化国家的过渡过程。


But are they really able and willing to achieve that goal?	但他们是否真的愿意并有能力实现这一目标？


In the United States, the debate on Libya has focused on what steps its government should take next.	美国国内就利比亚问题的辩论集中在该国政府接下来应该采取哪些措施。


Senator Robert Menendez argues it “must move quickly to embrace democratic reform,” while international development specialists, such as Manal Omar of the US Institute for Peace, believe that success lies in the cultivation of a vibrant civil society.	罗伯特·梅南德斯参议员认为新政府“必须尽快进行民主制度改革，”而美国和平研究所的马纳尔·奥马尔等国际发展问题专家则认为能否培育出充满活力的民间社会才是成功的关键。


These views, however, overlook Libya’s unique history, and treat Libya as though it were just another Third World country in need of generic solutions.	但是上述观点忽视了利比亚独特的历史，只把利比亚当作需要通用解决方案的另一个第三世界国家。


In fact, remedying the country’s ills requires building strong state institutions.	而实际上，建设强有力的国家机构才是救国之道。


Since Libya achieved independence in 1951, it has been a fractured state.	利比亚从1951年独立后就一直处于分裂状态。


Rulers relied on loyal tribes and narrow cliques to prop up their regimes.	统治者依靠忠实的部族和狭隘的派系支撑他们的政权。


Under a monarchy that led the country from 1951-1969, King Idris’s relatives and inner circle ran roughshod over fledgling state institutions.	1951年到1969年的君主制统治期间，伊德里斯国王的亲属及核心集团的铁蹄无情践踏了羽翼未丰的国家机构。


More interested in reigning than in governing, state institutions withered under Idris’s neglect. 	伊德里斯与其说是管理还不如说是统治，国家机构也因为他的忽视而逐渐萎缩。


These trends were exacerbated after Muammar el-Qaddafi overthrew the king in 1969.	穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲1969年推翻君主制后，上述趋势就变得更加明显。


Frustrated with a bureaucracy reluctant to implement his political vision, Qaddafi bypassed traditional institutions and claimed a direct dialogue with the country’s population.	由于不满官僚机构不愿执行其政治理想，卡扎菲摒弃了传统的国家机构，要求直接与国内民众对话。


The new Libyan leader created an intricate hierarchy of political organizations that were advertised as empowering citizens, but which in reality only reinforced their subservience to his autocratic regime.	利比亚这位新领袖以向平民授权为名一手缔造了层级关系错综复杂的政治机构，但这些机构实际上只是巩固了平民对其专制政权的服从。


As Libyans tired of Qaddafi’s revolutionary rhetoric, he decided that a new organization was needed to stir popular support.	随着利比亚人逐渐厌倦了卡扎菲的革命言论，他认为要想唤起民众支持就必须建立新的机构。


In 1977, he established committees that he dubbed the “watchdogs of the revolution.”	1977年，他组建委员会，并冠之以“革命监督者”的称号。


The committees formed their own courts, assumed sweeping arrest powers, took over the media, and purged officials who resisted Qaddafi’s will.	委员会成立了自己的法庭，取得了至高无上的拘捕权，全面接管媒体，并清洗抵制卡扎菲意志的官员。


This led to a split between the state’s official institutions and Qaddafi’s shadow revolutionary apparatus.	利比亚官方机构和卡扎菲的影子革命机构之间自此分道扬镳。


Qaddafi clearly preferred the latter.	卡扎菲显然更倾向于后者。


In 1979, he resigned from his official posts to assume the vague role of “Commander of the Revolution,” explaining that “the revolution must be separated from the authority of the state.”	1979年，他辞去公职担任“革命指挥官”这一模糊职务，并解释说“革命事业必须要和国家权力分开。


This led to what the scholar Moncef Djaziri described as a division of formal and informal authority.	”学者Moncef Djaziri所指的正式及非正式政府的分裂由此产生。


Qaddafi’s strategy stunted the growth of state institutions, because, like Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution in China, it implied subordinating their development to the needs of an all-embracing vision of transformation.	卡扎菲的政策阻碍了国家机构的成长，因为这意味着它们的成长要服从所谓囊括一切的转型目标的需求，这与毛泽东在中国发动的文化大革命如出一辙。


Economic planning reflected his populist policies and foreign adventures, rather than any focus on stability and sustainable growth.	经济规划与其说关注的是稳定和可持续增长，还不如说反映卡氏的民粹主义政策和对外冒险的需要。


Instead of relying on state structures to govern, he leaned on a small coterie of minions and members of his tribe.	卡扎菲并不依赖国家机构来完成执政，而是依赖其爪牙和部族成员。


As a result, state institutions decayed.	结果造成了国家机构的衰退。


Beginning in 1986, the Libyan Central Bank ceased publishing the annual statistical reports that economists and specialists need to formulate coherent policies.	从1986年起，利比亚中央银行就停止发布经济学家和专家制定连贯政策所需要的年度统计报告。


Frustrated by his population’s political apathy, Qaddafi frequently announced his intention to dissolve all government ministries and transfer their responsibilities to municipalities.	由于对民众对待政治的冷漠态度感到失望，卡扎菲时常宣布自己打算解散所有政府部门，并将其职能转交给市政府。


Today, Libya’s state institutions exist merely to extract the country’s vast oil wealth and distribute it via subsidies.	今天，利比亚国家机构的存在只是为了提取该国庞大的石油财富并以补贴的形式分发。


In a state that embodied the whim of its leader for 42 years, the rule of law does not exist.	在一个容忍其领导人一切心血来潮决策长达42年的国家根本不存在法治。


Explaining why he helped spearhead a 1993 military coup attempt, Air Force officer Muhammad Bashir Salah said, “We have neither a state, nor laws, nor a constitution.”	空军军官穆罕默德·萨拉赫·巴希尔在解释自己推动1993年军事政变企图的原因时说，“我们既没有国家，也没有法律，也没有宪法。 ”


Indeed, even the military, which in many Third World countries is the strongest state institution, was marginalized under Qaddafi.	实际上，就连军队这个在很多第三世界国家最强势的国家机构也被卡扎菲边缘化。


The revolutionary committees’ attacked it for being “a traditional fascist institution.”	革命委员会攻击军队是“传统的法西斯机构。


Qaddafi declared his desire to disband the army on several occasions, and its role was so insignificant that it played almost no part in defending the regime during the eight months of fighting that overthrew him.	”卡扎菲在若干场合公开表达了解散军队的愿望，而在连续8个月试图推翻卡扎菲的战斗中，军队在政权保卫中所发挥的作用可以说微不足道。


American diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks noted that Libya has “few formal decision-making structures,” and called it an “opaque regime in which lines of authority are deliberately blurred to obscure power structures and mitigate accountability.”	维基解密公开的美国外交电文指出，利比亚“几乎没有正式决策机构，”电文称之为“不透明的政权故意模糊权力界线，目的是掩盖权力结构并减轻问责。 ”


Today, Qaddafi’s successors on the National Transitional Council (NTC) are perpetuating the dualistic authority that he created.	今天，全国过渡委员会（NTC）中卡扎菲的继任者接手了卡氏一手创建的二元政权。


Politically inexperienced and lacking strong leadership, they have proved unable to impose discipline on the myriad militias that sprang up during the revolution.	事实证明他们既缺乏政治经验又缺乏强势领导，根本无法对革命期间兴起的无数民兵组织执行纪律要求。


These rogue units have exacted vengeance on Qaddafi supporters and alienated significant segments of society.	这些不受控制的团体对卡扎菲的支持者实施报复，离间了很大一部分社会成员。


If the NTC cannot assert its authority, the council risks the emergence of a movement nostalgic for Qaddafi and the security that his regime provided.	如果全国过渡委员会不能树立威信，怀念卡扎菲及其所缔造安全环境的运动就可能应运而生。


Unlike their neighbors in Egypt, Libyans are not clamoring for the elections deemed by many Westerners to be of paramount importance.	不同于邻国埃及，利比亚民众对很多西方人视为最重要的选举并不热衷。


Instead, they have drawn on a patience rooted in their traditional political apathy.	相反，他们对待局势的态度仍然是传统政治冷漠所造就的耐心。


Few political parties have emerged, and there is little popular demand for them.	鲜有政党宣布成立，民众对此也少有热情。


Activists have instead focused on drafting a new constitution that would empower state institutions. 	活动人士反而全力起草授权国家机构的新宪法。


Libyans understand that the NTC needs time to build a new country on the ruins of the one that Qaddafi destroyed.	利比亚人清醒地意识到全国过渡委员会在被卡扎菲毁坏的废墟上重建国家需要时间。


That daunting task begins by developing the state institutions required to respond to Libyans’ needs.	要想完成这项艰巨的任务，第一步只能是建设满足利比亚需要的国家机构。


Re-Capturing the Friedmans	再诘弗里德曼夫妇


BERKELEY – On my desk right now are reporter Timothy Noah’s new book The Great Divergence: America’s Growing Inequality Crisis and What We Can Do about It and Milton and Rose Director Friedman’s classic Free to Choose: A Personal Statement.	伯克利—眼下，我案头摆着两部书：记者诺阿（Timothy Noah）的新书《大分化：美国日益严重的不平等性危机以及我们可以如何做》（The Great Divergence: America’s Growing Inequality Crisis and What We Can Do about It and Milton and Rose Friedman’s classic Free to Choose）以及弗里德曼夫妇的经典之作《自由选择：自白》（Free to Choose: A Personal Statement）。


Considering them together, my overwhelming thought is that the Friedmans would find their task of justifying and advocating small-government libertarianism much harder today than they did in 1979.	把两部书合起来思考，我的感觉是：放在今天，弗里德曼夫妇会发现，论证和支持小政府自由主义比1979年时要困难得多。


Back then, the Friedmans made three powerful factual claims about how the world works – claims that seemed true or maybe true or at least arguably true at the time, but that now seem to be pretty clearly false.	1979年时，弗里德曼夫妇给出了世界如何运转的三个有力的实证结论——从当时的情况看，这三个结论是对的，或者似乎是对的，或者至少很有道理； 但如今，这三个结论看上去显而易见是错的。


Their case for small-government libertarianism rested largely on those claims, and has now largely crumbled, because the world, it turned out, disagreed with them about how it works.	弗氏夫妇的小政府自由主义基本上便以这三个结论作为基础，故而从今天看也早已站不住脚，因为世界似乎并不赞同他们关于自己如何运转的结论。


The first claim was that macroeconomic distress is caused by the government, not by the unstable private market, or, rather, that the form of macroeconomic regulation required to produce economic stability is straightforward and easily achieved.	第一个结论是，宏观经济灾难是由政府引起的，而不是由不稳定的私人市场引起的，或者，换句话说，产生经济稳定所需要的宏观经济管理是直观的并且非常容易就能实现。


The Friedmans almost always made the claim in its first form: they said that the government had “caused” the Great Depression.	弗氏夫妇对此几乎是开宗明义：他们说，政府“引起”了大萧条。


But when you dug into their argument, it turned out that what they really meant was the second: whenever private-market instability threatened to cause a depression, the government could avert it or produce a rapid recovery simply by purchasing enough bonds for cash to flood the economy with liquidity.	但若深挖论据，你会发现他们的真实意思是第二个结论：当私人市场不稳定可能导致萧条时，政府只消以现金购买足够多的债券或用流动性支撑经济就能避免萧条或制造快速复苏。


In other words, the strategic government intervention needed to ensure macroeconomic stability was not only straightforward, but also minimal: the authorities need only manage a steady rate of money-supply growth.	换句话说，确保宏观经济稳定的战略性政府干预不但是直观的，而且是程度最低的：当局只需要维持稳定的货币供应增长即可。


The aggressive and comprehensive intervention that Keynesians claimed was needed to manage aggregate demand, and that Minskyites claimed was needed to manage financial risk, was entirely unwarranted.	凯恩斯主义者宣称的激进全面的干预是为了管理总需求，而明斯基主义式的干预是为了管理金融风险，它们都不能保证取得成效。


Real libertarians never bought the Friedmans’ claim that they were as advocating a free-market, “neutral” monetary regime: Ludwig von Mises famously called Milton Friedman and his monetarist followers a bunch of socialists.	真正的自由主义者从来不买弗氏夫妇结论的账，不认为他们支持的是自由市场和“中性”货币制度：米赛斯非常著名地将弗里德曼及其货币主义追随者称为社会主义者。


But, whatever its packaging, the belief that macroeconomic stability requires only minimal government intervention is simply wrong.	但是，不管披上什么样的外衣，宏观经济稳定性只需要最低限度的政府干预这一思想显然是错的。


In the United States, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has executed the Friedmanite playbook flawlessly in the current downturn, and it has not been enough to preserve or rapidly restore full employment.	在美国，美联储主席伯南克完美地在最近的经济大减速中演绎了弗里德曼主义，结果是如此并不足以保护经济或快速使之快速恢复充分就业。


The second claim was that externalities were relatively small, or at least that they were better dealt with via contract and tort law than through government regulation, because the disadvantages of government regulation outweighed the harm done by those externalities that the legal system could not properly address.	第二个结论是，与政府监管相比，通过契约和侵权法造成的外部性相对较小，或者至少处理外部性更得力，这是因为政府监管的劣势比法律制度所不能适当处置的外部性所造成的伤害更甚。


Here, too, reality does not seem to have endorsed Free to Choose.	在这一点上，现实再一次证明《自由选择》是错的。


In the US, this is most apparent in changing attitudes toward medical-malpractice lawsuits, with libertarians no longer viewing the court system as the preferred arena to deal with medical risk and error.	在美国，人们对医疗事故诉讼的态度变化显而易见，自由主义者不再将法庭视为处理医疗风险和失误的最佳场所。


The third, and most important, claim is the subject of Noah’s The Great Divergence.	第三个也是最重要的一个结论便是诺阿新书的标题《大分化》。


In 1979, the Friedmans could confidently claim that, in the absence of government-mandated discrimination (for example, the South’s segregationist Jim Crow laws), the market economy would produce a sufficiently egalitarian distribution of income.	1979年，弗里德曼夫妇自信满满地定论道，没有政府指令的歧视（比如南方种族歧视法案法案Jim Crow法），市场经济会形成充分平等的收入分配。


After all, it had appeared to do so – at least for those who did not suffer from legal discrimination or its legacies – for the entire post-WWII era.	毕竟，在整个二战后时代便是如此——至少对那些未受法律歧视（及其遗留伤害）者是如此。


So the Friedmans argued that a minimal safety net for those whom bad luck or a lack of prudence had rendered destitute, and elimination of all legal barriers to equality of opportunity, would lead to the most equitable outcomes possible.	于是，弗氏夫妇指出，为不走运者或不知节制者设置最低限度安全网造成了贫困，而消除所有机会平等的法律壁垒将会造就最公平的可能结果。


Profit-seeking employers, using and promoting human talents, would bring us as close to a free society of associated producers as is attainable in this fallen sublunary sphere.	追求利润的雇主会启用和提拔人才，将我们引向人世间所能达到的最为自由的生产者联合社会。


Here, too, the Friedmans’ hopes have been disappointed.	在这方面，弗氏夫妇的愿望再一次落空了。


The end of American preeminence in education, the collapse of private-sector unions, the emergence of a winner-take-all information-age economy, and the return of Gilded Age-style high finance have produced an extraordinarily unequal pre-tax distribution of income, which will burden the next generation and make a mockery of equality of opportunity.	随着美国教育优势不再、私人部门工会的堕落、赢者通吃的信息时代经济的到来以及镀金时代高端金融的回归，税前收入分配出现了极大的不平等，这给下一代造成了沉重的负担，也是对机会平等的极大讽刺。


It would have been nice if the political program laid out a generation ago in Free to Choose had lived up to the Friedmans’ billing.	如果一代人之前的《自由选择》中所列出的政治项目能够按弗氏夫妇的构想在当时得到实施，那敢情好。


It would have been nice if a relatively equal and prosperous society with full employment and equal opportunity had followed from a government that stood back from the economy and provided nothing but a minimal safety net, courts, and a constantly growing money supply.	如果原理经济、只提供最低安全网、法律制度和恒定货币供应增长量的政府能实现相对平等和繁荣的充分就业且机会平等的社会，那也感情好。


Alas, that did not happen. And it did not happen because the world described by the Friedmans is not the world in which we live.	唉，可惜那似乎不是我们所生活的世界。


Recession Geopolitics	跟萧条有关的地缘政治


FLORENCE – The news that China has overtaken Japan as the world’s second largest economy did not come as a surprise.	发自佛罗伦撒——中国超越日本成为世界第二大经济体的消息并不令我吃惊。


This is the major geo-political outcome of the Great Recession of the early twenty-first century – one that carries both economic hope and political fear.	因为这是21世纪早期大衰退在地缘政治方面所呈现的结果——既让人充满经济腾飞的希望，也伴随着政治上的恐惧。


First, the good news: the economic side of the case.China’s response of to the world economic crisis is the central reason why the financial turbulence that emanated from the US sub-prime debacle did not completely destroy the world economy and lead to a repeat of the 1930’s Great Depression.	首先是经济方面的利好：美国次贷危机所引发的金融骚乱之所以没能彻底毁灭全球经济并重蹈1930年代大萧条的覆辙，中国的应对措施应该记上头功。


In a famous analysis of the Great Depression, the economic historian Charles Kindleberger argued that it arose from a failure of world leadership.	在对大萧条的一个著名分析中，经济史学家查理斯·金德博格将萧条的起源归结为全球领导角色的缺失。


Great Britain had been the hegemonic power of the nineteenth century, but its creditor status had been severely eroded by the cost of fighting World War I.	英国虽然贵为19世界的全球霸主，但他的债权人地位已经被第一次世界大战的巨大消耗所削弱了。


The United States had emerged from the war as the world’s largest creditor, but it had a double vulnerability.	一战后美国崛起成为全球最大的债务人，但其内部依然存在着两个弱点：美国的金融系统不够稳定，容易陷入恐慌；


Its financial system was unstable and prone to panics, and its political system was immature and prone to populism and nativism.	而其政治系统则不够成熟，有严重的民粹主义和排外倾向。


In the Depression, according to Kindleberger, the US should have provided an open market to foreign goods. Instead, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act closed off American markets and provoked other countries into a spiral of retaliatory trade measures.	照金德博格所说，在大萧条期间美国本应对国外商品开放市场，但斯穆特-哈维关税法案却反其道而行之，导致其他国家也开始推行一连串报复性贸易政策，且政策的严厉程度随着事态的发展而不断升级。


US financial institutions should have continued to lend to distressed borrowers, in order to prevent a spiral in which credit rationing forced price reductions and intensified world deflation.	美国的金融机构本该继续向那些身陷困境的借贷人放贷，以避免由信贷比率导致的商品价格下滑以及全球通货紧缩的继续恶化。


Instead, US banks, widely blamed for the international lending boom that preceded the bust, were so intimidated and weakened that the flow of American credit stopped.	谁知在早前的全球信贷膨胀中兴风作浪的美国银行却畏首畏尾，弱不禁风，导致美国的信贷流基本停滞。


After World War II, as a leading figure in developing the Marshall Plan, Kindleberger set about applying these lessons: the US should keep its markets and its flow of funds open to support other countries.	在二战之后，位居马歇尔计划领导层的金德博格开始着手解决这个问题：美国应当对世界其他国家开放自己的市场和资金流。


How different the twenty-first century looks!	转眼到21世纪，这又是怎么一番景象！


It is as if China’s leaders were the star pupils in one of Kindleberger’s courses.	中国似乎已经成为了金德博格理论的最佳追随者。


Throughout the crisis, the Chinese economy continued to grow at an amazing pace, in part as a consequence of massive fiscal stimulus.	纵观整场危机，中国经济依然在以一种惊人的速度增长（部分源自于其庞大的财政刺激计划）。


When anyone wants an example of how effective a Keynesian counter-cyclical strategy can be, internationally as well as domestically, they need look no further than China’s four-trillion-renminbi stimulus of 2008-2009.	每个想探究凯恩斯的反经济周期策略究竟有多有效的人，无论是在国际还是国内层面展开讨论的，都应该好好研究一下中国2008~2009财年总值4万亿人民币的经济刺激计划。


Apart from a six-month period after the September 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers, in which trade finance stopped and the world did look as if it was close to Great Depression circumstances, China and other emerging markets helped those export-oriented industrial economies to recover.	在雷曼公司于2008年9月年破产后的那六个月间，全球经济贸易近乎停滞，似乎又回到了大萧条的时代，但中国以及其他新兴经济体却一手推动了那些以出口为导向的工业经济体的复苏。


The surprising strength of the German economy, with more vigorous growth than at any time in the past 15 years, is due to the dynamism of emerging-market – particularly Chinese – demand, not only for investment goods, engineering products, and machine tools, but also for luxury consumer products.	德国经济取得了15年来最高的增长，而其强大动力则是拜新兴经济体（尤其是中国）的需求所赐——其中不但包括投资产品和工程机械，还有奢侈品贸易。


Germany’s high-end automobile producers are now operating at full capacity.	德国的高端汽车工业正开足马力生产以满足这些需求。


China also followed Kindleberger’s financial lessons. For a moment, it looked as if a contagious crisis, driven by fears of government over-indebtedness, would destroy the politically fragile compromise that European countries had carefully constructed over a 50-year period.	中国同时也遵循着金德博格的经济信条：在对政府过度负债的恐惧推动下，一度不断蔓延的危机似乎要摧毁欧洲人苦心经营了50余年的脆弱政治承诺（欧盟）。


The turning point in this spring’s euro panic came when big holders of reserve currencies signaled that they saw the need for the euro as an alternative to the increasingly problematic dollar and the equally vulnerable yen.	但今年春天发生的欧元恐慌却迎来了转机，那些手握巨额外汇储备的国家暗示说希望将欧元作为危机不断的美元以及日元的替代货币。


China started to buy European Union governments’ bonds, and a high-profile Chinese team even went to Greece to buy under-priced real assets.	于是中国开始大幅买入欧盟政府债券，而一个高规格的中国商团甚至奔赴希腊去收购当地被低估的地产。


It was not just Europe that benefited from China’s willingness to take on the mantle of “lender of last resort.”	从中国希望成为“最后借贷人”的举动中获益的可不仅仅是欧盟。


The new-found dynamism of African economies is a consequence of the Chinese drive to build up and secure sources of raw materials.	最近非洲经济的蓬勃发展也是源自于中国建立并确保原材料供应的决心。


But there is a problem with Kindleberger’s argument.	但金德博格的理论有一个问题。


Kindleberger, a kind and well-meaning man, could never see that the world is never entirely grateful to the country that saves it.	作为一个友好而又心怀善意的人，金德博格永远不会想到一个事实——这个世界从来不会全心全意地感激任何拯救了它的国家。


Being a hegemon is a thankless task.	要知道霸主可是一个吃力不讨好的角色。


The beneficent effects of China’s engagement in the world economy are felt much more powerfully farther away from China.	人们离中国越远，就越容易感受到中国参与为世界经济带来的正面效应。


In that sense, too, there is a parallel with the story of the US, whose leadership was felt much more positively in Europe than it was in Canada, Mexico, or Central America.	正如欧洲人往往对美国的领导地位予以正面评价，但加拿大，墨西哥和中美洲的人们却不以为然。


It is not surprising that the greatest and strongest ideological opponent of the American way of life was not in distant Europe or Asia, but in Cuba, just 90 miles off the Florida coast.	比如说，在意识形态上最为抗拒美式生活方式的并不是千里之外的欧洲或亚洲，而是距离佛罗里达海岸只有区区90公里的古巴。


Since the early twentieth century, Mexicans have felt worried and threatened by American strength.	从20世纪早期开始，墨西哥人就感觉到了美国实力的威胁。


And, in the same way, Taiwan and Vietnam feel that they will be the Chinese giant’s first victims.	同理，台��和越南也觉得自己会首当其冲成为中国崛起的牺牲品。


The global hegemon has never been loved by its neighbors.	那些全球霸主们永远不会得到自己邻居的爱戴。


But the US gradually, if imperfectly, built up trust through multilateral institutions.	但美国正逐渐（虽然还不算完美地）通过多边机制来建立彼此之间的信任。


Europeans did much better at reconciliation with their neighbors after WWII, in part because the malign and evil conditions of Nazi rule made it necessary to talk about the past in terms of moral categories rather than power politics.	欧洲人在与自己的二战对手和解方面做得更好，这在某种程度上是因为纳粹统治的邪恶性令人们觉得更有必要去从道德范畴，而不是权力政治层面去谈论过去。


In contrast to America’s engagement in multilateralism, or Europe’s search for reconciliation through a plethora of common institutions, power politics is much more a part of Asia’s twentieth-century legacy.	相对于美国对多边主义的参与，或是欧洲通过建立大量共同机构来追求和解的探索，权力政治依然是亚洲20世纪政治遗产的重要组成部分。


The real challenge for China’s leaders will be to develop a coherent view of the world that does not scare the people just across the border.	因此中国领导人所面对的真正挑战，其实是要树立一套连贯的世界观，并以此打消周边国家和地区的疑虑。


Recession Insurance	衰退保险


NEW HAVEN – The Chief Economist of the International Monetary Fund, Olivier Blanchard, and several IMF economists have proposed in a recent paper that governments should offer what they call “recession insurance.”	纽黑文--国际货币基金组织首席经济学家布朗夏和该组织的其他几位经济学家最近在一片论文中建议政府应该提供“衰退保险”。


Companies and/or individuals would buy insurance policies, pay a regular premium for them, and receive a benefit if some measure of the economy, such as GDP growth, dropped below a specified level.	公司和个人可以购买保险，定期支付保费并且在某些经济指标、例如GDP增长低于一定水平的时候获得保险利益。


Such insurance, they argue, would help firms and people deal with the “extreme uncertainty” of the current economic environment.	他们认为，这样的保险会帮助公司和个人应付当前经济环境下的“极度不确定性”。


Recession insurance might, indeed, help alleviate the economic crisis by reducing uncertainty.	衰退保险确实可能通过减少不确定性来缓解经济危机。


After all, the real problem that we are currently facing is one of paralysis: uncertainty has placed many spending decisions – by businesses (on higher output) and by consumers (on the items that businesses produce) – on hold.	毕竟，我们目前面临的实际问题就是经济瘫痪。 不确定性使得公司(更高的产量) 和消费者 (公司生产的产品) 都推迟了开支决定。


Reducing uncertainty might augment, or even be superior to, fiscal stimulus programs, for it would address the root cause of the unwillingness to spend.	减少不确定性或许可以增大财政刺激规划，甚至更胜一筹，因为这会解决不愿开支的根本原因。


Moreover, recession insurance might, in contrast to fiscal policy, impose no costs on the government, for if it stimulates confidence, then the risk being insured against is prevented.	而且，相对于财政政策而言，衰退保险不会对政府造成开销。 这是因为，如果它能够刺激信心，那么，所要保险的风险就不会发生。


The government’s ability to offer such insurance on a scale sufficient to make it costless is one reason to favor a public scheme over private insurers.	政府有能力大规模地提供这一保险，足以使得其代价低微。 如此，人们就有理由采用公共计划而非私营保险公司。


Blanchard and his colleagues point out that banks might condition loans to firms on their purchase of recession insurance, which might help credit markets function better, addressing a serious problem underlying the current crisis.	布朗夏和他的同事们指出，各个银行可以给公司的贷款设定条件，也就是购买衰退保险。 这样就可以帮助信贷市场更好地运转，从而解决当前危机中严重的根本性问题。


Tantalizingly, they say that doing this would create “a market-based view of future output and the likelihood of severe shocks,” although they do not explain how this market would be structured.	尽管他们并不解释如何建构这一市场，但是他们引人入胜地说，这将会建立“一个基于市场的、有关未来产量和严重冲击可能性的观点”。


Indeed, there is no market for other kinds of recession-related insurance provided by the government, such as unemployment insurance, old age insurance, or disability insurance.	的确，政府提供的其他有关衰退的保险，例如失业保险、老年保险或者残疾保险并不存在市场。


Instead, the government merely sets an insurance premium and forces everyone to pay it.	相反，政府只是确定一个保险费率并且强迫所有人都来支付。


The IMF authors are not saying that governments should do this with recession insurance, so perhaps they mean that governments would auction off the policies, which would create a market price.	国际货币基金组织的作者们并不是说各国政府应该强迫人们购买衰退保险，所以，他们或许是说政府应该拍卖保险，这样就会建立市场价格。


But the market price would depend especially on how much insurance a government decided to auction off, because the supply would influence the price both directly and through the insurance’s effect on the underlying recession risks.	但是市场价格将会尤其取决于政府决定拍卖多少保险，因为供应将会直接影响价格，并且通过保险对基本衰退风险的效力间接影响价格。


Governments are in a good position to create new risk-management policies, and they can then set an example for private insurers to follow.	各国政府完全有能力建立新的风险管理保险，然后就可以确立示范让私营保险公司效仿。


But, as an alternative to the IMF proposal, there could be purely private recession insurance.	但是，作为国际货币基金组织建议替代东西，可以有完全私营的衰退保险。


Such insurance already exists on a small scale in the form of credit insurance against unemployment.	这种形式的保险已经以失业信贷保险的形式小规模地存在了。


A New York-based firm, the Assura Group, has been working for four years on a plan to launch privately issued supplemental unemployment insurance to anyone.	位于纽约的一家公司Assura集团在过去四年里一直制定计划向所有人发售私营企业发行的附加失业保险。


Their policies would piggyback on US state unemployment insurance programs, allowing Assura to avoid getting into the monitoring business.	他们的保险建立在美国各州的失业保险计划之上，使得该公司不必监控。


One problem with market-based policies is strategic adoption and cancellation.	基于市场保单的其中一个问题是策略采纳和取消。


GDP risk is a long-term risk.	GDP风险是长期性的。


The price of the insurance would have to be adjusted regularly to adjust for varying public knowledge of the likelihood of a recession, and people could not be allowed to cancel their policies, and stop making payments, whenever the economic outlook became rosier.	保险的价格必须定期调整来适应公众对衰退可能性的不同了解。 在经济景气的时候，人们不允许取消保险以及停止支付保费。


The Assura Group had to get permission from the New York State Department of Insurance to have a dynamic rate filing, meaning that they will set prices by a formula, rather than using a fixed rate, so that their prices vary in rapid response to changing economic conditions.	Assura集团要从纽约州保险局获得批准来制定动态费率，也就是说，他们将根据公式来确定价格，而不是使用固定的费率。 这样，他们的价格就可以迅速地反映不断变化的经济状况。


In a recent paper, Mark Kamstra and I proposed that governments issue shares in their GDP, with each share amounting to a trillionth of GDP.	我和卡姆斯塔最近发表论文建议，政府发行GDP的股份，每一股的价值为GDP的一万亿分之一。


These “trills” would help individual countries manage their GDP risks.	这些股份就会帮助各国管理其GDP的风险。


We thought that the issuers of such securities would have, in effect, a form of recession insurance.	我们认为发行这些证券者将会实际上得到某种衰退保险。


Another way to create a market price for recession risk is to offer the MacroShares that my firm MacroMarkets pioneered.	建立衰退风险市场价格的另一种途经就是提供宏观份额。 我的宏观市场公司就开创了这一产品。


Our first MacroShares have been for oil price risk, but plans for GDP risk are on the drawing board.	我们的第一批宏观股份就是针对石油价格风险，但是有关GDP风险的计划还在酝酿之中。


These securities are offered in pairs –one long and one short – and, unlike in a government-run scheme, in whatever quantity the market demands.	这些证券是成对发行的，一个长期，另一个短期。 而且与政府运行的计划不同的是，它们完全根据市场要求的数量发行。


Once we have a market price for recession insurance or similar products, the question then arises: will it be so high that few people want to buy?	一旦我们对衰退保险或者相似产品有了市场价格之后，问题随之出现了。 是不是价格太高没有人会购买呢？


We know that we are probably in a recession right now, and may be for some time, so the expected losses currently are enormous.	我们知道我们大概处于衰退期，而且衰退会持续一段时间。 因此，目前预计会损失惨重。


As a result, people may balk at the price and not want to buy the insurance.	结果，人们会对价格不满并且不想购买保险。


The only insurance that people might think they can afford could carry a large deductible, and if the deductible is very large, people might not feel so reassured by this insurance.	人们唯一考虑可以��受的保险就有可能带有很大的抵扣，而且如果抵扣很大的话，人们就会对这一保险不太放心。


There are uncertainties with any really new proposal.	任何确有新意的建议都存在不确定性。


But the proposal from the IMF is an important step, because it deals with the essential problem that we are confronting right now: fears about the future of the economy become a self-fulfilling prophesy.	但是国际货币基金组织的建议是重要的一步，因为它应对的是我们目前面临的根本性问题，也就是对经济前途的恐惧成为了自我实现的预言。


We should not look askance at such a policy because of its potential shortfalls.	我们不应当因为这一政策的某些潜在缺陷而对它置之不理。


The current global economic crisis is an opportunity for some new experimentation that might not only lead to its resolution, but might also set in place institutions that help to prevent future crises.	目前的全球经济危机是一个机遇，可以让我们进行新的试验，不仅可以解决这一危机，而且或许可以建立某些机制来帮助防止未来的危机。


Recession insurance is one such idea.	衰退保险就是这样的一个点子。


Reconciliation’s New Frontier	化解矛盾的新前线


In France, May 10 is a day to commemorate the abolition of slavery.	在法国，5月10日是废除奴隶制的纪念日。


January 27 is the day we remember the Holocaust, through the commemoration of the liberation of Auschwitz.	1月27日是我们通过纪念奥斯维辛集中营的解放来纪念纳粹大屠杀的日子。


In a few days, there will be ceremonies to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the revision of Captain Alfred Dreyfus’s conviction on charges of espionage in a trial that tore the country apart.	再过几天，就到了阿尔福雷德·德雷福斯上尉因间谍罪被定罪又获平反的100周年纪念，当时这件事造成了法国的分裂。


France in particular, but also Europe in general, seems to be in a mood for remembering and repenting.	法国以及整个欧洲都好像处于一种回忆和忏悔的情绪之中。


It all looks as if the need to integrate communities within nations, to reconcile them with their past in order to unite them around a common identity and therefore a common project for the future, has replaced Europe’s now-completed mission of reconciling old enemies like Germany and France.	看来已经产生了一种需要，即将民族内部的各群体融合起来，化解他们的历史矛盾，以使他们团结起来，围绕在一个共同的身份及共同目标的周围。 这项需要已经取代了欧洲业已完成的化解德法这样宿敌的使命。


For decades, “reconciliation” and its most remarkable achievement – the Franco-German rapprochement – was the trademark of the project to create an ever closer union in Europe.	几十年来，化解矛盾及其最显著的成就——法德亲善——是创建一个更加亲密的欧洲的标志性工程。


Reconciliation may seem far off for, say, the peoples of Japan, China, and South Korea, but it is taken for granted by today’s Europeans.	对于日本、中国和南韩这样的国家，调解矛盾已经由来已久，但却被现在的欧洲人忽视了。


Except for the Balkans, most European nations are at peace with each other.	除了巴尔干半岛，欧洲大多国家都相安无事。


The genes of war now express themselves on the soccer field; competition for land has been replaced by competition for medals and titles.	现在，战争的基因只表现在足球场上； 对土地的争夺已经被对奖牌和冠军的争夺所取代。


The first Franco-German history book was released recently, and, according to its team of writers, it was not the past and the Nazi years that constitute a source of contention between French and German historians, but the present and in particular relations with the United States.	最近出版了第一部关于法德历史的著作。 据作者讲，法德历史学家的争论根源并不在于过去以及纳粹年代，而是现在特别是与美国的关系。


So, if the mission of reconciliation has any life left, its focus has shifted.	因此，调解矛盾如果还有生命力的话，那么重点也转移了。


If European nation-states are reconciled with each other, they are not yet fully reconciled with themselves, with their dark or grey spots, and in particular their treatment of minorities.	如果欧洲民族国家间的矛盾已经化解，那么他们还未能充分化解自身的矛盾，未能消除其黑色点或灰色点，特别是他们对少数民族问题的处理。


Historians of Europe will probably one day conclude that it is the Holocaust and Europe’s relations with its Jews that paved the way for the opening of this process of repentance.	欧洲历史学家也许有一天会得出这样的结论：纳粹大屠杀以及欧洲与犹太人的关系为现在的忏悔铺平了道路。


In the words of the Polish historian and statesman Bronislaw Geremek, the liberation of Auschwitz on January 27, 1945, has to be seen as one of the founding moments of today’s Europe.	用波兰历史学家及政治家杰瑞马克(Bronislaw Geremek)的话，1945年1月27日解放奥斯维辛集中营是为今天欧洲打下基础的一个重要时刻。


The silence that surrounded Holocaust survivors during the immediate postwar reconstruction of Europe has been replaced by gestures of contrition and reparation.	战后重建时期纳粹大屠杀幸存者们的沉默已经被现在忏悔和补偿的姿态所取代。


Responsibility for passivity as well as active crimes has been recognized.	为被动以及主动的罪行担负责任已经受到了认可。


Pious lies have been uncovered.	谎言也已经被揭穿。


In France half a century ago, as the Cold War loomed, Charles de Gaulle easily convinced the French that they were heroic during World War II because he was heroic.	半个世纪前的法国，冷战一触即发之际，戴高乐很轻易地让法国人相信他们是二战中的英雄，因为他自己便是英雄。


Francois Mitterrand, by contrast, managed to assure the French only that they were not so bad, because he, Mitterrand, had served in the collaborationist Vichy regime of Marshal Pétain before joining the resistance.	而与之相反，弗朗索瓦·密特朗只告诉法国人他们并不坏，因为密特朗本人先是参加了维希政权Marshal Pétain的通敌卖国阴谋，而后又加入了抵抗力量。


In the eyes of historians, President Jacques Chirac’s redeeming value will most probably remain his courageous attempt to reconcile France’s wounded minorities with their past and the French nation through a national process of repentance.	在历史学家眼中，雅克·希拉克总统作为补偿者的价值主要表现在他勇敢地用全国性的忏悔活动为法国少数民族弥补他们的历史创伤以及与国家的创伤。


It started with the Jews and acknowledgement that the Vichy regime did indeed incarnate the French state.	这一行动从犹太人开始以及承认维希政府确实可以代表法国。


Thus “France” itself was an accomplice to the crimes of the Nazi regime.	于是，“法国”便成为纳粹罪行的一个帮凶。


Today, France’s black minority is trying to organize itself along the lines of the Jewish minority.	今天，法国的黑人正试图与犹太人联合起来。


It has created a central authority serving as an umbrella for diverse organizations.	他们已经建立了一个中央权威机构，用以保护各种组织。


And it has concluded that centuries of slavery amount to the equivalent of the Holocaust.	该组织认为，几个世纪以来的奴隶制足以同纳粹大屠杀相比。


European recognition of crimes against the Jews, they argue, must be followed by an admission of guilt towards the Continent’s black minorities.	他们认为，欧洲人已经承认对犹太人犯下的罪行，随后也必须承认对欧洲大陆上的黑人少数群体的罪行。


It is likely that the violence that erupted in the fall of 2005 in many French cities and suburbs, in which young and unemployed black people played a large part, has accelerated the willingness of French officials to come to terms with this historical legacy.	看来，2005年秋天在法国很多城市及郊区发生的暴力，其中年轻人及失业黑人扮演了主要角色，已经加速了法国官员们试图解决这一历史遗留问题的意愿。


To face the challenge of integration, France must face its past.	面对融合问题的挑战，法国必须面对过去。


But it must also behave in a modern, rather than a neo-colonial, way in many places in its former African empire.	但在许多法国以前的非洲殖民地中，必须要采用一种现代的方法，而不是一种新殖民的方法。


If reconciliation with the past is vital to building a harmonious future, France has much to do concerning another minority for whom history seems to remain largely frozen.	如果想要化解以前的矛盾并建立一个和谐的未来，在面对历史被很大程度封存的另一个少数人群体，法国有许多需要做的事。


It is with the French of Algerian descent, not to mention Algeria itself, that reconciliation seems most difficult to achieve.	这包括处理法国阿尔及利亚后裔的问题，不用说阿尔及利亚本身的问题，化解矛盾似乎很难成功。


It will take more than a few role models, such as Zinedine Zidane, France’s greatest soccer star, to appease the frustrations and to curb the resentments.	这不是出动几个偶像明星，比如法国著名足球运动员齐尼丁·齐达内，就能够达到安抚伤痛及消除敌对的目的。


But is acknowledging past guilt only a way to facilitate the integration of minorities?	但是，承认以前的过错只是推动少数民族融合的一种方法吗？


Or is it also part of a process of closing the doors of our European “paradise” to all those who still want to join us?	还是将我们欧洲“天堂”的大门向那些想要加入的人关闭的一部分？


Reconciliation between nations is probably easier than reconciliation within nations.	化解国家间的矛盾要比化解国家内部的矛盾容易些。


This is the challenge facing much of the democratic world today, not only in France and Europe at large, but also in the US.	这是对现在很多民主国家的挑战，不只法国和欧洲，也存在于美国。


Reconciling Hamas and Fatah	实现哈马斯和法塔赫和解


GAZA/JERUSALEM – As representatives of Hamas and Fatah meet for the fourth round of national unity talks in Cairo, not only Palestinians but also Americans and Europeans will be watching closely.	加沙/耶路撒冷——随着哈马斯和法塔赫在开罗会面举行第四轮民族团结谈判，不仅巴勒斯坦人、就连美国人和欧洲人也将密切关注谈判的进展。


The top-level talks, hosted by Egyptian intelligence chief Omar Suleiman, will be crucial to ending nearly two years of bloody confrontation between Hamas-ruled Gaza and the Fatah-ruled West Bank, governed by Western-backed Mahmoud Abbas.	由埃及情报机构负责人奥马尔•苏莱曼主持的高层会谈将对结束哈马斯治下的加沙和由得到西方支持的马哈茂德·阿巴斯管理的法塔赫的西岸间近两年的血腥对抗非常关键。


Given previous failures, this round of talks might prove to be the final chance to re-establish Palestinian unity.	由于以前的种种失败，这一轮会谈也许会被事实证明是重建巴勒斯坦团结的最后机会。


The continuing internal schism between the more moderate and secular Fatah and the Islamist Hamas has not only left the Palestinian leadership in disarray, but has also made meaningful peace negotiations with Israel next to impossible.	相比而言较为温和世俗的法塔赫和伊斯兰主义哈马斯之间一以贯之的内部分裂不仅造成了巴勒斯坦领导层秩序混乱，而且致使与以色列展开有意义谈判的目标几乎不可能实现。


Moreover, continued internal disunity continues to thwart reconstruction efforts in Gaza, which are urgently needed in the aftermath of Israel’s military offensive earlier this year.	此外，持续不断的内部分裂继续阻碍加沙地区的重建努力，而在今年早些时候以色列发动军事袭击以后，人们又迫切需要这样的重建。


Thus, the outcome of the negotiations in Cairo will have repercussions for Palestinians and Israelis – and, indeed, for anyone with a stake in the Middle East peace process.	因此，开罗举行的谈判结果将影响到巴勒斯坦人和以色列人——事实上，这次谈判成功与否还将影响到中东和平进程所有的利益攸关者。


In previous rounds, the different factions agreed in principle on forming a united government for the West Bank and Gaza, and on holding legislative and presidential elections in the Palestinian Territories by January 2010.	在前几轮谈判中，各方已经原则同意组建西岸和加沙地带联合政府，并原则同意在2010年1月前在巴勒斯坦的领土上举行总统大选。


But Fatah and Hamas still differ fundamentally on how to form a government tasked to prepare elections.	但法塔赫和哈马斯仍然在如何组建负责筹备大选的政府方面存在根本的分歧。


Discussions also center on the control of the security services – a field in which neither Fatah nor Hamas have much room to maneuver.	谈判的另一个核心议题是安全机制——在这方面，法塔赫和哈马斯都没有太多空间可供斡旋。


Moreover, disagreement prevails on the type of electoral system to be used.	此外，在采用何种选举制度方面双方的分歧也不断凸显。


Whereas Fatah favors a clear majority voting system, Hamas calls for a more personalized approach.	在法塔赫偏好绝对半数投票制度的同时，哈马斯却呼吁采纳更为个性化的选举方式。


Furthermore, the question of including Hamas in the Palestine Liberation Organization is crucial.	此外，吸收哈马斯加入巴勒斯坦解放组织也是问题的关键。


Contrary to common perception, the PLO has always been the only official negotiating partner with Israel and does not include Hamas.	与一般看法不同的是，巴勒斯坦解放组织一直是以色列唯一的官方谈判伙伴，而哈马斯则被排除在外。


In a rather obscure linguistic debate, Hamas has in previous negotiation rounds refused to “commit’ itself to past PLO agreements with Israel, but has instead offered to “respect” them.	在相当晦涩的言辞辩论中，哈马斯在以前的谈判中拒绝承诺“遵守”过去巴解组织与以色列订立的协议，而是提出要“尊重”协议内容。


Negotiators in Cairo will thus have to discuss if such an indirect recognition of Israel’s right to exist will be acceptable.	因此开罗的谈判代表们需要探讨能否接受对以色列生存权利如此间接的承认。


Underneath this clear-cut quid pro quo of political bargaining, the representatives from Fatah and Hamas are charged with finding the means to reconcile Hamas’s tremendously popular political ideology with Fatah’s traditional secular aspirations.	在政治谈判这个清晰明了的交换条件背后，来自法塔赫和哈马斯的谈判代表还负有让哈马斯广受欢迎的政治信仰与法塔赫传统的世俗抱负互相融合的职责。


This is not merely an internal Palestinian affair, for it reflects a conflict raging across the entire Middle East.	这绝不只是巴勒斯坦的内部事务，因为它反应了遍及整个中东地区的冲突。


Until now, no Arab society has managed to harmonize these opposing trends.	到目前为止，还没有哪个阿拉伯社会成功实现了如此对立趋势的融合。


Instead, most governments have opted for a more or less confrontational approach of suppression and exclusion, banning Islamists from participating in elections or bullying them into semi-legality.	相反，绝大多数政府选择了多少带有对抗意味的压制和排斥的方式，禁止伊斯兰主义者参与选举，或威胁他们的合法地位。


The case of the Palestinian Territories, however, is different.	但巴勒斯坦地区的情况却截然不同。


In the absence of a strong central authority, the predominant divide between secular nationalism and politicized religion has led to the actual geographic disintegration of the Palestinian Territories into two distinct parts.	在强有力的中央政权缺失的情况下，世俗民族主义与政治化宗教最主要的区别已经导致了事实上巴勒斯坦地区十分鲜明的地理分割。


Given the difficulties that even major players in the region face when dealing with the challenge of political Islam, it becomes clear that for the Abbas-led Palestinian Authority, only compromise and dialogue is a feasible way to heal the rift.	考虑到在面对政治伊斯兰挑战时就连地区主要势力都不得不面对的困难条件，有一点变得非常明确，那就是对阿巴斯领导的巴勒斯坦当局来讲，只有妥协和对话才是弥合分歧唯一可行的方法。


Unsurprisingly, the fate of the Cairo talks is anything but certain.	开罗会谈的命运根本无法确定，这一点并不令人感到吃惊。


Failure to come up with a unified Palestinian position would undoubtedly play into the hands of the newly elected Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu.	巴勒斯坦方面无法达成一致的立场无疑会使以色列新当选的本杰明·内塔尼亚胡政府从中渔利。


After all, the Israeli Prime Minister has made it clear that he favors continued conflict management in terms of “economic peace” over far-reaching political processes based on mutual respect and cooperation.	归根结底，这位以色列总理已经明确表示他倾向于与“经济和平”有关的持续性冲突管理，而不是以相互尊重与合作为基础的影响深远的政治进程。


Faced with continued internal division, pressing for a meaningful peace process is very difficult for the Palestinians.	在内部分歧持续不断的情况下，巴勒斯坦人很难要求有意义的和平进程。


As a consequence, Israel’s willy-nilly expansion of West Bank settlements might finally bury comprehensive peace efforts for good.	其结果可能致使以色列无所顾忌的西岸定居点扩张政策最终彻底葬送全面和平进程。


But success in Cairo might prove even more challenging.	但事实也许会证明开罗会议的成功更富于挑战性。


If the negotiations lead to the establishment of a Palestinian government supported by both Fatah and Hamas, there will be a tough choice to make – not primarily for Palestinians, but first and foremost for Western decision makers.	如果这次谈判建立了法塔赫和哈马斯双方支持的巴勒斯坦政府，那么我们就必须做出艰难的抉择——这不仅涉及到巴勒斯坦人，而且首先涉及到西方决策者。


Will the West continue its policy of boycotting Hamas politically and financially, or will it adopt an alternative approach?	西方是否会继续实行在政治和财政领域抵制哈马斯的政策，还是会转而采用其他的方式？


Given Hamas’s belligerent ideology, any change in the West’s approach towards Hamas in the aftermath of successful Palestinian dialogue in Cairo would be difficult.	考虑到哈马斯的好战思想，开罗会议巴勒斯坦对话成功后西方很难改变对待哈马斯的态度。


But a modified and more pragmatic stance that focuses on Hamas’s behavior on the ground, rather than on abstract conditions, would not only be demanding for Western decision makers; it would pose a major political challenge for Hamas as well.	但注重哈马斯的实际行动，而不是抽象条件的经过修改也更加实际的立场不仅是对西方决策者的严峻考验，也会给哈马斯带来同样重大的政治挑战。


The Price of Peace	和平的代价


MADRID – The relationship between peace and justice has long been the subject of polarizing debates.	马德里—和平和正义之间的关系长期以来一直是两极分化的争论的主题。


Some argue that the pursuit of justice impedes conflict-resolution efforts, while others – including International Criminal Court (ICC) Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda – contend that justice is a prerequisite for peace.	一些人认为追求正义会阻碍冲突解决努力，也有人——包括国际刑事法庭（ICC）总检察官本索达（Fatou Bensouda）——认为正义是和平的先决条件。


As President Juan Manuel Santos leads Colombia through the most promising peace talks in five decades of brutal conflict with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), he will have to consider this question carefully.	在哥伦比亚总统桑托斯领导该国与哥伦比亚歌名武装力量（FARC）举行五十年激烈冲突史中最有希望的和平谈判时，他必须仔细考虑这一问题。


The Nuremberg trials, which followed Nazi Germany’s unconditional surrender in World War II, provide an ideal model for post-conflict justice.	纳粹德国在二战无条件投降后进行的纽伦堡审判提供了后冲突时代正义的理想榜样。


But, in conflicts in which no side has been defeated, the peacemaker’s job becomes more challenging.	但是，在尚未产生胜败的冲突中，和平缔造者的职责更具挑战性。


Given what is at stake, a trade-off between reconciliation and accountability may well be inescapable.	根据具体情况，妥协和问责之间做出权衡是不可避免的。


Since 1945, more than 500 cases of amnesty in post-conflict transitions have been recorded; since the 1970’s, at least 14 states – including Spain, Mozambique, and Brazil – have given amnesty to regimes guilty of serious human-rights violations.	1945年以来，记录在案的后冲突过渡期大赦就有500多起； 自1970年代以来，至少14个国家——包括西班牙、莫桑比克和巴西——对犯有严重侵犯人权罪行的当局实行了特赦。


In South Africa, amnesty was a key feature of the “truth and reconciliation” process that facilitated the peaceful transition from more than four decades of white-minority rule to democracy.	在南非，特赦是“真相和妥协”过程的关键要素。 而这一过程又是南非从四十多年白人少数统治转向民主的关键。


Similarly, in 2003, Nigeria’s president offered asylum to his Liberian counterpart, Charles Taylor, on the condition that Taylor retire from politics, thereby helping to end the rebellion against him.	类似地，2003年，尼日利亚总统赦免了利比里亚总统泰勒（Charles Taylor），条件是泰勒退出政坛，从而帮助结束了针对泰勒的叛乱。 （在这个例子中，正义最后还是到来了；


(In this case, justice was later served; in 2012, the Special Court for Sierra Leone convicted Taylor of 11 counts of aiding and abetting war crimes in Sierra Leone, making him the first former head of state to be convicted for such crimes by an international tribunal since Nuremberg.)	2012年，ICC判决泰勒11项支持和煽动塞拉利昂战争罪行成立，泰勒也因此成为自纽伦堡之后第一位被国际法庭判决此类罪行成立的前国家元首。 ）


Although it may be painful to offer a safe exit to war criminals and human-rights abusers, the prospect of ending the suffering of civilians can take priority over a principled stand for justice.	尽管给战争罪犯和侵犯人权者提供安全退路令人痛苦，但让饱受苦难的人民结束痛苦比坚持正义原则更加紧迫。


Who today would oppose amnesty for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad if it ended the brutal civil war that has led to more than 100,000 deaths and created nearly two million refugees (including more than a million children) in just two years?	如果能够结束在短短两年内造成10万多人死亡和近200万难民（包括100多万儿童）的叙利亚内战，谁会反对特赦叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德呢？


This is precisely the dilemma that Santos now faces.	这就是桑托斯目前所面临的两难。


Given the innumerable atrocities that the FARC have committed, the prospect of suspending punishment is difficult to accept.	FARC可谓罪行累累，免于惩罚的方案难以令人接受。


But prolonging a conflict that has already led to more than 200,000 deaths and displaced roughly five million people is in no one’s interest.	但继续延长已经造成20多万人死亡和500万人流离失所的冲突不符合任何人的利益。


With Colombia’s recent accord on agrarian reform having resolved the conflict’s root cause, the question of transitional justice has become the determining factor in whether the peace process will succeed.	哥伦比亚最新的土地改革已经解决了冲突的根源，于是过渡正义问题就成了和平进程能否成功的决定性因素。


If impunity for perpetrators of crimes against humanity, however morally repugnant, could protect potential future victims by ending the conflict, accepting such an outcome may well be worth sacrificing a full measure of justice for past victims.	如果让人权犯罪者免于惩罚能结束冲突、保护未来潜在受害者，那么不管这多么令人难以接受，牺牲过去受害者的充分正义措施都是值得的。


Rather than launching an uncompromising campaign to defeat the insurgents, Santos has pursued the more politically challenging course: a negotiated settlement.	桑托斯并没有采取决不妥协、务必打败叛军的立场，而是追求在政治上挑战更大的做法：谈判和解。


This suggests a willingness to do whatever it takes to protect long-suffering rural communities from continued violence.	这显示出他愿意承担一切后果以保护长期遭受持续暴力打击的农村社会。


Santos would certainly not be the first head of state to go silent on accountability.	桑托斯决不是第一个对问责问题保持缄默的国家元首。


In 2003, the United States and the European Union acquiesced to an accord that formally ended the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s civil war, which had claimed nearly four million lives, though the agreement lacked provisions to hold war criminals accountable.	2003年，美国和欧盟默许了一份正式结束夺走近400万人生命的民主刚果内战的协议，尽管这份协议使战争罪行无从问责。


The same is true for Sudan’s 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ended a 22-year civil war in which more than two million died.	2005年的苏丹《全面和平协议》（Comprehensive Peace Agreement）也是如此，该协议结束了夺走200多万人生命的持续了22年的内战。


In these cases – as in Colombia today – a fundamentalist approach to transitional justice was not feasible.	在这些例子中——今天的哥伦比亚也是如此——一根筋地追求过渡正义是不可行的。


Rather, justice had to be applied according to the specific political conditions that brought about the transition.	相反，正义必须根据带来转变过渡的具体政治条件来实现。


After all, transitional justice is essentially a political solution, a historic contract of national reconciliation – not a strictly judicial matter.	毕竟，过渡正义本质上是一种政治解决方案，一份民族妥协的历史契约，而不是严格的判决。


For Santos, reconciling peace and justice in a complicated domestic political context may require alternative formulas, such as reduced sentences, community penalties, conditional verdicts, or asylum in third countries.	对桑托斯来说，在复杂的国内政治环境中协调和平与正义要求他另辟蹊径，比如缩短刑期、社区惩罚、有条件判决或流��第三国等。


But none of these options, let alone amnesty, should be allowed unless the demobilized insurgents cooperate fully with the courts, including by disclosing all of their crimes.	但所有这些选择（更不用说特赦了）只有在被解散的叛军充分配合法庭——包括完全坦白罪行——的情况下才能实行。


Following this logic, FARC leader Pablo Catatumbo has acknowledged the “pain and acts of cruelty” that the guerillas have committed and has requested a collective pardon that would cover human-rights violations committed by both the FARC and state security forces.	根据这一逻辑，FARC领导人卡塔汤波（Pablo Katatumbo）承认了游击队所犯下的“痛苦和暴行”并请求集体赦免FARC和国家安全部队所犯下的侵犯人权罪行。


He has also insisted on the identification and compensation of victims as a prerequisite for peace and national reconciliation.	他还要求识别并补偿受害者，以此作为和平和国家妥协的先决条件。


When conflict-resolution efforts are on the line, a single-minded quest for retribution often is the wrong option.	当冲突解决努力举步维艰时，一根筋地要求惩罚往往错误的选择。


Archbishop Desmond Tutu, a leader of South Africa’s democratic transition, has described an alternative – restorative justice – that focuses on “the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, [and] the restoration of broken relationships.”	南非民主转型领袖图图大主教提出了替代方案——恢复性正义——专注于“治疗伤口、补偿损失（和）重建破坏的关系”。


With this constructive, forward-looking understanding of justice in mind, Santos, too, can succeed, thereby securing the peaceful, secure future that Colombians deserve.	在这一建设性、前瞻性的正义理解的前提下，桑托斯也可以获得成功，从而确保哥伦比亚人民获得他们应该得到的和平、安全的未来。


Reconciling with Sykes-Picot	平心而论赛克斯-皮科


NEW YORK – This month marks the centenary of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the secret British-French accord that launched a decade-long series of adjustments to the borders of the post-Ottoman Middle East.	纽约—这个月是赛克斯-皮科协定签署一百周年。 赛克斯-皮科是英国和法国之间的秘密协定，它启动了为期十年的对后奥斯曼帝国时代中东边境的一系列调整。


Most commentary on the anniversary has been negative, suggesting that the agreement bears considerable blame for the frequency and durability of the region’s conflicts.	在这个纪念日里，大部分评论都对赛克斯-皮科协定持负面态度，认为它需要为该地区频繁持久的冲突负相当大的责任。


That interpretation, however, borders on caricature.	但这一解读殊为可笑。


Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot aimed to devise a plan that would enable Great Britain and France to avoid a ruinous rivalry in the Middle East.	马克·赛克斯（Mark Sykes）和弗朗索瓦·乔治-皮科（François Georges-Picot）的目标是制定一个能让大英帝国和法国避免在中东形成劳民伤财的对峙的计划。


They largely succeeded: Their design kept the region from coming between the two European powers, and it managed to survive for a century.	他们基本取得了成功：他们的设计让该地区避免夹在欧洲两大列强之间，并且延续了一个世纪之久。


To be sure, many of the Sykes-Picot borders reflected deals cut in Europe rather than local demographic or historical realities.	诚然，赛克斯-皮科边境中有不少反映的是欧洲所形成的交易，而不是本地人口或历史现实。


But that hardly makes the Middle East unique: Most borders around the world owe their legacy less to thoughtful design or popular choice than to some mixture of violence, ambition, geography, and chance.	但这绝非中东独有的情况：全世界大部分边境与其说是有意识的设计或群众选择的结果，不如说是暴力、野心、地理和冒险等因素综合作用的结果。


The unpleasant reality is that today’s Middle East is what it is because its people and leaders have done such a bad job in shaping it.	令人不快的现实是，今天的中东之所以如此，是拜其人民和领导人的表现所赐。


Sykes and Picot cannot be blamed for the region’s pervasive lack of tolerance and political freedom, poor schools, or the unfair ways in which girls and women are treated.	不能把该地区普遍缺乏宽容和政治自由、学校体系破败、女孩和妇女遭遇不公对待等情况归咎于赛克斯和皮科。


Other parts of the world (including those without enormous reserves of oil and gas) have emerged from colonialism in much better shape.	世界其他地区（包括并不拥有巨量石油天然气蕴藏量的地区）从殖民主义中走出后表现要好得多。


The factors accounting for the record of failure in the Middle East – history, culture, religion, and personalities – are worthy of serious examination.	中东失败的原因——历史、文化、宗教和个性——都值得认真考察。


But the more pressing question that this anniversary raises has less to do with historical analysis than it does with current policy.	但在赛克斯-皮科协定一百周年之际，更紧迫的问题更多地与当前政策而不是历史分析有关。


In much of the Middle East, a violent struggle for mastery is the new normal.	在中东大部，争夺支配权（mastery）的暴力斗争已成新常态。


In four – arguably five – countries in the region, the government does not control significant portions of the state’s territory.	在地区内的四个——或者说五个——国家，政府无法控制国土中相当大的部分。


Lebanon has been in this condition for decades, Iraq for more than a decade, and Syria, Libya, and Yemen for some five years now.	黎巴嫩陷入这一状况已有即使年之久，伊拉克十多年，叙利亚、利比亚和也门大约五年。


Militias, terrorist organizations, foreign fighters, and other armed groups have asserted varying degrees of local authority.	军阀、恐怖组织、外国军人和其他武装集团以不同程度把持着地方权威。


There are also the unfulfilled national aspirations of the Kurds (large numbers of whom live in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran) and the unresolved matter of how to reconcile the reality of Israel with the Palestinians’ political goals.	此外还有库尔德人尚未得偿所愿的建国野心（他们中有大量生活在土耳其、斯拉克、叙利亚和伊朗）以及如何调和以色列的现实和巴勒斯坦人的政治目标这一悬而未决的问题。


The border between Syria and Iraq is for all intents and purposes gone.	叙利亚和伊拉克边境充满着各种目的和野心。


Millions of men, women, and children find themselves living in a country that is not their own.	是百万男女和儿童都生活在��属于自己的国家。


What, then, should be done?	那么，应该怎么做？


One option would be to try to preserve – or, more accurately, restore – the Sykes-Picot Middle East.	一个选择是试图维持——或更准确地说，是重建——赛克斯-皮科的中东。


But attempting to reunify the countries that appear on the map – and to make the borders between them matter – would be folly.	但尝试重新统一这些在地图上出现的国家——并让它们之间的边境起作用——是痴人说梦。


These countries will not go back to what they were; ties to region, religion, tribe, ethnicity, and/or ideology have in many cases superseded national identities.	这些国家不会回到过去； 与地区、宗教、部落、种族和/或意识形态的联系在很多时候会压倒民族身份。


A second option would be to try to negotiate the terms of a new Middle East, a successor to Sykes-Picot.	第二个选择是试图谈判建立作为赛克斯-皮科继任者的新中东的条件。


This, too, would prove to be an expensive failure.	这也将成为一个昂贵的错误。


Redrawing the map might be possible one day, but that day is decades away, at best.	重画地图也许有朝一日成为可能，但这一天距离现在至少有几十年的距离。


There is simply no consensus on what the map should look like, and no party or alliance that could impose or uphold it.	关于这张地图应用的模样根本没有共识，也没有哪一方或哪个联盟能推行或维持这张地图。


As a rule of thumb, diplomacy can be expected only to work with facts on the ground, not to create them, and the facts on the ground stand in the way of a regional settlement.	经验表明，外交只能根据实际情况起作用，而不能创造实际情况，而实际情况正是形成地区和解的障碍。


All of this leads to a third option: Acceptance of the fact that for the foreseeable future the Middle East will not resemble what appears on maps and globes.	所有这些引向了第三个选择：接受实际情况，即，在可预见的未来，中东不会保持它在地图和地球仪上的模样。


This is not an argument for remaining aloof; as bad as things are, they can always get worse.	这并不是说要保持冷漠； 对于糟糕的事情，它们总是可能变得更糟糕。


To see that they do not, governments and organizations that meet certain standards can and should be strengthened; those that do not can and should be weakened.	若不想这样，符合一定标准的政府和组织可以也应该被加强； 而不符合的可以也应该被削弱。


But no level of effort will alter the region’s basic reality: borders that count for little and governments that count for only a little more.	但不论什么层面的措施都无法改变该地区的基本现实：边境无足轻重，政府略足轻重。


Syria, Iraq, and Libya are likely to be countries in name only; important parts of each will essentially be autonomous and on their own, for better or worse.	叙利亚、伊拉克和利比亚已经名存实亡； 它们各自有非常重要的部分已经事实自治并自力更生，不管结果是好是坏。


The fact that Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Russia, and the United States are working at cross-purposes more often than not further suggests a messy future without legal foundation.	土耳其、伊朗、沙特阿拉伯、以色列、俄罗斯和美国往往各有各的算盘，这一事实更加意味着可能出现没有法律基础的混乱未来。


In some ways, the pre-Sykes-Picot Middle East is coming back – but without the order imposed by the Ottoman Empire.	从某些方面来说，前赛克斯-皮科中东正在回归——但不再有奥斯曼帝国来维持秩序。


As a result, the Middle East stands to suffer far worse in the next century than it did in the last – a reality that could well leave us nostalgic for the times of Sykes and Picot.	结果，中东的下一个世纪要比过去的一个世纪苦难深重得多——这一现实可能让我们相当怀念赛克斯和皮科的时代。


Recount Kenyans’ Votes	重计肯尼亚的选票


Kenya is aflame after a presidential election on December 27 widely believed to have been rigged to secure the re-election of Mwai Kibaki.	肯尼亚在去年12月27日的总统大选之后群情激愤。 民间广泛认为此次大选为了确保Mwai Kibaki的连任而存在舞弊行为。


Kibaki’s opponents took to the streets, the government issued shoot-to-kill orders, and hundreds have died at the hands of the police as well as from gang rampages and inter-ethnic violence.	Kibaki的反对者们走上街头，而政府也颁布了“格杀勿论”的命令。 数百人丧生于警察之手、帮派骚乱或种族间暴力。


The United States has led the international diplomatic response, but its approach has been deeply flawed.	美国引领着国际外交界对此的回应，但其方式却存在严重问题。


Kenyans voted in vast numbers, waiting in the hot sun for several hours at crowded polling booths around the country.	肯尼亚的众多选民顶着烈日等待了数小时，在全国各地拥挤的投票站投票。


The first results to be counted were for Kenya’s parliament, with Kibaki’s government ministers roundly defeated in their local constituencies.	第一个揭晓的结果是肯尼亚议会的选举。 Kibaki政府的部长们在他们的地方选区遭遇了全面失败。


The main opposition alliance, led by Raila Odinga, won about 100 seats, compared to roughly 30 for Kibaki.	相对于仅获得了约30席的Kibaki，由Raila Odinga领导的主要反对派联盟赢得了约100个议席位。


It appeared overwhelmingly likely that the presidential vote count would similarly show Odinga beating Kibaki by a wide margin.	形势似乎再明显不过了：总统票选的结果会同样显示Odinga以很大优势击败Kibaki。


That, indeed, is how the early count transpired.	而那正是初期的计票结果所透露的信息。


As the tallies from polling stations from around the country came into Nairobi, Odinga built up a lead of several hundred thousand votes.	当票数统计从遍布全国的投票站传到内罗毕时，Odinga以数十万票的优势领先。


Then the trouble began.	可麻烦也随之出现。


Vote tallies from Kibaki’s homeland in central Kenya were delayed.	来自Kibaki肯尼亚中部故乡的计票结果的汇总却延迟了。


Independent observers from the European Union and elsewhere began to report serious irregularities in the Kibaki strongholds, where opposition party representatives were denied access to polling sites.	欧盟和其他地方的独立观察家们开始报告Kibaki大本营出现的严重不规范情况。 当地的反对党代表被禁止进入投票地点。


Matters became even more dubious as the vote tallies were collected and recorded at the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK).	当票数统计在肯尼亚选举委员会（ECK）汇总时，情况变得更加可疑。


According to detailed evidence submitted by the opposition, the tallies from the countryside, allegedly already padded for Kibaki, were again manipulated, with additional votes awarded to him.	根据反对派提供的详细证据，来自农村地区、已被做了手脚的选票统计再一次被操纵，Kibaki被给予了额外的票数。


As a result, many more votes were recorded by the ECK for the presidential race than for the parliamentary race, even though voters were clearly instructed – indeed required – to cast a vote in both races.	其结果是，尽管投票人被明确指示—其实是被要求—为两场竞选各投一票，但ECK统计出的总统选举的总票数却大大超过了议会选举。


When the opposition tried to challenge these inconsistencies, the ECK abruptly declared Kibaki the winner.	当反对派正试图质疑这些不一致的现象时，ECK却匆匆宣布Kibaki当选。


Days later, the ECK’s head publicly acknowledged that Kibaki supporters had pressured him to announce the “results” immediately, despite the clear evidence of vote rigging.	几天以后，ECK的负责人公开承认在Kibaki的支持者施压下立刻宣布了“结果”，尽管选票舞弊证据确凿。


Shockingly, he declared that he did not know who really won.	更令人震惊的是，他宣布不知道到底谁获胜。


The EU observers also announced that the election tally had not met basic international standards.	欧盟观察员也宣布选举计票未能符合基本的国际标准。


The election is a disaster for Kenya, but the response of the international community, led by the US, is no less distressing.	这场选举对肯尼亚是场灾难，但以美国为首的国际社会对此的反应同样令人难过。


American foreign policy in Africa is in the hands of Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer, a former student of Secretary of State Condeleezza Rice.	美国在非洲的外交政策掌握在助理国务卿Jendayi Frazer的手中。 她曾是国务卿赖斯的学生。


From the start of the post-election crisis, Frazer took three flawed positions.	从竞选后危机发生之始，她就采取了三个问题严重的立场。


First, she declared that the vote could not be re-assessed by an independent tally.	首先，她宣布选票不能由独立计票机制再次统计。


In fact, most observers on the scene believed that there was a long paper trail, from the polling sites all the way to Nairobi, which could be re-assessed in detail.	实际上，大多数在场的观察家都认为从各投票点到内罗毕都有留底的选票，完全可以重新统计。


Second, she claimed that there had been vote rigging “on both sides,” and suggested that the true election results were very close and that perhaps Kibaki had won.	其次，她宣称当事“双方”都有选票舞弊行为，并暗示真正的选举结果是非常接近的，Kibaki很可能赢得了大选。


Given the vast amount of direct and circumstantial evidence that the rigging was on behalf of Kibaki, Frazer’s assignment of equal blame to each side was met with astonishment and dismay by the opposition.	鉴于有大量的直接和间接证据证明舞弊的目的在于支持Kibaki，Frazer各打五十大板的做法令反对派深感震惊又无可奈何。


She also failed to acknowledge an exit poll carried out by a US foundation, which showed a clear Odinga victory.	她也没有承认一家美国基金会进行的（投票站）出口民调的结果。 该调查的结果明确显示Odinga获胜。


Finally, Frazer argued that the two sides needed to compromise and share power.	最后，Frazer认为双方需要妥协并分享权力。


Instead, Kibaki disdainfully appointed 18 key cabinet members even as “mediation” from abroad was about to begin.	而目空一切的Kibaki甚至在来自海外的“调停”即将开始的时候还任命了18名关键的内阁成员。


The opposition, of course, was perplexed by the US call for compromise without any serious call to review the vote itself.	当然，反对派对美国在没有严肃呼吁重审选票的情况下就疾呼分享权力的做法感到迷惑不解。


In the end, only Kenya will decide its own fate.	最终，只有肯尼亚会决定自己的命运。


The US or other outside powers will not save Kenyan democracy.	美国和其他外部的力量将不会拯救肯尼亚的民主。


Threats, sanctions, or aid cutoffs would only cause further damage to an economy already in free fall, tragically punishing Kenya’s poor while fomenting further violence.	威胁、制裁或中断援助只会给这个经济已经急速恶化的国家雪上加霜，在悲剧性地惩罚肯尼亚穷人的同时进一步助长暴力。


Still, the international community can play a more constructive role than it has until now by pressing both sides to accept an independent recount.	然而，国际社会还是能够通过对双方施压令其接受一次独立的重新计票，从而发挥更具建设性的作用。


By standing up for democratic principles, the world would truly stand on the side of the Kenyan people.	通过维护民主原则，世界就能真正站在肯尼亚人民一边。


In dismissing such a recount, Frazer told Kenyans that they shouldn’t expect their vote to be tallied accurately, and that power can be seized or perhaps even negotiated in a backroom.	Frazer否定重新计票就是告诉肯尼亚人他们不应该指望选票能够得到准确的统计，并且权力可以被篡夺，或甚至可以被暗地交易。


She also sent an unmistakable signal to those who would steal votes: at worst, they might have to share a few cabinet positions with the opposition.	她也向那些窃取选票的人发出了一个明确无误的信号：最糟糕的结果也不过是与反对派分享几个内阁的职位而已。


Perhaps a recount would show that the election was too close to call.	可能重新计票的结果会显示双方势均力敌。


Perhaps, as the opposition insists, it would demonstrate a clear victory for Odinga.	也可能如反对派所坚持的那样，它会显示Odinga大获全胜。


Either way, Kenyans and their votes would be taken seriously, and tempers could well subside.	不论结果如何，肯尼亚人和他们的选票都会被认真对待，他们心头的怒火也能就此平息。


Only if both sides accept that there was no clear winner is it reasonable to call for power-sharing (or a new election).	只有在双方都接受不分伯仲的选举结果时，才有理由呼吁权力分享（或举行新的选举）。


There is still time to get this right.	亡羊补牢犹未晚。


The international community should stop pushing for a backroom “compromise” that ignores the popular will.	国际社会应该停止推动置民愿于不顾的背地“妥协”。


Let the world stand with neither Kibaki nor the opposition, nor for an arbitrary compromise, but with Kenya’s voters.	让世界不要站在Kibaki或反对派一边，也不要站在一场武断的妥协一边，而是要站在肯尼亚的选民们一边。


If Kibaki rejects an independent recount, his refusal will reverberate around Kenya and the world.	如果Kibaki拒绝独立重新计票，将会在肯尼亚和全世界激起强烈反响。


Those who ignore voters should quickly learn that they have no place to hide.	那些轻视选民的人很快就会知道他们无处藏身。


Recovering from Kosovo	从科索沃复苏


LONDON – Kosovo’s recent unilateral declaration of independence brought back memories.	伦敦--科索沃最近单方面宣布独立让人们回想到过去。


I publicly opposed NATO’s attack on Serbia – carried out in the name of protecting the Kosovars from Serb atrocities – in March 1999.	我在1999年3月曾经公开反对北约以保护科索沃人免于塞族屠杀的名义攻击塞尔维亚。


At that time, I was a member of the Opposition Front Bench – or Shadow Government – in Britain’s House of Lords.	在当时，我是英国上议院影子政府反对派前排成员。


The then Conservative leader, William Hague, immediately expelled me to the “back benches.”	当时的保守党领导人黑格立即把我驱逐到了后排。


Thus ended my (minor) political career.	这就结束了我(年轻)的政治生涯。


Ever since, I have wondered whether I was right or wrong.	从那时以来，我就在考虑我是对是错。


I opposed military intervention for two reasons.	我出于两个原因反对军事行动。


First, I argued that while it might do local good, it would damage the rules of international relations as they were then understood.	首先，我认为军事行动或许给当地人带来好处，但是却会损害当时人们所理解的国家关系规则。


The UN charter was designed to prevent the use of force across national lines except for self-defense and enforcement measures ordered by the Security Council.	联合国宪章的目的是防止跨越边境使用武力，除了自卫以及安理会授权的执法措施。


Human rights, democracy, and self-determination are not acceptable legal grounds for waging war.	人权、民主以及民族自决并非发动战争的可以令人接受的合法理由。


Secondly, I argued that while there might be occasions when, regardless of international law, human rights abuses are so severe that one is morally obliged to act, Kosovo was not such a case.	第二，我认为存在人权遭到极大践踏、人们不得不不顾国际法受到道义驱使采取行动的情形，但是科索沃并不属于这种情况。


I considered the “imminent humanitarian disaster” that the intervention was ostensibly aimed at preventing, to be largely an invention.	我认为这一干预表面上要防止“现实的人道主义灾难”很大程度上是虚构的。


I further argued that non-military means to resolve the humanitarian issue in Kosovo were far from being exhausted, and that the failed Rambouillet negotiation with Serbia in February-March 1999 was, in Henry Kissinger’s words, “merely an excuse to start the bombing.”	我进一步说，采用非军事手段解决科索沃的人道主义问题远远没有被用尽，而且用基辛格的话来说，1999年2月到3月间举行的让布里耶谈判无果而终，“只不过是开战的借口而已”。


This view was vindicated by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Report on Human Rights Violations in Kosovo , published in December 1999.	1999年12月出版的欧洲安全合作组织科索沃违反人权报告证实了我的观点。


The report showed that the level of violence fell markedly when OSCE monitors were placed in Kosovo following the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement of September 23, 1998; and that it was only after the monitors were withdrawn on March 20, 1999, in preparation for the bombing that general and systematic violation of human rights began.	这一报告显示，在1998年9月23日赫尔布鲁克与米洛塞维奇达成协议、该组织督察员进驻科索沃之后，暴力明显下降。 同时，只是在1999年3月20日为了准备轰炸撤离督察员之后大范围以及系统化的践踏人权才开始。


Between March and June 1999 – the period of NATO bombing – the number of deaths and expulsions in Kosovo shot up.	1999年3月至6月北约轰炸期间，科索沃的死亡以及驱逐数目大幅度上升。


The “humanitarian disaster” was in fact precipitated by the war itself.	战争实际上催发了“人道主义灾难”。


Despite this, the term “genocide,” freely bandied about by Western interventionists, was grotesquely inappropriate at any time.	除了这，西方干预主义者滥加采用的“种族屠杀”这一字眼在当时根本就不恰当。


Without doubt, NATO air strikes and the subsequent administration of Kosovo as a protectorate improved the political situation for Albanian Kosovars.	毫无疑问，北约空袭以及随后将科索沃作为保护地管理改善了阿尔巴尼亚族科索沃人的政治情况。


Without NATO intervention, they probably would have remained second-class citizens within Serbia.	没有北约的干预，他们或许还会是塞尔维亚的二等公民。


Against this must be set large-scale deterioration in the economic situation of all Kosovars, Albanian and Serbian (44% unemployment), widespread criminalization, and the fact that under NATO rule, Kosovo was ethnically cleansed of half its Serb minority.	在这一情况下，所有科索沃人、无论是阿族还是塞族的经济形势都大幅度恶化(失业率高达44%)，犯罪丛生。 同时，在北约管理下，科索沃一半的塞族少数人口被清理掉了。


Kosovo remains in political limbo to this day.	如今科索沃在政治上还是悬而未决。


Two thousand European Union officials run the country, and 16,000 NATO troops guard its security.	两千名欧盟官员管理这一国家，一万六千名北约士兵保护其安全。


Its “independence” is rejected by Serbia, unrecognized by the Security Council, and opposed by Russia, China, and most multi-national states in Europe and Asia, which fear setting a precedent for their own dismemberment.	塞尔维亚、安理会拒绝承认其“独立”，俄国、中国以及欧亚的大多数多种族国家也反对。 它们担心这样会给自己的分裂确立先例。


Indeed, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was quick to blame the disturbances in Tibet on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.	确实，俄国外长拉夫罗夫马上把西藏的骚乱归咎于科索沃宣布独立。


A Serbian insurgency and de facto partition of Kosovo remain possible, and we have yet to face the destabilizing effects of Kosovo’s claim to independence on other divided Balkan states such as Bosnia and Macedonia  But the balance sheet is even worse in terms of international relations.	塞族人叛乱以及在事实上分割科索沃还是可能的，而且我们还要面对科索沃宣布独立给其他分裂的巴尔干国家例如波斯尼亚和马其顿带来的破坏稳定效果。 但是在国家关系角度情况更加糟糕。


Kosovo was a stalking horse for Iraq, as the doctrine of humanitarian intervention morphed into President George W. Bush’s doctrine of “pre-emptive war,” by which the US claimed the right to attack any state that it deemed a threat to its national security.	科索沃是入侵伊拉克的借口。 布什总统“先发制人战争”中加入了人道主义干预原则，美国根据这一原则宣布有权利攻击任何它认为对其国家安全造成威胁的国家。


As then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan rightly argued, this opened the door to the proliferation of unilateral, lawless use of force.	当时的联合国秘书长安南正确地指出，这就打开了单方面非法使用武力泛滥的大门。


Not the least damaging consequence of the Bush doctrine is that it dispenses with the need for public proof of aggressive intent.	布什原则破坏效果还有，它不必向公众证明侵略性意图。


The Iraq invasion was justified by the same use of fraudulent evidence as was displayed in Kosovo.	在科索沃战争上显示出来的虚假证据也为入侵伊拉克提供理由。


On balance, I believe that I was right to oppose the Kosovo war.	总体而言，我相信我反对科索沃战争是正确的。


It was a regressive answer to a genuine international problem: how to hold together multi-ethnic/religious states in a reasonably civilized way.	这反过来回答了一个切实的国家问题，也就是，如何以相对文明的手段维护多种族和多种宗教国家的统一。


Since 1999, Kosovars have rejected Serbian offers of autonomy, because they were confident of American support for independence.	从1999年以来，科索沃人拒绝塞尔维亚自治的��议，因为他们相信美国支持他们的独立。


Western countries must consider more seriously how far they should press their human rights agenda on states with both the power and the will to defend their territorial integrity.	西方国家必须更加认真考虑它们在人权问题上对那些既有实力又有意愿维护领土完整的国家究竟施加多少压力。


Under American leadership, it is the West that has emerged as the restless, disturbing force in international affairs.	在美国的领导下，西方国家显得烦躁并破坏国际事务。 中国当然应该给予西藏更大的自治；


China should certainly grant Tibet more autonomy; but is pumping up the Dalai Lama into a world leader or threatening to boycott the Beijing Olympics the best way to secure a better deal for Tibetans, or to obtain Chinese cooperation on matters that are far more important than Tibet’s status?	但是中国攻击达赖喇嘛，反倒把他变成了一位国际领导人，或者把威胁抵制北京奥运会作为获得西藏解决办法的最佳手段，或者在比西藏地位问题上更为重要的问题上取得中国的合作呢？


Activists, impassioned by the justice of their cause, will not consider these questions.	活动份子受到其追求的事业正义性的感染不会考虑这些问题。


But world leaders should take them seriously.	但是各国领导人应该认真考虑。


Recovery before Reform	先求复苏，再求改革


LONDON – The financial crisis that started in 2007 shrunk the world economy by 6% in two years, doubling unemployment.	伦敦——始于2007年的金融危机在2年时间里让世界经济收缩了6%，让失业人数翻了一倍。


Its proximate cause was predatory bank lending, so people are naturally angry and want heads and bonuses to roll – a sentiment captured by the current worldwide protests against “Wall Street.”	危机最有可能的原因是银行的掠夺式放贷，因此人民自然感到十分愤怒，要求银行家下台、减少银行高管薪酬——这一情绪甚至激发了当前风靡全球的“占领华尔街”运动。


The banks, however, are not just part of the problem, but an essential part of the solution.	但是，银行不仅是问题的一部分，也是解决方案的关键组成部分。


The same institutions that caused the crisis must help to solve it, by starting to lend again.	造成危机的机构必须出力解决危机，办法就是重新开始贷款。


With global demand flagging, the priority has to be recovery, without abandoning the goal of reform – a difficult line to tread politically.	在全球需求不振的背景下，当务之急毫无疑问是复苏，但也不能将在政治上不讨好的改革的目标束之高阁


The common ground of reform is the need to re-regulate the financial services industry.	改革的共同基础是我们需要重新监管金融服务业。


In the run-up to the crisis, experts loudly claimed that “efficient” financial markets could be safely left to regulate themselves.	在危机之前，专家们信誓旦旦地宣称，对于“有效”的金融市场，大可安心让它们自己监管自己。