Khrushchev, for example, was stunned when he discovered that in the 1930’s and 1940’s, some 70% of Party members were annihilated.	例如，当赫鲁晓夫发现在20世纪30年代和40年代大约70%的党员残遭杀害时，他深感震惊。


Initially, Khrushchev didn’t plan to keep his denunciation of Stalin a secret.	最初，赫鲁晓夫并不打算将其对斯大林的揭露与谴责进行保密。


Five days after the Congress, his speech was sent to all the leaders of the socialist countries and read at local party meetings across the Soviet Union.	苏共20大结束5天之后，所有的社会主义国家的领导人都收到了他的讲话稿，苏联各地的党代会上也都宣读。


But people didn’t know how to discuss it.	但是人们不知道如何对之讨论。


And with good reason, for the problem with the de-Stalinization process was that, although the truth was partly revealed, no answer regarding what to do next was offered.	这是有原因的，因为在非斯大林化进程中的问题是，尽管部分真相得到了披露，但是并没有提供下一步如何行动的答案。


After the Congress, it became clear that the communist gospel was false and murderously corrupt.	此次大会之后，共产主义福音的虚伪与致命腐败昭然若揭。 但是，并没有提供其他的意识形态。


But no other ideology was offered, and the crisis – the slow rot of the system that became clear during the era of stagnation under Leonid Brezhnev – that began with Khrushchev’s speech lasted another 30 years, until Mikhail Gorbachev took up his mantle of change.	勃列日涅夫执政的停滞时代这个政权的缓慢腐朽逐渐明显。 赫鲁晓夫讲话始发的危机持续30年之久，直到戈尔巴乔夫扬起改革的大旗。


The doubts inspired at the Congress may have been inchoate, but they nonetheless sowed genuine unrest.	此次大会激起的怀疑可能尚未成熟，但是却播下了动荡不安的种子。


In the first of the protests that rocked the communist world in 1956, huge crowds in Georgia demanded that Khrushchev be fired and Stalin’s memory reinstated.	1956年震惊共产主义世界的第一次抗议声浪中，在格鲁吉亚共和国，大批群众要求赫鲁晓夫下台，恢复斯大林名誉。


An uprising in Poland and the far more tumultuous Hungarian Revolution argued for the opposite.	波兰的起义和比之更为激烈的“匈牙利革命”则持要求相反的东西。


The Poles demanded communism with a human face, and the Hungarians, after Imre Nagy sought to reform communism, ended up wanting no communism at all.	波兰人要求人性化的共产主义，而匈牙利则在纳吉寻求改良共产主义之后彻底抛弃了共产主义。


All of these protests were brutally crushed, which resulted in many West European Communists leaving the Party in utter disillusion.	所有这些抗议活动都遭到了残酷的镇压，导致西欧大批共产党员在理想破灭后脱离共产党。


Khrushchev’s speech also ignited the feud between Mao’s China and the USSR, for it allowed Mao to claim the crown of world revolutionary leadership.	赫鲁晓夫的讲话还导致毛的中国与苏联不和，因为它给毛戴上了世界革命领袖的桂冠。


Worried by the protests, Khrushchev tried to cool off the anti-Stalin campaign.	赫鲁晓夫对这些抗议活动忧心忡忡，试图平息这场反斯大林运动。


The release of the Gulag prisoners that followed his speech continued, but it was done in silence.	发表讲话后开始释放古拉格政治犯继续进行，但却悄无声息。


Party membership was restored to purge survivors, and they received new jobs, but they were forbidden from discussing the horrors that they had endured.	清洗运动中的幸存者被恢复了党籍，安排了新的工作，但却禁止议论其遭遇。


That silence lasted until 1961, when Khrushchev permitted new revelations of Stalin-era crimes.	这种压制持续到1961年，赫鲁晓夫允许再次揭露斯大林时代的罪恶。


These were publicly reported and discussed on TV and radio.	电视和电台公开报道和讨论这些罪恶。


Stalin’s body was removed from Red Square, Stalin monuments were destroyed, and cities restored their original Soviet names.	斯大林的遗体被迁离红场，斯大林纪念碑被破坏，并且各个城市都恢复了原来苏联的名字。


Stalingrad became Volgograd.	斯大林格勒更名为伏尔加格勒。


The idea of the Gulag entered our literature with Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich.	苏联古拉格中的思想随着亚历山大·索忍尼辛《伊凡的一天》进入了我们的文学作��之中。


This second anti-Stalinist campaign lasted two years, which was not nearly enough to change the country’s mentality.	第二场反斯大林运动持续了2年，还不足以改变这个国家的思想状况。


The Twentieth Congress shattered the world Communist movement, and it turned out to be impossible to cement the cracks.	苏共20大粉碎了世界共产主义运动，并且这些碎片再也无法粘合。


The Soviet Union and other socialist countries faced a crisis of faith, as the main threat to communism was not imperialism, or ideological dissidents, but the movement’s own intellectual poverty and disillusion.	苏联和其它社会主义国家都面临着一场信仰危机，因为共产主义的主要威胁不是帝国主义或意识形态上的持不同政见者，而是这场运动本身智识贫乏以及理想破灭。


So, although it is common today in Russia to blame Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin for the collapse of the USSR, it is both useless and unfair to do so.	因此，虽然俄罗斯普遍指责戈尔巴乔夫和叶利钦导致苏联解体，但这样做既没用，也不公平。


The system was dead already, and it is to Yeltsin’s great credit that he was able to bring Russia out of the ruins in one piece.	这个政权体制已经死了，能够带领俄罗斯完整地走出废墟也应归功于叶利钦。


Although Russia’s future is uncertain, its history is becoming clearer, in part because we now know that the Twentieth Party Congress started the process that brought about the end of Soviet despotism.	虽然俄罗斯前途未谱，但它的历史变得更加清晰，部分原因是因为我们现在知道苏共20大开启了苏联专制的终结。


Kicking the Oil Habit	打击耗油习惯


Chancellor Angela Merkel has made addressing climate change a high priority on Germany’s agenda for its EU and G-8 presidencies that begin in January.	德国总理默克尔已经将处理气候变化作为将于一月开始的德国担任欧盟和八国集团轮值主席国的高度优先问题。


Here is a concrete proposal, one general enough for world leaders to consider and accept, and clear enough for other governments and businesses to grasp: simply set a date, at the next G-8 summit, by which oil-powered cars would no longer be licensed in major industrialized countries.	不妨提出一个具体的提议，那就是在下一届八国集团首脑会议上制定一个日期，从这一日期以后，主要工业化国家都将不再给由汽油驱动的汽车颁发执照。 这一提议十分通用，足以让世界各国领导人考虑以及接受，而且十分明晰，足以让其他国家政府和工商界人士来加以领会。


Such a decision would have a strongly positive economic and geopolitical impact.	这一决定将会产生极为积极的经济和地缘政治影响。


The real cause of today’s worries over energy is not the decline in world oil reserves, but rather that domestic oil production by the top consumers – Europe, the United States, and China – will decline at the very moment that growing Asian demand strains the market.	如今对于能源的担忧的实际原因并非是世界石油储备的下降，而是最大石油消费国，例如欧洲、美国和中国的国内石油生产在不断增长的亚洲国家需求拖累市场之际下降。


Available reserves will increasingly be concentrated in the Middle East simply because supplies in all other regions will be depleted sooner.	现有的储备将日益集中在中东，简单的原因就是所有其他地区的储备将会提前耗尽。


Moreover, the main oil exporters are unwilling to subordinate their investment policies to market requirements.	而且，主要石油出口国不愿意将它们的投资政策屈从于市场要求。


Saudi Arabia seeks to run its oil production independently, while Iran scares off potential investors with bureaucratic hurdles and corruption.	沙特阿拉伯寻求独立自主地进行石油生产，伊朗以官僚主义障碍和腐败吓跑潜在的投资者。


Iraq suffers from a lack of security, and foreign investors in Russia are thwarted at every turn.	伊拉克苦于缺乏安全，而外国投资者在俄罗斯四处碰壁。


Those four states contain half of the world’s proven oil reserves and two-thirds of what could potentially be exported.	这四个国家拥有世界探明储备的一半以及可能出口的石油的三分之二。


All this, not production costs, lies at the heart of high oil prices and the scramble for oil contracts in Central Asia and Africa.	所有这些、而非生产成本是高油价以及追逐中亚和非洲石油合同的本因。


To believe that high oil prices are good because they serve the environment ignores some basic facts of international politics.	因为对于环境有益而相信高油价是好事就忽略了某些国际关系的基本事实。


First, in many of the poorest African and Asian countries, oil imports account for a significantly higher share of national expenditure than in industrialized countries, which means that economic growth and social development are being imperiled, while new debt crises loom.	首先，许多最穷的亚非国家与工业化国家相比，石油进口在国民支出上占据明显更高的比重。 这就意味着，它们的经济增长以及社会发展受到阻碍，而新的债务危机则呼之欲来。


Rents from oil production impede reforms in the major exporting countries.	石油生产的特许权收入阻碍了主要石油出口国的改革。


Thanks to their lubricated financial strength, regimes like those in Venezuela and Iran increasingly feel unconstrained by international rules.	由于其丰厚的金融实力，像委内瑞拉和伊朗等政权越发感到可以不受国际规则的制约，为所欲为。


Latecomers among consuming nations, such as China, mimic the former habits of the industrialized West, with their long record of overlooking human rights abuses in order to secure lucrative deals with authoritarian, oil-rich regimes.	像中国那样的后来的石油消费国模仿西方工业化国家的旧有习惯，长久以来漠视践踏人权的事例从而与独裁的石油大国政权签定丰厚的合同。


Only the world’s political and economic heavyweights, the main industrialized countries that remain by far the biggest consumers of hydrocarbons, can initiate change on a global scale.	只有当今世界的政治和经济重量级国家、也就是那些碳氢化合物最大的消费国家才能够在全球范围内发动改变。


Change must begin in the transport sector, which accounts for more than half of current oil consumption – a share that is likely to rise in the future.	改变必须从交通行业开始，这一行业占据目前石油消费的一半以上，而且这一比重今后可能会提高。


The G-8 countries should therefore agree to no longer license any new, oil-powered cars from 2025 onwards.	因此，工业八强国家应当同意从2025年以后不再给任何新的、以石油为动力的汽车颁发执照。


This decision would not be directed against individual mobility, but against the dissipation of a scarce resource that is more urgently needed to produce synthetic materials.	这一决定将不会针对个人的行动自由，而是针对制造合成材料上更为迫切需要的稀缺资源的消失。


Political leaders should not privilege any particular technology.	政治领导人不应当给予任何特别的技术以关照。


Instead, they should provide the automobile industry with incentives to develop alternative technologies that rely on bio-mass fuel, ethylene, hydrogen, and even natural gas during a transition period.	相反，他们应该给汽车产业提供激励，发展在过渡时期内依赖于生物燃料、乙烯、氢甚至是天然气的替换性技术。


Countries that lead the way politically will, as a collateral benefit, provide domestic industries with a leading position in energy technology, ensuring future markets.	在政治上发挥领导作用的国家将为国内产业在能源技术上提供领先地位，从而确保未来的市场，而这也是一项附带的利益。


The expected significant reduction of CO2-emissions could eventually bring about the breakthrough that is needed in international climate policies.	预期的大幅度降低二氧化碳排放最终可以带来在国际气候政策中所需要的突破。


But economic development comes into play as well: curing our “addiction” to oil would leave more of it to poorer, less developed, and newly industrializing countries, as well as pushing down prices and easing geopolitical energy competition.	但是，经济发展也发挥作用，那就是，治疗我们对石油的“上瘾”将会把更多的石油留给较为贫困、发展落后以及新兴的工业化国家，同时压低价格，消除地缘政治的能源竞争。


Geopolitically, the benefits would similarly obvious, as the ability of major oil exporters to blackmail industrialized countries would be significantly reduced.	从地缘政治角度而言，其利益也是同样明显的，因为主要石油出口国要挟工业化国家的能力将会被显著降低。


This could increase the bargaining power of the international community in the Middle East, and might strengthen those social forces in countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia that seriously wish to promote political and economic reform from within.	这将会提高国际社会在中东的讨价还价的实力，而且可能加强像沙特、伊朗以及俄罗斯等国的那些确实愿意从内部促进政治和经济改革的社会力量。


As a technologically advanced and major automobile-producing country, Germany is well placed to bring about such an initiative.	德国技术先进，而且是主要汽车制造国，具有提出这样一种倡议的地位。


Merkel, who holds a doctorate in physics and started her political career as an environment minister – presiding in 1995 over the first conference of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change – may have more credibility in addressing the issue than any of her EU and G-8 colleagues.	默克尔拥有物理学博士学位，其政治生涯从环境部长开始，1995年主持了首届联合国关于气候变化的框架会议，因此，在处理这一问题上要比她的欧盟和工业八强的同事们更为具有信誉度。


Now is the time for a bold act of leadership.	现在就是做出果敢的领导性行动的时候了。


Kick-Starting Employment	启动就业


BERKELEY – Unemployment is currently rising like a rocket, because businesses that normally would be expanding and hiring are not, and those businesses that would normally be contracting and shedding workers are doing so very rapidly.	美国伯克利报道－失业情况目前正如火箭一样飞速上升，因为要进行正常业务发展而需要招聘人才的企业没有得到发展，而那些通常要减员增效的企业则迅速地执行着其任务。


Businesses that ought to be expanding and hiring cannot, because the depressed general level of financial asset prices prevents them from borrowing money or selling bonds on profitable terms.	那些因扩展业务而需招聘人才的企业无法做到这样，是因为金融资产的价格下降的普遍水平让它们无法按照有利可图的条款从外界获得贷款或售出自己的债券。


In response, central banks should purchase government bonds for cash in as large a quantity as needed to push their prices up as high as possible.	作为对这种情况的回应，中央银行应该以必须的大数量现金买入债券，以此来将债券的价格尽可能地抬高。


Expensive government bonds will shift demand to mortgage or corporate bonds, pushing up their prices.	昂贵的政府债券则会将这种需求转移到抵押贷款或公司债券，以此抬高自己的价格。


Even after central banks have pushed government bond prices as high as they can go, they should keep buying government bonds for cash, in the hope that people whose pockets are full of cash will spend more of it, and that this will directly pull people out of joblessness and into employment.	即使在中央银行把政府债券的价格抬到它们能力所能的高价格，央行仍应该不断地买入政府债券以积累资金，以此希望那些口袋满是现金的人能多花些钱，并且也希望这样能直接让人们摆脱失业的困境而走向就业。


In addition, governments need to run extra-large deficits.	此外，政府需要启动超额的大赤字。


Spending – whether by the United States government during World War II, following the Reagan tax cuts of 1981, by Silicon Valley during the late 1990’s, or by home buyers in America’s south and on its coasts in the 2000’s – boosts employment and reduces unemployment.	无论是美国政府在二战期间的开支，还是在里根减税政策之后的20世纪90年代的硅谷的开支，或是21世纪初美国南部购房者在南部港口的开支，都能促进就业，减少失业问题。


And government spending is as good as anybody else’s.	而政府开支能与其它的开支有着同等的力量。


Finally, governments should undertake additional measures to boost financial asset prices, and so make it easier for those firms that ought to be expanding and hiring to obtain finance on terms that allow them to expand and hire.	最后，政府应该承诺采取额外措施来促进金融资产价格的上升，这样才能让那么本应当扩展业务并招募新人才的企业能以优惠的条件获取金融支持来扩展业务并招募人才。


It is this point that brings us to US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s plan to take about $465 billion of government money, combine it with $35 billion of private-sector money, and use it to buy up risky financial assets.	也就是这最后一点让我们聚焦于美国财政部长蒂莫西·盖特纳的计划——拿出政府4650亿美元的资金，与私有企业的350亿美元相结合，并用之于买入风险性的金融资产。


The US Treasury is asking the private sector to put $35 billion into this $500 billion fund so that the fund managers all have some “skin in the game,” and thus do not take excessive risks with the taxpayers’ money.	美国财政部要求私有企业拿出350亿资金加入总共5000亿的资金中来，因此基金公司的经理就能拥有些许“脸面”，这样就不会被指责拿着纳税人的钱去冒过多的风险了。


Private-sector investors ought to be more than willing to kick in that $35 billion, for they stand to make a fortune when financial asset prices close some of the gap between their current and normal values.	私有企业的投资人应该表现得更加情愿地拿出钱凑足350亿美元，因为当金融资产价格在它们目前的价值与正常价值没有任何差异时，它们就能赚上一笔。


If the fund does well over the next five years – returns profits of 9% per year –private investors get a market rate of return on their very risky equity investment and the equivalent of an “annual management fee” equal to 2% of assets under management.	如果资金在今后的5年里表现不错的话——回报率在每年9%——那么私有投资人以他们自己风险性较大的产权投资获得市场回报率，以及等同于2%资产管理费的“年管理费”。


If the portfolio does less well – profits of 4% per year – the managers still get a healthy but sub-market return of 10% per year on their equity.	如果投资表现不够理想——年利润率在4%——基金经理们仍能以他们的产权投资为基础得到相当丰厚的10%次市场利润率。


And if the portfolio does badly – loses 1% per year – they lose roughly 70% of their investment.	如果投资表现得很糟糕——每年亏损1%——那他们则会失去投资总额的70%。


Those are attractive odds.	这些都是引人入胜的几率。


Time alone will tell whether the financiers who invest in and run this program make a fortune.	只有时间能告诉我们，投入资金并经营这个项目的金融投资人是否能赚到钱。


But if they do, they will make the US government an even bigger fortune.	如果能赚的话，那他们给美国政府带来的财富则会更丰盛。


And 2% of assets under management is an annual fee that many sophisticated investors have been willing to pay private hedge funds – topped off with an extra fee of 20% of annual profits, which the Treasury is not paying.	而像2%的资产管理费这样的年费，许多久经世故的投资人都会愿意拿来支付私人对冲基金——最终要花费掉年利润中的20%做为额外费用，美国财政部不会支付这笔费用。


The fact that the Geithner Plan is likely to be profitable for the US government is, however, a sideshow.	然而，盖特纳计划可能会让美国政府获取利润的事实却是一个滑稽闹剧。


The aim is to reduce unemployment.	该计划的目的是减少失业。


The appearance of an extra $500 billion in demand for risky assets will reduce the quantity of risky assets that other private investors will have to hold.	为买入危险性资产而需要的额外5000亿美元的出现将减少危险资产的数量，这些是私有投资人所必须持有的。


And the sudden appearance of between five and ten different government-sponsored funds that make public bids for assets will convey information to the markets about what models other people are using to try to value assets in this environment.	��5或10种不同的政府赞助且需要公众竞相购买的基金的突然出现将向市场传达一个讯息，即在这种环境之下，其他人在为资产估值时会使用什么模式。


This sharing of information will reduce risk – somewhat.	信息的共享多少能减少风险。


When assets are seen as less risky, their prices rise.	当资产的风险性看似不大时，它们的价格就能上升。


And when there are fewer assets to be held, their prices rise, too.	而当资产的持有率少之又少时，资产的价格也能上升。


With higher financial asset prices, those firms that ought to be expanding and hiring will be able to get money on more attractive terms.	金融资产的价格越高，那些本该扩展业务并招募人才的企业将能够以更有优势的条件获得利润。


The problem is that the Geithner Plan appears to me to be too small – between one-eight and one-half of what it needs to be.	问题在于，盖特纳计划对我来说规模太小——只达到了它所应有程度的八分之一与五分之一之间。


Even though the US government is doing other things as well –fiscal stimulus, quantitative easing, and other uses of bailout funds – it is not doing everything it should.	尽管美国政府也在进行其它事务——财政刺激、定量放松，并使用了其它救援资金——但盖特纳计划没有做好它应该完成的一切。


My guess is that the reason that the US government is not doing all it should can be stated in three words: Senator George Voinovich, who is the 60th vote in the Senate – the vote needed to close off debate and enact a bill.	我猜想，美国政府没有做到它应该做的一切的原因能以三个字来描述：参议员约翰·沃诺维奇，他是参议院的第60投票，这个投票是结束辩论并通过一项法案的必须的投票。


To do anything that requires legislative action, the Obama administration needs Voinovich and the 59 other senators who are more inclined to support it.	要做任何需要立法行为的事情，奥巴马政府都沃诺维奇与其他更加支持他的59为议员。


The administration’s tacticians appear to think that they are not on board – especially after the recent AIG bonus scandal – whereas the Geithner Plan relies on authority that the administration already has.	奥巴马政府的战略家们似乎认为他们无权干涉此事，特别四在最近美国国际集团的奖金丑闻事件之后，而盖特纳计划却依赖于政府现有的权威人士。


Doing more would require a legislative coalition that is not there yet.	要达到更大的目标需要一个立法联合，但这种联合现在还没有形成。


Kidney for Sale	待售的肾


NEW HAVEN – World Kidney Day, to be held on March 12, is part of a global health campaign meant to alert us to the impact of kidney disease.	纽黑文—3月12日是世界肾脏日，也是旨在让人们警惕肾脏疾病的全球健康活动的组成部分之一。


Sadly, there is little to celebrate.	悲哀的是，没有什么可庆祝的。


According to the International Society of Nephrology, kidney disease affects more than 500 million people worldwide, or 10% of the adult population.	根据国际肾病学会的消息，世界范围内有超过5亿人受到肾脏疾病的影响，或者说是成年人的10%。


With more people developing high blood pressure and diabetes (key risks for kidney disease), the picture will only worsen.	随着越来越多的人身患高血压和糖尿病（这是肾脏疾病带来的的主要危险），情况只会变得更糟。


There are 1.8 million new cases of the most serious form of kidney disease – renal failure – each year.	最严重的肾脏疾病—肾衰竭—每年会新增180万例。


Unless patients with renal failure receive a kidney transplant or undergo dialysis – an expensive life-long procedure that cleanses the blood of toxins – death is guaranteed within a few weeks.	除非肾衰竭患者接受肾移植或是进行透析（这种程序可以清楚血液内的毒素，但是价格昂贵，还要持续终生），几周之内就会死亡。


Last year, an Australian nephrologist, Gavin Carney, held a press conference in Canberra to urge that people be allowed to sell their kidneys.	去年，澳大利亚肾病学家嘉文·卡尼在堪培拉举行了一次新闻发布会，主张应该允许人们出售他们的肾脏。


“The current system isn't working,” the Sydney Morning Herald quoted him as saying. “We’ve tried everything to drum up support” for organ donation, but “people just don’t seem willing to give their organs away for free.”	“现行制度不起作用”，《悉尼先驱晨报》援引他的话说：“我们已经竭尽所能来争取支持”器官捐赠，但是“人们似乎就是不愿意免费献出他们的器官”。


Carney wants to keep patients from purchasing kidneys on the black market and in overseas organ bazaars.	卡尼想要阻止病人从黑市或是海外器官市场购买肾脏。


As an American recipient of a kidney who was once desperate enough to consider doing that myself (fortunately, a friend ended up donating to me), I agree wholeheartedly that we should offer well-informed individuals a reward if they are willing to save a stranger’s life.	作为一位美国的肾脏接受者，我也曾经绝望到想要这样做，幸运的是一位朋友离世的时候把肾脏捐给了我。 我全心全意地赞同：如果有人在了解情况后愿意拯救陌生人的生命，我们应该报答他。


If not, we will continue to face a dual tragedy: on one side, the thousands of patients who die each year for want of a kidney; on the other side, a human-rights disaster in which corrupt brokers deceive indigent donors about the nature of surgery, cheat them out of payment, and ignore their post-surgical needs.	如果不这样做，我们将继续面对双重悲剧：一方面，每年有数千位病人因为没有肾源而死亡； 另一方面，腐败的掮客就手术的性质对贫穷的捐献者进行欺骗，骗走他们的酬劳，忽视他们手术后的需要，引发了人权灾难。


The World Health Organization estimates that 5% to 10% of all transplants performed annually – perhaps 63,000 in all – take place in the clinical netherworlds of China, Pakistan, Egypt, Colombia, and Eastern Europe.	国际卫生组织估计每年大约总计为63000的移植手术中，有5%到10%发生在中国、巴基斯坦、埃及、哥伦比亚和东欧最下层的诊所里。


Unfortunately, much of the world transplant establishment – including the WHO, the international Transplantation Society, and the World Medical Association – advocates only a partial remedy.	不幸的是，大部分世界移植机构（包括世界卫生组织，国际移植协会，世界医学协会）都赞成只进行部分补偿。


They�focus on ending organ trafficking but ignore the time-tested truth that trying to stamp out illicit markets either drives them further underground or causes corruption to�reappear elsewhere.	他们关注的焦点是终止器官走私，却忽视了一条经过时间验证的真理：试图消灭地下违法市场不是让它们转入更地下，就是使得腐败在其他地方再次出现。


For example, after China, India, and Pakistan began cracking down on illicit organ markets, many patients turned to the Philippines.	例如，在中国、印度和巴基斯坦开始打击地下器官市场之后，许多病人转向菲律宾。


Last spring, after the Philippines banned the sale of kidneys to foreigners, a headline in the Jerusalem Post read, “Kidney Transplant Candidates in Limbo after Philippines Closes Gates.”	当菲律宾去年春季禁止向外国人出售肾脏之后，《耶路撒冷邮报》出现了这样的大字标题：“菲律宾关闭大门之后, Limbo的肾移植候选者”。


(Israel has one of the lowest donation rates in the world, so the government pays for transplant surgery performed outside the country.)	（以色列是全球捐献率最低的国家之一，因此政府会给境外的移植手术付费。


Similarly, patients from Qatar who traveled to Manila are “looking for alternative solutions,” according to The Peninsula .	）同样，据《半岛日报》报道，前往马尼拉的卡塔尔患者正在“寻找替代的解决办法”。


True, more countries must develop efficient systems for posthumous donation, a very important source of organs.	的确，更多的国家必须发展高效的死后捐赠体制，这是一个重要的器官源。


But even in Spain, which is famously successful at retrieving organs from the newly deceased, people die while waiting for a kidney.	但是，即便在以成功使新近死者身上的器官得以再生利用而闻名于世的西班牙，人们依然会在等待肾源的过程中死去。


The truth is that trafficking will stop only when the need for organs disappears.	事实是：只有不需要器官的时候，走私才能停止。


Opponents allege that a legal system of exchange will inevitably replicate the sins of the black market.	反对者声称，合法的交换体制将会不可避免地复制黑市里的罪恶。


This is utterly backward.	这完全是一种落后的观念。


The remedy to this corrupt and unregulated system of exchange is a regulated and transparent regime devoted to donor protection.	为了纠正这种腐败堕落、不受控制的交易体制，可以施行一种受到管理，公开透明，致力于保护捐献者的新体制。


My colleagues and I suggest a system in which compensation is provided by a third party (government, a charity, or insurance) with public oversight.	我的同事和我建议建立这样一种体制，其中补偿由第三方（政府，慈善机构，保险公司）来提供，受到公众监督。


Because bidding and private buying would not be permitted, available organs would be distributed to the next in line – not just to the wealthy.	因为不允许竞价和私下购买，获得的器官将会分给下一个等候者，而不是仅仅分给富人。


Donors would be carefully screened for physical and psychological problems, as is currently done for all volunteer living kidney donors.	捐献者将会接受身体和心理方面的仔细筛选，就象现在所有活体肾脏的志愿捐献者所作的一样。


Moreover, they would be guaranteed follow-up�care for any complications.	而且，还会保证他们的任何并发症都会受到后续护理。


Many people are uneasy about offering lump-sum cash payments.	许多人都为提供一次性的现金偿付感到担心。


A solution is to provide in-kind rewards – such as a down payment on a house, a contribution to a retirement fund, or lifetime health insurance – so that the program would not be attractive to people who might otherwise rush to donate on the promise of a large sum of instant cash.	解决方法之���是提供实物回报，例如一栋房子的首付，捐给退休基金的一笔款子，或是终生的健康保险，以便这个项目不会吸引这样一批人：为了马上收到一大笔现金的承诺，他们就会冲过去捐肾。


The only way to stop illicit markets is to create legal ones.	阻止地下违法市场的唯一途径就是建立合法市场。


Indeed, there is no better justification for testing legal modes of exchange than the very depredations of the underground market.	的确，试行合法交易模式的最佳辩护理由就是地下市场正在进行大肆掠夺。


Momentum is growing.	这种势头正在加强。


In the British Medical Journal , a leading British transplant surgeon called for a controlled donor compensation program for unrelated live donors.	英国一位著名的移植外科大夫在《英国医学杂志》上号召为非亲活体捐赠者通过一个加以控制的捐献者补偿计划。


Within the last year, the Israeli, Saudi, and Indian governments have decided to offer incentives ranging from lifelong health insurance for the donor to a cash benefit.	过去一年中，以色列、沙特和印度政府已经决定提供奖励，范围涉及捐赠者的终生健康保险到现金收益。


In the United States, the American Medical Association has endorsed a draft bill that would make it easier for states to offer various non-cash incentives for donation.	在美国，美国医学会已经批准了一项议案草案，使得各州能够更方便地为捐献行为提供各种非现金的奖励。


Until countries create legal means of rewarding donors, the fates of Third World donors and the patients who need their organs to survive will remain morbidly entwined.	除非各国创立出酬劳捐赠者的合法方式，第三世界捐赠者的命运和需要器官移植来存活下去的病人的命运将会继续可怕地缠绕在一起。


What better way to mark World Kidney Day than for global health leaders to take a bold step and urge countries to experiment with donor rewards?	对于关注世界肾脏日来说，还有比全球的健康领袖们迈出勇敢的一步，敦促各国试行为捐赠者提供回报更好的方法吗？


Killer Fish Farms	养鱼场杀手


A recent report by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization found that almost half of all the fish eaten worldwide are raised on fish farms rather than caught in the wild.	根据最近由联合国粮农组织发表的一份报告显示我们所吃的鱼几乎有一半来自养鱼场而不是野生的。


It is likely that consumption of no other fish has soared more than that of farmed salmon, with production surging by almost 300% in 20 years.	在此方面，养殖鲑鱼的消费量增长应该是最快的，它的产量在过去20年间急剧上升了大约300%。


Salmon are carnivorous, however, and to feed the voracious appetite of these legions of farm-raised fish, the aquaculture industry increasingly has turned its attention to a small crustacean commonly known as Antarctic krill.	然而，鲑鱼是食肉动物，为了满足这些大批的人工养殖的鱼类的贪婪的食欲，水产业开始越来越多地把他们的注意力放在了一种通常叫做南极磷虾的很小的甲壳纲动物身上。


But that’s bad news for leopard seals and Adelie penguins, humpback and blue whales, and many other species, because most organisms in the Antarctic marine ecosystem eat either krill or something that eats krill.	但是那对于海豹、阿黛利企鹅、座头鲸、蓝鲸以及其他许多物种来说却是一个坏消息，因为绝大部分南极海洋生态系统的生物体依靠吃磷虾或者其他吃磷虾的东西为生。


Found in the cold waters of the Southern Ocean, krill constitute a key ingredient in fish oil and feed.	这种在南大洋冰冷的海水里发现的磷虾是鱼的油脂和饲料的一种重要成分。


Unfortunately, recent research indicates that expanded krill fishing might put the Antarctic ecosystem at risk.	不幸的是，最近的研究显示被扩大的磷虾捕捉会威胁到南极的生态系统。


Representatives from the world’s major fishing nations, meeting this fall in Australia, have an opportunity to limit krill catches, thereby helping creatures that need krill to survive.	来自世界上主要捕鱼国的代表今年秋天聚集在澳大利亚商议限制磷虾的捕捉量以此来帮助那些以磷虾为生的生物。


Although each krill may only grow to weigh about two grams, together they constitute one of the most abundant animal species on Earth.	尽管一只磷虾只能长到2克重，但是合在一起它们却组成了地球上动物种群之一。


Indeed, krill form the largest known aggregation of marine life, with a biomass perhaps greater than any other multi-cellular animal organism on the planet.	事实上，磷虾是海洋生命中数量最为庞大的物种，其数量也许比地球上任何其他多分子的动物都要多。


This “pink gold” forms the heart of the Antarctic marine food web, and land-based krill predators, such as penguins and seals, are most vulnerable to krill scarcity.	这种“红金色”的动物是南极海洋食物链的核心，而一些在陆地活动的食磷虾的动物，如企鹅和海豹，面对磷虾数量的减少会显得尤其脆弱。


Scientists have found that demand for krill has begun to exceed supply in some areas of the Southwest Atlantic.	科学家们已经发现南极洲的西南部分的一些地区磷虾的数量已经无法满足需求了。


As a result, penguins and albatrosses already experience difficulty rearing their offspring in areas such as South Georgia.	其结果是，在像南乔治亚岛这样的一些地区企鹅和信天翁在哺育它们的后代方面已经开始面临很大的困难。


And yet krill fishing is projected to grow.	然而人们还在计划扩大磷虾的捕捉量。


The Southern Ocean contains the largest population of krill in the world.	南大洋有着世界上最多的磷虾。


As krill tend to aggregate in concentrated swarms, they are easy to catch and have become particularly attractive to large-scale commercial interests.	因为磷虾喜欢成群结队地活动，所以它们很容易被捕捉因而特别容易吸引大规模商业利益的兴趣。


Moreover, krill fishing has recently been fueled by new technological advances such as vacuum pumps, which allow a single fishing vessel to catch and process huge amounts – up to 120,000 metric tons per season.	此外，最近一些新的科技进展更加促进了磷虾的捕捉。 比如说真空泵，它使得一只捕鱼船就能捕捉和加工极大数量的磷虾，每个季节超过12万公吨。


Furthermore, demand for krill products – from fish oil and feed to skin creams and other cosmetics – has increased over the past 20 years.	另外，对于磷虾产品的需求，从鱼油、鱼饲料到面霜和其他化妆品在过去20年间也变得越来越大。


As wild fish populations continue to decrease, in tandem with an ever-growing global appetite for seafood, the pressure on the aquaculture industry for fish feed will skyrocket.	因为野生鱼类的数量在不断地减少，加上全球对于海产品越来越大的需求，水产业迫切需要大量的鱼饲料。


The increased demand for krill, together with the new catching and processing capabilities, has combined in a way that the Antarctic ecosystem might not be able to withstand.	对于磷虾越来越大的需求量，以及新的捕捉和加工能力，使得南极的生态系统越来越难以承受。


But there is hope.	但是希望还是有的。


The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) was established in 1982, as part of the Antarctic Treaty System, in response to concerns that continued unregulated fishing might undermine the basis of the Antarctic food chain.	作为南极协约系统的一部分，成立于1982的南极海洋生命资源保护公约（CCAMLR）就是对持续无限制的捕捉会破坏南极食物链的基础的担忧的回应。


The CCAMLR is governed by a commission of 24 member states – including Argentina, Australia, Chile, Japan, Norway, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Ukraine, the United States and the European Union – that meets annually in Hobart, Australia, to discuss new fishing regulations concerning marine species in the Southern Ocean.	南极海洋生命资源保护公约由一个由24个成员国所组成的委员管理，包括阿根廷、澳大利亚、智利、日本、挪威、俄罗斯、南非、韩国、乌克兰、美国和欧盟。 它们每年在澳大利亚的霍巴特聚会讨论关于在南大洋捕捉海洋物种的新的规定。


The CCAMLR has pioneered ecosystem and precautionary approaches to fisheries management, which are now central to maintaining Antarctic krill.	南极海洋生命资源保护公约倡导在渔业管理上重视生态系统和采取谨慎的捕捉方法，现在他们把这用在了对于南极磷虾的保护上。


Although the needs of krill-dependent species were previously considered for large areas of the Southern Ocean, the CCAMLR must still scientifically subdivide the overall catch limit into smaller units.	尽管人们以前认为以磷虾为生的物种生活在南大洋的大片地区，南极海洋生命资源保护公约依然必须科学地把总体上的捕捉限制再加以细分。


This would help avoid local competition between krill vessels and the creatures that need krill to live, since krill fishing closely overlaps with the critical foraging areas for penguins and seals.	这将有助于避免捕捉磷销的船只与依靠磷销为升的生物之间的竞争，因为磷虾的捕捉区域与企鹅和海豹觅食的重要区域严重重叠。


The CCAMLR’s members must honor the organization’s mandate for conservation and ensure that there is enough “pink gold” to feed the penguins and other wildlife that depend on it.	南极海洋生命资源保护公约的成员国必须执行该组织关于保护物种的指令并且确保有足够的这种“红金色”动物供给企鹅和其他以此为生的野生生命。


The CCAMLR should also apply to krill fishing the same monitoring, control, and surveillance measures that it requires for all other fisheries.	南极海洋生命资源保护公约还应该把对磷虾捕捉的这些监督管理措施实施到所有其他也有此要求的渔业上。


Antarctic krill must not be fished to feed the fish farms of the world while starving the penguins, seals, whales, and other species whose survival depends on these tiny, but vitally important, creatures.	人们不应捕捉南极磷虾去喂养养鱼场的鱼类而让那些依靠这些细小、但却极其重要的动物为生的企鹅、海豹、鲸和其他物种饱受饥饿。


Killing Growth in Russia	扼杀俄罗斯的经济增长


I want Russia to be a boring country – at least for the next few decades.	我宁愿俄罗斯变成一个令人乏味的国家，至少在今后的几十年中。


In the twentieth century, Russia set an unquestionable record for all sorts of upheavals and social experiments that attracted the world’s attention.	二十世纪的俄罗斯创造了一份不容质疑的纪录，包括经历了各种各样的动乱剧变和社会实践，吸引了全世界的关注目光。


A time-out is essential.	现在该是暂停的时候了。


This objective seemed to be entirely within reach – or at least possible – until the first half of 2003.	在2003年上半年前，我们似乎还可以不费吹灰之力地达成这个目标，至少很有可能达到。


Foreign correspondents accredited in Moscow complained that nothing was happening in Putin’s Russia.	受命驻莫斯科的外国记者还曾抱怨普京管理下的俄罗斯波澜不惊，无甚可报道。


Investment in the Russian economy was growing fast.	俄罗斯的经济投资呈高速发展。


Unfortunately, Russia’s rulers are not accustomed to leaving the country and the rest of the world for long without something surprising to gawk at.	不幸的是，俄罗斯当权者还未习惯这种状态，隔不了多久他们总要做出些让本国和世界各国目瞪口呆的惊人之举。


Instilling a feeling of insecurity is the best way to scare your population into submission and frighten away potential investors.	恐吓你的人民使他们屈从听命的最有效方法是逐步灌输安全丧失感，此法同时亦能吓跑潜在投资者。


How democratic or undemocratic a regime is usually doesn't bother investors. All they need and care about is stable, predictable rules.	通常，困扰投资者的问题不是一个政权民主与否，投资者需要并且在意的，是稳定且可预见的政策。


Indeed, the watchword among major investors is inertia.	事实上，巨额投资者们都信奉惯性二字。


It takes time to reach a decision on whether or not to invest in a project, and once an investment decision is made, it becomes rather difficult to stop the process quickly.	一个投资项目需要时间达成共识，而一旦决定作出，要立刻叫停这个项目则更为艰难。


Russia’s government is now doing its best to prove that, while difficult, it is possible to defy the laws of business physics and kill investments that are already in the pipeline.	俄罗斯政府此刻正竭其全力要证明，即使困难重重，他们也是有可能打破商业常规，扼杀已在进行中的投资项目。


When Mikhail Khodorkovsky and other executives of Yukos, his oil company, were arrested last year, corporations investing or interested in investing in Russia were prepared to interpret the crackdown as an isolated incident brought on by the political agenda of the company and its CEO, who should have known better.	去年，尤科斯石油公司原首席执行官米卡耶·克多可夫斯基和他公司的其他高层人员被捕，正在俄罗斯进行投资及有意向投资的公司已准备好将此次打击镇压当作一个独立事件来看待，全由该公司及其首席执行官的政治议程所引起，个中缘由应该只有克多可夫斯基才比较清楚。


Never mind that by the second half of 2003, it had become obvious that the government intended to use legal means – in the form of massive tax claims – to destroy the company.	也难怪，到2003年下半年末，政府准备动用法律手段——以大规模税款申索的方式——以打垮该公司的意图已十分明显。


When only one company faced legal and financial problems, investors who had made a decision to put their money in Russia were ready to ignore this kind of development.	若仅有一家公司出现法律和经济问题，那些有意向把钱投放在俄罗斯的投资者们往往情愿忽略这一事态的发展。


“This must be an exception,” they kept repeating, like a mantra or a prayer.	“这一定是个例外，”他们总是这么重复，宛如重复着咒语，又像在祈祷。


I’ve heard something similar when Russian problems are discussed: “Just finish this Yukos affair.	我也在人们讨论俄罗斯问题时听到过类似的话语，“快点结束尤科斯的案子吧！


We don’t care how it goes, just put an end to it.”	我们才不在乎它进行得如何呢，早日了结它吧！


Unfortunately, the genie has been let out of the bottle.	不幸的是，妖魔一旦出瓶就那难以收回。


Throughout 2004, it became abundantly clear that Russia’s internal security apparatus had gained the upper hand in deciding how to manage economic and political problems.	2004一整年，比起经济和政治问题的管理，俄罗斯国内的安全设施建设明显占据了上风。


Security structures developed a taste for this kind of work, and welcomed new responsibilities.	安全机构对这项工作乐此不疲，对新职责颇为欢迎。


In many ways, they began to see fighting big business as akin to fighting terrorists.	从很多方面来看，他们开始把反巨大型企业与反恐行动一样对待。


And, indeed, they share one thing in common: the fight never ends.	确实，有一点是共通的：这场战争永无终日。


More and more tax claims are being produced, and not only against Yukos.	除了针对尤科斯石油公司之外，越来越多的税款申索开始起草。


Tax claims against the telecommunications company Vympelkom (one of Russia’s leading firms, and the first to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange in 90 years) send an unambiguous signal to investors: no one is safe.	矛头直指Vympelkom电信公司的税款申索（俄罗斯最大的电信运营商，也是过去90年中第一个在纽约证券交易所上市的公司）向所有的投资者发出了一个明确无误的信号：没有谁能够幸免于难。


In fact, official documents have now even started questioning the legitimacy of the privatization of the leading Russian companies in the 1990’s, which has opened the way for discussions about revising the outcomes of these privatizations.	事实上，官方文件甚至已经开始质疑1990年代俄罗斯大公司私有化的合法性，并启动了有关修正这些私有化成果的讨论。


Similarly, British Petroleum, which has invested more in Russia than any other company to date, has recently discovered that its rights to the Kovytkino gas field are not guaranteed at all. This property, it now seems, could be reclaimed by the state at any moment.	与此同时，目前为止在俄罗斯境内投资最多的英国石油公司最近已经发现他们在Kovytkino油田的权利已完全得不到保障。


It would be wrong to draw long-term conclusions from short-term economic information, even if this information confirms reality.	要从短期经济信息中得出长期结论是种错误做法，即使这些信息应证了事实。


The alarming tendencies we are seeing today may be short-lived and with no serious consequences.	今日我们目睹的趋势令人担忧，但也可能是短暂无常且不会造成严重后果的。


Post-socialist growth is a process that cannot (and should not) be easily stopped.	后社会主义的急速增长已经难以（也不该）止步。


If, however, the authorities continue their efforts to destabilize the Russian economy, today’s disturbing tendencies may actually take root.	然而，如果政府继续不遗余力地破坏俄罗斯经济，那么目前这种令人担忧的趋势将会扎根于俄罗斯。


Russia can then forget about attaining the fast, sustainable growth that China has achieved. Instead, we Russians will find ourselves trying to avert an impending economic crisis.	到彼时，俄罗斯就该彻底忘掉中国所取得的快速持续的经济增长，取而代之是发现自己正在全力避免一场日益迫近的经济危机。


Of course, no one can predict when such a crisis might occur.	当然，没有人可以预见这场危机何时发生。


But one thing is certain: we will know which path the country’s leaders have chosen sooner rather than later.	但是有一点却是肯定的：我们迟早会知道国家领导人究竟选择了哪条路。


Indeed, this year could be Russia’s most fateful yet.	毫无疑问，今年将会是俄罗斯最至关重大的一年。


Killing the Death Penalty	废除死刑


It is finally happening.	人们终于等来了这一时刻。


After 13 years of negotiations, delays, and hesitation, the UN General Assembly will vote this month on the proposal for a universal moratorium on the death penalty.	经过13年的谈判、推迟以及犹豫，联合国大会将在本月对一项全面暂停死刑提议进行投票。


A large majority of the UN adopted the proposal on 15 November, despite attempts by some member states to obstruct, amend, or bury it.	联合国的大多数成员国不顾某些国家的阻挠、修正或者终结的企图在11月15日通过了这一提议。


Fortunately, in the end, the opponents were forced to fight a will stronger than their own: the will of those who – after the abolition of slavery and torture – want to mark another turning point for civilization.	所幸的是，最终，反对国家被迫与一个比它们自己的更为强烈的意志斗争，也就是，在废除了奴隶制和酷刑后，想要在文明的道路上做出另一个转折点的人们的意志。


But will this December’s vote be a mere formality?	但是，今年12月的投票仅仅是例行公事吗？


Experience teaches us to be prudent.	经验告诉告诉我们要谨慎。


I have not opened my bottle of spumante yet.	我现在还没有开酒庆贺。


To be honest, I am not sure that all of the world’s governments have accepted the inevitable, or that even the most inflexible will now agree to the moratorium.	坦率而言，我并不确信世界上所有国家政府都已经接受了这一不可避免的事实，或者即使最为顽固的现在也会同意暂停死刑。


But I continue to have faith that the General Assembly will know, as always, how to meet this challenge.	但是，联合国大会将会像以往一贯那样面对挑战。 我对此继续保持信念。


We are all aware that even if the vote succeeds, the UN resolution will not be binding, and that establishing and enforcing a moratorium is only a necessary mid-way step toward full abolition.	我们都知道，即使投票成功，这一联合国决议也没有约束力，而且，确立和执行暂停死刑只是朝向全面废除目标上必要一步。


I believe the UN should push for an immediate de facto suspension, without waiting for the debates to begin on legal reforms in the respective countries.	我相信，联合国应该不等候有关国家法律改革辩论开始就推动立即在事实上中止死刑。


I hope that this approach will allow a wide consensus in the General Assembly, and that any last minute change of heart will fail.	我相信这一手段将会在联合国大会形成广泛共识，而且最后时刻的改变主意将不会成功。


One big lesson I learned during the struggle to create the International Criminal Court (ICC), and now during the battle for a moratorium on the death penalty, is that it is often better to aim for a realistic result rather than a perfect one.	我在建立国际刑事法庭以及现在暂停死刑的奋斗中所学到的一大的教训就是，很多时候退而求其次往往要好一点。


Before the international community established the ICC, there were two ad hoc tribunals – one for the former Yugoslavia and one for Rwanda.  Their work paved the way for the ICC.	国际社会建立国际刑事法庭之前有两个临时法庭，一个用于前南斯拉夫，另一个用于卢旺达。 这两个法庭的工作为国际刑事法庭铺平了道路。


Some European Union countries wanted to push for complete abolition of the death penalty right away.	某些欧盟国家想要立即推动完全废除死刑。


I understand their position.	我理解它们的立场。


I would have wanted the same thing myself.	我原本自己也想要这样。


But had we followed that route, we would most likely have failed.	但是如果我们按照这样行事，我们极有可能失败。


There is an important lesson in this for the EU at a time when it is seeking to become a global actor: we must reach an internal consensus while always bearing in mind what the external ramifications of our decision might be.	欧盟正在寻求成为一个全球性力量。 在这一时候，欧盟有一个重要的经验教训，那就是我们必须达成内部一致，同时总是知道我们的决定所可能带来的外部影响。


On the moratorium, we remained pragmatic and built a strong European foreign policy.	在暂停死刑问题上，我们保持了现实主义并且建立了一个强大的欧洲外交政策。


And it was an advantage in the UN negotiations to have a common Europeans position and to have spoken with a single voice.	在联合国谈判中具有一个共同的欧洲立场以及用一个声音说话是一个优势。


A second lesson that I learned is also useful for the EU, which finds itself in a world in which new powers are emerging and where all actors from Manila to Algiers, from Doha to Libreville, must deal with the challenges of globalization and interdependence on a daily basis.	我所学到的第二个经验教训对欧盟也有作用。 当今世界新的大国正在显现，欧盟必须每天都处理全球化和相互依赖的挑战。


That lesson is that Europe has more friends than it has enemies in the world.	得出的经验就是，在世界上，欧盟的朋友要比敌人多。


These friends deserve respect and attention.	这些朋友值得尊重和关注。


If Italy and the EU had not understood the need to work with non-European countries, and make them feel that they were responsible and fully-fledged protagonists, the efforts to establish the ICC and be so close to declare a universal moratorium on the death penalty would have failed.	如果意大利和欧盟没有理解与非欧盟国家合作的需要，并且让它们感到它们是负责以及完全的主角，建立国际刑事法庭以及如此接近全面暂停死刑就会失败。


I know that this is not exactly a new lesson, but it is what I have in mind when I think of efficient multilateralism.	我知道，这并非是一个全新的经验，但是当我思考有效的多边主义的时候我总是想到这一点。


Not only does it work, but, above all, in some cases, it is the only way of moving forward.	它不仅可以奏效，而且在某些情况下，它是前进的唯一途径。


Finally, a third lesson – relevant to the fight against the death penalty and, indeed, to winning any political battle – is perseverance, which I consider to be a mix of pig-headedness and the ability to maintain one’s position.	最后，第三个经验就是坚持不懈。 这与废除死刑的斗争以及赢得任何政治斗争有关。


Without perseverance, there can be no progress.	我认为这结合了固执和坚持自己立场的能力。 没有坚持不懈就没有进步。


All this is a success, not only for anti-death penalty radicals, for the “Hands off Cain” association, the Italian government, and for the European Union and its friends in the world.	所有这些都是一个成功，这不仅对废除死刑的极端人士而言如此，而且对于废除死刑协会、意大利政府、欧盟及其在全世界的朋友而言也是如此。


It is much more: it is a success for all those who believe that it is still possible to improve our world – and ultimately the human condition – every day.	其意义不止如此，这对于所有相信依旧有可能每天改良世界以及最终改良人类境况的人而言都是一个成功。


Is Tsipras the New Lula?	齐普拉斯是新卢拉吗？


CAMBRIDGE – Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras has the chance to become to his country what South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva were to theirs: a man of the left who moves toward fiscal responsibility and freer markets.	美国剑桥—希腊总理齐普拉斯有机会成为希腊的金大中（韩国总统）和卢拉（巴西总统）——推进财政责任和自由市场的左派。


Like Tsipras, both were elected in the midst of an economic crisis.	与齐普拉斯类似，金大中和卢拉都在经济危机中当选总统。


Both immediately confronted the international financial constraints that opposition politicians can afford to ignore.	两人上任伊始便面临着反对派政客才能忽视是国际金融约束。


On assuming power, Kim and Lula were able to adjust, politically and mentally, to the new realities that confronted them, launching much-needed reforms.	掌握了权力的金大中和卢拉能够从政治上和思想上做出调整以适应他们所面临的现实，启动急需的改革。


Some reforms were “conservative” (or “neo-liberal”) and might not have been possible under politicians of the right.	一些改革是“保守”（或“新自由主义”）的，绝不可能在右派政客手中实行。


But others were consistent with their lifetime commitments.	但其他改革与他们一生的承诺一致。


South Korea under Kim began to rein in the chaebols, the country’s huge family-owned conglomerates.	金大中治下的韩国开始遏制财阀（家族所有的巨型企业集团）。


Brazil under Lula implemented Bolsa Familia, a system of direct cash payments to households that is credited with lifting millions out of poverty.	卢拉治下的把戏实施了家庭补助金（Bolsa Familia）计划，该计划向家庭直接派发现金，将数百万人带出了贫困。


Tsipras and his Syriza party, however, spent their first six months in office still blinkered about financial realities, unable to see things from the perspective of others.	但是，齐普拉斯和他的左翼联盟党（Syriza）执政已经六个月，却仍没有看清金融现实，无法借助他人的角度看待问题。


The decision to hold a referendum on the bailout terms set by Greece’s creditors showed that they were politically blinkered as well.	就希腊债权人所要求的条件进行公投的决定表明，他们在政治上也没有认清现实。


If Tsipras were reading from a normal script, he would logically have asked Greeks to vote yes.	如果齐普拉斯从常理出发，合乎逻辑的做法是要求希腊人民投赞成票。


But he asked them to vote no, which they did by a surprisingly wide margin.	但他要求希腊人民投反对票，并出人意料地获得了绝大多数人的顺从。


He evidently thought that this would strengthen his hand; instead, it merely strengthened the position of those Germans convinced that the time had come to let Greece drop out of the euro.	他显然认为这将加强他的立场； 相反，这仅仅加强了那些认为是时候让希腊退出欧元区的德国人的立场。


Only a week after the referendum, Tsipras finally faced up to reality: Greece’s euro partners are not prepared to offer easier terms.	公投后不过一周，齐普拉斯终于开始面对现实：希腊的欧元伙伴国不准备向它提供更加容易的条件。


On the contrary, they are insisting on more extensive concessions as the price of a third bailout.	相反，它们坚持希腊做出更大的让步换取第三轮援助。


The only possible silver lining to this sorry history is that some of Tsipras’s supporters at home may now be willing to swallow the creditors’ bitter medicine.	这段悲哀历史的唯一一个闪光点是一些齐普拉斯的国内支持者现在也许愿意吞下债权人的苦口良药。


One should not underestimate the opposition that reforms continue to face among Greeks.	你不应该低估改革在希腊人中间所继续面临的反对。


But like Kim and Lula, Tsipras could marshal political support from some on the left who reckon, “If he now says that these measures are unavoidable, there truly must be no alternative.”	但与金大中和卢拉一样，齐普拉斯可以从一些认为“如果他现在说这些措施不可避免，那么确实是别无选择了”的左派中赢得政治支持。


(The same thing has of course happened on the right: Only Nixon could go to China.)	（同样的事情当然也在右派身上发生过：只有尼克松可能去中国。 ）


None of this is to say that the international financial realities a country faces are necessarily always reasonable.	所有这些都不是说一国所面临的国际金融现实永远是合理的。


Sometimes global financial markets’ eagerness to lend results in unreasonable booms, followed by abrupt reversals.	有时全球金融市场急切地想要贷款，结果导致非理性的繁荣，随之而来的急转直下。


Foreign creditor governments can be unreasonable as well.	外部债权人政府也有可能不理性。


The misperceptions and errors by leaders in Germany and other creditor countries have been as damaging as those on the part of the less-experienced Greek leaders.	德国和其他债权国领导人的误解和错误与经验欠缺的希腊领导人的误解和错误一样危险。


For example, the belief that fiscal austerity raises income, rather than lowering it, even in the short run, was a mistake, as was the refusal in 2010 to write down the debt.	比如，认为财政紧缩增加而不是降低了收入（哪怕是短期收入）就是一个错误，2010年拒绝减记债务亦然。


These mistakes explain why Greece’s debt/GDP ratio is even higher today than it was then.	这些错误解释了为何今天的希腊债务/GDP之比比当时还要高。


Each side’s refusal to admit its mistakes reinforced the other side’s stubbornness.	各方都拒绝承认错误，这让另一方更加顽固。


The Germans would have done better to admit that fiscal austerity is contractionary in the short run.	德国人如果能够承认财政紧缩在短期引起衰退，就能做出更好的选择。


The Greeks would have done better to admit that democracy does not mean that one country’s people can vote to give themselves other countries’ money.	希腊如果承认民主并不意味着一国人民可以让自己获得其他国家的钱，也可以做得更好。


In terms of game theory, the fact that the Greeks and Germans have different economic interests is not enough to explain the poor outcome of negotiations to date.	用博弈论的话说，希腊人和德国人经济利益不同，这一事实不足以解释到目前为止的糟糕的谈判结果。


The difference in perceptions has been central.	感觉的不同是核心问题。


“Getting to yes” in a bargaining situation requires that the negotiators not only have a clear idea of their own top priorities, but also that they understand what the other side wants most.	在讨价还价局面中“形成一致”要求谈判者不但清楚地明白自身的当务之急，还要求他们理解对方最想要什么。


A “bad bargain” would call on each side to forego its top priorities.	“坏讨价还价”要求各方放弃最重要的重点。


The European Central Bank should not have to agree to an explicit write-down of Greek debt.	欧洲央行不应该同意直接减记希腊债务。


And Greece should not have to run a substantial primary budget surplus for now.	希腊也不应该现在保持巨大的初级预算盈余。


Under a relatively “good bargain,” the creditors would modify interest rates and extend maturities further, as the International Monetary Fund now suggests, so that Greece does not have to pay the unpayable over the coming years, in exchange for growth-enhancing structural reforms.	在相对较“好的讨价还价”中，债权人应该如IMF现在所建议的那样调整利率并进一步延长期限，以使希腊不必在未来几年中偿付它无力偿付的金额来换取加强增长所需要的结构改革。


One hopes that the awful experience of the last six months has led both sides to a clearer perception of economic realities and priorities.	我们希望过去六个月的糟糕经验让双方都对经济现实和当务之急有了更清晰的认识。


This will be necessary if the two sides are to arrive at a good bargain, rather than a bad one – or even an outright failure to cooperate, so that Greece effectively drops out of the euro.	如果双方想形成好的而不是坏的讨价还价（甚至彻底的合作失败，从而导致希腊事实退出欧元区），这是必要条件。


A recurrent theme of the Greek crisis since it erupted in late 2009 is that both the Greeks and the eurozone’s creditor countries have been reluctant to consider lessons from previous emerging-market crises.	自2009年爆发以来，希腊危机的一个反复出现的主题���希腊人和欧元区债权国不愿从此前的新兴市场危机中汲取经验。


After all, they said, Greece was a eurozone member, not a developing country.	他们说，毕竟希腊是欧元区成员国而不是发展中国家。


That is why, for example, the ECB and European Commission initially did not want Greece to go to the IMF and did not want to write down Greek debt.	因此，（比如）欧洲央行和欧盟委员会最初不愿意让希腊求助IMF，也不愿减记希腊债务。


Emerging market crises do hold important lessons.	新兴市场危机确实可以提供重要经验。


If Tsipras can now follow the course taken by Kim and Lula, he will serve his country well.	如果齐普拉斯可以效仿金大中和卢拉，将给希腊带来巨大的好处。


Kipling’s Wisdom	吉卜林的智慧


LONDON – The beginning of October marked the seventh anniversary of the beginning of the American-led bombardment of Afghanistan.	伦敦– 十月的开始标志着由美国领导的对阿富汗的轰炸已经过去了七年。


Seven years later, the Taliban are still fighting.	七年后，塔利班依然在战斗。


Some 50 insurgents died recently in an assault on Lashkar gar, the capital of Helmand province.	在最近一次对Helmand 省会Lashkar Gar的袭击中有大约50名叛乱者被击毙。


Osama bin Laden is nowhere to be found.	奥萨马·本·拉登依然不知藏身何处。


Has the time come for NATO to declare victory and leave?	北约是时候宣布胜利并离开了吗？


Recently, a French diplomatic cable relating a conversation on September 2 between the French ambassador to Afghanistan, Francois Fitou, and his British colleague, Sherard Cowper-Coles, was leaked in Le Canard Enchainé , a French satirical magazine.	最近一份有关法国驻阿富汗大使Francois Fitou与英国驻阿富汗大使Sherard Cowper-Coles谈话的法国外交电报的内容在法国的一份讽刺杂志《Le Canard Enchainé》上被泄露。


Cowper-Coles was reported to have said that the security situation in Afghanistan was deteriorating, that NATO’s presence was making it worse, and that the two American presidential hopefuls should be dissuaded from getting bogged down further.	Cowper-Coles据说声称阿富汗的安全形势正在恶化，而北约的存在使情况变得更加糟糕，两名美国总统候选人应该被劝说不要在那里陷得更深。


The only realistic policy would be to cultivate an “acceptable dictator.”	唯一现实的政策应该是扶植一位“可接受的独裁者”。


Of course, the British Foreign Office denied that these thoughts reflected the British government’s views.	当然，英国外交部否认这些想法代表了英国政府的观点。


The departing commander of British forces in Afghanistan, Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith, has claimed that defeating the Taliban was “neither feasible nor supportable.”	即将离职的英国驻阿富汗部队指挥官Mark Carleton-Smith准将曾经说过击溃塔利班“既不可行也得不到支持”。


Two days after making that gloomy assessment, the French chief of the defense staff, General Jean-Louis Georgelin, followed suit.	而在这个令人沮丧的评论发表两天后，法国国防参谋长Jean-Louis Georgelin将军也作出了类似的表述。


And Kai Eide, the United Nations Secretary-General’s special representative in Afghanistan, has agreed that the situation cannot be stabilized by military means alone.	联合国秘书长阿富汗问题特别代表Kai Eide同意仅仅依靠军事行动无法稳定那里的局势。


All call for a concerted political effort implying some form of negotiation with the Taliban.	所有的人都呼吁各方作出共同的政治努力以便与塔利班开展某种形式的谈判。


A draft report by American intelligence agencies has also concluded that Afghanistan is in a “downward spiral” and casts serious doubt on the Afghan government’s ability to stem the Taliban’s resurgence.	美国情报部门的一份简报也曾得出结论说阿富汗处于“恶性循环”中，并且对阿富汗政府阻止塔利班重新崛起的能力表示严重怀疑。


Moreover, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia hosted a Ramadan breakfast for the Afghan government and Taliban representatives.	此外，沙特国王阿卜杜拉为阿富汗政府和塔利班代表举行了一次斋月早餐会。


Predictably, both parties deny that any serious negotiations took place, while the United States and Britain claimed to know nothing about this “Saudi initiative.”	两方并不令人意外地否认进行了任何正式的谈判，同时美国和英国也表示对于“沙特倡议”一无所知。


But Afghan Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak subsequently said that resolution of the conflict required a “political settlement” with the Taliban.	但是阿富汗国防部长Abdul Rahim Wardak随后表示解决冲突需要与塔利班达成“政治和解”。


Yet at the recent NATO summit in Budapest, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates called on NATO members to provide more troops for missions in Afghanistan.	然而最近在布达佩斯召开的北约峰会上，美国国防部长盖茨呼吁北约成员国向阿富汗增派更多的部队。


He accused the British of being “defeatist” and argued that Afghanistan’s deteriorating security situation could be addressed with an Iraq-style “surge,” which has undoubtedly brought down violence levels in that country.	他指责英国是“失败主义者”，指出阿富汗恶化的安全形势是可以通过伊拉克式的“大量增兵”来解决的，在伊拉克的增兵行动无疑大大降低了该国的暴力活动水平。


The Americans have already committed 8,000 extra troops for next year.	美国已经承诺明年再增兵8000人。


So there seems to be a split.	看起来各方存在着分歧。


The British and French are busy briefing, and preparing to scale down their commitments in Afghanistan.	英国和法国正忙于吹风、并且准备缩减它们在阿富汗的驻军。


They believe that boosting allied forces will only increase the sense of occupation and give the Taliban more targets.	它们认为加强联军的力量只会增加当地群众被占领的感觉并且为塔利班提供更多袭击的靶子。


The emergence of a “realistic dictator” might allow NATO to withdraw most of its troops within a few years.	一个“现实的独裁者”的出现也许能使北约在未来几年内撤出其大部分的部队。


But the Americans want a “surge,” and the US general commanding NATO forces in the country said last month that he needed three more brigades, some 15,000 troops in all, and Gates has asked the Europeans either to send or pay for them.	但是美国却希望“增兵”，负责指挥北约在该国的部队的美国将军上个月表示他需要增加三个旅，总共大约15000名士兵，而盖茨已经要求欧洲国家要么派兵要么出钱。


The Americans do recognize the importance of courting those Taliban leaders they believe to be motivated by tribal loyalties rather than religious ideology, but they oppose the latest Afghan policy of negotiating directly and officially with the Taliban.	美国确实认识到与那些他们认为更多地受部族忠诚而非宗教意识形态所驱动的塔利班领导人示好的重要性，他们只是反对阿富汗最近直接与塔利班举行正式谈判的政策。


Both Barack Obama and John McCain advocate increasing troop levels in Afghanistan above the levels that the Bush administration has already pledged.	奥巴马和麦凯恩都支持在布什政府已经承诺的基础上再向阿富汗增派更多的部队。


Obama has that said he would send troops from Iraq as an urgent priority.	奥巴马表示他将从伊拉克抽调部队来应付这一当务之急的问题。


McCain has given no details of his plans.	麦凯恩尚未给出他的计划的细节。


Obama has made it a campaign issue to criticize the Bush administration for neglecting Afghanistan and diverting resources needed there to the misguided war in Iraq.	奥巴马把指责布什政府忽视阿富汗以及把那里急需的资源用到伊拉克被误导的战争上作为他的一个竞选议题。


McCain, though, has always maintained that Iraq is the more important battlefield.	而麦凯恩则一直认为伊拉克是更重要的战场。


What candidates promise on the stump is not always what they do in office.	候选人在巡回演说中的承诺在他们当选后并不一定会兑现。


In the second presidential debate, Obama said, “We will kill bin Laden.	在第二场总统候选人辩论中，奥巴马说“我们将杀死本·拉登。


We will crush al-Qaeda.”	我们将击溃基地组织。


Are his patriotic credentials strong enough for him to renege on this pledge and pursue negotiations to withdraw without capturing the talismanic Osama?	”他的爱国口碑是否足够强到让他违背自己的承诺而寻求撤军谈判，同时不去抓捕似乎有护身符保护的奥萨马？


What would a US withdrawal mean for Afghanistan, for Pakistan, and for the future of NATO?	而美国的撤军对阿富汗、巴基斯坦以及北约��未来又意味着什么？


To retreat from its first major “out of area” mission would be a damaging blow for the alliance.	从它在“区域外”的第一次重大行动中撤军对于这个联盟来说将是一次毁灭性的打击。


Curiously, McCain may have more room for maneuver.	奇怪的是，麦凯恩可能有更大的操作空间。


Republican presidents have a better record in negotiating with enemies than do Democratic ones.	共和党总统在与敌人的谈判上有着比民主党更好的记录。


Eisenhower ended the Korean War, Nixon the war in Vietnam – both wars started by their Democrat predecessors.	埃森豪威尔结束了朝鲜战争，尼克松结束了越南战争——这两场战争都是由他们的民主党前任发起的。


Nixon, a vitriolic anti-Communist, opened relations with Mao’s China and started détente with the Soviet Union.	是尼克松，一位刻薄的反共产主义者，开始了与毛的中国的联系并且开始与苏联缓和关系。


Reagan brought the US hostages back from Iran.	里根从伊朗带回了美国人质。


Having condemned the “evil empire” of communism, he helped bring the Cold War to an end.  Only recently, George W Bush evicted North Korea from his “axis of evil” by removing that country from America’s list of countries that sponsor terrorism.	在谴责了共产主义的“邪恶帝国”后，他帮助结束了冷战。 而最近布什将朝鲜从支持恐怖主义的国家名单中撤出，不再称其为“邪恶轴心国”。


And what about the British?	英国人怎么办呢？


Have they suddenly remembered the unsustainable cost of fighting asymmetric conflicts?	他们是否突然想起了对抗不对称冲突的不可持续的代价？


Afghanistan has never been a place any foreign army could stay for long.	从来没有任何外国军队能在阿富汗久留。


The British were burned there twice (1840-1, 1878-80).	英国在那里失败了两次（1840-1841年以及1878-1880年）。


So were the Russians.	苏联也同样遭到了失败。


Rudyard Kipling got his arithmetic right in 1886:	吉卜林1886年所作的计算是绝对正确的：


No proposition Euclid wrote,	欧几里德所写的任何定理，


No formulae the text-books know,	书本上所学到的任何方程，


Will turn the bullet from your coat,	都不会使飞向你的子弹改变方向，


Or ward the tulwar’s downward blow	或者避开向下砍来的弯刀，


Strike hard who cares – shoot straight who can –	那些对此表示反对的人会被痛击——那些逞能的人会被直接命中——


The odds are on the cheaper man.	倒霉的总是那些更低级的人。


Asia’s Reform Trinity?	亚洲的改革三位一体？


SINGAPORE – Asia is poised to enter a historical sweet spot, with three of its most populous countries – China, India, and Indonesia – led by strong, dynamic, and reform-minded leaders.	新加坡—亚洲正站在历史的黄金机会点，三个人口最多的国家——中国、印度和印度尼西亚都由强大且有活力的改革派领导人领导。


In fact, China’s Xi Jinping, India’s Narendra Modi, and Indonesia’s Joko “Jokowi” Widodo could end up ranked among their countries’ greatest modern leaders.	事实上，中国的习近平、印度的莫迪和印尼的“佐科维”佐科·维多多（以下称佐科维）都有望跻身各自国家最伟大现代领导人行列。


In China, Mao Zedong united the country in 1949, while Deng Xiaoping was responsible for engineering its unprecedented economic rise.	毛泽东在1949年统一了中国，而邓小平发动了前所未有的经济崛起。


For Xi to join their ranks, he must create a modern, rules-based state.	习近平要想和毛邓看齐，就必须建立以基于规则（rules-based）的现代中国。


That requires, first and foremost, slaying the massive dragon of corruption.	而这首先需要清除腐败的“大老虎”。


Over the years, corruption has become endemic in China, with regional party leaders and bosses in state-owned enterprises wielding their vast privileges and authority to accumulate personal wealth.	多年来，腐败已成为中国的顽疾，地方党政领导人和国有企业负责人利用巨大的特权和权威敛聚个人财富。


This has severely undermined the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy, while hampering the kind of market-based competition that China’s economy needs to propel the country to high-income status.	这严重破坏了中国共产党的合法性，也妨碍了驱动中国经济迈入高收入行列所必须的基于市场的竞争。


So far, Xi seems to be up to the challenge.	目前，习近平似乎占据了对这一挑战的上风。


He has been boldly pursuing major figures who were previously considered “untouchable,” such as General Xu Caihou, a former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee, China’s highest government body.	他大胆地将目标对准了此前被认为“不可触及”的大人物，如前中央军委副主席徐才厚和前中共中央政治局常委周永康。


But the long-term fight against corruption cannot depend on Xi alone.	但与腐败的长期斗争不能光依靠习近平。


It will succeed only if strong institutions are created to protect and nurture the rule of law long after Xi is out of power.	只有建立强大的制度以保护和培育习近平退休之后的法治精神，才能赢得这场斗争。


If Xi chooses to establish such institutions, he has a strong legal tradition upon which to call.	如果习近平选择建立这样的制度，他有强大的法律传统可以援引。


As former US Ambassador to China Gary F. Locke reported in a speech early this year, the concept of equality before the law has deep historical roots.	正如前美国驻华大使骆家辉在今年出的演讲中所言，法律面前人人平等的观念具有深刻的历史渊源。


Indeed, in the fourth century BC, the statesman and reformer Shang Yang famously asserted that, “When the prince violates the law, the crime he commits is the same as that of the common people.”	事实上，在公元前四世纪，政治家、改革家商鞅就说，“王子犯法与庶民同罪。 ”


Building on this tradition, Xi can create strong institutions that will stand the test of time.	根据这一传统，习近平可以建立强大的经得起时间考验的制度。


If he does – recognizing that, to be credible, the rule of law must apply even to the Party’s most influential figures – he will become modern China’s third-strongest leader.	如果他这么做了——认识到要想赢得信誉就必须以法治精神约束党的最高人物——他就能成为现代中国第三强势的领导人。


In India, Mahatma Gandhi rejuvenated the country’s soul, which had been battered by colonialism, and Jawaharlal Nehru established its democratic political culture.	在印度，圣雄甘地重新唤醒了遭遇殖民主义重创的国家精神，尼赫鲁则确立了印度的民主政治文化。


Modi now must lay the foundations for India’s emergence as a global economic power.	如今，莫迪必须为印度崛起成为全球经济强国奠定基础。


Replicating the 10% annual growth rates achieved in Gujarat under Modi’s leadership from 2004 to 2012 would obviously be a boon to India’s development prospects and global standing.	复制2004—2012年主政古吉拉特邦每年经济增长10%的成绩显然将提振印度的发展前景和全球地位。


But achieving such high growth rates in a sustainable way will demand far-reaching, sometimes painful reforms, such as the removal of wasteful subsidies, especially for fuel, in order to free up resources for, say, increased health-care expenditure.	但以可持续的方式实现如此高的增长率需要深远的、有时甚至是痛苦的改革，如取消纯属浪费的补贴，特别是能源补贴，以解放资源用于（比如）增加医疗支出。


Other imperatives include shrinking the budget deficit, removing internal barriers to trade, and encouraging private investment.	其他当务之急包括缩减预算赤字、取消内部贸易壁垒、鼓励私人投资等。


To win the support needed to implement these reforms without undermining political stability or social cohesion, Modi must demonstrate that he is an inclusive leader capable of cooperating with Indians outside of his Hindu nationalist base – including the country’s 150 million-plus Muslims.	要赢得实施这些改革而不破坏政治稳定或社会团结所需要的支持，莫迪必须证明他是一个包容的领导人，有能力与不属于其印度教民族主义者圈子的印度人合作——包括1,500多万印度穆斯林。


If he succeeds, he, like Xi, will become his country’s next iconic leader.	如果获得成功，他将和习近平一样，成为祖国的下一个标志性领导人。


In Indonesia’s case, the two most influential leaders so far have been Sukarno, who used powerful rhetoric to foster a sense of national unity in one of the world’s most diverse countries, and Suharto, who overthrew Sukarno and created a strong economic base that lifted millions out of poverty.	在印度尼西亚，到目前为止影响力最大的两位领导人是苏加诺和苏哈托。 苏加诺用他的雄辩为这个世界上最多样化的国家之一构建了民族团结。


Jokowi must now lay the institutional foundations for good governance.	而推翻苏���诺的苏哈托建立了一个强大的经济基础，将数百万人带出贫困。


Jokowi has risen from humble beginnings to the apex of power without compromising his image as a “man of the people” or his reputation for pragmatism and honesty.	佐科维以卑微的出身稳定权力巅峰，并且从未在其“人民之子”的形象和务实诚信的声誉方面妥协。


Jokowi has a long track record of good governance, having implemented effective policies during his stint as Mayor of Surakarta (such as refurbishing markets, relocating slum dwellers, and cutting bureaucratic red tape), and as Governor of Jakarta (where he broadened access to health care and education).	佐科维拥有长期且优秀的治理成绩，担任苏拉卡尔塔（Surakarta）市长期间，他实施了一系列有效政策（如翻新市场、搬迁贫民窟和削减官僚繁文缛节），担任雅加达省省长期间亦然（增加了医疗和教育的普及程度）。


But replicating this success at the national level will be no easy feat.	但在全国范围复制这一成功决非易事。


Jokowi, who takes office in October, must implement policies that address rising inequality, unsustainable fuel subsidies, entrenched corruption, inadequate infrastructure, and restrictive labor laws – all while rebuilding trust in Indonesian institutions.	10月上台的佐科维必须采取措施治理不平等性加剧、不可持续的燃料补贴、根深蒂固的腐败、基础设施不足和过于严格的劳动法——与此同时还要重新建立对印尼制度的信任。


The challenges facing Jokowi are compounded by the fact that his ruling coalition holds only about one-third of the seats in Indonesia’s parliament, with the rest loyal to the coalition of his rival in the presidential election, Prabowo Subianto.	让佐科维所面临的挑战更加复杂的事实是，他的执政联盟只拥有印尼议会的约三分之一议席，其余议员忠于他在总统选举中的对手普拉博沃·苏毕安托（Prabowo Subianto）的联盟。


So, in introducing a new style of governance, exemplified by merit-based cabinet appointments, Jokowi must be careful not to alienate the political and business elites who have long benefited from their tight grip on power.	因此，在引入新的治国风格时——比如根据能力任命内阁成员——佐科维必须小心从事，避免得罪长期从把持权力中获益的政治和商界精英。


In short, if Jokowi is to form a national consensus on the institutions that Indonesia needs, he will have to reach across this political divide.	简言之，如果佐科维要想构建一个印尼所需要的国家制度共识，就必须超越政治分歧。


To this end, Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto’s cross-party “Pact for Mexico” could serve as a useful model.	在这方面，墨西哥总统涅托的超越党派的“墨西哥契约”（Pact for Mexico）可以作为有用的榜样。


Promisingly, Jokowi has a reputation for independence from partisan and religious politics, and a talent for communicating with the people.	幸运的是，佐科维拥有独立于党派和宗教政治的声誉，并且长于沟通。


And, as a political outsider, he is in a unique position to direct Indonesia toward a more prosperous, united future – and vault himself into the country’s pantheon of great leaders.	而作为政治外部人士，他拥有独一无二的地位引导印尼走向更繁荣、更团结的未来——也使他本人进入印尼伟大领导人俱乐部。


China, India, and Indonesia are all well positioned to take important steps forward.	中国、印度和印尼都处于跨出重要前进步伐的有利位置。


A commitment by Xi, Modi, and Jokowi to do what is needed would bring rapid, far-reaching progress to their respective countries, Asia, and the global order.	习近平、莫迪和佐科维致力于应做之事将为各自国家、亚洲和全球秩序带来迅速的、影响深远的进步。


The Techno-Political Transformation	技术政治转型


GENEVA – It would be an understatement to say that our world is undergoing rapid and far-reaching change.	日内瓦—说我们的世界正在经历快速而深远的变革有些保守了。


The global economy, the geopolitical landscape, the environment, and technology are subject to constantly shifting conditions that reinforce and transform one another in a web of complex interactions.	全球经济、地缘政治局势、环境以及科技面临不断变化的条件的约束，这些条件组成了一个复杂的互动网络，互相强化和转化。


In such an unpredictable and interconnected setting, effective leadership must be based on a radical outlook, a multifaceted skillset, and an understanding of technology and talent.	在这样一个不可预测又相互联系的环境中，有效领导必须建立在不同凡响的远见、多方位的技能和对科技和人才的理解之上。


The trends that are shaping the twenty-first-century world embody both promise and peril.	决定二十一世纪世界的趋势既包含了希望，也包含了危险。


Globalization, for example, has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, while contributing to social fragmentation and a massive increase in inequality, not to mention serious environmental damage.	比如，全球化将数亿人带出了贫困，但也造成了社会分裂和不平等性剧增，更不用说严重的环境问题了。


Likewise, big data offers untold benefits to companies and consumers, but poses a real threat to privacy and personal freedom.	类似地，大数据给公司和消费者带来了难以估量的好处，但也给隐私和个人自由造成了实实在在的威胁。


A similar dichotomy applies to many other critical issues, including adaptation to climate change, efforts to improve resource management, urbanization and the rise of megacities, increased labor mobility, and human-capital expansion.	类似的二分法也适用于其他许多关键问题，包括适应气候变化、改善资源管理的措施、城市化和大都市的兴起、劳动力流动性的增加和人力资本扩张等。


The scale and complexity of the challenges that lie ahead are undoubtedly daunting.	未来挑战的规模和复杂性毫无疑问是令人畏惧的。


But rapid, far-reaching change can also present great opportunities.	但快速、深远的变革也带来了很大的机会。


To make the most of them, the world needs technologically literate leaders – call them “techno-politicians” – who have an intuitive understanding of how to shape progress in this new, unpredictable environment.	为了抓住其中大部分机会，世界需要精通科技的领导人——不妨称之为“技术政治家”（techno-politician），他们应该拥有对如何在这一不可预测的新环境中取得进步这一问题的直觉理解。


Within the framework of techno-politics, economic growth and technological innovation are the two most important factors shaping the global landscape.	在技术政治框架内，经济增长和科技创新是决定全球图景的最重要的两个因素。


How we adapt to and guide their trajectories will determine our collective future.	我们如何适应它们、如何引导它们的轨迹将决定着我们的集体未来。


In economic terms, the world is entering an era of diminished expectations.	用经济学术语讲，世界正在进入一个预期递减的时代。


If, as predicted, average annual GDP growth amounts to 3% in the foreseeable future, it will take 25 years for the world economy to double in size – ten years longer than it took before the global economic crisis, when average GDP growth stood at 5%.	如果如同预测的那样，在可预见的未来，平均年GDP增长率达到3%，那么世界经济规模每隔25年可以扩大一倍——比全球金融及危机前（平均年GDP增长率为5%）长了十年。


Learning to live with slower growth will not be easy.	学习如何在增长减速的环境下生活并非易事。


Given that debt-fueled consumption has run its course, productivity gains will become an increasingly critical driver of economic growth.	债务驱动型消费已是明日黄花，生产率提高将成为日益关键的经济增长驱动力。


But, at a time when rising inequality is undermining social cohesion, it is far from certain that the conditions required to support such gains – that is, improved education and stronger incentives to innovate – can be met.	但是，在不平等的加剧破坏着社会凝聚力的时期，支持生产率提高所要求的条件——即教育和创新激励的改善——是否能够满足远未可知。


Perhaps most important, even as economic growth slows, technological change continues at a breakneck pace, raising seemingly unanswerable questions about its potential impact on the global economy.	也许最重要的是，即使经济增长减速，科技变革仍能以极快的速度发展，这就引起了一个似乎无法解决的问题，即其对全球经济的潜在影响力几何。


While some warn that technological progress will leave many unemployed, others remain convinced that displaced workers will find new jobs that do not yet exist, as has occurred in the past.	尽管一些人警告科技进步将让许多人失业，但其他人仍相信被替代的工人能够在从前不存在的岗位上找到新工作，一如过去所发生的那样。


All that is certain is that technology and innovation are disrupting virtually every aspect of life.	唯一可以确定的是，科技和创新将破坏生活的几乎每一个方面。


How can we adapt to such a world?	我们如何能够适应这样一个世界？


What underpins success in this new and challenging environment?	在这个新的挑战性环境中，什么才是成功的基础？


In a techno-polity, two inextricably linked factors are crucial: talent and innovation.	在技术政治中，两大牢不可破的联系因素至关重要：人才和创新。


Talent is now the key factor driving competitiveness (or the lack thereof) for companies and countries alike.	人才是推进（或缺少）公司和国家竞争力的关键因素。


Indeed, “talentism” will be the prevailing economic credo, with human or intellectual capital becoming the most critical asset – and the one most difficult to acquire and retain.	事实上，“人才论”将成为普遍的经济教条，人力和知识资本将成为最关键的资产——也是最难获得和保存的资产。


Innovation, spurred by talent, will determine success.	受人才刺激的创新将决定成功。


In the future, the distinction between high- and low-income countries, or between emerging and mature markets, will no longer matter.	在未来，高收入和低收入国家的区别，或新兴市场和成熟市场的区别将不复重要。


The question will be whether or not an economy can innovate.	问题将在于经济能否创新。


A techno-polity also recognizes the critical role of cooperation, strategic thinking, and adaptation.	技术政治也认识到合作、策略思维和适应的关键作用。


The biggest challenges nowadays are global in nature, and thus can be addressed only by engaging decision-makers and interest groups from various spheres.	今天的最大挑战都是全球性的，也只有通过各领域有魅力的决策者和利益集团才能应对。


New partnerships must be forged, even among actors with seemingly disparate interests.	必须塑造新型合作关系，即便不同行动方之间利益看似大相径庭。


Those who struggle to cope with change must be supported, not scorned.	在变革面前手忙脚乱的行动方应该获得支持而不是嘲笑。


But effective techno-politicians must go beyond firefighting to think about the long term.	但高效的技术政治家必须超越救火思维，而将目光放长远。


They must be able to respond to new and impending developments without delay, constantly experimenting with new ideas and processes.	他们必须能够毫不迟疑地应对发展局势，连续不断地实验新思想和过程。


Moreover, they must to be able to understand and react simultaneously to multiple competing realities.	此外，他们还必须能够同时理解和对多重竞争现实产生反应。


The role of the techno-polity is to steer the world toward positive outcomes.	技术政治的作用是引导世界走向积极方向。


It will demand that decision-makers use their heads and hearts – and it will also test their nerves.	它要求决策者用脑也用心，还会考验他们的神经。


India’s Jewel in the Crown	皇冠上的印度宝石


NEW DELHI – India’s Solicitor-General, Ranjit Kumar, recently declared that India would not seek the return of the Kohinoor diamond – one of the world’s oldest and most valuable – from the British, to whom India had “gifted” it.	新德里—印度司法部副部长兰吉特·库马尔（Ranjit Kumar）最近宣称印度不会寻求向英国人要回印度“送给”它的克西努尔钻石（Kohinoor，世界上最古老、最值钱的钻石之一）。


The statement shocked India and unleashed passionate debate – so passionate, in fact, that the government scrambled to declare that it still wants the gem back.	这一声明震惊了印度，引起了热烈争论——事实上，太过热烈以至于政府不得不宣布仍然想要回这颗宝石。


But the government’s commitment to securing that outcome remains unconvincing, at best.	但印度政府对这一结果的保证并不令人信服。


Kumar was responding before the Supreme Court to a suit filed by the All India Human Rights and Social Justice Front, an NGO, demanding that the government seek the return of the famed diamond, which can be found among Britain’s crown jewels.	库马尔是在最高法院前回应全印人民人权和社会正义阵线（All India Human Rights and Social Justice Front，一家非政府组织）要求政府寻求要回这颗被镶在英国皇冠上的著名钻石的上诉时说这番话的。


He claims that the erstwhile Sikh kingdom offered the gem to the British East India Company in 1849 as “voluntary compensation” for the expenses of the just-concluded Anglo-Sikh wars.	他说，1849年，当时的锡克王国将这个钻石作为刚刚结束的盎格鲁-锡克战争的“自愿赔款”送给英国东印度公司的。


Add to that the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act of 1972, which does not permit the government to seek the return of antiquities exported before India gained its independence in 1947, and, according to Kumar, the Indian government has no recourse to secure the diamond’s return.	此外， 1972年古董和艺术珍品法（Antiquities and Art Treasures Act of 1972）禁止印度政府寻求要回1947年印度独立前输出国外的古董，并且据库马尔所言，印度政府也没有能保证钻石回归的能力。


The uproar that Kumar’s statement triggered has forced government spokesmen to backpedal furiously, asserting that Kumar’s was not the final official view.	库马尔的声明所引起的轩然大波迫使政府发言人不得不紧急“救火”，说库马尔并不代表最终官方观点。


The Ministry of Culture announced that a claim will still be pursued.	文化部长宣布，印度仍将追求钻石索偿权。


But unless Kumar is instructed to file a new deposition before the Supreme Court, his statements appear to have put paid to India’s claim to the world’s most fabled diamond.	但除非库马尔被要求在最高法院前做出新的陈述，否则他的声明可视为已经放弃了印度对全世界最具传说色彩的钻石的索偿权。


So the question is whether that should indeed be the final outcome.	因此，问题在于这是否应该成为最终结果。


The Kohinoor was first mined by the Kakatiya dynasty near Guntur, in what is now Andhra Pradesh.	克西努尔最初由卡卡提亚（Kakatiya）王朝在贡土尔（今安得拉邦）发掘。


The Kakatiya kings installed it in a temple, which was raided by Delhi Sultan Alauddin Khilji, who took it back to his capital along with other plundered treasures.	卡卡提亚国王将它供奉在庙宇中，后来被德里苏丹西尔基（Alauddin Khilji）掠得，和其他战利品一起带回了他的都城。


It passed into the possession of the Mughal Empire that established itself in Delhi in the sixteenth century.	后来，克西努尔在十六世纪建立于德里的莫卧儿帝国传承。


In 1739, the Kohinoor fell into the hands of the Persian invader Nadir Shah, whose loot from his conquest of Delhi (and decimation of its inhabitants) also included the priceless Peacock Throne.	1739年，克西努尔落到了入侵的波斯奈迪尔沙（Nadir Shah）手中，奈迪尔沙征服德里（和大量屠杀其居民）的战利品还包括无价之宝孔雀王座。


It was Nadir Shah, or so legend has it, who baptized the diamond the Kohinoor, or “Mountain of Light.”	据传，奈迪尔沙给钻石命名为克西努尔，意思是“光明之山”。


One of his consorts memorably and colorfully stated, “If a strong man were to throw four stones – one north, one south, one east, one west – and a fifth stone up into the air, and if the space between them were to be filled with gold, it would not equal the value of the Kohinoor.”	他的一位妃子令人难忘地生动地说，“如果一位征服者向四周——北、南、东、西各扔一颗石头，在向空中扔一颗石头，然后把这五颗石头中间的空间全部用黄金填满，也抵不上克西努尔的价值。 ”


Upon Nadir Shah’s death in 1747, the diamond fell into the hands of one of his generals, Ahmad Shah Durrani, who became the Emir of Afghanistan.	1747年奈迪尔沙驾崩，钻石落到了其部将、阿富汗埃米尔艾哈迈德沙杜兰尼（Ahmad Shah Durrani）手中。


In 1809, one of Durrani’s descendants was obliged to cede the Kohinoor in tribute to the powerful Sikh Maharaja of Punjab, Ranjit Singh.	1809年，杜兰尼的后代被迫让出克西努尔，进贡给强大的旁遮普锡克大君兰吉特·辛格（Ranjit Singh）。


But Singh’s successors could not hold on to his kingdom.	但辛格的继任者无法维持他的王国。


The Sikhs were defeated by the British in two wars, culminating in the British Empire’s annexation of the Sikh domains in 1849.	锡克人被英国人在两场战争中击败，1849年大英帝国吞并了锡克领土。


That was when the Kohinoor was supposedly “gifted” to the British.	克西努尔也在这时候据说被“送给”了英国人。


The argument that the diamond was offered as “voluntary compensation” for the expenses the British incurred in defeating the Sikhs is ridiculous.	克西努尔作为英国击败锡克人的“自愿补偿”送给英国的说法是荒谬可笑的。


For starters, the formal handover was conducted by the last Maharaja of the Sikh Empire, Duleep Singh, who was only ten years old – and most certainly was not given a choice.	首先，进行正式转交的是锡克帝国末代大君杜力普·辛格（Duleep Singh），当时只有十岁——很有可能根本没得选择。


As I have pointed out to other Indian politicians, if you hold a gun to my head, I might give you my wallet, but that doesn’t make it a gift – and it doesn’t mean I shouldn’t get it back.	我向其他印度政客说过，如果你拿枪指着我的头，我肯定会把我的钱包给你，但这不叫送给你——也不意味着我不应该把它拿回来。


Compensation provided to the winners of a war by those they defeated is usually known as reparations, which are not entirely voluntary.	战败者向战胜者提供的补偿常常被称为赔款，完全不是自愿的。


And, in fact, many former colonies rightly argue that it is Britain that owes them reparations for centuries of oppression and looting.	而事实上，许多前殖民地正确地指出，英国对它们进行了数百年的压迫和掠夺，应该向它们赔款。


Returning priceless artifacts of cultural significance purloined at the height of imperial rule might be a good place to start.	要回帝国统治顶峰时期被抢走的含有文化意义的无价珍品是一个良好的开端。


To be sure, the Kohinoor poses a particular challenge, owing to competing claims.	诚然，由于存在多重竞争性索偿权，克西努尔钻石是一个特殊的挑战。


The Iranians say that Nadir Shah stole it fair and square, while the Afghans assert that the Sikhs forced them to surrender it.	伊朗人说，奈迪儿沙光明正大地窃取（stole）了它，而阿富汗人认为锡克人强迫他们交出了它。


Now Pakistan has entered the ring, with the somewhat flimsy argument that the capital of the Sikh Empire, the undisputed last pre-British owners, was in Lahore.	现在，巴基斯坦也加入了竞争，提出了不太站得住脚的主张，指出英国人之前无可置疑的所有者锡克帝国的首都就在拉合尔。


(They tend to gloss over the fact that, after decades of ethnic cleansing in Pakistan, hardly any Sikhs are left there.)	（他们想要掩饰一个事实，即在经历了几十年的种族清洗后，巴基斯坦已经几乎没有锡克人了。


But, given that the diamond spent most of its existence on or beneath Indian soil, Indians consider their claim self-evident.	）但是，由于到这颗钻石在其生命的绝大部分时间里都埋在印度国土地下，印度人认为他们拥有理所当然的索偿权。


For the British, however, the existence of contending claims is a major relief, as it helps the country to fend off a blizzard of demands to undo the manifold injustices of two or more centuries of colonial exploitation of far-flung lands.	但是，对英国人来说，存在互相竞争的索偿主张令它大舒一口气，这有助于英国抵挡蜂拥而至的对两个或更多世纪的对遥远殖民地的掠夺所带来的各种不公平拨乱反正的要求。


The British expropriation of other peoples’ patrimony, from the Parthenon Marbles to the Kohinoor diamond, is a particular point of contention, as conceding any one item could, the British fear, open a Pandora’s box of problems.	英国对其他民族祖先遗产的征用——从巴特农神庙大理石到克西努尔钻石—���是一个极具争议性的点，英国人担心，在其中一个物品上做出让步就会打开潘多拉魔盒。


Indeed, on a 2010 visit to India, Prime Minister David Cameron declared outright that the Kohinoor would have to “stay put,” because “if you say yes to one, you would suddenly find the British Museum would be empty.”	事实上，英国首相卡梅伦在2010年访问印度时明确宣布，克西努尔必须“原封不动”，因为“如果你想一个人说了‘是’，你就会突然发现，大英博物馆将被掏空。


With Kumar having essentially taken Britain’s side on the Kohinoor issue, albeit for different reasons, nationalists like me are losing hope that we will get that priceless element of our heritage back.	”库马尔在克西努尔问题上其实是站在了英国一边，尽管原因不同； 这让我这样的民族主义者对于要回我们的遗产的这一无价之宝深感希望大减。


Britain owes us.	英国人欠我们的。


But, instead of returning the evidence of their rapacity to their rightful owners, the British are flaunting the Kohinoor on the Queen Mother’s crown in the Tower of London.	但是，英国人并没有像正确的所有者返回他们掠夺的证物，而是将克西努尔镶嵌伦敦塔的皇太后皇冠上。


It is a stark reminder of what colonialism truly was: shameless subjugation, coercion, and misappropriation.	这鲜明地提醒我们殖民主义的本质：厚颜无耻的征服、强迫和侵占。


Perhaps that is the best argument for leaving the Kohinoor in Britain, where it emphatically does not belong.	也许这是让克西努尔留在英国的最好的理由——强调它并不属于那里。


Grading Abenomics	给安倍经济学打分


TOKYO – It has been almost a year since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe launched his plan to lift Japan’s economy out of two decades of deflation and recession.	东京—自首相安倍晋三抛出其日本经济走出二十年通��和衰退计划以来已经过去了近一年时间。


How has “Abenomics” fared so far?	“安倍经济学”进展如何？


Answering this question requires breaking Abenomics down into its three components – massive monetary easing, expansionary fiscal policy, and a long-term growth strategy – which Abe, referring to the tale of Motonari Mori, a sixteenth-century daimyo (feudal lord), calls the “three arrows.”	要回答这个问题，需要将安倍经济学分解为三个成分——大规模货币宽松、扩张性财政政策，以及长期增长战略——安倍晋三援引十六世纪大名毛利元就的传说称之为“三支箭”。


According to legend, Mori instructed each of his three sons to snap an arrow in half.	传说毛利元就让三个儿子各自将一支箭折断。


After they had succeeded, he told them to tie three arrows together, and break the whole bundle at once; none was able to do it.	成功后，毛利元就又让儿子们将三支箭绑在一起折，没人能够折断。


Like Mori’s three arrows, the three arrows of Abenomics are supposed to reinforce each other.	像毛利的三支箭一样，安倍经济学的三支箭也应该是互相强化的。


But Mori’s arrows were bound together in parallel, whereas Abe’s policy arrows are connected through underlying structural relationships.	但毛利的箭平行地绑在一起，而安倍的政策之箭是通过基础结构关系联系在一起。


While the first and second arrows aim to transform Japan’s actual growth path, the third operates on the economy’s potential growth path, which assumes the optimal use of all available resources and technologies.	第一支和第二支箭的目标是转变日本的实际增长路径，而第三支箭——实现所有可用资源和技术的最优用途——要改变日本经济的潜在增长路径。


Since Abenomics was launched, the “deflation gap” (the difference between actual and potential output) has dropped from roughly three percentage points to below 1.5.	自安倍经济学出台以来，“通缩缺口”（实际和潜在产出之差）从大约三个百分点降至1. 5个百分点以下。


This implies that, while the first two arrows are helping to improve Japan’s actual growth path, the third arrow has yet to do much for potential growth.	。 这意味着尽管前两支箭帮助改善了日本的实际增长路径，但第三支箭对于潜在增长并未起到多少作用。


In fact, since Abe’s first arrow took flight, Japan’s stock market has soared with it, recording an unprecedented 40% annual gain, while the yen has depreciated against the dollar by 20%, boosting Japanese firms’ export competitiveness.	事实上，自安倍射出第一支箭以来，日本股市应声大涨，录得前所未有的40%的年涨幅，同时日元对美元贬值20%，提振了日本企业的出口竞争力。


Moreover, credit growth has accelerated and asset prices have risen – trends that will encourage consumption by triggering the wealth effect (when people spend more because they feel richer).	此外，信用增长也有所加速，资产价格有所上涨——这些趋势可以通过触发财富效应（人们感觉变富了，因此花钱更多）鼓励消费。


And monetary expansion is also having a positive impact on the labor market: the unemployment rate has fallen to 4%, and the job-to-applicant ratio is nearing parity.	货币扩张还对劳动力市场产生了积极影响：失业率降至4%，岗位数/求职数接近相等。


With real GDP growth around 4% in the first half of the year (though it did fall below 2% in the third quarter), the first arrow has already hit the bull’s eye – a performance worthy of an A+.	今年上半年真实GDP增长率约为4%（尽管在第三季度又回到了2%以下），据此，第一支箭可谓正中目标，可以打一个A+。


The second arrow entails a sharp increase in short-term fiscal expenditure, especially investment in infrastructure projects.	第二支箭包括了短期财政支出的增加，特别是在基础设施项目投资方面。


While those who, like me, adhere to the Mundell-Fleming framework (according to which fiscal stimulus will be offset by the resulting increase in capital inflows, currency appreciation, and reduced export competitiveness) do not stress the impact of flexible fiscal policy, Keynesians take it very seriously.	尽管如我这样的蒙代尔-弗莱明（Meundell-Fleming）框架信奉者——认为财政刺激的效果被其所导致的资本流入、货币升值和出口竞争力降低抵消——并不强调弹性财政政策的效果，但凯恩斯主义者对此十分在意。


On the assumption that faster growth will neutralize any threat to debt sustainability, the second arrow receives a B.	假设更快的增长能够中和任何债务可持续性方面的风险，那么第二支箭可以获得B。


When the first and second arrows lift actual growth above potential growth, monetary expansion will no longer be able to produce substantial GDP or employment gains.	当第一支箭和第二支箭将实际增长提升到了潜在增长之上时，货币扩张就不再能够带来显著的GDP或就业改善。


That is when the third arrow, which aims to boost Japan’s potential growth through structural change (including increased private investment, technological innovation, improved trade links, and reformed corporate-tax policy), will become far more important.	此时，第三支箭的重要性就大大增加了。 第三支箭的目标是通过结构性变化（包括增加私人投资、技术创新、改善贸易联系、改革税收政策等）提振日本的潜在增长。


Abe has set out the vision behind his long-term growth plan.	安倍已经给出了其长期增长计划背后的愿景。


“Japan is a country that challenges, that is open, and that innovates,” he says.	他说：“日本是一个挑战之国、开放之国、创新之国。


But many of the details of his strategy remain uncertain.	”但他的战略中有很多细节仍不明确。


Japan’s longtime approach to industrial policy, in which the Ministry of International Trade and Industry provided support and subsidies for selected industries, helping them to compete in world markets, is now obsolete (indeed, MITI’s role was taken over by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry in 2001).	日本产业政策的长期方针——通产省为选定行业提供支持和补贴，帮助它们在世界市场上竞争——如今已经过时（事实上，通产省的角色在2001年已由经济产业省取代）。


When Japanese firms operate at the frontier of industry, bureaucrats cannot choose the winners.	日本企业在行业前沿经营时，官僚不再能够挑选赢家。


Given this, the government’s role should be confined to areas where externalities exist, such as carbon-emissions reduction.	因此，政府的角色应该限定于存在外部性的领域，如减少碳排放等。


Unfortunately, a new, clearly defined approach to industrial policy is still missing.	不幸的是，日本仍没有定义明确的新的产业政策方针。


In fact, descriptions of some third-arrow projects seem to be based on little more than wishful thinking, with new technology or knowhow apparently expected simply to fall into Japan’s lap.	事实上，关于第三支箭中一些项目的描述完全是基于臆测，好像技术和知识必然会自动掉到日本碗里一样。


A more effective approach would entail achievable, concrete goals like relaxing labor- and financial-market regulations, reducing corporate income taxes, liberalizing trade by joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and perhaps easing immigration policy.	更有效的方针应该包括可实现的切实目标，如放松劳动力和金融市场监管、降低公司所得税、加入跨太平洋合作伙伴关系以实现贸易自由等，或许也可以包括放松移民政策。


The problem is that bureaucrats like the power that regulation affords them.	问题在于官僚对于监管所给予他们的权力恋恋不舍。


Indeed, deregulation would require them to put their country’s long-term interests above their own short-term interests – a choice that they have so far resisted.	事实上，去监管话要求他们把日本的长期利益置于他们自身的短期利益之前——到目前为止，他们对此十分抵触。


To paraphrase John F. Kennedy, it is time for Japan’s leaders to ask not what their country can do for its government, but what the government can undo for its country.	改编以下约翰·肯尼迪的话，如今日本领导人不要问国家可以为政府做些什么，而要问政府可以为国家不做些什么。


In this context, the third arrow of Abenomics cannot yet be fairly assessed.	在这样的背景下，安倍经济学的第三支箭无法公正地判分。


While its impact has so far been lacking, it certainly cannot be deemed a failure, with Japan’s top leaders still working tirelessly to build the needed momentum.	其影响远未显现，也显然不能认为已经失败，因为日本最高领导层仍在不懈地试图带来必须的动力。


The most appropriate grade is therefore an “E” for effort.	因此，对他们的努力，最合适的分数是“E”。


One hopes that it is an effort that proves adequate to overcome bureaucratic resistance to deregulation in the coming year.	我们希望他们的努力可以在来年克服官僚对去监管话的抵制。


With an A+, a B, and an “E,” Abenomics’s first-year report card reflects important progress, providing plenty of reason for enthusiasm.	一个A+，一个B，一个“E”，安倍经济学的第一年成绩单表现出重要的进步，我们有足够的理由看好它。


It even spells its originator’s name.	而ABE正好也是“安倍”的罗马字母拼法。


Who’s Afraid of Tapering?	谁在害怕退出？


TOKYO – The US Federal Reserve’s gradual exit from so-called quantitative easing (QE) – open-ended purchases of long-term assets – has financial markets and policymakers worried, with warnings of capital flight from developing economies and collapsing asset prices dominating policy discussions worldwide.	东京—美联储的逐渐退出所谓量化宽松（QE，即无限期购买长期资产）让金融市场和决策者担忧不已，关于资本将从发达经济体外逃、资产价格将崩溃的警告充斥着全世界的政策讨论。


But, given that most major economies operate under a flexible exchange-rate regime, these concerns are largely unwarranted.	但是，大部分主要经济体是在浮动汇率制度下运转的，这些担忧基本上都是无稽之谈。


The logic behind the fear of the Fed’s “tapering” of QE is straightforward.	美联储“退出”QE的恐慌背后的逻辑是显而易见的。


Unconventional monetary policy in the United States – and in other advanced countries, particularly the United Kingdom and Japan – drove down domestic interest rates, while flooding international financial markets with liquidity.	美国（以及其他发达国家，特别是英国和日本）的非常规货币政策降低了国内利率，同时也让流动性在全球金融市场上泛滥。


In search of higher yields, investors took that liquidity – largely in the form of short-term speculative capital (“hot” money) – to emerging markets, putting upward pressure on their exchange rates and fueling the risk of asset bubbles.	寻找更高收益率的投资者带着这一流动性——大部分是短期投机性资本（“热”钱）来到新兴市场，给它们的汇率造成了升值风险，也助长了资产泡沫风险。


Thus, the Fed’s withdrawal from QE would be accompanied by a capital-flow reversal, increasing borrowing costs and hampering GDP growth.	因此，美联储的退出QE将伴随资本流的逆转，提高借贷成本、妨碍GDP增长。


Of course, not all emerging markets, according to this logic, are equally exposed.	当然，根据这一逻辑，并非所有新兴市场都存在相同的风险。


Among the most vulnerable countries are Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, India, and Indonesia – the so-called “Fragile Five” – all of which are characterized by twin fiscal and current-account deficits, high inflation, in addition to faltering GDP growth.	风险最高的国家是土耳其、南非、巴西、印度和印尼，即所谓的“脆弱五国”，它们都存在财政和经常项目双重赤���、高企的通胀以及萎靡不振的GDP增长。


This logic would be correct if the world were operating under a fixed exchange-rate regime, with governments tying official exchange rates to another country’s currency or the price of gold.	如果世界是在固定汇率下运转，那么这一逻辑是正确的。 在固定汇率下，政府的官方利率会盯住另一个国家的货币或黄金价格。


Under these conditions, monetary contraction (or slowing expansion) would have a recessionary (or a less stimulative) impact on other economies.	在这样的条件下，货币收缩（或缓慢扩张）会给其他经济体带来衰退（或更小的刺激）效应。


With flexible exchange rates, however, monetary-policy contraction in a major economy would stimulate other economies in the short run, while monetary expansion would damage their performance.	但是，在浮动汇率下，主要经济体的货币政策收缩在短期会刺激其他经济体，而货币扩张则会影响它们的表现。


(To be sure, in the medium or long run, monetary expansion can facilitate increased domestic production and trade, thereby generating positive spillover effects.)	（确实，在中长期，货币扩张能有利于增加国内产出和贸易，从而产生积极的溢出效应。 ）


After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, the rapid expansion of the money supply in the US and the UK triggered a sharp appreciation of the Japanese yen, as well as of some emerging-market currencies.	2008年雷曼兄弟倒闭后，美国和英国的快速货币扩张触发了日元和一些新兴市场货币的急剧升值。


In short, QE is what merits concern – not its termination.	简言之，QE，而不是退出QE，才是应该担心的东西。


Of course, the Fed’s policy reversal could hurt countries that maintain fixed – or, like China, “managed floating” – exchange rates.	当然，美联储的政策逆转可能伤害一些保持固定汇率的国家——或者中国这样的“管理浮动”汇率国家。


Likewise, weaker eurozone economies like Greece and Spain, which would prefer stronger monetary stimulus than their more competitive counterparts in Europe are willing to accept, may suffer.	类似地，比竞争力更强的欧洲邻国更喜欢较强货币刺激的希腊和西班牙等欧元区疲软经济体也会蒙受损失。


But, given that these economies have chosen to adhere to a fixed exchange rate, the Fed cannot really be blamed for the fallout.	但是，由于这些经济体是自己选择了固定汇率的，因此它们被波及到不能归咎于美联储。


In fact, the Fed – and other advanced-country central banks – should not be blamed for the negative effects of monetary expansion, either.	事实上，美联储（以及其他发达国家央行）也不必为货币扩张的消极效应担责。


Japan’s bold monetary easing, for example, was a critical element of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s strategy for lifting the Japanese economy out of more than a decade of recession – and it has led to a remarkable recovery.	比如，日本大激进货币宽松政策是首相安倍晋三带领日本经济走出十多年衰退的经济战略的关键要素，并且已经带来了颇为可观的复苏。


The problem is that the policy has also caused the yen to depreciate, leading nearby countries to accuse Japan of adopting “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies.	问题在于该政策还造成了日元贬值，让周边国家指责日本“以邻为壑”。


Similarly, emerging-market officials warned that monetary expansion in the US and the UK would trigger a wave of competitive currency devaluations, with Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega going so far as to accuse the Fed and the Bank of England of waging a full-blown “currency war.”	类似地，新兴市场官员警告美国和英国的货币扩张会触发竞争性贬值，巴西财政部长曼特加（Guido Mantega）更是指责美联储和英格兰银行发动了全面的“货币战争”。


But, while it is true that such expansionary policies can have a recessionary impact on other economies, modern international-finance theory shows that the concept of a “currency war” is a myth.	但是，尽管这些扩张政策确实可能给其他经济体带来衰退性影响，但现代国际金融理论表明“货币战争”的概念纯属神话。


The reality is that, under a flexible exchange-rate regime, competitive devaluations do not produce undesirable imbalances.	现实是，在浮动汇率机制下，竞争性贬值不会导致不利的失衡。


On the contrary, they can bolster recovery in participating economies.	相反，竞争性贬值可以给实施这一战略的国家带来更强劲的复苏。


In fact, currency devaluations were critical to ending the Great Depression.	事实上，货币贬值是大萧条结束的关键。


As Barry Eichengreen and Jeffrey Sachs demonstrated in 1984, while abandoning the gold standard had an immediate negative impact, it quickly spurred recovery, with the first countries to devalue their currencies escaping depression earlier than others.	艾肯格林（Barry Eichengreen）和萨克斯（Jeffrey Sachs）在1984年指出，尽管放弃金本位立刻带来了消极影响，但它很快就刺激了复苏，首批实施货币贬值的国家比其他国家更早摆脱了大萧条。


The fact is that, with a flexible exchange rate, a country can offset the recessionary impact of a neighboring country’s monetary easing using its own independent monetary policy, guided by carefully chosen inflation targets.	事实上，在浮动汇率下，一国可以使用以精心选择的通胀目标为指导独立的货币政策抵消邻国货币扩张的衰退影响。


If all countries adopt this approach, the entire global economy benefits.	如果所有国家都采取这一方针，整体全球经济将因此受益。


By working to revive the domestic economy, the Fed, like other advanced-country central banks, is simply fulfilling its mandate.	美联储和其他发达国家央行一样，它们只是为了重振国内经济而行使了自己的使命。


Instead of complaining about its actions, emerging-country policymakers should be devising strategies for offsetting the spillover effects on their own economies.	新兴国家决策者不应该抱怨这样的行动，而是应该改设计抵消各自受到的溢出效应的战略。


After all, they have the tools to do so.	毕竟，它们手里握着这样做的工具。


Japan’s Tax-Hike Test	日本的增税考验


TOKYO – As October began, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced that his government would raise the country’s consumption-tax rate from 5% to 8% next April, and presumably to 10% 18 months after that.	东京—10月伊始，日本首相安倍晋三宣布其政府将从明年4月开始把日本消费税率从5%提高到8%，并在此基础上的18个月后提高到10%。


The contrast with what is now happening in the United States could not be sharper.	与之最鲜明的对比莫过于眼下在美国发生的事情。


As US President Barack Obama’s domestic opponents resist his signature health-care legislation, owing to the wealth transfers that it implies, Japanese bureaucrats are trying to recover the authority to administer tax revenue to support social-welfare programs.	美国总统奥巴马的国内反对者因为潜在的财富转移效应而抵制他签署卫生立法； 而日本官僚正在试图重振税收收入管理大权以支持社会福利计划。


There are many arguments for raising Japan’s consumption-tax rate.	提高日本消费税率的理由很多。


Japan’s government has a huge debt burden, and its consumption-tax rate is far lower than the value-added-tax rates that prevail in Europe.	日本政府背着巨大的债务负担，其消费税率显著低于欧洲增值税率的普遍水平。


At the same time, the effective corporate-tax rate in Japan is higher than it is elsewhere, making it difficult for Japan to attract investment, foreign or domestic.	与此同时，日本的有效公司税率高于其他国家，这导致日本难以吸引国内外投资。


In order to survive international tax competition – and thus be able to rely on corporate taxes as a source of revenue – Japan’s corporate-tax rate should be lowered in the long run.	为了重振国际税收竞争力——从而能够依赖公司税作为收入源——从长期看日本的公司税率应该降低。


Nonetheless, with Japan’s economy just beginning to recover from more than 15 years of stagnation, such a steep consumption-tax hike is not advisable.	尽管如此，日本经济才刚刚从15年多的停滞中复苏，如此剧烈的消费税提高并不可取。


In fact, such a large increase has seldom – if ever – been attempted, owing to the risk that it would spur consumers to spend before it takes effect, thereby reducing future consumption.	事实上，如此大幅度的增税很少（如果有的话）实施，因为这可能刺激消费者在新税制实施之前抢先消费，从而降低未来消费。


Moreover, any sudden rise in the tax burden results in deadweight losses.	此外，任何突然的税收负担都会导致沉重的损失。


A consumption-tax hike should be timed in such a way that it does not suffocate the economic recovery that Abe’s bold economic program, dubbed “Abenomics,” is facilitating.	消费税提高的时机应该这样选择：它不会阻碍被称为“安倍经济学”的激进经济政策所推动的经济复苏。


Western economists typically favor gradual tax increases; Jeffrey Frankel, for example, recommends a pre-announced plan to increase the tax rate by, say, one percentage point annually for five years.	西方经济学家通常赞成逐渐增加税负，比如，杰弗里·弗兰克尔（Jeffrey Frankel）建议预先公布计划，以（比如）为期五年、每年一个百分点的节奏提高税率。


But Japanese policymakers, media, and academics largely continue to favor a sudden and substantial hike.	但日本决策者、媒体和学界大多仍支持突然大幅增税。


Last year, when Japan’s Diet passed the legislation to raise the consumption tax, it included a provision calling for the plan to be reevaluated if economic conditions required it.	去年，日本国会通过提高消费税的法律时纳入了一项条款，如果经济条件需要可以要求重新评估增税计划。


When the Cabinet Office called upon 60 business leaders, academics, and economists (including me) to perform such an evaluation, more than 70% favored the hike.	内阁询问了60位商界领袖、学者和经济学家（包括我）来做这项评估，70%以上赞同增税。


But the selection of experts reflected a clear bias toward the finance ministry’s views.	但专家的选择显然有利于财务省的观点。


In fact, the ministry has used its “informational campaign” to shape public discussion, convincing scholars, business economists, and the general public to be more concerned about keeping the budget deficit under control than about the effects of a negative demand shock.	事实上，财务省用其“消息活动”左右公共讨，让学者、商业经济学家和公众更关注保持预算赤字可控，更少关注增税对需求的消极冲击。


This is a typical example of what economists like Joseph Stiglitz call “cognitive capture.”	这是约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨（Joseph Stiglitz）等经济学家所谓的“认知俘虏”（cognitive capture）的典型例子。


For more than two decades – a period characterized by chronic recession and deflation – Japan has retained its position as the world’s richest country in terms of net wealth abroad.	二十多年来——这段时期的特征是长期的衰退和通缩——日本的海外净财富一直是世界之最。


At the end of last year, Japan’s net international wealth amounted to ¥296 trillion ($3 trillion).	到去年年底，日本净国际财富为296万亿日元（3万亿美元）。


But Japan’s government is believed to be the world’s poorest, with the finance ministry reporting that the gross debt/GDP ratio exceeds 200%.	但日本政府被认为是全世界最穷的政府，财务省报告期总债务/GDP比率超过200%。


That is an exaggeration.	这有夸张之嫌。


For example, Ichizo Miyamoto, a former senior finance-ministry official, claims that, accounting for the government’s assets, Japan’s net debt/GDP ratio is below 100%, similar to that of the United States.	比如，前财务省高级官员宫本一三（Ichizo Miyamoto）表示，计入政府资产，日本的净债务/GDP比率不到100%，与美国相当。


The validity of the finance ministry’s position on the tax increase was called into question by the decline in Japan’s Nikkei index of stock futures after Abe’s October 1 announcement.	日经指数期货在10月1日安倍晋三宣布计划后下跌，这表明财务省在增税问题立场的正确性可疑。


To be sure, the budget crisis in the US caused most stock futures to decline on that day.	平心而论，美国的预算危机导致了当天大部分股票期货下跌。


But, if the ministry’s view of the consumption tax was correct, Nikkei futures would have gained more – or at least lost less – than futures in other countries.	但是，如果财务省关于消费税的观点正确，则日经期货应该比其他国家的期货涨得更多（活跌得更少）。


Instead, the index declined three times more steeply than others.	相反，日经指数期货跌幅比其他国家深三倍。


And yet, while the consumption-tax increase is not ideally timed, I am not entirely pessimistic about its impact.	而尽管消费税提高的时机并不理想，我倒并不对其影响完全悲观。


The Mundell-Fleming framework – which describes the short-run relationship between the nominal exchange rate, interest rates, and output in an open economy – indicates that, under Japan’s flexible exchange-rate regime, the post-hike decline in demand could be addressed relatively easily with more expansionary monetary policy.	蒙代尔-弗莱明（Mundell-Fleming）框架——描述了开放经济名义汇率、利率和产出之间的短期关系——表明，在日本的弹性汇率机制下，增税后的需求下降可以通过更扩张的货币政策相对容易地得到��正。


That is why Bank of Japan Governor Haruhiko Kuroda should respond accordingly if the tax increase has a deflationary impact.	正因如此，如果增税导致通缩效应，日本银行行长黑田东彦应该采取相应的行动。


In doing so, he would avoid the criticism that former Bank of England Governor Mervyn King faced for supporting a consumer-tax hike in 2011 but failing to use monetary policy to offset its recessionary effects.	如此，他可以避免前英格兰银行行长默文·金（Mervyn King）所面临的的批评——支持2011年消费税增加但没有用货币政策抵消其衰退效应。


Just a year ago, former Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda attempted, despite a deep recession, to raise the consumption tax without monetary easing – a strategy that could have brought only continued economic stagnation.	仅仅在一年前，前首相野田佳彦试图在深度衰退的情况下提高消费税而不放松货币——这一做法的唯一效果是延长经济停滞。


Abe must not make the same mistake.	安倍晋三必须避免同样的错误。


If Japan’s government can overcome a demand setback after the tax increase takes effect – leaving the economy functioning smoothly and initiating a recovery in government revenue – Abe will be able to declare Abenomics an unequivocal success.	如果日本政府可以克服增税实施后出现的需求不振——让经济平稳运行并让政府收入复苏——那么安倍晋三可以宣布安倍经济学取得了不可否认的成功。


Abe’s Bullseye	安倍的靶心


TOKYO – Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has unveiled his long-awaited growth strategy – the so-called “third arrow” of what has come to be known as “Abenomics.”	东京—日本首相安倍晋三已经启动了人们其单一就的增长战略，亦即被称为“安倍经济学”的所谓“第三支箭”。


A preliminary version of the plan, announced to Japan’s Diet last year, was met with disappointment in international financial markets, which had expected a bolder approach.	去年，日本议会已经提出了这一计划的预览版，但国际金融市场对此表示失望，没有满足它们更大的预期。


The new version is far more robust – and has received a far more positive global response.	新版本比预览版强劲得多——全球反响也积极得多。