Iran seeks to project its influence in support of the region’s historically dominant Shia populations, while Saudi Arabia pushes back by arming rebel factions opposing Syria’s Iranian-backed president, Bashar al-Assad, and by fighting what it views as an Iranian presence in its own backyard, in Yemen.	伊朗试图投射影响力，支持该地区历史上曾占主导地位的什叶派人口，而沙特则通过武装反对受伊朗支持的叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德的叛军派别及反抗伊朗在自己卧榻边（即也门）酣睡来予以回击。


As for Turkey, it opposes the creation of a Kurdish state, which became possible when Iraq and Syria came undone territorially.	土耳其则反对库尔德人建国，伊拉克和叙利亚地域四分五裂给库尔德人建国以可乘之机。


With the region seemingly being sucked deeper into a vortex of permanent conflict, it is easy to believe that only dictators or religious bigots could impose any stability.	随着该地区似乎被深深卷入永久性冲突的漩涡，人们很容易相信只有独裁者或宗教偏执狂才能维护某种形式的稳定。


But to think that is to forget past progressive uprisings, such as in Beirut in 2005, Algiers and Tehran in 2009, and the Arab Spring that began in Tunisia and spread throughout the region in 2011.	但这样想却忘记了过去爆发的进步起义，包括2005年在贝鲁特、2009年在阿尔及尔和德黑兰以及2011年在突尼斯首先爆发并迅速蔓延至整个地区的阿拉伯春天革命。


To understand where the Middle East is going, we need to look further back to comprehend how the region arrived at this point.	要理解中东去向何处，我们必须回过头去进一步了解该地区迄今为止的历史。


Arab nationalism and its modernizing aspirations began to unravel after the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the 1986 oil-price collapse.	1967年阿以战争阿拉伯战败和1986年油价崩盘后，阿拉伯民族主义和现代化愿望开始四分五裂。


National leaders maintained control through repression and used Islamic opposition parties as scarecrows to avoid political reform.	国家领导人通过镇压来保持控制，并利用伊斯兰反对党作为吓阻政治改革的稻草人。


National economies, weighed down by cronyism, delivered low growth, and governments lost legitimacy.	国内经济在任人唯亲的拖累下进展缓慢，导致政府完全丧失了合法性。


It was this strategy’s untenability that led in 2011 to the fall of regimes – in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and elsewhere – that pursued it.	正是这种策略的不可持续性导致了2011年奉行该策略的突尼斯、埃及、利比亚、叙利亚和其他国家政权倒台。


With no institutions left to ensure a peaceful political transition in these countries, violent groups had an advantage over ordinary citizens, and a crude fight for power ensued.	因为没有留下任何机构来保障这些国家的和平政治过渡，暴力团体在普通民众面前占据上风，导致对权力的野蛮争夺随之而来。


Violent revolutions can reach peaceful resolutions, but such an outcome is less likely where deep, unresolved sectarian grievances are in play, as they are in the Middle East.	��力革命最终可能和平解决，但在像中东那样随处可见悬而未决的深层宗派恩怨的地方，这样的结果似乎不太可能。


The renewed salience of old, intractable cleavages – reflected in the grievances of Sunnis in Syria and Iraq, of Shias in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, and of Kurds and Palestinians everywhere – makes the current situation especially precarious.	顽固的既有分歧再度凸显——表现为叙利亚和伊拉克逊尼民众不满、巴林、沙特和也门什叶民众不满、以及遍布中东的库尔德人和巴勒斯坦人的不满——令当前形势显得尤其严峻。


These problems were simmering beneath the surface of autocratic repression for decades.	这些问题在专制镇压的表面下发酵已长达数十年之久。


Now, Pandora’s box has been opened, revealing an incredibly complex geopolitical puzzle.	现在，潘多拉的魔盒已经打开，一个令人难以置信的复杂的地缘政治难题也因此凸显出来。


The West deserves a share of the blame for the current situation.	西方理应为当前局势部分承担责任。


It failed to end the long-standing Palestinian conflict, and it created new problems by dismantling the Iraqi state, funding mujahedeen in Afghanistan, and backing dictators who supported its security agenda in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and elsewhere.	它不仅未能结束长期存在的巴以冲突，反而通过推翻伊拉克政府制造了新的问题。 西方在阿富汗出资支持圣战者，同时支持赞同其伊拉克、叙利亚、埃及和其他国家安全议程的独裁专制人员。


With the latest great-power interventions by the US and Russia, many are reminded of the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement between Great Britain and France to draw new national borders in the region and divide it into spheres of influence.	随着最新的美俄大国干预，很多人对1916年英法在该地区划定新国境线并划分势力范围的赛克斯 - 皮科协定依然记忆犹新。


But, if anything, Sykes-Picot provides a good model for what to avoid in rebuilding the Middle East.	但如果说对后世有什么意义，赛克斯 - 皮科协定恰恰告诉人们在重建中东过程中哪些问题需要避免。


The region does not need new borders and new protectorates, but rather better states, built to be resilient against ethnic divisions and less vulnerable to external influence.	中东地区不需要划定新边境及保护国，而需要更完善的政府，有能力抵御外部影响和种族分裂。


Opinion polls indicate that the vast majority of people in the Middle East want to be governed by legitimate states that uphold the rule of law, protect civic rights, and promote coexistence among communities.	民意调查显示中东大部分民众希望建立一个坚持法治、保障公民权利并推动各群体和平共处的合法政府。


This is a worthy goal that will require compromise and reconciliation at a global, regional, and national level.	这是个非常有价值的目标，需要在全球地区和国家层面作出妥协和和解。


For national actors to have space to find solutions, it is necessary to de-escalate tensions and find compromises – first globally, between the US and Russia, and then regionally, among Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.	国家主体要想找到方案，就有必要缓解紧张局势并实现妥协——先是全球层面在美俄之间，后是地区层面，涉及伊朗、土耳其、沙特阿拉伯和以色列。


The goal must be to reach a grand bargain that takes into account the major issues dividing the region, including the status of the Palestinians and Kurds, and creates conditions for viable political settlements in Syria and Iraq.	目标必须是达成涵盖主要问题的双赢协议，包括巴勒斯坦人和库尔德人地位，并在叙利亚和伊拉克为可行政治解决方案创造条件。


Addressing problems that have remained unsolved for decades is a tall order, but inaction is no longer affordable.	解决数十年来悬而未决的难题是一项艰巨的任务。 但我们不能再袖手旁观。


And none of the major fault lines of the Middle East can be resolved in isolation anymore.	任何一方都不能独自解决中东的主要分歧。


As Antonio Gramsci argued long ago in his Prison Notebooks, “The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born, and in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.”	就像安东尼奥·葛兰西很久以前在 狱中札记中所说的那样，“危机恰恰在于旧有的秩序正在逝去而新秩序仍尚未诞生，在这样的真空期会有大量的病态症状出现。


That is the Middle East’s situation in a nutshell.	”这就是用一句话总结中东危局。


Helping it build a new regional order will require all actors, great and small, to accept compromise, as the Lebanese have done.	建立新地区秩序要求所有大小主体像黎巴嫩人那样接受妥协。


A war that leaves one side vanquished is never over.	一方被彻底征服的战争永远不会停歇。


A Eurasian Solution for Europe’s Crises	欧洲危机的欧亚解决方案


MOSCOW – More than 18 months after former President Viktor Yanukovych was driven from power (and into exile), the crisis in Ukraine is at a stalemate.	莫斯科—乌克兰前总统亚努科维奇（Viktor Yanukovych）被赶下台（并流亡）已经过去了18个月，但乌克兰危机仍陷在僵局中。 克里米亚已经归附俄罗斯（许多人认为是吞并）；


Crimea has been reabsorbed by Russia (in what many consider an annexation); much of eastern Ukraine is held by pro-Russia rebels; and relations between the West and Russia are more tense than at any time since the early days of the Cold War.	东乌克兰大部被亲俄叛军占据； 西方和俄罗斯的关系也比冷战初期以来的任何时候都要紧张。


But can anyone claim an advantage?	但哪一方可以声称占优？


Those who wanted to see Ukraine anchored in the West, or imagined that sanctions on Russia would incite regime change in the Kremlin, by palace coup or popular uprising, have seen their hopes dashed: President Vladimir Putin’s popularity is as high as ever.	有些人希望乌克兰归属西方，有些人想象对俄制裁能够通过宫廷政变和群众暴动让克里姆林宫改换门庭，这些人的希望都落了空：总统普京的支持率和往常一样高。


In Russia, those who predicted the immediate collapse of Ukraine and the establishment in its eastern and southern provinces of a pro-Russian “Novorossia” have been similarly disappointed.	在俄罗斯，预测乌克兰马上就会崩溃、其东部和南部省份马上就会建立亲俄的“诺沃罗沙”（Novorossia）的人也收获了失望。


The tragedy is that the price of these illusions has been extraordinarily high in human terms – the ceasefire-defying death toll in eastern Ukraine has risen to more than 6,000 since April 2014 – and dangerously high in geostrategic terms as well.	悲剧在于，从人道角度看，这些幻想的代价实在高昂——2014年4月以来，拒不停火已经在东乌克兰造成了超过6,000人死亡——从地缘政治角度看，代价也十分昂贵。


It looks like both sides are ready to fight “to the last Ukrainian.”	看起来双方都誓将战斗到“最后一个乌克兰人”。


As I have long argued, Russia was never likely to yield.	我早就提出，俄罗斯绝不可能屈服。


After being pushed to the wall by more than two decades of Western expansion – be it European Union or NATO enlargement – into a part of Europe that it considers vital to its national security, Russians believe that they have the moral high ground in defending their interests.	二十多年来，西方——不管是欧盟还是北约——逐渐扩大到俄罗斯视为国家安全腹地的地区，把俄罗斯逼到了墙角，俄罗斯人认为他们占有捍卫自身利益的道德高点。


The danger now, with both sides trading accusations in an atmosphere of mutual distrust, is that the current stalemate will lead to a much deeper crisis between Russia and the West.	如今，双方在互不信任的氛围中相互指责，其危险在于当前的僵局可能导致俄罗斯和西方之间更加深刻的危机。


Both sides need to find a solution; yet, despite emerging victorious from the Cold War, the West seems not only to have lost the peace, but is on the verge of re-dividing Europe.	双方都需要找到解决方案； 但是，尽管西方在冷战中获得了胜利，但它们不但失去了和平，也站在了欧洲重新分裂的边缘。


And this is occurring at a time when the entire continent, including Russia and many other Eurasian states, is facing the threat of Islamic extremism.	而与此同时，整个大陆——包括俄罗斯和其他许多欧亚国家——正在面临伊斯兰极端主义威胁。


It is also happening at a time when both parts of Europe are in search of a new geopolitical, or even spiritual, identity.	这个时间还恰逢欧洲两部分都在寻找新的地缘政治乃至精神身份。


While the EU wrestles with problems of migration and integration, Russia is drifting away from a Eurocentric cultural and economic course toward a Eurasian alternative.	欧盟正在与移民和一体化问题角力，而俄罗斯正在偏离欧洲中心文化和经济策略，倒向欧亚方案。


And the United States – at least under President Barack Obama – has retreated into a kind of semi-isolation, leaving behind troubling zones of instability and unresolved crises.	而美国——至少在奥巴马治下——退回到一种半孤立状态，留下一摊动荡地区和未解决的危机。


So what will happen next?	那么，接下来会发生什么？


With both Western and Eastern Europe beset by political conflict and economic stagnation, the five centuries of European global dominance are drawing to an end.	西欧和东欧都面临着政治冲突和经济停滞，五个世纪的欧洲全球主导地位正在走向终点。


The reality now, following the end of the bipolar supremacy of the US and the Soviet Union and a brief “unipolar” phase following the Soviet Union’s collapse, is that we are now in a “multipolar” world.	现在的现实——在美苏两极状况结束和苏联解体后的短暂“单极”时期后——是我们正处于“多极”世界。


This, too, may prove temporary as two new geopolitical macro-blocs gain strength in the twenty-first century.	而这一状况可能也是暂时性的，二十一世纪，两大新的地缘政治宏观板块正在形成。


One centers on the US and its ambition to conclude the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).	一个板块的核心是美国及其完成跨太平洋合作伙伴关系 (TPP)和跨大西洋贸易与投资合作伙伴关系 (TTIP)的宏大目标。


The second macro-bloc is “Greater Eurasia,” featuring China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran, and possibly India.	另一个宏观板块是“大欧亚”（Greater Eurasia），由中国、俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦、伊朗，也许还有印度组成。


Strong foundations for this project were established with the May 2015 agreement between Russia and China to coordinate the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) with President Xi Jinping’s “Silk Road” initiative, which aims to bind Central Asia’s economies and those farther to the west closer to China’s.	2015年，大欧亚工程打下了坚固的基础，俄罗斯和中国签订协议，俄罗斯领导的欧亚经济联盟 (EEU)和习近平的“丝绸之路”计划（旨在拉进中亚和更西的经济体与中国的关系）将进行合作。


The question is whether this Greater Eurasia can help Europe find a way through its current security impasse.	问题在于这一大欧亚是否有助于欧洲找到走出当前安全困局之路。


Some in Europe will doubtless prefer to strengthen the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe – but the truth is that the OSCE, burdened by its Cold War history and its failure to secure the post-Cold War peace, is too tarnished to play a decisive role.	一些欧洲人毫无疑问更想强化欧安组织——但事实是，欧安组织背负着冷战的历史负担，并且没有能够保证后冷战时代的和平，这个毫无生气的组织无法扮演决定性角色。


An alternative might be a dialogue between the EU and the EEU, but that would be tricky as the EEU pursues a closer relationship with China and its Silk Road allies.	替代方案也许是欧盟和欧亚经济联盟之间的对话，但这一对话绝不容易，因为欧亚经济联盟追求拉近与中国及其丝绸之路盟友的关系。


A better approach would be to invite – sooner rather than later – China and Eurasian states to create over time a common economic space from Shanghai to Lisbon.	更好的方针是邀请——越早越好——中国和欧亚国家一起，假以时日打造一个从上海到里斯本的共同经济空间。


There is obvious potential for the EU to engage constructively with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (created in 2001 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, with India and Pakistan set to join next year).	显然，欧盟建设性参与上海合作组织（2001年由中国、俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、塔吉克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦创立，明年印度和巴基斯坦也将加入其中）的潜力是巨大的。


The failure of the old framework demands an effort to create a new one, beginning with a dialogue on Eurasian development cooperation and security that involves China and both Eurasian and European countries.	旧框架的失败要求我们建设一个新框架，其起点便是关于欧亚发展合作和安全的对话中国和欧亚及欧洲国家都应该参与其中。


None of this will render the OSCE or NATO redundant, and that should be no one’s goal.	这并不意味着欧安组织和北约已成为累赘，这绝不是任何人的目标。


What matters in resolving today’s conflicts, be they active or supposedly “frozen,” is to build a broader framework of cooperation and dialogue between the EU and what I term Greater Eurasia.	解决当今的冲突，不管是活跃的冲突还是貌似“冻结”的冲突，重要的是构建一个欧盟与我所谓的大欧亚之间的更加广泛的合作和对话框架。


The remaining question in such a scenario concerns the role of the US.	这一情景剩下的问题便是美国的角色。


Does it really want to remain in semi-isolation, hoping to be called back to center stage at some unlikely “unipolar moment” in the future?	美国真的想保持半孤立，以期在未来某个不可能的“单极时刻”被呼唤回到中心舞台吗？


Let us hope for an America ready to act as a responsible player in a fairer world.	但愿美国时刻准备着在更加公平的世界中扮演负责任大国的角色。


Women and the World Economy	女性和世界经济


WASHINGTON, DC – In many countries, public debate about gender equality focuses mainly on women's access to top positions and high-powered career opportunities.	华盛顿—在许多国家，性别平等的公共争论主要集中在女性获得顶级职位和权重职业机会的问题上。


But the “glass ceiling" is only a small part of the issue.	但“玻璃天花板”只是这一问题的一小部分。


The broader question is whether women have the same opportunities as men to participate in labor markets in the first place.	更大的问题是女性一开始是否和男性拥有一样的机会参与劳动力市场。


In other words, are women empowered to contribute fully to global economic growth and prosperity?	换句话说：女性是否拥有了充分贡献全球经济增长和繁荣的机会？


Unfortunately, the International Monetary Fund's latest study by its staff, “Women, Work, and the Economy," shows that, despite some improvements, progress toward leveling the playing field for women has stalled.	不幸的是，IMF的最新研究《女性、工作和经济》（Women, Work, and the Economy）表明，尽管有所进步，但女性通往公平之路陷入了停滞。


This is bad news for everyone, because it translates into lower economic growth – amounting to as much as 27% of per capita GDP in some countries.	这对于所有人来说都是坏消息，因为这意味着经济增长更低——在一些国家，人均GDP受拖累程度高达27%。


Around the world, the number of women in the workforce remains far below that of men; only about half of working-age women are employed.	放眼全球，职业女性的数量仍然远低于职业男性； 只有大约一半的工作适龄女性得到了雇用。


Women account for most unpaid work, and when they are paid, they are overrepresented in the informal sector and among the poor.	女性从事了大部分无薪工作，即使拿得到薪水，也大多是在非正式部门工作，薪水低的可怜。


They continue to be paid less than men for the same jobs, even in OECD countries, where the average gender wage gap is about 16%.	她们与男性仍然同工不同酬，即使在经合组织国家也是如此（性别收入差距为16%左右）。


And in many countries, distortions and discrimination in the labor market restrict women's chances of equal pay and rising to senior positions.	在许多国家，劳动力市场的扭曲和歧视限制了女性获得平等薪酬和擢升高级职位的机会。


The potential gains from a larger female workforce are striking.	让更多女性开始工作的潜在好处是巨大的。


In Egypt, for example, if the number of female workers were raised to the same level as that of men, the country's GDP could grow by 34%.	比如，在埃及，如果女性员工的数量提高到与男性一样多，那么GDP将能增加34%。 在阿联酋，GDP可以扩大12%，日本可以增加9%，美国可以增加5%。


In the United Arab Emirates, GDP would expand by 12%, in Japan by 9%, and in the United States by 5%.	一份基于国际劳工组织数据的最新研究表明，全世界有8.


According to a recent study based on data from the International Labor Organization, of the 865 million women worldwide who could contribute more fully to their economies, 812 million live in emerging and developing countries.	65亿女性可以为经济做出更充分的贡献，其中8. 12亿在新兴和发展中国家。


Raising women's labor-market participation rate boosts economic performance in a number of ways.	提高女性的劳动力市场参与率能从多方面提高经济表现。


For example, higher incomes for women lead to higher household spending on educating girls – a key prerequisite for faster long-term growth.	比如，女性收入的提高能增加家庭对女孩教育的支出——这是提高长期增长率的关键先决条件。


Employment of women on an equal basis with men provides companies with a larger talent pool, potentially increasing creativity, innovation, and productivity.	女性获得和男性一样的平等就业机会能扩大公司的人才库，潜在地增加创造力、创新力和生产率。


And, in advanced countries, a larger female labor force can help to counteract the impact of a shrinking workforce and mitigate the costs of an aging population.	此外，在发达国家，更多女性劳动力能够有助于抵消劳动力人数下降的影响，减轻人口老化的负担。


So what underlies the persistence of gaping inequality and stalled progress?	那么，是什么造成了不平等性的持续和进步的停滞？


Legal, regulatory, and social discrimination against women in many countries still prevents them from seeking paid work in the formal sector.	许多国家不利于女性的法律、监管和社会歧视仍在阻止她们在正式部门寻找带薪工作。


As a result, women dominate the informal economy, where jobs are often transient and earnings are low.	结果，女性主要集中在地下经济中，工作不稳定，收入和很低。


In addition, tax systems and social-welfare programs in many countries are designed in ways that discourage women from working.	此外，许多国家的税收制度和社会福利计划的设计也不利于女性参加工作。


Against this background, government tax and spending policies, as well as labor-market regulation, should be reformed to help boost female employment.	针对这一背景，政府税收和支出政策以及劳动力市场监管应该进行改革以提振女性就业。


For example, taxing individual rather than family income – which in many economies imposes a higher marginal tax on the second earner in households – would encourage women to seek employment.	比如，向个人而不是家庭课税——在许多经济体，家庭第二份收入的边际税率更高——能鼓励女性寻找工作。


Linking social-welfare benefits to participation in the workforce, training, or active labor-market programs also can help, as can affordable, high-quality childcare and greater opportunities for paternity and maternity leave.	将社会福利和劳动力参与、培训或积极的劳动力市场计划挂钩也能有所助益，同样可以起到效果的还有廉价高质量儿童看护以及更多的父亲和母亲产假。


In Brazil, for example, the share of women in the workforce has risen sharply over the past 20 years, from about 45% to almost 60%, owing in part to family-friendly policies.	比如，在巴西，女性工作者比例在过去20年中显著上升，从约45%增加到近60%，部分原因就在于家庭友好型政策。


These are just a few examples; far more can be done.	这些只是一些例子；


Women benefit when flexible work arrangements are introduced and the barriers between part-time and full-time work contracts are lowered, as the Netherlands has successfully done.	有待完成的任务还十分艰巨。 弹性工作安排的引入、兼职和全职工作合同壁垒的降低（荷兰在这方面取得了成功）使女性收益。


In developing countries, accessible water and better transportation systems in rural areas can help women manage their time better.	在发展中国家，农村地区供水和交通系统的改善也有助于女性更好地管理时间。


Establishing and upholding equal property and inheritance rights can increase women's access to credit and other productive resources, and creating greater awareness of legal rights in general will help reduce discrimination.	确认并保护产权和遗产权让女性更易获得信用和其他生产性资源，而普及一般法律权利意识有助于减少歧视。


Some of these steps have been taken in recent years, but it is time to jumpstart the process.	近几年来实施了这些政策中的几项，但我们必须加快进程。


We urge policymakers to take action and implement policies aimed at removing the obstacles that block women's participation in the workforce.	我们敦促决策者采取行动实施旨在消除阻挡女性参与劳动力大军的壁垒的政策。


We at the IMF will do our part by enhancing our analysis of the economic effects of gender inequality and working with our member countries to enable women to contribute fully to global economic growth and prosperity.	IMF将做好对性别不平等的经济影响的分析，并与成员国合作让女性能够为经济增长和繁荣做出充分贡献。


Especially now, with the growth outlook uncertain in much of the world, policies that encourage more women to enter the workforce certainly can help.	特别是在世界大部分地区增长前景不明的现在，鼓励更多女性参与劳动力大军的政策必然会有所助益。


Women are ready, willing, and able.	女性已经做好了准备，她们有能力也有意愿。


Take my word for it.	请相信我的话。


How to Keep a New Year’s Resolution	如何把新年计划坚持下来


MELBOURNE – Did you make any New Year’s resolutions?	发自墨尔本 —— 在新的一年里，你是否制定了些什么新年计划？


Perhaps you resolved to get fit, to lose weight, to save more money, or to drink less alcohol.	也许你决心要健身，或者减肥，想存更多的钱，又或者打算少喝点酒。


Or your resolution may have been more altruistic: to help those in need, or to reduce your carbon footprint.	或许你有个更为大公无私的计划：向那些急需帮助的人伸出援手，或者减少自己的碳足迹（ 指个人能源消耗量和污染排放量 ）。


But are you keeping your resolution?	但问题是，你果真能够把这份计划坚持下来吗？


We are not yet far into 2010, but studies show that fewer than half of those who make New Year’s resolutions manage to keep them for as long as one month.	虽然 2010 年才没开始几天，但已经有一系列研究显示，在那些制定了新年计划的人中，能够坚持执行超过一个月的还不到一半。


What does this tell us about human nature, and our ability to live either prudently or ethically?	而这个现象对人类本身的天性以及我们既明智又道德地生活的能力，又会带来些什么样的启示呢？


Part of the problem, of course, is that we make resolutions to do only things that we are not otherwise likely to do.	当然，一部分问题在于我们只会针对自己不喜欢做的事去制定计划。


Only an anorexic would resolve to eat ice cream at least once a week, and only a workaholic would resolve to spend more time in front of the television.	只有患了厌食症的人才会决心每星期至少吃一次雪糕，也只有工作狂才会决心花更多的时间去看电视。


So we use the occasion of the New Year to try to change behavior that may be the most difficult to change. That makes failure a distinct possibility.	也正因如此，我们才会利用新年这个特殊时刻来尝试改变那些对自己来说很难改变的行为，而这也意味着很有可能要吞下失败的苦果。


Nevertheless, presumably we make resolutions because we have decided that it would be best to do whatever it is that we are resolving to do.	然而不管计划内容是什么，我们制定计划的原因大概都是因为自己下定决心要做的事将带来最好的结果。


But if we have already made that decision, why don’t we just do it?	而既然我们已经作了决定，为什么却不去执行呢？


From Socrates onwards, that question has puzzled philosophers.	自苏格拉底以来，这一问题一直困绕着哲学家们。


In the Protagoras, one of Plato’s dialogues, Socrates says that no one chooses what they know to be bad.	在《普罗泰戈拉篇》这部柏拉图的对话集中，苏格拉底说没人会选择那些明知对自己不利的东西。


Hence choosing what is bad is a kind of error: people will do it only if they think that it is good.	故选择那些不好的东西就是一种错误：人们只会做那些他们认为有利的事情。


If we can teach people what is best, Socrates and Plato seem to have thought, they will do it.	苏格拉底和柏拉图都认为，只要我们能够教会人们哪些是好的，他们就会去做。


But that is a hard doctrine to swallow – much harder than eating the extra slice of cake that you know is not good for you.	但这也是个非常难以让人接受的道理 —— 甚至比明知再吃蛋糕对健康不利却还要多吃一块的行为还要困难得多。


Aristotle took a different view, one that fits better with our everyday experience of failing to do what we know to be best.	与前两位哲人不同的是，亚里士多德则持另一种与我们的日常生活经验更相吻合的，关于为什么我们不能完成自己明知是有利的事情的观点。


Our reason may tell us what is best to do, he thought, but in a particular moment our reason may be overwhelmed by emotion or desire.	他认为，我们的理性能够告诉我们什么是最好的，但在某一特定的时刻，理性可能会被我们情绪和欲望所掩盖。


Thus, the problem is not lack of knowledge, but the failure of our reason to master other, non-rational aspects of our nature.	因此问题不在于缺乏知识，而是在于我们的理性不能控制自己人性中其他的非理性因素。


That view is supported by recent scientific work showing that much of our behavior is based on very rapid, instinctive, emotionally based responses.	而这种观点也得到了最近的科学研究的支持，研究显示我们的大部分行为都是基于非常快速，直觉和感性的反应。


Although we are capable of deciding what to do on the basis of rational thought processes, such decisions often prove less powerful than our instinctive feelings in moving us to action.	尽管在理性思考的基础上，我们有能力下决心去做什么，但在驱使我们行动的过程中，这些决心与人自身的直觉较量起来，通常都是软弱无力的。


What does this have to do with keeping resolutions?	那这跟我们坚持自己的计划有什么关系呢？


Richard Holton, a professor of philosophy at MIT and the author of Willing, Wanting, Waiting, points out that a resolution is an attempt to overcome the problem of maintaining an intention when we expect that, at some future time, we will face inclinations contrary to our intention.	理查德·霍顿是麻省理工学院的哲学教授，也是《意愿，需要，等待》一书的作者，他指出计划是当我们预期未来会出现违背自身最初意愿的趋势时，试图克服阻碍维持意愿的那些麻烦的一种尝试。


Right now, we want to lose weight and we are rationally convinced that this is more important than the pleasure we will get from that extra slice of cake.	现在，我们想要减肥，同时我们也理性地明白这样做比享受更多的蛋糕所带来的快乐更重要。


But we anticipate that, faced with cake tomorrow, our desire for that rich chocolate texture will distort our reasoning so that we might convince ourselves that putting on just a little more weight doesn’t really matter all that much.	但我们预期，明天看到蛋糕时，我们对蛋糕上巧克力那种浓厚口感的渴望会扭曲我们的理性，于是我们就会尝试说服自己，再重一点对整个减肥过程来说没多大影响的。


To prevent that, we seek to shore up our current intention to lose weight.	为了防止这种情况，我们会寻找一些东西来支撑当前的减肥意图。


By making a solemn resolution and telling our family and close friends about it, we tilt the scales against succumbing to temptation.	通过制定一份严格的规划，并将其在亲朋好友中宣扬开来，我们不断地在抵制诱惑的天平上加码。


If we fail to keep our resolution, we will have to admit that we are less in control of our behavior than we had hoped, thus losing face in our own eyes and in the eyes of others about whom we care.	而倘若不能遵守这份计划，我们就将不得不承认自己的自控能力比想象中更差，而这将使我们在自己以及在意的人面前丢脸。


This fits well with what psychologists have discovered about how we can improve the odds that we will keep our resolutions.	这与心理学家在如何提高成功执行计划几率方面所取得发现惊人地一致。


Richard Wiseman, a professor of psychology at the University of Hertfordshire, has tracked 5,000 people who made New Year’s resolutions. Only about one in ten managed to stick to what they had resolved.	理查德·怀斯曼是英国赫特福德大学的心理学教授，他跟踪调查了 5000 名制定了新年计划的人，发现只有大约 1/10 的人能把自己的计划坚持了下来。


In his recently released book 59 Seconds, Wiseman sets out the things that you can do to make success more likely:	在新近发行的书《 59 秒》里，怀斯曼列出了你可以做来确保取得成功的事情：


·         Break your resolution into a series of small steps;	·          把计划分解为一系列细小的步骤；


·         Tell your family and friends about your resolution, thus both gaining support and increasing the personal cost of failure;	·          将其告知你的亲朋好友，从而既能获得他们的支持，又增加个人所付出的失败成本；


·         Regularly remind yourself of the benefits of achieving your goal;	·          时常提醒自己实现计划目标所带来的好处；


·         Give yourself a small reward each time you achieve one of the steps towards your goal;	·          每当向目标迈进一步时，都给自己一点小小的奖励；


·         Keep track of your progress towards your goal, for example by keeping a journal or putting a chart on the fridge door.	·          记录自己向目标前进的过程，比如写日记或者在冰箱门上贴张进度表


Individually, each of these factors seems trivial.	分开来看，这些因素中的每一点都微不足道。


Collectively, they are ways of exerting our self-control not only now, but in the future as well.	但合在一起，它们不但是当前实现自我控制的好方法，也是未来进行自我控制的好手段。


If we succeed, the behavior we judge to be better will become habitual – and thus no longer require a conscious act of will to keep acting in that way.	倘若取得了成功，那么那些我们认为更好的行为会成为习惯 —— 从而变成为一种不假思索的下意识行为。


These tools for keeping a New Year’s resolution can help us to make progress, not only in losing weight or staying out of debt, but also in living more ethically.	这些帮助我们遵从我们的新年规划的手段不仅可以应用在减肥或者个人理财上，而且在实行更有道德的生活方式上都能够协助我们取得进展。


We may even find that that is the best resolution to make, for our own benefit and that of others.	我们甚至可以发现，出于对自己和其他人的利益考虑，这可是最该制定的计划。


How to Make EU Integration Popular	怎样使欧盟一体化深入人心


Across the European Union, fears about globalization and antipathy to integration and immigration have produced massive political fallout, including the failed French and Dutch referenda on the Union’s draft constitutional treaty and a de facto moratorium on accession talks with Turkey.	在整个欧盟，对于全球化的担忧和对于一体化和移民的抵触在政治上造成了巨大的负面影响，包括使法国和荷兰没能通过对于欧盟宪法条约草案的全民公决，以及事实上暂停土耳其的入盟谈判。


The European Council and the Commission have watched helplessly, as if the matter was not in their hands.	欧洲理事会和欧盟委员会对此无能为力，似乎这件事与它们无关。


Conventional wisdom suggests that the EU’s inability to meet the challenges of integration is due to rigid economic structures and inadequate human capital – weaknesses that can only be tackled effectively by national policies, where the Union has little role to play.	大家普遍的看法认为，欧盟无法面对一体化的挑战的原因在于僵硬的经济结构以及不够充分的人力资本，这些弱点只有通过各国采取的政策才能得到有效解决，而在这方面欧盟无能为力。


But substantial policy spillover across the EU justifies strengthened policy coordination for labor-market and welfare reform.	但是，欧盟地区实质的政策效果证明了在劳动力市场和福利改革方面加强政策协调是正确的。


Outdated labor-market rules are the key reason why the full benefits of the internal market and monetary union have failed to materialize.	过时的劳动力市场规则是内部市场和货币联盟的全面利益未能得到实现的主要原因。


Labor-market rigidities – above all in France, Germany, and Italy – impede adjustment to the increased competition of integrating markets.	劳动力市场的僵硬，首当其冲是法国、德国和意大利，妨碍了对于迈向一体化的市场更加激烈的竞争调节。


Those who lose their jobs cannot find new ones because of barriers to entry, while high long-term unemployment makes those who do have jobs feel threatened.	失去工作的人因为准入障碍而无法找到新的工作，而居高不下的长期失业使得那些拥有工作的感到威胁。


Viewing immigrants and internal market integration with alarm, both groups thus have increasingly turned against Europe.	因为对移民和内部市场一体化感到担心，使得两个群体都开始对欧洲的一体化持反对的态度。


If they cannot reform, France or Italy eventually may be tempted to renege on free movement of goods, services and labor – and perhaps even abandon the euro – with disruptive consequences for all members.	如果无法实行改革，那么法国和意大利最终也许会在货物、服务和劳动自由流动的问题上食言，甚至也许会放弃欧元，这会给所有的成员国造成破坏性后果。


Therefore, there is a common interest in fostering national policies that are consistent with integration in the internal market.	因此，推行与内部市场相符的各国国内政策是符合共同利益的。


The benefits of coordination are likely to be reinforced by policy “learning,” as confirmed by evidence that reforms tend to spread in waves.	协调的益处可能会因为政策“学习”而得到加强，因为有证据表明改革很容易像波浪似地向外传播。


Structural reforms are usually resisted because of uncertainty about the costs and their distribution.	结构性改革因为其代价和分布的不确定性而常常被抵制。


One way to weaken this resistance is to involve not only ministers and heads of government in exchanging information on policy design, but also those who resist change, notably trade unions.	要弱化这种抵制，其中的一条途径就是不但让政府的部长和领导们相互交流政策设计的信息，同时让那些抵制变革的人，尤其是工会也参与进来。


After all, a clear message by the European Council would have a much stronger effect if it expressed not only the wishes of heads of governments, but also broad acceptance at all levels of society.	不管怎样，如果欧洲理事会能发出一个既表达了政府领导人的愿望，同时也为社会各个阶层所广泛接受的清晰的信息，那么它所产生的效果将会强得多。


Only then can one hope for full implementation of reforms and the virtuous circle of improved expectations and economic performance that should have been set in motion by the European Council’s Lisbon summit seven years ago.	只有那时，人们才有希望看到在本应在七年前的欧洲理事会里斯本峰会就开始实行的全面改革以及更高的期望和更好的经济形势的良性循环的实现。


The experience of successful reform in the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries shows that Europe need not be condemned to stagnation, provided that it renounces rigid employment protection.	盎克鲁撒克逊和斯堪的那维亚国家成功的改革经验表明，只要欧洲摈弃僵硬的劳动力保护，那么它就不会总是停滞不前。


The key to overcoming resistance is to give affected workers grounds to hope that they can find a new job.	消除抵制的关键在于使受影响的工人能够抱有找到新工作的希望。


The European Council might also recommend that any relaxation of employment protection be accompanied by the establishment of a minimum wage – determined as an agreed proportion of the statutory wage for regular long-term employment.	欧洲理事会也许还可以建议任何对于劳动力保护的放松同时伴有设定最低工资。 最低工资应该是正式长期雇佣的法定工资得到双方同意的一部分。


With such a comprehensive policy package, resistance to change would likely diminish.	通过这样一个全面的政策组合，对于变革的抵制很可能会大大减少。


Immigration poses even greater policy challenges, since newcomers are widely perceived as threatening jobs and crowding out natives from social services.	移民问题是一个更大的政策挑战，因为新来者被普遍认为是对工作的威胁，并且会把本国人从社会服务中排挤出去。


There is ample evidence that restrictions on immigration in one country divert migrant flows to other EU countries, and that migration is attracted by generous welfare entitlements.	有充分的证据表明，一国对于移民的限制会把移民潮分散到其他欧盟国家，并且移民会更多地涌向有高额福利补贴的国家。


Moreover, well-functioning labor markets attract migrants with higher qualifications, while countries with rigid employment protection are targeted by the low-skilled and those willing to work illegally.	此外，运作完善的劳动力市场会吸引素质更高的移民，而有严厉的劳动力保护的国家所吸引的是那些低技能和想非法工作的人。


Labor migration also presents challenges for source countries, for it diminishes their pool of young and educated workers.	劳动力移民对于来源国也是一种挑战，因为这降低了它们年轻和受过教育的工人的储备。


Policy coordination can provide effective remedies to these negative spillovers.	政策协作可以给这些负面的影响提供有效的救济。


Two measures would be particularly useful.	有两种措施会特别有用。


First, the old member states should immediately lift remaining restrictions on the freedom of movement for workers from new member countries.	第一是老��员国应该立即取消对于来自新成员国的工人的自由流动的现有限制。


Any minimum wage would automatically also apply to immigrant workers, mitigating “unfair” competition for low-skilled jobs.	任何最低工资应该自动地适用于移民工人，以缓解低技能工作上“不公平”的竞争。


Second, the EU should enact a common scheme for admission of immigrant workers from outside the Union.	第二，欧盟对于来自欧盟外部的移民工人的准入应该颁布一个统一的方案。


Such a scheme should include a “point system” for selecting applicants for residence and work permits, which would assign each applicant a score based on objective criteria, typically including language ability, education, and experience.	这个方案应该包括一个选择申请居住和工作许可的申请人的“分值制度”，以便能给每位申请人作出一个基于客观标准的评分，典型的标准应包括语言能力、教育水平和经验。


This approach has been successfully implemented in Australia, New Zealand, and Switzerland; Germany and Great Britain are following suit.	这种方法在澳大利亚、新西兰和瑞士得到了成功的实施； 德国和英国也采取了这种方法。


By establishing a common “welfare floor” throughout the EU, providing an effective safety net to native workers whose jobs are threatened by integration, and adopting a coordinated policy on immigration, European citizens would be reassured.	通过在整个欧盟建立一个共同的“最低福利标准”，为其工作受到移民威胁的本国工人提供一个有效的安全网络，并且对移民采用一个协同的政策，那么欧洲的公民就会感到放心。


This, in turn, might reduce their hostility to migrant workers while offering migrants an equitable and fair legal framework.	这反过来会减少他们对于移民工人的敌意，同时为移民提供一个合理并且公正的法律框架。


These labor-market and immigration policies should become the focus of policy coordination within the EU.	这些劳动力市场和移民的政策应该成为在欧盟内部进行政策协作的主要焦点。


By concentrating on policies to sustain integration while at the same preserving the European social model, the European Council would again become a relevant policy forum where the real needs and hopes of citizens could find effective responses.	通过集中精力关注鼓励移民的政策，同时又维护欧洲的社会模式，欧洲理事会将会再次成为能够有效回应公民的真实需求和希望的政策论坛。


New Model Europe	欧洲新模式


ROME – It is becoming increasingly clear that if Europe is to overcome its crisis, business as usual will not suffice.	罗马—欧洲要想克服危机，按常规出牌是不够的，这一点正变得日益清晰。


We need a Europe that is more concrete, less rhetorical, and better suited to the current global economy.	我们需要一个多点行动、少点口号、并能更好契合全球经济的欧洲。


We need to focus not only on the European Union’s specific policies, but also on how to change its “politics” – a change that must place economic growth at the top of the agenda.	我们不但要关注欧盟的具体政策，也要关注如何改变其“政治”——必须将经济增长作为最紧要任务的改变。


Europe does not need a debate between austerity and growth; it needs to be pragmatic.	欧洲不需要在紧缩和增长之间争来争去； 欧洲需要务实。


A good example of this was the most recent European Council, which addressed two of Europe’s most pressing problems: malfunctioning labor markets, reflected in record-high youth unemployment, and malfunctioning credit markets, in which access to financing is difficult and lending rates vary considerably among different parts of the single market.	一个很好的例子是最近欧盟理事会为欧洲解决了两个紧迫问题：运转不良的劳动力市场——体现于创纪录的年轻人失业上； 以及运转不良的信用市场——获得融资十分困难，欧洲单一市场的不同部分之间贷款利率相差极大。


The outcome of the Council’s June meeting was encouraging, and we must continue on that path in the coming months to make progress on two equally important issues: how to foster innovation and the digital economy, and how to ensure Europe’s manufacturing competitiveness.	欧盟理事会6月会议的结果令人鼓舞，在未来几个月中，我们必须继续沿着这条路走下去，在两个同样重要的问题上有所进展：如何构建创新和数字经济； 以及如何保护欧洲的制造业竞争力。


We need to assess what can be achieved at the national level and what EU institutions should do.	我们需要评估在国家层面可以实现什么，欧盟机构又必须做些什么。


Fiscal consolidation and national reforms are essential and should continue.	财政整合和国家改革至关重要，也应该继续进行。


But we can better achieve our objectives under an EU framework that supports, rather than impedes, national action to boost growth and employment.	但我们可以在支持而不是阻碍提振增长和就业的国家行动的欧盟框架下更好地实现我们的目标。


The European Commission’s recent decision to grant member states some flexibility for productive public investment linked to EU structural funds is a welcome step in this direction.	欧盟委员会最近决定授予成员国在与欧洲结构性资金有关的富有成效的公共投资方面一定的自由，这是方向正确的一步。


The second issue is the need to take further steps toward closer integration within the eurozone.	第二个问题是需要采取进一步动作实现欧元区内部的更紧密的一体化。


A banking union is an important start, which should prevent financial markets from fragmenting along national lines and reduce private-sector borrowing costs.	银行联盟是一个重要起点，它能防止金融市场出现各国各自为政的局面，并降低私人部门借贷成本。


Lending rates are still too high for small and medium-size enterprises and too dependent on where in the EU a company is located.	贷款利率对于中小企业来说仍然太高，并且仍取决于公司在欧盟内部的所在地。


We have achieved important results on the way to a banking union, notably on supervision.	在银行联盟方面，我们已经取得了重大进展，最显著的便是监督问题。


Now we need to work on the second pillar, resolution of the banking crisis.	如今，我们需要致力于第二大支柱，即解决银行危机。


The proposal presented by Michel Barnier, European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, is bold, but Europe does indeed need a strong, efficient resolution mechanism that ensures timely action to address banking crises.	负责内部市场和服务的欧盟委员巴尼耶（Michel Barnier）提出的方案十分大胆，但欧洲确实需要强大、有效的解决机制确保及时采取行动，解决银行危机。


We also need to consider how to enhance coordination of economic policies to promote productivity convergence.	我们还需要考虑如何加强经济政策间的协调以促进生产率趋同。


We already have a good mechanism for multilateral surveillance in place, but we should aim to focus it on the areas that really matter for economic union.	我们已经有了很好的多边监督机制，但我们的目标应该是使其专注于真正影响经济联盟的领域。


This must go hand in hand with a discussion of how the EU can provide incentives to member states that are committed to difficult structural reforms at a time of retrenchment, which could lead to talks about possible forms of fiscal coordination.	这必须团结一致地进行，并且同时讨论欧盟如何在紧缩时期为承诺艰难结构性改革的成员国提供激励，以便形成关于财政整合的可能形式的谈判。


Though it is premature to enter into such discussions now, the issue should not be taken off the table.	尽管目前加入这一讨论还为时过早，但不能对这一问题置若罔闻。


All of these changes concern the eurozone’s members first, of course, but they are clearly relevant for the wider EU.	当然，所有这些变化首先影响欧元区成员国，但显然也与更广的欧盟有关。


At the same time, setting eurozone members apart from the wider EU would be inadvisable.	与此同时，将欧元区成员国与更广的欧盟区别对待是不合适的。


Ensuring a stable and effective eurozone is essential to the smooth operation of the entire single market.	保证稳定有效的欧元区对于整个单一市场的平滑操作至关重要。


And, without an efficient EU, the eurozone could not prosper.	此外，没有有效的欧盟，欧元区也不可能繁荣。


We have only one Europe, and we all need to work together to reform it and drive it forward.	我们只有一个欧洲，我们需要团结一致改革欧洲、使其前进。


Indeed, with its 500 million consumers, the EU single market remains the largest destination for goods and services worldwide and is the best engine to restore growth.	事实上，拥有5亿消费者的欧盟单一市场仍是世界最大的商品和服务目的地，也是重振增长的最佳引擎。


Key economic sectors, such as financial services, benefit greatly from the single market’s common rules.	关键经济部门，比如金融服务业，从单一市场的共同规则中获益良多。


Without the single market, all member states would be less attractive to foreign investors, who, once established in one member state, can move freely around the EU.	没有单一市场，所有成员国对外国投资者的吸引力都会下降，投资者只要在一个欧盟成员国中落地，就能在整个欧盟自由行动。


The single market also provides a platform and leverage to export goods and services to international markets.	单一市场提供了向国际市场出口商品和服务的平台和杠杆。


So we must make the single market more open, internally and externally.	因此我们必须让单一市场更加开放，不管是对内还是对外。


But, to do so, we will need to make EU institutions more efficient, with better regulation and a lower administrative burden.	但是，这需要我们改善欧盟机构的效率，出台更好的监管，减少行政负担。


Common institutions are needed to ensure that all EU countries’ interests are protected, and to act as a bridge between eurozone and non-eurozone member states.	我们需要共同机构确保所有欧盟国家的利益都得到保护，并作为嫁接欧元区和非欧元区成员国的桥梁。


Frankly, the functioning of the EU and its institutions during the crisis has been a part of the problem.	坦白说，危机期间，欧盟的功能及其机构乃是问题的一部分。


For many people, EU decision-making is opaque, inefficient, and removed from democratic control.	对很多人来说，欧盟决策不透明、效率低，而且缺少民主控制。


Most worrying, the crisis has challenged the very idea of European integration.	最令人担忧的是，危机对欧洲一体化的思想形成了挑战。


Thus, we will be able to advance a reformist agenda only if we have a convincing narrative that explains why we need Europe and why it serves the interests of current and future generations.	因此，要想能够推进改革日程，我们就必须令人信服地解释我们为什么需要欧洲以及为什么它符合当前和子孙后代的利益。


I am a committed pro-European.	我是一个坚定的欧洲支持者。


I have in mind the extraordinary image of Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand at Verdun in 1984, two old leaders, standing hand in hand, remembering the victims of World War I.	1984年的凡尔登给我留下了深刻的印象，两名老一辈领导人科尔（Helmut Kohl）和密特朗手牵手纪念第一次世界大战的受害者。


Next year will mark the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of that war.	明年是一战爆发100周年。


The experience of two world wars was foundational for European integration.	两次世界大战的经验时欧洲一体化的根本动力。


But these memories no longer provide a sufficient catalyst for action.	但这些记忆不再能够提供充分的行动催化剂。


We need to find a forward-looking rationale that, after 50 years of integration, shows how acting together can help Europe achieve its goals in a changed global environment.	我们需要向前看的理由，在一体化进行了50年后，需要有东西向我们证明携手共进有助于欧洲在变化了的全球环境中实现其目标。


There is nothing worse than letting people believe that European integration is something that proceeds by stealth, a journey driven by invisible and uncontrollable forces.	最糟糕的的情况是让人们相信欧洲一体化在鬼鬼祟祟地进行，其背后的动力不可见人又不可控制。


The EU cannot last unless it is built on its citizens’ explicit commitment.	没有人民的明确承诺，欧盟就不可能维持。


Today, we have a chance to remodel Europe.	如今，我们有机会重塑欧洲。


Next year’s European parliamentary elections will provide an opportunity for a fundamental debate about the EU’s future.	明年的欧洲议会选举将提供一次机会展开关于欧盟未来的根本性讨论。


Unless we make a successful case for Europe (and for a different Europe), Euro-skeptic forces will gain ground and Europe’s decision-making processes will be blocked.	除非我们能为欧洲（不同的欧洲）树立成功的榜样，否则欧元怀疑派将得势，欧洲决策过程将被阻挠。


The choice is clear, and it will have to be made sooner rather than later.	选择是明确的，而且迟早要做出选择。


Escape from Mecca	逃离麦加


LOS ANGELES – The recent stampede in Mecca, in which more than a thousand pilgrims making the hajj were trampled to death, is a tragic but powerful reminder of the city’s prominence in the Muslim world.	洛杉矶——最近麦加发生的踩死千余朝圣者的踩踏事件悲情而有力地提醒人们这座城市在穆斯林世界的份量。


According to theological tradition, every Muslim is required to make a trip to the city once in their lifetime, if they are able to do so.	按照神学传统，每位男性穆斯林只要条件允许，都必须在有生之年去一次麦加。


In practice, however, it is only in recent times that making a pilgrimage to Mecca has come to play such an important role in Islam.	但实际上，只有到了近代麦加朝圣才在伊斯兰教中占据了如此重要的位置。


The city has always had symbolic significance, but its importance to millions of Muslims worldwide is largely a modern phenomenon, one that has grown in recent decades as Saudi officials and fundamentalist Wahhabi clerics promoted religious tourism as a means of spreading their influence.	这座城市向来不乏象征意义，但它在成百上千万穆斯林心目中的重要意义很大程度上是一种现代现象，这种现象近几十年才开始抬头，起因是沙特官员和原教旨主义瓦哈比教派的教士为扩大影响力推动宗教旅游。


For most of Islamic history, the overwhelmingly majority of Muslims did not travel to Mecca.	伊斯兰历史上多数时间，绝大多数穆斯林并未奔赴麦加。


Instead, they made local pilgrimages to the major shrines that still garland the Muslim world.	相反，他们前往穆斯林世界随处可见的当地主要圣地朝圣。


Some are to Koranic prophets even older than Muhammad; others are to Shia imams or Sufi saints; and still others are to hallowed Muslim women.	有些圣地供奉的可兰经先知历史甚至超过穆罕默德； 还有些供奉着什叶派伊玛目和苏菲派圣徒；


The name of one holy place, the necropolis of Makli in Pakistan, hints at its medieval ambition to become an alternative destination for pilgrims: Makli means the “little Mecca.”	还有些则是穆斯林圣女的供奉之所。 巴基斯坦马卡利墓地的命名隐含着其成为中世纪另一个朝圣圣地的雄心壮志：马卡利的字面意思是“小麦加”。


The modern hajj has its origins in the rise of religious tourism to Mecca in the nineteenth century, when steamships began transporting large numbers of pilgrims to the Arabian Peninsula.	现代麦加朝圣最初起源于19世纪麦加宗教旅游的兴起，那时的蒸汽轮船开始将大量朝圣者运抵阿拉伯半岛。


Then, as now, there was little local effort to limit the number of pilgrims to safe levels or to provide adequate infrastructure and security to handle the masses of visitors.	当时和现在一样对朝圣者安全游览的数量没有任何限制，当地也没有为大量旅游者提供充足的基础设施和安全服务。


Annual influxes of hundreds of thousands of pilgrims closely packed into steamships were blamed for spreading cholera through port cities from Bombay to Hamburg, making the hajj a major cause of death around the world.	每年蒸汽轮船中塞得满满当当的数十万朝圣者被指在孟买和汉堡等港口城市传播霍乱，导致麦加朝圣成为世界主要的死亡原因之一。


For the most part, the pilgrimage’s religious nature has muted criticism of the way it was handled.	多数时候，朝圣的宗教性质抑制了人们批评其处理方式。


But contemporary accounts make clear that not all were pleased with Mecca’s management of the event.	但现代评论显示并非所有人都满意麦加的管理方式。


In the 1860s, the female Indian Muslim ruler of Bhopal, Sikandar Begum, wrote a warts-and-all account of Mecca as a “wild and melancholy-looking” city whose “dirty and ill-drained” streets were filled with disease and disorder.	19世纪60年代，女性印度博帕尔穆斯林统治者Sikandar Begum写了一篇毫不掩饰的评价，说麦加是一座“野蛮忧郁的”城市，“肮脏且排水不良”的街道充斥着疾病和混乱。


A half-century later, the Central Asian pilgrim ‘Abd al-Rashid Ibrahim described the holy city’s filth and squalor, recounting stories of pilgrims walking through streets ankle deep in excrement.	半个世纪后，中亚朝圣者‘阿卜杜勒·拉希德·易卜拉欣描述了圣城的污秽和肮脏，讲述了朝圣者在街上齐踝深的粪水中行走的故事。


Religious tourism played a central role in the region’s nineteenth-century economy (until the arrival of Texas oilmen in the 1930s, Mecca was almost entirely dependent on visiting pilgrims).	宗教旅游在该地区19世纪经济中发挥了核心作用（直到20世纪30年代德克萨斯石油工人到来之前，麦加几乎完全依赖来访的朝圣者）。


But the numbers of visitors began to rise sharply after the city fell under the control of the Saudi royal family in 1924.	但1924年该市落入沙特皇室控制后朝圣者数量开始急剧上升。


Until then, the only way to reach Mecca was by pack animal.	在此之前，驼兽是前往麦加的唯一方式。


The Ottoman Empire raised funds from pious Muslims (and brought in German technicians) to lay a railway from Damascus to Medina.	奥特曼帝国向虔诚的穆斯林募集资金（并聘请德国技师）修筑从大马士革到麦地那的铁路。


But the last leg of the journey – to Mecca itself – remained a monopoly of the camel-owning Bedouin.	但朝圣之旅的最后一段——即前往麦加的那段，仍然被拥有骆驼的贝都因人所把持着。


When the Saudi government introduced Fords to the area in around 1930, it needed all of its military resources to prevent the Bedouin from destroying them.	当沙特政府1930年前后启用福特时，需要动用所有军事资源防止贝都因人毁掉汽车。


To be sure, the Saudi government faces massive demand from Muslims to be allowed to make the hajj, and it has introduced a quota system to limit their numbers.	可以肯定，沙特政府面临穆斯林朝圣之旅的巨大需求，并引入配额制度限制朝圣者。


Even so, it maintains strenuous efforts to attract pilgrims – particularly wealthy ones – by building attractions, including vast shopping malls and a colossal copy of London’s Big Ben that now looms incongruously over the Ka‘ba.	即便如此，沙特仍竭尽全力吸引穆斯林、尤其是富有穆斯林前来朝圣，他们兴建大型购物中心和伦敦大本钟等旅游景点，后者与克尔白圣寺近在咫尺显得十分不协调。


And the authorities’ admission of more pilgrims than the city’s infrastructure can safely handle is indisputable; the proof is repeated disasters like the one in September.	沙特当局接纳的朝圣者数量超过城市基础设施的安全容量也不容质疑； 今年9月那样的灾难一再发生就是明证。


Indeed, since taking control of Mecca, the Saudi government has used the city and the hajj as centerpieces in its efforts to place the kingdom at the center of the Muslim world and spread Wahhabi Islam.	事实上，控制麦加后，沙特政府利用这座城市和朝觐之旅力求使沙特王国成为穆斯林世界的核心并推广瓦哈比教。


As soon as the Saudi royal family seized the city, the new rulers destroyed the Shia and Sufi shrines that might have undermined their sought-after monopoly over the ritual aspects of the pilgrimage.	沙特王室控制这座城市后，新任统治者摧毁了可能威胁其对朝圣仪式垄断地位的什叶派和苏菲派圣地。


And their approach seems to have worked.	他们的做法似乎颇有成效。


It is not uncommon for pilgrims from, say, India or Indonesia to adopt strict, conservative tenets after their return from Mecca.	不少来自印度或印尼的朝圣者从麦加返回后开始信奉严格的保守主义信条。


As influence is ultimately a matter of numbers, it should come as no surprise that the Saudis seek to maximize the inflows of Muslim pilgrims each year.	因为影响力归根结底在于数量，沙特尽一切可能扩大每年朝圣的穆斯林数量也很正常。


Even when faced with calamitous death tolls, the Saudi establishment is unlikely to change its approach.	就算面对灾难性的死亡人数，沙特政府也不太可能改变自己的做法。


It is up to the rest of the Muslim world to provide alternatives to the modern idea, championed by Saudi Wahhabis and other arch-conservatives, that Mecca is the inexorable and inevitable center of the Muslim world.	此时需要其他穆斯林国家站出来挑战沙特瓦哈比教派和其他主要保守主义教派的现代理念，即麦加无可改变也无法避免地在穆斯林世界发挥核心作用。


There is nothing stopping Muslim governments from taking a page out of the Saudi handbook and promoting the neglected shrines in their own territories.	没有什么能阻止穆斯林政府模仿沙特的做法，对各自区域内被忽略的圣地加大宣传力度。


Doing so would not only reduce the number of pilgrims traveling to Mecca, making the visits safer; it would also force Saudi Arabia to share the enormous profits of religious tourism.	这样���不仅能减少前往麦加的朝圣者人数，令旅途更加安全； 也能迫使沙特阿拉伯分享宗教旅游的巨大利润。


Even more important, moving beyond the modern hajj to a more plural pattern of pilgrimage could help stem the Wahhabi takeover of the faith.	更重要的是，超越现代麦加朝圣走向更多元化的模式可以遏制瓦哈比教派夺取伊斯兰教的控制权。


How to Make Trade Easier	如何让贸易更方便


WASHINGTON, DC – The world is now in the fourth year of the Great Recession.	华盛顿—如今，世界步入大衰退已是第四个年头。


So far, the economies belonging to the World Trade Organization have resisted the kind of widespread protectionism that would make a bad situation much worse.	到目前为止，世贸组织成员国们成功抵制住了可能让情况雪上加霜的普遍保护主义。


But protectionist pressures are building as weary politicians hear more and more calls for economic nationalism.	但随着筋疲力尽的政客们面临越来越响的经济民族主义呼声，保护主义压力正在与日俱增。


The WTO’s best defense of open trade is a good offense.	对世贸组织来说，保卫开放贸易的最佳办法是以攻为守。


A new WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement would benefit all by increasing developing countries’ capacity to trade, strengthening the WTO’s development mandate, and boosting global economic growth.	新的世贸组织贸易便利协定（WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement）将提升发展中国家的贸易能力、增强世贸组织的发展号召力、刺激全球经济增长，从而让所有人受益。


More than a decade after the launch of the Doha Round of global free-trade talks, this agreement could be a down payment on the commitment that WTO members have made to linking trade and development.	在全球贸易谈判多哈回合开始十多年后，该协定可以称为世贸组织成员国兑现联系贸易和发展承诺的第一步。


Developing countries stand to gain the most from improving trade facilitation.	从贸易便利的改善中获益最大的是发展中国家。


The right support would help traders in poorer countries to compete and integrate into global supply chains.	恰当的支持有助于穷国贸易者竞争并融入全球供应链。


There are rich opportunities for gains.	获益的机会很多。


Inefficiencies in processing and clearing goods put traders in developing countries at a competitive disadvantage. Outdated and inefficient border procedures and inadequate infrastructure often mean high transaction costs, long delays, opportunities for corruption, and an additional 10-15% in the cost of getting goods to market – even more in landlocked countries.	商品处理和清算的低效让发展中国家贸易者处于竞争劣势。 陈腐的通关程序和基础设施不力通常意味着高昂的交易成本、长时间推迟、腐败机会滋生，让商品进入市场的成本增加10—15%，在内陆国家甚至更高。


Research by the World Bank suggests that every dollar of assistance provided to support trade-facilitation reform in developing countries yields a return of up to $70 in economic benefits.	世界银行的研究表明，用于支持发展中国家贸易便利改革的每一美元能够产生最多70美元的经济回报。


When funds are directed at improving border-management systems and procedures – the very issues covered by the trade-facilitation negotiations – the impact is particularly significant.	当资金用于改善通关管��系统和程序时——这也正是贸易便利谈判所针对的问题——产生的效果尤为显著。


Projects aimed at boosting efficiency and transparency, supported by development banks and bilateral donors, have made a dramatic difference. In East Africa, procedural improvements have reduced the average clearance time for cargo crossing the Kenya-Uganda border from almost two days to only seven hours.	由开发银行和双边机构支持、旨在增加效率和透明度的项目将产生极大不同。 在东非，程序上的改进让肯尼亚-乌干达边境货物清关的平均耗时从接近2天缩短为7小时。


In Cameroon, some of our organizations have worked with the World Customs Organization to help the customs authority reduce corruption and increase collection of revenues – estimated to be more than $25 million a year.	在喀麦隆，不少我们的组织与世界海关组织一道，帮助海关当局减少了腐败、增加了收入，据估算，每年可以增收2500万美元。


On the Laos-Vietnam border, a sub-regional cross-border transport agreement has cut cargo transit times from four hours to just over one hour.	在老挝-越南边境，一项亚地区跨境运输协议将货物转运时间从4小时缩减为不到1小时。


A new customs component to a highway project between Phnom Penh and Ho Chi Minh City helped increase the total value of trade through the Moc Bai-Bavet border by 40% over three years.	金边-胡志明市高速公路上的新海关工程让木牌（Moc Bai）-巴域（Bavet）边境通关贸易总量在三年内增加了40%。


In Peru, some of our banks have worked with international freight forwarders to connect remote villages and small businesses to export markets through national postal services, turning more than 300 small firms into exporters, most for the first time.	在秘鲁，我们的几家银行与国际货运代理一起通过国内邮递服务将边远村庄和小企业与出口市场联系了起来，让300多家小企业成为出口商，其中大部分是首次涉足出口业务。


The outlines of a new WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement are already clear, but some technical differences remain on specific provisions.	新的世贸组织贸易便利协定框架已经十分清晰，但在某些具体方面还存在技术分歧。


Developing countries want a credible commitment to support implementation, such as technical assistance and capacity-building. A World Bank study estimates that the costs of implementing the measures likely to be covered by a Trade Facilitation agreement would be relatively modest – $7-11 million in the countries studied, spread out over a number of years – especially when compared to the expected benefits.	发展中国家希望获得支持项目实施的可信承诺，比如技术援助和贸易能力建设。 一项世界银行研究估算，贸易便利协定所能覆盖的实施措施的成本相对较小——对于研究对象国来说只有700—1100万美元，且要多年才能实现——与预期收益一比显得特别微不足道。


Capacity-building and financing programs for governments that want to improve their trade facilitation are available already.	目前，希望改善贸易便利的政府已经能够获得能力建设和融资项目。


Major donor countries and international development organizations have put a priority on, and increased investment in, trade facilitation. According to the OECD, from 2002 to 2010, trade facilitation-related assistance increased ten-fold in real terms, from almost $40 million to nearly $400 million.	主要出资国和国际开发组织将贸易便利视为当务之急，并增加了投资。 根据经合组织的数据，2002—2010年，以实际值衡量，贸易便利相关援助增加了10倍，从4000万美元增加为近4亿美元。


The African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, and the World Bank stand ready – alongside the WTO – to assist developing countries through the process of full and effective implementation of the agreement.	非洲开发银行、亚洲开发银行、欧洲复兴开发银行、泛美开发银行、伊斯兰开发银行和世界银行——与世贸组织一起——都已做好了通过全面、高效实施新协定帮助发展中国家的准备。


That means helping countries to assess their trade-facilitation needs on a case-by-case basis, match those needs with the resources required, and broker partnerships between recipient countries and development allies to ensure that support is provided quickly and efficiently.	这意味着帮助它们根据具体情况进行贸易便利需求分析，将需求和要求的资源匹配起来，并协调受助国和开发协议国之间的伙伴关系，以保证援助能够快速高效地获得。


In international negotiations, there is always a way forward if the benefits of an agreement are shared by all.	在国际谈判中，只要一项协定的好处可以被所有国家分享，就一定能找到前进的突破口。


Trade facilitation offers a development dividend for all countries.	贸易便利可以为所有国家带来发展红利。


It is time for WTO members to make progress on issues where there is room to do so.	世贸组织成员国是时候行动起来取得进步了，而且也确实存在取得进步的空间。


It will be a down payment on a solid investment.	这将是可靠投资的第一步。


How to Prevent a Depression	如何避免萧条


AMSTERDAM – The latest economic data suggests that recession is returning to most advanced economies, with financial markets now reaching levels of stress unseen since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008.	阿姆斯特丹—最新的经济数据表明，大多数发达经济体正在重新陷入衰退，金融市场正在承受自2008年雷曼兄弟倒闭以来最大的压力。


The risks of an economic and financial crisis even worse than the previous one – now involving not just the private sector, but also near-insolvent sovereigns – are significant.	我们正面临出现比前一次更可怕的经济和金融危机的风险，而且这一风险还不小——这一次，危机将不仅包括私人部门，还将包括近于破产的主权当局。


So, what can be done to minimize the fallout of another economic contraction and prevent a deeper depression and financial meltdown?	因此，我们可以做些什么来让新一波经济收缩的后果最小化，并防止深度萧条和金融崩溃？


First, we must accept that austerity measures, necessary to avoid a fiscal train wreck, have recessionary effects on output.	首先，我们必须接受这一现实：紧缩措施虽然对于避免财政脱轨而言必不可少，但对产出却有着抑制效应。


So, if countries in the eurozone’s periphery are forced to undertake fiscal austerity, countries able to provide short-term stimulus should do so and postpone their own austerity efforts.	因此，如果欧元区外围国家被迫采取财政紧缩，有条件实施财政刺激的国家就不能首鼠两端，必须停止紧缩。


These countries include the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, the core of the eurozone, and Japan.	这些国家包括美国、英国、德国、欧元区核心国以及日本。


Infrastructure banks that finance needed public infrastructure should be created as well.	金融业所需要的公共基础设施——基础设施银行也必须建立起来。


Second, while monetary policy has limited impact when the problems are excessive debt and insolvency rather than illiquidity, credit easing, rather than just quantitative easing, can be helpful.	其次，由于问题出在过度负债和资不抵债，而不是流动性缺失，因此货币政策效果有限，但信贷宽松（而不是量化宽松）仍是大有裨益的。


The European Central Bank should reverse its mistaken decision to hike interest rates.	欧洲央行应该收回升息的错误决策。


More monetary and credit easing is also required for the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England, and the Swiss National Bank.	美联储、日本银行、英格兰银行和瑞士国民银行也应该采取更多的货币和信贷宽松。


Inflation will soon be the last problem that central banks will fear, as renewed slack in goods, labor, real estate, and commodity markets feeds disinflationary pressures.	要不了多久，通胀就将成为央行所面临的问题中最微不足道的哪一个，因为商品、劳务、房地产和大宗商品市场的新一轮不景气将形成通缩压力。


Third, to restore credit growth, eurozone banks and banking systems that are under-capitalized should be strengthened with public financing in a European Union-wide program.	第三，为了���振信贷增长，欧元区银行和资本不足的银行体系应该在欧盟层面的计划下通过公共融资加以强化。


To avoid an additional credit crunch as banks deleverage, banks should be given some short-term forbearance on capital and liquidity requirements.	为了避免在银行去杠杆化时出现又一次信贷动荡，各银行应该获得一定的短期资本和流动性要求的放松。


Also, since the US and EU financial systems remain unlikely to provide credit to small and medium-size enterprises, direct government provision of credit to solvent but illiquid SMEs is essential.	此外，由于美国和欧盟金融体系仍然难以向中小企业提供信贷，由政府直接向财务状况良好但缺少流动性的中小企业提供信贷就变得至关重要了。


Fourth, large-scale liquidity provision for solvent governments is necessary to avoid a spike in spreads and loss of market access that would turn illiquidity into insolvency.	第四，向偿债能力无忧的政府提供大规模流动性是避免利差急剧扩大、无法从市场上融资以至于流动性缺失问题恶化为偿付能力问题的必要手段。


Even with policy changes, it takes time for governments to restore their credibility.	即使政策有所转变，政府也需要时间来重塑信誉。


Until then, markets will keep pressure on sovereign spreads, making a self-fulfilling crisis likely.	到目前为止，市场将继续对主权利差施压，自我实现的危机的风险还没有消除。


Today, Spain and Italy are at risk of losing market access.	如今，西班牙和意大利正在面临无法从市场上融资的风险。


Official resources need to be tripled – through a larger European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), Eurobonds, or massive ECB action – to avoid a disastrous run on these sovereigns.	官方资金渠道必须三管齐下——更大规模的欧洲金融稳定基金（EFSF）、欧元债券以及欧洲央行呃大动作——以避免这些国家遭遇灾难性的主权债务挤兑。


Fifth, debt burdens that cannot be eased by growth, savings, or inflation must be rendered sustainable through orderly debt restructuring, debt reduction, and conversion of debt into equity.	第五，无法用增长、储蓄和通胀纾解的债务负担必须通过有序债务重组、债务削减和债权-股权转换让其变得可持续。


This needs to be carried out for insolvent governments, households, and financial institutions alike.	资不抵债的政府、家庭和金融机构都需要经历这样一个过程。


Sixth, even if Greece and other peripheral eurozone countries are given significant debt relief, economic growth will not resume until competitiveness is restored.	第六，即使希腊和其他欧元区外围国家获得了大面积债务豁免，经济增长仍将保持低迷，除非它们重新获得竞争力。


And, without a rapid return to growth, more defaults – and social turmoil – cannot be avoided.	此外，如果增长不能迅速复苏，那么更多的违约——甚至社会动荡——将成为不可避免之事。


There are three options for restoring competitiveness within the eurozone, all requiring a real depreciation – and none of which is viable:	在欧元区内重塑竞争力有三条途径，这三条途径都必须经过实际贬值才能实现，而且没有一条目前是可行的：


·         A sharp weakening of the euro towards parity with the US dollar, which is unlikely, as the US is weak, too.	·         欧元对美元大幅贬值，这是不可能的，因为美元目前也很弱势。


·         A rapid reduction in unit labor costs, via acceleration of structural reform and productivity growth relative to wage growth, is also unlikely, as that process took 15 years to restore competitiveness to Germany.	·         单位劳动力成本大幅下降，可以通过加速结构改革、让生产力增长快于工资增长来实现。 这也是不可能的，因为德国走完这一重塑竞争力之路花了足足15年。


·         A five-year cumulative 30% deflation in prices and wages – in Greece, for example – which would mean five years of deepening and socially unacceptable depression; even if feasible, this amount of deflation would exacerbate insolvency, given a 30% increase in the real value of debt.	·         在五年内让价格和工资累计降低30%（以希腊为例），这将意味着为期五年的深度的、不为社会所接受的萧条； 即使这条路可行，如此幅度的通缩也将进一步破坏偿债能力，让债务实际价值扩大30%。


Because these options cannot work, the sole alternative is an exit from the eurozone by Greece and some other current members.	由于这三条途径都起不了效果，于是就只剩下一条路：希腊和其他一些成员国退出欧元区。


Only a return to a national currency – and a sharp depreciation of that currency – can restore competitiveness and growth.	只有回归国家货币——并且对其实施大幅贬值——才能重塑竞争力和经济增长。


Leaving the common currency would, of course, threaten collateral damage for the exiting country and raise the risk of contagion for other weak eurozone members.	当然，摆脱共同货币会造成附带伤害：威胁到留在欧元区内的国家，还会给其他疲软的欧元区成员国造成传染风险。


The balance-sheet effects on euro debts caused by the depreciation of the new national currency would thus have to be handled through an orderly and negotiated conversion of euro liabilities into the new national currencies.	因此，由新的国家货币造成的欧元债资产负债表效应必须通过关于将欧元债务转变为新国家货币债务的有序的协商对话来解决。


Appropriate use of official resources, including for recapitalization of eurozone banks, would be needed to limit collateral damage and contagion.	适当使用官方资金渠道（包括欧元区银行的资本重组）将成为限制附带伤害和传染的必要措施。


Seventh, the reasons for advanced economies’ high unemployment and anemic growth are structural, including the rise of competitive emerging markets.	第七，发达经济体的高失业和低增长是结构性问题，极具竞争力的新兴市场的崛起也是原因之一。


The appropriate response to such massive changes is not protectionism.	对于这种剧变的合理应对措施绝不是保护主义。


Instead, the advanced economies need a medium-term plan to restore competitiveness and jobs via massive new investments in high-quality education, job training and human-capital improvements, infrastructure, and alternative/renewable energy.	事实上，发达经济体需要出台中期计划，通过对高质量教育、职业培训和人力资本改善、基础设施以及替代/可再生能源的大手笔新投资来重塑竞争力、创造就业岗位。


Only such a program can provide workers in advanced economies with the tools needed to compete globally.	唯有这样的计划才能向发达经济体的工作者提供全球竞争武器。


Eighth, emerging-market economies have more policy tools left than advanced economies do, and they should ease monetary and fiscal policy.	第八，新兴市场经济体所能动用的政策工具比发达经济体更多，它们应该放松货币和财政政策。


The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank can serve as lender of last resort to emerging markets at risk of losing market access, conditional on appropriate policy reforms.	IMF和世界银行可以作为最后贷款人，当新兴市场国家无法从市场上获得融资时，可以求助于IMF和世行，但要以适当的政策改革为条件。


And countries, like China, that rely excessively on net exports for growth should accelerate reforms, including more rapid currency appreciation, in order to boost domestic demand and consumption.	而中国等国家过于依赖进出口刺激增长，它们应该加速改革，包括让货币快速升值，以提振内需和消费。


The risks ahead are not just of a mild double-dip recession, but of a severe contraction that could turn into Great Depression II, especially if the eurozone crisis becomes disorderly and leads to a global financial meltdown.	我们所面临的风险不仅是温和的二次探底衰退，而是可能滑入大萧条II的严重收缩，特别是如果欧元区危机陷入混乱并引发全球金融崩溃的话。


Wrong-headed policies during the first Great Depression led to trade and currency wars, disorderly debt defaults, deflation, rising income and wealth inequality, poverty, desperation, and social and political instability that eventually led to the rise of authoritarian regimes and World War II.	第一次大萧条期间的政策失当导致了贸易战和货币战、混乱无序的债务违约、通货紧缩、收入和财富不平等加剧、贫困、绝望以及社会和政治不稳定，最终出现了集权主义的崛起和第二次世界大战。


The best way to avoid the risk of repeating such a sequence is bold and aggressive global policy action now.	要避免重蹈此覆辙的风险，最好的办法就是马上采取大胆积极的全球政策。


The Egypt-Israel Peace Test	埃及-以色列和平考验


WASHINGTON, DC – The rocket strikes that a militant Islamist group recently fired from the Egyptian Sinai into the Israeli city of Eilat served as yet another reminder of how delicate bilateral relations remain two years after Egypt’s revolution.	华盛顿—伊斯兰军事组织最近从埃及西奈半岛向以色列城市埃拉特（Eilat）发射了火箭，这又一次提醒我们，在埃及革命爆发两年后，两国关系仍然十分脆弱。


Terrorist activity could easily cause a crisis on the border, with the potential to trigger an unwanted confrontation that would threaten the peace treaty that normalized bilateral relations in 1979.	恐怖活动轻易地就能在边境掀起一场危机，并有可能触发可悲的冲突，威胁到1979年双边关系正常化和平条约。


To avoid such an outcome, Israel and Egypt must take convincing action now to uphold the treaty.	为了避免这一结果，以色列和埃及必须从现在开始拿出令人信服的举动维护条约。


Last November, when hostilities erupted in Gaza, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi mediated a swift resolution, even providing a guarantee for the cease-fire with Gaza’s ruling Hamas.	去年11月，加沙敌意爆发，埃及总统穆尔西提出了迅速的解决方案，甚至保证与统治加沙的哈马斯停火。


Morsi thus implicitly recommitted Egypt to upholding peace on the border and to playing a constructive role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.	穆尔西于是间接地重申了埃及维护边境和平以及在巴以冲突中扮演建设性角色的承诺。


This boosted confidence in Israel that the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s ruling party, would uphold the 1979 peace treaty.	这提振了以色列的信心，认为埃及执政党穆斯林兄弟会将支持1979年和平条约。


But Morsi has not explicitly endorsed peace with Israel and has avoided direct engagement with Israeli leaders.	但穆尔西并没有明确支持对以和平，也避免直接和以色列领导人碰面。


Preserving peace is in both countries’ interests.	维护和平符合两国利益。


The attack on an Egyptian army outpost in the Sinai last summer, in which armed militants killed 16 soldiers, demonstrated that terrorism threatens Egypt just as it does Israel.	武装激进分子去年夏天打击了埃及驻西奈半岛前哨部队并杀害16名士兵，这表明恐怖主义对埃及的威胁不亚于以色列。


In this volatile environment, reverting to a confrontational relationship with Israel would be extremely dangerous, inviting the risk of another disastrous war.	在如此动荡的环境中，与以色列重回冲突关系是极度危险的，有可能引发新一场灾难性战争。


Upholding the peace treaty with Israel would have the opposite effect, enabling Egypt to pursue its goals of consolidating the military’s authority at home and enhancing its influence throughout the Middle East.	支持与以色列的和平条约则正好相反，能让埃及追求其目标——巩固军队在国内的权威，增强其在中东地区的影响力。


Egyptian and Israeli leaders must recognize that the ongoing struggle to secure the Sinai Peninsula – which the treaty established as a demilitarized zone – is testing peace daily.	埃及和以色列领导人必须认识到，确保西奈半岛——和平条约规定的去军事区——安全的持续斗争每天都���考验和平。


Israel has so far tolerated Egyptian military activity and force deployments that technically violate the bilateral treaty, approving them retroactively in the hope that Egypt will do more to secure the border and crack down on weapons smuggling into Gaza.	到目前为止，以色列容忍了埃及的军事行动和军力部署——这在技术上已经违反了双边条约，保留追溯权利，希望埃及能在保证边境安全和打击加沙武器走私方面做得更多。


But Israel has little confidence that the deployments will enhance its security, and Israeli leaders are becoming increasingly anxious about the Egyptian military’s mobilization of forces without notice.	但以色列对于埃及驻军能增强安全并不抱有信心，以色列领导人也日益担心埃及军队不经告知就进行的力量调动。


In Egypt, the treaty is even more clearly under threat.	在埃及，双边条约更明显地处于危险之中。


The Muslim Brotherhood has long called for a referendum on the treaty, viewing the restrictions on Egyptian forces in the Sinai as an affront to national sovereignty.	穆斯林兄弟会长期要求就条约举行公投，认为限制埃及在西奈半岛的军事行动是对国家主权的公然践踏。


The Brothers condemned Morsi’s involvement in resolving the Gaza crisis last year, portraying it as kowtowing to Israel.	兄弟会指责穆尔西参与去年的加沙危机解决，认为这是对以色列卑躬屈膝。


In fact, Morsi is under fire from both the left and the right for upholding former President Hosni Mubarak’s obliging approach to Israel, as well as for reasserting Mubarak’s authoritarian bargain – diplomatic and financial support in exchange for “stability” – with the United States.	事实上，穆尔西因为支持前总统穆巴拉克的亲以色列方针以及肯定穆巴拉克与美国的政权讨价还价（用外交和金融支持换取“稳定”）而遭到左右两翼的抨击。


Faced with a collapsing economy and approaching elections, the temptation for Morsi to stoke nationalist, anti-Israel sentiment will become stronger.	面临经济崩溃局面和即将到来的选举的穆尔西面临着极大的诱惑点燃民族主义反以色列情绪。


A major incident on the border could be enough to push him over the edge.	边境发生大事足以促使他下定决心。


In order to sustain the peace treaty, Egypt and Israel should renegotiate its military annex to allow Egypt to deploy forces in previously restricted zones and re-establish full sovereignty over the Sinai.	为了维系和平条约，埃及和以色列应该重新协商军事附则，允许埃及在先前的限制区部署军队并重新获得西奈半岛的完全主权。


Such a move would strengthen bilateral relations, generate goodwill in Egypt, and increase Israel’s confidence in the Muslim Brotherhood’s commitment to peace.	这一步将加强双边关系，赢得埃及的好感，并增强以色列对穆斯林兄弟会和平承诺的信心。


During such a renegotiation, the two countries would discuss in detail the most effective approach to tackling their shared challenges related to terrorism and transnational crime, in order to ensure that Egypt’s increased military presence in the Sinai also enhances Israel’s security.	再重新谈判期间，两国将详细讨论应对与恐怖主义和跨国犯罪有关的共同挑战的最有效办法，从而确保埃及增加西奈半岛军事部署能同时增进以色列的安全。


Egypt’s newly democratic government would be more strictly accountable for fulfilling the treaty’s terms if it played an active role in establishing them.	埃及的新民主政府将受到更严格的问责——在更积极地规定条约内容后是否能够不折不扣执行。


At the same time, the agreement would boost domestic support for Egypt’s government and enhance its regional standing.	与此同时，埃以协定将增加埃及政府的国内支持度，提高其地区威望。


Likewise, US involvement in the negotiations would benefit all parties.	类似地，让美国加入谈判对三方都有利。


The process would provide an opportunity for the Egyptian military to engage with the US, helping to bolster its case for aid in a difficult environment.	这一过程能给埃及军队带来与美国会晤的机会，有助于增加其在困难环境下获得援助的机会。


Moreover, the US could set clear, narrow terms for the talks and provide a guarantee that the outcome would not impinge on Israel’s core interests, thereby mitigating Israeli officials’ fears that opening the treaty’s military annex for revision would call into question its other terms.	此外，美国可以为谈判设定清晰精确的条件，并保证结果不会侵犯以色列的核心利益，从而减轻以色列官员关于开启条约军事附则修订会让其他条款遭到质疑。


Finally, playing a successful role in bolstering Israel-Egypt relations could advance US Secretary of State John Kerry’s diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East.	最后，在巩固埃以关系中扮演成功角色能有助于推进美国国务卿克里在中东的外交努力。


In a region as volatile as the Middle East, no country can afford to take peace for granted.	在中东这样的动荡地区，没有哪个国家有把和平当做理所当然的奢侈。


But, by renewing their bilateral treaty now, Egypt and Israel would maximize their chances of prolonging an arrangement that has kept them from fighting for more than three decades.	但是，现在修订双边条约可以让埃及和以色列有最大的机会延长把它们从三十多年针锋相对史中拯救出来的安排。


How to Resolve the Euro Crisis	怎样解决欧元危机


NEW YORK – A comprehensive solution of the euro crisis must have three major components: reform and recapitalization of the banking system, a eurobond regime, and an exit mechanism.	纽约—一个完整的欧元危机解决方案必须包含三大主要部分：银行体系改革和资本结构调整、欧元债券机制，以及退出机制。


First, the banking system.	首先是银行体系。


The European Union’s Maastricht Treaty was designed to deal only with imbalances in the public sector; but, as it happened, the excesses in the banking sector were far worse.	欧盟马斯特里赫特条约只能对付公共部门失衡，但事实证明银行部门发展过度的危害要大得多。


The euro’s introduction led to housing booms in countries like Spain and Ireland.	欧元的引入导致了西班牙和爱尔兰等国的地产繁荣。


Eurozone banks became among the world’s most over-leveraged – and the worst-affected by the crash of 2008.	欧元区银行成了全世界杠杆率最高的银行，也是在2008年金融危机中受创最重的银行。


They remain badly in need of protection from the threat of insolvency.	它们至今仍然急需保护，否则就难逃破产厄运。


The first step was taken recently when the European Financial Stability Facility was authorized to rescue banks as well as governments.	最近，欧洲已经迈出了第一步：欧洲金融稳定基金被授权拯救银行和政府。


This needs to be followed by other steps.	但后续步骤需要跟上。


The equity capital of banks urgently needs to be substantially increased.	银行股权资本急需大幅提高。


And if a European agency is to guarantee banks’ solvency, that agency must also oversee them.	而如果要成立一个欧洲机构来担保银行不会破产，那么这一机构就必须担起监管银行之责。


A European banking agency would break up the incestuous relationship between banks and regulators that was at the root of the excesses that fueled the current crisis.	成立欧洲银行机构能打破银行和监管者之间你中有我、我中有你的混乱关系——这正是令当前危机大大恶化的银行部门发展过度的根源。


And it would interfere much less with national sovereignty than would the subordination of fiscal policies to an EU or eurozone-wide authority.	而与把财政政策交予欧盟或欧元区当局相比，欧洲银行机构对国家主权的干涉更少。


Second, Europe needs eurobonds.	其次，欧洲需要欧元债券。


The introduction of the euro was supposed to reinforce convergence; in fact, it created divergences, with widely different levels of indebtedness and competitiveness separating the member countries.	引入欧元的本意是为了让欧洲趋同； 但事实上，这反而造成了分歧，各成员国的负债情况和竞争力水平大相径庭。


If heavily indebted countries have to pay heavy risk premiums, their debt becomes unsustainable.	如果重债国必须付出极高的风险溢价，它们的债务就会变得不可持续。


And that is now happening.	这就是目前正在发生的事情。


The solution is obvious: deficit countries must be allowed to refinance the bulk of their debt on the same terms as surplus countries.	解决方案是显而易见的：必须允许赤字国按与盈余国相同的条件对其债务进行再融资。


This is best accomplished by authorizing the issuance of eurobonds, which would be jointly guaranteed by all of the member countries.	这一点最好通过发行欧元债券来完成，欧元债券将由所有成员国共同担保。


While the principle is clear, the details will require a lot of work.	原理是明细的，但细节上要需要多下功夫。


Which supranational agency will be in charge of issuing eurobonds?	由哪个超国家机构来主管欧元债券发行？


What rules will it follow in authorizing issuance?	用什么规则来规范发行授权？


How will it enforce the rules?	如何强化这些规则？


Presumably, the eurobonds would be under the control of the eurozone finance ministers.	大体上看，欧元债券将由欧元区各财政部长控制。


The board would constitute the fiscal counterpart of the European Central Bank; it would also be the European counterpart of the International Monetary Fund.	这个委员会将是欧洲央行的财政版； 也可以说是国际货币基金组织的欧洲版。


The debate will therefore revolve around voting rights.	争论将围绕投票权展开。


The ECB operates on the principle of one vote per country; the IMF assigns voting rights according to countries’ capital contributions.	欧洲央行的原则是一国一票； IMF则根据各国资本贡献来分配投票权。


Which system should prevail?	那种体系会胜出？


The former could give carte blanche to debtor countries to run up their deficits; the latter might perpetuate a two-speed Europe.	前者好比是给债务国开出空头支票，任由其填写数字以弥补赤字； 而后者可能会长期保持欧洲的两极分化。


Some compromise will be necessary.	必须在这两种体系之间达到妥协。


Because the fate of Europe depends on Germany, and because the issuance of eurobonds will put Germany’s own credit standing at risk, the compromise will clearly have to put Germany in the driver’s seat.	欧洲的命运唯德国马首是瞻，且欧元债券的发行将给德国自身信用带来危险，因此，要达成妥协，显然必须让德国来当主导者。


Unfortunately, Germany has some unsound ideas about macroeconomic policy: it wants the rest of Europe to follow its example.	不幸的是，德国的宏观经济政策观点并不十分靠谱：它希望其他欧洲国家跟在它身后亦步亦趋。


But what works for Germany cannot work for the rest of Europe: no country can run a chronic trade surplus without others running deficits.	但在德国有效的政策在其他欧洲国家不可能有效：没有哪个国家可以在其他国家都不存在赤字的情况下长期保持盈余。


Germany must propose rules that other countries can follow.	德国必须拿出其他国家可以效仿的方案来。


These rules must allow for a gradual reduction in indebtedness. They must also allow countries with high unemployment, like Spain, to continue running  budget deficits.	新规则必须允许逐步地消除债务，也必须允许西班牙等高失业率国家继续维持预算赤字的状态。


Rules involving targets for cyclically adjusted deficits can accomplish both of these goals.	包括周期性赤字调整目标的规则可以同时达到这两个目标。


Most importantly, the rules must recognize their own imperfection – and thus must remain open to review and improvement.	最重要的是，新规则必须了解自身的缺陷，从而对评估和改善持开放态度。


Bruegel, the Brussels-based think tank, has proposed that eurobonds should constitute 60% of eurozone members’ outstanding external debt.	布鲁塞尔智库布鲁格尔（Bruegel）提出，欧元债券应该包含60%的欧元区成员国未偿还外债。


Given the high risk premiums currently prevailing in Europe, this percentage is too low to constitute a level playing field.	由于目前欧洲风险溢价极高，这一比重显得太低了，无法为各国打造一个平等的舞台。


In my view, new issues should be entirely in eurobonds up to a limit set by the Board.	在我看来，新的债券发行应该完全以欧元债券形式进行，其限额由委员会决定。


The higher the volume of eurobonds a country seeks to issue, the more severe the conditions the Board would impose.	如果一国想发行更多的欧元债券，那么委员会就会向它施以更严苛的条件。


The Board should have no problem imposing its will, because denying the right to issue additional eurobonds would be a powerful deterrent.	委员会应该能够随心所欲地行使其意愿，因为否决增加欧元债券发行权将是有力的威慑。


Surveillance must be improved, however, in order to give countries timely notice when they are in violation.	但与此同时，监督也必须加强，以便各国及时注意到即将撞线的情况。


This leads directly to the third unsolved problem: What happens if a country is unwilling or unable to keep within agreed conditions?	这直接导致了第三个未解决的问题：如果一国不愿或无力达到协议条件会如何？


Inability to issue eurobonds could result in a disorderly default or devaluation.	无法发行欧元债券将导致无序的违约或贬值。


In the absence of an exit mechanism, this would have catastrophic consequences.	如果缺乏退出机制，这会带来灾难性后果。


A deterrent that is too dangerous to invoke would lack credibility. Greece constitutes a cautionary example.	耸人听闻的威慑缺乏可信度，希腊就是明证。


This is the most difficult of the three problem areas, and I do not claim to have a ready solution.	这是三个问题中最难解决的部分，我也找不到现成的解决方案。


Much depends on how the Greek crisis plays out.	很大程度上，这要取决于希腊危机如何收场。


It might be possible to devise an orderly exit for a small country like Greece that could not be applied to a large one like Italy.	也许欧洲会设计出一种适合希腊这样的小国的有序退出机制，但这种机制对于像意大利这样的大国并不适用。


In that case, the eurobond regime would have to carry sanctions from which there is no escape – something like a European finance ministry that has political as well as financial legitimacy which could emerge from the intense debate and soul-searching that is so badly needed (particularly in Germany).	在这种情况下，欧元债券机制就必须对无退出机制的国家采取制裁措施——如同成立了一个具有政治和财政合法性的欧洲财政部。 这样一个机构可以从激烈的争论和急需的深思（特别是德国）中产生。


One thing is certain: these three problem areas – reform and recapitalization of the banking system, a eurobond regime, and an exit mechanism – need to be resolved to make the euro a viable currency.	有一件事是确定的：这三大问题——改革和银行体系资本结构调整、欧元债券机制以及退出机制——不解决，欧元就走不出死胡同。


But financial markets might not offer the respite necessary to put the new arrangements in place.	但金融市场可能不会给欧洲人必须的时间来达成新的一致了。


Under continued market pressure, the European Council might have to find a stopgap arrangement to avoid a calamity.	在市场的持续压力下，欧洲委员会或许将不得不寻求权宜之计以避免灾难性后果。


It could authorize the ECB to lend directly to governments that cannot borrow from the markets on reasonable terms until a eurobond regime is introduced.	它可能授权欧洲央行直接向无法以合适条件从市场上借钱的政府发放贷款，直到欧元债券机制引入为止。


How to Save Brazil	如何拯救巴西


SÃO PAULO – Brazil’s political crisis appears to be coming to a head.	圣保罗—巴西政治危机似乎正在走向终结。


Now that the lower house of the National Congress has voted in favor of President Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment for violating fiscal rules, the Senate’s 81 members will vote in the coming days on whether to try her.	目前国会众议院投票结果是赞成因违反财政规则弹劾总统罗塞夫，几天后，参议院81名成员将投票决定是否弹劾罗塞夫。


If 42 agree, she will be suspended for up to 180 days, during which time Vice President Michel Temer will assume the presidency.	如果42人赞成，罗塞夫将被停职最多180天，在此期间由副总统特梅尔（Michel Temer）代行总统职责。


If the Senate does not produce a two-thirds vote for conviction during that period, Rousseff will return to the presidency.	如果参议院在此期间没有以三分之二多数确认弹劾，罗塞夫将重新担任总统。


But the most likely outcome, it seems, will be for Temer to carry out the final two years of Rousseff’s term.	但可能性最大的结果是特梅尔将代替罗塞夫履行剩余两年总统任期。


Whatever happens next, Brazil is not out of the woods.	不管接下来发生什么，巴西都没有摆脱困境。


Its economic situation is dire – a direct result of populist policies initiated by Rousseff’s predecessor, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and which she maintained.	其经济状态十分糟糕——这是罗塞夫前任卢拉实施、罗塞夫萧规曹随的民粹主义政策的直接结果。


In the early 2000s, flush with cash thanks to a commodity boom, Lula’s government began to distribute subsidized credit to consumers and businesses, hold down energy prices artificially, and expand government spending at more than double the rate of GDP growth.	本世纪初，大宗商品繁荣带来了大量现金，卢拉政府开始向消费者和企业提供补贴信用，人为降低能源价格，并以两倍于GDP增长的速度扩大政府支出。


The result was mounting public debt, which has now reached 70% of GDP, and a widening deficit, which has now reached nearly 11% of GDP.	结果是公共债务高企，现已高达GDP的70%，赤字也愈演愈烈，目前为接近GDP的11%。


Rather than acknowledge the problem and revise policies accordingly, Rousseff allegedly resorted to dodgy accounting tricks to enable her government ostensibly to meet its primary-surplus target without cutting social transfers, even as commodity prices collapsed.	罗塞夫并未承认问题并采取相应的政策，而是据称采用了会计欺诈手段让她的政府在表面上能够满足初级盈余目标，而不必削减社会转移支付，即使大宗商品价格出现了大跌。


This enabled her to win reelection in 2014 – and it is propelling her toward impeachment today.	这让她在2014年获得连任——也把她推向了今天面临弹劾的局面。


(The massive corruption scandal engulfing Petrobras, the state-owned oil company, which Rousseff used to head, has not helped her case.)	（罗塞夫曾经领导过的国有石油公司巴西石油身涉大规模腐败丑闻，令她的处境更加窘迫。 ）


But Rousseff is of course far from the only one suffering the consequences of this approach.	但罗塞夫显然不是唯一一个面临这一方针苦果的人。 如今，巴西正面临80年来最糟糕的经济衰退；


Brazil is now facing its worst economic recession in 80 years; unemployment stands at almost 10%; annual inflation exceeds 10%; and living standards have collapsed.	失业率接近10%； 年通货膨胀超过10%；


Though Brazilians pay 37% of GDP in taxes each year – about the same rate as Europeans – the quality of their public services remains very low.	生活水平大幅下降。 尽管巴西人每年缴纳的税收高达GDP的37%——与欧洲人相当——但巴西公共服务水平十分低下。


Assuming he takes over as President, Temer will have to act fast to put the economy back on track, rebuild business confidence, and restore the people’s trust in government.	如果由特梅尔代理总统，他将必须迅速行动起来让经济重回正轨，重建商业信心和民众对政府的信任。


It would be a daunting task for any leader, but it is especially so for one who will spend only two years in power and does not enjoy widespread popular support.	这对于任何领导人来说都是艰巨的任务，但对于智能掌权两年、民众支持率也不高的领导人来说尤其艰巨。


For Temer, there is no room for mistakes.	特梅尔没有犯错的空间。


His first mission will be to form a cabinet that can produce rigorous and credible economic policies and secure the needed congressional support.	他的第一个任务是组建一个内阁制定严厉而可信的经济政策，并保证获得必要的国会支持。


A four-point agenda for economic revitalization should then be implemented.	然后，他应该实施四点经济复兴日程。


The first point of that agenda should be to fast-track infrastructure investment.	第一点应该是快车道基础设施投资。


This is the fastest way to revive the economy and generate employment.	这是重振经济、制造就业最快捷的方法。


But Brazil desperately needs foreign capital to finance construction of roads, ports, and airports, as well as energy projects.	但巴西急需外国资本为公路、港口和机场建设以及能源项目提供资金。


To attract it, the government must improve transparency, simplify rules and regulations, introduce performance bonds (to guarantee the completion of projects), and abolish the cap on return on investment.	要吸引外部资本，政府必须改进透明度、简化规则和监管，引入履约保证（保证项目的完成），并取消投资回报限制。


The second item on the agenda should be labor-market reform.	第二点应该是劳动力市场改革。


The best approach, which would enable the government to avoid an endless political debate about which labor laws should be revoked, would be to approve a constitutional amendment that guarantees the right of workers to conclude private contracts with employers.	最佳方针是批准宪法修正案以保证工人与雇主签订私人合同的权利，这将让政府免于就应该取消那些劳动法律进行没完没了的政治争论。


Such a measure would reduce labor costs significantly and bring workers out of the informal sector.	这项措施将显著降低劳动力成本，让非正式部门的工人正式化。


Third, Temer must tackle pension reform.	第三，特梅尔必须实施退休金改革。


Though there is a consensus that the retirement age should be raised from 60 to 65, there is strong resistance to cutting benefits.	尽管已有共识认为退休年龄应该从60岁提高到65岁，但削减福利的阻力很大。


Again, the government can minimize time-wasting political entanglements – this time, by focusing on the public sector.	在这里，政府也可以通过将注意力集中在私人部门而让浪费时间的政治纠纷最小化。


Brazil’s government currently spends roughly the same amount on 950,000 retired public servants that it spends on 28 million retired private-sector workers, meaning that the bigger problem is also the one that will be less politically difficult to address.	目前，巴西政府在大约950,000名退休公职人员身上的支出与2,800万私人部门工人相当，这意味着更大的问题解决起来的政治难度更小。


Finally, Brazil needs to reinsert itself into the global economy.	最后，巴西需要重回全球经济。


To that end, it must revive productivity growth, expand exports, open its economy to international competition, and forge new bilateral and regional trade deals with major economic players.	在这方面，巴西必须重振生产率增长，扩大出口，向国际竞争开放经济，并与主要经济大国签订新的双边和地区贸易协议。


If Temer’s government succeeds in the first three areas, building up its credibility in the process, it will be in a strong position to fulfill these objectives, as well.	如果特梅尔政府首先在前三个方面取得成功，并在此过程中构建信誉，那么这些目标也大有希望实现。


This four-point agenda is crucial to restoring Brazil’s economy and bringing public spending under control.	这一四点日程对于重塑巴西经济、控制公共支出至关重要。


But it will not be enough to stop the vicious boom-and-bust cycles to which Brazil has long been vulnerable.	但它仍不足以阻止长期以来巴西常常陷入的恶性枯荣循环。


For that, Brazilians must take a hard look at the attitudes and expectations that have placed them in this situation.	在这方面，巴西必须认真审视让它陷入这一境地的看法和预期。


Real change means breaking the addiction to a paternalistic and interventionist state and supporting needed policy adjustments, even when they are unpleasant.	真正的变化意味着打破对家长统治和干涉主义国家的依赖，支持所需要的政策调整，即使这些调整并不令人愉快。


Brazilians still have a long way to go to eliminate corruption, reform or rescind populist policies, and create efficient and responsible state institutions.	巴西在根除腐败、改革或取消民粹主义政策，以及建立高效负责的国家机构方面还有很长的路要走。


But the combination of popular indignation, courageous and independent judges, and a dynamic free press seems to be propelling the country along a promising path, as the irresponsible actions of politicians and businessmen are not only brought to light, but also punished.	但民意、富于勇气的独立法官以及充满活力的自由媒体似乎正在联手推动巴西走向光明的道路，政客和商人的不负责任的行为不但被曝光，还受到了惩罚。


By itself, Rousseff’s likely impeachment will solve nothing.	罗塞夫可能遭到弹劾，这本身解决不了任何问题。


But if it helps to bury beliefs and values that have been holding Brazil back, the country, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, may find itself at the end of the beginning.	但如果这能葬送拖住巴西后退的信念和价值，那么，借用丘吉尔的话说，巴西终将启动。


How to Sell Anti-Protectionism	如何推销反保护主义


STOCKHOLM – The looming global recession has brought government intervention to save failing companies to the forefront of economic policy.	斯德哥尔摩－日益逼近的全球衰退使挽救崩溃中的公司的政府干预，成为经济政策的中心。


In a speech just prior to the recent G-20 summit, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown warned President-elect Barack Obama against bailing out America’s struggling Big Three automakers, arguing that global competition has made their decline irreversible.	就在最近的20国首脑峰会之前的一次演讲中，英国首相戈登·布朗警告美国当选总统巴拉克·奥巴马，不要援救陷入困境中的美国三大汽车制造商，他认为全球竞争使这三大汽车制造商的衰落无法逆转；


A bailout, then, would simply delay the inevitable at a huge cost to taxpayers.	因此，援救它们只能用纳税人付出的巨额成本，来延缓其必然衰落的趋势。


Such advice is always tough to sell – all the more so in the face of the worst economic outlook in 70 years.	这类建议总是很难推销——在70年来最差的经济前景面前，尤其如此。


After all, according to conventional wisdom, global competition moves jobs to low-cost countries and puts downward pressure on wages everywhere else.	毕竟，根据传统观点，竞争使工作机会向低成本国家转移，而且对其他地区的工资产生向下的压力。


As globalization intensifies and accelerates economic change, it affects the lives of ordinary citizens like never before, stoking popular fear.	在全球化强化和加速了经济转变的时候，它也前所未有地影响了普通民众的生活，并且引起了广泛的恐慌。


Little wonder, then, that French president Nicolas Sarkozy succumbed to the allure of protectionism during last year’s election campaign, as did both presidential candidates in the United States.	所以，难怪和美国的两位总统候选人一样，法国总统尼可拉斯·萨科齐在去年的选举活动中，被保护主义的诱惑所屈服。


But protectionism need not be the only alternative to fear of global competition.	但是，保护主义并不是对全球竞争的恐慌的唯一选择。


In the Scandinavian countries, as in the US, foreign competition intensified sharply during the past decade.	在斯堪的纳维亚国家，和像在美国一样，在过去十年里外国竞争急剧加剧。


China and India gained considerable economic power, and close neighbors in previously isolated communist states were rapidly integrated in the European economy.	中国和印度积累了巨大的经济实力，而且位于以前被孤立的共产主义国家中的临近国家，在快速地融入到欧洲经济之中。


However, surveys by Pew Research show that in Sweden, 85% of the population agrees that trade is good for their country, compared to only 59% of Americans.	然而，佩尤研究中心(Pew Research Center)的调查显示，在瑞典，85％的民众认为贸易对他们国家是有益的，而在美国只有59％的人这样认为。


Among Swedish industrial workers, the figure is 75% in favor.	在瑞典的产业工人中，认同这一观点的人达到75％。


How can that be?	怎么会是这样呢？


By designing educational and social protection policies that strengthen the individual, Scandinavian politicians have sought to promote change rather than prevent it.	通过制定增强个人能力的教育和社会保护政策，斯堪的纳维亚的政治家寻求去推动变化，而不是阻止变化。


The positive public opinion in Sweden is not a symptom of brainwashing, but a rational response to people’s experience during the last decade.	瑞典公众对全球积极的观点，不是被洗脑的结果，而是对他们过去十年经历的一种理性回应。


As competition intensified and production started moving to the Baltic States and Eastern Europe, Sweden’s policy answer was to upgrade the skills of the work force.	在竞争加剧，生产开始向波罗的海国家和东欧转移时，瑞典对此的政策回应是提升劳动力的技能。


As a result, from 1997 to 2007, Swedish exports nearly doubled and industrial production grew by 36%, with manufacturing companies achieving record-high productivity growth.	结果，从1997年到2007年，瑞典的出口几乎翻倍，工业生产增长了36％，制造业公司生产力的增长创出了历史新高。


Indeed, while annual US output per hour grew by 6.2% during this period, Swedish productivity rose by 8%.	事实上，美国在这段时间的每小时年产出增长了6. 2％，而瑞典的生产力增加了8％。


Sweden accumulated a current-account surplus of 53% of GDP, in contrast to America’s 48%-of-GDP deficit.	瑞典积累了GDP53％的经常账户盈余，与此形成对比的是，美国产生了GDP48％的赤字。


Employment rose by 11%, and blue-collar workers’ wages increased by 24%, fueling a more than 30% surge in private consumption.	瑞典的就业增加了11％，并且蓝领工人的工资增长了24％，刺激了超过30％的个人消费增长。


In short, even as globalization progressed, Swedish wage earners enjoyed a substantial improvement in living standards.	简而言之，即使在全球化前进的时候，瑞典工薪阶层的生活水平也得到了实实在在的提高。


While some jobs moved abroad, the net effect was still greatly positive.	虽然瑞典有些工作转移到了国外，但是净效应仍然是非常积极的。


The secret behind Sweden’s successful development, and hence people’s attitudes, is how the costs of change are distributed.	瑞典成功发展背后的秘密，以及因此而形成的人们的态度，是怎样分配变化的成本。


Official policy aims to reduce the cost of globalization for individuals, but never for companies.	瑞典官方的政策致力于降低全球化为个人带来的成本，但是从来不降低其给公司造成的成本。


Entrepreneurs need to face competition in order to develop, whereas individuals who are laid off may have difficulties getting back into productive work.	为了发展，企业家需要面对竞争，但是，失业的个人重新回到生产性工作或许会有困难。


As trade minister of Sweden for most of this period, I never hindered or postponed import competition.	作为在这一时期的大部分时间里担任瑞典贸易部长的人，我从来不阻碍或延缓进口竞争。


In the European Union, Sweden voted against almost all anti-dumping and other protectionist proposals.	在欧盟，瑞典几乎投票反对所有的反倾销和其他的保护主义提案。


This never met any criticism from my voters, because educational policy and the social safety net were designed to lower workers’ risk aversion.	这样做从来没有遭到我的选民的批评，因为瑞典制定的教育政策和社会保障安全网降低了工人对竞争的风险厌恶程���。


Broad educational policies equip an increasing share of Sweden’s population with basic education, thereby enhancing their employability.	广泛的教育政策使越来越多的瑞典人具有基础教育水平，从而增强了他们的就业能力。


Higher education is free of charge and accessible in all parts of the country.	瑞典高等教育免费，并且在全国所有地区都可以接受。


But reaching one cohort per year is too little to meet demands in a fast-changing economy.	但是每年只有一部分人接受高等教育，不能满足快速变化的经济的需要。


Therefore, on top of this, large resources are spent on modernizing the skills of those already in the labor force.	因此，瑞典还投入大量的资源，来更新那些已经就业了的劳动者的技能。


Social protection also has a broad, general nature.	瑞典的社会保护也具有广泛性和普遍性。


In the Scandinavian countries, as opposed to, say, Germany and the US, the government, not individual companies, are responsible for most social benefits.	在斯堪的纳维亚国家，例如，与德国和美国这样的国家相反，是政府而不是单独的公司，对绝大部分的社会福利负责。


That way, economically irrational lock-in effects, whereby workers simply cannot afford to change jobs, are avoided.	因此，从经济上讲非理性的锁定效应（lock-in effect），以及由此导致的工人无力变换工作的情况，得以避免。


Furthermore, benefits are generous enough to ensure that short periods of unemployment don’t force workers to sell their homes or even cars.	而且，瑞典的社会福利足以保证短期失业不会迫使瑞典工人卖掉他们的房子，或者甚至是汽车。


The system protects not only the unemployed, who can continue to pay their mortgages and interest, but also indirectly the banks, because their loans to households are repaid even in times of recession.	这种社会福利系统不仅保护那些失业的人可以继续支付他们的抵押贷款和利息，而且也间接地保护了银行，因为它们给瑞典家庭提供的贷款，即使是在经济不景气的时候，也会得到偿还。


And, instead of solving all sorts of economically caused private problems, laid-off workers can concentrate on finding new and more future-oriented jobs.	而且，失业工人可以集中精力寻找新的面向未来的工作，而不是解决种种经济造成的私人问题。


No doubt, these policies are expensive. But they pay for themselves by producing growth and revenues.	毫无疑问，这些政策的支出是非常昂贵的，但是它们通过带来经济增长和收入来偿还这些支出。


As the past decade shows, they have served the Scandinavian countries well during a period of extreme internationalization.	正如过去十年的情况表明的那样，这些政策在极度的国际化时期，在斯堪的纳维亚国家起到了很好的作用。


Instead of giving in to conventional wisdom, we have exploited the possibilities that globalization and technological change offer.	我们已经利用了全球化和技术变化带来的可能性，而不是屈服于传统观点。


Could the Scandinavian model work for others?	斯堪的纳维亚模式能够适用于其他地区吗？


At the very least, the Scandinavian example shows that politicians have more than one option to choose from when considering how to handle globalization.	至少，斯堪的纳维亚的例子显示，政治家在考虑如何处理全球化时，不是只有一种选择。


Intense foreign competition and rapid technological change does not have to be a race to the bottom.	激烈的外国竞争和快速的技术变化不是一定要成为竞相降低标准的竞次。


On the contrary, it can be compatible with rapidly rising real income and more and better jobs.	相反，它却能和快速增加的实际收入和更多更好的工作相容。


How to Sell Global Re-Balancing	如何推销全球再平衡政策


CHICAGO – At its most recent meeting in Toronto this spring, the G-20 agreed to disagree.	发自芝加哥——在今春的多伦多G20峰会上，各国领导人所取得的成果就是都重申了自己的观点。


Even though the world economy is desperately in need of rebalancing, their declaration was deliberately vague enough to accommodate any set of domestic policies that countries might choose.	虽然世界经济亟待重新平衡，他们所发表的宣言却依然含糊其辞，模棱两可，与任何国家的国内政策都不相违背。


Everyone came away thinking that they had won, but the world largely lost.	最终每个与会代表都带着得胜的心情回国，但在全世界层面来说却是一场惨败。


World trade is highly imbalanced.	世界贸易存在着极大的不平衡。


Households in the United States, having spent too much, are now weighed down by debt.	曾经过度消费的美国家庭如今债务缠身。


Exporters in Europe and Asia have become excessively dependent on selling to the US and other, now-weakened, economies like Spain and the United Kingdom.	欧洲和亚洲又过度依赖对美国以及其他如今被削弱的经济体（比如西班牙和英国）的出口。


Myopic actions on both sides have helped entrench a longer-term pattern of behavior that only makes it harder to move away from today’s unsustainable equilibrium.	从前那种只顾眼前利益的互动已经令双方都养成了一种难以更改的长期行为模式，致使双方更难从当今这种不可持续的均衡中脱身出来。


As ever, change upsets the cozy status quo and the interests that benefit from it.	跟往常一样，变革打破了安逸的现状以及随之而来的利益和好处。


For example, the real-estate lobby in the US obviously has no desire to see government support for housing diminish, despite the fact that the US probably has far more housing stock than it can afford.	比如说，虽然美国的房屋数量显然已经超出了其承受能力，但地产界国会游说团却不希望于政府支持房屋缩减计划。


Similarly, the export lobby in China has no interest in a strong renminbi, even though it is in China’s long-term interest to let its currency appreciate.	同样，中国的出口业界也对强势人民币不敢兴趣，即便最近的升值是符合中国长远利益的。


We keep hoping that somehow meetings of heads of state will magically produce the policies that will rebalance world trade.	我们一直希望某场首脑会议能奇迹般地推出重新平衡全球贸易的政策。


Unfortunately, the macroeconomic changes that countries must make involve actions to which even heads of state are unable to commit.	但不幸的是，在某些必须采取国家行动的宏观经济改革上，即便是领导人都无法做出承诺的。


No US president can unilaterally agree to alter the pattern of government support and spending; that is a decision for Congress.	美国总统不能独自转变政府的支持和支出模式，因为决定权在国会手里。


Similarly, no Chinese president can unilaterally agree to allow the renminbi to appreciate faster; that is a consensus decision reached together with the various apparatchiks in the State Council and Communist Party.	同样，中国国家主席也无法令到人民币加快升值，因为首先必须在人民代表大会和中共内部达成共识。


Moreover, the necessary reforms in both America and China go well beyond these two steps. They require deep, fundamental changes.	更重要的是，中美两国所必须采取的改革不仅限于这两个层面，而是需要深层次的，根本性的变革。


So we are caught between a financially unsustainable pattern of global demand and the need for politically difficult changes in many countries’ domestic policies.	因此我们陷入了一个困境之中，一边是经济上不可持续的全球需求模式，一边是难以改变的各国国内政策。


All politics is local, and there is no local constituency for the global economy, so what triumphs often erodes global imbalances further.	所有政治都着眼于国内，没有人去为全球经济负责，因此所谓的国家胜利通常都只会令到全球不平衡的情况更加恶化。


The G-20 asked the International Monetary Fund to prepare a road map for the policies that countries will have to follow to restore stable global growth.	20国集团要求世界货币基金组织制定一张路线图，好让各国可以参照执行并实现全球稳定增长。


But neither the G-20 nor the IMF can impose its will on national governments – nor should they.	但问题是两者都无法将其意志施加到地方政府身上——也不应该。


How, then, can we go beyond ritualistic meetings that do little to advance the global agenda?	为此我们究竟如何才能摆脱那些空洞无物，对全球议程毫无促进作用的会议呢？


Obviously, we need more political support for that agenda.	很显然，我们需要为全球议程争取更多的政治支持。


Perhaps non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like Oxfam or Mothers against Land Mines suggest a way.	或许像Oxfam或者“母亲反地雷行动”这样的非政府组织能闯出一条道路。


These movements use pressure from below to convince political leaders that there is domestic support for international agreement.	这些组织可以自下而上地对领导人施加压力，让他们意识到国际协议背后是得到了国内支持的。


The ability of grassroots movements to influence policy is set to increase.	草根运动影响政策的能力正不断增强。


As the power of the Internet spreads through social and political networking sites, and as virtual democracy grows, this bottom-up influence is likely to grow.	随着互联网力量通过社会或政治网站不断扩散，以及实质民主力量的形成，这种自下而上的影响力正不断增强。


Those who want to influence political leaders must get used to convincing their masters, the people, directly.	那些试图影响领导人的人必须首先学会说服那些授予权力的人——那就是人民。


Unfortunately, it is difficult for existing NGOs to take up the cause of popularizing global economic policy coordination.	不幸的是，现有的非政府组织是难以承担为全球经济政策协作争取民众支持这个重担的。


Unlike hunger or land mines, the cause of rectifying global trade imbalances will not touch the public enough to attract the donations that are necessary to keep NGOs afloat.	不像饥饿和地雷，矫正全球贸易不平衡的进程并未能真正深入民间，因此这些非政府组织也无法募集到足够的运作经费。


But there is an organization that could do the job: the IMF. If the IMF reoriented a substantial portion of its activities towards influencing the influential among the world’s public, it could have far more impact on global macroeconomic policy, especially policies followed by countries that do not need its loans, than it does today.	但有一个组织能担此重任：世界货币基金组织，如果该组织能将其基本政策转为提高其在全球公众心中的影响力的话，它就能更多地影响全球宏观经济政策，甚至可以令那些并不需要向其贷款的国家遵循这���政策。


The IMF is currently under-equipped for this task.	世界货币基金组织目前并不具备完成这一任务的能力。


If it is to improve its persuasive capabilities, it must learn to become more like grassroots activists, with punchy prose, clear policy recommendations, and TV-ready talking points.	如果想提高其游说能力的话，它必须变得更象一个草根活动家，言辞犀利，政策明确，拥有有利于电视传播的观点。


It must go directly to the public – including political parties, nongovernmental organizations, and influential figures – in each country, and explain its position.	它必须直接面向每个国家的大众——包括政党，非政府组织和意见领袖——并阐述自己的观点。


The Fund must also do more to enhance its presence on the Web and in school and university classrooms, especially as students are often the most receptive to ideas about global citizenship.	组织必须采取更多的行动来增加自己在网络，学校和大学的曝光率，因为学生往往是最容易接受全球公民这一概念的人。


Above all, the Fund must change how it is perceived from outside.	总的来说，世界货币基金组织必须改变外界对它的观感。


It must be seen as an institution that respects each country’s sovereignty but works for the global good.	它必须被视为一个尊重各国主权但却同时在为全世界谋福利的机构。


A transparent and fair process of arriving at its policy recommendations, based primarily on convincing economic research and data analysis, will be essential.	一个以可靠的经济研究和数据分析为基础的，透明公平的政策建议形成程序也是非常有必要的。


Countries will have to agree to accept and facilitate the IMF’s direct engagement with their influential citizenry as long as it is carried out in good faith.	各国都必须同意接纳并协助世界货币金组织直接发动民众的行为，只要其怀着善意的目的。


The IMF’s expression of its economic views to local publics should then be protected by international agreement, much like embassies and their activities.	组织向当地公众传达其经济观点的行为必须得到国际条约的保护，正如各国大使馆及其活动那样。