India and Africa both have populations roughly comparable to China’s 1.4 billion people, with significantly smaller shares having reached the middle class.	印度和非洲的人口都与中国（14亿）大致相当，但其中产阶层人口所占的份额则小得多。


Democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders is a far more appealing individual than “The Donald,” but his anti-trade rhetoric is almost as dangerous.	而民主党总统候选人伯尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）虽然比“老唐（纳德）”更具号召力，但他反贸易言论的危险性其实跟后者不相上下。


Following prominent left-leaning economists, Sanders rails against the proposed new Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), even though it would do much to help the developing world – for example, by opening up Japan’s market to Latin American imports.	在一些知名左倾经济学家的指点下，桑德斯大力反对新近提出的跨太平洋伙伴关系协议（Trans-Pacific Partnership，TPP），即便该协议将为发展中国家带来极大裨益——例如让日本向拉美国家商品开放市场。


Sanders even hammers his opponent Hillary Clinton for her support of earlier trade deals such as the 1992 North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).	桑德斯甚至大力抨击其对手希拉里·克林顿（Hillary Clinton），因为她对早期签订的贸易协定(如1992年的北美自由贸易协定)表示赞同。


Yet that agreement forced Mexico to lower its tariffs on US goods far more than it forced the US to reduce its already low tariffs on Mexican goods.	但这份协议恰恰是在美国对墨西哥进口货品关税已经较低的情况下迫使墨西哥降低自身极高的美国进口货物关税。


Unfortunately, the resounding success of Sanders’s and Trump’s anti-trade rhetoric has pulled Clinton away from her more centrist position, and might have the same effect on many members of the House and Senate. This is a recipe for disaster.	不幸的是，桑德斯的和特朗普反贸易言论的大获全胜令希拉里逐渐偏离其更为中间派的立场，并可能对众多众议员和参议员产生同样的影响，而这正是灾难的根源。


The TPP does have its flaws, particularly in its overshoot on protection of intellectual property rights.	虽然TPP确实有其缺点，尤其是在保护知识产权方面显得过分严厉。


But the idea that the deal will be a huge job killer for the US is highly debatable, and something does need to be done to make it easier to sell high-tech goods to the developing world, including China, without fear that such goods will be instantly cloned.	但认为这份协议将扼杀美国大量工作岗位的说法争议极大，而且也确实需要做一些工作才能在防止迅速被山寨的情况下更好地将高科技产品销售给发展中国家(包括中国)。


A failure to ratify the TPP would almost certainly condemn tens of millions of people in the developing world to continued poverty.	如果TTP无法得到批准，那么数千万发展中国家人民将注定继续陷于贫困。


The right remedy to reduce inequality within the US is not to walk away from free trade, but to introduce a better tax system, one that is simpler and more progressive.	同时减少美国国内不平等状况的药方不是放弃自由贸易，而是引入更为完善的税收制度——更简洁，也更先进。


Ideally, there would be a shift from income taxation to a progressive consumption tax (the simplest example being a flat tax with a very high exemption).	理想状态下，应该由所得税转向累进消费税（最简单的例子就是一个高豁免额的均一税）。


The US also desperately needs deep structural reform of its education system, clearing obstacles to introducing technology and competition.	美国也迫切需要对其教育体系进行深层次的结构性改革，清除那些阻碍科学技术和竞争进入学校的因素。


Indeed, new technologies offer the prospect of making it far easier to retrain and retool workers of all ages.	事实上，新技术令针对各个年龄段工人的再培训和技术升级变得更为容易。


Those who advocate redistribution by running larger government budget deficits are being short sighted.	那些主张通过运行更大的政府预算赤字来进行二次分配的人已经是短视了。


Given adverse demographics in the advanced world, slowing productivity, and rising pension obligations, it is very hard to know what the endgame of soaring debt would be.	鉴于发达国家的人口结构问题，生产力发展放缓以及不断加重的养老金负担，谁也不敢预言大举借债的做法最终会导致何种结局。


Do pro-deficit progressives realize that the burden of any future debt crises (or financial-repression measures) are likely to fall disproportionately on poor and middle-income citizens, as they have in the past?	而那些鼓吹赤字的人又是否意识到任何未来的债务危机（或金融抑制措施） 的负担很可能会像以往那样不成比例地落到贫穷和中等收入公民的肩上？


Simple redistribution of income through taxes and transfers is far more direct and more potent, and would certainly serve to expand aggregate demand.	简单地通过税收进行收入二次分配和转移支付的做法更直接也更有力，并必定有助于总需求的扩大。


Anyone who portrays the US as a huge loser from the global economic status quo needs to gain some perspective on the matter.	任何将美国描绘成全球经济现状下的大输家的人都需要对这个问题有更多的认识。


I have little doubt that a century from now, Americans’ consumption-centric lifestyle will no longer be viewed as something to envy and emulate, and the country’s failure to implement a carbon tax will be viewed as a massive failure.	我坚信从现在开始的未来100年内，美国人以消费为中心的生活方式将不再被羡慕和效仿，同时该国未能实施碳排放税将被视为一个巨大的败笔。


With under 5% of the world’s population, the US accounts for a vastly disproportionate share of carbon-dioxide emissions and other pollution, with much of the blame falling on America’s middle class.	美国人口只占全世界的5%，却同时拥有与该比例极不相称的巨量二氧化碳排放和其他污染，而美国的中产阶级则应承担大部分的骂名。


But the idea that trade fuels inequality is a very parochial perspective, and protectionists who shroud themselves in a moralistic inequality narrative are deeply hypocritical.	虽然贸易促进了不平等的观点非常狭隘，但那些用道德上的不平等描述来粉饰自己的贸易保护主义者也极其虚伪。


As far as trade is concerned, the current US presidential campaign is an embarrassment of substance, not just of personality.	在贸易的角度看来，当前的美国总统竞选是议题本质上的谬误，而不仅仅是候选人人品的缺陷问题。


The End of US Soft Power?	美国软实力终结？


NEW DELHI – One major casualty of Donald Trump’s victory in the bruising US presidential election is, without a doubt, America’s soft power around the world.	新德里—唐纳德·特朗普在激烈的美国总统大选中胜出，毫无疑问，这场大选的一个主要受害者是美国的全球软实力。


It is a development that will be difficult – perhaps even impossible – to reverse, especially for Trump.	这是一个非常难以逆转——甚至不可能逆转——的趋势，特别是对特朗普来说。


Traditionally, countries’ global political power was assessed according to military might: the one with the largest army had the most power.	传统上，一国的全球政治实力根据其军事实力评估：拥有最庞大的军队的国家实力最强。


But that logic was not always reflected in reality.	但这一逻辑并不总是反映在现实中。


The US lost the Vietnam War; the Soviet Union was defeated in Afghanistan.	美国输掉了越南战争； 苏联在阿富汗铩羽而归。


In its first few years in Iraq, the US discovered the wisdom of Talleyrand’s adage that the one thing you cannot do with a bayonet is sit on it.	在伊拉克的最初几年里，美国领教了塔列朗格言中的智慧——千万不要坐在火山口。


Enter soft power.	这就引出了软实力。


The term was coined by Harvard’s Joseph S. Nye in 1990 to account for the influence a country – and, in particular, the US – wields, beyond its military (or “hard”) power.	软实力一词由哈佛大学的约瑟夫·奈（Joseph S. Nye）提出，用来评估一国——特别是美国——在其军事（或“硬”）实力之外的影响力。


As Nye put it, a country’s power rests on its “ability to alter the behavior of others” to get what it wants, whether through coercion (sticks), payments (carrots), or attraction (soft power).	奈认为，一国的实力取决于其“改变其他国家行为的能力”，从而获得自己想要的东西，实现的方式可以是逼迫（大棒）、赎买（胡萝卜）或吸引（软实力）。


“If you are able to attract others,” he pointed out, “you can economize on the sticks and carrots.”	“如果你能吸引其他人，”他指出，“你就能省下大棒和胡萝卜。 ”


Nye argues that a country’s soft power arises from “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority.)”	奈认为一国的软实力来自“它的文化（它吸引其他国家的地方）、它的政治价值观（当这一价值观在国内外实现时）以及它的外交政策（当这些政策被视为合理并具有道德权威性时）。


But I believe that it also emerges from the world’s perceptions of what a country is about: the associations and attitudes conjured by the mention of a country’s name. Hard power is exercised; soft power is evoked.	”但我认为软实力还来自世界对一国的认知：这个国家的名字会勾起人们的什么联想和态度。


The US has been the world’s largest economy and oldest democracy, a haven for immigrants, and the land of the American Dream – the promise that anyone can be anything if they work hard enough.	美国是世界上最大的经济体和最古老的民主国家，它是移民避风港，也是美国梦的土地——它让人相信只要足够努力，任何人都能事竟成。


It is also the home of Boeing and Intel, Google and Apple, Microsoft and MTV, Hollywood and Disneyland, McDonald’s and Starbucks – in short, some of the most recognizable and influential brands and industries in the world.	它也是波音和英特尔、谷歌和苹果、微软和MTV、好莱坞和迪士尼、麦当劳和星巴克的故乡——简言之，全世界很多最著名、影响力最大的品牌和产业都坐落在这里。


The attractiveness of these assets, and of the American lifestyle that they represent, is that they enable the US to persuade, rather than compel, others to adopt its agenda.	这些资产以及它们所代表的美国生活方式的吸引力在于它们让美国能够说服而不是强迫其他国家采纳它提出的日程。


In this sense, soft power acts as both an alternative and a complement to hard power.	从这个角度讲，软实力既是硬实力的替代，也是它的补充。


But there are limits to a country’s soft power – even America’s.	但一国的软实力是有极限的——既是美国也不例外。


In the wake of the US terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there was an outpouring of goodwill for the US.	2001年9月11日美国遭遇恐怖袭击后，美国在全世界声誉大涨。


Then the country launched its War on Terror, in which it relied heavily on hard power.	然后美国发动了反恐战争，在此期间它严重依赖于它的硬实力。


The instruments of that power – the Iraq invasion, indefinite detention of “enemy combatants” and other suspects at Guantánamo Bay prison, the Abu Ghraib scandal, revelations of CIA “black sites,” the killing of Iraqi civilians by private US security contractors – were not received well by the global public.	这一实力的载体——入侵伊拉克、在关塔那摩湾监狱无期监禁“敌军”和其他嫌犯、阿布格莱布（Abu Ghraib）丑闻、中央情报局“黑监狱”曝光、美国私营安全承包商杀害伊拉克平民——在全球公众心中的形象并不很好。


America’s soft-power assets were inadequate to compensate for the deficiencies of its hard-power approach.	美国的软实力资产不足以弥补其硬实力方针的缺陷。


Fans of American culture were not prepared to overlook the excesses of Guantánamo.	美国文化的拥趸尚无法忽视关塔那摩的过分行为。


Using Microsoft Windows does not predispose you to accept torture by the country that produces it.	使用微软Windows并不会让你倾向于接受美国的酷刑。


America’s soft power declined sharply, demonstrating that how a country exercises its hard power affects how much soft power it can evoke.	美国的软实力急剧下降，这表明一国如何行使其硬实力将影响到它能够得到多少软实力。


America’s domestic narrative soon overcame its foreign-policy setbacks, thanks partly to today’s unprecedented connectivity.	美国的国内情况很快就克服了外交政策挫折，这部分要归功于当今世界前所未有的连通性。


In a world of instant mass communications, countries are judged by a global public fed on a diet of relentless online news, smartphone videos, and Twitter gossip.	在大众传媒转瞬即到的时代，全球公众能看到数不清的在线新闻、智能手机视频和Twitter流言，并根据这些内容作出评判。


In such an information age, Nye wrote, three types of countries are likely to gain soft power: “those whose dominant cultures and ideals are closer to prevailing global norms (which now emphasize liberalism, pluralism, autonomy); those with the most access to multiple channels of communication and thus more influence over how issues are framed; and those whose credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international performance.”	在这样一个信息时代，奈写道，三类国家可能获得软实力：“主流文化和理想家更接近于赢得全球规范（现在的全球规范强调自由、多元和自治）的国家； 最能获得多重沟通渠道因而对问题框架最有影响力的国家；


The US had done pretty well on all of these fronts.	以及国内和国际表现为其信誉加分的国家”。 美国在所有这三个方面都做得非常漂亮。


Indeed, America’s culture and ideals set the bar for others, and its international credibility rested on its domestic arrangements.	事实上，美国的文化和理想为其他人树立了榜样，而其国际信誉建立在其国内安排的基础上。


Overcoming the legacy of centuries of slavery and racism to elect a black president in 2008 and again in 2012 seemed to embody the country’s capacity to reinvent and renew itself.	美国克服延绵了数百年的奴隶制和种族主义的历史问题，在2008年选出一位黑人总统并在2012年连任，这似乎让它有望焕然自新。


Trump’s ascent to power has shattered that image.	特朗普问鼎权力粉碎了这一印象。


It has exposed and encouraged tendencies the world never used to associate with the US: xenophobia, misogyny, pessimism, and selfishness.	这暴露并助长了世界从未将其与美国联系起来的倾向：仇外、仇女、悲观和自私。


A system that promised a level playing field on which anyone could fulfill their aspirations is being denounced by its own political leaders as stacked against ordinary citizens.	一个带来人人能够公平竞争实现雄心壮志的憧憬的制度正在被其自身的政治领导人贬低为不利于普通公民。


A country that confidently counsels others on democratic practice has elected a president who suggested that, if he lost, he might not recognize the result.	一个自信地劝诫其他国家的内政的国家选出了一位宣称败选就不承认结果的总统。


Nye has argued that, in an information age, soft power often accrues to the country with the better story.	奈指出，在信息时代，软实力通常流向故事最诱人的国家。 长期以来，美国一直是“诱人故事之地”。


The US has long been the “land of the better story.”	它有新闻自由和开放社会；


It has a free press and an open society; it welcomes migrants and refugees; it has a thirst for new ideas and a knack for innovation.	它欢迎移民和难民； 它渴望新思想，拥有创新本能。


All of this has given the US an extraordinary ability to tell stories that are more persuasive and attractive than those of its rivals.	所有这些让美国拥有无与伦比的能力，能够讲出最有说服力、最吸引人的故事，远非其对手所能比。


But the story of America told in this election has deeply diminished the soft power the US evokes.	但这次选举所讲出的美国股市深深地伤害了美国所赢得的软实力。


Fear trumped hope.	恐惧战胜了希望。


The American Dream became the world’s nightmare.	美国梦成为世界噩梦。


And the demons released from Pandora’s box in 2016 – echoing in widespread reports of racist taunts by Trump supporters of non-whites in America – will continue to roam free in the country’s self-perception, and taint everyone else’s perception, too.	2016年的潘多拉魔盒所释放出来的魔鬼——回荡在关于特朗普支持者对美国有色人种的法西斯主义辱骂的广为流传的报道中——将在美国的自我认知中自由游动，同时毒害其他所有人的认知。


In our eyes, America will never be the same – and Trump’s term hasn’t even begun.	在我们看来，美国再也不是原来的美国了——而特朗普的任期甚至还没有开始。


The US Plutocracy’s War on Sustainable Development	美国富豪针对可持续发展发起的战争


NEW YORK – The US plutocracy has declared war on sustainable development.	纽约——美国富豪已经宣布针对可持续发展发动战争。


Billionaires such as Charles and David Koch (oil and gas), Robert Mercer (finance), and Sheldon Adelson (casinos) play their politics for personal financial gain.	查尔斯和戴维·科赫（来自石油天然气行业）、罗伯特·默瑟（来自金融行业）和谢尔登·阿德尔森（来自博彩行业）等亿万富翁为追求个人经济利益而玩弄政治。


They fund Republican politicians who promise to cut their taxes, deregulate their industries, and ignore the warnings of environmental science, especially climate science.	他们赞助承诺减税、放松行业管制和无视环境学（尤其是气候学）警告的共和党政客。


When it comes to progress toward achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, the US placed 42nd out of 157 countries in a recent ranking of the SDG Index that I help to lead, far below almost all other high-income countries.	在涉及联合国可持续发展目标进展的问题上，美国在157个国家当中排名第42，这是我近期参与主导的一次可持续发展目标指数排名的结果。 美国在这方面几乎落后于所有其他高收入国家。


Danish author Bjørn Lomborg was puzzled.	丹麦作家比约恩·隆伯格感到十分困惑。


How could such a rich country score so low?	一个如此富裕的国家怎么会得分如此之低？


“America-bashing is popular and easy,” he surmised.	“抨击美国既流行又轻松”，他这样推测。


Yet this is not about America-bashing.	但这并不是抨击美国。


The SDG Index is built on internationally comparable data relevant to the 17 Sustainable Development Goals for 157 countries.	可持续发展目标指数以与157个国家17项可持续发展目标相关的 国际可比数据为基础。


The real point is this: sustainable development is about social inclusion and environmental sustainability, not just wealth.	真正重要的是：可持续发展目标的要点是社会包容性和环境可持续性，而不仅仅关注财富。


The US ranks far behind other high-income countries because America's plutocracy has for many years turned its back on social justice and environmental sustainability.	美国排名远逊于其他高收入国家是因为美国的富豪阶层多年以来一直拒绝关注社会公平和环境可持续性。


The US is indeed a rich country, but Lord Acton’s famous aphorism applies to nations as well as to individuals: power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.	美国确实是一个富国，但阿克顿勋爵的名言既适用于个人也适用于整个国家：权力带来腐败、绝对权力带来绝对腐败。


The US plutocracy has wielded so much power for so long that it acts with impunity vis-à-vis the weak and the natural environment.	美国富豪阶层已经在如此长的时间内拥有如此之多的权力以至于可以在弱势的自然环境面前不受惩罚。


Four powerful lobbies have long held sway: Big Oil, private health care, the military-industrial complex, and Wall Street.	四大强势游说集团一直占统治地位：包括石油巨头、私人医疗机构、军工复合体和华尔街。


These special interests feel especially empowered now by Donald Trump’s administration, which is filled with corporate lobbyists, not to mention several right-wing billionaires in the cabinet.	这些特殊利益群体如今在唐纳德·特朗普政府的授权下更感到法力无边，特朗普政府充斥着行业游说势力，更不用说特朗普内阁本身就吸收了不止一位右翼百万富翁。


While the Sustainable Development Goals call for mitigating climate change through decarbonization (SDG 7, SDG 13), US fossil-fuel companies are strenuously resisting.	尽管可持续发展目标呼吁通过脱碳（可持续发展目标第7条、可继续发展目标第13条）来减缓气候变化，但美国的化石燃料企业正在竭力抵制该目标的执行。


Under the sway of Big Oil and Big Coal, Trump announced his intention to withdraw the US from the Paris climate agreement.	在石油和煤炭巨头的影响下，特朗普宣布他打算退出巴黎气候协定的企图。


America’s annual energy-related per capita CO2 emissions, at 16.4 tons, are the highest in the world for a large economy.	美国与能源相关的二氧化碳人均年度排放量为16. 4吨，在全球大型经济体中高居榜首。


The comparable figure for Germany, for example, is 9.2 tons.	举例来讲，德国的可比数字为9. 2吨。


The US Environmental Protection Agency, now in the hands of lobbyists from the fossil-fuel sector, dismantles environmental regulations every week (though many of these actions are being challenged in court).	现在已经被化石燃料业游说者牢牢掌控的美国环保署每周都在废除环境法规（尽管法庭对其中很多决定提出起诉）。


The SDGs also call for reduced income inequality (SDG 10).	可持续发展目标还呼吁减少收入不平等（可持续发展目标第10条）。


America’s income inequality has soared in the past 30 years, with the Gini coefficient at 41.1, the second highest among high-income economies, just behind Israel (at 42.8).	过去30年来美国的收入不平等呈快速上升之势，基尼系数为41. 1，在高收入经济体中仅次于以色列（42.


Republican proposals for tax cuts would increase inequality further.	8）高居第二。 共和党的减税议案会进一步加剧不平等。


The US rate of relative poverty (households at less than half of median income), at 17.5%, is also the second highest in the OECD (again just behind Israel).	美国的相对贫困率（家庭收入不到中位数收入的一半）为17. 5%，在经合组织中（仅次于以色列）排名次高。


Likewise, while the SDGs target decent jobs for all (SDG 8), American workers are nearly the only ones in the OECD that lack guaranteed paid sick leave, family leave, and vacation days.	同样，尽管可持续发展目标要求人人拥有体面的工作（可持续发展目标第8条），但经合组织中几乎唯一不享有有保障的带薪病假、家庭假和休假的就是美国劳工。


The result is that more and more Americans work in miserable conditions without job protections.	结果是越来越多的美国人在缺乏工作保障的情况下悲惨的工作。


Around nine million American workers are stuck below the poverty line.	约有900万美国工人挣扎在贫困线以下。


The US also suffers from an epidemic of malnutrition at the hands of the powerful US fast-food industry, which has essentially poisoned the public with diets loaded with saturated fats, sugar, and unhealthy processing and chemical additives.	美国也因为强大的国内快餐业而备受营养不良问题的困扰，美国快餐业一直在用充斥着饱和脂肪、糖和不健康加工和化学添加剂的饮食来毒害公众。 结果是肥胖率高达33.


The result is an obesity rate of 33.7%, the highest by far in the OECD, with enormous adverse consequences for non-communicable diseases.	7%，毫无疑问位居经合组织国家榜首，并由此带来非传染性疾病等巨大的不良后果。 美国的“健康寿命”（无病年龄）仅为69.


America’s “healthy life expectancy” (morbidity-free years) is only 69.1 years, compared to 74.9 years in Japan and 73.1 years in Switzerland.	1岁，而日本为74. 9岁，瑞士为73.


While the Sustainable Development Goals emphasize peace (SDG 16), America’s military-industrial complex pursues open-ended wars (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, to name some of America’s current engagements) and large-scale arms sales.	尽管可持续发展目标强调和平（可持续发展目标第16条），但美国军工联合体却追求开放式战争（阿富汗、伊拉克、叙利亚、也门、利比亚是几个当前的实例）和大规模军售。


On his recent visit to Saudi Arabia, Trump signed a deal to sell over $100 billion in weapons to the country, boasting that it would mean “jobs, jobs, jobs” in America’s defense sector.	在最近访问沙特阿拉伯时，特朗普签订协议向该国出售价值超过1000亿美元的军火，并大肆吹嘘这会对美国国防业带来“工作、工作、工作”。


America’s plutocracy contributes to homegrown violence as well.	美国富豪也助推本土暴力。 美国凶杀率为10万分之3.


The US homicide rate, 3.9 per 100,000, is the highest of any OECD country, and several times higher than in Europe (Germany’s rate is 0.9 per 100,000).	9，在所有经合组织国家中排名榜首，比欧洲高数倍之多（德国的凶杀率仅为10万分之0. 9）。


Month after month, there are mass shootings in the US, such as the massacre in Las Vegas.	月复一月，美国发生大规模枪击事件，如拉斯维加斯大屠杀。


Yet the political power of the gun lobby, which opposes limits even on assault weapons, has blocked the adoption of measures that would boost public safety.	但枪支游说集团的政治力量甚至反对限制攻击性武器，一直阻碍出台措施改善公共安全状况。


Another kind of violence is mass incarceration.	还有一种暴力是大规模监禁。


With 716 inmates per 100,000 people, America has the world’s highest incarceration rate, roughly ten times that of Norway (71 per 100,000).	美国每10万人中就有716名罪犯，其监禁率为全球最高，约为挪威的十倍（10万分之71）。


Remarkably, America has partly privatized its prisons, creating an industry with an overriding interest in maximizing the number of prisoners.	值得注意的是，美国部分实现了监狱私有化，并由此创造出以尽可能扩大被监禁群体为首要利益的既得利益者。


Former President Barack Obama issued a directive to phase out private federal prisons, but the Trump administration reversed it.	前总统奥巴马曾发布指令逐渐取消私人联邦监狱，但特朗普政府逆转了这种状况。


Lomborg also wonders why the US gets a low score on global “Partnership for the Goals,” even though the US gave around $33.6 billion in official development assistance (ODA) in 2016.	隆伯格还想知道为什么虽然美国2016年官方发展援助（ODA）达到约336亿美元，但在全球“目标伙伴关系”中却属于得分很低的。


The answer is easy: relative to gross national income of almost $19 trillion, ODA spending by the US amounted to just 0.18% of GNI – roughly a quarter of the global target of 0.7% of GDP.	答案其实非常简单：与近19万亿美元的国民总收入相比，美国官方发展援助开支仅占国民总收入的0. 18%——约为全球GDP目标0.


America’s low ranking in the SDG Index is not America-bashing.	美国在可持续发展目标指数中排名很低并不是侮辱美国。


Rather, it is a sad and troubling reflection of the wealth and power of lobbies relative to ordinary citizens in US politics.	相反，它是美国游说势力财富和权力相对于普通公民在政界地位的一种悲伤而令人不安的反射。


I recently helped to launch an effort to refocus state-level US politics around sustainable development, through a set of America’s Goals that candidates for state legislatures are beginning to adopt.	我不久前曾通过州议会候选人正在开始采纳的一系列美国目标，协助推动州一级政客关注可持续发展状况。


I am confident that a post-Trump America will recommit itself to the values of the common good, both within America and as a global partner for sustainable development.	我相信后特朗普时期的美国将重新致力于共同价值观，无论是在美国国内还是作为可持续发展的全球伙伴国。


Profiles in Cowardice	临阵脱逃


NEW YORK – The fate of nations often comes down to the choices made by a handful of individuals at a particular moment in history.	纽约—民族的命运，常常由一小撮人在某个特殊历史时刻的选择决定。


Today, the United States is facing just such a moment.	如今，美国正面临这样一个时刻。


What a handful of individual Republicans decide will shape the future not just of the country, but of democracy itself.	一小撮共和党的决定不但将影响这个国家的未来，也将影响民主的未来。


Modern history is littered with similarly pivotal choices, for better or worse.	现代史充满了类似的重要选择，结果有好也有坏。


A century ago, the Russian Revolution came down to a showdown between the iron will of Vladimir Lenin and the indecisiveness of Alexander Kerensky, who ended up sneaking out of Saint Petersburg to escape the Bolsheviks.	一百年前，俄国革命面临着列宁的钢铁意志和克伦斯基（Alexander Kerensky）的优柔寡断之间的抉择，后者最后黯然离开圣彼得堡，逃离布尔什维克之手。


Another Russian revolution – on New Year’s Eve 1999, when President Vladimir Putin gained the government foothold that ultimately enabled him to rule the country to this day – also came down to a solitary selfish decision by the country’s then-leader.	在另一场俄国革命中——1999年新年前夜，总统普京在政府中站稳了脚跟，并借此一直统治至今——同样也出现了时任领导人的刚愎自用。


Choosing to prioritize his own safety and that of his family over the wellbeing of Russia, President Boris Yeltsin named Putin, a former KGB colonel, as his successor.	总统叶利钦将自己和家人的安全置于俄罗斯的福祉之上，提名前克格勃上校普京为自己的继任者。


On a more positive note, where would France be today, if, in June 1940, the then-relatively unknown General Charles de Gaulle had not gone into exile and delivered his passionate call for his country to resist the Nazi invaders?	再来看一个比较积极的例子，如果1940年6月当时名气相对不大的戴高乐将军没有流亡并以满腔热血号召祖国抗击纳粹侵略分子，今天的法国会是怎样一副情况？


Where would the West be had anyone other than Winston Churchill become British prime minister that year?	如果那一年不是丘吉尔成为英国首相，西方会怎么样？


The US has also had its share of such pivotal moments, several of which were described by John F. Kennedy in his book Profiles in Courage, which he wrote before becoming president.	美国也遇到过类似的关键时刻，肯尼迪在他的《当仁不让》（Profiles in Courage）中就描述过一些。 这本书写于他成为总统之前。


For example, Secretary of State Daniel Webster supported the Compromise of 1850, despite his hatred of slavery, in order to save the union.	比如，为了拯救联盟，国务卿韦伯斯特（Daniel Webster）支持1850年妥协案（Compromise of 1850），尽管他憎恨奴隶制。


Similarly, Robert Taft denounced the Nuremberg Trials, despite his hatred of the Nazis, to defend the fundamental US legal principle that a person could not be criminally charged on the basis of a retroactive statute.	类似地，为了捍卫个人不能因为追溯法被判有罪的美国司法原则，塔夫特（Robert Taft）谴责纽伦堡审判，尽管他憎恨纳粹。


Webster and Taft, like the six others that Kennedy examined, risked political and reputational ruin to take difficult decisions, because they believed themselves to be defending the best interests of their country.	韦伯斯特和塔夫特，以及肯尼迪所考察的其他六人，冒着政治和名誉扫地的风险做出了艰难的决定，因为他们相信自己是为了捍卫国家的利益。


Such political courage is not a thing of the past.	这一政治勇气不是过去的专属。


Last week, 11 Conservative members of the British parliament balked at giving Prime Minister Theresa May’s government “Henry VIII powers” – the authority to create new laws or eliminate old ones, without parliamentary approval.	上周，11为英国保守党议员批评首相梅政府的“亨利八世权力”——在不经议会批准的情况下制定新法或取消旧法的威权。


Led by former Attorney General Dominic Grieve, the rebel Tory MPs refused to countenance such a step, regardless of the cost.	在前检察长多米尼克·格里夫（Dominic Grieve）的领导下，反叛的保守党议员们不惜一切代价拒绝这一做法。


And that cost turned out to be high: Grieve received death threats, and others were sacked by the Tory leadership.	而代价确实高昂：格里夫受到了死亡威胁，其他人也受到了保守党领导层的抨击。


The US today is one place where such bravery and selflessness cannot be glimpsed.	在今天的美国，这样的勇气和无私难觅其踪。


Yet, as President Donald Trump and a majority of Congressional Republicans attempt to pass a tax bill that would benefit America’s wealthiest households at the expense of saddling the country with more than $1 trillion in additional debt, such courage could not be more necessary.	但是，当总统特朗普的占国会多数的共和党想要推行有利于美国最富裕家庭、却让已经负债累累的国家在增加1万多亿美元债务的税收法案时，这样的勇气更加不可或缺。


US Republicans have long decried any measure that increases the US budget deficit.	美国共和党向来批评一切会增加美国预算赤字的措施。


Rob Portman of Ohio even served as Director of the White House Office of Management and Budget under President George W Bush.	俄亥俄州的罗伯·波特曼（Rob Portman）甚至担任过小布什总统的白宫行政和预算管理局（Office of Management and Budget）主任。


Yet now they support tax cuts that will cause the deficit to grow as much, if not more, than it did under President Barack Obama.	但如今他们支持将导致赤字增幅比奥巴马总统有过之而无不及的减税计划。


(And Obama, it should be noted, was attempting to stave off another Great Depression, not to deliver big tax savings to wealthy donors.)	（应该指出，奥巴马是为了避免大萧条重现才大幅举债的，而不是为了给富人节省巨大的税收开支。 ）


To be sure, seven Republican senators – Susan Collins of Maine, Robert Corker of Tennessee, Jeff Flake and John McCain of Arizona, Ron Johnson of Wisconsin, Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, and Marco Rubio of Florida – have voiced concerns about the bill.	平心而论，七位共和党参议员——缅因州的苏珊·柯林斯（Susan Collins）、田纳西州的罗伯特·考克（Robert Corker）、亚利桑那州的杰夫·弗莱克（Jeff Flake）和约翰·麦凯恩（John McCain）、威斯康辛州的罗恩·约翰逊（Ron Johnson）、阿拉斯加州的丽莎·莫尔科夫斯基（Lisa Murkowski）以及佛罗里达州的马可·卢比奥（Marco Rubio）——都表达了对该法案的担忧。


These concerns echo more fundamental fears, voiced by the same senators to varying degrees, that the Trump administration is doing serious harm to US institutions.	这些担忧与这几位参议员都或明或暗地表达过的更加根本性的顾虑遥相呼应：特朗普政府正在给美国的制度造成严重伤害。


But even these senators now appear to have fallen into line, effectively promising to deliver Trump an important legislative victory that will help to buttress his floundering presidency, while deepening inequality in the longer term.	但即便是这些参议员，现在也眼看就要就范，向特朗普妥协以令他实现有利于其摇摇欲坠的总统生涯，但同时会深化长期不平等的重要立法胜利。


In doing so, they are putting tribal partisan loyalty above concern for their country.	如此，他们将党派忠诚置于国家担忧之上。


Of course, it is hard to ask for more heroism from McCain.	当然，很难要求麦凯恩拿出更多的英雄气概。


His courage as a prisoner of war for five years in Vietnam seems to be doubted only by Trump, and the dignified way he is battling brain cancer today has only heightened the esteem in which most Americans hold him.	他在越南的五年战俘生涯只有特朗普发出质疑，而如今他与脑癌的不懈斗争也将进一步加深大部分美国人对他的尊敬。


But the fact is that McCain is now backing away from his call, made on his return to the Senate after brain surgery, for a return to the “old way of legislating in the Senate,” including thorough public committee hearings on bills.	但事实是麦凯恩正在与自己在脑部手术后返回参议院时所发出的号召渐行渐远，当时他说要回归“参议院昔日的立法方式”，包括对法案的公开听证委员会。


McCain’s fellow senator from Arizona is similarly failing to back word with deed.	麦凯恩的亚利桑那州参议院同事同样也面临食言而肥的局面。


Flake, whose memoir is called The Conscience of a Conservative, recently delivered a searing speech on the Senate floor denouncing Trump, whom Flake sees as threatening American “principles, freedoms, and institutions,” disregarding “truth and decency,” and engaging in petty and “reckless provocations.”	用《一个保守主义者的良心》（The Conscience of a Conservative）为自己的回忆录命名的弗莱克最近在参议院发表了热情的演讲，批评了特朗普。 弗莱克说特朗普威胁着美国的“原则、自由和制度”，他不尊重“事实和体面”，经常搞一些小家子气的“不计后果的挑衅”。


Yet Flake will support Trump’s tax bill without so much as a grimace.	但弗莱克也将腆着脸支持特朗普的税收法案。


Murkowski and Collins played a vital role in preventing the Trump-supported repeal of the 2010 Affordable Care Act and its replacement with a much crueler health-care bill.	莫尔科夫斯基和柯林斯在阻止特朗普支持的取消2010年平价医疗法并用更残酷的医疗法案取而代之的行动中扮演了关键角色。


Corker, too, has presented himself as somehow apart from the Trumpian mire.	考克也曾表现出和特朗普划清界限的姿态。


Yet, when it comes to tax cuts for the rich, these figures are as willing as any firm Trump acolyte to trade their honor for the approval of their tribe.	但在为富人减税的问题上，这些人和坚定的特朗普阵营成员一样，心甘情愿地用荣誉换取组织的认可。


Years from now, some young and ambitious politician will survey the Trump presidency and, in an effort to explain the events that are unfolding before us, pen a Kennedyesque Profiles in Cowardice focused on Republicans’ lack of personal integrity.	多年后，一些雄心勃勃的年轻政客将考察特朗普的总统生涯，为发生在我们眼前的事件做出解释，他们会借用肯尼迪的标题，写一部《临阵脱逃》（Profiles in Cowardice），集中描写共和党人的不健全人格。


The question is what will have become of American democracy by then.	问题是到那时美国的民主会变成什么样。


The World’s Priciest Stock Market	全世界最贵的股市


NEW HAVEN – The level of stock markets differs widely across countries.	纽黑文—全球各国股市水平不一而足。


And right now, the United States is leading the world.	眼下，是美国引领全世界。


What everyone wants to know is why – and whether its stock market’s current level is justified.	每个人都想知道这是为什么——以及当前股市水平是否合理。


We can get a simple intuitive measure of the differences between countries by looking at price-earnings ratios.	我们可以通过市盈率，对国家间的差异进行简单的直觉性衡量。


I have long advocated the cyclically adjusted price-earnings (CAPE) ratio that John Campbell (now at Harvard University) and I developed 30 years ago.	我一直主张用约翰·坎贝尔（John Campbell，现在在哈佛大学任教）和我在30年前所开发的经周期调整的市盈率（CAPE）来衡量股市。


The CAPE ratio is the real (inflation-adjusted) price of a share divided by a ten-year average of real earnings per share.	CAPE市盈率是用真实（经通胀调整的）股价除以十年真实每股收益平均值。


Barclays Bank in London compiles the CAPE ratios for 26 countries (I consult for Barclays on its products related to the CAPE ratio).	伦敦巴克莱银行（Barclays Bank）计算了26个国家的CAPE市盈率（我为巴克莱的CAPE市盈率相关产品提供顾问）。


As of December 29, the CAPE ratio is highest for the US.	到12月29日，CAPE市盈率最高的国家是美国。


Let’s consider what these ratios mean.	我们来看看CAPE市盈率的意义。


Ownership of stock represents a long-term claim on a company’s earnings, which the company can pay to the owners of shares as dividends or reinvest to provide the shareholders more dividends in the future.	拥有股票即代表你对公司盈利拥有长期索取权，公司可以将盈利用于向所有人发放股票红利，或进行再投资从而在未来给股东提供更多的红利。


A share in a company is not just a claim on next year’s earnings, or on earnings the year after that.	公司股票不仅仅是对明年盈利的索取权，也不仅仅是对后年盈利的索取权。


Successful companies last for decades, even centuries.	成功的公司会持续几十年乃至几百年。


So, to arrive at a valuation for a country’s stock market, we need to forecast the growth rate of earnings and dividends for an interval considerably longer than a year.	因此，要想得到一国股市的估值，我们需要预测远远长于一年的时期的增盈利和红利长率。


We really want to know what the earnings will do over the next ten or 20 years.	我们真的想知道未来十年或20年后盈利会怎么样。


But how can one be confident of long-term forecasts of earnings growth across countries?	但如何能够确定各国长期盈利增长预测呢？


In pricing stock markets, people don’t seem to be relying on any good forecast of the next ten years’ earnings.	在为股市定价时，人们似乎并不依赖于对未来十年盈利的优良预测。


They just seem to look at the past ten years, which are already done and gone, but also known and tangible.	他们似乎只看过去十年，这些都已是前尘往事，但它们是已知、有形的。


But when Campbell and I studied earnings growth in the US with long historical data, we found that it has not been very amenable to extrapolation.	但坎贝尔和我在用长期历史数据研究美国的盈利增长时，发现它并不十分符合外推法。


Since 1881, the correlation of the past decade’s real earnings growth with the price-earnings ratio is a positive 0.32.	自1881年以来，过去十年的真实盈利增长和市盈率的相关性为正0.


But there is zero correlation between the CAPE ratio and the next ten years’ real earnings growth.	32。 但CAPE市盈率和未来十年真实盈利增长的相关性为零。


And real earnings growth per share for the S&P Composite Stock Price Index over the previous ten years was negatively correlated (-17% since 1881) with real earnings growth over the subsequent ten years.	真实标注普尔综合股价指数成分股过去十年每股收益增长与未来十年真实盈利增长为负相关（1881年以来为-17%）。


That’s the opposite of momentum.	这是逆势而动。


It means that good news about earnings growth in the past decade is (slightly) bad news about earnings growth in the future.	这意味着过去十年中的盈利增长利好消息对于未来盈利增长是（小）利空。


Essentially the same sort of thing happens with US inflation and the bond market.	美国通货膨胀和债券市场也表现出差不多的关系。


One might think that long-term interest rates tend to be high when there is evidence that there will be higher inflation over the life of the bond, to compensate investors for the expected decline in the dollar’s purchasing power.	你也许会认为，当有证据表明债券存续期内通胀会变高时，长期利率会趋于高企，从而补偿投资者预期的美元购买力下降。


Using data since 1913, when the consumer price index computed by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics starts, we find that the there is almost no correlation between long-term interest rates and ten-year inflation rates over succeeding decades.	我们发现，自1913年美国劳工统计局开始统计消费物价指数以来，长期利率和未来几十年中十年通货膨胀率几乎不相关。


While positive, the correlation between one decade’s total inflation and the next decade’s total inflation is only 2%.	某十年期的总通货膨胀和下一个十年期的总通货膨胀呈现正相关，但相关性只有2%。


But bond markets act as if they think inflation can be extrapolated.	但债券市场的走势好像它们认为通胀可以外推一样。


Long-term interest rates tend to be high when the last decade’s inflation was high.	长期利率总是在过去十年通胀呈现高企的时期高企。


US long-term bond yields, such as the ten-year Treasury yield, are highly positively correlated (70% since 1913) with the previous ten years’ inflation.	美国长期债券（如十年期国债）收益率与过去十年通货膨胀呈现出高正相关性（1913年以来为70%）。


But the correlation between the Treasury yield and the inflation rate over the next ten years is only 28%.	但国债收益率与未来十年通货膨胀率之间的相关性只有28%。


How can we square investors’ behavior with the famous assertion that it is hard to beat the market?	我们如何解释投资者的行为和市场不可战胜的著名论断之间的矛盾？


Why haven’t growing reliance on data analytics and aggressive trading meant that, as markets become more efficient over time, all remaining opportunities to secure abnormal profits are competed away?	日益依靠数据分析和积极交易为何没有意味着，随着市场变得日益有效，一切剩余的确保反常利润的机会都会因为竞争而消失？


Economic theory, as exemplified by the work of Andrei Shleifer at Harvard and Robert Vishny of the University of Chicago, offers ample reason to expect that long-term investment opportunities will never be eliminated from markets, even when there are a lot of very smart people trading.	经济理论提供了足够的理由认为长期投资机会不会从市场上消失，即使有非常多非常聪明的人在交易，哈佛大学的安德烈·施莱佛（Andrei Shleifer）和芝加哥大学的罗伯特·维什尼（Robert Vishny）的工作就是一例。


This brings us back to the mystery of what’s driving the US stock market higher than all others.	这把我们带回到是什么让美国股市高于其他所有国家这一谜题。


It’s not the “Trump effect,” or the effect of the recent cut in the US corporate tax rate.	不是“特朗普效应”，也不是最近的美国公司税率下降。


After all, the US has pretty much had the world’s highest CAPE ratio ever since President Barack Obama’s second term began in 2013.	毕竟，自2013年奥巴马总统第二个任期伊始开始，美国CAPE市盈率便基本一直是世界最高。


Nor is extrapolation of rapid earnings growth a significant factor, given that the latest real earnings per share for the S&P index are only 6% above their peak about ten years earlier, before the 2008 financial crisis erupted.	将高速盈利增长进行外推也不是主要因素，因为标注普尔指数最新真实每股收益只比十年前（2008年金融危机爆发前夕）的峰值高了6%。


Part of the reason for America’s world-beating CAPE ratio may be its higher rate of share repurchases, though share repurchases have become a global phenomenon.	美国CAPE市盈率高居世界之最的部分原因在以其股票回购率较高，尽管股票回购已成为一种全球现象。


Higher CAPE ratios in the US may also reflect a stronger psychology of fear about the replacement of jobs by machines.	美国CAPE市盈率较高可能 还反映了更大的担忧心理——担忧就业岗位被机器人取代。


The flip side of that fear, as I argued in the third edition of my book Irrational Exuberance, is a stronger desire to own capital in a free-market country with an association with computers.	我在我的书《非理性繁荣》（Irrational Exuberance）第三版中指出，这一担忧的背面，是更大的渴望——渴望拥有一个与计算机强强联合的自由市场国家的资本。


The truth is that it is impossible to pin down the full cause of the high price of the US stock market.	真相是你无法说清楚美国股市价格高昂的全部原因。


The lack of any clear justification for its high CAPE ratio should remind all investors of the importance of diversification, and that the overall US stock market should not be given too much weight in a portfolio.	美国CAPE市盈率高企难以找到明确的依据，这应该令所有投资者认识到多样化的重要性，以及不应该在投资组合中赋予美国股市全体过高的权重。


The Coming Bear Market?	熊市将临？


NEW HAVEN – The US stock market today is characterized by a seemingly unusual combination of very high valuations, following a period of strong earnings growth, and very low volatility.	发自纽黑文——当前美国股市的特点是一个看似不寻常的组合：经历了强劲盈利增长期后的极高估值，加上极低的波动幅度。


What do these ostensibly conflicting messages imply about the likelihood that the United States is headed toward a bear market?	那么为什么这些表面上相冲突的信息意味着美国存在着走入熊市的可能性？


To answer that question, we must look to past bear markets.	为了回答这个问题，我们必须回顾过去的一系列熊市。


And that requires us to define precisely what a bear market entails. The media nowadays delineate a “classic” or “traditional” bear market as a 20% decline in stock prices.	这首先需要我们准确地定义熊市，而当今的媒体则将股价下跌20％定义为“经典”或“传统”熊市。


That definition does not appear in any media outlet before the 1990s, and there has been no indication of who established it.	但这个定义在1990年代以前的媒体报道中是不存在的，也没有迹象表明是由谁确立的。


It may be rooted in the experience of October 19, 1987, when the stock market dropped by just over 20% in a single day.	它可能源自于1987年10月19日的经历，当时美国股市在一天内下跌了20％以上。


Attempts to tie the term to the “Black Monday” story may have resulted in the 20% definition, which journalists and editors probably simply copied from one another.	将这个术语与“黑色星期一”事件联系在一起的尝试可能催生了与20％下跌有关的定义，而那些记者和编辑们可能只是一个接一个地复制前人的话语而已。


In any case, that 20% figure is now widely accepted as an indicator of a bear market.	无论如何，20％的数字现在已经被广泛接受为熊市的指标。


Where there seems to be less overt consensus is on the time period for that decline.	但关于这种下跌究竟以多长时间为限则似乎并没有明显的共识。


Indeed, those past newspaper reports often didn’t mention any time period at all in their definitions of a bear market. Journalists writing on the subject apparently did not think it necessary to be precise.	事实上在过去的报章报道中关于熊市的定义中根本没有提到任何时间段，那些撰写这一话题的作者显然并不认为有必要去确切说明。


In assessing America’s past experience with bear markets, I used that traditional 20% figure, and added my own timing rubric.	在评估美国过去的熊市经历时，我会用传统的20％数字，并增加了自己设定的时间标示。


The peak before a bear market, per my definition, was the most recent 12-month high, and there should be some month in the subsequent year that is 20% lower.	根据我的定义，熊市前的高峰是最近的12个月高点，而随后一年则有某个月的指数相对高点下降了20％。


Whenever there was a contiguous sequence of peak months, I took the last one.	如果连续出现高点月份的话，我会取最后一个。


Referring to my compilation of monthly S&P Composite and related data, I found that there have been just 13 bear markets in the US since 1871.	关于我对每月标准普尔综合指数和相关数据的汇编，我发现自1871年以来美国只有13个熊市。


The peak months before the bear markets occurred in 1892, 1895, 1902, 1906, 1916, 1929, 1934, 1937, 1946, 1961, 1987, 2000, and 2007.	熊市前的高峰月份出现在1892、1895、1902、1906、1916年、1929、1934、1937、1946、1961、1987，2000和2007年。


A couple of notorious stock-market collapses – in 1968-70 and in 1973-74 – are not on the list, because they were more protracted and gradual.	一些臭名昭著的股票市场崩盘事件——在1968~1970年和1973~1974年期间——都不在名单上，因为它们更加持久和渐进。


Once the past bear markets were identified, it was time to assess stock valuations prior to them, using an indicator that my Harvard colleague John Y. Campbell and I developed in 1988 to predict long-term stock-market returns.	一旦过去的熊市被定义，就可以开始使用我的哈佛同事约翰·Y·坎贝尔（John Y. Campbell）和我于1988年开发的预测长期股票市场回报指标来评估在那些时期之前的股票估值水平了。


The cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio is found by dividing the real (inflation-adjusted) stock index by the average of ten years of earnings, with higher-than-average ratios implying lower-than-average returns.	通过将实际（计入通胀后的）股票指数除以十年的平均收益水平，可以计算出周期调整后的市盈率比率，而如果该比率高于平均水平则意味着低于平均水平的回报。


Our research showed that the CAPE ratio is somewhat effective at predicting real returns over a ten-year period, though we did not report how well that ratio predicts bear markets.	尽管我们没有报告这个比率预测熊市的能力，但研究表明该比率对预测十年期间的实际收益是有一定效果的。


This month, the CAPE ratio in the US is just above 30. That is a high ratio.	就在本月，美国的周期调整后市盈率比率刚刚超过30，也是个很高的数字。


Indeed, between 1881 and today, the average CAPE ratio has stood at just 16.8.	事实上，从1881年至今的平均周期调整后市盈率比率只有16.


Moreover, it has exceeded 30 only twice during that period: in 1929 and in 1997-2002.	8，在此期间超过30的只有两段时间：1929年和1997 ~2002年。


But that does not mean that high CAPE ratios aren’t associated with bear markets.	但这并不意味着高周期调整后市盈率比率与熊市无关。


On the contrary, in the peak months before past bear markets, the average CAPE ratio was higher than average, at 22.1, suggesting that the CAPE does tend to rise before a bear market.	相反，在熊市前的高点月份平均比率都会高于平均水平，在22. 1的水平，表明该比率在熊市前趋向于上升。


Moreover, the three times when there was a bear market with a below-average CAPE ratio were after 1916 (during World War I), 1934 (during the Great Depression), and 1946 (during the post-World War II recession).	不过在1916年后（一战），1934年（大萧条时期）和1946年（二战后衰退时期）也出现过3次比率低于平均水平的熊市。


A high CAPE ratio thus implies potential vulnerability to a bear market, though it is by no means a perfect predictor.	因此尽管它决不是完美的预测指标，但高比率也预示着熊市的潜在可能性。


To be sure, there does seem to be some promising news.	但可以肯定的是，似乎也存在一些让人感觉有前景的好消息。


According to my data, real S&P Composite stock earnings have grown 1.8% per year, on average, since 1881.	根据我的数据，自1881年以来标准普尔综合成分股的实际收益平均每年增长1. 8％。


From the second quarter of 2016 to the second quarter of 2017, by contrast, real earnings growth was 13.2%, well above the historical annual rate.	而在2016年第二季度到2017年第二季度之间实际收益增长为13. 2％，远高于历史年增长率


But this high growth does not reduce the likelihood of a bear market.	然而这一高增长并不会减少进入熊市的可能性。


In fact, peak months before past bear markets also tended to show high real earnings growth: 13.3% per year, on average, for all 13 episodes.	事实上，过去熊市之前的高点月份也往往展现出较高的实际收益增长：所有13次熊市平均下来是每年13. 3％。


Moreover, at the market peak just before the biggest ever stock-market drop, in 1929-32, 12-month real earnings growth stood at 18.3%.	此外，在1929~1932年股市出现有史以来最大跌幅之前的市场高点时期，12个月的实际收益增长率为18. 3％。


Another piece of ostensibly good news is that average stock-price volatility – measured by finding the standard deviation of monthly percentage changes in real stock prices for the preceding year – is an extremely low 1.2%.	另一个看上去的好消息是，股价平均波动值——通过计算前一年实际股价每月百分比变动的标准差来得出——是非常低的1. 2％。


Between 1872 and 2017, volatility was nearly three times as high, at 3.5%.	而在1872至2017年间的波动性几乎是上述指标的3倍，达到3. 5。


Yet, again, this does not mean that a bear market isn’t approaching.	然而这也并不意味着熊市并未临近。


In fact, stock-price volatility was lower than average in the year leading up to the peak month preceding the 13 previous US bear markets, though today’s level is lower than the 3.1% average for those periods.	事实上在逐渐走向前十三个熊市前高点月的那些年中，股价波动值也是低于平均水平的，虽然当前的水平低于这些时期3. 1%的平均水平。


At the peak month for the stock market before the 1929 crash, volatility was only 2.8%.	在1929年崩盘之前股市的高点月，波动值只有2. 8％。


In short, the US stock market today looks a lot like it did at the peaks before most of the country’s 13 previous bear markets.	总而言之，美国股市现在的状况看起来就跟在过去十三个熊市中的大部分有点类似。


This is not to say that a bear market is guaranteed: such episodes are difficult to anticipate, and the next one may still be a long way off.	当然这并不是说熊市必定到来：这样的事情难以预料，下一个熊市可能还有很久才会到来。


And even if a bear market does arrive, for anyone who does not buy at the market’s peak and sell at the trough, losses tend to be less than 20%.	即使熊市确实到来，对于任何不是在市场高峰期买入并在低谷出售的人来说，损失也往往达不到20％。


But my analysis should serve as a warning against complacency.	但我的分析应该成为对市场高涨情绪的一个警告。


Investors who allow faulty impressions of history to lead them to assume too much stock-market risk today may be inviting considerable losses.	对于那些在错误历史印象的引导下承担了过多股票市场风险的投资者来说，巨大的损失可能就在不远处。


Tax Reform and Budget Deficits in America	美国的税收改革和预算赤字


CAMBRIDGE – The Republican Party’s leaders in the United States House of Representatives have been hard at work for more than a year designing a major reform of personal and corporate taxes.	坎布里奇—一年多来，美国众议院共和党领袖一直在竭尽全力制定个人和公司税重大改革方案。


With an election looming in 2018, the House Republicans are determined to deliver a reform package and send it to the Senate for enactment.	随着2018年选举的临近，众议院共和党决定要拿出一揽子改革方案，送参议院表决执行。


This reform will be very different from the last major tax overhaul enacted back in 1986.	这份改革方案与1986年实施的上一次重大税改截然不同。


The Tax Reform Act of 1986 focused on the personal income tax, lowering the top rate from 50% to 28% and cutting rates for lower-income taxpayers.	1986年税收改革法的重点是个人所得税，最高个人所得税率从50%下调到28%，同时也降低了较低收入纳税人的税率。


The revenue loss was offset by changes in tax deductions and other accounting rules, producing a reform that was revenue neutral at each income level, even without taking into account the effects of lower tax rates on increasing economic growth and taxable incomes.	由此导致的税收收入下降通过税收抵扣和其他会计规则抵消，最终形成了一个在每个所得水平上都实现税收收入中性的改革，并且是在考虑到降低税率对提高经济增长和应税所得的效应之前实现。


In the 30 years since 1986, the tax rates for high-income taxpayers rose significantly, from 28% to 39.6%, with an extra 3.8% tax on these taxpayers’ investment income.	1986年以来的30年中，高收入纳税人所得税率大幅提高，从28%增长到39. 6%，而他们的投资收益还要额外缴纳3.


A detailed study by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) of taxes between 1979 and 2013 concluded that while the effective tax rate fell in every quintile of the income distribution, it rose well above that 35-year average for taxpayers in the top 1% of the income distribution.	8%的税收。 国会预算办公室（CBO）对1979年至2013年间税收的详细研究表明，尽管收入分布的每一个五分位的有效税率都有所下降，但对于收入分布最顶层的1%纳税人，税率大大高于35年平均水平。


The House Republican plan would cut the top tax rate back to 30% or lower, with comparable reductions for those now facing lower tax rates.	国会共和党的计划将把最高税率重新下调到30%或以下，现在就享受较低税率的群体也能获得可比的降幅。


The new tax law might also follow the Canadian example and eliminate the estate tax, while imposing a tax on capital gains accrued before the taxpayer’s death.	新税法还将效仿加拿大，取消遗产税，但对于纳税人死前所发生的资本收益，仍要征税。


To offset some of the resulting revenue loss, the new law might eliminate tax deductions for state and local taxes, and tax some of the fringe benefits that are currently excluded from taxable income.	为了抵消由此带来的一些税收收入损失，新税法可能会取消州和地方税收抵扣，并对某些目前享受非税待遇的福利性收入征税。


The big difference between the House Republicans’ plan and the 1986 tax reform is that the current proposal would also address the tax treatment of corporate profits and other business income.	国会共和党的计划与1986年税收改革之间的重大区别在于现在的方案还将处理公司利润和其他企业收益的税收待遇。


The statutory tax rate on corporate profits is now 35%, the highest in the OECD.	目前，法定公司利润税率为35%，为经合组织最高。


The new legislation would reduce that rate to 25% or less, spurring a shift in capital flows away from investments in housing and agriculture, and toward domestic corporate investment.	新立法将把该税率降低到25%或以下，促使资本从房地产和农业投资流向国内公司投资。


The new tax law is also likely to boost domestic corporate investment by changing the tax treatment of the profits of US corporations’ foreign subsidiaries.	新税法还有望通过改变美国公司海外分支利润的税收待遇刺激国内公司投资。


Under current law, a subsidiary pays tax on profits to the government of the country where those profits are earned.	根据现有法律，美国公司海外分支向利润产生地政府缴纳利润税。


It can then invest the after-tax profits anywhere in the world outside the US.	然后它就可以将税后利润用于美国之外的世界任何地区的投资。


But if it brings those funds back to the US to invest or pay dividends to shareholders, it must pay the full US corporate tax rate, with a credit for the tax already paid to the foreign government.	但如果它想把这些资金转移到美国进行投资或向股东支付股利，就必须按照美国公司税率全额纳税，已经支付给外国政府的税额可以免征。


This penalty on repatriating funds causes US firms to leave those after-tax profits abroad.	这一对汇回资金的惩罚导致美国企业将这些税收利润留在海外。


The US Treasury estimates that American subsidiaries’ offshore investments stand at more than $2.5 trillion.	美国财政部估算，美国公司海外分支的离岸投资规模超过2. 5万亿美元。


This method of taxing the profits of foreign subsidiaries is unique to the US.	这一向海外分支利润征税的方式为美国独有。


Every other industrial country uses what is known as the territorial method, in which profits of foreign subsidiaries can be brought home with little or no extra tax.	即使是其他工业国，也采用所谓的领地原则，本国公司海外分支的利润转移回国不需要或仅需要略微缴纳额外税收。


By shifting the US toward such a system, the Republican proposal would stimulate repatriation of some of the funds that have been accumulated abroad, as well as increased inflows of future foreign profits.	共和党的方案将把美国也改成这种制度，这将刺激部分囤积在海外的资金回流，也会增加未来海外利润流入。


What does all this mean for the budget deficit?	所有这些对预算意味着什么？


The CBO estimates that the deficit will rise from 3.4% of GDP to more than 4% over the next ten years, even with no change in tax rules.	CBO估算，即使税收规则不发生变化，未来十年赤字也将从GDP的3. 4%增加到4%以上。


The direct impact of lowering tax rates on personal income and corporate profits will be to reduce tax revenue and increase the budget deficit.	降低个人所得税率和公司利润税率的直接影响将是降低税收收入，增加预算赤字。


But this will be offset by limits on personal tax deductions and exclusions, and the lower tax rates on personal income will boost taxable incomes as individuals increase earnings and compensation shifts from fringe benefits to taxable cash.	但限制个人税收抵扣和豁免将抵消这一效应，而随着个人收入增加和薪酬从福利性收入转变为应税现金，个人所得税率的降低还能够提振应税所得。


Likewise, the move to a territorial tax system will raise taxable profits, especially in the short term, as companies repatriate some of the existing stock of overseas funds.	类似地，将公司税制改为领地制将提高应税利润，特别是在短期，因为公司将汇回部分海外资金存量。


Although the net tax changes may widen the budget deficit in the short term, the incentive effects of lower tax rates and the increased accumulation of capital will mean faster economic growth and higher real incomes, both of which will cause rising taxable incomes and lower long-term deficits.	尽管净税收变化可能会在短期扩大预算赤字，但降低税率的激励效应和资本积累的增加意味着经济增长加速和真实所得提高，这两者有利于提高应税所得、缩小长期赤字。


There is an important legislative reason why the projected budget will return to surplus in the future.	出于一个重要的立法原因，未来预期预算将转为盈余。


The Republicans have only a very small majority in the Senate, where the filibuster rule requires a three-fifths majority to pass most legislation, giving the Democrats the ability to block the Republican tax agenda.	共和党在参议院仅占微弱多数，而参议院的冗长演说规则要求大部分立法需要五分之三多数才能通过，因此，民主党有能力阻挠共和党的税收日程。


But an exception allows tax and spending bills to be passed with a simple majority if the resulting budget returns to surplus after ten years.	但一个例外可以让税收和支出法案在简单多数情况下获得通过，即预算能够在十年后转为盈余。


By designing the tax and spending rules accordingly and phasing in future revenue increases, the Republicans can achieve the needed long-term surpluses.	共和党可以据此设计税收和支出规则，逐步提高未来税收收入增量，实现必要的长期盈余。


As a result, I am optimistic that a tax reform serving to increase capital formation and growth will be enacted, and that any resulting increase in the budget deficit will be only temporary.	因此，我对于有利于增加资本形成和增长的税收改革能够通过持乐观态度，对于由此导致的一切预算赤字的增加都只是暂时现象也持乐观态度。


America’s Broken System	破产的美国制度


BERKELEY – The tax bill that US Republicans have doggedly pushed through Congress is not as big a deal as many are portraying it to be.	伯克利—美国共和党固执地要在国会通过的税收法案的意义并不像很多人所描绘的那么大。


It is medium-size news.	这是个中等规模的消息。


The big news – the much more weighty and ominous news – lies elsewhere.	大消息——分量重得多、情况也恶劣得多的消息——在别的地方。


Of course, medium-size is not nothing.	当然，中等规模也不可等闲视之。


If the tax bill does clear its final hurdle – a conference committee must reconcile the Senate-approved bill with that of the House of Representatives – and become law, it will complicate the tax system considerably, as it opens many loopholes.	如果税收法案真的清除了最后的障碍——必须成立一个委员会来协调参议院通过的法案和众议院通过的法案——并成为法律，它让税收制度大大复杂化，因为它开启了大量漏洞。


It won’t have any impact on economic growth – positive or negative – but it would have an impact on the government’s finances, causing revenues to decline by the equivalent of about 1% of national income.	它不会对经济增长有任何影响——不管是积极影响还是消极影响——但会给政府融资带来影响，造成的税收收入降幅大约相当于国民收入的1%。


The missing resources would most likely be transferred to the top 1% of earners, raising their share of total income from 22% to 23%.	损失的资源最有可能会转移给最顶层1%的收入群体，他们占总收入的比重将从22%提高到23%。 最顶层0.


The top 0.01% would probably gain the most, with their share of income rising from 5.1% to 5.5%.	01%的群体或许是收益最大的群体，他们占总收入的比重将从5. 1%提高到5.


In this sense, the tax plan would be another brick – not a huge brick, but a medium-size brick – in the increasingly impregnable fortress of American plutocracy.	5%。 从这个角度讲，这项税收计划将给日益坚固的美国财法治国堡垒在添加一块砖块——不是一块大砖，而是一块中等规模的砖块。


But the bill may well not become law at all.	但法案和可能根本无法成为法律。


Consider the Republicans’ efforts earlier this year to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) – an effort that, it now seems clear, was pure Dingbat Kabuki.	想一想今年早些时候共和党取消和取代平价医疗法（“奥巴马医保”）的努力——现在看来，这些努力和街头卖艺差不多。


The Republicans didn’t actually want to take responsibility for changing the health-care financing system, much less strip their own constituents of health care.	共和党并不真的想承担改变医药费体系的责任，更不想剥夺自己的支持者的医保。


But the party’s propaganda arm had worked so hard to convince its base that Obamacare represented a clear and present danger to the country that its leaders had to act as if they were making a serious effort to fulfill their promise to repeal and replace it.	但共和党的宣传部门竭尽全力要让它的票仓相信奥巴马医保是对美国的赤裸裸的紧迫威胁，美国领导人必须有所行动，好像他们正在认真地采取措施兑现取消和取代承诺一样。


So a majority of Republicans in the House of Representatives voted for the bill, expecting, with reasonable confidence, that it would be blocked in the 100-member Senate, where fewer than 40 of the 52 Republicans actually wanted it to pass.	因此，众议院的共和党多数给该法案投了赞成票，他们有信心法案会被有100个席位、但其中52个共和党中只有不到40人真的希望该法案通过的参议院会将它“枪毙”。


Had any of the three Republican senators who voted against the bill – John McCain of Arizona, Susan Collins of Maine, or Lisa Murkowski of Alaska – made a different choice, there were probably about five more who would have stepped in to nix it.	如果反对该法案的三位共和党参议员——亚利桑那州的约翰·麦凯恩（John McCain）、缅因州的苏珊·柯林斯（Susan Collins）和阿拉斯加州的丽莎·莫尔科夫斯基（Lisa Murkowski）——中的任何一位做出不同的选择，都可能会有五位其他参议员站出来反对。


The same thing may be happening with the tax reform.	税收法案可能也会是如此。


It depends on whether at least three of the ten Republican senators who have raised objections are serious, or are playing a different game of Dingbat Kabuki: seeking to trick their constituents into thinking that they went the extra mile to try to help them, and are not puppets of Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell.	这取决于在十名举手反对的共和党参议员中，是否至少有三人是认真的，还是在玩不同的街头卖艺游戏：试图欺骗选民认为他们不辞万难要帮助他们，而不是参议院多数党领袖米奇·麦康奈尔（Mitch McConnell）的傀儡。


But, regardless of whether the tax bill survives the reconciliation process and becomes law, the big news won’t change: the Anglo-Saxon model of representative government is in serious trouble.	但不论税收法案是否能通过协调过程并成为法律，大消息不会改变：盎格鲁-萨克逊式代议制民主陷入了严重的麻烦。


And there is no solution in sight.	并且看不到解决办法。


For some 400 years, the Anglo-Saxon governance model – exemplified by the republican semi-principality of the Netherlands, the constitutional monarchy of the United Kingdom, and the constitutional republic of the United States of America – was widely regarded as having hit the sweet spot of liberty, security, and prosperity.	400年来，盎格鲁-萨克逊治理模式——以半封建制的荷兰、君主立宪制的英国和立宪民主制的美国为代表——被广泛认为集合了自由、安全和繁荣的优点。


The greater the divergence from that model, historical experience seemed to confirm, the higher the likelihood of repression, insecurity, and poverty.	历史经验似乎证明，越是偏离这一模式，发生镇压、不安全和贫困的可能性越大。


So countries were frequently and strongly advised to emulate those institutions.	因此各国时时被强烈建议模仿这些制度。


Nobody would dare offer that same advice today.	今天，没人再敢提出这样的建议了。


The UK, having been thrown into devastating austerity by Conservative and Liberal leaders after the global economic crisis, is now being led by the Conservatives toward a messy and damaging Brexit.	全球经济危机发生后，保守派和自由派领导人将英国扔进了灾难性的紧缩之中，如今，在保守党的领导下，英国正在迈向混乱和破坏性的退欧。


And, in the US, the election of President Donald Trump heralded the age of “alternative facts” and “governance by tweet,” overseen by an erratic and ignorant leader who is clearly in over his head.	而在美国，总统特朗普的当选预示着“另类事实”和“推特治国”时代的到来，领导这个国家的将是一个反覆而无知的、显然是心智失常的领导人。


When Trump was first elected, some argued that it did not have to be a disaster.	特朗普刚刚当选时，一些人认为这未必是一场灾难。


After all, the optimists pointed out, President Ronald Reagan had been more a “chief of state” than a “chief executive,” as had George W. Bush.	毕竟，乐观派指出，里根总统更多地是“国家元首”而不是“首席执政”，小布什也是如此。


As divisive as Chief of State Trump would be, according to this view, he wouldn’t derail policy, because electing a Republican president is more like electing the Republican Party establishment.	根据这一观点，作为果断的国家元首的特朗普不会让政策脱轨，因为选择一位共和党政府更像是选择了共和党建制派。


And that bench was very deep and very competent, despite its weakening in recent years.	这批人深不可测，且能力很强，尽管最近几年有所削弱。


The optimists were wrong.	乐观派错了。


After nearly a year in control of both houses of Congress and the White House, the Republicans haven’t achieved any of their four policy goals: repeal and replacement of Obamacare, infrastructure development, trade-policy reform, or even tax reform.	共和党控制国会两院和白宫已近一年，但在四大政策目标上全面受挫：取消和取代奥巴马医保、基础设施开发、贸易政策改革，以及税收改革。


This points to a broken system of politics and governance, one that Americans seem to have no idea how to fix.	这表明政治和治理制度已经破产，并且美国想不到办法来修补。


The US remains the world’s preeminent superpower.	美国仍然是全世界最强大的超级大国。


But doubts are intensifying over whether it’s still up to the job.	但对于它能否保持这一地位，质疑声越来越大。


In this context, the Republicans’ tax reform, however economically indefensible and blatantly unfair it is, is far from America’s biggest concern.	在这样的背景下，共和党的税收改革——不论在经济上多么站不住脚、多么令人发指地不公——都远远不是美国最大的隐忧。


The Varieties of Populist Experience	民粹主义经验的各种变体


LONDON – Emmanuel Macron’s decisive defeat of Marine Le Pen in the French presidential runoff was a major victory for liberal Europe.	伦敦—马克龙在法国总统竞选决战中决定性地击败玛丽娜·勒庞（Marine Le Pen），这是自由欧洲的一次伟大胜利。


But it was a battle, not a war.	但这只是一场战斗，而不是整场战争。


The idea that one in three French citizens would vote for the National Front’s Le Pen was inconceivable only a few years ago.	每三个法国公民就有一人投票给国民阵线的勒庞，这样的概念在几年前还令人无法置信。


Commentators have affixed the “populist” label to the wave of demagogic politics sweeping Europe (and much of the rest of the world).	评论家给目前席卷欧洲（和世界其余大部）的煽动政治贴上了“民粹主义”的标签。


But, beyond the raucous style common to populists, what do these movements share?	但是，除了民粹主义者常见的聒噪风格，这些运动还有那些共同点？


After all, Spain’s Podemos and Greece’s Syriza are of the left.	毕竟，西班牙社会民主党（Podemos）和希腊左翼联盟（Syriza）属于左派。


France’s National Front, the Netherlands’ Party for Freedom, and Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) are of the right.	法国国民阵线、荷兰自由党（Party for Freedom）和德国另类选择党（AfD）属于右派。


Beppe Grillo, the leader of Italy’s Five Star Movement, says that his movement is neither left nor right.	意大利五星运动（Five Star Movement）领导人毕普·格里洛（Beppe Grillo）则说他的运动既不左也不右。


And yet common themes run through all of them: economic nationalism, social protection, anti-Europeanism, anti-globalization, and hostility not just to the political establishment, but to politics itself.	但所有这些运动都有共同主题：经济民族主义、社会保护、反欧主义、反全球化，以及敌视政治建制甚至政治本身。


To understand what this might mean for the evolution of European politics, consider the history of fascism.	要理解这对欧洲政治的演进意味着什么，可以看看法西斯的历史。


Benito Mussolini, the founder of Italian fascism in 1919, started as a revolutionary socialist.	1919年在意大利创立法西斯的墨索里尼一开始是一位革命派社会主义者。


In Germany, the word Nazi was, we should recall, short for National Socialist German Workers’ Party.	我们也应该没有忘记，德国“纳粹”一词原本是国家社会党（National Socialist German Workers’ Party）的简称。


Initially, fascism was a nationalist, anti-capitalist movement.	一开始，法西斯是一场民族主义反资本主义运动。


Later it confined its attack to liberal capitalism, especially “international finance.”	随后，它将抨击限定于自由资本主义，特别是“国际金融”。


And this soon shaded into anti-Semitism – what the German Social Democrat August Bebel famously called “the socialism of fools.”	而这很快转变为反犹主义——德国社会民主党的奥古斯特·贝贝尔（August Bebel）为它起了一个著名的名字“愚人社会主义”。


European fascism collapsed with the defeat of Germany in 1945, but less aggressive forms lived on elsewhere, such as Argentina with its Peronism.	欧洲法西斯随着1945年德国战败而分崩离析，但其比较不激烈的形式在其他地方继续存在，如阿根廷的庇隆主义。


The social base of interwar fascism made it reasonable to see it as a party of the right.	法西斯在两次大战之间的社会基础使得人们合理地将其视为右翼政党。


At the time, the working class dependably supported parties of the left.	当时，工人阶级是左翼的可靠支持。


The only political space left for fascism was the petit bourgeoisie: shopkeepers, small businessmen, and low-level civil servants.	法西斯仅剩的政治生存空间是小资产阶级：商店主、小商人和底层公务员。


Today, the social basis of left-wing politics has vanished.	如今，左翼政治的社会基础已经消失。


The classic working class has disappeared: social democratic parties and trade unions are shadows of their former selves.	经典的工人阶级难觅其踪：社会民主党和工会只是它们的前身的残影。


This means that left-wing populists are inevitably compelled to compete with right-wing populists for the support of exactly the same groups that turned to fascism between the wars: young unemployed males, the “small man” who feels threatened by the “oligarchy” of bankers, global supply chains, corrupt politicians, remote European Union bureaucrats, and “fat cats” of all kinds. Today’s populists, of whatever political stripe, increasingly target not just the same potential supporters, but the enemies as well.	这意味着左翼民粹主义难免要被迫与右翼民粹主义争夺在两次大战之间转向法西斯的那群人：年轻失业男性，那些感到受到银行家、全球供应链、腐败政客、遥不可及的欧盟官僚和各种“权势人物”所组成的“寡头”的威胁的“小人物”。


How much space exists for populism’s further growth, and which variety – socialist or fascist – will attract the available votes?	民粹主义的未来增长还剩下多少空间，哪种民粹主义变体——社会主义或法西斯——会能够吸引可以利用的选民？


The broad answer to the first part of the question was provided by former US President Bill Clinton’s 1992 election campaign: “It’s the economy, stupid.”	对于这个问题的第一部分，美国前总统克林顿在1992年的竞选口号可以提供一个宽泛的答案：“经济最重要，笨蛋。


The EU has been the slowest of the world’s major economic centers to recover from the post-2008 slump.	”2008年大崩盘后，欧盟是世界主要经济中心中复苏最慢的。


In France, the unemployment rate is 10%.	法国失业率仍高达10%。


Youth unemployment there is around 24%, and 34% in Italy – creating fertile recruiting ground for the extremes of left and right.	年轻人失业率法国为24%左右，意大利为34%左右——这给极端左翼和右翼提供了肥沃的生长土地。


Though Macron is by no means an obsessive fiscal hawk, he wants to narrow the French government deficit from 3.4% to 3% of GDP, in line with the ceiling set by the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact.	马克龙从任何方面看都不是死硬财政鹰派，但他希望将法国政府赤字从GDP的3. 4%减少到3%，以符合欧盟稳定与增长公约制定的上限。


In the firing line are 120,000 civil service jobs.	这将危及120,000个公务员岗位。


Yet he also wants to boost the economy with a €50 billion ($55 billion) stimulus package and extend the welfare state.	但他还想通过一份500亿欧元的刺激计划和扩大福利国家来刺激经济。


To square the circle, Macron needs growth, and he is relying on supply-side reforms to deliver it.	为了成功，马克龙需要增长，而他依靠供给侧改革来实现增长。


He plans to cut the corporate-tax rate from 33% to 25% and exclude financial investment from wealth taxation.	他计划将公司税率从33%降低到25%，并免征金融投资的财富税。


A vocal critic of protectionism, he will push for the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the United States.	马克龙大力批评保护主义，将推动欧盟-加拿大全面经济与贸易协定和与美国的跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系。


His support of the El Khomri law, which made it easier to fire workers, and his opposition to the 35-hour week, indicate his desire to increase the French labor market’s “flexibility.”	他支持让解雇工人更加方便的科姆里法（El Khomri law），反对每周35小时工作制，这表明他渴望增加法国劳动力市场的“灵活性”。


Despite talk of the “green economy” and calls for a Europe-wide investment program, Macron’s agenda is broadly neoliberal.	尽管马克龙的计划谈到了“绿色经济”，呼吁实施泛欧洲的投资计划，但广义上仍属于新自由派。


Essentially, Macron is hoping that his agenda, if implemented at the EU level, will lift not just the French economy, but all European boats.	本质上，马克龙希望他的日程如果能够在欧盟层面得以实施，不但将提升法国经济，还将让整个欧洲受益。


In fact, the likelihood is that such reforms will sink all boats, giving the populists their chance.	事实上，更大的可能是这些改革将让整条船沉入水底，让民粹主义者获得机会。


In that case, which variety of populist will seize the opportunity?	果真如此的话，哪一种民粹主义将抓住这个机会？


The economist Dani Rodrik puts the appeal of populism into focus.	经济学家丹尼·罗德里克（Dani Rodrik）集中关注了民粹主义的号召力。


He argues that democracy, national sovereignty, and global economic integration are mutually incompatible; at least one must be sacrificed.	他指出，民主、国家主权和全球经济一体化互不相容； 至少必须牺牲其中一个。


Given that many voters in Europe and the US feel battered by globalization, a populist party that aggressively puts the nation first has a head start against its rivals.	考虑到欧洲和美国的许多选民感到受到了全球化的重创，激进地要求国家第一的民粹主义政党赢得了起跑线。


From this perspective, Macron was the ideal candidate for Le Pen to lose to.	从这个角度讲，马克龙是勒庞的理想的战胜者。


He embodies the globalist elite.	他堪称全球主义精英的化身。


He appears soft on immigration.	他在移民问题上立场较软。


And, assuming that his new political party fails to win a majority in next month’s National Assembly election, his government will require support from the mainstream parties.	此外，如果他的新政党不能在下个月的国民大会选举中赢得多数，那么他的政府将需要来自主流政党的支持。


Over the next five years, establishment figures may well coalesce around failing policies, giving Le Pen the perfect target for the National Front’s 2022 presidential campaign.	在未来五年，建制派人物的政策可能一败涂地，成为勒庞的国民阵线在2022年总统竞选中的完美目标。


To be sure, support for a leftist program certainly exists in France.	平心而论，对左派政策的支持在法国是绝对存在的。


About 20% of voters backed the left-wing populist Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the presidential election’s first round. In the second round, one particularly illuminating Twitter hashtag was #NiPatronNiPatrie (“neither boss nor country”), reflecting many voters’ dissatisfaction with the election’s choice between neoliberalism and nationalism.	大约20%的选民在总统竞选的第一轮中支持左翼民粹主义者让-卢克·梅朗雄（Jean-Luc Mélenchon），这表明许多选民不满于只在新自由主义和民族主义之间做出选择。


The task of the left is to direct attention to the truly problematic aspects of global economic integration – financialization, the prioritization of capital over labor, of creditor over debtor, of patron over ouvrier – without lapsing into reactionary politics.	左翼的任务是将注意力引向全球经济一体化中真正存在问题的部分——金融化、资本压倒劳动力、债权人压倒债务人、主顾压倒工人——而不要落入反动政治的陷阱。


D-Day Venezuela	重大变故中的委内瑞拉


CAMBRIDGE – The Venezuelan crisis is moving relentlessly from catastrophic to unimaginable.	剑桥——委内瑞拉危机正在从一场灾难残酷无情地转化为超出任何人的想象。


The level of misery, human suffering, and destruction has reached a point where the international community must rethink how it can help.	痛苦、人类灾难和破坏之严重已经足以促使国际社会重新思考如何提供帮助。


Two years ago, I warned of a coming famine in Venezuela, akin to Ukraine’s 1932-1933 Holomodor.	两年前，我曾警告委内瑞拉即将发生饥荒 ，就像1932到1933年乌克兰的大饥荒一样。


On December 17, The New York Times published front-page photographs of this man-made disaster.	12月17日，《纽约时报》头版头条刊发了这场人为灾难的实景照。


In July, I described the unprecedented nature of Venezuela’s economic calamity, documenting the collapse in output, incomes, and living and health standards.	7月，我曾描述过委内瑞拉经济灾难史无前例的性质，记录了产量、收入、生活与健康水平的崩溃性下滑。


Probably the single most telling statistic I cited was that the minimum wage (the wage earned by the median worker) measured in the cheapest available calorie, had declined from 52,854 calories per day in May 2012 to just 7,005 by May 2017 – not enough to feed a family of five.	我引用的一个最有说服力的数据也许就是以最廉价卡路里计算的最低工资（普通工人所挣得的中位数工资），该数据已经从2012年5月的每天52，854卡路里下降到2017年5月的仅7，005卡路里——根本不够支撑一个五口之家的生活。


Since then, conditions have deteriorated dramatically.	自那以后，情况进一步大幅恶化。


By last month, the minimum wage had fallen to just 2,740 calories a day.	截止上个月，最低工资已经骤降至每天仅能提供 2,740卡路里。


And proteins are in even shorter supply.	而蛋白质供应甚至更加短缺。


Meat of any kind is so scarce that the market price of a kilogram is equivalent to more than a week of minimum-wage work.	任何一种肉类都极端稀缺，以至于一公斤肉的市场价格相当于一周以上的最低工资。


Health conditions have worsened as well, owing to nutritional deficiencies and the government’s decision not to supply infant formula, standard vaccines against infectious diseases, medicines for AIDS, transplant, cancer, and dialysis patients, and general hospital supplies.	健康状况也急剧恶化，主要原因是营养不足，以及政府做出的不提供婴儿配方奶粉、抗传染性疾病标准疫苗、艾滋病、器官移植、癌症和透析患者所需药物以及普通医院用品的决策。


Since August 1, the price of a US dollar has added an extra zero, and inflation has exceeded 50% per month since September.	自8月1日以来，美元价格暴涨已经使物价又加了一个零，而9月后每月的通胀均已超过50%的速度增加。


According to OPEC, oil production has declined by 16% since May, down more than 350,000 barrels a day.	据欧佩克组织统计，5月以来，石油产量从每天350,000 桶出现了超过16%的降幅 。


To arrest the decline, President Nicolás Maduro’s government has had no better idea than to arrest some 60 senior managers of the state-owned oil company PDVSA and appoint a National Guard general with no industry experience to run it.	为阻止这种下滑，尼古拉斯·马杜罗总统政府想到的最好办法就是逮捕约60名国有石油公司委内瑞拉石油的高级管理者，并任命一名毫无行业经验的国民卫队将军来负责经营工作。


Rather than taking steps to end the humanitarian crisis, the government is using it to entrench its political control.	政府非但没有采取措施结束人道主义危机，反而利用这次危机来巩固自身的政治控制。


Rejecting offers of assistance, it is spending its resources on Chinese-made military-grade crowd-control systems to thwart public protests.	该国政府拒绝国际社会提供援助的建议，反而将资源用于购买中国制造的军用级别的群体事件控制系统，以挫败公众的抗议。


Many outside observers believe that as the economy worsens, the government will lose power.	许多国外观察家认为随着经济状况的不断恶化，政府的权力将逐渐丧失。


But the organized political opposition is weaker now than it was in July, despite massive international diplomatic support.	但尽管拥有国际外交界的大规模支持，有组织的政治反对势力仍然比7月份的时候要更弱一些。


Since then, the government has installed an unconstitutional Constituent Assembly with full powers, deregistered the three main opposition parties, sacked elected mayors and deputies, and stolen three elections.	从那以后，政府已经设立了一个违反宪法规定的全权制宪委员会，取消了三大主要反对党，解雇了民选市长和代表，并窃取了三次选举成果。


With all solutions either impractical, deemed infeasible, or unacceptable, most Venezuelans are wishing for some deus ex machina to save them from this tragedy.	因为所有解决方案要么不切实际、不可行要么就是无法接受，多数委内瑞拉人都希望有人能从天而降挽救他们从这场悲剧中摆脱。


The best scenario would be free and fair elections to choose a new government.	最好情况是组织自由而公正的选举来选出新一届政府。


This is Plan A for the Venezuelan opposition organized around the Mesa de la Unidad Democratica, and is being sought in talks taking place in the Dominican Republic.	这是委内瑞拉反对党民主联合会（Mesa de la Unidad Democratica）的首选计划，而在多米尼加共和国举行的谈判正在争取这样的结果。


But it defies credulity to think that a regime that is willing to starve millions to remain in power would yield that power in free elections.	但人们无法相信不惜饿死成百上千万人来保住权力的专制政权会通过一次自由选举就达到交权的结果。


In Eastern Europe in the 1940s, Stalinist regimes consolidated power despite losing elections.	在20世纪40年代的东欧，斯大林政权尽管选举失败但权力却得到了巩固。


The fact that the Maduro government has stolen three elections in 2017 alone and has blocked the electoral participation of the parties with which it is negotiating, again despite massive international attention, suggests that success is unlikely.	马杜罗政府在国际社会再次给予大力关注的情况下仅2017年一年就窃取三次选举成果并成功阻止与其谈判各方参选的事实表明要想通过这种方式取得成功是不可能的。


A domestic military coup to restore constitutional rule is less palatable to many democratic politicians, because they fear that the soldiers may not return to their barracks afterwards.	发动国内军事政变恢复宪法秩序在许多民主政治家看来不那么受欢迎，因为他们担心士兵在政变完成后可能不愿再回到军营当中。


More important, Maduro’s regime already is a military dictatorship, with officers in charge of many government agencies.	更重要的是，马杜罗政府已经是军事专制政府，并由军官来担任许多政府机构的负责人。


The senior officers of the Armed Forces are corrupt to the core, having been involved for years in smuggling, currency and procurement crimes, narco-trafficking and extra-judicial killings that, in per capita terms are three times more prevalent than in Rodrigo Duterte’s Philippines.	武装部队的高级军官处于腐败的核心，多年来一直涉嫌卷入走私、货币及采购犯罪、贩毒及法外处决等非法活动，这些非法活动从人均标准衡量其普遍性比杜特尔特的菲律宾高出三倍 。


Decent senior officers have been quitting in large numbers.	体面的高级官员已经在大量退出。


Targeted sanctions, managed by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), are hurting many of the thugs ruling Venezuela.	由美国外国资产管理局（OFAC）管理的针对性制裁正在伤及执政委内瑞拉的诸多暴徒。


But, measured in the tens of thousands of avoidable deaths and millions of additional Venezuelan refugees that will occur until the sanctions yield their intended effect, these measures are too slow at best.	但如果站在制裁措施达到预期效果前可能出现的成千上万原本可以避免的人员伤亡和成百上千万难民的角度来看，上述措施的效果充其量也是太过缓慢了。


At worst, they will never work.	最糟糕的情况是这些措施永远达不到预期的效果。


After all, such sanctions have not led to regime change in Russia, North Korea, or Iran.	归根结底，这样的制裁并没有促成俄罗斯、朝鲜和伊朗的政权更迭。


This leaves us with an international military intervention, a solution that scares most Latin American governments because of a history of aggressive actions against their sovereign interests, especially in Mexico and Central America.	于是可用的选项只剩下国际军事干预，而这种方案因为历史上针对拉美国家主权利益一系列的侵略行为而令地区各国政府、特别是墨西哥和中美国家政府感到害怕。


But these may be the wrong historical analogies.	但这样进行历史类比可能是错误的。


After all, Simón Bolívar gained the title of Liberator of Venezuela thanks to an 1814 invasion organized and financed by neighboring Nueva Granada (today’s Colombia).	毕竟，西蒙·波利瓦尔因为一次邻国新格拉纳达（也就是今天的哥伦比亚）组织和出资的一场1814年侵略战争而获得了委内瑞拉解放者的称号。


France, Belgium, and the Netherlands could not free themselves of an oppressive regime between 1940 and 1944 without international military action.	法国、比利时和荷兰如果没有国际社会的军事干预就无法从1940到1944年的压迫性政权治下获得自由。


The implication is clear.	含义十分明确。


As the Venezuelan situation becomes unimaginable, the solutions to be considered move closer to the inconceivable.	随着委内瑞拉形势变得越来越超乎想象，所要考虑的解决办法也越来越接近不可思议的地步。


The duly elected National Assembly, where the opposition holds a two-thirds majority, has been unconstitutionally stripped of power by an unconstitutionally appointed Supreme Court.	反对党占三分之二多数的正式选举的国民议会其权力却被一个违宪任命的最高法院所剥夺。


And the military has used its power to suppress protests and force into exile many leaders including the Supreme Court justices elected by the National Assembly in July.	而军方一直利用手中权力来镇压抗议活动并迫使由国民议会7月选举的包括最高法院法官在内的许多领导人物海外流亡。


As solutions go, why not consider the following one: the National Assembly could impeach Maduro and the OFAC-sanctioned, narco-trafficking vice president, Tareck El Aissami, who has had more than $500 million in assets seized by the United States government.	说到解决方案，为什么不考虑一下这个方案：由国民议会对马杜罗和遭受美国外国资产管理局制裁并被曝从事贩毒行为的副总统艾萨米提出弹劾。 艾萨米有超过5亿美元的资产 被美国政府没收。


The Assembly could constitutionally appoint a new government, which in turn could request military assistance from a coalition of the willing, including Latin American, North American, and European countries.	国民议会可以按照宪法规定任命新一届政府，而新政府反过来又可以邀请包括拉美、北美和欧洲国家在内的自愿联盟提供军事协作。


This force would free Venezuela, in the same way Canadians, Australians, Brits, and Americans liberated Europe in 1944-1945.	这股势力将会解放委内瑞拉，就像1944到1945年加拿大人、澳大利亚人、英国人和美国人解放欧洲一样。


Closer to home, it would be akin to the US liberating Panama from the oppression of Manuel Noriega, ushering in democracy and the fastest economic growth in Latin America.	举个近一点的例子，这就好比美国从曼努埃尔·诺列加的压迫下解放巴拿马，导致该国从此建立了民主制度并迎来了拉美地区首屈一指的经济增速。


According to international law, none of this would require approval by the United Nations Security Council (which Russia and China might veto), because the military force would be invited by a legitimate government seeking support to uphold the country’s constitution.	按照国际法规定，这一切都不需要得到联合国安理会的批准（因为俄罗斯和中国可能会投反对票），因为军队将在寻求支持的合法政府的邀请下来维护该国宪法。


The existence of such an option might even boost the prospects of the ongoing negotiations in the Dominican Republic.	这样一种选择的存在甚至可能会推动目前正在多米尼加共和国举行的谈判取得更好的结果。


An imploding Venezuela is not in most countries’ national interest.	一个崩溃的委内瑞拉不符合多数国家的国家利益。


And conditions there constitute a crime against humanity that must be stopped on moral grounds.	而那里的状况构成人道主义犯罪，必须本着道德的原则加以制止。


The failure of Operation Market Garden in September 1944, immortalized in the book and film A Bridge Too Far, led to famine in the Netherlands in the winter of 1944-1945.	1944年9月市场花园计划的失败在小说和电影遥远的桥中都进行过不朽的描述，这次计划的失败导致1944到1945年冬天饥荒在荷兰爆发。


Today’s Venezuelan famine is already worse.	今天委内瑞拉的饥荒已经有过之而无不及。


How many lives must be shattered before salvation comes?	究竟有多少生命将要毁灭，才能促成国际社会的拯救？


Stopping Venezuela’s Harvest of Sorrow	阻止委内瑞拉收获悲伤


CARACAS – Two years ago, public protests erupted in both Kyiv and Caracas.	加拉加斯——两年前，基辅和加拉加斯爆发了公众抗议活动。


Whereas Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity quickly took power, political change in Venezuela followed a much slower path.	尽管乌克兰的尊严革命迅速取得了政权，但委内瑞拉却经历了一场缓慢的政治变革。


But Venezuela’s parliamentary election on December 6, which gave the opposition a two-thirds majority, is moving political developments into the fast lane.	但委内瑞拉反对派在12月6日举行的议会选举中取得了三分之二多数席位，革命的进展也因此大为提速。


Although President Nicolás Maduro accepted defeat on election night, his government has promised to disregard any laws that the National Assembly enacts, and has appointed an alternative Assembly of the Communes not envisaged in the constitution.	虽然马杜罗总统在大选之夜接受了失败，但其政府扬言将无视国民议会颁布的任何法律，并已另行委任不符合宪法规定的公社大会。


Moreover, he used the National Assembly’s lame-duck session to pack the Supreme Court and has called on supporters to prevent the newly elected Assembly from being seated on January 5.	此外，他还利用国民大会的跛脚鸭会议占领最高法院，并公然呼吁支持者阻止新当选议会于1月5日就职。


Like Ukraine two years ago, Venezuela is heading toward a constitutional crisis.	就像两年前的乌克兰一样，现在的委内瑞拉正在走向宪政危机。


But there is an older and more ominous parallel between Venezuela and Ukraine: the Soviet Union’s man-made famine of 1933.	但委内瑞拉和乌克兰有着更为古老而可怕的相似之处：即1933年由苏联人为造成的灾难性饥荒。


Stalin’s decision in 1932 to force independent farmers – the kulaks – into large collectivized farms caused 3.3 million Ukrainians and ethnic Poles to starve to death the following year.	1932年斯大林迫使独立农民——富农——加盟大型集体农场导致330万乌克兰人和波兰人在第二年因饥饿而死于非命。


The catastrophe was unleashed when Stalin, convinced that the kulaks were hiding grain from the Soviet state, requisitioned the seed grain, believing that this would force the kulaks to use the hidden grain as seed.	灾难的起因是斯大林深信富农拒不将藏匿的粮食交给苏维埃政府，他以此为依据征用种粮，并认为这样做就会迫使富农用藏匿的粮食来做种子。


But there was no hidden grain – and thus no seed to plant the 1933 crop.	但藏匿的粮食其实并不存在——因此1933年农民没有种子来种植庄稼。


Stalin blamed the ensuing collapse in food production on conspiracies by the dead and dying.	斯大林将随之而来的粮食生产崩溃归咎于饿死和行将饿死的人合谋欺骗国家。


Instead of dealing with the unfolding catastrophe, Stalin increased grain requisitions, despite dismal production levels – a move that led to mass starvation.	斯大林非但没有及时采取对策，反而全然不顾糟糕的生产水平而加大粮食的征用力度，——他的这一举措导致了大规模饥荒的发生。


Information was hidden from the public, preventing remedial action.	政府对公众隐瞒事实真相，从而无法采取任何补救措施。


Even offers of international humanitarian assistance, especially by Poland, were rejected.	斯大林政府甚至拒绝了国际、尤其是波兰政府提供的人道主义援助。


A famine in a country as fertile as Ukraine was hard to imagine before it happened.	在乌克兰这样富饶的国度爆发饥荒很难想象。


And it is hard to imagine a similar catastrophe in a country with the world’s largest oil reserves.	同样难以想象的还有类似的灾难在拥有全世界最大石油储备的国家发生。


But, heading into 2016, Venezuela faces precisely such a scenario.	但随着时间跨入到2016年，这样的情景恰恰可能在委内瑞拉发生。


There are four fundamental ingredients of such man-made disasters: repression of the market, suppression of information, systematic persecution of dissent, and attribution of blame for the disaster to the victims (which justifies radicalizing the policies that led to the problem in the first place).	这样的人为灾难有四个基本要素：抑制市场、压制信息流动、对持不同政见者的全面迫害以及将灾难责任归咎于受害者本身（即证明从一开始就导致上述问题的极端政策的合理性）。


Sadly, Ukraine is not the only example: The human toll in China of Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward of 1958-1961 was even greater, causing an estimated 15-45 million deaths.	可悲的是，乌克兰并不是唯一的例子：1958至1961年毛泽东在中国开展的大跃进造成的人员伤亡更大，估计导致大概1，500万到4，500万人死于非命。


As in Ukraine and China, Venezuela’s government has been trying to collectivize production.	步乌克兰和中国的后尘，委内瑞拉政府一直不遗余力地推动生产集体化进程。


After Hugo Chávez was re-elected in 2006, he decided to accelerate the “revolution” and nationalized banks, telecoms, cement, steel, supermarkets, hundreds of other firms, and millions of hectares of land.	2006年查韦斯再次当选后，他决定加快推进“革命”，实现银行、电信、水泥、钢铁、超市、数以百计的企业和数以百万计公顷土地的国有化进程。


And, as in Ukraine and China, the affected firms’ output quickly collapsed.	而且，就像乌克兰和中国一样，受影响企业的生产很快就陷入崩溃的境地。


Beyond outright expropriation, the government implemented a system that attacked the market’s natural ability to self-organize the economy.	除直接征收外，政府还实施一套攻击市场自我组织经济能力的系统。


The market is no panacea, and it can work only with a state that operates properly, but it is a powerful stabilizing force.	市场是强大的稳定力量而非万能良药，需要政府正常运作才能发挥作用。


Market prices provide information about what is in short supply. Profits create incentives to respond to the information contained in prices.	供不应求的商品信息反映在市场价格当中，而利润则刺激人们对价格所包含的信息做出反应。


And capital markets allocate resources in pursuit of profits.	而资本市场配置资源目的是追求利润。


Markets may fail, and policies can improve on outcomes; but Chávez and Maduro, like Stalin and Mao, attacked the market mechanism itself.	市场有可能失灵，政策的结果也可以改善； 但查韦斯和马杜罗就像斯大林和毛泽东一样攻击市场机制本身。


In Venezuela, a generalized system of price and foreign-exchange controls is causing havoc.	在委内瑞拉，对价格和外汇的全面管制正造成明显的破坏作用。


Foreign exchange is allocated administratively at a price that is about 130 times cheaper than the market rate.	行政管制方式确定的外汇价格比市场价便宜约130倍。


Not even drug trafficking is as profitable as this arbitrage opportunity, with obvious consequences.	就连贩毒这样有明显后果的行为都比不上上述套利机会所带来的利润。


A formula for “just” prices keeps all prices artificially low (setting higher prices buys violators a ticket to prison), causing shortages, rationing, and queues that consume many hours of most Venezuelans’ days.	“公平”价公式人为压低所有商品价格（违法提价者往往会因此而获刑）。 结果造成商品短缺、配给制和每天耗费多数委内瑞拉人高达数小时排队的购物长龙。


Shortages of critical items have already cost many lives, not to mention the devastating effects on production.	重要物品短缺已经造成很多委内瑞拉人死亡，更不用说严重破坏了生产活动。


And, despite price controls, inflation is above 200%, because the central bank monetizes a fiscal deficit of more than 20% of GDP.	而且，通货膨胀在实行价格管制的情况下仍然超过200%，因为央行货币化的财政赤字超过GDP的20%。


The rising oil prices that accompanied the adoption of these policies initially muted their impact, as imports could make up for the fall in output.	伴随上述政策的油价上涨最初屏蔽了其负面影响，因为进口可以弥补产能的不足。


In 1998, when Chávez was first elected, oil was languishing at $8 per barrel; in 2012, prices averaged $104.	1998年查韦斯首次当选时，油价徘徊在8美元一桶； 而到2012年，油价则涨到平均每桶104美元。


But, rather than using the windfall to build a financial cushion for a rainy day, Chávez chose to use high oil prices as collateral to borrow massively, quadrupling the public external debt.	但查韦斯非但没有用这笔飞来横财建立应对不时之需的资金储备，反而利用高油价大规模抵押贷款，致使公共外债总额达到原来的四倍。


This allowed him to spend in 2012 as if the price of oil were $197 per barrel.	他因此在2012年支撑了油价相当于197美元一桶的消费。


But now, with Venezuelan crude below $30 dollars and the country cut off from international capital markets, imports are declining to a fraction of their 2012 level.	但现在随着委内瑞拉原油跌至不到30美元一桶且国家得不到国际资本市场的支持，进口额已经骤降至2012年的一小部分。


The previous destruction of productive capacity has come home to roost.	此前对生产力的破坏行为终于带来了报应。


Without the market mechanism, the adjustment is taking place with too little information and too many perverse incentives, making its impact on production and welfare even more devastating.	没有市场机制的调整信息太过闭塞、激励举措也太过负面，从而导致对生产和福利的影响更具破坏性。


The coming year will see a further drastic cut in imports.	来年进口额仍将进一步大幅降低。


Not only are oil prices even lower, but imports in 2014-2015 were financed in part by running down reserves and other assets, and by authorizing private imports but not paying for them, de facto expropriating the working capital – the seed grain – of private companies.	不仅油价仍将继续下降，而且2014-2015年部分进口资金源于消耗储备和其他资产，以及授权私人进口但却拒绝支付费用（相当于起到种子粮作用的私人企业营运资金被没收）。


The implications of this madness are ominous.	如此疯狂之举的后果极为严重。


To prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, swift action needs to be taken: restoration of the market mechanism; exchange-rate unification (as President Mauricio Macri just implemented in Argentina); an alternative system of social transfers to substitute for rationing; fiscal retrenchment; orderly foreign-debt restructuring; and massive financial support from the international community.	为了避免人道主义灾难，我们必须迅速采取行动：恢复市场机制； 统一汇率（就像毛里西奥·马克里总统刚刚在阿根廷实施的那样）；


Maduro is not trying to do any of this; instead, he is devoting his energy and creativity to maintaining power, by fair means or foul.	马杜罗没有采取任何一项举措； 相反，他正不择一切手段、发挥一切能力和创造力把持权力不被夺走。


But time is running out.	但剩下的时间已经不多。


Unless Maduro changes, the new National Assembly – where the opposition’s two-thirds majority enables it to amend the constitution – will have to change him.	除非马杜罗自己改变，否则新一届国民大会——反对党所占三分之二的多数席位足以修订宪法——必须用尽一切手段改变他。


Preparing for the Unknown Unknowns	为未知的未知做好准备


LONDON – We live in perilous times.	伦敦—我们生活在危险的时代。


Just as we seem to get our bearings, something happens to make us feel as if our legs have been knocked out from under us.	就在我们似乎认清了形势时，机会发生一些事情，让我们觉得双腿被位于我们之下的东西弄瘫痪了。


Actions and events often are intertwined, and what happens on one level – affecting individuals, states, economic sectors, and companies of all sizes – may have repercussions on others.	行动和事件常常互相纠结，在某一层面所发生的事情——影响个体、国家、经济部门和各个规模的公司——可能会在其他层面引起反响。


The recent terrorist attacks in Paris are a case in point, affecting not only the families and friends of the victims, or even only the people of France.	最近在巴黎发生的恐怖袭击就是这样的例子，它影响的不只是受害者的家庭和朋友，甚至不只是法国人民。


The reverberations are being felt around the world, and they will continue to have an impact – far beyond Europe – on public policy, electoral politics, media freedom, and more.	反响在全世界都能体验到，并将继续给公共政策、选举政治、言论自由和其他方面造成影响——并且远远不止于欧洲。


The attacks came at a time when the world traditionally tries to make sense of the year ahead – to forecast the risks that lie in wait, the opportunities that will arise, and the challenges that will have to be overcome.	袭击发生在全世界根据传统展望新年的时候——也就是预测前方有何风险、有何机会、需要克服何种挑战的时候。


But what about longer-term risks?	但长期风险情况如何？


Do events like the Paris attacks show that forecasting them is impossible?	巴黎袭击这样的事件是否表明预测它们是不可能的任务？


Or did the attacks expose precisely the type of risk that long-term projections should identify?	或者，袭击是否暴露了长期预测应该看到的风险？


The World Economic Forum has just released its “Global Risks 2015” report which attempts to predict and rank the biggest risks that the world faces over the next ten years.	世界经济论坛刚刚发布了其《2015年全球风险》（“Global Risks 2015”）报告，该报告试图预测未来十年世界所面临的最大风险并进行排序。


The WEF’s focus is squarely on the macro level.	世界经济论坛的注意力主要集中在宏观层面。


For example, “the biggest threat to the stability of the world in the next ten years comes from the risk of international conflict.”	比如，“未来十年世界稳定的最大威胁来自国际冲突的风险。


And the menace of war is followed by a raft of social, environmental, geopolitical, technological, and economic risks and trends.	”而战争威胁排在许多社会、环境、地缘政治、技术和经济风险和趋势之前。


But all of these risks will be felt on an organizational, and ultimately, individual level as well.	但所有这些风险都可以在组织层面，并且最终在个体层面被感觉到。


That is why we spend time in conference rooms and around kitchen tables trying to identify and mitigate them.	正因如此，我们花时间在会议室和餐桌周围试图识别并遏制它们。


And yet we also know that the pace of change is faster than ever before, and that governments, businesses, and households are finding it increasingly difficult to keep up.	但我们也知道，变化的速度比以往任何时候到要快，而政府、企业和家庭日益感到难以跟上变化的脚步。


Beneath all of our identifying, quantifying, and mitigating of risk lies the undeniable and timeless truth that the only constant is change.	在我们所有的识别、量化和遏制风险努力之下时不可否认的永恒真理——唯一不变的只有变化。


For Heraclitus, change was the fundamental principle of life.	对赫拉克利特来说，变化是生命的基本原理。


Machiavelli referred to it as fortuna:the events that shape us and determine our wellbeing are often beyond our reason and control.	马基雅维利称之为福尔图娜（fortuna）：左右我们、决定我们福祉的事件往往超越我们的推理和控制。


Though we can attempt to plan for change, we cannot always predict the precise nature and time at which it will occur.	尽管我们可以尝试规划变化，但我们不可能永远预测到变化的性质和发生时间。


Moreover, for all the risks that we can and do plan for, it is those for which we cannot prepare that can do the most damage.	此外，对所有我们可以并作出规划的风险来说，我们无法做好准备的那些变化会带来最大的伤害。


That is why, alongside all of the identifying, quantifying, and mitigating, we must also embrace the idea that not all change can be clearly foreseen and planned for.	正因如此，除了所有的识别、量化和遏制工作之外，我们还必须接受一个思想，即并非所有变化都可以明确地预测和规划。


The implication is that we must instill in our families, organizations, and states the resilience and tools needed to act effectively in times of crisis – and thus to minimize the potentially damaging impact of unexpected change.	言下之意是我们必须潜移默化地在我们的家庭、组织和国家中建立有效应对危机时刻所需要的恢复力和工具，从而让意料外变化的潜在破坏力最小化。


This ethos will also help us maximize the potential benefits of such flux.	这一思想有助于我们实现这些波动的潜在收益最大化。


After all, without unforeseen change, much of human endeavor would be fruitless, and innovation would be unnecessary.	毕竟，没有未预见到的变化，人类的许多努力将无功而返，我们也没有创新的必要了。


Shocking things like the massacre at Charlie Hebdo in Paris happen, and they seem to be happening more frequently than ever.	类似于巴黎《查理周刊》大屠杀的冲击性事件时不时地发生，并且似乎比以往任何时候都发生得更加频繁。


They turn our world upside down and make us question our sense of who we are.	它们颠覆我们的世界，让我们质疑“我们是什么”的问题。


It is at such moments that we demonstrate our ability – or lack of it – to confront the unexplained, the unplanned, and the unfathomable.	这样的时刻正是我们证明我们面对无法解释的、计划外的、深不可测的能力——或证明我们欠缺这种能力——的时刻。


At the same time, such moments remind us that future generations ultimately will judge us not on the basis of what we accumulated – whether personally, as organizations, or as states – but by the impact we had on those around us, and by how well we responded to their needs.	与此同时，这样的时刻提醒我们，最终子孙后代对我们的评价基础不是我们积累了什么——不管在个人、组织还是国家层面——而是我们队周围人群的影响，以及我们如何响应他们的需要。


In perilous times, when the emergence, timing, and diffusion of risks can have a paralyzing effect, what matters is not simply what we accomplish, but how we accomplish it.	在危险的时代，当风险的出现、时机和扩散都可能造成瘫痪性后果时，重要的不仅是我们取得什么成就，而是我们如何取得成就。


In such times, the value we create cannot be measured only in terms of money.	在这样的时代，我们所创造的价值不能只用钱来衡量。


More important is how much stronger, more capable, and more resilient we help our colleagues, partners, children, and fellow citizens become.	更重要的是我们帮助同侪、伙伴、儿童和同胞变得多强壮、多有能力、多有韧性。


Perhaps the main risk this year – and in the decade ahead – is that we lose sight of this fundamental truth.	也许今年的主要风险——以及未来十年的主要风险——是我们没有看清根本事实。


Like the Palestinians, the Kurds Deserve a State	库尔德人理应跟巴勒斯坦人一样建国


JERUSALEM – Nowadays, almost everyone agrees that the Palestinian people deserve a state, and that they should not live under Israeli rule.	发自耶路撒冷——如今几乎所有人都同意巴勒斯坦人应当建立自己的国家而非生活在以色列的统治之下。


Most Israelis share this view, including even Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who has reluctantly stated his own commitment to a two-state solution.	大多数以色列人也赞同这一观点，甚至连总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡也不情愿地表达了自己对两国方案的承诺。


And in many Western democracies, a strong left-wing constituency regularly organizes demonstrations in favor of Palestinian independence.	而在许多西方民主国家，一批强大的左翼选民团体也会定期组织鼓吹巴勒斯坦独立的示威活动。


The argument for Palestinian statehood is anchored in a fundamentally moral claim for national self-determination.	巴勒斯坦建国的论据源自于一个关于民族自决的根本性道义主张。


Yet when it comes to securing the same right for the Kurdish people, the West has been shamefully and strangely silent.	但这一主张赋予库尔德人同样的权利时，西方世界却陷入了一片耻辱而诡异的沉默之中。


Western democracies offered no support for the Kurdistan Regional Government’s independence referendum in late September, and they have not spoken out against the Iraqi and Turkish governments’ threats to crush the KRG’s bid for statehood by force.	各西方民主国家既没有对9月底库尔德斯坦地区政府的独立公投给予支持，也没有站出来反对伊拉克和土耳其两国政府动武阻止库尔德人建国的威胁。


When officials in the European Union or the United States give a reason for opposing Kurdish independence, it always comes down to realpolitik.	在列举反对库尔德人独立的理由时，欧盟或美国官员总是会归结为现实政治。


Iraq’s territorial integrity must be preserved, we are told, and independence for the KRG could destabilize Turkey and Iran, owing to those countries’ sizeable Kurdish minorities.	他们说伊拉克的领土完整必须得到保护，而库尔德斯坦地区政府的独立还可能会破坏土耳其和伊朗的稳定，因为这两国也有着数量庞大的库尔德少数民族。


But these arguments merely underscore a double standard.	但这些论据只不过体现了他们的双重标准。


Moral claims for self-determination are justly raised in the case of the Palestinians, but they are entirely absent from the international discourse about Kurdistan.	巴勒斯坦人理直气壮地提出了民族自决的道义主张，却完全没有遭遇到那种针对库尔德斯坦的国际议论。


Worse still, the brutal oppression of the Kurds over many generations has been totally overlooked.	更糟糕的是，外界还无视了相关各国几十年来对库尔德人的残酷压迫。


In Iraq under Saddam Hussein, the Kurds were subjected to genocidal chemical-weapons attacks.	在萨达姆·侯赛因统治下的伊拉克，库尔德人受到种族灭绝式的化学武器袭击。


And in Turkey, the military has razed hundreds of Kurdish villages.	在土耳其，军方已经扫荡了数百个库尔德村庄。


Among the arguments used to deny the Kurds their right to self-determination, the defense of Iraq’s territorial integrity is the most spurious and hypocritical of all.	在否认库尔德人民族自决权的论点中，维护伊拉克领土完整的说法堪称是最荒谬虚伪的。


When British statesmen established Iraq as a distinct political entity after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, they did so in accordance with their own imperialist interests. Accordingly, they disregarded the territory’s history, geography, demography, and ethnic and religious diversity.	当英国政治家在一战击败奥斯曼帝国后将伊拉克建成一个独立政治实体时，他们遵循的只是自己的帝国主义利益，却忽视了这片土地上的历史，地理，人口以及种族和宗教多样性。


The residents of this newly conjured state were never actually asked if they wanted to live in a country with an overwhelming Shia majority and large Kurdish and Christian minorities.	当地民众被划入了这个凭空建立的新国家，却没有人问过他们是否想要住在一个什叶派穆斯林人口占压倒性多数同时却有着大量库尔德和基督教少数族裔的地方。


And they certainly were never asked if they wanted to be ruled by a Sunni dynasty that the British had implanted from the Hejaz, now a part of Saudi Arabia.	自然也没有人问过他们是否希望被一个逊尼派穆斯林王朝统治，而后者是当年由英国人从现为沙特阿拉伯一部分的汉志（Hejaz）地区移植过来的。


Initially, under the Treaty of Sèvres, which the defeated Ottoman Empire signed in August 1920, the Kurds, like the Armenians, were promised an independent state.	最初，根据战败的奥斯曼帝国在1920年8月签署的《西弗斯条约》，库尔德人像亚美尼亚人一样得到了独立建国的承诺。


But the victorious Allied powers later abandoned this promise, and the Kurdish people have lived under constant oppression ever since.	但获胜的协约国势力随后放弃了这一承诺，令库尔德人从此落入了长期遭各方压迫的命运。


In what became northern Iraq, the Kurds, like the country’s Assyrian Christians, were for decades denied recognition of their distinct language and culture by hegemonic Arab rulers in Baghdad.	在伊拉克北部地区，库尔德人就跟该国的亚述裔基督徒一样，长期无法得到巴格达的阿拉伯霸权统治者对自身独特语言和文化的认可。


In this context, “territorial integrity” is nothing more than an alibi for ethnic or religious oppression.	在这方面“领土完整”只不过是种族或宗教压迫的托词罢了。


Similarly, the tens of millions of Kurds living in Turkey and Iran have also long been denied basic human and cultural rights.	同样，生活在土耳其和伊朗的数千万库尔德人也被长期剥夺了基本的人权和文化权利。


It is thus understandable that the Turkish and Iranian governments would object to the KRG’s independence bid: they fear the emergence, if it succeeds, of similar movements among their own oppressed Kurdish populations.	因此也可以理解土耳其和伊朗政府为何会反对库尔德斯坦地区政府的独立尝试：他们担心一旦库尔德斯坦成功独立，自己手下那些被压迫的库尔德人也会群起仿效。


But the prospect of an independent Palestine destabilizing Jordan is never offered as an argument against Palestinian statehood, and nor should such an argument be used against Iraq’s Kurds.	然而却从来没有人用巴勒斯坦独立会破坏约旦稳定的说法来反对巴勒斯坦建国，因此这种观点也不应被施加在伊拉克库尔德人身上。


Moreover, the KRG has already established a relatively open and pluralistic society.	此外，库尔德斯坦地区政府已经建立起一个相对开放和多元化的社会。


As a semi-autonomous region, Iraqi Kurdistan operates under a multi-party system the likes of which one will not find in neighboring Arab countries, let alone in Iran or Turkey, which is increasingly turning toward authoritarianism.	作为一个半自治地区，伊拉克库尔德斯坦以多党制体制运作，这种制度在邻近的阿拉伯国家可看不到，更别提逐渐转向威权主义的伊朗或土耳其了。


National self-determination is a universal right that should not be denied to populations suffering under oppressive non-democratic regimes.	民族自决是一个普世权利，也是那些惨遭非民主政权压迫的人民理应享有的权利。


The same arguments that rightly apply to the Palestinians should apply equally to the Kurds.	正确适用于巴勒斯坦人的论据也应适用于库尔德人。


Human-rights activists who demonstrate for Palestinian statehood should be no less vocal on behalf of Kurdish statehood.	而那些巴勒斯坦建国鼓与呼的人权活动家也应代表库尔德国家发声。


And human-rights claims – unless they are applied selectively as part of a hypocritical sham – should always trump realpolitik.	人权要求——除非它们被选择性地作为伪善表演的一部分来使用——应该永远高于现实政治。


Throughout their long, tragic history, the Kurds have repeatedly been abandoned by the West, to its great shame.	应该令西方深感羞耻的是，库尔德人漫长而悲惨的历史也是一部一再被西方抛弃的历史。


This must not happen again.	这个状况不应再发生。


Kurdish Peshmerga have been Western democracies’ staunchest allies in the fight against the Islamic State.	库尔德民兵组织已经是西方民主国家对抗伊斯兰国的坚定盟友。


It would be a bitter travesty to abandon the Kurds to the mercy of the Iraqi or Turkish governments in their time of need.	而如果西方为了讨好伊拉克或土耳其政府而去抛弃库尔德人，只会让一切变成一场痛苦的闹剧。


What’s Holding Back the World Economy?	是什么在阻碍世界经济？


NEW YORK – Seven years after the global financial crisis erupted in 2008, the world economy continued to stumble in 2015.	发自纽约——全球金融危机在2008年爆发七年后的2015年，世界经济依然萎靡。


According to the United Nations’ report World Economic Situation and Prospects 2016, the average growth rate in developed economies has declined by more than 54% since the crisis.	根据联合国发布的《2016年世界经济形势与展望》报告，自危机以来发达经济体的平均增长率下降了超过54 ％。


An estimated 44 million people are unemployed in developed countries, about 12 million more than in 2007, while inflation has reached its lowest level since the crisis.	据估计这些国家现有约4400万失业人口，较2007年多了1200万，而通胀则已经下探到自危机以来的最低水平。


More worryingly, advanced countries’ growth rates have also become more volatile.	更令人担忧的，发达国家的增长速度也变得更为不稳定。


This is surprising, because, as developed economies with fully open capital accounts, they should have benefited from the free flow of capital and international risk sharing – and thus experienced little macroeconomic volatility.	这是有点出人意料，因为这些完全开放资本账户的经济体本应从资本的自由流动和国际风险分担中获益——并因此只会经历小范围的宏观经济波动。


Furthermore, social transfers, including unemployment benefits, should have allowed households to stabilize their consumption.	此外，包括失业救济金在内的各类社会转移支付手段应该也可依然让家庭维持自身的消费水平。


But the dominant policies during the post-crisis period – fiscal retrenchment and quantitative easing (QE) by major central banks – have offered little support to stimulate household consumption, investment, and growth. On the contrary, they have tended to make matters worse.	但在后危机时期的主要政策——各大中央银行的财政紧缩和定量宽松——在刺激居民消费，投资和增长方面没有多大帮助，反而让事态变得更加糟糕。


In the US, quantitative easing did not boost consumption and investment partly because most of the additional liquidity returned to central banks’ coffers in the form of excess reserves.	在美国，量化宽松政策未能刺激消费和投资的部分原因是大部分额外流动性都以超额准备金的形式回到了中央银行的金库。


The Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, which authorized the Federal Reserve to pay interest on required and excess reserves, thus undermined the key objective of QE.	2006年的《金融服务管制放松法案》授权美国联邦储备委员会为法定和超额准备金支付利息，从而削弱了量化宽松的主要目标。


Indeed, with the US financial sector on the brink of collapse, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 moved up the effective date for offering interest on reserves by three years, to October 1, 2008. As a result, excess reserves held at the Fed soared, from an average of $200 billion during 2000-2008 to $1.6 trillion during 2009-2015.	事实上，在美国金融业濒临崩溃之时，《紧急经济稳定法案》将提供储备利率的生效日期提前了三年，从2008年10月1日开始，结果美联储持有的超额准备金额暴增，从2000~2008年间平均2000亿美元上升到2009~2015年间的1.


Financial institutions chose to keep their money with the Fed instead of lending to the real economy, earning nearly $30 billion – completely risk-free – during the last five years.	6万亿。 金融机构选择把自己的钱留在美联储而非向实体经济贷款，收并因此在过去五年间无风险套利近300亿美元。


This amounts to a generous – and largely hidden – subsidy from the Fed to the financial sector.	这相当于美联储向金融部门给与了一个慷慨的——而且在很大程度上隐蔽的——补贴。


And, as a consequence of the Fed’s interest-rate hike last month, the subsidy will increase by $13 billion this year.	同时由于上个月美联储加息，今年的补贴还会增加约130亿美元。


Perverse incentives are only one reason that many of the hoped-for benefits of low interest rates did not materialize.	负面激励措施只是导致低利率的预期好处无法兑现的其中一个原因。