CFIUS does not review greenfield investments, which account for about 50% of Chinese FDI in the US.	CFIUS不进行审查的绿地投资占了中国对美FDI的50%。


But Chinese FDI, especially in sensitive sectors like energy, does often trigger Congressional hearings, ad hoc resolutions, and calls for tougher CFIUS action.	但是，中国FDI，特别是能源等敏感领域的FDI，确实经常会触发国会听证、临时决议和要求CFIUS更加严格的呼声。


As a result of high-profile Congressional opposition, China’s state-owned energy company CNOOC withdrew its bid for Unocal, an American energy company, in 2005, before a CFIUS review that most likely would have cleared the deal on national-security grounds.	2005年，由于高规格的国会反对，中国国有企业中海油不得不收回其对美国能源公司优尼科的报价，而此时CFIUS的审查尚未开始（CFIUS的审查很可能会以国家安全原因叫停这笔交易）。


China still points to this episode as evidence that Chinese FDI is not welcome in the US.	中国至今仍将这一幕作为美国不欢迎中国FDI的证据。


Feeding this perception, some members of Congress are now exhorting CFIUS to block CNOOC’s proposed acquisition of Nexen, a Canadian energy company with holdings in the Gulf of Mexico, until China resolves ongoing disputes with the US over preferential government procurement policies and barriers to FDI by US companies in China.	让人不得不有这种感觉的是，某些国会议员目前正在劝CFIUS阻挠中海油对尼克森公司（加拿大能源公司，拥有墨西哥湾油田所有权）的收购，除非中国在与美国关于政府优先采购政策和中国对美国FDI壁垒的争论中做出让步。


Heeding these calls would be a costly mistake that would undermine the objective, non-discriminatory CFIUS process and encourage Chinese companies to look elsewhere at a time when Chinese FDI is poised to explode and the US economy sorely needs the jobs, capital, and trade benefits that it would bring.	响应这一要求将是代价沉重的错误，这样做会破坏客观中立的CFIUS程序、鼓励中国公司将目光投向别处——要知道，目前中国FDI正蓄势待发，而美国经济急需中国FDI所带来的就业、资本和贸易方面的好处。


Why Consolidate?	为什么要整合？


STANFORD – Around the world, raging debates about whether, when, how, and how much to reduce large budget deficits and high levels of sovereign debt are dividing policymakers and publics.	斯坦福—放眼全球，关于是否需要、何时、怎样以及在多大程度上削减巨额预算赤字和主权债务重负的激烈争论正在导致决策者和公众之间的分裂。


Diametrically opposed spending, tax, monetary, and regulatory policies and proposals are proliferating.	截然相反的支出、税收、货币和监管政策和方案正在增加。


To consolidate (the budget), or not to consolidate, that is the question.	整合（预算）还是不整合，这是个问题。


The political left clamors for more spending, higher taxes on high-income earners, and delayed fiscal consolidation.	政治左翼叫嚷着要求更多支出、提高高收入者税收、推迟财政整合。


For example, the economist and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman proposes waiting 10-15 years.	比如，经济学家兼《纽约时报》专栏作家保罗·克鲁格曼建议等上10—15年。


(Many of the same people argued for analogous reasons against the Federal Reserve’s successful disinflation policies in the early 1980’s.)	（同样是这群人中的许多人在20世纪80年代初以同样的理由反对美联储成功的反通胀政策。


The political right calls for more rapid deficit reduction by cutting spending.	）政治右翼则要求通过削减支出实现更快的预算削减。


In Europe, policymakers, including the European Central Bank, demand consolidation for high-debt countries, but are flexible in negotiations; voters, however, reject it – most recently in Italy.	在欧洲，包括欧洲央行在内的决策者要求重债国实行整合，但在谈判中态度颇为灵活； 不过选民拒绝了这一要求——最新的例子是意大利。


In the United States, Republicans propose to balance the budget within ten years by reforming entitlement spending and taxes (with fewer exemptions, deductions, and credits providing the revenue needed to reduce personal tax rates and a corporate rate that, at 35%, is the highest in the OECD).	在美国，共和党建议在通过改革福利支出和税收（减少免税、减税和豁免可以补偿个税和公司税（税率为35%，经合组织中最高）税收收入的减少）在十年内实现预算平衡。


America’s Senate Democrats propose $1.5 trillion in higher taxes over ten years (on top of the $600 billion agreed in early January), $100 billion (twice that, for House Democrats) in new stimulus spending, and modest longer-term expenditure cuts.	美国参议院中的民主党人则建议在十年的时间里增税1. 5万亿美元（在1月上旬达成的6000亿美元增税计划基础上）、增加1000亿美元（众议院民主党的计划是这一数字的两倍）的新刺激支出以及在长期略微减少支出。


Their version of tax reform would mean reducing deductions for the wealthy and corporations, with no rate reductions.	他们的税收改革路线图意味着减少富人和公司减税额，他们的税率不再能够削减。


What are the likely costs and benefits of stimulus versus consolidation?	刺激与整合，成本收益几何？


And what is the best combination of spending cuts and tax hikes?	减支和增税的最佳组合又是什么？


Economists agree that, at full employment, higher government spending crowds out private spending.	经济学家都同意，在充分就业时，增加政府支出会挤出私人支出。


Keynesian models claiming a quick boost from higher government spending below full employment show that the effect soon turns negative.	认为非充分就业情况下增加政府支出能快速起到提振效果的凯恩斯主义模型表明，增支效果会很快由正转负。


So it needs to be repeated over and over, like a drug, to sustain the economic high.	因此增支必须嗑药一样反复使用才能维持经济高增长。


That strategy saddled Japan with the world’s highest debt/GDP ratio, to little benefit.	这一策略让日本背上了世界最高的债务/GDP比率，而几乎没有得到好处。


To be sure, recent research suggests that increased government spending can be effective in temporarily raising output and employment during deep, long-lasting recessions when the central bank has reduced its short-term policy interest rate to zero.	诚然，最新的研究表明，当经济陷入长期深度衰退，而央行已将短期政策利率降至零水平时，增加政府支出能有效地暂时增��产出和就业。


But the same research suggests that the government spending multiplier is likely to be small or even negative in a variety of circumstances and, in any event, would quickly shrink.	但同样的研究还表明，在很多环境下，政府支出乘数很小甚至为负，而且在任何情况下都会迅速衰减。


Such circumstances include, first, a high debt/GDP ratio, with rising interest rates impeding growth.	这些环境包括哪些？ 第一，高债务/GDP比率，同时利率较高妨碍增长时。


Likewise, during expansions, higher government spending is more likely to crowd out private spending.	类似地，在扩张期，增加政府支出更有可能挤出私人支出。


Spending on transfer payments and/or nonmilitary purchases – which can become entrenched or be procured more cheaply from abroad (for example, solar panels and wind turbines, respectively, in America’s 2009 fiscal stimulus) – is also likely to yield only a small multiplier.	转移支付和非军事采购支出——这类支出不易削减，或从海外获取成本更低（比如美国2009年财政刺激中的太阳能面板和风力涡轮机）——也容易产生较小的乘数。


And, when the economy has flexible exchange rates, if government spending raises interest rates, the currency will strengthen, leading to a decrease in investment and net exports.	此外，当经济的汇率变动灵活时，如果政府支出推高了利率，货币将会走强，导致投资和净出口下降。


Finally, the effects of additional government spending may be offset by people’s expectations of higher taxes once the central bank exits the zero lower bound on interest rates (causing them to spend less now).	最后，增加政府支出的效果可能因人们预期一旦央行退出零利率下限就将出现增税（导致他们削减当下支出）而被抵消。


These considerations apply to the US and some European countries today.	这些情况在如今的美国和一些欧洲国家都适用。


Together with poor design, they explain why America’s 2009 stimulus cost several hundred thousand dollars per temporary job created.	它们与糟糕的设计一起，可以解释为何美国2009年的支出需要耗费好几十万美元才能创造一个就业岗位。


Recent research also reveals that in OECD countries since World War II, successful fiscal consolidation – defined as stabilizing the budget while avoiding recession – averaged $5-$6 of actual spending cuts per dollar of tax hikes.	最新研究还揭示，自二战以来，经合组织国家的成功财政整合——定义为同时实现预算稳定和避免衰退——平均实际减支-增税比为5—6比1。


Cuts in spending, especially on entitlements and transfers, were far less likely to cause recessions than tax increases were.	减支，特别是福利和转移支付的削减远没有增税容易引发衰退。


Unfortunately, tax hikes have predominated in many recent European consolidations, including last week’s proposed Cyprus bailout.	不幸的是，在许多最近的欧洲整合中，增税才是主导，包括上周塞浦路斯的援助方案。


Of course, caution is appropriate in order to avoid claiming too much for the benefits of short-run consolidation.	当然，谨慎点不会错，以免夸大了短期整合的好处。


After all, the current American and European economies differ in important ways from the other post-war cases – size, simultaneous consolidation in many countries, already-low interest rates, and the dollar’s status as the main global reserve currency.	毕竟，当前美国和欧洲经济体与其他战后国家在诸多重要方面大相径庭——规模、多国同时实施紧缩、已经很低的利率，以及作为全球主要储备货币的美元。


But, other than in deep recessions, the validity of the Keynesian claim that delaying spending cuts is necessary to avoid undermining the economy is at best unclear, and would leave a long boom as the only time to control spending.	但是，除了深度衰退情形，凯恩斯主义所宣称的推迟减支是避免伤害经济的必要手段的观点充其量只能说有待商榷，并且会导致唯一控制支出的时机只有长期繁荣这一推论。


And large deficits and high debt levels decrease the prospects for a long boom.	而巨额赤字和高债务水平会拖累长期繁荣前景。


Moreover, credibly phasing in spending reductions as the economy recovers is no easy task, given the political economy of the budget and the inability of one legislature to bind the next.	此外，由于存在预算的政治经济学和不可能将一时立法与未来立法绑定在一起，可信地随着经济复苏逐步减支绝非容易的任务。


Worse yet, the cost of delay and increased deficits and debt is enormous.	更糟糕的是，推迟和增加赤字和债务的成本是巨大的。


For example, without major reform in the US entitlement programs – which are exploding in size as a result of rising real benefits per beneficiary and an aging population – the next generation can expect a 20% reduction in living standards.	比如，在不对美国福利项目做重大改革的情况下——由于受益者人均收益额的增加和人口老龄化，其规模将出现爆炸性增长——下一代人的生活水平将下降20%。


The most credible reforms are structural – for example, higher retirement ages and changes to benefit formulas – and difficult to alter once they are implemented.	最可靠的改革是结构性改革——比如提高退休年龄、改变福利模式——而且一旦实施就难以改变。


Merely setting a dollar (or pound or euro) target for budget cuts is far less effective, because the target can easily be revised – and cuts reversed – to avoid political pain.	仅仅为预算削减设置金钱数量目标是远远不够的，因为这一目标很容易修改以避免政治痛苦——而削减也将就此撤销。


If there were some short-term stimulus that was timely and likely to raise output and employment at a reasonable long-term cost, I would be all for it.	如果有及时的短期刺激有助于提高产出和就业，其长期成本又较为合理，那我举双手赞成。


But the evidence is that highly effective fiscal policy, even at the zero lower bound on interest rates, remains at best a theoretical possibility, subject to severe political constraints.	但证据表明，高效的财政政策基本上只有理论可能，即使是在利率处于零下限时，这是拜重重政治约束所赐。


While consolidation may imply some short-term costs, especially in a recession, the long-term costs of delay are large.	尽管整合也许意味着一些短期成本，特别是在衰退之时，但拖延整合的长期成本是巨大的。


It would be best if a credible consolidation program could be phased in gradually; but consolidation needs to proceed nonetheless – and primarily by controlling spending.	逐渐推行可信的整合计划是最理想的情况，但整合无论如何必须推行——而且主要手段就是控制支出。


Inflation Is Still the Lesser Evil	通胀仍是次要问题


CAMBRIDGE – The world’s major central banks continue to express concern about inflationary spillover from their recession-fighting efforts.	发自剑桥——全球几大中央银行依旧在为自身抗衰退行为所导致的通胀溢出感到担忧。


That is a mistake.	但这是错误的。


Weighed against the political, social, and economic risks of continued slow growth after a once-in-a-century financial crisis, a sustained burst of moderate inflation is not something to worry about.	在经历了百年一遇的金融危机之后，相对于经济持续低迷所带来的政治、社会和经济风险，持续爆发的温和通货膨胀并没什么好担忧的。


On the contrary, in most regions, it should be embraced.	相反，大多数地区的人们应该乐于接受这种通货膨胀。


Perhaps the case for moderate inflation (say, 4-6% annually) is not so compelling as it was at the outset of the crisis, when I first raised the issue.	也许温和的通货膨胀（约为4~6%的年通胀率）的情况相对于危机最初爆发之时——即我首次提出这个问题的时候——并没有那么迫切。


Back then, against a backdrop of government reluctance to force debt write-downs, along with massively over-valued real housing prices and excessive real wages in some sectors, moderate inflation would have been extremely helpful.	在当时的大背景下，政府不愿去强制减轻债务，房地产价格大幅高估而某些领域的实际工资过高，当时如果能有适当的通货膨胀，应该是帮助极大的。


The consensus at the time, of course, was that a robust “V-shaped” recovery was around the corner, and it was foolish to embrace inflation heterodoxy.	当然，当时人们的共识是经济很快会出现“V型”强势复苏，所以听信通货膨胀这种异端邪说显然是不智的。 然而基于2009年与卡门·M·莱恩哈特（Carmen M.


I thought otherwise, based on research underlying my 2009 book with Carmen M. Reinhart, This Time is Different.	Reinhart）合著的《这次不一样》一书所做的研究，我当时却持有不同的观点。


Examining previous deep financial crises, there was every reason to be concerned that the employment decline would be catastrophically deep and the recovery extraordinarily slow.	通过研究以往的深度金融危机，我们有充分的理由担心就业率会灾难性地下降而经济复苏也会异常缓慢。


A proper assessment of the medium-term risks would have helped to justify my conclusion in December 2008 that “It will take every tool in the box to fix today’s once-in-a-century financial crisis.”	如果当时能对中期风险能作一个评估的话，就能支撑我2008年11月所下的结论“我们需要用尽一切手段工具来解决当今这个百年一遇的金融危机”。


Five years on, public, private, and external debt are at record levels in many countries.	5年后的今天，很多国家的公共、私人及外部债务都达到了历史新高。


There is still a need for huge relative wage adjustments between Europe’s periphery and its core.	但我们仍然需要大范围调整欧洲外围国家和核心国家之间的相对工资水平。


But the world’s major central banks seem not to have noticed.	然而全球几大央行却似乎未能注意到这一点。


In the United States, the Federal Reserve has sent bond markets into a tizzy by signaling that quantitative easing (QE) might be coming to an end.	在美国，美联储通过发出可能结束量化宽松政策的信号让债券市场陷入了恐慌。


The proposed exit seems to reflect a truce accord among the Fed’s hawks and doves.	这一退出行动似乎反映了美联储内部鹰派和鸽派之间的最终妥协。


The doves got massive liquidity, but, with the economy now strengthening, the hawks are insisting on bringing QE to an end.	鸽派拥有庞大的流动性，但随着经济逐步稳固，鹰派坚持要结束量化宽松政策。


This is a modern-day variant of the classic prescription to start tightening before inflation sets in too deeply, even if employment has not fully recovered.	这是在通胀过度深入之前开始实施收紧的经典手段的当代变体，即便此时就业尚未完全恢复。


As William McChesney Martin, who served as Fed Chairman in the 1950’s and 1960’s, once quipped, the central bank’s job is “to take away the punch bowl just as the party gets going.”	正如上世纪五六十年代时任美联储主席的威廉·麦克切斯尼·马丁（William McChesney Martin）所讽刺的那样，央行的工作就是“在宴会进行时把酒杯收走”��


The trouble is that this is no ordinary recession, and a lot people have not had any punch yet, let alone too much.	麻烦在于这并不是普通的经济衰退，而且很多人都还没有享受到通货膨胀的任何好处，更别提过度受益了。


Yes, there are legitimate technical concerns that QE is distorting asset prices, but bursting bubbles simply are not the main risk now.	确实，人们对量化宽松会扭曲资产价格的担忧合情合理，但泡沫破裂并不是当前的主要风险。


Right now is the US’s best chance yet for a real, sustained recovery from the financial crisis.	现在是美国从金融危机中真正恢复过来的最好时机。


And it would be a catastrophe if the recovery were derailed by excessive devotion to anti-inflation shibboleths, much as some central banks were excessively devoted to the gold standard during the 1920’s and 1930’s.	如果经济复苏被过度遏制通胀的举措所中断，这将会成为一个灾难，正如上世纪二三十年代有些国家央行过度沉迷于金本位一样。


Japan faces a different conundrum.	而日本则面临着不同的难题。


Haruhiko Kuroda, the Bank of Japan’s new governor, has sent a clear signal to markets that the BOJ is targeting 2% annual inflation, after years of near-zero price growth.	日本央行的新行长黑田东彦（Haruhiko Kuroda）已经向市场发出明确的信号，日本央行的目标是在多年的价格零增长之后，让年通胀率保持在2%。


But, with longer-term interest rates now creeping up slightly, the BOJ seems to be pausing.	但随着长期利率的缓慢上行，日本央行似乎又停手了。


What did Kuroda and his colleagues expect?	黑田东彦及其同僚到底在期待些什么呢？


If the BOJ were to succeed in raising inflation expectations, long-term interest rates would necessarily have to reflect a correspondingly higher inflation premium.	如果日本央行希望成功提升通胀预期，长期利率将必然要反映出随之产生的相对高通胀溢价。


As long as nominal interest rates are rising because of inflation expectations, the increase is part of the solution, not part of the problem.	只要名义利率因为通胀预期而上升，那么上升其实就是解决经济危机的表现，而不是问题所在。


The BOJ would be right to worry, of course, if interest rates were rising because of a growing risk premium, rather than because of higher inflation expectations.	当然，如果利率上升源自于风险溢价的上浮而非更高的通胀期望，那么日本央行的担忧就是有道理的。


The risk premium could rise, for example, if investors became uncertain about whether Kuroda would adhere to his commitment.	比如风险溢价也会因为投资者不确定黑田东彦是否会遵守承诺而上升。


The solution, as always with monetary policy, is a clear, consistent, and unambiguous communication strategy.	解决方案一直和货币政策一样，应当是一种非常清晰、一致且明确的沟通策略。


The European Central Bank is in a different place entirely.	欧洲央行则处在一个完全不同的情况下。


Because the ECB has already been using its balance sheet to help bring down borrowing costs in the eurozone’s periphery, it has been cautious in its approach to monetary easing.	因为欧洲央行一直在利用其自身资产负债表来降低欧元区外围国家的借贷成本，它在货币宽松方面也一直很谨慎。


But higher inflation would help to accelerate desperately needed adjustment in Europe’s commercial banks, where many loans remain on the books at far above market value.	但更高水平的通胀水平将有助于加速欧洲商业银行迫切需要的调整，因为这类银行手中许多贷款的书面价值远高于市场价值。


It would also provide a backdrop against which wages in Germany could rise without necessarily having to fall in the periphery.	它还会提供这样的背景：德国的工资会上升，而其周边国家的工资不一定需要下降。


Each of the world’s major central banks can make plausible arguments for caution.	世界各国的央行都能说出它们保持谨慎的理由。


And central bankers are right to insist on structural reforms and credible plans for balancing budgets in the long term.	而中央银行家们坚持结构性改革并实施可信的计划来长期平衡预算是正确的。


But, unfortunately, we are nowhere near the point at which policymakers should be getting cold feet about inflation risks.	然而不幸地是，我们根本还没有到达政策制定者应该害怕通胀风险的程度。


They should be spiking the punch bowl more, not taking it away.	他们现在应该做的应该是向酒杯中倒满美酒，而不是撤走它们。


Cartography’s New Golden Age	地图学的新黄金时代


MOUNTAIN VIEW, CALIFORNIA – Noé Diakubama, an emigrant from the Democratic Republic of Congo who now lives in Paris, is one of this century’s intrepid pioneers.	加利福尼亚州山景城——本世纪最勇敢的先驱之一，来自刚果民主共和国的移民诺伊·迪亚库巴马（NOE Diakubama）目前居住在巴黎。


Using online mapmaking tools, he created the first map of his village, Mbandaka, which he and his wife have modified more than 100,000 times since 2009.	他用在线绘图工具绘制了他所居住的姆班达卡（Mbandaka）村的首张地图，他和他的妻子2009年来已经对这张图修改超过100,000次。


Noé literally put Mbandaka – and the people who live there – on the map.	诺伊在地图上准确地绘制了姆班达卡和居住在那里的村民。


Noé is not the only such pioneer.	诺伊并不是地图测绘领域唯一的先驱。


There is a vast and growing community of online mapmakers creating useful, accessible maps of lesser-known areas – and transforming people’s lives in the process.	在线制图者队伍庞大而且持续发展，绘制出反应鲜为人知地区状况的方便查阅的实用地图，并因此改变了人们的生活。


During the Age of Exploration, which extended from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century, adventurers like Christopher Columbus, Ferdinand Magellan, and James Cook embarked on dangerous journeys to distant lands, from New Zealand to Newfoundland, drawing detailed charts of their voyages.	在从十五至十七世纪的地理大发现年代，克里斯托弗·哥伦布、费迪南德·麦哲伦和詹姆斯·库克等冒险家踏上了到新西兰和纽芬兰等遥远国度的危险旅程，并绘制出反应航程情况的详细地图。


By advancing geographic knowledge, they broadened people’s worldview, enhanced trade, and helped to usher in the Industrial Revolution.	通过普及地理知识，他们拓展了人们对世界的认识、强化了贸易并且助推了工业革命。


Today, people like Noé are spearheading a second golden age of cartography, which promises to bring equally significant economic and social benefits.	今天，诺伊等人正积极推进地图测绘的第二个黄金年代，由此所带来的经济和社会效益同样可观。


Indeed, accurate maps break down geographic barriers, empowering individuals to reach their desired destinations, enabling businesses to reach consumers anywhere, and enriching people’s outlooks.	事实上，精准地图测绘能打破地域壁垒，让个人抵达所希望的目的地，让企业接触世界各地的消费者，并且丰富人们的人生观。


The Internet is transforming the way maps are made, enabling ordinary people – dubbed “citizen cartographers” – to work alongside intrepid adventurers and professional geographers.	互联网正在悄然改变测绘方式，让被冠以“公民测绘者”称谓的普通人能与勇敢的冒险家和专业的地理学家携手合作。


These cartographers – whose only common characteristic is Internet access – are embracing the opportunity to depict the places that they know and love, whether to help their neighbors get around or to give faraway people a glimpse of their local environments.	这些测绘者唯一的共同特点是可以上网，他们充分利用机会描绘自己熟悉和喜爱的环境，既可以帮助邻居的日常生活也能让远方的人了解他们当地的环境。


Using online tools like Google Map Maker, they are contributing to the shared goal of building a digital map of the world.	他们借助谷歌地图制作工具等在线工具实现绘制世界数字地图的共同目标。


Some even host “mapping parties,” at which communities gather around computers, in schoolyards or church halls, to add layers of detail that extend beyond topography.	有人甚至专门举办“测绘晚会”，邀请同道在学校操场或教堂聚会，补充地形以外的细节内容。


By including human elements, such as popular cafés or local walking trails, they create comprehensive, useful tools for others, and enhance their understanding of their own community.	他们将热门咖啡馆或当地的步行小径等人文元素也混合进去，在为他人创造全面实用工具的同时，对自己社区的理解也有所加深。


Digital maps can be as dynamic as the communities that they depict.	数字地图可以和它们所描绘的社区一样鲜明生动。


While paper maps can accurately portray static features like rivers and mountains, they cannot easily be updated when new buildings are constructed, roads are rerouted, or new restaurants open.	虽然纸质地图可以准确地反应山河的静态特点，但在新建筑完工、道路改线或新餐馆开业时却无法实现即时更新。


By contrast, digital maps can be modified instantly, keeping locals apprised of developments in their area and helping visitors to feel like natives in unfamiliar places.	相比之下数字地图可以实现随时修改，从而让当地人了解社区的发展，也让外来者能像当地人那样熟悉陌生的环境。


Similarly, a digital map can be tailored to an individual’s interests or needs.	同样，数字化地图可以适应个性化的兴趣或需求。


A keen cyclist might want a map showing bicycle paths, including information about the terrain.	自行车爱好者可能需要掌握自行车道和地形信息。


But a tourist might prefer a map that highlights specific attractions or indicates public-transport links.	而游客则可能希望标明具体景点或指示公交线路。


Such customization leads to many millions of versions of the world – all of them accurate.	类似的定制化需求会产生数以百万计的地图版本——其中每一张反应的信息都准确无误。


Digital mapping technology is having the most profound impact on the world’s most remote and undeveloped regions.	数字化测绘技术对世界最偏远的欠发达地区影响最为深刻。


In Africa, for example, road coverage on Google Maps increased from 20% in 2008 to 75% last year, while the number of towns and villages for which detailed maps are available grew by more than 1,000%.	比方说在非洲，谷歌地图的道路覆盖率从2008年的20%提高到去年的75%，而可以找到详细地图的村镇数量去年实际增长1000%多。


This has not only facilitated trade and transport, but also translates into faster response times for emergency services, saving thousands of lives each year.	这在促进贸易和运输的同时缩短了应急服务响应时间，每年都有数千条生命因此而得救。


In fact, modern tools like maps and satellite navigation contribute to annual savings of up to 3.5 billion liters of gasoline and more than one billion hours of travel time.	事实上，地图和卫星导航等现代化工具每年可以节约高达35亿升汽油和超过10亿小时的旅行耗时。


As a result, farmers are better able to get their goods to market before they perish, and to build more efficient irrigation systems, which save the global agricultural industry $8-22 billion annually.	农民们因此可以在商品腐败之前将它们运抵市场、修建更高效的灌溉系统，并因此每年为全球农业节约下80－220亿美元的开支。


The mapping movement’s growing momentum promises to result in the accurate and comprehensive representation of almost every inch of the world, including road data, photos, and business listings.	测绘运动的发展有望准确全面反映世界的几乎每一寸土地，包括道路数据、照片和商业目录。


This will create even more opportunities for economic growth, improve access to health care and other services, contribute to social development, and broaden – both figuratively and literally – people’s worldview.	这可以为经济增长创造更多机会、改善医疗及其他服务、助推社会发展，并实际及象征性地拓展人们对世界的认识。


To advance the world’s geographic knowledge, explorers used to have to head out to sea, enduring inclement weather and debilitating disease, unsure of where they were going – or whether they would ever return home.	为了推动世界地理知识的发展，探险家们曾经被迫出海，忍受疾病和恶劣的天气。 他们不清楚要去哪，也不清楚能否平安返回。


While today’s online cartographers do not face the same risks, they, too, are embarking on a journey into the unknown in search of knowledge, excitement, and better lives.	虽然今天的在线测绘者们并未面临着同样的风险，但他们同样踏上了一条探索未知、激情和美好生活之路。


A New World’s New Development Bank	新世界的新开发银行


NEW YORK – At the conclusion of their summit in Durban in March, the leaders of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) announced their intention to establish a New Development Bank aimed at “mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging economies and developing countries.”	纽约—在3月份的德班峰会上，金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非）领导人宣布有意成立一家新开发银行，旨在“动员资源建设金砖国家和其他新兴经济体和发展中国家的基础设施和可持续发展项目。 ”


The significance of this decision cannot be overemphasized.	这一决定的重要性怎么强调都不过分。


For starters, it reflects the enormous successes in economic development during the last four decades (the BRICS’ aggregate GDP is now greater than that of the advanced countries when the Bretton Woods institutions were founded) and the rebalancing of global economic power that this implies.	首先，它反映了过去四十年来经济发展的巨大成功（金砖国家GDP之和已经比布雷顿森林体系建立时的发达国家更大）及其所隐含的全球经济实力的再平衡。


Indeed, the decision demonstrates the BRICS’ ability and willingness to work together, for their own benefit and for that of the entire world.	事实上，这一决定彰显了金砖国家出于自身和全世界利益合作共事的能力和意愿。


Emerging markets and developing countries are taking the future into their own hands – at a time when rich countries are muddling through their own self-inflicted problems.	新兴市场和发展中国家正在自己掌握未来——而此时，发达国家正在自作孽的问题中得过且过。


A new development bank is clearly needed.	新开发银行的必要性是显而易见的。


The infrastructure requirements alone in emerging-market economies and low-income countries are huge – 1.4 billion people still have no reliable electricity, 900 million lack access to clean water, and 2.6 billion do not have adequate sanitation.	光是新兴市场经济体和低收入国家的基础设施需要便已经十分巨大——14亿人口仍然没有可靠的电力供应，9亿人缺少清洁水，26���人得不到充分的卫生设施。


At the same time, an estimated two billion people will move to cities in the next quarter-century.	与此同时，大约20亿人将在未来25年里从农村迁往城市。


And policymakers must ensure that the investments are environmentally sustainable.	此外，决策者必须确保投资是环境可持续的。


To meet these and the other challenges confronting the developing world, infrastructure spending will have to rise from around $800 billion to at least $2 trillion annually in the coming decades.	面对发展中国家的这些和其他挑战，在未来十年中，年基础设施支出必须从约8000亿美元至少提高到2万亿美元。


Otherwise, it will be impossible to achieve long-term poverty reduction and inclusive growth.	否则的话，长期减贫和包容性增长目标就无法达到。


While the private sector can meet some of these needs, it can go only so far, especially given the nature of infrastructure projects’ risks, the huge upfront costs, and the high cyclical sensitivity of global financial markets.	私人部门能够满足部分需要，但形成不了气候，特别是考虑到基础设施项目的风险性质、巨大的前期成本和全球金融市场的高度周期敏感性。


The funding gap is beyond what existing international financial institutions can meet – and the advanced countries’ malaise means that significant recapitalization is not in the cards.	融资缺口之大绝非现有国际金融机构所能弥补——而发达国家的步履蹒跚意味着大规模资本重组根本无法进行。


Annual infrastructure financing from multilateral development banks and overseas development assistance is likely to amount to no more than $40-60 billion, or 2-3% of projected needs.	多边开发银行和海外开发援助每年对基础设施融资的支持充其量也只能有40—60亿美元，即预计需要量的2—3%。


A development bank anchored in emerging markets and developing countries can help to address this gap and become a powerful catalyst for change, both in the developing world and – through collaboration and example – in existing institutions.	植根于新兴市场和发展中国家的开发银行有助于弥补这一缺口并成为发展中国家和现有机构（通过合作和示范）变革的有力催化剂。


The world today is markedly different from the world at the time of the founding of the World Bank and many of the regional development banks.	当今世界与世界银行和众多地区开发银行成立的年代已经截然不同。


The BRICS’ proposed New Development Bank presents an important opportunity to reflect these changes, with modern financial instruments, strong governance, and a broad-based mandate.	金砖国家以现代金融工具、强健的治理和广泛的授权建立新开发银行的打算凸显出反映这些变化的重要机会。


For example, changes in financial markets (including the large amounts of money in sovereign wealth funds and public pension funds) provide opportunities for new development partnerships, which the New Development Bank can help to catalyze and orchestrate.	比如，金融市场的变化（包括主权财富基金和公共养老基金的巨额资金）为新开发合作提供了机会，而新开发银行能够催化和协调这一合作。


So, too, should its deployment of a wide range of modern instruments enable it to meet the diverse range of project needs while ensuring adequate risk management.	此外，它所配备的种类繁多的现代工具使其能够满足多样化的项目需要，同时又保证充分的风险管理。


The new bank should maximize its multiplier effects by sharing and reducing risk through collective action and “crowding in” other financing; by setting a powerful example in adopting innovative and cost-effective approaches; and through its policy and institutional impact beyond projects that it finances.	新开发银行应该通过集体行动和“挤入”其他融资从而共担并减少风险、树立采用创新性和低成本方式的有力榜样、以及其在融资项目之外的政策和制度影响力来实现乘数效应最大化。


While the older institutions have attempted to adapt, their governance remains out of sync with today’s economic and political realities.	就机构在竭力适应，但其治理仍无法与当今经济和政治现实同步。


The new bank’s governance structure has yet to be worked out, but it promises to be more consistent with contemporary best practices.	新开发银行的治理结构尚有待制定，但已承诺将更符合当代最优方法。


Most important, the New Development Bank will give greater voice to the perspectives and interests of those in developing countries and emerging markets.	最重要的是，新开发银行将给予发展中国家和新兴市场的愿景和利益更大的声音。


As with the outdated governance arrangements, conceptions of development that informed the existing multilateral institutions’ mandates are markedly different from modern development thinking.	除了过时的治理安排，现有多边机构所持的发展概念也与现代发展思想不同。


For example, there was no awareness of the challenge posed by climate change, and that all countries (including those in the developing world) must reduce their greenhouse-gas emissions and adapt to changes that will be particularly adverse to poor countries.	比如，现有多边机构没有意识到气候变化带来的挑战，所有国家（包括发展中国家）都必须减少温室气体排放量并适应穷国受影响特别严重的变化。


Likewise, there was no comprehension of the innovation and opportunities entailed in pursuing more sustainable paths of inclusive economic growth.	类似地，现有多边机构也不理解追求包容性经济增长的可持续路径所蕴含的创新和机会。


Of course, the World Bank and the regional development banks now recognize such imperatives, and the New Development Bank should not relieve the developed countries of their responsibilities.	当然，世界银行和各地区开发银行已经认识到这些紧迫问题，而新开发银行也不意味着发达国家不再需要担责。


But, with the shortfall of assistance from developed to developing countries, the new bank can provide essential help to developing countries and emerging markets as they undertake smarter and more sustainable infrastructure investment for growth and poverty reduction.	但是，在发达国家向发展中国家的援助不足的情况下，新开发银行能够向发展中国家和新兴市场提供基本帮助，以使他们进行更智能、更可持续的增长和减贫基础设施投资。


Given the need to act quickly – and given the slowness with which the developed world has been responding – this new institution is all the more welcome.	由于迅速行动的需求迫切——而发达国家反应速度奇慢无比——这一新机构不啻及时雨。


The new bank can make a major contribution to the global economy’s health by facilitating the transition to new poles of growth and demand, helping to rebalance global savings and investments, and channeling excess liquidity to productive use.	新开发银行有助于世界向新的增长和需求极转移，有助于全球储蓄和投资的再平衡，还能疏导过剩流动性流向高生产率用途，因此能为全球经济做出重大贡献。


It will not only be a driver for sustainable growth in the developing and emerging world, but will also foster reform in the existing multilateral financial institutions – changes from which all of us, in the developed and developing world alike, will benefit.	它将不仅是发展中和新兴国家的可持续增长推动器，也将促成现有多边金融机构的改革——我们所有人，不管是发达国家还是发展中国家都能受益的变化。


The Benefits of US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue	美中战略经济对话的益处


In recognition of the importance and complexity of the US-China economic relationship, in September 2006 President George W. Bush and President Hu Jintao created the “Strategic Economic Dialogue” between our countries.	2006年9月，布什总统和胡锦涛主席确认美中经济关系的重要性和复杂性，并且在两国之间建立了“战略经济对话”制度。


Their intent was not to replace the many economic dialogues already taking place, but to create a senior-level forum that was both comprehensive and strategic.	他们的意图并非是取代业已进行的其他经济对话制度，而是建立一个既全面又富有战略性的高级论坛。


A forum that would also build trust on both sides by demonstrating progress on the immediate issues we face.	这一论坛还将通过在两国所面临的紧迫问题上展示出进展而建立互信。


The SED has made substantial progress in achieving these goals.	这一制度在实现这些目标上已经取得实质性进展。


The US and China have built stronger relationships and established constructive channels of communication that didn’t previously exist.	美中两国已经建立了更为强大的关系和先前并不存在的建设性沟通渠道。


These innovations have helped keep the US-China economic relationship on an even keel, even in times of tension.	这些创新帮助让美中关系即使在紧张的时候也保持稳定。


Because we have a framework for high-level discussions, we can – and do – pick up the phone and talk.	由于我们具有高级别讨论的框架，我们能够而且确实拿起电话通话。


The SED meeting next week in Beijing will focus on five areas: integrity of trade and product safety; balanced economic development, including financial sector reform; energy efficiency and security; environmental sustainability; and bilateral investment.	下周在北京举行的战略经济对话会议将会集中讨论五大议题。 它们是贸易完整性和产品安全、平衡的经济发展包括金融部门改革、能源效率和安全、环境可持续性以及双边投资。


The meeting comes at a delicate time, as a new group of leaders moves into China’s senior positions, and as the agenda has been broadened to include food and product safety, energy efficiency and security, and environmental sustainability.	一批新领导人进入中国的高级职位，而且提议扩大到包括食品和产品安全、能源效率和安全以及环境可持续性，因此，这一会议是在一个敏感时期召开的。


These issues carry deep implications for economic ties.	这些问题将对经济联系产生深刻的影响。


Consumers need to have confidence in the safety of the products they purchase, whether produced at home or abroad.	消费者需要对他们所购买的产品安全具有信心，无论这些产品是在本国或是外国购买。


China’s management of food and product safety issues will have a long-term impact on trade relations, the sustainability of China’s growth strategy, and its further integration into the global trading system.	中国对食品和产品安全的管理将对贸易关系、中国发展战略的可持续性及其进一步融入全球贸易体制产生长期性影响。


US and Chinese government agencies are working together to address these issues.	美中两国政府机构正在合作解决这些问题。


Likewise, for both our countries, greater energy efficiency and security requires reliance upon market price signals, technology, innovation, and diversified energy sources.	同样，对于两国而言，提高能源效率和安全要求依赖于市场价格信号、技术、创新以及多样化的能源来源。


The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, clean coal development through FutureGen, and industrial efficiency audits represent some of the most productive areas of ongoing cooperation.	全球核能夥伴项目、传代清洁煤炭发展以及产业效率审计代表了正在进行中的合作的某些最具有创造力的领域。


We also encourage China’s active participation in the Major Economies Meeting efforts to develop a post-2012 framework for greenhouse-gas reduction.	我们还鼓励中国积极参与主要经济体会议的工作来制定2012年后的温室气体减排框架。


I was pleased to see that a large Chinese energy company, Shanghai Electric, recently indicated public support for substantial reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions.	我很高兴见到中国的一个大型能源公司上海电器公司最近公开表明支持实质性减少温室气体排放。


One pressing issue – for the US, China, and the global economy – is China’s move to a more flexible exchange-rate policy.	对于美中两国和全球经济而言的一个紧迫问题就是中国转向更为灵活的汇率政策。


China is reforming its policy, as a part of a move to a more market-determined exchange rate.	中国正在改变其政策，作为其转向更为由市场决定的汇率的一部分。


In the past year, the RMB has appreciated by 6%, but the pace is not fast enough to reduce China’s global trade surplus, its internal imbalances, or foreign-exchange-market pressures.	去年，人民币已经升值6%，但是其速度还不足以减少中国的全球贸易盈余、其国内不平衡或者外汇市场压力。


A more flexible currency is especially important now, when inflation risks are rising in China.	在中国通货膨胀风险正在上升之际，一个更为灵活的货币现在尤其重要。


Increased currency flexibility would allow China’s central bank to use monetary policy to enhance China’s financial and price stability.	提高货币灵活性将会让中国的中央银行利用货币政策来增强中国的金融和价格稳定。


As Premier Wen Jiabao recently emphasized, China must now undertake comprehensive measures to control mounting inflation, growing asset bubbles, and an overheating economy.	正如温家宝总理最近强调所言，中国必须实行全面措施控制上涨的通货膨胀、日益增大的资产泡沫以及过热的经济。


We share these concerns.	我们也持有同样的关注。


In the US-China relationship, the RMB exchange rate has become a touchstone for broader anxieties about competition from China.	在美中关系中，人民币汇率问题已经成为中国竞争更多担忧的基点。


As globalization advances and economies become more tightly integrated, worries about the effects of foreign competition – through trade or through foreign investment – have fueled economic nationalism and protectionist sentiments.	在全球化和各国经济越发紧密融合的时候，担心外国竞争通过贸易或者外国投资所带来的影响助长了经济民族主义和保护主义情绪。


Americans have been through this type of debate before.	美国人民以前也经历过这种辩论。


Twenty years ago, we were gripped by fear that Japan would overtake our economic leadership – a concern that was unfounded then and, in hindsight, looks profoundly mistaken.	二十年前，我们非常担心日本将会取代我们的经济领导地位。 这一担心在当时是没有根据的，而且事后来看非常错误。


America continues to lead the world in standard of living, productivity, and innovation.	美国继续在生活水平、生产效率以及创新上领先于世界。


China’s continued economic growth and integration into the global economy gives America even greater opportunities to grow and succeed.	中国持续的经济增长以及��入全球经济给了美国更大的增长和成功机会。


The biggest risk to both US and Chinese prosperity is that China’s growth stalls, or that it pulls back from further global integration and reforms too slowly.	美中两国繁荣最大的风险是中国的增长停缓或者从进一步的全球融合中退让以及改革过慢。


Indeed, economic nationalism is growing in China, too.	确实，经济民族主义也在中国增长。


Some Chinese are suspicious that the US push for RMB appreciation and financial-market liberalization is really an attempt to gain trade advantages and generate profits for American companies while slowing China’s economic expansion.	某些中国人怀疑美国推动人民币升值和金融市场自由化实际上是企图获得贸易优势并且为美国公司创造利润，与此同时减缓中国的经济扩展。


They mistakenly believe that yen appreciation during the mid-1980’s caused Japan’s weak economic performance in the 1990’s.	他们错误地认为八十年代日元升值造成日本经济在九十年代低迷。


Rather, we now know that Japan’s economic difficulties were caused by the growth, and then collapse, of a huge asset bubble, and the failure to use monetary policy to prevent deflation after the bubble burst.	实际上，我们现在知道日本的经济困境是由巨大的资产泡沫增长和随后破灭以及未能利用货币政策在泡沫破裂后防止通货紧缩而造成的。


Financial liberalization is not about foreign firms drilling holes in China’s economy.	金融自由化并不是让外国公司破坏中国经济。


Foreign participation in the financial sector brings expertise needed to provide more efficient savings instruments, risk management, and allocation of capital.	外国参与金融部门会带来所需要的专长来提高更为有效的储蓄手段、风险管理以及资本分配。


But to use that expertise – the most valuable asset a globally competitive financial institution has – investors need to control the operations of firms in which they have a stake.	这一专长是具有全球竞争力的金融机构所拥有的最为宝贵的资产。 但是，在利用这一专长之前，投资者需要控制与其利益相关的公司的运作。


This is why China’s equity limits for foreign investment in Chinese financial institutions are costly to the Chinese economy, and why raising these limits is important.	这就是为何中国对外国在华投资中国的金融机构设立资本限额对于中国经济代价很高，以及提高这些限额是重要的。


There are also those in China who argue that the US focus on food and product safety is part of a strategy to restrict Chinese imports and reduce the bilateral trade deficit.  This argument has no basis in fact.	中国还有人说美国抓住食品和产品安全问题是限制中国进口以及减少双边贸易赤字战略的一部分。 这一说法实际上没有根据。


Numerous other countries, notably European Union members, share our concerns.	众多其他国家特别是欧盟成员国也持有同样的担忧。


Finally, after welcoming foreign investment, which contributed greatly to Chinese manufacturing growth and export competitiveness, some in China would now tighten restrictions on foreign investment to protect China’s domestic industries.	最后，外国投资为中国制造业增长和出口竞争力做出了巨大的贡献。 中国有人在欢迎外国投资之后现在要加紧限制外国投资以保护中国的国内产业。


The US faces similar pressures, even though we are one of the world’s most open economies.	美国是世界上最为开放的经济体之一，即使如此，美国也面临相似的压力。


But neither country can protect its way to prosperity: protectionism harms China’s industrial development and our efforts to build stronger trading relationships.	但是美中两国都无法通过保护而实现繁荣。 保护主义对中国的产业发展有害，并且不利于建立更为强大的贸易关系。


I am committed to working to maintain economic openness, because it is good for America and for our workers.	我致力于维持经济开放，因为这有利于美国以及美国工人。


But, frankly, it will be easier to do this if the American public and the US Congress see that China is serious about reform and expanding access to its markets.	但是坦率而言，如果美国公众和国会看到中国认真对待改革和扩大市场准入这就会容易做到。


The SED is one valuable tool in combating protectionist sentiments.	美中战略经济对话是对抗保护主义情绪的有价值的工具。


In this and other bilateral dialogues, the US has demonstrated that we welcome and encourage the rise of a prosperous and stable China.	在此以及其他双边对话中，美国表明我们欢迎并鼓励繁荣和稳定的中国崛起。


We supported China’s membership in the World Trade Organization, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Financial Action Task Force.	我们支持中国加入世界贸易组织、美洲发展银行以及金融行动专题小组。


We supported a greater voting share for China, and other rapidly growing emerging markets, in the IMF and the World Bank.	我们支持中国以及其他快速成长的新型市场在国际货币基金组织和世界银行中拥有更大的投票份额。


But China’s government must recognize that, while increased participation allows China to advance its interests, it also brings greater responsibilities.	但是中国政府必须认识到，在增大参与让中国增进其利益的同时也带来更大的责任。


The agreements we have achieved thus far are like signposts showing progress along the road to mutual economic prosperity.	我们目前为止所达成的协议就像是标明通向共同经济繁荣道路上的路标。


While progress has not been as rapid as we would like, these signposts point the way to further benefits for Americans and Chinese alike.	尽管进展并不是像我们想要的那样快，这些路标还是指明了通往美中两国人民更大利益的道路。


To turn back would jeopardize the long-term strategic interests of both countries for short-term political expediency.	走回头路将会是为了短期政治权益而危及两国的长期战略利益。


The Black Hole in America’s GDP	美国GDP“黑洞”


CAMBRIDGE – The massive downturn in American’s economy will last longer and be more damaging than previous recessions, because it is driven by an unprecedented loss of household wealth.	剑桥——当前美国所面临的经济衰退将比以往任何时期的破坏力都大，持续的时间也更长。 原因是本次经济衰退的起因是由于房产资产大幅度意外缩水所造成的。


Although the fiscal stimulus package that President Obama recently signed will give a temporary boost to activity sometime this summer, the common forecast that a sustained recovery will begin in the second half of 2009 will almost certainly prove to be overly optimistic.	虽然奥巴马总统在近期推出了经济刺激方案，美国经济也许会在今年夏天暂时有所好转，但如果认为09年第二季度经济将会持续好转的话，那就显得过于乐观了。


Previous recessions were often characterized by excess inventory accumulation and overinvestment in business equipment.	以往的经济危机是由于产能过剩及产业过度投资所造成的。


The economy could bounce back as those excesses were absorbed over time, making room for new investment.	产能过剩和过度投资会随着时间而被慢慢消化，经济也会随之复苏，新一轮的投资也会慢慢兴起。


Those recoveries were also helped by interest rate reductions by the central bank.	与此同时，中央银行下调利率的政策也会对复苏起到作用。


This time, however, the fall in share prices and in home values has destroyed more than $12 trillion of household wealth in the United States, an amount equal to more than 75% of GDP.	然而此次危机则不同，美国家庭在股市房市的资损失已经超过了12万亿美元，相当于GDP的3/4还多。


Previous reactions to declines in household wealth indicate that such a fall will cut consumer spending by about $500 billion every year until wealth is restored.	在经济停止下滑之前，美国家庭每年将会减少大约5000亿美元的消费支出。


While a higher household saving rate will help to rebuild wealth, it would take more than a decade of relatively high saving rates to restore what was lost.	随着家庭储蓄率的升高，如果要恢复到危机爆发之前的水平。 至少还需要10年。


The decline in housing construction has added to the current shortfall in aggregate demand.	房地产建筑行业的衰退也会加大经济下滑的局面。


The annual number of housing starts has fallen by 1.2 million units, cutting annual GDP by an additional $250 billion.	每年美国将会减少建造120万个房屋，由此带来GDP损失是2500亿美元。


While this will eventually turn around as the inventory of unsold homes shrinks, the recovery will be slow.	虽然随着待售房屋的减少，局面会有所好转，不过复苏的过程将会是缓慢的。


So the US economy faces a $750 billion shortfall of demand. Moreover, the usual automatic stabilizers of unemployment benefits and reduced income tax collections will do nothing to offset this fall in demand, because it is not caused by lower earnings or increased unemployment.	综上所述，美国GDP将面临7500亿美元的缺口，由于经济下滑不是由于低收入和失业率的增加而引起的，失业金的发放和收入所得税减少等政策不会起到作用。


Although the recently enacted two-year stimulus package includes a total of $800 billion of tax reductions and increased government spending, it would be wrong to think that this will add anything close to $400 billion a year to GDP in each of the next two years.	近期，美国政府推出总额达到8000亿美元两年经济刺激方案，其中包括减税和增加政府支出，如果认为两年内每年会对GDP有4000亿美元贡献的话，那就错了。


Most of the tax reductions will be saved by households rather than used to finance additional spending.	原因是美国家庭将会把由于所得税下降的增加的收入存起来，而不是用来消费。


Moreover, a substantial part of the spending will be spread over the following decade. And some of the government spending in the stimulus package will replace other outlays that would have occurred anyway.	由此可见，刺激方案的效果会在随后的10年中慢慢起到作用，政府增加的支出也会起到一些作用。


An optimistic estimate of the direct increase in annual demand from the stimulus package is about $300 billion in each of the next two years.	根据乐观的估计，经济刺激方案将会在两年内每年对GDP增加3000亿美元。


The stimulus package would thus fill less than half of the hole in GDP caused by the decline in household wealth and housing construction, with the remaining demand shortfall of $450 billion in each of the next two years causing serious second-round effects. As demand falls, businesses will reduce production, leading to lower employment and incomes, which in turn will lead to further cuts in consumer spending.	这也就弥补不到GDP漏洞的一半，剩下每年4500亿美元的缺口会带来什么呢：需求下降使得企业不得不减少产能，由此失业率继续上升，收入持续减少，这样就更加剧需求的萎缩。


To be sure, an improvement in the currently dysfunctional financial system will allow banks and other financial institutions to start lending to borrowers who want to spend but cannot get credit today. This will help, but it is unlikely to be enough to achieve positive GDP growth.	可以肯定的是，让银行及其他金融机构给那些需要而没有信用额度的企业发放贷款，是目前有效的解决方式之一，但这只是对经济复苏有所帮助，对GDP的增长没什么影响。


A second fiscal stimulus package is therefore likely.	看来，第二轮的经济刺激方案或许会随后出台。


However, it will need to be much better targeted at increasing demand in order to avoid adding more to the national debt than the rise in domestic spending.	明确此次方案的目标尤其显得重要：就是以增加需求为导向，如果只是盲目的推出，就只会导致国债增加，对扩大需求没有什么作用。


Similarly, the tax changes in such a stimulus package should provide incentives to increase spending by households and businesses.	同样的，新的税改方案也应该是为了有利于企业家庭增加支出而设计的。


Although long-term government interest rates are now very low, they are beginning to rise in response to the outlook for a sharply rising national debt.	目前，虽然政府长期利率已经很低了，但利率会随着国债的迅速增加而慢慢上升。


The national debt held by US and foreign investors totaled about 40% of GDP at the end of 2008. It is likely to rise to more than 60% of GDP by the end of 2010, with the debt-to-GDP ratio continuing to increase.	到08年底，美国及其他国家的国债总数约为GDP的40%，预计到2010年底会上升到60%多。


The resulting increase in real long-term interest rates will reduce all forms of interest-sensitive spending, adding further to the economy’s weakness.	长期实际利率的上升也会抵消政府各种形式的利率刺激消费方案，这也会使得经济问题雪上加霜。


So it is not clear what will occur to reverse the decline in GDP and end the economic downturn.	由此可见，如何真正才能解决GDP的下降，结束经济下滑呢？ 目前看来还没有什么良方。


Will a sharp dollar depreciation cause exports to rise and imports to fall?	也许是美元的迅速贬值导致出口的增加和进口的减少？


Will a rapid rise in the inflation rate reduce the real value of government, household, and commercial debt, leading to lower saving and more spending?	也许是快速的通货膨胀减少政府，家庭和企业的债务，从而达到刺激消费的目的？


Or will something else come along to turn the economy around.	还是其他什么能够扭转经济衰退的方法？


Only time will tell.	看来，只有时间才能回答这个问题。


The Blinders of History	不明白历史的人


A distorted view of the present is the worst way to prepare for the challenges of the future.	扭曲地看待今天的状况是应对未来挑战最糟糕的方式。


To describe the struggle against international terrorism as “World War IV,” as the leading American neo-conservative Norman Podhoretz does in his new book, is wrongheaded in any number of ways.	像美国新保守主义的大名人波多雷茨在他的新书里把与国际恐怖主义的斗争描述为“第四次世界大战”，从许多方面来看都完全是错误的判断。


First of all, when and where was World War III?	首先，第三次世界大战是在何时何地发生的？


The Cold War, precisely because it never became “hot,” was never the equivalent of World War I or II.	冷战，单从它从来没有变“热”来看，就完全与第一次或第二次世界大战等同而言。


Of course, the “World War” reference may be intended to create an “us” versus “them” logic, but this does not correspond to the nature of the challenge posed by radical Islam, given the complexity and the many divisions that exist within the Muslim world.	当然，与“世界大战”联系起来也许是为了制造一个“我们”与“他们”对抗的逻辑，但是这与原教旨伊斯兰主义带给我们的挑战的性质并不相吻合，尤其是考虑到穆斯林世界内部的复杂性以及多个派别的存在。


Indeed, by militarizing our thinking, it renders us incapable of finding the right answers, which must be as much political as security-oriented.	事实上，当我们的思想变得好战时，我们就无法寻找到正确的答案。 而正确的答案不但应该以安全为核心，同时也要考虑政治因素。


As always, words are important, because they can easily be turned into weapons that boomerang on those who use them inappropriately.	像通常所表现出的一样，人们说的话是非常重要的，因为它们会非常容易地变成反过来伤及那些不恰当地说这些话的人的武器。


Wrong analogies have already led America to disaster in Iraq, which had nothing in common with Germany or Japan after World War II – the parallel that some in the Bush administration used in arguing that democracy could be made to sprout in former dictatorships through occupation.	错误的类比已经把美国引向在伊拉克的灾难，这与布什政府的某些人辩解民主可以通过占领以前的独裁国家来在该国生根发芽而常常拿出来举例的二战后的德国或日本没有任何相似之处。


Obviously, the terrorist threat is real and endures, as the recent foiled plot in Germany attests.	显然，恐怖主义的威胁是真实并且持久的，就像最近在德国被挫败的阴谋所证明的。


That plot, which included a young German convert to Islam, showed once again that terrorists can threaten us from both without and within.	那次阴谋，其中包括有一名转而信奉伊斯兰教的德国青年，再一次证明了恐怖分子的威胁在我们的内部和外部都有存在。


The nihilistic and destructive instincts that some young Germans of the Baader/Meinhof generation acquired from extreme leftist ideology in the 1970’s, it seems, can be transformed into a “romanticization” of al-Qaeda.	某些德国年轻的巴德-梅霍夫帮后裔从二十世纪七十年代的极左思想中所吸取的无政府主义和破坏意识，看起来能够被转变成对基地组织的“浪漫化”。


We must of course protect ourselves in the most serious and determined manner from the threat that terrorism may pose should, say, extremists acquire nuclear or biological weapons.	因此我们必须以最认真和最坚定的方式来保护我们自己免受恐怖主义可能带给我们的威胁，比如极端分子获得核武器或生物武器的可能性。


Intelligence, diplomacy, security forces, and educating people to the requirements of life lived under the shadow of an invisible menace must all be brought to bear.	情报、外交、警卫部队都应该被动员起来，同时告诫人们生活在一个看不见的威胁的阴影下应该注意的事项。


A certain “Israelization” of our daily lives has unfortunately become inevitable.	我们的日常生活在某种程度上被“以色列化”看来很不幸地是难以避免的了。


But that does not mean that we must become literally obsessed with terrorism at the expense of losing sight of broader historical challenges.	但是那并不意味着我们必须沉迷应对恐怖组织，而忽视更广泛的历史性挑战。


The assassination of the heir of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at Sarajevo in July 1914 was not the cause of World War I, but its pretext.	1914年7月刺杀奥匈帝国王储的事件并不是第一次世界大战爆发的真正原因，而只是它的一个借口。


The big picture then was not the “anarchist plot” to destabilize empires, but the rise of exasperated nationalisms, coupled with the suicidal instinct of a decaying order and the fatal mechanism of the logic of “secret alliances.”	当时的大背景并不是要颠覆帝国的“无政府主义者的阴谋”，而是被激起的民族主义情绪，加上一个腐朽的秩序的自杀意识和“安全联盟”逻辑的致命机制。


The big picture then was that, with the transportation revolution and the deployment of mass armies, war could no longer be seen as the continuation of politics through other means.	当时的大背景是，随着交通运输的革命和大规模军队的部署，战争不再能被看作是政治以其他方式的延续。


The industrialization of war had made it “obsolete” in rational terms.	战争的工业化使得理性的思维变得“过时”了。


Less than the defeat of Germany, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire, World War I meant the suicide of Europe.	第一次世界大战更多地意味着欧洲的自杀，而不是德国、奥地利和奥斯曼帝国的战败。


The big picture today is the possible passage of global leadership from the West to Asia.	而今天的大背景是全球的领导权可能正从西方转向东方。


The paranoid reaction of neoconservatives in America to the terrorist threat can only accelerate that process, if not render it inevitable, by endangering our democratic values and thereby weakening the “soft power” of the United States, while giving fuel to the terrorist cause.	美国国内的新保守主义者对于恐怖主义的威胁类似妄想狂似的反应只会加快这一进程，如果没有使之变得不可避免的话。 他们这样做损害了我们的民主价值观以及因而削弱了美国的“软实力”，而同时助长了恐怖分子的气焰。


Terrorism is the product of a fusion within a part of Islam of religious extremism, thwarted nationalism, and what Dostoyevsky called “nihilism.”	恐怖主义是伊斯兰宗教极端主义的一部分、被挫败的民族主义和陀斯妥耶夫斯基称为“无政府主义”者联合起来的产物。


Our challenge is to understand the root causes of these forces and to make distinctions among them.	我们所面临的挑战是要理解这些力量的根源然后对他们进行区别对待。


In other words, we are faced with the challenge of complexity, which requires us to ensure that a small minority is not joined by greater forces.	换句话说，我们所面临的是非常复杂的挑战，它要求我们确保一小撮人不会被更多的人加入进来。


Greater stability in the Middle East, which implies a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, together with more effective integration of Muslims in our societies based on social justice and a stronger humanistic message, are the key elements of a cohesive Western strategy.	中东更大的稳定，这要求以色列和巴勒斯坦冲突的解决以及基于社会公正和更强大的人文信息更有效地将生活在我们社会中的穆斯林融入我们的社会，是一个团结的西方战略的核心内容。


If we lose sight of that in our struggle against terrorism and its causes, we will be left unable to face successfully the long-term challenge of “Chindia.”	如果在我们对抗恐怖主义以及恐怖活动是忘掉了这一点，那我们将无法成功地应对“中国和印度”带给我的长期挑战。


The Bogey of Fiscal Stimulus	财政刺激妖魔


NEW YORK – After the economic disaster of 2008-2009, people are understandably wary of the devastation that yet another financial crisis can wreak.	纽约——不难理解，在经历了2008—2009年的经济灾难后，人们担心还会再来一场金融危机。


But the likelihood of another crisis is quite small, and its adverse impact would be far less devastating this time around, as there are no more massive credit or asset bubbles to burst.	但这种可能性相当小，而且其不良影响也会小得多，因为市面上已经没有大规模的信贷和资产泡沫可以破裂的了。


That has not stopped pundits and the media from exaggerating such fears, distracting from greater efforts to overcome protracted stagnation for much of the developed world, which will inevitably drag down economic recovery elsewhere, especially in developing countries.	但这并不妨碍学者和媒体继续夸大恐慌，将人们的注意力从如何克服发达世界长期徘徊不前这个问题上移开，而这个问题将不可避免地拖累世界其他地区，特别是发展中国家的经济复苏。


The current favorite bogeyman is public debt.	当前最被妖魔化的是公共债务。


Much is being made of high levels of sovereign debt on both sides of the Atlantic, and in Japan.	其中占大头的是大西洋两岸和日本水涨船高的主权债务。


As the economics commentator Martin Wolf has noted, “The fiscal challenge is long term, not immediate.”	经济评论家马丁·沃尔夫（Martin Wolf）指出：“财政挑战是长期性的，不是一夜之间就能解决的。


Likewise, while Japan has the highest debt-to-GDP ratio among rich countries, this is not a serious problem because the debt is domestically held.	”同样，尽管日本的债务-GDP比率为整个发达国家之最，但这并不是什么大问题，因为这些债务都是内债。


And Europe’s debt problems are now widely acknowledged to be due to ill-conceived aspects of European integration.	而欧洲债务问题被广泛认为是由对欧洲一体化程度的错误估计造成的。


The international community has, so far, failed to develop effective and equitable arrangements for restructuring sovereign debt, despite the clearly dysfunctional and problematic consequences of past international public-debt crises. This prevents timely debt workouts when needed, effectively impeding recovery.	到目前为止，国际社会尚未提出有效公正的主权债务重组安排，尽管过去的国际公共债务危机表明，这样会带来诸多不良后果。


High public debt is also being invoked in support of fiscal austerity in many developed countries.	公共债务水平高企也被许多发达国家用来支持财政紧缩。


But, rather than helping, the rush to budget cutting is reversing earlier recovery efforts.	但是，匆忙削减预算不但毫无助益，还会让早先的复苏努力付诸东流。


With private-sector demand still weak, austerity is slowing, not accelerating, recovery.	由于私人部门需求仍然疲软，因此紧缩只能延缓而不能加速复苏。


It has already reduced growth and employment.	紧缩已经削弱了增长和就业。


And, while financial markets insist on deficit reduction, the recent decline in equity and bond prices – and the loss of confidence that this reflects – suggests that they also recognize the adverse implications of fiscal consolidation at a time of weak private demand.	此外，尽管金融市场仍旧要求各国削减赤字，但最近股市和债市的下跌——以及从中所反映的信心缺失——表明，市场同样认为，私人需求疲软时期的财政整合会带来诸多负面影响。


Opponents of fiscal stimulus cynically claim that all such efforts are bound to fail, citing as evidence US President George W. Bush’s tax cuts!	财政刺激的反对者悲观地指出，这些措施注定要失败，并以布什总统的减税计划为例。


Others point out that the US Fed’s “quantitative easing” efforts have been modestly successful, at best.	也有人指出，美联储的“量化宽松”措施最多只能说是取得了一定的成功。


While undoubtedly mitigating the impact of the crisis, Europe’s “automatic stabilizers” are now said to be enough to ensure recovery, despite strong evidence to the contrary.	欧洲的“自动稳定器”尽管毫无疑问减轻了危机的影响，但如今也被认为不足以确保经济复苏（但大量证据表明正好相反）。


Slower growth means less revenue, and a faster downward spiral.	增长放缓意味着岁入减少，也意味着下跌螺旋加速。


Most major countries’ fiscal deficits nowadays reflect the recent collapse of tax revenues that followed the growth downturn, as well as very costly financial-sector bailouts.	目前，大多数主要国家的财政赤字反映了增长放缓带来的税收收入大减，也反映了所费甚巨的金融部门救援计划。


And yet many policymakers are insisting on immediate action to rectify not only fiscal deficits, but also trade imbalances and banks’ balance-sheet weaknesses.	但许多决策者不仅坚持要立刻采取行动削减财政赤字，还要马上消除贸易不平衡、提振银行资产负债表。


While these undoubtedly need to be addressed in the longer term, prioritizing them now effectively stymies stronger, sustained recovery efforts.	诚然，这些问题在长期都必须解决，但在当下把它们视为当务之急将大大妨碍强势的可持续复苏。


The wrong public policies can induce recessions.	错误的公共政策可能导致衰退。


This happened in 1980-1981, when the US Federal Reserve raised real interest rates, ostensibly to kill inflation, inducing a global economic downturn as well.	1980—1981年就是明证，当时美联储大幅提升真实利率，表面上抑制了通胀，但同时也造成了一场全球经济衰退。


This contributed not only to sovereign-debt and fiscal crises, but also to protracted stagnation outside East Asia, including Latin America’s “lost decade” and Africa’s “quarter-century retreat.”	结果不但引发了主权债务和财政危机，还致使除东亚以外的地区经历了长期停滞，比如拉美的“失去的十年”和非洲的“倒退四分之一世纪”。


Another distraction is exaggerating the threat of inflation.	另一大误导是放大通胀的威胁。


Recent inflation in many countries has been the result of higher commodity prices, especially fuel and food prices.	目前，不少国家的通胀是由商品价格，特别是燃料和食品价格的大涨引起的。


In these circumstances, domestic deflationary policies will only further slow growth – and are helpless to stem imported inflation.	在这样的环境下，国内通缩政策只能进一步拉低增长，对输入性通胀完全起不到作用。


Unfortunately, today’s top policy priority is to address remote possibilities, whereas the urgent task at hand – coordinating and implementing efforts to raise and sustain growth and job creation – is being ignored.	不幸的是，如今的优先政策是解决长期问题，而当务之急——协调行动并实施提振和维持增长和就业创造的政策——却被忽视了。


Meanwhile, cuts in social and welfare spending are only making things worse, as employment and consumer demand fall further.	与此同时，削减社会和福利支出只能让事态进一步恶化，因为就业和消费者需求将进一步萎缩。


The pressure on employment and household budgets is likely to persist.	就业和家庭预算压力可能会长久存在。


Strident calls for structural reforms mainly target labor markets, rather than product markets.	结构性改革的尖锐呼声大多集中在劳动市场而非产品市场。


Growing worker insecurity is seen as the basis for a healthy economy.	工人日益加深的不安全感被视为是健康经济的基础。


Labor-market liberalization in such circumstances not only undermines remaining social protection, but is also likely to diminish real incomes, aggregate demand, and, hence, recovery prospects.	在此背景下实施劳动市场自由化不但有害于社会保障，还可能拉低真实收入、总需求以及复苏前景。


Moreover, in recent decades, profits have risen not only at the expense of wages, but also with much more accruing to finance, insurance, and real estate compared to other sectors.	此外，近几十年来，利润增长的源泉不仅是压低工资，还日益向朝金融、保险和房地产业倾斜。


The outrageous increases in financial executives’ remuneration in recent years, which cannot be attributed to increased productivity, have exacerbated the financial sector’s focus on the short term, while worsening its risk exposure in the longer term, thereby exacerbating systemic vulnerability.	近几年来，金融业高管报酬已经引发了民愤，他们的高薪酬并非来自生产率提高，倒是让金融部门越来越短视，恶化长期风险暴露，从而加剧系统脆弱性。


Growing income inequality in most countries before the Great Recession only made matters worse, by reducing household savings and increasing credit for consumption and asset purchases, rather than augmenting investment in new economic capacity.	在大多数国家，大萧条之前的收入不平等日益增长的唯一结果是让事态进一步恶化了，因为这削减了家庭储蓄，增加了消费和资产购买行为的信用，而没有增加提升经济产能的投资。


What the world needs now are leaders who look to the long-term future.	如今，世界具有远见卓识的领导人。


The international financial institutions created after World War II were set up to ensure not only international monetary and financial stability, but also the conditions for sustained growth, employment generation, post-war reconstruction, and post-colonial development.	二战之后建立起来的国际金融制度的初衷不仅包括维持国际货币和金融稳定，也包括维持增长、就业创造、战后重建和后殖民时代发展。


Unfortunately, current policy is justified in terms of “pro-market” – effectively pro-cyclical – choices.	不幸的是，当前政策的评判标准是是否“亲市场”，即是否亲周期。


But it is counter-cyclical efforts, institutions, and instruments that are sorely needed instead.	但唯有反周期政策、制度和工具才是当今之所需。


Global leadership today seems to be held hostage by financial interests and associated media, ideologists, and oligarchs whose political influence enables them to secure more rents and pay lower taxes in what must truly be the most vicious of circles.	如今，全球领导人似乎沦为了金融利益集团和相关媒体、智囊和政治寡头（他们利用政治影响力获得更多的租金，支付更少的税收，这绝对是最为恶性的循环）的人质。


Indeed, the menace that now confronts us is not public debt or inflation, but a downward economic spiral that will be increasingly difficult to reverse.	事实上，当前我们所面对的威胁并不是公共债务和通胀，而是越来越难以扭转的下跌经济螺旋。


The Borders of Liberalism	自由主义的疆界


When it comes to whether and how to regulate the economy, Western societies have a history of liberal theory upon which to rely.	当谈到是否应该以及如何管制经济时，西方社会一贯倾向的是自由主义的理论。


But when it comes to immigration, there is not much in the liberal tradition to which they can turn.	但是在谈到移民问题时，他们却没有太多自由主义的传统。


As a result, in both Europe and the United States, much of the debate over immigration is dominated by illiberal voices, the most insistent belonging to politicians who promise to protect the cultural integrity of the homeland against the presumed degeneracy of the alien.	其结果是，在欧洲和美国大部分有关移民问题的争论中占据主导的是反自由的声音，在这其中最强硬的声音来自那些承诺保护祖国文化的完整性以对抗臆想中异族人的堕落的政治家们。


Xenophobia is an illiberal response to immigration from the right, but multiculturalism represents much the same thing from the left.	排外是右派对于移民问题反自由的回应，而左派的多元文化主义代表的其实是同样的想法。


Many multicultural theorists, although committed to openness toward immigrants, are not committed to the openness of immigrants to their new home.	许多多元文化理论家尽管主张对移民保持开放的态度，但是并不认为移民应该对他们新的家园也抱以开放的态度。


For them, newcomers, living in an environment hostile to their way of life, need to preserve the cultural practices they bring with them, even if some of those practices – for example, arranged marriages, gender segregation, religious indoctrination – conflict with liberal principles.	对于他们来说，新来者生活在一个对他们的生活方式抱有敌意的环境中需要保持他们原有的文化做法，即便其中的一些做法比如包办婚姻、性别隔离、宗教灌输等与自由的原则相抵触。


Group survival counts more than individual rights in the moral accounting of many multiculturalists.	在许多多元文化者的道义观中，群体的生存远比个人的权利更重要。


One way to maintain a commitment to openness when addressing the vexing question of national borders is to recognize that cosmopolitanism is a two-way street.	维护对开放的承诺同时又能应对国家疆界的复杂问题的一种方式是认识到世界主义是一条双向道路。


Immanuel Kant teaches us that the circumstances in which we find ourselves must always be judged against the circumstances in which, but for chance, we might have found ourselves.	康德教导我们说，我们所感知的自己所身处的环境是由我们碰巧可能所身处的环境来决定的。


From this perspective, it is unfair that someone who happens to be born in the US is likely to live longer and better than someone born in Kenya.	根据这种观点，说一个碰巧出生在美国的人会比一个出生在肯尼亚的人更长寿、更幸福是不公正的。


This does not mean that the US must open its borders to everyone from Kenya.	这并不意味着美国必须向来自肯尼亚的每一个人开放其边界。


But it does mean that a New Yorker should recognize that any advantages he may have over a Nairobian are due to an accident of birth rather than merit.	但是这确实意味着一个纽约人应该认识到他可能对一个内罗毕人所拥有的所有优势只不过是出生的偶然性所造成的，而不是因为他有什么功德。


From the perspective of Kantian cosmopolitanism, the least an American can do is to welcome a certain amount of immigration from Africa.	根据康德世界主义的观点，一个美国人至少应该欢迎来自非洲的一定量的移民。


But embracing cosmopolitanism also means that once a society admits new members, those members are obliged to open themselves to their new society.	但是拥护世界主义同时也意味着一旦一个社会接纳了新的成员，那么那些新成员必须向他们的新社会开放他们自己。


Multiculturalists are reluctant to endorse this part of the cosmopolitan bargain, but liberals must.	多元文化者不愿意认同世界主义的这一部分，但是自由主义必须认同这一点。


One can understand why, living in a foreign country they may perceive as hostile, immigrants opt to close themselves off, and some host countries – France, for example –may be too hasty in demanding that immigrants accept new ways of life.	人们能够理解，当生活在他们认为对他们抱有敌意的外国时，移民会选择把他们自己闭锁起来，而一些接纳他们的国家比如法国也许在要求移民接受新的生活方式的问题上表现得太急切了。


But attempting to live a closed life in an open society is bound to be self-defeating and not something a liberal society should encourage.	但是试图在一个开放的社会过一种闭锁的生活注定会是自我挫败的，这也不是一个自由社会所鼓励的。


An instructive example of the cosmopolitanism bargain came in 2006, when Great Britain’s former foreign minister, Jack Straw, raised concerns about the nijab, the full-head covering worn by some Muslim women.	世界主义的带有启发性的例子来自2006年，英国前外交大臣斯特劳对于一些穆斯林女人佩戴的罩住整个头部的阿拉伯头巾表示了关切。


Straw defended women’s right to wear less intrusive headscarves; yet he also argued that something is seriously wrong when, in conversation with another person, one cannot engage in face-to-face interaction.	斯特劳认为女性有权利戴不那么碍手碍脚的头巾； 他还辩解说在与另一个人进行交谈时，不能进行面对面的交流是非常严重的失礼。


Straw was saying that to wear the nijab is a decision to close yourself off from everyone around you.	斯特劳的意思是说戴阿拉伯头巾就意味着把你自己与周围的人隔绝开。


He was not making a xenophobic argument that Muslims do not belong in Great Britain, or a multiculturalist argument that Muslims should be allowed to wear whatever traditional garb they believe best expresses their cultural and religious sensibilities.	他并没有表达对外国人的排外，认为穆斯林并不属于英国，或者多元文化的观点认为穆斯林应该被允许穿戴任何他们认为最能表达他们的文化和宗教感情的传统服饰。


Nor was he asking for the full assimilation of immigrants to British customs.	他也没有要求移民全盘接受英国人的习俗。


Instead, through a carefully chosen example, Straw was illustrating what it means to be open to others while expecting openness in return.	相反，通过一个精心选择的例子，斯特劳表达了英国愿意对外国人开放同时也期望外国人对他们开放。


Some argued that, in suggesting to Muslim women what they should wear, Straw was interfering with religious freedom.	一些人反驳说，通过建议穆斯林女人的穿着，斯特劳是在干涉宗教自由。


In fact, liberal values sometimes contradict each other.	事实上，自由主义的价值观有时是相互抵触的。


Islam, for example, has historically permitted certain forms of polygamy, but no liberal society is obliged to extend religious freedom in ways that undermine its commitment to gender equality.	比如，伊斯兰历史上曾允许某种形式的一夫多妻制，但是没有哪个自由社会会愿意把宗教的自由延伸到损害其对性别平等的承诺的范畴。


Fortunately, Straw’s example does not pose such a sharp dilemma.	幸运的是，斯特劳举的例子并没有呈现这样一种尖锐的两难境地。


As he pointed out, wearing the nijab is not commanded by the Koran and represents a cultural choice, not a religious duty.	正如他所指出的，佩戴阿拉伯头巾并不是古兰经的要求，它代表的是一种文化选择，而不是宗教义务。


So long as other ways are available for Muslim women to cover their heads, agreeing not to wear the nijab is a way of signifying one’s membership in a liberal society at minimal cost to one’s religious commitments.	只要有其他方式能让穆斯林女人遮盖住她们的头部，同意不戴阿拉伯头巾是一种以对宗教忠诚度最小代价的让步来换取强调个人在一个自由社会的成员资格的方式。


For liberals, the question is never whether borders should be completely open or closed; a society open to all would have no rights worth protecting, while a society closed to all would have no rights worth emulating.	对于自由主义者来说，问题永远不在于边界是否应该完全被打开或关闭的问题； 一个对所有人都开放的社会不会有值得保护的权利，而一个对所有人都关闭的社会不会有值得仿效的权利。


If one is looking for an abstract principle to follow on questions of immigration, liberalism cannot provide it.	如果有人要寻找在移民问题上的抽象原则，那他是不会在自由主义上寻找到的。


But a liberal society will allow people in and make exceptions for conditions under which they must be kept out, rather than keeping people out and making exceptions for when they should be allowed in.	但是一个自由社会应该允许人们进来，并且制定在何时他们应该被拒之门外的例外条件，而不是不让人们进来，而制定在何时他们应该被允许进来的例外条件。


A liberal society will also view the world as teeming with potential that, however threatening to ways of life that are taken for granted, forces people to adapt to new challenges rather than trying to protect themselves against the foreign and unknown.	一个自由的社会还应该把世界看成是充满潜力的，应该它威胁了其赖以自豪的生活方式，但还是推动人们去适应新的挑战而不是试图保护自己不受外来者和陌生人的干扰。


Finally, a liberal society will not focus on what we can offer immigrants, but on what they can offer us.	最后，一个自由社会不应该关注我们能给移民提供什么，而应该关注他们可以为我们提供什么。


The goal of openness implied by immigration is worth preserving, especially if both its demands and its promise apply across the board.	移民所包含的开放目标值得维护，尤其是它的需求和承诺在所有方面都适用的话。


The Borgia Candidate for Russia’s Presidency	俄罗斯总统的非常候选人


In the latest interview given by Andrei Lugovoi, the man Great Britain wants Russia to extradite for poisoning the dissident Alexander Litvinenko with radioactive polonium, there was a remarkable moment that has not been fully appreciated. Lugovoi, still rather diffident but with unmistakable pride, mentioned that when he is seen in public, he usually finds himself surrounded by people who want to shake his hand, congratulate him on his valor, and ask for his autograph.	在Andrei Lugovoi（此君因为用放射性的钋毒死了持不同政见者Alexander Litvinenko而被英国要求俄罗斯将其引渡）最近接受的一次访问中，有一个没有得到足够重视的精彩时刻：仍有些许不自信的Lugovoi却毫不掩饰地提到了自己身处公众场合时，周遭的人都主动于其握手、赞许他的英勇并向他索要签名。


“Well, have you thought about a career in politics?” the interviewer asked.	“那么你想过步入政界么？ ”采访者问道。


Unfortunately, the interviewer did not pursue the matter any further.	不幸的是他没有继续追问。


This is a pity, because Lugovoi’s status in Russia tells us much about my country in the seventh year of President Vladmir Putin’s rule.	这是个遗憾，因为Lugovoi在俄罗斯的地位能够告诉我们关于我的国家在弗拉季米尔•普京总统统治下的第七个年头的许多情况。


Perhaps surprisingly, Lugovoi seems not to have wondered why he is enjoying such an enthusiastic reception from his compatriots.	或许令人惊讶的是，Lugovoi似乎对自己受到同胞如此热情的对待并不感到意外。


Are ordinary Russians showing solidarity with a victim unjustly hounded by the British Crown Prosecution Service?	是普通的俄国人面对一位遭受英国皇家检控署不公正的追捕的受害者所表现出的团结一致么？


That seems unlikely.	事情似乎不是这样。


When did Russians ever ask a victim for an autograph?	俄国人几时向受害者索要过签名？


I myself have been attracting the interest of the Russian Public Prosecutor’s Office for several months now, and I have yet to encounter any public support in the street, let alone a single autograph hunter.	我本人在过去几个月来一直被俄罗斯公共检察官办公室关注，但我在大街上还从未遇到过一个支持者，更别提任何一个向我索要签名的粉丝。


In Russia, you get asked for your autograph if you are a proper hero: an ice-hockey player, a cosmonaut, a high-society prostitute, or, like Lugovoi, an executioner.	在俄罗斯，如果你是一个真正的英雄，人们可能会要你签名：一位冰球运动员、一位宇航员、一位高级妓女、或者像Lugovoi这样的一位行刑者。


Part of Lugovoi’s acclaim is derived from the fact that the list of unspeakable crimes committed by the late Alexander Litvinenko in the course of his brief life is growing longer in Russian media reports with every passing day.	对Lugovoi的赞誉在一定程度上来源于这样一个事实：Alexander Litvinenko在其短暂的生命中所犯下的难以言表的罪行正越来越多地被俄罗斯媒体曝光。


These are crimes so treacherous that any right-minded Russian patriot can only thirst to see such a person subjected to the supreme measure of national retribution.	这些罪行是如此具有背叛性，以至于任何一个正直的俄罗斯爱国者都渴望看到这个人被处以最严厉形式的国家惩罚。


But only one such “patriot” was granted the honor of being allowed to perform this act.	但只有一位这样的“爱国者”被给予了实施这种惩罚的荣誉。


That is why Lugovoi is being asked for his autograph.	这就是Lugovoi名声大噪的原因。


This should not, of course, be taken to mean that the patriots gushing over Lugovoi’s achievement concede the justice of the British allegations.	当然这并不应该被解读为爱国者们对Lugovoi的成就滔滔不绝的累述会有损英国方面指控的公正性。


The social awareness of Homo Putinicus, meticulously burnished by television propagandists, is such that pride in Lugovoi’s achievement and indignation at the infamous campaign unleashed against him by those who hate Russia can jangle within the breast of ordinary Russians without the slightest dissonance.	电视宣传者们苦心打造的 亲普京派 的社会意识是如此高涨，以至于对Lugovoi的成就的自豪和对仇视俄罗斯者对他发起的无耻攻击的义愤使得普通的俄罗斯人可以绝对地同仇敌忾。


We are evidently facing the mystery of Russian thought that has proved so unfathomable to others, so unyielding to every analytical scalpel, and about which our Slavophiles and Eurasians wrote at length.	它对许多人而言都是如此深不可测、无法理解。 亲斯拉夫派和亚欧学者们对此都有长篇的著述。


But I see a practical turn in all this that no one has yet broached.	但我却看到了一个从未被人关注过的大好时机。


Wouldn’t Lugovoi’s entrance into politics bring about the ideal solution to the problem of finding an heir for Putin?	Lugovoi进入政界难道不是对普京寻找继任者这一问题的理想解决方案么？


That search, after all, is threatening to divide the nation’s elite.	毕竟这场选秀有分裂该国精英阶层的危险。


So why not choose a man like Lugovoi who truly represents what that elite stands for?	那么为什么不选择一个像Lugovoi这样一个真正代表精英阶层立场的人呢？


Let us compare two potential presidential candidates, Putin in 1999 and Lugovoi in 2007.	让我们比较一下这两个潜在的总统候选人，1999年的普京和2007年的Lugovoi。


The similarities are striking: the modest social background, the KGB milieu, the criminal vocabulary, the mentality and physique, the mercilessness towards “enemies of the people.”	他们有着令人惊异的相似之处：出身平凡、克格勃背景、熟悉黑道、强健的心智与体格、对“人民公敌”的冷酷无情。


The underworld manners of both go hand in hand with that lively interest in business which is so essential if “liberal reforms” in Russia are to be continued.	两人黑社会式的风格与对商业的浓厚兴趣相辅相成。 而如果俄罗斯的“自由化改革”要继续下去，这一点则至关重要。


Finally, there is the additional, highly significant coincidence that both men, at the start of their political careers, were largely dependent on the oligarch Boris Berezovsky, but subsequently fell out with him.	最后，还有一个颇具意义的高度巧合，即这两个人在其政治生涯的起始阶段，都在很大程度上依靠（政治）寡头Boris Berezovsky，而后又都与其交恶。


Regarding their professional attainments, Lugovoi in 2007 seems to have the edge.	就专业成就而言，2007年的Lugovoi似乎更胜一筹。


Successfully carrying out a large-scale operation in the middle of London beats a desk job in the GDR-USSR House of Friendship in Dresden in the years of perestroika and communist collapse.	在伦敦的中心地带成功地执行了一项重大任务的经验比在改革和共产主义崩溃的时代在位于德累斯顿的民主德国—苏联友谊宫里的文职工作更具说服力。


So perhaps the Russian people might take to their hearts this executioner with the rank of lieutenant colonel, just as eight years ago they took to their hearts another KGB lieutenant colonel, Vladimir Putin?	因此，俄罗斯人民可能会钟爱这位有着中校军衔的行刑者，正如他们在八年前钟爱另一位克格勃中校弗拉季米尔•普京一般？


Would the sybaritic, globe-trotting Lugovoi agree to wear the crown?	这位奢侈逸乐、走遍全球的Lugovoi会同意加冕么？


Running the Kremlin is, after all, a testing job.	毕竟，掌管克里姆林宫是项艰巨的工作。


We have all seen Putin’s face age dramatically over the last eight years.	我们都看到了过去八年的岁月沧桑已深刻地写在普京的脸上。


But Lugovoi’s face, too, has also changed markedly over the last eight months of press conferences.	但Lugovoi的面容在过去八个月来的无数新闻发布会的历练中也有了明显的变化。


Once a wary non-entity, he has grown bolder.	曾经谨慎的无名小卒已经变得更具胆识。


His is the face of Putin’s new Russia, of a smug Russia that is “getting off its knees” and reaching for its gun.	他的面孔代表着普京的新俄罗斯的面貌—一个“正在崛起”并寻求话语权的沾沾自喜的俄罗斯。


The Message from Boston	波士顿的教训


PRINCETON – America has grown up.	普林斯顿—美国成长了。


Public reaction to the Boston Marathon bombings and the identity of the perpetrators reveals a very different nation from the one reflected in the traumatized and occasionally hysterical responses to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001.	公众对波士顿马拉松爆炸案和犯案者身份的反应表明，这个国家与因2001年9月11日恐怖袭击而受到心理创伤、偶尔歇斯底里的国家大不相同了。


The magnitude of the two attacks was, of course, very different – thousands were killed and major national landmarks destroyed in 2001, whereas the Boston bombing killed three people and injured roughly 260.	当然，两起袭击的程度大相径庭——2001年数千人被杀，国家标志也被摧毁，而波士顿的爆炸案致三人死，约260人伤。


Still, it was the first major attack on the United States since 2001, and the contrast between now and then is instructive.	但是，此乃2001年后第一次在美国发生的重大袭击，此时与彼时的对比颇具说明性。


Consider the social-media buzz within minutes of the bombing.	就拿爆炸发生几分钟内社会媒体的强烈反应来说吧。


The New York Post, a tabloid, emitted a stream of sensational reportage claiming that 12 people had been killed and that a Saudi national was “under guard” at a Boston hospital.	小报《纽约邮报》（New York Post）发布了一系列骇人听闻的消息，说12人被杀，一名沙特籍人士在一家波士顿医院“被看护”。


Veteran reporters and columnists immediately countered with questions about the Post’s sources and the lack of confirmation for what it was reporting.	老牌记者和专栏作家马上予以反驳，质疑《纽约邮报》的消息来源，认为它没有确认它正在报道的内容。


Kerri Miller of Minnesota Public Radio tweeted that she had covered the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, which was first reported as a gas explosion, then as an attack by foreign terrorists, and finally as the work of domestic extremists.	明尼苏达公共电台（Minnesota Public Radio）的米勒（Kerri Miller）发推特说，她在1995年报道了俄克拉荷马城爆炸案，一开始该案被当做煤气爆炸案报道，随后又成为外国恐怖主义袭击案，而最后则是国内极端分子干的好事。


This caution and restraint stemmed directly from a collective awareness of the many innocent Muslim-Americans who suffered from Americans’ ignorance and wrath following the 2001 attacks.	如此谨慎和克制的直接原因是美国人集体认识到，2001年袭击后大量无辜的美国穆斯林因为美国人的无知和激愤而受到了不公待遇。


Indeed, equally striking was the number of pundits who suggested that the Boston bombing was homegrown, more similar to the Oklahoma City attack or the mass shooting last December of first graders in Newtown, Connecticut, than to the 2001 plot.	事实上，同样令人震惊的是，大量专家认为波士顿爆炸案是土生土长的美国案件，与俄克拉荷马城袭击或去年12月针对康涅狄格州纽顿一年级学生的大屠杀更相似，而不是和2001年恐怖袭击更相似。


The America of 2013, unlike the America of 2001, is willing to recognize its own pathologies before looking for enemies abroad.	2013年的美国已不是2001年的美国，如今美国人愿意在寻找外部敌人之前先做内省。


Moreover, even amid the shock and grief fueled by images of the bombing and the many victims with shattered, shredded limbs, Americans found at least a little bandwidth to comprehend that bombs are still a feature of daily life in Iraq and Syria.	此外，即使爆炸和受害者支离破碎的身体的画面令人震惊和悲恸，美国人至少可以略微领略一下爆炸仍是家常便饭的伊拉克和叙利亚的感受。


Today’s America is one that recognizes that it is not the world’s only country, and by no means the worst off.	今天的美国明白自己并不是世界上唯一的国家，更不是世界上最惨的国家。


Many commentators remarked on Americans’ resilience, and that of Bostonians in particular.	许多评论家赞叹美国人（特别是波士顿人）的韧劲。


Much like Londoners after the attacks on their public-transport system in July 2005, Boston’s citizens were determined to prove that life goes on.	正如2005年7月公交系统袭击发生后的伦敦人，波士顿市民决心证明，生活还在继续。 下半旗以致哀；


American flags flew at half-mast; President Barack Obama addressed the nation; the country mourned with the families of the victims and with the young athletes who will never run again.	总统奥巴马发表全国讲话； 整个国家为受害者家庭和再也无法奔跑的年轻选手哀悼。


But even amid a massive police manhunt and a citywide lockdown, planners were already focusing on ensuring that next year’s marathon will redeem the tragedy of this one.	但即使在大规模警方搜捕和全市戒严期间，规划者已经将注意力集中在确保用明年的马拉松挽回今年的悲剧上。


Likewise, when it became clear that the bombing suspects, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, were Chechens who had emigrated from the Russian province of Dagestan, the reaction – at least among regular participants in public debate – was far more nuanced than a decade ago.	类似地，当人们确定爆炸嫌疑犯——塔莫兰·萨尔纳耶夫和哲卡·萨尔纳耶夫（Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev）是来自俄罗斯省份达吉斯坦的车臣移民时，人们的反应——至少经常参与公共争论者是如此——比十年前微妙得多。


Back then, Fareed Zakaria’s cover story for Newsweek – entitled “The Politics of Rage: Why Do They Hate Us?” – painted a broad-brush portrait of Muslim youth in the Middle East raging against brutal and oppressive dictatorships funded and supported by the US government.	当时，扎卡利亚（Fareed Zakaria）为《新闻周刊》撰写的封面文章的题目是《愤怒的政治：为什么他们讨厌我们？ 》（The Politics of Rage: Why Do They Hate Us?


Zakaria was right in many ways, but he had to bring his readers up to speed on six decades of history in a few short pages.	），文章以白描的手法展现了中东穆斯林对美国政府出资和支持的倒行逆施的残暴独裁的愤怒。 从很多方面来说，扎卡利亚是对的，但他必须用短短几页的篇幅让读者快速领略六十年的历史。


By contrast, David Remnick, the editor of The New Yorker, weighed in with a piece on the Tsarnaev brothers that opened with Stalin’s banishment of the Chechen people “from their homeland in the northern Caucasus to Central Asia and the Siberian wastes.”	相反，《纽约客》编辑雷姆尼克（David Remnick）在一篇文章中分析了萨尔纳耶夫兄弟，文章开头提到斯大林把车臣人民“从北高加索故乡迁徙到中亚和西伯利亚的不毛之地。


Remnick’s lead-in was intended not to introduce a summary account of the brutal and violent history of the Chechen people, but to frame a detailed account of the specific history of the Tsarnaev family.	”雷姆尼克的引论并不是为了总结车臣人民的野蛮和暴力史，而是为了详细解构萨尔纳耶夫家庭的具体历史。


Remnick included a series of tweets from the younger brother, Dzhokhar, only 19, beginning with a message from March 12, 2012 (“a decade in America already – I want out”). In Remnick’s words, the tweets show “a young man’s thoughts: his jokes, his resentments, his prejudices, his faith, his desires.”	雷姆尼克引用了年仅19岁的弟弟哲卡的多条推特，第一条的日期是2012年3月12日（“来美国已经一年——我想离开”）。 用雷姆尼克的话说，这条推特表明了“一个年轻人的想法：他的吐槽、他的不满、他的偏见、他的信仰、他的渴望。


Even amid Americans’ anger and grief at the senselessness of what the Tsarnaev brothers did, we can see them not as faceless embodiments of Islamic rage, but as individuals, as human – even as sad.	”即使在美国人对萨尔纳耶夫兄弟所作所为的无厘头的愤怒和悲恸中间，我们也可以发现他们并非伊斯兰之怒的千篇一律的化身，而是个体，是人类，甚至是悲伤的人类。


The ability to distinguish individual features from the mass, to reach nuanced judgments, and to control initial impulses of rage and revenge are hallmarks of maturity in societies and people alike.	有能力区分个体特征和群体特征，形成微妙的判断，并控制愤怒和复仇的原始冲动，这些都是社会和人民成熟的标志。


But America has also grown up in another way, learning to choose transparency over secrecy, and to rely on the power of its citizens.	但美国还从另一方面获得了成长，学会了选择透明而不是保密，学会了依赖人民的力量。


After September 11, 2001, the security expert Stephen E. Flynn called on the government to “engage the American people in the enterprise of managing threats to the nation.”	2001年9月11日之后，安全专家福林恩（Stephen E. Flynn）呼吁政府“让美国人民团结起来，一起对付国家威胁。


A decade later, the FBI immediately called on all who attended the Boston Marathon to send photos and videos of the area around the finish line – anything that could help investigators identify the bombers.	”十年后，FBI马上号召所有参与波士顿马拉松的人提供重点线周边区域的照片和视频——只要能够帮助调查者识别投弹者。


The resulting flood of information enabled the authorities to identify the two suspects far sooner than would have been possible had they relied on traditional police methods.	由此引发的信息流让当局能够以极快的速度识别出两名嫌犯，所耗时间远远短于依赖传统警方手段的做法。


The US of 2013 is both more reflective than it was a decade ago and more consciously connected to the world. The result is a citizenry that is less likely to interpret events, even attacks, in simplistic and often counter-productive us-versus-them terms.	2013年的美国比十年前更能反思，也更有意识地与世界相连，结果是其人民不再像以前那样热衷于以简单的、往往会带来反面效果的敌我矛盾解读事件——甚至是袭击事件。


The cancer of violence is all too often found within the US, fed in part by the same inequality, alienation, lack of opportunity, and fervent search for absolute truth that we discern abroad.	暴力的顽疾对于美国来说绝不少见，一部分要归咎于不平等性、疏离感、机会缺失和狂热地追求绝对真理——与我们所认为的外国别无二致。


The brutal repression of Chechnya, violent Islamic extremism, an American cult of violence, immigrants’ dashed dreams, and plenty of other factors still to be uncovered create a complex pattern of risk that is difficult to unravel and even harder to minimize.	野蛮的车臣镇压、暴力的伊斯兰极端主义、美国的暴力崇拜、移民虚幻的梦想，以及其他各种各样的因素仍有待暴露，唯有将它们暴露，它们形成了一个难以解决、更难将之最小化的复杂风险模式。


But seeing it clearly is an important first step.	但清楚地看到这一点是重要的第一步。


The Bourbons of Global Finance	全球金融的波旁王朝


ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN – Today’s International Monetary Fund (and, to a lesser degree, the World Bank) recall Talleyrand’s description of France’s Bourbon kings: it has learned nothing and forgotten nothing.	密歇根，安阿伯尔－当今的国际货币基金组织（世界银行在某种程度上也是如此 ）令人想起塔列朗（Talleyrand）对法国波旁王朝国王们的描述：什么都没有学会，也什么都没忘记。


At a time when rich countries like the United States are running deficits of 12% of GDP because of the global financial meltdown, the IMF has been telling countries like Latvia and Ukraine, which did not start the crisis but have turned to the Fund to help combat it, that they must balance their budgets if they want aid.	当美国这样的富裕国家因为全球金融危机而使其财政赤字达到GDP的12%时，国际货币基金组织却告诉像拉脱维亚和乌克兰这样的国家，如果想得到国际货币基金组织的援助，就必须平衡其国家预算——这些国家还没有陷入经济危机，但是已经向国际货币基金组织请求帮助对抗经济危机了。


Such hypocrisy would be laughable if global economic conditions weren’t so dire that even countries that once swore never again to deal with the IMF have returned to its door, cap in hand.	如果全球经济环境不是如此严峻，就连曾经发誓再也不向国际货币基金组织借款的国家，都恭敬地来到它的门前，那么，这样的伪善就是非常可笑的。


Some leading economists in Argentina justify this reversal by arguing that the world now has an “Obama IMF,” one presumably friendlier and more attuned to local problems than the “Bush Fund.”	阿根廷的一些主要经济学家用论证世界上现在有一个“奥巴马国际货币基金组织”的方式——这个国际货币基金组织可能比“布什国际货币基金组织”更友好，更关注当地问题——来证明这些国家态度转变的正当性。


But, as the IMF programs for Latvia and Ukraine suggest, the main difference may only be a smile.	但是，正如国际货币基金组织在拉脱维亚和乌克兰的项目所表明的那样，“奥巴马国际货币基金组织”和“布什国际货币基金组织”间的主要区别，不值一提。


To be sure, IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn recently called for a global fiscal response to the worsening recession. But will the Fund now abandon its long-held emphasis on government cutbacks, monetary contraction, and overall austerity, policies that – in the opinion of many development economists – do considerably more harm than good?	虽然，国际货币基金组织主席多米尼克•斯特劳斯-卡恩（Dominique Strauss-Kahn）在最近呼吁世界各国对日益恶化的经济衰退作出财政回应，但是，国际货币基金组织现在会抛弃其长期强调的削减政府开支、紧缩银根以及全面紧缩政策吗？


Are the IMF and the World Bank actually willing to reconsider their failed policies?	这些政策——根据许多发展经济学家的观点——弊远远大于利。 国际货币基金组织和世界银行真的愿意重新思考它们的失败的政策吗？


In recent years, lending by both institutions contracted dramatically, even though they have increasingly become the exclusive lenders to the world’s poorest countries.	最近几年，虽然国际货币基金组织和世界银行逐渐成为世界上最贫穷国家的唯一贷款人，但是，它们的贷款数量却都在急剧减少。


In 2005, Argentina and Brazil were the first of the countries that previously denounced the IMF’s neo-liberal agenda to begin repaying their loans.	2005年，阿根廷和巴西成为曾谴责过国际货币基金组织的新自由主义政策的国家中，最先开始偿还国际货币基金组织贷款的国家。


Repayments followed from other large debtors, including Indonesia, the Philippines, Serbia, and Turkey.	在此之后，包括印尼、菲律宾、塞尔维亚和土耳其在内的大借款人，也开始偿还它们向国际货币基金组织的借款了。


Indeed, the IMF’s outstanding general resource account (GRA) credits to middle-income developing countries fell by an unprecedented 91% from 2002 to 2007, as richer developing countries gained access to sources of financing that were free of the Fund’s conditionality.	事实上，从2002年到2007年，当富裕发展中国家获得了国际货币基金组织无限制条件的资金来源时，国际货币基金组织借给中等收入发展中国家的未偿付公共资源账户(GRA)贷款却前所未有地减少了91％。


But poorer countries, for which international capital markets remain off limits, have no alternative but to rely on the World Bank and IMF.	但是，对无法进入国际资本市场的贫穷国家来说，它们没有选择，只能依靠世界银行和国际货币基金组织贷款来获得资金。


In September 2007, a year before warning signs gave way to a full-blown financial meltdown, Strauss-Kahn himself suggested that the IMF was in a “crisis of identity.”	2007年9月份，在世界金融危机从出现预警信号到变成完全的金融危机的前一年��斯特劳斯-卡恩自己暗示国际货币基金组织处于“身份危机”之中。


Indeed, the unprecedented decline in GRA lending, the IMF’s main source of income, forced the Fund to announce a $100 million cost-cutting plan in April 2008.	事实上，作为国际货币基金组织主要收入来源的公共资源账户(GRA)贷款的空前下降，迫使国际货币基金组织在2008年4月份宣布了一项1亿美元的支出削减计划。


Similar financial pressures affected the World Bank, with its main source of income, IBRD lending, down 40% in 2007 from its late-1990’s levels.	世界银行也受到了类似的金融压力的影响，其主要收入来源国际复兴开放银行贷款（IBRD），在2007年 比20世纪90年代后期减少了40%。


But the world’s pain has been these institutions’ gain.	但是，世界上有些国家的痛苦却成了国际货币基金组织和世界银行的机会。


Since the crisis went global last autumn, the IMF has had countries parading to its door.	自从去年秋天金融危机席卷全球之后，要求国际货币基金组织提供贷款的国家在它的门口排起了长队。


Between November 5, 2008 and January 12, 2009, the Fund committed nearly $50 billion to seven countries (Hungary, Ukraine, Iceland, Pakistan, Latvia, Serbia, and Belarus).	2008年11月5日至2009年1月12日间，国际货币基金组织承诺向7个国家（它们是匈牙利、乌克兰、冰岛、巴基斯坦、拉脱维亚、塞尔维亚和白俄罗斯）提供将近500亿美元的贷款。


The World Bank, too, has recently been resurrected in places like Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru, with loans to that region of Latin America up four-fold year on year since last September, reaching nearly $3 billion.	世界银行也在最近再次开始在像厄瓜多尔、玻利维亚以及秘鲁这样的地方开展贷款活动，自去年9月份以来，它向拉丁美洲的这部分地区提供的贷款与去年同期相比，增加了四倍，达到近30亿美元。


Unfortunately, for both institutions, such countries’ growing demand for financing merely means business as usual.	不幸的是，对国际货币基金组织和世界银行来说，这些国家日益增长的资金需求仅仅意味着一切如常。


Consider the recent standby arrangement with Latvia, whose conditions include a massive 25% cut in public-sector wages, a similar reduction in government expenditures, and a huge tax increase.	想想国际货币基金组织最近和拉脱维亚的备用贷款安排（standby arrangement）——这一安排的条件包括拉脱维亚大幅削减25％的公共部门薪水、削减同样幅度的政府开支以及大量增加税收——就知道为什么是这样的了。


Ukraine’s government, moreover, was told to balance its budget by massively slashing state pensions.	而且，国际货币基金组织还要求乌克兰政府通过大幅减少国家养老金来平衡国家预算。


Only when conditions in the country deteriorated even more in the wake of the Fund holding back on the second tranche of its loan did the IMF agree to loosen its conditions.  However in Latvia, the IMF has continued to demand austerity even in the wake of plummeting growth and rising unemployment which have lead to riots and political instability.	国际货币基金组织直到因它暂停对乌克兰的第二批贷款，而使乌克兰的状况进一步恶化时，才同意放松对乌克兰的贷款条件。 但是，在拉脱维亚，即使经济增长急剧下降，失业率不断上升，并因此而引起暴乱和政治动荡，国际货币基金组织仍然继续要求拉脱维亚政府紧缩开支。


Recent World Bank loans are similarly conditioned, in part, on “fiscal discipline.”	最近，世界银行贷款的“财政纪律”在某种程度上也设置了类似的条件。


Insistence on such policies at a time when the US and most of the rest of the rich world are following virtually the opposite economic strategy indicates the need for fundamental rethinking of what actually generates growth and development.	国际货币基金组织和世界银行在美国和大部分富裕国家都在实行扩张性的经济策略时，却坚持要求借款国家实行紧缩政策，表明人们有必要从根本上对什么会真地带来增长和发展进行重新思考。


There is a growing body of alternative ideas in this area –including work by the Nobel laureates Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman – which the IMF and the World Bank should consider.	在这一领域有越来越多的不同观点——其中包括诺贝尔奖获得者约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨（Joseph Stiglitz）和保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）的研究——对这些观点，国际货币基金组织和世界银行应该加以考虑。


More importantly, American control has meant that throughout their history these institutions have been used as an adjunct of US foreign policy.	更重要的是，美国对国际货币基金组织和世界银行的控制，意味着这两个机构一直都被美国作为其外交政策的附属物。


Given the centrality of orthodox stalwarts like Larry Summers and Timothy Geithner in the Obama administration, the prospect of serious reform appears dim.	考虑到拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）和蒂摩西·盖特纳（Timothy Geithner）这样的保守政策支持者都在奥巴马政府中担任职务，国际货币基金组织和世界银行进行认真改革的前景很黯淡。


Summers was a key architect of neo-liberal policies while at the World Bank and the US Treasury during the Clinton administration, and Geithner is a former senior IMF official.	而且，萨默斯在世界银行和克林顿政府时期的美国财政部任职期间，是新自由主义政策的主要设计者，而盖特纳曾任国际货币基金组织高级官员。


Both men are likely to support the prevailing global double standard, which allows rich countries to use fiscal expansion in the face of recession, while forcing poor countries into greater austerity.	拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）和蒂摩西·盖特纳（Timothy Geithner）都可能会支持现在盛行的国际双重标准，这一标准允许富裕国家在面临衰退时实行扩张性的财政政策，却迫使贫穷国家进一步紧缩开支。


But the Obama administration can still help – for example, by asking the Federal Reserve to expand the currency swap arrangements that it recently offered to Singapore, South Korea, and Brazil to other developing countries.	但是，奥巴马政府对这样的现状仍然能所有作为——例如，要求美联储将其最近提供给新加坡、韩国和巴西的货币互换协议对象扩大到其他发展中国家。


That way, the world’s poor could at least avoid the heavy-handed conditionality imposed by the IMF and World Bank.	通过这种方式，世界上的贫穷国家至少可以避免由国际货币基金组织和世界银行施加给它们的严格的贷款条件。


The Brain-Drain Panic Returns	“人才流失”担忧卷土重来


NEW YORK – While developed countries are angst-ridden over mostly illegal immigration by unskilled workers from developing countries, a different set of concerns has surfaced in Africa, in particular, over the legal outflow of skilled, and even more importantly, highly skilled, people to developed countries.	纽约—发达国家正在为来自发展中国家的无技能非法移民而焦虑，但非洲国家却在面临另一种担忧，即有技能（甚至高技能）公民合法移民至发达国家。


This outflow is supposedly a new and damaging “brain drain,” with rich countries actively luring away needed skills from poor countries.	这种流出被认为是具有伤害性的新型“人才外流”，即发达国家积极地吸取贫穷国家所急需的技能。


This fear is misplaced.	这一担忧可谓使错了力。


At the outset, we have to distinguish between “need” and “demand.”	从一开始，我们就应该区分“需要”和“需求”。


Yes, many African countries need skills.	诚然，众多非中国家需要技能。


But they are unable to absorb them, owing to several factors associated with economic backwardness.	但因为诸多与经济落后有关的因素，它们无法吸收这些技能。


In India in the 1950’s and 1960’s – a time when many professionals were emigrating – working conditions were deplorable.	印度在20世纪五六十年代经历过大量专业人员的外流，当时，印度的工作环境相当恶劣。


Bureaucrats decided whether we could go abroad for conferences.	官僚决定着我们是否可以出国参加会议。


Heads of departments carried inordinate power.	行政部门头脑掌握着无上的权力。


So, no surprise, many of us left.	因此，毫不奇怪，我们当中有许多人决定离开。


We Hindus may believe in an infinity of lifetimes, but we maximize our welfare in this one, just like everyone else.	我们印度人信仰“生也无涯”，但与其他人 一样，我们也会设法最大化这辈子的财富。


Besides, simply holding people back, even if feasible, would do little for their countries.	况且，仅仅把人留住，即使成功了也对国家助益有限。


The “brain” is not a static concept.	“人才”并不是静态的概念。


Trapped in Kinshasa, under appalling conditions, the brain will drain away in less time than it takes to get to New York.	身处金沙萨压抑的环境中，人才流失会比让他们前往纽约更快。


Moreover, keeping people at home is easier said than done.	此外，把人留在国内说起来容易做起来难。


In many poor countries, except those like India and South Korea, which have now developed superb educational institutions, the brightest citizens receive their education abroad.	在许多贫穷国家（印度和韩国除外，它们已经发展起了优秀的教育制度），最聪明的公民往往都是在国外接受的教育。


The challenge, then, is to prevent them from staying there and settling down.	于是，挑战就变成了如何防止他们留在国外，在国外定居。


But, in any event, emigration restrictions today would violate a human right enshrined in current international treaties.	但是，无论如何，在今天，移民限制违反了被国际法视为至高无上的人权。


But would immigration restrictions work instead, as proposed by some developed-country organizations, which worry about the “brain drain”?	但是，一些担心“人才流失”的发达国家组织所实施的限制外来移民政策是否有效呢？


Here, human-rights concerns pose serious difficulties.	在这方面，人权方面的顾虑相当棘手。


Could we really say to a Ghanaian doctor that she must return to her country while an immigrant Russian doctor is allowed to settle down and start a new life?	我们真的可以对加纳博士说，你必须返回你的国家，而一转身又允许俄罗斯博士定居开始新生活吗？


This is likely to run afoul of anti-discrimination principles and constitutional provisions in countries like the United States.	在美国等国家，这可能有违反歧视原则和宪法相关规定。


The proper response to the outflow of skilled manpower from poor countries, especially those in Africa, is to be found in a different direction.	应对贫穷国家（特别是非洲国家）技能人力外流的合理措施应该另辟蹊径。


Given that outflows of skilled workers cannot be restricted – and, indeed, should not be – we must devise institutional mechanisms to work with it.	技能工人的外流是不能加以限制的，事实上，也不应该加以限制，因此我们必须设计能合理处理这一现象的国际机制。


This means adopting a “diaspora” model, which implies four policy proposals.	这意味着采取一种“流散犹太人”的模式，其中包括四大政策方案。


First, stop crying over the fact that the diaspora is not returning home. Instead, nurture the loyalty of professionals settling abroad, so that they assist their home countries in a variety of ways.	首先，停止抱怨外流人才不回国的现象，而代之以培育海外专业人士侨民的忠诚度，让他们在诸多方面为祖国效力。


Thus, they may be offered voting rights.	因此，他们应该被授予选举权。


Restrictions on investment and land purchases can be dropped.	投资和购置土地方面的限制也可以解除。


And immigration experts like me have proposed since the 1970’s that schemes be developed to enable the academic diaspora to run workshops aimed at bringing teachers up to the best international standards.	而移民专家（比如我）从20世纪70年代便开始建议应该发展相应的机制方便学术人才回国举办培训班，培养本土符合国际最高标准的师资。


Second, while the diaspora should be integrated through more rights, its members also ought to accept obligations that put them on an equal footing with those who remain behind.	其次，在用更多的权利团结外流人才的同时，也应该让他们接受相应的义务，使他们和留在国内者处于平等地位。


I suggested in the 1970’s that a tax be levied on citizens abroad.	我在20世纪70年代时曾建议对侨民征税。


Known as the “Bhagwati Tax,” it is of course “the American way”: US citizens and permanent residents abroad, like those at home, must pay federal taxes.	这一“巴格瓦蒂税”显然是相当“美国”的：在外永久定居的美国公民与国内公民一样，都必须缴纳联邦税。


Third, because skills are necessary for nearly all activities in most of Africa, here and now, we need to organize ways to supply such skills to these countries.	第三，在非洲，几乎所有领域的活动都急需技能，因此我们需要组织向这些国家供给所需技能的渠道。


I have long argued that, because many in rich countries are retiring while still in sound health, and because altruism increases with age, we could organize a Grey Peace Corps of senior citizens to share their skills in countries whose own trained professionals prefer to settle abroad.	我很早就指出，发达国家有大量高技能人才退休时身体健康，精神矍铄，而且人年纪越大，越有助人为乐的精神，因此我们可以组织一支由高端人才组成的“灰色和平部队”（Grey Peace Corps），与自身训练有素的专业人士更喜欢移民海外的国家分享技能。


Finally, foreign aid should be used to expand training massively for Africans in all the essential fields in rich countries like the US, the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands.	最后，对于像美国、英国、法国和荷兰这样的发达国家，应该把对外援助用于大规模扩大在各基本领域非洲人培训。


They would add to the diaspora, while the Grey Peace Corps would help to fill current needs.	这些非洲人会加入外流人才行列，而灰色和平部队能填补当前需要。


When development has taken off, and conditions have improved sufficiently to attract people back to their homelands, the hugely increased diaspora would indeed return, as they have done in India, South Korea, and China.	当非洲国家发展起来之后，国内状况会得到足够的改善，吸引人才流回祖国，数量大增的流失人才的确实是会回去的，印度、韩国和中国就是明证。


Together, these policies would benefit Africa both immediately and in the long run.	这四大政策的综合效果将使非洲在即期和长期均获得巨大的好处。


Sentimental handwringing over the “brain drain,” and foolish attempts at restricting people’s mobility, will not.	对“人才流失”怨天尤人以及愚蠢地限制人口流动是不会有效果的。


What the World Needs from the BRICS	世界需要金砖国家什么


CAMBRIDGE – In 2001, Goldman Sachs’ Jim O’Neill famously coined the term BRIC to characterize the world’s four largest developing economies – Brazil, Russia, India, and China.	美国剑桥—2001年，高盛的吉姆·奥尼尔（Jim O’Neil）提出了著名的金砖四国（BRIC）一词来形容世界上最大的四个发展中经济体——巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国。


But, more than a decade later, just about the only thing that these countries have in common is that they are the only economies ranked among the world’s 15 largest (adjusted for purchasing power) that are not members of the OECD.	但是，十多年以后，这四个国家的唯一共同点是它们是仅有的位列世界前15大经济体（经购买力平价调整）但又不属于经合组织成员的国家。


The four countries have very different economic structures: Russia and Brazil rely on commodities, India on services, and China on manufacturing.	这四个国家的经济结构大相径庭：俄罗斯和巴西依赖商品，印度依赖服务，中国依赖制造。


Brazil and India are democracies, while China and Russia are decidedly not.	巴西和印度是民主国家，中国和俄罗斯肯定不是。


And, as Joseph Nye has written, Russia is a superpower in decline, while China and (less markedly) the others are on the rise.	此外，正如约瑟夫·奈（Joseph Nye）所指出的，俄罗斯是衰落的超级大国，而中国和其他两国（略为不如）则处于崛起之势。


Yet, in a strange case of life imitating fantasy, BRICS – the original four countries, now joined by South Africa – have formed a grouping of their own with regular meetings and policy initiatives.	但是，金砖国家——最初四国在加上南非——做了一个有趣的模仿，它们召开自己的定期会议，制定自己的政策方案，形成了一个集团。


Their most ambitious effort to date is the establishment of a development bank.	迄今未知，它们最雄心勃勃的努力是成立一家开发银行。


At their meeting in Durban in March, the five countries’ leaders announced that their “New Development Bank” will focus on infrastructure investment in developing countries, which, they said, was constrained by “insufficient long-term financing and foreign direct investment.”	在3月的德班会晤中，五国领导人宣布它们的“新开发银行”将专注于受约束于“产期融资和外国直接投资不足”的发展中国家基础设施投资。


They pledged to make an initial capital contribution to the bank that would be “substantial and sufficient for the bank to be effective in financing infrastructure.”	它们承诺将注入“足以让该银行有效地为基础设施提供融资的大量资本”。


A second initiative announced in Durban is the creation of a $100 billion contingent reserve facility to deal with “short-term liquidity pressures.”	在德班宣布的第二个计划是建立一个1000亿美元的应急储备基金以应对“短期流动性压力”。


It can be cause only for celebration that the world’s largest developing economies are regularly talking to each other and establishing common initiatives.	世界最大发展中经济体定期会晤并成立共同项目，这值得庆祝。


Nonetheless, it is disappointing that they have chosen to focus on infrastructure finance as their first major area of collaboration.	尽管如此，它们选择关注基础设施融资作为主要合作领域令人失望。


This approach represents a 1950’s view of economic development, which has long been superseded by a more variegated perspective that recognizes a multiplicity of constraints – everything from poor governance to market failures – of varying importance in different countries.	这一看法代表着20世纪50年代的经济发展观，它早已被更多样化的视角所取代。 现在的经济发展观关注约束的多重性——从贫困治理到市场失灵无所不包——和对不同国家的不同重要性。


One might even say that today’s global economy suffers from too much, rather than too little, cross-border finance.	有人甚至认为，当今全球经济经受着太多而不是太少的跨境金融。


What the world needs from the BRICS is not another development bank, but greater leadership on today’s great global issues.	世界需要金砖国家的不是新的开发银行，而是对当今重大问题的更大的领导力。


The BRICS countries are home to around half of the world’s population and the bulk of unexploited economic potential.	金砖国家拥有世界近一半人口和大部分未开发经济潜力。


If the international community fails to confront its most serious challenges – from the need for a sound global economic architecture to addressing climate change – they are the ones that will pay the highest price.	如果国际社会不能应对最严重的挑战——从扎实的全球经济结构到解决气候变化问题——那么这五个国���将是为此付出代价最高的国家。


Yet these countries have so far played a rather unimaginative and timid role in international forums such as the G-20 or the World Trade Organization.	但到目前为止，这些国家在G20和世贸组织等国际舞台上既无足轻重，又畏首畏尾。


When they have asserted themselves, it has been largely in pursuit of narrow national interests.	在表达自己意愿时，它们往往追求狭隘的国家利益。


Do they really have nothing new to offer?	它们真的拿不出新东西吗？