How can we make countries more competitive, growth more sustainable and inclusive, and genders more equal?	我们如何让国家更有竞争力，让增长更加可持续和包容，让性别更加平等？


One way is to have a correct theory of the relationship between actions and outcomes and then to implement actions that achieve our goals.	一个办法是拥有一套关于行动和结果之间的关系的正确的理论，然后实施实现我们的目标的行动。


But, in most of the situations we face, we lack such a theory, or if we have one, we are not sure that it is correct.	但是，在我们所面临的大部分情况里，我们缺少这样的理论，或者虽然有，但不确定它是否正确。


So what can we do?	那么，我们可以如何做？


Should we postpone action until we learn about what works?	我们应该暂停行动，直到学习到什么行动能起作用吗？


But how will we learn if we do not act?	但如果我们不行动，我们如何学习？


And if we act, how can we learn whether we did the right thing?	如果我们行动，我们如何了解我们是否做了正确的事情？


New advances in machine learning and biological anthropology are shedding light on how learning happens and what makes a learning process successful.	机器学习和生物人类学方面的新进展能让我们一窥学习如何发生以及如何做出成功的学习过程。


But, while theories are important, most of what we learn does not depend on them.	但是，理论固然重要，但我们学习的大部分东西并不取决于它们。


For example, there may be a theory of what makes a cat a cat, but that is not how toddlers learn to recognize them.	比如，也许有一种关于猫怎样成为猫的理论，但这绝非幼儿学习辨别猫的方法。


As Harvard’s Leslie Valiant argues in his 2013 book, we learn the concept of “catness” in a theory-less way by inferring it from a set of pictures of animals that are appropriately labeled as either cats or non-cats.	哈佛大学的莱斯利·瓦利安特（Leslie Valiant）在他2013的书中指出，我们学习“猫性”的概念是以一种无理论（theory-less）方法，通过从一组正确地标明“猫”和“非猫”的动物图片中推断而得。


And the more examples we see, the more we become “probably, approximately correct.”	我们看到的例子越多，我们就越“可能、近似地正确”。


We learn to recognize the spoken language without knowledge of linguistics, and voice-recognition software uses a theory-less learning algorithm called a “hidden Markov chain” on a set of audios and their texts, rather than by using linguistics, as Ray Kurzweil tells us in his book How to Create a Mind.	我们学习识别口语而不需要语言学知识，声音识别软件也是针对一组音频和它们的文本使用一种被称为“隐马尔科夫链”的无理论学习算法，而不是使用语言学。 雷·科尔兹维尔（Ray Kurzweil）在他的书《如何创造思维》（How to Create a Mind）中说明了这一点。


To the chagrin of many of us academics, theory is often dispensable.	让许多学者失望的是，理论常常是可有可无的。


Biological evolution is also based on a theory-less algorithm, one that learns which genotypes generate better-adapted individuals without having a theory of which changes in the genome will improve performance.	生物演化也是基于无理论的算法，这种算法学习那些遗传型产生更适应的个体，但它并没有关于哪些基因组的变化能改善表现的理论。


It just uses random variation and selection of the fittest, over and over again.	它只是反复使用随机变异和适者生存。


While biological evolution through sexual reproduction requires generations, we can learn from each other much more quickly through cultural evolution, explaining why humans have made so much progress.	通过有性生殖的生物演化需要多代，但我们可以以快得多的速度通过文化演化彼此学习，这解释了人类为何取得了如此多的成就。


According to Robert Boyd, Peter Richerson, and Joseph Henrich, our ability to imitate is at the core of our success as a species.	据罗伯特·博伊德、彼得·里切森（Robert Boyd, Peter Richerson）和约瑟夫·亨里克（Joseph Henrich）的研究，我们的模仿能力是我们成为成功物种的核心关键。


It is what makes cultural evolution possible, cumulative, and powerful.	模仿能力让文化演化成为可能、逐渐积累、变得强大。


It is what allows us to learn from others and hence to make progress much faster than if we were to learn by ourselves.	模仿能力让我们彼此学习，因此能够以远快于只能靠自己学习的速度进步。


In addition, because imitation, like genetic replication, is not perfect, we accidentally discover other ways of doing the same thing (or even new and better things).	此外，由于模仿就像基因复制，它是不完美的，因此我们偶尔也要发现不同的方法来做同样的事物（甚至发现更新更好的事物）。


We humans are wired to imitate others, and we especially prefer to imitate the most successful among us.	人类天生能够模仿其他人，并且我们也特别喜欢模仿周边最成功的人。


This makes evolutionary sense, as the features of the successful are more likely to be related to their success than those of others.	这具有演化意义，因为成功者的特征与他们的成功之间的关系要大于其他人的特征。


But this may lead to errors when what we imitate is unrelated to success.	但当我们的模仿与成功不相关时，这样会导致错误。


Advertising has exploited this weakness in our wiring, making us think that if George Clooney is cool and wears something, maybe we can be cool by wearing it, too.	广告就利用了我们天性中的这一弱点，让我们认为既然乔治·克鲁尼（George Clooney）穿某件衣服很酷，那么我们穿上它肯定也很酷。


More constructively, the business world uses imitation through the practice of benchmarking, whereby companies share performance information so that they can all learn what is achievable and whom to try to imitate, thus facilitating the identification of “best practices.”	更有建设性的是，商业界通过基准比较（benchmarking）实践使用模仿，从而公司之间共享表现信息，让它们都可以学习可以实现什么和模仿谁，进而促进识别“最佳实践”。


To improve, you can start by imitating what successful companies do, without a good theory of why.	要想进步，你可以从模仿成功公司的所作所为开始，而不需要关于为什么会这样的理论。


Benchmarking has been moving to the policy arena, including issues such as sustainable development, the business environment, competitiveness, gender parity, and, more recently, inclusive growth.	基准比较正在挺进政策界，包括可持续发展、商业环境、竞争力、性别平等a以及最近的包容性增长。


Some of these applications create good measures of performance, allowing users to assess outcomes and track progress.	这些应用中有一些创造了很好的表现衡量指标，让使用者能够评估结果、追踪进步。


Good examples of these benchmarking exercises are the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index or the United Nations’ Human Development Index.	这些基准比较的上佳例子包括世界经济论坛的全球性别差距指数和联合国的人类发展指数。


They are theory-less in the sense that they do not tell you how to improve performance; but they do tell you if you did improve – that is, they inform about changes in “fitness.”	它们都是无理论的，因为它们兵不告诉���如何改善表现； 但它们确实告诉了你是否做出了改善——也就是说，它们带来了关于“适合”的变化的信息。


Other indicators, in my view, confuse measures of performance with measures of hypothetical causes of performance.	在我看来，另一些指标混淆了表现衡量指标和假想的表现原因衡量指标。


They confuse the “what” and the “how,” and they inappropriately put both in the index.	它们混淆了“什么”和“如何”，不恰当地将两者都纳入了指数。


They attempt to be more theory-driven than our knowledge allows.	它们尝试变得更受理论推动，但这超出了我们的知识的允许范围。


Two examples of this are the WEF’s Global Competitiveness Index and its new Inclusive Growth and Development Index.	这方面的两个例子是世界经济论坛的全球竞争力指数和新的包容性增长和发展指数。


For example, competitiveness has to do with the ability to increase market share without sacrificing margins or lowering wages, something that reflects superior productivity.	比如，竞争力事关在不牺牲利润或降低工资的情况下增加市场份额的能力，它反映了高超的生产率。


The inclusiveness of growth has to do with the disparities of income and growth across different regions and social groups.	增长的包容性事关不同地区和社会群体收入和增长的差异。


But this is not what these indexes really measure.	但这些并非两个指数真正衡量的东西。


Instead, the indexes include variables – what they refer to as the “policy space” – that are supposed to cause either competitiveness or inclusive growth.	相反，这两个指数包含应该引起竞争力或包容性增长的变量——它们称之为“政策空间”。


And the authors do not even check whether they do.	指数作者甚至没有检查是否如此。


(In the case of competitiveness, my co-authors and I have found that they don’t.)	（在竞争力指数的例子中，我的合作者和我发现并非如此。 ）


Confusing “what” and “how” is counterproductive.	混淆“什么”和“如何”将适得其反。


It has led country after country, including Colombia, Mexico, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia, to try to improve their competitiveness ranking by working on things that are in the index but that do not really improve their performance.	这导致很多国家，包括哥伦比亚、墨西哥、摩洛哥和沙特阿拉伯，试图通过致力于指数中包含，但并不能真正改善其表现的事物改善它们的竞争力排名。


And they are late in finding out, because they do improve their ranking in the index.	而它们发现这一点已经太迟了，因为它们确实改善了在指数中的排名。


We do not really know what could make growth more inclusive, countries more competitive, and development more sustainable in each country and region; and we should not pretend that we do.	我们并不真正知道什么能够让增长更加包容，让国家更具竞争力，让各个地区和国家的发展更加可持续； 并且我们也不应该装作我们知道。


We can help the world make progress by measuring the outcomes we care about, facilitating imitation and tracking performance.	我们可以通过衡量我们关心的结果、促进模仿和追踪表现来帮助世界进步。


But confusing means and ends will have us all dressing like George Clooney and wondering why we do not really feel all that cool.	但混淆手段和目的将让我们东施效颦，穿着克鲁尼同款仍然奇怪为什么没有感到酷。


Can Lebanon Escape the Resource Curse?	黎巴嫩能否逃脱资源魔咒？


BEIRUT – After two and a half years without a president, Lebanon’s Parliament has elected Michel Aoun to the post.	贝鲁特——在总统之位空缺两年半之后，黎巴嫩议会选举米歇尔·奥恩担任这一职务。


Now, Lebanon can turn its attention to oil and gas production, with policymakers’ expectations running high – verging on irrational exuberance – that an energy windfall will jumpstart the country’s economy, which has suffered from poor political and economic governance and the spillover effects from Syria’s civil war.	现在，黎巴嫩终于可以把注意力转向石油和天然气生产，该产业担负着决策者很高的期望——甚至接近于非理性繁荣——希望能源暴利能够启动该国经济，之前经济发展一直受到政治和经济治理不善以及叙利亚内战溢出效应的困扰。


Lebanon’s potential hydrocarbon wealth could indeed transform the country, as well as providing a model for other Middle Eastern energy producers to follow.	黎巴嫩潜在的碳氢化合物财富的确可以协助这个国家完成转型，同时为中东其他能源生产国提供一种模式用于参照。


But policymakers must be mindful of four major risks.	决策者必须注意四大风险。


For starters, oil and gas prices are volatile, and fossil fuels in general have an uncertain future.	首先，石油和天然气价格极不稳定，而且化石燃料总的来讲未来不确定性很高。


Oil and gas prices have declined by some 60% since June 2014, and it is unlikely that they will recover over the medium term.	2014年6月以来石油和天然气价格已经跌去了约60%，而且中期恢复的希望非常渺茫。


We are in the age of oil’s “new normal,” defined by plentiful alternative energy sources.	我们已经进入石油“新常态”时代，这个时代的特点是各种各样丰富的替代能源共存。


Second, the size of Lebanon’s recoverable energy reserves is uncertain.	其次，黎巴嫩可采能源储量规模不确定。


Equally important, even under the most optimistic scenarios, the country’s capacity to manage oil and gas extraction, production, and distribution is uncertain as well.	同样重要的是，即使在最乐观的情况下，该国管理油气开采、生产和销售的能力也具有不确定性。


Third, ongoing territorial disputes in the region – and the absence of agreed maritime borders with Cyprus, Israel, and Syria – creates legal uncertainty about who owns and may exploit certain oil and gas blocks.	第三，该地区长期持续的地区争端——以及与塞浦路斯、以色列和叙利亚尚未确定协商一致的海上边界——造成了某些天然气和石油板块的拥有和开发者不确定。


Fourth, Lebanon’s leaders must deal with its dysfunctional politics and dismal governance, which are likely to frustrate any attempt to manage its natural resources transparently and sustainably.	第四，黎巴嫩领导人必须解决其混乱的政治环境和令人失望的治理，否则将影响任何透明和可持续的管理其自然资源的企图。


So, can Lebanon escape the curse of the “devil’s excrement” that has afflicted many of its Middle Eastern neighbors?	那么，黎巴嫩能否打破困扰其诸多中东邻国的“魔鬼粪便”的诅咒？


The International Monetary Fund’s estimate of Lebanon’s potential oil and gas revenues optimistically assumes that production will start in 2021, reach full capacity by 2036, and continue until 2056.	国际货币基金组织对黎巴嫩潜在石油和天然气收入的估计乐观地认为油气生产将于2021年开始，到2036年实现满负荷，并一直持续到2056年左右。


In this scenario, once production starts, resource revenues would constitute about 2.8% of Lebanon’s non-oil GDP, and would account for about 9% of government revenues at peak production, before gradually declining.	在这种情况下，一旦生产开始，资源收入就会占到黎巴嫩非石油国内生产总值的约2. 8%，并在生产高峰期达到政府收入的9%，之后才会逐渐萎缩。


But even if oil and gas blocks are auctioned off almost immediately, in 2017, and then successfully explored, the resulting revenues would not arrive until 2022 at the earliest.	但即使石油和天然气田几乎在2017年立即完成拍卖，而后成功得到开发，由此所产生的收入最早也要到2022年才会实际抵达。


Manna from heaven is not about to fall on Lebanon.	天降横财的美梦不会在黎巴嫩变成现实。


Meanwhile, Lebanon’s new leadership must address the government’s dismal fiscal predicament, including a 2016 budget deficit amounting to 8.1% of GDP and government debt totaling 144% of GDP – one of the highest public-debt ratios in the world.	此外，黎巴嫩新领导层必须解决政府令人失望的财政困境，包括2016年预算赤字占国内生产总值的8. 1%和政府债务总额占国内生产总值的144%——这也是全世界最高的公共债务比例之一。


This means that Lebanon must undergo strong fiscal adjustments sooner, rather than later, and that any future oil and gas revenues will have to be heavily discounted.	这意味着黎巴嫩早晚必须进行强有力的财政调整，而且任何未来��石油和天然气收入都将大打折扣。


But Lebanon’s governance is the more critical issue, because the country must now build a foundation to manage its fossil-fuel wealth properly.	但黎巴嫩治理才是最关键问题，因为该国必须建立管理化石燃料财富的牢固基础。


The main lesson from other resource-rich countries is that, in the absence of good governance – strong institutions, the rule of law, effective regulations – Lebanon’s energy windfall will likely lead to more corruption, as special interests and politicians try to capture the rents for themselves.	来自其他资源丰富国家的主要教训是，在缺乏合理执政的情况下——包括强有力的制度、法治原则、有效监管——黎巴嫩的能源暴利有可能导致更多腐败，因为特殊利益集团和政客会竭尽全力为自己寻租。


With Lebanese politics persistently in a quagmire, the new leadership must establish a sound fiscal regime and a robust governance framework to ensure transparency in energy exploitation and production, fiscal sustainability, and intergenerational equity.	由于黎巴嫩政治一直身处困境，新领导层必须建立健全的财政制度和稳健的管理框架，才能确保能源开发及生产、财政可持续发展和代际公平等领域的透明度。


It can do so if it follows the right roadmap.	如果采用正确的路线，新领导层可以实现上述目标。


First, to guarantee that Lebanon’s natural resources are prudently managed, the government should formally join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.	首先，为确保黎巴嫩的自然资源得到审慎管理，政府应正式加入采掘业透明度行动。 采掘业透明度行动要求政府机构和企业披露碳氢化合物开采和生产的相关信息。


The EITI would require government agencies and companies to disclose information relating to hydrocarbon extraction and production.	其中包括合同和许可证； 有关油气地块——以及勘探和生产权——如何拍卖和授权的详细资料；


This would include contracts and licenses; details about how blocks – and exploration and production rights – are auctioned and awarded; revenue figures, to ensure that companies comply with the “Publish What You Pay” principle; environmental-impact studies (offshore and onshore); and reports on how the government allocates its revenues.	公布收入数字，以确保企业遵守“公布付款数额”的原则； 环境影响研究（包括近海和陆上）；


Second, Lebanon should formally adopt the Natural Resource Charter.	其次，黎巴嫩应正式通过自然资源宪章。


The Charter’s 12 precepts to guide stakeholders’ decision-making should be integrated into relevant legislation and regulations by the Lebanese government, Parliament, applicable regulatory agencies, and civil-society actors such as the Lebanon Oil and Gas Initiative.	黎巴嫩政府、议会、相关监管机构和黎巴嫩石油及天然气计划等民间团体应该将宪章有关指导利益相关者决策的12条规则写入相关的立法方案和规章。


Third, Lebanon should establish an independent energy regulator, by making the Lebanese Petroleum Administration independent from the Ministry of Energy and Water and widen its mandate to manage Lebanon’s natural resources.	第三，黎巴嫩应建立独立的能源监管机构，具体办法是让黎巴嫩石油管理局脱离能源及水资源部，并扩大管理局权限，以使其完成黎巴嫩自然资源的管理任务。


Separation and independence from the ministry is needed to protect natural-resource management and decision-making from political interference.	要想保护自然资源管理和决策不受政治干扰，让石油管理局脱离并独立于能源及水资源部是一项必要的举措。


Finally, Lebanon should adopt a legal framework for setting long-term constraints on fiscal policy.	最后，黎巴嫩应建立制定财政政策长期限制的法律框架。


In particular, government expenditure should be determined by an estimate of permanent income (including the sustainable contribution from resource revenues), while cyclical revenue would be saved in a sovereign-wealth fund. Similar to Chile and Norway’s well-known precedents, such a rule would stipulate that all energy-price windfalls automatically be saved, and that government spending be determined by cyclically adjusted tax revenues and a share of energy revenues.	尤其是应当根据预估的永久性收入来确定政府开销（包括来自资源的可持续收入），同时将周期性收入存入与智利和挪威等著名先例类似的主权财富基金，这样的规则能够确保能源价格暴利自动进入储蓄，而政府开支则决定于周期调整、税收和一定份额的能源收入。


The stakes for Lebanon are high.	能否成功对黎巴嫩至关重要。


A troubled country in a tumultuous region, it could transform itself if it soundly and efficiently manages its prospective oil and gas wealth.	作为动荡地区一个动荡不安的国家，如果能恰当高效地管理其未来的石油天然气财富，就可以实现经济转型的目标。


Or it could succumb to the curse, which would entrench the country’s waste, nepotism, corruption, and inequality.	还有一种可能是陷入魔咒，导致国内浪费、裙带关系、腐败和不平等更加难以去除。


Lebanon’s oil and gas wealth belongs to all of its citizens, current and future.	黎巴嫩的石油和天然气财富属于全体民众，无论现在和未来，这都是首要原则。


If the new leadership bases its decision-making on a national consensus – and under a governance framework that ensures transparency, disclosure, and accountability – the curse will be cast off.	如果新领导层基于全国共识进行决策——并遵从确保透明、公开和问责的管理框架——阻碍发展的魔咒将会被破除。


And others in the region might see such success as worthy of emulation.	该地区其他国家可能会认为这样的成功值得仿效。


Educating Syria’s Refugee Children	教育叙利亚难民儿童


BEIRUT – When I took charge of Lebanon’s Ministry of Education and Higher Education in February 2014, I was presented with two huge challenges.	贝鲁特—2014年2月上任黎巴嫩教育和高等教育部长时，我需要面对两项艰巨的挑战。


In addition to improving the management and quality of Lebanon’s public education system, I had to determine how to handle the unprecedented influx of refugees from Syria – around half a million of them children.	除了改善黎巴嫩公共教育体系的管理和质量外，我还要决定如何处理前所未有的叙利亚难民潮——其中大约有五十万人是儿童。


One possibility would have been to focus solely on providing education to Lebanese children – thereby upholding our country’s long-held status as an important intellectual center in the Middle East – and to outsource the refugee problem to the international community.	一个可能性是完全集中精力于为黎巴嫩儿童提供教育——从而保持黎巴嫩长期以来作为中东地区重要的知识中心的地位——并将难民问题外包给国际社会。


After all, Lebanon has already done far more than many other countries, accepting well over a million Syrian refugees despite the intense pressure on the local population and economy.	毕竟，黎巴嫩已经比许多其他国家做出了大得多的贡献，在本地人口和经济饱受压力的情况下接收了超过一百万叙利亚难民。


Instead, I took the view that, as long as these children were on Lebanese soil, we have a responsibility to provide them with a quality education in a structured environment, so that when they can finally return to Syria, they will have the skills and knowledge with which to rebuild their country.	但是，我认为，只要这些儿童身在黎巴嫩，我们就有责任为他们提供结构化环境（structured environment）中的高质量教育，以使他们在回到叙利亚后具备技能和知识重建国家。


The greater risk, I felt, would have been to leave these children sitting idle, losing their hopes and aspirations, or, worse, being forced into child labor or drawn in by radical ideologies.	我认为，更大的风险是让这些孩子们“闲置”，让他们丧失希望和雄心，或者更糟糕地，迫使他们沦为童工或被激进思想俘虏。


My ministry has worked with the international community, especially UNICEF and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, as well as international donors like the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the World Bank, to develop the strategy we call Reaching All Children with Education (RACE).	我的部门与国际社会——特别是联合国儿童基金会（UNICEF）、联合国难民事务高级委员会（United Nations High Commission for Refugees）以及欧盟、英国和世界银行等国际出资人——合作发展了我们称之为有教无类计划（Reaching All Children with Education，RACE）的战略。


Through this initiative, we have committed to support all the children and youth displaced from Syria, a country that before the war had achieved near universal enrollment.	通过这一项目，我们致力于支持所有逃离叙利亚的儿童和年轻人。 内战爆发前，叙利亚已经基本实现了全民教育。


Despite various setbacks, during the last academic year we opened 1,000 public schools to non-Lebanese students.	尽管存在多次挫折，但在上一个学年中，我们向非黎巴嫩学生开放了1,000家公立学校。


By using many of the buildings in double shifts, we were able to provide 106,795 Syrian refugee children with schooling.	我们的很多校园实行轮班制，以此为106,795名叙利亚难民儿童提供学校教育。


Next year, I want to go much further.	明年，我希望能够更进一大步。


I am aiming to double the number of Syrian children in our public schools to 200,000 students.	我的目标是让我国公立学校的叙利亚儿童数量增加一倍，达到200,000人。


This is a huge endeavor, considering that only 238,000 Lebanese students are attending public school.	这是个艰巨的任务，因为目前只有238,000黎巴嫩学生在公立学校上学。


So I have commissioned a number of studies to help us craft a scaled-up enrollment strategy for September, and installed a project-management team in the ministry whose sole task is to make sure that we can reach this goal.	因此我组织了多项研究帮助我们制定扩大9月入学规模的战略，并在教育和高等教育部建立了一个项目管理团队，他们的唯一任务是确保我们能够实现这一目标。


The biggest challenge, however, will be to secure the necessary financing.	但是，最大的挑战是确保必要的资金。


The biggest constraint we had in providing education to Syrian children last year was the lack of resources.	去年，在向叙利亚儿童提供教育方面，我们遇到的最大的瓶颈是缺少资源。


Indeed, despite strong demand, lack of financing hampered our ability to increase enrollment considerably.	事实上，尽管需求强劲，但缺少资金制约了我们大幅提高就学率的能力。


My plan this year is to show the world that the planning, policies, and systems are in place months before the start of the school year – ready to be scaled up if the financing can be provided.	今年，我的计划是向全世界表明，计划、政策和体系在学年开始前几个月便已就绪——只要能获得融资，随时准备扩大规模。


It is important to note that the Lebanese government plans to cover a large share of the cost of the program.	一个重点是黎巴嫩政府计划出资该战略的一大部分成本。


We estimate that providing a refugee child with a place in our public schools will cost roughly $1,800 per year; donors are being asked to contribute $363 per student in the first shift and $600 per student in the second.	我们估计，在我们的公立学校为难民儿童提供学位每人每年的成本大约为1,800美元； 我们需要出资人第一步提供每人363美元，第二步提供每人600美元。


Unfortunately, however, the price tag for providing children with an education is just one part of the total cost of this effort.	但是，不幸的是，为难民儿童提供教育的成本只是总成本的一个部分。


Some Syrian children will need psycho-social and health support to cope with the unimaginable trauma suffered because of the war.	一些叙利亚儿童需要心理-社会和健康支持才能治愈战争导致的创伤。


Language difficulties mean that some will struggle to bond with their Lebanese counterparts or learn at the same rate.	语言困难意味着一些人难以与黎巴嫩同学建立关系或跟上教学进度。


New schools may need to be constructed.	我们需要建设新学校。


Transportation will need to be found and funded.	交通设施需要建立起来并得到资金支持。


And finally – and importantly for me – the program will have to be designed in a way that ensures that Lebanese parents don’t feel compelled to pull their children out of public school and incur debts by educating them privately.	最后——对我来说也是很重要的一点——该计划的设计必须确保黎巴嫩家长不会觉得被迫让孩子离开公立学校，负债让他们接受私立教育。


Each of these challenges will cost money, which is why we hope that, as we approach the beginning of the school year in September, the international community will urgently increase its financial support to Lebanon.	所有这些挑战都需要钱，因此，随着9月开学的临近，我们希望国际社会能抓紧增加对黎巴嫩的金融支持。


With no end in sight to the crisis in Syria, it is likely that we will need to provide these children with education for years to come.	叙利亚危机没有任何结束迹象，有可能我们需要为这些儿童提供多年的教育。


So I call on donors to make multi-year commitments that enable us to ensure the students are able to complete their schooling.	因此，我呼吁出资人承诺多年的援助计划以使我们能确保学生完成学业。


Lebanon is not able to bear this burden alone.	黎巴嫩无力单独承担这一负担。


We are facing a shortfall of $100 million for the new school year.	新学年我们面临1亿美元资金短缺。


Without additional support from the international community, our vision will not be realized – despite strong political will and rigorous planning.	如果国际社会不增加支持，我们的愿景就无从实现——即使有强大的政治意愿和严格的计划。


Lebanon often struggles to attract funding because of its status as a middle-income country, but this label is misleading, as it does not take into account serious structural weaknesses that pre-date the Syrian crisis or the huge proportion of the resident population composed of refugees from Syria, Palestine, and Iraq living in abject poverty.	黎巴嫩常常难以吸引资金，因为它属于中等收入国家，但这一标签具有误导性，因为它没有考虑叙利亚危机之前就存在的严重的结构性弱点，也没有考虑黎巴嫩居民中有很大比例是来自叙利亚、巴勒斯坦、伊拉克的难民，他们生活在赤贫状态。


One thing I hope will become clear at the Oslo education summit is the need to help middle-income countries affected by fragility and conflict.	我希望奥斯陆教育峰会能够明确一点，即帮助饱受脆弱和冲突影响中等收入国家的必要性。


I am thankful to the donors who have been with us from the beginning, but we now need additional international support.	我感谢所有从一开始就伸出援手的出资人，但现在我们需要更多的国际支持。


This September, we have the potential to enroll nearly half the refugee children in our country in the public-school system.	今年9月，我们有潜力让近一半的难民儿童在我国公立学校系统入学。


The alternative is leaving hundreds of thousands of children on the streets, languishing in informal settlements with an uncertain future.	若非如此，数十万儿童将流离街头，在棚户区度日，未来无从保证。


Lebanon’s Example to Iraq	黎巴嫩：伊拉克的可借之鉴


Iraq’s voters have spoken.	伊拉克的选民们终于发出了自己的声音。


Now a new government must be formed and a new constitution written.	如今，新政府成立和新宪法拟定势在必行。


Lebanon, argues Paul Salem, may provide a guide for those Iraqis who seek a constitution that can reconcile the country’s Shi-ite, Sunni, Kurdish and Turkmen communities.	Paul Salem 认为，对于那些正在寻找一部可以调和国内什叶派、逊尼派、库尔德人和土库曼人争端的宪法的伊拉克人，黎巴嫩也许能为他们提供导向。


Rebuilding a country devastated by war, riven by internal divisions, and plagued by foreign intervention in a part of the world as volatile as the Middle East is one of the most daunting tasks imaginable.	全世界范围内，在像中东这样一块动荡不安的土地上重建一个满目战争疮痍、内部四分五裂、又遭外国干涉力量困扰的国家，其艰难程度难以想象。


Add to it a desire to create a democracy from scratch in a region characterized by authoritarian government and that task becomes almost impossible.	更不要说，还要在这块以专权政府闻名的地区从头创建一个民主制度，那简直就是不可能完成的任务。


But the challenge has been met before, in Lebanon after its nightmarishly long civil war (1975-1990).	但是，黎巴嫩，在经历它如同噩梦般的持久内战(1975-1990)后，却成功应对了这一挑战。


So perhaps there are lessons from that experience that can be applied in Iraq.	因此，黎巴嫩的某些经验能为伊拉克提供榜样。


Both Lebanon and Iraq comprise ancient communities living within the borders of states outlined in the 20th century.	黎巴嫩和伊拉克一样，拥有各自生活在20世纪划定的州界范围内的古老教派。


Although a strong sense of modern nationalism exists in both, ancient ethnic and religious communities play a critical role in shaping political identities and public life.	尽管两者都存有一种强烈的现代民主主义感，但是古老的民族和宗教教派在塑造政治身份和公共生活方面扮演着决定性角色。


Both countries also possess a fairly educated middle class and intelligentsia alongside more traditional elites.	两个国家也都拥有一个受过高等教育的中层阶级和知识界以及更为传统的精英群。


Both societies have a mixed history that included periods of peaceful, cooperative politics and periods of violence and bloodletting.	两国社会也都有过一段复杂的历史，经历过和平的协作政治年代，也有过充满暴力和血腥的时代。


One lesson from Lebanon’s recent history stands out above all others: in divided political societies such as Lebanon and Iraq, coalition democracy is preferable to majoritarian winner-takes-all democracy.	黎巴嫩近代史给人们的教训中，有一个比其它都引人注目，即：在诸如黎巴嫩和伊拉克这样的政权分掌社会，联盟民主体制比多数选举制的胜者全拿型民主更受青睐。


In Lebanon, the danger of one community monopolizing power over others is avoided because the Lebanese constitution imposes permanent power-sharing arrangements on all major communities.	黎巴嫩避免了一个教派独揽大权的风险，因为黎巴嫩的宪法强制性地规定了主要教派之间 永久性 的分权。


These arrangements apply both to parliament and the executive branch.	这些规定被同样应用于议会和行政机构。


In Lebanon’s post-war parliament, seats are widely distributed among the various confessional communities, so that none feels excluded or fears losing political representation if it loses numerical superiority.	黎巴嫩的战后议会席位被广泛分配给各大教派，因此就算失去人数上的优势，也没有教派会担心被排挤或害怕失去政治代表的权利。


In the executive branch, the council of ministers is balanced among Christians and Muslims in order to encourage, indeed force, cooperation and to avoid the risk of domination the fear of oppression by one group.	在行政机构中，为了鼓励、事实上是强制多方合作并避免独权专治带来的风险以及对独教掌权镇压的恐惧，部长理事会由基督教徒和穆斯林派的双方力量平衡组成。


In addition, the three major posts in government—the president of the republic, the prime minister, and the speaker of parliament—are counterbalanced in power and are also divided among the three largest communities.	此外，政府内的三大主要职位——共和国总统，总理以及国会议长——被平分权力并在三大主要教派间平等分配。


Moreover, coexistence and cooperation among the various communities is enshrined as a basic principle in Lebanon’s constitution.	并且，各大教派之间的共存与合作被作为基本原则神圣地写进黎巴嫩宪法。


Promoting any policy or law that increases communal tension is unconstitutional.	推行任何增加教派间紧张关系的政策或法律将被视为违宪。


In Iraq, some of these steps have already been taken.	伊拉克已经采取了一些此类措施。


The Governing Council and the interim Government are both coalition bodies of the Lebanese type, comprising studied proportions from the three main communities in Iraq—the Shia, the Sunni, and the Kurds. Iraq, however, still has neither a parliament nor a constitution.	伊拉克管理委员会和过渡政府都是借鉴了黎巴嫩的联盟政体，根据深思熟虑的比例，由伊拉克的三大主要教派组成——什叶派、逊尼派和库尔德人，然而，伊拉克仍然没有议会也无宪法。


With regard to parliament, there is no need to follow Lebanon’s rigid apportionment of seats according to confessional identity.	至于议会，没有必要照搬黎巴嫩根据宗教身份强行委派席位的做法。


All the same, Iraq’s parliamentary electoral law should be drawn up to take two important factors into account:	同样地，草拟伊拉克议会选举法时应该考虑以下两个重要的因素：


· First, districts should be drawn to ensure that all major communities in the country are amply represented in parliament and none feels left out;	· 首先，选区的划分应当保证议会能广泛代表国家内所有的主要教派，不遗漏任何一个教派。


· Second, electoral districts should be multi-member districts and should, as far as is possible, include populations of more than one community in order to encourage cross-communal politics and the election of moderate politicians that can speak to all communities and that know how to resolve tensions among them.	· 其次，每个选区都应为多人选区，并且应该尽可能地包含多于一个教派的人口，以鼓励教派中立政治以及能与所有教派沟通并且知道如何解决教派间争端的中间派政治家参选。


Until elections can be organized, it may be necessary to do what was done in Lebanon just after the war: appoint members to an interim Iraqi parliament.	直到选举之后，才有必要在伊拉克实施黎巴嫩的战后措施：委任伊拉克过渡议会的成员。


This could be described as a temporary advisory parliament, or ‘Shura Council,’ but it should include hundreds of figures from throughout the country and they should be selected through the Governing Council and interim Government after nationwide consultations.	这可以被形容为一个临时的顾问型议会，或“舒拉议会（Shura Council）”，但是它应由来自全国的、从管理委员会和过渡政府中经由全国性的讨论选拔出的几百人组成。


Such a large Shura Council would provide a broad Iraqi face and body to the interim administration. It would also serve to create the beginnings of Iraqi parliamentary and local politics in advance of the elections, which should be held as soon as possible.	如此庞大的一个舒拉议会将在过渡政权中代表各个阶层的伊拉克人，也将作为伊拉克应当尽早举行的选举前的议会及本国政治的开端。


In terms of drawing up a new constitution, the Lebanese principle of government by power sharing must be a central pillar.	至于新宪法的起草，黎巴嫩的政府分权原则必须是首要原则。


Beyond the balance of representation in parliament and government, a balance might need to be struck between the highest offices of state.	除了平衡议会和政府内的代表分配，还需要在国家最高权力办公室之间找到折衷点。


As in Lebanon, Iraqis might need to create a balance between the offices of president, prime minister, and speaker of parliament, and to agree that a leader of a different major community will occupy each.	如同黎巴嫩一样，伊拉克可能需要在总统、总理和国会议长之间建立某种平衡，并且确定各主要教派领导人能相互牵制。


This would reinforce the need for inter-communal cooperation and minimize the risk of a return to any form of communal domination or dictatorship.	这将强化教派内的合作，将重回任何形式的教派独权或教派专政的风险降到最低。


As someone who knew Lebanon in its darkest hours—when Lebanon was a by-word for chaos, violence, and political hopelessness—and who saw its rapid reconstitution as a functioning participatory political system and its astonishing return to normalcy, I know that Iraq can be politically rebuilt.	当黎巴嫩成为混乱暴动、武力冲突和政治无望的代名词时，作为一个历经了黎巴嫩最黑暗的时期、目睹了它��速重新构建起一个运转正常的共享民主政治体系并令人惊异地重归常态的亲身经历者，我知道伊拉克可以做到政治重建。


Like the Lebanese, Iraqis have suffered enough.	与黎巴嫩人一样，伊拉克人已经遭受了足够的苦难。


By recognizing a permanent say in politics for all of the country’s mutually suspicious communities, Iraqis can pull back from the brink and build for themselves an Iraq worthy of their talents and their history.	当永久性政治权利在这个国家相互怀疑的教派中得到认可时，伊拉克人就能悬崖勒马，为他们自己建造一个与他们的智慧和历史相称的伊拉克。


Lebanon’s Moment of Decision	黎巴嫩的决定时刻


Lebanon is at a historic crossroad.	黎巴嫩现在正处于历史的十字路口。


It can choose to lead the Middle East into vibrant multi-sectarian democracy or slump back into corrupt local politics under foreign tutelage.	它既可以选择走上领导中东进入活力四射的多宗派民主政治之路，也可以后退陷入外部势力监护之下的腐朽地方政治之路。


The latter path could easily lead to civil strife and, perhaps, another civil war.	后一条道路可能会轻而易举地导致内乱，甚至可能会引发另一场内战。


At this very moment, Lebanon’s political leaders are meeting jointly for the first time in the country’s modern history without the interference of Syria, France, or the United States.	在这个非常时刻，黎巴嫩的政治领袖们联合举行会议，这是该国现代历史上第一次在没有叙利亚、法国或美国干涉的情况下举行会议。


Everyone from Saad Hariri, the son of our murdered Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, to Hizbullah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, is present to discuss openly the issues that divide the country, as are the leaders of Lebanon’s Shiia, Sunni, Greek Orthodox, Maronite Christian, and Druze communities.	各派领袖，从被刺杀的总理哈里里的儿子萨德·哈里里到真主党领导人纳斯鲁拉，以及黎巴嫩什叶派、逊尼派、东正教、马龙教和德鲁兹教派的领袖们系数出席，坦率地讨论那些分裂国家的问题。


This national dialogue, held under security measures that have basically shut down central Beirut, began March 2 and is expected to last up to ten days.	为此次全国对话所采取的严密的安保措施封闭了贝鲁特的中心地区。 会议于3月2日开始，预计为期10天。


But one player is missing: Emile Lahoud, who claims Lebanon’s presidency as his by right of Syrian power.	但是有一个人却未曾露面，那就是拉胡德。 他挟叙利亚的势力将黎巴嫩总统职位据为己有。


Lahoud’s absence is not surprising, as the discussions deal with the fate of his illegal presidency and how to break the deadlock that his continuance in office has imposed on the country.	拉胡德的缺席并不出人意料，因为此次会议将要讨论他的非法总统职位的命运以及如何打破由于其恋栈而导致的僵局。


Indeed, just as Lahoud’s chair at the talks is vacant, so – in the eyes of the world and under the country’s 150-year old constitution – is Lebanon’s presidency.	实际上，正如此次讨论会议上拉胡德缺席一样，无论在全世界人眼里还是按照这个国家有着150年历史的宪法，黎巴嫩的总统职位也同样空缺。


It has been vacant since September 2004 when Lahoud, backed by Syria, forced an extension of his six-year term on the Lebanese parliament, which elects the president.	自从2004年9月拉胡德在叙利亚的支持下强迫选举总统的黎巴嫩议会延长其6年任期之后，总统职位就一直空缺。


We Lebanese can already claim victory in our year-long non-violent fight for independence and democracy.	我们黎巴嫩人民已经可以宣布在长达一年的争取独立和民主的非暴力斗争中获得胜利。


We have succeeded in placing the issue of the presidency at center stage in Lebanese politics.	我们已经成功地将总统问题摆到了黎巴嫩政治舞台的中心。


Parliament Speaker Nabih Birri, Hizbullah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, and Michel Aoun, leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, remain reluctant participants in the search for a new head of state.	议会发言人比里、真主党秘书长纳斯鲁拉和“自由爱国运动”领袖奥恩对于参与寻求一位新的国家元首犹豫不决。


Nevertheless, the election of a new, democratic, and lawful president has become accepted nationally as a necessary point of departure from the murderous path taken by the country with the extension of Lahoud’s mandate.	然而，选举一位全新的民主合法总统已经成为全国人民的共识，这是与这个国家脱离因延长拉胡德的统治而走过的血腥道路所必不可少的。


This was clearly demonstrated on February 14, when roughly a million people assembled to commemorate the first anniversary of Rafik Hariri’s assassination.	这一点在2月14日被表达的淋漓尽致，当时大约有一百万民众集会纪念哈里里遇刺一周年。


The crowd’s sole demand was that Lahoud step down.	民众唯一的要求就是拉胡德下台。


On that day, I urged Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and Future Movement leader Saad Hariri, a Sunni and the political heir of his slain father, to make this their paramount slogan.	当天，我鼓动德鲁兹教派领袖琼布拉特和“未来运动”领袖萨德·哈里里（逊尼派教徒、他遇刺父亲政治遗产的继承人）打出他们最为重要的口号。


The democratic movement’s main objective is to bring about a non-violent, constitutional process to replace Lahoud with a new president in free and open elections.	此次民主运动的主要目标是开启非暴力宪政进程，通过自由公开的选举选出新的总统来取代拉胡德。


In this we have the clear support of the international community, with the United Nations Security Council giving its unanimous support to my demand for presidential elections.	我们在这一点上获得了国际社会明白无误的支持。 联合国安理会一致支持我的总统选举要求。


On January 23, the Security Council issued a statement expressing regret that the conduct of “free and fair presidential elections” had not yet been carried out in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1559, which was passed on the eve of Lahoud’s extension.	1月23日，安理会发表声明，对没有按照安理会1599号决议举行“自由公正的总统选举”表示遗憾，该决议于拉胡德延长任期的前夜通过。


At a historic gathering of the parliamentary majority on February 16, I presented a four-step process to complete, in a constitutional manner, our non-violent revolt against foreign power.	在2月16日议会多数派的历史性会议上，我提出以宪政方式完成我们反对外国势力的非暴力斗争的四步进程。


First, the popular and parliamentary majority in Lebanon must declare that no solution is possible without the election of a new president.	第一步，黎巴嫩大多数民众和议会中的多数派必须宣布，不选举新的总统就不可能寻找到任何可行的解决方案。


Second, a majority of parliamentarians must sign a petition declaring null and void the extension of Lahoud’s term.	第二步，大部分议员必须在宣布拉胡德延长任期无效的请愿书上签名。


Third, the parliamentary majority must formally acknowledge Lahoud’s illegitimacy.	第三步，议会中的多数派必须正式承认拉胡德的非法性。


Finally, Lebanon must elect a new president.	最后一步，黎巴嫩必须选举一位新的总统。


With the national dialogue now underway, we are in the midst of phase three.	随着全国对话的举行，我们进入了第三阶段。


If, during this dialogue, a consensus is reached on the need to elect a new president, so much the better.	如果在此次对话中就有必要选举一位新的总统达成一致意见，这样最好不过。


If not, phases three and four will be completed by other means.	如果布什这样的话，第三阶段和第四阶段将通过其它方式完成。


Lahoud has become irrelevant.	拉胡德已经出局。


Once the president’s illegitimacy is formally acknowledged by a majority of parliamentarians, all his acts will be considered beyond his constitutional powers, and the process of electing a new president will be firmly on track.	一旦议会中的多数派正式确认其总统职位的非法性，他所有的行动都将被认定超出了其宪法权力范围，选举一位新总统的进程将正式开始。


This can only be reversed by violence, which is unlikely, so strong is the consensus that Lebanon needs a new president, and so ingrained is the rejection of force by all Lebanese.	只有暴力才会逆转这一进程，但是不大可能，因为黎巴嫩需要一位新的总统的认同度是如此之高，所有黎巴嫩人民对武力的抵触心理是如此的根深蒂固。


While we must be vigilant in preventing extremist groups from derailing the process, the best way to do so is to accelerate transformation at the top.	尽管我们还必须保持警惕，预防极端集团破坏这一进程，最好的方法是加速上层的变革。


As for me, I realize that in seeking Lebanon’s presidency, we must look to the future.	就我个人而言，我认为在寻求黎巴嫩总统的过程中，我们必须面向未来。


That is why I offer a program that addresses such key issues as the effective representation of women in government, the need to urgently address environmental problems, to strengthen rule of law, transparency, and accountability, and to move toward universal suffrage in the election of top executive positions.	这就是我提交计划的原因所在，这个计划涉及到众多重要的问题，如政府中妇女的有效代表、迫切需���解决的环境问题、加强法制、透明度和问责制度、促进全民普选最上层行政职位的选举。


I have also emphasized that Lebanon must develop its comparative advantages, particularly in education, banking, and services.	我也已经强调，黎巴嫩必须发展自己的比较优势，特别是教育、银行和服务业。


All these issues have now become part of the national debate.	所有这些问题都已经成为此次全国对话的议题。


Lebanon’s traditional political class may not like it, but, as more of its members are now recognizing, the momentum for a new kind of presidency will not be stopped.	黎巴嫩的传统政治阶级可能不会喜欢这些，但是，正如其中越来越多的人所意识到的那样，建立一种全新的总统制度势不可挡。


Le Défi Chinois	中国威胁


NEW YORK – So far, discussions about whether or not China should revalue its currency, the renminbi, have focused almost exclusively on the impact of the currency’s exchange rate on China’s trade balance.	纽约——到目前为止，有关中国是否应该允许人民币升值的讨论几乎无一例外地关注人民币汇率对中国贸易平衡所造成的影响。


But what would an appreciation of the renminbi do to China’s inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI)?	但人民币升值会给中国对内对外直接投资带来些什么？


In evaluating China’s currency policy, the effects of any change on the trade balance are no more important than the potential consequences for inward FDI, which plays such a crucial role in China’s economic development, and China’s outward FDI, which is receiving increased attention worldwide.	评估人民币政策时，任何对贸易平衡变化产生的影响都不及对外商直接投资可能产生的影响那样重要，因为外商直接投资在经济发展中起到决定性的作用。 同样重要的还有中国对外直接投资，这部分投资正在越来越多地引起世界各国的关注。


China has been the developing world’s largest recipient of FDI since the mid-1990s.	中国从20世纪90年代起就一直是发展中世界最大的外商直接投资接受国。


Revaluation of the renminbi would make it more expensive for foreign firms to establish themselves (or expand) in China – the world’s most dynamic market – and would render exports of foreign affiliates, which account for 54% of total exports, less competitive internationally.	人民币升值会增加外国公司在华（全世界规模最大的活跃市场）设立（或拓展）业务的成本，同时令占出口总额54%以上的国外分支机构全球的出口竞争力下降。


On the other hand, the increased cost would be offset to some extent by lower-cost imported inputs, and foreign affiliates could expect to repatriate higher profits from sales in China in terms of their own currencies.	而另一方面，低成本进口将在某种程度上抵消增加的成本，而且国外分支机构可以寄回更多以本国货币计价的利润。


But the most notable development of recent years has been the surge in China’s outward FDI since the government adopted its “go global” policy in 2000, encouraging Chinese firms to invest overseas.	但近年来最显著的变化是中国政府2000年实行“全球化”政策、鼓励中国企业对外投资后中国对外直接投资额大幅增加。


China’s outward FDI more than doubled in 2005-2007, from $12 billion to $27 billion, and then more than doubled again in 2008, to $56 billion.	中国的对外直接投资从2005年的120亿美元增长至2007年的270亿美元，增长超过1倍，此后在2008年又再次翻番，增加到560亿美元的金额。


Outflows continued to rise to $57 billion in 2009, a time when global FDI flows had collapsed by 50%, making China the world’s fifth largest outward investor.	对外直接投资在2009年继续增至570亿美元，而同期的全球直接外资额锐减50%，令中国成为全世界第五大对外投资国。


The increasing international competitiveness of Chinese firms, together with government policy, has been the main driver of China’s skyrocketing outward FDI.	中国企业不断增长的国际竞争力，再加上中国政府采取的相关政策，成就了中国对外直接投资高歌猛进的主要驱动力量。


The 20% revaluation of the renminbi against the US dollar in 2005-2008 undoubtedly facilitated this in the case of recipient countries whose currencies did not also appreciate against the dollar.	在接受国货币并未相对美元升值的情况下，2005－2008年人民币对美元20%的升值无疑对中国增加对外投资起了不可忽视的作用。


China’s outward FDI is poised to increase sharply again in 2010, judging by the first half of the year, when it was rising at an annual rate of 44%.	从上半年年增长率达44%的情况看，中国的对外直接投资一定会在2010年再次大幅飙升。


Revaluation would accelerate this trend.	人民币升值将加速这种趋势的形成。


This is precisely what happened in Japan after the yen was revalued by over 50% against the dollar between 1985 and 1987, following the Plaza Accord.	这与《广场协议》签订后，日元在1985到1987年间相对美元升值50%的情况如出一辙。


Japan’s outward FDI rocketed from $7 billion in 1984 to $20 billion in 1986, peaking at $48 billion in 1990.	日本的对外直接投资从1984年的70亿美元增长到1986年的200亿美元，并于1990年达到480亿美元的顶峰。


A renewed renminbi appreciation would boost China’s outward FDI growth even further by lowering the cost of overseas assets for Chinese firms, which operate in a fairly competitive market and have strong cash reserves from both retained earnings and large-scale state credit allocations.	人民币再度升值会降低中国公司收购国外资产的成本，进一步推高中国企业对外直接投资的增速。 这些中国企业的经营环境竞争相对密集，其现金储备也因留存收益和国家授予的大规模信用额度而相对充足。


Like competitors elsewhere, they need to invest abroad to acquire a portfolio of local assets that give then better access to the markets, skills, technology, and natural resources that they need to protect and strengthen their international competitiveness.	像其他地方的竞争企业一样，他们需要投资海外收购当地的资产组合，通过这种方式，他们可以对保护并增强其国际竞争力必须的市场、能力、技术和自然资源进行更好的掌控。


The revaluation effect would be reinforced by rising wage pressures inside China, which are already leading some labor-intensive Chinese firms to invest abroad (there are more than 700 Chinese affiliates in Vietnam alone). Some of these firms have been weighing whether to move production abroad or to inland provinces of China; revaluation could push them in the former direction.	中国国内提高工资的压力将加大升值效应，这种压力已经导致某些劳动力密集型的中国企业加大国外投资（仅在越南一地的中国分支机构就超过700家）。 某些公司一直拿不定主意将生产企业转移到国外还是中国内陆省份，而人民币升值会推动他们做出向国外转移的决定。


Because most of China’s outward FDI is from state-owned enterprises (SOEs), suspicions of non-commercial motivations are widespread.	因为绝大多数中国对外直接投资来自国有企业（SOEs），非商业动机的怀疑引发了人们普遍的担忧。


But there is no systematic evidence that China’s SOEs are driven by more than normal commercial considerations.	但没有全面证据显示中国的国有企业受正常商业利益以外的考量驱动。


At the same time, various private or semi-private entities have been investing abroad.	与此同时，各种私营或半私营实体已经开始进行国外投资。


As their operations are less visible, it is likely that their outward FDI, and therefore China’s total, is understated.	由于他们的操作相对不那么显眼，因此他们的对外直接投资（以及中国对外投资的总额）很有可能会被低估。


Fears of Chinese overseas investment, as of Japanese and South Korean investment in the 1980s and 1990s – and, before that, of the great post-war U.S. multinationals, which the French writer Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber dubbed “le défi américain” in the 1960s – are misplaced.	就像20世纪八九十年代对日韩投资和之前对战后美国大型跨国公司的恐惧一样，对中国海外投资的恐惧是不合时宜的。 说起美国战后大型跨国公司，法国作家让-雅克·塞尔万－施赖伯曾将其戏称为20世纪60年代的“美国威胁”。


These investments were eventually accepted as making a contribution to their host countries.	这些投资最终由于对所在国有所贡献而被人们所接受。


Similarly, the surge in China’s outward FDI is good for China and for host countries.	同样，中国对外直接投资的激增对中国和投资所在国双方均有好处。


Chinese FDI, like all FDI, can provide host countries with a bundle of tangible and intangible assets needed for economic growth and development.	中国对外直接投资和所有对���直接投资一样，能够给所在国带来经济发展所需的各种有形和无形资产。


While a significant part of China’s outward FDI initially takes the form of trade-supporting FDI, it can be expected to lead relatively quickly to some production being shifted out of China, including to the US and Europe, thereby possibly reducing exports from China.	尽管中国对外直接投资的很大部分开始时都属于贸易支持型投资，但这些投资很快就会导致生产转移出中国，包括转移至美国和欧洲，也有可能因此减少中国的出口额。


Moreover, FDI, like trade, is a key means to integrate China into the world economy and make it a responsible stakeholder.	此外，对外直接投资和贸易一样，是实现中国融入世界经济并成长为负责任一员的关键方法。


Like their Japanese and South Korean counterparts, however, Chinese firms will have to learn how to operate in highly sophisticated developed-country markets, as well as in developing countries, where their investments in natural resources are expanding rapidly.	像日本和韩国的竞争企业一样，中国公司必须学习如何在发达和发展中国家的市场中开展经营活动，中国在发展中国家的自然资源投资发展异常迅速。


They will also have to learn from the past mistakes of other multinationals.	他们还需要从其他跨国企业过去的错误中吸取教训。


In particular, they need to establish a strong reputation as good corporate citizens, in addition to making a positive economic contribution to their host countries.	特别是他们需要建立良好的企业信誉，还要为东道国做出积极的经济贡献。


The Chinese government can play a crucial role by adopting a code of conduct for all Chinese enterprises investing abroad, in line with internationally accepted norms and taking into account the increasing importance of sustainable FDI.	中国政府可以按照国际公认的标准并考虑可持续对外投资日益增加的重要性，为所有投资海外的中国企业制定行为准则。


For their part, recipient countries should accept, rather than shun or discriminate against, China’s “new kids on the block.”	从他们的角度讲，接受国应当接受、而不是回避或歧视中国的“新街区男孩角色”。


South Korea’s Feminine Future	韩国的未来系于女性


SEOUL – Over the last half-century, South Korea has made considerable economic progress, with per capita income increasing from a mere $80 dollars in 1960 to more than $22,000 last year.	首尔—半个多世纪以来，韩国取得了卓越的经济进步，人均收入从1960年的80美元增加到去年的22,000多美元。


But its potential for sustained growth is faltering, owing to the imminent decline of its working-age population – projected to fall by 25% by 2050 – and rising competition from China and other emerging economies.	但由于工作适龄人口数量即将由升转跌（据预测到2050年将减少25%）以及来自中国和其他新兴经济体的竞争日渐激烈，韩国持续增长的潜力正在削弱。


In order to improve its prospects, South Korea must pursue economic reform and restructuring, with an emphasis on maximizing its human-capital resources – especially women.	为了改善前景，韩国必须追求经济重组改革，强调人力资本——特别是女性——的最大化。


South Korea’s success over the last five decades owes much to the rapid growth of its well-educated labor force.	韩国在过去五十年中取得的成功在很大程度上要归功于教育程度良好的劳动力数量的快速增加。


From 1960 to 2010, the share of adults with a secondary education soared from 20% to an impressive 87%.	从1960年到2010年，中学以上文化程度成年人比例从20%大幅增长至令人印象深刻的97%。


By boosting productivity, increasing returns on investment, and facilitating technological adaption and innovation, South Korea’s abundance of well-educated workers has served as the foundation for its export-oriented development strategy.	通过提振生产率、增加投资回报和促进技术改造和创新，韩国充分的高教育程度工人成为其出口导向型发展政策的基础。


But women remain underutilized, to the detriment of the entire economy.	但女性的作用仍没有充分利用起来，有损于整体经济。


Indeed, any effective South Korean growth strategy must create more and better economic opportunities for women, in part by establishing more accommodating working environments and instituting a more diverse and flexible education system.	事实上，韩国的增长战略要起到成效，就必须为女性创造更好的经济机会，这可以通过建立更舒适的工作环境和建立更多样、更灵活的教育制度来部分实现。


To its credit, South Korea has built a relatively gender-equal society.	值得肯定的是，韩国已经建立了性别相对平等的社会。


The gender gap in enrollment in both secondary and higher education is very small; and women’s access to elite positions in law, medicine, and the civil service has increased considerably in recent years.	中学和高等教育中的性别差异以已经非常小； 女性获得法律、医药和公民社会等领域的顶级职位的容易程度在近几年也有了很大提升。


The country elected its first female president, Park Geun-hye, in 2012.	2012年，韩国还选出了第一位女总统朴槿惠。


But a significant gender gap remains in terms of the return on human capital.	但在人力资本回报方面仍存在重大性别差距。


According to OECD data, only 55% of South Korean women aged 15-64 are in the labor force, compared to an average of 65% in the advanced economies.	根据经合组织的数据，55%十五至六十四岁年龄段的韩国女性参加工作，而发达国家平均水平为65%。


South Korea’s male labor-force participation rate, by contrast, stands at about 77% – close to the OECD average of 79%.	相反，韩国男性劳动力参与率为77%左右，接近经合组织平均水平79%。


Women who have completed secondary or tertiary education are more likely to enter and remain in the labor market than their less educated counterparts.	与其他女性相比，完成中学和大学教育的女性更有可能进入和呆在劳动市场内。


The labor-participation rate for women with post-secondary education is 64%, far exceeding the 35% rate for those with only a primary or middle-school education.	高中以上教育程度女性的劳动力参与率为64%，远远高于只有小学或中学教育程度女性的比例（35%）。


But, even for South Korea’s most highly educated and capable female workers, child rearing is a major career obstacle.	但是，即使对韩国教育程度最好、工作能力最强的女性来说，育儿也是主要职业障碍。


In fact, South Korean women participate in the labor force at roughly the average rate for the OECD while they are in their late twenties.	事实上，二十多岁接近三十岁韩国女性的劳动力参与率与经合组织平均水平相当。


The problem is that the rate drops sharply from 71% to 57% among women in their 30’s, as inflexible working environments and a lack of affordable childcare undermine their ability to continue investing in their careers.	问题在于，步入三十岁以后，女性劳动力参与率从71%猛降至57%，因为僵化的工作环境和缺少平价儿童看护服务削弱了她们继续投资于职业生涯的能力。


The good news is that Park’s government is working to change this.	好消息是朴槿惠政府正致力于改变这一状况。


Indeed, its three-year plan for economic innovation, announced in February, aims to raise the female employment rate to 62% by 2017, through the provision of affordable, high-quality childcare facilities and expanded paid parental leave, among other measures.	事实上，其2月份公布的经济创新三年计划旨在通过提供平价高质的儿童看护设施以及扩大带薪产假等措施，将2017年女性就业率提高到62%。


But it is less clear how the government will create additional jobs for women.	但政府如何为女性创造更多工作岗位更加棘手。


It could, for example, split full-time jobs into multiple part-time positions, and offer incentives for workers to reduce their hours.	比如，它可以将全职工作分解为几个兼职岗位，并鼓励员工减少工时。


But, given that South Korea’s workforce already includes a substantial share of non-regular workers, increasing temporary employment may not contribute to economic growth.	但是，由于韩国劳动力已经包括了较高的非全职比例，增加临时就业可能不会给经济增长带来多少推进。


A better approach would entail creating high-quality jobs in modern service industries.	更好的方针是创造现代服务业的高质量岗位。


As it stands, while the services sector accounts for more than 70% of employment in South Korea, its productivity-growth rate remains much lower than that of the manufacturing sector.	事实表明，尽管服务业就业占韩国总就业的70%，但其生产率增长率仍远低于制造业。


Too many people are working in traditional, low-productivity service industries, such as wholesale, retail trade, and restaurants, leaving modern, high-productivity services like communications, health, financial intermediation, and business services underdeveloped.	太多的人在传统的低生产率服务业工作，如批发、零售贸易和餐厅等，而通信、医药、金融中介和商务服务等高生产率服务业有欠发展。


It is also important to narrow the mismatch between women’s abilities and their career paths.	减轻女性能力和职业路径之间的不匹配问题也很重要。


The current system tends to reinforce gender roles, encouraging children to follow culturally framed paths, instead of nurturing their individual interests and potential.	当前的制度倾向于加强性别角色，顾虑儿童按传统的道路发展，而不是培养他们的个人兴趣、开发他们的个人潜力。


For example, female university students are much more likely to study humanities than the so-called “STEM” subjects (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) – key drivers of productivity gains, innovation, and economic growth.	比如，女大学生学习人文专业的比例远大于所谓的“STEM”专业（科学、技术、工程和数学），而后者才是生产率增长、创新和经济增长的关键推动力。


Efforts by primary and secondary schools could help to foster more diverse interests among female students, giving talented young women the tools they need to make important contributions to key economic sectors.	小学和中学的努力有助于在女生中培养更多样化的兴趣，让有才华的年轻女性获得她们所需要的工具，在关键经济部门做出重要贡献。


Of course, the potential of educated, empowered women to drive sustained economic growth is not limited to South Korea.	当然，受过良好教育、拥有强大实力的女性具有推动持续经济增长的潜力的状况并不是韩国所独有的。


Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, too, has identified increased female labor-force participation as critical to efforts to revive his country’s long-dormant economy.	日本首相安倍晋三也将增加女性劳动力参与率作为振兴日本长期停滞的经济的关键手段。


In South Korea, Japan, and elsewhere, developing and maximizing women’s potential will require comprehensive education and labor-market reforms, as well as structural change, particularly on the services side of the economy.	在韩国、日本和其他国家，开发和最大化女性潜力要求全面的教育和劳动力市场改革，结构性变化（特别是服务部门）也是必不可少的。


The question is whether political leaders are ready to back their lofty pronouncements with decisive action.	问题在于政治领袖是否做好了用果断行动支持美好承诺的准备。


China’s Education Revolution	中国的教育革命


BEIJING – Over the last 35 years, China’s strong and sustained output growth – averaging more than 9.5% annually – has driven the miraculous transformation of a rural, command economy into a global economic superpower.	北京—过去35年中，中国取得了持续的强劲产出增长，平均每年高达9%以上，这让中国这个指令性农业经济转变为全球经济超级大国。


In fact, according to the World Bank’s most recent calculation of the purchasing power of aggregate income, China is about to overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy.	事实上，根据世界银行最新的购买力平价总收入计算，中国即将取代美国成为世界第一大经济体。


But, in terms of the quality and sustainability of its growth model, China still has a long way to go.	但是，就增长模式的平等性和可持续性而言，中国还有很长的路要走。


Despite its remarkable rise, China’s per capita income, at $10,057 (adjusted for purchasing power) in 2011, ranks 99th in the world – roughly one-fifth of US per capita income of $49,782.	尽管取得了令人瞩目的崛起，但2011年中国的人均收入只有10,057美元（经购买力平价调整），位居世界第99位，只有美国人均收入49,782美元的五分之一。


And reaching high-income status is no easy feat.	而达到高收入标准决非易事。


Indeed, many countries have tried and failed, leaving them in a so-called middle-income trap, in which per capita income levels stagnate before crossing the high-income threshold.	事实上，许多国家都尝试过但失败了，最终陷入了所谓的中等收入陷阱，人均收入在越过高收入门槛之前便开始走下坡路。


Strong human capital is critical to enable China to escape this fate.	强大的人力资本是中国摆脱这一命运的关键。


But China’s labor force currently lacks the skills needed to support high-tech, high-value industries.	但目前中国劳动力缺乏能够支持高科技、高价值产业的技能。


Changing this will require comprehensive education reform that expands and improves opportunities for children, while strengthening skills training for adults.	改变这一局面需要全面的教育改革以扩展和改善儿童的机会，同时加强成人技能培训。


To be sure, over the last four decades, the quality of China’s labor force has improved substantially, which is reflected in impressive gains in educational attainment.	平心而论，在过去四十年中，中国劳动力质量有了极大提升，这反映在令人瞩目的教育普及度大提高上。


Gross enrollment rates at the primary level have surpassed 100% since the 1990’s, while secondary and tertiary enrollment rates reached 87% and 24%, respectively, in 2012.	小学毛入学率在20世纪90年代就超过了100%，2012年中学和大学入学率分别达到了87%和24%。


In 2010, more than 70% of Chinese citizens aged 15-64 had received secondary education, compared to about 20% in 1970.	2010年，70%多的15—64岁中国公民接受国中学教育，而1970年这一比例在20%左右。


Furthermore, Chinese students perform well in internationally comparable tests.	此外，中国学生在国际可比测试中表现优异。


Fifteen-year-olds in Shanghai outperformed students from 65 countries, including 34 OECD countries, in mathematics, science, and reading, according to the Program for International Student Assessment in 2009 and 2012.	根据2009年和2012年国际学生评估计划（Program for International Student Assessment）的数据，上海十五岁年龄组学生在数学、科学和阅读能力方面表现在65个国家（其中包括34个经合组织国家）中名列前茅。


China has also benefited from rapid employment growth, with more than seven million workers having entered the workforce each year since 1990.	中国也从就业的快速增长中获益良多，自1990年以来，每年都有七百万以上工人进入劳动力大军。


This, together with the massive reallocation of workers from rural to urban areas, has supported the labor-intensive manufacturing industries that have fueled China’s economic rise.	这加上大量工人从农村来到城市，支持了刺激中国经济崛起的劳动密集型制造业。


But China’s demographic advantage is diminishing quickly, owing to low fertility rates and population aging.	但中国的人口优势正在快速消失，主要原因是低生育率和人口老龄化。


According to the United Nations, by 2030, China’s working-age population (15–59 years old) will have decreased by 67 million from its 2010 level.	根据联合国的数据，到2030年，中国工作适龄人口（15—59岁）将比2010年减少6,700万。


Moreover, higher education in China leaves much to be desired, with employer surveys revealing that graduates of upper secondary schools and universities usually lack the required technical knowledge and soft skills.	此外，教育程度的提高让中国用工要求也有所提高，雇主调查表明，高中和大学毕业生往往缺乏必需的技术知识和软技能。


For example, in 2013, more than one-third of the Chinese firms surveyed said that they struggled to recruit skilled workers, with 61% attributing this to a shortage of general employable skills.	比如，2013年，三分之一以上的受访中国企业表示难以招聘到熟练工，61%将其归咎于一般就业技能的短缺。


How, then, can China expect to achieve the export diversification and technological upgrading that it needs to move up the global value chain?	那么，中国如何实现提高其价值链地位所需要的出口多样化和技术升级？


Clearly, China needs to reform its higher-education institutions, including technical and vocational training programs.	显然，中国需要改革其高等教育制度，包括技术和职业培训计划。


At the same time, it must expand opportunities for anyone with talent to acquire high-quality secondary and tertiary education, thereby reducing substantial disparities in the accessibility and quality of higher education across regions and social groups.	与此同时，中国必须扩展人才获得高质量中学和大学教育的机会，从而减小不同地区和社会群体之间的较高等级教育机会和质量差距。


And the children of migrant workers in urban areas must be granted full access to the education system.	城镇地区农民工子女必须获得完整的受教育权。


Such efforts to reduce educational disparities would help to address income inequality – a significant threat to China’s future economic growth.	这些降低教育不平等的措施有助于纠正中国未来经济增长的一个巨大威胁——收入不平等。


All of this will require increased public investment in education.	所有这些都需要增加教育方面的公共投资。


As it stands, China’s public investment in education, as a share of GDP, is below international standards across all levels, but especially in senior secondary and tertiary education.	就现状而言，中国的教育公共投资占GDP比重全面低于国际标准，尤其是高中和大学教育。


China’s education challenge also extends to quality.	中国的教育挑战也包括质量方面。


Inadequate education is a major driver of rising unemployment among China’s senior secondary and tertiary graduates, not to mention their declining wage premium.	教育不足是中国高中和大学毕业生失业增加（更不用说工资溢价减少了）的主要原因之一。


This can be remedied through better financing, more effective recruitment and compensation policies, and more decentralized decision-making in school administrations.	这可以通过更好的资金支持、更有效的招聘和薪酬政策以及更分散化的学校管理决策实现。


Finally, though some evidence suggests that there is an over-supply of university graduates in China, ongoing demographic and sectoral shifts mean that China will encounter a supply deficit of 24 million highly skilled graduates of universities or higher-level vocational schools by 2020.	最后，尽管有证据表明中国存在大学毕业生供过于求的迹象，但持久的人口和部门变迁意味着到2020年，中国将面临2,400万高技能大学和高层次职业学校毕业生的供给缺口。


To fill this gap, China must upgrade its fragmented and ineffective technical- and vocational-training programs.	要弥补这一缺口，中国必须升级其碎片化而低效的技术和职业培训计划。


To ensure that its labor force can meet the demands of a rapidly changing economic and technological environment, China must build a more inclusive, higher quality education system.	要确保劳动力契合其迅速变化的经济和技术环境，中国必须建立更包容、质量更高的教育体系。


Without it, China may not be the world’s number one economy for long.	若非如此，中国就不可能成为世界第一的经济体。


Financial Safety Nets for Asia	亚洲的金融安全网


SEOUL – Emerging economies are facing significant uncertainty and serious downside risks.	发自首尔——新兴经济体面临着极大的不确定性和严重的下行风险。


One major source of instability is the looming reversal of the US Federal Reserve’s expansionary monetary policy – the prospect of which is generating volatility in global financial markets and threatening to disrupt emerging-economy growth.	而这种不稳定局势的一个主要来源则是美联储扩张性货币政策发生逆转的可能性——这一预期导致了全球金融市场动荡并威胁和破坏了新兴经济体的增长。


The Fed has signaled that its federal funds rate will remain near 0%, at least as long as unemployment exceeds 6.5% and inflation expectations remain well anchored.	美联储已经暗示，只要失业率依然高于6. 5%而通胀预期保持稳定，联邦利率就将维持接近零的水平。


But when and how the Fed will begin tightening monetary policy remains unclear.	但美联储将何时和如何收紧货币政策仍不明朗。


What is certain is that, in making its decision, the Fed will not consider its policy’s spillover effects on the rest of the world, leaving affected countries’ policymakers and central bankers to deal with the fallout.	可以肯定的是，在作出决定时，美联储将不考虑其政策对世界其他国家的溢出效应，任由受影响国的政策制定者和中央银行自行应对。


Tighter US monetary policy could intensify the global credit shortage, thereby increasing pressure on Asia’s economic and financial systems.	美国收紧货币政策可能加剧全球信贷短缺，从而增加亚洲经济和金融系统的压力。


Overreaction and herding behavior by market participants could trigger a sudden reversal of capital inflows, with a severe dollar shortage – as occurred in 1997 and 2008 – straining Asian banks and corporations.	市场参与者的过度反应和羊群行为可能会引发资本流入的突然逆转，美元严重短缺——正如1997年和2008年发生的那样——将使亚洲各国银行和企业承受巨大压力。


These risks explain why the Fed’s mere suggestion of a potential move toward reducing its purchases of long-term asset (so-called quantitative easing) caused emerging-market currencies and asset prices to plummet this summer.	这些风险解释了为何美联储可能采取行动减少购买长期资产（所谓定量宽松）的暗示会导致今年夏天新兴市场货币和资产价格暴跌。


They also underscore Asian economies’ need for stronger financial safety nets.	而它们也同时令人意识到亚洲经济体需要加强金融安全网。


The 2008 global financial crisis revealed fundamental flaws in the international monetary system, as the failure to ensure sufficient liquidity weighed heavily on emerging Asian economies.	2008年全球金融危机暴露出国际货币体系的根本缺陷，正是由于该体系未能保证足够流动性，从而拖累了亚洲新兴经济体。


Since then, these countries have taken measures to safeguard the stability of their financial systems against volatile external shocks, strengthen financial supervision and regulation, and develop more effective macroeconomic frameworks, including better macro-prudential regulation and capital-control measures.	从那时起，这些新兴国家采取措施维护金融体系稳定以对抗动荡的外部冲击，加强金融监管，并制定更有效的宏观经济框架，包括更好的宏观审慎监管和资本控制措施。


But their heavy reliance on international trade and capital flows means that they remain vulnerable to severe financial spillovers from the United States.	但它们对国际贸易和资本流动的依赖意味着自身仍然容易受到美国严重金融溢出效应的影响。


Moreover, since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the region’s emerging economies have increased their holdings of foreign-exchange reserves, and now possess more than half of the world’s total.	此外，自1997年亚洲金融危机以来，亚洲新兴经济体已经增加了其持有的外汇储备，如今储备量已经占到世界总量一半以上。


Seven of the world’s top ten reserve-holding economies are in Asia.	世界十大外汇储备国中的七个在亚洲。


But hoarding international reserves, mostly in the form of low-yielding short-term US Treasury securities, is expensive and inefficient.	但囤积的国际储备主要是低收益的短期美国国债形式，不但昂贵，而且低效。


Some Asian economies, especially China, are also attempting to internationalize their currencies.	一些亚洲经济体，尤其是中国，也在尝试货币国际化。


Given China’s expanding global influence, the renminbi’s emergence as a new international currency is inevitable.	鉴于中国不断扩大的全球影响，人民币崛起为一个新的国际货币是不可避免的。


For smaller economies, however, internationalization will be far more difficult.	然而，对于较小的经济体，国际化将更为困难。


In their quest to ensure sufficient liquidity, Asian economies have also actively pursued currency-swap arrangements.	为了确保有足够的流动性，亚洲经济体也积极推行货币互换事宜。


Since 2008, China has signed 23 bilateral swap agreements, including one with South Korea.	自2008年以来，中国已经签署了23个双边货币互换协议，其中包括韩国。


Japan expanded bilateral swap facilities with its Asian neighbors during the global financial crisis.	在全球金融危机时，日本扩大与亚洲邻国的双边货币互换政策。


And the ten ASEAN countries, together with China, Japan, and South Korea, have constructed a $240 billion regional reserve pool to provide short-term liquidity to members in an emergency.	东盟十国，以及中国，日本，韩国，已经建立了一个2400亿美元的区域外汇储备库，能在紧急情况下向成员国提供短期流动性。


Such swaps should help Asian countries to cope with currency turmoil in the wake of a Fed policy reversal.	这种互换协议应该能够帮助亚洲国家应对美联储政策逆转之后的货币动荡。


But they remain untested and, given their relatively small volumes, cannot reassure markets or provide adequate emergency support to crisis countries, especially in the event of large-scale systemic shocks.	但它们仍未经测试，由于其规模相对较小，无法让市场安心或为危机中的国家提供足够的紧急支持，尤其是在遭遇大规模系统性冲击的事件之中。


The Fed, as the de facto global lender of last resort, can improve significantly the effectiveness of Asia’s financial safety nets by establishing currency-swap arrangements with emerging economies’ central banks during the policy-reversal process.	美联储作为事实上的全球最后贷款人，可以在政策逆转过程中通过与新兴经济体央行建立货币互换机制，从而显着提高亚洲金融安全网的有效性。


In 2008, the Fed established currency-swap lines with the central banks of ten developed economies, including the eurozone, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Switzerland, and four emerging economies (Brazil, South Korea, Mexico, and Singapore).	2008年，美联储与十个发达经济体的中央银行建立了货币互换机制，其中包括欧元区，英国，日本，瑞士，和四个新兴经济体（巴西，韩国，墨西哥，新加坡）。


These arrangements, most of which ended in 2010, responded to strains in short-term credit markets and improved liquidity conditions during the crisis.	这些机制主要为了应对短期信贷市场的压力以及提高危机期间的流动性，并大部分在2010年底结束。


The South Korean central bank’s $30 billion swap, though limited, averted a run on the won.	其中韩国中央银行300亿美元的货币互换尽管金额有限，却也避免了韩元遭到冲击。


Reestablishing the Fed’s swap arrangements with emerging economies would minimize negative spillovers during the coming monetary-policy reversal.	重建美联储与新兴经济体的货币互换机制将减少货币政策逆转过程中产生的负面溢出。


Even an announcement by the Fed stating its willingness to do so would go a long way toward reassuring markets that emerging economies can avert a liquidity crisis.	即使美联储宣布愿意这样做，但距离让市场确信新兴经济体能够避免流动性危机还有很长的一段路要走。


The swap lines would also serve American interests.	互换额度也将为美国利益服务。


After all, trouble in emerging economies would destabilize the entire global economy, threatening the fragile recoveries of advanced economies, including the US.	毕竟，新兴经济体的问题会动摇全球经济，威胁包括美国在内的发达经济体脆弱的经济复苏。


And, given China’s rise, it is clearly in America’s interest to maintain a balance of economic power in Asia.	而且，考虑到中国的崛起，在亚洲保持经济力量均衡显然符合美国的利益。


Critics might cite the moral-hazard risk generated by liquidity support.	批评家可能会举出流动性支持产生的道德风险问题。


But a well-designed framework that offers swap lines only to well-qualified emerging economies – and only temporarily – would diminish this risk substantially.	但一个设计良好的框架，只为合格的新兴经济体提供互换额度——并且仅仅是暂时的——将大幅减少这种风险。


In fact, some experts, such as the economist Edwin Truman, have proposed establishing an institutionalized global swap arrangement as a more effective and robust crisis-prevention mechanism – an idea that G-20 countries should consider.	事实上有一些专家，如经济学家埃德温·杜鲁门（Edwin Truman），提出了建立一种全球互换机制作为一个更积极有效的危机预防机制——这是一个20国集团应该考虑的方案。


But creating such a system would take time.	但建立这样一个系统需要时间。


In the meantime, the Fed should take the initiative by re-establishing swap lines with advanced and emerging economies alike.	而与此同时，美联储应主动与发达经济体和新兴经济体重新建立货币互换额度。


India’s Chinese Dream	印度的中国梦


SEOUL – In recent years, China and India have both emerged as global economic superpowers, with China leading the way.	首尔—近几年来，中国和印度都成长为全球经济超级大国，其中中国更为领先。


But, with Chinese growth slowing and the need for structural change becoming increasingly acute, will the economic-reform efforts of India’s new prime minister, Narendra Modi, enable the country to catch up?	但是，随着中国增长减速以及结构调整需要日益尖锐，印度新总理莫迪的经济改革措施能让印度赶超中国吗？


Since the 1980s, China has experienced unprecedented economic growth, fueled by abundant low-cost labor, high saving and investment rates, substantial market reforms, outward-oriented policies, and prudent macroeconomic management.	自20世纪80年代以来，中国经历了前所未有的经济增长，其动力来自充足的低成本劳动力、高储蓄和投资率、重大市场改革、外向型政策以及审慎的宏观管理。


Its leaders now hope to achieve high-income status by developing more technologically sophisticated industries.	中国领导人现在希望通过发展技术更先进的产业让中国迈入高收入国家行列。


India’s economic performance has been less remarkable.	印度经济表现没有中国那么引人注目。


Economic growth began to accelerate dramatically in the early 1990s, owing to trade liberalization and other economic reforms.	印度经济增长自20世纪90年代初开始大幅加速，动力来自贸易自由化和其他经济改革。


Then reforms stalled, the fiscal and current-account deficits soared, and annual GDP growth fell to 4-5%.	接着，印度的改革出现了停滞，财政和经常项目赤字飙升，年GDP增长回落到4—5%。


As a result, China has pulled ahead, with per capita income last year standing at $11,850 – more than double India’s $5,350.	结果是中国跑在了印度前面，去年中国人均收入达到了11,850美元，是印度的5,350美元的两倍多。


The question now is whether Modi’s push for faster growth can narrow the income gap in the coming decades.	问题在于莫迪刺激增长的政策是否能在未来几十年缩小两国的收入差距。


The most important factor working in India’s favor is its “demographic dividend.”	印度最重要的有利因素是“人口红利”。


In China, population aging and low fertility rates are already causing the prime working-age population, people aged 15-59, to decline.	在中国，人口老龄化和低生育率已经造成主要工作人口——即15—59岁人群——开始下降。


From 2015-2040, this group is expected to shrink by more than 115 million.	从2015年到2040年，这一群体预计将减少1. 15亿人以上。


Meanwhile, India’s prime working-age population will increase by 190 million.	与此同时，印度主要工作人口将增加1. 9亿人。


But favorable demographics alone will not bring about the kind of growth that has made China the world’s second-largest economy.	但中国之所以能够实现使其成为世界第二大经济体的增长，并不只是人口结构的功劳。


India’s leaders must develop a comprehensive plan to eliminate barriers to economic competitiveness, expand employment opportunities in manufacturing, and improve workers’ education and skills.	印度领导人必须发展全面计划，消除经���竞争力壁垒，扩大制造业的就业机会，并改善工人的教育和技能。


As it stands, India ranks 60th in the world for economic competitiveness – much lower than China, which, at 29th, is closing in on high-income countries like South Korea (25th) and France (23rd).	目前，印度在全球经济竞争力排行榜上名列第60，远低于中国的29名。 而中国的名次与韩国（25名）和法国（23名）等高收入国家相当。


The reasons for this are not difficult to discern: India performs poorly on the fundamental drivers of long-term economic prosperity.	个中原因不难理解：印度长期经济繁荣基本动力不足。


Indeed, despite steady improvements, public health and education levels remain low (102nd worldwide).	事实上，尽管出现了稳步改善，但印度公共健康和教育水平仍然十分低下（名列第102）。


Moreover, the lack of adequate transport, communication, and energy infrastructure (85th) is undermining India’s productivity growth.	此外，缺少足够的交通、通信和能源基础设施（第85名）也制约了印度的生产率增长。


And India lags behind China in the efficiency of its product and labor markets (ranking 85th and 99th, respectively).	印度在产品和劳动力市场效率（分别名列第85和99）上也落后于中国。


Only by addressing these shortcomings can India attract sufficient investment and boost economic growth.	只哟克服这些劣势，印度才能吸引到足够的投资提振经济增长。


At the same time, India should expand labor-intensive manufacturing, thereby creating employment opportunities for its growing pool of workers.	与此同时，印度应该扩张劳动密集型制造业，从而为日益增加的劳动力大军创造就业机会。


Given that manufacturing contributes only 15% of India’s total output, compared to 31% in China, there is considerable room for growth.	制造业只贡献了印度总产出的15%，而中国为31%，因此在这方面印度大有可为。


In a sense, India has the advantage of being able to learn from China.	从这个角度讲，印度具有可以向中国取经的优势。


China transformed its agrarian economy by building a strong, labor-intensive industrial base, shifting workers from agriculture to manufacturing and construction, and improving productivity across all sectors.	中国通过建立强大的劳动密集型工业基础、将工人从农业转移到制造业和建筑业以及改善全部门生产率实现了农业经济的转型。


Today, the agricultural sector accounts for only one-third of total employment in China, compared to one-half in India.	如今，农业部门只贡献了中国总就业的三分之一，而印度为二分之一。


India’s structural transformation and sustainable growth will hinge on its efforts to build a flexible labor market, centered on the easing of outdated and complicated employment laws.	印度的结构转型和可持续增长将取决于其建立灵活劳动力市场的努力，其核心是放松过时而复杂的就业法。


The legal protections of workers in India’s formal sector exceed those of most developed countries, as well as China, with mandated requirements rising as the number of employees increases.	印度正式部门的工人法定保护比大部分发达国家都要大，也比中国要大，强制要求随着雇员人数的增加而增加。


As Jagdish Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya have pointed out,excessive labor-market regulations deter Indian entrepreneurs from employing unskilled workers and developing labor-intensive manufacturing, implying that the Indian government should redouble its reform efforts in this area.	巴格瓦蒂（Jagdish Bhagwati）和帕纳加利亚（Arvind Panagariya）指出，劳动力市场的过度监管让印度企业家不敢雇用低技能工人和发展劳动密集型制造业，这意味着印度政府需要在这方面加倍努力地实施改革。


Equally important, Indian workers – especially young people – need opportunities to upgrade their skills continuously.	同样重要的是，印度工人——特别是年轻人——需要持续提高技能的机会。


The McKinsey Global Institute estimates that, of the potential global oversupply of 90 million low-skilled workers in 2020, 27 million will be in India.	据麦肯锡全球研究所（McKinsey Global Institute ）估计，到2020年全球将出现9亿低技能工人供给过剩，其中2. 7亿在印度。


Meanwhile, the country will face a shortage of 13 million medium-skilled workers.	与此同时，印度还将面临1. 3亿中等技能工人短缺。


Despite India’s educational expansion, especially at the secondary and tertiary levels, its system of higher education, including technical and vocational education and training, remains inadequate.	尽管印度的教育正在发展，特别是在初高中教育方面，但印度高等教育体系——包括技术和职业教育与培训——仍然不足。


Though India’s public vocational education and training systems are well institutionalized, they lack the scale, curriculum, financing, and incentives needed to prepare young workers to meet the demands of rapid globalization and technological advancement.	尽管印度公共职业教育和培训体系已得到了很好的制度化，但缺少必要的规模、课程、资金和激励让年轻工人满足快速全球化和科技进步的要求。


The good news is that Modi seems committed to boosting India’s competitiveness by improving its business climate.	好消息是莫迪似乎决心要通过改善商业环境提高印度的竞争力。


For example, he has already announced measures to promote foreign direct investment in insurance, defense, and telecommunications, including higher infrastructure spending and new tax incentives for savings and investment.	比如，他已经宣布了刺激保险、防务和通信方面的外国直接投资的措施，包括提高基础设施支出和新的鼓励储蓄和投资的税收激励。


India’s government will also sustain its predecessors’ efforts to strengthen vocational education and skills training.	印度政府还继续前任强化职业教育和技能培训的政策。


What Modi’s plan lacks is a strong focus on expanding India’s labor-intensive industries.	莫迪的计划所欠缺的是大力关注扩大印度的劳动密集型行业。


That, together with the planned reforms, would enable India to seize the opportunities that arise with favorable demographics and achieve Chinese-style growth.	这将与计划中的改革一起让印度能够抓住有利的人口结构所带来的机会，实现中国式增长。


Education and Opportunity	教育和机会


SEOUL – Education is a fundamental driver of personal, national, and global development.	首尔——教育能从根本上推动个人、国家和全球的发展。


Since the beginning of the century, recognition of this has driven many countries to pursue the Millennium Development Goal of achieving universal primary education and eradicating gender disparities at all levels of education by 2015.	自本世纪伊始，相关认识就推动众多国家努力实现到2015年普及小学教育、消除教育领域两性差异的千年发展目标。


This has contributed to considerable progress in expanding educational opportunities and attainment worldwide.	这成就了扩大全球教育机会及提高教育水平的巨大进步。


But there is much more to be done.	但还有很多工作要做。


To be sure, universal primary education has nearly been achieved.	毫无疑问，我们几乎实现了普及小学教育的目标。


Moreover, considerable progress has been made toward gender equality in educational opportunities and attainment.	此外，在教育机会和程度上实现两性平等也已经迈出了重要一步。


Indeed, enrollment rates for school-age females have increased steadily at all levels, reaching near parity with male enrollment globally.	事实上，适龄女童的入学率一直在稳步提高，并且在全球范围内接近男性入学率。


As a result, the gender gap in average years of schooling for the adult population – a widely used measure of educational attainment – has narrowed.	结果是成年人口平均受教育年限的差异（被广泛用来衡量教育成就）已经显著缩小。


Moreover, in 2010, for people aged 25 and above, the female-to-male ratio in average years of schooling was almost 100% in advanced countries and about 85% in developing regions.	此外，在2010年，在25岁及以上人群当中，发达国家女性与男性平均受教育年限比率已接近100%，而发展中地区则为85%。


But, in many low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, girls still have far less access to education, especially at the secondary and tertiary levels, than boys do.	但是在撒哈拉以南非洲、中东和南亚很多低收入国家，女性的教育机会仍远远逊于男性，特别是在中学和大学教育阶段。


Significant global disparities also remain in post-primary education and the quality of schooling.	小学后教育和教育质量方面存在的全球差距依然巨大。


In advanced countries, almost 90% of the population aged 15-64 has attained at least some secondary education, compared to only 63% in developing countries.	在发达国家，近90%15至64岁的民众都至少接受过某种程度的中等教育，而发展中国家这一比例只有63%。


Likewise, though more than 33% of the working-age population in advanced countries has achieved some level of tertiary education, the proportion is just 12% in the developing world.	同样，虽然发达国家劳动年龄人口33%以上都接受过一定程度的高等教育，发展中国家这一的比例却仅为12%。


Academic research suggests that countries with higher per capita income, lower income inequality, and lower fertility rates tend to invest more in children’s education, with public expenditure leading to higher enrollment rates.	学术研究表明人均收入较高、收入差距较低且生育率较低的国家倾向于更多投资于子女教育，其公共支出导致入学率升高。


The logical conclusion is that efforts to promote more inclusive economic growth and improve education systems can raise enrollment among young people in developing countries and reduce disparities between genders and among social groups.	由此得出的合理结论是促进更具包容性的经济增长及改善教育系统能提高发展中国家年轻人的入学率，并使性别和社会群体差距缩小。


But simply narrowing the gaps in school-enrollment rates and total years of schooling is not enough.	但仅仅缩小入学率和受教育年限差距还远远不够。


Countries must also ensure the quality of their education systems – a key challenge for the coming decades.	各国还必须确保其教育系统质量——这是今后几十年最主要的难题。


As it stands, poor educational outcomes and inefficient education systems are eliciting deep concern worldwide.	现状是差强人意的教育结果和低效的教育体系正在世界各地引发深切的忧虑。


In many countries, primary schools fail to provide students with appropriate cognitive skills like numeracy, literacy, problem-solving ability, and general scientific knowledge.	在很多国家，小学教育未能教会学生认字、算数、解决问题和一般科学知识等恰当的认知能力。


Furthermore, inadequate education at the secondary and tertiary levels, including technical and vocational education and training, is leaving students unequipped to meet the job market’s changing demands.	此外，中学和大学教育（包括技术及职业教育培训）的缺陷导致学生无法应对就业市场需求的不断变化。


As a result, many countries are struggling with a mismatch between the skills that employers seek and those that workers have.	结果很多国家都出现了雇主所需技能与工人掌握技能之间不匹配的状况。


Wide disparities in educational quality, often measured by student achievement on international examinations, are evident within and across countries.	教育质量的巨大差距（往往以学生在国际考试中的成绩来衡量）在国内各地和各国间显而易见。


The results of most internationally comparable mathematics, reading, and science exams for primary and secondary students reveal a considerable gap not only between advanced and developing countries, but also across the developing world.	最具国际可比性的中小学生数学、阅读和科学测试结果显示不仅发达和发展中国家间、甚至就连发展中国家之间也差距显著。


According to the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study, South Korea had the highest average score (590) in 2011 on the science test for secondary students, while Ghana scored the lowest (306).	《国际数学和科学研究趋势》显示韩国在2011年中学科学测试中平均分最高（590），而加纳最低（306）。


Though academic performance is determined largely by family inputs and students’ individual talents, other factors, such as the amount of school resources available to students, also play an important role, as do various other school inputs, such as teacher quality, class size, expenditure per pupil, and instruction time.	虽然家庭投入和学生的个体才华在很大程度上决定学习成绩，但其他因素（比方说学生享有的学校资源）和师资力量、班级规模、单位生源支出和教学时间等其他各类学校投入起到的作用同样重要。


The institutional features of education systems are another important determinant of student achievement.	教育系统的体制特点是决定学生成绩的另一重要因素。


Private financing and provision, school autonomy, and external monitoring and assessment mechanisms tend to influence the quality of education by changing the incentives for students and teachers.	民间融资和规则、办学自主权及外部监测和评估机制往往通过改变教师和学生激励机制来影响教育质量。


In the future, new information and communication technologies are expected to stimulate the expansion of educational opportunities and to improve educational quality at the national and global level, by offering a variety of innovative learning channels.	未来全新信息和通信技术有望通过提供各种创新学习渠道来刺激教育机会扩大并改善国家和全球层面的教育质量。


For example, the ability to use new technologies to build borderless networks among schools can offer opportunities for students in low-income countries to learn from teachers in advanced countries – and vice versa.	比方说利用新技术建设校际无边界网络可以为低收入国家的学生提供向发达国家教师学习的机会，反过来也同样成立。


The imperative is clear.	当务之急非常明确。


Global leaders must commit to enhancing the quality of education and reduce the education gap by increasing school resources, improving the efficiency of educational institutions, and seizing the opportunities afforded by technological innovation.	全球领导人必须竭力通过增加学校资源、提高教育机构效率和抓住技术创新所带来机遇切实提高教育质量及缩小教育差距。


All of this will serve to enrich human capital, which is essential to boosting productivity and incomes.	所有这一切可以丰富人力资源成本，而人力资源成本对于提高生产率和收入不可或缺。


Indeed, if such efforts are designed specifically to ensure equal opportunities for all, regardless of gender or wealth, they will be a boon to the global economy, while promoting social cohesion at the national level.	事实上，如果上述努力在设计时旨在确保无分性别及贫富人人机会平等，那么必将在促进国家层面社会和谐的同时致使全球经济从中受益。


When it comes to improving education, there really is no downside.	改善教育无论如何也没有任何坏处。


What Comes After Lee Kuan Yew?	李光耀之后会发生什么？


LONDON – All political leaders worry about their legacies.	伦敦——所有政治领袖都在意身后的美名。


Lee Kuan Yew, who presided over Singapore either directly or indirectly for more than a half-century – remaining influential right up to his death at 91 – had more time in power than most to do so.	直接或间接主宰新加坡半个多世纪的李光耀直到91岁逝世前都极富影响力——他的掌权时间超过了大多数人。


Several volumes of memoirs attest to Lee’s concern about his legacy, although Singapore’s extraordinary success under his leadership speaks for itself.	有几部回忆录证明李光耀非常在意身后的传统 ，虽然在他带领下新加坡异乎寻常的成功不言自明。


Like him or not – and many did not – there is no denying the city-state’s remarkable and enduring prosperity and stability.	很多人对他没有好感，但无论是否喜欢李光耀，人们都无法否认这个城市国家令人赞叹的长期繁荣和稳定。


Yet the effort put into those memoirs by the man who called himself “Minister Mentor” during his later years offers a clue about Lee’s ultimate concern.	但这位晚年自称“部长导师”的领袖所写的回忆录让人们了解了他的终极关切。


His legacy in terms of Singapore’s past success may be clear, but what about the future?	就新加坡过去的成功而言他的遗产或许非常明确，但未来呢？


That, of course, is one of the few things he could not control, beyond offering his teachings to future generations.	除对子孙后代勤加教导外，这无疑是少数他无法控制的问题之一。


Yet in one crucial respect – determining who Singapore’s new generation of leaders will be – the tight control that Lee exercised in the past may now make that future more difficult.	但在决定新加坡新一代领导人的关键问题上，李光耀过去的严格控制可能会加大未来的难度。


The issue is certainly solvable, especially given an excellent education system and high-quality institutions of all kinds.	这个问题肯定可以解决，尤其考虑到新加坡拥有优秀的教育体系和高质量的机构。


But Lee’s own actions suggest that he harbored doubts.	但李光耀自己的所做所为表明他的顾虑仍未消除。


The succession to Lee was clear: after handing over the premiership in 1990 (at the surprisingly young age of 66) to a trusted associate, Goh Chok Tong, he groomed his eldest son, Brigadier-General Lee Hsien Loong, for the job.	李光耀的继承人非常明确：在20世纪90年代（年仅66岁）将总理宝座交给值得信赖的同事吴作栋后，李光耀全力培养自己的长子准将李显龙。


After serving as Singapore’s trade minister, finance minister, and deputy prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong took over the top post in 2004.	在历任新加坡贸易部长、财政部长和副总理后，李显龙于2004年登上了总理宝座。


What is unresolved is where power goes next, and how.	之后传位给谁、怎么传位尚不明确。


Perhaps the answer will simply be that the ruling People’s Action Party will choose a successor in the conventional way.	或许答案仅仅是新加坡执政的人民行动党将以传统的方式选择继任者。


Certainly, Singapore’s cadre of talented and experienced officials and ministers is deep.	当然，新加坡有才干、经验丰富的官员和部长储备深厚。


Still, the question is an open one, owing to Lee Kuan Yew’s somewhat paradoxical sensitivity to the prominence of his family members in some of the country’s most senior posts.	但李光耀对家人担任新加坡某些最高级职位的异乎寻常的敏感致使问题仍未得到解决。


Lee fought many battles with the international media over their coverage of Singapore, especially from the mid-1980s onward, by which point the country’s success had become abundantly clear.	从20世纪80年代中外界明确感受到新加坡的成功后，李光耀曾就国际媒体对新加坡的报导与其展开了激烈的斗争。


As a Cambridge-trained lawyer, he was especially keen on using the law to browbeat his media (and political) critics, knowing full well that he had no serious chance of losing in Singapore’s own courts.	毕业于剑桥大学法律系的他特别热衷于用法律来恫吓媒体（和政界）批评者，因为他知道在新加坡国内法庭他不会真的败诉。


During my time as the editor-in-chief of The Economist (1993-2006), I received such browbeatings on many occasions.	在就任《经济学家》（1993-2006）杂志主编的日子里，我就有多次遭遇恫吓的经历。


What eventually became clear was that under no circumstances could Lee Kuan Yew countenance one particular word or concept: nepotism.	我终于明白裙带关系这个字眼或概念李光耀无论在什么情况下都不会接受。


After all, he had set up Singapore as an intensely meritocratic society, in which competition, under clear and accepted rules, was king.	归根结底，他一手将新加坡打造成纯粹的精英社会，在上述制度下，在明确且公认规则管理下的竞争才是王道。


So when his own son became Prime Minister, and his daughter-in-law, Ho Ching, took the helm at Temasek, one of the state’s huge investment companies, any insinuation that they had done so on anything other than their own merit was unacceptable.	因此当他的儿子成为总理，儿媳何晶执掌新加坡巨型投资公司淡马锡时，任何暗示他们靠自身素质以外的优势获此殊荣的影射都完全无法接受。


Lee established a high-minded committee to establish that nepotism was not the reason, and then set about suing anyone who dared to suggest otherwise.	李光耀执意成立高尚委员会证明家人当政不是依靠裙带关系，之后又着手对任何敢于挑战这一观点的人进行起诉。


Yet this abhorrence of nepotism was illogical – and Lee was generally nothing if not logical, even ruthlessly so – because in this case a perfectly good justification for it followed smoothly from his own analysis of Singapore.	但这种对裙带关系的厌恶不合逻辑——李光耀一般而言极重逻辑，甚至为此到了不讲情面的地步——因为他本人对新加坡的分析能顺理成章地告诉人们他为什么要这样做。


A tiny, multi-racial society ejected from Malaysia in 1965, Singapore was born in an atmosphere of vulnerability, lack of legitimacy and trust, and ethnic conflict.	1965年新加坡最早从马来西亚独立，这个多民族小国在成立之初脆弱、缺乏信任及合法性并随处可见民族冲突。


Up through the 1980s and 1990s, Lee often justified the continuation of authoritarian policies by reference to those communal riots, and to the ever-present possibility of a loss of social trust and a return to conflict.	直到二十世纪八九十年代，李光耀还常常以社会骚乱和丧失社会信任、回归冲突为由继续执行独裁政策。


So, in passing the baton to his eldest son, he could be said to have dealt with that risk in the most logical way possible.	因此，通过将指挥棒交给长子，李光耀可以说以最合乎逻辑的方式消灭了这一风险因素。


If you trusted the founder of Singapore and thought him legitimate, who better to trust than the founder’s own son?	如果你信任新加坡的创始人并承认其合法性，那么是否还有比信任他的儿子更好的选择？


Indeed, the father would remain on the scene, first as “Senior Minister” and then in his mentor role, and had made his son prove his abilities openly in a series of prominent positions.	事实上，身为父亲的李光耀一直没有离开政界，先是身为“资政”而后又担任导师，其���的能力已经在一系列显要位置上公开得到了证明。


It worked, and Lee Hsien Loong has by all accounts done a good job as Prime Minister, whatever the explanation for his rise.	李光耀的计划成功实现，无论如何解释李显龙的崛起，从各种角度而言他都出色完成了首相工作。


There is no current risk to Singapore’s political stability, and the younger Lee is only 63 years old; he could remain in office for a long time to come.	目前没有任何因素能威胁到新加坡的政治稳定，而李显龙才刚满63岁； 他还可以有很长时间担任总理职务。


The question, though, remains: What happens next?	但问题依然是：今后会发生什么？


Lee Kuan Yew dealt with the question of succession by deferring it.	李光耀通过延缓解决了继任者问题。


His son will need to provide the answer.	他的儿子还需要给出答案。


The Right Left for Europe	欧洲的正确左派


ATHENS – The United Kingdom’s referendum on whether to leave the European Union created odd bedfellows – and some odder adversaries.	雅典—英国关于是否脱离欧盟的全民公决造就了奇怪的枕边人——以及更加奇怪的对手。


As Tory turned mercilessly against Tory, the schism in the Conservative establishment received much attention.	保守党对保守党毫不留情，其建制内部的分歧饱受关注。


But a parallel (thankfully more civilized) split afflicted my side: the left.	而另一种分歧（谢天谢地，它要文明一些）折磨着我的阵营：左派。


Having campaigned against “Leave” for several months in England, Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland, it was inevitable that I faced criticism from left-wing supporters of “Brexit,” or “Lexit” as it came to be known.	几个月来，我在英格兰、威尔士、北爱尔兰和苏格兰宣传反对“脱离”，难免遇到一些来自左翼的“英国退出”支持者，即所谓的“左翼退欧派”（Lexit）。


Lexiteers reject the call issued by DiEM25 (the radical Democracy in Europe Movement, launched in Berlin in February) for a pan-European movement to change the EU from within.	左翼退欧派拒绝DiEM25（ 2月份成立于柏林的激进党派欧洲运动民主党）所提出的从内部改变欧盟的泛欧洲运动。


They believe that reviving progressive politics requires exiting an incorrigibly neoliberal EU.	他们认为，复兴进步政治就必须退出不可救药的新自由主义（neoliberal）欧盟。


The left needed the resulting debate.	左派需要由此产生的争论。


Many on the left rightly disdain the easy surrender of others on their side to the premise that globalization has rendered the nation-state irrelevant.	许多左派对于自己阵营中轻信全球化让民族国家不再重要这一前提的人嗤之以鼻，这是正确的。


While nation-states have become weaker, power should never be confused with sovereignty.	尽管民族国家式微，但永远不可把权力与主权混淆。


As little Iceland has demonstrated, it is possible for a sovereign people to safeguard basic freedoms and values independently of their state’s power.	蕞尔小国冰岛表明，主权民族无法独立于国家权力捍卫基本自由和价值。


And, crucially, Iceland, unlike Greece and the UK, never entered the EU.	关键是，冰岛不像希腊和英国，它从未加入欧盟。


Back in the 1990s, I campaigned against Greece’s entry into the eurozone, just like Britain’s Labour Party leader, Jeremy Corbyn, campaigned in the 1970s against joining the EU.	20世纪90年代，我奔走反对希腊加入欧盟，一如英国工党领袖杰瑞米·科尔宾在20世纪70年代奔走反对加入欧盟。


Indeed, when asked by friends in Norway or Switzerland whether they should support their countries’ entry into the EU, my answer is negative.	事实上，挪威和瑞士的朋友问我他们是否应该支持国家加入欧盟，我的回答是消极的。


But it is one thing to oppose entering the EU; it is quite another to favor exiting it once inside.	但反对加入欧盟是一回事，一旦加入之后支持退出欧盟又是截然不同的另一回事。


Exiting is unlikely to get you to where you would have been, economically and politically, had you not entered.	退出不可能让你在经济和政治上回到圆点，一如你在加入之前那样。


So opposing both entry and exit is a coherent position.	因此，既反对加入，也反对退出是一个一致的立场。


Whether it makes sense for leftists to advocate exit hinges on whether a nation-state freed from EU institutions provides more fertile ground for cultivating a progressive agenda of redistribution, labor rights, and anti-racism.	左派鼓吹退出是否明智取决于摆脱欧盟机构的民族国家是否能提供更加肥沃的土壤培育再分配、劳动权利和反种族主义的进步日程。


It also depends on the likely impact of an exit campaign on transnational solidarity.	它还取决于退出运动对国家间凝聚力的潜在影响。


As I travel across Europe, advocating a pan-European movement to confront the EU’s authoritarianism, I sense a great surge of internationalism in places as different from one another as Germany, Ireland, and Portugal.	我在周游欧洲、支持针对欧盟极权主义的泛欧洲运动时感到，德国、爱尔兰和葡萄牙这些截然不同的地方都涌现出巨大的国际主义浪潮。


Distinguished Lexiteers, like Harvard’s Richard Tuck, are prepared to risk quashing this surge.	著名的左翼退欧派，如哈佛大学的理查德·塔克（Richard Tuck），准备冒险镇压国际主义的兴起。


They point to pivotal moments when the left took advantage of Britain’s lack of a written constitution to expropriate private medical business and create its National Health Service and other such institutions.	他们指向左派利用英国缺少成文宪法征用私人传媒企业、成立国民健康服务（National Health Service，NHS）及类似机构的重要时刻。


“A vote to stay within the EU,” Tuck writes, “will…end any hope of genuinely left politics in the UK.”	“投票留在欧盟，” 塔克写道，“将……扼杀英国真正的左派政治的希望。 ”


Similarly, on immigration, Tuck claims that, despite the insufferable xenophobia dominating the Leave campaign, the only way to overcome racism is to let Britain’s people “feel” sovereign again by returning control of their borders to London.	类似地，在移民问题上，塔克声称，尽管难以容忍的仇外主义主宰着脱欧阵营，但克服种族主义的唯一办法是通过将边境控制权还给伦敦让英国人民重新“感觉到”主权。


Tuck’s historical analysis is correct.	塔克的历史分析是正确的。


The EU is inimical to projects such as the NHS and nationalized industries (though it was the British nation-state, under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, that gave the EU its neoliberal cast).	欧盟不利于NHS和产业国有化这样的计划（尽管让欧盟披上新自由主义���彩的正是首相撒切尔夫人治下的民族国家英国）。


And perhaps the loss of control over immigration from Europe inspired greater xenophobia.	也许失去对来自欧洲的移民的控制引发了更大的仇外主义。


But once locked into this EU, a political campaign to exit it is unlikely to steer national politics in the direction of leftist goals.	但一旦被锁定在这个欧盟内，退出欧盟的政治运动不可能引导国家政策转向左派目标。


Most likely, it will result in a new Tory administration that tightens the screw of austerity further and erects new fences to keep despised foreigners out.	最有可能的是，这将产生一个新的保守党政府，它会进一步收紧紧缩，竖起新的屏障将讨厌的外国人排除在国门之外。


Many leftists find it hard to fathom why I campaigned for “Remain” after EU leaders vilified me personally and crushed Greece’s “Athens Spring” in 2015.	许多左派觉得难以理解我为何在欧盟领导人对我个人进行口诛笔伐、并在2015年镇压希腊的“雅典之春”后还支持“留欧”。


Of course, no truly progressive agenda can be revived through the EU institutions.	当然，任何真正的进步日程都无法通过欧盟机构复兴。


DiEM25 was founded on the conviction that it is only against EU institutions, but within the EU, that progressive politics has a chance in Europe.	DiEM25的成立基础是人们相信它只反欧盟机构，但仍在欧盟内部，相信进步政治有机会改变欧洲。


Leftists once understood that the good society is to be won by entering the prevailing institutions in order to overcome their regressive function.	左派曾经理解，好社会需要通过加入通行机构以克服它们的退步作用才能赢得。


“In and against” used to be our motto.	“留下并反对”曾经是我们的座右铭。


We should revive it.	我们需要修订这个座右铭。


Another critic of DiEM25, Thomas Fazi, believes that, “given the current make-up of the European Parliament,” Greece would still have been crushed, even if the parliament were more democratic.	另一位DiEM25批评者托马斯法齐（Thomas Fazi）认为，“从当前的欧洲议会构成看，”希腊仍会受到镇压，即便议会变得更加民主。


But DiEM25’s view is not simply that the EU suffers a democratic deficit; it is that the European Parliament is not a proper parliament.	但DiEM25的观点不仅仅是欧洲蒙受了民主赤字，而是欧洲议会不是一个合适的议会。


Creating a proper parliament, able to dismiss the executive, would destroy the European Parliament’s “current make-up” and usher in a democratic politics that would prevent official creditors from crushing countries like Greece.	建立一个能否决执行官的合适的议会将摧毁欧洲议会的“当前构成”，并引入能防止官方债权人镇压希腊等国家的民主政治。


Fazi’s fellow economist Heiner Flassbeck likewise argues that the nation-state, not some airy-fairy pan-European terrain, as DiEM25 purportedly suggests, is the right place to push for change.	法齐的同道经济学家海纳·弗拉斯贝克（Heiner Flassbeck）也指出，民族国家，而不是DiEM25所提出的自由放任的泛欧洲领地，才是推行变化的正确地点。


In fact, DiEM25 focuses on both levels and beyond.	事实上，DiEM25的关注点包括但不限于这两个层面。


The left, once upon a time, understood the importance of operating simultaneously at the municipal, regional, national, and international levels.	曾几何时，左派理解在市政、地区、国家和国际层面同时运作的重要性。


Why do we, suddenly, feel the need to prioritize the national over the European?	为何我们突然之间觉得需要把国家置于欧洲之上？


Perhaps Flassbeck’s harshest criticism of DiEM25’s radical pan-Europeanism is the charge that we are peddling left-wing TINA: “there is no alternative” to operating at the level of the EU.	也许弗拉斯贝克对DiEM25的激进泛欧洲主义最严厉的批评是它指责DiEM25在兜售左翼TINA：“没有替代方案”可以运作于欧盟层面。


While DiEM25 advocates a democratic union, we certainly reject both the inevitability and the desirability of “ever closer union.”	尽管DiEM25宣扬一个民主联盟，但我们断然拒绝“日益紧密的联盟”的必然性和合理性。


Today, the European establishment is working toward a political union that, we regard as an austerian iron cage.	如今，欧洲建制正在朝一个我们称之为紧缩铁笼的政治联盟前进。


We have declared war on this conception of Europe.	我们已经向如此欧洲概念宣战。


Last year, when Greece’s official creditors threatened us with ejection from the eurozone, even from the EU, I was undaunted.	去年，希腊官方债权人威胁我们要将我们逐出欧元区乃至欧盟，但我不为所动。


DiEM25 is imbued with this spirit of defiance: we will not be forced by the prospect of the EU’s disintegration to acquiesce to an EU of the establishment’s choosing.	DiEM25充满了这一反抗精神：我们不会手迫于欧盟解体前景而默许建制所选择的欧盟。


In fact, we believe it is important to prepare for the collapse of EU under the weight of its leaders’ hubris.	事实上，我们认为，做好欧盟不堪领导人的傲慢而解体的准备至关重要。


But that is not the same as making the EU’s disintegration our objective and inviting European progressives to join neo-fascists in campaigning for it.	但这并不意味着我们将欧盟解体作为目标并推动欧洲进步分子与新法西斯主义联合推进这一目的。


The philosopher Slavoj Žižek, a DiEM25 signatory, recently quipped that socialist nationalism is not a good defense against the postmodern national socialism that the EU’s disintegration would bring.	DiEM25的签署者、哲学家齐泽克（Slavoj Žižek）最近戏谑道，社会主义民族主义不是针对欧盟解体将要带来的后现代民族主义社会主义的好防御办法。


He’s right.	他是正确的。


Now more than ever, a pan-European humanist movement to democratize the EU is the left’s best bet.	如今，通过一个泛欧洲人道主义运动实现欧盟民主化是左派的最佳选择。


Criminalizing Consent?	将同意入刑？


LONDON – Canada’s Parliament is debating a new anti-prostitution bill.	伦敦—加拿大议会正在争论一项新的反卖淫法案。


Entitled the “Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act,” the proposed legislation would criminalize the purchase of “sexual services.”	这项名为《保护社区和被剥削者法案》（Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act）的立法建议将把购买“性服务”的行为列为犯罪。


For those who are uncertain about what might constitute a sexual service, the term is helpfully defined by Canada’s Department of Justice to include lap-dancing, but not stripping or “acts related to the production of pornography.”	有人也许不确定什么构成性服务，加拿大司法部对该用语进行了有帮助的定义，其中包括了大腿舞，但不包括脱衣舞或“与产生色情有关的行为”。


Canada is not alone in seeking to criminalize transactional sex between consenting adults.	在将同意的成年人之间的性交易入刑方面，加拿大并不是唯一的尝试者。


More than 120 countries criminalize some aspect of sex work or solicitation, including 13 that, like the Canadian bill, criminalize the customer, and eight where possession of a condom is deemed to be proof of sex work, and thus punishable.	120多个国家将某种形式的性工作或组织卖淫列为犯罪，其中有13个国家（加拿大的立法建议也是如此）将购买行为也列为犯罪，更有八个国家规定拥有避孕套是从事性工作的证明，因此也是禁止的。


While the French Senate recently struck down a similar law, several European countries are pressing ahead.	法国参议院最近驳回了类似的法律，但不少欧洲国家正在这个方向前进。


In February, the European Parliament adopted a resolution to outlaw the purchase of sexual services from anyone below the age of 21.	2月，欧洲议会批准了一项决议，21岁以下购买性服务的行为一律视为非法。


The impact of such laws will be much more significant than many believe.	这些法律的影响比很多人想象得更大。


Surveys across 54 countries worldwide have found that up to 14% of men in nationally representative samples – and a global average of 9-10% – report paying for sex in the past year.	全球54个国家的调查发现，国家代表性样本中最多有19%的男性表示在过去的一年里买过春，全球平均水平则达到了9—10%。


Similar population-based surveys among women find much smaller proportions selling sex.	类似的基于人口的女性调查所披露的卖春比例要低得多。


Efforts to regulate or ban the sex trade are hardly new.	监管或禁止性交易的尝试并不新鲜。


Religious and cultural proscriptions aimed at controlling sexual behavior have been around for millennia.	旨在控制性行为的宗教和文化禁忌已经存在了上千年。


Over time, however, the concept of what, when, where, and with whom sexual activity is permissible has changed – sometimes quite arbitrarily, depending on who is in power.	但是，随着时间的推移，什么性行为、在何时发生性行为、与谁发生性行为应该被禁止的概念发生着变化——有时这种变化相当武断，取决于当权者是谁。


As a result, laws governing sexual behavior are almost as varied as human sexuality itself.	结果，约束性行为的法律几乎与人类性欲为本身一样多姿多彩。


Many countries criminalize extra-marital sex.	许多国家将婚外性列为犯罪。


Moreover, more than 20 countries criminalize premarital sex between consenting adults, though in at least 34 countries, young people cannot marry until they are 20 – and, in one country, men need to be 29.	此外，20多个国家将同意的成年人之间的婚前性行为列为犯罪，尽管至少有34个国家的法定结婚年龄超过20岁——其中有一个国家男性29岁才能结婚。


Conversely, in more than 50 countries, a girl under 15 can be married off if her parents consent to it, even if she does not.	反之，在50多个国家，只要家长同意，不满15岁的女孩也可以结婚，甚至不需本人愿意。


The United Nations estimates that more than 14 million girls under the age of 18 – of whom one third are under 15 – get married each year.	联合国估计，每年有超过1,400万不满18岁的女孩结婚——其中三分之一还不到15岁。


That is 39,000 girl brides every day.	这意味着每天都要产生39,000童婚新娘。


In three countries, a third of all girls are married by their 15th birthday.	有三个国家三分之一的女孩在15岁生日之前就已经结婚。


Laws governing sex among consenting adults can be similarly harsh.	约束同意的成年人之间性行为的法律也可以相当严苛。


In 78 countries, homosexuality is prohibited, and in seven it is punishable by death.	78个国家禁止同性恋，更有七个国家同性恋可能被判死刑。


The damage caused by such repressive and restrictive laws is well documented, including, for example, an increased risk of HIV transmission among gay men.	这些严刑峻法所造成的伤害不绝于书，比如同性恋男子之间艾滋病风险的剧增。


Do local cultural and religious values outweigh such concerns?	地方文化和宗教价值能超越这些考虑吗？


A universal definition of sexual health and sexual rights is sorely needed.	我们急需放之四海而皆准的性健康和性权利定义。


The UN has long attempted to define what constitutes a sexually healthy society.	长期以来，联合国一直在尝试定义什么构成性健康社会。