These three powers, each of great importance to Europe, have been rivals for many centuries.	这三大势力每一个都对欧洲有着重大影响，而他们相互之间的敌对状况已持续数百年了。


So an alliance between them would seem a near impossibility. Yet Europe seems bent on achieving the impossible, to the Continent’s detriment.	短期看来他们结盟的可能性似乎没有，不过欧洲似乎已下定决心要变不可能为可能，而不顾整个大陆可能受到的损害。


Within Turkey, opinion polls suggest that frustration with Europe is intensifying, while Iran is viewed with increasing favor.	民意调查显示土耳其国内对欧洲的挫败感不断加剧，同时对伊朗的看法正在日趋改善。


A sense of alienation towards the West is spreading, and Turkey’s diplomatic relations with Russia have reached a hitherto unknown intimacy.	一种对西方的疏离感正在传播，而土耳其与俄罗斯的外交关系已达到空前的亲密程度。


Of course, there is vast domestic resistance to Turkey’s accession to the EU.	当然，土耳其国内对加入欧盟的反对声浪也颇为汹涌。


The final result of the accession process is therefore an open question for both sides.	因此，对于双方来说，入盟进程的结果仍是未知数。


Admittedly, Turkey has a long way to go.	土耳其的确还有很长的路要走。


But to endanger this process here and now, in full awareness of the possible costs, is an act of very costly stupidity on the part of the Europeans – and stupidity is the worst sin in politics.	然而，如果欧洲人在充分了解可能付出的代价情况下在此时此刻将土耳其的入盟进程置于险境，那将是代价惨重的愚蠢行为——而在政治上愚蠢是最严重的罪过。


In European-Turkish relations, two trains are racing headlong towards each other.	欧土关系就像两列相向而驰的火车。


Neither Turkey nor Europe can afford the all-too-foreseeable crash.	不论是土耳其还是欧洲都无法从可以预见的碰撞中全身而退。


As one such supporter, Kenan Alpay, recently wrote, “Turkey cannot be a part of an international system that aims to dissolve all Islamic movements from the Muslim Brotherhood to…the Taliban in Afghanistan.”	其中一位支持者柯南·阿尔贝（Kenan Alpay）最近写道“土耳其不能成为旨在剿灭从穆斯林兄弟会到……阿富汗塔利班的一切伊斯兰运动的国际体系的一部分。 ”


A couple of weeks later, Erdoğan himself unleashed a furious anti-Western diatribe at Istanbul’s Marmara University. In his speech, he compared the West’s interference in the Middle East today with the British officer Lawrence of Arabia’s involvement in the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans during World War I, and blasted the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which has since defined the Middle East’s political map.	几周后，埃尔多安本人在伊斯坦布尔马尔马拉大学（Marmara University）措辞严厉地抨击了西方，他将如今西方对中东的干预与一战期间英国军官“阿拉伯的劳伦斯”（Lawrence of Arabia）介入针对奥斯曼帝国的阿拉伯革命（Arab Revolt）相提并论，并谴责了决定了此后中东政治版图的赛克斯-皮科协定（Sykes-Picot Agreement）。


Turkey, Armenia, and the Burden of Memory	土耳其、亚美尼亚，和沉重的记忆


All wars end, eventually.	终于，所有的战争都结束了。


But memories of atrocity never seem to fade, as the government-fanned anti-Japanese riots now taking place in China remind us.	但是，当下在中国发生的政府煽动的反日骚乱提醒我们，留在记忆中的暴行场面永远不会褪去。


The 90th anniversary of the Armenian massacres of 1915, ordered by the ruling Young Turks of the Ottoman Empire and carried out with the help of the Kurds, is another wound that will not heal, but one that must be treated if Turkey’s progress toward European Union membership is to proceed smoothly.	1915年，由当时统治的土耳其奥斯曼帝国青年土耳其党人下令、库尔德人协助的亚美尼亚大屠杀今年正逢90周年纪念，这是另外一个永远不会弥合的伤痕，如果土耳其加入欧盟之路要顺利坦荡的话，那么就必须治愈这个伤痕。


It is believed that the Armenian genocide inspired the Nazis in their plans for the extermination of Jews.	人们相信，是发生在亚美尼亚的种族屠杀引发了纳粹灭绝犹太人的计划。


However, in comparison with the Holocaust, most people still know little about this dark episode.	但是，比起大屠杀来说，大部分人对这段黑暗的插曲知之甚少。


Indeed, it is hard for most of us to imagine the scale of suffering and devastation inflicted on the Armenian people and their ancestral homelands.	事实上，我们中大部分人都难以想象亚美尼亚人民和他们世代相传的家园所遭受的苦难之深、浩劫之重。


But many members of today’s thriving global Armenian Diaspora have direct ancestors who perished, and carry an oral historical tradition that keeps the memories burning.	亚美尼亚后裔如今在全世界繁衍生息，但是他们已经去世的上一辈保留着口述历史的传统，让他们永记历史。


It is particularly ironic that many Kurds from Turkey’s southeastern provinces, having been promised Armenian property and a guaranteed place in heaven for killing infidels, were willingly complicit in the genocide.	尤为讽刺的是，许多曾向亚美尼亚人承诺杀害异教徒就能保证进入天堂并获得一笔财产的土耳其东南部库尔德人，对参与这场种族屠杀尤为积极。


They later found themselves on the losing end of a long history of violence between their own separatist forces and the Turkish army, as well as being subjected to an ongoing policy of discrimination and forced assimilation.	他们后来发现，在这场发生在他们自己的分裂势力和土耳其军队之间的长期武力斗争中，他们丝毫未沾任何便宜，还不得不屈服在一个歧视和被迫同化的政策之下。


Historically, the ancient Christian Armenians were amongst the most progressive people in the East, but in the nineteenth century Armenia was divided between the Ottoman Empire and Russia.	从历史角度来看，古代的基督教亚美尼亚人是东方最先进的民族之一，但是亚美尼亚在十九世纪分裂成了奥斯曼帝国和俄国。


Sultan Abdulhamit II organized the massacres of 1895-97 but it was not until the spring of 1915, under the cover of the First World War, that the Young Turks’ nationalistic government found the political will to execute a true genocide.	阿布都哈米提二世（Sultan Abdulhamit II）在1895-97年间曾组织过大屠杀，但是一直到1915年春天，第一次世界大战前夕，青年土耳其党人的民族主义政府才找到实施一场真正的种族屠杀的政治决心。


Initially, Armenian intellectuals were arrested and executed in public hangings in groups of 50 to 100.	最初，亚美尼亚的知识分子遭到逮捕， 50至100个一批地被示众绞刑处决。


Ordinary Armenians were thus deprived of their leaders, and soon after were massacred, with many burned alive.	失去了领导人的亚美尼亚百姓因此很快就遭到屠杀，很多人被活活烧死。


Approximately 500,000 were killed in the last seven months of 1915, with the majority of the survivors deported to desert areas in Syria, where they died from either starvation or disease.	大约有500,000万人在1915年最后七个月中惨遭杀戮，大部分幸存者被驱逐到了叙利亚的沙漠地带，在那里，他们不是饥饿至死就是疾病缠身而亡。


It is estimated that 1.5 million people perished.	据估计，死亡人数高达150万。


Recently, the Armenian Diaspora has been calling on Turkey to face-up to its past and recognize its historic crime.	最近，亚美尼亚后裔要求土耳其正视历史并承认它所犯下的历史罪行。


Turkey’s official line remains that the allegation is based on unfounded or exaggerated claims, and that the deaths that occurred resulted from combat against Armenians collaborating with invading Russian forces during the First World War, or as a result of disease and hunger during the forced deportations.	土耳其官方称这种说法毫无根据且过于夸张，死亡人数源于一战中反对亚美尼亚勾结入侵俄罗斯军队的战役，也可能是被迫驱逐过程中死于饥饿和疾病的人数。


Moreover, the local Turkish population allegedly suffered similar casualties.	并且，当地土耳其人口据称也遭受了相同的创伤。


Turkey thus argues that the charge of genocide is designed to besmirch Turkey’s honor and impede its progress towards EU accession.	土耳其辩称，对其种族屠杀的指控是为了玷污土耳其的尊严，阻止其加入欧盟的脚步。


There are also understandable fears that diverging from the official line would trigger a flood of compensation claims, as occurred against Germany.	可以理解这些官方发言的担忧所在，正如德国所经历的那样，这可能会引发索赔浪潮。


For many politicians, particularly in America, there is an unwillingness to upset Turkey without strong justification, given its record as a loyal NATO ally and putative EU candidate country.	考虑到土耳其一直是一个忠实的北约同盟国以及公认的欧盟候选国，许多政治家，尤其是美国的政治家，不愿意在没有可靠证据的情况下困扰土耳其。


But, despite almost half a century of membership in the Council of Europe – ostensibly a guardian of human rights, including freedom of speech and conscience – Turkey still punishes a crime against national honor any suggestion that the Armenian genocide is an historic truth.	然而，半个多世纪以来，虽然土耳其在欧洲议会中表面上是人权、言论和思想自由的护卫者，它仍然对任何暗示亚美尼亚的种族屠杀是一件真实历史事件、违反国家尊严的行为处以惩罚。


Fortunately, this article of Turkey’s penal code is now due for review and possible repeal.	值得庆幸的是，这篇有关土耳其刑法的文章现在将接受评议并很可能被删除。


Indeed, broader changes are afoot in Turkey.	事实上，在土耳其内，更大范围的变化蓄势待发。


The press and government, mindful of the requirements of EU membership, are finally opening the sensitive Armenian issue to debate.	考虑到加入欧盟的要求，媒体和政府最终决定开启有关亚美尼亚的敏感话题的辩论。


Even Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, under increasing EU pressure as accession negotiations are due to begin this October, has agreed to an impartial study by academic historians, although he has reiterated his belief that the genocide never occurred.	今年十月即将举行土耳其入盟谈判，在欧盟的重重压力下，就连总理雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安（Recep Tayyip Erdogan）也同意由专业的历史学家对此进行公正的研究，尽管他本人再三重申他认为从来没有发生过种族屠杀。


In France, the historical occurrence of the Armenian genocide is enshrined in law, and denial of its occurrence is regarded in the same way as Holocaust denial.	在法国，亚美尼亚屠杀被神圣地写进了法律，否认它的发生就像否认纳粹的种族大屠杀曾经发生过一样。


The European Parliament is pressing for Turkish recognition of the Armenian genocide. It is also calling for an end to the trade embargo by Turkey and its close ally Azerbaijan against the Republic of Armenia, a reopening of frontiers, and a land-for-peace deal to resolve the territorial dispute over Nagorno Karabakh in Azerbaijan and safeguard its Armenian identity.	欧洲议会向土耳其施加压力，要求其承认亚美尼亚种族屠杀，并且呼吁土耳其和与其关系甚密的阿塞拜疆取消对亚美尼亚的贸易禁运、重新开放边境、重新讨论土地换和平协议以解决阿塞拜疆境内的纳戈尔诺-卡拉巴赫（Nagorno Karabakh）的领土争端以及维护亚美���亚的民主认同。


Armenia, an independent country since 1991, remains dependent on continued Russian protection, as was the case in 1920 when it joined the Soviet Union rather than suffer further Turkish invasion.	亚美尼亚自1991年起成为独立国家，但是与1920年加入苏维埃联盟时候（而非后来遭受土耳其入侵）一样，亚美尼亚依靠在俄罗斯的保护伞下。


This is not healthy for the development of Armenia’s democracy and weak economy.	这对亚美尼亚的民主发展和不景气的经济成长是不利的。


Nor does Armenia’s continued dependence on Russia bode well for regional co-operation, given deep resentment of Russian meddling in neighboring Georgia and Azerbaijan.	考虑到俄罗斯干涉邻国格鲁吉亚和阿塞拜疆所引发的积怨，亚美尼亚继续依赖俄罗斯对地区合作也非吉兆。


There is only one way forward for Turkey, Armenia, and the region.	摆在土耳其、亚美尼亚和整个地区面前的只有一个办法。


The future will begin only when Turkey – like Germany in the past and Serbia and Croatia now – repudiates its policy of denial and faces up to its terrible crimes of 1915.	只有当土耳其像当年的德国以及现在的塞尔维亚和克罗地亚一样，放弃它的否认政策，直面它在1915年所犯下的恶行，未来才能真正开头。


Only then can the past truly be past.	只有到那时，过去才能真正成为过去。


The EU’s Turkish Opening	欧盟的土耳其开放


MADRID ‒ June’s Turkish general election sent a powerful message: Turkey’s democracy remains intact.	马德里—6月的土耳其大选释放出一个强有力的信号：土耳其民主完好无损。


Indeed, while there were some grievances about transparency during the campaign process, democracy prevailed, with a stunning 86% of eligible voters turning out – a rate rarely seen in Europe.	事实上，尽管在选战过程中曾出现过一些关于透明度的怨言，但民主仍然获得了胜利，合格选民中有86%参与了投票，这在欧洲是十分罕见的。


The rest of the world – and especially the European Union – should take note.	世界其他地区——特别是欧盟——应该对此感到关注。


With their votes, Turkey’s citizens denied the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) the absolute majority that it needed to amend the constitution.	土耳其公民通过选票否定了执政党正义与发展党（Justice and Development Party，AKP），使它没有能够获得修宪所需要的绝对多数。


Moreover, by giving the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) – which brings together the country’s long-marginalized Kurdish minority and other groups – more than 10% of the vote, they enabled the party to enter parliament for the first time, with representation throughout the country, not just in Kurd-majority areas.	此外，有10%以上的选民把票投给了人民民主党（Peoples’ Democratic Party，HDP），使这个由土耳其长期被边缘化的库尔德人和其他群体组成的政党首次跻身议会，取得了全国而不仅仅是库尔德多数地区代表权。


Reinforcing this triumph of pluralism, the Alevi and Christian minority groups won greater parliamentary representation, and the Yazidis and Roma will be represented for the first time.	而阿拉维派和基督徒少数群体也赢得了更大的议会代表权，雅兹迪人和罗姆人更是首次在议会中有了代表，这些进一步表明了多元化的胜利。


The new parliamentary configuration is likely to have a major impact on Turkey’s foreign policy, which has faced serious challenges in the last few years.	新的议会组成有可能对土耳其外交政策造成重大影响。 在过去几年中，土耳其外交政策面临诸多严峻挑战。


Indeed, as regional conflicts have intensified, the country’s central foreign-policy objective of ensuring “zero problems” with its neighbors has become unattainable.	事实上，随着地区冲突恶化，土耳其的核心外交政策目标——确保周边“零问题”已经成为不可能完成的任务。


And the policies that Turkey has pursued, most notably toward Syria and Egypt, have satisfied neither the region’s Sunni-majority countries nor the West.	而土耳其所追求的政策既没有让中东逊尼派多数国家满意，也没有让西方满意，叙利亚和埃及就是明证。


Perhaps more important, the AKP government’s foreign policy has faced considerable criticism from domestic forces, which now have more power to change it – an outcome that will occur regardless of whether the AKP ultimately forms a coalition or a minority government.	也许更重要的是，AKP政府的外交政策面临着巨大的国内力量批评，而如今，这些国内力量有了更大的权力改变土耳其外交政策——不论AKP最终是组成联合政府还是少数政府都将如此。


The direction of change will have to account for the various parties’ preferred approaches.	变化的方向必须考虑各政党的方针偏好。


The secular, center-left Republican People’s Party, for example, opposes interference in the internal affairs of any country, advocating instead that Turkey re-establish good relations with the countries of the region, including Syria.	比如，世俗的中左翼共和人民党（Republican People’s Party）反对干涉任何国家的 内政，倡议土耳其重新建立与包括叙利亚在内的中东国家的良好关系。


By contrast, the HDP protested against the previous AKP government’s failure to intervene last year when the Islamic State besieged the Syrian city of Kobane.	相反，HDP反对前AKP政府没有在伊斯兰国包围叙利亚科巴尼（Kobane）市时没有出手干预。


For its part, the rightist Nationalist Movement Party criticizes the AKP administration’s decision to denounce the current Egyptian government, arguing that the move has all but eliminated Turkey’s influence in the country.	而右翼的民族主义运动党（Nationalist Movement Party ）批评AKP政府谴责现任埃及政府的决定，认为这一举动的唯一效果是消除了土耳其在埃及的影响力。


Now, the party asserts, Turkey should work to defend its regional neighbors’ territorial integrity.	该党主张，现在土耳其应该致力于捍卫地区邻国的领土完整。


Amid all of this uncertainty, one thing is clear: Turkey cannot turn inward.	在所有这些不确定性中，有一点是明确的：土耳其不可能封闭起来。


Indeed, as a regional power, it has a responsibility to work to ease tensions and promote conflict resolution.	事实上，作为地区力量，土耳其有责任致力于缓解紧张局势、促进冲突解决。


It also has a long-term national interest in increased regional stability, not least because it would help to stem the tide of refugees – already numbering two million – flowing into the country, while opening up more commercial opportunities nearby.	增加地区稳定也符合土耳其的长期国家利益，因为这有助于遏制难民潮——目前已高达两百万人——流入土耳其，同时也能开放更多的周边商业机会。


Turkey’s democratic revival represents an ideal opportunity for the EU to rekindle its relations with the country.	对欧盟来说，土耳其民主的复兴是一次改善对土关系的理想机会。


The EU is Turkey’s leading trade partner and one of its largest investors, and has long considered Turkey to be a stable ally in a volatile region.	欧盟是土耳其主要贸易伙伴，也是其最大投资者之一，长期以来一直将土耳其视为动荡地区中的稳定盟友。


The escalation of warfare and sectarian violence, which are becoming chronic, endanger both Turkey and Europe.	战争和宗派暴力的升级和长期化对土耳其和欧洲来说都是危险。


In this context, renewed relations would serve both sides’ interests.	在这样的背景下，更新欧土关系符合双方利益。


The EU could, for example, provide diplomatic support in Turkey’s dealings with its neighbors and humanitarian aid to help refugees.	比如，欧盟可以提供外交支持帮助土耳其处理周边问题和为难民提供人道主义援助。


Given that a more stable Middle East would send fewer refugees and terrorists across its borders, Europe has a strong incentive to provide such support.	更稳定的中东意味着向周边输出的难民和恐怖分子数量下降，因此欧洲有很大的动力提供这一支持。


The urgency of this situation demands that the bilateral relationship move beyond narrow discussions of Turkey’s accession to the EU.	局势的紧迫性要求双边关系不能仅仅局限于土耳其加入欧盟的谈判。


After all, given broad resistance to any further EU enlargement at the moment, the accession process will undoubtedly move very slowly.	毕竟，眼下对欧盟继续扩张的反对声音很大，因此土耳其入盟过程必将十分缓慢。


The objective should thus be to find new, more efficient modes of cooperation that avoid the issues and conflicts that have impeded accession negotiations.	因此，应该将目标定在寻找更新、更有效的合作模式，避免阻碍入盟谈判的问题和冲突。


This is not to say that the accession process should be abandoned.	这并不是说应该放弃入盟谈判。


Rather, other more efficient channels of cooperation should be opened up in parallel to it.	相反，其他更有效的合作渠道可以与入盟谈判并行不悖。


A good place to start would be a meeting of members of the European and Turkish parliaments.	一个合适的起点是欧洲和土耳其议会成员会议。


European leaders should also carefully monitor the possible revision of Turkish foreign policy, grasping opportunities to reignite bilateral dialogue on issues of common interest.	欧洲领导人还应该仔细观察土耳其外交政策可能出现的转向，抓住机会重启共同利益问题上的双边对话。


This will require subsequent high-level meetings at regular intervals, in order to produce agreement regarding specific joint actions on urgent challenges.	这需要定期高规格会议的跟进，从而在关于紧迫挑战的具体联合行动的问题上形成协议。


This is a moment of opportunity for EU-Turkey relations, and it must be seized.	这是欧土关系的机会时刻，我们必须把握住它。


Achieving the goal of enhanced stability in the Middle East requires the two sides to work together.	实现增强中东稳定的目标需要双方共同努力。


Europe should not let this train pass it by.	欧洲不应该坐视机会流失。


Turkey, Europe and Middle-East Security	土耳其、欧洲与中东安全


Many factors contributed to the French and Dutch objections to the proposed EU Constitution.	法国和荷兰对提议中的《欧盟宪法》的反对有多种原因。


One – usually unstated – factor is a fear of Turkish membership in the Union.	有一个—通常没有言明的—因素是对土耳其欧盟成员国身份的恐惧。


That membership drive, however, has already transformed Turkey.	然而，这种入盟的动力已经改变了土耳其。


In order to prepare for EU accession, Turkey has undertaken vast and serious legal, political, and economic reforms.	在准备加入欧盟的过程中，土耳其在法律、政治和经济方面实施了广泛而严肃的改革。


Turkey’s bureaucrats, politicians, and citizens united to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership and tolerated the pain of the IMF-directed structural-adjustment programs.	土耳其的官僚、政治家和公民团结一致，努力达到针对欧盟成员的哥本哈根标准，并一起承受着IMF指导下的结构调整计划所带来的阵痛。


The looming accession process will be even more painful, but Turkey’s people are firmly resolved to face this challenge.	接下来的入盟进程会更加痛苦，但土耳其人民已经下定决心面对挑战。


Turkey’s transformation has already put an end to the Cold War-style security-state apparatus that ruled the country for half a century, and has changed the framework of the country’s domestic and foreign policy.	土耳其的变革已经终结了统治该国长达半个世纪的冷战型的国家机器，并改变了该国内外政策的框架。


By modernizing and democratizing at home, Turkey’s politicians gained self-confidence in their ability to conduct a successful regional policy.	通过国内的现代化和民主化，土耳其的政治家们对实施成功的区域政策的能力充满了自信。


As a result, Turkey’s leaders are now willing to pursue active diplomacy in the Middle East in an effort to minimize problems with neighboring countries.	其结果是土耳其的领袖们现在愿意追求积极的中东政策从而将该国与邻国之间的问题最小化。


Of prime importance is the fact that Turkey is emerging as a role model for those across the Middle East who are seeking reform and modernization.	最为重要的是土耳其正成为所有正在寻求改革与现代化之路的中东国家的楷模。


This influence does not imply a hegemonic relationship, but rather points to an alternative path for reform and economic development that other primarily Muslim countries might take.	这种影响并不意味着一种霸权关系，而是为以穆斯林为主导的国家指明了另一条进行改革和发展经济的道路。


The EU is associated with peace, democracy, and economic development, while the Middle East is characterized by instability, authoritarianism, and economic backwardness.	欧盟是与和平、民主和经济发展相关联的，而中东地区却总具有局势动荡、独裁主义和经济落后的特点。


Turkey’s reform process shows that the latter is not an unavoidable destiny for the countries of the region.	土耳其的改革进程证明后者并不是该地区不可避免的宿命。


In this respect, Syria and Iran appreciate Turkey’s EU membership process.	在这方面，叙利亚和伊朗都对土耳其的入盟进程表示赞赏。


They consider a European Turkey an opportunity to develop their own relations with the EU.	它们认为一个欧洲的土耳其也是发展它们自身与欧盟关系的契机。


Turkey also shows that the supposed clash between democracy and security – and, indeed, between democracy and Islam – can be reconciled.	土耳其也证明民主和安全之间—特别是民主和伊斯兰之间的冲突是可以化解的。


Other Muslim states seem to grasp this: recently, a Turk was chosen for the first time and by a majority vote to be Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Countries.	其他穆斯林国家也似乎明白了这一点：最近，一位土耳其人第一次以多数票当选为伊斯兰国家组织的秘书长。


Turkey’s other major contribution comes through constructive diplomatic engagement in the region.	土耳其的另一个重要贡献来自于在该地区的建设性外交接触。


The Turkish government has adopted an active role as a promoter of peace and has reconfigured its policies toward a number of regional problems.	土耳其政府已经扮演起了一个和平推动者的角色，并已经重新制定了在一些地区性问题上的政策。


For example, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan broke with tradition by displaying a critical attitude toward Israel’s more hawkish policies in the occupied territories, and did so without severing diplomatic relations with Israel.	例如，土耳其总理塔伊普·埃尔多安打破传统，对以色列针对被占领土的更为强硬的政策表示批评，而又没有导致两国的外交关系恶化。


During a visit of Turkey’s Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul to Israel in early January, there was serious discussion about Turkey assuming a mediating role between Israel and the Palestinians, as well as in future Syrian-Israeli talks.	在土耳其外长阿卜杜拉·居尔今年一月的早些时候出访以色列时，双方就土耳其担任巴以之间及未来叙以会谈的斡旋者的问题进行了严肃的讨论。


Turkey, of course, did not join the US-led occupation forces in Iraq, but it has put enormous effort into mobilizing regional support for a stable Iraqi state.	土耳其当然没有参加美国领导的在伊拉克的占领军，但却不遗余力地为建立一个稳定的伊拉克而争取地区性的支持。


Indeed, Turkish policymakers have, on a regular basis, brought the countries bordering Iraq together for discussions about the future of the region.	的确，土耳其的政策制定者们已经定期地将伊拉克的邻国组织起来讨论该地区的未来。


The United Nations Security Council has taken these meetings seriously and has requested further regional cooperation on the Iraqi question.	联合国安理会对这些会议非常重视，并已要求进一步推进在伊拉克问题上的区域合作。


Turkey’s constructive engagement with the EU creates a sense of trust in the West – among Western leaders at least, if not yet the general population -- for its regional initiatives.	土耳其与欧盟的建设性接触带来了西方—如果说争取西方广大民众还有待时日，那么至少在西方领导人之中—对其区域性努力的信任感。


Yet Turkey is also succeeding in keeping an equal distance between both the EU and the US.	它还成功地与欧盟和美国保持了等距离的关系。


For example, Turkey is closer to the EU in its policies toward Iraq and Palestine, yet follows a line similar to that of the US in the Balkans and Cyprus.	例如，土耳其在对伊拉克和巴勒斯坦的政策上与欧盟更接近，而在对巴尔干和塞浦路斯问题方面又与美国合拍。


In recent history, a variety of regional powers – the Shah’s Iran and Nasser’s Egypt – have arisen in the Middle East.	在最近的历史上，不同的区域性强国—沙(Shah, 伊朗国王的称号—译者注)的伊朗和纳塞尔的埃及—曾经在中东崛起。


Turkey’s arrival as a regional power is different in that its democratic structures make an active peacemaker, not a local bully.	土耳其作为��区性强国的出现与它们的不同之处在于其民主体制使它成为一个积极的调解人，而不是地区霸权。


This is both a necessary and a promising role, for the region needs a local dynamic force pushing for reform, transformation, and peace.	这是一个应运而生且前途光明的角色，因为该地区需要一支区域性的力量来推动改革、变化与和平。


Turkey’s experience shows that true security in the region requires internal stability and social peace.	土耳其的经验表明该地区真正的安全需要内部的稳定和社会和平来实现。


With luck, this model can be exported throughout the Muslim world.	幸运的话，这会成为一种可以输出到整个穆斯林世界的模式。


Turkey’s Diplomatic Dogfight	土耳其的外交混战


MADRID – Turkey’s downing of a Russian warplane risks opening a new front in the violence engulfing Syria, thereby dashing the hopes for a rapprochement between Russia and the West that had arisen in the wake of the Paris massacre.	马德里——土耳其击落俄罗斯战机有可能在席卷叙利亚的暴力战争中开创新战线，并导致巴黎大屠杀后俄罗斯和西方国家间修好的希望破灭。


With Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan now engaged in a war of words, and given the nightmare scenario of something far worse, it is more important than ever that the European Union do all that it can to reinvigorate its ties with Turkey.	鉴于俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京和土耳其总统雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安正在进行口水战和可能出现远比现在更糟的噩梦般的场景，欧盟竭尽所能重振与土耳其的关系比以往任何时候都更重要。


Prior to the attacks in Paris, Erdoğan had seemed to be holding all the cards in the bilateral relationship.	巴黎袭击发生前，埃尔多安似乎掌握着双边关系的所有主动权。


European leaders, faced with an escalating refugee crisis, agreed last month to pursue a joint action plan, which demanded that Turkey help stem the tide of migrants into Europe, in exchange for EU funds, visa liberalization, and, most relevant, renewed negotiations on Turkey’s EU accession.	欧洲领导人面对不断升级的难民危机，上个月同意执行一项联合行动方案。 该方案要求土耳其协助阻止涌入欧洲的难民潮，以换取欧盟资金、开放签证，还有最重要的，重启土耳其加入欧盟的谈判。


Shortly after that decision, German Chancellor Angela Merkel reversed her previous opposition to Turkish membership in the EU, calling it an “open-ended issue” during a visit to Istanbul.	这项决策做出后不久，德国总理默克尔改变了之前反对土耳其加入欧盟的态度，在出访伊斯坦布尔时将其称之为“开放性事件”。


All of this served Erdoğan well in the run-up to Turkey’s November 1 general election.	所有这些非常有利于埃尔多安参加11月1日的土耳其大选。


The action plan and Merkel’s visit were viewed within Turkey as de facto endorsements of Erdoğan; the EU even delayed the release of a critical “progress report” on Turkey’s accession negotiations until after the vote.	该行动计划和默克尔的访问在土耳其国内被视为事实上支持埃尔多安； 欧盟甚至将公布对土耳其入盟谈判的一篇批评性“进展报告”推迟到土耳其选举投票之后。


In the end, Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) regained its comfortable parliamentary majority.	最后，埃尔多安的正义与发展党（AKP）重新以较大优势夺回了议会多数席位。


The G-20 Summit in Antalya, held on November 15-16, was to cement Erdoğan’s triumphant return to the world stage, ending a period of relative isolation by the West that reflected disapproval of his authoritarian tendencies.	11月15到16日在安塔利亚举行的G-20峰会再次巩固了埃尔多安胜利重返世界舞台，结束了西方国家因为不满前者的独裁倾向而对土耳其的相对孤立姿态。


And a joint EU-Turkey summit was scheduled for November 29 to formalize the action plan.	同时定于11月29日召开欧盟 - 土耳其首脑会议正式制定行动方案。


Then, as so often happens, events intervened.	其后，与往常一样，发生了意想不到的事件。


The tragedy in Paris sidelined Turkey at its own summit, derailing Erdoğan’s international comeback.	巴黎悲剧夺走了土耳其在本国举办峰会上的风头，阻碍了埃尔多安再次登上国际舞台。


Instead, the focus was on US President Barack Obama, Putin, and French President François Hollande acting from Paris.	相反，峰会主角变成了美国总统奥巴马、俄罗斯总统普京和远在巴黎的法国总统奥朗德。


Now, Erdoğan faces a different strategic outlook, particularly with Russia-Turkey relations under greater strain than at any time since the Cold War’s end.	现在，埃尔多安的战略前景发生了巨大变化，尤其是俄土关系承受的压力超过冷战结束以来的任何时候。


With the world now more determined than ever to defeat the Islamic State – an enterprise that will, it is becoming clear, require boots on the ground – the major powers are seeking immediately available forces.	随着现在世界比以往任何时候都更坚定地要击败伊斯兰国——要实现这一目标显然需要派遣地面部队——大国正全力寻找可以立即投入战斗的资源。


For the time being, that means, on the one hand, the Syrian Democratic Forces, dominated by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, which oppose President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and, on the other hand, the pro-regime forces backed by Russia, as well as Iran and its proxies, particularly Hezbollah.	从目前来看，这一方面意味着由库尔德人民保护力量主导的叙利亚民主部队，上述部队反对巴沙尔·阿萨德总统政权，另一方面则意味着由俄国、伊朗及其代理势力支持的亲政府派力量，尤其是黎巴嫩真主党。


From a Turkish perspective, both are unacceptable.	从土耳其人的角度看，以上两股力量都无法接受。


Meanwhile, Turkey faces a direct threat from the Islamic State, exemplified by the twin suicide bombings that killed more than 100 people in Ankara last month.	此外，土耳其还面临来自伊斯兰国的直接安全威胁，比方说上月在安卡拉发生的炸死百余人的两起自杀性炸弹袭击事件。


Turkish authorities have since foiled another attack, planned for the same day as those in Paris.	土耳其当局挫败了另一起袭击，这起袭击本来是计划与巴黎袭击同一天发生的。


Finally, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, which drove a wedge between the Kremlin and the West, Turkey had carved out a strategically advantageous position between the two sides.	最后，继2014年挑起克里姆林与西方不和的俄罗斯吞并克里米亚行动后，土耳其在俄欧双方之间取得了战略优势地位。


But Turkey now finds itself increasingly isolated from both camps, owing to its downing of the Russian fighter and its staunch opposition to Assad, whom both American and European leaders increasingly believe will have to play some role in any political settlement.	但土耳其现在发现自己在两大阵营之间越来越孤立，因其击落俄罗斯战机并坚决反对阿萨德，而美欧领导人越来越相信后者在政治解决中能够发挥作用。


As France shuns NATO as the centerpiece of an international response to the Islamic State, Turkey’s zero-tolerance approach to encroachments on its airspace has put NATO-Russian relations under dangerous strain.	随着法国避开以北约作为应对伊斯兰国国际策略的核心，土耳其对侵犯其领空行为的零容忍态度令北约俄罗斯关系承受着危险的压力。


It is in easing those tensions that the EU has an important role to play.	欧盟可以在缓解上述紧张局势时发挥重要的作用。


While Turkey still has leverage vis-à-vis the EU, owing to the continued flow of refugees toward Europe, both sides are now approaching the partnership from positions of genuine need.	虽然难民不断涌入欧洲令土耳其仍然握有对欧盟的谈判筹码，但双方现在都拥有对伙伴关系的真正需求。


Neither side can afford further complication of the already volatile situation.	本已动荡不安的局势进一步复杂化双方都无法承受。


This should be reflected at the upcoming summit.	这种情况应该在即将举行的首脑会议上得到反应。


On the EU side, it is important to acknowledge Turkish sensitivities regarding Kurdish forces.	在欧盟方面，重要的是要承认土耳其人在库尔���问题上的敏感性。


This means establishing credible safeguards to prevent potential safe zones in northern Syria, essential to stemming refugee flows and beginning to stabilize the country, from threatening Turkey’s internal security.	这意味着采取可靠措施防止叙利亚北部的潜在安全区对土耳其国内安全造成威胁，上述措施在遏制难民潮和稳定叙利亚局势时应该发挥关键的作用。


European leaders – along with the US – must weigh in to avoid an escalation between Turkey and Russia.	欧洲领导人——和美国一道——必须施加影响避免土俄冲突升级。


And they must do a better job of reassuring the Turkish government that, despite Assad’s possible inclusion in Syria’s initial transition, he has no long-term future as the country’s leader.	他们必须更好地安抚土耳其政府，向其解释尽管阿萨德可能被纳入到叙利亚最初的过渡体系，但从长远来看他不会成为叙利亚的国家领袖。


For its part, Turkey needs to broaden its perspective.	就其本身而言，土耳其需要进一步拓宽视野。


The developments on its southern border concern far more than the Kurdish question; they have far-reaching implications for regional stability.	其南部边境的事态发展远远超出库尔德问题； 而是将对地区稳定影响深远。


The AKP’s election victory offers a chance for the government to shift its attention back toward resolving the broader problems in its neighborhood – that is, to act like a true regional leader, instead of pursuing a narrow, self-serving agenda.	正义与发展党不久前在选举中获胜为政府提供了将注意力转回到解决邻国大范围问题的机会——换言之土耳其应该像地区领袖般行事，而不是追求狭隘、自私自利的政治议程。


To address today’s most urgent challenges, Turkey and the EU must commit to building a genuine partnership, based on common interests, in particular security interests, rather than a transactional arrangement that addresses issues à la carte.	为应对当前最紧迫的挑战，土耳其和欧盟必须承诺基于共同利益、尤其是安全利益，而非解决单一问题的交易性安排建立真正的伙伴关系。


This necessarily includes a good-faith approach to negotiations on Turkey’s accession to the EU.	其中必然包括以善意的方式对待土耳其加入的欧盟的谈判。


In the wake of Turkey’s fraying relations with Russia, the decision to proceed with the planned EU-Turkey Summit is an important one.	面对土耳其与俄国关系紧张，按计划召开欧盟土耳其峰会是项重要的决策。


Now more than ever, the EU and Turkey have a responsibility to act together, before an already appalling situation gets even worse.	现在欧盟和土耳其有责任采取共同行动，以防止本已令人震惊的局势进一步恶化。


Turkish Democracy’s Secret Weapon	土耳其民主的秘密武器


OXFORD – The recent failed coup attempt in Turkey highlights the country’s continuing vulnerability to military takeover.	牛津——不久前，土耳其的那次未遂政变凸显了该国面对军事接管一贯非常脆弱。


But it also reveals a newly developed – and highly potent – asset, one that Turkey’s neighbors should also seek to cultivate: a strong middle class willing and able to mobilize against extremist threats.	但这次政变也揭示了一种新的——而且是非常有效的——资产，这样的资产土耳其的邻国也应当设法加以利用：一个愿意并有能力反对极端威胁的强大的中产阶级。


The question for Turkey now is whether President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will cultivate this asset.	雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安总统是否会利用这一资产是土耳其现在所面临的问题。


For the wider Middle East, the issue is how to build a middle class that can safeguard stability.	而对其他中东国家而言，问题在于如何建设一个有能力维稳的中产阶级。


When throngs of citizens took to the streets of Istanbul in the middle of the night, in an effort to push back the military coup makers, it was a powerful show of collective action – one that should interest any political leader, particularly those seeking to develop their countries.	当成群结队的市民为打击军事政变制造者深夜走上伊斯坦布尔街头，这是集体力量的充分展示——这种力量应当引起任何政治领袖，尤其是那些试图发展自己国家的政治领袖的关注。


Analysis of the coup has tended to focus on the rivalries within the Turkish elite, and on Erdoğan’s failings (which, to be sure, are plentiful).	对政变的分析往往把重点放在土耳其精英阶层和埃尔多安决策不利方面（在上述方面寻找原因肯定有不小的收获）。


But little has been said about the structural shifts in Turkey’s political economy that have empowered the country’s middle classes, which form the electoral base of Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP).	但很少有人提及导致该国中产阶级崛起的土耳其政治经济结构性转型，正是上述转型构成了埃尔多安正义与发展党（AKP）的选民基础。


Over the past two decades, Turkey has made remarkable economic strides, transforming itself from Europe’s sick man into one of its most vibrant economies and a new center of gravity for trade in the Middle East.	过去20年来，土耳其取得了令人瞩目的经济成就，从欧洲病夫一跃成为欧洲最具活力的经济体之一和新的中东贸易中心区。


Critical to this transformation have been infrastructure investment, support for medium-size firms, expansion of regional trade, and development of the tourism sector.	基础设施投资、支持中型企业、扩大地区贸易和发展旅游业成为土耳其转型的关键因素。


As a result of these efforts, Turkey’s per capita income has tripled in less than a decade, while its poverty rate has more than halved, according to World Bank estimates.	据世界银行估计土耳其的人均收入在不到10年时间里翻了两番，而贫困率则降低了一半以上。


This has underpinned tremendous economic mobility among Turkey’s rural labor force, small entrepreneurs, and lower-income workers, taking masses of people from the margins of society to the mainstream.	由此带来了土耳其农村劳动力、小企业家和低收入工人巨大的经济流动性，让大批民众摆脱社会边缘进入主流。


Even foreign policy was, wherever possible, aligned with the economic interests of the rising middle class (though the Syrian intervention reflects a shift in foreign-policy priorities).	就连外交政策也尽可能与崛起的中产阶级经济利益保持一致（虽然叙利亚干预行动反映外交政策重点发生了变化）。


For Turkey’s new middle class, the survival of democracy could not be more important – and, as recent events have shown, they are willing to fight for it.	对土耳其新生中产阶级而言，没有什么比民主制度的生存更加重要——而且，不久前发生的事件表明，土耳其民众愿意为捍卫民主而奋斗。


Indeed, what has occurred in Turkey does not reflect only a power struggle between Erdoğan and his challengers; it also highlights the determination of the middle class to ensure that Turkey does not revert to a political system that would damage its economic and political fortunes.	事实上，土耳其发生的一切不仅反映了埃尔多安及其挑战者之间的权力斗争； 同时也凸显了中产阶级决心确保土耳其不会恢复到有损其经济和政治命运的政治制度。


All of this suggests that, in responding to the coup attempt, Erdoğan and his supporters must think beyond punishing the military faction that carried it out, though that is, of course, critical.	所有这一切表明在应对政变企图时，埃尔多安及其支持者不应仅局限于惩罚策动政变的军事派别，尽管这当然也非常重要。


They must also focus on strengthening the interests of the middle class that came to the government’s defense.	他们还必须确保保卫政府的中产阶级利益得到强化。


In this sense, the real challenge facing Turkey in the coming months and years will not be from the military or foreign conspirators.	从这个意义上讲，未来数月或数年当中土耳其所面临的真正挑战并不来自于军事或外交阴谋。


Succumbing to the temptation to consolidate power in the hands of the president, ostensibly to protect his government’s authority, could limit checks and balances and restrict space for political opposition, including within his own party.	屈服于巩固总统手中权力的诱惑表面上看是在保护政府权威，但实际却有可能限制制约力量和政治反对派（包括总统自身所在政党）。


That would undermine the very system for which the middle class has been fighting.	这样有可能破坏中产阶级为之奋斗的政治制度。


Of course, Erdoğan does need to consolidate his political base, including by renewing ties with loyal supporters.	当然，埃尔多安的确需要巩固自己的政治基础，包括恢复与忠实支持者之间的关系。


And purging the military and civilian bureaucracy of possible coup supporters would undoubtedly please party loyalists.	而清洗可能支持政变的军事和文职官僚无疑会取悦党派的忠实支持者。


But he must also heal the political rift and forge a new consensus that supports economic prosperity.	但他还必须弥��政治裂痕，达成支持经济繁荣的全新共识。


Perhaps most important, the AKP needs to halt the dangerous unravelling of the Turkish model of regional economic integration, based on the policy of “zero problems with neighbors,” originally conceived by former Prime Minister Ahmed Davutoğlu but rolled back in recent years.	也许最重要的是，正义与发展党必须阻止土耳其区域经济一体化模式的危险瓦解，区域经济一体化基于“邻国零纠纷”政策，这项政策最初由前总理艾哈迈德·达吾特欧鲁提出设想，但在近年间遭遇挫折。


Turkey has severed ties with virtually all of its immediate Middle Eastern neighbors.	土耳其已经切断了与几乎所有中东邻国的直接联系。


The recent souring of diplomatic ties with Russia has further weakened Turkey’s position.	近期上演的土俄外交关系恶化又进一步削弱了土耳其的立场。


In the process, Turkey’s status as a model Muslim democracy has gradually deteriorated and political polarization has deepened, amid growing threats to the country’s stability.	土耳其作为穆斯林民主典范的地位也逐渐恶化，政治分化不断加深，国家稳定所遭受的威胁越来越强。


None of this is good for the economy on which Turkey’s middle class – and, in turn, the AKP’s electoral success – depends.	所有这些对土耳其中产阶级——以及正义与发展党最终选举成功——所依赖的经济都没有任何好处。


That provides reason to hope that the failed coup, by highlighting the role of the middle class as a bulwark against military rebels, will spur Erdoğan’s government to resolve Turkey’s political impasse and ensure economic growth.	这让人们有理由期望此次失败的政变能通过凸显中产阶级在反政府军事武装面前的壁垒作用，刺激埃尔多安政府解开土耳其的政治僵局并确保经济增长。


Turkey’s middle class will not support a party that fails to advance its interests and deliver economic prosperity.	土耳其的中产阶级不会支持一个无力推进自身利益和实现经济繁荣的政党。


But an AKP that returns to its foundational vision of enabling economic mobility – that is another story.	但如果正义与发展党回归其实现经济流动性的根本初衷——则是另外一回事。


Importantly, as Erdoğan seeks to concentrate more powers in the office of the President, he would do well to remind himself of the conditions that led to the Ottoman Empire’s emergence and its eventual collapse.	更重要的是，在埃尔多安试图将更多权力聚集于总统办公室之际，时刻提醒自己导致奥斯曼帝国崛起及最终覆灭的条件对他非常有好处。


Much like the AKP’s rise, the empire’s was based on the support of an emancipated citizenry in the rural countryside, particularly in the Anatolian heartland.	像正义与发展党的崛起一样，奥斯曼帝国有赖于土耳其乡下，尤其是安纳托利亚内陆地区翻身农民的支持。


But, upon consolidating their power in Constantinople, Ottoman rulers quickly moved toward establishing a Sultanic order that contradicted its progressive origins – and weakened it from within.	但在君士坦丁堡巩固了自身权力后，奥斯曼帝国统治者迅速建立了与其进步本源相抵触的某种苏丹式统治秩序——从而在内部遭到了削弱。


With greater centralization of powers, Ottoman rulers became uncomfortably dependent on notables at home and imperial powers in Europe.	随着权力的日益集中，奥斯曼统治者越来越依赖于国内显要和欧洲列强。


If Erdoğan’s AKP hopes to avoid a similar fate, it must not continue its march toward a latter-day Sultanic order.	如果埃尔多安的正义与发展党希望避免类似的命运，那么就必须停止其日后向苏丹式秩序进军的步伐。


A prosperous and inclusive democracy is the only way out for Turkey, and it would restore a model that the countries of the wider Middle East desperately need.	建立繁荣和包容的民主制度是土耳其唯一的出路，而且还会为中东其他国家树立一个急需的榜样。


Why Turkey Won’t Go Nuclear	为何土耳其不会追求核武器


ISTANBUL – According to conventional wisdom, if Iran develops nuclear weapons, then Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and perhaps Egypt will try to follow suit.	伊斯坦布尔—根据传统智慧，如果伊朗发展核武器，沙特阿拉伯、土耳其、也许还有埃及也会紧随其后。


Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu went further when he addressed the United States Congress in early March, asserting that even allowing Iran a uranium-enrichment program would “spark a nuclear arms race in the most dangerous part of the planet.”	以色列总理内塔尼亚胡在3月初的美国国会演讲中更进一步，提出允许伊朗继续铀浓缩项目将“在你地球最危险的部分挑起核军备竞赛。 ”


Each of these potential nuclear dominoes should be analyzed separately and carefully.	这些潜在核多米诺骨牌的每一块都应该单独仔细地予以分析。


And, as far as Turkey is concerned, the conventional wisdom seems to be largely wrong.	此外，就目前土耳其看来，传统智慧几乎一无是处。


Turkey does have a nascent nuclear energy program.	土耳其确实拥有初期阶段的核能项目。


After decades of false starts, the Turkish government signed a contract with Russia in 2010 for the construction and operation of the country’s first nuclear power plant.	在经历了数十年的失败起步后，土耳其政府在2010年与俄罗斯签订了该国首个核电站的建设和运营合同。


The project, located on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast, is now under construction.	该工程位于土耳其地中海沿岸，目前已在建设中。


The Turkish government’s effort to secure other international suppliers has been complicated by the fact that the terms offered by Russia are significantly more generous than those proposed by its competitors.	土耳其政府让其他国际供应商放心的努力因为一个事实而复杂化，即，俄罗斯提供的条件比其竞争者优厚得多。


Still, Turkey is in negotiations with a Franco-Japanese consortium for the construction of a second nuclear power plant on the Black Sea.	但土耳其仍在与一个法日合资团体谈判位于黑海沿岸的第二座核电站的建设事宜。


Turkey has valid economic arguments for developing the capacity to produce nuclear energy.	土耳其有充足的经济理由发展生产核能的能力。


Primary energy imports comprise almost half of Turkey’s chronic current-account deficit, because the country imports more than 90% of its oil and natural gas.	初级能源进口占了土耳其长期存在的经常项目赤字的近一半，因为该国90%的石油和天然气需要进口。


Moreover, unlike in Europe, Turkey’s electricity demand continues to grow at 5-6% per year.	此外，与欧洲不同，土耳其电力需求仍以每年5—6%的速度增长。


Turkish policymakers see nuclear power as an almost indispensable tool for enhancing energy security and reducing the import bill.	土耳其决策者视核电为增加核安全、减少进口的堪称不可或缺的工具。


These economic interests, combined with national-security considerations, give Turkey an incentive not to seek nuclear weapons.	这些经济利益，以及国家安全考虑，让土耳其没有动力寻求核武器。


As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Turkey is prohibited from developing military applications of the technology.	作为核不扩散条约签署国，土耳其被禁止发展核技术的军事用途。


If it were perceived to be breaking this commitment, other states, including those that would otherwise contribute to its nuclear energy program, would turn against it and jeopardize its ability to meet growing demand at an affordable cost.	如果世界认为土耳其违反这一承诺，其他国家，包括本应帮助其核能计划的国家，将转而与土耳其为敌，破坏其以平价成本满足不断增长的需求的能力。


This, in turn, would undermine the economic growth that has been central to sustaining the government’s popular support over the past two decades.	这反过来又将破坏经济增长，而经济增长是过去二十年土耳其政府维持群众支持的关键。


Moreover, Turkey is a member of NATO and thus benefits from the security guarantee that the alliance provides, including its nuclear umbrella.	此外，土耳其还是北约成员国，因此得益于盟友提供安全保障包括核保护伞的好处。


Indeed, the US has based nuclear weapons in Turkey for decades.	事实上，美国几十年前就在土耳其部署核武器基地。


More recently, NATO and the US have deployed ballistic missile defenses in the country.	更晚近一些，北约和美国又在土耳其部署了弹道导���防御系统。


If the Turkish government sought to acquire its own nuclear weapons, it would jeopardize these security guarantees and turn NATO against it.	如果土耳其政府寻求获得自身的核武器，将破坏安全保障，让北约转而与其敌对。


In any case, Turkey lacks the know-how and technical infrastructure to produce a nuclear weapon quickly, and the country would need a long time – probably more than a decade – to develop this capacity.	无论如何，土耳其缺少快速制造核武器的知识和技术基础，并且需要很长时间——有可能是十年以上——发展这一能力。


During this period, Turkey would face severe political, economic, and security pressures not only from the US and other NATO states, but also from Russia, Iran, and others.	在此期间，土耳其将面临严重的政治、经济和安全压力，不仅来自美国和其他北约成员国，也来自俄罗斯、伊朗和其他国家。


Meanwhile, Turkey’s immediate security threats would be exacerbated.	与此同时，土耳其最紧迫的安全威胁也会恶化。


Nuclear weapons would do little to reduce the dangers posed by Syria’s violent disintegration, the rise of the Islamic State, and the unresolved challenge of Kurdish separatism.	核武器对于叙利亚暴力分裂、伊斯兰国崛起以及悬而未决的库尔德人分裂所造成的危险几乎毫无用处。


Turkey’s relations with Iran, which heretofore have been manageable, could become more prone to crisis.	目前仍处于可管理状态的土耳其与伊朗的关系也可能走向危机。


All of these considerations point to the serious risks that seeking nuclear weapons would pose to Turkey’s security.	所有这些考虑表明，寻求核武器将给土耳其的安全造成严重风险。


These risks could in turn exacerbate internal discord in the country at a time when the ruling Justice and Development Party is struggling to retain popular support.	这些风险可能反过来恶化土耳其国内动荡，而与此同时，执政的正义与发展党（Justice and Development Party）面临着保持群众支持的难题。


In these circumstances, it matters how the rest of the world portrays and talks about Turkey’s nuclear future.	在这样的环境中，世界其他国家如何描述和谈论土耳其的核未来至关重要。


To assert that Turkey will naturally – perhaps inevitably – seek to acquire a nuclear arsenal ignores the important incentives the country has not to militarize its existing civilian energy program.	认为土耳其将自然地——也许是不可避免地——追求核武库忽视了土耳其不对其现有民用能源项目进行军事化的重要激励。


Glib talk of nuclear proliferation risks should not mislead Turks about their own interests.	漫无边际地大谈核扩散风险不应该在自身利益问题上误导土耳其人。


The rest of the world would be wiser instead to reaffirm the country’s efforts to pursue a purely peaceful nuclear energy program and to work within NATO to seek a resolution of the Iranian challenge.	世界其他国家更明智的做法是确认土耳其追求完全和平的核能项目以及北约框架内寻求解决伊朗挑战方面的努力。


Turkey’s Politics of Peace	土耳其的和平政治学


VIENNA – Turkey is moving into unchartered political territory, following the failure of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to retain its parliamentary majority in the country’s recent general election.	维也纳—土耳其执政党正义与发展党（Justice and Development Party，AKP）在最近的议会大选中没能保住多数席位，这让土耳其滑向了陌生的政治领域。


The choices that Turkey makes in establishing a new government will not only be pivotal to shaping the future of democracy there; the next administration could also play a decisive role in a series of peace processes vital to restoring stability in the wider Middle East.	土耳其如何组建型政府不但将成为决定土耳其民主未来的关键； 其下一任政府还有可能在一系列对重塑大中东稳定至关重要的和平进程中起到决定性作用。


First and foremost for Turkey, there is the ongoing peace process with its own Kurdish population.	对土耳其最重要的是进行中的其与本国库尔德人的和平进程。


At its core, this process is about redefining the secular, unitary state created in 1923.	本质上，这一进程事关重新定义1923年成立的世俗、统一的土耳其。


Everyone in the new republic who was not explicitly defined as a member of an officially recognized minority was supposed to merge into a new Turkish identity.	在这个新共和国中，每一个没有被明确定义为官方认可的少数民族成员的人，都应该归为新的土耳其身份。


But this did not happen as Atatürk planned.	但事实并不像阿塔图尔克计划得那样发生。


Kurds held fast to their own ethnic identity.	库尔德人迅速竖起了自身民族身份的大旗。


Eventually, the suppression of the Kurdish language and culture fueled a brutal insurgency, led by the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) which has cost the country more than 30,000 lives.	最终，对库尔德语言和文化的镇压煽动了库尔德工人党（Kurdish Workers’ Party，PKK）领导残酷的起义，造成30,000多人死亡。


It is to the great credit of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that he had the courage to launch an open peace process with the PKK in 2013.	总统埃尔多安敢于在2013年与PKK展开和平进程，这让他受到广泛赞誉。


Since then, that process has made progress that seemed unthinkable only a few years ago.	此后，这一进程取得了几年前都不敢想象的进展。


Yet key steps toward lasting peace remain to be taken.	但要想获得持续和平，还有很多关键步骤需要迈出。


A comprehensive settlement of the Kurdish issue within Turkey will be key to the country’s stability and the future of its bid for accession to the European Union.	全面解决土耳其国内的库尔德问题将是国家稳定的关键，也是其未来加入欧盟的关键。


Otherwise, one can envisage scenarios in which the forces of disintegration now roiling the neighboring Levant actually spread into Turkey itself, with unimaginable consequences.	否则，你可以想象如今在相邻的黎凡特风生水起的分裂力量渗入土耳其、造成骇人听闻的后果的情景。


The success of the mainly Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) in capturing 13% of the vote in the recent election – a total well above the party’s core constituency – should boost the Kurds’ confidence and ease the way ahead in the peace process.	库尔德人民民主党（Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party，HDP）在最近的大选中大获成功，获得13%选票——远多于该党核心选区的选票比例——这必然会增强库尔德人的信心，有利于和平进程。


But the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) performed strongly in the election, capturing 16% of the vote, probably owing largely to popular opposition to the opening to the Kurds.	但极右翼的民族运动党（Nationalist Movement Party，MHP）也在选举中表现抢眼，赢得16%的选票，主要原因也许是公众对接纳库尔德人的反对。


Indeed, even Erdoğan, evidently trying to stop the MHP’s advance, used campaign rhetoric that alienated many Kurdish voters.	事实上，甚至是明显想要阻止MHP发展的埃尔多安，也采用了让许多库尔德选民离心离德的竞选口号。


A high priority for any new government in Turkey should be to complete the peace process that Erdoğan began.	不管谁成为土耳其新政府，一个重要的当务之急是完成埃尔多安所开启的和平进程。


And Erdoğan should understand that his legacy might well be shaped by whether that process succeeds or fails.	埃尔多安应该明白，他的遗产也将在很大程度上由这一和平进程的成败决定。


The second peace process at stake is the new attempt to unify Cyprus, which has been divided since its constitutional breakdown in 1963 and Turkey’s invasion in 1974.	第二个重要的和平进程是统一塞浦路斯的新尝试。 自1963年在宪法崩溃以及1974年土耳其入侵以来，塞浦路斯一直处于分裂状态。


Indeed, it is bizarre that the capital of an EU member country is divided by a dead zone patrolled for decades by United Nations peacekeeping troops.	事实上，一个欧元区成员国的首都被一个几十年来由联合国维和部队巡逻守备的无人区一分为二，这实在是一件咄咄怪事。


The continued division of Cyprus is blocking both the EU accession talks with Turkey and increasingly necessary cooperation between the EU and NATO.	塞浦路斯的继续分裂阻碍了土耳其的入盟谈判，也阻碍着欧盟和北约之间日益必要的合作。


But now, under President Nicos Anastasiades and the newly elected president of Northern Cyprus, Mustafa Akinci , there is a real possibility, after years of stalemate, of reaching a settlement that can re-unify the island.	但如今，在总统阿纳斯塔夏季斯和新当选的北塞浦路斯总统阿金奇（Mustafa Akinci）的领导下，我们终于在多年的僵局后看到了形成能够重新统一塞浦路斯岛的和解的真正希望。


UN-supported talks have acquired new and important momentum.	联合国支持的谈判已经取得了重要的新动力。


But a settlement will not be possible without the clear support of the Turkish government.	但如果没有土耳其政府的明确支持，和解就无从实现。


The new administration’s stance will thus be critical: Turkey has much to gain by supporting a solution in Cyprus; but it could also revert to old habits and spoil today’s unique opportunity.	因此，新政府的立场将是至关重要的：支持塞浦路斯解决方案对土耳其十分有利； 但土耳其也有可能老方一帖，放弃眼前千载难逢的良机。


The third peace process in play concerns Turkey’s relationship with Armenia, which, if improved, could help create the conditions for a peace settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.	第三个进行中的和平进程是土耳其与亚美尼亚的关系，如果得到改善，将有助于为亚美尼亚和阿塞拜疆的和平和解创造条件。


A far-sighted agreement was signed by Armenia and Turkey in Zürich in October 2009; but wider regional forces eventually blocked progress, with Russian intervention decisive.	2009年10月，亚美尼亚和土耳其在苏黎世签署了远见卓识的协议； 但更广泛的地区力量最终阻碍了进展，其中俄罗斯的干预是决定性的。


Maintaining the frozen conflict with Armenia is not in the long-term interests of Turkey or any other state in the region.	保持对亚美尼亚的冻结冲突（frozen conflict）状态不利于土耳其或任何该地区国家的长期利益。


The ongoing blockades and military face-offs could, at some point, lead to violent upheaval in the southern Caucasus, with very negative effects for Turkey.	持续封锁和军事对垒迟早会导致南高加索地区的暴力剧变，给土耳其造成巨大的消极影响。


The next government should resume the approach it took in Zürich – and Armenia’s government must do the same.	新一届土耳其政府应该遵循其在苏黎世采取的方针——亚美尼亚政府也应该这么做。


The fourth and most immediately consequential peace process concerns Syria.	第四个也是最紧迫的和平进程是叙利亚。


Turkey has taken a principled and strong stand against President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and has generously taken in more than a million refugees.	土耳其对叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德的政权持最坚定、最强烈的反对态度，并慷慨地接纳了一百多万难民。


But the dangers posed by the ongoing conflict, particularly the strains on Turkey itself, should not be underestimated.	但叙利亚冲突所造成的威胁，特别是给土耳其本身造成的压力，决不能低估。


All key actors have a common interest in preserving the Syrian state while changing the regime.	保护叙利亚国，同时改变政权，这是所有重要行动方的共同利益。


A complete collapse, fueled by efforts to impose a political solution by military means, would most likely lead to catastrophic consequences for decades to come, with Turkey among the worst affected.	试图通过军事手段实施政治解决方案而导致的全盘崩溃极有可能给未来数十年带来灾难性后果，而土耳其将是首当其冲者之一。


So Turkey’s new administration should be ready to engage in a constructive dialogue, together with the United States and Iran, on possible solutions.	因此，土耳其新政府应该做好准备参与建设性对话，与美国和伊朗共同探讨可能的方案。


The immediate task facing Turkey is to bridge old divisions and establish a functioning coalition government.	土耳其所面临的当务之急是弥合旧分歧，建立一个正常运转的联合政府。


Otherwise, a fresh election – and thus fresh political uncertainty – will be unavoidable.	否则将不得不进行新选举——从而带来新的政治不确定性。


That is why Turkey’s friends should take this opportunity to remind the country’s leaders of what is at stake – for Turkey itself, as well as for peace in the region.	因此，土耳其的友邦应该抓住这次机会提醒土耳其领导人什么问题最重要——对土耳其本身，也对地区和平而言。


Turkey’s Changing Freedom Deficit	土耳其不断变化的自由赤字


DURHAM – Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) rose to power in 2002 on the promise that it would give pious Muslims religious freedom.	达拉谟——土耳其正义与发展党（AKP）2002年上台时曾承诺会给予虔诚的穆斯林宗教自由。


Fourteen years later, “freedom” is the last thing the AKP has delivered.	十四年后，正义与发展党最不可能带来的就是“自由”。


Today, even AKP supporters need to measure their words carefully, lest they be perceived as criticizing the government or siding with its enemies.	今天，就连正义与发展党的支持者也要仔细衡量自己的言论，唯恐被视为批判政府或者同情敌人。


This imperative has intensified since the failed coup against President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government on July 15.	7月15日针对埃尔多安政府的政变失败后坚持这种做法更加必要了。


Now, destroying any evidence of association with the AKP’s foes – especially Fethullah Gülen, the reclusive Pennsylvania-based imam whom the government accuses of masterminding the putsch – is a matter of self-preservation.	现在，销毁与正义发展党敌人——特别是隐居在美国宾夕法尼亚州被指策划此次政变的伊玛目费图拉·居伦有染的任何证据——关系到自我保护。


Erdoğan’s government is by no means the first to compel Turkish citizens to hide their preferences and beliefs.	迫使土耳其民众隐藏自己的爱好和信仰绝不是埃尔多安政府的创举。


Under the secular governments that ruled Turkey from the 1920s to 1950, and to some extent until 2002, pious Turks seeking advancement in government, the military, and even commerce had to downplay their religiosity and avoid signaling approval of political Islam.	在二十世纪20到50年代世俗政府对土耳其的统治下，甚至在某种程度上直到2002年，虔诚的土耳其人要想在政界、军界甚至商界出人头地就必须淡化自己的宗教信仰，小心翼翼地避免表态支持政治伊斯兰主义。


The leaders of the three Islamist parties that preceded the AKP resented the barriers to religious expression.	正义与发展党之前三任伊斯兰党派领袖均不满于世俗政府阻碍宗教表达。


They held that French-style secularism had perverted Turkish culture.	他们认为法国式的政教分离已经败坏了土耳其文化。


Though careful not to challenge the constitution openly, from 1971 to 2001, they were successively banned as threats to secularism.	虽然小心翼翼地并未对宪法提出公开挑战，从1971到2001年，他们还是相继被视为对世俗主义构成威胁从而遭到取缔。


In 1999, Erdoğan himself was jailed for reciting a poem deemed an incitement to sectarian violence.	1999年，埃尔多安本人也因为朗诵一首被视为煽动宗派暴力的诗而被捕入狱。


In the same year, Gülen, under investigation for advocating an Islamic state, moved to the United States.	同年，因宣扬伊斯兰国家而接受调查的居伦移居美国。


As fellow opponents of secular governance, Gülen’s Hizmet (Service) movement and the AKP were natural allies.	因为同样反对世俗政府，居伦的服务运动和正义与发展党是天然的联盟。


Indeed, they spent a decade working together to undermine Turkey’s secular institutions.	事实上，在长达十年时间里他们密切合作对抗土耳其的世俗制度。


After a constitutional referendum in 2010 terminated the staunchly secular military’s guardianship of the Republic, they saw an historic opportunity for overhauling Turkey’s institutions, though there was some disagreement – and, indeed, tension – over how that should occur.	在2010年一次宪法公投结束了世俗军队对共和国牢不可破的控制之后，虽然就改革的具体方式依然存在某些分歧——甚至是紧张局势——但他们看到了改革土耳其体制的历史性机会。


Erdoğan, who was then Prime Minister, began to transform Turkish society according to his own conservative interpretation of Islam.	时任总理的埃尔多安开始按照他本人保守的伊斯兰教理念来改革土耳其社会。


Religious education was intensified.	宗教教育得到加强。


Alcohol restrictions were tightened.	同时收紧了对酒精饮料的限制。


Women were instructed to have at least three children and, later, not to laugh loudly in public.	妇女接到指令至少要生三个孩子，之后，女性在公共场合大笑又被禁止。


What news media the AKP did not buy off were subdued through threats of punitive taxation and jail time for uncooperative journalists.	那些未能被新闻媒体和正义与发展党收买的群体最终又借助惩罚性税收和让不合作记者遭受牢狱之灾而被轻松制服。


Secular Turks, once the politically dominant vanguards of modernity, were characterized as lacking in morality, decency, and even Turkishness.	世俗土耳其人曾经是主导现代化的政治排头兵，现在却被定义为不讲道德、体面甚至不属于土耳其。


But devout Muslims were not free from fear, either, not least because of the ensuing power struggle between the Erdoğan and Gülen camps.	但因为埃尔多安和居伦阵营紧随其后的权力斗争和其他因素，虔诚的穆斯林也未能避免恐惧。


Though Gülen’s supporters initially shared the privileges of power under AKP rule, including preferential treatment in government hiring and contracts, tensions came to a head in 2013, when Gülenists tried to implicate Erdoğan in a corruption probe.	虽然居伦的支持者最初在正义与发展党治下共享特权红利，包括在政府雇用及合同方面的优惠待遇，但紧张局势却在2013年达到了高潮，当时居伦派份子试图将埃尔多安牵连进一场腐败案件调查。


Erdoğan responded by initiating a purge of suspected Gülenists from state institutions.	埃尔多安则以从国家机构中清洗可疑居伦份子的方式来进行报复。


With two academics having already revealed that several sensational legal cases against the old secular establishment rested on fabricated evidence, AKP officials began to blame Gülen for all judicial improprieties.	随着两位学者发现针对旧有世俗体制的几起耸人听闻的法律案件证据纯属伪造，正义与发展党官员开始将所有司法领域的不当行为都推到居伦头上。


While there was no doubt that the AKP knew that the victims of the lawsuits, including hundreds of generals, were framed, few Turks said a word, for fear of being labeled part of Gülen’s “parallel state.”	尽管没有人怀疑正义与发展党知道包括数百名将军在内的案件受害者遭到诬陷，但因为害怕被贴上居伦“平行集团”的标签，所以没有几个土耳其人敢站出来讲话。


Two months after the bloodiest coup attempt in Turkish history, Turks still talk incessantly about the surreal bombardments, the televised images of tanks in the street, and the ferocious government response, which has included tens of thousands of arrests.	在土耳其历史上最血腥的政变企图结束两个月后，土耳其人仍在不停地谈论超现实轰炸，坦克开上街头的电视画面和包括数万人被捕在内的残忍的政府对策。


Some wonder whether Erdoğan staged the coup to justify the epic purge.	有人怀疑埃尔多安是否谋划了此次政变借以开展这次历史性的清除。


Of course, any such questions are raised in private, amid assertions of antipathy to the “Fethullah Terror Organization,” the new official designation for Hizmet.	当然，这些问题都是私下提出的，掺杂在对服务运动的新叫法“费图拉恐怖组织”的愤怒声讨当中。


Turks know that the government may equate the slightest connection to Gülen, however old or tenuous, with treason.	土耳其人知道政府可能将与居伦最微弱的联系（无论多么陈旧和微弱）等同于叛国。


Alleged sympathizers are being summarily dismissed from their jobs, if not also jailed.	即使现在尚未获刑，但那些所谓的同情者正在大批失去工作。


People educated on Gülen scholarships are prime suspects, as are millions who have had dealings with a Gülenist-owned business.	拿过居伦奖学金的人成为主要嫌犯，遭到怀疑的还有数百万曾与居伦企业打过交道的人。


Gülenists’ assets are being seized, in the biggest wealth grab since the 1940s.	居伦份子的资产正在二十世纪四十年代后规模最大的一场财富争夺中遭到查封。


Under the circumstances, extolling the merits of the Gülenist charities that are being destroyed would amount to professional suicide.	在这样的情况下，歌颂正在遭���灭顶之灾的居伦慈善机构的功绩无异于职业自杀。


This is beyond excessive, not least because, whatever the involvement of Gülen himself, the putsch was not the work of Gülenists alone.	这种做法何止是过分，尤其因为无论居伦本人扮演了何种角色，政变都不是居伦份子可以单独发动的。


Disaffected officers of many persuasions participated, as did opportunists seeking promotion.	诸多派别的不满官员和谋求高升的机会主义者都参与其中。


The putsch’s failure may have stemmed from the fact that information about it was leaked in advance, inducing many conspirators, including some key military units, to withdraw from the plot.	政变的失败可能归咎于信息被事先泄露，导致很多同谋者，包括某些重要的军事部队，从这次阴谋中撤出。


Many generals, intelligence officers, and other officials hesitated when it became known that a putsch was underway.	当许多将军、情报官员和其他官员得知政变消息时态度犹豫。


Erdoğan’s top generals and intelligence chief kept him uninformed for hours, even as an assassination squad made its way to his vacation residence.	埃尔多安的高级将领和首席情报官即使在刺杀小组潜入其度假官邸时，也隐瞒他长达数小时之久。


The wait-and-see approach adopted by many Turkish security officials ended up landing some in jail.	许多土耳其安全官员所采取的等待和观望做法最终导致某些人入狱。


Among other Turks, too, there are doubtless many who decided to wait to see how the putsch would end, before turning against Gülen.	而在其他土耳其人当中，无疑也不乏在最终表态反对居伦前，观望政变将如何结束者。


The AKP and many of its opponents agree on one thing: had the putsch succeeded, the repression would be far worse.	正义与发展党及其众多反对者就一件事达成了共识：即如果政变得手，镇压将会严厉得多。


And, indeed, AKP supporters far outnumber Gülenists.	而且事实上，正义发展党的支持者远多于居伦主义者。


But the AKP has made bitter enemies over the last 14 years, and millions of Turks would have applauded the jailing of its leaders, even as many of those leaders plausibly claimed that their support for Erdoğan was feigned.	但正义与发展党过去十四年来树立了许多不共戴天的仇敌，数百万土耳其人都会对其领袖被捕入狱表示庆贺，即使那些领导人中有不少人宣称自己支持埃尔多安是假装的。


Today, Turkey is further than ever from creating a society whose members feel free to speak openly and honestly.	今天，土耳其离建立成员言论公开自由的诚实社会远得不能再远了。


The ongoing witch hunt causes citizens of all persuasions to fear for their jobs and their lives.	正在进行的政治迫害导致所有派别的民众担心自己的工作和生活。


They seek refuge in dissimulation – social, political, intellectual, and religious.	他们避开灾难的方法是在社会、政治、知识和宗教领域装糊涂。


This pervasive untruthfulness reinforces the underpinnings of Turkey’s recurrent political crises.	这种无处不在的虚伪强化了土耳其政治危机不断爆发的基础。


Turkey’s Syrian Tangle	土耳其的叙利亚困局


MADRID – As 2015 draws to a close, new steps – albeit small and tentative – have been taken toward ending the war in Syria.	马德里—2015年行将结束，在结束叙利亚战争方面已经做出了一些新举措——尽管是一些小规模尝试性举措。


The United Nations Security Council has adopted Resolution 2254, expressing its backing for a transition out of the conflict, and the International Syria Support Group has set a date for its next meeting, to be held next month.	联合国安理会通过了2254号决议，支持让叙利亚实现结束冲突的过渡，而国际叙利亚支持组织（International Syria Support Group，ISSG）已经定下了将在下个月进行的下一次会议的日期。


But the ISSG comprises both allies and adversaries – for example, Saudi Arabia and Iran – meaning that continued progress will be a challenge.	但ISSG中既有盟友也有对手——比如沙特阿拉伯和伊朗——这意味着能否继续取得进展仍是个挑战。


Now, another pair of countries in the process, Turkey and Russia, appear headed down the road to mutual enmity.	如今，该进程中的另一组国家——土耳其和俄罗斯似乎也走向了为敌的道路。


Turkey, whose proximity to Syria generates both challenges and opportunities, could play an especially significant role in shaping how the peace process plays out.	土耳其与叙利亚毗邻，这既是挑战也是机会，它能够在决定和平进程如何实现方面起到特别重要的作用。


But Turkey’s downing of a Russian warplane on its border with Syria last month has spurred a swift and sharp deterioration in bilateral relations, with the Kremlin imposing retaliatory economic sanctions.	但上个月土耳其在其与叙利亚边境击落俄罗斯战机导致图俄关系急转直下，克里姆林宫已经报之以经济制裁。


Russia, for its part, is facing the tough reality of maintaining an active military presence in the Middle East.	至于俄罗斯，它正在面临保持在中东进行活跃军事行动的严峻现实。


Its efforts to bolster President Bashar al-Assad’s regime (and thus to strengthen its own role at the negotiating table) places it at odds with the countries – including NATO member Turkey – that want Assad out.	它支持总统巴沙尔·阿萨德政权（从而增强其自身在谈判桌上的分量），这让它站在了想要阿萨德下台的其他国家的对立面，包括北约成员国土耳其。


The problem for Turkey is that its interests are not as straightforward as stopping the Islamic State (ISIS), or even driving Assad from power.	土耳其的问题是其利益并不像阻止伊斯兰国，甚至不如将巴沙尔赶下台那样直接。


It also aims to ensure that Kurdish groups – such as the Democratic Union Party (PYD) of Syria, which is closely affiliated with Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – do not consolidate control of territory in Syria, now or during the post-conflict reconstruction.	它的目标还包括确保库尔德组织——如与土耳其的库尔德工人党（PKK）有密切联系的叙利亚民主联盟党（PYD）——无法巩固对叙利亚领土的控制，不管是现在还是在冲突后重建阶段。


Since the summer, when several severe outbreaks of violence effectively ended a two-year old ceasefire between the PKK and the Turkish government, the Kurdish conflict in Turkey has once again been burning white-hot, raising fears about the impact of an empowered PYD.	今年夏天的多次暴力事件事实上结束了两年来PKK与土耳其政府的停火状态，自此以后，土耳其的库尔德冲突就在此白热化，让人们担忧获得实力的PYD的影响。


Ongoing domestic political upheaval, including two parliamentary elections in just six months, has complicated Turkey’s situation further.	未结束的政治剧变，包括短短六个月内举行的两次议会选举，进一步复杂化了土耳其局势。


Turkey’s opposition to empowering the Kurds has been a source of tension with its traditional ally, the United States, which believes the Kurds are the only force on the ground capable of fighting ISIS.	土耳其反对库尔德人获得实力已成为土耳其与其传统盟友美国关系紧张的一个原因。 美国认为库尔德人是唯一有能力在地面打击伊斯兰国的力量。


The rekindled hostility between Turkey’s government and the PKK is thus undermining Turkey’s interest in the success of the Syrian peace negotiations.	因此，土耳其政府与PKK再度敌对破坏了叙利亚和平谈判成功对土耳其的利益。


Amid these challenges, however, is a ray of hope: Turkey’s relations with the European Union have lately improved markedly.	但是，在这些挑战中也包含着一丝希望：土耳其与欧盟的关系最近有了显著改善。


Europe’s desperation to resolve the refugee crisis has strengthened its incentive to cooperate with Turkey. This creates an important opportunity to restart negotiations for Turkish accession to the EU – a prospect that had been nearly extinguished.	欧洲急切地想要解决难民危机，这造成了其与土耳其合作的动机，于是形成了一个重要的重启土耳其加入欧盟谈判的机会——这一情形此前已经几乎被判死刑。


To be sure, in its latest report on Turkey’s progress toward meeting the accession criteria, the European Commission noted “significant shortcomings” relating to the judiciary, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly, and appealed for the resumption of efforts to resolve the Kurdish issue.	诚然，在关于土耳其在满足入盟标准封面所取得的进步的报告中，欧盟委员会指出在司法、言论自由和集会自由方面，土耳其仍“严重不足”，并要求重启解决库尔德问题的努力。


But now the mood is significantly improved.	但如今欧盟的看法已大为缓和。


Already, the EU and Turkey have agreed on a joint-action plan, which entails some visa liberalization, and there has been talk of a possible “privileged” bilateral relationship.	欧盟已经同意与土耳其采取联合计划，包括一定的签证自由化，并在谈判可能的“特惠”双边关系。


Moreover, there has been some promising forward movement on the Cyprus issue, a longstanding impediment to Turkey’s EU accession.	此外，在塞浦路斯问题上也出现了一些非常积极的发展趋势。 塞浦路斯问题一直是土耳其加入欧盟的障碍。


With Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders having resumed talks in May, Turkey now has the opportunity to take decisive steps toward uniting the island.	5月，希腊塞浦路斯领导人和土耳其塞浦路斯领导人重新开始谈判，如今，土耳其有机会迈出实现塞浦路斯岛统一的决定性步骤。


In short, the refugee crisis has tilted the EU toward Turkey.	简言之，难民危机促使欧盟导向土耳其。


But defeating ISIS remains a top priority.	但打击伊斯兰国仍是最最高任务。


This will require negotiating with Russia – something that EU members have recognized.	这需要与俄罗斯谈判——欧盟成员国已经意识到这一点。


Since the Paris attacks in November, efforts to strengthen cooperation against terrorism, including between France and Russia, have intensified.	自11月巴黎袭击以来，加强反恐合作方面的努力（包括法国与俄罗斯之间）有所加强。


If Turkey wants its relationship with the EU to continue to improve, it will have to engage, too.	如果土耳其希望其与欧盟的关系得到改善，也必须加入进来。


The tension between Turkey and Russia has also hurt Turkey’s own position in Syria.	土耳其和俄罗斯之间的紧张关系还危及到土耳其自身在叙利亚的处境。


Beyond the economic sanctions, Russia has now equipped its warplanes with air-to-air missiles, making it more difficult for Turkey to defend its airspace and maintain its influence over the northeastern Syrian border, an area that it considers critical to prevent the PYD from crossing the Euphrates to the West.	除了经济制裁，俄罗斯还给战机装上了空对空导弹，使土耳其更加难以防卫自身领空和维持其对叙利亚东北边境的影响力。 该地区被土耳其认为是阻止PYD跨过幼发拉底河进入西方的关键。


Turkey should reflect on its position.	土耳其应该深思其处境。


It cannot risk being perceived as a country that jeopardizes basic freedoms, thereby widening the gap with the EU.	它决不能冒被认为是妨碍基本自由的国家的风险，这会加大它与欧盟之间的裂痕。


Two factors will sustain its position as an essential ally of the US and the EU: improved relations with the Kurds and progress toward a settlement in Cyprus.	两个因素能够保持其作为美国和欧盟重要盟友的地位：改善与库尔德人的关���以及塞浦路斯和解问题上的进展。


In the Syrian peace process, the decisions Turkey makes can either drive or impede progress toward a settlement.	在叙利亚和平进程中，土耳其的决定要么推动形成和解的进程，要么妨碍这一进程。


The myriad factors shaping Turkey’s position make decision-making very difficult.	决定土耳其处境的众多因素导致决策变得十分困难。


But there is a way out of the current tangle: a strategic approach that makes the most of rapprochement with the EU, recognizes the importance of stabilizing Syria as soon as possible, and clarifies, once and for all, Turkey’s role in the fight against the Islamic State.	但有一个办法可以走出当前的困境：一套充分利用与欧盟重建关系，认识到尽快稳定叙利亚的重要性，以及一劳永逸地明确土耳其在打击伊斯兰国中的作用的战略方针。


Turkey recently demonstrated its ability to overcome complex challenges, wisely restoring full diplomatic relations with Israel after a five-year breach in ties.	土耳其最近证明了其有能力克服复杂挑战，在长达五年的决裂之后明智地与以色列重建完全的外交关系。


Given this, reconciliation with Russia cannot be ruled out.	因此，与俄罗斯的和解也未必不可能。


Such an approach would, no doubt, facilitate the management of a host of risks that have been exacerbated by the Syrian conflict.	毫无疑问，这样的方针有助于管理因为叙利亚冲突而加剧的一系列风险。


Turkey’s Balancing Act	土耳其的平衡策略


EAST LANSING, MICHIGAN – Turkey has over the past few weeks become the spearhead of a joint Western-Arab-Turkish policy aimed at forcing President Bashar al-Assad to cede power in Syria.	发自密歇根州东兰辛市——在过去几个星期里土耳其俨然成为了西方-阿拉伯-土耳其三方联合逼迫叙利亚总统阿萨德放弃权力的急先锋。


This is quite a turnaround in Turkish policy, because over the past two years the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had gone out of its way to cultivate good relations with neighboring Syria, with whom it shares a long land border.	而此举堪称土耳其在外交政策上的一大转向，因为过去两年里厄尔多安总理领导下的土耳其政府一直都在想尽办法与叙利亚这个共享漫长边境的邻国发展友好关系。


This change of course on Syria has also cost Turkey a great deal in terms of its relations with Iran, the principal supporter of Assad’s regime, which Turkey had also cultivated as part of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy.	而这种对叙利亚政策的转变同时也令土耳其在对伊朗关系上遭到了相当大的损失，因为后者正是阿萨德政权背后的最重要势力。 在土耳其外长达武特奥卢（Ahmet Davutoğlu）一直推行的“邻国无冲突”政策中，对伊关系也是培养对象之一。


Given these new strains, it is worth recalling that a only few months ago many American leaders were livid at what they perceived to be Turkey’s betrayal.	在这些新变调之下，我们不妨回想一下几个月前许多美国领导人还在对土耳其的“背叛”耿耿于怀。


In their view, Turkey had re-oriented its foreign policy toward the Muslim Middle East and away from the West – a shift supposedly reflected in the country’s deteriorating relations with Israel and improving ties with Iran and Syria.	在他们看来，土耳其重新将外交政策的重点定位在中东穆斯林地区并逐渐远离西方——据信该国对以色列关系恶化以及对伊朗，叙利亚关系的改善正好反映了这一转变。


Many American policymakers and publicists, unable or unwilling to distinguish Turkish-Israeli relations from Turkish-American relations, interpreted Erdoğan’s condemnation of Israel’s blockade of Gaza as a bid to cozy up to his Arab neighbors at the expense of Turkey’s relations with not only Israel but with the West in general.	但许多美国政策制定者和时事评论家都不能（或者不愿）把土耳其-以色列两国关系和土美关系区分开来，于是就把总理厄尔多安谴责以色列封锁加沙地区的言论解读为土耳其为讨好阿拉伯邻国而不惜牺牲对以甚至对整个西方关系的例证。


Turkey’s attempt to mediate between the major Western powers and Iran concerning the Islamic Republic’s uranium stockpile went unappreciated in the West; indeed, the United States scuttled the effort just as it seemed to be bearing fruit.	土耳其在伊朗铀囤积问题上尝试调解西方大国与伊朗的举动并未受到西方的欢迎； 美国甚至在调解有望时出手搅局。


And Turkey’s subsequent vote in the United Nations Security Council against imposing additional sanctions on Iran seemed to offer further proof that Turkey had adopted an “Islamic” foreign policy.	而土耳其随后在联合国安理会投票反对对伊施加进一步制裁的行为似乎也证明该国正在推行一个“伊斯兰”外交政策。


America’s anxiety assumed that it is a contradiction for Turkey to seek good relations with both the West and the Muslim Middle East, and that Ankara’s decision to improve its relations with its Muslim neighbors was motivated primarily by religious and ideological concerns considered important by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).	忧心忡忡的美国人假设土耳其不可能同时与西方和中东穆斯林地区发展友好关系，还认为安卡拉当局改善穆斯林邻国关系的决定主要基于执政的正义与发展党（Justice and Development Party）所看重的宗教和意识形态理念。


Turkey’s recent tense relations with Iran demonstrate this assumption’s basic fallacy, and point to a non-ideological foreign policy that caters to Turkish national interests as defined by the country’s political elite – including the post-Islamists in power today.	而土耳其最近与伊朗的紧张关系则证明这一推论完全错误，并指明了一个由该国政治精英（包括当前执政的后伊斯兰主义者）所定义的服务于土耳其国家利益的非意识形态外交政策。


Disagreement between Turkey and Iran initially centered on their conflicting approaches to the internal rebellion against Assad’s dictatorship.	土耳其与伊朗之间的争执起初集中在双方对阿萨德政权国内反对派截然不同的处理方式上。


Iran has been heavily invested in the Assad regime, its lone Arab ally and the main conduit for delivering material support to Hezbollah in Lebanon.	伊朗对阿萨德政权投资甚巨，因为后者是该国唯一的阿拉伯盟友，也是向黎巴嫩真主党输送物资的主要通道。


Turkey, on the other hand, after some initial hesitation, has thrown its weight fully behind Assad’s opponents, including by providing refuge to them, as well as to defectors from Syria’s army.	而另一方面土耳其起初有点迟疑，但随后开始大力支持反对派一方，包括为这些人以及叙利亚军叛逃者提供庇护。


Indeed, Turkey has gone further by helping the divided Syrian opposition to come together on its territory to establish a joint front against the Assad regime and provide a credible alternative to it.	事实上，土耳其还更进一步，让原本松散的叙利亚反对派在土国境内成立了一个联合阵线来反抗阿萨德政权并谋求取而代之。


Turkey abruptly shifted its stance on Syria, and aligned its position with that of the major Western powers, for two reasons. First, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) could not afford to be seen as opposing democracy in Syria, given that its own legitimacy rests heavily on its democratic credentials.	而土耳其之所以突然转变对叙利亚立场并和西方大国站在一起，原因有二：首先执政的正义和发展党不能让外界觉得自己反对叙利亚民主，因为该党的合法性在极大程度上都源自于其民主声誉。


Second, once Erdoğan’s government concluded that Assad’s regime was bound to fall, it sought to secure its future interests in Syria, which is of strategic importance to Turkey – even at the cost of jeopardizing relations with Iran.	其次，一旦土耳其政府判定阿萨德政权必将倒台，那么就必须想办法维护自身在叙利亚的利益，而这些利益极具战略重要性——即便危及对伊朗关系也在所不惜。


Iran’s displeasure at Turkey’s “betrayal” of Assad was compounded by the Erdoğan government’s recent decision to install a NATO anti-missile early-warning facility – aimed at tracking Iranian missile activity – in Malatya in eastern Turkey.	此外伊朗对土耳其“背叛”阿萨德的愤恨还跟厄尔多安政府最近决定安装北约反导弹早期预警系统的决定夹杂在了一起。 这套系统将放置在土耳��东部的马拉蒂亚地区，目的是监控伊朗导弹活动。


According to Iranian authorities, NATO’s system is designed to neutralize Iran’s deterrent capacity vis-à-vis Israel, thereby increasing the likelihood of an Israeli or US strike against Iranian nuclear facilities.	伊朗当局声称，北约安装这套系统的目的就是为了抵消伊朗对以色列的遏制能力，并因此增加以色列/美国袭击伊朗核设施的可能性。


Iranian officials went so far as to warn Turkey that it would make the Malatya facility its first target in retaliation for a Western strike on Iran.	伊朗官员还进一步警告土耳其，声称一旦遭受西方军事打击，马拉蒂亚设施将是首要报复目标。


In reality, Israel can track Iranian missile activity from several sites other than Malatya.	事实上以色列可以从马拉蒂亚之外的许多地方追踪伊朗导弹活动。


Iran’s threat, therefore, is an expression more of discontent with Turkey than of genuine concern that the Malatya facility will adversely affect its deterrent capacity.	因此伊朗的威胁更多地是为了表达对土耳其的不满，而不是担心马拉蒂亚设施将削弱其遏制能力。


Iranian-Turkish tensions reflect three larger realities. First, the Arab Spring, and especially the Syrian uprising, exposed the two sides’ underlying rivalry for influence in the Middle East and the Arab world.	而伊朗与土耳其之间的紧张局势也反映了三个更为宏观的事实：其一，阿拉伯之春尤其是叙利亚国内的起义体现了双方对中东以及阿拉伯世界影响力的潜在争夺。


Second, Turkey’s turn toward the east is not ideologically or religiously inspired, but instead is based on solid strategic and economic calculations; as the fluid situation in the Middle East continues to develop, Turkey will adapt its policies accordingly.	其次，土耳其转向东部邻国的行为并非来自于意识形态或者宗教原因，而是基于单纯的战略和经济推算。


Finally, Turkey has invested far too much in its strategic relations with NATO, and with the US in particular, to fritter them away in exchange for uncertain gains in relations with Iran.	最后，土耳其在北约关系（尤其是美国）上倾注了极大精力，自然也不可能为了伊朗那点不确定的好处而轻易抛弃。


This does not mean that Turkey will return to its traditional strategic dependence on the US and its allies, an approach that defined Turkish foreign policy throughout the Cold War and the decade following it.	但这也并不意味着土耳其将回到对美国及其盟友的传统依附关系上，虽然这一方针在冷战乃至随后那十年间贯穿了整个土耳其外交政策。


The AKP government is committed to the country’s strategic autonomy and to greater activism in the Middle East. But it is also aware that such policies must not cost Turkey its relationship with NATO and the US.	正义与发展党政府致力于实现本国的战略独立性并希望在中东地区有更大作为，但它同时也意识到这些政策不应损害本国与北约和美国之间的关系。


Turkey is engaged in an intricate effort to preserve its old relationship with the West while building new ties with its Muslim neighbors.	土耳其一方面要维护与西方的旧有关系，另一方面又要与穆斯林邻国建立新的纽带，而实现这两点需要错综复杂的手段。


Turkey’s leaders understand that the country can best preserve and enhance its leverage with both sides by maintaining good relations with each.	土耳其领导人也深知自己的国家能通过与东西双方维持良好关系而将自身对各方的影响力维持在最佳状态。


Turkey’s Choice	土耳其的选择


In what may be Turkey’s most important political event since the republic was founded in the 1920’s, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has won a landslide parliamentary election victory, with around 47% of the vote.	在可能是土耳其共和国二十世纪二十年代建立以来最为重要的政治事件中，正义和发展党赢得47%的选票，获得了议会选举的压倒性胜利。


Only two other parties – the Republican People’s Party (CHP) with 21% and the National Movement Party (MHP) with 14% – surpassed the 10% threshold for representation in parliament.	只有其他两个政党，也就是共和人民党和国家运动党分别获得21%和14%的选票，超过了在议会获得席位的10%的标准。


A number of independents will complete the legislative roster.	几名独立候选人也获得议会席位。


What makes the result so complex is that the ruling AKP got far more votes – up 13 percentage points from 2002 – but fewer seats than it had before.	正义和发展党获得的选票比2002年高出13个百分点，但是获得的议会席位却少了很多，这就让选举结果如此复杂。


The party will be able to form a government by itself, but will lack the two-thirds majority needed to bring about some of the big changes that it seeks.	该党将可以自行组织政府，但是却缺少所需要的三分之二的多数来实行它所寻求的巨大变革。


Still, the AKP can be satisfied that after five years in office its popular support has climbed, while the opposition has been shown to be incapable of challenging it seriously.	然而，经过五年的执政，其大众支持上升，反对派无力对其发起严重的挑战，因此该党还是可以感到满意。


The AKP’s resounding victory means that the Turkish republic originally shaped as a secular state by Kemal Ataturk in the 1920’s is dead.	正义和发展党的大获全胜意味着二十世纪二十年代由凯末尔建立的世俗土耳其共和国的终结。


However, this does not necessarily mean that Turkey will become an Islamic, must less an Islamist, country.	但是，这并不一定意味着土耳其将变成一个伊斯兰国家，更不会是一个伊斯兰化的国家。


Ataturk viewed Islam as a major factor holding back Turkey’s progress.	凯末尔认为伊斯兰是阻碍土耳其进步的一个关键因素。


He sought to banish Islam as a political and social force from the public sphere, though of course the vast majority of the population remained Muslim by religion.	尽管土耳其人口的绝大部分在宗教上还是穆斯林，他寻求将伊斯兰作为政治和社会势力从公共领域中驱逐出去。


For Ataturk, Westernization and modernization went hand in hand.	对于凯末尔来说，西方化和现代化是并行的。


And, indeed, Turkey achieved great success – arguably more than any other Muslim-majority state in the world – in building democracy, maintaining stability, and moving forward economically.	而且确实，土耳其在建立民主、维持稳定并且经济发展上获得了巨大的成功，无疑超过世界上其他任何穆斯林占多数的国家。


This period came to an end for several reasons.	这一时期结束有几个原因。


A key factor was the increasing prominence and power of more traditional sections of the population from central Anatolia, where many small businesses grew big, enriching a more Islamic-oriented middle class.	一个关键因素是，来自安纳托利亚的人口中更为保守的部份的势力和权力不断增长。 在那里，许多小企业发展壮大，使得更为具有伊斯兰导向的中产阶级变得富有。


At the same time, millions of people emigrated from villages to cities, becoming mobilized and politicized as a result.	与此同时，数以百万计的人从乡村移居到城市，结果变得组织化和政治化。


The end of the Cold War – in which Turkey was a frontline state – and the growth of political Islam elsewhere also contributed to a rebirth of Islam in the public arena.	冷战中，土耳其是一个前线国家。 冷战结束以及其他地方政治伊斯兰的发展也造成了公共领域伊斯兰的复生。


Equally significant was the development in the old Islamic party of talented leaders that wanted to break with its backward-looking ways and extremist image.	同样重要的是旧的伊斯兰政党的进展。 其富有才华的领导人想要与其后进和极端主义的形象分道扬镳。


They successfully reconciled Islamic politics with the Turkish lifestyle and modernity in general.	他们成功地将伊斯兰政治和土耳其总体上的生活方式和现代化结合起来。


Cleverly, they positioned the party as conservative rather than Islamist – a process aided by the corruption, bickering, and incompetence of the existing parties.	他们的聪明之处是，他们将他们的政党定位为保守政党，而非伊斯兰政党。 现有政党的腐败、争吵以及无能也助长了这一过程。


Indeed, while the socialist left survived by uniting around the CHP, the conservative parties that largely dominated Turkish politics for a quarter-century fell apart.	确实，社会党通过联合在共和人民党周围而得以保全，在过去二十五年中统领土耳其政治的保守派政党土崩瓦解。


Unwilling to change or work together, and unable to devise ways of appealing to voters, these once-powerful groups simply disappeared, leaving the AKP largely in control of the conservative electoral base.	这些称雄一时的团体不愿意变革或者合作，也无法制订出吸引选民的方法干脆就消亡了，从而让正义和发展党控制了保守派选民根基。


But not completely.	但是并非完全如此。


The election’s other success story was the MHP, which has often been seen as a neo-fascist party since its creation immediately after World War II, but which has been reinventing itself along conservative nationalist lines.	这一选举的另一个成功者是国家运动党。 该党建立于二战结束后不久，从那以来，它经常被视为是一个新纳粹党，但是，它一直也沿着保守派民族主义路线重新改造自己。


The fact that two-thirds of the voters supported parties that were long considered extremist and whose allegiance to democracy is questionable has shocked many Turks, including those who comprised most of the ruling elite in modern times.	三分之二的选民支持长期以来被认为是极端主义、而且对民主的忠诚令人生疑的政党，这让许多土耳其人、包括大部分现代统治精英们惊讶不已。


There are two sets of questions that now need to be answered.	现在有两大问题需要解答。


First, what does the AKP want?	首先，正义和发展党想要什么？


Is it a conservative party of good government that seeks equality for Islam in the public sphere, as its leaders usually suggest, or an Islamist wolf in moderate sheep’s clothing, as its enemies fear?	它是一个像它的领导人通常所表明的那样治理良好的保守派政党、寻求公共领域中伊斯兰的平等，还是像它的敌人所害怕的那样是一个披着温和派羊皮的伊斯兰主义狼？


These alternatives are not necessarily contradictory.	这些选择并不一定是矛盾的。


The AKP contains people with both views.	正义和发展党包含持有这两种观点的人。


Moreover, it might be that the party will push as far as it can until it is stopped by fear of a military coup or a rejection of its program by the voters.	而且，也有可能这一政党将会尽力推动，直到害怕军事政变或者选民拒绝其规划而停止。


That leads to the second question: how far can the AKP go in changing Turkish society?	这就产生了第二个问题：正义和发展党在改变土耳其社会上将会走多远？


The problem is that unless there is a viable opposition, the only check on the AKP will be its own conscience and a crackdown by the still secular-oriented armed forces.	问题是，除非有一个能够存活的反对派，否则，对正义和发展党唯一的制约就是其自身的良知和目前依然是世俗主义导向的军队镇压。


But, as part of its seemingly endless effort to get into the European Union – an aspiration that seems all but doomed at present – Turkey implemented reforms that undercut the military’s political role.	土耳其无休无止地努力加入欧盟，而目前这一渴望看起来已经破灭。 作为这一努力的一部分，土耳其实行了改革，削弱军队的政治作用。


Also at the top of the AKP’s agenda is choosing a president in tune with its worldview.	同样，正义和发展党的首要议程之一根据其世界观选择一名总统。


The president names the head of the armed forces, a power that could potentially turn the military into a servant of the government.	总统任命武装力量的首脑，这一权力有可能将军队服务于政府。


Given that the government can change laws, name judges, and staff the state administration, Turkey’s slide to another political model could reach a point of no return.	鉴于政府可以改变法律、任命法官并且组成国家行政机构，土耳其移向另一个政治模式就有可能不可逆转。


But what precisely would that model be?	但是，这一模式究竟是什么样子呢？


If such a model means a Turkey that is more willing to embrace its traditional and religious heritage, the outcome would be relatively benign for most of its citizens as well as its strategic alliances.	如果这一模式意味着土耳其更加愿意接纳其传统和宗教遗产，其结果对于其大多数公民以及它的战略盟国来说将会相对良好。


But if it means a more anti-Western Turkey increasingly oriented toward Iran, Syria, and radical Islamist movements, a major shift in international politics would be accompanied by mounting domestic instability.	但是如果这意味着更为反西方、朝向伊朗、叙利亚以及激进的伊斯兰运动，那么，国际政治中的这一主要变化将会伴随着不断增加的国内不稳定。


Turkey’s Democratic Dusk	土耳其民主的黄昏


CAMBRIDGE – When questioned recently about a constitutional law professor who was arrested for lecturing at an institute run by the country’s main pro-Kurdish political party, Turkey’s interior minister, Idris Naim Sahin, couldn’t hide his irritation: “I am having a hard time understanding those saying a professor should not be arrested while thousands of other people are being arrested in Turkey.”	发自剑桥——一位土耳其宪法学教授最近因为在本国主流库尔德政党开办的学校授课而遭到逮捕，而被问到此事的时候，土耳其内政部长沙欣（Idris Naim Sahin）无法掩饰其愤怒：“我就不明白，在土耳其每天都有几千人被捕，逮捕一个教授又有什么问题？ ”


Presumably, Sahin meant to say that a professor cannot claim special treatment under the law.	沙欣大概想说即便是对教授也不能法外开恩。


But his remark inadvertently underscored Turkey’s new reality, in which any perceived opponent of the current regime can be jailed, with or without evidence, for terrorism or other violent acts.	但他的言论却无意中点明了土耳其的新现状：无论是谁，不管有没有证据，只要被认为是反对现政权，都会以恐怖主义或其他暴力行为的罪名投入监狱。


Special courts, tasked with prosecuting terrorism and crimes against the state, have been working overtime to produce charges that are often as absurd as they are baseless.	那些专门针对恐怖主义和反国家罪的特别法庭日以继夜地罗织各种毫无根据的荒谬指控。


For example, journalists have been imprisoned for producing articles and books at the behest of an alleged terrorist organization called “Ergenekon,” whose existence has yet to be confirmed, despite years of investigation.	例如有些记者遭到逮捕，罪名是在“Ergenekon”组织的授意下撰写文章和书籍，但问题是官方在多年调查之后连这个所谓的恐怖组织是否存在都尚未弄清


Likewise, military officers have been charged on the basis of blatantly fraudulent – indeed, amateurishly produced – documents containing obvious anachronisms.	类似的还有利用一些公然撒谎（实际上就是业余水平杜撰），连人名时间都对不上号的文件来指控部队军官。


A senior police commissioner is currently languishing in jail for allegedly collaborating with far-left militants he spent his entire career hunting down.	一名高级警官最近因与极左翼武装分子勾结的罪名入狱——但后者却是他一生追捕的对象。


These prosecutions have cast an ever-widening net, ensnaring scores of journalists, authors, and academics, hundreds of military officers, and thousands of Kurdish politicians and activists, among others.	这些指控还进一步扩大化，被逮捕者包括数十名记者，作家和学者，还有数百名军人和数千名库尔德政治家和积极分子。


Self-censorship has become routine.	自我审查已成家常便饭。


Media bosses anxious to retain Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s favor have fired many of those journalists who continue to criticize his regime.	那些渴望得到总理厄尔多安垂青的媒体老总们已经解雇了许多批评现政权的记者。


And government control now extends beyond the media, judiciary, and academia to the worlds of business and sports.	而政府控制也从媒体，司法和学术领域扩散到了商业和体育方面。


Previously autonomous regulatory bodies (such as the competition authority) have been quietly subordinated to the government, with no debate or discussion.	那些原本自治的监管机构（比如竞争管理局）都已悄悄归顺政府，根本不容争辩和讨论。


Even the Turkish Academy of Sciences has been targeted.	就连土耳其科学院都成为了控制目标。


A recent decree, widely condemned abroad, allows the government to appoint two-thirds of the Academy’s members, thereby ending even the semblance of scientific independence.	最近一份备受外界批评的裁决允许政府任命2/3的学院成员人选，使科学自由的表象都荡然无存。


Erdoğan seems immune to criticism.	厄尔多安本人似乎无可指摘。


His success at expanding access to health, education, and housing has enabled him to win three general elections – each with a greater share of the popular vote than previously.	他在扩大医疗，教育和住房福利方面的成功使其连夺三次大选胜利，而且每一次得票都比上一次更多。


He has broken the power of the military old guard and the hold of its stale Kemalist ideology – the secular nationalism introduced by Turkey’s first president, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk – thereby permanently altering the makeup of Turkish politics.	他掀翻了旧军人守护者的权力以及后者对老一套凯末尔主义意识形态的固守——也就是土耳其首任总统穆斯塔法·凯末尔·阿塔蒂尔克所订下的世俗民族主义——并因此永久改变了土耳其政治的面貌。


He has presided over the emergence of a vibrant new class of Anatolian entrepreneurs.	在他的带领下一个新的安纳托利亚企业家阶层蓬勃崛起。


And, under his rule, Turkey has become a regional power.	而在他的统治下土耳其也成长为一大区域势力。


Yet, while Erdoğan may appear to be at the pinnacle of power, it is his government’s “Gülenist” allies who have grown increasingly powerful.	而当厄尔多安似乎登临权力之巅时，其政府的“谷兰主义者”盟友也已日渐强大。


Members of the transnational Gülen movement – inspired by followers of Fethullah Gülen, a Pennsylvania-based Muslim theologian – are staffing Turkey’s police, judiciary, bureaucracy, and universities.	国际性的谷兰运动——由身处美国宾夕法尼亚州的穆斯林神学家法图拉赫·谷兰的追随者们所推动——在土耳其的警务、司法，政府机关和大学都拥有一批成员。


The Gülenist media now set the country’s new ideological tone, producing a steady stream of disinformation in their vocal support of the country’s show trials.	“谷兰主义者”媒体如今为这个国家的意识形态定下了新的基调，用持续不断的误导性信息来声援政府的公开审判。


These trials are, in fact, often staged to serve Gülenist ends specifically.	但事实上这些审判最终都是专门为谷兰主义者的目的服务。


Prominent detainees, such as the journalist Nedim Sener and police commissioner Hanefi Avci, landed in jail after exposing the wrongdoings of Gülenist police and prosecutors.	类似记者内迪姆·萨纳尔（Nedim Sener）和警官哈内非·阿维西（Hanefi Avci）这样的知名囚犯都是因为揭露了谷兰派警察和检察官的���误行径而当啷入狱的。


Editorials in Zaman, the Gülen network’s Turkish-language daily newspaper, no longer mince words: a new Turkey is being created; those who stand in the way are getting what they deserve.	对此隶属于谷兰主义网络的土耳其语日报《时代报》在社论中直言不讳：一个新的土耳其正在诞生； 而那些逆流而动的人都将受到应有的惩罚。


Erdoğan has benefited greatly from Gülenist support, yet he detests sharing power and remains suspicious of the movement.	厄尔多安从谷兰主义者的支持中获益甚多，但他极端不愿分享权力并对这个运动充满猜忌。


Early on, he successfully exploited the Gülenist-supported political trials in order to demonize the opposition.	在早些时候他成功借助谷兰主义者支持下的政治审判妖魔化了自己的对手。


But, as the charges have increased in scope and implausibility, the trials have complicated his relationships with the military, domestic liberals, and outsiders such as foreign media and the European Union.	但随着这些指控不断扩大化并难以取信于人，他与军方，国内自由派以及外国媒体和欧盟这样的外部势力的关系也变得棘手。


Moreover, individuals close to him and his administration have recently become entangled in the net of judicial manipulation, which suggests that he may be losing control over the police and the special courts.	更重要的是，他的亲信和政府最近也陷入了司法操纵的大网之中，而这可能说明他正失去对警察和特别法庭的掌控。


Given that the fight against the common enemy, the secularist old guard, has been decisively won, an eventual break between Erdoğan and the Gülenists is perhaps inevitable.	考虑到对共同敌人——旧世俗主义守护者——的斗争已经取得了决定性胜利，厄尔多安和谷兰主义者之间的分裂或许也无法避免。


Unfortunately, regardless of which side emerges victorious, the outcome will not be good news for Turkish democracy.	但不幸的是，无论哪一方最终胜利，对土耳其民主来说也不是什么好消息。


For Turkey’s friends abroad, it is time for some tough love.	因此土耳其的友邦们也是时候表达一些“严厉的爱”了。


So far, the European Union and the United States have reacted to Turkey’s descent into authoritarianism with little more than vague statements of concern.	迄今为止，欧盟和美国对土耳其滑向专制的态势仅限于一些态度模糊的关切性声明。


No official has offered criticism analogous to Swedish Foreign Secretary Carl Bildt’s condemnation of former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko’s show trial in that country, or US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s frank statements about Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s erosion of the rule of law.	相对于瑞典外交大臣卡尔·比尔特对乌克兰公审该国前总理尤利娅·季莫申科的谴责，或是美国国务卿希拉里对俄罗斯总理普京破坏法治的尖锐评论，没有任何官员能对土耳其发出类似的言论。


Incredibly, the EU’s progress reports on Turkey have continued to call the Ergenekon trials, which are heavily supported by the Gülenists, an opportunity to strengthen the rule of law.	令人难以置信的是，欧盟撰写的相关土耳其发展报告（progress report）一直都将谷兰主义者大力支持的“Ergenekon”组织审判称为一个增强法治的契机。


It wasn’t long ago that Turkey appeared to be a bright beacon of democracy and moderation in a region accustomed to autocracy and radicalism.	不久之前土耳其还似乎是一盏民主和现代化的明灯，照亮了这个惯于推行专制和极端主义的区域。


Now it looks more like a country heading towards authoritarianism at home and embracing adventurism abroad.	如今它却看上去像一个对内推行专制主义，对外实施冒险主义的国家。


It is understandable that Europeans and Americans do not want to offend a regional power.	欧洲和美国人都不想和一个区域势力交恶，这是可以理解的。


But playing Erdoğan’s game only reinforces his sense of invincibility.	但纵容厄尔多安只会让他觉得自己天下无敌。


It does not advance the cause of democracy in Turkey; nor does it make Turkey a more reliable ally.	这既不能推进土耳的民主进程； 也无法令土耳其变成一个更可靠的盟友。


Will Turkey Weather the Middle East Storm?	土耳其能抵御住中东风暴吗？


ISTANBUL – A cycle of terrible violence has taken over much of the Middle East.	伊斯坦布尔—一场可怕的暴力风暴席卷了中东大部。


Its center has shifted from Iraq (where sectarian strife has recently escalated again) to Syria, but it encompasses Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia as well.	风暴中心从伊拉克（宗派冲突最近再次抬头）移到了叙利亚，但也将埃及、也门、利比亚和突尼斯包括在内。


Farther east, Afghanistan is suffering its second decade of violent conflict, while Pakistan seems to be chronically on the brink of war, civil war, or social breakdown.	在更远的东方，阿富汗的暴力冲突进入了第二个十年，而巴基斯坦也在慢慢地滑向战争、内战或社会分裂的边缘。


The most worrisome underlying threat is the increase in fighting between Sunni and Shia Muslims.	最令人担忧的根本威胁是逊尼派和什叶派穆斯林之间的斗争愈演愈烈。


Likewise, pious conservatives and liberal and leftist secular youth, who joined forces in Cairo and Tunis in 2010-2011 to challenge the dictators, have now turned on each other: witness the Egyptian security forces’ appalling massacres of Islamist demonstrators in Cairo recently, following a military coup carried out with liberals’ support.	类似地，虔诚的保守派和自由派和左翼世俗青年（2010—2011年间，正是他们挑战了开罗和突尼斯城的独裁者）也在互相操戈：最近埃及军事政变受到了自由派的支持、随后安全部队又令人震惊地屠杀开罗伊斯兰教徒游行就是明证。


The region’s people are sliding into enemy camps, deepening their societies’ wounds in the process.	该地区人民正在滑入敌方阵营，社会伤口越来越深。


I have often argued that Turkey should not intervene in the internal affairs of its neighbors or adopt a Middle East-centered policy.	我常指出，土耳其不应该干预邻国的内部事务，也不应该采取以中东为核心的政策。


Both government and opposition should remain steadfastly focused on Europe, despite the obstacles that the European Union has placed in Turkey’s way during membership negotiations.	政府和反对派都应该坚决地把焦点集中在欧洲，尽管欧盟在土耳其入盟谈判道路上设置了重重障碍。


But Turkey cannot be indifferent to the tragedy engulfing its southern neighbors.	但土耳其不能眼睁睁看着悲剧吞噬其南方邻国。


The Arab world’s pain is acutely felt, owing to Turkey’s historical, religious, and emotional bonds with these countries.	阿拉伯世界的痛苦土耳其感同身受，这是土耳其的历史、宗教和与这些国家的情感联系决定的。


Moreover, economic ties and sheer proximity mean that Turkey’s prosperity depends, to some degree at least, on that of the Middle East.	此外，经济联系和地利意味着土耳其的繁荣至少在一定程度上取决于中东。


In recent years, there was hope that Turkey could help by serving as a model of a successful economy and well-functioning democracy; but recent events have raised doubts.	近几年来，人们寄希望于土耳其能树立一个经济成功、民主运转良好的榜样； 但最近的一系列事件让人们产生了怀疑。


In fact, Turkey must overcome four sources of internal tension if it is to continue to thrive economically, consolidate its democracy, and act as a compelling example to others.	事实上，如果想要持续经济繁荣、巩固民主并成为其他国家无法抗拒的榜样的话，土耳其必须克服四大国内动荡暗流。


The first and most serious source of tension stems from the need to recognize Kurdish identity as a fully legitimate part of the Turkish Republic.	第一个也是最严重的动荡之源来自完全承认库尔德人作为土耳其共和国合法组成部分的需要。


Those who wish to express a Kurdish identity, as well as all other citizens, must be confident that, while all remain committed to national unity, Turkey is a country in which diversity can thrive.	希望彰显库尔德人身份的人与其他所有公民一样，必须有信心认为尽管国家团结还仅仅是承诺，但土耳其是一个多样性能够生根发芽的国家。


Second, there is an underlying historical tension between the large Sunni majority and the Alevi-Bektashi minority, loosely linked to Shia Islam.	其次，逊尼派多数和阿拉维-比克特西派少数之间存在历史对立，后者与什叶派伊斯兰教有着并不��密的联系。


Third, there is the difference between those who adhere to the tradition of political Islam and those who uphold the strict secularism that came with the republic.	第三，坚持政治伊斯兰传统者和支持与共和国一同诞生的严格世俗主义者之间存在分歧。


Often this social “divide” intersects with the Sunni-Alevi cleavage, as the Alevis have increasingly aligned themselves with the political left.	这一社会“分歧”往往与逊尼派-阿拉维派分裂交相辉映，而阿拉维正日渐与政治左翼结盟。


Finally, there is a growing perception of partisanship within the public administration.	最后，在公共行政方面，人们感到派系正在日渐形成。


Building independent, non-partisan regulatory bodies was one of the key pillars of the 2001-2002 reform program.	建设独立、无党派色彩的监督机构是2001—2002年改革的重要支柱之一。


But these reforms have been rolled back recently, with independent regulatory authorities again coming under the control of government ministries (though it seems that the central bank has retained much of its autonomy).	但这些改革最近出现了倒退，独立监督当局再次受到了政府部门的控制（尽管中央银行似乎仍保留了相当的自治性）。


As the perception of non-partisanship in public administration has diminished, proximity to those in power has become another source of tension.	随着公共行政无党派性质的减弱，接近权力的群体就成了新的动荡之源。


Turkey benefits from republican reflexes and values that have been built over decades, as well as from humanist wisdom anchored in centuries of history.	土耳其从共和习惯和价值中获益良多。 这是数十年经营的结果，也是几百年历史积淀中的人文智慧。


Yet, given the regional context, Turkey’s internal tensions now represent a serious threat.	但是，从地区环境看，土耳其内部紧张已是严重威胁。


All sides must manage these tensions with great care and caution.	所有各方都必须小心翼翼地处理内部紧张。


Respect for diversity and individual freedom, and concern for generating growth and jobs in an atmosphere of social peace, must be guiding principles.	尊重多样性和个人自由，以及关注在社会和平的氛围中实现增长和就业必须成为指导原则。


Healing the wounds to which all sides have at times contributed, and practicing forgiveness, should be the order of the day.	弥合所有各方都曾有所“贡献”的伤疤并实现谅解应该成为当下的共识。


A spiral of frustration and antagonism must not be allowed to develop.	绝不能让沮丧和敌对的恶性循环继续发展。


Turkey must look carefully at the catastrophe unfolding around it in the Middle East.	土耳其必须密切关注其四周围中东地区正在发生的灾难。


Humanitarian help is necessary, and Turkey is providing it generously, in ways that should serve as an example for Western countries.	人道主义援助是必不可少的，而土耳其也在慷慨提供，并且应该成为西方国家效仿的榜样。


But Turkey’s political leaders, opinion shapers, and citizens must also recognize that the only protection against a similar disaster at home is a vibrant democracy, a fully professional public administration, and a tolerant society embodying pride and affection for the country’s diversity.	但土耳其的政治领导层、意见领袖和人民还必须认识到，唯一保护土耳其免遭类似灾难的办法是充满活力的民主、彻底专业化的公共行政、以及珍视和爱戴土耳其社会多样性的包容性社会。


Others will not protect Turkey; some may even promote strife within its borders (historical examples of such tactics abound).	其他人不会保护土耳其； 一些人甚至会挑拨离间（历史上充满了这些伎俩）。


Turkey alone can protect itself, and only by upholding truly democratic behavior at home and pursuing an external policy that promotes peace and democracy but does not take sides in the region’s ongoing battles, particularly between Sunni and Shia.	土耳其靠自力更生就能保护自己，而只有在国内建立真正的民主行为、与此同时追求推进和平和民主但不在中方兴未艾的中东战局（特别是逊尼派和什叶派之争）中站边的对外政策才能实现这一点。


Fortunately, there is hope.	幸运的是，希望是存在的。


The Gezi Park demonstrators who in June protested peacefully against the use of excessive police force by simply standing still also protested peacefully, years ago, against the ban on the headscarf then in effect in Turkey’s universities.	6月份的盖兹公园（Gezi Park）示威者和平地反对政治力量的过度使用，他们的方式是静静地站在那里。 多年前，他们也曾反对过土耳其大学中禁止女生佩戴头巾的禁令。


This kind of concern for the rights of all is a hallmark of Turkey’s young generation.	如此争取权利证明了土耳其年青一代的品质。


Similarly, when the outgoing governor of Van sent a farewell message last month to the largely Kurdish-speaking people in his southeastern province, he delivered it in Kurdish – and received warm wishes in return.	类似地，上个月离职的凡城省（Van）省长向这个东南部省份大部分说库尔德语的人民发表了告别演说，他的演说用的是库尔德语，而听众报之以温暖的祝福。


A large majority of Turkey’s citizens share such generosity of spirit.	大部分土耳其人民都有这种慷慨大量的品质。


That is why, despite serious difficulties, Turkey has a good chance of overcoming its internal tensions and becoming the example that its Middle East neighbors (and perhaps a few of its European neighbors as well) so desperately need.	这就是为何面临重重艰难险阻的土耳其仍有很大的机会克服其内部紧张、成为中东邻国（或许还包括一些欧洲邻国）渴望的榜样。


Turkey’s Middle Eastern Road to Europe	土耳其从中东到欧洲之路


ISTANBUL – Just a few years ago, Europe headed Turkey’s agenda.	伊斯坦布尔-就在几年前，欧洲在土耳其议程上占了首要地位。


Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s newly elected government had embarked on a series of ambitious reforms to meet the European Union’s political criteria for membership.	雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安的新当选政府那时就开始了一系列雄心勃勃的改革，以满足欧盟对其成员国的政治标准。


At the end of 2004, the EU decided to initiate accession talks.	截至2004年底，欧盟决定开始其入盟谈判。


But pro-European euphoria proved short-lived: for all practical purposes, the accession negotiations are now at an impasse.	但是，亲欧洲的兴奋期最后成为昙花一现：因为各种实际的目的，入盟谈判现在陷入了僵局。


Euro-skepticism is now at an all-time high in Turkey, fueled by some European political leaders’ rhetoric opposing Turkey’s accession, and by the EU’s own failure to dispel doubts about the feasibility of Turkey’s eventual membership.	由于一些欧洲的政治领导人发出反对土耳其加入欧盟的言论，以及欧盟本身没有清除对土耳其最终入盟的可行性的疑虑，土耳其国内的欧洲怀疑论，在历史上从未像现在这样高涨。


Domestic support for EU accession was 70% at the start of the negotiations, but is now closer to 40%.	在谈判初期，国内对加入欧盟的支持率达70 ％在，但现在已接近40 ％ 。


Not surprisingly, Turkey’s government has also lost its appetite for EU-related reforms.	不足为奇的是，土耳其政府也失去了为加入欧盟而进行改革的兴趣。


For more than two years, the European Commission has found little positive to say in its annual progress reports on political reform.	两年多来，欧盟委员会发现在针对土耳其的政治改革进度而撰写的年度报告中，已乏善可陈了。


Yet, just as Europe is looking more distant, the Middle East is looming larger, as Turkey shifts its attention from Brussels to Beirut and beyond.	然而，正当欧洲与土耳其渐行渐远的时候，中东却是在眼前越来越大，因为土耳其将其注意力从布鲁塞尔转移到了贝鲁特以及更远的地方。


The frustrations of dealing with an undecided Europe have led Turkish policymakers to focus their efforts on an area where the expected return on their investment is more immediate and more concrete.	与一个优柔寡断的欧洲打交道所遭受的挫折感已导致土耳其的决策者们把他们的精力集中在预期投资回报率更直接也更具体的领域中去。


In fact, whereas Erdoğan recently visited many Middle East countries – Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq – until this month, he had not been to Brussels since 2005.	事实上，到本月为止，埃尔多安总理在最近访问了许多中东国家-叙利亚，黎巴嫩，埃及，阿尔及利亚，约旦、沙特阿拉伯、伊朗和伊拉克，但他自2005年以来还没有过到布鲁塞尔。


Turkey was traditionally a bystander in Middle East politics.	土耳其在传统上一直在中东政治中扮演旁观者的角色。


Its leaders believed that there was little to be contributed or gained by getting involved in the region’s problems, and that Turkey’s Ottoman legacy would leave its Arab neighbors suspicious.	它的领导人一直认为，如果介入该地区的问题，土耳其没有什么可贡献，也不会得到任何好处，而且土耳其奥斯曼帝国的历史遗产会让其阿拉伯邻国们产生疑虑。


But developments in recent years have enabled Turkey to become a more active player in the region, and to score several diplomatic successes.	但是近几年的局势进展已使土耳其能在该地区扮演一个更积极的角色了，并且它取得了一系列的外交成就。


Turkey was instrumental in bringing about an end to Lebanon’s factional strife, and its overtures to Syria – undertaken despite warnings from the United States – have paid off handsomely.	土耳其在结束黎巴嫩的派系纷争方面贡献了其作用，其向叙利亚所表示的姿态-尽管被美国警告过-已成效可观。


Turkey was able not only to defuse the international tensions surrounding its Arab neighbor, but also to engineer the start of direct talks between Syria and Israel.	土耳其不仅能够缓解围绕着其阿拉伯邻国的紧张的国际局势，而且能为叙利亚和以色列之间开始直接会谈进行谋划。