The PBOC now has three options: it can stop all interventions and let the renminbi float; link it to a basket of currencies; or peg it tightly to the US dollar, as it did during the Asian financial crisis of 1997.	现在，中国人民银行有三个选择：停止一切干预让人民币自由浮动； 让人民币与一揽子货币挂钩；


So far, however, the PBOC has offered no indication of its plans, beyond the continuation of its current renminbi-sustaining policy.	或紧紧盯住美元（和1997年亚洲金融危机期间一样）。 但是，到目前为止，中国人民银行尚未表现出除继续当前人民币维持政策之外的计划意图。


In my opinion, the PBOC should reinforce the Chinese government’s market-oriented reform plans and allow the renminbi to float.	我认为，中国人民银行应该执行中国政府的市场改革计划，允许人民币自由浮动。


China is still running a large current-account surplus and a long-term capital-account surplus, and it has not fully liberalized its capital account; so the chances are good that the renminbi would not fall too far or for too long.	中国仍保持巨量经常项目盈余和长期资本账户盈余，其资本账户尚未完全自由化； 因此很有可能人民币不会跌得太多太久。


Moreover, even if the renminbi did experience a double-digit depreciation, China would not be thrust into financial crisis.	此外，即使人民币真的发生两位数的贬值，中国也不会陷入金融危机。


After all, the country’s stock of corporate external debt is not too large; the currency mismatch within Chinese banks is small; and inflation is just above 1%.	毕竟，中国公司外债存量并不很大； 中资银行内部的货币错配问题很小；


To bolster such financial buffers, China must enforce existing capital controls much more strictly.	通胀也只是略高于1%。 要加强这些金融缓冲，中国必须更加严格地执行现有资本管制。


Nonetheless, there remains the possibility of a market panic, with all of the uncertainty that such an episode implies.	尽管如此，市场恐慌仍有可能发生，从而引发各种不确定性。


Given this, the PBOC could engineer a transition during which the renminbi is pegged to a basket of currencies, with an adjustable central parity rate and a wide fluctuation band of 7.5% or even 15%.	因此，中国人民银行可以实施转型，在此期间，人民币盯住一揽子货币，围绕可调整的中间价波动，波动幅度可以放得很大，比如7.


It could choose not to announce the (very wide) fluctuation band, so that investors, judging that the renminbi had fallen far enough, might begin to purchase the currency before it actually reached the floor, thereby stabilizing the exchange rate before the PBOC was forced to spend more foreign-exchange reserves.	5%甚至15%。 中国人民银行可以不宣布这一（非常大的）波动区间，从而让投资者判断人民币已经下跌到位，进而在人民币真的跌到下线之前开始买入，从而在中国人民银行被迫花费更多外汇储备之前稳定汇率���


This year will be another difficult one for China.	今年对中国来说又将是艰难的一年。


But the situation is far from dire.	但情况远非绝望。


With the right policy mix, China should be able to stabilize its currency and foreign-reserve position, and return to a sustainable growth path.	在正确的政策组合下，中国应该能够稳定人民币和外汇储备头寸，并回归可持续增长之路。


The Return of the Renminbi Rant	人民币喧嚣卷土重来


NEW HAVEN – China’s currency, the renminbi, has been weakening in recent months, resurrecting familiar charges of manipulation, competitive devaluation, and beggar-thy-neighbor mercantilism.	纽黑文—最近几个月来，人民币一直在贬值，操纵论、竞争性贬值论和以邻为壑的重商主义论再度兴起。


In mid-April, the US Treasury expressed “particularly serious concerns” over this development, underscoring what has long been one of the most contentious economic-policy issues between the United States and China.	4月中旬，美国财政部“非常严重关注”这一发展态势，对这一中美之间最具争议的经济政策问题煽风点火。


This is a timeworn debate – politically inspired and grounded in bad economics – that does a serious disservice to both sides by diverting attention from far more important issues affecting the US-China economic relationship.	这场争论已是老生常谈——来源于政治，经济学基础并不可靠——它使双方的注意力从远为重要的其他影响中美经济关系的问题上移开，对双方都造成了极大的不利影响。


Taken to its extreme, America’s accusations risk pushing the world’s two largest economies down the slippery slope of trade frictions, protectionism, or something even worse.	说得极端些，美国的指控可能让世界最大的两个经济体滑向贸易摩擦、保护主义甚至更糟糕的情形。


First, the facts: Since hitting its high watermark on January 14, 2014, the renminbi has depreciated by 3.4% relative to the US dollar through April 25.	首先来看事实：自2014年1月14日触及最高点以来，到4月25日，人民币兑美元汇率已下跌3. 4%。


This follows a cumulative appreciation of 37% since July 21, 2005, when China dropped its dollar peg and shifted its currency regime to a so-called “managed float.”	此前，从2005年7月21日中国取消盯住美元政策，开始采用所谓的“有管理的浮动”机制以来，人民币累计升值37%。


Relative to where it started nearly nine years ago, the renminbi is still up 32.5%.	若与近九年前的起始点相比，人民币仍升值了32. 5%。


Over the same period, there has been a dramatic adjustment of China’s international balance-of-payments position.	在此期间，中国的国际收支状况发生了重大改变。


The current-account surplus – the most telling symptom of an undervalued currency – has narrowed from a record 10.1% of GDP in 2007 to just 2.1% in 2013.	经常项目盈余——货币低估最具说服力的现象——从2007年占GDP的10. 1%（最高纪录）下降至2013年的2.


The International Monetary Fund’s latest forecast suggests that the surplus will hold at around 2% of GDP in 2014.	1%。 国际货币基金组织的最新预测指出，2014年中国经常项目将占GDP的2%左右。


Seen against this background, US officials’ handwringing over the recent modest reversal in the renminbi’s exchange rate appears absurd.	照此看，美国官员对人民币最近略有贬值大惊小怪显得殊为可笑。


With China’s external position much closer to balance, there is good reason to argue that the renminbi, having appreciated by nearly one-third since mid-2005, is now within a reasonable proximity of “fair value.”	中国的外部收支已相当接近于平衡，因此我们大有理由认为人民币在自2005年中以来升值近三分之一后，已经相当接近“公允价值”了。


The IMF conceded as much in its latest in-depth review of the Chinese economy, which calls the renminbi “moderately undervalued” by 5-10%.	IMF在其最新中国经济深度报告中也肯定了这一点，人民币“略微低估”了5—10%。


This stands in contrast to its earlier assessments of “substantial” undervaluation.	这与其早先“严重低估”的论断形成了鲜明对比。


America’s fixation on the renminbi is a classic case of political denial.	美国抓住人民币问题不放可谓政治否认的经典案例。


With US workers remaining under intense pressure in terms of both job security and real wages, politicians have understandably been put on the spot.	美国工人面临着工作保障和实际工资的双重压力，在这样的背景下，不难理解美国政客处境相当尴尬。


In response, they have fixated on the Chinese component of a long-gaping trade deficit, charging that currency manipulation is the culprit to the long festering woes of the American middle class.	他们的应对措施是渲染长期贸易赤字的中国因素，指责中国货币操纵为美国中产阶级每况愈下的元凶。


This argument is politically expedient – but wrong.	这是错的，只能作为政治托辞。


The US trade deficit is a multilateral imbalance with many countries – 102 in all – not a bilateral problem with China.	美国贸易赤字是对多个国家（102个）的多边失衡，而不是对中国的双边问题。


It arises not from the alleged manipulation of the renminbi, but from the simple fact that America does not save.	这一问题并非来自遭遇口诛笔伐的人民币操纵，而是来自美国人不储蓄这一简单的事实。


Lacking in domestic savings and wanting to grow, the US must import surplus savings from abroad, and run massive current-account deficits to attract the foreign capital.	国内储蓄不足又想增长，因此美国不得不从国外进口剩余储蓄，维持巨大的经常项目赤字以吸引外国资本。


And that leads to America’s multilateral trade imbalance.	而这导致了美国的多边贸易失衡。


Yes, trade with China is the largest component of this imbalance, but that largely reflects the complexity of multinational supply chains and the benefits of offshore efficiency solutions.	是的，对中国的赤字是这一失衡的最大组成部分，但这只不过反映了跨国供应链的复杂性和离岸效率方案的益处。


That brings us to the uncomfortable truth about America’s politically inspired China bashing: It will backfire.	这让我们必须面对一个令人不安的事实：美国出于政治动机抨击中国迟早砸了自己的脚。


If America fails to solve its saving problem – a reasonable scenario in light of fiscal gridlock and persistently subpar personal saving – the current-account deficit will persist.	如果美国不能解决其储蓄问题——考虑到财政将局和个人储蓄长期萎靡，这很有可能——经常项目赤字就会一直存在。


That means that any reductions in China’s share of America’s external imbalance would simply be shifted to other foreign producers.	这意味着中国占美国外部失衡比例的减少必然会由其他外国生产国填补。


Significantly, this alternative sourcing will most likely have a higher cost base than Chinese production, thereby imposing the functional equivalent of a tax hike on already-beleaguered middle-class Americans.	更重要的是，这一外包替代极有可能比中国制造成本更高，最终形成的效应等同于向已经不堪重负的美国中产阶级进一步加税。


As China rebalances toward a growth model that draws greater support from domestic demand, Washington should stop ranting about the renminbi and start focusing on the opportunities that this bonanza will create.	中国正在实现向更加依赖内需的增长模式的再平衡，华盛顿应该停止在人民币问题上喋喋不休，转而关注这一转变带来的机遇。


That means emphasizing US companies’ access to China’s domestic goods and services markets.	这意味着促进美国公司进入中国国内商品和服务市场。


Pushing for a bilateral investment treaty that relaxes caps on foreign ownership in both countries would be an important step in that direction.	推动双边投资条约、放松两国外国所有权限制将是这一方向的重要步骤。


Similarly, the US needs to give China credit for having taken meaningful steps on the road to further currency reform.	类似地，美国需要赞美中国以促使其进一步采取有意义的货币改革措施。


The mid-March widening of the daily renminbi-dollar trading bands to plus or minus 2% (from the earlier 1% band) is an important step in relaxing control over the so-called managed float.	3月中旬，人民币-美元日间交易区间扩大为正负2%（此前为1%），这是向放松对所谓的有管理的浮动的管制的重要一步。


That, coupled with the 3% depreciation in the past few months, should send a strong signal to speculators that one-way renminbi bets are hazardous – a signal that could help dampen inflows of hot money, which have complicated liquidity management and fueled asset-market volatility in China.	这一举动加上最近几个月3%的贬值构成了一个强烈的信号，投机者下注人民币单边升值是很危险的——这或许有助于遏制热钱流入并干扰流动性管理、增加中国资产市场波动。


There are two views of the future of the US-China economic relationship: one that sees only risk, and another that sees opportunity.	关于中美经济关系的未来有两种看法：一种只看到风险，另一种只看到机遇。


Fixating on the renminbi falls into the former category: It misses the rebalancing and reforms already under way in China and deflects America’s focus from addressing its most serious long-term macroeconomic problem – a lack of saving.	纠结于人民币贬值属于第一种：它无视中国已经采取的再平衡和改革，也让美国不再关注纠正其最严重的长期宏观经济问题——储蓄不足。


By contrast, viewing China as an opportunity underscores the need for America to undertake its own rebalancing – rebuilding US competitiveness and pushing for a meaningful share of China’s coming boom in domestic demand.	相反，将中国视为机遇契合美国自身的再平衡需要——重塑美国竞争力，争夺中国即将到来的内需繁荣份额。


Unfortunately, the revival in US saving that this will require is being drowned out by the renminbi rant.	不幸的是，实现这一点所要求的美国储蓄回升需要完全被人民币喧嚣掩盖了。


The Fed Trap	美联储陷阱


NEW HAVEN – As the US Federal Reserve attempts to exit from its unconventional monetary policy, it is grappling with the disparity between the policy’s success in preventing economic disaster and its failure to foster a robust recovery.	纽黑文—美联储试图退出其非常规货币政策，这一政策面临着一对矛盾：它成功地阻止了经济灾难，但没能铸就强健的经济复苏。


To the extent that this disconnect has led to mounting financial-market excesses, the exit will be all the more problematic for markets – and for America’s market-fixated monetary authority.	由于这一矛盾已经导致了金融市场过度，退出政策将会给市场以及依赖市场的美国货币当局造成相当大的问题。


The Fed’s current quandary is rooted in a radical change in the art and practice of central banking.	美联储目前的窘境的根源在于央行业务艺术和实践上的剧烈变化。


Conventional monetary policies, designed to fulfill the Fed’s dual mandate of price stability and full employment, are ill-equipped to cope with the systemic risks of asset and credit bubbles, to say nothing of the balance-sheet recessions that ensue after such bubbles burst.	为了满足美联储的两大职责——稳定物价和充分就业而制定的常规货币政策无法处置资产和信用泡沫的系统性风险，更不用说这些泡沫破裂后持续的资产负债表衰退了。


This became painfully apparent in recent years, as central banks, confronted by the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, turned to unconventional policies – in particular, massive liquidity injections through quantitative easing (QE).	近几年来，这一点变得相当明显，面对2008—2009年全球金融危机的各央行纷纷转向非常规政策——特别是通过量化宽松（QE）进行的大规模流动性注入。


The theory behind this move – as espoused by Ben Bernanke, first as an academic, then as a Fed governor, and eventually as Fed Chairman – is that operating on the quantity dimension of the credit cycle is the functional equivalent of acting on the price side of the equation.	这一变化背后的理论是——由学者出身、后担任美联储董事、最后成为美联储主席的本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke）提出——信用周期数量维度上的操作，其功能与在方程的价格端进行操作是等价的。


That supposition liberated the Fed from fear of the dreaded “zero bound” that it was approaching in 2003-2004, when, in response to the collapse of the equity bubble, it lowered its benchmark policy rate to 1%.	这一论断使美联储不再担心其2003—2004年曾经接近过的令人畏惧的“零区间”。 当时，面临股票泡沫崩溃的局面，美联储将其基准政策利率下降到1%。


If the Fed ran out of basis points, the argument went, it would still have plenty of tools at its disposal for supporting and guiding the real economy.	该理论指出，即使美联储不再有基点空间可用于降息，它仍然有足够的工具支持和指引实体经济。


But this argument’s intellectual foundations – first laid out in a 2002 paper by 13 members of the Fed’s Washington, DC, research staff – are shaky, at best.	但该理论的思想基础——其根源可以追溯到华盛顿美联储研究团队2002年的一篇论文——大有问题。


The paper’s seemingly innocuous title, “Preventing Deflation: Lessons from Japan’s Experience in the 1990s,” makes the fundamental assertion that Japan’s struggles were rooted in a serious policy blunder: the Bank of Japan’s failure to recognize soon enough and act strongly enough on the peril of incipient deflation.	该论文有一个看似人畜无害的标题：《防止通胀：来自日本20世纪90年代经验的教训》（Preventing Deflation: Lessons from Japan’s Experience in the 1990s），其基本结论是，日本困境的根源在于其政策错误：面临初期通缩的危害，日本银行没有尽快认识到问题，也没有采取足够强的手段。


(Not coincidentally, this view coincided with a similar conclusion professed by Bernanke in a scathing attack on the BOJ in the late 1990s.)	（并非巧合的是，20世纪90年代末伯南克曾严厉抨击过日本银行，其结论与该论文类似。


The implication was clear: substantial monetary and fiscal stimulus is critical for economies that risk approaching the zero bound.	）言下之意很明显：大规模货币和财政刺激对有可能陷入零区间的经济至关重要。


Any doubt as to what form that “substantial stimulus” might take were dispelled a few months later, when then-Fed Governor Bernanke delivered a speech stressing the need for a central bank to deploy unconventional measures to mitigate deflationary risks in an economy that was approaching the zero bound.	任何对“大规模刺激”的可能形式的疑问在几个月后被打消。 时任美联储董���伯南克发表了一篇讲话，强调央行应该采用非常规手段减轻向零区间靠近的经济的通缩风险。


Such measures could include buying up public debt, providing subsidized credit to banks, targeting longer-term interest rates, or even intervening to reduce the dollar’s value in foreign-exchange markets.	这些手段可以包括购买公共债务、向银行提供补贴信用、以长期利率为目标，甚至干预或压低美元在外汇市场上的价值。


A few years later, the global financial crisis erupted, and these statements, once idle conjecture, became the basis for an urgent action plan.	几年后，全球金融危机爆发，伯南克的这些曾经只是空想的措施成了紧急行动计划的基础。


But one vital caveat was lost in the commotion: What works during a crisis will not necessarily provide sufficient traction for the post-crisis recovery – especially if the crisis has left the real economy mired in a balance-sheet recession.	但有一项关键警告在混乱中被忘记：在危机中奏效的措施未必能给危机后的复苏提供足够动力——特别是如果危机让实体经济陷入资产负债表衰退的话。


Indeed, given that such recessions clog the monetary-policy transmission mechanism, neither conventional interest-rate adjustments nor unconventional liquidity injections have much impact in the wake of a crisis, when deleveraging and balance-sheet repair are urgent.	事实上，由于这样的衰退会制约货币政策的传导机制，因此不管是常规利率调整还是非常规流动性注入都不会在危机爆发、去杆杠化和资产负债表修复成为紧迫任务时产生多大作用。


That is certainly the case in the US today.	现在的美国显然就处于这一状态。


QE may have been a resounding success in some ways – namely, arresting the riskiest phase of the crisis.	也许从某些方面看，QE大获成功——比如拯救了危机最危险的阶段。


But it did little to revive household consumption, which accounts for about 70% of the US economy.	但它对重振占美国经济70%的家庭消费几乎没有任何作用。


In fact, since early 2008, annualized growth in real consumer expenditure has averaged a mere 1.3% – the most anemic period of consumption growth on record.	事实上，自2008年初以来，平均年化真实消费支出增长只有1. 3%——为有记录以来消费增长最萎靡的阶段。


This is corroborated by a glaring shortfall in the “GDP dividend” from Fed liquidity injections.	美联储流动性注入所产生的“GDP红利”严重低迷也印证了这一点。


Though $3.6 trillion of incremental liquidity has been added to the Fed’s balance sheet since late 2008, nominal GDP was up by just $2.5 trillion from the third quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of this year.	自2008年末以来，美联储资产负债表上增加了3. 6万亿美元流动性，但自2008年三季度到今年二季度，名义GDP只增长了2.


As John Maynard Keynes famously pointed out after the Great Depression, when an economy is locked in a “liquidity trap,” with low interest rates unable to induce investment or consumption, attempting to use monetary policy to spur demand is like pushing on a string.	5万亿美元。 凯恩斯在大萧条后曾指出，当经济陷入“流动性陷阱”，即低利率无法刺激投资和消费时，试图使用货币政策提振需求就好比是想推着绳子前进。


This approach also has serious financial-market consequences.	该方针还带来了严重的金融市场后果。


Having more than doubled since its crisis-induced trough, the US equity market – not to mention its amply rewarded upper-income shareholders – has been the principal beneficiary of the Fed’s unconventional policy gambit.	美国股市已从危机低点反弹了一倍有余，成为美联储非常规政策的主要受益者——更不用说高收入股票持有者所获得的巨大利润了。


The same is true for a variety of once-risky fixed-income instruments – from high-yield corporate “junk” bonds to sovereign debt in crisis-torn Europe.	众多曾经属于高风险的固定收益工具——从高收益“垃圾”公司债券到饱受危机摧残的欧洲主权债务——也是如此。


The operative view in central-banking circles has been that the so-called “wealth effect” – when asset appreciation spurs real economic activity – would square the circle for a lagging post-crisis recovery.	央行业务周期的操作观一直是，所谓的“财富效应”——资产升值刺激实体经济活动——应该能够给该周期带来滞后的危机后复苏。


The persistently anemic recovery and its attendant headwinds in the US labor market belie this assumption.	复苏的持续萎靡以及美国劳动力市场困难重重表明这一假设是错误的。


Nonetheless, the Fed remains fixated on financial-market feedback – and thus ensnared in a potentially deadly trap.	尽管如此，美联储仍沉溺于对金融市场反馈的依赖——因此陷入了危险的陷阱中。


Fearful of market disruptions, the Fed has embraced a slow-motion exit from QE.	美联储担心市场扰动，采取了缓慢的QE退出动作。


By splitting hairs over the meaning of the words “considerable time” in describing the expected timeline for policy normalization, Fed Chair Janet Yellen is falling into the same trap.	美联储主席珍妮特·耶伦（Janet Yellen）在用来描述政策正常化的时间路径的“相当长时间”的定义上纠缠不清，实际上也在滑向同样的陷阱。


Such a fruitless debate borrows a page from the Bernanke-Greenspan incremental normalization script of 2004-2006.	这一毫无结果的争论是2004—2006年伯南克-格林斯潘（Greenspan）渐进正常化手法的翻版。


Sadly, we know all too well how that story ended.	不幸的是，你我都很清楚最后的结局。


The Sino-American Trust Deficit	中美信任赤字


NEW HAVEN – The recently concluded Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) between the United States and China was a major disappointment.	纽黑文—最近刚刚结束的中美战略和经济对话令人颇为失望。


It lacked strategy at a time when both countries face formidable challenges on many fronts.	两国都面临着诸多方面的艰巨挑战，但此次对话缺少战略。


And what passed for dialogue was a series of speeches and tightly scripted talking points.	纵观对话全过程，你只能看到一系列讲话和严格的照本宣科。


Most significant, it failed to address an increasingly corrosive trust deficit that poses the most serious threat to Sino-American relations in 25 years.	更重要的是，此次对话没有解决一个影响日益严重的信任赤字，它是中美关系35年来最严重的威胁。


Conditions were tough heading into the talks.	对话的气氛非常紧张。


The US Treasury was complaining yet again about the Chinese currency, which had depreciated by 2.4% against the dollar in the first half of 2014, after having appreciated by 37% over the previous eight and a half years.	美国财政部再一次指责中国货币。 自2014年以来，人民币兑美元汇率贬值了2.


The US State Department and China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs were engaged in a war of words over mounting territorial and sea-lane disputes in the East and South China Seas.	4%，而在此前的八年半中，人民币升值了37%。 美国国务院和中国外交部就东海和南海的领土和航路纠纷打起了嘴仗。


But the darkest clouds were on the cyber front.	但最严重的对立在网络阵线。


Two months before the S&ED, the US Department of Justice indicted five officers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on 31 counts of charges ranging from computer fraud and hacking to identity theft and economic espionage.	战略和经济对话开始前两个月，美国司法部起诉了五名解放军军官，罪名包括电脑欺诈和黑客、盗用身份、经济间谍等31项。


In response, China suspended its participation in bilateral military exchanges on cyber threats.	中国的反应是中止了中美关于网络威胁的军事交流。


Meanwhile, revelations of the pervasive scope of US cyber-espionage activities reverberated from Capitol Hill to Berlin, giving rise to legislation aimed at controlling America’s largely unchecked National Security Agency and casting a pall over the all-important US-German relationship.	与此同时，美国无孔不入的网络间谍行为遭到了曝光，引起了从国会山到柏林的巨大反响，激发了旨在控制基本不受管制的美国国家安全局的立法，也给最重要的美德关系蒙上了一层阴影。


Charges and countercharges on the cyber issue have focused primarily on motives.	网络问题上的指责与反指责主要集中在动机上。


The US has been quick to distinguish between commercial and military espionage.	美国很快就区分了商业间谍和军事间谍。


But for China, this distinction rings hollow.	但在中国，这样的区分并不为人所熟知。


Chinese officials see little difference between the cyber threat posed by the NSA and that posed by the PLA, especially given that America’s cyber intrusions have also been aimed at foreign companies, trade negotiators, and international leaders – all of whom are directly or indirectly engaged in commercial activity.	中国官员认为美国国安局所造成的网络威胁和解放军所造成的网络威胁没有什么区别，特别是考虑到美国的网络入侵也以外国公司、贸易谈判员和国际领导人为目标——他们都直接或间接地参与着商业活动。


In the end, moral hair-splitting is less important than the blame game itself – a visible manifestation of the deepening bilateral distrust wrought by a destructive phase of Sino-American codependency.	最终，道德上的吹毛求疵反倒不如指责游戏本身重要——这是中美相互依存进入破坏阶段所造成的双边不信任程度深化的一个鲜明例子。


Against this backdrop, it was hardly surprising that the S&ED produced so little.	在这样的背景下，战略和经济对话成果甚微也就不足为奇了。


Cyber exchanges between the two militaries were not restarted, and negotiations over a bilateral investment treaty – a mutually beneficial rules-based framework that would go a long way in opening up both countries’ markets to increasingly globalized US and Chinese companies – were particularly disappointing.	两军的网络交流尚未重启，关于双边投资条约的谈判也令人非常失望。 这一基于规则的双赢框架能够极大地促进两国市场向日益全球化的美国和中国公司开放。


A year ago, there was an encouraging breakthrough on the investment treaty; this year, there was a setback, as the launch of explicit negotiations over which industries would be exempt – the always contentious “negative list” – was deferred until 2015.	一年前，在这一投资条约问题上曾经有过令人振奋的突破； 今年形势有所倒退，关于那些行业将排除在外——这一“负面清单”永远存在争议——的明确谈判将被延迟到2015年。


The problem with “kicking the can down the road” is that the road is leading directly toward the upcoming US presidential election cycle – a time when the debate over China always intensifies.	“扫除障碍”的问题在于美国即将进入总统选举周期——每逢此时，关于中国的争议就会激烈起来。


Add to that a polarized and dysfunctional Congress, and the timeframe for concluding a US-China investment treaty is beginning to appear eerily reminiscent of the decade-long process that was required for Chinese accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001.	此外，美国国会呈现出两极分化和功能失调，而完成中美贸易条约的时间表也开始让人想起，中国被接纳为世贸组织成员也经历了长达十年的谈判，直到2001年才成功。


That would be bad for both countries, as each now faces urgent economic challenges.	这对于双方都不利，因为两国现在都面临着紧迫的经济挑战。


I was in China during the week following the S&ED, and official circles were abuzz about the new growth opportunities of services-led rebalancing.	战略和经济对话结束后的一周我在中国，官员圈子在热议服务业推动的再平衡所带来的新的增长机会。


There was also clear recognition of meaningful progress on this front, with China’s tertiary sector (services) growing more rapidly than its secondary sector (manufacturing and construction) for the third year in a row – sufficient to make services the Chinese economy’s largest sector for the first time.	在这方面，你也可以看到显而易见的有意义的进步，中国第三产业（服务业）连续第三年比第二产业（制造业和建筑业）增长更快——服务业也第一次成为中国经济中最大的组成部分。


And there is plenty more to come.	未来还会有更多进步。


At around 47% of GDP, China’s embryonic services sector remains well short of the 60-65% share that a middle-income economy typically possesses.	中国的服务业尚在萌芽阶段，只占GDP的47%，比中等收入经济体的正常水平60—65%低得多。


At the same time, Chinese officials understand that further progress toward a services-led economic rebalancing will stall without the talent, systems, experience, and scale of global multinational services providers.	与此同时，中国官员明白，没有人才、制度、经验和全球跨国服务供应商规模的保证，朝向服务推动型经济再平衡的后续进步就很难实现。


And who better to provide what is needed than the US – the world’s largest and most competitive services economy.	而最能提供中国所需要之物的莫过于美国——世界上第一大、竞争力第一强的服务经济。


Given that the US has experienced yet another year of weak performance, one might have thought that this growth opportunity would have resonated on the American side of the S&ED table.	由于美国又度过了一个表现不佳之年，你可能会想到，这一增长机会在战略和经济对话桌的美国一侧也会引起共鸣。


The failure of both US and Chinese leaders to recognize the mutual benefits of an investment treaty is disturbing.	美国和中国领导人都没有认识到他们在干扰能投资条约所带来的共同好处。


Going slow on such an obvious “win-win” reform suggests either that each country attaches little importance to its growth imperative or that they are unwilling to address that urgency by coming to grips with the increasingly insidious trust deficit that divides them.	在这一显而易见的“双赢”改革上进展缓慢表明，要么双方都不太重视增长问题，要么双方都不愿纠正让双方陷入分歧的日益严重的信任赤字从而解决这一紧迫问题。


I suspect that it is the latter.	我认为问题出在后者。


Leaders on both sides understand their countries’ growth challenges.	中美两国领导人明白各自国家的增长挑战。


But neither seems willing to address the intensification of distrust that has arisen during the past year from the cyber issue.	但他们都不愿解决去年的网络问题所产生的不信任的加剧之势。


Here is where the blame game belies the obvious: Both countries hack, and both have lost control over their hackers.	从这个角度讲，指责游戏欲盖弥彰：两国都有黑客，都不能控制各自的黑客。


Moreover, cyber-hacking itself is growing at an exponential rate in today’s interconnected world.	此外，在当今的互联世界中，网络黑客行为本身正在以极快的速度增加。


In other words, the cyber blame game is pointless.	换句话说，网络指责游戏根本是无厘头。


Acceptance of shared responsibilities in coming to grips with cyber tensions is essential if the US and China are to re-engage on the other geostrategic and economic challenges that they both face.	如果美国和中国想重新参与双方都面临的地缘战略和经济挑战，那么接受共同责任、解决网络紧张对立是至关重要的。


The failure of July’s S&ED was a red flag, yet another indication that the bilateral relationship is headed in the wrong direction.	7月的战略和经济对话的失败是一个警示信号，但另一个双边关系指标正在向错误的方向前进。


Staying the course is not an option.	不能坐视这一状况发展下去。


China’s Wake-Up Call from Washington	来自华盛顿的警报


NEW HAVEN – Yes, the United States dodged another bullet with a last-minute deal on the debt ceiling.	发自纽黑文——毫无疑问，在最后一刻达成债务上限协议的美国人又躲过了一颗致命子弹。


But, with 90 days left to bridge the ideological and partisan divide before another crisis erupts, the fuse on America’s debt bomb is getting shorter and shorter.	但如今留给人们去弥合理念和党派分歧的时间只剩下90天，美国债务炸弹的引信也变得越来越短。


As a dysfunctional US government peers into the abyss, China – America’s largest foreign creditor – has much at stake.	随着一个失能的美国政府逐渐滑向深渊，中国这个美方最大的外国债权人也危在旦夕了。


It began so innocently.	事情原本并没有那么复杂。


As recently as 2000, China owned only about $60 billion in US Treasuries, or roughly 2% of the outstanding US debt of $3.3 trillion held by the public.	在2000年时中国只拥有价值约600亿美元的美国国债，约占美国3. 3万亿美元超额公共债务的2%。


But then both countries upped the ante on America’s fiscal profligacy.	但随后两国都增加了在美国财政这个浪荡公子身上的赌注。


US debt exploded to nearly $12 trillion ($16.7 trillion if intragovernmental holdings are included).	美国的负债规模暴涨到近12万亿美元（如果包括政府内部持有负债的话就达16.


And China’s share of America’s publicly-held debt overhang increased more than five-fold, to nearly 11% ($1.3 trillion) by July 2013.	7万亿美元）。 而中国占美国超额公共持有债务的比例也翻了五番，截至2013年7月达到近11%（1.


Along with roughly $700 billion in Chinese holdings of US agency debt (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), China’s total $2 trillion exposure to US government and quasi-government securities is massive by any standard.	3万亿美元）。 再加上其持有的美国政府机构债务（房地美和房利美），中国手中这2万亿美元政府和准政府债券无论以何种标准衡量都是极为庞大的。


China’s seemingly open-ended purchases of US government debt are at the heart of a web of codependency that binds the two economies.	中国对美国政府债券看似无穷无尽的收购正是把两大经济体捆绑在一起的那张相互依存网络的核心。


China does not buy Treasuries out of benevolence, or because it looks to America as a shining example of wealth and prosperity.	中国购买美国债券并非出于仁慈或是认为美国是财富和繁荣的优秀榜样。


It certainly is not attracted by the return and seemingly riskless security of US government paper – both of which are much in play in an era of zero interest rates and mounting concerns about default.	它显然也不是被这些美国政府印出的纸片所带来的回报以及貌似毫无风险的安全性所吸引——这两者在零利率时代和不断增大的违约忧虑之下都岌岌可危。


Nor is sympathy at work; China does not buy Treasuries because it wants to temper the pain of America’s fiscal brinkmanship.	同时中国人这样做也不是出于同情； 它购买债券可不是为了缓解美国财政冒险行为所带来的痛苦。


China buys Treasuries because they suit its currency policy and the export-led growth that it has relied on over the past 33 years.	中国之所以购买美债是因为这符合其货币政策以及33年以来一直依赖的出口导向型增长。


As a surplus saver, China has run large current-account surpluses since 1994, accumulating a massive portfolio of foreign-exchange reserves that now stands at almost $3.7 trillion.	作为一个贸易盈余的储蓄者，中国自1994年以来就拥有大幅经常账户盈余，并逐渐积累到今天将近3. 7万亿美元的巨额外汇储备。


China has recycled about 60% of these reserves back into dollar-denominated US government securities, because it wants to limit any appreciation of the renminbi against the world’s benchmark currency.	中国把其中约60%的外汇储备又重新注入了以美元发行的美国政府债券之中，因为它希望限制人民币对美元这一世界基准货币的升值幅度。


If China bought fewer dollars, the renminbi’s exchange rate – up 35% against the dollar since mid-2005 – would strengthen more sharply than it already has, jeopardizing competiveness and export-led growth.	如果中国不买那么多美元的话，人民币的汇率——自2005年中以来对美元已升值35%——将会出现比如今更大的升幅，导致其竞争力和出口导向型增长受损。


This arrangement fits America’s needs like a glove.	这个做法正中美国下怀。


Given its extraordinary shortfall of domestic saving, the US runs chronic current-account deficits and relies on foreign investors to fill the funding void.	考虑到自身国内储蓄的严重缺失，美国存在长期的经常账户赤字并依靠外国投资者来填补资金差额。


US politicians take this for granted as a special privilege bestowed by the dollar’s position as the world’s major reserve currency.	美国的政客们对此觉得理所当然，认为是美元作为主要国际储备货币所享有的特权。


When queried about America’s dependence on foreign lenders, they often smugly retort, “Where else would they go?”	当被问到关于对外国资金的依赖时，他们总会板起脸来反驳说：“不然这些人又该向哪投钱呢？


I have heard that line many times when I have testified before the US Congress.	”笔者在美国国会听证会上作证时��多次听到这样的说辞。


Of course, America benefits from China’s outward-facing growth model in many other ways, as well.	当然，美国在其他许多方面也都受益于中国的外向型增长模式。


China’s purchases of Treasuries help hold down US interest rates – possibly by as much as one percentage point – which provides broad support to other asset markets, such as equities and real estate, whose valuation depends to some extent on Chinese-subsidized US interest rates.	中国购买美债的行为有助于降低美国的利率——大概降低了1%——也因此为其它资产市场提供了广泛支持，比如股票和房地产等市场的估值就在某种程度上依赖于中国补贴下的美国利率。


And, of course, hard-pressed middle-class American consumers benefit hugely from low-cost Chinese imports – the Walmart effect – that enable them to stretch their budgets in an era of unrelenting pressure on jobs and real incomes.	此外，生活压力极大的美国中产阶级也在低价中国出口商品上极大受益——即所谓沃尔玛效应——让他们得以在就业和实际收入的无情重压下充分规划自身的预算支出。


For more than 20 years, this mutually beneficial codependency has served both countries well in compensating for their inherent saving imbalances while satisfying their respective growth agendas.	超过20年以来，这种互利依存的关系既补足了两国内在的储蓄不均衡现象，又满足了各自的发展规划议程。


But here the past should not be viewed as prologue.	但这些过去在此不应被视为序幕。


A seismic shift is at hand, and America’s recent fiscal follies may well be the tipping point.	一场震撼性的转变迫在眉睫，而美国最近的财政闹剧则可能是引爆点。


China has made a conscious strategic decision to alter its growth strategy.	中国已经决定要有意识地转换其增长战略。


Its 12th Five-Year Plan, enacted in March 2011, lays out a broad framework for a more balanced growth model that relies increasingly on domestic private consumption.	2011年3月启动的第十二个五年计划布下了一个更均衡增长模型的宏大框架，旨在更加依赖于国内个人消费。


These plans are about to be put into action.  An important meeting in November – the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the 18th Chinese Communist Party Congress – will provide a major test of the new leadership team’s commitment to a detailed agenda of reforms and policies that will be required to achieve this shift.	而这些计划都即将付诸实施。 即将在今年11月召开的一场重要会议——中国共产党第十八届三中全会——将考验新领导班子为实现这一转变而推动一个细化议程所需的改革和政策决心。


The debt-ceiling debacle has sent a clear message to China – and comes in conjunction with other warning signs.	美国债务上限的乱局已经向中国发送了一个明确的信号——而且和其他警报结合在了一起。


Post-crisis sluggishness in US aggregate demand – especially consumer demand – is likely to persist, denying Chinese exporters the support they need from their largest foreign market.	后危机时代美国总需求的停滞状况——尤其是消费者需求方面——很可能持续，导致中国出口商无法在这个最大的出口市场中获取所需的支持。


US-led China bashing – a bipartisan blame game that reached new heights in the 2012 political cycle – remains a real threat.	以美国为首的抹黑中国行为————这场两党之间互相指责的闹剧在2012年政治周期中达到了一个新的极端——依然是一个真实的威胁。


And now the safety and security of US debt are at risk.	而如今美国债券的安全和保障都无法保证。


Economic alarms rarely ring so loudly. The time has come for China to respond with equal clarity.	经济的警钟声如此响亮，中国也是时候发出明确的应对措施了。


Rebalancing is China’s only option.	而中国唯一的选择就是实现重新平衡。


Several internal factors – excess resource consumption, environmental degradation, and mounting income inequalities – are calling the old model into question, while a broad constellation of US-centric external forces also attests to the urgent need for realignment.	一系列内部因素——过量资源消耗，环境恶化以及不断拉大的收入差距——都令人们对旧有的发展模式产生了质疑。 而以美国为中心的一系列外部因素也表明再平衡行动已经刻不容缓了。


With rebalancing will come a decline in China’s surplus saving, much slower accumulation of foreign-exchange reserves, and a concomitant reduction in its seemingly voracious demand for dollar-denominated assets.	再平衡会导致中国的盈余储蓄减少，外汇储备的增加也会大幅放缓，同时也减少其对美元资产似乎如饥似渴的需求。


Curtailing purchases of US Treasuries is a perfectly logical outgrowth of this process.	减少对美国国债的购买也是这一进程的完美逻辑结果。


Long dependent on China to finesse its fiscal problems, America may now have to pay a much steeper price to secure external capital.	在长期依赖中国解决自身财政问题之后，美国或许要支付一个更高昂的价格去保证外部资本的供应。


Recently, Chinese commentators have provocatively referred to the inevitability of a “de-Americanized world.”	近来中国的评论员们都在大力鼓吹一个无可避免的“去美国化的世界”。


For China, this is not a power race.	对中国来说，这可不是一场实力竞赛。


It should be seen as more of a conscious strategy to do what is right for China as it confronts its own daunting growth and development imperatives in the coming years.	这应当被视为一个有意识的战略去为自身的利益服务，因为它在未来数年也将面对自身的增长和发展困局。


The US will find it equally urgent to come to grips with a very different China.	美国也会发现与一个截然不同的中国携手是件同样紧迫的事。


Codependency was never a sustainable strategy for either side.	相互依存对于双方来说都不是一个可持续战略。


China just happens to have understood this first. The days of its open-ended buying of Treasuries will soon come to an end.	中国只不过是首先意识到了这一点，而其源源不断购买美国国债的行为也会很快终结。


Bringing the Chinese Consumer to Life	激活中国消费者


BEIJING – History will be the ultimate judge, but there is good reason to believe that China’s recently completed Third Plenum will come to be regarded as a pivotal moment in the country’s development.	北京—历史才是终极判官，但我们有很好的理由相信刚刚结束的中共十八大三中全会将是中国发展的一个关键时刻。


At long last, China’s senior leadership has endorsed a raft of reforms that could impel the economy’s shift from reliance on exports to consumption-led growth.	中国高级领导层最终通过了一揽子驱使中国经济从依赖出口转为消费拉动增长的改革。


Until now, this transformation was framed in terms of broad goals and aspirations.	到目前为止，这一转型已经有了广泛的目标和方向。


For example, the 12th Five-Year Plan, adopted in March 2011, promised the emergence of a consumer-led economy, resting on the building blocks of urbanization and the development of an embryonic services sector.	比如，2011年3月通过的十二五规划承诺中国经济将进入消费拉动时代，建立在城镇化和方兴未艾的服务部门的发展的基础上。


Notwithstanding the importance of these commitments in setting out opportunities for China’s middle class, they lacked a critical component: incentives for Chinese families to convert their newfound income into discretionary consumption.	尽管这些承诺的重要性为中国的中产阶级带来了希望，但它们缺少关键要素：激励中国家庭将其新增收入转化为自主消费。


On the contrary, financial and economic insecurity has gripped Chinese households since the “iron rice bowl” – the cradle-to-grave support that the socialist state offered workers and their families – was discarded in the late 1990’s.	相反，金融和经济的不安全自20世纪90年代末“铁饭碗”——社会主义国家向工人及其家庭提供的从摇篮到坟墓的支持——被打破以来一直困扰着中国家庭。


Fearing for the future, households have hoarded incremental income, rather than spending it on consumer goods.	出于对未来的担忧，家庭将新增收入储藏起来，而不是用于购买消费品。


Economists call that precautionary saving.	经济学家称之为预防性储蓄。


China’s leaders called it frustrating.	中国领导人认为这令人沮丧。


The reforms endorsed by the Third Plenum focus on this wedge between income and consumption, offering specific proposals aimed at altering the behavior of fear-driven Chinese families.	三中全会的改革方案聚焦于这一收入和消费之间的楔子，给出了一系列旨在改变受担忧驱动的中国家庭的行为的方案。


Especially important is the proposal to channel 30% of the profits of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) – currently running at close to $400 billion – into the country’s woefully under-funded social safety net.	尤其重要的是将国有企业利润——目前接近4 000亿美元——的30%用于资金严重不足的社会安全网。


China’s national health-insurance plan, for example, boasts nearly universal coverage, but the benefits it provides are negligible.	比如，中国的国民医保计划号称接近全民覆盖，但实际上它所提供的好处可以忽略不计。


The same is true of China’s retirement system: the workforce’s enrollment rate is around 50%, but only $600 of assets per worker (in national, local government, and private pension schemes, combined) are available to cover lifetime retirement benefits.	中国的退休制度也是这样：劳动力退休注册率为50%左右，但每位工人只能获得600美元（中央、地方和私人养老金之和）的资产作为一生的退休福利。


Little wonder that Chinese families, fearful of such an uncertain future, save to excess.	毫不奇怪，担心充满不确定性的未来的中国家庭要过度储蓄。


An adequately funded safety net could go a long way in tempering the expectations underlying this behavior.	资金充裕的安全网可以大大改变导致这一行为的期望。


Several other measures proposed at the Third Plenum seek to shift Chinese families’ behavioral norms.	三中全会提出的另外一些措施意在改变中国家庭的行为范式。


A major reconsideration of the one-child policy is especially important, given the need to relieve pressures arising from the inevitable decline in China’s working-age population.	一孩政策的重大调整尤其重要，因为中国工作适龄人口的下降已成定局，需要缓解因此造成的压力。


Reform of the hukou (residency permit) system to allow citizens to transfer their welfare benefits from one city to another is vital for an increasingly flexible labor force that now includes almost 200 million migrant workers.	户口制度的改革——允许公民在不同城市之间转移社会福利账户——对于包括近2亿农民工在内的日益灵活的劳动力来说至关重要。


China’s consumers should also draw comfort from the likely move to market-based deposit rates on their savings accounts, which will reinforce incremental growth in wage income.	中国消费者应该对可能的存款利率市场化感到满意，因为这将增强工资收入的增量增长。


This long overdue policy shift is an important component of the Third Plenum’s official elevation of market-based pricing as the “decisive” mode of resource allocation in China.	这一早就应该采取的政策变化是三中全会正式将市场定价拔高到中国资源配置的“决定性”地位的重要组成部分。


The word “decisive” holds important implications for key resources – including fuels, financial capital, and, of course, the currency – that historically have been subject to state-administered pricing.	“决定性”一词对关键资源有重要影响——包括燃料、金融资本，当然还有货币——过去这些资源都由国家指导定价。


Rhetorical flourishes have always been an important signaling mechanism for major policy changes – think of Deng Xiaoping’s “reforms and opening up” of the late 1970’s.	用词永远是重大政策变化的重要信号——比如20世纪70年代末邓小平所提出的的“改革开放”。


The Third Plenum’s use of “decisive” to anchor a market-based approach is a similar gambit.	三中��会用“决定性”一词给基于市场的道路定性，意义类似。


All of this casts modern China’s development strategy in a new light.	所有这些拉开了中国发展战略的新帷幕。


Beginning with Deng in the late 1970’s, scientists and engineers – technocrats with the determination to convert a dysfunctional centrally planned economy into an investment- and export-led colossus – framed and implemented a producer-oriented development model.	自20世纪70年代末的邓小平改革以来，科学家和工程师——决心将功能失调的中央计划经济改变为投资和出口拉动的巨兽的技术官僚——设计并实施了生产者导向的发展模式。


Today, the task at hand is very different: to transform the technocratic framework of the producer model into the aspirational vision of a flourishing consumer society.	如今，中国领导人的任务有了极大的不同：将生产这模式的技术官僚框架转变为繁荣的消费社会的雄心壮志。


The need to navigate this shift raises the toughest question of all: Is the new “fifth-generation” Chinese leadership, headed by President Xi Jinping, up to the challenge?	实施这一转变的需要引出了最艰巨的问题：以习近平主席为核心的新的“第五代”领导集体是否能应对挑战？


There are three reasons to believe that it is.	有三个理由相信答案是肯定的。


First, the role of technocrats in China’s senior leadership is on the wane.	首先，中国高层领导人中技术官僚的角色在消退。


Research by Cheng Li of the Brookings Institution reveals that only about 15% of the current 25 Politburo members are engineers and scientists, down from 40% in 2007 and 72% in 2002.	布鲁金斯研究所的李成的研究披露，在当前的25名政治局委员中，只有15%是工程师和科学家，较2007年的40%和2002年的72%大幅下降。


Li’s analysis points to the related ascendance of senior officials trained in law and the social sciences – providing a skill set that is more closely aligned with the vision of a consumer society.	李成的分析还指出，这与接受法律和社会科学训练的高级官员的崛起有关。 法律和社会科学训练所提供的技能与消费社会前景密切相合。


Second, the Third Plenum established a new high-level organization – the so-called Central Leading Group on Reforms.	其次，三中全会成立了一个新的高级别组织——所谓的中央改革领导小组。


This small group, likely to be headed by Xi, will play the key role in drafting specific guidelines for implementing the Plenum’s proposed reforms – thus threatening to marginalize the long-dominant technocrats of the National Development and Reform Commission, the heir to the old State Planning Commission.	该小组极有可能以习近平为首，将在起草三中全会改革实施方案具体指导中起到关键作用，而长期起主导作用的技术官僚组织发改委（前身为计划委）将可能被边缘化。


Finally, Xi’s power base is far broader than that of his two predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, both of whom had shaky transitions in the first years of their leadership.	最后，习近平的权力基础远比两位前任江泽民和胡锦涛广阔。 江泽民和胡锦涛在成为领导人的最初几年中都面临着过渡动荡期。


Unlike Jiang and Hu, Xi assumed quick command of the Chinese Communist Party, the government, and the military, and very effectively shepherded the Third Plenum’s historic reforms.	与他们不同，习近平很快成为党政军一把手，并十分有效地领导了三中全会的历史性改革。


As always, proof will come only with implementation.	做了才知道结果，这是永恒不变的真理。


But with China’s leaders now focusing squarely on aligning the vast population’s behavioral norms with the next phase of transformation, the case for a consumer-led China has become more compelling than ever.	但是，中国领导人目前正全力专注于将广大人民的行为范式与转型的下一阶段协调起来，因此消费拉动的中国比以往任何时候都更加刻不容缓。


The End of Chinese Central Planning	中国中央计划的结束


BEIJING – “Isn’t it now time for China to abandon the concept of a growth target?”	北京—“现在难道不正是中国放弃增长目标概念的机会吗？ ”


That was the question I asked Chinese Finance Minister Lou Jiwei this week at the 15th annual China Development Forum, which brings together top Chinese officials and an international delegation of academics, leaders of multilateral organizations, and business executives.	这是我在本周举行的中国发展论坛第十五届年会上向中国财政部长楼继伟提出的问题。 这次会议聚集了许多中国顶级官员和国际学界代表、跨国组织首脑以及企业高管。


Having attended the CDF since former Premier Zhu Rongji initiated it in 2000, I can attest to its role as one of China’s most important platforms for debate.	我从2000年前总理朱镕基发起该论坛就是参与者，我可以证明，该论坛是中国最重要的讨论平台之一。


Zhu welcomed the exchange of views at the Forum as a true intellectual test for China’s reformers.	朱镕基鼓励大家在论坛上交换观点，使其成为中国改革者的真正的智力测试。


It was in that spirit that I posed my question to Lou, whom I have known since the late 1990’s.	我向楼继伟提出这一问题正是出于这种精神。 我从20世纪90年代末就认识了他。


In that period, he has been Deputy Minister of Finance, founding Chairman of China’s sovereign wealth fund, China Investment Corporation, and now Minister of Finance.	那段时间他是财政部副部长、中国主权财富基金中投公司创始董事长，现在则是财政部长。


I have always found him to be direct, intellectually curious, a first-rate analytical thinker, and a forward-looking advocate of market-based reforms.	他一直是一个直接的人，充满了求知欲，拥有顶级分析思维，极具前瞻意识，是市场改革的支持者。


He is cut from the same cloth as his mentor, Zhu.	他和他的导师朱镕基一脉相承。


My question was set in the context of the new thrust of Chinese reforms announced at last November’s Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which emphasized the “decisive role” of market forces in shaping the next phase of China’s economic development.	去年11月的中共十八大三中全会公布了中国的新改革方案，强调市场力量在决定中国下一阶段经济发展中起到“决定性作用”，我的问题正是在这一背景下提出的。


I prefaced my question by underscoring the inherent contradiction between a target and a forecast in framing China’s major economic objectives.	在提问之前，我先讲述了在制定中国主要经济目标时，目标值和预测之间的内在矛盾。


I argued that the former embodied the obsolete straitjacket of central planning, while the latter was far more consistent with market-based outcomes.	我指出，前者属于早已过时的中央计划紧箍咒，而后者则与基于市场的结果更一致。


A target perpetuates the image of the all-powerful state-directed Chinese growth machine – a government that will essentially stop at nothing to hit a predetermined number.	目标值让人想起的是权力无边的国家指导增长机器——政府将不可阻挡地实现预先确定的数字。


While it may seem like splitting hairs, continuing to frame the economic goal as a target sends a message of determined and explicit guidance that now seems at odds with the government’s market-oriented intentions.	尽管听起来像是诡辩，但继续以目标值来作为经济目标给人的信息是坚决明确的指导，这与政府的市场导向意图相悖。


Wouldn’t dropping the concept send a far more powerful message?	取消这���概念难道不是强有力得多的信号吗？


Isn’t it time for China to let go of the last vestiges of its centrally planned past?	中国摆脱中央计划痕迹的难道不正逢其时吗？


Lou’s response: “Good question.”	楼继伟的回答：“很好的问题。 ”


China, he went on, is in fact moving away from its once single-minded emphasis on growth targeting.	他接着说，中国实际上正在摆脱单一的增长目标值思维。


The government now stresses three macroeconomic goals – job creation, price stability, and GDP growth.	如今政府强调三个宏观经济目标：就业创造、价格稳定和GDP增长。


And, as evidenced by the annual “work report” that the premier recently submitted to China’s National People’s Congress, the current emphasis is in that order, with GDP growth at the bottom of the list.	而正如总理最近向全国人大所提交的年度《工作报告》所标明的，上述三个目标是按优先级顺序排列的，即GDP增长是位列最末的目标。


This gives China and its policymakers considerable room for maneuver in coping with the current growth slowdown.	这给了中国及其决策者宽裕的腾挪空间应对当前的增长减速。


Unlike most Western observers, who are fixated on the slightest deviation from the official growth target, Chinese officials are actually far more open-minded.	与大部分西方观察者不同——他们斤斤计较于最微小的偏离官方增长目标值幅度——中国官员的思维要开放得多。


They care less about GDP growth per se and more about the labor content of the gains in output.	他们较少关注GDP增长本身，而较多关注产出增量中的劳动力成本。


This is particularly relevant in light of the important threshold that has now been reached by the structural transformation of the Chinese economy – the long-awaited shift to a services-led growth dynamic.	考虑到中国经济已经抵达结构转型的关键门槛——期待已久的向服务领导型增长动态转变，这一点尤其重要。


Services, which now account for the largest share of the economy, require close to 30% more jobs per unit of output than the manufacturing and construction sectors combined.	服务业目前已占经济的最大份额，该部门的单位产出需要比制造业和建筑业加起来还多近30%的就业岗位来创造。


In an increasingly services-led, labor-intensive economy, China’s economic managers can afford to be more relaxed about a GDP slowdown.	在日益由服务业领导、趋于劳动密集型的经济中，中国经济管理者可以更加游刃有余地面对GDP减速。


Last year was a case in point.	去年是很好的例子。


At the start of 2013, the government announced that it was targeting ten million new urban jobs.	2013年伊始，政府宣布了创造一千万个城市就业岗位的目标值。


In fact, the economy added 13.1 million workers – even though GDP expanded by “only” 7.7%.	事实上，中国经济增加了1,310万工人——尽管GDP“只”扩张了7. 1%。


In other words, if China can hit its employment goal with 7.5% GDP growth, there is no reason for its policymakers to panic and roll out the heavy counter-cyclical artillery.	换句话说，如果中国可以在GDP增长率为7. 5%的情况下实现就业目标，决策者就不必担心和祭出重型反周期武器。


That, in fact, was pretty much the message conveyed by a broad cross-section of senior officials at this year’s CDF: Slowdown, yes; major policy response, no.	事实上，在今年的中国发展论坛上，许多部门的高级官员都传递了这一信号：减速，有； 重大政策应对，没有。


Zhou Xiaochuan, the head of the People’s Bank of China, was just as emphatic on this point.	中国人民银行行长周小川也强调了这一点。


The PBOC, he argued, does not pursue a single target.	他指出，人行不追求单一目标。


Instead, it frames monetary policy in accordance with what he called a “multi-objective function” comprised of goals for price stability, employment, GDP growth, and the external balance-of-payments – the latter factor added to recognize the PBOC’s authority over currency policy.	反之，它根据他所谓的“多目标制”制定货币政策。 “多目标”包括了价格稳定、就业、GDP增长以及外部收支平衡等——最后一个目标可以看出人行控制货币政策的权威。


The trick, Zhou stressed, is to assign weights to each of the four goals in the multi-objective policy function.	周小川强调，诀窍在于为多目标制政策函数中的四个目标配置权重。


He conceded that the weighting problem has now been seriously complicated by the new need to pay greater attention to financial stability.	他坦承权重问题因为需要将更多精力集中在金融稳定上而大大复杂化了。


All of this paints China with a very different brush than was used during the first 30 years of its growth miracle.	所有这些都表明中国将采取与其增长奇迹的第一个三十年截然不同的方针。


Since Deng Xiaoping’s reforms of the early 1980’s, less and less attention has been paid to the numerical targets of central planning.	自20世纪80年代初邓小平改革开始以来，对中央计划的数字目标值的关注一直在减少。


The State Planning Commission evolved into the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) – though it is still housed in the same building on Yuetan Street in Beijing.	国家计划委也转变为国家发改委——尽管办公地点仍在北京月坛南街的那幢大楼里。


And, over time, economic managers succeeded in drastically curtailing sector-by-sector Soviet-style planning.	此外，随着时间的推移，经济管理者成功地逐步彻底取消了苏联式的计划。


But there was still a plan and an aggregate growth target – and an all-powerful NDRC hanging on to the levers of control.	但计划和总增长目标值仍然存在——而权力无边的发改委仍高高在上，掌握着控制权。


Those days are now over.	现在，这样的日子要结束了。


A new “leading committee” on reforms is marginalizing the NDRC, and China’s most senior fiscal and monetary policymakers – Lou Jiwei and Zhou Xiaochuan – are close to taking the final step in the long journey to a market-based economy.	新的改革“领导小组”正在边缘化发改委，而中国最高级财政和货币决策者——楼继伟和周小川——快要卖出市场经济长征的最后一步了。


Their shared interpretation of flexible growth targeting puts them basically in the same camp as policymakers in most of the developed world.	他们都对增长目标做出了灵活的解读，这意味着他们和大部分发达世界决策者站在了同一个阵营。


The plan is now a goal-setting exercise.	现在的计划是目标设定。


From now on, fluctuations in the Chinese economy, and the policy responses that those fluctuations imply, need to be considered in that vein.	自此，中国经济波动及其所隐含的政策应对措施需要换个思路考虑了。


America’s False Dawn	美国的虚假曙光


NEW HAVEN – Financial markets and the so-called Davos consensus are in broad agreement that something close to a classic cyclical revival may finally be at hand for the US.	纽黑文—金融市场和所谓的达沃斯共识达成了广泛的一致，类似于经典的周期性复苏的东西终于要在美国出现了。


But is it?	真是这样吗？


At first blush, the celebration seems warranted.	乍一看，如此乐观有理有据。


Growth in real GDP appears to have averaged close to 4% in the second half of 2013, nearly double the 2.2% pace of the preceding four years.	实际GDP增长在2013年下半年平均接近4%，比此前四年2. 2%的速度接近翻番。


The unemployment rate has finally fallen below the 7% threshold.	失业率终于下降到了7%的阈值以下。


And the Federal Reserve has validated this seemingly uplifting scenario by starting to taper its purchases of long-term assets.	美联储也确定了这一看起来令人振奋的情景——它开始收缩长期资产买入规模了。


But my advice is to keep the champagne on ice.	但我的建议是庆祝胜利为时尚早。


Two quarters of strengthening GDP growth hardly indicates a breakout from an anemic recovery.	两个季度的GDP增长走强并不意味着复苏萎靡的状况得到了突破。


The same thing has happened twice since the end of the Great Recession in mid-2009 – a 3.4% average annualized gain in the second and third quarters of 2010 and a 4.3% average increase in the fourth quarter of 2011 and the first quarter of 2012.	自2009年中期大衰退结束以来，相同的情况发生过两次——2010年第二季度和第三季度的年化增长率平均为3. 4%；


In both cases, the uptick proved to be short-lived.	3%。 结果，这两次的乐观形势最终都只是昙花一现。


A similar outcome this time would not be surprising.	这一次也是如此并不令人奇怪。


Indeed, much of the acceleration in GDP growth has been bloated by an unsustainable surge of restocking.	事实上，GDP增长加速的大部分动力来自不可持续的库存重建。


Over the first three quarters of 2013, rising inventory investment accounted for fully 38% of the 2.6% increase in total GDP.	2013年前三季度，存货投资增加贡献了2. 6%的总GDP增量的整整38%。


Excluding this inventory swing, annualized growth in “final sales” to consumers, businesses, and the government averaged a tepid 1.6%.	剔除这一存货变化因素，面向消费者、企业和政府的“最终销售”的年化增长平均只有1.


With inventory investment unlikely to keep accelerating at anything close to its recent rate, overall GDP growth can be expected to converge on this more subdued pace of final demand.	6%。 存货投资不可能以当前速度持续增加，因此可以预期总体GDP增长将向更低的最终需求增长速度靠拢。


That gets to the toughest issue of all – the ongoing balance-sheet recession that continues to stifle the American consumer.	这就引出了最严重的问题——困扰美国消费者的持续的资产负债表衰退。


Accounting for 69% of the economy, consumer demand holds the key to America’s post-crisis malaise.	消费需求占美国经济的69%，也是美国经济危机后萎靡不振的症结。


In the 17 quarters since “recovery” began, annualized growth in real personal consumption expenditures has averaged just 2.2%, compared to a pre-crisis trend of 3.6% from 1996 to 2007.	在“复苏”开始以来的17个季度中，实际个人消费支出年化增长率平均只有2. 2%，而危机前的1996—2007年的趋势增长率为3.


To be sure, there were indications of a temporary pick-up in annual consumption growth to nearly 4% in the fourth quarter of 2013.	平心而论，年消费增长表现出暂时性的提振信号，2013年四季度接近4%。


Yet that is reminiscent of a comparable 4.3% spurt in the fourth quarter of 2010, an upturn that quickly faded.	但这让人想起了2010年四季度的4. 3%，后来这一昙花一现的上升很快就夭折了。


The lackluster trend in consumption is all the more pronounced when judged against the unprecedented decline that occurred in the depths of the Great Recession.	在大衰退的影响下，消费经历了前所未有的下降，从这个角度判断，消费的萎靡趋势更加触目惊心。


From the first quarter of 2008 through the second quarter of 2009, real consumer spending plunged at a 1.8% average annual rate.	从2008年一季度到2009年二季度，实际消费支出平均年增长率为-1. 8%。


In the past, when discretionary spending on items such as motor vehicles, furniture, appliances, and travel was deferred, a surge of “pent-up demand” quickly followed.	在过去，当花在汽车、家具、电器和旅游方面的自由支配支出被推迟时，“被压抑的需求”会马上爆发。


Not this time.	这次不同了。


The record plunge in consumer demand during the Great Recession has been followed by persistently subpar consumption growth.	大衰退期间创纪录的消费需求暴跌之后迎来的是长期消费增长萎靡。


This should not be surprising.	这其实也并不令人奇怪。


The American consumer was, in effect, ground zero in this horrific crisis.	美国消费者处在这次危机的暴风眼。


Far too many US households made enormous bets on the property bubble, believing that their paper gains were permanent substitutes for stagnant labor income.	太多美国家庭在房地产泡沫上下了重注，认为他们的纸面收益能够永远补偿劳动收入的停滞不前。


They then used these gains to support a record consumption binge.	于是他们用这笔收益支撑了创纪录的消费狂欢。


Compounding the problem, they drew freely on a monstrous credit bubble to finance the gap between spending and income-based saving.	更糟糕的是，他们还享受了巨大的信用泡沫，可以融资填补支出和基于收入的储蓄之间的缺口。


When both bubbles burst – first housing, and then credit – asset-dependent US consumers were exposed to the American strain of the Japanese disease first diagnosed by Nomura economist Richard Koo.	当这两个泡沫破裂时——先是房地产泡沫，再是信用泡沫——依赖资产的美国消费者就陷入了美国版日本病。 日本病理论首先由野村证券经济学家辜朝明提出。


Koo has stressed the lingering perils of a balance-sheet recession centered on the corporate sector of the Japanese economy; but the analysis is equally applicable to bubble-dependent US consumers.	辜朝明强调，挥之不去的资产负债表衰退风险集中在日本经济中的公司部门； 但这一分析也同样适用于依赖泡沫的美国消费者。


When the collateral that underpins excess leverage comes under severe pressure – as was the case for Japanese businesses in the early 1990’s and American consumers in the mid 2000’s – what Koo calls the “debt rejection” motive of deleveraging takes precedence over discretionary spending.	当支撑过度杠杆的抵押品开始承受严重压力时——如20世纪90年代初的日本企业和2005年左右的美国消费者——辜朝明所谓的“拒绝债务”的去杠杆动机就会压倒自由支配支出。


The Japanese parallels do not stop there.	日本比喻并不仅限于此。


As research by the economists Richard Caballero, Takeo Hoshi, and Anil Kashyap has shown, Japan’s corporate “zombies” – rendered essentially lifeless by their balance-sheet problems – ended up damaging the healthier parts of the economy.	经济学家理查德·卡巴列罗（Richard Caballero）、星岳熊（Takeo Hoshi）和阿尼尔·卡什亚普（Anil Kashyap）指出，日本的“僵尸”公司——从资产负债表看他们实际上已经破产了——最终伤害了经济中健康的部分。


Until balance sheets are repaired, such “zombie congestion” restrains aggregate demand.	在资产负债表修复之前，这一“僵尸栓塞”会抑制总需求。


Japan’s lost decades are an outgrowth of this phenomenon; the US is now halfway through the first lost decade of its own.	日本的失去的十年便是这一现象的产物； 而美国也已经度过了其自身的失去的十年的上半场。


Indicators of US balance-sheet repair hardly signal the onset of the more vigorous cyclical revival that many believe is at hand.	美国资产负债表修复指标并未显示出许多人相信已经发生了的更强劲的周期性复苏的信号。


The debt/income ratio for American households is now down to 109% – well below the peak of 135% reached in late 2007, but still 35 percentage points above the average over the final three decades of the twentieth century.	美国家庭的债务/收入比率目前已下降至109%，比2007年末的135%的峰值低了很多，但仍比20世纪后三十年的平均水平高了35个百分点。


Similarly, the personal saving rate stood at 4.9% in late 2013, up sharply from the low of 2.3% in the third quarter of 2005; but it remains 4.4 percentage points below the average recorded from 1970 to 1999.	类似地，2013年末个人储蓄率为4. 9%，比2005年第三季度的低点2.


By these measures, American consumers’ balance-sheet repair is, at best, only about half-finished.	4个百分点。 从这些指标看，美国消费者资产负债表修复过程至多只能称之为正在进行时。


Optimists see it differently.	乐观者看到了不同的景象。


Encouraged by sharp reductions in households’ debt-service costs and a surprisingly steep fall in unemployment, they argue that the long nightmare has finally ended.	受家庭债务维持成本大降和失业意外大减的刺激，他们认为长期噩梦终于要结束了。


That may be wishful thinking.	这可能只是一厢情愿。


Plunging debt service is largely an outgrowth of the Fed’s unprecedented zero-interest-rate policy.	下降的债务维持成本基本上只是美联储前所未有的零利率政策的产物。


As long as the stock of debt remains excessive, consumers will dismiss the reduction in interest expenses as nothing more than a temporary subsidy from the Fed.	只要债务存量仍然处于过高水平，消费者就不会考虑利息支出减少的影响，只是把它看成是美联储的暂时性补贴。


Moreover, the decline in unemployment largely reflects persistently grim labor-market conditions, which have discouraged many workers from remaining in the labor force.	此外，失业的减少大体上反映了劳动力市场的萧条状况，这让许多工人退出了劳动力市场。


If the labor-force participation rate was 66%, as it was in early 2008, rather than 62.8%, as it was in December 2013, the unemployment rate would be just over 11%, not 6.7%.	如果劳动力参与率保持在2008年初的66%而非2013年12月的62. 8%，则失业率将会略高于11%，而不是6%。


Yes, there has been some progress on the road to recovery.	是的，我们在复苏之路上取得了一些进展。


But, as Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff have long documented, post-crisis healing is typically slow and painful.	但是，正如卡门·莱因哈特（Carmen Reinhart）和肯·罗格夫（Ken Rogoff）很早前便指出的，后危机时期的复苏通常是缓慢而痛苦的。


Notwithstanding the Fed’s claims that its unconventional policies have been the elixir of economic renewal in the US, the healing process still has years to go.	尽管美联储声称其非常规政策是美国经济永葆青春的万灵丹，但复苏过程还有很多年的路要走。


Rethinking the Sino-American Relationship	反思中美关系


NEW HAVEN – In early July, senior US and Chinese officials will gather in Beijing for the sixth Strategic and Economic Dialogue.	纽黑文—7月初，美国和中国高官将在北京举行第六次战略和经济对话（Strategic and Economic Dialogue）。


With bilateral frictions mounting on a number of fronts – including cyber security, territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, and currency policy – the summit offers an opportunity for a serious reconsideration of the relationship between the world’s two most powerful countries.	两国在诸多方面都存在双边摩擦——包括网络安全、东海和南海领土纠纷以及货币政策——因此此次峰会是一次深刻反思这两个全球最强大国家关系的良机。


The United States and China are locked in an uncomfortable embrace – the economic counterpart of what psychologists call “codependency.”	美国和中国陷入了一个不太舒服的状态——它们互为经济对手，形成了心理学家所谓的“共存”（codependency）关系。


The flirtation started in the late 1970s, when China was teetering in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution and the US was mired in a wrenching stagflation.	两国关系的升温始于20世纪70年代末，当时中国需要收拾文化大革命留下的残局，而美国则陷入了与滞涨的苦斗。


Desperate for economic growth, two needy countries entered into a marriage of convenience.	两个极度渴望经济增长的国家一拍即合，好像为利益而结合的夫妻。


China was quick to benefit from an export-led economic model that was critically dependent on America as its largest source of demand.	中国很快就开始从出口拉动型经济模式中获益。 这一模式的关键就在于依靠美国作为最大需求源。


The US gained by turning to China for low-cost goods that helped income-constrained consumers make ends meet; it also imported surplus savings from China to fill the void of an unprecedented shortfall of domestic saving, with the deficit-prone US drawing freely on China’s voracious appetite for Treasury securities.	美国则利用中国的低成本商品助囿于收入的消费者一臂之力，产生了最终需求； 同时也从中国进口过剩储蓄填补其前所未有的国内储蓄不足，中国对美国国债的巨大胃口让美国不再担忧赤字。


Over time, this marriage of convenience morphed into a full-blown and inherently unhealthy codependency.	随着时间的推移，这场基于利益的婚姻演变为赤裸裸的、具有天生缺陷的共存。


Both partners took the relationship for granted and pushed unbalanced growth models too far – the US with its asset and credit bubbles that underpinned a record consumption binge, and China with an export-led resurgence that was ultimately dependent on America’s consumption bubble.	双方都将这一关系视为理所当然，将失衡增长模式推得太远——美国产生了巨大的资产和信用泡沫，从而形成创纪录的消费狂潮，而因出口而复兴的中国说到底需要依赖美国的消费泡沫。


The imbalances only worsened.	失衡愈演愈烈。


China’s three decades of 10% annual hyper-growth led to unsustainable strains – outsize resource and energy needs, environmental degradation and pollution, and mounting income inequality.	持续三十年、每年10%的超常增长让中国陷入了不可持续的约束中——巨大的资源和能源需求、环境破坏和污染、日益加剧的收入不平等。


Huge Chinese current-account surpluses resulted from too much saving and too little consumption.	巨额中国经常项目余额来自储蓄过多而消费过少。


Mounting imbalances in the US were the mirror image of those in China – a massive shortfall of domestic saving, unprecedented current-account deficits, excess debt, and an asset-dependent economy that was ultimately built on speculative quicksand.	日益恶化的美国失衡则是中国失衡的镜像——巨大的国内储蓄不足、前所未有的经常项目赤字、过度负债、归根结底建立在投机流沙之上的依赖资产的经济。


Predictably, in keeping with the pathology of codependence, the lines distinguishing the two countries became blurred.	不难预测，随着两国在共存的道路上越走越远，两国之间的分界线也变得日益模糊。


Over the past decade, Chinese subsidiaries of Western multinationals accounted for more than 60% of the cumulative rise in China’s exports.	在过去十年中，西方跨国公司子公司贡献了中国出口累计增量的60%以上。


In other words, the export miracle was sparked not by state-sponsored Chinese companies but by offshore efficiency solutions crafted in the West.	换句话说，中国出口奇迹的创造者不是受国家支持的中国公司，而是西方制造的离岸效率解决方案。


This led to the economic equivalent of a personal identity crisis: Who is China – them or us?	这导致了一场经济身份危机：谁是中国——他们还是我们？


In personal relationships, denial tends to mask imbalances – but only for so long.	在人际关系中，我们总是试图掩盖失衡——但纸包不住火。


Ultimately, the denial cracks and imbalances give rise to frictions and blame – holding a codependent partner responsible for problems of one’s own making.	最终，掩盖会破碎，失衡将导致摩擦和指责——指责共存的伙伴应该为某人自身问题负责。


Such is the case with the US and China.	这就是美国和中国之间发生的事情。


America blames China for its trade deficits and the pressures they inflict on workers, citing a massive accumulation of foreign-exchange reserves as evidence of an unconscionable currency manipulation.	美国指责中国造成了它的贸易赤字，对它的工人造成了压力，以中国所积累的巨大的外汇储备为证指责中国过度操纵货币。


China counters by underscoring America’s saving shortfall – a gap that must be plugged by surplus saving from abroad, a current-account deficit, and a multilateral trade imbalance with more than 100 countries.	中国则以美国的储蓄不足为反诘——这个漏洞必须通过来自外国的储蓄盈余、经常项目赤字和与100多个国家的贸易不平衡来填补。


China blames the US for fixating on a bilateral imbalance as the source of America’s multilateral problem.	中国指责美国沉迷于以双边失衡，这是美国多边问题的根源。


The same blame game of codependency is apparent in the cyber-security controversy.	同样的共存指责游戏在网络安全争议中也表露无遗。


The US contends that China steals intellectual property for competitive reasons, inflicting grave damage on companies and workers.	美国声称中国出于竞争考虑窃取知识产权，给公司和工人造成严重伤害。


China, for its part, claims that the US is guilty of equally egregious violations – widespread cyber spying on international leaders, trade negotiators, and foreign firms.	中国则宣布美国也存在同样骇人听闻的不当行径——对国际领导���、贸易谈判员和外国公司大面积进行网络间谍行动。


Equally worrisome are the security disputes that have flared up in the East and South China Seas, which, via treaty obligations, directly involve the US.	同样令人担心的是出现在东海和南海的安全纠纷，根据条约义务，美国也深入牵涉其中。


America’s strategic “pivot” to Asia adds more tension.	美国的亚洲“支点”战略加剧了紧张局面。


The longer these frictions fester, the greater the risk of an accident or miscalculation leading to a military response – culminating in the ultimate break-up nightmare.	摩擦越激烈，事故或误算导致军事反应的风险就越大——最终可能演变为决裂噩梦。


The US and China could escape the potentially destructive endgame of a codependent relationship by recasting their ties as a more constructive and sustainable interdependency.	美国和中国可以通过将双方的关系重置为更具建设性和可持续性的相互依存（interdependency）来摆脱共存关系可能带来的灾难性结局。


An interdependent relationship fosters healthy interaction between partners, who satisfy their own needs rather than relying on others to do so, and maintain their own identities while appreciating the relationship’s mutual benefits.	相互依存关系铸就伙伴之间健康的互动，双方自己满足自己的需要而不依赖他人，并且在维持自身身份的同时维护双边关系的共同利益。


The upcoming Strategic and Economic Dialogue provides the US and China a platform of engagement to seize their collective opportunities.	即将到来的战略和经济对话给美国和中国提供了一个参与抓住共同机会的平台。


Both countries should press ahead with a bilateral investment treaty, which would enhance rules-based market access and eventually foster greater trade liberalization.	两国都应该用双边投资条约推进关系，这能够强化基于规则的市场进入，最终铸就更大的贸易自由。


That would allow the US, the world’s preeminent services economy, to seize the opportunity that is about to be provided by the emergence in China of a services-led consumer society.	这能让世界最大的服务经济——美国抓住中国服务拉动型消费社会崛起所带来的机会。


And it would enable China to draw on America’s expertise and experience to help master its daunting economic rebalancing act.	这也将让中国能够利用美国的专业知识和经验更好地驾驭其艰难的再平衡政策。


At the same time, the upcoming dialogue should aim to restart the military-to-military exchanges on cyber-security issues that were launched a year ago.	与此同时，即将到来的对话应该将目标放在重启一年前开始的网络安全问题军方交流上。


These efforts were recently suspended in the aftermath of the US Justice Department’s decision to file criminal charges against five members of the People’s Liberation Army.	这一交流因为美国司法部决定对五名解放军军人提起刑事指控而被叫停。


Here as well, the goal should be a rules-based system of engagement – especially vital for all modern economies in an era of IT-enabled globalization.	在这方面，目标同样应该定在基于规则的参与制度上——这对于以IT为基础的全球化时代的每一个现代经济体都是至关重要的。


Progress on these fronts will not be possible if the US and China remain stuck in the quagmire of codependency.	如果中国和美国继续陷在共存陷阱中，那么这些方面的进展就不可能发生。


Only by embracing the opportunities of interdependency can the hegemon and the rising power reduce tensions and focus on the benefits of mutually sustainable prosperity.	只有抓住相互依存的机会，才能让霸权和崛起新大国减少摩擦，专注于互相可持续繁荣的益处。


The Stall-Speed Syndrome	失速速度综合症


NEW HAVEN – Relapse is the rule in the post-crisis global economy.	纽黑文—复发是后危机时代全球经济的常态。


In the United States, Japan, and Europe, GDP growth faltered again in the first half of 2014.	在美国、日本和欧洲，GDP增长在2014年上半年再次疲软。


These setbacks are hardly a coincidence.	它们的退步不是巧合。


Persistent sluggish growth throughout the developed world has left major economies unusually vulnerable to the inevitable bumps in the road.	全体发达国家增长长期停滞不前，这使得主要经济体极易受到前进道路上难免的坎坷的羁绊。


Sure, there are excuses – there always are.	当然，借口是有的——永远如此。


A contraction in the US economy in the first quarter of the year was dismissed as weather-related.	美国经济今年一季度的负增长据说与天气有关。


Japan’s plunge in the second quarter was blamed on a sales-tax hike.	日本第二季度的衰退被归咎为销售税的提高。


Europe’s stagnant growth in the second quarter has been explained away as an aberration reflecting the confluence of weather effects and sanctions imposed on Russia.	欧洲二季度的停滞被解释为气候影响和对俄制裁的共同效应。


As tempting as it may be to attribute these developments to idiosyncratic factors, the latest slowdown in developed countries is not so easily dismissed.	人们总喜欢将这样的发展趋势归结为各种奇特的原因，但发达国家的最新减速之势并不容易开脱。


Lacking cyclical vigor in the aftermath of severe recessions, today’s economies are finding it especially difficult to shrug off the impact of shocks and break out of anemic growth trajectories.	由于在经历了严重衰退后缺乏周期性动力，今天的各大经济体发现摆脱冲击影响、突破长期不振的增长轨迹特别困难。


Consider the US.	以美国为例。 其今年一季度经济衰退了2.


Though annual GDP growth is estimated to have rebounded to 4% in the second quarter of 2014, following the 2.1% first-quarter contraction, that still leaves average growth in the first half of the year at a measly 1%.	1%，但二季度年GDP增长反弹至4%。 尽管如此，上半年平均增长仍只有1%。


The problem is even worse in Japan, where consumers brought forward expenditures in anticipation of the sales-tax hike.	日本的问题甚至更加严重，消费者因为预计销售税将有所提高而扩大了支出。 这使得一季度经济大幅增长了6.


The 6.1% first-quarter growth surge to which this gave rise was more than offset by a 6.8% second-quarter contraction.	1%，但二季度却出现了6. 8%的收缩，将一季度的涨幅吞噬殆尽。


The net result in the first half of this year – an average decline of 0.3% – is broadly in line with the 0.2% contraction now estimated for the fourth quarter of 2013.	净结果是今年上半年平均衰退0. 3%，与目前所估算的2013年一季度水平——收缩0.


With the trajectory of real (inflation-adjusted) growth having moved into negative territory, on average, for three consecutive quarters, Japan may once again be reverting to recessionary form.	2%基本一致。 平均实际（经通胀调整的）增长趋势已经连续三季度落入负值区间，日本可能再一次陷入衰退深渊。


Europe’s fragile economy has similarly failed to recover strongly enough to ward off periodic growth setbacks.	类似地，脆弱的欧洲经济也没能出现足够强劲的复苏以抵消周期性增长回落。


During the acute phase of the euro crisis, recession was concentrated in peripheral economies such as Greece, Portugal, and Spain.	在欧元危机最猛烈的阶段，衰退集中在希腊、葡萄牙和西班牙等外围经济体。


Now, however, the malaise has spread to the core economies of Germany and Italy, both of which contracted in the second quarter, and to France, which recorded zero growth.	但是，如今，颓势蔓延到了德国和意大利等核心经济体，德意两国在二季度都出现了衰退，法国则报告零增长。


As a result, annual growth in the 18-country eurozone slipped to just 0.4% in the first half of 2014.	结果，2014年上半年，拥有18个国家的欧元区年增长率滑落至只有0.


This poor performance can only exacerbate the European Central Bank’s deflationary concerns.	4%。 如此拙劣的表现更加剧了欧洲央行的通缩担忧。


Collectively, the annual growth rate in the major developed economies averaged a little less than 0.7% in the first half of 2014.	合计而论，2014年上半年主要发达经济体年增长率平均为不到0. 7%。


America’s paltry 1% growth led the way, while Japan and Europe, whose combined GDP is roughly equal to that of the US in purchasing-power-parity terms, recorded no better than a 0.3% increase.	美国平庸的1%增长率已经拔得头筹，而日本和欧洲（案购买力平价衡量，其总GDP与美国大致相当）的增长只有不到0. 3%。


On balance, that is easily 1-1.5 percentage points below the developed world’s longer-term, or potential, growth trend – a worrisome outcome, to say the least, for employment, deflation risk, global trade, and export-dependent developing economies, such as China, which remain heavily reliant on external demand in developed countries.	总而言之，这要比发达国家的长期（或潜在）增长趋��低1—1. 5个百分点——这一结果令人不得不担心就业、通缩风险、全球贸易以及中国等严重依赖发达国家外部需求的出口推动型发展中经济体。


But there is another problem with persistently subpar growth: It provides no cushion to shield economies from unexpected blows.	但长期增长萎靡还有另一个问题：它使得经济不再拥有抵御意料外冲击的缓冲。


That is especially true when growth falls below 1%, leaving a thin margin between expansion and contraction.	特别是在增长下降到1%、挣扎在扩张和收缩之间时。


Such sluggish performance is the economic equivalent of “stall speed” – the heightened vulnerability that aircrafts can encounter at low velocity.	如此拙劣的表现就好比是经济的“失速速度”（航空术语，指飞机在低速是可能遇到的高度危险）。


Under such circumstances, it does not take much to lead to an aborted takeoff, or worse.	这种情形很容易引起起飞失败甚至更糟糕的结果。


The analogy is all too apt today.	这一比方在今天再合适不过了。


Shocks, whether traceable to weather, geopolitical disturbances, strikes, or natural disasters, are the rule, not the exception.	不管起因于天气、地缘政治干扰、罢工还是自然灾害，冲击永远是规则而不是例外。


When hit by them, vigorously growing economies have cushions to withstand the blows and the resilience to shrug them off.	当遭遇冲击时，强劲增长的经济体拥有抵御打击的缓冲和从打击中重新崛起的恢复力。


Economies limping along near stall speed do not.	在失速速度上运行的经济体不行。


The odds of a recessionary relapse in an environment of unusually weak growth – very much the problem today – should not be minimized.	在增长极其萎靡的情况下（今天的问题正在于此），衰退复发的可能性无法最小化。


The big question is what should be done about it.	一个大问题在于应该如何应对这一局面。


The current approach, centered on unconventional monetary policy, is not the answer.	目前的方针以非常规货币政策为中心，并不是问题的答案。


Though monetary policy provided a powerful antidote to frozen credit markets in the depth of the global financial crisis, it has failed to spark classic cyclical recoveries.	尽管货币政策能有效地解决全球金融危机顶峰时期信用市场冻结的问题，但并没能启动经典的周期性复苏。


That should be no surprise.	这并不令人奇怪。


The world’s major developed economies are not suffering from cyclical deficiencies in aggregate demand that are amenable to a monetary cure.	世界主要发达经济体并没有遭遇可以通过货币政策解决的总需求的周期性不足问题。


As the Bank for International Settlements correctly points out, they are still struggling in the aftermath of wrenching balance-sheet recessions.	国际清算银行正确地指出，它们仍在猛烈的资产负债表衰退的残局中挣扎。


In the US, a lingering overhang of household debt implies that deleveraging and the rebuilding of savings continues to take precedence over discretionary consumption.	在美国，家庭债务的长期积压导致去杠杆化和重建储蓄仍然是比自由裁量消费更紧迫的问题。


In Japan, long-standing structural problems, such as aging, labor-market rigidities, and a generalized productivity malaise, can be addressed only through the so-called “third arrow” of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s reform agenda, which remains woefully incomplete.	在日本，长期存在的结构性问题（如老龄化、劳动力市场僵化和一般化的生产率停滞不前）只能通过首相安倍晋三改革日程中的所谓“第三支箭”解决，而这“第三支箭”还远远没有完成。


And Europe faces a desperate need to build pan-European institutions to ensure banking and fiscal union, and to address serious competitiveness problems in France and Italy.	而欧洲迫切需要成立泛欧洲机构以确保银行和财政联盟以及解决法国和意大利的竞争力问题。


Unfortunately, the more that central banks give the impression that that they are on the case, and the more that markets cheer them on, the less pressure there is on politically gridlocked governments to deploy fiscal policy and push through structural reforms.	不幸的是，各大央行越是造成它们将全力以赴的印象，市场越是对它们欢呼雀跃，在政治上缩手缩脚的政府就越没有压力实施财政政策和推行结构性改革。


Moreover, the fixation on monetary accommodation leaves slow-growth, balance-sheet-constrained economies stuck at stall speed, increasing the risk of yet another global growth relapse. 	此外，货币调整情结导致了经济增长缓慢，饱受资产负债表束缚，陷于失速速度无法自拔，从而增加了全球衰退复发的风险。


Myopic authorities need to take less guidance from frothy financial markets and focus more on the structural repair of a post-crisis world.	目光短浅的当局应该更少关注肤浅的金融市场的指示，更多地专注于结构性修补危机后的世界。


This is a time for heroes, not cheerleaders.	这是个需要英雄而不是拉拉队的时代。


Diet and Growth	饮食与增长


KIGALI – There is no greater hindrance to a country’s long-term economic development than childhood undernourishment.	基加利—没有什么能比儿童营养不良给一国的长期经济发展带来更大拖累的了。


When a growing body does not get enough essential vitamins and nutrients, the harmful effects last long into adulthood.	生长中的身体得不到足够的必须维生素和营养的话，伤害会在成年以后长期存在。


In low-income countries, diets consist primarily of starches, such as rice, and legumes, like peas, that contain very little protein.	低收入国家的饮食主要由淀粉类（如稻米）和豆类（如豌豆）食品组成，这类食品蛋白质含量很低。


So even a child with a full belly does not necessarily get the right balance of nutritious food and vitamins required for healthy physical development.	因此，即使儿童能够吃饱，也难以得到营养食品的正确平衡和健康发育所需要的维生素。


This takes an enormous toll.	代价是沉重的。


Undernourished children are more susceptible to illness.	饮养不良儿童更容易得病。


According to UNICEF, children who suffer from severe under-nutrition are 9.5 times more likely to die from diarrhea and 6.4 times more likely to die from pneumonia.	据联合国儿童基金会统计，严重营养不良的儿童因痢疾致死的可能性高9. 5倍，因肺炎致死的可能性高6.


Fully one in three preventable deaths among young children worldwide – up to 2.5 million each year – are the result of inadequate nutrition.	4倍。 放眼世界，每三起可预防儿童死亡中就有一起（每年250万例）是营养不足的后果。


Worldwide, one in four children under the age of five is stunted, meaning that chronic under-nutrition has caused serious and often irreversible physical and cognitive damage.	全世界，每四名五岁以下儿童就有一人发育不良，这表明长期营养不良造成了常常是不可逆转的生理和认知伤害。


There were 165 million stunted children in 2001, equivalent to half the population of the United States.	2001年有1. 65亿儿童发育不良，等于美国人口总数的一半。


Stunted children often struggle to reach their potential in school and ultimately the workplace, diminishing economic productivity and development.	发育不良儿童常常会在学校和最终的工作场所中疲于发展潜力，阻碍了经济生产率和发育。


A World Bank study found that under-nutrition can cost an individual up to 10% of his or her potential lifetime earnings, and as much as 3% of a country’s GDP.	世界银行的一份研究发现，营养不良所造成的成本最多相当于一个人一生潜在收入10%，或一国GDP的3%。


To combat this problem, we need a multi-pronged approach that marshals all available resources to ensure good nutrition among children.	为了打败这一问题，我们需要多管齐下，利用一切可利用的资源确保儿童获得良好的营养。


That starts with strong leadership in countries where the challenge is acute.	首先，这一挑战最为尖锐的国家应该担起坚强的领导责任。


While my country, Rwanda, has reduced child mortality by 70% over the past decade, the rate of stunting remains high, with 44% of children under the age of five chronically malnourished.	尽管我的祖国卢旺达在过去十年中将儿童夭折率减少了70%，但发育不良率依然很高，44%的五岁以下儿童经受着长期营养不良。


Rwandan President Paul Kagame has initiated a national emergency plan to address the fundamental causes of malnutrition.	卢旺达总统卡加梅（Paul Kagame）推出了一项全国紧急方案来纠正营养不良的根源。


This means not only increasing available food sources for children, but also educating families about the importance of nutritious diets.	这意味着不但要扩大儿童的食品来源，还要向家庭普及营养饮食重要性的教育。


Between 2006 and 2011, for example, we doubled the agriculture budget, distributed more than 2,000 cows to low-income families, and expanded milk delivery and fruit and vegetable gardens across the country.	比如，2006—2011年，我们将农业预算提高了一倍，向低收入家庭发放了2000多头奶牛，还扩大了卢旺达的牛奶输送和蔬果园。


Community health workers in each of Rwanda’s 15,000 villages, as well as nurses at health centers across the country, periodically measure the weight and height of each child under the age of five, referring for help those identified as malnourished or at risk.	卢旺达15000个村庄的社区卫生工作人员以及全国卫生中心的所有护士定期为每一位五岁以下儿童称重量高，建议被认为营养不良或高危的儿童寻求帮助。


At the same time, ensuring that these efforts translate into better health outcomes requires a revolution in the way families prepare their children’s food.	与此同时，为了确保这些措施转变为更好的卫生成果，就需要变革家庭为儿童准备食物的方式。


Our government has started a massive educational campaign to broaden understanding of the importance of nutritious diets.	我们的政府启动了一个大规模教育计划，推广对营养饮食重要性的理解。


Pamphlets have been distributed across the country detailing the kinds of foods that children need, how to cook them, and the need for proper hygiene and exclusive breastfeeding for children under the age of six months.	我们在全国散发详细列出儿童所需食品、它们的烹饪方法以及半岁一下儿童适当卫生条件和纯母乳喂养需要的小册子。


In each village, a woman skilled in communication will teach families how to prepare balanced meals and ensure adequate nutrition for children.	在每一个村庄，都有一名善于沟通的女性教导家庭如何准备均衡膳食以及确保儿童营养充足。


Providing proper nutrition in a child’s first thousand days is particularly important.	在儿童生命的第一个一千天提供合适营养尤其重要。


The British medical journal The Lancet has described a package of effective interventions to accomplish this.	英国医学杂志《柳叶刀》（The Lancet）描述了一个完成这一目标的有效干预方案。 建议措施包括通过强化食品和补充品提供必须维生素和矿物质；


Recommended measures include providing essential vitamins and minerals through enriched foods and supplements; promoting breastfeeding and nutritious complementary feeding for weaning babies; and treating severely malnourished children with therapeutic foods such as specially fortified peanut butter.	推广纯母乳喂养以及断奶婴儿的补充营养； 以及用医疗食品（比如特别强化花生酱）治疗严重营养不良的儿童。


There is an emerging consensus on the need to address under-nutrition worldwide.	解决全世界营养不良问题的需要正在形成共识。


Last year, the Copenhagen Consensus – an esteemed panel of economists including several Nobel Laureates – ranked child nutrition as the top priority on its list of cost-effective investments that would improve global welfare.	去年，哥本哈根共识（Copenhagen Consensus，由包括数名诺贝尔奖在内的经济学家组成的德高望重的委员会）将儿童营养列为其能改善全球福利的划算投资名单首位。


In many low-income countries, making these investments will require forging partnerships with foreign governments – and we welcome the vital role that donor programs, aid agencies, and volunteer organizations can play by working within the framework of national plans.	在许多低收入国家，进行这类投资要求与外国政府形成伙伴关系——我们欢迎赞助项目、援助机构和志愿组织通过在国家计划框架内部的工作起到关键作用。


Regional collaboration will also be key to fulfilling our commitment to succeed in fighting malnutrition.	地区合作也是兑现我们成功战胜营养不良承诺的关键。


For us, this means working closely with our neighbors in the East African Community.	对我们来说，这意味着与东非共同体邻国精诚合作。


On June 8, just ahead of the G-8 Summit, the United Kingdom will convene a summit on Nutrition for Growth.	6月8日，在G8峰会之前，英国将主办“为了增长的营养”（Nutrition for Growth）峰会。


Leaders from rich and poor countries, foundations, non-governmental organizations, and private industry will gather to make specific commitments to invest in nutrition.	来自发达国家和贫困国家的领导人、基金会、非政府组织和私人产业将齐聚一堂，做出营养投资方面的具体承诺。


I hope that they will increase their efforts – and that they think hard about how to ensure that all sectors of recipient countries’ economies benefit through local procurement.	我希望他们能加大动作——并认真思考如何确保被投资国经济的所有部门都从本地采购中获益。


Simply flooding markets with cheap high-calorie, low-nutrient grains will never solve chronic malnutrition.	仅仅向市场供应廉价高热量、低营养作物无法解决长期营养不良问题。


A change of mindset among development partners is required, along with long-term commitments to building sustainable, diversified, and equitably distributed systems of food production and distribution.	发展伙伴必须转换思想，做出长期承诺构建可持续、多样化、平等分配的食品生产和分配体系。


The investments needed to make this happen represent a fraction of most donor assistance to low- and middle-income countries, but would have a massive global impact on human development in the long term.	让这一点成为可能的投资只占大部分对中低收入国家援助者出资规模的一小部分，但将对长期全球人类发展起到重大作用。


All of these efforts – production of affordable and nutritious food, ensuring its availability everywhere, and education about how to prepare it – will be essential if Rwanda and other countries are to succeed in ensuring that children receive the nourishment they need to live healthy and productive lives.	所有这些措施——生产负担得起的营养食品、确保其能够为全世界所获得以及教育人们如何准备——将是关键性的，如果卢旺达和其他国家想要在确保儿童获取健康和生产性生活所需营养方面取得成功的话。


Our job will not be finished until every child is assured a healthy and balanced diet and the opportunity to reach his or her full potential.	只有在所有儿童都能保证获得健康均衡饮食以及充分发挥潜力的机会时，我们的使命才能宣布完成。


A World of Pain	疼痛的世界


BALTIMORE – Pain is ubiquitous in life.	巴尔的摩—疼痛在生活中无处不在。


Inextricably bound to consciousness, it is an experience that all living creatures with advanced nervous systems share.	这是一种无法摆脱的知觉，所有具有高级神经系统的生命体都有疼痛的体验。


For our ancestors, whose lives were fraught with danger, pain conferred an evolutionary advantage, signaling the need to separate oneself from its immediate source.	对于生活危机四伏的我们的祖先来说，疼痛是一种进化优势，表明你需要远离疼痛源。


But evolution has failed to keep pace with biomedical and technological advances, allowing chronic pain (pain that persists beyond an acute injury or condition) to become a disease in itself.	但进化赶不上生物医学和技术的进步，这让慢性疼痛（在急性伤口或症状消失后继续存在的疼痛）本身也成了一种疾病。


It is difficult to overestimate chronic pain’s societal impact.	慢性疼痛的社会影响是巨大的。


According to the US Institute of Medicine, one in three people suffer from chronic pain – more than from heart disease, cancer, and diabetes combined.	据美国医学会（US Institute of Medicine）估计，三分之一的人饱受慢性疼痛的折磨——比心脏病、癌症和糖尿病加起来还要多。


Pain is the leading cause of disability, especially back pain among people under 45 years of age and joint pain in older individuals.	疼痛是残疾的主要诱因，特别是45岁以下背痛人群和关节痛老人。


In the United States alone, chronic pain is estimated to cost more than $600 billion annually.	光是在美国，慢性疼痛每年就要造成大约6,000亿美元的成本。


Pain can be classified according to a variety of factors, such as duration or location.	疼痛可以根据不同因素区分，比如持续时间或区域。


But the most useful categorization is based on mechanism.	但最有用的分类方法是根据疼痛机制区分。


Nociceptive pain, which arises from damage to non-nervous tissue, occurs when, say, a person twists an ankle.	伤害性疼痛——因非神经组织受伤而产生——往往会在（如）扭到脚踝时发作。


An example of chronic nociceptive pain is arthritis.	慢性伤害性疼痛的一个例子是关节炎。


Neuropathic pain, by contrast, arises after a lesion or disease affects the nervous system.	相反，神经性疼痛的原因是机能损害或疾病影响了神经系统。


Nerve damage resulting from diabetes (diabetic neuropathy) and persistent pain after shingles (postherpetic neuralgia) are among the most common causes.	糖尿病引起的神经损伤（糖尿病性神经病）和带状疱疹后的持续疼痛（后遗神经痛）是最常见的例子。


Chronic pain is difficult to treat; even the most effective medications provide only modest relief to a minority of patients.	慢性疼痛很难治愈； 即便是效力最强的药物也只能略微减轻少数病人的疼痛。


This can be explained partly by pain’s subjective nature, and partly by the fact that its source can be difficult to pinpoint.	这部分是因为疼痛的主观性质，部分是因为疼痛根源难以精确查明的事实。


Although neuroscientists are adept at studying pain, animal models fail to account for its “affective-motivational” component – that is, pain’s emotional, cognitive, and contextual features.	尽管神经科学家长于研究疼痛，但动物模型无法解释其中的“情感动机”要素，即疼痛的情感、感知和情景特征。


Indeed, physiological indicators have less of an impact on a patient’s prognosis after a painful injury than psychological and social factors such as depression or poor coping skills.	事实上，对于病人在痛苦伤害后会出现哪些症状，生理指标的影响不如抑郁或调整力不足等心理指标。


The problem is that subjective measures are much more difficult to study – not least because they are associated with high placebo response rates.	问题在于主观手段的研究难度要大得多——不仅是因为它们伴随着高安慰剂反应率。


Unrealistic expectations exacerbate these psychological impediments to progress.	不切实际的期望加剧了对改善的心理障碍。


In an era of instant access, people often expect immediate relief from symptoms, which is difficult to achieve when it comes to chronic pain.	在“立竿见影”（instant access）时代，人们通常希望马上能从症状中解脱，而对于慢性疼痛很难达到这一点。


For example, the best way to relieve back and neck pain is often to exercise, while treating underlying contributing factors like obesity.	比如，减轻背痛和颈痛的最佳办法是经常锻炼，同时解决肥胖等基础性因素。


But few people are willing to devote the time and effort that such a therapeutic plan demands; they would prefer an injection, operation, or medication.	但很少有人愿意花时间和努力满足这一疗法的需求； 他们宁可打一针、做一次手术或用止痛药。


When there is no instant fix available, they can become discouraged, hampering their recovery further.	当不存在立竿见影的方法时，他们就会变得很沮丧，从而进一步妨碍了恢复过程。


Making matters worse, people are being inundated with information – and often misinformation – through television, the Internet, and other direct-marketing channels.	更糟糕的是，人们被来自电视、互联网或直销渠道的各种信息——通常是误导信息——所淹没。


This fuels misconceptions and, in many cases, gives people false hope about the kind of relief they can expect from a particular drug or treatment.	这加剧了错误观念，在许多例子中，还让人们对某种药物或疗法的纾痛效果产生了错误的期望。


Not even physicians are immune to these influences; indeed, in some cases, they actually create the bias.	就连医生也无法摆脱这些东西的影响； 事实上，在不少例子中，他们实际上创造了偏见。


For example, studies of epidural steroid injections for back pain have been shown to be almost three times more likely to yield positive results when conducted by doctors who routinely administer them.	比如，对硬膜外类固醇注射治疗背痛的研究证明，由对此进行日常管理的医生操作更有可能产生积极效果。


Financial incentives have compounded the problem, leading to some alarming trends.	金融激励也加剧了这一问题，导致了一些值得警惕的趋势。


Procedures, operations, and prescription opioid use aimed at curbing chronic pain have increased dramatically over the last decade, driving up health-care costs, while failing to stem the increase in the prevalence of pain or the number of disability claims.	旨在缓解慢性疼痛的程序、手术和处方类阿片药物在过去十年急剧增长，推高了医疗成本，但并没有阻止疼痛发作率的上升和残疾数字��增加。


This is particularly problematic in countries where health-care delivery is based on a fee-for-service model.	对于医疗服务基于按服务计费的国家来说，这一问题尤其严重。


The rate of spine surgery in the United States, for example, is more than twice as high as in Europe.	比如，美国的脊柱手术数量是欧洲的两倍多。


And, despite having less than 5% of the world’s population, the US accounts for more than three-quarters of global opioid consumption – leading to a surge in addiction rates and overdoses.	此外，尽管美国哦人口只占世界人口的不到5%，但其阿片药物消费量占据了四分之三以上——这导致了致瘾率和服药过量的暴增。


What can be done to improve management and treatment of chronic pain?	怎样改善慢性疼痛的管理和治疗？


For starters, health-care providers and individuals should view chronic pain more as a “syndrome” than a symptom – one that may not be “curable.”	首先，医疗提供者和个人应该将慢性疼痛视为“综合症状”（syndrome）而非征兆（symptom）——是不可“治愈”的。


For patients who have not responded to conventional treatment, restoring function should replace eradicating pain as the primary objective.	对于常规疗法不起作用的病人，功能还原应该成为比减轻疼痛更重要的目标。


Similarly, patients must recognize that there are no “silver bullets” for pain treatment.	类似地，病人必须认识到疼痛治疗没有“万灵丹”。


Indiscriminate use of procedures that may benefit only a select few patients merely drives up health-care costs.	滥用只能对少数病人起作用的程序只能推高医疗成本。


Likewise, for chronic non-cancer pain, there is virtually no evidence to support the long-term use of high doses of opioids, which often do more harm than good.	类似地，对慢性非癌症疼痛而言，几乎没有证据支持应该长期使用高剂量阿片类药物，这类药物往往弊大于利。


The long-term pain treatment with the strongest empirical support involves lifestyle modifications such as exercise, stress reduction, and weight loss – all of which require significant time and effort.	实证效果最好的长期疼痛治疗方法包括生活方式的改变，如锻炼、减压和减肥——所有这些都需要大量的时间和努力。


Finally, researchers should compare the long-term cost-effectiveness of different treatments in typical chronic-pain patients.	最后，研究者应该对不同疗法对典型慢性疼痛病人的长期成本-效益进行比较。


Such an approach would be more relevant and generalizable than industry-sponsored short-term studies that compare new treatments to placebos in a fastidiously chosen population that does not reflect real-world conditions.	而产业界支持的短期研究会精心挑选无法反映真实世界情况的被试，在他们身上比较新疗法和安慰剂的效果。 相比之下，前一种方法更切中要害，也更一般化。


A thorough and realistic understanding of the nature of chronic pain is crucial to devising effective treatments.	切实理解慢性疼痛的性质对于设计有效疗法来说至关重要。


Indeed, without better evidence, efforts to help patients may well end up creating more problems than they solve.	事实上，如果没有更好的证据，帮助病人的效果往往适得其反。


A Bad Bet on Synthetic Biology	合成生物学的差劲赌注


LAS VEGAS – Las Vegas seems to be an apt place to launch a risky corporate gamble that could destroy the livelihoods of millions of small-scale farmers.	拉斯维加斯——拉斯维加斯似乎是发动一场冒险的企业赌博，毁掉数以百万计小农生计的恰当地点。


Earlier this month, the international food conglomerate Cargill chose the city’s famous Strip to introduce what it hopes will be its next blockbuster product: EverSweet, a sweetener made of “the same sweet components in the stevia plant.”	本月早些时候，国际食品巨头嘉吉选择该市著名的拉斯维加斯大道发布它所期待的下一代重磅产品：与甜叶菊有着相同成分的甜味剂EverSweet。


And yet, despite Cargill’s heavy reliance on stevia in its promotional material, EverSweet does not contain a single leaf of the plant.	但尽管嘉吉依赖甜叶菊进行促销宣传，EverSweet却不含一丁点植物成分。


Cargill’s new product is an example of synthetic biology, a form of genetic engineering that uses modified organisms to manufacture compounds that would never be produced naturally.	嘉吉公司这种新产品是合成生物学的成果，合成生物学是基因工程的一种，即用转基因生物制造永远不可能自然合成的化合物。


What makes EverSweet taste sweet is not stevia; it is a compound produced by a bioengineered yeast.	EverSweet是一种生物工程酵母制成的化合物，它的甜味并非来源于甜叶菊。


Synthetic biology is high-tech, and it is also potentially high-risk.	合成生物学是高科技，但也可能伴随着高风险。


Even as it attracts billions of dollars in investment, it is the subject of growing international concern.	即便吸引了数亿美元的投资，但由此引发的国际关注也一天胜似一天。


Tellingly, Cargill does not advertise its use of the controversial technology; instead, the company describes EverSweet as the product of “specially crafted baker’s yeast,” as if it were a recipe brewed for centuries in Bavarian villages.	很显然，嘉吉只字不提它使用有争议的技术； 相反，这家公司将EverSweet说成是“特制的烘焙师酵母”，好像配方出自几个世纪前的巴伐利亚乡村。


Discerning the risks that may be posed by food ingredients made from this kind of genetic engineering – different from those known from other types of transgenic foods – is still at an early stage.	对这种基因工程食品成分所带来风险——这些风险不同于其他类型的转基因食品——的认识仍处于早期阶���。


In a recent opinion, European Union scientific committees concluded that while the risk assessment used for evaluating genetically modified organisms should be applicable to aspects of synthetic biology, in specific cases new approaches may be needed to evaluate the safety of the technology.	欧盟科学委员会最近的结论是尽管用于转基因生物风险评估的手段理应适用于合成生物学的某些方面，但在特定情况下可能需要新的方法来评估这项技术是否安全。


And yet there is one area in which the dangers are already apparent: the economic damage that will be caused as lab-grown compounds replace field-grown stevia.	但有一个领域的危险已经显露无遗：那就是实验室化合物取代种植甜叶菊所造成的经济损害。


The Guarani indigenous people of Paraguay have grown and used the herb for centuries.	巴拉圭土著瓜拉尼人种植使用甜叶菊长达几个世纪之久。


More recently, it has become a food-industry craze, driven in part by fear of obesity lawsuits.	部分出于对肥胖诉讼的恐惧，近来这种植物正在食品行业引发热潮。


As major brands like Coke and Pepsi aggressively market stevia-sweetened cola drinks as natural and healthy, the agricultural acreage of the plant has exploded.	随着可乐及百事等大品牌积极宣传含甜叶菊成分的可乐饮品自然健康，这种植物的种植面积呈爆炸式增长。


Analysts expect the stevia market to reach $275 million by 2017.	分析师预计甜叶菊市场 2017年将达到2. 75亿美元的规模。


The global leaders in stevia production are Paraguay, China, and the United States, with Kenya close behind.	巴拉圭、中国和美国，以及紧随其后的肯尼亚是全球甜叶菊生产的领导者。


Early in 2015, Marian Bassey (representing the ETC Group) met stevia farmers in Kenya to understand what competition from synthetic biology might mean for them.	2015年初，玛丽安·贝西（代表ETC集团）会见肯尼亚的甜叶菊种植户，了解他们怎样看待来自合成生物学的竞争。


They were very worried.	他们对此非常担忧。


For Ann Nduta Kanini, a widowed mother of eight, selling stevia has allowed her to send her children to school and put food on the table.	寡居的Ann Nduta Kanini是八个孩子的母亲，出售甜叶菊让她能够送孩子上学，并为家人购买食物。


When we asked Paul Mwangi Kigaa, another small-scale farmer, what Cargill’s use of synthetic biology would mean for him and his neighbors, he answered that “growing stevia in their factories will affect our lives!”	当我们问另一位小农Paul Mwangi Kigaa嘉吉使用合成生物技术会对他和他的邻居造成何种影响，他回答说“在他们工厂里种植甜叶菊会影响我们的生活！ ”


Moreover, poor farmers have been actively encouraged to invest in stevia, because its cultivation can help preserve fragile and unique ecosystems.	此外，当局积极鼓励贫困农户投资甜叶菊，因为甜叶菊种植有助于维护脆弱而独特的生态系统。 在对全球主要风险的年度调查中，世界经济论坛强调“发明高价值农业出口产品廉价的合成替代品.


In its annual survey of leading global risks, the World Economic Forum noted that, “the invention of cheap, synthetic alternatives to high-value agricultural exports … could suddenly destabilize vulnerable economies by removing a source of income on which farmers rely.”	可能会突然间破坏脆弱的经济，夺走农民所依赖的收入来源。 ”


Nor are stevia farmers the only ones who should be concerned.	理应担忧的也不止是种植甜叶菊的农民。


Ingredients that are being replaced or are likely to be exchanged for products made through synthetic biology include vanilla, saffron, coconut oil, patchouli, olive squalene, and rose oil.	合成生物技术正在取代或可能替换的产品包括香草、藏红花、椰子油、广藿香、橄榄角鲨烯和玫瑰油。


Indeed, the world’s largest cosmetics, flavor, and fragrance companies are hoping that synthetic biology will help them replace more than 200 natural botanical extracts.	事实上，世界最大的化妆品、调味剂和香料公司正期望合成生物技术帮它们取代超过200种天然植物提取物。


According to the International Federation of Essential Oils and Aroma Trades (IFEAT), around 95% of these botanical products are produced by small-scale farmers, bringing much-needed cash income to some of the world’s poorest communities.	据国际精油和香料贸易联盟（IFEAT）统计，上述植物产品中约95%为小农生产，为全世界某些最贫困群体带来了迫切需要的现金收入。


Fortunately, consumers are becoming increasingly aware of the risks posed by synthetic biology, and companies are responding.	幸运的是，消费者越来越了解合成生物学所带来的风险，并且企业正在对此做出回应。


Earlier this year, the iconic ice cream brand Ben and Jerry’s pledged not to use any ingredients produced through synthetic biology.	今年早些时候，标志性冰淇淋品牌班杰利承诺不使用任何合成生物成分作为生产原料。


Similarly, Häagen-Dazs confirmed that it will not use vanilla flavor produced through synthetic biology in its ice cream.	同样，哈根达斯也确认不在冰激凌中使用以合成化学方式生产的香草香精。


And, after the natural cleaning products brand Ecover was petitioned by tens of thousands of angry consumers, the company quickly rolled back an experiment in which it used algal oil produced through synthetic biology in a laundry detergent.	此外，在成千上万愤怒的消费者向天然清洁用品品牌艾克佛请愿后，该公司迅速取消了一项在洗衣粉中采用合成生物海藻油的试验项目。


These are unlikely to remain isolated examples.	上述事件不太可能是孤立的。


The Non-GMO Project, an increasingly influential labeling organization, has ruled that the 33,000 products carrying its seal must not use synthetic biology.	影响力日渐扩大的非转基因项目组织已经裁定贴有其标签的33,000种产品不允许采用合成生物技术。


Meanwhile, the European Stevia Association (EUSTAS), has expressed concern that EverSweet will undermine stevia’s reputation as safe and natural.	此外，欧洲甜菊协会（EUSTAS）已经表达了对EverSweet可能损害甜叶菊天然安全声誉的关注。


The dark clouds gathering around synthetic biology may not have been visible at Cargill’s sunny product launch.	笼罩在合成生物技术周围的乌云或许在嘉吉阳光明媚的产品发布会上并不那么明显。


But, by competing with poor farmers and misleading consumers about the origins of its ingredients, EverSweet and other examples of synthetic biology are generating bitterness at both ends of the product chain.	但因为与贫困农民竞争和误导消费者其所含成分的出处，EverSweet和其他合成生物技术正在产品链的两端制造痛苦。


That is why what happened in Vegas should stay in Vegas.	这也解释了为什么从维加斯开始的势头必须在那里结束。


Stick to the Resolution	严格贯彻决议的内容


MELBOURNE – The international military intervention in Libya is not about bombing for democracy or for Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi’s head – let alone keeping oil prices down or profits up.	墨尔本——对利比亚进行国际军事干预不是为了靠轰炸实现民主，也不是为了拿到穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲上校的人头——更不是为了压制油价或谋取暴利。 从法律、道德、政治和军事角度这种做法只有一个解释： 保护利比亚人不受卡扎菲四周前强加给手无寸铁的抗议群众；


Legally, morally, politically, and militarily, it has only one justification: protecting Libyans from the kind of murderous harm that Qaddafi inflicted on unarmed protestors four weeks ago; has continued to inflict on those who oppose him in the areas that his forces control; and has promised to inflict on his opponents in Benghazi and other rebel-held territory.	并仍将继续强加给其军事控制下的反对派势力； 以及扬言要强加给班加西和其他反对派控制地区民众的残忍的暴行。


When that job is done, the military’s job will be done.	这项任务就是军事任务全部的意义所在。


Regime change is for the Libyan people themselves to achieve.	政权更迭需要由利比亚民众自己完成。


It should not be necessary to rearticulate and reargue these basic points.	我本以为没有必要重申以上基本观点。


But it is.	但这种必要性的确存在。


Despite the best efforts of US President Barack Obama, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, and others who have stayed admirably focused and consistent, other voices – from the right, the left, and the simply muddled – are now capturing media attention, and are beginning to drown, or at least confuse, the basic message.	尽管美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马、联合国秘书长潘基文等人竭尽全力实现这一目标的做法令人钦佩，但来自右派、左派和混沌派的其他声音已经赢得了媒体的关注，并开始淹没、至少是混淆这些最基本的原则。


US Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman, for example, have said that the aim must be not only to protect civilians, but also to drive Qaddafi from power.	比如美国参议员约翰·麦凯恩和约瑟夫·利伯曼就曾扬言，此次干涉的目标不仅要保护平民的安全，还要迫使卡扎菲交出权力。


British Defense Minister Liam Fox has suggested that Qaddafi could be targeted.	英国国防大臣利亚姆·福克斯也提出可以将卡扎菲锁定为打击目标。


And from the other side, many commentators – anxiously or cynically, according to taste – have drawn parallels with Iraq and other past misuses of Western military power.	而另一方面，不少性格各异或焦急或愤世嫉俗的评论人士已开始拿此次行动与伊拉克和过去西方滥用军力的其他状况进行类比。


Many others talk of being drawn inexorably into an Afghanistan-style quagmire.	还有很多人认为此次肯定会不可自拔地陷入阿富汗式的泥潭之中。


To clarify the issues, the best place to start is with the two UN Security Council resolutions.	要想澄清这些问题，联合国安理会的两份决议是最好的出发点。


The first, Resolution 1970, adopted on February 26, invoked “the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population,” condemned its violence against civilians, demanded that this violence stop, and sought to concentrate Qaddafi’s mind by applying targeted sanctions, an arms embargo, and the threat of prosecution for crimes against humanity.	第一份是2月26日通过的第1970号决议，提出“利比亚当局有责任保护民众的安全”，决议谴责对平民滥用武力，要求停止这样的暴行，并借助针对性制裁、武器禁运和起诉反人道罪威胁等方法试图引起卡扎菲的关注。


The follow-up Resolution 1973, adopted on March 17, deplored the failure to comply with Resolution 1970, reasserted a determination to ensure the protection of civilians, and called for an immediate ceasefire and a complete end to violent attacks against and abuses of civilians.	3月17日进一步通过第1973号决议，对未能贯彻1970号决议表示遗憾，同时重申确保平民安全的决心，并呼吁立即停火，同时终止针对平民的暴力袭击和虐待。


Then, for the first time ever, the Council explicitly authorized military intervention by member states to achieve these objectives.	之后，有史以来第一次，安理会明确授权成员国进行军事干预，以促成这一目标的实现。


Coercive military action was allowed to take two forms: “all necessary measures” to enforce a no-fly zone, and “all necessary measures… to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.”	决议规定强制性军事行动可以采用两种形式： “采取一切必要措施”设立禁飞区，及“采取一切必要措施…保护受到袭击威胁的平民和平民聚居区。


Boots on the ground – “a foreign occupation force” – were expressly excluded.	” 派遣地面部队——“外国占领军”——被列入明令禁止的范畴。


The language of these resolutions could hardly be clearer in prescribing the scope and limits of what should be done.	上述决议规定干涉行动范围和限度所使用的语言已经极其明确。