Moreover, African governments could match China’s “Africa policy” with their own “China policy.”	此外，非洲国家政府可以针对中国的“非洲政策”来匹配对华政策。


This could encourage investment in a range of higher-value-added sectors, promote positive spillovers, and minimize adverse effects.	这可能在一定范围内鼓励更高增值部门的投资，促进积极的溢出效应，并最大限度减少不良影响。


Only with a long-term strategy can host governments ensure that Chinese (and other) investments become a tool of development, not just a means of generating short-term profit.	只有制定一个长期的战略，东道国政府才能确保中国（和其他地区）的投资行为是一个发展的工具，而不只是一种获得短期利润的手段。


Sinai’s Second-String Security	西奈半岛的二流安全力量


SHARM EL-SHEIKH – In the wake of an attack that killed 16 security officers in the Sinai Peninsula in August, the Egyptian military has ratcheted up the pressure against jihadis there.	沙姆沙伊赫——8月西奈半岛发生致死16名安全人员的袭击事件后，埃及军队逐步加强了对圣战者的压力。


Generals have promised an extended campaign to extinguish the terrorist threat, bringing in heavy armor and firing missiles at training camps to back up their pledge.	将军们信誓旦旦要发动扑灭恐怖威胁的长期战争，并为实践诺言为训练营配备了重装备和导弹。


But, if past performance is indicative of future returns, the offensive is likely to be a fleeting affair.	但如果过去的表现能预示未来的结果，这次进攻很有可能只是昙花一现。


The armed forces have never shown much interest in stabilizing Sinai, and previous operations to clear out jihadis have not prevented them from returning.	军方向来对稳定西奈半岛没多大兴趣，此前清除圣战者的行动并没有阻止他们重回西奈。


Egyptians blame the strictures of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty for their military’s inability to police Sinai.	埃及人认为1979年埃以和平条约导致他们无法从军事上管理西奈。


The bilateral accord stipulates that Egypt can station only 22,000 troops in the western part of the peninsula, known as Zone A. In the eastern section bordering Israel, known as Zone C, the Egyptian presence is restricted to Central Security Forces personnel.	因为双边协议规定埃及只能在划为A区的西奈半岛西部部署22,000人的部队。 而在与以色列接壤的东部的C区，埃及允许派驻的只限于中央安全部队。


Composed of poorly trained cadets, the CSF is limited to carrying out “normal police functions,” according to the agreement’s security annex.	中央安全部队由缺乏训练的军校学员组成，按照协议安全附件的规定只限于履行“常规警察职能”。


Jihadis have exploited the security void created by last year’s revolution to reinforce their presence in Sinai.	圣战份子利用去年革命造成的安全真空加强自身在西奈的存在。


As the threat has mounted, Israel has allowed Egypt to increase troop levels in the peninsula beyond those stipulated in the peace accords.	随着安全威胁不断升级，以色列允许埃及在和平协议的规定以外进一步强化西奈半岛的军事存在。


But Egypt has not taken advantage of the offer.	可是埃及并没有充分利用对方开出的条件。


Last August, the Israelis permitted an additional seven battalions and 20 tanks in Zone C. But the Egyptian armed forces never brought in the full number of additional troops, and did not even bother to transport the tanks across the Suez Canal.	去年8月，以色列允许在C区额外派驻7个营和20辆坦克。 可是埃及武装部队一直没有全额派驻部队，甚至懒得将坦克运过苏伊士运河。


Egypt’s approach toward Sinai troop deployments reflects its traditional neglect of the peninsula.	埃及在派驻问题上的做法反映了其长久以来对西奈半岛的忽视。


Historically, it has deployed only 70-80% of the 22,000 soldiers that the treaty allows in Zone A. And the military has never established a regional command in Sinai, preferring to allow units temporarily stationed there to report to their superiors scattered around Cairo and its environs.	埃及历史上仅仅派驻了A区所允许22,000名驻军的70-80%，而且军方从未在西奈设立地区司令部，宁愿让那里的临时驻军向分散在开罗及其周边地区的上级汇报情况。


Egypt’s new Islamist leaders may want to restore “full sovereignty” over the peninsula, as President Mohamed Morsi’s legal adviser, Mohamed Fouad Gadalla, recently noted.	穆罕默德·穆尔西总统的法律顾问穆罕默德·福阿德·贾杜拉最近表示，埃及新上任的伊斯兰领导人或许想要恢复对西奈半岛的“完全主权”。


Such saber-rattling comments vis-à-vis Israel are currently popular in the country.	这种对以色列施以战争威胁的强硬态度一时在埃及国内甚嚣尘上。


But the generals, who have the final say on military matters, are likely to preserve the status quo.	但手握军队生杀大权的将军们则极有可能继续维持现状。


Egypt’s indifference toward Sinai stems from its view of Israel.	埃及对西奈问题的漠视源于它对以色列的态度。


When the guns fell silent following the two countries’ 1973 war, Egypt stopped viewing Israel as a threat.	埃以两国1973年战争的枪声停止后，埃及就不再把以色列视为对自身的威胁。


In the cease-fire talks that followed, the two sides made so much progress that US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, fearing that he would have nothing to negotiate when he arrived in the region weeks later, asked the Israelis to halt them.	埃以两国之后的停火谈判进展得如此迅速，以致于当时的美国国务卿亨利·基辛格害怕自己过几周赶到后所有问题都已达成协议，因此要求以色列暂时停止谈判。


Since then, Egypt has fought a war with Libya and sporadically clashed with Sudan. But not a shot has been fired across Sinai.	自那以后，埃及与利比亚打了一仗，偶尔也与苏丹爆发冲突，但在西奈半岛却再也没开过一枪。


Employing CSF troops in the sensitive border region where jihadis have established their strongholds is similarly indicative of Sinai’s insignificance in Egyptian military thought.	在圣战分子已经建立据点的边境敏感区域派驻中央安全部队同样表明了西奈在埃及军事理念中的微不足道。


Created to absorb army rejects who must still complete their mandatory national service, the CSF is a lower-rung security organization in a country whose armed forces are subpar to begin with.	中央安全部队一贯接收仍需服完强制兵役的军队拒收人员，在武装部队本就标准不高的埃及也属于低级别的安全机构。


Its members are uneducated rural men, some of whom are illiterate.	中央安全部队的兵员大多是没有受过教育的农村人，其中有些人还是文盲。


Their most crucial tasks include guarding banks and hotels.	他们最重要的任务包括守卫酒店和银行。


These forces are poorly trained and badly equipped to take on fighters with experience in international jihadist campaigns.	这些装备欠佳的乌合之众根本无法和具备国际圣战运动经验的战士对抗。


And the CSF’s track record is dismal at best.	中央安全部队的过往记录充其量也只能说令人沮丧。


When it was deployed as part of the battle against the Islamist uprising of the 1990’s, insurgents penetrated a number of units.	在1990年代的伊斯兰起义战斗中，有多个单位曾经被武装分子穿透。


The government’s counter-terrorism policies also work against an enhanced military role in quashing the Sinai jihadis.	埃及政府的反恐政策也对强化军队在镇压西奈半岛圣战份子中的作用没有帮助。


Historically, Egypt has used its intelligence services, supplemented by the police and the CSF, to fight Islamist militants.	历史上埃及曾经利用其情报部门，在警察和中央安全部队的协助下打击伊斯兰激进分子。


As a result, the army has neither the training nor the experience to grapple with Sinai insurgents.	结果导致军队在对抗西奈叛乱分子时既无能力也无经验的现状。


The military’s recent offensive reflects this, relying on air strikes that imperiled civilians rather than a ground offensive that would have been more precise in achieving its objectives.	军方不久前的攻击行动也证实了这一点，他们更多的依赖威胁平民安全的空袭，而不是能够精确实现军事目标的地面进攻。


And dropping bombs instead of arresting jihadis prevented the military from gaining valuable intelligence about future attacks and transnational ties to other organizations and networks.	投放炸弹而不是逮捕圣战份子使军方无法取得对今后攻击行动和圣战分子与其他跨国机构和网络关系的有价值的情报。


But, beyond such theoretical objectives, lay the operation’s practical realities.	不过在这些理论目标之外可以找到这次行动的现实目标。


Sinai residents claim that there were no funerals following the missile strikes.	西奈半岛的居民称导弹袭击后没有看���举行葬礼。


The lack of evidence of casualties has left many Egyptian analysts believing that the military’s aim was not to target jihadis, but rather to silence its domestic and international critics.	伤亡证据的缺乏导致很多埃及分析家认为军队的目标不是打击圣战分子，而是想让国内和国际的批评者们无话可说。


If so, it is a tactic that can work only until the next attack.	果真如此，那么这样的策略只能在下一次袭击前奏效。


And that will only lead to more civilian and military casualties in Egypt’s neglected war.	这只会在这场被埃及忽视的战争里导致更多的平民和军队伤亡。


Turkey’s Iran Strategy	土耳其的伊朗战略


ISTANBUL – Following Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif’s recent visit to the Gulf states, the Islamic Republic’s charm offensive is set to continue with President Hassan Rouhani’s trip to Turkey early next month.	伊斯坦布尔—继伊朗外交部长扎里夫（Javad Zarif）最近访问海湾国家后，总统鲁哈尼将在下个月访问土耳其，继续伊斯兰共和国的魅力攻势。


Unlike the majority of Iran’s Arab neighbors, Turkey unequivocally welcomed the interim nuclear deal concluded last month between Iran and the P5+1 (the United Nations Security Council’s five permanent members and Germany).	与伊朗的大部分阿拉伯邻国不同，土耳其旗帜鲜明地欢迎上个月伊朗与P5+1（联合国安理会五大常任理事国加上德国）达成的临时和协议。


But Turkish policymakers are keenly aware that the agreement may upend the Middle East’s fragile balance of power.	但土耳其决策者强烈地感觉到，这一协议可能逆转中东地区脆弱的实力平衡。


From Turkey’s perspective, the nuclear deal, if successfully implemented and made permanent after six months, is set to eliminate a major security concern.	在土耳其看来，这一核协议如能成功实施并在六个月后永久化，将能打消一个巨大的安全顾虑。


Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government does not want to be faced with a nuclear Iran, fearing the emergence of an asymmetric power relationship with the Islamic Republic after centuries of balanced ties.	总理埃尔多安的政府不想面对有核的伊朗，担心在经历了几百年的平等关系后，土耳其与伊斯兰共和国将呈现不对称的实力关系。


But Turkey also did not want a military intervention in Iran, led by the United States.	但土耳其也不想对伊朗实施军事干预。


It was believed that a military strike would create even more problems in terms of regional stability and security.	土耳其认为，军事打击只能给地区稳定和安全带来更多问题。


That is why Turkish policymakers have consistently championed a diplomatic solution to the Iranian conundrum, which is what they got with the latest deal.	这也是土耳其决策者一直呼吁通过外交手段解决伊朗问题的原因，最近的协议正是这一努力的一个成果。


There are other reasons why Turkish officials have welcomed the interim agreement so warmly.	土耳其官员如此热烈地欢迎临时协议还有别的原因。


First, they interpret the deal as vindication of their ill-fated effort in May 2010 (together with Brazil) to reach an agreement with Iran on the disposition of Iran’s nuclear fuel.	首先，他们认为该协议证明了他们2010年5月（与巴西一起）试图与伊朗达成销毁其核燃料的协议的未成功努力是正确的。


Turkish authorities continue to highlight that earlier tripartite agreement with Iran.	土耳其当局一直在强调这份早先的三方协议。


The foreign ministry, for example, released a statement noting that, “The agreement…constitutes the first concrete positive development concerning Iran’s nuclear program since the Tehran Declaration of 2010.”	比如，外交部发布了一份声明，说“该协议……是自2010年德黑兰宣言以来关于伊朗核计划第一次取得实质性进展。 ”


Turkey is also satisfied that the deal does not weaken its position on sovereign rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.	土耳其还对该协议并未削弱其根据核不扩散条约（NPT）的主权权利地位感到满意。


Turkey has consistently defended the interpretation that states have the right to establish domestic uranium-enrichment programs under the NPT, provided that they comply with their treaty commitments.	土耳其坚持认为各国有权在NPT框架下发展本国铀浓缩计划，只要符合条约的各项承诺。


Even at the peak of diplomatic tensions with Iran, Turkey refrained from adopting America’s more maximalist position, which challenged the validity of Iran’s right to enrich uranium.	即使在与伊朗外交关系最紧张的时刻，土耳其也没有接受美国不承认伊朗核浓缩权利正当性的先发制人立场。


So the tacit and conditional acceptance of this right is a satisfactory outcome for Turkey.	因此，缄默和有条件地接受这一权利对土耳其来说是令人满意的结果。


Though Turkey currently has no plans to develop a fuel cycle of its own, its ambitious agenda for developing nuclear power has made policymakers intent on safeguarding the rights recognized by the NPT, including the right to enrich uranium.	尽管目前土耳其无意开发本国的燃料循环，但雄心勃勃的核电发展计划让决策者试图捍卫NPT所承认的权利，包括核浓缩权利。


There are also significant economic considerations for Turkey, which relies on Iran for a substantial share of its energy imports.	土耳其还有经济方面的重大考虑。 土耳其的能源进口很大一部分要依赖伊朗。


Equally important, as a neighboring country, Iran has been a traditional trading partner – a relationship worth more than $15 billion per year.	同样重要的是，作为邻国，伊朗是土耳其的传统贸易伙伴，每年贸易往来超过150亿美元。


As a result, Turkey’s export potential has been negatively affected by the rising stringency of the sanctions regime against Iran, with trade losses estimated at $6 billion for the first nine months of 2013.	因此，土耳其的出口潜力因为对伊制裁的收紧而大受影响，据估计，2013年前九个月的贸易损失高达60亿美元。


The gradual easing of the sanctions is expected to benefit Turkey’s export industries, which hope to satisfy pent-up Iranian demand for consumer and investment goods.	对伊制裁的逐渐放松预计将增加伊朗对消费品和投资品的需求，从而让土耳其出口部门获益。


Finally, in contrast to Arab states like Saudi Arabia, Turkey is generally comfortable with the deal’s geopolitical ramifications.	最后，与沙特阿拉伯等阿拉伯国家不同，土耳其总体上对该协议的地缘政治影响感到满意。


The improvement of Iran’s relationship with the West and the easing of diplomatic pressure on the Islamic Republic is not a major concern.	伊朗与西方关系的改善以及伊斯兰共和国外交压力的缓解并非大问题。


But, for the Gulf states – and also possibly for Israel – this scenario is viewed as opening the door to stronger Iranian influence throughout the region.	但是，海湾国家——可能也包括以色列——认为这不啻于开启了增加伊朗地区影响力的大门。


These countries believe that, following the interim agreement, the US will fail to demonstrate sufficiently strong resolve to deter Iran from seeking regional hegemony.	这些国家认为，继临时协议之后，美国将无法拿出足够的决心阻止伊朗寻求地区霸权。


In that case, tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran will become more acute in the years ahead, emerging as the main destabilizing factor in the region.	果真如此的话，沙特阿拉伯和伊朗之间的紧张局势将会在未来几年中进一步加剧，成为地区主要不稳定因素。


It is in this context that Turkey’s role as a secular power, one capable of transcending the sectarian divide, will become more important than ever.	在这样的背景下，土耳其作为有能力克服宗派分歧的世俗大国，其重要性将变得无与伦比。


Turkish policymakers would be well advised to seize this opportunity to consolidate the country’s effectiveness as a regional actor, one that is uniquely positioned to stem the danger of a widening – and potentially extremely dangerous – rift.	土耳其决策者将被建议抓住这一机会巩固该国作为地区行动者的影响力，在防止可能极其危险的裂痕扩大趋势方面起到独一无二的作用。


Erdoğan’s Pyrrhic Victory	埃尔多安的皮洛士式胜利


ISTANBUL – Turkey’s beleaguered Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) have emerged victorious from this week’s local elections.	伊斯坦布尔—饱受围攻的土耳其总理埃尔多安及其正义和发展党（AKP）在本周的地方选举中胜出了。


Still, the AKP’s triumph is unlikely to ameliorate the country’s internal conflicts, much less revive its tarnished international standing.	但是，AKP的胜利无法缓和土耳其的内部冲突，更不能改善土耳其的国际地位。


The local elections were widely seen as a referendum on Erdoğan.	此次地方选举被广泛视为是对埃尔多安的全民公投。


The AKP received 44% of the national vote and now controls 49 of Turkey’s 81 metropolitan municipalities, including Istanbul and the capital, Ankara.	AKP获得了44%的全国选票，并已控制了包括伊斯坦布尔和首都安卡拉在内的81个大自治市中的49个。


The main opposition force, the center-left Republican People’s Party (CHP), received 26% and won only 13 municipalities.	主要反对力量——中左翼的共和人民党（CHP）只赢得了26%的全国选票和13个自治市。


The outcome can be seen as a vindication of Erdoğan’s strategy of using political polarization to consolidate his support and counter the challenge to his rule posed by followers of his former ally, the US-based Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen.	这个结果表明，埃尔多安利用政治极化来巩固他的支持并应对来自其前盟友、现居美国的伊斯兰教牧师葛兰（Fethullah Gülen）的追随者的对其统治的挑战收到了成效。


With the AKP’s initial support, the Gülen movement gradually infiltrated state institutions, particularly the judiciary and law enforcement, until the alliance eventually ended in an acrimonious split over the distribution of power within Turkey.	一开始，在AKP的支持下，葛兰运动逐渐渗透到国家机构中，特别是司法和执法部门，直到埃尔多安与葛兰的同盟因为在如何分割土耳其内部权力问题上的巨大分歧而最终破裂。


The end result was a dirty war of graft allegations spread through social media, apparently by Gülen’s followers primarily.	最终结果是一场肮脏的宣传战，在社交媒体上大肆指责腐败，主要指责者显然是葛兰的追随者。


In response, the government has branded its opponents as enemies, and sought to promulgate new laws undermining the independence of the judiciary and restricting freedom of expression – including shutdowns of Twitter and YouTube.	土耳其政府的应对措施是将反对者列为敌人，试图通过颁布新法律破坏司法独立性，限制言论自由——包括关闭Twitter和YouTube。


Erdoğan’s strategy sought to complement this exercise in damage limitation with a demonstration of its popular legitimacy.	埃尔多安试图通过证明其群众合法性来巩固其政治止损操作。


With the AKP’s overwhelming triumph in the local elections, Erdoğan can now justifiably claim that the Turkish electorate backs his approach, including his government’s suspension of the rule of law in order to obstruct corruption investigations that it views as a judicial coup attempted by Gülen’s followers.	AKP在地方选举中的压倒性胜利让埃尔多安能够名正言顺地宣布土耳其选民支持他的方针，包括其政府中止法治精神的行为。 政府这样做是为了阻止被其视为葛兰追随者的司法政变的腐败调查。


Yet the AKP’s electoral victory heralds two specific dangers for the future of Turkey’s democracy.	但AKP的选举胜利给土耳其民主的未来带来了双重危险。


The first is the persistence of intense political polarization in the run-up to the presidential election in August and the parliamentary election in the first half of 2015.	第一重是在8月总统选举以及2015年上半年议会选举之前将一直存在政治极化。


In Turkey, polarization does not have the same political costs as it does elsewhere: Given a weak system of checks and balances, the Turkish executive still has ample room to manage the state’s affairs.	在土耳其，极化带来的政治成本与其他国家不尽相同：由于缺少制衡机制，土耳其执政者由充分的余地管理国家事务。


And Erdoğan’s recent victory will embolden him to continue his polarizing politics as the basis of a presidential run.	埃尔多安的最新胜利将使他敢于继续将极化政治作为总统选举的基础。


The other danger is that of growing alienation from the West.	另一重危险是与西方的日渐疏远。


With a renewed popular mandate, the government is likely to begin prosecuting Gülenists for alleged criminal behavior.	有了新的人民授权，政府可能开始起诉葛兰主义者，指控他们的犯罪行为。


But the creation of a wider siege mentality to boost domestic support also requires the invention of external co-conspirators – global financial markets, the international media, or even Turkey’s NATO allies.	但营造更广的受害心理以巩固国内支持还需要外部合作者的干预——全球金融市场、国际媒体、甚至土耳其的北约盟国。


Such allegations have been a part of the government’s conspiratorial rhetoric since last summer’s protests, and the authorities dismissed the recent corruption accusations against Erdoğan in the same way.	这些指控自去年的示威以来便已成为政府阴谋论的一部分，而当局打击针对埃尔多安的腐败指控也是如法炮制。


Turkey’s international standing has thus suffered enormously from Erdoğan’s strategy of internal polarization.	土耳其的国际形象也因为埃尔多安的内部计划战略而大受影响。


Long gone are the days when the prospect of accession to the European Union sustained a powerful dynamic of democratic reform.	为了被欧盟接纳而有十分的动力实施民主改革的日子早已一去不返。


With hope of EU membership fading, reform momentum has been lost, and the European Commission is expected to issue a sharply critical progress report in October.	欧盟资格的渐行渐远让改革动力消失殆尽，而欧盟委员会预计将在10月发布严厉的批评性进展报告。


The bilateral relationship with the United States is also under strain.	与美国的双边关系也处于紧张状态。


President Barack Obama and Erdoğan rarely speak with one another anymore, whereas Obama once considered Erdoğan among his favorite world leaders.	总统奥巴马和埃尔多安已不再经常对话，而奥巴马一度把埃尔多安列为他最喜欢的世界领导人之一。


Turkey has also lost several regional allies, particularly some of the Gulf monarchies, which are angry at the Erdoğan government’s unconditional support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.	土耳其还是去了一些地区盟友，特别是海湾君主国家，后者对埃尔多安政府无条件支持埃及穆斯林兄弟会十分恼怒。


Turkey’s much-vaunted soft-power diplomacy and neighborhood policy now lie in tatters.	土耳其自夸成分很大的软实力外交和邻国政策已经支离破碎。


Yet Turkey remains a large and important regional power.	但土耳其仍是重要的地区大国。


With his popularity reaffirmed, Erdoğan could still move in a different direction.	在保证了民众支持后，埃尔多安仍能改变方向。


Aware of the dangers of extreme polarization and reassured by the level of support obtained by the AKP in the local elections, Erdoğan may opt to lower the political temperature at home in the hope of repairing Turkey’s frayed relations abroad.	如能认识到极端极化的危险并从AKP在地方选举中所获得的支持中获得信心，埃尔多安可能选择降低国内的政治气温，希望以此修复受破坏的土耳其对外关系。


How Erdoğan behaves will not only determine the intensity of domestic political conflict; it will also greatly affect Turkey’s potential to regain the regional clout that it once enjoyed.	埃尔多安如何做不但将决定国内政治冲突的激烈程度，也将极大地影响土耳其重获曾经拥有的地区影响力的潜力。


If Erdoğan believes that a higher level of antagonism is necessary to retain power, he may remain oblivious to the harm done to Turkey’s international standing.	如果埃尔多安相信更多的敌对态度是保留权力的必要条件，那么他可能继续对土耳其国际形象受到的伤害视而不见。


The Sino-American Codependency Trap	中美相互依存陷阱


NEW HAVEN – Increasingly reliant on each other for sustainable economic growth, the United States and China have fallen into a classic codependency trap, bristling at changes in the rules of engagement.	纽黑文—美国和中国的可持续经济增长日益依赖对方，结果陷入了经典的相互依存陷阱，为互动规则的改变恼怒不已。


The symptoms of this insidious pathology were on clear display during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to America.	这一险恶隐疾的症状清楚地表现在中国国家主席习近平最近的访美之旅中。


Little was accomplished, and the path ahead remains treacherous.	习近平此次访美几乎没有达成任何成果，并且前景也相当险恶。


Codependency between America and China was born in the late 1970s, when the US was in the grips of wrenching stagflation, and the Chinese economy was in shambles following the Cultural Revolution.	美国和中国之间的相互依存始于20世纪70年代末，当时美国陷入了严重的滞涨，而中国经济仍未摆脱文化大革命的阴影。


Both countries needed new recipes for revival and growth, and turned to each other in a marriage of convenience.	两国都需要复兴和增长的新办法，情投意合走到了一起。


China provided cheap goods that enabled income-constrained American consumers to make ends meet, and the US provided the external demand that underpinned Deng Xiaoping’s export-led growth strategy.	中国提供廉价商品，让囊中羞涩的美国消费者实现收支相抵，而美国提供的外部需求成为邓小平出口拉动增长战略的基础。


Over the years, this arrangement morphed into a deeper relationship.	多年来，这一安排演化为更深层次的关系。


Lacking in saving and wanting to grow, the US relied increasingly on China’s vast reservoir of surplus saving to make ends meet.	美国想要增长，但缺少储蓄，因此日益依赖中国巨大的剩余储蓄实现收支相抵。


Anchoring its currency to the dollar, the Chinese built up a huge stake in US Treasuries, which helped America fund record budget deficits.	中国则将货币盯住美元，囤积了巨量美国国债，这让美国得以为其创纪录的预算赤字融资。


America provided China with both stability and growth anchors.	美国为中国提供了稳定和增长之锚。


China enabled the US to sidestep the mounting perils of subpar saving, reckless fiscal policy, and weak household income growth.	中国让美国安然度过储蓄不足、鲁莽的财政政策和家庭收入增长萎靡所带来的危局。


But economic codependency is as unstable as human codependency.	但经济互相依存并不像人身互相依存那样稳定。


One partner eventually changes, while the other is left hanging, feeling scorned.	一方最终会发生变化，让另一方备受冷落。


China is now changing, and America doesn’t like it.	现在，中国正在发生变化，而美国不喜欢这一点。


Not only is China rebalancing its economic model from exports to consumption; it is also redefining its national character.	中国不但将其经济模式从出口转向消费，还开始重新定义其国民性。


It has adapted a more muscular foreign policy in the South China Sea, embraced the nationalistic longing of rejuvenation, framed by what Xi calls the “China Dream.”	中国在南海采取了更加强硬的外交政策，表现出对民族复兴的渴望，习近平称之为“中国梦”。


And it has started to reshape the international financial architecture with new institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, and the Silk Road Fund.	中国还开始改造国际金融格局，成立了亚洲基础设施投资银行、新开发银行和丝绸之路基金等机构。


The US response has put China on edge, particularly America’s so-called “Asian pivot,” or “strategic rebalancing,” with its subtext of containing China.	美国的反应让中国深感不安，特别是美国所谓的“重返亚洲”或“战略再平衡”，其潜台词都是遏制中国。


The US recognizes the need to increase China’s role in the existing Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank); but when it fails to deliver, it chafes at Chinese institution building.	美国承认有必要增加中国在现有布雷顿森林机构（国际货币基金组织和世界银行）中的角色； 但没有这样做，于是在机构建设方面与中国产生了冲突。


And while the US has long urged China to tilt its growth model toward private consumption, it is uncomfortable with many of the implications of this shift.	美国长期以来一直在敦促中国让其增长模式转向私人消费，但又对这一转变的许多影响感到不安。


In large part, America’s unease reflects a failure to address its core economic problems – mainly a lack of domestic saving.	在很大程度上，美国的不安反映出其无法解决核心经济问题——主要是国内储蓄不足。


The net national saving rate (businesses, households, and the government combined) stood at just 2.9% of national income in mid-2015, less than half the 6.3% average over the final three decades of the twentieth century.	2015年年中净国民储蓄率（企业、家庭和政府之和）只占国民收入的2. 9%，还不到二十世纪最后三十年的平均储蓄率6.


As China shifts from surplus saving to saving absorption – using its surpluses to build a safety net for the Chinese people rather than subsidize the savings of Americans – a saving-short US will find it tough to fill the void.	3%的一半。 随着中国从储蓄剩余转向吸收储蓄——利用其剩余储蓄为中国人构建安全网，而不是补贴美国人的储蓄——储蓄不足的美国将发现难以填补空白。


America’s monetary policy reveals another layer of codependency.	美国的货币政策揭示了另一层面的相互依存。


By citing international concerns – especially China’s slowing growth – as a major reason for deferring its long-awaited interest-rate hike in September, the Federal Reserve has left little doubt concerning the key role that China plays in sustaining a still-fragile US recovery.	美联储以国际顾虑——特别是中国增长放缓——为主要理由推迟了人们期待已久的今年9月的升息计划，这毫无疑问表明中国在维持依旧脆弱的美国复苏中起着至关重要的作用。


And with good reason: US exports, which accounted for a record 13.7% of GDP in the fourth quarter of 2013, up from 10.6% in the first quarter of 2009, slipped back to 12.7% of GDP in mid-2015.	这是有原因的：2013年四季度，美国出口占GDP之比从2009年一季度的10. 6%增加到创纪录的13.


With domestic demand still weak – real consumption has grown at an anemic 1.4% pace over the past 7.5 years – the US needs export growth more than ever.	5年中增长率只有1. 4%——美国比以往任何时候都更加需要出口增长。


So the outlook for China, America’s third-largest and most rapidly growing major export market, is crucial for a Fed that has failed to gain much traction from its unconventional post-crisis monetary policies.	因此中国——美国第三大和增长最快的主要出口市场——的前景对于美联储来说至关重要。 美联储的非常规危机后货币政策并没有带来很大的增长动力。


This aspect of codependency is global in scope.	相互依存的这个层面是全球性的。


Over the past decade, China has accounted for an average of 1.6 percentage points of world GDP growth per year – more than double the combined 0.7-percentage-point contribution of the so-called advanced economies.	在过去十年中，中国平均每年为世界GDP增长贡献1. 6个百分点，比所谓的发达经济体的贡献之和（0.


Even if its GDP growth slows to 6.8% this year, China would account for slightly more growth than is likely from the advanced world.	7个百分点）多出一倍多。 即使今年中国GDP增长率下降到6.


Little wonder that China’s growth prospects are such a big deal for policymakers worldwide.	8%，其对全球增长的贡献仍将高于发达世界。 毫无疑问，中国的增长前景对于全世界决策者来说都是兹事体大。


Speaking in Seattle on September 22, Xi stressed the need for both the US and China to deepen their “mutual understanding of strategic intentions” as a key objective for the bilateral relationship.	习近平在9月22日的西雅图演讲中强调，中国和美国需要深化“相互理解战���意图”，这是双边关系的关键目标。


And yet his deliberations with US President Barack Obama were lacking in precisely that respect.	但他于美国总统奥巴马的会谈所缺少的正是这一层面。


The agenda was shaped more by disconnected issues – cyber security, climate change, and market access – rather than by an appreciation of the strategic challenges that both countries face alone and together.	习近平访美议程更多地由不相关的问题——网络安全、气候变化和市场准入，而非对两国各自和共同面对的战略挑战的理解所主导。


Moreover, there was little sign of meaningful progress even on the issues that Xi and Obama discussed.	此外，没有什么迹象表明习近平和奥巴马进行了讨论的问题能产生有意义的进展。


Both sides hailed a newfound commitment to high-level exchanges on cyber crime; but the US is about to impose sanctions on Chinese companies that have benefited from egregious hacking.	双方都为就网络犯罪问题进行高层次交换意见的新承诺而振奋，但美国即将对从臭名昭著的黑客行为中获益的中国公司进行制裁。


Likewise, they stressed yet again the need for a “high standard” bilateral investment treaty; but there was little indication of serious movement on the industries that would be shielded from such an agreement (the “negative list.”).	类似地，双方再次强调有必要签订“高标准”双边投资条约； 但没有迹象表明将被排除在这一协议之外的行业（“负面清单”）有真动作。


To its credit, China did announce an important shift in environmental policy – a nationwide cap-and-trade system for greenhouse-gas emissions, to go into effect in 2017.	值得赞扬的是，中国确实宣布了环境政策的重大变化——一个全国性的温室气体排放限额交易系统，将于2017年生效。


But, without similar actions by the US, China’s move hardly tempers the perils of global climate change.	但是，如果美国不采取类似的行动，中国的动作难以改变全球气候变化的险状。


Trapped in a web of codependency, the US-China relationship has become fraught with friction and finger pointing.	陷入相互依存之网的中美关系充满了摩擦和相互指责。


In human behavior, the endgame of this pathology is usually a painful breakup.	在人类活动中，这一症结的最终结果常常是痛苦的分手。


The just-concluded summit between Obama and Xi did little to dispel this possibility.	刚刚结束的“习奥会”并没有降低多少发生这一情况的可能性。


Sixty Years of the Palestinian “Catastrophe”	巴勒斯坦六十年的“大灾难”


As the state of Israel celebrates its 60th birthday, Palestinians remember the Nakbeh,  or “catastrophe” – their story of dispossession, occupation, and statelessness.	当以色列国庆祝它六十岁生日的时候，巴勒斯坦人民回忆起了 Nakbeh ，即“大灾难”——关于他们被剥夺，领土被占领和没有国家的故事。


But, for both sides, as well as external powers, the events of 1948 and what has followed – the occupation since 1967 of the remaining lands of historic Palestine – represents a tragic failure.	但是，对双方以及外部势力来说，1948年的事件和随后发生的事情——从1967年开始对剩余历史巴勒斯坦土地的占领——代表着一个悲惨的失败。


Israel is most at fault for this failure, owing to its continued military occupation and illegal settlements.	因为以色列不断的军事占领和非法移民，它应该对这个失败负主要的责任。


Despite giving lip service to peace, the Israeli army’s refusal to leave the occupied territories continues to be in direct contravention to what the preamble to United Nations Security Council resolution 242 termed the “inadmissible taking of land by force.”	尽管口头上支持和平，但是以色列军队拒绝从被占领土上撤军不断地直接违背了联合国安理会第242号决议前言“不得武力占领领土”的规定。


But the international community, Palestinians, and Arabs all bear responsibility as well, albeit at different levels.	但是国际社会、巴勒斯坦和阿拉伯国家同样负有责任，虽然责任大小有不同。


Indeed, the list of disappointments pre-dates Israeli statehood and the Nakbeh itself: the King-Crane Commission of 1919, the 1937 Peel Report, the British White Paper of 1939, the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry of 1945, and the UN Partition Plan of 1947.	确实，令人失望的一系列事件在以色列建国和 大灾难 本身之前就有了：1919年的金恩－克雷恩委员会，1937年的皮尔报告书，1939年的英国白皮书，1945年的英美调查委员会和1947年的联合国分治计划。


Since then, we have had UN resolutions 194, 242, and 338, the Rogers Plan, the Mitchell Plan, the Tenet Plan, Camp David, Taba, the Saudi plan, the “road map,” the Geneva Initiative, the People’s Choice, and the Arab Peace Initiative.	从那以后，我们又有了联合国第194、第242和第338号决议，罗杰斯计划，米切尔计划，腾里特计划，戴维营，塔巴，沙特阿拉伯计划，“路线图”，日内瓦倡议，人民的选择和阿拉伯和平倡议。


To be sure, Palestinians and Arabs are also to blame for their inability to empathize, recognize, and understand the plight of the Jewish people.	同样，巴勒斯坦和阿拉伯国家也应该对他们不能体会、认识和理解犹太人民的处境负责。


Although Palestinians had nothing to do with European anti-Semitism and the Nazi Holocaust, they should not have turned a blind eye to the Jews’ tragedy.	虽然巴勒斯坦人和欧洲的反犹太主义和纳粹大屠杀没有关系，但是他们也不应该对犹太人的苦难熟视无睹。


Palestinians were so locked in their opposition to Zionism that they were unable to appreciate the Jews’ existential needs, just as they failed to appreciate the effects of indiscriminate acts of violence against Israeli civilians.	巴勒斯坦人如此圉于他们对犹太复国主义的反对以至于忽略了犹太人对生存的需要，就像他们忽略了不加选择的用暴力对付以色列平民的后果一样。


Consumed with legitimate anger, Palestinians and Arabs failed to come up with a serious approach to reach out to Israelis and failed to devise a workable political strategy that would address Palestinian daily needs and national aspirations.	巴勒斯坦和阿拉伯国家沉浸在合法的愤怒之中，却没有提出一个严肃的可以和以色列会谈的方法，也没有制定出一个有效的政治策略来关注巴勒斯坦人民的日常需要和民族渴望。


Cross-border attacks, hijackings, Arab and international diplomacy, secret talks, non-violent resistance, suicide bombings, rockets, regional Arab initiatives, international peace envoys: nothing has succeeded in ending the occupation.	跨境袭击，劫机，阿拉伯国家和国际社会外交，秘密会谈，非暴力抵抗，自杀炸弹，火箭弹袭击，区域阿拉伯倡议和国际和平特使：它们都没有成功地结束占领。


With each approach, Palestinian leaders, believing Arab states’ hollow proclamations of solidarity with their cause, have failed to measure accurately their own powers vis-à-vis the Israelis.	在运用一个策略的时候，由于相信阿拉伯国家对它们事业团结一致的空洞的宣言，巴勒斯坦领导人没能准确的判断他们在面对以色列时的实力。


Indeed, the Arab states have come nowhere close to matching the level of US and European aid to the Palestinians, much less the even higher level of Western support – political and military, as well as financial – that has been the key to Israel’s ability to withstand Palestinian demands for freedom.	确实，阿拉伯国家远远没有达到美国和欧洲对巴勒斯坦的援助程度，更是无法和西方对以色列的援助——政治的，军事的和经济的相比——这正是以色列能够抵挡巴勒斯坦要求自由的关键因素。


While European public and private support to Israel, especially in its founding years, is believed to be very extensive, the US has created a firewall of vetoes and political protection for Israel, in addition to providing massive financial support.	虽然欧洲公开和私下对以色列的帮助，特别是在它建国之初，被认为是非常巨大的，但是美国除了为以色列提供大量的经济支持外，还为它建立了否决权和政治保护的防火墙。


Writing in the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs , Shirl McArthur, a retired US Foreign Service officer, estimates that direct US aid to Israel between 1949 and 2006 totaled $108 billion.	一位名叫希而·麦克阿瑟的退休的美国驻外事务处官员，在华盛顿中东事务报告中写道，在1949年到2006年之间，估计美国对以色列的直接经济援助共达1080亿美元。


After the US, Germany is the principal donor of both economic and military aid to Israel.	在美国之后，德国是以色列经济和军事主要的捐赠国。


By far the largest component of German aid has been in the form of restitution payments for Nazi atrocities.	到目前为止，德国绝大部分的援助都是以归还纳粹暴行造成的损失的形式进行的。


Total German assistance to the Israeli government, Israeli individuals, and Israeli private institutions has been roughly $31 billion, or $5,345 per capita, bringing combined US and German assistance to almost $20,000 per Israeli.	德国对以色列政府，个人和私人机构的援助共达约310亿元美元，即平均每个以色列人5345美元。 将美国和德国的援助加起来平均到以色列人身上，几乎达到了每个以色列人20000美元。


In the face of Israel’s strength, the Palestinian national movement’s failure has now played into the hands of Islamists.	面对以色列的强大，巴勒斯坦民族运动的失败现在已经被伊斯兰主义者所利用。


The Islamic Resistance Movement (known by its Arabic acronym, Hamas), which emerged during the first Intifada in 1987, grew more powerful in the 1990’s, after the return of the PLO’s Yasser Arafat and the creation, as a result of the Oslo Accords, of the Palestinian Authority.	伊斯兰抵抗运动（以其名称的阿拉伯首字母为人所知的哈马斯）形成于1987年的第一次抵抗运动，在巴勒斯坦解放组织的亚瑟·阿拉法特回来以后以及作为奥斯陆协定成果的巴勒斯坦政权建立之后，它在上个世纪90年代变得更有势力了。


Hamas’s rejection of the Oslo Accords bore political fruit as it became increasingly clear to Palestinians that the handshakes on the White House lawn would not produce the coveted end to the Israeli occupation, or even of Israel’s illegal settlement activities.	当巴勒斯坦人民逐渐清楚的认识到在白宫草坪上的握手不能取得人们想要的结束以色列占领的结果，甚至都无法停止以色列的非法移民的时候，哈马斯对奥斯陆协定的反对就在政治上奏效了。


Yet, despite history’s long train of failures, Hamas’s June 2007 seizure of control of Gaza, and its pariah status in the West, we are repeatedly told by the US that 2008 will be the year of a peace agreement.	然而，尽管有历史上一系列的失败，哈马斯在2007年6月对加沙的控制以及它在西方世界中的无赖的地位，美国仍然不停的告诉我们2008年是缔结和平协定的一年。


Meanwhile, the Arab peace proposal, which calls for a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders and a fair solution to the refugee problem in exchange for normalization of Arab states’ relations with Israel, appears doomed.	同时，要求按照1967年边界建立巴勒斯坦国和以公平解决难民问题换取阿拉伯国家和以色列关系正常化的阿拉伯和平建议看起来也前景不妙。


After 60 years of failures, and as the generation that lived through the Nakbeh passes from the scene, a political settlement that can provide Palestinians with freedom in an independent state alongside a secure Israel and a fair solution of the refugee problem is more necessary – but also appears less possible – than ever.	在经过60年的失败之后，当经历过 大灾难 的一代人逐渐远去，一个可以让巴勒斯坦人民在一个独立的巴勒斯坦国自由的生活同时也保证以色列安全的政治解决方案和对难民问题的公平解决变得更加必要了——但是也比以前任何时候变得更不可能了。


Slamming the Euro Door	关上欧元的大门


LONDON – Last week, central bankers from around the world assembled in Frankfurt to bask in the glory of the euro’s first ten years.	伦敦－上个星期，来自世界各地的中央银行家齐聚法兰克福，沐浴欧元第一个十年的光辉。


But for those coming from euro candidate countries, the event was a cold shower.	但是，对那些来自欧元区候选国的人来说，这次活动给他们当头泼了冷水。


Just as the global financial crisis has made euro membership seem more urgent and necessary than ever, euro incumbents have started floating proposals that would raise the bar for entry.	正像全球金融危机使成为欧元区成员国比以前任何时候都要紧迫和必要一样，现有的欧元成员国已经开始提出提高加入欧元区的标准的提议了。


Under the proposal that was openly discussed in Frankfurt, in addition to the macroeconomic Maastricht criteria that have been in place since the euro’s launch, the quality of a country’s banking system would be used as an additional criterion for euro entry.	在法兰克福公开讨论的这个提议中，除了从欧元启动以来就有的宏观经济马斯特里赫特标准之外，一个国家银行系统的质量也会被用来作为成为欧元区成员国的附加标准。


Leaving aside the hypocrisy of Western governments pontificating on this topic while they are bailing out banks after massive regulatory failures, the proposal is seriously flawed.	将西方政府在大量的监管失误后正援救其银行的同时，却在这个问题上装模作样的伪善放在一边不提，这个提议本身就是有严重瑕疵的。


To fully appreciate the proposal’s absurdity, consider the extraordinarily successful East European growth model of the past two decades.	为了完全看清这个提议的荒谬之处，可以想想过去20年里极其成功的东欧增长模式。


The model advocated by Western Europe and embraced by Eastern Europe has been based on the idea that capital should flow from capital-rich to capital-poor countries.	这种得到西欧支持并为东欧所采纳的增长模式，建立在资本应该从资本充裕的国家流向资本缺乏的国家的理念之上。


Economists have to go back to the nineteenth-century United States to find a similar textbook example of successful growth, with large current-account deficits financed mainly through foreign direct investment.	经济学家要回到19世纪的美国，才能找到类似的成功增长的典型例子，这样的增长伴随着主要通过外国直接投资带来的巨额经常账户赤字。


Financial flows have been accompanied by unprecedented financial integration, with most East European banks now controlled by Western parents.	资金流动伴随着前所未有的金融一体化，现在西方母银行控制着大部分的东欧银行。


This model has worked remarkably well not just in generating growth, but also, as documented in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s 2008  Transition Report , in improving the institutions that support markets and democracy in Eastern Europe.	这种模式不仅在促进增长上成效卓著，而且，像在欧洲复兴开发银行2008年的《转型经济体报告》中显示的那样，在完善支持东欧市场和民主的机构上，也卓有成效。


But it has also left these countries vulnerable to the twists and turns of global financial markets.	但是，它也使这些东欧国家易于受到全球金融市场波动的影响。


Over the last year and a half, they withstood these pressures remarkably well; but, as the global crisis hits them with full force, they are now seeking help from the International Monetary Fund.	在过去一年半的时间里，东欧国家很好地抵抗住了这些压力； 但是，当全球危机整个冲击到它们的时候，它们就向国际 货币基金组织寻求帮助了。


The main vulnerability in the current crisis has been massive exposure to foreign exchange movements.	东欧当前危机的主要风险是外汇汇价变动的巨额风险敞口。


Actors in all parts of the economy, households and companies alike, have bet that their local currencies would continue to appreciate.	东欧经济体中的所有参与者，不管是家庭还是公司，都认为它们的本国货币会继续升值。


Mortgages in Swiss francs and car loans in Japanese yen have been common throughout the region.	以瑞士法郎进行的抵押和以日元进行的汽车贷款在整个东欧地区非常盛行。


But it was probably in Hungary, the first country to seek an IMF package, that these practices were most widespread.	但是，可能在匈牙利——第一个寻求国际货币基金组织帮助的国家——这些行为最为普遍。


Yet this vulnerability was largely created, or at least accommodated, by Western banks.	然而，这种风险主要是由西方银行制造的，或者至少它们容纳了它。


The funding from the parent banks that in the earlier phase of the crisis helped provide liquidity to the East European banking systems now appears more as a liability and possible source of contagion.	在危机早期来自西方母银行为东欧的银行系统提供流动性的资金，现在看起来更像是负债以及可能的危机传染源。


It was also the West European financial regulators and supervisors who, under “home rule,” were supposed to discourage these excesses.	而且，是西欧金融机构的监管者，按照 “自治规则”，应该防止这些过度的风险敞口。


The penetration of foreign banks has also effectively deprived countries in Central and Eastern Europe of monetary policy tools, leaving them with little control over extremely rapid credit growth.	外国银行的渗透也极大地削弱了中欧和东欧国家货币政策工具的有效性，使这些国家几乎无法控制极度快速的信贷增长。


Add to this the impact of the current West European bank rescue packages on the banking systems of Eastern Europe.	 当前西欧银行对东欧银行系统的援救计划的冲击，进一步削弱了中欧和东欧国家货币政策工具的有效性。


On one hand, these programs help promote stability by supporting the parent banks active in the region.	一方面，通过支持在该地区经营活跃的母银行，这些计划有助于银行系统的稳定。


On the other hand, the interventions have also undermined the East European financial systems. 	另一方面，西方银行的干预也削弱了东欧的金融系统。


Governments in Eastern Europe cannot credibly match the broad deposit guarantees issued by their Western neighbors, and the generous recapitalizations have brought down Western banks’ relative funding costs, further weakening local institutions’ competitiveness.	东欧国家的政府不能有效地满足其西方邻国提出的广泛的存款保证要求，而且慷慨的资本额调整已经降低了西方银行的相对资金成本，从而更进一步削弱了当地机构的竞争力。


Finally, many governments explicitly or implicitly restrict parent banks’ ability to use government funds to back up their East European subsidiaries, many of them critical to the stability of the local financial systems.	最后，许多政府明示地或暗示地限制母银行使用政府资金支持其东欧分支机构的能力，而许多这样的分支机构对全球金融系统的稳定至关重要。


To make the quality of the banking system a new criterion for euro membership is not only hypocritical; it is also counterproductive.	将银行系统的质量作为成为欧元区成员国的一个新标准不仅是伪善的，而且是达不到预期目标的。


Relatively high levels of inflation have been the main reason why euro membership was perceived as increasingly remote in most countries, and why the prospect of euro entry has had a diminishing impact on domestic reform efforts.	相对高的通胀水平已经成为大部分国家感到离成为欧元区成员国越来越遥远，以及加入欧元区对国内改革活动有负面影响的主要原因。


A small consolation in the current crisis is that inflation rates are now coming down.	在当前的危机中，令人稍感安慰的是通胀率现在正在下降。


More importantly, the crisis has demonstrated the value for these small economies of being part of a larger currency area.	更重要的是，危机显示了这些小经济体成为一个更大的货币区域一部分的价值。


Instead of exploiting the current opportunity of unprecedented leverage over euro candidates to push them to meet the Maastricht criteria, euro incumbents are contemplating a new and exceedingly vague criterion based on the quality of banking systems.	 现有的欧元成员国不是利用当前对欧元区候选国前所未有的杠杆作用的机会，来推动它们满足马斯特里赫特标准， 而是考虑设立一个建立在银行系统质量上的新的非常模糊的标准。


And whose banks are these?	人们不禁要问，这些银行是谁的银行？


Who are we kidding?	我们在骗谁？


Sleepwalking in the Balkans	巴尔干半岛梦游


SARAJEVO - Almost exactly 13 years ago, American leadership brought an end to Bosnia's three-and-a-half-year war through the Dayton peace agreement.	萨拉热窝－几乎就在13年前，美国领导人用《代顿和平协定》结束了波斯尼亚三年半的战争。


Today that country is now in real danger of collapse.	现在，这个国家处在真正的崩溃危险之中。


As in 1995, resolve and transatlantic unity are needed if we are not to sleepwalk into another crisis.	像在1995年那样，如果我们不打算稀里糊涂地陷入另一场危机，我们就需要决断和大西洋两岸的团结。


Bosnian Serb Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, once the darling of the international community (and especially the United States) for his opposition to the nationalist Serb Democratic party, has adopted that party's agenda without being tainted by their genocidal baggage.	波斯尼亚的塞尔维亚族总理米洛拉德·多迪克(Milorad Dodik)曾经因为反对民族主义的塞尔维亚民主党，而成为国际社会的宠儿（特别是美国的宠儿），现在，他在没有背负该党种族灭绝历史包袱污名的情况下，已经采纳了该党的主张。


His long-term policy seems clear: to place his Serb entity, Republika Srpska, in a position to secede if the opportunity arises.	多迪克的长期政策似乎很清楚：在机会出现的时候，将其塞尔维亚实体波黑塞族共和国(Republika Srpska)置于可以脱离波斯尼亚的位置。


Exploiting the weaknesses in Bosnia’s constitutional structure, the international community's weariness and EU inability to stick by its conditionality, he has, in two years, reversed much of the real progress in Bosnia over the past 13, crucially weakened the institutions of the Bosnian state, and all but stopped the country's evolution into a functioning (and EU-compatible) state.	多迪克充分利用了波斯尼亚宪法结构的弱点，国际社会的厌倦和欧盟坚持其限制条件的无能，已经在两年内逆转了过去13年里在波斯尼亚取得的许多真正的进步，严重地削弱了波斯尼亚国家的机构，并且几乎阻止了该国向一个有效的（以及与欧盟相容的）国家的进程。


Dodik's actions have been fuelled by Russian encouragement and petrodollars.	俄罗斯的鼓励和石油美元助长了多迪克的行为。


In addition his rival, the senior president of all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haris Silajdzic, has stressed the need to abolish the two entities that make up Bosnia, to create one non-federal country.	此外，他的竞争对手，波斯尼亚－黑塞哥维那主席团轮值主席哈里斯·西拉伊季奇(Haris Silajdzic)，强调取消组成波斯尼亚的两个实体，建立一个非联邦国家的必要性。


Dodik professes to respect Dayton and Silajdzic wishes to revise it, but both men are violating its basic principle: a federal system within a single state.	多迪克表示会尊重《代顿和平协定》，而西拉伊季奇则希望修改该协定，但是两个人都违反了《代顿和平协定》的基本原则：存在在一个国家里的联邦系统。


This toxic interaction is at the heart of today's Bosnian crisis.	这种有害的相互作用是引起当前波斯尼亚危机的中心问题。


As a result, the suspicion and fear that began the war in 1992 has been reinvigorated.	结果，引发1992年战争的怀疑和恐惧又回来了。


A destructive dynamic is accelerating, and Bosnian and Croat nationalism is on the rise.& Recent local elections gave a fillip to nationalist parties.	一个破坏性的因素正在加速，波斯尼亚和克罗地亚的民族主义情绪在上升。 最近的地方选举又刺激了民族主义政党。


This tipping point is the result of a distracted international community.	当前波斯尼亚危机的引爆点是国际社会注意力分散的结果。


While the Bush administration largely turned its back on Bosnia, the EU became deeply engaged; EU membership has been the critical lever for pressing reforms in Bosnia since it was made policy in 2003.	在布什政府几乎抛弃了波斯尼亚的同时，欧盟的介入却很深入； 自从2003年取得欧盟成员资格被制定成为政策以来，它已经成为推进波斯尼亚改革的关键工具。


But the EU did not develop a coherent strategy, and by proclaiming progress where it has not been achieved, the EU weakened not only its own influence in the country, but also the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the international military presence (the European Union Force, Eufor, which succeeded NATO) the drivers of progress in Bosnia since Dayton.	但是，欧盟没有确定一个连贯的策略，并且通过声称取得了没有取得的成就，欧盟不仅削弱了其自身在波斯尼亚的影响力，也削弱了《代顿和平协定》后作为波斯尼亚进程推动者的国际高级代表办公室(OHR)和国际驻军（接替北约的欧盟部队，即Eufor）的影响力。


The degeneration of the OHR's influence coincided with the withdrawal of the US military and the hollowing-out of Eufor, which now has little in the way of operational capacity.	& 国际高级代表办公室(OHR)影响力的下降与美国的撤军和欧盟部队的空洞化——它现在只有很弱的行动能力——一致。


Despite the danger signals, France and Spain apparently want to pull the plug on Eufor altogether before the end of the year, seemingly to prove the purely technical point that EU missions can end.	尽管存在危险信号，法国和西班牙仍然显然想在今年年底之前，一起结束欧盟在波斯尼亚的驻军； 它们似乎是为了证明欧盟使命可以结束这样一个纯粹的技术性问题。


The EU, fixated on a still undefined ampquot;transitionampquot; from OHR to an EU-centered mission, seems intent on emptying its toolbox before it knows what tools it will need to enable Bosnia's transition.	关注从国际高级代表办公室(OHR) 到以欧盟为中心的使团这一仍不明确的 “过渡”的欧盟，似乎决定在其了解促使波斯尼亚过渡所需的工具之前，清空其工具箱。


It failed, for example, to back its man on the ground, the able Slovak diplomat Miroslav Lajcak, at a crucial moment, fatally undermining his authority.	例如，欧盟没能在关键时刻支持其在当地的自己人、能干的斯洛伐克外交官米罗斯拉夫·拉卡克（Miroslav Lajcak），从而严重地损害了他的威信。


Like Dodik, Russia is exploiting weak EU resolve, making trouble for the US and EU where possible.	和多迪克一样，俄罗斯也在利用欧盟决心的不坚决，尽可能地给美国和欧盟制造麻烦。


Yet the Kremlin’s stake in Bosnia pales in comparison to those of the EU or US.& Russia’s attempts to close the high representative's office, regardless of whether the job is done, must be rebuffed.	然而，克里姆林宫与波斯尼亚的利害关系同美国或欧盟与波斯尼亚的相比，相形见绌。 对俄罗斯关闭国际高级代表办公室(OHR)的企图，不管该办公室的任务是否完成，国际社会都必须加以抵制。


It has to remain open - or a similarly strong organization set up - until the conditions for the transition to a more normal EU presence are met.	在满足过渡到一个更正常的欧盟存在的条件之前，国际高级代表办公室(OHR)必须继续存在下去——或者建立一个��样有力的机构。


The US, lame duck president or not, must re-engage.	美国，不管现任总统是否即将离任，都必须重新对波斯尼亚进行介入。


Javier Solana, the EU's foreign policy chief, should initiate an independent study with the task of producing a new transatlantic policy, backed by America's full engagement and strong EU conditionality, which can lead to deeper and broader international involvement in Bosnia.	欧盟外交政策首席代表哈维尔·索拉纳（Javier Solana）应该发起一个以制定新的大西洋政策——这个政策有美国的充分介入和严格的欧盟限制条件支持——为目的的独立研究，从而使国际社会在波斯尼亚进行更深入和更广泛的介入。


A collapse of the Dayton peace agreement would be an unnecessary and unwanted additional problem for the next US president.	《代顿和平协定》的失败对下任美国总统来说，是一个不必要也不希望的额外问题。


The EU’s foreign policy attention has recently focused on Kosovo, but it is Bosnia that has always been the bigger and more dangerous challenge.	欧盟外交政策最近的关注点是科索沃，但是，是波斯尼亚一直是一个更大更危险的挑战。


That country's decline can still be arrested, provided the EU wakes up, the new US administration gets engaged, and both renew their commitment to Bosnia's survival as a state, by maintaining an effective troop presence and beginning the process of strengthening the international community's approach long-term, including finding ways to untie Bosnia's constitutional knot.	如果欧盟觉醒，新一届美国政府介入，并且二者都通过保持有效的军事存在和开始加强国际社会的长期策略的进程的方式，包括寻找解开波斯尼亚宪法难题的途径，来重审它们对波斯尼亚作为一个国家存在下去的承诺，那么，就可以阻止波斯尼亚情形的恶化。


It's time to pay attention to Bosnia again, if we don't want things to get nasty very quickly. By now, the entire world knows the price of that.	如果我们不希望事情迅速变得棘手，现在是再次关注波斯尼亚的时候了，因为现在全世界都知道情形恶化会付出多么大的代价。


Five Reasons for Slow Growth	慢增长的五个原因


MILAN – A remarkable pattern has emerged since the 2008 global financial crisis: Governments, central banks, and international financial institutions have consistently had to revise their growth forecasts downward.	米兰—2008年全球金融危机以来出现了一个值得关注的模式：政府、央行和国际金融机构不断地被迫向下修正增长预期。


With very few exceptions, this has been true of projections for the global economy and individual countries alike.	除了极少数例外，全球经济和个体国家预测都出现了这一现象。


It is a pattern that has caused real damage, because overoptimistic forecasts delay measures that are needed to boost growth, and thus impede full economic recovery.	这个模式造成了真正的伤害，因为过于乐观的预期推迟了提振增长所需的措施，从而阻止了经济的全面复苏。


Forecasters need to come to terms with what has gone wrong; fortunately, as the post-crisis experience lengthens, some of the missing pieces are coming into clear focus.	预测者需要找到真正的问题； 幸运的是，随着后危机时代经验增长，一些错过的因素正在获得明确关注。


I have identified five.	我在这里提出五点。


First, the capacity for fiscal intervention – at least among developed economies – has been underutilized.	首先，财政干预能力——至少在发达经济体——没有得到充分利用。


As former United States Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Frank Newman argued in a recent book, Freedom from National Debt, a country’s capacity for fiscal intervention is better assessed by examining its aggregate balance sheet than by the traditional method of comparing its debt (a liability) to its GDP (a flow).	前美国财政部副部长纽曼（Frank Newman）在其新著《摆脱国民债务》（Freedom from National Debt）中指出，一国的财政干预能力更应该通过考察总资产负债表而不是比较债务（负债）和GDP（流量）的传统方法来评估。


Reliance on the traditional method has resulted in missed opportunities, particularly given that productive public-sector investment can more than pay for itself.	依赖传统方法导致错失机会，特别是在生产性公共部门投资完全可以收回成本的情况下。


Investments in infrastructure, education, and technology help drive long-term growth.	基础设施、教育和技术方面的投资有助于推动长期增长。


They increase competitiveness, facilitate innovation, and boost private-sector returns, generating growth and employment.	它们能够增加竞争力、促进创新、提振私人部门回报、制造增长和就业。


It does not take a lot of growth to offset even substantial investment – especially given current low borrowing costs.	即使是大手笔投资，其成本也只需要略微增长即可抵消——特别是考虑到当前的低借贷成本。


Research by the International Monetary Fund has indicated that these fiscal multipliers – the second factor overlooked by forecasters – vary with underlying economic conditions.	国际货币基金组织（IMF）的研究表明这些财政乘数——被预测者忽略的第二大因素——随基本经济条件的波动而变化。


In economies with excess capacity (including human capital) and a high degree of structural flexibility, the multipliers are greater than once thought.	在产能过剩（包括人力资本）和高结构弹性的经济体，这些乘数比此前认为的更大。


In the US, for instance, structural flexibility contributed to economic recovery and helped the country adapt to long-term technological changes and global market forces.	比如，在美国，结构弹性刺激了经济复苏，帮助美国适应长期技术变化和全球市场力量。


In Europe, by contrast, structural change faces resistance.	相反，在欧洲，结构变化面临阻力。


Fiscal stimulus in Europe may still be justified, but structural rigidity will lower its impact on long-term growth.	欧洲的财政刺激或许仍是合理的，但结构僵化会削弱财政刺激对长期增长的影响力。


Europe’s fiscal interventions would be easier to justify if they were accompanied by microeconomic reforms targeted at increasing flexibility.	如果欧洲用旨在增加弹性的微观经济改革辅助财政干预，其财政干预的合理性将会更大。


A third piece of the forecast puzzle is the disparity between the behavior of financial markets and that of the real economy.	预测之谜的第三个方面是金融市场行为和实体经济行为的分化。


Judged only by asset prices, one would have to conclude that growth is booming.	若只从资产价格判断，你会觉得增长已经进入繁荣期了。


Obviously, it is not.	但显然并非如此。


A major contributor to this divergence has been ultra-loose monetary policy, which, by flooding financial markets with liquidity, was supposed to boost growth.	这一分化的一大原因是极端宽松的货币政策。 该政策向金融市场注入了大量流动性，初衷是提振增长。


But it remains unclear whether elevated asset prices are supporting aggregate demand or mainly shifting the distribution of wealth.	但资产价格的飙升是否支持了总需求，还是主要改变了财富分配还不得而知。


It is equally unclear what will happen to asset prices when monetary assistance is withdrawn.	同样不清楚的是，当货币支持撤回时，资产价格会发生什么。


A fourth factor is the quality of government.	第四个因素是政府质量。


In recent years, there has been no shortage of examples of governments abusing their powers to favor the ruling elite, their supporters, and a variety of special interests, with detrimental effects on regulation, public investment, the delivery of services, and growth.	近几年来，政府滥用权力为执政精英、他们的支持者以及各种特殊利益牟利的例子层出不穷，给监管、公共投资、服务和增长造成消极影响。


It is critically important that public services, public investment, and public policy are well managed.	好的公共服务、公共投资和公共政策管理至关重要。


Countries that attract and motivate skilled public managers outperform their peers.	吸引和动员高技能公共管理者的国家能过获得傲视同侪的表现。


Finally, and most important, the magnitude and duration of the drop in aggregate demand has been greater than expected, partly because employment and median incomes have been lagging behind growth.	最后也是最重要的是，总需求下跌的幅度和持续期比预期更大，部分是因为就业和中位收入一直落后于增长。


This phenomenon preceded the crisis, and high levels of household debt have exacerbated its impact in the aftermath.	这一现象在危机前就已存在，家庭债务水平高企又放大了它在危机爆发后的冲击力。


The stagnation of incomes in the bottom 75% of the distribution presents an especially large challenge, because it depresses consumption, undermines social cohesion (and thus political stability and effectiveness), and decreases intergenerational mobility – especially where public education is poor.	收入分配底层75%的收入停止是一个特别巨大的挑战，因为这抑制了消费、破坏了社会凝聚力（因而也破坏了政治稳定和效率），并降低了跨国流行性——特别是公共教育落后的地区。


Sometimes change occurs at a pace that outstrips the capacity of individuals and systems to respond.	有时变化发生的速度超过了个体和系统的响应能力。


This appears to be one of those times.	眼下就是这样一个时期。


Labor markets have been knocked out of equilibrium as new technology and shifting global supply chains have caused demand in the labor market to change faster than supply can adjust.	由于新技术和全球供应链的变化导致劳动力市场需求变化快于供给调整能力，劳动力市场无法达到均衡状态。


This is not a permanent condition, but the transition will be long and complex.	这不会是永久现象，但转型将是漫长且复杂的。


The same forces that are dramatically increasing the world economy’s productive potential are largely responsible for the adverse trends in income distribution.	大幅提高世界经济生产潜力的因素要为收入分配的恶化趋势负很大责任。


Digital technology and capital have eliminated middle-income jobs or moved them offshore, generating an excess supply of labor that has contributed to income stagnation precisely in that range.	数字技术和资本杀死了中等收入岗位或让它们离岸化，所造成的劳动力过度供给恶化了恰恰发生在该范围中的收入停滞。


A more muscular response will require an awareness of the nature of the challenge and a willingness to meet it by investing heavily in key areas – particularly education, health care, and infrastructure.	更有力的应对需要认识到挑战的性质，并愿意通过大力投资于关键领域面对挑战——特别是教育、医疗和基础设施。


It must be recognized that this is a difficult moment and countries must mobilize their resources to help their people with the transition.	必须认识到，这是一个艰难的时刻，各国必须动员资源帮助人民渡过转型。


That will mean redistributing income and ensuring access to essential basic services.	这意味着收入再分配和确保基本服务的供给。


If countering inequality and promoting intergenerational opportunity introduces some marginal inefficiencies and blunts some incentives, it is more than worth the price.	即便遏制不平等性和促进跨国机会造成一些边际无效率、阻碍一些激励，这也是值得付出的代价。


Public provision of critical basic services like education or health care may never be as efficient as private-sector alternatives; but where efficiency entails exclusion and inequality of opportunity, public provision is not a mistake.	关键基本服务——如教育和医疗——的公共供给也许永远不如私人部门替代方案那样高效； 但在高效率会造成排斥和机会不平等的领域，公共供给并不是错误。


One hopes that a growing awareness of the significance of these and other factors will have a positive effect on policy agendas in the coming year.	我们希望瑞这些和其他因素重要性的日渐清醒的认识能给明年的政策日程带来积极影响。


Mission: Save the Environment	任务：拯救环境


CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND – Picture this. It is 1966.	切维蔡斯，马里兰州—想象这样的图景。


You are standing in a government office in Washington, DC, watching a uniformed official tell a man in business attire, “Your mission is to eradicate an enemy that has killed more people than both world wars combined.	在1966年，你站在华盛顿的一间政府办公室里，看到一位身着制服的官员对一位商务打扮的人说：“你的任务是消灭一个敌人，这个敌人杀掉的人比两次世界大战加起来还要多。


You will have a paltry budget, a small team, and should you fail, the Secretary will disavow any knowledge of your actions.”	你将获得一丁点儿预算、一个小团队，如果你失败了，部长将否认知情你的行动。 ”


It sounds like a scene from a Hollywood movie.	听起来像是好莱坞电影场景。


And, indeed, it mirrors the opening scenes of the Mission: Impossible television series that premiered that year.	是的，这就是当年首播的《碟中谍》电视剧的的开头。 但它确实发生了，只不过用的不是这些词句。


But it really happened, if not in precisely those words.	官员是助理军医处长詹姆斯·沃特（James Watt）；


The official was Assistant Surgeon General James Watt; the man with the mission was Communicable Disease Center (CDC) scientist Donald Henderson; and the enemy was smallpox.	获得任务的是传染病中心（CDC）科学家唐纳德·亨德森（Donald Henderson）； 而敌人是天花。


The mission certainly seemed impossible.	这个任务看上去绝对是不可能完成的。


At the time, smallpox was killing as many as two million people, and infecting another 15 million, each year.	当时，每年天花杀死的人数高达两百万，另有1,500万人被传染。


Yet, like in the series, Henderson and his team at the World Health Organization defied expectations.	亨德森和他的世界卫生组织（WHO）团队超越了人们的预期。


In just over a decade, smallpox became the first – and, so far, the only – infectious human disease ever to be fully eradicated.	只花了十年略多的时间，天花就成为第一个——到目前为止也是唯一一个——被完全根除的人类传染病。


The key to this tremendous medical achievement was not, as one might expect, some major health breakthrough (the smallpox vaccine had been around since the eighteenth century).	这一巨大的医学成就的关键并不是你可能预想的重大卫生突破（天花疫苗在十八世纪便已诞生）。


It was diplomacy, flexibility, and cooperation.	而是外交、灵活性和合作。


From the beginning, the WHO lacked faith in a vaccination campaign.	一开始，WHO不相信疫苗方案。


Many, including the WHO director-general, believed that, to stop smallpox, all 1.1 billion people in the 31 affected countries, including those in remote villages, would have to be inoculated – a logistical nightmare.	包括WHO总干事在内的许多人认为，要想阻止天花，31个受影响国家的全部11亿人，包括生活在边远村庄中的人口，都必须接种——这将是一场物流噩梦。


That is why WHO delegates debated for days before agreeing, by the slimmest margin ever, to provide a measly $2.4 million per year for the effort – too little to cover the costs of whatever vaccine was not donated, let alone fund the necessary logistical support.	因此，WHO代表在经历了多日的争论后才以最微弱多数同意每年为这一目标拨出区区240万美元款项——如若没有捐赠，根本不足以覆盖疫苗成本，更不用说为必须的物流支持提供资金了。


Many donors shared this pessimism, believing that their money would be better spent on, say, health-care infrastructure.	许多捐赠者也持有悲观态度，认为他们的钱用在（比如）医疗基础设施方面作用更大。


Even UNICEF decided against contributing to the campaign.	甚至连联合国儿童基金会（UNICEF）也决定不出资支持该计划。


In fact, the decision to assign Henderson to the unenviable job of spearheading the campaign stemmed from the WHO director-general’s decision to put an American in charge, so that the United States, not the WHO, would take the blame for the program’s failure.	事实上，之所以指定亨德森来担任这个不讨好项目的主管，是因为WHO总干事决定要让美国人来牵头，以便让美国而不是WHO承担项目失败的责任。


(Henderson tried to refuse the role, but there was no “should you choose to accept it” in this episode.)	（亨德森试图谢绝这个职位，但这一回没有“如果你选择接受的话”这个桥段。


Yet Henderson managed to turn a bad hand into a winning one, with a key insight.	）但亨德森成功地利用一项关键洞见用一手烂牌打出一个胜仗。


Henderson recognized that the Soviet Union – which had been pressing for an eradication campaign for several years, and had already pledged to donate 25 million doses of vaccine annually – would not be enthusiastic about an American leading the charge.	亨德森意识到，多年来一直敦促启动根除计划、并已经承诺每年捐助2,500万疫苗剂量的苏联不会情愿让美国人来当这个计划的领导。


So he reached out to the Soviet deputy health minister, Dimitri Venediktov, with whom he established a rapport that enabled the two sides to work together on strategy and logistics, in addition to their vaccine donations (the US had agreed to provide 50 million doses each year).	因此他接触了苏联卫生部副部长德米特里·文尼迪克托夫（Dimitri Venediktov），与他建立起良好的关系，使得在疫苗捐赠之外（美国同意每年提供5,000万疫苗剂量），双方得以进行战略和物流合作。


The two most unlikely allies ended up leading the fight together.	两个最不可能合作的盟友最终合力承担起这场战斗的领导责任。


Henderson’s knack for diplomacy was matched by an eye for talent and leadership.	出了外交手段，亨德森也兼顾人才和领导力。


He insisted that all of his staff spend at least a third of their time in the field, working with local officials and visiting villages, so that they could see firsthand the challenges of mass vaccination.	他坚持要求他的手下至少把三分之一的时间花在实地工作上，与地方官员进行合作并访问村庄，从而获得关于群体免疫挑战的第一手资料。


Among those personnel was William Foege, a Lutheran missionary doctor working as a consultant for the CDC in Nigeria.	其中有一个人叫做威廉·福格（William Foege），他是一位路德派传教士医生，在尼日利亚担任CDC顾问。


One day in December 1966, Foege got word of a smallpox case in another village and immediately traveled there to vaccinate the victim’s family and other villagers.	1966年12月的一天，福格听说另一个村子里发现一例天花病例，并马上前往接种患者家人和其他村民。


But Foege was worried that a wider outbreak might be unfolding, and he did not have enough doses to vaccinate everyone in the area.	但福格担心更广泛的爆发可能已经开始，而他没有足够的疫苗为地区内所有人接种。


So he adopted a different tactic: he sent runners into all villages within 30 miles to check for more cases, and then vaccinated people only in the four places where cases turned up.	因此他另辟蹊径，派人跑步前往方圆30英里内的村庄检查其他病例，然后只给发现有病例的四个地点的人接种。


This created a “ring” of vaccination around infected people that broke the chain of infection.	这创造了一个包围被传染人员的免疫“环”，从而切断了传染链。


Foege’s strategy was extended to eastern Nigeria, then introduced to other parts of West Africa, and ultimately applied to the most challenging environment of all: India, with its half-billion people.	福格的策略被推广到东尼日利亚，然后又引入西非的其他地区，最终应用到最具挑战性的环境：拥有五亿人口的印度。


It took 130,000 trained health workers 20 exhausting months, but they eliminated the scourge of smallpox that had tormented India for millennia.	130,000名经过培训的卫生工作者殚精竭虑工作了20个月，终于根除了折磨了印度上千年的天花。


Then, in spite of natural disasters, the kidnapping of WHO personnel, and civil war, health workers repeated that success in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Somalia.	接着，尽管经历了自然灾害、WHO人员被绑架事件以及内战，但卫生工作者仍然在孟加拉国、埃塞俄比亚和索马里复制了这一成功经验。


Finally, in 1980, the world was officially free of smallpox.	最后，在1980年，世界正式摆脱了天花。


Fifty years after the launch of this daring mission, the tremendous achievement that emerged from it is fading from memory.	这个大胆的任务布置五十年后，它所带来的巨大成就正在从人们的记忆中消逝。


But the lessons it carries for galvanizing a fractious international community to tackle a shared challenge could not be more important, especially at a time when urgent problems like environmental degradation demand global solutions.	但它所带来的如何引导各自为政的国际社会进行合作应对共同挑战的经验是无比重要的，特别是在环境破坏等紧迫问题需要全球解决方案的时候尤其如此。


As Foege has pointed out, the eradication of smallpox proves that “global efforts are possible.”	福格指出，根除天花证明“全球努力是可能的”。


We do not “have to live in a world of plagues, disastrous governments, conflict, and uncontrolled health risks.”	我们不是“必须生活在一个充满瘟疫、灾难性政府、冲突和失控的健康风险的世界”。


Instead, “the coordinated action of a group of dedicated people” can “bring about a better future.”	相反“一群有决心的人的通力合作”能够“带来更好的未来”。


Humanity cannot live in a world of polluted air and water, empty seas, vanishing wildlife, and denuded lands.	人类无法生活在空气和水受到污染、海洋空空如也、野生动物凋零、土地荒芜的世界。


The ecological challenges we now face are matters of public health and welfare, just as smallpox was.	我们现在所面临的的生态挑战是公共卫生和福利问题，和天花一样。


Our mission, whether we want to accept it or not, is to summon the collective will to halt our self-destruction.	我们的任务——不管我们想不想接受——就是召唤停止自我毁灭的集体意愿。


Brexit and the Pound in Your Pocket	脱欧和你钱包里的英镑


BERKELEY – The early returns on Brexit are in, and, contrary to what some have been claiming, they’re not good.	发自伯克利——跟许多人原本宣称的相反，英国脱欧的初期结果不太乐观。


In July, following the referendum, consumer confidence collapsed at its most rapid rate since 1990.	在7月公投过后消费者信心指数出现了自1990年以来最大幅的下跌。


Surveys of manufacturing and construction dropped precipitously.	制造业和建筑业指数也同步暴跌。


While August’s data were better, it is too soon to say whether the improvement was just a “dead cat bounce.”	虽然8月的数据有所好转，但还需要时间去弄清楚这是否仅仅是一场回光返照。


In this topsy-turvy post-referendum world, the one piece of good news is sterling’s fall on the foreign exchange market.	在这个一片混乱的后公投时代，一条好消息就是英镑汇率出现了下跌。


A lower exchange rate will make British exports more competitive.	更低的汇率更让英国的出口更具竞争力。


Faced with higher import prices, consumers will shift their spending toward domestic goods. This, too, will give a boost to the British economy.	同时在进口货物提价的情况下，消费者会转而购买本土产品，这也将有助于提振英国经济。


The question is how big a boost.	但问题在于提振的效果能有多大。


Skeptics caution that Britain relies heavily on exports of financial services, which are not especially price-sensitive, and that the scope for growth of merchandise exports is limited by the subdued global demand.	有怀疑论者就警告说英国倚重的出口金融服务业其实对价格不甚敏感。 而商品出口的增长幅度则会受制于疲软的全球需求


Britain has been here before, so this is a question on which history can shed light.	其实英国早就面对过这种情况，因此历史可以为我们提供一些解答。


In 1931, when the UK abandoned the gold standard, sterling plummeted by 30%.	1931年英国放弃金本位制度时就曾引发英镑汇率暴跌30%。


Like now, the country relied heavily on exports of services – not just banking services but also shipping and insurance.	跟现在类似，英国在很大程度上依赖服务业的出口——不仅仅是银行业，还有船运和保险。


And the external environment was even more unfavorable than it is now.	而外部环境甚至比当前更为严峻。


Yet, despite these headwinds, the merchandise trade deficit fell by a quarter between 1931 and 1932.	但即便面对这些困难，商品贸易逆差依然成功在1931~1932年间减少了1/4。


By 1933, the services balance was strengthening as well.	服务业的国际收支状况也有所改善。


At this point, the economy was on the road to recovery.	这说明经济已经走上了复苏的道路。


Three circumstances made this possible.	有三大因素促成了这一成功。


First, excess capacity enabled companies to ramp up production.	首先，充裕的过剩产能让企业可以轻易增加生产。


Second, Britain was able quickly to put in place a set of favorable trade deals, negotiated with Commonwealth countries at the Ottawa Conference in 1932.	其次，借助1932年的渥太华会议英国得以迅速与各英联邦国家签订有利的贸易协定。


Third, political uncertainty fell sharply, as the Labour government, widely blamed for the 1931 crisis, was replaced by a Conservative-dominated cabinet with broad popular support.	第三，因1931年危机而保守指责的工党被保守党主导的内阁所取代，令政治上的不确定大减。


Clearly, none of these conditions is present today. Excess capacity in traded-goods sectors is low.	很显然，上述因素如今都已不复存在：贸易品部门的过剩产能较低；


In today’s more complicated legal environment, it will take years to negotiate trade deals with the EU and then other partners.	在当前更为复杂的法律环境下，需要花费多年时间才能与欧盟及其他贸易伙伴订立条约；


Political uncertainty is high, and there is no prospect of a general election to resolve it anytime soon.	政治不确定性较高而且预计短期内都无法通过大选解决。


Investors have every reason to adopt a wait-and-see attitude.	投资者们完全有理由去采取观望态度。


In 1949, Britain found itself in the same position, with a trade deficit vis-à-vis the United States and weak investor confidence.	在1949年英国又陷入了同样的困境，遭遇了对美国的贸易赤字和低迷的投资者信心。


In September of that year, sterling was again devalued, as it had been 18 years before, by 30%.	在同年9月英镑又像18年前那样暴跌了30%。


Because pressure for higher wages was subdued, British exports became more competitive.	由于工资上涨的压力被成功遏制，英国的出口变得更具竞争力。


The trade deficit with the dollar area, made up of the US and other countries that used its currency to settle international payments, contracted sharply.	与美元区（由美国以及其他用美元进行国际结算的国家组成）的贸易逆差大幅缩减。


The current account of the balance of payments swung from deficit in 1949 to surplus in 1950, and GDP rose strongly.	经常账户收支从1949年的逆差转为1950年的顺差，GDP也录得大幅增长。


Again, three things made this possible.	这次也是三个因素发生了作用。


First, there was robust demand in the US, which was recovering from its 1948-1949 recession.	一是美国正从1948~1949的经济衰退中逐步恢复并产生了强劲的需求。


Second, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 created demand for exports of all kinds.	二是1950年朝鲜战争的爆发创造了对各类出口商品的需求。


Third, with the creation of the European Payments Union, the UK and its European partners agreed to dismantle controls on trade with one another.	三是欧洲支付联盟的创立使英国及其欧洲贸易伙伴同意废除对双边贸易的管制。


Here, too, the current situation could not be more different. US growth is far from robust, and EU countries have made clear that they are in no hurry to negotiate a trade deal with the UK.	这与我们当前面对的形势也是大相径庭：美国的增长远远谈不上强劲，欧洲各国也明确表示并不急于与英国展开任何贸易谈判。


A third precedent is the 1967 devaluation of sterling, again after an interval of 18 years.	而第三个先例则是英镑在1967年的贬值，也恰好与上一次相隔18年。


The balance-of-payments crisis of 1966-7 reflected the tendency of British wages to grow faster than productivity, the consequent trade deficits, and foreign investors’ reluctance to finance a position they saw as unsustainable.	1966~1967年的收支危机反映出英国的工资增速要高于其生产力增速，并随之产生贸易逆差，而外国投资者们也不愿意去出资支撑一个在他们看来不可持续的点位。


This time, however, it took two years for the external accounts to improve.	但这次整整花费了两年才实现了外部帐户的改善。


With unemployment already low, that much time was needed to reallocate resources from nontraded- to traded-goods sectors.	由于失业率已经较低，就需要大量时间去完成资源从非贸易品部门转向贸易品部门的重新分配。


In the interim, foreign investors remained reluctant to finance Britain’s deficits.	在此期间外国投资者们依旧不愿出资弥补英国的收支逆差。


Seeing the difficulty of the adjustment, they worried that sterling would collapse.	眼看调整如此艰难，人们都担心英镑会崩溃。


The UK, unable to attract short-term capital inflows, was forced to borrow from the International Monetary Fund.	无力吸引短期资本流入的英国人只好求助于国际货币基金组织的贷款。


This history suggests that exchange rates matter for competitiveness, and that sterling’s depreciation should help by enhancing the competitiveness of British exports.	这些历史说明汇率对一个国家的竞争力极为重要，而英镑贬值也可以增强英国的出口竞争力。


But policymakers shouldn’t expect too much.	但政治制定者们不能对此抱有过多期望。


The external environment is unfavorable.	外部环境不尽如人意。


It will take time to reallocate resources toward the production of traded goods.	重新将资源导向贸易品的生产也需要时间。


And a new set of trade deals will not be concluded overnight.	一系列新贸易协定也不可能一蹴而就。


Meanwhile, British leaders must resolve the lingering political and policy uncertainty.	与此同时，英国的政治领袖们也必须解决那些长期悬而未决的政治不确定性问题。


They must use not just monetary policy, but also fiscal tools, to support spending and strengthen the incentive to invest.	他们不仅要动用货币政策，还包括财政政策去维持财政支出并强化投资意愿。


Until now, they have shown little awareness of the urgency.	但迄今为止，这些人似乎都并未意识到这些行动的紧迫性。


Smart Development Targets	明智的发展目标


ABUJA, NIGERIA – Over the next 15 years, the international community will spend $2.5 trillion on development, with national budgets contributing countless trillions more.	尼日利亚阿布贾——未来15年里，国际社会将耗资2. 5万亿美元用于发展，国家预算的相关贡献更是达到不知多少万亿美元以上。


In September, the world’s 193 governments will meet at the United Nations in New York to agree on a set of global targets that will direct these resources.	9月，世界193个国家政府将在纽约联合国举行会议，就引导上述资源投入的全球目标进行磋商。


With so much at stake, it is vital that we make the smartest choices.	因为关系太过重大，我们必须做出明智的选择。


Because it is only natural for politicians to promise to do everything, the UN is currently poised to consider an impossibly inclusive 169 targets.	因为政治家总习惯大包大揽，联合国目前正不可思议地考虑制定169项目标。


The proposed targets range from the ambitious (“end the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria”) to the peripheral (“promote sustainable tourism”) to the impossible (“by 2030 achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities”).	所涉目标有些雄心勃勃（“像消灭艾滋病、结核病和疟疾等传染病”）、有些则相对次要（“像发展可持续旅游”），还有些不可能完成（“像到2030年实现所有男女全面高效就业和体面工作，其中也包括青年和残疾人”）。


But promising everything to everyone provides no direction.	但承诺为任何人做任何事并没有指明方向。


In truth, having 169 priorities is like having none at all.	事实上，169项重点等于没有重点。


That is why my think tank, the Copenhagen Consensus, asked 82 of the world’s top economists, 44 sector experts, and UN organizations and NGOs to evaluate which targets would do the most good for every dollar, euro, or peso spent.	于是我所属的“哥本哈根共识”智库邀请世界顶尖经济学家、44个部门的专家及联合国、非政府机构评估哪些目标能让单位美元、欧元或比索投入所产生的效益最大化。


A team of eminent economists, including several Nobel laureates, then prioritized these targets in value-for-money terms.	著名经济学家，包括几位诺贝尔奖得主之后从投入产出比方面确定了哪些是优先目标。


It turns out that not all targets are equal.	事实证明并非所有目标都是平等的。


Some generate amazing economic, social, and environmental benefits per dollar spent.	有些单位美元投入所带来的经济、社会和环境效益是惊人的。


Many others generate only slightly more than a dollar per dollar spent.	有些目标花费1美元仅产生略高于1美元的效益。


Some even generate a net loss, doing less than a dollar of good per dollar spent.	有些甚至带来亏损，1美元投入仅带来低于1美元的效果。


If the world were to spend money equally across all 169 UN targets, it would do about $7 of social good for each dollar spent.	如果世界决定在所有169个联合国目标上平均分配资金，每投入1美元将产生7美元的社会效益。


That is respectable, but we could do much better.	这当然还算不错，但我们还可以做得更好。


The panel of eminent economists has produced a much shorter list of just 19 targets that will do the most good for the world.	知名经济学家小组已经确定了仅19项目标的简短清单，投资这些目标能使成本效益最大化。


Every dollar spent on these targets will likely produce $32 of social good – more than four times more effective than spending on all 169.	每为这些目标花费1美元将可能产生32美元的社会效益——效率是投资所有169项目标的4倍还多。


Being smart about development spending could be better than quadrupling the global aid budget.	明智地选择发展投入的效率可能比全球援助预算翻两番还高。


The short list covers a lot of ground; what connects the targets is the amount of good they will do for people, the planet, and prosperity.	这份重点清单涉及到众多领域； 其中的联系是能为民众、地球和繁荣带来多少好处。


Consider a few targets that would do so much to help people.	比如有几个能对人产生巨大帮助的目标。


Tuberculosis is a “hidden” disease, but a much bigger problem than headline-grabbing Ebola.	结核病是种“隐性”疾病，但带来的问题甚至超过引人注目的埃博拉。


More than two billion people carry the TB bacterium, and at some point about 10% of them will develop the disease, which kills some 1.5 million victims per year (compared to 20,000 dead in the recent Ebola outbreak).	超过20亿人携带结核病菌，其中约10%的携带者会在某个时点发病，造成每年150万人死亡（与死于近期埃博拉病毒爆发的20，000人形成了鲜明的���照）。


Yet treatment is inexpensive and, in most cases, highly effective.	但相关治疗非常便宜，而且对多数病例十分有效。


Spending a dollar on diagnosis and treatment pays back $43 by giving people many more years of productive life.	在诊断和治疗上每投入1美元能带来43美元的效益，让曾经的患者拥有很多年的高效生活。


Another outstanding use of resources is to reduce childhood malnutrition.	另一种最有效率的资源利用方式是降低儿童营养不良。


Good nutrition is especially critical for young children, because it allows their brains and bodies to develop better, producing life-long benefits.	充足的营养对幼儿尤其重要，因为它们能使大脑和身体更好地发育，由此产生的收益能够惠及孩子一生。


Well-nourished children stay in school longer, learn more, and end up being much more productive members of society.	营养良好的儿童在校时间更长、学到知识更多，并最终成为更有效率的社会建设者。


The available evidence suggests that providing better nutrition for 68 million children each year would produce $45 in long-term social benefits for every dollar spent.	现有证据表明每年为6，800万儿童提供更好的营养可以和投入1美元带来45美元的长期社会效益划等号。


Some targets that benefit the planet also provide excellent value.	某些惠及地球的目标还能带来不菲的经济价值。


Cutting fossil-fuel subsidies, which amount to nearly $550 billion a year – would reduce pollution and CO2 emissions while freeing up resources for investment in health, education, and infrastructure.	削减每年将近5，500亿美元的化石燃料补贴能减少污染和二氧化碳排放，同时腾出资源投资于健康，教育和基础设施。


In total, each dollar not spent on fossil-fuel subsidies would provide more than $15 of planetary benefits.	总之，取消1美元的化石燃料补贴能为地球带来超过15美元的好处。


Focusing on coral reefs turns out to be a surprisingly efficient target.	事实证明注重珊瑚礁保护是一种令人惊讶的高效目标。


It preserves biodiversity, with healthy reefs producing more fish and attracting more tourists.	它保护了生物多样性，健康的珊瑚礁能提高渔业产量和吸引更多游客。


Each dollar spent protecting them can provide benefits worth $24.	每花费1美元保护珊瑚礁能带来24美元的好处。


Perhaps the most important, cross-cutting problem is poverty, which afflicts billions of people and underlies most other development problems.	或许最重要的跨领域问题是贫困，令数十亿人深受其害并构成其他多数发展问题的罪魁祸首。


When you are poor, your children will more likely suffer malnutrition and succumb to TB.	如果你是穷人，你的孩子更容易营养不良及患上结核病。


When you are poor, you are more likely to slash and burn rain forest or fish atop coral reefs with dynamite.	如果你是穷人，你更有可能砍伐并烧毁热带雨林或者为了捕鱼在珊瑚礁上使用炸药。


Better nutrition and greater access to education will help.	改善营养和加强教育能够有所帮助。


But so will targets for prosperity, allowing hundreds of millions to lift themselves out of poverty.	但实现繁荣目标同样能让成百上千万人脱贫致富。


As we have seen repeatedly – in China, South Korea, Chile, India, and elsewhere – fewer trade restrictions can lift incomes and reduce poverty.	我们在中国、韩国、智利、印度和其他地方已经反复看到减少贸易限制可以减少贫困、提升收入。


Economic models show that a successful reduction of trade barriers like that foreseen in the ongoing Doha Round of multilateral trade talks could add $11 trillion to global GDP by 2030.	经济模型显示像多哈回合多边贸易谈判所预期的成功削减贸易壁垒到2030年可能增加11万亿美元的全球GDP收入。


This would mean $1,000 more for each person in the developing world every year, and would lift a staggering 160 million people out of poverty.	这相当于发展中国家每人每年增加1，000美元，同时让令人惊讶的1. 6亿人脱贫致富。


This list of smart targets will not solve all of the world’s problems; no realistic list, however ambitious, can.	这份明智的目标清单将无法解决世界所有的问题； 无论多么雄心勃勃，没有哪份现实的清单能够完成这项工作。


But the 19 targets identified by the Copenhagen Consensus can help the world’s governments to concentrate on key priorities.	但哥本哈根共识确定的19项目标可以帮助世界政府专注于关键目标。


These targets will do more than four times as much good per dollar spent as spending across all 169 targets would do.	这些目标单位美元投入所产生的效益将是169项目标平均分摊的4倍还多。


Governments should stop promising everything to everyone and start focusing on delivering the most possible.	政府应该停止向所有人做出大包大揽的承诺，开始专注于实现最有可能的目标。


For more information about the project and all 19 targets, visit www.post2015consensus.com	了解项目及全部19项目标的更多信息，请访问www. post2015consensus.


Smarter Thinking on Climate Change	气候变化的明智思维


COPENHAGEN – Politicians and commentators are understandably pessimistic about the chances of an international deal on carbon cuts emerging from the United Nations summit in Mexico this December.	发自哥本哈根——对于今年11月在墨西哥联合国峰会上达成全球碳排放削减协议的可能性，无论是政治家还是新闻评论员都感到悲观，这是可以理解的。


Nothing has been resolved since the Copenhagen climate talks fell apart last year.	自哥本哈根气候峰会落幕以来，我们就没有实现任何进展。


Fortunately, recent research points to a smarter way to tackle climate change.	但幸运的是，最近的研究为我们指明了一条应对气候变化的更明智之路。


There is no longer any mainstream disagreement about the reality of global warming. The crucial questions concern the economics of our response.	全球变暖的存在已经被主流民意都所认可，而问题的关键则是经济方面（对于这一点的谈论正逐渐升温）。


But this debate can be just as heated. Ever since I published The Skeptical Environmentalist in 2001, I have always acknowledged that man-made global warming is real.	自从2001年出版了《持怀疑论的环保主义者》一书以来，经常有人跟我说人为的气候变化是确实存在的。


Yet activists have repeatedly labeled me a “climate-change denier.”	但环保分子却一直把我定义为“气候变化否定论者”。


This is not because I have ever suggested that the basic science of global warming is wrong. Rather, it reflects anger and frustration over my insistence on pointing out that drastic carbon cuts make no sense.	这不但是因为我曾经指出关于全球变暖的基本研究方法是错的，也更因为他们对我一直坚持的观点——大幅度削减碳排放的做法是错误的——既感到恼火，又觉得沮丧。


The Copenhagen Consensus Center – a think tank where I serve as director – recently asked a large group of top climate economists to explore the costs and benefits of different responses to global warming.	而由我所主持的一个智库机构——哥本哈根共识研究中心——最近集中了一大批顶尖气候经济学家来研究不同全球变暖对策的优劣之处。


At the same time, we convened a second, equally stellar group of economists, including three Nobel laureates, to examine all of the research and rank the proposals in order of desirability.	与此同时，我们还召集了包括诺贝尔奖得主在内的一批优秀经济学家来讨论所有的研究并按优劣做出排位。


Cambridge University Press is publishing their research and findings this month, under the title Smart Solutions to Climate Change.	剑桥大学出版社将在本月发表他们的研究成果，书名就叫《气候变化的明智方案》


The book includes a chapter by prominent climate economist Richard Tol, who has been a contributing, lead, principal, and convening author for the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.	该书的其中一章由联合国政府间气候变化研究小组的主要研究执笔人，著名气候经学家理查德·托尔执笔。


In his chapter, Tol shows why grand promises of drastic, immediate carbon cuts are such a flawed strategy.	在该章中托尔阐述了庞大而迅速的碳排放削减方案究竟有何缺陷。


Tol found that trying to keep temperature increases under 2°C, as the G-8 industrialized nations have promised to do, would require emissions reductions of about 80% by mid-century.	托尔发现：如果要将8国集团峰会上所承诺的那样将气温上升幅度限制在2摄氏度以内的话，就必须在本世纪中叶时将碳排放总量下降80%。


Based on conventional estimates, this would avoid total climate damages of about $1.1 trillion across the century.	按照一般估计，由气候变化带来的损失将因此减少1. 1万亿美元。


However, it would cut economic growth by around $40 trillion a year.	但与此同时，平均每年的经济增长都将减少40亿美元。


In other words, we would effectively be spending $40 trillion every year by the end of the century to do just over $1 trillion worth of total good.	换句话说，我们每年都花掉40亿美元，坚持到世纪末却只能换来区区1万亿美元的收益。


In fact, this estimate is wildly optimistic.	事实上，这个估计还是太过乐观了。


The calculation assumes that over 100 years, politicians everywhere in the world will consistently enact the most efficient, effective laws imaginable to reduce carbon emissions.	因为该计算假设在100年以内，全世界的政治家都能推动通过最高效率且最有效的法律来减少碳排放。


Dump that far-fetched assumption and the cost could jump by a factor of ten or even 100.	倘若去掉了这点假设的话，成本还将上升10倍甚至100倍。


To put it starkly, such drastic carbon cuts are likely to do a lot more damage than climate change to our quality of life (especially for those in the developing world).	一言以蔽之，如此大幅度的碳排放削减对我们生活质量的负面效应甚至比气候变化还要大（尤其是对发展中国家的人们而言）。


The reason is simple. Despite all of the optimistic talk about wind, solar, geothermal, and other sustainable, non-carbon-emitting energy sources, no alternative is remotely ready to shoulder the energy burden currently borne by fossil fuels.	原因很简单，尽管风能，太阳能，地热能和其他可持续非碳能源前景一片乐观，但至今尚未有任何一个能取代化石燃料的能源供给作用（哪怕是其中一小部分）。


This is why I have long urged policymakers to increase significantly the amount of money invested in research and development of green-energy alternatives.	这就是我一直呼吁政策制定者们大幅提高绿色能源研究方面的投入的原因。


Now there is research that shows exactly how we can put this approach into action.	幸好如今也有研究成果能为我们指明行动的方向了。


In Smart Solutions to Climate Change, Chris Green of McGill University and Isabel Galiana look at current rates of progress and conclude that by 2050 alternative energy sources will produce less than half the power needed to be able to stabilize carbon emissions.	在《气候变化的明智方案》一书中，加拿大麦吉尔大学的克里斯·格林和伊莎贝尔·加里安娜对目前的科技发展进度进行了分析，并得出结论：如果要将碳排放量稳定下来的话，我们需要大量的额外能源来源来补足，但到2050年替代能源承担该需求量的50%。


By 2100, the gap would be even wider. The challenge is enormous.	到了2010年两者之间的差距将进一步加大，可见挑战是十分艰巨的。


Galiana and Green find that devoting just 0.2% of global GDP – roughly $100 billion a year – to green energy R&D would produce the kind of game-changing breakthroughs needed to fuel a carbon-free future.	加里安娜和格林发现只要将全球GDP的0. 2%(约每年1000亿美元)投入到绿色能源研究中就能实现突破，创造一个无碳的未来。


Not only would this be a much less expensive fix than trying to cut carbon emissions, but it would also reduce global warming far more quickly.	这不但是一个比削减碳排放更为廉价的方案，而且能更快地解决全球变暖问题。


And, unlike carbon cuts, this is a solution that developing countries would be likely to embrace.	与此同时，这是一个比大幅削减更能为发展中国家接受的解决方案。


Even with a major R&D effort, green energy won’t become affordable overnight.	即便投入了大量研究，绿色能源的成本依然不会在短期内大幅降低。


To ensure that we have enough time to conduct the necessary R&D, we should step up our commitment to research into climate-engineering technology.	为了确保能争取到足够的时间进行必要的研究，我们就必须承诺研究气候工程技术方面追加更多投资。


In Smart Solutions to Climate Change, Eric Bickel and Lee Lane of the University of Texas offer compelling evidence that a tiny investment in climate engineering could result in bigger and faster reductions in global warming than would a vastly more expensive program of carbon cuts.	在《气候变化的明智方案》一书中，美国德克萨斯州大学的埃里克·比克尔和李·莱恩就提供了可靠的证据，证明只要在气候工程进行少量的投资，就能更大幅度并更快地降低全球变暖效应，省下削减碳排放所需的庞大费用。


The publication of Smart Solutions to Climate Change has generated considerable interest, including some from activists who believe that my enthusiastic support of its proposals represents a major shift in my thinking.	《气候变化的明智方案》的出版受到了各方的关注，其中也包括一些相信我对该书方案的热情支持意味着立场转换的环保分子。


In fact, I have advocated R&D spending for years.	多年来我都呼吁加大研究投入。


What is new – and exciting – is that with the publication of this research, we may finally be starting a constructive discussion about how we really can respond intelligently to this challenge.	而最新——而且令人兴奋——的方面则是随着该项研究的发表，我们将最终得以开启一个关于如何明智应对挑战的建设性讨论。


Smart Taxes	明智的税收方式


ATHENS/BERLIN – Governments throughout the European Union and around the world confront a seeming Catch-22: the millstone of national debt around their necks has required them to reduce deficits through spending cuts and tax increases. But these are impeding the consumer spending needed to boost economic activity and kick-start growth.	雅典/柏林——整个欧洲联盟及世界各国政府都面临着一种类似于“第二十二条军规”这样进退两难的境地：他们背负着巨大的国家债务负担，必须要通过削减开支和增加税收的方式来减少财政赤字，但是这又会抑制推动经济活动和促进经济强劲增长所需的消费支出。


As the debate shifts from austerity towards measures aimed at stimulating growth, smarter taxation will be essential to getting the balance right.	随着辩论的焦点从通货紧缩转至旨在刺激经济增长的措施上，实行更明智的税收政策对于维持当前经济的适度平衡至关重要。


When governments think about the difficult task of raising taxes, they usually think about income tax, business taxes, and value-added tax (VAT).	在应对增加税收的艰巨任务时，政府通常考虑的是所得税、营业税和增值税。


But there are other taxes that can raise significant amounts of revenue with a much less negative impact on the economy. These are the taxes that governments already levy on electricity and fossil fuels.	但也有其他税收，即政府已经对电力和化石燃料征收的税收，这种方式在大量增加财政收入的同时，不会对经济产生过多的负面影响。


Such taxes play a crucial role in cutting the carbon emissions that cause climate change.	这种税收在削减导致气候变化的碳排放方面发挥着至关重要的作用。


But recent research shows that they can also play a useful role in raising government revenue at little cost in terms of economic growth.	但最近的研究表明，它们还可以在提高政府收入方面发挥有益的作用——以低成本方式促进经济增长。


Euro for euro, dollar for dollar, yen for yen: energy and carbon taxes have a lower negative impact on a nation’s economy, consumption, and jobs than income tax and VAT.	欧元对欧元，美元对美元，日元对日元：能源税和碳税对一个国家的经济、消费和就业产生的负面影响比所得税和增值税要小。


For example, an increase in direct taxes, such as income tax, can reduce consumption by twice as much as energy and carbon taxes that raise the same amount of revenue.	例如，要增加同等数额的财政收入，提高直接税（如所得税）所减少的消费是能源税和碳税的两倍之多。


Maintaining consumption at as high a level as possible is vital to reviving economic activity, which means that freeing money for consumers to spend is just as important.	将消费维持在尽可能高的水平对于重振经济活动至关重要，这意味着创造条件让消费者自由消费同等重要。


Energy and carbon taxes can raise revenue while leaving the economy in a stronger state to sustain a recovery.	能源税和碳税可以增加财政收入，同时又可以使经济复苏保持更强劲的状态。


Conventional taxes raise revenue, but pose a much greater risk of depressing growth in the process.	传统的税收当然也可以增加收入，但是在这一过程中却给经济增长带来了更大的风险。


This is not the only reason why looking more closely at energy and carbon taxes makes sense.	现在人们更加密切地关注能源税和碳税，这种做法并非无稽之谈，当然这也不是唯一的原因。


The current framework for energy taxation, particularly in Europe, is not sustainable.	当前的能源税框架体系，尤其是在欧洲内部，难以长久维系。


Tax rates on different fuels vary by more than 50% across the EU, causing major distortions in the single market.	在整个欧盟内部，不同燃料的税率差别超过50％，这给单一市场造成重大扭曲。


Creating a level playing field on energy taxation in the EU would harmonize economic incentives, eliminate gas-tank tourism by drivers crossing borders for lower prices, and improve the business climate in all of Europe’s economies.	在欧盟内部营造能源税收公平竞争的环境，这将有助于协调经济激励措施，消除司机为降低成本而跨越国界的高风险旅游方式，改善所有欧洲经济体的商业环境。


Rising energy bills, driven by the cost of fossil fuels, are a massive political issue in many countries in Europe and elsewhere, including the United States, where consumer energy prices have become a major issue in the run-up to this year’s presidential election.	化石燃料成本上涨，受此驱动，整体能源成本也上涨，这在欧洲的许多国家和其他地区是一个严重的政治问题，包括美国在内。 美国的消费能源价格已成为今年总统大选中关注的主要问题。


But, relative to other forms of taxation, energy taxation tends to benefit consumers overall.	但是，相对于其他形式的税收而言，能源税趋于使整体消费者受益。


The gains from avoiding the negative impact of conventional taxes work across the economy, particularly as the least well-off maintain a higher level of disposable household income.	从规避传统税收带来的负面影响中获得的收益会造福整个经济工作，特别是那些最不富裕的人保持较高的水平家庭可支配收入。


Most energy and carbon taxes are levied by national governments.	大多数能源税和碳税是由国家政府征收的。


But in Europe there is another option for raising revenues: the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (ETS).	但是在欧洲，提高收入有另一种选择，即欧盟排放交易计划（ETS）。


In terms of the effect on GDP and jobs, the cost of increasing revenue from this source would be as much as one-third less than that of raising the same amount via income taxes or VAT.	说到对于国内生产总值和就业产生的影响，通过这种渠道来增加财政收入所投入的成本比通过提高所得税和附加税来增加财政收入的方式低1/3。


Given Europe’s fiscal deficits and the economic impact of reducing them, that is a huge potential prize. But, first, the issues depressing the carbon price must be addressed.	鉴于欧洲的财政赤字和减少这些财政赤字所带来的经济影响，这将可能是一项丰厚的回报。


Taking the massive over-allocation of carbon-emission permits out of the ETS will be vital.	但是首先，压低碳价格的问题必须得到解决。


Finance ministers everywhere need to think more imaginatively about their fiscal options.	 各国财政部长需要以更具想象力的方式考虑他们的财政选择。


Energy and carbon taxes can produce less economic pain and more gain than conventional taxes can.	与传统的税收方式相比，能源税和碳税带来的经济上的痛苦更小，收益更大。


Europe needs fiscal consolidation, reductions in carbon emissions, and a strategy for economic growth.	欧洲需要巩固财政，减少二氧化碳排放，制定经济增长战略。


Greater reliance should be placed on energy taxes and an effective ETS to deliver all three.	我们应该更加依赖能源税，采取一种有效的欧盟排放交易计划予以实践。


Smiles on the Rhine	莱茵河畔的微笑


On February 23, a day after addressing America’s allies in Brussels, President George W. Bush will meet German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in the old city of Mainz on the Rhine.	二月二十三日，就在美国总统乔治W·布什在布鲁塞尔向美国的联盟国发表完演说之后的第二天，他在莱茵河旁的古城马恩斯会见了德国总理格哈德·施罗德。


After the falling-out over Bush’s Iraq adventure, the two countries – so central to the transatlantic relationship in the past – are once again on speaking terms.	自从两国因为布什的伊拉克政策而闹翻之后，这两个过去曾对跨大西洋两岸关系举足轻重的国家终于又重新说话了。


But, however welcome the return to cordiality may be, it is no more than that.	虽然，友好气氛的归来可能令人可喜，但是其意义远甚于此。


If Bush and Schroeder are now showing the world how well they get along together, it is not because they are off to a new start, but because it suits their tactical interests.	如果布什和施罗德现在要向世界展示他们如何融洽相处，那不是因为他们正准备一个新开始，而是因为那符合他们的战略利益。


Had the American people chosen John F. Kerry over George W. Bush last November, the reunion would be seen by both sides as a new beginning, resonant with personal warmth. But both continue to doubt that past substantive divisions can really be overcome.	要是去年十一月美国人民选择了约翰F·克里而非乔治W·布什的话，那么，在温暖友好的私人气氛下，此次重新联盟也许会被双方看作一个新起点。


Thus, the meeting in Mainz will be one of those diplomatic courtesy calls that gloss over important bilateral differences.	因此，马恩斯会议只是那些用以掩饰双边重要分歧的外交礼节性拜访的其中之一。


There will be no meeting of minds between Bush and Schroeder, because, on most key issues, their minds hold opposite views.	布什和施罗德之间并无思想上的会晤，因为在大多数重要问题上他们的观点相反。


Consider what is potentially the most contentious issue, how to cope with Iran’s nuclear program. Germany has been determined, together with France and Britain, to get Iran to stop uranium enrichment through incentives and negotiation.	关于什么是最有可能导致争议的问题、如何应对伊朗的核武器计划，德国已经和法、英两国一道做出决定，将通过“奖励刺激”和谈判来使伊朗停止铀浓缩计划。


While the US has now explicitly welcomed the European initiative, it remains openly skeptical and unwilling to join, thus weakening the chances of success.	尽管美国现已明确对欧洲的行动表示欢迎，它仍公开对此表示怀疑，迟迟不愿加入，也因此减小了成功的可能性。


Failure would lead America to seek the UN Security Council’s formal condemnation of Iran, coupled with sanctions.	若是该行动失败，将导致美国转而寻求联合国安理会对伊朗实行正式谴责及制裁。


Indeed, the US is already trying to soften up Iranian resistance by hinting at a possible use of force.	事实上，美国已经给出暗示，为了削弱伊朗的抵抗力，将不排除使用武力的可能性。


But there is no support in Europe for military action, and little backing for sanctions.	但是欧盟反对对伊朗采取军事行动，也不支持制裁。


If the negotiations should fail, the transatlantic cleavage could once again become glaringly wide.	一旦谈判失败，大西洋两岸关系的鸿沟将再次明显扩大。


The divisions are no less marked in another transatlantic quarrel, this one over whether to lift the European Union’s embargo on arms exports to China, imposed following the Tiananmen Square massacre 15 years ago.	这种分歧在另外一个跨大西洋争论中也一样显著，即欧盟是否会取消15年前天门广场事件发生后对中国实施的武器禁运。


Schroeder has been pushing the EU to lift the embargo, a move that now appears imminent.	施罗德正在推动欧盟解除禁运，现在看来这项禁令的解除迫在眉睫了。


But for the US, the step is seen, not without reason, as an encouragement to China in its conflict with Taiwan.	但是在美国看来，这一措施却鼓励了中国大陆与台湾之间的冲突，这种看法不无道理。


It will be interpreted as a stab in the back of US efforts to maintain stability in the region.	美国在该地区投入力量以维持稳定，这却宛如在其背后中伤一刀。


Nor will there be much progress on a matter dear to Berlin, namely Germany’s application to enter the UN Security Council as a permanent member.	还有一件与柏林休戚相关的事情也无多大进展，即德国谋求成为安理会常任理事国一事。


The prospect is uncertain enough as it stands that Bush may be spared the need to veto it.	就算布什可能不计前嫌地不投反对票，德国的前景依然未置可否。


But it would make an immense difference for Germany’s chances if the US actively supported what is, after all, a reasonable objective of one of its most important allies.	但是，如果美国积极支持它最重要的盟国伙伴的这一合理目标的话，就会给德国成功的可能性带来很大变化。


But the Mainz meeting will not bring the two sides closer to working out a common position on any of these issues, or even to seeing the other side’s point of view. Instead, they will dwell on what is by now uncontroversial: welcoming the recent, if still fragile, progress in Israel-Palestine relations, supporting stability in post-election Iraq and Afghanistan, and extolling the transatlantic link.	但是马恩斯会议并没有使双方走得更近，在上述任一问题上达成共识，甚至双方都没有了解对方观点，而只是详说着已不再备受争议的事件：对最近巴以关系微小的进步表示欢迎，支持伊拉克和阿富汗选举后时代的稳定局势，并且赞美大西洋两岸的联系。


The drafters of the farewell communiqué are, no doubt, already at work listing all the issues on which the two governments see eye to eye.	无疑，会议结束公报的起草者已经开始排列两国政府意见一致的话题。


Bush and Schroeder will make up for the paucity of substance with a good deal of friendly banter and bonhomie before the press assembled in Mainz.	在聚集在马恩斯的新闻媒体面前，布什和施罗德彼此开着善意的玩笑，用友好的气氛弥补实质性内容的缺憾。


That is, of course, better than nothing.	当然，聊胜于无。


But it amounts merely to a temporary papering over of differences, not their resolution.	但那仅仅只是暂时掩盖了分歧，并非他们的决议。


Worse, there is no sign that either man is willing to speak his mind in order to signal to the other side what he will expect when the next crisis looms.	更糟糕的是，谁也不愿谈及他的观点，好给对方一个信号，免得下次危机迫近时对方连他期望什么都不知晓。


Future misunderstandings and misgivings are thus inevitable.	更多的误解和疑虑难以避免。


The welcome return to civility is not, therefore, a return to mutual trust.	友好氛围的回归，却不是互相信任感的回归。


After all, the test of alliance does not lie in praising agreements, but in thrashing out disagreements in a spirit of cooperation.	毕竟，检验同盟的方法不是为一致的协议大唱赞歌，而是本着合作精神排除不和。


Neither Bush nor Schroeder seem ready for this.	布什和施罗德看起来都没有为此准备充分。


If nothing else happens, the chief transatlantic partners will be no better prepared for the next crisis than they were for the last.	如果没有什么事情发生的话，这对大西洋两岸的重要合作者对下次危机的准备不会比上一次好到哪里去。


As Leslie Gelb, the former president of The Council on Foreign Relations in New York, recently remarked, leaders in Europe and the US have lost the habit of serious cooperation.	正如纽约的对外关系委员会前主席Leslie Gelb最近说的那样，欧洲和美国的领导人已经丧失了严肃合作的传统。


What could revive that habit?	什么才能恢复那一传统呢？


Perhaps only a miracle: real progress in the Israel-Palestine conflict, which both the US and the Europeans could then claim to have helped bring about.	也许只有一个奇迹：巴以冲突得到真正的解决。 到那时美国和欧洲都可宣称，这一成功是他们所带来的。


Common success could make both sides realize that they still have a common cause.	共同的成功能使双方意识到他们还拥有一项共同的事业。


But that miracle will not materialize in Mainz.	但是那个奇迹不会在马恩斯得以实现。


Surveillance and American Liberty	监控和美国的自由


CAMBRIDGE – Ever since Edward J. Snowden disclosed the National Security Agency’s ongoing collection of massive amounts of electronic-communications data generated by United States citizens and non-citizens alike, attention has been lavished on his personal status.	美国剑桥—自从爱德华·斯诺登披露美国国家安全局一直在搜集来自美国公民和非公民的大量电子通讯数据以来，人们的目光一直集中在他的个人状况。


But the more important issue, even before Russia granted him temporary asylum, is the status of American civil liberties.	但更重要的问题——即使在俄罗斯授予他临时庇护之前——应该是美国公民的自由状况。


Is the US guilty of hypocrisy, as Russia, China, and others have charged?	美国真的像俄罗斯、中国和其他人职责的那样伪善吗？


To answer that question, it is important to distinguish between two issues that have become conflated in public debate: electronic espionage against foreign entities and domestic surveillance of a government’s own citizens.	为了回答这个问题，很重要的一点是区分在公共争论中常被混为一谈的两个问题：针对外国实体的电子间谍和针对政府本国人民的国内监控。


Before Snowden’s disclosures, cyber espionage had become a major point of contention in US-China relations.	在斯诺登披露之前，网络间谍已成为中美关系争论的一大要点。


It was discussed at the June “shirt-sleeves summit” between Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping, and the two governments agreed to create a special working group on the issue.	今年6月的“习奥会”就讨论了这个问题，两国政府同意成立特别工作组处理这一问题。


The US accuses China of using cyber espionage to steal intellectual property on an unprecedented scale.	美国指责中国以前所未见的规模使用网络间谍盗取知识产权。


Among other public sources, it could point to a study by the cyber-security firm Mandiant, which traced many such attacks to a People’s Liberation Army facility in Shanghai.	美国援引的公开资源之一是网络安全公司Mandiant的一份研究，该研究跟踪到，此类袭击来自中国人民解放军在位于上海的设施。


China counters that it is also the victim of innumerable cyber intrusions, many originating in the US.	中国反驳说，它也是无处不在的网络入侵的受害者，其中许多来自美国。


Both countries have a point.	两国各有各的论据。


If a proverbial Martian were watching the flow of electrons between East Asia and North America, he would probably notice robust two-way traffic.	如果一个火星人观看东亚和北美之间的电子流，他可能会注意到鲁棒的双向流动。


But if he looked inside the data packets, he would see very different content.	但如果它细看数据包内部，就会发现非常不同的内容。


American policy is not to steal intellectual property, while China’s policy appears to be the opposite.	美国的政策不是为了偷取知识产权，而中国的政策似乎正好相反。


At the same time, both governments constantly hack into each other’s computers to steal traditional political and military secrets.	与此同时，两国政府都在不断地侵入对方电脑窃取传统政治和军事秘密。


Spying is not a violation of international law (though it often violates various domestic laws), but the US argues that theft of intellectual property violates both the spirit and letter of international trade agreements.	间谍活动并不违反国际法（尽管通常会违反各种本国法律），但美国认为知识产权窃贼违反了国际贸易协定的精神和内容。


China is not the only country that steals intellectual property.	中国不是唯一一个窃取知识产权的国家。


Some of America’s allies, now professing outrage at disclosures of US spying, have been known to do the same thing to the US.	美国的一些盟国——目前纷纷对被曝光的美国间谍活动表示愤慨——据信也对美国做过同样的事。


According to the US, when it inspects a non-American’s e-mail, it is searching for terrorist connections, and has often shared the findings with its allies.	按照美国的说法，当它检查非美国人的电子邮件时，它寻找的是与恐怖分子的联系，并且通常将这一信息与盟国共享。


In that sense, security surveillance can benefit both the US and other countries.	照此看，安全监控应��对美国和其他国家都有利。


After all, part of the plot that culminated in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, was hatched by an Egyptian living in Hamburg.	毕竟，以2001年9月11日恐怖袭击为高潮的阴谋部分地被居住在一名汉堡的埃及人发现了。


But the Americans are not without sin.	但美国也不无辜。


As Snowden’s information revealed, the US was monitoring the communications of European Union representatives as they were preparing for trade negotiations.	斯诺登的情报表明，美国监控了欧盟代表在准备贸易谈判时的通讯。 这可没有带来共同的好处；


This did not produce a joint benefit; it was a bad decision, and one that Obama should renounce.	这是一个糟糕的决定，奥巴马应该有所解释。


It is tactically useful for Russia, China, and others to conflate espionage issues with civil liberties and accuse the US of hypocrisy.	从策略上讲，俄罗斯、中国和其他国家将间谍问题和公民自由混为一谈并指责美国的伪善是有用的。


But those charges seem odd coming from countries with weak rule of law and heavy Internet censorship.	但这些指责来自法律精神淡薄、互联网审查严格的国家，这倒是颇令人奇怪。


Snowden revealed two major surveillance programs inside the US.	斯诺登披露了美国国内的两个重大监控项目。


In terms of civil liberties, examining the content of a message from a suspect non-American source is less controversial.	从公民自由角度讲，检查可疑非美国来源的信息的内容比较不容易引起争议。


The more hotly debated program is one in which the NSA maps the origin and destination of US citizens’ telephone traffic and stores it for possible later inspection (presumably with a court order).	在争论较激烈的项目中，国安局勾画出美国公民电话通信的来源地和目的地地图，予以存档以供未来的可能调查之用（也许需要法院调令）。


This application of technological capacity to store what is called “big data” raises a new set of issues about intrusion into citizens’ privacy.	利用技术能力存储所谓的“大数据”带来了一组关于侵入公民隐私的新问题。


Defenders of the program point out that it is consistent with current law and with America’s constitutional philosophy of checks and balances, because both the legislative and judicial branches approved it.	该项目的辩护者指出，它符合当前法律，也符合美国宪法的制衡原则，因为立法和司法机构都批准了它。