Whether Forgeard acted illegally is still under investigation, but, with the announcement causing the share price to plummet by 26% overnight – wiping out €5.5 billion of the company’s value – his position became untenable.	福尔杰拉德是否违法尚在调查之中，但是，这一宣布推迟使得股价一夜之间暴跌26％，公司市值蒸发了55亿欧元，其宝座变得摇摇欲坠。


Such events have brought old questions back to the fore in almost every rich country: Are bosses being paid too much?	此类事件将几乎所有富国中的老问题重新带回到了台前。 那就是，老板们是否拿得太多？


Should laws governing stock options be reformed?	规范期权的法律是否应当改革？


Although the circumstances are different, the fundamental issues are always the same, for they touch on questions of legitimacy and morality.	尽管情况不同，基本问题还总是相同的，因为它们涉及到合法性和道德问题。


If remuneration is perceived as unjust, trust in the capitalist system will suffer.	如果人们认为老板们的报酬是不正义的，那么，对于资本主义的信任就会受损。


The French debate about executive compensation is particularly striking in this respect, because managers’ salaries are in fact lower than those paid to their German, British, and American counterparts, and their remuneration has grown in step with corporate share prices, increasing six-fold in 25 years.	法国有关主管薪金的辩论在这方面特别引人瞩目，那是因为法国经理们的工资实际上比他们的德国、英国以及美国的同事们要低，他们的报酬和企业股价同步上升，在25年里增加了六倍。


Moreover, like managers everywhere, their responsibility is great, making their positions less secure, while companies must compete for the relatively few good ones, driving up their price.	而且，像在所有地方的经理们一样，他们职责重大，使得他们的地位更为不安稳，而各公司则必须争取相对较少的优秀人才，从而抬高了他们的身价。


But critics argue that the best managers are not necessarily the best paid, that the market for them is not transparent, and that boards of directors are often partial to their presidents when setting compensation.	但是批判者们指出，最好的经理未必报酬最高，他们的市场不透明，而且董事会成员在确定薪金时往往偏向于公司的总裁。


Likewise, they insist that mergers and acquisitions, which make big companies bigger, should not be motivated by salary considerations, and that “golden parachutes” should not be granted to failed managers.	同样，他们坚持说，让大公司愈加强大的企业并购不应当受到工资考虑的驱使，而且，不应当把所谓的“金色降落伞”授予那些效绩糟糕的经理们。


More fundamentally, they claim that it is simply immoral that bosses should earn as much in a day as their employees do in a year.	他们主张，更为重要的问题是，老板们一天的收入相当于雇员一年所得，这一现象纯粹是不道德的。


No manager is a superstar, a Tiger Woods or Michael Schumacher of the boardroom.	没有任何经理是像伍兹或者舒马赫那样的超级明星。


Stock options, too, often stir passionate criticism.	同样，期权问题也引起激动的批评。


Allowing managers to buy shares at prices fixed in advance was intended to align their interests with those of other shareholders by giving them a personal stake in building the value of the company.	允许经理们按照事先确定的价格购买股票意在通过让公司价值与他们的个人利益息息相关而让他们的利益符合股东的利益。


But, for some managers, stock options have created an incentive to inflate profits and hide losses, thereby enriching themselves artificially while jeopardizing their companies and other shareholders.	但是，对于某些经理们而言，股票期权激励他们抬高利润、隐瞒亏损，从而在危及公司以及其他股东的同时人为地令其个人致富。


The question is not specific to France.	这一问题并非法国独有。


In the United States, a recent study by two university professors showed that more than 25% of the companies reviewed had manipulated the dates of stock-option allowances to increase the profits of the beneficiaries.	甚至在美国，最近两名大学教授所作研究表明，接受调查研究的公司的25%操纵了股票期权的日期以便提高受益者的利润。


The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the US Department of Justice apparently decided to fight the “backdating” practices, which where especially common in Silicon Valley.	美国证券交易委员会和司法部显然决定同所谓“倒签”现象做斗争。 这一现象在硅谷司空见惯。


In France, a law adopted in 2005 requires that severance pay for company managers now be subject to a shareholder vote, and the EADS scandal has spurred consideration of further legal changes.	法国的一部2005年通过的法律要求股东投票来决定公司经理的离职报酬，而欧洲航空防务及航天公司的丑闻激发了采取进一步法律变革的考虑。


A bill proposed by former Prime Minister Edouard Balladur seeks to eliminate perverse incentives by barring corporate officers from exercising their stock options until they leave the company.	前总理巴拉迪尔提出的一项法律草案寻求通过禁止公司官员在离开公司之前行使他们的股票期权来消除产生副作用的激励机制。


Jacques Chirac, more cautiously, stated that stock options should be legally “encadrés” (framed).	希拉克则更为谨慎地声明股票期权应当受到法律的“约束”。


Others suggest broadening the scope of stock options to include more employees.	其他人建议股票期权的范围包括更多的雇员。


Some Socialists are more radical, advocating, as Laurent Fabius recently did, the suppression of stock options.	某些社会党人士，例如法比尤斯最近所为一样，则更为激进。 他们主张限制股票期权。


The problem with legal measures, however, is that they can have pernicious side effects and unintended consequences, especially when they are tailored to a particular crisis.	但是，法律措施的问题是它们可能产生有害的副作用以及非预期的后果，特别是当专门定制以应付某一特别的危机的时候。


The state’s function should be to enact and enforce laws on corporate governance and taxation of managers’ compensation.	国家的功能应当是在企业管治和经理人的报酬税收上制定和执行法律。


In all other areas, legislation cannot serve as a substitute for the exercise of common sense, discernment, and responsibility by a company’s board of directors.	在其他所有方面，立法不能作为常识、认识以及董事会的责任的替代品。


But if we must have laws to bolster our ethics, their guiding principle should be that remuneration is always linked to the performance and services it is intended to compensate.	但是，如果我们非要法律来提高我们的伦理，那么，它们的指导原则就应当是薪金报酬应当总是与打算让其报偿的效绩和服务挂钩。


Only measures that ensure that companies reward true merit will be considered legitimate by employees, shareholders, and the public.	雇员、股东以及公众只会把确保公司奖励真实功劳业绩的措施视为是合法的。


Is the European Dream Over?	欧洲梦破灭了吗？


NEW YORK – Were the Euroskeptics right after all?	纽约——欧元怀疑论者终究说对了吗？


Was the dream of a unified Europe – inspired by fears of another European war, and sustained by the idealistic hope that nation-states were obsolete and would give way to good Europeans – a utopian dead end?	人们对发生另一场欧洲战争的担忧促成了欧洲统一的梦想，天真地希望独立国家已经过时并将让位于出众的欧洲人，这种希望支持着该梦想，这个不切实际的梦想破灭了吗？


On the surface, Europe’s current crisis, which some people predict will tear apart the European Union, is financial.	从表面上来看，欧洲当前的危机是金融危机，许多人预测这场危机将使欧盟四分五裂。


Jacques Delors, one of the architects of the euro, now claims that his idea for a single currency was good, but that its “execution” was flawed, because the weaker countries were allowed to borrow too much.	目前欧元的构建者之一雅克•德洛尔称，自己创造单一货币的想法是好的，但是“实施的过程”有缺陷，因为较弱的国家举债过多。


But, fundamentally, the crisis is political.	但是，从根本上来说，这是一场政治危机。


When sovereign states have their own currencies, citizens are willing to see their tax money go to the weakest regions. That is an expression of national solidarity, a sense that a country’s citizens belong together and are prepared, in a crisis, to sacrifice their own interests for the collective good.	当主权国家拥有自己的货币时，公民愿意看到其上交的税收用到一些最弱的地区，这是国家团结的表现，国家的团结感能够使国民团结起来，在危机期间，为了集体利益，他们会做好牺牲自己个人利益的准备。


Even in nation-states, this is not always self-evident.	即使在独立国家，这常常也不是不言自明的。


Many northern Italians fail to see why they should pay for the poorer south.	许多北部的意大利人不理解为什么他们要为较穷的南部地区埋单。


Affluent Flemings in Belgium resent having to support unemployed Walloons.	比利时富裕的佛兰芒人厌恶不得不支持失业的瓦隆人。


Still, on the whole, just as citizens of democratic states tolerate the government that won the last election, they usually accept economic solidarity as a part of nationhood.	此外，总体而言，正如民主国家的公民能够忍受最近一次选举获胜的政府一样，他们常常能够接受经济团结作为国家的一部分。


Since the EU is neither a nation-state nor a democracy, there is no “European people” to see the EU through hard times.	由于欧盟既不是独立的国家又不是民主国家，在艰难时期，没有“欧洲人”能够理解欧盟。


Rich Germans and Dutch do not want to pay for the economic mess in which the Greeks, Portuguese, or Spanish now find themselves.	富裕的德国人和荷兰人不想为希腊人、葡萄牙人和西班牙人当前深陷的经济困境买单。


Instead of showing solidarity, they moralize, as though all of the problems in Mediterranean Europe were the result of native laziness or its citizens’ corrupt nature.	他们没有表现出团结一致，反而进行道德说教，似乎欧洲地中海地区的所有问题都是其国民懒惰或腐败的本性造成的。


As a result, the moralizers risk bringing the common roof down on Europe’s head, and confronting the nationalist dangers that the EU was created to prevent.	结果，道德说教者把共同的屋顶搞塌了，砸到了欧洲的头上，还有面临民族主义危险的风险，而成立欧盟就是为了防止这种危险。


Europe must be fixed politically as much as financially.	必须从政治上和金融上同时解决欧洲的问题。


It is a cliché, but nonetheless true, that the EU suffers from a “democratic deficit.”	欧盟存在“民主赤字”，这是老调重弹，但是确实如此。


The problem is that democracy has only ever worked within nation-states.	问题在于，民主只有在独立国家发挥过作用。


Nation-states need not be monocultural, or even monolingual.	独立国家不一定只有一种文化，甚至不一定只说一种语言。


Think of Switzerland or India.	想想瑞士或印度就知道了。


They need not be democracies, either: China, Vietnam, and Cuba come to mind.	它们也未必是民主国家：中国、越南和古巴浮现到了脑海中。


But democracy does require that citizens have a sense of belonging.	但是民主确实需要公民有一种归属感。


Is this possible in a supra-national body like the EU?	这在像欧盟这样的超国家组织中可能吗？


If the answer is no, it may be best to restore the sovereignty of individual European nation-states, give up on the common currency, and abandon a dream that is threatening to become a nightmare.	如果答案是否定的，或许最好恢复欧洲各国的主权，放弃共同的货币，抛弃有可能成为噩梦的梦想。


This is what the more radical Euroskeptics in Britain think, having never shared the EU dream to begin with.	英国较激进的欧元怀疑论者就是这么想的，他们一开始就没有追逐欧盟的梦想。


It is easy to dismiss this as typical British chauvinism – the insular attitude of a people living in splendid isolation.	很容易将这视为典型的英国沙文主义——与世隔绝的民族的偏狭态度——从而不屑一顾。


But, in Britain’s defense, its citizens have had a longer and more successful democratic history than have most continental Europeans.	但是，英国人辩护说，其公民享有的民主历史比大多数欧洲人更长、更成功。


Still, even if disbanding Europe were possible, it would come at enormous cost.	但是，即使解散欧洲是可能的，也要付出巨大的代价。


Abandoning the euro, for example, would cripple the continent’s banking system, affecting both Germany and the affluent north and the distressed countries in the south.	比如，抛弃欧元将导致欧洲的银行体系瘫痪，影响到德国、富裕的北部地区以及深陷困境的南部国家。


And, if the Greek and Italian economies face difficult recoveries inside the eurozone, consider how hard it would be to repay euro-denominated debts with devalued drachmas or liras.	再者，如果希腊和意大利经济体在欧元区内都面临困难的经济复苏，可以想象一下以贬值的德拉克马或里拉偿还以欧元计价的债务将多么困难。


Quite apart from the financial aspects, there would be a real danger of throwing away the benefits that the EU has brought, particularly in terms of Europe’s standing in the world.	金融方面除外，欧盟所取得的成果将面临毁于一旦的真正危险，尤其是欧洲在世界上的地位。


In isolation, European countries would have limited global significance.	欧洲单个国家的全球影响力非常有限。


As a union, Europe still matters a great deal.	作为一个联盟，欧洲仍然举足轻重。


The alternative to dismantling the EU is to strengthen it – to pool the debt and create a European treasury.	解散欧盟的替代方法是巩固欧盟——将债务集中起来并创建欧洲财政部。


If European citizens are to accept this, however, the EU needs more democracy.	然而，如果要欧洲民众接受这一点，欧盟需要更多的民主。


But that depends upon a vital sense of European solidarity, which will not come from anthems, flags, or other gimmicks devised by bureaucrats in Brussels.	但是这取决于重要的欧洲团结感，布鲁塞尔官僚发明的圣歌和旗帜等花招并不能带来这种团结感。


For starters, affluent northern Europeans have to be convinced that it is in their interest to strengthen the EU, as it certainly is.	首先，必须让富裕的北部欧洲人相信，巩固欧盟符合他们的利益，事实也是如此。


After all, they have benefited most from the euro, which has enabled them to export cheaply to southern Europeans.	毕竟，它们是欧元的最大受益者，欧元使他们以较低的价格出口卖给南部欧洲人。


While it is up to national politicians to make this case, the EU’s governing institutions in Brussels, Luxembourg, and Strasbourg also have to be brought closer to European citizens.	这需要各国政客说明这一点，但是布鲁塞尔、卢森堡和斯特拉斯堡的欧盟管理机构也可以拉近与欧洲公民的距离。


Perhaps Europeans could vote for members of the European Commission, with candidates campaigning in other countries, rather than just in their own.	或许欧洲人可以投票选出在别国竞选的欧洲委员会成员，而不仅仅是自己国家的成员。


Perhaps Europeans could elect a president.	或许欧洲人可以选出一名总统。


Democracy may seem like a mad dream in a community of 27 nation-states, and perhaps it is.	对于一个有27个国家组成的共同体而言，民主似乎是一个疯狂的梦想，或许真是如此。


But unless one is prepared to give up on building a more united Europe, it is surely worth considering.	但是除非准备放弃建立一个更加团结的欧盟，否则这必定是值得考虑的。


And who can say what is possible?	谁能说什么是可能的呢？


Consider football clubs, the modern world’s most insular, even tribal institutions.	可以想想足球俱乐部，这是现代世界中最泾渭分明甚至具有部落性的组织。


Thirty years ago, who would have imagined that two of London’s most popular clubs – Arsenal and Chelsea – would have a French and a Portuguese coach, respectively, and players from Spain, France, Portugal, Brazil, Russia, Serbia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Mexico, Ghana, South Korea, Holland, Belgium, Nigeria, and the Ivory Coast?	30年前，谁会想到伦敦最受欢迎的两个俱乐部——阿森纳和切尔西——会分别请法国教练和葡萄牙教练，请来自西班牙、法国、葡萄牙、巴西、俄罗斯、塞尔维亚、捷克共和国、波兰、墨西哥、加纳、韩国、荷兰、比利时、尼日利亚和科特迪瓦的球员呢？


Oh, yes, they have one or two from Britain, too.	不错，还有一两名球员来自英国。


Is the European Union imploding?	欧盟正发生聚变吗？


The prospect of being accepted into the EU provided the nations of Eastern and Central Europe with a strong incentive to achieve fiscal balance - a process somewhat similar to what happened in Western Europe at the time the euro was launched.	被欧盟接纳的前景成为东欧各国实现财政平衡的强大动力-这一过程与欧元开始流通时西欧诸国的反应颇为相似。


In both cases, however, after initial progress, countries have shown clear signs of political "fatigue": in the euro area, the Stability Pact has imploded; throughout Eastern Europe, budget deficits have started to rise.	然而，在这两个进程中，相关国家在起初的财政改善之后，都明显地表现出政治"疲惫"的迹象：在欧元区， 《稳定协议》发生了聚变； 在整个东欧，财政预算赤字开始上升。


In the Czech Republic last year, the budget deficit jumped to 13% of GDP, a threefold increase since 1999.	在捷克共和国，去年的预算赤字攀升至GDP的13%，比1999年增加了3倍。


Although this included a one-time charge for bank restructuring costs, this year the deficit will close above 6% of GDP.	虽然这其中包含了一笔一次性的银行重组成本，但今年的赤字仍会占GDP的6%以上。


In Poland, the deficit is also moving close to 6% of GDP, up from 2.9% in 2001.	在波兰，财政赤字也从2001年的2. 9%上升到占GDP的近6%。


In Hungary the budget deficit is widening again, after narrowing to 4% of GDP in 2001.	在匈牙利，预算赤字也在2001年达到占GDP的4%之后开始新一轮的攀升。


Malta, too, has a deficit close to 10% of GDP, up four percentage points since 2001.	马耳他的预算赤字也占到了GDP的近10%，比2001年上涨了4个百分点。


Only the Baltic countries seem able to maintain sound fiscal policies.	只有巴尔干地区各国似乎还能维持合理的财政政策。


In many ways, this is not surprising: once politicians no longer face annual EU progress reports - and the threat of exclusion - fiscal relaxation becomes much less costly.	从许多方面看，这一现象不足为奇：一旦政治家们不用再面对欧盟进步的年度报告-及排他主义的威胁-财政放宽的成本也就不再那么高昂了。


At the same time, the big euro area members (France and Germany) do not have a leg to stand on to criticize other countries' fiscal policies, so there are virtually no international constraints on EU countries' budget deficits.	同时，欧元区的大国们（法国和德国）也自顾不暇，无法对他国的财政政策指手画脚，因而对欧盟各国财政政策的国际性约束也不复存在。


Indeed, these constraints have proven to be utterly useless after a country's EU entry, and it will be hard to impose them as an admission criterion for other potential entrants.	的确，在一个国家加入 欧盟以后，这些约束实际上就成了摆设。 而要将其作为一种行政规范施加于潜在的新成员国也并非易事。


Perhaps more surprising is the apparent political backlash against the governments that have led countries into the EU.	或许更让人意想不到的是民众对曾引领这些国家加入欧盟的各国政府在政治上的对抗性反应。


Once again the similarity with what happened in Western Europe at the time of the euro's implementation is striking.	现今的情况与欧元开始流通时西欧的情况又一次惊人的相似。


The government of Romano Prodi, having managed against all the odds to get Italy into Europe's monetary union, fell three months later.	罗马诺•普罗迪政府在力排众议将意大利领入欧洲货币联盟的3个月之后倒台了。


The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary have each endured a government crisis since EU accession.	捷克共和国、波兰和匈牙利自加入欧盟之后都不约而同地经历了政府危机。


Throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the EU is not as popular as it used to be.	在整个中欧和东欧，欧盟不再像以前那么受欢迎了。


Voter turnout in the European Parliament elections in June was embarrassingly low in the new accession countries, ranging from just 17% in Slovakia to 38.5% in Hungary.	在6月份的欧洲议会选举中，欧盟新成员国的选民投票率低得令人尴尬-从斯洛伐克的17%到匈牙利的38. 5%。


Participating in their first-ever EU election, citizens in these countries turned out at a rate not only well below the European average (about 45%), but even below the UK average.	在他们的第一次欧盟大选中，这些国家公民的投票率不仅远低于欧洲平均水平（45%），甚至还低于英国的平均水平。


The reasons are twofold.	究其原因，主要有两层。


Accession countries felt that they were asked to make major fiscal adjustments in order to be accepted into the EU.	新成员国们觉得为了被欧盟接受它们被迫进行重大的财政调整。


Regardless of whether such policies were in the long-term interest of these countries, in the short run they were politically costly.	不论这些政策是否符合这些国家的长期利益，在短期内它们为之付出了高昂的政治成本。


This "adjustment fatigue," a term coined to describe the experience of Latin American countries to economic liberalization in the 1990's, is now coupled with the feeling that the EU is not such a great bargain after all.	这种"调整疲惫"是一个为了形容拉美各国在20世纪90年代经济自由化中的经历而生造的词。 而今欧洲对它的体会更添加了一种感觉，认为加入欧盟并不如想象的划算。


Perhaps most visible has been Western European countries' eagerness to protect their labor markets against migration from Central and Eastern Europe - a sticking point that always comes up in every meeting between politicians from the West and the East.	或许最明显的就是西欧各国针对来自中、东欧的移民潮而对劳务市场的积极保护-一个令西欧和东欧的政治家们在每一次会面时都相持不下的问题。


Little wonder, then, that voters in Central and Eastern Europe now feel that they got a poor bargain from the governments that brought them in: belt tightening, labor market restrictions, and the notorious barrage of EU regulation.	如此一来，中、东欧各国的选民们现在觉得政府让他们做了亏本生意也在情理之中：勒紧裤带、劳务市场限制和欧盟规章的狂轰滥炸。


The result has been a reaction against these governments and a lack of public interest in EU affairs.	其结果就是公众与这些政府的对抗情绪和对欧盟事务的兴趣缺乏。


So, after all the celebrations of European enlargement, we are left with a predictable set of problems: a "union" of countries with very different views on everything (from foreign policy to labor market policies) and different economic interests; widespread disillusionment among voters in the new member states; a constitutional process whose future is uncertain; and all the usual political wrangling in Brussels between countries seeking to get as much power as possible.	因此，在欧洲扩大的欢庆之余，我们所要面对的是一系列意料之中的问题：一个由对所有事物（从外交政策到劳务市场政策）的观点和经济利益都不相同的国家所组成的"联盟"； 新成员国的选民中普遍存在的幻灭感；


Is the Perfect Storm Over for Markets?	肆虐市场的风暴结束了吗？


LAGUNA BEACH – Earlier this year, financial markets around the world were forced to navigate a perfect storm – a violent disruption fueled by an unusual amalgamation of smaller disturbances.	发自拉古纳海滩——今年早些时候，世界各地的金融市场都被迫在一场完美风暴中艰难航行——这是一场由众多小型干扰因素的异常合并所助长的暴力破坏。 金融震荡加剧，令投资者如惊弓之鸟；


Financial volatility rose, unsettling investors; stocks went on a rollercoaster ride, ending substantially lower; government bond yields plummeted, and lenders found themselves in the unusual position of having to pay for the privilege of holding an even bigger amount of government debt (almost one-third of the total).	股市如过山车般上下翻飞，最终往往是大跌收场； 政府债券收益率大幅下降，同时贷款人发现自己处于一个尴尬境地：他们甚至要为持有总额更庞大（占总数近三分之一）的政府债券而额外付钱。


The longer these disturbances persisted, the greater the threat to a global economy already challenged by structural weaknesses, income and wealth inequalities, pockets of excessive indebtedness, deficient aggregate demand, and insufficient policy coordination.	这些干扰因素持续时间越长，受到结构性弱点，收入和财富不平等，过度负债，过度负债，总需求不足，以及政策协调不足挑战的全球经济所遭受的威胁就更大。


And while relative calm has returned to financial markets, the three causes of volatility are yet to dissipate in any meaningful sense.	虽然金融市场已经相对恢复了平静，但导致波动的三大因素却尚未在真正意义上被消除。


First, mounting signs of economic weakness in China and a series of uncharacteristic policy stumbles there still raise concerns about the overall health of the global economy.	首先，逐渐明显的中国经济疲软迹象以及该国一系列非典型的政策盲动令人们对全球经济整体健康状况的担忧日益增加。


Given that China is the second largest economy in the world, it didn’t take long for European officials to reduce their own growth projections, and for the International Monetary Fund to revise downward its expectations for global growth.	鉴于中国是全球第二大经济体，欧洲和国际货币基金组织的官员们也就迅速反应，分别调低了对本地区和全球经济的增长预期。


Second, there are still legitimate doubts about the effectiveness of central banks, the one group of policymaking institutions that has been actively engaged in supporting sustainable economic growth.	其次，人们对各国央行——这群积极支持经济可持续增长的政策制定机构——的有效性还存在着合法性上的质疑。


In the United States, doubts focus on the willingness of the Federal Reserve to remain “unconventional”; elsewhere, however, doubts about effectiveness concern central banks’ ability to formulate, communicate, and implement policy decisions.	在美国，质疑集中在美联储保持“非常规（货币政策）”的意愿上； 而在其他地方，人们对有效性的怀疑集中在央行制定，沟通和执行政策决策的能力上。


For example, rather than viewing monetary authorities’ activism as an encouraging sign of policy effectiveness, markets have been alarmed by the Bank of Japan’s decision to follow the European Central Bank in taking policy rates even deeper into negative territory.	比如说，货币当局的主动出击并未被视为政策有效性的一个令人鼓舞的迹象，日本央行跟随欧洲央行将政策利率进一步向负值下调的决定就令市场震惊不已。


Third, the system has lost some important safety belts, which have yet to be restored.	第三，该系统已失去了一些重要的安全机制，而且尚未得到恢复。


There are fewer pockets of “patient capital” stepping in to buy when flightier investors are rushing to the exit.	一面是越来越少的“耐心资本”出手买入，一面是越来越多浮躁投资者争先出逃。


In the oil market, the once-powerful OPEC cartel has stepped back from the role of swing producer on the downside – that is, cutting output in order to stop a disorderly price collapse.	在石油市场，曾经强大的欧佩克集团不再迫使产油国增产，因为当务之急是削减产量以阻止油价继续无序崩溃。


Each of these three factors alone would have attracted the attention of traders and investors around the world.	这三个因素中的任何一个都会吸引世界各地交易者和投资者的关注。 如果三者同时出现的话就会动摇市场。


Occurring simultaneously, they unsettled markets.	全球金融市场的几乎每一个门类都出现了大幅单日内震荡；


Intra-day volatility rose in virtually every segment of global financial markets; adverse price contagion became more common as more vulnerable entities contaminated the stronger ones; and asset-market correlations were rendered less stable.	负面的价格蔓延成为普遍现象，因为那些弱势实体会把强势实体拖下水； 同时资产市场的相联性对稳定的促进作用也在降低。


All this came in the context of a US economy that continues to be a powerful engine of job creation.	所有这一切都发生在美国经济仍然是强大就业增长引擎的大背景下。


But markets were not voting on the most recent economic developments in the US.	但各大市场并没有对美国最近的经济发展感到欢欣鼓舞。


Instead, they were being forced to judge the sustainability of financial asset prices that, boosted by liquidity, had notably decoupled from underlying economic fundamentals.	相反，它们都忙着去判断金融资产价格的可维持性，因为在流动性泛滥下这些价格已经与经济基本面严重脱钩。


In the wake of this volatility, markets have recently regained a more stable footing.	在经历了这种波动之后，市场近期重新获得了更加稳定的基础。


Yet the fundamental longer-term challenge of allowing markets to re-price assets to fundamentals in a relatively orderly fashion – and, critically, without causing economic damage that would then blow back into even more unsettled finance – remains.	然而，让市场以一个相对有序的方式根据基本面重新定价——以及关键是不能���成将导致金融退化到更加不稳定状态的经济破坏——的根本性长期挑战仍然存在。


Indeed, the more frequent the bouts of financial volatility in the months to come, the greater the risk that it will lead consumers to become more cautious about spending, and prompt companies to postpone even more of their investment in new plant and equipment.	事实上，未来几个月的金融波动状况越频繁，令消费者消费更加谨慎的风险就越大，并促使企业推迟更多的新厂房和设备投资。


And, if this were to persist and spread, even the US – a relatively healthy economy – could be forced to revise downward its expectations for economic growth and corporate earnings.	同时如果这种情况持续并蔓延开来，连美国 这个相对健康的经济体都可能被迫下调其对经济增长和企业盈利的预期。


Durably stabilizing today’s markets is important, especially for a system that has already assumed too much financial risk.	持久稳定当前的市场是极为重要的，尤其是对于一个已经承担过多财务风险的系统来说。


It requires a policy handoff instigated by more responsible behavior on the part of politicians on both sides of the Atlantic – one that undertakes the much-needed transition from over-reliance on central banks to a more comprehensive policy approach that deals with the economy’s trifecta of structural, demand, and debt impediments (and does so in the context of greater global policy coordination).	它需要大西洋两岸的政治家通过更负责任的行为来推动政策转换——从对央行过度依赖于转为采用一个更全面的政策手段来处理结构，需求和债务这三大经济障碍（并在更广泛全球政策协调的情况下推动这一点）。


Should this handoff occur, its beneficial impact in terms of delivering inclusive growth and genuine global stability would be turbocharged by the productive deployment of cash sitting on companies’ balance sheets, and by exciting technological innovations that began as firm/sector specific but are now having economy-wide effects.	如果这种转换能够实现，其在提供包容性增长和真正全球稳定性方面的有利影响将借助企业对资产负债表中现金的建设性运用，以及那些原本专属于某公司/行业但最终覆盖全经济体的惊人技术革新而被放大。


If the handoff fails, the financial volatility experienced earlier this year will not only return; it could also turn out to have been a prologue for a notable risk of recession, greater inequality, and enduring financial instability.	如果转换失败的话，在今年年初经历的金融动荡不仅会重演； 还可能演变成一场经济衰退，更严重不平等和持久金融动荡的巨大风险的序幕。


Is There a New Washington Consensus?	有一个新华盛顿共识吗？


CAMBRIDGE – Two and a half years ago, senior staff members of the World Bank approached the Nobel laureate Michael Spence to ask him to lead a high-powered commission on economic growth. The question at hand could not have been more important.	剑桥－两年半前，世界银行高级官员来到诺贝尔奖获得者迈克尔·斯宾塞那里，请他领导一个高规格的有关经济增长的委员会。


The “Washington consensus” – the infamous list of do’s and don’ts for policymakers in developing countries – had largely dissipated. But what would replace it?	即将到来的这个问题比以前任何时候都要重要，“华盛顿共识”－有关发展中国家政策制定者可以做和不可以做的声名狼藉的清单－大部分已经不存在了，但是用什么来取代它呢？


Spence was not sure he was the man for the job.	斯宾塞不敢确定他是该工作的恰当人选。


After all, his research had focused on theoretical issues in advanced economies; he had been dean of a business school; and he did not have much experience in economic development.	毕竟，他的研究集中在发达经济体的理论问题上； 他曾经是商学院的院长；


But he was intrigued by the task.	并且他在经济发展方面没有什么经验。


And he was encouraged by the enthusiastic and positive response he received from the commission’s prospective members.	但是该工作激起了他的兴趣， 并且他被从预期的委员会成员那里得到的热情和积极反应所鼓励。


Thus was born the Spence Commission on Growth and Development, a star-studded group of policymakers – including another Nobelist – whose final report was issued at the end of May.	因此云集知名政策制定者的斯宾塞增长和发展委员会诞生了－该委员会包括另一位诺贝尔奖获得者－并于五月末发表了最后的报告。


The Spence report represents a watershed for development policy – as much for what it says as for what it leaves out.	斯宾塞报告代表了发展政策的一个分水岭－它涵盖的东西和遗漏的东西一样多。


Gone are confident assertions about the virtues of liberalization, deregulation, privatization, and free markets.	对自由化，放松监管，私有化和自由市场优点的自信的断言消失了。


Also gone are the cookie cutter policy recommendations unaffected by contextual differences.	不考虑环境差别的千篇一律的政策建议也不见了。


Instead, the Spence report adopts an approach that recognizes the limits of what we know, emphasizes pragmatism and gradualism, and encourages governments to be experimental.	相反，斯宾塞报告采纳了承认我们的认识有局限性的方法，强调实用主义和渐进主义，并且鼓励政府进行试验。


Yes, successful economies have many things in common: they all engage in the global economy, maintain macroeconomic stability, stimulate saving and investment, provide market-oriented incentives, and are reasonably well governed.	是的，成功的经济体有许多共同的地方：它们都参与全球经济，维护整体经济稳定，鼓励储蓄和投资，提供市场导向型的激励措施，以及政府治理良好。


It is useful to keep an eye on these commonalities, because they frame the conduct of appropriate economic policies.	关注这些共同点是有益的，因为它们界定了恰当的经济政策的行为规则。


Saying that context matters does not mean that anything goes.	提及背景差异并不意味着所有的规定都不适用，但是世界上没有通用的规则手册；


But there is no universal rulebook; different countries achieve these ends differently.	不同的国家用不同的方法取得这些成果。


The Spence report reflects a broader intellectual shift within the development profession, a shift that encompasses not just growth strategies but also health, education, and other social policies.  The traditional policy framework, which the new thinking is gradually replacing, is presumptive rather than diagnostic .	斯宾塞报告反映了在发展学术界的一个更广泛的认识转变，该转变不仅包括了增长策略，也包括了健康，教育和其他的社会政策。 正在被新思维逐渐取代的传统政策的框架是假定的，而不是诊断的。


It starts with strong preconceptions about the nature of the problem: too much (or too little) government regulation, too poor governance, too little public spending on health and education, and so on.	它以对问题性质的强烈偏见开始：政府监管太多（或太少），政府治理太差，在健康和教育上的公共开支太少等等。


Moreover, its recommendations take the form of the proverbial “laundry list” of reforms, and emphasize their complementary nature – the imperative to undertake them all simultaneously – rather than their sequencing and prioritization.	而且，它的建议以众所周知的改革“细目清单”的形式出现，并且强调它们的相互补充的性质－必须同时执行它们－而不是给它们排出先后顺序和优先次序。


And it is biased toward universal recipes – “model” institutional arrangements, “best practices,” rules of thumb, and so forth.	它被偏倚成为通用的解决方法－“标准”制度安排，“最好的”实践，经验法则等等。


By contrast, the new policy mindset starts with relative agnosticism about what works.	与此相对，新的政策理念以不太确定什么有效开始。


Its hypothesis is that there is a great deal of “slack” in poor countries, so simple changes can make a big difference.	它假定在贫穷国家有大量的“萧条”，因此简单的改变就会产生很大的不同。


As a result, it is explicitly diagnostic and focuses on the most significant economic bottlenecks and constraints.	结果，它具有明确的诊断性质并关注最主要的经济瓶颈和抑制因素。


Rather than comprehensive reform, it emphasizes policy experimentation and relatively narrowly targeted initiatives in order to discover local solutions, and it calls for monitoring and evaluation in order to learn which experiments work.	它强调政策试验和目标范围相对狭窄的尝试以发现适合当地的解决方法而不是详尽的改革，并且它提倡检测和评估，以了解哪一个试验有效。


The new approach is suspicious of universal remedies.	新方法对通用的解决方法持怀疑态度。


Instead, it searches for policy innovations that provide a shortcut around local economic or political complications.	与此相反，它在当地经济或政治复杂因素的包围中寻求提供捷径的政策革新。


This approach is greatly influenced by China’s experimental gradualism since 1978 – the most spectacular episode of economic growth and poverty reduction the world has ever seen.	该方法深受中国自1978年以来的试验渐进主义影响－它是全世界看到的最引人入胜的经济增长和减少贫困事件。


The Spence report is a consensus document, and therefore an easy target for cheap shots.	斯宾塞报告是一个共识文件，因此是低代价尝试容易关注的对象。


It has no “big ideas” of its own, and at times it tries too hard to please everyone and cover all possible angles.	它本身没有“高见”，并且有时候它太努力取悦每个人并试图覆盖所有可能的方面。


But, as Spence puts it with regard to economic reform itself, you need to take small steps in order to make a big difference in the long run.	但是，正如斯宾塞就经济改革本身表达的观点那样，你需要采取较小的措施以取得在长远过程中的巨大变化。


It is quite a feat to have achieved the degree of consensus he has around a set of ideas that departs in places so markedly from the traditional approach.	在一系列和传统方法在有些地方如此不同的观点包围中，斯宾塞已经取得达成共识的程度，是一个了不起的壮举。


It is to Spence’s credit that the report manages to avoid both market fundamentalism and institutional fundamentalism.	该报告设法既避免了市场正统主义又避免了制度正统主义，使斯宾塞感到高兴。


Rather than offering facile answers such as “just let markets work” or “just get governance right,” it rightly emphasizes that each country must devise its own mix of remedies.	它正确的强调了每个国家都应该设计自己的复合解决方案，而不是提供诸如“让市场起作用”或“把国家治理弄好”这样简单的答案。


Foreign economists and aid agencies can supply some of the ingredients, but only the country itself can provide the recipe.	外国经济学家和援助机构能够提供一些建议，但是只有这个国家自己能够提供解决方法。


If there is a new Washington consensus, it is that the rulebook must be written at home, not in Washington.	如果有一个新华盛顿共识，那就是规则手册应该在具体的国家写成，而不是在华盛顿。


And that is real progress.	这才是真正的进步。


Is Ukraine Next?	下一个目标是乌克兰吗？


LONDON – The war in Georgia has clearly exposed the security vacuum in the surrounding region, as well as a lot of raw nerves.	伦敦--格鲁吉亚战事明显暴露了周边地区的安全真空以及新的紧张因素。


Russia’s hasty decision to recognize the “independence” of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was a shot across the bow for every former Soviet country, and has intensified speculation about who might be “next” – and how to prevent Russia from multiplying the supposed Kosovo “precedent” in other ex-Soviet countries.	俄国匆忙决定承认南奥塞梯和阿布哈兹“独立”给前苏联加盟共和国敲响了警钟，并且让人们更加猜测哪个国家将会成为俄国的下一个目标。 同时，人们也认真思考如何防止俄国如法炮制，对其他前苏联加盟共和国也施行所谓的科索沃“先例”。


Having established itself as the main broker in the conflict, the European Union has many urgent priorities in Georgia itself.	欧盟在目前冲突中奠定了主要调停人的角色，而且在格鲁吉亚本身还有许多急迫的优先重点工作。


But it should also be thinking ahead about how it can demonstrate a stronger commitment to security, democracy, and prosperity in the European “neighborhood.”	但是，欧盟还应当深谋远虑，考虑其如何对欧洲“近邻”的安全、民主以及繁荣表现出更为有力的承诺。


The most effective way of dealing with a newly assertive Russia will be for Europe to issue a collective refusal to accept a bipolar Europe of distinct Russian and EU spheres of influence.	无论在九月一日的欧盟紧急峰会上考虑其他何种制裁，对付最近张狂起来的俄国最为有效的手段就是一致表明拒绝接受两强分立的俄国和欧盟势力范围。


The place to start is Ukraine.	这应该从乌克兰开始。


Fortunately, the EU-Ukraine summit on September 9 in Evian, France, provides the perfect opportunity.	所幸的是，9月9日在法国埃维昂举行的欧盟和乌克兰峰会提供了绝佳机会。


Many Ukrainians now hear domestic echoes of the lead-up to war in Georgia.	许多乌克兰人现在都看到了类似格鲁吉亚战争前的国内局势。


Ukraine has its own potentially separatist region in Crimea, and the country’s Russian minority numbers some 8.3 million (the largest minority in Europe).	乌克兰的克里米亚也有分裂可能的地区，俄罗斯少数居民有大约八百三十万左右(这是欧洲最大的少数族裔)。


Half of Ukraine’s population is Russian-speaking in various degrees.	乌克兰一半人口在不同程度上将俄语。


Although the Ukrainian constitution bans dual citizenship, the government has had to launch an inquiry into alleged covert Russian passport-holding in the Crimean city of Sevastopol.	尽管乌克兰宪法禁止双重国籍，但是政府还是不得不开始调查据传在克里米亚的塞瓦斯托波尔秘密持有俄国护照事件。


Ukrainians note that Russia justified its invasion of Georgia, as the Nazis justified their dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, as being necessary to “protect” a minority to whom they had just given citizenship.	乌克兰注意到，俄国入侵格鲁吉亚以及纳粹分解捷克斯洛伐克都是打者所谓“保护”刚刚赋予国籍的少数居民旗号的。


Russia has begun a war of words over Ukraine’s supply of arms to Georgia.	俄国已经开始对乌克兰向格鲁吉亚提供武器发动了口头战争。


And the conflict itself has shown that the Russian Black Sea Fleet, based in Sevastopol, can operate with impunity, whether Ukraine likes it or not.	冲突本身表明，无论乌克兰喜欢与否，驻扎在塞瓦斯托波尔的俄国黑海舰队可以为所欲为。


Based on its analysis of Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution” as a foreign-backed “NGO revolution,” Russia has also been quietly building its own network of Russia-friendly NGOs in Ukraine since 2004.	俄国分析了乌克兰受到外国“非政府组织革命”支持的“橙色革命”。 它自己也从2004年以来静悄悄地开始在乌克兰建立亲俄的非政府组织网络。


Ukrainians also talk of an otkat ekonomiya (“kickback economy”), in which Russian money percolates throughout the Ukrainian elite.	乌克兰人也谈论所谓“回扣经济”，也就是俄国资金渗透到乌克兰精英阶层。


The European Neighborhood Policy is worthy enough, but it does not address the pressing concerns about maintaining and securing Ukraine’s independence.	欧洲近邻政策本身尚可，但是它并不处理维护和确保乌克兰独立这一急迫问题。


Many member states will worry about leaping straight to the contentious issue of ultimate membership for Ukraine, but the EU already recognizes Ukraine’s theoretical right to join once it has met the Copenhagen criteria; and it cannot be beyond EU leaders’ verbal dexterity to play up the prospect.	欧盟许多成员国担心直接讨论乌克兰的最终成员国资格这一富有争议的问题，但是欧盟已经承认，一旦乌克兰满足哥本哈根标准它就在理论上有权加入欧盟。 而且欧盟领导人也在言辞上可以抬高乌克兰入盟前景。


What Ukraine would value most is a real sense that it is being treated distinctly in its own right.	乌克兰最为看中的是确实感到自己凭着自身力量获得了切实的对待。


The key words are “association” and “partnership,” in whatever order or combination.	这里的关键词是“合作”以及“伙伴关系”，而无论二者次序或者如何合并。


The EU has more scope for short-term measures, and should develop a multi-dimensional solidarity strategy as a signal to both Ukraine and Russia.	欧盟具有更多的短期措施，而且应该制定一项多层面的团结战略作为向乌克兰和俄国两国发出的信号。


For example, the EU’s foreign ministers should invite their Ukrainian counterpart to give a briefing on Ukraine-Russia relations at their next meeting.	例如，欧盟各国外长应该邀请乌克兰外长在下一次会议上通报乌俄关系。


Ukraine should be offered a road map for visa-free travel.	应该做出规划赋予乌克兰人免签证旅行。


The new EU-Ukraine agreement should include a beefed-up solidarity clause, building on the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, whereby the EU would consult and assist Ukraine in case of challenges to its territorial integrity and sovereignty.	新的欧盟乌克兰协议应该在1994年布达佩斯备忘录的基础上包含强化的团结条款。 根据这一条款，在乌克兰的主权和领土完整受到挑战的时候，欧盟将会予以磋商并且援助乌克兰。


And the EU should back Ukraine if it insists that the Russian Black Sea Fleet leaves on schedule in 2017.	而且，如果乌克兰坚持俄国黑海舰队在2017年撤离，欧盟就应该予以支持。


The EU should also launch a comprehensive study of all aspects of Europe’s reliance on Russian energy supplies, including transit, energy security and conservation, supply diversification, and the impact of “bypass” pipelines like Nord Stream and South Stream.	欧盟应当全面研究欧洲的能源供应依赖外国的所有方面，包括运输、能源安全和节能、供应多样化以及北溪管道和南溪管道等“旁道”输油管的影响。


It should consider linking the opening of the Nord Stream pipeline, which would allow Russia to cut off gas to Poland and Ukraine while maintaining deliveries to Germany, to the opening of the proposed “White Stream” pipeline to bring gas from Azerbaijan directly to Ukraine via Georgia, bypassing Russia.	北溪管道可以让俄国在继续向德国运送天然气的情况下切断向波兰和乌克兰供应天然气。 欧盟应当考虑将北溪管道的开口和拟议中的白溪管道的开口连接起来，从而绕过俄国，把阿塞拜疆的天然气直接途经格鲁吉亚运送到乌克兰。


The EU could even play a part in keeping the 2012 European Championship football finals on track.	2012年欧洲杯足球赛将在波兰和乌克兰举办。 欧盟甚至应该发挥作用，确保这一赛事如期举办。


The decision to appoint Ukraine and Poland as co-hosts was a powerful symbol of European unity across the current EU border (Poland is a member, Ukraine is not).	由乌克兰和波兰共同主办这一赛事的决定强烈表明了跨越欧盟的欧洲团结(波兰是欧盟成员，乌克兰则不是) 。


UEFA is unhappy with Ukraine’s progress in building the necessary infrastructure, but Ukraine should be given time to get its act together.	欧足联对乌克兰兴建必要的基础设施进展并不满意，但是应该给乌克兰时间来全力以赴。


Where appropriate, the EU should extend these measures to Moldova, which is now calling Ukraine a “strategic shelter.”	摩尔多瓦把乌克兰称为“战略屏障”。 在适当的条件下，欧盟应当把这些措施延伸到摩尔多瓦。


Ukraine faces a crucial presidential election in 2009 or 2010 (and Moldova will hold elections in March 2009).	乌克兰在2009年或2010年面临关键性的总统选举(摩尔多瓦则在2009年举行选举)。


After getting its fingers badly burned at the last election in 2004, Russia is clearly tempted to intervene again.	俄国在2004年的上一次选举中惨遭失败，现在明显想要再次干预选举。


The “Russian factor” will strongly influence the campaign.	“俄国因素”将会强烈影响竞选。


Greater Western engagement is needed to ensure that the “Europe factor” is equally prominent.	西方应该更多地接触来确保“欧洲因素”也同样重要。


Roman Europe?	罗马的欧洲？


BERLIN/VENICE – As the European Union begins to disintegrate, who can provide the leadership to save it?	柏林/威尼斯—欧盟开始分崩离析之际，谁能拿出领导力来拯救它？


German Chancellor Angela Merkel is widely credited with finally answering Henry Kissinger’s famous question about the Western alliance: “What is the phone number for Europe?”	德国总理默克尔被广泛认为终于回答了亨利·基辛格所提出的著名的西方联盟之问：“欧洲电话号码是多少？


But if Europe’s phone number has a German dialing code, it goes through to an automated answer: “Nein zu Allem.”	”但如果欧洲电话号码加上了德国区号，就会来到自动应答：“什么都不行。 ”


This phrase – “No to everything” – is how Mario Draghi, the European Central Bank president, recently described the standard German response to all economic initiatives aimed at strengthening Europe.	这句话——“什么都不行”——便是欧洲央行行长德拉吉最近用来描述德国对一切旨在强化欧洲的经济措施的反应的用语。


A classic case was Merkel’s veto of a proposal by Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi to fund refugee programs in Europe, North Africa, and Turkey through an issue of EU bonds, an efficient and low-cost idea also advanced by leading financiers such as George Soros.	一个经典案例是默克尔否决了意大利总理伦齐所提出的通过发行欧盟债券资助欧洲、北非和土耳其难民计划的方案，索罗斯等著名金融家也都支持伦齐的这个高效率低成本的想法。


Merkel’s high-handed refusal even to consider broader European interests if these threaten her domestic popularity has become a recurring nightmare for other EU leaders.	默克尔甚至蛮横地拒绝考虑更广泛的欧洲利益——如果这些利益威胁到她在国内的支持度的话。 这已经成为其他欧盟领导人反复遭遇的噩梦。


This refusal underpins not only her economic and immigration policies, but also her bullying of Greece, her support for coal subsidies, her backing of German carmakers over diesel emissions, her kowtowing to Turkey on press freedom, and her mismanagement of the Minsk agreement in Ukraine.	默克尔的拒绝不但支撑着她的经济和移民政策，也导致了她对希腊的欺压、对煤炭补贴的支持、对德国汽车制造商在柴油排放问题上的支持、在新闻自由问题上对土耳其的让步，以及对乌克兰问题明斯克协议的管理不善。


In short, Merkel has done more to damage the EU than any living politician, while constantly proclaiming her passion for “the European project.”	简言之，默克尔比任何其他在任政客对欧盟为害都要大，而她还言必称热衷于“欧洲工程”。


But where can a Europe disillusioned with German leadership now turn?	但眼下打破了德国领导幻觉的欧洲将何去何从？ 显然，以下国家不会或无法承担领导者角色：英国自绝于欧洲；


The obvious candidates will not or cannot take on the role: Britain has excluded itself; France is paralyzed until next year’s presidential election and possibly beyond; and Spain cannot even form a government.	法国在明年总统选举前都将陷入瘫痪，总统选举后也未必能恢复； 而西班牙甚至连政府都组织不起来。


That leaves Italy, a country that, having dominated Europe’s politics and culture for most of its history, is now treated as “peripheral.”	于是就只剩下了意大利，这个在大部分历史中主导着欧洲政治和文化的国家，现在被视为“外围”。


But Italy is resuming its historic role as a source of Europe’s best ideas and leadership in politics, and also, most surprisingly, in economics.	但意大利正在重建作为欧洲最优秀思想和政治领导力来源——以及最令人震惊的，经济领导力来源——的历史角色。


Draghi’s transformation of the ECB into the world’s most creative and proactive central bank is the clearest example of this.	最显著的例子是德拉吉让欧洲央行成为全世界最具创新性和最积极主动的央行。


The enormous program of quantitative easing that Draghi pushed through, against German opposition, has saved the euro by circumventing the Maastricht Treaty’s rules against monetizing or mutualizing government debts.	德拉吉顶着德国的反对所推行的大规模量化宽松绕过马斯特里赫特条约中禁止政府债务货币化或共同化的规定，拯救了欧元。


Last month, Draghi became the first central banker to take seriously the idea of helicopter money – the direct distribution of newly created money from the central bank to eurozone residents.	上个月，德拉吉成为第一个认真考虑直升飞机撒钱的央行行长。 直升飞机撒钱是指欧洲央行将新创造出的货币分给欧元区居民。


Germany’s leaders have reacted furiously and are now subjecting Draghi to nationalistic personal attacks.	德国领导人对此异常愤怒，目前正在对德拉吉展开民族主义人身攻击。


Less visibly, Italy has also led a quiet rebellion against the pre-Keynesian economics of the German government and the European Commission.	不太令人关注的方面是意大利还在领导着一场反对德国政府和欧盟委员会的前凯恩斯时代经济学的反叛。


In EU councils and again at this month’s International Monetary Fund meeting in Washington, DC, Pier Carlo Padoan, Italy’s finance minister, presented the case for fiscal stimulus more strongly and coherently than any other EU leader.	在欧盟各委员会上，以及本月的国际货币基金组织（IMF）华盛顿会议上，意大利财政部长帕多安（Pier Carlo Padoan）提出了比其他欧盟领导人力度更大、协调更好的财政刺激。


More important, Padoan has started to implement fiscal stimulus by cutting taxes and maintaining public spending plans, in defiance of German and EU Commission demands to tighten his budget.	更重要的是，帕多安已开始实施财政政策——降低税收并维持公共支出计划，丝毫不顾德国和欧盟委员会收紧预算的要求。


As a result, consumer and business confidence in Italy have rebounded to the highest level in 15 years, credit conditions have improved, and Italy is the only G-7 country expected by the IMF to grow faster in 2016 than 2015 (albeit still at an inadequate 1% rate).	结果，意大利消费者和企业信心反弹至15年来最高值，信用条件也有所改善，成为G-7国家中唯一一个IMF预期2016年增长速度快于2015年的国家（尽管仍然只有1%）。


Padoan has more recently created an imaginative public-private partnership to finance a desperately needed recapitalization of Italy’s banks.	帕多安最近构思了一套想象的公私合作方案 为意大利急需的银行资本重组提供资金。


And he has launched his initiative without waiting for approval from ECB and EU officials, who blocked an earlier “bad bank” plan under German pressure.	他等不及欧洲央行和欧盟官员的批准便启动了他的计划，后两者曾在德国的压力下阻止了早前的“坏银行”计划。


Financial markets immediately rewarded Italy for its defiance, with the share price of the country’s biggest bank, Unicredit, jumping by 25% in three days.	金融市场对意大利的反叛的反应是应声而涨，意大利最大银行Unicredit在三天内大涨25%。


Italy’s increasingly assertive resistance to German economic dogmas may not be surprising: The country has suffered from almost continuous recession since joining the euro.	意大利越来越自信地反对德国经济教条，这或许并不令人惊奇：自加入欧元区以来，意大利几乎衰退不断。


Moreover, Padoan, who was formerly the OECD’s chief economist, is the only G-7 finance minister with professional economics training.	此外，曾任经合组织首席经济学家的帕多安是G-7国家财政部长中唯一一个受过专业经济学训练的。


He understands better than anyone that misguided fiscal and monetary policies have been the underlying cause of Europe’s economic underperformance, and are largely responsible for the political tensions threatening to destroy the EU.	他比其他任何人都更能理解误导性财政和货币政策是欧洲经济表现低迷的根本原因，也要为可能破坏欧盟的政治紧张局面负有很大责任。


The renaissance of Italian self-confidence and leadership can also be observed in domestic and international politics.	意大利自信心和领导力的复兴也可以从国内和国际政坛中发现 。


Renzi was the only European leader to increase his party’s vote share in the 2014 European Parliament election, and his dominance of Italian politics has since grown.	伦齐是2014年欧洲议会选举中唯一一个提高了所在党派选票比例的欧洲领导人，他在意大利政坛的主宰地位也有所加强。


While populist politics now threatens Germany, France, Spain, and Britain, Italy has turned its back on Silvio Berlusconi, and Renzi has squeezed support for the Northern League and the Five Star Movement.	如今，民粹主义政治威胁着德国、法国、西班牙和英国，而意大利已经与贝卢斯科尼分道扬镳，伦齐也成功遏制了对北方联盟（Northern League）和五星运动（Five Star Movement）的支持。


As a result, Italy has started implementing labor, pension, and administrative reforms that were unthinkable in the past.	结果，意大利已开始实施过去无法想象的劳动力、退休金和行政改革。


In foreign affairs, too, Italy has become more assertive.	在外交事务方面，意大利也变得更加坚决自信。


The Italian foreign minister, Paolo Gentiloni, is collaborating with his predecessor, Federica Mogherini, now the EU’s High Representative for foreign affairs, to create more pragmatic and effective European policies on Libya and the refugee crisis.	意大利外交部长詹迪伦尼（Paolo Gentiloni）正在与其前任、现欧盟外交事务高级代表蒙赫里尼（Federica Mogherini）合作制定更加务实有效的利比亚和难民危机政策。


Most significantly, Italy is leading an effort to repair relations with Russia after the Ukraine confrontation and to strengthen cooperation over Syria.	更重要的是，正在领衔修复乌克兰冲突后的对俄关系以及加强在叙利亚问题上的合作。


This campaign appears to be bearing fruit with a gradual lifting of EU sanctions against Russia, starting this summer.	这方面的努力似乎正在产生结果，从今年夏天开始，欧盟将逐渐取消对俄制裁。


Given the failures of German leadership in Europe and the political vacuum elsewhere in the EU, Italy’s decision to raise its profile is surely right.	考虑到德国在欧洲领导的失败以及欧盟其他地区的政治真空，意大利提升其形象的决定毫无疑问是正确的。


As Renzi put it in a recent interview, “After two years listening, now I speak.”	伦齐在最近的采访中指出：“在做了两年听众之后，现在我开始发话了。 ”


It remains to be seen whether Italy can assemble a coalition of economically progressive and politically pragmatic countries to overcome German conservatism and dogmatism.	意大利能否组织起一个由经济进步、整治务实的国家组成的联盟以克服德国的保守和教条还有待观察。


But one way or another, Europe’s political economy will have to adapt to the new type of global capitalism evolving out of the 2008 crisis.	但无论如何，欧洲政治经济必须适应2008年危机后所产生的新型全球资本主义。


With luck, a new breed of wily and agile Italian leaders will out-maneuver the blundering German dinosaurs, whose outdated rules and doctrines are leading the EU toward extinction.	幸运的话，新一代多谋而灵活的意大利领导人将取代愚钝的德国老顽固，后者过时的规则和思维正在让欧盟走向灭亡。


Europe’s December Day of Reckoning	12月，欧洲的反思日


VIENNA – While most of the European Union seems panic-stricken by the prospect of a victory for French far-right leader Marine Le Pen in France’s presidential election in May, the EU’s next test will come much sooner.	维也纳—欧盟大部分国家都因为法国极右翼领导人马琳·勒庞（Marine Le Pen）可能在5月的法国总统大选中取得胜利，但欧盟的下一场考验来得要比这早得多。


On Sunday, Italians will vote in a referendum on constitutional reforms, and Austrians will choose their next president.	本周日，意大利将进行宪政改革全民公投，奥地利将选出下一任总统。


Both countries’ votes could have major ramifications beyond their borders.	两国的投票结果将产生远远超越国境线的重大影响。


In Italy, the upcoming plebiscite has become a popular confidence vote in Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, who has said he will resign if the reforms are rejected.	在意大利，即将到来的公决已经成为对总理伦齐的群众信心投票。 伦齐已经表示，如果改革遭拒，他将辞职。


According to the latest polls, Renzi could be forced to make good on his pledge, which might spell the end of reformist social democracy in Italy – and beyond.	根据最新民调，伦齐可能会被迫履行他的承诺，进而宣告意大利——以及其他国家——改革派社会民主告一段落。


In Austria, voters will choose between a pro- and an anti-EU candidate in the nationalist mold of Le Pen, Norbert Hofer of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ).	在奥地利，选民将在亲欧盟和反欧盟候选人之间选择，后者是与勒庞持有相同民族主义立场的奥地利自由党（FPÖ）的诺尔伯特·霍福尔（Norbert Hofer）。


A victory for Hofer could add wind to Le Pen’s sails.	霍福尔取得胜利将大大助力勒庞的选情。


The constitutional changes that Renzi’s Yes campaign is asking voters to approve would undo some of his predecessor Silvio Berlusconi’s legacy – a legacy that serves as a prime example of the damage right-wing populism can do to a country.	支持伦齐阵营要求选民批准的宪政改革将剪除一些其前任贝卢斯科尼的遗产——这些遗产显著地表明了右翼民粹主义可能一个国家带来什么伤害。


Among other things, Berlusconi altered Italy’s political system in such a way as to prevent the left from ever gaining full power again, and to block any criminal charges that could be leveled against him.	为了阻止左翼重新赢得充分的权力，以及阻挠一切可能针对他个人的犯罪指控，贝卢斯科尼大大改变了意大利政治制度。


Renzi’s proposed reforms would, among other things, modernize the political system by disempowering the Senate (the upper house of Parliament).	伦齐所提出的改革要通过削减参议院（议会上院）的权力实现政治制度现代化。


Such an amendment is sorely needed to eliminate political gridlock, and Renzi has already succeeded in getting it through both chambers of Parliament.	要打破政治僵局，进行这样的宪法修订是十分必要的，并且伦齐已经成功说服了议会两院。


Indeed, the plebiscite was only supposed to provide final confirmation.	事实上，公决应该只是提供最终确认。


But Renzi failed to improve Italy’s dismal economic performance.	但伦齐没能改善意大利萎靡不振的经济。


Eight years after the 2008 financial crisis, industrial production is still down by 25% from pre-crisis levels, and youth unemployment is hovering at more than 40%.	2008年金融危机已经过去了八年，但意大利工业产量仍比危机前水平低25%，年轻人失业仍徘徊在40%以上。


According to these economic indicators, “la crisi,” as the Italians call it, is as bad as that experienced a quarter-century ago in Poland and other Eastern European countries, in the aftermath of communism’s collapse.	这些经济指标——意大利人称之为“危机”（la crisi）——与四分之一个世纪前波兰和东欧国家在共产主义崩溃后的情况一样糟糕。


But those countries endured their post-communist hardships, because their leaders and enough of their people believed in the promise of free-market capitalism.	但这些国家渡过了后共产主义难关，因为它们的领导人和足够多的人民相信自由市场资本主义带来的憧憬。


By contrast, since the 2008 global financial crisis, that belief has been badly shaken in Italy and other EU-countries.	相反，2008年全球金融危机以来，意大利和其他欧盟国家的这一信念受到了极大的动摇。


The boyish Renzi did try to improve the existing system and close some of Italy’s generational gaps, by implementing labor-market reforms.	年少成名的伦齐确实试图通过实施劳动力市场改革改善现有制度，消除一些代际差距。


But, unlike former British Prime Minister Tony Blair in the 1990s or former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in the early 2000s, Renzi is operating under far worse global economic conditions.	但是，与20世纪90年代的英国前首相布莱尔和21世纪初的德国总理提施罗德不同，伦齐需要在恶劣得多的全球经济环境下施展。


Italy cannot build on an export-driven growth model, and it is staggering under the massive debt burden inherited from Berlusconi.	意大利无法以出口拉动型增长模式为基础，并且因为贝卢斯科尼留下的沉重债务负担而步履维艰。


Renzi’s foes include left-wing populists such as the Five Star Movement (Movimiento Cinque Stelle) and right-wing populists such as the Northern League, or Lega Nord, which fiercely attack him while blaming the EU for many of Italy’s economic and political problems.	伦齐的对手包括五星运动（Movimiento Cinque Stelle）等左翼民粹主义者和北方联盟（Lega Nord）等右翼民粹主义者，他们猛烈抨击伦齐，同时指责欧盟要为意大利的诸多经济和政治问题负责。


The EU, meanwhile, has left Italy to manage on its own the 160,000 North African refugees who have arrived so far just in the course of this year.	与此同时，欧盟要求意大利管理好自身160,000北非难民，他们都是在今年到达意大利的。


If Renzi’s referendum fails, Five Star Movement leader Beppe Grillo has indicated that he will demand another plebiscite on Italy’s eurozone membership, which might just succeed.	如果伦齐的公投失败，五星运动领导人贝佩·格里洛（Beppe Grillo）已经表示他将要求举行关于意大利欧元区成员地位的新公决，这场公决很有可能取得成功。


While Italy was once a staunchly pro-EU country, many Italians may now support less integration, especially after the high-profile example set by the United Kingdom’s Brexit referendum in June.	尽管意大利曾经是坚定的欧盟支持者，但如今许多意大利人支持退出一体化，特别是在6月的英国退欧公投树立了高调的榜样之后。


On the other hand, a eurozone-membership referendum may not even be necessary.	另一方面，欧元区成员地位公投也许根本没有必要。


If Renzi steps down, Italy could become almost ungovernable, which will frighten financial markets.	如果伦齐下台，意大利可能陷入不可收拾之局，从而令金融市场感到恐慌。


This, in turn, will make it difficult for Italy to remain in the eurozone, given the already high interest rates on its public debt, which amounts to 132% of its GDP.	这反过来将使意大利难以留在欧元区，因为其占GDP的132%的公债利率已经非常高。


Meanwhile, in Austria, the upcoming presidential election – pitting Hofer against independent left-wing candidate Alexander Van der Bellen – will be more about the country’s politics than about its economy.	与此同时，在奥地利，即将到来的总统选举——霍福尔对阵独立左翼候选人亚历山大·范德贝伦（Alexander Van der Bellen）——的政治意义大于经济意义。


For the past 10 years, Austria has been governed by a grand coalition of Social Democrats and Conservatives; but these two mainstream parties constantly block each other, and are united only in their opposition to right-wing populists such as Hofer.	过去10年来，奥地利由社会民主党和保守党所组成的大联盟执政； 但这两个主流政党一直在互相掣肘，只有在反对霍福尔这样的右翼民粹主义者时才能团结一致。


This sclerotic arrangement, however, has enabled those same right-wing populists to present themselves as the only alternative to “the system.”	但是，这一僵硬的安排使得这些右翼民粹主义者能够以“体制”的唯一替代者的身份出现。


Austria is one of the EU’s richest countries, and it is doing well compared to Italy.	奥地利是欧盟最富裕的国家之一，与意大利相比，它的表现堪称优秀。


But Austrians are afraid of losing their current wealth, and they do still have economic grievances that politicians can tap.	但奥地利人担心失去现有的财富，并且仍然存在政客可以利用的经济不满。 比如，奥地利���低产阶级收入十年来一直在缓慢下降；


For example, low- and middle-class Austrians’ incomes have been slowly shrinking for ten years; overall economic growth is lower than the EU average; and unemployment is rising.	总体经济增长慢于欧盟平均水平； 并且失业也在攀升。


As in Italy, Austria’s right-wing populists have railed against the EU, and have mused about taking the country out of the Eurozone.	和意大利一样，奥地利右翼民粹主义者将矛头指向欧盟，考虑要让奥地利退出欧盟。


But such a move would be even more suicidal than in Italy’s case, and the FPÖ has actually moderated its anti-European stance since the Brexit vote.	但奥地利这样做比意大利更像是自杀，而在英国退欧投票后，FPÖ的反欧盟立场其实也不像以前那样坚决了。


Instead, the FPÖ has announced its intention to turn Austria’s political system into a more presidential-plebiscitary democracy.	相反，FPÖ宣称要让奥地利政治制度朝总统-公决制民主转变。


This, too, would be a blow against Europe, because it would mean that any EU legislation – such as policies to disperse refugees now in Italy to other member countries – could be blocked by a plebiscite.	这也将构成对欧盟打击，因为这意味着任何欧盟立法——如将目前滞留在意大利的难民遣送到其他成员国——可以通过全民公决阻止。


When the Berlin Wall came down – and state socialism along with it – the European Economic Community’s founding member states responded by establishing the European Union, and committing to deeper European integration.	柏林墙倒塌时，国家社会主义也随之倒塌，欧洲经济共同体创始成员国的应对之道是成立欧盟，并致力于加深欧洲一体化。


That project worked well until the 2008 crisis, suggesting that the EU might be best suited for good times, not for hard times.	这项工程一直进展顺利，直到2008年危机，这表明欧盟也许只能同甘，不能共苦。


Its double test in Italy and Austria on December 4 will provide powerful evidence one way or the other.	12月4日，欧盟将迎来意大利和奥地利的双重考验，这次考验将给上述看法提供有力的证据——有可能是肯定，也有可能是否定。


The Stakes of Italy’s Referendum	意大利公投所牵涉到的事


MILAN – In the last 68 years, Italy has held 17 general elections and a few referenda.	米兰—在过去68年中，意大利举行过17次大选和几次公投。 但只有三次，意大利选情成为国际舞台的中心：1948年选择西方还是共产主义；


But only three times has an Italian vote claimed center stage internationally: in 1948, when the choice was between the West and communism; in 1976, when voters faced a similar choice, between the Christian Democrats and Enrico Berlinguer’s “Eurocommunism”; and now, with the upcoming referendum on constitutional reforms.	1976年选民在基督教民主党和恩里克·贝林格（Enrico Berlinguer）的“欧洲共产主义”之间做出同样的选择； 以及现在，即即将到来的宪政改革公投。


The implications of the upcoming vote are enormous.	这场即将到来的投票的影响是巨大的。


Prime Minister Matteo Renzi has staked his political future on the vote, pledging to step down (though not immediately) if the reforms are rejected.	总理伦齐押上了自己的政治前途，宣布如果改革被拒绝就将下台（尽管不是立刻下台）。


Such an outcome that would irreparably weaken the center-left government coalition as well: Renzi’s Democratic Party (PD) is already roiled by infighting over the reforms.	这样的结果也将不可挽回地伤害中左翼执政联盟：伦齐的民主党（PD）已经因为在改革问题上的内斗而出现了混乱。


In fact, the PD may not be able to avoid a split even if the vote goes the prime minister’s way.	事实上，即使投票结果有利于伦齐，民主党也有可能无法避免分裂。


A defeat for Renzi will be read as a victory for Italy’s two major populist parties: the Lega Nord and the larger Five Star Movement, led by the comedian Beppe Grillo.	伦齐如果失败，将被解读为意大利两大民粹主义政党的胜利：北方联盟（Lega Nord）和由滑稽演员贝佩·格里洛（Beppe Grillo）领导的规模更大的五星运动（Five Star Movement）。


The two parties are not allied, but both are nurtured by anti-establishment sentiment and favor “national solutions” to Italy’s problems – beginning with a return to the Italian lira.	这两个政党没有结盟，但都得益于反建制情绪并支持用“民族方案”解决意大利的问题——首先就是恢复意大利里拉。


If Renzi is defeated, Lega Nord and the Five Star Movement could join forces to support a new government and hold a new referendum – this time on the euro.	如果伦齐失败，北方联盟和五星运动可能联手支持新政府，举行新公投——针对欧元的新公投。


If Italy – one of the world’s largest public debtors – decided to go it alone, the entire European project could be dealt a mortal blow.	如果身为全世界最大公债债务国之一的意大利决定脱欧，则整个欧洲工程都可能遭受致命打击。


In the age of Donald Trump and Brexit, that outcome is far from unthinkable.	在特朗普成为美国总统、英国退出欧盟的时代，这一结果绝不是不可想象的。


The issue at stake in the referendum is not inconsequential, but it should not decide the fate of Europe.	此次公投所牵涉到的问题绝非不重要，但应该不会左右欧洲的命运。


Italians will vote on whether to strip the Senate (the parliament’s upper house) of two-thirds of its members and much of its legislative authority, making it merely a talking shop akin to Germany’s Bundesrat, and return some of the regions’ powers to the central government.	意大利人将投票决定是否将参议院（议会上院）席位削减三分之二，裁去其大部分立法权，让它仅仅充当言事堂，类似于德国联邦参议院，并将一些大区权力收回中央政府。


Changes like these have been discussed for 30 years.	诸如此类的变化已经讨论了30年。


The lack of movement could benefit Renzi, if voters conclude that they should not waste such a rare opportunity to do something to reform their sclerotic system.	迟迟没有采取行动可能有利于伦齐，如果选民认为不应该浪费如此宝贵的机会做些事情改革僵化的体制的话。


President Sergio Mattarella is impartial, but he would prefer that the reforms go forward.	总统马达莱拉没有党派立场，但他更想看到改革得到推进。


His predecessor, Giorgio Napolitano, is also strongly in favor of the reforms, which he says would be “great news for Italy.”	他的前任纳波利塔诺也强烈支持改革，说改革“对意大利来说是绝好的消息”。


But the reforms have also faced stiff opposition.	但改革也面临着强硬的反对。


Some state institutions dislike the idea of delivering more powers to the executive branch; magistrates, for example, fear a loss of judges’ extensive and unchecked powers.	一些国家机构不喜欢将更多权力让渡给行政机关的安排； 比如，地方行政官担心法官的权力太大并且没有制衡。


Then there are the new populists, several PD old-timers, and plenty of other establishment figures, including several former members of the constitutional court, who generally fear change.	还有新民粹主义者、某些民主党元老以其他众多建制派人物（包括一些宪法法院前法官），他们一般都担心变革。


Former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, ever the opportunist, is also opposing the reforms.	前总理、一直秉持机会主义的贝卢斯科尼也反对改革。


The opposition, as usual, benefits considerably from its simple message.	与往常一样，反对派通过简洁的信息赢得大量支持。


To vote “no” is to vote against the “system” and all of its corruption.	投票支持“不”就是投票反对“体制”及其所有的腐败现象。


Who is not against corruption?	谁不反对腐败？


Add to that rising Euroskepticism, and the result is an intoxicating political brew.	此外还有日益兴盛的欧洲怀疑论，于是一杯醉人的政治佳酿就酿成了。


Opinion polls now indicate a 5-6-point majority for No, with 20% of voters still undecided.	现在的民调显示反对派占据5—6个点的多数，而仍有20%的选民举棋不定。


If a general election follows the referendum, Grillo will be running neck and neck with Renzi’s PD.	如果公投后举行大选，格里洛将与伦齐的民主党并驾齐驱。


Given the huge premium accorded to the winner by Italy’s new electoral law (Renzi was sure he would be the one to benefit), such a prospect is truly frightening.	考虑到根据意大利新选举法，获胜者将获得巨大的优势（伦齐确定他将是受益者之一），这样的前景着实骇人。


Grillo – much like Lega Nord’s Matteo Salvini – has scant political experience, little knowledge of European history, few refined arguments, and no credible vision for the future.	格里洛与北方联盟的马蒂奥·萨尔维尼（Matteo Salvini）十分相似，他没有什么政治经验，不了解欧洲的历史，没有多少经过提炼的观点，也没有可信的未来愿景。


He blames Europe for Italy’s mistakes, such as piling up massive public debt, which now amounts to 132% of GDP.	他将意大利的错误（如大量累积公债，目前已达GDP的132%）归咎于欧洲。


And he makes unfeasible promises, such as a guaranteed income for all citizens without other means.	他还做出不可行的承诺，比如在没有其他方法的情况下保证所有意大利公民的收入。


Juan Perón, the consummate populist, proved just how flawed such giveaways can be when he took a similar tack in Argentina.	完美的民粹主义者胡安·庇隆通过在阿根廷使用类似的伎俩证明了如此慷慨的缺陷有多么严重。


And that is not even the only Argentinian mistake Grillo may be set to make.	而这甚至不是格里洛可能犯下的唯一一个阿根廷式的错误。


He also supports the Argentinian model of dealing with the debt by defaulting on it.	他还支持阿根廷通过违约处理债务的模式。


It is such an absurd proposition – Italy has never defaulted, though it did, under Mussolini, try to go its “own way,” with disastrous results – that one wonders whether Grillo is capable of distinguishing between policy and comedy.	这样的办法实在太过荒谬——意大利从未违约，尽管在墨索里尼时期它确实曾经试图“自说自话”，结果导致了灾难性后果——让人不禁怀疑格里洛是否能够分清政策和滑稽戏。


As in the United Kingdom and the United States, change is the magic word in Italy today.	与英国和美国一样，在今天的意大利，变化是一个魔法词汇。


Nobody wants to be against change.	没人想反对变化。


Instead, opposition to reform is framed as support for better reforms.	相反，反对改革被包装为支持更好的改革。


Don’t just change the constitution, the No campaign implores voters: change everything!	不要只改变宪法，反对阵营哀求选民，而要改变一切！


As in Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa’s great novel Il Gattopardo (The Leopard), changing everything could be just the way to keep it all the same.	朱塞佩·托马西·兰佩杜萨（Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa）的名著《豹》（Il Gattopardo）中写道，改变一切最后只能让一切不变。


That is the last thing Italy needs.	而一切不变绝不是意大利所需要的。


Can Trump Save the Euro?	特朗普能拯救欧元吗?


BRUSSELS – Europe has just endured two more difficult tests.	发自布鲁塞尔——欧洲刚刚经历了两场更艰难的考验。


While Austrian voters rejected the possibility of the European Union getting its first far-right head of state, Italians delivered a stinging rebuke to their government – and opened the way for populist forces to come to power.	虽然奥地利选民否决了欧盟首位极右翼国家元首上台的可能性，但意大利人却对本国政府表达了冷酷无情的否定，并为民粹主义力量上台开启了大门。


Add to that a Brexit that has yet to unfold and the eurozone’s still-lackluster economic performance, and the survival of the common currency is far from guaranteed.	此外英国脱欧进程尚未展开，欧元区经济表现依旧疲软，共同货币的生存也难有定局。


With the euro taking the blame in recent years for Europe’s many economic travails (from a double-dip recession to a slow and uneven recovery), nationalist, Euroskeptic, and populist political movements have gained ground.	由于近年来对欧洲许多经济困局（从双底衰退到复苏缓慢不均）的指责都被归到了欧元头上，民族主义，欧洲怀疑论和民粹主义政治运动都因此找到了落脚点。


Austria has sidestepped their advance, but Italy may not.	虽然奥地利已经避开了这些思潮的锋芒，但意大利则可能无法幸免。


Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s decision to make good on his promise to resign if voters rejected his government’s proposed constitutional reforms has thrown Italian politics into disarray, and an early general election is likely.	总理马修奥·伦齐（Matteo Renzi）因选民否决其政府提出的修宪议案而依承诺辞职的决定使意大利政治陷入了混乱，并可能引发提前大选。


At a time of substantial economic challenges – Italy’s output has been stagnant for a decade, and its public finances remain precarious – the populist Five Star Movement, which has pledged to hold a referendum on continued euro membership, may well tempt voters.	在这一经济面临重大挑战的时候——意大利的产出增长已经停滞了十年，其公共财政状况仍不稳定——承诺就是否保持欧元成员国资格举行全民公投的民粹主义五星运动党（Five Star Movement）很可能会拉拢大量选民。


If the eurozone’s breakdown is to be avoided, Italy – indeed, the entire currency area – urgently needs an economic boost.	如果要避免欧元区的崩溃，意大利——实际上是整个单一货币区域——迫切需要经济增长。


US President-elect Donald Trump may be just the person to deliver it.	而候任美国总统特朗普可能就是能实现这一点的那个人。


Even weeks before Trump takes office, he is beginning to have an impact.	即使距离特朗普正式就任还有几个星期，他开始产生影响了。


Long-term interest rates have risen in the United States, and are expected to climb higher. That has contributed to a (much smaller) rate increase in Europe.	美国的长期利率上升并预计将持续走高，令欧洲的债券回报率也出现（极小幅）上涨。


Yields on German ten-year bunds are in positive territory, having risen by around 50 basis points since the US election.	德国十年期国债收益率自美国大选以来上涨了大约50个基点，目前处于正值区域。


Populists can no longer complain that the European Central Bank is taxing German savers.	因此民粹主义者无法再抱怨欧洲央行正在对德国储蓄者征税。


In the eurozone’s periphery, the increase has been more marked; in Italy, for example, ten-year bond yields are up almost a full percentage point.	而欧元区外围国家的债券收益率的上涨更为明显； 比如意大利10年期国债的收益率几乎上升了一个百分点。


While this might seem problematic, the reality is that the negative impact of higher rates in the periphery is likely to be limited.	虽然这似乎不是好事，但现实情况是外围国家较高利率的负面影响可能有限。


After all, a large share of the borrowing by households and businesses in the periphery is indexed to short-term rates, which are set by the ECB, not the markets, and therefore have remained low.	毕竟外围国家的家庭和企业借款中的很大一部分与短期利率挂钩，而该利率是由欧洲央行而非市场设定的，因此仍然很低。


Moreover, periphery governments are largely shielded from the increase in the risk premium on long-term bonds, because their central banks continue to purchase their outstanding debts.	此外，外围国家政府在很大程度上不会受长期债券风险溢价增加的影响，因为它们的央行继续购买其未偿债务。


And the US dollar’s substantial appreciation in the wake of Trump’s election is likely to make European exports more competitive.	同时特朗普的胜选导致的美元大幅升值可能使欧洲的出口更具竞争力。


So the immediate impact of Trump’s victory has been a net positive for the eurozone – and the benefits seem set to continue.	因此特朗普获胜对欧元区的影响是利大于弊的——而且好处似乎不断扩大。


Trump has pledged to implement sweeping tax cuts, including a reduction of the corporate tax rate from 35% to 15%.	特朗普承诺将大幅减税，包括将企业所得税从35％降至15％。


Add to that plans to subsidize infrastructure investment and increase military spending, and it seems likely that the US will face rapidly rising fiscal deficits and a huge short-term increase in demand.	再结合补贴基础设施投资和增加军费开支的计划，似乎美国将面临快速增长的财政赤字和巨大的短期需求增长。


With the US economy already operating at close to full capacity (unemployment is below 5%), higher imports – and a stronger US dollar – will be needed to meet that demand.	由于美国经济已经接近满负荷运营（当前失业率低于5％），就需要更高的进口——以及更强的美元来满足这一需求。


All of this will be good for the eurozone, for which the US remains a leading export market.	所有这一切都将对欧元区有利，因此美国仍然是最重要的出口市场之一。


But it is the peripheral countries that are likely to benefit the most.	而外围国家可能受益最大。


For example, the impact of a euro depreciation is about three times larger in Italy than it is in Germany, because demand for Germany’s exports of specialized capital goods is not very price elastic.	例如，欧元贬值对意大利的影响力大约是德国的三倍，因为对德国特定出口资本货物的需求价格弹性并不太大。


As a result, rapid demand-fueled growth in the US, together with the strong dollar, could contribute to a much-needed rebalancing of the eurozone.	因此美国需求激增的快速增长加上强势美元可能有助于实现欧元区急需的（国与国之间经济）再平衡。


Europe may also benefit from Trump’s energy policy.	欧洲也可能受益于特朗普的能源政策。


During the campaign, Trump pledged to ensure energy self-sufficiency – an effort that would probably entail new subsidies for domestic oil, gas, and possibly coal production.	在运动期间，特朗普承诺确保能源自给自足——这种努力可能需要为美国国内石油，天然气以及可能的煤炭生产提供新的补贴。


That would help to suppress oil prices – a boon for the eurozone’s energy-importing countries.	这将有助于抑制石油价格——也是欧元区能源进口国的福音。


There is a precedent for Trumponomics’ potential benefits for Europe.	特朗普经济学这类政策对欧洲的潜在益处是有先例的。


After the collapse of the dollar-based Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the 1970s, Europe created the European Monetary System to serve as an island of stability in an ocean of widely fluctuating exchange rates.	在1970年代以美���为基础的布雷顿森林体系固定汇率制度崩溃后，欧洲建立了欧洲货币体系（European Monetary System），作为汇率大幅波动形势下的稳定安全岛。


While maintaining stable exchange rates within the EMS initially proved difficult, owing to large differences in national inflation rates and economic-policy priorities, the situation quickly improved, thanks to US President Ronald Reagan.	由于各国的通胀率和经济政策优先次序都存在巨大差异，在体系内部维持汇率稳定极为艰难，但美国总统罗纳德·里根（Ronald Reagan）的作用下这一状况得到迅速改善。


“Reaganomics” produced large fiscal deficits and an ultra-strong dollar. Together with low oil prices, this put Europe in a strong position to overcome challenging disparities and achieve growth.	“里根经济学”产生的巨大财政赤字和超强的美元以及低油价，使欧洲处于一个强势的地位并得以克服差距并实现增长。


In fact, it was the last time Italy’s GDP grew faster than the EMS average.	事实上，这也是意大利GDP增度最后一次超过欧洲货币体系平均水平。


Trumponomics aims to create precisely the same conditions.	而特朗普经济学也是为了创造完全相同的条件。


Whatever the potential downsides to Trump’s policies, there is one clear upside: they will boost growth and employment in a eurozone where economic dissatisfaction is generating political turmoil – and the gains will be most pronounced in the countries that most need them.	不管特朗普政策的潜在缺点如何，都有一个明显的优点：它们将为因经济走弱而导致政治动荡的欧元区带来增长和就业——而且最大的收益者则是那些最急需的国家。


As Italians face the prospect of a referendum on eurozone membership, and the French prepare for next year’s presidential election, the value of this cannot be overestimated.	鉴于意大利即将迎来是否保留欧元区成员国资格的公投，法国则正明年的总统大选做准备，这些政策的价值是极大的。


Indeed, Trump could well end up saving the euro.	事实上，特朗普可能最终会拯救欧元。


Saving Italy From Itself	意大利的自救


SIENA – Now that Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s credibility is weakening at home, he will need all the friends he can get to clear the hurdle of a constitutional referendum in December – and thereby avoid likely political disruption.	发自锡耶纳——当前意大利总理马泰奥·伦齐（Matteo Renzi）在其国内的信誉跌至新低，需要联合各路人马才能挺过十二月宪法公投这一关——从而避免可能爆发的政治动乱。


Renzi will need the support not just of his own party, which is deeply divided over the referendum, but also of an Italian electorate that has grown disillusioned with politics in general.	伦齐不仅需要获得已经在公投议题中陷入严重分裂的本党派的支持，还需要争取已经对政治大失所望的意大利选民的支持。


The referendum has become a litmus test for Renzi and his government partly because of his ill-considered warning earlier this year that he would resign if the proposed reform of the Senate (the parliament’s upper house) were voted down.	公投之所以成为对伦齐及其政府的重要考验，在某种程度上是因为今年早些时候他头脑一热威胁说如果针对参议院的改革议案被否决就将辞去总理职务。


But Renzi’s bigger problem is that he is a mid-term, unelected prime minister who promised, in 2014, to bring change to a country that has heard it all before.	但伦齐更大的问题在于他是一个在上一任总理任期中间切入的非选举上台总理，而且在2014年承诺为这个国家带来变革——这个词汇早就让意大利人听得耳朵起茧子了。


Two years later, far less change than expected has materialized, and Renzi has come to resemble a guarantor of political stability more than a rottamatore – a “scraper of the old,” as he had been nicknamed.	如今两年过去了，已经兑现的承诺却比预期中要少得多，当前的伦齐更像是个政治稳定的担保人，而不是像他从前的绰号“rottamatore”那样成为一台横扫旧势力的推土机。


Renzi has vigorously backpedaled from his conditional vow to step down; but if voters reject the Senate reform, he will become a lame duck, and political stability will most likely suffer unless he keeps his promise.	纵使他已经不怎么再提自己的有条件下台承诺； 但如果选民否决了参议院改革议案，他将成为一个跛脚鸭总理，到时就只能下台，否则就会威胁政治稳定。


Renzi is an astute politician who understands and speaks to many voters’ gut feelings about the two main issues on their minds: the state of the economy and immigration.	伦齐是一个精明的政治家，他了解并点出了直击许多选民内心的两个主要议题：经济形势和移民。


So he knows that his government’s survival – and his own political future – depends on their trust in his ability to address both.	因此他也明白当前政府的生存——及他个人的政治前途——取决于选民是否信任他拥有解决这两大问题的能力。


There is no guarantee that he will succeed.	但谁也没法保证他能成功。


Italy’s economy started the year with strong exports and positive growth, but it has since lost momentum: for the first time since 2014, the economy recorded zero growth in the second quarter, and full-year GDP growth is now expected to be a modest 0.8%.	意大利经济在今年的开局不错，出口强劲且实现了正增长，但随后就失去了动力：自2014年以来首次出现第二季度经济零增长，当前对全年GDP增长的预期只有不痛不痒的0.


That is far below what Italy needs to make up for the economy’s 5% contraction between 2005 and 2015.	8 ％，这远远无法弥补意大利在2005~2015年间5％的经济收缩幅度。


Simply put, Italy’s economic malaise stems from the country’s inability to live with the euro.	简而言之，意大利的经济萎靡不振源自于其无力与欧元共存。


The economy has always needed radical supply-side and public-administration reforms to cope with eurozone-membership constraints – both fiscal and monetary.	该国经济一直亟需激进的供给侧和公共管理改革以符合欧元区成员国资格的相关限制——无论是财政还是货币。


And yet no government, not even those of Silvio Berlusconi, which held comfortable parliamentary majorities, could accomplish more than piecemeal reforms in specific areas, such as pensions.	但至今没有任何一届政府——包括持有议会多数席位的贝卢斯科尼（Silvio Berlusconi）——可以在特定领域（比如养老金）实现大幅度改革。


Lacking a framework to adjust to new economic realities, Italian real (inflation-adjusted) GDP growth has suffered, averaging just 0.3% per year from 1999 to 2015.	由于缺乏一个框架以适应新的经济现实，意大利的（排除通胀因素）实际GDP增长受到了损害，在1999~2015年间平均每年只的0. 3％。


During this period, real wages and employment were hit hard – almost 37% of young people and 19% of people in southern Italy are unemployed – and as many as 1.5 million young Italians have left the country, with 90,000 departing in 2014 alone.	在此期间实际工资和就业都遭到了重创——南部地区有近37％的年轻人和19％的劳动者失业在家——多达150万年轻意大利人离开了这个国家，仅仅在2014年就有9万人离开，同时又涌入了500万外国移民，占到了全体居民总数的8.


Meanwhile, five million foreign immigrants have arrived, constituting 8.3% of all residents (and not including undocumented immigrants).	3％（还不包括非法移民）。


Many Italians blame German-inspired fiscal austerity for their country’s economic malaise; and opposition parties such as the right-wing Northern League and the anti-establishment Five Star Movement want Italy to leave the euro, redenominate, and devalue to regain competitiveness.	许多意大利人责怪德国式的财政紧缩导致本国经济低迷； 右翼北方联盟和反建制的五星运动党这类反对党都希望意大利退出欧元区，重新发行货币并通过贬值重获竞争力。


Just 20 years ago, Italians willingly agreed to pay a one-off tax to bring the fiscal deficit into compliance with eurozone rules.	就在20年前，意大利人心甘情愿地同意支付一次性税来迎合欧元区的财政赤字规定。


Today, an estimated 35-40% of Italians want out.	如今估计有35-40％的意大利人想离开欧元区。


But Italians are torn between antipathy toward the European Union, which disciplines the Italian government, and discontent and frustration with that government itself, owing to its failure to present a credible reform plan.	但意大利人其实也相当左右为难：他们一方面反感欧盟对意大利政府的处处掣肘，另一方面又对本国政府感到不满和沮丧——因为其始终未能拿出一套可信的改革方案。


Because there is no clear villain, an Italian version of the United Kingdom’s “Brexit” referendum is implausible.	由于无法辨认哪方面才是真正的症结，因此意大利版的英国脱欧公投也不太可能发生。


In an August opinion poll, only 28% of respondents supported leaving the EU; in a May survey, as many Italians wanted “more Europe” as wanted “less Europe.”	8月的民意调查显示只有28％受访者支持脱离欧盟； 而在5月时支持欧盟和反对欧盟的意大利人数量则差不多。


Italy’s upcoming constitutional referendum cannot plausibly be compared to June’s Brexit vote.	意大利即将举行的宪法公投是没法跟6月的英国脱欧公投相提并论的。


In Italy, the referendum is required by the constitution – it did not come about through political machinations – and it is not a vote on EU membership, even if the EU or the eurozone will be on voters’ minds.	在意大利，公投是宪法本身的要求——不是政治运作的结果——即便选民会考虑到欧盟或欧元区的问题，投票本身也并非关于欧盟成员国资格。


Still, the referendum could have far-reaching implications that would spill over into Europe.	尽管如此，此次公投依然可能产生可能波及全欧的深远影响。


The political uncertainty likely to result if voters reject the Senate reform would adversely affect Italy’s struggling economy.	如果选民否决参议院改革所导致政治不确定性会对意大利的经济困难造成不利影响。


International investors have come around to Renzi, believing that he strikes the right balance between dynamism and stability needed to bring Italy out of its torpor.	国际投资者都是受伦齐的感召而来，信任他能够拿捏好带意大利走出困境所需的活力和稳定性之间的平衡。


They have tolerated his exuberance and even his mistakes (for example, in his management of the country’s banking crisis).	他们已经容忍了他的过度活跃的做派甚至失误（比如他对本国银行危机的处理）。


They are underwriting the narrative that Renzi is the only person who can save Italy from itself; that may be the right bet – at least for the time being.	也是他们在担保伦齐是唯一一个能让意大利实现自救的人； 至少是当前来说，这还是个正确的选择。


Italy’s Capital Flight	意大利的资本外逃


MUNICH – In August, the European balance-of-payments crisis moved beyond the Eurozone’s periphery and began buffeting Italy.	慕尼黑——8月，欧洲国际收支平衡危机冲出了欧元区外围国家范围，开始影响意大利。


Interest spreads for Italian government bonds began to rise, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s administration was alarmed enough to implement an austerity program, and the European Central Bank helped with extra liquidity.	意大利国债息差开始上升，贝卢斯科尼政府再三收到警示，必须采取财政紧缩计划，欧洲央行也伸出了援手，提供了额外流动性。


The ECB directed the central banks of all Eurozone members to buy huge quantities of Italian government bonds during the crisis.	危机期间，欧洲央行指示欧元区所有成员国的央行购买巨量意大利国债。


While the national central banks have not revealed how much they bought, the aggregate stock of all government bonds purchased rose from €74 billion ($102 billion) on August 4, to €165 billion this month.	各国央行并未披露各自的购买量是多少，但欧洲央行国债存量总额从8月4日的740亿欧元上升到了本月的1650亿欧元。


Most of this increase was probably used to purchase Italian government bonds.	增量中的巨大部分都来自意大利国债。


The German Bundesbank, which was forced to buy most of the bonds, strongly opposed the program, but was unable to stop it.	被迫购买了大部分意大利国债的德国央行强烈反对这一方案，但也于事无补。


In response, ECB Chief Economist Jürgen Stark resigned.	欧洲央行首席经济学家尤尔根·施塔克（Jürgen Stark）因此辞职。


He followed Bundesbank President Axel Weber, who had resigned in February because of the earlier bond repurchases.	此前，德国央行总裁艾克塞尔·韦伯（Axel Weber）于2月因早先的债券买入行为而辞职。


Meanwhile, the new Bundesbank president, Jens Weidmann, openly objects to the program, while German President Christian Wulff has publicly accused the ECB of circumventing the Maastricht Treaty.	与此同时，新的德国央行总裁延斯·魏德曼（Jens Weidmann）公开反对这一方案，而德国总理伍尔夫也公开指责欧洲央行在打马斯特里赫特条约的擦边球。


But the bond purchases are just the tip of the iceberg.	但债券购买行为只是冰山一角。


Equally important, but largely unknown, is the fact that the Banca d’Italia has resorted to the printing press to cover Italy’s gigantic balance of payments deficit.	同样重要但不为人知的是，意大利央行已经重启印钞机来解决意大利巨额国际收支赤字问题了。


The extra money printing and lending, as measured by the so-called Target deficit, effectively means drawing a credit from the ECB.	这些多印出来的并成为贷款的钞票——可以用所谓的“目标”赤字来衡量——实际上无异于从欧洲央行那里得到信用。


This credit replaces the private capital imports that had hitherto financed the country’s net purchases of foreign goods, but which dried up because of the crisis, and it finances a capital flight, i.e. the purchase of foreign assets.	这笔信用取代了私人资本进口（到目前为止，意大利外国商品净买入全靠私人资本进口融资，但因危机而发生了锐减），也为资本外逃——即购买外国资产——提供了资金。


The ECB in turn draws the Target credit from the respective national central bank to which the money is flowing and which therefore has to accept a reduction in its scope for issuing refinancing credit.	欧洲央行反过来从存在资金流入从而不得不接受削减再融资信用发行规模的央行那里获得目标信用。


Until July, only Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain had drawn Target credit, for a combined total of €330 billion.	到7月份为止，只有希腊、爱尔兰、葡萄牙和西班牙获得了目标信用，总量为3300亿欧元。


Italy was stable and did not seem to need the printing press to solve its financial problems.	当时意大利情况还算稳定，看起来并不需要开动印钞机解决财政问题。


No longer.	但今日不同往日。


In August alone, Italy’s central bank drew €40 billion in Target credit, and it probably drew roughly another €50 billion in September, when the Bundesbank’s Target loans to the ECB system increased by €59 billion (after a €47-billion hike in August).	光是在8月份，意大利央行就获得了400亿欧元的目标信用，9月份大概还要再获得500亿欧元，与此同时，德国央行给欧洲央行的目标贷款将增加590欧元（8月份增加了470亿欧元）。


This is the highest Target loan ever drawn from the Bundesbank in a single month, and in all likelihood it went primarily to Italy.	这是德国央行目标贷款数量增加幅度最大的一个月，不管从哪个角度看，这笔钱绝大部分都流入了意大利。


This is an explosion in slow motion.	我们来还原一下目标信用大爆炸的慢镜头。


The stock of overall Target credit that the ECB system has drawn from the Bundesbank was around zero until mid-2007.	截止2007年年中，欧洲央行系统从德国央行那里获得的目标信用总量为零。


By the end of September, it had climbed to €450 billion – in addition to the purchases of government bonds that the Bundesbank has been forced to make.	到今年9月底，这一数字已经上升到了4500亿欧元，这还不包括德国央行被迫买入的国债。


As Italy’s monthly current-account deficit approximates only €3-4 billion, the Target credit must have compensated primarily for capital flight.	意大利的月经常项目赤字大概只有30—40亿欧元，因此目标信用的主要用途定为弥补资本外逃无疑。


Italian investors sold their assets to the banking system, which paid with newly printed money.	意大利投资者将手中的资产卖给银行体系，银行体系用新印出来的钞票付账。


The investors then invested the proceeds in Germany, buying shares, bonds, and other assets.	接着，投资者在把钱投资于德国，买入股票、债券和其他资产。


In essence, Germany and Italy traded Target claims against marketable assets.	简言之，德国和意大利在用可交易资产交易目标债权。


Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain’s collective draw on Target credits forced the Bundesbank to reduce the refinancing credit that it issued by about €30 billion per year from 2008 to the end of 2010, when it stood at barely €90 billion.	希腊、爱尔兰、葡萄牙和西班牙迫使德国央行在2008—2010年间每年削减300亿欧元的再融资信用（2010年，四国目标信用总量为900亿欧元）。


At that rate, it was predicted that the level could fall to zero within the next three years.	照这个速度，德国的再融资信用发行量不出三年就会减少到零。


The Italian Target credit, however, has now exceeded that estimate.	但是，目前意大利目标信用量远远超过了估计值。


In September 2011, the Bundesbank’s stock of refinancing loans, net of its deposit facilities vis-à-vis German banks, turned negative for the first time in history.	2011年9月，德国央行再融资贷款存量，即其向德国银行提供的存款便利，在历史上首次降到了零以下。


The ECB’s shifting of refinancing credit via the Target system has therefore already hit the limit, three years earlier than the trend of the past three years would have suggested.	因此，欧洲央行转向通过目标系统对信用进行再融资的做法已经达到了极限，比按过去三年态势推断的期限提前了三年���


This is not the end of the world, not even for the ECB.	世界不会因此毁灭，欧洲央行亦然。


However, the Bundesbank has entered a new regime in which it will have to borrow extensively from the private banking sector to absorb the flight money from the crisis countries.	不过，德国银行步入了一种新制度，它将不得不大举向私人银行部门融资，以吸收从危机国家外逃而来的资产。


They, in turn, will continue to compensate for capital flight by cranking up the money-printing press.	而那些国家反过来将继续通过开动印钞机补偿资本外逃。


With this, the Eurozone has entered dangerous territory.	这样看来，欧元区已经步入了危险区域。


Deposit facilities count as central bank money and have inflationary potential, given that the German banks could withdraw those funds at any time.	存款便利被与央行资金无异，具有引发通胀的潜力，因为德国银行有权随时要回这些钱。


If they do, more than the Target balances could be exploding in Europe.	果真如此的话，比目标信用余额更多的资金将引爆欧洲。


Europe, Italian-Style	意大利式的欧洲


MILAN – Last summer, after two years of growing uncertainty, systemic risk in the eurozone finally began to wane, as conditional commitments came together.	发自米兰——在持续了两年的游移不定以及多种有条件承诺的共同作用之下，欧元区的系统性风险终于开始有所降低。


Italy and Spain offered credible fiscal and growth-oriented reforms, and the European Central Bank, with Germany’s backing, promised intervention as needed to stabilize the banking sector and sovereign-debt markets.	意大利和西班牙实施了可靠的财政增长型改革，此外欧洲央行在德国的支持下承诺会在有需要的情况下出手稳定银行部门和主权债务市场。


Unfortunately, that trend may be reversing.	不幸地是，形势可能会被逆转。


Growth in the eurozone has turned negative overall, significantly so in the south.	欧元区的增长整体已经变成负值，尤其是其南部地区。


Unemployment stands at about 12% in Italy, and 38% for the young.	意大利失业率约为12%左右，其中38%为年轻人。


Likewise, Spain’s unemployment rate is above 25% (and 55% for young people).	西班牙的失业率在25%以上（其中55%是年轻人）。


And French economic indicators are slipping quickly.	而法国的经济指标正迅速下滑。


Meanwhile, the outcome of Italy’s election will most likely leave the country – the eurozone’s third-largest economy and the world’s third-largest sovereign-debt market – without a stable government.	与此同时，意大利大选的结果很可能会让该国——欧元区第三大经济体及世界第三大主权债务市场——失去稳定的政府。


As a result, it will be difficult to sustain a reform program that is vigorous enough to satisfy the ECB and the eurozone core.	从而令一个足以满足欧洲央行和欧元核心区的改革计划变得无以为继。


Surprisingly (to me, at least), markets have reacted stoically.	令人惊讶地是（至少对笔者而言），市场对此的反应相当平淡。


Interest-rate spreads on Italian sovereign debt have widened, but not sharply.	意大利主权债券的利差有所扩大，但幅度并不大。


External investors may not be rushing for the exits, but they are not piling in, either.	国外投资者或许并不会急着逃跑，但也不会涌进来买入。


It feels like wait and see at this point.	这个阶段人们似乎都在观望。


Italy is the only debt-distressed eurozone country in which the negative competitiveness trends (productivity relative to income) have not reversed direction in the post-crisis period.	意大利是唯一一个在后危机时期并未扭转其负面的竞争力趋势（生产力相对于收入）的欧元区高负债国家。


With a debt/GDP ratio of more than 120%, Italy lacks the flexibility to implement fiscal stimulus to bridge the transition to higher growth.	在债务对GDP比率超过了120%的情况下，意大利缺乏足够的灵活性去实施可以实现从转型向更高速增长过渡的财政刺激政策。


Outgoing Prime Minister Mario Monti’s government accomplished a major pension reform, cut public spending, and raised taxes.	即将卸任的总理马里奥·蒙蒂（Mario Monti）所领导的政府完成了主要的养老金改革、削减了公共支出并提高了税收。


But Italian voters overwhelmingly rejected his approach, in part because austerity did not appear to extend to elected officials or to major parts of the large ecosystem of departments, enterprises, and unions that surround government.	但绝大部分意大利选民都反对他的做法，这在某种程度上是因为财政紧缩似乎并未波及到选举官员及围绕政府的部门、企业、工会这些大型生态系统的主要部分。


Systemic reform of Italy’s government may be a prerequisite to achieving consensus on a path to fiscal health and growth.	对意大利政府的系统性改革也许是就财政健康与经济增长路径达成共识的先决条件。


But this is not the ideal moment for a timeout to do that.	但当前并不是实现这些的完美时机。


The real issues, in any case, are distributional and reflect a shortage of policy instruments.	无论如何，真正的问题是与分配有关，并反映了政策工具的缺乏。


For example, tax evasion is pervasive, so increases disproportionately hit those who already pay, fueling a widespread perception of unfairness.	比如，避税行为是如此普遍，以致那些交税的人反而承受了更多的加税冲击，并因此觉得越发不公平。


Monti attempted to address this, but moving from the current equilibrium to a better one, in which tax evasion is the exception rather than the norm, is a long-term project.	蒙蒂之前试图解决这个问题，但要把目前的均衡状态转化为另一个更好的均衡——即避税是例外而不是常态——是一项长期的工程。


As a result, the burden of the crisis is being borne mainly by the unemployed and the young.	结果危机的重负只好��要由失业者和年轻人来承受。


Given Italy’s adverse competitiveness position, devaluation of the currency, were it possible, would not be a long-term substitute for productivity-boosting reforms, but it certainly would help in at least three ways.	考虑到意大利的负面竞争力态势，货币贬值——如果可能的话——不能长期替代促进经济增长的改革，但它肯定至少在三个方面有所裨益。


First, devaluation would distribute the costs of rebalancing more evenly, making it easier to clear the burden-sharing hurdle to deeper reforms.	首先，贬值能更加平均地分配再平衡的成本，使得要为深层次的改革清除责任分担的障碍变得更加容易。


Second, floating exchange rates imply that devaluation is an automatic adjustment mechanism, so it occurs without the appearance of an explicit burden-sharing choice and the accompanying potential for political gridlock.	其次，浮动汇率意味着贬值是一个自动调整的机制，所以它的发生不需要清晰的责任分担选项以及可能随之而来的政治僵局。


Finally, as is true in many of the advanced countries, weak demand constrains Italy’s short- and medium-term growth.	最后，像很多发达国家的情况一样，需求疲软制约了意大利的中短期增长。


This means that, unless government spending provides the demand bridge, the large non-tradable part of the economy cannot drive growth and job creation.	这意味着除非政府支出能够搭起需求的桥梁，该经济体的大型非贸易部门就不能驱动经济增长也不会创造新的工作机会。


But Italy’s government, like that of the United States and other fiscally constrained countries, is subtracting effective demand.	但意大利政府，和美国及其它有财政约束的国家一样，正在削减有效需求。


Some parts of the global economy are growing.	全球经济的某些领域正在增长。


So a negative domestic demand shock need not completely constrain the roughly one-third of the Italian economy that is tradable – and thus could grow and generate employment if the competiveness parameters were reset quickly.	所以负面的国内需求冲击并不必完全约束几乎占意大利经济三分之一的可贸易部门——如果竞争力参数能被迅速重置，经济就会实现增长并制造就业机会。


Obviously, in the context of the eurozone, this is not an option.	但显然，在欧元区的背景下，这并不是一种选择。


The alternative is muted wage and income growth shared across the income spectrum, combined with productivity-enhancing measures.	对此的替代方案就是让各个收入阶层都分担缓慢的工资和收入增长，再结合促进生产力发展的措施。


This was a component of Germany’s successful reform program of a decade ago, which included labor-market and social-security reforms, the combined effect of which was to restore competitiveness and growth potential in the tradable sector, while improving productivity on the non-tradable side.	这是德国十年前成功改革计划的配方——它包括了劳动力市场和社会保障改革，这种结合的结果是恢复贸易部门的竞争力和发展潜力，同时提高了非贸易部门的生产率。


This process does work in the long run.	这种方法就长期而言并不有效。


But Germany’s reforms took place in a much healthier global economy, and, when the initial divergences are large, it may take too long to restore growth.	但德国的改革发生在全球经济更为良好的情况下，而且当最初的差距较大的时候，就可能需要相当长的时间来恢复增长。


Some observers have argued for a higher stable inflation target in the eurozone to facilitate the “relative deflation” process in countries that need it, and to put the “zero bound” on interest rates further away, thereby enhancing the potential impact of monetary policy.	一些观察家提出了欧元区需要设立一个更高且稳定的通胀目标来促进有需要国家的“相对紧缩”过程，并进一步推进利率的“零点限制”，从而提高货币政策的潜在影响力。


But inflation has its own adverse distributional and efficiency implications, and would be fiercely resisted.	但通胀也有其自身不利于分配和效率的负面效应，并会遭到强烈抵制。


It is hard to see how this ends well.	很难看得出来这会有个好结果。


The alternatives seem to be a lengthy and difficult return to growth and employment, or declining enthusiasm for the common currency.	备选方案似乎是一个恢复增长和就业的漫长艰难过程，或者说是对共同货币热情的下降。


Beyond that, the main lessons concern design flaws.	除此之外，主要的教训与设计缺陷有关。


In the eurozone, for the most part, national governments separately choose investment levels in infrastructure, education, research, and technology.	在大多数情况下，欧元区的国家政府各自决定在基础设施、教育、研究和科技上的投资水平。


Their labor-market, social-welfare, and competition policies vary.	它们的劳动力市场、社会福利和竞争政策各不相同。


All affect the trajectories of growth, income, and employment.	但都影响着经济增长、收入和就业的轨迹。


So, even if the eurozone’s structure is modified to achieve the desired level of fiscal discipline and balance, in its current highly decentralized structure, countries will continue to diverge in other important respects.	所以，即便欧元区的结构能被修正并达到实现财政秩序和平衡的理想水平，在其目前高度分散的结构下，各国将继续在其它重要方面产生分歧。


Divergence in policies and convergence in outcomes is not a realistic expectation.	而奢望各国政策分歧却得出一致结果是不现实的。


Adjustment mechanisms are needed, but external devaluation and inflation are not available, while labor mobility is partial at best.	调整机制是必需的，但外部贬值和通胀又无法实施，而劳动力的流动性也算不上良好。


Perhaps one could interpret the common currency as “forcing” eventual convergence in policies.	也许人们可以理解为共同货币“迫使”政策最终趋同。


But, realistically, loss of support for the euro might come first, precisely because the adjustment mechanisms are so limited.	但实际上可能最先出现的情况是人们不再支持欧元，尤其考虑到调整机制的作用是那么有限。


No one doubts the depth of Europe’s official long-run commitment to integration.	没有人怀疑欧洲官方长期致力于一体化的决心。


The huge design challenge is to find the right level of mandatory policy convergence – one that works economically and is acceptable politically.	而巨大的制度设计挑战就在于要找到强制性政策趋同的合适水平，使之既能在经济上起作用，又能在政治上可接受。


Italy’s Return to Political Paralysis	意大利重拾瘫痪政治


For more than a decade, Italy has been ruled through a bipolar political system.	十多年来，意大利一直为两极政治制度所统治。


Voters could choose between a left-wing coalition and a right-wing coalition.	选民可在左翼联盟与右翼联盟之间进行选择。


Those disappointed by the incumbent government could vote for the opposition.	那些对现任政府不满的人可投票支持反对党。


And the existence of a viable alternative has had a disciplining effect on politicians: not by chance, Silvio Berlusconi’s government served its entire electoral term.	并且这种替代选择的存在对政客们具有约束作用：西尔维奥·贝卢斯科尼政府能够度过其整个选举任期绝非偶然。


This is in stark contrast to the Italian political tradition.	这与意大利的政治传统形成鲜明的对比。


Throughout the post-war era, until the early 1990’s, Italian governments survived less than a year on average.	在整个战后时期，直到二十世纪九十年代初，意大利历届政府平均任期不到一年。


Voters were unable to choose between the incumbent and the opposition, because the same centrist parties were in office all the time.	选民们无法在现任政府与反对党之间进行选择，因为一直都是同样的中间派执政。


Government crises were merely an opportunity to reshuffle key cabinet positions or change the party faction of the prime minister.	政府危机仅仅是改组重要内阁职位或改变总理政党派系的一个机会。


However, there is now a high risk that Italian politicians will return to their old habits.	然而，现在存在极大的风险，意大利政治家们要重拾其传统惯例。


This may seem strange, given the antagonism between Romano Prodi and Silvio Berlusconi during the electoral campaign.	想到竞选运动期间罗马诺·普罗迪与西尔维奥·贝卢斯科尼之间的敌对态度，这种现象似乎有些奇怪。


But that antagonism reflected the personalization of politics achieved by Berlusconi, as well as an institutional feature that he abolished.	但是，那种敌对态度反映了贝卢斯科尼所实现的政治个人化，以及他废除的体制特征。


One of the last acts of his government was to replace the majoritarian electoral system, introduced in 1993, with proportional rule.	他执政期间的最后一项行动是用按比例统治替代了1993年引进的多数主义选举制度。


The new electoral system changes the politicians’ incentives, and could induce a return to shifting coalitions and unstable governments.	这种新的选举制度改变了政客们的激励机制，并且可能导致重新回到联盟之间轮换和政府不稳定状态。


This outcome would be accelerated if, as is likely, Berlusconi himself were to distance himself from politics in the coming electoral term.	如果贝卢斯科尼本人在接下来的选举期内远离政治（这是有可能的），这一后果将会更加严重。


Under the new electoral rules, seats are allotted to parties in proportion to votes, but a special provision induces parties to forge pre-electoral agreements: the pre-electoral coalition that wins the most votes receives a seat premium that ensures a comfortable majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house).	根据新的选举规则，席位按选票比例在各党之间进行分配，但有一项特殊规定促使各党缔结选举前协议：获得最多选票的选举前联盟得到确保在下议院拥有足够多数的席位奖励。


Unfortunately, the new law – hastily enacted at the last minute of the previous legislature – has a silly formulation that does not guarantee an equally safe majority in the Senate.	不幸的是，由前任立法机关最后一刻仓促颁布的这一新法存在一个愚蠢的公式，并不保证在参议院获得同样安全的多数票。


As a result, Prodi has won a large margin in the lower house, but he has only a handful of extra votes in the Senate.	因此，普罗迪在下议院赢得了很大的富余票，在参议院却仅有少数多余选票。


Given Italy’s almost perfect bicameralism, this means that the new government will find it very difficult to function even under ideal circumstances.	如果意大利实施最完善的两院制，这就意味着新政府会发现甚至在理想情况下也难以发挥作用。


But Italy’s circumstances are far from ideal.	但意大利的情况远不是理想的。


The new government will face formidable challenges.	新政府将面临强大的挑战。


The budget deficit is again out of control, and well over the 3%-of-GDP Maastricht ceiling.	预算赤字再度无法控制，并且远远超过马斯特里赫特占GDP的3%的上限。


The aging population is straining the public pension and healthcare systems beyond sustainability.	人口老年化使公共养老金紧张，并且保健制度难以为继。


The manufacturing sector, squeezed by stagnating productivity and competition from China and other low-cost producers, is no longer competitive.	制造部门受到生产力停滞和来自中国及其他低成本生产商的排挤，不再具有竞争力。


Many services remain inefficient, because they are either in the domain of an archaic public administration or enjoy monopoly rents created by regulatory barriers.	众多服务依然效率低下，因为它们要么处于陈旧的公共管理领域，要么享受管制壁垒所产生的垄断地租。


Inaction is simply not an option for the new government. And yet agreement on virtually everything of significance will be very difficult to reach.	无为显然不是新政府的选择，但是关于重要事情的协议实际很难达成。


Prodi’s left-wing l’Unione coalition comprises a hodge-podge of parties spread all over the political spectrum, ranging from staunch communists to former liberals (with communists stronger than in the previous election).	普罗迪的左翼l’Union联盟是遍布所有政治领域的一个各党大杂烩，从坚定的共产主义者到以前的自由主义者（上次选举中共产主义者势力更强）。


Under the new electoral system, all of these parties will be competing with each other for the same votes, and each one will seek to protect its own constituency or claim credit for whatever is accomplished.	根据新选举制度，所有这些政党相互竞争拉选票，并且每个政党将寻求保护其自身的选民或对已完成的事项邀功。


Given l’Unione’s razor-thin majority in the upper house, the most likely outcome is paralysis.	如果l’Union在上议院拥有极微弱的多数，最可能的结果就是瘫痪。


As if this was not enough, Prodi will face another problem.	但这似乎还不够，普罗迪将面临另一个问题。


Just before stepping down, Berlusconi’s government also approved a constitutional reform that, among other things, provides a logical complement to the new electoral system.	就在下台前，贝卢斯科尼政府还批准了宪法改革，特别对新选举制度提供了一个逻辑性补充。


In particular, the new constitution strengthens the powers of the prime minister and enables him to call early elections in the event of a government crisis.	新宪法尤其强化了总理的权力，使其能够在政府危机的情况下召集提前选举。


This provision would be an important weapon in Prodi’s hands.	这一规定将是普罗迪手里的一个重要武器。


But the left-wing parties that support him have already announced that they will block the constitutional reform, which they opposed for other reasons.	但支持他的左翼各党因为别的原因加以反对。


Hence, Prodi will almost certainly be deprived of his best tool for imposing discipline on his unruly coalition.	因此几乎可以肯定，普罗迪会丧失对桀骜不逊的联盟施加强制性约束的最佳工具。


What is likely to happen when a large and heterogeneous coalition with barely a parliamentary majority must govern in an increasingly dire economic situation?	如果勉强占议会多数票的成员混杂的大型联盟必须在日益可怕的经济状况中实施统治，可能会发生什么情况呢？


The answer is almost obvious: either the government will collapse, or it will seek to poach supporters from opposition parties.	答案几乎是显然的：要么政府垮台，要么设法窃取反对党的支持。


Which of these two outcomes will materialize also depends on what happens inside Berlusconi’s camp, and that is less easy to predict.	这两种结果中哪种将会实现，取决于贝卢斯科尼阵营内部的情况，这是不容易预测的。


But, either way, the bipolar political system to which Italians were getting accustomed is unlikely to survive unscathed.	但是，不管怎样，意大利人逐渐习惯的两极政治制度不可能毫发无损地保留下来。


The left-right divide will become easier for opportunistic politicians to cross, and perhaps a new centrist party will emerge.	左右翼的分裂状况将使机会主义政客更容易跨越，并且或许会出现一个新的中间派。


As a result, Italy will soon return to its older tradition of short-lived governments and unstable coalitions.	因此，意大利很快将重拾更为陈旧的传统，即政府任期短、联盟不稳定。


Of course, Prodi could preserve a bipolar political system – and thus increase the longevity of his government – by either restoring a majoritarian electoral system or pressing ahead with other constitutional amendments designed to preserve government and coalition stability.	诚然，普罗迪可能保留��极政治制度¾并因此延长其政府的寿命—其方法是，要么恢复多数票选举制度，要么促进旨在保护政府和联盟稳定的其他宪法修订。


But forcing such changes on his coalition partners could be as difficult for Prodi as tackling Italy’s daunting economic problems.	但是，强迫其联盟伙伴接受这种变革对普罗迪而言其难度不亚于处理意大利令人望而却步的经济问题。


No Country for Young Men (and Women)	少无所依


MILAN – Over the last 20 years, roughly a half-million Italians aged 18 to 39 have moved abroad, especially to more economically dynamic European Union countries such as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.	米兰—过去20年中，大约五十万18到39岁的意大利人迁居国外，特别是德国、法国和英国等经济更有活力的欧盟国家。


And those are just the official figures; the actual numbers are probably much higher, possibly more than double.	而这只是官方数字； 实际数字可能要高得多，可能要多一倍有余。


Why are young Italians so eager to leave?	为什么意大利年轻人如此热衷于离开？


It is not for lack of political representation.	并非政治上得不到代表。


Since 2013, the share of Italy’s parliament that is under 40 has increased from 7% to 13%.	2013年以来，意大利议会40岁以下代表比例从7%增加到13%。


Moreover, Italy now has one of the youngest governments among advanced countries (only France does better).	此外，目前意大利政府是发达国家中最年轻的之一（仅次于法国）。


And Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, at age 41, is Italy’s youngest prime minister ever.	41岁的总理伦齐也是意大利历史上最年轻的总理。


Nonetheless, young Italians remain deeply dissatisfied with the state of their country and the economic opportunities it can provide.	尽管如此，意大利年轻人对祖国的状态和它所能提供的经济机会深感失望。


Indeed, despite Renzi’s promise to implement reforms aimed at rejuvenating the country’s economy and institutions – the platform on which he won power in 2014 – some 90,000 Italians under the age of 40 have since left.	事实上，尽管伦齐承诺实施旨在重振意大利经济和制度的改革——他也凭此赢得2014年大选——但此后仍有约90,000四十岁以下意大利人选择离开。


Renzi’s message, while skillfully crafted and optimistic, cannot mask the harsh economic reality in Italy today.	伦齐的承诺尽管组织精巧，也很乐观，但仍无法掩盖眼下意大利严峻的经济现实。


Most jarring, youth unemployment stands at 39% – one of the highest rates in the EU and well above the bloc’s average of 20%.	最惹眼的是青年失业率高达39%——为欧盟最高之一，远高于20%的欧盟平均水平。


With 26% of people under the age of 30 not in school, employment, or training – the second-highest rate in the EU, behind only Greece – structural youth unemployment will prove difficult to correct.	26%的30岁以下年轻人不上学，不工作，也不接受培训——为欧盟第二高，仅次于希腊——结构性青年失业问题解决起来非常困难。


Even those who have jobs have reasons to be unhappy.	即使是有工作的人，也有理由不高兴。


According to Eurostat, Italy’s young people are among the most dissatisfied with their jobs, with many convinced that the best jobs are reserved for the well connected.	据欧盟统计局数字，意大利年轻人是对工作最不满的年轻人，许多人认为最好的工作岗位都留给了关系户。


And, indeed, corruption still poses a major challenge for Italy; Rome’s last two mayors, for example, were forced out of office for malfeasance.	而腐败确实仍是意大利的一大挑战； 比如，罗马的上两任市长都因为渎职而被迫下台。


In last year’s Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, Italy was ranked 61st, trailing all other advanced economies.	在去年透明国际的腐败印象指数中，意大利排名第61，在所有发达国家中垫底。


Making matters worse, Italy’s economy has been stagnant for years.	更糟糕的是，意大利经济已经停滞多年。