By strengthening civil society – through legal rights and long-term economic development – and instituting clear rules to ensure accountability, political despotism and corruption will be brought under control.	通过合法权利以及长期经济发展强化公民社会，以及制定清晰的规则来确保政府对人民负责，政治专制和腐败将会得到控制。


We should be uncompromising, therefore, in our defense of civil liberties.	因此，我们要坚定不移地维护公民自由。


The rich world should offer impoverished regions like sub-Saharan Africa more economic support to break out of poverty.	富国应当向类似萨哈拉以南国家的贫穷地区提供更多的经济支持以摆脱贫困。


Of course, aid should be directed to specific needs – for example, malaria control, food production, safe drinking water, and sanitation – whose fulfillment can be measured and monitored to resist corruption.	当然，应当将援助提供给专门的需求，例如，控制霍乱、粮食生产、安全饮用水以及卫生。 可以衡量并监督是否满足这些需求以抵制腐败。


By raising living standards, we would also be empowering both civil society and impoverished governments to defend the rule of law.	通过提高生活水平，我们还将使得公民社会和贫穷的政府能够维护法治。


Who is Gordon Brown?	布朗的真面目


At long last, Gordon Brown is taking over from Tony Blair as Britain’s Prime Minister, thus attaining his life-long ambition, as if by right.	最终，布朗从布莱尔手中接任英国首相一职，因而好像理所当然地实现了其终身的雄心。


That is his first problem.	这是他的第一个问题。


He has not been elected by anyone – not by the Labour Party, and not by Britain’s voters; he has merely come into an inheritance that he has long thought was his due.	他并非经过选举上任，即不是工党，也不是英国选民。 他只不过是继承了他长久以来认为本应是他的东西。


How, then, will Brown acquire legitimacy as Britain’s new leader?	那么，布朗将会如何获得作为英国新领导人的合法性呢？


The one thing that is clear is that he will not gain legitimacy if he offers only more of what Blair has been dishing up for the past ten years.	现在唯一清楚的事情就是，如果他仅仅重蹈布莱尔过去十年中的复辙，那么他就不会获得合法性。


Brown’s second problem is the mirror image of the first.	布朗的第二个问题是第一个问题的翻版。


As a senior member of Blair’s government throughout its tenure, he shares responsibility for everything that Blair has done.	作为整个布莱尔政府任期内的重要成员，布朗要对布莱尔的所作所为分担责任。


Political commentators sometimes claim to detect important differences in their underlying political attitudes.	政治评论家们有时宣称他们二人的基本政治态度存在重要分歧。


However, in practice, Brown has remained in the shadows, skillfully managing the economy, but remaining silent and enigmatic on vital political issues, and apparently endorsing everything Blair did.	但是实际上，布朗一直躲在幕后，娴熟地管理着经济，但是在重大政治问题上保持缄默和深不可测，而且明显地支持布莱尔所做的所有事情。


If Brown is to gain legitimacy, he must offer something new; but he can do that only by distinguishing himself from the Blair legacy in clearly perceptible – and therefore fairly radical – ways.	如果布朗要获得合法性，他就必须有所新意。 但是，他只有通过以显而易见、进而激进的方式来把他自己同布莱尔留下的东西分道扬镳才能做到这一点。


This will be a difficult trick to pull off.	这绝非易事。


Perhaps the single most important domestic question Brown faces concerns where he stands on the balance between the free market and the claims of social policy.	布朗面临的最重要的国内问题可能是在自由市场和社会政策平衡问题上的立场。


Blair’s government moved the Labour Party a long way to the right of its traditional priorities of protecting the underprivileged, and to justify the change he re-named the party “New Labour.”	布莱尔政府将工党大大地拉向了保护弱势群体的传统重点的右翼，从而为布莱尔给工党重新民名为“新工党”提供改变的理由。


In many ways, the Blair government’s support of free-market policies turned out to be a shrewd and productive shift.	在许多方面，布莱尔政府支持自由市场政策是精明而又有成果的转变。


Britain’s economy grew more steadily and rapidly than it had done for several generations, and the tax revenue generated by growth enabled the government to pour money into education and the National Health Service.	与过去几十年相比，英国经济增长更为稳健和快速，而由经济增长所带来的税收收入使得政府能够把钱投入到教育和全国医疗系统上。


But this has come at a price, or rather several prices.	但是这些都是有代价的，甚至是沉重的代价。


First, inequality has grown at both ends of the income scale.	首先，不平等在收入等级的两端都扩大了。


At the bottom, the proportion of the population with an income below the poverty line increased from 13% at the start of Blair’s government to 20% now.	在最低端，收入在贫困线以下的人口比例从布莱尔政府伊始的13％增加到现在的20％。


That situation is much worse among ethnic minorities.	在少数族裔人口中这一情况更为糟糕。


And, despite the government’s efforts, childhood poverty also has increased under Blair.	而且，尽管政府作出了努力，儿童贫困在布莱尔时期也增加了。


At the top, the incomes of the mega-rich have soared, with predictable repercussions, especially in the property market.	在最顶端，超级巨富的收入大幅上扬，其结果是可想而知的，特别是在房地产市场上。


Public concern about this issue has been made much worse by claims that the rich get even richer by paying little tax.	有人说富人纳税很少从而越发富有，因此有关这一问题的公共关切越发严重。


There was a time when Brown was thought to be a believer in traditional Labour Party values.	布朗一度被认为是传统工党价值观的真正信仰者。


Was it true?	果真如此吗？


Is it true now?	现在是否还是如此呢？


What will he say about inequality?	他对不平等会作何表态呢？


Unfortunately, Blair and his government are perceived to be tainted by some of the less attractive features of free-market capitalism.	不幸的是，人们认为布莱尔及其政府由于自由市场资本主义的某些并不吸引人的特点所玷污。


Blair himself seems to prefer to have “friends” who are very rich and who will lend him their holiday villas in Tuscany.	布莱尔本人看起来宁愿与某些十分富有、并且会把在意大利图斯卡尼的度假别墅借给他使用的“朋友”交往。


This “closeness” has led the police to investigate claims that some Labour Party donors have been rewarded with political honors.	这一“紧密联系”让警方调查有关某些工党的捐助者获得了政治荣誉的指控。


In short, Blair’s government exudes an aura of sleaze and cronyism.	简而言之，布莱尔政府流露出的是龌龊和任人唯亲。


Can Brown show that he is different?	布朗能够表明他有所不同吗？


The worst part of Blair’s legacy, of course, is the war in Iraq.	当然，布莱尔留给世人的最为糟糕的东西就是伊拉克战争。


Many people predicted, and everyone can now see, that the decision to invade was a disastrous error; that it is having catastrophic consequences, not just for Iraq, but also for the Middle East generally; and that it has seriously damaged the moral standing of the United States and Britain.	许多人预计，而且现在每个人都可以看到，入侵伊拉克的决定是一个灾难性的错误。 不仅仅对伊拉克产生了灾难性的后果，而且对整个中东地区也是如此。


The most critical issue facing Brown is whether he chooses to distance himself from Blair’s self-satisfied and delusional claim that the invasion of Iraq was “the right thing to do.”	这一战争严重地损害了美国和英国的道德地位。 布朗面临的最为重大的问题就是他是否与布莱尔自我满足以及错觉般宣称入侵伊拉克是“正确的事情”拉开距离。


Britain has already reduced its forces in southern Iraq, and is on course to reduce them still further as they hand over “security” to the Iraqi police and military.	英国已经减少了在伊拉克南部的兵力，而且将要在把“治安”交给伊拉克警察和军队的时候继续进一步削减。


In reality, of course, the civil and guerrilla war under way in the rest of Iraq means that any security in the south can only be a temporary illusion.	当然，实际上，在伊拉克其他地方进行的内战和游击战意味着南部的治安只能是一个暂时幻觉。


The choice facing Brown is whether to cling silently to the existing policy, in the futile hope that the problem will go away, or explicitly recognize Britain’s share in the disaster.	布朗面临的选择是，是否默默地坚持现行政策并且徒然地希望问题会消失，还是明确承认英国在这一灾难中应有的责任。


This is partly a question of what to do now in Iraq; but it is also a question of Britain’s relationship with the US.	这部分也是目前伊拉克政策问题。 但是这也是英国与美国关系的问题。


With hindsight, it is clear that Britain’s participation in the Iraq war was driven solely by Blair’s determination to stick limpet-like to the US.	从事后来看，很明显，英国参加伊拉克战争完全是由于布莱尔决心为美国的马首是瞻所驱使。


Brown believes, and has said, that Britain must always be close friends with America; and obviously that is the right thing to believe and say.	布朗相信，而且也说过，英国必须始终是美国的紧密朋友。 很明显，这样相信和说话是正确的。


But is he prepared to make clear that there is a difference between being close friends and going into an illegal and disastrous war just to please George W Bush?	但是，他是否准备表明，紧密朋友和仅仅为了取悦布什而发动非法和灾难性的战争是有区别的呢？


So far, there is no indication that he will.	目前，没有迹象表明他会这样做。


While he has publicly regretted the errors in British intelligence about Saddam Hussein, that is merely a way of shifting the blame from the government to the intelligence services.	尽管他公开地对英国情报机关有关萨达姆的情报错误表示遗憾，这只不过是将责难从政府推卸到了情报机构头上。


But it was not the intelligence services that decided to go to war; it was Tony Blair, with the support of Gordon Brown.	但是并不是情报机构决定发动战争的。 决定是由布莱尔在布朗的支持下做出的。


Who is to Blame?	谁之罪？


PRINCETON – Now that the economic crisis looks less threatening (at least for the moment), and forecasters are spying “green shoots” of recovery, an ever more encompassing blame game is unfolding.	普林斯顿——这场经济危机看起来已经没那么危险了（至少眼下是这样），预测人士纷纷开始搜索复苏的“绿芽”，与此同时，一场范围空前的问责游戏也轰轰烈烈地展开了。


The financial crisis provides an apparently endless opportunity for unmasking deceit, malfeasance, and corruption.	显然，金融危机提供了用之不竭的机会，可以揭露欺诈、渎职和腐败。


But we are not sure quite who and what should be unmasked.	然而，究竟应该揭露谁，揭露什么，我们倒有些吃不准了。


Leading bankers were initially the most obvious culprits.	大银行家首当其冲，成了最显眼的被告。


They presided over institutions that made large profits for a substantial period of time by mispricing risk, and then argued for public support on the grounds that they were too big to fail.	长期以来，他们掌管的金融机构靠着扭曲风险定价赚得盆满钵满，回过头来又振振有词地要求公众出资救助，理由是这些机构太大，倒不得。


They appeared arrogant and overpaid, and were easily demonized.	他们表现得趾高气扬，收入似乎高得离谱，很容易就被妖魔化。


But what about the political process?	但政治程序又如何呢？


Why were the banks not more closely controlled and better regulated?	为什么这些银行没有受到更密切的监控和更完善的规管？


It is not that politicians were “bought” in a simple sense; rather, they convinced themselves that financial innovation opened the gate to greater general prosperity, increased home ownership, and, of course, popular support in elections.	这不是某些政客被“收买”了那么简单，毋宁说，政客们使自己相信，金融创新开启了普遍繁荣之门，提高了房屋所有者的比例，当然，也就提高了选举中的民众支持率。


Governments are now vulnerable, and politicians are under attack almost everywhere.	各国政府眼下如履薄冰，政客们差不多成了过街老鼠。


Administrations have collapsed in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, and Ireland.	捷克、匈牙利、冰岛和爱尔兰的行政当局已然崩溃。


Riots and paralyzing strikes have crippled Thailand, France, and Greece.	泰国、法国和希腊被暴乱和罢工折腾得半身不遂。


In Kuwait, the government dismissed parliament.	科威特政府解散了议会。


Britain is convulsed by a scandal about parliamentary expenses that has no equivalent since the attacks on “old corruption” in the early nineteenth century.	英国则因为议员骗领津贴丑闻闹翻了天——自打19世纪上半叶声讨“陋规”（old corruption）以来，英国还没出过这么大的腐败丑闻。


Recriminations after financial crises have a long history, and they recur in regular cycles.	金融危机一过秋后算账的现象有很长的历史了，它们循着规律性的周期一再出现。


The stock exchange boom of the early 1870’s was followed by collapse in 1873 and a witch-hunt for those responsible.	19世纪70年代初的股市泡沫导致1873年的崩盘，也引发了对相关责任者的“围剿”。 1907年大恐慌期间，J.


In 1907, J.P. Morgan was first viewed as the savior of the market, and then as the enemy of the commonweal.	P. 摩根先是被看作市场救星，最后却沦为全民公敌。


In the 1930’s, bankers and finance ministers were accused.	20世纪30年代，银行家和财政部长们则成为众矢之的。


But for the rest of the twentieth century, the backlash cycle seemed to have stopped.	不过在20世纪的其余时间里，这种反冲循环似乎已不再上演。


Today the attacks are not limited to the political and financial establishment.	时至今日，受攻击的不仅是政治和金融大佬们。


Critics are trying to identify the ideas as well as the interests that were responsible for financial and economic dysfunction.	批评者试图挖掘出导致金融和经济失调的一些错误理念和既得利益。


In this respect, the contemporary crisis is unlike the historical analogies, in that it looks as if financial innovation was driven by a set of intellectual and even technological innovations.	在这方面，我们这场危机被挖出来的根子同历史上的危机都不一样——看起来，金融创新背后的驱动力是一系列学术乃至技术革新。


Since it is an economic crisis, most people seeking its intellectual roots are tempted to begin with economists, who, with a few exceptions, look particularly discredited.	由于它是一场经济危机，多数人都不自觉地从经济学家那儿开始挖它的学术根子。 除了一些例外，经济学家的公信力大打折扣。


The founder of the rational expectations revolution, Robert Lucas, is endlessly quoted as having stated in 2003 in his presidential address to the American Economic Association that the “central problem of depression-prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes, and has in fact been solved for many decades.”	人们无休止地引用理性预期革命的奠基人罗伯特·卢卡斯（Robert Lucas）2003年在美国经济学学会主席就职演说里讲的一段话：“预防萧条的核心课题已经得到解决，已经可以满足实践上的一切需要，而且实际上已经解决了好几十年。 ”


It is also clear that academic economists had an impact on policy.	学院经济学家能够影响政策，这一点也很清楚。


Larry Summers, now the highly influential director of President Barack Obama’s National Economic Council, concluded as a young economist that “financial and monetary shocks are less important sources of depression than we had suspected.”	目前身居贝拉克·奥巴马总统国家经济委员会主席这一极富影响力之要职的拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）年轻的时候曾经断言：“金融和货币冲击在引发萧条方面的重要性被我们高估了。


If the economy was foolproof, and if so many good policy options existed to deal with crisis and distress, there was less need to avoid mistakes.	”如果经济简单得连傻瓜都懂，如果对付危机和困难有那么多好的政策选项，也就不需要避免什么错误了。


Things could always be set right retrospectively.	毕竟，事后诸葛亮总是容易的。


Other academic disciplines have looked rather smugly at the public humiliation of their colleagues in economics.	当公众鄙夷经济学家的时候，其他学科颇有些幸灾乐祸。


The non-mathematical appear to have their revenge, as the perils of over-reliance on complex symbolic notation and arcane formulae are relentlessly exposed.	非定量学科似乎有了个扬眉吐气的机会——过度依赖复杂符号和晦涩公式的危险这回算是暴露无遗。


In fact, developments or fashions in other academic disciplines and also in the general culture contributed at least as much to a willingness to engage in absurd risks and to provide and accept valuations of complex and inherently unfathomable securities.	可实际上，鼓励人们去荒唐冒险，去制造和接受高度复杂、根本看不懂的证券定价的，不仅仅是经济学家； 其他学术领域乃至一般文化领域里的发展和时尚也难辞其咎。


The general cultural developments are sometimes termed post-modernism, which involves the replacement of reason by intuition, feeling, and allusion.	一般文化领域近年来的种种趋势有时被称为后现代主义，其内涵包括以直觉、感受和隐喻取代理性认知的倾向。


But post-modernism has itself been generated by technology, with which it has a deeply ambiguous relationship.	然而，后现代主义本身就源自技术革命，它同后者的纠葛剪不断理还乱。


In contrast to a steam engine or an old-fashioned automobile, whose operations were easily comprehensible, modern automobiles or airplanes are so complicated that their operators have no idea how the technology they are using actually works.	蒸汽机或老式汽车的工作原理一目了然，而现代的汽车飞机如此复杂，以至于这些高科技产品的操纵者对其实际工作���理毫无概念。


The Internet has created a world in which strict logic is less important than the juxtaposition of striking images.	互联网创造了一个虚拟世界，在这个虚拟世界里，严格的逻辑已不那么重要，大行其道的是错综杂陈的酷炫图像。


Post-modernism moves away from the rational culture of the so-called “modern era.”	后现代主义跳出了所谓“摩登时代”的理性文化。


Many people are finding more analogies with medieval life, in which humans were surrounded by processes that they found difficult to comprehend. As a result, they thought they lived in a world populated by demons and mysterious forces.	不少人觉得它更像中世纪的生活图景——人类被种种晦涩难解的现象包围着，于是自认为生活在一个充斥神魔和灵力的世界里。


The recent era of global finance – perhaps we should speak of it as being past? – differed from the financial surge of a century ago.	全球金融的最近时代——也许我们该叫它“正在逝去的时代”？ ——不同于一个世纪之前的金融浪潮。


Its cultural manifestations also appeared to be novel.	其文化表现也是前无古人的。


It was playful, allusive, and edgy – in short, post-modern.	它玩世不恭，言辞闪烁，喜欢游走于边缘地带——一句话，整个就是一后现代。


It treated tradition and history not as a constraint, but as a source of ironic reference.	在它眼里，传统和历史与其说是威严的训诫，不如说是讥讽的对象。


At the era’s height, major financial players built vastly expensive collections of highly abstract modern art.	在这个时代玩得最high的时候，金融玩家们也在挥金如土地收藏极度抽象的现代艺术品。


A post-modern neglect or disdain for reality generated the sense that the whole world was constantly shifting and malleable, and might be as transient and meaningless as stock quotations.	对现实性的一种后现代式的无视或轻慢造成一种感觉：整个世界分分秒秒都在流变，时而可以捶扁搓圆随心所欲，时而又像股价一样倏忽无常毫无意义。


An alliance was formed between financial experts who thought they were selling truly innovative ideas, a political elite that endorsed the philosophy of “regulation lite,” and a cultural climate that pushed experimentation and the rejection of traditional values.	一个同盟就此结成，一边是自以为在兜售绝顶创意的金融高手，一边是推崇“无为规管”哲学的政治精英，还有一边则是热衷于尝新、对传统价值弃之如敝屐的文化气候。


The result was that every sort of value – including financial values – came to be seen as arbitrary and fundamentally absurd.	结果，一切价值——包括金融业的传统价值——都被看作是僵硬武断、顽固不化，因而也就是骨子里的谬论。


When incomprehension no longer produces new heights of prosperity, but rather economic collapse and failure, it is not surprising that it turns to anger.	当无厘头再也无法推高繁荣的泡沫，当经济崩溃铺天盖地袭来，毫不奇怪，这个狂欢同盟也就一下子从狂喜转为狂怒。


Finding out who is to blame becomes more and more like the late medieval and early modern search for witches: a way of making sense of a disorderly and hostile universe.	寻找谴责对象的做法也变得越来越像中世纪后期和现代早期那种迫害女巫的勾当：在一个失序和充满敌意的世界里，这是一种强求意义的方式。


Who Lost Turkey?	谁丢失了土耳其？


PARIS – “Who lost Turkey?”	巴黎- “谁丢失了土耳其？


That question, often raised in the past, has been heating up in the aftermath of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s emotional outburst during the recent World Economic Forum 2009 in Davos, when he abruptly left a panel he was sharing with Israeli President Shimon Peres.	”这个经常在过去被提起的问题，在土耳其总理雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安最近在2009年达沃斯世界经济论坛上情绪爆发事件后，变得越来越热门了-在会议期间，在与以色列总统西蒙佩雷斯同一个讨论小组上，他突然离去。


And the Turkish question matters greatly, because it touches on some of the most unstable and unsettling of the world’s diplomatic disputes.	土耳其的问题事关重大，因为它涉及到世界上外交争端中一些最不稳定和最令人担心的部分。


If Turkey has indeed been “lost,” those responsible include the European Union, the United States, Israel, and Turkey itself.	如果土耳其确实已经“被丢失”，要对此负责的方面包括欧盟、美国、以色列和土耳其本身。


The EU’s growing reservations about Turkey’s membership have been expressed unambiguously by French President Nicolas Sarkozy.	欧盟对土耳其加入欧盟所持的越来越保留的态度已由法国总统萨科齐明确地表达了。


In the US, former President George W. Bush gets some of the blame because of the war in Iraq.	美国方面，前总统布什也因为伊拉克战争而要对此负一定责任。


Israel, too, has played its part in Turkey’s alienation from the West, as a result of the Lebanon war of 2006 and its recent military operations in Gaza.	以色列也由于2006年的黎巴嫩战争和最近在加沙的军事行动，在土耳其疏远西方一事上起了它的作用。


All of these events have disturbed and disoriented Turkey, and are magnified by the domestic impact of worst global economic crisis since the 1930’s.	所有这些事件都让土耳其感到不安和无所适从，这些事件并因20世纪30年代以来最严重的全球性经济危机对国内的影响而被放大。


Of course, Turkey’s secular, pro-Western elites may still consider the EU and the US important, if not indispensable, allies and partners, and they may consider Islamic fundamentalism, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran real or at least potential threats.	当然，土耳其的非宗教的亲西方精英们可能仍然认为欧盟和美国是重要的（如非必不可少的）盟友和伙伴。 他们可能会视伊斯兰原教旨主义、哈马斯、真主党和伊朗为真正的或至少是潜在的威胁。


Yet they are also convinced that Europe has behaved improperly toward Turkey, through a combination of short-term populist reflexes and the absence of a long-term strategic vision.	然而，他们也认定由于欧洲的短视的民粹主义反应加上缺乏长远的战略眼光，欧洲对土耳其的所作所为是欠妥的。


The Turkish question is, of course, complex.	当然，土耳其的问题是复杂的。


Turkey’s geography is predominantly Asian, Turkey’s emotions are increasingly Middle Eastern, i.e., Muslim on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and yet Turkey’s elites remain resolutely pro-Western and pro-European.	土耳其的地理位置主要是在亚洲，土耳其的情绪色彩越来越中东化-即在以色列和巴勒斯坦冲突上持穆斯林的情绪，但土耳其的精英们仍然坚定地亲西方和亲欧洲。


But for how long?	但这种情况会持续多久呢？


At the beginning of the twenty-first century, when dialogue with the Islamic world is one of the Western world’s key challenges, Europe would commit a historic strategic blunder if it were to close its doors to Turkey.	在这21世纪初，与伊斯兰世界展开对话是西方世界面临的主要挑战之一，在这个时候，如果欧洲要对土耳其关上大门，那么它将铸成一个历史性的战略错误。


To do so would push back the inheritors of the Ottoman Empire back onto an Asian, Muslim, and Middle Eastern historical trajectory.	这样做会把奥斯曼帝国的后裔们推回到亚洲、穆斯林和中东的历史轨道中去。


In the question of Turkish accession to the EU, the journey matters more than the destination.	在土耳其加入欧盟的问题上，其过程比目的更为重要。


The reforms that Turkey has already implemented in a very short period of time, thanks to its EU candidate status, are impressive.	由于其加入欧盟的候选国地位，土耳其已经在很短的时间内进行了改革，这令人印象深刻。


Should we in Europe really put at risk that progress by expressing an all-too-audible “no”?	难道我们在欧洲真的要大声说“不”而让这样的进程处于危境中吗？


The EU desperately needs a strategic and diplomatic partner that can significantly reinforce its clout in the Middle East.	欧盟迫切需要一个可大大增强其在中东影响力的战略和外交伙伴。


Europe also needs the dynamism of a youthful Turkey.	欧洲也需要年轻的土耳其的活力。


Above all, it needs the message of reconciliation sent to Islam that Turkey’s entrance into the Union would represent.	最重要的是，它需要把和解的信息发送到伊斯兰世界中，而土耳其加入欧盟将代表了这个信息。


Of course, to want Turkey “in” is an act of will, if not an act of faith that is in many ways counterintuitive.	当然，希望土耳其 “入盟”是意志所导致的行为，若不是说在许多方面是违反直觉的信念所导致的行为。


Most Europeans do not perceive Turkey as a “European Other” but as a “non-European Other.”	大多数欧洲人不把土耳其视为“欧洲的那部分” ，而视为“非欧洲的那部分 ”。


Even in Istanbul, the most Westernized of Turkish cities, as soon as one leaves the main arteries, one seems to be immersed in a Middle Eastern or Asian culture.	即使在土耳其最西化的城市伊斯坦布尔，只要一离开主干道，你似乎是沉浸在中东或亚洲文化中。


Israel is not in the European Union, but it, too, is in great danger of losing Turkey.	以色列不属于欧盟，但失去土耳其也会对它造成威胁。


Far from reinforcing Israel’s security, its last two military adventures, in Lebanon and now in Gaza, have caused further self-isolation and loss of world sympathy.	其过去两年在黎巴嫩和目前在加沙地带的军事冒险，根本没有巩固以色列的安全，而是造成了进一步的自我孤立并失去了世界的同情。


Nowhere has this phenomenon been stronger than in Turkey, where those military escapades have strained the two countries’ strategic alliance almost to the breaking point.	在土耳其，这个现象没有比其它地方更强的了，那些军事冒险使得两国的战略联盟几乎紧张到了崩裂的低点。


It is too early to speak of Obama’s policy towards Turkey; suffice it to say that in his willingness to open a respectful dialogue with Islam, he is the only Western leader to move in the right direction.	现在来谈论奥巴马对土耳其的政策还为时太早;我只想说，他现在愿意以尊重的态度打开与伊斯兰世界的对话，他就是唯一的朝正确的方向迈进的西方领导人。


But can positive American gestures towards Turkey, a key NATO member, be sufficient to offset Israel’s insensitive, if not reckless, policies?	但是，美国对土耳其这一北约重要的成员国的积极姿态，能足以抵消以色列采取的不够敏感（若非鲁莽的）的政策吗？


The answer is unclear.	答案还不清楚。


Turkey, too shares some of the responsibility for this mounting process of estrangement.  Erdogan’s behavior in Davos was, at the very least, irresponsible.	土耳其，也要为这个越来越严重的分裂过程负部分责任。 埃尔多安在达沃斯的行为至少是不负责任的。


He may have gained popularity back home, but in today’s difficult economic times, the temptations of cheap populism are more dangerous than ever.	他可能在国内是得到了一些民意支持，但在今天的经济困难时期，廉价的民粹主义的诱惑比以往任何时候都更危险。


One does not play lightly with matches next to a pile of dry wood.	我们不能在火柴放在一堆干材旁边的时候掉以轻心。


Who Needs a Flat Tax?	谁需要统一税率？


WASHINGTON, DC – With America’s Republican presidential candidates lining up to declare their fealty to a flat tax – a system of personal-income taxation that assesses a single rate for all – opponents have focused on why it is a bad idea to raise taxes on the poor in order to reduce them for the wealthy.	华盛顿特区——统一税率体系是对所有纳税者实行单一税率的个人所得税体系，美国共和党总统候选人异口同声地支持统一税率，而反对者则喋喋不休地强调为什么为了给富人减税而给穷人增税是个坏主意。


But, if a flat tax is such a bad idea, why have so many countries embraced it?	但如果统一税率真的那么糟糕，为什么还有那么多国家实行统一税率？


A careful study of these countries – mainly post-communist countries in Eastern Europe and a smattering of tiny micro-states worldwide – suggests that there are three main reasons.	仔细研究就会发现，主要是东欧的后共产主义国家和世界各地的小国采用统一税率。 主要有三种理由促使它们这么做。


First, some countries are so relatively poor and lacking in domestic capital that they opt to drop rates in order to attract foreign investors.	首先，有些国家太过贫困并且缺乏国内资金，它们选择降低税率吸引外国投资。


Other countries are so small and ineffective at collecting revenue that they cannot afford a progressive tax system.	还有些国家太小、税收效率太低，担负不起累进制税率。


Finally, some countries are so corrupt that they have to offer the wealthy a huge rate cut to get them to pay any taxes at all.	最后，有些国家太过腐败，需要大幅度降低富人的税率才能让他们交税。


The United States, like other developed countries, does not suffer from any of these conditions (yet), so it is not clear why it needs a flat tax.	美国和其他发达国家一样（尚）不存在上面提到的问题，因此不清楚为什么要实行统一税率。


The formerly communist countries of Eastern Europe that have adopted a flat tax – including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine, among others – sorely lack investment capital.	东欧实行统一税率的前共产主义国家——包括保加利亚、捷克共和国、爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚、立陶宛、马其顿、罗马尼亚、斯洛伐克和乌克兰在内——都严重缺乏投资资金。


Whether on the European Union’s doorstep or just inside, they compete for the attention of foreign direct investors, for whom a flat tax provides an important signal: You are welcome, we will not steal your money, and you can keep what you earn.	上述有些国家刚刚加入欧盟，有些正争取加入，但它们都千方百计地吸引国外直接投资者的注意，而统一税率发出了一个重要的信号：欢迎你们来投资，我们不会拿走你们的钱，你们所挣的钱都归你们自己。


For developed countries that already have capital and a track record of inward investment, “the appeal of the flat tax is consequently less,” as a report by the International Monetary Fund concludes.	国际货币基金组织的一份报告显示，对已有资金及国内投资记录的发达国家而言，“统一税率并没有那么大吸引力”。


Thus, the flat tax has not been adopted in any developed countries, or in China.	因此，发达国家和中国都没有采用统一税制。


The other countries that have embraced a flat tax are small or micro-states: Jamaica, Tuvalu, Grenada, Mauritius, Timor-Leste, Belize, and Seychelles.	实行统一税率的其他国家均属小型及微型之列：牙买加、图瓦卢、格林纳达、毛里求斯、东帝汶、伯利兹和塞舌尔。


The only (partial) exception to this rule is Paraguay, which adopted a flat tax in 2010.	唯一（部分）打破这项定律的是巴拉圭，该国从2010年开始实行统一税率。


Here, flat-tax advocates’ administrative-simplicity arguments have some traction.	这里，统一税率所宣扬的行政简化有一定道理。


If a country is so small that it cannot develop a tax administration effective enough to manage a fair system of progressive taxation, then a flat tax may make sense.	如果国家面积太小无法制定有效的税收征管机制来监管公平的累进制税率，那么就有理由实行统一税率。


Moreover, some small countries have other sources of revenue, so the benefit of implementing a progressive tax system does not justify the cost.	此外，有些小国有其他收入来源，因此实行累进制税率的好处与所付出的代价不成正比。


Tuvalu’s government, for example, derives nearly 10% of its revenues from the sale of rights to its “.tv” Internet domain name, which brings in about $2 million annually.	比方说图瓦卢政府10%的收入来自其“. tv”互联网域名的销售，仅此一项每年即可获得约200万美元的收入。


Countries that are just slightly larger can afford to collect income taxes in a fairer way.	稍大一些的国家就能承受以更公平的方式征收所得税。


Finally, if a country’s public institutions are in the thrall of oligarchs who are accustomed to stealing with impunity from the public till, a flat tax may be the only way to induce the wealthy to pay any tax at all.	最后，如果一个国家的公共机构深受寡头影响而惯于肆无忌惮地盗窃公共财物，诱使富人纳税的唯一办法可能就是实行统一税率。


Thus, in 2001 Russia became the first large state to adopt a flat tax, reducing the top marginal rate from 30% to 13%.	因此在2001年，俄国成为实行统一税率的唯一一个大国，最高边际税率从30%降至13%。


In 2003, Ukraine dropped its top rate from 40% to 13%.	2003年，乌克兰将最高税率从40%降至13%。


In nearly all countries that have introduced a flat tax, government revenues from income tax have declined.	几乎在所有实行统一税率的国家，政府的所得税收入都有所降低。


That is why its adoption is often associated with an increase in value-added tax rates (as has occurred throughout Eastern Europe).	这也解释了为什么在实行统一税率的同时往往会调高增值税率（几乎所有东欧国家都是如此）。


In the US, the Republican presidential candidate Herman Cain’s “9-9-9” plan calls for a 9% rate for personal and corporate taxes, together with a new 9% national sales tax.	美国共和党总统候选人赫尔曼·凯恩的“999”计划呼吁在实行9%的个人及企业税率的同时，实行9%的国家销售税率。


A country’s tax system reflects its institutional capacity, economic circumstances, and distribution of political power.	一个国家的税制状况反应其体制能力、经济状况和政治权力分配。


If the US were to become the first developed country to experiment with a flat tax, that shift would tend to confirm what many suspect but hope is not true: that America is broke, desperate for inward investment, incompetently governed, and increasingly ruled by a self-regarding oligarchic elite.	如果美国真的成为试行统一税率的首个发达国家，只会确认很多人希望不要成为现实的怀疑：美国已经破产，急需外来投资，政府管理不善，执政权越来越多地落到自以为是的寡头精英们手里。


Who Needs the Humanities?	谁需要人文学科？


WARWICK, UK – Nowadays, in country after country, policymakers have become obsessed with the need to strengthen science education.	英国，华威－现在，一个国家接着一个国家，政策制定者们都沉迷于需要加强自然科学教育的观点。


But what about the humanities – all those disciplines (literature, history, languages, and so forth) whose relevance to economic competitiveness is not so obvious?	但是，人文学科－所有这些和经济竞争关系不是那么明显的学科（文学，历史，语言等等）, 又怎么样呢？


We need the humanities only if we are committed to the idea of humanity.	我们只有在我们忠于人性的观点的时候我们才需要人文学科。


If the humanities have become obsolete, then it may be that humanity is losing its salience.	如果人文学科荒废了，那么这可能是因为人性正在失去其卓越。


I do not mean that we are becoming “less human” in the sense of “inhumane.”	我并不是指在“残忍”这个意义上我们变得“不那么有同情心”。


If anything, we live in a time when traditionally human-centered concerns like “rights” have been extended to animals, if not nature as a whole.	如果有什么的话，那就是,在我们生活的时代，传统的以人类为中心的关注，例如“权利”，如果没有扩大到整个自然上，也已经扩大到动物身上。


Rather, the problem is whether there is anything distinctive about being human that makes special demands of higher education.	更确切地说，问题是，是否作为人的特质使我们对高等教育有特殊的需求。


I believe that the answer continues to be yes.	我认为答案一直是肯定的。


Today, it sounds old-fashioned to describe the university’s purpose as being to “cultivate” people, as if it were a glorified finishing school.	现在，将大学的宗旨描述成“培养”人似乎过时了，仿佛大学是一个华而不实的女子精修学校。


However, once we set aside its elitist history, there remains a strong element of truth to this idea, especially when applied to the humanities.	但是，一旦我们将其杰出的历史放在一边，这个观点仍然有很强的真实性，特别是在人文学科方面。


Although we now think of academic disciplines, including the humanities, as being “research-led,” this understates the university’s historic role in converting the primate Homo sapiens into a creature whose interests, aspirations, and achievements extend beyond successful sexual reproduction.	虽然我们现在认为包括人文学科的学术课程是以“研究为导向的”，但是，这仍然低估了大学在 将灵长类智人转变成其兴趣、渴望以及成就不再局限在成功的有性生殖上的历史作用。


What was originally called the “liberal arts” provided the skills necessary for this transformation.	最初被称作“文科”的学科为这个转换停供了必要的技能。


By submitting to a common regime of speaking, writing, reading, observing, and calculating, the “upright ape” acquired the capacity to reason in public.	通过遵守共同的说,写，读，察以及算体系，“站立的猿人”获得了当众推理的能力。


This enabled first him and then her to command authority regardless of birth, resulting in the forging of networks and even institutions whose benefits cut deeply across bloodlines.	这首先使他，接着使她，在不管其出身的条件下，能够支配权力，从而建立起人际网络甚至是制度，这些人际网络和制度的好处径直超越了血统。


We too easily forget that our heterogeneous societies rely on at least a watered-down version of this training to maintain political and economic order.	我们非常容易忘记，我们成分不同的社会至少依靠一种被打了折扣的训练来维护政治和经济秩序。


The university began with the humanities at its heart, but today it is playing catch-up with the natural sciences.	在最初的大学里，人文学科具有中心地位，但是现在它在和自然科学玩追赶游戏。


This is largely because the natural sciences have most closely imitated the productivity measures associated with industry. The result is a “bigger is better” mentality that stresses ever more publications, patents, and citations.	这主要是因为自然科学最密切地复制了与工业相关的生产力方法，其结果是“越大越好”的思想观念被在越来越多的出版物，专利和引证中加以强调。


Yet, this agenda tends to be pursued without much concern for how – or if – these measures feed into something of greater social, cultural, and even economic relevance.	然而，人们倾向于在完成这个过程中，对这些方法怎样－或者是是否－注入更多的社会、文化甚至经济相关性没有太多的考虑。


The Science Citation Index, originally designed to help researchers discern aggregate trends in increasingly complex subject domains sciences, has helped measure productivity.	最初被设计用来帮助研究人员洞悉日益复杂的各科学领域总体趋势的科学引文索引，帮助测量了生产力。


But now these trends are routinely converted into norms against which the performance of particular universities, departments, and even individual researchers is judged.	但是，现在这些趋势被例行公事地转换成为判断某大学，院系，甚至单个研究员表现的标准。


What is most easily measured has become confused with what is most worth measuring.	最容易被测量的东西已经为最值得测量的东西感到困惑。


But, more profoundly, this entire line of thinking neglects the distinctly transformative capacity of the knowledge in which the humanities specializes.	但是，更深刻的是，这整个的思想路线忽视了人文科学专攻的知识的出众的变革能力。


An adequate assessment of this capacity requires looking at its multiplier effects.	对这种能力充分的评估需要观察其乘数效应。


As with John Maynard Keynes’s notion that returns on public investment must be measured as the long-term consequence of other investments that it stimulates across the economy and society, so, too, with the knowledge generated by the humanities.	按照约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯的观点，公共投资的收益必须用其刺激整个经济和社会的其他投资的长期影响来加以测量，所以，由人文学科产生的知识也应该如此测量。


This idea is lost in today’s cost accounting for universities, which treats what transpires between teacher and student in the classroom as akin to what happens between producer and consumer in the market.	在当今大学的成本会计中，它把在教室里老师和学生之间发生的事情看作在市场上生产者和消费者之间发生的事情一样。


In both cases, it is assumed that the value of the exchanged good is decided shortly after its delivery according to how it satisfies an immediate need.	在这两种情况中，都是假设被交换的商品的价值在商品被交付不久后，按照其满足直接需要的程度确定。


Not surprisingly, students value their degree by the first job it gets them rather than the life it prepares them for over the next half-century.	毫不奇怪，学生们通过他们得到的第一份工作来确定他们的学位的价值，而不是它为他们在接下来的半个多世纪的生活所做的准备。


Today, it is hard to believe that in the heyday of the welfare state, universities were both more elite and more publicly funded than they are today.	现在，很难相信在福利国家的全盛时期，大学比现在更精英化并且更多的接受公共资助。


Back then, it was assumed that the benefits of academic training accrued not only, or even primarily, to those who experienced it but also, and more importantly, to the rest of the population, whose lives were variously enriched by the application of the arts and sciences.	在那时候，人们认为理论训练不仅－甚至是主要的－使接受它的人受益，更重要的是，对其他的人，他们的生命不同程度的因为艺术和科学的应用而变得丰富起来。


Of course, this enrichment included such practical benefits as medical breakthroughs and labor-saving technologies.	当然，这种丰富包括诸如医学突破和节省劳力的技术���样实际的好处。


But the enrichment provided by the humanities was no less enduring, though its subtler nature makes it harder to track.	但是，人文学科停供的丰富一样不朽，虽然它微妙的本质使人很难追寻其踪迹。


Nevertheless, to paraphrase Keynes, every time we turn on the radio or television, read a newspaper, pick up a novel, or watch a movie, we are in the thrall of one or more dead humanists who set the terms of reference through which we see the world.	然而，可以向凯恩斯进行这样的解释，每次当我们打开收音机或电视，看报，拿起一本小说，或者观看一部电影的时候，我们在处在一个或多个死去的人文主义者的思想内,他们设定了参考术语，通过这些术语我们来观察这个世界。


In its long history as the premier form of academic knowledge, the humanities were frequently criticized for their subversive character.	在作为首要的学术知识的悠久历史中，人文学科经常因为其破坏性的特征而遭到批评。


That some would now question whether the humanities have any impact at all merely reflects the crude and short-sighted way in which the value of academic knowledge is measured and judged today.	现在有些人质问人文学科是否具有任何的影响力, 这仅仅反映了现在判断理论知识拙劣而短视的方法。


Perhaps that befits creatures whose lives are “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,” to recall Thomas Hobbes’ description of the state of nature. But it does a grave injustice to those of us who still aspire to full-fledged humanity.	或许，这适合生命“孤独，贫穷，污秽，粗野和短暂”的生物去回忆托马斯·霍布斯描述的自然状态,但是这对我们当中立志于完整的人性的人是一个重大的不公。


Who Needs to Be EU President?	谁需要当选欧盟主席？


Whoever steps into Europe’s new top job as President of the European Council will set the mold.	无论由谁来出任欧盟理事会主席这一新职位都将开启一种新的模式。


If it is someone of worldwide renown, the presidency will immediately be established as a post of global importance.	如果此人闻名世界，欧盟理事会主席一职也将立即成为全球极为重要的职位。


But if its first occupant is not a household name, the presidency will be doomed as just another of the European Union’s confusing plethora of worthy senior positions that are neither valued nor understood outside Brussels.	可如果首任主席默默无闻，那么欧盟理事会主席一职就将注定成为又一个滥竽充数的欧盟高级职位，既不被外界所看重，在布鲁塞尔之外也不为人所知。


The key point here is that Europe won’t be able to upgrade the job later.	问题的关键是欧洲今后没有能力再给这个职位升级。


If the presidency goes to a politician who lacks fame and charisma, its place will forever be low down in the international pecking order.	如果主席一职由缺乏威望和魅力的政治家担任，那么它永远不会在国际权力排行中占据任何优势。


Of the half-dozen candidates to become “Europe’s President,” only Tony Blair needs no introduction anywhere.	在六名竞选“欧洲主席”的候选人中，只有托尼·布莱尔一人无论走到哪里都不需要介绍。


All the other names in the ring have to be accompanied by a description – the former Finnish this or Austrian that.	其它所有人的名字后面都必须加上注脚——前芬兰这个或者前奥地利那个。


Nobody knows whether the current prime ministers of the EU’s 27 member countries will choose Blair.	没有人知道欧盟27个成员国的现任首相是否会选择布莱尔。


There is considerable lingering ill will over his role in the invasion of Iraq, and there is the inconvenient fact that he is from Euro-skeptic Britain, and that many on the left view him as a leader whose “third way” was a betrayal of socialism.	人们对他在入侵伊拉克时所起的作用耿耿于怀，另外一个不利的事实是他来自对欧盟抱有怀疑态度的英国，更有甚者，左翼阵线中有太多人认为他所谓的“第三条道路”就是对社会主义的背叛。


But choosing a president for Europe isn’t about Blair the man, or about the political records of any of the others who would like the job.	但选择欧洲主席不是要看布莱尔的为人，而是要看竞争这一职位的其它人拥有什么样的政治履历。


It is about the job itself.	真正重要的是这个职务本身。


Europe’s problem is that it lacks a clearly identifiable leader.	欧洲的问题在于它缺乏一个广为人知的领袖。


As a result, despite the EU’s many successes, it still speaks with too many voices.	因此，虽然欧盟取得了很多成功，但至今仍然缺乏统一的话语权。


This was among the problems that the EU’s controversial Lisbon treaty was designed to fix.	欧盟备受争议的《里斯本条约》就旨在解决这个问题。


It is now in the final stages of its long and difficult birth, and by the New Year should be bringing new mechanisms to bear to streamline European decision-making.	该条约已经进入漫长而艰苦的诞生过程的最后阶段，到新年来临时应该会带来一种新的机制，对简化欧盟的决策过程施加影响力。


The jewel in its crown is to be the appointment for a 30-month term of a full-time president of the European Council, which groups the heads of EU member governments, along with a foreign policy chief who will be backed by an embryonic EU diplomatic service.	《里斯本条约》这座王冠上的宝石是任命一位任期为30个月的全职欧盟理事会主席，他的职责是与以早期欧盟外交人员为后盾的外交政策首脑们一道，完成对欧盟成员国政府领袖的分组工作。


Now that more than two-thirds of Irish voters have reversed their country’s earlier opposition to the Lisbon treaty – with only the Czech Republic’s Europhobic president, Václav Klaus, holding out against it – the focus is on who will fill these two jobs.	现在已经有三分之二以上的爱尔兰选民改变了态度，不再迫使国家投票反对《里斯本条约》——只有捷克共和国病态惧怕欧元的总统瓦茨拉夫·克劳斯仍然对条约抱着坚决否定的态度——当前问题的焦点是由谁来出任这两个职位。


And that, in turn, has triggered a round of bitter political squabbling that threatens to negate the entire idea of a much more powerful European voice on the global stage.	而这终于又引发了新一轮激烈的政治争吵，在全球舞台上大幅度提升欧洲话语权的整个理念都险些遭到颠覆。


The three Benelux countries, along with a few other smaller EU nations, are opposed to the new European president being from a large nation.	荷、比、卢经济联盟三国和其它几个欧盟小国反对由大国派人担任新的欧盟理事会主席。


And there are also those who fear that a political heavyweight in the job might eclipse the EU Commission’s President, former Portuguese prime minister José Manuel Barroso, who has just been confirmed for a second five-year term, and devalue the role of the foreign policy chief whose authority Lisbon is due to beef up.	也有人担心一个重量级的政治人物可能会让欧盟委员会主席，前葡萄牙总理若泽·曼努埃尔·巴罗佐相形见绌，巴罗佐刚刚确定出任第二个五年任期，这一决策削弱了里斯本本应全力增强的欧盟外交首脑的影响力。


These are specious arguments.	这种说法似是而非。


The EU’s external relations involve two different types of politics.	欧盟的对外关系中涉及两种不同类型的政治。


The first is the politics of world theatre, where a political figure of global stature could do much to raise the EU’s profile and ensure that it has a major say in re-ordering the post-crisis global economic rulebook.	其一是世界舞台上的政治，一个拥有全球成就的政治人物可以大大提升欧盟的政治形象，并确保其在后危机时代的全球经济规则重塑中取得重要的发言权。


The second is the politics of detail, where the new foreign policy chief’s role is to create a single EU stance on the wide range of issues about which European governments still have wildly different national positions.	另一个则是细节的政治，也就是欧盟新的外交政策首脑肩负着在欧洲各国政府立场大相径庭的一系列问题上塑造统一欧盟立场的艰巨任务。


Europe has an international image problem that in part stems from a complex institutional structure that non-EU countries find baffling.	欧洲的国家形象出现了问题，这部分是因为非欧盟国家无法理解���复杂的制度结构。


It is over-represented at G-20 world summits, for instance, but the presence of four European national leaders, plus EU representatives like Barroso, weakens rather than strengthens its political weight.	例如，欧洲在20国集团世界峰会上代表过多，但是四名欧洲国家领导人的出席，再加上像巴罗佐这样的欧盟代表，削弱而不是增强了欧洲的政治影响。


The same is true of other global bodies like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.	欧洲在世界银行和国际货币基金组织的代表权也处于同样的状况。


The result is that Europe’s achievements in recent years – its expansion to create a single economic market of 500 million people and its creation of the euro as a currency that challenges the dollar – are not accompanied by a significantly greater global standing.	因此欧洲近年来所取得的成就——它创造了5亿人的统一经济市场的扩张并建立了挑战美元的欧元货币——并没有使它的国际地位得到显著的提升。


World leaders from Barack Obama to Hu Jintao address themselves to Berlin, Paris, and London, rather than to Brussels.	从巴拉克·奥巴马到胡锦涛的世界领袖寻求与柏林、巴黎和伦敦，而不是布鲁塞尔的对话。


The result is that EU policy proposals that could do much to advance the economic and geopolitical interests of Europeans are not as influential as they could be.	结果造成原本可以大幅度促进欧洲人经济和地缘政治利益的欧盟政策提案并没有充分发挥应有的影响。


The text of the Lisbon treaty is studiously vague in its job description of the president’s role – an approach that prevented trouble for treaty’s framers, but merely postponed disagreement.	《里斯本条约》的具体规定有意在主席的职务描述上含糊其辞——这种方法能为条约的制定者减少麻烦，但所起的作用不过是将分歧的时间推后。


The real argument now taking place between Europe’s national governments is about the authority that the EU’s president should have.	当前欧洲各国政府间的真正争议在于欧盟主席应该拥有什么样的权威。


The risk is that Europe’s squabbling politicians will opt for a figurehead and miss this golden opportunity to create a global leader.	真正的风险在于欧洲争执不休的政客会选择一名傀儡，从而错过这个发挥全球领导作用的黄金时机。


Who Next at the ECB Helm?	欧洲央行行长花落谁家？


TILBURG, THE NETHERLANDS – Two years ago, the leaders of the world’s central banks were considered heroes for their efforts in preventing financial crisis from turning into Great Depression II.	发自荷兰蒂尔堡——两年前，各国央行的领导人都受到了英雄般的待遇，因为他们成功阻止了经济危机演变成另一场大萧条。


Today, however, central banks are being sharply criticized, and their independence is coming under severe pressure in many countries, particularly in the eurozone, as Mario Draghi, the head of the Bank of Italy, recently pointed out.	而如今他们却又面对着尖锐的职责，正如意大利中央银行行长马里奥·德拉齐指出的那样，许多国家央行的独立性都受到了极大挑战，特别是欧元区内的那几家。


The type of person at the helm of any central bank is always important – but now more than ever, because financial crises always threaten central banks’ independence.	一国的中央银行究竟该让何人掌舵？ 这个问题通常都至关重要——这在当今则更显尖锐，因为金融危机让央行的独立性备受威胁。


In the United States, the Federal Reserve seems to have support only of the Obama administration, hardly something of which to be proud.	在美国，美联储背后只有奥巴马政府在撑腰，这可不是一件光彩的事。


Congress has disparaged the Fed’s handling of the crisis, and Representative Ron Paul of Texas, who believes that the Fed’s very existence is unconstitutional, will take over one of the key congressional oversight committees in January.	国会对美联储处理危机的手段大加责难，而认为美联储的存在本身就是违宪的德克萨斯州参议员罗恩·保罗将在1月接掌相关国会监察委员会。


More than half of all Americans want politicians to have more say over monetary policy – a scary prospect in view of the historical record.	此外大多数美国人都希望政治家们能对货币政策多发表一点看法——而过去的历史已经证明这并非明智之举。


Given the likelihood of a long period of sub-par economic growth, increasing pressure on public finances in the eurozone, and the ongoing debate on the future of the euro, the European Central Bank has become, more than ever before, the last line of defense for Europe’s common currency.	长期低速经济增长的可能性，欧元区的公共财政压力，以及对欧元未来的讨论三管齐下，以致欧洲中央银行成为捍卫欧洲共同货币的最后一道防线。


A firm ECB president, unwilling to yield to political pressure, is needed.	因此我们需要一个立场坚定，不会向政治压力低头的欧洲央行主席。


During the financial crisis, the ECB has had an outstanding president in the person of Jean-Claude Trichet.	在金融危机期间，欧洲央行有幸拥有让-克劳德·特里谢这位杰出的主席。


But his non-renewable term will end in October 2011, and European leaders are not waiting until the last moment to appoint his successor.	但他的任期将在2011年10届满，而且无法连任，欧洲各国领导人也不可能等到最后一刻才确定他的继任者。


Indeed, positioning and bargaining among the euro’s member countries has already started.	而各欧元区成员国其实之间早已展开了博弈。


First and foremost, the next ECB president should excel on monetary matters.	首先，下一任欧洲央行主席必须精通货币事务。


True, the current financial crisis has brought bank supervision to the fore.	毫无疑问，当前的金融危机使银行监管成为第一要务。


But monetary policy, not bank supervision, is the raison d’être of central banks, whereas the banks can be well handled by the newly established European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which will be responsible for macro-prudential supervision in Europe from January 1, 2011.	但货币政策才是央行存在的真正理由，而银行事务可以交由新近成立的欧洲系统性风险委员会（ESRB）来承担，该委员会于2011年1月1日开始运作，负责对欧洲各银行的大小事务进行监管。


Furthermore, and contrary to common belief, the ECB president need not be very diplomatic, but should be able to unite all members of the ECB’s Governing Council.	但与一般共识相反的是，欧洲央行主席无须善于外交，但必须有能力团结欧洲央行管理委员会的全体成员。


As political pressure on central banks, including the ECB, increases, its president must not hesitate to criticize European politicians and, if necessary, publicly name and shame them.	随着各国央行（包括欧洲央行）承受的政治压力不断增大，其主席应敢于批评那些欧洲政治家，有必要的话甚至可以公开点名。


The ECB’s independence is its most valuable asset – indeed, it is indispensible.	因为欧洲央行的独立性就是其最宝贵的财产——事实上，这是不可或缺的。


A good central banker must be able to say no to politicians.	一位优秀的中央银行家必须能对政治家说不。


This does not mean the ECB president should pick fights whenever possible.	当然这不意味着欧洲央行主席要四处与人交恶。


On the contrary, he should be able to build support for the ECB’s independence.	相反，他应当能为欧洲央行的独立性赢得支持。


But he should follow the maxim about politicians set down by the ECB’s first president, Wim Duisenberg: “I can hear them, but I do not listen.”	但也要尊崇欧洲央行首任行长维恩·迪森博格应对政治家的座右铭：“我听到他们说什么，但我不会放在心上。 ”


The president should also count on support from a majority of Europeans.	这位主席还必须倚靠大多数欧洲人的支持。


Unfortunately, country of origin is highly important in this respect.	不幸的是，在这方面主席的出身也是个异常重要的因素。


Given the fact that the current ECB vice-president is from southern Europe (Portugal), the next head of the ECB must come from northern Europe.	由于当前欧洲央行副主席来自南欧（葡萄牙），因此下届欧洲央行主席必须来自北欧。


Only someone from Germany, the Netherlands, or a Scandinavian euro country like Finland can count on support from Germans, which is crucial.	只有那些来自德国，荷兰或者是芬兰这样的斯堪的纳维亚半岛欧元区国家的人才能得到德国人的支持，这点非常关键。


There is certainly someone to be found in the eurozone who possesses all these qualities.	我们当然能在欧元区内找到符合上述要求的人。


In fact, there is more than one.	事实上这样的人选还不止一个。


Draghi is one.	德拉齐是一个。


Others include Klaus Regling, head of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), Axel Weber, President of the Bundesbank, and Jürgen Stark, a current member of the ECB’s Executive Board.	另外还有欧洲金融稳定机构的主管克劳斯·雷格林，德国联邦银行主席阿塞尔·韦伯，还有现任欧洲央行执行董事会董事的荣根·斯塔克。


Draghi’s Italian passport and his past service at Goldman Sachs do not help him much.	德拉齐的意大利国籍以及高盛公司的工作经历对他并无太多帮助。


Regling has a lot of experience, but none in central banking and monetary policy.	雷格林经验甚丰，但在央行事务和货币政策方面则一片空白。


Anyone who wants Stark will need a good team of lawyers to figure out how to convert his current, non-renewable appointment on the Executive Board into an appointment as President without violating the ECB’s rules.	那些钟情于斯塔克的人必须先找一帮好律师，以便想方设法在不破坏欧洲央行规则的情况下让他从现任执行董事晋身为主席。


Given some of Weber’s statements over 2010, he could be accused of being much too undiplomatic.	而考虑到韦伯在2010年发表的某些言论，或许他在外交方面还罗显稚嫩。


Nout Wellink, currently the head of the Dutch central bank, is a wildcard candidate, as is Erkki Liikanen of the Finish central bank.	现任德国中央银行行长的努特·威尔林克也是一位未知的候选人，正如芬兰中央银行行长艾尔奇·林坎南那样。


Both are suitable for the post.	这两人都能胜任欧洲央行行长之位。


The final decision, of course, rests with European heads of state and government.	当然最后的决定还是要由欧洲各国首脑做出。


But, in our view, Trichet’s successor will most likely answer to the name of Weber, Wellink, or Liikanen.	但在我们看来，特里奇是继任者将可能在韦伯，威尔林克和林坎南之间产生。


Who Owns Bolivia?	谁是玻利维亚的主人？


A few months ago, Evo Morales became Bolivia‘s first democratically elected indigenous head of state.	几个月前，莫拉莱斯成为玻利维亚首位经民主程序当选的土著人国家元首。


Indigenous groups constitute 62% of Bolivia’s population, and those with mixed blood another 30%, but for 500 years Bolivians had been ruled by colonial powers and their descendants.	土著人占玻利维亚人口的62％，混血人口占另外的30％。 但是在过去500年里，玻利维亚人一直由殖民强国及其后裔统治。


Well into the twentieth century, indigenous groups were effectively deprived of a vote and a voice.	二十世纪很长一段时间，土著人实际上被剥夺了投票权和发言权。


Aymara and Quechua, their languages, were not even recognized for conducting public business.	土著人语言艾马拉语和盖丘亚语甚至不被承认为公共事务用语。


So Morales’ election was historic, and the excitement in Bolivia is palpable.	所以，莫拉莱斯的当选是历史性的，而且玻利维亚民心激动是显而易见的。


But Morales’ nationalization of Bolivia’s oil and gas fields sent shock waves through the international community.	但是，莫拉莱斯将玻利维亚的石油和天然气油田收归国有却令国际社会震惊不已。


During his campaign, Morales made clear his intention to increase state control over national gas and oil.	在竞选过程中，莫拉莱斯明确表明，他打算提高对国家天然气和石油的控制。


But he had made it equally clear that he did not intend to expropriate the property of energy firms – he wanted foreign investors to stay. (Nationalization does not, of course, necessarily mean expropriation without appropriate compensation.)	但是，他还同样明确表明他并不打算征收能源公司的财产，而是想让外国投资者留在玻利维亚（国有化当然并不意味着不经适当补偿予以征收）。


Perhaps surprising for modern politicians, Morales took his words seriously.	莫拉莱斯的言论对于现代政治家们而言可能是令人惊讶的，因此他对自己的承诺严肃对待。


Genuinely concerned about raising the incomes of his desperately poor people, he recognized that Bolivia needs foreigners’ expertise to achieve growth, and that this entails paying fairly for their services.	他真心关心提高其一贫如洗的人民的收入，并认识到玻利维亚需要外国专业知识来取得经济增长，而这就需要公允地支付他们的服务。


But are foreign owners getting more than a fair rate of return?	但是，外国所有者们是否得到了公允的回报率呢？


Morales’ actions are widely supported by Bolivians, who see the so-called privatizations (or “capitalizations”) under former President Gonzalo “Goni” Sanchez de Lozada as a rip-off: Bolivia received only 18% of the proceeds!	莫拉莱斯的行动得到了玻利维亚人的广泛支持。 他们把前总统桑切斯当政期间的所谓私有化（或者“资本化”）视为抢劫。


Bolivians wonder why investments of some $3 billion should entitle foreign investors to 82% of the country’s vast gas reserves, now estimated to be worth $250 billion.	玻利维亚只获得18％的收入！ 玻利维亚人疑惑不解，为什么大约30亿美元的投资就让外国投资者拥有该国大量天然气储备的82％，而这些储备现在估计相当于2500亿美元。


While there has not yet been full disclosure of returns, or an audit of the true value of investments, it appears that investors would, at the old terms, have recouped all their money within just four years.	尽管目前还没有完全披露回报、稽查投资的真实价值，看起来投资者们根据原有条款已经在短短四年时间里收回了全部投资。


Bolivians also ask why foreigners reap all the benefits of today’s high prices for oil and gas?	玻利维亚人还想问，为什么外国人大肆收取当今居高不下的石油和天然气价格的利益？


It costs no more to extract oil or gas today than it did when prices were one-third of their current level.	现在开采石油或天然气的成本并不比当初价格只有现在的三分之一的时候更为昂贵。


Yet, the foreign oil companies get 82% of the increase – in the case of oil, this would amount to a windfall for them of $32 a barrel or more.	但是，外国石油公司得到提价的82％。 对于石油来说，这将是每桶32美元或者更多的横财。


No wonder that Bolivians thought they were being cheated and demanded a new deal.	难怪玻利维亚人觉得他们受到了欺骗并且要求重新谈判。


On May 2, Morales simply reversed the percentages, pending renegotiation of the contracts: the companies operating in the two largest fields would get 18% of the production for themselves.	5月2日，莫拉莱斯在对合同重新谈判之前一举转变了百分比，也就是在两个最大的油田运作的公司得到其产量的18％。


As part of this new deal, Bolivia should also get a larger share when prices increase. (Bolivia may, of course, not want to bear the risk of a fall in the price, so it may strike a deal to transfer some of the downside risk to foreign companies, giving them in exchange more of the upside potential.)	作为这一合约的一部分，玻利维亚还应该在价格提高的时候得到更大的份额（当然，玻利维亚并不想承担降价时的风险，因此它可能签署协议，把某些价格下跌的风险转移给外国公司，作为交换，也给它们更多的提价潜力）。


To most Bolivians, what is at stake is a matter of fairness: Should foreign oil and gas companies get a fair return on their capital, or a supernormal return?	对于大多数玻利维亚人而言，公平并不得到保证。 外国石油和天然气公司是否应该在它们的资本上得到公允的还是超乎正常的回报？


Should Bolivia be paid a fair value for its resources?	是否应当为玻利维亚的自然资源支付公允的价格？


And should Bolivia, or foreign companies, reap most of the windfall gains from increases in energy prices?	是玻利维亚还是外国公司应当获取能源价格上扬而带来的意外的收益？


Moreover, many deals were apparently done in secret by previous governments – and apparently without the approval of Congress.	而且，许多交易明显没有得到国会的批准而由前任政府秘密签订。


Indeed, because Bolivia’s Constitution requires the approval of Congress for such sales, it isn’t clear that Morales is nationalizing anything: the assets were never properly sold.	实际上，由于玻利维亚宪法规定此类交易需要得到国会批准，因此并不清楚莫拉莱斯是否在国有化，因为这些资产从来就没有被合法地出售。


When a country is robbed of a national art treasure, we don’t call its return “re-nationalization,” because it belonged to the country all along.	当一个国家的国家艺术珍品被劫掠后，我们不能把归还成为“重新国有化”。 因为这本来就属于这个国家。


As with many privatizations elsewhere, there are questions as to whether the foreign investors have kept their side of the bargain.	正如其他地方的私有化一样，外国投资者是否遵守了他们应当遵守的协议部分还是个问题。


Bolivia contributed to these joint enterprises not only with resources, but also with previous investments.	玻利维亚不仅以自然资源为这些合资企业投入资本，而且还投入了原先的投资。


The foreign companies’ contribution was supposed to be further investment.	外国公司的投入应当是进一步投资。


But did they fully live up to their commitments?	但是，它们是否完全遵守了承诺呢？


Are accounting gimmicks being used to overstate the true value of foreign capital contributions?	是否使用了会计伎俩来过高地申报外国资本投入的实际价值呢？


Bolivia’s government has, so far, simply raised questions, and set in motion a process for ascertaining the answer.	玻利维亚政府目前仅仅是提出了问题，而且开始了澄清答案的进程。


The problem in Bolivia is a lack of transparency, both when contracts are signed and afterwards.	玻利维亚的问题是缺乏透明，不仅是签署协议的时候，也是签署之后。


Without transparency, it is easy for citizens to feel that they are being cheated – and they often are.	没有透明，公民们就很容易感到受到了欺骗，他们经常这样感觉。


When foreign companies get a deal that is too good to be true, there is often something underhanded going on.	当外国公司签订了优惠得不可思议的协议的时候，就经常会有某些不可告人的东西。


Around the world, oil and gas companies have themselves to blame: too often, they have resisted calls for greater transparency.	全世界的石油和天然气公司都是咎由自取，那就是，在大多数情况下，它们拒绝更大透明的呼吁。


In the future, companies and countries should agree on a simple principle: there should be, to paraphrase President Woodrow Wilson’s memorable words, “open contracts, openly and transparently arrived at.”	未来，公司和国家之间应当达成一个简单的原则，那就是，借用美国前总统威尔逊令人难忘的话来说，“合同应当正大光明”。


If the Bolivians do not get fair value for their country’s natural wealth, their prospects are bleak.	如果玻利维亚无法为其自然财富得到公允的价值，那么，前途就会渺茫。


Even if they do, they will need assistance, not only to extract their resources, but also to improve the health and education of all Bolivians – to ensure long-term economic growth and social welfare.	即使得到了，它们也将会需要援助，不仅仅是帮助开采其资源，而且也是提高玻利维亚人民的健康和教育水平来确保长期的经济增长和社会福利。


For now, the world should celebrate the fact that Bolivia has a democratically elected leader attempting to represent the interests of the poor people of his country.	目前，世界应当为玻利维亚有了一个经过民主程序当选的、力图代表该国穷人利益的领导人而庆贺。


It is a historic moment.	这的确是一个历史性的时刻。


Who Pays for Bird Flu?	谁来为禽流感买单？


Fifty years ago, American chicken farmers found that by keeping their birds in sheds they could produce chickens for the table more cheaply and with less work than by traditional farmyard methods.	50年前，美国的鸡农发现大棚养鸡不仅可以提供价廉物美的餐桌肉食，还能比传统庭院养鸡的方式省不少力气。


The new method spread: chickens disappeared from fields into long, windowless sheds.	新的方法被快速推广：肉鸡从田野里消失，搬进了没有窗户的长长的鸡棚。


Factory farming was born.	工厂化养鸡诞生了。


It isn’t called “factory farming” merely because those sheds look like factories.	把这种方法命名为“工厂化养鸡”不仅是因为鸡棚很像工厂。


Everything about the production method is geared towards turning live animals into machines for converting grain into meat or eggs at the lowest possible cost.	生产的所有步骤只有一个目的，就是以最低的成本把活生生的动物变成把粮食转为肉蛋的机器。


Walk into such a shed – if the producer will let you – and you will find up to 30,000 chickens.	如果能得到鸡农的允许入棚参观，就能看到多达30，000只被饲养的肉鸡。


The National Chicken Council, the trade association for the US chicken industry, recommends a stocking density of 85 square inches per bird – less than a standard sheet of typing paper.	美国养鸡业的行业协会全国养鸡协会推荐的养殖密度达到了令人震惊的每只鸡85平方英寸¾还不及一张标准打字纸的大小。


When the chickens approach market weight, they cover the floor completely.	肉鸡快要上市时，会把这块地方塞得密不透风。


No chicken can move without having to push through other birds.	如果不把同伴们挤到一边，它们谁都无法动弹。


In the egg industry, hens can barely move at all, because they are crammed into wire cages, which makes it possible to stack them in tiers, one above the other.	产蛋的母鸡更是一动不动，因为它们被塞进了铁丝编的鸡笼，这样就能一层层堆叠起来，压在同伴的上面。


Environmentalists point out that this production method is unsustainable.	环境专家指出这样的生产方式不能持久。


For a start, it relies on the use of fossil fuel energy to light and ventilate the sheds, and to transport the grain eaten by the chickens.	首先，鸡棚要采用化石燃料来照明通风，并把粮食饲料输送到肉鸡跟前。


When this grain, which humans could eat directly, is fed to chickens, they use some of it to create bones and feathers and other body parts that we cannot eat.	这些粮食本来可以供人类直接食用，现在却被用作饲料喂鸡，而其中一部分变成了骨骼和羽毛，还有其它无法食用的身体器官。


So we get less food back than we put into the birds – and less protein, too – while disposing of the concentrated chicken manure causes serious pollution to rivers and ground water.	这样，从禽鸟身上回收的食物及蛋白质就小于我们的初始投入，而家禽粪便的集中处理又给河流和地下水造成严重的污染。


Animal-welfare advocates protest that crowding the chickens keeps them from forming a natural flock, causes them stress, and, in the case of laying hens, prevents them from even stretching their wings.	动物福利人士抗议把肉鸡挤在一起，认为这样会阻碍其形成自然群落，并造成它们紧张焦虑，而蛋鸡甚至无法伸展自己的翅膀。


The air in the sheds is high in ammonia from bird feces, which are usually allowed to pile up for months – and in some cases for a year or more – before being cleaned out.	鸡棚内的空气充斥着氨气和鸡屎的味道，几个月都得不到清理，有时会堆上一年甚至更长。


Medical experts warn that because the birds are routinely fed antibiotics to keep them growing in such crowded, filthy, and stressful conditions, antibiotic-resistant bacteria could cause a public-health threat.	医学专家警告因为禽鸟日常须饲喂抗生素才能在如此拥挤、肮脏和压抑的环境内持续生长，造成对抗生素有耐受能力的细菌会给公众健康造成威胁。


Yet, despite these well-founded criticisms, over the last 20 years factory farming – not only of chickens, but also of pigs, veal calves, dairy cows, and, in outdoor feedlots, cattle – has spread rapidly in developing countries, especially in Asia.	虽然这些批评不无道理，但过去20年来工厂养殖¾不仅包括肉鸡，还包括肉猪、肉用小牛和室外牧场饲养的肉牛¾在发展中国家，特别是亚洲国家得到迅速的推广。


Now we are discovering that the consequences may be far more deadly than we ever imagined.	现在我们发现由此带来的后果可以比我们预想的要严重得多。


As University of Ottawa virologist Earl Brown put it after a Canadian outbreak of avian influenza, “high-intensity chicken rearing is a perfect environment for generating virulent avian flu viruses.”	正如渥太华大学病毒学家厄尔·布朗在加拿大爆发禽流感之后所说的那样，“高密度养殖禽鸟是产生致命禽流感病毒的绝佳温床。 ”


Other experts agree.	其它专家也持同样的意见。


In October 2005, a United Nations task force identified as one of the root causes of the bird flu epidemic, “farming methods which crowd huge numbers of animals into small spaces.”	2005年10月，联合国特遣部队指出禽流感疫情的根源之一是“把大量动物挤入狭小空间的养殖方法。 ”


Supporters of factory farming often point out that bird flu can be spread by free-range flocks, or by wild ducks and other migrating birds, who may join the free-range birds to feed with them or drop their feces while flying overhead.	工厂式养殖的支持者常常指出：自由放养的家禽也能够传播禽流感，不仅如此，野鸭和其它候鸟与放养家禽争食或飞过时排出粪便也有可能传播这种疾病。


But, as Brown has pointed out, viruses found in wild birds are generally not very dangerous.	但正如布朗指出的那样，野鸟身上发现的病毒一般危险性不大。


On the contrary, it is only when these viruses enter a high-density poultry operation that they mutate into something far more virulent.	恰恰相反，只有当病毒进入高密度禽鸟养殖场时才会出现致命变异。


By contrast, birds that are reared by traditional methods are likely to have greater resistance to disease than the stressed, genetically similar birds kept in intensive confinement systems.	与之形成鲜明的对照，按照传统方法饲养的禽鸟可能比囚禁在狭小环境内性格压抑、基因相似的禽鸟具有更强的免疫力。


Moreover, factory farms are not biologically secure.	不仅如此，工厂式养殖从生物角度讲并不安全。


They are frequently infested with mice, rats, and other animals that can bring in diseases.	棚里到处滋生着能传播疾病的老鼠和其它生物。


So far, a relatively small number of human beings have died from the current strain of avian influenza, and it appears that they have all been in contact with infected birds.	迄今为止，死于当前禽流感病毒的人相对较少，而且这些人似乎都曾与患病鸟类有过接触。


But if the virus mutates into a form that is transmissible between humans, the number of deaths could run into the hundreds of millions.	但如果这种病毒变异到可以在人间传染，那么死亡数量恐怕就会数以亿计。


Governments are, rightly, taking action to prepare for this threat.	政府正在采取恰当的措施应对这一威胁。


Recently, the US Senate approved spending $8 billion to stockpile vaccines and other drugs to help prevent a possible bird flu epidemic.	最近，美国参议院批准花费80亿美元储存疫苗和其它药品，帮助预防可能的禽流感爆发。


Other governments have already spent tens of millions on vaccines and other preventive measures.	其它政府也已花费了几千亿美元购买疫苗，采取其它预防措施。


What is now clear, however, is that such government spending is really a kind of subsidy to the poultry industry. Like most subsidies, it is bad economics.	而目前可以肯定的是：政府开支实际是对家禽养殖业的一种补贴，它也和多数补贴一样不合时宜。


Factory farming spread because it seemed to be cheaper than more traditional methods.	工厂式养殖迅速扩展是因为它似乎比传统方式更为廉价。


In fact, it was cheaper only because it passed some of its costs on to others – for example, to people who lived downstream or downwind from the factory farms, and could no longer enjoy clean water and air.	但实际上它廉价的原因只是把部分开支转嫁到了他人身上¾比如居住在养殖场下风下水的居民，洁净的饮水和空气对他们来讲几乎成了一种奢望。


Now we see that these were only a small part of the total costs.	现在我们知道这只是开支总额中的一小部分。


Factory farming is passing far bigger costs – and risks – on to all of us.	工厂化养殖将比这多得多的成本和风险全部转嫁到我们身上。


In economic terms, these costs should be “internalized” by the factory farmers rather than being shifted onto the rest of us.	用经济术语讲，这些成本应该由养殖户来“内化”承担，而不是转嫁到其它人的身上。


That won’t be easy to do, but we could make a start by imposing a tax on factory-farm products until enough revenue is raised to pay for the precautions that governments now have to take against avian influenza.	这并不容易，但我们可以先对工厂化养殖产品进行课税，来补足政府现在用于预防禽流感所支出的费用。


Then we might finally see that chicken from the factory farm really isn’t so cheap after all.	而后我们就会发现工厂化养殖出来的家禽其实一点都不便宜。


The US Still Runs the World	美国仍然主宰世界


WASHINGTON, DC – Reports of the death of American power have often been greatly exaggerated.	华盛顿—关于美国实力已死的报道常常夸大其词。


In the 1950s the Soviet Union was thought to have surpassed the United States; today, the Soviet Union no longer exists.	20世纪50年代，苏联被认为已经超越美国； 如今，苏联早已不复存在。


In the 1980s, Japan was widely regarded as on the verge of overtaking the US; today, after more than two decades of Japanese stagnation, no one would take this scenario seriously.	20世纪80年代，日本被广泛认为即将超越美国； 如今，日本经历了二十年的停滞，再也没人把这种论断当真了。


And in the 1990s, monetary union was considered likely to propel Europe to greater global prominence; today, the European economy is frequently in the world’s headlines, but not in a good way.	而在20世纪90年代，人们认为货币联盟有望让欧洲赢得更大的全球主宰力； 如今，欧洲经济经常见诸世界报端，但不是因为好事。


Now it is China’s turn.	现在轮到了中国。


Until recently, China, in many people’s view, was poised to assume global leadership, if it hadn’t done so already.	直到最近，在许多人眼里，中国即使尚未获得全球领导权，也必将如此。


Today, doubts about the Chinese economy’s long-term prospects are rattling stock markets worldwide (including in the US).	如今，关于中国经济长期前景的怀疑正在冲击全球股市（包括美国）。


China matters, and its economic policy, including how the exchange rate is managed, must be taken seriously.	中国很重要，其经济政策——包括如何管理汇率——也必须认真对待。


But China does not run the world, and it is unlikely to do so anytime soon.	但中国并没有主宰世界，也不可能在近期主宰世界。


The potential for global leadership still rests, believe it or not, with the US.	不管你信不信，全球领导权的未来仍然与美国同在。


The best case for taking China seriously as a world power is made in Arvind Subramanian’s best-selling book Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance, published in 2011.	真心把中国当成全球力量的最佳例子是2011年出版的阿文德·萨布拉曼尼安（Arvind Subramanian）的畅销书《日蚀：在中国经济主宰的阴影下生活》（Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance）。


(The author, now Chief Economic Adviser at India’s finance ministry, and I were colleagues and sometimes co-authors at the International Monetary Fund and the Peterson Institute for International Economics.)	（本书作者现为印度财政部首席经济顾问，我和他曾在国际货币基金组织和彼得森国际经济学研究所共事，有时合作撰写文章。 ）


One hopes that the Indian government will heed Subramanian’s account of how China grew through exports of manufactured goods and associated productivity improvements.	人们希望印度政府能效仿萨布拉曼尼安所描述的中国如何通过制造品出口和随之到来的生产率改进实现增长。


China also became integrated into global supply chains – producing things for companies elsewhere – on a previously unimaginable scale, and Chinese managers learned how to make better products.	中国还以此前无法想象的规模融入了全球供应链——为其他地区的公司生产东西——中国管理者也学会了如何制造更好的产品。


But other parts of China’s experience have served it less well over time.	但随着时间的推移，中国经验的其他部分效果在减弱。


China ran a very large current-account surplus during the early 2000s and accumulated a vast stock of foreign reserves – including at least several trillion dollars’ worth of US Treasury debt.	21世纪最初几年中，中国存在巨额经常项目盈余，累积了庞大的外汇储备存量——包括至少数万亿美元的美国国债。


Although this looks impressive on paper, reserves of this magnitude are essentially useless.	尽管从纸面上看，这令人印象深刻，但如此规模的储备实际上毫无用处。


If China were to sell its US assets, the dollar would weaken, and US companies would find it easier to export and to compete against imports.	如果中国要出售它的美国资产，美元就会贬值，美国公司也将更容易出口和与进口竞争。


But Americans’ anxiety about being overtaken is not new.	但美国人关于被超越的焦虑并不新鲜。


There was great angst in the late 1980s when a Japanese company bought New York City’s Rockefeller Center.	20世纪80年代末，一家 日本公司买下了纽约市洛克菲勒中心，引起了巨大的不安。


In retrospect, that was one of the great non-events of the twentieth century.	事后看来，这是二十世纪的一桩规模巨大的没事找事。


Similarly, Americans will most likely look back on China’s accumulation of US government debt and simply shrug.	类似地，未来美国极有可能回顾中国囤积美国国债的历史，然后耸耸肩。


The bigger issue is China’s exchange-rate policy.	更大的问题是中国的汇率政策。


For a long time, China prevented the renminbi from becoming overvalued – and this was good policy, as Subramanian’s research confirms.	长期以来，中国阻止人民币高估——这是很好的政策，有萨布拉曼尼安的研究为证。


But in the early 2000s, China went too far.	但21世纪初，中国过犹不及了。


For reasons that are still debated, the renminbi became massively undervalued; exports were much higher than imports, and the current-account surplus reached more than 10% of GDP.	出于至今仍在争论的原因，人民币被大幅低估； 出口大大高于进口，经常项目盈余超过了GDP的10%。


Instead of letting the renminbi appreciate and gradually reducing their reliance on export markets, the Chinese authorities preferred to accumulate foreign reserves (US Treasury debt).	中国当局没有让人民升值并逐渐减少对出口市场的依赖，而是选择了囤积外汇储备（美国国债）。


Now China has to figure out a way to sustain growth when demand in the rest of the world is sluggish.	如今，中国必须在面临世界其他地区需求停滞的情况下寻找维持增长之道。


A return to a substantially undervalued exchange rate would almost certainly provoke an international response, including from the US Congress.	回归汇率持续低估几乎肯定会激起强烈的国际反弹，包括美国国会。


But switching suddenly to domestic-led growth is not easy.	但猛然转向内需拉动的增长绝非易事。


China will not collapse (it is not the Soviet Union), and Japanese-style stagnation is also unlikely.	中国不会崩溃（它不是苏联），日本式的停滞也不太可能。


But China is aging fast – and could become old before it becomes rich.	但中国正在快速老龄化——有可能未富先老。


Every decade, important people predict the end of American power.	每一个十年，都有要人预测美国力量的终结。


And there are reasons to be concerned – particularly when some US politicians refuse to acknowledge the nature of America’s global role.	也确实存在担心的理由——特别是当一些美国政客拒绝承认美国全球角色的性质时。


For example, the US built the world’s trading and monetary system 70 years ago, but now Republicans in Congress refuse to support change at the IMF – including sensible reforms that almost all other countries favor.	比如，70年前，美国构建了世界贸易和货币制度，但如今国会中共和党拒绝支持IMF改革——包括几乎所有其他国家都支持的明智的改革。


Still, it is the US that is currently leading the push for freer trade across the Pacific and a substantial reduction in barriers to trade with Europe.	但是，当前领衔推动跨太平洋自由贸易、大幅降低与欧洲贸易壁垒的仍然是美国。


If America gets the rules right – favoring ordinary citizens, rather than footloose corporations – its trade initiatives will make a major contribution to global growth and its own prosperity.	如果美国正确地制定规则——使之有利于普通公民而不是逍遥的公司——其贸易方案将为全球增长及其自身繁荣做出重大贡献。


Likewise, in terms of monetary policy, the major issue for the world over the next year is when and how much the Federal Reserve will raise interest rates.	类似地，在货币政策上，明年世界所面临的主要问题是美联储何时升息、升息多少。


As US monetary officials gather for their annual Jackson Hole conclave, they will consider myriad relevant dimensions of the global economy.	随着美国货币官员齐聚杰克森霍尔（Jackson Hall）年会，他们将考虑全球经济的诸多重要方面。


But the policy-setting Federal Open Market Committee will move interest rates based almost entirely on its collective read of US economic circumstances.	但制定货币政策的美联储公开市场委员会的汇率决定将几乎完全取决于其对美国经济状况的集体解读。


Once again, the rest of the world will react to what the US does.	再一次，世界其他地区将根据美国做什么而做出反应。


Who\u0027s Afraid of Al Jazeera?	谁惧怕半岛电视台？


No one is indifferent to Al Jazeera, the Qatari-based Arab satellite television station.	没有人胆敢认为卡塔尔的半岛阿拉伯卫星电视台无关紧要。


You can practically see the blood of US officials boil when they discuss it.	美国官员谈起半岛时简直可以说热血沸腾。


To be sure, in the context of the dream of all Arabs being united and independent of foreign control, Al Jazeera is undeniably partial to Arab aspirations.	可以肯定的是，在所有阿拉伯人携起手来、摆脱外来势力控制的梦想里，半岛电视台无可否认地站在了阿拉伯人的一边。


But that does not make its news reporting untruthful.	尽管如此，它的新闻报导依旧真实。


In fact, Al Jazeera, which US Secretary of State Colin Powell calls "horrible" and "slanted," is a pivotal vehicle for reform and change, which genuinely democratic Arab activists and the international community alike have been calling for.	被美国国务卿柯林·鲍威尔称为"可怕"、"偏激"的半岛电视台，实际却是改革变化的关键工具，真正的民主阿拉伯人士和国际社会都期待看到变革的发生。


So incensed has America been, however, that it created its own Arabic language mouthpiece in the form of satellite station Al Hurra.	然而，美国却对此怒不可遏，并创立了自己的阿拉伯语卫星频道自由一台。


Yet Al Hurra is forbidden from broadcasting within the US, because it is state controlled.	但由于受到国家的控制，自由一台在美国属于禁播之列。


Arabs don't trust it, either.	阿拉伯人也对它缺乏信任。


It demonstrated its lapdog status by never broadcasting images of prisoners being abused inside Baghdad's notorious Abu Ghraib prison.	自由一台从未报导过巴格达臭名昭著的阿布格莱布监狱发生的虐俘丑闻，也清楚地暴露了它的哈巴狗嘴脸。


In this respect, at least, Al Hurra fits perfectly within the tame tradition of Arab state broadcasters.	至少在这方面，自由一台完全合乎阿拉伯国家频道温顺驯服的传统。


America, however, is not alone in challenging Al Jazeera head on.	尽管如此，美国并不是唯一向半岛电视台发出挑战的国家。


The BBC, which briefly ran its own Arabic language news station in the mid-1990's - before closing it down because its Saudi funders were unhappy with its reporting - recently announced that it will re-launch an Arabic language news satellite station.	20世纪90年代中期短暂开播过阿拉伯语新闻节目的英国广播公司，不久前宣布将重新开办阿拉伯语新闻卫星频道。 前者由于其沙特出资者不满意它的报导，没坚持多久就遭到停播的厄运。


But instead of bashing or seeking to undermine Al Jazeera, politicians should encourage this bastion of free expression, recognizing that Arabs will need to endure a messy process on the way to democracy.	与痛恨或破坏半岛电视台相反，如果政治家们意识到阿拉伯民主之路是一个十分棘手的过程，那么他们理应鼓励这块言论自由的阵地。


Along that tortuous route, the world's major powers are bound to be offended, probably quite regularly.	在这条崎岖的民主之路上，大国注定会经常受到冒犯。


Television in the Arab world has for years been the mouthpiece used by ruling presidents, kings, and emirs to propagate their official opinions and nothing else.	多少年来，阿拉伯电视台都仅仅是现任总统、国王和埃米尔宣传政策观点的工具。


Elite military units usually protect radio and television stations, because they have often been the first targets in military coups.	电台和电视台常有精锐部队重兵把守，这些地方通常都是军事政变的首要目标。


Given this history, and the storm of calls for reform in the Arab world, it is a tragic irony that America and the West have paid so little attention to the terrestrial Arab monopoly television channels.	有了这样的历史背景和阿拉伯世界高涨的改革呼声，美国和西方世界还如此忽视阿拉伯大陆的垄断电视频道，不能不说是个悲剧性的讽刺。


Indeed, US criticism of Al Jazeera sounds more like special pleading because of America's inept bumbling in Iraq than a genuine desire for free, open, and critical Arab media.	实际上，美国在伊拉克的拙劣表演之后，它对半岛电视台的批评更像是在要求某种特权，而不是真心希望看到自由、开放、观点鲜明的阿拉伯媒介。


If democracy means giving people a free choice, then there is no doubt that the choice of most Arabs is for a television broadcaster that reflects their aspirations.	如果民主意味着赋予人们自由选择的权利，那么毫无疑问，多数阿拉伯人会选择一个代表自己心声的电视媒体。


In this sense, Al Jazeera is clearly biased, because it is run by Arab patriots and reflects Arab sentiment.	从这个意义上讲，半岛的倾向性十分明显，因为它由阿拉伯爱国人士控制，反映了阿拉伯人的呼声。


But this is no more a crime than the fact that America's media reflects American aspirations, and in times of war behaves like a cheerleader for US forces.	就像美国媒体反映美国人民的愿望，并在战争时期充当美国军队的啦啦队长一样，半岛电视台的阿拉伯情结也谈不上什么罪过。


The key issue here is whether Al Jazeera, as well as American TV stations, are truthful in what they say.	这里的关键问题是，半岛电视台是否像美国频道一样，在他们的新闻报导中尊重事实。


Al Jazeera is certainly professional.	半岛无疑是非常职业的。


Its leading journalists are Western-trained, many having worked for years at the BBC.	它的骨干记者都受过西方教育，其中很多人曾在BBC任职多年。


In fact, Al Jazeera was founded only after the BBC closed its Arabic language station under Saudi pressure.	实际上，只是在BBC迫于沙特压力关闭阿拉伯语频道之后，半岛电视台才得以建立。


Al Jazeera's motto, "opinion and opposing opinion," has galvanized Arab viewers, because clashing opinions are rarely heard on terrestrial Arab television stations.	半岛的格言"观点和反面观点"已经给阿拉伯观众留下了深刻的印象，因为在阿拉伯大陆电视台，人们几乎听不到针锋相对的观点冲撞。


Of course, when covering the Israeli occupation of Palestine and the US-led war on Iraq, Al Jazeera has not been objective. How could it be?	当然，在报导以色列占领巴勒斯坦和以美国为首的对伊战争时，半岛没有做到客观，它又怎么可能保持客观呢？


But it did not make up facts; it merely reflected majority Arab opinion.	但它并没有捏造事实，而只是反映了多数阿拉伯人的观点。


On such fundamental issues of Arab consensus, it is simply illogical to expect an Arab broadcaster to be even-handed.	在这些阿拉伯世界公认的根本问题上，要求阿拉伯媒体客观公正显然是不可能的。


Moreover, Al Jazeera has not been dumb to complaints about it.	此外，半岛并没有对反对的呼声置若罔闻。


In July, Al Jazeera became the first Arab TV station to create a professional code of ethics.	7月，半岛成了第一家制定职业道德规范的阿拉伯电视台。


According to the BBC, the code defines with absolute clarity and transparency how Al-Jazeera journalists are to behave, and sets clear divisions between news, analysis, and commentary.	根据BBC的报导，规范明确规定了半岛记者的行为准则，并为新闻、分析和评论内容划出了明确的界线。


As for Al Jazeera's journalistic performance, it is past time that the station be judged by respected professional journalists, not by US or other officials with a policy axe to grind.	说到半岛的新闻表现，电视台由德高望重的职业记者，而不是挥舞政策利斧的美国或其它官员评判的时代已经一去不返。


A major university department of journalism working with Arab media critics, for example, could provide a much more honest analysis of the station's work.	举例来说，与阿拉伯媒体评论家合作过的主要学府的新闻专业，应该能够对该台的工作给予客观得多的评价。


If American, British, and other Western officials are serious about reform in the Arab world, they must support reform-minded Arab individuals and organizations, even if those organizations make them uncomfortable at times.	如果美国、英国和其它西方官员能够认真对待阿拉伯世界的改革，那么他们必须支持具备改革思想的阿拉伯个人和组织，即便这些组织有时让他们感到不快。


If that becomes the West's standard, Al Jazeera will rightly be seen as part of the solution, not part of the problem.	如果这能够成为西方的处事标准，半岛电���台就自然会成为解决方案，而不是问题的组成部分。


Who’s Dependent Now?	如今谁在依附？


If the late great Argentine economist Raul Prebisch were alive today, he no doubt would wonder whether the world had turned upside down.	如果阿根廷已故的伟大经济学家罗尔·普里比时如今在世，他肯定会疑惑，这个世界是否换了人间。


His hugely influential “dependency” theory argued that if poor countries relied too much on commodity exports, they would never achieve the industrial depth needed to sustain rapid growth.	他影响深远的“依附”理论认为，如果穷国过度依赖于原料出口，那么。 它们将永远不会达到维持快速增长所需要的产业深度。


Instead, they would become mired in a cycle of declining global commodity prices and ever-dwindling income shares.	实际上，它们将陷于全球性原料价格下跌和不断降低的收入份额的恶性循环之中。


Prebisch’s preferred policy response, protectionism, proved disastrous for the many Latin American and African countries that heeded him.	普里比时所喜爱的政策对应是保护主义。 对于许多听取他的意见的拉美国家和非洲国家而言，这一政策危害不浅。


But the fact is that for many years, Prebisch seemed to have made the right call on long-term commodity price trends.	但是，事实却是，普里比时可能对原料的长期价格趋势作出了正确的预测。


Relentless efficiency gains in agriculture and resource extraction pushed down prices for commodities, especially during the 1980’s and 1990’s.	农业和原材料采集的效率大为提高，降低了原料价格，特别是在二十世纪八十年代和九十年代。


With few exceptions, countries that focused on commodity exports performed dismally, whereas many resource-poor Asian countries raced ahead.	除了少数例外情况，致力于原料出口的国家惨淡经营，而许多资源匮乏的亚洲国家则高歌猛进。


Today, however, with Asia’s giants, India and China, joining the global economy, prices for oil, gold, wheat, and virtually every other commodity are exploding.	然而如今，随着亚洲巨人印度和中国加入全球经济，石油、黄金、小麦以及几乎所有其他原料的价格都在扶摇直上。


While there will always be cycles – oil prices, for example, will probably fall before they start rising again – the long-run trend for many commodities will clearly remain upward for some time to come.	尽管总会有周期，例如说，石油价格再次上升之前可能还会下降，但是，长期而言，许多原料将无疑在一段时期内保持上扬趋势。


What many trade negotiators and other policymakers do not seem to have recognized yet, though Prebisch would have realized it instantly, is that this dramatic turn of events carries huge implications for the global balance of power.	许多贸易谈判代表和其他决策者并未认识到、而普里比时会立即意识到的情况是，对于全球权力平衡而言，这一局势巨变影响巨大。


Indeed, perhaps no other aspect of economic globalization will pose greater challenges to world leaders over the coming decades.	的确，在未来几十年中，可能不会有其他经济全球化的问题对世界各国领导人带来更大的挑战。


The questions are many.	需要解答的问题众多。


Are today’s rich countries prepared for an era of co-dependency, in which they are just as desperate for commodities as developing countries are for industrial imports and technology?	如今的富国是否为相互依附的时代做好准备？ 届时，富国急需原料，正如发展中国家急需工业产品进口和技术。


Are they prepared for the inevitable flow of power and influence to commodity producers as they become much wealthier?	它们是否准备好，随着原料生产国变得大为富有，权力和影响力将不可避免地流向这些国家？


How will the world’s two superpowers, China and the United States, come to terms with the fact that important commodity-exporting regions from Africa to the Middle East to Central Asia are littered with ill-formed nation states?	世界两大超级大国中国和美国如何应对这一事实，即从非洲到中东和中亚的重要的原料出口地区散布于不稳定的民族国家之中？


Some self-anointed seers portray the problem as being one of finite natural resources, with the world running out of critical commodities at an alarming rate.	一些自我吹嘘的预言家认为，问题在于有限的自然资源，关键性原料正在以惊人的速度消失。


Nowadays, there are many adherents of the “Hubbert’s peak” theory of oil production, which holds that we have reached the upper limits of output capacity, the wells are running dry, and it is all downhill from here.	有关石油生产的“哈伯特顶峰”理论认为，我们已经达到了生产能力的上限，油井已经干枯，石油产量将从此下滑。 如今，这一理论的信徒为数众多。


However, as leading oil historian Dan Yergin points out, prophets of doom have declared that the world is running out of oil at least four times already.	但是，正如知名的石油问题历史学家耶金指出的那样，预言大难临头的预言家宣称世界石油耗尽已经至少有四次了。


Each time, radical improvements in technology made the threat evaporate.	每次，技术上的大幅更新都使得威胁不攻自破。


In the late 1800’s, oil extraction involved dredging with a mule.	十九世纪后期，人们用驴来开采石油。


Today, no one thinks anything of drilling 3,000 meters beneath the ocean floor.	今天，人们对在洋底以下3,000米钻井不以为然。


There have been similar improvements across the board in metals mining and agriculture.	在金属采矿和农业方面也有全面的改进。


No, the world is not about to run out of commodities.	世界并不会耗尽原料。


Instead, what is happening is that the integration of 2.5 billion people (China and India alone) into the global economy is producing a demand shift that is likely to put far more upward pressure on commodity prices than any technology gains are likely to offset.	实际上，25亿人口（仅仅是中国和印度两国）融入全球经济，其产生的需求移动带来的对原料价格的上浮压力要远远大于技术进步所可能抵消的部分。


So, for at least the next 50 to 75 years, and perhaps until humans start mining on Mars sometime in the coming centuries, prices for many natural resources are headed up.	所以，在未来50到75年的时间里，甚至未来几百年人类开始在火星采矿之前，许多自然资源的价格都会上扬。


Will the rebalancing of global economic power that results from this destabilize world politics?	由此带来的全球经济力量重新平衡会破坏世界政治的稳定吗？


World War I, of course, was partly set off by Germany’s concern that the other colonial powers had locked up too large a share of world oil and commodity supplies.	第一次世界大战无疑是部分由于德国担忧其他殖民列强占据了过多的世界石油和原料供应而引发。


Similarly, in World War II, Japan feared for the stability of its foreign supplies of oil and other natural resources.	类似的情况是，在第二次世界大战中，日本对它的石油和其他自然资源的稳定供应感到担心。


Will similar tensions arise between resource-challenged China (where even water scarcity is a problem) and the West?	资源短缺的中国（甚至连用水短缺都成为问题）和西方之间会产生类似的紧张关系吗？


Fortunately, this does not seem likely for the moment, especially given the Chinese leadership’s sober and pragmatic approach to its resource problems.	幸运的是，目前这并不大可能，特别是鉴于中国领导人对其资源问题采取冷静和务实的做法。


The Chinese are looking to regions like Africa, hoping to find stable trading partners.	中国正在寻求类似非洲那样的地区，希望找到稳定的贸易伙伴。


They do not share the political evangelism of the Americans, who don’t just want to trade with commodity exporters, but to convert them as well.	他们并不像美国人那样具有政治福音教义。 美国人不仅想要与原料出口国做交易，而且同时想要使其皈依。


Then there are those American leaders who still speak of making the US self-sufficient in energy supplies.	有的美国领导人还在谈论美国的能源供应自给自足。 但是这基本上是一个笑话。


But this is basically a joke: self-indulgent, maybe, but self-sufficient, never.	可能是一个空想，而永远不会自给自足。


Much of the Arab world understandably views the invasion of Iraq as the cornerstone of the real US strategy for securing stable energy supplies.	可以理解的是，大多数阿拉伯世界把入侵伊拉克视为美国真正的确保稳定能源供应战略的基石。


If they are right, one can only hope that America has a plan B.	他们如果是正确的话，但愿美国还有第二套方案。


Meanwhile, commodity prices will continue to rise, with oil exporters now constituting the largest contributors to America’s gaping trade deficit.	目前，原料价格将继续上升，石油生产国现在成为美国庞大贸易赤字的最大因素。


Maybe the real US strategy is to try to owe the commodity-exporting countries so much money that they will feel dependent on making America happy!	美国的真实战略可能是试图欠原料出口国大量金钱，迫使它们感觉要依赖于讨美国的欢心！


That is one twist that Prebisch would never have anticipated.	这一变局是普里比时所永远不会料想得到的。


Whose Champions, Anyway?	大公司到底是谁的？


The links between states and companies have grabbed headlines, most recently in Russia, where President Vladimir Putin seems obsessed with creating “national champions” in the energy and aerospace sectors.	最近在俄国，国家和公司之间的关系占据了报纸的头版头条，弗拉基米尔·普京（Vladimir Putin）总统似乎沉湎于在能源和航天领域建立“全国性大公司”的梦想。


Such efforts seem but a part of a surge of protectionism in European political debate about business, especially when it comes to cross-border acquisitions.	普京的所作所为只是当前欧洲政治辩论中企业保护主义甚嚣尘上的一部分表现，尤其是在涉及到跨国收购问题时这种保护主义趋势就更加明显。


Across Europe, governments position themselves to be seen as defending “national” players from “foreign” competitors.	欧洲所有国家政府无一不在履行保护“国内”企业免受“国外”竞争威胁的职责。


“Economic patriotism,” the slogan coined by France’s Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin following PepsiCo’s rumored attempt in July 2005 to takeover Danone, perhaps best encapsulates the political imperative.	“经济爱国主义”是法国总理多米尼克·德维尔潘（Dominique de Villepin）在2005年7月百事公司传闻收购达能集团后创造出来的口号，也可能是对上述政治责任的最佳概括。


Although de Villepin’s speeches are more flamboyant than those of most political leaders, the underlying sentiment extends far beyond France.	虽然德维尔潘的辞藻比其他多数政治领袖都要华丽，但内中所蕴含的核心精神却绝对不仅局限在法国。


The same impulse appears to be at work behind Italy’s policy on Autostrade, Spain’s on Endesa, Poland’s on its banking sector, the former Swedish Prime Minister’s on Volvo, German unease about “locust”-like funds on Deutsche Börse, or the United Kingdom’s ever louder defense of the London Stock Exchange’s independence from the United States.	如出一辙的冲动似乎也左右了意大利对Autostrade公司、西班牙对Endesa公司、波兰对银行业和瑞典前首相对沃尔沃公司的政策。 德国对“入侵者”的戒惧¾比如拨款支持德国证券交易所，或是英国大张旗鼓地捍卫伦敦证交所相对于美国的独立性，背后也隐藏着同样的原因。


The basic belief that underpins “economic patriotism” is that of an alignment of interests between companies considered “national” (most prominently the largest ones or so-called “champions”), their national employees, and the national community.	支撑“经济爱国主义”的基本理念是在“国内”公司（尤其是大公司或者所谓“顶级公司”）、国内雇员以及各式各样的国内团体之间建立起利益联盟。


According to de Villepin, “to defend the employees’ interests well, we must protect the interests of our companies.”	按照德维尔潘的话讲，“为了更好地保护员工的利益，我们必须先保护好国内公司的利益”。


He later argued that Danone should be considered “French” because its “milk collection and its water sources are in France.”	他接下来提出达能应该算作“法国”的企业，因为该公司“奶源和水源均取自法国”。


But Danone’s own filings indicate that only 22% of its global sales and less than 14% of its global workforce are in France.	但达能公司的内部档案显示，该公司仅有22%的全球销售额来源于法国，而法国境内的员工人数还不到其全球员工总数的14%。


In fact, the link between European companies and national communities is becoming more tenuous by the day.	事实上，欧洲公司和国内团体之间的联系已经日渐薄弱。


Research that I carried out for Bruegel surveyed the largest 100 listed companies headquartered in Europe (ranked by market capitalization) and analyzed the geographical distribution of their revenue, which is increasingly transparent since the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) last year.	我为Bruegel所作的研究调查了以欧洲为总部的百强上市公司（按市场资本总额进行排序），并分析了其收入来源的地理分布状况。 去年国际财务报告准则（IFRS）正式实施后，公司营业收入的来源及分布状况的透明度也大大增加。


Europe was divided into eight broad zones, comprising individual countries like Germany, France, and Italy, or groupings of smaller countries such as Benelux and the Nordic area.	这项研究把欧洲分成了8大区域，囊括了德国、法国、意大利等国家或卢比荷关税同盟及北欧区域联盟等小型国家集团。


The survey then calculated the share of revenue earned by each company in the zone in which it is headquartered (or “home base”), the rest of Europe, and the rest of the world.	调查接下来计算了总部设在区域之内、欧洲其他国家和世界其他国家的各公司所挣得的收入份额。


Where relevant information for companies was available, the comparable distribution of employees was also examined.	如果能找到相关资料，我们也对员工的可比分布进行了研究。


The results show that the share of the home base in total revenue has become, on average, relatively low: just three-eighths, or 37.5%, on average for Europe’s largest 100 companies.	结果显示总部所在地收入在总收入中所占的比重平均相对较低：欧洲百强公司平均只有八分之三，或37. 5%。


Of course, this figure covers a wide diversity of industries, and also some geographical differences across the continent.	当然，这一数字包含各式各样的行业，而且欧洲大陆的不同国家也存在一些地理上的差异。


For example, the averages for German (34%) or French (35%) companies are markedly lower than for their Spanish (56%) or Italian (65%) counterparts.	比如，德国公司（34%）和法国公司（35%）的平均数就比他们在西班牙（56%）或意大利(65%)的同伴有着显著的差距。


But the general trend is unambiguous.	虽然如此，但总体趋势依然十分清晰。


For a broadly representative sub-sample of 55 companies that could be tracked since 1997, the proportion of revenue generated in the home region has fallen sharply on average, from 50.2% to 36.9%.	在1997年后追踪的具有广泛代表性的55个公司子样中，总部所在地的收入比重平均起来都有大幅度下降，从50. 2%降到了36.


For these companies, sales to the “rest of Europe,” which represented an average of less than 30% of total European sales in 1997, rose above 43% in 2005.	9%。 同样在这些公司中，对“欧洲其他国家”的销售额1997年平均只占其欧洲总销售额的不到30%，而2005年已经上升到超过43%。


If the trend is extrapolated, the home bases of Europe’s largest companies will account, on average, for less than half of their European revenue, and less than a third of their global revenue, before the end of this decade.	如果这样的趋势得以延续，那么到2010年，欧洲最大公司在所在地获得的收入占其欧洲地区总收入的平均比重将低于一半，而在其全球总收入中所占的比重将低于三分之一。


These companies are “Europeanizing” fast, and the relative weight of their home base is declining even faster.	这些公司正在迅速实现“欧洲化”，其所在地的相对重要性则下降得更为迅速。


Moreover, this is not just a story about sales. The survey also measured the geographical distribution of employees relative to the distribution of revenue.	调查不仅研究了销售状况，还研究了员工的地理分布与收入分布之间的相对关系。


While the distribution profiles between employees and revenue could be sharply dissimilar in some companies, on average they were almost identical: for a sub-sample of 73 companies among Europe’s top 100, the home base represented 37% of employees and 35% of revenue on average in 2005, while the rest of Europe accounted for 29% of employees and 28% of revenue.	尽管有些公司人员和收入的分布状况可能相去甚远，但一般来讲这两者都具有一致性：名列欧洲百强的73家公司子样中，其原属地在2005年占员工总数和收入总数的平均比例分别是37%和35%，而欧洲其他地区占员工总数和收入总数的平均比例则分别是29%和28%。


This strongly suggests that jobs broadly “follow” sales (or perhaps the other way round), even though, once again, this is true only on average and not for all companies.	这样的结果有力地表明：尽管只适用于部分公司的平均状况，但就业的分布状况与销售的分布状况大致关系呈“正相关”（反之亦然）。


What are the implications for policymakers?	政府决策者能从中得到什么启示？


Put simply, the numbers show a growing gap of interests between these so-called “champions” and their national home bases.	简言之，上述统计数据显示了这些所谓的“顶级公司”和他们的总部所在地之间有着越来越明显的利益差异。


For Europe’s governments, fostering champions increasingly means providing benefits to non-national customers and employees – a dubious use of taxpayer money.	对欧洲政府来讲，培育顶级公司越来越多地意味着为非国民客户和员工提供好处¾这种利用纳税人钱财的方式非常值得怀疑。


Another consequence is that regulatory competition is likely to increase in Europe, as companies are less bound by local interests to keep their headquarters at “home” if the tax or regulatory environment becomes unfavorable.	另外一个结果就是欧洲各国的管理竞争可能会加剧，因为在税收或管理环境不那么有利的情况下，本地利益不再能约束公司继续把总部设在“本国”。


The decision by Depfa Bank to shift its headquarters from Wiesbaden to Dublin in 2002 may be a sign of things to come.	德国银行2002年决定把总部从威斯巴登迁往都柏林的举动可能就代表了未来的趋势。


The biggest risk is that the growing disconnect between the perception of “national” companies and the reality of Europeanization may lead to spectacularly ill-judged policies.	其中最大的风险是，人们对“国内”公司的传统认识和欧洲化日益扩大的现实可能会导致在制定政策时南辕北辙。


It is high time for business leaders to be more candid about where their real constituencies lie, and for national politicians to recognize that they can no longer wield control over the giants of today’s European business.	现在是时候让企业领导者坦率地公布他们真正的客户到底在哪里，也是时候让国内政治家们明白，他们今天再也无法真正控制欧洲的企业。


Whose Corporate Social Responsibility?	谁的企业社会责任？


NEW YORK – Increasingly, corporations are under pressure, often from activist non-governmental organizations, to take on specific “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) obligations.	发自纽约——以非政府组织为首的外界正向企业施加越来越大的压力，要求他们去承担某些特定的“企业社会责任”。


But the fact that CSR is being demanded, and occasionally conceded, does not ensure clarity about either its rationale or the ways in which it should be undertaken.	但即便对这类责任的呼声越来越大，企业也偶尔做出让步，却不能确保这些责任以及承担这些责任的方式是合理的。


CSR can be divided into two categories: what corporations should do (say, contribute to a women’s rights NGO or build a village school) and what they should not do (say, dump mercury into rivers or bury hazardous materials in landfills). The latter is wholly conventional and subject to regulation (and recently to questions about how corporations should behave when there are no host-country regulations).	一般来说，企业社会责任可以被分成两类：企业应该做的（比如说向一个保护妇女权益的非政府组织捐款，或是捐建一所乡村学校）以及不应该做的（向河中排放水银或在填埋场掩埋危险物料），而后者属于一般性行为，且易于监管（但在东道国缺乏相关监管的情况下，企业该如何作为？


But are CSR obligations really good practice?	但是，企业承担社会责任真的一种合理的行为吗？


Milton Friedman and other critics often asked if it was the business of businesses to practice corporate altruism.	米尔顿·弗里德曼以及其他一些批评家一直都质疑企业是否应开展利他主义行为。


Prior to the rise of the corporation, there were mainly family firms, such as the Rothschilds. When they made money, it accrued principally to the family itself.	在企业诞生之前，社会上存在的主要是一些诸如罗斯柴尔德这样的家族产业，赚到的收入主要归家族所有。


Altruism, where it existed, also was undertaken by the family, which decided how and on what to spend its money. Whether the firm or its shareholders and other stakeholders spent the money was beside the point.	那个时候，利他主义行为主要也是由家族来承担，钱怎么花，花在哪里，决定权都在家族手里，而不是在企业或其股东以及其他利益相关者身上。


With the rise of the business corporation, large family firms have generally disappeared.	随着企业的发展壮大，大型家族产业大多退出了历史的舞台。


But that does not mean that a corporation is the right entity to engage in altruism – though its various stakeholders obviously can spend any portion of the income they earn from the corporation and other sources in altruistic ways.	但这并不意味着企业就是继承利他主义的合适主体——当然，企业的股东完全可以把自己从企业和其他渠道赚来的钱以个人名义花在利他主义行为上。


Instead of CSR, we should have PSR (personal social responsibility).	实际上，相对于企业社会责任这个说法，我们更应该提倡的是个人社会责任。


One can also argue for PSR on the grounds that asking for CSR becomes a way of “passing the buck” – evading personal responsibility for doing good.	个人社会责任之所以更加合理，是因为苛求企业承担社会责任已经成了一种“推卸责任”的途径——企业责任已经成了个人逃避行善的借口。


This is the flip side of blaming corporations for everything from obesity to scalding from spilled coffee – both the subject of lawsuits in recent years.	而这恰恰是人们把肥胖到被咖啡烫伤都统统归咎于快餐店的背后原因——近年来，这类诉讼已经成为了大热门。


There is also an added advantage in replacing CSR with PSR: there is virtue in diversity of approaches to altruism.	此外，以个人社会责任取代企业社会责任还有一个好处：因为其优势在于可以利用多种途径来具体实现利他主义。


Chairman Mao wanted a hundred flowers to bloom, but only so that he could cut them all off at their roots.	企业社会责任就像毛主席提倡“百花齐放”，最终只是为了获得斩草除根的结果。


But PSR is more like President George H.W. Bush’s metaphor of a “thousand points of light.”	但个人社会责任却更像老布什总统说所说的那样“发出万千光芒”。


Moreover, it is hard to see how a corporation’s stakeholders can always arrive democratically at a common position on how the corporation should engage in social responsibility on their behalf.	而且在公司如何代表他们来承担社会责任的问题上，很难想象一间公司的股东能够民主地达成共识。


Each will consider his or her CSR view the best.	毕竟每个人都会觉得自己的想法是最好的。


But there are strong arguments in favor of CSR as well. First, the political reality is that society treats corporations as if they were persons, which is often also a legal reality for many purposes.	不过话又说回来，企业社会责任也有其存在的依据：首先，不可忽略的一个政治现实是，社会以对待个人的要求来对待企业，这在许多方面也是一个法律现实。


Society increasingly demands that these “corporate citizens” be altruistic, just as people are.	社会越来越要求这些“企业公民”要如社会上的个人一样承担起利他主义的责任。


Given this reality, corporations want to give simply because it is expected of them.	在这种情况下，企业愿意承担起相应的责任也只是因为社会是这样的期待它们的。


Such CSR builds the firm’s image as a “good” corporation, just as giving by Bill Gates and Warren Buffet builds their image as “good” billionaires.	而承担这些责任也为企业建立起了“良好”形象，正如参与慈善事业为比尔·盖茨和沃伦·巴菲特这些亿万富翁建立起了“富贵善人”形象一样。


Second, many corporations view CSR as an effective defensive strategy against powerful activist NGOs (such as Greenpeace) that have taken to using online agitation, boycotts, and other means to “blackmail” targeted corporations into acceding to the activists’ demands.	其次，许多公司都把企业社会责任作为一种有效的防御性战略，以此来应付那些非政府组织（诸如绿色和平组织）——这些人利用网络煽动，抵制和其他各种方法来迫使企业满足他们的要求。


The more CSR a company can point to, the less such efforts will succeed – or even be mounted.	而企业越是承担起社会责任，那些非政府组织的要挟就越不可能成功——甚至反过来被企业所利用。


Consider the contrasting experiences of Coke and Pepsi.	试回想一下可口可乐与百事可乐这个两个截然相反的例子。


Coke has been targeted by NGOs for alleged lapses in labor and environmental standards.	可口可乐公司在劳资关系和环保标准等问题上与非政府组织纠缠不休，声名狼藉。


By contrast, Pepsi, which once teamed up with AT&T and the CIA to oust President Salvador Allende in Chile, smells like a rose nowadays, because it has distributed CSR largesse to several causes that influential NGOs embrace.	相反，曾与AT&T和中情局联手驱逐了智利总统萨尔瓦多·阿连德的百事可乐公司却誉满天下，原因很简单，因为它在好几个由大型非政府组织发起的运动中都表现出了极大的企业社会责任感，慷慨解囊。


That is a lesson that Wal-Mart has since learned.	沃尔玛在这个问题上也吃过亏。


In 2005, the Service Employees’ International Union (SEIU) created Wal-Mart Watch, with an annual budget of $5 million. The purpose was to make Wal-Mart a “better employer, neighbor, and corporate citizen,” and Wal-Mart eventually capitulated on some of the SEIU’s specific demands as well.	在2005年，服务业雇员国际工会（SEIU）创立了一个名叫沃尔玛监视者的组织，每年活动经费500万美元，目标只有一个，就是为了使沃尔玛成为一个“更好的雇主，邻居和企业公民”，而沃尔玛最终也只能屈从于SEIU的某些特殊要求。


Finally, CSR can be simply a matter of advertising.	最后，企业社会责任也可以仅仅作为一个宣传手段。


In this case, the choice of CSR spending is focused directly on generating added revenue, much like advertising, and is aimed at sales much the way advertising is.	在这种情况下，选择承担责任主要是为了直接创造额外收益和刺激销售额上升，正如广告的效果一样。


A benign example is Adidas’s sponsorship of tennis tournaments.	阿迪达斯赞助网球比赛就是一个很好的例子。


A malign example is Philip Morris’s donation of money to museums, symphony orchestras, and opera houses, cynically aimed at buying off artists who might otherwise work to ban cigarettes.	而烟草巨头菲利普莫里斯公司给博物馆，交响乐团以及歌剧院的慈善捐款则别有用心，捐款被揭露是出于收买那些地方的艺术家，好让他们不要致力于禁烟运动。


All these rationales for CSR suggest that it should be left to each corporation to determine, just as PSR leaves altruism to each individual’s conscience and sense of what needs supporting.	总的来说，所有承担企业社会责任的行为都应该由企业自己来决定，正如个人社会责任让每个个人依靠自己的良知和感觉来进行判断，决定哪些事情是值得支持和赞助的一样。


The attempt by some NGOs and activists to impose a straitjacket on CSR, reflecting their priorities, is misguided and must be rejected.	部分非政府组织以及一些社会活动家都企图按照他们自己的个人好恶来左右企业社会责任的实现，这样的做法绝对是个误导，必须坚决抵制。


Instead, the model should be former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan’s initiative, the Global Compact.	所以说，联合国前秘书长科菲·安南所提倡的“全球契约”才是理想的方案。


What Annan has done is to embrace ten wide-ranging guiding principles while leaving signatory corporations free to choose that which they wish to support actively.	安南的贡献在于他列出了范围广泛的十大指导性原则，而把选择承担哪些社会责任的权利留给了签约企业，让他们自由选择。


Whose Georgia?	格鲁吉亚究竟属于谁？


In recent weeks, leaders of various opposition organizations in Georgia, such as Antisoros and Fairness, have been jailed on unfair accusations of plotting a coup on behalf of Russia.	最近几周，格鲁吉亚“反索罗斯”运动和“公正”党等反对组织领袖都因遭到不公正指控而入狱，罪名是替俄国策划政变。


But the wave of political repression merely reflects President Mikhail Saakashvili’s desperate effort to cling to power.	但新一轮政治镇压不过反映了米哈伊尔·萨卡什维利(Mikhail Saakashvili)总统想要继续掌权的疯狂努力。


With popular dissent growing and opposition forces strengthening, the authorities have sought to controll non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and strengthen the security forces.	随着公众不满与日俱增，反对力量日渐强大，格鲁吉亚当局试图掌控非政府组织（NGO），并加强安全力量。


But this will only make mass protests inevitable, ultimately jeopardizing the democratic transition in Georgia that Saakashvili claims to represent.	但这样的努力只会导致公众抗议不可避免，最终致使萨卡什维利声称代表的格鲁吉亚民主转型陷入危险之中。


Saakashvili sees a “Moscow hand” in every challenge to his authority, which could be explained by his government’s close alliance with the United States.	萨卡什维利认定对他权威的每次挑战背后都有“莫斯科的操纵”，原因是他所领导的政府与美国建立了亲密的伙伴联盟。


But the people rounded up in the latest raid against the opposition were originally imprisoned by Eduard Shevarnadze’s government, which Saakashvili helped depose in Georgia’s supposedly democratic “Rose revolution” in 2003.	但不久前聚在一起袭击反对派的民众很多都曾受到过爱德华·谢瓦尔德纳泽(Eduard Shevardnadze)政府的监禁，谢瓦尔德纳泽政府在被认定为民主运动的2003年“玫瑰革命”中被萨卡什维利推翻。


The latest events clearly indicate that a czarist mentality survived the revolution, reflected in a Byzantine model of political power — an emperor and his court — that has as its main vehicle largely unconstrained presidential authority.	不久前的事件显然表明沙皇主义思想逃过了革命的清洗，并在拜占庭模式（皇帝及其法庭）的政权下把基本不受控制的总统权力作为其执政的主要手段。


Before the security forces targeted the opposition bloc that I represent, supporters of educational reforms were prosecuted, while most of the press is under the influence of the government.	在安全部队打击我所代表的反对派集团之前，教育改革的支持人士已经遭到了迫害，而绝大多数媒体都处在政府的严密控制之下。


Saakashvili claims that the opposition forces that I represent oppose Western values.	萨卡什维利称以我为代表的反对力量抵制西方价值观。


But we advocate parliamentarism – genuine separation of executive and legislative power – in Georgia.	而我们却积极倡导在格鲁吉亚推行议会制度，从而在真正意义上实现行政和司法权力分开。


And, in supporting the Western model of parliamentariansm, we are on the side of Georgia, not Russia.	而且从支持西方议会模式的角度讲，我们也代表了格鲁吉亚、而非俄国的立场。


It is strange that Saakashvili, a graduate of Columbia Law School, fails to see the disparity between his own democratic rhetoric and autocratic actions.	作为哥伦比亚大学法学院的毕业生，萨卡什维利看不到自己的民主言论与独裁行为之间的差异真是咄咄怪事。


Thus, those of us who value Georgia’s historical ties with Russia are called, at best, “archaists,” and at worst “enemies of Georgian independence,” as if Georgia would become a Russian colony if we ever came to power.	于是，珍惜格鲁吉亚与俄国历史渊源的人士被客气地称做“复古主义者”，更有甚者，他们被指责为“格鲁吉亚独立的敌人”，就好像我们一上台，格鲁吉亚就会沦为俄国的殖民地。


But what separates us from Saakashvili is that we understand that history, geography, and economics dictate close ties to Russia.	但我们与萨卡什维利的不同之处就是我们了解是历史、地理和经济因素造就了我们与俄国之间的密切关系。


We simply see no contradiction between that stance and support for Western values.	我们认为这一立场与支持西方价值观之间没有任何冲突。


Indeed, even Russia, with all its imperfections, cannot be said to oppose Western values.	实际上，尽管俄国有着各种各样不尽如人意之处，也不能说俄国反对西方的价值观。