No map can work when some Asian nations are Western (Japan, Taiwan), when non-Western groups (Muslims in Europe) live in supposedly Western countries, when some Eastern countries are partially Westernized and some Western countries (Russia) are not fully Westernized.  Eventually it looks easier to define the mental borders of the West than its territorial borders.	某些亚洲国家(日本和台湾)属于西方，非西方人群(欧洲的穆斯林)生活在本应属于西方的国家，某些东欧国家部分被西方化而某些西方国家(俄国)并没有完全西方化。 在这些情况下，地图是无济于事的。


I believe that the West is a mindset defined by three fundamental traits that cannot easily be found in the so-called Eastern civilizations: a passion for innovation, a capacity for self-criticism, and gender equality.	我相信西方是一个由三个基本特征确定的心态，在东方文明中不大容易找到这种心态。 这些特征是对创新的热情、自我批评的能力以及性别平等。


‘What is new?’ -- a personal greeting since the Hellenistic age – captures the essence of the Western mind.	从古希腊时代以来人们的问候语就是“有什么新消息吗”。 这一句话总结了西方心态的要害。


The non-Westerner, however, would rather place tradition above innovation.	但是非西方人更加愿意把传统置于创新之上。


But innovation as a fundamental value explains the scientific breakthroughs of the West versus the East.  It explains unavoidable conflicts with conservative non-Western societies and it also explains what we should call ‘the Westernization of the West.’	但是创新作为一种基本价值观可以解释与东方相比西方取得了科学突破。 它也说明西方与传统非西方社会不可避免的冲突，同时也说明了我们应该称作的“西方的西方化”。


The West keeps destroying its own traditions, including its religions.  The economist Joseph Schumpeter defined this process as one of “creative destruction.”	西方不断破坏自身的传统，包括其宗教。 经济学家熊彼德把这一过程成为“创造性破坏”。


The term could be applied to all walks of life in the West.	这一名词可以适用于西方所有阶层。 西方保守派在创造性破坏上并不比西方自由派差劲。


Western conservatives are no less prone to creative destruction than Western liberals: conservatives, indeed, are well known for inventing traditions.  Take the 19th century British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, who invented most of the supposedly ancient traditions around the British monarchy.	保守派实际上因创造传统而著名。 例如，十九世纪英国首相迪斯雷利就创造出了大多数本应该是有关英国君主制度悠久的传统。


Innovation in the West seems to be a never-ending, self-transforming process.	西方的创新好像是一个没有尽头、自我转变的进程。


Self-criticism, even more than innovation, is a defining characteristic of the West.	自我批评与创新相比更加能够确定西方的特征。


In most if not all non-Western civilizations, pride and self love exclude self-criticism or at least the criticism of one’s civilization as such.	非西方文明中面子和自恋排除了自我批评，至少不会自我批评自身的文化。


A true Muslim or Chinese scholar cannot be defined as a true Chinese or a true Muslim by being critical of his own world.	一个真正的穆斯林或者中国学者由于对自身文化的批评而难以被称为一个真正的中国人或者穆斯林。


Not so in the West.	西方就不是如此。


The Western scholar remains perfectly legitimate when putting to death Western values: there is no Chinese or Muslim Nietzsche claiming that his own God is dead.	西方学者宣布西方价值观死亡完全正当，而中国或者穆斯林世界中就没有向尼采那样的人说他自己的上帝已经死了。


Is there a Chinese or a Muslim Montaigne ready to write that the “Indian savages” may be wiser than us, as Montaigne did in 16th century France?	中国或者穆斯林世界中有没有人像16世纪法国的蒙田那样那样说“印第安野人”或许比我们更加明智呢？


Of course there must be some Chinese or Muslim Montaigne or Nietzsche, but they would not be considered beacons of their civilizations.	当然肯定会有像蒙田或者尼采那样的中国人或者穆斯林，但是他们不会被视为自身文明的灯塔。


Self-criticism, not self-love, and cultural relativism are the nuts and bolts of the Western mindset.	自我批评而非自恋以及文化相对主义是西方心态的根基。


The same goes with gender equality.	在性别平等上也是如此。


This has not always been so.  In the ancient Greek, Jewish, and Christian religions, women were perceived as inferior to men.	情况并不总是这样。 在古希腊、犹太和基督教地区，妇女被视为低人一等。


But this notion has been contentious in the West for centuries.  Nowadays, gender equality has become the norm.	但是很多世纪以来这一观点一直引发争议。 如今，性别平等已经成为通例。


This is not the case in most non-Western civilizations.	在非西方文明中并非如此。


Some would argue that gender equality is a consequence of the modernization process, not of Westernization.	有人会说性别平等是现代化进程的结果，而非西方化的结果。


This may be true, but the status of women is clearly one issue that puts non-Western Muslims into opposition to the West.	这种说法不无道理，但是妇女的地位问题明显把非西方的穆斯林与西方世界对立起来。


If we accept the above definition of the West as a mindset, this leaves open three major questions: can the East be modernized without being Westernized?	如果我们接受以上西方作为一种心态的定义就会带来三个大问题。 它们是：东方在不被西化的情况下能否现代化？


Where do we draw the line between West and East?	我们如何区分东方和西方？


Will the West remain Western?	西方世界会保持西方吗？


So far, there is no case in history of non-Western modernization; the discourse on Asian values, initially started in Singapore, is basically a political discourse.	目前为止，历史上还没有非西方的现代化。 有关亚洲价值观的讨论最初起源于新加坡，这基本上是一个政治性讨论。


It is after retooling their mindset towards innovation and self-criticism that Asian countries have become modern.	亚洲国家只是在把它们的心态转向了创新以及自我批评之后才变得现代化。


This does not make them less Asian.	这并不让这些国家不那么亚洲化。


Contemporary Koreans or Japanese remain fully Korean or Japanese but are closer to a Westerner than they would be to their own ancestors.	当代的韩国人和日本人还依旧完全是韩国人和日本人但是要比祖先相比更加靠近西方。


Similarly, a modern Egyptian or a modern Saudi will be more on par with a French or an American than they would be with an ancient Arab.	同样，现代埃及人或者沙特人比古代阿拉伯人更加接近法国人或者美国人。


Does this Westernization make the Egyptian or the Saudi less authentic Arabs?	这一西方化是否让埃及人或者沙特人不再是正宗的阿拉伯人呢？


Such a debate does take place within all Eastern societies, which leads us to the real clash of civilizations: all societies today are fragmented between Westernizers and non-Westernizers.	所有的东方社会都存在这一辩论，从而把我们带到了真正的文明冲突，也就是当今所有社会都分裂为西方化人士和非西方化人士。


This clash within civilizations on what modernization means is more significant than Huntington’s alleged conflict between geographical entities.	这一文明内部有关现代化含义的冲突要比亨廷顿所谓的地理实体之间的冲突更加显著。


The controversy on the essential meaning of modernization, also known as an identity crisis, does impact Western countries as well.	有关现代化基本含义的争议也被称作身份认同危机同样也影响到西方国家。


Vast groups who live in the West, Western and non-Western fundamentalists, fight the unending Westernization process in the name of tradition.	生活在西方的大量西方和非西方原教旨主义者以传统的名义与西方化进程进行永无休止的斗争。


Many would like to stop the engine by using various guises like ecology or identity, but a Western society where you could not start your day by asking ‘What's new?’ would not be Western any more.	许多人想要通过使用生态或者身份认同的伪装来停止熄火，但是如果你早上第一句话不是“有没有新消息”的话，西方社会也就不再是西方了。


What Lies Ahead in 2011?	2011年将迎来什么？


NEW YORK – The global economy ends 2010 more divided than it was at the beginning of the year.	发自纽约——相对于2010年初，今年年末的全球经济更为分化。


On one side, emerging-market countries like India, China, and the Southeast Asian economies, are experiencing robust growth.	一方面，印度，中国这样的新兴市场国家以及东南亚经济体都在蓬勃增长。


On the other side, Europe and the United States face stagnation – indeed, a Japanese-style malaise – and stubbornly high unemployment.	而另一方面，欧美却面临着滞胀（其实就是一种日本式的经济萎靡）以及挥之不去的高失业率。


The problem in the advanced countries is not a jobless recovery, but an anemic recovery – or worse, the possibility of a double-dip recession.	发达国家当前的问题并不是一场缺乏就业的复苏，而是一场贫血的复苏——或者再更悲观地说：一种二次衰退的可能性。


This two-track world poses some unusual risks. While Asia’s economic output is too small to pull up growth in the rest of the world, it may be enough to push up commodity prices.	这一两极发展的状况也因此引发了某些特殊风险：虽然亚洲经济尚不足以带动世界其他地区的增长，但在推高商品价格方面却已绰绰有余了。


Meanwhile, US efforts to stimulate its economy through the Federal Reserve’s policy of “quantitative easing” may backfire.	与此同时，美国试图通过美联储的“量化宽松”政策来刺激国内经济的做法可能会弄巧反拙。


After all, in globalized financial markets, money looks for the best prospects around the world, and these prospects are in Asia, not the US.  So the money won’t go where it’s needed, and much of it will wind up where it’s not wanted – causing further increases in asset and commodity prices, especially in emerging markets.	毕竟在全球金融市场中资金总是向那些最繁荣的地区流动，而这些区域目前是在亚洲而不是美国。 因此资金是不会向那些急需它的地方流动的，而是涌向那些不需要它的地方——这会导致资产和商品价格进一步升值，在新兴市场尤甚。


Given the high levels of excess capacity and unemployment in Europe and America, quantitative easing is unlikely to trigger a bout of inflation.	考虑到欧美地区巨量的过剩产能以及极高的失业率，量化宽松政策不太可能引发通胀。


It could, however, increase anxieties about future inflation, leading to higher long-term interest rates – precisely the opposite of the Fed’s goal.	但它会增加人们对未来通胀的忧虑，导致长期利率进一步升高——这与美联储的愿望恰好倒了过来。


This is not the only, or even the most important, downside risk facing the global economy.	而这并不是世界经济所面对的唯一或是最重要的危机。


The gravest threat comes from the wave of austerity sweeping the world, as governments, particularly in Europe, confront the large deficits brought on by the Great Recession, and as anxieties about some countries’ ability to meet their debt payments contributes to financial-market instability.	最严重的威胁来自于席卷全球的紧缩浪潮，这是因为以欧洲国家为首的各国政府都面对着大萧条所带来的巨额赤字，而对某些国家还债能力的忧虑则导致了金融市场的不稳定。


The outcome of premature fiscal consolidation is all but foretold: growth will slow, tax revenues will diminish, and the reduction in deficits will be disappointing.	对这种不成熟的财政巩固措施所导致的结果其实已经早有预言：增长将放缓，税收将减少，而赤字削减的效果却不如人意。


And, in our globally integrated world, the slowdown in Europe will exacerbate the slowdown in the US, and vice versa.	同时在我们这个一体化的世界上，欧洲经济的放缓将加剧美国经济的下滑，反之亦然。


With the US able to borrow at record-low interest rates, and with the promise of high returns on public investments after a decade of neglect, it is clear what it should do.	随着将贷款利率降低到历史最低水平，以及在十年的迷失之后重拾对公共投资的高回报承诺，美国终于知道了自己应当如何做为。


A large-scale public-investment program would stimulate employment in the short term, and growth in the long term, leading in the end to a lower national debt.	一个大规模的公共投资计划应能在短期内刺激就业，并推动长期增长，最终减低国家债务水平。


But financial markets demonstrated their shortsightedness in the years preceding the crisis, and are doing so once again, by applying pressure for spending cuts, even if that implies reducing badly needed public investments.	但金融市场不但在危机袭来的前几年暴露了自己的短视，如今又再次重蹈覆辙，逼迫政府削减支出，而这则意味着急需的公共投资将大幅减少。


Moreover, political gridlock will ensure that little is done about the other festering problems confronting the American economy: mortgage foreclosures are likely to continue unabated (legal complications aside); small and medium-sized enterprises are likely to continue to be starved of funds; and the small and medium-sized banks that traditionally provide them with credit are likely to continue to struggle to survive.	此外，政治僵局也将导致美国政府在另一个不断恶化的经济难题上难有作为：抵押贷款赎回权取消（mortgage foreclosures，意指贷款人因无法偿还而被银行收回房产）的风潮将愈演愈烈（先不管其同时引发的法律纠纷），中小企业依旧无法得到贷款，而那些往常贷款给他们的中小型银行则将继续挣扎在死亡线上。


In Europe, meanwhile, matters are unlikely to be any better.	与此同时，欧洲的状况也没有转好的迹象。


Europe has finally managed to come to the rescue of Greece and Ireland. In the run up to the crisis, both were governed by right-wing governments marked by crony capitalism or worse, demonstrating once again that free-market economics didn’t work in Europe any better than it did in the US.	欧洲最终出手拯救的两个国家——希腊和爱尔兰——都是在一个与大资本勾肩搭背的右翼政府领导下滑向危机的，这再一次证明了自由市场理论不但在美国一败涂地，在欧洲也行不通。


In Greece, as in the US, a new government was left to clean up the mess.	与美国类似，希腊组建了一个新政府来收拾这个烂摊子。


The Irish government that encouraged reckless bank lending and the creation of a property bubble was, perhaps not surprisingly, no more adept in managing the economy after the crisis that it was before.	而爱尔兰那个鼓励银行滥发贷款并制造了地产泡沫的政府则在危机之后现出了不懂管理经济的原形。


Politics aside, property bubbles leave in their wake a legacy of debt and excess capacity in real estate that is not easily rectified – especially when politically connected banks resist restructuring mortgages.	抛开政治因素不谈，地产泡沫给爱尔兰政府留下了一大堆债务和一个产能过剩的房地产行业，而这些东西是不那么容易被消除的——尤其是当那些在政治上抱团的银行拒绝进行抵押贷款重组的时候。


To me, attempting to discern the economic prospects for 2011 is not a particularly interesting question: the answer is bleak, with little upside potential and a lot of downside risk.	对于我本人来说，预测2011年的经济并不是个特别有趣的问题：答案必定是黯淡的，既难寻上升之潜力，又充斥着下滑的风险。


More importantly, how long will it take Europe and America to recover, and can Asia’s seemingly export-dependent economies continue to grow if their historical markets languish?	更重要的是，欧美究竟要花费多少时间才能复苏，而当这些传统出口目的地一蹶不振之时，亚洲的出口导向型经济又能增长多久？


My best bet is that these countries will maintain rapid growth as they shift their economic focus to their vast and untapped domestic markets.	我的最佳方案是这些亚洲国家都将重点转向庞大且尚未开发的国内市场，并以此维持快速增长。


This will require considerable restructuring of their economies, but China and India are both dynamic, and proved their resilience in their response to the Great Recession.	这需要他们对本国的经济结构进行重大改革，但中印两国都充满活力，使之在面对这场大萧条时拥有更大的回旋余地。


I am not so bullish on Europe and America.	我对欧美的前景都不太乐观。


In both cases, the underlying problem is insufficient aggregate demand.	他们所面临的根本问题其实就是累计总需求不足。


The ultimate irony is that there are simultaneously excess capacity and vast unmet needs – and policies that could restore growth by using the former to address the latter.	而最大的讽刺莫过于一方面产能过剩，另一方面却有巨大的需求无法的到满足——而利用前者来应对后者的政策对恢复增长是有帮助的。


Both the US and Europe, for instance, must retrofit their economies to address the challenges of global warming. There are feasible policies that would work within long-term budget constraints.	比如说，欧美两地都必须对自身经济进行革新以应对全球变暖的挑战，即便处于长期的预算限制之下，还是有可行的政策可供施展的。


The problem is politics: in the US, the Republican Party would rather see President Barack Obama fail than the economy succeed.	问题还是出在政治上，在美国，共和党宁愿不要经济振兴也要看着奥巴马出丑。


In Europe, 27 countries with different interests and perspectives are pulling in different directions, without enough solidarity to compensate.	在欧洲，27个国家都有着不同的利益诉求和观点，危机之下各自突围，连足够的凝聚力都没有。


The bailout packages are, in this light, impressive achievements.	由此看来，那个紧急援助计划的出台已经是很了不起的成就了。


In both Europe and America, the free-market ideology that allowed asset bubbles to grow unfettered – markets always know best, so government must not intervene – now ties policymakers’ hands in designing effective responses to the crisis.	无论是在欧洲还是美国，纵容资产泡沫任意疯长的自由市场理念——所谓市场万能，政府切勿干预——如今变成了套在政策制定者身上的枷锁，使之无法制定有效的危机应对策略。


One might have thought that the crisis itself would undermine confidence in that ideology.	有人会觉得危机本身的出现将动摇这一理念的公信力。


Instead, it has resurfaced to drag governments and economies down the sinkhole of austerity.	但事实上，它却重新得势，又把各国政府和经济体拖入了紧缩的泥潭。


If politics is the problem in Europe and America, only political changes are likely to restore them to growth.	如果欧美的问题是政治，那只有政治变革才能使它们重新走上增长之路。


Or else they can wait until the overhang of excess capacity diminishes, capital goods become obsolete, and the economy’s internal restorative forces work their gradual magic.	或者它们可以选择等到过度产能减少，资本货物被抛弃，经济内部的恢复性力量逐渐滋长的那一刻。


Either way, victory is not around the corner.	但无论选择哪一条道路，胜利都不会立刻到来。


India’s Outrage	印度之怒


NEW DELHI – Last year ended for India on a note of public outrage that has burdened the country with anger, frustration, and pessimism.	新德里—印度的去年以公共愤怒收尾。 这场愤怒让印度背上了怨气、沮丧和悲观。


The cause, as all the world knows, was the fatally brutal rape of a young woman on a moving bus, after which she and her male companion – himself beaten nearly to death – were thrown, naked, into the street on a freezing night.	其原因早已全世界皆知——一名女性在公交车上被野蛮的强奸夺取了生命，和她在一起的男伴也遭到了几乎致命的殴打，在寒冷的夜晚被剥光了衣物扔下街头。


The savagery and wanton cruelty of the attack shocked the country to its core.	这一轻薄而野蛮的袭击恶行震入了印度的骨髓。


But there is more behind the spontaneous protests that have choked the great central vistas of Delhi (to such an extent that the government was forced to change the venue for meetings with visiting Russian President Vladimir Putin).	但在万人空巷的德里自发游行背后，有很多东西值得我们反思（游行达到了什么样的规模呢？ 政府被迫改变与来访的俄罗斯总统普京举行会晤的地点。


The anger that has poured onto the streets of Delhi and many other Indian cities was fueled by a great accumulated discontent – at the bestial rape and murder of that still-unnamed woman, yes, but also at pervasive public and private corruption, the absence of governance and accountability, and much more.	在德里和其他许多印度城市街头挥洒的愤怒的背后是极深的积怨——不仅是对这位不知名女性所遭受的强奸和杀害的愤怒，也包括对无处不在的公私腐败、治理和问责的缺乏以及其他诸多问题的愤怒。


Years of pent-up rage are now flowing out.	多年的积怨如今终于爆发。


Of course, the government deserves – and has received – no quarter.	当然，政府不值得原谅，也没人原谅它。


The government failed to prevent the crime, then failed again when its unresponsive, inefficient, and crooked police force was unable to respond appropriately.	政府没能预防犯罪在先，犯罪发生后，在腐败低效的警方没能恰当响应的情况下，政府又没能拿出措施。


A wholly moribund and sclerotic administration simply did not know where its duty lay.	一个完全僵化、行将就木的政府根本不知道自己的责任在哪里。


When protests erupted, the government, in a fit of blind idiocy, set the police upon peaceful protesters, men and women, with long batons, water cannon, and tear gas.	游行爆发后，政府又像抽风一样把警察派向示威群众，用警棍、水枪和催泪弹对付走上街头的男男女女。


This heavy-handedness of course resolved nothing.	如此笨拙的应对措施解决不了任何问题，群众的愤怒开始向暴行深化；


Citizens’ fury deepened into grim resolve; the government’s repressive impulse was challenged and defeated.	政府的抑制措施根本无法阻挡。


Since then, tokenism has replaced leadership.	此后，装门面取代了领导力。


Not one government official had the courage, skill, or decency to rise to the occasion.	政府之中没有一位官员有勇气、能力和人格魅力出现在示威群众跟前。


The opposition, too, floundered, doing no more than simply faulting the ruling establishment. 	反对派也在胡乱挣扎，除了大肆指责执政党外拿不出任何策略。


After an unconscionably long delay of seven days, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh finally broke his incomprehensible silence about the rape.	在经历了冷漠无情的七天后，总理辛格终于打破了令人费解的沉默。


But his public statement offered no answers and no balm – indeed, nothing but platitudes.	但他的公开讲话并不构成强奸案的答案，也起不了镇抚人心的作用——事实上，这全是一番陈词滥调。


Then, humiliatingly, Singh inquired, sotto voce, of those surrounding him: “Was it all right?”	接着，辛格做了令人汗颜的动作：他轻声问随从说：“这么说对吗？ ”


A torrent of electronic wrath burst forth.	这在电子世界中掀起了怒波。


Protest placards could be seen all over the country: “No!	全国各大论坛随处可见示威标语：“不！


Prime Minister, it is not all right.”	总理，这么说不对。


Clearly, Machiavelli was correct: for a political leader, the people’s contempt is worse than their hatred.	”显然，马基雅维利是对的：对政治领袖来说，人民的轻视比人民的愤怒更糟糕。


Then, in another mindless act, the victim, struggling for life, was flown to a hospital in Singapore.	接着，政府又干了一件蠢事，生命垂危的受害者被飞机送到了新加坡的医院。


No one would or could say why.	没人知道为什么要这样。


It was there that she died – some say that she arrived already brain-dead.	后来她死在了新加坡——也有人说到达新加坡时她已经陷入了脑死亡。


Her body was then hurriedly flown back to India, where it was quietly, almost surreptitiously, cremated.	随后，她的遗体又被匆忙运回印度，悄悄地——甚至可以说是偷偷地——火化了。


If the government feared her alive, it was petrified of her dead.	如果说政府害怕她活着，那么她的死足以令政府恐惧。


All of India was shamed by this callous and inhuman folly.	全体印度人都因为这场野蛮残忍的蠢事而蒙羞。


As a result, India’s Congress-led government has irretrievably lost the public’s confidence; the establishment’s authority has evaporated.	结果，国大党领导的印度政府已经彻底失去了公众信心； 执政者的权威已经蒸发殆尽。


A blunt question is now being asked frequently and openly: “Is this India’s Tahrir Square?”	如今，一个尖锐的问题被公开地频繁提及：“这会是印度的解放广场吗？


Even if it is not, how can an internally roiled India respond adequately to its many external tests, the severity of which was underscored recently by Pakistani troops’ killing of two Indian soldiers along the Line of Control in Kashmir.	”即使答案是否定的，内部阵脚已乱的印度如何充分地应对诸多外部考验，比如最近发生的巴基斯坦军方在克什米尔控制线附近杀害两名印度士兵的事件？


Meanwhile, as India flounders, Northeast Asia has been astir choosing new leaders, who have now been installed in China, Japan, and North and South Korea.	在印度苦苦挣扎的同时，东北亚 纷纷选出了新领导人，中国、日本、朝鲜和韩国都完成了权力交接。


With an assertive China, ongoing regime change in Myanmar, a troubled Bangladesh, a constitutionally stymied Nepal, and continuing ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka, India’s eastern challenges are many and mighty.	咄咄逼人的中国、体制转变方兴未艾的缅甸、麻烦重重的孟加拉国、宪政问题缠身的尼泊尔、种族冲突不断的斯里兰卡——在印度的东面可谓强敌四伏，挑战重重。


But they are even more severe to India’s west, with Pakistan heading into elections (one hopes) in the spring of 2013, and NATO troops withdrawing from Afghanistan.	而西面的情况甚至更为严峻，巴基斯坦（有望）即将在2013年春迎来大选，北约将从阿富汗撤军。


Indian diplomacy faces a time of trial in both countries.	印度外交将同时面临这两个国家的考验。


Farther west, too, India’s statecraft is in question.	进一步向西看，印度的国基也存在问题。


Where does India, which remains dependent on Middle Eastern energy, stand on that region’s many crises?	仍需依赖中东能源的印度在中东诸多危机中立场如何？


How will it address the nuclear issue in Iran – a country with which it has close historical, cultural, and economic ties – or the civil war in Syria, the rise of Salafism in Egypt, and the Israel-Palestine standoff?	印度如何处理与之存在密切历史、文化和经济关系的伊朗的核问题，或是叙利亚内战问题、埃及沙拉菲主义崛起问题以及以巴冲突问题？


Moreover, India no longer appears to be the vigorous economic dynamo that was the darling of global investors only five years ago.	此外，印度已不再是强大的经济发动机，而五年前，它还是全球投资者梦想的地方。


Already some say that the “I” in BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) should now stand for Indonesia.	有人说，金砖国家（BRICS，巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非）中的“I”现在应该是印度尼西亚。


India is running high current-account and fiscal deficits; food-price inflation is in the double digits; and the rupee has weakened.	印度存在巨大的经常项目和财政赤字； 食品价格通胀率高达两位数；


As for trade with China, The Economist points out that “for every dollar’s worth of exports to China [principally raw materials], India imports three.”	卢比也在贬值。 至于与中国的俄贸易，《经济学人》指出“印度每向中国出口1美元（主要是原材料），都要进口3美元。


Can outrage turn to catharsis?	愤怒���导致动乱吗？


Clearly, the current government is unable to bring about any of the necessary changes.	显然，现任政府拿不出任何必须的改变。


A possible answer lies in an early election: a new mandate for an India that is in desperate need of renewal.	可能的答案在于提前大选：渴望涅槃的印度需要一个新指挥官。


What McCain and Obama Ignore	麦凯恩和奥巴马无瑕顾及之处


PRINCETON – Barack Obama worked for three years as a community organizer on Chicago’s blighted South Side, so he knows all about the real poverty that exists in America.	普林斯顿--奥巴马曾经在芝加哥破烂不堪的城南当过三年的社区组织者，所以他完全了解美国真实的贫困状况。


He knows that in one of the world’s richest nations, 37 million people live in poverty, a far higher proportion than in Europe’s wealthy nations.	他知道，在世界上最为富有的国家中有三千七百万人生活在贫困之中。 这一比例要远远高于欧洲富国。


Yet Obama’s campaigning has focused on “Main Street” and tax cuts for the middle class, bypassing the issue of what to do about poverty.	但是奥巴马竞选集中谈论的是大众百姓以及中产阶级减税，却忽略了如何应对贫困。


It’s not as if Obama has no policies for helping the poor.	这并非是奥巴马没有扶贫规划。


Go to his Web site, click on “The Issues” and then on “Poverty.”	到他的网站上，点击“议题”，然后再点击“贫困”。


There you will find a set of thoughtful proposals ranging from raising the minimum wage to establishing model “Promise Neighborhoods” that will attempt to turn around areas with high levels of poverty and low levels of educational achievement by providing services such as early childhood education and crime prevention.	在那里你可以找到一整套规划，内容遍及提高最低工资到建立模范“保证邻里”项目等。 这些都试图通过提供类似早期幼儿教育以及阻止犯罪等服务项目来整治高贫困以及低教育地区。


(Go to John McCain’s Web site, and you won’t even find “poverty” among the list of issues to click on – although “Space Program” is there.)	(你到麦凯恩的网站上就找不到“贫困”议题可以点击，然而“空间计划”却赫然在目。 )


So why isn’t Obama speaking up about an issue on which he has so much more first-hand experience than his opponent, and better policies, too?	在贫困问题上，奥巴马比麦凯恩更有切身体会和更好的政策。 那么，为何奥巴马没有大声疾呼呢？


Perhaps not enough of the poor vote, or they will vote Democratic anyway.	也许是因为贫困人口选票不够多，或者是因为反正他们会投票给民主党。


Moreover, his researchers presumably have told him that independent middle-class voters are more likely to be won over by appeals to their wallets than to concern for America’s poor.	而且，他的研究人员据说告诉他，收入问题要比关心美国的贫困人口更会赢得独立中产选民的支持。


If America’s poor don’t rank high among voters’ concerns, it is no surprise that the poor abroad are virtually invisible.	如果贫困问题并非为选民关注，那么，外国的贫困问题几乎视而不见也就不足为奇了。


Again, Obama has both the background – with his family ties to Kenya – and a promising policy, to increase America’s foreign assistance to $50 billion by 2012, using the money to stabilize failing states and bring sustainable growth to Africa.	同样，奥巴马家族与肯尼亚有渊源，他也就有这一问题的背景，他也有令人鼓舞的规划。 他的规划就是到2012年把美国的对外援助增加到五百亿美元，用这笔钱来稳定摇摇欲坠的国家并且带给非洲可持续增长。


(Currently, of all the OECD donor nations, only Greece gives a lower percentage of its gross national income than the United States does.)	(目前，在所有经合组织成员中，只有希腊的外援占国民总收入的比例比美国的低。 )


But when Obama’s running mate, Joe Biden, was asked, in his debate with his Republican counterpart, Sarah Palin, what proposals an Obama-Biden administration might have to scale back as a result of the $700 billion Wall Street bailout, the only specific proposal he mentioned was the increase in foreign assistance.	但是，奥巴马的竞选搭档拜登在与共和党副总统候选人佩林的电视辩论中被问到奥巴马和拜登政府如何削减开支来应付七千亿美元的华尔街救市计划时，他提到的唯一具体建议就是增加外援。


McCain has never gotten down to specifics about how much foreign aid he would like the US to give.	在美国给予多少外援时，麦凯恩从来都是语焉不详。


Both candidates refer to deaths of American military personnel in Iraq, but there has been less attention to the war’s civilian causalities.	两个候选人都谈到了在伊拉克的美军阵亡，但是对于战争中的平民死亡却较少谈论。


In her debate with Biden, Palin actually attacked Obama for saying that, in her words, “All we’re doing in Afghanistan is air-raiding villages and killing civilians.”	在与拜登的辩论中，佩林攻击奥巴马的言论，用她的话来说就是“我们在阿富汗所做的一切就是空袭村庄以及杀害平民”。


She called that comment “reckless” and “untrue,” because, “That’s not what we’re doing there.	她称这一言论“鲁莽”以及“不真实”，因为，“那不是我们在那里干的事。


We’re fighting terrorists, and we’re securing democracy.”	我们在与恐怖分子作战，而且我们在保护民主”。


Of course, killing civilians is not all that the US and its NATO allies are doing in Afghanistan, and if Obama implied that it was, his rhetoric was careless.	当然，杀害平民并非美国及其北约盟国在阿富汗所从事的所有事情。 而且如果奥巴马暗示那就是他们的所作所为，那么他的言论就是没有头脑。


But what is extraordinary about Palin’s comment is that, despite being a strong proponent of the sanctity of human life, in criticizing Obama she did not pause to deplore the serious loss of innocent human life that American air strikes in Afghanistan have caused.	但是佩林评论的惊人之处在于，尽管她强烈支持人命不可侵犯，但是在批评奥巴马的时候她并没有停下来哀悼美国空袭在阿富汗造成的巨大平民死亡。


Afghanistan’s president, Hamid Karzai, has repeatedly expressed outrage at American air strikes that have killed civilians – most recently in August, when he said that 95 Afghans, including 50 children, were killed in the bombing of a village.	阿富汗总统卡尔扎伊多次对美军空袭造成平民死亡表示愤怒。 最近的一次发生在八月，95名阿富汗人，包括五十名儿童在空袭村庄中死亡。


The global ethical challenge that has been most prominent in the campaign is climate change.	竞选中最为主要的全球性伦理问��是气候变化问题。


Here, the candidates’ goals are virtually identical: they both support a cap-and-trade system to make deep cuts in US greenhouse-gas emissions by 2050.	在这一问题上，候选人的目标几乎是一致的。 他们都支持限额-交易机制，从而到2050年大幅度削减美国的温室气体排放。


Obama wants the goal to be an 80% reduction and McCain says 66%, but, since the next president will leave office no later than 2016, that difference is irrelevant.	奥巴马想要削减80%，麦凯恩则为66%。 但是，由于下一任总统最晚也要在2016年离任，所以，这一区别也就微不足道了。


Interestingly, one ethical issue on which neither candidate has campaigned has been shown to have the potential to move voters.	有趣的是，有一个两党候选人在竞选中都还没有涉及到的一个伦理问题却有可能会打动选民。


A group called Defenders of Wildlife has been running an ad graphically highlighting Palin’s support for shooting wolves from aircraft.	一个名为野生动物守护者的团体投放了一则广告，用图表的方式突出表现了佩林支持从飞机上射杀狼。


A study of Republicans, Democrats, and independents showed that viewing the ad led to greater support for Obama.	一项对共和党、民主党以及独立党派的研究显示看过这则广告的人大部分会转而支持奥巴马。


According to Glenn Kessler, the head of HCD research, which conducted the study with the Muhlenberg College Institute of Public Opinion, whereas recent ads from both parties have had little impact among voters, “This is the first ad in over a month that seems to have broken through.”	与穆伦堡学院民意研究所共同进行该项研究的HCD研究的主管Glenn Kessler指出。 尽管两党候选人最近投放的广告在选民中很少产生影响，“这是一个月来第一个似乎打动选民的广告。


Consistent with that finding, an historic ballot initiative in California to ban cruel forms of animal confinement on factory farms, including the battery cage system of keeping hens, is also showing strong support.	”与这项发现相符的是，在历史上加利福尼亚对制止工厂化农场囚禁动物的残酷方式，包括笼养鸡只的系统进行的投票表决也获得了相当高的支持率。


What Monetary Policy Does China Need?	中国需要何种货币政策？


China’s remarkable growth has been financed recently by a rapid expansion of money and bank credit that is producing an increasingly unsustainable investment boom.	最近，中国货币和银行信贷的快速扩张为其引人注目的经济增长提供了资金，而这正在产生一个愈发难以持久的投资激增。


This renews concerns that the country may not be able to avert a replay of the painful boom–and-bust cycle such as the one it endured in the mid-1990’s.	这重新引发人们的担忧，那就是中国可能无法避免重演其在九十年代中期所经历的痛苦的经济繁荣破灭循环。


Monetary policy is usually the first line of defense in such situations.	在这种情况下，货币政策往往是第一道防线。


But China’s monetary policy has been hamstrung by the tightly managed exchange-rate regime.	但是中国的货币政策却被严格管理的汇率体系所削弱。


This regime prevents the central bank – the People’s Bank of China (PBC) – from taking appropriate policy decisions to manage domestic demand, because interest-rate hikes could encourage capital inflows and put further pressure on the exchange rate.	这一体系阻止中央银行即中国人民银行作出适当的政策决定来管理国内需求，因为利率提升可能会鼓励资本流入并且进一步对汇率造成压力。


There is, of course, a vigorous ongoing debate about China’s exchange-rate policy.	当然，有关中国的汇率政策一直争论不休。


China’s rising trade surplus has led some observers to call for a revaluation of the renminbi to correct what they see as an unfair competitive advantage that China maintains in international markets.	中国上升的贸易顺差让某些观察家呼吁对人民币重新估价，以便修正他们所认为的中国在国际市场中维持的不公平的竞争优势。


Others argue that the stable exchange rate fosters macroeconomic stability in China.	其他人则提出，稳定的汇率促进中国的宏观经济稳定。


But this debate misses the point.	但是，这一论点不得要领。


What China really needs is a truly independent monetary policy oriented to domestic objectives.	中国需要的是切实独立的、面向国内目标的货币政策。


This would enable the PBC to manage domestic demand by allowing interest rates to rise in order to rein in credit growth and deter reckless investment.	这将会让人民银行通过允许利率上升来管理国内需求，从而限制信贷增长以及抑制盲目投资。


An independent monetary policy requires a flexible exchange rate, not a revaluation.	独立的货币政策要求灵活的汇率，而非重新估价。


But what could take the place of the stable exchange rate as an anchor for monetary policy and for tying down inflation expectations?	但是，什么东西可以取代作为货币政策以及压制通货膨胀预期的依靠的稳定汇率呢？


We recommend a low inflation objective as the anchor for monetary policy in China.	我们建议采用低通货膨胀目标作为中国货币政策的出发点。


Theoretical research and the practical experiences of many countries both show that focusing on price stability is the best way for monetary policy to achieve the broader objectives in the charter of the PBC: macroeconomic and financial stability, high employment growth, etc.	理论研究以及多国实际经验都表明，致力于价格稳定是货币政策实现人民银行职能中更为广泛的目标的最佳途径。 这些目标包括宏观经济和金融稳定以及高就业增长等等。


The low inflation objective need not involve the formalities of an inflation-targeting regime, such as that practiced by the European Central Bank and the Bank of England, and is similar in approach to that recommended for the United States by US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke.	低通胀目标并不需要包括以通胀为指标的体系中的手段，欧洲央行和英格兰银行就采用这些手段，而且，美联储主席伯南特也建议美国采取类似的手段。


How could such a framework be operated effectively in an economy in which financial sector problems have weakened the monetary transmission mechanism?	中国金融体系问题已经削弱了货币转变机制，这样的一个框架如何在这种经济体中有效运作呢？


This is a key concern because, notwithstanding recent reforms, the banking system remains fragile.	这是一个关键性的顾虑，因为最低程度的金融体系改革应当足以落实低通胀目标。


Nevertheless, we believe that a minimal set of financial sector reforms – essentially making banks’ balance sheets strong enough to withstand substantial interest-rate policy actions – should suffice to implement a low inflation objective.	这些改革基本上可以将银行的资产负债表强化到足以抵御根本性的利率政策行动的程度。


Although full modernization of the financial sector is a long way off even in the best of circumstances, the minimal reforms that we recommend could strengthen the banking system sufficiently in the near term to support a more flexible exchange rate anchored by an inflation objective.	即使在最佳情况下实现金融体系的现代化还都是遥远的事情。 尽管如此，我们建议的最低程度的改革应当可以在近期内有力地加强银行体系，从而支持通胀目标所包含的更为灵活的汇率。


Indeed, price stability, and the broader macroeconomic stability emanating from it, would provide a good foundation for pushing forward with other financial sector reforms.	事实上，价格稳定，以及由此带来的更大程度的宏观经济稳定将会为推动金融体系的其他改革提供良好的基础。


The framework we suggest has the important benefit of continuity.	我们建议的框架具有连续性的重要益处。


The PBC would not have to change its operational approach to monetary policy.	人民银行将不必改变其针对货币政策的运作手段。


Only a shift in strategic focus would be needed to anchor monetary policy with a long-run target range for low inflation.	只需要改变战略关注点就可以在长期指标范围内为低通胀制定货币政策。


Monitoring of monetary (and credit) targets would still be important in achieving the inflation objective.	监控货币以及信贷指标在实现通胀目标上仍将十分重要。


Furthermore, it should be easier to adopt the new framework when times are good – like now, when growth is strong and inflation is low.	而且，时机妥当的时候采纳新的框架将会较为容易。 当前，增长强劲而通胀较低，正是好时机。


There is some risk that appreciation of the exchange rate if greater flexibility were allowed could precipitate deflation.	现在还有一种风险，那就是如果允许更大的灵活性会引起汇率上升从而加快通货紧缩。


What this really highlights, however, is the importance of framing the debate about exchange-rate flexibility in a broader context.	但是，这一情形实际上突出将汇率灵活性放在更大的范围内进行辩论的重要性。


Having an independent monetary policy that could counteract boom-and-bust cycles would be the best way for China to deal with such risks.	具有独立的、能够抵御从繁荣到破灭循环的货币政策是中国应付此类风险的最佳途径。


Contrary to those who regard the discussion of an alternative monetary framework as premature, there are good reasons for China to begin right now to build the institutional foundation for the transition to an independent monetary policy.	某些人认为现在讨论替换性的货币框架为时尚早。 与此相反，中国有很好的理由现在就为向独立的货币政策过渡建立机制性基础。


Indeed, early adoption of a low inflation objective would help secure the monetary and financial stability that China needs as it allows greater exchange-rate flexibility.	实际上，低通胀可以允许更大的汇率灵活度，尽早采纳这一目标将会帮助中国所需要的货币和金融稳定。


What Money Can Buy	金钱可以买什么


CHICAGO – In an interesting recent book, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of the Market, the Harvard philosopher Michael Sandel points to the range of things that money can buy in modern societies and gently tries to stoke our outrage at the market’s growing dominance.	芝加哥—在迈克尔·桑德尔（Michael Sandel）颇有意思的新书《钱买不到的：市场的道德边界》（What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of the Market）中，这位哈佛大学哲学家提到了许多在现代社会中可以用金钱买到的东西，然后优雅地煽风点火哦，激发我们对市场主宰一切的愤怒。


Is he right that we should be alarmed?	我们真的应该引起警惕吗？


While Sandel worries about the corrupting nature of some monetized transactions (do kids really develop a love of reading if they are bribed to read books?), he is also concerned about unequal access to money, which makes trades using money inherently unequal.	桑德尔担心某些货币化交易的腐败性质（真的可以用悬赏开发孩子的阅读兴趣吗？ ），但他也担心金钱获得渠道的不平等性，因为这导致了用钱进行的贸易具有内在不平等性。


More generally, he fears that the expansion of anonymous monetary exchange erodes social cohesion, and argues for reducing money’s role in society.	更一般地讲，阿担心匿名货币交换的扩张会侵蚀社会凝聚力，并呼吁减弱金钱在社会中的作用。


Sandel’s concerns are not entirely new, but his examples are worth reflecting upon.	桑德尔的担忧算不上最新鲜，但他举的例子值得我们深思。


In the United States, some companies pay the unemployed to stand in line for free public tickets to congressional hearings.	在美国，一些公司花钱雇失业者排队抢过会听证的公共入场券。


They then sell the tickets to lobbyists and corporate lawyers who have a business interest in the hearing but are too busy to stand in line.	接着，他们把入场券卖给游说集团和公司律师——听证对事关后两者的利益，但他们又太忙，没有时间排队。


Clearly, public hearings are an important element of participatory democracy.	显然，公共听证是参与性民主的重要元素。


All citizens should have equal access.	所有公民都应该有平等的参与权。


So selling access seems to be a perversion of democratic principles.	因此出售参与权似乎是对民主原则的滥用。


The fundamental problem, though, is scarcity.	但是，根本问题出在稀缺上。


We cannot accommodate everyone in the room who might have an interest in a particularly important hearing.	我们无法协调可能在某个重要听证上存在利益的所有人。


So we have to “sell” entry.	因此，我们不得不“出售”参与权。


We can either allow people to use their time (standing in line) to bid for seats, or we can auction seats for money.	我们可以让人们牺牲时间（排队）换取听证席位，也可以将听证权拿来拍卖换钱。


The former seems fairer, because all citizens seemingly start with equal endowments of time.	前者比较公平，因为似乎所有公民的初始时间禀赋都是一样的。


But is a single mother with a high-pressure job and three young children as equally endowed with spare time as a student on summer vacation?	但是，可以说一位从事高压力工作还带着三个幼儿的单身母亲的闲暇禀赋和一位放暑假的学生是一样的吗？


And is society better off if she, the chief legal counsel for a large corporation, spends much of her time standing in line?	而作为某大公司首席法律顾问的这位单身母亲花时间排队能产生让社会变得更好的效果吗？


Whether it is better to sell entry tickets for time or for money thus depends on what we hope to achieve.	用时间还是用金钱换取入场券孰优孰劣取决于我们希望达到的目的是什么。


If we want to increase society’s productive efficiency, people’s willingness to pay with money is a reasonable indicator of how much they will gain if they have access to the hearing.	如果我们希望增加社会生产率，那么人们愿意付多少钱可以作为合理的指标显示他们可以从参与听证中获得多少好处。


Auctioning seats for money makes sense – the lawyer contributes more to society by preparing briefs than by standing in line.	货币拍卖听证席位是有用的——律师准备总结陈词对社会的贡献大于排队。


On the other hand, if it is important that young, impressionable citizens see how their democracy works, and that we build social solidarity by making corporate executives stand in line with jobless teenagers, it makes sense to force people to bid with their time and to make entry tickets non-transferable.	另一方面，如果重点在于让年轻、敏感的公民体验他们身处其中的民主是如何运转的，以及通过让公司高管与失业年轻人一起排队培养社会凝聚力，那么就应该迫使人们牺牲时间换取不可转移的入场券。


But if we think that both objectives – efficiency and solidarity – should play some role, perhaps we should turn a blind eye to hiring the unemployed to stand in line in lieu of busy lawyers, so long as they do not corner all of the seats.	但如果我们两个目标——效率和凝聚力都应该起作用，也许我们应该对繁忙的律师雇用失业者替自己排队的现象睁一只眼闭一只眼，只要他们被霸占所有席位。


What about the sale of human organs, another example Sandel worries about?	那么贩卖人体器官又该怎么看呢？ 这是桑德尔所担心的又一件事。


Something seems wrong when a lung or a kidney is sold for money.	卖肾或者卖肺听起来似乎总有那么一丝不对劲。


Yet we celebrate the kindness of a stranger who donates a kidney to a young child.	但对于捐献肾脏给年轻小孩的陌生人，我们总要赞扬他的善良。


So, clearly, it is not the transfer of the organ that outrages us – we do not think that the donor is misinformed about the value of a kidney or is being fooled into parting with it.	因此，显然，是器官的交易激怒了我们——我们并不会去想捐献者被误导了肾脏的价值，或是受骗上当才接受取肾的。


Nor, I think, do we have concerns about the scruples of the person selling the organ – after all, they are parting irreversibly with something that is dear to them for a price that few of us would accept.	而我认为，我们也不会去想出售器官者所经历的犹豫——毕竟他们所经历的是与宝贵之物的不可逆的分离，而他们所获得的代价是很少有人愿意能够的。


I think part of our discomfort has to do with the circumstances in which the transaction takes place.	我想，我们的不满部分是来自交易发生的环境。


What kind of society do we live in if people have to sell their organs to survive?	如果一个人得出售器官才活得下去，那么我们生活在其中的是怎样一个社会啊！


But, while a ban on organ sales may make us feel better, does it really make society better off?	但是，尽管禁止贩卖器官会让我们感觉好受些，这真的能让社会变得更好吗？


Possibly, if it makes society work harder to ensure that people are never driven to the circumstances that would make them contemplate selling a vital organ.	也许是，如果这能让社会变得更努力从而确保人们永远不会陷入被诱出售活体器官的境况中去的话。


But possibly not, if it allows society to ignore the underlying problem, either moving the trade underground, or forcing people in such circumstances to resort to worse remedies.	但也可能不是，如果社会并没有意识到基本问题，而是将器官贩卖行为转入地下并迫使出售器官者得不到更好医疗的话。


Then again, part of our unease probably has to do with what we perceive as an unequal exchange.	再一次，我们的不安可能部分来自我们对不公平交换的定义。


The seller is giving up part of her body in an irreversible transaction.	出售者在一次不可逆的交易中放弃了身体的一部分。


The buyer is giving up only money – perhaps earned on a lucky stock trade or at an overpaid job.	购买者只放弃了金钱——这笔钱可能来自某次撞大运的炒股或薪酬过高的工作。


If that money had been earned by selling a portion of a lung, or represented savings painfully accumulated during years of backbreaking work, we might consider the exchange more equal.	如果这笔钱本身便来自出售一部分肺脏，或是多年来辛勤劳作、一分一厘苦苦储蓄而得，我们或许会觉得这样的交换会公平些。


Of course, the central virtue of money is precisely its anonymity.	当然，钱最核心的优点正在于其匿名性。


I need know nothing about the dollar bill I receive to be able to use it.	我不需要知道拿到的美元钞票的相关信息就可以使用它。


But, because money’s anonymity obscures its provenance, it may be socially less acceptable as a medium of payment for some objects.	但是，匿名性使得我们无从考证钱的来源，而对于某些目标，这会导致人们对钱作为支付中介的角色难以接受。


In both examples – congressional tickets and organ sales – Sandel suggests reducing money’s role.	在上述两例中——国会入场券和贩卖器官——桑德尔都建议减弱钱的作用。


But money has many virtues in facilitating transactions – hence its ubiquitous use.	但钱在促进交易和使用范围方面有着大量好处。


So, perhaps the more important message is that society’s tolerance for monetization is proportional to the legitimacy accorded to the distribution of money.	因此，也许更重要的问题在于社会对货币化的容忍度与源自金钱分配的合理性成正比。


The more people believe that it is the hardworking and the deserving who have money, the more they are willing to tolerate transactions for money (though some transactions remain beyond the pale).	人们越是认为多劳多能者才能多得，就越是愿意忍受金钱交易（尽管仍有某些交易超出了仍受界限）。


But if people believe that the moneyed are primarily those who are well connected or crooked, their tolerance for monetary transactions falls.	但如果人们认为关系最多、人品最劣者往往最能致富，那么他们对货币交易的容忍度也会下降。


Rather than focusing on prohibiting monetary transactions, perhaps a more important lesson imparted by Sandel’s examples is that we should work continuously to improve the perceived legitimacy of money’s distribution.	不要将注意力放在禁止货币交易上。 也许桑德尔的例子给我们的更重要的教训是我们应该不断改善对金钱分配的合理性的感觉。


The Moral Limits of Markets	市场的道德局限性


TOKYO – Today, there are very few things that money can’t buy.	发自东京——在今天这个社会，不能用钱来换取的东西已经少之又少了。


If you are sentenced to a jail term in Santa Barbara, California, and don’t like the standard accommodations, you can buy a prison-cell upgrade for about $90 per night.	如果你在美国加利福尼亚州的圣塔芭芭拉市被判入狱，却又不喜欢跟普通囚犯一样的监狱环境，那么只需支付90美元/天就可以享受升级版的监仓。


If you want to help to prevent the tragic fact that, each year, thousands of babies are born to drug-addicted mothers, you can contribute to a charity that uses a market mechanism to ameliorate the problem: a $300 cash grant to any drug-addicted woman willing to be sterilized.	如果你不忍看见每年有数千名婴儿由吸毒妇女生下的悲惨事实，就可以捐款给一个利用市场机制来缓解这一状况的慈善组织：他们向每个愿意接受绝育的吸毒妇女支付300美元。


Or, if you want to attend a US Congressional hearing, but don’t want to wait for hours in line, you can enlist the services of a line-standing company.	又或者，你希望旁听一场国会听证，却不愿花费几个小时排队轮候入场券。 那么你可以找一家排队公司。


The company hires homeless people and others in need of work to wait in line – overnight if necessary.	这些公司雇佣那些无家可归或者其他需要工作的人去排队——有必要的时候甚至可以通宵。


Just before the hearing begins, the paying customer can take his or her line-stander’s place in the queue, and claim a front-row seat in the hearing room.	等到听证会就快开始之前，付了钱的顾客就可以和排队者交换个位置，并因此在听证厅里占据一个前排的座位。


Is there anything wrong with buying and selling these things?	买卖这些东西有什么不对的吗？


Some would say no; people should be free to spend their money to buy whatever someone else is willing to sell.	有些人说没问题； 人们应当有自由去花钱购买别人愿意出售的一切东西。


Others believe that there are some things that money should not be able to buy.	其他人则相信有些东西是不应该被投入金钱交易的。


But why?  What exactly is wrong with selling prison-cell upgrades to those who can afford them, or offering cash for sterilization, or hiring line-standers?	但这是为什么？ 购买升级监仓，给绝育吸毒妇女送钱或者雇佣排队者究竟有什么错呢？


To answer questions such as these, we need to pose a bigger question: What role should money and markets play in a good society?	要解答这类问题，我们需要提出一个更宏大的问题：在一个好的社会里金钱和市场究竟应该扮演一个什么角色？


Asking this question, and debating it politically, is more important than ever.	询问这一问题并在政治上进行讨论的重要性已经变得前所未有的紧迫。


The last three decades have witnessed a quiet revolution, as markets and market-oriented thinking have reached into spheres of life previously governed by non-market values: family life and personal relations; health and education; environmental protection and criminal justice; national security and civic life.	过去30年我们见证了一场平静的革命，市场和以市场为导向的思维已经延伸到了那些原本被非市场价值观所主宰的生活领域：家庭生活和私人关系，健康和教育； 环境保护和刑事司法；


Almost without realizing it, we have drifted from having market economies to becoming market societies.	几乎在无意识的情况下，我们从拥有市场经济漂流到了逐渐成为市场社会。


The difference is this: A market economy is a tool – a valuable and effective tool – for organizing productive activity.	不同之处在于：市场经济组织生产活动的一种——有价值且富有成效的——工具。


A market society, by contrast, is a place where almost everything is up for sale.	而相比之下市场社会则是一个几乎所有东西都可以用来出售的地方。


It is a way of life in which market values seep into social relations and govern every domain.	这是一种市场价值观渗入社会关系并主宰每一个领域的生活方式。


We should be worried about this trend for two reasons.	我们应当为此而感到忧虑，原因有二：首先，随着金钱在我们的社会中所占据的形象越来越高大。


First, as money looms larger in our societies, affluence – and its absence – matters more.	富有——或者不富有——就变得越发重要。


If the main advantages of affluence were the ability to afford yachts and fancy vacations, inequality would matter less than it does today.	如果富有的主要好处只不过在于能否支付得起游艇或者奢华假期，那么不平等在今时今日的重要性就不会那么大。


But, as money comes to govern access to education, health care, political influence, and safe neighborhoods, life becomes harder for those of modest means.	但随着金钱开始主宰获取教育、医疗，政治影响力和社区安全的渠道，中下收入者的生活就变得越发艰难。


The marketization of everything sharpens the sting of inequality.	所有事物的全盘市场化因此导致不平等状况对人的刺痛感不断增加。


A second reason to resist putting a price tag on all human activities is that doing so can be corrupting.	第二个反对把所有人类活动都贴上价格标签的理由就是这样做可以是道德败坏的。


Prostitution is a classic example.	其中卖淫堪称一个经典例子。


Some object to it on the grounds that it typically exploits the poor, for whom the choice to sell their bodies may not be truly voluntary.	有些人反对卖淫，理由是这是典型的剥削穷人行为，因为那些选择去出卖自己肉体的人可能不是真正自愿的。


But others object on the grounds that reducing sex to a commodity is inherently degrading and objectifying.	而另一些人反对的理由则是将性降格成一种商品是本来就是有辱人格且将人物质化的。


The idea that market relations can corrupt higher goods is not restricted to matters of sex and the body.	这种市场关系可以腐蚀更高层次事物的理念可不仅仅局限在性和人的身体方面。


It also applies to civic goods and practices.	它同样也适用于公共产品和实践。


Consider voting. We don’t allow a free market in votes, even though such a market would arguably be “efficient,” in the economist’s sense of the term.	以投票为例，即便在经济学意义上把投票交给自由市场据说是“更为高效”，但我们也不会允许这样做。


Many people don’t use their votes, so why let them go to waste?	既然许多人不会使用自己的投票权，那么为什么要让这些选票白白浪费了呢？


Why not let those who don’t much care about an election’s outcome sell their vote to someone who does?	为什么不能让那些不在意选举结果的人把选票出售给其他在意的人？


Both parties to the transaction would be better off.	须知在这场交易中双方都会得益啊。


The best argument against a market in votes is that the vote is not a piece of private property; rather, it is a public responsibility.	但反对投票市场化的最有利论证则认为选票并不是一个私人财产，而是一项社会责任。


To treat a vote as an instrument of profit would be to degrade it, to corrupt its meaning as an expression of civic duty.	将选票当成赚钱工具就等于贬低和腐蚀了其作为一种公民责任表现方式的意义。


But, if a market in votes is objectionable because it corrupts democracy, what about systems of campaign finance (including the one currently in place in the United States) that give wealthy donors a disproportionate voice in elections?	然而如果因为腐蚀民主制度就可以反对一个选票市场，那么又该如何看待那些在选举中给予富有捐助者一个不相称的影响力的竞选筹款体制（包括美国当前这个）。


The reason to reject a market in votes – preserving the integrity of democracy – may be a reason to limit financial contributions to political candidates as well.	反对选票市场的理由——维护民主制度的完整性——或许也是一个限制对政治候选人实施经济资助的理由。


Of course, we often disagree about what counts as “corrupting” or “degrading.”	当然，我们经常会在什么才算是“腐蚀”或“侮辱”上有不同意见。


To decide whether prostitution is degrading, we have to decide how human sexuality is properly valued.	为了认定卖淫是否是种侮辱，我们得定义如何合理地评估人类性活动的价值。


To decide whether selling prison-cell upgrades corrupts the meaning of criminal justice, we have to decide what purpose criminal punishment should serve.	为了认定升级监狱仓室是否侮辱了刑事司法制度，我们必须定义刑罚本身应当服务于什么样的目的。


To decide whether we should allow the buying and selling of human organs for transplantation, or hire mercenaries to fight our wars, we have to think through hard questions about human dignity and civic responsibility.	为了认定是否应该放开人类器官移植或者使用雇佣兵参战，我们需要深刻思考与人类尊严和公民责任有关的问题。


These are controversial questions, and we often try to avoid addressing them in public discourse.	这些都是些富有争议性的问题，而我们也常常试图避免在公共论述中提到它们。


But that is a mistake.	但这是不对的。


Our reluctance to engage morally contested questions in politics has left us ill-equipped to deliberate about one of the most important issues of our time: Where do markets serve the public good, and where do they not belong?	羞于在政治中提及存在道德冲突的问题使我们无力深刻思考我们时代中最重要的议题：市场究竟在哪些领域能促进公共福祉，而哪里又是市场不应涉足的地方？


What Next after Failed Sanctions on Iran?	制裁伊朗无效又当如何？


LOS ANGELES amp#45;amp#45; The approval of fresh sanctions on Iran marks the third time that the United Nations Security Council has been galvanized to stem the Islamic Republic’s feared uranium enrichment efforts.	联合国安理会行动起来制止伊朗令人担忧的铀浓缩行动以来已经第三次批准对伊朗实行新的制裁。


Unfortunately, the new sanctions are unlikely to be any more effective than the first two rounds.	不幸的是，新的制裁不大可能比前两次更有效果。


Consider the two earlier Security Council resolutions.	让我们来看一看前两次的安理会决议。


The December 2006 resolution curbed international assistance to Iran in mastering the nuclear fuel cycle.	2006年12月的决议限制国际社会帮助伊朗掌握核燃料循环技术。


The March 2007 resolution called for “vigilance and restraint” in the sale of heavy weapons to Iran and avoidance of new grants, financial assistance, or concessional loans.	2007年3月的决议则呼吁在向伊朗出售重型武器的时候要“审慎和克制”，并且避免新的赠款、财政援助或者减让性贷款。


Neither moved the country’s ruling mullahs.	而统治伊朗的毛拉们对它们则无动于衷。


Few expect a different outcome from the new sanctions, which authorize international interception of Iranian contraband and tightened monitoring of the regime’s financial institutions, along with travel limitations and asset freezes applied to people and companies involved in Iran’s nuclear program.	新的制裁授权国际社会拦截伊朗的违禁品，加紧监控该政权的金融机构并且对参与伊朗核子项目的人员和公司实施旅行限制和冻结资产，但是很少有人预计它们能够产生什么不同的结果。


The failure of targeted UN sanctions should come as no surprise.	联合国有针对性的制裁未能奏效并不出人意外。


The US has been on the sanctions treadmill for years.	美国多年来一直推动制裁。


Between 2003 and 2007 the US Treasury Department brought litigation against 94 companies for violating the ban against trade and investment in Iran.  The State Department imposed sanctions 111 times against foreign entities that engaged in proliferation or terrorism-related activities with Iran.	2003年至2007年间，美国财政部对49家违犯禁令与伊朗贸易并在该国投资的公司提起诉讼。 美国国务院对参与伊朗扩散或者与恐怖主义有关活动的外国实体实行了111次的制裁。


And both departments have used their power to freeze financial assets or access to the US financial system.	这两个部门都使用了其权力来冻结金融资产或者禁止使用美国的金融系统。


The results amounted to little more than a pin prick.	而制裁却无济于事。


Iran’s nuclear programs continued to be financed by international commerce.	伊朗的核子项目继续得到国际贸易的资金。


In 1994, Iran exported $37 billion in goods; by 2007, the figure had nearly doubled, to $70 billion.	1994年，伊朗出口了370亿美元的商品； 到2007年，这一数字几乎翻倍，达到700亿美元。


In roughly the same period, Iran’s imports also soared, from $22 billion in 1994 to $45 billion in 2006.	几乎在同一时期，伊朗的进口也大幅度增加，从1994年的220亿美元增加到2006年的450亿美元。


Evaluating two decades of US sanctions to curb Iran’s nuclear appetite, the US Congress’s Government Accountability Office recently concluded that the results are “unclear,” adding with candid obliqueness that “some evidence, such as foreign firms signing contracts to invest in Iran’s energy and Iran’s continued proliferation efforts, raise questions about the extent of the sanctions’ impact.”	美国国会政府职责办公室回顾了二十年来美国为限制伊朗的核子胃口而对其实施的制裁，最近得出结论说其效果“不明朗”，并且用客气的语调说：“外国公司签署合同投资于伊朗的能源、伊朗继续扩散等证据对于制裁效果的大小提出了疑问。 ”


Not only have sanctions failed to halt Iran’s fuel cycle programs, but so have other avenues.	制裁不仅没有阻止伊朗的燃料循环项目，而且其他手段也无济于事。


The European Union’s multiple offers of political and economic inducements went nowhere, as did cajoling by the International Atomic Energy Agency.	欧盟提供多种政治和经济引诱毫无成效，而国际原子能机构的诱胁也是如此。


To be sure Iran offered, in 2005 and subsequently, to tether its program to international co-management, which arguably could have placed resident international monitors on site.	的确，伊朗曾经在2005年以及后来曾经提出将其核子项目处于国际共同管理之下，这样做无疑会将国际监督员派驻现场。


But both the international community and Iran failed to follow through, and now that opportunity has increasingly become moot as Iranian engineers gain confidence in their handiwork.	但是国际社会和伊朗都没有跟进，而且随着伊朗的工程师对其工作增加了信心，这一机会日益无用。


Some hope that the next US administration can stem Iran’s nuclear ambitions through bilateral diplomacy.	有些人希望，美国下届政府可以通过双边外交来阻止伊朗的核子野心。


But Europe’s negotiating experience raises doubts about that prospect, as Iran remains unequivocal about never abandoning its nuclear fuel cycle program.	但是欧洲的谈判经历对这一前景提出了疑问，而伊朗也对绝不放弃核燃料循环项目毫不含糊。


Assuming that concern over Iran’s nuclear “breakout” capacity mounts, this leaves the US and its allies with three options, each with its own risks.	假设对伊朗的核子突破能力的担忧不断增加，美国及其盟国就有三个选择，而每个选择都有各自的风险。


First, a naval blockade (reminiscent of the Cuban missile crisis) that halted both Iran’s oil exports and imports of refined fuel would cripple the country’s economy.	首先，海上封锁(这让人回想其古巴导弹危机)中断伊朗的石油出口以及提炼燃料的进口将会让该国的经济限于瘫痪。


But the US military would have to be able to prevent Iran from closing the Strait of Hormuz, through which much of the world’s oil supply passes.	但是美国军队不得不将要防止伊朗关闭霍尔穆兹海峡，世界石油供应的很大部分都通过这一海峡。


A halt in Iran’s oil exports alone would dramatically upset international oil markets, and the Iranian leadership would likely  dig in its heels to continue, if not accelerate, nuclear development.	仅仅是中止伊朗的石油出口就会大大打乱国际石油市场，而伊朗领导人将会坚持立场，如果不是加速、也会继续其核子发展计划。


Second, while a military strike would slow Iran’s nuclear program, facilities could be rebuilt in the absence of inspectors to find and destroy remnants, regime change, and/or military occupation.	第二，尽管军事打击可以减缓伊朗的核子项目，在没有监察员在场或者军事占领以寻找和销毁残余以及政权改变的情况下，各种设施可以重建。


Moreover, the attack shock could trigger Iranian vengeance regionally and elsewhere, with a global economic impact far exceeding that implied by a blockade.	而且，军事打击的冲击将会引发伊朗在该地区和其他地方实施报复，其对全球经济的影响要远远超过封锁。


This leaves an unsettling fallback option.	这样就只有令人不安的撤回选择了。


An Iran on the cusp of becoming a nuclear-armed state confronting a nuclear-armed Israel bringing its bomb out of the basement.	伊朗即将成为核武国家与具有核武器的以色列对峙。


In that event, there remains the hope that mutual nuclear deterrence will promote mutual common sense.	在这一情形下，人们还是希望相互间的核子威摄将会促进相互间的人类常识。


Absent a dramatic improvement in the Middle East’s grim political landscape, the failure of deterrence would bring the sum of all the fears of our nuclear age upon us.	在中东地区严峻的政治形势没有得到大幅度改善的情况下，威摄无力将会让核子时代的所有恐惧降临到我们头上。


What Next After the Gaza Withdrawal?	加沙撤离之后又会是什么？


The withdrawal of Israeli troops and the evacuation of Jewish settlers from Gaza, after 38 years of occupation, is the most recent proof of the limits of military power, even when that power is overwhelming.	在加沙长达38年的占领后，以色列军队的撤退和犹太定居点的撤离是军力限度的最新证明，即便军力再强大也不能例外。


Now is the time to take stock of the lessons learned from the years of occupation and resistance in order to understand what Israelis and Palestinians should do next.	现在应该汲取从多年占领和反抗运动中得来的教训，进而了解以色列和巴勒斯坦人应该怎么做。


To begin with, it is imperative to understand how much credit Palestinians can credibly claim for the Israeli withdrawal.	首先必须弄清巴勒斯坦人在以色列撤军中的贡献到底有多大。


True, Palestinian resistance and sacrifices were a contributing factor in Ariel Sharon’s decision to reverse a policy he had espoused for decades. But it would be a mistake to attribute the Israeli withdrawal exclusively to Palestinian militancy.	没错，巴勒斯坦人的抵抗和牺牲对阿里埃勒·沙龙在摒弃和平政策几十年后的重新回归作出了贡献，但将以色列撤军完全归功于巴勒斯坦的抵抗肯定是错误的。


After all, this bittersweet Israeli action was neither a clear result of military defeat nor a consequence of political negotiations.	毕竟，以色列实施这项苦乐参半的行动并非军事失败和政治谈判的明确结果。


But unilateralism is not a rational long-term and effective policy, for it will not lead to a genuine and lasting peace in the Middle East.	但单方政策绝非合理有效的长期政策，因为它带不来中东地区真正的持久和平。


Just as President Bush has discovered in Iraq, Sharon will also be forced to acknowledge the limits of his strategy.	正如布什总统在伊拉克学到的，沙龙也不得不承认自己政策的局限性。


Unilateralism seems very expedient to shortsighted politicians, for it obviates the need for what they perceive as the mess of actual negotiations – that is, meeting their counterparts face to face and discovering the human results of their policies.	单边政策似乎是目光短浅的政客们最喜欢的权宜之计，因为这样就能避开一团乱麻似的艰苦谈判¾具体地讲，就是与对手面对面地进行交锋，从而弄清不同政策可能产生的人文后果。


Going it alone also seems politically advantageous domestically, because leaders can decide how much and how far they want to carry out a particular policy.	自作主张也能在国内政治中拣到便宜，因为某项政策如何执行和执行到何种程度都由领导人自己决定。


To be fair, unilateralism is convenient not only for a reluctant Israeli prime minister who does not wish to make substantial compromises during negotiations; it is also attractive to hard-line Palestinians who regard multilateralism as a means of pressing them to make unpopular concessions.	公平地讲，单边主义不仅对不愿在谈判中做出实质性让步的以色列总理有利，还能够吸引持强硬态度的巴勒斯坦人，在他们眼中，多边主义不过是一种手段，迫使他们做出不受欢迎的让步。


In any case, the day after the completion of the Gaza withdrawal, Israelis and Palestinians will be confronted with important unresolved questions.	无论如何，加沙撤军完成后，以色列人和巴勒斯坦人还将面对重要的遗留问题。


There is no doubt that the evacuation of Jewish settlers in areas that Israelis consider part of their God-given territory represents a huge ideological reversal.	勿庸置疑，犹太定居者撤出以色列人心目中的神赐之地的确代表了观念上的逆转。


But after years of preaching and practicing one of Zionism’s main tenets, will the removal of settlements continue in the West Bank, or will this be a one-time exception?	但是在多年宣扬和实行犹太复国主义的主要原则后，撤除定居点的行动是将继续下去，还是将成为千古绝唱？


Palestinians, for their part, will be expected to answer questions – in deeds, not just in words – about their ability to build a modern pluralistic state.	巴勒斯坦人需要回答的问题是：他们是否有能力建立现代的多元化国家，实际上，这个问题仅仅用语言回答是远远不够的。


How will the Palestinian body politic deal with the growing power of the Islamic movements that undoubtedly will expect a significant share of power in post-withdrawal Gaza?	巴勒斯坦国将如何应对实力日益增强的伊斯兰运动，面对他们在撤军后的加沙不可忽视的权力要求？


The international community also will have to answer some key questions.	国际社会也需要回答一些重要的问题。


According to the Palestinian Economic Council for Reconstruction and Development (PECDAR), annual per capita income in Gaza continues to average roughly $700, while Israelis enjoy incomes averaging a $16,000 per capita.	据巴勒斯坦发展和重建经济理事会（PECDAR）统计，加沙地带的年人均收入继续维持在大约700美元，而以色列的人均收入却达到了16，000美元。


In the absence of relatively well-paying jobs, what will happen to the lines of unemployed Gazans?	由于缺乏相对高薪的职业机会，失业的加沙人未来又将如何？


The potential flight of employment seekers – a formidable force worldwide – is only one problem.	加沙人为了求职可能会背井离乡，这虽然是一个世界性的难题，但却仅仅是问题的一个方面。


More immediately, if Gazan families are not well fed, the recurrence of cross-border violence, if not the eruption of a third intifada, will only be a matter of time.	更直接的后果是如果加沙家庭的生活继续窘迫下去，那么爆发跨边界暴力，甚至是第三次就地起义都只是一个时间问题。


While the economic situation in Gaza is a critical issue, the future of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will be determined mainly by the next steps in the peace process.	加沙的经济形势正处在危急关头，而巴以冲突的未来将主要取决于和平进程中的后续步骤。


Permanent-status issues concerning borders, the West Bank, Jerusalem, and refugees must be dealt with bilaterally.	与边界、西岸、耶路撒冷和难民相关的永久性地位问题必须通过双边努力才能得以解决。


Any serious observer of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will no doubt acknowledge that there can be no unilateral solution to these issues.	巴以冲突的任何认真的观察者都无疑会承认：上述问题不可能找到单边的解决方案。


As for the peace process’s multilateral guarantors, the United States and its quartet partners – the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia – have failed to provide even the most basic facts regarding Israel’s withdrawal or how it relates to the “road map” agreed in 2003.	至于和平进程的多边担保人，美国及其四重奏表演的搭档，欧盟、联合国和俄国，甚至未能就有关以色列撤军的最基本事实或与2003年路线图计划的关系达成一致。


They cannot continue to sit on the sidelines. Washington’s quixotic decision to call Israel’s unilateral move part of the road map has failed to convince many Palestinians.	他们再也不能冷眼旁观了。 华盛顿将以色列单边行动纳入路线图计划的幻想对多数巴勒斯坦人来讲根本没有说服力。


The prevailing opinion among Palestinians is that the road map will be put into deep freeze once the Israelis complete their Gaza withdrawal.	巴勒斯坦人中普遍流行的观点是：一旦以色列完成从加沙的撤军，路线图计划就会进入深度休眠的状态。


But the Palestinian and Israeli peoples, their leaders, and the international community must all respond to the challenges that will follow.	但巴勒斯坦���、以色列人、两国领袖和国际社会都必须对接踵而来的挑战做出反应。


Most importantly, the future of the conflict and the chances for genuine peace in the region will depend on understanding the limits of offensive military power, defensive resistance, and unilateralism.	最为重要的是，巴以冲突的未来和真正实现地区和平的机遇将会取决于人们是否了解进攻性军事力量、防御性自卫和单边主义各自的局限。


Serious face-to-face talks, in accordance to international law and with the help of the international community, are the only way forward.	取决于人们能否在国际社会的帮助下，按照国际法的规定进行认真的面对面谈判。 这才是解决问题的唯一出路。


What Next After the Likud Referendum?	利库德公决之后的巴以局势


Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's proposal for a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and part of the West Bank has been overwhelmingly defeated by a referendum within his own party, Likud, in what seems to be a humiliating defeat.	阿里尔•沙龙总理企图让以色列从约旦河西岸和加沙地带单方面撤离的提议被其所在政党"利库德集团"的公决所否定。


Yet this is likely to have little or no effect on Sharon's intention to carry through with the plan.	这次失败看似个奇耻大辱，但它似乎完全没有影响沙龙实施这项计划的意图。


At first, this seems surprising, since he said before the referendum that he would abide by its outcome.	乍一看这有点让人惊讶。 因为他在全党公决以前曾表示会遵守表决的结果。


But Sharon is 75 years old and probably within two years of retirement.	但沙龙已是75岁高龄，并且有可能在两年内退休。


He is determined that his plan becomes his political legacy.	他是决心要让这项计划成为其政治遗策。


Since there is no precedent for a party referendum, he can argue that the vote does not bind him.	由于从未有过党内公决的先例，他可以争辩说自己不受表决结果束缚。


Moreover, Sharon made sure that his main political rivals - notably former Prime Minister Benjamin (Bibi) Netanyahu - supported his plan.	此外，沙龙还确保了其主要的政治对手-特别是前总理本杰明•内塔尼亚胡-支持他的计划。


They are now in no position to challenge him as the champions of the opposition within Likud.	如此一来，他们现在就不能以利库德集团内部反对派的拥护者的身份对他发起挑战了。


So while some members may walk out, Sharon can easily hold on to control of the party.	因此，虽然有些党员可能弃他而去，沙龙也能轻易地控制党内的局面。


In addition, many Sharon supporters, torn by what they saw as the plan's combination of costs and benefits, stayed home or even voted against it, but still want Sharon as their leader.	另外，许多沙龙的支持者在这项计划所包含的成本和利益之间进退两难。 他们有的弃权，有的甚至投票反对，但仍然都希望沙龙担任他们的领导。


But Sharon is prepared to go even further in taking political risks to push through the withdrawal.	但沙龙已经准备好承担政治风险，进一步推进他的撤离计划。


Small right-wing parties in his coalition have already announced that his determination to do so will make them walk out of the government.	沙龙联合政府中的一些右翼小党派已经宣称如果沙龙决心实施这项计划就会使他们退出政府。


Sharon will then turn to the leader of the opposition, 80-year-old former prime minister Shimon Peres, to form a national unity government.	在那样的形势下，沙龙会转而寻求反对派领导人，80岁高龄的前首相西蒙•佩雷斯的支持，组建国家团结政府。


And Peres is ready to do so.	佩雷斯已做好了准备。


The passionate debate stirred up by Sharon's plan shows how truly revolutionary his proposal is.	沙龙的计划所引起的激烈辩论反映了他的建议多么具有革命性。


Having the army uproot Jewish settlements - with inevitable scenes of settlers resisting and being dragged off - will be a traumatic event for the country.	让军队拆除犹太人定居点-不可避免的引发定居者抗拒然后被拖走的场面-这会给这个国家造成创伤。


The plan also entails considerable strategic risks, which, probably more than the prospect of uprooted settlements, account for the large "no" by Likud members.	这项计划还会带来比拆除定居点更为巨大的战略风险，即引发利库德集团内部多数人的反对之声。


A key concern is the precedent of withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000.	2000年从黎巴嫩南部撤离的前车之鉴让人不由得对沙龙的撤离计划担忧。


Today, most Israelis believe that this step, though justified on strategic grounds in the face of constant attacks by the Lebanese group Hizbollah, convinced Palestinians that violence worked.	今天，大多数的以色列人认为上一次撤离虽然是在不断遭受黎巴嫩Hizbollah组织攻击之下的正确战略决策，但也让巴勒斯坦人相信暴力是有用的。


In the same manner, a withdrawal from Gaza, many people worry, will bring increased anarchy there and a rise in overall terrorist attacks.	同样，许多人担心从加沙地带撤离会加剧该地区的无政府状态和全面的恐怖袭击。


But convinced - as are most Israelis - that there is no Palestinian partner ready to negotiate seriously and implement its promises, the prime minister wants to prepare for an extended interim period.	但正如大多数的以色列人一样，沙龙首相也确信巴勒斯坦人并不准备进行认真的谈判并履行他们的承诺。 所以他要为一段延长的过渡期做准备。


Assuming that terrorist attacks against Israel are going to continue under any circumstances, he seeks to improve the country's strategic position to handle this war.	假定恐怖分子对以色列的袭击在任何情况下都会继续，他正寻求改善以色列控制这场战争的战略地位。


Combined with the long-completed security fence around the Gaza Strip and one being built near Israel's border with the West Bank, pulling out of the most exposed positions is intended to reduce casualties and the number of clashes with the Palestinians.	结合包围加沙地带的早已完工的安全屏障和正在以色列和约旦河西岸边界修建的屏障，以色列从最无掩护的地方撤退是为了减少伤亡和与巴勒斯坦人的冲突。


A secondary intention is to show the world that Israel is ready to withdraw from most of the remaining territories it captured in 1967 in exchange for real peace.	第二层意图则是向世界显示以色列准备从其在1967年占领的大多数领土撤退以换取真正的和平。


The United States and Britain have supported the withdrawal plan, while most other European countries have been critical.	美英两国对撤退计划表示支持，而大多数欧洲国家则持批评态度。


While demanding an Israeli withdrawal for years, the Palestinian leadership opposes Sharon's plan, arguing it is intended to create permanent borders.	虽然巴勒斯坦领导层长久以来一直要求以色列撤离，但他们此次却反对沙龙的计划，认为这是想要制造永久的边界。


Nevertheless, if implemented, Sharon's proposal would leave them in control of about 99 percent of the Gaza Strip and roughly 50 percent of the West Bank.	可无论如何，如果该计划得以实施，巴勒斯坦人将会控制约99%的加沙地带和约旦河西岸近50%的土地。


If it appears that the withdrawal will proceed and Sharon can assemble a government to implement it, the Palestinian side will then face a major challenge.	如果撤离会得以实施且沙龙有能力组建一个政府来实施该计划，那么巴勒斯坦方面就会面临一个巨大的挑战。


Will it be able to put together an effective governmental authority to rule the Gaza Strip, or will that area dissolve into bloody battles among Palestinian factions and a staging area for attacks into Israel that will bring reprisal raids?	他们有能力组建一个政府性的机构去管理加沙地带吗？ 抑或该地区会陷入巴勒斯坦血腥的派系斗争之中并成为发动会招致以色列报复性打击的恐怖袭击的基地呢？


A key issue in this mix is the division of power between the nationalist Fatah group and the Islamist Hamas organization.	这个问题的关键是民族主义的"法塔赫"组织和伊斯兰主义的"哈马斯"之间的权力分化。


Local Fatah officials want support from their leader, Yassir Arafat, to take firm control of the territory.	当地的"法塔赫"官员希望得到其领导人阿拉法特的支持以牢固地控制该领土。


But Arafat has shown a willingness to let groups act as they please, apparently believing that continuing unrest will bring international sympathy and intervention on his behalf.	但阿拉法特的表现却像是希望该组织内的不同利益集团自行其是，明显是希望继续的不安定局面会引来国际社会的同情和干预。


Yet Arafat himself will be 75 in a few months and is clearly reaching the end of his career.	而阿拉法特自己在几个月后就75岁，已经到了其政治生涯的尽头。


He has been the only leader his movement has ever known, having led Fatah for 40 years and the Palestinians as a whole for 35 years.	在领导了"法塔赫"40年及全体巴勒斯坦人35年之后，他是其所发起的运动中唯一一位被公众熟悉的领导者。


With no apparent successor, his departure from the scene will bring a massive and unpredictable shake-up in Palestinian politics.	在没有指明继任者的情况下，他的离开会给巴勒斯坦政局带来巨大的，不可预知的动荡。


The Israeli government's projection has been that both the withdrawal and the security fence will be completed by the end of 2005.	按照以色列政府的构想，撤离计划和安全屏障都会在2005年底完成。


Sharon's retirement is likely to come within another twelve months, with a new opposition leader having to be chosen as well.	沙龙极有可能在未来的12个月内退休，而同期的巴勒斯坦也存在领导人更替的问题。


Thus, while the Likud referendum seems to have left the Israeli-Palestinian dispute at yet another impasse, both sides are on the verge of enormous changes.	因此，虽然利库德的全党公决似乎使以巴争端陷入了另一个僵局，但双方的政局都处在巨变的边缘。


What Next for Europe?	欧洲何去何从？


In many ways, 2005 has been Europe’s annus horibilis.	在很多方面，2005年对于欧洲而言都是不堪回首。


It began well, when Spanish voters approved the draft European Union constitution, but it turned sour when French and Dutch voters spurned it soon after.	年初西班牙选民批准欧盟宪法时开局顺利。 但是，当法国和荷兰选民不久拒绝该宪法时，形势就急转而下。


Those votes partly reflected displeasure with domestic policies, and partly disappointment with the way governments conduct European affairs.	那些选民拒绝宪法，部分是由于不满国内政策，部分则是对政府处理欧洲事务的方式感到失望。


Governments promptly obliged with more of the same.	欧洲各国政府随即变本加厉。


Within days of the votes, they failed to agree on the EU budget for 2007-13.	投票几天后，它们未能就2007年到2013年的欧盟预算达成一致。


French and British leaders engaged in a heated quarrel that derailed the subsequent summit, before Britain assumed the rotating six-month EU presidency in July.	英国在七月就任欧盟轮值主席国前，法英两国领导人争吵不休，使得欧盟峰会不欢而散。


Normally, countries use their EU presidencies to display their ability to solve problems and move the Union forward.	通常，各国会利用轮值主席国的时机来展示其有能力解决问题并推动欧盟前进。


But, as of early December, Britain has remained dormant.	但是，直至12月初，英国却保持低沉。


Besides burying the draft constitution, it has largely sidestepped the budget issue.	除了终止欧盟宪法外，它还大体上绕过了预算问题。


Chances that it gets the budget approved this year are slim, and, unless the dispute is resolved soon, the Union will not have an operational budget by 2007.	今年内批准这一预算的机会渺茫，而且，除非马上解决争端，否则，到2007年欧盟将没有一个运营预算。


Even if a budget is adopted, there is no lack of depressing business for the Austrian presidency, which starts on January 1.	即使批准预算，当奥地利在1月1日就任轮值主席国之时，棘手的问题也会堆积如山。


The deepest problem is Europe’s inability to grow at more than a snail’s pace and to provide jobs to its citizens.	最为严重的问题是，欧洲经济增长迟缓，无法提供就业机会。


This is mostly due to the Big Three – France, Germany, and Italy – which produce 70% of Europe’s GDP.	这主要是由于欧盟三大国的问题，即法国、德国和意大利。 三国的国民生产总值占欧洲的70％。


The collective response, adopted in 2000, has been the “Lisbon Strategy,” which aims at making the EU “the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world” by 2010.	2000年采取的联合举动是所谓的“里斯本战略”，其目标是将欧盟在2010年前变成“世界上最富活力和竞争力的知识经济体”。


More realistically, it is designed to provide governments with the incentive to undertake the reforms that stimulate economic growth and productivity.	出于更为现实的原因，这一战略激励各国政府实施改革，解决抑制经济增长和生产效率的问题。


That means facing down the myriad interest groups – from industry lobbies to trade unions and entrenched bureaucracies – that have (so far) successfully protected their turfs.	这就意味着抵制难以计数的从产业游说团体到工会乃至地位稳固的官僚组织等利益集团。 目前为止，它们成功地保护了它们的既得利益。


The strategy rests on peer pressure, naming and shaming governments that fail to make progress.	里斯本战略依赖于同等地位者的压力，点名未能取得进展的政府并使其蒙羞。


In practice, however, peer pressure has become peer collusion.	然而在实际上，这一压力成为串通。


When EU leaders met last spring to assess progress, they pitifully recognized that the Lisbon Strategy’s goal was unlikely to be met.	今年春季欧盟领导人开会评估进展之时，他们可怜地承认里斯本战略的目标难以实现。


The best that they could do now would be to dump the pretense of a strategy and carry on with the other business.	他们所能做的是放弃战略的托辞而着手其他事务。


Unfortunately, the host of the 2000 summit was José Manuel Barroso, then Prime Minister of Portugal and current President of the European Commission, who has staked his presidency on the Lisbon Strategy.	不幸的是，2000年欧盟峰会的东道主是当时的葡萄牙首相和现任欧盟委员会主席巴罗佐。 他将欧盟委员会主席的成败系于里斯本战略。


Expect him to push on hopelessly.	可以想见他知其不可为而为之。


One of the few good ideas contained in the Lisbon Strategy was to remove barriers to trade in services.	里斯本战略包含的少数明智之策是消除服务贸易壁垒。


Intra-European competition in services is restricted by innumerable national regulations that, for instance, strictly determine the requirements for becoming a hairdresser or a plumber.	欧盟各国内部难以计数的规章限制了各国间服务业竞争。 例如，有的规定成为理发师或水管工的条件要求。


One of the defining features of the past decades is the sharp increase in services productivity in the US; none of that happened in Europe.	过去十年最显著的特征是美国的服务业生产效率大幅提高，而欧洲则悄无声息。


Guess why.	猜一猜原因。


Because services account for 70% of European GDP, the potential impact from enhanced competition is substantial.	由于服务业占欧洲GDP的70％，提高竞争后可能造成的影响剧烈。


But removing protection is always politically difficult.	但是，消除保护总归在政治上难以做到。


The European Commission submitted a proposal in 2005 – just as the constitution was being put up for a vote.	欧盟委员会在2005年欧盟宪法全民公决时提出一项建议。


Not surprisingly, the proposal was quickly shelved.	不出所料，这一建议立即被束之高阁。


Now, with countless private interest groups trying to water it down into irrelevance, the battle will be firmly on the EU’s agenda in 2006.	现在，众多的私营利益集团试图削弱这一建议使其无关痛痒。 这一斗争将无疑提上欧盟2006年的议事日程。


At the same time, Europe is again blocking progress in the Doha round of world trade talks, with the farmers’ lobby fighting to preserve its subsidies.	同时，由于欧洲农民抗争要求保留补贴，欧洲再一次阻挡世界贸易组织多哈回合谈判的进展。


Many governments are so fearful of their farmers that they see no other option than to hold their ground, no matter what.	众多国家政府惧怕农民，从而除坚持立场外别无他途。


Europe has agreed to a single trade policy.	欧洲有统一的贸易政策。


When disagreements run as deep as they do on agriculture, there can be no give-and-take of the kind that allows for successful negotiations.	如果分歧正如农业问题一般严重，则毫无妥协退让可言，惶论谈判成功。


There is little reason for optimism.	对前景也就毫不乐观。


And what next for the ECB, which has just nudged up interest rates by 0.25%, after 30 months on hold.	欧洲中央银行在30个月纹丝不动后新近将利率提升0. 25％。


Experts can disagree about whether the move was premature, but no one agrees with the many political leaders who have argued that the tiny hike will derail the timid resumption of economic growth.	其前景如何呢？ 专家对于升息是否过早可能见仁见智，但是并无人同意政治领导人的观点，即利率微升会破坏微弱的经济增长复苏。


The sharpness of political attacks on the ECB might trigger dangerous talk about restricting its independence.	对于欧洲央行尖锐的政治抨击可能引发有关限制其独立性的讨论。


While such a move is out of the question – it would require a change in the European Treaty – the noise is unhealthy.	尽管这一举措需要修改欧盟条约而不可能，但是这一噪音却并不健康。


It distracts the ECB, adds to the impression that Europe is bad, and, more importantly, will be used by ineffective governments as a scapegoat for their failings.	它干扰欧洲央行，增加了欧洲有害的印象，而且，更为重要的是，无能为力的政府可以此为其失策寻找替罪羊。


Expect more ECB-bashing.	将会有更多的对欧洲央行的抨击。


Is Europe stuck?	欧洲是否陷入泥潭？


The current team of leaders has been an enormous disappointment.	目前的欧洲领导人团队令人大失所望。


But as they fade away, there could be some light at the end of the tunnel.	但是随着他们的淡出，隧道尽头可能会出现亮光。


In Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel is obviously more positive on Europe and more pro-reform than her predecessor, but she is tied up in a grand coalition.	在德国，默克尔总���与她的前任相比更为肯定欧洲并更为亲改革，但是她却受大联合政府的束缚。


In France, President Jacques Chirac, the epitome of a leader captured by his lobbies, is staggering impotently toward the end of his term in 2007.	在法国，作为被其游说集团俘虏的缩影，希拉克总统正虚弱无力地踟蹰迈向2007年任期届满。 继任者中的两位佼佼者德维尔潘和萨尔科齐都在政府任职。


The two frontrunners to succeed him, Dominique de Villepin and Nicolas Sarkozy, both in government, compete on a reformist agenda, but pre-election years do not encourage bold moves.	他们在改革议程上互不相让。 然而，大选前几年里并不鼓励大胆的举措。


Meanwhile, Italy must decide whether it replaces Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who displayed no interest in reform and European affairs, with the cautious Romano Prodi, the former European Commission President.	与此同时，意大利必须决定是否用前任欧盟委员会主席普罗狄更换对改革和欧洲事务毫无兴趣的总理贝鲁斯科尼。


Tony Blair, once an ardent pro-European (at least by Britain’s undemanding standards), might finally have to cede power to Gordon Brown, who is famously cold to European integration.	至少根据英国松软的标准，英国首相布莱尔曾经是热烈的亲欧洲派。 他可能最终让位给布朗，而布朗对欧洲联合冷漠众所周知。


Fortunately, Britain has always been an outsider.	幸运的是，英国素来是欧洲联合的局外人。


In the end, whatever light there is, it may not shine until 2007, after the French elections.	最终，在法国2007年总统大选前，无论有何光亮都不会闪烁。


What Next in Afghanistan?	阿富汗，下一步怎么办？


BERLIN – Afghanistan’s future does not look good.	柏林 ——阿富汗前景不妙。


The Taliban are gaining military and political strength, and President Hamid Karzai is losing support at home and internationally due to his administration’s rampant corruption and the obvious fraud committed in his re-election.	塔利班在军事、政治上日益坐大，总统哈米德·卡尔扎伊在国内、国外渐失人心——他的政府太过腐败，而他的再度当选则明显存在舞弊。


Weariness with the war is spreading in the United States, where President Barack Obama finds it difficult to decide about an increase in troops, as demanded by his own generals.	美国国内的厌战情绪不断蔓延，于是乎贝拉克·奥巴马总统增兵阿富汗的命令迟迟难以下达，尽管他的将军已一再敦促。


European NATO members with troops in Afghanistan would prefer to withdraw them today rather than tomorrow.	在阿富汗驻有军队的欧洲北约成员国则一门心思地想要早日抽身而出。


The West seems to have lost its orientation in the Hindu Kush – that “graveyard of empires,” as it was called after the British disaster in January 1842, when only one man survived an expedition 16,000.	西方国家似乎在兴都库什山区迷失了方向——1842年1月，第一次英阿战争期间，一支1万6千人的英国远征军在此遭阿富汗军袭击，仅一人生还，这一带由此得名“帝国的坟墓”。


What, many people are asking, is NATO really fighting for in Afghanistan?	许多人质疑，北约在阿富汗，究竟为什么而战？


Europe remains silent on that question and has only one aim: to get out.	欧洲对此质疑仍避而不答，心里只想着如何脱身。


In the US, the debate about the purposes being served in Afghanistan is at least still taking place.	在美国，至少还有人辩论，继续阿富汗战争意义何在。


Follow it, and you will conclude that, ultimately, the war is all about the American superpower’s military victory over the Taliban, so that it can finally withdraw its troops – for a second time.	细究下去，你将得出结论：说到底，阿富汗战争打到这个份上，作为超级大国的美国，其目的无非是从军事上彻底打败塔利班，好让自己的军队最终能够撤出来——这将是美国第二次从阿富汗撤军。


The source or meaning of the conflict in Afghanistan is impossible to find in the country itself.	发生在阿富汗的战争有什么意义，答案不可能在阿富汗内部找到。


Afghanistan is the battlefield, but the causes of the wars that have devastated it since the mid-1970’s were and are still to be found beyond its borders.	阿富汗只是外部势力的角斗场而已，自20世纪70年代以来，这里爆发的历次战争，根源都在国外。


So an exclusively “Afghan solution” is not possible.	所以，想找到一种局限于阿富汗的“阿富汗解决方案”，只是痴人说梦。


Three dates are central to understanding today’s Afghan quagmire: 1989, 2001, and 2003.	要理解今日的阿富汗泥潭，有三个年份必须牢记：1989、2001和2003。


In 1989, when the Cold War ended, the Red Army had already withdrawn from the country, thereby admitting its defeat.	1989年，冷战告终，苏联从阿富汗撤军，实质上承认在苏阿战争中失败。 美国也随即撤出。


Following the Soviet Union, the US withdrew from the conflict, too, and at that moment, the second Afghan war started – a proxy war between regional neighbors over power in the Hindu Kush, disguised as a civil war.	于是阿富汗内战再度爆发——说是内战，其实是一场代理人战争，是盘踞在兴都库什山区和武装力量和邻近的各部武装之间的一场混战。


Supported by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan sought strategic depth against its arch-enemy India with the help of militant religious students from Afghan refugee camps. These “Taliban” were created and equipped by the Pakistani secret service, the ISI.	为了寻求战略纵深以对抗世仇印度，巴基斯坦在沙特阿拉伯的支持下，以阿富汗难民营好战的宗教学生为班底拉起一支队伍——由巴基斯坦三军情报局（ISI）一手组建和武装起来的“塔利班”。


Iran defended its own interests and those of the Shia minority in the west of the country.	为了本国利益，也为了保护阿富汗西部地区的少数派——什叶派穆斯林，伊朗也介入了阿富汗。


And in the north, the Tajik Northern Alliance and Abdul Rashid Dostum’s Uzbek militia were supported and equipped by Afghanistan’s northern neighbors and Russia.	在阿富汗北部，塔吉克族背景的北部同盟和阿卜杜勒·拉希德·杜斯塔姆领导的乌兹别克族武装背后则是阿富汗的北方邻国和俄罗斯。


In the shadow of this second Afghan war, Osama bin Laden established his terrorist organization in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan: Al Qaeda, which, on September 11, 2001, carried out its terrible terrorist attack on the US.	在阿富汗内战的背景下，奥萨马·本·拉登在塔利班统治下的阿富汗创建了恐怖组织——“基地组织”。 该组织于2001年9月11日对美国发动了骇人听闻的恐怖袭击。


A month later, the current war in Afghanistan started.	一个月之后，目前的这场阿富汗战争开打。


In March 2003, George W. Bush launched his invasion of Iraq, not only squandering America’s military strength, but also connecting all the individual crises between the eastern Mediterranean and the Indus Valley.	2003年3月，时任美国总统的乔治·W·布什入侵伊拉克，这一决策非常愚蠢，不仅耗费了美国大量军力，而且促使地中海以东到印度河流域广大地区原先互不相干的几个冲突点连成了一片。


As a result of America’s foreign-policy folly, Iran became the central geo-political player in the entire region, linking the western and eastern part of this long belt of instability.	美国对外政策上的昏招令伊朗成为整个区域的地缘政治核心力量，成为连结起该区域东西地带不稳定因素的桥梁。


So, those who are grappling with the Afghan riddle today should consider, first and foremost, the regional realities: can the West afford to withdraw?	所以，我奉劝那些正为阿富汗焦头烂额的人们，首先好好思考一下这一地区的现实：西方国家能否承受从阿富汗撤军所要付出的代价？


If so, we should pull out of Afghanistan immediately.	如果能，我们就立即撤出阿富汗。


If not, we should stop discussing an “exit strategy.”	如果不能，我们就别再为讨论什么“推出战略”而白费唇舌了。


The cost of the West’s retreat from this troubled region is predictable, since we must deal with several threats that endanger Western security, and that would not disappear with withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan: terrorism, Islamist radicalism, nuclear threats (Pakistan, Iran), proxy wars and regional conflicts (Israel-Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kashmir), and looming disintegration (Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and in the longer term in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula).	西方国家从这一混乱地区撤军的代价是可以预估的。 西方安全的几大威胁并不会随着从伊拉克和阿富汗撤军而消失：恐怖主义、伊斯兰极端势力、核威胁（巴基斯坦与伊朗）、代理人战争、地区冲突（巴以冲突、伊拉克、阿富汗和克什米尔地区）以及愈演愈烈的脱离国际秩序中���倾向（伊拉克、阿富汗、巴基斯坦，从长远来看还包括波斯湾以及阿拉伯半岛）。


This means that we cannot talk about withdrawing our troops, but only of redrawing the battle line farther West.	这说明，西方国家完全撤军根本是不可能的，最多是向西收缩战线。


It is extremely doubtful that such a step would bring more security.	即便走向西收缩战线这一步棋，是否会使安全形势得到很大改善，也是极其值得怀疑的一件事。


On the other hand, the West’s strategy in Afghanistan up to now has also yielded little progress, only strengthening the Taliban day by day.	但另一方面，西方国家的阿富汗战略到目前为止也没有取得多大进展，反而一天天壮大了塔利班。


So what should we do?	如此进退维谷之际，我们应当怎么做？


First, we need to define a clear political goal: a stable status quo in Afghanistan that will prevent the country from again becoming a battlefield of regional interests and an organizational base for Al Qaeda.	首先，我们得树立一个明确的政治目标：在不打破现状的前提下稳定阿富汗局势，防止这个国家再次沦为地区博弈的战场，或者成为基地组织的庇护所和大本营。


Without a sufficient military presence, as well as improved and reinforced reconstruction efforts, this goal is not attainable.	要实现这一目标，需要充足的军力投入和更有效的重建努力，两者缺一不可。


Second, a renewed regional consensus on Afghanistan’s future would also help avoid further destabilizing nuclear-armed Pakistan.	其次，协调各方，就阿富汗的前途达成共识。 这也有助于遏止巴基斯坦进一步滑向内乱，要知道巴基斯坦可是拥有核武器的国家。


This requires that Pakistan’s and Iran’s interests be included in this consensus, as well as India’s, Saudi Arabia’s and probably also China’s. (The Kashmir conflict must, indirectly, play a role in this settlement, but the difficulties of including it should not be underestimated.)	这样一个共识必须照顾到巴基斯坦、伊朗、印度、沙特阿拉伯甚至中国的利益（克什米尔地区冲突必然会间接影响这一共识的形成，不过要把它纳入议程的难度不容低估）。


Forging this consensus will not be an easy diplomatic task.	促成这一共识并不是一个轻松的外交使命，但它并非不可完成。


But it is feasible and should be the goal of a new conference on Afghanistan.	应召开一次新的阿富汗问题国际会议，把这个目标明确起来。


Third, a parallel effort at crisis containment – and perhaps even at finding solutions – is needed for the wider Middle East, Iraq, the Persian Gulf, and Iran.	第三，与此同时，需要在中东、伊拉克、波斯湾和伊朗也就是更广大的中东地区缓和危机，甚至寻求解决方案。


It’s an equation with very many known unknowns, but if we do not try at least to mitigate these issues, the known unknowns will continue challenging all partial solutions.	我们早已意识到，这一进程充满未知变数，但如果我们连试都不试，这些已经意识到的未知数必将继续挑战一切局部性的解决方案。


But the big question remains whether the US and its European allies still have the strength, perseverance and far-sightedness for such an undertaking.	说一千，道一万，根本的问题在于，美国及其欧洲盟友是否还有足够的实力、坚毅与远见来承担这一使命。


There are good reasons to doubt this.	人们有理由怀疑。


The alternative would be a chaotic and dangerous future in this large hot spot.	但如果我们不这样做，这个大“火药桶”就势必面临一个混乱而危险的前景。


Afghanistan may seem far away, but its chaos and violence are in fact just next door.	阿富汗看似遥远，但那里的混乱和暴力其实就是我们家门口的威胁。


What Now In the Middle East?	中东现在该怎么办？


The political and security situation in the vast region between the Indus Valley and the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean is a cause for grave concern.	从印度河到地中海东海岸之间地域广阔，政治和安全形势却不容乐观。


When the US intervened militarily in Iraq in 1991, the intention was to effect fundamental change in the entire region.	1991年，美军抱着给整个地区带来根本性变化的初衷入侵伊拉克。


Today it is clear that hardly any aspect of this policy has succeeded. Even the success of free elections in Iraq is threatening to divide rather than unite the country.	到今天，形势已经渐趋明朗，美国的政策没有在任何方面取得成功，即便的确在伊拉克成功地实现了自由选举，也没有因此带来伊拉克的团结，相反却使这个国家进一步四分五裂。


The existing power relations in the Middle East have indeed been permanently shaken and, indeed, revolutionized.	美军入侵的确从根本上动摇了中东现有的权力关系，带来了一场轰轰烈烈的权力革命。


The effect however, has not been a domino-like democratization; instead we are threatened with a domino effect of descent into chaos.	但想象中多米诺骨牌式的民主化进程并没有因此实现，恰恰相反，摆在我们面前的却是一连串的混乱局势。


The decision to go to war against Iraq to liberate Kuwait, back in 1991, marked the beginning of America’s role as the sole hegemonic military power in the region.	1991年做出对伊宣战、解放科威特的决定，标志着美国开始成为中东地区唯一的军事霸权。


The decision to go to war against Iraq for a second time, and then to occupy the country in March 2003, transformed this hegemony into direct US responsibility for the future of the Middle East.	第二次对伊宣战、并在2003年3月占领伊拉克，将美国的军事霸权演变成了对中东未来所承担的直接责任。


Two outcomes could flow from America’s adopted role as the decisive power in the Middle East.	美国成为中东霸主可能带来两种结果。


Were the US to succeed in using its military strength, it would create a new, democratic Middle East.	如果美国成功地施展其军事力量，将会缔造出一个崭新、民主的中东；


But were it, despite its military might, to fail, it would create a power vacuum and destabilize the region.	可如果军事霸权遭受失败，带来的必将是地区的动荡和权力的真空。


The second scenario – which was foreseeable from the outset – has now become a reality.	后一种情况从战争一开始就可以预见，现在果然变成了现实。


The very character of the war in Iraq has been transformed from a democratizing mission into a stabilizing mission high in casualties and in cost.	伊拉克战争的性质也从追求民主降格为制止动荡，伴随着大量的人员伤亡和财产损失。


Instead of the intended radical realignment of power relations in the region, the aim is now to simply maintain the status quo.	原本期待的地区权力关系的彻底调整终于没有实现，而当前的目标已经沦落为简单地维持现状。


The most the US can hope at this point is a withdrawal that saves face.	现在，既能安全撤军、又能保留些许颜面已经是美国所能期待的最佳选择。


The recent elections in America were a referendum on the war in Iraq.	不久前进行的美国选举实际上是关于伊拉克战争的全民公决。


Their result in fact set a timetable for the “Iraqisation” and US withdrawal – before the next presidential election.	选举的结果实际确定了“伊拉克自制”和美军撤退的具体计划，而所有这一切都要在下一届总统大选前完成。


Behind the all-too-foreseeable end of the American stabilizing mission lurks a civil war in Iraq, which threatens to turn into an Arab-Iranian proxy war for dominance in Iraq, the Gulf, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, and beyond.	美国稳定行动的结果怎样已经毫无悬念，但在这毫无悬念的结果背后，一场伊拉克内战正在酝酿之中。 这场内战很可能演变为阿拉伯－伊朗为争夺伊拉克、波斯湾、黎巴嫩、巴勒斯坦和其余地区霸权而一手操纵的傀儡战争。


Moreover, there is an acute risk that the power vacuum created in Iraq will fuse the Israeli-Arab conflict, Iraq, and Afghanistan into one regional mega-crisis.	不仅如此，伊拉克的权力真空使得以巴冲突、伊拉克和阿富汗冲突演变成为大规模地区冲突的危险已经迫在眉睫。


In light of America’s impending withdrawal, the regional powers are reassessing their interests and objectives.	在美军即将撤离的背景下，各地区大国正在重新审视自己的利益和目标。


Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Turkey, and Israel will be the main players.	伊朗、叙利亚、沙特阿拉伯、埃及、约旦、巴基斯坦、土耳其和以色列将会扮演主要角色。


With the Iraq war, the US has lost its unilateral-power position in the Middle East, and elsewhere.	对伊战争后，美国失去了它在中东及世界各地独一无二的霸主地位。


In the future, various global powers will be active in the Middle East – primarily the US, Russia, China, India.	从今以后，包括美国、俄国、中国、印度在内的各大强国将活跃在中东的历史舞台。


Let’s hope Europe is amongst them, because its security is defined there.	让我们共同期待欧洲也能在其中扮演重要角色，因为中东的局势也直接关系到欧洲的安全。


So at stake is no longer just Iraq, but rather the future of the entire region.	因此，这不仅关系到伊拉克的命运，而且关系到整个地区的未来。


We can count ourselves lucky if the emerging chaos can be contained in Iraq.	如果伊拉克即将到来的混乱局势能够得到控制，这将是我们共同的幸运。


Washington’s realization that Iraq can no longer be won or even stabilized unless the regional framework changes, has come late – perhaps too late.	当华盛顿最终认识到除非地区构架发生变化，否则伊拉克战争不仅没有战胜者，甚至就连最基本的局势稳定都将成为奢望的时候已经迟了¾或许是太迟了。


The US will have to find agreement with its allies and enter into direct talks with all the other players to try and achieve a new regional consensus.	美国必须与盟国达成一致，同其他国家展开直接对话，以图达成新的地区共识。


If this policy shift had taken place a year ago or even early last summer, the prospects would have been better.	同样的政策变化如果发生在一年前、甚至发生在去年夏天，前景都会比现在乐观。


And with every passing day, America’s position in the region is weakening further and the chances of a successful new political strategy become more remote.	随着时间一天天流逝，美国在中东的地位也一天天衰弱，新对策的成功前景也将因此变得更加渺茫。


The greatest danger stems from Iran, the clear beneficiary of the Iraqi power vacuum.	最大的威胁来自于伊朗，这个国家显然从伊拉克的权力真空中坐收渔翁之利。


Iran harbors hegemonic ambitions which it seeks to realize by means of its military potential, oil and gas reserves, its nuclear program, its influence over Shiites throughout the region, and its efforts to upset the status quo within the Arab Muslim world.	伊朗野心勃勃，要凭借自身的军事实力、油气储备、核能计划、遍布整个地区的什叶派影响和破坏阿拉伯穆斯林世界现有格局的计划来谋求自己在中东地区的霸权。


Yet Iran is also relatively isolated.	但伊朗也因此备受冷落。


Its only allies in the region are Syria and Hezbollah.	它在地区之内的唯一盟友是叙利亚和黎巴嫩真主党。


What’s more, it is threatened by a de-facto anti-Iranian coalition of all other regional powers, united by their fear of Iranian ascendancy.	不仅如此，伊朗还处在其他地区大国构造的反伊联盟的威胁之下，对伊朗强势地位的恐惧把这些国家紧紧联合在一起。


If the West – America and Europe – act swiftly, decisively, and with a joint strategy, there remains a chance to stabilize the situation.	如果以美国和欧洲为代表的西方世界能够迅速、果断地采取联合行动，稳定地区局势也并非毫无希望。


But to achieve this, it will be necessary to offset, or at least balance, the interests of the most important actors in the region.	但要想达到目的，该地区内多数重要角色的利益必须相互抵消、最低限度也要达到暂时的平衡。


This means a strategy based on political leverage not a threat of military intervention or regime change.	这意味着必须以政治力量对比为基础来制定策略，而不是单纯依靠武力侵略或政权颠覆的军事威胁。


In their stead must come, on the one hand, direct talks, security guarantees, and support in political and economic integration.	相反，各国之间必须开展直接对话、提供安全保障、并支持政治和经济领域的相互融合。


To be successful, this strategy also requires a realistic threat of isolation of those who continue to undermine regional stability, as well as substantial progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict.	要想获得成功，这一策略还需要孤立破坏地区稳定的力量，并在阿以冲突中取得实质性的进展。


A new Middle East policy will thus have to concentrate primarily on four aspects: 1) a comprehensive offer to Syria to detach the country from Iran and settle open conflicts; 2) an offer to Iran for direct talks about the perspective of a full normalization of relations; 3) a decisive and realistic initiative to resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict 4) a regional security architecture that centers on stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan.	因此，新的中东政策必须关注以下几个方面：1)向叙利亚提供脱离伊朗、解决现有争端的综合方案； 2)为伊朗制定实现全面关系正常化的方案，提供直接谈判机会；


What Now?	现在怎么办？


More Europe!	加强欧洲一体化！


The rejection of the European Union’s Constitution by French and Dutch voters forces us to think well beyond that treaty.	法国与荷兰对欧盟宪法的反对迫使我们开始好好考虑一些条约之外的问题。


That much is clear from the current debate on the Community budget.	这在目前有关共同体预算的辩论中毫无涉及。


The naysayers’ victories show that sovereignty-based arguments that oppose any kind of European political union are on the march.	反对者的胜利表明以基于主权、反对任何形式的欧洲政治联盟的辩论已经启动。


Euroskeptics, it seems, are gaining ground everywhere, and a kind of xenophobia is on the rise.	欧洲怀疑论者的队伍看来正在各地壮大，并且一种惧外主义也日渐抬头。


But xenophobia and sovereignty were not the primary impulses that propelled the “no” votes.	但是，惧外主义和主权并非推动否决票的主要因素。


Above all, the “no” votes in France and Holland – and rising discontent in other member states, such as Germany – are the result of the inability of national governments and the Union to respond effectively to the problems that most concern citizens.	首先，法国和荷兰的否决票——以及在其他成员国内不断升温的不满情绪——是国家政府以及欧盟对大多数民众关心的问题未能有效反应的结果。


Not only anti-Europeans rejected the constitution; far from it.	反对欧盟宪法的不仅仅是反欧洲主义者，远远不止他们。


Many Europeans are, in fact, calling on the EU to act to reduce unemployment and to intervene decisively in the international arena.	事实上，许多欧洲人都呼吁欧盟采取措施以降低失业率并在国际领域内要果敢介入。


Many interpreted Europe’s internal division over the war in Iraq, with ordinary citizens overwhelmingly opposed to military intervention, as a sign of the Union’s weakness.	许多人将当时普通民众强烈抗议军事介入情形下欧洲内部在伊拉克战争问题上的分歧看作欧盟无能的一个信号。


But the answer to such doubt and dismay is more Europe, not less.	但是要消除这些怀疑和沮丧情绪，办法就是加强欧洲一体化，而非削弱。


The European Council’s summit on June 16-17 should give a clear sign that it recognizes this.	6月16-17日举行的欧洲理事会峰会应该给出一个明确信号，表示理事会已经认识到了这一点。


Most supporters of the Constitution believe that it will not only help build a citizens’ Europe, but also create better conditions for European economic development, and for the EU to act globally.	大多数欧盟宪法的支持者们相信，这部宪法将不仅仅有助于建立一个欧洲公民们的欧洲，也将为欧洲经济发展以及欧盟的全球行动创造更好的条件。


They are right.	他们是正确的。


It would be imprudent to assume that the French and Dutch “no” votes were not about discontent with Union policies; but that anger was directed against the French and Dutch governments, not Europe itself.	假定法国和荷兰的反对票与他们对欧盟政策的不满毫无关系是草率的。 只是他们将愤怒矛头直指法国和荷兰政府而并非欧盟本身而已。


The fact is that citizens in every EU member country are increasingly aware that national policies are determined by decision making at the European level, over which they have little influence.	事实上，每个欧盟成员国的公民越来越意识到，他们的国家政策现在由欧洲级别的决策来决定，而他们对此几乎无法施加任何影响。


The European Constitution has little to do with this, but referenda are never confined to the actual questions put to voters.	欧盟宪法与此无甚关联，但是公民投票从不仅限于那些需要投票决定的实质问题。


Instead, they provide opportunities for citizens to express what they feel about the choices their governments make, particularly within the EU framework.	相反，它们为公民提供了机会来表达他们对政府所作选择的看法，尤其是在欧盟框架内的决定。


The 2004 elections for the European Parliament had already shown that the level of discontent with the Union was high.	2004年欧洲议会选举已经表现出了人们对欧盟的不满程度。


Voters heavily punished almost all national governments.	投票者狠狠惩罚了几乎所有政府。


Yet nobody thought that that election had changed the course of Europe.	然而没有人想到那场选举改变了欧盟的进程。


Above all, the French and Dutch referendums confirmed that politics in the Union is now conducted “on the street,” and that it is no longer possible to “construct” Europe at a distance and by stealth.	首先，法国和荷兰的公投证实了欧盟内的政治现在是“在大街上”进行的，再也不可能保持一定距离暗暗“建造”欧洲了。


This means that EU governments must respond to popular anxieties and make the Union more transparent and democratic.	这意味着欧盟各国政府必须对普遍的民众忧虑做出反应，并使欧盟变得更加透明民主。


This would be a lot easier with the Constitution in place, but there are measures that can and should be adopted now to make that possible.	如果我们手里有一部宪法，这就容易多了，但是我们还需要采取能够采取同时也是必要的措施，以使之成为可能。


First, the community budget should be structured so that it has a significant impact on growth and employment (a return to the voluntarism of the Delors Packages, now applied to the Lisbon Strategy).	首先，应当制定一份对经济增长和就业率具有重大影响的共同体预算方案（重回德罗尔的唯意志论，其现在正适用于里斯本战略）


Second, European governments must show a real commitment to act together.	其次，欧盟各国政府必须做出一致行动的实际承诺。


A key opportunity presents itself with the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration to define a common position to support democratic change in the Mediterranean by ceasing to back the political status quo there.	巴塞罗那宣言十周年纪念为他们提供了一个重要机会来达成对统一立场的共识，即通过停止支持地中海地区的政治现状来支持当地的民主改革。


Finally, Council meetings should be open when legislative matters are at stake, so that citizens can know who voted for what and according to which criteria.	最后，当立法无法奏效的时候，就应该召开欧盟理事会会议，这样公民们就能知道谁该根据哪种标准为什么投票。


All of this can be decided at the next European Council, even before the constitutional problem is resolved.	所有这些将在欧盟理事会下届会议中决定，甚至还赶在宪法问题解决之前。


This kind of action is more likely to win back a skeptical citizenry than any information campaign, however well designed.	这样的行动比起任何精心策划的宣传活动都更有可能赢回持怀疑态度的公民们。


At the same time, it is necessary to solve the Constitutional deadlock.	同时，我们必须化解宪法所陷入的僵局。


As already proposed by the Convention, this would mean separating constitutional matters per se from Union policy.	正如公约所提议，这意味着将宪法问题本身与欧盟政策分离开来。


The real innovations are found in Part I and II of the proposed Constitution, in the definition of the normative and political identity of the Union, its competences, the new institutional balance – including the creation of a European Minister of Foreign Affairs – and, last but not least, the introduction of a Bill of Rights.	我们在被提议的宪法中的第一和第二部分中发现了真正的革新内容，表现在对欧盟政治身份及标准身份、权限，新体制平衡的定义中——包括产生一名欧洲外交部长——最后但却十分重要的一点是，引入了权利法案。


The part that was actually rejected and raises the most concerns among citizens of the member States is in Part III, which focuses on Union policies such as the Common Market, competition policy and the Common Agricultural Policy.	真正遭到拒绝以及在成员国公民中引起最多忧虑的在第三部分中，该部分将重点放于诸如统一市场、竞争政策以及共同农业政策等欧盟政策上。


So the first and second parts could be ratified without new negotiations and could form the basis for the new Treaty, so that the Treaty of Nice would still apply; and the debate on the European social model would continue.	因此，第一和第二部分无须新辩论就可通过并能为形成新条约打下基础，因此尼斯条约将继续适用； 并且有关欧洲社会模式的辩论将持续下去。


It is essential to reaffirm the normative essence of the Constitutional Treaty to protect the greatest achievement of the Constitutional Convention.	最基本的是要再次重申宪法条约的规范本质以保护宪法公约所取得的伟大成就。


Diversity and inclusiveness, through the integration of European democracies with a common project, remains Europe’s great gift to the world.	在一个共同方案下，通过欧洲民主体制一体化进程所达成的多样性和包容性，使欧洲得以保持它对这个世界的伟大贡献。


It is what has made Europe an “international public good” to use former Brazilian foreign minister Celso Lafer’s felicitous turn of phrase.	正是这，使欧洲成为一个使用巴西前外交部长塞尔索·拉弗（Celso Lafer）那及其精巧措辞的“国际公共产品”。


Such a Europe is better placed to contribute to a fairer international order than the narrow, bitter Europe the xenophobes have in mind.	这样一个欧洲最好还是致力于维护更为公平的国际秩序，而不是成为惧外主义者所希望的那个狭隘刻薄的欧洲。


For Europe to remain a promise for the world, it must thrive as a public good for all its citizens.	若要维持它对全世界的承诺，欧洲必须作为一个为其所有公民谋利的公共产品而繁荣发展。


Europe and Europeans cannot wait for a new treaty to show that the Union is able to fulfill that promise.	欧洲和欧洲人都不能干等着一个新条约的出现来表明欧盟有能力履行那个承诺。


What Nuclear Energy Renaissance?	核能的“文艺复兴”从何而来？


ZURICH – Repeatedly in recent years there have been calls for a revival of civilian nuclear power.	发自苏黎世——这几年来不断有人呼吁要重振民用核能的雄风。


Yet that renaissance never seems to come.	但在我看来，这么一场民用核能的“文艺复兴时代”似乎还远未到来。


Indeed, of the more than 200 countries in the world, only 30 use nuclear power.	事实上，全世界200多个国家中采用了核能的只有区区30国。


In July 2010, a total of 439 nuclear power plants with a net installed capacity of 373.038 GW(e) were connected to various national electricity grids, about 1.2 GW(e) more than at the beginning  of 2006.	截止到2010年7月，全球总共有439座核电站投入运作，净装机容量达373. 038吉瓦（GW(e)，电力学单位，1吉瓦=10亿瓦）并实现了联网，较2006初又增加了1.


Roughly 16% of total energy needs (up to 25% in the highly industrialized countries) are now met by electric energy.	全球大概有16%的能源需求（发达国家为25%）是由电来提供的。


Nuclear fission’s contribution to total electric energy has decreased from about 18% more than ten years ago to about 14% in 2008.	而相比于1998年之间的18%，核能所占的份额在2008年已经下降到了14%。


On a worldwide scale, nuclear energy is thus only a small component of the global energy mix, and its share, contrary to widespread belief, is not on the rise.	从全球角度上看，核能如今只能算是能源多样性中的一个小的组成部分，更出乎人们意料的是，其所占的份额也没有上升。


During 2009, for example, nuclear power plants provided 2,560 TWh(e) (2,560 billion kWh) of electric energy, about 1.6% lower than during 2008 and almost 4% lower than during the record year of 2006, when 2,658 TWh(e) were produced.	比如说在2009年，核电站提供了2560太瓦时（TWh(e)，电力学单位，1太瓦时=10亿千瓦时）的电能，比2008年降低了1. 6%，更比2006年的2658太瓦时下降了近4%。


Early results for the first four months of 2010 for the OECD countries, collected by the International Energy Agency indicate that so far the 2010 results are as low or lower than during the last year.	从国际能源机构搜集的经合组织国家2010年1~4月核能发电数据来看，各月数据都与去年同期持平或更低。


During the next five years, on average, roughly 10 new nuclear reactors are expected to become operational every year. But this assumes that all of them are constructed according to schedule, and the nuclear industry has rarely met its promised construction deadlines.	在未来五年内预计每年会有大概10座新反应堆投入运行，但这要求所有建设都按期完工，而核能行业却经常是不守时的。