These countries may not yet be full democracies, but, because they hold competitive elections, they have met a necessary condition for being a democracy.	它们也许并非完全的民主政体，但是，他们举行过竞争式选举，已经满足了成为民主政体的一个必要条件。


But since Lebanon was torn apart thirty years ago by civil war and violence, exacerbated by PLO, Israeli, Syrian, French, and US military incursions, not a single Muslim has lived in an electorally competitive Arab state.	但是，自从黎巴嫩三十年前由于内战和暴力活动而分裂、其形势因巴勒斯坦解放组织（PLO）、以色列、叙利亚、法国和美国的武力入侵而雪上加霜以来，没有一个穆斯林人居住在一个具备竞争选举制度的阿拉伯国家。


This is why it is so important for the world to think deeply about the current opportunities for democracy in Palestine and its neighbors.	这就是为什么全世界应当深刻考虑巴勒斯坦及其邻国当前面临的实现民主政体的机遇的重要性。


Modern democracies share at least seven preconditions:	现代民主政体至少要满足七个前提：


· a functioning state;	· 一个正常运作的国家


· a monopoly over the use of legitimate force;	· 一个能使用合法力量的专权


· borders that have strong national and international recognition;	· 完全获得国内、国际承认的边界


· agreement on who are its citizens;	· 对国民的一致定义


· a government that rules from within the national territory;	· 一个在其领土内进行统治的政府


· an elected government responsible to its citizens;	· 一个通过选举产生、对其民众负责的政府


· a reasonably integrated legal system.	· 一个合理整合的法律体系


Obviously, when the PLO was headquartered in Jordan, Lebanon, or Tunisia, and there was not yet a Palestinian Authority, Palestine did not meet any of these seven prerequisites.	显然，当巴勒斯坦解放组织在约旦、黎巴嫩或突尼斯设立总部时，还没有一个巴勒斯坦政权，它不满足七个前提中的任何一个。


Indeed, partly owing to Yasir Arafat’s own actions or inactions, at his death Palestine still had none of them.	事实上，由于阿拉法特的行动或懈怠，在他去世之时，巴勒斯坦仍然不符合上述任一条件。


For example, while Palestine’s state capacities were destroyed by Israel, especially following the second Intifada, Arafat made matters worse by constantly bypassing and eviscerating potential mechanisms of accountability, such as the elected Palestinian Legislative Council.	例如，当巴勒斯坦的国家能力遭到以色列的破坏，尤其是在第二次人民起义（Intifada）后阿拉法特一直对诸如巴勒斯坦立法委员会这样的潜在责任机构避而不谈并想要废除它，这使得情况进一步恶化。


He failed to do anything about Palestine’s legacy of four different and contradictory legal systems.	面对巴勒斯坦遗留的四个相为矛盾的不同法律体系，阿拉法特无所作为。


Moreover, Arafat contributed to the absence of a legitimate monopoly of force by ignoring the semi-autonomous armed actions of his own Fatah-based militia, as well as the Fatah-based Al–Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, not to mention other groups’ armed militias.	此外，阿拉法特对他法塔赫旗下的民兵组织及阿克萨烈士旅的半自治军事行动视而不见，更不用说其他团体的武装民兵了，这导致了巴勒斯坦始终缺乏合法专权。


But let us imagine what was unimaginable even a few months ago: a world where the present diminution of conflict holds, and where discussions between Israel and Palestine arrive at a mutually acceptable recognition of each state’s sovereignty.	但是让我们想象一下就在几个月前还是难以想象的事情：在一个目前冲突不断减少的世界里，以色列和巴勒斯坦互相接受承认对方国家主权。


To be sure, this is possible only if the United States pushes Israel much harder than it has so far to give Palestine viable borders.	诚然，只有当美国用甚于向巴勒斯坦给出可行边界划定的压力来更用力地推动以色列，这才会成为可能。


How might such a world affect prospects for peace and democracy in the Middle East?	这样的一个世界将对中东的和平和民主前景产生何种影响呢？


Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas desperately wants to construct a functioning state.	巴勒斯坦总统穆罕穆德·阿巴斯极力想要建立一个正常运作的国家。


With cessation of Israeli incursions, and large-scale international aid from the European Union, the US, Japan, and some Arab League countries, he could begin to make a plausible go of it.	随着以色列停止入侵以及大量来自欧盟、美国、日本和一些阿盟国家的国际援助，他似乎可以走出很好的一步。


With an effective state, and an inclusive and functioning electoral system, Abbas could then disarm his own Fatah-based militia.	在一个有效能的国家中，在一个正常运作的选举体系下，阿巴斯将能解散他自己的法塔赫民兵组织的武装力量。


With peace, and the prospect of doing well in July’s parliamentary election, in which it has agreed to participate, Hamas would have powerful incentives to transform itself from an armed movement outside the system into a political party committed to competing for power at the ballot box.	在和平背景以及哈马斯已经同意参加的七月国会选举的美好前景下，哈马斯有强大的动力将他们自己从一个选举体系外的武装运动组织转变为一个在选举中竞争权力的政党。


By disarming any remaining militias, Abbas could claim what Max Weber called the necessary ingredient of any state, namely a “monopoly of the legitimate use of force.”	通过解除民兵的武装力量并保留民兵组织，阿巴斯可以声称巴勒斯坦已经具备被麦克斯·韦伯称之为任何国家不可或缺的因素，即“一个可以合法使用军事力量的政权”。


Palestine has more elements of a vigorous civil society than virtually any other country in the Arab world, including an active human rights movement, which initially focused only on Israeli abuses, but that has increasingly criticized violations by the Palestinian Authority itself.	比起任何阿拉伯世界的其他国家，巴勒斯坦具有更多一个生机勃勃的公民社会所需的元素，包括积极的人权运动。 这原本仅仅针对以色列攻击，但是现在该运动正越来越多地批评巴勒斯坦政权本身的暴力行动。


Palestine also has a powerful women’s movement (Palestine being the first Arab country to give women the vote, in 1946).	巴勒斯坦也有强大的妇女运动（巴勒斯坦是第一个给予妇女投票权的阿拉伯国家，1946年）


Finally, and ironically, because so many Palestinians have worked in Israel, spent time in Israeli prisons, often speak and read Hebrew, and are regularly exposed to the Israeli media and the rough and tumble of Israeli politics, Palestine has more young citizens than any other Arab country who have observed life in a democracy at first hand.	最后，颇具讽刺意义的是，因为如此多的巴勒斯坦人已经在以色列工作，在以色列监狱待过，已经使用并阅读希伯来语，并长期接受以色列媒体、以色列政治混战的影响，巴勒斯坦拥有比其他阿拉伯国家更广泛的一个亲眼目睹过民主政体生活的年轻群体。


So democracy in an independent Palestinian state is possible.	因此在一个独立的巴勒斯坦国内实现民主政体是有可能的。


Lebanon has had regular elections since its civil war ended in 1990.	黎巴���自从1990年内战结束后就一直举行定期的选举。


But a country without sovereignty, or control over its domestic politics, does not have a democratically serviceable state.	但是一个没有主权、或对其民主政治无掌控权的国家，是无法拥有一个享有民主的政府的。


Syria, bolstered by the 14,000 troops it stationed in Lebanon, has imposed its choice as Lebanon’s president and otherwise interfered with Lebanese politics.	叙利亚依仗其驻扎于黎巴嫩境内的14,000兵力，在当黎巴嫩总统及其他方面力量干涉黎巴嫩政治时，将其选择强加于黎巴嫩。


So Lebanon cannot be considered electorally competitive.	因此，黎巴嫩不能算举行过竞争式选举。


With a just and stable Israeli-Palestinian peace, Syria might be forced not only to withdraw its troops, but also to lessen its interference in Lebanese politics.	随着公平且稳固的以色列—巴勒斯坦和平关系的确立，叙利亚也许不得不被迫撤走其在黎巴嫩的驻军，并减少对黎巴嫩政治的干预。


Lebanon could return to the democratic track, and Hezbollah might use democratic, not military, politics as its survival strategy in the newly sovereign Lebanon, especially if an international peacekeeping force were consensually allowed to demilitarize the Golan Heights.	黎巴嫩又能重新回到民主轨道上，并且真主党也许能在一个新获独立自主权的黎巴嫩使用民主而非军事和政治手段作为其生存之道，特别是在双方一致同意下允许一支国际维和部队解除戈兰高地的武装。


The only two Arab countries ever to recognize Israel were Egypt in 1978 and Jordan in 1994.	仅有的两个分别在1978年和1994年承认以色列的阿拉伯国家是埃及和约旦。


But this was an asymmetrical peace.	但这是不平等的和平。


Both countries recognized Israel, but Israel did not recognize Palestine, and Israel’s construction of settlements on occupied land continued.	这两个国家承认了以色列，而以色列却不承认巴勒斯坦，并且他们在巴勒斯坦被占领土内的定居点的建设还在继续。


In Jordan and Egypt, protests against the asymmetrical peace led to growing social fragmentation and processes of regime-led domestic de-liberalization.	在约旦和埃及，针对不平等和平的抗议导致了社会的逐渐分裂以及政府领导的反自由化行动。


A symmetrical peace between Israel and Palestine would, by contrast, incite much less Islamic resistance.	相比之下，一个平等的巴以和平关系应该少煽动伊斯兰的抵触情绪。


A symmetrical peace agreement might also contribute to a new dynamic in Jordan and Egypt, namely re-liberalization of society.	一个平等的和平协定对缔造生机盎然的新约旦和埃及，即实现社会再自由化，也许有所帮助。


Palestine and its immediate neighbors have their best opportunity in thirty years to produce democratic states.	在未来三十年中，巴勒斯坦与它的紧邻国家拥有最佳的建立民主国家的机会。


They can do so if they seize the current opening, and if the international community intensifies its support for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict.	如果他们抓住当前的这个机遇，如果国际社会为结束巴以冲突而增加援助，他们就能实现这个机会。


The Arab Young and Restless	阿拉伯的青年与动乱


NEW YORK – Many factors underlay the ongoing upheavals in the Middle East: decades of corrupt and authoritarian rule, increasingly literate and digitally-connected societies, and skyrocketing world food prices.	发自纽约——其实早已有众多因素促成了今日中东的乱局：长达数十年的腐败与专制，教育程度不断提高且经由网络串联起来的社会，以及飙升的全球食品价格。


To top it off, throughout the Middle East (as well as Sub-Saharan Africa and most of South Asia), rapid population growth is fueling enormous demographic pressures.	最后，整个中东地区（以及撒哈拉南部非洲以及南亚地区）人口数量的快速增长也带来了巨大的人口压力。


Egypt’s population, for example, more than doubled over the course of Hosni Mubarak’s rule, from 42 million in 1980 to 85 million in 2010.	比如说，埃及的人口已经在胡斯尼·穆巴拉克的统治下翻了一倍有多，从1980年的4200万增加到了2010年的8500万。


This surge is all the more remarkable given that Egypt is a desert country, its inhabitants packed along the Nile.	考虑到埃及是一个人口主要聚居于尼罗河沿岸的沙漠国家，这个数字就更加使人惊叹。


With no room to spread out, population densities are rising to the breaking point.	由于无处扩张，埃及国内的人口密度逐渐上升到危机的临界点。


Cairo has become a sprawling region of some 20 million people living cheek-by-jowl with inadequate infrastructure.	首都埃及目前挤进了2000万人，城市内部极为混乱，居民接踵摩肩，基础设施严重不足。


Rapid population growth means a bulging youth population.	同时迅速的人口增长意味着不断膨胀的青年人数量。


Indeed, half of Egypt’s population is under age 25. Egypt, like dozens of countries around the world, is facing the extreme – and largely unmet – challenge of ensuring productive and gainful employment for its young people.	事实上有超过一半的埃及人年龄低于25岁，而埃及跟世界上其他几个国家一样，正在面对着极端艰巨——而且很大程度上无法满足——的就业压力，无法确保为这些青年人提供体面的工作岗位。


Employment growth is simply not keeping up with this population surge, at least not in the sense of decent jobs with decent wages.	就业的增长无法追上人口增长，那些勉强创造出来的职位又无法提供体面的薪水。


The unemployment rate for young people (15-24 years old) in North Africa and the Middle East is 30% or more.	北非和中东地区青年人（15-24岁）的失业率高达30%以上。


The frustration of unemployed and under-employed youth is now spilling over into the streets.	而这些沮丧的失业和半失业青年如今都涌上了街头。


The problem of high youth unemployment is certainly not confined to the developing world, however.	其实青年人高失业率的问题并不仅限于发展中国家。


In the United States, the overall unemployment rate is around 9%, but among 18-25 year olds, it is a staggering 19%.	在美国，总体失业率约为9%，但18-25岁青年人的失业率高达19%。


And this includes only young people actually at work or looking for work. Many more have simply become discouraged and dropped out of the labor force entirely: not at school, not at work, and not looking for work.	而这只包括那些事实上正在打散工或者求职的年轻人，另外还有一些沮丧的青年人直接就退出了劳动力大军：他们不上学，不上班，也不去求职。


They don’t protest much, but many end up in prison.	这些人倒不会上街抗议，不过大多会最终走上犯罪道路。


The world’s labor markets are now interconnected.	全球的劳动力市场如今早已实现了联网。


Young people in countries as diverse as Egypt and the US are in effect competing with young Chinese and Indians for jobs.	来自美国或者埃及这些不同国家的青年人必须与来自中国和印度的青年人同台竞争。


China’s low-paid, reasonably productive manufacturing workers and high-quality infrastructure (roads, power, ports, and communications) has set the standard for competitiveness globally.	中国那些低薪水要求但生产力更高的制造业工人以及高质量的基础设施（公路，电力，港口和通信设施）已经为全球竞争设定了新的标杆。


As a result, low-skilled workers in Egypt, the US, and other countries must either raise their productivity enough to compete at a decent wage, or accept extremely low pay or outright unemployment.	相比之下，埃及，美国以及其他国家那些低技术工人要么提高自己的生产力来挣得一份体面的工资，要么只能忍受极端低下的薪水或者彻底失业。


So creating decent jobs at decent wages is at the heart of being internationally competitive.	因此创造一份薪金合理的体面职位就是形成国际竞争力的核心。


That requires equipping workers with a good education, strong on-the-job training, and supportive infrastructure.	这要求用更好的教育，专业的在职培训以及完善的基础设施来武装本国工人。


While the private sector must create most of the jobs, the public sector must create the underlying conditions for high productivity. That is a tall order.	当私人部门承担起创造大部分就业岗位的时候，公共部门必须为高生产力创造所需的基础条件，而这是一项艰巨的任务。


Only one high-income region has done a reasonably good job of preparing its youth, and its overall economy, for tough global competition: Northern Europe, including Germany and Scandinavia (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden).	只有一个高收入地区为其年轻人和经济做出了相对完善的安排：北欧，包括德国以及丹麦、芬兰，挪威和瑞典这四个斯堪的纳维亚半岛国家。


In these countries, public education is excellent, and the transition from school to work often involves programs like the apprenticeships for which Germany is especially famous.	这些国家的公共教育素质极高，而青年人在由学生向职场专业人士转变的过程中经常能参与一些实习课程，在这方面德国尤其有名。


In developing countries, the main advances are found in countries that emphasize excellence in education, public investment in infrastructure, and serious on-the-job training. South Korea is probably the leading success story, with superb educational attainment and strong employment of young people having taken it from developing-country to high-income status within one generation.	在发展中国家，主要的进步都来自于那些强调教育，政府大力投资基础设施并认真实施在职培训的地方，而韩国堪称其中的佼佼者，极高的青年入学率和青年的大量就业使其在一代人的时间内就从一个发展中国家跃升成为一个高收入国家。


And South Korea has accomplished this feat in China’s intensely competitive immediate neighborhood.	更重要的是韩国这一成就在中国周边的那些激烈竞争的邻国之间取得的。


The US, by contrast, is a case of failure, except for youth from high-income households. American children raised in affluence succeed in obtaining an excellent education and have good job prospects after a bachelor’s degree.	相反美国是一个失败的例子（除了那些出生于高收入家庭的青年以外），那些在富裕家庭成长的孩子无疑能得到良好教育并在取得学位后拥有良好的职业预期。


But, as the rich have successfully pressed for tax cuts and reductions in government spending, children from poor and working-class households are far less likely to receive a high-quality education, and the US government has failed to provide for training or adequate infrastructure.	但随着富裕阶层成功迫使政府减免税务以及政府支出削减，其他贫穷及工薪家庭的子女比以往更难以得到高质量教育，此外美国政府也未能提供培训机会及足够的基础设施。


The result is a growing youth unemployment crisis among poor and working-class youth.	其结果就是贫穷及工薪阶层的年轻人中的失业危机不断蔓延。


The countries of North Africa and the Middle East should learn from East Asia and Northern Europe, and take pains to avoid the failures of the US. If democracy is to take hold and flourish in Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere in the Arab world, the new reform-minded governments must make the youth unemployment crisis their highest priority.	北非以及中东国家应该向东亚和北欧学习，努力避免美国式的失败，如果民主要在埃及，突尼斯，及其他阿拉伯国家生根发芽的话，改革派的新政府就必须将解决年轻人失业问题列为头等大事。


Middle Eastern countries should elaborate strategies to improve the quality and increase the length of schooling, invest in job training, establish private-sector apprenticeships, and develop small and medium-sized businesses.	中东国家应当详细制定战略去提升教育的质量和年限，投资于职业培训，建立私人部门实习制度并发展中小型企业。


They should identify key infrastructure projects needed to ensure private-sector productivity.	他们还应当找出哪些是私人部门生产力发展所需的关键基础设施项目。


And they must work together to deepen regional trade integration, thereby creating a much larger market.	而两者必须协同合作加深区域贸易整合，并因此建立一个更大规模的市场。


The deposed authoritarian rulers – Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Mubarak, and soon Libya’s Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi – stashed away billions of dollars stolen from the public treasury.	那些被赶下台的独裁统治者——突尼斯的本·阿里，埃及的穆巴拉克，还有时日无多的利比亚统治者卡扎菲上校——都从国家和公众手中盗取了数十亿美元的财富。


This ill-gotten money should be recovered and put into a special fund for youth employment.	这些非法所得的金钱应当被追回并投入到一个专门用以改善青年就业的特殊基金中。


Moreover, with oil prices back above $100 per barrel, the Gulf states are enjoying a bonanza.	此外，随着原油价格上升到100美元/桶，海湾国家正享受着一笔巨大的财富。


They, too, should create a special fund for youth employment in the region through the Islamic Development Bank.	但他们也应当通过伊斯兰开发银行成立一个特殊基金来资助中东地区的青年人就业发展。


There can be no better way to use the region’s resources than to ensure that its young people’s lives are enriched by education, skills, and high-quality jobs.	事实上，利用该区域丰富资源的最佳方式莫过于确保本地青年的生活可以通过教育，技能和高质量的职位而得到充实。


The Arafat Succession Scramble	阿拉法特继承人引起的混乱


To understand what the Palestinian cause will look like without Yasir Arafat, consider the various titles that he currently holds.	要想了解巴勒斯坦解放事业没有亚西尔·阿拉法特后会是什么样子，只要看看他现在拥有的头衔就知道了。


Arafat is Chairman of the PLO executive Committee, President of the Palestinian National Authority, Commander-in-chief of the Palestinian forces, and head of the Fatah movement.	阿拉法特现任巴解执行委员会主席、巴勒斯坦民族权力机构主席、巴勒斯坦军队总司令和法塔赫运动领袖。


The PLO embodies Palestinian national aspirations for independence and statehood. It is the highest political body for all Palestinians, both those living in Palestine and the refugees and other Palestinians in the diaspora.	巴解组织体现了巴勒斯坦人对独立和主权的渴望，它是所有巴勒斯坦人公认的最高政治机构，不仅包括国内的巴勒斯坦居民、也包括流散在外的难民和其它巴勒斯坦人。


Arafat’s successor will need to juggle between negotiations with Israel, which will require concession on refugees’ “right of return” to Palestine, and the aspirations of more than three million Palestinians who wish to come back to the homes from which they were expelled in the wars of 1948 and 1967.	阿拉法特的继任者要在与以色列的谈判中巧妙周旋，要在300多万巴勒斯坦人重返故里的愿望和难民“返回巴勒斯坦”的权利问题上做出让步，这些难民都是在1948到1967年爆发的战争中逃到国外的。


Arafat’s successor as President of the Palestinian National Authority will be bound by the Oslo Accords, which created an interim government, now headed by Prime Minister Ahmad Qurei, that is responsible for the day-to-day lives of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.	担任巴勒斯坦民族权力机构主席的阿拉法特继任者要受《奥斯陆协议》的约束，这份协议规定要设立巴现总理艾哈迈德·库赖领导下的临时政府，管理西岸和加沙地带巴勒斯坦人的日常生活。


Palestinians will have to decide whether to make the position of PNA president a powerful one or merely symbolic, as it now is. The latter option would make Qurei an empowered prime minister, which is what many Palestinians and others want.	巴勒斯坦人要决定民族权力机构的主席是只起象征作用还是像现在一样实权在握，后一种选择会使库赖像很多巴勒斯坦人和其它人所希望的那样手握重权。


The position of the commander of the Palestinian forces supposedly puts the various Palestinian military, security, and intelligence units under one leader, who is expected to ensure the rule of law.	巴勒斯坦军队司令的职务理论上把巴勒斯坦军队、安全和情报单位划归一人领导，由他来确保巴勒斯坦的法治进程。


But these forces are now in disarray, with most uniformed Palestinian security agencies needing to be reorganized after four years of intensive effort by Israel to crush them.	但这些部队现在一片混乱，在遭到长达四年的以色列镇压后，绝大多数身着制服的巴勒斯坦安全机构都迫切需要进行重组。


The key factor in internal security is local paramilitary units.	当地准军事组织是国内安全的关键因素。


These units, most of which are not controlled by the PNA’s central leadership, are more loyal to grassroots figures than to uniformed PNA officers.	这些组织多数都不归民族权力机构中央领导人直接控制，而是听命于基层组织的领导。


Local Fatah leaders like Marwan Barghouti have tremendous power over the nationalist armed units that are loosely organized under the title of the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades.	像巴库提这样的当地法塔赫领袖掌握着民族主义武装的制高权力，它们组成了 “阿克萨烈士旅”这样的松散型组织。


Barghouti advocated and was trying to implement internal Fatah elections when the Israelis arrested him.	以色列人逮捕巴库提时，他正宣扬和全力组织法塔赫的内部选举。


As a street leader who was elected as the head of the Bir Zeit University student council, he gained legitimacy by being chosen by his peers.	作为当选了比尔宰特大学学生会主席的街头领袖，他由于受到同僚的拥戴而拥有了合法性。


When the Oslo process began, he refused to accept any official position within the Palestinian Authority, choosing instead to remain close to the local Fatah cadres.	奥斯陆进程开始后，他拒绝接受巴权力机构内部的任何官方职务，而是选择继续与当地的法塔赫干部保持密切联系。


Whoever fills Arafat’s shoes will need to make sure that these brigades are satisfied that their status, demands, and leaders are respected.	不管接替阿拉法特职务的究竟是谁，他都要满足这些基层组织的要求，对它们的现状、要求和领袖给予足够的尊重。


Indeed, the power struggle that will ensue in the post-Arafat era will ultimately center on Al Fatah, the backbone of the PLO.	实际上，后阿拉法特时代的权力斗争会最终围绕着法塔赫展开，因为法塔赫是巴解组织的骨干力量。


A worldwide assembly chooses Fatah’s 100-member revolutionary council, which in turn elects a 20-member central committee, where most of the power struggle will take place.	全球会议确定了法塔赫的百人革命委员会，进而又选出了20人的中央委员会，它们将会成为此次权力斗争的核心。


Many young street leaders will insist on an emergency meeting of the revolutionary council, or even holding the sixth general assembly (which would be the first since 1988).	很多年轻的街头领袖会要求召开革命委员会紧急会议，甚至召开1988年来首次全体大会。


Events in recent months show that the Al Asqa Martyrs’ Brigades have forced even Arafat to take their demands into consideration.	近几个月来发生的一切表明：阿拉法特本人都不得不认真考虑阿克萨烈士旅所提出的要求。


While much of the power struggle will take place within the nationalist camp, one must not overlook the Islamist camp led by Hamas and Islamic Jihad.	尽管权力斗争大多会发生在民族主义阵营内部，但哈马斯和伊斯兰圣战组织领导的伊斯兰阵营也不可小视。


Although the Islamists are unlikely to interfere in the post-Arafat power struggle, they will not sit idly by if the new leadership moves in what they consider the wrong direction.	尽管伊斯兰教徒不太可能卷入后阿拉法特时代的权力斗争，但如果新领袖在他们看来犯了方向性的错误，那他们也绝不会坐视不管。


Of course, the new leadership will have to reach some agreement with the Islamists regarding the rules of the game, both domestically and vis-à-vis Israel.	当然，新的领导人要在游戏规则上与伊斯兰份子达成一致，国内事务和巴以问题都不能例外。


Without such an agreement, and if the new leadership cracks down hard on the Islamists, a violent civil war could erupt.	如果没有这样的协议，如果新领袖对伊斯兰教徒进行大规模镇压，那么就会引发全面内战。


Most importantly, in order to consolidate his leadership, the next Palestinian leader must make some hard decisions and show some tangible results quickly.	最重要的是，接下来的巴勒斯坦领袖必须做出艰难的决策，并尽快取得实质性的成果，才能使自己的领导地位更加稳固。


The experience of the first Palestinian prime minister, who resigned largely because of his inability to deliver any improvements to his people – particularly personal and collective security, the rule of law, and an end to chaos in Palestinian areas – remains fresh in the public’s memory.	第一位巴总理的前车之鉴至今仍令巴勒斯坦公众们记忆犹新，由于未能改善人民的生存状况－特别是个人和群体的安全、法治状况，结束巴勒斯坦地区的动荡，这位总理最终被迫辞职。


At the same time, a freeze on settlement activities, release of Palestinian political prisoners – including Marwan Barghouti – and the removal of the hundreds of checkpoints between Palestinian cities would revive a feeling of hope, without which no Palestinian leader can negotiate what the world wants: a peace settlement.	与此同时，停止修建定居点、释放包括巴库提在内的巴勒斯坦政治犯，撤除巴勒斯坦各大城市间成百上千的检查站，会让人们找到久违了的希望，如果没有这些，任何巴勒斯坦领导人都无法谈判赢得世界想要的和平。


The problem is that no Palestinian leader, no matter who he is, can deliver these changes.	问题在于，任何一位巴勒斯坦领袖，不管他是谁，都没有能力实现这样的变革。


They represent a direct challenge to the Israeli occupiers, neighboring Arab countries, and the international community, led by the United States.	它们所代表的是对以色列占领者、阿拉伯邻国和以美国为首的国际社会的直接挑战。


The Misplaced War Against Fire	错误的抗火战争


TEMPE, ARIZONA – The simplest way to describe fire worldwide is that there is too much of the wrong kind, too little of the right kind, and too much overall.	坦普，亚利桑那州—描述全世界火情的最简单的话是太多错误的火，太少正确的火，总体而言太多火。


The wrong kinds are those such as the blaze that just killed 19 firefighters here in Arizona, or those that have put southeast Asia under a pall, that incinerate communities, befoul ecosystems with effluents, and trash biotas by burning at the wrong times and intensities.	错误的火比如刚刚夺去亚利桑那州19名消防员生命的大火、让东南亚笼罩在烟雾之下、烧毁社区、让生态系统受到污水污染、因在错误的时间燃起错误程度的烈焰而毁灭动植物的大火。


The right kinds are those that perform an ecological service by burning landscapes properly – and that stay in their place.	正确的火是将地表烧掉合理程度而有利于生态的火。


Paradoxically, it is likely that there is not enough fire on the planet; but, thanks to fossil fuels, there is certainly too much combustion.	矛盾的是，地球上可能火焰不足； 但是，拜化石燃料所赐，燃烧显然是太多了。


Overall, the developed world has too few good fires, and the developing world has too many bad ones.	总体而言，发达世界好火太少，而发展中世界坏火太多。


Nearly every observer forecasts that this will continue over the coming years.	几乎所有观察家都认为这一局面会在未来多年中持续下去。


What to do about it depends on how we characterize the problem.	对此有何良策取决于我们如何描述这一问题。


The paradox of fire stems from its role as the great shape-shifter of natural processes.	火悖论源于火的作用——自然过程的强大改变者。


The reason is simple: fire is not a creature nor a substance nor a geophysical event like a hurricane or an earthquake.	原因很简单：火不是生物，也不是实在物质，也不是地质事件（如飓风和地震）。


It is a biochemical reaction.	火是生物化学反应。


It synthesizes its surroundings.	火能合成其周围物质。


It takes its character from its context.	火的意义也来自于此。


Fire integrates everything around it – sun, wind, rain, plants, terrain, roofing, fields, and everything people do, and don’t do.	火将它周围的所有东西都糅合在一起——阳光、风、雨、植被、屋檐、田野，还有人们做的和不做的一切。


In this way, it indexes the state of an ecosystem.	火以此检验生态系统。


It is also our signature act as a species, the one thing we do that no other creature does.	火还是人类作为一个物种的标志，除了人类之外再无生命使用火。


While we did not invent fire (it has been integral to Earth for more than 400 million years), we exercise a monopoly over its controlled use.	尽管我们没有发明火（火成为地球的一部分可以追溯到4亿年前），但我们垄断了对火的有控制的使用。


All of this makes fire universal, difficult to grasp, and tricky to wrestle into manageable shape.	所有这些让火变得普遍，难以把握，也难以让它处于可控制的状态。


There is no solution to fire, because there are many kinds of fires, and they change with their context.	没有东西可以解决火，因为火的种类太多，并随环境而变化。


Some fire problems do have technical fixes.	一些火问题确实有技术上的解决之道。


We can build machines that reduce combustion to its essence and contain it.	我们可以制造机器减少燃烧物质，从而控制火。


We can erect houses that resist burning.	我们可以建造防火屋。


We can design cities that prevent fires from spreading from building to building.	我们可以设计能防止火在建筑物之间蔓延的城市。


But these fires are fixable only because we construct their settings.	但这类火之所以能控制，是因为我们创造了它们烧起来的条件。


We cannot survive without fire; we just need it in the right ways.	没有火，人类就难以生存； 我们需要的只是正确的使用火。


It is certainly a problem when it burns freely through cities.	当火焰在整个城市中自由燃烧时，这肯定是一个问题。


But it is also a problem when it is removed from wildlands that have adapted to it, because its absence can be as ecologically significant as its presence.	但当火焰从可适应火的荒地上小时，这也是一个问题，因为无火造成的生态后果与着火可能不相上下。


The point is, urban fire is not a model for wildland fire.	重点在于城市之火与荒原之火不是同一类型的火。


Our prevailing templates for describing fire are similarly misdirected.	我们描述火的流行方式同样也是错误的。


They portray the burn as a disaster and the fight against it as a war story.	人们将燃烧描述为灾难，将灭火称为战斗。


The battlefield allusion leads observers to reason that there must be more sophisticated technologies than shovels and rakes with which to suppress the flames.	战场暗示使观察者认定我们需要比铲子和耙子更复杂的技术来抑制火苗。


We must meet force with greater force.	我们必须用更强大的力量来解决火的力量。


Such metaphors matter, because they mis-define the problem.	这样的隐喻问题很大，因为它们错误地描述了问题。


Over the past decade, the world has experienced a pattern of untrammeled burning – what some observers have termed “megafires.”	在过去十年中，世界经历了难以遏制的燃烧过程——一些观察者称之为“超级大火”。


Explanations vary.	解释众说纷纭。


Some point to climate change, with global warming producing deeper droughts and more extreme weather.	一些人指向气候变化，认为全球变暖制造了更严重的干旱和更极端的天气。


Some of these fires have raged under abnormal conditions; some have not.	一些大火因为反常的条件而肆虐； 一些则否。


Others emphasize a buildup of combustible materials.	有人强调可燃物的积累。


The nature of such fuel accumulations runs the gamut, including swamp drainage in Indonesia, rainforest destruction in Amazonia, self-thickening woods in American wildlands as a result of fire exclusion, and everywhere the intrusion of urban sprawl and fire-prone houses.	燃料积累的内容无所不包，包括印度尼西亚的沼泽排水、亚马逊流域的热带雨林毁灭、因祛火而导致的美国森林的自我增厚，以及无孔不入的都市扩张和防火住房。


Still others blame changes in policy and practice.	还有人将矛头指向了政策和实践的变化。


Lands legally recorded as wilderness will encourage more fire; and a reluctance to put firefighters at risk in remote settings – as well as cost concerns – argues for backing off and letting the next ridge burn while offering point protection for threatened communities.	法定为荒地的土地会助长更多火焰； 不愿让消防员去边远地区冒险——亦是出于成本考虑——解释了收回人手放任下一个山头被烧，而为受威胁社区提供点保护。


Of course, we need the ability to control bad fires.	当然，我们需要控制坏火的能力。


But an emphasis on suppression alone leads to the fire equivalent of a police state, not to a livable landscape.	但光是强调抑制将导致火等同于警察国家，而不是适宜居住的家园。


Rather, the great diversity of fires points to the need for an equal diversity of means to cope with them or convert them to beneficial outcomes.	火的多样性意味着需要同样多样的办法对付火，或者让火产生有益的结果。


Matching problems with solutions requires us to characterize the issue properly.	让问题与解决方案匹配要求我们正确地描述问题。


A fire that burns into a community is a disaster, but if we see fire only as a disaster, then we will follow the example of many wildland fire agencies that are adopting urban, all-hazard models in place of traditional land management.	烧进社区的火是一场灾难，但如果我们只把火视为灾难，我们就会效仿许多荒地灭火机构的例子——采用风险重重的都市模式来实施传统土地管理。


This leaves them fighting the fires that break out, rather than managing the settings that sustain those fires.	这导致我们与烧起来的火作斗争，而不是管理让火持续燃烧的条件。


Likewise, if we define the fight against fire as a battlefield, we will build up our forces, search for more powerful technologies like air tankers, and accept firefighters’ deaths as inevitable.	类似地，如果我们将与火的斗争定义为战场，我们将建立起军队、研发灭火飞机等强大技术，并将消防员的牺牲视为不可避免。


We will win battles but kill crews in a war that does not exist.	我们将赢得战斗，但我们在这场战争中消灭的是子虚乌有的东西。


Even if we accept the war metaphor, we are engaged less in set-piece conflicts than in an ecological insurgency that we cannot bomb or bulldoze into submission.	即使我们接受了战争隐喻，我们所参与的与其说是建立和平的冲突，不如说是无法用炸弹和恫吓使敌人投降的生态起义。


In many settings, the best solution is to use good fires to contain bad ones.	在许多条件下，最佳解决方案是用好火遏制坏火。


A generalized war on fire is as ill-conceived as, say, a global war on terror.	一刀切的抗火战争就像（比如）全球反恐战争一��站不住脚。


Fire is what its setting makes it.	火其来有自。


It is also a relationship.	它也是一种关系。


Fire and humanity long ago began shaping each other’s realm.	火和人类很久以前就开始互相决定各自的领域。


Today, as always, we remain the best of friends and the worst of enemies.	今时一如往日，火仍是我们最好的朋友和最恶的敌人。


The Art of Finance	金融的艺术


PRINCETON – In the middle of September’s financial meltdown, a remarkable event occurred in London. While the City of London was shaken by the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the run on HBOS, Sotheby’s staged a record-breaking auction for the works of the artist Damien Hirst, which produced a gross take of around $200 million.	普林斯顿-在9月的金融危机中，伦敦发生了一桩大事：虽然雷曼兄弟的倒闭和HBOS苏格兰哈利法克斯银行挤兑事件震撼了伦敦金融城，但苏富比拍卖行却举行了艺术家达米安·赫斯特作品的破纪录的拍卖会，拍得了约2亿美元的总值。


Compared to the values that were being destroyed on Wall Street, this was small change; but it was a remarkable vote of confidence in the work of one artist.	与华尔街上正在被吞噬的价值相比，这笔钱算是小儿科； 但此拍卖对一位艺术家的作品投了大大的信任票。


Financial bubbles, like the one that has just definitively burst, are intimately related to the world of art.	金融泡沫，正如刚刚彻底破灭的那个一样，是与艺术界密切相关的。


Renaissance Florence depended on the patronage of the Medici. Sixteenth-century Venice turned the wealth of the spice trade into the canvases of Titian and Tintoretto.	文艺复兴时期的佛罗伦萨要依靠美迪奇家族的光顾，而十六世纪的威尼斯把香料交易赚来的钱换成了画家提香和丁托列托的画布。


The world’s next great commercial center was Amsterdam, where again the successful burghers pushed for a new style of art and produced the age of Rembrandt.	此后世界上出现了另一个大商业中心阿姆斯特丹，那里的成功富足的中产市民再次促成了一个新的艺术风格的形成并创造了伦勃朗时代。


The great nineteenth- and early twentieth-century financiers, men like J.P. Morgan, Henry Frick, and Andrew Mellon, spent a large part of their fortunes on art.	伟大的十九世纪和二十世纪早期的金融家们，比如JP摩根、亨利·弗里克和安德鲁·梅隆，把他们很大一部分财富花在了收藏艺术品上。


From their viewpoint, collecting art was not simply a matter of benevolence or public spiritedness.	他们认为，收藏艺术品不仅仅是行善或公益心的体现，也不仅仅是非常昂贵的嗜好。


Nor was it simply a very expensive hobby. Their galleries showed in a visible and very public way the discernment and judgment that their financial business depended on.	他们的画廊以一种非常明显和公开的方式向人们展示着他们的鉴赏力和判断力，这些能力是他们金融业务赖以的生存之道。


Financial judgment, by contrast, is not by its nature open to inspection. It depends on inside deals, on moving ahead of the market.	与之相反，金融方面的判断力就其性质而言，因其取决于内部交易和先于市场所采取的行动，是不适于被公开审核的。


It is impossible to tell who is making good bets and who is gambling recklessly.	要说出是谁在做明智的预测，又是谁在鲁莽地赌博，是不可能的。


Consequently, it is helpful to have a proxy activity that enables outsiders to see that the process of discernment and valuation really occurs.	因此，这样的一项代理活动是有益的，这让外人看到辨别和估值的过程是真实存在和发生的。


The recent era of global finance – maybe we can already possibly speak of it as being past – differed from the financial surge of a century ago. Its cultural manifestations also appeared to be novel.	最近的全球金融时代 - 也许我们可以说它已成为过去时了 - 不同于一个世纪以前的金融浪潮，其文化表现形式也似乎是新颖的。


To some of its participants, collecting contemporary art showed how finance had become much more of a creative process than it was the world of the older financiers.	对某些参与者来说，与老一辈金融家相比，收藏当代艺术品展示了融资是如何成为更具有创造性的过程。


Morgan or Mellon collected largely old masters from the cinquecento, whose reputation was clearly and solidly established.	摩根士丹利或梅隆主要收集的是16世纪意大利享有盛名的艺术大师的作品。


The new art collectors, however, were more like the Medici: they were really stimulating new cultural creation.	不过，新的艺术品收藏家更像美迪奇家族的人：他们真正是刺激了文化创新。


As with their investments, the habitués of contemporary art markets relied not purely on their own judgment, but on teams of sophisticated advisers and dealers who could give opinions on what trends best caught the spirit of the age.	随着他们参与投资，当代艺术市场里的常客并非纯粹地依靠自己的判断，他们同时也依靠高端顾问和经纪人团队，这些顾问和经纪人可以提供咨询告诉人们什么样趋势最能抓住的时代的精神。


Naïve outsiders found the world of contemporary art bewildering.	天真的局外人对当代艺术世界感到迷惘。


Why was a cow preserved in formaldehyde a great cultural achievement?	为什么用甲醛保存的一头母牛称得上一项伟大的文化成就？


What did the sheets of cloth covered by regularly interspersed colored dots – the products of Hirst’s large and mechanized workshops – have to do with artistic innovation or originality?	用彩色斑点有规则地点缀的床单 - 这种从赫斯特的大而机械化的工作坊出来的产品，与艺术创新或创意又有什么关系呢？


But was not the same incomprehension on the part of the broad public characteristic of the increasingly sophisticated financial products that were being traded?	但大众对此的迷惘和对交易中日益复杂的金融产品的迷惘，本质上难道不是相同的吗？


Indeed, the nature of the risks involved was not clear, it seems, even to regulators or the senior management of the firms that were building the business.	事实上，对所涉及的风险的性质，即使是监管机构或建立此业务的公司的高级管理人员看来也并非清楚。


Some modern artists and their patrons explicitly point to the parallel between contemporary art and new financial products.	一些现代艺术家和他们的顾客明确指出了当代艺术和金融新产品之间的相似之处。


Deutsche Bank, Europe’s most prominent art-collecting bank, published the view of academic experts to the effect that customers, the broad public, were “extremely conservative, boring, lack imagination, and don’t know their own minds.”	欧洲的最著名的艺术收藏银行德意志银行发表了学术专家的看法，说是客户，即广泛的大众“极端保守，沉闷，缺乏想象力，没有自己的主见。 ”


After financial implosions, such as the collapse of the dot-com bubble in 2000 or the sub-prime meltdown of 2007-8, such views appear arrogant.	经过了金融风暴，比如2000年网络泡沫的破裂和2007-8年间的次贷危机，这种观点就显得太自负了。


The parallel between bewildering and apparently meaningless art and unintelligible financial products is damning rather than reassuring.	扑朔迷离的看上去毫无意义的艺术品和令人如坠五里云雾之中的金融产品之间的相似之处，应是令人不安的，而不是令人欣慰的。


So why was the Hirst auction such a success?	那么，为什么赫斯特作品拍卖会会取得如此成功呢？


In part, because the art involved was far from being unintelligible.	部分原因是因为所拍的艺术作品还远远没有达到扑朔迷离的地步。


The most eagerly anticipated item, a bull with golden horns and hooves, was entitled, with obvious intent, “The Golden Calf.”	最受期待的一件拍品是一头有着金牛角和金蹄的牛，它被命名为“金色之牛”，其意图不言自明。


But there was also another motive driving the bidders.	但也有另一种动力驱动着投标人。


One hint was that Russian buyers paid the big money, at the very moment that Russia’s banking system was melting down.	有一个暗示就是，在俄罗斯的银行系统崩溃的时候，俄罗斯买家却出手阔绰。


At the same time, there was a surge in demand for gold jewelry.	与此同时，对黄金首饰的需求激增。


The search for non-financial assets looks like characteristic behavior in any financial crisis – what was known during the great drama of hyperinflation in Weimar Germany as “die Flucht in die Sachwerte,” the flight to material assets.	人们寻求非金融资产看起来是任何金融危机发生时的典型行为-在德国魏玛共和国恶性通货膨胀的大动荡期间，就有大家熟知�� “一切投资立即转换为实物 ”的对实物资产的追求。


Art also functions as a store of value.	艺术也有保值的功能。


But in order to be sure of the reliability of this function, the purchaser must be convinced of the long-term valuation of the object of desire.	但是，为了确保这一功能可靠性，买方必须对所买之物的长期估值有信心。


The bankers of the Italian Renaissance also bought works of art because they reminded them of timeless values that transcended quotidian transactions.	意大利文艺复兴时期的银行家们也收藏艺术作品，因为它们让他们记住超越日常交易的永恒的价值。


They saw their acquisitions of paintings and sculptures as a connection to eternity.	他们把收购绘画和雕塑视为连接永恒的通道。


Who can say the same for the products of Damien Hirst?	那谁敢说达米安·赫斯特的作品也具有同样的性质呢？


The ASEAN Heart of Asia	亚洲的东盟之心


JAKARTA – The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) stands at a defining moment.	发自雅加达——东南亚联盟如今正迎来一个决定性的时刻。


Its member states are constantly being evaluated for their economic potential and desirability as a market for investments, goods, and services.	一直以来，全世界都在评估东盟各成员国作为一个整体性投资、商品和服务市场的潜力和可行性。


At the same time, their effort to forge a community free from external intervention is shaping a new regional order based on common security and shared prosperity.	而与此同时，东盟各国也正在努力构建一个不受外部干涉的联盟，并以此形成一个基于共同安全和共同繁荣的新秩序。


In geopolitical terms, ASEAN is well-placed to be an acceptable and equal partner to many larger, more powerful economies, such as China, India, Japan, Australia, and South Korea – a part of the world that, for the first time, is leading a global recovery.	从地缘政治学的角度来看，东盟具备有足够的地理优势，有资格得到诸如中国、印度、日本，澳大利亚和韩国等更强大经济体的认可，并与之平起平坐——而这些经济体如今也史无前例地成为了带领全球经济复苏的领头羊。


ASEAN has also contributed to building one of the most dynamic economic-integration platforms in the world, and now acts as a de facto regional hub of wider economic cooperation and integration.	同时，东盟也为打造世界上最具活力的经济整合平台做出了突出贡献，并在现实中扮演着更广泛经济合作和一体化区域枢纽的角色。


Indeed, the importance of regional economic integration for global stability and security cannot be understated.	我们不能低估了区域经济整合对全球稳定和安全的重要性。 中国、日本，印度和东盟的年度GDP总和已经达到了14.


The combined annual GDP of China, Japan, India, and ASEAN is $14.45 trillion, roughly equal to that of the United States, at $14.62 trillion.	45万亿美元，与美国的14. 62万亿美元旗鼓相当。


More importantly, East Asia’s economies are expected to grow at an average annual rate of 5.1%, compared to 3.2% in the US.	更重要的是，东亚经济体的经济年平均增长率预计会达到5. 1%，而美国只有3.


That said, the wide disparities and development gaps between ASEAN members call for a multi-track and multi-speed approach to deepening economic integration.	而这也意味着东盟各国需要采取多轨道多增速的策略来加深内部经济整合，并以此克服各国间的发展程度差异。


In anticipation of worsening food and energy security concerns in the future, ASEAN has set priorities for programs that increase productivity and production, strengthen policy coordination on agricultural trade, and boost efforts to alleviate poverty.	出于对未来粮食安全和能源安全会恶化的担忧，东盟各国决定优先发展能提高生产力和产量的项目，加强各国间农业贸易政策的协调性，并加大脱贫工作的力度。


East Asia needs to maintain a fine balance of political-security requirements in much the same way.	东亚也需要采取类似的方式来平衡各种关于政治安全的要求。


Continual restructuring and consolidation will be needed to create a balanced regional geopolitical architecture, which must broaden beyond ASEAN members to meet the needs of Japan, the US, Australia, India, China, and Russia – all of which have vital interests in the region.	它需要在区域内不断重新构建和巩固一个均衡的地缘政治结构，这要求它跳出东盟之外，满足日本，美国，澳大利亚，印度，中国和俄罗斯的需求——这些国家在该区域内都有着重要的利益。


ASEAN pursues an inclusive growth strategy.	因此东盟力图实现一种包容性的增长战略。


With the participation of the US and Russia in the expanded East Asia Summit, the regional architecture is, indeed, becoming more dynamic.	随着美国和俄罗斯相继列席东亚峰会扩大会议，该区域内的政治架构正变得越来越具有活力。


Given this, it is imperative that ASEAN becomes pro-active and remains focused on relevant strategic issues.	有见及此，东盟应当表现得更积极主动并持续关注相关战略议题。


In engaging the major powers, ASEAN will not shun traditional security issues, such as maritime cooperation, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.	在面对世界超级大国时，东盟不会回避传统的安全议题，如海上合作事务，人道主义援助以及救灾。


Japan has been the biggest provider of development assistance and technological know-how to ASEAN for the past four decades. Indeed, Japan’s investment and aid to Southeast Asia have fueled ASEAN’s economic progress.	在过去40年里，日本是东盟发展和技术援助的最大赞助者，而该国对东南亚的投资和援助无疑也促进了东盟的经济发展。


I believe that Japan’s strategic role in the region will only increase, because its economy and industrial production chains have been regionally integrated.	我相信未来日本在这一区域内的战略角色仍会与日俱增，因为其经济和工业生产的供应链已经与该区域深入整合在一起了。


Both sides have pledged to forge closer cooperation and initiate new programs to consolidate their relationship.	双方都公开宣布要构建更为紧密的合作，并开展新的合作项目以巩固彼此的关系。


Nevertheless, unresolved and overlapping maritime and territorial claims remain ASEAN’s biggest challenge.	然而领海和国土方面的主权争议依然悬而未决，这仍然是让东盟最头痛的难题。


We believe that maritime cooperation between ASEAN and major powers including China would benefit all countries.	我们相信，东盟和中国等主要大国之间开展海洋合作将惠及全球各国。


ASEAN will continue to address this issue strategically.	为此，东盟将继续致力于战略性地解决这个问题。


And, as to Myanmar, ASEAN has deferred the decision on its prospective chairmanship in 2014.	至于缅甸，东盟已经搁置了该国在2014年当选轮值主席的决议。


At its recent summit, ASEAN leaders asked Myanmar for more clarification about the country’s internal situation.	在最近召开的峰会上，各成员国领导人一致要求缅甸就其国内的状况作出更为详细的说明。


In doing so, ASEAN showed its continued influence on Myanmar’s progress towards democratic reforms.	藉此，东盟展示了它对缅甸民主改革进程的持续影响力。


Not all challenges, however, are external.	不过并非所有的挑战都来自外部。


The critical issue concerns ASEAN’s engagement with civil society.	其中一个关键的议题就与东盟内的公民社会有关。


Indonesia’s government has expressed support for more proactive engagement with the region’s civil-society organizations, pledging to organize “community conferences or forums” to engage with stakeholders in efforts to strengthen the security, economic, and socio-cultural pillars that support ASEAN as a group.	印尼政府已经表示愿意给予国内的民间组织更多的支持，并承诺要组织“社区会议或论坛”来与各利益团体共同改善国内的安全状况，经济和社会文化状况并以此作为东盟一体化的支柱。


Indonesia hopes that these community conferences will gradually gain acceptance at the ASEAN level.	印尼希望这些社区会议能逐步得到东盟组织的认可。


Through these efforts, ASEAN is emerging as the fulcrum of geopolitical stability in Asia.	通过这些努力，东盟正逐渐成为亚洲地缘政治稳定的基石。


What could have otherwise been a liability – ASEAN's diversity – was transformed into an asset that has set the benchmark for regional integration in a troubled and complex world.	当缺点（东盟的多样化）转化成为优势，使其在一个麻烦而又复杂的世界里成为区域融和的典范之时，情况也会更加乐观。


Yes, we have our share of challenges.	不错，我们也面对着这些挑战。


Nevertheless, ASEAN is constantly demonstrating its determination to create a region where no member is left behind, even as we collectively pursue prosperity and an equitable distribution of our burgeoning wealth.	但是正当我们全力追寻自己的繁荣，财富增长和平等分配的同时，东盟一直展示着它们实现共同繁荣，绝不抛弃任何一个成员的决心。


Moreover, ASEAN is seeking to forge a clearer position on key international issues to heighten its standing on world affairs.	此外在重大的国际问题上，东盟也正在努力形成更清晰的定位，以增强自身在国际事务中所扮演的角色。


Disaster management, peace-keeping operations, and, again, maritime-security cooperation are some of the areas in which ASEAN members can work together to formulate common policy approaches and action plans.	东盟各国可以在灾难应对，维和以及海洋合作事务等领域开展广泛合作并制定共同的政策和行动计划。


In the years to come, ASEAN will make further progress on unified responses to climate change, human trafficking, and food and energy security.	在未来几年，东盟还将在统一应对气候变迁，贩卖人口以及粮食和能源安全等问题上取得更大的进展。


Of course, as it moves forward, ASEAN will have to make structural and policy adjustments to strengthen its voice.	当然，随着发展的深入，东盟必须要调整自身结构和政策以增强话语权。


And the ability to deter and resolve conflicts among its members must remain one of its priorities.	而培养防止和解决成员间冲突的能力仍将是联盟的首要问题。


At its recent summit, ASEAN agreed to establish an ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation that will deal with issues of peace and reconciliation – a milestone achievement for ASEAN.	在最近一次峰会上，东盟各国一致同意建立一个东盟和平与和解机构，以处理成员国间的相关问题——这是东盟取得的一个里程碑式的成就。


There will be many more innovative breakthroughs as ASEAN develops into an integrated, open, peaceful, and outward-looking region.	在向成为整合，开放，和平和外向型区域的发展过程中，东盟将实现越来越多的创新性突破。


That outcome will benefit ASEAN’s members – and the world.	而这些创新和突破将惠及东盟各国和整个世界。


The “Asset Crisis” of Emerging Economies	新兴经济体的“资产危机”


BEIJING – In theory, the difference between capital inflows and outflows in developing countries should be positive – they should be net capital importers, with the magnitude of the balance equivalent to the current-account deficit.	北京——理论上，发展中国家的资本流入和流出之差应该为正——它们应该是资本净进口国，余额应等于经常项目赤字。


Since the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, however, many East Asian countries have been running current-account surpluses – and hence have become net capital exporters.	但是，自从1997—1998年亚洲金融危机以来，许多东亚国家一直拥有着经常项目盈余，成了资本净出口国。


Even odder is the fact that while they are net capital exporters, they run financial (capital) account surpluses.	更奇怪的是，尽管它们是资本净出口国，却有着金融（资本）项目盈余。


In other words, these countries lend not only the money they earned through current-account surpluses, but also the money they borrowed through capital-account surpluses – mainly to the United States.	换句话说，这些国家不仅借出了自己从经常项目盈余中赚得的钱，还把它们从资本项目盈余中借来的钱也借出去了——主要是借给美国。


As a result, East Asian countries are now sitting on a huge pile of foreign-exchange reserves in the form of US government securities.	结果，东亚国家现在积累了巨大的以美国国债为形式的外汇储备。


While China has attracted a large amount of foreign direct investment, it has bought an even larger amount of US government securities.	中国尽管吸引着大量的外国直接投资（FDI），但其所购入的美国政府债券数量要更大。


Whereas the average return on FDI in China was 33% for American firms in 2008, the average return on China’s investment in US government securities was a mere 3-4%.	2008年，美国公司在中国的FDI平均回报率为33%，而中国的美国国债投资平均回报率只有3—4%。


So, why does China invest its savings so heavily in low-return US government securities, rather than in high-return domestic projects?	因此，为何中国要把这么多储蓄投资在低回报的美国国债上，而不投资于高回报的国内项目？


One answer lies in the fact that China’s FDI policy over the past 30 years has crowded out Chinese investors from high-return projects, forcing them to settle for less lucrative projects.	一个答案，过去30年来，中国的FDI政策将中国投资者挤出了高回报项目，迫使他们投资于低回报项目。


But there are still potential investors who cannot find any suitable investment opportunities in China, generating excess resources, which in turn are invested in US government securities.	但仍然有不少潜在投资者在中国找不到任何合适的投资机会，他们手里握着过剩的资源，只能投资于美国国债。


But, while China’s foreign assets are denominated in US dollars, its liabilities, such as FDI, are mostly denominated in renminbi.	但是，尽管中国对外资产以美元计价，其债务，比如FDI，却是用人民币计价的。


As a result, when the dollar depreciates against the renminbi, the value of China’s foreign liabilities increases in dollar terms, while that of its foreign assets remains unchanged.	结果，当美元对人民币贬值时，中国的对外债务的美元价值就会上升，而其对外资产并不发生变化。


As a result, China’s net international investment position (NIIP), which is the difference between China’s gross assets and its gross liabilities, automatically worsens.	结果，中国的净国际投资头寸（NIIP），即中国总资产与总负债之差，会自动减少。


The deterioration of China’s NIIP is a reflection of the transfer of wealth from China to the US. 	中国NIIP的恶化反映了财富从中国向美国的转移。


Since the 2000’s, China’s gross assets and gross liabilities have increased dramatically, owing to the success of China’s trade-promotion and FDI policies.	进入21世纪以来，拜贸易扩张和FDI政策所赐，中国的总资产和总负债显著地增加了。


As a result, China’s net international investment position has become very vulnerable to the devaluation of the dollar.	结果，中国的NIIP变得极其容易受美元贬值影响。


Meanwhile, capital inflows into developing countries have surged since the 2007-2009 global financial crisis.	与此同时，自2007—2009年金融危机以来，发展中国家的资本流入出现了剧增。


In 2010, China’s capital-account surplus stood at $230 billion, and capital inflows remain large this year.	2010年，中国资本项目盈余为2300亿美元，今年的资本流入额也颇为可观。


With ever-increasing gross dollar assets and gross renminbi liabilities, a stronger renminbi means that China will suffer additional welfare losses from the valuation effect of exchange-rate movements.	由于总美元资产和总人民币负债在不断增长，人民币升值意味着中国将因汇率变动的价值效应而遭受额外的福利损失。


(It is worth noting that this is not solely a Chinese phenomenon; all major emerging-market economies are faced with the same fate.)	（值得注意的是，这并非只是中国独有的现象，所有新兴市场国家如今都存在这个问题。 ）


During the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, East Asia’s economies paid heavily for excessive accumulation of dollar-denominated debts.	1997—1998年亚洲金融危机期间，东亚经济体为过度积累美元债务付出了沉重代价。


Because governments failed to defend their currencies, they lost hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign-exchange reserves to international speculators.	由于政府无法捍卫本币，它们被国际投机者赚去了数千亿美元的外汇储备。


Whether for self-insurance or to maintain a competitive exchange rate, East Asia has since then accumulated a huge volume of dollar-denominated assets.	不管是为了自我保险，还是为了维持竞争性汇率，亚洲金融危机后，东亚再一次开始积累过多的美元债务。


This time around, thanks to the deterioration of the US fiscal position and the Federal Reserve’s expansionary monetary policy, “the long-term risk [for] emerging markets’ external balance sheets is shifting,” as Eswar Prasad of the Brookings Institution has pointed out, “to the asset side.”	这一回，由于美国财政状况恶化以及美联储扩张性的货币政策，“新兴市场外部资产负债表的长期风险正在移向资产项，”布鲁金斯研究所的帕莱萨德（Eswar Prasad）。


Rather than confronting a debt crisis, as in 1997-98, emerging-market economies now face an “asset crisis,” but they will suffer the same result: great capital losses on their foreign-exchange reserves.	与1997—1998年间面临债务危机不同，新兴市场经济体如今面临的是“资产危机”，但结果是一样的：巨大的外汇储备损失。


Indeed, the magnitude of the losses will be on par with that of Asian financial crisis, if not higher.	事实上，这笔损失的程度将不会亚于当年的亚洲金融危机


While China’s government should make greater efforts to rebalance the economy by conventional measures, it also should focus more attention on adjusting the currency structure of the country’s gross assets and gross liabilities.	中国政府需要更努力地通过常规手段实现经济再平衡，但与此同时也应该更关注调整总资产和总负债的货币结构。


In particular, China should try to replace its dollar-denominated assets with renminbi-denominated assets, and its renminbi-denominated liabilities with dollar-denominated liabilities.	特别地，中国应该尝试用人民币资产取代美元资产，用美元负债取代人民币负债。


If China cannot do very much about existing gross assets and gross liabilities, it should address new assets and liabilities in order to minimize future capital losses.	如果中国不能对已有的总资产和总负债动太大的手脚，那么应该修正新的资产和负债，以使未来资本损失最小化。


In short, China must take into consideration the ongoing asset crisis facing emerging economies, especially when considering highly consequential questions such as full renminbi convertibility and the currency’s internationalization.	简言之，中国必须认真考虑当前新兴经济体所面临的资产危机，特别是如果它想实现人民币完全可兑换和国际化的话。


The Autumn of the Commandante	将军迟暮


The death watch for Fidel Castro is something that only Gabriel Garcia Marquez could get right.	守候菲德尔▪卡斯特罗死亡这样的事只有加布里埃尔▪加西亚▪马奎斯这样的人才能做得妥帖。


His novel Autumn of the Patriarch captures perfectly the moral squalor, political paralysis, and savage ennui that enshrouds a society awaiting the death of a long-term dictator.	他的小说《族长的秋天》完美地刻画了围裹着一个等待一位长期独裁者死亡的社会的道德贫困、政治麻痹和极度倦怠。


Commandante Fidel’s departure from power, of course, will be solely a matter of biology, and the few pictures of him that have emerged since he took ill last year clearly show biology at work.	当然，菲德尔司令步下权坛将完全是一桩生物学事件。 自他去年病倒后所公布的数张照片表明了生物学的作用。


When the end comes, change in Cuba could be as vast as any that greeted the end of the last century’s great dictators.	当终结到来时，古巴发生的变化可能和上个世纪所有的大独裁者去世后所发生的一样巨大。


Stalin, Franco, Tito, Mao: all were mostly alike in their means and methods.	斯大林、弗朗哥、铁托和毛泽东：在统治方略和手段上何其相似。


How they passed from the scene, however, was often very different, and these differences can shape societies for years and decades to come.	但他们如何从政坛消逝的情况却迥异。 而这些不同会对他们所在的社会产生短期和长期的重大影响。


Consider the Soviet Union.	先看苏联。


On March 9, 1953, from the Gulf of Finland to the Bering Sea, everything stood still; likewise in Warsaw, Budapest, Prague, and East Berlin.	在1953年3月9日，从芬兰湾到白令海峡，万物静穆； 在华沙、布达佩斯、布拉格和东柏林也是如此。


In Beijing, Mao Zedong himself bowed low before an immense effigy of Joseph Stalin.	在北京，毛泽东本人也在约瑟夫▪斯大林那令人憎恶的巨大雕像前鞠躬。


Huge mourning crowds, crying, nearly hysterical, could be seen all over the vast empire Stalin had ruled.	斯大林所统治的辽阔帝国上到处可见悲恸的人群近乎歇斯底里地哀嚎。


Yet, within days, the word Stalinism was being expunged from a new Soviet dictionary, and three years later my grandfather, Nikita Khrushchev, denounced Stalin’s “cult of personality” in his famous “Secret Speech” to the Communist Party’s XXth Congress.	然而，几天之后，“斯大林主义”一词就被从新的苏维埃字典中擦去。 三年之后，我的祖父，尼基塔▪赫鲁晓夫就在其著名的苏联共产党第二十次代表大会上的“秘密讲话”中公开抨击了斯大林的“个人崇拜”。


The Khrushchev thaw that followed may have been short-lived, but for the first time in Soviet history the possibility of change was opened – a possibility that Mikhail Gorbachev seized upon in 1985.	赫鲁晓夫似的解冻也许是昙花一现，但在它第一次在苏维埃历史上开启了变革的可能性—一种被戈尔巴乔夫在1985年利用的可能性。


The death of Marshal Josip Broz Tito brought forth an outpouring of another sort.	铁托将军的死带来了另一种爆发。


For decades, his personal rule imposed a false unity on Yugoslavia.	数十年以来，他的个人统治将一种团结的假象强加于南斯拉夫。


Following his death in 1980, that artificial state began to unravel, culminating in the genocidal wars in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo of the 1990’s.	在他于1980年去世以后，那个人工的国家就开始四分五裂，最终导致发生在波斯尼亚、克罗地亚以及1990年代在科索沃的种族灭绝战争。


Not all long-term dictatorships, however, end in disintegration and mayhem.	然而，并不是所有的长期独裁统治都以瓦解和混乱告终。


Mao’s death allowed for Deng Xiaoping’s return from disgrace and internal exile.	毛泽东的死使邓小平从被内部流放的失意状态重返政坛。


Deng quickly routed Mao’s “Gang of Four” heirs, and in only a few years opened China’s economy, fueling a capitalist revolution that has transformed China far more completely – and successfully – than Mao’s socialist revolution ever did.	邓很快就清理了毛的“四人帮”继承者，并只用了数年时间就开放了中国的经济，掀起了一场使中国比在毛泽东的社会主义革命下更彻底—并更成功—转型的资本主义革命。


The Communist Party, of course, remains in power, and Mao’s portrait still looms over Tiananmen Square.	当然，共产党仍然掌权，毛泽东的画像仍然高挂在天安门之上。


But both are mere relics of ideas and ideals that in reality have been consigned to the dustbin of history.	但这两者都只不过是在现实中已被扔进历史故纸堆的理念和理想的遗迹罢了。


Spain, too, escaped violent dissolution when Generalissimo Francisco Franco’s fascist dictatorship collapsed at his death.	西班牙也在弗朗西斯科▪弗朗哥大元帅去世，其法西斯独裁统治崩溃之后逃过了分崩离析的灾难。


Here the old dictator can take some credit, for by re-establishing the monarchy under King Juan Carlos just before he died, Franco provided Spain with a foundation on which to build anew.	而这在一定程度上还是要归功于这位老独裁者。 由于在其死前恢复了国王胡安▪卡洛斯领导下的君主政治，弗朗哥给西班牙提供了一个重建的基础。


Little did Franco realize that what Juan Carlos would build, with the help of a clever young Franco-era bureaucrat named Adolfo Suarez, was the modern, democratic Spain of today.	然而弗朗哥万万没想到胡安▪卡洛斯在一位聪颖而年轻的弗朗哥时期官员阿多夫▪舒瓦雷茨的帮助下所建立的是今天这样现代、民主的西班牙。


It was no accident that communist countries were (and are) usually run by geriatric leaders, and democracies by younger men and women.	共产主义国家通常曾经并仍然由年迈的领导人统治，而民主国家的首脑通常是较年轻的男性和女性—这一现象并非偶然。


That difference matters.	这种区别意义重大。


Old leaders can preside successfully over smoothly running countries that need no radical re-examination of their policies and purposes.	年迈的领导人能够成功地领导一个平稳发展，并不需要对其政策和目的进行激进的重新评估的国家。


There are exceptions to this rule, of course – Churchill, Adenauer, Deng, Reagan – but states cannot count on fortune bringing an exceptional ruler their way.	当然，也有例外—如丘吉尔、阿登纳、邓小平和里根—但国家不能依靠幸运来赐予这样的领袖。


Younger leaders are more likely to be able to cope with the chop and change of difficult times.	较年轻的领导人更有能力应对困难时期的风浪和变革。


Political competition makes it necessary for all politicians, whatever their age, to stay on their toes, anticipate new problems, and remain open to new ideas aimed at addressing them.	政治竞争令所有的政客，不论年龄大小，都保持警醒，准备应对新问题，并对解决问题的新理念保持开放的态度。


No one can keep himself ensconced in high office subject only to death or his own boredom.	没人可以将他自己锁在办公室里闭关修炼、只求终老。


One-party systems, one-man charismatic dictatorships, or a mixture of the two, as in Tito’s Yugoslavia, are a guarantee of sclerotic minds and inert governments.	一党制、个人魅力独裁��或是铁托的南斯拉夫那样的二者混合，肯定只会带来僵化的头脑和迟钝的政府。


So what will become of Cuba after Fidel departs?	那么，卡斯特罗去世后古巴将会怎样？


Many observers portray Raúl Castro, Fidel’s younger brother and designated heir, as a pragmatist – the “practical Castro.”	许多观察家都将其胞弟和指定继承人劳尔▪卡斯特罗描述为一个实用主义者—“实用的卡斯特罗”。


When Cuba’s lavish Soviet subsidies vanished in the early 1990’s, it was Raúl who recognized that the regime’s survival required economic reforms, pressing to allow private agricultural markets to reopen in order to boost food production and stave off possible starvation.	当古巴慷慨的苏维埃时代补贴在1990年代消失殆尽时，正是劳尔认识到政权的生存需要经济改革。 在他的敦促下，私人农业市场重新开放从而促进粮食生产并避免可能发生的饥荒。


However, this is the same man who, as the head of Cuba’s internal security apparatus, for many years represented the knuckles of an iron-fisted regime, directly responsible for imprisoning – and often torturing – thousands of dissidents.	然而，同是这个人，作为古巴内部安全机器的首脑，多年以来代表着一个铁腕政权的威力，直接对监禁—并时常折磨—成千的持不同政见者负责。


So perhaps the best that could be hoped for is a Russian-style experiment with liberalization that is quickly called off by the regime’s nervous Old Guard.	因此，我们可能希望的最好结局也就是一个俄罗斯似的自由化试验，并很快就会被该政权紧张不安的保守势力叫停。


Moreover, with the support of oil-rich allies like Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez – and with the recent discovery of significant crude reserves off Cuba’s own coast – introducing reforms could well become less urgent.	另外，有了像盛产石油的委内瑞拉的总统查韦斯这样的盟友支持—再加上最近发现的古巴本国的丰富近海石油储藏—引入改革很可能也变得不那么急迫了。


In that case, Raúl may seek to cling grimly to the fossilized system that he helped build and maintain with such brutality.	在那样的情况下，劳尔可能会选择沿袭这一他参与缔造并以强权维护的陈腐政体。


But Raúl Castro is an old man himself, so we can hope for the prospect that some Deng or, better yet, a Suarez will ultimately emerge from the wreckage of Fidelism.	但劳尔▪卡斯特罗本人也已年迈。 所以我们可以憧憬着某一个邓小平，或更好的舒瓦雷茨似的人物最终会从古巴革命主义的废墟里出现。


But for now, younger communist officials, like Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque, remain ideological hardliners whom many Cubans refer to as “los Taliban.”	但就现在来看，较年轻的共产党官员，如古巴的外交部长菲利普▪佩雷兹▪罗格仍然是意识形态上的强硬派。 许多古巴人都称其为“塔利班”。


If they take control and stick to their guns, Cuba could face another long biology lesson.	如果他们接手政权并固执己见，那么古巴可能又要面临一堂漫长的生物课了。


The Ayatollah Contemplates Compromise	阿亚图拉考虑妥协


WASHINGTON, DC – The recent nuclear talks in Istanbul between the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, plus Germany, and Iran have shifted the world’s focus to the possible terms of a deal when the sides meet again, probably in Baghdad on May 23.	华盛顿——不久前，联合国安理会五个常任理事国再加上德国和伊朗曾经在伊斯坦布尔就核问题举行会议，各方可能在5月23日在巴格达再次召开会议，由此可能达成的相关协议条款吸引了世界各国的关注。


So, what accounts for the new seeming willingness of Iran’s leaders to reach an agreement?	那么，是什么原因导致伊朗领导人似乎有意愿达成协议？


Economic sanctions and political isolation have, of course, deeply hurt the regime, especially the Revolutionary Guards, whose leaders and industries have been directly targeted by the international community.	当然，经济制裁和政治孤立深深地伤害了伊朗政权，首当其冲的是革命卫队，他们的领导人和所属产业已经成为国际社会的打击对象。


But these are not the only factors.	但这些并不是唯一的因素。


The regime’s propaganda machine is already portraying the Istanbul talks as a triumph for the Islamic Republic and a setback for the West.	伊朗政府的宣传机器已经把伊斯坦布尔会谈描绘成伊斯兰共和国的胜利和西方的失败。


Indeed, it is setting the stage for a significant compromise by preparing both the Iranian public and the global community.	事实上，它在让伊朗公众和国际社会为重大妥协做好准备。


Iran, it must be remembered, cares as much about its image as it does about its nuclear achievements.	我们必须记住一点，伊朗关心其自身形象不亚于关心其核成就。


A successful strategy must allow Iran to come out of talks with a smile on its face, even if it gives up the most sensitive parts of its nuclear program.	因此必须让伊朗即使放弃核计划最敏感部分，也能面带笑容地离开谈判桌，这才是真正成功的策略。


Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, has made an uncompromising nuclear policy central to his domestic authority.	伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊把毫不妥协的核政策当作其国内权力的核心要素。


For years, he sabotaged the efforts of Iranian officials who might have cut a deal with the West because he doubted their loyalty to him.	多年来他不断破坏伊朗官员与西方达成妥协的努力，因为他怀疑他们的忠诚度。


Those whom Khamenei did trust were not skillful enough to craft a policy of compromise that would preserve his ability to portray himself as a tough anti-American leader.	而那些深受哈梅内伊信任的人又没有能力制定政策，在达成妥协的同时仍将其塑造成强硬的反美领袖。


As the talks move ahead, the United States and its allies must stick to a dual-track policy: intensifying political pressure and economic sanctions, while negotiating seriously.	随着会谈的进行，美国及其盟国必须坚持贯彻双轨制政策：在强化政治压力和经济制裁的同时严肃认真地开展谈判工作。


They should insist on transparency in Iran’s nuclear program, while offering a gradual easing of sanctions in exchange for verifiable guarantees that the regime is not pursuing nuclear weapons.	他们应该坚持要求伊朗核计划加大透明度，并在确保伊朗政府没有研制核武器的同时逐步放松经济制裁政策。


If things break down, the possibility of a pre-emptive military strike, whether by Israel or the US, remains an option.	如果出现问题，由以色列或美国抢先发动军事打击的可能性仍然是一种选择。


Regardless of their outcome, the new negotiations have put Khamenei in a perilous position.	无论结果如何，哈梅内伊在新一轮谈判中的处境都是危险的。


As the person in charge of Iran’s nuclear policy, compromising is as dangerous for him as digging in his heels.	身为伊朗核政策的负责人，妥协之于他的确难以承受。


This might be the last chance for Iran to change its nuclear policy, prevent military confrontation, and save the economy.	这或许是伊朗改变核政策、防止军事对峙和挽救经济的最后的机会。


But, for Khamenei, nuclear concessions might also undermine his monopoly over domestic politics.	但对哈梅内伊而言，在核问题上的让步也可能危及他在国内政治领域的垄断地位。


Khamenei is not a suicidal jihadist.	哈梅内伊绝不是抱定必死之心的圣战者。


In 23 years of leadership, he has avoided risky domestic and foreign policies.	在23年的执政生涯中，他成功避免了高风险的国内和国际政策。


But he is not immune to miscalculation.	但他也绝非从不失策。


In 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad relied on Khamenei’s financial and political support to win the presidency.	2005年，艾哈迈迪内贾德依靠哈梅内伊的经济和政治支持登上总统宝座。


Today, however, Khamenei is profoundly regretful about that choice.	但时至今日，哈梅内伊非常后悔当时的选择。


Ahmadinejad disobeys his orders, tries to discredit him with the public by challenging his authority, and undermines key institutions, including the judiciary and the parliament.	艾哈迈迪内贾德不听从他的命令，试图抹黑他，挑战他的权威，破坏他的司法和议会等关键制度。


It is an open secret in Iranian political circles that Khamenei also regrets permitting volunteers of the Basij militia to attack the British embassy last November.	哈梅内伊还后悔允许巴斯基民兵志愿者在去年11月袭击英国使馆，这已经是伊朗政界公开的秘密了。


The troubling conclusion to be drawn from these episodes is that even if Khamenei is not looking for a military confrontation, he may very well be susceptible to misjudgments about how to avoid one.	由此可以得出一个令人不安的结论，即就算军事对峙不是哈梅内伊想要的结果，他也很可能在如何避免的问题上出现判断失误。


Khamenei faces a deeper problem: he is not Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, his predecessor and the Islamic Republic’s founding Supreme Leader, who shaped the system’s identity.	哈梅内伊还面临一个更深层次的问题：他与创立伊斯兰共和国、确立国家制度的前任最高领袖霍梅尼不可同日而语。


Khomeini was so self-confident, and his authority was so well consolidated, that he was not afraid to make concessions if he thought it necessary for the regime’s well-being.	霍梅尼自信心极强、对权力的把控极为牢固，并不惧怕在必要的情况下进行妥协。


Khamenei’s political standing is closely associated with the current nuclear policy, and he lacks the charisma and authority necessary to move the political and religious elite toward compromise.	而哈梅内伊的政治地位与目前的核政策息息相关，他也缺乏带领政治和宗教精英接受妥协所必须的魅力和权威。


For Khamenei, nuclear capability is not a goal but rather a means to force the West and its regional allies to recognize the regime’s strategic interests.	对哈梅内伊而言，核能力与其说是目的，不如说是迫使西方和其地区盟国承认现政权战略利益的一种手段。


Moreover, he is convinced that the West is seeking to undermine the Islamic Republic through a “soft” assault of culture and politics, and that compromise on the nuclear program would lead inevitably to concessions on human rights and democracy, and eventually to regime change.	���外，他深信西方企图通过文化和政治领域的“软”攻击来破坏伊斯兰共和国，核计划的妥协必然导致在民主和人权等领域做出让步，并最终导致政权更迭。


Given this, a guarantee that the West, especially the US, is not seeking the overthrow of Iran’s leaders would have to be a key component of a nuclear compromise.	有鉴于此，西方，尤其是美国，保证不寻求推翻伊朗领导人必须是核妥协的关键要素。


Indeed, Khamenei might well demand that this guarantee cover Farsi broadcasts, financial and political support to opposition groups, and censorship of the Internet.	事实上，哈梅内伊可能还会要求同样的保证适用于波斯语广播、对反对派团体的经济和政治支持以及对互联网的审查。


The nuclear crisis should be resolved through negotiations, before, in US President Barack Obama’s phrase, the window closes.	用美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马的话说，必须在机会之窗关闭前通过谈判手段解决核危机问题。


The problem for Khamenei – and thus for those negotiating with Iran – is that there is scant benefit for him in success.	哈梅内伊，连带那些与伊朗谈判者所面临的问题是，解决核危机让他们很难得到好处。


The biggest obstacle to a successful outcome is the contradiction of his situation: to compromise, he must save face; but, to save face, he must not compromise.	他的矛盾处境是谈判成功的最大障碍：要想妥协，他必须保住面子； 但要想保住面子，他就一定不能妥协。


The Ayatollahs’ Tipping Point	阿亚图拉的倒台之时


SOUTHAMPTON, ENGLAND – Once the crowds were in the streets in Tehran, one could, if one knew the script, begin the countdown: if today there are mass protests, tomorrow there will be threats of retaliation in the name of “national security.” By day three, we will see journalists imprisoned and media shut down; day four, bloody reprisals against protesters by secret police; day five, arrests of key opposition figures.	发自英格兰南安普顿——一旦人群开始聚集在德黑兰的街头，自然就会有熟知内情的人开始暗自算计：如果今天发生了大规模示威，那么明天就会冒出以“国家安全”为名的镇压威胁，第三天就有一批记者和新闻媒体遭到逮捕和查封，第四天则是秘密警察对示威群众的血腥报复，最后到了第五天，一切以几个关键反对派人物铛锒入狱告终。


Sure enough, right on schedule, each of those steps was set in motion in Iran, within the space of a week.	而在人们的预计当中，这一整套算计都将按部就班，分毫不差地发生在伊朗。


These same ten steps occurred in Thailand in 2006 – in ten days, and in seven days in Myanmar a year later.	事实上，同样的步骤早就在2006年时的泰国和2007年的缅甸付诸实施——只不过是泰国用了10天而缅甸用了7天而以。


The script is so well known by now among the world’s would-be dictators that it can take less than a week to lock down a country.	而世界上那些怀抱独裁野心的人则早已把这个“一星期治国”的法则倒背如流了。


None of this should surprise anyone anymore.	上述策略早就不能令任何人感到惊讶了。


We should understand that this time-tested script for establishing or enforcing a dictatorship exists – but so does a counter-strategy for opening up a closed society.	我们应该明白到这套经过历史检验的策略的确可以用来建立独裁——而同时也可以用来阻止一个封闭的社会走向开放。


When a would-be dictator – anywhere, any time, on the right or the left – wants to close an open society or initiate a crackdown against a democracy movement, he follows ten classic steps: invoke a threat, create secret prisons, develop a paramilitary force, establish a surveillance apparatus, arbitrarily detain citizens, infiltrate citizen groups, target key individuals, go after journalists, call criticism “treason,” and subvert the rule of law.	当一个准独裁者——无论其身处哪一国家，选择什么时机，是左派还是右派——想要封闭一个开放社会或者阻止一场民主运动，他都会遵照经典的十部曲：发出威胁—建立秘密监狱—发展准军事组织—设立监视机构—肆意逮捕公民—渗透公民组织—锁定关键人物—跟踪记者—把批评声音定义为“叛国”—推翻法治体系。


Once these steps are put in place, it is extremely difficult for a pro-democracy movement to survive – but not impossible if counter-pressure is applied correctly.	当这十步都各就各位之时，一场民主运动要最终生存下来就变得极端困难了——但如果反对力量能巧妙行事的话，生存下来也不是没有可能的。


History shows again and again – throughout the modern era and around the world – that people do indeed have some powerful tools to reestablish an open society if they were willing to use them.	历史一次又一次地昭示了近现代时期的世界各地人民如果试图重建一个开放社会的话，他们手中还是有一些有力手段可资利用的。


The counter-script for establishing or restoring pro-democratic conditions consists of more mass protest; the appearance and display of resistance symbols; the emergence of enough spokespeople throughout society that all of them cannot be arrested at once; overt civil and covert disobedience, at every level of society, that brings the economy to a halt; withdrawal of support by lawyers and judges for the regime’s decisions; international sanctions tied to human rights and clean elections; the refusal – tricky but not unattainable – of many soldiers and police to fire at unarmed citizens; and, finally, when the rule of law is reestablished, serious prosecutions of the defeated regime’s ringleaders.	士兵和警察巧妙地违抗向手无寸铁的市民开枪的命令； 最后，当法治体系被重新建立起来之后，对前政权领导人罪行的无情追诉。


When we see footage of nonviolent protesters being brutally beaten by police and militia members, it is painful to deliver the message that, if history is a guide, continued street protest will make the difference between Iran being like Myanmar or, possibly, like Czechoslovakia.	当我们看到和平示威的人们被警察和民兵残酷殴打时，就应该在悲痛之中传达这么一种信息，那就是如果历史可以借鉴的话，坚持不断的示威将令伊朗的局势发展有别于缅甸甚至是捷克斯洛伐克。


Time and again, when mass street protest has been sustained for more than a week or two, a regime – even one that has begun beating and arresting protesters –eventually finds it practically and psychologically difficult to sustain its hold.	历史一次又一次地证明，当大规模街头示威能持续一个星期或者两个——即使是那些开始殴打和逮捕示威者的政权也会在事实和心理上感到坐立不安


Street protest, if it can sustain itself for more than that crucial first week, has an effect that is both tactical and emotional; mass protest during the French Revolution made it clear to the courtiers that this rebellion would be too profound to quell in the usual manner; street protests in the American colonies, in the face of arrest or worse, made the colonies ungovernable even before George III waged a costly, unpopular war.	如果街头抗议能挺过关键的第一个星期，那么就会产生战术和感情了两方面的影响； 法国大革命中的大规模示威令那些王公大臣意识到这些反抗民众是如此，不能像平常那样被镇压；


In Estonia in the 1980’s, the small, illegal protests that surrounded the public singing of the banned national anthem grew, and Estonians were emboldened as their numbers swelled by the thousands daily.	而美洲殖民地的街头示威活动，即使面对逮捕甚至更坏的后果，也使美洲殖民地在英王乔治三世发动一场耗资重大而不讨好的战争之前就变得难以管理。 在1980年代的爱沙尼亚，围绕着公开演唱被禁止的国歌这样的行动，小规模的非法抗议不断增加，而人们的勇气则随着抗议队伍人数每天数以千计的膨胀而不断受到鼓舞。


In the United States, street protests helped bring the Vietnam war to an end, and the mass protests of the civil rights movement showed that, as Martin Luther King, Jr. put it,  “business as usual” could no longer continue.	在美国，街头抗议终结了越南战争，而大规模的民权运动，正如马丁·路德·金所说的那样，使“正常的商业活动”都难以进行。


According to King, disruptive mass protest exposes the tension that has been hidden or ignored, so that it can be addressed.	在他看来，分裂性的大规模示威暴露了在一般情况下被掩盖或者忽视了的紧张关系，并使这种矛盾得以被辨认和解决


Iran’s citizens – and all people longing to resist a tyrannical government or to protest in an established democracy – should bear that lesson in mind.	因此伊朗市民——以及所有渴望反抗一个残暴政府或者抗议一个民主政权的——都要牢记这些历史经验。


Protest that works must disrupt business as usual and, ideally, stop traffic.	有效的示威必须能中断商业活动，甚至在理想的层面来说，要中断交通。


Iranian citizens have shown great courage, and they would do well to continue pouring into the street and sitting down, lying down, or standing still.	伊朗民众已经展示了巨大的勇气，而他们如果能继续涌入街道并坐下来，躺下或者只是站着，效果都会更好。


Unless a regime is willing to start machine-gunning its citizens, peaceful, steady, long-term disruption of “business as usual” always works.	除非一个政权真的下决心要用机枪血洗街道，否则的话一个和平，坚定和长期的对“正常商业活动”的阻挠往往是有效的。


What the West can do is apply pressure on Iran – and on other governments in the future – to assure and account for the safety of protesters.	而西方可以做的则是给伊朗施加压力——这也包括对未来的其他政权——以保证示威者的安全。


Natan Sharansky said that this tactic – the West tracking and demanding accountability for the treatment of individual internal dissenters – helped break up the Soviet Union.	Natan Sharansky说这种战略——西方追踪并要求政权对其国内异见分子的待遇有所保证——帮助了苏联的解体。


In this crisis, the US president should form a united front with human rights groups, which can advise him exactly how to follow, sustain, and support those Iranians who have been or may yet be arrested, or worse.	而在这场危机中，美国总统应该和人权组织共同组建一个前线联盟，而这些组织则告诉他具体应该怎样跟进，支撑并支持那些被逮捕或未被逮捕，或者碰到更遭待遇的伊朗人。


Barack Obama says that America “stands with” those who support free assembly.	巴拉克·奥巴马说美国人和那些支持自由集会权的人“站在一起”。


That will be welcome news to people living under dictatorial regimes installed and propped up by the US, and to the opposition leaders and journalists languishing in US-supported prisons in those countries for having engaged in just such protest. But it is a start.	这对那些在美国扶持下的独裁政权治下的人们来说是个好消息，对于那些因为参加这类集会而在美国支持的政权的监狱中挣扎求生的反对派领导人和记者们也是好消息。


What a real revolution it would be if the Western democracies did indeed begin to frame their foreign policies with human rights and democratic processes as their benchmark.	但这只是个开始，而真正的革命，则是西方民主国家真正开始用人权和民主进程作为基准来构建其外交政策。


The Bad Society	坏社会


LONDON – How much inequality is acceptable?	伦敦—多大程度的不平等是可接受的？


Judging by pre-recession standards, a great deal of it, especially in the United States and Britain.	从衰退前标准看，相当大，美国和英国尤其如此。


New Labour's Peter Mandelson voiced the spirit of the past 30 years when he remarked that he felt intensely “relaxed” about people getting “filthy” rich.	新工党（New Labour）的彼得·曼德尔逊（Peter Mandelson）说他对“不义”而富之人完全没有“不忿”，以此描述了过去30年的精神。


Getting rich was what the “new economy” was all about.	致富是“新经济”全部意义之所在。


And the newly rich kept an increasing part of what they got, as taxes were slashed to encourage them to get still richer, and efforts to divide up the pie more fairly were abandoned.	新兴富豪所能保留的财富越来越多，因为为了鼓励他们变得更富，税收被大幅削减了，而更公平的切蛋糕规则却被抛弃了。


The results were predictable.	结果是可以预料的。


In 1970, the pre-tax pay of a top American CEO was about 30 times higher than that of the average worker; today it is 263 times higher.	1970年，美国顶级CEO税前薪酬大约是普通员工的30倍； 如今是263倍。


In Britain, the basic pay (without bonuses) of a top CEO was 47 times the average worker’s in 1970; in 2010, it was 81 times more.	在英国，1970年顶级CEO基本工资（不含奖金）是普通员工的47倍，2010年为81倍多。


Since the late 1970s, the post-tax income of the richest fifth has increased five times as fast as the poorest fifth in the US, and four times as fast in the UK.	20世纪70年代末以来，美国最富有的20%人群的税后收入增速是比最贫穷的20%人群的5倍，英国则是4倍。


Even more important has been the growing gap between average (mean) and median income: that is, the proportion of the population living on half or less of the average income in the US and Britain has been growing.	更重要的是，普通（平均）收入和中位收入之间的差距在扩大。 也就是说，收入不超过平均收入一半的美国人和英国人比重一直在增加。


Although some countries have resisted the trend, inequality has been increasing over the last 30-40 years in the world as a whole.	尽管一些国家阻止了不平等性增加的趋势，但从过去三四十年来的世界总体情况看，不平等性一直在增加。


Inequality within countries has increased, and inequality between countries increased sharply after 1980, before leveling off in the late 1990’s and finally falling back after 2000, as catch-up growth in developing countries accelerated.	各国国内的不平等性在增加，国与国之间的不平等性则在1980年之后显著增加，但在20世纪90年代末开始趋缓，并最终在2000之后开始下降，原因在于发展中国家的赶超增长开始发力。


The growth of inequality leaves ideological defenders of capitalism unfazed.	不平定性的增加并没有让资本主义意识形态捍卫者乱了阵脚。


In a competitive market system, people are said to be paid what they are worth: so top CEOs add 263 times more value to the American economy than the workers they employ.	在竞争性市场制度中，据说人们有多少价值才能获得多少薪酬，因此，顶级CEO为美国经济增加的价值是他们所雇用的员工的263倍。


But the poor, it is claimed, are still better off than they would have been had the gap been artificially narrowed by trade unions or governments. The only secure way to get “trickle-down” wealth to trickle faster is by cutting marginal tax rates still further, or, alternatively, by improving the “human capital” of the poor, so that they become worth more to their employers.	但是，据说由于收入差距没有被工会和政府人为缩小，穷人的境况也因此得到了改善。 确保“滴渗”财富渗透得更快的唯一办法是进一步降低边际税率，或者改善穷人的“人力资本”，从而增加他们对雇主的价值。


This is a method of economic reasoning that is calculated to appeal to those at the top of the income pyramid.	这一经济论证算法对位于收入金字塔顶层的人群颇具吸引力。


After all, there is no way whatsoever to calculate the marginal products of different individuals in cooperative productive activities.	毕竟，不管怎样，你都无法计算不同个体在合作生产活动中的边际产量。


Top pay rates are simply fixed by comparing them to other top pay rates in similar jobs.	顶层薪酬只能通过与相似职位薪酬进行比较确定。


In the past, pay differentials were settled by reference to what seemed fair and reasonable.	过去，收入差距是通过参考貌似公平合理的标准确定的。


The greater the knowledge, skill, and responsibility attached to a job, the higher the acceptable and accepted reward for doing it.	某职位中所包含的知识、技能和职责越大，该职位可接受和公认的薪酬就越高。


But all of this occurred within bounds that maintained some connection between the top and the bottom.	但所有这些都有一个限度：维持顶端和底端的某种联系。


Top business salaries were rarely more than 20 or 30 times higher than average wages, and for most people differentials were far less.	顶端企业薪酬很少有超过平均工资二三十倍的时候，对大部分人来说，收入差距要小得多。


Thus, the income of doctors and lawyers used to be about five times higher than that of manual workers, not ten times or more, as they are today.	因此，医生和律师的收入通常要比劳动力高出5倍，而不会像如今那样高出10倍甚至10倍以上。


It is the breakdown of non-economistic, common-sense ways of valuing human activities –framing them in larger social contexts – that has led to today’s spurious methods of calculating pay.	评估人类行为的非经济、常识性手段——将其纳入更广的社会环境框架中加以考虑——被抛弃了，这导致了如今采用欺骗性方法来计算薪酬。


There is a strange, though little-noticed, consequence of the failure to distinguish value from price: the only way offered to most people to boost their incomes is through economic growth.	不能区分价值和价格会产生一个奇特但不为人注意的后果：大部分人提高收入的唯一办法是经济增长。


In poor countries, this is reasonable; there is not enough wealth to spread round.	在穷国，这在合理不过了——没有足够的财富可供分配。


But, in developed countries, concentration on economic growth is an extraordinarily inefficient way to increase general prosperity, because it means that an economy must grow by, say, 3% to raise the earnings of the majority by, say, 1%.	但是，在发达国家，经济增长的集中是极其低效的产生整体繁荣的方法，因为这意味着用（比如）3%的经济增长来提升（比如）大多数人收入的1%。


Nor is it by any means certain that the human capital of the majority can be increased faster than that of the minority, who capture all of the educational advantages flowing from superior wealth, family conditions, and connections.	就人力资本而言，大部分人也不能保证能够比通过雄厚的财力、优渥的家庭条件和关系网尽享教育优势的小部分人增加得更快。


Redistribution in these circumstances is a more secure way to achieve a broad base of consumption, which is itself a guarantee of economic stability.	在这种情况下，再分配才是更有效地扩大消费基础的办法，而后者又是经济稳定的保证。


The attitude of indifference to income distribution is in fact a recipe for economic growth without end, with the rich, very rich, and super-rich drawing ever further ahead of the rest.	对收��分配采取不关心的态度事实上是让经济无限量增长，同时让豪门阔族将其他人群远远甩在身后。


This must be wrong for moral and even practical reasons.	这显然不符合道德标准，甚至也不符合务实标准。


In moral terms, it puts the prospect of the good life perpetually beyond reach for most people.	从道德上讲，这会导致美好生活之梦永远游离在大多数人可触及的范围之外。


And, in practical terms, it is bound to destroy the social cohesion on which democracy – or, indeed, any type of peaceful, contented society – ultimately rests.	从务实角度讲，这注定会摧毁民主——事实上，是所有和平、舒适的社会类型——的最后基石。


The Bailout Bias	援助偏见


WARSAW – The seemingly never-ending debate over the eurozone’s fiscal problems has focused excessively on official bailouts, in particular the proposed purchase of government bonds on a massive scale by the European Central Bank.	华沙—不知何时才能结束的欧元区财政问题争论过度地关注了正式援助，特别是计划中的欧洲央行大规模购买国债的方案。


Indeed, we are warned almost daily – by the International Monetary Fund and others – that if bailout efforts are not greatly expanded, the euro will perish.	事实上，IMF和其他机构几乎每天都在警告我们，如果不大幅扩大援助行动，欧元将保不住。


For some, this stance reflects the benefits that they would gain from such purchases; for others, it reflects mistaken beliefs.	对某些人来说，持这一立场是因为他们可以从购买计划中得到好处，对其他人来说，这是一种错误的观点。


Creditors obviously support bailing out debtor countries to protect themselves.	债权人显然支持援助债务国从而保全自己。


Many political leaders also welcome official crisis lending, which can ease market pressure on them.	许多政治领导人也欢迎正式的危机贷款，因为这样可以缓解对他们的市场压力。


The media, meanwhile, always thrives on being the bearers of bad news.	与此同时，媒体则热衷于挖掘坏消息。


Mistaken beliefs, on the other hand, are reflected in metaphors like “contagion” and “domino effect,” which imply that financial markets become blind, virulent, and indiscriminate when they are disturbed.	另一方面，体现错误观点者包括那些言必称“传染”和“多米诺效应”的人，他们暗示金融市场失去了理智，已成为一剂毒药，当它们受到干扰时，没有哪个国家能够幸免。


Such terms provoke fear that, once confidence in any one country is lost, all others are in danger.	这样的言论引起了人们的恐慌——一旦对某个国家丧失了信心，其他所有国家都得跟着遭殃。


According to this logic, it follows that only a formidable countervailing power – such as massive official intervention – can halt the ravenous dynamics of financial markets.	顺着这一逻辑往下推，则唯有依靠强大的对抗性力量——比如大规模正式干预——才能让金融市场的贪婪链条停止传动。


Widespread use of expressions like “aim a bazooka at the eurozone,” and “it’s them or us,” demonstrates a pervasive Manichean view of financial-market behavior vis-à-vis governments.	“用火箭炮瞄准欧元”、“生死存亡之秋”等言论甚嚣尘上，这表明在金融市场行为和政府措施之间，普遍弥漫着一种摩尼教主义的观点。


But financial markets, even when agitated, are not blind.	但金融市场充其量只是焦虑，绝不是失去理智。


They are capable of distinguishing, however imperfectly and belatedly, between macroeconomic conditions in various countries.	金融市场有能力区分——不管多么不完美、来得多么晚——不同国家不同的宏观经济条件。


This is why interest-rate spreads within the eurozone have been widening, with Germany and the Nordic countries benefiting from lower borrowing costs and the “problem” countries being punished by a high-risk premium.	这就是为什么欧元区内部的利差在不断扩大，德国和北欧国家因较低的借贷成本而收益，“问题国家”则在经受高风险溢价的惩罚。


Another, related, fallacy is the assumption that reforms can reap benefits only in the long run.	另一个相关谬论是改革只能收获长期效果的观点。


This misconception reduces the short-term solution to affected governments’ sharply higher borrowing costs to bailouts.	这一错误观点使得人们认为，要想在短期影响飙升的政府借贷成本，唯一的办法只有援助。


In fact, properly structured reforms have both short- and long-term effects.	事实上，合理的结构性改革既有长期效果，也有短期效果。


For example, one does not need to wait for the completion of a pension reform to see reduced yields on government bonds.	比如，你不需要等到养老金改革彻底完成就能看到政府债券收益率的下降。


Markets react to credible announcements of reforms, as well as to their implementation.	市场不仅会对改革的实施做出反应，也会对可信的改革公告做出反应。


The countries that have been severely affected by the financial crisis illustrate the impact of reform.	深受金融危机危害的国家说明了改革的影响力。


One group – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (BELL) – experienced a surge in yields on their government bonds in 2009, followed by a sharp decline.	一组国家——保加利亚、爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚和立陶宛——2009年时经历了国债收益率的飙升，但随后就快速回落了。


Another group – Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain (PIIGS) – has had more mixed outcomes: yields have soared on Greek and Portuguese bonds, while Ireland’s were falling until recently.	另一组国家——葡萄牙、爱尔兰、意大利、希腊和西班牙——的结果就要复杂得多：希腊和葡萄牙债券的收益率飙升，而爱尔兰的收益率直到最近才开始上升。


These differences can be explained largely by the variations in the extent and structure of these countries’ reforms.	其中的差别很大程度上可以用这些国家在改革方面的程度和结构的不同来解释。


Proper reforms can produce confidence and growth.	合理的改革能够产生信心和增长。


Official crisis lending can buy time to prepare, and it can help to stop a banking-sector crisis, but it cannot substitute for reform.	正式的危机贷款可以为一国赢得应对时间，可以阻止银行部门危机，但不能代替改革。


All bailouts can create moral hazard, because they weaken the incentive to implement reforms that will avoid bad outcomes in the future.	援助必定会造成道德风险，因为这减弱了实施能避免未来坏结果的改革的激励。


To some extent, official crisis lending replaces the pressure from financial markets with pressure from experts and creditor countries’ politicians.	从某种程度上讲，正式危机贷款用来自专家和债权国政客的压力代替了来自金融市场的压力。


Among the proposed eurozone bailouts, none has come under the spotlight as much as the idea that the ECB should purchase massive quantities of the problem countries’ bonds.	在计划中的欧元区援助行动中，最令人瞩目的莫过于欧洲央行大量购买问题国家债券的主意了。


Advocates of this approach stretch the concept of “lender of last resort” to suggest that providing liquidity to commercial banks is the same as funding governments.	这一办法的鼓吹者拓展了“最后贷款人”的概念，认为向商业银行提供流动性与向政府提供融资效果是一样的。


They also present the alternative to a bailout as a “catastrophe.”	他们还说，如果不援助，就会发生“灾难”。


Finally, they cite similar policies implemented by the United States Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan – as though merely mentioning past examples is evidence that ECB lending will work.	最后，他们援引美联储、英格兰银行和日本银行所采取的类似政策作为例证，好像欧洲央行曾经实施过此类计划而且获得成功过似的。


These rhetorical devices must not overshadow careful analysis of the various options.	雄辩不应该影响对不同选择方案的审慎分析。


There has been surprisingly little comparative analysis of the effects of quantitative easing (QE) in Japan, the US, and Britain.	你或许不相信，日本、美国和英国的量化宽松根本没有多少可比较的效果分析。


Yet the evidence indicates that QE is no free lunch. Although it may offer potential benefits in the short run, costs and risks invariably emerge later.	但有证据表明，量化宽松绝非免费午餐，尽管可以在短期产生潜在好处，但随后无一例外地导致了成本和风险。


In Japan, QE may have contributed to delays in economic reform and restructuring, thereby weakening longer-term economic growth and exacerbating fiscal distress.	在日本，量化宽松或是经济改革和重组被推迟的原因之一，因此影响了较长期的经济增长，放大了财政困境。


In the US, it failed to avert the slowdown during 2008-2011, while America’s 2011 inflation figures may turn out to be higher than they were in 2007.	在美国，量化宽松并没有避免2008—2011年的经济减速，而2011年的通胀数字也将高于2007年。


In Britain, economic growth is even slower, while inflation is much higher.	在英国，经济增长速度甚至更慢了，通货膨胀倒是大大提高了。


And these countries’ QE has also fueled asset bubbles in the world economy.	此外，这些国家的量化宽松还助长了世界经济的资产泡沫。


Massive purchases of government bonds by the ECB would be the worst type of bailout.	欧洲央行大量买入国债将是较差的援助行动。


The fact that such purchases are potentially unlimited would exacerbate the problem of moral hazard. It would also increase the risk of inflation, along with other negative economic consequences.	欧洲央行的购买行为是没有上限的，这一事实将放大道德风险，还会提高通胀和负面经济后果的风险。


Moreover, such a bailout could undermine the ECB’s trustworthiness as guardian of the euro’s stability, particularly in light of the new political power that it would obtain.	此外，这样的援助还有损于欧洲央行捍卫欧元稳定性的信誉，特别是考虑到它所须应对的新政治势力。


And it would further undermine the rule of law in the EU at a time when confidence in the Union’s governing treaties is already fragile.	而这将在欧盟治理条约已然相当脆弱的当口进一步破坏欧盟的法治精神。


The key to resolving the eurozone crisis lies in properly structured reforms in the ailing countries.	解决欧元区危机的关键在于各盟国采取合适的结构性改革。


Indeed, experience shows that there is no substitute.	事实上，经验表明，除此之外没有替代方案。


The Balkan Endgame	巴尔干的收官之战


ROME – Twenty years after the collapse of Yugoslavia and the communist regime in Albania, the western Balkans region is at a turning point once again.	发自罗马——在南斯拉夫解体以及阿尔巴尼亚共产政权倒台整整20年后，西巴尔干地区又走到了另一个历史转折点上。


Slovenia is in the European Union, Croatia is very close to membership, and all of the region’s other countries have started along the EU path.	斯洛文尼亚已经成功加入欧盟，而克罗地亚距欧盟成员国资格也只有一步之遥，该区域其他国家也已先后启动了入盟进程。


Yet there remains a danger that this positive progress can still be undermined.	但这一积极进程背后却依然潜藏着半途而废的危险。


Indeed, although EU integration is already bringing democracy and stability to the countries of the Balkans, it is an unfinished job, and completing that task is both vital and uncertain.	事实上，虽然入盟进程已经为巴尔干各国带来了民主和稳定，但这项至关重要的工作还远未结束，甚至无法确定能否圆满完成。


The current economic crisis is leading public opinion in the western Balkans to lose confidence that peace and economic growth are still within reach, creating the risk of a possible slowdown in the integration process.	经济危机致使该地区民众对未来的和平与增长失去了信心，使人担心整合进程会否因此步履维艰。


As a whole, the region has made notable progress. Pro-European governments are now in place across the Balkans.	整体来看，整个西巴尔干地区确实取得了显著的进步。


The recent elections in Bosnia show that the electorate is still ethnically oriented.	亲欧洲政府已经遍布整个地区。


It is our task – with the support of the new Bosnian leadership – to redirect this approach to a genuine European mindset.	最近的波斯尼亚大选显示出选民投票依然是以种族为导向。


Democratic reforms are proving to be an increasingly effective cure for the instability created in the past by nationalism and ethnic strains. The key issue is to ensure that the western Balkans keeps its focus on the European agenda, which means that the EU must provide guidance and encouragement through tangible initiatives.	而我们的任务就是要在新任波斯尼亚领导层的配合下将这种心态扭转过来，并最终转化为经典的欧洲式思维方式。


That is why, at the EU-United States summit held in Prague last year, I proposed an eight-pronged initiative, elements of which have now been fully or partially taken up, including the Conference held in Sarajevo last June where the EU reiterated its commitment to the integration process of the Balkans region as whole.	而这也正是我在去年举办的布拉格欧盟-美国峰会上提出了一个八点问题动议的原因。 如今这八点都在不同程度上获得了采纳，其中在六月的萨拉热窝会议上，欧盟重申了将巴尔干地区整体整合入盟的承诺；


New EU membership applications confirm the desire of Balkan governments to engage seriously in internal reforms.	新的入盟申请也显示出了巴尔干国家认真开展内部改革的愿望。


But the road to EU membership involves painful sacrifice, so each country should be judged on its own merits.	但入盟之路意味着必须做出痛苦的牺牲，因此各国也应当依据自身的实际情况做出抉择。


From its part, Europe is delivering as soon as the counties are adopting the necessary reforms.	只要各国实现了必要的改革，欧洲自然会履行承诺。


The EU needs to give clear signals to public opinion across the region that meeting EU benchmarks has tangible effects on their lives.	欧盟必须清楚地告知巴尔干地区的人民：达到欧盟的标准也将为他们的生活带来实质性的变化。


Serbia is emblematic of the importance of doing so, as public support there for the EU integration process has risen sharply in a only months, from 40% to 60%, thanks in large part to the EU’s decision of earlier this year to liberalize the visa regime.	在这方面塞尔维亚堪称表率，其民意对入盟进程的支持率在短短一个月内从40%跃升到60%，而这源自于欧盟在年初时放宽签证管制的决定。


The EU integration process is also proving a powerful driver for much-needed reform in Bosnia.	与此同时，欧盟整合进程也对波斯尼亚亟待进行的改革提供了强大的驱动力。


Despite the country’s worrisome political stalemate, and the seeming entrenchment, at least for the moment, of ethnic politics, the chance to grab the “low-hanging fruit” of visa liberalization did encourage the Bosnian leadership to make a serious effort at reform in a relatively short period of time.	尽管该国内部的种族政治僵局令人担忧，且一时间难觅破局之策，但抓住放宽签证这块“嘴边肉”的渴望还是成功促使波斯尼亚领导人在一个较短的时期内认真地推行了改革。


Over the last 20 years, the goal of EU membership has proved an invaluable asset for stabilizing, democratizing, and modernizing the western Balkans.	在过去20年间，对欧盟成员国资格的追求已经被证明是一笔对西巴尔干地区稳定，民主和现代化贡献良多的宝贵资产。


Now it is up to leaders in the region to overcome the remaining obstacles, starting with an understanding between the governments of Belgrade and Pristina.	如今要靠当地的领袖们去克服余下的那些障碍，而这将由贝尔格莱德和普里什蒂纳之间的互相和解开始。


The EU has offered to play a facilitating role: we urge both leaderships to promptly seize this opportunity, with a view to their states’ further steps along the path towards the European family to which all Balkan countries naturally belong.	欧盟从中扮演了一个协调人的角色：我们敦促双方领导人及时把握住这个机会，并着眼于通往欧洲大家庭的国家未来，更何况他们自古就是这个家庭的其中一员。


The EU’s ability to overcome “enlargement fatigue” and maintain its commitments to the region are also dependent on public support, so we must not stint in our efforts to convey to our citizens the political and economic advantages of accession of the countries of the western Balkans to the EU.	欧盟克服所谓“扩大性疲劳”并且遵守对该区域的承诺的能力也有赖于民意的支持，为此我们必须不遗余力地向民众宣传西巴尔干国家加入欧盟的种种政治和经济上的益处。


The Balkans on Trial	巴尔干的审判


Serbia’s long tragedy looks like it is coming to an end.	塞尔维亚长久以来的悲剧似乎就要结束了。


The death of Slobodan Milosevic has just been followed by Montenegro’s referendum on independence.	紧随米洛舍维奇之死，黑山又进行了关于独立的全民公决。


Independence for Kosovo, too, is inching closer.	科索沃的独立也正逐日实现。


The wars of the Yugoslav succession have not only been a trial for the peoples of that disintegrated country; they also raised huge questions about the exercise of international justice.	争夺南斯拉夫继承权的战争不仅对这个四分五裂的国家中的各民族是场考验； 它们也提出了行使国际公正方面的重大问题。


Do international tribunals of the sort Milosevic faced before his death promote or postpone serious self-reflection and reconciliation in damaged societies?	米洛舍维奇死前所面对的这种国际审判庭究竟是推动还是阻碍着遭到重创的社会中的自省与和解呢？


Do they strengthen or undermine the political stability needed to rebuild wrecked communities and shattered economies?	它们到底是在加强还是在削弱重建满目疮痍的社会和经济所必需的政治稳定性呢？


The evidence on these questions is mixed.	这些问题的征兆纷繁复杂。


Indeed, the record of the International War Crimes Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), based in The Hague, may be instructive in judging the credibility of the strategy of using such trials as part of the effort to end civil and other wars.	的确，设在海牙的前南斯拉夫国际刑事法庭(ICTY)的纪录可能对我们判定以这种审判方式作为终止内战和其它战争的战略之一所具有的公信力具有指导意义。


In 13 years, the ICTY, with 1,200 employees, spent roughly $1.25 billion to convict only a few dozen war criminals.	在13年里，拥有1200名工作人员的ICTY花费了约12. 5亿美金却只给几十个战犯定了罪。


Moreover, whereas members of all ethnic groups committed crimes, in its first years, the ICTY indicted and prosecuted far more Serbs than others, fueling a perception, even among opponents of Milosevic’s regime, that the tribunal was political and anti-Serbian.	另外，虽然所有族裔集团的成员都犯下了罪行，但在审判的初期，ICTY对塞族人提起的诉讼却远比对其他族裔的要多。 这样一来就强化了人们（甚至是米洛舍维奇政权的反对者）认为该法庭带有政治和反塞尔维亚色彩的印象。


We may regret that Milosevic’s own trial ended without a conclusion.	我们可能对米洛舍维奇的审判不了了之而感到遗憾。


But a conviction only of Milosevic, however justified, without parallel penalties for his Croat, Bosniak, and Kosovo-Albanian counterparts would hardly have contributed to serious self-reflection within the post-Yugoslav nations.	但不论米洛舍维奇多么罪有应得，只对他一人定罪，而不对其克罗地亚、波斯尼亚和科索沃-阿尔巴尼亚的对手实施同等的处罚，就很难促进后南斯拉夫的各国进行严肃的自省。


To be sure, the arrest of General Ante Gotovina, adored by many Croats as a hero, but responsible for the brutal expulsion of a quarter-million Serbs from Croatia and north-west Bosnia – the biggest ethnic cleansing in Europe since WWII – improves the ICTY’s standing.	确切地说，逮捕被克罗地亚人奉为英雄的Ante Gotovina将军改善了ICTY的立场。 他一手领导了对克罗地亚和波斯尼亚西北的45万塞族人的野蛮驱逐—这是自第二次世界大战以来欧洲最大规模的一次种族清洗。


But Milosevic’s Croatian and Bosniak counterparts, Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic, respectively, remained unindicted when they died.	但米洛舍维奇的克罗地亚和波斯尼亚对手Franjo Tudjman和Alija Izetbegovic，直到死也未被起诉过。


So, too, the main commanders of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK).	同样的情况也发生在科索沃解放军(UCK)的总指挥官身上。


Ramush Haradinaj, the prime minister of Kosovo, was accused but later released from detention.	科索沃首相Ramush Haradinaj虽被指控，但后来也被释放。


I have always been convinced that Milosevic should have been put on trial in Belgrade.	我一直坚持认为米洛舍维奇应该在贝尔格莱德接受审判。


After all, Milosevic’s critics and political rivals such as the journalist Slavko Curuvija and Milosevic’s former mentor, Ivan Stambolic, were assasinated by Serb police agents, who also tried three times to murder the opposition leader Vuk Draskovic.	毕竟，米氏的批评者和政治竞争对手如记者Slavko Curuvija和他的前导师Ivan Stambolic被塞尔维亚警察特工暗杀了。 这些特工还曾三次企图杀害反对派领袖Vuk Draskovic。


There was, moreover, ample evidence of corruption among Milosevic’s inner circle, including members of his immediate family.	另外，还有足够的证据表明包括其家人在内的米洛舍维奇的心腹圈子里腐败严重。


Holding the trial in Belgrade might have served better to catalyze a sober examination of the past.	在贝尔格莱德进行审判本可能更好的促进人们清醒地审视过去。


The atmosphere was certainly favorable.	那里的氛围当然是有利的。


The majority of Serbs hold Milosevic responsible for the decline of their society.	大多数的塞族人都认为米洛舍维奇要对它们社会的沦落负责。


Even before his fall, the opposition controlled most big Serbian cities, and in 2000 he lost the election that he called to shore up his authority.	甚至在他倒台之前，反对派也控制着大多数的塞尔维亚大城市。 2000年他在自己发起的企图为自己的权威赢得支持的选举中败北。


The relatively small turnout at his funeral confirmed that only a minority of Serbs considers him a national hero.	他葬礼上的冷清也说明只有少数塞尔维亚人还认为他是民族英雄。


Meanwhile, with the exception of Slovenia, the democratic transformation in the post-Yugoslav region remains uneasy.	同时，除了斯洛文尼亚，在后南斯拉夫各国进行的民主转型仍然困难重重。


Wars, ethnic cleansing, embargoes, and sanctions created not only psychological traumas, but also black markets, smuggling, large-scale corruption, and de facto rule by mafias.	战争、种族清洗、贸易禁运和制裁不仅造成了心理创伤，还导致了黑市、走私、腐败盛行和黑手党的实际统治。


The bombing of Serbia by NATO in 1999 heavily damaged its economy, with serious consequences for neighboring countries.	北约组织在1999年对塞尔维亚的轰炸，重创其经济，也给其邻国造成了严重的后果。


The definitive end of what remains of Yugoslavia may – at least today – pose no danger of war, but the Muslim Sandjak region will now be divided by state boundaries, and Albanian extremists, with their dreams of a Greater Albania, believe their influence in a separate Montenegro will be reinforced with a yes vote on independence.	南斯拉夫所剩下的遗产—至少在当今看来—不会再有战争危险。 但穆斯林为主的Sandjak地区现在会被国界线分开。


Most Serbs and Croats in Bosnia believe that the best solution to the problems of that sad country would be to join the territories that they inhabit with their “mother” countries.	心怀大阿尔巴尼亚梦想的阿尔巴尼亚极端分子相信他们在黑山的影响力会随着全民公决选择独立而加强。 波斯尼亚的大多数塞族和克（罗地亚）族人相信这个苦难深重的国家的问题的解决之道就是让他们所居住的领土成为他们“祖国”的一部分。


Then there is the unresolved status of Kosovo, where the Albanian majority demands independence, and extremists threaten to fight for it.	然后还有悬而未决的科索沃地位问题。 这里的阿尔巴尼亚多数派要求独立，极端分子们更威胁要为之而战。


As one Kosovo Liberation Army commander warned, “If we kill one KFOR soldier a day, these cowards will leave.”	正如一个科索沃解放军指挥官所警告的那样：“如果我们每天杀掉一名KFOR士兵，这些胆小鬼们就会滚蛋。


With independence, the extremists would gain a territorial base from which to undermine Macedonia, southern Montenegro, and southern Serbia, jeopardizing stability in the entire region.	”一旦获得独立，极端分子们就有了一个领土基地，并能够从这里对马其顿、南黑山和南塞尔维亚构成威胁，从而破坏整个地区的稳定。


Serbia is offering Kosovo the formula “less than independence, more than autonomy.”	塞尔维亚为科索沃提供了“小于独立，大于自治”的方案。


It demands security guarantees for the Serbian minority and cultural monuments, as well as control of the borders with Albania and Macedonia to stop traffic in arms, drugs, and women, and to prevent the use of Kosovo by Albanian extremists.	它要求对塞族少数人口和文物古迹的安全保证，还要控制与阿尔巴尼亚和马其顿的边界以阻止武器、毒品和妇女的走私，并防止阿尔巴尼亚极端分子利用科索沃。


Any resolution of Kosovo’s status is problematic, but the international community should not repeat old mistakes.	关于科索沃地位的任何决议都存在问题，但国际社会不应该重复老的错误。


In 1991, the principle that only a politically negotiated division of Yugoslavia would be recognized was abandoned.	1991年，只有通过政治谈判划分的南斯拉夫才能得到承认的原则被摒弃。


Now, as then, a change of boundaries without the consent of all concerned parties would not only violate international law, but could also lead to violence.	现在，正如当时一样，在相关各方没有达成共识的情况下改变边界不仅将违反国际法，还可能引发暴力冲突。


The international community must not be gulled into thinking that war-crimes trials marginalize, rather than mobilize, extremists and nationalists.	国际社会决不能相信审判战争罪行会使极端分子和民族主义者边缘化。


Pressure on Croatia and Serbia to arrest and hand over suspects – a condition of EU accession negotiations – has yielded several extraditions and may result in more.	给克罗地亚和塞尔维亚施压，令其逮捕和交出嫌疑犯的做法—欧盟入盟谈判的条件之一—已经引发了几桩引渡，并还可能引发更多。


But further trials alone are unlikely to bring about the long-term settlements that the region’s fragile states need in order to ensure stability and democratic development.	但仅靠进一步的审判似乎不会带来长期的和解。 而该地区脆弱的各国正是需要这种和解来确保稳定和民主的发展。


The people of the Balkans should feel that the EU offers them political and economic support.	巴尔干的人民应该感到欧盟为他们提供了政治和经济上的支持。


They deserve it.	这是他们应得的权利。


The Banality of Abu Ghraib	阿布格勒布刍议


As more images of debased Iraqi detainees ricochet around the world, many viewers are as bewildered as they are outraged.	随着更多伊拉克的被拘押者受虐的影像传遍世界，许多观众在激愤的同时也感到困惑。


How could ordinary American soldiers, whether they were following orders or acting on their own, appear so untroubled, even exhilarated by their brutish conduct?	不论是奉命行事还是个人行为，普通的美国士兵怎么能对自己的兽行表现得如此平静，甚至还乐在其中呢？


To be sure, over-eager military-intelligence interrogators, as well as the Bush Administration's high-handed attitude toward international law, helped precipitate the crisis.	确切地说，过于急切的军事情报审讯者和布什政府对国际法的蛮横态度促使了这场危机的发生。


But few commentators have focused enough attention on the site of this macabre theatre - not a battlefield, but a prison.	但几乎没有几位时事评论员对这出恐怖剧的发生地（不是战场而是监狱）给予足够的关注。


Prison experts are the least surprised by the grotesque reports filtering out of Abu Ghraib.	监狱专家们对从阿布格勒布走漏的怪异报道毫不惊奇。


They recognize that prisons, as uniquely divisive and authoritarian institutions, regularly give rise to behaviors that appear depraved to the wider world but come to seem acceptable - even normal - behind bars.	他们认为监狱作为一种具有独特的分裂性和独裁性的机构时常会导致一些在外部世界看起来十分败坏的行为发生。 而这些行为在监狱的特定环境中却是可接受的，甚至是正常的。


Indeed, some of the most publicized prison scandals have erupted in the United States, which incarcerates more people in absolute and per capita terms than any other country.	的确，在美国惊爆了一些被媒体大肆渲染的监狱丑闻。 不论是以绝对还是人均数目来讲，美国的监狱比任何一个国家的监狱都关押了更多的人口。


Compared to Saddam Hussein's murderous old regime at Abu Ghraib, of course, American prisons are relatively well managed.	当然，与萨达姆•侯赛因在阿布格勒布的凶残体制相比，美国的监狱算是管理得不错的。


But as mandatory sentencing rules have landed more and more Americans behind bars, incidents that bear a disquieting resemblance to the degenerate cruelties photographed in Iraq have come increasingly to light.	但随着强制判决的法规将越来越多的美国人送进监狱，越来越多的事件被曝光。 这些事件与在伊拉克拍下的残酷情景惊人的相似。


The connection is no accident.	这种关联决非偶然。


Some of the US scandals tie American prison personnel directly to Abu Ghraib.	一些美国丑闻将美国的监狱职员和阿布革勒布直接联系起来。


In Virginia, for instance, human rights advocates report that inmates at two "supermax" prisons have been hooded and subjected to "excessive and malicious use of force by prison staff," often involving electric shock devices and rubber bullets.	例如弗吉尼亚的人权活动家们就报道说在两间 "超大"监狱的犯人就被戴上头套并遭受了"监狱管理人员过度和恶意的暴力"，通常包括电击装置和橡皮子弹。