And, again, even this more substantial rise probably represents a substantial underestimate of the increase in the real standard of living.	而即使是这一大大提高了的增幅，也可能大大低估了实际生活水平的提高。


The authorities arrive at their estimates by converting dollar incomes into a measure of real income by using a price index that reflects the changes in the prices of existing goods and services.	在有关部门的测算中，美元收入通过一个反映现有商品和服务价格变化的物价指数换算为实际收入指标。


But that price index does not reflect new products or improvements to existing goods and services.	但这一物价指数没有反映新产品或已有商品和服务的改进。


Thus, if everyone’s money incomes rose by 2% from one year to the next, while the prices of all goods and services also rose by 2%, the official calculation would show no change in real incomes, even if new products and important quality improvements contributed to our wellbeing.	因此，如果所有人的货币收入较一年前增加了2%，而所有商品和服务的价格也上涨了2%，则官方测算将表明实际收入没有变化，即使新产品和重要质量改进增加了我们的福利。


Indeed, the US government does not count the value created by Internet services like Google and Facebook as income at all, because these services are not purchased.	事实上，美国政府根本没有将谷歌和Facebook等互联网服务所创造的价值计算在内，因为这些服务没有被购买。


No one knows how much such product innovations and improvements have added to our wellbeing.	没人知道这些产品创新和改进给我们增加了多少福利。


But if the gains have been worth just 1% a year, over the past 30 years that would cumulate to a gain of 35%.	但假设这些收益只相当于每年1%，过去三十年累计下来也能造成35%的增长。


And combining that with the CBO estimate of a gain of about 50% would imply that the real income of the median household is up nearly 2.5% a year over the past 30 years.	将这个数字与CBO所测算的50%左右的收益相加，意味着实际中位家庭收入在过去30年的年增长率接近2. 5%。


So the US middle class has been doing much better than the statistical pessimists assert.	因此美国中产阶级的表现比统计悲观派所认为的要好得多。


And with better policies, these households can do even better in the future.	而如果有更好的政策，这些家庭未来还会做得更好。


Are We Five Years Wiser?	五年的时间让我们更睿智了吗？


As the fifth anniversary of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States by al-Qaeda approaches, we should take the opportunity to assess the results of the response by the US and the international community.	在2001年9•11事件的五周年纪念日即将到来之际，“基地” （al-Qaeda）针对美国的新的攻击也在临近。 我们应该借此机会来评估一下美国和国际社会对此的反应。


The attacks and the response to them have obviously brought about a sea change in international relations, but it would be difficult to argue that further atrocities have become less likely as a result.	这些攻击及其激发的反应已经造成了国际关系的突变，但我们却没有理由认为进一步的暴行发生的可能性较小。


Why are we no more secure than we were five years ago?	为什么我们现在的安全感并不比五年前有所增强呢？


Within a week of the attacks, President George W. Bush declared a “war on terrorism.”	在袭击发生后的一周内，布什总统就宣布进行一场“反恐战争”。


The metaphor of war has the singular advantage that it clearly and strongly evokes the intensity of the counterattack that was called for.	战争比喻的一个独特优势就是清楚而又强有力地引发美国所需要的猛烈反击。


Moreover, the metaphor of war constitutes an implicit appeal to intense mobilization, not only by a country that comes under attack, but also by its friends and allies.	另外，战争的比喻对于积极动员还有潜移默化的推动作用，而动员的对象不仅是遭受袭击的国家，还包括其盟友。


Naturally, no one questions America’s right to defend itself.	当然，没人会质疑美国捍卫自己的权利。


The legitimacy of a violent counterattack has never been in doubt.	暴力反击的合法性从来就未被怀疑。


But the war metaphor also carries inevitable connotations that, when applied to terrorism, are misleading and counterproductive.	但战争的比喻也有一个不可避免的内涵，即当被用于恐怖主义时，它具有误导性并且结果适得其反。


Whenever war is invoked, it implies a fight against nations, peoples, or states.	当我们诉诸战争时，它意味着一场针对民族、人民或国家的战斗。


It implies that whole territories and the populations living there are to be considered hostile.	它意味着整片领土和定居其上的人口都被认为是敌对方。


War implies armies and command structures that can be recognized, if not clearly known; in any case, war entails a military confrontation with an identifiable adversary .	战争意味着不一定为人了解但却是公认的军队和指挥架构； 在任何情况下，战争都必然需要与可识别敌方的军事对抗。


On all of these points, the concept of war, to paraphrase US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, is not helpful.	在所有这几点上，战争的该概念，用美国国防部长拉姆斯菲尔德的话来讲，都是无益的。


Even if the scale of the September 11 attack was of such a dimension that only the American army seemed able to face the challenge, in technical terms dealing with a threat that is extra-national rather than international is a matter of police techniques, not military tactics.	即便是如9•11这样规模的，只有美国军方似乎才能够应对的挑战—在技术层面上，对付这种来自外国的，而不是国际的威胁应该使用警方专长而不是军事策略。


The negative consequences of this mistaken vision very quickly became apparent.	这种错误愿景所带来的消极后果很快便显现出来。


It is now widely known that the US government, perhaps partly unconsciously, embraced a deeply distorted image of al-Qaeda that portrayed it as a hierarchical organization with a seamless command structure – the prototype of a foe that the American army could attack and destroy.	现在一个广为人知的事实就是美国政府很可能无意识地（在一定程度上）接受了“基地”是一个有着严密指挥体系的，等级森严的恐怖组织的形象—这正是一个美国军队可以攻击并摧毁的敌人原型。


But al-Qaeda – the word means “the base” or “the camp,” that is, nothing more or less than a point of gathering and training – is more like a blurred sphere of influence, comprising individuals and small local cells that act on their own initiative and cooperate very rarely, and only for large-scale operations.	但al-Qaeda—这个词的意思是“基地”或“营地”，也就是说它仅仅是一个让人集中并受训的地点—更像是一个令人琢磨不透的影响力圈，其主要构成是个体成员和许多自行其是，除了大规模行动外，极少合作的小型本地基层组织。


It has not been proved that the attacks in London, Madrid, or Bali in the years since the September 11 plot, or the attack on America’s warship the USS Cole in 2000, reflected the existence of a “center” that coordinated the operations or gave orders to carry them out.	至今没有证据表明“9•11”阴谋之后的若干年里发生在伦敦、马德里或巴厘岛的恐怖袭击，或在2000年对美国军舰“柯尔号”发动的袭击，反映了一个协调行动或下达行动指令的“中心”的存在。


It is also wrong to conflate Islamic terrorism with that of the Basque ETA, Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers, or the Irish Republican Army.	将伊斯兰恐怖主义与巴斯克人的“埃塔”组织（ETA）、斯里兰卡的泰米尔猛虎组织或爱尔兰共和军混为一谈也是错误的。


Whereas these groups have a territorial base and are preoccupied with national aims, Islamic terrorism appears to be the work of a very small number of individuals who seek to avenge the centuries-long “humiliation” of the Muslim world, brought about by colonization, absence of economic development, and political weakness.	这些组织都有一个地区性的基地，并专注于民族目标的实现，而伊斯兰恐怖主义却似乎是由一小撮试图为穆斯林世界在若干世纪以来由于殖民化、经济发展缺失和政治羸弱所造成的“屈辱”实施报复而来。


The goal of Islamic terrorists is nothing less than the destruction of the “hegemonic” Western world, despite most Muslim nations’ desire to live in peace within the international community and to cooperate in crafting effective development strategies.	伊斯兰恐怖分子的目标无外乎就是摧毁西方世界的“霸权”。 尽管许多穆斯林国家都希望与国际社会和平共处并在缔造有效的发展战略方面进行合作。


The only viable strategy for confronting the threat of Islamic terrorism was, and continues to be, a search for agreement among Muslims, and among the leaders of Muslim nations, on the forms of mutual cooperation, including police cooperation, that are needed to isolate, weaken, or destroy the militants in their midst.	对抗伊斯兰恐怖主义威胁最可行的战略曾是，也将继续是以相互合作的方式寻求广大穆斯林中、穆斯林国家领导人中的一致性。 这其中包括警方之间的合作，这是孤立、削弱或消灭他们中的武装分子所必需的。


This is a long and difficult enterprise, but there remains no alternative.	这是一项漫长而艰难的事业，但我们别无选择。


Instead, the war metaphor continues to define the US response and that of several of America’s allies.	可现实中，战争的比喻继续阐释着美国及其几个盟国的反应。


The attraction of this metaphor may be attributable to the excessive trust that Americans place not only in their army, which is understandable, but in force in general, which is much less understandable in the case of an intelligent people.	这一比喻的吸引力可能应该归结到美国人不仅对其军队（这一点可以理解），还对广义上的武力的过度信赖。 而后一点着实令人对这个富于智慧的民族感到费解。


Whatever the case, casting the fight against terrorism as a war has led American policymakers to multiply violent military operations that have absolutely no chance of winning hearts and minds in the Muslim world.	不论在什么情况下，对恐怖主义宣战使得美国的政策制定者们加倍实施暴力的军事行动。 这种做法绝对不可能赢得穆斯林世界的人心，反而会令事与愿违。


Afghanistan was the only case where a military response was understandable: its government had, after all, given al-Qaeda a temporary territorial home.	阿富汗是军事反应可以让人理解的唯一案例：其政府毕竟给了“基地”一个暂时的驻扎地。 但将与“基地”或9.


But to implicate Iraq, which had nothing to do with al-Qaeda or the September 11 attacks, was a huge mistake, one that has strengthened Islamic extremists and has probably helped them recruit terrorists.	11恐怖袭击全无瓜葛的伊拉克牵扯进来就大错特错了。 这一错误强化了伊斯兰极端分子的实力并很可能为其招募恐怖分子助了一臂之力。


Moreover, the US response has strengthened Israel’s belief in the effectiveness of military methods, leading to the recent war in Lebanon and the ongoing invasion of Gaza.	另外，美国的反应也��化了以色列对军事解决方式有效性的信心，从而导致了最近的黎巴嫩战争和对加沙的入侵。


Powerless, the international community does nothing.	国际社会对此束手无策。


The rigidity and brutality of America’s behavior – resulting in many times more civilian deaths than occurred on September 11 – have blocked any useful intervention by countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, or the United Arab Emirates.	美国行动的僵化和残暴—造成的平民死亡人数比9. 11袭击中高出许多倍—阻碍了阿尔及利亚、摩洛哥、约旦、沙特或阿联酋等国进行任何有益的干预。


Likewise, the appeal of war has ruled out the prospect of serious negotiations between Israel, Syria, and Lebanon.	同样，战争的诉求也排除了以色列、叙利亚和黎巴嫩之间进行严肃谈判的前景。


By attacking one Muslim country after another, the US and its allies have created the impression that Islam itself is the enemy, leading inexorably to the “clash of civilizations” that America says it wants to avoid.	由于一个接一个地攻击穆斯林国家，美国及其盟友给世界造成了这样一种印象，即伊斯兰教本身是他们的敌人，从而无情地导致美国口口声声想要避免的“文明的冲突”。


But America’s strategy has failed.	但美国的战略失败了。


Force cannot accomplish everything.	武力不是万能的。


The international community must say clearly that Islam is not our enemy and that terrorism must be fought in other ways.	国际社会必须明确表示伊斯兰教不是我们的敌人，抗击恐怖主义应该采取其他的方式。


Muslim political leaders, for their part, should declare just as openly that terrorism is not their choice.	而穆斯林的政治领导人们应该同样公开宣布恐怖主义不是他们的选择。


If both sides can stifle their murderous deviances, the hope of cultural and political reconciliation will be reborn.	如果双方都能遏制杀人心态，那么文化和政治和解的希望就会重生。


Are We Running Out of Oil (Again)?	我们正（又一次）陷入石油危机吗？


Oil prices are now running well above $50 a barrel, partly owing to short-run supply shocks, such as the Iraq conflict, Nigerian labor disputes, the conflict between Yukos Oil and the Russian government, and Florida's recent hurricanes.	石油价格正快速攀升，远超过每桶50美元。 其部分原因是由于伊拉克冲突、尼日利亚劳资纠纷、俄罗斯政府和尤科斯石油公司之间的冲突以及最近飓风袭击佛罗里达所带来的短期石油供应震荡。


Oil prices may fall once these shocks dissipate, but speculative effects could keep them relatively high, weakening the world economy and depressing stock markets.	一旦这些震荡因素消失以后，石油价格可能回落，但投机因素可能会使其保持在相对的高位，从而给世界经济和股票市场带来不利影响。


Even a temporary spike in oil prices can have long-term effects because of the social reactions they provoke.	由于会引发社会反应，所以即使是暂时的油价飙升也可能会造成长期的后果。


High oil prices fuel public discussion about the future of oil prices.	高昂的石油价格促使公众就未来的油价进行讨论。


The outcome of any public discussion can never be known with certainty, but chances are that it will amplify stories that imply risks of higher oil prices.	任何一场公众讨论都不会产生一个明确的结论，但却有可能夸大那些暗示更高的石油价格所带来的风险的传闻。


Experts may say that short-run supply factors caused the recent price increases, but the price increases will nonetheless lend credibility to scarier long-term stories.	专家们或许会说最近的价格上涨是由于供给因素引起的，但价格的上涨无疑会给更骇人的长期传闻增加可信度。


The scary story that is being amplified now concerns the developing world, notably China and India, where rapid economic growth - and no restrictions on emissions under the Kyoto Protocol - are seen as creating insatiable demands for oil.	现时正被夸大的一个耸人传闻事关发展中国家，特别是经济飞速发展的中国和印度。 由于没有加入《京都议定书》对废气排放进行限制，两国都被看作是正在引起对石油的不可满足的需求。


The story's premise is that the world will run out of oil faster than we thought, as these billions of people chase their dreams of big houses and sport utility vehicles.	这一传闻的假定是：随着上述两国亿万人追逐大房子和跑车的梦想，我们会比预想更快地耗尽我们的石油资源。


Is this plausible?	这样的假设有根据吗？


Certainly, China, India, and some other emerging countries are developing fast.	诚然，中国、印度和其他一些新兴国家正飞速发展。


But experts find it difficult to specify the long-run implications of this for the energy market.	但专家们发现很难确定这种发展形势对能源市场的长期影响。


Too many factors remain fuzzy: the rate of growth of these countries' energy demand, discoveries of new oil reserves, developments in oil-saving technology, and the ultimate replacement of oil by other energy sources.	许多因素仍然模糊：这些国家能源需求的增长率、新油田的发现、节油技术的发展和石油最终被其他能源所代替。


But what matters for oil prices now and in the foreseeable future is the perception of the story, not the ambiguities behind it.	但就现在和可预见的将来而言，与油价相关的是人们对这一传闻的理解，而非其背后的不确定因素。


If there is a perception that prices will be higher in the future, then prices will tend to be higher today.	如果人们认为未来的油价会更高，那么现在的油价也会相应更高。


That is how markets work.	这就是市场运作的规律。


If it is generally thought that oil prices will be higher in the future, owners of oil reserves will tend to postpone costly investments in exploration and expansion of production capacity, and they may pump oil at below capacity.	如果人们总体上认为未来的石油价格会更高，那么油田的所有者就会推延在开发和扩大产能方面的巨额投资，而且还可能将石油产量压制在生产能力之下。


They would rather sell their oil and invest later, when prices are higher, so they restrain increases in supply.	他们宁愿在油价更高时才售油和投资，所以会遏制石油供应量的增长。


Expectations become self-fulfilling, oil prices rise, a speculative bubble is born.	这些预期成为可以自然实现的结果，油价上涨，投机的泡沫随之出现。


But if owners of oil reserves think that prices will fall in the long run, they gain an incentive to explore for oil and expand production now in order to sell as much oil as possible before the fall.	但如果油田的所有者们认为油价在长期来看会呈下跌之势，他们现在便会有动力开发石油并扩大生产以求在跌价之前卖出更多的石油。


The resulting supply surge drives down prices, reinforces expectations of further declines, and produces the inverse of a speculative bubble: a collapse in prices.	随之而来的石油供应增加会使油价下跌，从而强化进一步跌价的预期，并导致与投机泡沫全然相反的结果：油价崩溃。


All of this may seem obvious, but we tend not to think of oil prices as being determined by expectations of future prices.	上诉的道理似乎显而易见，但我们却不愿认为石油价格是被对未来油价的预期所左右。


For example, in January 1974, when the first world oil crisis began, oil prices doubled in just days.	例如，在1974年1月第一次世界石油危机开始时，油价在几天内就翻了一番。


The immediate cause was believed to have been Israel's stunning success in the Yom Kippur War, which led Arab oil producers to retaliate by choking off output.	其直接原因被认为是以色列在"赎罪日之战"中大获全胜从而导致阿拉伯产油国以限制石油产出量作为报复。


The second crisis, in 1979, is usually attributed to supply disruptions from the Persian Gulf following the Islamic revolution in Iran and the subsequent start of the Iran-Iraq war.	1979年第二次危机，则被认为是受伊朗的伊斯兰革命和随后的两伊战争爆发给海湾的石油供应造成的影响。


Why, then, did real inflation-corrected oil prices remain at or above their 1974 levels until 1986?	那么，为什么剔除了通胀因素之后的实际石油价格直到1986年还维持在或高于其1974年的水平呢？


Speculative pressures are likely to have been at work, influencing the decisions of OPEC and many others.	这很可能是投机的压力在发挥作用，影响了欧佩克和其他产油国。


Although changes in market psychology are difficult to understand, the broad concerns that underlie such episodes of irrational exuberance are almost always clear.	虽然市场心理的变化令人难以理解，但支撑这种非理性繁荣的主要因素却几乎总是明了的。


For example, in 1972, scientists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, including computer pioneer Jay Forrester, published The Limits to Growth .	例如，包括计算机的先驱杰伊· · 弗莱斯特在内的一群麻省理工学院的科学家在1972年出版了《增长的极限》一书。


The book launched an international debate on whether the world would soon face immense economic problems due to shortages of oil and other natural resources - problems that seemed to be presaged by OPEC's production cuts eighteen months later.	此书就世界是否会因为石油和其他自然资源短缺而面临严重的经济问题这一话题引发了国际性的辩论。 而18个月后欧佩克的石��减产似乎预示了这些问题的出现。


The second crisis was immediately preceded by the accident at the Three-Mile Island nuclear reactor in Pennsylvania in March 1979, which reinvigorated the anti-nuclear movement.	第二次危机就发生在1979年3月宾西法尼亚州三哩岛核反应堆事故之后。 该事故重新激发了反原子能运动。


With nuclear power - regarded as the main technological bulwark against depletion of the world's oil supplies - suddenly suspect, oil prices doubled again by the year's end.	原子能-曾被认为是针对世界石油资源耗尽的主要技术防波堤-突然间受到了怀疑。 石油价格在年底再次翻番。


After 1979, fears about limits to growth and nuclear power ebbed.	1979年之后，对于增长极限和原子能的恐惧消退了。


Oil prices gradually fell, and the stock market began its long climb towards its peak in 2000.	石油价格逐渐回落，而股市也开始了向其2000年的高峰进发的上涨行情。


But the current rise in oil prices shows that people are still eager to embrace "running out of oil" stories - this time focused on China and India - even when short-run factors are to blame.	但目前的石油价格上涨反映了人们仍然急于相信"石油耗尽"的传闻-这一次归咎于中国和印度-即使这是受短期因素的影响。


Indeed, the International Energy Agency noted in September that the usual relationship between oil prices and inventory levels has broken down, with prices much higher than the usual relationship would suggest.	的确，国际能源机构（IEA）注意到油价和存货水平之间的关系在今年9月脱钩，实际油价比该关系通常所提示的价格要高得多。


The IEA's report calls this breakdown evidence of a "structural shift in the market."	IEA的报告将这种脱钩称为"市场的结构性转变"。


But the same pattern followed the 1973-4 and 1979-80 oil crises, when prices dropped from their highest peaks, but stayed quite high for years, representing a drag on the stock market, the housing market, and the world economy.	但同样的油价变化在1973-4和1979-80的石油危机之后都有所发生。 在那两个时期，油价从最高峰回落之后却还保持了数年的高位，从而影响了股票市场、房屋市场和世界经济的成长。


Let's hope that the effects of the present spike will be more short-lived.	让我们祈愿目前油价坚挺的影响不会长期持续。


But don't hold your breath.	但也请不要屏住呼吸（但也请做好持久的准备-译者）。


Are We Still Evolving?	我们是否还在进化？


NEW HAVEN – Many public-policy decisions are based on implicit assumptions about “human nature,” and it is currently popular to speculate about how evolution might have shaped human behavior and psychology.	发自纽黑文——许多公众政策决策都基于某种对“人性”的假设，而最近人们也非常热衷于谈论进化究竟是如何塑造人类行为和心理的。


But this raises some important questions: are humans continuing to evolve – and, if so, is our basic biological nature changing – or has modern culture stopped evolution?	但这也随之引出了若干重要问题：人类是否依然在进化——如果是的话，我们的生物特性是否在不断改变？ ——或者现代文明已经令我们的进化陷于停滞？


For some traits, we do not have to speculate – we can measure and compare on the basis of studies covering thousands of individuals over several generations.	对于人类的某些特性，我们不需要去妄加猜测——因为已经有覆盖几代人以及数千个样本的研究可供分析比较。


Such studies have not yet been done on most of the traits where speculation is popular, but they have been done on some traits of medical interest.	虽然这类研究还未能涵盖人们感兴趣的大多数生理特性，但出于医学研究的需要，人们也开展了对其中一些特性的研究。


What have we learned?	那么这些研究又揭示了什么呢？


Scientists are taking two approaches. In one, they sequence the DNA of particular genes in many individuals with or without some determined health condition and look for differences between the two groups.	科学家们运用两种方法进行研究：一是提取出具有特定健康问题的人的特定基因DNA序列，将其与其他人群进行对比并找出两者的差异之处。


This genetic approach measures effects that have accumulated over hundreds to thousands of generations, and the message is clear: humans have evolved in these respects fairly recently, some in one direction, some in another, depending on their environment and other conditions encountered.	这种基因方法可以测量出那些经过数百甚至数千代人积累下来的进化效果，而且结果很明确：人类是在一个相对较短的时期内对这些特性进行进化的，有些人向这个方向进化，而另一些人则选择了不同的路径，这取决于他们的生存环境以及其他特殊情况。


From this approach, we have learned, for example, that the ability to digest milk as adults evolved within the last 10,000 years – and several times – in cultures that domesticated sheep, goats, or cattle.	通过这个手段，我们认识到成人消化牛奶的能力其实是在近1万年内的进化成果——而且还发生了多次进化——并源自于那些懂得驯养绵羊，山羊和牛的文明。


Similar studies have taught us that sensitivity to alcohol consumption and resistance to diseases like malaria and leprosy also evolved within the last several thousand years.	类似的研究也揭示出人类吸收酒精的敏感度，以及对疟疾和麻风病的免疫力也是最近几千年才进化出来的。


Some scientists, myself included, have taken a different approach.	而包括我在内的一些科学家则选择了另一种方式。


Instead of looking for changes in genes that take many generations to accumulate until they can be detected, we have measured natural selection directly.	我们不是去寻找那些经过许多代人逐渐积累并最终显现的基因特征，而是直接对自然选择进行测量。


This method can reveal selection in action, working over periods of time as short as one generation – so that it can answer the question of whether modern culture has stopped evolution.	这种方法可以揭示出那些正在发生的进化选择，而这种选择的发生时间可以缩短至一代人以内——因此也可以用来回答现代文明是否令进化停滞的问题。


The message of this approach is also clear: natural selection continues to operate in modern cultures.	这个方式所传达的信息也非常明确：自然选择依然在现代文明内部持续进行着。


Whether it will operate consistently enough for a long enough time to produce significant genetic change can be answered only by future generations.	而这种选择是否能持续足够长久并最终引发重大的基因改变，只能由下一代人来回答。


Nevertheless, it is interesting to see in what direction natural selection is starting to shape us.	不过观察自然选择会向着哪个方向塑造人类则是一件很有趣的事。


Some of the answers are surprising.	有些答案甚至会令人大吃一惊。


We measured natural selection operating on women in Framingham, Massachusetts, where a long-term medical study on heart disease produced the data that we used.	我们在美国马萨诸塞州的佛明翰衡量妇女身上发生的自然选择，而依据则是该地对心脏病的长期医学研究。


The women were born between 1892 and 1956. We found significant selection and projected that if it continued for ten generations, the women would evolve to be about two centimeters shorter and have their first child about five months earlier.	我们抽取出生于1892年至1956年的妇女作为样本，从中发现了明显的自然选择因素并预计如果这个过程能持续十代人的话，妇女的身高将比现在矮两公分，而她们生下第一胎的时间也会提前5个月。


This is a surprising result, because women in developed countries have become taller thanks to better nutrition, and are having children later in life for many reasons, some of them cultural.	这个研究结论让人吃惊不已，因为由于更加良好的营养状况以及多种因素（文化因素也包含其中）影响下的推迟生育，发达国家的妇女身高正不断增加。


So what is going on here?	那么这个地方的妇女为何会出现这种现象？


Three things:	原因有三：


First, we know that giving birth for the first time when younger carries a cost in increased infant mortality, but modern medicine and hygiene have strikingly reduced infant mortality, reducing the cost of younger age at first birth.	首先我们知道妇女生育头一胎的年龄越小，婴儿死亡率的风险也会随之而增加，但现代医学和保健学已经令这个概率大大降低，减少了低龄生育的风险。


We therefore expect a shift toward earlier reproduction, because the costs previously associated with doing so have disappeared – exactly what we found in Framingham.	因此我们都会倾向于更早生育，因为相关风险几乎已经消失了——这也是我们在佛明翰所发现的现象。


And we expect those younger women to be shorter simply because they have had less time to grow.	而我们之所以预计这些更早生育的妇女会变得更矮，原因就是她们的发育期也相应缩短了。


In five other cases, scientists found women in developed countries maturing earlier, in two of them at smaller size (in the other three cases, size was not measured).	在另外5个研究项目中，科学家们在其中两个项目中发现更早发育成熟的发展中国家妇女身高变得更矮（另外三个项目并未测量身高）。


It is too early to say that this is a general trend, but right now, all signs point that way.	虽然断言这是个总体趋势还为时过早，但目前所有的迹象都指向了这一点。


Second, we measured the effects of natural selection by noting that women who were shorter and first gave birth when younger had more children.	其二，我们发现了一种自然选择效应，那就是那些更矮而且更早生育的妇女将生育更多儿女。


But genes are only one of many factors that influence height and age at first birth.	但基因只是众多影响身高和头胎生育年龄的因素之一。


Personal decisions, nutrition, income level, education, and religious affiliation all enter the mix.	个人选择，营养水平，收入层次，教育和宗教状况等各方面因素会最终组合成一种混合性因素。


When we estimated how much of the variation among individuals could be attributed to biology, the answer was less than 5%.	当我们估算一个人体内发生的变异有多少是来自于生物因素的时候，答案可能是小于5%。


That left 95% of the variation to be explained by the effects of culture and individual decisions.	这意味着95%的变异都来自于文化的影响和个人选择。


But, while the effects of biology on the traits that we measured are relatively small for humans living in complex modern cultures, even small effects, when repeated consistently, will accumulate.	但对于生存于如此一个复杂现代文化中的人们来说，生物因素对某些特性的影响虽然微小，但在长期重复和积累之后必将最终显现出来。


Third, traits like these are always the result of interactions between genes and environment.	第三，这些特性通常都是基因与环境互相作用的结果。


A woman could have genes that would tend to make her taller than average but end up shorter than average if she had been poorly nourished as a child. 	一位妇女身上可能携带着令她长得比同龄人更高的基因，但由于儿童时期缺乏营养，她可能最终会成为一个矮个子。


If evolution took its steady course and changed the genetic basis of height and age at first birth, we might not see women ten generations later who were shorter and matured earlier, for the effects of nutrition and culture could more than compensate for the genetic change. As a colleague of mine likes to put it, one good school-lunch program could be enough to obscure the biological effects.	即便进化的进程一直延续并最终改变了���响身高和头胎生育年龄的基因基础，但在10代人之后我们可能也无法看到更矮且更早发育成熟的妇女，因为营养和文化的因素可能会抵消甚至掩盖了基因的作用。


Even when we focus on a simple physical trait like height, natural selection in humans turns out to be a multifaceted and nuanced process.	由此可见，即使我们关注的是身高这么一个简单的物理特性，人类的自然选择依然会表现为一个多方面作用且差别极为细微的过程。


Similar studies on human behavior and psychology, where causation is more complex, remain beyond our grasp.	那些影响人类行为和心理的因素则更为复杂，而且超出了我们的研究能力。


In such cases, silence may be wiser than speculation.	在这些方面，人类一思考，上帝就发笑。


The Destructive Power of Inflation	通货膨胀的破坏力


CAMBRIDGE – When I was in Argentina last week, I was reminded of the devastating power of high inflation.	坎布里奇—上周我在阿根廷的时候，领教了高通胀的破坏力。


Argentina’s annual inflation rate is now about 20%, down from an estimated rate of about 40% last year.	眼下阿根廷年通胀率在20%左右，而去年估算的通胀率有40%左右。


The central bank is struggling to keep the economy on a disinflationary path, with a goal of achieving a 5% rate three years from now.	阿根廷央行竭尽全力让经济去通胀，目标是三年后实现5%的通胀率。


Inflation in Argentina has been much higher in the past.	阿根廷通胀在过去要高得多。


For the 15 years from 1975 to 1990, the annual rate averaged a remarkable 300%, meaning that the price level doubled every few months, on average.	在1975年到1990年的15年中，年通胀率高达300%，这意味着平均每过几个月物价水平就要翻番。


Prices rose at an explosive annual rate of more than 1,000% in 1989, before inflation was finally brought under control.	1989年，物价上涨年率暴增至1,000%，此后通胀终于受到控制。


In fact, inflation was all but extinguished.	事实上，通胀基本消失了。


I remember being in Argentina in the mid-1990s, when there was virtually no inflation.	我记得20世纪90年代中期在阿根廷时基本上没有通胀。


Back then, the Argentine peso was pegged to the US dollar, and both currencies were used equally for day-to-day transactions on the streets of Buenos Aires.	当时，阿根廷比索盯准美元，两种货币在布宜诺斯艾利斯街头平行流通。


But the subsequent collapse of the peso’s dollar peg, and the forced conversion of dollar contracts into peso contracts at a non-market exchange rate, caused inflation to soar.	但此后比索不再盯住美元，美元合同被迫按照非市场汇率转换为比索合同，这导致通胀飙升。


By 2003, the annual rate had increased to 40%.	2003年，年通胀率达到了40%。


It then fell to 10% for a few years.	随后几年下降到10%。


But it rose again during the presidencies of Néstor Kirchner and his wife and successor, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, to 25%.	但在内斯托·基什内尔及其妻子兼继任者克里斯蒂娜·费尔南德兹担任总统期间，通胀又上升到25%。


It finally jumped back up to 40% in 2016, propelled by the removal of distortionary price subsidies that had previously been used to disguise the true inflation rate.	最后，2016年通胀率又回到40%，与此同时，此前用来掩盖真实通胀率的扭曲性价格补贴也被取消。


The recent high rates of inflation, and the public’s memory of even higher rates in the past, have severely harmed Argentina’s economy.	最近的高通胀率，以及公众对过去更高通胀率的记忆给阿根廷经济造成了巨大的伤害。


Because market interest rates rise to compensate for high inflation, even the government must now pay an interest rate of about 25% to borrow in pesos for short periods.	为了补偿高通胀，市场利率也随之上升，这导致即使是政府现在也必须为短期比索借贷支付25%左右的利率。


Lenders are unwilling to provide long-term credit at fixed interest rates, because a jump in inflation would destroy the value of their bonds and loans.	贷款人不愿意提供固定利率长期信用，因为通胀剧增将影响到他们的债券和贷款的价值。


Households and businesses are reluctant to finance long-term investments with short-term loans or with variable-interest-rate loans, because a jump in inflation would cause their interest payments to rise sharply.	家庭和企业不愿用短期贷款或可变利率贷款为长期投资融资，因为通胀剧增将导致它们的利息支出剧增。


Indeed, Argentina’s history of high and variable inflation has destroyed the domestic mortgage market, making it impossible for a household to use a mortgage to buy a home.	事实上，阿根廷通胀高企而多变的历史已经毁掉了国内按揭市场，家庭无法通过按揭买房。


Businesses are also reluctant to borrow, because they recall how previous increases in inflation – and thus in interest rates – pushed otherwise healthy companies into bankruptcy.	企业也不愿借钱，因为它们还记得此前通胀——从而利率——剧增导致健康企业破产的情景。


The life insurance industry has been destroyed by high and uncertain inflation as well.	人寿保险业也受到高企而不确定的通胀的破坏。


Given that no one knows what the peso will be worth when future claims are paid, why would anyone buy insurance with today’s pesos?	没人知道未来被索偿时比索价值几何，既然如此，还有谁会以今天的比索来购买保险呢？


Economists might respond by suggesting that mortgages, insurance contracts, and other agreements could be indexed to the price level, adjusting payments to the contemporary rate of inflation.	经济学家的对策兴许是建议按揭、保险合同和其他协议可以进行物价水平指数化，根据当前通货膨胀率偿付。


But when the inflation rate is changing rapidly, it is hard to know what the contemporary rate even is.	但当通胀率变化十分迅速时，甚至连当前通胀率都很难确定。


The previous government tried to deceive the public by publishing inflation estimates that experts agreed were far lower than the true rate of price growth.	前任政府试图通过发布通胀估算来欺瞒公众，专家们一致认为政府发布的数字远低于真实的物价增长率。


As one Argentine friend explained, the government fired the statisticians who had tried to provide accurate measures of inflation and replaced them with political allies who would produce artificially low numbers.	一位阿根廷朋友解释说，试图提供准确的通胀衡量手段的统计学家都会被政府炒鱿鱼，替之以能炮制低通胀数字的政治盟友。


As he put it, they “changed government statistics from a technical problem to a creative art.”	他说，他们“将政府数据从技术问题变成行为艺术。 ”


In the years when the government allowed Argentinians to convert their pesos into dollars and take them out of the country, people who had financial wealth moved their money into investments in the United States.	在政府允许阿根廷人将比索兑换成美元并携带出境的时候，拥有金融财产的人都将钱投资到了美国。


I am told that there is much more Argentinian investment wealth in the US than in Argentina.	有人告诉我，投资美国的阿根廷财富比投资阿根廷的都多。


As a result of this outflow of funds, investment in Argentina is low, holding down productivity and growth.	拜这一资金流出所赐，阿根廷投资十分低迷，这拖累了生产率和增长。


Gross capital formation represents only 17% of GDP in Argentina, compared to 23% in Chile and Mexico.	阿根廷总资本形成只占GDP的17%，而中国和墨西哥占23%。


Although President Mauricio Macri’s new government is determined to reduce inflation and achieve price stability, it is politically costly to do so.	尽管总统马克里的新政府决心降低通胀、实现物价稳定，但这样做需要付出高昂的政治代价。


Tight money and high interest rates depress demand and have caused real GDP to decline.	紧货币和高利率抑制了投资，导致真实GDP收缩。


At the same time, the public cannot perceive a reduction of inflation from 20% to 15%.	与此同时，通胀从20%变成15%对公众来说没有什么感觉。


So the government must pay a short-term political price to achieve a long-term economic gain.	因���，政府必须付出短期政治代价才能实现长期经济收益。


Argentina’s experience holds two crucial lessons for other countries.	阿根廷的经验为其他国家提供了两个关键教训。


First, price stability is fragile, and the inflation rate can rise rapidly.	第一，物价稳定是脆弱的，通货膨胀率可能急剧升高。


And, second, high rates of inflation remain in the public’s memory and have long-lasting adverse effects.	第二，高通胀率会留在民众的记忆中，并造成长期的负面影响。


It is important to achieve price stability; but it is just as important to maintain it, by continually managing monetary policy to target a low rate of inflation.	实现物价稳定非常重要，但通过管理货币政策、盯住低通货膨胀率目标来维持物价稳定同样重要。


Argentina’s Economic Big Bang	阿根廷经济大爆炸


FRANKFURT – Last week, the government of newly elected Argentine President Mauricio Macri launched a bold plan to revitalize a bruised and beleaguered economy plagued by high inflation.	法兰克福—上周，新当选的阿根廷总统马克里启动了一项雄心勃勃的计划，意欲重振因为高通胀而饱受折磨、困难重重的经济。


At a time of daunting crisis conditions, one should not underestimate the importance of this move not just for Argentina, but also for other countries, where leaders are watching closely for clues about how to deal with their own economic woes.	在危机四伏的环境下，我们不可低估这一举动对阿根廷以及其他国家的重要性。 其他国家领导人正在密切观察如何应对自身经济困难的线索。


Thanks to years of economic mismanagement, Argentina’s economy has been badly underperforming for decades.	拜多年经济管理失当所赐，阿根廷经济数十年来一直表现萎靡。


Previous governments sought to avoid difficult policy choices and obfuscate fundamental issues by implementing inefficient controls that grossly misallocated resources and undermined Argentina’s ability to generate the foreign-exchange earnings needed to cover its import bill, resulting in domestic shortages.	前任政府试图想避免困难的政策选择，掩盖根本性问题，它们实施了无效的控制，导致资源大面积错配，破坏了阿根廷获得支付进口账单所需的外汇收入，导致国内短缺。


The recent drop in commodity prices has exacerbated the situation, depleting what little growth dynamism the economy had left, while fueling inflation, deepening poverty, and spreading economic insecurity and financial instability.	最近大宗商品价格的下跌加剧了这一情况，耗尽了阿根廷经济仅存的一点增长活力，同时恶化了通胀，深化了贫困，也扩散了经济不安全和金融动荡。


In theory, governments in such a situation have five basic options to contain crisis conditions, pending the effects of measures to reinvigorate growth and employment engines.	理论上，面临这一情况的政府有五个基本选择遏制危机，等待重振增长和就业引擎的措施起效。


· Run down the financial reserves and wealth that were accumulated when the economy was doing better.	·         消耗经济表现较好时所积累的金融储备和财富。


· Borrow from foreign and domestic lenders.	·         向国内外贷款人借钱。


· Cut public-sector spending directly, while creating incentives to induce lower private-sector expenditure.	·         直接削减公共部门支出，同时制造激励诱导降低私人部门支出。


· Generate revenues through higher taxes and fees, and earn more from abroad.	·         通过提高税费产生收入，并增加海外收入。


· Use the price mechanism to accelerate adjustments throughout the economy, as well as in trade and financial interactions with other countries.	·         用价格机制加速整个经济以及与其他国家贸易和金融互动的调整。


Through careful design and sequencing, these five measures can help not only to deal with immediate economic and financial problems, but also to create the conditions for higher growth, job creation, and financial stability in the longer term.	通过精心设计和排列，这五项措施不但有助于应对当下的经济和金融问题，还能为更高的长期增长、就业创造和金融稳定创造条件。


In this manner, they can contain the spread of economic hardship among the population, protect the most vulnerable segments, and put future generations on a better footing.	通过这样的安排，它们可以遏制经济困难在群众中蔓延，保护最脆弱人群，为子孙后代提供更好立足点。


In practice, however, governments often face complications that undermine effective implementation of these measures.	但是，在实践中，政府常常面临制约这些措施的有效实施的复杂情况。


If policymakers are not careful, two problems, in particular, can reinforce each other, potentially pushing the economy over the precipice.	如果决策者不够谨慎，那么特别是有两个问题可能互相强化，有可能导致经济脱轨。


The first problem arises when specific factors, real or perceived, block some options from the adjustment menu.	第一个问题是具体因素——不管是真实因素还是人们所认为的因素——导致一些选项无法进入调整候选清单。


Some measures may already have been exhausted: the country may not have any wealth or reserves left to tap, and there may be a shortage of willing lenders.	一些措施有可能已经失去效果：该国可能没有任何财富或储备可用，其领导人可能意志力不足。


Other measures, such as fiscal adjustment, must be implemented very carefully, in order to avoid torpedoing the growth objective.	其他措施，如财政调整，必须小心实施，以避免破坏增长目标。


The second problem is timing, with governments struggling to ensure that the measures take effect in the right sequence.	第二个问题是时机问题，政府难以确保这些措施以正确的顺序起效。


Effective implementation requires understanding key features of economic and financial interactions, including not just feedback effects, but also the behavioral aspects of private-sector responses.	有效的实施需要理解经济和金融互动的关键特征，不但包括反馈机制，也包括私人部门反应的行为学角度。


And all of this must be closely coordinated with the pursuit of supply-side reforms that promote robust, durable, and inclusive growth.	所有这些都必须与追求供给面改革密切协调。 供给面改革可以刺激鲁棒、持久、包容的增长。


Here is where the Macri government’s approach is an historical exception.	这也是马克里政府的方针成为历史例外之处。


Macri took over the presidency with a bang, launching an audacious – and highly risky – strategy that places aggressive price liberalization and the removal of quantitative controls front and center, ahead of the five measures relating to demand management and financial assistance.	马克里就任总统后的第一炮打得很响，抛出了一个大胆——风险也很高——的战略，将价格自由化和消除量化控制列为核心，位于与需求管理和金融协助有关的五项措施之前。


Already, most export taxes and currency controls have been scrapped, income taxes have been cut, and the exchange rate has been freed up, allowing for an immediate 30% depreciation of the peso.	目前，出口税和货币管制已经取消，所得税已经削减，汇率已经放松，放任比索立刻贬值30%。


Historically, few governments have pursued this type of sequencing, much less with such fervor; indeed, most governments have hesitated, especially when it comes to full currency liberalization.	历史上，很少有政府采取这样的顺序，更少有政府以如此力度执行； 事实上，大部分政府都会犹豫不决，特别是在货币完全自由化问题上。


When governments have taken similar steps, they usually have done so after – or at least alongside – the provision of financial injections and efforts to restrain demand.	当其他政府采取类似的措施时，它们往往要等到提供金融注资和遏制需求的措施之后。


The reason is clear: by taking time to set the stage for liberalization, governments hoped to limit the initial spike in price inflation, thereby avoiding a wage-price spiral and curbing capital flight.	原因很显然：政府希望获得时间为自由化做准备，以此限制价格通胀的初始幅度，从而避免工资-价格螺旋，遏制资本外逃。


They worried that, if these problems emerged, they would derail reform measures and erode the public support needed to press on.	它们担心，如果出现这些问题，改革措施就会脱轨，继续改革所需要的公共支持就会受到影响。


To revive the Argentine economy in a durable and inclusive manner, Macri’s government needs to act fast to mobilize sizeable external financial assistance, generate additional domestic resources, and implement deeper structural reforms.	要想持久、包容地重振阿根廷经济，马克里政府需要快速行动动员大规模外部金融支持，开辟新的国内资源，实施更深入的结构改革。


If it does, Argentina’s bold economic strategy will become a model for other countries, both now and in the future.	如果做到这些，阿根廷的雄心勃勃的经济战略将成为其他国家的榜样，不管是现在还是将来。


But if the approach falters – whether because of incorrect sequencing or a surge of popular dissatisfaction – other countries will become even more hesitant to lift controls and fully liberalize their currencies.	但如果这一方针失败——不管是因为不正确的顺序还是因为群众不满暴增——其他国家在放松管制、实现货币完全自由化时就会更加犹豫。


The resulting policy confusion would be bad for everyone.	由此带来的政策困惑对所有人都是件坏事。


A Fair Hearing for Sovereign Debt	公平对待主权债务


NEW YORK – Last July, when United States federal judge Thomas Griesa ruled that Argentina had to repay in full the so-called vulture funds that had bought its sovereign debt at rock-bottom prices, the country was forced into default, or “Griesafault."	纽约—去年7月，美国联邦法官托马斯·格里萨（Thomas Griesa）裁定阿根廷必须足额偿付以触底价购买了其主权债务的所谓兀鹫基金。 结果，阿根廷被迫违约——或可称之为“格里萨违约”。


The decision reverberated far and wide, affecting bonds issued in a variety of jurisdictions, suggesting that US courts held sway over contracts executed in other countries.	这一裁决反响激烈，影响了诸多地区发行的债券，这表明美国法院能够左右其他国家的合约执行。


Ever since, lawyers and economists have tried to untangle the befuddling implications of Griesa's decision.	自此以后，律师和经济学家试图厘清格里萨裁决的影响。


Does the authority of US courts really extend beyond America's borders?	美国法院的权威真的可以扩展到美国国界以外？


Now, a court in the United Kingdom has finally brought some clarity to the issue, ruling that Argentina's interest payments on bonds issued under UK law are covered by UK law, not US judicial rulings.	如今，一家英国法庭给这一问题带来了一些澄清。 它裁定阿根廷根据英国法律发行的债券，其利息偿付只需遵守英国法律，不必顾及美国法院的裁决。


The decision – a welcome break from a series of decisions by American judges who do not seem to understand the complexities of global financial markets – conveys some important messages.	这一决定是对似乎并不理解全球金融市场复杂性的美国法官的一系列决定的有益反驳。 它释放出一些重要信息。


First and foremost, the fact that the Argentine debt negotiations were preempted by an American court – which was then contradicted by a British court – is a stark reminder that market-based solutions to sovereign-debt crises have a high potential for chaos.	首先也是最重要的是，阿根廷债务谈判被一家美国法院先发制人——但随后被一家英国法院反制——这一事实尖锐地提醒我们，基于市场的主权债务危机解决方案可能造成重大混乱。


Before the Griesafault, it was often mistakenly assumed that solutions to sovereign-debt repayment problems could be achieved through decentralized negotiations, without a strong legal framework.	在格里萨违约前，人们常常错误地假设主权债务偿付问题的解决方案应该通过分散化的谈判实现，不必有强大额法律框架。


Even afterwards, the financial community and the International Monetary Fund hoped to establish some order in sovereign-bond markets simply by tweaking debt contracts, particularly the terms of so-called collective-action clauses (which bind all creditors to a restructuring proposal approved by a supermajority).	即使在事后，金融界和国际货币基金组织（IMF）仍希望仅仅通过调整债务合同、特别是所谓的集体行动条款（要求所有债权人按照绝对多数原则执行获通过的重组方案）为主权债券市场建立些许秩序。


But simple modifications like contract amendments will not overcome the system's deficiencies.	但简单的改变，如合同修改，无法克服系统漏洞。


With multiple debts subject to a slew of sometimes-contradictory laws in different jurisdictions, a basic formula for adding the votes of creditors – which supporters of a market-based approach have promoted – would do little to resolve complicated bargaining problems.	多边债务有时会牵涉到不同司法辖区的相互矛盾的法律，债权人投票这一基本模式——由基于市场的方法的支持者推行——无助于解决复杂的讨价还价问题。


Nor would it establish the exchange rates to be used to value debt issued in different currencies.	它也无法确定用于给以不同货币发行的债务估值的汇率。


If these problems are left to markets to address, sheer bargaining power, not considerations of efficiency or equity, will determine the solutions.	如果这些问题留给市场去解决，那么强大的讨价还价实力而非效率或所有权因素将决定结果。


The consequences of these deficiencies are not mere inconveniences.	这些缺陷带来的后果不仅是不便。


Delays in concluding debt restructurings can make economic recessions deeper and more persistent, as the case of Greece illustrates.	推迟完成债务重组可能加深和延长经济衰退，希腊就是明证。


This brings us to the second lesson of the British ruling.	这就引出了英国裁决的第二个教训。


With the stakes so high and the system so broken, debt markets have little reason to remain in the US.	兹事体大，系统破败，因此市场没有理由唯美国马首是瞻。


America has always prided itself on the strength of its “rule of law," a selling point that has made Wall Street host to the largest sovereign-debt market.	美国向来标榜其“法治”之强大，这一卖点让华尔街成为最大的主权债务市场。


But Griesa's ruling, based on a peculiar – and in our view, indefensible – interpretation of certain terms in Argentina's contract, showed that US commercial interests can dominate its courts' decisions.	但格里萨的裁决基于对阿根廷合同的某些条款的特殊解读——在我们看来，这样的解读根本站不住脚——这表明美国的商业利益可能左右法院判决。


The vaunted American rule of law no longer looks so robust.	浮夸的美国法治不再强健。


Perversely, it protects the strong against the weak.	它保护强者、欺凌弱者。


The Griesafault is only the latest of many decisions and legal changes that have revealed what one might call a symptom of “corruption, American-style," in which lobbying and campaign contributions compromise the entire system, even when no individual official is on the take.	格里萨违约只不过是诸多判决和法律修改的最新例子，这些判决和修改表现出一种可称之为“美国式腐败”的症候，即游说和选举献金威胁到整个系统，即使没有个体官员受贿。


The US would be wise to react before the sovereign-debt market migrates from New York.	美国最好在主权债务市场抛弃纽约之前采取行动。


China should stand ready to pick up the slack.	中国应该做好收拾局面的准备。


Its savings now far outstrip those of the US, and it is striving to make Shanghai a global financial center.	如今，中国储蓄远超美国，并且正在竭力将上海打造成全球金融中心。


That ambition has become more attainable in view of the damage to the US system's credibility in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.	考虑到2008年金融危机后美国体系的信誉扫地，这一雄心的可行性更强了。


But, if Shanghai is to emerge as a leader in sovereign lending markets, China should be aware of the shortcomings of legal frameworks elsewhere, and design a more efficient and equitable alternative.	但是，上海要想崛起成为主权借贷市场的领导者，中国应该了解其他地区法律框架的弱点，并设计出更高效、更公平的替代品。


The final, overarching message of the British court's decision is one that all countries should heed.	英国法院判决的最后一个影响深远的意义所有国家都应该注意。


There is an urgent need to renew the United Nations' efforts to create a multinational legal framework for sovereign-debt restructuring.	联合国应该重新为主权债务重组建立一套多边法律框架，这一需要十分迫切。


Though the US is striving to undermine these efforts, the UK ruling reminds us that America's judges are not the world's judges.	尽管美国正致力于搞破坏，但英国的判决提醒我们，美国法官不是世界的法官。


That last revelation may not make Wall Street happy; but, for the many countries around the world that rely on sovereign debt, it is very good news indeed.	最后这个意义也许会令华尔街不快； 但是，对全球许多依赖主权债务的国家来说，这是名副其实的好消息。


Argentina’s Bumpy Ride	阿根廷的颠簸之旅


SANTIAGO – “Fasten your seat belts, because it should be a bumpy ride,” the captain warned from the cockpit.	圣地亚哥——当我们的飞机即将进入阿根廷空域时，机长从驾驶室里传出指示：“请务必系好安全带，因为本段飞行会较为颠簸。


We were about to enter Argentine airspace.	”


Investors looking to do business in Argentina have long been issued similar warnings.	那些想在阿根廷做生意的投资者们也会经常听到类似的警告。


This is the country that scholars study when they want to understand financial crises.	这是一个被学者们视作金融危机研究范本的国度。


The country’s largest such crisis, in 2001, brought down the local banking system and caused the Argentine government to default on its debts.	该国2001爆发的最严重金融危机摧毁了整个本地银行体系并引发政府债务违约。


The economy contracted by a whopping 18%, and the unemployment rate peaked above 22%.	当时总体经济规模剧减了18%，而失业率则飙升到22%以上。


After a period of calm that has now lasted a decade, dire economic warnings are back.  Forecasts for the world economy are turning pessimistic, and economists in export-dependent Argentina are finding much to worry about.	在经历了十年的平静之后，可怕的经济警报再度降临。 全球经济的预测都倒向悲观，而阿根廷这个出口依赖国的经济学家们更是千头万绪。


Itau, Latin America’s largest bank, is predicting GDP growth in Argentina of only 3.2% next year, down sharply from 6% in 2011.	拉美规模最大的巴西银行预测阿根廷明年的GDP增长只有3. 2%，大幅低于2011年的6%。


Inflation is another concern.	另外还有通货膨胀的问题。


With official figures widely discredited, private analysts estimate that consumer prices are rising at an annual rate of 25% or more.	官方数据已经失去人民的信任，而私人分析机构则估计物价指数正以25%以上的年增长率不断攀升。


Those are careful estimates by serious economists. But, then again, one should take all economic forecasts about Argentina with a grain of salt.	虽然上面那些都是严肃经济学家认真评估出来的结果，但你必须再次对这些经济预测持保留态度。


In the decade since the last crisis, Argentine policymakers have broken almost every rule in the economic-policy playbook.	自从十年前爆发经济危机之后，阿根廷的政策制定者们几乎违反了所有经济政策教科书中所必须遵守的原则。


Again and again, local and international economists have issued dire warnings about what would happen if it persisted in its heterodoxy.	与此同时，本地和国外经济学家都警告说如果这种极端举动继续持续下去的话必将导致严重后果。


And yet Argentina has managed to grow fast, doubling per capita income since 2002.	但阿根廷却实现了迅速增长，人均收入自2002年以来也已经翻了一番。


Energy policy is a perfect example of a wrongheaded strategy.	能源政策恰好是政府决策失误的一个绝佳样本。


The Argentine government fixed gas prices, despite ongoing inflation.	阿根廷政府在通胀不断的情况下坚持冻结了天然气价格。


Gas became artificially cheap, consumers seldom bothered to turn the thermostat down, and producers stopped investing.	该价格被人为压低，以致消费者们根本不在意过多消耗，而投资者们则停止注资。


As a result Argentina, once a thriving gas exporter, had to seek imports to overcome domestic shortages.	结果阿根廷这个曾经的天然气出口大国只能寻求天然气进口来填补国内短缺。


What saved Argentina over the last decade were highly favorable external conditions: sky-high global commodity prices and technological innovations that greatly increased farm yields.	而在过去十年帮了阿根廷一把的则是高度优越的外部环境。 高涨的全球商品价格和科技革新使农业产量大幅增长。


Neighboring Brazil helped by undergoing a boom of its own, which pumped up demand for a wide range of Argentine products.	邻国巴西的繁荣也提升了对各类阿根廷产品的需求。


With rising tax revenues and the burden of debt gone after the default a decade ago, the government went on a spending spree: real public expenditure grew at double-digit rates most years since 2002.	随着税收增加以及十年前违约之后卸掉了债务负担，政府开始了一场消费的狂欢：2002年后大部分时期实际公共支出都以两位数的速度增长。


At the same time, the central bank kept interest rates low, so that the inflation-adjusted cost of loans is zero or negative.	与此同时中央银行则维持低利率，因此贷款成本在考虑通胀因素后基本保持在零或是负数水平。


In this environment, Argentine consumers naturally also went on a spending spree, and corporate profits rose accordingly.	在这个环境下，阿根廷消费者自然也开始大肆消费，而企业利润也因此上升。


Not long ago, I met with a group of foreign investors in Argentina.	就在不久之前我遇到了一批在阿根廷投资的外国投资者。


They owned everything from paper mills to department stores and supermarket chains.	他们的项目从造纸厂到超市百货商店无所不包。


After they finished trading stories of endless red tape and arbitrary government decisions, I asked why they kept investing in Argentina.	在听完他们如何跟阿根廷政府那帮朝令夕改的官老爷们打交道的故事之后，我问他们为何要继续在阿根庭投资。


“Because we make a lot of money,” was the unanimous answer.	而我得到的一致回答是“因为能赚大钱”。


The question making the rounds in Argentina nowadays is whether this period of plenty is coming to an end.	如今困扰阿根廷的问题则是这个繁荣时代是否已经走到了尽头。


You would not feel any such anxiety in Buenos Aires shopping malls, which are as crowded as ever. Nor could you infer it from the behavior of voters, who seem poised to re-elect President Cristina Kirchner in October.	你无法在布宜诺斯艾利斯常年人头涌涌的商场里感受到任何恐慌的气氛，也无法通过选民的行为来推断这一点，因为他们似乎要在今年十月继续支持克里斯蒂娜·基什内尔连任总统。


But the signs of economic deterioration are surely there.	但经济恶化的迹象其实已经有所显现了。


With imports still growing strongly and commodity prices beginning to fall as a result of the world slowdown, Argentina’s large trade surplus is disappearing quickly.	一方面进口依然强劲，一方面商品价格由于全球增长放缓而下跌，阿根廷的大规模贸易顺差正在迅速缩水。


Fearing a weaker peso, spooked investors demand dollars.	投资者们也如履薄冰，害怕阿根庭比索走弱的他们开始兑换美元。


Capital is flowing out of the country, and official reserves are slowly being depleted.	资本正不断流出这个国家，而政府储备也逐渐走向枯竭。


To stem the outflow of dollars, the central bank may well be forced to raise interest rates.	为了遏制美元的流出，阿根庭中央银行很可能会提高利率。


That, plus the gloomy international outlook and a fiscal policy that will have to become less expansionary after the election, will slow the economy down.	而此举再加上悲观的国际预测以及必须在选举后转向紧缩的财政政策，阿根廷的经济增长将会放缓。


A bumpy ride is acceptable as long as the landing is smooth.	不过只要能平稳着陆的话，些许颠簸也是可以接受的。


Ensuring that outcome will be the number one job for a newly re-elected President Cristina Kirchner.	而即将连任的克里斯蒂娜总统所面临的头等大事就是要确保稳定着陆。


It will prove a difficult period at the controls.	而对于那些掌舵人来说，这必将是一段充满挑战的时期。


The Vultures’ Victory	兀鹫的胜利


NEW YORK – A recent decision by a United States appeals court threatens to upend global sovereign-debt markets. It may even lead to the US no longer being viewed as a good place to issue sovereign debt.	纽约—美国上诉法院的最新决定可能会让全球主权债务市场天翻地覆，甚至会导致美国不再被视为发行主权债务的理想之地。


At the very least, it renders non-viable all debt restructurings under the standard debt contracts.	从最轻的角度说，它让所有根据标准债务契约进行的债务重组都变得不可行。


In the process, a basic principle of modern capitalism – that when debtors cannot pay back creditors, a fresh start is needed – has been overturned.	在此过程中，当债务人无法偿还债权人时就需推倒重来这一现代资本主义的基本原则被颠覆了。


The trouble began a dozen years ago, when Argentina had no choice but to devalue its currency and default on its debt.	麻烦在十多年前就已经产生，当时阿根廷别无选择，只能贬值其货币和违约其债务。


Under the existing regime, the country had been on a rapid downward spiral of the kind that has now become familiar in Greece and elsewhere in Europe.	在现有制度下，阿根廷处于如今为希腊和欧洲其他国家所熟知的快速下降螺旋中。


Unemployment was soaring, and austerity, rather than restoring fiscal balance, simply exacerbated the economic downturn.	失业率飙升，紧缩，而不是重塑财政平衡，只能放大经济下降之势。


Devaluation and debt restructuring worked.	贬值和债务重组是有效的。


In subsequent years, until the global financial crisis erupted in 2008, Argentina’s annual GDP growth was 8% or higher, one of the fastest rates in the world.	在此后几年中，直到2008年金融危机爆发前，阿根廷的年GDP增长率都保持8%或以上，为世界增长最快的国家之一。


Even former creditors benefited from this rebound.	即便是此前的债权人，也从阿根廷的经济反弹中获了益。


In a highly innovative move, Argentina exchanged old debt for new debt – at about 30 cents on the dollar or a little more – plus a GDP-indexed bond.	阿根廷采取了极富创新精神的措施，用老债务换新债务——大概是三折多一点的折算比例——加上GDP指数债券。


The more Argentina grew, the more it paid to its former creditors.	阿根廷增长得越快，它偿付给前债权人的规模就越大。


Argentina’s interests and those of its creditors were thus aligned: both wanted growth.	阿根廷及其债权人的利益由此形成了一致：双方都希望增长。


It was the equivalent of a “Chapter 11” restructuring of American corporate debt, in which debt is swapped for equity, with bondholders becoming new shareholders.	这就好比是美国公司债务的“第十一章”重组，即用债券换股权，债券持有人成为新股东。


Debt restructurings often entail conflicts among different claimants.	债务重组通常会造成不同利益人的冲突。


That is why, for domestic debt disputes, countries have bankruptcy laws and courts.	这就是为何各国需要破产法和破产法庭来处理国内债务纠纷。


But there is no such mechanism to adjudicate international debt disputes.	但在国际债务纠纷的裁定上就不存在这样一套制度。


Once upon a time, such contracts were enforced by armed intervention, as Mexico, Venezuela, Egypt, and a host of other countries learned at great cost in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.	曾几何时，这样的契约由武力干预来强制实施，墨西哥、委内瑞拉、埃及和其他一些国家在十九世纪和二十世纪初以沉重的代价学到了这一教训。


After the Argentine crisis, President George W. Bush’s administration vetoed proposals to create a mechanism for sovereign-debt restructuring.	阿根廷危机后，小布什政府否决了建立主权债务重组机制的方案。


As a result, there is not even the pretense of attempting fair and efficient restructurings.	结果，我们就连试图进行公证有效的重组的姿态都不曾看到。


Poor countries are typically at a huge disadvantage in bargaining with big multinational lenders, which are usually backed by powerful home-country governments.	穷国在于多边贷款人讨价还价时处于严重劣势，后者往往有强大的本国政府撑腰。


Often, debtor countries are squeezed so hard for payment that they are bankrupt again after a few years.	通常，债务国会被紧逼还债，以至于隔几年后又要破产一次。


Economists applauded Argentina’s attempt to avoid this outcome through a deep restructuring accompanied by the GDP-linked bonds.	经济学家对阿根廷试图通过伴随GDP关联债权的深度重组避免这一结果赞不绝口。


But a few “vulture” funds – most notoriously the hedge fund Elliott Management, headed by the billionaire Paul E. Singer – saw Argentina’s travails as an opportunity to make huge profits at the expense of the Argentine people.	但一些“兀鹫”基金——特别是亿万富翁保罗·辛格（Paul E. Singer）领导的大名鼎鼎的对冲基金艾略特管理公司（Elliott Management）——将阿根廷的痛苦视为一次以阿根廷人民为代价攫取巨额利润的机会。


They bought the old bonds at a fraction of their face value, and then used litigation to try to force Argentina to pay 100 cents on the dollar.	他们以面值的几分之一买进老债券，然后通过诉讼迫使阿根廷十足偿付这些债券。


Americans have seen how financial firms put their own interests ahead of those of the country – and the world.	美国人看到了金融企业如何将自身利益置于这些国家——以及全世界——之前。


The vulture funds have raised greed to a new level.	兀鹫基金创造了贪婪的新境界。


Their litigation strategy took advantage of a standard contractual clause (called pari passu) intended to ensure that all claimants are treated equally.	它们的诉讼战略利用了标准的契约条款（称为平权条款），该条款的本意是确保所有债权人得到平等对待。


Incredibly, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York decided that this meant that if Argentina paid in full what it owed those who had accepted debt restructuring, it had to pay in full what it owed to the vultures.	令人难以置信的是，美国纽约第二巡回上诉法院判决这意味着如果阿根廷十足偿付欠接受债务重组者的债务，那么它也必须十足偿付欠兀鹫基金的债务。


If this principle prevails, no one would ever accept debt restructuring.	如果这一原则推而广之，就不会有人接受重组。


There would never be a fresh start – with all of the unpleasant consequences that this implies.	这绝不是推倒重来——而是包含着无数令人不安的后果。


In debt crises, blame tends to fall on the debtors.	在债务危机中，人们的指责通常会落到债务人身上。


They borrowed too much.	他们借得太多。


But the creditors are equally to blame – they lent too much and imprudently.	但债权人的责任不亚于债务人——它们贷得太多，太不谨慎。


Indeed, lenders are supposed to be experts on risk management and assessment, and in that sense, the onus should be on them.	事实上，贷款人理应是风险管理和评估专家，从这个角度讲，责任应该由他们承担。


The risk of default or debt restructuring induces creditors to be more careful in their lending decisions.	违约或债务重组风险应该让债权人在贷款决策中更谨慎。


The repercussions of this miscarriage of justice may be felt for a long time.	这一显失公正的后果可能是长期的。


After all, what developing country with its citizens’ long-term interests in mind will be prepared to issue bonds through the US financial system, when America’s courts – as so many other parts of its political system – seem to allow financial interests to trump the public interest?	毕竟，考虑人民长期利益的发展中国在准备通过美国金融系统发行债券时应该准备些什么？ 而美国法院——及其政治体系内的其他许多部分——似乎将坐视金融利益压倒公共利益。


Countries would be well advised not to include pari passu clauses in future debt contracts, at least without specifying more fully what is intended.	各国将得到的一个好建议是在未来债务契约中不再加入平权条款，至少不会更具体地说明意图。


Such contracts should also include collective-action clauses, which make it impossible for vulture funds to hold up debt restructuring.	契约还应该包括集体行动条款，使兀鹫基金无法作梗债务重组。


When a sufficient proportion of creditors agree to a restructuring plan (in the case of Argentina, the holders of more than 90% of the country’s debt did), the others can be forced to go along.	当足够比例的债权人批准重组计划时（在阿根廷的例子中，90%的该国债务持有人同意重组），其他人也将被迫同意。


The fact that the International Monetary Fund, the US Department of Justice, and anti-poverty NGOs all joined in opposing the vulture funds is revealing.	IMF、美国司法部和减贫NGO都加入到反对兀鹫基金的行列这一事实很能说明问题。


But so, too, is the court’s decision, which evidently assigned little weight to their arguments.	但是法庭的裁决也是如此，这对它们的观点没有什么作用。


For those in developing and emerging-market countries who harbor grievances against the advanced countries, there is now one more reason for discontent with a brand of globalization that has been managed to serve rich countries’ interests (especially their financial sectors’ interests).	对发展中和新兴市场国家的那些对发达国家怀恨在心的人来说，现在又有了新的理由反对用来保护富国利益（特别是其金融部门利益）的全球化。


In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the United Nations Commission of Experts on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System urged that we design an efficient and fair system for the restructuring of sovereign debt.	全球金融危机爆发后，联合国国际货币和金融系统改革专家委员会敦促我们为重组主权债务设计有效而公平的制度。


The US court’s tendentious, economically dangerous ruling shows why we need such a system now.	美国法院带倾向性的裁决会带来沉重的经济代价，也显示了为什么我们现在需要这样一套制度。


Argentina’s Energy Dilemma	阿根廷的能源难题


BUENOS AIRES – The expropriation of nearly all of the Spanish company Repsol’s stake in Argentina’s energy producer YPF, announced in a vehement speech by President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, has raised legal alarms worldwide.	布宜诺斯艾利斯—总统费尔南德斯以严厉的用词宣布没收西班牙雷普索尔公司（Repsol）在所持有的阿根廷能源生产商YPF的几乎全部股份，这在全世界拉响了法律警报。


In fact, the move will not resolve the country’s energy problems in the absence of enormous inflows of investment to the sector.	事实上，在能源部门没有大规模投资流入的情况下，这并不能解决阿根廷的能源问题。


Repsol acquired complete control of YPF in 1999; in February 2008, it transferred part of its shares to the Petersen Group, which today holds 25%.	雷普索尔于1999年收购了YPF的完全控股权； 2008年2月，它将部分股权转让给了彼得森集团（Petersen Group），如今，后者持股量为25%。


Repsol currently holds 57%, with the rest owned by stock-market investors.	雷普索尔现在则持有57%的股份，其余部分由股市投资者持有。


The Argentine government intends to expropriate 51%, leaving Repsol with a 6% stake.	阿根廷政府将没收51%的股份，这样普雷索尔将只持有6%。


In the 2008 sale of shares, the two majority stockholders agreed to distribute at least 90% of future profits in cash.	在2008年的股票发售中，两大主要股东同意将至少90%的未来利润以现金股利的形式发放。


That decision was intended to allow the Petersen Group to service the debts to banks, and to Repsol itself, that it incurred with its share purchase, for which it made no initial payment.	这一决定是为了让彼得森集团能够偿付对银行和普雷索尔债务。 在股票收购中，彼得森集团并没有付钱，而是赊账向普雷索尔进行了收购。


This is an extraordinarily high dividend in the world oil industry.	如此分红在世界石油产业中可谓鹤立鸡群。


In the past decade, YPF’s reserves diminished significantly, along with those of most oil companies operating in Argentina, because investment in exploration was greatly reduced.	过去十年中，YPF的石油储备量大幅下降（其他大部分在阿根廷开展业务的石油公司也是如此），因为石油勘探投资被大幅削减了。


At the same time, natural gas accounts for 51% of energy consumption, compared to 32% for oil and barely 17% for coal, renewables, and hydroelectric and nuclear power.	与此同时，天然气占据了能源消费的51%，石油占32%，煤、可再生及水电核电占17%。 从全世界看，天然气只占能源总消费量的四分之一左右——比如在美国为27%，在邻国巴西为9%。


Worldwide, gas accounts for barely a quarter of total energy consumption – for example, 27% in the United States and just 9% in neighboring Brazil.	阿根廷汽车使用压缩天然气为燃料的比例世界最高； 家庭也大量使用天然气；


Argentina has the world’s largest fleet of vehicles running on compressed natural gas; families use gas intensively; most electricity is generated with gas; and the petrochemical industry is based on it.	大部分电力由天然气提供； 石化行业也建立在天然气的基础上。


Of course, in a few other countries (Qatar, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Russia), gas also accounts for more than half – or even more than 60% – of energy consumption.	当然，在某些别的国家（卡塔尔、阿尔及利亚、阿联酋、伊朗和俄罗斯），天然气也占据能源消费的一半甚至六成以上。


But there is an enormous difference: all of these countries have reserves that will last another 70-100 years.	但它们的情况与阿根廷有着绝大不同：它们无不拥有至少够用70—100年的储量。


Argentina, by contrast, is a highly gas-dependent country with diminishing reserves – equivalent to less than eight years of production.	而阿根廷作为高度依赖天然气的国家，其储量却在日渐减少，大概只相当于八年的产量。


Covering this drop in reserves – more than half of gas reserves and a fifth of oil reserves have been consumed – with imports implies an annual cost of more than $300 billion.	用进口弥补储量的下降——大约一半的天然气储量和五分之一石油储量已经被用掉了——意味着每年要花去3000亿美元以上的成本。


Indeed, after two decades of cheap, abundant energy and exports of surplus output, a new cycle of expensive, scarce, and imported energy has begun, as oil production has fallen by one-third since 1998, and gas production by 15% since 2004.	事实上，在经历了20年廉价充足的能源供应（甚至还有余量可供出口），新的昂贵、稀缺、进口能源周期已经开始。 石油产量自1998年以来下降了三分之一，天然气产量自2004年以来下降了15%。


Argentina’s greatest challenge today is to try to regain energy self-sufficiency through significant investment in exploration on land, as well as in the Atlantic Ocean.	如今，阿根廷最大的挑战是通过大力投资陆上和大西洋矿井勘探保持自给自足。


At the same time, the country must modify its consumption model through greater reliance on hydroelectric, nuclear, and wind energy.	与此同时，阿根廷还必须改变消费模式，更多地依靠水电、核能和风能。


While there is great potential for new non-conventional resources, all of this is expensive, requiring annual investment of about 3% of GDP over the next five years.	非常规资源潜力无限，但无不成本极高，需要在未来五年内每年拿出GDP的3%进行投资。


It is very likely that, in the short term, growing imports of expensive liquid natural gas and other fuels will continue to exert pressure for change.	极有可能的是，在短期内，增加液化天然气和其他冉柳的进口将继续增加变革压力。


Last year, the external energy deficit was more than $3 billion, and this year it is expected to double.	去年，外部能源赤字已达30亿美元以上，今年可能会继续翻番。


The important question is whether the Argentine government’s decision to nationalize 51% of YPF’s shares is the best way to recover self-sufficiency in oil and gas production, and to attract the capital needed for exploration and development of conventional reserves.	一个重要的问题是，阿根廷政府将YPF51%的股权国有化的决定是不是石油和天然气生产重回自给自足的最佳办法，是不是吸引所需资本来进行常规能源储量勘探开发的最佳办法。


Argentina has particularly high potential for production of non-conventional gas resources as well, given that it holds the world’s third-highest level of such reserves, after China and the United States.	阿根廷也拥有生产非常规天然气资源的无穷潜力，因为它拥有仅次于中国和美国的世界第三大储量。


But, as with the country’s conventional resources, these reserves will not produce themselves.	但是，这些资源和阿根廷的常规资源一起等待着开发，而不会自己冒出来。


Argentina’s Warning to Would-Be Euro Deserters	阿根廷对欧元区准逃兵发出的警告


BUENOS AIRES – The tensions between the eurozone’s north and south, and the complex and politically costly transfers of money required to dampen the euro crisis, have led many people to think the unthinkable: saving Europe’s common currency may require that some countries abandon it. Indeed, talk about exiting the euro has intensified, particularly in southern eurozone countries that desperately need to regain competitiveness.	布宜诺斯艾利斯——


Adopting a stronger currency (as in “euroization”) is neither difficult nor particularly unusual.	近来，欧元区南北国家的关系日趋紧张，手续复杂及政治繁琐的资金转移成本加重了欧元危机，这使得一些人开始考虑过去从未想过的选项：或许只有一些国家的退出才能拯救欧元。


Introducing a new, weaker national currency to substitute for a stronger one in times of financial distress is an altogether different matter, about which most economists know almost nothing.	实际上，有关退出欧元区的讨论日趋激烈，特别是一些南欧国家，它们急需重新获得竞争力。 但首先我们先来看看退出欧元的真正代价。


The closest experiment along these lines is probably Argentina’s exit in 2002 from its dollar exchange-rate peg (embodied in its currency board) to a floating regime that depreciated the peso by 300% in the first three months.	但在金融乱局中引人一个全新贬值的国家货币来代替欧元则是完全是另一回事情，绝大多数经济学家对此一无所知。 回顾历史，和这个最为接近的恐怕是2002年的阿根廷退出锁定美元的汇率机制（连系汇率制度）自由浮动，阿根廷比索在头三个月内就贬值了300%。


Despite Argentina’s obvious differences from the eurozone’s troubled southern economies, the Argentine currency rollercoaster provides sobering lessons for European policymakers to ponder.	虽然阿根廷和南欧经济体有着明显的区别，但阿根廷汇率过山车事件为欧洲的领导层提供了一个值得深思的借鉴。


Do Europeans want to return to their own version of a flexible “peso”?	欧洲人是否也想有着自己版本的自由的“比索”？


At the very least, European policymakers will need to be willing to (a) “pesify” contracts, (b) impose heavy restrictions on commercial banking operations, (c) restructure debts, and (d) introduce capital and exchange controls.	欧洲领导人至少应该做到（a）“救赎”合同，（b）对商业银行的业务严格限制，（c）债务重组，（d）对资本和汇率采取严格管控机制。


Consider each facet more closely. First, a new currency needs to create its own demand as a means in which to conduct commercial transactions by displacing the euro as sole legal tender and unit of account.	让我们来仔细推敲每一步，首先，新货币要和欧元建立兑换机制，以确立自身地位，这就需要通盘考虑物价，货币和金融合同等因素，强行制定出与欧元的汇率。


This, in turn, requires the forced redenomination of prices, wages, and financial contracts, which can create serious disruptions, owing to heavy and asymmetrical balance-sheet effects, as well as a massive redistributive impact.	由于严重不对称的资产负债表而引发严重的混乱及巨大的财富再分配效应。


Argentina´s “pesification” of bank deposits and loans benefited debtors at the expense of depositors, inciting public upheaval.	阿根廷对银行存贷款的“整顿重组”是建立在牺牲广大储户利益之上，从而引发了社会动荡。


Second, should any eurozone country quit the euro, the anticipation of forced pesification is likely to set off a bank panic, as depositors quickly switch their pesified holdings back into foreign exchange in order to move them out of the system and probably abroad.	第二，一旦有国家退出欧元区，就会引发银行恐慌，储户们争相挤兑和将手中的货币兑换成为外币并转移国外。


In fact, in Argentina, people started to withdraw their deposits almost a year before the exit from the currency board, fueling capital flight and feeding back into market pressures to abandon the peg to the dollar – a dynamic that could be even faster and more furious in financially integrated European economies.	实际上，在阿根廷实现退出机制的一年之前，人们就开始纷纷提出存款。 资本的逃离又反过来加速了比索和美元的脱钩进程——如果这发生在经济一体化的欧元区，这样的速度还会更快更疯狂。


In these circumstances, a selective deposit freeze appears to be the only option to avoid bankrupting the banking sector.	于是，有选择的冻结存款将是避免银行破产的唯一选项。


Here, Argentina offers both a good and a bad example.	这里，阿根廷就是一个正反面的例子。


When all deposit withdrawals were capped in November 2001, the resulting liquidity crunch deepened the recession and, eventually, brought down the government.	当2001年11月对所有的存款都采取冻结时，由于市场缺乏流动性而加重经济危机，最终导致政府下台。


By contrast, the restructuring of term deposits in January 2002 attenuated the bank run and kept the payments system alive, while allowing so-called “sight deposits” – which can be withdrawn immediately without penalty – to help build demand for pesos.	相反的，2002年1月对定期存款的重组减少对银行的挤兑，逐渐恢复正常取款业务，同时允许活期存款来满足比索的需求。


Third, while pesification removes balance sheet losses from domestic foreign-currency debts, external contractual obligations cannot be redenominated unilaterally.	第三，虽然“比索化”清除了资产负债表中的国内外汇债务损失，但外债却不能单方面重组。


Thus, the exit from the dollar peg requires a restructuring of external debt, both sovereign and corporate.	退出美元机制需要对国家和公司外债进行重组。


Indeed, Argentina’s sovereign default happened almost simultaneously with the demise of the currency board, but corporate renegotiations were a protracted affair.	实际上，阿根廷国债违约发生在货币局汇率制度撤销的同时，但公司债务的谈判是一个漫长的过程。


Eventually, most companies avoided bankruptcy, mainly owing to the fourth ingredient in Argentina´s exit toolkit: capital controls that provided the legal umbrella to stop external corporate debt servicing.	最终，绝大多数公司没有破产，主要是由于阿根廷退出方案中的第四条：资本管制给公司外债争取到了时间和法律保护。


Of course, controls are an inevitable ingredient in the exit mix.	当然，管制是必须的。


Adopting a weaker currency is predicated on the need to regain competitiveness and improve external accounts.	贬值货币也是为了刺激出口，重新获得市场上的竞争力。


But, in the short run, given the huge uncertainties involved in a regime switch, and the loss of access to capital markets that follows a debt renegotiation, foreign exchange becomes scarce, requiring a plethora of traditional restrictions – some more distorting than others – on capital movements.	但短期来看，王朝的变更带来巨大的不确定性，无法进入资本市场会出现债务重新谈判，外汇极度紧缺，这都需要对资本流动采取相对大程度方方面面��管制，有些管制来的更为严格。


In Europe, too, capital controls would be the only way to avoid the offshoring of financial settlements after the currency conversion and the freezing of bank deposits.	对欧洲来说，在冻结银行存款和货币兑换之后，对资本流动的控制是避免离岸金融的唯一手段。


At any rate, experience indicates that exiting the euro while preserving the freedom of capital movements is little more than a fantasy.	不管怎么说，退出欧元的同时而不管制资本流动是痴人说梦。


Some observers suggest, based on Argentina’s precedent, that countries should introduce their own weaker currency to denominate wages and selected prices without leaving the euro.	一些观察人士建议，鉴于阿根廷事件的教训，在重新引入本国贬值货币时，只能将其运用在工资和一些特定产品的定价上，同时不能完全抛弃欧元。


We believe this analogy is misconstrued.	我认为这不可行。


While Argentina did issue quasi-money in 2001 before abandoning the currency board, this money was conceived to meet fiscal needs and remained stable vis-à-vis the dollar.	当时的阿根廷在放弃连系汇率制度之前的2001年确实发行了一种代用货币，以此满足财政需求和保持兑美元的稳定汇率。


Indeed, it is hard to imagine how this dual-currency scheme could have avoided the consequences of converting to a weaker currency if the quasi-money had depreciated, as the idea’s current promoters intend.	实际上，可以想象，一旦代用货币贬值，这种双货币机制很难避免兑换成币值较低的可能性，这个想法最终以失败告终。


Argentina’s exit from its dollar peg was a traumatic experience, concentrating contract violations, wealth redistribution, defaults, bank runs, exchange restrictions, and severe limitations on capital movements into a short period of time.	阿根廷退出锁定美元事件是一场灾难，它导致大量的合同违约，财富重新分配，破产，储户挤兑存款，汇率限制，短期内对资本流动的严格限制。


Even so, it was simpler than introducing a “new drachma” would be for, say, Greece.	即便如此，这也会比引入一个新希腊“德拉克马”要好的多。


Because Argentina’s currency board never eliminated the peso as the main means of transactions, the basis for demand for it was there at the time of the blowup.	因为阿根廷货币局从来没有取缔过比索，即便最糟糕的时候，比索的需求还是客观存在。


Euro defectors, by contrast, would need to promote demand for the new currency from scratch – a much messier and nastier process altogether.	相比于退出欧元的国家而言，他们将不得不为新货币创造出需求——这将是更加混乱糟糕的事情。


A Rio Report Card	里约成绩单


NEW YORK – One of the world’s pre-eminent scientific publications, Nature, has just issued a scathing report card in advance of next week’s Rio+20 summit on sustainable development.	纽约——全世界优秀的科学出版物之一《自然》刚刚赶在下周举行的里约+20可持续发展首脑会议前公布了措辞严厉的成绩单。


The grades for implementation of the three great treaties signed at the first Rio Earth Summit in 1992 were as follows: Climate Change – F; Biological Diversity – F; and Combating Desertification – F. Can humanity still avoid getting itself expelled?	1992年首届里约地球峰会签署的三项伟大条约执行成绩如下：气候变化－F，生物多样性－F，防治荒漠化－F。 人类究竟还能否避免被开除球籍的厄运？


We have known for at least a generation that the world needs a course correction.	整整一代人早已明白世界需要改变发展道路。


Instead of powering the world economy with fossil fuels, we need to mobilize much greater use of low-carbon alternatives such as wind, solar, and geothermal power.	我们需要更多地利用风能、太阳能和地热发电等低碳替代能源，而不能继续依靠化石燃料来推动世界经济。


Instead of hunting, fishing, and clearing land without regard for the impact on other species, we need to pace our agricultural production, fishing, and logging in line with the environment’s carrying capacity.	我们需要调整农业及渔业生产以适应环境的承载能力，而不能在毫不顾忌对其他物种影响的情况下狩猎、捕鱼和砍伐树木。


Instead of leaving the world’s most vulnerable people without access to family planning, education, and basic health care, we need to end extreme poverty and reduce the soaring fertility rates that persist in the poorest parts of the world.	我们需要结束极端贫困并降低世界最贫困地区快速增长的生育率，而不能坐视全球最弱势群体得不到计划生育，教育和基本医疗保健等服务。


In short, we need to recognize that with seven billion people today, and nine billion by mid-century, all inter-connected in a high-tech, energy-intensive global economy, our collective capacity to destroy the planet’s life-support systems is unprecedented.	简言之，我们需要认识到今天的70亿人口在本世纪中叶可能达到90亿，所有人在高科技驱使的能源密集型全球经济中都拥有非常密切的联系，因此我们作为整体掌握着前所未有的毁坏地球生命支持系统的能力。


Yet the consequences of our individual actions are typically so far removed from our daily awareness that we can go right over the cliff without even knowing it.	但通常个人行为的后果离我们的日常生活如此遥远，以致于我们可能在浑然不觉中跌下悬崖摔得粉身碎骨。


When we power our computers and lights, we are unaware of the carbon emissions that result.	我们打开电脑和电灯时，并不了解会造成多少碳排放。


When we eat our meals, we are unaware of the deforestation that has resulted from unsustainable farming.	我们用餐时，也不知道不可持续的耕作导致了多少森林砍伐。


And when billions of our actions combine to create famines and floods halfway around the world, afflicting the poorest people in drought-prone Mali and Kenya, few of us are even dimly aware of the dangerous snares of global interconnectedness.	当数十亿件微不足道的小事共同造成地球另一面爆发饥荒和洪水，折磨马里和肯尼亚等旱灾频发地区最贫困民众的时候，很少有人对全球网络的危险圈套有最基本的认识。


Twenty years ago, the world tried to address these realities through treaties and international law.	20年前，世界试图通过条约和国际法解决上述现实问题。


The agreements that emerged in 1992 at the first Rio summit were good ones: thoughtful, far-sighted, public-spirited, and focused on global priorities.	1992年首届里约峰会达成的协议用心良苦：深思熟虑、高瞻远瞩，热心公益，并集中关注全球重点问题。


Yet they have not saved us.	但协议却没有能够拯救人类。


Those treaties lived in the shadow of our daily politics, imaginations, and media cycles.  Diplomats trudged off to conferences year after year to implement them, but the main results were neglect, delay, and bickering over legalities.	上述条约笼罩在我们日常政治、幻想和媒体周期的阴影之下。 外交官年复一年地参与会议落实这些条约，但却摆脱不了忽视、延误和争论合法性的结果。


Twenty years on, we have only three failing grades to show for our efforts.	二十年来，我们付出的努力只换来三项不及格的成绩。


Is there a different way?	那还有没有其他方法？


The path through international law engages lawyers and diplomats, but not the engineers, scientists, and community leaders on the front lines of sustainable development.	国际法涉及律师和外交官，但却没有在可持续发展的前沿领域吸引工程师、科学家和社团领导人的参与。


It is littered with technical arcana about monitoring, binding obligations, annex-I and non-annex-I countries, and thousands of other legalisms, but has failed to give humanity the language to discuss our own survival.	到处充斥着有关监督、约束性义务、附件一及非附件一国家和成千上万其他法律条文的技术性条款，但却没有为人类提供一种语言来讨论自身的生存。


We have thousands of documents but a failure to speak plainly to one other.	我们拥有数以千计的文件，但却无法坦率地进行沟通。


Do we want to save ourselves and our children?	我们想不想拯救自己和孩子？


Why didn’t we say so?	我们为什么不这样说？


At Rio+20 we will have to say so, clearly, decisively, and in a way that leads to problem-solving and action, not to bickering and defensiveness.	我们必须在里约+20峰会上果断地表述清楚，进而解决问题并采取行动，而不是继续喋喋不休地争吵和自我保护。


Since politicians follow public opinion rather than lead it, it must be the public itself that demands its own survival, not elected officials who are somehow supposed to save us despite ourselves.	由于政治家顺应民意而不是领导民意，因此不能指望当选官员在公众不知情的情况下拯救公众，而必须由公众自身明确地提出生存要求。


There are few heroes in politics; waiting for the politicians would be to wait too long.	政界没有几个人可以称得上英雄，因此根本不可能等待政治家做出决策。


The most important outcome in Rio, therefore, will not be a new treaty, binding clause, or political commitment. It will be a global call to action.	因此里约最重要的成果不是新条约、约束性条款或者政治承诺，而是呼吁在全世界采取行动。


Around the world, the cry is rising to put sustainable development at the center of global thinking and action, especially to help young people to solve the triple-bottom-line challenge – economic well-being, environmental sustainability, and social inclusion – that will define their era. Rio+20 can help them to do it.	世界各国异口同声地要求将可持续发展置于全球思想和行动的中心，尤其是协助年轻人应对三重底线带来的挑战——即经济福祉、环��可持续性和社会包容——如何应对上述挑战将决定他们时代的特色。 里约+20峰会可以协助他们达到目的。


Rather than a new treaty, let us adopt at Rio+20 a set of Sustainable Development Goals, or SDGs, that will inspire a generation to act.	我们需要的不是新条约，而是里约+20峰会采用能激励一代人采取行动的全套可持续发展目标，也叫SDG。


Just as the Millennium Development Goals opened our eyes to extreme poverty and promoted unprecedented global action to fight AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, the SDGs can open the eyes of today’s youth to climate change, biodiversity loss, and the disasters of desertification.	正如千年发展目标让我们认识到极端贫困并促成了前所未有的抗击艾滋病、结核和疟疾的全球行动，SDG可以让今天的年轻人清醒地认识到气候变化、生物多样性丧失以及荒漠化灾害。


We can still make good on the three Rio treaties, by putting people at the forefront of the effort.	通过敦促人们站在行动的前沿，我们仍然可以兑现之前签署的三项里约协议。


SDGs to end extreme poverty; decarbonize the energy system; slow population growth; promote sustainable food supplies; protect the oceans, forests, and drylands; and redress the inequalities of our time can galvanize a generation’s worth of problem-solving.  Engineers and technology wizards from Silicon Valley to São Paolo to Bangalore to Shanghai have world-saving ideas up their sleeves.	以及纠正我们这个时代存在的不平等能够激励一代人去发挥价值，解决问题。 从硅谷到圣保罗到班加罗尔再到上海，工程师和技术高手对拯救世界的想法全都胸有成竹。


Universities around the world are home to legions of students and faculty intent on solving practical problems in their communities and countries.	世界各地的大学是有意为各自所在的团体和国家解决实际问题的大批学生和教师的大本营。


Businesses, at least the good ones, know that they can’t flourish and motivate their workers and consumers unless they are part of the solution.	而至少好的企业知道除非自己成为解决方案的一部分，否则将无法蓬勃发展并激励自己的工人和消费者。


The world is poised to act.	世界正准备采取行动。


Rio+20 can help to unleash a generation of action.	里约+20峰会可以促成一代人迈出行动的脚步。


There is still time, just barely, to turn the F’s to A’s, and to pass humanity’s ultimate test.	我们勉强还有时间将F变成A，并通过这次人类的终极考试。


Arms or Allies?	武器，或是同盟？


RIGA – It should surprise no one that many in Latvia view the sale by France of fully-equipped assault warships to Russia with grave concern. Other European Union member states seem to be looking increasingly towards Russia as a potential purchaser of military equipment.	发自里加——当许多拉托维亚人还在为法国向俄罗斯出售两栖攻击舰而吃惊不已时，其他欧盟成员国却已开始将俄罗斯视为潜在的军火买家了。


But is it wise for EU and NATO members to enhance the capacity of non-allies to project their military power?	但欧盟和北约成员国这种提升非盟国兵力投送能力的举动是否明智？


After all, only two and a half years ago, Russia invaded Georgia, a country that NATO had named as a potential future member, and has occupied part of it ever since.	毕竟俄罗斯入侵格鲁吉亚还仅仅是两年半以前的事，甚至至今仍占据着这个北约所谓“潜在未来成员国”的一部分领土。


The EU Council’s common position on arms exports is legally binding on all EU states.	欧盟理事会针对武器出口行为的共同立场对所有成员国都具有法律约束力。


Of course, competence and responsibility for arms-export controls and licensing rests with member states, not EU institutions.	当然，对武器出口控制以及许可的权限和责任则属于成员国自身，而非欧盟机构。


Indeed, under the Wassenaar Arrangement, a decision on exports is the sole responsibility of each participating state.	事实上在“瓦森纳安排”（全球33个国家建立的常规武器和军/民双用途物资及技术出口控制机制）下，各成员国可以自行决定是否出口武器。


Implementation of the common EU position on arms exports has led to more exchanges of information, greater transparency, and closer consultation. It has also harmonized export-control arrangements and procedures.	欧盟在武器出口方面的共同立场为我们带来了更多的信息交流，更高的透明度以及更密切的磋商，同时也协调了与武器出口控制相关的一系列条约和规程。


But there are obvious limits to what can be achieved.	但这一机制的潜力仍未能完全发挥出来。


Consultations are currently a bilateral matter, with no rules governing how they should be conducted – and no requirement that any final agreement on arms-export decisions be reached.	磋商目前还仅限于两国之间，同时缺乏指导磋商的相关行为准则——也不要求达成任何关于武器出口决策的最后协议。


The effectiveness of this consultation mechanism is difficult to evaluate.	因此这一磋商机制的有效性也极难评估。


According to the common position’s provisions, before a member state grants an export license, it should consult with any member state that has previously denied a similar license.	依照共同立场条款，某一国颁发武器出口许可证之前必须与曾经拒绝颁发类似许可证的另一成员国进行磋商。


But the common position does not specify the extent to which another member state should be consulted.	但相关条款却并未明确说明这种磋商究竟要达到何种程度。


More importantly, it does not require the arms-exporting member state to consult with any other member state that might have concerns.	更重要的是，它并不要求武器出口国与其他可能关注该项出口的国家进行磋商。


As a result, arms exports to third countries remain a contentious issue within the EU.	于是对第三国的武器出口问题就一直困扰着欧盟。


At the heart of the matter is a conflict between the individual member states’ national interests – the competitiveness of European defense-related companies and the strategic importance of defense markets when linked to national foreign policy – and the Lisbon treaty, which refers specifically to enhanced solidarity and consultation.	而该问题的核心则是各成员国之间的核心利益冲突——欧洲各大武器厂商之间的竞争，还有防务市场的战略重要性（尤其是牵涉到各国外交政策的时候）——以及特别强调增强团结与磋商机制的里斯本条约


If the Lisbon treaty is to be respected, solidarity must be viewed as a political tool for moving towards a European defense policy that works for the common good.	如果我们希望遵重里斯本条约精神的话，那么团结必须被视为一个重要的政治工具，并以此实现一个服务于集体利益的欧洲防御政策。


Pursuing solely national policies on technology transfer runs contrary to that goal.	而各国在技术转让方面对各自国家政策的追求则与该目标背道而驰。


Clearer rules for the consultation mechanism need to be elaborated, and arms-exporting EU member states should consult all other member governments that might have concerns, not only those that have previously issued or denied an export license.	因此必须出台相关法则来对磋商机制进行更清晰的阐述，而出口武器的欧盟成员国必须与所有利益相关成员国进行协商，而不仅限于那些曾签发（或禁止）类似许可证的国家。


The EU could work towards a common arms-export policy by seeking a shared understanding of the predictability and stability of third-party countries.	通过各方对第三国行为的可预见性和稳定性达成共识的方式，欧盟可以最终构建一个共同的武器出口政策。


Developing a common policy on arms exports to such countries should go hand in hand with the creation of a common and internationally competitive European defense-equipment market.	但对第三国武器出口共同政策的制定进程不可孤立运行，同时还需要建立一个共有且具备国际竞争力的欧洲防务市场。


This means that cooperation with non-EU countries should not be to the detriment of solidarity and common rules within the EU.	这意味着与非欧盟成员国的合作不应对欧盟内部的团结和共同原则造成损害。


Consulting at an early stage would help manage misperceptions – often fueled by reports in the media long before deals are concluded – and thus strengthen convergence and unity among EU member states.	尽早进行磋商有助于消弭误解——这些误解通常会在媒体的添油加醋下不断加深，即便交易还远未达成——并因此增强欧盟成员国之间的团结一致。


Giving the EU a greater role in situations where member states’ views differ should also be considered.	在各成员国意见不一的情况下，欧盟应当扮演一个更重要的角色。


For example, member states could consult on sensitive or contentious issues within the Political and Security Committee.	比如成员国可以在政治和安全委员会内部就某些敏感或争议性事务进行协商。


This would strengthen the EU Council’s common position, which already defines general rules for the control of exports of military technology and equipment.	这将增强欧盟理事会共同立场的影响力，更何况这一立场已经对军事技术和设备的出口管制提出了大概的原则。


As for NATO, the question of consultations among allies is addressed in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that, “the Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”	对北约来说，盟国之间的磋商问题已经在《北大西洋公约》的第4条中进行了界定：“无论何时任何一缔约国认为缔约国中任何一国领土之完整，政治独立或安全遭受威胁，各缔约国应共同协商。 ”


But Article 4 does not relate only to imminent threats.	但上述第四条仅仅是针对即将到来的威胁。


Decisions taken by a NATO country can have implications for other allies.	一个北约成员国的决策可以影响到其他盟国。


The transfer of military equipment and technology to third countries could affect regional security and prompt a revision of threat assessments.	对第三国的军事装备和技术转让可能影响到区域安全，并因此要对威胁态势进行重新评估。


The North Atlantic Council would seem an obvious forum within which to enhance solidarity among members, reassure member states that have perceptions of greater vulnerability, and avoid misperceptions.	北大西洋理事会显然可以作为一个增进成员国团结，消除成员国对各种威胁的恐惧并避免误解的论坛而存在。


At a lower level, the Political and Partnership Committee and/or the Conference of National Armaments Directors could be used for initial consultations.	在更底层级上，政治和伙伴关系委员会和/或国家军事力量主管会议可以用作初步磋商。


These issues are of concern to all allies, so discussions should not be confined to bilateral agendas.	这些事务与所有盟国都利益攸关，因此讨论也不应局限于两个国家之间。


Arms sales and technology transfers inevitably raise complex moral and ethical questions. That is all the more reason to seek open, confidence-reinforcing discussions among allies.	武器贸易和技术转让无疑会引发众多道德和伦理问题，因此也必须在盟国之间进行公开且增强信心的讨论。


Solidarity cannot be achieved when our most important institutions are excluded.	如果众多重要机构都被排除在外的话，团结是无法实现的。


Indeed, some of the most dangerous decisions taken in both the EU and NATO are those that are not openly discussed beforehand.	事实上，欧盟和北约曾经做出的某些最危险的决策，都是那些事前未被公开讨论过的决定。


Toward an Immunized World	迈向免疫的世界


ABU DHABI/NEW YORK – For a child, receiving a vaccine takes just a moment (and perhaps a few tears).	阿布扎比/纽约—对一名孩子来说，接种疫苗只要几秒钟（大概还要搭上几滴眼泪）。


But such moments are crucial for getting children off to a healthy start in life, and for advancing progress on global health and development goals.	但这几秒种对于让他获得健康的生命起点、让全球健康和发展目标获得进步来说是至关重要的。


Along with Mohamed bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, we attach great importance to the world’s first global summit, being held this week in Abu Dhabi, aimed at ensuring that all children have access to the full benefits of vaccines.	与阿布扎比太子阿勒纳哈扬（Mohamed bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan）一起，我们将论述第一届旨在确保所有儿童都能获得疫苗的全部好处的全球峰会的巨大意义。 此次峰会将于本周在阿布扎比举行。


Vaccines protect people for a lifetime.	疫苗为人们提供终生保护。


They are one of the most cost-effective investments we can make to improve our world.	它们是改善世界的最廉价的投资。


Vaccines have eradicated smallpox, pushed polio to the verge of eradication, and saved millions of children from measles, diphtheria, tetanus, and other deadly and disabling diseases.	疫苗让我们根除了天花，几乎根除了小儿麻痹症，从麻疹、白喉、破伤风和其他致命致残疾病手中拯救了数百万儿童。


Thanks in large part to the power of vaccines, the number of children dying before the age of five has fallen from 20 million in 1960 to 6.9 million in 2011, despite a large increase in global population.	由于疫苗的作用，5岁前夭折的儿童数量从1960年的2000万降至2011年的690万，而且这是在地球人口大量增长的条件下实现的。


Disease saps the greatest asset that any country possesses: the energy and talent of its people.	疾病会侵蚀一国所拥有的最宝贵财富：人民的能量和天才。


This is an especially harsh loss for poor countries seeking to gain a foothold in the global economy.	对于寻求立足全球经济的穷国来说，代价尤其沉重。


But when children are healthy, families are freed from the burden of costly medical care, allowing them to spend more on food and education.	而若儿童健康，家庭就能从沉重的医疗负担中摆脱，将更多的钱用于食品和教育。


Healthy children attend school more regularly, are better able to learn, and become more productive adults.	健康的孩子能稳定地上学，获得更好的学习能力，将来成为生产率更高的成年人。


New research shows that vaccines improve cognitive development in children, raise labor productivity, and contribute to a country’s overall economic growth.	新研究表明，疫苗能改善孩子的认知发展，提高劳动力生产率，有助于一国的总体经济增长。


Yet more than 22 million children lack access to the basic vaccines that people in high-income countries take for granted.	但超过2200万的孩子缺少获得基本疫苗的手段，而基本疫苗在高收入国家已是理所当然的福利。


These children live in the poorest and most remote communities, where the risk of disease is highest.	这些孩子生活在最贫穷、最偏远的社区，患病风险也最高。


A child born in a low-income country is 18 times more likely to die before reaching the age of five than a child in a high-income country.	生于低收入国家的孩子在5岁前夭折的可能性比高收入国家孩子高18倍。


Ending this inequity is at the heart of history’s largest and most successful anti-poverty push – the Millennium Development Goals.	结束这一不平等状况是历史上最大、最成功的减贫项目——千年发展目标的核心。


The eight MDGs were adopted in the year 2000, when leaders meeting at the United Nations agreed to cut extreme poverty and hunger by half, fight disease, improve water safety and sanitation, expand education, and empower girls and women.	2000年，各国领导人齐聚联合国，定下了八个千年发展目标，一致同意减少一半的极端贫困和饥饿、战胜病魔、改善水安全和卫生、扩大教育、赋予女孩和妇女更多权利。


There have been remarkable gains, but there is still much to do – and fewer than 1,000 days of action left until the 2015 deadline.	成就是斐然的，但仍有很多事情有待完成——而现在距离2015年的最后时限已经不足1000天了。


Raising global immunization coverage will speed progress toward the MDGs and generate momentum toward a successful post-2015 development agenda.	全球免疫覆盖面的增加将加速推动千年发展目标的实现并为2015年之后的发展日程的成功创造动力。


The World Health Assembly, representing the World Health Organization’s 194 member countries, has endorsed a shared vision – known as the Decade of Vaccines – of a world free from vaccine-preventable diseases, with the full benefits of immunization reaching all people, regardless of who they are or where they live.	代表世界卫生组织194个成员国的世界卫生大会形成了一致的共同愿景——被称为疫苗十年（Decade of Vaccines）——将打造没有疫苗可防疾病的世界，让免疫的全部好处抵达每一个人，不管他是谁、身处何方。


Eradicating polio will be a milestone on our path to realizing this vision.	根除小儿麻痹症将是实现这一愿景的一大里程碑。


With a new, comprehensive plan to be introduced at the Summit, the world will have a clear roadmap for creating a polio-free world by 2018.	峰会将发布一个新的、全面的计划，世界将有一个明确的路线图在2018年建成没有小儿麻痹症的世界。


The plan works hand in hand with our overall efforts to raise immunization coverage against other diseases like measles, pneumonia, and rotavirus.	该计划将与我们提高麻疹、肺炎和冠状病毒等疾病的免疫覆盖面的总体努力齐头并进。


Indeed, we are seeing how strong immunization systems protect our gains against polio and provide a platform for reaching the world’s most vulnerable mothers and children with new vaccines and primary health care.	事实上，我们正在目睹强大的免疫系统保护我们在消灭小儿麻痹症的战争上的胜利，提供一个接触世界最脆弱母亲和儿童、为他们带去新疫苗和基本医疗服务的平台。


If we are successful, by the end of the decade we will save more than 20 million lives, prevent nearly one billion cases of illness, and save almost $12 billion in treatment costs alone.	如果我们成功，到这个十年末，我们将拯救2000多万条生命，预防近10亿例疾病，光是治疗成本就能节省120亿美元。


And, in the process of freeing people from the burden of disease, we will unlock immeasurable human potential.	而在让人们摆脱疾病负担的过程中，我们还能解放不可估量的人类潜力。


The MDGs and the Decade of Vaccines prove that focused global development objectives can make a profound difference.	千年发展目标和疫苗十年证明，齐心合力的全球发展目标能产生深远不同。


They show the power of partnerships that bring together the United Nations, governments, development agencies, civil society, foundations, and the private sector.	它们证明了把联合国、政府、发展机构、公民社会、基金会和私人部门联系在一起的合作的力量有多大。


Over the next 1,000 days and beyond, our progress will be measured by what we have done to improve the lives of the poorest and most vulnerable members of the human family.	在未来1000天里，我们的进步将以我们在拯救最贫困、最脆弱人类家庭成员方面做了些什么来衡量。


Let us start by recommitting ourselves to realizing the shared vision of a world in which all children get a fair start in life with the protection of vaccines.	让我们从再次承诺实现所有孩子都能获得受疫苗保护的公平起点的共同愿景开始。


This generation will thank us – and so will many generations to come.	这一代人会感谢我们——未来一代又一代人亦然。


Arrogance and Authority	自大与权威


WASHINGTON, DC – It is increasingly common to hear prominent American and European central bankers proclaim, with respect to the crisis of 2008-2010, the following verdict: “We did well.”	发自华盛顿特区——最近耳边充斥的都是各大欧美央行主管们对自身在2008~2010年危机中所作所为的评价：“咱们干得不错。


Their view is that the various government actions to support the financial system helped to stabilize the situation.	”在他们眼里，正是一系列维护金融系统的政府行为协助稳定了整个局势。


Indeed, what could be wrong when the United States Federal Reserve’s asset purchases may have actually made money (which is then turned over to the US Treasury)?	而美联储的资产收购行为既然已经获得了盈利（并随后上缴了美国国库），那又什么可指摘的呢？


But to frame the issue in this way is, at best, to engage in delusion.	但用这种思维来界定这一事务其实是有问题的：往轻了说，是被一时的错觉遮了耳目；


At worst, however, it creates an image of arrogance that can only undermine the credibility on which central banks’ authority rests.	往重了说，这将催生出一种傲慢自大的偏见，最终腐蚀中央银行得以构建其权威的基石——公信力。


The real cost of the crisis is not measured by the profit and loss statement of any central bank – or by whether or not the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), run by the Treasury Department, made or lost money on its various activities.	事实上，那场危机的真正成本根本无法用任何中央银行的账面盈亏来衡量——也无法用美国财政部问题资产救助计划（Troubled Asset Relief Program）的一系列行动是赚是亏来进行评估。


The cost is eight million jobs in the US alone, with employment falling 6% from its peak and – in a major departure from other post-1945 recessions – remaining 5% below that peak today, 31 months after the crisis broke in earnest.	如果要说真正的成本，那就是仅美国就失去了800万份工作，就业率也从最高峰下跌了6%——这也是与1945年后历次衰退最大的不同之处——如今距离危机爆发已经过去31个月了，失业率依然徘徊在低于最高峰5%的水平上。


The cost is also the increase in net federal government debt held by the private sector – the most accurate measure of true government indebtedness.	另一项成本则是私人部门手中不断增加的联邦政府净债务额——该指标是计算政府债务的最准确手段。


Comparing the US Congressional Budget Office’s medium-term forecasts before (in January 2008) and after the crisis, this debt increase is a staggering 40% of GDP.	对比美国国会预算办公室在危机前（2008年1月）和危机后发布的中期预测，这一债务的增加额相当于GDP的40%，足以令人震惊不已了。


Indeed, the reason there is a perceived fiscal crisis in the US today – along with spending cuts that will further hurt many people – is simple: the banks blew themselves up at great cost to the American people, with major negative global implications.	事实上，导致美国如今的财政危机（以及可能进一步伤害许多民众的政府支出削减）的原因其实很简单：各大银行的危机使美国民众付出了巨大的代价，并在全球范围内造成了巨大的负面影响。


Most of the public-debt increase in the US and elsewhere is not due to any kind of discretionary fiscal stimulus; it’s all about the loss of tax revenue that comes with a deep recession. (And the Bush administration’s tax cuts for the wealthiest, unfunded Medicare prescription benefit, and debt-financed wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have severely weakened the long-term fiscal outlook.)	美国和其他一些国家所出现的大部分公共债务并非源自于无节制的财政刺激政策，而是来自于本次衰退所引发的税收锐减（加上布什政府为最富有的那批人减税，经费不足的老年医疗保健药物财政补贴，还有靠借债维持的阿富汗和伊拉克战争都严重削弱了美国的远期财政前景）。


Finally, the cost of the crisis is millions of homes lost and lives damaged, some permanently.	最后一项成本则是数百万无家可归者和被扰乱的生活，有些影响甚至将持续一辈子。


The issue is not whether the Fed, or any central bank, should seek to prevent the collapse of its country’s banking system.	但问题不在于美联储或是其他中央银行是否应当设法阻止本国银行系统的崩溃。


To see the severe effects of a banking crisis, look no further than the 1930’s, a period that Ben Bernanke studied in detail before he became Fed chair.	如果想了解银行危机的恶劣影响，最佳的范例莫过于1930年代（也是伯南克担任美联储主席之前的研究领域）。


If the choice at any particular moment is to provide support or let the system collapse, you should choose support.	如果在任何特定时期只有两个选择：要么政府出手，要么坐视其崩溃，那么前者将是必然的选择。


But, more broadly, as Dennis Lockhart, President of the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank, said last week at a public conference organized by his institution, we should not seek to operate a system based on the principle of “private gains and public losses.” And these losses are massively skewed in ways that are grossly inefficient, in addition to being completely unfair.	但在更广泛的意义上，正如亚特兰大联邦储备银行主席丹尼斯·洛克哈特（Dennis Lockhart）上星期在该机构组织的一个公共论坛上所指出的那样，我们不应试图运行一个构建在“私人得益公众受损”原则之上的银行系统，更可况这些损失大多由一些效率极低的行为方式所造成，而且毫无公平可言。


The private gains can be measured most directly in the form of executive compensation.	相反私人得到的好处则可以通过管理人员津贴的数额来直接计算得出。


From 2000 to 2008, the people running the top 14 US financial institutions received cash compensation (salary, bonus, and the value of stock sold) of around $2.6 billion.	从2000年到2008年，全美前14家金融机构的管理者总共获得了大约26亿美元的现金津贴（包括工资，分红和股票出售在内）。


Of this amount, around $2 billion was received by the five best-paid individuals, who were also central to creating the highly risky asset structures that brought the financial system to the edge of the abyss: Sandy Weil (built Citigroup, which blew up shortly after he left); Hank Paulson (greatly expanded Goldman Sachs, lobbied for allowing more leverage in investment banks, then moved to the US Treasury and helped save them); Angelo Mozilo (built Countrywide, a central player in irresponsible mortgage lending); Dick Fuld (ran Lehman Brothers into the ground); and Jimmy Cayne (ran Bear Stearns into the ground).	到如今，前五位收入最高的人合共收取了近20亿美元，而他们恰巧也是构建了整个高风险资产架构并险些将金融系统推入深渊的始作俑者：山迪·维尔（建立了花旗集团，该集团在他离职不久后就爆发了危机）、汉克·保尔森（大规模扩展了高盛集团业务并说服国会允许投资银行采取更高投资杠杆，然后又摇身一变到美国财政部赴任去协助拯救这些银行）、安杰罗·莫兹洛（创立美国国家金融服务公司Countrywide financial corp. ，是滥发抵���贷款的主要推手），迪克·福德和杰米·卡尼（分别是雷曼兄弟和贝尔斯登的送葬者）。


The public losses are massive in comparison: roughly $6 trillion, if we limit ourselves just to the increase in federal government debt.	相比之下公众的损失则极为巨大：如果仅仅用联邦政府的债务增长来评估的话，大概60亿美元。


And leading bank executives still insist that they should be allowed to run highly leveraged global businesses, in which they are paid based on their return on equity – unadjusted for any risk.	但那些银行大佬们却依然坚持自己应当被允许运营更高杠杆的全球业务，并基于企业股票回报率来向他们支付报酬——无论出现任何风险。


The world’s top independent financial minds have looked long and hard at these arrangements, and, given what we have learned in recent years, have found them worse than wanting (see the Web page of Anat Admati at Stanford’s Graduate School of Business for the details).	为此有一批全球最顶尖的独立金融研究者也正以长远而严谨的眼光观察这类事务，而我们近几年的研究显示情况比想象中更糟（详见斯坦福大学商学院教授安娜特·阿德玛蒂Anat Admati的网页）。


In their view, the big banks should be funded much more with equity – perhaps as much as 30% of their capitalization.	在他们看来，大银行应具备更多的准备金——大概应占其资本总额的30%。


But bankers strongly reject this approach (because it would likely lower their pay), as do central bankers (because they are too much persuaded by the protestation of bankers).	但银行家们则强烈反对这一建议（因为这很可能减少他们的收入），而中央银行管理者们也持有类似的立场（他们都被银行家的抗议所说服了）。


There are many advantages to having an independent central bank run by professionals who can keep their distance from politicians.	如能有一个由远离政界的专业人士来运作的独立中央银行，那是有许多好处的。


But when the people at the apex of these institutions insist that the crisis response went well, and that everything will be fine, even as the financial behemoths that caused the crisis lumber forward, their credibility inevitably suffers.	但当掌管这些金融机构的人都坚持自己在危机中做得很好，宣称所有问题都会解决，放任那些引发危机的金融巨鳄们逍遥法外，那么他们的公信力也将不可避免地受到损害。


That should worry central bankers, because their credibility is pretty much all they have.	这一切都应当令中央银行管理者们感到忧心，因为公信力就是他们的一切。


The US Constitution, after all, does not guarantee the Fed’s independence.	毕竟美国宪法并不保证美联储的独立。


Congress created the Fed, which means that Congress can un-create it.	国会创造了美联储，也可以解散它。


By assuming away the damage that highly leveraged megabanks can do, the myth of a “good crisis” merely makes political pressure on central banks all the more likely.	通过忽视高杠杆大银行所可能造成的危害，一场“坏事变好事”的危机神话带来的，仅仅是中央银行身上的不断累积政治压力而已。


Artificial Intelligence and Globalization	人工智能和全球化


Today’s conventional wisdom is that the rise of India and China will be the single biggest factor driving global jobs and wages over the twenty-first century.	今天的常规看法是：印度和中国的崛起将成为21世纪推动全球就业和薪酬的唯一重要因素。


High-wage workers in rich countries can expect to see their competitive advantage steadily eroded by competition from capable and fiercely hard-working competitors in Asia, Latin America, and maybe even some day Africa.	富裕国家的高薪劳动者将会看到：自己的竞争优势在来自亚洲、拉美、甚至有一天也会包括非洲的极其吃苦耐劳的能干竞争者的侵蚀之下不断减弱。


This is a good story, full of human drama and power politics.	这是件好事，充分展现了权力政治和人类生活的戏剧性。


But I wonder whether, even within the next few decades, another factor will influence our work lives even more: the exponential rise of applications of artificial intelligence.	但是我更想知道：今后几十年内，是否会有另外一个因素对我们的职业生涯造成更大的影响：这个因素就是人工智能应用的指数级增长。


My portal to the world of artificial intelligence is a narrow one: the more than 500-year-old game of chess.	我对人工智能的接触范围非常狭窄：那就是有着500多年历史的国际象棋运动。


You may not care a whit about chess, long regarded as the ultimate intellectual sport.	你可能对早就被公认为终极智能运动的象棋毫无兴趣。


But the stunning developments coming out of the chess world during the past decade should still command your attention.	即便如此，过去10年来国际象棋界令人惊叹的发展也足以引起你的关注。


Chess has long been the centerpiece of research in artificial intelligence.	国际象棋在人工智能的研究中一直是核心环节。


While in principle, chess is solvable, the game’s computational complexity is almost incomprehensible.	尽管从原则上看，国际象棋是可解的运动，但其计算的复杂程度几乎超出了所有人的想象。


It is only a slight exaggeration to say there are more possible moves in a chess game than atoms in a universe.	如果有人说在国际象棋比赛中走棋的方法比宇宙中的原子还要多，也只是稍有夸张而已。


For most of the twentieth century, programmers were patently unsuccessful in designing chess computers that could compete with the best humans.	20世纪大多数时候，程序员们在设计能与顶尖人类选手较量的国际象棋电脑时显然都未获成功。


A human chess master’s ability to intuit, visualize, and prioritize easily prevailed over the brute force approach of computers.	人类国际象棋大师的直觉、想象和排序能力轻易就可以胜过电脑的横冲直撞。


The computers gradually improved, but they still seemed far inferior to the top humans.	电脑在一点一滴地逐渐进步，但要与顶尖的人类高手较量似乎还相去甚远。


Or so we thought.	至少我们是这么认为的。


Then, in 1997, in what will surely long be remembered as a historical milestone for modern man, IBM’s “Deep Blue” computer stunned the world by defeating the world champion Garry Kasparov.	而后，在1997年，在那个注定要作为现代人类的丰碑载入史册的时刻，IBM的“深蓝”电脑战胜了世界象棋冠军卡斯帕罗夫（Gary Kasparov），令世界为之震惊。


Proud Kasparov, who was perhaps more stunned than anyone, was sure that the IBM team must have cheated.	也许骄傲的卡斯帕罗夫受到的震动比任何人都大，他一口咬定IBM的团队肯定做了手脚。


He sarcastically told reporters that he sensed the “the hand of God” guiding his silicon opponent.	他以讽刺的口吻告诉记者，他感到“上帝之手”在指引着他的电脑对手。