What we Europeans now need most of all is to embark on precisely the opposite course.	现在我们欧洲人最最需要的就是走上一条相反的道路。


Only by enlarging the scope of EU decision-making, backed by the commitment of equally responsible partners, can Europe meet the shared challenges of a common future.	只有扩大由享有平等责任的伙伴所支持的欧盟的决策范围，欧洲才能应对对于我们共同未来的共同挑战。


Europe’s Myopic Defense Cuts	目光短浅的欧洲防务削减


COPENHAGEN – All over Europe, budgets are being pared as a new age of austerity takes hold. Defense expenditures are proving to be the easiest of targets.	发自哥本哈根——在整个欧洲大陆，新预算紧缩时代的来临使得各国政府都开始削减预算，而国防经费则是他们最容易下手的目标，连戴维·卡梅伦领导下的英国保守党政府都投身到了这股压缩国防支出的热潮之中。


These cuts are coming at a time when European efforts to shoulder a fair share of the Western defense burden have been cast in doubt – not least in Afghanistan, where most European countries have limited their participation by insisting on a myriad of “caveats” that usually serve to keep their troops far from the most dangerous zones.	而这类削减行为恰恰又发生在一个特殊的时期：人们对欧洲承担西方防务责任的行动提出了质疑——尤其是在阿富汗，许多欧洲国家都想方设法制定一大堆“附加条款”，好让本国部队得以远离那些最危险的区域，最终也减少了各国对整场战争的参与度。


Defense cuts are also happening at a time when Europe, for the first time in modern history, has been overtaken by Asia in terms of total defense spending.	与此同时，欧洲的国防支出总额自近代以来首次被亚洲超越。


Western Europe’s long-held position as the world’s most important concentration of military power after the United States and Russia appears to be over.	西欧长期以来作为除美俄之外第三大军事力量聚集区的地位也荡然无存了。


The US faces no serious challenge (not yet, at least) as the world’s dominant military power. After all, the US spends almost as much on its armed forced as the rest of the world combined.	美国作为世界军事霸主的地位至今尚未受到任何严重威胁，毕竟它在军事上挥洒的金钱比全世界其他国家的总和还多。


But the picture is changing with the rapid growth of China’s military expenditures.	但情况也随着中国军费的不断增长而发生了变化。


The official growth rate of China’s military expenditure – 15% per year over the last decade – has increased substantially, and there is much hidden military spending as well.	中国官方公布的军费增长——过去十年每年提升15%——是一个相当惊人的数目，更何况还有一些秘密费用尚未计算在内。


Growing anxiety among China’s neighbors, particularly India, has led to remarkable increases in defense spending by other Asian powers as well.	而其周边邻国（尤其是印度）不断增加的紧张情绪则导致了其他亚洲国家军费的大幅增长。


Cuts in European defense spending, moreover, are starting to cause serious tensions within the Atlantic Alliance.	此外，欧洲国防经费的削减也引发了大西洋联盟内部的紧张关系。


NATO is often described as a construction with two pillars and an architrave symbolizing the common values that form the basis of the alliance. But even during the Cold War, Americans often pointed out that the European pillar was lacking.	北约组织从来被认为是“两根支柱（美欧），一条横梁（共同的价值观）”，但即便是冷战时期，美国也经常指责欧洲那根“支柱”形同虚设，而美国人想要的则是更大程度上的“责任分担”。


This debate may soon heat up again, now that the US, no less than Europe, is faced with grave budgetary problems.	估计上述争吵很快又会死灰复燃，尤其是当前美国预算问题的严重程度比欧洲有过之而无不及的时候。


Indeed, in a time of austerity, US politicians might find it difficult to understand Europe’s willingness to cut defense budgets that already total far less than NATO’s official 2%-of-GDP target.	事实上，在这个一个预算紧缩时代，美国政治家可能很难理解欧洲人为何还要削减国防支出，尤其是在费用水平早已远低于GDP2%的北约标准之时。


Europe’s problem is not only a lack of military spending, but also poor effectiveness when it comes to the purpose of that spending: the use of force when and where necessary.	欧洲的问题不仅仅是缺乏军费，还有使用军费去实现其目的时的效率低下问题——究竟应该在何时何地使用军事力量。


Europe’s capability of deploying combat forces is simply too small relative to the number of men and women in uniform. It is often half-jokingly pointed out that the number of generals and admirals in some European countries (none mentioned, none forgotten) is glaringly disproportionate to the number of fighting troops.	相对其武装部队总人数来说，欧洲部署战斗部队的能力太弱了，以致有人半开玩笑地指出欧洲某些国家（在此姑隐其名）的将军人数相对其战斗部队数量来说显然有点夸张了。


European military effectiveness is also curbed by different procurement policies, as those countries that produce military hardware prefer to keep orders at home.	欧洲军队的效率问题同时也与不同的采购政策有关，因为那些生产的军用设备的国家都喜欢把订单留给本国。


This is true of weaponry as well as logistical capabilities, where, despite immense efforts over the years to get more out of the shrinking funds, there is still great potential for integration and standardization.	武器配置和物流方面都存在着这个问题，尽管近年来在各国都努力用更少的预算做更多的事，但在整合和标准化中还是有巨大的潜力可挖。


The defense treaties concluded recently by France and the United Kingdom appear to be a good example of what can be obtained through greater cooperation and integration – even though it is a strictly bilateral affair with no direct links to either NATO or the European Union.	英法两国最近签订的防御条约显然是一个体现更大程度合作整合优势的绝佳范例——尽管该条约跟北约和欧洲无关。


But the value of the new “Paris-London Entente” will be limited if both countries cut their defense expenditures so much that their combined strength remains at best unchanged.  That Britain plans to fund construction of a new aircraft carrier, but not the planes to fly off of it, suggests that resources for the new entente will be sorely lacking.	但如果两国都大幅削减国防支出，以至于就算整合在一起都充其量只能维持原有水平的话，那么这个新“巴黎-伦敦协约”的价值也就有限了。 英国计划建造一艘新航空母舰，却拿不出钱来采购配套的舰载机，这意味着投入新协约的资源也是极为有限的。


Still, French-British cooperation if it does take on real substance could be an inspiration to others, though the challenges to making the agreement viable are formidable.	但即便法英合作最终未能落到实处（须知实施条约所要客服的挑战不可胜数），对其他国家也能起到激励作用。


British “Tommies” have to learn to speak French, and French legionnaires will have to learn English – and the limits on the spirit of cooperation will no doubt be found at the entrance to every army, navy, and air force canteen.	英国大兵必须学讲法语，而法国军团则要练习英文——而种种缺乏协作精神的行为无疑会不断上演（比如军队食堂大门该谁先走）。


After all, can anyone imagine French sailors eating “spotted dick” or any other culinary peculiarity of the Royal Navy?	毕竟，谁能想象法国水兵大嚼“葡萄干布丁”这类皇家海军的特色食品呢。


Somewhat more promising is the possible invitation to India to participate in developing, alongside France, Germany, and Britain, the new joint Euro-fighter.	某些更有发展前景的做法是把印度邀请进来，与法、德、英三国一道进行新Euro-fighter战斗机的研发。


India’s commitment to defense spending, and its desire to acquire advanced military production processes, may provide the kind of energy that Europe has been lacking.	印度增加防务费用的决心以及获取新型军工生产线的意愿正是欧洲所国家缺少的。


But with Germany’s Luftwaffe planning heavy cuts to its procurement of Euro-fighters, India may have second thoughts about taking part in the project.	但随着德国空军大幅减少Euro-fighter战斗机的采购量，印度参与研发的意愿就大打折扣了。


The kind of energy and commitment to defense spending that India represents needs to be injected into Europe, because European rhetoric about playing a strategic global role remains in high gear.	印度这种增加国防支出的激情和决心必须被引入欧洲，因为欧洲正全力推动自身成为全球战略参与者。


But it seems ages since a Belgian foreign minister (as chairman of the EU Council of Ministers) declared at an ASEAN meeting in Singapore in 1993: There are now only two superpowers left, the US and Europe!	但自从一位比利时外交部长（时任欧盟理��会主席）在1993年东盟会议上宣布“世界上只剩下两个超级强权，那就是美国和欧洲”之后，许多年都没有什么动静。


If Europeans want their ambitions to be taken seriously, they must find ways to deal with the decline in Europe’s military power. Political leaders will have to tell their constituents that there are limits to how much military budgets can be cut, as the “peace dividend” from the Cold War’s end was digested long ago.	如果欧洲认真想实现这一野心的话，他们就必须为不断下滑的军事力量找到解决方案政治领袖必须告诉选民军费是不能无限度削减的，因为冷战结束所节省出来的那部分军费早就花光了。


Europeans may have to embrace new modes of cooperation among their national armed forces in order to put them to effective use.	欧洲国家之间必须采取新形式的军事合作以维持其效率。


Otherwise, not only will Europe’s global political ambitions become untenable, but its allies on the other side of the Atlantic will lose patience with Europeans’ refusal to shoulder their share of the security burden.	不然的话，不但欧洲的全球政治野心化为泡影，连大西洋那边的盟友也最终将对欧洲人拒绝承担安全责任的行为失去耐性。


Europe’s Neo-Liberal Challenge	欧洲的新自由主义挑战


For over 20 years I have argued that Western Europe’s high unemployment rates are unsustainable.	在过去的20年里，我一直认为西欧的高失业率是不可持续的。


At the end of the 1970’s, monetarists bet that only a transitory and modest increase in unemployment could rein in the creeping – and trotting – inflation of the industrial west, and that in retrospect the cost of returning to effective price stability would be judged worthwhile.	在1970年代末期，货币主义者断言只有通过失业率短暂而温和的上升才能控制在西方工业化国家逐渐蔓延并正在加速的通货膨胀。 他们还认为当我们将来回顾历史时，会认为为回归有效的价格稳定性所付出的成本都是值得的。


In Britain and the United States, this monetarist bet turned out well.	在英国和美国这样的论断得到的印证。


In Western Europe, it did not.	但在西欧却并非如此。


Over the past 25 years in Europe, unemployment rose as monetary policy was tightened and interest rates were raised to fight inflation.	在过去的25年里，随着货币政策的收紧和为应对通胀而提高利率，失业率也上升了。


But after inflation succumbed, unemployment did not fall – or not by much.	但在通胀得到控制之后，失业率却并没有下降—或者说下降得不多。


If unemployment was not stuck quite at Great Depression levels, it remained high enough to make long-term joblessness or the fear of long-term joblessness a defining experience.	如果说失业率并没有维持在“大萧条”时期的水平，但也高得足以使长期失业或对长期失业的恐惧成为一种刻骨铭心的经历。


Societies in which the official unemployment rate stands at 10% or more for generations are societies in which government economic management has failed.	连续好几代人的官方失业率都维持在10%或更高的社会是政府的经济管理失败的社会。


So, for 20 years it has seemed to me that Western Europe’s underlying political equilibrium – corporatist bargaining and ample social insurance, on the one hand, and tight monetary policies, on the other – must crack.	因此，似乎西欧20年以来根本的政治平衡—一边是社团主义者的讨价还价和充足的社会保障，另一边使紧缩的货币政策—必然破裂。


Twin fears appear to be paralyzing European policymakers.	这双重的恐惧似乎让欧洲的决策者们束手无策了。


Europe’s central bankers fear that their political masters will order them to loosen monetary policy, that the structural reforms needed to free up aggregate supply will not be forthcoming, and that the result will be a return to the inflation of the 1970’s.	欧洲央行的官员们担心他们的政治主人会勒令他们放松货币政策； 担心释放总合供给所必需的结构性改革不会出现；


In short, they fear that all of the sacrifices made for price stability will have been in vain.	还担心最后的结果就是又回到1970年代的通胀状态。 简言之，他们担心为价格稳定性所做出的一切牺牲都会付诸东流。


West European politicians, for their part, fear the opposite outcome.	而西欧的政治家们担心的却是相反的结果。


They worry that even after undertaking structural reforms to reduce the attractiveness of unemployment benefits and increase the ability of workers to move to jobs and of firms to move to workers, central bankers will continue to insist on tight money.	他们担忧的是即便在实施了结构性改革，降低失业受益的吸引力，提高工人获得工作和公司录用工人的能力之后，中央银行的官员们会依然坚持通货紧缩。


In short, they fear that, with no expansion of output or employment, the net effect will simply be an increase in poverty.	总之，他们担心没有产出或就业的扩张，实际结果就只会是贫穷的增加。


Of course, these fears are accompanied by the hope that structural reforms and monetary expansion work in harmony, boosting employment and output without raising inflation by much.	当然，这些担心也伴随着对结构性改革和货币扩张协调实施的希望。 这样做可以促进就业和产出而又不至于大幅提高通胀率。


But the reality is that steps toward looser monetary policies are non-existent – especially with the fledgling European Central Bank anxious to establish its inflation-fighting credibility – and that steps toward structural reforms are half-hearted, hesitant, and small.	但现实表明实现宽松的货币政策的方式是不存在的—特别是在羽翼未丰的欧洲央行急于建立自己应对通胀的公信力的情况下—且实现结构性改革的手段也仅是半心半意，缩手缩脚和小打小闹而已。


For 20 years, I have been wrong: West European polities have remained stable despite the exclusion of a large proportion of citizens from meaningful participation in much of economic life.	20年来，我一直是错的：尽管有高比例的公民被排除在相当部分的重要经济生活之外，西欧的政治仍然保持了稳定。


West European economies have continued to grow – albeit not as rapidly as they might have – despite bearing the heavy burden of the unemployed 10% or more of the labor force.	西欧的经济体们仍然继续成长—虽然本应更快一些—尽管他们仍然背负着失业劳动人口比例达10%甚至更高的沉重负担。


Now, though, it looks like I may finally be right – or at least right to worry, if not to panic.	但现在我的观点似乎最终得到了印证—或者说如果不至于惊慌的话，至少我有理由担忧。


The French rejected the European Union constitution, primarily – or so it appears – because further European integration, it is feared, must bring in its wake the huge costs and disruptions of neo-liberalism.	法国拒绝欧盟宪法，首先—或说表面上看来—是因为它担心欧洲的进一步一体化必然会带来巨大的成本并危害新自由主义。


It is one thing to back the “European project” when the idea is to bind Germany so tightly to France that never again will anybody think it worthwhile to wage a war over what language is spoken in Alsace-Lorraine.	当法国认为与德国结成紧密的伙伴就不会再有人为阿尔萨斯-洛林地区应该使用何种语言而大动干戈时，它支持了“欧洲计划”。


It is another when the European project means that French workers face competition from Polish plumbers, Romanian farmers, and Turkish shop clerks.	可当欧洲计划意味着法国工人面临来自波兰的水管工、罗马尼亚的农民和土耳其的店员的竞争时就完全是另一码事了。


In Germany, the electorate seems poised to eject Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder out of discontent with his tepid allegiance to the neo-liberal project.	在德国，选民们似乎由于不满施罗德总理对新自由主义项目不温不火的忠诚而准备让他走人。


The problem is that the electorate will then get four years of rule by a chancellor, Angela Merkel, whose commitment to the neo-liberal project is almost as strong as mine.	问题是，他们一旦这样做了又会迎来新总理安吉拉·默克尔（Angela Merkel）四年的任期。 而她对新自由主义项目的承诺几乎和我一样坚定。


I think that Germany would be better off in a decade under more neo-liberal policies.	我认为德国在未来10年里还是实行更为新自由主义的政策比较好。


But this does not seem to be what the German electorate wants, and this makes the complexion of German politics four years from now incalculable.	但这似乎不是德国选民们的想法，所以也使得德国未来四年的政治局面充满了不确定因素。


Coupled with all this is northern European discontent with the central bankers, specifically with the ECB and the euro.	北欧对央行官员，特别是对欧洲央行和欧元的不满使形势更为严峻。


It is not that the end of European Monetary Union is on the agenda; it is merely that people have begun thinking about possible low-probability futures in which the end of EMU might be placed on the agenda.	这并不是因为终结欧洲货币联盟已经提上了议事日程，而仅仅是因为人们开始考虑欧洲货币联盟的终结可能会催生低概率的期货。


That is enough to shake asset prices worldwide.	就这一点就足以动摇全世界的资产价格。


Western Europe’s accomplishments since World War II are among the most heartening and impressive success stories in world history.	西欧在第二次世界大战之后所取得的成就演绎了世界史上最令人振奋的成功故事���重要篇章。


Everyone should want today’s undivided Europe to build on these accomplishments, rather than for generations of high unemployment to jeopardize them.	所有人都希望今天统一的欧洲在这样的成就之上继续发展而不愿让持续数代人的高失业率使我们前功尽弃。


But this will require a shift in the ECB’s attitude.	但这就需要欧洲央行转变态度。


Europe needs a monetary policy that views aiding employment growth in northern Europe as more important than continental price stability.	欧洲需要一种重视帮助北欧提高就业率更多于实现价格稳定性的货币政策。


There will, after all be inflation in southern and eastern Europe – there must be, for as regions develop and industrialize their terms of trade must improve, and under a monetary union regional inflation is how this can happen.	毕竟在南欧和东欧还是会出现通胀—这是必然的。 因为随着各地区的发展和工业化，它们的贸易条件必须得到改善，而在货币联盟当中，地区性通胀是实现这一目的的手段。


The ECB should not try to balance inflation in the south and east with deflation in the north in order to hit artificial continent-wide targets.	欧洲央行不应该为了实现人为的欧洲大陆范围内的目标，就以北欧的通货紧缩来平衡南欧和东欧的通货膨胀。


Europe\u0027s Never-Ending Constitution	永不休止的欧洲宪法


On October 29, leaders of the European Union will gather in Rome to sign the Union's new Constitutional Treaty.	10月29号，欧盟的首脑们将聚集在罗马，签署一部新的欧州宪法条约。


Praise for the document's uniqueness will undoubtedly be heard, and in this they won't be boasting, because the EU Constitution is unlike any other constitution ever written.	毫无疑问，到时会有很多对文件独特性的赞美。 这倒不是吹牛，因为欧洲宪法的确不同于任何其它宪法。


Most constitutions - including the American one - aspire to "freeze history," or to set up a lasting institutional order that will resist the winds of change.	大多数宪法，包括美国宪法，都渴望"凝固历史"，或建立一个最终的能抵抗变化的法律文本。


Indeed, a constitution is by its nature an attempt to "tame" history, to make it follow the laws of man rather than its own logic, including unwelcome contingencies and the whims of fate.	事实上，宪法的本义就是试图"控制"历史，让历史跟随人类制定的法律而不是它自己的逻辑，包括不受欢迎的偶然性以及命里的一时冲动。


By contrast, the EU Constitution is written with the unspoken understanding that the institutions it is setting up are transitory, that they are far from optimal, and that it would be desirable to change them right now if political realities allowed it.	但与之相反，欧洲宪法却被大家心照不宣地认定为是一部暂时性的宪法。 它远远称不上完美，如果允许的话，它现在就需要作改动。


But the realities of politics in today's Europe do not allow for the sort of document the signatories really wanted to draft, so the constitution that they did write is designed to establish a process of evolutionary change that will motivate further improvements along the way - improvement that will, it is hoped, one day obliterate the very arrangements today's EU Constitution is setting up.	但是今天欧洲的政治现状不允许签约国真正想要的宪法存在，所以他们起草的宪法被定位为是一部反映进化过程、促进未来发展的法律。 社会的进步将--希望如此--在某一天忘掉目前这部行将签署的欧洲宪法。


Indeed, from the start, the architects of the Union's Constitutional Treaty never seriously expected that their draft would endure in the form in which they wrote it. Instead, they saw themselves as following Europe's long established pattern of step-by-step integration.	事实上，欧州宪法条约的设计者从一开始就没有真的期望他们的草案会保留下去，相反，他们把自己看作是欧洲长期形成的"一步一步综合"模式的追随者。


This pattern began at the start of the 'European project' over half a century ago.	这个模式最早开始于半个世纪前的"欧洲计划"。


Spillover effects from the original Coal and Steel Community of the 1950's led to the creation of the European Economic Community, then to the European Community, and finally to the creation of the Union.	50年代来自煤和钢社团的外溢效应导致了欧洲经济共同体的产生，接着又出现了欧洲共同体，最后成立了欧盟。


Each step led to progressively greater integration.	每一步都是更大的结合。


Even milestone documents such as the Single European Act and the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice, were never envisaged as achieving the kind of permanence (or even semi-permanence) that we normally associate with a constitution. The same is true of developments like the Union's common foreign and security policy or Monetary Union, with its Euro and European Central Bank.	即使是里程碑似的文件如单一欧洲法、马斯垂克条约、阿姆斯特丹条约、尼斯条约等，也从来没有想过要追求永恒。


No sooner did one intergovernmental conference produce a "settlement" than the wheels started turning to prepare for a successor conference and a successor settlement. This mechanism for the deliberately progressive construction of a unified polity out of nominally sovereign states is unprecedented in human history.	欧盟的外交和安全政策、以及欧洲货币同盟也是如此。


When nations embark on a program of ever closer integration, the end result is always likely to look unfinished if they put aside - on an ongoing basis - any resolution of the ultimate destination.	当国家着手一个整和计划时，最后的结果往往是：如果它们被放在一边，它们看上去就象没完成一样，而实际上还在进行中。


Indeed, the only thing that seemed clear from the start of the European integration process was that the states involved - along with whatever new partner states they might pick up along the way - would continue wheeling and dealing to construct their ever more integrated polity.	任何终极目标的决议都是这样。 事实上，在欧洲统一进程中，只有一件事似乎是从一开始就很明了的，那就是所有参与的国家，不管它们可能会选择什么样的合作伙伴，都会继续建造它们那个更加综合的政体。


As a result, every set of treaty amendments was the product of the type of untidy political haggling typical of intergovernmental decision-making.	结果是，每一个条约的修订都是混乱的政治争论的产物。


Indeed, even under the Constitutional Treaty, all states know that their partners have the express right to withdraw if they should ever become sufficiently disenchanted or come to look upon the EU as a bad bargain.	事实上，即使是在宪法条约下，所有国家都知道，他们的伙伴拥有明确的撤退的权力，只要他们足够地清醒或把建立欧盟看作是一个坏主意。


But will the Union's new Constitutional Treaty put an end to this pattern of evolutionary constitution building?	但是，这部欧州宪法条约会结束这种进化模式吗？ 可能在某种程度上会，但不会全部。


It may do so to some degree, but not nearly as much as if the treaty's architects had done more to separate constitutional matters, such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the competences of Union bodies and member states, from the stuff of everyday politics, like agricultural and fisheries policies or the technicalities of judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters.	因为条约的设计者们已经将宪法中的不同内容分门别类，如基本权利宪章，欧盟机构和成员国的职责等。 从每日政治内容，如农业和渔业政策到民事刑事诉讼中司法合作的学术性等。


A great opportunity to segregate what is permanent and durable (i.e., "constitutional") about the Union from what is impermanent and changeable (i.e., "political") was missed.	欧盟中那些永恒和持久的东西与欧盟中那些不太永恒和持久的东西分开来的机会被错过了。


With nothing set in concrete, Europe's constitutional process continue to rely not on any transcendent document, but on balancing political relations and calculations so that the whole thing does not fall apart.	由于没有什么实在的东西，欧洲的制宪过程没有依赖于任何至高无上的文件，而是平衡政治关系和计算数据，这样整个欧盟才不会分裂。


This process will probably carry the cost of prolonging the emergence of a single European political loyalty (if one ever does emerge).	但这个过程很可能会延长一个单一欧洲政治体的出现。


This will be considered tragic only for those who see a stable European federation as Europe's manifest destiny.	只有那些把建立一个稳定的欧洲联盟看作是欧洲的命运的人才会把这当成是悲剧。


For the rest of us, notwithstanding the Union's unprecedented eastward enlargement, the schisms that erupted over the Iraq war, and the other frictions that are bound to result from Europe's flexible, evolutionary approach to constitution-making, there is also a lot of hope in this extended struggle for self-definition.	对余下的我们这些人来说，虽然欧盟向东扩展、在伊拉克问题上又爆发分歧、还存在其它的从欧洲灵活的进化论到宪法的制定等问题上的摩擦，但我们对这场为自我定义而进行的奋斗仍然抱有很多希望。


The recent collective sense across Europe of the urgency of being able to speak with one voice in external affairs may provide the next breeze, and enough glue, to keep the enterprise afloat.	最近在欧洲形成的在紧急关头必须同心通力一起应付外部事务的共识，也许正是我们事业不败的保证。


Europe\u0027s New Dawn	欧洲新的黎明


Today in Rome, the heads of state and government of the EU's 25 member states will sign the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.	今天在罗马，欧盟25个成员国的首脑们将签署一部欧洲宪法条约。


We have come a long way since the six founding members formed the European Economic Community back in March 1957 - also in Rome.	从1957年，也是在罗马，6国成立欧洲经济合作体以来，我们走过了一条漫长的道路。


After the Treaty is signed, it will go before the national parliaments for approval. So it is crucially important to understand why the Treaty deserves to be ratified.	条约签署以后，它将领先于各国议会批准文件，所以理解为什么它值得被认可就至关重要。


Simply put, it places the interests of Europe's citizens more than ever at the heart of the European Union's activities. It does so in four ways.	简单地说，它将从4个方面，使欧洲人民的利益在欧盟的中心工作中占据更重要的地位。


First, the Constitutional Treaty guarantees that the Union's institutions will respect the fundamental rights of everyone within the EU.	首先，欧洲宪法条约将确保欧盟的机构尊重欧盟内每一个人的基本权利。


The "catalogue of fundamental rights" included in the Constitution is extensive, centering on respect for human dignity, freedom, and equality, and also on the principles of democracy and the rule of law.	纳入宪法中的"基本权利目录"内容广泛，以尊重人的尊严、自由、平等为中心，同时还阐明了民主原则以及法律规则。


By enshrining them in the Constitution, these fundamental rights and principles become legally binding, and citizens will have greater scope for bringing appeals to the Court of Justice.	通过归入宪法，这些基本权利和原则就有了法律依据，人们可以有更多机会向法院提请诉求。


In this respect, the EU leads the world in the protection of fundamental rights.	从这一点来说，欧盟在保护基本权利方面领导了世界。


Second, the Treaty makes the EU more democratic and brings government closer to Europe's citizens.	其次，条约使欧盟更加民主，使政府离老百姓更近。


The Union has no business interfering in matters that can be dealt with successfully at the local, regional, or national level.	欧盟不会参与那些在地方、地区或国内可以成功解决的事务。


The EU's objectives are precisely those that countries are unable to achieve on their own, for example, a stronger economy and greater security.	欧盟的目标很明确，那就是解决那些各国不能自行解决的问题，如发展更强大的经济、建立更安全的体制。


The Constitutional Treaty includes guarantees to ensure that the EU adheres to this principle strictly.	宪法条约包含了确保欧盟严格执行这一原则的条款。


National parliaments will be able to call a time-out if Brussels makes proposals that seem to interfere unnecessarily.	如果布鲁塞尔制定任何不必要的参与计划，国家议会有权提出抗议。


Should one-third of national parliaments so wish, the European Commission will be required to reconsider a proposal.	如果三分之一的国家议会这么做，欧盟委员会就会被要求重新考虑计划。


In addition, the Constitutional Treaty gives citizens the right to ask the European Commission to take action on a specific point.	此外，宪法条约还给予公民要求欧盟委员会就某一特殊事件采取行动的权力。


A citizens' initiative of this kind will require one million signatures, obtained in different countries.	但公民的这种自发行动需要有来自不同国家的100万个签名。


At the same time, the European Parliament will have far greater powers.	同时，欧洲议会的权力将更大。


It will have joint decision-making authority in many more areas, including the budget.	它将在更多领域参与当局的决定，包括预算。


As a result, European citizens' elected representatives will be better able to scrutinize the work of the Commission.	因此，欧洲人民选出的代表们将更好地审查委员会的工作。


Third, the Treaty makes the EU more open and more transparent.	第三，条约使欧盟更加开放和透明。


Citizens want powers to be clearly defined and decisions to be taken openly in a way that they can understand.	公民要求以一种他们可以明白的方式来明确权力，公开作决定的过程。


Many people despair of finding their way through the maze of current EU treaties and their numerous amendments.	很多人对目前欧盟混乱的条约以及它们无数的修正文件感到失望。


Outside Brussels, few people can explain the "pillar" structure and the distinction between the Union and the Community.	布鲁塞尔以外的人，很少可以解释"立柱"结构以及欧盟和欧洲合作会之间的区别。


The Constitution consigns these complexities to history.	宪法交代了这些复杂的历史过程。


It also gives people far greater access to official information, extending their right of access to documents from all institutions, organs, and bodies.	它还给公民提供了更多获取官方信息的渠道，扩大了他们了解所有机构、组织文件的权利。


Finally, the Treaty will make Europe more effective.	最后，条约将使欧州更加有效。


This is essential if the issues that affect people's lives are to be tackled successfully.	这很重要，如果影响到人们生活的问题可以被成功地处理的话。


Two themes that people consider crucial are a stronger European economy (more jobs and more growth) and greater security (reducing cross-border crime).	人们认为很重要的两个问题是更强大的经济（更多工作机会，更高的经济发展率）和更安全的社会（减少跨国犯罪）。


European countries are heavily reliant on each other in addressing these issues.	欧洲国家在这些问题上是紧密相连的。


People are counting on Europe to take action.	人们指望欧洲行动起来。


But, because EU decisions often have to be taken unanimously, this can be difficult.	但是，由于欧盟经常必须一致通过才能作决定，因此要采取行动很困难。


Moreover, the means to work together effectively are often lacking.	而且，也缺乏有效合作的方法。


The Treaty introduces major improvements here, enabling us to work together more effectively to achieve our aims.	宪法条约在这方面取得了很重要的进步，可以使我们更有效地工作在一起以达到我们的目标。


In sum, the Constitutional Treaty firmly enshrines fundamental rights in law, and also makes the EU more democratic, more transparent, and more effective.	概括说来，宪法条约把基本权利纳入了法律中，同时使欧盟更加民主，更加透明，更加有效。


This makes it a good deal for everyone - for people who expect more cooperation and more concrete results from the Union, but also for those concerned about excessive interference by Europe in questions that can be better dealt with by the member states themselves.	它让每一个人满意--不仅让那些希望欧盟有更多合作并取得更多实在的结果的人满意，也使那些原来担心欧盟会过多参与成员国内部事务的人满意。


Next year, we will celebrate 60 years of peace across a large part of Europe.	明年，我们将庆祝欧洲大部分地区和平60周年。


Never before in our history have we enjoyed such a long period of concord, a period that has seen an enormous growth in prosperity.	此前在我们的历史中，我们从来没有享受过这么长时间的和睦，我们也没有见过如此巨大的繁荣。


Democracy has taken root in almost every corner of Europe, and Europeans now have far greater freedom to live, work, and study where and how they wish.	民主已经几乎遍布欧洲的每一个角落，欧洲人现在有了多得多的自由，他们可以任意选择在哪里生活、工作和学习。


These achievements are largely due to European cooperation.	这些成就的取得主要归功于欧洲各国间的合作。


The Constitutional Treaty is a reflection of our wish to continue in the same vein, to carry on working together.	宪法条约反映了我们渴望继续合作的意愿。


We want to reaffirm our commitment to a life without war and injustice, and to the freedom that we hold so dear.	我们要重申，我们承担着一个急迫的义务，那就是建设一个没有战争、没有不公、自由的生活。


The Constitutional Treaty provides solid foundations for our shared future.	宪法条约为我们的将来创造了一个坚实的基础。


Peace, security, and prosperity are as vulnerable as they are valuable.	和平、安全和繁荣很可贵，但也很脆弱。


This Treaty makes them stronger. And that makes us stronger.	这个条约将使它们更加坚强，也将使我们更加坚强。


The signing ceremony is therefore a message of hope.	因此，签署典礼代表着希望。


It is a new beginning.	这是一个新的开始。


Europe’s New Donald Rumsfeld	欧洲的新拉姆斯菲尔德


Russia’s Duma elections this December are almost certain to cement the power of forces loyal to Vladimir Putin.	今年十二月，俄国杜马选举几乎肯定会巩固忠于普京的力量的势力。


That outcome is likely to confirm Russia’s emergence as the most divisive issue in the European Union since Donald Rumsfeld split the continent into “old” and “new” Europe.	自从拉姆斯菲尔德把欧洲大陆划分为“新”欧洲和“老”欧洲以来，这一结果有可能会确认俄国成为最为引起欧盟分化的事务。


In the 1990’s, EU members found it easy to agree on a common approach to Russia.	在二十世纪九十年代，欧盟成员国们很容易就形成对俄共同政策。


They coalesced around a strategy of democratizing and westernizing a weak and indebted Russia.	这些国家联合在一个意在将软弱和负债累累的俄国民主化和西方化的战略之下。


That policy is now in tatters.	这一政策现在已经瓦解。


Soaring oil and gas prices have made Russia more powerful, less co-operative, and less interested in joining the West.	窜升的石油和天然气价格已经让俄国更为强大，不再如此合作，也不再对加入西方如此感兴趣。


Today, Europeans cannot even agree on the nature of the Russian regime, let alone what policy to adopt towards it.	如今，欧洲人甚至无法对俄国政权的性质取得共识，更不要说对其采取何种政策了。


Part of the confusion lies in Putin’s skillful political positioning.	这一混乱局面部分是由于普京高超的政治技巧造成的。


On the one hand, he needs to maximize his control of the economy and society in order to raise wages and pensions and to keep opponents down, while nourishing the long-tail of patronage that keeps him in power.	在一方面，普京需要最大程度地控制经济和社会以便提高工资和养老金并且压制反对派，与此同时培育让他稳坐江山的那些恩宠。


On the other hand, Moscow’s elite – who fear that their assets may be expropriated by a future government – wants to avoid international pariah status so that they can see out their sun-set years in the safety of the West if the need arises.	在另一方面，莫斯科的精英阶层担心未来的政府会将他们的资产收归国有，想要避免成为国际贱民，这般就可以在需要的时候在西方安度晚年。


A tightly knit group of political consultants has helped Putin resolve his conundrum.	一群联系紧密的政治顾问们帮助普京解决了这一难题。


Rather than establish a dictatorship, they helped Putin use the trappings of liberal democracy to consolidate power.	他们并不是建立起一个独裁制度，而是帮助普京利用自由民主制度的微妙之处来巩固权力。


By establishing fake opposition political parties that are under the Kremlin’s thumb, creating pseudo pressure groups and organizations such as Nashi (“Ours”), and recasting the rule of law as an instrument of political power, Putin has tightened his control in a more effective and subtle way than many autocratic regimes.	普京通过建立克里姆林宫控制下的虚假的反对派政党和像“纳西”这样虚假的施加压力团体和组织并且重新确定法治作为政治权力工具，从而比许多独裁政权更为有效和微妙地加紧了其控制。


The possibility that he may run for prime minister in order to prolong his rule when his presidential mandate expires is a logical continuation of this approach.	在他的总统任期结束之计，他有可能竞选总理从而延长其统治，这是这一做法符合逻辑的延续。


Though the EU has failed to change Russia during the Putin era, Russia has had a big impact on the EU.	尽管欧盟未能在普京时代改变俄国，但是俄国却对欧盟出生了巨大的影响。


On energy, it is picking off individual EU member states and signing long-term deals that undermine the core principles of the EU’s common strategy.	在能源方面，俄国对欧盟各成员国们各个击破，分别签订破坏欧盟共同战略核心原则的长期协议。


On Kosovo, Russia is blocking progress at the United Nations.	在科索沃问题上，俄国阻挠在联合国取得的进展。


In the Caucasus and Central Asia, the Kremlin has effectively shut the EU out of regions where it has an interest in promoting political reform, resolving conflicts, and forging energy partnerships.	在高加索和中亚，克里姆林宫有效地将欧盟排除除去，而欧盟则在这些地区具有促进政治改革、解决冲突以及建立能源合作夥伴的利益。


In Ukraine and Moldova, the Kremlin has worked hard, with some success, to blunt the appeal of Europe.	在乌克兰和摩尔多瓦，克里姆林宫努力破解欧洲的吸引力，并且取得了一定的成功。


In the eyes of some neighboring countries, Russia is emerging as an ideological alternative to the EU that offers a different approach to sovereignty, power, and world order.	在某些邻国眼中，俄国正在重新崛起，对主权、实力以及世界秩序采取不同的策略，从而成为欧盟在意识形态上的替换品。


Whereas the European project is founded on the rule of law, Russia believes that when the balance of power changes, the laws should be changed to reflect it.	欧洲建设建立在法治的基础之上，俄国则相信当实力平衡改变之际，法律也应当改变以反映这一变化。


Moreover, Russia is trying to build a relationship of “asymmetric interdependence” with the EU.	而且，俄国正在试图与欧盟建立“不平衡的相互依存”关系。


While EU leaders believe that peace and stability is built through interdependence, Russia’s leaders are intent on creating a situation in which the EU needs Russia more than Russia needs the EU, particularly in the energy sector.	欧盟领导人们相信，和平和稳定是通过相互依存而建立的，俄国领导人却愿意形成这样一种局面，也就是欧盟需要俄国要大于俄国需要欧盟，特别是在能源领域。


Although Russia’s GDP is no bigger than that of Belgium and the Netherlands combined, and its military spending is a fraction of the EU’s, the Kremlin has consistently managed to get the better of the Union.	尽管俄国的GDP并不大于比利时和荷兰相加之和，其军费开支也只是欧盟的一小部分，但是克里姆林宫却一贯占据欧盟的上风。


The central problem is that Europeans have squandered their most powerful source of leverage: unity.	中心问题是，欧洲人荒废了其最为强大的实力源泉，也就是团结一致。


Member states are divided between those that view Russia as a potential partner which can be drawn into the EU’s orbit through a process of “creeping integration,” and those that view Russia as a threat whose expansionism and contempt for democracy must be rolled back through a policy of “soft containment.”	一派把俄国视为潜在的���伴，可以通过“缓慢融入”的进程将其带入欧盟的范围。 另一派把俄国视为一个威胁，其扩张主义和蔑视民主必须通过“柔性遏制”政策来加以逆转。


The last few years demonstrate that neither approach will work.	最近几年的历史表明这两个策略都不成功。


The first approach risks giving Russia easy access to all the benefits of cooperation with the EU, without insisting that Russia abide by stable rules.	第一个策略有在不坚持让俄国遵守稳定的规则而让其轻易获得与欧盟合作的所有利益的风险。


Open hostility toward Russia, however, will make it hard for the EU to draw on Russia’s help to tackle a host of common problems - from environmental pollution and illegal migration, to nuclear proliferation and Kosovo’s final status.	但是，公开敌视俄国将会让欧盟难以取得俄国在一堆共同问题上的帮助，这些问题包括环境污染、非法移民、核子扩散以及科索沃的最终地位问题。


The EU urgently needs a new approach.	欧盟现在急需一个新的策略。


Rather than attempt to democratize or contain Russia, the Union should settle on the more limited goal of turning Russia into a reliable partner, bound by the rule of law.	它不应该试图将俄国民主化或者遏制俄国，而是应该确定更为有限的、将俄国转变为可靠的、受到法治制约的夥伴的目标。


A common approach will give the EU many powerful levers to ensure that Russia honors treaties and mutual agreements.	共同策略将会给欧盟多种手段来确保俄国遵守条约和共同协议。


At the diplomatic level, Europeans could threaten to deprive Russia of the prestige it draws from participating in G8 and EU-Russia Summits.	在外交层面上，欧洲可以威胁剥夺俄国参加工业八强和俄欧高峰会议所带来的威望。


They should also aim to strengthen democracy and the rule of law in the European neighborhood by tightening relations with countries such as Georgia and Ukraine.	它们还应该力图通过加强与诸如格鲁吉亚和乌克兰的关系而在欧洲近邻强化民主和法治。


Economic leverage should be applied as well.	还应该使用经济杠杆。


Europeans should subject Russian investments in EU markets to greater scrutiny and use competition law to launch investigations into monopolistic practices and money laundering for existing investments.	欧洲应该加强审查俄国在欧盟市场上的投资并且使用竞争法规来对垄断做法和现有投资活动的洗钱进行调查。


At the same time, EU members could target the interests of the individuals in the Kremlin elite by scrutinizing their purchases of Western assets, and even ban travel to the EU for human rights abusers.	与此同时，欧盟成员国可以通过审查克里姆林宫精英人物购买西方资产而瞄准其利益，甚至可以禁止违犯人权者前往欧盟旅行。


So long as the EU continues to sway between integration and containment, it will continue to appear to the Kremlin as weak and directionless.	只要欧盟继续在融入和遏制之间摇摆不定，它就会继续在克里姆林宫面前显得软弱和举棋不定。


That, in turn, will merely encourage Russia to become even more assertive.	这反过来将会鼓励俄国变得更为嚣张。


Europe’s Next Single Market	欧洲的下一个单一市场


The current European Commission has made clear its commitment to reducing bureaucratic red tape by adopting an approach to regulation that keeps the number of laws we propose to an absolute minimum.	当前的欧盟委员会已经明确承诺改正其官僚文牍作风。 具体作法是采用一种可以将我们法律提案的数量控制在最少限度的规则制定方式。


We are serious about this.	我们对此事态度严肃。


But our commitment to reducing the amount of legislation must be matched by an equal commitment to making what we have really count.	但我们为立法减负的承诺必须和使我们现有的法律有效的同等承诺相适应。


This is a shared responsibility, and member states have to play their part.	这是一项共同的责任，成员国都应该各尽其责。


Until laws adopted in Brussels are enacted in national law and properly enforced, they remain paper tigers, entirely without teeth.	直到布鲁塞尔通过的法律在国内法中生效并得到有效实施之前，它们完全就是没牙的纸老虎。


Most laws adopted in Brussels allow a grace period – generally about two years – for member states to act.	在布鲁塞尔通过的大多数法律都允许一个宽限期—通常是两年—让成员国采取行动。


Member states set this deadline themselves, so it should be more than enough time.	各成员国自定最后期限，所以时间应该不成问题。


After that, there should be no excuses.	在宽限期之后， 就不应该再有任何借口了。


Ten years ago, the gap between the number of single-market laws adopted in Brussels and those in force in the member states – known as the “transposition deficit” – stood at 6%.	十年前，布鲁塞尔通过的单一市场法律数量与在各成员国生效的法律数量之间的差距—被称为“转换赤字”—是6%。


Faced with this poor record, in 2001 the European Council committed itself to achieving a target of no more than 1.5% at any given time.	面对这样一个不良纪录，欧洲理事会在2001年承诺实现使该赤字在任何时候都不高于1. 5%的目标。


In the period since, we have had our ups and downs, but most member states have made a considerable effort to get their house in order.	自那段时期以来，我们经历了一些波折，但大多数成员国都在理顺相关内务方面付出了巨大的努力。


For the very first time, the average deficit has fallen below 1.5%, standing at 1.2%.	平均转换赤字有史以来第一次降到了1. 5%以下，达到1.


What is more, all member states have made progress, with Denmark and Latvia – both five directives away from a perfect record – sharing first place.	2%。 另外，所有的成员国都取得了进步，尤以丹麦和拉脱维亚—都只差5个指令就实现完美达标—为最佳。


This is an important achievement, but it should not be taken as a signal to relax.	这是一项重要的成就，但它不应该成为我们松懈的信号。


On the contrary, we should ask whether the time has not come to set even more stringent targets.	相反，我们应该自问是否到了设立更严格的目标的时候了。


And it is also time to take a more detailed look at where we continue to fall short.	同时还应该借此机会审视我们在哪些方面还继续存在不足。


When member states sign up to laws in Brussels, they accept an absolute obligation to be bound by them.	当各成员国在布鲁塞尔签署通过法律时，它们就接受了实施这些法律的绝对义务。


When they fail to live up to their commitments, they fail in their duty to the consumers and businesses that stand to benefit.	当它们未能实现承诺时，就辜负了本应从中受益的消费者和公司。


Nor should good overall results be permitted to mask problems in particular areas – public procurement, for example, which accounts for between 15% and 20% of Europe’s GDP.	也不能用总体的良好结果来遮掩某些方面的问题—比如，占欧洲GDP15%至20%的公共采购。


Opening up markets and applying European rules properly produces savings for governments and delivers better value for taxpayers’ money.	开放市场并实施欧洲的法规可以有效地为各成员国政府节省开支并使纳税人的税金实现更好的价值。


I am, therefore, deeply disappointed that a package of measures adopted in this area in 2004 – aimed at simplifying and modernizing procedures – has not been transposed within the agreed deadline by several member states.	因此，我在这里对2004年在这一领域通过的一揽子方案深表失望。 有几个成员国未能在既定的期限内转换这套旨在使流程简单化和现代化的方案。


I warn those that have not yet acted that I will take whatever steps are necessary to make them act.	我警告那些还没有行动的成员国，我将会采用一切必要的手段来迫使他们采取行动。


We cannot continue to commit ourselves to delivering a more competitive Europe while denying ourselves the means to achieve it.	我们不能够在继续自我承诺建设一个更具竞争力的欧洲但同时却拒绝实现这一目标的手段。


But reducing the transposition deficit, while important, is not the end of the game.	但降低转换赤字固然重要，却不是这场博弈的结束。


Getting laws onto national statute books is one thing, ensuring they are properly applied and enforced is another.	使法律写入国内法典是一回事，确保它们得到有效实施和执行则是另外一回事了。


And while the story is good on transposition, it is less rosy when it comes to how things are working on the ground.	法律转换成效卓越，但在实际操作上情况就不那么漂亮了。


Eight member states have managed to reduce the number of infringement cases taken against them by the Commission, but 17 have as many or more than they did this time last year.	虽然有8个成员国成功地减少了欧盟委员会提起的违反欧盟法律的个案数量，但仍有17个成员国今年在这方面与去年持平以至更甚。


I appreciate that close cooperation and partnership with member states are required, and I am ready to work with them in whatever way I can to help them to transpose and apply EU law correctly.	我赞赏各成员国之间建立紧密的合作和伙伴关系，我也准备尽我所能与它们合作从而帮助它们正确地转换和实施欧盟法律。


I prefer to avoid infringement cases, which are costly and time consuming.	我倾向于避免陷入成本高昂而旷日持久的违法案件诉讼。


But member states should know by now that I am not a soft touch.	但各成员国现在应该已经了解到我不是个手软的人。


My job is to ensure that the law is enforced without fear or favor, and that is what I will continue to do.	我的责任是确保法律得到不偏不倚的执行，这也是我会继续从事的工作。


The single market is one of the European Union’s greatest achievements.	单一市场是欧盟最伟大的成就之一。


Removing barriers to the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital has brought greater prosperity to people across the Continent, hones our skills internally, and gives us weight internationally.	为人员、商品、服务和资本的自由流动扫清障碍给整个欧洲大陆上的人们带来了伟大的繁荣，锤炼了我们内部的实力，增加了我们在国际上的份量。


When we made the big push for the single market 20 years ago, there were just 12 member states.	当我们在20年前大力推动单一市场时，只有12个成员国。


Now there are 27.	现在我们有了27个。


Europe is a very different place.	欧洲发生了巨变。


We have also undergone a communications and technological revolution that has touched every aspect of our lives.	我们还经历了一场影响到生活方方面面的通信与技术革命。


While immense new opportunities have opened up for Europe's citizens and businesses, global competition for trade and investment has never been tougher.	在众多的新机遇为欧洲公民和公司开启的同时，在贸易和投资方面的全球竞争也更为严酷。


Later this year, the Commission will bring forward a review of the single market to ensure that Europe is ready for what lies ahead.	今年晚些时候，欧盟委员会将开展一次单一市场评估以确保欧洲有足够的准备面对未来。


This is an important opportunity for reform and renewal.	这是一次改革和更新的重要机遇。


A modern single market should reflect modern needs, and we should concentrate our efforts where they can have most effect.	一个现代的单一市场应该反映现代的需求，我们应该将努力投入到最有成效的领域。


We need a set of priorities that responds to what people want and expect – jobs, growth, and security.	我们需要一套优先战略以应对人们的需求和期望—工作、成长和安全。


To cope with rapid change, we need to be flexible when it comes to regulation.	为了适应快速的变化，我们需要在监管方面保持灵活。


We need to accept that not everything can be run from the center, which means more trust and more partnership, but also more willingness to shoulder responsibility further down the line.	我们必须接受并不是所有事物都可以集中管理的事实，这就意味着更多的信任和伙伴关系，但还要有更强的担当未来责任的意愿。


Indeed, if we are to succeed in creating a single market that is open to the world, builds on its internal strengths, and is at the cutting edge when it comes to shaping the international environment, our efforts at the EU level have to be matched by efforts at the national level.	的确，如果我们要成功地建立一个向世界开放，能不断提升内部实力，并在国际环境形成方面举足轻重的单一市场，那么我们在欧盟层面上的努力就必须要有各成员国层面上的努力来配合。


I commend the member states for the efforts they have made, but we can all do better.	我赞扬个成员国已经付出的努力，但我们还能做得更好。


Europe’s Next Steps	欧洲的下一步


Terrorism in London and the French and Dutch rejections of the European Union’s Constitutional Treaty have brought Euro-pessimism back into fashion.	发生在伦敦的恐怖主义事件以及法、荷两国否决欧盟宪法条约使欧洲悲观论再次盛行。


The failure of the June EU summit and the bitter clashes between Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac have even inspired some to proclaim the beginning of the end for Europe.	六月欧盟峰会的失败及托尼·布莱尔和雅克·希拉克之间的龃龉加深甚至促使某些人宣称欧洲末日已经开始。


Europe is neither dead nor dying.	欧洲没有消亡，也不会消亡。


But recent events do spell the end of one version of European integration – the vision of an “ever closer union” producing a federal country that would become a new superpower.	但是最近的一些事件却宣告了欧洲一体化——即建立一个会成为超级强权的全新联邦国家的“前所未有的紧密联盟”的说法的终结。


That vision, however, was not in the cards even before the recent setbacks.	然而，即使没有最近的一系列挫折，这个说法也难以实现。


Once the original six core countries began to expand to include northern, southern, and, most recently, eastern European countries, the old federal vision was doomed.	一旦欧盟六个中心创始国开始扩张欧盟以吸纳北欧、南欧以及最近加入的东欧国家，联邦国家的陈旧说法就注定失败。


The constitution was designed to make a Europe of 25 members more efficient, not produce a strong federal state.	宪法是为了使一个拥有25个成员国的欧盟变得更有效率，而不是产生一个强大的联邦制国家。


Chirac’s rhetoric often includes references to a “multi-polar world” in which the United States is no longer the only superpower.	希拉克的言辞中经常提到一个美国不再是唯一超级霸权的“多极世界”。


A recent Pew poll found that many Europeans have lost their attraction to the US and would like Europe to play a larger role in world politics.	最近的佩尤民意调查发现，许多欧洲人已经失去了对美国的兴趣并且希望欧洲在世界政治中扮演更重要的角色。


But even if America has lost some of its attractive “soft power,” Europe’s post-industrial publics are not willing to pay the price – a doubling or tripling of defense spending as a share of GDP – to invest in the military power that would be required to balance its hard power.	但是即使美国已经失去其一部分有魅力的“软力量”，处于后工业社会的欧洲公民们也不愿意为用于平衡欧洲硬力量的军事力量所需的投资付钱，这笔款项将占国内生产总值（GDP）内国防经费的两倍或三倍。


Even so, the picture for Europe is not as bleak as pessimists assume.	即使是这样，欧洲的前景也不像悲观主义者所设想的那样黯淡。


Power in world politics today is distributed like a three-dimensional chess game that is played vertically as well as horizontally.	当今世界政治的力量分布就宛若一个三维国际象棋，阡陌纵横。


On the top board of military relations among states, the US is the world’s only superpower with global reach.	在军事力量的顶层棋盘上，美国是世界唯一具备影响全球能力的超级霸权。


Europe or China are unlikely to overtake the Americans in the next two decades.	欧洲和中国难以在今后二十年内赶超美国。


Here the world is uni-polar.	在这里，世界还是单极的。


On the middle board of economic relations, the world is already multi-polar.	在经济关系的中层棋盘上，全球已经化为多极局面。


This is the board where Europe acts as a union, and other countries like Japan and China play significant roles.	在这个棋盘上，欧洲以一个联盟身份行动，其他诸如日本和中国等国也发挥着举足轻重的作用。


The US cannot reach a trade agreement or settle anti-trust cases without the approval of the EU Commission.	美国无法在欧盟委员会（EU Commission）不赞成的情形下达成某个贸易协议或解决某个反垄断案例。


Just recently, after the World Trade Organization ruled in favor of a European complaint, the US Congress had to rewrite billions of dollars of tax legislation.	就在最近，在世贸组织赞同欧洲的诉讼后，美国国会不得不以几十亿美元的代价修改税法。


This hardly fits the description of a uni-polar world.	这完全不符合单极世界的特性。


The bottom board includes transnational relations that cross borders outside the control of governments – everything from drugs to infectious diseases to climate change to transnational terrorism.	棋盘的底层包括政府控制之外、超越边疆的跨国关系——从毒品到传染病到气候变化到跨国恐怖主义等每件事情。


On this board, power is distributed chaotically among non-state actors.	在这个棋盘上，各种力量无序地分布于各个非国家行动组织中。


No government can control outcomes without the cooperation of others.	没有政府能够在不与其他政府合作的情况下控制结果。


Here the US needs the help of Europeans, and it makes no sense to call this world uni-polar, either.	在这里，美国需要欧洲人的帮助，把这个世界称为单极世界也同样毫无道理。


On this bottom board, the degree of close civilian cooperation is also important, which is affected by a country’s attractiveness or soft power.	在这个底层棋盘中，同样至关重要的还有民间合作的紧密程度，它受到国家吸引力或软力量的直接影响。


Here European countries are well endowed, having overcome centuries of animosity and developing a large successful market.	在这里欧洲国家表现良好，他们克服了几个世纪以来彼此之间的仇恨并发展了一个巨大且成功的市场。


One danger of the recent setbacks is a halt to EU enlargement.	最近的挫折所带来的一个危险就是欧盟扩张停滞不前。


At the Cold War’s end, East European countries did not try to form local alliances, as they did in the 1920’s, but looked toward Brussels as the magnet for their futures.	冷战末期，东欧国家并没有像他们在1920年代所做的那样试图形成一个当地联盟，而是把欧共体总部看作吸引他们未来的磁场。


Similarly, countries like Turkey and Ukraine have adjusted their policies because they are attracted to Europe.	同样地，诸如土耳其、乌克兰等国也调整了他们的政策，因为他们也被欧洲所吸引。


The loss of soft power implied by rejection of further enlargement would be a setback for Europe, the Balkans, and international stability.	对进一步扩张的反对之声所暗示的软力量缺失对欧洲、巴尔干半岛地区和国际稳定而言，都是一个大挫。


What will the EU do next?	欧盟下一步该如何走呢？


Some counsel retreating to the original six countries as an inner core that creates a federation within the larger union.	一些人建议，应该重回以六个创始国作为内部中心、在更大联盟内建立一个联邦制的状态。


This approach appeals to those who think that the French and Dutch referendums were a rejection of the British liberal economic model.	这个方法吸引了一部分人，这些人认为法国和荷兰的公民投票是对英国自由经济模式的反对。


But that diagnosis is suspect, because polls show that many who voted “non” were objecting to Chirac and/or to high rates of unemployment.	但是这个分析颇有可疑之处，因为民意测验表明，那些许多投反对票的人反对希拉克并/或对居高不下的失业率心存不满。


Turning backward and inward to the original six EU members is unlikely to meet such concerns, and augurs poorly for the liberalization of labor markets that Europe’s economies need to get moving.	退回到欧盟创始六国的状态不可能解决这些顾虑，对欧洲经济需要再接再厉的劳力市场自由化进程也无甚好处。


A better path for the EU is to show that Europe still works.	对欧盟而言，更好的办法是表现出欧洲依然有用。


This means a compromise on a new budget that curtails some of the expenditure on the common agricultural policy and devotes funds to integrating the new members who joined last year.	这意味着对新预算进行妥协，该预算将削减一部分共同农业政策的支出并将资金用于对去年新加入的成员国的一体化进程上。


It also means carrying on with the important role that Europe plays in foreign policy such as attracting Serbia to reach agreement on the future status of Kosovo, or continuing efforts to persuade Iran to give up its plans for the enrichment of uranium.	这也意味着继续欧洲在外交政策中所扮演的重要角色，诸如说服塞尔维亚在科索沃的未来地���上达成一致，或者继续劝说伊朗放弃其浓缩铀计划。


Equally important will be to press ahead with the Doha round of WTO trade talks, and to follow through with past commitments regarding aid to Africa.	同样重要的还有加紧世贸组织多哈回合的谈判，并把过去对非洲实行援助的承诺坚持到底。


Eventually, after the dust has settled, it may be possible to reach inter-governmental agreements to tidy up some of the institutional arrangements that would have been settled if the new constitution had been approved.	最终，在尘埃落定之后，才有可能在各政府之间达成协议以共同理清某些在新宪法条约通过之前应该解决的制度管理问题。


Such a practical, effective EU may not reach the lofty rhetorical aspirations beloved by politicians, but it will not be moribund.	这样一个实际高效的欧盟也许不会达到政治家们惯用的华藻辞令中所称的雄伟期望，但是它却不会被淘汰。


On the contrary, such a Europe has a lot to gain for itself as well as to contribute to the rest of the world.	相反，这样一个欧洲不仅能为世界其他国家作出贡献，也能为自己赢得很多。


Europe\u0027s Obama Challenge	奥巴马带给欧洲的挑战


PARIS – Will the year 2009 and the beginning of Barack Obama’s presidency mark the beginning of a new era in transatlantic relations, or will the old divisions linger, nurtured by the depth and gravity of the economic crisis?	巴黎—2009年和巴拉克·奥巴马开始担任总统会标志着跨大西洋关系开始进入一个新时代吗？ 或者经济危机的纵深度和严重性会让过去的分裂徘徊不去？


Will the crisis lead to nationalistic and selfish attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic, stymieing the long-awaited rapprochement, if not a full reconciliation?	这一危机将会使大西洋两岸出现民族主义的和只顾自己的态度，阻碍期待已久的关系好转吗？ 如果不是完全恢复这种关系的话？


It is, of course, too early to tell.	当然，要下定论还为时过早。


Even if the left wing of the European left – like the most liberal of America’s Democrats – voices concerns that Obama has selected a far too centrist cabinet, a classical form of anti-Americanism is bound to recede in Europe.	即使欧洲左派中的左翼—相当于美国民主党中最自由的派别—表示担心奥巴马已经选定了一个过于温和的内阁，反美国主义的传统形式也必然在欧洲暂停。


It is very unlikely that Europeans will take to the streets to denounce the “essence” of the United States – what America is as much as what America does – as they did during the Bush era and even during the Clinton years.	欧洲人几乎不可能走上街头去谴责美国的“本质”（即美国是什么和美国在干什么），而在布什时代甚至克林顿时代他们就这样做了。


America’s image in Europe has changed profoundly since November 4, and the style of Obama’s diplomacy once he becomes president will probably confirm that change.	自从11月4日以来，美国在欧洲的形象已经大变，而一旦奥巴马接任总统，他的外交风格可能还会巩固这种变化。


Yet in the realm of transatlantic relations, as is true globally, it is unwise to expect too much from a single man, whatever his exceptional qualities.	但在大西洋两岸的关系领域过多地指望一个人，无论他有多少独特之处，都是不明智的。 这也同样适用于全球关系。


Fundamental problems remain, and new ones are likely to emerge.	根本性的问题依然还在，新的问题也可能发生。


First, whatever the brutal style of the new Russia under Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev, the Soviet Union no longer exists and no longer constitutes the common threat that was the “glue” of the Alliance until 1989.	首先，无论在弗拉基米尔·普金和德米特里·梅德维杰夫治下的新俄罗斯行事多么蛮横，苏联已经不复存在，也不再构成对欧美的共同威胁，这种威胁直到1989年都把欧美黏在一起。


Unless something very wrong happens, a new cold war is not about to start.	除非发生了相当离谱的事，新的冷战不会开始。


Second, there is a continuing structural imbalance between the way Europe looks at America, i.e., with passion and concern, and the way America looks at Europe, i.e., with mild interest giving way to growing indifference.	第二，欧洲和美国看待彼此的方式之间存在一种持续的结构失衡：欧洲带着热情关注美国，而美国对欧洲兴趣一般，而且越来越不关心。


During the Cold War, Europe was America’s first line of defense.	冷战时期，欧洲曾是美国的第一道防线。


In the current global age, Asia, the Middle East, and even maybe Africa will constitute greater priorities for the US.	而在当下的全球时代，美国将优先考虑亚洲，中东，甚至可能是非洲。


Third, even if America under Obama praises and even practices multilateralism, Americans are far from ready to accept the reality of a multi-polar world.	第三，即使奥巴马治下的美国提出，甚至施行多边主义，美国人也远远没有准备好接受一个多极的世界。


They may write about it conceptually, but its meaning – a world in which their country is only “primus inter pares” – has not really penetrated the national psyche.	他们可能会就它的概念写些东西，但是它的含义—在这个世界中他们的国家仅仅是“资格最老的那个” —并没有真正深入这个国家的精神。


America’s internationalism remains grounded in the idea of American “exceptionalism” – a unique role and sense of mission.	美国的国际主义建立在“美国例外论”的观念上，事关一种独特的角色和使命感。


It is an approach to the world with which Europeans have great difficulty coming to terms.	这种处理世界问题的方法很难让欧洲人妥协接受。


Even with Obama as president, they may be quick to denounce the combination of arrogance and hypocrisy that they see as linked to America’s view of her “special and unique mission.”	即使由奥巴马担任总统，他们也可能很快就交织在一起的傲慢和伪善发起谴责，这在他们看来是和美国“特殊又独特的使命”联系在一起的。


Fourth, if US diplomacy changes in style and content, will Europe be ready to face the challenge when America calls for help?	第四，如果美国的外交在形式和内容上发生变化，在美国要求帮助的时候，欧洲准备好应对挑战了吗？


One early test is likely to be Afghanistan, when a smiling but firm Obama turns to Europe and says directly: “You have backed me in immense numbers.	先期考验可能事关阿富汗：奥巴马微笑而坚决地直接表示：“你们已经很支持我了。


I thank you for it.	我谢谢你们。


But now I do not need your symbolic votes; I need your concrete support.	但是现在我不需要你们象征性的投票，我需要你们具体的援助。


I need the further engagement of your troops in Afghanistan!”	我需要你们的部队更多地介入阿富汗。 ”


I suspect that European leaders will not respond eagerly.	我怀疑欧洲领袖不会做出激烈反应。


Most are convinced that there is no military solution in Afghanistan and they know that public opinion, especially in time of great economic hardship, has no appetite for such operations.	大多数人都被说服接受阿富汗的问题不能用军事解决，他们也知道公众没有兴趣开展这样的行动，尤其是在经济极其困难的时期。


Europeans have a traditional tendency to denounce American military adventurism while relying on the US as their protector.	欧洲人有倾向于既谴责美国的军事冒险主义又依赖美国保护的传统。


Fifth, to these “old” problems one must add a new one: the likely impact on transatlantic relations of the worst financial crisis in decades.	第五，“老”问题之外我们必须加上一个新问题： 好几十年来最严重的金融危机可能对大西洋两岸关系造成的影响。


Protectionism in the classical sense of the term is unlikely. We have learned the lessons of 1929.	不可能是传统意义上的保护主义，因为我们已经汲取了1929年的教训。


But public subsidies to “national champions” may prove to be as destabilizing for the climate of international cooperation as tariff barriers were in the past.	但是向“龙头产业”提供公众援助可能被证实会对国际合作氛围造成破坏，就像关税壁垒过去所做的那样。


The temptation to “appease” suffering populations with populist, selfish measures may grow as the crisis deepens.	随着危机深入，使用民粹主义的利己措施来“安抚”受苦民众的诱惑可能会加剧。


Paradoxically, too, the “greening” of America – an America that discovers late but with passion its responsibility for the planet’s survival – may lead to a competitive transatlantic race for first prize in ecological good behavior.	自相矛盾之处还在于，一个“变绿”的美国—一个虽然晚了些才发现自己在地球幸存中的责任，却满怀热情的美国—可能会使得大西洋两岸竞相争取在生态保护中力拔头筹。


And one could multiply the subjects of possible tensions, from nuclear disarmament – too much for the French, too little for many others – to the best ways to deal with Iran, Russia, and China.	有可能发生的冲突还可以成倍增加，从核裁军—法国裁得太多，其他国家太少���到和伊朗，俄罗斯和中国打交道的最佳方法。


The essential issue lies elsewhere.	还有其他很重要的事情。


For Europe, the election of Barack Obama is a crucial test.	对于欧洲而言，巴拉克·奥巴马当选是一场至关重要的考验。


Will Europe rise to the occasion and seize the opportunity created by America’s daring and exhilarating choice to prove to itself and to the world that the old continent can exist as a power and a united actor?	欧洲能否相时而动，抓住机会（这是由美国做出勇敢热情的选择而创造出来的），从而向它自己和世界证明，老欧洲依然能够作为一种政治力量和一个统一的整体存在呢？


Fiscal Austerity Versus European Society	财政紧缩与欧洲社会


WASHINGTON, DC – Over the last five years, the eurozone has, without explicit popular consent, maintained a strict policy focus on fiscal austerity and structural reforms – despite serious social repercussions, not only in the Mediterranean periphery and Ireland, but even in a “core" European Union country like France.	华盛顿—在过去五年中，在没有明确的群众支持的情况下，欧元区的政策焦点严格地集中于财政紧缩和结构改革上——尽管这掀起了巨大的社会反弹，不仅在地中海周边和爱尔兰是如此，甚至在法国等欧盟“核心”国家也是如此。


Unless eurozone leaders rethink their approach, the radical Syriza party's success in Greece's recent general election could turn out to be just one more step toward a future of social fragmentation and political instability in Europe.	除非欧元区领导人反思这一方针，否则极端政党左翼联盟（Syriza）在最近的希腊大选中获胜将只是欧洲滑向社会分裂和政治动荡过程中的一小步。


Or it could mark the beginning of a realistic and beneficial re-orientation of Europe's economic strategy.	或者它也可以标志着务实而有益的欧洲经济战略再转向的开端。


Of course, fiscal sustainability is vital to prevent a disruptive debt refinancing and inspire confidence among investors and consumers.	当然，财政稳定是防止破坏性债务重组、激发投资者和消费者信心的关键。


But there is no denying that it is much easier to support fiscal austerity when one is wealthy enough not to rely on public services or be at serious risk of becoming mired in long-term unemployment.	但不可否认，当你足够富裕因此不必依赖公共政策或者面临长期失业的巨大风险时，支持财政紧缩会容易得多。


(The wealthy also remain largely in control of the media, the public discourse, and cross-border capital flows.)	（富人还掌握着媒体、公共话语权和跨国资本流。 ）


For the millions of workers – and especially young people – with no job prospects, fiscal sustainability simply cannot be the only priority.	对数百万工人来说——特别是年轻人——没有工作前景，财政可持续性就不可能成为仅有的优先考虑项。


When unemployment benefits are slashed, they are the ones who suffer.	当失业救济大幅减少时，他们就会沦为受害者。


And when budget cuts extend to education, it is their children who are unable to gain the skills they need to reach their future potential.	而当预算削减影响到教育时，他们的孩子就无法获得实现未来潜力所需要的技能。


Austerity-induced suffering is particularly extreme in Greece.	紧缩导致的痛苦在希腊尤为极端。


Severe pension cuts are preventing the elderly from living out their lives with dignity.	大量养老金削减让老年人无法有尊严地安享晚年。


A large burden has been placed on those who actually pay their taxes, while many – often the wealthiest, who long ago stashed their money abroad – continue to evade their obligations.	大量负担落到了实际缴税的人身上，而许多人——通常是最富有人群，他们早就开始将钱移往国外——继续逃避着义务。


Health care has lapsed, with many cancer patients losing access to life-saving treatment.	医疗崩溃，许多癌症患者无法获得救命治疗。


Suicides are on the rise.	自杀率也在攀升。


Yet Greece's creditors have continued to ignore these developments.	但希腊债权人继续忽视这些趋势。


This is clearly not sustainable – a point that former Director of the International Monetary Fund's Europe Department Reza Moghadam recognized when he recently called for writing off half of Greece's debt, provided an agreement can be reached on credible growth-enhancing structural reforms.	这显然是不可持续的——前国际货币基金组织（IMF）欧洲部门主管莫哈丹（Reza Hoghadam）认识到了这一点，他最近呼吁减记一半希腊债务，只要能够形成可信的促增长结构性改革协议。


Social sustainability is essential for long-term economic success.	社会可持续性对长期经济成功来说至关重要。


A country cannot prosper if its educational system lacks the resources and capacity to prepare its children to thrive in the digital economy.	如果教育体系缺少资源和能力让儿童做好在数字经济中实现繁荣的准备，一国就不可能繁荣。


Likewise, a reform program cannot be implemented if inequality, poverty, and social frustration strengthen extremist political parties, such as Greece's overtly fascist Golden Dawn party or France's far-right, anti-Europe National Front, which now boasts 25% electoral support.	类似地，如果不平等性、贫困和社会不满强化了极端主义政党——如公然宣扬法西斯主义的希腊金色黎明党（Golden Dawn）和极右翼的反欧洲政党法国国民阵线（National Front，目前已获得25%的选举支持率）——改革方案就无法实施。


When times are tough, immigrants and minorities become easy targets.	世道艰难时，移民和少数群体很容易成为目标。


As Joseph Stiglitz recently pointed out, it is unlikely that Hitler would have come to power in Germany if the unemployment rate was not 30% at the time.	约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨（Joseph Stiglitz）最近指出，如果当年德国失业率没有高大30%，希特勒就不会上台。


It does not help when some of those trapped in the poor ghettos surrounding major cities – however small a minority – become tempted by violence and fall prey to terrorist recruiters.	大城市周边的贫民区的一些人——不管他们人数多么少——被暴力所引诱加入恐怖组织也绝不可能是是件好事。


Regardless of what today's corporate profit reports and stock indices may show, a country cannot achieve inclusive, sustainable success – in economic or human terms – if these fundamental social issues are not adequately addressed.	不管今天公司利润报告和股市指数表现多好，如果这些基本社会问题得不到正确的解决，一国就无法实现包容性可持续成功——不管在经济上还是在人道角度上。


Of course, fiscal caution cannot be abandoned; after all, if governments or the private sector were to spend borrowed or newly minted money freely, the result would simply be more crises, which would hurt the poor most.	当然，也不能放弃财政谨慎； 毕竟，如果政府或私人部门可以自由使用借来或新印出来的钱，结果肯定是更多的危机，而受危机冲击最大的正是穷人。


But social sustainability must be an integral part of a country's economic program, not an afterthought.	但社会可持续性必须成为一国经济计划的一部分，而不是事后再去考虑的东西。


The persistent tendency to pay lip service to social sustainability, while implementing economic programs focused on unrelenting austerity, is a leading cause of political instability in Europe.	在社会可持续性问题上一直打嘴炮，而真正实施的经济计划对紧缩毫不放松，这就是欧洲政治动荡的主要因素。


Though reform programs aimed at building viable macroeconomic frameworks remain essential, they must include strong provisions for countercyclical policies to offset the “paradox of thrift" (the tendency to save more during a recession, undermining economic growth).	尽管旨在构建可行宏观经济框架的改革计划仍然至关重要，但它们必须包括强大的反周期政策内容以抵消“节俭悖论”（在衰退期储蓄更多、破坏经济增长的倾向）。


When aggregate demand falls short of aggregate supply, governments must increase public spending.	当总需求落后于总供给时，政府应该增加公共支出。


Moreover, governments that are now focused narrowly on microeconomic issues need to devote the same level of attention and commitment to designing and implementing social policies that focus explicitly on ensuring the livelihoods, health, education, and housing of the most vulnerable segments of the population.	此外，现在狭隘地专注于微观经济问题的政府需要以同样程度的注意力和精力用于制定和实施明确专注于确保人口中最脆弱群体的民生、卫生、教育和住房问题的社会政策。


And, using new technology to analyze large amounts of data, they should boost the efficiency of social programs, while encouraging the active participation of concerned citizens.	此外，通过使用新技术分析大数据，它们还可以增加社会计划的效果，同时鼓励相关公民的积极参与。


The European Commission and the IMF have admitted their errors – not only the inaccurate macroeconomic forecasts on which the Greek program was based, but also the decision not to account for social sustainability – and have acknowledged that the program has not produced the expected results.	欧盟委员会和IMF已经承认了错误——不但包括作为希腊计划依据的不准确的宏观经济预测，也包括不考虑社会可持续性的决定——并且承认了它们的计划没有产生预期效果。


Yet, for some reason, Greece's creditors refuse to negotiate with the new government (which enjoys strong domestic support) to develop a new program that incorporates debt relief, a lower fiscal surplus, and structural reforms that support growth and promote social cohesion.	但是，出于某些原因，希腊债权人拒绝与（国内支持率极高的）新政府谈判制定包括债务纾困、降低财政盈余和支持增长和促进社会凝聚力的结构改革在内的新计划。


This must not continue.	决不能放任这一状况继续下去。


The last five years have underscored the challenge of achieving financial stability.	过去五年彰显出实现金融稳定的挑战。


But political and social stability have proved to be even more elusive.	但政治和社会稳定更加难以获得。


Policymakers must direct just as much effort and resources toward realizing social sustainability as they do toward getting the Basel III financial reforms right.	决策者必须将同样多的精力和资源用于实现社会可持续性，一如他们在确保巴塞尔III金融改革一样。


Europe's future prosperity – and its global role – depends on it.	欧洲的未来繁荣——及其全球角色——取决于此。


Europe’s Opportunity in Hollande	奥朗德给欧洲带来的机会


BRUSSELS – Rarely has an election resonated so widely across the European Union as the French presidential ballot has done.	布鲁塞尔—很少有哪次选举如同此次法国总统竞选那样在整个欧盟引起如此深刻的共振。


Rarely has a leadership change in one EU member state created expectations of a real policy shift.	很少有哪次欧盟成员国领导人变化如此次引起人们对实际政策变迁的猜想。


Remarkably, a new European demos and public sphere are emerging from the economic crisis.	全新的欧洲样板和公共氛围正在经济危机中形成，这一点颇为引人注目。


Europeans are recognizing how interdependent they are.	欧洲人正在认识到他们有多么互相依赖。


One country’s failures can threaten the entire European economy, and can call into question the fruits of 60 years of integration.	一个国家的失败可以威胁到整个欧洲经济，可以引起人们对欧洲60年一体化成果的质疑。


Peace, solidarity, and prosperity are not irreversible achievements; only 27 countries working together can guarantee them.	和平、团结和繁荣不再是不可逆转的成就； 只有27个国家同心共力才能保证这些成就。


François Hollande’s victory is a fresh chance for Europe.	奥朗德的获胜对欧洲来说是一次全新的机会。


It should spell the end of a policy oriented exclusively towards austerity, which has paralyzed our economies and divided the EU. The new French president’s commitment to a European growth policy has brought hope to citizens, and should not alarm anyone – certainly not the financial markets.	它可以称为一根筋紧缩政策的终结，正是这一政策阻碍了我们的经济、让欧盟陷于分裂。 法国新总统承诺采取欧洲增长措施给公民带来了希望，应该也不会让任何人感到紧张——至少金融市场肯定不会。


Hollande’s plans for a growth initiative fall on fertile ground, especially in the European Parliament, which has repeatedly called for such measures.	奥朗德的增长计划拥有雄厚的支持基础，特别是在再三呼吁如此行动的欧洲议会中。


I am delighted that this message is increasingly echoed by the political mainstream, including most recently by European Central Bank President Mario Draghi.	我很高兴地看到，这一信号正在得到越来越多的政治主流的响应，包括欧洲央行行长德拉吉。


Likewise, the European Commission is working on a “growth pact” to be discussed by EU leaders in June.	类似地，欧洲委员会正在制定“增长公约”，将于6月提交欧盟领导人讨论。


Indeed, Europe needs a master plan to avoid a tailspin of recession, growing unemployment, and weakening banking systems.	事实上，欧洲需要一个整体计划以免蹈衰退深化、失业增加和银行系统进一步疲软之辙。


A new master plan for growth would not be about printing money.	新的增长整体计划将不再是开动印钞机。


Fiscal discipline remains essential, as are deep structural reforms.	财政纪律依然重要，深度结构性改革亦然。


The growth pact can be properly financed by new sources of revenue, such as a financial-transaction tax and joint project bonds for infrastructure investment, or by curbing tax evasion and tax fraud and eliminating tax havens, as well as by more efficient and intelligent use of structural funds.	新增长公约可以通过新的收入源得到合适的融资，比如金融交易税和基础设施投资合作项目债权，或者减少偷税漏税和税收欺诈并取消避税港，还可以考虑更高效、更巧妙地使用结构性资金。


What is to be done?	那么，需要怎么做？


First, targeted investment should be given priority.	首先，定向投资应该作为优先事项。


The European Investment Bank would be a good vehicle – in addition to new project bonds – to boost spending on major infrastructure projects (for example, in the energy sector).	欧洲投资银行是很好的平台，可以（辅之以新的项目债券）刺激重大基础设施项目的支出（比如能源部门）。


The EIB could be given significantly more resources to boost its loan programs.	可以大幅增强欧洲央行的资金源，以提振其贷款项目。


In the longer-term, we should revisit the idea of joint Eurobonds.	从长期看，我们应该重新考虑联合欧元债券的方案。


Channeling EU structural funds towards innovation is essential, given that spending on research and development is alarmingly low compared to our global partners.	将欧盟结构性资金导向创新领域是很重要的，因为与我们的全球伙伴比起来，我们在研发方面的支出之少足以引起警惕。


Fundamental reform of the Common Agricultural Policy should not remain a taboo.	共同农业政策（Common Agricultural Policy）的基本改革不应该是禁区。


Indeed, the CAP is ensuring neither sustainable agriculture nor decent incomes for all farmers.	事实上，基本农业政策既不能保证可持续农业，也不能给全体农民带来体面的收入。


Undoubtedly, tough negotiations lie ahead on this front, including with Hollande.	毫无疑问，在这一领域需要进行艰难的谈判过程，奥朗德便是一块难啃的骨头


Second, young people must be a top priority.	其次，必须优先考虑年轻人。


Our responsibility here is twofold: to put growth back on track, but also to respond immediately to the human tragedy that has hit our youth.	在这个问题上，我们的责任是双重的：让增长重回轨道，同时对冲击我们的年轻人的人道危机做出迅速反应。


The eurozone’s unemployment rate, at 10.9%, is at its highest level since the euro was introduced, and young people everywhere, as the first to suffer the consequences of the crisis, are paying a disproportionally high price.	目前欧元区失业率为10. 9%，为采用欧元以来的最高值，而各国年轻人更是首当危机之冲，承受着不成比例的压力。


Youth unemployment in Spain, for example, is above 50%.	比如，西班牙的青年失业率已经超过了50%。


We cannot afford to sacrifice a generation, or, rather, risk creating a lost generation that could destroy Europe’s social fabric and stability.	我们不能牺牲一代人，或者说，我们不能冒制造可能摧毁欧洲社会结构和稳定的失落的一代的风险。


We need an immediate contingency plan: invest to finance job training, improve educational opportunities, and, crucially, create incentives for employers to hire young people.	我们需要立刻启动应急预案：投资职业培训，改善教育机会，以及（最重要的）创造雇主雇用年轻人的激励。


The ECB has been offering long-term loans to banks at a favorable rate.	欧洲央行一直在以优惠利率向银行提供长期贷款。


This money should be loaned out to small and medium-size enterprises, which are the lifeblood of Europe’s economy.	这笔钱应该贷给中小企业，它们才是欧洲经济的生命线。


The EU also needs common initiatives to replace piece-meal bilateral agreements on tax evasion and tax havens, which undermine the goal of a fair society.	欧盟还应该用共同行动代替零敲碎打的双边税收优惠和避税港协议，这些协议不利于公平社会的目标。


Third, member states should not cut the EU budget indiscriminately during negotiations on the Union's long-term spending plan for 2014-2020.	第三，在欧盟2014—2020长期支出计划谈判中，成员国不应该不问青红皂白地削减欧���预算。


If we are serious about a master plan for growth, we need to provide the necessary means.	如果我们认真考虑整体增长计划，就需要拿出必要的手段。


The EU budget is an investment vehicle that boosts economic growth and creates jobs.	欧盟预算是一个投资平台，可以提振经济增长、创造就业岗位。


It finances crucial pan-EU transport and energy links. It helps to foster innovation and boost research and development.	欧盟预算为至关重要的泛欧盟运输和能源供应线提供融资，也有助于促进创新、刺激研发。


The EU budget leverages investment, allows for economies of scale, and cannot run a deficit.	欧盟预算为投资提供杠杆，有助于形成规模经济，而且不能有赤字。


The EU’s lack of solidarity, imagination, courage, unity, and vision in recent years has made Europe a symbol of division for some, if not many.	近几年来，欧盟一直缺少团结、想象力、勇气、统一和远见，以至于不少人（如果不是很多人的话）将欧洲视为分裂的典型。


We cannot let this continue.	我们不能再坐视这一幕发展下去了。


Hollande’s election offers us a valuable opportunity to meet the challenges that the EU faces.	奥朗德的当选对我们来说是一次良机，可以抓住它来应对欧盟所面临的挑战。


Alternatively, we can allow growing poverty, fear, and anger to give rise to xenophobia and racism, and thus place at risk the EU’s greatest accomplishments.	要不然的话，我们就将放任贫困、恐惧和愤怒的滋生，培养出排外主义和种族主义，从而让欧盟最伟大的成就陷入危机。


But let us be optimistic.	但我们不妨乐观一点。


It is not too late.	现在行动为时未晚。


Europe can still emerge stronger from its current economic woes. The EU is changing direction at last, and Europe’s leaders will find an energetic partner in the European Parliament.	欧洲仍可以从当前的经济乱象中站起来变得更强。 欧盟终于开始改变方向，而欧中领导人可以在欧洲议会找到强有力的合作伙伴。


Europe’s Paradoxical Parliament	欧洲的矛盾议会


What do members of the European Parliament (MEPs) actually do?	欧洲议会议员们（MEP）实际上都在做些什么？


Most of the 375 million or so people eligible to vote in the European elections on June 4-7 probably have only a hazy idea, or none at all, which explains why voter turnout throughout the European Union is likely to be disastrously low.	将在6月4号至7号举行的欧洲议会选举中有资格投票的三亿七千五百万选民中，大多数人可能只有一个朦胧的 概念，甚至根本没有任何概念。 这就解释了为什么整个欧盟的投票率有可能低至灾难性的程度。


Thirty years ago, when the first elections to the parliament were held, almost two-thirds of the electorate voted, but over the years, participation has dropped steadily.	而30年前，当第一次议会举行选举时，有将近三分之二的选民参加了投票，但这些年来，投票率却节节下降。


This year it may be 30%.	今年可能只有30 ％ 。


Europe’s politicians are by and large proud of the EU and the way it has both grown and deepened.	欧洲的政治家们对欧盟及其扩展和深化的方式基本上是感到自豪的。


But it is also the EU’s growing complexity that is at the root of voters’ waning enthusiasm, so their indifference is a matter for serious concern.	但是，正是欧盟变得日益复杂的情况成了选民热情减弱的根源，所以他们的冷漠应该引起严重的关注。


The European elections are themselves curious and unsatisfactory; there are no obvious EU-wide issues that people can vote for or against, and, with the average MEP’s constituency numbering well over half a million people, the vote is not a test of personal popularity, either.	欧洲选举本身就古怪并不能令人满意，也没有明显的欧盟范围的问题让人们可以投票赞成或反对，而每个欧洲议会议员的平均选民人数远远超过50万人，投票也不是对个人声望的测试。


In most parts of Europe, the elections will be an opportunity for protest votes on national issues.	在欧洲大部分地区，选举将是一个对国家问题投抗议票的机会。


Paradoxically, though, great deal hangs on the elections’ outcome.	奇怪的是，选举结果却会产生重要的作用。


The number of seats won by the socialists and centre-right parties is likely to influence the make-up of the next European Commission – and thus the EU’s political agenda until 2014.	社会党和中间偏右政党赢得的席位数可能会影响下届欧洲联盟委员会 的组成-因此，也会影响2014年前的欧盟政治议程。


But you wouldn’t know this from the low level of media interest.	但仅从媒体对此的聊无兴趣上，你是不会知道这一点的。


Most journalists, like national electorates, have little understanding of the significant shift in Europe’s political decision-making over the last 20 years.	和国内选民一样，大多数新闻工作者根本不知道在过去的20年中欧洲的政治决策发生了重大改变。


They hang on to the outdated notion that their national parliaments make all key decisions, when in reality some four-fifths of the policies that determine Europe’s future are taken in Brussels and then rubber-stamped by national parliamentarians.	他们还相信过时的观念，即本国议会作出所有重要决定。 但现实中决定欧洲未来的五分之四的决策是在布鲁塞尔作出的，然后由橡皮图章形式经各国家的议员通过。


A glance at any EU member state’s parliamentary calendar shows that lawmaking there is largely confined to domestic issues.	只要看一看任何欧盟成员 国的议会日程，就知道它们的立法主要限于国内的问题。


The specialist MEPs, on the other hand, use their expertise and their steadily increasing powers to exert a good deal of influence on EU legislation.	而另一方面，作为专家的欧洲议会议员们，利用他们的专业知识和不断增加的权力对欧盟施加影响。


But this does not mean that the European Parliament is a “real” parliament.	但是，这并不意味着，欧洲议会是一个“真正的”议会。


It can’t raise taxes, declare war, or sack a government (even though in theory it can dismiss all the members of the European Commission en masse, the so-called “nuclear option” that is unlikely ever to be used).	它既不能征税，也不能对外宣战或解散政府（即使在理论上它可以集体解散欧盟委员会的所有成员，即所谓的“核选择”，而这是不太可能被采用的） 。


More to the point, perhaps, the European Parliament doesn’t really work on the same basis of left-right politics as national parliaments do; it deals in practicalities more than ideologies.	也许，更重要的是，欧洲议会并不象各国议会一样真正在左派-右派政治的基础上运作;与其说它涉及意识形态方面还不如说它涉及的是实际的方面。


For all that, the European Parliament’s importance goes far beyond its members’ technical expertise on complex issues, or its usefulness as a democratic fig leaf for an EU decision-making process that is dominated by inter-governmental horse-trading.	尽管如此，欧洲议会的重要性远远超出其成员国的表面上对复杂问题的透彻理解，或作为欧盟决策过程中的民主遮羞布，这种过程主要被政府间的讨价还价所主宰。


The parliament has been able to claw greater power for itself because it is the only mechanism Europe has for questioning and challenging EU policy proposals, and ironing out the sometimes clumsy and high-handed diktats of Brussels’ officialdom.	议会已经能够掌握更大的权力，因为它是欧洲唯一的能对欧盟的政策建议提出质疑和挑战的机制，也能熨平布鲁塞尔官场上有时出现的笨拙的高压式命令。


Unfortunately, however, the European Parliament is fairly inept at selling itself to public opinion.	但不幸的是，欧洲议会在向舆论推销自己方面是相当无能的。


A recent Gallup poll showed that 36% of people questioned in all 27 EU countries no longer trust the parliament, with the only consolation being that even more, 37%, now mistrust the European Commission.	最近的一项盖洛普民意测验表明， 在所有27个欧盟国家中被访人中，有36 ％表示不再信任议会； 而唯一值得安慰的是，更大比例的被访者，即37 ％ 的人，现在也不信任欧盟委员会了。


Of those who said they wouldn’t be voting in this year’s European elections, 64% cited “lack of information” as the reason, with 62% complaining that their vote “wouldn’t change anything.”	在那些表示不会在今年的欧洲议会选举中投票的人中，有64 ％的人认为，“缺少信息”是他们做出此决定的原因，而有62 ％抱怨说他们的投票“不会促成任何改变 ”。


This feeling of ignorance coupled with powerlessness is not entirely the European Parliament’s fault.	这种无知加无力的感觉并不完全是欧洲议会的错。


The combination of high politics and grinding technical detail makes EU policymaking a much less interesting spectacle than national politics, and of course there’s the added problem that so many of the players are unknown foreigners.	高层政治和折磨人的技术细节使欧盟决策远远不如各成员国本国政治景象有趣，当然还加上另一个问 题，即如此多的议员都是不为人知的外国人。


But, even when the parliament does make an effort to connect with voters, the ponderous bureaucratic culture of its permanent officials tends to spoil things.	但是，即使议会努力和选民保持联系，议会的常任官员们所形成的冗长的官僚文化往往会把事情搞砸。


Last year, the parliament launched a lamentably amateurish Web-TV broadcasting service whose large budget was spent not on good programming but on doing everything in all the EU’s official languages.	去年，议会开始着手一种可悲的缺少专业精神的网络电视服 务，其庞大的预算支出没有放在好好做节目上，而是以欧盟官方语言办了一切事情。


So what is to be done?	那么，该怎么办呢？


Many of the 736 EU parliamentarians are unsung heroes who risk being seen more and more as a problem rather than a solution to the EU’s ills.	736名欧盟议员中的许多人越来越被视为是问题而不是解决欧盟弊病的无名英雄。


Rather than tinkering, perhaps the EU should boldly create an American-style bicameral system by turning the parliament into a House of Representatives and electing a Senate to replace the Council of Ministers, with two senators per member state.	也许欧盟应该 大胆地创造一个美国式的两院制议会，把欧洲议会变成众议院，并选举出一个参议院以取代部长会议，并由各会员国派两位参议员。


But that is probably far too revolutionary for an EU that took 50 years to fashion today’s unsatisfactorily hybrid decision-making structures.	但是，对于欧盟这个用了50年时间才形成今天这样的不能令人满意的杂交式的决策结构来说，这可能是过于革命性了。


Europe’s Power to Lead	欧洲的领导实力


CAMBRIDGE -- At this year’s World Economic Forum in Davos, the buzz was about Asia’s growing power.	剑桥--在今年的达沃斯世界经济论坛上，众人热议的话题是亚洲不断增长的实力。


One Asian analyst argued that by 2050, there will be three world powers: the United States, China, and India.	一位亚洲问题分析家指出，到2050年，世界将会有三大强权，也就是美国、中国和印度。


He did not mention Europe, but underestimating Europe’s power is a mistake.	他没有提到欧洲，但是低估欧洲的实力是一个错误。


Yes, Europe currently punches below its weight.	是的，欧洲目前确实是虎落平川。


It is fragmented, peaceful, and normative in a world of hard power, but part of the world is not about military power.	它现在各自为政，和平无事，并且在一个硬性实力的世界里确定标准，但是，世界还有一部分并非完全由军事实力左右。


The use of force among advanced industrial democracies is virtually unthinkable.	在先进工业化民主国家中使用武力几乎是难以想见的。


In their relations with each other , such countries are all from Venus, to paraphrase Robert Kagan, and here Europe’s focus on law and institutions is an asset.	借用罗伯特卡根的话来说，在彼此关系中，这些国家都来自金星，所以在这里欧洲集中于法律和机制是有利之处。


As for other parts of the world, a recent Pew poll found that many Europeans would like Europe to play a larger role, but to balance American military power would require a doubling or tripling of defense spending, and few Europeans are interested in such an increase.	对于世界其他地方而言，最近的一项皮尤调查显示，许多欧洲人想要让欧洲发挥更大的作用，但是，平衡美国的军事实力将会要求军费翻两番或者三番，而欧洲人很少对于这样的增加军费感兴趣。


Nevertheless, a smart strategy for Europe will require greater investments in hard power.	但是，欧洲的灵巧战略要求在硬性实力上更大的投资。


The picture for Europe, however, is not as bleak as pessimists assume.	但是，对于欧洲而言，形势并非如悲观派估计的那样暗淡。


Power is the ability to get the outcomes one wants, and the resources that produce such behavior depend upon the context.	所谓实力，就是达到想要达到的结果的能力，而产生这样行为的资源取决于环境。


In functional terms, power is distributed like a three-dimensional chess game.	在功能意义上，实力就像是一个三维象棋游戏棋盘一样分配。


On the top board are military relations among states, with the US the world’s only superpower with global reach.	在最高层是国家间的军事关系，而美国则是唯一拥有全球打击实力的超级大国。


Here the world is uni-polar.	在这一层面上世界是单级的。


On the middle board are economic relations, where the world is already multi-polar.	中间一层是经济关系，世界在这一层面已经是多极的了。


Here, Europe acts as a union, and other countries like Japan and China play big roles.	在这一层面，欧洲以一个联盟行事，而像中国、日本等国发挥重要作用。


The US cannot reach a trade agreement or settle anti-trust cases without the approval of the EU.	没有欧盟的同意，美国无法达成贸易协议或者和解托拉斯案件。


Or, to take another example, Europe was able to lead the drive to remove Paul Wolfowitz from the World Bank.	或者举另外一个例子，欧洲能够带领把沃尔弗维茨从世界银行总裁的位置上赶走。


The bottom chessboard includes transnational relations outside the control of governments – everything from drugs to infectious diseases to climate change to terrorism.	象棋棋盘最底层包括政府控制以外的跨国关系，这包括毒品、传染病、气候变化乃至恐怖主义等等。


On this board, power is chaotically distributed among non-state actors, and it makes no sense to call this world either uni-polar or multipolar.	在这一层面，实力混乱地分配于非国家参与者之间，把这一世界称为单级或者多极都是毫无意义的。


Here, close civilian cooperation is important, for which Europe is well endowed.	在这里，紧密的民间合作十分重要，欧洲在这一点上极有实力。


European countries’ success in overcoming centuries of animosity, and the development of a large internal market, has given them a great deal of soft power.	欧洲国家在克服几百年来敌对上的成功以及确立巨大的内部市场给了它们巨大的软实力。


At the Cold War’s end, East European countries did not try to form local alliances, as they did in the 1920’s, but looked toward Brussels to secure their future.	冷战结束时，东欧国家并不企图像二十年代那样组成地区联盟，而是放眼布鲁塞尔来寻求安定其前途。


Similarly, countries like Turkey and Ukraine have adjusted their policies in response to their attraction to Europe.	同样，像土耳其和乌克兰那样的国家已经针对欧洲对它们的吸引力调整了政策。


Recently, the US National Intelligence Council published four widely different scenarios for the world in 2020: Davos World, in which economic globalization continues, but with a more Asian face; Pax Americana, where the US continues to dominate the global order; New Caliphate, where Islamic religious identity challenges the dominance of western norms; and Cycle of Fear, in which non-state forces create shocks to security that produce Orwellian societies.	最近，美国国家情报委员会发布了世界在2020年四个迥然不同的可能局面。 第一是达沃斯世界，也就是经济全球化继续，但是亚洲份量更多。


Like any exercises in futurology, such scenarios have their limits, but they help us ask which three or four major political factors will help shape the outcome.	第四是恐惧循环，也就是非国家势力制造对安全的冲击而产生专制社会。 就像是未来学中的任何演习一样，这些推演存在局限，但是它们帮助我们探究哪三个或者四个政治因素将会帮助产生这样的结果。


The first is the rise of Asia.	首先是亚洲的崛起。


The big question will be China and its internal evolution.	中国及其内部演进将会是大问题。


China has lifted 400 million people out of poverty since 1990, but another 400 million still live on less than $2 per day.	从1990年以来，中国已经让四亿人口脱贫，但是还有四亿人口每天用不到两美元过活。


Unlike India, China has not solved the problem of political participation.	和印度不同，中国还没有解决政治参与的问题。


If China replaces its eroded communism with nationalism or ensure social cohesion, the result could be a more aggressive foreign policy and unwillingness to deal with issues like climate change.	如果中国用民族主义取代遭到侵蚀的共产主义或者确保社会凝聚，结果将会是更为侵犯性的外交政策并且不愿意处理类似气候变化那样的问题。


Or it may deal with its problems and become a “responsible stakeholder” in world politics.	或者，它会处理其问题并且成为世界政治中一个“负责任的利益相关者”。


Europe can contribute significantly to China’s integration into global norms and institutions.	欧洲可以为中国融入全球体制和机制做出重大贡献。


In general, Europe and the US have more to fear from a weak China than they do from a wealthy China.	通常而言，欧洲和美国对疲弱的中国的担心要胜过对富有���中国的担心。


Political Islam and how it develops will be the second factor.	政治伊斯兰及其如何发展将会是第二个因素。


The struggle against extreme Islamist terrorism is not a “clash of civilizations,” but a civil war within Islam.	反对极端伊斯兰恐怖主义的斗争并非是“文明的冲突”，而是伊斯兰内部的内战。


A radical minority is using violence to impose a simplified and ideological version on a mainstream with more diverse views.	一个极端少数派正在利用暴力来把简化和意识形态化的版本强加给具有更大多样性观点的主流人群头上。


While the largest number of Muslims live in Asia, they are influenced by the heart of this struggle in the Middle East, an area that has lagged behind the rest of the world in globalization, openness, institutions, and democratization.	绝大多数穆斯林生活在亚洲，他们受到发生在中东的这一斗争本质的影响。 中东地区在全球化、开放性、机制以及民主化上落后于世界其他地方。


Here Europe’s economic might and soft power have a lot to contribute.	在这里，欧洲的经济实力和软实力可以做出很大贡献。


More open trade, economic growth, education, development of civil society institutions, and gradual increases in political participation might help strengthen the mainstream over time, as could the way Muslims are treated in Europe and the US.	更为开放的贸易、经济增长、教育、发展公民社会机制以及逐步提高政治参与或许会长久以往帮助强化主流社会，正如穆斯林在欧洲和美国所受待遇一样。


Equally important will be whether Western policies toward the Middle East satisfy mainstream Muslims or reinforce the radicals’ narrative of a war against Islam.	同样重要的是，西方对中东的政策是否能够满足主流穆斯林或者强化极端份子有关针对伊斯兰战争的讲述。


The third major determinant of which scenario prevails will be American power and how it is used.	决定哪一种局面占据主导地位的主要决定因素将是美国的实力以及如何使用这一实力。


The US will remain the most powerful country in 2020, but, paradoxically, the strongest state since the days of Rome will be unable to protect its citizens acting alone.	美国在2020年依旧是最强大的国家，但是，自相矛盾的是，罗马时代以来最为强大的国家将无法独自保护其公民。


American military might is not adequate to deal with threats such as global pandemics, climate change, terrorism, and international crime.	美国的军事实力并不足以处理像全球传染病、气候变化、恐怖主义以及国际犯罪等威胁。


These issues require cooperation in the provision of global public goods and the soft power of attracting support.	这些问题要求吸引支持的软实力以及在提供全球公共利益的时候进行合作。


No part of the world shares more values or has a greater capacity to influence American attitudes and power than does Europe.	除了欧洲，世界上没有其他任何地方与美国具有共同的价值观或者具有更大的能力影响美国的态度和实力。


That suggests that the fourth political determinant of the future will be the evolution of European policies and power.	这就意味着，未来的第四个政治决定因素将是欧洲政策和实力的演化。


Europe’s Racist Schools	欧洲的种族学校


I am what many people call a “Gypsy.” I prefer the term “Roma.”	我是很多人所说的“吉普赛人”，而我更喜欢“罗姆人”一词。


There are more than 10 million of us across Europe.	我们在欧洲大概有1000万人。


The vast majority of us live in Third World conditions – denied access to adequate housing, health care, and education.	我们中绝大多数人过着第三世界的生活——不能住上大房子，也不能享受到医疗和教育。


I was born in a provincial town in Bulgaria in the late 1960’s, when, like the rest of Eastern Europe, the country was under Communist rule.	我于20世纪60年代末出生在保加利亚的一个省辖市里。 那时候，和其他东欧国家一样，保加利亚还在共产党的统治下。


The Party recognized no ethnic minorities – we were all, formally, equal.	共产党不承认有少数民族的存在——我们所有人在形式上都是平等的。


Indeed, we were so equal that the government gave many of us new, Bulgarian names.	确实如此，我们很平等，以致于政府给我们很多人一个新的保加利亚人名字。


One day, when I was a teenager named Husni, my name became Ivan.	一天，我这个叫做胡斯尼（Husni）的十几岁孩子就变成了伊凡（Ivan）。


But we were not equal.	但我们并不平等。


Roma lived in segregated ghettos.	罗姆人住在与其他人分开的贫民窟里。


We were second-class citizens.	我们是二等公民。


One of my clearest early childhood memories is of my father telling my younger sister and me, “Education is the key to success.”	我儿时最清晰的一个记忆就是我父亲对我和妹妹说：“教育是走向成功的钥匙。


He said, “If you want to be accepted as equals by Gadje [non-Roma], you must be better educated than they are.	”他说：“如果希望那些非罗姆人把你当做平等的人，你必须接受比他们更好的教育。


This is not easy.	这并不容易。


But if you succeed, this will change not only your life but also the lives of many of your people.”	但如果你成功了，这不只会改变你个人，而且能够改变你这个民族很多人的生活。 ”


Education is the only way out of the ghetto for many Roma.	对很多罗姆人来说，教育是离开贫民窟的唯一途径。


But in societies like Bulgaria, where racism is rampant, Roma have to fight for equal schooling.	但在像保加利亚这样种族歧视严重的社会里，罗姆人要为平等教育权而斗争。


Most of the children I grew up with received an inferior education that did not train them for university or skilled jobs.	和我一起长大的多数孩子接受的教育都不高，无法使他们进入大学或者获得职业技能。


They are either unemployed or working as unskilled laborers in Bulgaria or in the black market abroad.	他们要不失业，要不就在保加利亚或者国外的黑市里做不需要技术的劳工。


By contrast, in large part because of my father, I managed to complete high school, then medical school, and become a general practitioner.	和他们相反，很大程度上多亏有我的父亲，我完成了高中学习，而后进入医学院，而后成为了一名全科大夫。


By the early 1990’s, Bulgaria had changed.	到了20世纪90年代初，保加利亚发生了巨变。


The transition to democracy promised freedom and prosperity to all who had suffered in communism’s stranglehold.	向民主的过渡保证所有在共产主义控制下的受苦人能够有自由和富裕的权力。


Yet the Roma found themselves losers of the democratic transformation.	但罗姆人发现自己是这次民主转型的输家。


Their situation, always tenuous, dramatically worsened.	他们一直很糟糕的境况更是大幅度地下降了。


Their poor schooling left them ill equipped for the new economy.	他们不佳的教育情况，使他们无力面对新型的经济。


The communist dogma was shattered, but so was the pretense that we were all equals in a homogenous society.	共产党的教条不行了，我们在同一社会里人人平等的主张也不行了。


The government allowed employment discrimination to go unchecked, leaving the majority of Roma without jobs, and communities were plunged deeper into poverty.	政府允许就业歧视的存在，这样就使大多数罗姆人没有工作，这一群体进一步陷入了贫困。


I obtained a law degree to help advocate for members of my community.	我获得了法律学位，因此我能够为我的群体说话。


Today, I live and work in Brussels, where I lead an organization that advises the European Union and national governments on Roma-related policies.	今天，我生活并工作在布鲁塞尔。 在这里，我领导着一个向欧盟以及国家政府就罗姆问题政策提供咨询的组织。


I support my family and have achieved fulfillment in my career.	我能够养家并在事业上取得了成就。


But I am an exception.	但我是一个特例。


It is because of the importance of education in making me an exception that I am so deeply troubled by a recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights.	教育的重要性使我成为了一个特例，这也使我正在为欧洲人权法庭最近做出的一个决定而深感忧虑。


The case was brought by 18 Roma children from the city of Ostrava in the Czech Republic who had been assigned to special remedial schools for the “mentally deficient.”	这起诉讼是由捷克共和国俄斯特拉法市18个罗姆孩子提起的。 这些孩子因为“智力缺陷”而被分配去特殊的补习学校。


In Central and Eastern Europe, Roma are often unfairly placed in these special schools, which provide sub-par education that all but guarantees a life of poverty and manual labor.	在中欧和东欧，罗姆人被不公平地分配入特殊的学校里，那里为罗姆人提供极低的教育，只能让他们干体力活并过着贫困的生活。


I served as one of the lawyers for the children.	我成为这些孩子的律师之一。


The evidence showed that more than half of the Roma children in Ostrava were placed in special schools, and that more than half of the population of special schools was Roma.	证据显示，俄斯特拉法有超过一半的罗姆孩子被分配到特殊学校就读，而这些特殊学校里超过一半的学生是罗姆人。


All told, Roma children in Ostrava are more than 27 times more likely than non-Roma to be placed in such schools.	据说，俄斯特拉法的罗姆孩子比非罗姆孩子有高出27倍的可能性被分配到这样的学校。


This is not a unique situation.	这不是一个特例。


Far from it.	远远不是。


The same disproportionate patterns of school assignment exist throughout much of Central and Eastern Europe.	这样不成比例的学校分配在大多数中欧和东欧国家里存在着。


As a United Nations expert body has declared, this is racial segregation, plain and simple.	正如一个联合国专家机构宣称的，这就是明显的种族隔离。


But the Court was unmoved.	但法庭却并不为之所动。


Its judgment recognized that the claimants raised “a number of serious arguments,” and that the education system in Ostrava perpetuated racial segregation.	法庭承认原告提出了“一些重要的论据，” 俄斯特拉法的教育制度维护了种族隔离。


But the Court ruled that, absent a showing of actual racial bias in the minds of testers and administrators – virtually impossible to prove – the pervasive reality of racial disadvantage was not unlawful.	但法庭判决说，由于未能确实证明试验者以及行政长官头脑里存在着种族偏见——事实上无法证实——这种普遍存在的种族劣势不属于非法。


In what could have been a landmark victory that would open the doors of opportunity for Europe’s Roma, the Strasbourg Court instead chose to keep Roma locked out of a decent education.	这本是一场可能为欧洲罗姆人打开机会之门的历史性胜利，斯特拉斯堡的法庭却选择将罗姆人接受良好教育的大门锁上了。


Its decision reverberates across the Continent – not just for the Roma, but for all who have a stake in promoting the values of tolerance and equality in a democratic Europe.	法庭的决定在欧洲大陆引起了反响——不只罗姆人，还有所有在民主欧洲里倡导宽容、平等价值观的人们。


Anyone who believes in the rights of all children to quality education should be troubled by a decision so myopic.	任何相信所有孩子都有权接受高质量教育的人都会为这种短视的决定而不安。


For decades, racial segregation in European schools has stigmatized generations of Roma children as stupid and disabled.	几十年来，欧洲学校���种族隔离使多少代罗姆孩子打上了愚蠢无能的烙印。


The Court’s decision allows this brutal and systematic violation of fundamental rights to continue.	法庭的决定致使这一残酷的、制度化侵犯基本人权的情况得以继续。


The Roma, and Europe, have suffered a great defeat.	罗姆人以及全欧洲都遭受到一次惨重的失败。


Europe’s Russia Problem	欧洲的俄国问题


NEW YORK – How should Europe react to the rise of a hostile Russia on its eastern flank?	纽约amp#45;amp#45;对于充满敌意的俄国在欧洲东边崛起，欧洲应该如何应对呢？


Different countries have reacted differently, influenced by their historical experience and their economic interests.	不同的国家受到各自历史经历以及经济利益的影响而做出了不同的反应。


Yet it is essential for the European Union to develop a unified policy, reconciling these divergent national interests and attitudes.	但是欧盟制定一项统一的政策，协调不同的国家利益和态度十分关键。


Europe cannot afford not to resist Russia’s geopolitical aggression, and it needs to be unified to have any chance of success.	欧洲无法不阻止俄国的地缘政治侵略，而且为了有成功的希望它就必须联合一致。


Yet, the unified European policy must not be purely geopolitical, because if it were, the common interest would not be strong enough to override national interests.	但是，统一的欧洲政策不能仅仅局限于地缘政治方面，因为如果是这样的话，共同利益就不足以强大到推翻国家利益的程度。


Russia could divide and conquer as it is doing already.	俄国可以像现在一样分而治之。


In purely geopolitical terms, Russia holds the stronger hand.	在纯粹的地缘政治方面，俄国占据优势。


Europe’s superiority lies in its values and principles as an open, democratic, peaceful, prosperous, and law-abiding society.	欧洲的优越在于其作为开放、民主、和平、繁荣以及守法社会的价值观以及原则。


These values hold great attraction for the people in the former Soviet Union—and that includes the leaders as well as the masses, in spite of the fact that the West did not back up its values and principles with deeds in the past.	尽管西方在过去的行为中并没有支撑其价值观和原则，但是这些价值观对前苏联人民而言具有强大的吸引力，不仅包括领导人，也包括广大民众。


As a result, admiration of and aspiration to European values is mixed with disillusionment and resentment, and the Putin regime has been able to gather enthusiastic support by baiting the West and scoring well in the geopolitical game.	结果，对于欧洲价值观的崇拜和向往同失望和仇视搀杂在一起。 普京政权通过引诱西方并且在地缘政治游戏中得分而获得了民众热情的支持。


Nevertheless, Russia remains susceptible to Europe’s allure.	但是，俄国还是受到欧洲吸引力的影响。


Historically, Russia always aspired to be part of Europe, and the Putin regime recognizes that it would pay a big price if it sought to return to the Soviet Union’s isolation.	在历史上，俄国总是想成为欧洲的一部分，而且普京政权认识到，如果它寻求回到苏联孤立状态就会付出巨大代价。


But Russia’s strengthened geopolitical position vis-à-vis Europe obscures grave weaknesses in other areas.	但是俄国相对于欧洲强化的地缘政治地位掩盖了在其他领域上的巨大弱点。


Its authoritarian political system stifles private enterprise and innovation.	其专制政治制度压抑了私有企业和创新。


The rule of law is absent, and much more effort is spent on extortion and rent collection than production.	那里没有法治，而且人们在敲诈勒索和收租上花的精力要远远超过生产。


Consequently, economic progress has not kept pace with the accumulation of oil revenues.	结果，经济进展没有与石油收入的积累同步。


These deficiencies became accentuated by the decline in the price of oil.	这些缺点随着石油价格的下跌而越发严重。


Another great weakness is demography.	另一个巨大的弱点是人口方面的。


Russia has immense territory but only 140 million people.	俄国幅员辽阔，但是只有一亿四千万人口。


A growing portion of the population consists of Muslim minorities with higher birthrates than ethnic Russians.	人口中越来越多的部分是穆斯林少数民族，其出生率超过俄罗斯人。


Overall population is expected to drop by 10 million in a decade.	人口总数预计在十年内下降一千万人。


Resource rich but sparsely populated Siberia is bordered by resource-deficient but teeming and rising China.	西伯利亚资源丰富但是人口稀少，它与资源短缺但是蓬勃发展的中国交界。


If the Central Asian republics are cut off from the West, they are liable to turn to China in order to avoid becoming totally dependent on Russia.	如果各中亚共和国与西方断绝，那么它们就可能转向中国以避免完全依赖于俄国。


In the long run, Putin’s baiting of the West may turn out to be as self-defeating as Saakashvili’s baiting of Russia.	从长期而言，普京引诱西方有可能像萨卡什维利引诱俄国一样弄巧成拙。


But in the short run there is a real danger that Russia will pursue its age-old aspiration of becoming part of Europe by seeking to become the dominant entity.	但是在短期而言确实存在危险，也就是俄国将会通过力求成为统领国家实体而追寻其成为欧洲一部分的百年渴望。


In these circumstances, Europe needs to pursue a two-pronged strategy.	在这样的情况下，欧洲需要追寻双刃战略。


On the one hand, it must protect itself against the geopolitical threat posed by a newly assertive and adventurous Russia.	一方面，它必须保护自己免受新近张狂而又冒险的俄国构成的地缘政治威胁。


On the other, it must seek to replace the rule of force with the rule of law, and geopolitics with the pursuit of democracy, open society, and international cooperation.	另一方面，欧洲必须寻求用法治取代武治，用民主、开放社会以及国际合作取代地缘政治。


The European Union could not possibly forge a common policy without such a two-pronged approach.	欧盟无法在不运用这一双刃战略的情况下制定共同政策。


There would be too many freeloaders and defectors in a purely geopolitical game, but in a two-pronged approach each member state could find its proper place.	在纯粹的地缘政治游戏中将会有太多的贪图便宜和叛逃者，但是采用了双刃战略每个成员国就会找到自身恰当的位置。


The key to neutralizing the geopolitical advantage that Russia enjoys is to establish a unified energy policy with a Europe-wide regulatory authority which has precedence over national regulators and a Europe-wide distribution network.	抵销俄国享有的地缘政治优势的关键就是建立统一的能源政策。 在这一政策中，跨欧管理机关优先于各国的管理当局，同时建立跨欧的能源分配网络。


This would deprive Russia of its ability to play one country against another, because a concession granted to one national distributor would immediately become available to customers in all the other countries.	这就会剥夺俄国各个击破的能力，因为给予某个国家分配商减让将会马上也提供给所有其他国家的客户。


Energy companies are beginning to realize this and becoming less resistant to a common European energy policy.	能源公司开始意识到这一点并且不再抵制欧洲共同能源政策。


That would also serve another shared objective, namely helping to bring climate change under control.	这也会有利于另一个共同的目标，也就是帮助控制气候变化。


The other prong, promoting the rule of law, international cooperation, and the principles of open society has to be pursued indirectly, by reforming the international financial system and by paying special attention to Russia’s near-abroad.	另一个刀刃，也就是促进民主、国际合作以及开放社会的原则应当通过改革国际金融体系以及特别关注俄国近邻而间接地予以追寻。


Ukraine, in particular, is in a perilous state, but financing public works that would create jobs in eastern Ukraine, where the steel industry is in distress, could make a major difference both politically and economically.	特别是乌克兰处于危险境地。 但是给公共基建项目提供资金从而在钢铁产业不景气的乌克兰东部创造就业可以在政治上和经济上产生巨大的效益。


Georgia must also be helped to recover from the damage inflicted by the Russian invasion, but help should be contingent on the Saakashvili regime observing the principles of open society.	我们必须帮助格鲁吉亚从俄国入侵造成的损失中复原过来。 但是援助必须取决于萨卡什维利政府遵守开放社会的原则。


Russia cannot be helped directly because of its excessive reliance on arbitrary state power, but when Russia sees progress in international cooperation, particularly with China, it will not want to be left out in the cold.	俄国由于其对国家强制力的过度依赖而不能得到直接援助，但是当俄国看到特别是与中国的国际合作取得进展的时候，它就不想被抛在后面。


Strengthening and supporting the former Soviet republics would serve both prongs of a unified EU policy towards Russia.	加强和支持前苏联加盟共和国将会有利于欧盟对俄统一的双刃政策。


It would be against open society values if Russia were allowed to turn these countries into satellites just because it has superior military force.	如果允许俄国仅仅因为它拥有超级军力而把这些国家变成卫星国就会违反开放社会的价值观。


And Europe has a geopolitical interest in keeping them open as sources of energy supply.	而且，让这些国家作为能���供应国家保持开放也符合欧洲的地缘政治利益。


Europe’s Russia Question	欧洲的俄国问题


BRUSSELS – Friend or foe, or something uneasily in-between?	布鲁塞尔--是朋友还是敌人，还是尴尬地介于两者之间的东西？


That’s the question Europe is asking about Russia, and Russia about a newly aggressive Europe.	这就是欧洲正在探寻的关于俄国的问题，而这也是俄国探寻有关近来咄咄逼人的欧洲的问题。


President Vladimir Putin’s choice of Dmitri Medvedev, Chairman of Gazprom, the gas company with an emerging stranglehold on European energy supplies, only throws this question into an even starker light.	俄罗斯石油天然气公司在欧洲的能源供应日益重要。 普京总统选择其董事长梅德韦捷夫作为总统继任人更把这一问题突出了。


Relations between Europe and Russia have been deteriorating for several years, but once manageable economic issues, including energy, are now being aggravated by much more volatile political differences.	欧洲和俄国之间的关系几年来每况愈下，但是原先尚且可以控制的包括能源在内的经济问题现在正在由于更为起伏不定的政治分歧而恶化。


The risk is a climate of undisguised hostility, with potentially greater costs than during the nadir of the Cold War.	现在存在毫不掩饰的敌对状态环境的风险，而潜在的代价要大于冷战时期最严峻的阶段。


The most obvious and imminent flashpoint is Kosovo.	其中最为明显而又急迫的问题就是科索沃了。


The likelihood is that early next year most of the European Union’s member nations will recognize the Albanian-majority enclave on Serbia’s southern edge as an independent state.	现在的可能性就是，明年早些时候欧盟大多数成员国将会承认位于塞尔维亚南部边界的这一阿尔巴尼亚人占人口多数的飞地为一个独立国家。


This is certain to enflame not just Serbia, but also the Kremlin.	这不仅肯定会让塞尔维亚，也会让克里姆林宫怒火中烧。


Then there are rising tensions over plans by the United States to based a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as the growing likelihood that further NATO enlargement will include Georgia, the increasingly prosperous neighbor with which Russia has fractious relations.	还有，美国打算在波兰和捷克共和国建立导弹防御系统，以及北约进一步东扩越来越可能包括格鲁吉亚，因此造成紧张局势日益升高。 日益显现繁荣的格鲁吉亚与邻国俄国的关系充满摩擦。


Russia continues to fan secessionist flames there by encouraging the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.	俄国继续在那里通过鼓励阿布哈兹和南奥塞梯独立而煽动分裂主义。