One example is “shared responsibility” mortgages, in which payments are reduced under certain circumstances, such as when home prices dip below the borrower’s purchase price.	一个实例是“共同责任”抵押，即在特定情况下减少还款，比方说住宅价格跌到借款人购买价格以下。


In exchange for this flexibility, the lender receives a share of any capital gain that is realized when the home is sold.	上述灵活机制的对价是贷款人在房屋出售时得到资本收益的一定份额。


Similarly, the continuous-workout mortgage adjusts payments and terms in specific cases, such as job loss.	同样，联动型按揭在特定情况下调整还款的金额及条件，比方说借款人丢掉工作。


A third option for limiting debt accumulation is to reconsider tax rules that favor debt.	限制债务的第三种方法是重新审视债务有利的税收规则。


In many countries, interest accrued on a mortgage remains tax deductible.	很多国家规定抵押付息可以抵税。


Though phasing out this policy is politically contentious, some countries – such as the United Kingdom in the 1980s – have managed to do so.	虽然淘汰这项政策在政治上存在争议，但有些国家——比如20世纪90年代的英国——就成功取消了这项政策。


Similarly, it would be difficult – but not impossible – to reduce the incentives, created by almost all countries’ tax regimes, for corporate leverage.	同样，几乎所有国家的税收制度均为企业加杠杆创造方便，减少这种刺激虽然困难，但并不是完全不可能的。


Governments must also work to reduce existing debt – and the deficient global demand to which it contributes.	各国政府还必须尽全力降低现有债务——以及因为债务所导致的全球需求不足。


It is simply not feasible for the most highly leveraged governments to grow their way out of debt.	高杠杆国家根本不可能靠增长来摆脱债务。


Nor can austerity alone suffice, as it would require countries to make such large fiscal adjustments – 5% of GDP, in Spain’s case – that citizens would likely resist them, as the Greeks have done.	单靠紧缩也不行，因为那样政府要做出的财政调整过大——具体到西班牙是GDP的5%——因此很可能像在希腊那样遭遇民众抵制。


A more effective approach would employ a broader range of tools, including debt restructuring.	更有效的方法会采用各种工具，其中包括进行债务重组。


In some countries, sales of public assets and the levying of one-off wealth taxes would also be helpful.	在某些国家，出售公共资产和一次性财富征税也将起到一定帮助。


Investors, analysts, and other commentators, for their part, must take a more nuanced view of governments’ true debt liabilities.	投资者、分析师和其他评论家必须要更加细致入微地观察政府的真实债务。


Much of the sovereign-debt accumulation of recent years has been enabled by quantitative easing, with central banks making large-scale purchases of government bonds.	近年来多数主权债务均源于定量宽松政策，即央行对政府债券进行大规模采购。


The US Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan now own 16%, 24%, and 22%, respectively, of all bonds outstanding.	美联储、英国央行和日本央行目前的未偿还债券分别占全球总额的16%、24%和22%。


Given that central banks are owned by the government, and that interest paid on outstanding bonds is remitted back to the national treasury, these government bonds are fundamentally different from those owned by other creditors.	鉴于央行所有者是政府，且未偿债利息终将回到国库，上述政府债与其他债权人债有着本质的不同。


Focusing on “net” government debt (which excludes intra-government debt holdings, such as the bonds owned by central banks) is a more effective approach to assessing and ensuring the sustainability of public debt.	关注“净”政府债务（其中扣除政府内部债务，如央行所持债券的部分）在评估和保障公共债务可持续性时将收到更好的效果。


The global economic crisis laid bare the challenge of debt reduction – and the risks that excessive indebtedness raises.	全球经济危机使减债难题——和过度负债所引发的风险得以暴露。


Yet the crisis also intensified government and household dependence on leverage, causing debt levels to continue to rise – a trend that, left unchecked, will lead to more crises in the future.	但危机也加剧了政府和家庭对杠杆的依赖，导致债务水平持续攀升——如果这样的趋势得不到遏制，今后将可能有更多危机发生。


It is time to redirect financial innovation toward developing new tools and approaches to address these challenges.	现在是时候重新引导金融创新，研发全新工具和方法来应对这些挑战。


Only then can the world economy move onto a sustainable growth path.	唯其如此，世界经济才能走上可持续发展的道路。


Global Disaster Recovery	全球金融灾难复苏


PALO ALTO – With the global economy mired in recession and financial crisis, policymakers everywhere have launched a series of monetary, financial, and fiscal responses.	帕洛•阿尔托——随着全球经济陷入衰退与金融危机之中，世界各国的决策人都启动了一系列的回应，包括货币的、金融的与财政方面的。


Nevertheless, economies continue to contract, unemployment to rise, and wealth to decline.	然而，经济仍继续萎缩，失业率仍持续上升，国家财产仍继续下降。


Countries’ policy responses have ranged from modest to immense.	各个国家的政策回应有的适度，有的则过于强烈。


China has undertaken a 6%-of-GDP stimulus package aimed (mostly) at infrastructure; the United States has enacted a two-year $800 billion spending and tax rebate package.	中国承诺将国内生产总值的6%做为经济刺激并（主要）用于基础设施的建设； 美国则颁布了一个两年计划：共投入8000亿美元的公共开销与退税措施。


The Federal Reserve and the Bank of England lowered short-term interest-rate targets to near zero and are adopting “quantitative easing” – i.e., continuous infusions of money.	美联储与英格兰银行都将短期存款利息指标降低到了几乎零利息，并在采纳“定量放松”，也就是说连续不断地进行现金注入。


Despite all this, massive excess bank reserves remain unlent.	尽管采取所有这些措施，巨大的超额银行准备金仍是无法借出。


During Japan’s “lost decade,” the Bank of Japan mostly bought Japanese government bonds, whereas the Fed is trying to reopen secondary markets for securitized private lending (which in the US is as important as bank lending), buying mortgage-backed securities and consumer and business loans, as well as U.S. Treasury bonds.	在日本“失落的十年”期间，日本银行主要是在购买日本政府的国债，而当时的美联储则在试图为安全性的私人贷款开启次级市场（这在美国是与银行借贷是同等重要的），购买具有财产抵押的有价证券与消费者和商业贷款，以及美国财政部发售的长期国债。


The Bank of England is buying UK government bonds (“gilts”).	英格兰银行也在购买英国政府公债（或称“镀金有价证券”）。


The European Central Bank, reflecting a strong inflation concern, has responded more slowly.	而正在强烈关注通货膨胀的欧洲中央银行则回应得更加慢一些。


The US government is now insuring, lending or spending over $10 trillion from guaranteeing money market funds to the AIG bailout to the Fed’s swap lines supporting foreign central banks.	美国政府如今正着手确保、借出或花费10万亿美元来确保货币市场的资金能对美国国际集团的救援发挥作用，并进而确保美联储支援外国中央银行的互惠交易顺利进行。


Analogous guarantees and bank bailouts have occurred in the other major economies (the ECB does not play this role for Europe; national governments do).	在其它的主要经济体中，类似的担保与银行救援行为也出现过（欧洲中央银行没有发挥这种作用； 国家政府在履行这种职责）。


The fiscal response – tax cuts and spending increases – has varied considerably, being somewhat more tepid in debt-averse Europe than in the US and China.	各国的财政回应（减少税收与降低公共开支）有着很大程度的不同，大力反对债务的欧洲比美国与中国表现得有些不大热情。


The US is hectoring Europe for more fiscal stimulus, while the Europeans pressure the US for greater and more globally coordinated financial regulation.	美国正威迫欧洲各国采取更多的财政刺激手段，而欧洲政府则对美国进行施压，让美国在全球更大范围以更大力度对金融规范进行调整。


Will near-zero interest rates, financial-sector bailouts, and fiscal stimulus work?	政府采用接近零利息、金融部门的救援以及财政刺激手段能有所收获吗？


What else could be done?	还有什么其他措施可以使用？


As for fiscal measures, the empirical evidence suggests that three-quarters of consumption is based on longer-term economic prospects, not short-run disposable income.	对于财政手段，经验表明，四分之三的消费是基于长期的经济前景，而不是短期的可支配收入。


Thus, temporary tax rebates are mostly saved, not spent.	因此，临时退税大多被人们存了起来，而不是被花掉了。


Targeting liquidity-constrained people, especially the unemployed, is a bit more effective, as well as humane.	针对流动性受限人群，特别是失业人群，这是一种更有效，也更人道的手段。


Some claim that infrastructure spending creates a big Keynesian “multiplier,” a bigger increase in incomes than the initial spending (estimates range up to about 1.5 times the initial increase in spending).	有人声称，基础设施方面的支出造就了一个巨大的凯恩斯主义的“放大器” ——收入的增加比初始支出的增加多得多（估计比初始投入的增加多约1. 5倍）。


But infrastructure spending is usually slow – and almost always driven heavily by parochial political considerations.	然而，基础设施方面的支出通常进展缓慢——而且几乎总是受到狭隘的政治考虑地严重驱使。


Japan’s annual 15-20 trillion yen infrastructure-intensive stimulus didn’t prevent its lost decade.	每年，日本投资15~20万亿日元的大量的基础设施刺激手段并不能阻止其失去的十年。


Nor did American government spending end the Great Depression (unemployment was still over 15% in 1939, a decade after the depression’s onset).	美国政府的支出也没有让大萧条结束（大萧条开始后的第十年1939年的失业率仍超过了15 ％） 。


A more effective stimulus would speed up spending that needs to be done anyway.  Or cut taxes to change the marginal calculus of firms on layoffs and consumers on spending – for example, by suspending the payroll tax on firms and workers for a year or suspending part or all of the sales tax or national value-added tax.	不管怎样，一个更有效的刺激手段将加快必要的支出。 或者，通过减税来改变要裁员的公司的边际运算和消费者的开支。


Better yet would be permanent rate reductions and controls on future spending.	例如，通过暂停企业和员工一年的工资税或免除部分或全部的销售税或国家增值税。 不过，更好的是永远都减免税收和对未来的支出进行控制。


But governments should be wary of expensive fiscal stimulus.	然而，各国政府应当警惕昂贵的财政刺激手段。


It is likely to yield little cushion for employment and income per dollar spent, while servicing the large debt accumulation will impede long-run growth, either by forcing substantial future tax increases or spending cuts, or by forcing central banks to inflate.	每花1美元它就可能对就业和收入带来微弱的缓冲空间，而提供大型债务的累积会阻碍长期的增长，要么靠增加大量的未来增加税或削减开支，要么靠央行进行通货膨胀。


Indeed, China frets over the safety of the US Treasury bonds that it holds.	事实上，中国烦恼的正是它持有的美国国债的安全性。


In theory, enough quantitative easing implies future inflation, motivating people to buy big-ticket items, like cars and appliances, now to avoid the run-up in prices later.	从理论上来说，足够的量化缓解意味着将来的通货膨胀，激励人们去购买大件物品，如汽车和家用电器，以避免以后价格的飞涨。


(In practice, it is an experiment.)	（在实践里，这是一个实验。


High and rising inflation creates great costs and is difficult to reverse.	）快速膨胀的高通胀造成了巨大的成本，并且很难扭转。


After mitigating the downturn, central bankers must withdraw the immense infusion of liquidity before inflation takes off, a tricky maneuver.	在危机衰退后，央行必须在通货膨胀结束前撤出巨大的之前所注入的流动资金。


The bottom line, though, is that better policies can at best mitigate the economic consequences of this horrible recession.	不过，底线是越好的政策能最好地减轻此次可怕的金融危机带来的经济后果。


We will not get out of this mess completely any time soon.	我们不会很快就摆脱这次混乱。


Sometimes, strong recoveries follow recessions, but recovery following financial crises is always immensely painful, time-consuming, and traumatic.	有时侯，衰退后就是强劲的复苏，但金融危机后的复苏总是痛苦的、耗时的和伤痕累累的。


The economists Ken Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart have argued that the major financial crises of the last century typically lasted a half-decade or longer.	经济学家肯•罗格夫和卡门•莱因哈特认为，上世纪主要的金融危机通常持续了5年或更久。


In many of the previous banking crises, it was a country or a region that was hit hard (Argentina, Japan, etc.).	在以前许多银行危机中，通常是一个国家或地区遭受了沉重打击（比如阿根廷、日本等）。


This time, virtually every economy is suffering substantially and the banking crisis is global.	这一次，几乎每一个经济体都在遭受极大的重创和全球性的银行危机。


Policymakers will continue to throw whatever ammunition they can find at the problem, but it will take time for the deleveraging from the boom to run its course.	决策者将继续扔出他们这这个问题中找到的任何弹药，但从繁荣到正常发展的反杠杆作用需要很长一段时间。


At times of serious economic distress, policymakers thrash about seeking solutions, and some people lose confidence in the economic system itself.	遭遇几次严重的经济危机后，决策者开始寻求解决办法，有些人则会对经济制度本身失去信心。


Indeed, in the Great Depression of the 1930’s, it was common for Western intellectuals to turn to communism and central planning as a hoped-for panacea.	事实上，在二十世纪三十年代大萧条期间，西方知识分子转向共产主义，将计划经济作为救市的灵丹妙药是很正常的。


Some never returned from that intellectual journey, despite the collapse of communism.	一些因此从未转回来过，尽管共产主义倒台了。


There is, of course, no case for going back to socialism and central planning.	当然，没有理由回到社会主义和计划经济中去。


Once off government lifelines, we will need a better-regulated financial system.	一旦脱离政府的生命线，我们需要一个监管更完善的金融体系。


Any financial institution that is too big or too interconnected to fail, or could quickly become so, must be closely regulated and monitored for risk and capital adequacy in real time, or be broken up into smaller firms.	任何太大或内部关系太紧密的，或可能很快变成那样的金融机构都会失败，因此金融机构必须得到密切管制，对风险和资本充足率的进行实时监管，或将他们分成较小的公司。


In the meantime, let’s hope that Messrs. Bernanke, King, Trichet, and the world’s other central bank governors get monetary policy roughly right, and that our politicians don’t waste vast sums on ineffective fiscal stimulus.	在此同时，我们希望，贝南克先生们、国王、特里谢先生，以及世界其他央行行长可以将货币政策制定得比较合理吧，我们的政治家不要将巨额资金浪费到无效的财政刺激手段上了。


A Global Strategy for Disaster Risk	灾难风险的全球战略


SENDAI – Current disaster-risk levels are alarming.	仙台—目前，灾难风险水平相当高。


The cost of damage to commercial and residential buildings worldwide is averaging $314 billion each year, with the private sector bearing as much as 85% of that price tag.	每年全球商用和住宅建筑破坏成本平均达3,140亿美元，其中私人部门承担了85%的损失。


At the same time, a new United Nations report shows that annual investments in disaster-risk reduction of $6 billion can result in savings of up to $360 billion.	与此同时，新联合国报告表明，每年投入60亿美元用于降低灾难风险可以省下最多3,600亿美元。


Hundreds of business executives, aware of the dramatic costs – and potential benefits – at stake, are now preparing to attend a UN conference on disaster-risk reduction in Sendai, Japan.	数百名意识到其中的巨大成本——和可观潜在收益——的企业高管目前正在日本仙台出席联合国降低灾难风险会议。


A decade ago, when the last such gathering was held, the private sector was scarcely represented.	十年前上一次类似会议举行时，私人部门几乎没有任何代表出席。


This time, companies and entrepreneurs will be there in full force to explore a range of valuable opportunities.	这一次，公司和企业家将在仙台充分参与探索一系列极具价值的机会。


The Tohoku region of Japan, where the meeting will take place, is a vivid reminder of how a disaster's economic impact reverberates far beyond its epicenter.	仙台位于日本东北地方，也是灾难的经济影响如何能够波及与震中相去甚远之地的生动例子。


Devastated four years ago by the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami, Japan's automobile production was cut by nearly half.	受四年前日本东部大地震和海啸的破坏，日本汽车产量遭遇腰斩。


The financial damage did not stop at the country's borders; as a direct result of the slowdown in Japan, automobile production dropped by some 20% in Thailand, 50% in China, and 70% in India.	金融损失范围超越了国界； 日本减速直接导致泰国汽车产量下降20%，中国下降50%，印度下降70%。


The risks inherent in globalized production carry great rewards for those who know how to manage them properly.	全球生产的内在风险意味着知道如何管理这些风险能够让你获益良多。


That is why major businesses such as PricewaterHouseCoopers, Hindustan Construction Corporation, AbzeSolar, Swiss Re, AECOM, AXA Group, IBM, and others – spanning many sectors and encompassing all regions – are engaging with UN experts to improve global strategies for disaster-risk management and reduction.	正因如此，普华永道、印度斯坦建设集团（Hindustan Construction Corporation）、AbzeSolar、瑞士再保险（Swiss Re）、艾益康（AECOM）、AXA集团、IBM和其他公司——经营活动范围覆盖所有地区的多个行业的公司——与联合国专家一起改进灾难风险管理和降低的全球战略。


This level of business engagement bodes well for pioneering a new planet-friendly and people-sensitive approach to global prosperity.	如此水平的企业参与预示着将产生全新的环境友好、以人为本的全球繁荣方针。


Indeed, the disaster-risk reduction conference in Sendai is the first in a series of major international gatherings this year.	事实上，仙台灾难风险降低会议只是今年一系列重要国际会议的第一个。


Beyond Sendai, world leaders will convene in Addis Ababa in July to discuss financing for development, in New York in September to adopt a new development agenda, and in Paris in December to reach a meaningful climate-change agreement.	除了仙台，世界领导人7月将在亚的斯亚贝巴会晤讨论发展金融，9月将在纽约制定新的发展日程，12月将在巴黎达成有意义的气候变化协定。


Taken together, these meetings promise to generate transformative action that can set the world on a safer, more prosperous, and more sustainable path.	这些会议有望形成一股转型力量，让世界走上更安全、更繁荣、更可持续的道路。


Sustainability starts in Sendai for three major reasons.	可持续性从仙台开始，有三个重要原因。


First, by its very nature, disaster-risk reduction requires forward planning.	首先，顾名思义，灾难风险降低需要前瞻性计划。


Second, investment in this area advances both sustainable development and climate action.	其次，这方面的投资有利于可持续发展和气候行动。


And, third, helping those who are most vulnerable to disasters is the ideal starting point for the effort to aid all people by establishing universal targets for development and climate change.	第三，帮助最易受灾难影响的群体是通过建立发展和气候变化的全球性目标造福全人类的理想起点。


Over the last 12 months, thousands of lives were saved in India, the Philippines, and elsewhere by improved weather forecasting, early-warning systems, and evacuation plans.	在过去12个月中，印度、菲律宾和其他地区通过改善天气预报、早期预警系统和疏散计划拯救了数千生命。


Advances in risk reduction that safeguard development gains and business investments must match this progress in disaster preparedness, and we must make wise choices that create greater opportunities in the future.	风险降低方面的进步捍卫了发展果实和商业投资，它们必须匹配灾难准备方面的进展，并且我们还必须做出明智的选择，从而为未来创造更大的机会。


For example, experts estimate that 60% of the land that will be urbanized by 2030 has not yet been developed.	比如，专家估计，60%的到2030年将被城市化的土地还没有得到开发。


Enterprises that factor disaster risk into their construction plans will avert the much higher costs of retrofitting later.	在建设计划中考虑灾难风险因素的企业能够避免事后改进所造成的高得多的成本。


More broadly, over the next 15 years, the world will make major investments in urban infrastructure, energy, and agriculture.	更广泛地说，在未来15年终，世界将为城市基础设施、能源和农业投入巨资。


If this spending is directed toward low-carbon goods, technologies, and services, we will be on our way to creating more resilient societies.	如果这笔支出被引导向低碳商品、技术和服务，我们就有望打造出恢复力更强的社会。


More and more industries appreciate this.	越来越多的行业认识到这一点。


At the Climate Summit that I convened last September at the UN in New York, financial institutions, commercial and national banks, insurance companies, and pension funds vowed to mobilize more than $200 billion by the end of this year for action to address climate change.	在去年9月我组织的联合国纽约气候峰会上，金融机构、商业和国民银行、保险公司、退休基金承诺在今年年底前动员2,000亿美元以上的资金用于遏制气候变化的行动。


They envisioned a host of new initiatives, including issuing so-called green bonds and shifting assets to clean-energy portfolios.	它们构想了一系列新方案，包括发行所谓的绿色债券和将资产转移到绿色能源投资组合。


In a particularly important move, the insurance industry, representing $30 trillion in assets and investments, committed to creating a Climate Risk Investment Framework for industry-wide adoption by the end of the year.	一个特别重要的动作是坐拥30万亿美元资产和投资的保险业承诺在今年年底之前建立一个气候风险投资框架（Climate Risk Investment Framework）并在全行业内采用。


It is time to stop addressing development and humanitarian emergencies separately.	我们应该停止区别对待发展和人道主义危机问��。


Disaster-risk reduction lies at the nexus of development assistance, which seeks to advance better living conditions, and humanitarian aid, which begins after a disaster hits.	灾难风险降低是发展援助（寻求改善生活条件）和人道主义援助（在灾难袭击后开始）的枢纽。


Starting our international calendar with the Sendai meeting on disaster-risk reduction sends a clear signal that the world is ready to integrate its strategies.	以仙台降低灾难风险会议为起点启动我们的国际日程释放了一个明确的信号：世界已经准备好将各种战略融合起来。


I have seen the human toll of disasters – from earthquakes in China and Haiti to floods in Pakistan and Bangladesh to Superstorm Sandy, which affected the Caribbean and North America, even inundating the lower floors of the UN facilities in New York.	我目睹过灾难的人道损失——从中国和海地的地震到巴基斯坦和孟加拉国的洪水再到影响加勒比海和北美、甚至淹没了纽约联合国低洼地区设施的超级飓风桑迪。


When business, civil society, and government team up to help countries withstand disasters, they save lives, boost stability, and create opportunities that enable markets and people alike to flourish.	当商界、公民社会和政府齐心协力帮助各国应对灾难时，就能拯救生命、增进稳定并创造能让市场和人类繁荣的机会。


Sustainable profits.	可持续利润。


Sustainable livelihoods.	可持续生活。


Sustainable development.	可持续发展。


It all starts in Sendai.	这些都在仙台起步。


Global Economic Cooperation or Bust	全球经济合作还是破裂


According to estimates by the United Nations, the global economy expanded by 3.8% last year, continuing the strong performance recorded since 2003.	根据联合国的估计，去年全球经济增长了3. 8%，继续了自2003年以来的强劲表现。


Led by China and India, developing countries were prominent among the best performing economies, expanding by 6.5% on average in 2006.	以中国和印度为首的发展中国家在表现最佳的国家中尤其突出，它们在2006年平均增长了6. 5%。


But can this apparently benign pattern of global growth be sustained, particularly since growth has been accompanied by ever-widening global financial imbalances?	但是这个显然是良性的全球增长态势会一直持续下去吗，尤其是我们必须看到这一增长伴随着越来越大的全球金融的不平衡？


Average annual growth in the least developed countries, many in Africa, reached almost 7% last year.	去年主要是在非洲的最不发达国家的年平均增长达到了大约7%。


The world’s largest economy, the United States, expanded by 3.2 %, and growth also recovered in previously sluggish Japan and Europe.	世界上最大的经济体美国增长了3. 2%，甚至以前处于呆滞状态的日本和欧洲也出现了增长。


These trends are remarkable in light of the shocks from the surge in oil prices, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, international terrorism, and the breakdown of multilateral trade negotiations.	考虑到这些增长是在油价的暴涨、阿富汗和伊拉克的战争、全球的恐怖主义以及多边贸易谈判破裂的状况下取得的，这些态势尤其引人瞩目。


Strong economic performance reflects strong domestic demand in the US, owing to low borrowing costs and rising asset prices.	强劲的经济表现反映了美国因为低廉的借款成本和提升的资产价格而带来的强劲的国内需求。


This lifted manufactured exports around the world and kept inflation down, which in turn boosted demand for energy and raw materials from the developing world, pushing up commodity prices and benefiting many poor countries.	这提高了全球制造业的出口并且抑制了通货膨胀，它们反过来又使对于发展中国家的能源和原料的需求出现了暴涨，推动了商品价格的上涨并且使许多贫困国家获益匪浅。


The savings generated in East Asia and the major oil exporters have increased global liquidity, helping to finance the US current account deficit, which has now reached unprecedented levels.	东亚国家以及主要的石油出口国所产生的储蓄提高了全球流通，并且帮助弥补了美国已经达到前所未有水平的国际收支经常项目赤字。


But the outlook for 2007 is for weakening global economic growth.	但是2007年的全球经济增长可能会放缓。


The UN’s World Economic Situation and Prospects 2007 cautions that a weaker housing market will undermine US growth.	联合国的《2007年世界经济状况和前景》警告说，趋于低迷的房地产市场会削弱美国的经济增长。


Consequently, global economic expansion will slow, as no other major country is set to take over as the main engine of growth.	其结果是全球的经济增长会放缓，因为没有其他哪个大国能够取而代之称为经济增长主要引擎。


With slowing world economic growth, US financing needs could cause a drop in investors’ confidence in the future of US-based assets, precipitating a sharp dollar depreciation.	随着世界经济增长的放缓，美国的融资需求会使投资者对于位于美国的资产信心下降，从而促使美元产生剧烈的贬值。


The UN report observes that national economic policies and existing multilateral settings are not designed to mitigate effectively the risk of a global slowdown or to address global imbalances.	联合国的报告指出，国家的经济政策和现存的多边框架并不能有效地缓解全球经济减速的风险以及解决全球经济的不平衡。


In Europe and Japan, for example, monetary and fiscal policies have been tightening in response to domestic concerns, further slowing the world economy.	比如说，日本和欧洲为了回应其内部的关注已经收紧了它们的货币和财政政策，这进一步放缓了世界经济。


The build-up of official reserves in East Asia and other developing countries will provide them with extra means to deal with possible external shocks.	东亚和其他发展中国家官方储备的增加会使它们拥有对抗可能产生的外部震荡的额外手段。


However, it has also limited the expansion of domestic demand and import growth, exacerbating rather than redressing the global imbalances.	然而，它同时也限制了国内需求以及进口增长，更加加剧而不是平息了全球经济的不平衡。


Of course, no single government can bear all the costs of the policies needed to correct today’s global imbalances.	当然，没有哪个国家能够单独承担纠正当今全球经济的不平衡的政策的所有代价。


But an internationally agreed set of policies could help reduce the risk of weaker growth in the major economies, maintain confidence in the stability of international financial markets, and avoid a hard landing for the dollar.	但是一组获得国际认可的政策可以帮助减轻主要经济国家增长放慢的风险、维持对于国际金融市场稳定的信心以及避免美元的硬着陆。


This would require, for instance, stimulating growth in Europe, Asia, and the major oil exporters in order to offset the contractionary effect on the world economy of adjustment in the US, which should include more restrictive fiscal policies, less private consumption, and higher domestic savings to reduce its external deficit.	这就需要，比如说，刺激欧洲、亚洲以及主要石油出口国的经济增长以便抵消世界经济调整对于美国的收缩效应，后者应制定更加严谨的财政政策、减少私人消费以及提高国内储蓄以弥补其对外赤字。


Exchange rates should be realigned in a coordinated fashion to stimulate exports from deficit countries and import demand from surplus countries.	汇率应该重新调整到一个协调的水平以刺激赤字国家的出口以及盈余国家的进口需求。


This is not just a matter of revaluing the Chinese currency, as argued by some US policymakers, but requires gradual adjustment of most major currencies against the dollar in conjunction with concerted fiscal and monetary policy adjustments in the rest of the world.	这并不仅仅是一个一些美国政策制订者叫嚷的中国货币的重新估值问题，而是需要逐渐调整绝大多数主要货币对美元的汇率，同时对世界其他国家的财政和货币政策进行相应的调整。


Existing platforms, such as the G-8 summits, are unsuitable to achieve this course of action, mainly because key players from the developing world are not included.	现有的像八国峰会这样的平台并不适合完成这样的行动，这主要是因为一些主要的发展中国家并不是八国峰会的成员。


The multilateral surveillance mechanisms launched last year by the IMF are a step in the right direction, but only if they become part of an institutionalized multilateral mechanism of surveillance and policy coordination.	国际货币基金组织去年所建立的多边监管机制是朝正确方向所迈出的一个步骤，但是只有成立了一个实施多边监管机制和政策协调的组织，它们才能发挥作用。


To be credible as a mediator of this mechanism, the IMF itself would need reform, including a substantial change of voting power to bring the influence of developing countries in line with the weight they carry nowadays in the global economy.	要成为这一机制可信赖的协调者，国际货币基金组织自身也需要改革，包括对表决权进行实质性改变以便使发展中国家拥有与其在当今世界经济中的份量相称的影响力。


Modest steps in that direction were taken during the IMF meetings in Singapore last September.	国际货币基金组织去年九月份在新加坡召开的会议朝这个方向迈出了一点步骤。


Such a new platform should also be used to work towards structural reform of the international monetary system aimed at reducing its excessive reliance on the US dollar as a reserve currency.	同时也应该利用这样一个新的平台对国际货币体系进行结构性的改革，以便减少其对美元作为一种储备货币的过分依赖。


Such reforms should work towards developing a multilaterally agreed multi-currency reserve system or even, in the longer term, a world currency based on the Special Drawing Rights issued by the IMF.	这种改革应该努力建立一个为多方所同意的多种货币储备体系。 甚至从长远来看，建立一种国际货币基金组织所发行的基于特别提款权的世界货币。


The mere possibility of an imminent hard landing for the dollar – and with it, for the US and world economy – should be alarming enough to mobilize concerted action.	美元的硬着陆以及由此所造成的美国和世界经济即将发生硬着陆的可能性应该使我们产生足够的警惕以采取协同一致的行动。


Coordination will surely deliver more satisfactory outcomes than what any one country can achieve on its own.	协作肯定可以比任何一个国家采取单独行动带来更好的结果。


Try Everything	尝试一切手段


BERKELEY – When it became clear in late 2008 that the global economy was headed toward a crash at least as dangerous as the one that had initiated the Great Depression, I was alarmed, but also hopeful.	伯克利——2008年底，当我意识到全球经济距离曾诱发与大萧条同样危险的崩溃越来越近时，我在震惊之余同时又充满希望。


We had, after all, seen this before.	毕竟，我们曾有过类似的经历。


And we also had a model for how to mitigate the damage; unfortunately, policymakers left it on the shelf.	而且我们也曾找到过减轻损失的方法； 不幸的是，决策者却将其束之高阁。


For three and a half years following the start of the Great Depression, US President Herbert Hoover’s top priority was to balance the budget, trying – but ultimately failing – to restore business confidence.	大萧条开始三年半时间内，美国总统赫伯特·胡佛的首要任务是平衡预算，并竭力恢复企业信心（但他的努力最终没有成功）。


In 1933, newly elected President Franklin D. Roosevelt changed course, adopting a simple yet radical strategy: try everything that might boost demand, increase production, or reduce unemployment – and then keep doing the things that work.	1933年，新当选的美国总统富兰克林·罗斯福改变了路线，采取一种简单而激进的策略：尽一切可能刺激需求、增加产量或降低失业率——之后继续重复行之有效的方法。


Roosevelt abandoned attempts to balance the budget, increased the money supply, and initiated deficit spending.	罗斯福放弃试图平衡预算，增加货币供应并启动赤字开支。


He took the United States off the gold standard, had the government hire workers directly, and offered loan guarantees to those in danger of losing their homes.	他让美国脱离金本位，允许政府直接雇佣工人，并为有可能失去家园的人提供贷款担保。


He cartelized the oil industry and instituted aggressive antitrust policies to break up monopolies.	他推动石油行业联盟化，并为打破垄断引入了积极的反垄断措施。


To be sure, Roosevelt’s New Deal policies sometimes conflicted with one another, and quite a few of them were counterproductive.	可以肯定，罗斯福的新政政策有些时候彼此冲突，也有不少取得了适得其反的效果。


But, by trying everything, and then scaling up the most successful policies, Roosevelt was ultimately able to turn the economy around.	但通过尝试一切办法并推广其中最成功的政策，罗斯福最终成功地遏止住了经济的下滑。


And so, in late 2008, the way forward seemed obvious: recapitalize the banks, guarantee loans, use the government-backed housing lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to resolve underwater mortgages, drop short-term interest rates to zero and use quantitative easing to prevent deflation or dangerously low inflation, and embrace deficit spending.	因此，2008年底，摆在面前的道路似乎显而易见：实现银行资本重组、提供贷款担保、利用政府背景的住房贷款机构房利美和房地美化解水下抵押危机，调降短期利率至零，并利用量化宽松政策防止出现通货紧缩或危险的低通胀并大幅增加赤字开支。


Then, as events evolved, we would reinforce those policies that seemed to be working and gradually drop those that seemed to be ineffective or counterproductive.	而后随着事态发展，我们会强化那些起到效果的政策，并逐渐从那些看似无效或效果适得其反的政策中退出。


But that was not what we did.	但我们没有那么做。


Instead, each proposal faced its own opposition.	相反，所有方案都不乏相应的反对力量。


Some worried that recapitalizing the banks would reward the very institutions that had caused the problem.	有人担心注资银行恰恰会奖励那些应该为此次危机负责的机构。


Others fretted that resolving underwater mortgages would reward feckless borrowers.	还有人担心化解水下抵押贷款会鼓励不负责任的借款者。


Still others raised concerns about expansionary fiscal and monetary policy.	还有人担心扩张性的财政和货币政策。


And some favored one set of polices (say, resolving underwater mortgages and recapitalizing the banks), while opposing all the others (for example, deficit spending and raising inflation expectations).	还有人看好其中某些政策（如化解水下抵押贷款和注资银行），但反对实行其他政策（如扩大赤字开支和提高通胀预期）。


Six years on, the economy has yet to fully recover and the problem persists.	危机爆发六年后，经济仍未完全复苏，问题仍未解决。


In an article published on Christmas Day in the Wall Street Journal, the usually wise economist Martin Feldstein makes the case for a set of policies designed to stimulate demand, including increasing investment tax credits and shifting the corporate-tax burden to firms that do not spend very much.	在《华尔街日报》圣诞刊载的一篇文章中，一向明智的经济学家马丁·费尔德斯坦提出了一套旨在刺激需求的政策，包括增加投资税收抵免和向不肯花钱的企业转移税收负担。


Feldstein’s ideas are promising; and, in line with the lessons of the Great Depression, they are definitely worth trying.	费尔德斯坦的思想很有希望； 而且参考大萧条的经验，上述理念绝对值得试行。


The trouble is the rhetoric surrounding his proposals.	问题在于其建议引起的反对声浪。


The article’s headline, “The Fed’s Needless Flirtation With Danger,” is followed by warnings that quantitative easing could “increase the risk of financial instability.”	有篇文章的标题是“美联储与风险的无谓调情，”之后是连篇累牍的警告量化宽松可能“加大金融领域的不稳定性”。


Instead of simply promoting his policies, Feldstein presents them as a “safe and effective alternative” to other approaches.	费尔德斯坦也没有直接宣扬他的政策，而是将其定义为对其他方法“安全而有效的”替代补充。


His proposals, he argues, are not an additional arrow in the quiver, but replacements for “traditional Keynesian policies…[that] increase budget deficits and national debt.”	他认为他的建议不是理应并行不悖的另一项政策，而是对“扩大预算赤字和国家债务的传统的��恩斯主义政策”起替代作用。


The result is that Feldstein’s contribution to solving our economic difficulties is, at best, unproductive.	结果导致费尔德斯坦对化解我们经济困难的贡献即使从最乐观的角度看也并不突出。


Though he presumably hopes that his commentary will increase the likelihood that his preferred policies are adopted, the more likely real-world effect will be to diminish support for existing policies without marshaling support for a coalition that can implement effective replacements.	虽然他大概希望其评论能够增加其首选政策被采纳的可能性，但真实的效果更有可能是在削弱对现有政策支持的同时也未能巩固支持实行有效替代政策的联盟。


I would be remiss if I did not note that I have sometimes been part of the problem.	如果不指出我自己有时也有同样问题将是我的失职。


When I look back at everything I have written since 2008, I find that I, too, have sometimes been too ready to push my favorite recipes at the expense of others.	当回顾2008年来我所撰写的文章时，我发现自己有时也急于推进个人最喜欢的方法，而不顾可能给其他方法造成的损失。


As policymakers continue to seek a path out of the ongoing malaise, it would be wise to remember Roosevelt’s words before he led the US out of a very similar crisis.	在决策者继续探索治愈经济痼疾方法的同时，我们最好不要忘记罗斯福在引领美国走出相似危机前说过的一句话。


“The country needs and…demands bold, persistent experimentation,” he said in 1932.	罗斯福1932年曾说，“这个国家需要并且. .


“Take a method and try it.	. 强烈要求不断进行大胆的尝试。


If it fails, admit it frankly, and try another.	”“不断探索尝试各种方法。 如果效果不佳必须坦白承认，再去尝试其他方法。


But above all, try something.”	但用尽一切方法才是最核心的内容。 ”


New Year’s Resolutions for the Global Economy	新一年的全球经济解决方案


STANFORD – Over the last year, global growth has been anemic – and the forecast is only slightly better for 2016.	发自斯坦福——在过去一年中全球经济增长一直乏力——而对2016年的预测也仅仅是稍好一点。


Something must be done to boost incomes and expand opportunities for people everywhere.	我们必须行动起来，让全球各地的人们可以提高收入并增加社会流动机会。


Here are some economic resolutions that could bring good cheer in the new year and beyond.	而下面就是有可能在新的一年以及未来带来希望一些经济解决方案。


Let us begin in Europe.	首先我们从欧洲开始。


Despite the European Central Bank’s monetary accommodation, a sharp depreciation of the euro, and negative short-term interest rates, the European economy remains in the doldrums.	尽管欧洲央行实施了宽松货币政策，欧元大幅贬值，且短期利率为负，但欧洲经济依旧低迷。


In 2016, Europe’s leaders must stop expecting monetary policy to solve their problems, and instead pursue faster, firmer resolutions to the myriad crises they face, from the intertwined growth, banking, currency, and governance crises to the escalating refugee crisis, which is threatening free movement across internal borders.	在即将到来的2016年，欧洲的领导人必须停止寄望于靠货币政策解决问题，而是寻求更果断坚定的解决方案来他们所面临的种种危机：从相互纠缠的增长，银行业，货币和政府治理危机，再到不断升级的，正在威胁欧洲内部跨国界自由流动的难民危机。


They must pursue supply-side fiscal, structural, labor-market, and regulatory reforms, with common-sense solutions for the struggling periphery economies’ fiscal crises and the stronger economies’ medium-term debt woes topping the agenda.	他们必须寻求供应方财政的，结构性劳动力市场和监管改革，而最重要的议程则是为陷入困境的外围经济体寻找合理的财政危机解决方案，并应对较强经济体所面临的中期债务危机。


In Latin America, the situation is more varied.	拉丁美洲的情况则更加多样化。


After a decade of progress (with some exceptions, notably Venezuela), the region is facing serious challenges, stemming partly from a sharp decline in global commodity prices.	在经历了十年的增长后（有一些例外，特别是委内瑞拉），该地区正面临着严峻的挑战，这部分源自于从全球大宗商品价格的急剧下跌。


Indeed, plummeting oil prices helped to push the region’s largest economy, Brazil, into its worst recession in decades, while a major corruption scandal at Petrobras, the state oil company, has thrown the country’s politics into disarray, with President Dilma Rousseff now facing impeachment.	事实上，石油价格的暴跌令巴西这个该地区最大的经济体陷入了近十年来最严重的衰退，而国营巴西石油公司的重大腐败丑闻已导致该国政治陷入混乱，现任总统迪尔玛·罗塞夫（Dilma Rousseff）面临弹劾。


This makes the pursuit of economy-saving resolutions exceedingly difficult.	这使得经济解救方案的实施变得极为困难。


The new leftist finance minister will probably make things worse.	而新上任的左派财长则可能让情况进一步恶化。


Political instability is undermining economic prospects elsewhere, too.	政治不稳定也在破坏其他国家的经济前景。


In Ecuador, where President Rafael Correa, who seems intent on imitating Venezuelan Chavismo, has eliminated term limits on his office, high inflation is a growing risk.	在厄瓜多尔，有意仿效委内瑞拉查韦斯路线的总统拉斐尔·科雷亚（Rafael Correa），已经取消了自己的连任限制，而国家面临的高通胀风险也越来越大。


In Latin America’s second- and third-largest economies, however, new leadership offers reason for hope.	而在拉美第二和第三大经济体，新履职的领导层则带来了希望。


President Enrique Peña Nieto’s decision to open Mexico’s deep-water oil deposits to international energy companies will help the country overcome declining production, lagging technology, and corruption at Pemex, the national oil company.	墨西哥总统恩里克·佩尼亚·涅托（Enrique Peña Nieto）向国际石油公司开放本国深水石油开采的决定将有助于该国克服国营墨西哥石油公司产能低下，技术滞后和腐败等问题。


Nieto also recognizes the imperative of improving Mexico’s education system, and thus is taking on the powerful teachers’ union.	涅托也认识强化墨西哥教育体系势在必行，并为此与强大的教师工会展开正面交锋。


In Argentina, newly elected President Mauricio Macri is nothing like his anti-business, anti-American predecessor Cristina Kirchner, who pillaged the central bank, channeling funds toward favored local governments, and even fudged national statistics to obscure skyrocketing inflation.	在阿根廷，新当选的总统毛里西奥·马克里（Mauricio Macri）没有像他的反美反商业化的前任克里斯蒂娜基什内尔（Cristina Kirchner）那样掠夺央行，将资金导向那些投其所好的地方政府，甚至捏造国家统计数据来掩盖恶性通胀。


Among Macri’s resolutions are market-oriented reforms, and clearing the many economic land mines that Kirchner planted.	马克里的解决方案包括市场化改革，并清除许多基什内尔任内布下的经济地雷。


He is off to a good start, having freed the peso from its official peg, reduced taxes, and moved toward freer trade.	他启动了一个良好的开端，解除了比索的汇率管制，减税并向自由贸易迈进。


Venezuela also has reason for hope.	委内瑞拉也有希望。


The opposition, having won a supermajority in parliament, defeating the ruling socialists for the first time in 17 years, should be able to limit the harm caused by the policies of President Nicolás Maduro, heir to Hugo Chávez.	在议会大选中应得绝对多数的反对派来17年首次击败执政的社会主义者，应能限制由查韦斯继承者尼古拉斯·马杜罗（Nicolás Maduro）所造成的政策危害。


But if opposition forces are to turn the economy around, they will need to win the presidency in 2019.	但是如果反对力量希望实现经济转向的话，就将需要在2019年赢得总统大选。


In Asia, all eyes are on China, the epicenter of a growth slowdown that has reverberated throughout the region (and beyond).	在亚洲，所有目光都集中到了中国身上，增长放缓的地震波已经传导到了整个地区（及其外围）。


The remarkable growth spurt of the last three decades has degraded the natural environment considerably, produced vast excess capacity in basic industries like cement and steel, and left the banking system saddled with bad loans.	过去三十年的显着井喷式增长带来了自然环境恶化，水泥，钢铁等基础行业巨大的产能过剩，以及因此背负坏账的银行系统。


China’s government has committed to reform, but its efforts are lagging.	中国政府一直承诺改革，但其工作却相对滞后。


The rebalancing of its economy from exports to domestic demand remains a major challenge, not least because its consumers are slow to cooperate.	其经济实现从出口型转向国内需求的再平衡仍然是一项重大挑战，这不仅是因为获得消费者的配合需要时间。


And the government maintains significant control over major companies, even some that are listed on public stock markets.	而政府依旧对大企业握有控制权，甚至一些上市公司也是如此。


To engineer the soft landing that Asia needs, China’s leaders must redouble their reform efforts.	为了实现亚洲需要的软着陆，中国的领导人必须加倍努力进行改革。


One key resolution should be to dispense state-owned companies’ profits directly to the population, to consume the proceeds or invest them elsewhere.	一个关键手段应该是将国有企业的利润分配给人民，让人们可以进行消费或向其他地方投资。


Japan, for its part, has sunk back into recession, despite Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s large and costly economic-revitalization strategy.	虽然日本首相安倍晋三实施了庞大和昂贵的经济振兴战略，但这个国家自身已经重新陷入了衰退。


The Japanese, like many of their neighbors, hope that enactment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal – which would, among other things, lower tariffs on thousands of commodities and reduce non-tariff barriers – will provide a much-needed boost.	日本人跟他们的许多邻居一样，希望跨太平洋伙伴关系（TPP）贸易协议的制定——这将降低上千种商品的关税，减少非关税壁垒——能提供急需的经济刺激。


Africa has been a less visible success story in the last decade.	非洲在过去的十年间都是一个不太显山露水的成功故事。


Despite the many difficulties the continent faces, foreign investment and trade (not aid) provide major opportunities for growth and development.	尽管非洲大陆面临着许多困难，但外国投资和贸易（而非援助）提供了增长和发展的重大机遇。


A resolution to break the scientifically illiterate opposition to genetically modified food would help boost agriculture and exports to Europe substantially.	一项破除盲目反对转基因食品的解决方案将极大促进该地对欧洲的农产品出口。


In North America, Canada’s new center-left prime minister, Justin Trudeau, will be tempted to expand government spending and regulation. But he must not loosen the strings of the public purse too much.	在北美，加拿大的新中左派首相贾斯汀·特鲁多（Justin Trudeau）有可能倾向于扩大政府支出和监管，但切忌大撒金钱。


Thanks to the collapse in oil prices, western Canada is in the early stages of a serious downturn.	因为随着石油价格雪崩，加拿大西部如今进入了严重衰退的早期阶段。


Fortunately, there is room for Trudeau to meet the demands of his supporters, without wasteful spending.	幸运的是，特鲁多有空间去在不铺张浪费的情况下满足自身支持者的要求。 为此，他应该要求美国下一任总统按照保护北美自由贸易协定的原则来实施跨太平洋伙伴关系协议；


To this end, he should press America’s next president to pursue the implementation of the TPP in a way that protects NAFTA; to maintain a sound monetary policy; and to reverse President Barack Obama’s veto of the Keystone Pipeline.	保持稳健合理的货币政策； 并尝试将奥巴马总统对基石输油管（Keystone Pipeline）的否决扭转过来。


These steps would also be in the interest of the United States.	这些做法也符合美国的利益。


In fact, US efforts to promote free trade should go beyond the TPP to target the revitalization of the moribund Doha Round of multilateral trade liberalization.	事实上，美国对自由贸易的推动应该超越跨太平洋伙伴关系协议，致力于复兴本已垂死的多哈回合多边贸易自由化谈判。


Both monetary- and fiscal-policy normalization are critical.	货币和财政政策两者的正常化都是至关重要的。


And the US must capitalize on its expanded energy production, such as by enabling exports of oil and natural gas, to reduce its European allies’ dependence on Russian energy.	而且，美国必须利用其扩大能源生产（如通过允许石油和天然气出口）以减少其欧洲盟国对俄罗斯能源的依赖。


But perhaps America’s most important New Year’s resolution should be to return to global leadership – a role that has gradually eroded over the last decade, with devastating consequences.	不过，或许是美国最重要的新年解决方案应该是回归到全球领导地位——这在过去十年中已经被逐步腐蚀，具并产生了破坏性后果。


That erosion, rooted in deep political fissures that are evident in the current presidential election campaign, is disturbing global economic, financial, and security arrangements that depend on American leadership.	这种植根于深层次政治裂痕的政局糜烂在当前的总统竞选活动中暴露无遗，并威胁到了依赖于美国领导地位的全球经济，金融和安全局势。


The US may have a lot on its plate, but unless it leads effectively, the challenges it faces will only grow.	美国可能依然拥有很多优势，但除非其领导力能有效回归，否则只会面临越来越多的挑战。


The Global Economy’s Marshmallow Test	全球经济的棉花糖测试


NEW YORK – The world economy is experiencing a turbulent start to 2016.	纽约—2016年伊始，世界经济正在经历动荡。 股市崩盘；


Stock markets are plummeting; emerging economies are reeling in response to the sharp decline in commodities prices; refugee inflows are further destabilizing Europe; China’s growth has slowed markedly in response to a capital-flow reversal and an overvalued currency; and the US is in political paralysis.	难民流入进一步动摇着欧洲； 中国的增长因为资本流逆转和货币高估而显著放缓；


A few central bankers struggle to keep the world economy upright.	美国则陷入了政治瘫痪。 一些央行行长竭尽全力让世界经济保持增长。


To escape this mess, four principles should guide the way.	要摆脱这一困境，需要遵循四个原则。


First, global economic progress depends on high global saving and investment.	首先，全球经济进步取决于全球储蓄和投资高企。


Second, saving and investment flows should be viewed as global, not national.	其次，储蓄和投资流应该从全球而不是国家角度去看待。


Third, full employment depends on high investment rates that match high saving rates.	第三，充分就业取决于与高储蓄率匹配的高投资率。


Fourth, high private investments by business depend on high public investments in infrastructure and human capital.	第四，企业部门的高私人投资取决于基础社会和人力资本方面的高公共投资。


Let’s consider each.	让我们逐一分析。


First, our global goal should be economic progress, meaning better living conditions worldwide.	首先，我们的全球目标应该是经济进步，这意味着全世界都获得更好的生活条件。


Indeed, that goal has been enshrined in the new Sustainable Development Goals adopted last September by all 193 members of the United Nations.	事实上，这一目标已经在去年9月写入了获得联合国所有193个成员一致同意的可持续发展目标。


Progress depends on a high rate of global investment: building the skills, technology, and physical capital stock to propel standards of living higher.	进步取决于高全球投资率：构建技能、技术和实体资本存量提高生活水平。


In economic development, as in life, there’s no free lunch: Without high rates of investment in know-how, skills, machinery, and sustainable infrastructure, productivity tends to decline (mainly through depreciation), dragging down living standards.	经济发展和日常生活一样，没有免费的午餐：不提高在知识、技能、机械和可持续基础设施方面的投资率，生产率就会下降（主要是因为折旧），降低生活水平。


High investment rates in turn depend on high saving rates.	高投资率反过来取决于高储蓄率。


A famous psychological experiment found that young children who could resist the immediate temptation to eat a marshmallow, and thereby gain two marshmallows in the future, were likelier to thrive as adults than those who couldn’t.	一项著名的心理学实验发现，能抵挡住不马上吃掉棉花糖的诱惑，进而在未来获得两个棉花糖的小孩，他们长大成人后成功的可能性比经不住诱惑的小孩更大。


Likewise, societies that defer instant consumption in order to save and invest for the future will enjoy higher future incomes and greater retirement security.	类似地，推迟即刻消费为未来储蓄和投资的社会将获得更高的未来收入和更大的退休保障。


(When American economists advise China to boost consumption and cut saving, they are merely peddling the bad habits of American culture, which saves and invests far too little for America’s future.)	（当美国经济学家建议中国刺激消费、削减储蓄时，他们其实是在传播美国文化的坏习惯，美国人为美国的未来储蓄和投资得实在太少了。 ）


Second, saving and investment flows are global.	其次，储蓄和投资流是全球性的。


A country such as China, with a high saving rate that exceeds local investment needs, can support investment in other parts of the world that save less, notably low-income Africa and Asia.	中国这样的国家，它的高储蓄率超过了本地投资需要，可以支持储蓄较少的世界其他地区的投资，特别是低收入的非洲和亚洲地区。


China’s population is aging rapidly, and Chinese households are saving for retirement.	中国的人口正在快速老龄化，中国家庭也在为退休而储蓄。


The Chinese know that their household financial assets, rather than numerous children or government social security, will be the main source of their financial security.	中国人知道，他们的家庭金融资产，而不是数量众多的孩子和政府社会保障，才是财务安全的主要来源。


Low-income Africa and Asia, on the other hand, are both capital-poor and very young.	另一方面，低收入非洲和亚洲地区缺少资本而很年轻。


They can borrow from China’s high savers to finance a massive and rapid build-up of education, skills, and infrastructure to underpin their own future economic prosperity.	他们可以从中国的高储蓄中借钱大量快速地构建教育、技能和基础设施，支持自身的未来经济繁荣。


Third, a high global saving rate does not automatically translate into a high investment rate; unless properly directed, it can cause underspending and unemployment instead.	第三，高全球储蓄率不会自动转变为高投资率； 除非得到适当引导，否则高储蓄率可能导致支出不足和失业。


Money put into banks and other financial intermediaries (such as pension and insurance funds) can finance productive activities or short-term speculation (for example, consumer loans and real estate).	存入银行和其他金融中介（如退休基金和保险资金）的钱可以用于生产性活动，也可以用于短期投机（如消费贷款和房地产）。


Great bankers of the past like J.P. Morgan built industries like rail and steel.	摩根等大银行家创造了铁路和钢铁这样的产业。


Today’s money managers, by contrast, tend to resemble gamblers or even fraudsters like Charles Ponzi.	反之，今天的资金管理人效仿的榜样却是赌徒甚至诈骗犯（如查尔斯·庞齐）。


Fourth, today’s investments with high social returns – such as low-carbon energy, smart power grids for cities, and information-based health systems – depend on public-private partnerships, in which public investment and public policies help to spur private investment.	第四，如今，具有高社会回报的投资——如低碳能源、城市智能电网和基于信息的医疗系统——取决于公私合作，其中公共投资和公共政策有助于刺激私人投资。


This has long been the case: Railroad networks, aviation, automobiles, semiconductors, satellites, GPS, hydraulic fracturing, nuclear power, genomics, and the Internet would not exist but for such partnerships (typically, but not only, starting with the military).	这早已不是什么新鲜事：铁路网、航空、汽车、半导体、卫星、GPS、液压致裂法、核电、基因组学还有互联网都是拜公私合作所赐（通常但不总是从军用项目起步）。


Our global problem today is that the world’s financial intermediaries are not properly steering long-term saving into long-term investments.	当今的全球问题是世界金融中介没有合理地引导长期储蓄进入长期投资。


The problem is compounded by the fact that most governments (the US is a stark case) are chronically underinvesting in long-term education, skill training, and infrastructure.	大部分政府（美国就是显例）在长期教育、技能培训和基础设施方面长期投资不足，这一事实进一步加剧了这一问题。


Private investment is falling short mainly because of the shortfall of complementary public investment.	私人投资不足主要是因为与之互补的公共投资不足。


Shortsighted macroeconomists say the world is under-consuming; in fact, it is underinvesting.	短视的宏观经济学家说，世界消费不足； 事实上，世界是投资不足。


The result is inadequate global demand (global investments falling short of global saving at full employment) and highly volatile short-term capital flows to finance consumption and real estate.	结果是全球需求不足（全球投资达不到充分就业水平下的全球储蓄）和短期资本流波动频繁（为了给消费和房地产融资）。


Such short-term flows are subject to abrupt reversals of size and direction.	这些短期资本流常常发生规模和方向的突然逆转。


The 1997 Asian financial crisis followed a sudden stop of capital inflows to Asia, and global short-term lending suddenly dried up after Lehman Brothers collapsed in September 2008, causing the Great Recession.	1997年亚洲金融危机之前，流向亚洲的资本流突然中断； 而在2008年9月雷曼兄弟倒闭后，全球短期借贷突然干涸，导致了大衰退（Great Recession）。


Now China is facing the same problem, with inflows having abruptly given way to outflows.	如今，中国正面临同样的问题，资本流入突然之间转变为资本流出。


The mainstream macroeconomic advice to China – boost domestic consumption and overvalue the renminbi to cut exports – fails the marshmallow test.	给中国的主流宏观经济学建议——刺激国内消费和高估人民币以降低出口——便是失败的棉花糖测试。


It encourages overconsumption, underinvestment, and rising unemployment in a rapidly aging society, and in a world that can make tremendous use of China’s high saving and industrial capacity.	这一建议鼓励人口迅速老龄化的中国社会和能让中国的高储蓄和工业产能大显身手的世界过度消费、投资不足、提高失业率。


The right policy is to channel China’s high saving to increased investments in infrastructure and skills in low-income Africa and Asia.	正确的政策是将中国的高储蓄引向增加低收入非洲和亚洲地区的基础设施和技能投资。


China’s new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and its One Belt, One Road initiative to establish modern transport and communications links throughout the region are steps in the right direction.	中国的新亚洲基础设施投资银行及其在全地区构建现代交通和通讯联系的一带一路计划才是方向正确的举措。


These programs will keep China’s factories operating at high capacity to produce the investment goods needed for rapid growth in today’s low-income countries.	这些项目将让中国工厂保持开足马力，为当今低收入国家的高速增长生产所需要的投资品。


China’s currency should be allowed to depreciate so that China’s capital-goods exports to Africa and Asia are more affordable.	人民币也应该允许贬值，以使中国对非洲和亚洲的资本品出口更加便宜。


More generally, governments should expand the role of national and multilateral development banks (including the regional development banks for Asia, Africa, the Americas, and the Islamic countries) to channel long-term saving from pension funds, insurance funds, and commercial banks into long-term public and private investments in twenty-first-century industries and infrastructure.	更一般地说，政府应该扩大国家和多边开发银行（包括亚洲、非洲、美洲和伊斯兰国家的地区开发银行），引导来自退休基金、保险资金和商业银行的长期储蓄进入二十一世纪产业和基础设施的长期公共和私人投资。


Central banks and hedge funds cannot produce long-term economic growth and financial stability.	中央银行和对冲基金无法营造长期经济增长和金融稳定。


Only long-term investments, both public and private, can lift the world economy out of its current instability and slow growth.	唯有长期投资（包括公共和私人投资）能够让世界经济摆脱目前的动荡和低增长。


The Economic Consequences of Drug Resistance	抗药性的经济后果


LONDON – When British Prime Minister David Cameron asked me in July to lead an effort to find solutions to the growing global problem of antimicrobial resistance, my first question was: “What is that?”	伦敦—7月，英国首相卡梅伦要我领导一个寻找日益严重的耐药性全球问题解决方案的项目，我的第一个问题是：“这是个什么玩意？


I soon learned that, as bacteria and parasites develop resistance to existing drugs, like antibiotics and antimalarial medications, the world is at risk of losing its battle against infectious diseases.	”很快我就了解到，随着细菌和寄生虫发展出对已有药物（如抗生素和抗疟疾药物）的抗药性，世界有可能在对抗传染病的战斗中败下阵来。


So my next question was: “Why me?	因此，我的下一个问题是：“为什么找我？


Don’t you need a scientist?”	你需要的难道不是科学家吗？ ”


It turns out that the problem of rising antimicrobial resistance is as much about economics as it is about science or medicine.	看起来，抗药性升高的问题既是科学或医学问题，也是经济学问题。


Left unchecked, it will kill millions of people every year, and have serious adverse economic consequences for the world.	据称（有待核实）这一问题每年要杀死数百万人，并且对世界经济表现造成严重的消极影响。


For developing economies, including most of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey) countries, the risk is particularly large.	对发展中经济体，包括大部分金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国）以及薄荷国家（MINT，墨西哥、印度尼西亚、尼日利亚和土耳其），这一风险尤其巨大。


Recent research, by an independent review on antimicrobial resistance, which I chair, has modeled the phenomenon’s likely impact on the world economy.	由我领导的最新研究独立调查了抗药性问题，对抗药性现象可能造成的世界经济影响做了建模。


It suggests that if we fail to address antimicrobial resistance, the problem will grow worse.	模型表明，如果我们不能解决抗药性，问题会越来越糟糕。


By 2020, if we allow resistance to rise by 40%, global GDP will be 0.5% smaller than it otherwise would have been.	到2020年，如果抗药性增加40%，全球GDP就会比不增加的情况收缩0. 5%。


By 2030, it will be 1.4% smaller.	到2030年，收缩比例为1. 4%。


By 2050, the economic shortfall will reach 3%.	到2050年，经济收缩幅度会达到3%。


The accumulated loss of global output over the next 35 years will total $100 trillion – more than one and a half times annual world GDP today.	未来35年累计全球产出损失将达到100万亿美元——是今天全球GDP的1. 5倍多。


Already, 60,000 people die every year from causes related to antimicrobial resistance in the United States and Europe – some ten times the worldwide death toll from the ongoing Ebola crisis.	如今，美国和欧洲每年有60,000人死于与抗药性有关的原因——比正在肆虐的埃博拉危机造成的死亡人数多三倍。


By 2050, if the problem is allowed to continue to grow, antimicrobial resistance will kill more than ten million people per year.	到2050年，如果放任问题增长，抗药性每年会夺走一百多万人的生命。


That is more than the number of people who currently die of cancer, and greater than the number of deaths from diabetes, lung cancer, road traffic accidents, diarrhoeal disease, and HIV combined.	这一数字比目前死于癌症、糖尿病、肺癌、交通事故、腹泻症和艾滋病的总数还要多。


The economic costs from the resulting panic, including a collapse of travel and trade, could be devastating.	由此造成的恐慌（包括旅游和贸易崩溃）所带来的成本极其巨大。


Rising rates of antimicrobial resistance will have a particularly severe impact on India, Indonesia, and Nigeria (as well as the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa).	抗药率的增加对印度、印尼和尼日利亚（以及其他撒哈拉以南非洲国家）的影响特别巨大。


Countries like China and Brazil, which have been successful in reducing malaria rates, could see their hard work undermined by an increase in resistance to antimalarial drugs.	中国和巴西等国家已经成功地降低了疟疾发病率，它们的艰苦努力也会因为对抗疟疾药物的抗药性的增加而遭到破坏。


The research we commissioned was based on the limited data available.	我们所进行的研究基于有限的可获得数据。


It does not take into account the damage from drug-resistant illnesses outside of hospitals or the impact of escalating healthcare costs.	我们的研究没有考虑医院之外的抗药性疾病或医疗成本日渐增长的影响。


Nor does it include the drop in living standards from the loss of life-enhancing treatments – for example, knee or hip replacements, cancer treatment, and caesarean sections – that rely on antibiotics to prevent infections.	我们的研究也没有包括因依赖抗生素防止感染的强化生命治疗的损失而导致的生活水平的下降——如膝关节或髋关节替换术、癌症治疗和剖腹产。


The broad-brush research we conducted shows that such treatments – many of which would not be possible without effective antibiotics – add around 4% of benefit in terms of GDP.	我们所进行的粗略研究表明这些治疗方法——如果没���有效的抗生素，其中许多就无法进行——可以为GDP带来4%的增益。


One of my goals is to persuade policymakers at the United Nations to agree to a set of rules and policies to stop the growth of antimicrobial resistance.	我的目标之一是说服联合国决策者同意实施一套规则和政策阻止抗药性的增加。


In addition to highlighting the scale of the problem, the review is seeking to find ways to reduce drug resistance and to stimulate the production of new antibiotics to compensate for the loss of those that are now or will become ineffective.	除了强调问题的规模，我们的调查还试图找到降低抗药性、刺激新抗生素的生产以抵消现在已经或将要失效的抗生素的损失的办法。


Some solutions to reduce resistance will require cutting-edge technology.	一些降低抗药性的方案需要尖端科技。


We must encourage policymakers to support the development of the best diagnostics.	我们必须鼓励决策者支持发展最好的诊断技术。


Quicker, more accurate diagnoses will curb the current overreliance on antibiotics – a key requirement for combating resistance.	更快、更准的诊断能遏制当前对抗生素的过度依赖——这也是打击抗药性的关键需要。


We also must develop tools to identify and halt outbreaks of resistant diseases at an early stage.	我们还必须发展早期识别和阻止抗药性疾病暴发的工具。


Data provided by diagnostic devices could be a potent weapon in containing these outbreaks.	诊断设备提供的数据可以成为遏制这类疾病暴发的有力武器。


Other solutions are low tech, requiring little more than common sense.	其他解决方案技术含量较低，只需要常识。


We need to start washing our hands thoroughly and often.	首先，我们需要经常、彻底地洗手。


We need to stop demanding antibiotics from our doctors.	我们应该停止要求医生开抗生素。


And, when antibiotics are called for, we need to finish the prescribed course.	当确实需要抗生素时，我们需要按处方配药。


As we try to prevent resistance to existing drugs, we will also need to examine the impact of antibiotics in agriculture.	在试图阻止已有药物的抗药性时，我们还需要考察抗生素对农业的影响。


Developing new antibiotics is a challenge, because pharmaceutical companies seem to need incentives to conduct the required research.	开发新抗生素是一项挑战，因为制药公司需要激励进行必要的研究。


The review will study whether market incentives can be changed.	我们的调查将研究市场激励能否被改变。


If they cannot, more dramatic alternatives to boost early innovation by university labs and small companies could be sought, perhaps through a targeted fund.	如果不能，可以寻求通过大学实验室和小公司提振早期创新作为更有效的替代方案，也许可以采用定向资金支持。


As the review research shows, the stakes of inaction on antimicrobial resistance are high.	我们的调查研究表明，对抗药性问题无动于衷将带来沉重代价。


Now is the time to search for bold, clear, and practical long-term solutions.	我们应该从现在开始寻找果断、明确、实际的长期解决方案。


Are the Good Times Over?	好日子已经过去了吗？


STANFORD – In the 25 years before the Great Recession of 2008-2009, the United States experienced two brief, mild recessions and two strong, long expansions.	发自斯坦福——在2008至2009年大衰退之前的25年间，美国分别经历了两次温和短期衰退以及两次强劲长期的增长。


Globally, incomes grew briskly; inflation abated; and stock markets boomed.	在全球范围内，收入迅速上升； 通胀并不明显；


Moreover, the recovery from the last major slump, in the early 1980s, brought about a quarter-century of unprecedentedly strong and stable macroeconomic performance.	股票市场一片欣欣向荣。 此外，1980年代早期那场从上一场大型衰退中走出来的经济复苏则带来了持续1/4个世纪的，前所未有的强劲稳定宏观经济繁荣。


This time, however, the return to growth has been much more difficult.	但如今，回归增长之路却比以往更加艰难。


America’s recovery since the Great Recession, has been inconsistent, with growth repeatedly picking up and then sputtering out.	自大萧条以来美国经济的复苏其实不是持续的，其中存在着反复的涨涨跌跌。


In fact, the US has not experienced three consecutive quarters of 3% growth in a decade.	事实上，在近十年来美国从未连续三个季度实现3%的增长。


Though lower oil prices are helping consumers, this gain is partly offset by less energy investment, and the effects of the stronger dollar will be even larger.	虽然低油价对消费者有所裨益，但这一收益在某种程度上被更低的能源投资所抵消，而更强势美元所产生的影响则不断加大。


The US is not alone. Though most European economies are now growing again, aided by lower oil prices and currency depreciation, the pace of expansion remains anemic.	而面临这种状况的可不仅仅是美国，虽然大多数欧洲经济体如今都在低油价和货币贬值的帮助下恢复了增长，但经济扩张之路依旧疲软。


Similarly, Japan’s recovery remains fragile, despite strong efforts by the government. Even the major emerging economies, which were supposed to serve as global growth engines in the years ahead, are struggling: China and India have downshifted, and Brazil and Russia are contracting.	即便是那些本应在未来几年承担全球增长引擎任务的主要新兴经济体都陷入挣扎之中，中国和印度的经济增长幅度下滑，巴西和俄罗斯都出现了收缩。


When a boom or bust lasts for such a long time, it begins to seem like it will continue indefinitely.	当一场繁荣或是衰退持续如此之久时，它就开始变得似乎将无尽期地持续下去。


Six years after the crisis, some prominent economists are asking whether insufficient investment and/or waning gains from technological innovation have pushed the global economy into a “new normal” of lower growth and slow, if any, gains in living standards.	在危机过去六年后，一些知名经济学家开始思索是否投资不足和/或科技创新的红利缩减已把全球经济推入一个更低增长以及生活水平的提高（如有的话）放缓的“新常态”中。


Some economists call this “secular stagnation” – a fancy way of saying that the good times are gone for good.	一些经济学家将此称之为“长期经济停滞”——这是种提示大好时光已经永远终结的时髦词汇。


Are they right?	那他们又是对的吗？


Total economic growth amounts to roughly the sum of the growth of work hours (an increase in the number of workers or the amount of hours that they work) and productivity (output per hour of work).	总体经济增长大约为工作时长（劳动者数量或者工作小时数的增长）以及生产力（每小时劳动的产出）增长的总和。


If productivity improves by one percentage point in a year, the improvement of living standards over the subsequent generation would be augmented by one-third.	如果某年的生产力提升了一个百分点，那下一代人的生活水平将随之提升1/3。


Over time, a productivity improvement of even a fraction of a percentage point would be immensely consequential.	随着时间不断累积，即便是极为细微的生产力提升都将带来极大的影响。


Productivity can be enhanced by capital investment, technological innovation, and improvements in the knowledge and skills of the labor force, though economists disagree on which has the largest impact.	虽然经济学家们对资本投资，技术革新以及提高劳动者知识技术水平这三者中哪种更能提升生产力众说纷纭，但它们都有其积极作用。


According to my research with Larry Lau, technology has played the largest role boosting productivity in the G-7 economies since World War II.	根据本人与刘遵义教授最近所做的研究，自二战结束以来，科技是推动G-7经济体生产力增长的最大动力。


Given this, America’s declining productivity growth – which has averaged just 0.7% annually since 2010 – has led some observers to blame the slowdown on inadequate technological advances.	在这一前提下，美国的生产力增长放缓——自2010年以来年均仅增长0. 7%——令某些观察家将这一放缓归罪于科技进步过慢。


These pessimists, such as the economist Robert Gordon, claim that new innovations are unlikely to improve productivity as fundamentally as electricity, automobiles, and computers did in the last century.	这些悲观主义者，比如经济学家罗伯特·戈登（Robert Gordon）都认为新的科技创新都不可能像上世纪的电力，汽车和计算机那样为生产力带来翻天覆地的变化。


Optimists counter that smart phones, Big Data, and expected advances in nanotechnology, robotics, and biosciences are harbingers of a new era of technology-driven productivity improvements.	而乐观主义者则认为，智能手机、大数据、纳米技术进步，机器人技术和生物科学预示着一个科技推动生产力提升的新时代即将到来。


It may be impossible to predict the next “killer app,” they argue, but it will always be developed.	他们指出虽然无法预测哪一种是下一个“杀手应用”，但总有一天会被研制出来的。


Both sides cite Moore’s Law, named for Intel’s co-founder, Gordon Moore, who noticed that the density of transistors on a chip could be doubled every 18 months.	双方都引用英特尔的联合创始人戈登·摩尔（Gorden Moore）所创立的摩尔定律来作为论据。 该定律认为集成电路上可容��的晶体管数目，约每隔18个月便会增加一倍。


The pessimists claim that this is becoming harder and more expensive; the optimists hold that the law will remain valid, with chips moving to three dimensions.	悲观主义者认为增长将变得更为困难和昂贵； 乐观主义者则认为这一定律将随着芯片向3D阵列发展而继续有效。


Clearly, the trajectory of technological progress is difficult to predict.	很显然，科学技术发展的轨迹是难以预测的。


In fact, the main commercial value of new technology is not always apparent even to the inventor.	事实上，许多新技术的商业价值连其发明者都难以辨明。


When Guglielmo Marconi made the first transatlantic wireless transmission over a century ago, he was competing with the telegraph in point-to-point communication; he never envisioned popular mass-broadcast radio.	当古列尔莫·马可尼（Guglielmo Marconi）在一个世纪之前实现首次跨大西洋无线电传输时，还只是想在点对点传输方面和电报竞争； 却从未预见大众广播收音机会因此诞生。


Thomas Edison designed the phonograph to help the blind – and filed a lawsuit to prevent it from being used to play music.	托马斯·爱迪生发明留声机只是为了帮助盲人——甚至还上诉至法院要求禁止将其用于播放音乐。


Complicating matters further is the fact that the next wave of productivity-enhancing technological developments are likely to occur in sectors such as health care, where their economic impact is difficult to measure.	而令事情进一步复杂化的则是推动下一波生产力提升的科技进步很可能在医疗卫生这类部门产生，而它们对经济的影响则极为难以测量。


Economists believe that many improvements in health-care quality – such as more effective treatments for cataracts or cardiac disease – are not accurately reflected in real GDP, and are incorrectly reported as price increases.	经济学家相信许多在医疗卫生质量方面的提升——例如对白内障和心脏疾病的更有效治疗——有在实际GDP方面得到准确的体现，甚至因为价格提升而受到错误报道。


Better measures for these changes are essential for an accurate assessment of economic progress.	如果要更精确地评估经济发展，就必须有更好的手段来测量这类变革。


To be sure, technology-driven growth carries some risks.	无可否认，科技推动的增长也会带来某些风险。


While old fears that automation and artificial intelligence would cause widespread structural unemployment have never been borne out, technology and globalization have put downward pressure on wages for all but the most skilled workers in the advanced economies.	当自动化和人工智能将导致广泛结构性失业的旧忧虑还未彻底被撇除之时，科技和全球化已经对发达国家中几乎所有高技术工人群体造成了工资压力。


Capital’s share of national income has increased, while labor’s share has fallen.	国民收入中的资本收入比例不断上升，而劳动报酬所占比例则不断下降。


But implementing policies that restrict potentially productivity-enhancing technologies would be a grave mistake.	但实施一些限制潜在生产力提升技术的政策则是极端愚蠢之举。


To encourage more robust growth and the associated improvements in living standards, governments should ensure that the private sector has sufficient incentives for innovation, entrepreneurship, and investment in physical and human capital.	为了推动更具活力的增长以及与之相关的生活水平提升，政府应当确保私人部门有足够的激励因素去实施创新，创业以及投资于实物和人力资本。


For example, officials could cut red tape, rein in deficits and debt, enact tax policies conducive to capital formation, reform the education system, and invest in research and development.	比如说政府官员们应该减少繁文缛节、控制赤字和负债、颁布有助于资本形成的税务政策、改革教育体系，并向科研部门追加投资。


Of course, no one should expect a return to the pre-crisis boom years, given the demographic pressures that almost all major economies – including China – are facing.	当然，考虑到几乎所有主要经济体（包括中国）所面对的人口结构压力，没人会希望有可能回到危机前的繁荣岁月。


But these incentives stand the best chance of continuing the flow of productivity-enhancing technology, from startups to the research divisions of established companies in industries from technology to energy to health care.	但这些激励因素却代表着了实现持续生产力提升的最佳机遇，从科技行业到能源行业再到健康产业，从创业企业到现有企业的研究部门，都是如此。


In Search of Growth Strategies	寻找增长战略


MILAN – In 2008, the Commission on Growth and Development, which I had the privilege of chairing, produced a report updating our knowledge about sustainable growth patterns.	米兰——2008年，我有幸领导的增长与发展委员会公布了一份报告，更新了我们所掌握的可持续增长模型的知识。


Then, as now, one thing is clear: the policies that underpin multi-decade periods of high growth, structural transformation, rising employment and incomes, and dramatic reductions in poverty are mutually reinforcing.	当时像现在一样，有一点非常清楚：那就是支持数十年高增长、结构转型、就业及收入上升和贫困显著下降的政策相辅相成。


The impact of each is amplified by the others.	它们对各自的影响起到放大作用。


They are ingredients in recipes that work – and, as with recipes, missing items can substantially undermine the outcome.	它们是组成食谱的重要成分——而且，像食谱一样，某种成分的缺失可能严重破坏其结果。


To understand the weak, deteriorating, and fragile growth patterns seen today in many countries and in the global economy as a whole, one should compare what is actually happening with what reasonably comprehensive growth strategies might look like.	要想对今天众多国家和全球总体经济脆弱且不断恶化的增长模式有所了解，就应该对比现实情况与较为全面的发展战略间存在哪些异同。


Of course, there are many policies that sustain high growth, and to some extent they are country-specific.	当然，确保持续高增长的政策多种多样，并且在一定程度上适应某个特定国家。


But a few key ingredients are common to all known successful cases.	但所有已知的成功案例均具备若干关键要素。


The first is high levels of public and private investment.	首先是高水平的公共和私人投资。


In successful developing countries, investment is at or above 30% of GDP.	在成功的发展中国家，投资占GDP总额的30%或以上。


The public-sector component (infrastructure, human capital, and the economy’s knowledge and technology base) is in the 5-7% range.	其中公共部门（基础设施、人力资本、经济的知识和技术基础）投资处于5-7%的范畴。


And the public- and private-sector investments are complementary: The former raises the rate of return to the latter, and hence its level.	公共和私营部门投资互补：前者通过提升后者的回报率实现其投资水平的提升。


Private domestic and foreign investment is influenced by a host of other factors that affect risks and returns. These include the skills of the workforce, the security of property rights and related legal institutions, ease of doing business (for example, the process and time required for starting a business), and the absence of rigidities in its product and factor markets (those for labor, capital, and raw materials).	民间国内外投资受到一系列影响风险回报的其他因素的影响，其中包括劳动者技能、产权安全性及相关法律制度、经商的便利性（如创业所需的时间和手续、以及避免劳动力、资金和原材料等产品要素市场陷入僵化）。


Above all, the investment climate is positively influenced by stability – both competent and alert macroeconomic management and political effectiveness and continuity.	首先，稳定对投资环境产生积极的影响——包括有效灵活的宏观经济管理和政治上的有效性和连续性。


Conversely, uncertainty about growth, or the commitment to a reasonably coherent reform agenda, will produce adverse impacts on investment.	反过来，对经济增长和合理连贯改革议程的不确定性都会对投资产生负面影响。


A second common ingredient of sustainable growth strategies is that financing these relatively high levels of investment comes from domestic savings.	可持续发展战略第二个常见要素是靠国内储蓄支持相对较高的投资水平。


Substantial reliance on external savings (as reflected in persistent high current-account deficits) seems to end badly – in debt crises and major growth setbacks.	大幅依赖外部储蓄（比如经常账户赤字居高不下）似乎结局不是太好——可能导致债务危机和重大增长停滞。


Openness to the global economy with respect to trade and investment is critical as well.	贸易投资领域对全球经济开放同样至关重要。


Foreign direct investment, for example, is a key channel for transmitting and adapting the accumulated stock of global technology and knowhow.	比如外国直接投资就是传播和学习全球技术及专有诀窍累积存量的重要渠道。


And export competitiveness is raised as investment pours into the construction of links in global supply chains.	投资涌入全球供应链环节建设导致出口竞争力随之提高。


The capital account is a more complicated story.	资本账户的问题相对复杂。


Generally, successful developing economies have managed it to prevent excessive volatility, including volatility resulting from external shocks or imbalances and from excessive reliance on external financing.	一般而言，成功的发展中经济体能够防止过度波动，包括外部冲击或不平衡造成的过度波动和过度依赖外国投资。


In addition, most successful countries manage the exchange rate to keep it in line with productivity growth, using a combination of capital controls, monetary policy, and reserve accumulation or decumulation.	此外，多数成功国家调控汇率适应自身生产率增长，采用的方式包括资本管制、货币政策、储备积累或缩减的组合。


Both over- and undervalued currencies have different adverse effects, though persistent overvaluation is more problematic for stability and growth.	货币高估和低估同样会造成负面影响，但持续高估会给稳定和增长带来更严重的问题。


Finally, inclusiveness is also a key component of successful development strategies.	最后，发展战略成功重要的组成部分还包括包容。


Growth patterns that systematically exclude subgroups founder on the loss of political and social cohesion and, ultimately, on the loss of support for the strategy.	系统地将某些群体排除在外的发展模式必然会丧失政治和社会凝聚力，并最终失去对该发展战略的支持。


By contrast, income inequality that is not too extreme, and that does not arise from corruption or privileged access to markets, is understood and accepted.	相比之下，只要不是过于极端或来自腐败及市场特权等因素，我们就应该理解和接受收入不平等。


The provision of high-quality basic services like education and health care is viewed as crucial for equality of opportunity and intergenerational mobility.	提供像教育和医疗那样的高质量基础服务被视为机会平等和代际流动的关键因素。


Against that backdrop, one can assess current growth patterns in the global economy and its various parts.	在上述背景下，我们可以对全球经济目前的增长模式及其组成部分进行评估。


For starters, public-sector investment is broadly below levels needed to restore and sustain growth, partly owing to fiscal constraints in overly indebted countries.	首先，公共部门投资普遍达不到恢复及保持增长所需的标准，这种情况部分归咎于过度负债国家的财政限制。


Absent defaults, the normal way to reduce sovereign-debt overhangs is with nominal growth.	在不允许违��的前提下，缺乏削减主权债务负担的正常方式。


But growth-oriented policies have been absent, beyond whatever monetary policy can contribute, and inflation is broadly below targets.	但除货币政策外以增长为导向的政策长期缺位，且通胀普遍低于目标值。


And large pools of savings in sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, and insurance companies have not yet been successfully deployed at scale on the public-sector side, presumably because of blockages in the intermediation channels related to risk and incentives.	而且大概因为与风险激励相关的融通渠道堵塞等限制，主权财富基金、养老基金和保险公司的海量规模储备一直未能在公共领域成功实现大规模配置。


Private-sector investment (in tangible and intangible assets) is also below growth-sustaining levels (though there are contrary trends in some high-growth technology sectors).	（尽管某些高增长科技领域趋势相反），但私营部门投资（包括有形和无形资产）同样低于维持增长之所需。


Contributing factors include a shortage of aggregate demand, high levels of uncertainty about policies and regulatory agendas, and growing doubts about key drivers of global growth like China.	造成现状的因素包括总需求不足、政策及法规议程高度不确定和对中国等全球增长关键动力越来越普遍的怀疑。


In addition, depending on the economy in question, stalled tax reform and policy-induced structural rigidities in product and factor markets are having adverse effects.	此外，根据相关经济体自身状况，税收改革停滞和政策造成的产品及要素市场结构僵化正在造成负面的冲击。


With respect to inclusiveness, much useful recent analysis focuses on technology-driven shifts in economic structure and labor markets on the demand side, and globalization, which has left education and skills mismatches on the slower-moving supply side.	在包容性问题上，近期诸多有益分析重点探讨技术驱动的供给侧经济结构和劳动力市场变化，以及全球化导致变化较慢的供给侧教育和技能不匹配等问题。


Job polarization and rising patterns of income inequality are in part the result of these forces, with adverse effects on final demand and, more important, on the resources that individuals and families have to invest in their own human capital.	工作两极分化和收入不平等上升部分系由上述因素造成的结果，这不仅对最终需求产生负面影响，而且更重要的是，削弱了个人和家庭对于自身人力资本的投资能力。


In short, a reasonably comprehensive strategy for restoring country-level and global growth would include measures to elevate and remove obstacles to public and private investment, thereby contributing to aggregate demand.	简言之，恢复国家和全球经济增长的合理综合性战略包括采取措施消除公共私人投资障碍，从而解决总需求问题。


It would also include a variety of reforms to strengthen private investment incentives. And it would include an inclusiveness agenda directed at structural disequilibrium in labor markets and potentially destructive income inequality.	此外还将包括强化民间投资激励机制的一系列改革措施和解决劳动力市场结构性失衡及潜在破坏性收入不平等的包容性议程问题。


Thus far, with few exceptions, such comprehensive growth strategies have been missing.	到目前为止，这样的全面发展战略几乎毫无例外已经彻底缺失。


If those strategies were not just implemented, but also synchronized across major economies, each would be amplified through positive international spillovers via trade – a clear role for the G-20.	如果这样的战略不仅能得以落实，而且能够跨主要经济体实现同步，那么以贸易为介质的国际正面溢出效应将放大各项战略成果——显而易见20国集团应当承担起这样的职责。


In the absence of such an approach, one can foresee an extended period of low and fragile growth, at best, with downside risks stemming from increased leverage in a prolonged low-interest-rate and deflationary environment.	如果没有上述举措，那么人们充其量可以预见长期的增长低迷和衰退，长期低利率及通缩环境可能加剧杠杆，导致下行风险累积。


A worse outcome – and all too plausible – is further deterioration in the political and social cohesion that forms the foundation for vigorous policy responses.	更坏结果（而且发生的可能性很大）是造成政治和社会凝聚力进一步恶化，从而破坏制定有效对策的根基。


At that point, stagnation becomes a trap.	真到那时，我们就将落入停滞陷阱很难摆脱。


In Praise of Global Imbalances	全球失衡颂


SINGAPORE – In recent weeks, there has been a chorus of opinion arguing for a sharp increase in global investment, particularly in infrastructure.	新加坡—最近几周，关于大幅增加全球投资尤其是基础设施投资的声音十分响亮。


Former US Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers asserted that public investment really is a free lunch, while IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde has argued that an investment boost is needed if the world economy is to “overcome a new mediocre.”	前美国财政部张劳伦斯·萨默斯（Lawrence Summers）主张公共投资是真正的免费午餐，IMF总裁克里斯汀·拉加德（Christine Lagarde）指出如果世界经济要想“克服新平庸”就必须提振投资。


These comments suggest that the world has been under-investing for many years.	这些评论认为世界处于投资不足状态已有多年。


In fact, according to International Monetary Fund data, the current overall global investment rate, at 24.5% of world GDP, is near the top of its long-term range.	事实上，根据IMF数据，当前全球总投资率为世界GDP的24. 5%，接近长期区间的上限。


The issue is not a lack of overall investment, but the fact that a disproportionate share of it comes from China.	问题不在于总投资不足，而在于中国一国占总投资规模比例过大这一事实。


China’s share of world investment has soared from 4.3% in 1995 to an estimated 25.8% this year.	中国占世界投资比从1995年的4. 3%飙升至今年的25.


By contrast, the United States’ share, which peaked at 36% in 1985, has fallen to less than 18%.	8%（估计值）。 相反，美国的比重在1985年见顶（36%），如今下降至不足18%。


The decline in Japan’s share has been more dramatic, from a peak of 22% in 1993 to just 5.7% in 2013.	日本的比重下降更加剧烈，从1993年的峰值（22%）减少到2013年的5. 7%。


China dominates global investment because it saves and invests nearly half of its $10.5 trillion economy.	中国主宰着全球投资，这是因为其10. 5万亿规模的经济有近一半用于储蓄和投资。


But this investment rate is likely to decline sharply over the next 5-10 years, because the country already boasts new infrastructure, has excess manufacturing capacity in many sectors, and is trying to shift economic activity to services – which require less investment.	但这一投资率有可能在未来5—10年中大幅下降，因为中国已开始以新基础设施为荣，许多部门的制造产能出现了过剩，并且正在试图将经济活动转向服务业——服务业的投资要求较低。


Moreover, China’s rapidly aging population and declining working-age population will reduce long-term investment demand.	此外，中国人口的快速老化一级级工作年龄人口的下降也将减少长期投资需求。


Because the current-account balance is the difference between the investment and savings rates, the decline in investment will generate large surpluses unless savings also decline.	经常项目余额无非是投资和储蓄率之差，因此投资下降将形成大量盈余，除非储蓄也跟着下降。


And the experience of other aging societies, such as Germany and Japan, suggests that domestic investment falls faster than savings rates.	而从德国和日本等其他老龄化社会的经验看，国内投资会比储蓄率以更快的速度下降。


Thus, China can expect large external surpluses to transform the country from the world’s workshop into its main financier.	因此，可以预计中国将获得巨大的外部盈余，使其从世界工厂转变为主要资金提供者。


Indeed, the scale of capital outflows could be so large that long-term capital will remain cheap even after the world’s major central banks tighten monetary policy. How the world absorbs those surpluses will define the next period of global economic expansion.	事实上，资本外流规模可能极其巨大，以至于即使世界主要央行都收紧货币政策，长期资本仍将十分廉价。


Emerging markets may be able to take some advantage of this low-cost financing.	新兴市场也许能够利用这一低成本融资。


India would undoubtedly benefit, though it is unlikely to absorb a significant portion of China’s excess savings.	印度毫无疑问将从中受益，尽管它无法吸收中国过剩储蓄的大头。 印度占世界投资的比重只有3.


India’s share of world investment is only 3.4%; and even a large expansion will not compensate for a small decline in Chinese investment.	4%； 即便大大扩张也无法抵消中国投资的小幅下降。


Furthermore, East Asia’s growth model has been sustained ultimately by mobilizing rising domestic savings and pumping out exports.	此外，东亚增长模式说到底是通过动员国内储蓄增加和刺激出口维持的。


So, although India might initially absorb some international capital, it might ultimately prefer to build foreign reserves by running small external deficits or even a surplus.	因此，尽管印度或许在一开始能够吸收一些投资资本，但最终或许更愿意通过较小的外部赤字甚至盈余构建外汇储备。


Other emerging countries are also unlikely to absorb much of China’s capital.	其他新兴国家也无法吸收大量中国资本。


Notwithstanding its advocacy of public investment spending, even the IMF accepts that a sudden increase in public investment is more likely to cause developing-country indebtedness than growth.	尽管IMF大力鼓吹公共投资支出，但它也同意共同投资的猛增更有可能导致发展中国家陷入债务而不是增长。


That is why calls by the IMF and others to scale up public infrastructure spending are really aimed at developed countries.	正因如此，IMF和其他人所呼吁的增加公共基础设施支出实际上是针对发达国家的。


Yet this, too, may prove insufficient.	但是这或许仍不充分。


Germany’s investment-savings gap is so large that, even if it increases domestic investment, the most we can expect from Europe is that it does not add to the global savings glut.	德国的投资-储蓄差非常大，即使其增加国内投资，我们也只能指望欧洲不会加剧全球储蓄过剩。


Only a revival in US infrastructure investment can create a sustained global economic recovery.	只有美国基础设施投资复兴能够创造全球经济的持续复苏。


The US has the necessary scale to absorb China’s surplus, and its inadequate infrastructure provides plenty of avenues for fruitful investment.	美国规模够大，能吸收中国的盈余，且其基础设施不足也提供了充足的可行投资机会。


Ironically, the IMF’s new investment mantra ultimately leads back to large global imbalances.	讽刺的是，IMF的新投资咒语最终又绕回到严重的全球失衡上。


But, far from decrying this as a major failure of global policy coordination, economists should accept imbalances as the natural state of the world and try to manage the resulting distortions.	但是，经济学家不应该将此指责为全球政策协调的大失败，而应该接受失衡是世界的常态并试图遏制由此带来的扭曲。


Indeed, almost every period of globalization and prosperity has been accompanied by symbiotic imbalances.	事实上，几乎所有全球化和繁荣时期都伴随着失衡。


They have always caused economic distortions and political complaints, but many have endured for surprisingly long periods.	它们总是造成经济扭曲和政治抱怨，但许多失衡令人惊奇地维持了很长时间。


Consider, for example, the Indo-Roman trade that drove the world economy in the first and second centuries AD.	比如，印度-罗马贸易在公元1世纪和2世纪推动着全球经济。


India ran a current-account surplus while the Romans complained about the loss of gold, yet the system endured.	印度存在经常项目盈余，而罗马人因为黄金流失而怨声载道，但这一状况得到了持续。


Similarly, the first Bretton Woods system was sustained with European capital, and Bretton Woods 2 was fueled by Asian capital, with the US providing the deficits in both cases.	类似地，第一个布雷顿森林体系是用欧洲资本维持的，布雷顿森林2的燃料来自亚洲资本，而美国在这两个阶段都扮演了赤字方的角色。


There is no reason why Bretton Woods 3 should not experience similar imbalances.	没有理由表明布雷顿森林3不能重现这一失衡。


But if, for whatever reason, the global economy fails to take off, we will have to reconcile ourselves to a long period of mediocre growth in which cheap capital depresses yields, drives up asset prices, inflates bubbles, and seeks out trophy assets.	但是，不管出于什么原因，如果世界经济无法起飞，我们继续要让自己适应长期平庸增长，忍受廉价资本抑制收益率、太高资产价格、产生泡沫、寻找圣杯资产。


These are not the sort of imbalances to which the world’s policymakers should aspire.	这类失衡可不是世界决策者应该追求的。


Out of Ammunition to Combat Recession?	对抗衰退的手段穷尽了吗？


STANFORD – Economic forecasts for 2017 project continued frailty in the global economy, and subpar growth for most countries and regions.	发自斯坦福——对2017年的经济预测预计全球经济将持续疲软，同时大多数国家和地区的增长也不甚理想。


Obvious economic problems include Europe’s weak banks, China’s distorted property market, political uncertainty in the West, historically high private and public debt – 225% of GDP, according to the International Monetary Fund – and the reluctance of heavily indebted Greece and Portugal to comply with IMF programs.	其中显而易见的经济问题包括欧洲银行抗风险能力低下，中国房地产市场过度扭曲，西方政治不确定性，史上最高的私人和公共债务——据国际货币基金组织测算相当于GDP的225％，以及负债累累却又不愿遵照基金组织方案行事的希腊和葡萄牙。


Additional global economic risks, such as a major oil-market disruption that could drive prices up, are not as obvious, and thus receive less attention.	其他全球经济风险——例如可能推动价格上涨的重大石油市场危机——则不甚明显，人们对此的关注也较少。


Economists call such events “shocks” precisely because they come unexpectedly and can have far-reaching consequences.	而经济学家之所以将这类事件称为“冲击”，恰恰是因为它们总是意外爆发并可能带来深远的影响。


Unprecedented long-term monetary stimulus and massive spikes in public-debt burdens have left governments poorly equipped to manage the next economic downturn when – not if – it arrives.	前所未有的长期性货币刺激政策和公共债务负担的大幅攀升必将使政府在应对下一次（必定会来的）经济衰退时捉襟见肘。


The next recession probably will not be as bad as the last one, but advanced economies will be far better prepared for it if they undergo gradual monetary-policy normalization and fiscal consolidation in the meantime.	下一次经济衰退或许不会像上一次那样糟糕，但如果发达经济体能实施逐步的货币政策正常化和财政整顿，它们就不会那么被动。


With respect to monetary policy, the United States’ unemployment rate, at around 5%, is close to what most economists consider full employment, and the Federal Reserve is widely expected to raise its target interest rate again in December. But the Fed is moving at a very slow pace.	在货币政策方面，美国的失业率（约5％）接近大多数经济学家认定的充分就业状态，外界普遍预期美联储会在12月再次提高其目标利率，但该机构却总是一副慢条斯理的样子。


The European Central Bank will likely extend its bond-purchasing program; but it has reason to question the results of its quantitative-easing policy, given that eurozone unemployment still averages around 10%, indicating a sizeable output gap.	欧洲中央银行可能会扩大其债券购买计划； 但鉴于欧元区失业率仍然维持在平均为10％左右，表明产量距离理想状态依然存在相当差距，使其有必要检讨一下量化宽松政策的成果。


Meanwhile, the Japanese economy continues to limp along, with the Bank of Japan now “managing the yield curve” in yet another attempt to raise inflation and growth from their current low levels.	与此同时日本经济继续徘徊不前，于是日本央行如今开始“管理收益率曲线”以图再次将通胀和增长指数拖离当前的低水平。


In terms of fiscal policy, most advanced economies’ public finances are suffering because policymakers have failed to implement sufficient supply-side structural reforms to control public-pension growth, reform growth-inhibiting taxes, and liberalize labor markets.	在财政政策方面，大多数发达经济体的公共财政目前都处于煎熬之中，因为政策制定者未能实施充足的供给侧结构改革以遏制公共养老金增长，改革抑制增长的税制以及为劳动力市场松绑。


These fiscal-policy failures have put too much of the burden on central banks, even though growth would more likely accelerate with productivity-enhancing supply-side measures.	即便增长可能会借助提高生产率的供给侧措施而加速，但这些财政政策败局依然给央行带来了过于庞大的负担。


Lately, the economists who are most influential with left-leaning politicians seem hopeful that growth, employment, and incomes will rise if policymakers embrace massive new deficit-financed spending to create demand for goods and services.	而就在最近，那些对左倾政治家影响较大的经济学家似乎寄望决策者能动用大规模的新赤字融资支出来创造对商品和服务的需求，以实现增长，就业和收入的上升。


They argue that with borrowing costs so low, deficit spending is virtually free, and we need not worry about high debt levels.	他们觉得既然借款成本如此之低，赤字支出几乎是免费的，我们也不必对高债务水平有所忧虑。


But this argument ignores the typically large gap between what economists devise and what politicians promise, and what public-spending programs actually deliver.	无奈这一论点忽视了经济学家的设想与政治家的承诺之间的巨大差距，以及公共支出项目实际呈现的成果。


As ECB President Mario Draghi has put it, “There aren’t many public investments with a high rate of return.”	正如欧洲央行行长马里奥·德拉吉（Mario Draghi）所说：“公共投资没几个是高回报的”。


Governments should certainly cut taxes and fund initiatives that pass rigorous cost-benefit tests; but broad new spending programs usually do not yield a significant or immediate economic boost.	政府应当实施减税并资助那些通过严格成本效益测试评估的计划;但大范围的新支出计划通常不会产生显著或即时的经济增长。


For starters, spending generally occurs well into the future, when economic conditions are projected to be better.	首先，一般来说，支出策略通常应该被放在经济前景预测向好的遥远未来去执行。


As President Barack Obama, referring to his signature 2009 stimulus bill, eventually admitted, “the shovels weren’t ready.”	就连奥巴马总统在提到自己于2009年推出的标志性刺激法案时也得最终承认“有些（本应立刻动工的）项目还没有动静”。


Similarly, Japan has attempted government spending stimulus for decades, with little to show for it in terms of overall economic growth.	同样，日本在过去几十年间一直都尝试进行政府支出刺激，却在整体经济增长方面收效甚微。


To be sure, large deficits can be benign or even desirable during recessions and wars, or when used to finance productive public investments; and in a deep, long-lasting downturn, with interest rates at or near zero, a well-timed, sensible fiscal response can theoretically help in the short term.	可以肯定的是，在经济衰退和战争期间，或在用于资助生产性公共投资时，巨额赤字可能是良性的或甚至是可取的； 同时在利率处于或接近零的长期持续低迷时期，一个及时且合理的财政应对措施在理论上可以在短期内有所帮助。


But studies show that the multiplier effect of government spending – when it may increase GDP by more than the expenditure – shrinks rapidly after a few quarters, and then turns negative.	但多项研究表明：政府支出的乘数效应——虽然可能产生超过支出本身的GDP增长——会在几个季度后迅速减少，然后变为负数。


In fact, the multiplier effect can even be negative during economic expansions when central banks maintain zero-interest rates and households expect taxes to rise when interest rates do.	事实上在央行维持零利率且人们预期税率和利率将同步上升的经济扩张期间，这一乘数效应甚至可能是负的。


Because new government purchases can devolve into counterproductive political boondoggles that spur little economic growth, another proposal one often hears is to expand government transfer payments.	由于新的政府采购行为可以劣化为无力刺激经济增长的反效应政治风险，另一个常常听到的建议就是扩大政府转移支付。


Leaving aside the fact that transfer payments are already fiscally unsustainable in most countries (because they were adopted and expanded under better economic and demographic conditions), could they lift the economy?	即便不考虑转移支付在大多数国家已经在财政上不可持续的事实（因为该政策早在经济和人口构成尚处于理想状态时就被实施和扩大了），它们是否就能提振经济呢？


A recent study addresses this very question.	最近的一项研究正好探讨了这一问题。


According to former Obama administration Chief Economist Christina Romer and David Romer of the University of California, Berkeley, even permanent transfer-payment increases provide stimulus for only a few months, and the effect does not spread to employment.	前奥巴马政府首席经济学家克里斯蒂娜·罗默（Christina Romer）和加州大学伯克利分校教授大卫·罗默（David Romer）的研究指出，即使永久性的转移支付增长也只能带来几个月的刺激效应，而且这种影响并不会扩散到就业。


The study concludes that the benefits from transfers are “much less persistent, and much smaller overall, than those of tax changes.”	研究结论认为转移支付的收益“在持续性方面远远低于税收调整，其总体上收益规模也更小”。


In economies where stimulus programs are carefully vetted and can be implemented quickly, any temporary government spending should be coupled with gradual fiscal consolidation, to minimize economic risk and long-term costs.	在刺激计划经过仔细审查并可以快速实施的经济体中，任何临时性政府支出都应与逐步的财政巩固手段相结合以尽量减少经济风险和长期成本。


As history and theory indicate, this fiscal consolidation should happen through reduced future spending growth, especially on transfer payments.	正如历史和理论所表明的那样，这种财政巩固应该通过减少未来支出增长（尤其是转移支付）来实现。


Economic policymakers should heed this lesson so that they can gradually re-arm themselves; otherwise, they could be left with no firepower when they most need it.	经济决策者应该吸取这一经验并以此逐步重新武装自己； 否则就会在事态最为紧急是陷入手无寸铁的窘境。


Two Cheers for the New Normal	新常态的两大亮点


JAKARTA – The conventional wisdom about the state of the world economy goes something like this: Since the start of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the developed world has struggled to recover, with only the United States able to adjust.	雅加达—关于世界竞技状态的传统智慧大概是这样的：自2007—2008年金融危机爆发以来，发达世界在挣扎着复苏，只有美国有能力做出调整。


Emerging countries have fared better, but they, too, have started to flounder lately.	新兴国家表现更好，但它们也最近也开始步入低迷。


In a bleak economic climate, the argument goes, the only winners have been the wealthy, resulting in skyrocketing inequality.	这一观点认为，在恶劣的经济环境下，唯一的赢家是富人，这导致了不平等性一飞冲天。


That scenario sounds entirely right – until, on closer examination, it turns out to be completely wrong.	这一情景看上去无懈可击——但若做一番更仔细的考察就能发现它完全是错误的。


Start with economic growth.	从经济增长开始。


According to the International Monetary Fund, during the first decade of this century, annual global growth averaged 3.7%, compared to 3.3% in the 1980s and 1990s.	据国际货币基金组织（IMF），本世纪第一个十年，全球年平均增长率为3. 7%，而20世纪80和90年代为3.


In the last four years, growth has averaged 3.4%.	3%。 在过去四年中，平均年增长为3.


This is far lower than what many had hoped; in 2010, I predicted that in the coming decade, the world could grow at a 4.1% annual rate.	这比人们期望的增长低得多； 2010年，我预测在未来十年，世界将以4.


But 3.4% is hardly disastrous by historical standards.	但从历史标准看，3. 4%也远不是什么灾难。


To be sure, all of the large, developed economies are growing more slowly than they did when their economic engines were roaring.	平心而论，所有大型发达经济体的增长都不如经济引擎充分转动时快。


But it is only the eurozone that has badly disappointed in recent years.	但在最近几年中，只有欧元区令人大失所望。


I had assumed, when I made my projections in 2010, that the region’s poor demographics and weak productivity would prevent it from growing at more than 1.5% a year.	我在做出2010年预测时假设，该地区的不利人口因素和低下的生产率将使其增长率无法超过每年1. 5%。


Instead, it has managed only a meager 0.3%.	事实结果是更加令人失望的0. 3%。


For Japan, the US, and the United Kingdom, the prospects are brighter.	日本、美国和英国的前景要好一些。


It should be relatively straightforward for them to grow at an average rate that outpaces that of the last decade – a period that includes the peak of the financial crisis.	它们可以以超过包括了金融危机最剧烈阶段的过去十年的水平的平均增长率增长，这应该是相对直观的判断。


In addition, the dramatic drop in the price of crude oil will serve as the equivalent of a large tax cut for consumers.	此外，原油价格的暴跌相当于消费者获得巨大的减税。


Indeed, I am rather baffled by the IMF’s decision to downgrade its growth forecast for much of the world.	事实上，IMF决定调降今年的世界大部分地区增长预测，这令我十分困惑。


If anything, with oil prices falling, an upward revision seems warranted.	在油价下降的背景下，要调整也应该是调高。


Another factor supporting a more positive outlook is the rebalancing that has occurred between the US and China, the world’s two largest economies.	另一个支持更加积极的前景的因素是世界两大经济体——美国和中国之间已经开始了再平衡。


Each entered the financial crisis with huge current-account imbalances.	中美两国都是带着巨大的经常项目失衡进入金融危机的。


The US was running a deficit of more than 6.5% of its GDP, and China had a surplus of close to 10% of its GDP.	美国的赤字超过其GDP的6. 5%，而中国的盈余接近其GDP的10%。


Today, the US deficit has fallen to about 2%, and the Chinese surplus is less than 3%.	如今，美国的赤字已降到2%左右，而中国的盈余也已不足3%。


Given that their intertwined imbalances were key drivers of the financial crisis, this is a welcome development.	由于中美之间的不平衡是金融危机的重要因素，因此这是个值得欢迎的趋势。


It has recently become fashionable to disparage the economic performance of the large emerging countries, particularly China and the other BRIC economies (Brazil, Russia, and India).	最新的流行趋势是看淡新兴大国的经济表现，特别是中国和其他金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯和印度）。


But it is hardly a surprise that these countries are no longer growing as fast as they once did.	但这些国家不再如过去那样高速增长并不令人奇怪。


In 2010, I predicted that China’s annual growth would slow to 7.5%.	2010年我预测中国年增长率将下降至7. 5%。


It has since averaged 8%.	此后的平均值为8%。


India’s performance has been more discouraging, though growth has picked up since early 2014.	印度的表现比中国更差，尽管2014年初增长有回暖之势。


The only real disappointments are Brazil and Russia, both of which have struggled (again, not surprisingly) with much lower commodity prices.	唯一真正令人失望的是巴西和俄罗斯，这两个国家都深陷大宗商品价格大跌的泥潭（这也不令人奇怪）。


Their lethargic performance, together with the eurozone’s, is the main reason why the world economy has not managed the 4.1% growth that optimists like me thought was feasible.	它们的低迷表现，再加上欧元区的萎靡，就构成了世界经济无法达到我这样的乐观派认为应该达到的4. 1%的增长率的主要原因。


The conventional wisdom on wealth and inequality is similarly mistaken.	类似地，关于财富和不平等性的传统智慧也是错误的。


From 2000 to 2014, global GDP more than doubled, from $31.8 trillion to over $75 trillion.	从2000年到2014年，全球 GDP翻了一倍多，从31. 8万亿美元增长到75万多亿美元。


Over the same period, China’s nominal GDP soared from $1.2 trillion to more than $10 trillion – growing at more than four times the global rate.	与此同时，中国名义GDP从1. 2万亿美元增长到10万亿美元以上——增长速度比全球快4倍。


In 2000, the BRIC economies’ combined size was about a quarter of US GDP.	2000年，金砖四国经济体加起来大约能达到美国GDP的四分之一。


Today, they have nearly caught up, with a combined GDP of more than $16 trillion, just short of America’s $17.4 trillion.	如今，它们已接近赶超，GDP之和超过16万亿美元，只是略低于美国的17. 4万亿美元。


Indeed, since 2000, the BRICs have been responsible for nearly a third of the rise in nominal global GDP.	事实上，2000年以来，金砖国家为世界贡献了近三分之一的名义GDP。


And other emerging countries have performed similarly well.	其他新兴国家表现也同样出色。


Nigeria’s economy has grown 11-fold since 2000, and Indonesia’s has more than quintupled.	尼日利亚经济自2000年以来增长了11倍，印度尼西亚也翻了五倍多。


Since 2008, these two developing giants have contributed more to global GDP growth than the EU has.	2008年以来，这两个发展中巨人对全球GDP增长的贡献比欧盟更大。


Statistics like these utterly disprove the idea that global inequality is growing.	这些数据有力地反驳了全球不平等加剧的观点。


Gaps in income and wealth may be shooting up within individual countries, but per capita income in developing countries is rising much faster than in the advanced economies.	收入和财富的差距也许在个体国家内部有所加剧，但发展中国家的人均收入增长远快于发达经济体。


Indeed, that is why one of the key targets of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals – to halve the number of people living in absolute poverty – was achieved five years ahead of the deadline.	事实上，正因如此，联合国千年发展目标（Millennium Development Goals）的关键目标之一——让生活在绝对贫困状态中的人口数量减少一半——提前五年实现了。


None of this is meant to deny that we are living in challenging and uncertain times.	所有这些都不是为了否认我们生活在极具挑战性并且不确定的时代。


But one thing is clear: economically, at least, the world is continuing to become a better place.	但有一件事是清楚的：至少从经济上说，世界仍在变得更加美好。


Global Energy Realism	全球能源现实主义


MADRID – Energy has become a focal point of global policymaking.	马德里—能源已成为全球决策的焦点。


As falling oil prices grab headlines worldwide, US President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping have signed a major climate-change deal, and October’s European Council decisions could signal real progress toward a serious European Union energy policy.	油价下跌占据了世界媒体头条，与此同时，美国总统奥巴马和中国国家主席习近平签署了一项重要的气候协议，而10月的欧洲理事会决定也可能表明欧盟朝着严肃的能源政策做出了真正的进步。


This momentum should be maintained in the coming year, culminating in December’s United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP21) in Paris.	这一趋势应该在明年继续保持，在12月的巴黎联合国气候变化会议（COP21）上达到高潮。


But, in order to establish a global energy system that meets growing demand within the constraints of carbon neutrality, we must avoid the pitfalls that have plagued past responses.	但是，要建立一个全球能源体系、在碳中性的约束下满足日益增长的需求，我们必须避免破坏了过去的努力的陷阱。


In particular, we must strike the proper balance between ideology and realism, the public and private sectors, and long- and short-term considerations.	特别是，我们必须在理想与现实之间、公共和死人部门之间以及长期与短期考虑之间达到合适的平衡。


And, critically, we must follow through on our commitments.	最关键的是，我们必须信守我们的承诺。


When it comes to ideology and realism, the European Union is perhaps the best example of an imbalanced approach, as Europeans’ tendency to lead with their hearts, rather than their heads, has undermined effective action.	在理想与现实方面，欧盟也许是方针失衡的最佳范例。 欧洲总是随心所欲而不理性思考，这制约了有效行动。


The knee-jerk rejection of nuclear power by some EU member countries has led to sharp increases in coal usage.	一些欧盟成员国下意识地拒绝核电导致煤炭使用量激增。


Renewables have been pursued with a sort of missionary zeal, regardless of their effectiveness or feasibility.	可再生能源激起了一种传教士般的狂热，丝毫不考虑效率或可行性问题。


And the EU’s “20/20/20 targets” – a 20% reduction in greenhouse-gas emissions, a 20% share for renewables, and a 20% increase in energy efficiency, all by 2020 – was more of a mantra than a policy.	而欧盟的“20/20/20目标”——到2020年削减20%温室气体排放、使用20%可再生能源、提高20%能源效率——更多地只是一个口号而不是政策。


Bridging the gap between the public and private sectors is vital to finance the construction of an efficient global energy system.	弥合公共和死人部门之间的差异对于为建设高效的全球能源体系的融资来说至关重要。


The International Energy Agency estimates that by 2040, the annual investment required in energy-supply infrastructure alone will total $2 trillion, up 20% from current levels.	国际原子能机构测算，到2040年，光是能源供给基础设施一项每年所需要的总投资额就高达2万亿美元，较目前增加20%。


Over the next 26 years, some $51 trillion will be needed.	未来26年中总共需要大约51万亿美元。


This is just part of the overall infrastructure investment shortfall, which stands at $1 trillion annually – far more than what governments can afford.	这只是基础设施投资总缺口的一部分。 基础设施总缺口达每年1万亿美元——远远高于政府的承受能力。


That is why governments must build innovative partnerships with private-sector actors, while recognizing that energy, as a public good, must be subject to appropriate regulation and oversight.	因此，各国政府必须与私人部门行动方建立创新合作模式，同时认识到能源作为一种公共品必须接受恰当的监管和监督。


There have been some notable moves in this direction, though it remains to be seen whether they will translate into real action.	在这方面已经有了一些值得关注的动作，尽管是否能转化为真实行动还有待观察。


China has spearheaded the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.	中国身先士卒，建立了亚洲基础设施投资银行。


More important, the World Bank, the G-20, and the EU recently launched initiatives aimed at directing the financing power of business toward infrastructure development.	更重要的是，世界银行、G-20和欧盟最近都启动了旨在引导商业融资力量进入基础设施开发的计划。


The World Bank’s Global Infrastructure Facility is an open platform that brings together multilateral development banks, national governments, and private finance to shepherd infrastructure projects to completion and to fill in gaps that have hampered investment.	世界银行的全球基础设施基金（Global Infrastructure Facility）是一个聚集了多边开发银行、国家政府和私人融资的开放平台，引导基础设施工程的完工和填补阻挠投资的缺口。


Pivotal to sparking this investment is the mitigation of associated political risks, especially through an enhanced role for the Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.	点燃这一投资之火的关键是降低相关政治风险，特别是通过加强世界银行的多边投资担保局（Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency）实现这一点。


Similarly, at last month’s summit in Brisbane, the G-20 created a new Global Infrastructure Hub to facilitate information-sharing, thereby streamlining infrastructure projects.	类似地，在上个月的布里斯班峰会上，G-20成立了新的全球基础设施枢纽（Global Infrastructure Hub）以便于信息共享，从而实现基础设施工程的合理化。


And, the EU’s Connecting Europe Facility has allocated €5.85 billion ($7.2 billion) from now until 2020 to help kick-start private investment in infrastructure projects linking member countries’ energy systems.	此外，欧盟的连通欧洲基金（Connecting Europe Facility）将在从现在到2020年的时间里花58. 5亿欧元用于帮助私人投资参与连接各成员国能源系统的基础设施工程。


Of course, the need for private-sector involvement extends beyond investment.	当然，私人部门参与的需要不止在于投资。


The private sector is also better situated to research and develop new production methods that limit demand for fossil fuels.	私人部门也更适合研发限制化石燃料需求的新生产方法。


To spur such action, the public sector should offer funds or guarantees, which, though risky, could offer huge benefits.	要刺激这方面的行动，公共部门应该提供资金或担保——尽管风险高，但能带来巨额回报。


US government funding of research into hydraulic fracturing – the technology now driving the surge in America’s oil and gas production – dates back to the 1970s.	美国政府对液压致裂法研究的资金支持可以追溯到20世纪70年代。 如今，液压致裂技术正在推动美国油气产量大幅增长。


This brings us to the need to balance short-term imperatives with long-term vision.	这就引出了平衡短期任务和长期愿景的需要。


Energy projects and policies today must account for the projected increase in emerging-market demand, while ensuring sufficient investment in future generating capacity.	今天的能源工程和政策必须考虑能源市场需求的预期增加，同���保证未来产能的充分投资。


For example, over the next 25 years, 60% of the EU’s generating capacity is due to retire – contributing to demand for $2.2 trillion of energy investment.	比如，在未来25年里，60%的欧盟产能将退役——这将产生2. 2万亿美元能源投资需求。


Furthermore, with US tight-oil production expected to peak in the early 2020s, new sources must be developed, such as in Iraq.	此外，美国致密油（tight-oil）产量预计将在21世纪20年代初达到顶峰，因此必须开发新的资源（比如伊拉克的资源）。


Given the long lead time for bringing new projects onstream, efforts to address the coming shortfall must begin today.	考虑到新工程投产需要很长时间，解决未来短缺的工作必须现在就开始。


In all of these efforts, there is one common imperative: matching words with deeds.	在所有这些工作中，有一项共同的当务之急：言行一致。


The world does not need more commitments and pledges; it needs action.	世界需要的不是更多的承诺和誓言，而是行动。


Yet many countries continue to issue weak declarations that fail to produce genuine progress.	但许多国家继续发表无力的宣言，而不拿出真正的进展。


Once again, this problem is particularly pervasive in Europe.	在这方面，欧洲也是重灾区。


The maxims of today – the need for diverse suppliers, enhanced interconnection, greater efficiency, and a sensible energy mix – have been discussed for at least a decade.	今天的口头禅——需要实现供给源多样化、加强连通性、增进效率、形成明智的能源组合等——都是至少已经存在了十年的老生常谈。