The Ghost of Biafra	比夫拉的幽灵


When Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo made his surprise announcement on 13 January to begin a nationwide dialogue to discuss constitutional reform, he was bowing to the inevitable.	当尼日利亚总统奥卢塞贡·奥巴桑乔1月13日出人意料地宣布开始全国性探讨宪法改革的对话时，他终于接受了无可避免的现实。


The clamor by disaffected politicians and human rights activists for such a conference had reached a crescendo.	心存不满的政界和人权人士要求举行类似会议的呼声前所未有的高涨。


Obasanjo and the ruling Peoples Democratic Party were re-elected in May 2003 in controversial circumstances.	奥巴桑乔和执政的人民党于2003年5月在充满争议的情况下当选。


Opposition forces, led by Muhammadu Buhari, the candidate of the All Nigeria People’s Party, accused Obasanjo of using the police to intimidate voters and falsify the election results.	由全尼日利亚人民党候选人穆罕穆杜·布哈里领导的反对力量指控奥巴桑乔利用军警来恐吓选民，伪造选举结果。


Initially, it looked like Obasanjo would weather the storm and serve out his last term without making concessions to his opponents.	起初，奥巴桑乔似乎能承受这场风暴的洗礼，在不对反对派让步的情况下完成自己的最后任期。


However, in late December 2004, the national election tribunal, sitting in Abuja, the capital, ruled that while the election had been free and fair in most parts of the country, the number of votes was larger than the population in Ogun, the President’s home state.	但在2004年12月末，首都阿布贾的国家选举法庭裁决全国大多数地区的选举都比较自由和公正，唯独总统家乡奥贡州的选票数超过了那里的人口总数。


The opposition seized on the ruling and called on Obasanjo to resign.	这样一来，反对派抓住了执政党的把柄，呼吁奥巴桑乔立即辞职。


Simultaneously, the eastern part of the country descended into anarchy.	与此同时，尼日利亚东部地区政局一片混乱。


Political thugs linked to the president resorted to strong-arm tactics in an attempt to remove one of the governors, angry that he had not given them lucrative public contracts.	与总统有关的政治暴徒以未能得到利润丰厚的公共合同为由，采用暴力手段逼迫一名州长下台。


Obasanjo refused to call them to order, even after they invaded and razed government offices.	即便在暴徒们攻入政府部门，并把那里夷为平地后，奥巴桑乔仍然拒绝给予他们相应的制裁。


In the Niger delta, where oil production and official neglect have devastated the environment and wrecked livelihoods, enraged youths took to the swamps and led an insurgency against Federal troops.	在石油生产和政府渎职已经将环境破坏殆尽、人民生活也早已一塌糊涂的尼日尔三角洲地区， 愤怒的年轻人以沼泽为根据地，发动了针对联邦军队的起义。


But the most powerful push for the conference came from politicians in the largely Christian south, apprehensive that power would return to the Muslim north in 2007 after Obasanjo, himself a southern Christian, completed his second term.	但推动会议的最强大力量来自基督教占主导地位的南方，那里的政界人士担心身为南方基督教信徒的奥巴桑乔2007年完成自己的第二个任期后，权力会最终落到被穆斯林势力占据的北方。


Since political independence in 1960, politics has revolved round Nigeria’s major ethnic groups – the Igbo and Yoruba in the south, and the Hausa and Fulani in the north.	1960年政治独立后，政权就一直在尼日利亚的主要种族¾南方的伊博和约鲁巴、还有北方的豪萨和富拉尼之间循环往复。


Southerners’ apprehension is well founded.	南方人的担心很有道理。


The north dominated the armed forces following the Biafra civil war in the late 1960’s.	20世纪60年代末的比夫拉内战以来，武装部队就一直为北方所控制。


As military rule became the norm in Africa in the 1970’s, northern army officers imposed an authoritarian and predatory mode of governance on the country, a vicious grip that was loosened only when a resurgent civil society forced them to return to the barracks in 1999.	随着20世纪70年代军事统治在非洲的巍然成风，北方军队的军官们也在治国上采取了独裁和掠夺的方式，这种邪恶的控制直到1999年复兴的平民社会把他们赶回到军营之中后才有所缓解。


Obasanjo’s election marked the return of civilian rule.	奥巴桑乔的当选标志着平民执政的回归。


The demand for a new constitution emulating Nigeria’s First Republic of the early 1960’s, when the country was a federation of powerful regions enjoying a large measure of fiscal autonomy, grew over the years as Nigeria’s economy plummeted.	随着尼日利亚经济的迅速衰退，要求仿效20世纪60年代早期尼日利亚第一共和国的样式制定新宪法的呼声日益高涨，当时的共和国是由一系列强大地区组成的联邦，在财政上享有很大程度的自主权。


But Obasanjo is a passionate advocate of unitary government and counts many influential northerners as personal friends.	但奥巴桑乔是单一政府的积极倡导者，很多颇有影响的北方人都是他的私人朋友。


The northern business and political elite see him as a bulwark against their increasingly restive southern rivals who openly threaten a repeat of the Igbo attempt to secede in 1967 that caused the Biafra conflict, taking the rich oil fields of the Niger delta with them.	北方的商界和政界精英把他当作阻挡越来越难以控制的南方对手的一道屏障，这些南方人公开威胁要步1967年伊博族退出联邦的后尘，这次行动是比夫拉冲突的导火索，他们离开时带走了尼日尔三角洲富庶的油田。


Obasanjo’s latest move, his proposed “National Political Reform Conference” in March, is an attempt to steal the opposition’s thunder.	奥巴桑乔的最新对策，在3月份提议召开国家政治改革会议，是要窃取反对党的成果。


There will be 400 delegates, but the bulk of them nominated by the president and his party, and the government-controlled National Assembly will vet their proposals.	与会代表将达到400人，但绝大部分由总统及其政党提名，再由政府控制的国民议会最终审查通过。


The opposition has responded by calling on Nigerians to boycott the conference, arguing that it lacks legitimacy.	反对派已经做出回应，以缺乏合法性为由呼吁尼日利亚人抵制这次会议。


The opposition, grouped in the Pro-National Conference Organization (PRONACO), a new umbrella coalition of political parties and human rights groups, has said it would convene an alternative national conference in June.	政党和人权组织新的保护联盟国民会议组织（PRONACO）中的反对派也已经分成了不同的小组，并提出要在6月份另行召开国民会议。


PRONACO has formidable leaders in Wole Soyinka, the Nobel literature laureate, and Anthony Enahoro, an elderly politician who made his name as a fiery young nationalist in the 1940’s.	国民会议组织的领导力量十分强大，既有诺贝尔文学奖得主沃尔·索因卡，也有20世纪40年代以充满热情的年轻民族主义者而闻名的资深政治家Anthony Enahoro。


The group’s demands include dividing the country into six or eight new regions along broad ethnic lines with powers to generate and spend revenue.	组织的要求包括大致按种族界线将尼日利亚分成6或8个新地区，这些地区无一例外地拥有创收和开支的权利。


Opposition leaders also intend to debate such issues as the rights of women and minority groups, and the place of Shari’a, the Islamic legal code, which has replaced civil courts in several northern states.	反对党领袖还希望讨论妇女和少数民族的权利和伊斯兰教沙里亚教法的地位问题，沙里亚教法在北部几个州已经取代了民事法庭。


Reformers also have the Obasanjo government’s neo-liberal economic policies, which they describe as “punitive and intellectually bankrupt,” in their sights.	改革派还提出讨论奥巴桑乔政府的新自由经济政策，这些政策被他们形容为“愚蠢和惩罚性的”。


But it is PRONACO’s demand that at least 50% of the oil revenue derived from the Niger delta and other states in the south be retained in the area of production that most threatens the survival of the country’s survival as a united entity.	但国民会议组织提出尼日尔三角洲和其它各南方州石油收入的50%以上要留在产地，这对作为总体的国家的生存构成了最大的威胁。


The Biafra war was largely an oil war, prosecuted by northern officers and politicians to win back the delta oil fields from the Igbo.	比夫拉战争很大程度上是北方官员和政治家发动的一场石油战争，目的是从伊博人手中夺回三角洲油田。


It is not likely that northern elites will stand by idly as a fresh attempt is made to take away what they consider a glittering prize.	而面对着企图夺走这种闪光奖赏的新的图谋，北方精英们也不太可能坐以待毙。


For now, the north appears divided.	到目前为止，北方仍然是四分五裂的局面。


But a hardening of the mood there, and a brokered armistice between its disenchanted youth and older but vastly more experienced political war horses, will not only present PRONACO with a formidable opponent, but could throw West Africa into turmoil if matters degenerate into a frontal clash.	可一旦他们下定了决心，一旦失望的年轻人和年纪大不了多少，但却更有经验的政治老兵之间的休战协议最终达成，那就不仅是国民会议组织面对着一个强大的对手，而且一旦局势演变为前沿冲突，还可能使整个西非陷入混乱。


The Ghost of North Korea	朝鲜死人


TOKYO – At 7:39 a.m. on April 13, North Korea fired a missile (which it called a satellite launch) in the face of opposition from almost the entire international community.	东京—4月13日上午7:39，顶着几乎全体国际社会的反对之声，朝鲜发射了一枚导弹（他们称之为卫星）。


In a perverse way, the world got its way, because the vehicle exploded a minute after takeoff, its debris falling harmlessly into the sea.	但全世界还是以一种另类的方式遂了愿：这玩意在升空1分钟后就爆炸了，碎片落入了大海，没有造成任何伤害。


North Korea typically goes silent after such episodes: “failure” does not exist in its political lexicon, so it cannot be reported or discussed.	通常，在发生类似事件后，朝鲜事总是对此闭口不谈。 “失败”在朝鲜的政治词典中是不存在的，因此也不能提及或者讨论。


The country’s media routinely meets any failure with outpourings of patriotic music and bombastic praise for the regime.	每逢失败，朝鲜媒体就会播放爱国主义音乐，激励颂扬现行体制。


But this time was different.	但这一次有所不同。


Behind the scenes in North Korea, failure does have consequences.	在朝鲜的神秘面纱背后，失败确实会造成后果。


In the coming weeks, we will most likely learn of a purge of those responsible.	在未来几周中，我们最有可能听到的是负责人会被清洗。


Indeed, the engineers and scientists involved in the launch probably put their lives on the line.	事实上，与这次发射相关的工程师和科学家可能已经命悬一线了。


Moreover, North Korea could not deny failure this time, because the regime invited international media to attend the event – even allowing foreign reporters into the mission-control room – in order to legitimize it as a “satellite” launch and not a weapons test.	此外，这一次朝鲜无法否认失败，因为该国邀请了国际媒体参观发射，甚至允许外国记者进入到控制室，这是为了证明他们所从事的是一次“卫星”发射，而不是武器测试。


The “failure” could not be concealed, so it was quickly admitted.	“失败”无法隐瞒，因此很快就被承认了。


What was supposed to be a celebration of the 70th anniversary of the late Kim Jong-il on April 15, and of the regime’s new beginning under his successor, his youngest son, Kim Jong-un, ended up being a funereal salute.	此次发射原本是为了庆祝已故的金正日七十诞辰和其幼子金正恩继承大统。 结果，庆祝仪式变成了一场悲剧。


Supposedly ordinary people in Pyongyang told foreign media, with a practiced spontaneity, that “success is born of repeated failure.”	毫不奇怪，普通平壤群众会用十分自然的口气对外国媒体大谈“失败是成功之母。 ”


That is a chilling sentiment.	这是一种令人心寒的情绪。


The missile launch is believed to have been a legacy of Kim Jong-il, who fervently believed that the North’s survival required it to develop nuclear and biochemical weapons.	这次导弹发射据信是金正日的遗嘱。 金正日坚信，朝鲜要想生存，就得开发出核武器和生化武器。


So the failed missile launch probably means that a resumption of nuclear testing is inevitable, following tests in 2006 and 2009.	因此，此次发射失败可能意味着朝鲜必将在2006年和2009年之后再次重启核试验。


However, radioactive elements, such as Krypton-85 or Xenon-135, were not detected in the atmosphere after previous tests.	但是，在前几次核试验后，大气中并未检测到有氪-85和氙-135等放射性元素。


Just as the North called the recent missile a “satellite,” an underground explosion caused by conventional explosives cannot be used as a bargaining chip unless it is called a “nuclear test.”	正如朝鲜将这次的导弹称为“卫星”，在地下进行的常规爆炸也只有在冠上了“核试验”的名头后才能成为讨价还价的筹码。


The next one probably will occur as soon as 500-1,000 tons of dynamite have been secured.	朝鲜一收集到500—1000吨炸药，就会马上进行下一次“核试验”。


The failed launch also marked a security fiasco for the North, as a South Korea think tank obtained the final orders for it.	这次失败的发射同时也是朝鲜安保方面的大溃败，因为韩国智库提前获得了最后的发射指令。


These instructions casually referred to Kim family business, indicating that “the teachings should be executed by Kim Kyong-hui” (Kim Jong-il’s sister), that “Kim Kyong-hui and Kim Jong-un should take care of the family,” and that “Kim Kyong-hui should handle management of all assets inside and outside the country.”	这方面的指令总是由金氏家族临时做出的，这表明“指令应该是金敬姬（金正日之妹）下达的”，“金敬姬和金正恩应该掌握着金家大权”以及“金敬姬应该控制着金家在朝鲜内外的所有资产”。


Foreign media often focus on Kim Kyong-hui’s role as the wife of regime insider Jang Sung-taek, but, as Kim Jong-il’s sister, she has been firmly in control of personnel changes since her brother’s death.	外国媒体通常总是关注金敬姬作为朝鲜体制内高官张成泽之妻的角色，但是，作为金正日之妹，金敬姬在金正日死后一直掌握着人事变动大权。


Of the 232 members on Kim Jong-il’s funeral committee, she was listed 14th; her husband was 19th.	在金正日治丧委员会中，金敬姬排名第14，其夫排名第19。


She is routinely ranked higher than her husband in terms of protocol.	她的排名通常总是高于其夫。


Indeed, Jang Sung-taek’s promotion to General was her decision.	事实上，张成泽晋升大将也是金敬姬的决定。


The problem is that Kim Kyong-hui is in poor health, owing to years of alcohol abuse.	问题在于金敬姬长年酗酒，这导致她健康状况很差。


Moreover, she is so capricious and self-centered that even Kim Jong-il had trouble keeping her in check.	此外，金敬姬性格乖张，十分自我，甚至连金正日都对她没什么办法。


Due to her poor health, it is unclear how long she will be able to continue advising Kim Jong-un, now surrounded by military personnel in their seventies and eighties who supported past generations.	由于糟糕的健康状况，很难说她还可以辅佐金正恩多久，而金正恩周围多是些支持老一代的七八十岁的老将。


He needs advisers closer to his own age, but none is at hand.	他需要与他年龄相仿的谋士，但一个都找不到。


Dynastic concerns now seem to be paramount for the regime.	王朝大统现在是朝鲜体制压倒一切的重点。


Speculation is growing, for example, about whether Kim Sol-song – the second daughter of Kim Jong-il’s third wife – will be appointed when Kim Kyong-hui is no longer able to perform her duties.	比如，关于金敬姬无法工作后金雪松——由金正日第三任妻子所生的次女——是否会顶替她的职位的猜测正在日嚣尘上。


Before his death, Kim Jong-il reiterated that at least three nuclear reactors should be built.	金正日死前再三强调。 至少应建造三座核反应堆。


He also warned that China, despite being North Korea’s closest ally, is also the country that merits the most caution.	他还警告说，中国是朝鲜最紧密的盟友，但同时也是最需提防的。


North Korea, he insisted, must not allow itself to be used by China.	他坚持认为，朝鲜决不能任由中国摆布。


When Kim Il-sung (the “Eternal Great Leader”) died in 1994, Kim Jong-il relied on his father’s teachings to reinforce his authority.	当“永远的伟大领袖”金日成在1994年逝世时，金正日靠着乃父的遗训坐稳了江山。


Indeed, there is no way of knowing whether his ideas and policies throughout his reign were actually Kim Il-sung’s.	事实上，你无从知道他的治国思想和政策是否其实是金日成的。


Perhaps Kim Jong-il’s “Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System” should now be viewed as an official document that stipulates which instructions are to be followed when, where, and by whom.	也许金正日的《建立单一意识形态体系的十大原则》（Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System）现在应该被视为规定了何时、何地、由谁来行使某项权力的正式文件。


In that case, his successor, the callow Kim Jong-un, can claim to be bound to do as he was told.	果真如此的话，他羽翼未丰的儿子金正恩可以宣称是在按乃父教导行事。


North Korea routinely pushes the international community around.	朝鲜总是把国际社会玩弄于股掌之间。


But the North is itself being pushed around by the teachings of a ghost, conveniently used by the people who remain in charge in Pyongyang.	但朝鲜自身也被死人玩弄于股掌之间——通常是通过在平壤王座上的那个人代理。


How long will the rest of the world allow itself to be pushed around by a ghost?	世界还能容忍被死人玩弄多��时间？


The Ghosts of History in East Asia	东亚的历史幽灵


This year marks the centenary of the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, and on August 15 many countries will commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the end of WWII in the Pacific.	今年正值1905年日俄战争发生一百年，而许多国家将于8月15日纪念二次世界大战太平洋战争结束六十周年。


Of course, Japan’s military dominance in East Asia – which began with the Russo-Japanese War and led to WWII – is no more.	当然，日本在东亚地区始于日俄战争并引发了二次世界大战的军事统治已不复存在。


The ghosts of this history still hang over in East Asia, with each country struggling to find ways to deal with the past.	当每个国家努力寻找面对历史的方法的时候，这段历史的幽灵还笼罩在东亚上方。


China is a benchmark.	中国就是一个例子。


Over the centuries, Japan and China have taken turns dominating East Asia, and both now seek to assert regional hegemony.	几个世纪以来，日本和中国轮番主宰东亚地区，现在两国都在寻求获得地区霸权。


Historically, the Korean Peninsula was the playground for this rivalry, but, with North and South Korea appearing to make peace with each other, South Korea is also staking a claim to regional influence.	纵观历史，朝韩半岛一直是这场竞赛的比赛场地，但是随着韩国和朝鲜快要彼此达成和平，韩国也要宣扬它对该地区的影响力。


Resentment over past wrongs buttresses all of these rival claims for influence.	对历史错误的怨恨不平助长了所有这些争夺地区影响力的冲突。


During his visit to the US in June, South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun told President Bush that China had invaded Korea over 100 times in history.	韩国总统卢武铉（Roh Moo Hyun）在六月美国之行中对美国总统布什说，中国历史上曾经侵略过朝鲜一百多次。


His remarks shocked China, which views itself as the victim of invasions (most humiliatingly, by the Japanese) and has forgotten its own history of bullying its neighbors.	他的话震惊了中国，中国一直把自己视为侵略的受害者（最为耻辱就是遭到日本的侵略）并且已经忘却了自己也曾欺凌邻国。


Roh also openly criticizes Japan for its cowardice in not facing up to its historic war crimes, saying that it does not deserve a seat on the UN Security Council.	卢武铉也公开指责日本不敢正视自己历史战争罪行的懦夫行为，说这种行为不配在联合国安理会获得一个席位。


Japan long colonized Korea, and during WWII, Koreans were forced to join the Japanese Imperial Army – a situation similar to that of Taiwan.	日本长期把朝鲜作为殖民地，二战期间，朝鲜人被迫参加日本的帝国军队——这与台湾的情况相似。


But, whereas the struggle between China and Japan for dominance over Korea was the focal point of the East Asian drama, Taiwan was but a side-show, a mere outpost to the Imperial Qing Dynasty, while Korea was a vassal paying tribute to China.	但是，当朝鲜还是一个向中国进贡的臣属国时候，中国与日本有关朝鲜统治权之争是东亚之剧的焦点，作为清朝帝国的前哨地区的台湾仅仅只是一个小节目。


After defeating both the Qing dynasty and Russia, Japan not only gained control over the Korean Peninsula, but also extended its reach deep into Northeast China.	在打败了清王朝和俄国之后，日本不仅仅掌控了朝韩半岛，也将它的势力范围延伸到了中国东北部。


As East Asia’s “Big Brother,” Japan’s Kwantung Army founded Manchukuo, in Northeast China, in 1932.	作为东亚的“老大哥”，日本关东军（Kwantung Army）在1932年在中国东北建立了伪满帝国（Manchukuo）。


Japan wanted Manchukuo to become what India was to Britain or what Algeria was to France – a crown jewel of the empire – and sent a million immigrants (800,000 of whom died there after post-war Manchukuo was taken over by Russia) while investing huge sums to develop heavy industry.	日本要伪满帝国就像英国的印度或法国的阿尔及利亚一样——成为皇冠上的钻石——并向那里派遣了一百万移民（其中八十万在伪满帝国由俄国接管后死于战后）同时也向重工业投资了巨额资金。


Japan’s Nanjing government in China, under Wang Jingwei, was like Germany’s Vichy government in France, under Henri Philippe Pétain.	日本在中国的汪精卫南京政府就像德国在法国建立的以亨利·菲利浦·贝当（Henri Philippe Pétain）为首的维希政府（Vichy government）。


Both men were treated as traitors after the war ended.	这两人在战争结束后都被视为叛国者。


By contrast, as a result of long colonization, Taiwan and Korea had developed a complex of both resistance and reliance towards their rulers.	与之形成对照的是，长期的殖民统治使得台湾和朝鲜对它们的统治者产生出一种既抵触又依赖的情结。


With only a few exceptions, the local elite was assimilated into the colonial system.	大部分（除了一些例外）的当地精英分子都被吸纳进殖民体系。


But the outcome was similar throughout the region following Japan’s defeat in WWII.	但是随着日本在二战中投降，全东亚地区的走上了相似的道路。


Civil war broke out in China, the Korean Peninsula was divided, and the other Southeast Asian colonies, with the sole exception of Thailand, resorted to military force to achieve independence.	中国爆发了内战，朝鲜半岛分裂了，其他的东南亚殖民地，就除了台湾之外，都采取武力以获得独立。


China has still failed to face up to the history of Manchukuo and its civil war, not to mention opening the secret files concerning Mao Zedong’s decision to send almost a million soldiers into the Korean War.	中国至今还未能勇敢面对伪满帝国与其内战的历史，更不用说公开有关毛泽东决定派遣将近一百万士兵奔赴朝鲜战争的秘密文件。


South Korea initiated talks with the Japanese government only recently on retrieving the remains of Korean slave workers.	韩国直到最近才开启与日本政府的谈话，要寻回朝鲜奴工的遗体。


More than 20,000 Taiwanese and about the same amount of Korean soldiers who died for the Imperial Japan are worshipped in Japan’s Yasukuni shrine.	超过2万名为日本帝国而战死的台湾士兵以及相同数目的朝鲜士兵被供奉在日本靖国神社。


And Recently, some civil groups in both countries started to demand the return of the remains of their countries’ soldiers interred at Yasukuni.	最近，两国国内的一些民间团体开始要求日本归还他们埋葬在靖国神社的士兵遗体。


Taiwan’s delayed re-awakening reflects the early reliance of its nationalist government on protection from the US and assistance from Japan.	台湾的重新觉醒姗姗而至，这反映出台湾政府对美国庇护以及日本援助的依赖性。


Chiang Kaishek had no choice but to return good for evil by abjuring compensation claims on Japan, as well as by secretly arranging for the Kwantung Army’s ex-Chief of Staff to join Taiwan’s efforts in confronting the Communists.	蒋介石（Chiang Kaishek）无从选择而不得不以德报怨，放弃要求日本赔偿并秘密安排关东军的前主要人物加入台湾与共产党的对抗活动。


Japan has never apologized for its colonization of Taiwan, and Taiwanese had no opportunity for historical reflection during 30 years of martial law.	日本从未对其在台湾的殖民统治道歉，而台湾在其三十年的军事管制法统治期间也从未有机会反省历史。


This spring, anti-Japanese demonstrations broke out almost simultaneously in both China and Korea, with both countries seeking to place the memory of Japanese dominance in the service of building a new national identity and strategic position.	今年春天，当中国和朝鲜都在寻求利用日本统治的这段回忆塑造新国家身份和新战略地位之际，两国几乎同时爆发了反日游行。


So we can expect that, like the events in May to mark 60 years since the end of WWII in Europe, Asia’s commemoration on August 15 of the end of the war in the Pacific will expose lingering – and still raw – historical sensitivities.	因此我们可以预期，就像5月在欧洲举行的二战结束六十周年的纪念活动一样，亚洲8月15日的太平洋战争结束的纪念活动将会展现那挥之不去——至今依然刺痛心灵的历史���感。


Unlike in Europe, however, historical memory in Asia continues to be wedded to current strategic ambitions.	然而与欧洲不同，亚洲的历史回忆将继续与当前的战略雄心结合在一起。


One hundred years ago, the rise of Japanese military power changed the fate of Asia.	一百年前，日本军事力量的崛起改变了亚洲的命运。


Sixty years ago, the demise of Japanese power changed Asia’s fate again.	六年前，日本军事力量的瓦解再次改变了亚洲的命运。


Today, as China rises in wealth and power to rival Japan, Asia holds its breath, waiting for the ghosts of history to disappear.	今日，当中国在富足和力量中崛起以抗衡日本之时，亚洲屏住呼吸，等待着历史幽灵的消失。


The Global Cost of Turkey’s Crisis	土耳其危机给世界造成的影响


Turkey will hold its parliamentary election in July, four months earlier than scheduled, thereby narrowly avoiding a constitutional crisis over the choice of the country’s next president.	土耳其七月份将要举行议会选举，比原定的时间提前了四个月，这样勉强避免在选择国家的下一任总统问题上的宪法危机。


Nonetheless, Turkey’s bout with political instability has damaged its foreign policy and international standing.	然而，土耳其政局不稳已经严重损害了它的外交政策和国际地位。


At the center of the storm are Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, head of the moderately Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP), and Yasar Buyukanit, Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish military, which regards itself as the guardian of the secular republican tradition established by Kemal Ataturk.	处于这场风暴中心是温和的伊斯兰正义和发展党首脑总理埃尔多安和土耳其军队的总参谋长克阿纳特。 土耳其的军队把自己看成是由国父凯末尔所创立的世俗共和传统的守护者。


When Erdogan contemplated moving from the prime minister’s job to the presidency earlier this spring, the military and secular political parties indicated profound dissatisfaction.	当埃尔多安今春早些时候打算辞去总理职位去竞选总统时，军队和世俗派政治团体表示了强烈的不满。


General Buyukanit said in April that the country’s new president must be secular “not just in words, but in essence.”	克阿纳特将军四月份说国家的新总统必须“不仅仅是在口头上是世俗主义的，而且在本质上也是世俗主义的。 ”


Having met and conversed with Erdogan on more than one occasion, I found him a moderate and reasonable man.	我本人与埃尔多安有过不止一次的会面和交谈，我知道他是一个温和并且理性的人。


Moreover, the AKP has broad support among Turkish voters and an admirable record of economic growth, human rights legislation, and improvement in the treatment of Turkey’s Kurdish minority.	此外，伊斯兰正义和发展党在土耳其选民中拥有广泛的支持，并且在经济发展、人权立法和改善土耳其库尔德少数民族的待遇等问题上都表现得非常出色。


Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, a close associate of Erdogan in the AKP, pressed Turkey’s application to join the European Union.	外交部长居尔是埃尔多安在伊斯兰正义和发展党内的亲密盟友，努力推动土耳其申请加入欧盟。


So when Erdogan decided to nominate Gul as the AKP candidate for the presidency, I was surprised by the strength of the secularist opposition.	所以当埃尔多安决定推选居尔作为伊斯兰正义和发展党参加总统竞选时，我对世俗反对派的力量感到非常震惊。


The secular establishment argues that the AKP’s moderation thus far reflects the checks and balances implied by secularist control of the presidency.	世俗主义当权派声称，伊斯兰正义和发展党迄今为止所表现出的温和是因为世俗派人士担任总统所带来的制约平衡的结果。


They argue that if the AKP comes to control the presidency, it may no longer pursue moderate policies.	他们说，如果伊斯兰正义和发展党控制了总统职位，那么该党可能就不会再实施温和的政策。


Secularists point with concern to other AKP, such as Speaker of the Parliament Bulent Arinc, who are noted for their pronounced religious and social conservatism.	世俗派指出其他伊斯兰正义和发展党的成员也有这种担心，比如议长阿林克，后者以其公开宣称的宗教和社会保守主义而著称。


When the Turkish Parliament attempted to elect the president on April 27, Gul did not receive enough votes to win on the first ballot.	当土耳其议会准备在4月27日选举总统时，居尔在第一轮投票中并没有赢得足够的选票。


The main opposition party argued that the vote was invalid, and the General Staff issued a statement that it was “watching this situation with concern.”	主要反对党声称选举是无效的，而总参谋部发表了一份声明说它“正在密切关注事态”。


Massive public demonstrations were held in Istanbul to support Turkey’s Kemalist secular tradition.	伊斯坦布尔爆发了大规模的支持土耳其凯末尔派的世俗主义传统的示威游行。


The issue went to Turkey’s highest court, which annulled the parliamentary vote, effectively blocking Gul’s candidacy, resulting in Erdogan’s decision to call an early election.	事情闹到了土耳其的高等法院，后者宣布议会的选举无效，从而实际上剥夺了居尔的候选人资格，最后导致埃尔多安决定提前进行大选。


These events were closely watched in Washington and Brussels.	华盛顿和布鲁塞尔都在密切地关注这些事态的发展。


The United States had been pressing the EU to advance Turkey’s application for admission, but Turkish membership was already controversial in several EU countries.	美国一直在督促欧盟加快土耳其的入盟申请进程，但是好几个欧盟国家已经对土耳其的成员国资格产生了争论。


This reflects concerns about Turkey’s Muslim culture and its large population, as well as concern that any further enlargement will overly dilute the European project.	这反映出它们对于土耳其的穆斯林文化及其庞大人口的担心，同时它们也担心欧盟的继续扩张会过度稀释欧洲建设。


Now opponents of Turkey’s EU accession bid have seized upon recent events to argue that the country does not meet the democratic standards necessary for full membership.	现在反对土耳其加入欧盟努力的人正好抓住最近的事态说这个国家并没有达到正式成员所必须达到的民主标准。


They point out that Turkey’s military has ousted four elected governments since 1960, and continues to play an inappropriately large role in Turkish politics.	他们指出土耳其的军队自从1960年以来已经罢黜了四届民选政府，并且继续在土耳其的政治中扮演着一个不恰当的重要角色。


While the high court decision and the appeal to the electorate means that Turkish democracy has dodged a bullet for now, the progress of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations has been further slowed.	而高等法院的裁决和要求举行大选意味着土耳其的民主暂时逃过了一劫，但是土耳其入盟谈判的进程却被再一次延缓了。


This is unfortunate for both Turkey and Europe.	这对于土耳其和欧洲来说都是不幸的事情。


With a slowdown in accession negotiations, Turkish politicians will have less incentive to continue the reforms necessary for membership.	随着入盟谈判的延缓，土耳其的政治家们对于为获得成员国资格而必须进行的改革会不再显得那么热情。


Turkey suffers from nationalist sensitivity, and extremist groups have orchestrated several unfortunate incidents, including attacks on minorities and harassment of cultural figures like the Nobel Prize-winning novelist Orhan Pamuk.	土耳其深受民族主义敏感之苦，极端主义团体已经蓄意制造了好几起事端，包括对少数民族的袭击，以及骚扰像诺贝尔奖获得者帕幕克这样的文化名人。


If Turkey pulls away from Europe, the EU’s claim that it successfully wields “soft power” in world politics will be powerfully undermined.	如果土耳其不再向欧洲靠近，那么欧盟关于它在世界政治中成功���运用了“软实力”的说法必将被大打折扣。


In the larger picture, Turkey is not only an important member of NATO, with influence both in the Balkans and the Middle East, but it also plays a vital role in the wider world.	从宏观角度来看，土耳其不仅仅是北约的一个重要成员，对于巴尔干和中东都有巨大的影响力，同时它也在更广泛的世界政治上扮演重要角色。


One of the crucial questions of twenty-first century politics will be how the world copes with the rise of political Islam.	二十一世纪世界政治的一个重大问题之一就是世界该怎样应对政治伊斯兰的崛起。


For radical Islamists (and some Westerners), the rise of Islam sets the scene for a “clash of civilizations,” which they welcome as a polarizing device that will allow them to recruit from the much larger Muslim mainstream.	对于伊斯兰极端组织（还有某些西方人）来说，伊斯兰的崛起迎来了“文明的冲突”，对此他们表示欢迎，因为作为一支分化力量可以使他们从数量大得多的穆斯林主流中吸引来更多的追随者。


But Turkey has the potential to show the shallowness of such a scenario by demonstrating the compatibility of liberal democracy and Islam.	但是土耳其有能力通过展现自由民主与伊斯兰的兼容来说明这种局面是没有根据的。


Unfortunately, this appears to have been lost on the neo-conservatives in the Bush administration, for whom it was the invasion of Iraq and its liberation from Saddam Hussein that was supposed to provide a beacon for a wave of democratization that would transform the Middle East.	不幸的是，布什政府的新保守派似乎并不这样理解，他们认为入侵伊拉克、把它从萨达姆的统治下解放出来就是为将会席卷整个中东的民主浪潮树立了一盏明灯。


What they produced instead was an “electocracy” that, in the absence of liberal institutions, replaced the tyranny of the Sunni minority with a tyranny of the Shiite majority and a religious sectarian civil war.	然而他们所炮制的“民主选举”在缺乏自由制度的情况下，只是由处于多数的什叶派的独裁取代了处于少数的逊尼派的独裁，以及带来了宗教派别的内战。


Indeed, the invasion of Iraq also hurt Turkey, both economically and by strengthening the base for the Kurdish terrorist PKK organization operating from northern Iraq.	事实上，入侵伊拉克对土耳其同样也造成了伤害，不但是在经济上，同时也增强了在伊拉克北部活动的库尔德恐怖组织库尔德工人党的力量。


The result has been a dramatic increase in anti-Americanism in Turkish politics.	结果是土耳其政治中的反美情绪空前高涨。


If the neo- conservatives had instead focused their attentions on strengthening the soft power of Turkey, they could have done far more to advance the cause of democracy in the Middle East.	如果新保守派能把他们的注意力放在强化土耳其的软实力上，他们在中东推动民主事业的努力本来可以取得大得多的成就。


Nuclear Power’s Renaissance in Reverse	核能的复衰


PARIS – Last June, Yukiya Amano, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), declared that “nuclear power will make a significant and growing contribution to sustainable development in the coming decades.” But, as this year’s World Nuclear Industry Status Report highlights, recent trends paint a very different picture.	巴黎—去年6月，国际原子能机构（IAEA）总干事天野之弥宣称“在未来数十年中，核力量将在可持续发展方面起到日渐增加的重要作用。


Duke Energy, America’s largest utility, has shelved plans to build two reactors in Florida, after having spent $1 billion on the project.	在耗费了10亿美元后，美国最大的电力公司杜克能源公司（Duke Energy）搁置了其在佛罗里达州建设两座反应堆的计划。


The decision came only three months after the company abandoned investment in two new units in North Carolina.	此前三个月，该公司刚刚宣布放弃北卡罗来纳州的两座核反应堆投资。


In fact, this year, four American utilities have decided to shut down a total of five reactors permanently – the first closures in the United States in 15 years.	事实上，今年有四家美国电力公司决定永久关闭总共五座核反应堆——这是15年来美国首次关闭核反应堆。


One of the units – Kewaunee Power Station in Wisconsin – was abandoned after massive investment in upgrades and a 60-year license renewal; it simply could not generate power at competitive prices.	其中一座——威斯康辛州的吉瓦尼电站（Kewaunee Power Station）——在投入了大量资金、获得了60年的许可证续期后遭弃； 其原因是它无法以具有竞争力的价格产出电力。


For the same reasons, Vermont Yankee, another plant with a license to operate through 2032, is now scheduled to close in 2014.	出于同样的理由，生产许可2032年才到期的佛蒙特扬基电站（Vermont Yankee）也将于2014年关闭。


Similarly, the world’s largest nuclear operator – the French state-controlled utility Électricité de France – announced its impending withdrawal from nuclear power in the US, after having sunk roughly $2 billion into aborted projects.	类似地，世界上最大的核电公司——法国国家控股的法国电力公司（EDF）——宣布即将退出美国核电市场。 该公司有20亿美元因为项目遭弃而打了水漂。


And, in order to help offset soaring operating costs, which resulted in losses of €1.5 billion ($2 billion) last year, EDF will raise electricity prices this year for its French customers by 5%, on average, and by another 5% next year.	此外，为了弥补急剧增加的经营成本（去年因此造成15亿欧元或20亿美元损失），EDF今年将把法国电价平均提高5%，并在明年再提高5%。


Over the five years ending in March 2013, EDF lost 85% of its share value.	在截至2013年3月的五年中，EDF股价下跌了85%。


Likewise, the world’s largest nuclear builder – the French state-controlled company AREVA – lost up to 88% of its share value between 2008 and 2012.	类似地，2008—2012年间，世界上最大的核电建设商——法国国家控股的阿海珐（AREVA）公司——股价下跌了88%。


Not surprisingly, investors have welcomed new strategic plans by both companies, as well as EDF’s withdrawal from the US market; the downward pressure on their share prices has eased, though for how long remains to be seen.	毫不奇怪，投资者对两家公司的新战略计划相当欢迎，对EDF退出美国市场的决定亦然，两家公司股价下跌的压力有所缓解，但会维持多久还有待观察。


The nuclear-energy industry’s decline began decades ago.	核能产业的衰落始于几十年前。


But, since the March 2011 triple-meltdown at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi plant, the pace of the decline has accelerated significantly.	但是，自2011年日本福岛第一核电站的三座反应堆出事故以来，其衰落速度大大加速了。


Indeed, in 2012, annual nuclear generation worldwide dropped by an unprecedented 7%, exceeding the previous year’s record-breaking drop of 4% and bringing total annual nuclear-power generation to 12% below its historic maximum, achieved in 2006.	事实上，2012年，全球核电发电量前所未有地下降了7%，超过了前一年创下的下降4%的记录，也使核电发电量较2006年的历史最高水平减少了12%。


Although Japan accounts for three-quarters of this decline, with only two of the 50 units that are officially in operation in Japan actually producing power, 16 other countries, including the world’s top five nuclear generators, also decreased their output.	发电量下降的四分之三来自日本，在日本50座出于正式运行的核反应堆中，只有两座在实际产出电力。 尽管如此，其他16个国家，包括世界五大核电生产国，发电量也在下降。


As a result, nuclear power’s share of global electricity generation dropped to around 10% in 2012, compared to its 1993 peak of 17%.	结果，2012年核电站世界总发电量的比例下降至10%左右，而1993年的峰值为17%。


Only the Czech Republic reached its historic maximum nuclear share last year.	只有捷克去年的核电比例达到了历史最高值。


Moreover, of the 66 reactors under construction worldwide, two-thirds are located in just three countries – China, India, and Russia – with China alone accounting for 28.	此外，在全世界66座在建核反应堆中，三分之二坐落于三个国家——中国、印度和俄罗斯，其中中国一国占了28座。


Nine of the 66 have been listed as “under construction” for more than two decades.	其中9座核反应堆列入“在建”名单已经超过了二十年。


(The Watts Bar 2 reactor in Tennessee holds the record, having been under construction for 41 years.)	（田纳西州的瓦茨巴（Watts Bar）2号反应堆保持着在建时间记录，已经长达41年。


An additional four projects have been underway for more than ten years.	）另有四座在建时间已经超过十年。


In total, at least 23 of the 66 units currently under construction have encountered delays, many of which have lasted for several years.	总体看，这66座反应堆中至少有23座被延长过工期，许多已经在建多年。


Whether the other projects, all of which have been initiated in the past five years, are on schedule remains to be seen.	其他项目——全部在过去五年中开工——是否能按期进展还未可知。


As a result of such delays, only three new units began operating last year – half the number of reactors that were shut down.	由于工期延长，去年只有三座新反应堆开始运转——只有被关闭反应堆数量的一半。


The average age of the world’s reactor fleet now stands at 28 years, and continues to increase steadily.	当前，全球核反应堆平均运行时间是28年，而且还在稳步增加。


By contrast, new renewable technologies are gaining traction, illustrating a fundamental shift in international energy policy and investment strategies.	相反，新的可再生技术正在赢得动力，这反映出国际能源政策和投资战略的根本��转变。


Last year, China, Germany, Japan, and India generated more power from renewables than from nuclear for the first time.	去年，中国、德国、日本和印度的可再生电力首次超过了核电。


In China and India, wind alone outpaced nuclear.	在中国和印度，光是风电便已超过核电。


Since 2000, global onshore wind-power generation has averaged 27% annual growth, while the growth rate for solar photovoltaics has been a staggering 42%.	自2000年以来，全球离岸风电发电量平均每年以27%的速度增长，而太阳能光伏发电增长率更是达到了惊人的42%。


Last year, an additional 45 GW of wind and 32 GW of solar were installed worldwide, compared to a net addition of 1.2 GW of nuclear.	去年，全世界新增45GW风能和32GW太阳能，而核电仅仅增加了1. 2GW。


The shift to renewables has been particularly pronounced in the world’s major advanced economies.	主要发达国家向可再生能源的转向尤为积极。


For example, Germany’s ongoing nuclear phase-out has been complemented by accelerated renewables implementation, with up to 3,000 MW of solar photovoltaic capacity connected to Germany’s power grid in a single month.	比如，德国以加快可再生能源部署作为退出核能的补充，每个月都有3000MW的太阳能光伏电力接入德国电网。


As a result, the price per installed solar kilowatt has dropped by three-quarters over the last seven years.	因此，在过去七年中，太阳能电力的每千瓦成本降低了四分之三。


Even in the US, where cheap shale gas is reshaping the energy industry, more wind power was connected to the grid last year than gas, and, in the first three months of this year, more than 80% of new capacity was renewable.	即使在廉价页岩气正在重写能源产业格局的美国，去年新进入电网的风电也高于火电，而在今年前三个月，80%的新增发电能力来自可再生能源。


Over the past decade, the nuclear industry has attempted to capture global leaders’ attention with a promotional campaign centered around the notion of a “nuclear renaissance.”	在过去十年中，核电产业试图用以“核复兴”概念为核心的宣传吸引全球领导人的注意。


But their promises – including investment costs of $1,000 per installed kilowatt and building times of four years – have proved to be false.	但它们的承诺——包括每1000瓦建成发电量投资成本1000美元、建设工期四年——并没有实现。


Indeed, since the industry launched its public-relations campaign in the early 2000’s, cost estimates have increased roughly sevenfold, and profits have declined.	事实上，自从核电产业从2000年代初开始其公关活动以来，测算成本增加了大约七倍，而利润节节下降。


The 34 reactors that started up over the last decade had a mean construction time of nearly ten years, but contributed just 26 GW – one-third of what solar and wind added in one year.	过去十年中实现发电的34座反应堆平均建设工期为近七年，但只贡献了26GW的装机容量——还不到太阳能电和风电一年的增加值的三分之一。


The IAEA’s optimistic rhetoric cannot obscure fundamental arithmetic: skyrocketing maintenance expenses and, in many cases, post-Fukushima upgrade costs, together with the impossibility of building competitive new capacity without massive government subsidies, are devastating the nuclear industry.	IAES的乐观语气掩盖不了基本算术：极高的维护支出和福岛事故后的巨额升级成本以及无法在不获得政府大量补贴的情况下创造出有竞争力的新产能正在摧毁核能产业。


As the economist Mark Cooper has put it, nuclear power is actually undergoing a “renaissance in reverse.”	正如经济学家马克·库珀（Mark Cooper）所说，核能实际上在经历“复衰”。


The Global Economy’s Dialogue of the Deaf	失效的世界经济对话


CHICAGO – As governments do more to try to coax the world economy out of recession, the danger of protectionism is becoming more real.	芝加哥——正当各国政府试图将是全球经济带出经济危机之时，贸易保护主义的呼声有所抬头。


It is emerging in ways that were unforeseen by those who founded our existing global institutions.	很多国家的领袖还没有意识到这一点。


Unfortunately, the discussion between countries on trade nowadays is very much a dialogue of the deaf, with countries spouting platitudes at one another, but no enforceable and verifiable commitments agreed upon.	不幸的是，国与国之间的贸易对话形同虚设，他们相互都在指责对方，没有任何实质性和有效性的协议可以达成。


There is an urgent need to reform global institutions – and more dramatically than envisaged by the G-20 thus far.	然而，全球金融体系的改革又迫在眉睫——20国峰会的峰回路转式的结局更令人觉得眼花缭乱。


Protectionism is not just about raising tariffs on imports; it is any government action that distorts the global production and allocation of goods, services, and capital to favor domestic producers, thereby reducing overall efficiency.	贸易保护主义不仅仅表现在提高进口产品的关税上。 任何政府阻碍货物，服务，资本的流动，任何有碍全球生产力的提高，有利于本国制造商或服务商的行为都可以看作是贸易保护主义。


So, for example, government pressure on multinational banks to lend domestically, or to withdraw liquidity from foreign branches, is protectionism, as are capital injections into multinational companies with the explicit requirement that domestic jobs be preserved.	例如，政府对跨国银行施加压力，让其给本国银行提供贷款，从国外分支机构提取流动资金都可以看做是贸易保护主义。 还有的例子包括对跨国银行注资时，明确地要求必须给本国员工保留就业机会等。


Such actions are problematic not only because they insulate inefficient forms of production, but also because foreign countries respond by adopting similar measures towards their national champions, so that everyone is worse off.	这些行为之所以有问题，原因在于它阻碍了资金的有效流动。 同样，外国政府也可以用同样的方式来对付非本国的银行。


The number of inefficient workers protected by these measures is offset by the number of efficient workers laid off by foreign multinationals responding to political pressures in their home country.	如此这般地恶性循环。 由于此项政策，外国银行不得不在压力下，裁减自身的员工来保留低效率的所在国员工。


Perhaps of greatest concern, moreover, is that the public, especially in poor countries that cannot undertake offsetting measures, will come to distrust global integration, with multinationals viewed as Trojan horses.	更为严重的是，一些国家的民众，尤其是在一些不能有效管理的贫穷国家，产生对全球化一种怨恨的情绪，这在某些跨国公司看成为是“木马”病毒。


In addition to explicit protectionist measures, governments now plan actions that will affect others across the globe.	除了一些明显的贸易保护主义措施，某些政府也采取妨碍其他国家的一些行动。


For example, the large volume of public debt that industrial countries will issue will undoubtedly raise interest rates and affect developing country governments’ borrowing costs.	例如，发达国家大量发行债券，这势必会提高了利率，从而影响到发展中国家借贷资金的成本。


There is little dialogue about how industrial country issuances can be staggered to minimize the impact on global markets, and what alternatives can be developed for countries that are shut out.	有关工业国家在发行债券的同时，如何把对世界经济造成影响化解到最小，以及其他被波及的国家如何采取应对措施等话题，目前都还没有非常良好的沟通渠道。


If developing countries are left to their own devices, they will conclude that they should self-insure by rebuilding foreign-exchange reserves to even higher levels, a strategy that has clearly hurt global growth.	如果发展中国家的利益被忽视，他们自然会采取反制手段，比如储备大量的外汇，这样显然对全球的发展不利。


We need a moderate-sized representative group of leaders of the world’s largest economies to meet regularly to discuss such issues, informed by an impartial secretariat that will place its analyses before the group.	我们需要有来自世界各国的领袖们的定期聚会，会议的规模应该适中，同时能够代表世界上最大多数的经济体的利益。


Initially, the group should only exert peer pressure on its members to comply with international responsibilities.	在会议召开之前，应该再配备一个相对公正的秘书处来进行协调安排。


But, as confidence in the group’s decision-making – and in the impartiality of the secretariat – improves, members might give it some teeth, such as the ability to impose collective economic sanctions on recalcitrant members.	这个组织应该利用团队的压力来对其成员国是否履行国际义务而施加影响，同时，为了提高决策的权威性，成员国还要有一些惩处措施。 例如对违约的国家实行集体的经济制裁等。


The United Nations is too large to serve this purpose, and the most obvious candidate for the group, the G-20, is not representative.	显然，联合国过于庞大，不适合此类。 最合适的组织应该算是20国峰会了，但20国峰会不是代表制的。


There is, however, a representative alternative – the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC), a group of finance ministers and central bank governors that meets twice a year to advise the International Monetary Fund.	另一个可选的对象是国际货币与金融委员会（IMFC），它是由一些国家的财长和央行行长组成的 ，每年聚会两次，共同讨论有关IMF的一些问题。


While the IMFC could be shrunk (for example, if euro-zone countries agree to a common seat), the real challenge is to make it a venue in which countries talk to one another rather than at one another.	IMFC的人数可以裁减（例如，欧元区国家只占一个席位，如果他们同意的话）。


To meet this goal, some changes would be in order.	会议真正的目的是让各自国家之间有个相互交流，而不是相互指责的机会，为了达到这个目标，我们还可以相应地做一些调整。


First, the frequency of meetings should be increased, especially in times of crisis, and the level of a few of these meetings enhanced.	首先，会议的频率应该增加，特别是在金融危机发生的时刻，不同级别的会议也可以增加。 例如，政府首脑级的会议可以每年召开两次，而各国财长则可以一年聚会四次。


So, for example, two meetings a year at the head-of-government level and quarterly meetings at the finance-minister level (with more at the deputy-minister level) would provide ample time for dialogue, and thus for trust-building, and would allow the commitments made by the heads of government to be monitored.	）让大家更有更多的机会交流。 这样一来增加了各国之间的相互信任，各国首脑所作出的承诺也可以被监测能否兑现。


Second, the IMF’s permanent Executive Board, established in an era when travel was costly and communications difficult, and consisting of mid-level government functionaries, should be abolished.	其次，取消IMF常任理事国，当时建立的背景是交通不便而且通讯不发达。 他们当时起着一部分政府的职能。


Important decisions should be vetted by the IMFC and others delegated to IMF management.	IMFC和非IMF常任理事国的代表可以对重要的决定有否决权。


Current executive directors typically do not have the authority to make commitments on their countries’ behalf, so their effort is often diverted to minutiae.	目前各国的执行董事不能有效地代表各自的国家行，所以他们的努力往往白费。


And, in an attempt to preserve its turf, the Board constantly attempts to keep the IMFC from discussing anything of substance.	为了维护自己的地盘，IMF董事会常常把IMFC排斥在外。


Third, the obvious secretariat is the IMF.	第三，成立IMF的秘书处，目前的领导班子不被看为是公正的。


Unfortunately, the Fund is not regarded as being impartial, especially by countries that have been seared by its past conditionality.	特别是对一些受到它伤害过的国家来说。


The IMF has, however, become far more neutral than it is given credit for – though it could take more steps to distance itself from its past.	现在的IMF比过去要公正很多——虽然它还可以做的更好一些。 这些措施还应该包括废除任何地区或国家任命IMF管理层的权利。


These include abolishing any region or country’s right to appoint IMF management; allowing the Fund to borrow from markets, so that it does not have to keep seeking key countries’ permission to expand; eliminating any country’s official veto power over major decisions; and having its agenda set by the IMFC rather than outside bodies.	允许IMF可以从市场上融资，这样一来，就在不用看某些国家的脸色行事。 应该是有IMFC来制定IMF需要讨论的议题。


Industrial countries should be happy that developing countries would take greater responsibility for global economic outcomes, rather than simply sulking about their lack of voice and representation.	发展中国家不是简单抱怨自己的声音被忽视，应该在全球经济中承担更多的责任，发达国家也应该因此感到为此欣慰。


Developing countries, in turn, would gain greater voice, but would also be forced to contribute ideas (and resources) to deal with global problems.	同时，发展中国家也应该有更多的发言权，对解决全球问题献计献策。


And maybe, just maybe, we would preserve faith in globalization.	或许，仅仅是或许，我们还对全球化抱那么一点点信心的话。


The Global Economy\u0027s Gathering Storm	全球经济正在聚集的风暴


MUNICH – From 2004 to 2007, the world economy experienced an unusually long and strong boom, with growth rates of nearly 5% and with many countries participating.	慕尼黑－从2004年到2007年，全球经济经历了一个不同寻常的长时间强劲增长，增长率几乎达到了5%并且许多国家都有增长。


The European Union (EU15) recorded 2.4% growth on average during these years.	在这些年份，欧盟（欧盟15国）的平均增长率达到了2. 4%。


In Germany, where growth averaged 1.8% during this period, some journalists proclaimed a new economic miracle.	在德国，这个时期的平均增长率为1. 8%，就有些记者宣布这是一个新的经济奇迹。


Now, however, increasingly bad news is giving rise to serious doubts; dark clouds are hovering over the United States, in particular.	但是，现在越来越多的坏消息引起人们对经济状况的严重怀疑； 特别是乌云笼罩着美国，尤其如此。


Is the world economy on the brink of recession?	世界经济正处在衰退的边缘吗？


In the US, real-estate prices remain in free fall, and the banking crisis is still claiming new victims (Bear Stearns, IndyMac, First Heritage Bank, First National Bank of Nevada, First Priority Bank, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, etc.).	在美国，房产价格仍然以自由落体的方式下降，而且银行危机仍然在危及新的受害者（从贝尔斯登、因迪美、第一传统银行、内华达州第一国民银行、第一优先银行到房地美以及房贷美等等）。


In the banking world as a whole, expected write-offs now considerably exceed the €400 billion mark projected just last spring.	在整个银行业，现在预期的呆账核销数额大大超过了去年春天预计的4000亿欧元。


Unemployment, moreover, is rising at its fastest rate in seven years.	而且，失业人数在以七年来最快的速度增长。


Overall employment, which is still high in historical terms, has been declining continuously since the beginning of 2008.	从历史来看，现在的整体就业率仍然很高，但是从2008年年初以来就开始持续下降。


It is surprising that America’s stock market hasn’t crashed yet, since all other indicators are pointing downward.	既然其他所有的指标都显示出向下的趋势，美国的股票市场还没有崩溃是很令人惊讶的。


The Standard ampamp; Poor’s price/earnings ratio recently stood at around 20, well above the long-term average of around 16 since 1881.	标普的市盈率最近处于20倍左右，远远高于自1881年以来的长期平均市盈率16倍的水平。


Disturbing signals for the world economy have also come from recent surveys of economic activity.	对世界经济的扰动信号也来自最近对经济活动的调查。


The Ifo World Economic Climate index deteriorated in the third quarter of 2008 for the fourth consecutive time.	Ifo世界经济景气指数在2008年第三季度继续恶化，这也是连续四次如此。


That decline was primarily the result of more unfavorable appraisals of the current economic situation, but also reflected another downward revision of expectations for the next six months.	该指数的下降主要是对当前经济形势更不利的评估的结果，但是它也被反映在对未来六个月经济预期的向下修正上。


Today, the index is at its lowest level since the fourth quarter of 2001.	现在，该指数处于2001年第四季度以来的最低水平。


The cooling of the Ifo World Economic Climate index was particularly marked in Western Europe and Asia.	Ifo世界经济景气指数的降温在西欧和亚洲表现得特别显著。


This has dispelled hopes that Asia economic activity could develop separately from that of the US, thereby offsetting European exporters’ losses in America.	这驱散了亚洲经济活动可以独立于美国经济从而抵消欧洲出口商在美国的损失的幻想。


In the third quarter of 2008, the Ifo index for Asia was at its lowest level since the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, with particularly poor economic assessments coming from Japan.	在2008年的第三季度，Ifo亚洲指数处于2001年基地组织袭击世贸中心以来的最低水平，其中对日本经济状况的评估特别差。


In the US, the climate indicator declined again, after having sunk dramatically in the second quarter, bringing it to its lowest level since 1991.	在美国，景气指标在第二季度急剧下降后再次下降，已经降低到自1991年以来的最低水平。


The University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index fell in June 2008 to its lowest level in decades and has since recovered only insignificantly.	密歇根大学消费者信心指数在2008年6月份降低到几十年来的最低水平，并且此后回升甚微。


Also for the euro area, the Ifo Economic Climate index registered a dramatic decline.	在欧元区也是如此，Ifo经济景气指数纪录了该地区经济指数的急剧下降。


Europe’s largest economy, Germany, is now going into the doldrums.	欧洲最大的经济体德国现在正在进入经济停滞状态。


The Ifo Business Climate index, which, though based on a survey for Germany, is regarded as Europe’s most important economic activity indicator, has been falling with few interruptions since the autumn of last year.	Ifo商业景气指数虽然建立在对德国的调查上，但是它也被认为是欧洲最重要的经济活动指标，该指标自去年秋天以来几乎不受阻碍的不断下降。


It is now clearly in territory that implies an economic downturn.	它现在显然处于显示经济下滑的区域内。


In addition, export expectations for German manufacturing are heading south.	此外，对德国制造业出口的预期也在下降。


Incoming orders in manufacturing, the most important indicator in the official statistics, fell more sharply in the first two quarters of 2008 than at any time since the beginning of 1993.	作为官方统计最重要指标的新进制造业订单，在2008年的头两个季度下降的幅度比自1993年开始以来的任何时候都要大。


In the second quarter, the German economy shrank at an annualized, seasonally and calendar adjusted rate of 2%.	在第二季度，德国经济按年化季节日期调整率2%的幅度收缩。


All in all, there is now hardly any doubt that the economic upturn in Germany that began in the summer of 2005 is now coming to an end.	总而言之，现在，对德国经济从2005年夏天开始的上升趋势现在正在结束这一问题，几乎没有疑问。


Amid this gloomy outlook, we anxiously look for encouraging signs.	在这令人沮丧的展望中，我们急切地寻找鼓舞人心的迹象。


The price of crude oil, which hit a record level of $148 a barrel in July, has since fallen almost 25%, or $36.	原油的价格自从七月份达到148美元每桶的纪录高点后，已经下跌了25%或36美元。


Whether recent developments in America’s economy give reason for hope is now the question.	最近美国经济的发展是否给予人们充满希望的理由，现在还是一个疑问。


With an annualized 1.9% quarterly rise in GDP in April-June, growth was twice as high as in the first quarter (0.9%).	从四月份到七月份美国的GDP有1. 9%的年化季度增长率，这一增长率是第一季度增长率0.


This largely reflects the impact of $152 billion in tax rebates (roughly 1% of GDP), but, given the continuing and intensifying real-estate crisis, this boost to growth still does not mark a turnaround.	9%的两倍。 这一增长率主要反映了1520亿美元（大约占美国GDP的1%）退税的影响，但是，鉴于美国房地产危机的持续和加剧，这种对经济增长的推进并不表明经济趋势的转向。


In Japan, with an economy of about half the size of the US, growth forces remain weak.  In the second quarter of 2008, the Japanese economy shrank at an annualized rate of 2.4%, primarily due to weak exports.	日本的经济规模大约是美国的一半，其增长动力仍然很弱。 在2008年的第二季度，日本经济以2.


With all this discouraging news, it is little comfort that some areas of the world are still displaying considerable growth rates: China is expected to grow by 9.5% this year and in 2009, with India growing by 8%, Russia up by 6.5%, owing to higher oil prices, and Latin America growing by 4.5% on average during this period.	伴随着这些令人沮丧的消息，世界有些地区仍然展示出的相当可观的增长率给人稍许安慰：预期中国在今年和2009年的增长率达到9. 5%，印度达到8%，俄罗斯由于高油价达到6.


Unfortunately, the weight of these countries and regions is small; China, the biggest of them, accounts for only 5% of the world economy.	5%。 不幸的是，这些国家和地区的比重过小：它们中经济规模最大的中国也只占世界经济的5%。


So the signs of a worldwide economic slowdown have increased.	所以全球经济放缓的迹象增多了。


The American crisis is now spreading to other areas of the world.	美国的危机现在正在向世界其他地区扩散。


Former US Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan may be right when he says: “This crisis is different – a once or twice a century event deeply rooted in fears of insolvency of major financial institutions.”	当前美联储主席艾伦·格林斯潘说“这次危机不同——这是一个深深植根于对主要金融机构破产的恐惧中的一个世纪发生一次或两次的危机”的时候，他可能是对的。


The Economic Fundamentals of 2013	2013年经济的基本面


NEW YORK – The global economy this year will exhibit some similarities with the conditions that prevailed in 2012.	发自纽约——今年全球经济将会展现出与2012年经济环境的若干相似之处。


No surprise there: we face another year in which global growth will average about 3%, but with a multi-speed recovery – a sub-par, below-trend annual rate of 1% in the advanced economies, and close-to-trend rates of 5% in emerging markets.	这并不让人吃惊：我们面临着又一个全球经济增长平均只得3%的年份，但各国的复苏速度并不相同——发达国家的增长率低于平均水平，仅有1%且不断下滑，而新兴市场的增长率则为5%，依然维持升势。


But there will be some important differences as well.	但这中间也存在着一些重要的差别。


Painful deleveraging – less spending and more saving to reduce debt and leverage – remains ongoing in most advanced economies, which implies slow economic growth.	令人痛苦的去杠杆化过程——必须减少消费提高储蓄才能降低债务和杠杆——依然在很多发达国家中经历着，这意味着较为缓慢的经济增长。


But fiscal austerity will envelop most advanced economies this year, rather than just the eurozone periphery and the United Kingdom.	但今年财政紧缩会遍布大部分发达国家，而不仅仅是欧元区外围国家和英国。


Indeed, austerity is spreading to the core of the eurozone, the United States, and other advanced economies (with the exception of Japan).	的确，财政紧缩正慢慢渗入到欧元区中心、美国及其他发达国家（日本除外）。


Given synchronized fiscal retrenchment in most advanced economies, another year of mediocre growth could give way to outright contraction in some countries.	鉴于大部分发达国家同步进行财政紧缩，某些国家下一年的温和增长会让位于彻底的紧缩。


With growth anemic in most advanced economies, the rally in risky assets that began in the second half of 2012 has not been driven by improved fundamentals, but rather by fresh rounds of unconventional monetary policy.	随着大部分发达国家经济增长乏力，始于2012年下半年的高风险资产价格回升并非源自于基本面的改善，而是受到新一轮的非常规货币政策驱动。


Most major advanced economies’ central banks – the European Central Bank, the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the Swiss National Bank – have engaged in some form of quantitative easing, and they are now likely to be joined by the Bank of Japan, which is being pushed toward more unconventional policies by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s new government.	大多数重要发达国家的央行——比如欧洲央行、美联储、英格兰银行、瑞士国家银行——都忙于实施某种形式的定量宽松政策，而日本央行很有可能会加入这种大潮——首相安倍晋三领导的新政府致力于推动实施更加非常规的政策。


Moreover, several risks lie ahead.	此外，以后还会有几个风险等着我们。


First, America’s mini-deal on taxes has not steered it fully away from the fiscal cliff.	首先，美国在税收问题上的迷你协议未能完全避开财政悬崖。


Sooner or later, another ugly fight will take place on the debt ceiling, the delayed sequester of spending, and a congressional “continuing spending resolution” (an agreement to allow the government to continue functioning in the absence of an appropriations law).	早晚有一天，在债务上限、对支出的延迟暂缓和国会的“持续支出方案”（一项允许政府在缺乏拨款法案的情况下继续运作的协议）上会出现另一场不光彩的争斗。


Markets may become spooked by another fiscal cliffhanger.	市场可能会被又一个财政悬念吓坏了。


And even the current mini-deal implies a significant amount of drag – about 1.4% of GDP – on an economy that has grown at barely a 2% rate over the last few quarters.	甚至当前的迷你协议都意味着对经济的严重拖累——约为GDP的1. 4%——何况该经济体在过去几个季度也仅是以2%的速度增长。


Second, while the ECB’s actions have reduced tail risks in the eurozone – a Greek exit and/or loss of market access for Italy and Spain – the monetary union’s fundamental problems have not been resolved.	其次，虽然欧洲央行的行动减少了欧元区尾部风险——希腊的退出以及意大利和西班牙丢失市场准入权的丧失——货币联盟的根本问题并未解决。


Together with political uncertainty, they will re-emerge with full force in the second half of the year.	加上政治上的不确定性，这些问题都将会在今年下半年全面重新凸显出来。


After all, stagnation and outright recession – exacerbated by front-loaded fiscal austerity, a strong euro, and an ongoing credit crunch – remain Europe’s norm.	毕竟，停滞和彻底衰退——在前期施行的财政紧缩、强势欧元以及正在持续的信贷危机的影响下不断恶化���—成了欧洲经济的常态。


As a result, large – and potentially unsustainable – stocks of private and public debt remain.	结果，大量且潜在不稳定的私人股票和公共债务依然存在。


Moreover, given aging populations and low productivity growth, potential output is likely to be eroded in the absence of more aggressive structural reforms to boost competitiveness, leaving the private sector no reason to finance chronic current-account deficits.	此外，鉴于人口老龄化和低生产率增长，且缺乏用以提高竞争力的更激进结构性改革，潜在产出很有可能会被侵蚀，这就使得私人企业没有理由去支持长期的经常项目赤字。


Third, China has had to rely on another round of monetary, fiscal, and credit stimulus to prop up an unbalanced and unsustainable growth model based on excessive exports and fixed investment, high saving, and low consumption.	第三，目前中国不得不依靠新一轮的货币、财政和信贷刺激来支撑其不平衡且不持续的增长模式，其增长过去一直依赖于过度出口和固定投资、高储蓄和低消费。


By the second half of the year, the investment bust in real estate, infrastructure, and industrial capacity will accelerate.	今年下半年之前，在房地产、基础设施和工业产能上的破产会将加速。


And, because the country’s new leadership – which is conservative, gradualist, and consensus-driven – is unlikely to speed up implementation of reforms needed to increase household income and reduce precautionary saving, consumption as a share of GDP will not rise fast enough to compensate.	而且由于中国的新领导层——保守、渐进、共识驱动——不大可能加快实施增加家庭收入和减少预防性储蓄所需的改革，消费占GDP比例将不会上升得快到足以弥补其损失。


So the risk of a hard landing will rise by the end of this year.	所以今年年底出现硬着陆的风险会上升。


Fourth, many emerging markets – including the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), but also many others – are now experiencing decelerating growth.	第四，很多新兴市场——包括金砖四国（巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国），还有其他许多国家——如今都正在经历减速增长。


Their “state capitalism” – a large role for state-owned companies; an even larger role for state-owned banks; resource nationalism; import-substitution industrialization; and financial protectionism and controls on foreign direct investment – is the heart of the problem.	它们的“国家资本主义”——国有企业的重要作用； 更重要的国有银行作用；


Whether they will embrace reforms aimed at boosting the private sector’s role in economic growth remains to be seen.	金融保护主义并控制外国直接投资——是问题的核心。 它们是否会拥护旨在提高私企在经济增长角色的改革还有待观察。


Finally, serious geopolitical risks loom large.	最终，严重的地缘政治风险日益凸显。


The entire greater Middle East – from the Maghreb to Afghanistan and Pakistan – is socially, economically, and politically unstable.	整个大中东地区——从马格里布到阿富汗和巴基斯坦——在社会、经济和政治上都不稳定。


Indeed, the Arab Spring is turning into an Arab Winter.	确实，阿拉伯之春正在变成阿拉伯之冬。


While an outright military conflict between Israel and the US on one side and Iran on the other side remains unlikely, it is clear that negotiations and sanctions will not induce Iran’s leaders to abandon efforts to develop nuclear weapons.	虽然以色列、美国与伊朗之间不大可能出现直接的军事冲突，但很明显谈判和制裁不能促使伊朗领导人放弃发展核武器。


With Israel refusing to accept a nuclear-armed Iran, and its patience wearing thin, the drums of actual war will beat harder.	由于以色列拒绝接受拥有核武器的伊朗，它的耐心正逐渐消失，而实际战争的鼓声正越敲越响。


The fear premium in oil markets may significantly rise and increase oil prices by 20%, leading to negative growth effects in the US, Europe, Japan, China, India and all other advanced economies and emerging markets that are net oil importers.	石油市场的恐慌性溢价可能会显著上升，因而引起石油价格上涨20%，这就会导致美国、欧洲、日本、中国、印度和所有其他石油净进口的发达国家及新兴市场出现负增长效应。


While the chance of a perfect storm – with all of these risks materializing in their most virulent form – is low, any one of them alone would be enough to stall the global economy and tip it into recession.	虽然出现完美风暴的可能性——所有的风险都以它们最致命的形式出现——非常低，它们当中任何一个风险都足以拖累全球经济并导致衰退。


And while they may not all emerge in the most extreme way, each is or will be appearing in some form.	虽然这些风险可能不会以最极端的方式出现，每个风险都将会以某种形式出现。


As 2013 begins, the downside risks to the global economy are gathering force.	随着2013年开始，全球经济的下跌风险正在增加。


Global Markets\u0027 Time Factor	全球市场的时间因素


BARCELONA – In recent months, the dichotomy between booming financial markets, on the one hand, and sluggish economies and dysfunctional politics, on the other, has loomed large.	巴塞罗那—最近几个月来，二分法渐成气候——一边是繁荣的金融市场，另一边是停滞的经济和陷入瘫痪的政治。


Yet insufficient attention is being devoted to a critical factor – time, and who controls it – that could well mean the difference between an orderly global resolution of today’s growing inconsistencies and a return to a more troubled phase.	但一个关键因素没有受到足够的关注——时间，以及谁掌握着时间。 这一因素极有可能意味着当前愈演愈烈的矛盾得到有序的全球解决和回到更麻烦阶段的区别。


Markets have been understandably buoyant in the first quarter of 2013.	2013年第一季度，市场颇为活跃，这不难理解。


Most economic data confirm that, after the trauma caused by the global financial crisis, the United States’ economy is healing, and doing so in an accelerated fashion.	大部分经济数据都确认，在经历了全球金融危机的重创后，美国经济正在恢复，并且恢复过程在加速。


The sequence is now well established.	整个序列已经被排好了。 开始是大型跨国公司，在我的记忆中，它们的财务状况前所未有地好。


It started with large multinational companies, which are on as solid a financial footing as I can remember.	规模较小的企业正在逐渐复原； 银行已经重建了资本缓冲，削减了可疑资产；


Smaller firms are gradually recuperating; banks have rebuilt their capital cushions and reduced their dubious assets; the housing sector has stabilized; and a growing number of households are reestablishing healthier balance sheets, especially as employment gradually picks up.	住房部门已经稳定； 越来越多的家庭资产负债表正在恢复中，特别是在就业逐渐起色的情况下。


This private-sector recovery is helping government finances.	私人部门的复苏有助于政府财政。


The US budget deficit has been on a downward trend for now, helped by both higher revenues and lower pressure on spending (for example, payments to the unemployed have fallen as joblessness has declined).	目前美国预算赤字已进入下降趋势，这既是岁入提高的结果，也是拜支出压力减小所赐（比如，失业救济额随失业人数的减少而减少）。


The healing process is also evident in Europe, though, unfortunately, it is effectively limited only to sovereign-bond markets.	欧洲也显示出了恢复迹象，尽管不幸的是只局限于主权债券市场。


The real economy remains under enormous pressure in several countries, as economies contract and unemployment remains alarmingly high.	多个国家的实体经济仍面临沉重压力，经济在收缩，失业依然高企。


After flirting with disaster last July, interest-rate spreads for eurozone bonds have generally been subdued, and financial segmentation has been slowly reversed (that is, at least before European officials embarked on the controversial path of trying to impose losses on guaranteed bank deposits in Cyprus).	在经历了去年7月的灾难后，欧元区债券之间的利差大体上已经缩小，金融分裂之局逐渐扭转（至少在欧洲官员试图祭出让塞浦路斯受担保银行存款承受损失的争议手段之前是如此）。


Moreover, as Ireland’s highly successful €5 billion ten-year bond issue in mid-March demonstrated, some countries are in the process of restoring normal access to capital markets.	此外，3月中旬爱尔兰成功发行50亿欧元十年期债券表明，有的国家正在回归正常进入资本市场的状态。


The impact on markets of these trends has been turbocharged by central banks, which are risk markets’ best friends.	这些趋势给市场造成的影响又受到了央行的煽风点火。 央行堪称风险市场的好朋友。


This is not because they wish to play that role; rather, it is because higher asset prices are essential if central bankers stand any chance of delivering the desired economic outcomes of higher growth and stronger job creation.	这不是因为它们愿意扮演这一角色，而是因为如若央行想要给出人们所盼望的更高增长、更多就业创造的结果，一个很重要的方面是提高资产价格。


This is most evident in the US, where markets love the Federal Reserve’s trifecta of near-zero policy interest rates (negative in real terms), aggressive forward policy guidance, and asset purchases – all of which push investors to take more risk.	美国尤其如此，市场非常欢迎美联储延长近零利率（负真实利率）政策、激进的政策指导以及资产购买方案的三管齐下——所有这些都让投资者更多地承担风险。


Markets also welcome the fact that the Fed’s hyperactive experimentation is forcing other central banks around the world to pursue more expansionary policies.	美联储的积极动作正迫使世界其他央行采取更宽松的政策，市场对这一事实也非常欢迎。


Indeed, from the Bank of Japan’s dramatic policy U-turn to the Bank of Mexico’s surprise interest-rate cuts, the Fed’s approach is affecting central banks in a growing number of countries.	事实上，从日本银行的一百八十度政策大转弯到墨西哥银行出人意料的降息，美联储的方法正在影响越来越多的央行。


Pushed further away from best-case scenarios, they are unable to ignore the global liquidity impact of the Fed’s policies, yet they lack the right policy tools to address it.	它们被美联储的政策推理了最佳情形，无法忽视后者的全球流动性影响，但却没有合适的政策工具来纠正。


The mix of endogenous healing and strong central-bank tailwinds, including from a “whatever it takes” European Central Bank, has also helped markets shrug off troubling political uncertainties.	内生恢复加上强劲的央行助推——包括“不惜一切代价”的欧洲央行——还帮助市场摆脱了令人不安的政治不确定性。


Be it the US Congress’s paralyzing polarization or Italy’s protest vote against the established political order, politicians are being given time to overcome their dysfunction, thereby minimizing any immediate disruptive impact.	不管是美国国会导致僵局的两极分化，还是意大利反对现存政治制度的抗议票，政客都获得了时间克服功能失调，从而将即期破坏性影响最小化。


Understandably, investors have interpreted all of this as a green light to take more risk.	不难理解，投资者将所有这些解读为可以放心承担更多风险的信号。


And with the hype this month over eight successive records for the Dow Jones index (and many other records around the world), excitement induces more investors to enter riskier asset markets.	而随着道琼斯指数在本月连续创出八次新高（全世界也有众多新高被打破），兴奋情绪使投资者涌入风险更高的资产市场。


The excitement is not anxiety-free, however, and rightly so.	但是，兴奋情绪并不是没有顾虑的，理应如此。


Investors worry about the longer-term consequences of political dysfunction, another year of European economic contraction, disastrously high unemployment, unprecedented – and thus untested – central bank policies, and increasing global tensions.	投资者担心政治僵局的长期后果、欧洲经济迎来又一个衰退年份、灾难性的高失业、前所未有——也未受过检验——的央行政策，以及日渐升级的全球紧张局势。


And the recent bungling of the Cyprus rescue does not help. No wonder some have called the recent market rally “one of the most unloved” in history.	而在塞浦路斯，最近的拙劣救援毫无成效。 毫不奇怪，有人将近期的市场反弹称为史上“最不受欢迎”的反弹。


This mix of excitement and anxiety is, in fact, a sign of the looming crossroads that faces investors.	事实上，这一兴奋和焦虑的混合标志着投资者走到了十字路口。


One road, involving a relatively orderly handoff from policy-assisted recovery to self-sustaining growth, offers the possibility of even greater financial rewards, as rapidly improving economic and political conditions validate current artificial pricing and drive it higher.	一条路是政策推动复苏有序向自我维持增长转变，这或能带来更大的金融利益，因为经济和政治条件的改善能对当前的人为价格形成支撑并进一步推高。


The other road is a lot less attractive.	另一条路就要差一些。


With insufficient endogenous healing and no economic escape velocity, the effectiveness of central banks’ policies wanes and political dysfunction increases, leading to financial losses, volatility spikes, and huge risk-management challenges.	内生复苏不足以及经济达不到逃逸速度将使央行政策的效应消失殆尽，让政治僵局恶化，导致金融损失、波动性激增和大规模风险管理风险。


Given current policy and political uncertainties – and the multiple equilibria that they entail – it is difficult to predict with a high degree of confidence which road eventually will be taken and when.	考虑到当前的政策和政治不稳定性——以及它们所暗含的多重均衡——很难信心满满地预测最终会在何时走上哪条路。


Those who claim otherwise may well fail to appreciate fully the exceptional nature of the current situation.	如果你不同意这一点，这意味着你不能完全理解当前情况的异常性。


In these circumstances, timing may not be everything, but it may prove to be a key determinant of the probabilities.	在这样的条件下，时机或许不是万能的，但将是可能性的关键决定因素。


If the journey to the crossroads is accelerated by a large geopolitical shock (originating in, say, the Middle East or North Korea) and/or a serious political breakdown in Europe (for example, a meltdown in Cyprus or prolonged political paralysis in Italy), the probability of taking the adverse path rises to an uncomfortably high level.	如果走向十字路口的进程因重大地缘政治冲突（比如来自中东或朝鲜）和/或严重政治分裂（如塞浦路斯崩溃或意大利政治僵局迟迟得不到解决）而加速，那么走上死路的可能性就会大大增加。


If, however, central banks can contain domestic and global inconsistencies long enough, the combination of endogenous healing and eventual political progress would significantly improve the probability distribution.	但是，如果央行能够在足够长的时间里遏制国内和全球性矛盾，那么内生恢复和最终的政治进步将大大改善概率分布。


Have no doubt: today’s markets rely heavily on the old adage that “time heals all wounds.”	不要怀疑，如今市场严重依赖于“时间会治愈一切”的老话。


The timekeepers are central banks.	时间掌握在央行手里。


But their control of the clock is less than perfect; and it will become increasingly ineffective if economic improvement faces additional political headwinds in the months ahead.	但它们控制时间的能力并不完美； 如果在未来几个月中经济改善遇到新的政治阻力，这一能力将变得越来越虚弱。


The Global Home	全球住房


Homes are the most local of investments, rooted to a particular place like a tree, and thus thriving or withering in response to local economic conditions.	住房是最具地域性的投资，如同一棵树一样扎根在一个特定的地方，随着当地经济状况的变化而兴衰。


The whole world flashes by on our television screens, but the market for our homes, which is comprised almost entirely of local amateurs, remains grounded right there in our own backyard.	整个世界都在我们的电视屏幕上闪烁，但是，我们的住房市场却仍然被牢牢地限制在我们的后院里，因为市场几乎全部由当地业余投资者组成。


Soon, however, this could all change.	然而，这种情况将很快改变。


Within a month, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), in collaboration with my company, MacroMarkets, as well as Fiserv and Standard & Poor’s, will launch futures and options contracts on home prices in ten cities in the United States.	一个月之内，芝加哥商业交易所将与我的公司宏观市场研究公司、Fiserv公司和标准普尔一道推出美国国内10个城市的住房价格期货和期权合同。


The contracts will be settled on the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, which developed out of academic work that my colleague Karl Case and I pioneered almost twenty years ago.	该合同将以标准普尔及蔡斯席勒住房价格指数进行结算，该指数源于我和同事蔡斯近20年前开发研究得出的学术成果。


For many years we have been campaigning for housing futures, but no exchange wanted to use such indices to create a futures market until now.	多年来我们一直争取创建住房期货，但在此之前没有一家交易所愿意采用这些指数建立一个期货市场。


The futures markets on home prices will allow investors around the world to invest in US homes indirectly, by buying interests in them through these markets.	住房价格期货市场将允许全世界的投资者通过这些市场购买美国住房的权益实现对美国住房的间接投资。


An investor in Paris, Rio de Janeiro, or Tokyo will be able to invest in owner-occupied homes in New York, Los Angeles, and Las Vegas.	巴黎、里约热内卢或东京的投资者将能够对纽约、洛杉矶和拉斯维加斯业主居住的住房进行投资。


A fundamental principle of financial theory – “diversification” or “risk spreading” – implies that interest in the new contracts will be high.	金融理论的一个基本原则即“多样化”或“风险分散”意味着这个新的合同将有很高的权益。


People and businesses in New York, for example, are overexposed to their local real estate risks, so they should reduce this risk by selling New York home price futures.	例如，纽约的市民和企业对他们本地房地产的风险已经不堪重负，所以他们将会通过出售纽约住房价格期货来减少风险。


People in Tokyo will assume some of this risk by purchasing New York home price futures if the price is right.	如果价格合理，东京的人将通过购买纽约住房价格期货来承担一部分风险。


The New Yorkers still live in their own homes, but now they have spread their investment risk worldwide.	纽约人仍将安居乐业，但是现在他们将投资风险分散到全球。


A genuine futures market on single-family homes has not been attempted since 1991 when the London Futures and Options Exchange (now merged into Euronext.liffe) failed in its effort to launch such a market in Britain.	自从1991年伦敦期货及期权交易所（现在泛欧交易所的衍生品市场即伦敦国际金融期货期权交易所）试图在英国推出一个真正的独立房屋期货市场的努力失败之后，就再也没有人尝试建立一个这样的市场了。


That attempt never generated much trading volume.	当时的交易量微不足道。


The Exchange threw a party and no one came.	交易所开张，却没有人来捧场。


British spread-betting markets for home prices, and some retail online markets, have never amounted to much either.	英国住房价格点差博彩市场以及其它一些在线零售市场均乏善可陈。


Will it be different this time?	这次会有所不同吗？


To be sure, starting a new market is always an uncertain proposition: people want to go to parties only if a lot of other people are there; if no one is there, no one wants to come.	可以肯定的是，开创一个新的市场前景捉摸不定。 人们总是随波逐流，如果应者寥寥无几，也就门可罗雀了。


Likewise, in markets without many investors, not enough trades can be executed to generate the returns needed to attract them.	同理，投资者罕至的市场交易稀少，从而无法产生足以吸引他们的回报。


As is often true of great parties, it can be a bit of a mystery how substantial new markets get started, but we know that it does happen from time to time.	如同大型聚会一样，大型新兴市场是的起家难免显示神秘，但是我们知道有时的确如此。


Initial indications suggest growing interest in futures trading for home prices, particularly as so much talk about the “housing bubble” underscores the importance of diversifying risk.	最初迹象显示对住房价格期货交易的兴趣越来越浓，特别是关于“房产泡沫”的言论甚嚣尘上，更加突出了风险多样化的重要性。


After the CME’s announcement, one of its competitors, the Chicago Board Options Exchange, said that it plans to create futures and options contracts on major US regions, to be based on the median home price published by the National Association of Realtors.	芝加哥商业交易所宣布之后，其竞争对手之一的芝加哥期权交易所表示也计划建立美国主要地区的期货和期权合同，这些合同将以美国全国房地产经纪人协会发布的住房价格中值为基础。


But, aside from strong public interest in investing in housing and in hedging housing risks, another critical issue must be resolved if futures markets are to succeed: prices must be revealed, and investors must understand what these prices mean.	但是，除了公众对投资房产和规避房产风险有强烈的兴趣之外，期货市场要取得成功还需要解决另外一个重要的问题，那就是价格必须披露，并且投资者必须理解价格的含义。


I believe there is a very good chance that many of these futures markets will soon be predicting substantial price declines in some US cities over the next year.	我相信，众多上述期货市场将预言来年美国一些城市的住房价格会大幅下降。


They will be in what traders call “backwardation”: the future price in the market today is lower than the price of a home today.	这就是交易人所谓的“现货升水”，那就是，今天市场上期货的价格低于今天住房的实际价格。


Maybe backwardation won’t appear on the first day that housing futures are traded, but there is a good chance it will come within a matter of months.	或许现货升水不会在房产期货交易的第一天就出现，但几个月之内出现的可能性非常大。


We may need backwardation in some of these markets if they are to fulfill their function.	在上述某些市场上，如果想让他们完全履行职能的话，我们可能确实需要现货升水。


Everyone knows that there has been a huge real estate boom in many of these cities (and elsewhere in the world) in recent years.	众人皆知，近年来上述许多城市以及世界各地房地产热膨胀。


International investors are not likely to want to invest in these cities unless expectations of a price decline are built into the futures markets, as people in Tokyo understand from their own bitter experience.	国际投资者不太可能愿意在这些城市进行投资，除非期货市场上出现了价格下降的预期，对于这一点东京人深有体会，教训惨痛。


But if backwardation is strong enough, even investors who think that the US housing market is headed for a fall will still be able to expect a good return from home price futures, because they are already getting a discounted price in the futures market.	但是如果现货升水足够强势的话，即使投资者认为美国房产市场将下跌，他们将仍然可以预期从住房价格市场中得到高额回报，因为他们已经从期货市场上得到了折扣价。


Nevertheless, it will require some adjustment for New Yorkers seeking to hedge their own real estate investments to sell futures contracts that have a built-in price decline.	然而，这将要求那些寻求套期保值其自身不动产投资的纽约人作出调整。 出售势必价格下跌的期货合同。


They will have to get used to the idea that the market already expects the decline, and that they can protect themselves only for that margin of possible future price declines that exceed this expectation.	他们将不得不顺应这一观点，即市场已经预计到下跌，他们只有在可能的期货价格下跌超过预期的幅度内保护自己。


In fact, such adjustments in our thinking will likely occur when we actually see the futures market prices.	事实上，当我们实际看到未来的市场价格时，我们的心态调整才有可能。


Until now, the future course of real estate prices has been merely a matter of diverse opinion.	迄今为止，房地产价格的未来走向仅仅是多样观点的问题。


When markets create an international consensus on the future price of homes in cities around the world, we will be better able to manage the risks facing these cities, thereby stabilizing their economies – and our own lives.	当市场就��界各地城市的未来住房价格形成一致意见时，我们将能够更好地管理这些城市面临的风险，从而稳定他们的经济以及我们自己的生活。


The Global Imagination of Protest	全球抗议狂想曲


NEW YORK – When graffiti appeared last spring on a wall near Tunisia’s interior ministry reading “Thank you, Facebook,” it was not just praise for a social-media company that had facilitated the country’s uprising.	纽约——去年春天当突尼斯内政部附近的墙上出现“谢谢你，Facebook”的涂鸦时，其意义远远超出了对推动该国起义的这家社交媒体公司的赞许。


It was also a celebration of the sense of shared experience that defined the Tunisian revolution – and the many other historic protests and revolutions that erupted in 2011.	这标志着人们对突尼斯革命中共同经历的庆祝——2011年爆发的其他很多历史性的抗议和革命其基础也在于这种共同的经历。


As we discovered collecting essays for our new book From Cairo to Wall Street: Voices from the Global Spring, one of the defining characteristics of the new age of protest is the dovetailing of the desire and the ability to connect – across neighborhoods, cities, countries, and even continents.	正如我们为新著《从开罗到华尔街：全球春天之音》收集文章时所发现的那样，抗议活动新阶段最主要的特点是将愿望与跨社区、城市、国家、甚至是大洲的联系能力衔接在一起。


In every contributor’s country, a new awareness of shared destinies and of a global community permeated protest movements.	在撰稿者所在国家，所有抗议活动都渗透着对共同命运和全球社会的全新认识。


Social-media technology was one tool that advanced it; but so was a reconceptualization of the meaning of public space, and the view that a plurality of ideas is superior to dogma – that the act of collaboration is as important as the outcome.	社交媒体技术起到了推波助澜的作用； 此外还有对公共空间的重新定义，以及认为思想多元化好过教条主义——合作行为本身及其所取得的结果拥有同等的重要性。


So these were not just political revolutions. They were also revolutions of ideas – the globalization of protest as a strategy.	因此抗议活动全球化策略不仅仅是一场政治革命，同时也是一场思想革命。


To be sure, protesters’ grievances vary greatly according to local circumstances (though there is surprising consistency across regions and even continents when it comes to issues like housing, unemployment, inequality, and the frustration of young people who have studied hard and cannot find jobs).	可以肯定的是，抗议者的不满情绪会随当地的具体情况出现极大的变化（尽管不同地区甚至大洲在涉及如住房、失业、不平等和年轻人勤奋苦读却找不到工作所导致的挫折感方面是惊人的一致）。


At the same time, the philosophy of change through mass, collaborative, and inclusive action is common to – and cross-fertilized between – almost every movement.	同时，通过集体协作和包容性行动改变现状的理念贯穿并影响着所有的抗议活动。


Consider Tunisia, where Mouheb Ben Garoui, a 24 year-old activist, writes in our book about how fellow citizens from all walks of life and no definite political affiliation poured out of their homes to occupy squares and demand a say in the country’s future.	比方说突尼斯，24岁的活动人士Mouheb Ben Garoui在我们的书中记录了各行各业没有明确政治联系的同胞们是如何涌出家门占领广场，并要求在决定国家未来时拥有发言权。


Facebook helped, but mainly because it magnified and accelerated the process.	Facebook的确发挥了作用，但主要原因是它放大并加速了这一进程。


As in other countries, the very act of seizing territory meant a lot to protestors.	在其他国家，占领行为本身对抗议者的意义就十分重大。


In the squares of both Tunisia and Egypt, demonstrators who had felt alienated and isolated under repressive regimes were overjoyed to discover that they were not alone.	在突尼斯和埃及的广场，在专制政权下饱受孤立和疏离之苦的示威者喜出望外地发现自己并不孤独。


Sitting in the square became more than an act of defiance: in Spain, Greece, and in the Occupy Movements of the United States and the United Kingdom, the occupied zones became places where a new democratic society could be practiced, sometimes through the time-consuming General Assembly process of group decision-making.	在广场上静坐被赋予了超乎挑衅行为之外的涵义：在西班牙、希腊和英美占领运动，被占领地区成了新民主社会的试验地，有时甚至通过极为耗时的大会做出集体决策。


In Greece and Spain, protesters told us that their neighbors’ stories were a revelation.	在希腊和西班牙，示威者告诉我们邻国的故事为他们带来启迪。


People unburdened themselves to strangers.	人们面对陌生人发泄和倾诉不满。


As Spain’s indignados sat in the squares, they felt for the first time connected to the people in their communities – a feeling that became a large part of why they stayed.	西班牙愤怒者们坐在广场上的时候，他们首次感觉到与自己人取得了联系——这种感觉也成为他们留下来的重要原因。


In our book, the story of Egyptian protester Jawad Nabulsi, 29, shows how some activists used technology to mobilize people.	在我们的书里，29岁埃及抗议者Jawad Nabulsi的故事显示了一些活动人士如何运用技术去动员人民。


Nabulsi, who worked for charities in Upper Egypt that raised money to provide running water and electricity to poor households, wrote about how Malcolm Gladwell’s The Tipping Point and Jim Collins’s Good to Great affected his thinking about social change.	Nabulsi为上埃及的慈善机构工作，这些机构筹集资金为贫困家庭提供自来水和电力服务。 他在书中讲述了马尔科姆·格拉德威尔的《临界点》和吉姆·柯林斯的《从优秀到卓越》如何影响他对社会变革的认识。


“I had gone to villages and slums, saw the depth of problems in these places and assumed they could not be fixed.	Nabulsi 写道，“我到过乡村和贫民区，看到这些地方问题严重并想当然地认为它们无法解决。


I’d tell myself, ‘They are too humungous, it’s like throwing something in the sea,’” he writes.	我会对自己说，‘这些问题太过庞大，就像把零星东西扔进海里。


Reading Gladwell and Collins, Nabulsi realized he didn’t need to change the whole country, but just “a circle of key players who could have an influence,” and that he “needed to focus on the leaders in the community and work with them.”	’”在读过格拉德威尔和柯林斯的著作后，Nabulsi意识到他没有必要改变整个国家，而只需改变“有影响力的关键圈子”，他“需要关注社区领导人，并与他们展开合作。


He began setting up Facebook groups in order to connect like-minded people.	”他开始建立Facebook好友群，并与志同道合者取得联系。


These groups took on a life of their own.	这些好友群一点一滴拥有了自己的生命。


Seeing that there were others who felt the same frustrations, people became willing to make their voices heard in Tahrir Square, and, like the Spaniards, rediscovered their community.	看到有其他人也在体验同样的挫折感，人们开始愿意在塔里尔广场发出自己的声音，并且和西班牙人一样，重新找回了属于自己的集体。


Satellite, tweets, and Facebook statuses beamed that same message to the world.	卫星、推特和Facebook向世界传递出同样的信息。


The immediate political results of this new connectivity are tenuous.	这种全新联系方式所产生的直接政治后果纤细而脆弱。


Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya have had their regime change, but it is unclear what role, if any, the young idealistic revolutionaries will play in their countries’ future.	埃及、突尼斯和利比亚均实现了政权更迭，但目前还不清楚革命理想青年在这些国家将会扮演什么样的角色。


In Egypt, the power of the military is more concentrated now than it was under former President Hosni Mubarak.	当今埃及的军权比前任总统胡斯尼·穆巴拉克治下更为集中。


In the US, the protests of 2011 will have a lasting effect only if Occupiers remain organized and continue their work on fighting foreclosures.	美国的2011年抗议活动只有在占领者保持组织，并继续开展反止赎斗争时才会产生长期效果。


They certainly will not feel motivated to turn out to support President Barack Obama’s re-election campaign if their voices are not heard in the White House as they were in Zuccotti Park and other public spaces from Oakland to Madison.	如果白宫没有听到抗议者从祖科提公园和奥克兰到麦迪逊的其他公开场合所发出的心声，他们肯定没有动力去支持奥巴马总统的竞选连任。


But if the movements’ gains are uncertain, the connectivity that they created is likely to endure.	但即便抗议运动的收益具有不确定性，它们所建立起来的联系却能够长存。


With American protesters citing Egyptians and Spaniards as direct inspiration, online communities from Syria to Europe cross-pollinating, and continuing strong turnout for rallies like those on May Day 2012 in the US, it is clear that the spirit of community is here to stay.	就像美国抗议者从埃及人和西班牙人身上吸取直接灵感，从叙利亚到欧洲的在线团体相互影响，2012年美国劳动节集会的参与人数持续高涨那样，群体精神将会延续下去已经是不争的事实。


And, worldwide, it is clear that if politicians do not respond to demands for fairness, freedom, a more prosperous future, and government that actually serves the people, the protests will continue.	同时在世界范围内，如果政治家们不对公平、自由、未来繁荣和切实服务于人民的政府等诸多要求做出回应，抗议活动就将不会止步。


The Global Impact of America’s Health Care Debate	美国医疗辩论的全球影响


CAMBRIDGE – Since assuming the presidency earlier this year, Barack Obama’s primary legislative focus has been on reforming the financing of American health care.	坎布里奇——自从年内早些时候就任总统以来，巴拉克·奥巴马就将首要的立法重点放在了改革美国医疗体系的筹资方式上。


Yet his proposals are meeting strong opposition from fiscally conservative Democrats as well as from Republicans, owing to their potential impact on future fiscal deficits.	但他的提案却由于对未来财政赤字的潜在影响而遭到强烈抵制，而抵制力量主要来自在财政问题上偏于保守的民主党和共和党。


Because those deficits are the primary cause of America’s current-account deficit – and thus of global imbalances – the health-care debate’s outcome will affect governments and investors around the world.	上述赤字是造成美国经常账户赤字（进而造成全球不平衡）的主要因素，因此医疗改革辩论的结果将会影响到世界各国政府和投资者。


About 85% of all Americans are now covered by some form of health insurance.	目前约有85%的美国人拥有某种形式的医疗保险。


All individuals over the age of 65 are eligible to be insured by the federal government through the Medicare program.	所有65岁以上的美国人都有资格由政府出资加入Medicare计划。


Low-income families (and those whose income and assets are depleted by high medical costs) are covered by the Medicaid program, which is financed jointly by the states and federal government.	低收入家庭（以及收入和财产被高额医疗费用耗尽的人）可以参与由各州及联邦政府共同出资的Medicaid计划。


Many uninsured get free care in emergency rooms of public and private hospitals and receive free care for chronic conditions in those same institutions.	许多没有保险的人可以在公立和私立医院的急诊室接受免费治疗，并在同样这些机构中接受慢性病的免费治疗。


In the most recent budget, the federal government’s outlays for Medicare in 2010 are projected to be over $500 billion, while Medicaid will cost taxpayers over $250 billion.	在最新预算中，联邦政府2010年用于Medicare计划的支出预计将超过5000亿美元，而Medicaid则将耗费纳税人2500亿美元。


Private health insurance is generally provided by employers, which is encouraged by treating employer payments for health insurance as a tax-deductible business expense while not including the value of that insurance as taxable income to employees.	私人医疗保险一般由雇主提供，政府鼓励雇主支付医疗保险费用，将其作为一项可以免税的业务开支，同时也不将医疗保险价值计入雇员的应税收入。


That rule reduces income and payroll taxes by more than $200 billion.	这项规定使工资所得税减少了2000多亿美元。


In short, an overwhelming majority of Americans are insured, with government a major financer of health care.	简言之，绝大多数美国人都有保险，而医疗服务的主要出资人是政府。


But there remain about 54 million individuals who are not formally insured, and some insured individuals still face the risk of financially ruinous medical costs if they have very expensive medical treatment.	但依然有5400人没有正式保险，而且有些有保险的人在接受昂贵的治疗时，依然无法逃脱医疗开支毁灭性的财务风险。


Obama campaigned on the goals that everyone should have health insurance, that high medical costs should not bankrupt anyone, and that increased efficiency in the production and delivery of care should slow the overall growth of health-care costs.	奥巴马的竞选目标是人人都应该有医疗保险，任何人都不应该因高额的医疗费用而破产，而提高医疗行业的生产和服务效率应该使医疗开支的整体增长速度放缓。


But, rather than producing a specific proposal, he left it to Congress to design the legislation.	但奥巴马并没有拿出一个具体的方案，而是将立法的难题留给了国会。


Several competing plans emerged from the different Congressional committees that have jurisdiction over the issue.	对医疗问题有管辖权的各国会委员会拿出了几份互相矛盾的方案。


The leading proposal, produced by the Senate Finance Committee, fails to achieve any of Obama’s goals.	其中由参议院财政委员会制定的方案影响力最大，但却未能实现奥巴马的任何目标。


It would cut the number of uninsured roughly in half, but would still leave about 25 million people uninsured – with the threat of ruinously high medical bills deterring them from getting care.	这项方案将没有保险的人数减少一半，但仍然有2500万人没有保险——毁灭性的巨额医疗费用会使这些人无法接受治疗。


There is also no clear plan to slow the growth of health-care costs.	仍然没有明确的计划来遏制医疗费用的增长。


As a sign of their support for the administration’s goals, the pharmaceutical industry and the hospital industry have together promised to reduce costs by a total of about $20 billion a year – a token amount, given government health spending of roughly $1 trillion and total health outlays of more than $2 trillion.	为表示对政府目标的支持，制药行业和医疗行业共同承诺将每年的费用降低200亿美元——在政府约1万亿的医疗开支和总共超过2万亿的医疗费用面前，这个数字不过是一种象征性的姿态。


The non-partisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the Senate Finance Committee plan would cost about $800 billion between now and 2019.	无党派的国会预算局预测参议院财政委员会计划从现在到2019年将耗资8000亿美元。


Most of this increased cost would, in principle, be financed by $215 billion of taxes on high-premium insurance policies, and by about $400 billion of cuts in payments to physicians and hospitals that provide services to older patients in the Medicare program.	原则上增加的大部分开支将来自对高保费保单2150亿美元的税收，以及在Medicare计划中为老年患者服务的医生和医疗机构4000亿美元费用的缩减。


If the cost and financing estimates are accurate, and if Congress does not change any of these provisions in the future, the CBO’s calculations imply that the Senate Finance Committee plan would reduce fiscal deficits between now and 2019 by $49 billion, less than 1% of the projected deficits of more than $7 trillion.	如果费用和融资的测算大体准确，且国会在未来不修改任何相关规定，那么国会预算局的计算结果意味着参议院财政委员会计划将从现在到2019年减少财政赤字490亿美元，也就是7万多亿美元预测赤字的不到1%。


In fact, there is a strong risk that this legislation would ultimately add to the fiscal deficit.	事���上，这项法案很可能最终会增加财政赤字。


Increasing the number of insured by 35 million and broadening protection for some who are now insured implies increased demand for health care, which could raise the cost of care paid for by the government as well as by private health-care buyers.	增加3500万被保险人并扩大某些现有被保险人的保障范围意味着增大对医疗服务的需求，这可能增加政府和私人医疗服务购买者为医疗服务所支付的费用。


In addition, both sources of financing are also uncertain.	此外，相关的两条筹资渠道也不确定。


Taxes on high-premium insurance policies would lead many employees and employers to shift their sources of tax-free income from these health-insurance benefits to other forms of untaxed compensation.	对高保费保单的税收会导致许多雇员和雇主将免税收入的来源从医疗保险收益转向其它形式的免税酬劳。


If they do this, the government would not collect the additional revenue from the insurance companies, employers, or employees.	如果他们真的这样做，政府就无法从保险公司、雇主或雇员那里得到额外的收入。


Similarly, the proposed cuts in payments to providers of services to Medicare patients are unlikely to receive the necessary Congressional support in future years, especially if it turns out that doing so would reduce the volume of services, rather than just providers’ incomes.	同样，拟议中付给Medicare医疗服务机构费用的缩减不大可能在未来得到必要的国会支持，特别是当事实证明这样做将缩减服务的数量，而不只缩减服务机构的收入。


There is a long history of legislating such spending cuts, only to reverse them in subsequent years.	立法缩减开支已经有了很长的历史，但不过持续几年光景就又开始重蹈覆辙。


In considering the fiscal implications of Obama’s health proposals, it is important that the current legislation would still leave 25 million individuals without insurance.	在思考奥巴马医疗提案的财政内涵时，重要的是目前这项法案仍会让2500万人没有保险。


How much would it cost to insure them if the gross cost is now projected at $800 billion for the easier-to-insure 35 million?	如果比较容易投保的3500万人总费用预计为8000亿美元，那么需要花费多少资金才能为剩下这2500万人上保险？


And how could that cost be financed if the proposed taxes on existing health policies and the reductions in Medicare outlays have already been used?	如果现在提议的对现有医疗保险征税和削减Medicare开支的方法实施以后，这笔开支又将从何而来？


Closing that gap could add more than $1 trillion to the government’s cost over the next 10 years.	补上这个窟窿可能会在未来10年内增加超过1万亿美元的政府开支。


It is clear that there is a significant danger that the current legislation would add substantially to future US deficits – and establish a precedent for even more expensive expansions of health care in the future.	显而易见，现有法案很有可能大大增加美国未来的财政赤字——并为未来医疗更为昂贵的扩张设定先例。


This would come on top of the currently projected fiscal deficits in both the near term and over the coming decade – and before America’s demographic shift substantially raises the cost of Social Security and Medicare.	这将会建立在目前预测的近期和未来几十年财政赤字的基础之上——而且在美国的人口变化大幅度提高社保和Medicare的成本之前。


Surprisingly, the bond market still seems almost oblivious to this risk.	令人惊讶的是，债券市场似乎仍然没有注意到这一点。


But holders of US debt worldwide have every reason to be concerned.	但全世界美国债券的持有人有理由对此感到担忧。


The World After November	11月之后的世界


MADRID – On November 6, either Barack Obama or Mitt Romney will emerge victorious after an exhausting electoral race, setting the wheels in motion for the coming four years.	马德里—11月6日，奥巴马或罗姆尼将从旷日持久的选战中胜出，称为未来四年的掌舵人。


An ocean away, on November 8, more than 2,000 members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will gather in Beijing.	在大洋彼岸，11月8日，2000多名中共代表将在北京开会。


Approximately a week later, the members of the Politburo Standing Committee will walk out in hierarchical order, preparing to take charge of a growing country of 1.3 billion people.	大约一周后，新的政治局常委将从层级序列中脱颖而出，准备接管有着13亿人口的增长之国。


The leaders of the world’s two largest economies are changing.	世界最大的两个经济体面临着领导人交接班。


So is the world itself.	世界本身也是如此。


The Middle East, in particular, is experiencing a moment of intense transformation.	特别是中东正在经历密集转型的时刻。


While reconstruction – both literal and figurative – is commencing in some parts of the region, countries like Syria are aflame.	重建——不管从字面意思还是引申意思看——正在该地区的一些部分萌芽，叙利亚等国家正在燃烧。


Others, such as Iran, with its moribund revolution, have never ceased rumbling.	伊朗等其他国家还在做困兽之斗。


Amidst a crumbling economy, the country remains belligerent, using its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, to launch at least one successful drone flight above Israel and reportedly initiating recent cyber attacks.	尽管经济萧条，伊朗仍然好斗不已，通过其黎巴嫩代理人真主党发动了至少一次针对以色列的成功的无人机空袭，最近，据说还发动了网络袭击。


As a result, relations among regional actors remain tense.	结果，地区势力间的关系依然紧张。


After his speech at the United Nations appealing for a “red line” on the Iranian nuclear program in the spring or summer of 2013, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu called an early general election, which could potentially give him a strong mandate for action against Iran.	以色列总理内塔尼亚胡在联合国大会上呼吁在2013年春天或夏天为伊朗核计划划定一条“红线”，现在又呼吁提前进行大选，以便让他牢牢掌握对伊朗采取行动的指挥权。


Egypt, meanwhile, is finding its own equilibrium, both domestically, drafting a new constitution, and in terms of foreign policy.	与此同时，埃及还在寻找自己的均衡，既包括国内均衡（起草新宪法），也包括外交政策均衡。


Then there is Turkey, straddling Europe and the Middle East.	还有横跨欧亚的土耳其。


An emerging economy poised to become a regional power, it has exchanged fire with its neighbor to the south, Syria, and has called on its NATO allies to bolster its security.	作为一个意在成为地区一极的新兴国家，土耳其已于其南部邻国叙利亚开火，并呼吁其北约盟国予以支持。


This is part of the changing panorama that new world leaders will inherit in the Middle East – a region in which the United States has been deeply involved.	这是世界新领导人所要接手的中东变局的一部分——美国在这一地区早已泥足深陷。


After nearly a decade of draining military engagement, the US combat mission in Iraq concluded in 2010, and the combat mission in Afghanistan is set to end in 2014.	在经历了近十年的日渐疲软的军事干预后，美国在伊拉克的作战任务于2010年结束，在阿富汗的作战任务计划在2014年结束。


The next American president will also inherit a country with a markedly changed geopolitical perspective.	新人美国总统还将接手一个面临地缘政治前景重大变化的国家。


Technological advances and innovation have begun to turn the longstanding dream of energy independence into a reality.	技术进步和创新已让能源独立的长期梦想开始成为现实。


Whereas extraction of America’s extensive reserves of natural gas was previously thought to be unfeasible, technologies such as hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) have ushered in a shale-gas revolution.	美国有着巨大的原本认为无法利用的天然气储备，但液压致裂法等技术已经开启了页岩气革命之门。


Indeed, the US is on the cusp of energy self-sufficiency.	事实上，已经站在了能源自给的边缘。


Last year, for the first time in 15 years, less than one-half of the oil consumed in the US was imported.	去年，美国所消费的石油中只有不到一半来自进口，这是15年来的第一次。


Annual growth in shale-gas production has increased from 17% between 2000 and 2006 to 48% between 2006 and 2010.	页岩气年产量增长率从2000—2006年间的17%提高到2006—2010年间的48%。


By 2035, shale gas is projected to account for roughly one-half of total US energy production.	到2035年，预计页岩气将占美国能源产量的一半左右。


The repercussions of this revolution will not be only economic.	这场革命的反响绝不仅仅局限于经济。


Politically, reduced reliance on foreign oil may allow the US to concentrate on its foreign-policy shift toward Asia.	在政治上，减少对外国石油的依赖使得美国能够将外交政策焦点转向亚洲。


But it is not just the new US leader who will inherit a changed world.	但并非只有美国新领导人面临着变化的世界。


Across the Pacific, the days of record-breaking economic growth in Asia – a key component of social and political stability – may be coming to an end.	在大洋彼岸亚洲经济增长频创记录——社会和政治稳定的关键因素——的日子正在走向终结。


Indeed, events in China in recent months have revealed internal unease.	事实上，近几个月来在中国发生的事情体现了其内部的不安定。


Though nationalist sentiment directed against external foes tends to divert attention temporarily from internal turmoil, the country’s serious domestic problems need to be addressed.	尽管针对外部敌人的民族主义情绪暂时把注意力从内部动荡中转移开去，但中国严重的国内问题始终需要解决。


China’s economy and politics, ideologically transformed in all but name, will soon need to be adapted to address rising social inequality.	中国经济和政治——意识形态早已发生了变化，只是名义未改——很快就必须做出改变，以解决日渐加剧的社会不平等。


Despite global economic headwinds, China’s leaders will surely remain focused on maintaining and boosting growth, in order to lift more Chinese out of poverty and avert social unrest; they are also certain to continue monitoring the oil-rich Middle East.	尽管全球经济形势不利，但中国领导人显然仍会把注意力集中在维持和提振增长，以帮助更多的中国人走出贫困，避免社会动荡； 他们也必然会继续关注富油的中东。


After years of relying on America’s presence in the region, playing an advantageous waiting game, China’s next leaders may embrace a more active role.	多年来，中国一直在进行有利的等待，让美国在中东呼风唤雨，而下一代领导人可能会采取更积极的政策。


And, because China’s reputation in the region is untainted by a legacy of imperialism, they may be in a rather advantageous position to do so.	中国在该地区的名声从未受帝国主义遗毒的侵蚀，因此在中东问题上，中国的地位颇为有利。


Meanwhile, the European Union is struggling with its own demons.	与此同时，欧盟正在自身的困境中挣扎。


Despite the EU’s need to focus inward while weathering the global economic crisis, the Union must not abandon its neighbors to the south.	尽管欧盟需要同时管好自己并抵御全球经济危险，但也不能抛弃其南方邻居。


It is crucial to engage with the southern Mediterranean region as a critical meeting point – a place of political, economic, and energy cooperation.	介入南地中海地区，将其作为关键切入点，进行政治、经济和能源合作是很重要的。


In this respect, the EU’s most valuable tools are its signature, Nobel Prize-winning model of multilateral dialogue and soft power.	在这方面，欧盟最有价值的工具是其名声，其获得了诺贝尔奖的多边对话和软实力模式。


Next door, Russia, too, must respond to new vulnerabilities stemming from changing global conditions.	紧邻欧洲的俄罗斯也必须应对源自变化的全球环境的新的动荡之势。


The Kremlin continues to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, maintaining a strict aversion to military intervention and seeking to defend its strategic interests, including its naval base in the Syrian city of Tartus.	克里姆林宫继续支持着叙利亚巴沙尔·阿萨德政权，充当着军事干预的顽固障碍，寻求捍卫其自身的战略利益（包括在叙利亚城市塔尔图斯的海军基地）。


That stance has translated, most obviously, into repeated vetoes of UN Security Council resolutions aimed at ending a conflict that has already produced tens of thousands of victims.	这一立场最清晰的体现是俄罗斯一再否决联合国安理会旨在结束已经造成数万受害者的冲突的方案。


International inaction on Syria is bad news not only for the country’s people; it is also eroding the legitimacy of one of the world’s most important multilateral institutions.	对叙利亚的国际不作为不仅对该国人民是坏消息，也损害着全世界最重要的多边机构之一的正统性。


Given that the issues of Iran and Syria are closely connected, internal division among the Security Council’s five permanent members (the US, China, Britain, France, and Russia) could be extremely damaging to the search for a solution to Iran’s nuclear-enrichment drive.	由于伊朗问题和叙利亚问题关系密切，安理会五常（中美英法俄）的分歧对于寻找伊朗和浓缩行为的解决方案也是极为有害的。


That is reflected in the current stalemate in talks between them (plus Germany) and Iran.	最近五常（以及德国）和伊朗的谈判陷入僵局就是明证。


Too much is at stake, which is why all possible tracks for a negotiated outcome must be pursued.	相关利益方太多，这就是为什么需要尽一切可能追求谈判解决方案。


Whether or not recent rumors of bilateral US-Iran talks prove true, such initiatives should be welcomed.	不管关于美国-伊朗双边谈判的传闻是否属实，这样的努力值得欢迎。


While the big players remain preoccupied with their internal changes, the region continues to smolder.	大国仍被国内变局束缚着手脚，中东的闷火仍在郁积。


The main question now is whether the leaders who emerge in November will be firefighters or fire starters.	目前的主要问题是11月上台的领导人会成为救火员还是纵火犯。


Mental Health for All	为了全人类的心理健康


MELBOURNE – One spring evening in 1997, when I was a mental-health researcher at the Australian National University in Canberra, I was discussing with my wife, Betty Kitchener, a registered nurse who taught first-aid courses for the Red Cross in her spare time, the inadequacy of conventional first-aid training.	墨尔本—1997年春天的一个傍晚，当时我还是堪培拉澳大利亚国立大学的一名心理健康研究员，我和我的妻子贝蒂·基齐纳（Betty Kitchener，她是一位注册护士，业余时间在红十字会教急救课程）讨论常规急救训练不足的问题。


Such courses typically neglect mental-health emergencies, leaving participants poorly equipped to help people who are struggling with suicidal thoughts, panic attacks, post-traumatic stress, the effects of alcohol or drug abuse, or a diminishing grip on reality.	这些课程通常都忽略心理健康紧急状况，参与者很难帮助陷于自杀念头、无端恐惧、创伤后压力、酒精和药物滥用后果以及深感无力抓住现实而难以自拔的人。


Betty knew firsthand the potential consequences of this lack of knowledge.	贝蒂拥有关于缺少这些知识的潜在后果的第一手经验。


When she was 15, she experienced an episode of severe depression, which culminated in a suicide attempt.	她15岁时曾经历过严重抑郁，最严重时曾尝试过自杀。


But her family and teachers failed to recognize the problem, so she received no support or professional help.	但她的家庭和老师没有发现问题，因此她也没有获得支持和专业帮助。


This lack of early treatment undermined her recovery, and she has continued to experience episodes of depression throughout her life.	早期治疗不力影响了她的恢复，她这一辈子都在经历间歇性抑郁。


In order to help ensure that more people did not have to suffer alone as Betty had, we resolved to create a mental-health first-aid training course in our local community.	为了有助于确保更多的人遭遇贝蒂这样的无助，我们致力于在当地社区建立心理健康紧急救助培训课程。


Three years later, when Betty reduced her paid employment in order to develop Mental Health First Aid training, we were finally able to launch the course.	三年后，贝蒂辞去工作，专心发展心理健康紧急救助培训，我们终于可以发布课程了。


The benefits of this initiative quickly became apparent, with evaluation studies showing that participants became more accepting of the health significance of mental illnesses, more confident in their ability to help others, and motivated to apply their knowledge after completing the course.	这一项目的好处很快显现出来，评估研究表明，参与者变得更能接受心理疾病对健康的影响，对他们帮助他人更有信心，并且随时准备着在完成课程后把所学知识应用到实际中。


Such positive results helped to drive the course’s expansion.	这些积极成果刺激了本课程的扩大。


By 2005, it was operating across Australia and in Scotland and Hong Kong, and has since spread to more than 20 other countries.	2005年，本课程在澳大利亚全国、苏格兰和香港开设，并在此后扩大到另外20多个国家。


Over 200,000 people in Australia alone – more than 1% of the population – have now received the training.	光是在澳大利亚就有超过20万人（人口的1%多）接受国这一培训。


This rapid growth should not be surprising, given the prevalence of mental-health problems worldwide.	如此快速增长并不令人奇怪，因为心理健康问题是全球性的。


In Australia, roughly one in five adults is affected by a diagnosable mental-health problem each year, but many of these people receive no professional help.	在澳大利亚，每年大约每五个成年人中就有一位被确诊的心理健康问题影响，但他们中有很多人得不到专业帮助。


The statistics are similar in other developed countries.	其他发达国家的数据也差不多。


This means that everyone will either be personally affected by a mental-health problem or have close contact with someone who is.	这意味着你要么受到了心理健康问题的影响，要么和某位这样的人关系密切。


Indeed, most people will have contact, whether they are aware of it or not, with someone who is suicidal.	事实上，每个人都与某位有自杀倾向的人关系密切，区别只在于他是否知道这一点��


Research shows that whether or not a person obtains professional help is strongly influenced by the encouragement and attitudes of those close to them.	研究表明，一个人是否能得到专业帮助受来自亲近人群的鼓励和态度的影响很大。


People with strong support networks have a significantly better chance of recovery than those whose problems go undetected or are ignored or minimized.	有强大支持网的人比问题未被发现或被忽略或不受重视的人恢复的机会大得多。


Given this, ensuring awareness and acceptance in communities, while enhancing people’s ability to identify potential mental-health problems in others and to provide help, is vitally important.	因此，保证社区的警觉和接受，同时增强人们识别他人潜在心理健康问题并提供帮助的能力至关重要。


This need is particularly pressing for those – such as parents, teachers, youth workers, and sports coaches – who are in regular contact with young people.	特别是与年轻人经常接触的人群，比如父母、老师、青年工作者和体育教练。