So Prince Turki al-Faysal, the long time head of Saudi intelligence, has met with Meir Dagan, the head of Israel’s Mossad, while Bandar met with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in Jordan the same month.	所以长期执掌沙特情报部门的费萨尔亲王与以色列摩萨德领导人达甘会面，而班达尔本人则于同月在约旦会见了以色列总理奥尔默特。


Yet covert support from Israel, America, and the Saudis for Abbas and Siniora does little to help them in their domestic battles.	但是，来自以色列、美国以及沙特对阿巴斯和西尼乌拉的公开支持并未在其内部争斗中帮助他们多少。


From Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Sudan to Bahrain and Yemen – indeed, throughout the Muslim world from Jakarta to Nigeria – Islamic radicals have won the popularity sweepstakes.	从摩洛哥、阿尔及利亚、利比亚和苏丹一直到巴林和也门，实际上，从雅加达到尼日利亚的整个穆斯林世界，伊斯兰极端份子已经赢得了广大拥护。


A recent poll in Egypt ranked Nasrallah, Meshal, and Ahmadinejhad as the three most popular figures.	埃及最近的一次民意调查把纳斯鲁拉、马沙勒以及内贾德列为最受欢迎的领导人。


This leads to an unavoidable dilemma: Bush will have to choose between supporting democracy and backing those who want to fight Islamic radicalism.	这就导致了一个无法回避的窘境，那就是，布什不得不在支持民主以及支持想要与伊斯兰极端主义斗争的那些人之间进行选择。


Yet Israel, America, and the region’s moderates can benefit from the deepening schism in the Arab/Muslim world.	但是，以色列、美国以及该地区的温和派却可以从阿拉伯和穆斯林世界不断深化的宗派分立中获益。


That schism is being consolidated by Saudi support of all the region’s Sunni Muslims.	沙特支持该地区所有的逊尼派穆斯林而加强了这一分立。


It is this sense of “Sunni solidarity” that is becoming the decisive factor in the war for the soul of Islam, and in the struggle for mastery in the Middle East that is now underway.	正是“逊尼派团结”的感觉成为在争取伊斯兰人心的战争以及正在进行的争霸中东的决定性因素。


The New Monetary Disorder	新的货币无序状态


PRINCETON – Currency chaos is back, highlighting demands for a revised international monetary order.	普林斯顿 ——汇率乱象卷土重来。 这凸显了对国际货币新秩序的需求。


The rapid decline of the dollar and the pound, but also of the renminbi – now more firmly tied to the dollar than ever – is fanning tensions.	美元、英镑以及空前未有地紧盯美元的人民币汇率迅速走低，引发摩擦。


Some of the ghosts of the 1930’s have returned, too – in particular, the fear of unfair trade advantages caused by competitive devaluation.	1930年代的幽灵有些又借尸还魂了，尤其是由货币竞相贬值所引起的对不公平贸易优势的担忧。


United States Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has already accused China of currency manipulation.	美国财长盖特纳已经谴责中国在操纵汇率了。


There are two alternative and sharply contrasting approaches to getting currencies right.	矫正汇率乱象有两种办法，但它们相互之间是尖锐对立的。


One is to have an international conference at which experts can suggest models to calculate exchange rates and politicians can negotiate deals.	一种是召开国际会议，由专家提议汇率计算模型，再由政治家来谈判。


The only successful instance of such an arrangement is the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, but even then the exchange rates that were fixed there proved unrealistic, and a major wave of parity alterations was soon needed (as well as the maintenance of exchange controls).	这种安排唯一成功的例子就是1944年的布雷顿森林会议。 但即便是布雷顿森林会议所确定的固定汇率也被证明是脱离实际的，所以很快就出现了一轮修正货币平价（parity alterations）以及坚持汇率管制的潮流。


Other currency-centered conferences were dismal failures.	其他以汇率问题为中心的会议统统都失败了。


President Richard Nixon hailed the 1971 Smithsonian agreement as “the most significant monetary agreement in the history of the world.”	美国总统尼克松曾赞誉1971年代的史密森协定（Smithsonian Agreement）是“世界历史上最具意义的货币协定。


But it was soon in tatters, and the world moved to generalized floating.	”但这个体系很快就分崩离析，各国的汇率安排也纷纷转向浮动汇率。


In 1987, at the Louvre conference, there was not even any agreement about what had been concluded.	1987年的七国集团财长卢浮宫会议甚至没能达成任何一致结论。


Some participants thought they had agreed to a sort of semi-fixing of exchange rates in the form of target zones, but the powerful German Bundesbank never shared that interpretation.	有些与会国赞成某种以目标区间为形式的半固定汇率，但说话很有分量的德国联邦银行却并不支持那种思路。


History suggests that collective negotiation about currencies and a new approach to the issue of reserves are unlikely to succeed.	历史似乎意味着，有关汇率和储备问题新方案的会谈是不太可能成功的。


The second, and better, approach lies in agreements in each country about what the appropriate basis for monetary policy should be.	第二种办法也许是更好的选择，那就是各国就什么是货币政策的恰当基础这个问题达成共识。


If those agreements have widespread acceptance and mutual consistency, the result will be a stable international monetary system.	如果这种共识能够广泛达成并且保持其一致性，其结果就是产生一个稳定的国际货币体系。


There have been two models for such a consensus.	历史上曾两度达成这种共识。


In the first, a century ago, confidence was underpinned by gold; in the more recent wave of globalization, it depended upon the power of the human intellect to solve policy problems.	第一次是在一个世纪前，当时信心的保证是黄金； 后一次是在最近的全球化浪潮中，这回信心的基础是人类智慧解决政策难题的能力。


The end of inflation and “the great moderation” of the past three decades were fundamental to the liberalization of large parts of the world and to increased confidence, trade, and prosperity.	通货膨胀的终结和所谓“大温和时期”（the great moderation）——人们以此来描述最近30年经济动荡几乎消失的现象——构成了某种基础，在此基础之上，世界的大部分都经历了自由化过程，信心、贸易与繁荣也得到增进。


The search for a monetary rule during the latter period had two phases: in the earliest attempt to construct a basis for stable monetary policy, the emphasis was on monetary targeting.	上述第二个时期对货币制度的探索又可分为两个阶段：第一阶段的侧重点是货币总量目标法（monetary targeting）。


In the second, more successful, phase, an increasing number of countries adopted either explicit or implicit inflation targets.	第二阶段，越来越多的国家或公开或隐含地采纳了通货膨胀目标法（inflation targeting），而这一阶段在为稳定货币政策建立基础方面更成功一些。


But inflation targeting was never an obvious concept, and the financial crisis has discredited it.	然而，通货膨胀目标法却从未成为一种明确的理念，而且这次金融危机也使它丧失了信誉。


In 2003, Ben Bernanke, then a Governor of the US Federal Reserve, stated in a speech that many Americans considered inflation targeting “foreign, impenetrable, and possibly slightly subversive.”	早在2003年，时任一家美国联邦储备银行行长的伯南克就曾说，通货膨胀目标法“怪异、含糊，而且可能带点儿颠覆性”。


That feeling is stronger now.	如今这种感觉更强烈了。


There was always uncertainty over the extent to which central banks should attempt to correct or limit asset-price bubbles when there was no corresponding rise in the general level of inflation.	在未发生相应总体通胀却形成了资产价格泡沫的情况下，中央银行应该作出多大程度的努力加以纠正和限制？ 关于这一点一直没有定论。


Rising asset prices lead to a general increase in purchasing power, because many asset holders are willing (and able) to borrow more.	资产价格上涨会一般地增进购买力，因为许多资产持有者此时都愿意（且能够）更多地举债消费。


Many Europeans tried to argue in recent years that monetary policy should also take asset-price developments into account, whereas American policymakers and academics largely resisted this approach.	近年来，许多欧洲专家试图论证货币政策也应把资产价格纳入考虑范围，美国的政策制定者和经济学家却普遍抵制这一观点。


The problem is that asset prices and consumer-price inflation may move in different directions, as they did in the 2000’s, and that weighing both factors would produce inconsistent policy recommendations.	上述欧洲观点的困难在于，资产价格和消费者价格通胀可能会向不同的方向运动，就像21世纪头十年那样，所以同时考量两种因素会导致政策上的自相矛盾。


As a result, central banks ran the risk of no longer appearing to follow a clearly formulated policy guideline.	这将致使央行面临丧失明确政策指导方针的风险。


The credibility associated with a simple rule disappeared.	央行的公信力在于简单明了的法则，法则亡则公信力亡。


After the financial crisis, we have become wiser.	在这次金融危机之后，我们学乖了。


Formulating monetary policy has become a more complex process, but also a more politicized process, which is why it is likely to become more chaotic, with sharp differences between national approaches.	货币政策的制定过程变得较为复杂，也变得更���政治化，所以在国与国之间就出现了更多的差异和混乱。


The Fed and the Bank of England remain less likely to be concerned about the emergence of new kinds of asset bubbles in stock markets or commodities. But the European Central Bank (ECB) will be more worried.	美联储和英格兰银行一如既往地对股市和商品市场上的资产泡沫保持较为超然的态度，欧洲央行则会变得更关切一些。


As divergences become explicit, the demand for a wider political debate about monetary policy and for political involvement in its formulation will become more intense.	由于货币政策观念上的分歧明朗化了，货币政策的制定也就要求更广泛的政治辩论和更多的政治介入。


The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee has often been presented as a pioneer in making monetary policy transparent.	英格兰银行的货币政策委员会常常被视作货币政策透明化的先驱。


But, from an early stage, the transparency that resulted from the early publication of who voted for and against rate increases led to a public identification of members of the Committee as hawks or doves.	长期以来，委员会成员谁对加息投了赞成票，谁投了反对票都会被及早披露，可谓高度透明。 然而，恰恰是这种透明度，使得公众能够把委员会成员某些归入鹰派，某些归入鸽派。


If it is clear who will vote for which measure, there will be increased demand for a public debate about who should be chosen: why not elect the MPC, since it is effectively a monetary government?	如果说谁投什么票是清楚的，那公众就会越来越多地要求讨论委员会的人选：既然货币政策委员会是事实上的货币当局，它为什么不能由选举产生呢？


In Europe, a similar debate about the political accountability of European central banks has been simmering since before the ECB was even established.	在欧洲，早在欧洲央行成立之前，有关欧洲各国央行是否要向政治负责的类似辩论就已经相当激烈了。


Tensions between advocates of different policy solutions will lead to a demand for a greater political say.	支持不同货币政策的阵营之间分歧越大，要求以政治办法解决争议的呼声也就越高。


This exercise looks like a dramatic repeat of the interwar story, when it was impossible to obtain consensus about policy and about mutually consistent policy frameworks.	这一发展势头好似两次世界大战之间的旧戏重演。 当时的问题也在于，各国就货币政策和互相一致的政策框架难以达成共识。


Then, too, central banks were blamed when their policy framework (at that time the gold standard) disintegrated.	另一方面，当时的央行在选择脱离统一的政策框架（金本位）之后也备受谴责。


Consequently, nationalization of the central bank became a major platform of the British or French left.	而央行的一国化倾向也构成了英国和法国左翼政治力量的主要活动平台之一。


That, in turn, cleared the way for manipulation of currencies in the interests of exporters, businesses, and labor unions.	再进一步说，那种发展形势也为操纵汇率以谋求出口、商业与工会利益的做法扫除了障碍。


The result was international monetary chaos – precisely the path we are heading down now.	其结果则是国际货币体系的混乱——这恰恰是当今世界的一个潜在走向。


Is the US Losing Latin America?	美国在失去拉丁美洲吗？


MADRID – It is a mantra increasingly heard around the world: US power is in decline.	马德里—一个在世界范围内日渐流传的咒语是美国的实力正在衰落。


And nowhere does this seem truer than in Latin America.	对于这一点，没有比拉丁美洲显得更加真实的了。


No longer is the region regarded as America’s “backyard”; on the contrary, the continent has arguably never been so united and independent.	该地区已不再被认为是美国的“后院”； 相反，这个大洲大概从未如此团结和独立过。


But this view fails to capture the true nature of US influence in Latin America – and elsewhere as well.	但这一观点并未抓住美国在拉美（以及其他地区）影响力的真正要害。


It is true that US attention to Latin America has waned in recent years.	诚然，美国对拉丁美洲的注意力近几年来有所下降。


President George W. Bush was more focused on his “global war on terror.”	小布什总统更专注于他的“全球反恐战争”。


His successor, Barack Obama, seemed to give the region little thought as well, at least in his first term.	他的继任者奥巴马似乎也不对拉美有多少兴趣，至少在第一个任期是如此。


Indeed, at the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena in April 2012, Latin American leaders felt sufficiently confident and united to challenge US priorities in the region.	事实上，在2012年4月举行的卡塔赫纳美洲峰会上，拉美领导人认为有充分的信心联合起来挑战美国在该地区的主导权。


They urged the US to lift its embargo on Cuba, claiming that it had damaged relations with the rest of the continent, and to do more to combat drug use on its own turf, through education and social work, rather than supplying arms to fight the drug lords in Latin America – a battle that all acknowledged has been an utter failure.	他们敦促美国取消对古巴的禁运，声称这伤害了与拉丁美洲其他国家的关系，还敦促美国应该在国内缉毒方面做得更多，应该通过教育和社会工作而不是提供武装与拉美毒枭斗争来进行，后者被认为是一场彻头彻尾的失败战争。


It is also true that Latin American countries have pursued a massive expansion of economic ties beyond America’s sway.	诚然，拉丁美洲国家在经济方面拓展了很多，与美国的联系远远不像过去那样紧密。


China is now Latin America’s second-largest trading partner and rapidly closing the gap with the US.	如今，中国是拉美第二大贸易伙伴，并且与美国的差距在迅速缩小。


India is showing keen interest in the region’s energy industry, and has signed export agreements in the defense sector.	印度对该地区的能源产业也表现了浓厚的兴趣，并在防务方面签署了出口协议。


Iran has strengthened its economic and military ties, especially in Venezuela.	伊朗也加强了其经济和军事联系，特别是与委内瑞拉。


Similarly, in 2008, Russia’s then-President Dmitri Medvedev identified the US war on terror as an opportunity to create strategic partnerships with rising powers such as Brazil, and with the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), a Venezuelan-inspired bloc opposed to US designs in the region.	类似地，2008年，时任俄罗斯总理梅德韦杰夫认为美国的反恐战争是与巴西等崛起强国以及与美洲玻利瓦尔联盟（ALBA，由委内瑞拉发起的反对美国对拉美指手画脚的组织）建立战略合作伙伴关系的机会。


The energy giant Gazprom and the country’s military industries have spearheaded the Kremlin’s effort to demonstrate Russia’s ability to influence America’s neighborhood – a direct response to perceived American meddling in Russia’s own “near abroad,” particularly Georgia and Ukraine.	能源巨头俄罗斯天然气（Gazprom）和俄罗斯军工业充当了克里姆林宫的先锋队，以展示俄罗斯影响美国周边的能力——这是俄罗斯对其所感到的美国插足其“近邻”特别是格鲁吉亚和俄罗斯的直接回应。


Yet it would be a mistake to regard Latin America’s broadening international relations as marking the end of US preeminence.	但认为拉美国际关系的扩张标志着美国超然地位的终结是错误的。


Unlike in the bygone era of superpowers and captive nations, American influence can no longer be defined by the ability to install and depose leaders from the US embassy.	与已经成为过去的超级大国和附属国家的时代不同，美国的影响力早已不在体现在美国大使废立领导人的能力上。


To believe otherwise is to ignore how international politics has changed over the last quarter-century.	认为美国衰落忽视了国际政治在过去25年的变局。


A continent once afflicted by military takeovers has slowly but surely implanted stable democracies.	一个曾经饱受军事独裁折磨的大洲缓慢但决然地植入了稳定的民主。


Responsible economic management, poverty-reduction programs, structural reforms, and greater openness to foreign investment have all helped to generate years of low-inflation growth.	负责任的经济管理、减贫计划、结构性改革以及进一步朝外国投资开放均有助于造就多年的低通胀增长。


As a result, the region was able to withstand the ravages of the global financial crisis.	该地区也因此得以抵抗全球金融危机的侵袭。


The US not only encouraged these changes, but has benefited hugely from them.	美国不但鼓励这些变化，也从中获得了巨大的收益。


More than 40% of US exports now go to Mexico and Central and South America, the US’s fastest-growing export destination.	目前美国出口中超40%流向墨西哥和中南美洲，它们是美国增长最快的出口目的地。


Mexico is America’s second-largest foreign market (valued at $215 billion in 2012).	墨西哥是美国第二大外部市场（2013年的估值为2150亿美元）。


US exports to Central America have risen by 94% over the past six years; imports from the region have risen by 87%.	美国向中美洲的出口在过去六年中增加了94%； 进口增加了87%。


And the US continues to be the largest foreign investor on the continent.	美国依然是拉丁美洲最大的外国投资者。


American interests are evidently well served by having democratic, stable, and increasingly prosperous neighbors.	民主、稳定、不断繁荣的邻邦显然符合美国的利益。


This new reality also demands a different type of diplomacy – one that recognizes the diverse interests of the continent.	这一新现实还要求不同类型的外交，一种承认拉丁美洲利益多样性的外交。


For example, an emerging power such as Brazil wants more respect on the world stage.	比如，巴西等崛起强国希望在世界舞台上获得更大的尊重。


Obama blundered when he dismissed a 2010 deal on Iran’s nuclear program mediated by Brazil and Turkey (despite having earlier endorsed the talks).	2010年，奥巴马否决了由巴西和土耳其从中调停的伊朗核计划解决方案（尽管他此前支持谈判），这是个大错。


Other countries might benefit from US efforts to promote democracy and socioeconomic ties, as Obama’s recent trips to Mexico and Costa Rica show.	其他国家可以从美国推进民主和社会经济联系的措施中获���，奥巴马最近的墨西哥和哥斯达黎加之旅就是明证。


Trade relations provide another all-important lever.	贸易关系提供了另一个至关重要的杠杆。


President Sebastian Piñera of Chile visited the White House earlier this week to discuss, among other things, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an ambitious trade agreement that might encompass New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Mexico, Canada, and Japan.	本周早些时候，治理总统皮涅拉访问白宫，议程之一是跨太平洋伙伴关系（TPP），一个可能包括新西兰、新加坡、澳大利亚、墨西哥、加拿大和日本在内的宏大的贸易协定。


President Ollanta Humala of Peru is expected in the White House next week, while Vice President Joe Biden is scheduled to visit Latin America soon after.	秘鲁总统胡马拉预计将于下周访问白宫，而副总统拜登将在不久后访问拉美。


Language and culture matter, too.	语言和文化也起着作用。


Given the extraordinary growth of Latinos’ influence in the US, it is almost inconceivable that America could lose its unique status in the region to China or Russia, let alone Iran.	在拉美在美国的影响力大大提高的背景下，很难想象美国在该地区的特殊地位会输给中国、俄罗斯甚至伊朗。


Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of subversion could secure US influence – in Latin America or anywhere else.	靠军事实力和颠覆政治就能确保美国在拉美和其他地区的影响力的时代已经一去不复返了。


A world power today is one that can combine economic vigor and a popular culture with global outreach on the basis of shared interests.	如今，大国必须能够在共同利益的基础上将经济实力和流行文化与全球开拓结合起来。


The US is better positioned than any other power in this respect, particularly when it comes to applying these advantages in its immediate vicinity.	在这方面，美国所处的位置比其他任何大国都要优越，特别是在把这些优势应用到近邻时。


The “New Normal” for Growth	新的增长模式


Cambridge – Markets are bubbling over signs of “green shoots” in the global economy.	剑桥——世界经济经过了泡沫破灭之后，目前出现了一丝复苏的迹象。


An increasing number of investors see a strong rebound coming, first in China, then in the United States, and then in Europe and the rest of the world.	越来越多的投资者看到了经济回暖的现象：首先是在中国，然后是美国，欧洲以及世界其他地区。


Even the horrible growth numbers of the last couple quarters don’t seem to discourage this optimistic thinking.	即使有了前几个季度令人糟糕的经济数据，也没有吓退投资者的热情。


The deeper the plunge, the stronger the rebound, some analysts say.	一些投资者甚至认为：跌的越深，反弹的就越厉害。


Perhaps these optimists are right.	也许，这些乐观的情绪是有道理的。


But how strong an expansion can one reasonably expect when the worst is finally over?	但如此强劲的反弹是否可以说明我们最坏的时候已经过去了么？


Is the “new normal” going to be the same as the “old normal” of the boom years from 2002 to 2007?	我们现在是否又在重复2002至2007年的泡沫经济的老路么？


I have trouble seeing how the US and China, the main engines of global growth for two decades, can avoid settling on a notably lower average growth rate than they enjoyed before the crisis.	我有一些担忧，以最近20年来的时间坐标轴来看，作为世界经济引擎的美国和中国，最近的经济增长明显有所放缓。


Let’s start with the US, the epicenter of the financial crisis, and still the most important economy in the world.	让我们先从美国谈起，美国是此次金融危机的始作俑者，不过他依然是世界最重要的经济体。


In the best of worlds, the US financial sector will emerge from the crisis smaller and more heavily regulated.	美国的金融机构在加强被监管以后，慢慢地走上复苏之路。


Not to worry, some economists, say. The US grew rapidly in the 1950’s and 1960’s with a relatively heavily regulated banking system.	一些经济学家认为，即使在监管严厉的20世纪50和60年代，美国的经济依然迅猛发展。


Why not again?	为什么我们现在不再试试过去的政策呢？


Sure, but the early post-war financial sector wasn’t called upon in those days to support nearly as diverse and sophisticated an economy as it is today.	当然，战后的金融机构，无论在品种的多样性和复杂性方面和如今的金融机构都不可同日而语。


If authorities set the clock back several decades on banking regulation, can we be so sure they will not also set the clock back on income?	如果将我们的监管水平向后退几十年的话，那是不是我们的收入水平也向后退几十年呢？


US consumption, the single biggest driver of global growth, is surely headed to a lower level, on the back of weak housing prices, rising unemployment, and falling pension wealth.	美国消费，作为带动世界经济的龙头，现在明显处于低潮期。 原因是低靡的房市，上升的失业率以及缩水的养老金。


During the boom, US consumption rose to more than 70% of GDP.	美国消费在鼎盛时期占GDP的70%还多。


In the wake of the crisis, it could fall down towards 60%.	现在已经下滑到60%以下。


And what about the major political shift the US has experienced?	这对美国的政局是否有重大影响呢？


Tired of go-go growth, voters now look for more attention to addressing environmental concerns, health-care issues, and income inequality.	民众的注意力已经从纯粹的经济增长转向环境，医疗保健和分配不均等问题上来。


But achieving these laudable goals will be expensive, coming on top of the giant budget deficits the US is running to counter the financial crisis.	当然，解决上述问题的成本会很高。 奥巴马政府正在运用天文数字的财政预算用应对目前的经济危机。


Higher taxes and greater regulation cannot be good for growth.	显然，高税收和严格的监管对经济的增长没有好处。


True, there is room to run the government more efficiently, especially in the areas of education and health care.	当然，政府应该运行地更有效率一些，特别是在教育和医疗保健领域。


But will these savings be enough to offset the burden of a significantly larger overall government?	从效率上节省下来的钱是否可以弥补政府过于繁重的开支呢？ 我希望如此。


I hope so, and certainly the Obama administration is a breath of fresh air after the stunning ineptness of the Bush-Cheney years.	经历了布什切尼政府多年沉闷的岁月之后，奥巴马政府给我们带来焕然一新的感觉。


But governments all over the world are always convinced that their expansions can be substantially financed by efficiency gains, and that dream usually proves chimerical.	不过，世界上所有的政府好象都向选民承诺：增加的政府预算可以从其他有效率的运转上节余出来，但事实证明这都是空谈。


Chinese growth is set to slow over the longer run, as well.	从长期来看，中国经济的增长也有放缓的迹象。


Even before the financial crisis, it was clear that China could not continue indefinitely on its growth trajectory of 10% or more.	即便没有金融危机的发生，中国的经济也不可能一直保持10%以上的增长速度。


Environmental and water problems were mounting.	环境和水问题的矛盾日益突出。


It was becoming increasingly clear that as China continued to grow faster than almost anyone else, the rest of the world’s import capacity (and tolerance) could not keep up with China’s export machine.	不过，总体来说，中国经济的增长速度还是超过人们的想象，中国的出口也远远大于世界上其他国家所能承受的进口，这也是大多数国家不能忍受的。


China was becoming too big.	中国变的越来越强大了。


With the financial crisis, the Chinese economy’s necessary adjustment towards more domestic consumption has become far more urgent.	本次金融危机使��中国将拉动内需提到首要日程上来。


True, even as exports have collapsed, the government has managed to prop up growth with a huge spending and credit expansion.	当然，即使出口业倒了，中国政府还可以通过加大开支和增发信贷来维持经济的增长。


But, while necessary, this strategy threatens to upset the delicate balance between private- and public-sector expansion that has underpinned China’s expansion so far.	不过，如此方式有可能导致私人机构和国有企业之间的不平衡性越来越突出，从而影响经济的发展。


The growing role of the government, and the shrinking role of the private sector, almost surely portends slower growth later this decade.	如果政府的权力越来越大，民营经济逐渐萎缩，这样对经济的发展没有什么好处。


Europe, too, faces challenges, and not just from the fact that it now has the worst downturn of the world’s major economic regions, with Germany’s government warning of a surreal 6% decline in GDP for 2009.	欧洲目前也在面临着危机，作为世界经济重要的一部分，欧洲正经历着有史以来最大的衰退，德国政府甚至警告说，2009年的GDP可能下滑6%。


The ongoing financial crisis will almost surely slow the integration of the accession countries in Central and Eastern Europe, whose young populations are the single most dynamic source of growth in Europe today.	经济危机的出现显然会减缓中欧和东欧加入欧盟的脚步。 年轻的人口或许是欧洲成为世界最有活力地区的保证。


Not all regions will necessarily have slower economic expansion in the decade ahead.	并不是所有的地区都有放缓经济发展的迹象。


Assuming continuing reforms in countries such as Brazil, India, South Africa, and Russia, emerging markets could well fill some of the growth gap left by the largest economies.	如果巴西，印度，南非和俄罗斯等国家继续改革，这些新兴市场国家可以缩小和发达国家之间的差距。


But, in all likelihood, after years of steadily revising up its estimates of trend global growth, the International Monetary Fund will start revising them down.	但是，IMF也在不断修正着对世界经济前景的预测，乐观的情绪随时可能也会被悲观的看法取代。


Even after the crisis, global growth is almost certain to remain lower than the pre-crisis boom years for some time to come.	即便此次经济危机过去，在相当长的时间内，全球经济依然不可能恢复到危机发生前的水平。


This change may be good for the environment, for income equality, and for stability.	这或许给了环境，分配不均和社会的稳定等问题的解决提供了机会。


Governments are right to worry about the quality of growth, not just its speed.	政府应该关注的是增长的质量，而不仅仅是速度。


But when it comes to tax and profit estimates, investors and politicians need to reorient themselves to the “new normal” – lower average growth.	至于对未来税收和利润的预测时，投资者和政客们应该将眼光放在新的着眼点上——放缓经济增长速度。


The New Old Year	旧事重演


NEW YORK – Any look back at 2012 would necessarily focus on three parts of the world: the eurozone, with its seemingly endless financial uncertainties; the Middle East, with its many upheavals, including, but hardly limited to, the Muslim Brotherhood’s accession to power in Egypt and Syria’s savage civil war, which has already claimed more than 60,000 lives; and the Asia-Pacific region, with its rising nationalism and political tensions after decades of being defined almost exclusively by extraordinary economic growth amid considerable political calm.	中东剧变，包括但不限于穆斯林兄弟会在埃及执政和已经夺去60,000多人生命的野蛮叙利亚内战； 还有亚太地区，在经历数十年异乎寻常的经济增长和政治平静后，民族主义和政治紧张局势逐渐抬头。


But which issues will dominate 2013?	但究竟什么能够成为2013年的主题？


In no small part, as the French are fond of saying, plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.	很大程度上正如法国人所津津乐道的那样，万变不离其宗。


Thus, we can safely predict ongoing difficulty throughout Europe, as the countries of the south, in particular, struggle to reduce public spending in order to align their fiscal policies with actual economic capacity.	因此，我们可以准确地预测出欧洲仍将面临困难，特别是南欧国家为使财政政策与实际经济能力相匹配，不得不努力削减公共开支。


What might be different this year is that France, rather than Greece and Spain, could well be at the center of the storm.	今年与去年不同的是，法国有可能取代希腊和西班牙成为风暴的核心。


This would pose fundamental, even existential questions for Germany, the other half of a tandem that has been at the heart of the European project since World War II.	这可能给二战后一直处在欧洲核心地位的与法国对等的德国带来根本、甚至是生死攸关的问题。


The likelihood that Europe as a whole will experience little, if any, economic growth will make matters all the more difficult for officials in governments, banks, and regional institutions.	欧洲经济即使实现整体增长也将微乎其微，这一大概率事件将使政府、银行和地区机构官员面临更加棘手的问题。


Likewise, the Middle East remains in the early phase of a revolutionary transition.	同样，中东仍处在革命过渡阶段的初期。


In a year, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi will almost certainly still be in power, but it is not so clear how he will use that power – and what Egypt will look like politically and economically as a result.	几乎可以肯定，未来一年埃及总统穆罕默德·穆尔西仍将在位，但他如何运用权力——以及由此造成的埃及政治经济局势却远没有那么清晰。


Recent disagreements over the drafting of a new constitution reveal a deeply divided society and a government that appears to equate (and confuse) majority rule with democracy.	最近在新宪法起草问题上的分歧显示了社会严重分裂，政府似乎将多数统治和民主制度混淆在一起。


By contrast, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime is likely to have been ousted before the year’s end.	相反，叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德的政权很可能在今年年底前被赶下台。


But, as we have seen elsewhere in the region, it will prove far more difficult to put something benign and effective in its place.	但就像我们在该地区其他国家所看到的那样，事实证明建立起良性有效的制度要困难得多。


Civil war along sectarian lines could well predominate, or fighting between the various anti-Assad opposition groups could erupt.	教派内战可能成为主旋律，不同的反阿萨德团体之间也可能爆发战争。


There is also a real possibility of major upheavals in both Bahrain and Jordan.	巴林和约旦也切实存在着剧变的可能性。


Finally, the friction in the Asia-Pacific region is unlikely to diminish; in fact, it is far more likely to intensify.	最后，亚太地区摩擦非但不可能减少，而且极有可能增加。


The chance of a military incident involving China and one of its neighbors – be it Japan, the Philippines, or Vietnam – cannot be ignored, and it remains to be seen whether the region’s diplomatic circuits can carry the load.	我们不能忽视中国与某邻国（无论是日本、菲律宾还是越南）发生军事摩擦的概率，亚太地区外交是否能够承载这样的重压还有待观察。


New leadership in many of the region’s countries, including China, Japan, and South Korea, make the future even more uncertain.	中、日、韩等国众多新领导人上任让未来更加变幻莫测。


What else can we expect in the 2013?	2013年我们还能期待些什么？


One disappointing probability is that global efforts to fashion new arrangements to promote trade, slow the pace of climate change, or regulate cyberspace are likely to come to naught.	一种令人沮丧的可能性是促进贸易、减缓气候变化或管理网络空间的全球努力极有可能前功尽弃。


Large-scale multilateralism, in which most of the world’s 193 United Nations-recognized countries meet to negotiate accords, has become too unwieldy.	全世界193个联合国承认国的绝大多数面对面谈判协议这种大规模多边主义已经很难实现。


Instead, the most we can hope for are small accords among select governments or accords that tackle only a part of much larger problems.	相反，我们可以期望的最多是特定政府达成小规模协议，或协议解决部分全局性问题。


The biggest challenge for the world may well be what to do about Iran’s nuclear program.	如何对待伊朗核计划也许是世界所面临的最严峻的挑战。


Iran has put into place much of what is needed to produce nuclear weapons.	伊朗已经备齐了制造核武器所需的条件。


At the same time, sanctions that have been imposed by a substantial set of countries are taking a significant toll on the Iranian economy.	与此同时，不少国家实行的制裁正严重影响到伊朗的经济。


There are signs of a growing debate inside the country about whether to press ahead with nuclear weapons – and thus risk not only economic ruin, but also military attack – rather than to accept a diplomatic compromise.	有迹象表明伊朗国内在是否继续核武器研制问题上的争论越来越激烈。 制造核武器在毁灭经济的同时还可���带来军事打击，为避免出现这种后果不如接受外交妥协。


Such a pact would place limits on Iran’s nuclear activities and require that it open itself up to more international inspection than it has ever permitted.	这样的协议将限制伊朗核活动，并促使它以开放的姿态接受前所未有的国际检查。


The main question this year is thus likely to be whether an outcome can be negotiated that is enough for Iran but not too much for the United States, Israel, and others.	因此能否达成让伊朗可以承受、同时也不超过美、以和其他国家忍受限度的谈判结果很可能会成为今年的首要问题。


What is certain, however, is that 2013 will be defined in a fundamental way by whether military action against Iran occurs or is averted.	但有一点可以肯定，那就是能否避免对伊朗采取军事行动将对2013年做出最根本的定义。


One more country needs to be added to the list of “unpredictables”: the US.	还有一个国家需要加入“不可测因素”列表，这个国家就是美国。


The question here is whether the American political system can meet the challenges that it faces, many of which it has aggravated.	这里的关键在于美国政治制度能否应对其所面临的挑战，这些问题曾因美国的参与而趋于恶化。


The US remains the greatest economic and military power in the world, but questions about its solvency have in turn cast doubt on its ability to act and lead in the world.	美国仍然是全世界排名居首的经济和军事强国，但其偿付能力问题质疑了它的行动和领导能力。


Recent events in Washington have been less than reassuring.	华盛顿最近发生的事件一直不太令人满意。


Global developments not just in the year ahead, but also during the next decade and beyond, will depend in large part on whether the US can better manage its domestic challenges and divisions.	今后一年，而且是未来十年甚至更长时间的全球发展将在很大程度上取决于美国能否很好地管理其国内挑战和分歧。


The New Revolt of the Masses	群众的新反抗情绪


PARIS – Is the current economic crisis uniting the democratic world in anger as much as in fear?	巴黎——当前这场经济危机是不是用愤怒和恐惧把民主世界联系在一起？


In France, with many factories closing, a wave of executive hostage-taking – “bossnapping,” as this newfangled crime is called – is agitating board rooms and police across the country.	在法国，随着许多工厂倒闭，一股绑架经理人的浪潮——这种最新流行的犯罪方式被称为“挟持老板”——正搅动着整个国家的董事会议室和警察局。


In the United States, big bonuses given to executives from firms receiving billions of dollars in taxpayer bailouts – the insurance giant AIG, in particular – has infuriated public opinion, with a populist press and Congress fueling popular rage.	在美国，大笔的奖金被发放给拿到数十亿美元纳税人援助的公司的管理者——特别是保险业巨人AIG——这种现象已经激怒了公众舆论，而民粹主义的媒体和国会又为公众的愤怒火上浇油。


Similarly, in Great Britain, an increasingly inquisitive and critical public is now lumping together bankers and members of Parliament in a common climate of suspicion.	同样，在英国，越来越喜欢盘根问底和吹毛求疵的公众在共同的怀疑氛围下把银行家和议员混在了一起。


Is the current crisis creating or revealing a growing split between rulers and ruled?	当前这场危机是否造成或凸显了统治者和被统治者之间越来越大的分歧？


Populist anger is one of the most predictable, and certainly inevitable, consequences of today’s financial and economic crisis.	民众的愤怒是今天这场金融和经济危机最容易预测、肯定也是不可避免的后果之一。


The unifying factor behind this rising “anger” is rejection of both real and perceived inequality – inequality in both treatment and economic conditions.	越来越高涨的“愤怒”背后的联系因素是对存在于现实和想象中的不平等现象的抗拒——其中包括待遇和经济条件上的不平等。


In terms of the French Republic’s credo, “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,” the first principle, liberty, became the motto of our age after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989; the second is gaining greater precedence today as the economy falters.	借用法兰西共和国的信条“自由、平等、博爱”，其中的首要原则自由成为1989年柏林墙倒塌后我们这个时代的座右铭； 而今天随着经济状况的摇摇欲坠，排在第二位的“平等”正在得到越来越多的重视。


Can a renewed quest for equality close the traditional gap that has existed between America and Europe?	重新兴起的对平等的追求是否能够弥合美国和欧洲之间业已存在的传统鸿沟？


Will the “American dream” be Europeanized?	“美国梦”是否将会趋向欧洲化？


And, with their country’s economy humbled, will countless Americans’ secret hope that they, too, might one day be rich now give way to European-style envy?	而随着国家的经济遭到破坏，无数美国人希望自己有一天同样变得富有的隐秘愿望是否会让步于欧洲式的妒忌？


It would be dangerous for America if things went that far.	如果事情果真发展到这个地步，对于美国人来讲将会是非常危险的。


America is not France – at least not yet.	美国不是法国——至少现在还不是。


But it seems obvious that increasing economic inequality in the US and, indeed, throughout the OECD, has stoked a perception of injustice and growing anger.	但有一点似乎非常明显，那就是美国、事实上遍及整个经合组织内部越来越严重的经济不平等已经在为不公和越来越高涨的愤怒情绪火上浇油。


In the US, as the financial sector soared, the manufacturing base contracted sharply.	在美国，随着金融行业的腾飞，制造基础收缩非常严重。


It is clear that all over the western world, particularly in the last 20 years, those at the top of the income ladder have done much better than those in the middle or at the bottom.	在整个西方世界，特别是在最近20年，处在收入阶梯顶端的人比处在中间或底层的人要好得多，这一点是非常明显的。


While the rich got richer, the poor did not get poorer, but the gap between rich and poor expanded significantly.	在富人越来越富的同时，穷人并没有越来越穷，但富人和穷人之间的差距却越拉越大。


The current crisis may have seriously eroded the wealth of many of the very rich, destroying their assets in an unprecedented way.	当前这场危机可能严重侵蚀了许多巨富的财产，以一种前所未有的方式将他们的资产毁于一旦。


But the fear, if not despair, of the poor and not-so-poor has increased tremendously.	但是穷人和不那么穷的人的恐惧甚至绝望情绪大幅度增加了。


Of course, inequalities between countries are one thing, and inequalities within countries are quite another.	当然，国家之间的不平等是一个问题，但国内的不平等却完全不同。


But today the two processes are taking place simultaneously and at an accelerating pace.	但今天这两种过程都在同时发生，而且速度越来越快。


Anger is no longer restricted to extreme anti-capitalist, anti-globalization forces.	愤怒的情绪不再被限制在极端反资本主义和反全球化势力中间。


A deep feeling of injustice is spreading across large swaths of society.	深刻的不公感觉正在大片的社会领域中迅速扩散。


This sense of injustice is only partly contained by political considerations in the US, thanks to the “Obama factor,” a rare phenomenon that can be described as the restoration of trust in one’s political leaders.	这种不公的感觉在美国只得到了政治考量的部分控制，而这多亏了“奥巴马因素”，这一罕见的现象可以被形容为恢复对政治领导人的信任。


But the more you distrust politics and your politicians, the more anger will manifest itself in uncontrollable ways, especially if your country is imbued with a romantic “revolutionary” tradition and culture.	但你越是不信任政治和政治领袖，就会无节制地表达越多的愤怒情绪，尤其当你的国家被灌输了浪漫“革命”传统和文化时就更是如此。


This is obviously the case in France, where, contrary to what the French historian François Furet thought in the immediate aftermath of communism’s collapse 20 years ago, the French Revolution is neither over nor a closed chapter in history.	法国的情况显然就是这样，与法国历史学家佛朗西斯• 傅雷在20年前共产主义刚刚崩溃时所预计的情况相反，法国大革命既没有结束也没有成为尘封的历史。


In France the decreasing popularity of President Nicolas Sarkozy and of his main “classical” opponent, the Socialist party (still deeply divided and in search of a leader), favors the rise of the extreme left behind the energy and charisma of its young leader, Olivier Besancenot.	在法国，尼古拉·萨科奇总统及其主要“传统”反对党社会党（该党仍然存在严重的分歧并仍在寻找领袖）越来越低的支持率给了由充满活力和魅力的年轻领导人奥利维尔·比桑辛诺带领的极左翼党派崛起的大好时机。


In the US, the reverse is true.	在美国恰恰是相反的情况。


President Barack Obama’s popularity remains largely intact and acts as a kind of buffer against an uncontrolled explosion of anger.	巴拉克·奥巴马总统的支持率仍然基本完好，并成为愤怒失控爆发的一种缓冲因素。


It is possible, but far from certain, that what Obama describes as a “glimmer” of hope in the US could be sufficient to keep popular anger at bay and bring about a recovery in trust in politics and politicians.	奥巴马所形容的希望的“一线曙光”在美国有可能足以抵挡民众的愤怒情绪，带来对政治和政治家的信任的回归，但这样的结果只是可能而远非确定。


And European discontent will probably continue to grow, whatever happens in the US.	而无论美国的经济复苏过程中发生了什么，欧洲的不满情绪都可能继续酝酿。


Economic recovery, when it comes, will probably start in America, but it is likely that the public’s sharpened sense of injustice, and the resulting resentments, will linger, poisoning politics in the Western world long after the crisis has passed.	当经济复苏真正到来的时候，很可能会发生在美国，但公众越来越激烈的不公平感以及由此带来的怨恨很可能会继续存在下去，并在危机过去很久以后继续损害西方世界的政治生活。


The New Transatlantic Stalemate	新大西洋僵局


WASHINGTON, DC – Senator Barack Obama’s recent European tour hints that the Illinois senator is Europe’s choice to be America’s next president.	华盛顿——巴拉克·奥巴马不久前对欧洲的访问暗示这位伊利诺伊州参议员已经是欧洲人心目中的下一任美国总统人选。


But Europeans should not expect too much.	但欧洲人也不宜寄予过高的期望。


While Obama would likely restore civility and politeness to transatlantic discourse, the sources of friction are more profound.	虽然奥巴马可能使跨大西洋会谈恢复起码的礼貌，但美欧摩擦的起因恐怕没有那么简单。


The geo-political interests of Europe and America have been drawing apart, and may well continue to do so, no matter who is president.	欧洲和美国的地缘政治利益越来越不一致，而无论是谁当选总统，这一点恐怕都无法改变。


Halting this progressive alienation will require major changes in outlook and policy on both sides of the Atlantic.	遏止美欧关系日渐疏远的趋势需要大西洋两岸国家在观点和政策两方面发生重大的改变。


The United States will have to stop defining its transatlantic interests in terms of its hegemonic mindset, and Europe will have to take fuller charge of its own region.	美国必须停止以谋取霸权的心态来看待跨大西洋利益，而欧洲则必须为自己的领土担负起更全面的职责。


To call interests “geopolitical” underscores the influence of geography in shaping those interests.	所谓的“地缘政治”利益强调了地理环境对国家利益的决定性影响。


As Charles de Gaulle and Winston Churchill once famously agreed: “When all is said and done, Great Britain is an island, France the cape of a continent; America another world.”	正如查尔斯·戴高乐和温斯顿·丘吉尔曾经在闻名遐迩的共识中所认可的那样：“归根结底，英国是一个小岛，法国是大陆的一角，而美国则是另外一个世界。


Both understood that for centuries the English Channel has been a formidable geopolitical barrier to a durable sharing of interests between Britain and France.	”戴高乐和丘吉尔都明白几个世纪以来，英吉利海峡一直是阻碍英法谋求持久共同利益的难以逾越的地理障碍。


If the Channel has been such a barrier, durable bonds across the Atlantic seem implausible.	如果由一条海峡所构成的障碍都如此难以跨越，那么持久不变的跨大西洋关系就更没有理由延续下去。


In other words, from this perspective, the world’s two richest and most powerful economic spaces, the European Union and the US, are bound to be rivals, even when they are allies.	换句话讲，如果从这个角度看，世界上最富有也最强大的两大经济体欧盟和美国注定只能是对手，即使它们结成同盟也改变不了这样的事实。


A shared enemy did underpin America’s alliance with parts of Europe over much of the twentieth century.	一个共同的敌人有力地支撑了美国与部分欧洲国家跨越大半个二十世纪的联盟。


That enemy, however, was also European – first Germany, then Russia.	那个敌人同样来自欧洲——开始是德国，然后又是俄国。


In effect, the shared transatlantic geopolitical interest was between the US and one part of Europe against another.	事实上，美国和一部分欧洲国家处于跨大西洋共同地缘政治利益的一端，而另一部分欧洲国家则处在另一端。


With the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, the transatlantic alliance confronted new realities.	1991年苏联倒台后，跨大西洋联盟不得不面对新的现实。


The interests of both the EU and the US were expansively redefined.	欧盟和美国的利益在扩张之后重新进行了界定。


With no massive Soviet army in the middle of Germany, Europe was no longer firmly divided into Western and Eastern hemispheres. Mitteleuropa revived and Germany reunified.	德国中部没有了大量的苏联军队，欧洲也不再被人为地分割成东西欧两大阵营。 欧洲中部得到了复兴，德国也重新统一在一起。


Western Europe evolved from a “Community” to a “Union,” and its states became less firmly bound to American protection.	西欧从“共同体”演化成了“联盟”，而欧盟各成员国也不再那么需要美国的保护。


The Soviet demise encouraged US political elites to construct a “unipolar” view of America’s global position and interest.	在苏联解体的鼓励下，美国政治精英对美国全球地位和利益的看法日益“单极化”。


This trend accelerated as the current Bush administration attempted to construct unilateral global hegemony out of the “War on Terror,” which provoked growing disquiet in “Old Europe.”	随着现任的布什政府试图借助“反恐战争”构筑单边全球霸权的努力步步推进，这样的单极化趋势加快了形成的步伐，同时也引发了“老欧洲”国家越来越深的忧虑。


While America’s invasion of Afghanistan was widely seen as justified, the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq produced an open break between the US and its two major continental allies, France and Germany, which were supported by Russia and China.	尽管美国入侵阿富汗被普遍视作正义之举，但英美联军入侵伊拉克却使美国和欧洲大陆两大盟国（即法国和德国）间产生了公开的分歧，俄中两国也支持法德两国的立场。


A great Eurasian bloc suddenly appeared in opposition to America’s hegemonic global pretensions, prefiguring a new fluidity in geopolitical relationships, if not a tectonic shift in alignments.	一个反对美国全球霸权的大规模欧亚大陆集团的突然出现即便不意味着联盟关系的彻底改变，至少也预示着新的变数在地缘政治关系中逐渐形成。


The effectiveness of Franco-German resistance to American hegemony was qualified, though, by the reactions of other European states.	但是，欧洲其他国家的反应削弱了法德两国抵制美国霸权的力量。


The United Kingdom’s Prime Minister Tony Blair did his best to resurrect Churchill’s special relationship, and Britain was joined by Italy and Spain, together with nearly all the states of New Europe.	英国首相托尼·布莱尔竭尽全力复兴丘吉尔时代的英美特殊关系，与英国持同样立场的还有意大利和西班牙，以及几乎所有的新欧洲国家。


The Franco-German couple could no longer claim to speak for the EU as a whole.	法德联盟再也不能宣称代表欧盟所有国家的看法。


European plans for a Common Foreign and Security Policy and for closer defense cooperation seemed brutally discredited.	而欧洲旨在加强防卫合作的共同外交与安全政策计划的基础似乎也根本不存在。


Slowly, however, Europe has seemed to grow more cohesive in its opposition to American unipolar policies and pretensions.	可是慢慢地，欧洲在反对美国单极化政策和主张的问题上似乎达成了一致。


And, after his re-election in 2004, Bush grew more conciliatory.	而在2004年再次当选总统后，布什加强了对欧洲的抚慰和对美欧之间利益的调和。


Blair’s departure left Bush increasingly isolated diplomatically, with changes of government in Berlin and Paris bringing only superficial improvements.	布莱尔的卸任导致布什在外交上进一步陷入孤立，而柏林和巴黎新当选的政府也只在表面上改善了和美国的关系。


Deteriorating economic conditions at home implied stricter limits on American intervention abroad.	国内经济状况的恶化意味着美国在国外的干预行动要受到更严格的限制。


It is difficult to know where this uneasy transatlantic détente of 2008 will lead.	很难预知2008年跨大西洋关系这令人不安的缓和未来将去往何方。


It is now clear that European and American geopolitical interests are not automatically in harmony.	目前有一点已经非常明显：那就是欧洲和美国的地缘政治利益并不总能保持协调。


Europeans do not accept the Bush administration’s strategic vision, and the US is unable to pursue that vision without European support.	欧洲人并不认可布什政府的战略目标，而没有欧洲的支持美国的目标根本无从实现。


The reasons for Europe’s defection are eminently geopolitical.	欧洲立场的改变与地缘政治利益密切相关。


To Europe’s east lies Russia, to its south the Muslim world.	欧洲东部与俄国接壤，而其南部则是穆斯林世界。


Europe needs good relations with both in order to penetrate growing markets, tap sources for raw materials and energy, and ensure its own domestic stability, whereas many Europeans believe that US policies alienate these regions.	欧洲需要与两者保持良好的关系才能进入发展中国家市场，利用原材料和能源资源，同时确保自身的稳定，而在许多欧洲人看来，美国的政策导致了与上述地区的关系日渐疏离。


In these circumstances, the transatlantic alliance survives less from genuinely shared interests than from inertia.	在这样的情况下，跨大西洋联盟生存的基础与其说是真正的共同��益，还不如说是长期积累的惯性。


Can anything restore the old transatlantic harmony?	有没有什么可以恢复跨大西洋区域原有的和谐关系？


A forceful revival of Russian imperialism, or a war of civilizations with the Muslim world, might provide a threat so overbearing that a frightened Europe would resume its Cold War dependency on America.	俄国帝国主义的强力复兴、抑或是民主国家与穆斯林世界开战的威胁可能如此紧迫，以致于被吓得魂飞魄散的欧洲将恢复冷战期间对美国的依赖。


But Europe will not be eager to embrace such a future.	但像这样的未来发展却并非欧洲之所愿。


It may be careful not to alienate America, but it will struggle to build a collaborative relationship with its regional neighbors.	欧洲或许会小心翼翼地保持与美国的关系，但同时也会竭尽全力与邻国建立起合作关系。


Of course, America’s definitions of its role in the world may change.	当然，美国对自身全球作用的定义或许会发生变化。


America’s unipolar expectations have not been ratified by events.	美国的单极愿望并没有得到现实环境的支持。


Indeed, there is now considerable opposition to that vision in the US itself.	事实上，现在在美国国内也出现了相当强大的反对力量。


Yet today too much power is agglomerated in Washington to be contained successfully within a purely national constitutional structure.	可是今天华盛顿聚集了太多的力量，无法用纯粹的国家宪法结构来加以遏制。


Checks and balances at home require a correlative balance of power abroad.	只有相对均衡的国外力量，才能使对国内力量的平衡和牵制变为现实。


Constructing such a balanced state system for itself on a regional scale has been postwar Europe’s great achievement.	在地区范围内构建这种平衡的国家体制是战后欧洲所取得的巨大成就。


Implementing that system has depended heavily on a supportive America.	推行这样的体系特别需要美国的支持。


Perhaps it is time for Europe to return the favor.	也许现在已经到了欧洲报答美国的时候了。


Balancing, it seems, is always necessary, even among friends.	现在看来，平衡之术即便在朋友之间也根本不可缺少。


And among friends balancing is also more likely to be successful.	而朋友间的平衡也更有可能取得成功。


That Europe can find the will, the means, and the confidence to play that role cannot be taken for granted.	不能理所当然地认为欧洲有愿望、有办法也有信心来发挥这样的作用。


What does seem clear is that a cohesive and strong Europe on good terms with its neighbors will not fit easily into a close transatlantic alliance with an America actively pursuing global hegemony.	有一点显而易见，那就是在美国积极寻求全球霸权的情况下，一个与邻国有着良好关系的统一强大的欧洲恐怕很难真正符合亲密的跨大西洋联盟的需要。


America by Proxy?	代理的美国？


PARIS – The demise of the Roman Empire resulted from a combination of strategic overreach and excessive delegation of security responsibilities to newcomers.	巴黎—罗马帝国的崩溃的原因是过度的战略延伸和将过多的安全责任委托给新来者。


Without making undue comparisons, the question for the United States today is whether it can remain the world’s leading power while delegating to others or to technological tools the task of protecting its global influence.	一个并不过分的比较是，如今美国所面临的问题是是否能在将保护其全球影响力的责任委托给他人或技术工具的情况下维持其世界领先的实力。


Drones and allies – non-human weapons and non-American soldiers – have become central to America’s military doctrine.	无人机和盟友——非人武器和非美国人士兵——已成为美国军事思想的核心。


Leading the world in technological prowess while leading it from behind in terms of combat forces on the ground, if not in the air, America’s shift of emphasis is impossible to ignore.	领导世界技术威力、在地面战斗（如果不是空战的话）中充当幕后领袖，美国强调重点的改变是无法忽视的。


First there was the combined French and British action in Libya that led to the overthrow of Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi’s regime; then came French intervention in Mali, and now Israeli airstrikes in Syria.	首先，在利比亚，法国和英国的联合行动推翻了卡扎菲上校的政权； 随后是法军干预马里，现在则是以色列空袭叙利亚。


Each case is, of course, utterly different, but all have something in common: America has not been on the front line of intervention.	当然，这三件事本身大相径庭，但它们有一个共同点：美国不再站在敢于最前沿。


Yet, without direct US military support or indirect (and in some cases implicit) political support, it is difficult to imagine that such risky operations would have been launched.	但是，如果没有美国的军事支持或间接（在某些情形中是隐藏的）政治支持，你很难想象英国、法国和以色列会做出这些高风险动作。


Have the British, French, and even Israelis become armed extensions of the US in their respective spheres of influence?	英国、法国甚至以色列已经沦为美国在它们各自影响圈中的武装延伸了吗？


If so, the contrast with the recent past could hardly be starker.	如果答案是肯定的，那么最新局面的矛盾性就表露无疑了。


In the aftermath of the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, Americans simply could not envisage sharing their security responsibilities with others.	2001年9月11日恐怖袭击后，美国已无法想象与他人共担安全责任。


At best, Europeans could be America’s “cleaning ladies,” to use the indelicate analogy coined at the time by some neo-conservative thinkers during George W. Bush’s first term in office.	在小布什的第一个任期中，新保守主义思想家以不太雅观的比方称欧洲充其量只能是美国的“清洁女工”。


But, even before September 2001, some US conservatives had expressed disdain toward their European allies.	但是，即使在2001年9月之前，一些美国保守派便已开始表达他们对欧洲盟友的蔑视。


I still remember the warning uttered by a top US diplomat in Strasbourg in the early 1990’s, on the eve of the Balkan wars. “If we leave Europeans in charge of themselves, they will prove irresponsible, divisive, and suicidal, and then we will have to rescue them from themselves.”	我至今仍记得，20世纪90年代初巴尔干战争前夕一位美国高层外交官在斯特拉斯堡的警告：“如果我们离开，让欧洲人自己领导自己，他们必然会被证明是扶不起的阿斗，群龙无首，自取灭亡，我们不得不出手把他们从自己手中救出来。


Today, Americans are only too happy to rely on the military competence and interventionist inclinations of some (in fact, very few) of their European friends.	”如今，美国巴不得依靠一些（事实上，是极少数）欧洲朋友的军事能力和干涉主义倾向。


It would be easy to interpret this shift as a response to the human and economic cost of America’s interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.	如此转变很容易被解读为是由于美国对阿富汗和伊拉克的干预的人力和经济成本所致。


The reality is more complex.	但现实要更为复杂。


America’s newfound taste for delegating military responsibilities to others is not the result of a series of events, but the product of a long-term process driven by America’s simultaneous ambivalence toward the world and active engagement with it.	美国新出现的将军事责任授权给他人的立场并不是一系列事件的结果，而是长期过程的产物，其背后的推动力是美国同时存在的对世界和积极干预世界的矛盾心理。


Is it worth fighting for a world that cannot be saved, and that only invites murky, inconclusive entanglements?	为不可拯救的世界做只能导致迷途、产生不了明确的决定性结果的斗争是否值得？


From this perspective, America’s involvement in World War I and, even more so, in World War II, are exceptions to the rule.	从这个角度看，美国参与一战和二战（更有过之）是这一规则的例外。


The US troops that landed on Normandy beaches in June 1944 were animated by a strong sense of mission.	1944年6月登陆于诺曼底的美军因为强大的使命感而斗志昂扬。


They knew that they were fighting evil in an environment that was historically and culturally familiar.	他们知道，他们将在熟悉的历史和文化环境中与恶魔搏斗。


In Vietnam, US soldiers, many of them black, often did not understand why they were fighting.	在越南，美军士兵（其中有很多是黑人）常常在还没有弄清战斗意义的情况下就送了命。


In Iraq, their equivalents were very often Latinos for whom integration into American society – including, for many, the promise of permanent residence or citizenship – was at least as important as toppling Saddam Hussein.	在伊拉克，遭遇这一命运的是多是拉美裔美国人，对他们来说，融入美国社会——对其中很多人来说，这包括永久定居权或入籍承诺——的重要性至少不亚于推翻萨达姆·侯赛因。


When a country engages in the world, its authority stems from its willingness and ability to take “personal” risks.	当一个国家干预世界时，其正统性来自其承担“个人”风险的意愿和能力。


Its authority is diminished when the perceived gap between the value of its population’s lives and the lives of its enemies is too wide.	当��人民生命的价值和敌人生命的价值之间的差距太大时，其正统性就会削弱。


In this respect, drone warfare reinforces the perverse nature of “asymmetrical wars.”	从这个角度讲，无人机战斗强化了“不对称战争”的不正当性。


In her recent book Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control, Medea Benjamin, a peace activist and shrewd observer of international relations, makes a crucial point: “While drones make it easier to kill some bad guys, they also make it easier to go to war.”	在其新著《无人机战斗：用远程控制杀戮》（Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control）中，和平活动家、敏锐的国际关系观察家梅地亚·本雅明（Medea Benjamin）提出了一个关键要点：“无人机让除掉坏人变得更容易，但也让开战变得更容易。 ”


Likewise, delegating security to allies can have perverse psychological effects.	类似地，将安全委托给盟友也有不正当的心理效应。


This is particularly true in the Middle East.	尤其是在中东。


How can the US exert pressure on Israel to engage in serious negotiations with the Palestinians, or to refrain from attacking Iran, when it offers encouragement – if only through public silence – to Israeli military intervention in Syria?	美国如何给以色列施加压力使其参与与巴勒斯坦的严肃谈判，或保持克制不去袭击伊朗，同时又鼓励以色列——只要保持舆论缄默即可——对叙利亚采取军事干预？


If America’s purpose is to deliver a message to Iran – “Beware, you could be the next target” – many will question its sincerity about restraining Israel.	如果美国的目的是给伊朗放风——“当心，没准你就是下个目标”——那么很多人会质疑美国是否真的想约束以色列。


For some, the US has moved from too much engagement under Bush to doing too little under Barack Obama.	对一些人来说，在布什任期内，美国在干预方面走得太远，而在奥巴马任期内做的太少。


For others, Obama is merely pursuing Bush’s foreign policy through other means – drones instead of soldiers.	也有人认为，奥巴马只是在通过其他途径——用无人机代替士兵——追求布什的对外政策。


The reality is probably somewhere in between.	现实大概介于两者之间。


But it is clearly not beneficial to the US, its allies, or global stability.	但显然这对美国无益，对美国盟友无益，对全球稳定也无益。


Precisely because America remains indispensable to international security, one wishes that its leaders would act in a more discerning way.	恰恰因为美国仍是不可或缺的国际安全定海神针，我们但愿其领导人以更有远见卓识的方式行事。


In international politics, as in education, there is no such thing as care by proxy.	国际政治与教育一样，不能用代理人来代为行使看护之职。


If responsibility is to be exercised effectively, it cannot be delegated to machines or other countries.	要想有效行使责任，就不能授权给机器或别国。


The Measurement of Hope	希望的度量


SEATTLE – The lives of the world’s poorest people have improved more rapidly in the last 15 years than ever before, yet I am optimistic that we will do even better in the next 15 years.	西雅图—过去十五年来，世界最穷人群的生活的改善比以往任何时候都要快，但我乐观地认为，未来十五年会变得更好。


After all, human knowledge is increasing.	毕竟，人类知识在进步。


We can see this concretely in the development and declining costs of new medicines like HIV drugs, and in the creation of new seeds that allow poor farmers to be more productive.	这具体表现在HIV药物等药品的研发和成本下降，以及让贫穷农民收获更多产量的新种子的创造上。


Once such tools are invented, they are never un-invented – they just improve.	一旦这样的新工具被发明出来，就不会倒退回去——只可能进步，不可能退步。


Skeptics point out that we have a hard time delivering new tools to the people who need them.	悲观派指出，我们将面临难以把新工具交给需要它们的人的局面。


This is where innovation in the measurement of governmental and philanthropic performance is making a big difference.	这便是政府和慈善机构表现衡量标准创新的用武之地。


That process – setting clear goals, picking the right approach, and then measuring results to get feedback and refine the approach continually –helps us to deliver tools and services to everybody who will benefit.	这一过程——设置明确的目标，采取正确的方法，然后度量结果以持续地获得反馈和改进方法——有助于我们将工具和服务交到能从中获益的群体手上。


Innovation to reduce the delivery bottleneck is critical.	减少传递瓶颈的创新十分关键。


Following the path of the steam engine long ago, progress is not “doomed to be rare and erratic.”	自很久以前蒸汽机发明以来，进步便不再“注定是罕见且不稳定的”。


We can, in fact, make it commonplace.	事实上，我们可以让进步变得稀松平常。


Though I am an optimist, I am not blind to the problems that we face, or to the challenges that we must overcome to accelerate progress in the next 15 years.	我是个乐观派，但也不会忽视我们所面临的问题和在未来十五年中加速这一过程所要克服的挑战。


The two that worry me the most are the possibility that we will be unable to raise the funds needed to pay for health and development projects, and that we will fail to align around clear goals to help the poorest.	两个令我最担心的问题是我们可能无法筹集所需的资金支持卫生和发展项目，以及我们不能齐心协力向明确目标努力，帮助最穷人群。


The good news is that many developing countries have growing economies that allow them to devote more resources to helping their poorest people.	好消息是许多发展中国家的经济增长使得它们可以将更多的资源用於帮助最穷国民。


India, for example, is becoming less dependent on aid, and eventually will not need it.	比如，印度正在日益远离援助依赖，最终会不再需要它。


Some countries, like the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, South Korea, and Australia, are increasing their foreign-aid budgets; others, even traditionally generous donors like Japan and the Netherlands, have reduced theirs.	一些国家，如英国、挪威、瑞典、韩国和澳大利亚，正在增加它们的外国援助预算； 其他国家，如日本和荷兰，则在削减这一预算，尽管传统上它们是慷慨的援助者。


The direction of many countries, including the United States, France, Germany, and Canada, is unclear.	还有很多国家，包括美国、法国、德国和加拿大，态度尚不明朗。


Still, aid is critical.	但援助是很关键的。


It helps people in the poorest countries to meet their basic needs.	它帮助最穷国家的人们满足基本需要。


It funds innovation in the creation of new tools and services, and in their delivery.	它为创造和传递新工具和服务的创新提供资金。


Unfortunately, aid budgets are threatened by fiscal weakness in almost all of the advanced countries.	不幸的是，在几乎所有发达国家，援助预算都因为财政疲软而受到了威胁。


Unless voters hear about the positive impact that their generosity is having, they will inevitably focus on issues closer to home.	除非选民了解到自己的慷慨所带来的积极效应，否则他们免不了会把注意力更集中在自己家里。


A single story, true or not, about a small amount of aid being misused can often cloud the entire field.	关于援助被挪用的个别案例，不管真实与否，通常都会坏了整个援助大局。


Imagine how you would feel about investing if every article you read were only about stocks that did poorly, with no reporting on the big successes.	想象一下，如果你所读到的每篇文章都是关于股票如何表现不佳，没有任何获得大成功的报道，你会对投资做何感想？


Historically, aid was discussed largely in terms of the total amount of money invested.	从历史上看，援助通常会以总投资资金规模为标准进行讨论。


But now that we are measuring indicators like child mortality more precisely, people are able to see the impact that aid has in stark terms – that it means the difference between, say, giving people access to HIV treatment and letting them die. When framed this way, aid has a better chance of becoming a priority.	但如今我们在使用儿童死亡率等指标进行更精确的衡量，人们可以通过解读明确的指标检查援助的效果，这意味着类似于让人们获得HIV治疗和让他们死去之间的区别。


But will the world align around a clear set of goals in the next 15 years?	但未来十五年，世界会团结在明确的目标周围吗？


The United Nations is starting to map out new goals for the years following the 2015 expiration of the current Millennium Development Goals.	联合国正在开始着手为千年发展目标2015年到期后的时代制定新目标。


As with the MDGs, the next set of goals could help to align groups doing the work, remind voters what their generosity supports, and allow us to see where we are making progress in delivering solutions to the poor.	与千年发展目标一样，下一组目标能有助于让凝聚做出贡献的团体，让选民知道他们的慷慨在支持什么项目，并让我们看到我们在向穷人传递解决方案方面做出了那些进步。


The MDGs’ success means that there is a lot of interest in expanding them to include a broader set of issues.	千年发展目标的成功意味着将它们进行扩展、纳入一系列范围更广的问题是极具意义的。


But many of the potential new goals lack unanimous support, and adding a lot of new goals – or goals that are not easily measurable – may sap momentum.	但许多潜在新目标缺少一致支持，加入大量新目标——或不容易衡量的目标——可能不利于进步。


The MDGs were coherent because they focused on helping the poorest people in the world.	千年发展目标之所以具有凝聚力，是因为它们专注于帮助全世界最穷人群。


The groups that needed to work together to attain them were easy to identify, and they could be held accountable for cooperation and progress.	需要团结一致实现这些目标的团体很容易识别，它们的合作和进步也被大家所监督和问责。


When the UN reaches agreement on other important goals like mitigating climate change, it should consider whether a different set of actors and a separate process might be best for those efforts.	当联合国在减轻气候变化等重要目标上达成一致时，应该考虑不同行动者和独立过程是否最适于这些努力。


The progress that the world has made in helping the poorest in the last 15 years is the kind of good-news story that happens one life at a time, so it often does not have the same visibility as a big setback, such as the outbreak of a new epidemic.	过去十五年中世界在帮助最穷人群方面取得的进步是千载难遇的好好消息，因此，当重大退步，比如新传染病的爆发发生时，通常并不那么引人注目。


From time to time, we should step back and celebrate the achievements that come with having the right goals, the necessary political will, generous aid, and innovation in tools and their delivery.	一次又一次，我们应该后退一步，庆祝随正确的目标、必要的政治意愿、慷慨的援助和工具及其传递的创新一起到来的成就。


Doing so has certainly deepened my commitment to this work.	这样做显然可以加深我们对这项事业的热情。


The Next Gas Crisis Awaits	乌克兰摆脱了寒冷的威胁


Europe’s sigh of relief at the supposed end of the dispute between Russia and Ukraine over gas pricing was audible here in Kyiv.	俄罗斯和乌克兰之间的天然气价格之争似乎结束了，基辅所有人都能感觉到欧洲长长地出了一口气。


But the settlement raises more questions than it answers.	但这样的解决方法却带来了更多新的问题。


By placing Ukraine’s energy needs in the hands of a shadowy company linked to international criminals, the agreement has planted the seeds of new and perhaps more dangerous crises.	新签定的协议把乌克兰的能源需求交给一个与国际犯罪联系密切的影子公司全盘掌控，这样就为新的、也许是更加凶险的危机埋下了伏笔。


As a result, I am challenging this deal in court and asked the members of my party to vote no confidence in the government.	因此，我提请法院否决这项交易。


Let a public hearing before a judge reveal exactly who will benefit from this deal, and let parliament examine all of the agreement’s terms and secret protocols.	让法官主持的公开听政告诉人们到底谁将从这项交易中获益。


The settlement between Ukraine and Russia’s state-owned gas monopoly, Gazprom, is intolerable because Ukraine’s energy future has been placed in the hands of RosUkrEnergo, a criminal canker on the body of our state gas corporation.	乌克兰和俄罗斯国有天然气垄断商俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司（Gazprom）之间的协议根本不可容忍，因为这样一来，乌克兰的能源未来将全部掌握在俄罗斯乌克兰能源公司（RosUkrEnergo）的手中，而这家公司恰恰是我们国有天然气企业中的一颗毒瘤。


RosUkrEnergo was established in the last months of the regime of our former ruler, Leonid Kuchma. Yet it miraculously gained control of all of Ukraine’s gas imports from Central Asia.	俄罗斯乌克兰能源公司在前总统库奇玛下台前的最后几个月刚刚成立，却奇迹般地控制了乌克兰进口中亚天然气的所有业务。


Under the deal agreed this week, it retains that control.	按照本周签署的这项协议，该公司将继续保留这样的控制权。


As one who worked in the gas industry before entering politics, I know that the gas trade in the countries of the former Soviet Union is riddled with corruption.	由于从政前曾经在天然气行业任职，我非常清楚前苏联国家的天然气行业到处充斥着腐败的谜团。


During my premiership, my government sought to investigate RosUkrEnergo – to discover who precisely its owners are, how it gained a virtual monopoly on the import of Central Asian gas, and where its profits go.	任职总理期间，我领导的政府曾调查俄罗斯乌克兰能源公司，了解谁是它真正的所有者、它采用什么手段获得了对中亚天然气进口的实际控制权、以及利润最终去了哪里。


Now that I am not in government, that investigation has been shelved.	但现在我的任期结束了，调查也被束之高阁。


Ukraine’s energy needs, and thus the certainty of energy supplies across Europe, will never be secure as long as gas transit is in the hands of secretive companies with unknown owners.	但只要天然气输送一天掌握在被身份不明者控制的秘密公司手里，乌克兰的能源需求，乃至整个欧洲的能源供应就永远没有安全可言。


But the issues raised by the gas dispute between Ukraine and Russia go beyond energy security, reviving questions about Ukraine’s place in Europe and the world.	但乌克兰和俄罗斯天然气争端所提出的问题已经超越了能源安全的范畴，它再次将乌克兰在欧洲和世界的地位问题摆在了我们面前。


As this struggle shows, Ukraine has been obliged to assume a higher-profile role in European affairs. It must consider where and in what sort of Europe it fits, what balance it should strike between Russia and the European Union, and how it should find the self-assurance needed to play its full part in world affairs.	就像这场斗争所表明的那样，乌克兰不得不在欧洲事务中承担更加引人注目的角色，它必须考虑欧洲局势和自己在欧洲的定位，它要在俄罗斯和欧盟之间达到什么样的平衡，以及它怎样才能找到在世界事务中充分发挥作用的自信。


It would be sheer folly to suggest that Ukrainians start with a blank slate.	说乌克兰可以从头开始纯粹是种愚蠢。


Centuries of being part of the Russian and Soviet empires have, in different ways, shaped how Ukrainians view their country and its interests.	几百年来俄罗斯和苏联帝国成员的地位已经以不同的方式决定了乌克兰人对国家和利益的看法。


One consequence of this is that Ukrainians are often shy about asserting Ukraine’s independent interests plainly – exemplified by Ukraine’s acceptance of a deal that leaves its energy future so insecure.	后遗症之一是乌克兰人常常不好意思公开主张自己的独立利益¾乌克兰接受这样一个根本无法确保未来能源安全的协议就是最好的证明。


Like any country, Ukraine’s relations with the world are determined by four interlocking factors: history, patriotism, national interests, and geography.	同任何国家一样，乌克兰与世界的关系由历史、地理、爱国精神和国家利益等四个相互影响的因素共同决定。


Each factor has special resonance here.	其中的每个因素都能引起特殊的共鸣。


True, Ukrainians rightly feel like citizens of a normal, independent country, and want to be treated that way.	是的，乌克兰人认为自己是生活在正常、独立国家的公民，并要求世界给予相应的对待。


But this does not mean we want to bury history and our historic ties.	但这并不是说我们希望埋葬历史和历史上形成的联系。


We are a normal country with an abnormal history.	我们是个正常的国家，却有着非同寻常的历史。


Indeed, Ukraine’s interests form a comfortingly familiar triangle of economic, political, and strategic priorities: free trade and open markets across the globe; prosperous and democratic neighbors; and not being on the front-line of a conflict, still less a potential battleground, between Russia and the West.	实际上，乌克兰利益构成了我们所熟悉的经济、政治和战略重心三角：全球自由贸易及开放市场； 临近国家的繁荣、民主；


Our goal is thus a democratic Ukraine located between prosperous like-minded neighbors to east and west.	以及不充当俄国和西方之间争端的前线，更不充当潜在的战场。 我们希望东西两方的邻国经济繁荣、思想接近，而民主的乌克兰就处在它们的中央。


Of course, the risk of tyranny, turmoil, and war within the so-called “post-Soviet space” is large, leaving Ukraine keen to limit its vulnerability.	当然，所谓“后苏联空间”里存在着巨大的专治、动乱和战争风险，这使得乌克兰急切地寻求自我保护。


Ukrainian enthusiasm about the EU is based on the idea that European security is indivisible.	欧洲安全密不可分是乌克兰对欧盟一切热情的基础。


We recognize, of course, that few of even the most fervent supporters of European integration want to help Ukraine quickly become a member.	当然，我们也知道即便是欧洲融合最狂热的支持者也很少愿意帮助乌克兰迅速成为欧盟的一员。


But the risk to EU gas supplies shows that our fates are linked.	但欧盟天然气供应的危险表明，我们的命运紧密相连。


Europe must play its part as Ukraine redefines its historic ties to Russia, and its actions must do nothing to undermine Ukraine’s national independence – or, indeed, that of any of the countries that emerged from the Soviet Union’s breakup.	欧洲必须在乌克兰重塑对俄关系的过程中发挥自己的作用，他们的所作所为不能威胁到乌克兰的国家独立¾实际上，苏联解体后分离出来的所有国家都不应受到威胁。


The proposed Baltic Sea pipeline, which would bring gas to Germany directly from Russia, bypassing Poland, Ukraine, the Baltic states, and the rest of Central Europe, is dangerous in this regard, because it may allow Gazprom the freedom to cut gas supplies to customers without endangering supplies to its favored western markets.	拟议中的波罗的海输气管线可以直接将天然气从俄罗斯经由波兰、乌克兰、波罗的海诸国和中欧其它国家输送到德国，但这项提议本身非常危险，因为这样一来，俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司（Gazprom）就可以按照自己的意愿切断对某些国家的天然气供应，而不威胁到有利可图的西方市场。


That is a recipe for renewed threats, not only to Ukraine, but to EU members like Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the three Baltic states.	这样的做法会制造新的威胁，这些威胁不仅针对乌克兰，还将针对波兰、捷克共和国、匈牙利、斯洛伐克、斯洛文尼亚和其它三个波罗的海国家。


In broad terms, Ukraine seeks security and stability, and it should be remembered that our record here is strong.	广义地讲，乌克兰所追求的是安全和稳定，人们应该记得，我们在上述领域曾有过辉煌的历史。


Our decision more than a decade ago to surrender Ukraine’s status as a nuclear nation is the clearest sign of our good neighborly intentions and political maturity.	10多年前，我们决定主动放弃有核国家的地位，这样的举措最清楚不过地表明了我们对邻国的善意，以及我们在政治上的成熟。


Today’s crisis over gas supplies must not be overblown.	今天的天然气供应危机不该被遗忘。


Objectively speaking, Ukraine today is more secure as a nation than at any time in its history.	客观地说，今天的乌克兰比历史上任何时候都更安全。


But Ukrainians do not feel as secure as they should.	但这样的安全乌克兰人却没有充分感受到。


The way to deal with uncertainty and complex situations is to think clearly and act decisively, not cut deals that place Ukraine’s future in the hands of shadowy businesses.	处理变幻莫测的复杂局势需要思路清晰、行动果断，不要把乌克兰的未来交到背景不明的企业手中。


Only by clearly articulating and defending Ukraine’s national interests can today’s dispute over gas supplies establish our role in a transformed Europe.	只有明确地宣布并捍卫乌克兰的国家利益，今天的天然气供应争端才能够奠定我们在变革后欧洲的地位。


The Next IMF	国际货币基金组织的改革


The international monetary and financial system has witnessed tremendous change over the recent decades.	过去数十年中，国际货币和金融体系目睹了巨变。


Rapid expansion in cross-border capital flows, continued financial innovation, and deepening financial markets pose increasing challenges not only for national policy makers, but also for international financial institutions.	跨国资本流动快速扩张、金融创新延续以及金融市场深化不仅给各国的决策者，也为国际金融机构带来了日益增加的挑战。


This has been particularly true of the IMF as it seeks to serve its global membership, and it has triggered a critically important discussion of the Fund’s strategic direction.	由于国际货币基金组织寻求服务于全球成员，因此这对于它而言尤其如此，而且还引发了有关该基金战略方向的极为重要的讨论。


The IMF’s current strategic review does not start from scratch.	国际货币基金组织当前的战略检讨并非从头开始。


The reform process was launched at the end of the 1990’s and was continued by former Managing Director Horst Köhler with important initiatives.	二十世纪九十年代末开始了改革进程，并由前任总裁科洛尔以重要的措施加以推进。


These initiatives – particularly efforts to strengthen the IMF’s surveillance function and the so-called “exceptional access framework” – must now be locked in and implemented consistently.	现在应当锁定这些措施，特别是加强该基金的监控职能以及所谓的“特殊贷款框架”，并且贯穿实施。


For example, the introduction of standards and codes, reports on their observation (ROSC’s), Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAP’s), and the resulting increase in the Fund’s transparency might contribute to an improvement of bilateral, regional, and multilateral surveillance.	例如，引入标准和准则、汇报遵守情况（ROSC’s）、金融部门评估项目（FSAP’s）以及该基金随之而来的透明度提高将有可能促进改善双边、地区以及多边监控。


The exceptional access policy, which seeks to both enhance the predictability of the Fund’s lending policy and to safeguard its financial position, is still waiting for its first real test.	特殊贷款框架目的在于提高该基金借款的可预测性并且保护其财政地位，目前尚有待接受实际考验。


But the world needs to look beyond even these issues.	但是，我们应当放眼于这些问题之外。


The IMF’s management shares many strategic considerations repeatedly raised by the Bundesbank, which has argued that the Fund should limit its activities to its core mandate: promoting monetary and financial stability.	德国联邦银行多次提出的战略考虑主张，该基金应当将其活动限制于核心本职工作，即促进货币和金融稳定。 国际货币基金组织的管理层认同其许多考虑。


Thus, the IMF’s role in the international monetary system should not go beyond applying its key instruments for promoting macroeconomic stability: surveillance and economic policy advice.	这样，国际货币基金组织在国际货币体系中的作用就不应当超出实施其主要手段来促进宏观经济稳定，即监控和提供经济政策建议。


In fact, these two instruments should go hand in hand as the IMF’s internal reforms continue.	实际上，在国际货币基金组织的内部改革继续之际，这两项手段应当携手并进。


Increasing analytical focus and improving transparency by providing comprehensive advice and timely information would serve to strengthen surveillance further.	通过提供全面的建议和及时的信息来增加分析重点并改进透明度将会进一步增强监控。


By contrast, an IMF that attempted to act, say, as an international umpire of national exchange-rate policies would face insurmountable implementation and acceptance problems.	与此相反，如果国际货币基金组织试图扮演各国汇率政策国际公断人的角色，那就将面临无法克服的实施以及接受问题。 国际货币基金组织的使命是以有意不扣除风险因素的条件提供财政援助。


Similarly, positioning the IMF as a general risk insurer by introducing precautionary credit lines above normal access limits would be compatible neither with its mission to provide financial assistance on deliberately non-risk-adjusted terms nor with the current system of refinancing short-term Fund credit through risk-free official reserves.	目前，其体制是通过无风险的官方储备为该基金的短期信贷再融资。 同样，通过引入超出贷款限额的预防性贷款而将该基金定位为总体风险承保人将不符合其使命以及体制。


Only in true balance-of-payments crises should the IMF stand ready to provide limited temporary financial assistance to member countries, thereby encouraging their own policy adjustments and signaling this commitment to the markets.	只有在真正的收支平衡危机之时，国际货币基金组织才可准备为成员国提供有限的临时财政援助，这样就鼓励各国自身的政策调整并向市场表明这一承诺。


Nor is becoming a development institution consistent with the Fund’s mission.	成为发展机构也不符合该基金的使命。


Development financing should be left to the World Bank.	提供发展资金的任务应当交由世界银行。


By concentrating on their specific comparative advantages in line with clearly defined mandates, both institutions will fulfill their tasks more efficiently.	通过以符合其明确规定的本职工作的方式专注于其专门的比较优势，这两个机构都可以更为有效地完成其任务。


Indeed, the implementation of the Multilateral Debt Relief initiated by the G-8 already provides an unprecedented opportunity to complete the process of debt relief for a large number of low-income countries.	实际上，实施由八国集团提出的多边债务减免计划已经为大量低收入国家提供了前所未有的完成债务减免进程的机遇。


This also opens the way for the IMF to dispose of its current diffusion of activity in low-income countries and intensify its agenda in the areas of its core expertise.	这也为该基金料理当前在低收入国家的活动扩散并且将其日程集中于其核心专长领域开辟了道路。


Finally, adequate representation and the right of each member to have a say in the Fund is a prerequisite of the legitimacy that the IMF needs to fulfill its global role.	最后，国际货币基金组织要实现它的全球性作用，其先决条件是每个成员国都可以在该组织中享有足够的代表权和发言权。


The quota distribution should be guided by members’ economic weight and degree of integration into the global economy, and any quota adjustments must be undertaken in a coherent manner that applies the same standard for all countries.	配额分配应当受成员国的经济地位以及融入全球经济的程度指导，进行配额调整应当以对所有成员国一视同仁的方式进行。


But, in order to maintain the creditor countries’ willingness to contribute to the Fund’s finances, a strong link must be maintained between quotas, on the one hand, and voting rights, access to IMF resources, and financial contributions on the other hand.	但是，为了维护债权国为该基金提供资金的意愿，就必须在配额以及投票权、拥有该基金的资源和财政贡献两端之间保持强有力的联系。


The issue of representation is an important component of the IMF’s strategic review.	代表权问题是国际货币基金组织战略检讨的重要组成部分。


However, that review, and the reforms that follow from it, must be much more comprehensive in order to benefit the Fund and all of its members.	但是，这一检讨以及随后开展的改革必须更为全面，从而受益于该基金及其所有成员国。


The Next Liberation of France	法国的下一轮解放


Ségolène Royal has turned the tables on the Socialist Party to become its standard bearer in next year’s election.	塞格莱娜·罗亚尔反败为胜，成为明年大选社会党的旗手。


But her triumph is only part of an intense political debate of the sort France has not seen for decades.	不过她的胜利只是一场法兰西数十年来未曾见过的激烈政治争论的一部分。


With parliamentary and presidential elections next year, the stakes are as high as at any previous turning point in modern French history.	随着明年议会和总统大选的到来，赌注之高不亚于之前现代法国历史上的任何一个转折点。


A unique feature of today’s debate is its cohort of public intellectuals like Jacques Marseille, Nicolas Baverez, Elie Cohen, and Stephane Rozes, none of whom subscribe to the hoary notion of French uniqueness (the so-called  exception française ).	当前争论的一个罕见特点在于一群公共知识分子，如雅克·马塞勒、尼古拉·巴维莱兹、艾利·科恩和史蒂芬尼·罗兹等，全都不认同法国超然世外的陈腐观念（即所谓的“法国式的例外”）。


Their thinking is at the forefront of a widening recognition that France must face the world’s challenges as they really are, not as the French want them to be.	他们的思想处在一个日益扩大的认知前沿，即法国必须直面世界的真实挑战，而不能按照法国人自己的意愿歪曲它们。


That means accepting and dealing with globalization.	也就是说，要接受并适应全球化。


France certainly has the tools to cope.	法国当然有能力适应。


With only 1% of the world’s population, France is the sixth largest economy, ranking fourth in international trade and third in exports of goods and services.	法国人口只占全世界的1%，经济规模却排名第六，国际贸易排名第四，商品和服务的出口则排第三。


More than 40% of the largest companies quoted on the Paris stock exchange are in foreign hands.	巴黎证券交易所挂牌的最大公司中超过40%是外国公司。


Indeed, one in seven workers is employed by a foreign company, compared to one in ten in the UK and one in 20 in the United States.	甚至，每七个工人中就有一名受雇于外国公司，而英国则是十分之一，美国是二十分之一。


Productivity is relatively high, at $33 per hour, compared to $27 for the UK.	生产力也相对较高，每小时33美元，英国只有27美元。


Moreover, France will enjoy large gains from exports to the fast-growing emerging world, since it produces more competitive high value-added goods than, for example, southern European countries, whose exports are closer to those of the leading emerging countries.	此外，面向快速发展的新兴国家的出口会给法国带来极大的收益，因为法国生产的高增值商品比南欧国家的更具竞争力。 后者的出口商品更接近于领先新兴国家。


France could handle globalization, if not for the French state.	如果不是法兰西国家机器，法国是可以应付全球化的。


Its relatively poor business environment was highlighted by the World Bank’s latest  Doing Business survey.	世界银行最新的“商业展望”调查突出显示了法国相对较差的商业环境。


The section “Starting a business,” which identifies the bureaucratic and legal hurdles to incorporating and registering a new firm, ranks France in 35th place, whereas the UK ranks sixth and the US ranks third.	“开创企业”一节指出了建立和注册新公司所要面临的官僚和法律障碍，将法国排在第35名，相对于英国的第六名和美国的第三名。


But the worst damage done by state policies is unemployment.	但是国家政策造成的最严重的损害还是失业。


If there is an  exception française , it is that for the past 30 years, the unemployment rate has never fallen below 8.5%.	如果“法国式的例外”的确存在，那就是过去30年来，失业率从未降至8. 5%以下。


If you exclude the cosseted army of public-sector workers, the rate approaches 15%.	如果不算娇生惯养的公职人员大军，失业率将接近15%。


Youth unemployment, including the female population, averages 23%, while in deprived suburbs with concentrated immigrant populations, the rate hits 70%.	青年失业率，包括妇女在内，平均达到23%，而在移民聚集的贫困郊区，失业率高达70%。


Much of the political class and public opinion blames globalization – outsourcing and company relocations to cheaper labor markets – for unemployment.	许多政治阶级和舆论将失业归咎于全球化——公司向劳动力低廉的市场外包和转移。


But the chief culprit is France’s own labor code – a forest of regulations that offers the strongest employment protection anywhere in the world.	但是罪魁祸首其实是法国自己的劳工法——林林总总的条例，形成世界上最坚实的就业保护。


In the section “Employing workers” of  Doing Business , France ranks 134th, compared to 17th for the UK and first for the US.	在“商业展望”调查的“雇用工人”一节，法国排名第134位，英国则是17，美国名列榜首。


With employers unwilling to hire workers that they cannot easily fire, French young people are right to feel uncertain about their future.	雇主们不愿意聘用不能轻易解雇的工人，法国的年轻人当然会对自己的未来失去信心。


Joblessness is the main cause of poverty.	失业是贫困的主要原因。


The primary protection against poverty is earned income – for which even France’s generous unemployment benefits and other welfare payments are an inadequate substitute. Much of the high tax burden required to finance them falls on companies in the form of payroll taxes (employers’ social security contributions), which further deter companies from taking on more staff.	防止贫困的主要保护是工作收入——对此，即便是法国慷慨的失业救济和其他福利补贴也不能充分代替，而给这些福利提供资金所需的税收负担很大一部分以工资税的形式落在公司的头上（雇主的社会保障贡献），从而进一步妨碍公司雇用更多的职员。


Successive French governments have let this situation fester.	法国历届政府任由这种情况腐烂化脓。


Dominique de Villepin’s government turned away from this challenge in favor of “economic patriotism” – that is, protecting supposed national champions from foreign takeover.	多米尼克·德·维尔潘政府避开这个挑战，转而选择了“经济爱国主义”——即保护所谓的国家卫士不被外国公司兼并。


Despite comical episodes such as classifying the dairy company Danone as a national security asset to head off a possible bid from Coca Cola, France’s foreign investment regime is no less restrictive than other developed countries, including the US.	尽管有过一些滑稽的插曲，例如将乳品公司Danone划为国家安全资产，从而阻止了可口可乐公司可能的投标，但是法国外资投资制度的限制强度并不比包括美国在内的其他发达国家低。


This scapegoating of globalization reflects another key problem.	这种把全球化当作替罪羊的做法反映了另一个关键性的问题。


Successive governments, not companies, are responsible for the most damaging outsourcing in France – that of responsibility.	历届政府，而不是公司，要为法国最具破坏性的外包行为——即职责的外包——负责。


Instead of proposing reforms to the electorate and then implementing them on the strength of a clear democratic mandate, the few serious reforms in the past 20 years have been presented as being externally imposed – mainly to comply with European Union requirements.	过去20年来为数不多的几次严肃改革不是向选民提出改革方案，然后凭借明确的民主权力实施这些方案，而是外部强加的——主要是为了满足欧盟的要求。


As a result, reform has come to seem illegitimate, which has strengthened resistance to it.	结果，改革似乎变得不合法，反过来强化了国内的抵制。


Breaking the impasse requires restoring political legitimacy by electing a president who, having promised reform, gains a mandate to deliver it.	要打破这样的僵局就必须选出承诺改革、并获得实施改革的权力的总统，从而恢复政治合法性。


Both leading contenders in the 2007 presidential election, Ségolène Royal and Nicolas Sarkozy, share relative youth (compared to the geriatrics of recent decades) and have their fingers on the pulse of public opinion.	2007年总统大选的两位主要竞争对手塞格莱娜·罗亚尔和尼古拉·萨尔科齐都比较年轻（与最近数十年来的老人相比），并且都对舆论的脉搏有一定的把握。


Their common approach is to enter into a real dialogue with the French people based on an understanding that the only viable basis for reform is a strong political contract between government and citizens.	他们共同的手法是与法国人民达成共识，即改革惟一可行的基础是政府与公民之间强有力的政治契约，并在此基础上与法国人民进行真正的对话。


This stands in sharp contrast to the reigns of François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac, with their elitism, arrogance, paternalism, and stagnation.	这与弗朗索瓦·密特朗及雅克·希拉克充满精英主义、傲慢、家长式作风和停滞的统治形成了鲜明的对比。


Whatever the election’s outcome, the return of political will and legitimacy to France will come not a moment too soon.	不论大选的结果怎样，法国政治意愿和合法性的回归将姗姗而来。


The Nixon Option for Iran?	用尼克松的办法解决伊朗问题？


WASHINGTON, DC – Rearranging the deck chairs would not have saved the Titanic.	华盛顿—把船上的躺椅换掉救不了泰坦尼克号。


Nor did the endless debates on the shape of the table in the Vietnam negotiations advance the effort to end that malign conflict.	为越南谈判的谈判桌形状争执不休对于结束这场恶性冲突也无济于事。


Nevertheless, many American presidents have successfully redesigned talks with adversaries in bold new ways to strengthen national security without war.	尽管如此，不少美国总统仍然凭借大幅改变与敌谈判的方法在不发动战争的情况下解决了国家安全问题。


Such boldness is now needed in the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.	如今，伊朗和谈判也需要作出此类大幅改变。


In 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt negotiated personally with Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov to open diplomatic relations between the two countries.	1933年，富兰克林·罗斯福与苏联外交部长李维诺夫进行了个人谈判，这便是两国外交关系之滥觞。


Dwight D. Eisenhower invited Nikita Khrushchev to the United States in 1959 to open the eyes of the first Soviet leader ever to visit America.	1959年，艾森豪威尔邀请赫鲁晓夫访美，开了苏联领导人访美之先河。


The bilateral US-China talks in Warsaw in the 1960’s were fruitless until Richard M. Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger opened a different, more direct discussion through the auspices of Pakistan.  	20世纪60年代，华沙美中双边会谈一直没有取得进展，直到尼克松及其国务卿基辛格另辟蹊径，在巴基斯坦的协助下与中国开展了更加直接的交流。


International negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program also need a new concept and broader agenda.	与伊朗就其核计划所开展的国际谈判也需要引入新概念、扩大谈判日程。


The Istanbul meeting last month concluded on a positive note.	上个月的伊斯坦布尔会议达成了积极意向。


Both sides decided to find a way to avoid the pattern of mutual recrimination and sterile exchanges.	双方决定应该避免相互指责和毫无助益的扯淡。


The door is now open to an initial agreement with modest goals.	通向温和目标的初步一致的大门已经敞开了。


But don’t count on a new era without some form of direct US-Iran discussions.	但是别指望可以在缺少美伊直接对话的基础上开启新篇章。


The talks with the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) are formulaic, stagnant, and not likely to achieve any breakthrough on their own.	与联合国安理会五常及德国（P5+1）的谈判只是一种形式，刻板而不可能达成突破。


The Iranians feel out-numbered by diverse participants with varying agendas.	伊朗人觉得对方人数太多，安排变数太大，颇有孤立之感。


The US needs to reshape the environment to make it easier for Iran to compromise.	美国需要重新安排更能让伊朗妥协的谈判环境。


The US should press for bilateral talks.	美国应该要求双边谈判。


One lesson provided by former American presidents is the value of direct, high-level contacts with key adversaries.	诸位前任总统留下的教训是与对手展开高层次的直接对话非常有效。


Of course, a face-to-face meeting between President Barack Obama and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei seems absurd to imagine – now.	当然，至少从目前看，要奥巴马和哈梅内伊面对面坐下来对话显得相当不切实际。


But could any meeting have seemed more absurd in 1969 than the 1972 meeting between Nixon and Mao Zedong?	但1969年和1971年尼克松与毛泽东的会谈不是更加不可思议吗？


The US and Iran need to set a path toward broad bilateral discussions on worldviews, regional security, and plans to improve mutual understanding in order to minimize differences.	美国和伊朗需要找出一条通向广泛双边谈判之路，主题应包括世界观、地区安全以及增进互相理解以尽力消除差异的计划。


Even without direct US-Iran talks now, the current negotiations need reshaping.	即使不能在现在开展美伊对话，目前的谈判也需要重新安排。


The P5+1 should continue to negotiate with Iran on its uranium-enrichment program, while the International Atomic Energy Agency should negotiate with Iran on strengthening the transparency of its nuclear program.	P5+1应该继续与伊朗就其核浓缩项目展开谈判，同时，国际原子能机构应该与伊朗就增加其核计划透明度的问题展开谈判。


The Iranians want to resolve their problems directly with the IAEA, and to avoid negotiating under the cloud of UN Security Council resolutions, which impose sanctions on Iran to force suspension of enrichment.	伊朗希望直接与国际原子能机构解决问题，而不愿与五常谈判解决，后者对伊朗实施了旨在强迫其中止核浓缩计划的制裁。


This situation suggests a phased approach.	这一状况表明需采取阶段性方法。


First, during the talks in Baghdad, the P5+1 might seek an early confidence-building agreement by which Iran voluntarily ceases enriching the U-235 fissile isotope to 20% content and blends down or ships out its stockpile of such uranium, which is closer to weapons grade.	首先，在巴格达谈判期间，P5+1应该争取形成提振信心的协议，让伊朗停止将U-235裂变同位素浓度浓缩至20%的活动并削减或外运该裂变同位素存量，该浓度已接近核武器级别。


They might also seek a standstill on the deep underground enrichment facility at Fordow, near Qom, in exchange for provision of fuel rods for Iran’s research reactor and a freeze on some sanctions.	P5+1还可以争取让伊朗停止富尔道（Fordow）深度低下核浓缩设施运转，作为交换，P5+1可以向伊朗提供研究用燃料棒并冻结某些制裁措施。


Second, the P5+1 could then agree to agree to some Iranian enrichment as an incentive for Iran to conclude a parallel agreement with the IAEA on greater transparency.	接着，P5+1可以同意伊朗进行某些核浓缩活动，以激励其与国际原子能机构达成增加透明度的协定。


These parallel steps would reshape the process to achieve a key US objective: ensuring that Iran abides by Khamenei’s own fatwa (religious decree) against nuclear weapons.	这些同时实行的步骤能够促使局面朝美国所期待的目标转变：确保伊朗遵守哈梅内伊本人所提出的反核武器宗教法令。


Third, both sides will need to outline the long-term objectives of the negotiations.	第三，双方应该给出长期谈判目标纲要。


As the IAEA presses Iran for agreements on greater transparency, Iran wants to know where such agreements might lead, particularly regarding sanctions.	正如国际原子能机构敦促伊朗在增加透明度的协定上签字，伊朗希望了解这类协定将会给它带来什么，特别是有关制裁的方面。


Iranians claim that each time they move toward cooperation with the US, a new problem emerges to block improved relations.	伊朗人说，每当他们朝着与美国合作的方向努力时，就会出现新的问题阻挠关系的改善。


Iran wants to know which sanctions might be delayed, frozen, or lifted in exchange for current and future concessions, fearing that the US will continue to impose sanctions on human-rights, security, or other grounds.	伊朗希望知道，作为伊朗当下和未来的让步的交换，哪几项制裁会被推迟、冻结或取消。 他们担心，美国会在人权、安全和其他领域继续对伊朗实施制裁。


The US, for its part, views Iran as a duplicitous and unreliable negotiator that is committed to nuclear weapons and unserious about talks.	而美国则将伊朗看做狡猾而不可靠的谈判对手，他们誓要拥有核武器，对谈判根本不上心。


The time has come to test Iran’s intentions by reaching something like the two-phased agreements outlined here – a longer-term, step-by-step process with reciprocal actions, in which each side must give something to get what it needs.	现在是对伊朗的考验时刻，他们到底有没有形成本文所列举的两阶段协定——一个长期的、逐步实现的过程，需要协定各方精诚合作，给予对方所欲之物——的意愿？


Finally, even with step-by-step progress on Iran’s nuclear program, broader discussions are needed to address the many non-nuclear issues that threaten regional stability.	最后，即使在伊朗核计划问题上有了逐步解决的过程，仍然需要更广泛的讨论以解决对地区稳定构成威胁的非核问题。


There is currently no forum to discuss Afghanistan, Iraq, drug trafficking, Persian Gulf security, emergency communications to avoid accidental conflict, and the sources of deep distrust and misunderstanding.	目前还没有讨论阿富汗、伊拉克、贩毒、波斯湾安全、突发冲突紧急交流以及根深蒂固的互不信任和理解的根源等问题的论坛。


Some of these discussions might involve representatives of states that are not part of the P5+1, including governments that have closer relations with Iran.	这些问题的探讨可能需要非P5+1国家代表的参与，包括那些与伊朗关系密切的国家。


To organize discussion of these broader issues, the US and others should explore the possibility of appointing a special envoy – perhaps a former Chief of State under UN auspices – to engage Iran in new ways.	为了组织这些更广泛问题的讨论，美国和其他国家应该研究任命特使——可以是由联合国出面任命的前国家元首——前往伊朗以新办法解决问题。


If Obama were to take the lead in reshaping the setting and the process by which the US and others talk with Iran, progress could become easier.	如果奥巴马能在改变和制定美国及其他国家对伊谈判程序中起到领导作用，那么取得进展就会更加容易一些。


The Istanbul talks opened the door to an initial – if incremental – breakthrough agreement.	伊斯坦布尔谈判开启了初步突破性协定（即使只是一小步）的大门。


The US now has an opportunity to establish new ways to explore common ground and reach a more durable political solution.	现在，找出建立共同立场、形成更具持久力的政治解决方案的新办法的机会已经摆在了美国面前。


The Nixon Shock Doctrine Revisited	汇率单边主义——奥巴马重蹈尼克松覆辙？


FLORENCE – Richard Nixon has been dead for 15 years, but he is making another comeback in America.	佛罗伦萨——理查德·尼克松死了15年，最近却好像在美国借尸还魂了。


The 37th President of the United States believed that international monetary relations are unlikely to be transformed by talking.	这位美国第37任总统认为，要调整国际货币关系，光靠磋商搞不定；


Instead, he thought that radical unilateral action was required.	激进的单边行动是必要的。


Today, pressure is increasing for the US Treasury to follow Nixon’s misguided example and issue a finding (due by April 15th) that China is manipulating its exchange rate.	如今，美国的政客们正向财政部不断加压，逼它学习尼克松的坏榜样，最晚于4月15日裁定中国为汇率操纵国。


Some 130 members of Congress have signed a letter demanding action on China’s currency.	约130名国会议员联署信件，要求对中国采取行动。


The campaign is enthusiastically endorsed by a leading US economist and trade specialist, the Nobel laureate Paul Krugman.	大力鼓动这场“战役”的是美国顶尖经济学家和贸易专家、诺贝尔经济学奖得主保罗·克鲁格曼。


From today’s perspective, the problems of the Nixon era look relatively manageable, even trivial.	以今天的眼光来看，尼克松时代的问题似乎挺好对付，甚至显得微不足道。


The world’s currency reserves were held in a slightly lop-sided way: at the end of 1971, Germany had reserves worth $17.2 billion, and Japan’s were worth $14.1 billion – 14% and 11.5% of the world’s total, respectively.	当时，全世界的货币储备分布略显不均：到1971年底，德国拥有价值172亿美元的储备，日本141亿美元，分别占世界总量的14%和11. 5%。


In 2008, the last year for which figures are available, Japan held 23.4 % of the world’s reserves and China held 44.8%.	而在2008年（我们掌握数据的最近一年），日本拥有全球储备的23. 4%，中国则拥有44.


These figures are even higher today.	8%。 今日的数字高得多了。


In 1971, Americans were feeling the effects of a German and Japanese export surge.	1971年，美国感受到德国、日本出口量迅速攀升的影响。


Germany had a current-account surplus of 2.1% of GDP at the time, while Japan’s was 4.4%.	德国当时的经常账户盈余占GDP的2. 1%，日本则占4.


In 2008, the Japanese surplus was 3.2% of GDP, Germany’s was 6.7%, and China’s was 9.8%.	到了2008年，日本盈余的GDP占比为3. 2%，德国为6.


Then, as now, there were differing perspectives on the cause of the global imbalances.	当年同今日一样，在全球贸易不平衡这个问题上存在各种不同的立场。


Europeans and Asians saw excessively loose US fiscal and monetary policy as the major culprit.	欧洲人和亚洲人认为，美国过分宽松的财政和货币政策是罪魁祸首。


Americans, by contrast, thought that Japan and Germany were artificially holding down their currencies’ value in order to get an unfair advantage for their politically powerful export industries.	美国人则反过来说日本和德国刻意压低本币汇率，牟取不公平的贸易优势，以扶持其颇具政治影响力的出口产业。


Germany was more obliging in the face of US pressure, mainly because its security relied on America’s military presence.	面对美国的压力，德国当年表现得比较听话，主要是因为它依赖美国的军事保护。


It undertook a small revaluation in 1969 and then let its currency float in May 1971.	它先让马克在1969年小幅升值，然后在1971年5月转向浮动汇率。


But Japan’s government was intransigent.	日本政府却不肯就范。


Talking about the charms of market opening or about fairness did not help.	任凭美国把开放市场和公平贸易的好处说得天花乱坠，它就是我行我素。


Treasury Secretary John Connolly attacked Japan’s “controlled economy.”	结果，时任美国财长的约翰·康诺利（John Connolly）决心向日本的“管制经济”发起攻击。


There were two American strategies to prize open Japan’s supposedly closed economy.	日本经济据说是封闭着的，美国要迫使它开放，可以采取两种策略。


One strategy, termed “benign neglect,” was to let the surplus countries pile up reserves until they realized that they had a very big problem.	一种策略叫“善意忽视”，就是放任盈余国家积累储备，直到它们自己意识到问题的严重性。


But there seemed to be no end to the piling up of reserves, so the only remaining choice was confrontation.	可是储备积累起来似乎没有个顶，所以仅存的选择就是对抗。


Nixon intrinsically distrusted multilateralism.	尼克松骨子里就不信任多边主义。


The conventional view, then as now, was that unilateral action risked unleashing a wave of protectionism.	当年和如今一样，通常的观点是，单边行动会引发贸易保护主义。


When Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns objected on the grounds that other countries might retaliate, Connolly replied, “Let ‘em.	当年的美联储主席阿瑟·伯恩斯（Arthur Burns）以其他国家可能抱负为由提出反对，康诺利回答说：“那就让它们反对好了。


What can they do?”	它们能做什么？


The point was clear: “So the other countries don’t like it.	”意思很清楚：“单边行动会惹恼其他国家。


So what?”	那又怎么样？ ”


On August 15, 1971, Nixon imposed a temporary surcharge of 10% on imports “to ensure that American products will not be at a disadvantage because of unfair exchange rates.”	1971年8月15日，尼克松向进口货物加征10%的临时附加税，以“确保美国产品不会因不公平汇率而陷于劣势。


At the same time, there was a wage and price freeze, an end to the Federal Reserve’s swap network of support for other central banks, and a limitation of gold transactions, implying a reduction in the value of the American currency.	”与此同时，当局还下令冷冻工资和物价、终止了美联储向其他央行提供支持的货币互换、限制黄金交易，这意味着美元的贬值。


None of these measures served to restore US economic growth rates or correct the surpluses of America’s competitors.	这些措施没有一项真正帮上忙，令美国经济回升或修正竞争对手的贸易盈余。


To be sure, the Japanese and German external balances were subject to heavy swings in the course of the turbulent 1970’s.	在动荡的20世纪70年代，日本和德国的对外收支的确遭遇剧烈波动。


Large surpluses turned into deficits for Japan in 1973 and 1979, and for Germany in 1974, 1975, 1979, and 1980.	日本的巨额盈余在1973年和1979年两度转为赤字，德国则有四次，分别是1974年、1975年、1979年和1980年。


But this was due not to bilateral corrections in these countries’ trade relationships with the US, but mostly to their energy dependence and the decade’s energy price shocks.	但这不是因为它们同美国的贸易关系发生了双边修正，而主要是因为当年的高油价休克令严重依赖能源进口的两国备受冲击。


Between these deficits, large surpluses for Germany and Japan reappeared – as they have in the 2000’s.	在赤字年度之外的年份里，德国和日本的巨额盈余又卷土重来了，比如20世纪的头10年。


Some of the late 1970’s correction did follow from renewed intense US pressure for fiscal and monetary expansion, but that expansion caused inflationary pressure, which the Japanese and Germans then predictably blamed on the US.	实际上，20世纪70年代后期的几次修正往往是由美国新一轮财政和货币扩张所致，美国的扩张政策又转化成通胀压力，于是日本人和德国人自然对美国人大为恼火。


After an initial inflationary surge, American economic growth fell off sharply in the 1970’s.	经过一段最初的快速通胀期，美国经济在20世纪70年代又剧烈下跌。


The world became much more inflationary, and quite a bit more protectionist.	全世界的通胀形势都有所加剧，保护主义也有所抬头。


This did not, however, imply a return to the 1930’s, in large part because energy dependence forced industrial countries to maintain an open trade regime so that they could earn the money to pay for oil and gasoline.	然而，这并不意味着又回到了20世纪30年代，主要是因为能源依赖迫使工业化国家维持开放的贸易体制，以便它们挣到足够的钱来购买石油和天然气。


America’s currency unilateralism pushed everyone else to organize against the chaos emanating from Washington.	当年，美国的汇率单边主义迫使全世界团结起来，对付华盛顿引发的混乱。


The Europeans advanced their plans for regional monetary and economic integration.	欧洲人加快了他们的区域货币和经济一体化进程。


The dollar confusion encouraged the oil producers to form their (briefly) highly effective cartel, OPEC.	美元乱局也促使产油国建立了（一度）十分有效的卡特尔——欧佩克。


Only the most obvious of the targets of August 1971, Japan, was badly hit by what the Japanese called the second “Nixon shokku” (the first being Nixon’s announcement the previous month that he would visit mainland China in 1972).	只有日本，1971年8月战役的首要目标，遭受了沉重打击。 这被日本人称作第二次“尼克松休克”，第一次是几个月之前，尼克松突然宣布将于1972年访问中国大陆。


That was because, unlike Germany, Japan was standing on its own.	日本之所以受伤，因为它不像德国，它是自力更生的。


China today is not isolated in the way that Japan was in 1971.	今日的中国并不像1971年的日本那样孤立。


On the contrary, it will find an easy way to turn its resentment of American pressure into an issue of regional solidarity – exactly as the Germans did in the 1970’s.	相反，它很容易就能把美国施压所激起的愤怒情绪凝聚成地区团结的动力——正如20世纪70年代的德国所做的一样。


Instead of leading to an American renaissance, the “Nixon shock” produced theories about American imperial overstretch and decline.	“尼克松休克”并没有带来美国的复兴，相反，它催生了很多理论，探讨美国帝国的过度扩张和衰落。


Today, the fastest way to really make this “the Asian century” is to give Asian exporters a similarly unpleasant shock, thereby spurring the creation of an Asian community of surplus countries.	如今，要把这个世纪变成“亚洲世纪”，最省事的办法莫过于给亚洲出口国一次“尼克松式休克”，从而刺激它们抱成一团，组成一个亚洲盈余国集团。


Can Barack Obama, fresh from his major domestic victory on health care, really afford to turn himself into Richard Nixon?	刚刚在国内打赢医疗改革战役的贝拉克·奥巴马想变成尼克松附体吗？ 他能担得起这个后果吗？


The Non-Communicable Disease Paradox	非传染病悖论


WELLINGTON – Albert Einstein is reputed to have said that “everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.”	惠灵顿—艾尔伯特·爱因斯坦有一句名言：“越简单越好，但不要太简单。


Yet the current debate about the global epidemic of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) – chronic diseases such as heart disease, stroke, diabetes, and cancer – has ignored this advice.	”但当下关于全球性爆发的非传染性疾病（NCD，即心脏病、中风、糖尿病、癌症等慢性病）显然没有把这句话当回事。


Policymakers have oversimplified the challenge by focusing on the growing prevalence of NCDs – the sheer number of people with these diseases – which, I argue, is not really the problem.	决策者将这一挑战简单化了，他们专注于NCD越来越普遍的发生——即罹患疾病人数的陡峭增加，但我认为，真正的问题并不在这里。


True, almost all regions of the world are currently experiencing an increase in the prevalence of NCDs – in part because, as deaths from acute infectious diseases and injuries decline, people live long enough to develop these diseases.	诚然，几乎在世界所有地区，都在经历NCD的普遍发生，这部分是因为随着急性传染病和伤害致命人数的下降，人们的寿命得到了增加，使得越来越多的人患上了NCD。


But NCDs are increasing for many other demographic and epidemiological reasons as well – and understanding these has implications for health policy, and even for economic development.	但CND的增加同样也有人口和流行病因素在其中，弄清楚此中缘由将对卫生政策甚至经济发展都带来重大影响。


In much of the world, populations are growing and aging simultaneously.	世界上有很多地区同时发生着人口的增加和老化。


Most NCDs increase in prevalence with age – a consequence of the cumulative exposure to risk factors (including unhealthy behaviors such as tobacco use and biological risk factors such as high blood pressure) over a lifetime.	大部分NCD的出现伴随着年龄的老化——这是一生中累积风险因素的结果（包括吸烟等不健康行为以及高血压等生物性风险因素）。


All else being equal, larger and older populations mean more people with NCDs.	在其他条件相同的情况下，人口的增加和老化意味着更多的人患上NCD。


This “population aging” effect is well understood.	这一“人口老化”效应已为人所熟知。


Far less well understood are the epidemiological forces that drive NCD dynamics.	不为人所熟知的是NCD动态背后的流行性因素。


From an epidemiological perspective, NCD prevalence is determined by the difference between the rate at which previously healthy people become ill (incidence) and the rate at which ill people either recover or die (from any cause). If inflow exceeds outflow, prevalence rises.	从流行病学的观点看，NCD的普遍性决定于先前健康的人群的发病率（事件）和病人被发现发病或死亡（不管什么原因）频率之差。


Over the past several decades, standards of living, lifestyles, and biological risk factors have generally improved worldwide (obesity is an exception).	在过去几十年中，生活水平、生活方式和生物性风险因素在全世界范围内获得普遍的改善（肥胖是一个例外）。


So, contrary to popular belief, the incidence of most NCDs other than diabetes has actually been falling.	因此，与流行的观点相反，大部分NCD事件的发生（糖尿病除外）实际上是在下降的。


Nevertheless, NCD prevalence has increased, because improvements in survival have outpaced reductions in incidence.	尽管如此，NCD的普遍性在上升，因为生存率的改善要更甚于发病率的下降。


Inflow and outflow have both fallen, but outflow has fallen further and faster.	流入和流出都在下降，但流出下降得更快更深。


Several factors underpin the recent dramatic gains in survival at older ages.	老龄人口生存率的显著上升有几大原因。


People living with a chronic disease may die not only from that disease, but also from other causes – including other NCDs, acute infections, and injuries.	患有慢性病的人最终的死亡原因并不只有这些疾病，还有其他因素——包括其他NCD、急性传染病以及受伤。


In particular, more accessible and higher-quality health care has significantly improved survival rates for people living with NCDs, including diabetes.	特别是，更便捷、更高质量的医疗已经显著改善了患有NCD（包括糖尿病）的人群的生存率。


Yet health care is not solely responsible for the observed improvement in survival rates.	但对于我们所观察到的生存率改善的事实来说，医疗并不是唯一因素。


Improvements in lifestyle and related risk factors have contributed as well.	生活方式和相关风险因素的改善也起到了作用。


A decline in the proportion of people who use tobacco, consume unhealthy diets, are physically inactive, and/or have elevated blood pressure and cholesterol does more than just prevent disease.	吸烟、饮食不健康、缺乏体育锻炼、高血压和胆固醇人口比例的下降所起到的效果不仅仅局限于预防疾病。


Not only do fewer cases occur, but the NCD cases that do tend to be less severe, and to progress more slowly than was previously the case.	不但NCD的发病率下降了，而且即使发生了NCD，发病程度和势头也不像以前那样严重和迅猛。


As a result, the increase in prevalence that has been seen in recent decades for many NCDs largely reflects an increase in the prevalence of early stages of the disease only.	因此，最近几十年来多种NCD普遍性的增加在很大程度上只是早期疾病的普遍性增加了。


Increasing overall disease prevalence has hidden decreasing prevalence of late-stage or complicated disease.	总体NCD普遍性的增加隐藏了晚期或复杂病症普遍性的下降。


I have called this shift towards the milder end of the NCD spectrum the “severity effect.”	我将这一NCD患病人群症状的轻化趋势称为“严重度效应”。


Most health problems linked to NCDs – problems such as chronic pain, disordered sleep, depression, disability, and premature death – are associated with late-stage or complicated disease, rather than with early-stage or uncomplicated disease.	与NCD有关的大部分健康问题——慢性病痛、睡眠不规律、压抑、残疾和过早死亡——大多与晚期或复杂病症，而不是早期和非复杂病症有关。


Whenever the “severity effect” outweighs the “prevalence effect,” the increasing overall prevalence of the NCD will be accompanied by a decreasing health impact, not an increasing disease “footprint,” as is widely assumed.	只要“严重度效应”压过了“普遍性效应”，总体NCD的普遍性的增加就会伴随着对健康影响的下降，而不是许多人认为的疾病“覆盖面”的增加。


This is the paradox of NCDs: objective measures of poor health (severe symptoms, disability, premature death) are declining, even as the prevalence of these diseases is increasing.	这就是NCD的悖论：不健康程度的客观标准（严重症状、残疾、过早死亡）在下降，尽管这些疾病的普遍性在上升。


And, while this paradox is no excuse for complacency in responding to what the United Nations has rightly called a global NCD crisis, it does have practical implications for that response.	这一悖论并不能作为对联合国的“全球NCD危机”的正确说法的嗤笑，但对于如何应对具有实践性影响。


First, the primary concern should not be with reducing disease prevalence, but rather disease burden – the health impact as measured by disability and premature mortality.	首先，关注的焦点不应该是疾病普遍性的下降，而是疾病负担——用致残和致过早死亡的标准来衡量——的下降。


That means channeling resources according to burden rather than according to prevalence, particularly as co-morbidity (two or more diseases in the same patient) increases.	这意味着应该根据负担，而不是普遍性，来配置资源，比如（特别是）并发症（即两种或以上病症在同一患者身上出现）的增加情况。


Second, we should concentrate less on improving health care and more on strengthening disease prevention, for example by driving down tobacco use, expanding opportunities for physical activity, and increasing the availability and affordability of a healthy diet.	其次，我们不应当过多关注医疗的改善，而应当关注疾病预防，比如减少烟草的使用、增加体育锻炼、增加健康饮食的可获得性和成本。


A greater focus on prevention can both reduce the incidence of NCDs and ensure that those cases that continue to occur will tend to be less severe and will progress more slowly, allowing scope for inexpensive but effective treatment in primary-care settings.	更关注预防既可以降低NCD的发生，也可以确保即使NCD发生，其症状也会较轻，发展也会较慢，以便采取低成本、高效率的初级护理疗法。


Both mechanisms – lower incidence and lesser severity – will contribute to a smaller disease “footprint,” even as NCD prevalence continues to rise.	这��大机制——更低的发生率和更轻的严重度——将使疾病“覆盖面”有所萎缩，尽管NCD的普遍性仍将继续上升。


The Non-Crisis of the Euro	欧元无恙


BERKELEY – The global financial crisis has breathed new life into hoary arguments about the euro’s imminent demise.	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 伯克利--全球金融危机给欧元即将崩溃这一老生常谈注入了新的生命力。


Such arguments often invoke Milton Friedman, who warned in 1998 that Europe’s commitment to the euro would be tested by the first serious economic downturn.	这些观点经常引用弗里德曼的话。 他在1998年警告说，欧洲实行欧元的承诺将会在第一场严重的经济衰退中受到考验。