This reversal became apparent in June, when Britons – including those who benefit significantly from the existing open economic and financial system – voted to leave the European Union, based on what might be called the sovereignty principle.	这种逆转在6月初露端倪，英国人——包括那些从现有的开放经济和金融体系中获益良多的人——基于所谓的主权原则最终投票决定脱欧。


EU institutions were perceived to be undermining Britain’s capacity to boost its own economy, regulate immigration, and control its destiny.	在他们眼中，欧盟机构会损害英国促进本国经济，规管移民和控制自身命运的能力。


A similar view has been animating nationalist and populist political movements across Europe, many of which believe that supra-national arrangements should come second to domestic prosperity.	类似的观点令欧洲的民族主义和民粹主义政治运动大受鼓舞，其中许多人认为超国家协议应该排在本国繁荣之后。


The EU – which actually does, in its current configuration, leave its member governments short of policy tools to meet their citizens’ evolving needs – is an easy target.	实际上，在目前的配置下，欧盟确实令其成员国政府在满足公民不断变化的需求时缺乏政策工具 ，因此也容易沦为众矢之的。


But even without such institutional arrangements, there is a sense that emphasizing international markets and linkages can hamper a country’s capacity to advance its own interests.	但即使没有这样的体制安排，人们也会觉得强调国际市场和各国联系会妨碍一个国家增进自身利益的能力。


Donald Trump’s victory in the United States’ presidential election made that abundantly clear.	而特朗普在美国总统大选中的胜利更令这点显露无遗。


In keeping with Trump’s main campaign slogan, “Make America Great Again,” it was his “America first” comments that were most revealing.	再结合特朗普的主要竞选口号“让美国再次伟大起来”，他这种“美国为先”的言论最能说明问题。


While Trump might pursue mutually beneficial bilateral agreements, one can expect that they will be subordinated to domestic priorities, especially distributional aims, and supported only insofar as they are consistent with these priorities.	虽然特朗普可能会寻求签订互利性双边协议，但人们也会预料这些协议将服从于国内优先事项，尤其是一些分配性目的，也只有在与这些优先事项一致的情况下才会予以支持。


Developed-country voters’ frustration with the old market-driven global economic architecture is not unfounded.	发达国家选民对旧有市场导向型全球经济结构的沮丧不是没有根据的。


That order did allow powerful forces, at times beyond the control of elected officials and policymakers, to shape national economies.	这种秩序确实会催生某种塑造一国经济的强大势力，有时连民选官员和政策制定者都无力控制。


It may be true that some of that order’s elites chose to ignore the adverse distributional and employment-related consequences of the old order, while reaping the benefits.	虽然可能确实有一些该秩序下的精英选择无视旧秩序在分配和就业方面的负面后果，同时获取好处。


But it is also true that the old order, taken as sacrosanct, hampered elites’ capacity to address such problems, even if they tried.	但是旧的秩序虽然貌似神圣不可侵犯，但也削弱了精英们解决这些问题的能力（即便他们倾尽全力），这也是事实。


This was not always the case.	但情况可不总是这样。


In the wake of WWII, the US, motivated partly by the Cold War, helped to create the old order by facilitating economic recovery in the West and, over time, creating growth opportunities for developing countries.	第二次世界大战后，美国在某种程度上受冷战推动，通过促进西方经济复苏来创建了这个旧秩序，并随着时间的推移为发展中国家创造了增长机会。


For 30 years or so, the distributional aspects of the global growth patterns that these efforts underpinned were positive, both for individual countries and for the world as a whole.	在 30多年间，这些努力所支撑的全球增长模式在分配方面对个别国家和整个世界来说都是积极正面的。


Compared with anything that came before, the post-war order was a boon for inclusiveness.	与之前的任何情况相比，二战后的秩序堪称一笔具备包容性的福利。


But nothing lasts forever.	但没有什么能保持永恒。


As inequality across countries has declined, inequality within countries has surged – to the point that the reversal of priorities was probably inevitable.	随着各国之间的不平等状况逐步收窄，各国内部的不平等现象却出现激增——以至于优先次序的逆转可能是无法避免的。


Now that the reversal has arrived, so have the consequences.	现在逆转已经到来，因此出现这些后果也毫不奇怪。


While it is difficult to say precisely what those will be, some seem fairly clear.	虽然很难准确地说明将会发生什么，但其中一些问题似乎已经相当清楚。


For starters, the US will be more reluctant to absorb a disproportionate share of the cost of providing global public goods.	首先，美国未来将更不愿意继续不成比例地承担提供全球公共产品的成本。


While other countries will eventually pick up the slack, there will be a transition period of unknown duration, during which the supply of such goods may decline, potentially undermining stability.	虽然其他国家最终将填补这一空缺，但中间总会有一个长短不明的过渡期，在此期间这种产品的供应可能减少，并因此威胁局势的稳定。


For example, the terms of engagement in NATO are likely to be renegotiated.	比如说加入北约的条件可能会被重新制定。


Multilateralism – long enabled by the same sort of asymmetric contribution, though typically proportionate to countries’ income and wealth – will also lose steam, as the trend toward bilateral and regional trade and investment agreements accelerates.	多边主义——尽管通常与国家的收入和财富相对应，但也同样算是不对称的贡献 ——也将失去动力，而双边和区域性贸易和投资协议的趋势加速。


Trump is likely to be a leading proponent of this tack; in fact, even regional trade deals may be ruled out, as his opposition to ratifying the 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership suggests.	特朗普很可能是这一进程的首要支持者； 事实上，甚至连区域贸易协议都会被排除在外，因为他反对批准12个国家的跨太平洋伙伴关系。


This creates an opportunity for China to lead the establishment of a trade pact for Asia – an opportunity that Chinese leaders are already set to seize.	这为中国牵头在亚洲建立贸易协定创造了机会——而中国领导人也已经抓住了这个机会。


In conjunction with its “one belt, one road” strategy and its creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, China’s influence in the region will expand significantly as a result.	随着“一带一路”战略以及其附属亚洲基础设施投资银行的建立，中国在该地区的影响力将大为扩大。


Meanwhile, for developing countries that lack China’s economic might, the trend away from multilateralism could hurt.	同时，对于那些缺乏类似中国般经济实力的发展中国家，摆脱多边主义的趋势可能会带来负面影响。


Whereas poor and less-developed countries found opportunities to grow and prosper under the old order, they will struggle to negotiate effectively on a bilateral basis.	虽然贫穷和欠发达国家在旧秩序下得到了繁荣发展的机会，但它们会在双边基础上进行有效谈判时面临很大压力。


The hope is that the world will recognize its collective interest in keeping development pathways open for poorer countries, both for these countries’ benefit and for the sake of international peace and security.	唯有希望世界能认识到，为了较贫穷国家的利益和为了国际和平与安全，为这些国家留一条畅通的发展道路是符合集体利益的。


Beyond trade, technology is another powerful global force that is likely to be treated differently in the new order, becoming subject to more national-level regulations.	在贸易之外，技术是另一个可能会在新秩序中受到不同待遇的强大全球性力量，也更多地受到国家级法规的制约。


Cyber threats will all but require some regulations and will demand evolving policy interventions.	网络威胁需要一些法规监管并要求不断变化的政策干预。


But other threats – for example, the fake news that has proliferated in the West (and, in particular, in the US during the presidential campaign) – may also call for a more hands-on approach.	但其他威胁——例如，在西方（特别是在美国总统竞选期间）滋生的假新闻——也可能需要更切实际的应对手段。


And the adoption of work-displacing digital technologies may need to be paced, so that the economy’s structural adjustment can keep up.	而那些替代工作人员的数字技术的采用步伐可能需要进行规划，以便实现与经济结构调整同步。


The new emphasis on national interests clearly has costs and risks.	对国家利益的新强调显然存在成本和风险。


But it may also bring important benefits.	但它也可带来重要的好处。


A global economic order sitting atop a crumbling foundation – in terms of democratic support and national political and social cohesion – is not stable.	坐落在摇摇欲坠的基础上的全球经济秩序——在民主支持和国家政治及社会凝聚力方面——不稳定。


As long as people’s identities are mainly organized, as they are now, around citizenship in nation-states, a country-first approach may be the most effective.	只要人们的自我认知还是像现在一样围绕着民族国家的公民身份来定义，以国家为先的方法可能是最有效的。


Like it or not, we are about to find out.	不管喜欢与否，我们都要认识到这一点。


A third way to fight the new xenophobia is through innovation.	打击新仇外主���的第三种方法是通过创新。


NATO after Riga	里加会议后的北约


When the Soviet Union collapsed, many predicted the end of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).	苏联瓦解以后，许多人预测北大西洋公约组织（北约）也走到了尽头。


Yet a few weeks ago, NATO held its summit meeting in the Latvian capital of Riga, formerly part of the USSR.	但就在前几周，北约还在拉脱维亚（曾是前苏联一部分）首都里加召开了首脑会议。


NATO was created in 1949 as an alliance to contain Soviet power.	北约创建于1949年，是一个旨在牵制苏联强权的联盟。


Its focus was on Western Europe, and, as one joke went, it was designed to keep the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in.	其重点在西欧，并且曾作为笑谈被指出，其目的是孤立俄国、摧毁德国、拉入美国。


But that Cold War world is long gone.	但曾经的冷战世界早已成为过眼云烟。


Germany is a democracy firmly anchored in the European Union, and there is no threat of Soviet tanks sweeping across the North German plains.	德国成为紧固于欧盟的民主国家。 苏联坦克在北德平原扫荡的威胁也并不存在。


NATO survived by transforming itself.	北约通过不断转变得以存在。


While some Central European members that were formerly occupied by the USSR continue to see NATO as a political insurance policy against a revival of Russian ambitions, NATO is no longer aimed against Russia.	虽然一些曾被苏联占领的中欧成员仍认为北约是制约苏联野心复生的政治保证，但实际上其目标已不针对俄国。


In fact, Russian officers are welcome to participate in military exercises and to visit NATO headquarters under the Partnership for Peace program.	事实上，北约欢迎俄国官员在和平伙伴项目下参加军事演习并访问北约总部。


Residual suspicions and Russian pride limit the NATO-Russia agreement, but the organization is no longer focused on Russia.	残留的疑团和俄国自尊给北约俄国协议造成了局限，但该组织的重心已不在俄国。


One major task that NATO performed in the first decade after the Cold War was to attract the newly freed countries of Central Europe toward the West, with the prospect of membership conditioned on meeting democratic standards.	冷战后第一阶段北约的主要任务之一为吸收西方的中欧新获自由的国家朝向西方，他们在达到民主标准的条件下加入北约。


Another important task was to help bring stability to the troubled Balkan region after the breakup of Yugoslavia and the resultant wars in Bosnia and Kosovo.	另一重要任务为，在南斯拉夫瓦解及其所引起的波斯尼亚与科索沃战争后，给处于困境中的巴尔干地区带来稳定。


NATO peacekeeping operations have been a stabilizing factor in the region.	北约的维和行动成为该地区的稳定因素之一。


For example, NATO and EU diplomacy prevented ethnic conflict in Macedonia from erupting into a crisis.	举例来说，北约和欧盟的外交阻止了马其顿的种族冲突演变成危机。


While these actions were important, many observers argued that NATO would have to look beyond Europe.	虽然这些行动颇为重要，许多观察家却指出北约需把眼光放在欧洲以外。


A common quip was that NATO would have to go “out of area or out of business.”	当时一个流行的讽刺是北约须“出去或垮台”。


This became particularly important after the Al Qaeda attacks on September 11, 2001, shifted the focus of American foreign policy toward transnational terrorism.	在基地组织的9/11袭击以后这变得异为重要，将美国外交的重心转到了跨国恐怖主义。


The European members of NATO responded by invoking the Article 5 mutual defense clause of the NATO charter and coming to the aid of the US in Afghanistan, where today there are 32,000 NATO troops.	北约的欧洲盟国通过援引北约宪章中第五条的共同防御条款作出回应，并在阿富汗（如今已驻扎了三万两千的北约军队）协助美国。


Because they train together, NATO countries can operate effectively even when not all members of the organization are officially involved.	由于他们共同训练，北约国家即使在并非集团内所有成员都正式参与的情况下亦可以高效运作。


For example, NATO did not conduct the Gulf War in 1991 or the initial Afghan campaign, but NATO planning and training meant that members could cooperate effectively when called upon to do so.	举例说，北约并没有领导1991年的海湾战争或起初的阿富汗战役，但北约的计划和训练意味着其成员可以在得到号召时，可以展开高效的协同合作。


At the same time, NATO after Riga faces a number of problems.	同时，里加会议以后的北约面临着一系列的问题。


Europe split over the American invasion of Iraq, and there is no political will to involve NATO there.	欧洲在对美国对伊拉克的入侵是分裂，并且没有要北约参战的政治意图。


The new relationship with Russia needs careful management, and rapid extension of membership to former Soviet republics like Ukraine and Georgia could prove difficult.	与俄国的新关系需要谨慎管理。 在诸如乌克兰和格鲁吉亚等苏联加盟共和国迅速发展成员也困难重重。


In military terms, European countries need to spend more on secure communications, airlift capabilities, special operations, and dealing with chemical and biological battlefields in order to be able to fight the war on terrorism effectively.	从军事上来说，欧洲国家需要更多地在安全通讯、空运能力、特种行动以及在化学和生物战争领域的行动中投入更多，以有效地应对反恐战争。


France is concerned that America’s influence in NATO is too large, and opposes a global role in which NATO establishes special partnerships with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and other countries.	法国担心美国对北约的影响太大，并反对北约发挥全球性作用，在该计划中北约与澳大利亚、新西兰、日本及其它国家建立特殊的合作关系。


The French worry that NATO’s global ambition, particularly in East Asia, could produce friction with China.	法国担心北约的全球野心，特别是在东亚的扩张，将与中国发生摩擦。


But by far the biggest problem that NATO faces today is Afghanistan.	但到目前为止，北约面临的最大问题是阿富汗问题。


Hamid Karzai’s government remains weak, and the economy continues to be heavily dependent upon opium production.	卡尔扎伊政府仍然虚弱，其经济仍极大地依赖于鸦片生产。


The Taliban and Al Qaeda networks are re-emerging as political and military threats.	塔利班和基地组织的网络不断出现，成为政治和军事威胁。


Many NATO countries with troops in Afghanistan have “national caveats” that restrict how their troops may be used.	许多将军队驻扎于阿富汗的北约国家受到“国家告诫”，对他们使用军队提出了限制。


While the Riga summit relaxed some of these caveats to allow assistance to allies in dire circumstances, Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, and the US are doing most of the fighting in southern Afghanistan, while French, German, and Italian troops are deployed in the quieter north.	里加会议解除了一些告诫，以让其协助处于紧急威胁之下的同盟。 英国、加拿大、荷兰和美国在阿富汗南部为主力作战方而法国、德国和意大利军队则在更平静的北部部署军队。


It is difficult to see how NATO can succeed in stabilizing Afghanistan unless it is willing to commit more troops and give commanders more flexibility.	北约如何成功稳定阿富汗局势仍难于预见，除非其投入更多军队并且赋予指挥官更多的机动性。


Success will also require more funds for reconstruction, development, and alternatives to opium poppy cultivation.	要获得成功还需更多基金用于重建、发展和取代鸦片栽培经济。


Governments in Europe and the US are concerned about budget problems, but in a larger perspective, providing significantly greater resources to Afghanistan now may turn out to save more funds later.	欧洲和美国政府担心的是预算问题。 但从长远来看，目前为阿富汗提供更多的资源日后会节省更多的基金。


One of the great costs of the Bush administration’s mistaken Iraq policy has been to divert attention and resources away from the just war in Afghanistan.	布什政府错误的伊拉克政策导致的一项最大成本就是使其偏离了对阿富汗的正义战争。


If only a small portion of the money and forces invested in Iraq had been devoted to Afghanistan, the current threat of a resurgent Taliban and Al Qaeda might not be so great.	仅需将伊拉克支出和军队中的小部分转向阿富汗，目前塔利班和基地组织复活的威胁就不会那么严重。


Unfortunately, Iraq is draining all the oxygen out of the policy process in Washington.	不幸的是，伊拉克吸干了美国对外的所有资金。


Few people are focused on saving NATO from a significant failure in its first major test outside of Europe.	很少有人关心将北约从其在欧洲以外首个重大测试的失败中解救出来。


Nato to Lebanon – but on one condition	北约进驻黎巴嫩的条件


The current discussion surrounding an international force for southern Lebanon has focused almost exclusively on which countries and organizations – NATO, the European Union, the United Nations – will provide the troops.	目前围绕派遣一支国际部队进驻黎巴嫩南部的讨论几乎全部集中在由哪些国家和组织，是北约，欧盟还是联合国派遣军队上。


This is an important issue, to be sure, but the real question concerns the changes that Israel must undertake in exchange for this force being put in place and assuming the risk of such a mission.	这当然是一个重要的问题，但是真正的问题在于以色列必须作何变化用来换取进驻部队以及为这一任务承担风险。


No international force will simply protect Israel from Hezbollah rockets while Israel continues its current strategy.	当以色列还在继续目前的战略时，没有哪支国际部队会来单单保护以色列不受真主党火箭弹的袭击。


After all, the recent military escalation in the region is at least partly due to that strategy.	不管怎样，最近该地区军事冲突的不断升级至少部分归咎于那个战略。


If an international force simply allows Ehud Olmert’s government to pursue its plans further, the countries that provide troops for the international force will not only be seen as rubberstamping Israeli policy, but will also be dragged into its failure.	如果国际部队只是允许奥尔默特政府进一步推行其计划，那么，为这支国际部队提供士兵的国家将不仅被看作是对以色列的政策唯唯诺诺，还有可能被拖进它的失败之中。


To criticize Israel’s strategy as flawed is not to condone the acts of Hamas or Hezbollah or to deny Israel’s right to self-defense.	指责以色列战略的错误并不是要宽恕哈马斯或真主党的行为或否认以色列有权自卫。


It is merely to point out what should be obvious: Israel’s efforts to find a unilateral solution to its security problems – whether occupation, withdrawal, or separation – have failed.	它只是为了指出明显的事实，那就是以色列寻求单边解决其安全问题的努力，不管是占领、撤退还是隔离均已失败。


Unilateral occupation without commitment to a viable Palestinian state has produced only the intifada and suicide bombers.	不承诺建立一个能够生存下去的巴勒斯坦国而进行单边占领只是换来起义和自杀式爆炸者。


Unilateral withdrawal from Gaza without the prior establishment of a local authority to maintain order has only led to renewed intervention.	从加沙单边撤离而没有事先那里建立一个地方政权以维持秩序最后只是换来重新介入。


And the “security fence,” which was to allow for unilateral separation, may hold back suicide bombers but not modern missiles of the kind currently employed by Hezbollah.	而为单边隔离设置的“安全墙”虽然挡住了自杀性爆炸者，但却挡不住真主党现在拥有的现代化导弹。


So far, the only lesson Israel seems to have drawn from its failed strategies is that it must extend and intensify the use of unilateral force: re-invade Gaza, devastate Lebanon, and threaten Syria and, by implication, Iran, which the Israeli government hints, had a hand in orchestrating the recent crisis.	迄今为止，以色列从其失败的战略中所获得的唯一教训似乎是，它必须扩大和加强单边行动，也就是重新侵入加沙，摧毁黎巴嫩，警告叙利亚，也含蓄地警告伊朗，因为以色列政府暗示是伊朗导演了最近的危机。


It takes little foresight, however, to predict that more force will not produce more security for Israel.	然而，不需要多少洞察力就能看出更强有力的军事打击并不能给以色列带来更多安全。


The policy, reminiscent of terrorist stratagems, of bombing civilians in order to force the hands of their leaders will only strengthen the radicals and boost their popular support.	这一轰炸平民以迫使其领导人让步的策略使人联想到恐怖分子的策略，只会加强极端分子的力量并使他们得到更多的支持。


It will not hide the fact that Israel has run out of unilateral options.	这不能掩盖以色列已经失去单边行动的选择的事实。


Israel has so far been unwilling to accept this fact.	以色列迄今一直不愿意承认这一事实。


Instead, its leaders hope that a robust international force in southern Lebanon will provide protection for northern Israel, leaving them with a free hand to deal unilaterally with Gaza and the West Bank, while committing the international community to Israel’s failed unilateralism.	相反，它的领导人希望在黎巴嫩南部驻扎一支强有力的国际部队给以色列北部提供保护，使他们能腾出手来单边处理加沙和西岸的问题，同时又可以指责是国际社会应该对以色列失败了的单边行动主义负责。


To join such an international force under these conditions would be irresponsible.	在这种条件下加入这样一支国际部队将是不负责任的。


Countries that contribute troops would appear to be siding unequivocally with Israel, thereby losing all credibility with Israel’s adversaries.	派遣士兵的国家会显得是在明显偏袒以色列，从而失去以色列的对手们所有的信任。


They would also risk being drawn into renewed Israeli operations against Hezbollah and its backers.	它们会冒着被拖进以色列与真主党和它的支持者新一轮的争斗中的危险。


Most important, they would forego what may be the last chance to promote a consensual peace.	更重要的是，它们将失去促进各方都同意的和平的最后一次机会。


So the prior condition for setting up and joining an international force for Southern Lebanon must be that Israel renews its commitment to the “road map” and negotiations with the Palestinians for a viable Palestinian state.	所以，组成和参加一支进驻黎巴嫩南部的国际部队的首要条件是以色列必须重启“路线图”并且坐下来与巴勒斯坦就建立可以存活的国家进行谈判。


With this aim in mind, it must enter into talks with democratically elected Palestinian representatives.	带着这个目标，它必须与民主选举出来的巴勒斯坦代表进行谈判。


True, such talks will be difficult, and they may not succeed.	当然，谈判将会很困难，也许不会取得成功。


But that can no longer be an argument against diplomacy now that Israeli unilateralism has once again proven to be a strategic blind alley.	但是现在以色列单边主义再次被证明只会在战略上走进死胡同，不应再对外交手段表示反对。


Only an Israel seriously willing to seek security through agreement, not one that wants to impose her security on her neighborhood by fiat, can be partner to an international effort to bring stability to Lebanon and beyond.	只有当以色列认真地想通过协议寻求和平，而不是想通过法令向它的邻居强加安全，它才能成为为黎巴嫩及其周边地区带来稳定的国际社会努力的伙伴。


Of course, some countries, not least the US, would oppose making such a reversal in Israeli policy a condition of creating an international force and consensus in NATO, the EU, or the UN may not be found or, if it were to emerge, Israel might simply refuse to abide.	当然，有些国家，不仅仅是美国，会反对将以色列改变政策作为组建国际部队的先决条件。 北约、欧盟或联合国内部取得一致同意的情况也许也不会出现，即便出现了，以色列也会拒绝遵守。


Both prospects would be reason enough for staying away from the project altogether.	两个前景都足以使大家有足够的理由远离这项计划。


Creating an international force for southern Lebanon makes sense only as an investment in regional peace, not as an appendix to Israel’s current strategy.	向黎巴嫩南部派遣国际部队只有在它能促进地区和平、而不是成为以色列现行战略的帮凶时才有意义。


Mother Nature vs. Climate Change	大自然母亲和气候变化


MARRAKESH – Wetlands, forests, and oceans absorb and store carbon, which makes them a vital asset for countries pursuing the Paris climate agreement’s targets for reducing CO2 emissions.	马拉喀什—湿地、森林和海洋吸收并储存碳，因此它们是追求巴黎协定中减少二氧化碳目标的国家的宝贵资产。


So how can we use them most effectively?	那么，我们如何最有效地使用它们？


The Paris accord was concluded by 196 governments last December, and came into force earlier this month.	去年12月，196个国家达成了巴黎协定，并在本月早些时候正式生效。


Now, its signatories are meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco, for the annual United Nations climate change conference.	现在，巴黎协定的签署国正齐聚摩洛哥马拉喀什出席一年一度的联合国气候变化会议。


Several conference events specifically focus on how countries can use natural systems to meet their CO2-reduction targets.	会议中将专门研讨各国如何使用自然系统实现减少二氧化碳的目标。


While the climate-change challenge is immense, so, too, is the opportunity to accelerate sustainable development and ensure a better future for everyone on the planet.	气候变化挑战十分艰巨，但它也带来了巨大的加快可持续发展和确保全世界人民更美好的未来的机会。


Under the Paris agreement, governments have committed to reducing their carbon emissions drastically, in order to keep global warming below 2°C. The vast majority of signatory countries have already presented national action plans for achieving this goal, and these plans will become more ambitious over time.	根据巴黎协定，各国承诺大幅削减碳排放，以使全球变暖幅度不超过2℃。 绝大部分签署国已经给出了实现这一目标的行动计划，并且这些计划将逐渐变得越来越宏大。


These Nationally Determined Contributions include renewable-energy targets and proposals for sustainable transportation, energy efficiency, and education.	这些各国自定贡献包括可再生能源目标以及可持续交通、能源效率和教育方案。


In addition, countries should consider adopting policies to manage natural capital better.	此外，各国还应该考虑采取更好���管理自然资本的政策。


The Paris agreement itself recognizes the important role that natural ecosystems play in limiting the amount of carbon in the atmosphere, and governments should not neglect such powerful tools.	巴黎协定本身确认了自然生态系统在限制大气中碳含量方面的重要作用，各国政府也不应该忽视这一强大的工具。


Governments will need to take action to conserve existing ecosystems – and restore and expand degraded ecosystems – in people-friendly ways.	各国政府需要采取行动保护现有生态系统，恢复和扩大遭到破坏的生态系统——并且以以人为本的方式实现。


This is particularly true of wetlands, which include all land areas – such as lakes, floodplains, peatlands, mangroves, and coral reefs – that are covered with water, either seasonally or permanently.	被水覆盖的湿地尤其如此，不论是季节性湿地还是永久性湿地——湿地包括了所有陆地地区——比如湖泊、泛洪区、泥炭地、红树林和珊瑚礁等。


Peatlands are particularly important.	泥炭地尤其重要。


Though they cover only 3% of the world’s total surface area, they store twice as much carbon as all forests combined.	尽管它们只占世界地表总面积的3%，却储存了两倍于森林储存量之和的碳。


Peatland soils are composed of carbon – in the form of decomposed plant material – that has accumulated for thousands of years; and when peatlands are drained or burned, that carbon is released into the atmosphere.	泥炭地土壤含有碳——由被分解的植物组成——这些碳已经积累了数千年； 而当泥炭地消耗或燃烧时，这些碳就被释放到大气中。


In fact, draining peatlands releases two times more carbon into the atmosphere than the aviation industry does.	事实上，消耗泥炭地排入大气中的碳两倍于航空业。


In 2015, fires raged across Indonesia’s forested peatlands, raising concerns worldwide about how much carbon was being released into the atmosphere, to say nothing of the far-reaching health effects.	2015年，印度尼西亚森林泥炭地遭遇大火，全世界都在关注有多少碳因此被排入大气中，更不用说因此导致的巨大的健康影响了。


Indonesia’s government estimates that peatland fires and deforestation alone account for more than 60% of the country’s total greenhouse-gas emissions.	印尼政府估计，光是泥炭地火灾和毁林就要占该国温室气体总排放量的60%以上。


Conserving and restoring peatlands could significantly reduce global CO2 emissions, which is why, in 2015, the Nordic Council of Ministers announced a commitment to preserve the region’s peatlands.	保护和恢复泥炭地可以大幅减少全球二氧化碳排放，因此，2015年北欧部长理事会（Nordic Council of Ministers）做出承诺保护该地区泥炭地。


Almost half of Nordic countries’ peatlands have been lost, and this ecosystem degradation contributes 25% of their total carbon emissions.	北欧国家泥炭地已经失去了近一半，这一生态系统的破坏占北欧碳排放总量的25%。


The Paris agreement entered fully into force in less than a year.	不出一年，巴黎协定就完全生效。


This indicates that there is global momentum for concrete action to address the causes of climate change, as well as its effects, such as the disastrous floods, water shortages, and droughts already afflicting many countries.	这表明世界有采取务实行动解决气候变化根源及其影响——如已经影响到许多国家的洪灾、水短缺、干旱——的动力。


That sense of urgency is not surprising.	这种紧迫感并不令人奇怪。


According to UN-Water, 90% of all natural hazards are water-related, and they will increase in frequency and intensity as climate change worsens.	据联合国水利署，90%的自然风险与水有关，并且随着气候变化恶化，它们的频率和程度都会加强。


But natural systems can mitigate them: wetlands act as sponges that reduce flooding and delay the onset of droughts; and mangroves, salt marshes, and coral reefs all act as buffers that protect against storm surges.	但自然系统能够减轻这些风险：湿地可以起到海绵的作用，减少洪水、推迟旱季的到来；


And wetlands, oceans, and forests do far more than just absorb and store carbon; they also provide fresh water, and are a food source for nearly three billion people.	而红树林、盐沼和森林的作用也绝不仅限于吸收和储存碳； 它们还能提供淡水，也是近三十亿人的食物来源。


Countries have a readymade platform that they can use for their future wetland-conservation efforts.	各国有一个现成的平台可用于未来湿地保护措施。


The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, an intergovernmental treaty under which 169 countries have committed to conserve and sustainably manage their wetlands, is an ideal vehicle for help them reach their CO2-reduction targets, as well as meet the UN Sustainable Development Goals for 2030.	拉姆萨尔湿地公约（Ramsar Convention on Wetlands）是一份169个国家签署的跨政府条约，承诺保护和可持续地管理湿地，它可以成为帮助这些国家实现减少二氧化碳的目标并实现2030年联合国可持续发展目标的理想工具。


The Paris agreement’s long-term objective is to achieve climate neutrality – no net greenhouse-gas emissions – in the second half of this century.	巴黎协定的产气目标是在本世纪下半叶实现气候中性——二氧化碳零净排放。


Climate neutrality is necessary to keep global warming below 2°C; to reach it, we must reduce emissions to the point that they can be fully and easily absorbed by nature.	气候中性是将全球变暖保持在2℃以下的必要条件； 要实现这一目标，我们必须将排放减少到大自然可以轻易地充分吸收的程度。


This was the natural cycle for millions of years before anthropogenic climate change began.	在人为气候变化开始出现之前的数百万年时间里一直是如此。


Climate neutrality can be achieved through political willpower, imaginative policies, new green technologies and clean-energy sources, and a multi-trillion-dollar shift in investment toward sustainable economic sectors and infrastructure.	气候中性可以通过政治意志、创新政策、新绿色技术和清洁能源资源，以及数万亿美元的投资方向改变——用于可持续经济部门和基础设施——实现。


In addition, these measures’ success requires cost-effective investment in conservation efforts and expansion of natural capital.	此外，这些措施的成功需要对自然资本的保护和扩大进行高性价比投资。


Only nature-based systems such as wetlands and forests can truly guarantee success – and a clean, prosperous future.	唯有湿地和森林等给予大自然的系统能够真正确保成功——以及清洁繁荣的未来。


Sovereign Environmental Risk	主权环境风险


NAIROBI – Until the global financial crisis erupted four years ago, sovereign bonds had traditionally been viewed as reliable, virtually risk-free investments.	内罗毕—直到四年前金融危机爆发为止，传统上主权债务被视为可靠的、几乎无风险的投资。


Since then, they have looked far less safe.	金融危机以来，它们的安全性大大地下降了。


And many observers within and outside the financial sector have begun to question the models upon which credit-rating agencies, investment firms, and others rely to price the risks tied to such securities.	许多金融部门内外的观察家开始质疑评级机构、投资公司和其他机构赖以为与这类证券相关的风险定价的模型。


At the same time, it is increasingly obvious that any reform of risk models must factor in environmental implications and natural-resource scarcity.	与此同时，一个越来越清楚的问题是任何风险模型的改造都必须将环境影响和自然资源稀缺性嵌入其中。


Indeed, a recent investment report underlined that the fall in prices in the twentieth century for 33 important commodities – including aluminum, palm oil, and wheat – has been entirely offset in the decade since 2002, when commodity prices tripled.	事实上，一份最近的投资报告指出，33种重要商品——包括铝、棕榈油和小麦等——价格在20世纪的下跌被2002年以来十年间的商品价格三倍的上涨所完全补偿了。


It is likely that growing natural-resource scarcities are driving a paradigm shift, with potentially profound implications for economies – and thus for sovereign-debt risk – worldwide.	很可能日渐增加的自然资源稀缺性正在推动范式变迁，对全世界经济、进而是主权债务风险产生巨大潜在影响。


Indeed, many countries are already experiencing an increase in import prices for biological resources.	事实上，许多国家已经开始经历生物资源进口价格的省长。


Financial markets can no longer overlook how ecosystems and the multitrillion-dollar services and products that they provide – ranging from water supplies, carbon storage, and timber to the healthy soils needed for crop production – underpin economic performance.	金融市场已不再忽略生态系统及其所提供的价值数万亿美元的产品和服务——包括水供应、碳储存、木材、以及种植庄稼所需要的健康土壤——对经济表现的支持作用。


In addition, we are living in a world in which over-exploitation of natural resources, unsustainable consumption, and the condition of many ecosystems have become incompatible with accelerating demographic growth, as the human population increases from seven billion today to well over nine billion by 2050.	此外，我们居住在一个对自然资源的掠夺和不可持续的消费日益加剧的世界中，随着人类数量将从今天的70亿人增加到2050年的90亿，许多生态系统的条件已不再与人口增长形势兼容。


Studies such as the The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), conducted on behalf of the G-8, have improved our understanding of the economic, ecological, and social value of the goods and services provided by ecosystems, and have proposed better methods for pricing them.	G8国家所做的《前年生态系统评估》和《生态系统和生物多样性经济学》（TEEB）等研究增进了我们对生态系统所提供的商品和服务的经济、生态和社会价值的理解，也提供了更好的为它们定价的方法。


Yet this new thinking has yet to influence significantly the behavior of bond investors and rating agencies.	但这一新思想尚未对债券投资者和评级机构的行为产生重大影响。


Some might assume that bond markets are shielded from the effects of climate change, ecosystem degradation, and water scarcity.	一些人也许会认为��券市场与气候变化、生态系统恶化和水稀缺等的影响绝缘。


With more than $40 trillion of sovereign debt in global markets at any given time, that is a very high-risk game.	在任何时刻，全球市场的主权债务规模都超过40万亿美元，因此这是一次高风险赌注。


In order to address the gap between reality and perception, the United Nations Environment Program Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) and the Global Footprint Network (GFN), together with a number of institutional investors, investment managers, and information providers, have launched E-RISC, or Environmental Risk in Sovereign Credit analysis.	为了填补现实和认识之间的差距，联合国环境项目融资计划（UNEPFI）和全球足迹网（GFN）以及众多机构投资者、投资管理人和信息提供者一道推出了E-RISC，即主权信用中的环境风险分析。


The project will take center stage at a gathering of investors in London on November 19, providing an early glimpse of how environmental criteria can be factored into sovereign-risk models and hence into the credit ratings assigned to sovereign bonds.	这项计划将是11月19日伦敦投资者会议的中心议题，对环境标准如何成为主权风险模型的因子，进而成为主权债务信用评级因子进行初步探索。


E-RISC highlights the situation in several countries – including Brazil, France, India, Turkey, and Japan – demonstrating how importers and exporters of natural resources such as timber, fish, and crops are being exposed to the increasing volatility that accompanies rising global resource scarcity.	E-RISC强调了一些国家（包括巴西、法国、印度、土耳其和日本）的情况，展示木材、鱼类和庄家等自然资源的进出口因全球资源稀缺性日渐增加而日渐波动。


Indeed, the E-RISC report estimates that a 10% variation in commodity prices can lead to changes in a country’s trade balance amounting to more than 0.5% of GDP.	事实上，E-RISC报告估计，10%的商品价格变化可以导致相当于一国0. 5% GDP以上的贸易余额变化。


Meanwhile, the economic consequences of environmental degradation can be severe.	与此同时，环境恶化的经济后果可能极为严重。


The report estimates that a 10% reduction in the productive capacity of soils and freshwater areas alone could lead to a reduction in the trade balance equivalent to more than 4% of GDP.	报告估计，土壤和清洁水域生产能力下降10%就能让一国贸易余额下降GDP的4%以上。


Clearly, environmental risks are potentially large enough to affect countries’ economies in ways that could influence their willingness or ability to repay sovereign debt.	显然，环境风险足以通过影响一国偿还主权债务的意愿和能力影响该国的经济。


In addition, these risks vary widely across countries, including countries whose current credit ratings suggest similar levels of sovereign risk.	这类风险视国家的不同而大相径庭，包括哪些当前信用评级表明主权风险相似的国家。


This suggests that the findings and methodologies applied in the E-RISC project bring added value to traditional sovereign-risk analysis, by providing insights into relevant but currently unaccounted-for parameters.	这表明，E-RISC报告的发现和所使用的方法对传统主权风险分析带来了附加值，因为它们提供了对相关但目前未加解释的参数的洞察。


Credit-rating agencies, institutional investors, and asset managers are encouraged to see how such factors can be incorporated into their own risk models.	评级机构、机构投资者和资产管理者被鼓励研究如何将这些因子嵌入其自身的风险模型中。


The time has come for a better understanding of the connection between environmental and natural-resource risk and sovereign credit risk.	是时候更好地理解环境和自然资源风险与主权信用风险之间的联系了。


Only then will investors, rating agencies, and governments be able to plan over the medium to long term with the knowledge needed to ensure long-term economic growth and stability.	惟其如此，投资者、评级机构和政府才能在以确保长期经济增长和稳定所必须的知识进行中期和长期规划了。


Navigating Lebanon’s Political Minefield	黎巴嫩政治雷区导航


On the face of it, the donor conference of Western and oil-rich Arab nations in Paris this week merely continues the work of two previous multilateral conferences in 2001 and 2002, aimed at helping Lebanon to rebuild its infrastructure after years of civil war and Israeli occupation and to tackle its massive debt.	从表面上看，由西方和盛产石油的阿拉伯国家在巴黎召开的捐助国会议仅仅是2001年和2002年前两次多边会议的继续。 其目的是帮助黎巴嫩在多年内战和以色列占领之后重建基础设施并解决庞大的债务问题。


This time, donors will additionally help offset the $3.5 billion in direct and indirect losses caused by last summer’s war between Israel and Hezbollah, and the further rise of debt to $40.6 billion, a staggering 180% of Lebanon’s GDP.	这一次，捐助国将会帮助黎巴嫩额外勾销由去年夏天以色列和真主党之间的战争所造成的350亿美金的直接或间接损失，以及将新增加的、竟相当于该国GDP180%的406亿美金债务。


The agenda appears straightforward, but “Paris III” has acquired a barely concealed political purpose: to bolster the government of Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora in the face of a powerful domestic challenge led by Hezbollah, and by extension to curb the influence of Hezbollah’s regional backers, Syria and Iran.	会议议程看上去直截了当，但“第三次巴黎会议”其实还有一个难以掩盖的政治目的：支持面临国内真主党强力挑战的黎巴嫩首相Fouad Siniora的政府，并遏制真主党的地区支持者叙利亚和伊朗的影响力。


The West should tread carefully.	西方应该步步谨慎。


There is a real risk that it will become entangled as a partisan actor in Lebanese domestic politics.	因为它面临着在黎巴嫩国内政治中扮演一个派系角色的真正风险。


Nor should it seek to play into the regional agendas of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan – hardly paragons of democracy – which are anxious to confront what they portray as a menacing “arc” of Shi’a Muslim power extending from Iran to Lebanon via Syria, and in Iraq.	它同样也不应该企图介入沙特阿拉伯、埃及和约旦的地区议程—这些国家无论如何也不是民主的典范—它们都急于应付被描画成一条邪恶“弧线”的，从伊朗经叙利亚以及从伊拉克延伸到黎巴嫩的什叶派穆斯林影响力。


Consider this.	考虑一下这一点。


The United States and France, which have taken the West’s lead on Lebanon, have both confirmed the “democratic and constitutional nature” of the Siniora government.	在黎巴嫩事务方面引领西方的美国和法国都确认了Siniora政府的“民主和宪法本质”。


This is true, but only up to a point, for Lebanon’s confessional-based political system assigns the Shi’a, who make up close to 40% of the population, only 21% of parliamentary seats.	确实如此，但这种确认只是在一定程度之上。 因为黎巴嫩基于告解的政治体系只给了占总人口40%的什叶派21%的议会席位。


The Sunnis, who comprise at most 20% of the population, are given the state office with the greatest executive power, that of prime minister.	而仅占总人口20%的逊尼派穆斯林却被给予了拥有最高的国家行政权力的首相职位。


Furthermore, the Sunni-based, anti-Syrian Future Movement to which Siniora belongs effectively extended this inequity into the present parliament when it overrode the opposition and insisted on conducting the 2005 general elections on the basis of the Electoral Law gerrymandered by Syria in 2000.	另外，Siniora所属的以逊尼派为基础的、反叙利亚“未来运动”有效地将这种不平衡延伸进目前的议会。 它无视反对派的立场，坚持以在叙利亚操控下制定的2000年《选举法》为基础进行2005年大选。


The West should therefore be wary of dismissing the Lebanese opposition out of hand as the cat’s paw of Syria and Iran.	因此，西方应该避免将黎巴嫩反对党斥为叙利亚和伊朗的爪牙而将其激怒。


Rather, it should welcome proposals by Arab League mediators for immediate electoral reform and early parliamentary elections.	它应该欢迎阿拉伯联盟斡旋人的提议，促成选举改革的即刻实施并提前举行国会选举。


At the same time, it should expect the opposition to endorse the establishment of an international tribunal to adjudicate the matter of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, albeit after clarifying and narrowing the current excessively broad United Nations rules governing the investigation.	同时，虽然在澄清了规范了目前联合国在调查问题上管得过宽的情况之后，它还是应该期望反对派接受建立国际仲裁法庭对前首相哈里里被刺一案进行判决。


The West should also recognize that the constituencies of Hezbollah and its allied, largely Christian, Free Patriotic Movement, led by presidential contender Michel Aoun, will be hit hardest by many of Siniora’s proposed economic and administrative reforms, such as lifting fuel subsidies and sharply raising value added tax.	西方还应该承认真主党及其盟友（主要是由参与总统竞争的Michel Aoun所领导的基督教“自由爱国运动”）将会受到Siniora所提出的经济和行政改革计划的最沉重打击。 这些提案包括取消燃料补贴并大幅度提高增值税。


Already the 200,000-member Federation of Labour Unions has joined the opposition bandwagon, and Siniora’s proposals will further fuel grassroots populist nationalism.	拥有20万会员的“工会联盟”已经加入了反对派阵营。 Siniora的提案会进一步激发基层民粹主义者的民族主义情绪。


All this might be seen as a predictable, conservative reaction to urgently needed reforms, were it not for the poor track record of the Sunni economic establishment, which for many years adapted well enough to Syrian domination.	如果不是逊尼派的经济当权派确实纪录不佳，那么上述这一切可能就会被看成是对迫在眉睫的改革的情理之中的保守反应了。 逊尼派多年以来对叙利亚的控制早已是服服帖帖。


Part of Hariri’s legacy was the award of quasi-monopolistic licences to cronies – for mobile telephones, for example – and the sale of government debt at highly profitable rates to local banks in which had a direct interest.	哈里里遗策的一部分就是将半垄断式的许可授予亲信—例如移动电话业务—以及将政府债务以很高的利润率卖给有直接利益关系的地方银行。


So were the profligate borrow-and-spend policies and the use of public-sector hiring to co-opt political factions, both of which resulted in Lebanon’s massive debt problem.	放任无度的“借钱花”政策和使用公用事业领域的租赁来拉拢政治小团体的做法同样导致了黎巴嫩的巨额债务问题。


Yet the real challenge for Western policy in Lebanon is neither constitutional reform nor establishment of the Hariri tribunal.	然而，西方对黎巴嫩政策的真正挑战既不是宪法改革，也不是哈里里案仲裁庭的建立。


The Siniora government and the opposition are likely to reach a compromise within the next few months, probably on the basis of some variant of Arab League proposals.	Siniora政府和反对派之间在未来几个月内很可能会达成一项妥协。 其基础很可能是某些变相的阿拉伯联盟提案。


The tougher challenge is to solve the Gordian knot that binds Hezbollah (and the issue of its disarmament), Syria, and Israel together in a fateful triangle.	更艰巨的挑战是解决将真主党（以及解除武装问题）、叙利亚和以色列之间剪不断，理还乱的三角关系。


In short, the West needs to pre-empt a resumption of hostilities in Lebanon by seeking unconditional talks between Syria and Israel over the Golan Heights.	简言之，西方需要先发制人地促成叙以之间就戈兰高地展开无条件谈判，从而在黎巴嫩重新激起敌对情绪。


Failing that, Paris III will represent a sidestepping of the key political issues that must be addressed, and thus merely stock up trouble for the future.	否则“第三次巴黎会议”将会使必须解决的问题偏离主航道，从而只会给未来制造更多的麻烦。


Needed But Not Wanted	那些有用却不被接纳的人们


NEW YORK – Baruch Spinoza, the seventeenth-century Dutch philosopher, Benjamin Disraeli, the nineteenth-century British prime minister, and Nicolas Sarkozy, the twenty-first century French president, have one thing in common: all were sons of immigrants.	发自纽约——生活在17世纪的荷兰哲学家巴鲁赫·斯宾诺莎，19世纪的英国首相本杰明·迪斯雷利和21世纪的法国总统尼古拉·萨科齐这三人有一个共同点：他们都是移民的后代。


People have migrated to other countries for thousands of years – to escape, prosper, be free, or just to start again.	事实上，人们在国家间的迁徙早已有数千年历史了——有人为了避祸，有人为了发财，有人向往自由，有人则为寻找一个新的开始。


Not a few enriched their adopted homelands by achieving great things, or producing children who did.	这些移民中的许多人（或是他们的子女）都取得了伟大的成就，使那片接纳他们的土地更加繁荣昌盛。


New waves of immigrants are rarely, if ever, popular. But they are often needed.	但在那些接收移民的国家中，大规模的移民虽然不太受欢迎，但却是必需的。


Many people have migrated to Western European countries from North Africa and Turkey during the last half-century, not because of Western generosity, but because they were required for jobs that natives no longer wanted.	在过去50年间有许多北非和土耳其人迁入西欧，这倒不是因为西方人慷慨大方，而是要他们去承担许多当地人不愿再做的工作。


They were treated as temporary workers, however, not as immigrants.	在欧洲人眼里他们只是些临时劳工，还算不上移民。


Once the job was done, it was assumed that the migrants would go home.	欧洲人原本假设工作完成后这些人自当归国。


When it became clear that most had elected to stay, and were joined by extended families, many were grudgingly allowed to become citizens of European states, without necessarily being treated as such.	但显然其中大多数人会选择留下，并设法把自己的家人也弄来，许多人都被（欧洲人）极不情愿地接纳为欧洲国家公民，即便他们从来都没得到过相应的公民待遇。


Xenophobes, as well as leftist multi-cultural ideologues, regarded these new Europeans as utterly different from the native born, albeit for different reasons.	虽然理由各不相同，但排外主义者以及左派多文化意识形态主义者都会将这些新欧洲人视为与当地人完全不同的族群。


Multi-culturalists saw attempts to integrate non-Westerners into the Western mainstream as a form of neo-colonialist racism, while xenophobes just didn’t like anything that looked, talked, or smelled foreign.	对于多文化主义者来说，让非西方人融入西方主流社会的尝试堪称一种新殖民种族主义，而在排外主义者看来，所有外国面孔，语言甚至是感觉都是仇视的对象。


We who live in rapidly aging societies, such as Western Europe or Japan, still need immigrants.	对于生活在西欧和日本这类高速老龄化社会中的我们来说，这些移民是必需的。


Without them, necessary institutions, such as hospitals, would be unstaffed, and more and more elderly people would have to be supported by fewer and fewer young people.	如果没有了他们，类似医院这样的许多必要社会设施都会人手不足，而越来越多的老龄人则必须由越来越少的年轻人来供养着。


And yet many politicians, especially in Europe, now treat immigration as a disaster.	但如今许多地方（尤其是欧洲）的政治家却视移民为洪水猛兽。


New populist parties garner large numbers of votes simply by frightening people about the supposed horrors of Islam, or of clashing civilizations.	那些新民粹主义政党仅凭对伊斯兰恐怖行动或者文明冲突的大肆渲染就能收获大批选票。


For the populists, however, the real enemies – perhaps even more nefarious than the immigrants themselves – are the “cosmopolitan elites” who tolerate and even encourage these horrors.	但对民粹主义者来说，真正的敌人（可能比移民本身更为邪恶）则是那些容忍甚至鼓励这类恐怖行动的“城市精英阶层”。


Mainstream politicians are so afraid of this populist demagoguery that they often end up mimicking it.	而那些主流政治家对民粹主义煽动者是如此忌惮，以致他们往往不得不去附和后者的论调。


The failure of integration of non-Western immigrants in such countries as France, Germany, or The Netherlands is often exaggerated by hysterical alarmists; Europe, after all, is not about to be “Islamized.”	法国，德国或荷兰等国的非欧洲移民融合政策的失败往往被那些神经过敏的恐慌主义者所夸大了——欧洲其实是不会被“伊斯兰化”的。


But the fact that some young people of African, South Asian, or Middle Eastern descent feel so alienated in the European countries of their birth that they are happy to murder their fellow citizens in the name of a revolutionary religious ideology, means that something is amiss.	但那些有着非洲，南亚或者中东血统的青少年为何会在他们降生的欧洲国家中感觉如此孤立，以致会乐于以一种革命宗教意识形态的名义对其他公民举起屠刀，这说明有些事情确实出了问题。


Children of immigrants in the past, however unwelcome they were made to feel, rarely wished to blow up the places to which their parents had chosen to move.	从前那些移民子女虽然也知道自己不受欢迎，但绝不会动起将这个自己父母选择移居的地方炸个稀巴烂的念头。


Politics in many Muslim countries is partly to blame.	许多穆斯林国家的政客必须为此承担一部分责任。


Islamist extremism is a handy revolutionary creed for vulnerable young people to latch onto, to gain a sense of power and belonging.	对于那些敏感脆弱的青少年来说，伊斯兰极端主义是一种触手可及的革命理论，不需要费力去理解，还能从中得到力量或归属感。


Hindus, Christians, or Buddhists lack such a cause, which is why political terrorism is largely confined to Muslims.	而印度教，基督教和佛教则缺乏这类动因，这也是政治恐怖主义大都与穆斯林有关的原因。


But, as the occasional riots in French immigrant areas show, violence is not confined to Muslims. National policies have something to do with this, but so do the deeply flawed immigration policies in all European Union countries.	但在法国移民社区所发生的暴乱也表明，暴力其实并不仅仅归因于穆斯林，而是与国家政策有关，尤其所有欧盟国家所实施的谬误甚巨的移民政策。


Apart from EU citizens, who in theory are allowed to seek work anywhere in the Union (Romanian gypsies in France might argue otherwise), three other categories of people have been allowed to settle in Europe: former colonial subjects, such as Algerians in France, Indians and Pakistanis in Britain, or Surinamese in The Netherlands; “guest laborers” who arrived in the 1960’s and 1970’s; and political refugees, the so-called asylum-seekers.	相对于那些理论上允许在欧盟内部任何地方找工作的欧盟公民来说（法国的罗马尼亚裔吉卜赛人可能会对此多有抱怨），还有其他三类人被允许在欧盟安顿下来：前殖民地人民，比如法国的阿尔及利亚人，英国的印度和巴基斯坦人或是荷兰的苏里南人； 那些在1960~1970年代来到欧洲“临时劳工”；


Unlike in Canada or the United States, economic immigrants are not allowed to become citizens in exchange for their necessary labor.	还有政治难民，就是那些寻求政治庇护的人。 不像加拿大或者美国，那些海外劳动者不会因为其所提供的必要劳动力而获得公民身份。


Immigrants – not “guest workers” – who come for work are more likely to want to integrate to some degree, and to be treated as fellow citizens, than people who come with the baggage of empire, or simply as refugees, or, worse, people pretending to be refugees because they have no other way to gain access to wealthy countries’ job markets.	而相对于那些偷渡入境或是以难民身份（甚至是冒充难民以获得富裕国家工作机会）找工作的人来说，真正的移民（而不是“临时劳工”）其实更想融入社会并希望获得与其他公民同等的待遇。


But European welfare states are better equipped to deal with asylum-seekers and other newcomers as needy dependents than as people in need of a job.	但欧洲福利国家似乎更倾向于把政治避难者或者其他新来者视为身无分文的累赘，而不是一个需要工作的人。


When European politicians claim that France, Britain, or The Netherlands are not traditional “immigrant countries” like the US, they are right only up to a point, as the examples of Spinoza, Disraeli, and Sarkozy show.	当欧洲政治家们宣称法国，英国或者荷兰并非美国那样的“传统移民国家”时，他们只说对了其中一部分，因为斯宾诺莎，迪斯雷利和萨科齐的存在已经说明了很多问题。


What is true is that large numbers of de facto immigrants have accumulated in many countries in a very short time, in a haphazard way that makes it seem as though no government was ever in control.	实际上大量的实质性移民都在一个很短的时期内聚集到了许多国家，而他们到来的方式是如此随意而杂乱，仿佛从来就没有任何政府尝试控制过似的。


Children of guest workers feel unwanted.	那些临时劳工的子女感觉自己是个不受欢迎的人。


Refugees languish helplessly in welfare nets, or are suspected of being cheats.	难民们则在社会福利网的庇护下逐渐消磨了意志，或���背负诈骗福利的骂名。


And former colonial subjects, though in many cases remarkably well integrated, still bear the scars of troubled imperial histories.	而那些前殖民地人民虽然在许多情况下都成功融合进了社会，但却依然摆脱不了过去那段沉痛殖民历史的伤痕。


Japan, and even the US, is not immune to these problems, either. The Japanese government simply got rid of its Iranian guest workers when jobs dried up.	而在这方面日本甚至是美国也无法独善其身。


But it won’t be as easy to deal with the hundreds of thousands of Chinese who live in Japan without the rights of citizenship. The same is true of Mexicans working in the US, often illegally.	日本政府可以在就业枯竭时直接将伊朗劳工遣送回国，但却难以处理数十万在日本打黑工的中国人，而同样的情况也发生在美国的墨西哥人身上，其中许多人都没有正式身份。


Millions of people around the world remain in limbo – often needed, or pitied, but nonetheless unwanted.	目前全世界有数百万人都处于这种尴尬的状态——那些国家需要他们，怜悯他们，但却不欢迎他们。


There is no quick or easy way out of this problem, especially in bad economic times.	而针对这一问题至今还没有任何简单迅速的解决方案，尤其是在年景不好的时候。


But Europe – and Japan, for that matter – should start by making economic migration legitimate.	但欧洲——以及日本——应该从经济移民合法化着手。


This means working out what jobs need to be filled, and welcoming those who will fill them, not as guests, but as equal citizens.	这意味着判定究竟哪些工作岗位需要填补，并欢迎的接纳那些因此而来的人，不是将他们视为外人，而是平等的公民。


Need Versus Greed	需求与贪婪之争


NEW YORK – India’s great moral leader Mohandas Gandhi famously said that there is enough on Earth for everybody’s need, but not enough for everybody’s greed.	发自纽约——印度精神领袖甘地曾说过一句名言：“地球上的一切足以满足每个人的需要，却不足以填满每个人的欲望。


Today, Gandhi’s insight is being put to the test as never before.	”时至今日，甘地这番见解的正确性正经受着前所未有的考验。


The world is hitting global limits in its use of resources.	全球资源的利用状况已近极限。


We are feeling the shocks each day in catastrophic floods, droughts, and storms – and in the resulting surge in prices in the marketplace.	同时我们每天都遭受着特大洪水，干旱和风暴的冲击——以及因此引发的市场价格飙升。


Our fate now depends on whether we cooperate or fall victim to self-defeating greed.	如今人类的命运将取决于我们的选择：究竟是携手合作共同抗灾，还是在弄巧反拙的贪婪中一起灭亡。


The limits to the global economy are new, resulting from the unprecedented size of the world’s population and the unprecedented spread of economic growth to nearly the entire world.	全球经济的极限则是最近出现的，其源头是空前膨胀的世界人口，以及前所未见的，几乎遍布全世界的经济增长。


There are now seven billion people on the planet, compared to just three billion a half-century ago.	这个星球上目前已经生存着70亿人，而半个世纪之前还只有30 亿人。


Today, average per capita income is $10,000, with the rich world averaging around $40,000 and the developing world around $4,000.	如今全球人均收入为1万美元，其中发达国家人均4万美元，发展中国家则为4000美元左右。


That means that the world economy is now producing around $70 trillion in total annual output, compared to around $10 trillion in 1960.	这意味着全球经济的年总产值已达70万亿美元，是1960年的7倍。


China’s economy is growing at around 10% annually. India’s is growing at nearly the same rate.	中国目前正以年均10%的速度增长，印度的速度也差不多。


Africa, long the world’s slowest-growing region, is now averaging roughly 5% annual GDP growth.	连非洲这个增长长期全球垫底的区域如今也实现了大约5%的年均增长。


Overall, the developing countries are growing at around 7% per year, and the developed economies at around 2%, yielding a global average of around 4.5%.	总体算来，发展中国家的增长率达到了每年7%，发达经济体也有2%的年增长率，核算起来全球年增长约有4. 5%。


This is very good news in many ways.	这在许多方面都是个非常好的消息。


Rapid economic growth in developing countries is helping to alleviate poverty.	发展中国家经济的迅速增长缓解了贫困状况。


In China, for example, extreme poverty has been cut from well over half of the population 30 years ago to around 10% or less today.	比如说中国的赤贫人口在30年前几乎占了总人口的一半，如今只有不到10%了。


Yet there is another side to the global growth story that we must understand clearly.	但我们也必须清楚地看到这场全球增长神话的另一面。


With the world economy growing at 4-5% per year, it will be on a path to double in size in less than 20 years.	在全球经济每年4~5%的增长之下，不出20年整个规模就会翻一番。


Today’s $70 trillion world economy will be at $140 trillion before 2030, and $280 trillion before 2050 if we extrapolate from today’s growth rate.	如今的70万亿美元将在2030年前变成140万亿美元，如果继续维持这样的增长率，到2050年前将达到280万亿美元。


Our planet will not physically support this exponential economic growth if we let greed take the upper hand.	如果我们让贪婪占了上风的话，这个地球将无法承受这样的指数式经济增长。


Even today, the weight of the world economy is already crushing nature, rapidly depleting the supplies of fossil-fuel energy resources that nature created over millions of years, while the resulting climate change has led to massive instabilities in terms of rainfall, temperature, and extreme storms.	即便是今天的世界经济规模也开始与大自然产生摩擦，大自然花费数百万年创造的化石燃料资源正被人类迅速消耗着，随之产生的气候变化又导致了大规模的降雨，温度和极端风暴等不稳定状况。


We see these pressures every day in the marketplace.	我们每天都能在市场上看到类似的压力。


Oil prices have surged to more than $100 per barrel, as China, India, and other oil-importing countries join the United States in a massive scramble to buy up supplies, especially from the Middle East.	随着中国和印度等石油进口国加入美国的石油大买家行列（尤其是中东石油），原油价格已经飙升到100美元一桶。


Food prices, too, are at historical highs, contributing to poverty and political unrest.	食品价格也攀升到历史高位，引发贫困和政治动荡。


On the one hand, there are more mouths to feed, and with greater purchasing power on average.	一方面，需要食品养活的人口越来越多，而且他们的平均购买力也不断增加。


On the other hand, heat waves, droughts, floods, and other disasters induced by climate change are destroying crops and reducing the supplies of grains on world markets.	另一方面，由气候变化导致的酷热、干旱，洪水及其他自然灾害都在破坏农作物并减少全球粮食供应量。


In recent months, massive droughts have struck the grain-producing regions of Russia and Ukraine, and enormous floods have hit Brazil and Australia; now, another drought is menacing northern China’s grain belt.	最近几个月大规模干旱袭击了俄罗斯和乌克兰的产粮区，巴西和澳大利亚也遭遇了大洪水，与此同时，另一场干旱又开始在中国北部的产粮地带肆虐。


There is something else hidden from view that is very dangerous.	还有某些非常危险的事物尚未露出端倪。


In many populous parts of the world, including the grain-growing regions of northern India, northern China, and the American Midwest, farmers are tapping into groundwater to irrigate their crops. The great aquifers that supply water for irrigation are being depleted.	在世界上许多人口稠密地区，包括印度北部，中国北部和美国中西部的产粮区，农民都开始抽取地下水来进行灌溉，而提供这些灌溉水的地下蓄水层也开始干涸。


In some places in India, the water table has been falling by several meters annually in recent years.	在印度的某些地区，地下水水位正在以每年几米的速度下降。


Some deep wells are approaching the point of exhaustion, with salinity set to rise as ocean water infiltrates the aquifer.	许多深井都几近枯竭，海水开始倒灌进这些蓄水层，导致水中盐度不断上升。


A calamity is inevitable unless we change. And here is where Gandhi comes in.	如果我们不能立刻做出改变的话，一场大灾就将无法避免，而这也正是甘地的睿智之处。


If our societies are run according to the greed principle, with the rich doing everything to get richer, the growing resource crisis will lead to a widening divide between the rich and the poor – and quite possibly to an increasingly violent struggle for survival.	如果我们的社会继续以这样的贪婪法则运作下去的话——富人想尽办法去使自己更富——不断加剧的资源危机将导致更大的贫富差距——也更可能导致更多为求生存而爆发的暴力行为。


The rich will try to use their power to commandeer more land, more water, and more energy for themselves, and many will support violent means to do so, if necessary.	富人将利用手中的权力抢占更多土地，水资源和能源，而且许多人支持在有必要的情况下使用暴力手段。


The US has already followed a strategy of militarization in the Middle East in the naïve hope that such an approach can ensure secure energy supplies.	美国已经采取了一个在中东地区穷兵黩武的幼稚政策，妄图用这样的手段来确保自身的能源供应。


Now competition for those supplies is intensifying, as China, India, and others bid for the same (depleting) resources.	而随着中国，印度以及其他国家加入对（枯竭中的）能源的争夺，如今的竞争态势也不断恶化。


An analogous power grab is being attempted in Africa.	类似的争夺也正在非洲上演。


The rise in food prices is leading to a land grab, as powerful politicians sell foreign investors massive tracts of farmland, brushing aside the traditional land rights of poor smallholders.	食品价格的上涨导致圈地现象不断增加，掌权的政客将大片农场土地倒卖给外国投资者，肆意践踏那些穷苦农民的传统土地所有权。


Foreign investors hope to use large mechanized farms to produce output for export, leaving little or nothing for the local populations.	外国投资者只希望用高度机械化的农场去生产粮食并出口，根本不在意当地民众的福祉。


Everywhere in the leading countries – the US, the United Kingdom, China, India, and elsewhere – the rich have enjoyed soaring incomes and growing political power.	在那些繁荣国家（美国、英国、中国，印度等地）的各个地方，富人都在享受着不断增加的收入和政治权力。


The US economy has been taken over by billionaires, the oil industry, and other key sectors.	美国经济已经由亿万富翁，石油企业和其他关键部门接管。


The same trends threaten the emerging economies, where wealth and corruption are on the rise.	同样的趋势也在威胁着那些新兴经济体，在这些国家财富与腐败堪称比翼齐飞。


If greed dominates, the engine of economic growth will deplete our resources, push the poor aside, and drive us into a deep social, political, and economic crisis.	如果坐视贪婪统治了一切的话，经济增长的驱动力就将挖空我们的资源，将穷人抛在一边，并把我们拖进一场深重的社会，政治和经济危机中。


The alternative is a path of political and social cooperation, both within countries and internationally.	而另一条道路则是走上国内和国际间的政治与社会合作道路。


There will be enough resources and prosperity to go around if we convert our economies to renewable energy sources, sustainable agricultural practices, and reasonable taxation of the rich.	如果我们能将经济向可再生能源，可持续农业以及向富人征收合理税项转化的话，那就能有足够的能源和财富可供分配。


This is the path to shared prosperity through improved technologies, political fairness, and ethical awareness.	而这就是一条通过提高科学技术，政治公平和道德意识来共享繁荣的道路。


The False Promise of Negative Interest Rates	负利率的假前途


LONDON – As a biographer and aficionado of John Maynard Keynes, I am sometimes asked: “What would Keynes think about negative interest rates?”	伦敦—作为约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯的传记作者和发烧友，时常有人问我：“凯恩斯对负利率会如何看待？ ”


It’s a good question, one that recalls a passage in Keynes’s General Theory in which he notes that if the government can’t think of anything more sensible to do to cure unemployment (say, building houses), burying bottles filled with bank notes and digging them up again would be better than nothing.	好问题。 这个问题让我想起凯恩斯的《通论》中有一段指出，如果政府找不到更好的解决失业的办法（比如造房子），那么埋掉装满钞票的瓶子，再把它们挖出来总比什么都不做强。


He probably would have said the same about negative interest rates: a desperate measure by governments that can think of nothing else to do.	也许对于负利率他也会这么说：这是政府在走投无路的情况下的绝望之选。


Negative interest rates are simply the latest fruitless effort since the 2008 global financial crisis to revive economies by monetary measures.	负利率无非是2008年全球金融危机以来为了重振经济而采取的最新的无果货币措施。


When cutting interest rates to historically low levels failed to revive growth, central banks took to so-called quantitative easing: injecting liquidity into economies by buying long-term government and other bonds.	央行将利率降低到历史最低水平，但仍无法重振经济，因此采取了所谓的量化宽松：通过购买长期政府和其他债券为经济注入流动性。


It did some good, but mostly the sellers sat on the cash instead of spending or investing it.	这起了一些作用，但在大部分情况下，出售债券者都把现金囤积起来而没有支出或投资。


Enter negative interest-rate policy.	接着，负利率来临。


The central banks of Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Japan, and the eurozone have all indulged.	丹麦、瑞典、瑞士、日本和欧元区都已经“沦陷”。


The US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England are being tempted.	美联储和英格兰银行也在蠢蠢欲动。


“Negative interest rate” is a phrase seemingly designed to confuse all but the experts.	“负利率”一词似乎专门是为了让专家以外的人混淆的。


Instead of paying interest on commercial banks’ “excess” reserves held by the central bank, the central bank taxes these deposits.	央行不对其所持有的商业银行“超额”准备金支付利息，而是对这些存款课税。


The idea is to impel the banks to reduce their unspent balances and increase their lending or investments.	其思想是迫使银行降低其未使用余额，增加其贷款或投资。


In the case of the European Central Bank, there is a technical reason: to increase the supply of high-class bonds for President Mario Draghi’s ongoing program of quantitative easing.	在欧洲银行的例子中，还有一个技术性理由：为了给其行长德拉吉进行中的量化宽松计划增加高等级债券供应。


The policy is supposed to work by aligning the market rate of interest with the expected rate of profit, an idea derived from the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell.	这项政策应该通过使市场利率与预期利润率保持一致起作用，其思想根源来自瑞典经济学家维克赛尔（Knut Wicksell）。


The problem is that whereas until now it had been believed that nominal interest rates cannot fall below zero, an investor’s expected rate of return on a new investment may easily fall to zero or lower when aggregate demand is depressed.	问题是，尽管到目前为止人们一直认为名义利率不能下降到零以下，但一项新投资的预期回报率很可能下降到零或更低水平，如果总需求萎靡不振的话。


Negative interest rates are the latest attempt to overcome the mismatch of incentives for lenders and borrowers.	负利率是克服贷款人和借款人激励不匹配的最新尝试。


Making it more costly for commercial banks to park their money with the central bank should lower the cost of commercial loans.	增加商业银行把钱存在央行的成本理应降低商业贷款的成本。


The calculation is that it will make more sense for a commercial bank to put money into circulation, whether by making loans or buying government and other securities, than to pay the central bank for holding that money.	其中的算盘是，商业银行将钱用于流通比付钱给央行持有这笔钱更加有利可图，不管是通过发放贷款还是通过购买政府和其他证券。


But, as the World Bank has pointed out, negative rates can have undesirable effects.	但是，世界银行指出，负利率可能带来不利后果。


They can erode bank profitability by narrowing interest-rate margins.	负利率可能降低存贷利差，侵蚀银行的盈利空间。


They can also encourage banks to take excessive risks, leading to asset bubbles.	它们还可能鼓励银行过度冒险，导致资产泡沫。


Lower interest rates on deposits may cause large sections of the economy to become cash-based, while pension and insurance companies may struggle to meet long-term liabilities at a fixed nominal rate.	存款利率下降可能导致经济中的诸多部门变为基于现金，而退休基金和保险公司将难以以固定名义利率兑现长期负债。


But, quite apart from these problems, the real case against negative interest rates is the folly of relying on monetary policy alone to rescue economies from depressed conditions.	但是，与这些问题相去甚远的是，真正反对负利率的理由只依靠货币政策将经济救出萧条的做法愚不可及。


Keynes put it in a nutshell: “If we are tempted to assert that money is the drink which stimulates the system into activity, we must remind ourselves that there may be several slips between the cup and the drink.”	凯恩斯言简意赅地指出：“如果我们先要主张货币是刺激系统活动起来的饮品，那么我们就必须提醒自己，在杯子和饮品之间可能存在几档台阶。


His list of “slips” is well worth recalling:	”他的“台阶”名单值得回顾：


“For whilst an increase in the quantity of money may be expected...to reduce the rate of interest, this will not happen if the liquidity-preferences of the public are increasing more than the quantity of money; and whilst a decline in the rate of interest may be expected...to increase the volume of investment, this will not happen if [profit expectations] are falling faster than the rate of interest; and whilst an increase in the volume of investment may be expected...to increase employment, this may not happen if the propensity to consume is falling off.”	“尽管人们可能期待货币数量的增加……会降低利率，但如果公众的流动性偏好增加快于货币数量，利率就不会降低； 尽管人们可能期待利率降低……会增加投资量，但如果[利润预期]下降比利率更快，投资量就不会增加；


Quite so.	正是如此。


Economists are now busy devising new feats of monetary wizardry for when the latest policy fails: taxing cash holdings, or even abolishing cash altogether; or, at the other extreme, showering the population with “helicopter drops” of freshly printed money.	如今，经济学家热衷于炮制新货币巫术来接替最新的失败政策：现金持有税，或干脆取消现金； 或者，在另一个极端，用“直升机撒钱”把新印出来的钞票分配给群众。


The truth, however, is that the only way to ensure that “new money” is put into circulation is to have the government spend it.	但是，真相是唯一确保“新钱”进入流通的办法是让政府来花钱。


The government would borrow the money directly from the central bank and use it to build houses, renew transport systems, invest in energy-saving technologies, and so forth.	政府将直接从央行借入这笔钱，用于造房子、更新交通系统、投资能源节约型技术，等等。


Sadly, any such monetary financing of public deficits is for the moment taboo.	悲哀的是，目前任何这类公共债务的货币融资都属于禁忌。


It is contrary to European Union regulations – and is opposed by all who regard post-crash governments’ fiscal difficulties as an opportunity to shrink the role of the state.	这与欧盟监管规则相悖——也被所有将危机后政府财政困境视为缩小国家作用的机会的人所反对。


But if it is at all true that we are entering a period of “secular stagnation” and growing joblessness, as Larry Summers and others have argued, a larger investment role for the state is inescapable.	但如果如拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）和其他人所指出的，我们确确实实正在进入一个“长期停滞”和失业增长期，那么增加国家的投资角色就是难以避免的。


Events following the crash of 2008 clearly show that monetary policy on its own cannot achieve a level of economic activity close to its potential.	2008年危机之后的一系列事件清楚地表明，光靠货币政策无法实现接近潜力的经济活动水平。


The state must be involved.	国家必须参与进来。


Whether the capital spending appears on the books of the central government or on the balance sheet of an independent investment bank (as I would prefer) is secondary.	资本支出出现在中央银行账上还是出现在独立央行资产负债表上是次要问题（我倾向于后者）。


Negative interest rates are simply a distraction from a deeper analysis of what went wrong – and what continues to go wrong.	负利率只能起到转移注意力的作用，让人们不再更深刻地分析是什么出了问题——以及是什么仍然在出问题。


The Politics of Negative Interest Rates	负利率的政治学


ATHENS – Objects of desire come at a cost.	雅典—欲望目标都是有成本的。


Only bad things, like toxic waste, have a negative price, the equivalent of a fee payable to anyone willing to make them disappear.	只有坏东西，比如有毒废弃物，价格为负，等于为愿意让他消失的人所支付的费用。


Does this mean that negative interest rates embody a new perspective on money – that it has gone “bad”?	这意味着负利率隐含着一个新的看待货币的角度——它已经“坏了”吗？


In market economies, money is the measure of the value of goods and services.	在市场经济中，货币是衡量商品和服务价值的指标。


And the interest rate is the price of that metric – of money itself.	而利率则是这一指标——即货币本身的价格。


When the price is zero, it makes no difference whether money is kept under a mattress or lent, because there is no cost to holding or borrowing cash.	当价格为零时，把钱藏在床底下和拿来放贷没什么区别，因为持有或借贷现金没有成本。


But how can the price of money – which, after all, makes the world go round, or, as Karl Marx put it, “transforms all my incapacities into their contrary” – be zero?	但货币价格怎么会是零呢？ 毕竟，世界的运转要靠钱，卡尔·马克思也说，钱“把我的一切无能变成了能力。


And how can it possibly ever become negative, as it now is in much of the global economy, with the world’s moneyed people “bribing” governments to borrow from them more than $5.5 trillion?	”它又怎么可能变负呢？ 目前，全球经济中许多货币的利率为负，全世界有钱人“贿赂”政府向自己借走5.


The answer can only be of a type that economists loathe: philosophical, political, and thus irreducible to neat positivist explanation.	答案只能在经济学家所憎恨的角度寻找：哲学的、政治的、因此不能归纳为简洁的实证解释的角度。


In other words, the answer must concern the essence of money.	换句话说，答案必须考虑货币的本质。


In a farmers’ market, sellers with many unsold potatoes start dropping the price until a level is reached (possibly very low, but still positive) at which all of the potatoes are bought.	在农民市场中，有大量土豆没卖出去的卖家开始降价，直到价格达到所有土豆都被买走的程度（可能非常低，但仍为正）。


In contrast, since the 2008 global financial crisis, every time the price of money has been reduced, demand for it falls and excess savings rise.	相反，自2008年全球金融危机以来，每一次货币价格降低后，货币需求都会下降，而储蓄过剩更加严重。


Clearly, money is not like potatoes or any other well-defined “thing.”	显然，货币不是土豆或其他任何定义明确的“东西”。


To understand how money can be our societies’ supreme good while fetching a negative price, it helps to start with the realization that, unlike potatoes, money has no intrinsic private value.	要理解为何货币可以在成为社会至高商品的同时具备负价格，一个有益的起点是认识到和土豆不同，货币没有内在私人价值。


Its utility comes from what its holder can make others do.	它的效用来自持有人可以让别人做什么。


Money, to recall Lenin’s definition of politics, is about “who does what to whom.”	货币，用列宁的政治学定义讲，有关“谁对谁做什么。 ”


Imagine you are an entrepreneur with money in the bank, or have a bank eager to lend large sums to invest in your business.	设想你是一位企业家，在银行里存着钱，或有一家银行急切地想发出巨额贷款投资你的企业。


You spend sleepless nights wondering whether you should invest in a new product – that is, whether you should exploit your access to money to cause an array of others to work on your behalf.	你辗转反侧地思考是否应该投资于新产品——亦即是否应该利用获得资金的便利让各种其他人为你工作。


In our current Great Deflation, what worries you most is your customers’ future purchasing power and sentiment.	在当前的大紧缩中，你最担心的是你的客户的未来购买力和情绪。


Will they be able and willing to buy your new product at high enough prices and quantities?	他们能不能、愿不愿意以足够高的价格和数量购买你的新产品？


Suppose that, sleep-deprived, you then switch on the radio or TV only to hear that US Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen and European Central Bank President Mario Draghi are considering reducing interest rates further.	假设失眠的你打开收音机或电视，听说美联储主席耶伦和欧洲央行行长德拉吉正在考虑进一步削减利率。


Will you rejoice at the prospect that your financing costs will fall?	你会因为你的融资成本将有所下降而欢呼雀跃吗？


Will you be motivated to invest your own money now that it earns lower (perhaps even negative) interest?	你会受此激励把利息���少（甚至为负）的自己的钱拿来投资吗？


No and no.	不会、不会。


Your reaction is most likely to be one of alarm: “Oh, my God!	你最有可能的反应是心里一紧：“天哪！


If Janet and Mario are considering another interest-rate cut, they must have good reason to believe that demand will remain low!”	耶伦和德拉吉正在考虑新一轮降息，想必他们有足够的理由认为需求将保持萎靡！


So you abandon your investment plan.	”于是你放弃了投资计划。


“Better to borrow money at almost no cost,” you think, “and buy back a few more of my company’s shares, boost their price, earn more on the stock exchange, and bank the profits for the rainy days that are coming.”	“最好可以几乎没有成本地借钱，”你想，“回购更多的公司股票，提振它的股价，在股票上挣更多钱，把钱存在银行以备不测。 ”


And so it is that the price of money falls, even as the supply of it burgeons.	于是，货币价格下跌，尽管货币供给大增。


Central bankers who never predicted the Great Deflation are now busily trying to find a way out with economic and econometric models that could never explain it, let alone point to solutions.	从未预测到大紧缩的中央银行行长们现在正忙于从经济和经济计量模型中寻找办法，但这些模型都解释不了这一现象，遑论提出解决方案。


Unwilling to question the political dogma that central banks must be apolitical, they refuse to think of money as more than a “thing.”	他们不愿质疑央行必须非政治化的政治学教条，拒绝将货币视为超越“东西”的事物。


And so they continue the search for a technocratic fix to a problem crying out for a philosophically astute political solution.	于是，他们继续为这个需要用精巧的政治哲学方法解决的问题寻找技术官僚解决方案。


It’s a futile quest.	这样的努力是徒劳的。


Once the price of money (interest rates) hit zero, central banks tried buying mountains of public and private debt from commercial banks to give them an incentive to lend freely.	一旦货币价格（利率）达到零，央行就试图向商业银行购买巨量公共和私人债务，为它们提供自由放贷的激励。


The ECB went so far as to pay banks to lend to business while, at the same time, punishing them for not lending (via negative interest rates for excess reserves).	欧洲央行甚至付钱给银行让它们放贷，并惩罚不放贷的银行（通过超额准备金负利率）。


But bankers and businesses, viewing these measures as desperate responses to self-fulfilling deflationary expectations, went on an investment strike, while using the central-bank money to inflate the prices of their own assets (stocks, art, real estate, and so forth).	但银行家和企业将这些措施视为面对自我实现的通缩预期的绝望之举，它们拒绝投资，而是用央行的钱抬高自身资产（股票、艺术品、不动产等）的价格。


This did nothing to defeat the Great Deflation; it only made the rich richer, an outcome that somehow reinforced central bankers’ belief in central bank independence.	这对于解决大紧缩毫无帮助； 而只能让富者愈富，这一结果在某种程度上加强了央行行长对央行独立性的信念。


Not all central bankers, thankfully, are incapable of responding creatively to the Great Deflation.	谢天谢地，不是所有的央行行长都对大紧缩一筹莫展。


Andy Haldane, Chief Economist at the Bank of England, has courageously suggested that all money should become digital, which would permit real-time negative interest rates to be imposed on all of us, thus forcing everyone to spend at once.	英格兰银行首席经济学家安迪·哈尔丹（Andy Haldane）勇敢地提出所有货币都应该数字化，这将让实时负利率降临到每一个人头上，从而迫使所有人都立即花钱。


John Williams, President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, recently argued that the Great Deflation could be beaten only by targeting the price level and nominal national income simultaneously – a New Deal-like approach featuring joint action by the Fed and the government.	旧金山联储主席兼CEO约翰·威廉姆斯（John Williams）最近指出大紧缩只有通过同时兼顾物价水平和名义国民收入目标才能解决——这是一个要求美联储和政府联合行动的罗斯福新政式的方针。


What separates these central bankers from the herd is their readiness to jettison the myth of independent monetary policy, to accept that money is the most political of commodities, to challenge the sanctity of cash, and to concede that defeating the Great Deflation requires a progressive policy agenda.	这些中央银行高管与主流的区别在于他们准备放弃独立货币政策的神话，接受货币是最具政治性的商品，挑战现金的神圣性，并承认解决大紧缩需要与时俱进的政策日程。


Simone Weil once said, “If you want to know what a man is really like, take notice of how he acts when he loses money.”	西蒙妮·维尔（Simone Weil）曾说，“要想知道男人的真面目，只要留意一下他在输钱时怎么办。


Likewise, if we want to know what our societies are really like, we must take notice of how they react to negative interest rates.	”类似地，要想知道社会的真面目，就必须留意它面对负利率怎么办。


The Negative Way to Growth?	通往增长致“负”之路？


NEW YORK – Monetary policy has become increasingly unconventional in the last six years, with central banks implementing zero-interest-rate policies, quantitative easing, credit easing, forward guidance, and unlimited exchange-rate intervention.	纽约—在过去六年中，货币政策越来越不“常规”，央行纷纷实施零利率政策、量化宽松、信用宽松、前瞻指引和无限制汇率干预。


But now we have come to the most unconventional policy tool of them all: negative nominal interest rates.	但如今我们迎来了其中最不常规的政策：负名义利率。


Such rates currently prevail in the eurozone, Switzerland, Denmark, and Sweden.	目前，欧元区、瑞士、丹麦和瑞典都实施了负名义利率。


And it is not just short-term policy rates that are now negative in nominal terms: about $3 trillion of assets in Europe and Japan, at maturities as long as ten years (in the case of Swiss government bonds), now have negative interest rates.	并且不但短期政策利率名义值为负：欧洲和日本大约有3万亿美元、期限长达十年的资产（如瑞士政府债券）如今的利率为负。


At first blush, this seems absurd: Why would anyone want to lend money for a negative nominal return when they could simply hold on to the cash and at least not lose in nominal terms?	乍一看，这显得十分奇怪：为何会有人愿意以负名义利率贷款？ 他们持有现金就可以不损失名义值。


In fact, investors have long accepted real (inflation-adjusted) negative returns.	事实上，投资者早就接受了实际（经通胀调整的）负回报。


When you hold a checking or current account in your bank at a zero interest rate – as most people do in advanced economies – the real return is negative (the nominal zero return minus inflation): a year from now, your cash balances buy you less goods than they do today.	当你以零利率开立银行账户时——许多发达经济体的人民都这样做——实际回报就是负的（名义零回报减去通胀）：一年后，你的现金余额所能买到的商品不如现在多。


And if you consider the fees that many banks impose on these accounts, the effective nominal return was already negative even before central banks went for negative nominal rates.	而如果考虑许多银行对账户所收取的费用，有效名义回报早在央行实施负名义利率前便已经是负数了。


In other words, negative nominal rates merely make your return more negative than it already was.	换句话说，负名义利率只是让你的回报比以前负得更多罢了。


Investors accept negative returns for the convenience of holding cash balances, so, in a sense, there is nothing new about negative nominal interest rates.	投资者接受负回报是为了得到持有现金余额的便利，因此，从某种意义上说，负名义利率并不是什么新鲜事。


Moreover, if deflation were to become entrenched in the eurozone and other parts of the world, a negative nominal return could be associated with a positive real return.	此外，如果通缩在欧元区和世界其他地区形成长期趋势，负名义回报可能会带来正实际回报。


That has been the story for the last 20 years in Japan, owing to persistent deflation and near-zero interest rates on many assets.	过去20年中的日本便是如此，因为日本经历了持久的通缩，而许多资产的利率接近于零。


One still might think that it makes sense to hold cash directly, rather than holding an asset with a negative return.	有些人可能任然认为直接持有现金而不是回报为负的资产才有意义。


But holding cash can be risky, as Greek savers, worried about the safety of their bank deposits, learned after stuffing it into their mattresses and walls: the number of armed home robberies rose sharply, and some cash was devoured by rodents.	但持有现金可能风险很高，比如希腊储蓄者就很担心他们的银行存款，将现金藏在床底和墙缝里，结果是武装入室抢劫数量急剧增加，更有不少钱进入了老鼠的肚子。


So, if you include the costs of holding cash safely – and include the benefits of check writing – it makes sense to accept a negative return.	因此，如果把安全地囤积现金的成本考虑在内——并将写支票的便利考虑在内——接受负回报也是有意义的。


Beyond retail savers, banks that are holding cash in excess of required reserves have no choice but to accept the negative interest rates that central banks impose; indeed, they could not hold, manage, and transfer those excess reserves if they were held as cash, rather than in a negative-yielding account with the central bank.	除了零售储户，持有多于准备金要求的现金的银行别无选择，只能接受央行制定的负利率； 事实上，如果这些超额准备金是以现金方式持有而非存放在负收益率的央行账户中，银行就无法持有、管理和转移这些超额准备金。


Of course, this is true only so long as the nominal interest rate is not too negative; otherwise, switching to cash – despite the storage and safety costs – starts to make more sense.	当然，只有在名义利率不至于负得太离谱时这一点才成立； 否者的话，持有现金——尽管会带来储存和安全成本——就会更有意义。


But why would investors accept a negative nominal return for three, five, or even ten years?	但为何投资者要接受三年、五年甚至十年的负名义回报？


In Switzerland and Denmark, investors want exposure to a currency that is expected to appreciate in nominal terms.	在瑞士和丹麦，投资者希望投资于期望出现名义升值的货币。


If you were holding Swiss franc assets at a negative nominal return right before its central bank abandoned its euro peg in mid-January, you could have made a 20% return overnight; a negative nominal return is a small price to pay for a large capital gain.	如果你在1月中旬瑞士央行放弃瑞士法郎盯住欧元时持有负名义回报的瑞郎资产，那你一夜之间就获得了20%的回报； 负名义回报在巨大的资本利得面前根本不值一提。


And yet negative bonds yields are also occurring in countries and regions where the currency is depreciating and likely to depreciate further, including Germany, other parts of the eurozone core, and Japan.	但负债券收益率也发生在货币正在贬值并且可能继续贬值的国家和地区，包括德国、欧元区其他核心国家和日本。


So, why are investors holding such assets?	那么，投资���为何还要持有这样的资产？


Many long-term investors, like insurance companies and pension funds, have no alternative, as they are required to hold safer bonds.	许多长期投资者，如保险公司和养老基金，别无选择，因为它们必须持有更安全的债券。


Of course, negative returns make their balance sheets shakier: a defined-benefit pension plan needs positive returns to break even, and when most of its assets yield a negative nominal return, such results become increasingly difficult to achieve.	当然，负回报让它们的资产负债表更加飘忽不定：固定受益养老金计划需要正回报才能收支平衡，而当其大部分资产只能产生负名义回报时，收支平衡将日益难以实现。


But, given such investors' long-term liabilities (claims and benefits), their mandate is to invest mostly in bonds, which are less risky than stocks or other volatile assets.	但是，考虑到这些投资者的长期负债（索偿和养老金支出），它们必须主要投资于债券，因为债券比股票和其他波动性资产风险更小。


Even if their nominal returns are negative, they must defer to safety.	哪怕它们的名义回报为负，它们也必须遵从安全性要求。


Moreover, in a “risk-off" environment, when investors are risk-averse or when equities and other risky assets are subject to market and/or credit uncertainty, it may be better to hold negative-yielding bonds than riskier and more volatile assets.	此外，在“远离风险”的环境中，但投资者不愿承担风险或股票和其他风险资产面临市场和/或信用不确定性时，持有负收益率债券比持有风险更高、波动更大的资产更好。


Over time, of course, negative nominal and real returns may lead savers to save less and spend more.	当然，假以时日，负名义和真实回报可能导致储户更少储蓄、更多支出。


And that is precisely the goal of negative interest rates: In a world where supply outstrips demand and too much saving chases too few productive investments, the equilibrium interest rate is low, if not negative.	而这正是负利率的目的：在供过于求并且太多储蓄追逐太少生产性投资的时期，均衡利率即使非负也十分低。


Indeed, if the advanced economies were to suffer from secular stagnation, a world with negative interest rates on both short- and long-term bonds could become the new normal.	事实上，如果发达经济体因长期停滞而受损，短期和长期债券利率均为负也许将成为新常态。


To avoid that, central banks and fiscal authorities need to pursue policies to jump-start growth and induce positive inflation.	要避免这一现象，央行和财政当局需要追求提振增长、带来正通胀的政策。


Paradoxically, that implies a period of negative interest rates to induce savers to save less and spend more.	矛盾的是，这意味着一段时期的负利率以促使储户更少储蓄、更多支出。


But it also requires fiscal stimulus, especially public investment in productive infrastructure projects, which yield higher returns than the bonds used to finance them.	但这还需要财政刺激，特别是生产性基础设施工程方面的公共投资，以产生比作为融资手段的债券更高的回报。


The longer such policies are postponed, the longer we may inhabit the inverted world of negative nominal interest rates.	这些政策拖延得越晚，我们身处负名义利率的颠倒世界中的时间就越长。


What’s Wrong With Negative Rates?	负利率有什么问题？


NEW YORK – I wrote at the beginning of January that economic conditions this year were set to be as weak as in 2015, which was the worst year since the global financial crisis erupted in 2008.	纽约—1月初我写道，今年的经济条件和2015年一样疲软，为2008年全球金融危机爆发以来最糟糕的一年。


And, as has happened repeatedly over the last decade, a few months into the year, others’ more optimistic forecasts are being revised downward.	此外，如过去十年中反复发生的，今年过去几个月后，其他人较为乐观的预测纷纷向下修正。


The underlying problem – which has plagued the global economy since the crisis, but has worsened slightly – is lack of global aggregate demand.	基本问题——这一问题自金融危机以来一直困扰着全球经济，但略有恶化——是全球总需求不足。


Now, in response, the European Central Bank (ECB) has stepped up its stimulus, joining the Bank of Japan and a couple of other central banks in showing that the “zero lower bound” – the inability of interest rates to become negative – is a boundary only in the imagination of conventional economists.	目前，欧洲央行的反应是实施刺激措施，加入了日本银行和其他 一些央行的行列，证明“零下限”——利率无法为负——只是传统经济学家想象中的极限。


And yet, in none of the economies attempting the unorthodox experiment of negative interest rates has there been a return to growth and full employment.	但是，在尝试负利率的非正统实验的经济体中，没有一个回归增长和充分就业。


In some cases, the outcome has been unexpected: Some lending rates have actually increased.	一些经济体的结果出人意料：某些贷款利率实际有所上升。


It should have been apparent that most central banks’ pre-crisis models – both the formal models and the mental models that guide policymakers’ thinking – were badly wrong.	大部分央行的危机前模型——包括正式模型和指导决策者思维的思维模型——大有问题，这理应显而易见。


None predicted the crisis; and in very few of these economies has a semblance of full employment been restored.	没人预测到危机； 并且这些经济体中几乎没有一个看上去恢复了充分就业。


The ECB famously raised interest rates twice in 2011, just as the euro crisis was worsening and unemployment was increasing to double-digit levels, bringing deflation ever closer.	欧洲央行2011年引人瞩目地提升了两次利率，而与此同时，欧元危机正在恶化，失业正在向两位数迈进，让通缩更加靠近了。


They continued to use the old discredited models, perhaps slightly modified.	它们继续使用不可信的旧模型，也许进行了略微的改进。


In these models, the interest rate is the key policy tool, to be dialed up and down to ensure good economic performance.	在这些模型中，利率是关键政策工具，可以通过控制其升降确保出色的经济表现。


If a positive interest rate doesn’t suffice, then a negative interest rate should do the trick.	如果正利率不足以奏效，那么应该采取负利率。


It hasn’t.	负利率也没有奏效。


In many economies – including Europe and the United States – real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates have been negative, sometimes as much as -2%.	在许多经济体——包括欧洲和美国——真实（经通胀调整的）利率已经为负，有时低达-2%。


And yet, as real interest rates have fallen, business investment has stagnated.	但是，随着真实利率的下降，商业投资也陷入了停滞。


According to the OECD, the percentage of GDP invested in a category that is mostly plant and equipment has fallen in both Europe and the US in recent years.	据经合组织数据，近几年中，欧洲和美国投资于包括大部分厂房和设备的类别的GDP的比重均有所下降。 （美国从2000年的8.


(In the US, it fell from 8.4% in 2000 to 6.8% in 2014; in the EU, it fell from 7.5% to 5.7% over the same period.)	同期欧洲从7. 5%下降到5.


Other data provide a similar picture.	7%。 ）其他数据也给出了类似的信息。


Clearly, the idea that large corporations precisely calculate the interest rate at which they are willing to undertake investment – and that they would be willing to undertake a large number of projects if only interest rates were lowered by another 25 basis points – is absurd.	显然，大公司精确计算它们愿意投资的利率水平、并且当利率再下降25个基点时它们就会愿意上马大量项目的观点是荒谬的。


More realistically, large corporations are sitting on hundreds of billions of dollars – indeed, trillions if aggregated across the advanced economies – because they already have too much capacity.	更现实的情况是，大公司坐拥数千亿美元——事实上，如果将发达经济体的数据加总，可达数万亿美元——因为它们的产能已经过剩。


Why build more simply because the interest rate has moved down a little?	只是利率略微下降，为什么要做更多的建设？


The small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) that are willing to borrow couldn’t get access to credit before the ECB went negative, and they can’t now.	愿意借钱的中小企业在欧洲央行实施负利率前得不到信用，现在也同样得不到信用。


Simply put, most firms – and especially SMEs – can’t borrow easily at the T-bill rate.	简言之，大部分企业——特别是中小企业——无法轻松地以国债利率借到钱。


They don’t borrow on capital markets.	它们不是在资本市场上借钱。


They borrow from banks.	它们是从银行借钱。


And there is a large difference (spread) between the interest rates the banks set and the T-bill rate.	而银行规定的利率与国债利率之间差距（即利差）甚大。


Moreover, banks ration.	此外，银行实行信用配给。


They may refuse to lend to some firms.	它们可以拒绝贷款给某些企业。


In other cases, they demand collateral (often real estate).	或者它们要求抵押品（通常是不动产）。


It may come as a shock to non-economists, but banks play no role in the standard economic model that monetary policymakers have used for the last couple of decades.	对于非经济学家来说也许令人震惊，但在货币决策者过去几十年所使用的标准的经济学模型中，银行无足轻重。


Of course, if there were no banks, there would be no central banks, either; but cognitive dissonance has seldom shaken central bankers’ confidence in their models.	当然，如果没有银行，也不会有中央银行； 但认知失调很少撼动央行行长对他们的模型的信心。


The fact is that the eurozone’s structure and the ECB’s policies have ensured that banks in the underperforming countries, and especially in the crisis countries, are very weak.	事实是，欧元区的结构和欧洲央行的政策确保了表现低迷的国家的银行，特别是危机国的银行十分脆弱。


Deposits have left, and the austerity policies demanded by Germany are prolonging the aggregate-demand shortfall and sustaining high unemployment.	存款流失，德国所要求的紧缩政策延长了总需求短缺，维持了高失业。


In these circumstances, lending is risky, and banks have neither the appetite nor ability to lend, particularly to SMEs (which typically generate the highest number of jobs).	在这样的情况下，贷款风险很大，银行不愿或无力贷款，特别是给中小企业贷款（而中小企业常常贡献了最多的就业岗位）。


A decrease in the real interest rate – that on government bonds – to -3% or even -4% will make little or no difference.	真实利率——政府债券利率——下降至-3%甚至-4%也不会造成什么区别。


Negative interest rates hurt banks’ balance sheets, with the “wealth effect” on banks overwhelming the small increase in incentives to lend.	负利率伤害银行资产负债表，而银行的“财富效应”将压倒略微增长的贷款激励。


Unless policymakers are careful, lending rates could increase and credit availability decline.	除非决策者十分谨慎，否则贷款利率可能上升，信用可得性将下降。


There are three further problems.	有三个进一步的问题。


First, low interest rates encourage firms to invest in more capital-intensive technologies, resulting in demand for labor falling in the longer term, even as unemployment declines in the short term.	首先，低利率鼓励企业投资于资本较密集的技术，导致长期劳动力需求下降，虽然短期失业率会有所降低。


Second, older people who depend on interest income, hurt further, cut their consumption more deeply than those who benefit – rich owners of equity – increase theirs, undermining aggregate demand today.	其次，依赖利息收入的年长者进一步受到影响，更大地削减消费，削减量将超过低利率的受益者——富有的股票持有者——的消费增加量，制约当下总需求。


Third, the perhaps irrational but widely documented search for yield implies that many investors will shift their portfolios toward riskier assets, exposing the economy to greater financial instability.	第三，也许不理性、但被广泛记录到的追求收益率的行为意味着许多投资者将投资组合更多地配置给高风险资产，让经济暴露在更大的金融动荡风险下。


What central banks should be doing is focusing on the flow of credit, which means restoring and maintaining local banks’ ability and willingness to lend to SMEs.	央行应该做的是注重于信用流，这意味着重塑和维持地方银行向中小企业贷款的能力和意愿。


Instead, throughout the world, central banks have focused on the systemically significant banks, the financial institutions whose excessive risk taking and abusive practices caused the 2008 crisis.	相反，放眼全世界，央行注重的是具系统重要性的银行，这些金融机构的过度冒险和不当行为导致了2008年危机。


But a large number of small banks in the aggregate are systemically significant – especially if one is concerned about restoring investment, employment, and growth.	但大量小银行加起来也具有系统重要性——特别是你关心重塑投资、就业和增长的话。


The big lesson from all of this is captured by the familiar adage, “garbage in, garbage out.”	所有这些的大教训可以用一句人们耳熟能详的俗语来概括：“垃圾输入，垃圾输出”。


If central banks continue to use the wrong models, they will continue to do the wrong thing.	如果央行继续使用错误的模型，也将继续做错误的事。


Of course, even in the best of circumstances, monetary policy’s ability to restore a slumping economy to full employment may be limited.	当然，即使是在最好的环境下，货币政策让崩溃的经济重回充分就业的能力也可能十分有限。


But relying on the wrong model prevents central bankers from contributing what they can – and may even make a bad situation worse.	但依靠错误的模型让央行无从做出能做出的贡献——甚至可能让糟糕的情况变得更糟。


Marginalized People’s Neglected Diseases	边缘化人群被忽视的疾病


WASHINGTON, DC – When Pope Francis visited the United States in September, he delivered historic addresses to the US Congress and the United Nations General Assembly.	华盛顿—9月，教皇方济各在访问美国时向美国国会和联合国大会做了历史性演讲。


Building on the sentiments of his encyclical letter, Laudato Si’, Francis highlighted the international community’s responsibility to respond to human suffering, such as that faced by refugees and those living in extreme poverty, and called for global solidarity in order to overcome social exclusion and inequality.	根据其教皇通谕《愿祢受赞颂》（Laudato Si’）的精神，方济各强调了国际社会有责任对（比如难民和生活在极端贫困中的人所受到的）人道灾难做出反应，并呼吁全世界团结起来克服社会排斥和不平等。


The pope’s entreaties should make us turn our attention to every aspect of human suffering, especially those that affect the most marginalized people.	教皇的恳求理应让我们关注人道灾难的每一个方面，特别是影响边缘化人群的灾难。


One of these is neglected tropical diseases (NTDs).	其中之一是被忽视的热带病（NTD）。


This group of parasitic and related infections – including lymphatic filariasis (or elephantiasis), intestinal worms, and schistosomiasis – is a scourge of poverty.	这类寄生虫引起的相关的传染病，包括淋巴性丝虫病（或象皮病）、肠道寄生虫病和血吸虫病，是贫困的刺激因素。


These illnesses afflict approximately 1.4 billion people per year, including more than 500 million children, causing untold pain and suffering and, through lost productivity, contributing to the cycle of poverty.	这些疾病每年都要影响约14亿人，八廓5亿多儿童，造成鲜为人知的病痛，并且因为导致生产率损失而恶化贫困循环。


Over the past decade, the international community has made important progress against NTDs.	在过去十年中，国际社会在遏制NTD方面做出了重要进步。


For example, the generosity of major pharmaceutical companies, which provide medicines free of charge, has enabled treatment programs to be scaled up.	比如，大型制药公司慷慨解囊免费提供药品，让我们能够扩大治疗计划的规模。


But, unfortunately, despite encouraging signs of progress, barely 40% of people at risk for these preventable diseases receive the medicine they require.	但不幸的是，尽管有这些令人鼓舞的进步信号，但在可能罹患这些可预防疾病的人中，只有40%获得了需要的药物。


Well over a billion people still do not have access to treatments for potentially debilitating conditions that cost less than $0.50 per person to deliver.	10亿多人仍无法获得这些让人虚弱的疾病的治疗，而治疗成本还不到没人0. 50美元。


This is not only a serious medical issue; it is also a grave moral problem, one that those of us who work with the poor confront every day.	这不仅是一个严重的医学问题； 更是一个巨大的道德问题，我们扶贫工作者每天都要面临这样的问题。


The reason for the international community’s failure to solve this problem is as simple as it is ugly: for the most part, NTDs afflict only the poorest and most overlooked people.	国际社会无法解决这一问题的原因很简单，但也很丑陋：对大部分人来说，NTD只影响最贫困、最不受重视的人群。


As Francis put it in Laudato Si’ “There is little in the way of clear awareness of problems which especially affect the excluded.”	方济各在《愿祢受赞颂》中指出，“对于对受排斥人群影响特别巨大的问题，根本没有清醒的认识。


Indeed, “they are mentioned in international political and economic discussions, but one often has the impression that their problems are brought up as an afterthought.”	”事实上，“这些问题在国际政治和经济讨论中有所提及，但人们常常会有这样的印象，他们的问题事后才被提出。 ”


The pope’s historic visit to the US came at an important time.	教皇对美国的历史性访问正逢一个重要时机。


Congress was finalizing spending bills for fiscal year 2016, and the UN was completing its work on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), setting targets that will guide development policy for the next 15 years.	国会正在最后敲定2016财年的支出法案，联合国正在完成其可持续发展目标（SDG），设定将在未来十五年指导发展政策的目标。


Both organizations would do well to heed the pontiff’s words.	美国国会和联合国将十分重视教皇的言辞。


It is critical that the US continue its strong leadership on NTDs by maintaining funding for treatment programs in the federal budget, this year and in the years to come.	一个关键是美国继续它在NTD问题上的强势领导地位，在今年和未来几年继续划拨联邦预算为治疗计划提供资金。


As Francis reminded members of Congress, “How much has been done in these first years of the third millennium to raise people out of extreme poverty!	方济各提醒国会议员：“在这第三个千年伊始的几年中，我们做了多少事情帮助人们摆脱极端贫困！


I know that you share my conviction that much more still needs to be done, and that in times of crisis and economic hardship a spirit of global solidarity must not be lost.”	我知道，你们和我一样认为仍有更多的事情需要做，而在危机和经济困难时期，决不能丢失全球团结精神。 ”


On the international level, we are encouraged that UN members were inspired to assign high priority to the fight against NTDs in the post-2015 development agenda.	在国际层面，联合国成员国受到启发，将遏制NTD列为2015年后发展日程的重中之重，这令我们深感鼓舞。


In particular, a global indicator for NTDs – the “number of people requiring interventions against neglected tropical diseases” – was included in the SDGs’ monitoring framework.	特别是，NTD的一项全球性指标——“需要被忽视的热带疾病干预的人数”——已被纳入SDG的监控框架。


This will help to ensure that NTDs are finally given the attention they deserve over the next 15 years.	这将有助于确保未来15年NTD最终能够获得应有的关注。


One of the most basic steps we can take to overcome what Francis calls “the globalization of indifference” is to come together in support of decisive, measurable action against NTDs.	为了克服方济各所谓的“冷漠的全球化”，我们所能采取的基本措施是齐心协力支持果断的、可衡量的遏制NTD方针。


Introducing a global metric to mark our progress on the path to controlling and eliminating them for good is a true demonstration of our solidarity with the poor.	引入一项出于善意的全球性指标衡量我们在控制和根除NTD的进步是我们与穷人团结一致的最好的证明。


In his UN speech, Francis reminded us of a crucial point: “Above and beyond our plans and programs, we are dealing with real men and women who live, struggle and suffer, and are often forced to live in great poverty, deprived of all rights.”	在联合国演讲中，方济各提醒我们一个关键点：“在我们的计划和项目之外和之上，我们面对的是活生生的男性和女性，他们在挣扎，在受苦，常常被迫生活在极端贫困中，被剥夺了所有权利。


If, with all of our technological advances and unprecedented private-sector donations, we cannot change the predicament of the poorest people for mere pennies per person, how can we truly expect to overcome the more challenging, costlier health and development challenges we face?	”如果在科技进步和前所未有的私人部门赞助、并且在每个人身上只需要花几毛钱的情况下，我们仍不能改变最贫困人群的境况，我们还有什么希望克服我们所面临的更具挑战性、成本更大的健康和发展挑战？


Neighbors	邻居


TEL AVIV – During the military operations in Gaza, code-named “Fused Lead” (after a Hanukkah song about a small spinning top – one of that holiday’s symbols – made out of fused lead), we Israelis have been reminded of a fundamental fact: Gaza is not Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, or even Lebanon.	特拉维夫—在代号为“熔铅（Fused Lead）[得名于一首关于一只由熔化的铅制成的，旋转的小陀螺的哈努卡犹太人节歌曲。 这种陀螺是该节日的象征之一。


It is a region composed of a common country that we share with the Palestinians.	]”的加沙军事行动中。 我们以色列人又认识到一个根本的现实：加沙不是越南、伊拉克、阿富汗甚或黎巴嫩。


It is a country that we call Israel and they call Palestine.	它是一个由我们和巴勒斯坦人共同所有的国家组成的地区。 我们叫它以色列，他们称它为巴勒斯坦。


One and a half million people live in Gaza.	有150万人居住在加沙。


They are part of a people of whom another 1.3 million live in Israel, and another two million in the West Bank.	在他们所属的那个民族中，有130万人居住在以色列，另有200万人居住在约旦河西岸。


The men and women of Gaza are our neighbors and have lived back to back with us for a long time, even if we are separated from them by a border.	加沙的男人和女人们是我们的邻居。 尽管和我们之间有边界分割，他们也与我们背靠背生活了很长时间。


Our homes and our cities are just a few kilometers from each other, our fields brush up against theirs.	我们的家园和城市鸡犬相闻，我们的田野唇齿相依。


The men of Gaza, the activists or policemen of Hamas whom we observe through our military binoculars, were in the past the activists and policemen of Fatah.	加沙的男人们，那些我们通过军用望远镜观察的哈马斯活动分子或警察，以前曾是法塔赫的活动分子和警察。


They were born in Gaza or pushed there as refugees during the war of 1948, or in other wars.	他们或出生在加沙，或是在1948年战争及其他的战争中被作为难民赶到那里。


Over the course of the years, they were the masons who built our homes, they washed dishes in the restaurants where we ate, they were the merchants from whom we used to buy goods, and workers in the greenhouses of the kibbutzim.	多年以来，他们曾是为我们修筑房屋的工匠，是在我们的餐馆里洗刷碗碟的工人，是我们时常光顾的商贩，是kibbutzim温室中的园丁。


They are our neighbors, and they will be our neighbors in the future.	他们现在是我们的邻居，将来也会是我们的邻居。


So, when we decide to fight a war against them, we have to consider very carefully the character of that war, its duration, and the effect of its violence.	因此，当我们决定向他们发动战争时，我们必须考虑这场战争的性质、持续时间及其暴力造成的后果。


We Israelis have no power to extirpate the Hamas government from Gaza, much as we did not have the power to eliminate the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the voice of the Palestinian people’s national aspirations, or Hezbollah from Lebanon in the war of 2006.	我们以色列人没有权力将哈马斯政府从加沙铲除，正如我们没有权力消灭代表巴勒斯坦人民民族理想的巴解组织(PLO)，也没有权力在2006年的战争中根除黎巴嫩真主党一样。


Ariel Sharon and Menachem Begin went all the way to Beirut in the early 1980’s, paying a terrible and bloody price, to try to eliminate the PLO – a result that could never be obtained.	沙龙和贝京在1980年代早期为根除巴解组织—一个永远无法达成的目标—一路打到贝鲁特，并为此付出了血的代价。


And what happened?	可结果如何呢？


In the end, Sharon and then Binyamin Netanyahu both ended up sitting down at the negotiating table with Yassir Arafat and his representatives to try to reach an agreement.	最终，沙龙和彼时的内塔尼亚胡还是和阿拉法特及其代表坐到了谈判桌前试图达成协议。


Now Arafat’s former deputy, Abu Mazen, is a frequent and welcome guest in our country.	现在，阿拉法特的前副手Abu Mazen成了我国颇受欢迎的常客了。


We Israelis must begin to realize this simple fact: the Arabs are not metaphysical creatures, but human beings, and human beings have it within themselves to change.	我们以色列人必须认识到这个简单的事实：阿拉伯人并非形而上的生物，他们也是人，而求变是人类的天性。


After all, we Israelis change our positions, mitigate our opinions, and open ourselves up to new ideas.	毕竟，我们以色列人会改变立场、软化态度并接受新的理念。


So we would do well to get out of our heads as quickly as possible the illusion that we can somehow annihilate Hamas or eradicate them from the Gaza strip.	因此我们最好尽快将这样的幻想抛诸脑后，即：我们能够制服哈马斯或将其从加沙地带斩草除根。


Instead, we have to work, with caution and good sense, to reach a reasonable and detailed agreement for a lasting ceasefire that has within it the perspective that Hamas can change .	相反，我们应该通过审慎而明智的努力达成一个合理而详细的持久停火协议，其中也考虑到哈马斯可以改变的前景。


Such a change is possible and can be acted upon.	如此的改变是可能的，也是可以实现的。


Such fundamental changes of heart and mind have happened many times in the course of history.	在历史进程中，这种心智与理性的根本性变化曾经发生过多次。


To be sure, even if, beginning today, we start working for such a lasting truce, there will inevitably be further days of war ahead.	确切而言，即便我们从今天开始就为达成持久的停火而努力，在未来也不可避免地还会有战事发生。


Rockets will, no doubt, again be launched against us.	毫无疑问，还会有火箭弹向我们发射。


But at least we will know that we are not fighting for an impossible objective that can only result in blood and devastation – blood and devastation that will weigh on the collective memories of the sons and grandsons of our neighbors, who will remain our enemies, even if the spinning top continues to turn.	但至少我们会知道我们不是为了一个只会造成流血和破坏的不可达成的目标而战。 这种流血和破坏会深深地烙印在我们邻居子孙后代的集体记忆中，就算陀螺继续旋转，他们也仍然会是我们的敌人。


Kremlin Murder Incorporated	克里姆林杀手组织


NEW YORK – In his play Murder in the Cathedral, T. S. Eliot describes the murder of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Becket, as a silently ordered hit.	纽约—在《大教堂谋杀案》（Murder in the Cathedral）一剧中，艾略特（T. S.


The English king, Henry II, did not need to give a direct order; his knights knew what to do with somebody seen to be undermining the state.	Eliot）描写了坎特伯雷大主教托马斯·贝克特（Thomas Becket）被沉默命令谋杀的案子。 英格兰国王亨利二世不需要下达直接命令，他的骑士们知道如何对付那些看上去对国家有威胁的人。


Eliot may have set his play in twelfth-century England, but he wrote it in 1935, barely two years after Adolf Hitler had come to power in Germany.	艾略特的戏剧时间设定在十二世纪的英格兰，但其写作时间是在1935年，当时希特勒在德国掌权刚刚两年。


So it is, at least in part, a cautionary tale about the rise of fascism in Europe.	因此，这部戏至少部分是一个警告，警告法西斯主义在欧洲的崛起。


Sadly, it has lost none of its relevance.	悲哀的是，今天它的意义一点也没有减弱。


Today, Eliot's masterpiece can be read as a warning about the path being taken by Russia, where politics under President Vladimir Putin has been growing murderously medieval.	如今，艾略特的这部名剧可以被解读为对俄罗斯的道路的警告，总统普京治下的俄罗斯政治越来越像穷凶极恶的中世纪。


One by one, Putin's critics have been eliminated.	普京的批评者一个一个地被清除。


In 2006, the journalist Anna Politkovskaya was gunned down in an elevator, and Alexander Litvinenko, a former KGB agent who had been critical of Putin, died of polonium poison while in exile in London.	2006年，记者安娜·波利科夫斯卡娅（Anna Politkovskaya）在电梯中遭枪杀，前克格勃特工、普京的关键人物亚历山大·利特维年科（Alexander Litvinenko）在伦敦逃亡期间死于钋中毒。


In 2009, Sergei Magnitsky, a lawyer campaigning against corruption, died in prison after being denied medical care for life-threatening conditions.	2009年，反腐律师谢尔盖·马格尼茨基（Sergei Magnitsky）因为被禁止接受致命状况的治疗而死在狱中。


The same year, another lawyer, Stanislav Markelov, a champion of human rights, was shot following a news conference.	同一年，另一名律师、人权领袖斯坦尼斯拉夫·马尔科洛夫（Stanislav Markelov）在一次新闻发布会后遭射杀。


The murder last week of Boris Nemtsov, a leading opposition politician and a former deputy prime minister under Boris Yeltsin, should come as no surprise.	上周，反对派政治领袖、叶利钦政府副总理鲍里斯·涅姆佐夫（Boris Nemtsov）被杀，这早已不足为奇。


But it should come as a shock – and as a wake-up call for those Russians who until now have tolerated a culture of lawlessness and impunity, unseen since the darkest days of Stalin's personal rule in the Soviet Union.	但其发生仍是一次冲击——并且也是对至今仍在容忍无法无天文化的俄罗斯人的一次警醒。 自斯大林在苏联大搞独裁以来，俄罗斯还从未如此黑暗。


Before his death, Nemtsov was said to be working on a report titled “Putin and the War," providing proof of Russia's involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine.	据说涅姆佐夫死前正在准备一份题为《普京和战争》的报告，该报告将提供关于俄罗斯介入乌克兰东部冲突的证据。


He was scheduled to lead a protest against the war two days after his murder.	按照日程，他将在被杀两天后领导反对乌克兰战争的示威。


Some have wondered if Putin was afraid of what Nemtsov had uncovered, and thus ordered the assassination.	一些人怀疑普京害怕涅姆佐夫所揭露的东西，因此下令暗杀他。


That is unlikely, at least in terms of someone receiving a direct order from Putin.	这是不可能的，至少不可能是普京直接下令某人干的。


Simply put, orchestrating Nemtsov's murder was not worth the trouble; after all, the Kremlin's propaganda machine would have had little problem twisting Nemtsov's report to Putin's benefit.	简言之，策划谋杀涅姆佐夫并不需要普京操心； 毕竟，克里姆林宫的宣传机器有的是办法让涅姆佐夫的报告变得对普京有利。


Indeed, even Nemtsov's brazen murder is unlikely to hurt Putin politically.	事实上，哪怕是令人发指的谋杀涅姆佐夫的行为也无法在政治上伤害到普京。


His popularity now stands at 86%.	如今，普京的支持率为86%。


For many Russians, Nemtsov's opposition to the war in Ukraine made him a traitor, whose death was justified – indeed, almost demanded – by national necessity.	对许多俄罗斯人来说，涅姆佐夫反对乌克兰战争意味��他是卖国贼，出于国家需要让他死理所应当——事实上几乎可以说是不得不死。


Putin has announced that he will personally oversee the investigation into the assassination.	普京已宣布将亲自挂帅对此次暗杀的调查。


But those leading the effort have already indicated its likely conclusion: Nemtsov's murder was an attempt to destabilize Russia.	但早已有人指出了可能的结论：谋杀涅姆佐夫是有人试图动摇俄罗斯。


We can be all but certain that some culprit or another will be “found," and that his crime will be part of a conspiracy by the CIA or Ukrainian authorities.	我们可以确定，总会有这样或那样的凶手被“发现”，并且这一罪行时美国中情局或乌克兰当局阴谋的一部分。


The Kremlin is no stranger to twisting the truth to fit its needs.	克里姆林宫在根据自身需要扭曲事实方面可谓行家里手。


Before Russia's annexation of Crimea, it argued that the United States had hired snipers to fire at pro-Western protesters in Kyiv in order to blame Russia for their deaths.	俄罗斯吞并克里米亚前，克里姆林宫宣称美国雇用狙击手朝基辅的亲西方示威群众开火，然后指责俄罗斯造成了他们的死亡。


When a Malaysian airliner was shot down over Ukraine – most likely by pro-Russia rebels – the official Kremlin story was that Western secret services downed it to undermine Putin's reputation.	马来西亚航空公司航班在乌克兰领空被击落时——最有可能是由亲俄叛军干的——克里姆林宫官员的说辞是西方秘密部门击落了这架飞机，目的是败坏普京的名声。