Japanese financiers bought up pricey trophy properties like Rockefeller Center in New York and the Pebble Beach Golf Club in California, and then had to sell later at rock-bottom prices.	日本的金融家们以高昂的价格收购了纽约洛克菲勒中心和加州圆石滩高尔夫俱乐部等不动产战利品，后来却只能以底价售出。


These investment failures have been great for Americans, who owe a lot less to foreigners than they would otherwise.	这些投资失败对美国人来说却不失为一件好事，若非如此他们会欠外国人更多的钱。


Unfortunately, this cannot go on forever.	不幸的是，这样的情况不会永远持续下去。


Foreigners are either going to start earning much better returns in the US, pushing American debt levels into unsustainable territory, or else they will pull back and invest elsewhere.	外国人在美国的投资回报要么会不断改善，将美国的负债水平推向不可持续的境地； 要么则会撤资，并投往别处。


Either way, the dollar collapse has to continue.	不论在哪种情况下，美元的贬值都会继续。


So how low can the dollar sink?	那么，美元究竟会贬值到什么程度呢？


By my calculations, the dollar still needs to go down another 15% if the US trade deficit is to go back towards balance.	依照我的计算，如果要使美国贸易逆差达到平衡，美元还需进一步贬值15%。


Ideally, Asian currencies would rise much more than 15% while European currencies would rise less.	在理想状态下，亚洲货币会升值15%以上，而欧洲货币升值幅度较小。


Unfortunately, there is a real danger that we may see the opposite, with the euro going to $1.50 or beyond.	然而，真正的危险在于欧元可能会达到或突破1. 5美元的比价，从而令事与愿违。


Governments may try to resist the fall of the dollar, but in today’s world of deep and fluid capital markets, they will not succeed indefinitely, even in Asia.	各国政府可能会抵制美元的贬值，但在当今深邃而极具流动性的资本市场上，这样的抵制即使是在亚洲也不可能取得无限期的成功。


Moreover, although US policy is making everyone else look good for now, things might not be so comfortable if the dollar collapse leads to skyrocketing interest rates and a sustained global slowdown.	再者，虽然美国的政策现在还是皆大欢喜，但如果美元的贬值引发利率高涨和持续的全球经济发展减速则大家的日子可能都不好过。


Some of the countries that look so strong today may suddenly experience the kind of financial crises that they thought they had left behind.	一些经济强健的国家可能会突然遭受那种被认为已成为历史的金融危机。


Even if countries avoid the immediate blow of a dollar collapse, they still have to watch for a boomerang effect.	即便是一些国家避免了眼下美元贬值的打击，他们也应该对其飞反 效应(boomerang effect) 保持警惕。


Exchange rates have a nasty habit of overshooting their equilibrium values, then knifing back on countries, especially those who have been spending too much based on inflated income valuations.	汇率有突破其均衡价值的可恶习惯，并重创相关国家，特别是那些基于通胀状态下的收入计算而大肆支出的国家。


OK, so maybe it is too soon for the world to start toasting America’s insane consumption patterns.	好了，如此说来全世界要现在就举杯欢庆美国的疯狂消费模式还为时尚早。


Even so, isn’t it generous of the Americans to make everyone else look so sober and frugal, if only for the moment?	即便如此，只要美国人暂时让其他国家看起来既冷静又节俭，不也算是慷慨有加了吗？


Alpha, Beta, and Beyond	阿尔法、贝塔以及兼得


NEW YORK – Even in normal times, individual and institutional investors alike have a hard time figuring out where to invest and in what.	纽约—即使在正常时期，散户和机构投资者也很难决定去哪里投资、投资什么。


Should one invest more in advanced or emerging economies?	你应该更多地投资于发达经济体还是新兴经济体？


And which ones?	投资于哪几个经济体？


How does one decide when, and in what way, to rebalance one’s portfolio?	你如何决定何时以及怎样再平衡你的投资组合？


Obviously, these choices become harder still in abnormal times, when major global changes occur and central banks follow unconventional policies.	显然，这些选择在反常时期，即发生全球大变局、央行采取非常规措施时，变得更加困难了。


But a new, low-cost approach promises to ease the challenge confronting investors in normal and abnormal times alike.	但一种新的低成本方法能够减轻投资者在正常和反常时期所面临的挑战。


In the asset management industry, there have traditionally been two types of investment strategies: passive and active.	在资产管理行业中，有两种传统投资战略：消极投资和积极投资。


The passive approach includes investment in indices that track specific benchmarks, say, the S&P 500 for the United States or an index of advanced economies or emerging-market equities.	消极投资包括指数投资，追踪比如美国标准普尔500这样的具体的基准指数或者囊括发达经济体或新兴经济体股票的指数。


In effect, one buys the index of the market.	本质上你买的是市场指数。


Passivity is a low-cost approach – tracking a benchmark requires no work.	消极投资是一种低成本方法——追踪基准不需要费心费力。


But it yields only the sum of the good, the bad, and the ugly, because it cannot tell you whether to buy advanced economies or emerging markets, and which countries within each group will do better.	但它只能获得好标的、坏标的和丑标的的收益之和，因为它无法告诉你买发达经济体还是新兴市场，也无法告诉你每个版块中的哪些国家会做得更好。


You invest in a basket of all countries or specific regions, and what you get is referred to as “beta” – the average market return.	你投资的投资篮子是所有国家或特定地区，你获得的是所谓的“贝塔”——平均市场回报。


By contrast, the active approach entrusts investment to a professional portfolio manager.	相反，积极方法把投资交给专业资产组合管理人打理。


The idea is that a professional manager who chooses assets and markets in which to invest can outperform the average return of buying the whole market.	这种方法认为，选择投资哪些资产和市场的专业管理人能战胜买入整个市场带来的平均回报。


These funds are supposed to get you “alpha”: absolute superior returns, rather than the market “beta.”	这些基金应该让你获得“阿尔法”，即绝对超额回报，而不是市场“贝塔”。


The problems with this approach are many.	这种方法问题多多。


Professionally managed investment funds are expensive, because managers trade a lot and are paid hefty fees.	专业管理的投资基金很贵，因为管理人大量交易并收取大笔费用。


Moreover, most active managers – indeed, 95% of them – underperform their investment benchmarks, and their returns are volatile and risky.	此外，大部分积极管理人——事实上是其中的95% ——无法战胜他们的投资基准，并且回报波动高、风险大。


Moreover, superior investment managers change over time, so that past performance is no guarantee of future performance.	此外，顶尖投资管理人随时间变化而变化，因此过去的表现绝不保证未来表现。


And some of these managers – like hedge funds – are not available to average investors.	其中一些管理人——如对冲基金——不是普通投资者可以投资的。


As a result, actively managed funds typically do worse than passive funds, with returns after fees even lower and riskier.	结果，积极管理基金常常比消极基金表现更差，费后回报则更低、风险更大。


Indeed, not only are active “alpha” strategies often worse than beta ones; some are actually disguised beta strategies (because they follow market trends) – just with more leverage and thus more risk and volatility.	事实上，不但积极的“阿尔法”策略常常不敌贝塔策略，其中一些实际上根本就是伪装的贝塔策略（因为它们跟踪市场趋势），只不过杠杆更大，因此风险和波动也更大。


But a third investment approach, known as “smart” (or “enhanced”) beta, has become more popular recently.	但第三种投资方法，即所谓的“聪明”（或“强化”）贝塔，最近日渐流行起来。


Suppose that you could follow quantitative rules that allowed you to weed out the bad apples, say, the countries likely to perform badly and thus have low stock returns over time.	假设你可以遵循能够让你剔除坏标的（比如表现拙劣、因此长期股票回报较低的国家）的量化规则。


If you weed out most of the bad and the ugly, you end up picking more of the good apples – and do better than average.	如果你剔除了大部分坏标的和丑标的，你就能握有更多好标的——从而获得比平均水平更好的表现。


To keep costs low, smart beta strategies need to be passive.	为了降低成本，聪明贝塔策略必须是消极的。


Thus, adherence to specific rules replaces an expensive manager in choosing the good apples and avoiding the bad and ugly ones.	因此，具体规则取代昂贵的管理人选择好标的和避免坏和丑标的。


For example, my economic research firm has a quantitative model, updated every three months, that ranks 174 countries on more than 200 economic, financial, political, and other factors to derive a measure or score of these countries’ medium-term attractiveness to investors.	比如，我的经济研究公司有一个每三个月更新一次的量化模型，它根据200多项经济、金融、政治和其他因素计算一个指标或分数衡量174个国家的中期投资吸引力并进行排名。


This approach provides strong signals concerning which countries will perform poorly or experience crises and which will achieve superior economic and financial results.	该方法提供关于哪些国家将表现不佳或经历危机、哪些国家将实现优异经济和金融结果的强烈信号。


Weeding out the bad and the ugly based on these scores, and thus picking more of the good apples, has been shown to provide higher returns with lower risk than actively managed alpha or passive beta funds.	根据这些分数剔除坏标的和丑标的，从而遴选出更多好标的，这样做已证明能够提供比积极管理阿尔法基金或消极贝塔基金更高的回报和更小的风险。


And, as the rankings change over time to reflect countries’ improving or worsening fundamentals, the equity markets that “smart beta” investors choose change accordingly.	此外，排名会随时间推移而改变以体现各国基本面的改善或恶化，“聪明贝塔”投资者所选择的股票市场也会随之改变。


With better returns than passive beta funds at a lower cost than actively managed funds, smart beta vehicles are increasingly available and becoming more popular.	聪明贝塔基金回报高于贝塔基金，成本低于积极管理基金，因此日益兴盛和流行。


(Full disclosure: my firm, together with a large global financial institution, is launching a series of tradable equity indices for stock markets of advanced economies and emerging markets, using a smart beta approach).	（充分披露：我的公司正在与一家大型全球金融机构合作发布一系列关于发动大经济体和新兴市场股市的可交易股票指数，我们采用的是聪明贝塔方法）。


Given that this strategy can be applied to stocks, bonds, currencies, and many other asset classes, smart beta could be the future of asset management.	聪明贝塔策略可用于股票、债券、货币和其他多种资产类别，因此它也许代表了资产管理的未来。


Whether one is investing in normal or abnormal times, applying a scientific, low-cost approach to get a basket with a higher-than-average share of good apples does seem like a sensible approach.	不管你在正常时期还是反常时期投资，运用科学的低成本方法获得好于平均水平的好标的篮子都是明智的方法。


When Inequality Kills	吃人的不平等


NEW YORK – This week, Angus Deaton will receive the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics “for his analysis of consumption, poverty, and welfare.”	纽约——本周，安格斯·迪顿（Angus Deaton）将“为其在针对消费，贫困和福利的分析方面所做出的突出贡献”而领取诺贝尔经济学奖。


Deservedly so.	这堪称实至名归。


Indeed, soon after the award was announced in October, Deaton published some startling work with Anne Case in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences – research that is at least as newsworthy as the Nobel ceremony.	实际上就在十月公布获奖后不久，迪顿发表在《美国国家科学院学报》上与安娜·凯斯（Ann Case）联合发表了一些重大研究成果——而这一研究的新闻价值甚至可以与诺贝尔奖典礼媲美。


Analyzing a vast amount of data about health and deaths among Americans, Case and Deaton showed declining life expectancy and health for middle-aged white Americans, especially those with a high school education or less.	在分析了大量美国人的健康和死亡数据后，凯斯和迪顿发现中年美国白人预期寿命和健康状况都在不断恶化，尤其是那些只拥有高中或更低学历者。


Among the causes were suicide, drugs, and alcoholism.	导致这一状况的其中一些原因是自杀，吸毒和酗酒。


America prides itself on being one of the world’s most prosperous countries, and can boast that in every recent year except one (2009) per capita GDP has increased.	美国自诩是世界上最繁荣的国家之一，并且除2009年外，近年以来每年都实现了人均GDP增长。


And a sign of prosperity is supposed to be good health and longevity.	而繁荣的其中一个标志本应是健康长寿。


But, while the US spends more money per capita on medical care than almost any other country (and more as a percentage of GDP), it is far from topping the world in life expectancy.	但尽管美国在医疗保健上的人均消费几乎比其他任何国家更多（占GDP的百分比也是如此），却远未获得位居世界前列的预期寿命。


France, for example, spends less than 12% of its GDP on medical care, compared to 17% in the US. Yet Americans can expect to live three full years less than the French.	以法国为例，其国民在医疗保健上的支出不到GDP的12％，相比之下支出17％的美国人平均寿命却比前者整整少三年。


For years, many Americans explained away this gap.	许多年来，很多美国人都尝试对此做出解释。


The US is a more heterogeneous society, they argued, and the gap supposedly reflected the huge difference in average life expectancy between African Americans and white Americans.	他们辩解说美国是一个更加异质性的社会，数字的差异应该是反映了非裔美国人和美国白人之间平均预期寿命的巨大差别。


The racial gap in health is, of course, all too real.	在健康方面的种族差距显然是赤裸裸的现实。


According to a study published in 2014, life expectancy for African Americans is some four years lower for women and more than five years lower for men, relative to whites.	根据2014年发表的一项研究，非裔美国女性的预期寿命比白人女性低差不多四年，而男性之间的差异则超过五年。


This disparity, however, is hardly just an innocuous result of a more heterogeneous society.	但这种差异可不仅仅是一个更异质的社会里一个无��痛痒的结果。


It is a symptom of America’s disgrace: pervasive discrimination against African Americans, reflected in median household income that is less than 60% that of white households.	这是一个美国耻辱的象征：对美国黑人的普遍歧视，体现在黑人家庭收入中位数还不如白人家庭的60％。


The effects of lower income are exacerbated by the fact that the US is the only advanced country not to recognize access to health care as a basic right.	这种收入较低的影响还进一步恶化，因为美国是唯一一个不承认获得医疗保健是一项基本权利的发达国家。


Some white Americans, however, have attempted to shift the blame for dying younger to African Americans themselves, citing their “lifestyles.”	对此一些美国白人试图把低寿命的成因归结于非裔美国人自身，认为这就是他们的“生活方式”。


It is perhaps true that unhealthy habits are more concentrated among poor Americans, a disproportionate number of whom are black.	这或许是事实，因为不健康的生活习惯更集中于美国的贫困人口身上，其中黑人占的比例又高于其在全国总人口中的比例。


But these habits themselves are a consequence of economic conditions, not to mention the stresses of racism.	但这些习惯本身就是经济状况的后果，更别提种族主义的压力。


The Case-Deaton results show that such theories will no longer do.	凯斯-迪顿的研究成果表明这种理论已经不再适用。


America is becoming a more divided society – divided not only between whites and African Americans, but also between the 1% and the rest, and between the highly educated and the less educated, regardless of race.	美国正在成为一个更加分化的社会——不仅白人和非裔美国人之间分化，1％和剩下的人之间分化，无论种族的高学历和低学历之间也分化。


And the gap can now be measured not just in wages, but also in early deaths.	而如今这些差距不仅可以通过收入，还可以通过死亡寿命来测量。


White Americans, too, are dying earlier as their incomes decline.	原来白种美国人同样也会因收入下降而寿命变短。


This evidence is hardly a shock to those of us studying inequality in America.	对我们这些研究美国不平等状况的人来说，这方面的证据没什么好大惊小怪的。


The median income of a full-time male employee is lower than it was 40 years ago.	一名全职男雇员的平均收入比40年前更低。


Wages of male high school graduates have plummeted by some 19% in the period studied by Case and Deaton.	在凯斯-迪顿所研究的时间区间内男性高中毕业生的工资已经大幅下跌了约19％。


To stay above water, many Americans borrowed from banks at usurious interest rates.	为了维持体面的生活，许多美国人只能依赖从银行借来的高利率贷款。


In 2005, President George W. Bush’s administration made it far more difficult for households to declare bankruptcy and write off debt.	2005年，美国总统乔治·W·布什政府让家庭宣告破产并核销债务变得更加困难。


Then came the financial crisis, which cost millions of Americans their jobs and homes.	随后金融危机爆发，数百万美国人丢掉了工作和住宅。


When unemployment insurance, designed for short-term bouts of joblessness in a full-employment world, ran out, they were left to fend for themselves, with no safety net (beyond food stamps), while the government bailed out the banks that had caused the crisis.	在专为充分就业状况下的短期失业设计的失业保险耗尽之后，人们只得自生自灭，（除了食品券外）没有任何社会安全网，而政府却出手去解救那些导致了危机的银行。


The basic perquisites of a middle-class life were increasingly beyond the reach of a growing share of Americans.	越来越多的美国人无法达到中产阶级的生活水平。


The Great Recession had shown their vulnerability.	这场大衰退展现了人们的脆弱性。


Those who had invested in the stock market saw much of their wealth wiped out; those who had put their money in safe government bonds saw retirement income diminish to near zero, as the Fed relentlessly drove down both short- and long-term interest rates.	这些曾投资于股市的人眼看着大笔财富灰飞烟灭； 由于美联储无情地压低了短期和长期利率，那些把钱放在在政府安全债券的人发现退休后的收入减少到近乎零。


With college tuition soaring, the only way their children could get the education that would provide a modicum of hope was to borrow; but, with education loans virtually never dischargeable, student debt seemed even worse than other forms of debt.	随着大学学费飞涨，让他们的孩子能得到教育——这算是一点点希望之火——的唯一方法是借钱； 但是由于教育贷款基本上从来不会被免除，学生负债似乎比其他形式的债务更加恶劣。


There was no way that this mounting financial pressure could not have placed middle-class Americans and their families under greater stress.	这种金融压力只会让中产阶级美国人和他们的家庭神经更加紧绷。


And it is not surprising that this has been reflected in higher rates of drug abuse, alcoholism, and suicide.	于是吸毒，酗酒和自杀的比率不断走高就不出意外了。


I was chief economist of the World Bank in the late 1990s, when we began to receive similarly depressing news from Russia.	本人曾在在1990年代末担任世界银行的首席经济学家，当时我们开始收到来自俄罗斯的类似坏消息。


Our data showed that GDP had fallen some 30% since the collapse of the Soviet Union. But we weren’t confident in our measurements.	数据显示自苏联解体后其GDP已下降约30％，但我们对自己的测量方式没什么信心。


Data showing that male life expectancy was declining, even as it was increasing in the rest of the world, confirmed the impression that things were not going very well in Russia, especially outside of the major cities.	世界其他地区男性的预期寿命都在上升，俄罗斯的数字却不断下降，这令我们确信当地情况不妙，尤其是在那些大城市以外的地区。


The international Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, which I co-chaired and on which Deaton served, had earlier emphasized that GDP often is not a good measure of a society’s wellbeing.	由本人担任联合主席同时迪顿参与的经济表现和社会进步国际测定委员会早前就强调，GDP往往不是衡量社会福祉的优秀指标。


These new data on white Americans’ declining health status confirms this conclusion.	美国白人健康状况下降的新数据证实了这一结论。


The world’s quintessential middle-class society is on the way to becoming its first former middle-class society.	美国这个世界典型的中产阶级社会正在沦为它的第一个前中产阶级社会。


Oil’s New Normal	石油的新常态


LAGUNA BEACH – Oil prices have been heading south again, with a barrel of US crude recently falling below $42 – the lowest level since March 2009, the nadir of the global financial crisis.	拉古娜海滩—石油价格一直在下跌，美国原油最近已跌至42美元/桶下方——这是2009年3月全球金融危机低点以来的最低水平。


And, while last year’s sharp price drop was heavily influenced by two large supply shocks, the current decline also has an important demand dimension.	去年的暴跌受到两次供给冲击的巨大影响，而最近的下跌则存在重要的需求因素。


At the same time, oil markets are discovering what it is like to operate under the regime of a new swing producer: the United States.	与此同时，石油市场发现，它似乎多了一个新的摇摆生产国：美国。


As a result, the price formation process is much clumsier nowadays, with considerably longer adjustment lags.	结果，今天的市场形成过程笨拙了许多，出现了比以前长得多的调整时滞。


The dynamics of the energy markets changed notably as shale-oil production came onstream at a market-moving scale in 2013-2014.	2013—2014年，页岩石油生产以足以影响市场的规模源源涌出，这大大改变了能源市场动态。


With this new source meeting more of world energy demand, particularly in the US, energy users were no longer as dependent on OPEC and other oil producers.	这一新资源满足了更多的世界能源需求，特别是美国的需求，能源用户不在依赖欧佩克和其他石油生产者。


In the process, they also became less vulnerable to geopolitical concerns.	在此过程中，它们也不再那么容易受到地缘政治因素影响了。


Adding to the supply-side changes was Saudi Arabia’s subsequent historic announcement that it would no longer lead OPEC in playing the role of swing producer.	另一个供给端因素是沙特阿拉伯随后历史性地宣布，它将不再领导欧佩克充当石油的摇摆生产者角色。


It would no longer lower production when prices fell sharply, and increase output in response to large price surges.	它不会再在石油价格暴跌时减产，也不会再在石油价格大涨时增产。


That decision was both understandable and rational.	这一决定不难理解，也符合理性。


Playing the role of swing producer was coming at a growing cost to both current and future generations of Saudi citizens.	扮演摇摆生产者的角色对于当前和未来沙特公民来说成本日益增加。


Non-traditional suppliers had increased their market influence, non-OPEC producers continued to plan high output, and some OPEC members failed to adhere to their production ceilings.	非传统供给者的市场影响力有所扩大，非欧佩克生产国继续规划高产出，而一些欧佩克成员国也不遵守产量上限。


Given all this, Saudi Arabia could no longer be expected to incur the growing short- and long-term cost of being the stabilizing market force that it had been for decades.	考虑到这些因素，不必期待沙特阿拉伯像过去几十年来那样继续承担日益增加的稳定市场的短期和长期成本。


Such fundamental changes in the supply side of the market naturally drove oil prices lower – a lot lower.	这一市场供给端的根本性变化自然导致了石油价格的下跌——大幅下跌。


Prices plummeted by more than half in a period of just a few months last year, catching many oil traders and analysts by surprise.	去年，在短短几个月中，石油价格暴跌一大半，让许多石油交易者和分析师大跌眼镜。


Oil prices stabilized after a somewhat temporary overshoot, trading increasingly robustly for a while on the back of two conventional market reactions.	石油价格在一定程度的暂时性过度调整后有所稳定，在两次常规市场反弹的支持下，石油交易日益健康活跃。


First, the large price drop caused massive supply destruction, as some energy producers, from both the traditional and non-traditional sectors, became unprofitable.	首先，价格大跌导致大规模减产，因为一些传统和非传统部门的能源生产商无法盈利。


Second, as consumers reacted to lower energy costs, demand adjusted only gradually.	其次，随着消费者对下跌的能源成本做出了反应，需求只是逐渐调整。


But a new factor soon disturbed this relative stability, pushing oil prices even lower: Evidence that the global economy was weakening, and that much of the weakening was occurring in relatively energy-intensive countries such as China and Brazil, as well as Russia (itself an energy producer).	但一个新因素很快动摇了这一相对稳定的局面，让油价进一步下跌：证据表明全球经济日趋疲软，并且这一疲软大部分发生在相对能源密集型国家，如中国和巴西，以及俄罗斯（它本身也是能源生产国）。


Today, indicators of this global slowdown are to be found everywhere – from underwhelming retail and trade data to unanticipated policy responses, including China’s surprise currency devaluation (which coincides with its leaders’ commitment to a long-term shift toward a more market-based exchange-rate regime).	如今，全球减速的迹象随处可见——从令人失望的零售和贸易数据到意料之外的政策反应，比如中国意外地实施货币贬值（恰好发生在中国领导人承诺实现通往市场汇率机制的长期转型的同时）。


The impact is not limited to economic performance and financial-market movements.	影响不仅仅局限于经济表现和金融市场走势。


Slower global growth is also amplifying political pressures and, in some countries, adding to social strains – both of which tend to constrain policy responses.	全球增长的减缓也增加了政治压力，在一些国家还增加了社会压力——而这两者总是会掣肘政策反应。


It is hard to see the global oil market’s current configuration of supply and demand rapidly changing any time soon.	很难说全球石油市场目前的供需状况会在短时间内发生迅速变化。


As for the new swing producer, the US has a much slower (and leakier) reaction function relative to that of Saudi Arabia and OPEC.	而新晋摇摆生产者——美国的反应功能相对沙特阿拉伯和欧佩克来说要慢得多（漏出项也大得多）。


Over the next few months, the US will indeed alter its supply and demand conditions in a way that puts a floor under oil prices and enables a gradual recovery in the market.	在未来几个月中，美国确实将改变其供给和需求条件，形成石油价格的底线并让市场得以缓慢复苏。


But, unlike the previous swing producer, this will result from traditional market forces, not policy decisions.	但是，与此前的摇摆生产者不同，这将来自传统市场力量而非政策决定。


Indeed, we should expect an even sharper reduction in US energy output as persistently low prices increase the pressure on domestic producers.	事实上，随着持续低油价增加国内生产者的压力，我们可以期待美国能源产出会有更大程度的减产。


From the shutdown of additional rigs to the curtailment of new investment in exploiting shale resources, the US will likely experience a fall in its absolute energy production, as well as in its share of world output.	从关闭新增钻井到削减勘探页岩资源的新投资，美国绝对能源产量可能会出现下降，占世界产出比例亦然。


But, while demand will increase, this will not have much of an immediate effect on oil prices.	但是，尽管需求将上升，但这并不会立刻对石油价格形成很大影响。


Yes, US consumers will be tempted to buy more trucks and bigger cars, drive more miles, and fly to more places.	诚然，美国消费者会被吸引购买更多卡车和更大的汽车，驾车行驶更大里程，更多地坐飞机出行。


But the creation of this demand will be very gradual, especially given all the leakages in the transmission of lower energy-input costs to consumer fuel prices.	但这一需求的创造将十分缓慢，特别是，在能源投入品成本的下降渗透到消费者燃料价格的过程中会有许多“漏出”。


At the end of the day, no swing producer controls the fate of today’s oil prices.	最终，当今石油价格的命运并不掌握在摇摆生产者手中。


A sustained price recovery requires a healthier global economy that combines faster inclusive growth and greater financial stability.	持续价格复苏需要一个结合更快的包容性增长和更大的金融稳定的更健康的全球经济。


And this will not occur quickly, especially given the policy shortcomings in both advanced and emerging countries.	而这不可能马上实现，特别是考虑到发达和新兴国家都存在各种政策缺陷。


The Inflation Puzzle	通货膨胀之谜


CAMBRIDGE – The low rate of inflation in the United States is a puzzle, especially to economists who focus on the relationship between inflation and changes in the monetary base.	美国剑桥—美国通胀率低是一个谜，特别是对于关注通胀和货币基础变化的关系的经济学家来说。


After all, in the past, increases and decreases in the growth rate of the monetary base (currency in circulation plus commercial banks’ reserves held at the central bank) produced – or at least were accompanied by – rises and falls in the inflation rate.	毕竟，在过去，货币基础（流通中货币加上商业银行存在央行的准备金）的增加和减少制造——或至少伴随着——通胀率的上升和下降。


And, because the monetary base is controlled directly by the central bank, and is not created by commercial banks, many believe that it is the best measure of the impact of monetary policy.	此外，由于货币基础由央行直接控制而非由商业银行创造，因此许多人相信它是衡量货币政策影响的最佳指标。


For example, the US monetary base rose at an annual rate of 9% from 1985 to 1995, and then slowed to 6% in the next decade.	比如，1985—1995年间美国货币基础以每年9%的速度增加，而在此后的十年内放缓至每年6%。


This decelerating monetary growth was accompanied by a slowdown in the pace of inflation.	这一货币增长的放缓伴随着通货膨胀的下降。


The consumer price index (CPI) rose at a 3.5% rate from 1985 to 1995, and then slowed to just 2.5% in the decade to 2005.	消费物价指数（CPI）增长率在1958—1995年间为3. 5%，而在随后的十年中下降到2.


But then the link between the monetary base and the rate of inflation was severed.	但随后货币基础和通货膨胀率之间的联系被切断了。


From 2005 to 2015, the monetary base soared at an annual rate of 17.8%, whereas the CPI increased at an annual rate of just 1.9%.	从2005年到2015年，货币基础以17. 8%每年的速度增加，而CPI增长年率只有1.


To explain this abrupt and radical change requires examining more closely the relationship between the monetary base and inflation, and understanding the changing role of the reserves that commercial banks hold at the Federal Reserve.	要解释这一突然而彻底的变化，需要更仔细地考察货币基础和通货膨胀的关系，理解商业银行存放在美联储的准备金的角色变化。


When banks make loans, they create deposits for borrowers, who draw on these funds to make purchases.	当银行发放贷款时，它们为借款人创造存款，后者用这些资金采购。


That generally transfers the deposits from the lending bank to another bank.	总体而言，这将储蓄从贷款银行转移到另一家银行。


Banks are required by law to maintain reserves at the Fed in proportion to the checkable deposits on their books.	根据法律，银行必须按照账面活期存款（checkable deposit）的一定比例向美联储上缴准备金。


So an increase in reserves allows commercial banks to create more of such deposits.	因此，准备金的增加让商业银行能够创造更多这类存款。


That means they can make more loans, giving borrowers more funds to spend.	这意味着它们可以发放更多贷款，给借款人更多的钱用于支出。


The increased spending leads to higher employment, an increase in capacity utilization, and, eventually, upward pressure on wages and prices.	支出的增加带来就业提高、产能利用率增加，最终形成工资和物价的上涨压力。


To increase commercial banks’ reserves, the Fed historically used open-market operations, buying Treasury bills from them.	要增加商业银行的准备金，历史上美联储使用的办法是公开市场操作，从前者手中购买美国国债。


The banks exchanged an interest-paying Treasury bill for a reserve deposit at the Fed that historically did not earn any interest.	银行用付息美国国债交换历史上不产生任何利息的美联储准备金存款。


That made sense only if the bank used the reserves to back up expanded lending and deposits.	这一交易只有在银行用准备金支持贷款和存款扩张的情况下才有意义。


A bank that that did not need the additional reserves could of course lend them to another bank that did, earning interest at the federal funds rate on that interbank loan.	当然，不需要新增准备金的银行可以将它们贷给另一家需要的银行，并获得这笔银行间贷款的联邦基金利率。


Essentially all of the increased reserves ended up being “used” to support increased commercial lending.	最终，基本上所有的新增准备金都被“用于”支持商业贷款的增加。


All of this changed in 2008, when a legislative reform allowed the Fed to pay interest on excess reserves.	2008年改变了一切。 立法改革允许美联储向超额准备金付息。


The commercial banks could sell Treasury bills and longer-term bonds to the Fed, receive reserves in exchange, and earn a small but very safe return on those reserves.	商业银行可以向美联储出售美国国债和长期债券，换取准备金，并从中赚取小额但相当安全的回报。


That gave the Fed the ability in 2010 to begin its massive monthly purchases of long-term bonds and mortgage-backed securities.	这让美联储有能力在2010年开始大规模按月购买长期债券和按揭支持证券。


This quantitative easing (QE) allowed the Fed to drive down long-term interest rates directly, leading to a rise in the stock market and to a recovery in prices of owner-occupied homes.	这一量化宽松（QE）使美联储直接降低了长期利率，导致股市上涨和屋主自住房屋价格回升。


The resulting rise in household wealth boosted consumer spending and revived residential construction.	由此带来的家庭财富增长刺激了消费支出，重振了住宅建设。


And businesses responded to this by stepping up the pace of investment.	而企业对此的反应是增加投资。


Although a link between the Fed’s creation of reserves and the subsequent increase in spending remained, its magnitude changed dramatically.	尽管美联储创造准备金及其后支出增加之间的关系仍然存在，但其程度已经发生了很大的变化。


The Fed increased its securities holdings from less than $1 trillion in 2007 to more than $4 trillion today.	美联储证券持有量从2007年的不到1万亿美元增加到如今的4万亿美元以上。


But, rather than being used to facilitate increased commercial bank lending and deposits, the additional reserves created in this process were held at the Fed – simply the by-product of the effort, via QE, to drive down long-term interest rates and increase household wealth.	但是，在此过程中发生的准备金增量并没有用于促使商业银行贷款和存款增加，而是存在了美联储——这完全是通过QE压低长期利率、增加家庭财富的措施的副作用。


That brings us back to the apparent puzzle of low inflation.	这让我们回到了表面上的低通胀之谜。


The overall CPI is actually slightly lower now than it was a year ago, implying a negative inflation rate.	如今，总体CPI实际比一年前略低，这意味着负通胀。


A major reason is the decline in gasoline and other energy prices.	一个主要原因是汽油和其他能源价格下降。


The energy component of the CPI fell over the last 12 months by 19%.	能源占CPI的比重在过去12个月下降了19%。


The so-called “core” CPI, which excludes volatile energy and food prices, rose (though only by 1.8%).	所谓的“核心”CPI，即剔除了高波动的能源和食品价格的CPI，仍有所上升（尽管幅度只有1. 8%）。


Moreover, the dollar’s appreciation relative to other currencies has reduced import costs, putting competitive pressure on domestic firms to reduce prices.	此外，美元相对其他货币升值降低了进口成本，给国内企业造成了降价的竞争压力。 这清楚地反映在-0.


That is clearly reflected in the difference between the -0.2% annual inflation rate for goods and the 2.5% rate for services (over the past 12 months).	2%的商品年通胀率和2. 5%的服务年通胀率（过去12个月）之间的差异上。


Nonetheless, inflation will head higher in the year ahead.	尽管如此，通货膨胀在未来一年中仍将走高。


Labor markets have tightened significantly, with the overall unemployment rate down to 5.4%.	劳动力市场已大为趋紧，总体失业率已下降至5. 4%。


The unemployment rate among those who have been unemployed for less than six months – a key indicator of inflation pressure – is down to 3.8%.	��业时间不超过六个月的失业率——通胀压力的关键指标——已下降至3. 8%。


And the unemployment rate among college graduates is just 2.7%.	而大学毕业生失业率只有2. 7%。


As a result, total compensation per hour is rising more rapidly, with the annual rate increasing to 3.1% in the first quarter of 2015, from 2.5% in 2014 as a whole and 1.1% in 2013.	因此，总时薪正在快速增长，2015年一季度增长年率为3. 1%，而2014年全年为2.


These higher wage costs are not showing up yet in overall inflation because of the countervailing impact of energy prices and import costs.	1%。 这些增加的工资成本尚未表现在总体通胀中，原因就在能源价格和进口品成本下降的抵消作用。


But, as these temporary influences fall away in the coming year, overall price inflation will begin to increase more rapidly.	但是，随着这些暂时性影响在未来一年中逐渐消失，总体物价通胀将开始更快地增长。


Indeed, the inflation risk is on the upside, especially if the Fed sticks to its plan to keep its real short-term interest rate negative until the end of 2016 and to raise it to one percentage point only by the end of 2017.	事实上，通胀风险在于增加，特别是如果美联储坚持将真实短期利率为负的情况一直保持到2016年底、并在2017年底前只提高一个百分点的话。


If inflation does rise faster than the Fed expects, it may be forced to increase interest rates rapidly, with adverse effects on financial markets and potentially on the broader economy.	如果通货膨胀增加确实比美联储预期的更快，美联储或许将被迫更快地提高利率，给金融市场乃至整体经济造成不利影响。


The Oil Price Opportunity	油价的机会


WASHINGTON, DC – The sharp drop in the price of crude oil since late June has been grabbing headlines worldwide – and producing a lot of contradictory explanations.	华盛顿—6月以来，原油价格的暴跌吸引着全世界的目光——也产生了许多互相矛盾的解释。


Some attribute the fall largely to declining global growth expectations.	有些人把下跌原因主要归于全球增长预期的下降。


Others focus on the expansion of America’s oil and gas production.	也有人关注美国石油和天然气生产的扩张。


Still others suspect a tacit agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United States aimed at, among other things, weakening political rivals like Russia and Iran.	还有人怀疑是沙特阿拉伯和美国心照不宣地合作，目标在于（包括但不限于）削弱俄罗斯和伊朗等政治对手。


Regardless of the reason for the price drop – probably to be found in some combination of these factors – the consequences are the same.	不论价格下跌原因为何——也许是这些因素的某种合力——结果是相同的。


Though, as International Monetary Fund Managing Director Christine Lagarde has noted, lower oil prices may boost overall global growth, with the oil-importing advanced economies gaining the most, the impact on efforts to combat climate change could be devastating.	尽管如国际货币基金组织（IMF）总裁拉加德所指出的，较低的油价可能提振全球总增长，其中石油进口发达经济体获益最多，但对气候变化战役的影响可能是灾难性的。


Indeed, a sustained decline in oil prices would not only make renewable energy sources less competitive now; it would impede their future competitiveness by discouraging research and investment.	事实上，石油价格的持续下跌不但让可再生能源资源竞争力下降； 还阻挠了研究和投资，使它们的未来竞争力进一步削弱。


More generally, it would reduce the incentive for consumers, companies, and governments to pursue more energy-efficient practices.	更一般地，这抑制了消费者、公司和政府追求能源节约型行为的激励。


Even if we remained on our current trajectory, keeping temperatures from rising more than 2º Celsius above pre-industrial levels – the threshold beyond which the most disruptive consequences of climate change would be triggered – would be next to impossible to achieve.	即使保持现有趋势，将气温限制在前工业化水平以上2℃之内——超过这一阈值就有可能引发灾难性后果——也将是难以完成的目标。


As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s most recent report reinforced, we cannot afford a slowdown in progress.	正如政府间气候变化专门委员会（Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change）最近的报告所强调的，我们决不能在这方面减慢速度。


Of course, climate science is not precise; instead, it works in terms of probability ranges.	当然，气候学不是精确的科学； 相反，它是一门概率范围科学。


But uncertain estimates do not mean that the risk is any less acute.	但不确定的估计并不意味着风险不尖锐。


World leaders increasingly seem to recognize this in theory, including at the just-concluded climate-change meeting in Lima, Peru.	理论上说，世界领导人日益认识到了这一点，刚刚结束的秘鲁利马气候变化会议就是明证。


But they continue to depend on non-binding commitments – leaving the world on a dangerous climate trajectory.	但它们继续依赖不具约束力的承诺——放任世界继续走在危险的气候轨迹上。


A sharp decline in oil prices does, however, provide a rare political opportunity to introduce more carbon pricing.	但是，油价的急剧下跌确实提供了千载难逢的政治集会引入更多的碳定价。


After all, one of the major arguments against a “carbon tax” has been that it would make energy more expensive.	毕竟，反对“碳税”的一大理由是这会让能源变得更加昂贵。


Even assurances that the revenue from such a tax would be refunded to taxpayers were inadequate to overcome political resistance, particularly in the US.	即使保证这一税种的收入将用于向纳税人返利，但这仍不足以克服政治反对，特别是在美国。


But, with declining oil prices now exerting downward pressure on oil substitutes, a carbon tax could be introduced without raising the price of energy for consumers.	但是，如今，油价下跌正在给石油替代品造成不利影响，碳税可以再不会抬高消费者能源价格的情况下实施。


Policymakers must simply be willing to forego some of the short-term stimulus effects of cheaper energy.	决策者完全应该愿意放弃一些来自廉价能源的短期刺激效应。


In fact, with low enough prices, consumers could still benefit from lower energy costs – just not quite as much as they are now.	事实上，如果价格足够低，消费者仍能从能源成本下降中获益——只是好处没有像现在那么大罢了。


The structure of a carbon-pricing scheme remains up for discussion.	碳定价机制的结构仍有待讨论。


One option would be to introduce flexible pricing, tied to the price of oil.	一个选择时引入弹性定价，与石油价格绑定。


For example, for every $5 decline in the price per barrel, the carbon tax could be raised by a specified amount; for every $5 increase, the tax could be lowered by, say, two-thirds of that amount.	比如，石油价格每下跌5美元/桶，碳税就提高一个特定数额； 每上涨5美元，碳税就下调（比如）这一特定数额的三分之二。


The carbon price would thus increase over time – the optimal outcome, according to growth models that account for climate constraints.	因此，碳价将随时间的推移而增加——根据考虑气候约束的增长模型，这是最优结果。


At the same time, it would buffer consumers from oil-price volatility, thereby stabilizing their energy spending.	与此同时，这也能保护消费者面临油价波动，从而稳定能源支出。


Finally, and perhaps most important, such an approach would be more politically attractive than a fixed carbon tax, especially if it is introduced at a time of sharply declining oil prices.	最后也许也是最重要的是，这一方针比固定碳税更具政治吸引力，特别是在油价暴跌时采用的话。


In short, world leaders must take advantage of falling oil prices to move beyond indirect carbon pricing – achieved through the prices of carbon-emitting substances – to an explicit carbon tax that can help steer the world onto a more sustainable growth path.	简言之，世界领导人必须利用油价下跌之机突破碳定价的间接现状，实现有助于让世界走向更加可持续的增长路径的直接碳税——通过碳排物质的价格实现。


Crucially, in order to make a real impact, carbon-pricing schemes would have to be introduced in all major economies.	关键是，为了产生真正的影响，碳定价机制必须在所有经济体同时实施。


Of course, given the multitude of existing taxes, fees, and subsidies on energy products in various countries, the goal of aligning the effective cost of carbon with its most economically efficient level would take time to achieve.	当然，考虑到不同国家现有能源生产税收、费用和补贴的多样性，将碳的实际成本与最划算效率水平相协调需要一定时间才能实现。


But introducing a modest, flexible carbon tax in major economies would be an important first step.	但在主要经济体实施温和、灵活的碳税将是重要的第一步。


Today’s environment of falling oil prices enables the world to take that step.	今天的油价下跌环境让世界能够采取这一步骤。 这一步应该是温和的，以使其具有政治可行性；


It should be modest, so that it is politically feasible; flexible, so that it helps stabilize user prices; and it should increase over time, to place the global economy on a more sustainable path.	它也应该是灵活的，从而有助于稳定用户价格； 它还应该随时间而增加，从而让全球经济走上更加可持续的道路。


Most important, it should be implemented quickly.	最重要的是，它应该马上实施。


After all, this window of opportunity will not remain open for very long.	毕竟，这一机会窗口不会打开很久。


America’s Saving Perils	美国的储蓄危机


NEW HAVEN – US politicians invariably bemoan trade as the enemy of the middle class, the major source of pressure on jobs and wages.	纽黑文—美国政客总是哀叹贸易是中产阶级的敌人，是就业和工资压力的主要来源。


The current presidential campaign is no exception: Republicans and Democrats alike have taken aim at both China and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, holding them up as the scourge of beleaguered American workers.	最近的总统选战也不例外：共和党和民主党都将矛头对准了中国和跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP），说它们是美国工人遭遇困境的祸根。


While this explanation may be politically expedient, the truth lies elsewhere.	这一解释在政治上也许十分方便，但真相并不在此。


When it comes to trade, as I recently argued, America has made its own bed.	我最近指出，对于贸易问题，美国是自作自受。


The culprit is a large saving deficit; The country has been living beyond its means for decades and drawing freely on surplus saving from abroad to fund the greatest consumption binge in history.	罪魁是巨大的储蓄赤字； 几十年来，美国一直入不敷出，大肆吸引海外盈余储蓄来支撑史上最大的消费狂热。


Politicians, of course, don’t want to blame voters for their profligacy; it is much easier to point the finger at others.	当然，政客不想因为选民的挥霍而批评他们； 将矛头指向其他人要容易得多。


The saving critique merits further analysis.	储蓄批评值得进一步分析。


The data show that countries with saving deficits tend to run trade deficits, while those with saving surpluses tend to run trade surpluses.	数据表明，存在储蓄赤字的国家一般伴随着贸易赤字，而储蓄盈余的国家伴随着贸易盈余。 美国是最显著的例子，2015年净国民储蓄率为2.


The United States is the most obvious example, with a net national saving rate of 2.6% in late 2015 – less than half the 6.3% average in the final three decades of the twentieth century – and trade deficits with 101 countries.	6%——还不到二十世纪最后三十年平均水平6. 3%的一半——对101个国家存在贸易赤字。


The pattern also holds true elsewhere.	其他国家也是如此。


The United Kingdom, Canada, Finland, France, Greece, and Portugal – all of which have large trade deficits – save much less than other developed countries.	英国、加拿大、芬兰、法国、希腊和葡萄牙——它们都存在巨大的贸易赤字——储蓄远远少于其他发达国家。


Conversely, high savers like Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, South Korea, Sweden, and Switzerland all run trade surpluses.	相反，高储蓄国家，如德国、日本、荷兰、挪威、丹麦、韩国、瑞典和瑞士都有巨大的贸易盈余。


Saving imbalances can also lead to destabilizing international capital flows, asset bubbles, and financial crises.	储蓄失衡还可能导致破坏性国际资本流、资产泡沫和金融危机。


That was the case in the run-up to the financial crisis of 2008-2009, when global saving imbalances, as measured by the disparities between countries with current-account deficits and surpluses, hit a modern record.	2008—2009年金融危机的根源就在于此，以经常项目赤字国和盈余国差距大小衡量的全球储蓄失衡创造了现代史的记录。


The asset and credit bubbles fueled by those imbalances brought the world to the brink of an abyss not seen since the 1930s.	受此失衡推动的资产和信用泡沫几乎让世界陷入20世纪30年代以来所未见的萧条。


Here, too, there is considerable finger pointing.	在这方面，也有可观的谴责游戏。


Deficit countries tend to blame the yield-seeking “saving glut” that sloshes around in world financial markets.	赤字国总是指责在全球金融市场中寻找收益率的“储蓄过剩”。


As former US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke put it, if only countries like China had spent more, the bubbles that nearly broke America would not have formed in the first place.	美联储前主席本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke）指出，要是中国等国家支出更多，那么几乎让美国破产的泡沫一开始就不会形成。


Others have been quick to point out that America’s supposed growth miracle probably could not have happened without the capital provided by surplus countries.	其他国家很快便指出，要不是盈余国提供的资本，美国所谓的增长奇迹可能根本不会发生。


The prudent approach would be to strike a better balance between saving and spending.	审慎的方法是在储蓄和支出之间达到更好的平衡。


That is particularly important for the US and China, which together account for a disproportionate share of the world’s saving disparities.	对美国和中国来说这一点尤其重要，这两个国家占了全球储蓄差异的一大半。


Simply put, America needs to save more and consume less, while China needs to save less and consume more.	简言之，美国需要增加储蓄，减少消费，而中国需要减少储蓄，增加消费。


To succeed, both countries will have to overcome entrenched mindsets.	要想成功，两国都必须克服根深蒂固的思维。


On this front, China has been leading the way, with a strategy of consumer-led rebalancing that it introduced five years ago.	在这方面，中国一直领先美国，五年前便已经制定了消费拉动的再平衡战略。


The results so far have been mixed, as inadequate funding of a social safety net continues to temper the support to household incomes provided by services-driven job creation and urbanization-led increases in real wages.	到目前为止，这一战略成果不显著，社会安全网资金不足继续制约着服务驱动的就业创造和城市化拉动的真实工资增长给家庭收入带来的支持。


But China has lately shown a commitment to addressing this shortcoming.	但中国最近表现出解决这一不足的决心。


Its recently enacted 13th Five-Year Plan aims to dampen fear-driven precautionary saving through interest-rate liberalization, the introduction of deposit insurance, the loosening of the hukou residential permit system (which would improve benefit portability), and relaxation of the one-child family planning policy.	其最近实施的十三五规划旨在通过利率自由化、引入存款保险和放松户口制度（这将改善社会福利的流动性）和放松一孩计划生育来破除基于恐惧的预防性储蓄。


The US, however, is headed in the opposite direction.	但是，美国走在了相反的方向。


There is no interest in debating the saving issue, let alone implementing policies to address it.	美国人根本不想讨论储蓄问题，更不用说采取政策解决它了。


A pro-saving US policy agenda should draw on the following: longer-term fiscal consolidation, expanded IRAs (individual retirement accounts) and 401Ks, consumption-based tax reform (such as value-added or sales taxes), and interest-rate normalization.	支持储蓄的美国政策日程应该是这样的：长期财政整合、扩大IRA（个人退休账户）和401K、基于消费的税收改革（如增值税或销售税）以及利率正常化。


Instead, US politicians continue to focus on keeping the consumption binge going, regardless of its implications for America’s saving imperative.	相反，美国政客继续将注意力集中在维持消费狂热，不顾其对美国储蓄问题造成的后果。


The asymmetrical response of the world’s two largest economies to their respective saving dilemmas has far-reaching consequences.	世界前两大经济体对各自储蓄困境的不对称反应造成了影响深远的后果。


To the extent that China makes progress on the road to consumer-led rebalancing, it will shift from surplus saving to saving absorption.	中国正在朝消费拉动的再平衡迈进，它将从储蓄盈余国转变为储蓄吸收国。


Already, China’s gross national saving rate has declined from a peak of 52% of GDP in 2008 to around 44% this year.	目前，中国国民总储蓄率已经从2008年占GDP的52%的峰值下降到今年的44%左右。


It should fall further in the years ahead.	未来几年���该还会继续下降。


The US, long locked in a codependent economic relationship with China, cannot afford to ignore this shift.	长期依靠相互依存的中美经济关系的美国决不能忽视这一转变。


After all, along with reduced current-account and trade surpluses, China’s consumer-led shift to saving absorption likely entails diminished accumulation of foreign-exchange reserves and reduced recycling of those reserves into dollar-based assets such as US Treasuries.	毕竟，在经常项目和贸易盈余下降的同时，中国消费拉动的吸收储蓄转型可能意味着外汇储备积累放缓，降低其外汇储备再转变为美国国债等美元计价资产的规模。


To the extent that America fails to boost its domestic saving, the lack of Chinese capital may well force the US to pay a steeper price for external financing, through a weaker dollar, higher real interest rates, or both.	如果美国不能刺激国内储蓄，那么中国资本告急可能迫使美国为外部融资支付更加高昂的代价——可能是美元贬值或提高真实利率，或两者兼而有之。


Such are the classic pitfalls of codependency: when one partner alters the relationship, there are consequences for the other.	这便是经典的相互依存陷阱：当一方改变关系时，另一方将受到冲击。


No country can prosper indefinitely without saving.	没有国家可以在没有储蓄的情况下无限地繁荣下去。


Holding the world’s reserve currency, America has gotten away with it, largely because the rest of the world let it.	拥有世界储备货币的美国之所以能在没有储蓄的情况下活得好好的，主要是因为世界其他国家的配合。


After all, the enablers – especially export-led economies like China, along with its resource-dependent supply chain – benefited from America’s consumption binge, as it drove an outsize expansion of global trade.	毕竟，成就美国的国家——特别是中国等出口拉动经济体及其依赖资源的供应链——从美国的消费狂热中获益，因为这大大刺激了全球贸易的扩张。


But those days are numbered.	但这样的日子屈指可数了。


American voters – especially disenfranchised, angry middle-class workers – increasingly recognize that something does not add up.	美国选民——特别是丧失权利的愤怒的中产阶级工人——日益认识到有些东西没有增加。


Yet US politicians continue to deflect the electorate’s anger outward, dismissing the growth subsidy that accompanies the “kindness of strangers.”	但美国政客仍然在向外转移选民的愤怒，排挤伴随“陌生人的友善”而来的增长补贴。


It is time for politicians to own up to the uncomfortable truth: The saving deficit is the single greatest threat to the American Dream.	美国政客应该坦率承认令人不快的事实：储蓄赤字才是美国梦最大的威胁。


Lucky Little Countries?	幸运的欧洲小国


AMSTERDAM – Western Europe’s small democracies have, on the whole, been exceptionally fortunate.	阿姆斯特丹——总体而言，欧洲的民主小国极为幸运。


Freer and richer than almost anywhere else in the world, countries such as Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland would seem to have little to worry about.	向荷兰、比利时以及瑞士等国家比世界上的几乎所有地方都更为自由和富有，它们似乎没有什么可以担忧的。


This is why the world normally hears less about them than about Afghanistan, say, or Kosovo.	这就是为何有关阿富汗或者科索沃的消息比这些国家更多。


Yet all three have been much in the news of late – and not for happy reasons.	但是最近这三个国家都有点新闻，但是不是什么好消息。


The most successful political force in Switzerland today is Christoph Blocher’s Swiss People’s Party.	如今在瑞士最为成功的政党是布洛谢领导的瑞士人民党。


The party’s propaganda material tells its story.	该党的宣传材料就说明了问题。


A poster shows three white sheep kicking a black sheep off the Swiss flag.	一张海报画着三只白羊正在把一只黑羊从瑞士国旗上踢走。


And images of junkies and Muslim women in headscarves are contrasted in a promotional movie with idyllic pictures of Alpine scenery and efficient banks – the People’s Party’s Switzerland.	而在宣传电影中，瘾君子和戴头巾的穆斯林妇女与田园诗般的阿尔卑斯风景和高效率的银行形成对照。 这就是人民党的瑞士。


Vlaams Belang, the Flemish nationalist party, may not be the biggest party in Belgium, but it has done well in local elections.	佛拉芒国民党或许并不是比利时最大的党派，但是它在地方选举中表现不俗。


Like the Swiss People’s Party, Vlaams Belang feeds on popular resentment of immigrants – especially Muslim immigrants – of the European Union, and, of course, of the French-speaking Walloons, from whom the Flemish nationalists would like a divorce.	该党像人民党一样也依赖于对于欧盟的移民、特别是穆斯林移民的仇恨，当然还有对讲法语的瓦隆区也是如此。 佛拉芒想要另立门户独立。


This last sentiment is posing a serious threat to Belgium’s survival.	这一仇视对比利时的生存构成严重的威胁。


Although the Dutch government is still managed mostly by mainstream, steady-as-you-go Christian Democrats, right-wing populism is growing.	尽管荷兰政府现在还是有大体上属于主流稳定的基督教民主党管理，但是，右翼民粹主义在抬头。


Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party wants to ban the Koran, halt Muslim immigration, and deprive delinquents with an immigrant background of Dutch citizenship.	维得尔的自由党想要禁止古兰经，停止穆斯林移民并且剥夺有移民背景的犯罪者的公民资格。


The new Proud of the Netherlands Movement, led by Rita Verdonk, the former Minister of Integration, promotes a somewhat more respectable version of this hard line.	由前任融入部长费尔多克领导的新的荷兰骄傲运动则推动这种强硬政策较为令人尊敬的模式。


These parties and movements share a sense that native-born citizens have been let down by liberal political elites, who seem unable or unwilling to stem the tide of immigration, crime, and Islamist militancy, as well as the erosion of national sovereignty by EU bureaucracy and global capitalism.	这些政党和运动的共同之处是，它们都感到自由派政治精英们让土生土长的人们失望，这些精英们无法也不愿意制止移民浪潮、犯罪、伊斯兰暴力以及欧盟官僚机构以及全球化资本主义对国家主权的侵蚀。


Such fears are by no means confined to Europe’s small countries.	这些担忧绝不局限于欧洲小国。


Nicolas Sarkozy’s election in France has at least something to do with similar feelings.	法国萨尔科奇当选总体至少也与这些感觉有关。


But anxieties about being swamped by foreigners and dominated by outside powers are more acute in smaller countries, whose political elites seem particularly impotent.	但是对于被外国人吞没以及被外部势力控制的担忧在小国中尤为突出，这些国家中德政治精英们显得尤为束手无策。


The Dutch case is the most surprising, because, unlike Belgium, the Netherlands has no significant tradition of right-wing populism.	荷兰的情况最为令人惊讶，这是由于荷兰不同于比利时，没有突出的右翼民粹主义传统。


Nor does it share Switzerland’s insularity.	它也不像瑞士那样与世隔绝。


On the contrary, the Dutch pride themselves on their openness and hospitality to foreigners.	相反，荷兰人对他们对外国人的开放和友善而自豪。


The case of Somalia-born Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the bestselling author of Infidel , best illustrates both the popular resentments and the relative openness that mark contemporary Dutch society.	畅销书《异教徒》的作者、出生于索马里的阿里最好地表明了当代荷兰社会突出的民众仇视以及相对开放。


Much criticism and even abuse has been heaped on the Dutch for the way her adopted country has treated her.	其移民国家荷兰对待她的方式引发了大量的批评甚至谩骂。


She has received death threats from Muslim extremists ever since she renounced – indeed, denounced – her Muslim faith, and was forced to live as a virtual fugitive, albeit under the protection of the Dutch state.	自从她放弃乃至谴责其穆斯林信仰以来，她收到了来自穆斯林极端份子的死亡威胁，被迫在荷兰政府的保护下过着逃犯般的生活。


Before moving to the United States, she was forced out of her apartment in The Hague by complaining neighbors, and almost deprived of her passport.	她在移居美国之前，由于邻居的抱怨被赶出了其在海牙的公寓，又几乎被剥夺护照。


Now that she is a permanent US resident, the Dutch government no longer wants to pay for her protection.	现在她是美国的永久居民，荷兰政府不再愿意支付她的保护费用。


Commentators in the US and elsewhere have accused the Dutch of “unacceptable cowardice.”	美国和其他地方的评论员们谴责荷兰是“无法接受的胆怯”。


Salman Rushdie called her “the first refugee from Western Europe since the Holocaust.”	拉什迪称她为“犹太人大屠杀以来来自欧洲的第一个难民”。


French intellectuals, never shy of public posturing, are campaigning to give her French citizenship.	从来都不回避公众姿态的法国知识分子在争取授予她法国国籍。


The way the Dutch government handled the affair was not elegant, to say the least.	至少而言，荷兰政府处理此事的方式并不圆满。


But I’m not sure how many governments do pay for the protection of private citizens who live permanently abroad.	但是我并不知道有多少国家政府的确为永久居住在外国的平民支付保护费用。


The US doesn’t pay to protect its citizens who are under threat even at home.	美国对于其国内受到威胁的公民都并不提供保护。


It is easy to voice contempt of the Dutch government.	对荷兰政府表达鄙视是容易的。


But what has been lost in all the commentary is the nature of Hirsi Ali’s rise to prominence.	但是所有评论没有提及的是阿里是如何取得名声的。


It is hard to imagine many countries where a young African woman could become a famous member of parliament only ten years after seeking asylum.	很难想象在许多国家中，一名寻求避难的年轻非洲女子可以在仅仅十年后成为知名的国会议员。


But the reasons for her rise are not entirely salubrious.	但是她的崛起并不完全是有益的。


Whatever the merits – and they are considerable – of her arguments against the bigotry of Islamic or African customs, especially those concerning the treatment of women, she lent respectability to bigotry of a different kind: the native resentment of foreigners, and Muslims in particular.	不管她对偏执地遵从伊斯兰或非洲习俗的批评，尤其是对待妇女方面的习俗，有多大价值——事实上有很大的价值，她遵从的是另一种偏执——国人对外国人，尤其是穆斯林的憎恨。


Indeed, contrary to what some commentators have written, it wasn’t cowardly liberals who hounded Hirsi Ali out of the country because of her politically incorrect views about Islam.	事实上，与某些评论家所写的恰恰相反，并不是懦弱的自由主义者因为阿里对伊斯兰教在政治上不正确的观点而要把她逐出这个国家。


She was betrayed by her own former ally, Rita Verdonk, and a variety of Dutch xenophobes, who don’t like an outspoken black female immigrant from Somalia any more than they like Muslims.	实际上她遭到了她自己以前的盟友，费尔多克以及荷兰各种对外国人持憎恨态度的人的背叛，他们对一个来自索马里的敢于直言不讳的黑人女移民的讨厌并不亚于他们对穆斯林的讨厌。


But the truth in these matters counts for less than the emotions.	但是比起这些事情的真相来，情绪占据了更重要的地位。


And the emotions in this case betray an element of Schadenfreude: look at how even the Dutch, always boasting of their superior tolerance and liberalism, have responded like cowards when their principles are truly tested.	而在这件事情所表现出的情绪显示出了一种幸灾乐祸：看看甚至是经常标榜他们高度的容忍性和自由主义的荷兰人，当他们的原则受到真正的考验时，是怎样表现得像一个懦夫的。


It is true that the Dutch, proud and comfortable inside their narrow borders, have, like the Swiss, often viewed the outside world with a degree of smugness.	自豪并且舒适地生活在他们自己狭小的国家里的荷兰人确实像瑞士人一样经常以一种自命不凡的眼光看待外部的世界。


And for this they are now being punished.	而他们现在因为这点而受到了惩罚。


That, too, is the natural fate of being a lucky little country in Western Europe.	这其实也是位于西欧的一个幸运的小国自然的命运。


Lucky Putin, Unlucky Yeltsin	幸运的普京，不幸的叶利钦


Russian President Vladimir Putin’s assertive foreign policy stance of recent years reflects the confidence that comes with a booming economy.	俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京（Vladimir Putin）在近年奉行的自信的外交政策反应了与经济繁荣携手而至的政治信心。


In 1999, the year before Putin succeeded Boris Yeltsin as president, Russia’s GDP was a paltry $200 billion.	在普京接替叶利钦担任总统以前的1999年，俄国的国内生产总值只有微不足道的2000亿美元。


By last year, it had reached $1 trillion.	而到去年为止，俄国的GDP已经达到了10000亿美元。


Real growth has averaged 7% for eight years, and real incomes have grown by roughly 10% per year.	平均经济增长连续8年来保持在7%左右，而实际收入每年的平均涨幅更是达到了10%。


Russia’s budget surplus has stood at more than 7% of GDP in the last two years, public debt has dwindled to only 8% of GDP, from 100% in 1999, and the current account surplus has averaged at 10% of GDP for the last eight years.	俄罗斯的预算盈余在过去两年中保持在7%以上，而公共债务从1999年占国内生产总值的100%缩减到目前情况下的8%，而经常帐户盈余在过去8年中平均达到了国内生产总值的10%。


But Russia’s stellar economic performance has little to do with Putin’s policy, and a lot to do with the reforms Yeltsin embraced.	但俄国一流的经济表现与普京政策之间的关系微乎其微，却与叶利钦推行的改革关系密切。


By 1998, Russia already had achieved a critical mass of markets and private enterprise, while the financial crash of that year worked like a catharsis, forcing the government to abolish enterprise subsidies that underpinned a devastating budget deficit of some 9% of GDP.	截止1998年，俄国已经建立起市场和私有企业的基本主体，而此时发生的金融崩溃就像一剂强力泻药，迫使政府取消了对占国内生产总值9%的破坏性预算赤字起支撑作用的企业补贴。


Moreover, world oil prices that had fallen to $10 a barrel started rising toward the stratosphere.	不仅如此，已经降到10美元一桶的世界石油价格再次开始向最高点迈进。


The whole success story thus was in place in early 1999, one year before Putin entered the stage.	成功的机会在1999年初就已经崭露头角，而此时离普京上台执政还有一年的时间。


To be sure, Putin should be praised for substantial economic reforms during his first three years.	可以肯定的是，普京理当因为其执政最初三年中所进行的大规模经济改革而受到赞誉。


A new tax code was adopted, with lower and fewer taxes, notably a flat income tax of 13%.	当时实行了新的税收政策，税收种类有所减少，税率也有所降低，特别是实行了13%的固定所得税率。


The civil code was completed, a new customs code was enacted, and substantial judicial reform was implemented.	民事法规也制定完毕、新的海关法规也开始实行，实质性的司法改革也进入了全面铺开的阶段。


At the same time, however, Putin has systematically eliminated the rudimentary democracy Yeltsin had build.	可与此同时，普京也已经有系统地开始了对叶利钦建立起来的根本民主制度的清洗。


One television channel after another was taken over by the state under various pretexts, as were major newspapers.	一个又一个电视台被国家以各式各样的借口接管，主要的报纸媒体也难逃厄运。


Opposition candidates and parties were denied registration for the slightest formal complaint.	反对派候选人和政党哪怕是最微不足道的正式抗议也被严格禁止。


Falsification of elections became the rule.	在选举中弄虚作假成了不变的规则。


Many prominent Russians favored the Pinochet model of authoritarian politics and liberal economics.	很多地位显赫的俄国人都看好皮诺切特政治独裁而经济自由的发展模式。


But growing authoritarianism also hit business.	但日益成长的独裁主义也给企业造成了沉重的打击。


In October 2003, Putin cracked down on Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the CEO and main owner of Yukos oil, Russia’s most valuable company, who was thrown into prison on dubious charges of tax fraud after backing Putin’s political opponents.	2003年10月，普京镇压了俄国最有价值的公司¾尤科斯石油公司的首席执行官兼主要所有者米哈伊尔·霍多尔科夫斯基(Mikhail Khodorkovsky)，此人在支持普京的政治对手之后便被以令人怀疑的税收诈骗指控投入了监狱。


Moreover, Putin’s associates wanted Yukos’ wealth, which was confiscated by the state oil company Rosneft through lawless taxation, leaving Putin’s tax reform and judicial reform in tatters and severely undermining property rights.	不仅如此，普京的利益相关者希望得到尤科斯的巨额财产，而这笔财产最终被俄罗斯国有石油公司（Rosneft）通过非法税收的方式没收占用，彻底摧毁了普京的税务改革和司法改革，并严重破坏了财产所有权。


In fact, since 2003, Putin’s main economic policy has been re-nationalization.	事实上，从2003年起，普京的主要经济政策就是重新实行国有化。


Well-run private companies have been more or less forced to sell out to state-dominated companies.	经营良好的私营公司或多或少地被迫将股份转卖给由国家控股的公司。


Gazprom is buying up oil (Sibneft), gas, and power companies at knockdown prices, reinforcing its monopoly.	俄国天然气工业股份公司不断地以最低价格买断石油（Sibneft）、天然气和电力公司，其市场垄断地位也因此得到进一步巩固。


That, in turn, allows Gazprom to boost its profitability through price increases, despite stagnant production.	而这样的低价买入又使得俄国天然气工业股份公司在生产停滞的情况下，通过提高价格来获取更多的盈利。


Indeed, with state companies now producing one-third of Russia’s oil, output growth has plummeted, as owners of private enterprises – the source of dynamism in the sector – are now afraid to invest in new capacity.	事实上，由于国有公司现在掌握着俄国三分之一的石油生产，产量的增长已经大幅下降，而扮演着行业活力源泉的私营企业所有者现在不敢投资扩大生产能力。


Among foreign investors, both Shell and TNK-BP are being pushed out by Gazprom in their main gas fields in Russia.	而在外国投资者中，壳牌和英国石油天然气控股公司（TNK－BP）都被俄国天然气工业股份公司挤出了俄国国内的主要天然气田。


Beyond oil and gas, Russia’s arms export agency, Rosoboronexport, has just seized Avtovaz, the giant dysfunctional Soviet car factory, and VSMPO-Avisma, Russia’s big titanium company, while all aircraft production has been concentrated in one state company.	在石油和天然气领域以外，俄国的武器出口机构俄罗斯国防出口公司（Rosoboronexport）兼并了规模庞大但经营不善的苏联汽车企业Avtovaz，以及大型钛金属公司VSMPO-Avisma。 与此同时，所有的飞机制造全部集中到了一家国有企业。


The government cheers this re-nationalization, although it has reduced Russia’s industrial growth from 8.3% in 2004 to 4% in the last two years.	这样的再国有化进程令政府欢欣鼓舞，尽管它使俄国的工业增长从2004年的8. 3%下降到了最近两年的4%。


Similarly, inefficient state banks – far inferior to private banks even in Kazakhstan or Ukraine – dominate the banking system.	与此类似，效率低下的国有银行完全占据了银行系统，这些银行即便与哈萨克斯坦或乌克兰的私有银行相比差距也十分巨大。


The not very profitable state-owned Vneshtorgbank, for example, is on a buying spree, aggravating the quality of Russian banking.	以俄罗斯的国有银行Vneshtorgbank为例，虽然不怎么盈利花钱却大手大脚，使俄国银行业的经营状况进一步恶化。


Increasingly, Russia’s oil surpluses drive economic growth through rising investment, which boosts construction and consumption, in turn benefiting retail trade and finance.	俄国石油行业日益增长的盈利通过促进投资推动经济增长，投资促进了建设和消费，反过来又推动了零售贸易与金融。


With personal incomes rising strongly, poverty is declining, while 68% of Russia’s college-age youth now attend universities.	随着个人收入的大幅度增长，贫困人口数量大大下降，有68%的大学适龄青年现在进入大学就读。


But other social indicators are unimpressive.	但其他的社会状况指标却并不乐观。


Life expectancy for men is stuck at 59.	男性的平均寿命在59岁左右徘徊。


The murder rate is even higher under Putin than it was under Yeltsin, as is the traffic death rate.	普京统治下的谋杀率甚至超过了叶利钦时代，交通死亡率也是一样。


None of the big public systems – education, health care, or the military – has been reformed, and the regime shows little interest in doing so.	没���任何大型公共体制¾包括教育、医疗或军队¾进行了改革，而独裁政府对这样的制度改革也没有多大兴趣。


Instead, the Kremlin is preoccupied with the profitability and value of the state-dominated companies that it controls.	恰恰相反，克里姆林宫的注意力集中在它所控制的国有公司的高额利润和价值。


Not surprisingly, all corruption indicators have been rising since Putin took over from Yeltsin, whereas they are falling in most post-communist countries.	在多数后共产主义国家腐败指数下降的大背景下，在普京接替叶利钦出任总统后，俄国的所有腐败指数在过去几年内都有了大幅度提升，这一点丝毫也不值得大惊小怪。


Although corruption is pervasive, no top official has been prosecuted.	尽管腐败随处可见，但没有任何高层官员被因此提起诉讼。


Putin and his KGB friends from St. Petersburg sit safely on all this wealth, thanks to their authoritarian governance and control over all security organs.	普京和他来自圣彼得堡的克格勃朋友安安稳稳地享受着这巨大的财富，而这多亏了他们的独裁统治和对安全机构的强力控制。


Such a powerful apparatus cannot retire to a quiet life in a dacha as Yeltsin did – it would have to privatize everything first – which implies that Putin has no choice but to remain in office, regardless of what he says about not seeking a third presidential term.	这样强大的机器不会像叶利钦那样在俄国郊外的别墅里享受宁静的生活，而是必须先完成所有的私有化改革，这也意味着无论普京如何强调他不会谋求第三次连任，他也别无选择地必须继续任职总统。


But if he holds on to power contrary to the constitution, his popularity could easily collapse, especially as his economic policy has thrived on luck, not reform.	但是如果他违反宪法规定抓住权力不放，他的支持率可能会很快下降，尤其考虑到他经济政策的成功是更多地源于运气、而不是源于改革。


Squaring the Eurozone’s Vicious Circle	摆脱欧元区的恶性循环


SALAMANCA – The eurozone is caught in a diabolical loop, in which weak banking systems harm their sovereigns’ fiscal positions, which in turn compromise the banking system’s stability.	萨拉曼卡—欧元区陷入了恶性循环，疲软的银行系统危害了主权国家的财政状况，而这反过来又危害银行系统的稳定。


But, over the last couple of years, policymakers have focused largely on reducing banks’ impact on their sovereigns – for example, through a Europe-wide supervisory authority and efforts to establish a European resolution mechanism – while ignoring the feedback in the other direction.	但是，在过去几年中，决策者的注意力基板上集中在减少银行对主权国家的影响上——比如成立泛欧洲监管当局和建立欧洲清算机制——而忽略了反方向的反馈。


Although eurozone sovereign-debt markets have stabilized, the share of sovereign bonds held by domestic banks has increased sharply in the last few months, accounting for more than half of the net increase in debt emissions in some countries.	尽管欧元区主权债务市场已经稳定下来，但银行持有本国主权债券的比例在最近几个月中大幅上升，一些国家甚至达到了净新增债务的一半以上。


In Spain and Italy, sovereign bonds now account for roughly 10% of banks’ total assets (see graphs below).	在西班牙和意大利，主权债券目前占银行总资产的10%左右。


The risk is that any unexpected challenge faced by a weaker debtor country’s sovereign-bond market – say, Catalonia’s secession referendum, or the renegotiation of the Portuguese and Greek bailouts – will undermine bank solvency, often even more than in previous rounds of the feedback loop.	风险在于，疲软债务国的主权债券市场所面临的任何意料之外的挑战——比如加泰罗尼亚的独立公投或葡萄牙和希腊援助计划的重新谈判——都会破坏银行偿债能力，并且破坏力常常会比前几次反馈循环更大。


Moreover, even in the absence of a crisis, the sovereign-bond market’s geographical segmentation hampers monetary-policy transmission substantially.	此外，即使不发生危机，主权债券市场的地理隔离也极大地妨碍着货币政策的传导。


What accounts for banks’ growing bias toward their own country’s sovereign debt?	是什么让银行越来越偏爱本国主权债务？


And what should be done about it?	对此应该做些什么？


The most obvious suspect is Basel III, the new global regulatory standard for banks’ capital adequacy and liquidity.	最显而易见的原因是新的全球银行资本充足度和流动性监管标准——巴塞尔III。


But, while Basel III favors sovereign debt in general by assigning it a zero risk-weight in calculating capital requirements, it does not favor home-country debt, at least not within the context of the eurozone.	但是，尽管从总体上说巴塞尔III给资本要求计算所规定的主权债务权重为零，因此非常有利于主权债务，但并不有利于母国债务，至少在欧元区框架下是如此。


Indeed, Basel III treats all OECD government bonds in the same way, regardless of whether they are denominated in the issuing country’s own currency.	事实上，巴塞尔II对所有经合组织政府债券一视同仁，不管是不是用发行国自身的货币计价。


Likewise, while the European Central Bank’s collateral policy imposes different “haircuts” on bondholders depending on a country’s credit rating, it discriminates little between countries.	类似地，尽管欧洲央行的抵押品政策根据一国的信用评级规定了不同的债券持有者损失标准，但国家间的差别甚微。


In short, current bank regulation neither encourages nor discourages the home-country bias in banks’ sovereign-debt holdings.	简言之，当前的银行监管既不鼓励，也不打压银行在主权债务持有上偏袒母国。


In fact, eurozone banks’ preference for home-country sovereign bonds is rooted in a combination of factors, including fear of redenomination – a consequence of the crisis that leads banks to concentrate their risk domestically – and the expectation that bailout mechanisms will be national.	事实上，欧元区银行偏好母国主权债务的原因是多方面的，其中包括对重新计价的担心——这是危机所导致的银行将其风险向国内集中所带来的后果——和对援助机制将是国家性质的预期。


Given that the eurozone lacks any supra-national fiscal backstop, such as a lender of last resort or a debt-mutualization mechanism like Eurobonds, the home-country bias can be expected to intensify whenever an economy experiences a significant shock.	由于欧元区缺少超国家的财政基础——如最后贷款人和类似于欧元债券的债务共同化机制——只要一国经济经历了重大冲击，我们都可以预期母国偏好会有所加重。


Against this background, European policymakers and regulators must take action to encourage banks to diversify their sovereign-debt holdings.	在这样的背景下，欧洲决策者和监管者必须采取行动鼓励银行增加主权债务持有的多元化。


Of course, a common fiscal backstop (along with a single banking supervisor) would eliminate the bias.	当然，共同财政基础（以及单一银行监督机构）能够消除这一偏好。


But there is strong resistance to the fundamental changes to the eurozone’s architecture that this would require.	但这需要欧元区的结构做出根本性变化，因此阻力很大。


A more feasible solution would be to introduce an explicit regulatory bias against home-country sovereign-debt holdings.	更可行的方案是引入明确不利于母国主权债务持有的监管安排。


This could be done in three ways.	这可以从三个方面入手。


The first option would be to place upper limits on the sovereign debt held by banks – for example, by eliminating the current exemption of zero-risk sovereign bonds from regulators’ so-called large exposure regime.	第一个选择是规定银行主权债务持有量的上限——比如在监管者的所谓大规模敞口制度（large exposure regime）中取消现行的零风险主权债务豁免。


But administrative caps are a blunt instrument that introduce new nonlinearities and opportunities for arbitrage and speculation.	但行政限制是一种粗略的工具，会带来新的非线性以及套利和投机机会。


And weaker sovereigns, legitimately fearing that such a scheme would suppress demand for their debt, would almost certainly block it.	而较弱的国家很自然地会担心这一机制将抑制其主权债务的需求，几乎肯定会从中阻挠。


Another potential solution, proposed by the euro-nomics group in 2011, would be to create “European Safe-Bonds” (ESBies).	另一个潜在方案是2011年欧元经济集团（euro-comics group）提出的。


A European debt agency would purchase eurozone countries’ sovereign bonds, weighted according to each country’s contribution to the eurozone’s GDP, and use them as collateral to issue two securities.	该方案指出应该成立“欧洲安全债券”（ESBies）。 欧洲债务机构将以各国对欧元区GDP的贡献为权重购买欧元区国家的主权债券， 并以这些债券为抵押发行两种证券。


The first security, the ESBies, would be composed of the senior tranche of the bond portfolio, and would serve as the “safe asset,” while the second, risky security would be sold to investors in the market.	第一种是ESBies，它将由债券组合中的高级份额构成，并成为“安全资产”，第二种是高风险证券，将面向市场中的投资者发售。


ESBies would effectively fulfill the role of Eurobonds, but without the joint and several liability that would demand treaty changes.	ESBies将有效实现欧元债券的作用，但不会产生需要修改条约的连带和多重责任。


Though the lack of such debt mutualization has caused weaker sovereigns to resist ESBies, while stronger sovereigns contend that ESBies still demand excessive risk-sharing, this solution could gain traction in the event of another crisis.	尽管债务共担程度的不足将让较弱的国家抵制ESBies，而较强的国家认为ESBies仍要求了过多的债务共担，但若爆发新的危机，这一方案将赢得支持。


The third option would be to introduce a new rule conditioning sovereign bonds’ zero-risk weight on banks’ willingness to hold them in certain proportions – for example, relative to GDP.	第三个选择是引入新规则，以银行持有主权债券的意愿的占（比如）GDP的一定比例为权重考虑主权债券的零风险地位。


Although a transitional regime would be needed to avoid hurting banks in weaker countries, such a rule would dramatically reduce banks’ exposure to home-country sovereign debt.	尽管这一方案需要转移机制避免伤害弱国的银行，但这一规则将极大地降低银行在母国主权债务上的敞口。


Indeed, it could help to encourage the market-driven creation of a eurozone safe asset – a kind of non-regulatory ESBie.	事实上，它或许有助于鼓励市场驱动的欧元区安全资产创造，即无监管版的ESBies。


Regardless of the approach, one thing is clear: European policymakers and regulators must act now to eliminate the negative feedback loop between sovereigns and their banks.	不管采取何种方法，有一点是显而易见的：欧洲决策者和监管者必须马上行动起来消除主权国家及其银行间的负反馈环。


Waiting for another crisis to strike could have devastating consequences for both.	坐等新危机来袭可能给两者带来毁灭性的后果。


A Theory of Boardroom Justice	董事会正义论


LONDON – There is a real danger that corporate leaders, making decisions that seem correct behind closed doors, end up being tone-deaf in a soundproof room.	伦敦—有一个现实危险：公司领袖闭门做出的貌似正确的决定，结果就像是音盲在隔音室作曲。


When the doors open and the decisions are announced, it is clear that board members are often deeply disconnected from the world’s economic and social realities.	当房门打开、决定公布时，很显然董事会通常与世界经济和社会现实大大脱节。


Consider executive pay packages.	以高管薪酬为例。


Board remuneration committees can explain them logically with complex formulas to justify them, and yet often they are completely out of line with common sense.	董事会薪酬委员会可以拿出复杂的公式为自己开脱，头头是道地论证，但通常他们的决定和常识根本格格不入。


Board members need to rethink what they are doing in those rooms, and here individual directors’ guiding principle should be the “veil of ignorance” proposed by the political philosopher John Rawls in his 1971 treatise A Theory of Justice.	董事会成员需要反思他们在董事会做了什么，在这方面，就个人而言，董事应该以政治哲学家约翰·罗尔斯（John Rawls）在其1971年的专著《正义论》（A Theory of Justice）中所提出的“无知之幕”为指导原则。


Rawls proposed the veil of ignorance as a way to derive principles of social justice to which anyone who did not know in advance their identity and position in society would consent.	罗尔斯的无知之幕是作为社会正义原则提出的，任何事先不知道自己在社会中的身份和地位的人都会同意这一原则。


How would the veil of ignorance work in a boardroom?	无知之幕理论如何在董事会中起作用？


Board directors’ role is not simply to ensure return on investment; it is also to make decisions with due consideration for the community, employees, suppliers, consumers, and even the overall economy.	董事的作用不仅是确保投资回报； 他们还要在决策时适当考虑社区、雇员、供应商、消费者甚至整个经济的利益。


The decisions made in that room have an impact beyond the company, so it is not just shareholders who hold board members accountable for their choices.	董事会所做出的决定影响到的不仅仅是公司本身，因此要问责董事选择责任的不仅是股东。


In order for board directors and senior executives to make judicious decisions, they cannot think only about whether they will directly benefit.	董事和高管要做出明智决策，就不能仅仅考虑他们能否直接获利。


As in Rawls, if we imagined that we did not know who we are or where we stand in society – whether we are rich or poor, male or female, young or old, CEO or shop-floor worker – our decisions would be more ethically grounded.	罗尔斯指出，想象我们不知道身处社会何处的情形——不知道我们是贫是富、是男是女、是老是少、是CEO还是车间工人——这样能使偶们的决定更加合乎伦理。


The veil of ignorance changes the nature of the discussion on almost every issue, from executive pay, wage discrepancies, and working conditions to long-term strategy, succession planning, and much more.	无知之幕改变了几乎每一个问题的讨论性质，从高管薪酬、工资差异、工作环境到长期战略、接班人计划等莫不如此。


Many issues that should be viewed through the veil of ignorance fall into the categories of environmental sustainability, social equity, and corporate governance.	许多应该通过无知之幕看待的问题属于环境可持续性、社会平等和公司治理范畴。


For example, if we didn’t know whether we would be working long days at a fast-food counter or overseeing the entire organization, we would think differently about compensation structures and the ever increasing gap between the most senior management and the most junior staff members.	比如，如果我们不知道我们会在快餐柜台每天工作很长时间还是管理整个组织，我们就会对薪酬结构和不断扩大的最高管理层和最初级员工日益扩大的工资差距等问题做出不同的思考。


If we didn’t know whether we would be working on a factory floor in Bangladesh or in a shiny head office in the United States, no one would disavow responsibility for the health and safety of Bangladeshi workers.	如果我们不知道我们会在孟加拉国工厂流水线上工作还是在美国朝阳高管办公室上班，就不会有人否认保证孟加拉国工人健康和安全的责任。


The list goes on.	这样的清单可以拉得很长。


If board members were making choices from behind the veil of ignorance –not knowing their position in the company – they would want everyone to have opportunities to implement change or be entrepreneurial.	如果董事在无知之幕背后做出选择——不知道他们在公司中的地位——他们就会希望所有人都有机会实施变革或具有企业家精神。


Not knowing whether they were male or female, they would ensure pay equity and better policies concerning parental leave and child care.	如果他们不知道自己是男是女，他们就会保证薪酬平等，做出更好的产假和育儿假政策。


Likewise, knowing that they might be the customer would make them look differently at cost-cutting measures that weaken product testing and consumer protection.	类似地，如果他们可能身为客户，他们就会以不同角度看待弱化产品检测和消费者保护的成本削减措施。


If they believed that they might live in a community affected by an oil spill, they would want robust, not minimal, environmental safety standards, and they would not seek to circumvent the rules.	如果他们认为它们有可能生活在受漏油影响的社区，他们就会就会希望采取鲁棒而非最低限度的安全标准，也不会寻求绕过法规。


There is a danger of taking this thought experiment too far.	这个思想实验做得太远也有危险。


Getting caught up in factoring in all of the different perspectives would cause decision-making to gravitate toward the lowest common denominator, with outcomes that achieve very little for anyone.	纠结于考虑所有不同角度会导致决策偏向分母最大化，导致所有人都得不到大好处。


That is not the point.	这不是要点。


The point is to step outside of one’s comfort zones, distance oneself from the voices around the table that sound just like one’s own, and remember that board members are responsible for the direct and indirect impact of their decisions.	要点在于跨出你的舒适区，让你自己与周边和你差不多的声音保持距离，并且记住董事要为他们的决定的直接和间接后果负责。


There is no doubting corporate directors’ responsibility for the growth and success of the company.	毫无疑问公司董事负有增长和公司成功的责任。


But that responsibility also requires being thoughtful individuals who can see the bigger picture.	但这一责任还需要能大处着眼的有思想深度的个体。


Investors are more attuned than ever to companies’ social and environmental impact, and they are increasingly concerned about whether the companies in their portfolios are good corporate citizens.	投资者比以往任何时候都关注公司的社会和环境影响，越来越关心投资组合中的公司是否是公司界的模范公民。


If directors remind themselves each time they enter the boardroom why they are there, and pause for a moment to consider how their views would be affected if they did not know who they were, they would make better decisions for the company and for the entire system in which it operates.	如果董事能在每次步入董事会办公室的时候提醒一下自己为何要在这��，并且停下来考虑一下，如果他们不知道自己身在董事会观点会受到何种影响，他们就能为公司以及公司经营所在的整个体系做出更好的决定。


In this sense – and only this sense – ignorance in the boardroom is the right approach.	从这个角度讲——也仅从这个角度讲——对身处董事会保持无知是正确的做法。


The BP spill was one of the first instances in which companies were forced to contend with the power of social media – and in which people realized the potential of the tools at their disposal.	BP漏油事件是企业被迫与社交媒体博弈——也是民���意识到所掌握工具力量的首批实例。


No organization that holds so much public influence and importance should be able to operate as a black box.	我们��能允许手握如此公众影响力的组织继续其黑箱操作。


Lula\u0027s Legacy	卢拉走后又怎样


MEXICO CITY – The first round in Brazil’s upcoming presidential elections, scheduled for October 3, may turn out to be the only round. For outgoing President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva’s hand-picked successor, Dilma Rousseff, is very close to winning an outright majority of the vote.	墨西哥城——


Rousseff's main opponent, São Paulo Governor José Serra, has not gained traction with voters, owing to his inconsistent stances – ranging from withering criticisms of Lula’s foreign policy to outright support for his social policies. According to some polls, Serra is more than 20 points behind.	巴西总统选举首轮投票将在10月3日举行，目前来看，由即将离任的总统卢拉钦点的继任者迪尔玛·罗塞芙很可能在本轮投票中以绝对多数胜选。


The economy is growing at a double-digit rate, and the 2014 Soccer World Cup and 2016 Olympics are on the horizon. Under Lula’s stewardship, millions of Brazilians emerged from poverty, and the middle class has become a majority – albeit a small one.	罗塞芙的主要竞争对手，圣保罗州州长若泽·塞拉没能赢得选民的支持，原因在于其政治观点自相矛盾——例如一方面大肆批评卢拉的外交政策，另一方面却强烈支持其社会政策。


Brazil has acquired an international stature worthy of its size and success, though perhaps not of its ambitions. Its democracy is thriving and vibrant, if not always effective or without corruption.	有调查显示，在选民支持率上，塞拉落后对手20个百分点。


But there are grounds for skepticism about Lula’s legacy, and the fact that they are rarely mentioned does not diminish their significance.	这不难理解——巴西经济正以超过10%的速度增长，2014年世界杯和2016年奥运会也将在此举行； 在卢拉任内，数百万巴西人口脱贫，中产阶级壮大成为多数（尽管数量优势尚不明显）；


There is nothing wrong with either per se, so long as they are sustainable in the medium term and viable in the long term. The problem is that Brazil’s overall investment rate remains around 16% of GDP, far less than Mexico’s or the Latin American average, not to mention China (40%).	虽然很少有人对卢拉任内的所谓成就提出置疑，但是有些疑问确实值得考虑。


Rousseff’s solution is massive state-funded investment, financed by the National Development Bank (BNDS), in key economic sectors (oil, meat-packing, construction).	首先，巴西经济的持续增长在根本上依靠国内消费和商品出口支持。 诚然，只要这两大支柱能在中长期内保持活力，这种增长模式无可厚非。


But that strategy will most likely reinforce the corruption that has been a fixture of Brazilian politics for decades – and which improved little under Lula.	但问题在于，巴西的总投资额仅占到国内生产总值的16%，同比远低于墨西哥及拉丁美洲平均水平，更赶不上中国（40%）。 在这样的投资水平下，该国的基础设施必然难以维持高效运转，国家竞争力也将减弱。


A second issue is the highly touted Bolsa Familia, which began under Lula’s predecessor as Bolsa Escola, and was originally devised by the economist Santiago Levy under Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo. These “conditional cash transfers” were initially intended to stop inter-generational poverty by helping to ensure that children are properly fed, schooled, and kept healthy.	对此，罗塞芙提出要由国家大力投资建设关键产业，石油、肉类加工、建筑等行业将得到国家发展银行（BNDS)的支持。


But, under Lula (and under Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón in Mexico, for that matter), they became a direct anti-poverty program aimed at the current generation of poor.	但是此举很可能会助长腐败——这一顽疾已经困扰巴西政坛数十年，在卢拉任内也鲜有改观。


No one questions the generosity of this mutation, but it is far from clear that the nearly 15 million families receiving Bolsa Familia will maintain their current income level when the stipend disappears, or that it can be sustained indefinitely.	另一个问题是受高度赞扬的家庭补助金（Bolsa Familia）计划，这一项目在卢拉的前任时称为奖学金（Bolsa Escola）计划，原本由经济学家桑迪亚哥·利维在墨西哥总统埃内斯托·塞迪略任内制定。


Bolsa Familia has been a stunning electoral success, and undoubtedly increased bottom-of-the-pyramid consumption in Brazil.	这种“有条件的现金转移”的宗旨原本是通过帮助穷困儿童获得食物、教育和医疗以防止贫困的跨代延续。


But there are doubts as to what it can achieve in the long run to eradicate poverty.	但是，在卢拉（在墨西哥则是比森特·福克斯和费利佩·卡德隆）任内，这一模式却变成了直接帮助当前贫困人口脱贫的项目。


Third, Rousseff's rhetoric and origins as a militant leftist feed doubts as to whether she will pursue Lula's pragmatic, centrist economic and social policies.	新的模式表现出了政府的慷慨，但是这种补助能否无限期地持续下去？ 当补助停发时，一千五百万领取家庭补助金的家庭能否维持现有收入水平？


Her democratic credentials are as solid as his, but there are worries about her apparent enthusiasm for state intervention in the economy – she seems to believe in the virtues of Keynesian fiscal stimulus at all times – as well as her ability to control the Workers’ Party the way that Lula did.	的确，家庭补助金计划为卢拉赢得选举贡献颇大，也无疑提高了巴西底层民众的消费水平。 但是，长远来看，该计划能否消除贫困值得存疑。


Foreign policy has been the most criticized aspect of Lula’s tenure, and Rousseff will most likely make things worse.	第三，罗塞芙的政治出身和言论倾向都属于激进左派，这不能不让人怀疑她能否继续卢拉在经济和社会政策上的实用主义中间路线。


As an opponent of the military dictatorship that ruled his country years ago, Lula advocated respect for human rights, free and fair elections, and representative democracy.	虽然罗塞芙同卢拉一样坚持民主，但她似乎是凯恩斯主义财政刺激手段的拥趸、公然赞成政府出手干涉经济，这引起一些人的担忧。


But he paid little heed to these issues in office, dismissing concerns about human rights and democracy throughout the region and elsewhere, particularly in Cuba, Venezuela, and Iran.	另外，也有人担心她没有像卢拉般掌控劳动党的手腕。


Lula accentuated the traditional Brazilian attitude of not meddling in Cuban affairs, to the point of traveling to Havana shortly after a hunger-striking dissident died in prison there. When asked what he thought, Lula practically blamed the hunger striker for his death.	外交政策是卢拉任内最受诟病的方面，而罗塞芙很可能搞得更糟。


He also welcomed Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejhad in Brasilia and São Paulo almost as a hero barely three months after Ahmadinejhad stole Iran’s presidential election in 2009, which resulted in a wave of violent repression. And, within a year of the vote, Lula traveled to Iran.	卢拉曾反对统治巴西多年的军事独裁政权，倡导尊重人权、自由竞选、公平选举和代议制民主，但上台后却对国内国际（特别对古巴、委内瑞拉和伊朗）的人权民主问题不管不顾。


Lula also turned a blind eye to Hugo Chávez’s increasingly heavy hand in Venezuela, never protesting or questioning his jailing of opponents, his crackdowns on the press, trade unions, and students, or his tampering with the electoral system.	卢拉强调巴西一如既往地不会干涉古巴内政，甚至在一名异见分子绝食身亡之际照常访问哈瓦那，并且（虽未明确地）表示绝食者是咎由自取。


Brazilian corporations, especially construction companies, have huge investments and contracts in Venezuela, and Lula has used his friendship with the Castro brothers and Chávez to placate the left wing of his party, which has never been comfortable with his orthodox economic policies.	卢拉还在内贾德���取2009年伊朗总统选举后不到三个月的时候欢迎他到访巴西利亚和圣保罗，此举还引发了强烈抗议。 卢拉还在今年访问过伊朗。


Brazil’s ambivalent stance on human rights and democracy under Lula goes hand in hand with its attitude toward nuclear proliferation.	卢拉还对查韦斯在委内瑞拉日益严厉的统治手段不闻不问，从未就委国拘禁反对派、阻挠新闻出版、反对工人或学生结社、操纵选举等事发出质询或抗议。


A signatory in the 1960’s of the Tlatelolco Treaty, which banned nuclear weapons from Latin America, Brazil dismantled its enrichment process and research facilities during the 1990’s and ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1998.	巴西企业，特别是建筑公司，在委内瑞拉的投资及承建项目很多。 卢拉也利用其与卡斯特罗兄弟和查韦斯的关系平息党内左翼势力对其务实经济政策的不满。


Then, in May of this year, Lula teamed up with Turkey in proposing a deal with Iran on its nuclear program, which the latter nominally accepted but the rest of the world did not.	卢拉政府模棱两可的外交立场同样表现在核扩散问题上。 巴西在上世纪六十年代签署了特拉特洛尔科条约,为履行条约规定的在拉丁美洲禁止核武器的义务，巴西在九十年代拆除了其铀浓缩设备并解散了相关研究机构，随后在1998年批准了核不扩散条约。


Whereas Brazil and Turkey claimed that the arrangement had been accepted by the US and Europe, the US called for – and got, with the support of Europe – new and stronger United Nations sanctions, which only Brazil and Turkey opposed.	今年五月，卢拉和土耳其一道主张就伊朗核计划同伊达成协议，该协议得到伊朗名义上的赞成，但遭到其他各国的反对。 虽然巴西和土耳其曾声称这一协议已经得到美国和欧盟的支持，但实际上美国却呼吁——并最终在欧盟帮助下促成——对伊朗更有力的制裁，反对这一决议的只有巴西和土耳其。


Brazil is on the cusp of sustained growth, higher international stature, and consolidating its middle-class status.	巴西有望保持经济增长势头、赢得更高国际地位并且巩固国内中产阶级构成。


But, until it develops a mature foreign policy that matches its economic aspirations – a foreign policy based on principled leadership, not heedless Third World solidarity – its global influence will be constrained.	但是如果没有与其经济规划相符的更为成熟的外交策略——要讲求基本原则，不盲目和第三世界结盟——谋求更大国际影响的巴西必难突围。


Lying and Leadership	说谎和领导力


CAMBRIDGE – This election season has been marked by frequent charges of dishonesty.	坎布里奇—这个选举季的一大特色是充满了不诚实的指控。


During Britain’s “Brexit” debate, each side charged the other with distorting the truth, though the speed with which the “Leave” camp has been disowning its campaign promises, and the “Remain” camp’s claims have come true, suggests which was telling it like it is.	在“英国退出”争论期间，每一方都指责对方扭曲事实，但“脱欧”阵营否认其选战承诺，以及“留欧”阵营的主张称为事实的速度表明了谁才是实事求是的人。


In the United States’ presidential election campaign, Donald Trump, the presumptive Republican nominee, seldom referred to his closest competitor in the primaries without calling him “Lying Ted Cruz.”	在美国总统选战中，推定共和党提名人唐纳德·特朗普在提到他在初选中最接近的竞争对手时总是称其为“撒谎的泰德·科鲁兹”。


Similarly, Trump rarely misses an opportunity to refer to Hillary Clinton, the presumptive Democratic nominee, without attaching the prefix “Crooked.”	类似地，特朗普在提及推定民主党提名人希拉里·克林顿时也不会错过加上“不诚实的”前缀的机会。


When she recently delivered a careful speech on foreign policy, Trump responded by calling her a “world-class liar.”	最近，克林顿就外交政策发表了一份谨慎的讲话，特朗普的反应是成她为“世界级撒谎大王”。


But, according to PolitiFact, a Pulitzer prize-winning organization that checks the veracity of political statements, 60% of the claims by Trump that it investigated since he began his campaign have been deemed false or “Pants on Fire” false, versus 12% for Clinton.	但是，据获得普利策奖的检验政治言论真实性的组织“政治事实”（PolitiFact）的数据，在它所调查的自选战开始以来的特朗普的论断中，有60%属于错误或“荒唐的”错误，而克林顿的这一比例为12%。


Some cynics shrug off such exchanges between candidates as typical behavior by politicians.	一些犬儒主义者对候选人之间的这些“往来”嗤之以鼻，认为这是政客的典型做派。


But that is too facile, because it ignores serious questions concerning how honest we want our political leaders and our political discourse to be.	但这个结论过于肤浅，因为它忽视了一个问题：我们希望我们的政治领导人和我们的政治叙事多么诚实。


In fact, we may not want our political leaders to tell the literal truth all the time.	事实上，我们并不总是想要我们的政治领导人说出一板一眼的真相。


In wartime or during a counterterrorism operation, deception may be a necessary condition of victory or success – which clearly is in our interest.	在战时或反恐行动期间，欺骗或许是胜利获成功的必要条件——并且显然符合我们的利益。


Other cases are less dramatic but no less important.	其他情形不那么引人注目，但重要性并不因此减少。


Sometimes, leaders have objectives that differ from those of a large part of their followers; rather than revealing the differences, they deceive their followers.	有时，领导人的目标不同于他的大部分追随者； 他们不会揭露这一不同，而是会欺骗追随者。


When such actions are self-serving, as in cases of corruption or narcissistic ego gratification, moral censure is easy and appropriate.	当这些行为属于自利行为时，比如腐败或自恋式的自我陶醉，你很容易做出道德批判，并且这也是合适的。


In contrast, other leaders with different objectives from their followers invest heavily in educating those who would oppose them to a different point of view.	相反，一些目标与追随者不同的领导人花大力气引导那些可能反对他们的人采纳不同的观点。


In some instances, leaders find it impossible to educate their followers adequately in time, or their followers are too deeply divided to reach a consensus that will sustain collective action.	在一些情形中，领导人发现不可能及时充分地引导追随者，或者追随者分歧太大，无法形成可以保持集体行动的共识。


In such circumstances, some leaders may take a paternalist view and decide to deceive their followers for what they see as their larger or later good.	在这样的情况下，一些领导人会采取家长作风，为了他们看到的更大更长远的利益而决定欺骗他们的追随者。


For example, as Senate Majority Leader, Lyndon B. Johnson deceived his southern supporters in order to pass the 1957 civil rights act.	比如，参议院多数党领袖林登·约翰逊为了让1957年民权法案通过而欺骗他的南方支持者。


Charles de Gaulle did not reveal his strategy for Algerian independence when he came to power in 1958, because he knew that doing so would doom it to failure.	戴高乐在1958年掌权时也没有披露他的阿尔及利亚独立战略，因为他知道，这样做会让该计划失败。


John F. Kennedy misled the public about the withdrawal of US nuclear warheads from Turkey in the deal that peacefully ended the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.	在和平解决1962年古巴导弹危机的协议中，美国从土耳其撤出了核弹头，而约翰·肯尼迪对公众隐瞒了这一点。


Moreover, Franklin D. Roosevelt lied to the American public about a German attack on a US destroyer, in an effort to overcome isolationist resistance to helping Britain before World War II.	此外，二战打响前，罗斯福骗美国公众说德国袭击了美国驱逐舰，以此克服对于援助英国的孤立主义抵制。


And Winston Churchill once said that the truth may be “so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.”	丘吉尔曾说，真相可能“太宝贵，只能在谎言的护卫下登场。 ”


The fact that leaders’ ends may sometimes justify violating norms about honesty does not mean that all lies are equal, or that we must suspend our moral judgment in such cases.	领导人的结局有时证明违反诚实规范是合理的，这一事实并不意味着所有的谎言都是一样的，也不意味着我们必须怀疑在这些例子中的道德判断。


Machiavellian deception is often part of a strategy, for example, in bargaining or even in bringing a group to accept new goals.	比如，马基雅维利式欺骗常常是讨价还价乃至诱使某群体接受新目标的战略的一部分。


But intentions matter.	但动机很重要。


Deception that is purely self-serving turns from a strategy that may benefit others into selfish manipulation.	纯粹出于自利目的的欺骗让可能有利于他人的战略演变为自私的操纵。


Even if one admits that deception may sometimes be necessary, one can still ask about the importance of the goal, the availability of alternative means to achieve it, whether the deception is likely to spread through precedent or example, the damage done to various victims, and the deceivers’ accountability (whether their behavior can be discovered and explained later).	即使你承认欺骗有时是必要的，你仍可质疑目标的重要性、实现目标的其他途径是否可行、欺骗是否通过先例或“榜样”蔓延、对各种受害者所造成的伤害，以及欺骗者的问责情况（他们的行为是否可以被发现以及随后解释）。


In his book, When Presidents Lie, the historian Eric Alterman concludes that presidential lies “inevitably turn into monsters that strangle their creators.”	在《当总统撒谎》（When Presidents Lie���一书中，历史学家埃里克·奥特曼（Eric Alterman）推论说，总统的谎言“难免演变为吞噬始作俑者的怪兽。 ”


And presidents may set bad precedents.	并且总统可能树立坏先例。


When Roosevelt lied about the German attack on the destroyer Greer in 1941, he set a low bar for Johnson’s highly embellished description of a North Vietnamese attack on US naval vessels, which led to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964.	1941那边，罗斯福撒谎德国攻击驱逐舰格里尔号（Greer），降低了约翰逊大力粉饰北越攻击美国海军舰艇的阻力，该事件导致1964年北部湾决议。


It is all too easy for leaders to convince themselves that they are telling a noble lie for the good of their followers, when in fact they are merely lying for political or personal convenience.	领导人很容易说服自己，他们是在编制一个高贵的谎言，是为了追随者们好，而其实他们只是为了政治或个人便利而撒谎。


That makes it all the more important in a democracy that we carefully examine the nature of the tradeoffs between ends and means that leaders make.	这使得民主变得非常重要，我们可以仔细考察领导人所做出的目的和手段之间的权衡的性质。


There may indeed be situations where we would approve a political leader telling us a lie, but such cases should remain rare and subject to careful scrutiny.	确实有这样的情况：我们允许政治领导人对我们撒谎，但这样的情形应该十分罕见，并接受仔细的审查。


Otherwise, we debase the currency of our democracy and lower the quality of our political discourse.	否则，我们就将破坏民主的基石，降低政治叙事的质量。


This is why it is a mistake for cynics to shrug off Trump’s rhetoric as simply one of the things politicians do.	因此，犬儒主义对特朗普的修辞嗤之以鼻，视之为政客的惯用伎俩，这是个错误。


If PolitiFact and other similar organizations are correct, politicians are not all the same when it comes to lying.	如果政治事实和其他类似组织是正确的，那么政客在撒谎的问题上并不那么相似。


Trump has made many more false statements than any of his opponents, and few (if any) could pass the test of not being self-serving.	特朗普的错误言论比他的所有反对者都要多，并且其中鲜有可以通过自利动机排除测试的。


An independent and vigorous press that checks the truth is crucial to preserving the integrity of democracy; but so is an electorate that resists cynicism and the debasement of political discourse.	检查事实的独立严格的媒体对于保证民主的诚信来说至关重要； 但选民抵制犬儒主义和贬损政治叙事也很重要。


Argentina’s Fresh Start	阿根廷的新开始


BUENOS AIRES – For the last 99 years, the presidency of Argentina has rotated between Peronists – Juan Domingo Perón and his populist followers – and reactionary generals.	布宜诺斯艾利斯——过去99年来，庇隆主义者——胡安·多明戈·庇隆及其民粹主义追随者——还有反动将领轮流把持着阿根廷的总统宝座。


Every so often, centrists from the Radical Civic Union were voted into office, but their terms ended quickly, in resignations or coups.	激进公民联盟的中间派偶尔会在竞选中获胜，但其执政任期无一例外都因为辞职或是政变而很快结束。


In Sunday’s election, Argentina’s voters broke the pattern: for the first time in almost a century, the president will not be a Peronist, a Radical, or an army general.	周日大选中，阿根廷选民打破了这一模式：近一个世纪以来第一次，总统不是庇隆主义者、不是激进份子，也不是将军。


It is difficult to overstate the significance of the occasion.	此次选举的意义怎么强调都不为过。


According to Héctor Schamis, a political scientist at Georgetown University, if a similar political change had occurred in France or Brazil, the country’s citizens would be celebrating the birth of a new republic.	按照乔治城大学政治学家赫克托·斯卡米斯的说法，如果类似的政治变化发生在法国或巴西，那里的民众将会庆祝一个全新共和国的诞生。


Argentina’s new president-elect, Mauricio Macri, an engineer by training, is often described in the international press as “center-right.”	阿根廷当选新总统，工程师出身的毛里西奥·马克里，常常被国际媒体称之为“中间偏右”。


But that label is not quite correct.	但这一标签并不确切。


In Argentina, the left-right divide has been blurred by the policies of the hydra-headed Perónist Justicialist Party, which privatized state companies in the 1990s, only to re-nationalize them later.	在阿根廷，拥有顽强生命力的庇隆正义党政策已经模糊了左右翼之间的鸿沟，该党于20世纪90年代推行了国企私有化，但后来又将企业重新收归国有。


Moreover, “center-right” often means “conservative,” and Macri’s victory will not “conserve” the status quo.	此外，“中间偏右”往往是“保守”的代名词，而马克里的胜利无疑不会“保持”现状。


Macri is best described as a “liberal” – in the European sense of the word.	形容马克里最贴切的词莫过于“自由”——而且是欧洲意义上的自由。


That means, first of all, respect for Argentina’s democratic institutions, badly damaged after a decade of rough handling by Presidents Néstor and Cristina Kirchner.	这首先意味着在内斯托尔和克里斯蒂娜·基什内尔总统十年暴政所造成的严重损害后，对阿根廷的民主制度表示尊重。


It also means more market-friendly economic policy.	此外它还意味着推行有利于市场的经济政策。


One of Macri’s early post-election proclamations was that he wants a “developmentalist” as finance minister.	马克里在当选后很快宣布要找一位“发展主义者”担任财政部长。


In Latin America, that means an economist who worries about growth, employment, and exports, as well as about balancing the budget and paying debts.	在拉丁美洲，这意味着关心增长、就业和出口的经济学家，而且注重平衡预算和偿付债务。


Macri will phase out, albeit gradually, the stringent price and capital controls favored by the Peronists.	马克里将逐步淘汰庇隆主义者所青睐的严格的价格和资本管制制度。


And his trade and industry minister is unlikely to repeat the antics of a recent predecessor, who placed a gun on the table while negotiating import and export quotas with local producers.	而他的贸易和工业部部长不太可能重犯近期前任犯下的的荒唐错误，这位前任在与地方生产商谈判进出口份额时掏出一把抢放在桌上。


And yet, the world should not expect free-market zealotry from Macri.	但世界不应指望在马克里身上看到自由市场狂热。


He heads a broad coalition that includes his own liberal-minded Republican Proposal Party, the center-left Radical Civic Union, and other centrist groupings.	他所领导的广泛政治联盟包括他自己所在的开明的共和提案党、中左翼激进公民联盟和其他中间派机构。


The coalition will not command a majority in either house of Congress, so legislating will require fashioning temporary ad hoc alliances.	该联盟不会在议会两院占据多数，因此立法需要组建临时特设联盟。


During the campaign, Macri displayed a sensitive political ear.	竞选期间，马克里表现出卓越的政治敏感度。


He understood that Argentines were tired of the Kirchners’ imperious (one might even say authoritarian) political style, whereby anyone who disagreed with them was branded a lackey of dark imperialist forces.	他清楚阿根廷人厌倦了基什内尔夫妇“傲慢”（甚至可以说独裁）的政治风格，将任何不同意他们观点的人打成黑恶帝国主义势力的走狗。


Even for a country with a political history as tumultuous as Argentina’s, partisan polarization and vitriol had reached levels that seemed extreme.	即使对一个像阿根廷这样有着动荡政治史的国家，党派极化和恶语相向似乎也已经达到了极端的地步。


The contrast was striking even on Macri’s first day as president-elect.	即使在马克里作为当选总统的第一天反差也非常强烈。


Unlike Cristina Kirchner, who gave long-winded speeches but held no press conferences and took no questions from journalists, Macri answered queries until reporters had none left.	马克里并未像与克里斯蒂娜·基什内尔那样发表冗长的演讲，但却拒绝举行记者招待会及回答记者提问。 相反，马克里回答了在场记者的所有提问。


Expect more of that.	这样的情况今后我们仍将看到。


As President, Macri will inherit a dire economic situation.	身为总统，马克里将继承严峻的经济形势。


The economy is shrinking.	经济正在萎缩过程中。


Inflation is above 20% (no one is sure by how much, because the figures have been doctored).	通货膨胀超过20%（因为数字经过篡改，所以没有人知道确切的数据）。


The peso is overvalued.	比索遭到高估。


International reserves are dwindling quickly.	国际储备快速降低。


And the budget deficit has reached 7% of GDP.	而预算赤字已经达到GDP的7%。


Some adjustment is inevitable.	有些调整势在必行。


Fortunately, there is also some good news.	幸运的是也有一些好消息。


The current account is roughly in balance, so there is no need for further import compression.	经常帐户大体平衡，所以没有必要进一步压缩进口。


And because no one would lend to Argentina after it defaulted in the early 2000s, the government has relatively little debt.	而且因为没有人愿意在21世纪初债务违约后借钱给阿根廷，政府相对来讲没有多少债务。


By allowing the peso to depreciate, Macri could achieve two goals at once.	通过允许比索贬值，马克里可以一次性达到两个目标。


A weaker currency would stimulate exports and allow imports to grow as foreign-exchange controls are lifted.	货币贬值可以刺激出口并在取消外汇管制的同时推动进口增加。


Meanwhile, because a significant share of government revenues are dollar-linked, while its expenditures are mostly in pesos, devaluation would reduce the budget deficit.	同时，因为政府收入的很大部分都与美元挂钩，而政府支出则以比索为主，贬值可以缩减预算赤字额。


Macri’s honeymoon is likely to be brief; the Peronist opposition, having rid itself of the Kirchners, will not hesitate to attack the new administration.	马克里的蜜月或许是短暂的； 反对派庇隆份子在摆脱基什内尔夫妇后，会毫不犹豫地攻击新政府。


But if he uses his political capital wisely, he has a good chance of stabilizing the economy while retaining reasonable levels of political support.	但如果他明智地利用手中的政治资本，那么有很大机会能够稳定经济，并将政治支持保持在合理的水平。


That would change the political outlook not only in Argentina, but throughout Latin America.	这不仅会改变阿根廷的政治前景，而且会影响整个拉丁美洲。


In neighboring Brazil, President Dilma Rousseff’s administration made little effort to hide its preference for Macri’s opponent.	在邻国巴西，总统迪尔玛·罗塞夫的政府几乎从未掩盖其对马克里对手的偏好。


As her government plumbs record lows in opinion polls, the centrist opposition has been inching toward power.	随着她的政府在民意调查中跌落至历史低点，中间派反对党一直在缓慢地向权力靠拢。


Macri’s victory could accelerate that process.	马克里的胜利可能会加速这一进程。


Likewise, Macri’s victory could give voters in Venezuela – headed to the polls on December 6 – the courage they need to cast their ballots against their increasingly authoritarian government.	同样，马克里的胜利可以赋予委内瑞拉选民——定于12月6日进行投票——反对本国日益独裁政府所必需的��气。


Indeed, Macri has announced that, in response to human rights violations in Venezuela, he will invoke the so-called “democratic clause” in the statutes of Mercosur, which could lead to Venezuela’s suspension from the regional trading bloc.	事实上，马克里已经宣布为应对发生在委内瑞拉的侵犯人权，他将援引《南方共同市场法》规定的所谓“民主条款”，该条款可能导致委内瑞拉被从区域贸易集团之中开除。


This stands in marked contrast to the cowardly and complicit silence of other governments in the region.	这与其他地区政府串通一气的懦弱的沉默形成了鲜明的对照。


If Macri follows through, that action alone will guarantee his presidency a mention in the history books.	如果马克里坚持到底，仅此一项就足以令他的总统任期载入史册。


The Promise and Peril of Macroprudential Policy	宏观审慎政策的利弊


MONTEVIDEO – Central bankers continue to fret about frothy asset markets – as well they should, given the financial crisis of 2008-2009.	蒙得维的亚—央行行长们仍在担心泡沫丛生的资产市场——从2008—2009年的金融危机看，理应如此。


Having been burned once, they are now doubly shy.	所谓一朝被蛇咬，十年怕井绳也。


And China’s recent stock-market plunge has certainly not eased their fears.	而最近中国股市暴跌显然让他们更加担忧了。


Securities prices are extraordinarily high, considering the backdrop of flaccid economic growth.	考虑到经济增长的萎靡，证券价格高得有些离谱。


Bond prices have soared on the back of quantitative easing by the Bank of Japan, the Federal Reserve, and the European Central Bank.	债券价格在日本银行、美联储和欧洲央行采取量化宽松后一飞冲天。


Property prices from London to San Francisco have risen to nosebleed-inducing levels.	从伦敦到旧金山的房地产价格已经达到了让人喷血的水平。


What, if anything, should be done to minimize the risks of a rapid and sharp asset-price reversal?	那么，应该做些什么将发生快速急剧的资产价格反转的风险降到最低？


For many years, this question was framed according to the “lean versus clean” debate: Should central banks “lean” against bubbles, damping down asset prices that create risks to financial stability, or just clean up the mess after bubbles burst?	多年来，这一问题引起了一场“遏制还是清理”的争论：央行应该“遏制”泡沫，打压引起金融稳定风险的资产价格，还是等到泡沫破裂后清理混乱局面？


Proponents of the latter approach, such as former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan, express doubt that policymakers can reliably identify bubbles, and are generally uneasy about managing asset prices.	后一个方针的支持者包括前美联储主席艾伦·格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan），该方针质疑决策者是否能可靠地识别泡沫，认为总体而言管理资产价格绝非易事。


To be sure, central bankers cannot know for sure when asset prices have reached unsustainable heights.	诚然，央行行长无法确切地知道资产价格何时达到了不可持续的高水平。


But they cannot know for sure when inflation is about to take off, either.	但他们也无法确切地知道通货膨胀何时会突飞猛进。


Monetary policy is an art, not a science; it is the art of taking one’s best guess.	货币政策是一种艺术而不是一种科学； 它是“猜准”的艺术。


And, as the 2008-2009 crisis demonstrated, merely cleaning up after the bubbles burst is very costly and inefficient.	2008—2009年危机表明，仅仅在泡沫破裂后收拾局面事倍功半。


So what should central bankers do instead?	那么，央行行长应该怎么做？


Ideally, they would develop a set of specially tailored financial tools.	在理想情况中，他们应该开发一套量身定做的金融工具。


For example, raising banks’ capital requirements when credit is booming could restrain lending and strengthen banks’ cushion against losses, while setting ceilings on loan-to-value ratios could rein in exuberant property markets, thereby heading off excessive risks for borrowers and lenders.	比如，在信用繁荣时期提高银行资本要求可以抑制贷款、增强银行吸收损失的能力，而制定贷款-价值（loan-to-value）比上限可以给火热的房地产市场泼冷水，从而降低借款人和贷款人的过高风险。


Unlike such tools, interest-rate policy is a blunt instrument for dealing with financial imbalances.	与这些工具不同，利率政策是应对金融失衡的“钝器”。


And using interest rates to address such concerns may interfere with the central bank’s primary objective of keeping inflation near target.	使用利率解决这类问题可能妨碍央行的主要目标——将通货膨胀保持在目标水平附近。


Unfortunately, the development and use of macroprudential tools faces considerable economic and political obstacles.	不幸的是，宏观审慎工具的开发和使用面临诸多经济和政治障碍。


The Bank of Spain’s attempt to implement adjustable capital requirements for banks, through its system of “dynamic provisioning,” did little to deter aggressive lending during the country’s property boom.	西班牙银行试图通过“动态准备金”系统实施可调银行资本要求，结果并未达到在房地产繁荣期间抑制激进放贷的行为。


Once a mania gets underway, the temptation to join is simply too strong.	狂热一旦形成，加入其中的诱惑就会变得难以阻挡。


Macroprudential policy may also fail when the regulatory perimeter is too narrow.	宏观审慎政策还可能因为监管范围过窄而失效。


In 1929, the Fed attempted to restrain Wall Street with a policy of “direct pressure,” coercing member banks not to lend to security brokers and dealers.	1929年，美联储试图用“直接压力”约束华尔街，强制要求成员银行不向证券经纪商和交易商贷款。


In 2006, it encouraged its members not to lend to commercial property developers.	2006年，美联储鼓励其成员不要贷款给商业地产开发商。


In both cases, other lenders stepped in to meet the demand for credit, neutralizing the authorities’ macroprudential initiative.	在这两个例子中，其他贷款人填补了空白，满足了信贷需求，当局的宏观审慎措施效果被中性化。


And, while countries like the United Kingdom and New Zealand have experimented with giving central banks the power to place ceilings on loan-to-value ratios, this remains a bridge too far in the United States.	而尽管英国和新西兰等国家尝试了授予央行规定贷款-价值比上限的权力，但对美国来说，这仍然是“遥远的桥”。


In a country where homeownership is virtually an entitlement, measures making it more difficult would whip up a political firestorm.	在美国，房屋所有权实际上是一项权利，让拥有房屋变得更加困难的措施将引起政治风波。