The need to increase agricultural output becomes more urgent every day.	增加农业产出的需要每一天都在变得更加紧迫。


The global population is set to reach nine billion by 2050, while people in the developing world – where nearly all of the population growth will occur – are seeking more varied diets.	全球人口将在2050年达到九十亿，而发展中世界的人口——增量人口几乎全部来自这里——正在追求更多样化的饮食。


By 2030, demand for animal products will double, with overall food demand rising by 40%.	到2030年，动物产品需求将翻番，而食品总需求将上升40%。


Science has much to contribute to global food security.	科学可以极大地有利于全球食品安全。


While genetic modification is not essential to feed the world, it does provide significant advantages, enabling scientists to introduce or enhance traits – virus resistance in cassava, for example, or improved digestibility of feed – that cannot be realized with conventional breeding.	尽管转基因技术无法养活全世界，但它的确提供了重大进步，使科学家能够进行或改良传统饲育无法达到的特性，比如让木薯变得抗虫和让饲料变得更加容易消化。


To be sure, raising yields is not the same as feeding the world.	平心而论，增加产量和养活全世界并不是一回事。


If a vast swath of the population cannot afford the food that is produced, the size of the yield is irrelevant.	如果大量人口无法负担生产出来的粮食，那么产量再大也无济于事。


While nearly one billion people have been lifted out of poverty (defined by the World Bank as an income of less than $1.25 per day, in purchasing-power-parity terms) in the last 20 years, such progress will prove more difficult for the next billion.	过去20年中，近十亿人口摆脱了贫困（根据世界银行的定义，贫困线是每天收入少于1. 25美元），要让另一个十亿人口摆脱贫困就没有那么容易了。


Given this, policymakers should redouble their efforts to reduce poverty by supporting sustainable and inclusive economic growth.	因此，决策者应该加倍努力，通过支持可持续、包容性经济增长减少贫困。


They should commit to advancing sound agricultural management, maintaining well-functioning markets, and increasing investment in agriculture.	他们应高承诺推进可靠的农业管理，维系运转良好的市场，并增加农业投资。


At the same time, these objectives, while pressing, should not obscure the need to focus on yields – increases in which have accounted for three-quarters of food-production growth in recent decades.	与此同时，这些紧迫目标也不能妨碍产量这一焦点问题——在近几十年中，产量增加带来了四分之三的粮食总产增长。


Fortunately, the most significant potential limitations – land, water, and nutrients – seem unlikely to constrain global output excessively in the foreseeable future.	幸运的是，在可预见的未来，最大的潜在限制——土地、水和营养素——不太可能严重约束全球产出。


But, while none is in short supply globally, local shortages may occur.	但是，尽管从全球看这些要素并不短缺，但从局部而言并非如此。


Although crop land per capita will continue to decline, more arable land is available worldwide than previously thought.	尽管人均作物产量仍将下降，但全球适耕土地数量比先前估计的要多。


The example of the use of the Brazilian cerrado, once considered useless, augurs well for the African savannas.	比如，巴西塞拉都（cerrado）原本认为无法耕种，但也已经开始使用，这对于非洲稀树草原来说是个福音。


Underused land reserves also exist elsewhere in South America, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe.	未使用土地储备也存在于南美、中亚和东欧各处。


A more immediate challenge is ensuring that crops receive sufficient water, which requires building and maintaining efficient irrigation systems to stabilize yields and enable farmers to harvest an additional crop each year.	更紧迫的挑战是确保作物得到足够的水，这需要建造和维护高效灌溉系统以稳定产量、让农民每年可以收获更多季的作物。


As it stands, only 4% of arable land in Sub-Saharan Africa is irrigated, compared to 38% in Asia.	比较而言，撒哈拉以南非洲地区只有4%的适耕土地得到了灌溉，而亚洲这一比例为38%。


While the Middle East will face serious water shortages, Africa, where most population growth is set to occur, contains numerous unexploited water sources.	尽管中东面临严重的水短缺问题，但非洲——大部分人口增长都将发生于此——蕴藏着大量未开发水资源。


Fertilizer use has become significantly more efficient in recent years, a trend that will continue.	肥料的使用在近几年中效率猛增，这一趋势还将持续下去。


Reserves of minerals like phosphate will remain plentiful in the next decades, and nitrogen is not limited.	磷酸盐等物质的储备足够使用几十年，氮更是取之不尽。


Technology to extract nutrients from waste already exists, reducing dependency on mining.	从废料中提取营养素的技术已经发明，从而降低了对采矿的依赖。


Moreover, pigs and poultry are ideal food-waste processors, and their effluents can serve again as nutrient and energy sources, turning future food chains into interconnected production cycles.	此外，猪和家禽是理想的食物废料处理者，它们的排泄物也可以作为养料和能量源，将未来食物链融入生产大循环。


Perhaps the most pressing constraint on agricultural production is the impending labor shortage, as rural young people, who traditionally comprise the agricultural labor force, flock to cities.	也许对农业生产最紧迫的约束是严峻的劳动力短缺问题，因为农村年轻人口——传统上他们组成了农业劳动大军——纷纷涌向城市。


With small farmers unable to provide sufficient surpluses, agricultural production will become increasingly consolidated and mechanized, raising fossil-fuel consumption, which will have to be offset by the introduction of more efficient technologies.	小农无法生产足够的剩余，农业生产将日渐集中化和机械化，增加化石燃料使用，这必须通过引入更高效的技术以抵消影响。


Of course, future food production is subject to significant uncertainty.	当然，未来粮食生产还面临着极大的不确定性。


Population growth may not slow down as rapidly as expected.	人口增加可能不会如预料般减缓。


Protectionism threatens open markets and GDP growth.	保护主义威胁着开放市场和GDP增长。


And price volatility, whether triggered by drought or short-sighted national policies, could deter investments in agriculture and decrease the poor’s purchasing power.	价格波动——不管其触发因素是干旱还是短视的国家政策——可能阻挠农业投资、降低穷人的购买力。


Whether climate change will be a source of yield uncertainty in the coming decades remains unclear as well.	气候变化是否会变成未来几十年产量不确定的来源，目前还不得而知。


Although precipitation may be affected, higher temperatures would enable agricultural production in colder regions, and CO2 is known to bolster plant growth, even in dry areas.	尽管降水量可能受到影响，但温度升高能让较冷地区适合农业生产，而二氧化碳能刺激植物生长，即使在干旱地区也是如此。


In addition, while food hygiene, traceability, and labeling are improving, any amount of negligence when it comes to food safety could have far-reaching consequences in the complex and interconnected global food chain.	此外，尽管食品卫生、食品溯源和标签在改善，但任何食品安全方面的疏忽都可能在复杂而互相关联的全球粮食链中引起深远的后果。


Rising demand for animal products highlights microbiological risks, with animal-welfare measures sometimes creating new hazards.	动物产品需求上升凸显微生物风险，而动物福利措施有时会造成新风险。


For example, open pens for poultry may increase the spread of communicable diseases like avian influenza.	比如，开放家禽饲养增加了禽流感等传染病的传播。


Despite such risks, the outlook for future food security is promising.	尽管存在这些风险，未来粮食安全的前景仍然是光明的。 我们的食品比以前更安全，我们的饮食比以前更多样；


Our food is safer and our diets are more diverse than ever before; production methods are becoming increasingly sustainable, clean, and efficient; and we are constantly becoming better at protecting biodiversity.	生产方法变得越来越可持续、清洁和高效； 我们在保护生物多样性方面的经验也越来越丰富。


Yet many in Europe and the United States – which have benefited most from agricultural advances – are mistrustful of this progress, viewing scientific advancement and free trade as a dangerous combination.	但许多欧洲人和美国人——他们从农业进步中获益最多——对这些进步深感狐疑，视科学进步和自由贸易为洪水猛兽。


To the extent that this perception impedes progress, it is the real threat to global food security.	这样的观念妨碍进步，它们才是全球食品安全的真正威胁。


How Terrorism\u0027s Victims Became Perpetrators	恐怖主义受害者如何变成罪犯


Why is America in trouble?	美国为什么祸事连连？


September 11 was a traumatic event that shook the nation to its core. But it would not have changed the course of history for the worse if President Bush had not responded as he did.	911的巨大创伤动摇了国家的根本，但如果布什总统做出恰当的反应，情况还不至于演变得如此糟糕。


Declaring war on terrorism was understandable, perhaps even appropriate, as a figure of speech. The problem is that President Bush meant it literally.	宣布向恐怖开战可以理解，甚至是一种恰当的比喻，但问题是，布什总统真的那么做了。


I believe there is a direct connection between this and the abuse of detainees by US soldiers in Abu Ghraib prison.	我认为这和阿布格莱布监狱的美军疟俘事件有着直接的联系。


What happened at Abu Ghraib was not a case of a few bad apples, but a pattern tolerated and even encouraged by American authorities.	阿布格莱布所发生的一切并非几个害群之马的胡作非为，而是美国当局容忍甚至暗中鼓励的一种模式。


For example, the Judge Advocate General Corps routinely observes military interrogations from behind a two-way mirror; that practice was discontinued in Afghanistan and Iraq.	比如，军法队例行公事地从双面镜后观察军事审问，这种做法在阿富汗和伊拉克已经中止。


The International Red Cross and others started complaining about abuses as early as December 2002.	早在2002年12月，国际红十字会和其它组织就开始控诉疟俘问题。


It is easy to see how terrorism can lead to torture.	我们很容易看到恐怖主义将如何导致人身折磨。


Last summer, I took an informal poll at a meeting of Wall Street investors to find out whether they would condone the use of torture to prevent a terrorist attack.	去年夏天，我在华尔街投资者会议上进行了一次非正式的民意测验，了解与会者是否能够容忍为阻止恐怖袭击而采用折磨手段。


The consensus was that they hoped somebody would do it without their knowing about it.	多数人希望有人能这么做，只要不让他们了解真相。


Americans, sadly, are now victims who have turned into perpetrators.	令人悲哀的是，美国人已经从受害者变成了罪犯。


Indeed, since September 2001, the war on terror has claimed more innocent victims than those terrorist attacks.	事实上，2001年9月开始，反恐战争夺去的无辜生命已经比恐怖袭击多得多。


This fact is unrecognized at home because the victims of the war on terror are not Americans.	上述事实在美国国内没有得到认可，因为反恐战争的牺牲者都不是美国人。


But the rest of the world does not draw the same distinction, and world opinion has turned against America.	但其它国家并不认可这种差别，世界舆论转而对美国不利。


The Bush administration knew what it was doing when it declared war on terror and used that pretext for invading Iraq.	布什政府宣布反恐战争开始时就对自己的行为了如指掌，这不过是为入侵伊拉克找到了借口。


Perhaps Bush did not personally recognize this, but Vice President Dick Cheney and a group of extremists concentrated in and around the Pentagon did.	也许布什自己并未意识到，但副总统迪克·切尼和环绕在五角大楼周围的极端份子却心知肚明。


These people are guided by the belief that international relations are relations of power, not law.	这些人相信强权而不是法律主宰着国际关系的走向。


Because America is the most powerful nation on earth, it ought to use that power more assertively.	因为美国在全球最为强大，它当然应该充分利用这种优势。


They advocated the overthrow of Saddam Hussein even before Bush was elected and won him to their cause after September 11.	甚至在布什就职之前，他们就鼓吹推翻萨达姆·侯赛因，911之后又把布什拉进了自己的事业。


The invasion of Afghanistan could be justified on the grounds that the Taliban provided Bin Laden and Al Qaeda with a secure training ground. Invading Iraq could not be similarly justified.	塔利班为本·拉登和基地组织提供了安全的培训基地，美国能以此作为入侵阿富汗的理由，入侵伊拉克却并非如此。


Nevertheless, the ideologues in the administration were determined to pursue it because, in the words of Paul Wolfowitz, "it was doable."	尽管如此，政府内的空想家们还是决定这么做，因为用Paul Wolfowitz的话讲，"这简直唾手可得。


President Bush managed to convince the nation that Saddam Hussein had some connection with the suicide bombers of September 11, and that he possessed weapons of mass destruction.	"布什总统成功地说服了民众，萨达姆·侯赛因与911自杀性爆炸事件脱不了干系，他拥有大规模杀伤性武器。


When both claims proved false, he argued that America invaded Iraq to liberate the Iraqi people.	当所有理由落空的时候，他又声称美国入侵是为了解放伊拉克民众。


That claim was even more far-fetched.	这样的说法更站不住脚。


If America had really cared for the Iraqi people, more troops would have been sent to provide protection not only for the Ministry of Oil, but for museums and hospitals, too.	如果美国真的在乎伊拉克民众，就会增加派驻的军队，不仅保护石油部，也保护博物馆和医院。


Instead, Iraq was devastated by looting.	但事实上，伊拉克几乎被洗劫一空。


Now that America's position has become unsustainable, the Bush administration is handing over power to local militias in Falluja and elsewhere.	如今美国的位置已经不保，布什政府正在将权力移交给费卢杰和其它地区的民兵。


This prepares the ground for religious and ethnic divisions and possible civil war à la Bosnia, rather than democracy.	这埋下了宗教和种族分裂的隐患，甚至可能导致波斯尼亚那样的内战，但绝不会带来民主。


I would love to pin the blame for all this on Bush and his team. But that would ignore that Bush was playing to a receptive audience.	我很乐意将这一切归罪于布什及其政府，但这样会忽略布什面对的愿意听命的受众。


Indeed, after all that has happened, a majority of the US electorate continues to have confidence in Bush on national security matters.	事实上，在这一切发生后，多数美国选民依然表示信任布什对国家安全事务的决策。


If this continues and Bush is reelected, Americans must ask the question: "What is wrong with us?"	如果这种状况继续下去，布什竞选连任，美国人就必须扪心自问："我们究竟怎么了？ "


America needs profound soul-searching.	美国需要深刻的灵魂反省。


The terrorists seem to have hit upon a weak point in America's collective psyche. They have made Americans fearful and found a willing co-conspirator in the Bush administration.	恐怖分子似乎抓住了美国共同心理的弱点，让美国人忧心忡忡，迫不及待地与布什政府同流合污。


For reasons of its own, the Bush administration has found it advantageous to nurture the fear that September 11 engendered.	究其自身的原因，布什政府发现扩大911造成的恐惧非常有效。


By declaring war on terror, Bush united the country behind him.	通过发动反恐战争，布什将美国紧紧团结在自己的身旁。


But fear is a bad counselor.	但恐惧是蹩脚的顾问。


By succumbing to fear Americans are doing the terrorists' bidding: unleashing a vicious cycle of violence that may result in a permanent state of war.	美国人向恐惧屈服正中恐怖分子的下怀：邪恶的暴力怪圈由此形成，甚至可能招致永久的战争。


The war on terror need never end; because the terrorists are invisible, they will never disappear.	反恐战争永远不会结束，因为恐怖分子无影无形，永远不会消失。


The war on terror polarizes the world.	反恐战争使世界两极分化。


In battles for survival, whether in Yugoslavia or Israel, everyone sticks with his own tribe or nation, whether its policies are right or wrong.	在南斯拉夫或以色列的生存之战中，每个人都忠于自己的民族和国家，而不管政策是否正确。


This is the state of mind that Bush sought to foster when he declared that those who are not "with us" are with the terrorists.	布什宣称"不支持我们的人"就是恐怖分子的帮凶时，就是在培植这样的心态。


That attitude cannot be reconciled with an open society, a concept based on the recognition that nobody possesses ultimate truth.	这种心态与开放的社会互不相容，文明理念不认可绝对的真理。


Might is not necessarily right. It is not enough to reject the Bush administration's policies; Americans must reaffirm the values and principles of an open society.	权力不一定正确，抵制布什政府的政策也还不够，美国人必须再次肯定开放社会的价值观和处事原则。


The war on terror is an aberration. America must defend itself against terrorist attacks, but that cannot be allowed to become the overarching objective of its existence.	反恐战争有悖常理，美国必须保护自己不受恐怖袭击之害，但绝不能将自身利益作为至高无上的理由。


Today, no single country or combination of countries can stand up to American military might.	今天，任何国家或国家集团都无法对抗美国的军事力量。


The main threat to America's dominant position comes not from outside, but from within.	美国统治地位的最大威胁并非来自国外，而是源于国内。


If Americans fail to recognize that they may be wrong, they risk undermining the country's dominant position.	如果美国人不承认自己也可能出错，那么他们就冒着破坏统治地位的危险。


Being the most powerful nation gives America privileges, but it also imposes obligations.	美国作为最强大的国家好处多多，但责任也随之而来。


If Americans want to preserve their privileged position, they must not use it to dictate to the rest of the world, but for the well being of others.	如果美国希望保住自己的优势地位，就不能支配世界其它国家，而要为他人谋求福祉。


Indeed, many problems-maintaining peace, ensuring law and order, protecting the environment, reducing poverty, and fighting terrorism-require collective action.	事实上，维护和平、保证法律秩序、保护环境、消除贫困和战胜恐怖主义等很多问题都需要我们共同应对。


Americans cannot do anything they want, but little can be done without US leadership or active participation.	美国不能为所欲为，但没有美国的领导和积极参与，我们也只能停滞不前。


Instead of undermining and demeaning international institutions because they do not necessarily follow America's will, the US should strengthen and improve them.	美国应该加强和改善国际制度，而不能因为不合美国意志而加以破坏和贬低。


Instead of engaging in preemptive military actions, the US should pursue preventive actions of a constructive nature, creating a better balance between carrots and sticks in the prevailing world order.	美国应该采取建设性的防范行动，寻找现有秩序在胡萝卜和大棒间的最佳平衡，而不是先发制人地采取军事行动。


Emerging Markets’ Euro Nemesis	新兴市场的欧洲复仇女神


BRUSSELS – Emerging markets’ currencies are crashing, and their central banks are busy tightening policy, trying to stabilize their countries’ financial markets.	布鲁塞尔—新兴市场货币正在暴跌，它们的央行忙于收紧政策，试图稳定国内金融市场。


Who is to blame for this state of affairs?	出现这样的状况谁是罪魁祸首？


A few years ago, when the US Federal Reserve embarked on yet another round of “quantitative easing,” some emerging-market leaders complained loudly.	几年前，当美联储抛出新一轮“量化宽松”时，一些新兴市场领导人大胜抱怨。


They viewed the Fed’s open-ended purchases of long-term securities as an attempt to engineer a competitive devaluation of the dollar and worried that ultra-easy monetary conditions in the United States would unleash a flood of “hot money” inflows, driving up their exchange rates.	他们认为美联储无限期的购买长期债券是在试图造成美元的竞争性贬值，并且担心极端宽松的美国货币条件会导致“热钱”大量涌入，推高他们国家的汇率。


This, they feared, would not only diminish their export competitiveness and push their external accounts into deficit; it would also expose them to the harsh consequences of a sudden stop in capital inflows when US policymakers reversed course.	他们担心，这不但会削弱他们的出口竞争力，导致他们的对外账户转为赤字； 如果美国决策者转变政策方向，这还会造成资本流入突然停止的严重后果。


At first sight, these fears appear to have been well founded.	乍一看，这些担心不无道理。


As the title of a recent paper published by the International Monetary Fund succinctly puts it, “Capital Flows are Fickle: Anytime, Anywhere.”	IMF最新论文的标题言简意赅地指出，《资本流是易变的：不论何时，不论何国》（“Capital Flows are Fickle: Anytime, Anywhere）。


The mere announcement that the Fed might scale down its unconventional monetary-policy operations has led to today’s capital flight from emerging markets.	仅仅宣布美联储可能缩减非常规货币政策操作的规模便已导致如今资本逃离新兴市场的局面。


But this view misses the real reason why capital flowed into emerging markets over the last few years, and why the external accounts of so many of them have swung into deficit.	但这一观点并没有击中过去几年资本流入新兴市场、如此多的新兴市场国家对外账户转为赤字的原因。


The real culprit is the euro.	真正的罪魁是欧元。


Quantitative easing in the US cannot have been behind these large swings in global current-account balances, because America’s external deficit has not changed significantly in recent years.	美国的量化宽松不可能全球经常项目平衡如此大规模波动的原因，因为在近几年中美国的对外赤字并没有发生大变化。


This is also what one would expect from economic theory: in conditions approaching a liquidity trap, the impact of unconventional monetary policies on financial conditions and demand is likely to be modest.	我们也可以从经济学理论中发现这一点：在日益接近流动性陷阱的条件下，非常规货币政策对金融条件和需求的影响是微小的。


Indeed, the available models tell us that, to the extent that an expansionary monetary policy actually does have an impact on the economy, its effect on the current account should not be large, because any positive effect on exports from a weaker exchange rate should be offset by larger imports due to the increase in domestic demand.	事实上，现有模型告诉我们，由于扩张的货币政策事实上却是对经济有影响，其对经常项目的效应不会很大，因为任何弱势汇率带来的积极出口效应都应该会被内需增加所引发的的进口增长抵消。


This is what has happened in the US, and its recent economic revival has been accompanied by an expansion of both exports and imports.	美国正是如此，其当前的经济复苏伴随着出口和进口的同时扩大。


The impact of the various rounds of quantitative easing on emerging markets (and on the rest of the world) has thus been approximately neutral.	因此，多轮量化宽松对新兴市场（以及世界其他地区）的影响大致上是中性的。


But austerity in Europe has had a profound impact on the eurozone’s current account, which has swung from a deficit of almost $100 billion in 2008 to a surplus of almost $300 billion this year.	但欧洲的紧缩对欧元区经常项目造成了深远影响，从2008年的近1000亿美元赤字变为今年的近3000亿美元盈余。


This was a consequence of the sudden stop of capital flows to the eurozone’s southern members, which forced these countries to turn their current accounts from a combined deficit of $300 billion five years ago to a small surplus today.	这导致了流向欧元区南部成员国的资本流突然断流，迫使这些国家的经常项目从五年前的3000亿美元赤字（总和）转变为如今的略有盈余。


Because the external-surplus countries of the eurozone’s north, Germany and Netherlands, did not expand their demand, the eurozone overall is now running the world’s largest current-account surplus – exceeding even that of China, which has long been accused of engaging in competitive currency manipulation.	由于欧元区北部的外部盈余国（德国和荷兰）的需求并未扩张，因此目前欧元区总体呈现出世界最大规模的经常项目盈余，甚至比中国还要大，而这长期以来被指责是通过参与竞争性货币操纵获得的。


This extraordinary swing of almost $400 billion in the eurozone’s current-account balance did not result from a “competitive devaluation”; the euro has remained strong.	欧元区经常项目余额的这一近4000亿美元的反常波动并不是由“竞争性贬值”造成的； 欧元仍然保持着强势。


So the real reason for the eurozone’s large external surplus today is that internal demand has been so weak that imports have been practically stagnant over the last five years (the average annual growth rate was a paltry 0.25%).	因此如今欧元区的巨额对外盈余的真实来源时其内需太弱，进口在过去五年中几乎毫无增长（平均年增长率只有0. 25%）。


The cause of this state of affairs, in one word, is austerity.	什么造成了这一局面？ 一言以蔽之，紧缩。


Weak demand in Europe is the real reason why emerging markets’ current accounts deteriorated (and, with the exception of China, swung into deficit).	欧洲需求不振是新兴市场经常项目走弱并转为赤字（中国除外）的真实原因。


Thus, if anything, emerging-market leaders should have complained about European austerity, not about US quantitative easing.	因此，如果新兴市场要抱怨的话，对象也应该是欧洲的紧缩，而不是美国的量化宽松。


Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke’s talk of “tapering” quantitative easing might have triggered the current bout of instability; but emerging markets’ underlying vulnerability was made in Europe.	美联储伯南克“逐渐减少”量化宽松的说法可能引发了最新一波动荡； 但新兴市场的根本脆弱性来自欧洲。


The fickleness of capital markets poses once again the paradox of thrift.	资本市场的易变性再次造成了节俭悖论。


As capital withdraws from emerging markets, these countries soon will be forced to adopt their own austerity measures and run current-account surpluses, much like the eurozone periphery today.	随着资本撤出新兴市场，这些国家将被迫采取自身的紧缩措施并形成经常项目盈余，一如欧元区外围国今天的行为。


But who will then be able – and willing – to run deficits?	但谁可以——也愿意——形成赤字？


Two of the world’s three largest economies come to mind: China, given the strength of its balance sheet, and the eurozone, given the euro’s status as a reserve currency.	进入眼帘的是世界三大经济体中的两个：一是中国，其资产负债表情况相当坚挺； 二是欧元区，因为欧元是一种储备货币。


But both appear committed to running large surpluses (indeed, the two largest in the world).	但这两个经济体似乎都致力于形成巨额盈余（事实上，是世界上第一和第二大盈余）。


This implies that, unless the US resumes its role as consumer of last resort, the latest bout of financial-market jitters will weaken the global economy again.	这意味着，除非美国再次扮演最后消费者，最近的资本市场动荡将再次削弱全球经济。


And any global recovery promises to be unbalanced – that is, if it materializes at all.	而全球复苏——如果能够实现的话——必然是失衡的。


A Time for Action in the Middle East	中东行动正当时


LONDON – The announcement, following the use of chemical weapons in Syria, of an emergency summit in Jordan this week of military leaders from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar is a welcome development.	伦敦——在叙利亚使用化学武器后，本周美国、英国、法国、德国、意大利、加拿大、土耳其、沙特阿拉伯和卡塔尔等国军事领导人在约旦召开紧急峰会后发表声明是一项值得欢迎的举措。


Western policy is at a crossroads: commentary or action; shaping events or reacting to them.	西方政策需要在评论还是行动； 决定事态还是被动反应中做出抉择。


After the long and painful campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, I understand every impulse to stay clear of the turmoil, to watch but not to intervene, to ratchet up language but not to engage in the hard, even harsh business of changing reality on the ground.	在漫长而痛苦的伊拉克阿富汗行动后，我理解一切躲避动荡、冷眼旁观但拒绝亲身参与、在旁指手划脚却不愿插手改变现状的冲动。


But we have to understand the consequences of wringing our hands instead of putting them to work.	但我们必须明白捶胸顿足、而拒绝脚踏实地努力的后果。


People wince at the thought of intervention.	只要想到干预我们就会倒吸一口凉气。


But contemplate the future consequences of inaction and shudder: Syria, mired in the carnage between the brutality of Bashar al-Assad and various affiliates of Al Qaeda, a breeding ground of extremism infinitely more dangerous than Afghanistan in the 1990’s; Egypt in chaos, with the West, however unfairly, looking as if it is giving succor to those who would turn it into a Sunni version of Iran; and Iran itself, despite its new president, still a theocratic dictatorship, with a nuclear bomb.	但是否考虑过战战兢兢、坐视不理将会带来的后果：叙利亚被巴沙尔·阿萨德的残暴和基地组织分支机构的屠杀所吞没，演变为危险性远胜于20世纪90年代阿富汗的极端主义温床； 埃及则陷入混乱，无论多不公平，在人们眼中西方都似乎在全力支持逊尼版的伊朗；


The West would appear confused, its allies would be dismayed, and its enemies would be emboldened.	还有伊朗自己，尽管更换了新总统执政，但仍然是掌握核武器的政教合一的独裁统治。 西方将无所适从、盟国会感到失望、而敌对势力则有恃无恐。


This is a nightmare scenario, but it is not far-fetched.	这的确是噩梦般的场景，但它的出现却并不牵强。


Start with Egypt.	先说埃及。


To many in the West, it is clear that the Egyptian military has removed a democratically elected government and is now repressing a legitimate political party, killing its supporters and imprisoning its leaders.	在很多西方人看来，很明显是埃及军方推翻了民选政府，而且仍在镇压合法政党，屠杀该党的支持者并监禁其领袖。


So we are on a steady track toward ostracizing the new government.	因此我们越来越倾向于排斥新政府。


In doing so, we think that we are upholding our values.	我们认为这样做是在坚持我们的价值观。


I completely understand this view.	这种想法我完全可以理解。


But to embrace it would be a grave strategic error.	但这么做将犯下严重的战略错误。


The fallacy of this approach lies in the Muslim Brotherhood’s nature.	这种看法的谬误在于穆兄会的性质。


We think of it as a normal political party.	它不是我们眼中正常的政党。


It is not. If you want to join the UK Conservative Party or the German Christian Democrats or America’s Democratic Party, you can do so easily, and they will welcome you with open arms.	如果想加入英国保守党、德国基督教民主党或美国民主党，你可以非常轻易地这样做，因为他们将敞开胸怀欢迎你的加入。


In all of these countries, all parties respect basic democratic freedoms.	上述所有国家的所有党派都尊重基本的民主自由。


The Muslim Brotherhood is not such a party.	但穆兄会却不是这样的政党。


Becoming a member is a seven-year process of induction and indoctrination.	成为党员需要长达七年的诱导和灌输。


The Brotherhood is a movement run by a hierarchy that is more akin to the Bolsheviks.	穆兄会的性质和布尔什维克相似，是等级制度管理下的运动。


Read their speeches – those put out not for Western ears, but for their own.	看看他们的演讲——这些演讲针对的不是西方，而是自己人。


What they were doing in Egypt was not “governing badly.”	他们在埃及的所作所为绝非“执政不利”。


If you elect a bad government, then tough – you live with it.	如果选出了糟糕的政府，那么很遗憾——你只能接受。


The Muslim Brotherhood, by contrast, was systematically changing the constitution and taking control of the commanding heights of the state in order to make it impossible for its rule to be challenged.	相反，穆兄会全面篡改宪法并控制政府制高点，以此来巩固自身的统治。


And it was doing so in pursuit of values that contradict everything for which democracy stands.	它所追求的价值观与一切民主主张相抵触。


So you can rightly criticize the actions or overreactions of Egypt’s new military government; but it is difficult to criticize the intervention that brought it into being.	因此你可以理所当然地批评埃及新军政府的行为或过度反应，但却很难批评造就军政府的干预行动。


Now all of the choices that Egypt faces are ugly.	现在埃及面临的所有选择都非常凶险。


There are large numbers of soldiers and police among the casualties, as well as civilians; and, partly as a byproduct of the fall of Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi, Egypt is awash with weapons.	伤亡者中既有大批军警、也有普通民众； 同时，作为利比亚卡扎菲倒台的副产品，埃及现在到处都是武器。


But simply condemning the military will not bring a return to democracy any nearer.	但单纯地谴责军方换不回民主制度。


Egypt is not a creation of nineteenth- or twentieth-century global power games.	埃及不是十九、二十世纪全球权力游戏的产物。


It is an ancient civilization stretching back thousands of years, imbued with fierce national pride.	它的古老文明可以回溯几千年，民族自豪感非常强烈。


The army has a special place in its society.	军队在社会中占有特殊地位。


The people do want democracy, but they will be disdainful of Western critics whom they will see as utterly naive in the face of the threat to democracy that the Muslim Brotherhood posed.	民众的确希望民主，但却对穆兄会民主威胁中在他们看来极端天真的西方评论家嗤之以鼻。


We should support the new government in stabilizing the country; urge everyone, including the Muslim Brotherhood, to get off the streets; and let a proper and short process to an election with independent observers be put in place.	我们理应支持新政府采取稳定行动； 敦促所有人、包括穆兄会成员远离街道；


A new constitution that protects minority rights and the basic ethos of the country should be drafted, and all political parties should operate according to rules that ensure transparency and commitment to the democratic process.	迅速组织各方都能接受的派遣独立观察员的选举。 应当起草新宪法保护少数族裔权利和国家的基本精神，所有政党都应该按规则行事，以确保民主进程的承诺和透明度。


This is the only realistic way to help those – probably a majority – who want genuine democracy, not an election used as a route to domination.	这是唯一现实的方法能够帮助多数真正渴望民主的群体，而不是利用选举走上独裁之路。


In Syria, we know what is happening – and that it is wrong to let it happen.	我们很清楚叙利亚发生的一切，而且清楚它其实不该发生。


But leave aside any moral argument and just think of the world’s interests for a moment.	但此时我们应抛开道德观以全球利益为重。


Doing nothing would mean Syria’s disintegration, divided in blood, with the countries around it destabilized and waves of terrorism rolling over the region.	坐视不理意味着叙利亚解体、在流血事件中四分五裂、威胁到所有周边国家的安全、让恐怖主义浪潮席卷整个区域。


Assad would remain in power in the richest part of the country, with bitter sectarian fury reigning in the country’s eastern hinterland.	阿萨德将继续在阿富汗最富裕的地区掌权，该国的东部腹地则陷入痛苦的宗派愤怒。


Iran, with Russia’s support, would be ascendant – and the West apparently impotent.	伊朗将在俄国的支持下实力不断增强——而西方国家则明显束手无策。


I hear people talk as if nothing can be done: the Syrian defense systems are too powerful, the issues too complex, and in any event, why take sides when one is as bad as the next?	我听到的说法似乎根本无事可做：叙利亚的防御系统太过强大、问题太过复杂、而且为什么要在没有更好方案的情况下做出选择？


But others are taking sides.	但别人正在表明态度。


They are not terrified of the prospect of intervention.	他们在面对干预可能时并未惊慌失措。


They are intervening in support of a regime that is assaulting civilians in ways not seen since the dark days of Saddam Hussein.	他们正在支持从萨达姆·侯赛因的黑暗统治后以前所未有方式对平民发动攻击的独裁政府。


It is time we took a side: the side of the people who want what we want; who see our societies, for all their faults, as something to admire; who know that they should not be faced with a choice between tyranny and theocracy.	我们现在应该做出选择：支持与我们有同样愿望的群体； 他们看到我们的社会虽然有种种缺点，但仍有值得敬佩之处；


I detest the implicit notion behind so much of our commentary that the Arabs or, even worse, the people of Islam, are unable to understand what a free society looks like, that they cannot be trusted with something so modern as a polity where religion is in its proper place.	他们清楚不该在专制和政教合一之间做出选择。 我厌恶我们众多评论背后所隐含的潜台词，即阿拉伯人、甚至伊斯兰人根本无法理解自由社会，我们不相信他们能够接受赋予宗教恰当地位的现代化政治制度。


It is not true.	这种说法是不对的。


What is true is that there is a life-and-death struggle going on over the future of Islam, with extremists aiming to subvert both its open-minded tradition and the modern world.	伊斯兰未来的生死斗争正在进行中，而极端份子的目的是要颠覆其开明的传统和现代世界。


In this struggle, we should not be neutral.	我们不应在这场斗争中隔岸观火。


Wherever this extremism is destroying the lives of innocent people – from Iran to Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, as well as elsewhere in Africa, Central Asia, and the Far East – we should be at their side.	从伊朗到叙利亚、埃及、利比亚、突尼斯、以及非洲，中亚和远东的其他地方，无论极端主义在哪里毁灭无辜民众的生命，我们都应该在他们身边给予帮助。


As one of the architects of policy after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, I know the controversy, anguish, and cost of the decisions taken.	身为2001年911恐怖袭击后的决策者，我清楚这些决策所带来的冲突、痛苦和代价。


I understand why the pendulum has swung so heavily the other way.	我明白舆论为什么会发生如此大的变化。


But it is not necessary to revert to that policy to make a difference.	但没有必要恢复以前的政策就能够改变现状。


And the forces that made intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq so difficult are of course the very forces at the heart of the storm today.	今天处于风暴核心的恰恰是让阿富汗和伊拉克干预行动变得如此艰难的力量。


They have to be defeated.	这种力量必须被打败。


We should defeat them, however long it takes, because otherwise they will not disappear.	无论需要多长时间我们必须打败它们， 否则它们会持续存在。


They will grow stronger, until we will reach another crossroads; at that point, there will be no choice.	这些力量将会发展壮大，直到我们再次走到十字路口； 到那时，我们将别无选择。


How the West Was Re-Won	西方是如何再次获胜的


PARIS – In 2005, at the Royal Academy of Arts in London, a prestigious exhibit sponsored by the Chinese Government, “The Three Emperors,” celebrated the greatness of Chinese art.	巴黎——2005年，在中国政府的赞助下，伦敦的皇家艺术学院举办了一场著名的展览——“天皇”之展，该展览展示的是伟大的中国艺术。


The show’s central piece was a giant painting in the European (Jesuit) style depicting the envoys of the Western world lining up to pay respect to the Chinese emperor.	展会的核心作品是一幅具有欧式（即耶稣会）风格的巨画，画中描绘的是西方国家的特使正排成一队向中国皇帝致敬。


The message could not have been more explicit: “China is back.”	其韵意十分明确，即“中国归来了”。


The West would have to pay tribute to China in the future the way it had kowtowed to it in the past.	在未来，西方将像昔日一样以古老的叩头礼节向中国致敬。


In 2012, China is on the verge of becoming the world’s largest economy and is by far the leading emerging power.	当前中国是遥遥领先的新兴力量； 到2012年，中国将成为世界上最强大的经济体。


Yet two simultaneous phenomena suggest that the West may have been buried prematurely by its own Cassandras and by Asian pundits who sometimes behave like “arrogant Westerners.”	然而，两种同时发生的现象表明，西方国家可能已提前被西方预言家和行为举止有时貌似“傲慢的西方人”的亚洲学者所埋葬。


First, the West, particularly Europe, is slowly taking the measure of the Asian challenge.	首先，西方，尤其是欧洲，正逐步探究亚洲将带来怎样的挑战。


Second, it is doing so at the very moment that the emerging countries are starting to feel the consequences of a world economic crisis that has Europe as its epicenter.	其次，此刻新兴国家开始认识到以欧洲为中心的世界经济危机将会带来怎样的后果。


In other words, a new balance of strengths and weaknesses is emerging beneath the surface of events – and runs contrary to current mantras.	换言之，在种种事件背后，强国和弱国之间正形成一种新的平衡关系，而且这种关系同目前人们所预想的截然相反。


Europe has awakened to the Asian challenge just as its own crisis exposes and intensifies the emerging countries’ economic, political, and social weaknesses.	欧洲爆发的经济危机更加暴露了新兴国家的经济、政治及社会弱点，而与此同时欧洲也意识到了亚洲带来的挑战。


A few years ago, in my book The Geopolitics of Emotion, I stressed the differences that existed between a Western world dominated by fear and an Asia animated by hope.	几年前，我在本人所著的《情感边缘政治学》一书中指出了充满恐惧的西方世界和充满希望的亚洲之间的异同。


While the West accumulated debts, Asia had startled the world with its long economic boom.	西方的债务不断增加，但令世界震惊的是亚洲的经济长期以来却不断繁荣发展。


This continues to be the case, but nuances are appearing.	这一现象仍在继续，然而现实却发生了微妙的变化。


There is more fear today in the West, but also a little less hope in Asia.	今天，西方充满了更多的恐惧，然而亚洲的希望却更小。


Indeed, global investors are starting to hedge their bets, as if preparing themselves for a more genuinely balanced world spanning different continents and cultures.	事实上，全球投资者开始多方投资，好像要做好准备以应对一个横跨各个大陆和不同文化的更加平衡的新世界。


Asia may have caught up with the West; Latin America may be on track to do so; and Africa may be slowly positioning itself to grow.	也许亚洲已赶上了西方； 拉丁美洲可能正在努力；


The Arab world, too, with its ongoing revolution, may also be joining the game, overcoming the humiliation that had been its peoples’ animating emotional force.	而非洲或许正缓慢发展。 目前阿拉伯国家正进行改革，而阿拉伯可能也会参与进来，以洗刷其民众长期饱受的屈辱感。


The West, meanwhile, may be slowly adapting to the new realities of a world that it no longer dominates, but in which it still occupies an essential role, owing to values whose universalism is now formulated in a more restrained and coherent way.	同时，或许西方正慢慢适应全新的世界现实——即西方不再占主导地位，但由于其价值观的影响，它仍会在世界上发挥至关重要的作用，只是其价值观的影响会受到更大的限制。


Indeed, to fear, hope, and humiliation, I would now add a fourth and decisive cultural mood: modesty.	事实上，除恐惧、希望及羞辱感之外，现在我要加入第四种具有决定性的文化情绪：谦虚。


Today’s West is very different from the historical West.	今天的西方同历史上的西方有着巨大的差异。


It is a reduced entity, increasingly aware that it can no longer be the center of the world, if only because of its shrinking demographic weight.	西方的影响力正逐渐减小，它越来越认识到自己已不再是世界的中心，同时西方非常希望这仅仅是由人口减少所引起的。


Europe accounted for 20% of the world’s population at the beginning of the eighteenth century; the population of the West as a whole will constitute slightly more than 10% in 2050.	18世纪初，欧洲人口占世界总人口的20%； 而到20510年西方总人口将仅占世界人口的10%。


The West is also fragmented: the American West is growing increasingly apart from the European West.	此外，西方日益分裂：美国西部逐渐从欧洲西部脱离出来。


The question is no longer one of shared interests or common security goals, but of culture, as the United States, in particular, increasingly looks to Asia and Latin America and attracts immigrants from those regions.	这已不再是简单的共同利益目标问题或共同安全目标问题，而是发展成一个文化问题，因为尤其是美国越来越依赖亚洲和拉丁美洲，并吸引了越来越多的亚洲和拉美移民。


As for the Asian West, Japan will continue to remain alone and unique.	至于亚洲西部，日本将继续维持其独特的独立状态。


Given this, it might seem premature, to say the least, to announce the “return of the West,” especially at a time when the US economy remains fragile, Europe’s financial crisis is fueling an existential funk, and Japan’s deep structural malaise continues.	鉴于这一点，也许现在宣布“西方回归”有点为时过早，尤其是目前美国经济依然十分脆弱，欧洲的金融危机引起了人们更大的惶恐，以及日本仍存在深层的结构问题。


Still, across Europe, particularly in the south, one is witnessing a willingness to learn from others.	而且，整个欧洲，尤其是欧洲南部，也愿意借鉴他人的经验。


There is a growing awareness, even in France – not known for its humility – that benchmarking is necessary, and that tough sacrifices will have to be made.	甚至是法国（一个不懂得“谦虚”的国家）都日益意识到制定基准的必要性，尽管这要付出巨大的牺牲。


In other words, Europeans are beginning to understand that they have lived well beyond their means materially, and well below their means intellectually, spiritually, and ethically – a process that might be described as the beginning of Europe’s “Montization,” to pay tribute to Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti’s embodiment of responsibility and courage.	换言之，欧洲人开始认识到他们的物质生活过于充裕，但其智慧、精神或道德食粮却相对不足。 也许可以将这一过程称为欧洲“蒙蒂化“的开端，以向责任和勇气的化身——意大利总理马里奥•蒙蒂——致敬。


Just imagine: a more virtuous Europe encountering a more “decadent” China, whose venal elites are starting to turn on each other?	试想：更加高尚的欧洲遇上了更加“颓废”的中国，哪国精英将唯利是图、相互攻击呢？


What we may be witnessing is the consolidation of a truly multipolar world, in which the West no longer dominates, but is not about to be replaced by Asia or the emerging world in general.	也许我们会看到一个真正多极化的世界，在这个世界里西方将不再占据主导地位，但也不会被亚洲或其他的新兴国家所取代。


The West is not “striking back.”	但西方并没有“回击”。


But a more modest West may stabilize its position with respect to China, particularly at a time when China has become both more arrogant and less confident in its own political and social system.	相反，西方会变得更加谦逊，将更尊重中国，尤其是目前的中国更加高傲，但却对自身的政治和社会体制更缺乏信心。


America’s Rehearsals for Retirement	美国的退休演习


BERKELEY – As the first wave of America’s baby boomers begins to retire, the retirement system is revealing its flaws.	伯克利—随着美国首波婴儿潮开始退休，退休制度的漏洞正在显现。


More than half of all workers (and more than 60% of low-income workers) are at risk of lacking sufficient savings to maintain their living standards after they stop working.	一大半退休者（以及超过60%的低收入工人）面临缺少足够储蓄在停止工作后维持生活水平的风险。


In a recent international comparison, America’s retirement system received a passing grade of C; but, for a large and growing number of Americans, the system is failing.	在最新的国际比较中，美国退休制度的得分只能打及格； 但对于庞大且不断增长的美国人口数量来说，这个制度是不及格的。


The slow recovery from the Great Recession has exacerbated the challenge.	大衰退以来的缓慢复苏加剧了挑战。


Homes are most Americans’ major retirement asset, and, despite a recent pickup, housing prices are still 28% below their 2006 peak, while 28% of all homeowners owe more on their mortgages than their property is worth.	住房时大部分美国人的主要退休资产，而尽管住房价格最近有所反弹，但仍比2006年的峰值水平低了28%，更有28%的屋主，他们的按揭额比所拥有的物业价值还要高。


Discretionary employer retirement plans are a major pillar of America’s retirement system.	自由裁量雇主退休计划是美国退休制度的一大主要支柱。


But nearly 16 million Americans are either unemployed or have dropped out of the labor force, while more than half of the jobs created during the recovery are low-wage positions that usually do not offer such plans.	但有近1600万美国人要么无人聘用，要么退出了劳动力大军，与此同时，复苏期间创造的工作岗位一大半属于低薪职位，通常并不提供退休计划。


By contrast, most of the 625,000 public-sector jobs lost during the recovery offered generous pensions.	相反，在复苏期间减少的625 000个公共部门职位倒是提供慷慨的退休金。


Nearly 60% of all employed private-sector workers aged 25-64 are not covered by employer retirement plans, and coverage rates vary by income: 73% of all workers in the top earnings quartile are covered by such plans, compared to only 38% in the bottom quartile.	近60%的25—64岁私营企业员工没有加入雇主退休计划，该计划的覆盖率因收入水平不同而不同——最顶尖的25%员工中有73%得到雇主退休计划覆盖，最底端的25%员工覆盖率只有38%。


Plan participation also varies by income, with low-income workers much less likely to participate than high-income workers.	退休计划参与率也因收入水平不同而不同，低收入员工的参与率远低于高收入员工。


The lack of universal coverage also means that workers move in and out of plans as they change jobs; more than one-third of all households end up with no employer-based pension coverage.	缺少全体覆盖还意味着员工在跳槽时需要退出和重新进入退休计划； 超过三分之一的家庭最终无法获得基于雇主的退休金。


By contrast, in several other countries, mandatory employer and employee participation in national employer-based plans means nearly universal coverage.	相反，在不少其他国家中，雇主和员工被强制要求参与基于雇主的国民退休金计划，这意味着几乎是全民参与。


Personal retirement savings, another pillar of the US retirement system, are woefully inadequate for most households, partly because the decades-long stagnation in median wages has made it difficult to save.	美国退休制度的另一大支柱——个人退休储蓄对大部分家庭来说是远远不够的，这部分是因为中位收入已有数十年停滞不前，导致储蓄变得困难。


According to a recent study, one-third of Americans aged 45-54 have nothing saved specifically for retirement.	一份最新研究表明，三分之一的45—54年龄段美国人没有任何专门针对退休的储蓄。


Meanwhile, three-quarters of near-retirees – those aged 50-64 – have annual incomes below $52,201 and average total retirement savings of less than $27,000.	与此同时，四分之三的接近退休人群——即50—64年龄段——年收入低于52 201美元，总退休储蓄少于27 000美元。


The United States relies on generous tax incentives to encourage personal retirement savings, but these incentives are poorly targeted and yield limited returns.	美国依赖慷慨的税收激励鼓励个人退休储蓄，但这些激励定位不当，成效有限。


More than 80% of the value of these incentives goes to the top 20% of taxpayers, who earn more than $100,000 a year.	这些激励的价值有超过80%落在了最顶端的20%纳税人手里，他们的年收入超过100 000美元。


Moreover, while the incentives cost the US Treasury nearly $100 billion annually, they induce little new saving; instead, they cause high-income taxpayers to shift their savings to tax-advantaged assets – a major reason why President Barack Obama proposes capping the tax deduction for retirement saving.	此外，尽管这些激励每年给美国财政带来1 000亿美元的成本，却几乎不能刺激新储蓄； 相反，它们导致高收入纳税人把储蓄转移到具税收优势的资产——这正是总统奥巴马计划给退休储蓄税收优惠设定上限的原因。


A more radical proposal would convert the tax deduction into a means-tested and refundable matching government contribution – deposited directly into a taxpayer’s individual retirement account (IRA).	更激进的方案把减税改为基于调查的可退还的政府匹配缴纳计划——把存款直接打入纳税人的个人退休账户（IRA）。


Taxpayers are more responsive to matching incentives than they are to tax incentives, because the former are easier to understand and more transparent.	与税收激励相比，纳税人更响应匹配激励，因为后者更易理解，也更透明。


Lack of coverage in employer-based plans and insufficient personal savings leave more than one-third of all households (and more than 75% of low-income households) entirely dependent on Social Security for their retirement income.	基于雇主的退休计划覆盖不足和个人储蓄不足导致三分之一以上家庭（以及超过75%的低收入家庭）完全依靠社会保障获得退休收入。


And, because Social Security replaces only about 40% of pre-retirement income for low-wage workers and less than a third for median-wage workers, those who rely on it as their sole source of income live at or below the poverty line.	此外，由于社会保障只能取代低收入员工40%的退休前收入（以及中位收入员工不到三分之一的退休前收入），依赖社会保证作为唯一收入来源的群体将在贫困线上下挣扎。


(Replacement rates in other developed countries are in the 70% range, compared to a benchmark of 80% recommended by retirement experts.)	（其他发达国家的取代率在70%区间，而退休专家的建议基准替代率为80%）。


Addressing the looming retirement crisis in the US requires increasing worker coverage in employer-based plans.	解决美国退休危机前景要求增加基于雇主的退休计划的员工覆盖率。


Here, automatic enrollment, unless workers opt out, has proved effective, boosting employee participation to more than 90%.	在这里，自动注册（除非员工选择退出）已证明是有效的，把员工参与率提升到了90%以上。


Indeed, recent research indicates that automatic enrollment is much more effective than tax incentives for increasing retirement saving.	事实上，最新研究表明，自动注册比税收激励更能提高退休储蓄。


But many employers do not offer retirement plans, while almost all workers are eligible for tax-advantaged IRAs.	但许多雇主并不提供退休计划，而几乎所有员工都符合有税收优势的IRA的要求。


As Obama has proposed, employers that do not offer retirement plans should be required to offer automatic contributions to their workers’ IRAs through regular payroll deductions.	正如奥巴马所建议的，不提供退休计划的雇主应该被要求通过定期工资减扣提供自动缴纳其员工的IRA。


Matching government contributions should be used in lieu of, or in addition to, tax deductions to encourage low-income workers to participate.	政府匹配缴纳应该用于代替或补充减税以鼓励低收入员工参与。


California and several other US states are also evaluating new state-administered retirement-savings programs for private-sector workers without access to employer-based plans.	加利福尼亚和其他几个美国州还在评估新的州政府退休储蓄计划，这些计划适用于无法参与基于雇主的退休计划的私人部门员工。


The California plan, based on a proposal by Teresa Ghilarducci and her colleagues, would automatically enroll eligible employees, defined as private-sector workers at firms with five or more employees that do not offer retirement plans.	加州的计划基于吉拉杜奇（Teresa Ghilarducci）及其同事的方案，将自动注��符合条件的员工（员工人数五人及以上的私人部门员工，雇主不提供退休计划）。


Contributions would be made through automatic payroll deductions by employers at a default rate of 3% of gross pay, but employees could opt out or adjust their contribution rates.	退休储蓄缴纳将通过雇主自动工资减扣实现，默认减扣率为毛工资的3%，但员工可以选择退出或改变其缴纳率。


Under this scheme, each worker would have an individual account balance (treated as an IRA from a tax perspective), but the assets that secure the plan’s benefits would be held in a pooled trust, with a real return guaranteed by private insurance and paid out as an annuity upon retirement.	在这一制度下，每名员工可以获得个人账户余额（税收待遇等同IRA），但确保该计划收益的资产将由资金池信托持有，实际回报由私人保险担保，从退休开始以年金的形式发放。


Accounts would be linked to workers, not to their employers, ensuring portability between jobs.	账户将与员工而不是雇主挂钩，以保证就业的流动性。


(The lack of portability and the absence of annuity payouts are major shortcomings of most employer plans.)	（缺少流动性和没有年金支付时大部分雇主计划的主要缺点。


An independent board would oversee the state plan’s administration, relying on a competitive bidding process to select investment managers.	）一个独立委员会将监督州计划的管理，以竞标程序选择投资经理。


Senator Tom Harkin recently proposed a national plan with many similar features, open to all workers whose employer plans do not meet minimum requirements.	哈金（Tom Harkin）参议员最近提出了具有许多类似特点的全国计划，向所有雇主退休计划不满足最低要求的员工开放。


The countries that outrank the US on the global retirement index in terms of coverage, adequacy of benefits, and long-term sustainability have national pension plans in addition to their basic social-security-type programs.	在全球退休指数榜上覆盖率、退休金充足性和长期可持续性排名高于美国的国家都在基本社会保障型计划之外还有全国退休金计划。


Some are mandatory, some have automatic enrollment, and some rely on matching government contributions to encourage participation.	其中一些是强制性的，一些是自动注册的，还有一些依赖政府匹配缴纳鼓励参与。


In the US, making saving easier and more financially rewarding through better-targeted tax incentives, matching government contributions, automatic IRAs, and state-wide retirement plans would help boost retirement savings, especially for low- and middle-income households.	在美国，通过定向更合理的税收激励、政府匹配缴纳、自动IRA和全国退休计划让储蓄变得更容易、在财务上好处更大有助于刺激退休储蓄，特别是中低收入家庭。


Improving financial literacy would also help.	改善财务知识也有所助益。


The current obsession with government deficits and budgetary constraints should not deflect attention from the need for reforms that address the looming retirement crisis confronting many Americans.	当前沉迷于政府赤字和预算约束的局面不应该把注意力从改革需要上移开。 美国需要改革纠正大量美国人即将面临的退休危机。


How to Default on Sovereign Debt	怎样对主权债务违约


ITHACA – The financial brinkmanship over Greece’s debts has raised the question of whether (or when) the country will default.	伊萨卡岛—希腊债务的金融边缘政策引起了一个问题：这个国家是否（或何时）会违约。


To be sure, it would be far better for Greece and its creditors to reach a negotiated solution.	平心而论，对希腊及其债权人来说，形成谈判解决方案要好得多。


But that outcome is far from guaranteed.	但这一结果还远远不能确定。


The Greek government barely managed to make a significant payment last month, and even larger payments fall due throughout the summer, starting in June with an installment of more than €1.5 billion on its liabilities to the International Monetary Fund.	希腊政府在上个月勉强进行了一大笔偿付，而今年夏天到期的偿付规模还要大，首先是6月的一笔超过15亿欧元的国际货币基金（IMF）债务分期偿还款。


As Greek officials consider their options, they would do well to bear in mind that there are better and worse ways to default on sovereign debt – especially given countries’ desire to reestablish their creditworthiness as soon as possible.	希腊官员在考虑选项时最好记住，主权债务违约的方式也分好坏——特别是如果渴望尽快重塑国家信誉的话。


In the coming weeks and months, the Greek government would be wise to consider three guidelines:	在未来几个月中，希腊政府最好考虑三大指导方针：


Don’t name-call: Default is painful, even if it does turn out to be the right choice in the long run.	不要指责：违约是痛苦的，即使对于长期来说这是正确的选择。


In the midst of all that pain, it is tempting to point fingers.	不管经历什么痛苦，指责责任总是颇有诱惑力的行为。


But it is important to resist this urge.	但抵制这一诱惑很重要。


More likely than not, sovereign debtors will have to interact with the same creditors and international actors again.	更有可能的情况是，主权债务人必须再次与同样的债权人和国际行动方打交道。


It is hard to know how much harm Argentina’s undiplomatic pronouncements during its default saga did to its efforts at navigating the United States’ legal system; what is clear is that its ill-considered official rhetoric did not help its case.	很难知道阿根廷在其重大违约过程中欠妥的外交声明对其与美国司法制度碰面时造成了多大的伤害； 但很显然，其不当的官方说辞没有形成积极的效果。


In the Greek context, there has already been enough name-calling for several debt crises.	在希腊问题上，对于多次债务危机，指责一再出现。


Issuing a statement of regret at the inability to reach a negotiated solution, offering clear short- and long-term plans to manage the default, and outlining a compelling strategy for recovery and growth would be far preferable.	发布声明对无法形成谈判解决办法表示遗憾、提出明确的短期和长期计划管理违约、列明令人信服的复苏和增长战略要好得多。


Explain yourself: In the aftermath of a default, it may seem that no one is listening to even the most rational of explanations.	自我解释：违约发生后，即使是最合理的解释，也有可能没人愿意听。


Creditors will likely insist that the default was a terrible mistake and argue that recovery is impossible unless the decision is quickly reversed.	债权人可能坚持认为违约是一个可怕的错误，指出除非迅速推翻这一决定否则复苏根本无从实现。


Some commentators may actually wish an insubordinate country ill, if only to prove a point or teach would-be followers a lesson.	一些评论家实际上可能期望出现拒不服从的国家病（country ill），以此来证明他们的论点或给可能的后来者上一课。


But other actors, including potential future creditors, could be more open to persuasion.	但其他行动方，包括潜在未来债权人，可能对解释采取更加开放的态度。


Creditworthiness is generally understood to depend on two things: willingness to pay and ability to pay.	根据一般的理解，信誉取决于两样东西：愿意偿付和有能力偿付。


A default is a concrete demonstration of the limits of a state’s willingness to pay, at least in the short term.	违约是一国偿付意愿极限的铁证，至少在短期是如此。


And yet things are not necessarily so black and white.	但事情并不一定非黑即白。


A country that is defaulting can emphasize that the rejection of a particular debt payment does not necessarily entail a rejection of the logic of debt payments as a whole.	正在违约的国家可以强调拒绝某项具体债务偿付并不一定意味着拒绝所有债务偿付的逻辑。


In the case of Greece, some investors and commentators may sympathize with the authorities’ contention that austerity measures have only hampered its recovery.	在希腊的例子中，一些投资者和评论家可能同情当局的辩解——紧缩措施阻碍了复苏。


They may accept that a default could be part of a policy package designed to improve the country’s economic fundamentals and thus its capacity to repay its debt in the long term.	他们可能接受违约可以成为改善国家经济基本面、从而增强长期偿付能力的政策计划的一部分。


Repay some debt: It sounds counterintuitive, but countries in default should consider paying some of their debts – on their own terms and on a graduated basis – as a way to rebuild creditworthiness.	偿还一些债务：这看上去有些反直觉，但违约国应该考虑偿还一些债务——根据自身条件逐步偿还——以此作为重塑信誉的办法。


If the explanation for a default includes an assertion that payments should be tied to economic recovery, then it can make sense to specify the conditions for resuming payments – and follow through when the conditions are met.	如果违约的解释主张偿付应该与经济复苏挂钩，那么具体说明恢复偿还的条件——并在条件满足时兑现承诺——是大有裨益的。


To be sure, this could weaken a debtor’s leverage – the promise of future repayment – in bringing creditors back to the negotiating table.	诚然，这可能削弱债务人让债权人重回谈判桌的手段——承诺未来偿付。


But it would also demonstrate to old and potential new creditors alike not only a capacity, but also a willingness, to make payments, thereby creating incentives for external actors to support economic recovery.	但这也能够像旧债权人和潜在新债权人证明国家有能力也有意愿偿还债务，从而为外部行动方制造支持其经济复苏的激励。


Even after the Soviet Union’s repudiation of czarist Russia’s debts – perhaps the twentieth century’s most notorious (and most misunderstood) debt default – certain creditors expressed interest in lending to the new regime, in part because Soviet agencies repaid debt that they considered legitimate.	即使在苏联拒绝承认沙俄债务后——这也许是二十世纪最臭名昭著（也是被误解最多）的债务违约——仍有一些债权人表示有兴趣向新政权提供贷款，这部分是因为苏联偿还了他们认为是合理的债务。


More recently, Ecuador continued payments on the small portion of debt that it considered acceptable after defaulting on its international debts in 2008 (under circumstances far less extreme than Greece’s).	更晚近一些，厄瓜多尔在2008年兑其国际债务违约后继续偿还了一小部分它认为可接受的债务（它所处的环境远没有希腊那么极端）。


This repayment contributed to a slow improvement in its credit rating and its eventual return to international capital markets in 2014.	这一偿还债务行为使厄瓜多尔的信誉慢慢得到改善，最终在2014年重返国际资本市场。


Even if Greece reaches an agreement in time to make the first IMF installment due in early June, it may not have enough to cover the even larger payments required of it through the rest of the summer.	即使希腊及时达成协议，偿付6月上旬到期首笔IMF分期债务，它也未必能够负担夏天余下时间所需要偿还的数额更大的债务。


Chances are that the Greek government and its creditors will be back at the negotiating table again.	极有可能，希腊政府及其债权人将再次回到谈判桌。


A unilateral default, one hopes, will not be necessary.	我们希望单方面违约不会成为不可避免之事。


But if Greece does take that route, it should seek to make its path as smooth as possible.	但如果希腊真的选择这条路，也应该尽量让这条路更加平滑。


How to Emerge from the Crisis in 2009	怎样在2009年摆脱危机


WASHINGTON, DC – In the maelstrom of events and news that characterize the current global crisis, it is often difficult to keep a clear head and a sense of what is really going on.	华盛顿特区—在目前的全球危机的各种事件和新闻报道的漩涡中，要保持清醒的头脑并看清真实状况殊为不易。


But when one takes a step back (something easier to do on days when markets are closed), the picture becomes clearer, and so do the required policies.	但当我们退后一步（在休市的日子里不难做到），图景就变得更清晰，而我们所需要的政策也同样如此。


Let me first set the scene by making three observations on where we are today.	在切入正题之前先让我讲讲对目前形势的三点观察。


First, in the advanced countries, we have probably seen the worst of the financial crisis.	首先，在发达国家我们很可能已经看到了最严重的一次金融危机。


There are still land mines, from unknowable credit default swap (CDS) positions to hidden losses on balance sheets, but the worst days of frozen money markets and obscene risk spreads are probably over. 	虽然还有雷区（从不可知的信用违约调期(CDS)，到资产负债表上的隐藏亏损），但货币市场冻结和风险急剧扩散的最糟糕的阶段很可能已经过去了。


Second, and unfortunately, the financial crisis has moved to emerging countries.	其次，也非常不幸的是，金融危机已经转移到了新兴国家。


In crossing borders, the sharp portfolio reallocations and the rush to safer assets are creating not only financial but also exchange-rate crises.	投资组合的仓惶转移和对更安全资产的追逐不仅正在新的国家造成危机，还将汇率危机也带过了国界。


Add to this the drop in output in advanced countries, and you can see how emerging countries now suffer from both higher credit costs and decreased export demand.	在发达国家产出下降的同时，你也能看到新兴国家正遭受着更高的信贷成本和出口需求的下滑。


Third, in the advanced economies, the hit to wealth, and even more so the specter of another Great Depression, has led people and firms to curtail spending sharply.	第三，在发达国家，财富受到的重创，更加上对另一次“大萧条”的忧虑，使民众和公司都大幅削减了开支。


Not only have they revised their spending plans, but, in many cases, they have delayed purchases, waiting for the uncertainty to clear.	他们不仅修订了开支计划，还大都推迟了购买，以期不确定性变得明朗。


The result has been a sharp drop in output and employment, reinforcing fears about the future, and further decreasing spending. 	其结果是产出和就业的大幅下降，加重对未来的担忧，并使支出进一步缩减。


Let me now turn to policy.	现在让我转到政策上来。


If my characterization of events is correct, then the right set of policies is straightforward:	如果我对各种事件特点的把握是准确的，那么相应政策也应该是直截了当的：


First, the measures put in place earlier to repair the financial system must be refined and consolidated.	首先，应该对早前已经到位的，用以修补金融系统的举措进行细化调整和整理强化。


One silver lining of the worst days of the crisis in October was to scare governments into action on the financial front.	十月危机深处不幸中的万幸是饱受惊吓的各国政府都在金融领域采取了行动。


Central banks generously provided liquidity.  	各国央行也都慷慨地提供了流动性。


But governments soon realized that the main issue was solvency.	但各国政府很快就意识到主要的问题是偿付能力。


They pledged to implement programs aimed at asset purchases (to clarify the balance sheets of financial institutions), recapitalization (to make sure that, if solvent, they could operate and continue to lend), and guarantees (to reassure depositors and some investors that their funds were safe).	它们承诺实施计划，旨在收购资产（以厘清金融机构的资产负债表）、改变资本结构（以确保如果恢复了偿付能力，这些机构能够营运并继续放贷）和担保（向存款人和一些投资者保证他们的资金是安全的）。


The basic architecture for these measures is now in place, but the implementation has been often haphazard.	这些举措的基本架构现已到位，但其实施却往往带有随意性。


Lessons from previous banking crises around the world could have been learned faster.	我们本应从以前世界各地的银行业危机中更好地吸取教训。


The twists and turns in some of the programs, most notably in the United States, have left markets confused, and have led private investors to stay on the sidelines, waiting for policy clarification before taking a stake in financial institutions.	这些计划的一波三折（在美国尤为明显）令市场迷惑，并让私人投资者持币观望，在介入金融机构之前等待政策变得明晰。


I have little doubt that learning by doing will eventually lead to coherent programs.	我毫不怀疑在实践中学习将最终使我们的各项计划具有连贯性。


But time has been lost. 	但时间已经延误了。


Second, emerging market countries must get help in adjusting to the financial crisis.	第二，新兴市场国家必须在应对金融危机的过程中获得帮助。


It is not just a question of providing them with liquidity so that they can simply maintain their exchange rates in the face of a large capital outflows.	问题不仅仅是向它们提供流动性以便它们能在资本大量外流的情况下保持汇率稳定。


Many investors who want out will not return for some time, and countries must accept this fact and adjust accordingly.  	想要退出的许多投资者短期内不会再回来，各国必须接受这一现实并制定相应的对策。


In some cases, they can do this on their own, so all that is needed is liquidity support to avoid a collapse of the exchange rate and allow for the adjustment to occur.	在某些情况下，它们能够自己应对，所需要的只是流动性支持以避免汇率崩溃并使得这种调整能够发生。


In other cases, the capital outflows only worsen already difficult situations.	在另一些情况下，资本外流只会使本已严峻的形势进一步恶化。


These countries need more than liquidity; they need financial help to carry out the necessary adjustments.	这些国家不只需要流动性； 他们还需要金融援助以实施必需的调整。


Are the proper help measures in place?	适当的援助举措到位了么？


Yes and no.	答案既肯定又否定。


For a few countries, the main central banks have provided access to liquidity through swap lines.	在一些国家，主要的中央银行通过外汇调期（swap lines）获得了流动性。


The International Monetary Fund, for its part, has created a new liquidity facility, enabling countries that pre-qualify to apply and get funds with little or no conditionality.	就国际货币基金组织而言，它创建了一种新的流动性机制，是通过资格预审的国家能够以较少的条件或无条件申请并获得资金。


For the time being, these arrangements have been sufficient.	这些安排暂时看来是足够有效的。


But liquidity provision needs to be provided on a more coherent and comprehensive basis.	但流动性的提供需要建立在一个更持续和全面的基础之上。


As for countries that need more help, this is the IMF’s natural function. A number of countries have already obtained funds under program lending.	对于那些需要帮助的国家而言，这是国际货币基金组织的自然职能。


One may reasonably worry that the available funds will be depleted before the crisis is over.	一些国家已经在计划放贷的安排下获得了款项。


Third, governments must counteract the sharp drop in consumption and investment demand.	第三，各国政府必须阻止消费和投资的大幅下滑。


In the absence of strong policies, it is too easy to think of scary scenarios in which depressed output and troubles in the financial system feed on each other, leading to further large drops in output.	在强有力的政策缺位的情况下，人们很���易想到恐怖情形：一蹶不振的产出和金融体系中的问题相互交织，使得产出进一步大幅下降。


It is thus essential for governments to make clear that they will do everything to eliminate this downside risk.	因此对各国政府而言，至关重要的一点是它们必须明确表示要尽其所能扫除这种下滑的风险。


Can they credibly do it?	他们能够不孚众望么？


The answer is yes.	答案是肯定的。


With interest rates already low, the room for monetary policy is limited.	由于利率已经降低，货币政策的空间是有限的。


But the room for fiscal policy is wider, so governments must do two things urgently.	但财政政策的空间却扩大了，因此各国政府有两项当务之急。


First, in countries in which there is fiscal space, they must announce credible fiscal expansions; we – the IMF – believe that, as a whole, a global fiscal expansion about 2% of world GDP is both feasible and appropriate.	首先，在有财政运作空间的国家，它们必须宣布具有公信力的财政扩张政策； 我们—国际货币基金组织—相信，占世界GDP 2%的全球财政扩张是可行的也是适当的。


Finally, and just as importantly, governments must indicate that, if conditions deteriorate, further fiscal expansion will be implemented.	最后，也同样重要的是，政府必须表示，如果情况恶化，还会实施进一步的财政扩张。


Only with such a commitment will people and firms be confident that we are not headed for a repeat of the Great Depression, and start spending again. 	只有这样的承诺才能使民众和公司相信我们不会走向另一次“大萧条”，从而重新开始支出。


My strong belief is that if these policies are followed, by the end of 2009, if not sooner, the world economy will start recovering from the crisis.	我坚信如果实施这些政策，世界经济将最晚在2009年末开始从危机中复苏。


In the lower-middle-income countries, social protection reaches about a quarter of those living in extreme poverty, leaving about a half-billion people without coverage.	在中低收入国家，社会保护大约能覆盖四分之一极端��困人口，大约有五亿人得不到覆盖。


How to End the Greek Tragedy	如何终结希腊悲剧


SANTIAGO – European leaders, faced with the reality of an insolvent Greece, are reportedly now considering a “Plan B” that would involve reducing the burden of its future debt payments.	发自圣地亚哥——据报道，面对希腊危机无计可施的欧洲领导人如今正在考虑一套帮助该国减少外来债务支出的“B方案”。


This is a welcome contrast to the options considered so far, all of which involved – under different guises – foisting more debt onto a country that has too much of it already.	而相对于从前那些试图（以各种名目）向希腊这个早已负债累累的国家增加债务的方案来说，这个方案还是挺受欢迎的。


Greek public debt today stands at nearly 160% of the country’s official GDP. Suppose Greece took 25 years to bring it down to the Maastricht ceiling of 60%.	希腊的公共债务总额已经相当于该国官方GDP的160%，如果要下降到《马斯特里赫特条约》中公共债务不得超过GDP60%的限制条件估计得花上25年。


If the real interest rate on Greek debt were 4% (more or less what Greece is paying now for the emergency loans from the European Union) and annual GDP grew by 2% on average, the required primary fiscal surplus each year for the next quarter-century would be 5.7% of GDP.	如果这些债务的实际利率为4%（与希腊从欧盟取得紧急贷款利率相近）而希腊年均GDP增长为2%的话，意味着在未来25年内都要取得想当于GDP5. 7%的基础财政盈余。


That is an unimaginably large burden, and it risks condemning Greece to permanent recession and social unrest.	这显然是个无法想象的巨大包袱，而希腊也很可能由此陷入长期的经济衰退和社会动荡。


A possible counterargument is that Greece has a large informal economy, so its actual GDP is larger than the official figure. As a result, the debt ratios commonly applied to Greece could be overstated.	有人或许会反驳说既然希腊拥有一个庞大的地下经济，那么其实际GDP总量显然要比官方数字更大，因此现在给希腊定下的公共负债比率其实被高估的。


But informal output is of little use for debt service if it cannot be taxed.	但由于政府无法向这类地下经济征税，因此在帮助还债方面的作用其实不大。


In any case, the scope for tax increases is severely limited in an economy that is shrinking quickly.	无论在任何情况下，一个迅速下滑的经济体中税收增长的余地都是极为有限的。


The conclusion is clear: Greece’s debt-service burden is too large, and it must be reduced.	结论很清晰：希腊的债务负担已经过于庞大，因此必须想办法进行削减。


This can be accomplished in two ways: sharply cutting the interest rate paid by Greece, or reducing the face value of the debt.	有两种方法来实现这一点：要么大幅减低希腊债务的利率，要么减少这些债务的票面价值。


Some analysts – most prominently Jeffrey Sachs – have argued that the best way forward is to cut the yield on Greek debt to that of German public debt. Germany currently pays a little over 3% nominal interest on 10-year debt, half of what Greece is being charged for emergency loans – and far less than Greece would pay if it attempted to raise money in private markets.	以哥伦比亚大学经济学教授杰弗里•沙斯为代表的一些分析家认为最佳处置方式就是将希腊债务的利率降到德国公债的利率水平——目前德国10年期公债的名义利率稍高于3%，只相当于希腊为紧急贷款所支付利率的1/2，更远远低于希腊在私人市场筹款的利率。


This approach has several advantages: by leaving the face value of the debt unaltered, EU officials could argue that restructuring Greece’s debt did not amount to a default, thereby limiting contagion.	这个方案拥有几大好处：由于希腊债务的票面价值保持不变，欧盟官员就可以坚持重组希腊债务并不意味着债务违约，因此也限制了危机的扩散。


European banks holding Greek government debt could keep pretending that it is worth its full value.	持有希腊政府债券的欧洲各大银行也可以继续（假装）认为这些债务并未贬值。


And the European Central Bank would have fewer excuses to refuse Greek bonds as collateral.	而欧洲央行没有那么多理由去回绝以希腊债务作为抵押品的贷款行为。


The question is whether the change in coupons – possibly coupled with an extension of maturities – would be enough to stabilize the Greek economy and restore growth.	而问题是这项对债券条款的修改——或许还会同时延长债券到期日——足以稳定希腊经济并恢复增长。


Even with German-level interest rates, Greece would have to run a primary surplus of at least 2% of GDP – still quite large, and far from today’s deficit.	即便采用了德国的利率，希腊也必须实现想当于GDP2%的年均财政盈余——该要求依旧想当严苛，与该国目前的赤字水平也有相当距离。


And, with the face value of the debt unchanged, the psychological drag on expectations and investment might linger.	同时由于债务的票面价值未变，对经济增长预期以及投资的心理激励作用也会逐渐消散。


The alternative is to cut the face value of Greece’s debt.	对此的另一个手段则是削减希腊债务的票面价值。


European leaders seem to be moving in this direction.	欧洲领导人似乎都在向这方面运作。


The required cut is large: eliminating half of Greece’s public debt obligation would leave it at nearly 80% of GDP, a ratio higher than Spain’s.	但要削减的面额也相当庞大：就算减免了希腊一半的公共债务，剩下的债务依然想当于GDP的80%，比西班牙的水平还要高。


Talk of “haircuts” for private investors immediately triggers concerns about contagion.	这种对私人投资者“减半”的论点很快引发了关于危机蔓延的担忧。


But markets are already assigning a high probability to a Greek default.	但其实市场早已认定希腊有极大可能出现债务违约。


The rating agencies have long placed Greek debt deep in junk territory, and are now giving Portuguese and Irish debt the same status.	各大评级机构也一早就将希腊国债归入垃圾债券一档，最近也将葡萄牙和爱尔兰放入这一行列。


Rising spreads in Spain and Italy show that contagion is already occurring, even in the absence of an official decision to write down Greek debt.	即便目前还没有正式决定取消希腊债务，但在西班牙和意大利不断爆发的事件说明危机早已开始蔓延了。


The EU is pinning its hopes on one mechanism to reduce Greek debt: loans from the European Financial Stability Facility that would allow Greece to buy its own debt at a discount in the secondary market.	对此欧盟将削减希腊债务的希望倾注在一个机制之上：来自欧洲金融稳定基金的贷款令希腊可以在二级市场折价购买本国债券。


But, while allowing the EFSF to finance buybacks is a step forward, a slew of theoretical and empirical research, generated by developing countries’ efforts to buy back their debt in the 1980’s and 1990’s, has shown that it is far from a cure-all.	但虽然允许该基金资助希腊回购债务的举措堪称进步之举，但对1980和1990年代大量发展中国家回购债务的理论和实地研究也表明这一做法不是万金油。


The main reason is simple: as debt is reduced, its price rises in the secondary market, sharply curtailing the benefits to the borrower.	其主要原因很简单：随着债务减少，其二级市场价格也会不断上升，因此极大损害了借贷者的利益。


So far, policymakers are talking only about exchanging old Greek bonds for cash (in buybacks) or new Greek bonds.	到目前为止，政策制定者们仅仅是在讨论将旧的希腊债券换成现金（通过回购）或者新希腊债券。


It would be far preferable to exchange them for Eurobonds, backed by the full faith and credit of all eurozone countries.	没有人想把这些债券换成以全体欧元区国家的信念和信用担保的欧元债券。


Nor are European ministers, still struggling to catch up with reality, yet considering involuntary debt exchanges.	而那些依然不愿接受现实的欧洲各国部长们也尚未考虑进行非自愿的债务交换。


But, if the past 18 months are any guide, they soon will be.	但鉴于过去18个月所发生的情况，他们很快会有所行动。


How to Fail to Recover	“经济复苏”是怎样失败的？


NEW YORK – Some people thought that Barack Obama’s election would turn everything around for America.	纽约——有些人会以为，随着巴拉克·奥巴马的竞选胜利，美国的经济将完全扭转局面。


Because it has not, even after the passage of a huge stimulus bill, the presentation of a new program to deal with the underlying housing problem, and several plans to stabilize the financial system, some are even beginning to blame Obama and his team.	但事实好象不是如此，奥巴马推出的计划一个接着一个，包括巨额经济刺激法案，针对问题频频的房贷领域的解决方案，以及稳定金融系统的几个计划等，效果都不明显，现在甚至有一些人开始抱怨奥巴马和他的团队了。


Obama, however, inherited an economy in freefall, and could not possibly have turned things around in the short time since his inauguration.	当然，奥巴马接下的是一个烂摊子，要在短期之内彻底扭转也是不切合实际的。


President Bush seemed like a deer caught in the headlights –�paralyzed, unable to do almost anything – for months before he left office.	布什总统在离任前的几个月内也是束手无策，几乎无法开展任何事情。


It is a relief that the US finally has a president who can act, and what he has been doing will make a big difference. 	现在，至少我们有个一个可以做事情的总统了，而且他所作所为可能给美国带来一个大的改变。


Unfortunately, what he is doing is not enough.	然而，他做的还远远不够。


The stimulus package appears big – more than 2% of GDP per year – but one-third of it goes to tax cuts.	经济刺激方案看起来很庞大——超过GDP的2%——但有三分之一都用到了减税上。


And, with Americans facing a debt overhang, rapidly increasing unemployment (and the worst unemployment compensation system among major industrial countries), and falling asset prices, they are likely to save much of the tax cut.	美国人目前负债累累，失业率快速上升（可以说是工业国家最失败的失业救助机制），财富迅速缩水，所以，对于减税的所得，他们最可能的是储蓄起来，而不是用于消费。


Almost half of the stimulus simply offsets the contractionary effect of cutbacks at the state level.	在国家层面来看，几乎所有的经济刺激方案仅仅是抵消了经济紧缩效应的一半。


America’s 50 states must maintain balanced budgets.	美国的50个州也应该维持预算的平衡。


The total shortfalls were estimated at $150 billion a few months ago; now the number must be much larger – indeed, California alone faces a shortfall of $40 billion.	几个月前的财政赤字为1500亿美元。 现在数字会变的更大——实际上，加州已经有400亿美元的财政赤字了。


Household savings are finally beginning to rise, which is good for the long-run health of household finances, but disastrous for economic growth. Meanwhile, investment and exports are plummeting as well.	居民家庭存款开始慢慢增多，就长期而言，对改善家庭财政状况起到一定作用，但对目前的经济成长却是灾难性的，与此同时，投资和出口的份额直线下降。


America’s automatic stabilizers –�the progressivity of our tax systems, the strength of our welfare system – have been greatly weakened, but they will provide some stimulus, as the expected fiscal deficit soars to 10% of GDP.	美国经济自动调节器——税收及福利制度——也大大受到损害，随着一些经济刺激方案出台，预计今年的财政赤字将高达到GDP10%。


In short, the stimulus will strengthen America’s economy, but it is probably not enough to restore robust growth. This is bad news for the rest of the world, too, for a strong global recovery requires a strong American economy.	简而言之，经济刺激方案可能改善美国现有的经济，但还不足以重振美国经济，对其他国家来说，也不是一个好的消息，毕竟，全球的复兴需要的是一个强健的美国经济。


The real failings in the Obama recovery program, however, lie not in the stimulus package but in its efforts to revive financial markets.	抛开经济刺激方案不说，奥巴马救助计划的真正败笔是对金融市场的救助上，美国的失败案例没有给世界一个好的榜样。


America’s failures provide important lessons to countries around the world, which are or will be facing increasing problems with their banks:	目前银行导致的问题层出不穷。


- Delaying bank restructuring is costly, in terms of both the eventual bailout costs and the damage to the overall economy in the interim.	——银行重组方案越迟推出，救助费用的支出和对整个经济所造成的短期影响就越大。


- Governments do not like to admit the full costs of the problem, so they give the banking system just enough to survive, but not enough to return it to health.	—— 政府不愿意公开说明彻底解决问题所需要投入的真正金额，现在给予银行的救助还不够，只能说是救急，而不能使得经济真正得以好转。


- Confidence is important, but it must rest on sound fundamentals.	——除了信心以外，务实的方案也必不可少。


Policies must not be based on the fiction that good loans were made, and that the business acumen of financial-market leaders and regulators will be validated once confidence is restored.	政策的制订不能幻想着优质信贷的出现上，只有当人们信心回来的时候，金融市场的领袖和监管者的作用才会重新发挥出效果。


- Bankers can be expected to act in their self-interest on the basis of incentives.	——银行家们为了个人的私利，他们会铤而走险去追逐暴利。


Perverse incentives fueled excessive risk-taking, and banks that are near collapse but are too big to fail will engage in even more of it.	如果银行“越大越不能倒闭”的怪圈不能打破的话，他们会更加肆无忌惮。


Knowing that the government will pick up the pieces if necessary, they will postpone resolving mortgages and pay out billions in bonuses and dividends.	他们吃准政府必然会出手相救，所以自私的银行家门不会救助问题重重的房市，而是先忙着自己的��终分红。


- Socializing losses while privatizing gains is more worrisome than the consequences of nationalizing banks.	——比起国有化银行的后果来说，民众的损失和私营公司的得利的后果当然更为严重。 美国纳税人的钱会打水漂。


American taxpayers are getting an increasingly bad deal.	在对银行救助的第一轮的资产注入中，国民每支付1美元，实际得到的是0,67美元的资产。


In the first round of cash infusions, they got about $0.67 in assets for every dollar they gave (though the assets were almost surely overvalued, and quickly fell in value).	（当然这些资产的价格还是高沽的，不久后会迅速贬值。 ）对于最近的一次资产注入而言，预计每支付1美元，实际上最多只能得到0.


But in the recent cash infusions, it is estimated that Americans are getting $0.25, or less, for every dollar.	25美元的资产。 如此搞法只能使得国家负债累累。


Bad terms mean a large national debt in the future.  One reason we may be getting bad terms is that if we got fair value for our money, we would by now be the dominant shareholder in at least one of the major banks.	为什么目前的政策如此差劲？ 原因之一就是：如果国家能以合理的价格购买资产的话，我们早就是至少一家大型银行的股东了。


- Don’t confuse saving bankers and shareholders with saving banks.	——不要将救助银行家和股东和救助银行混淆到一起去。


America could have saved its banks, but let the shareholders go, for far less than it has spent.	美国可以救助银行，但可以让那些股东走人。


- Trickle-down economics almost never works.	——缓慢的救助计划从来就不会成功。


Throwing money at banks hasn’t helped homeowners: foreclosures continue to increase.	将钱砸给银行也不会帮助房贷人——越来越多的人会被迫搬出自己的房子。


Letting AIG fail might have hurt some systemically important institutions, but dealing with that would have been better than to gamble upwards of $150 billion and hope that some of it might stick where it is important.	与其花费高达1500亿美元美国国际集团（AIG），不如让其破产。


- Lack of transparency got the US financial system into this trouble.	——美国金融系统的不透明性也是个大的问题。


Lack of transparency will not get it out.	缺乏应有的透明度就不能根本解决问题。


The Obama administration is promising to pick up losses to persuade hedge funds and other private investors to buy out banks’ bad assets.	奥巴马政府承诺会说服那些对冲基金和私人投资者，让他们购买银行的坏帐，承担起应负的损失。


But this will not establish “market prices,” as the administration claims.	但这不是他们所说的“市场上的价格”。


With the government bearing losses, these are distorted prices.   Bank losses have already occurred, and their gains must now come at taxpayers’ expense.	政府承担损失的同时，价格体系自然就会失效。 从而银行实际已经亏损，纳税人为此买单。


Bringing in hedge funds as third parties will simply increase the cost.	如果让对冲基金也来参与的话，局面会更糟糕。


- Better to be forward looking than backward looking, focusing on reducing the risk of new loans and ensuring that funds create new lending capacity.  Bygone are bygones.  As a point of reference, $700 billion provided to a new bank, leveraged 10 to 1, could have financed $7 trillion of new loans. 	——向前看当然比向后看要好，把注意力集中在新发贷款上，规避风险，让它们真正发挥作用，这样才能良性循环。 举个例子，如果将7000亿美元都投给了一家银行，假设10倍的杠杆作用，就能产生70000亿美元的新贷款。


The era of believing that something can be created out of nothing should be over.	如果认为可以不投入就能得到产出的话，自然是痴想。


Short-sighted responses by politicians – who hope to get by with a deal that is small enough to please taxpayers and large enough to please the banks – will only prolong the problem. An impasse is looming.	政客们的短视行为——例如认为可以用纳税人较少的投入来解决如此复杂的问题银行——只能延长问题解决的时间，结果只能是死路一条。


More money will be needed, but Americans are in no mood to provide it – certainly not on the terms that have been seen so far. The well of money may be running dry, and so, too, may be America’s legendary optimism and hope.	美国人还没有意识到，现在必须投入更多的资金，当注入资金的条件也要有所改变，否则，注入的资金将会渐渐枯竭，同样枯竭的还有美国人的乐观和希望。


How to Fight Secular Stagnation	怎样对抗长期停滞


MILAN – Much of the world, especially the advanced economies, has been mired in a pattern of slow and declining GDP growth in recent years, causing many to wonder whether this is becoming a semi-permanent condition – so-called “secular stagnation.”	米兰—世界大部，特别是发达经济体，在近几年中陷入了GDP增长缓慢且下降的模式，许多人担心这是否正在演变成半永久性状况，即所谓的“长期停滞”。


The answer is probably yes, but the question lacks precision, and thus has limited utility.	答案也许是肯定的，但这个问题问得不精确，因此意义有限。


There are, after all, different types of forces that could be suppressing growth, not all of which are beyond our control.	毕竟，抑制增长的力量有多种类型，并非所有都不在我们的控制范围内。


To be sure, there is a strong case to be made that many of the growth-destroying headwinds that we currently face would be difficult, if not impossible, to counter in the near term without endangering future growth and stability.	诚然，可以说我们当前面临的许多增长阻力，要想在短期以不危及未来增长与稳定的方式克服非常困难，几乎是不可能的。


The result of these persistent conditions can be called “secular stagnation one” (SS1).	这些持久性状况可称之为“长期停滞一”（SS1）。


The first indication that we are experiencing SS1 relates to technology.	我们正在经历SS1的第一个指标与技术有关。


If we are, as the economist Robert Gordon argues, experiencing a slowdown in productivity-enhancing technological innovation, long-term potential growth would be constrained.	如果我们如经济学家罗伯特·戈登（Robert Gordon）所指出的那样，正在经历生产率增强型技术创新的减速过程，那么长期潜在增长将受到抑制。


But even if innovation has not dropped off too much, or picks up again soon, the structural adaptation and behavioral changes needed to take advantage of the concomitant productivity gains will take time.	但即使创新不大大减速，或很快再次起势，抓住由此带来的生产率进步所需要的结构调整和行为变化也得消耗时间。


A second condition supporting SS1 is rooted in the impact of heightened uncertainty – about growth, job security, policies and regulations, and the many developments that could affect any of those factors – on investment and consumption.	第二个支持SS1的条件来自投资和消费方面的突出的不确定性的影响——增长、就业安全、政策与监管，以及许多可能影响这些因素中的任何一个的发展趋势。


People simply don’t know whether their governments are going to start making progress in combating deflationary pressure, countering rising inequality, addressing social and political fragmentation, and restoring economic growth and employment.	人们根本不知道政府是否能在对抗通缩压力、遏制不平等性加剧、解决社会和政治分裂、重塑经济增长和就业等方面取得进步。


With future demand far from guaranteed, private investment has been declining in many countries, including, most recently, China.	未来需求如何远未可知，包括最近的中国在内的许多国家私人投资持续下降。


The same goes for household consumption, particularly in the advanced economies, where a larger share of consumption is optional (for example, replacing consumer durables, traveling, and eating out at restaurants).	家庭消费亦然，特别是在发达经济体，发达经济体的消费中选择性消费比重更大（比如耐久品更新换代、旅行和下馆子）。


Given how long it took the US economy, for example, to recover fully from the Great Depression – until World War II, when the government took over much of the demand side of the economy – it seems that a reversal in these trends will not arrive anytime soon.	比如，从美国经济从大萧条中完全恢复所花的时间看——直到第二次世界大战期间政府接管了经济中需求侧的大部分才完成——这一趋势的逆转短期无望。


The third indication that we are stuck in SS1 is debt.	我们陷入SS1的第三个指标是债务。


Households, corporations, financial institutions, and governments are all facing balance-sheet constraints, which it seems plausible to assume, are holding back expenditure and investment, elevating savings, and contributing to a broadly deflationary environment.	家庭、企业、金融机构和政府无不面临资产负债表约束，这很有可能抑制了支出和投资，使储蓄激增，并造成了广泛的通缩环境。


Actions aimed at supporting deleveraging and balance-sheet repair – such as recognizing losses, writing down assets, and recapitalizing banks – carry longer-term benefits but short-term costs.	支持去杠杆化和修复资产负债表的行动——如承认损失、减记资产、重组银行——对长期有利，但会产生短期损失。


Indeed, balance-sheet repair takes time, especially in the household sector, and produces an unavoidable drag on growth.	事实上，修复资产负债表需要时间，特别是家庭部门，并会对增长产生不可避免的拖累。


The picture is somewhat bleak.	情况可谓糟糕。


But there is more to the story, revealed by another, more precise, question: is there a set of policy responses that could, over time, increase the level and quality of growth?	但一个更加精确的问题引出了另一个故事：是否存在政策响应组合，能够在一段时间后提升增长的层次和质量？


Here, the answer also seems to be yes, suggesting that we are also facing another type of secular stagnation – call it “secular stagnation two” (SS2) – that is dictated by our unwillingness or inability to implement the right policy mix.	答案似乎也是肯定的，这意味着我们还面临另一种长期停滞——称之为“长期停滞二”（SS2）——其标志是我们不愿或无力实施正确的政策组合。


A key element of that policy mix would focus on tackling rising inequality.	这一政策组合的一个关键要素应关注解决不平等性的加剧。


While the forces fueling this trend – in particular, globalization and progress in digital technology – will be difficult to counter fully, their adverse effects can be mitigated through redistribution via the tax and social-security systems.	助长这一趋势的因素——特别是全球化和技术科技的进步——难以完全克服，但它们的消极影响可以通过税收和社会安全制度等再分配手段减轻。


As economies undergo prolonged structural transformations, individuals and families need the resources to invest in new skills.	随着各大经济体进入长期结构性转变过程，个人���家庭需要资源投资于新技能。


Moreover, monetary policy, which has been shouldering much of the burden of recovery since the 2008 economic crisis, must be rethought.	此外，货币政策也必须进行反思。 2008年经济危机以来，货币政策承担了大部分复苏重任。


The fact is that years of ultra-low interest rates and massive quantitative easing have not increased aggregate demand sufficiently, much less reduced deflationary forces adequately.	事实是多年来的极低利率和大面积量化宽松并未充分提高总需求，更不用说充分降低通缩力量了。


But raising interest rates unilaterally carries serious risks, because in a demand-constrained environment, higher interest rates attract capital inflows, thereby driving up the exchange rate and undermining growth in the tradable part of the economy.	但单方面提高利率会带来严重的风险，因为在需求受到约束的环境中，提高利率会引起资本流入，从而推高汇率、破坏经济可贸易部门的增长。


Given this, advanced-country policymakers should consider imposing some controls on their capital accounts (much as successful emerging economies do) – a move that would facilitate more independent and tailored approaches to exiting financial repression.	因此，发达国家决策者应该考虑实施一些资本账户管制（比如成功的新兴经济体的做法）——这有利于采取更多独立和契合自身的方法退出金融抑制。


A third priority should be to strengthen fiscal responses, especially with respect to public-sector investment.	第三个重点是强化财政响应措施，特别是在公共部门投资方面。


Europe, in particular, is paying a heavy price for underusing its fiscal capacity – a decision that has been driven by the political unpopularity of debt and fiscal transfers.	特别是，欧洲正在为财政能力运用不足付出沉重代价——而财政能力运用不足是拜对财政转移和债务在政治上不受欢迎所赐。


Under the right conditions, the balance sheets of pension and sovereign-wealth funds could also be tapped to fund investment.	在正确的条件下，养老基金和主权财富基金的资产负债表也可以用来为投资提供资金。


There are many more areas where countries may need to consider reforms. These include tax policy, the inefficient or improper use of public funds, impediments to structural change in product and factor markets, and mismatches between the reach of global financial institutions and the capacity of sovereign balance sheets to intervene in case of financial distress.	各国需要考虑改革的领域还有很多，包括税收政策、公共资金的无效或不恰当使用、产品和要素市场结构变化阻碍，以及全球金融机构的触及面与主权资产负债表干预金融抑制的能力之间的不匹配等。


SS1 will make addressing SS2 much more difficult.	SS1导致SS2更加难以解决。


In fact, it seems that not even robust domestic and international policy responses would be sufficient to eliminate the risk that demand and growth will remain subdued for an extended period.	事实上，即使是强健的国内和国际政策反应也未必足以消除需求和增长在相当长的一段时期内萎靡不振的风险。


But that is no reason to delay action in the areas where policy can make a difference.	但这绝不是推迟在政策能够造成不同的领域采取行动的理由。


Just as our past policy choices helped to generate the SS1 we face today, failure to implement policies aimed at tackling SS2 could create a much more intractable and potentially unstable situation tomorrow.	正如我们的政策选择导致了我们今天所面对的SS1的形成，不能实施旨在解决SS2的政策可能造成未来更加难以应付的潜在不稳定状况。


National Governments, Global Citizens	国家政府，全球公民


CAMBRIDGE – Nothing endangers globalization more than the yawning governance gap – the dangerous disparity between the national scope of political accountability and the global nature of markets for goods, capital, and many services – that has opened up in recent decades.	发自剑桥——没有什么能比近几十年来开始逐渐撕裂产生的治理漏洞对全球化危害更大了。 这一漏洞体现了局限在国家内部的政治问责与商品、资本及其他许多服务的市场全球化本质之间充满危险的错位状况。


When markets transcend national regulation, as with today’s globalization of finance, market failure, instability, and crisis is the result.	当市场超越了国家监管之时——正如当前金融、市场失灵与不稳定的全球化现象——危机的爆发也就在所难免了。


But pushing rule-making onto supranational bureaucracies, such as the World Trade Organization or the European Commission, can result in a democratic deficit and a loss of legitimacy.	但把规则制定工作推给类似世界贸易组织或者欧盟委员会这样的超国家机构，却又面临着缺乏民主和丧失合法性的后果。


How can this governance gap be closed?	如何才能把治理鸿沟给堵上呢？


One option is to re-establish national democratic control over global markets.	其中一种选择是重建国家对全球市场的民主控制。


This is difficult and smacks of protectionism, but it is neither impossible nor necessarily inimical to healthy globalization.	这种做法实施起来很困难，甚至还带着些保护主义的意味，但它对健康运作的全球化来说既非不可能，也不一定有害。


As I argue in my book The Globalization Paradox, expanding the scope for national governments to maintain regulatory diversity and rebuild frayed social bargains would enhance the functioning of the global economy.	正如我在《全球化悖论》中所言，扩大各国家政府的管理范围以保持监管多样性并重建受损的社会契约将有助于提升全球经济的运作表现。


Instead, policy elites (and most economists) favor strengthening what is euphemistically called “global governance.”	相反，政治精英（以及大部分经济学家）更青睐于加强“全球治理”（这是一种委婉的说法）。


According to this view, reforms such as those that enhance the effectiveness of the G-20, increase the representativeness of the International Monetary Fund’s Executive Board, and tighten the capital standards set by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision would be sufficient to provide a sound institutional underpinning for the global economy.	根据这种观点，那些提高20国集团运作效力的改革增加了国际货币基金组织执行委员会的代表性，收紧巴塞尔银行监管委员会设立的资本标准就能提供一个足以支撑全球经济的合理制度。


But the trouble is not just that these global institutions remain weak. It is also that they are inter-governmental bodies – a collection of member states rather than agents of global citizens.	在问题在于这些全球机构不仅非常脆弱，而且它们只是政府间的机构——即成员国的组合而不是全球公民的代理人。


Because their accountability to national electorates is indirect and uncertain, they do not generate the political allegiance – and hence legitimacy – that truly representative institutions require.	因为它们对各国选民的责任是间接而不确定的，因此也无法催生相应的政治忠诚——这是真正代表机构所必须具备的特征——因此也无法获得合法性。


Indeed, the travails of the European Union have revealed the limits of transnational political community-building, even among a comparatively limited and similar set of countries.	事实上，欧盟一直以来的艰难历程揭露了跨国政治共同体建设的局限——即使这还是在一些数量相对有限且相似的国家之间。


Ultimately, the buck stops with national parliaments and executives.	最终还是要各国议会和领导人挺身而出。


During the financial crisis, it was national governments that bailed out banks and firms, recapitalized the financial system, guaranteed debts, eased liquidity, primed the fiscal pump, and paid the unemployment and welfare checks – and took the blame for everything that went wrong.	在金融危机期间，各国政府出面帮助银行和公民摆脱困境、调整金融系统的资产结构、为债务担保、缓解流动性危机、推动财政运作并为失业和福利买单——同时还要为所有出错的事情背黑锅。


In the memorable words of outgoing Bank of England Governor Mervyn King, global banks are “international in life, but national in death.”	英国央行行长默文·金（Mervyn King）说过令人难忘的话——跨国银行“繁荣时是国际的，垮台后却是国家的。 ”


But perhaps there is another path, one that accepts the authority of national governments, but aims to reorient national interests in a more global direction.	但也许还存在着另外一种途径——一种认可国家政府的权威，但致力于往更全球化的��向重新定位国家利益的途径。


Progress along such a path requires “national” citizens to begin viewing themselves increasingly as “global” citizens, with interests that extend beyond their state’s borders.	这条道路要求“国家”公民开始逐渐超越国家边界把自己视为“全球”公民。


National governments are accountable to their citizens, at least in principle. So, the more global these citizens’ sense of their interests becomes, the more globally responsible national policy will be.	那么，这些公民的利益取向越全球化，那么各国的国家政策就更会对全球负责。


This may seem like a pipedream, but something along these lines has already been happening for a while.	这看起来似乎是个空想，但实际上已经取得了一些进展。


The global campaign for debt relief for poor countries was led by non-governmental organizations that successfully mobilized young people in rich countries to put pressure on their governments.	对贫穷国家减免债务的全球行动由非政府组织领导，这些民间组织成功地动员了富裕国家的年轻人向其政府施压。


Multinational companies are well aware of the effectiveness of such citizen campaigns, having been compelled to increase transparency and change their ways on labor practices around the world.	许多跨国公司都充分感受到了这些公民运动的效力，被迫增加运作透明度并在世界各地更改雇佣条件。


Some governments have gone after foreign political leaders who committed human-rights crimes, with considerable domestic popular support.	有一些政府曾追捕那些侵犯人权的国外政治领导人并得到相当多国内民众的支持。


Nancy Birdsall, the president of the Center for Global Development, cites the example of a Ghanaian citizen providing testimony to the US Congress in the hope of convincing American officials to pressure the World Bank to change its position on user fees in Africa.	全球发展中心（Center for Global Development）的主席南希·伯索尔（Nancy Birdsall）引用了一个例子——一个加纳公民向美国国会提供证词以期说服美国官员向世界银行（World Bank）施压，使后者改变在非洲用户使用费上的立场。


Such bottom-up efforts to “globalize” national governments have the greatest potential to affect environmental policies, particularly those aimed at mitigating climate change – the most intractable global problem of all.	这种自下而上“全球化”各国政府的举措拥有影响环境政策的巨大潜力，尤其是那些针对减缓气候变化——这是当前最棘手的全球问题——的政策。


Interestingly, some of the most important initiatives to stem greenhouse gases and promote green growth are the products of local pressures.	有趣的是，一些阻止温室效应并促进绿色增长的最重要提案都是本地压力的产物。


World Resources Institute President Andrew Steer notes that more than 50 developing countries are now implementing costly policies to reduce climate change.	世界资源研究所（World Resources Institute）总裁安德鲁·斯蒂尔（Andrew Steer）指出如今有超过50个发展中国家正在实施代价高昂的政策来减缓气候变化。


From the perspective of national interest, that makes no sense at all, given the global-commons nature of the problem.	考虑到这个问题全球共同分担的本质，再从国家利益的角度上看，此举根本是说不通的。


Some of these policies are driven by the desire to attain a competitive advantage, as is the case with China’s support for green industries.	其中有一些政策被获得竞争优势的欲望所驱使，比如中国对绿色产业的支持。


But when voters are globally aware and environmentally conscious, good climate policy can also be good politics.	但当各国选民都拥有全球观及环保意识时，好的气候政策也可以成为好的政治策略。


Consider California, which at the beginning of this year launched a cap-and-trade system that aims to reduce carbon emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2020.	以美国加州为例，今年年初推出了一个总量管制与碳排放交易的减排制度，其目的是要在2020年前使碳排放量回落到1990年的水平。


While global action remained stalled on capping emissions, environmental groups and concerned citizens successfully pushed for the plan over the opposition of business groups, and the state’s Republican governor at the time, Arnold Schwarzenegger, signed it into law in 2006.	当全球行动仍停留在限制排放的时候，当地环保组织以及关心环境的公民成功压制了商业团体的反对声音并实施计划，而加州当时的共和党州长阿诺德·施瓦辛格（Arnold Schwarzenegger）于2006年将其签署同意了这一立法。


If it proves a success and remains popular, it could become a model for the entire country.	如果它能成功并依然赢得民众支持的话，它将会成为整个国家效仿的典范。


Global polls such as the World Values Survey indicate that there is still a lot of ground that needs to be covered: self-expressed global citizenship tends to run 15-20 percentage points behind national citizenship.	但像世界价值观调查（World Values Survey）这样的全球民调也显示出依然还有很多地方需要覆盖：自认全球公民的人比自认某国家公民的人数要低15到20的百分点。


But the gap is smaller for young people, the better educated, and the professional classes.	但这种差距在年轻人，受过更好教育者以及中产阶级等群体中要小得多。


Those who consider themselves to be at the top of the class structure are significantly more globally minded than those who consider themselves to be from the lower classes.	那些自认处于社会顶端的人明显比那些低下阶层人士更具有全球思维。


Of course, “global citizenship” will always be a metaphor, because there will never be a world government administering a worldwide political community.	当然，“全球公民身份”往往只会是一种比喻，因为永远也不会有一个世界政府来管理世界性的政治共同体。


But the more we each think of ourselves as global citizens and express our preferences as such to our governments, the less we will need to pursue the chimera of global governance.	但我们越把自己当全球公民来看待并向自己的政府表达这种偏好，就越不需要追求全球治理的幻想。


How to Help Burma	如何帮助缅甸


RANGOON – Across the Middle East, and now in Burma (Myanmar), one of the great questions of contemporary global politics has resurfaced: How can countries move from a failing authoritarianism to some form of self-sustaining pluralism?	仰光--和中东地区一样，当今时代一个全球性的政治问题开始在缅甸浮出水面：应该如何从一个失败的独裁主义国家转向一个自立的多元主义国家？


Foreign ministers everywhere, in turn, face crucial policy questions: When a country launches such a political transition, when should other countries help, and what is the best way to do so?	反过来，各个国家的外交部长都面临着重大的政策问题：当一个国家进行这样的政治转变之时，其他国家应该何时给予帮助？ 什么样的方法最合适？


Happy transitions, to paraphrase Tolstoy, are all alike; but every unhappy transition is unhappy in its own way.	用托尔斯泰的话来说，愉快的转变都是大同小异的；


The happy transitions across much of Central Europe following the end of the Cold War were made easier by the fact that the old communist order more or less died on its feet and surrendered power peacefully.	但是每一个不愉快的转变都有它自己独特的方式。 冷战以来，旧的共产主义秩序或多或少地势力减弱，并且和平地让出了权力，这有利于中欧大部分地区的愉快转变。


This, along with generous support from Western Europe, the United States, and others, helped to create a mood conducive to reconciliation, allowing each country to tackle in a measured, non-vengeful way the many difficult moral issues arising from the recent dark past.	再加上西欧国家，美国以及其他国家大量的帮助，创造了一个有利于和解的氛围，并且以慎重，非报复的方式解决了黑暗时代出现的一些难处理的道德问题。


Above all, perhaps, these transitions took place amidst a wider network of legitimate institutions – the European Union, OSCE, NATO, and the Council of Europe – championing the rule of law.	最重要的是，或许这些转变是在一个更加广泛的合法网络体系之下完成的-欧盟，欧洲安全与合作组织，北约以及欧洲理事会-他们都支持法律规则。


This supportive context provided a roadmap for national policymakers, helping them to build democratic institutions and marginalize extremists.	这种支持性的背景为国家的决策者提供了路标，帮助他们建立民主的体系，排除极端主义。


Elsewhere in the world, things are not so easy.	在世界上的其他国家，事情就没这么简单了。


Discredited regimes may cling all the more ruthlessly and ruinously to power, as in Syria.	那些名誉扫地的政权借助权力，做出了残忍，毁灭性的举动，叙利亚就是个例子。


Or they may create all sorts of new problems on their way out of power, as in Libya.	他们也可能通过权力制造一些新的问题，如利比亚。


Or they may be struggling to introduce democratic accountability while maintaining stability, as in Egypt.	或许他们一方面采用民主问责制，一方面却保持着稳定性，例如埃及。


In Burma, we see another model – a bold attempt after decades of military rule to move in a controlled but purposeful way toward a new, inclusive form of government. Here there are striking similarities to what happened in Poland as communism ended.	在缅甸，我们看到了另外一种模式-几十年来，他们以一种既受控制同时又带有目的性的方式进行军事运动，现在是一种大胆的尝试，力图建立一个包容性的新政府。


A military elite favors step-by-step reform, but wants to protect its position and is determined to avoid a descent into chaos.	这和波兰结束共产主义以来发生的一切有着极其的相似之处。


The opposition is led by a charismatic leader with huge popular support.	军事精英赞成循序渐进的改革，但是又想保持其原有的地位，决定避免陷入混乱之中。


And the ruling elite opens a number of parliamentary seats to a popular vote, only to be shocked by a landslide opposition win.	但是深受大家喜欢的领导却对此表示反对。


Moreover, as was true in Poland, Burma’s opposition leaders must strike a delicate balance: satisfy their impatient supporters (many of whom have suffered mightily under the old regime), while offering those still in power the prospect of a worthwhile future.	此外，和波兰一样，缅甸的反对领导必须达成平衡：一方面满足那些缺乏耐心的支持者（他们中的许多人在旧的体制下深受毒害），另一方面让那些还有权力的的人觉得他们的未来是值得的。


But there are key differences.	但是这里也有很大的不同。


Burma has a very different internal political dynamic, not least because of the complex relationships among its various ethnic and linguistic communities – social cleavages that were not an issue in largely homogeneous Poland’s transition.	缅甸的内部政治不同，因为各个不同的民族和语言群体关系复杂-波兰相对比较单一，在其转变过程中，就不会出现这样的分歧。


Moreover, unlike Poland when communism collapsed, Burma already has powerful business tycoons flourishing under the existing system – and they mean to maintain and develop their privileges.	此外，和波兰共产主义奔溃时期不同的是，在现行的体系之下，缅甸有大量强有力的商业巨头-他们想要保持和发展自己的特权。


Above all, there is no immediate international institutional context encouraging steady change and establishing standards and benchmarks: Burma must find its own path.	尤其没有直接的国际体系来鼓励稳定的转变和建立标准以及参照点：缅甸必须寻找自己的道路。


Earlier this month, I visited Burma, where I met President Thein Sein and the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, as well as former political prisoners and many other activists.	本月的早些时候，我访问了缅甸，在那里我遇到了主席添盛和反对派领袖昂山素季，还有之前的政治犯和许多激进分子。


I came away convinced that Burma is a country on the move – and moving firmly in a good direction.	离开的时候，我认为缅甸正在转变，并且是坚定地朝着正确的方向前进的。


All sides accept that this large and resource-rich country has under-performed for far too long.	各方都认为长期以来，这个幅员辽阔，资源丰富的国家都没有发挥其应有的作用。


They also agree that a step-by-step approach, based on reconciliation, is better than an open struggle for power, which could quickly take on a calamitous ethnic dimension.	他们也认为给予和解基础上的循序渐进的改革比公开的权力之争更好。 因为后者很快会造成灾难性的民族问题。


That consensus will remain credible as long as political reform continues and economic growth accelerates.	只要政治改革继续进行，经济加速增长，达成的这项共识就是可靠的。


After such a long period of stagnation, people demand to see and feel changes for the better in their own lives.	经过长期的经济停滞之后，人们都希望看到他们的生活朝着好的方面改变。


The rest of us should be constructive and creative, not prescriptive and pernickety.	其他的人应该要富有创造性，而不是按照惯例或者特别挑剔。


Above all, we should be patient.	此外，我们还应该要有耐心。


The EU’s suspension of sanctions and general readiness to engage constructively make sense.	欧盟暂停制裁以及愿意建设性的参与都是有道理的。


Burma’s leadership should respond by releasing all remaining political prisoners and opening up the entire political process.	缅甸的领导应该释放剩下的政治犯，开放所有的政治程序。


The EU also should ensure that its development assistance – and the process of delivering it – enhances pluralism and reconciliation by benefiting all of Burma’s communities fairly and transparently.	欧盟还应该保证他们的援助以及援助的程序可以强化多元主义和促成和解，让所有的缅甸人公平的收益。


Poland is making its own direct contribution, above all by helping senior Burmese decision makers, opposition leaders, and business representatives to understand the “technology of transition” – that is, the sequencing of technical reforms, which has helped to make Poland one of Europe’s healthiest economies today.	波兰通过帮助资深的缅甸决策者，反对派领袖，商业代表理解“技术转型”，做出自己的贡献。 换言之，技术改革使得波兰成为当今欧洲经济健康发展��国家之一。


Our business representatives came with me to present large-scale investment projects.	商业代表们和我出席了大规模的投资项目。


Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of my visit to Burma was a willingness to open up and learn from other countries that have navigated the painful transition from dictatorship to democracy.	或许我本次访问缅甸最鼓舞人心的就是我们愿意像这样一个国家开放和学习，他们是从独裁转向民主的国家。


One general asked me, off the record, “How did you manage to implement such dramatic political changes without bloodshed?”	一位将军问我说：“你怎样在没有流血的情况下进行这样一项巨大的政治变革？


A young woman at our democracy workshop told the assembled journalists and lecturers, “We thought that Burma was a one-off example.	”民主研讨会的一位年轻妇女告诉记者和发言者说，“我们认为缅甸是一次性的例子。


Now we see that countries far away have had very similar experiences. We feel less lonely – it all worked out for you.”	现在我们看到远在亚洲的国家和我们有着相似的经历，我们不再感到孤独=这一切都会适用于你们的。


Given that spirit – and appropriate foreign assistance – I am confident that it will all work out for Burma, too.	只要本着这样的精神，再加上适当的外来帮助-我坚信这一切也一定适用于缅甸。


How to Help the Middle East	如何帮助中东？


BEIRUT – In Lebanon today, all the symptoms of the Middle East’s current turmoil are visible.	贝鲁特——在今天的黎巴嫩，中东当前动荡的所有症状都表现得非常明显。


Newly arrived refugees from Syria and Iraq are joining Palestinian refugees who have long been here.	从叙利亚和伊拉克最新抵达的难民正与已经在那里的巴勒斯坦难民会合。


The country hasn’t had a president for two years, as rival political factions, reflecting the rising enmity between their Iranian and Saudi Arabian backers, are weakening domestic governance.	国内已经两年时间没选出一位总统，因为反映伊朗和沙特阿拉伯支持者不断加剧敌意的对立政治派别正不断削弱国内的执政基础。


Political corruption runs rampant.	政治腐败十分猖獗。


The garbage doesn’t always get picked up.	垃圾并不总能得到清除。


But Lebanon also shows signs of resilience.	但黎巴嫩也表现出富有韧性的一面。


Investors and entrepreneurs are taking risks to start new businesses.	投资者和企业家正在冒着风险开展新的业务。


Civil-society groups are proposing and implementing useful initiatives.	民间社会团体正在建议和落实有益的举措。


Refugees are going to school.	难民们在学校上学。


Political enemies are collaborating to minimize security risks, and religious leaders advocate coexistence and tolerance.	政治对手协作控制安全风险，同时宗教领袖也主张共处和宽容。


Lebanon’s resilience owes much to the memory of its painful civil war (1975-1990).	很大程度上，痛苦的内战（1975-1990）记忆造就了黎巴嫩人的坚韧性格。


By contrast, the rest of the region’s experiences – which involve a long history of autocratic governance and neglect of long-simmering grievances – have fanned the flames of conflict.	相比之下，其他地区经验——涉及长期专制统治以及忽视长期存在的不满——一直在煽动冲突的烈火。


Syria, Iraq, and Yemen are now riven by war.	叙利亚、伊拉克和也门现在也因为战争四分五裂。


Meanwhile, the Palestinians’ worsening plight is still a perennial grievance on the Arab and Muslim street.	此外，巴勒斯坦人困境恶化仍然是阿拉伯和穆斯林街道上不满的长期根源。


In this maelstrom, new radical groups with transnational agendas are blossoming.	在混乱的漩涡中，有跨国目标的新激进组织就像雨后春笋般不断冒出来。


In the last two years, conflicts have spilled over national borders, threatening global security.	过去两年来，全球安全面临着蔓延到国界之外的冲突的威胁。


The Islamic State has exploited long-standing Sunni grievances to challenge the territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria, creating a strategic vacuum in which Russia, Iran, the United States, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia now vie for power, sometimes through proxies, but increasingly through direct military intervention.	伊斯兰国一直利用逊尼派长期以来的不满挑战伊拉克和叙利亚的领土完整，制造出俄罗斯、伊朗、美国、土耳其和沙特阿拉伯现在争夺权力的战略真空。 上述争夺有时通过代理人战争的形式实现，但现在通过直接军事干预的情况越来越多。


Each country has its own agenda.	每个国家都自有其目的。