But perhaps most conspicuously absent from both precautionary and proactionary thinking is the old welfare-state ideal – that we might procreate at will in a world where our offspring are assured a secure existence.	但或许预防性��主动性理念中最明显的共同空白处则是那种旧有的福利国家理想——无论我们繁衍多少后代都能够确保其安稳生存的世界。


For all of their substantial disagreements, both sides dismiss this prospect as a twentieth-century fantasy that was only temporarily realized in Northern Europe for a few decades after World War II.	而无论在其他方面的分歧有多大，双方都将这一愿景否定为一个只在二战结束后几十年间于北欧短暂实现过的21世纪童话。


Lurking behind this dismissal is a sense that humanity itself is undergoing a massive transformation in its self-understanding.	而这种否定背后潜藏的则是一种认识，认为人类本身正在经历着一个自我认知方面的重大转换。


However, that transformation is moving at once in two diametrically opposed directions, which I have called “Humanity 2.0.”	然而这种转换却同时向两个截然相反的方向发展着，对此我称之为“人类2. 0”。


Precautionary types would reacquaint us with our humble animal origins, from which we have strayed for much too long, whereas exponents of the proactionary principle would expedite our departure from our evolutionary past.	走预防性路线的人会让我们重新认识到自己的动物本源——我们在这一点上已经迷失太久了，而主动性的倡议者们将加速我们与自身进化历史的决裂。


At the very least, they would re-engineer our biology, if not replace it altogether with some intellectually superior and more durable substratum.	如果他们没有一次过用智力更高的上等人和耐力更强的下等人取而代之的话，至少也会重新构建我们的生理。


To be sure, the precautionary and proactionary principles remain relatively marginal to mainstream political discourse.	当然，预防性和主动性原则相当于主流政治论述来说依然是相对边缘化的。


But they have the potential to shift the ideological axis by 90 degrees.	但它们也拥有将意识形态之轴扭转90度的潜力。


The right is currently divided into traditionalists and libertarians; the left into communitarians and technocrats.	右派目前已经分裂成了传统主义者和自由论者两派，左派则解体为公有社会论者和专家政治论者。


In the future, I suggest, the traditionalists and the communitarians will form the precautionary pole of the political spectrum, while the libertarians and technocrats will form the proactionary pole.	我猜将来传统主义者和公有社会论者会形成政治光谱中预防性的那一极，而自由论者和专家政治论者则化身成为主动性的另一极。


These will be the new right and left – or, rather, down and up.	这将成为新的左派和右派——或者说是向上派和向下派。


One group will be grounded in the earth, while the other looks toward the heavens.	一群人扎根泥土，而另一群人则在仰望天堂。


The Future of Internet Search	网络搜索的未来


NEW YORK – Imagine that Googling an address gave you a list of the closest buildings, ranked by distance.	纽约——让我们想象一下，在谷歌上搜索地址搜到了一系列距离最近的建筑物，这些建筑物按照离搜索地址的远近排序。


Not exactly what you were looking for, most likely.	这很有可能并不是你想查找的结果。


But that is pretty close to what we still accept for most Internet searches.	但在现阶段绝大多数网络搜索中我们也只好如此。


You don't get what you actually want to finish your task; you get a list of pages that might lead you to it.	你无法借助所得出的结果直接完成任务，但你能找到相关网页，协助你达到目的。


That is beginning to change.	这种情况已经开始改变。


Even as the online world has turned its attention from searching to social networking, search is getting interesting again.	即使网络世界的注意力已经从搜索转向了社交，搜索却变得越来越有趣。


Consider the development of online search in the broadest terms.	让我们广义地思考一下网络搜索的发展。


First came Yahoo!, with its carefully cultivated (by human editors) catalogue of interesting web pages.	始作俑者是雅虎，它推出了由真人编辑精心制作的趣味网页目录。


Then along came Google, with co-founder Larry Page’s innovative ranking of Web pages not just by their content, but also by the quantity and quality of other pages that link to them.	而后领跑的谷歌，其共同创始人拉里·佩奇创造性地将网页不仅按内容，而且按链接网页的数量和质量进行排序。


Social networking brings a new insight.	社交网络开辟了全新的领域。


People are likely to buy what their friends recommend, which is why marketers should spend time on social networks and join the conversation, rather than interrupt it with traditional advertising.	人们更有可能购买朋友推荐的产品，因此营销人员应当花时间进行社交，融入人们的谈话，而不是用传统的广告打断人们的交流。


But what happens when, influenced by their friends, people actually go to buy something or take some action?	但人们在朋友的影响下实施购买或其他行为时又将如何？


That long list of blue links to pages that may or may not contain what they want looks pretty old.	可能包含、也可能不含他们所需信息的长长的蓝色链接列表似乎已经过时。


Now, however, something is happening to fix this, and it’s not just a prettier background.	而现在这个问题正在得到解决，呈现在人们面前的绝不仅限于网页背景变得更加靓丽。


It’s structure – the same sort of context the old Yahoo! catalogue supplied, but this time automatically generated and deeper – and across more than just a few categories such as sports and travel.	这种结构与雅虎原来提供的目录服务有几分类似，但现在不仅能够自动生成、而且更有深度，涉及的范围也更广，早已超越了运动和旅游领域。


For example, what people want (and are now getting) in  product search is not a list of pages, but a set of products displayed in some meaningful fashion.	举例来说，人们在搜索产品时想找的（现在找到的）并不是一系列网页，而是按一定顺序排列的产品组合。


They want a map of the product space, not a list.	他们想要的是产品领域的指示图，而不是简单的列表。


The challenge of course, is that each kind of product has a different structure and a different set of attributes.	其中的难度当然在于每种产品都有自己特定的结构和特色。


Consider wines: you can sort them by price, year, or region of origin, by red, white, or rosé, or by sparkling or still.	以葡萄酒为例： 既可以按价格、年份、原产地分类，也可以分为红酒、白酒或玫瑰红酒，还可以分为有气或无气。


For clothes, you want sizes and colors – and perhaps some filters depending on your personal characteristics – and of course a “buy now” button.	而服装则需要尺寸和颜色——还可能根据个人情况需要进行某些过滤，当然也少不了“立即购买”按钮。


Some areas, such as travel, are even more complex.	旅游等某些领域甚至更为复杂。


To “map” travel properly, the software needs to understand such things as time zones, flight duration, layovers, and the like, along with concepts such as coach or first class, deluxe and standard rooms, double vs. single, and so on.	要想准确“描述”旅游，软件需要对时区、飞行时间、中途停留等等有所了解，还要了解经济舱或头等舱、豪华间和标准间、双人间和单人间，以及诸如此类的概念。


That is why there is a whole separate vertical market for travel, but one that first Bing, and now Google (with the acquisition of ITA Software), may be claiming.	旅游也因此发展成一个独立的垂直市场，但先是必应、现在是谷歌（收购ITA软件公司后）可能获得一部分市场份额。


For a long time Google didn’t need to do much to remain the leader in Internet search, focusing primarily on the “access” part of its self-proclaimed mission “to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful.”	很长时间以来谷歌无需付出多少努力就能继续坐稳网络搜索领袖的宝座，他们把主要经历都放在“准入”领域，完成其自命的“汇聚全球信息，让它们能为所有人有效服务”的目标。


But runner-up Microsoft went out and bought Medstory in 2007 and then Powerset in 2008.	但排名第二的微软却不停出招，于2007年收购了Medstory，2008年又收购了Powerset。


(I was an investor in both of them, so I have been watching these developments with interest, but I have no inside information on either company since the acquisitions.)	（我曾经是这两个公司的投资人，因此我饶有兴趣地关注事态的发展，但收购以后我就没有得到过这两个公司的内部消息）。


Medstory has a deep understanding of health care, including the relationships between diseases and treatments, drugs and symptoms, and side effects.	Medstory对医疗保健（包括疾病和治疗、药物和症状以及副作用之间的关系）有着深入的理解。


Powerset, a tool for creating and defining such relationships in any sphere of interest, is broader but less deep.	而Powerset则是在任何利益领域创造和定义类似关系的利器，涉及面较广但深度较浅。


This all happened a couple of years ago – just before Yahoo! gave up on search entirely and handed that part of its business over to Microsoft.	这些都发生在几年前——就在雅虎放弃搜索引擎业务，将其移交给微软之前。


Also around that time, Bill Gates uttered one of the smartest things he has ever said: “The future of search is verbs.”	也就是在那个时候，比尔·盖茨说出了他个人的至理名言： “动词代表了搜索的未来。


But he said it at a private dinner and it never spread.	” 不过他说这句话是在一次私人晚宴上，这句话后来也没有传开。


To me, the meaning was clear: when people search, they aren't just looking for nouns or information; they are looking for action.	在我看来，这句话的含义非常明确： 人们搜索时寻找的不仅是名词或者信息，他们是想采取行动。


They want to book a flight, reserve a table, buy a product, cure a hangover, take a class, fix a leak, resolve an argument, or occasionally find a person, for which Facebook is very handy.	他们是想预订航班、预订餐桌、购买产品、治疗宿醉、学习课程、修复渗漏、解决争论，或者用Facebook 偶尔找找人。


They mostly want to find something in order to do something.	多数情况下他们寻找某件东西是为完成某件事情。


As a result, Bing launched a few forays into vertical integration.	必应也因此进行了几次纵向一体化的尝试。


And in the last few months Google has begun to react.	几个月前谷歌也开始做出反应。


First, it bought ITA Software, which provides the underlying data to several travel-booking sites (Hotwire and Orbitz) and to Kayak, as well as to Bing.	它首先收购了ITA软件，该公司为几家旅游预订网站（Hotwire和Orbitz）和Kayak提供基本数据，必应的后台服务也是由这家公司提供的。


Most resellers, a little nervous about Bing’s tool that sends users to book directly with airlines and hotels, are even more concerned about what Google might be up to.	必应提供的由用户直接向航空公司和酒店预订的工具令多数经销商感到紧张，而谷歌即将推出服务则让他们更加忧虑。


Then, last month, Google acquired Metaweb and its user-generated database Freebase.	就在上个月，谷歌收购了Metaweb 及其用户生成数据库Freebase。


While Powerset was a tool for understanding natural language and for structuring it “under the covers” (where programmers could see it), Metaweb lets partners and end-users create data structures or add information to structures created by others.	如果说Powerset 是理解自然语言、并对其进行“幕后”组织（只有程序员能看到）的工具，那么Metaweb 则允许合作伙伴和最终用户创建数据结构，或在由他人创建的数据结构上添加信息。


For example, Metaweb/Freebase has an extensive structured database of movies, actors who appear in them, and their directors.	比方说， Metaweb/Freebase拥有结构化数据库，广泛收录电影、演员和导演信息。


You can ask (and get the answer) to “movies directed by Roman Polanski” and get only those movies – not those in which he only appeared.	你可以提问“由罗曼·波兰斯基执导的影片”并只获得符合条件的结果，这些电影由波兰斯基执导，而不仅是有他出现。


Try doing that with Google.	你也可以用谷歌试一试。


You soon will be able to.	谷歌很快就会推出类似服务。


Other categories include business (with entities such as employers, industries, and employees), biology, space flight, and many more, and include representations – such as graphs, timelines, and tables – of how they are connected.	其他相关类别包括商业（含雇主、行业和雇员等实体）、生物、航天和其他很多领域，还包括阐明其相互关系的描述——如图示、时间安排和表格。


Most things don’t exist in isolation.	多数事务都不是孤立存在的。


They have complex relationships to other things, and by representing that information using verbs – for example, “the company that Google acquired” vs. “the company that Google competes with” – we can represent the world more accurately.	它们与其他事务间有着复杂的联系，而通过用动词描述相关信息——如“被谷歌收购的企业”和“与谷歌竞争的企业”——我们就能更准确地描述这个世界。


And that means better, more meaningful responses when we search.	这也就是说我们的搜索结果会更准确、更有意义。


The Future of Power	权力的未来


CAMBRIDGE – Global government is unlikely in the twenty-first century, but various degrees of global governance already exist.	发自剑桥——虽然一个统治全人类的全球政府已经不可能存在于21世纪，但不同程度的全球治理却正方兴未艾。


The world has hundreds of treaties, institutions, and regimes for governing interstate behavior involving telecommunications, civil aviation, ocean dumping, trade, and even the proliferation of nuclear weapons.	目前在全世界范围内已经设立了数百种不同的条约，机构和制度来规管国与国之间的行为，其中涵盖电信、民航、海洋垃圾，贸易甚至是核武器的扩散。


But such institutions are rarely self-sufficient. They still require the leadership of great powers.	但这类制度很少能独立行事，绝大部分依然要在超级大国的领导下运转。


And it remains to be seen whether this century’s great powers will live up to this role.	但本世纪的各个大国能否承担起这一责任，还是未知之数。


As the power of China and India increases, how will their behavior change?	随着中国和印度实力的不断增强，他们的行为又会发生哪些变化？


Ironically, for those who foresee a tri-polar world of the US, China, and India at mid-century, all three of these states – the world’s most populous – are among the most protective of their sovereignty.	讽刺的是，对于那些预言美、中、印将在在21世纪中期实现三足鼎立的人来说，这三国——也是人口最多的三个——恰恰都是最为在意自身主权的国家。


Some argue that our current global institutions are sufficiently open and adaptable for China to find it in its own interests to become what Robert Zoellick, president of the World Bank, once called a “responsible stakeholder.”	有人说当今的全球架构已经足够开放和包容，足以吸引中国成为世界银行行长罗伯特·佐立克所说的“负责任的股东”。


Others believe that China will wish to impose its own mark and create its own international institutional system as its power increases.	其他人却认为日渐强大的中国更愿意在在国际制度上打上自己的烙印，并创造一套独有的制度系统。


The countries of the European Union have been more willing to experiment with limiting state sovereignty, and they may push for more institutional innovation.	而欧盟各国则更愿意尝试去限制主权，并推动更多的制度创新。


But it is unlikely that, barring a disaster like World War II, the world will witness “a constitutional moment” such as it experienced with the creation of the United Nations system of institutions after 1945.	但除了在二战这么一大场灾难中劫后余生之外，世界已经不大可能像1945年联合国体系成立那样再度见证一个“制度性时刻”了。


Today, as a universal institution, the UN plays a crucial role in legitimization, crisis diplomacy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian missions, but its very size has proven to be a disadvantage for many other functions.	今时今日，作为全球机构的联合国在裁决政治争端、危机外交，维和以及人道主义行动中扮演着重要的角色，但联合国庞大的规模已成为其履行另外一些职能的重大障碍。


As the 2009 UN climate-change summit in Copenhagen demonstrated, meetings of 192 states are often unwieldy and subject to bloc politics and tactical moves by largely extraneous players that otherwise lack the resources to solve functional problems.	正如2009年哥本哈根联合国气候变化峰会所显示的那样，这么一个涵盖192个国家的会议往往尾大不调，而且会被派系政治还有外部参与者的策略所左右，又或者缺乏足够的资源去解决某些根本问题。


As US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put it recently, “the UN remains the single most important global institution…but we are constantly reminded of its limitations….The UN was never intended to tackle every challenge; nor should it.”	诚如美国国务卿希拉里所言：“联合国依然是世界上最为重要的国际机构……但我们也经常会遭遇其不足……联合国本来就不是被设计来应对所有挑战的； 也不应尝试去这样做。


Indeed, the main dilemma that the international community faces is how to include everyone and still be able to act.	事实上，国际社会所面临的主要困境就是如何既确保所有人参与，又能做出实际行动。


The answer is likely to lie in what Europeans have dubbed “variable geometry.”	而答案则在欧洲人所谓的“可变几何”上。


There will be many multilateralisms and “mini-lateralisms,” which will vary by issue with the distribution of power resources.	这意味在同时有大量多边主义和“迷你多边主义”行动并存，并按照不同的事务性质来分配权力资源。


For example, on monetary affairs, the Bretton Woods conference created the International Monetary Fund in 1944, and it has since expanded to include 186 countries.	比如说，在货币政策方面，布雷顿森林会议在1944年创立了世界货币基金组织，而组织的成员国数量也最终扩大到184个。


But the dollar’s global pre-eminence was the crucial feature of monetary cooperation until the 1970’s.	但美元的超级货币地位则是实现国际货币合作的最关键因素，并一直延续到到1970年代。


After the weakening of the dollar and President Richard M. Nixon’s decision to end its convertibility into gold, in 1975 France convened leaders of five countries in the library of the Chateau de Rambouillet to discuss monetary affairs.	在美元被削弱而尼克松总统宣布放弃美元金本位之后，1975年法国召集其他5国领导人在兰布莱城堡（Chateau de Rambouillet）的图书馆商讨货币事务。


The group soon grew to seven, and later broadened in scope and membership – including Russia and a vast bureaucratic and press apparatus – to become the G-8.	这个小集团很快扩展到7个国家，后来又增加了议事范围和成员——加入了俄罗斯以及一套庞大的官僚执行和宣传机构——并最终形成了G8.


Subsequently, the G-8 began the practice of inviting five guests from the emerging economies.	接着G8有开始着手邀请另外几个新兴经济体列席会议。


In the financial crisis of 2008, this framework evolved into the G-20, which boasts a more inclusive membership.	在2008年爆发的世界经济危机当中，会议的框架扩展成了G20，并为自身更大的规模和包容性而感到自豪。


At the same time, the G-7 continued to meet on a narrower monetary agenda; new institutions, such as the Financial Stability Board, were created, while bilateral discussions between the US and China played an increasingly important role.	与此同时，原本那7国继续就一些小范围的货币事务进行会谈； 当中美之间的商讨变得更加重要时，类似金融稳定委员会这样的新机构也随之创立。


As one experienced diplomat put it, “if you’re trying to negotiate an exchange-rate deal with 20 countries or a bailout of Mexico, as in the early Clinton days, with 20 countries, that’s not easy.	正如一位资深外交官所说：“如果你想和另外20国商讨一个汇率协议，或者像克林顿政府早期那样与20个国家商讨援助墨西哥问题，那不是一件容易的事。


If you get above 10, it just makes it too darn hard to get things done.”	一旦谈判对手超过了10个，想达成协议就非常困难了。 ”


He’s right, of course.	毫无疑问，他是对的。


After all, with three countries, there are three bilateral relationships; with ten, there are 45; and with 100 players, there are nearly 5,000.	如果是和3个国家商谈的话，就会有3个不同的双边关系； 10个国家则有45个双边关系，100个国家则有将近5000个。


That is why, on issues like climate change, the UN will continue to play a role, but more intensive negotiations are likely to occur in smaller groups such as the Major Economies Forum, where fewer than a dozen countries account for 80% of greenhouse gas emissions.	这也是为何在气候变化这类事务上，虽然联合国继续扮演主要角色，但更深入的探讨都是发生在类似主要经济体论坛（Major Economies Forum）这类规模更小的会议当中，因为屈指可数的几个国家已经占据了全球温室气体排放量的80%。


Much of the work of global governance will rely on formal and informal networks.	全球治理的大部分工作都依赖于正式和非正式网络。


Network organizations (such as the G-20) are used for setting agendas, building consensus, coordinating policy, exchanging knowledge, and establishing norms.	网络组织（比如G20）被用来设定议程、建立共识、协调政策，交换资讯并设立标准。


As Anne-Marie Slaughter, Director of Policy Planning in the US State Department, argues, “the power that flows from this type of connectivity is not the power to impose outcomes.	正如美国国务院政策计划主管安-玛丽·斯朗特（Anne-Marie Slaughter）所言：“从这种联系中所产生的权力并不是那种足以催生结果的权力。


Networks are not directed and controlled as much as they are managed and orchestrated.	网络并不像它们原先管理和设想那样容易被引导和控制。


Multiple players are integrated into a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.”	而多个参与者整合为一体的力量要大于他们作为各自分散的个体的总和。 ”


In other words, the network provides power to achieve preferred outcomes with other players rather than over them.	换句话说，。 只有在联合，而不是凌驾于其他参与者时，这些网络才能有能力实现意想中的成果。


To cope with the transnational challenges that characterize a global information age, the international community will have to continue to develop a series of complementary networks and institutions that supplement the global framework of the UN.	为了应对以全球信息时代为特征的国际性挑战，国际社会必须继续设立一系列互补的网络和机构来作为联合国这个全球框架的补充。


But if major countries are divided, it is unlikely that even network organizations like the G-20 can set the agenda for the UN and the Bretton Woods financial institutions to act upon.	但如果大国之间发生了分裂的话，那么即便是G20这样的网络组织也无法为联合国或者布雷顿森林金融机构设定议程。


In the immediate aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the G-20 seemed to help governments to coordinate their actions and avoid rampant protectionism.	作为2008金融危机之后的快速反应措施，G20在协调各国政府行动并防止贸易保护主义蔓延方面都有所建树。


The world waits anxiously to see how it will perform when it meets again in Seoul this November.	而全世界正急不可耐地观望着，想知道在11月的首尔G20峰会究竟能有何作为。


The Future of the Japan-US Alliance	The Future of the Japan-US Alliance


Cambridge – Many analysts currently detect malaise in Japan about its alliance with the United States.	剑桥-许多分析家最近注意到日本对其与美国的同盟心存不快。


Some of this relates to North Korea’s nuclear weapons and a concern that the US will not adequately represent Japan’s interests (such as accounting for Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea years ago.)	其中部分缘于朝鲜的核武器以及担心美国不会恰当地代表日本的利益（比如在几年前被朝鲜绑架的日本公民的问题）。


Other issues concern the basing of US marines in Okinawa and sharing the costs of moving some to Guam.	其他问题包括美国驻扎在冲绳的海军基地以及为将部分设施迁到关岛的费用分担问题。


The list is long, but they might best be thought of as “housekeeping” issues: many a couple can quarrel over them without contemplating divorce.	存在的问题很多，但是我们还是把它们看成是“家务事”：许多夫妇会为这样的事情发生争执，但是绝对不会想到要为此离婚。


There is a deeper level of concern, however, which relates to Japan’s fear of being marginalized as the US turns toward a rising China.	然而还存在更深层次的担忧，就是日本担心美国转向崛起的中国而把自己边缘化。


For example, some Japanese complain that China receives far more attention than Japan in the American election campaign.	比如，一些日本人抱怨说在美国的大选中中国受到的关注要远远超过日本。


Such anxiety is not surprising: US and Japanese defense capabilities are not symmetrical, and that is bound to agitate the more dependent party.	产生这种担心并不奇怪：美国和日本的防御能力并不对称，而这注定会使更多地处于依赖的一方感到焦虑。


Over the years, various suggestions have been made with a view to making the alliance more symmetrical, including that Japan become a “normal” country with a full panoply of military capabilities, even nuclear weapons.	多年来，为使同盟显得更加均衡而提出了种种建议，包括使日本成为一个拥有军事能力、甚至包括核武器的“正常”国家。


But such measures would raise more problems than they would solve.	但是这些措施所带来的问题远比它们所解决的问题多。


Even if Japan implemented them, they would still not equal the capacity of the US or eliminate the asymmetry.	即便日本贯彻这些措施，它的军事力量依然无法与美国相抗衡，也依然无法消除这种不对称。


It is worth noting that during the Cold War, America’s European allies had similar anxieties about dependency and abandonment, despite their own military capabilities.	值得注意的是在冷战期间，美国的欧洲盟友也对依赖性和美国对它们的抛弃有着类似的担心，尽管它们自己的军事力量也很强。


The real guarantee of American resolve to defend Japan is the presence of US troops and bases, and cooperation on issues – such as ballistic missile defense – aimed at protecting both Americans and Japanese.	美国决心为日本提供防卫的真正保证是美国军队以及军事基地的存在，以及它们在旨在保护美国和日本公民的种种行动，比如弹道导弹防御系统上的合作。


Moreover, there are two good answers to the question of whether the US would abandon Japan in favor of China: values and threat.	此外，对于美国是否会为了中国而抛弃日本的问题有两个很好的答案，即价值观和威胁。


Japan and the US, unlike China, are both democracies, and they share many values.	与中国不同，日本和美国都是民主国家，有着许多共同价值观。


In addition, both Japan and the US face a common challenge from China’s rise and have a strong interest in ensuring that it does not become a threat.	此外，因为中国的崛起，日美面临着共同的挑战，并且都强烈希望它不会成为一个威胁。


The US regards a triangular Japan-China-US relationship as the basis of stability in East Asia, and wants good relations between all three of its legs.	美国认为日、中、美的三角关系是维护东亚稳定的基础，因而希望三国之间都保持良好的关系。


But the triangle is not equilateral, because the US is allied with Japan, and China need not become a threat to either country if they maintain that alliance.	但是这个三角并不是等边的，因为美国是与日本结盟的，而如果它们维持这一同盟关系，中国就不会成为它们任何一个国家的威胁。


On the other hand, China’s power should not be exaggerated.	另一方面，中国的实力也不应被夸大。


A recent poll indicates that one-third of Americans believe that China will “soon dominate the world,” while 54% see its emergence as a “threat to world peace.”	最近进行的一次民意调查显示有三分之一的美国认为中国将“很快主导世界”，而54%的人把它的崛起看成是“对世界和平的威胁”。


To be sure, measured by official exchange rates, China is the world’s fourth largest economy, and it is growing at 10% annually.	确实，如果根据官方的汇率计算，中国是世界第四大经济体，并且它还在以每年10%的速度增长着。


But China’s income per capita is only 4% that of the US.	但是中国的人均国民收入只有美国的4%。


If both countries’ economies continue to grow at their current rates, China’s could be larger than America’s in 30 years, but US per capita income will still be four times greater.	如果两国的经济继续以它们现在的速度增长，中国将在30年后超过美国，然而即便到那时美国的人均国民收入也会是中国的四倍。


Furthermore, China’s lags far behind in military power, and lacks America’s “soft power” resources, such as Hollywood and world-class universities.	此外，中国的军事实力还远远落后于美国，并且缺乏美国的“软实力”资源，比如好莱坞和世界一流大学。


China’s internal evolution also remains uncertain.	中国国内的改革也存在着很多不确定因素。


It has lifted 400 million people out of poverty since 1990, but another 400 million live on less that $2 per day.	尽管自1990年以来已经有4亿人脱贫，但是依然还有4亿人每天的收入不足2美元。


Along with enormous inequality, China has a migrant labor force of 140 million, severe pollution, and rampant corruption.	由于经济发展的不均衡，中国存在着1. 4亿农民工、严重的污染以及猖獗的腐败现象。


Nor has its political evolution matched its economic progress.	此外它的政治改革也并不与它的经济发展同步。


While more Chinese are free today than ever before in Chinese history, China is far from free.	尽管中国人现在的自由程度是有史以来最高的，但是中国还远非一个自由国家。


The danger is that Party leaders, trying to counter the erosion of communism, will turn to nationalism to provide ideological glue, which could lead to an unstable foreign policy – including, for example, conflict over Taiwan.	危险在于党的领导人为了转移人们对于共产主义衰落的注意，而转向民族主义作为意识形态的粘合剂，从而形成好斗的外交政策，包括比如与台湾的冲突。


Faced with such uncertainty, a wise policy combines realism with liberalism.	面对这些不确定因素，聪明的策略应该是将现实主义与自由主义融合在一起。


By reinforcing their alliance, the US and Japan can hedge against uncertainty while at the same time offering China integration into global institutions as a “responsible stakeholder.”	通过强化它们的同盟关系，美国和日��可以防范这种不确定性，与此同时拉拢中国以“负责任的利益共享者”的形象融入全球体系。


The greatest danger is that an escalating fear of enmity in the three countries becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.	最大的危险在于三国对于敌对关系越来越大的担忧成为一种自我实现的预言。


In that sense, the US-Japan alliance rests on deeply rooted joint interests.	如果那样的话，美日同盟取决于两国深厚的共同利益。


There is a new dimension to the alliance, however, and to the relationship with China.   This year, China surpassed the US as the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases.	不过这一同盟以及与中国的关系现在又出现了一个新问题。 今年中国超越美国成为世界上最大的温室气体排放国。


China argues, correctly, that it is still behind the US and Japan in per capita emissions, but this does not reduce the costs imposed on the world (including Japan and the US).	尽管中国不无道理地争辩说它的人均排放量依然比美国和日本低，但是这并没有减少给整个世界（包括美国和日本）所造成的代价。


A cooperative program that helps China to burn its coal more cleanly is in the interests of all three countries.	通过合作帮助中国更清洁地燃烧它的煤符合所有三个国家的利益。


In general, transnational threats such as climate change or pandemics can cause damage on a scale equivalent to military conflict.	一般来说，像气候变化或传染病这样的跨国威胁所造成的损失在规模上等同于军事冲突。


(In 1918, avian flu killed more people than died in World War I).	（1918年死于禽流感的人要超过在第一次世界大战中死亡的人数。


Responding to such threats requires cooperation, soft power, and non-military instruments, and this is an area in which Japan is a much more equal and important ally.	）应对这种威胁需要合作、软实力和非军事的手段，而在这方面日本是一个更为对等和重要的盟友。


If anything, the new and growing dimension of transnational threats, when added to traditional security concerns, makes the future of the Japan-US alliance look more promising than ever.	不管怎样，新的和正在出现的跨国威胁，加上传统的安全问题，使日美同盟看上去比过去更牢固。


The Rise of the Robots	机器人的崛起


LONDON – What impact will automation – the so-called “rise of the robots” – have on wages and employment over the coming decades?	伦敦——自动化，也就是所谓 “机器人的崛起”将对今后几十年的薪酬就业形势产生什么样的影响？


Nowadays, this question crops up whenever unemployment rises.	如今，每当失业率上升就会有人提到这个问题。


In the early nineteenth century, David Ricardo considered the possibility that machines would replace labor; Karl Marx followed him.	十九世纪初，大卫·李嘉图认为机器有可能取代劳动力； 卡尔·马克思也有与他相似的看法。


Around the same time, the Luddites smashed the textile machinery that they saw as taking their jobs.	大约同时代，勒德份子捣毁了纺织机械，他们认为正是这些机器抢走了他们的工作。


Then the fear of machines died away. New jobs – at higher wages, in easier conditions, and for more people – were soon created and readily found.	后来对机器的恐惧逐渐消失，因为有更多人很快找到了工资更高、条件更优越的新工作。


But that does not mean that the initial fear was wrong.	但这并不是说最初的担心是错误的。


On the contrary, it must be right in the very long run: sooner or later, we will run out of jobs.	相反，这种担心在遥远的未来一定会兑现，我们迟早会找不到工作。


For some countries, this long-run prospect might be uncomfortably close.	令人不快的是，对某些国家而言，这样的远期前景也许很快就会摆在面前。


So, what are people to do if machines can do all (or most of) their work?	既然如此，在所有（或多数）工作被机器取代的情况下人们该做些什么？


Recently, automation in manufacturing has expanded even to areas where labor has been relatively cheap.	近来，制造业自动化甚至扩展到劳动力相对便宜的地区。


In 2011, Chinese companies spent ¥8 billion ($1.3 billion) on industrial robots.	2011年，中国公司耗资80亿人民币（合13亿美元）用以购置工业机器人。


Foxconn, which build iPads for Apple, hopes to have their first fully automated plant in operation sometime in the next 5-10 years.	为苹果生产iPad的富士康公司也计划未来5－10年开办第一家完全自动化的生产企业。


Now the substitution of capital for labor is moving beyond manufacturing.	目前资本取代劳动力的趋势已经不仅局限在制造业。


The most mundane example is one you will see in every supermarket: checkout staff replaced by a single employee monitoring a bank of self-service machines.	最不起眼的例子是超市用由一名员工监督的银行自助服务机取代了收银员的岗位。


(Though perhaps this is not automation proper – the supermarket has just shifted some of the work of shopping onto the customer.)	（虽然这样的自动化并不恰当，因为超市将购物的工作部分转嫁给了顾客。 ）


For those who dread the threat that automation poses to low-skilled labor, a ready answer is to train people for better jobs.	安抚害怕自动化对低技能工人就业构成威胁的现成理由是培训工人从事更高级的工作。


But technological progress is now eating up the better jobs, too.	但技术进步现在已经开始侵蚀更高级的工作。


A wide range of jobs that we now think of as skilled, secure, and irreducibly human may be the next casualties of technological change.	大批现在被认为无法简化的安全的人类技术工种很可能成为下一轮技术革命的受害者。


As a recent article in the Financial Times points out, in two areas notoriously immune to productivity increases, education and health care, technology is already reducing the demand for skilled labor.	《金融时报》最近有一篇文章指出，在出了名地不受生产率提高影响的教育和医疗两大领域，技术的应用都已经开始影响对熟练劳动力的需求。


Translation, data analysis, legal research – a whole range of high-skilled jobs may wither away.	翻译、数据分析、法律研究等一系列高技术工种有可能逐步萎缩。


So, what will the new generation of workers be trained for?	因此，新一代工人将接受哪些培训？


Optimists airily assert that “many new types of job will be created.”	乐观者轻率地断言“会产生很多全新类型的工作。


They ask us to think of the lead drivers of multi-car road trains (once our electric cars join up “convoy-style”), big data analysts, or robot mechanics.	”他们让我们想象（电动车“编队行驶”后）多车厢公路列车的领驾、高级数据分析师或机器人技师。


That does not sound like too many new jobs to me.	但我并不觉得有很多新的岗位诞生。


Imagine a handful of technicians replacing a fleet of taxi drivers and truckers, a small cadre of human mechanics maintaining a full robot workforce, or a single data analyst and his software replacing a bank of quantitative researchers.	我们可以想象区区几位技师取代了整车队的出租车和卡车司机，少数人类技师承担着机器人劳工大军的维修任务，又或者一名数据分析师利用软件取代银行所有的定量研究员职务。


What produces value in such an economy will no longer be wage labor.	在这样的经济体中雇佣劳动力将不再是创造价值的主要角色。


We can see hints of that future now.	我们已经可以看到这种未来的影子。


Twitter, the social-media giant, is an employment minnow.	社交媒体巨头Twitter是条就业领域的小鱼。


It is valued at $9 billion, but employs just 400 people worldwide – about as many as a medium-size carpet factory in Kidderminster.	其价值达90亿美元，但仅雇佣400名全球员工——仅相当于基德明斯特一家中型地毯厂的规模。


It is not true that automation has caused the rise of unemployment since 2008.	将2008年来的失业率增加归咎于自动化的影响并不准确。


What is noticeable, though, is that structural unemployment – the unemployment that remains even after economies have recovered – has been on an upward trend over the last 25 years.	但值得注意的是结构性失业——也就是经济复苏后仍然存在的失业问题——25年来一直处于上升趋势。


We are finding it increasingly difficult to keep unemployment down.	我们发现控制失业率的工作越来越艰巨。


Indeed, the days when we in Britain thought it was normal to have an unemployment rate of 2% have long since passed.	事实上，认为英国2%失业率属于正常的时代早已过去。


It was considered a great achievement of the last government that it brought unemployment down to 5% at the height of an unsustainable boom.	人们普遍认为上届政府在不可持续繁荣达到顶点时将失业率压制在5%是一项了不起的成就。


And it only succeeded in doing so by subsidizing a lot of unnecessary jobs and useless training schemes.	即便达到这个并不起眼的目标也需要补贴众多不必要的岗位和毫无意义的培训计划。


No doubt some of the claims made for robots replacing human labor will prove as far-fetched now as they have in the past.	关于机器人取代真人劳动力的某些说法无疑会像过去那样被证明是牵强附会。


But it is hard to resist the conclusion that “technological unemployment,” as John Maynard Keynes called it, will continue to rise, as more and more people become redundant.	但随着越来越多的人成为剩余劳动力，我们很难拒不承认约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯所谓“技术失业”将不断增加的结论。


The optimist may reply that the pessimist’s imagination is too weak to envisage the full range of wonderful new job possibilities that automation is opening up.	乐观主义者可能会说悲观者的想象力太弱，预见不到自动化所带来的各式各样精彩的全新工作机会。


But perhaps the optimist’s imagination is too weak to imagine a different trajectory – toward a world in which people enjoy the fruits of automation as leisure rather than as additional income.	但也有可能乐观者的想象力太弱而无法预见一条完全不同的轨迹——人们正在走向一个享受自动化休闲成果而非额外收入的世界。


During the Industrial Revolution, working hours increased by 20% as factories replaced feasting.	工业革命期间工厂取代了灯红酒绿，工作时间延长了20%之多。


With our post-machine standard of living, we can afford to shed some of the Puritan guilt that has, for centuries, kept our noses to the grindstone.	但有了后机械时代的生活标准，我们就可以摒弃几个世纪来某些清教徒式的内疚，从枯燥乏味的工作中抬起头来。


Today we find a great deal of work-sharing in poor countries.	今天我们可以在贫困国家看到共享工作。


It is the accepted means of making a limited amount of available work go around.	这是实现有限工作岗位分配的为众人接受的方式。


Economists call it “disguised unemployment.”	经济学家们称之为“隐性失业”。


If escape from poverty is the goal, disguised unemployment is a bad thing.	如果我们的目的是摆脱贫困，那么隐性失业是一件坏事。


But if machines have already engineered the escape from poverty, then work-sharing is a sensible way of “spreading the work” that still has to be done by human labor.	可如果机械发展已经让我们摆脱了贫困，那工作共享就成为“分配”仍须由人类劳动完成工作的一种合理方式。


If one machine can cut necessary human labor by half, why make half of the workforce redundant, rather than employing the same number for half the time?	如果机器可以压缩半数的人力劳动，为什么要让半数劳动力沦为过剩，而不让同样这些人工作一半的时间？


Why not take advantage of automation to reduce the average working week from 40 hours to 30, and then to 20, and then to ten, with each diminishing block of labor time counting as a full time job?	为什么不利用自动化将周平均工作时数从40小时降低到30小时、再到20小时、10小时，从而缩短全职工作的劳动时间？


This would be possible if the gains from automation were not mostly seized by the rich and powerful, but were distributed fairly instead.	实现这一目标需要实现自动化的大部分收益不被富人和当权者攫取，而是以平均的方式加以分配。


Rather than try to repel the advance of the machine, which is all that the Luddites could imagine, we should prepare for a future of more leisure, which automation makes possible.	我们不应像勒德分子想象的那样试图抗拒机械化进步，而应该准备迎接自动化带来的更加闲适的未来。


But, to do that, we first need a revolution in social thinking.	但完成社会思想革命是实现这一目标的前提条件。


The Future(s) of Civil Aeronautics	民用航空的未来


HAMPTON, VIRGINIA -- Civil aeronautics is in the midst of becoming a “mature” industry, with all the drawbacks that this entails.	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 弗吉尼亚汉普顿--民用航空正在成为一个“成熟”的产业，与此同时也带来了各种缺点。


For decades, technological advances have been essentially incremental, and the industry remains largely based on long-haul transport aircraft, with an emerging small jet component and a legacy of general aviation markets and products.	几十年来，技术进步基本上小幅度增长，而这一产业大体上是建立在长途运输飞机的基础之上，同时正在涌现一小部分喷气飞机以及遗留下来的通用航空市场和产品。


But it has become increasingly clear that the industry cannot survive in this form.	但是现在越发清楚的是，这一产业无法以这种形式生存。


The problems bedeviling the industry include pollution from emissions, increasing competition (particularly from communications technology, which has made business travel less necessary), air traffic control delays and inefficiencies, expanding noise restrictions, safety and security concerns, and an overall business environment highly dependent on fuel prices.	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 民用航空产业面临的问题包括来自排放的污染、日益增加的竞争(特别是来自通讯技术，这一技术已经让商务旅行变得没有那么必要)、空中交通管治延误和没有效率、不断增长的噪音限制、安全担忧以及高度依赖于燃油价格的整体商业环境。


Solutions for all of these problems will probably require a complete reinvention of airplane technology.	解决所有这些问题或许会要求对飞机技术进行全面创新。


The greatest hope is to be found in the ongoing information, Bio-, Nano-, Energetics, and Quantum technology revolutions.	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 最大的希望在于现行的信息技术、生物技术、纳米技术、热力学以及量子技术革命。


The IT revolution and associated “swarm” technologies enable the foremost solution: a “digital airspace” that is wholly automatic in terms of air traffic control, navigation, and vehicle operations.	信息技术革命以及相关的“蜂窝”技术提供了最为前沿的方案，也就是空中交通管治、航行以及交通工具操作等完全自动化的“电子空间”。


Automatic aircraft operation is already becoming commonplace – especially in the military – but further increases will require a similarly automatic airspace.	航空器的自动化操作已经成为家常便饭，特别是在军事领域，但是进一步提高还是需要同样自动化的空间。


A digital airspace would in turn enable a complete revolution in personal mobility.	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 电子空间将会反过来形成个人移动上的完整革命。


Together with new technologies enabling Super-Short Takeoff and Landing (superSTOL) a digital airspace would put safe, quiet, affordable, street-in-front-of-your-house personal air vehicles within sight.	电子空间将会和超短起飞和降落新技术一道，让安全、安静、可以承受并且是就在你家房子面前的马路的个人空中交通工具摆在面前。


So-called flying HumVee’s (high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles) would create a superb transportation system for areas lacking intercity roads, and eventually would supplement – or perhaps supplant – automobiles.	所谓的高度移动多功能带轮交通工具将会为缺少城市间道路的地区创造极佳的交通系统，并且最终将会补充或者甚至取代汽车。


The variety of machines currently under study is accessible at  www.roadabletimes.com .	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 目前研究的不同机器可以在网站www. roadabletimes.


The estimated worldwide market for such vehicles is in the range of $1 trillion, and their use would erode the scheduled domestic airline customer base by enabling 300 kilometer “commutes” and providing huge cost avoidance for roads and bridges.	com找到。 预计这种交通工具的全球市场在一万亿美元上下，而它们的运用将会通过建立三百公里的“通勤线”以及节省修建道路和桥梁的巨额费用而削弱定期的国内航班客户基础。


Nevertheless, even given eventual development of an affordable, safe, fly/drive, airport-independent personal transportation system, there would still be a need to re-invent long-haul transport, especially for transoceanic flights.	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 但是，即使最终会发展负担得起的、安全、飞行及驾驶、独立于机场的个人交通系统，人们依旧需要翻新长途交通，特别是跨越大洋的飞行航线。


The current machines of this genre are direct descendants of the Boeing 707, and, after many decades of evolutionary improvement, this design approach simply lacks the scope to address the many problems that must be solved.	目前这种用途的机器是波音707直接改造过来的，而且，经过几十年演变提高，这一设计方式根本缺乏解决必须加以解决的众多问题的范围。


There are several alternatives, such as the blended wing body and strut/truss braced wings, which offer major potential increases in lift-to-drag ratio and improvements in structural weight fraction.	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 现在有几个可替代选择，例如混合机翼机身以及支柱和桁架加固机翼。 这有可能大大增加升阻比并且提高结构性重量分数。


Such improvements in these parameters would provide design margins to address most of the current problems, with the exception of emissions.	这些参数改进将会提供设计余量，解决除了排放之外的当前大多数问题。


The issue of water emissions can be addressed by designs that enable long-haul aircraft to cruise below 9,000 meters.	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 水排放的问题可以通过让长途飞机在九千米以下巡航的设计加以解决。


Such designs could be enabled by using circulation control for high lift and employed at cruising altitude for ride quality.	可以通过使用高升循环控制来实现这样的设计并且在巡航高度加以运用。


The resulting STOL (short takeoff and landing) performance could also improve airport productivity.	随之而来的短途起飞和降落效果也可以改进机场生产效率。


On the other hand, emissions of carbon dioxide can be reduced simply by using biofuels, made from plants whose carbon dioxide “price” was paid via uptake of the very same gas from the atmosphere during their growth.	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 在另一方面，可以仅仅使用生物燃料来减少二氧化碳排放，而这些燃料取自于那些通过在生长期间从大气中吸收了同样多二氧化碳的作物。


Reductions of other greenhouse gases, such as nitric oxide, are attainable through clever combustor design.	减少其他温室气体例如氧化一氮也可以通过更加灵巧的燃烧设计来实现。


Given the number and severity of problems currently plaguing civil aeronautics, the conventional approach of evolutionary changes to current paradigms is no longer sufficient.	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 鉴于目前困扰民用航空事业的问题的数量和严重性，传统的对目前的模式进行渐进性改造的方法已经不再足够有效。


Instead, the industry must re-invent itself.	相反，这一产业必须重塑自我。


With the advent of a digital airspace, and with appropriate research support, success would be both possible and likely.	随着电子空间的来临以及适当的研究支持，成功将会是可能的。


The G-20’s Helpful Silence on Capital Controls	G20在资本管制问题上应该保持沉默


NEW YORK – When French President Nicolas Sarkozy took the reins as host of this year’s G-20 summit, to be held in Cannes on November 3-4, he called on the International Monetary Fund to develop an enforceable “code of conduct” for the use of capital controls (or capital-account regulations, as we prefer to call them) in the world economy.	纽约——法国总统萨科齐在获得11月3—4日的戛纳G20峰会的主办权时，曾他呼吁IMF出台强制性的“管理办法”来规范世界经济的资本控制（我们通常更愿意称之为资本账户管制）。


The IMF followed through by publishing a preliminary set of guidelines this past April.	今年4月，IMF出台了初步方案草案。


Regulation of cross-border capital flows has been strangely absent from the G-20’s agenda, which is aimed at strengthening financial regulation.	很奇怪，跨境资本流动管制一直没有在旨在加强金融监管的G20日程中出现过。


But they are a central element in the financial volatility that incited calls for stronger regulation in the first place.	但它们却是金融波动——使人们决定加强监管的原因——的中心元素。


The IMF has shown that those countries that deployed capital-account regulations were among the least hard-hit during the worst of the global financial crisis.	IMF已经证明，实施资本账户管制的国家在全球金融危机中受影响最小。


Since 2009, it has accepted and even recommended that such regulations are useful to manage the massive inflows of “hot money” into emerging markets.	自2009年以来，人们已经接受甚至建议，此类管制对治理流入新兴市场的大规模“热钱”很有用。


That said, while the IMF’s proposed code is a step in the right direction, it is misguided.	如此说来，IMF的简易办法虽然方向正确，但却有误导嫌疑。


So, the G-20’s endorsement of the Fund’s guidelines would not be wise for a world economy trying to recover from one financial crisis while preventing the next one.	因此，G20对IMF指导方案的支持对于一个正在试图从金融危机中复苏、同时又在预防危机重演的世界来说并不明智。


With low interest rates and a slow recovery in the developed countries, accompanied by high interest rates and rapid growth in emerging markets, the world’s investors flocked from the former to the latter – Brazil, Chile, South Korea, Taiwan, and others.	发达国家利率很低，复苏很慢，而新兴市场利率很高，增长很快，在这样的背景下，世界投资者蜂拥涌向后者——巴西、智利、韩国、中国台湾，等等。


Then, in recent months, they flocked out of those emerging countries, showing once again how volatile and dangerous such flows are.	而在最近几个月中，他们又纷纷从新兴市场中涌出，再次显示了此类资本流的���动性和危险性。


Indeed, as the IMF has pointed out in its World Economic Outlook, these flows threaten to inflate asset bubbles, make it harder for countries to pursue an independent monetary policy, and trigger currency appreciation and associated losses in export competitiveness.	事实上，IMF在其《世界经济展望》中指出，这类资本流动容易吹起资产泡沫，破坏货币政策的独立性，触发货币升值过程并导致出口竞争力的损失。


Brazil’s currency, for instance, appreciated more than 40% from 2009 until August 2011, before weakening in recent months.	比如，巴西货币在2009年至2011年8月间升值了40%，直到几个月前才有所回落。


Some countries responded by doing nothing, but many, including industrialized countries like Japan and Switzerland, intervened heavily in currency markets.	一些国家的对策是以不变应万变，但许多国家——包括日本和瑞士等工业化国家——积极地干预了货币市场。


Some resorted to capital-account regulations on inflows, such as taxes on the foreign purchases of bonds, equities, and derivatives, reserve requirements on short-term inflows, and so forth.	一些国家重启了资本账户流入管制，如对购买本国债券、股票和衍生品的外国投资者征税、对短期资本流实施储备金要求等。


Brazil’s finance minister referred to these numerous actions as the “currency wars.”	巴西财政部长称这些动作为“货币战争”。


This is where Sarkozy came in, using his platform as G-20 host to try to forge a set of enforceable guidelines to govern capital-flow management.	萨科齐的着眼点也在此处，他将利用担任G20峰会东道主的机会力推治理资本流的强制性指导方案。


The IMF’s proposed guidelines recommend that countries deploy capital-account regulations only as a last resort – that is, after such measures as building up reserves, letting currencies appreciate, and cutting budget deficits.	IMF的指导方案草案建议各国将资本账户管制作为最后手段，也就是说，在建立储备、允许货币升值、削减预算赤字等手段无用之后，才实施资本账户管制。


In response to these suggestions, an independent Task Force, made up of former government officials and academics, was established to examine the use of capital-account regulations and come up with an alternative set of guidelines for the use of such regulations in developing countries. 	作为对这些建议的回应，我们成立了一个由前政府官员和学者组成的独立特别小组，考察了资本账户管制的实施情况，并向发展中国家提出了此类管制的替代性指导方案。


Among other findings and recommendations, our task force pointed out that in the cases where the IMF found capital-account regulations to be effective, such measures were part of a broader macroeconomic toolkit, and were deployed early on, alongside other measures, not as a “last resort.”	在诸多发现和建议中，特别小组指出，在IMF所发现的资本账户管制有效的情形中，这些措施都是更广泛的宏观经济工具组合的一部分，而且很早就与其他措施配合实施，并非作为“最后手段”实施。


Unless countries have signed trade and investment treaties that restrict the use of such regulations (and many have), the IMF’s Articles of Agreement give them full policy scope to manage capital flows as they see fit.	除非一国已签署了限制此类管制使用的贸易和投资条约（许多国家确实如此），否则根据IMF协定，该国有充分的政策自由以自认为合适的办法管理资本流。


Consigning such measures to “last resort” status would reduce the available options precisely when countries need as many tools as possible to prevent and mitigate crises.	将此类措施归于“最后手段”会压缩一国在需要尽可能多的工具来防止和减轻危机的关口的选择空间。


Rather than embracing a globally enforceable code of conduct that could paradoxically lead to a compulsory opening of capital accounts across the globe, the IMF, the G-20, the Financial Stability Board, and other bodies should try to reduce the stigma attached to capital-account regulations and protect countries’ ability to deploy them.	IMF、G20、金融稳定性委员会和其他机构不应该出台全球性的强制管理办法——这样做只能在违背各国意愿的情况下形成全球性、强制性的资本账户开放局面——而应该为资本账户管制正名，保护各国实施此类管制的能力。


Indeed, the IMF could help countries to prevent evasion of the regulations, and, together with the G-20 and the FSB, should lead a global dialogue about the extent to which countries should coordinate such regulations.	事实上，IMF可以协助各国防止回避此类管制，并与G20和金融稳定型委员会一道，引导各国就如何在资本账户管制问题上互相合作这一问题展开全球对话。


Countries’ interests are considerably aligned in favor of such coordination.	通过合作，各国可以发现可观的共同利益。


Industrialized economies are seeking to recover from the crisis, and want credit and capital to stay home to boost growth, while developing countries have little interest in gaining short-term capital inflows.	工业化国家正在寻求从危机中复苏，希望信贷和资本留在国内以提振增长； 而发展中国家也对吸引短期资本流入没什么兴趣。


This could form the basis for industrialized countries to adjust their tax codes and deploy other types of regulation to keep capital at home, while emerging markets implement measures aimed at changing the composition and reducing the level of potentially destabilizing inflows.	这就构成了一个基础，工业化国家应该调整税法并实施其他管制以将资本留在国内； 而新兴市场则实施旨在改变结构、减少具有潜在破坏力的资本流入水平的措施。


The G-8’s Broken Aid Promises	八国集团没有履行援助诺言


The Millennium Development Goals are the world’s agreed goals to cut poverty, hunger, and disease.	千年发展目标是全世界共同商定的减少贫困、饥饿和疾病的目标。


Established in 2000, their targets were to be met by 2015.	这一目标在2000年得以确定，并且应当在2015年得以实现。


We are now at the halfway point.	现在时间已经过去了一半。


So far, despite endless words about increasing aid to poor countries, the rich G-8 countries are reneging on their part of the bargain.	目前，尽管为穷国增加援助的言论层出不穷，但是富有的八国集团却没有履行这一诺言。


Cynicism abounds here.	在这一问题上存在许多犬儒主义。


At the G-8 Gleneagles Summit in 2005, member countries pledged to double aid to Africa by 2010.	在2005年的格伦伊格尔斯八国集团峰会上，各成员国承诺到2010年将向非洲的援助增加一倍。


Soon after the summit, I was invited to a small, high-level meeting to discuss the summit’s follow-up.	峰会结束后不久，我被邀请参加一个小型的高级别会议来讨论峰会的跟进措施。


I asked for a spreadsheet showing the year-by-year planned increases, and the allocation of those planned increases across donor and recipient countries.	我要求提供有关每年援助增加规划以及这些增加规划中在援助国家和受援国分配情况的数据表。


The response I received was chilling.	我所得到的回答令人寒心。


“There will be no spreadsheets.	“根本就没有什么数据表。


The US has insisted on no spreadsheets.”	美国坚持不要数据表。


The point was clear.	”意思是非常清楚的。


Though the G-8 had made a clear promise, there was no plan on how to fulfill it; indeed, there were clear instructions that there would be no such plan.	尽管八国集团已经做出了明确的承诺，但是却没有如何实现的规划； 实际上，却有明确的指示，那就是不做这样的规划。


The G-8 is now reaping the consequences of its inaction.	八国集团现在正遭受这种不作为的苦果。


For the first year after the Gleneagles meeting, aid numbers were padded by misleading accounting on debt cancellation operations.	格伦伊格尔斯八国集团峰会后的第一年通过债务免除误导的会计数据夸大了援助数额。


With those debt cancellation operations largely completed, the data are now revealing the stark truth: development aid to Africa and to poor countries more generally is stagnant, contrary to all the promises that were made.	这些债务免除大部分已经完成，数据就开始揭示黑暗的事实。 那就是，与所有承诺相反的是，向非洲以及贫穷国家提供的发展援助基本上陷于停顿。


Specifically, between 2005 and 2006, overall aid to Africa, excluding debt cancellation operations, increased by a meager 2%.	具体而言，在2005年到2006年期间，除去债务免除，向非洲提供的总体援助仅仅增加了2%。


In fact, total official development assistance to all recipient countries, net of debt cancellation, actually declined by 2% between 2005 and 2006.	实际上，除去债务免除，向所有受援国提供的正式发展援助净额在2005年到2006年期间减少了2%。


Even the World Bank, which usually takes the donors’ point of view, recently acknowledged that except for debt cancellation, “promises of scaled up aid have not been delivered.”	世界银行通常采纳援助国家的观点，但是它最近也承认说除了债务免除以外，“增加援助的诺言并未实现。 ”


Private reactions among senior government officials in the G-8 are surprising.	八国集团的政府高官私下的反应是令人惊讶的。


One senior G-8 official told me that the aid promises are all lies anyway.	八国集团的一位高官告诉我说，援助的承诺只不过是谎言而已。


I don’t agree with that, but the cynicism that such a view reflects is alarming.	我并不同意这一说法，但是，这一观点反应的犬儒主义却是令人震惊的。


It shows the nature of discussions at the highest reaches of the G-8.	这表明八国集团最高层所进行的讨论的本质。


All this would seem to be insurmountable if the basic economics were not clear.	如果基本经济学问题不清楚的话，那么，所有这些都看起来是无法克服的。


We are not talking about unachievable financial goals.	我们并没有在谈论无法实现的财政目标。


Indeed, the sum of money is minuscule.	实际上，这些金钱的数量是微不足道的。


The G-8, representing nearly one billion people, has promised to increase aid to Africa from $25 billion in 2004 to $50 billion in 2010 – a difference that represents less than one-tenth of one 1% of the income of the rich donor world!	八国集团代表了将近10亿人口，已经承诺将向非洲提供的援助从2004年的250亿美元提高到2010年的500亿美元。 这一数字差额只是富有的援助国家收入的1%的十分之一不到！


To put it in perspective, the Christmas bonuses paid this year on Wall Street – just the bonuses – amounted to $24 billion.	换言之，今年华尔街所支付的圣诞奖金(只是奖金)就高达240亿美元。


Spending on the Iraq war, which achieves nothing but violence, is more than $100 billion per year.	在伊拉克战争上的开销每年超过1000亿美元。 而这一战争实现的只有是暴力。


So the G-8’s commitment could be honored, if rich countries cared to honor it.	所以，如果富有国家果真想要实现承诺，那么，八国集团的承诺是可以得到履行的。


To salvage its credibility, the G-8 needs to make crystal clear – once again – that it will honor its commitment to increase aid to Africa by $25 billion per year by 2010.	八国集团为了挽救其信誉度，就需要再一次明确表明它将会履行承诺，到2010年每年向非洲增加援助250亿美元。


That way, cynics within the G-8 governments can understand their assignments.	这样，八国集团政府内部的怀疑者们就能够理解其说法。


Moreover, unlike in 2005, the G-8 needs to present a plan of action.	而且，不像2005年那样，八国集团需要提出行动规划。


The lack of specific commitments by specific countries is a shocking display of governance at its poorest.	具体的国家缺乏具体的承诺令人震惊地表明了其治理方面最为差劲的一面。


Finally, recipient countries need to be informed about the year-to-year increases in aid that they can expect, so that they can plan ahead.	最后，受援国需要知道它们所可以预期的每年的援助增加额，这样，它们就可以提前规划。


The increased aid should be directed at building roads, power grids, schools, and clinics, and at training teachers, doctors, and community health workers.	增加的援助应当用于建造道路、电网、学校以及诊所，并且用于培训教师、医生以及社区医疗工作者。


All of that investment requires plans and years of implementation.	所有这些投资都要求规划以及多年的落实行动。


Aid cannot be a guessing game.	援助不能是猜谜游戏。


It must be committed in clear terms over a period of several years, so that recipients can use it in a sensible and accountable manner.	援助必须是做出的在几年时间里实现的明确承诺，这样，受援国家就可以以合理和负责的方式使用援助。


Admittedly, part of the problem with the G-8 is not simply lack of good faith or political will, but basic competence.	当然，八国集团问题的一部分并非缺乏诚意或者政治意愿，而是基本的称职问题。


The US government doesn’t really know what it is doing in Africa, because over the years America’s aid agency has been largely emptied of its leading thinkers and strategists.	美国政府并不知道非洲所发生的事情，因为多年来，美国的主要援助机构中的主要思想者和战略家都大体上走光了。


Moreover, the Bush administration politicized the delivery of aid by channeling it through private religious groups that are part of the administration’s political coalition.	而且，布什政府通过以私营宗教团体来派发援助的做法而将提供援助政治化了。 这些宗教团体是布什政府政治联盟的一部分。


That’s the reason that much of the US funding on AIDS follows religious strictures rather than science.	这就是为何美国大量的艾滋病援助遵守的是苛刻的宗教责难而非科学。


Fortunately, what needs to be done is not complicated.	所幸的是，所需要做到工作并不复杂。


African countries have already identified their high-priority investments in health, education, agriculture, and infrastructure (including roads, power, and internet connectivity).	非洲国家已经确定了它们在医疗、教育、农业以及基础设施(包括道路、电力以及互联网方面)的高度优先投资。


These investments could be increased systematically during the period from now until 2015, in order to enable these countries to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.	这些投资可以从现在其直到2015年有系统地增加，这样就可以让这些国家实现千年发展目标。


The plans are already on the table, or at least on the shelf, waiting for the G-8 funding to arrive.	规划已经提出，或者已经制订，等待八国集团的资金到来。


It’s time for the rich countries to stop giving lectures to the poor, and instead to follow through on their own words.	现在是富有国家停止向贫穷国家讲授道理、而是履行诺言的时候了。


And G-8 citizens must hold their governments accountable for what they have pledged but not delivered.	八国集团的公民们必须让他们的政府为言而无信承担责任。


The Gambler of North Korea	北朝鲜的赌徒


SEOUL – After a painstaking investigation, South Korea is pointing the finger of blame at North Korea for the sinking of its warship, the Cheonan, on March 26.	首尔——在经历了痛苦的调查过程后，韩国将其天安号战舰于5月26号沉没的罪责归咎于北朝鲜。


The debate about how to respond is complicated by the fact that the Cheonan’s sinking does not seem to be a stand-alone event, but was, instead, part of a change in North Korea’s general pattern of behavior.	天安号的沉没似乎并不是一个孤立事件，而是北朝鲜整体行为模式所发生的变化，这些因素也使围绕应对之策所展开的争论变得更加复杂。


Indeed, North Korea has become increasingly bold and impetuous ever since Kim became ill (probably from a stroke) in August 2008.	事实上，从2008年8月金可能因一次中风病倒以后，北朝鲜就变得越来越大胆和冲动。


In the past, top North Korean leaders tended to calculate carefully the costs and benefits when they acted to put pressure on the outside world.	过去，北朝鲜最高领导人在对外界施加压力时，更倾向于小心计算这样做的代价和收获。


And they were inclined to play only one of their “threat” cards at a time.	他们一般一次只打一张牌。


But in April and May 2009, they threw diplomatic caution to the wind, launching a long-range rocket (as well as various missiles) and conducting a second nuclear test – all in the space of several weeks.	但在2009年的4月和5月，他们将审慎的外交姿态抛到了九霄云外，在短短几周时间里发射了远程火箭（以及各式导弹）并实施了第二次核试验。


As soon as the international community reacted, by adopting United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874, North Korea quickly shifted to a charm offensive aimed at the United States and South Korea.	随着国际社会对此采取措施，通过了联合国安理会第1874号决议，北朝鲜又迅速发起了一波主攻美国和韩国的魅力攻势。


The authorities released two American journalists and a South Korean worker whom they had seized in August 2009 on charges of violating North Korean law.	北朝鲜当局释放了两名美国记者和一名韩国工人，上述人士于2009年8月因被控违反北朝鲜法律而被捕。


But when the North Korean regime realized that smile diplomacy did not get it whatever it was they wanted, the country’s rulers shifted back to hostility.	但当北朝鲜政府意识到微笑外交没能达到目的的时候，这个国家的领导人又转而重回敌对政策。


This time, the authorities froze South Korean real estate in the Geumgang Mountain tourist zone and, most seriously of all, attacked the Cheonan.	这一次，北朝鲜当局冻结了南朝鲜在锦江山旅游区持有的房产，而更严重的是对天安号发动了袭击。


The regime even dispatched two spies to Seoul to assassinate Hwang Jang-yop, the highest-level North Korean official ever to defect to South Korea.	北朝鲜政府甚至派遣两名间谍到首尔刺杀黄长烨，黄是有史以来从北朝鲜叛逃到韩国的最高级别的官员。


I believe that this change in North Korea’s pattern of behavior is profoundly related to recent fundamental changes there.	我认为北朝鲜行为模式的转变与其国内近来发生的根本变化密切相关。


First, Kim Jong-il and his third son, Kim Jong-un, may have become much more confident as a result of North Korea’s emergence as a de facto nuclear state.	首先，金正日及其子金正云可能由于北朝鲜成为事实上的核国家而变得更加自信。


They seem to believe that possession of nuclear weapons provides them with far wider room for strategic and tactical boldness.	他们似乎相信拥有核武器为他们带来了更为广阔的战略和技术冒险的空间。


After all, they achieved what they wanted in defiance of enormous international pressure, and even succeeded in transferring nuclear technology to Syria several years ago without being punished.	归根结底，他们在无视巨大国际压力的情况下达到了自己的目的，甚至在没有受到任何惩罚的情况下成功地在几年前将核技术转让给了叙利亚。


Given such a run of successful gambles, why be timid?	有了这些赌博成功的先例，还有什么值得胆怯呢？


The second change concerns Kim’s successor.	第二重变化与金的继任者有关。


North Korea’s new boldness may reflect Kim Jong-il’s wish to polish the 26-year-old Kim Jong-un’s image as a strong and decisive leader.	北朝鲜新一轮的胆大妄为可能反映了金正日希望提升26岁的金正云的形象，将其打造成一位强大果敢的领袖。


Or, it may be that all of the provocations that have followed Kim Jong-il’s illness may be the work of Kim Jong-un himself.	金正日病后的挑衅行为也由可能都是金正云本人的杰作。


In other words, the process of power transfer may be progressing much faster than anyone outside of North Korea has guessed.	换言之，权力移交的完成速度可能超过北朝鲜以外其他国家的想象。


Finally, long-term mismanagement and international sanctions have pushed the North Korean economy to the brink of collapse.	最后，长期的规管不力和国际制裁已经把北朝鲜经济推向了崩溃的边缘。


As a result, the regime may be trying to divert people’s attention from internal difficulties and push them to unite behind the emerging new leader.	当局可能因此试图将民众注意力从国内困难上转移开去，促使他们聚拢在新领袖的身边。


The attack on the Cheonan may have been particularly useful in cementing the regime’s hold on the military, which felt disgraced by North Korea’s inept performance in a confrontation with the South Korean navy near the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea in November 2009.	袭击天安号对巩固朝鲜当局对军队的控制至关重要，军队将士对2009年11月朝鲜与韩国海军在西海北方限界线附近对峙时的无能表现感觉丢尽了颜面。


But, compared to the more fundamental factors discussed above, I believe that this is probably a secondary motive for the attack on the Cheonan.	但与上文所述的根本因素相比，我认为这可能只是袭击天安号的辅助动机。


The problem is that all three factors – nuclear-armed boldness, the succession, and economic malaise – will continue to influence North Korea’s behavior for the time being.	问题在于上述三大因素——以核武器为后盾的胆大妄为、权力过渡和经济上的萎靡不振——将在目前情况下继续影响北朝鲜的所作所为。


Without a strong and internationally coordinated response to the sinking of the Cheonan, such reckless provocations are not only likely to continue, but may become more frequent.	如果不对天安号的沉没做出国际统一的强烈反应，那么这样鲁莽的挑衅不仅有可能继续下去，而且还可能更为变本加厉。


Thus, South Korea and the international community must respond firmly.	因此，韩国和国际社会必须坚定地做出反应。


A joint South Korea-US military exercise near the Demilitarized Zone or a joint anti-submarine exercise at the Northern Limit Line should be considered.	应当考虑在非军事区附近组织韩美联合军事演习，或者在北方限界线附近举行联合反潜演习。


A UN Security Council resolution denouncing North Korea’s brutal attack on the Cheonan must be an essential part of any international diplomatic response.	而联合国安理会谴责北朝鲜粗暴袭击天安号的决议则应当成为国际外交反应的核心部分。


Making North Korea pay a high economic cost for its rash behavior should be considered as well.	同时还应当考虑让北朝鲜为自己的轻率行为付出沉重的经济代价。


All of these options are, however, short-term responses, and will likely be insufficient to bringing about any serious change in North Korea.	但上述所有方案都只是短期的应对之策，要想带来北朝鲜的真正变化很可能还不够。


A more fundamental, long-term strategy is needed to face the new reality and achieve lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.	我们需要更为根本的长期战略，以便更好地面对新形势并实现朝鲜半岛的长久和平。


One of the messages that Chinese President Hu Jintao delivered to Kim Jong-il at their bilateral summit on May 5 – concerning North Korea’s need to launch serious economic reform and open up to the world – has provided a clue as to how to move forward.	中国主席胡锦涛在5月5日举行的双边会议上向金正日传传达的有关北朝鲜急需启动真正的经济改革和对外开放的相关信息为下一步应当何去何从提供了线索。


So far, the international community has focused mainly on the immediate concern of denuclearizing North Korea.	到目前为止，国际社会一直把主要精力放在如何解决北朝鲜无核化的近忧。


But this is merely addresses the symptom, not the disease.	但这样做只能治标而不能治本。


It is past time for the international community – particularly China, Russia, the US, Japan, and South Korea – to devote similar diplomatic effort to persuading and pressuring North Korea to reform and open its economy.	国际社会，特别是中国、俄国、美国、日本和韩国等国早就应该为说服和迫使北朝鲜启动改革和经济开放付出同样的外交努力。


The world must develop a more carefully calibrated policy toward North Korea, one aimed at simultaneously implementing denuclearization and economic reform.	世界必须针对北朝鲜制定经过审慎考虑的准确政策，政策目标是同时实现无核化和经济改革。


The added benefit of such an approach is that it is far more likely to gain Chinese support than today’s single-minded focus on denuclearization.	此等策略的额外收获是它比当前一心一意的无核化策略赢得中国支持的可能性更大。


The Gaza Prison	加沙监狱


GAZA CITY – It is easier to enter a maximum-security prison than it is to enter the strip of land – 45 kilometers long and maybe eight wide – that is home to Gaza’s 1.5 million Palestinians.	加沙城——进入加沙地带比进入警戒级别最高的监狱还要难，这块地带只有45公里长、可能8公里宽，却是加沙150万巴勒斯坦人生活的家园。


Surrounded by a forbidding wall, watchtowers, and deadly buffer zones, I entered with a hard-to-obtain visa at the Erez crossing – iron gates, an interrogation by bored young immigration officers and scanners.	在围墙、了望塔和致命的缓冲区的包围之下，我凭借一张好不容易得来的签证通过了埃雷兹过境点——那里有铁门、百无聊赖的青年移民官和扫描设备的盘查。


On the other side is a kilometer-long caged walkway that leads into this part of Palestine, trapped between Israel, Egypt, the Mediterranean, and the general indifference of the international community.	铁门的另一端是进入这部分巴勒斯坦领土的被铁丝网包围的1公里长的通道，这块土地被以色列、埃及、地中海，还有国际社会的集体冷漠压得透不过气来。


The view walking – in sweltering heat – through that long cage is apocalyptic.	在酷暑中走过那条狭长的铁笼通道感觉如同经历了世界末日一般。


Small groups of Palestinians smash up the remains of Gaza’s bombed industrial infrastructure – the concrete blocks that litter the sandy landscape.	小群的巴勒斯坦人正在破拆沙地上随处可见的混凝土块，这些混凝土块是加沙工业设施在轰炸后的残留物。


They pummel the blocks for gravel and the steel bars inside.	他们捶打这些混凝土块，收集里面的钢筋和沙砾。


The result of their labor is hauled away in carts pulled by mangy horses or donkeys.	他们的劳动成果被长满疥癣的驴和马拉车拖走。


This is much of what passes for industry in Gaza.	这可以勉强算作加沙唯一的工业。


The world periodically wakes up to the horrors of life in Gaza, and then goes back to watching the World Cup or planning summer holidays.	世界每隔一段时间就会注意到加沙生活的恐怖，而后又会回到看世界杯或计划消夏暑假中去。


We were awakened, for example, by the military assault of December 2008 and January 2009, when more than 1,300 Palestinians (including over 300 children) and 13 Israelis died.	比如，2008年12月和2009年1月发生的军事袭击将我们惊醒，1，300多名巴勒斯坦人（其中包括300多名儿童）和13名以色列人在这次袭击中丧生。


We noticed the long-running horror story again when the Israeli Defense Forces attacked a Turkish flotilla, carrying relief supplies, in May, with nine civilian fatalities.	以色列国防军今年5月袭击运送救援物资的土耳其舰队让我们再次注意到这个似乎永远讲不完的恐怖故事，9名平民在这次袭击中丧生。


You have to be careful with language when discussing Israeli actions.	谈到以色列军事行动时你必须小心用词。


Those who argue that there is a humanitarian crisis in Gaza should not compare the situation with Ethiopia or Sudan in the middle of a drought or a war.	认为加沙存在人道主义危机的人不该将这里的局势与旱灾或战争中的埃塞俄比亚或苏丹相提并论。


Conditions in Gaza are harsh and the population does suffer.	加沙的条件的确艰苦，这里的民众也确实在受苦受难。


Israel’s government has denied that people are starving and has relaxed its import restriction regime.	以色列政府已经否认加沙人正在挨饿，并且已经放松了进口限制制度。


But the siege was never intended to starve Gazans; as Dov Weissglass, a former aid to Ariel Sharon, famously observed, the aim was “to put the Palestinians on a diet.”	但是封锁的目的从来不是要饿死加沙人，这一点曾任阿里埃勒·沙龙助理的多夫·魏斯格拉斯早就有过著名的论述，以色列的目标是“让巴勒斯坦人节食”。


The intention was collective punishment, imposed partly in response to Hamas’s political control of Gaza.	以色列人的部分目标是因为哈马斯政治控制加沙地带而对巴勒斯坦人实施集体惩罚。


Hamas won the 2006 elections in the whole of occupied Palestine and formed a national unity government with Fatah.	哈马斯在2006年巴勒斯坦被占领土全境选举中获胜，并与法塔赫共同成立了民族联合政府。


America, Israel, and much of the international community then torpedoed that arrangement.	美国、以色列和国际社会的大多数国家而后猛烈攻击这一结果。


It was all very well having elections – until the wrong side won.	进行选举本来是件好事——直到错误的一方在选举中获胜。


With the changes in the import controls on Gaza – there is now a list of what cannot be taken in, rather than of what can – more goods should arrive.	随着加沙进口管制的变化，不允许进口的商品清单取代了允许进口的商品清单，更多的商品会被运进加沙。


But the ability to buy the jams, muesli, balsamic vinegar, and pots of lemon curd that I saw in an up-market Gazan supermarket will not do much for ordinary people, 80% of whom depend on emergency food rations.	但购买我在一家加沙高档超市看到的果酱、健康麦片、香醋和罐装柠檬酱与普通百姓无关，80%的加沙民众依靠紧急粮食配给维持生计。


Moreover, ordinary Gazans cannot rebuild their homes and schools, because building materials remain proscribed, or are dribbled in only for UN projects.	此外，普通的加沙百姓不能重建住房和学校，因为建材属于违禁物品，或只针对联合国项目实行少量配给。


No raw materials, which would allow the revival of Gaza’s commerce and industry, are permitted.	任何能恢复加沙工商业的原材料都被禁止。


This is a central part of Israel’s policy, in flat defiance of international law and customary norms of civilized behavior.	这就是以色列政策的核心，公然无视国际法和文明行为的惯例。


With chocolate and cardamom now allowed into Gaza, Israel is applying a “smarter” siege, which will keep Palestinians here isolated, poor, and aid-dependent, but not starving.	随着巧克力和小豆蔻现在被允许进入加沙，以色列正在实施一种“更加聪明的”封锁，让这里的巴勒斯坦人与世隔绝、穷困潦倒、靠救援为生，但却不会饿死。


When I was in Gaza before the Second Intifada, there were many examples of entrepreneurial activity – factories and farms.	二次起义之前我曾经到过加沙，当时那里有工厂和农场，它们都是创业活动的实例。


Most of that has been stamped out.	现在它们中的绝大多数已经被剔除。


As the assault on Gaza ended in 2009, Israeli military bulldozers flattened factories.	2009年加沙袭击结束后，以色列的军用推土机将工厂夷为平地。


The imposition of a border zone has gobbled up 29% of the strip’s agricultural land.	强行划定的边界地区吞噬了加沙地带29% 的农地。


But Israel and Egypt – partners in the siege – turn a blind eye most of the time to tunnels (perhaps as many as a thousand) that snake under the Egyptian border at Rafah and bring in black-market goods, which Hamas then taxes.	但合作实施封锁的以色列和埃及在多数时间里对从埃及边境的拉法地下蜿蜒而来的地道（可能达千条之多）装作视而不见，黑市商品则通过这些地道源源不断地流入，随后哈马斯开始对这些商品征税。


Decent would-be Palestinian businessmen (the potential backbone of a middle class) are destroyed.	正经的潜在巴勒斯坦商人（也是中产阶级的潜在骨干）因此被彻底摧毁。


Racketeers flourish.	而敲诈勒索则蔓延开去。


Kafkaesque politics produces “Alice in Wonderland” economics.	卡夫卡式的政治催生出“爱丽丝漫游仙境”般的经济。


You see some of the humanitarian problems stemming from the siege most clearly when visiting hospitals, as I did with the charity Medical Aid for Palestinians, of which I am President.	参观医院时你会对封锁造成的一系列人道主义问题感同身受，就像我以巴勒斯坦医疗援助慈善组织会长之名参观医院时感受到的那样。


Life-saving drugs are in short supply, and equipment often does not work because of power cuts or the absence of spare parts.	救命的药品时常短缺，而设备则时常因为停电或零部件供应不足而无法正常工作。


Seriously ill patients require permission to be treated in West Bank hospitals, and some are reportedly pressed to collaborate with Israel’s security services in return for being allowed out.	重病患者需要得到特殊许可才能进入西岸的医院接受治疗，据说有些人为能被允许出境还被迫与以色列安全机构合作。


Doctors and students can leave Gaza only rarely to attend conferences or universities abroad.	医生和学生只允许偶尔离开加沙到国外开会或上大学。


I strongly opposed the international call a year ago to boycott Israel’s universities.	一年前我曾对抵制以色列大学的国际呼声强烈表示反对。


But the Gaza blockade means that Israel boycotts Palestinian academic life.	可加沙地带的封锁却意味着巴勒斯坦的学术生活遭到以色列的抵制。


It is time that Israel took its boot off Gaza’s windpipe.	以色列现在应该移走踩在加沙喉咙口的靴子。


Some in Israel, such as Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, seem to want to cut off Gaza completely from the West Bank, in contravention of the Oslo accords (and the prospect of a two-state solution!), and push it in the direction of Egypt.	以色列有些人，比如外交部长阿维格多·利伯曼，似乎想要无视《奥斯陆协议》（和实现两国解决方案的希望）彻底切断加沙同西岸的联系，并将加沙推向埃及。


But Gaza remains an integral part of Palestine – and a growing part.	但加沙仍然是巴勒斯坦不可分割、而且日益壮大的组成部分。


With its population increasing at 3.5% a year, the number of Gazans will double in about 15 years (the same timeframe in which the World Health Organization estimates that Gaza will run out of water for its population).	如果保持3. 5%的年均人口增长，加沙居民的人数将在15年内实现翻番（同样在这段时间内，世界卫生组织预计加沙人口的水资源将会耗尽）。


What type of world will the children you see in such prodigious numbers in Gaza inherit?  Will collective punishment make them moderate, law-abiding helots?	你在加沙看到的惊人数量的孩子将会继承一个什么样的世界？   集体惩罚能否将他们变成温和、守法的希洛奴隶？


History is not on the side of this immorality.	如此不道德的行为不会得到历史的支持。


I want to see Israel, a free, democratic society, live up to its original values and be at peace with its neighbors.	我希望看到一个自由、民主的以色列忠实于它最初的价值观并且与邻国和平共处。


It will not achieve this through its appalling Gaza policy.	但它不可能通过这种令人震惊的加沙政策达到目的。


The world – starting with the US administration and the European Union – should tell that to Israel.	以美国政府和欧盟为首，世界应当把这种想法明确地告诉以色列。


But don’t hold your breath.	但是千万不要屏住呼吸。


The Gazpromization of European Energy Security	欧洲能源安全的俄罗斯天然气工业公司化


The term “energy security” in Europe has been hijacked to empower suppliers and weaken importers, implying a drastic reduction in competition, rising political vulnerability, and the erosion of the rule of law.	欧洲的能源安全问题已经遭到了劫持，使供应者的地位变得越来越强大而进口者的地位变得越来越弱小，导致竞争的严重退化、政治的愈加脆弱和法治被侵蚀。


The fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s likely successor, Dmitry Medvedev, is Chairman of Gazprom leaves little doubt about the Kremlin’s determination to maintain an iron grip on the energy sector.	俄罗斯总统普京可能的继任者梅德维杰夫就是俄罗斯天然气工业公司总裁的事实清楚地表明了克里姆林宫对能源部门保持铁腕控制的决心。


But the asymmetry in European Union-Russian energy relations must end.	但是欧盟与俄罗斯能源关系的不对称绝对不能再继续下去了。


Concerns in the EU over energy security, fueled by increasing dependence on Russia, have never been greater.	由于对俄罗斯越来越高的依赖性，欧盟内部对于能源安全问题的担心从来没有像今天这样高过。


Together with the Russian authorities’ expropriation of oil company Yukos, foreigners have been squeezed out of Russia’s energy extraction sector. Inevitably, many in Europe are questioning the value of the Kremlin’s word.	加上俄罗斯当局没收尤科斯石油公司的举动，外国公司被挤出俄罗斯的能源开采业，许多欧洲人无可避免地开始质疑克里姆林宫所说的话的价值。


Rather than turning away, the EU should seek deeper engagement and reciprocity.	当然欧盟不应该抛弃俄罗斯去寻求其他供应商，而是应该寻求更多的参与和互惠。


It should facilitate further incorporation of Gazprom into the EU market through market liberalization and downstream integration.	欧盟应该寻求通过市场自由化和下游的一体化来使俄罗斯天然气工业公司更多地融入欧盟市场。


Yet it must also press for Gazprom’s ultimate restructuring and real market entry into Russia for European companies, because Russia’s unwillingness to do so guarantees energy insecurity for Europe.	然而它还必须促使俄罗斯天然气工业公司最终重组以及让欧洲公司真正地进入俄罗斯市场，因为俄罗斯不同意这样做只会导致欧洲能源的不安全。


Indeed, the Putin administration established a track record of bending rules and bullying foreign investors, with the support of prosecutors, tax authorities, regulatory agencies, and courts.	事实上，普京政府在检察官、税务机关、监管部门和法庭的支持下经常网开一面以及肆意威吓外国投资者。


At the same time, Gazprom has evolved into the dominant market-maker in gas for Europe, and its actions have made a mockery of EU efforts at greater collaboration with Russia.	与此同时，俄罗斯天然气工业公司成为了欧洲天然气市场统治者，它的行为使欧盟谋求与俄罗斯进行更大协作的努力成为笑柄。


Gazprom strategy deploys three tactics: co-optation – cultivating partnerships with certain countries, political leaders, and corporations, as levers of its interests; preemption – using upstream power and Russian diplomacy to manipulate downstream conditions and scoop up assets; and disaggregation – dividing the EU through bilateral deals.	俄罗斯天然气工业公司的策略有三种：挑选代理人，即推动与某些国家、政治领导人及公司的合作伙伴关系作为其利益的杠杆； 抢先占有，利用上游的权力和俄罗斯的外交操纵上游供应的条件以及占有资产；


Gazprom’s co-optation of Europe has been achieved mainly through Germany, where its partnerships with energy companies and banks have helped align the authorities with Russian aims.	俄罗斯天然气工业公司在欧洲挑选代理人很大程度上是通过德国来实现的，它与德国能源公司和银行的合作帮助使政府当局站在俄罗斯目标一边。


Extensive lobbying, directly and by proxy, is underway to persuade European regulators to allow long-term supply contracts in the EU – despite their deadening effect on competition.	通过直接以及通过代理人进行的广泛游说，它们正在劝说欧洲的监管者允许在欧盟签署长期的供应合同，尽管这样做会严重地阻碍竞争。


Preemption by Gazprom has been accomplished through a raft of acquisitions.	俄罗斯天然气工业公司的抢先占有是通过大规模的并购来实现的。


Gazprom has flooded the market in Turkey, withheld gas in Ukraine, threatened to do so in Belarus, and offered preferential market access to willing partners, such as Italy.	俄罗斯天然气工业公司已经完全占有了土耳其市场、对乌克兰断气、威胁对白俄罗斯断气以及为愿意成为其合作伙伴的国家如意大利提供优惠的市场准入。


In the Caucasus, the Kremlin has prevented Iran from establishing infrastructure to compete as a supplier of gas to Europe.	在高加索地区，克里姆林宫阻止伊朗建造基础设施从而成为它对欧洲供气的竞争对手。


To stop Iran’s gas, Russia effectively bought Armenia’s entire energy sector, while its support for Iran’s nuclear program helps maintain Iranian isolation, keeping away the Western money Iran would need to become a rival gas exporter.	为了阻止伊朗供气，俄罗斯有效地购买了亚美尼亚的整个能源业，同时它对伊朗核计划的支持也使伊朗继续在国际上保持孤立，使伊朗无法获得要成为一个天然气出口的竞争对手所必需的西方资金支持。


Gazprom’s dominance is reinforced by activities coordinated with the Kremlin to assert its influence in markets like Spain and Italy.	通过克里姆林宫在西班牙和意大利等国家的市场施加影响力这样的协作行动，俄罗斯天然气工业公司的垄断地位得到了进一步加强。


In exchange for gas deals with rival suppliers, such as Algeria, Russia has offered vast concessions on arms and preferential debt terms.	作为与供应竞争对手如阿尔及利亚达成天然气协议的交换，俄罗斯在武器和优惠的债务条款等问题做出了巨大让步。


In other cases, the Kremlin acts punitively, as when it cut off oil supplies to Lithuania following the sale of the Mazeikiu Nafta refinery to a Polish company, or to Ukraine after its people voted for the “wrong” party.	在其他问题上，克里姆林宫则采取惩罚性的行动，比如在立陶宛将Mazeikiu Nafta炼油厂出售给一家波兰公司后，它切断了对立陶宛的石油供应； 在乌克兰的人民将选票投给“错误”的政党时，也切断了对它的供应。


The prime example of disaggregation is the Nord Stream pipeline, which appeals to Germany while angering Poland and the Baltic countries.	分化瓦解的最好例子就是Nord Stream天然气管道的问题，它使德国感到满意，而使波兰和波罗的海国家感到愤怒。


The undersea pipeline will cost three times as much as a new pipeline along existing land routes, undermines the energy security of Germany’s eastern neighbors, and threatens the Baltic Sea’s fragile ecosystem.	这条海底管道的耗资将是在现有的陆地线路上铺设一条新的管道的三倍，损害了德国东部邻国的能源安全，同时会威胁波罗的海脆弱的生态系统。


But, by delivering exports directly to Germany, Russia will be able to cut off gas to Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic states without directly affecting West European supplies – and Russia’s recent behavior indicates that this is a real threat.	但是，通过将天然气直接输入到德国，俄罗斯将可以切断对乌克兰、波兰和波罗的海国家的天然气供应而不会直接影响对西欧国家的供应。 俄罗斯最近的行为表明这是一个真正的威胁。


But Gazprom is worried about its upstream capabilities, as is evident from the decision to divert gas from its Shtokman field to Europe rather than liquify it for new North American markets.	但是俄罗斯天然气工业公司担心它的上游能力，这从它把Shtokman气田的天然气转运到欧洲而不是将之液化后供应新的北美市场的决定可以明显地看出来。


As long as Gazprom remains opaque, Europe cannot know whether its key supplier is spending enough to develop future reserves.	只要俄罗斯天然气工业公司的运作依然保持不透明，欧洲就无法知道它的主要供应商是否在开发未来的储备方面投入了足够的资金。


The Kremlin’s political battle to win control of Russia’s energy sector has resulted in a dramatic reduction in the growth rate of domestic oil and gas production.	克里姆林宫对俄罗斯能源部门控制权的政治斗争导致了国内石油和天然气生产增长率的急剧下降。


That is a problem for Europe.	这是欧洲所面临的一个严重问题。


Gazprom cannot be a partner to Europe if it does not invest in its own infrastructure, yet plays a leading role in stripping Russian private businesses, invests $14 billion in non-core assets, such as news media, and is run from the Office of the Presidential Administration.	如果俄罗斯天然气工业公司不在它自己的基础设施上进行投资，而是在剥夺俄罗斯私人企业的资产扮演主要角色、将140亿美元投资在像新闻媒体这样的非核心资产上以及对总统宝座的争夺上，那么它就无法成为欧洲的合作伙伴。


The lights must not go out across Europe.	欧洲绝对不能失去光明。


Brussels must demand transparency, symmetry, and the rule of law from Moscow, with the goal being a revolutionary integration of European and Russian energy markets.	布鲁塞尔必须要求莫斯科保持透明、对等以及遵守法治，使欧洲和俄罗斯的能源市场达成革命性的一体化。


Simultaneously, through the diversification of supply sources, massive investments in liquified natural gas (LNG), and a strong push in favor of the Nabucco pipeline and inter-connectors between the Mediterranean rim countries, Europe can move closer toward energy security.	与此同时，通过对供应源的多元化、对液化天然气的大规模投资以及大力推进Nabucco管道以及地中海沿岸国家之间管道的建设，欧洲在能源安全方面能够做得更好。


The very downstream access Gazprom wants in Europe is the EU’s trump card.	俄罗斯天然气工业公司希望获得欧洲的下游资产是欧盟手里的一张王牌。


The EU should tell Gazprom that access to Europe’s downstream assets is conditional on the reciprocal openness of Russia’s energy sector.	欧盟应该告诉俄罗斯天然气工业公司获得下游资产必须以开放俄罗斯的能源业为交换条件。


The result would be a welcome place in the European energy market for a Russia that is both trusted and respected by its international partners.	这样将使俄罗斯作为一个受到其国际合作伙伴信任和尊重的伙伴被欢迎进入欧洲的能源市场。


The Geopolitical Consequences of the Financial Crisis	金融危机的地缘政治后果


PRINCETON – Worried investors and policymakers are becoming obsessed with Great Depression analogies.	普林斯顿amp#45;amp#45;忧心忡忡的投资者和决策者们正在陷于大萧条的比较之中。


But the lesson of 1931 is only in part financial or economic.  The 1931 crisis was so big and so destructive because it was a financial drama that played out on a geo-political stage.	但是，1931年的教训只有一部分是金融或者经济方面的。 1931年的危机规模如此巨大、破坏力如此严重，是因为那是一场在地缘政治舞台上演的金融剧本。


Two surprising conclusions are emerging in today’s discussions, but only one has been fully digested.	今天，人们在讨论中得出了两个吃惊的结论，但是只有其中一个得到了完整的分析。


First, big public sector action is needed.  Second, such action is complicated because in a globalized world the need for assistance spans borders.	首先是需要大规模的公营部门行动。 第二，由于在全球化的世界中协助需求跨越国界，因此这样的行动复杂多变。


First, private sector solutions have been tried but have failed in a breathtakingly short space of time.	首先，人们已经尝试了私营部门的解决方案，但是都迅告失败。


The most frequent consolation in this failure is that a really bad crisis is purgative.	在这些无效的措施中最为经常出现的安慰就是，糟糕透顶的危机就是泻药。


Insolvent businesses close, bad loans are written off, and lenders can lend with new confidence again.	资不抵债的公司破产，坏帐勾销，而放款人又可以抱有信心放贷了。


Hank Paulson, who came to America’s Treasury from the strongest US investment bank, Goldman Sachs, made the purgation gamble in allowing Lehman Brothers to go under.  He argued that the US could not tolerate a bailout culture.	美国财长保尔森来自美国实力最为强劲的投资银行高盛公司。 他听任雷曼兄弟公司倒闭就是在进行泻药赌博。


A firm denial by the government should be seen as a sign that most of the American economy is fundamentally sound, and that American financial markets are sophisticated enough to be able to identify sound business practices.	他说，美国无法容忍救市文化。 政府严辞拒绝拯救该公司，这应当被视为一种迹象，也就是美国经济的大部分基本面保持良好，而且美国的金融市场足够发达，可以确定良好的商业行为。


America’s Treasury Secretary in the Great Depression was also a titan of finance, Andrew Mellon.  Mellon’s immediate conclusion in the face of the 1929 stock market panic has subsequently become notorious: “liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate… purge the rottenness out of the system.”	面对1929年的股市恐慌，梅隆最初的结论随后变得臭名昭著。 他说：“清算那些劳力，清算那些股票，清算那些农民，清算那些房地产，把那些腐烂的东西清除出系统之外”。


It is already clear that the high risk bet of 2008 has not paid off, any more than it did in 1929.  On the contrary, the failure to perform one rescue has made more rescues necessary: of AIG, of HBOS in Britain.  That is unlikely to be the end.  There are lists circulating of which institution is next on the ladder to fall off – or be picked off.  The most appropriate analogy for this kind of mood is Agatha Christie’s “And Then There Were None …” in which each murder produces more paranoia.	现在已经清除，2008年高风险的赌注还没有得到回报，一点也不比1929年的多。 相反，放任公司破产导致必须拯救更多的公司，比如美国国际集团以及英国的哈利法克斯银行。


In a financial system that has become so demented, only institutions with more or less infinite resources can stem the tide.  Such institutions can conceivably be self-help organizations, such as pools of powerful banks.  The US Treasury indeed tried to put together such a pool on Sunday, September 14th.	金融体系已经疯狂，只有拥有无限资源的公司才能够平安无事。 而它们只能是一些自助性的组织，像规模庞大的连锁银行。


But in a climate of profound uncertainty, self-help is not enough.  Governments or central banks are needed, because only they are both big and quick enough.	但是现在局势飘忽不定，自助还是不足。 现在需要各国政府和中央银行动手，因为只有它们才规模足够庞大，行动足够迅速。


Only they could quickly come to the assistance of the giant housing finance institutions US Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and then deal with AIG.	只有它们才能够迅速挽救美国的两大房贷公司，随后又托起美国国际集团。


The second question is what kind of government can do the job?	第二个问题是，什么样的政府能够做到这一点？ 并不是任何政府都可以这样做的。


Not just any government will do.  Mid-sized European governments can possibly rescue mid-sized European institutions, but in the case of really major financial conglomerates at the heart of the world’s financial system, there are probably only two governments that have the fire power: the US and China.	欧洲中等规模国家的政府或许可以挽救一些中等规模的欧洲公司。 但是对于处于世界金融体系核心的、规模巨大无比的金融业公司而言，现在大概只有美国和中国两个国家政府才能力挽狂澜。


In the similar circumstances of a financial meltdown in 1931, there were also only a limited number of governments that could be effective.  The old economic superpower, Britain, was too exhausted and strained to help anyone else.  World’s reserves were massively accumulated in the US.	在1931年类似的金融崩盘中，当时也只有几个国家政府可以采取有效行动。 老的经济超级大国英国已经精疲力竭，无瑕顾及他人。


Thus the only plausible case for a way out of the worldwide Great Depression in 1931 lay, as the great economic historian Charles Kindleberger emphasized, with some step from the US.  At the time, there were all kinds of convincing reasons why Americans should not want to take on the burden of a worldwide rescue: sending more money to Europe might be seen as pouring money down a drain; had not the Europeans fought a World War that had been the fount and origin of the financial mess?  Economically such action would have made a great deal of sense from a long term perspective; but politically it was a non-starter with no short term payoff at all.	因此，正如著名经济史学家金乐伯格所强调的那样，摆脱1931年全球大萧条的唯一可行办法就是美国伸出援手。 当时，美国不愿意承担拯救全球经济的负担有各种各样令人信服的理由。


China is the America of this century.  The initial stages of the credit crunch in 2007 were managed so apparently painlessly because sovereign wealth funds from the Middle East, but above all from China, were willing to step in and recapitalize the debt of American and European institutions.  The pivotal moment in today’s events came when the Chinese SWF China Investment Co. was unwilling to go further in its exploration of buying Lehman Brothers.  CIC’s turning back will be held up in the future as a moment when history could have turned in a different direction.	2007年信贷危机之初��理尚且从容，那时因为来自中东尤其是中国的国家财富基金愿意介入并且重新给美国和欧洲公司注入资本。 中国国家财富基金中国投资公司不愿进一步商讨收购雷曼兄弟公司，使得目前的事件达到了主要转折关口。


Now there will be plenty of reasons why the Chinese pulled back.	现在，中国后撤有许多理由。 这一逻辑就类似美国1931年那时候的一样。


The logic sounds like the American case of 1931.  Some of the arguments that are reverberating around Beijing are very reasonable: there is a great deal of uncertainty, and the SWFs might lose a lot of money.	某些在北京出现的论点非常合理。 那就是现在形势扑朔迷离，而且国家主权基金或许会损失惨重。


CIC would have initially lost some money with Lehman.	中国投资公司如果投资雷曼兄弟公司说不定就会赔钱。


Some lines of thought are more emotional: might not 2008 be a payback for the American bungling of the 1997-1998 East Asia crisis?	还有一些论点含有更多的感情色彩。 比如，美国在1997年和1998年亚洲金融危机时表现笨拙，那么，2008年是不是就是报应呢？


We are about to see what stake China really has in the survival of the globalized world economy.  As in 1931, the political arguments are all against such an operation.  Only the far-sighted will see that the economic case for a rescue is compelling.	我们就会发现在全球化的世界经济存亡中中国究竟持有何种悠关利益。 正如在1931年那样，政治观点都是反对采取行动。


The Geopolitical Message from Libya	来自利比亚的地缘政治信息


NEW DELHI – Will “mission creep” in the West’s intervention in Libya end up creating, inadvertently, a jihadist citadel at Europe’s southern doorstep?	发自新德里——不知西方在干涉利比亚过程中的所产生“使命偏离效应”（mission creep，意指行动偏离原定目标）是否会无意中在欧洲的南大门外孕育出一个伊斯兰圣战大本营呢？


Of course, the Western powers must be applauded for their efforts, with the support of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, to prevent a slaughter of Libya’s civilian population.	西方各国肯定会自我感觉良好，因为他们在卡塔尔和阿联酋的支持下阻止了一场对利比亚平民的屠杀。


The democratic world should never stand by idly while a tyrant uses military force to massacre civilians.	对于独裁者像平民动武的行为，民主世界是不能袖手旁观的。


But, if despots are to be deterred from untrammeled repression, any intervention – whether military or in the form of economic and diplomatic sanctions – must meet the test of impartiality.	但如果要制止卡扎菲这个暴君放肆镇压民众的话，任何干涉行动——无论是在军事上还是经济外交方面——都必须是公正和中立的。


The current political upheaval in the Arab world could transform the Middle East and North Africa in the same way that the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 fundamentally changed Europe.	当前这场阿拉伯政治动荡最终会像1989年柏林墙倒塌改变欧洲那样彻底改变整个中东和北非地区。


Indeed, 1989 was a watershed, producing the most profound global geopolitical changes in the most compressed timeframe in history.	事实上1989年是个分水岭，在极为短促的历史时期内实现了最为深刻的全球地缘政治变革。


But, in the decades since, the Arab world’s rulers, regimes, and practices seemed to have remained firmly entrenched.	但从那以后的几十年来，阿拉伯世界的统治者，政权和政治习俗却似乎依然根深蒂固，不可动摇。


In 1989, Francis Fukuyama claimed in a famous essay that the Cold War’s end marked the end of ideological evolution, “the end of history,” with the “universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.�� Yet, two decades on, the global spread of democracy has been encountering increasingly strong headwinds.	政治学者弗朗西斯·福山于1989年发表了一篇著名论文，认为冷战的结束标志着意识形态演化的终结，是“西方自由民主制度作为人类政府最终形式的普世化”之下的“历史终结”。


Only a small minority of states in Asia, for example, are true democracies.	但二十多年过去了，民主制度的全球扩张所遇到的阻力却与日俱增，例如亚洲地区就只有极少数国家真正实现了民主。


In fact, a new bipolar, Cold War-style ideological divide has emerged.	相比之下，另一个冷战意识形态分割下的新两极世界正日渐凸现。


The rise of authoritarian capitalism – best symbolized by China, but also embraced by countries as disparate as Malaysia, Singapore, Kazakhstan, and Qatar – has created a new model that competes with (and challenges) liberal democracy.	专制资本主义（以中国为典型，同时也被马来西亚、新加坡，哈萨克斯坦和卡塔尔等不同的国家争相效仿）的崛起已经形成了一种新的模式，对自由民主制度发起了竞争（甚至是挑战）。


The popular upsurge in the Arab world shows that democratic empowerment hinges on two key internal factors: the role of security forces and the technological sophistication of the state’s repressive capacity.	阿拉伯世界的人民起义进程体现出民主是否能实现，与两大关键内部因素紧密相连：国家安全力量所扮演的角色，以及国家镇压能力的技术含量。


In recent weeks, security forces have shaped developments in different ways in three Arab states.	而在最近这几个星期内，三个阿拉伯国家的安全力量分别以不同的形式左右了局势的发展.


Yemen’s popular uprising has splintered the security establishment, with different military factions now in charge of different neighborhoods in the capital, Sana.	也门的民众起义已经彻底撕裂了整个国家安全体系，首都萨那如今被不同的军事派别分割据守。


In Bahrain, by contrast, the monarchy has used the foreign Sunni mercenaries that dominate its police force to fire on demonstrators, who are predominantly Shia.	相反在巴林，王室则指挥大多由外籍逊尼派教徒组成���警察力量向主要为什叶派的示威者开火。


In Egypt, it was the military’s refusal to side with former President Hosni Mubarak that helped end his 30-year dictatorship.	在埃及，正是军队的倒戈最终导致了前总统穆巴拉克30年独裁统治的垮台。


Long used to wielding power, the military had become increasingly wary of Mubarak’s efforts to groom his son as his successor.	当时善于操弄权力的军队已经对穆巴拉克传位给其子的动向日渐担忧。


Yet today’s heady talk of freedom cannot obscure the reality that the people’s “revolution” has so far led only to a direct military takeover, with the decades-old emergency law still in force and the country’s political direction uncertain.	但如今对自由的高谈阔论却难以掩盖这场人民“革命”最终演变成一场军事接管的事实，数十年的紧急状态法依然有效，而国家的政治方向却难以捉摸。


As for the second key internal factor, a state’s ability to police mobile and electronic communications and Internet access has become as important as jackboots and truncheons.	在第二个关键国内因素方面，一个国家对手机，电信以及网络的监控能力正逐渐变得和警棍皮靴一样重要。


China, for example, is a model of despotic efficiency: its internal-security system extends from state-of-the-art surveillance and extralegal detention centers to an army of paid informants and neighborhood patrols that looks out for troublemakers.	对此中国堪称高效专制的样板：其内部安全系统一方面是极端完善的监控体系和非法拘留中心，另一方面则是一大批拿钱办事，时刻准备着揪出“捣乱分子”的线人和社区纠察队。


In response to calls by some overseas Chinese for people to gather on Sundays at specific sites in Shanghai and Beijing to help launch a molihua (jasmine) revolution, China has revealed a new strategy: preemptively flood the protest-designated squares with police to leave no room for protesters.	为了应对某些海外中国人呼吁星期日在北京上海等地特定地点集中发动“茉莉花革命”的号召，中国动用了一个新的策略：让警察布满那些计划中的示威场地，让示威者根本无法进入。


More importantly, as the world’s leader in stringent, real-time censorship of electronic communications, China is strongly placed to block any Arab contagion from reaching its shores.	更重要的是，作为全球严格实时电子通信审查技术的领头羊，中国努力将一切阿拉伯“毒草”拒之门外。


External factors are especially important in smaller, weaker countries. Nothing illustrates this better than Bahrain, where Saudi Arabia – which has contributed more than any other country to the spread of global jihad – sent forces under the Gulf Cooperation Council banner to crush peaceful protests.	外部因素对于那些比较弱小的国家来说特别重要，这点在打着海湾阿拉伯国家合作委员会（Gulf Cooperation Council）的旗号派兵镇压示威者的巴林身上尤为突出——须知该国对全球伊斯兰圣战的贡献远超世界各国。


Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s effort to prop up the Bahraini regime parallels the Soviet Union’s intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 to bolster a besieged allied regime – an invasion that led to the multibillion-dollar, CIA-scripted arming of Afghan rebels and the consequent rise of transnational Islamic terrorists.	事实上，沙特阿拉伯扶持巴林政权的效果跟1979年苏联干涉阿富汗以支持一个遭到围攻的同盟政权的效果类似——这场入侵催生了耗费数十亿美元，由美国中央情报局（CIA）亲自武装的阿富汗反抗军，并最终导致了跨国伊斯兰恐怖分子的崛起。


Libya, too, is a weak, divided country.	同样，利比亚也是一个内部分裂的弱国。


Indeed, with the CIA conducting covert operations inside Libya and aiding the rebels there, the danger is that the West could be creating another jihadist haven.	事实上随着美国中情局在其境内的秘密活动以及对反政府势力的援助，西方很可能制造出另一个伊斯兰圣战者的天堂。


After all, the broadening of the NATO-led mission from a limited, humanitarian goal to an all-out assault on Libya’s military signals to some Arabs that this war is really about ensuring that the region does not slip out of Western control.	毕竟对于某些阿拉伯人来说，以北约为首的多国部队行动从一个有限度的人道主义目标扩大到一场对利比亚部队的全面进攻就是想把该区域牢牢掌握在手里。


The intervention has seemingly been driven by a geopolitical imperative to bottle up or eliminate Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi so that his regime cannot exploit the political vacuum in neighboring Egypt and Tunisia.	这场干涉看上去似乎是被一种地缘政治动机所驱动，旨在牵制或者消灭卡扎菲，不让他的政权在邻国埃及和突尼斯的政治真空中得利。


While it is now clear that much of the Arab world is in transition, the end point is not yet clear.	虽然当前大多数阿拉伯国家显然都处于转型期，但转型的终点却依然模糊不清。


But Barack Obama’s administration apparently has concluded that Arab monarchs are likely to survive, whereas Arab presidents are more likely to fall, and that it is acceptable for the United States to continue to coddle tyrannical kings.	但美国总统奥巴马则明确认为各个阿拉伯王朝都将继续存活下来，相反那些总统们则更可能下台，而美国也乐于继续关照这些专制帝王。


Unfortunately, this double standard sends a message that democratic empowerment in any society is possible only if it is in the interest of the great powers.	不幸的是，这一双重标准向人们传达了一个信息：任何社会的民主制度只有在符合大国利益的时候才可能存在。


No one has a greater interest in broad acceptance of this noxious idea – that promotion of human freedom is nothing more than a geopolitical tool – than the world’s largest, oldest, and most powerful autocracy, China.	那么对这一观点——对自由的推动只不过是一项地缘政治工具——的普遍承认对谁最有好处？ 答案就是世界上最庞大，最古老，也最强大的独裁国家——中国。


The Geopolitics of Football	足球的地缘政治


In football, defeat is never definitive, but it is always passionate.	在足球运动中，失败并非万劫不复，但绝对激动人心。


For football lovers, FIFA (the governing body of international football) should have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize long ago.	对足球爱好者来说，国际足联（国际足球运动的管理机构）老早就应该被授予诺贝尔和平奖。


For others, exasperated by football and the emotions it stirs up, the sport is no longer a game, but a type of war that stokes the basest sort of nationalist emotions.	而在其他对足球及其激起的情感感到恼火的人看来，这项运动已经不再是一种比赛，而是一种战争，一种能煽起最低级的民族主义情感的战争。


Is there a relationship between football (and sports in general) and a spirit of nationalism and militarism?	足球（乃至所有体育运动）和民族主义及黩武主义的精神之间是否存在一种联系？


During the Middle Ages, sports were regularly forbidden in England because they came at the expense of military training.	中世纪的时候，体育运动在英格兰一般是遭到禁止的，因为开展了体育活动就无法进行军事训练。


After France’s defeat by Bismarck’s Germany in the Franco-Prussian War, Baron Pierre de Coubertin (who re-launched the Olympic Games a few decades later) recommended a renewed national emphasis on sport, which by this point was seen as a form of military preparation.	法国在普法战争中被俾斯麦时期的德国击败后，皮埃尔·德·顾拜旦男爵（他在数十年后复兴了奥运会）建议全国重新重视体育运动。 这时的体育运动被视为一种备战方式。


In a football match, the rituals – the flag waving, the national anthems, the collective chants –and the language that is employed (the match starts with a “breakout of hostilities,” one “bombs” the goal, blows up the defense, launches “missile”) reinforce the perception of war by other means.	足球比赛的仪式——挥旗、国歌、集体吟唱——以及使用的语言（比赛开始是“开战”，射门是“轰炸”，冲破防御是“炸开”，远射是“发射导弹”）加强了战争的概念。


And, in fact, real war has actually broken out over football.	事实上，足球的确引起过战争。


In 1969, Honduras and Salvador clashed after a qualification game for the World Cup.	1969年，洪都拉斯和萨尔瓦多在世界杯资格赛之后就发生了冲突。


Football matches can, it seems, revive national rivalries and conjure the ghosts of past wars.	足球比赛似乎可以唤醒国家间的对抗，召回过去战争的幽灵。


During the 2004 Asia Nations Cup final, which pitted China against Japan, Chinese supporters wore 1930’s-style Japanese military uniforms to express their hostility to the Japanese team.	2004年，在中国对日本的亚洲杯决赛上，中国球迷穿着20世纪30年代的日本军服来表达他们对日本队的敌意。


Other Chinese fans brandished placards with the number “300,000” written on it, a reference to the number of Chinese murdered by the Japanese army in 1937.	还有的中国球迷挥舞着写着“300,000”的牌子，暗指1937年被日本军队屠杀的中国人数量。


But can one really say that football is responsible for the currently bad diplomatic relations between China and Japan?	但是我们能说足球应该对当前中日之间糟糕的外交关系负责吗？


Of course not.	当然不能。


Hostility on the football pitch merely reflects the existing tense relations between the two countries, which carry the weight of a painful history.	球场上的敌对仅仅反映了两国之间已经存在的紧张关系，上面还压着一段苦痛历史的重量。


At the opposite end of the spectrum, the dramatic semi-final between France and Germany in Seville in 1982 produced no political ripples, either for diplomatic relations between the two countries or for relations between the two peoples.	而另一边，在1982年的塞维利亚，法德之间充满戏剧性的半决赛在两国的外交关系和两国人民的关系上都没有引起政治涟漪。


Antagonism was confined to the stadium, and ended when the match did.	对抗仅限于运动场，随着比赛的结束而结束。


What football really provides is a residual area of confrontation that allows for the controlled expression of animosity, leaving the most important areas of interaction between countries unaffected.	足球真正提供的是一个残余的对抗领域，人们可以借此有节制地表达敌意，而国家间最重要的交流领域则不受影响。


France and Germany will soon have a common army – they already have a common currency – yet the survival of national teams channels, within a strictly limited framework, lingering rivalry between the two countries.	法国和德国很快就会建立共同的军队——他们已经有了共同的货币——而国家队的继续存在将在一个严格限制的框架内发泄两国间残留的敌意。


Football can also be the occasion of positive gestures.	足球也可以成为做出积极姿态的舞台。


The joint organization of the 2002 World Cup by Japan and South Korea helped accelerate bilateral reconciliation.	日本和韩国共同承办2002年世界杯加快了双方的和解。


The performance of the South Korean players was even applauded in North Korea.	韩国球员的表现甚至得到了朝鲜的赞赏。


Sport, indeed, seems to be the best barometer of relations between the divided Korean people.	体育似乎的确是分裂的韩民族之间关系的最佳晴雨表。


Moreover, football, more than long speeches or international resolutions, can help induce progress towards peaceful solutions for military conflicts.	此外，与冗长的演说和国际调解相比，足球更能促进军事冲突的和平解决。


After their qualification for this year’s World Cup, the Ivory Coast’s national team, including players from the north and south, addressed all of their fellow citizens, asking the warring factions to lay down their weapons and to put an end to the conflict that has shattered their country.	在获得今年世界杯的资格后，科特迪瓦的国家队，包括来自南北双方的球员，向他们的全体同胞发表了演说，恳请战争中的集团放下武器，结束这场使国家支离破碎的冲突。


After Haiti’s President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown a few years ago, Brazil’s football team acted as an ambassador for the United Nations’ Brazilian-led peacekeeping forces.	几年前海地总统让·贝特朗·阿里斯蒂德垮台后，巴西足球队成为巴西领导的联合国维和部队大使。


And, when conflict stops, from Kosovo to Kabul, football is the first sign of a society returning to normal.	还有，从科索沃到喀布尔，足球是战争结束后社会回复正常的最早征兆。


The former president of the FIFA, Joao Havelange, often dreamed of a football match between Israelis and Palestinians: the American vice-president Al Gore regarded such a match as a means to help Washington solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.	国际足联前主席乔·阿维兰热常常梦想在以色列和巴勒斯坦之间举行一场足球比赛：美国副总统戈尔曾将这样的比赛视作帮助华盛顿解决巴以冲突的方法之一。


Perhaps one day it will take place.	或许有一天真能举行这样一场比赛。


Certainly the Iran-United States football game in 1998 offered a moment of fraternization between the two teams.	1998年伊朗和美国之间的足球赛的确在两队之间形成了短暂的友善关系。


Another Iran-US match might be helpful at this difficult time.	再举行一场伊美比赛或许有助于度过这段艰难时期。


It is because football allows for symbolically limited confrontations, with no major political risks, that it is useful.	足球的作用在于它为象征性的有限冲突提供了舞台，不会引起重要的政治风险。


Its impact on national and international public opinion is broad, but not deep.	足球对国内和国际舆论的影响很广泛，但却不深刻。


As the sociologist Norbert Elias put it: “The spectators of a football match can enjoy the mythical excitement of battles taking place in the stadium, and they know that neither the players nor they will suffer any harm.”	正如社会学家诺伯特·伊莱亚斯所说：“足球比赛的观众可以感受到运动场上的争夺带来的虚幻的激情，同时也知道不论是球员还是自己都不会受到任何伤害。 ”


As in real life, fans can be torn between their hopes for victory and their fear of defeat.	和在现实生活中一样，球迷在对胜利的渴望和对失败的恐惧之间挣扎。


But in football, the elimination of an adversary is always temporary.	但是在足球中，淘汰对手总是暂时的。


A return match is always possible.	对手随时可能回来再决雌雄。


As a Frenchman, I cannot wait for the next World Cup match between France and Germany.	身为法国人，我迫切地等待法德之间的下一场世界杯比赛。


But I want France to avenge its defeat at the last World Cup in Seville, not its defeat at Verdun.	但是我希望法国雪耻的是上届世界杯在塞维尔的失利，而不是在凡尔登的战败。


The Ghost of Appeasement	姑息的幽灵


PRAGUE – One of the fundamental pillars of Europe’s political architecture is a strong and enduring belief in the universal validity of equal, universal, and inalienable human rights.	布拉格——欧洲政治结构的一个基本支柱就是对平等的、普遍的和不可剥夺的人权这个普世价值抱有强烈而坚定的信念。


At the core of this is a belief in the rights of human beings to a life of freedom and the protection of their dignity.	而其核心就是从人权到自由生活的信念以及保护人的尊严。


In the years after World War II, this humanist ideal became the basis of Europe’s spiritual and political identity and hence it is contained in the founding documents of the European Union.	二战之后，这种人文主义理念就成为欧洲精神和政治标识的基石，这种理念也被包纳在欧盟成立文件中。


Of course, this does not mean that the EU could or would want to conquer the rest of the world in the name of imposing its values, rules and culture on the rest of humanity.	当然，这并不意味着欧盟可以或者想要以自身的价值、法规和文化强加给其他民族的名义，来征服世界上的其他国家。


Far from it. What Europe’s devotion to humanism does mean, however, is a determination, no matter the circumstances, to stand firm and not abandon the fundamentals of European civilization and European unification.	相反的，欧洲对人文主义的贡献意味着一种决心，那就是，无论在什么情况下，都要立场坚定、不放弃欧洲文明和欧洲统一的重要精神。


As a result, Europe places a primary emphasis on the universality of human rights and freedoms.	所以，欧洲对于人权和自由的普世性尤为重视。


To be sure, there are many places around the globe where human rights and civil liberties continue to be trampled underfoot: North Korea, Iran, Burma, Tibet, Zimbabwe, and many others.	我们知道，世界上有许多地区，比如朝鲜、伊朗、缅甸、西藏、津巴布韦等地方，那里的人权和自由继续遭到践踏。


This week, a meeting of the EU’s General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) will discuss once more relations between the EU and Cuba.	本周，欧盟总务与对外关系委员会（GAERC）将召开会议，就欧盟与古巴的关系再次进行讨论。


Despite repeated reminders from the EU, the Cuban government has done none of the things that the Union has been urging it to do for many years – above all, to release all political prisoners and stop the persecution of independent civil-society groups and the regime’s political opponents.	多年来，尽管欧盟一再督促古巴政府，要求其释放所有的政治犯、停止迫害独立社会团体和政见异议人士，但是古巴政府却置若罔闻。


On the contrary, the Cuban government continues to detain prisoners of conscience and to criminalize demands for a society-wide dialogue.	相反的，古巴政府继续羁押那些良心犯，对要求社会范围内更多的政治对话的行为予以治罪。


This year, the peoples of Europe are marking the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Iron Curtain that once divided Europe in two.	今年，欧洲人民将纪念“铁幕”落幕二十周年，“铁幕”曾经将欧洲一分为二。


That 20 years after this epochal event an iron curtain remains around Cuba makes this anniversary poignant.	但铁幕降落、这一划时代的事件过去二十年后，仍有类似的铁幕环绕着古巴，使得今年的纪念更加令人感到刻骨铭心。


Of course, the tourists who crowd Cuba’s beaches are not aware of this iron curtain.	当然，在古巴海滩边来来往往的游客们并没有意识到铁幕还存在。


But, regardless of this ignorance and of its economic interests, the EU should insist on the release of political prisoners and use all international institutions to bring pressure to bear on the Cuban government to respect the human and civil rights of Cuba’s people.	虽然由于无知或是出于经济利益的考虑，但不管这么来说，欧盟都应该坚持要求古巴政府释放政治犯，利用一切国际场合向古巴政府施压，要求其尊重古巴人民的人权和民权。


During any negotiations with Cuba’s leaders, European politicians and diplomats should remind their Cuban partners of their obligations. They should also be in contact with Cuban civil society to express their solidarity with the families of the political prisoners.	在每一次与古巴领导人的谈判中，欧盟的政治领袖和外交官们都应该提醒他们的伙伴，古巴履行自己的义务，欧盟还应该与古巴社会团体保持接触，表达他们站在政治犯家属一边的立场。


From its own experiences in the twentieth century, Europe knows what catastrophes can result when concessions are made to evil.	从其二十世纪的自身经历出发，欧洲知道向邪恶妥协可能引发的灾难性后果。


The history of the twentieth century is an object lesson in this.	二十世纪的历史就是一个显而易见的教训。


Time and again, Europe paid a high price for policies of compromises with evil that were dictated by economic interests or the illusion that evil can be appeased and will disappear of its own accord.	这种政策或被经济利益主导，或者出于邪恶能被安抚并自行消失的幻想。


The EU should not and must not repeat this error.	向邪恶妥协的政策导致欧洲付出了惨重的代价，欧盟不应该也一定不能再重复犯这种错误。