What would be unacceptable are the two extremes: making an immediate transition to democratic rule a precondition for normalization of relations with the US and re-entering the Latin American community, or exempting Cuba from the obligation to adhere to democratic principles and practices on the grounds that it is somehow different.	真正不可接受的是两种极端状况：把立即转向民主统治作为实现与美国关系正常化和重新回归拉美社会的先决条件，或者以古巴现在已经有所变化为借口免除这个国家遵守民主原则和举措的义务。


In 1953, Fidel Castro, in what is probably the best-known speech in Latin American political history, proclaimed in court that history would absolve him.	1953年，菲德尔·卡斯特罗曾在或许是拉美政治史上最有名的一次法庭讲话中称，历史将宽恕他的罪过。


In fact, history will judge him, and his nearly 50 years in power, only when the results are in: when the initial achievements in health and education and combating inequality are evaluated according to international standards and with the transparency to which the rest of the region’s countries are subject.	但实际上，只有在下列目标实现以后，历史才会对他和他将近50年的执政生涯进行审判：那就是医疗、教育和与不平等斗争的初步成果按照国际标准来进行估价，而古巴也与拉美地区其他国家一样严格遵守执政透明原则。


Only then we will know if the trade-off at least made sense, even if for many it was unacceptable: authentic social justice and progress in exchange for authoritarian rule, international ostracism, and a cultural desert.	即便对很多人来讲根本无法接受，但只有到那时我们才知道这种交易是否起过作用：牺牲真正的社会正义和进步，得到的却是独裁统治、国际排斥和文化沙漠。


Africa’s Hidden Hunger	非洲的隐性饥饿


DAR ES SALAAM – Just over 20 years ago, South African photographer Kevin Carter shocked the world with a controversial photograph of a famished young Sudanese child being watched by a vulture during a famine.	达累斯萨拉姆——20年前，南非摄影家凯文·卡特拍摄的一张苏丹儿童在饥荒中饿死，而秃鹫就在他头顶盘旋的争议照片震惊了全世界。


Critics slammed the shot as “disaster porn,” calling it yet another example of how the international media sensationalize African problems.	批评者抨击这张照片兜售“灾难色情”，称这是国际媒体炒作非洲问题的又一个例子。


But what disturbs me is not the photograph.	但令我感到不安的并不是照片。


Rather, it is that two decades later, the conditions that the photograph depicts remain basically the same.	而是20年后，照片所描绘的问题依然故我。


Every year, 3.1 million children around the world still die of hunger.	每年全世界仍有310万名儿童死于饥饿。


As an African doctor, I know that the ravages of serious malnutrition and hunger are not always visible.	作为一名非洲医生，我知道严重营养不良和饥饿的摧残并不总是显而易见的。


They are not always as manifest as they are in the protruding ribs of ghostly children hooked up to feeding tubes, like those I used to see in hospital wards in Tanzania.	饥饿对人的摧残并不总像我曾在坦桑尼亚医院病房中看到的插着鼻饲管的幽灵般儿童根根突出的肋骨那么明显。


Chronic malnutrition, or “hidden hunger,” shows itself in other ways – but it can be just as devastating and deadly.	慢性营养不良，也叫“隐性饥饿”，还体现在其他方面——但其破坏性和致命性却丝毫不减。


And while deaths from many other diseases, including acute malnutrition, have declined, hidden hunger remains pervasive.	而在其他疾病（包括急性营养不良）致死率降低的同时，隐性饥饿现象依然随处可见。


In the last two decades, astounding success has been achieved in the fight against HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria.	20年来，人们在对抗艾滋病、肺结核和疟疾的斗争中取得了惊人的胜利。


New HIV infections have dropped by as much as 50% in some countries in Africa, with AIDS-related deaths down by 30-48%; TB cases have declined by 40%, and malaria cases by 30%.	新增艾滋病毒感染病例在非洲某些国家已经降低了近50%，艾滋病致死率降低30-48%； 肺结核病例降低40%，疟疾病例也出现了30%的下降。


But the stunting of early childhood growth as a result of malnutrition remains high, dropping by only about 1% over the same period.	但营养不良导致的幼儿生长发育障碍依然严重，同期仅有约1%的降幅。


In Africa, hunger remains the leading cause of death in children, accounting for half of all deaths of children under the age of five and killing more than AIDS, TB, and malaria combined.	饥饿仍然是非洲儿童死亡的罪魁祸首，占到5岁以下儿童死亡率的一半，致死人数超过艾滋病、结核病和疟疾的总和。


In fact, many scientific studies have shown that a malnourished child is much more likely to contract an infection, to suffer from other illnesses, and to suffer from them longer.	事实上，众多科学研究显示营养不良儿童更有可能出现感染、罹患其他疾病并且久病不愈的可能性也更大。


Diarrhea, for example, is a deadly disease for severely underweight children, who are 12 times more likely to die from an ailment that should be easily treated.	比如痢疾是体重严重不足儿童常患的致命疾病，他们死于原本应该很容易治疗疾病的概率是普通儿童的12倍之多。


And severely underweight children are 9.5 times more likely to die from malaria as well.	体重严重不足的儿童死于疟疾的可能性是普通儿童的9. 5倍。


Indeed, childhood malnutrition is now confirmed to be the leading cause of the global disease burden, with the World Health Organization attributing to it 45% of all deaths under the age of five in 2011. Recent reports from the war-ravaged Central African Republic indicate that more children there are dying from hunger than from bullets.	事实上，儿童营养不良现已证实是全球疾病负担的主要原因，世界卫生组织认为2011年


These numbers make the problem of malnutrition look insurmountable. But what works is no secret: vitamin A, iodized salt, and fortified foods.	5岁以下儿童死亡总数的45%是营养不良造成的。


The lack of vitamin A alone results in blindness in a half-million children every year, with half of them dying within 12 months of losing their sight. Similarly, half of all women of childbearing age in developing countries suffer from weakened immune systems, owing to anemia caused by iron deficiency.	不久前来自饱受战争蹂躏的中非共和国的报告显示那里死于饥饿的儿童比死于战火的还要多。


The long-term damage caused by malnutrition has a domino effect, impeding educational achievement, and ultimately, hobbling national economies.	这些数字让营养不良问题看似难以克服。 但解决方法也并不神秘：维他命A、碘盐和强化食品。


Addressing this ongoing crisis requires money – an estimated $10 billion per year – and new and better strategies to bring life-saving solutions to the mothers and children who most need them.	仅维生素A缺乏一项就导致每年有50万儿童失明，失明后12个月内有高达一半的儿童死亡。 同样，发展中国家半数育龄妇女因缺铁导致免疫系统减弱。


But the cost looks far less daunting when one considers the cost of hunger. UNICEF estimates that the cost of Africa’s child malnutrition is $25 billion a year.	营养不良造成的长期损失具有多米诺骨牌效应，阻碍人们取得教育成就，并最终危及国家经济。


And this is not the whole story. Malnutrition costs an estimated $3.5 trillion every year to the global economy, owing to loss of productivity and higher health-care costs.	化解这一持续危机需要资金——每年估计要投入100亿美元——还有能让救命方案惠及拯需救助的母亲和儿童的更新更好的策略。


To meet this challenge, save lives, and improve economies, Africa needs a comprehensive strategy and increased investment in agriculture.	而且这还不是全部。 营养不良给全球经济每年造成35，000亿美元的损失，具体表现在生产力损失和更高的医疗费用。


The Africa Union has declared 2014 the year of agriculture and food security in Africa, and the continent’s agriculture sector is expected to grow significantly. In theory, that should improve overall nutrition; but increased investment in agriculture is not a panacea.	为了迎接挑战、挽救生命和改善经济，非洲需要制定全面战略并且加大对农业投资。


A big step would be to increase women’s control over land ownership and farming decisions, along with access to agricultural credits and subsidies designed to encourage domestic food production through home gardening and cattle and poultry husbandry.	非盟已宣布2014年是非洲的农业及粮食安全年，非洲大陆农业部门预期将显著增长。 理论上这应该能改善总体营养状况；


Studies show that women are much more likely than men to spend additional income on food and health.	但增加农业投资并非总是万能良方。


Increasing their farming income and decision-making power ultimately has a greater impact on children’s health and nutrition.	我们需要集中力量建设营养敏感型农业项目，并确保小规模农户、家庭、妇女和儿童参加。


Moreover, agricultural policies, subsidies, and investments have traditionally benefited cereal farmers.	重要的是增加妇女在土地所有权和农业决策中的话语权，并让她们可以申请到旨在通过家庭种植、牲畜和家禽饲养鼓励家庭粮食生产的农业贷款和补助。


But policymakers need to concentrate on increasing access to more nutritious foods, such as meat, fruit, and vegetables, which are too expensive for the poor.	研究表明女性比男性更愿意在食品和健康领域花费更多收入。 增加她们的农业收入和决策权最终能对儿童健康和营养产生更大影响。


Malnutrition causes the greatest damage during the first thousand days of life, leading to grievous and irreversible changes in infant health.	此外，农业政策、补贴和投资传统上一直惠及谷物种植者。


To make real inroads against hidden hunger, African governments, supported by global development partners, must act quickly. Childhood hunger in Africa does not have to be as dramatic as that depicted in Carter’s 1993 photograph to be just as deadly.	但决策者需要关注增加肉类、水果和蔬菜等高营养食物，而这些食物对穷人来讲价钱过高。


Read more from "Visionary Voices"	营养不良会在出生前1000天造成最大的损害，导致婴幼儿健康发生严重而不可逆的变化。 为战胜隐性饥饿，非洲政府必须在全球发展伙伴的支持下迅速采取行动。


Rating the Raters	评估评估者


CAMBRIDGE – In the new financial order being put in place by regulators around the world, reform of credit rating agencies should be a key element.	坎布里奇——在全球监管者建立的新金融秩序中，改革信用评级机构应当成为关键因素。


Credit rating agencies, which play an important role in modern capital markets, completely failed in the years preceding the financial crisis.	现代资本市场中作用举足轻重的信用评级机构在金融危机之前的那些年没有起到任何作用。


What is needed is an effective mechanism for rating the raters.	我们需要建立有效机制对评估者进行评估。


There is widespread recognition that rating agencies have let down investors.	人们普遍认为评级机构辜负了投资者的信任。


Many financial products related to real estate lending that Standard & Poor, Moody’s, and Fitch rated as safe in the boom years turned out to be lethally dangerous.	标准普尔、穆迪和惠誉在繁荣时期确定为安全的许多金融产品后来却被证明是极端危险的。


And the problem isn’t limited to such financial products: with issuers of other debt securities choosing and compensating the firms that rate them, the agencies still have strong incentives to reciprocate with good ratings.	问题还不仅仅局限在这些金融产品： 在其他债券发行人自主选择并支付评级机构酬劳的情况下，评级机构仍然具有以高分来回报主顾的强烈动机。


What should be done?	应该采取什么措施？


One proposed approach would reduce the significance of the raters’ opinions.	一种方法是降低评级机构意见的重要性。


In many cases, the importance of ratings comes partly from legal requirements that oblige or encourage institutional investors and investment vehicles to maintain portfolios of assets that have received sufficiently high grades from the recognized agencies.	很多情况下，评级的重要性部分来源于迫使或鼓励机构投资者及投资工具持有从著名评级机构得分足够高的资产组合的法律要求。


Disappointment about the raters’ performance, and skepticism about the effectiveness of regulation, has led to calls to eliminate any regulatory reliance on ratings.	对评级机构所作所为的失望、以及对监管有效性的怀疑，已经导致人们呼吁取消依赖评级的监管原则。


If ratings are not backed by the force of law, so the argument goes, regulators need not worry about rating quality and can leave the monitoring of raters to the market.	这种说法认为，如果评级失去了法律的支持，监管机构就不必担心评级质量，可以让市场承担起监管评级机构的职责。


Even if ratings were no longer required or encouraged by law, however, demand for ratings – and the need to improve their reliability – would remain.	但即使评级不再受到法律的强制和鼓励，对评级的需求——以及提高评级可靠性的必要性——依然会存在下去。


Many investors are unable to examine the extent to which a bond fund’s high yield is due to risk-taking, and would thus benefit from a rating of the fund’s holdings.	许多投资者无法判断债券基金的高回报在多大程度上来源于承担风险，因此对基金持仓的评级会给投资者带来好处。


Given past experience, we cannot rely on market reputation to ensure that such ratings will be reliable.	过去的经验显示，我们无法依赖市场信誉来确保此类评级是否可靠。


Another approach would be to unleash the liability system.	另一种方法是实行责任制。


On this view, if investors were able to take raters to court, raters’ incentives would improve.	在这方面，如果投资者能将评级机构告上法庭，将可以改善评级机构的动机状况。


But, while such judicial scrutiny may be effective in eliminating some egregious cases, it cannot ensure that raters do the right thing when courts are not expected to be able to tell after the fact what the right thing was.	但尽管这样的司法审查可以有效地清除某些臭名昭著的案例，但如果法庭在事后也无法确定什么样的做法正确，那么这种制度也无法确保评级机构按正确的方法行事。


There is thus no substitute for providing raters with incentives to provide as accurate a rating as they can.	因此什么也无法替代确保评级机构尽可能提供准确评级结果的动机。


This can be done by making raters’ profits depend not on satisfying the issuers that select them, but on performing well for investors.	这只有当实现评级机构的利润与选择他们的发行机构脱钩，并与为投资者所提供服务挂钩的时候才可能成为现实。


If raters’ profits depend on such performance – on the accuracy of their ratings – the profit motive would turn from a source of perverse incentives to a provider of beneficial incentives.	如果评级机构的利润取决于这样的表现——取决于评级的准确程度——那么逐利动机就会从负面转化为一种正面的激励。


The US Senate voted this month to incorporate such a mechanism into the financial reform bill that will now have to be reconciled by the bill passed by the US House of Representatives.	美国参议院已于本月投票将此等机制纳入金融改革法案，该法案现在必需纳入美国众议院所通过的法案之中。


Under the Senate’s approach, regulators would create rules under which an independent regulatory board would choose raters.	按照参议院的方法，监管机构将会制定独立监管委员会选择评级机构的相关规则。


The board would be allowed to base its choices on raters’ past performance.	委员会将根据评级机构过往的评级准确度来进行选择。


For such a mechanism to work well, it must link the number of assignments won by raters, and thus their compensation, to appropriate measures of their performance.	此等机制要想发挥作用，必须将评级机构所得的评级数量、也就是所获的评级报酬，与对其业绩的恰当衡量标准挂钩。


Such measures should focus on what makes ratings valuable for the investors who use them – their accuracy in forecasting financial health.	衡量标准应当着重考察对应用评级结果的投资者的价值——也就是它们在预测财务状况方面的准确度。


Once developed, such a mechanism should not be limited (as, unfortunately, it is in the Senate’s bill) to ratings of structured financial products.	确定下来之后，这样一种机制不应只局限于（像参议院法案中所规定的那样）结构性金融产品的评级应用。


It should apply to all products that rating agencies evaluate.	而应运用到评级机构评估的所有产品当中。


All ratings of financial products raise the same incentive problems and could benefit from reform.	对于金融产品的所有评级都牵涉到动机问题，也都能受益于此次改革举措。


Predictably, the Senate’s bill encountered stiff resistance from the dominant rating agencies.	果不出人所料，参议院的法案遭到了主要评级机构的强烈抵制。


Standard & Poor argued that such a mechanism would provide credit rating agencies with “less incentive to compete with one another, pursue innovation, and improve their models, criteria, and methodologies.”	标准普尔提出这样一种机制会令信用评级机构“相互竞争、追求创新、改善评估模型、标准和方法的意愿受损。 ”


Well, such a mechanism would indeed reduce raters’ negative incentives to compete with one another to please issuers of securities, and to pursue innovations and improvements that enable raters to serve issuers better.	没错，这样一种机制肯定会损害评级机构相互竞争取悦债券发行方的消极意愿、致令其无法通过追求创新和改革更好地为发行方服务。


But it would strengthen raters’ positive incentives to compete with one another to produce accurate ratings, and to pursue innovations and improvements that enable raters to achieve that far more socially beneficial goal.	但它却可以强化评级机构相互竞争得出准确评级结果的积极意愿，并鼓励它们追求能实现积极社会目标的创新和改革。


Rating agencies have been and should remain an important aspect of modern capital markets.	评级机构一直也仍将是现代资本市场的重要组成因素。


But to make ratings work, the raters need to be rated.	但要使评级发挥作用，就必需对评级机构进行评估。


Taking Back Immigration	回收移民


LONDON – Within hours of US President Barack Obama’s re-election last month, a powerful belief took hold: overwhelming support from Latino voters had helped to secure his victory.	发自伦敦——就在上月美国总统奥巴马成功连任的几个小时内，一个强大的理念就也随之树立了起来：是拉丁裔选民压倒性的支持确保了他的胜利。


Suddenly, the Republican Party, long identified with a hard line on immigration, started talking about the need for comprehensive reform.	突然，共和党——这个一直被认为对移民持有强硬立场的政党——开始讨论全面改革的需要。


Pundits argued that if the Republicans resisted reform, they would lose the Latino vote for the next generation, relegating their party to near-permanent opposition status.	专家们认为如果共和党人反对这一改革的话，他们就将在下一代选民中丢失拉丁裔选票，并使之降格成为一个几乎永远在野的状态。


That might or might not be true.	这一观点或许是对的，但或许也不对。


But the American election’s implications for immigration run deeper than electoral expediency – with lessons for governments around the world.	但美国选举与移民的牵连可比选举算计更为深刻——全世界政府都可以从中获得经验教训。


The remarkable speed with which anti-immigration positions buckled indicates that what most Americans want, above all, is a rational approach; they want their political leaders to take responsibility for the issue, rather than running away from it.	反移民立场转变的惊人速度体现出大多数美国人其实最想要的就是一个合理的手段； 他们希望自己的政治领袖能在这一事务上有所担当，而非躲躲藏藏。


When it comes to immigration, politicians usually are driven by fear – a tendency that has become even more acute since the onset of the global financial crisis.	每当论及移民问题，政治家们通常被恐惧所左右——这种趋势自全球金融危机开始后更是变本加厉。


The rise of extreme nationalists in places like Greece and Finland has reinforced the belief that talking about immigration, except to argue against it, is politically fraught.	在希腊和芬兰等地极端民族主义者的崛起强化了这样一种理念——即谈论移民，除非是反对它，在政治上就是危险的。


So politicians either address immigration in the context of border security and cultural identity, or they ignore it.	所以政治家要么就把移民问题放到边境安全和文化身份定义的语境下讨论，要么直接忽略这一问题。


But they might well be misreading their citizens’ concerns.	但他们也很有可能误读了其公民的关注点。


Voter reaction is often less about disliking immigrants than it is about a profound sense of frustration that governments have failed to create an immigration system that works.	选民的反应通常并不是因为不喜欢移民，而更多是对政府无法创造一个有效移民体系所产生的深刻挫折感。 他们希望这个体系能在允许本国稀缺工人合法入境的同时阻止非法偷渡；


They want a system that allows for the legal entry of needed workers, while preventing illegal entry; clamps down on exploitative employers; and provides resources to integrate immigrants into communities.	取缔那些剥削移民的雇主； 并为移民融入当地社区提供资源。


Voters might not like that some migrants enter their country illegally.	选民们或许不会喜欢移民非法进入他们的国家。


But many find it equally or even more unconscionable that migrants are forced to live for decades in the shadows – or that children raised by immigrant parents could be deported to countries that they have never seen.	但很多人也会发现同等或者甚至更为不合理的现象：这些非法移民将被迫在阴影之中生活好几十年——而那些由移民父母抚养的孩子们有可能被驱逐到那些他们从未见过的国家。


When migration is undertaken in a legal, orderly way, the public supports it.	当移民以合法有序的方式进行时，公众就会支持它。


A recent transatlantic survey by the German Marshall Fund found that, while majorities in all countries were worried about illegal immigration, anxiety about legal immigration was low – with only 26% of European respondents expressing concern, and just 18% doing so in the United States.	一份近期由德国马歇尔基金支持的大西洋两岸调查发现，当所有国家的大部分人都在担忧非法移民的时候，对合法移民的担忧就显得很少——只有26%的欧洲受访者表达了担忧，而在美国只有18%的受访者表示担忧。


Ceding the immigration debate to extremists has abetted another extraordinary distortion: people generally believe that the number of immigrants in their countries is far higher than it actually is.	将移民事务讨论交给极端主义者的做法已经滋生出另一个奇怪的误解：人们普遍认为的本国移民数量比实际移民要多得多。


In the same German Marshall Fund survey, British respondents estimated that 31.8% of the United Kingdom’s population was foreign born; the true figure is 11.3%.	在同样的一份德国马歇尔基金报告中，英国的受访者估计31. 8%的英国人口是在外国出生的；


Americans estimated that the US foreign-born population stood at 37.8% – triple the actual proportion, 12.5%.	美国人估计其人口中的37. 8%出生于外国——这是实际比例12.


Such false perceptions make it even more difficult to have a reasonable debate about the issues.	5%的三倍。 而这些错觉使得针对这类事务的理性辩论极为困难。


Tackling migration-related challenges is necessary regardless of whether one favors more or less immigration.	不管人们支不支持移民，处理与移民相关的挑战都是很有必要的。


Today, according to the United Nations, there are 214 million people living outside their country of birth, up from approximately 82 million in 1970.	根据联合国统计，现在有2. 14亿人居住在其出生国之外，而1970年这个数字大概只有8200万。


So, even if not a single new person were to cross a border, the challenges would still be with us.	所以，即使从今往后再也不出现一个非法移民，我们仍然会面临着挑战。


The reality, of course, is that many countries, especially OECD members, will decide that they need more immigrants as their own populations age and shrink.	当然，事实上很多国家，尤其是经合组织成员国，会考虑到随着本国人口老化及较少而需要更多的移民。


This implies that they should figure out how to manage immigration well, rather than outsourcing much of the process to smugglers and extremists.	这意味着他们应该想办法如何好好管理移民，而不是把这个包袱甩给走私者和极端分子。


And, in a world in which nearly half of migrants are now moving from one developing country to another, the problems are no longer confined to the West.	在这个几乎一半移民都是从一个发展中国家搬到另一个发展中国家的世界，移民的问题也就不仅仅只是西方国家的问题了。


The good news is that there have been important advances during the last decade in managing migration.	好消息是在过去的十年里在移民管理上已经取得了很重要的进展。


For example, policymakers can draw on successful programs to integrate migrant children into educational systems.	比如，政策制定者可以利用成功的项目来将移民子女纳入教育系统。


They can learn how some countries are successfully matching their businesses’ labor needs with immigrants’ skills.	他们可以学习其他国家是如何成功地把本国商业的劳动力需求与移民自身技能结合起来。


Developing countries, meanwhile, are getting smarter about how to leverage the $406 billion in remittances that their expatriate citizens will send home this year – by issuing diaspora bonds, for example, or by creating targeted investment opportunities for them.	同时发展中国家也在更加明智地利用本国侨民本年将要寄回家的4060亿美元汇款。 比如通过发行侨民债券，或者为他们创造有针对性的投资机会。


Many pivotal stakeholders also are advocating for a more rational immigration system.	很多关键利益相关者也提倡一个更加合理的移民系统。


Labor unions, once known for their skepticism toward immigration, are increasingly in favor of pro-immigration reforms.	曾经以移民怀疑论出名的工会也渐渐开始支持移民改革。


In fact, unions were a driving force behind last year’s Domestic Workers Convention, which seeks to protect the rights of the world’s estimated 50-100 million domestic workers.	事实上，工会是去年家政工人公约背后的推动力量，这份公约旨在保护世界上大约5000万到1亿家政工人的权利。


By supporting smart, progressive reforms, politicians should at least be able to neutralize the issue of immigration on Election Day, if not turn it to their advantage.	通过支持明智而进步的改革，政治家们至少应该能在选举日期间对移民问题保持中立，而不是借此牟利。


More important, electoral politics aside, they would be helping to craft better societies whose politics are shaped by reasonable debate among citizens, not distorted by the community-destroying behavior of smugglers and extremists.	更重要的是，除了选举政治之外，它们将有助于打造一个更为良好的社会，里面的政治是由市民之间的理性讨论所塑造，而不是被走私客和极端分子的破坏社区行为所扭曲。


This, after all, is what democratic politics is all about.	归根结底，这才是民主政治的真谛。


Rationality versus Intelligence	理性对阵智力


TORONTO – In 2002, the cognitive scientist Daniel Kahneman of Princeton University won the Nobel Prize in Economics for work done with his longtime collaborator Amos Tversky (who died in 1996).	多伦多 — 2002年，来自普林斯顿大学的认知科学家丹尼尔·卡纳曼获得了该年度的诺贝尔经济学奖，表彰他和长期合作者阿莫斯·特沃斯基（已经于1996年过世）所作的贡献。


Their work had to do with judgment and decision-making – what makes our thoughts and actions rational or irrational.	他们的工作针是针对判断和决策的：二者决定了我们的思想和行为是否理性。


They explored how people make choices and assess probabilities, and uncovered basic errors that are typical in decision-making. 	他们探究了人们怎样做出选择和评估可能，还揭示了在决策过程中典型的基本错误。


The thinking errors they uncovered are not trivial mistakes in a parlor game.	他们所揭示的思维错误并不是客厅游戏里面的小过失。


To be rational means to adopt appropriate goals, take the appropriate action given one’s goals and beliefs, and hold beliefs that are commensurate with available evidence.	具有理性意味着确定适当的目标，并且基于个人的目标和信念来采取适当的行为，而且持有和可获得的证据相称的信念。


It means achieving one’s life goals using the best means possible.	它还意味着采用尽可能最佳的手段来达成一个人的生活目标。


To violate the thinking rules examined by Kahneman and Tversky thus has the practical consequence that we are less satisfied with our lives than we might be.	因此，如果违反卡纳曼和特沃斯基验证过的思考规律，就会带来实际后果：我们对生活的不满程度将会增大。


Research conducted in my own laboratory has indicated that there are systematic individual differences in the judgment and decision-making skills that Kahneman and Tversky studied.	在我自己实验室中进行的研究显示：在卡纳曼和特沃斯基研究过的判断和决策技能中，存在着系统性的个体差异。


Ironically, the Nobel Prize was awarded for studies of cognitive characteristics that are entirely missing from the most well-known mental assessment device in the behavioral sciences: intelligence tests.	具有讽刺意味的是，诺贝尔奖是针对就某些认知特征所作的研究而颁发的。 而在行为科学最广为人知的脑力评估 —智力测验里，这些认知特征却完全无影无踪。


Scientists and laypeople alike tend to agree that “good thinking” encompasses sound judgment and decision-making – the type of thinking that helps us achieve our goals.	科学家和外行人同样倾向于赞同“优质思维”包含着准确的判断力和决策力，这也是帮助我们达成目标的思维能力。


Yet assessments of such good (rational) thinking are nowhere to be found on IQ tests.	但是智力测验中却找不到针对这种优质的（理性的）思维的测定方式。


Intelligence tests measure important things, but they do not assess the extent of rational thought.  This might not be such a grave omission if intelligence were a strong  predictor of rational thinking.	智力测验测试了很重要的东西，但是它们没有测量理性思维的程度。 如果智商能够准确 预测 理性思维能力，这项省略也没什么大不了的。


But my research group found just the opposite: it is a mild predictor at best, and some rational thinking skills are totally dissociated from intelligence.	但我从自己的研究组别里得出的发现正好相反：智商最多只能部分预测理性，有些理性思维技巧还完全和智商无关。


To an important degree, intelligence tests determine the academic and professional careers of millions of people in many countries.	对于世界许多国家数以百万计的人而言，智力测验在很大程度上决定了他们的学术和职业生涯。


Children are given intelligence tests to determine eligibility for admission to school programs for the gifted.	孩子们接受智力测验来决定是否能被学校录取进专为天才儿童所设的项目。


Corporations and the military depend on assessment and sorting devices that are little more than disguised  intelligence  tests.	为公司和军队所倚重的测试和排序方法差不多就是隐形智力测验。


Perhaps some of this attention to intelligence is necessary, but what is not warranted is the tendency to ignore cognitive capacities that are at least equally important: the capacities that sustain rational thought and action.	也许必须对智力给予一些关注，然而忽略起码是同样重要的认知能力—这一趋势却不合理：正是这种能力支撑起理性的思维和行为。


Critics of intelligence tests have long pointed out that the tests ignore important parts of mental life, mainly non-cognitive domains such as socio-emotional abilities, empathy, and interpersonal skills.	长期以来，智力测验的批评家们已经指出这些测验忽略了精神生活的重要方面，主要是类似社会情感能力，情感转移能力和人际交流技能等非认知领域。


But intelligence tests are also radically incomplete as measures of  cognitive functioning, which is evident from the simple fact that many people display a systematic inability to think or behave rationally despite having a more than adequate IQ.	然而，即使是作为认知功能的衡量方式，智力测验也很不全面，这可以通过一个简单的事实就体现出来：许多人虽然智商出众，但在理性思维和行为方面却体现出了彻底的无能。


For a variety of reasons, we have come to overvalue the kinds of thinking skills that intelligence tests measure and undervalue other important cognitive skills, such as the ability to think rationally. 	由于形形色色的原因，我们已经过分高估了那些由智力测验进行测试的思维能力，却低估了其他重要的认知技能，例如理性思维的能力。


Psychologists have studied the major classes of thinking errors that make people less than rational.	有些思维方面的错误导致人们进行非理性思考，心理学家已经对这些错误的主要类别进行了研究。 他们研究了人们的下列倾向：减缓对不连贯的可能性进行测试；


They have studied people’s tendencies to show incoherent probability assessments; to be overconfident in knowledge judgments; to ignore the alternative hypothesis; to evaluate evidence with a “my side” bias; to show inconsistent preferences because of framing effects; to over-weigh short-term rewards at the expense of long-term well-being; to allow decisions to be affected by irrelevant context; and many others.	过分看重短期回报而牺牲长期福祉； 允许决定受不相干的环境因素干扰，还有许多其他倾向。


All of these categories of failure of rational judgment and decision-making are very imperfectly correlated with intelligence – meaning that IQ tests tend not to capture individual differences in rational thought.	所有这些类型的非理性判断和决策都与智商毫不相关，也就是说智力测验可能无法捕捉到理性思维方面的个体差异。


Intelligence tests measure mental skills that have been studied for a long time, whereas psychologists have only recently had the tools to measure the tendencies toward rational and irrational thinking.	智力测验评估的是脑力技能，这一技能已经被人们研究多时； 而心理学家直到最近才找到测算理性和非理性思维倾向的工具。


Nevertheless, recent progress in the cognitive science of rational thought suggests that nothing – save for money – would stop us from constructing an “RQ” test.	尽管如此，认知科学近来在理性思维研究上取得的进展意味着：没有什么因素—金钱除外—会阻止我们设立“RQ”测试（理性测试）。


Such a test might prove highly useful.	这种测试也许将被证明大有裨益。


Suboptimal investment decisions have, for example, been linked to overconfidence in knowledge judgments, the tendency to over-explain chance events, and the tendency to substitute affective valence for thought.	例如，次优投资决定是和下列因素联系在一起的：在知识判断方面的过度自信，倾向于过度诠释机会事件，容易于用情感因素代替思考。


Errors in medical and legal decision-making have also been linked to specific irrational thinking tendencies that psychologists have studied.	医学和法律决策方面的错误同样与具体的非理性思维倾向相关，心理学家已经就此展开了研究。


There are strategies and environmental fixes for the thinking errors that occur in all of these domains.	在所有这些领域中，都存在策略和环境方面的困境来导致思考发生错误。


But it is important to realize that these thinking errors are more related to rationality than intelligence.	但是认识到这些思维错误更多是和理性而不是和智力相关，这一点十分重要。


They would be reduced if schools, businesses, and government focused on the parts of cognition that intelligence tests miss. 	如果学校，企业和政府对智力测验中缺失的认知能力给予关注，就能减少类似错误的发生。


Instead, these institutions still devote far more attention and resources to intelligence than to teaching people how to think in order to reach their goals.	不过，这些机构仍然把更多的注意力和资源用来关注智商，而不是用来教会人们为了达到目标应该如何进行思考。


It is as if intelligence has become totemic in our culture.	似乎智商已经变成了我们文化中的图腾。


But what we should really be pursuing is development of the reasoning strategies that could substantially increase human well-being.	但是我们真正应该追求的是培养推理策略，它能极大地增加人类的幸福。


Rattling the Renminbi	好动的人民币


BEIJING – From July 2005 until this past December, China’s renminbi (RMB) appreciated steadily.	北京—从2005年7月到去年12月，人民币一直在逐渐升值。


But then the RMB fell unexpectedly, hitting the bottom of the daily trading band set by the Peoples’ Bank of China (PBoC) for 11 sessions in a row.	但此后人民币出现了出人意料的贬值，连续11个交易日触及中国人民银行设定的日交易下限。


Though the RMB has since returned to its previous trajectory of slow appreciation, the episode may have signaled a permanent change in the pattern of the exchange rate’s movement.	尽管此后人民币又重新回到了缓慢升值的轨道，但其汇率变动的轨迹也许已经发生了永久改变。


As long as China was running a trade surplus and receiving net inflows of foreign direct investment, the RMB remained under upward pressure.	只要中国存在贸易顺差和净外国直接投资流入，人民币就会承受升值压力。


Short-term capital flows had little impact on the direction of the RMB’s exchange rate.	短期资本流对人民币汇率几乎没有影响。


There were two reasons for this.	原因有二。


First, thanks to an effective – albeit porous – capital-control regime in China, short-term “hot money” (capital coming into China aimed at arbitrage, rent-seeking, and speculation) could not enter (and then leave) freely and swiftly.	其一，由于中国卓有成效（尽管漏洞很多）的资本管制，短期“热钱”（即流入中国以套利、寻租和投机为目的的资本）无法迅速自由地进出。


Second, short-term capital flows usually would strengthen rather than weaken upward pressure on the RMB’s exchange rate, because speculators, persuaded by China’s gradual approach to revaluation, bet on appreciation.	其次，短期资本流通常加强而不是削弱了人民币的生孩子压力，因为投机者在中国渐进的升值态度的指引下，都在赌人民币会升值。


So why, if China was still running a decent current-account surplus and a long-term capital surplus, did the RMB suddenly depreciate, forcing the PBoC to intervene (though not very vigorously) to prevent it from falling further?	那么，既然中国仍然存在漂亮的经常项目顺差和长期资本盈余，为什么人民币会突然贬值，迫使人民银行出手干预（尽管力度不是很大）以防止其进一步下跌呢？


Many economists outside of China have argued that the December depreciation resulted from betting by investors that Chinese policymakers, facing the prospect of a hard landing for the economy, would slow or halt currency appreciation.	许多外部经济学家指出，12月贬值的原因是投资者认为中国决策者在面临经济硬着陆的前景时，将延缓甚至叫停人民币的升值。


But if that were true, we would now be seeing significant long-term capital outflows and heavy selling of RMB for dollars in China’s foreign-exchange market.	但如果这种观点正确，那么我们现在应该看到大量长期资本流出以及中国外汇市场上出现大量抛售人民币换取美元的现象。


We see neither reaction.	但这两种现象一个都没有出现。


More importantly, the RMB’s slow appreciation resumed fairly promptly after December’s dip, while investors’ bearish sentiments about China’s economy remain consistent.	更重要的是，在12月的贬值之后，人民币又相当稳健地回到了缓慢升值的轨道上，而与此同时，投资者看熊中国经济的情绪并没有缓解。


In fact, the RMB’s sudden fall in December reflects China’s liberalization of cross-border capital flows.	事实上，12月人民币的突然贬值反应出中国跨境资本流的自由化。


That process began in April 2009, when China launched the pilot RMB Trade Settlement Scheme (RTSS), which enables enterprises, especially larger ones, to channel their funds between Mainland China and Hong Kong.	这一过程始于2009年4月，当时中国开始试点人民币贸易结算机制（RTSS），企事业单位（尤其是大型企事业单位）可以在大陆和香港之间转移资金。


As a result, an offshore RMB market, known as the CNH market, was created in Hong Kong alongside the onshore market, now dubbed the CNY market.	结果，离岸人民币市场，即CNH市场，在香港被建设起来，与在岸市场（现在称为CNY市场）并行。


But, in contrast to the CNY, the CNH is a free market.	但是，与CNY不同，CNH是一个自由市场。


Given expectations of RMB appreciation and a positive interest-rate spread between Mainland China and Hong Kong, the RMB had a higher value in dollar terms on the CNH than on the CNY market.	在人民币升值以及大陆-香港正利差的预期下，人民币的CNH市场美元价值要高于CNY市场。


That difference led to active exchange-rate arbitrage by mainland importers and multinational firms – one form of capital inflows from Hong Kong to the mainland.	这一差别促使大陆进口商和跨国公司开展了积极的套利活动——即资本从香港流入大陆的一种形式。


Correspondingly, RMB liabilities owed by mainland Chinese and multinationals increased, as did RMB assets held by Hong Kong residents.	相应地，大陆中国居民和跨国公司的人民币债务增加了，香港居民持有的资产亦然。


Exchange-rate arbitrage by mainland importers and multinationals creates upward pressure on the CNY and downward pressure on the CNH.	大陆进口商和跨国公司的汇率套率行为在CNY市场上造成了升值压力，而在CNH市场上造成了贬值压力。


In an economy with flexible interest and exchange rates, arbitrage eliminates the exchange-rate spread quickly.	在一个具有弹性利率和汇率的经济体中，套利会迅速消除利率差别。


But, because China’s exchange rate and interest rates are inflexible, the CNH-CNY spread persists, and arbitragers are able to reap fat profits at the economy’s expense.	但是，由于中国的汇率和利率缺乏弹性，因此CNH-CNY利差持续存在，套利者得以赚取丰厚利润，而代价则由经济承担。


Last September, however, financial conditions changed suddenly in Hong Kong.	但是，去年9月，香港财金融况急转直下。


The liquidity shortage caused by the European sovereign debt-crisis led developed countries’ banks – especially European banks with exposure in Hong Kong – to withdraw their funds, taking dollars with them.	因欧洲主权债务危机导致的流动性短缺使得发达国家银行——特别是对香港存在风险敞口的欧洲银行——以美元的形式抽回了资金。


As a result, the CNH fell against the dollar.	结果，CNH开始对美元贬值。


At the same time, the shortage of dollars had not yet affected the CNY, which remained relatively stable.	与此同时，美元短缺尚未影响到CNY，CNY市场继续保持相对稳定。


The CNH therefore became cheaper than the CNY.	于是，CNH变得比CNY更便宜了。


Consequently, mainland importers and multinationals stopped buying dollars from the CNH market and returned to the CNY market. At the same time, mainland exporters stopped selling dollars in the CNY market and turned to the CNH market.	其结果是，大陆进口商和跨国公司不再通过CNH市场买入美元再通过CNY市场换回人民币。 与此同时，大陆出口商也不再在CNY卖出美元然后通过CNH市场换回美元。


The dollar shortage created depreciation pressures on the CNY, which the PBoC declined to offset.	美元短缺造成了CNY市场的贬值压力，而人民银行拒绝对此有所反应。


The CNY was thus bound to fall, which it did last September.	于是，CNY不可避免地要出现贬值，这就是去年9月的情形。


Reverse arbitrage meant capital outflows from the Chinese mainland.	反向套利意味着资本从中国大陆流出。


Correspondingly, RMB liabilities owed by mainlanders and multinationals decreased, as did RMB assets held in Hong Kong.	相应地，大陆居民和跨国公司持有的人民币债务下降了，香港居民持有的人民币资产亦然。


In fact, increases in financing costs and uncertainty about RMB appreciation prompted a partial sell-off of RMB assets by Hong Kong residents.	事实上，融资成本的上升以及人民币升值的不确定性触发了香港居民单方面甩卖人民币资产。


In short, because the RTSS made cross-border capital movements much easier, short-term flows have become a major factor in determining the RMB’s exchange rate.	简言之，因为RTSS的出现，跨国资本流动变得更加容易，短期流动成为决定人民币汇率的主要因素。


External shocks affect the offshore exchange rate first, and then feed through to the onshore exchange rate.	外部冲击首先影响离岸市场，然后影响在岸汇率。


The RMB will continue to appreciate in the near future, owing to strong economic fundamentals, but the inherent instability of short-term capital flows will make its exchange rate more volatile.	在短期未来，人民币还将继续升值，这是强劲的经济基本面决定的，但短期资本流的内在不稳定性将会导致人民币汇率更加波动。


This change is bound to pose new challenges for decision makers in the United States and China, particularly as they engage in a fresh round of debate about China’s exchange-rate policy.	这一变化将不可避免地给美国和中国的决策者带来新的挑战，特别是在他们准备开展新一轮中国汇率政策辩论的当口。


Reaffirming Europe	重塑欧洲信心


ROME/STOCKHOLM – The ongoing global economic crisis is shaking beliefs and approaches that have long been enshrined in European policies.	罗马/斯德哥尔摩—横扫全球的经济危机正动摇着欧洲政策中那些长久以来被奉若神明的信念和措施。


Indeed, the crisis is calling into question the very foundations of the European Union.	的确，这场危机正让人考问欧盟的立盟之本。


There is thus an urgent need to reassert the core character and identity of Europe.	因此，重新确立欧洲的核心特质和认同就成为当务之急。


The very nature of our European model – a model that is open internally, externally, and globally – must be reaffirmed.	欧洲模式的根本特点—一种对内、对外和对全球都开放的模式—必须重新确认。


Internally, Europe should remain both an open society and an open economy.	对内而言，欧洲必须坚持作为一个开放的社会和开放的经济体。


We should fight against the protectionist temptations that would unravel the very foundation of the European project, a project based on the “four freedoms”: free movement of goods, people, services, and capital.	我们应该抵制那些会动摇欧洲大业的保护主义诱惑。 欧洲大业是基于“四项自由”：商品、人员、服务和资本的自由流动。


But the European economic recovery plan that was recently reaffirmed by the European Council of Ministers is mainly focused on national measures to support domestic demand.	但最近得到欧盟部长理事会重新确认的欧洲经济复苏计划也主要以支持内需的国家手段为核心。


In implementing this plan, governments must refrain from the temptation to turn national measures into narrow protectionist schemes.	在实施这一计划的过程中，各国政府必须抵制诱惑，以免将国家计划转变为狭隘的保护主义措施。


Such a development would threaten growing unemployment in Europe and elsewhere, and make fighting the crisis much more difficult.	这样的情况（如果出现）将会威胁到欧洲和其它地方不断攀升的失业率问题，并使应对经济危机变得更加困难。


So a return of economic, social, or political nationalism is simply not an option.	所以我们决不能回到经济、社会或政治民族主义的老路上去。


Indeed, intra-EU trade today accounts for nearly two-thirds of EU member states’ total trade.	的确，欧盟内部贸易占欧盟成员国贸易总量的三分之二。


And the EU itself is the leader in world trade, accounting for 18%, followed by the US and China.	而欧盟本身则是世界贸易的领导者，占世界贸易总量的18%，紧随其后的是美国和中国。


Even the free circulation of workers and people in Europe is a well-established and positive reality: 2% of EU citizens – more than 10 million people – reside in a Union member country other than their native one.	甚至工人和人员在欧洲内部的自由流动也是一个习以为常的积极现实因素：2%的欧盟公民—超过一千万—定居在祖国以外的另一个欧盟国家。


Moreover, in 2006, 57% of European citizens declared themselves ready to move abroad for professional reasons.	此外，在2006年，57%的欧洲公民宣称他们准备好了为职业原因而移居国外。


Among these, young Europeans are the most motivated (a half-million EU young people are already studying in another country).	这其中，年轻的欧洲人最为活跃（五十万欧盟年轻人已经在另一个国家接受教育）。


The crisis must also not become an excuse to create new institutional formats that jeopardize the delicate balance between the different EU institutions, a balance that – through appropriate adjustments – has been proven by the test of time.	这场危机决不能成为借口，让人可以创造新的制度形式来破坏欧盟不同制度间的微妙平衡。 这种平衡—通过适当的调整—已经经受住了时间的考验。


Of course, the crisis does highlight the need to strengthen the EU’s institutions and instruments for common action and coordination.	当然，这场危机的确凸显出强化欧盟共同行动和协调的制度和措施的必要性。


We need final and complete ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in order to have the institutionally and internationally stronger European Union we need.	我们需要最终并完全地批准《里斯本条约》，以打造一个我们所需要的在制度上和国际上都更强大的欧洲。


Nor should today’s uncertainties become an excuse to call into question the need to continue and complete the process of EU enlargement.	当今的不确定因素也不能成为我们质疑继续并完成欧盟扩大进程的必要性的借口。


Extending the EU’s area of freedom and democracy, peace, stability, and prosperity, especially throughout south-eastern Europe, is in the interest of every European citizen.	扩展欧盟自由民主、和平、稳定和繁荣的疆域，特别是在欧洲东南部，符合每一个欧洲公民的利益。


Indeed, we need to send a strong signal to our neighbors in the Western Balkans that their European perspective is still alive, as reaffirmed by the European Heads of State in 2008.	的确，我们需要向西巴尔干的邻国发出一个强烈的信号，即它们加入欧盟的前景依然乐观，正如欧洲各国首脑在2008年所重申的那样。


And we remain convinced of the strategic and economic benefits of bringing Turkey into the Union.	我们仍然坚信将土耳其纳入欧盟所带来的战略和经济利益。


Of course, the process of accession depends on the readiness of the adhering countries, but it should not be halted or slowed down.	当然，入盟的进程还要看相关国家的准备程度，但它不应该被中止或放缓。


Globally, Europe needs to promote an open, inclusive, and effective system of international governance.	在全球，欧洲需要推动一种开放、包容和高效的国际治理体系。


Through its wide-ranging experience of convergence of national interests and values, the EU has emerged as a model of multilateralism and as the most powerful normative actor in all areas of governance.	通过其在融合国家利益与价值观方面的广泛经验，欧盟已经成为一个多边主义的楷模和在所有治理领域最为强大的典范行动者。


The EU is ready to play a major role in building a new system of global governance.	欧盟已经准备好在建立一个新的全球治理体系方面发挥主要作用。


This requires further development and deepening of strategic relations with emerging powers, such as China, India, and Brazil, as well as with regional organizations.	这需要进一步发展和深化与新兴强国，如中国、印度和巴西及其他地区性组织之间的战略关系。


This is precisely what Italy has been promoting during its current presidency of the G-8.	这恰恰是意大利作为G8的现任主席国所一直推动的事情。


We need to integrate today’s emerging powers into a new system of global governance.	我们需要将当今的新兴强国融入一个新的全球治理体系之中。


The latter, however, should be ready to share the burden with us.	而后者也应该准备好和我们共担重任。


This is also the moment to inject new energy into the Doha round of global trade talks.	这也是向多哈回合全球贸易谈判注入新活力的时机。


A successful conclusion of the round would be the strongest possible action to counter protectionist tendencies and resume growth in world trade.	该回合的成功结束将会是应对保守主义倾向和重启世界贸易增长的最强有力行动。


Finally, in times of economic crisis we should be guided more than ever by our common democratic values – the inner dimension of our European identity and a crucial unifying factor for our societies.	最后，在经济危机的艰难时世中，我们更应该前所未有地汇集在我们共同的民主价值观的引领之下—这是我们欧洲认同的内在因素和我们社会至关重要的一体化动因。


They are also a powerful tool for European leadership in global affairs.	它们还是欧洲领导力在全球事务中的强有力工具。


Europe has a special role to play in securing a better world where human rights and individual freedoms are widely and fully respected.	欧洲在建立一个更美好的世界的进程中发挥着特殊的作用。 在这样一个世界里，人权和个人自由得到广泛和完全的尊重。


We must not shy away from our responsibilities.	我们必须有所担当。


Realism about Russia	对俄罗斯的现实主义


BERLIN – Russia’s strategy to revise the post-Soviet order in what it calls its “near abroad” will be pursued with even more perseverance following its victory over Georgia.	柏林 – 俄罗斯要在自称的“近邻”地区改变后苏联时代的格局。 在格鲁吉亚取得胜利后，俄罗斯将以更大的决心贯彻这一策略。


Europe should have no illusions about this and should begin to prepare itself.	欧洲不应抱以任何幻想，并应该开始做好准备。


But, as the European Union ponders what to do, cold realism, not hysterical overreaction, is in order.	但是，当欧盟在考虑如何应对时，出现了冷峻的现实主义，而并非歇斯底里的过度反应。


Unfortunately, equating the current situation in the Caucasus with the Soviet Union’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 does not attest to this kind of realism.	不幸的是，把目前高加索地区的形势等同于1968年苏联对捷克斯洛伐克的入侵，并不能解释这种现实主义。


Neither the West nor NATO constitutes the decisive strategic threat facing Russia, which comes from the Islamic South and from the Far East, in particular the emerging superpower, China.	西方和北约现在都构不成对俄罗斯重大的战略威胁，而威胁是来自南部的伊斯兰和远东地区，尤其是崛起的超级大国中国。


Moreover, Russia’s strength is in no way comparable to that of the former Soviet Union.	还有，如今的俄罗斯的国力根本不能和前苏联相比。


Indeed, demographically, Russia is undergoing a dramatic decline.	事实是，从人口统计学的角度看，俄罗斯正在大步衰退。


Apart from commodity exports, it has little to offer to the global economy.	除了物资的出口，它对全球经济的贡献很小。


Notwithstanding booming oil and gas revenues, its infrastructure remains underdeveloped, and successful economic modernization is a long way off.	尽管出售石油和天然气带来的财政收入在快速增长，俄罗斯的基础设施仍然落后，而且要成功实现经济现代化仍然路途遥遥。


Likewise, its political and legal system is authoritarian, and its numerous minority problems remain unsolved.	同样，俄罗斯的政治和法律体制是集权的，其众多的少数民族问题仍未解决。


As a result, Russia’s current challenging of the territorial integrity of Georgia might prove to be a grave error in the not-so-distant future.	所以，俄罗斯目前对格鲁吉亚领土完整的挑衅，在不久的将来可能会被证明是一个严重的错误。


Given this structural weakness, the idea of a new Cold War is misleading.	考虑到俄罗斯这种结构上的弱势，那种认为新的冷战已开始的观点是误导人的。


The Cold War was an endurance race between two similarly strong rivals, the weaker of which eventually had to give up.	冷战是一场两个实力相当的强大对手之间的耐力较量，而最后，较弱的一方不得不放弃。


Russia does not have the capacity to wage another struggle of that type.	俄罗斯没有实力再展开这样的较量。


Nevertheless, as a restored great power, the new Russia will for the time being attempt to ride in the slipstream of other great powers for as long as doing so coincides with its possibilities and interests; it will concentrate on its own sphere of influence and on its role as a global energy power; and it will otherwise make use of its opportunities on a global scale to limit America’s power.	但是，作为重新崛起的大国，新俄罗斯目前将在其它大国之间周旋，只要这样做也吻合其国家的机遇和利益。 它将集中精力打造自己的影响圈和作为一个国际能源大国所扮演的角色。


But it will not be able to seriously challenge the United States – or looking towards the future, China – in ways that the Soviet Union once did.	它还将在其它方面在全球范围利用机会来牵制美国的力量。 但它没有能力如同前苏联那样，对美国，或我们把眼光放远一些，对中国，造成严重的挑战。


It is now clear that in the future, Russia will once again pursue its vital interests with military force – particularly in its “near abroad.”	现在很明确，俄罗斯将会重新借助其军事力量来谋求重大利益，尤其是在它的“近邻”地区。


But Europe must never accept a renewal of Russian great power politics, which operates according to the idea that might makes right.	但欧洲应该永远不接受俄罗斯大国政治的复活。 这种政治的运行，奉行的是“强的就是对的”的理念。


Indeed, it is here that Russia’s renewed confrontation with the West begins, because the new Europe is based on the principle of the inviolability of boundaries, peaceful conflict resolution, and the rule of law, so to forgo this principle for the benefit of imperial zones of influence would amount to self-abandonment.	事实上，就是在这一点上，俄罗斯开始了新一轮和西方的对峙，因为新欧洲是建立在国境线神圣不可侵犯、以和平方式解决冲突以及法制的理念上的； 所以，如果为了帝国的影响圈而放弃这个理念，那就等于自暴自弃。


Further eastward expansion of NATO, however, will be possible only against fierce Russian resistance. Nor will this kind of policy in any way create more security, because it entails making promises that won’t be kept in an emergency – as we now see in Georgia.	然而，北约继续的东扩的政策只能在俄罗斯强烈的的反对声中展开，而这样做也不会让现实更加安全，因为它会让人许下诺言，而在紧急情况发生时却不遵守诺言，正如目前我们在格鲁吉亚所看到的那样。


For too long, the West has ignored Russia’s recovery of strength and was not prepared to accept the consequences.	西方在过去太长的一段时间里，忽视了俄罗斯国力的恢复，也没有做好准备应付其后果。


But not only Russia has changed; so has the entire world.	但是，不仅是俄国变了，全世界也都变了。


America’s neo-conservatives have wasted a large part of their country’s power and moral authority in an unnecessary war in Iraq, willfully weakening the only global Western power.	美国的新保守主义者们已经把他们国家相当大的力量和道德权威浪费在和伊拉克那场无谓的战争上，心甘情愿地削弱了西方唯一的全球大国的力量。


China, India, Brazil, Russia, and the Persian Gulf today are the world economy’s new growth centers and will soon be centers of power to be reckoned with.	今天的中国、印度、巴西、俄罗斯和波斯湾地区，是世界经济增长的新兴中心，不久还会成为倍受重视的力量中心。


In view of these realities, the threat of exclusion from the G8 doesn’t really feel earth shattering to Russia.	基于这样的现实，如要威胁俄国开除其G8成员国资格，俄国是不会感到如天崩地裂般的威胁的。


Europe’s disunity and impotence underline this image of a West that has partially lost touch with geo-political realities.	欧洲的不团结和无能，巩固了西方这样的形象：西方已经在某种程度上和地域政治现实脱节了。


The response to the return of Russia’s imperial great power politics has nothing to do with punishing Russia, and a lot to do with establishing innately Western – especially European – positions of power.	对俄罗斯重拾帝国主义大国政治做出的反应，与处罚俄罗斯无关，但和建立西方的，尤其是欧洲的固有的力量地位有很大关系。


This requires several measures:	这需要采取几个行动：


·        a new political dynamism vis-à-vis Turkey to link this country, one crucial for European security, permanently to Europe;	·        以新的政治热忱让土耳其这个对欧洲安全至关重要的国家永远和欧洲联系在一起；


·        putting a stop to Moscow’s divide-and-conquer politics by adopting a common EU energy  policy;	·        欧盟采取共同能源政策以抑制莫斯科的“先分裂后征服”的策略；


·        a serious initiative for strengthening Europe’s defense capabilities;	·        认真地采取行动以加强欧洲的防御能力；


·        a greater EU commitment to Ukraine to safeguard its independence;	·        欧盟要作出更大的承诺以保护乌克兰的独立；


·        a greater freedom of travel for all the EU’s Eastern neighbors.	·        给所有欧盟的东部邻国的人民以更大的旅行自由。


All of this, and much more, is needed to send a clear signal to Russia that Europe is unwilling to stand idly by as it returns to great power politics.	我们需要采取所有上述的甚至更多的行动，来向俄罗斯发出信号，那就是欧洲不愿在俄罗斯重拾大国政治时袖手旁观。


Presumably, none of this will happen, and it is precisely such inaction that is, in large part, the cause of Russia’s strength and Europe’s weakness.	很可能上述任何一项都不会发生。 很大程度上，就是因为如此的不作为，才促成了俄罗斯的强大和欧洲的弱势。


At the same time, however, one shouldn’t lose sight of the joint interests linking Russia and the West.	但是，我们同时也不能对联系俄罗斯和西方的共同利益视而不见。


Cooperative relations should be maintained as far as possible.	我们应该尽可能地维持合作的关系。


It is blatantly obvious that for Russia’s elites, weakness and cooperation are mutually exclusive.	很明显，对俄罗斯的精英人物来说，软弱和合作是互不相容的。


Therefore, whoever wants cooperation with Russia – which is in Europe’s interest – must be strong.	因此，谁想要和俄罗斯合作（这是符合欧洲利益的），谁就必须强大。


That is the lesson from the violence in the Caucasus that Europe must urgently take to heart.	这是从目前高加索武力冲突中欧洲人必须切记在心的教训。


Realism in Iraq	伊拉克的现实主义


The Washington mountain has labored and brought forth less than a mouse.	华盛顿尽管努力，但却徒劳。


General David Petreaus and President George W. Bush have spoken, but United States policy in Iraq remains as it was.	虽然David Petreaus将军和布什总统都对此滔滔不绝，但美国在伊拉克的政策却依然如故。


This policy has led the US into a trap, so that now the largest and most important power in the world is facing only bad options.	这种政策将美国带入了一个陷阱，以至于这个世界上最强大、最重要的国家现在只能面对糟糕的选择。


If the US followed its national interests, it would withdraw from Iraq as soon as possible, because the war can no longer be won.	如果美国遵从国家利益，那么它就会尽快从伊拉克撤军，因为这是一场打不赢的战争。


It is weakening the West’s leading power and strengthening the West’s enemies.	它正削弱着西方的领导力、强化着西方的敌人。


But the US cannot withdraw without sending the entire region into chaos.	但美国一旦撤军又将使整个地区陷入混乱。


The US wanted to establish a democratic Iraq.	美国想建立一个民主的伊拉克。


Instead, after a US withdrawal, the country might fall apart, possibly leading to “balkanization” of the Middle East, with extremely dangerous consequences for the whole region.	然而，在其撤军之后，该国可能会四分五裂，致使中东地区“巴尔干化”，给整个地区带来危险的后果。


With the war in Iraq, the US also wanted to initiate a democratic transformation of the entire Middle East.	通过在伊拉克的战争，美国试图开启一场整个中东的民主变革，而实际的结果却是帮助伊朗提升了其区域地位。


Instead, it has helped Iran to gain a regional ascendancy that the country could never have achieved on its own.	这一结果仅靠其自身是无法实现的。


Instead of a democratic transformation, were the US to withdraw now, the Middle East would face a war of all against all for regional hegemony.	如果美国现在从伊拉克撤军，中东将面临各国争夺地区性霸权的全面战争，而不是民主转型。


There is no indication that Bush will begin to grasp this bitter reality during the remaining months of his term.	没有迹象表明布什会在其任期的最后几个月里开始明白这一苦涩的现实。


If he were to admit defeat, his presidency would be destroyed.	如果他承认失败，其总统生涯将会遭受毁灭性的打击。


He will thus pass the war on to his successor.	因此，他将会把这场战争移交给继任者。


This might be advantageous for Bush’s domestic purposes, but as a foreign policy, it will only escalate the risk of a Middle East explosion.	这对布什的国内策略而言可能是有利的，但作为一项外交政策，它只会增加中东局势爆炸的危险。


The current US turn toward collaboration with Sunni militias holds within it the risk of a final break-up of Iraq into three parts.	美国现在转向与逊尼派武装合作，这其中暗含了将伊拉克最终一分为三的风险。


The key question is whether the consequences of Iraq’s disintegration could be contained within its national borders, or whether large parts of the region would be affected.	关键问题在于伊拉克分裂的后果是会被限制在其边界以内还是会波及中东的大部分地区。


A disintegrating Iraq would draw all its neighbors and other powers in the region into an undeclared war of succession.	一个正在分崩离析的伊拉克会把所有的邻国和中东的其它国家都卷入争夺区域霸权的不宣之战中。


Moreover, in the Middle East, there is no safety net like the European Union, which has helped lure the Balkans out of the abyss.	另外，在中东也没有欧盟那样的安全网可以诱导巴尔干人走出泥淖。


The only way out of this dilemma is to set a reachable and realistic goal.	摆脱这一困局的唯一办法是设定一个可以达成的现实目标。


Instead of victory, the goal must be a minimum of stability – and this still seems achievable.	这个目标必须是最小的稳定性，而不是胜利。 这似乎还是可以实现的。


Indeed, US military withdrawal from Iraq can be accomplished without causing a major regional catastrophe only if America manages to establish such a minimum of regional stability.	的确，除非美国能够设定一个地区稳定性的最低目标，否则它从伊拉克撤军很难不引发整个地区的灾难性后果。


What this requires is a sustainable consensus that includes all the parties involved.	这就需要建立一种包括各利益相关方在内的可持续共识。


Iraq’s future, if it still has any, will depend first and foremost on Iraqi Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds, and, secondly, on Iraq’s neighbors and their interests and risk calculations.	伊拉克的未来（如果它还有的话）将会首先有赖于伊拉克的什叶派、逊尼派和库尔德人； 其次，还要依靠其邻国、它们的利益和风险计算。


But even if Iraq does fall apart after US withdrawal, it will be of vital importance to contain the consequences of its disintegration within Iraq’s own borders.	但即便伊拉克在美国撤军后真的四分五裂，将其分裂的后果限制在伊拉克国内也是至关重要的。


This will require a regional consensus that only the US can bring about.	这将需要建立一种只有在美国力促之下才能达成的区域共识。


It is hard to understand why the US does so little to advance the goal of regional stabilization, especially since it still retains considerable leverage in this respect.	难以理解的是美国为何在实现地区稳定方面几乎无所作为，特别是在它还游刃有余的情况下。


As no regional power is strong enough to win a war of succession outright, all of these powers could only lose if a conflict ensues.	由于没有一个国家能有足够的实力在这场霸权争夺战中获胜，因此一旦冲突发生，所有参与方都将是输家。


Indeed, all will be threatened by internal destabilization as a consequence of such a confrontation.	确实，这种冲突造成的内部动荡的后果对所有国家都是一种威胁。


Certainly, talks and conferences make little sense without a coherent policy.	诚然，没有连贯性的政策，所有的和谈与会议都毫无意义。


But with appropriate preparation, a regional solution is possible, and, of all the parties involved, Syria is uniquely positioned to help bring it about.	但如果准备充分，是可以出台一个区域性的解决方案的。 并且在各方都参与的情况下，叙利亚在这方面具有独特的优势。


Syria is the only Arab country allied with Iran, and, as Iraq’s direct neighbor, it is crucial for Iraq’s stabilization.	叙利亚是唯一与伊朗结盟的阿拉伯国家，作为伊拉克的邻国，它对伊拉克的稳定举足轻重。


Moreover, Lebanon’s security and independence hinges on Syria, and Syria is one of the main actors in the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors.	另外，黎巴嫩的安全和独立也与叙利亚息息相关，叙利亚也在以色列和其阿拉伯邻国之间的冲突中扮演着重要角色。


Finally, economically and politically, Syria is in a weak position, and its interests are by no means congruent with those of Iran.	最后，叙利亚在政治和经济上处于劣势，其利益和伊朗肯定不一致。


It’s incomprehensible, then, why the US, having succeeded in striking a deal with Libya, vehemently rejects any initiative toward Syria.	既然如此，美国在成功地与利比亚达成协议之后却粗暴地拒绝与叙利亚修好的做法就令人费解了。


If Syria changed sides, the situation in the region would be fundamentally transformed.	如果叙利亚改变立场，该地区的局势就会发生更本性的转变。


This would be true for Lebanon, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iraq and, above all, Iran.	这对于黎巴嫩、巴—以冲突、伊拉克和（最重要的）伊朗都是如此。


For Iran, this development would be tantamount to a strategic worst-case scenario, bringing about its definitive isolation.	对于伊朗而言，这种情况将等同于一种最糟糕的战略局面，导致其被完全孤立。


Should it become a realistic prospect, a decisive approach to Iran would make sense.	如果这种情况既成事实，那么针对伊朗的果断策略就应该是有效的。


The ensuing “grand bargain” should concern the stabilization of Iraq, Iran’s nuclear program, and its role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.	随后的“大讨价”将包括伊拉克的稳定、伊朗的核计划和它在巴—以冲突中所扮演的角色。


If successful, the bargain should also aim at a total normalization of relations between Iran and the US.	如果成功，那么这种议价还应该以美国和伊朗关系的完全正常化为目标。


To be sure, even a decisive regional strategy by the US and its Western partners will not stop terrorism and violence in Iraq or, indeed, in the Middle East overnight.	确切地说，即便是美国及其西方伙伴实施一项决定性的地区战略，也不会使伊拉克和整个中东的恐怖和暴力在一夜之间停止。


But it would be a decisive first step toward changing the regional balance of power that would enable the stabilization of Iraq and the region as a whole.	但它会是改变该地区实力平衡的决定性的第一步。 这种改变将会使伊拉克以至整个（中东）地区的稳定成为可能。


Only this can make a withdrawal of US troops from Iraq realistic in the foreseeable future.	只有这样，美国从伊拉克的撤军计划才会在可预见的未来成为现实。


Realism\u0027s Gift to Palestinian Radicals	巴勒斯坦激进分子的现实主义礼物


In support of Ariel Sharon's plan to evacuate unilaterally all Gaza settlements and a few in the West Bank, the Bush administration backed Israel's stance on borders and refugees, two of the most important issues of Palestinian-Israeli final status negotiations.	为支持沙龙从加沙和部分西岸定居点的单方面撤军计划，布什政府全力支持以色列在边界和难民问题上的立场，这是巴以最后阶段谈判中最重要的两个问题。


This position is in clear violation of the text of the "roadmap" to achieve a Palestinian/Israeli peace, which the Bush administration claims it continues to believe in.	这一立场显然违反了布什政府信誓旦旦遵守的巴/以和平"路线图"计划。


That claim does not withstand scrutiny.	这样的说法经不起推敲。


President Bush assured the Israelis that, given the "new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers," Israel does not have to return all the territories it occupied in 1967.	布什总统向以色列保证，"在包括已经存在以色列人口中心这样的环境下，"以色列不必归还1967年侵占的所有领土。


Moreover, in Bush's view, Israel need not worry about allowing Palestinian refugees to return to their homes inside Israel.	不仅如此，在布什看来，以色列不必为允许巴方难民重返以色列境内家园的问题发愁。


Instead, the vast majority of refugees are expected to settle in a Palestinian state.	相反，绝大多数难民都将在巴勒斯坦国内得到安置。


Given Palestinian public opinion, the most likely outcome of Sharon's disengagement plan is the empowerment of Hamas and other Palestinian militants.	在巴勒斯坦现有的舆论环境下，沙龙的分离计划很可能增强哈马斯和巴方其它好战分子的力量。


By presenting the settlements' evacuation as a unilateral step, Sharon allows Palestinian militants to present it as Israel bowing to the "reality" of defeat inflicted by their armed struggle.	通过提出从定居点单方面撤军的计划，沙龙赋予巴勒斯坦好战分子以口实，宣称以色列是由于在武装斗争中失败而被迫屈服。


Indeed, a survey that I conducted in April 2004 found that two-thirds of Palestinians saw the Israeli plan in just this light.	实际上，我2004年4月的一次调查显示，三分之二的巴勒斯坦人认为这就是以军计划的实质。


The same survey showed Hamas with more public support than the nationalist Fatah in the Gaza Strip.	同样的调查显示，较之加沙地带的法塔赫民族运动，哈马斯得到了更多的公众支持。


Israel's disengagement plan presents the evacuation of Gaza settlements as an end to 37 years of occupation.	以色列分离计划将从加沙定居点撤退作为37年占领的终结。


But at the same time, Israel insists that Gaza will not have any attributes of sovereignty and will continue to be governed by existing arrangements covering most aspects of security and civil administration.	与此同时，以色列坚持认为：加沙不应享有主权，而应继续接受涉及多数安全和民众管理的现行政策的统治。


This means that the Israeli military will continue to enter Gaza at will and maintain control over border crossings, airspace, and territorial waters. Nor will the Israeli military be withdrawn from the strip of land along the Palestinian-Egyptian border.	这意味着以色列军队仍可以随意出入加沙地带，保持对边境口岸、机场和地区流域的控制，不仅如此，以色列军队也不会从巴勒斯坦和埃及边境地带撤出。


These conditions rule out any possibility of forging a security plan that would receive the support of all factions, including Hamas.	这种条件使打造得到哈马斯在内所有势力支持的安全计划成为泡影。


Under such conditions, the option of Hamas agreeing to a cease-fire and some form of power sharing with the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority would no longer be viable.	上述条件下，哈马斯同意停火和以一定方式与法塔赫领导的巴勒斯坦政权分享权利的可能已经不复存在。


Sharon's disengagement plan may ultimately render the Gaza Strip little more than a suffocating ghetto isolated from Israel and the rest of the world.	沙龙分离计划的最终结果很可能使加沙地带沦为世界各国和以色列之外的一处令人窒息的犹太定居点。


While the new American positions do not represent a revolutionary change in US policy, they do represent a clear procedural and indeed substantive departure from previous American positions, particularly those of the Clinton administration.	尽管美国的最新立场并不代表美国政策发生了革命性变化，但确实与美国以前的立场，特别是克林顿政府立场有了程序和内容上的本质不同。


The so-called "Clinton Parameters," which were presented just before the end of Clinton's second term, sought to preclude Israeli annexation of parts of the occupied territories by conditioning any border changes on "territorial swaps and other arrangements."	克林顿连任结束前刚刚提出的所谓"克林顿限制因素"试图阻止以色列吞并被占领土，为一切"领土交换和其它领土变化"规定了前提。


Similarly, while clearly advocating the absorption of refugees in the Palestinian state, the Parameters did not exclude Israel from the list of countries in which refugees could choose to live.	与此相似，尽管明确倡导难民在巴勒斯坦国内的吸收，限制因素并未将以色列从难民可以居住的国家中排除出去。


Indeed, the Palestinians themselves have always agreed to absorb refugees in their future state, but this was conditional on granting refugees the right to choose.	实际上，巴勒斯坦人自己一直同意在未来国家中接纳难民，但前提是赋予难民自由选择的权利。


In almost all previous final status negotiations, Israel has agreed to accept a certain number of refugees as part of its contribution to help close this historical file.	已经举行的几乎所有最后阶段会谈中，以色列都同意接受部分难民，为结束这场历史冲突尽自己的绵薄之力。


With his letter, President Bush managed to punish the Palestinians twice: by making significant concessions on their behalf and by excluding them from negotiations.	这封信中，布什总统两次惩罚了巴勒斯坦：盗取他们的名义做出重要让步，并把他们从谈判中清除出去。


On the other hand, Israel was rewarded twice: by receiving US assurances of significant Palestinian concessions, and by being relieved from paying a price in return for these concessions.	另一方面，以色列两此受到奖赏：得到巴勒斯坦会作出重要让步的美国承诺，还无须为此付出任何代价。


Aside from forcing Palestinian concessions on borders and refugees, the US also relieved Israel of the need to negotiate with the Palestinians until they change their leadership.	美国不仅迫使巴勒斯坦在边界和难民问题上作出让步，还让以色列领导人更替之前无须与巴勒斯坦进行谈判。


Most discouragingly, the American assurances will likely discredit Palestinian moderates and the positions they have advocated regarding the need for mutual concessions with Israel.	最令人失望的是，美国的保证很可能使巴勒斯坦中间派丧失信用，危及他们所宣传的双方共同让步的立场。


From now on, the Bush statement will strongly affect the framing of the solution to the issues of territory and refugees.	从此刻起，布什的讲话将对领土和难民问题的解决产生重大的影响。


Under normal conditions of give and take, the idea of mutual concessions finds acceptance among the majority of Palestinians.	在互谅互让的正常条件下，绝大多数巴勒斯坦人认可共同让步。


Now, however, the one-sidedness of the US approach is likely to discredit possible compromises in the eyes of the public.	但现在，美国做法的片面性很可能使可能的妥协在公众眼里丧失信用。


Radicals will remind Palestinians that these two concessions represent a US-Israeli imposition and an attempt to force the Palestinians to bow to the realities of occupation and dispossession.	激进分子会提醒巴勒斯坦国民：这两项让步代表美国和以色列的胁迫，试图迫使巴勒斯坦人在占领和剥夺的事实面前低头。


So concessions that were deemed legitimate and acceptable may now become illegitimate and unacceptable.	于是，过去可以接受的合理让步也可能变得无法容忍。


Moderate leaders who advocate these concessions in the context of give-and-take negotiations may become weaker and hardliners stronger.	互利谈判中宣传妥协的中间派领袖力量遭到削弱，强硬派却越来越强大。


For the Palestinians, the bottom line in the Sharon plan and the Bush letter is that diplomacy and negotiations no longer have a role: Israeli unilateralism, combined with American prejudgment, makes that clear.	对巴勒斯坦人来说，沙龙计划和布什信件的底线是剥夺外交努力和谈判的一席之地。 以色列的单边政策和美国的主观臆断使这一点变得分外清晰。


The message is that any peace agreement can only come at the expense of Palestinian rights.	美国传递的信息是：任何和平协议只能牺牲巴勒斯坦权利来换取。


Facts on the ground will be understood as the ultimate arbiters, no matter how illegal and unjust they may be.	无论多不公平、多不合理，现有事实都将成为最终裁决。


For Israel and its US supporters, this strategy has the seeming appeal of hardheaded realism.	对以色列及其美国支持者来说，这种策略不失为冷静理智的现实主义。


But attempting to formalize a fait accompli will most likely lead nowhere in the direction of lasting peace, for under such conditions, Palestinians would have no reason to abandon violence.	但既成事实的合法化很可能换不来持久的和平，因为这种条件下，巴勒斯坦人没有理由放弃暴力。


The Real Roots of Populism	民粹主义的真正根源


MONTEVIDEO – Out-of-control globalization has destroyed jobs, caused middle-class incomes to stagnate, and deepened income inequality.	蒙得维的亚——失控的全球化已经摧毁了就业、导致中产阶级收入停滞不前和收入不平等进一步深化。


In response, angry voters are turning to populist politicians.	愤怒的选民因此正转而求助民粹主义政客。


Without a radical shift away from liberal economic policies, populism will be unstoppable.	如果不从根本上抛弃自由经济政策，民粹主义潮流将是不可阻挡的。


This narrative is simple and increasingly popular.	这种简单的说法越来越受人们欢迎。


It is also dead wrong.	但其实这样的理解完全错误。


Precisely because populism – whether leftist (Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Podemos in Spain) or rightist (Donald Trump in the United States, the National Front in France) – is ugly, menacing, and destructive, its growing strength calls for nuanced explanation.	恰恰因为民粹主义——无论是（以委内瑞拉的查韦斯和西班牙的“我们可以”党为代表的）左翼势力还是（以美国的唐纳德·特朗普和法国国民阵线为代表的）右翼势力——丑陋不堪、来势汹汹和破坏力极强，民粹主义势力日益壮大需要人们作出细致入微的解释。


A weak grasp of causes will lead to ill-conceived solutions – at which point populism truly may become unstoppable.	对原因把握不准会导致拙劣的解决方案出台——到那时民粹主义真有可能成为不可阻挡的潮流。


One problem with the emerging conventional wisdom is that it mixes three sets of factors that should be kept separate for analytical and policy purposes.	新兴传统智慧的问题在于将因为分析和政策目的而应当区别对待的三项因素相互混淆。


Product-market deregulation and falling trade barriers belong to what academics call microeconomics.	产品市场放松管制和破除贸易壁垒属于学者们口中的微观经济学范畴。


Destabilizing international capital flows and self-defeating fiscal austerity (Exhibit A: the eurozone) are part of macroeconomics.	破坏稳定的国际资本流动和自我挫败的财政紧缩政策（附录A：欧元区）则属于宏观经济学范畴。


Lower transport costs and new labor-saving technologies fall under the rubric of exogenous structural change.	降低运输成本和新的节约劳动力技术属于外生性结构变化。


Lumping all three together as globalization only causes confusion.	将三者混为一谈的全球化唯一能造成的局面是杂乱无章。


This confusion was evident two months ago, when the International Monetary Fund published a piece that was greeted as the final nail in the coffin of “neoliberalism” (an empty label that can encompass whatever bugbear a critic wants to rail against on that particular day).	这样的杂乱无章在两个月前显而易见，当时国际货币基金组织发表了一篇被誉为“新自由主义”（几乎能容下批评家当天想要攻击的一切问题的空洞的标签）棺材上最后一颗钉子的文章。


Yet the Fund was only saying what, at this point, is pretty obvious.	但国际货币基金组织所说的内容从现阶段看已经显而易见。


Unregulated international capital movements can be destabilizing.	那就是不受管制的国际资本流动可能成为不稳定因素。


Large inflows appreciate currencies, reduce competitiveness, and destroy jobs; sudden outflows cause those appreciated currencies to crash, bankrupting local financial institutions and requiring costly bailouts at taxpayers’ expense.	巨额资本流入导致货币升值、竞争力下降并摧毁就业； 突如其来的资本流出又导致之前升值的货币崩盘，诱发地方金融机构破产并迫使纳税人承担高昂的救助成本。


Moreover, added the Fund, fiscal austerity can backfire.	此外，基金组织补充，财政紧缩有可能适得其反。


Cutting useful expenditures or raising distortionary taxes reduces the supply of goods. It also shrinks overall demand, which is fine when the economy is overheated, but devastating when the economy is depressed and a liquidity trap (Exhibit B: the eurozone again) prevents monetary policy from doing the heavy lifting.	削减有用的开支或提高扭曲性税收可以减少商品供应，此外还缩减整体需求，这在经济过热时尚可以忍受，但如果经济低迷且流动性陷阱（附录B：再次以欧元区为例）阻止货币政策完成艰巨任务，就会带来毁灭性的后果。


If growth slows enough, the ratio of public debt to GDP can end up rising, despite austerity.	如果经济增长放缓的幅度足够大，可能最终导致公共债务占GDP的比重上升，此时即便实行紧缩政策也起不到任何效果。


So macroeconomic mistakes are costly – in terms of growth, jobs, and income distribution.	因此宏观经济政策失误能让经济增长、就业和收入分配付出沉重的代价。


That’s the bad news.	这是坏消息。


The good news is that, by imposing intelligent capital controls (as Chile did in the early 1990s and other countries have done since), an economy can enjoy the benefits of free trade in goods and services with less destabilizing capital mobility.	好消息则是，通过强制实行智能资本控制政策（就像20世纪90年代的智利和从那以后很多其他国家曾经做过的那样），经济体可以在享受自由商品服务贸易所带来好处的同时降低资本流动的破坏性。


For nearly a decade, the IMF has been acknowledging that controls are a useful policy tool – a change of heart that I lauded back in 2011.	近十年来，国际货币基金组织一直认可控制政策是一种有效的政策工具——2011年我曾赞誉基金组织转变相关看法。


Likewise, misguided fiscal austerity is neither unavoidable nor inextricably linked to globalization – especially the smart kind that moderates short-term capital movements.	同样，被误导的财政紧缩政策既非不可避免，其与全球化之间的联系也并非是无法化解的——尤其是调节短期资本流动的明智政策。


Closed economies also can have fiscal crises, and open economies can avoid them if they follow the right policies.	封闭的经济体也可能爆发经济危机，而开放的经济体如果实行恰当的政策同样可以避免危机的爆发。


The key is to be Keynesian throughout the economic cycle: pursuing expansionary policies when growth is slow; tightening to reduce public debt (and thus create room for future expansion) when activity is buoyant.	关键是要在整个经济周期奉行凯恩斯主义：在经济增长缓慢时实行扩张性政策； 而在经济活动活跃期则实行紧缩降低公共负债（并借此为未来的扩张腾出空间）。


Fiscal rules can help make such behavior politically palatable.	财政法规可以提高上述行为的政治接受度。


So there is no need to throw out the baby of a liberal international economic order with the bathwater of bad macroeconomic policy.	因此将自由国际经济秩序的婴儿与错误宏观经济政策的洗澡水一同倒掉是没有必要的。


Economies open to foreign goods and technology can develop the tools to mitigate volatility and defend jobs.	面向国外产品和技术开放的经济体也可以找到减轻波动和捍卫工作岗位的政策。


Europe, laboring under a common currency, a half-hearted banking union, and an unnecessarily tight fiscal policy, has chosen to abandon those tools.	在共同货币、三心二意的银行业联盟和不必要的紧缩财政政策重压下艰难度日的欧洲已经选择放弃这些工具。


That choice was neither preordained nor one that the rest of the world should imitate.	这样的选择绝非命中注定，世界其他国家也不应当效仿。


The other problem with the conventional wisdom’s simplistic link between globalization and populism is that it gets the timing wrong.	传统智慧所秉持全球化和民粹主义简化关系的另一个问题是时机不对。


Whatever the causes, average wages in the US have been stagnant since the 1970s.	无论出于何种原因，美国的平均工资自20世纪70年代后一直处于停滞状态。


As Daniel Gros has pointed out, the wage gap between highly educated workers and the rest has been roughly constant in Europe (and declining in the United Kingdom) over the last decade.	丹尼尔·格罗斯指出过去10年来欧洲教育程度较高的工人工资与其他人工资差距基本保持不变（英国的工资差距则呈下降之势）。


And in countries like Belgium, France, and Spain, the unemployment rate was at or above 10% for long periods in the 1980s and 1990s.	在比利时、法国和西班牙等国，20世纪八九十年代很长一段时间失业率都维持在10%左右或者以上。


But there was no outbreak of nativist populism back then, and there is now. Why?	但当时并未爆发本土民粹主义危机，为什么现在却发生了改变？


The answer has everything to do with politics.	答案完全与政治有关。


And politics, as former US House Speaker Tip O’Neill liked to say, is always local.	而正如美国前众议院议长蒂普·奥尼尔所说的那样，政治始终摆脱不了地域性。


Elites in Western countries discredited themselves by permitting the financial excesses that helped trigger the Great Recession and by being slow – particularly in Europe – to deal with the social consequences.	西方国家精英坐视触发大衰退的金融过剩并消极面对——尤其在欧洲——由此产生的社会后果影响了其自身的信誉。


Next they underestimated the effect that unfettered migration and the perceived weakening of the nation-state would have on the sense of “us” – the people with whom we share a destiny and of whom we ask sacrifices (one of which is paying taxes).	而且他们低估了不受约束的移民和人们所感知到的对民族国家的削弱会对“我们”——也就是与我们同命运和被我们要求做出牺牲的民众（其中一部分人是纳税人）——所造成的影响。


Harvard’s Ricardo Hausmann has pointed out that the British choose to have four different football teams (England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland), even though having one united team might keep them from losing to tiny Iceland, as England did in the recent European Cup.	哈佛大学的里卡多·豪斯曼指出英国选择组建4支不同的足球队参赛（英格兰、苏格兰、威尔士和北爱尔兰），尽管组建一支团结的球队有可能让他们避免像英格兰那样在近期举行的欧洲杯赛上负于小小的冰岛。


No wonder, then, that – viewing the choice this way – the UK opted for Brexit.	从这个意义上看，也难怪英国选择了退出欧盟。


Now Western political elites are making another mistake when – seemingly cowed by the populists – they fail to mount a full-throated defense of liberalism’s virtues.	现在西方政治精英正在犯下另外一个错误——那就是在看似受到民粹主义者威胁的时候——他们未能打响捍卫自由主义美德的全面防御战。


UK Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn’s pathetic efforts on behalf of the “Remain” campaign ahead of the Brexit referendum, and his inability (one might say unwillingness) to confront the Brexiteers’ many untruths, is a case in point.	英国工党领袖杰里米·科尔宾在英国退欧公投前代表“留欧”阵营所做的可悲努力以及他无力（或许可以说不愿）直面退欧支持者的众多不实之词就是一个很好的例子。


In the 1930s, thinkers like John Maynard Keynes and political leaders like Franklin Roosevelt, with brave and eloquent words still worth quoting, discarded capitalism’s mindless orthodoxies in order to save the liberal democratic order.	20世纪30年代，像约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯这样的思想家和像富兰克林·罗斯福这样的政治领袖用依然值得引用的勇敢和雄辩的话语抛弃了资本主义的盲目正统以求实现拯救自由民主秩序的目标。


One world war and tens of millions of deaths later, they succeeded.	一次世界大战和成百上千万条生命逝去之后，他们取得了成功。


Today, liberal democratic values are once again under siege, and the path paved by Keynes and Roosevelt is still the only way out.	今天，自由民主的价值观再次遭到围攻，凯恩斯和罗斯福所铺就的道路仍旧是唯一的出路。


We should follow it.	我们应当坚定不移地遵循这条道路。


Reasoning with Iran	与伊朗讲理


PARIS – Negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program have been stalled for more than three years.	巴黎-针对伊朗核发展计划的谈判已经停顿了三年多。


For six years, the voices of reason have largely been drowned out, with passions and delusions claiming primacy.	六年来，理智的声音基本上都被淹没了，而激情和妄想占了上风。


Countries sitting on their own nuclear arsenals seem to think that they can give Iran orders; it’s a case of “do as I say, not as I do.”	那些坐拥核武器的国家似乎认为他们能向伊朗下命令;那就是“照我说的做，而不是学我做。


Another favorite delusion in the West is to believe that Iran will surrender if pressure is steadily increased.	”另一个西方偏爱的妄想是，如果对伊朗的施压不断增加，伊朗将会屈服。


Anyone familiar with Iran knows that this provokes only a defiant response.	而任何熟悉伊朗的人都知道，这样做只能引起伊朗藐视的回应。


But Iran, too, harbors illusions, including the notion that it can count on support from non-Western countries, or at least from some sort of Islamic caucus.	但伊朗自己也存在着幻想，包括它认为能指望非西方国家的支持，或至少是某种伊斯兰集团国的支持。


Yet, at each stage in the crisis, Iran’s supposed “friends” have let it down.	然而，在危机的每个阶段，被认为是伊朗的“朋友们”都让伊朗失望。


Iran has also believed that it could split France, and perhaps Germany, away from the United States – as if either country would risk infuriating the Americans for the sake of a leader like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.	伊朗还认为它可以让法国，也许还有德国，与美国一刀两断-好像这两个国家愿意为内贾德这样的领袖而激怒美国似的。


Above all, Iran deludes itself that it can develop an advanced nuclear program by itself.	首先，伊朗自欺认为它靠自己就可以建立先进的核发展计划。


In fact, continued isolationism would force Iran to reinvent nuclear technologies already invented by others, no doubt with poor results.	事实上，持续的孤立伊朗的政策会迫使伊朗只能重新发明他国已经发明的核技术，毫无疑问，这不会有好的成果。


Passions abound.	处处不乏激烈的情绪。


The West feels repugnance over the Iranian regime’s cynical human rights transgressions and hypocritical mixing of religion and politics.	西方对伊朗政权玩世不恭的侵犯人权的行为以及虚伪的政教合一感到厌恶。


Western public opinion abhors the constant insults directed at Israel, Jews, and the West in general.	西方舆论也憎恶伊朗不断地对以色列、犹太人和一般西方国家进行的侮辱。


There is a profound conviction in the West that an Iranian regime such as this must want nuclear weapons, and that it is acting accordingly.	西方坚信，像现在这样的一个伊朗政权一定想要拥有核武器并且正在采取相应行动。


But Iran has been forecast to develop the bomb for 20 years.	但20年来人们一直在预测伊朗正在制造核武器。


People remain convinced that next year, or maybe the year after, the prediction will come true.	人们依然相信，明年，或后年，这一预测会成为现实。


Thus, insidiously, the burden of proof is shifted.	因此，不知不觉地，举证的责任发生了转移。


As Angela Merkel said at the United Nations in 2007: “The world does not need to prove to Iran that Iran is building an atomic bomb.	正如默克尔2007年在联合国所说的那样：“世界并不需要向伊朗证明伊朗正在制造原子弹。


Iran must persuade the world that it does not want the Bomb.”	伊朗必须向全世界证明，它不想要原子弹。


Emotions run high in Iran too, which is happy to return to its familiar role as eternal victim in plots by the Great Powers.	“而伊朗国内也情绪高涨，伊朗欣然又扮演了它的老角色，即它是大国阴谋永恒的受害者。


From time to time, Mohammed El Baradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has attempted to reintroduce reason and remind everyone that the focus must remain on capabilities, not intentions.	国际原子能机构（ IAEA ）的总干事穆罕默德·巴拉迪不时地试图重新把理智带回到这个问题上，并提醒大家关注的重点必须放在伊朗的能力上，而不是意图上。 这就提出了一个实际问题，即目前伊朗到底有着怎样的核弹制造能力？


This raises the practical question of what Iran’s current bomb-making capability is.	我们能否在事先侦查到生产核弹的秘密活动呢？


Would it be possible to detect in advance clandestine activity aimed at producing one, and, if so, what would Iran have to pledge in the matter of inspections and checks, and how might such pledges be obtained?	如果能的话，在监察问题上，伊朗会承诺什么呢？ 而这样的承诺如何获得呢？


We know that Iran has made progress with the centrifuge technology essential for producing the enriched uranium needed for nuclear weapons.	我们知道，伊朗已在离心技术方面取得了进展，而此技术对核武器所需的浓缩铀生产来说是必不可少的。


It is likely that Iranian teams have been working on the mechanics of a nuclear explosive device, at least at the blueprint stage, and the country is also developing ballistic missiles that would bring many regional capitals within range of a nuclear attack – Israeli cities, of course, being the obvious targets.	可能伊朗人已经进入到核爆炸装置的技术性阶段了，至少已进入到蓝图规划阶段，而该国还正在研制弹道导弹，这将使许多该地区国家的首都纳入其核攻击范围-以色列城市当然是明显的目标。


That said, Iran must still bring all of these programs together, and that cannot happen undetected.	尽管如此，伊朗仍然必须把所有这些进展组合在一起，而这样做就不可能不被发现。


Iran may be capable of producing sufficient nuclear material to make one or two bombs within the next couple of years, but such activities would inevitably come into the open, because Iran would either have to enrich the uranium under the eyes of IAEA inspectors or expel them, giving the game away.	伊朗可能有能力生产足够的核原料在未来几年内造出一两枚核弹，但这些活动将不可避免地被公开，因为伊朗不得不在国际原子能机构视察员的眼皮底下进行铀浓缩活动，要么他们干脆就驱逐他们出境而结束这场游戏。


At this stage, Iran still needs at least a year or longer to assemble one or two crude Hiroshima-type bombs.	在目前阶段，伊朗仍需要至少一年或更长的时间才能组装成功一枚或两枚像当年投放在广岛那样的最原始的核弹。


The hardest part still lies ahead: the miniaturization needed to fit a nuclear device into a warhead.	伊朗仍然面临着最难的部分：即，把核装置安装到弹头上所需的微型化技术。


Here, too, Iranian testing would also be easily detected.	伊朗在这方面的试验也将是很容易被发现的。


So, to build a credible nuclear arsenal, Iran would need a decade or longer.	因此，要建立一个像样的核武器库，伊朗将需要十年或更长的时间。


No one can say for sure that Iran’s regime has formally adopted a nuclear weapons program.	没有人可以肯定地说伊朗政府已正式开始了研制核武器的计划。


Although many Iranian leaders no doubt toy with the idea, others are carefully weighing the costs of such a venture – the risks of preventive strikes from outside, increased isolation, and a regional nuclear arms race.	虽然许多伊朗领导人无疑在玩弄这个想法，但该国的其他领导人也在仔细权衡这种行为的代价-国外抗议带来的打击、更加地被孤立以及带来该地区的核军备竞赛。


The West’s options will continue to narrow if it maintains its present course.	如果西方坚持目前的路线，那么西方的选择余地将会越来越小。


It is a great pity that formal negotiations with Iran have been stalled since 2005 amid Western demands that Iran suspend all of its enrichment-related activities.	很可惜的是，由于西方要求伊朗暂停所有与铀浓缩有关的活动，与伊朗的正式谈判自2005年以来一直处于停顿状态。


Three years have been wasted, and we have seen no signs of suspension or willingness to negotiate.	三年的时间被浪费了，而我们没有看到任何暂停或愿意谈判的迹象。


Do negotiations stand any chance of success with Ahmadinejad as president?	在内贾德的总统任期内，这样的谈判有任何成功的机会吗？


The answer is “no” if our objective remains forcing Iran to renounce all activity on centrifugation.	如果我们的目标仍然是迫使伊朗放弃一切离心技术活动，那么答案是否定的。


But this objective was also unattainable under President Mohammad Khatami, Ahmadinejad’s reform-minded predecessor.	但是，这一目标，即使在内贾德的具有改革意识的前任哈塔米总统时期，也是无法实现的。


Acquisition of this technology was, even then, a national priority.	即使在那时，获得这项技术也是国家重要的优先事项。


If we alter course, progress may still be possible.	如果我们改变政策，仍然会有取得进展的可能。


For example, if Iran’s nuclear activities were to be surrounded with enough voluntarily accepted checks and controls, we could be confident of detecting at an early stage any diversion toward military purposes.	例如，如果伊朗的核试验活动周围有足够的伊朗自愿接受的检查和控制，那我们可以有信心在早期阶段探测到任何这样的活动转向军事目的。


Iran could develop its civil nuclear program while remaining a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; the IAEA would be able to fulfill its role as watchdog; and perhaps confidence in Iranian intentions would slowly be restored.	伊朗可以发展其民用核计划，而依然是防核武器扩散条约的签约国;国际原子能机构将能够履行其监督作用;也许对伊朗的意图的信心将慢慢得到恢复。


We cannot know whether this course of action is realistic unless we try it.	如果我们不加尝试，我们是无法知道这样的行动计划是否是现实的。


But we do know that the alternatives – increasing sanctions, military strikes, and perhaps war – would have unforeseeable consequences.	但我们知道其它方式-如加大制裁幅度、军事上的打击或是战争-将带来无法预知的后果。


Only rational behavior by the West has any chance of eliciting a rational response from Iran.	只有西方国家理智的行为才有可能得到伊朗理智的反应。


Reason in the Age of Trump	特朗普时代的理性


MADRID – In the classical Greek tragedy The Bacchae, the god Dionysus, powered by a thirst for vengeance, battles the inflexible and closed-minded King Pentheus for the soul of Thebes.	马德里—在希腊古典悲剧《酒神的女祭司》（The Bacchae），酒神狄俄尼索斯带着对复仇的渴望，与顽固保守的国王潘修斯为底比斯的灵魂而战斗。


Ultimately, Pentheus’s rigidity – his attempt to suppress, rather than understand or adapt to, the emotions inflamed by the passionate and unconventional Dionysus – proves to be his undoing.	最后，潘修斯的顽固不化——他试图镇压而不是理解和适应被热情而新奇的狄俄尼索斯煽动起来的情绪——成为他败落的原因。


Dionysus emerges victorious, and Pentheus is ripped to shreds.	狄俄尼索斯赢得了胜利，而潘修斯粉身碎骨。


Today, the emotional and mercurial Donald Trump is challenging the US political establishment for America’s soul.	如今，情绪化且善变的唐纳德·特朗普正在挑战美国的政治建制，争夺美国的灵魂。


But Trump is no god.	但特朗普不是神。


And if he wins this battle, his country will be far worse off than Thebes, and the repercussions will be felt by the entire world.	如果他赢得这场战斗，他的国家将比底比斯惨得多，并且整个世界都将受到波及。


While the likelihood of a Trump presidency seems to be declining by the day, it would be premature – and, indeed, highly risky – to dismiss it altogether.	特朗普成为总统的可能性与日俱减，但就此宣布他已经毫无希望仍然为时过早——事实上也相当危险。


As the British vote in June to exit the European Union starkly demonstrated, citizens of democratic countries are more than capable of making choices that contradict their own rational self-interest – a trend that has lately been picking up steam.	6月份英国退欧投票清楚地表明，民主国家的公民完全有可能做出有悖于理性自利的选择——这一趋势目前正在起势。


Paradoxically, this is not altogether illogical.	矛盾的是，这并不完全不符合逻辑。


Amid economic struggle, national identity crises, and populist fearmongering – all amplified by social media – there is some sense in gravitating toward voices and ideas that provide comfort and an outlet for frustration.	面临着经济萎靡、国民身份危机和民粹主义散播恐怖——所有这些都因为社交媒体而放大——被能够提供抚慰和沮丧情绪宣泄口的声音和思维所吸引亦不无道理。


But, while the fantasy of deus ex machina may feel good, it will not solve any problems.	但是，尽管“洪荒之力”的幻想感觉不错，它是无法解决任何问题的。


Leaders like Trump make things much worse, because they undermine the rules-based system that has delivered untold prosperity and security over the last seven decades.	特朗普这样的领导人将让事情变得糟之又糟，因为他们破坏了在过去七十年中带来数不清的繁荣和安全的基于规则的制度。


A century ago, the sociologist Max Weber classified the three types of legitimacy that can ground governmental authority: traditional (an inherited system); charismatic (a particular leader’s force of personality); or legal (a set of rational rules, applied fairly).	一个世纪前，社会学家马克斯·韦伯总结了三种能够巩固政府权威的合法性：传统（继承的制度）、魅力（某个领袖的个人力量）、法律（一组公正运用的理性规则）。


For Weber, the modern state was rooted in a self-evident legal legitimacy.	对韦伯而言，现代国家植根于不言自明的法律合法性。


But, contrary to Weber’s assumptions, a growing number of Westerners today regard neither the logic nor the fairness of the rules as obvious.	但是，与韦伯的假设相反，如今越来愈多的西方人不再将规则的逻辑或公平性视为显然。


This leaves space for new leaders to step in, using personal charisma and appeals to tradition to win support.	这给了新领袖介入的空间，他们用个人魅力和传统诉求赢得支持。


For everyone from right-wing populists in the West to ISIS recruiters, the combination has proved to be a powerful one.	从西方右翼民粹主义者到ISIS圣战招募者，不管你是谁，这一组合都具有强大的力量。


To be sure, there are real problems with the current system.	诚然，目前的制度确实有问题。


Western democracies offer endless examples of regulation run amok, as well as instances of rules being applied unevenly.	在西方民主国家管制走向失控和规则达不到公平运用的例子不胜枚举。


Add to that enduring income, racial, and gender inequality, and frustration with the current system is not surprising.	此外还有持续的收入、种族和性别不平等，对当前制度感到失望不足为奇。


But this is reason to pursue reform, not to advocate the wholesale exit that people are increasingly supporting.	但这是追求改革的理由，而不是鼓吹越来越多的人所支持的推倒重来的理由。


And, indeed, the key to saving a rules-based order is not just to demonstrate its unquestionable superiority, but also to acknowledge and address its flaws.	事实上，拯救基于规则的秩序的关键不仅仅在于证明其无可置疑的优越性，也遭遇承认和纠正它的缺陷。


That is the only way to change the perception of rules as a source of oppression, rather than protection.	这是改变规则是压迫而不是保护的源泉这一认知的唯一办法。


Reform will not be easy.	改革绝非易事。


Politically, it is much simpler – and electorally more rewarding – to criticize a system than it is to defend it, especially when that system is far from perfect.	政治上，批评一套制度比捍卫它简单得多——在选举上也更容易得到好处——特别是当制度远远算不上完美时。


But defend it we must, with leaders explaining effectively why rules are necessary, including by educating the public on why the system operates the way it does.	但我们必须捍卫它，其中领袖必须有效地解释为何规则必不可少，包括教育公众制度为何要以现在的方式运行。


At the same time, policymakers must take a deeper look at the system, and make vital changes.	与此同时，决策者必须更深刻地看待制度，并做出重要改变。


Specifically, they must adjust how rules are made, to ensure that what results is fit for the modern world.	具体而言，他们必须调整制度的制定方法，以确保结果适合现代世界。


At a time when change happens at lightning speed, there is a perception that formal rule-making is too slow to keep up.	在变化日新月异的时代，有一种正式规则制定过于缓慢、跟不上时代的感觉。


But the predictable rules that formal processes produce remain critical to reinforce the stability required for sustained prosperity.	但正式程序所产生的可预测的规则仍然是强化持续繁荣所需要的稳定的关键。


What is needed is an updated approach that supports the evolution of law in a constantly evolving environment, thereby ensuring that law is more responsive to the needs of citizens.	我们需要的是更新方法以支持法律在不断演化的环境中演化，从而确保法律能够更积极地响应公民的需要。


The final item on the agenda for reviving the rules-based order, and defeating the world’s destructive Dionysuses, is the most challenging: we must reinforce rules-based communities.	复兴基于规则的秩序，并打败破坏性的狄俄尼索斯们的日程的最后一项挑战最为艰巨：我们必须加强基于规则的社会。


Dislocated by modernity, the West has seen a turn towards identities of the past – nationalism, tribalism, sectarianism – whose allure rests in their familiarity and certainty.	被现代性冲击得支离破碎的西方已经呈现出转向过去的身份的迹象——民族主义、宗派主义、门户之见等——它们的诱惑力来自它们的熟悉性和确定性。


But identity politics, it is well known, can be very destructive.	但众所周知，身份政治可能带来极大的破坏。


That is why it is critical that rules-based communities, such as the modern state, become a hook that people overwhelmed by change can grasp.	因此，基于规则的社会，如现代国家，充当被变化压得喘不过气来的人们的救命稻草至关重要。


This means moving beyond pure reason to establish an emotional connection with and among citizens.	这意味着超越纯粹理性，建立一个公民之间的情感纽带。


This may seem counterintuitive.	这也许有些反直觉。


Law is supposed to be impartial and rational; that is its core strength.	法律被认为是中立、理性的； 这是它的核心优势。


But if the rules-based order is to survive, it must resonate in people’s hearts, as well as their heads.	但基于规则的秩序要想存在，就必须共鸣于人们的内心，也共鸣于他们的大脑。


It is not yet clear precisely how to approach this process.	尚不清楚如何接近这一过程。


What is clear is that it will require a foundation of common values, and leaders who work actively and consistently to build credibility and earn a skeptical public’s trust.	清楚的是它需要个共同价值观基础，以及积极而持久地致力于构建信誉、赢得狐疑的公众的信任的领袖。


Otherwise, we will see the shift toward an unruly world, one shaped by passion and power grabs, gain momentum.	否则，我们将发现，滑向没有规则、受激情和权力争夺左右的世界的趋势日益得势。


The growing appeal of irrationality should be a wake-up call to rational leaders everywhere.	不理性的号召力越来越强，这应该成为每一位理性领袖的警示信号。


If we want to prevent our societies from being lured onto the rocks by the siren song of charisma and nostalgia, we must make a strong case for the rule of law, while rejecting rigidity.	如果我们想要阻止我们的社会被个人魅力和怀旧之情所迷惑，就必须强力推行法治，同时拒绝顽固。


Failure to do so is, after all, what got Pentheus killed.	毕竟，无法做到这一点正是潘修斯被杀的原因。


Rebalancing the Eurozone	重新平衡欧元区


WASHINGTON, DC – The eurozone crisis unfolded primarily as a sovereign-debt crisis mostly on its southern periphery, with interest rates on sovereign bonds at times reaching 6-7% for Italy and Spain, and even higher for other countries.	华盛顿—欧元区危机之发酵，首先是作为多发生于南欧外围国家的主权债务危机，意大利和西班牙的主权债券利率数次达到了6—7%的水平，其他国家甚至更高。


And, because eurozone banks hold a substantial part of their assets in the form of eurozone sovereign bonds, the sovereign-debt crisis became a potential banking crisis, worsened by banks’ other losses, owing, for example, to the collapse of housing prices in Spain.	而欧元区银行有很大一部分资产以欧元区主权债券形式持有，于是主权债务危机演变成了一场潜在银行危机，并因银行的其他损失而恶化，比如西班牙房地产价格的崩盘。


So a key challenge in resolving the eurozone crisis is to reduce the southern countries’ debt burdens.	因此，解决欧元区危机的关键挑战是降低南欧国家的债务负担。


The change in a country’s debt burden reflects the size of its primary budget balance (the balance minus interest payments) as a share of GDP, as well as the difference between its borrowing costs and its GDP growth rate.	一国债务负担的挑战反映了其基本预算余额（预算余额减去利息支出）占GDP的比重规模以及其借贷成本与其GDP增长率之差。


When the difference between borrowing costs and growth becomes too large, the primary budget surpluses required to stop debt from increasing become impossible to achieve.	当借贷成本与增长率之差过大时，阻止债务增加所要求的预算盈余就会变得太高而不可能达到。


Indeed, growth in southern Europe is expected to be close to zero or negative for the next two years, and is not expected to exceed 2-3% even in the longer term.	事实上，在未来两年中，南欧增长率预期将接近于零甚至为负，从较长时间看也不会超过2—3%。


While not always evident from the headlines, an underlying cause of the eurozone crisis – and now an obstacle for growth in the south – has been the divergence in production costs that developed between the peripheral countries, notably the “south” (specifically, Greece, Spain, Italy, and Portugal) and the “north” (for simplicity, Germany) during the first decade after the introduction of the euro.	尽管新闻标题上很少提及，但欧元区危机的一大基本原因——以及如今南欧增长的一大障碍——是外围国家（主要是“南欧”国，以希腊、西班牙和葡萄牙为首）和“北欧”国（简单起见，可以德国代之）在使用欧元的第一个十年中生产成本的日渐分化。


Unit labor costs in the four southern countries increased by 36%, 28%, 30%, and 25%, respectively, from 2000 to 2010, compared to less than 5% in Germany, resulting in an end-2010 cumulative divergence above 30% in Greece and more than 20% in Portugal, Italy, and Spain.	2000—2010年间，四大南欧国家单位劳动成本分别增长了36%、28%、30%和25%，而德国只增长了不到5%，这导致了希腊对德国的单位劳动成本累积差别达到了30%以上，葡萄牙、意大利和西班牙达到了20%以上。


Unit labor costs reflect compensation levels and productivity: gains in productivity can offset the effect of wage growth.	单位劳动成本体现了报酬水平和生产率：生产率的提高能够抵消工资增长的影响。


Productivity performance did not vary dramatically between northern and southern European countries from 2000 to 2010 – in fact, average annual productivity growth was faster in Greece than in Germany (1% versus 0.7%).	2000—2010年，生产率表现在南欧和北欧国家间并没有显著变化——事实上，平均年生产率增长在希腊比在德国更快（1%对0. 7%）。


But labor costs increased much faster in the south, resulting in differential cost increases that cannot be addressed by devaluation as long as the monetary union endures.	但南欧劳动成本增速要快得多，这导致了成本增长速度差异，且这一差异不能被贬值修正，因为它们同处一个货币联盟。


As long as this internal divergence persists, the euro crisis cannot be fully resolved, because current-account deficits and/or slow growth will continue to stalk the southern European countries, perpetuating worries about sovereign debt and commercial banks.	只要这一内部分化存在，欧元危机就不能得到完全解决，因为经常项目赤字和/或增长缓慢将继续缠住南欧国家，关于主权债务和商业银行的担心将长久存在。


In this context, productivity growth �� whether through technical progress, better allocation of resources, or productive investment – is as important a variable for the southern economies as wage restraint is.	在这样的环境下，生产率增长——不论是通过技术进步、优化资源配置还是生产性投资实现——对南欧经济体来说重要性不亚于抑制工资。


Indeed, excessive wage deflation is likely to have negative effects on productivity.	事实上，过度的工资通缩可能会对生产率不利。


Skilled labor is likely to emigrate faster, and extreme austerity, falling prices, and high unemployment – and the resulting likelihood of social tension – are not exactly conducive to investment, innovation, or labor mobility.	高技能劳动力可能会更快地迁移，而极端紧缩、价格下降和高失业——以及这些因素引起的社会动荡的可能性——绝非投资、创新和劳动力流动的利好。


Likewise, while reducing employment is one way to boost productivity, it implies high macroeconomic costs in terms of lost revenues and higher social spending.	类似地，尽管压低就业是提振生产率的一种办法，但这隐含着高昂的宏观经济成本，如岁入损失和更高的社会支出。


Perhaps even more importantly, economic policy should not break a society’s confidence in itself; what economists call “animal spirits” must be able to reflect hope for the future.	也许，更重要的是，经济政策不应该破坏社会信心； 经济学家所谓的“动物精神”必须能够反映人们对未来的希望。


For all of these reasons, excessive austerity and deflation could defeat its own purpose and make the “reforms” to improve the southern European countries’ competitiveness impossible to implement.	出于这些理由，过度紧缩和通缩将会破坏其自身目标，导致旨在改善南欧国家竞争力的“改革”难以实施。


The right approach must combine reasonable wage restraint and low (but not negative) inflation with microeconomic policy measures aimed at encouraging productivity increases.	正确的办法必须结合合理工资限制和低（但非负）通胀并辅之以旨在刺激生产率增长的微观经济政策措施。


Moreover, it is clear that northern European countries could help to close the competitiveness gap more rapidly by encouraging faster wage growth.	此外，显然，北欧国家可以在加快缩小竞争力差距方面助一臂之力，办法是鼓励更快的工资增长。


Indeed, Western policy-makers’ strong focus on persuading the Chinese authorities to permit greater appreciation of their currency is puzzling when one considers that Germany’s current-account surplus, as a share of GDP, is now much larger than China’s.	事实上，西方决策者将注意力集中在说服中国当局允许人民币更快升值上是令人困惑的，因为不论经常项目余额数目还是占GDP的比重，德国均远高于中国。


Reversing the large differential in unit labor costs that has emerged in the euro’s first decade thus requires not only wage restraint and productivity-enhancing reforms in the south, but also higher wage gains in the north.	因此，逆转使用欧元的第一个十年中所出现的单位劳动成本巨大差异不仅要求在南欧实行��资限制和生产率强化改革，还要求北欧提高工资。 一项模拟测试表明，如果德国工资年增长率达到4%，而不是过去十年中的1.


A simulation shows that if German wages grew at 4% annually instead of the 1.5% of the last decade, and if annual productivity growth in Spain accelerated to 2% (it was close to 0.7% in both countries), Spain could reverse the unit-labor-cost differential that emerged with Germany since 2000 in five years, with Spanish wages growing at about 1.7% per annum.	5%，同时西班牙生产率增长率为2%（现实中两国均为接近0. 7%），那么西班牙可以在五年内逆转自2000年以来所累积的对德单位劳动力成本差，只要西班牙工资增长率控制在每年1.


This should not be an impossible scenario.	这并非不可能的情景。


It would require restraint in Spain, where wages grew at an average annual rate of 3.4% in 2000-2010, as well as a serious effort to accelerate productivity growth.	这需要限制西班牙的工资（2000—2010年平均年增长率为3. 4%），同时努力加快生产率增长，但并不需要工资下降或大幅物价通缩：1.


But it would not require falling wages or significant price deflation: annual wage growth of 1.7% and productivity growth of 2% would be compatible with inflation close to zero.	7%的年工资增长率以及2%的生产率增长率便能与接近零的通胀率相容。


Productivity growth at the historical rate of 0.7% in Germany, with wage growth of 4%, would be compatible with an inflation rate a little above 3%.	至于德国，若生产率增长率在历史水平0. 7%，而工资增长率为4%，则与略高于3%的通胀率相容。


In short, internal adjustment in the eurozone is achievable without serious deflation in the south, provided that productivity growth there accelerates, and that the north does its part by encouraging modestly faster wage gains.	简而言之，欧元区内部调整是可以在南欧不出现严重通缩的情况下实现的，只要那里的生产率增长能够加速，同时北欧能够适当加快工资增长助其一臂之力。


The smaller current-account surplus in northern Europe that might result from this should itself be welcome.	由此造成北欧经常项目盈余的减少本身便是一件值得欢迎的事情。


If the north insists on maintaining the low wage growth of the 2000-2010 period, internal adjustment would require significant unemployment and deflation in the south, making it more difficult and perhaps politically impossible to achieve.  	如果北欧维持2000—2010年间的低工资增长率，那么内部调整就要求南欧国家出现严重失业和通货紧缩，增加内部调整的困难，甚至导致调整在政治上变得不可行。


Rebalancing the US-China Economic Relationship	平衡美中经济的相互关系


CAMBRIDGE – As the global economy stabilizes, there is a growing danger that the United States and China will slip back into their pre-crisis economic patterns, placing themselves and the rest of the world at risk.	剑桥——随着全球经济形势逐渐稳定，一种担忧之声不断渐渐响起：美国和中国是否会重复走经济危机发生之前的老路，如果这样的话，这不仅关系到美中之间，整个世界都会处于危险之中。


Despite Chinese official rhetoric about the need for a new global currency to replace the dollar, and US lawmakers’ flirtation with “Buy American” clauses (which scares everyone, not just the Chinese), no one will want to rock a boat that has almost capsized.	尽管中国官员象征性的提出，希望有一种全球性货币来取代美元，尽管美国的立法官员也草率地推出“购买美国货”的条款，（这不仅吓坏了中国人，更让整个世界担忧。 ）但是，应该没有人会想要目前的经济再更雪上加霜。


So China continues to run a giant trade surplus, and the US continues to spend and borrow.	于是乎，中国还是维持着巨大的贸易顺差，而美国继续透支着借贷和消费。


Short-run stability certainly seems attractive right now.	目前，暂时的经济稳定局面看起来似乎还不错。


But if the US-China trade and debt relationship merely picks up where it left off, what will prevent recurrence of the same unsustainable dynamic that we just witnessed?	如果美中贸易和债务关系还是维持原来的模式，那我们怎么能阻止已经发生的动荡金融局面的再度重演？


After all, huge US foreign borrowing was clearly a key factor in creating the recent financial mess, while China’s excessive reliance on export-driven growth has made it extraordinarily vulnerable to a sudden drop in global demand.	很显然，美国对外巨额负债是这场金融乱局的关键因素。 在全球需求急剧下降的背景下，中国对外向型经济的过分依赖也使得局面更加动荡。


A giant fiscal stimulus in both countries has helped prevent further damage temporarily, but where is the needed change?	虽然两国随后推出的巨额财政刺激方案，暂时缓解了局面进一步恶化，但实质性的政策改变却没有随后跟上。


Wouldn’t it be better to accept more adjustment now in the form of slower post-crisis growth than to set ourselves up for an even bigger crash?	我们是应该对危机后的经济缓慢增长作出相应的调整，还是要再承受一次更大的经济崩盘么？


True, both the US administration and China’s leadership have made some sensible proposals for change.	诚然，美国政府和中国的领导层已经作出了一些改变，推出了一些理性的政策。


But is their heart in it?	但他们是全力而为的么？


US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has floated a far-reaching overhaul of the financial system, and China’s leaders are starting to take steps towards improving the country’s social safety net.	美国财长蒂莫西·特纳已经开始对金融体系进行了广泛而深入的调查，中国领导人也着手进行国内社会保障体系的改革，


Both of these measures should help a lot in bringing the US and Chinese trade balances toward more sustainable levels.	这些措施对增加美国和中国贸易之间的平衡起到一定的作用。


Greater financial regulation in the US means consumers will not be able to borrow so easily to rack up huge mortgage and credit card debt.	对金融体系的严格监管可以使得美国人不那么容易地获得巨额房贷，大量进行信用卡消费。


Chinese consumers, on the other hand, might actually start spending more of their income if they can worry a bit less about saving for health care, their children’s education, and their old-age retirement.	另一方面，对于中国消费者来说，如果有了一定的社会保障，少了对医疗保健，子女的教育和退休后的养老问题的担忧，他们就会更敢于消费。


Nevertheless, there is cause for concern.	而且，我们还一个必须注意的问题。


As the world seems to emerge from its horrific financial crisis, it is human nature for complacency to set it, and the domestic politics of the US-China trade and financial relationship is deeply rooted.	目前，世界好象正在摆脱令人恐怖的金融危机，我们似乎理所应当地开始放松起来。 政治因素在美国与中国金融贸易的关系中的因素占了很大的比重。


One shudders to think what lessons the US financial sector will draw if, after the multi-trillion dollar bailout, there are only superficial, toothless reforms.	花费在数百万亿的美元救援方案之后，我们应该从此次金融危机中得到什么启示呢？ 目前我们只看到表面和无关痛痒的改革。


And will China’s coastal export interests again prevail in exchange rate policy decisions, at the expense of poor inland consumers?	中国为了沿海城市的出口利益，采取固定的利率政策，难道还要以牺牲内地贫困地区的发展为代价么？


Another reason to worry is that the global recovery is still fragile.	另一个担心的理由是，目前全球经济的复苏仍然很脆弱。


US and Chinese leaders have fought the crisis with not only massive fiscal stimulus, but also deep intervention into credit markets.	美中政府解决危机的办法不仅是推出巨额的财政刺激方案，而且深深地介入了信贷市场。


Such extraordinary fiscal largesse, all at taxpayers’ expense, cannot continue indefinitely.	这些超乎寻常措施都是以所有纳税人的买单为代价的，显然不是维持长久。


World Bank President Robert Zoellick has rightly warned that all this massive temporary fiscal stimulus is a “sugar high” that will ultimately pass without deeper reforms.	世界银行行长罗伯特•佐利克最近警告说，如果没有深层次的改革方案跟进，目前的财政刺激方案就象是吃了“棒棒糖”那样，只能是短暂的兴奋。


As I have argued before, the endgame to the financial bailouts and fiscal expansion will almost certainly mean higher interest rates, higher taxes, and, quite possibly, inflation.	就如同我以前说的那样，金融救助和财政刺激方案的最终结果是高利率，高税收，还很可能出现通货膨胀。


For better or for worse, it may not be possible to turn back the clock.	不管最终的结局是好是坏，时光都不可能倒流。


The US consumer, whose gluttony helped fuel growth throughout the world for more than a decade, seems finally set to go on a diet. In addition to tighter credit, falling home prices and high unemployment will continue to put a crimp on US consumer spending.	美国的消费者在过去的10多年里都是世界经济发展的带动者，现在看来，应该节制他们的消费能力，此外，紧缩的信贷市场，下滑的房价以及攀升的失业率都会进一步降低美国人的消费能力。


Frankly, higher US personal saving rates would not be a bad thing. It would almost certainly help reduce the risk of an early repeat of the financial crisis.	坦率地说，美国较高的个人储蓄率并不是一件坏事情，这会显著地减少金融危机重演的机率。


The obvious candidates to replace them are Chinese and other Asian consumers, whose combined economies are more than equal to that of the US.	能替代美国消费者的当然应该是中国和其他亚洲国家的消费者。 他们这些国家加在一起的经济总量比美国要大。


But are Asian governments prepared to abandon their mercantilist paradigm?	但是，亚洲各国政府是否准备好放弃重商主义的模式呢？


Outside Japan, Asia policymakers certainly don’t seem amenable to exchange-rate appreciation	除了日本，亚洲其他各国的决策者们显然不会改变他们目前的汇率体制。


Since the beginning of this decade, at least a few economists (including me) have warned that the global trade and current-account imbalances needed to be reined in to reduce the chance of a severe financial crisis.	早在十年前，包括我在内的几个经济学家就已经发出警告，全球贸易和活期帐户的长期不平衡最终会导致金融危机的发生。