And public anxiety about employment and living standards has replaced the fears about global warming that inspired the 2009 movement.	而关于就业和生活水平的公众焦虑也取代了触发2009年行动的对全球变暖的担忧。


Environmental NGOs worry that raising expectations could worsen the fallout from failure, damaging efforts at the national level to build low-carbon economies.	环境方面的非政府组织（NGO）担心，预期越高，失败带来的失望也越大，破坏建设低碳经济的国家层面的努力。


But this threatens to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.	但这有成为自我实现的预言的可能。


If expectations are low, talks can only fail.	如果预期很低，则谈判只有失败一途。


Although political leaders are not focused on climate change, a big international event can capture their attention, as the Copenhagen conference did.	尽管政治领导人的关注点并不在气候变化，但重大国际事件会吸引他们的注意力，哥本哈根会议便属此类。


And next year, when the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change begins publishing its latest assessment of the scientific evidence, the prospect of runaway climate change is bound to mobilize civil society.	明年，当跨政府气候变化委员会（Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change）开始发布其最新的科学证据评估报告时，气候变化失控的迹象必定会在文明社会掀起波澜。


In fact, the current situation, characterized by rising global greenhouse-gas emissions, already amounts to failure, with the current trend putting the two-degree target out of reach in less than a decade.	事实上，以全球温室气体排量稳步上升为特征的现状已经可以称之为失败，不出十年，目前设定的2摄氏度目标就将无法保持。


The only hope is an international movement for immediate action, such as that which, in advance of the Copenhagen conference, compelled the world’s largest carbon emitters – including the United States and China – to set emissions targets.	唯一的希望是出现一场促使立刻行动的国际运动，比如像在哥本哈根会议前那样迫使世界最大碳排放国——包括美国和中国——给出排放目标。


Indeed, the Copenhagen experience offers some valuable lessons.	事实上，哥本哈根经验提供了宝贵的教训。


First, given that countries make international commitments only when their citizens are ready to do so, increasing domestic pressure for emissions reduction is crucial.	首先，各国只有在其公民做好准备的情况下才会做出国际承诺，因此减排的国内压力的增加十分重要。


Every major economy must recognize that investment in “green growth” can create jobs and bolster economic development.	所有主要经济体都必须认识到，“绿色增长”投资能够创造就业、促进经济发展。


Moreover, combating climate change must again become a moral crusade, which entails appealing to people’s emotions.	此外，与气候变化的斗争必须再次动用道德大军，这需要激发人们的热情。


After all, crossing that two-degree threshold implies condemning future generations to global warming’s most devastating consequences.	毕竟，跨越2摄氏度的界限意味着让子孙后代承担全球变暖最严重的后果。


Third, developing countries should lead the debate over a new global agreement, in order to ensure equity and protect their right to develop.	第三，发展中国家应该在��的全球协定谈判中起到主导作用，这样才能确保公平，保护它们的发展权利。


Climate action should be viewed as a means to improve the well-being of the world’s poorest people – those who most need an agreement – rather than as a burden.	气候行动应该被视为改善世界最贫困人群的办法——他们是最需要协定的人群——而不是成为他们的负担。


Finally, the involvement of heads of state and government must complement the UN process, rather than supplant it.	最后，国家和政府首脑的参与必须为联合国程序起到锦上添花的作用，而不是取而代之。


UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has called for a leader’s summit on climate change in 2014; that summit must now become the focus of public pressure to move toward an agreement in 2015.	联合国秘书长潘基文呼吁在2014年举行气候变化领导人峰会； 如今，这一峰会应该成为公众压力的焦点，以促使在2015年达成协定。


The path to an international agreement strong enough to keep global warming under two degrees will be fraught with obstacles.	形成足以把全球变暖幅度控制在2摄氏度以内的强大国际协定之路充满了险阻。


But, if citizens ratchet up the pressure on their leaders, and policymakers demonstrate vision and leadership, the route can be navigated.	但是，如果人民向其领导人施加更大压力，决策者也拿出远见和领导力，则仍能杀出一条坦途。


The countdown to 2015 has begun.	2015年倒计时已经开始。


The Bilateral Threat to Free Trade	自由贸易的双边威胁


ISTANBUL – The Doha Round of global trade talks appears to have died this year, almost without a whimper.	伊斯坦布尔—全球贸易谈判多哈回合今年无声无息地死去了。


While a small portion of the project may be saved, the essential reality is that this is a unique failure in the history of multilateral trade negotiations, which have transformed the global economy since World War II.	其中一小部分或许可以救活，但根本现实是，这是改变二战后全球经济面貌的多边贸易谈判史上一次独一无二的失败。


Many of the seven previous rounds of negotiations – including the Uruguay Round, which resulted in the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 as the successor to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) – took years to complete, but none died of neglect or disinterest.	前七次谈判——包括成立作为关贸总协定继承者的世界贸易组织的1995年乌拉圭回合——有多次都经历了多年才得以完成，但没有一次在无人愿意看一眼的情况下寿终正寝。


Today’s indifference is particularly, though not exclusively, evident in the United States.	今天的冷漠在美国特别显而易见（尽管美国不是唯一冷漠的国家）。


President Barack Obama was silent on the issue in his re-election campaign, and breathed scarcely a word about it in his first campaign, too. One wonders whether what is at stake is even fully understood in some capitals.	总统奥巴马在连任竞选过程中对此只字不提，在其第一次竞选中也几乎没有谈过这一问题。


Successful multilateral trade negotiations have significantly shaped the world in which we live and have dramatically enhanced the lives of millions of people.	成功的多边贸易谈判极大地改变了我们所居住的世界，也极大地改善了千百万人的生活。


Between 1960 and 1990, only one person in five lived in an economically open society; today, nine in ten do.	1960—1990年，只有五分之一的人生活在经济开放社会，如今，这一比例是十分之九。


The rule-based trading system developed by the GATT and the WTO has been embraced by virtually the entire global community.	关贸总协定和世贸组织开发的基于规则的贸易体系被几乎整个国际社会所接受。


It has provided an effective road map for the former planned and import-substituting economies, facilitating their integration into the global market.	它为此前的计划和进口替代经济提供了真正的路线图，帮助它们融入全球市场。


Initially, “globalization” was a dirty word to some.	当初，“全球化”是个贬义词。


But, even among its opponents, its value for poorer countries came to be recognized, as it helped to lift more than a billion people in Asia out of abject poverty.	但是，即使在反对全球化者看来，其对于穷国的价值也得到了承认，因为它帮助十多亿亚洲人民走出了不幸的贫困。


While much more needs to be done for Africa and parts of Latin America, the Doha Round was intended to assist in providing market access (and therefore opportunity) to many more in the developing world.	尽管非洲和部分拉美国家还需要更多，但多哈回合可以在向更多发展中国家提供市场进入（从而得到机会）方面有所助益。


The essence of the multilateral system consists in two principles: non-discrimination and national treatment.	多边体系基于两个原则：无歧视和国民待遇。


The former is described in the trade negotiators’ lexicon as the ���most favored nation” principle, which essentially seeks to ensure that trade benefits provided to one country are provided to all.	前者在贸易谈判者的词典中就是“最惠国”原则，即保证向一国提供的贸易优惠条件同时向所有国家提供。


The latter requires member states to provide the same treatment to trading partners within national borders as that provided to nationals.	后者要求成员国在国内向贸易伙伴国提供与本国国民一样的待遇。


The non-discrimination principle ensured that global trade did not become a “spaghetti bowl” of preferential bilateral trade agreements.	无歧视原则保证了全球贸易不会沦落为特惠双边贸易协定的“意大利面碗”（spaghetti bowl）。


Moreover, a multilateral framework for trade negotiations gave weaker states far more balanced conditions than they would face were they forced to negotiate bilaterally with the likes of China, the United States, or the European Union.	此外，贸易谈判的多边框架让弱小国可以获得比被迫与中国、美国、欧洲等国家和地区进行双边谈判时可能面临的更加平衡的条件。


In fact, what we have seen in recent years is an increasing rush to bilateral agreements by the major trading countries and blocs.	事实上，近几年来，主要贸易国家和区域越来越多地转向了双边协议。


This has apparently consumed virtually all of their attention.	显然，这几乎耗尽了它们的全部注意力。


The WTO has been marginalized, and even what has already been achieved in the incomplete Doha Round appears unlikely to be delivered in a final agreement in the foreseeable future.	世贸组织被边缘化了，未完成的多哈回合所达成的有限成果在可以预见的将来也无法形成最终协定。


The damage to the credibility of the WTO – once lauded as the greatest advance in global governance since the inspired institution-building of the immediate postwar period – may yet prove lasting.	世贸组的织信誉损失——它一度被赞美为战后制度建设创新以来最伟大的全球治理进步——可能还将继续下去。


Worse, it could have a serious impact not merely on trade, but on political relationships more generally.	更糟糕的是，其严重后果可能不仅仅在于贸易，也将在于更一般的政治关系。


One of the WTO’s great achievements has been the adjudication system that it provides – the so-called Dispute Settlement Mechanism.	世贸组织的最伟大成就之一是其裁决系统，即所谓的纠纷解决机制（Dispute Settlement Mechanism）。


This independent body has been a resounding success, giving the world an effective quasi-judicial system to resolve disputes between trading partners.	这一独立系统的成功与目共睹，相当于让世界有了一个有效的准法庭系统解决贸易伙伴之间的纠纷。


But its continued success depends ultimately on the credibility of the WTO itself; it will inevitably suffer collateral damage from a failure of multilateral negotiations.	但其成功能否持续最终取决于世贸组织本身的信誉； 多边谈判的失败将不可避免地导致它遭受附带伤害。


Indeed, the current rush to bilateral trade agreements has been accompanied by a rise in protectionism.	事实上，伴随当前忙不迭转向双边贸易协议的现象出现的是保护主义的兴起。


For example, there have been 424 new measures of this kind in the EU since 2008.	比如，自2008年以来，欧盟出台了424项此类新措施。


Furthermore, the EU’s non-discriminatory tariffs are fully applicable to only nine trading partners.	另外，欧盟的无歧视关税也只对九大贸易伙伴完全适用。


Everyone else has “exceptional” treatment.	其他贸易伙伴都有“例外”待遇。


Next, no doubt, we will have the prospect of a bilateral free-trade agreement between the EU and the US.	其次，毫无疑问，我们将看到欧盟和美国之间的双边贸易协议。


An EU-Japan treaty is already in the wind, as is a “Trans-Pacific Partnership” to liberalize trade among the US and major Asian and Latin American economies.	欧盟-日本协议已经出现，“跨太平洋合作伙伴”则旨在实现美国和主要亚洲和拉美经济体之间的贸易自由化。


If either ever comes to pass, which I doubt, a huge share of world trade would be conducted within a discriminatory framework.	我认为这两者不管何者成为现实，世界贸易的一大部分都将进入歧视框架中。


Some recognize the risks.	一些人意识到了这一风险。


In May 2011, Jagdish Bhagwati of Columbia University and I co-chaired a High Level Group convened by the prime ministers of the United Kingdom, Germany, Turkey, and Indonesia to attempt to move the multilateral process ahead.	2011年5月，哥伦比亚大学的贾格迪什·巴格瓦提（Jagdish Bhagwati）和我共同主持了由英国、德国、土耳其和印尼首相/总理组成高级别小组，试图推动多边程序的进步。


Our sponsors welcomed our recommendations, but that and similar efforts have gained little traction, leaving all countries rushing headlong toward a world full of uncertainty and risk.	我们的发起人欢迎我们的建议，但类似的努力并没有获得多少动力，所有国家仍一股脑儿奔向充满不确定性和风险的世界。


It is not too late to reverse the apparently inexorable tide of bilateralism.	现在扭转双边主义不可阻挡的潮流还为时未晚。


But the only way to do so is by proceeding with WTO negotiations.	但唯一的可行之道是通过世贸组织谈判推进。


Even if the Doha Round cannot be concluded, there may be other routes, such as implementing what has already been agreed.	即使多哈回合无法产生结果，也可以通过其他路径，比如实施已经形成共识的措施。


Another alternative might be to advance multilateral negotiations among willing countries in specific areas, such as services, with other WTO members joining later.	另一个替代方案是在有意愿的国家之间推行具体领域（如服务业）的多边谈判，其他世贸组织成员国随后跟进。


But if we are to move forward rather than revert to earlier, more dangerous times, the US, in particular, must reassert a constructive role in multilateralism.	但如果我们想要前进，而不是倒退回危险的旧路，那么（特别是）美国必须重新担起多边主义中流砥柱的角色。


The US must lead again, as it did in the past.	美国必须和以往一样再次成为领袖。


And now it must do so with China at its side.	此外，这一回必须将中国也拉到美国一边。


The Dollar and the Dragon	美元和中国


CAMBRIDGE – For several years, American officials have pressed China to revalue its currency.	剑桥——几年来，美国官方一直敦促中国重新估值人民币。


They complain that the undervalued renminbi represents unfair competition, destroying American jobs, and contributing to the United States’ trade deficit.	他们抱怨说，被低估的人民币体现了一种不公平竞争，造成美国就业岗位的减少，并且导致了美国的贸易赤字。


How, then, should US officials respond?	那么，美国官方该如何应对？


Just before the recent G-20 meeting in Toronto, China announced a formula that would allow modest renminbi appreciation, but some American Congressmen remain unconvinced, and threaten to increase tariffs on Chinese goods.	就在最近G20多伦多峰会举行的前夕，中国宣布了一项让人民币略微升值的方案，但是一些美国国会议员仍然心存质疑，并且威胁对中国商品增加关税。


America absorbs Chinese imports, pays China in dollars, and China holds dollars, amassing $2.5 trillion in foreign-exchange reserves, much of it held in US Treasury securities.	美国从中国进口商品，付给中国美元； 中国持有美元，积累了25亿美元的外汇储备，其中大部分是美国国债。


To some observers, this represents a fundamental shift in the global balance of power, because China could bring the US to its knees by threatening to sell its dollars.	在某些观察家看来，这代表了全球实力天平的一种根本性转变，因为中国可以通过威胁卖掉其持有的美元而挫败美国。


But, if China were to bring the US to it knees, it might bring itself to its ankles in the process.	但是，假如中国真把美国踩在脚下，自己的脚可能也会因此扭伤。


China would not only reduce the value of its reserves as the dollar’s value fell, but it would also jeopardize America’s continued willingness to import cheap Chinese goods, which would mean job losses and instability in China.	美元价值的下跌不仅会让中国的外汇储备贬值，还会使美国不愿继续进口便宜的中国商品，而这些便宜的中国货对于中国来说意味着失业和不稳定。


Judging whether economic interdependence produces power requires looking at the balance of asymmetries, not just at one side of the equation.	判断经济上的相互依赖是否会产生生产力，这需要着眼于不对称的平衡，而不能仅仅只看方程式的一端。


In this case, interdependence has created a “balance of financial terror” analogous to the Cold War, when the US and the Soviet Union never used their potential to destroy each other in a nuclear exchange.	在本例中，相互依赖创造了一种“金融恐怖平衡”，可以类比冷战期间的美国和苏联，两国当时从未运用自身的核实力在核战争中摧毁对方。


In February 2010, angered over American arms sales to Taiwan, a group of senior military officers called for the Chinese government to sell off US government bonds in retaliation.	2010年2月，受到美国对台军售行为的触怒，一群高级军官要求中国政府出售美国政府债券作为回击。


Their proposal went unheeded.	但是他们的提议并未得到理会。


Instead, Yi Gang, China’s director of state administration of foreign exchange, explained that “Chinese investments in US Treasuries are market investment behavior, and we don’t wish to politicize them.”	相反，中国国家外汇管理局局长易纲解释说，“中国对于美国国债的投资是市场行为，我们不想将其政治化。


Otherwise, the pain would be mutual.	” 否则，疼痛将会成为相互的。


Nevertheless, this balance does not guarantee stability.	不过，这个平衡并不能确保稳定。


There is always the danger of actions with unintended consequences, especially as both countries can be expected to maneuver to change the framework and reduce their vulnerabilities.	行动总会伴随无法预料的后果，尤其因为两国都会想办法改变框架，减小自身弱点——这是可以预料得到的。


For example, after the 2008 financial crisis, while the US pressed China to let its currency appreciate, officials at China’s central bank began arguing that America needed to increase its savings, reduce its deficits, and move toward supplementing the dollar’s role as a reserve currency with IMF-issued special drawing rights.	例如，2008年的金融危机之后，美国敦促中国升值其货币，而与此同时，中国中央银行的官员却开始主张，美国需要增加储蓄，减少赤字，并且要努力改善美元作为具有IMF特别提款权的储备货币的角色。


But China’s bark was louder than its bite.	但是中国叫得响，却不一定做得实。


China’s increased financial power may have increased its ability to resist American entreaties, but despite dire predictions, its creditor role has not been sufficient to compel the US to change its policies.	尽管中国日益增长的金融实力可能会让其更有能力回拒美国的乞求，尽管有那些可怕的预测，但是中国作为债权人的角色不足以逼迫美国改变它的政策。


While China has taken minor measures to slow the increase in its dollar-denominated holdings, it has been unwilling to risk a fully convertible currency for domestic political reasons.	尽管中国并未采取很多措施来减缓其美元标价资金的增长，但是它也不想因为国内的政治原因冒险使人民币成为一种完全可兑换货币。


Thus, the renminbi is unlikely to challenge the dollar’s role as the largest component of world reserves (more than 60%) in the next decade.	这样，在未来十年，人民币不大可能挑战美元作为世界最大外汇储备货币（超过60%）的角色。


Yet, as China gradually increases domestic consumption rather than relying on exports as its engine of economic growth, its leaders may begin to feel less dependent than they now are on access to the US market as a source of job creation, which is crucial for internal political stability.	但是，随着中国逐渐增加国内消费，并减小对于其经济增长引擎——出口的依赖，中国的领导人可能会开始感到更多的自由，不再像现在那样依赖与美国市场的畅通（美国市场可以提供就业机会，这对于国内的政治稳定至关重要）。


In that case, maintaining a weak renminbi would protect the trade balance from a flood of imports.	��样的话，保持人民币的弱势地位就会保护中美贸易平衡，让其从容面对进口潮。


Asymmetries in currency markets are a particularly important aspect of economic power, since they underlie global trade and financial markets.	货币市场的非对称性是经济实力尤其重要的一方面，因为它是全球贸易和金融市场的基础。


By limiting the convertibility of its currency, China is avoiding currency markets’ ability to discipline domestic economic decisions.	通过对人民币兑换的限制，中国正在避免货币市场对于国内经济决策的惩罚。


Compare, for example, the discipline that international banks and the IMF were able to impose on Indonesia and South Korea in 1998, with the relative freedom of the US – bestowed by denomination of American debt in dollars – to increase government spending in response to the 2008 financial crisis.	例如，比较一下1998年的印尼、韩国和2008年金融危机中的美国。 想一想国际银行和国际货币基金组织能够对前面两国进行的惩罚，和美国增加政府开支来应对危机的相对自由，这个自由是美国债务的美元面值所赐予的。


Indeed, rather than weakening, the dollar has appreciated as investors regard the underlying strength of the US as a safe haven.	而且，美元非但没有疲软，还随着投资者注意到美元作为避风港的潜力而升值了。


Obviously, a country whose currency represents a significant proportion of world reserves can gain international power from that position, thanks to easier terms for economic adjustment and the ability to influence other countries.	明显地，一个国家的货币如果在世界外汇储备中占据相当大的比例，它就会因为这样的地位而获得国际权力，这要归功于针对经济调整的宽松条款和影响其它国家的能力。


As French President Charles de Gaulle once complained, “since the dollar is the reference currency everywhere, it can cause others to suffer the effects of its poor management.	正如法国总统戴高乐曾经抱怨的那样，“因为美元在哪里都是被报价币，其它国家会因为美元的管理不善而受到影响。


This is not acceptable.	这是不能接受的。


This cannot last.”	不能永远是这样。 ”


But it did.	但是美元依然是被报价币。


America’s military and economic strength reinforces confidence in the dollar as a safe haven.	美国的军事和经济实力加强了人们对于美元作为避风港的信心。


As a Canadian analyst put it, “the combined effect of an advanced capital market and a strong military machine to defend that market, and other safety measures, such as a strong tradition of property rights protection and a reputation for honoring dues, has made it possible to attract capital with great ease.”	如一位加拿大的分析家所说，“一个先进的资本市场，和一个保护这个市场的强大的军事机器，再加上其它的安全措施，比如保护产权的优良传统和按时付款的好名声，这些因素的共同作用使得美国能够很轻松地吸引资金。 ”


The G-20 is focusing on the need to “re-balance” financial flows, altering the old pattern of US deficits matching Chinese surpluses.	此次G20峰会的焦点是“重新平衡”金融流动的必要性，改变“美国赤字—中国盈余”这个旧有模式。


This would require politically difficult shifts in consumption and investment, with America increasing its savings and China increasing domestic consumption.	这要求消费和投资的改变，要求美国增加储蓄，中国增加国内消费。 这在政治上做来并不简单。


Such changes do not occur quickly.	这样的改变不会很快发生。


Neither side is in a hurry to break the symmetry of interdependent vulnerability, but both continue to jockey to shape the structure and institutional framework of their market relationship.	中美都不会立即打破靠相互依赖的弱点所形成的对称性，但是双方都会继续努力去塑造两者市场关系的结构和制度框架。


For the sake of the global economy, let us hope that neither side miscalculates.	为了全球经济，让我们祝愿哪一方都不会失算。


The Dollar’s Last Days?	美元的末日？


CAMBRIDGE – Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of the People’s Bank of China, recently suggested that replacing the dollar with the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights as the dominant reserve currency would bring greater stability to the global financial system.	剑桥——中国人民银行行长周小川近日表示，如果用特别提款权（SDR）取代美元成为主要储备货币，这将对世界金融的稳定起到积极的作用。


The idea of reforming the system by introducing a supranational reserve currency is also, it appears, supported by Russia and other emerging markets.	显然，这种将超越国界的货币作为改革储备货币的想法，得到了俄罗斯和法国，以及其他新兴市场国家的支持。


And a United Nations advisory committee chaired by the Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz has argued for a new global reserve currency, possibly one based on the SDR.	以此同时，诺贝尔奖得主约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨领导的联合国顾问委员会也提出建立了全球通用的储备货币的概念，并且表示，该货币最好是以特别提款权为基础而设立。


Transforming the dollar standard into an SDR-based system would be a major break with a policy that has lasted more than 60 years.	如果将特别提款权取代美元作为世界主要的货币，这将是60多年来一次最重要的金融改革之一。


The SDR was introduced 40 years ago to supplement what was then seen as an inadequate level of global reserves, and was subsequently enshrined in the IMF’s amended Articles of Agreement as the future principal reserve asset.	特别提款权是在40多年前开始使用，当时主要为了应对外汇储备币种的不足，这同时也是IMF改革计划的一部分，为的是将SDR作为全球主要的外汇储备币种。


But the world soon became awash in dollars.	然而，随后，美元占据了主导地位。


So, instead of becoming the principal reserve asset of the global system, the proportion of SDRs in global reserves shrank to a tiny fraction, rendering the SDR the monetary equivalent of Esperanto.	慢慢变成了世界金融系统的主要外汇储备货币。 SDR的市场份额逐渐萎缩，两者之间的关系有点类似于国际语和英语之间的关系。


Although the euro, created in 1999, turned out to be a more serious competitor to the dollar, its share in total international reserves has probably remained below 30%, compared to 65% for the dollar (these shares are in part estimates, as China, the world’s largest holder of reserves, does not report the currency composition of its holdings).	虽然，由于1999年欧元的横空出世，美元的地位受到一定得威胁，不过美元的市场份额依然高达65%，而欧元却占不到30%。 （以上的估计是根据已有的公开数据得出的，因为作为世界最大外汇储备国家的中国，并没有公布它所持币种的比例。


One possibility is a gradual, market-determined erosion of the dollar as a reserve currency in favor of the euro. But, while the euro’s international role – especially its use in financial markets – has increased since its inception, it is hard to envisage it overtaking the dollar as the dominant reserve currency in the foreseeable future.	看来，削减美元在国际货币系统中的地位有两种方法，一个是市场的自然规律，欧元的崛起会渐渐威胁到美元的霸主地位，不过，如果认为欧元会在不久的未来取代美元成为世界主要货币，这种看法还为时过早。


Such an outcome is probably only possible if two conditions are met: first, the United Kingdom joins the euro area, and, second, the United States makes serious, confidence-sapping mistakes.	只有在两种情况下，欧元才能取代美元的地位：一是英国加入欧元区，二是美国犯了非常严重的错误，让其他国家对美元失去信心。


The latter condition may already have been partially met, but US policies to stabilize its financial system should help avoid a major dollar slide.	后者可能部分地实现，但随后美国政府推出的有效政策，稳定了金融市场，防止美元地位的下滑。


Moreover, the European Central Bank has repeatedly stated that it neither encourages nor discourages the euro’s international role.	欧洲中央银行也一再表示，他们既不鼓励也不放弃将欧元作为国际货币的想法。


With the dollar’s hegemony unlikely to be seriously undermined by market forces, at least in the short and medium-term, the only way to bring about a major reduction in its role as a reserve currency is by international agreement. The Chinese proposal falls into this category.	既然美元的霸主地位不可能被市场的因素而动摇，从中短期来看，美元的地位只能被国际新的协议而降低，中国的提议正是归于此类。


One way to make the SDR the major reserve currency relatively soon would be to create and allocate a massive amount of new SDRs to the IMF’s members. While the G-20 leaders have decided to support an SDR allocation of $250 billion, this will increase the share of SDRs in total international reserves to no more than 4%.	如果在IMF的成员国中大量地推出以SDR为基础的交易，SDR的地位将会逐渐加强，在近期的20国峰会上，参会的领袖们决定推出2500亿SDR的金融方案，这将SDR在国际金融储备市场的份额增加到了4%。


In order to make the SDR the principal reserve asset via the allocation route, close to $3 trillion in SDRs would need to be created, an unrealistic proposition.	如果SDR要成为市场的主要货币的话，市值至少要到3万亿SDR，现在看来这种可能性不大。


But there is a more realistic way for the SDR’s importance to grow.	但是，为了提高SDR的市场份额，也有一些现实的操作方法。


Back in 1980, the IMF came close to adopting a so-called SDR Substitution Account.	早在1980年时候，IMF几乎采用了所谓的SDR替代帐户。


The idea was to permit countries whose official dollar holdings were larger than they were comfortable with to convert dollars into SDRs.	就是允许官方持有美元的国家自由地将美元兑换成SDR。


Conversion would occur outside the market, and thus would not put downward pressure on the dollar.	兑换是在市场外操作，以避免对美元造成压力。


Member countries would receive an asset that was more stable than the dollar, as it was based on a basket of currencies, thereby providing better protection against losses.	IMF的成员国可以收到比美元更稳定的货币，因为SDR是建立在一揽子货币的基础上的，理论上可以更好地抵抗风险。


The plan fell apart when some major IMF shareholders could not accept the burden-sharing arrangements that would be necessary in case of losses due to exchange-rate movements.	由于主要的成员国不愿意接受一些限制条件，上述计划不能得以成功。 这些限制条件目的是防范在汇率兑换市场上的损失。


The US also lost interest in the scheme as the dollar strengthened.	随着美元地位的加强，美国也对该方案失去了兴趣


What are the chances of adopting a scheme of this kind today?	现在重新实行该方案有多大的成功概率呢？


Is the US prepared to go along with a reform of the international monetary system that reduces the dollar’s role?	美国政府会同意这种削减美元地位的方案么？


Until recently, I would have considered this unlikely.	我不认为该方案会在近期会成功。


But the changed international climate, and the possibility of a bout of severe dollar weakness, could convince the US to go along with a conversion scheme that would alleviate excessive pressure on the dollar.	但随着国际大气候的改变，考虑到美元独大可能出现的系统性风险，美国也会渐渐会接受一个一揽子的货币方案，以减轻美元自身的压力。


And, apart from possible political considerations, large holders of dollars would find a substitution account attractive as a form of protection against strong fluctuations in the dollar’s value.	另外，除了政治的考量之外，一些以美元为主要储备货币的国家也会因为担心美元的动荡引起自身的损失，目前考虑到另一种���代的储备货币。


What about possible losses suffered by the Substitution Account?	但另外替代的货币是否也会有风险呢？


This can be dealt with by setting aside part of the IMF’s large gold stock.	这应该可以通过IMF建立大量的黄金储备来解决。


Even if an SDR Substitution Account is established, it is unlikely that the dollar’s share in international reserves would fall to an insignificant level.	即便SDR替代帐户建立起来，美元的市场份额也不会降低到很小的份额。


The dollar will remain important for many countries as a vehicle for intervention in foreign-exchange markets, as well as for invoicing and for denominating internationally traded securities.	一些国家仍然会用美元来作为干预外汇市场，同样将美元作为国际交易安全保障的货币。


But one can envisage a system in which international reserves are held each in roughly equal shares of dollars, euros (assuming a further gradual increase in its share), and SDRs.	不过，我们应该正确对待国际储备货币的市场份额，美元，欧元（如果市场份额有所增加的话）和SDR应该有着相同重要的地位。


While there are currently other priorities, it would be useful for the IMF to study anew an SDR substitution account and similar schemes.	如果条件合适的话，IMF应该研究出一种SDR替代帐户或是其他类似的方案。


If it does not, the debate will take place elsewhere.	如果不允许，看来有关的争论还会继续下去。


The Dollar’s Long Tail	美元的长尾


NEW DELHI – The ongoing economic crisis and the persistent deficits of the United States have increasingly called into question the dollar’s role as the world’s anchor currency.	新德里——没完没了的危机和美国赤字正在日渐威胁美元世界锚货币的地位。


Recent moves to internationalize China’s renminbi have led to anticipation of a looming shift in the global monetary system.	最近，人民币国际化的动作已经引起了人们关于全球货币体系大变迁的猜测。


Many prominent economists, including the members of a United Nations panel headed by the Nobel laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz, are recommending a “Global Reserve System” to replace the dollar’s hegemony.	许多知名经济学家——包括由诺贝尔奖获得者斯蒂格利茨领衔的联合国专家委员会成员们——建议用“全球储备体系”代替美元独大的现状。


But the long history of global anchor currencies suggests that the dollar’s days on top may be far from over.	但全球锚货币的漫长历史表明，美元的主导地位还将持续很久。


In ancient times, India ran a large trade surplus with the Roman empire.	在古代，印度对罗马帝国存在巨额贸易盈余。


As Pliny wrote in the first century: “Not a year passed in which India did not take 50 million sesterces away from Rome.”  That trade imbalance implied a continuous drain on gold and silver coin, causing shortages of these metals in Rome.	蒲林尼在1世纪时写道：“印度每年从罗马拿走5000万塞斯特斯，没有哪一年不是这样。 ”印度-罗马的贸易失衡让罗马的金币和银币持续流失，造成了金银的短缺。


In modern terms, the Romans faced a monetary squeeze.	用现在的话讲，罗马面临着货币压缩。


Rome responded by reducing the gold/silver content (the ancient equivalent of monetization), which led to sustained inflation in the empire.	罗马的应对措施是降低金银含量（即货币化的古代版），这导致罗马帝国出现了持续通胀。


But the frequent discovery of Roman coins in India suggests that Roman coinage continued to be accepted internationally long after it must have been obvious that its gold or silver content had fallen.	但印度频繁发现罗马硬币表明，罗马硬币在其金银含量早已大大下降之后很久仍被接受为国际货币。


In the sixteenth century, Spain emerged as a superpower following its conquest of South America.	16世纪，西班牙因征服南美而崛起为超级大国。


Between 1501 and 1600, 17 million kilograms of pure silver and 181,000 kilograms of pure gold flowed from the Americas to Spain, which spent the money on wars in the Netherlands and elsewhere.	1501—1600年间，1700万千克纯银和181000千克纯金从美洲流入西班牙，并被西班牙用于对荷兰和其他国家的战争。


This increase in liquidity caused both an economic boom and inflation across Europe.	此次流动性剧增在全欧洲造成了经济繁荣和通货膨胀。


Despite this wealth, Spain became increasingly indebted, eventually defaulting three times – in 1607, 1627, and 1649 – and heading into sharp geopolitical decline.	尽管财源滚滚，但西班牙仍然债务日重，并最终违约了三次——分别在1607、1627和1649年——国势也日薄西山。


Yet Spanish silver coins (known as “pieces of eight” or Spanish dollars) remained the main currency used in world trade right up to the American Revolutionary War.	但西班牙银币（被称为“八片”或西班牙元）仍作为主要货币通行于世界贸易，直到美国独立战争。


In fact, Spanish coin remained legal tender in the US until 1857 – long after Spain itself had ceased to be a major power.	事实上，在1857年以前，西班牙硬币一直是美国的法定货币，此时距离西班牙失去超级大国地位已经过去了很久。


By the middle of the nineteenth century, the world was functioning on a bi-metal system based on gold and silver.	19世纪中叶，世界在金银双本位体系的基础上运转。


But, following the British example, most major countries had shifted to a gold standard by the 1870’s.	但是，在英国的带领下，大部分主要国家在19世纪70年代进入了金本位时代。


The Bank of England stood ready to convert a pound sterling into an ounce of (11/12 fine) gold on demand.	英格兰银行时刻准备着将1英镑兑换为1盎司黄金。


That system was disrupted by World War I, but Britain went back to a gold peg in 1925.	这一体系被一战打破，但英国在1925年又回到了钉住黄金的制度。


As the Great Depression took root, however, the Bank of England was forced to choose between providing liquidity to banks and honoring the gold peg.	不过，随着大萧条的爆发，英格兰银行被迫在向银行提供流动性和维系黄金钉住制度之间做出选择。


It opted for the former in 1931.	1931年，英格兰银行选择了向银行提供流动性。


Yet pound sterling continued to be a major world currency until well after World War II.	但英镑仍然是世界主要货币，在二战结束后很长一段时间仍是如此。


Even as late as 1950 – more than a half-century after the US had replaced Britain as the world’s largest industrial power – 55% of foreign-exchange reserves were held in sterling, and many countries continued to peg their currencies to it.	即使在1950年——此时美国超越英国成为世界第一大工业国已逾半个世纪——仍有55%的外汇储备是英镑，大量国家仍选择将本国货币盯住英镑。


Three things should be clear from this history.	从历史中我们应该学到三点教训。


First, a global monetary system based on precious metals does not resolve the fundamental imbalances of a global economic system.	首先，基于贵金属的国际货币体系不能解决全球经济体系的基础性失衡问题。


Second, precious metals do not resolve the problem of inflation.	其次，贵金属不能解决通货膨胀问题。


And, finally, the anchor currency and the underlying eco-system of world trade often outlive the geopolitical decline of the anchor country by decades.	最后，锚货币及世界贸易生态系统基础通常会在锚货币发行过失去地缘政治地位很久后依然存在。


A new economic order was established after World War II, with the US as the anchor country.	二战后建立了新的经济秩序，美国成为新的锚国家。


The Bretton Woods system linked the US dollar to gold at $35 per ounce, with other currencies linked to the dollar (though occasionally allowed to make adjustments).	布雷顿森林体系将美元与黄金挂钩（35美元兑1盎司黄金），其他货币则与美元挂钩（偶尔也允许调整）。


The flaw in the system was that it underpinned global economic expansion for only as long as the US was willing to provide dollars by running up deficits – the same deficits that would eventually undermine America’s ability to maintain the $35/ounce gold price.	这一体系的确显示，它只有在美国愿意通过增加赤字提供美元的情况下才有利于全球经济扩张，而最终，赤字侵蚀了美国维持35美元/盎司的黄金价格的能力。


In 1961, the US responded by creating the London Gold Pool, which obliged other countries to reimburse the US for half of its gold losses.	1961年，美国建立了伦敦黄金储备市场（London Gold Pool），强迫其他国家偿还美国其黄金损失的一半。


But this arrangement quickly bred discontent, with France leaving the Gold Pool in 1967.	但这一安排很快就引起了不满，法国于1967年退出伦敦黄金储备市场。


The Bretton Woods system collapsed four years later.	布雷顿森林体系也在4年后崩溃。


Or did it?	果真如此吗？


Despite the problems of the 1970’s, the dollar remained the world’s dominant currency, with successive generations of Asian countries pegging their exchange rates to it.	尽管在20世纪70年代遇到了问题，但美元仍然是世界主导货币，亚洲国家纷纷将本币汇率盯住美元。


As with the Bretton Woods system, a peripheral economy (for example, China) could grow very rapidly even as the anchor economy (the US) enjoyed cheap financing.	与布雷顿森林体系一样，外围经济体（比如中国）可以在锚经济体（美国）享受廉价融资的同时快速增长。


China’s relative rise did not diminish the dollar’s role – and may even have enhanced it.	中国的相对崛起不但未影响，甚至强化了美元的地位。


Indeed, like the Japanese during their period of rapid growth, the Chinese have, until recently, resisted internationalization of the renminbi.	事实上，与处于快速增长阶段的日本相似，如今中国正在抵制人民币的国际化。


So, are we entering a post-dollar world?	那么，我们正在进入后美元时代吗？


Despite all of the pain caused by the Great Recession, there is no sign that the world is forsaking the greenback.	尽管大衰退造成了诸多阵痛，但没有迹象表明世界正在抛弃美元。


Investors remain willing to finance the US at rock-bottom interest rates, and the nominal trade-weighted index of the dollar has not collapsed.	投资者仍然愿意以低得不能再低的利率向美国提供资金，名义贸易加权美元指数也没有出现崩溃。


Even if China replaces the US as the world’s largest economy within a decade, an anchor currency can be more resilient than the economic and geopolitical dominance of its country of origin.	就算中国在十年内取代美国成为世界第一大经济体，锚货币也比经济和地缘政治的主导地位更加持久。


That is why the dollar will most likely remain the dominant global currency long after the US has been surpassed.	因此，即使美国被超越，美元仍有很大可能将继续长期充当全球主要货币。


The Unloved Dollar Standard	不受欢迎的美元本位


PALO ALTO – Since World War II’s end, the US dollar has been used to invoice most global trade, serving as the intermediary currency for clearing international payments among banks and dominating official foreign-exchange reserves.	帕罗奥图—二战结束以来，美元一直是全球贸易的记账货币、银行间国际收支的清算媒介，也是最主要的正式外汇储备货币。


This arrangement has often been criticized, but is there any viable alternative?	这一安排经常受到批判，但存在可行的替代方案吗？


The problem for post-WWII Europe, mired in depression and inflation, was that it lacked foreign reserves, which meant that trade carried a high opportunity cost.	二战结束后，欧洲陷入了萧条和通胀，其问题在于缺少外汇储备，而这意味着贸易存在巨大的机会成本。


To facilitate trade without requiring payment after each transaction, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation created the European Payments Union in 1950.	为了在不要求每笔交易都实现资金收付的情况下促进贸易，欧洲经济合作组织在1950年成立了欧洲支付同盟（EPU）。


Supported by a dollar-denominated line of credit, the EPU’s 15 Western European member states established exact dollar exchange-rate parities as a prelude to anchoring their domestic price levels and removing all currency restrictions on intra-European trade.	EPU受美元计价信用支持，其15个西欧成员国建立了精确的美元汇率平价，以此作为锚定国内价格水平和消除一切欧洲内部贸易货币障碍的基础。


This formed the keystone of the hugely successful European Recovery Program (the Marshall Plan), through which the US helped to rebuild Europe’s economies.	这便是获得巨大成功的欧洲复兴计划（即马歇尔计划，美国帮助欧洲国家重振经济）的基石。


Today, most developing economies, with the exception of a few Eastern European countries, still choose to anchor their domestic macroeconomic arrangements by stabilizing their exchange rates against the dollar, at least intermittently. Meanwhile, to avoid exchange-rate conflict, the US Federal Reserve typically stays out of the currency markets.	如今，除了少数东亚国家之外，大部分发展中国家仍然选择将本国宏观经济安排之锚设定为（至少是间歇性地）稳定对美元汇率。


But the dollar’s role as international anchor is beginning to falter, as emerging markets everywhere grow increasingly frustrated by the Fed’s near-zero interest-rate policy, which has caused a flood of “hot” capital inflows from the US.	但美元作为国际锚的作用正在减弱，因为其他新兴市场国家越来越不满足于美联储的近零利率政策——这导致“热”资本从美国涌入。


That, in turn, has fueled sharp exchange-rate appreciation and a loss of international competitiveness – unless the affected central banks intervene to buy dollars.	这反过来助长了剧烈的汇率升值和国际竞争力损失——除非受影响国家的央行出手干预买入美元。


Indeed, since late 2003, when the Fed first cut interest rates to 1%, triggering the US housing bubble, dollar reserves in emerging markets have increased six-fold, reaching $7 trillion by 2011.	事实上，自2003年末美联储首次将利率削减至1%从而引发美国房地产泡沫以来，新兴市场的美元储备增加了六倍，2011年达到了7万亿美元。


The resulting expansion in emerging markets’ monetary base has led to much higher inflation in these countries than in the US, and to global commodity-price bubbles, particularly for oil and staple foods.	由此带来的新兴市场基础货币的增加导致这些国家通胀远高于美国，也导致了全球商品价格泡沫，特别是石油和粮食。


But the US is also unhappy with the way the dollar standard is functioning.	但美国也对美元本位的运转情况不满。


Whereas other countries can choose to intervene in order to stabilize their exchange rates with the world’s principal reserve currency, the US, in order to maintain consistency in rate setting, does not have the option to intervene, and lacks its own exchange-rate policy.	其他国家可以实施干预以稳定本币对世界主要储备货币的汇率，但美国为了保持与利率设定的一致性，不能出手干预，也缺少自身的汇率政策。


Moreover, the US protests other countries’ exchange-rate policies.	此外，美国反对其他国家的汇率政策。


Two decades ago, the US pressed the Japanese to allow the yen to strengthen against the dollar, claiming that Japan’s unfair exchange-rate policies were responsible for America’s ballooning bilateral trade deficit.	二十年前，美国向日本施压，要求后者允许日元对美元升值，声称日本不公平的汇率政策是美国双边贸易赤字激增的原因。


Likewise, today’s “China-bashing” in the US – which has intensified as China’s contribution to America’s trade deficit has soared – is intended to force the Chinese authorities to allow faster renminbi appreciation.	类似地，如今的“中国冲击”论——随着美国贸易赤字的中国因素日益增加，这一论调也甚嚣尘上——也试图迫使中国当局加快人民币升值步伐。


Herein lies the great paradox.	这里存在一个大悖论。


Although no one likes the dollar standard, governments and private market participants still consider it the best option.	尽管没人喜欢美元本位，但政府和私人市场参与者仍认为这是最佳选择。


In fact, US trade deficits are primarily the result of insufficient, mainly government, saving – not a misaligned exchange rate, as economists have led policymakers to believe.	事实上，美国贸易赤字的根本原因是储蓄不足，主要是政府储蓄不足，而不是经济学家诱导决策者所认为的汇率不一致。


Large US budget deficits during Ronald Reagan’s presidency generated the famous twin fiscal and trade deficits of the 1980’s.	里根总统任期内美国的巨大预算赤字造成了20世纪80年代著名的财政和贸易双赤字。


This, not an undervalued yen, caused the bilateral deficit with Japan to widen in the 1980’s and 1990’s.	这，而不是被低估的日元，才是导致对日双边赤字在20世纪八九十年代扩大的原因。


The much larger US fiscal deficits of the new millennium, courtesy of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, portend large – and indefinite – trade deficits.	进入新千年，小布什和奥巴马任期中的美国财政赤字要大得多，这预示着大规模——不确定会有多少——贸易赤字。


But American policymakers continue to blame China, claiming that the renminbi has been undervalued for the last decade.	但美国决策者仍在谴责中国，声称人民币被低估了十年。


The claim that exchange-rate appreciation will reduce a country’s trade surplus is false, because, in globally integrated economies, domestic investment falls when the exchange rate appreciates.	认为汇率升值会减少一国贸易盈余的观点是错误的，因为在全球一体化的经济中，国内投资会随汇率的升值而下降。 因此，对中国冲击厌恶是毫无根据的。


So the ill will that China-bashing is generating is for nothing.	更糟糕的是，这导致政治关注点从美国的巨额财政赤字——2012年高达1.


Worse, it detracts political attention from America’s huge fiscal deficit – $1.2 trillion (7.7% of GDP) in 2012 – and thus impedes any serious effort to rein in future spending for entitlements, such as health care and pensions.	2万亿美元（或GDP的7. 7%）——上移开，从而妨碍了限制未来开支和福利（如医保和养老金）的措施。


Some contend that large fiscal deficits do not matter if the US can exploit its central position under the dollar standard –& that is, if it finances its deficits by selling Treasury bonds to foreign central banks at near-zero interest rates.	有人认为大额财政赤字无关紧要，只要美国能充分利用其在美元本位下的核心地位——也就是说，只要它能通过向外国央行以近零利率兜售国债为赤字融资。


But America’s ongoing trade deficits with highly industrialized countries, particularly in Asia, are accelerating de-industrialization in the US, while providing fodder for American protectionists.	但美国对高度工业化国家（特别是亚洲）的持续贸易赤字正在导致美国去工业化加速，同时为美国保护主义者制造着借口。


Indeed, America’s trade deficit in manufactures is roughly equal to its current-account deficit (the amount by which domestic investment exceeds domestic saving).	事实上，美国制造业贸易赤字大约与其经常项目赤字（国内投资高于国内储蓄的值）相当。


So those concerned with job losses in US manufacturing should join the chorus lobbying for a much smaller fiscal deficit.	因此，担心美国制造业岗位流失者应该鼓吹降大大降低财政赤字才对。


Can large US fiscal deficits and near-zero interest rates be justified because they help to revive domestic economic growth and job creation?	美国巨额财政赤字和近零利率能振兴国内经济增长和就业创造，因而打有必要，这种观点正确吗？


Five years after the credit crunch of 2007-2008, it seems that they cannot.	从2007—2008信贷动荡后的五年来看，答案是否定的。


And, without even that justification, the latest wave of criticism of the US dollar standard appears set to rise further – and to stimulate the search for a “new” arrangement.	此外，即使没有这一观点的论证，对美元本位的最新批判也会走得更远，并刺激对“新”安排的探索。


But the best new arrangement – and possibly the only feasible one – would follow an old formula: as in the 1950’s and 1960’s, the US would set moderately positive and stable interest rates, with sufficient domestic saving to generate a (small) trade surplus.	但最佳新安排——或许也是唯一可行的新安排——将跟在旧模式后亦步亦趋：正如20世纪五六十年代，美国将把利率设定在略正的稳定水平，以充足的国内储蓄催生（小规模）贸易盈余。


The cooperation of China, now the world’s largest exporter and US creditor, is essential for easing and encouraging the transition to this nirvana.	目前已是世界出口冠军兼美国最大债权人的中国的合作对于这一涅槃过程的加速和刺激是至关重要的。


Apart from the ongoing euro crisis, a stable renminbi/dollar exchange rate is the key to renewed (dollar) exchange-rate stability throughout Asia and Latin America – as envisaged in the original 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement.	撇开尚在发酵的欧元危机，稳定的人民币/美元汇率是亚洲和拉美的新（美元）汇率稳定的关键——一如1944年布雷顿森林协定的设想。


The Domestic Logic of Iran’s Foreign Plots	伊朗外交阴谋的国内逻辑


WASHINGTON, DC – Though Saudi Ambassador Adel al-Jubeir is alive and well in Washington, the plot to assassinate him may have succeeded – if its aim was not to kill al-Jubeir, but rather Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy.	发自华盛顿——虽然沙特驻美大使阿德尔·朱拜尔在美国宣称挫败的暗杀阴谋中毫发未伤，但如果这一行动的真正目标并不是朱拜尔，而是为了破坏伊朗总统内贾德的外交政策的话，那么策划者的目的或许已经实现了。


The history of the Islamic Republic is filled with cases of factions exploiting foreign policy to gain power against their domestic rivals.	在伊朗伊斯兰共和国的历史上不乏各派利用外交政策增强实力兼打击国内政敌的例子。


It is common for competing groups to sacrifice national interests – such as Iran’s international credibility – to achieve their own goals.	敌对派别为实现自身目的而不惜牺牲国家利益（比如伊朗国际信誉）的行为更是家常便饭。


During the Iran-Iraq war, Ronald Reagan’s national security adviser, Robert McFarlane, paid a clandestine visit to Iran with the approval of the country’s highest authorities, to pursue a deal that would have been to Iran’s advantage.	在两伊战争期间， 罗纳德·里根的国家安全顾问罗伯特·麦克法兰曾在伊朗最高权力机构的批准下密访德黑兰，并有望达成一项有利于伊朗的密约。


But anti-American elements in the government leaked the news to an Arab newspaper, killing the deal and landing both the Reagan administration and the Iranian government in huge trouble.	谁知伊朗政府内部的反美派却把这一消息泄漏给了一家阿拉伯报纸，不但生生搅黄了整个事件，还令里根政府和伊朗方面都倒了大霉。


Mir Hossein Mousavi, the former prime minister who now leads the opposition, spelled out the problem more than 20 years ago.	伊朗前总理、现反对派领袖米尔-侯赛因·穆萨维早在20年前就指出了这一问题。


On September 5, 1988, he resigned in protest against then-president Ali Khamenei’s interference in his duties.	1988年9月5日，穆萨维因不满时任总统的阿里·哈梅内伊对其工作横加干涉而愤然辞职。


In his resignation letter, Mousavi complained that the “government’s authority on foreign policy was taken away.” He charged that	在离职信中穆萨维抱怨“政府制定外交政策的权力被剥夺了”，他控诉说：


“[military and intelligence] operations outside the country are taking place without the government’s knowledge or orders....Only after an airplane is hijacked are we made aware of it.	“伊朗在国外的（军事和间谍）行动都是在政府不知情或未下令的情况下执行的…直到客机被劫，我们才知道有这个行动。


Only after a machine gun opens fire in one of Lebanon’s streets and its noise echoes everywhere do we find out.	直到枪声回荡在黎巴嫩街头，我们才知道已经开火了。


Only after [Saudi police] find explosive material in Iranian pilgrims’ baggage am I informed.”	直到（沙特警方）在伊朗朝圣者的香袋中找到了炸药，我才知道此事。 ”


Iranian intelligence has assassinated more than 400 Iranian dissidents outside of Iran, including the last prime minister under the Shah, Shapour Bakhtiar, and four Kurds in Berlin’s Mikonos restaurant in 1992 (a German judge later officially named Iran’s Supreme Leader as one of the senior officials involved in the terrorist attack).	伊朗情报部门已经在海外刺杀了超过400名本国异见分子，包括在1992年刺杀了伊朗巴列维王朝的最后一任首相巴赫提亚尔以及住在柏林Mikonos 酒店的4名库尔德人（事后一位德国法官正式声明伊朗哈梅内伊是涉及这起恐怖事件的伊朗高级领导人之一）。


Similarly, the Quds Force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has carried out hundreds of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and elsewhere.	而伊朗革命卫队的圣城旅也已经在伊拉克，阿富汗，黎巴嫩及世界其他地区执行了数百起行动。


By contrast, the plot targeting al-Jubeir seems to have been highly unprofessional, almost unconcerned with success.	相比上述袭击，日前这起行刺朱拜尔的阴谋就显得十分业余了，甚至几乎没想过要成功完成任务。


So unlikely are the details that only a power struggle within Iran could justify it.	行凶手法与以往差异如此之大，只有将其归结为伊朗内部权力斗争才能说得通。


If so, the plot’s target likely was not al-Jubeir himself, but rather those elements in the regime that seek a diplomatic opening to the US – namely, Ahmadinejad and his circle.	如果这个推测正确的话，那么阴谋的目标自然不是朱拜尔，而是政府内部致力于亲美外交的派系——内贾德及其党羽。


When news about the assassination plot first appeared, the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, was on his way to the western province of Kermanshah.	最高领袖阿里·哈梅内伊是在前往伊朗西部城市科曼莎的路上听到了这起暗杀消息的。


In his first speech after the story broke, he made no reference to it, most likely expecting the president to make a statement.	但他在事发后的首场演说中并未做出任何评论，很可能是在等总统表态，但等来的却是内贾德方面长达两天的刻意沉默。


After two days of Ahmadinejad’s meaningful silence, Khamenei felt forced to reject the US allegations publicly.	最终哈梅内伊承受不住压力，只好开始公开反驳美国的指责。


Only after five days did Ahmadinejad issue a statement denying the accusations – and not as strongly as did Khamenei.	而直到事发后第五天，内贾德才发布了一份反驳美国指控的声明——其中表达的立场还不如哈梅内伊强硬。


It is ironic to see Iran’s radical Islamist president portray himself as open to resuming US-Iran relations and suffer for it at the hands of a supposedly pragmatic Supreme Leader.	看着那位走极端伊斯兰主义路线的伊朗总统一面声称自己敞开怀抱修复美伊关系，一面又仿佛因此而受到一位据说相当务实的最高领袖的迫害，实在是够讽刺的。


But Ahmadinejad is no exception to the historical rule in Iran: every faction that loses out to its domestic rivals looks beyond the country for an alliance with outside powers.	实际上，内贾德并没有超越伊朗的历史法则：任何一个不敌其国内政敌的派别都会转而寻求外国盟友的支持。


In the Islamic Republic, those interested in opening up to the West are typically those with little authority.	在伊朗，那些亲西方的派别都是些没有多大权威的。


Ahmadinejad and his faction face a two-edged problem: Khamenei has boxed them in politically, while rampant economic corruption and failed efforts at reform have disillusioned many of the president’s supporters.	内贾德及其派别面临着一个两难困境：在政治上，哈梅内伊已经重创了他们； 在经济上，腐败猖獗，改革失败又让很多总统支持者心灰意冷。


As a result, Ahmadinejad, in a further ironic twist, is seeking to glorify Iran’s pre-Islamic history in order to stir nationalist sentiment in his favor and accomplish what he is sure that Khamenei does not want: greater openness to the West, particularly to the US.	于是更讽刺的是，内贾德开始大肆美化伊朗伊斯兰共和国建立前的历史，试图以此激发国内民族主义情绪来拉自己一把，并��此达成哈梅内伊必定不愿接受的目标：伊朗对西方，特别是美国更深程度的开放。


He has repeatedly expressed his willingness to meet with US President Barack Obama – even sending him a congratulatory letter on his inauguration – and has traveled to New York to be interviewed by the American media much more often than his predecessors.	也因为这样，他才会反复表示愿意与美国总统奥巴马会晤——甚至写信祝贺奥巴马当选——而且还前往纽约接受比历任伊朗总统更高频率的美国媒体采访。


Ahmadinejad is well aware that if he succeeds in portraying himself as someone who – in opposition to the Supreme Leader’s will – wants to solve major issues between Iran and the US, that could partly compensate for his economic failures and gain him some new supporters.	内贾德深知，如果他能成功扮演一个敢于和最高领袖唱对台戏——同时致力于解决美伊两国之间重大问题的角色，那将能部分弥补其经济政策的失败并争取到一些新的支持者。


For that plan to work, Ahmadinejad needs to survive through the next parliamentary election in March 2012 and the presidential election in June 2013, despite Khamenei’s determination to marginalize him.	如果要实现这一计划，已经被哈梅内伊边缘化的内贾德就必须同时拿下2012年3月的国会大选和2013年6月的总统大选。


Regardless of whether Khamenei was aware of the plot against al-Jubeir, its purpose was to delegitimize Ahmadinejad’s foreign-policy agenda.	且不论哈梅内伊事前是否知道刺杀朱贝尔的阴谋，其目的是很明显的，就是为了扰乱内贾德的外交政策议程。


So, if Khamenei really was unaware of the plot, it means that some elements in the government or the Revolutionary Guards are acting on their own, which is deeply troubling in its own right.	倘若哈梅内伊事前确不知情，那就意味着政府或革命自卫队内部某些感到权力受威胁的团体已经单独开始了行动。


If there are elements powerful enough to plan such a plot – even an unsuccessful one – they could do it again in the future.	如果这些团体有能力策划这样的阴谋——尽管未能成功——那么他们将来自然也会重施故伎。


That raises an even more troubling question: If such “independent” decision-makers exist, are they able to affect Iran’s nuclear policy, too? 	那将引出一个更为麻烦问题：如果真有这样的“独立”决策者存在，他们是否也会插手伊朗的核政策呢？


The Domestic Wars of Hosni Mubarak	胡斯尼·穆巴拉克的国内战争


The decision by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s government to try two senior judges for blowing the whistle on vote rigging in last autumn’s parliamentary elections has rocked the country.	埃及总统胡斯尼·穆巴拉克领导的政府审判两名高级法官的决定在埃及国内掀起了一场轩然大波，这两名法官之所以被起诉是因为他们揭露了去年秋天议会选举中的舞弊行为。


Massive crowds have gathered to support the judges – and have caught Mubarak’s regime completely unaware.	大批群众举行集会支持这两名法官¾¾这种结果是穆巴拉克政府完全没有预料到的。


Mubarak’s government now seems to be backtracking as fast as it can.	穆巴拉克政府现在正忙不迭地做出让步。


Judge Mahmoud Mekki has been acquitted, and Judge Hisham al-Bastawisy, who suffered a heart attack the night before, has merely been reprimanded.	马哈穆德·米基（Mahmoud Mekki）法官被判无罪，而头天晚上突发心脏病的希沙姆·阿尔巴什塔维基（Hisham al-Bastawisy）法官则只受到了象征性的申斥。


Yet Cairo remains restless, and the government fears another outpouring of support for democracy, as the judges have called for renewed nationwide demonstrations.	可是开罗仍不太平，政府害怕会引发新一轮支持民主的运动，因为法官们已经呼吁公众发起全国性的示威游行。


Egyptian judges have a long-standing tradition of discretion and propriety. But they feel abused by government efforts to sugarcoat the manipulation of election after election by claiming that judges supervise the voting.	埃及法官自古以来就有独立决策的传统，政府在一次又一次操纵选举后还哄骗公众，称选举是在法官的严格监督下进行的，这使法官们感受到了莫大的屈辱。


What makes their struggle loom so large for a normally quiescent Egyptian public is partly that nearly all 9,000 judges are standing fast in solidarity.	但又是什么让法官们的斗争在原本平静的埃及公众中引起那么强烈的反响？ 9，000多名法官团结一致地进行绝食恐怕是一个重要原因。


Their representative body, the Judges’ Club, has long pushed for a new law to restore judicial independence.	作为全体法官的代表，法官俱乐部坚持不懈地争取通过新的法律，恢复司法的独立性。


Now the judges are insisting on their independence by themselves.	现在，法官们终于自己站出来，要求获得不受干扰的独立裁决权。


The Mubarak regime is adamantly opposed, and resorts to extra-judicial means, such as emergency courts and national security and military courts, which do not observe international standards.	法官们的要求遭到了穆巴拉克政府的坚决抵制，政府甚至不惜动用紧急法庭和国家安全及军事法庭等等根本不符合国际惯例的非法手段。


Contrary to his campaign promises during his run for a fifth term as President, Mubarak has requested (and his rubber-stamp parliament has granted) a two-year extension of the Emergency Law by which Egypt has been ruled throughout his presidency.	穆巴拉克没有遵守竞选第5任总统时许下的诺言，要求把紧急状态法再延长两年。 在穆巴拉克执政期间，埃及一直受到紧急状态法的统治。


It is to this law, above all, that the judges and Egypt’s civil society object.	埃及的法官和平民社会最不能容忍的就是这项法案。


The Emergency Law has been in force since the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in October 1981, and Mubarak claims that he needs another extension to combat terrorism.	1981年10月安瓦尔·萨达特(Anwar Sadat)总统遇刺身亡后，埃及就一直处在紧急状态法的统治之下，现在穆巴拉克再一次提出延期，理由是需要应对恐怖主义。


But, according to a recent human rights report, despite the Emergency Law, 89 people were killed and 236 wounded in terrorist attacks in Egypt during the previous 12 months.	但根据最近的人权报告，尽管实施了紧急状态法，但在过去12个月内埃及仍有89人在恐怖袭击中丧生、另外还有236人受伤。


In neighboring Israel, which is still in a struggle with the Palestinians, only 18 were killed and 25 wounded in similar attacks during the same period. Yet Israelis do not live under an emergency law.	而在相邻的以色列，尽管与巴勒斯坦的斗争仍未结束，相同期间内在类似袭击事件中死亡的却仅有18人，受伤仅25人，更重要的是，以色列根本没有实行紧急状态法。


Consider, moreover, that at the height of the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1973, Egypt’s armed forces stood at one million troops.	此外，1973年阿以冲突处在顶峰时，埃及的武装部队力量曾经超过百万。


Now only 350,000 serve in the military, while the internal security police recently hit the one-million mark.	如今军队服役人员仅有350，000人，而国内安全警察的数量却突破了百万大关。


Mubarak’s first internal war was with Islamic militants during his early years in power, but he now finds himself caught in three more domestic wars.	穆巴拉克早年执政期间，曾与伊斯兰好战分子展开第一场内战，如今他又陷入了另外两场内战的泥潭。


The battle with the judges has incited enough popular unrest to warrant Mubarak’s deployment of thousands of black-uniformed central security forces in the heart of Cairo.	与法官们的斗争所激起的公众骚乱使穆巴拉克顺理成章地在开罗市中心部署了成千上万名身穿黑色警服的中央安全部队。


This deployment, lasting three weeks so far, is already longer than the combined duration of the last two wars with Israel.	这一部署迄今为止已经持续了三个星期，比最近两次与以色列作战加起来的时间还要长。


Another domestic war, with the Egyptian Bedouins of Sinai, broke out two years ago.	两年前爆发了另外一次与埃及西奈贝多因人的内战。


Taking their cue from their Palestinian neighbors, if not from al-Qaeda, alienated young Bedouins apparently decided to rebel against their treatment as third-class citizens.	受到邻国巴勒斯坦斗争的启示（如果不是受到基地组织的启示），被排斥在主流社会之外的贝多因人显然决意反抗他们所受到的三等公民待遇。


All around them, but especially in the ebullient resorts of southern Sinai, billions are spent on roads, airports, and beaches; sizeable parcels of land are allocated generously to rich Egyptians from the Nile Valley and to foreigners, but not to Sinai natives.	就在他们身边，尤其是在西奈南部一片欢腾的度假胜地，几百上千亿的投资被用来修路、建设机场和海滩，大片大片的土地被慷慨地划拨给来自尼罗河谷的埃及富商和国外投资者，但土生土长的西奈人却无法从中得到任何好处。


Indeed, Sinai Bedouins have the right of use but not ownership of land, because a lethargic, occasionally corrupt bureaucracy still deems the Sinai a military zone and its natives’ loyalty questionable.	实际上，西奈的贝多因人有权使用却无权占有土地，因为行事昏庸、不时贪污腐化的政府似乎把西奈看作一块军事领地，根本不相信西奈人对国家的忠诚。


Two years ago, on the anniversary of the war of October 1973, young Sinai militants bombed the Taba Hilton. Last July, on another national holiday, they hit three tourist spots not far from the Mubarak family compound in Sharm el-Sheikh.	两年前，在1973年10月战争爆发的纪念日，年轻的西奈好战分子炸毁了塔巴希尔顿（Taba Hilton）饭店，去年7月，他们又袭击了沙姆沙伊赫(Sharm el Sheikh)离穆巴拉克家庭院不远的三处旅游景点。


These symbolic as well as lethal warnings to a family that has grown Pharaonic in scale, style, and power have gone unheeded.	但他们对这个无论从规模、形式还是权力都越来越具有独裁特色的家庭所发出的具有象征意义的致命警告却还没有引起应有的重视。


The third recent domestic war, this one over Christian Coptic citizenship rights, has been brewing for years.	不久前爆发的第三次内战涉及信奉基督教的科普特人的公民权，这次内战已经酝酿了几个年头。


Copts are the original Egyptians, and they were the majority population until the tenth century.	科普特人是埃及土著，十世纪以前一直是这里的主要人口。


As Egypt was Arabized and Islamized, the Copts became a minority in their original homeland.	但随着埃及日益阿拉伯化和伊斯兰化，科普特人在他们原来的土地上慢慢变成了少数民族。


In Mubarak’s Egypt, citizens’ legal equality, while stipulated in the constitution, is not respected or observed, especially with regard to the construction and protection of Coptic churches.	在穆巴拉克统治下的埃及，尽管宪法规定了公民在法律面前权利平等，但在实际生活中却从未得到尊重或执行，尤其在涉及到修建和保护科普特教堂时更是如此。


Last November, when Muslim zealots attacked a Coptic church in Alexandria, several Copts were injured.	去年11月，穆斯林狂热分子对亚历山大港的科普特教堂发动袭击，导致好几名科普特人受伤。


Six months later, a fanatic targeted three churches during Sunday services, killing a few worshippers and injuring many.	短短6个月后，又一名狂热分子在周日礼拜时袭击了三座教堂，造成数名教徒无辜丧命，很多人因此受伤。


Copts marched in the streets of Alexandria for the next three days, protesting the security authorities’ leniency toward the culprits, the scapegoating of their community, or even an official hand in the attacks to justify an extension of the Emergency Law.	科普特人在亚历山大港的街道上举行了为期三天的示威游行，抗议安全当局对施暴者心慈手软，对科普特人沦为暴行的牺牲品听之任之，更有甚者，当局甚至对恐怖袭击给予某种形式的官方协助，目的是为继续执行紧急状态法寻找借口。


Hosni Mubaraks’ four domestic wars are fuelled by Egypt’s excluded, who are increasingly in rebellion against a regime that has long outlived its legitimate mandate.	被排除在主流社会之外的埃及民众发动了对胡斯尼·穆巴拉克的四次内战。 他们对这个早就该寿终正寝的非法政权越来越不满。


The battle with the judges may well prove to be Mubarak’s Achilles’ heel.	法官之争很可能成为穆巴拉克一个致命的软肋。


Justice is a central value for Egyptians, and its absence is at the core of all protests.	公正是所有埃及人翘首企盼的核心价值观，而缺乏公正是导致所有抗议活动的核心源泉。


There can be no evidence more compelling than the unprecedented numbers of people who have rallied peacefully in solidarity with the judges.	前所未有的大批民众无声无息地与法官们站在一起，就是对这种说法最为有力的证明。


America’s Labor Market by the Numbers	通过数字看美国劳动力市场


NEWPORT BEACH – Politicians and economists now join investors in a ritual that typically takes place on the first Friday of each month and has important consequences for global markets: anticipating, internalizing, and reacting to the monthly employment report released by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).	纽波特海滩—如今，政客和经济学家加入了一个仪式，这个仪式原本属于投资者，在每月的第一个星期五进行，并且对全球市场产生重要影响：对美国劳工统计局（BLS）公布的月度就业报告进行预测、内部化并据之反应。


Over the last few years, the report has evolved in a significant way – not only providing an assessment of the economy’s past and current state, but, increasingly, containing insights into its future as well.	在国务几年中，该报告出现了一种重要的新模式——不但提供经济过去和当前的就业率评估，还越来越多地提供对未来趋势的洞见


Think of the BLS’s employment report as a comprehensive monthly check-up for the American labor market.	BLS就业报告可以作为对美国劳动力市场全面的月度检视。


Among its many interesting statistics, it tells you how many jobs are created and where; how earnings and hours worked are evolving; and the number, age, and education of those seeking employment.	在该报告的众多有趣的统计数字中，你可以找到在哪里创造了多少新就业岗位、收入和工作时间如何变化、以及找工作群体的数量、年龄和教育程度。


Despite the data’s richness, only two indicators consistently attract widespread attention: net monthly job creation (which amounted to 169,000 in August) and the unemployment rate (7.3% in August, the lowest since December 2008).	尽管数据十分丰富，但只有两个指标一直吸引着广泛的注意力：每月就业岗位净创造值（8月为169 000个）和失业率（8月为7. 3%，为2008年12月以来最低值）。


Together they point to a gradual and steady improvement in overall labor-market conditions.	这两个数据表明总体劳动力市场条件在缓慢但稳健地改善。


This is certainly good news.	这当然是好消息。


It is not long ago that job creation was negative and the unemployment rate stood at 10%.	不久前，就业岗位创造还是负水平，失业率也高居10%。


The problem is that the headline numbers shed only partial light on what may lie ahead.	问题在于，标题数字只能提供未来的片面图景。


The figure for monthly job creation, for example, is distorted by the growing importance of part-time employment, and it fails to convey the reality of stagnant earnings. Meanwhile, the headline unemployment rate does not reflect the growing number of Americans who have left the work force – a phenomenon vividly reflected by the decline in the labor participation rate to just 63.2%, a 35-year low.	比如，月度就业岗位创造数字因为兼职岗位的日益重要而被扭曲，无法表现收入停滞的现实与此同时，标题失业率也没有反映越来越多的美国人退出了劳动力大军——这一现象生动地体现在劳动力参与率中，该指标只有63.


To get a real sense of the labor market’s health, we need to look elsewhere in the BLS’s report.	为了获得关于劳动力市场健康状况的真实图景，我们需要研究BLS报告的其他部分。


What these other numbers have to tell us – about both the present and the future – is far from reassuring.	其他数字——既有关于现在的数字，也有关于未来数字——所表现的出来的图景不容乐观。


Consider the statistics on the duration of unemployment.	就拿事业持续时间的数字来说吧。


After all, the longer one is unemployed, the harder it is to find a full-time job at a decent wage.	毕竟，一个人失业时间越长，找到收入体面的全职工作就越难。


In August, the BLS classified 4.3 million Americans as long-term unemployed, or 37.9% of the total unemployed – a worrisome figure, given that the global financial crisis was five years ago.	8月，LBS将430万美国人归于长期失业，他们站总失业人口的37. 9%——这个比例令人担忧，因为全球金融危机已经过去五年了。


And, remember, this number excludes all the discouraged Americans who are no longer looking for a job.	此外，不要忘了，这个数字并没有包括太沮丧以至于放弃寻找工作的美国人。


In fact, the more comprehensive employment/population ratio stands at only 58.6%.	事实上，更全面的就业人口/总人口比例只有58. 6%。


The teenage-unemployment rate is another under-appreciated indicator that is at an alarming level.	二十岁以下失业率是另一个未引起足够重视但足以让人警觉的数字。


At 22.7%, too many American teenagers, lacking steady work experience early in their professional careers, risk going from unemployed to unemployable.	美国二十岁以下人群中有高达22. 7%的人在职业生涯早期没能找到稳定的工作，这意味着他们可能从失业者变成无就业能力者。


Then there are the indicators that link educational attainment and employment status.	再来看看表现教育水平和就业状况的联系的数据。


Most notable here is the growing gap between those with a college degree (where the unemployment rate is only 3.5%) and those lacking a high school diploma (11.3%).	在这方面，最令人关注的是拥有大学学历者（失业率只有3. 5%）和高中以下学历者（11.


Rather than confirming the paradigm of gradual and steady improvement, these disaggregated numbers attest to a highly segmented, multi-speed labor market – one with features that could become more deeply embedded in the structure of the economy.	这些分散的数据告诉我们，劳动力市场的状况绝不是缓慢而稳健的改善，而是处于分裂、速度各异的状态——其特征更能体现经济的结构。


If current trends persist, the BLS’s report will continue to evolve from a snapshot of the past and present to a preview of the future.	如果当前趋势持续，BLS报告将进一步从关于未来和现在的快照转变为关于未来的预览。


Undoubtedly, the US labor market’s uneven recovery has much to do with the structural and policy gaps exposed by the 2008 global financial crisis and the recession that followed.	毫无疑问，美国劳动力市场的复苏之所以不平均，很大程度上要归因于2008年全球金融危机及其后的衰退所暴露的结构和政策差异。


The economy is still struggling to provide a sufficient number of jobs for those who were previously employed in leverage-driven activities that are no longer sustainable (let alone desirable).	在向此前因为不可持续（更不用说值得追求）的杠杆推动的行为才找到工作的人提供工作岗位方面，经济仍陷于停滞状态。


Moreover, US schools, particularly at the primary and secondary levels, continue to slip down the global scale, constraining Americans’ ability to benefit from globalization.	此外，美国的学校，特别是小学和初衷，仍落后于全球水平，这制约了美国人从全球化中获益的能力。


Meanwhile, existing and newly created jobs provide less of an earnings upside.	与此同时，现有和新创造岗位给的薪水都不高。


And political polarization narrows the scope for effective tactical and structural policy responses.	而政治两极分化又制约了采取有效策略性和结构性政策应对的空间。


This combination of factors is particularly burdensome for the most vulnerable segments of the US population – particularly those with limited educational attainment, first-time labor-market entrants, and those who have been out of work for an extended period.	这些因素的组合对美国人口中最脆弱部分带来的冲击最大——特别是文化程度有限者、初次进入劳动力市场者、失业已有相当长时间者。


So while net job creation will continue and the unemployment rate will maintain its downward trajectory – both highly welcome – the labor market’s evolution risks fueling rather than countering already-significant income and wealth inequalities, as well as poverty.	因此，尽管净就业创造仍在增加，失业率仍将持续下降趋势——这两个现象都值得庆贺——但劳动力市场更有可能加剧而不是减小已经很大的收入和财富不平等以及贫困。


Overburdened social support mechanisms would thus come under even greater pressure.	负担过重的社会支持制度也因此将陷于更大的压力。


And all of this would amplify rather than attenuate political polarization, placing other urgent policy priorities at even greater risk.	而所有这些将增加而不是减弱政治两极分化，让其他紧要政治日程更加紧急。


If this interpretation is correct, the heightened attention given to the monthly BLS headline indicators needs to be accompanied by a broader analysis and a different mindset.	如果我的解读正确，那么除了大量关注月度BLS标题指标，我们还要进行更广的分析，采取不同的思维。


After all, the report is much more than a scorecard on America’s performance in confronting a persistent economic, political, and social challenge; it is also an urgent call for a more focused corrective effort involving both government and business.	最重要的是，该报告不仅仅是美国面临持续经济、政治和社会挑战的记分牌，它还是紧急呼叫，要求政府和企业采取更集中的矫正措施。


A better mix of fiscal and monetary policies and sustained measures to enhance productivity and competitiveness remain necessary conditions for addressing America’s labor-market challenges.	我们仍需要更好的财政和货币政策以及持续措施加强生产率和竞争力，以解决美国劳动力挑战。


But they are not sufficient.	但光有这些还不够。


Both the public and private sectors – individually and through scalable and durable partnerships – need to think much more seriously about labor retraining and retooling programs, enhanced labor mobility, vocational training, and internships.	公共部门和私人部门——单独行动以及大规模、长时间的合作——需要以更严肃的态度思考如何对劳动力的再培训和再武装、增强劳动力流动性、职业培训和实习。


President Barack Obama’s appointment of a “jobs czar” would also help to enhance the credibility, accountability, and coordination required to overcome today’s significant and rising employment challenges.	总统奥巴马任命了“就业沙皇”，这也有助于提振信誉、加强可问责性以及强化克服当今重大且不断恶化的就业挑战所必须的协调。


Yes, the headline numbers will continue to signal overall improvement in the labor market.	是的，标题数字将继续显示劳动力的总体改善。


The urgent task now is to ensure that lasting progress is not undermined by the worrisome compositional trends that the BLS’s report highlights month after month.	现在的紧迫任务是确保这一持续进步不会因为月复一月的BLS报告中的令人担忧的局部趋势而被破坏。


The Dragon and the Bear	龙和熊


Second honeymoons rarely, if ever, recapture the zest of lost love.	第二次蜜月很少——如果曾经有的话——能重新体验失去的爱的激情。


Yet ever since the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, Russia and China have sought to rekindle the close relations that once supposedly existed between the USSR and Mao’s China before Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin in 1956.	然而，自从苏联在1991年解体后，俄罗斯和中国已经开始寻求重新点燃在赫鲁晓夫在1956年谴责斯大林之前，曾经存在在苏联和毛泽东时代的中国之间的亲密关系。


But that renewed Sino-Russian marriage always smacked more of convenience – aimed as it was at checking American hegemony – than of true romance.	但是，恢复后的中俄联姻总是更多的带有便利的味道——事实上是为了制衡美国的霸权——而不是真正的罗曼蒂克。


Now Russia’s invasion of Georgia has shattered even the illusion of attraction.	现在，俄罗斯对格鲁吉亚的入侵甚至已经粉碎了中俄之间的吸引力幻想。


In 1969, the Chinese and Soviet armies exchanged fire across their disputed border.	在1969年，中国和俄罗斯军队在两国有争议的边界地区交火了。


Recently, the two countries signed an agreement that seemed to put an end to their long border dispute.	最近，两国签订了一个似乎要结束两国长期的边界争端的协议。


The agreement was a sort of follow-up to the visit to Beijing of Dmitry Medvedev, who made China one of his first official trips abroad after being elected Russia’s president.	该协议可以算是某种德米特里·梅德韦杰夫访问北京后的后续工作，梅德韦杰夫在当选俄罗斯总统后将中国作为其首次外国正式访问的目的地之一。


During Vladimir Putin’s presidency, Chinese and Russian troops engaged in joint military maneuvers, and the two countries became dominant powers in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which, to some Western observers, looked like an effort to counterbalance NATO.	在弗拉基米尔·普京担任俄罗斯总统期间，中国军队和俄罗斯军队进行了联合军事演习，并且这两个国家成为上海合作组织(SCO)主要的国家。 对有些西方观察者来说，上海合作组织看起来像是一种平衡北约的努力。


There were also years of “Russia in China” and “China in Russia” cultural exchanges, meant to underscore that the two countries were tied together not just by geopolitical pragmatism, but by genuine cultural/historical ties as well.	中俄之间也进行了几年的“俄罗斯在中国”和“中国在俄罗斯”的文化交流，这些交流旨在强调两国不仅仅是因为地缘政治实用主义而联系在一起，而且也被真正的文化/历史关系联系在一起。


But the fact is that 17 years of high-level bilateral cooperation have produced little of substance.	但是，事实是，中俄之间17年的高层双边合作并没有产生很多实质性的成果。


Indeed, in the wake of the invasion of Georgia, China may be seriously rethinking its relations with Russia.	确实，在俄罗斯入侵格鲁吉亚之后，中国可能会认真地重新思考其与俄罗斯的关系。


It may not yet be ready to embark on a full-fledged policy of “containment,” but in the wake of the dismemberment of Georgia – and with Russia claiming a zone of “privileged influence” throughout the former Soviet world – China clearly views Russia as an emerging strategic threat.	中国可能还没有为开始成熟的“牵制”政策做好准备，但是，在格鲁吉亚被分裂之后——以及随着俄罗斯要求在前苏联国家拥有一个“特殊影响”区域之后——中国已经明确地将俄罗斯作为一个新兴的战略威胁。


For example, China has refused to endorse Russia’s recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and has encouraged the SCO’s other members to do the same.	例如，中国已经拒绝认可俄罗斯对南奥塞梯和阿布哈兹独立的承认，并鼓励上海合作组织的其他成员国也采取同样的态度。


The reasons are not hard to find.	找到中国这样做的原因并不难。


As a general principle of foreign policy, China believes that national borders are sacrosanct.	作为外交政策的一般原则，中国认为国家边界是非常神圣的。


No power, not even the United Nations, should be allowed to change them without the consent of the country concerned.	没有大国，即使是美国，应该被允许在没有相关国家的同意下改变它们的边界。


More importantly, China views the break-up of the USSR as one of the greatest strategic gifts in its history.	更重要的是，中国认为苏联的解体是其历史上最大的战略机遇之一。


Instead of confronting a (usually hostile) Russian/Soviet empire on its border, a vast swath of buffer states appeared after 1991.	中国不用再在其边界对抗一个（通常是敌对的）苏联/俄罗斯帝国，反而在1991年后在两国之间出现了一个长长的缓冲国地带。


Their continued independence is now deemed essential to China’s national security.	现在，这些缓冲国持续的独立被中国认为是对其国家安全极其重要的。


As a result, any more Russian efforts to establish even informal suzerainty over the Soviet successor states are, following the dismemberment of Georgia, likely to meet Chinese resistance.	结果，在格鲁吉亚被分裂后，俄罗斯任何新的对原苏联国家的即使是建立非正式的宗主国地位的努力，都有可能遭到中国的抵制。


The economic components of the Sino-Russian relationship – where real attachments are tested – are also dissatisfactory, at least from China’s point of view.	中俄关系的经济元素——在这里双方关系真正地得到考验——也不令人满意，至少从中国方面的观点来看如此。


China’s major interest in Russia is oil and gas.	中国对俄罗斯最感兴趣的是石油和天然气。


But, while Russia is firmly committed to being a major supplier of gas and oil to Europe, it is hesitant to play a similar role with China.	但是，在俄罗斯坚定地承诺成为欧洲石油和天然气主要供应商的同时，它却对向中国扮演同样的角色很犹豫。


Moreover, Russia’s efforts to gain monopoly control of the gas pipeline networks across Eurasia pose a direct danger for China, because monopolists can not only gouge their consumers, but also shut off supplies for political purposes, as Russia has done repeatedly over the past two decades.	而且，俄罗斯努力取得对跨越欧亚的天然气管道网络的垄断地位，对中国构成了直接的威胁，因为垄断主义者不但可以欺骗其消费者，而且还可以为了政治目的而切断供应，像俄罗斯在过去20年里多次做过的那样。


So China’s national security interest is to ensure that the gas-supplying nations of Central Asia have outlets to sell their gas that are not under Kremlin control.	所以，中国的国家安全利益是保证中亚的天然气供应国有不受克里姆林宫控制的出售天然气的管道。


Other than oil, gas, and other commodities, China has rather limited interests in Russia.	除了石油、天然气以及其他商品外，中国对俄罗斯的兴趣相对有限。


Russia has been China’s major supplier of weapons since the late 1990’s.	俄罗斯从20世纪90年代后期开始成为中国主要的武器供应国。


But, given the stagnant state of Russian science and technology, even the best Russian equipment nowadays seems out of date.	但是，鉴于俄罗斯科学和技术停滞不前的状态，现在即使最好的俄罗斯装备也似乎过时了。


Indeed, although the war with Georgia demonstrated the revived combat spirit of the Russian army – at least when compared to its ineptness in the two Chechen wars of the 1990’s – it also exhibited the grave defects of Russian military technology.	确实，虽然和格鲁吉亚的战争显示了俄罗斯军队战斗精神的复活——至少与20世纪90年代的两次车臣战争相比如此——它也显示了俄罗斯军事技术的严重缺陷。


Most of the arms used were yesterday’s weapons.	在这次战争中使用的大部分武器都是过时了的。


As China is now able to harness its own technological might to produce sophisticated weapons, Russia’s usefulness in this area is waning fast.	因为中国现在能够使用其自身的技术制造复杂的武器，俄罗斯在这一领域的价值正在迅速减弱。


Nor do the Chinese have much interest in assuming de facto control of Asiatic Russia, despite shrieks from Russian strategic pundits that this is China’s real goal.	中国对取得俄罗斯亚洲部分的实际控制权也没有多少兴趣，尽管俄罗斯战略学者耸人听闻地说这才是中国真正的目标。


China might, indeed, have an interest in some border areas with fertile soil and moderate climate.	事实上，中国可能对一些富含石油并且气候温和的边界地区有兴趣。


But it hardly wishes to colonize the frozen wastes of Siberia.	但是，它不大可能希望将严寒荒芜的西伯利亚变成其殖民地。


In fact, Siberia is not much different from China’s own almost empty mountain/desert borderlands, where even agriculture is a daunting task.	事实上，西伯利亚和中国自己几乎没有人烟的高山/沙漠边界地区没有多大差别，在这些地区，即使种植农作物都是很艰巨的任务。


As for Russia’s Far East, the Chinese believe it will eventually fall to China anyway, so there is no need to hasten the process.	对于俄罗斯的远东地区，中国人认为这些地区不管怎样最终都会开始变成中国的一部分，所���现在没有必要急忙开始这一进程。


China is far more interested in focusing on the United States, its major trade partner and rival, and on South Asia and Iran, which supplies much of China’s oil and regards it as a more reliable ally than Russia.	中国对关注作为其主要贸易伙伴和竞争对手的美国以及南亚和伊朗——这些国家为中国供应许多石油并认为中国是比俄罗斯更可靠的盟友——的兴趣远远比对俄罗斯大。


Thus, the settling of the border dispute with Russia was not aimed so much at building a geopolitical marriage as securing each other’s rear, offering both sides a free hand to explore opportunities elsewhere.	因此，中国和俄罗斯解决边界争端的主要目的不是为了建立地缘政治婚姻，以保护双方的后方并为双方发展其他地方的机会腾出手来。


What China wants and what it gets may be different things.	中国想要的东西和得到的东西可能是不同的。


With its long borders with Russia, China knows it would have much to regret if a new, oil-fired Russian empire appeared on its doorstep.	由于和俄罗斯拥有很长的边界线，中国知道如果一个新的以石油为武器的俄罗斯帝国出现在其门前，它会非常后悔的


The Earth Moves in Britain	英国的政坛地震


LONDON – Volcanoes have consequences – and I’m not just thinking about the chaos caused to air travel by Iceland’s unpronounceable last eruption (known to the Pentagon as E-15).	发自伦敦——火山爆发通常都会造成一定后果的——但我要说的可不是上次冰岛火山爆发所导致的航班混乱——那座火山的名字实在太长太难拼，以致五角大楼索性偷懒给它定了个军用编号“E-15”,“E”是火山名的首字母，“15”则指代后面那一长串15个字母。


In 1783, a volcano in Iceland spewed so much ash into the atmosphere that the entire northern hemisphere was cooled for almost three years. This resulted in crop failures and famine, and some historians argue that it helped to precipitate the French Revolution.	回想在1783年的时候，冰岛有座火山向天空中喷发了过量的火山灰，以至于整个北半球几乎降温达3年之久，不但导致粮食减产和饥荒，甚至有历史学家认为正是该事件催生了法国大革命。


Should we blame the “British Revolution” of 2010 on E-15? This undoubtedly would be going too far.	那么我们是否该把今年爆发的“英国革命”归罪于E-15？


But the agreement between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats to form a coalition government does look revolutionary to many British voters.	这显然有点离谱了，但英国保守党和自由民主党组建联合政府的协议对于许多英国选民来说不亚于一场革命。


In London, governing arrangements that other countries take for granted look like a radically new type of politics.	在伦敦这个地界上，其他国家司空见惯的共同管治协议看上去就像是一种全新的政治形式。


The election produced an inconclusive result, even though the Conservative Party received 7% more of the popular vote than the second-place Labour Party.	即便保守党比排名第二的工党还多了7%的选票，这场大选却依然得出了一个不确定的结果。


The failure to equalize electorates in different constituencies counted heavily against the winners, as it takes more votes to send a Conservative MP to Westminster than it does a Labour MP.	无法在不同选区平均分配选民的现状使得作为胜者的保守党受到了极大损害，因为选出一个保守党议员要比工党议员需要更多的选票。


But the coalition negotiated by David Cameron’s Conservatives with the third-place Liberal Democrats (which should give the government a comfortable majority in Parliament) is not so novel as some people think.	但是，由大卫·卡梅隆所率领的保守党和得票数排名第三的自由民主党所组成的联盟（这也确保政府拥有了议会大多数）并不像某些人想象的那么新奇。


In the last years of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, coalition governments were quite common in Britain.	在19世纪末期以及20世纪上半叶，联合政府对于英国来说是件稀松平常的事。


It is only in the years since the Second World War that one-party government has been the rule, though the country did have an informal pact between Labour and Liberals in the 1970’s.	一党政府只在第二次世界大战结束后才成为主流，期间也只有1970年代时工党和自由党曾经订立过一个非正式的联盟协议。


Benjamin Disraeli, the nineteenth-century prime minister, famously said that Britain does not like coalitions.	在19世纪担任过首相的本杰明·迪斯雷利曾经说过一句名言，认为英国人从来就不喜欢联合政府。


Although it is too early to judge, opinion polls suggest that the British people do at least like the look and the purpose of the current one.	但下这个判断显然有点为时过早了，因为民调显示英国人至少对当前这个联盟的形象和纲领都是接受的。


But can this infatuation possibly last?	但两党之间的热恋能维持下去么？


At the local level, Conservatives and Liberals tend to be at daggers drawn.	在地方层面上，保守党人和自由党人往往势不两立。


This is partly because Liberals have usually thrived by winning seats from Conservatives when Conservative administrations are unpopular.	这在某种程度上是因为当保守党政府不受欢迎时自由党人往往通过夺取保守党人的席位而得势。


Conservatives, for their part, think of Liberals as combining sanctimoniousness with hard-ball electoral tactics.	在保守党人看来，自由党人只不过是一帮喜欢耍下三滥手段却还要假装清高的人罢了。


Moreover, there are substantial policy differences between the two parties, with Liberals placing political reform at the top of their agenda, in order to establish an electoral system that would suit them better.	此外，两党在某些政策上还存在着巨大分歧，自由党人总是把政治改革放在议程的第一位，以便建立一个对它们有利的选举体制。


Despite all this, the marriage has taken place, with the two parties’ smart, attractive, and socially similar leaders – David Cameron and Nick Clegg – taking a bold gamble on their ability to get this new show on the road and to keep it there.	然而虽然有上述困难存在，这场政治联姻却最终得以成功举行，双方的两位机智，迷人且善于交际的领导人——大卫·卡梅隆和尼克·克列格——都冒了巨大的风险将这出新戏搬上舞台并将其导演下去。


Cameron and Clegg have agreed, in a constitutional innovation, that the coalition should last the full five years until the deadline for the next election.	作为一项体制创新，卡梅隆和克列格双方都同意将联盟维持整整5年直到下一次大选来临。 他们打造了一个双方都各有取舍的平台。


They have hammered out a common platform that has involved give-and-take on both sides.	自由党人取得了五个内阁大臣席位以及更多的部长级职位。


The Liberals have taken five seats in the Cabinet, and more in the lower ministerial ranks. The Conservatives have agreed to hold a referendum on whether Britain should change its first-past-the-post electoral system to an alternative-vote arrangement.	保守党人则同意举行全民公决，确定英国是否要将其得票数多者当选的选举制度，转换成选民依个人偏好来给候选人排序，最终偏好程度高低来确定胜者(alternative-vote)的新选举安排。


For both parties, the biggest justification for this unorthodox act of political courage is the scale of the economic problems facing Britain.	对双方来说，推动这一需要极大政治勇气的非传统举动的最大理由就是英国目前所面对的大规模经济问题。


The Liberal-Conservative coalition inherits, by common consent, the worst economic legacy since the war, with a huge hole in the public finances that is starting to look ever deeper as new ministers get a chance to inspect things for themselves.	两党联盟继承了自二战以来公认最大的经济烂摊子，估计当新任部长们得以亲自视察问题之时，公共财政的窟窿甚至已经开始不断扩大了。


Indeed, Liam Byrne, the outgoing Labour budget chief, left a note to his successor saying “I’m afraid there is no money. Kind regards and good luck.”	事实上，即将离职的工党首席预算官员利亚姆·伯恩在自己的办公室里给继任者留了张字条，上面写着：“恐怕已经没钱剩了，此致敬礼，祝您好运。


It was meant to be a joke. But there won’t be many laughs when cherished public programs are cut, welfare entitlements curbed, and taxes raised.	”这本身只是开个玩笑而已，但当重要公共项目遭削减，福利资格门槛升高和加税的时候，恐怕就没什么人能笑得出来了。


The bond markets will demand quick and effective action.	此外，岌岌可危的债券市场也需要及时而有效的行动来解救。


So the new government has no alternative but to begin the long haul of restoring the nation’s finances to the black.	所以新政府别无选择，只能开始将国家财政扭亏为盈的漫长过程。


The lesson for other governments is clear: if you want independence of action, don’t put yourself in hock.	对于其他国家的政府同行来说，英国的教训很明确：如果你想自由自在，那就别欠债。


From the Conservatives’ point of view, there is much to be said for sharing responsibility for what has to be done.	在保守党人看来，在分担解决问题的责任方面还有许多要谈的地方。


The Liberals, meanwhile, have a golden opportunity to show that they are capable of government, rather than simply flakey representatives of the “None of the Above” party.	而与此同时，自由民主党人也迎来了一个证明自己管治能力的黄金机会，而不仅仅作为一个“见谁都反对”的古怪政党而存在。


As the months pass, both parties will probably find that they face their greatest political difficulty in managing the fringes of their own camps – rightists in the Conservative Party, who don’t like the centrist moderation of the coalition’s policies, and leftists in the Liberal Democratic Party who don’t want to support a largely Conservative government.	此外，随着时间一月一月地过去，两党都会在发现最大的政治困难在于处理自己阵营内部的纷争——保守党的右派看不惯联盟的中间温和派政策，而自由民主党的左派则不愿意支持一个大部分倾向保守的政府。


But if the coalition works and lasts, then we will see not so much a political volcano in Britain as a real shift in the tectonic plates.	但如果联盟能成功运作并维持下去的话，我们将不会在英国看见一个类似地壳变化的政治火山爆发。


Nothing will be quite the same again.	毕竟，一切都已经变得有所不同了。


The East Asian Triangle	东亚三角


Once again, North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is threatening Asia’s stability.	北朝鲜对于核武器的追求再一次威胁着亚洲的稳定。


Japan’s new prime minister, Shinzo Abe, hastily arranged a summit in China with President Hu Jintao on the eve of North Korea’s nuclear test, a meeting that saw both men agree that such a move was “intolerable.”	日本新首相安倍晋三在北朝鲜核试验的前一天赶紧安排了与中国国家主席胡锦涛的会见，在这次会见中双方都同意这样的举动是“难以容忍的”。


The meeting is a welcome development.	这次会见令人鼓舞。


But Abe comes into office with a reputation as a stronger nationalist than his predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi, whose insistence on visiting the controversial Yasukuni Shrine (where Class A war criminals from World War II are buried) helped sour relations with China.	但是安倍入主首相府时被认为是一个比他的前任小泉纯一郎更加强硬的民族主义者，后者对于有争议的供奉着二战甲级战犯的靖国神社的持续参拜恶化了中日关系。


For stability to be preserved, Sino-Japanese relations must improve.	而如果要保持稳定，中日关系必须得到改进。


Although North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are worrying and destabilizing, China’s rise is the key strategic issue in East Asia.	尽管北朝鲜梦想拥有核武器令人担忧和破坏了稳定，但中国的崛起却是东亚所的关键战略问题。


For three decades, its economy has grown by 8% to 10% annually.	过去三十年间，中国的经济每年以8%到10%的速度增长。


Its defense expenditures have an even faster pace.	它的国防费用开支增长得更快。


Yet Chinese leaders speak of China’s “peaceful rise” and “peaceful development.”	然而中国的领导人称中国是“和平崛起”和“和平发展”。


Some believe that China cannot rise peacefully, and will seek hegemony in East Asia, leading to conflict with the United States and Japan.	有些人认为中国不可能会和平崛起，并会在东亚寻求霸权，引发与美国和日本的冲突。


Others point out that China has engaged in “good neighbor” policies since the 1990’s, settled border disputes, played a greater role in international institutions, and recognized the benefits of using soft power.	另外一些人指出中国自二十世纪九十年代以来一直致力于“睦邻友好”的政策，解决边界争端，在国际事务中扮演着更为重要的角色，同时认识到了运用软实力所带来的好处。


A decade ago, I oversaw preparation of the US Pentagon’s East Asian Strategy Report , which has guided American policy under the Clinton and Bush administrations.	十年前，我负责管理编写美国五角大楼德东亚战略报告，这一报告在克林顿和布什政府中起着指导美国政策的作用。


Back then, there was a debate between those who wanted to contain China’s growing strength increased and those who urged China’s integration into the international system.	那个时候，存在着到底是应该遏制中国不断增强的国力还是鼓励让中国融入到国际体制上来的争论。


Containment was unfeasible, because, unlike the Soviet Union during the Cold War, China’s neighbors did not see it as a clear and present danger.	遏制是行不通的，因为不像冷战时期的苏联，中国的邻国并没有把它看作一个清晰并且现实的危险。


Moreover, treating China as an enemy would ensure that it became one, thus unnecessarily ignoring the possibility of benign outcomes.	另外，如果把中国当作敌人看待那么它肯定就会成为一个敌人，由此不必要地忽略了可能有利的结果。


The strategy we chose was to “balance and integrate.”	我们所选择的策略是“平衡和融合”。


The East Asian balance of power rested on the triangle of China, Japan, and the US.	东亚的实力平衡取决于中国、日本和美国这个三角。


By reaffirming the US-Japan security relationship in the Clinton-Hashimoto declaration of 1996, the US helped structure a favorable regional balance.	凭借1996年克林顿和桥本龙太郎发表的联合声明重新确定了美日安全关系，美国帮助建立了一种有益的地区平衡。


By simultaneously encouraging China’s entry into the World Trade Organization and other institutions, we created incentives for good behavior.	同时通过鼓励中国加入到世贸组织和其他一些组织，我们表明了对于良好行为加以鼓励的态度。


So integration was hedged by realism in case things went wrong.	我们用现实主义的态度来把它融合进来以免事情向坏的一面发展。


That strategy has largely worked.	这一战略在很大程度上奏效了。


China’s military power has increased, but its behavior has been more moderate than it was a decade ago.	中国的军事力量增强了，但是它的行为比起十年前来要温和了许多。


China is a long way from posing the kind of challenge to American preponderance that the Kaiser’s Germany posed when it surpassed Britain at the beginning of the twentieth century.	相比二十世纪初叶凯撒的德国对英国的挑战而言，中国要对美国的优势形成挑战还差得很远。


The key to military power in today’s information age depends on the ability to integrate complex systems of space-based surveillance, high speed computers, and “smart” weapons.	在当今这个信息时代军事力量的关键在于具有融合基于太空的侦察、高速计算机和“智能”武器的复杂系统的能力。


It is not likely that China (or others) will soon close that gap with the US.	在这方面中国（或者其他国家）要在短期内赶上美国是不太可能的。


Of course, the fact that China is unlikely to compete with the US on a global basis does not mean that it could not challenge the US in East Asia, or that war over Taiwan is not possible.	当然，中国无法在全球层面上与美国竞争并不意味着它不能在东亚挑战美国，或者与台湾作战是不可能的。


If Taiwan were to declare independence, it is likely that China would use force, regardless of the perceived economic or military costs.	如果台湾宣布独立，那么中国有可能会动武，不管这会在经济和军事上付出多大的代价。


But it would be unlikely to win such a war, and prudent policy on all sides can make such a war unlikely.	但是它不大可能会赢得这样的一场战争，而各方谨慎的政策可以有助于避免这样的一场战争。


So what is the strategic problem today?	那么今天的战略问题是什么呢？


Stability in East Asia depends upon good relations between all three sides of the US-China-Japan triangle, but ties between China and Japan deteriorated in the Koizumi years.	东亚的稳定取决于美、中、日本这个三角的各方的良好关系，然而在小泉时代中日关系变得非常糟糕。


China permitted demonstrations, sometimes violent, against Japanese consulates in protest of changes in Japanese textbooks that softened descriptions of Japan’s invasion in the 1930’s.	中国允许针对日本大使馆的示威有时甚至是暴力行为，抗议日本修改的教科书上淡化了关于日本在二十世纪三十年代的侵略的描述。


After 22 million Chinese signed a petition against Japanese membership of the United Nations Security Council, Premier Wen Jiabao announced China’s opposition to such a step.	在2200万中国人联名要求反对给予日本在联合国安理会席位后，温家宝总理宣布中国反对日本加入联合国安理会。


China also objected to Japanese statements about Taiwan.	中国还反对日本在台湾问题上的陈述。


And there are territorial disputes about small islands and potential gas reserves near the China-Japan maritime boundary.	同时两国在接近中日海上界线的区域的小岛和潜在的天然气储备问题上存在着领土争端。


The most contentious issue, however, has been prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and, until Abe’s visit, China had been reluctant to engage in any summit meetings with Japan so long as such visits continue.	然而，争议最大的问题还是首相对于靖国神社的参拜，直到安倍来访之前，只要这种参拜还在持续，中国一直拒绝与日本领导人会面。


Although China has become Japan’s largest partner in trade and foreign direct investment, nationalists in the two countries have fueled each other’s extremism, while their governments play with fire.	尽管中国已经成为日本在贸易和外国直接投资方面的最大伙伴，但是两国的民族主义者不断挑动着双方的极端情绪，而它们的政府不断地在玩火。


American interests rest on regional stability and continued growth in trade and investment.	美国的利益依赖于地区的稳定及在贸易和投资上的持续增长。


So President George W. Bush could quietly tell Abe that we welcome good relations between Japan and China, and that prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine undercut Japan’s own interests in East Asia.	所以布什总统私下里告知安倍，我们欢迎中日双方的良好关系，而首相对于靖国神社的参拜只会破坏日本在东亚的利益。


It reminds Asians of the repulsive Japan of the 1930’s rather than the attractive Japan of today.	它会让亚洲人想起二十世纪三十年代那个令人憎恶的日本而不是今天有吸引力的日本。


At the same time, the US can be cautious about involving Japan in Taiwan issues – a neuralgic point for China – while encouraging the development of Asian institutions that increase contacts and dampen conflict.	与此同时，美国应该对让日本参与到台湾事务上来保持谨慎的态度。 台湾问题触动着中国的神经。


This can include the development of the East Asian Summit, revival of the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the evolution of the current six-party talks on North Korea into a permanent Northeast Asia Security Dialogue.	美国还应当同时推动发展旨在增加接触和淡化冲突的亚洲机制。 这方面可以包括开发东亚峰会，重振亚太经合组织，把现在针对北朝鲜问题的六方会谈发展成一个永久性的东北亚安全对话机制。


Fortunately, there are signs that both China and Japan are seeking to back away from the impasse of recent years.	幸运的是，中日双方都显示出了寻求解决近年来的僵局的意愿。


While Abe has maintained his position on Yasukuni, his summit with Chinese President Hu Jintao was a promising step forward.	尽管安倍维持其在靖国神社问题上的立场不变，但是，他与中国国家主席胡锦涛的会见就是一个令人鼓舞的举动。


Some Chinese analysts, for their part, recognize the danger in stimulating too much nationalism toward Japan.	在中国这一方面，他们的一些分析人士认识到了过于刺激针对日本的民族主义所带来的危险。


The US should quietly try to nudge these steps forward.	美国应该悄悄地努力推动这些步伐。


The US-Japan alliance remains crucial to stability in East Asia, but it takes three sides to make a triangle.	美日同盟对于东亚的稳定依然是至关重要的，但是三角需要三方的参与。


The ECB Grows Up	欧洲央行的成长


BERKELEY – August 2 marked the first anniversary of the European Central Bank’s “outright monetary transactions” program, under which it stands ready to purchase government bonds on the secondary market.	伯克利—8月2日是欧洲央行“直接货币交易”（OMT）计划满一年的日子，根据该计划，欧洲央行随时准备着在二级市场上买入政府债券。


The ECB announced OMT in response to last summer’s panicked sales of southern European sovereign debt, which threatened to blow apart the eurozone.	欧洲央行宣布OMT是为了对付让欧元区有崩溃之虞的南欧主权债务的恐慌性抛售。


At one level, the anniversary was a happy one.	从某种程度上说，这是个愉快的一周年纪念。


Yields on Spanish and Italian bonds, which had risen to unsustainable heights over fears of a eurozone breakup, fell sharply after the announcement. They have remained at lower levels ever since, despite little visible improvement in the European economy.	曾经因为担忧欧元区崩溃而升高到不可持续水平的西班牙和意大利债券收益率在欧洲央行宣布OMT后大幅下降，并在此后持续走低，尽管欧洲经济并未出现可见的改善。


Perhaps best of all, the ECB has never had to activate the facility.	也许最令人高兴的事，欧洲央行从未被迫激活这一计划。


It has not actually bought any bonds under the program.	事实上，它并没有按计划买入任何债券。


Its promise to act was enough to calm markets.	其行动承诺已足以安抚市场。


But the OMT scheme is also condemned for exceeding the ECB’s mandate.	但OMT计划也受到了抨击，认为它扩大了欧洲央行的权限。


Critics view it as a devious attempt to circumvent the prohibition on the ECB’s direct purchases of eurozone governments’ bonds.	批评者认为这是一条不光彩的诡计，绕过了欧洲央行不能直接购买欧元区政府债券的禁令。


It is thus a source of moral hazard, for it relieves pressure on spendthrift politicians to balance budgets and push ahead with reforms.	因此，这会带来道恩风险，因为它将缓解挥霍无度的政客平衡预算、推进改革的压力。


In addition, it is seen as exposing the ECB’s principal shareholders, notably Germany, to the risk of losses on their holdings of southern European bonds.	此外，批评者还认为它使欧洲央行大股东——特别是德国——有可能因为持有南欧债券而受损。


Earlier this summer, these issues were the subject of two days of hearings before Germany’s Constitutional Court, which will issue its ruling shortly.	今年夏天早些时候，这些问题在德国宪法法院做了两天的听证，很快，德国宪法法院就将做出裁决。


If it finds that the OMT program is inconsistent with the German Constitution, it could force the Bundesbank to withhold its participation. It might even force the ECB to abandon OMT.	如果它认为OMT与德国宪法不符，可能强迫德国央行退出参与，甚至迫使欧洲央行取消OMT。


Now, more than 100 economists, half from Germany, half from abroad, have signed a letter in support of the program.	如今，100多名经济学家（其中一半来自德国，一半来自海外）签署了支持该计划的公开信。


(Full disclosure: I am among them.)	（充分披露：我也是签名者之一。


It might seem odd for foreigners to weigh in on a question of German law.	）外国人参与德国法律问题可能显得有些奇怪。


But the stakes are too high to remain on the sidelines.	但兹事体大，匹夫有责。


A normal monetary union, which is what the eurozone aspires to be, requires a normal central bank to carry out the entire range of central-banking functions.	一个正常的货币联盟——这也是欧元区的梦想——必须有正常的央行行使完全的央行功能。


This starts with ensuring price stability.	首要的功能是确保价格稳定。


But, as is acknowledged in the ECB’s statute, it also means ensuring the “smooth operation of payment systems.”	但是，欧洲央行章程也承认，这意味着确保“支付系统的平滑操作。 ”


Moreover, it means preserving financial stability.	此外，这意味着保护金融稳定。


Recent experience has provided a harsh reminder of the consequences of neglecting this responsibility.	最近的经验充分表明了忽视这一责任的后果。


Specifically, the central bank must be ready to act as a lender of last resort when investor panic threatens financial markets.	具体而言，当恐慌威胁到金融市场时，央行必须时刻准备好作为最后贷款人。


Americans learned these lessons the hard way.	美国人付出了沉重的代价才学到了这一课。


The founding governors of the Federal Reserve System interpreted their mandate narrowly, viewing the Fed as responsible for maintaining gold convertibility and a stable dollar.	美联储的创始人对这一使命的理解是狭义的，认为美联储需要对保持黄金可兑换性和稳定的美元负责。


Embracing the “real bills doctrine,” they regarded their role as being to provide as much money and credit as was required for retail and wholesale transactions, and no more.	他们信奉“真是票据理论”，认为自己的角色是提供零售和批发交易所需数量的货币和信用，仅此而已。


In particular, they did not see the Fed as a lender of last resort.	特别是，他们并不认为美联储是最后贷款人。


Emergency lending to distressed financial institutions and markets, they warned, would only encourage excessive risk taking and create bubbles, while exposing the Fed to losses on its investment portfolio.	他们警告说，向受困金融机构和市场发放紧急贷款只能鼓励过度冒险和信用泡沫，同时让美联储的投资组合有损失之虞。


The result was a series of escalating banking and financial crises in 1930, 1931, and 1933, the last of which shut down the entire US financial system.	结果是1930、1931和1933年发生一连串逐步升级的金融危机，其中第三次危机把整个美国金融系统都拉下了水。


Obviously, this was no way to manage what was already the world’s largest economy.	显然，这绝不是管理当时已是世界第一大经济体的美国的办法。


The result was the Banking Act of 1933, which expanded the Fed’s powers to discount and purchase notes, drafts, and bills, thereby ensuring that retail banks would have the liquidity required to meet depositors’ needs.	于是产生了1933年银行法，该法将美联储的权力扩大到贴现和购买票据、汇票和本票，从而保证零售银行能获得流动性满足存款人的需要。


The Banking Act – and the experience that prompted it – made clear that the Fed had an obligation to use those powers.	该银行法——以及导致该法设立的经验——明确规定，美联储有使用这些权力的义务。


It is no coincidence that the US has not had a 1933-style financial crisis ever since.	美国自1933年以来便再未发生过类似性质的金融危机，这决不是巧合。


The financial crisis of 2008 came close, but it was precisely the Fed’s readiness to step in as an emergency lender that prevented the worst.	2008年金融危机比较接近，但正是美联储时刻准备着作为紧急贷款人出手干预，才防止了最坏情形的发生。


The lesson of this US experience is unambiguous.	美国这一经验的教训是显而易见的。


The eurozone will never be a normal, well-functioning monetary union until it has a normal, well-functioning central bank prepared to act as a lender of last resort.	欧元区永远成不了运转良好的正常货币联盟，除非它有了时刻准备好充当最后贷款人的运转良好的正常中央银行。


The OMT program is a step in this direction.	OMT计划是迈向这一方向的一步。


The ECB has recently signaled that it is similarly prepared to take the other steps expected of a normal central bank, publishing its board’s minutes, for example, so that the public can understand its deliberations and hold its members accountable for their actions.	欧洲央行最近表示，它已经准备好迈出朝向正常中央银行的其他步骤，比如公布其董事会会议记录以使公众明白其意见以及迫使其成员行为受到问责。


The ECB statute was not engraved on stone tablets and handed down on Mount Sinai.	欧洲央行章程并没有刻在西奈山的石板上。


It is a man-made charter, and it should be treated – by the German Constitutional Court and others – as a living document that is to be interpreted in light of current events.	这是一份人造的章程，因此应该（被德国最高法院和其他人）视为活的档案，根据当前事件进行解释。


The rest of us should encourage this approach.	我们其他人应该鼓励这样做。


The euro’s fate could well depend on it.	欧元的命运在很大程度上取决于此。


The ECB Picks Up The Pace	欧洲央行加快步伐


Buoyant US economic growth, so far, has provided the European Central Bank with the necessary global backdrop to raise interest rates from very low levels at a slow and steady pace that limits political friction with euro-zone political leaders but that gets the job done.	美国经济的强劲增长迄今为欧洲央行以缓慢但却稳定的步伐将其利率从极低的水平慢慢提升提供了必需的全球背景，使他们在完成目标的同时又减少了与欧元区政治领导人的摩擦。


That is about to change.	但是情况将开始发生变化。


The latest anecdotal evidence from the US indicates that the economy is taking a sharp downward turn, which should become manifest in the coming months.	来自美国轶事般的证据表明，它的经济将急转直下，这将在未来的几个月内得到体现。


Unless the ECB picks up the pace of interest-rate increases now, the goal of interest-rate neutrality may not be politically feasible, jeopardizing achievement of the bank’s price stability goals.	除非欧洲央行加快其提升利率的步伐，否则，利率中立的目标也许在政治上不大可能，进而危及其实现物价稳定的目标。


The ECB should act with greater alacrity not because there are increased prospects for future growth, but for the opposite reason: the fear that European growth will slow, thus limiting the possibility for future rate hikes.	欧洲央行需要表现得更迅捷不是因为经济增长的前景增加而是出于相反的原因，那就是担心欧洲经济增速将放缓，由此限制将来利率上涨的可能性。


Indeed, even before the sudden downturn in the US economy, a growing number of members of the ECB’s Governing Council already had come to the conclusion that accelerating the pace of interest-rate increases was needed if its goal of monetary neutrality was to be achieved.	事实上，甚至在美国经济急转直下之前，欧洲央行管理委员会里就有越来越多的成员得出结论说，如果想要实现其货币中立的目标，那么就必须加快其利率上升的步伐。


The key reason is that several recent “reforms” announced by German Chancellor Angela Merkel – raising the value-added tax, increasing user charges for healthcare, and taxing interest payments as a part of so-called corporate tax reform – promise to reduce German economic growth, perhaps significantly, in 2007.	主要原因在于德国总理默克尔最近宣布的几项“改革”措施，也就是提高增值税，提高医疗使用者收费及作为所谓的企业税收改革的一部分的征收利息税。 这些措施将肯定会大幅降低德国经济增长，或许在2007年将会得到集中体现。


When Germany sneezes, Europe catches a cold.	德国打喷嚏，欧洲就感冒。


As a result, Merkel’s reforms have increased the angst of euro-zone central bankers that the “window of opportunity” for future rate hikes might be closing.	结果是，默克尔的改革加深了欧元区各国央行的银行家们对于未来利率上升的“机会之窗”可能会被关闭的忧虑。


The latest ZEW survey of euro-zone business confidence buttresses these fears.	ZEW对于欧元区企业信心的最新调查支持了这些忧虑。


It shows that current conditions are good, but that expectations about future conditions have dropped off significantly.	调查显示，当前情况良好，但是对于未来状况的期望值显著下降。


The message for the ECB is clear: make haste while the sun shines.	给予欧洲央行的信息是清晰的，那就是趁阳光明媚的时候赶紧行动。


That is exactly what the ECB is doing.	而欧洲央行正是这样做的。


ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet indicated at his July press conference that the bank plans to raise interest rates by 25 basis points on August 3, not August 31, as expected.	欧洲央行行长特里谢在七月份的新闻发布会上指出，该行计划在8月3日，而不是预期的8月31日将利率提高25个基点。


This implies an interval of two months between interest-rate moves instead of the three-month interval that has become standard ECB practice in the current interest-rate cycle.	这表明欧洲央行利率调整的间隔由三个月便成了两个月，而三个月的间隔是欧洲央行在当前利率循环中的标准做法。


The next rate hike in the normalization process is expected in October, two months after the expected August move.	在八月份预期的调整后，下一次正常化进程中的调整将会出现在两个月之后，即十月份。


Ironically, the October meeting of the ECB’s Governing Council will take place in Paris this year.	具有讽刺意味的是，欧洲央行管理委员会十月份的会议今年将在巴黎举行。


French politicians have been the most aggressive in putting political pressure on the ECB to relax its interest-rate normalization policy.	法国政治家一直对于要求欧洲央行放松其利率规范化调整政策施加了最多的政治压力。


French Finance Minister Thierry Breton recently warned the ECB about “nasty surprises.”	法国财政部长布莱顿最近警告欧洲央行“可恶的惊奇行为”。


Prospective French presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy wants the ECB to promote economic growth, not just price stability.	预期将参加法国总统竞选的萨尔科奇希望欧洲央行推动经济增长，而不是仅仅保持价格稳定。


The Paris meeting affords the ECB an opportunity to make a political statement – its “Declaration of Independence,” so to speak – by raising interest rates on French soil.	巴黎会议给欧洲央行提供了一次发出政治宣言的机会，可以看作是它的“独立宣言”，即在法国领土上提高利率。


Trichet already has cleared the way for this to happen.	特里谢已经为此扫清了障碍。


In June, the ECB jettisoned its long-standing practice of not changing rates outside of Frankfurt, increasing them by 25 basis points in Madrid.	六月份，欧洲央行放弃了它一贯坚持的不在法兰克福以外改变利率的做法，在马德里把利率提高了25个基点。


Trichet is a clever and resourceful person.	特里谢是个聪明而又足智多谋的人。


But even he might find it daunting to reconcile the conflicting demands of the ECB to accelerate the interest-rate normalization process and those of the French political establishment to maintain the status quo.	但是即便他也会对于调和欧洲央行加快其利率规范化步伐的需要与那些法国政治家保持现状的要求感到为难。


But the recent good economic numbers coming out of France should make an October rate hike easier for French politicians to accept.	但是最近法国良好的经济表现会使法国政治家们更容易接受十月份利率的增长。


The ECB is accelerating the pace of normalization at precisely the right moment.	欧洲央行加快其利率规范化恰逢其时。


The danger is that it will be blamed if European growth falters.	危险在于一旦欧洲经济疲软，它将会受到指责。


However, with the German and US economies slowing precipitously, the ECB would have a perfect cover for its interest-rate moves.	不过，在德国和美国经济急转直下的情况下，欧洲央行为其利率改变找到了一个最佳的借口。


The ECB could convincingly argue that Merkel’s reforms and the US, not its interest-rate hikes, are responsible for the European slowdown, should one occur.	如果情况果真如此的话，欧洲央行可以令人信服地争辩说是默克尔的改革和美国，而不是它的提高利率应该为欧洲经济的放缓负责。


Politically, the path is clear for the ECB to act.	从政治上讲，欧洲央行的行动是不会有风险的。


The ECB’s Battle against Central Banking	欧洲央行不央行


BERKELEY – When the European Central Bank announced its program of government-bond purchases, it let financial markets know that it thoroughly disliked the idea, was not fully committed to it, and would reverse the policy as soon as it could.	伯克利——欧洲央行宣布了其购买政府债券的计划，但同时也让金融市场知道了它其实非常讨厌这个主意，并未作出完全的承诺，且时刻准备着将这一政策收回。


Indeed, the ECB proclaimed its belief that the stabilization of government-bond prices brought about by such purchases would be only temporary.	事实上，欧洲央行是在表达这样的信念：由买入计划带来的政府债券价格企稳只是暂时的。


It is difficult to think of a more self-defeating way to implement a bond-purchase program.	很难想象还有比债券购买计划更能弄巧成拙的事情。


By making it clear from the outset that it did not trust its own policy, the ECB practically guaranteed its failure.	欧洲央行一开始就明确宣告，它自己并不相信自己的政策，因此该政策的失败已是板上钉钉。


If it so evidently lacked confidence in the very bonds that it was buying, why should investors feel any differently?	既然欧洲央行对正在买入的债券如此缺乏信心，你还能指望投资者有不同的感觉吗？


The ECB continues to believe that financial stability is not part of its core business.	欧洲央行仍然认为，金融稳定性并非其核心职责。


As its outgoing president, Jean-Claude Trichet, put it, the ECB has “only one needle on [its] compass, and that is inflation.”	正如其去职行长特里谢所指出的，欧洲央行“的罗盘上只有一个指针，那就是通货膨胀。


The ECB’s refusal to be a lender of last resort forced the creation of a surrogate institution, the European Financial Stability Facility.	”由于欧洲央行拒绝充当最后贷款人，人们不得不成立了一个替代机构，即欧洲金融稳定基金（EFSF）。


But everyone in the financial markets knows that the EFSF has insufficient firepower to undertake that task – and that it has an unworkable governance structure to boot.	但金融市场深知，EFSF没有足够的弹药来完成任务，且其治理结构也不足以让其胜任。