Although grants are a nice source of funding for demonstration projects and research, only a for-profit approach that attracts broader investment will ensure that this scheme catches on.	尽管补助是示范性工程和研究的可靠资金来源，但唯有盈利才能吸引更广的投资，确保这一机制流行起来。


The funder makes a deal with whoever is responsible for the health-care costs: upfront investment in exchange for continued payment of the $1 billion yearly baseline, with the funder to keep the future savings against originally predicted costs.	出资者与卫生成本责任人做交易：用前期投资交换持续的每年10亿美元最低支付额，出资人将保有根据初始预测成本所做的储蓄。


The money may be paid by employers, private insurers, or government health-care funds (the trickiest source).	资金可以由雇主、私人保险商或政府卫生资金（最雄厚的资源）支付。


Community officials and voluntary organizations also need to sign on – or, indeed, they could drive the process and find the investors themselves.	社区官员和志愿组织也需要加入进来——或者，事实上他们可以推动进程并自己发现投资者。 他们还能做出贡献：补充学校营养餐和体育课；


They could also contribute with complementary changes in school meals and gym classes; zoning and other planning measures to encourage cycling, walking, and the like; provision of health counseling; and perhaps by working with local restaurants and food stores to subsidize healthy choices and discourage unhealthy ones.	提供健康咨询； 也许还能与本地餐厅和食品店合作补贴健康选择、阻止不健康选择。


The X Prize Foundation once promoted this idea, but dropped it when a funder lost interest.	X奖基金会（X Prize Foundation）曾近推行过这一想法，但在出资人失去兴趣后不了了之。


But there are many smaller-scale examples, such as Oklahoma City, which lost one million pounds of collective weight in a population of about 600,000; we hope the people involved will join with HICCup to share their experiences, good and bad.	但还有许多较小规模的例子，比如俄克拉荷马城，该市的60万人口总共减掉了100万磅体重； 我们希望参与其中的人们加入HICCup分享他们的经验，不论好坏。


Indeed, HICCup will not choose which communities participate.	事实上，HICCup就不会选择哪个社区参与。


They will choose themselves.	它们会选择它们自己。


HICCup’s role will be to advise them and help them to communicate and learn from other communities going through the same process.	HICCup的角色将是为它们提供咨询，帮助它们与曾经走过相同过程的社区沟通并学习。


We also want to be a clearinghouse for vendors of health-oriented tools, services, and programs.	我们也希望成为健康导向工具、服务和项目销售商的清算所。


There are many bargains to be struck between communities and vendors offering discounts in exchange for wholesale adoption of their tools or programs.	社区和销售商有很大的讨价还价空间，用批发购买工具和项目��取折扣。


There is, however, one unbreakable rule: To work with HICCup, communities must collect and publish a lot of independently vetted data (without personal information, of course).	但是，有一个规则不能破：与HICCup合作的社区必须收集和公布大量经独立审核的数据（当然不包括个人信息）。


For starters, they will need benchmarks of current conditions and projected costs, and then detailed statistics on the adoption of the measures, their impact and costs, and what happens over time.	首先，它们需要当前条件和预计成本的基准，接着，它们需要提供关于措施采用、措施的影响和成本以及随时间推移发生什么的详细数据。


HICCup will spend a lot of time with lawyers and actuaries!	HICCup将把大量时间花在与律师和精算师合作上！


Indicators to be measured include not just rates of obesity, high blood pressure, and incidence of disease and related costs, but also absenteeism, school grades and graduation rates, employment statistics, accidents, and the like.	测量指标不但包括肥胖率、高血压率、疾病发生率及相关成本，还包括缺勤率、学业成绩和毕业率、就业统计、事故，等等。


Although the funder keeps the reduction in health-care costs, the community gets all of the many payoffs from a healthier population – including an enhanced reputation.	尽管出资人将获得卫生成本的节约额，社区将获得来自人口健康改善的全部好处——包括名声远扬。


It is now time to try this on a broad scale.	是时候广泛地实施这一项目了。


Five years from now, we will wonder what took us so long to get started.	五年后，我们会奇怪为什么不早点这样做。


So, again, who will those investors be?	那么，我要再一次问，谁会是那些投资者？


How Does the Weak Dollar Affect Oil Prices?	弱势美元是怎样影响石油价格的？


Around the world, there is anguished hand-wringing about the high price of oil.	在世界范围内，都存在对高油价的痛苦绝望情绪。


But if political leaders and policymakers want lower oil prices, they should be promoting policies that strengthen the dollar.	但是，如果政治家和政策制定者们想降低油价，他们就应该促进增强美元的政策的制定。


The implications of pricing oil in any single-currency are more far-reaching than most people think.	用任何一个单一货币给石油计价的意义要比大多数人想到的深远得多。


For example, some oil-producing countries ask their customers to pay in euros, but that does not mean that their oil is priced in euros.	例如，一些产油国要求他们的客户支付欧元，但是这并不意味着他们的石油是用欧元计价的。


And even if dollar prices were to be replaced by euro prices, the impact of single-currency pricing on the oil market would be the same.	并且即使石油以美元计价被以欧元计价代替，单一货币计价对石油市场的影响将是一样的。


While oil-exporting countries receive revenues in dollars (or their euro equivalent), they use different currencies to import goods and services from various countries.	在石油出口国以美元（或他们的欧元等价物）取得收入的同时，他们用不同的货币从许多国家进口货物和服务。


Any change in the exchange rate of the dollar affects the purchasing power of these countries, and therefore their real income.	美元汇率的任何变动都会影响这些国家的购买力，继而影响他们的真正收入。


Likewise, international oil companies sell most of their oil in dollars, but they operate in various countries and pay some of their costs in local currencies.	同样的，虽然国际石油公司卖出的大部分石油都是以美元计价的，但是他们在不同的国家经营并且用当地货币支付一些支出。


Any change in the value of the dollar therefore affects their cost structure and profitability. In turn, it affects reinvestment in exploration, development, and maintenance.	任何美元价格的变动都会影响到他们的成本结构和盈利能力，从而进一步影响他们在勘探、研发和维护方面的再投资，


The relationship between the value of the dollar and oil prices is very complex.	美元价格和石油价格之间的关系非常复杂。


While they can feed on each other to produce a vicious cycle, their short-term relationship is distinct from their long-term relationship.	虽然它们可以互相依存从而陷入一个恶性循环的怪圈，但是它们的短期关系和长期关系是截然不同的。


In the short-term, dollar depreciation does not affect supply and demand, but it does affect speculation and investment in oil futures markets.	在短期内，虽然美元贬值不会影响供求，但是它确实会影响石油期货市场的投机行为和投资行为。


As the dollar declines, commodities – including oil – attract investors.	在美元贬值的时候，商品——包括石油——会吸引投资者。


Investing in futures becomes both a hedge against a weakening dollar and an investment vehicle that could yield substantial profit, particularly in a climate of vanishing excess oil production capacity, increasing demand, declining interest rates, a slumping real estate market, and crisis in the banking industry.	特别是在石油超额产能消失，石油需求增加，利率下降，房地产市场萧条和银行业危机的背景下，投资石油期货成为一个既可以对冲弱势美元风险又可以产生真实利润的投资工具。


OPEC might be correct to blame American policies and speculators for higher prices.	石油输出国家组织（OPEC）责备美国的政策和投机者推高油价可能是正确的。


It is also correct that if OPEC had excess capacity, it would have already used it to flush out speculators to bring oil prices down.	同样，如果OPEC拥有超额产能，它已经用其来对付投机者从而降低油价的假设也是正确的。


OPEC can regain control in one of two ways: use its “claimed” excess capacity to flush out speculators, or use its financial surpluses to overtake them.	OPEC可以用下面两种方法中的一种来重新取得控制权：使用其“被声称”的超额产能来对付投机者，或者使用其财政盈余来超过他们。


Recourse to the latter option means that, even without excess capacity, OPEC can still be in the driver’s seat.	使用后一种选择意味着即使没有超额产能，OPEC仍然可以处于掌控之中。


In the long run, however, statistical analysis of various oil industry variables indicates that a weaker dollar affects supply by reducing production, regardless of whether oil is owned and produced by national or international oil companies.	但是，从长远看，对各种石油工业变量的统计分析显示，不管石油是由国内还是国际石油公司所有和生产，弱势美元都通过降低石油产量来影响供应。


A weak dollar also affects demand by increasing consumption.	弱势美元也通过增加石油消费来影响需求。


The result of a decrease in supply and an increase in demand is higher prices.	供应减少和需求增加的结果就是石油的价格更高。


The lower dollar also reduces the purchasing power of oil exporters.	便宜的美元也降低了石油出口商的购买能力。


If nominal oil prices remain constant while the dollar declines, the real income of the oil-producing countries declines, resulting in less investment in additional capacity and maintenance.	如果在美元贬值的时候名义石油价格保持不变，石油生产国的真正收入下降，从而导致他们对附加产能的投资和维护减少。


The same is true of oil companies.	这一点对石油公司也是一样的。


Consequently, oil prices increase.	其结果就是石油价格上涨。


Indeed, because oil prices were rising while the dollar was declining, capacity expansion by oil firms failed to meet forecasts for non-OPEC production in the last three years.	确实，因为石油价格上涨而美元贬值，在过去的三年里，非OPEC国家的石油公司的石油产能扩张没有达到预期。


Even oil production in the United States has not matched the increase in oil prices, as rising import costs for tools and equipment – partly a reflection of the dollar’s weakness and other factors – have forced project delays and cancellations.	即使美国的石油生产也未能与石油价格的上涨相匹配，这是因为进口工具和设备的成本增加——部分反映了美元的弱势和其他因素——已经迫使许多石油项目被延迟和取消。


Of course, the lower dollar means cheaper oil in Europe, Asia, and all countries with appreciating currencies.	当然，便宜的美元意味着在欧洲、亚洲和其他所有货币在升值的国家里石油更便宜。


Oil prices hit records in the US in 2004 and 2005, but not in Europe, which partly explains why economic growth there has not been affected.	在美国，2004年和2005年石油价格都创出新高，但是并没有在欧洲创出新高，这部分解释了为什么那里的经济增长没有受到影响。


When Americans paid $120 per barrel, Europeans paid only about €76 per barrel.	当美国的油价达到每桶120美元的时候，欧洲的油价每桶只有76欧元。


Several factors have prevented high oil prices from affecting the demand for petroleum products in the US in recent years, such as increased government spending, low interest rates, tax breaks, and an increase in real incomes.	在最近几年里，美国有几个因素阻止了高油价对石油产品需求的影响，例如政府开支的增加，低利率，减税和实际收入的增加。


To be sure, the weaker dollar has forced some American families to spend their vacations in the US instead of Europe.	可以肯定，弱势美元已经迫使一些美国家庭在美国本土度假，而不是去欧洲。


But, since many Americans use gas-guzzling SUV’s for their vacations, demand for gasoline has remained high.	但是，由于许多美国人使用耗油的SUV作为度假的交通工具，所以美国对汽油的需求一直保持高位。


Unless and until US consumption patterns change or a rebounding dollar increases oil production, Americans will bear the brunt of single-currency oil pricing.	除非并且直到美国人的消费模式发生改变或者美元反弹从而增加石油产量，美国人将首当其冲的受到石油用单一货币计价的影响。


How Economic Superpowers Rise	经济超级大国的崛起


Anti-Japanese riots across China have heightened tensions in Asia.	席卷中国的反日浪潮令亚洲绷紧了神经。


Indeed China-mania, a mixture of hopes, but mostly fears, is sweeping the world due to China’s rapid economic rise.	中国狂热，一种希望，但更主要是恐惧的混合物正由于中国迅速的经济崛起而横扫全世界。


Should the world really be more fearful than hopeful?	世界真的应该对此更为恐惧而非更充满希望吗？


Americans fear their markets being flooded by Chinese goods.	美国人害怕他们的市场被中国货占领。


Mexico, Brazil, Central Europe, Indonesia, and even Sri Lanka are worried about competition from lower wages.	墨西哥、巴西、中欧、印度尼西亚，甚至是斯里兰卡都担心来自低工资的竞争。


Europeans may be more cheerful, believing that the Chinese market will open not only for European engineering products and machine tools to equip the new workshop of the world, but also for luxury goods and even the tourism demanded by a new and affluent Chinese middle class.	欧洲人可能比较高兴，因为他们相信中国市场不仅会为欧洲的工程和机械产品开放以装备这个世界工场，同时也会应新兴而富裕的中产阶级的需求向奢侈品甚至旅游业开放。


Everyone feels that a seismic shift is under way.	每个人都感到一种具有震撼力的转变即将发生。


Such rapid industrial rises are rare, but not unprecedented.	这样疾速的工业化崛起虽然罕见，但却并非史无前例。


The most interesting analogies are Germany’s rise in the 19th century and Japan’s in the 20th.	最为有趣的类比是德国在19世纪及日本在20世纪的崛起。


Even prior to that time, England was the economic Wunderkind of Europe.	甚至就在那时以前，英格兰也曾是欧洲的“经济神童”。


What had been an offshore European island with bad weather emerged as the world’s major economy, whose products, from textiles to railroad equipment, came to dominate world markets.	这个地处汪洋，天气恶劣的欧洲岛国日渐成为世界的经济大国，其从纺织品到铁路设备在内的工业品占领了世界市场。


England was a pioneer in industrialization, and was deeply shocked by the presumption of newcomers who soon entered the same stage.	英格兰是工业化的先驱，对于后来者会如此之快地登上同一个舞台的假设使其大为震惊。


By the end of the 19th century, however, Germany, with much lower wages levels, had overtaken England in steel production, and was clearly dominant in the new technologies of electrical goods, chemicals, and dyes, as well as in many aspects of fine engineering.	然而，到了19世纪末期，德国利用其低廉得多的工资水平，在钢产量上超过英格兰，并在电器、化工和染料产品等新技术以及许多精工领域占据了明显的优势地位。


But Germany also swamped world’s markets with mass consumption goods: cheaper musical instruments than the traditional makers in France or Italy could produce, and lithographic prints used for Christmas cards and seaside postcards.	但德国同样以其大众消费品占领了世界市场：比法国和意大利的传统制造商生产的更为廉价的乐器和用于圣诞卡和风景明信片的平板印刷技术。


Indeed, German products were omnipresent.	的确，德国产品无所不在。 当一位怒气冲冲的英国作家，E.


When an irate British writer, E.E. Williams, wrote a protest entitled “Made in Germany,” he began by recording his discomfort that the pencil he was using was a German product as well.	E. Williams在撰写一篇题为“德国制造”的抗议文章时，他以记录自己的不快来开头：他正使用的铅笔也是德国制造的。


The ‘Made in Germany’ scare of the late 19th century foreshadowed the reaction in the United States to Japan’s industrial success in the 1960’s and 1970’s.	19世纪对“德国制造”的恐惧预示了美国对日本在1960和1970年代的工业化成功的反应。


In particular, Americans were frightened by Japanese consumer products – televisions, which wiped out domestic production, and automobiles, which seemed so malignly efficient.	美国人特别害怕日本的消费品：日本的电视机摧毁了美国的电视制造业，而日本汽车工业的效率也高得近乎邪门。


In both the German and the Japanese cases, the already-existing industrial powers complained that there was some sort of nefarious and unfair mechanism behind the newcomer’s advantages.	在德国和日本的案例中，老牌的工业化国家都抱怨说在新来者的优势背后有着某种邪恶而非公平的机制。


Such explanations included government intervention or a new sort of industrial organization, and unfair patent infringements by the new producers who copied products and then blocked off their own markets from import competition.	对此的解释包括政府干预或一种 新型的工业组织，及新的制造者们对专利的侵犯。 他们仿制他国产品并阻断进口产品参与国内的市场竞争。


But the economics of the rise of industrial Germany and Japan should hold comforting lessons for us today.	但工业化的德国和日本的经济实例为我们当今提供了令人欣慰的经验教训。


The fears were misplaced, because the world benefited from cheaper and more readily available products.	人们的恐惧是毫无必要的，因为世界从更为廉价和丰富的产品中获益。


Thanks to German manufacturers, pianos were no longer restricted to aristocratic salons or the professional middle class, but began appearing in respectable working-class homes.	正是因为有了德国的制造商，钢琴才不再是贵族沙龙和中产阶级的专美，而开始进入寻常百姓家。


Thanks to Japanese car producers, American manufacturers learned to produce more efficiently and competitively.	正是因为有了日本汽车制造商，才迫使美国的制造商们提高自身的生产效率和竞争力。


The classical liberal free-trade argument about the universal economic benefits of greater commerce and open markets proved to be unambiguously correct.	关于更大规模的商业和开放的市场所带来的普遍经济收益的经典开明的自由贸易理论被证明是无往而不胜的。


It did not matter that the catch-up countries’ economic “miracles” were produced in part by illiberal policies guided by government bureaucracies.	后发展的国家的“经济奇迹”是否在一定程度上得益于政府官僚机构引导下的非自由政策其实并不重要。


The outcome was an endorsement of the lessons of economic liberalism.	其结果都是对经济自由主义的认可。


But changing economic balances also lead to changing political balances.	然而变化中的经济平衡也会导致变化中的政治平衡。


At the moment, it looks as if there is nothing to fear from China.	目前对于中国似乎没有什么好担心的。


Like Germany in the mid-19th century, or Japan in the 1960’s, China sees many advantages in participating in the international order more or less as it is currently configured.	正如19世纪的德国和1960年代的日本那样，中国发现参与现行的国际秩序有着或多或少的好处。


Can this change?	这一切会改变吗？


Germany certainly became assertive, owing mostly to the social pressures and tensions incited by rapid economic growth.	在由快速经济增长所带来的社会压力和紧张局面的驱使下，德国当然变得执拗。


When it feared that it might be overtaken by the next rising economic power, the vast Russian empire, assertiveness turned into aggression.	当它担心自己会被下一个正在崛起的经济大国，广袤的俄罗斯帝国赶超时，执拗就变成了攻击性。


By the early 20th century, Germans had concluded that Russia’s faster demographic growth and rapid industrialization posed a military threat.	到20世纪早期，德国人断定俄罗斯快速的人口统计学增长和工业化已成为一种军事威胁。


China can already see considerable problems in the medium term.	中国已经可以预见到许多中期性的问题。


In forty years, a demographic implosion within China, the consequence of its one-child policy, will make European and Japanese concerns about aging populations look trivial.	在40年后，其独生子女政策所带来的人口统计聚变，会使欧洲和日本所担心的老龄化问题也相形���绌。


Before then, profound inequalities between China’s poor countryside and its dynamic industrial centers will generate tensions, which may be increased by the gender imbalance – young men greatly outnumber young women.	在那之前，中国穷困农村与充满活力的工业中心之间深刻的不平等会引发紧张局面，而这种局面有可能会在性别不平衡的影响下加剧：年轻男性的数量大大超过年轻女性。


Combine this with a tottering authoritarian regime, and something like the pre-1914 German scenario looks realistic.	这一切再加上一个蹒跚的独裁政权，让人觉得1914年前的德国的社会局面就会重演。


A government impressed by past national achievement, but fearful of being overtaken and deeply worried about its own legitimacy, is likely to look for an outlet in foreign policy to mobilize domestic support or ward off opposition.	一个对过去的国家成就深为自豪，但却害怕被赶超并为自身的合法性深为担忧的政府很可能会在对外政策中寻找出路以调动国人的支持并防范反对派。


So there is no need for a strategy to deal with China’s economic rise; but there is a need to lock in China’s prosperity and reduce the chances of political eruption.	所以我们并不需要一种应对中国经济崛起的战略，但却需要保持中国的繁荣并减少政治动荡爆发的可能性。


Japan in the second half of the 20th century had stable politics, due in large part to a good constitution and democratic institutions.	日本在20世纪下半叶的政治稳定在很大程度上得益于一部好的宪法和民主制度。


If China is to avoid the fate of early 20th century Germany, it must bolster successful economic modernization with constitutional and political reform.	如果中国要避免重蹈20世纪初德国的覆辙，就必须以宪法和政治改革来支撑成功的经济现代化。


Our Children’s Economics	我们后代的经济学


TOKYO – The economics profession has not had a good crisis.	东京—经济学这个职业还从未有过好危机。


Queen Elizabeth II may have expected too much when she famously asked why economists had failed to foresee the disaster, but there is a widespread sense that much of their research turned out to be irrelevant.	伊丽莎白女王二世有过著名的一问：经济学家为何不能预见灾难？ 她或许要求太高了些，但一个众人皆有的感觉是经济学家的研究有很多属于“无厘头”。


Worse still, much of the advice proffered by economists was of little use to policymakers seeking to limit the economic and financial fallout.	更糟糕的是，经济学家所提出的很多建议对于寻求限制经济和金融灾难余波的决策者来说毫无用处。


Will future generations do better?	我们的后代会比我们做得更好吗？


One of the more interesting exercises in which I engaged at the recent World Economic Forum in Davos was a collective effort to imagine the contents of a Principles of Economics textbook in 2033.	在达沃斯世界经济论坛中，我参加的一次有点意思的活动是对2033年《经济学原理》教科书目录的想象。


There was no dearth of ideas and topics, participants argued, that existing textbooks neglected, and that should receive more attention two decades from now.	参与者认为，现存教科书所忽视的观点和主题不少，这些观点和主题会在二十年后获得更多的关注。


Economists working on the border of economics and psychology, for example, argued that behavioral finance, in which human foibles are brought to bear to explain the failure of the so-called efficient markets hypothesis, would be given more prominence.	比如，游走在经济学和心理学之间的经济学家指出，行为金融——在这个学科中，人性弱点被用来解释所谓的有效市场假说的失灵——将会获得更重要的地位。


Economic historians, meanwhile, argued that future textbooks would embed analysis of recent experience in the longer-term historical record.	与此同时，经济史家认为未来教科书会加入在长期历史记录中分析最新经验的内容。


Among other things, this would allow economists-in-training to take the evolution of economic institutions more seriously.	这（和其他内容一起）有助于未来经济学学生更严肃地研究经济制度的演变。


Development economists, for their part, argued that much more attention would be paid to randomized trials and field experiments.	至于发展经济学家，他们指出随机试验和现场实验应该获得比现在大得多的份量。


Applied econometricians pointed to the growing importance of “big data” and to the likelihood that large data sets will have significantly enhanced our understanding of economic decision-making by 2033.	应用计量经济学家则强调“大数据”和大数据集有望极大地加强我们在2033年对经济决策的理解的重要性。


Overall, however, the picture was one in which the economics of 2033 differed only marginally from the economics of today.	但是，总的来说，与今天相比，2033年的经济学将只出现一些边际变化。


A textbook two decades from now might be more sophisticated than this year’s edition, fully integrating contributions that today constitute the frontiers of economic research.	二十年后的教科书可能比今年的版本更加成熟，完全将今天的经济学研究前沿内容嵌入其中。


But it would not differ fundamentally in structure or approach from today’s economics.	但在结构和方法上，它和今天的经济学不会有本质区别。


The consensus, in other words, seemed to be that there would be nothing in the next 20 years as transformative as Alfred Marshall’s synthesis of the 1890’s or the revolution initiated by John Maynard Keynes in the 1930’s.	换句话说，经济学家的共识是，未来二十年不会有像19世纪90年代马歇尔那样的划时代集大成之作或是20世纪30年代凯恩斯的革命性之作。


In contrast to the economics of those years, economics today is a mature, well-established discipline.	与这两个年代的经济学相反，今天的经济学已是完全成型的成熟学科。


And, like any mature discipline, it advances incrementally rather than in revolutionary steps.	与所有成熟学科一样，其进步只能是渐进性的，而不会是革命性的。


This presumption is almost certainly mistaken.	这一推论几乎肯定是错误的。


It reflects the same error made by scholars of technology who argue that all of the radical breakthroughs have already been made.	这一错误就好比是技术学者认为所有的重大突破都已经完成了那样。


As this view is sometimes put, the next 20 years will see no breakthrough as revolutionary as the steam engine or the transistor.	这一观点时不时地指出，未来二十年不可能出现蒸汽机或晶体管这样的革命性突破。


Technological progress will be incremental rather than revolutionary.	技术进步将是渐进性的，而不可能是革命性的。


Indeed, insofar as the increments are small, the result is likely to be slower productivity growth and a “Great Stagnation.”	事实上，由于进步不大，其结果可能是生产率增长的放缓和“大停滞”。


In fact, the history of technology has repeatedly refuted this pessimistic view.	然而技术史一次又一次地宣布这一悲观观点是错误的。


We can’t say what the next radical innovation will be, but centuries of human experience suggest that there will be (at least) one.	我们无法预言下一次重大创新会是什么，但几百年的人类经验表明会有（至少一次）重大创新发生。


Similarly, we can’t say what the next revolution in economic analysis will be, but more than a century of modern economic thinking suggests that there will be one.	类似地，我们无法预言下一次经济分析革命是什么，但一百多年的现代经济思想史表明会有革命发生。


All of this suggests that the economics textbook of 2033 will look very different from the economics textbook of today.	所有这些都表明，2033年的经济学教科书会与今天大不相同。


We just can’t say how.	只是我们不知道不同在哪里。


Indeed, one might question the very premise that, two decades from now, there will be textbooks as we know them.	事实上，你甚至大可怀疑二十年后的教科书将不再是我们熟悉的模样。


Today, introductory economics is taught using a textbook in which an eminent professor authoritatively bestows the conventional wisdom on his or her (typically, his) students.	今天，经济学概论课程大多采用著名教授编写的教科书，作者（通常是男性）以自己的方式向学生灌输传统智慧。


Knowledge, as encapsulated in the textbook and interpreted by the professor, is delivered from above.	蕴藏在教科书中、由编写教授组织的知识是自上而下传递的。


This, of course, is also how newspapers traditionally delivered the news.	当然，这也是报纸传递新闻的传统方式。


Editors and publishers assembled and collated stories, and the newspaper that they produced was then delivered to the subscriber’s doorstep.	编辑和出版人撰写并核对报道，接着，他们编出来的报纸被送往订户家中。


But the last decade has seen a veritable revolution in the news business.	但在最近十年，新闻业掀起了一场不折不扣的革命。


News is now assembled and disseminated via Web sites, wikis, and the comment sections of blogs.	如今，新闻通过网站、维基百科和博客评论板撰写和分解。


News, in other words, is increasingly delivered from the bottom up.	换句话说，新闻的传递正在日益变成自下而上。


Rather than relying on editors, everyone is becoming their own news curator.	我们不再依靠编辑，我们自己就是新闻官。


Something similar is likely to happen to textbooks, especially in economics, where everyone has an opinion and first-hand experience with the subject.	教科书也可能发生类似的事情，特别是经济学教科书。 每个人都会有自己关于经济学的观点和第一手经验。


Textbooks will be like wikis, with faculty adopters and students modifying text and contributing content.	教科书将会如同维基百科，教员和学生可以修订教材、贡献内容。


There still may be a role for the author as gatekeeper; but the textbook will know longer be the font of wisdom, and its writer will no longer control the table of contents.	教材编写者或许还能起到看门人的作用，但教科书将不再是智慧前沿，教科书作者也将不再能够控制目录内容。


The outcome will be messy.	其结果将是混乱的。


But the economics profession will also become more diverse and dynamic – and our children’s economics will be healthier as a result.	但经济学这个行当会变得更多元化、更有活力——我们的后代的经济学也因此将更加健康。


The Tyranny of Political Economy	专横的政治经济学


CAMBRIDGE – There was a time when we economists steered clear of politics.	美国剑桥—曾几何时，我们经济学家与政治井水不犯河水。


We viewed our job as describing how market economies work, when they fail, and how well-designed policies can enhance efficiency.	在我们看来，我们的职责是描述市场经济如何运行、什么时候会失灵，精心设计的政策如何能够增进效率。


We analyzed trade-offs between competing objectives (say, equity versus efficiency), and prescribed policies to meet desired economic outcomes, including redistribution.	我们在竞争性将目标（比如公平和效率）之间做权衡分析，为所欲的经济结果（包括再分配）开政策药方。


It was up to politicians to take our advice (or not), and to bureaucrats to implement it.	接不接受我们的建议是政客的事情，实施它们则是官僚的事情。


Then some of us became more ambitious.	后来，我们中有一些人雄心有所膨胀。


Frustrated by the reality that much of our advice went unheeded (so many free-market solutions still waiting to be taken up!), we turned our analytical toolkit on the behavior of politicians and bureaucrats themselves.	我们的许多建议被忽视（如此之多的自由市场解决方案从未被使用过！ ），这一事实令我们颇为尴尬，于是我们把政客和官僚本身的行为也纳入了我们的分析范围。


We began to examine political behavior using the same conceptual framework that we use for consumer and producer decisions in a market economy.	我们开始用与考察市场经济中的消费者和生产者的决策相同的概念框架考察政治行为。 政客成为收入最大化的政策选择供给者；


Politicians became income-maximizing suppliers of policy favors; citizens became rent-seeking lobbies and special interests; and political systems became marketplaces in which votes and political influence are traded for economic benefits.	人民成为寻租游说者和特殊利益者； 而政治制度成为为了经济目的交易选票和政治影响的市场。


Thus was born the field of rational-choice political economy, and a style of theorizing that many political scientists readily emulated.	于是，理性选择政治经济学就这样诞生了，随之诞生的是许多让政治学家亦步亦趋的理论套路。


The apparent payoff was that we could now explain why politicians did so many things that violated economic rationality.	显而易见的好处是，如今我们可以解释政客为什么会做那么多违反经济理性的事情。


Indeed, there was no economic malfunction that the two words “vested interests” could not account for.	事实上，没有一种经济失灵不能用“既得利益”四个字来解释。


Why are so many industries closed off to real competition?	为何如此之多的行业要将真正的竞争拒之门外？


Because politicians are in the pockets of the incumbents who reap the rents.	因为政客被获租的现任所控制着。


Why do governments erect barriers to international trade?	为何政府要设置国际贸易壁垒？


Because the beneficiaries of trade protection are concentrated and politically influential, while consumers are diffuse and disorganized.	因为贸易保护获益者很集中，而且拥有政治影响力，而消费者很分散，没有组织。


Why do political elites block reforms that would spur economic growth and development?  Because growth and development would undermine their hold on political power.	为何政治精英要阻挠刺激增长和发展的改革？ 因为增长和发展不利于他们把持政治权力。


Why are there financial crises?	为何会有金融危机？


Because banks capture the policymaking process so that they can take excessive risks at the expense of the general public.	因为银行绑架了决策过程，因而可以以大众至慨承担过度风险。


In order to change the world, we need to understand it.	为了改变世界，就必须理解世界。


And this mode of analysis seemed to transport us to a higher level of understanding of economic and political outcomes.	而这一分析模式似乎能提高我们对经济和政治结果的理解层次。


But there was a deep paradox in all of this.	但所有这些都存在一个严重的悖论。


The more we claimed to be explaining, the less room was left for improving matters.	我们要求解释的越多，改善情况的空间越有限。


If politicians’ behavior is determined by the vested interests to which they are beholden, economists’ advocacy of policy reforms is bound to fall on deaf ears.	如果政客的行为由其既得利益恩主所决定，则经济学家的政策改革呼声注定只能是耳旁风。


The more complete our social science, the more irrelevant our policy analysis.	我们的社会科学越完善，我们的政策分析越无用。


This is where the analogy between human sciences and natural sciences breaks down.	这就是人的科学和自然科学的差异之处。


Consider the relationship between science and engineering.	就拿科学和工程的关系来说吧。


As scientists’ understanding of the physical laws of nature grows more sophisticated, engineers can build better bridges and buildings.	随着科学家对自然物理定律的理解的成熟，工程师得以建造更好的桥梁和大厦。


Improvements in natural science enhance, rather than impede, our ability to shape our physical environment.	自然科学的进步促进而不是妨碍了我们改变实体环境的能力。


The relationship between political economy and policy analysis is not at all like this.	但政治经济和政策分析之间的关系与此大相径庭。


By endogenizing politicians’ behavior, political economy disempowers policy analysts.	将政客行为内生化后，政治经济学让政策分析者束手无策。


It is as if physicists came up with theories that explained not only natural phenomena, but also determined which bridges and buildings engineers would build.	这就好比是物理学家的理论不仅解释了自然现象，还决定了工程师能够建造那些桥���和大厦。


There would then scarcely be any need for engineering schools.	这样一来，就完全没必要开办工学院了。


If it seems to you that something is wrong with this, you are on to something.	如果你觉得有什么地方不对劲，那说明你已经入得门道了。


In reality, our contemporary frameworks for political economy are replete with unstated assumptions about the system of ideas underlying the operation of political systems.	在现实中，我们的当代政治经济学框架充斥着关于政治制度操作基础的思想体系的隐含假设。


Make those assumptions explicit, and the decisive role of vested interests evaporates.	若将这些假设明确化，既得利益的决定性作用就消失了。


Policy design, political leadership, and human agency come back to life.	政策设计、政治领导和人的能动性复活了。


There are three ways in which ideas shape interests.	观念决定着利益，方式有三。


First, ideas determine how political elites define themselves and the objectives they pursue – money, honor, status, longevity in power, or simply a place in history.	首先，观念决定了政治精英如何定义自己和他们所追求的目标——金钱、荣誉、地位、掌权时限，或仅仅是青史留名。


These questions of identity are central to how they choose to act.	这类身份问题是他们选择如何行动的关键。


Second, ideas determine political actors’ views about how the world works.	其次，观念决定了整治行动者关于世界如何运行的观点。


Powerful business interests will lobby for different policies when they believe that fiscal stimulus yields only inflation than when they believe that it generates higher aggregate demand.	如果强大的商业利益相信财政刺激只能导致通胀而不是引导更高的总需求，那么他们会游说采取不同政策。


Revenue hungry governments will impose a lower tax when they think that it can be evaded than when they think that it cannot.	急需收入的政府认为税收容易逃漏，那么它们会选择减税。


Most important from the perspective of policy analysis, ideas determine the strategies that political actors believe they can pursue.	从政策分析角度讲，最重要的一点是观念决定了整治行动者认为自己可以追求的战略。


For example, one way for elites to remain in power is to suppress all economic activity.	比如，精英把持权力的一种方法是抑制一切经济行为。


But another is to encourage economic development while diversifying their own economic base, establishing coalitions, fostering state-directed industrialization, or pursuing a variety of other strategies limited only by the elites’ imagination.	但另一种方法是鼓励经济发展同时过氧化其自身经济基础，建立联盟，培育国家指导下的工业化，或推行仅由精英想象决定的各种政策。


Expand the range of feasible strategies (which is what good policy design and leadership do), and you radically change behavior and outcomes.	扩大可行战略的范围（高明的政策设计和领导方法）会极大地改变行为和结果。


Indeed, this is what explains some of the most astounding turnarounds in economic performance in recent decades, such as South Korea’s and China’s breakout growth (in the 1960’s and the late 1970’s, respectively).	事实上，这解释了近几十年来最令人震惊的经济表现起落，如韩国和中国的起飞（分别在20世纪60年代和70年代晚期）。


In both cases, the biggest winners were “vested interests” (Korea’s business establishment and the Chinese Communist Party).	在中韩两国，最大的赢家都是“既得利益”（韩国财阀和中国共产党）。


What enabled reform was not a reconfiguration of political power, but the emergence of new strategies.	让改革得以推行的不是政治权力的再分配，而是新战略的出现。


Economic change often happens not when vested interests are defeated, but when different strategies are used to pursue those interests.	经济变迁通常并不伴随既得利益的倒台，而是伴随改变追求既得利益的战略。


Political economy undoubtedly remains important.	政治经济学毫无疑问是重要的。


Without a clear understanding of who gains and who loses from the status quo, it is difficult to make sense of our existing policies.	如果不能对现状带给我们的潜在得失做明确的理解，就很难明白现行政策。


But an excessive focus on vested interests can easily divert us from the critical contribution that policy analysis and political entrepreneurship can make.	但过度关注既得利益很容易让我们注意力分散，不再关注政策分析和政治创业家所作出的关键性贡献。


The possibilities of economic change are limited not just by the realities of political power, but also by the poverty of our ideas.	经济变迁的可能性不仅受政治权力制约，也受我们缺少好主意的制约。


How Effective is Disaster Relief?	赈灾的有效性


When disaster strikes, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are among the first on the scene.	当灾难袭来，非政府组织(NGO)总是最先到达现场。


The United Nations estimates that there are now more than 37,000 international NGOs, with major donors relying on them more and more.	据联合国估计，现在共有37000多家国际NGO，重要的捐助者对它们的依赖也与日俱增。


Inevitably, there are problems.	当然问题是不可避免的。


Both the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami saw chaotic competition among NGOs.	在1994年的卢旺达种族大屠杀和2004年的印度洋海啸中，都出现了NGO无序竞争的情况。


Yet there have also been landmark successes.	然而它们也取得了令人瞩目的成功。


More than 1,400 NGOs operating in 90 countries helped to get 123 countries to ratify the treaty banning landmines.	在90个国家运作的超过1400家NGO推动123个国家批准了禁止使用地雷的公约。


But the sheer scale of the disaster relief “industry” – plus the longer-term development efforts of NGOs – is raising serious concerns about how to measure their performance.	但赈灾“业”本身的规模—加上NGO长期发展的努力—正引起对其进行绩效评估的严重关注。


Flexibility allows NGOs to be innovative in ways that organizations like the UN often cannot.	灵活性使NGO们具备联合国这样的组织通常难以具备的创新能力。


But there are few international rules on what an NGO actually is, and the lack of control can lead to unpredictable consequences.	但国际上鲜有对NGO的合法定义，缺乏控制也可能导致不可预测的后果。


In Chad recently, the French NGO L’Arche de Zoé tried to smuggle children out of the country without obtaining permission from either parents or the government.	最近在乍得，法国NGO“ 佐伊的方舟 ”企图在未经当事儿童的父母和该国政府许可的情况下就私自将其带出境外。


Among the questions being asked by NGOs, the UN, and national donors is how to prevent the recurrence of past mistakes.	现在NGO们、联合国和捐助国们问得最多的一个问题就是如何避免再犯过去的错误。


The wake-up call for most NGOs came after the Rwandan genocide, when hundreds of small organizations tried to set up ad hoc operations in refugee camps in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania. Some camps turned into staging posts for armed factions.	在卢旺达种族屠杀之后，当数百家NGO试图在刚果民主共和国和坦桑尼亚的难民营里建立特别执行机构时，情况的发展给它们敲响醒钟：有的难民营变成了武装分子的补给站。


In the ensuing chaos, more than 50,000 refugees died from cholera.	在随之而来的混乱中，有5万多难民死于霍乱。


There was also mayhem following the Indian Ocean tsunami.	在印度洋海啸之后也同样出现了混乱的局面。


At one point, more than 400 NGOs were on the ground in Aceh, Indonesia, competing for resources, personnel, and funding.	在某一时间，印尼的亚齐省聚集了超过400家NGO，在资源、人才和资金方面彼此竞争。


Many of the lessons learned in Rwanda were forgotten or ignored as smaller NGOs with little or no experience in dealing with disasters caused much of the confusion.	由于较小的NGO在赈灾方面缺乏经验从而造成了相当的混乱，从卢旺达汲取的许多教训就被抛诸脑后了。


The situation in Indonesia led the UN to adopt a new “cluster” system to improve coordination.	印尼的情况使得联合国开始采用一种新的“集束”体系来改善协调工作。


And, after a review of the Rwanda debacle, 400 NGOs and UN organizations working in 80 countries got together in the Sphere Project to develop a common humanitarian mandate and handbook of standards outlining the minimum performance required of any NGO working in a disaster zone.	此外，在对卢旺达的灾难进行评估之后，在80个国家运作的400多家NGO和联合国组织聚拢在“全球计划（Sphere Project）”中，制定一部共同的人道主义要求和标准手册，对在灾区工作的所有NGO的最起码绩效做出规定。


As the number of post-intervention reviews increases, a rudimentary framework for evaluating the impact of NGOs has appeared.	随着灾后干预评估的增加，对NGO的影响进行评估的一套基本框架也出现了。


Rather than simply looking at project inputs and outputs, the emphasis has turned towards measuring the overall impact of an operation.	评估重点转向衡量一项行动的总体影响，而不仅仅是该项目的投入和产出。


The idea is to find out if the lives of the people on the receiving end were changed for the better in any sustained way.	其理念是看受助方的民生是否得到了持续的改善。


More and more donors are also insisting that NGOs provide measurable proof that they make a difference.	越来越多的捐助方也要求NGO们为其救援行动取得的成效提供具体证明。


That sounds fine in theory, but in practice there are drawbacks.	这在理论上听起来不错，但在实际操作中还是有所欠缺的。


By demanding quantifiable results, donors may force program managers to choose easily achieved targets over less measurable actions that accord with sound humanitarian principles.	通过要求可量化的结果，捐助方可能迫使项目经理们选择更容易实现的目标而不是采取较难量化的行动以求符合正规的人道主义原则。


Or reporting about aid programs may be skewed to keep donor funds flowing.	而对援助项目的报告也可能被歪曲以获得捐助资金。


The greatest danger is that humanitarian relief will be tailored to meet donors’ demands, rather than actual needs.	最大的危险在于人道主义援助将会更多地满足捐助方的要求而不是实际的需要。


Until recently, the record on evaluating responses to humanitarian emergencies has been patchy at best.	直到最近，在对人道主义紧急情况的响应进行评估方面的记录至多也只是凌乱的。


CARE, as both a relief and development agency, can take a long-term approach to disasters, matching emergency relief with a rehabilitation and recovery phase.	CARE作为一家援助及发展机构，能够采用一种长期的灾难响应机制，将紧急救援和灾后重建与恢复阶段契合起来。


But this is not an option for NGOs that focus only on emergency responses.	但这是那些仅仅关注紧急响应的NGO们所做不到的。


Once their allotted time is up – or their funds run out – they tend to pack up and leave.	一旦它们既定的时限到来—或资金用尽—它们往往会打包走人。


Even for NGOs that stick around, determining their relief efforts’ impact in the middle of a crisis is difficult, if not impossible.	即便对于坚守阵地的NGO们而言，要在危机的进程中判断自己赈灾努力的影响即便不是不可能的，也是困难的。


Emergencies are chaotic: staff and resources are stretched, the local population is very unlikely to be able to provide meaningful feedback, and pre-crisis baseline data are largely unavailable, so comparisons are complicated.	紧急情况是混乱的：人员和资源捉襟见肘，当地人几乎不能提供有用的回馈，且危机之前的基本数据也往往难以获得，因此要进行比较更是困难重重。


Moreover, all too often, events move too quickly to be measured accurately.	再者，事件的急速发展往往使得准确量化的工作难以为继。


And, until recently, donors who were willing to pay for relief were less likely to finance follow-up evaluations.	而就最近的情况而言，愿意为赈灾解囊的捐助方也不太愿意资助后续的评估。


As a result, emergency relief evaluations often rely on little more than guesswork and assumptions.	其结果是对紧急援助的评估基础常常是除了臆测与假设之外别无他途。


A 2004 report by the Humanitarian Policy Group cited a survey carried out in Ethiopia after UN agencies said that humanitarian efforts had averted widespread famine in 2000.	在联合国的相关机构宣称人道努力在2000年避免了埃塞俄比亚大范围的饥荒发生之后，“人道政策集团”在2004年的一份报告中引述了一项调查。


The claim sounded credible until the subsequent survey showed that the area’s crude mortality rate had actually risen to six times the normal base rate.	该声明的可信性直到后续调查的结果出来之后才被质疑。 调查显示该地区的毛死亡率较之正常的基本比率上升了六倍。


Most of the deaths were from communicable diseases, which malnourished people may well have contracted after crowding into feeding centers.	大多数的死亡是由传染性疾病导致的。 营养不良的人们很可能是在涌入拥挤的食物供给中心之时被感染的。


The HPG therefore recommended long-term monitoring of future humanitarian responses, and said that success or failure should be judged in a broad context rather than by a narrow focus on a specific project.	该集团由此建议对人道主义响应实施长期监控，并称其成败应该在更为广泛的背景下来判断而不应只局限于关注某一具体项目。


Many people who survive an earthquake or a flood, for instance, may soon face another crisis if the disaster also destroys their only means of earning a living.	例如，如果灾难摧毁了他们仅有的谋生手段，那么许多在地震或洪灾中幸存的人们可能很快就会面临另一个危机。


New and more sophisticated analytical tools are needed to understand these long-term effects, along with sufficient training to ensure that new methods are applied properly in the field.	我们需要新的、更为全面系统地分析工具来了解这些长期效果，同时还要有足够的培训来确保新的方法能够恰当地运用到实际中。


A recent innovation has been the Coping Strategy Index, devised by the World Food Program and CARE, which analyzes how people cope with short-term food crises while also taking into account their future vulnerability to hunger.	最新的一项创举是由世界粮食计划组织和CARE共同开发的“应对战略指数”。 该工具在分析人们如何应对短期的食物危机的同时也考虑到了他们在未来面对饥饿的脆弱性。


NGOs do the lion’s share of the world’s humanitarian work, and some mistakes are inevitable.	NGO们承担了世界上相当一部分人道主义工作，或有失误也在所难免。


But as we deepen our experience of humanitarian relief and development, we must learn the lessons of the past and understand how much more there is to know.	但我们在深化人道主义援助与发展的经验时，必须汲取历史教训，努力求索。


Avoiding Algeria in Egypt	防止埃及重蹈阿尔及利亚覆辙


PORTO – The military coup that has overthrown Egypt’s first democratically elected president and led to the arrests of Muslim Brotherhood leaders across the country poses an enormous danger not only for Egypt’s democratic transition, but for the democratic hopes of the entire Arab world as well.	波尔图—推翻埃及首个民选政府、在全国逮捕穆斯林兄弟会诸位领袖的军事政变不但给埃及的民主转型带来了严重的威胁，也极大地威胁着整个阿拉伯世界的民主希望。


The fact that the coup was undertaken with massive popular support is a sign of the enormous difficulties faced by the Muslim Brotherhood during its first turn in power.	这场政变是在大规模民众支持的基础上发生的，这一事实是一个信号——穆斯林兄弟会在它第一次掌权期间面临了太多的困难。


President Mohamed Morsi’s government struggled to address Egypt’s inherited economic and social crises in the face of the enormous public expectations created by the 2011 revolution, whose protagonists sought not only freedom, but also economic development and social justice.	总统穆尔西的政府忙于解决穆巴拉克时代遗留下来的经济和社会危机，并肩负着2011年革命所造成的殷切期望——这场革命的主角追求的不但是自由，也包括经济发展和社会公正。


Of course, the Muslim Brotherhood was also a victim of its own mistakes, particularly the failure of Morsi and his government to reach out to the secular opposition, elements of which had contributed to his election.	当然，穆斯林兄弟会也是自身错误的受害者，特别是穆尔西及其政府干涉了世俗反对者，这些人原本为他的当选贡献了力量。


The Morsi government seemed incapable of understanding that a slim electoral majority is not enough, especially nowadays.	穆尔西政府似乎没有意识到，光有微弱的选举多数优势是不够的，特别是在当下。


Indeed, the breadth of the opposition to Morsi reflects a major global tendency toward the empowerment of the educated and connected middle classes, whose members tend to be suspicious of political parties and demand more direct political participation.	事实上，穆尔西反对派阵线之广反映了一个全球大趋势——受过良好教育又团结一致的中产阶级力量的崛起，这个阶级怀疑政党，要求更直接的政治参与。


In this sense, Egypt’s difficulties differ only in scope, not in kind, from those faced by governments in Turkey, Brazil, and even Europe.	从这方面讲，与土耳其、巴西甚至欧洲政府所面临的的困境相比，埃及困境的特殊之处只在于范围，而不在于类型。


Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood dominated government from its first days in power.	穆尔西的穆斯林兄弟会在掌权第一天起就主宰着政府。


But it also faced opposition from a variety of other, far less democratically minded, forces, including holdovers from Hosni Mubarak’s regime, who continue to wield influence in official institutions.	但他们仍受到诸多民主思想远不及他们的势力的反对，包括仍在官方机构拥有影响力的穆巴拉克政权遗老。


The judiciary, for example, dissolved the first elected legislative assembly.	比如，司法部解散了第一届当选立法大会。


Likewise, the interior minister refused to protect the Brotherhood’s headquarters from repeated attack.	类似地，内政部长也拒绝保护穆斯林兄弟会大本营免受一再发生的袭击干扰。


Moreover, some secular intellectuals demonized the Brotherhood.	此外，一些世俗知识分子在妖魔化穆斯林兄弟会。


Like their Algerian counterparts – who in 1992 approved of the Algerian army’s suppression of an Islamist electoral victory, leading to years of brutal fighting that left perhaps a half-million dead – many Egyptians didn’t mind repressing Islamists.	与阿尔及利亚人一样，许多埃及人并不介意镇压伊斯兰教徒。 1992年，阿尔及利亚世俗派批准了阿军队镇压伊斯兰选举胜利，导致了多年的激烈战斗，可能有50万人因此丧生。


Morsi and the Brotherhood also faced competition from Saudi-backed Salafists.	穆尔西和穆斯林兄弟会还面临受沙特支持的沙拉菲派的竞争。


Indeed, on the night of the coup, these ultra-conservative Islamists appeared together with military leaders and the secular political leader Mohamed ElBaradei to announce Morsi’s overthrow.	事实上，在政变当夜，极端保守穆斯林与军方领袖和世俗政治领袖巴拉迪（Mohamed ElBaradei）一起现身宣布推翻穆尔西。


The prospects for Egypt’s democratic transition have become increasingly difficult to predict, but one thing is clear: the military cannot and must not be trusted. During the period after the fall of Mubarak, when the army exercised full power, 12,000 civilians were charged in military courts, virginity tests were imposed on women (particularly those protesting against the military), demonstrators were killed, and myriad human-rights violations were committed with impunity.	埃及民主转型的前景变得越来越难以预测，但有一点是显而易见的：军队不能也不可信任��穆巴拉克倒台后的一点时间中，军队行使着全部权力，结果12 000平民被送上了军事法庭，女性被强制检查是否为处女（特别是那些反对军方的女性），示威者遭到杀害，侵犯人权事件大量爆发且凶手逍遥法外。


Of course, it is possible for soldiers to assure a transition to democracy, as they did four decades ago in my homeland, Portugal, following their overthrow of the Salazar/Caetano dictatorship.	当然，战士也可以保证向民主的过渡，正如他们四十年前在我的祖国葡萄牙在推翻萨拉扎/卡尔塔诺（Salazar/Caetano）独裁后做的那样。


But the record of military-led transitions elsewhere has been poor: democracy may be proclaimed to be the coup’s raison d’être, but the transition stops there.	但在其他地区，军方领导的转型的记录并不光彩：军方会宣布民主，但这只是为了证明政变的合法性，转型则到此为止。


Moreover, in this case, the Egyptian army appears far more interested in protecting its enormous economic interests than it is in securing the benefits of a civilian government responsive to its citizens.	此外，在埃及的例子中，埃及军队对保护自身巨大经济利益的兴趣远远高于捍卫响应人民要求的民选政府的好处。


Trust should still be put in young Egyptians and their demands for freedom and democracy – demands that link the movement that overthrew Mubarak to the demonstrations that led to Morsi’s removal.	信任应该仍系于埃及年轻人及其对自由和民主的要求上——要求推翻穆巴拉克的运动与导致穆尔西下台的示威联系起来。


But the predominant goal should be to support the creation in Egypt of a pluralistic society that defends the rights of all to political participation and free and fair elections.	但主要目标应该是支持在埃及创造多元社会，捍卫所有人参与政治和自由公正选举的权利。


Today, this requires opposition to any Mubarak-style repression of the Muslim Brotherhood.	如今，这需要反对任何针对穆斯林兄弟会的穆巴拉克式的镇压。


Immediately following the coup, the European Union adopted an ambivalent position toward it.	政变发生伊始，欧盟的立场是矛盾的。


This, too, is reminiscent of Algeria in 1992, when most European governments supported the annulment of the Islamists’ electoral victory.	这也让人想起了1992年的阿尔及利亚，当时大部分欧洲政府支持废除伊斯兰教徒的选举胜利。


(Likewise, the EU refused to recognize Hamas’s electoral victory in Gaza in 2006.)	（类似地，欧盟拒绝承认2006年哈马斯在加沙的选举胜利）。


Continuing fear of political Islam in much of the West explains past support for dictatorial regimes.	许多西方人一直担心政治化的伊斯兰教，这解释了他们过去为何支持独裁政权。


Today, the EU and the US should demand the liberation of all members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including Morsi, and the integration of the Brotherhood into any political solution.	如今，欧盟和美国应该要求释放包括穆尔西在内的所有穆斯林兄弟会成员，并且任何政治解决方案都必须包括穆斯林兄弟会在内。


The international community should also be concerned with the coup’s regional implications.	国际社会还应该担心政变的地区影响。


Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s cynical declaration of support for the coup is a sign that some want to turn today’s struggle in the Arab world into a bloody contest between Islamists and secularists.	叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德冷言支持政变表明有人希望将当今阿拉伯世界的斗争转变为穆斯林和世俗者的血腥冲突。


In the long term, any crackdown on the Brotherhood would lead its members and supporters – already bitterly disappointed in democracy – to reject elections entirely.	从长期看，任何对穆斯林兄弟会的镇压都会导致其成员和支持者——目前他们已经对民主失望透顶——彻底拒绝选举。


That outcome could have a very negative impact on Islamist movements elsewhere.	这一结果将对其他地区的伊斯兰运动造成极其负面的影响。


For many, the extremists who criticized the Brotherhood and other Islamist parties for choosing a democratic route to power will have been vindicated, and a new wave of violence in the region may begin.	对许多人来说，批评穆斯林兄弟会和其他伊斯兰政党选择民主之路掌权的极端主义者会因此获得论据，阿拉伯地区或许将开始新一轮暴力。


Hope remains that Egypt will not become Algeria in 1992 (or Chile in 1973).	埃及免蹈1992年阿尔及利亚（以及1973年智利）覆辙的希望仍然存在。


But to avoid that grim fate, it is imperative that Muslim Brotherhood members’ fundamental rights now be protected.	但为了避免这一悲惨的结果，就必须在现在保护好穆斯林兄弟会的基本权利。


US President Barack Obama, who has expressed deep concern about the overthrow of Morsi, is perhaps the only leader able to mediate in such a situation and work for a consensus solution that prevents a civil war.	美国总统奥巴马表示严重关注推翻穆尔西事件，他或许是唯一一个能够调停这一局面、推动形成避免内战的一致解决方案的领导人。


To achieve this, he would need to use all of the leverage at his disposal, including cutting off the massive military assistance that the US provides to Egypt’s armed forces, as he has threatened to do.	为了实现这一目标，他必须全面运用手中的工具，包括像他曾威胁的那样削减美国对埃及武装部队的大规模军事援助。


He can also use the reserve of trust that he established by reaching out to the Brotherhood during Morsi’s presidency.	他也可以利用在穆尔西当政时期与穆斯林兄弟会打下的信用基础。


But will Obama take the initiative?	但奥巴马会这样采取行动吗？


His speech in Cairo in 2009 – which called for “A New Beginning” in the region – inspired many in the Arab world.	他2009年在开罗的演讲——呼吁该地区“新的开始”——启发了许多阿拉伯人民。


Now it is time for more than words.	现在，奥巴马应该拿出行动了。


How Europe Can Rescue Europe	欧洲如何拯救欧洲


LONDON – At their meeting in Rome last Thursday, the leaders of the eurozone’s four largest economies agreed on steps towards a banking union and a modest stimulus package to complement the European Union’s new “fiscal compact.”	伦敦—在上周四的罗马会议上，欧元区四大经济体领导人就迈向银行联盟和温和刺激方案以补充欧元区新“财政契约”的步骤达成了一致。


Those steps are not enough.	这些步骤还不足够。


German Chancellor Angela Merkel resisted all proposals to provide relief to Spain and Italy from the excessive risk premiums that both countries are now confronting.	德国总统默克尔拒绝了所有旨在纾解西班牙和意大利风险溢价过高现状的方案。


As a result, the EU’s upcoming summit could turn into a fiasco, which may well prove lethal, because it would leave the rest of the eurozone without a strong enough financial firewall to protect it from the possibility of a Greek exit.	结果，即将到来的欧盟峰会可能以失败告终，这很可能会引起致命后果，因为欧元区其他国家将无法建立起足够强大的防火墙免受希腊退出所带来的冲击。


Even if a fatal calamity can be avoided, the division between creditor and debtor countries will be reinforced, and the “periphery” countries will have no chance to regain competitiveness, because the playing field is tilted against them.	即便能够避免致命灾难，债权国和债务国之间的分歧也可能会加剧，“外围国”将失去重塑竞争力的机会，因为游戏规则对它们不利。


This may serve Germany’s narrow self-interest, but it will create a very different Europe from the open society that fired people’s imagination and propelled European integration for decades.	这也许符合德国的狭隘私利，但会让欧洲远离启发人民想象力、促进欧洲一体化数十年的开放社会。


It will make Germany the center of an empire and permanently subordinate the “periphery.”	这会让德国成为帝国中心，而“外围国”将永远低人一等。


That is not what Merkel or the overwhelming majority of Germans stand for.	这就是默克尔和绝大多数德国人的立场。


Merkel argues that it is against the rules to use the European Central Bank to solve eurozone countries’ fiscal problems – and she is right.	默克尔指出，动用欧洲央行来解决欧元区国家的财政问题是不符合规则的。 此话不假。


ECB President Mario Draghi has said much the same.	欧洲央行行长德拉吉的说法也大致相同。


Indeed, the upcoming summit is missing an important agenda item: a European Fiscal Authority (EFA) that, in partnership with the ECB, could do what the ECB cannot do on its own.	事实上，即将到来的峰会忽视了一项重要日程：欧洲财政机关（European Fiscal Authority，EFA）。 EFA可以与欧洲央行合作，做欧洲央行本身无法做到的事。


In particular, the EFA could establish a Debt Reduction Fund – a modified form of the European Debt Redemption Pact that was proposed by Merkel’s Council of Economic Advisers and endorsed by Germany’s Social Democrats and Greens.	特别是，EFA可以成立一个债务削减基金（Debt Reduction Fund）——由默克尔经济顾问委员会提出并得到德国社会民主党和绿党支持的欧洲偿债协议（European Debt Redemption Pact）改进版。


In exchange for specified structural reforms in Italy and Spain, the Fund would acquire and hold a significant portion of their outstanding stock of debt.	为了让意大利和西班牙实施各自的结构性改革，作为交换，债务削减基金将收购并持有两国存量债券的大部分。


It would finance the purchases by issuing European Treasury bills – joint and several obligations of the member countries – and pass on the benefit of cheap financing to the countries concerned.	购买资金可以通过发行欧洲债券（European Treasury bill，即成员国共同承担的各种义务）筹集，而廉价融资的好处则由受助国接受。


The Treasury bills would be assigned a zero-risk rating by the authorities and treated as the highest-quality collateral for repo operations at the ECB. The banking system has an urgent need for risk-free liquid assets.	欧洲债券将获得当局的零风险评级，成为欧洲央行回购操作最高质量抵押品。 银行系统急切需要无风险资产。


Banks are currently holding more than €700 billion of surplus liquidity at the ECB, earning only one quarter of 1% interest. This assures a large and ready market for the bills at 1% or less.	目前银行在欧洲央行存有持有着超过7000亿欧元的剩余流动性，每年只能获得0. 25%的利息。


Should a participating country subsequently fail to abide by its commitments, the EFA could impose a fine or other penalty, which would be proportionate to the violation, thereby preventing enforcement from becoming a nuclear option that can never be exercised.	如若参与国事后没能遵守承诺，EFA可以课以罚款或其他惩罚措施，程度依违反承诺的严重度而定，如此，强制执行就不会沦为永远不会触发的核打击了。


This would provide strong protection against moral hazard.	这将会有效地防止道德风险。


A successor government in, say, Italy, would find it practically impossible to break any commitments undertaken by Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti’s current administration.	比如，意大利新政府将发现，想撇清现任蒙蒂政府所做出的承诺是十分困难的。


With practically half of Italy’s debt financed by European Treasury Bills – producing an effect similar to a reduction in the average maturity of its debt – a successor government would be all the more responsive to any punishment imposed by the EFA.	大约一半的意大利债务将通过欧洲债券融资——这相当于削减了意大利债券的平均期限——新政府将更加积极的相应EFA所施加的任何惩罚措施。


After a suitable period, the participating countries would enter into debt-reduction programs tailored in a way that does not jeopardize their growth.	在经过适当的时期后，参与过将进入合理设计、不会影响增长的债务削减计划。


This would be the prelude to the establishment of a full political union and the introduction of Eurobonds.	这将成为完整的政治联盟和引入欧元债券的序幕。


Of course, the issuance of European Treasury bills would require the approval of the Bundestag, but it would be in conformity with the German Constitutional Court’s requirement that any commitment approved by the Bundestag be limited in time and size.	当然，欧洲债券的发行需要德国联邦议院的首肯，但这与德国宪法法院任何联邦议院批准的承诺都必须规定时间和规模限制的要求相符。


It is not too late to turn this proposal into a political declaration that outlines not only the long-term goal of a political union, but also a road map toward a fiscal and banking union.	将这一方案转变为给出兼具长期政治联盟目标和财政及银行联盟路线图的政治宣言还为时未晚。 在该宣言的指引下，欧元区财政援助基金，即欧洲稳定机制（ESM）可以立刻接管欧洲央行所持有的希腊债券；


Guided by this declaration, the eurozone’s financial-rescue fund, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), could immediately take over the ECB’s holdings of Greek bonds; the ECB could start accumulating Spanish and Italian bonds; and Italy and Spain could implement the structural reforms needed to qualify for the Debt Redemption Fund.	欧洲央行可以开始买入西班牙和意大利债券； 而意大利和西班牙可以实施满足偿债基金条件所要求的结构性改革。


This agenda would bring immense relief to the financial markets.	这一日程将立刻让金融市场舒一口气。


Equally important, it would change Europe’s political dynamics from negative to positive.	同样重要的是，它还能改变欧洲的政治动态，从负向转变为正向。


The main obstacle is that German politicians remain mired in a “can’t do” mode.	主要障碍在于德国政客死抓“没门”模式不动摇。


Merkel insists that a political union should precede a full-fledged fiscal and banking union.	默克尔坚持认为应该让政治联盟先于完全的财政和银行联盟。


That is both unrealistic and unreasonable.	这既不现实，也不合理。


The three have to be developed together, step-by-step.	三大联盟必须齐头并进、逐步实现。


There can be no treaty or constitutional clause preventing the establishment of the EFA if the German electorate, as represented by the Bundestag, approves it; otherwise, the ESM could not have been created.	如果德国联邦议院代表德国选民点了头，那么就不会有阻碍EFA成立的条约或宪法性条款； 否则的话，当初ESM也就不会成立了。


If the rest of Europe is united behind this proposal, and the Bundestag rejects it, Germany must take full responsibility for the financial and political consequences.	如果欧洲其他国家在这一方案下联合起来，而德国联邦议院一言否决，那么必须由德国承担所有金融和政治后果。


How France Will Reform	法国如何改革


PARIS – The world is changing rapidly – and it will not wait for anyone.	巴黎—世界变化很快——它不会等待任何人。


The only way to thrive is to keep pace with this transformation.	唯一的繁荣之道是跟上转型的步伐。


That is why France is pursuing reforms.	这也是法国追求改革的原因。


Of course, reform means change.	当然，改革意味着变化。


But it does not mean giving in to external pressure, or giving up what makes France French.	但它不意味着屈服于外部压力或放弃让法国成为法国的东西。


Rather, it is the key to consolidating our history, our pride, our traditions, our way of life, and our values in a dynamic global environment, for the sake of today’s citizens and tomorrow’s.	相反，在动态的全球环境中巩固我们的历史、骄傲、传统、生活方式和价值至关重要，这事关当代人和子孙后代的命运。


It is the key to building a stronger, more prosperous France.	这是建立更强大、更繁荣的法国的关键。


Clearly, much is at stake in the ongoing reform process.	显然，正在开展的改革进程是一场“豪赌”。


The good news is that many factors work in France’s favor, including diverse geography, a vibrant science and technology sector, a rich culture, and vast human capital.	好消息是许多因素都朝着有利于法国的方向发展，包括多样化的地理条件、充满活力的科技部门、丰富的文化、庞大的人力资本。


Indeed, these factors help to explain why France remains the world’s fifth-largest economy.	事实上，这些因素有助于解释为何法国仍是世界第五大经济体。


But, as globalization transforms the world economy, France must adapt in order to enable its businesses to compete abroad as well as at home.	但是，随着全球化改变世界经济，法国必须有所适应，以使法国企业能够在国外保持与国内一样的竞争力。


A robust business sector is decisive in an open economy, as it shapes a country’s ability to preserve – and improve – its citizens’ living standards.	强健的企业部门是开放经济的决定性因素，也决定了一国保持——以及改善——公民生活水平的能力。


That is why everything possible must be done to enable France to create more and better wealth.	正因如此，我们必须竭尽全力让法国建立更多更好的财富。


By helping French businesses recover lost margins, we can empower them to invest and create employment.	我们需要帮助法国企业恢复失去的盈利能力，从而让它们有力气投资和创造就业。


That is precisely what the “responsibility pact,” which came into force on January 1, and the tax credit for encouraging competitiveness and jobs aim to do.	这就是将于1月1日生效的“责任契约”和旨在提振竞争力和就业的税收优惠的初衷。


As we help French businesses to expand abroad, we must also work to encourage inward foreign investment.	在帮助法国企业海外扩张个的同时，我们还必须致力于引进外国投资。


Both are key to a country’s commercial attractiveness – among the most important dimensions of global competition.	这两者都是一国商业吸引力的关键——也是全球竞争中最重要的方面。


This stronger France will tackle whatever challenges the world throws at it head on.	更加强大的法国将能够抵挡它所面临的任何挑战。


At the same time, it will demonstrate its capacity to eliminate drags on creativity and wealth creation.	与此同时，它还将展现消除创新和财富创造力方面的落后的能力。


The “law on growth and activity” that will be voted on this year will unleash the business sector’s energy, including by stimulating competition.	将在明年投票表决的“增长和活动法”将释放企业部门的能量，刺激竞争正是方针之一。


Moreover, opening up regulated professions will help to reduce the inequalities with which the French public has become increasingly frustrated.	此外，开放管制行业将有助于降低令法国公众怨气日增的不平等性。


To create more wealth in an open economy is one of my government’s priorities.	在开放经济中创造更多财富是我的政府的当务之急之一。


But more wealth alone will not cure France’s ills.	但光是更多的财富无法治愈法国的顽疾。


The most successful countries are those where employers and employees feel bound to a common fate.	在最成功的国家，雇主和雇员应该同呼吸共命运。


It is thus urgent to improve social dialogue and bolster trust in France.	因此，改善法国的社会对话、巩固信任十分紧迫。


This objective underlies our “simplification schemes” for negotiation and consultation in the business sector.	这一目标使我们企业部门协商和咨询“简化机制”的基础。


And it is helping to guide vocational education and training reform, which will benefit not only those who wish to enhance their skills at work, but also those whose lack of training is preventing them from finding employment.	这有助于指导职业教育和培训改革，从而不但有利于想要增强工作技能的人，也将有利于因为缺少训练导致无法找到工作的人。


These initiatives are just part of a broader shift.	这些计划只是更大变革的一部分。


Through a variety of mechanisms, we are working to make citizens’ lives easier, streamline business activities, and relieve the authorities of extraneous work that diverts attention from important strategic tasks.	我们正在通过不同机制致力于让公民生活得更便利，让商业活动更顺畅，让相关部门摆脱干扰它们关注重要战略任务的俗务。


French citizens will soon begin to feel the impact of these efforts in their daily lives.	法国公民很快就将感受到这些措施给他们的日常生活带来的影响。


Despite the tremendous potential of these initiatives, they will be for naught if they are not perceived as being fair.	尽管这些计划拥有无穷潜力，但如果不能让人感到公平，它们将一无是处。


France, after all, has long been defined by a strong egalitarian impulse.	毕竟，法国一直以强大的平等意识著称。


Consider education.	以教育为例。


In reworking our “priority education” program, we can adjust teaching methods to address school inequalities, while channeling additional resources to disadvantaged areas.	通过改进我们的“优先教育”计划，我们可以调整教学方式纠正学校不平等性，同时将更多资源用于落后地区。


This includes ensuring that all schools have enough computers, so that all students can benefit from today’s technological breakthroughs, with no digital divide among students or regions.	这包括确保所有学校都有足够的计算机，以使所有学生都能从今天的科技突破中获益，让所有学生、所有地区都不存在数字差距。


The fact that the impact will not be felt for years should not be allowed to diminish its urgency.	这一计划的效果可能在多年内都无法感觉到，但不应该因此干扰到这一计划的紧迫性。


Indeed, the entire process of building a strong and equitable economy should aim not just to improve citizens’ lives today; it must also prepare France for the future.	事实上，建设强大、公平的经济的整个过程不但应该致力于改善当下的公民生活； 也必须为法国的未来打下基础。


And, when it comes to boosting a country’s long-term prospects, the most successful initiatives often take time to produce visible results.	而要提振一国的长期繁荣，最成功的计划往往需要时间来产生可见的成果。


In a society that overvalues immediacy, it can be difficult to take a long-term view.	在一个过度强调立竿见影的社会中，保持长期远见是很困难的。


But my government will not be deterred from forward-thinking action that will ensure that tomorrow’s France is the France our citizens want and deserve.	但我的政府不会因此放弃前瞻行动。 前瞻行动才是确保明天的法国是我们的公民想见且应得的法国的关键。


It is up to the state to set an example for reform.	国家应该为改革树立榜样。


This is all the more true in France, where citizens place high expectations on the state – not to do everything, but certainly to draw strategic lines and enable local actors to succeed.	法国尤其如此。 法国公民对国家期望很高——不是要国家包办一切，但至少要做好能让地方行动者成功的战略规划。


In short, the government must put its agenda-setting power at the service of the people.	简言之，政府必须用它的日程设置权力为人民服务。


When it comes to preparing for the future, one exceptionally large project lies ahead: the energy transition.	在为未来打好基础方面，有一个无与伦比的大工程摆在眼前：能源转型。


We all know that we are headed toward a new growth model – one that is more sober and sustainable, that depends less on fossil fuels and more on renewable energy sources.	众所周知，我们正在转向新增长模式，新模式更加审慎、更加可持续，更少依赖化石燃料，更多依赖可再生能源资源。


This new approach to growth will entail new habits, new attitudes, and new modes of living.	这一新增长方针包括全新的生活习惯、态度和模式。


With the energy transition law, my government aims to get ahead of this trend by creating the legislative framework for future “green” growth.	我的政府实施能源转型法的目的就是要通过为未来“绿色”增长建立法律框架引���趋势。


The goals of the French government’s reform agenda are clear: A stronger France, able to thrive in a rapidly changing global environment; a fairer France, without which no effort, whether individual or collective, could be considered a success; and a more steadfast France that can serve as a stable and prosperous home for our children.	法国政府改革日程目标明确：一个能在快速变化的全球环境中实现繁荣的更强大的法国； 一个没有它仍和个人和集体的行动都不能称之为成功的更公平的法国；


In the interest of France and its people, we are committed to the reforms needed to realize this vision.	一个可以成为我们的孩子们的稳定而繁荣的家园的更坚定的法国。 为了法国和法国人民的利益，我们将致力于实施实现这一愿景所需要的改革。


How India Survived the Financial Crisis	印度是如何走出危机的


NEW DELHI – As the world economy begins to recover, Indians are looking back with particular satisfaction at how they coped with the recent crisis.	发自新德里——随着世界经济开始复苏，印度人也得以志得意满地回顾自己当时是如何应对这场危机的。


Despite an unprecedented global recession, India remained the second fastest growing economy in the world.	虽然全球正遭遇着前所未有的衰退，但印度依然成功保持着世界第二快的增长态势。


Whereas most countries suffered negative growth in at least one quarter over the last two years, India’s GDP grew by more than 6% throughout this period – and by 7.9% in the last quarter of 2009.	而当其它国家的GDP在过去两年内出现了至少25%的负增长时，印度反而取得了6%的提升——2009年第4季度更实现了7. 9%的飞跃。


India’s achievement is all the more striking given that the Pakistani terrorist attacks on Mumbai – India’s financial nerve center and commercial capital – in late November 2008 came in the midst of the crisis.	而将印度的成就衬托得更为引人注目的，在巴基斯坦恐怖分子于2008年11月对孟买——印度的经济神经中枢和商业首都——的袭击事件。


The terrorists dented the worldwide image of India as an emerging economic giant, a success story of the era of globalization, and a magnet for investors and tourists.	当时正值危机中期，印度的国际形象——正在崛起的经济巨人，全球化时期的成功故事，全球投资者和旅游者的圣地——都因恐怖分子的暴行而蒙上了阴影。


Indeed, in late 2008, foreign investors did withdraw $12 billion from India’s stock markets. But India’s resilience in the face of adversity, and its mature restraint in the face of violent provocation, encouraged investors to return.	在2008年年末的时候，外国投资者已经从印度股市中抽回了120亿美元，但凭借着遭受困境之后的回复力以及面对暴力挑衅时的克制力，印度成功赢回了投资者的心。


Foreign direct investment totaled $27.3 billion in 2008-2009, despite the global financial crisis, and reached $1 billion in just one week in May 2009.	在全球危机之中，境外直接投资总额在2008~2009年达到了273亿美元，仅在2009年5月就取得了10亿美元的成绩。


India’s ability to stave off the economic gales was helped by the fact that it is much less dependent than most countries on global flows of trade and capital.	印度避开经济冲击的能力源自于其经济的相对独立，不像其他国家那样过度依赖于全球贸易和资本流。


India relies on external trade for about 20% of its GDP (the figure for China is roughly double). The country’s large and robust internal market accounts for the rest.	印度GDP的20%依赖于对外贸易（中国的数据几乎是印度的两倍），其他部分则面向庞大而坚实的国内市场。


Indians continued producing goods and services for other Indians, and that kept the economy humming.	印度不断生产着供本国人使用的产品，并以此维持着经济的欣欣向荣。


Though India’s merchandise exports did register declines of about 30%, its exports of services continued to do well throughout the crisis.	虽然商品出口确实下降了30%，但印度服务业的出口依然在危机中蓬勃发展。


Indians abroad stayed loyal to India: remittances from overseas Indians remained robust, reaching $46.4 billion in 2008-2009, the bulk of which came from the mainly blue-collar Indian expatriate community in the Gulf countries.	海外印度人也依然心系故土，境外汇款总额不断增长，在2008~2009年间达到了464亿美元，其中大部分是来自那些在海湾地区打工的印度蓝领工人。


India’s generally conservative financial system played a vital role, too.	此外，印度总体上保守的金融系统也扮演了极其重要的角色。


Its banks and financial institutions were not tempted to buy the mortgage-supported securities and credit-default swaps that ruined several Western financial institutions.	面对抵押债券和信用违约互换等令诸多西方金融遭遇灭顶之灾的金融衍生品，印度银行和金融机构不为所动。


Among the drivers of growth, domestic capital formation retained much of its momentum from preceding years.	而在印度增长的诸多推动力中，国内资本形成依然维持着接近前几年的良好势头。


Moreover, India’s government adopted a pro-active fiscal policy, rolling out two rounds of stimulus packages.	印度政府也采取了积极的财政政策，先后推出了两个一揽子经济刺激计划。


The authorities pursued pro-growth policies, including lower interest rates, expanded credit, and a reduction in excise duties.	当局实施的刺激增长政策包括降低利率，增加信贷以及调低消费税等举措。


There are still challenges ahead.	但未来依然存在着挑战。


Reform is pursued hesitantly by a coalition government constantly wary of voters’ reactions.	由于过于忌惮民众的反应，联合政府的改革步伐依然踌躇不决。


A decision to de-regulate petrol and diesel prices has sparked massive street protests and stoked fears of rampant inflation.	一项放开汽油柴油价格的决策引发了大规模街头抗议以及对通货膨胀的忧虑。


Privatization of India’s bloated public sector (from massive coal and steel enterprises to the loss-making national carrier Air India) has been slow to get off the ground.	对印度过度臃肿的国有企业（包括大型煤矿钢铁企业以及亏损不断的印度航空公司）的私有化进程依然在艰难起步。


And, of course, the persistent complaints of corruption and bureaucratic red tape have not faded with liberalization.	毫无疑问，对政府腐败以及官僚主义的抱怨并未随着自由化进程而消失。


The country’s infrastructure remains woeful, as any visitor flying into an Indian airport notices. Power shortages are frequent.	正如每一个飞临印度的访客所见，印度的基础设施依然少得可怜。


Some 40% of the population still lives below a poverty line drawn just this side of the funeral pyre.	停电更是家常便饭，有40%的人口终生生活在贫困线以下。


Yet all these problems are being dealt with by a confident Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who has steered the ship of state through some particularly treacherous waters.	然而自信的印度总理曼莫汉·辛格正着手处理上述这些问题，并带领着印度这艘巨轮前进在礁石之间。


India is simultaneously tackling the “hardware” of development (ports, roads, airports) and its “software” (health care, education).	印度同时强调发展其“硬件”（港口，公路和机场）以及“软件”（医疗卫生和教育）。


Success will not occur overnight, but progress has been impressive and is continuing.	罗马不是一天建成的，但印度正持续取得令人瞩目的进步。


In the last 15 years, India has pulled more people out of poverty than in the previous 45 – roughly 10 million people per year on average in the last decade.	在过去15年间，印度脱离贫困线的人口总量比之前45年都要多——近10年间大概每年有1000万人实现了脱贫。


The country has visibly prospered, and, despite population growth, per capita income has grown faster, and to a greater level, than ever before.	国家的兴旺有目共睹，虽然人口持续增长，但人均收入增长更快，已经达到了一个前所未有的高度。


The current financial crisis, far from prompting India to retreat, is an opportunity to safeguard and build on those gains.	当前的金融危机不但不能令印度退缩，还提供了一个维护和巩固这些成果的大好机会。


India can advance with the confidence that it can cope with the world from a very secure base.	印度满怀信心，因为我们能倚赖自身雄厚的基础去和世界打交道。


As the 2010 monsoon nourishes India’s plains, that’s an encouraging place to be.	随着印度洋季风再次染绿了这个国家，这里将成为一片激动人心的土地。


How Inequality Fueled the Crisis	社会不平等如何引发了金融危机


CHICAGO – Before the recent financial crisis, politicians on both sides of the aisle in the United States egged on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the giant government-backed mortgage agencies, to support low-income lending in their constituencies.	芝加哥——在金融危机发生之前，美国两大房屋抵押贷款机构“房利美”与“房地美”都得到政府的支持，在美国两党的怂恿下，这两个贷款机构向选区内的低收入家庭提供贷款。


There was a deeper concern behind this newly discovered passion for housing for the poor: growing income inequality.	这种热衷于向穷人提供房产贷款的现象背后，则是出于对社会收入不平等日益加深的深切忧虑。


Since the 1970’s, wages for workers at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution in the US –such as office managers – have grown much faster than wages for the median worker (at the 50th percentile), such as factory workers and office assistants.	自上世纪70年代以来，美国工资分配群体中，90%的办公室经理比50%的普通工人和办公室职员的工资增长速度快得多。


A number of factors are responsible for the growth in the 90/50 differential.	这就拉大了收入的差距。


Perhaps the most important is that technological progress in the US requires the labor force to have ever greater skills.	也许最重要的原因是因为美国的技术进步对劳动力技能的要求有了很大提高。


A high school diploma was sufficient for office workers 40 years ago, whereas an undergraduate degree is barely sufficient today.	40年前，一份高中文凭就足以应付办公室职员的工作，但现在本科学历都不太够用了。


But the education system has been unable to provide enough of the labor force with the necessary education.	我们的教育体制一直未能给我们的劳动力大军提供所必需的教育。


The reasons range from indifferent nutrition, socialization, and early-childhood learning to dysfunctional primary and secondary schools that leave too many Americans unprepared for college.	原因有多方面，责任心的缺乏、社会化进程、早期的学前教育、小学及中学教育不完善，这些原因都导致许多美国人未能进入大学学习。


The everyday consequence for the middle class is a stagnant paycheck and growing job insecurity.	由此给中产阶级带来的影响体现在日常生活中，就是工资上不去，就业形势日益不稳定。


Politicians feel their constituents’ pain, but it is hard to improve the quality of education, for improvement requires real and effective policy change in an area where too many vested interests favor the status quo.	政府了解选民的苦衷，但也知道提高教育质量绝非易事，因为提高质量要求政府的政策有实质而有效的改革，而改变现状是很多既得利益者不愿看到的。


Moreover, any change will require years to take effect, and therefore will not address the electorate’s current anxiety.	另外，任何改革都需要经历数年才能见到成效，所以不能满足选民们当下的诉求。


Thus, politicians have looked for other, quicker ways to mollify their constituents.	政客们只好寻找其他捷径来安抚选民。


We have long understood that it is not income that matters, but consumption.	我们早已知道，消费而不是收入才是关键因素。


A smart or cynical politician would see that if somehow middle-class households’ consumption kept up, if they could afford a new car every few years and the occasional exotic holiday, perhaps they would pay less attention to their stagnant paychecks.	一个聪明或愤激的政客会意识到，如果一个中产阶级家庭的消费增加了，隔几年换一辆新车、偶尔去国外度度假，也许选民就不会太在意自己的薪水停滞不前了。


Therefore, the political response to rising inequality – whether carefully planned or the path of least resistance – was to expand lending to households, especially low-income households. The benefits – growing consumption and more jobs – were immediate, whereas paying the inevitable bill could be postponed into the future.	所以，面对日益加剧的社会不平等问题，政府的举措就是向普通家庭、尤其是低收入家庭扩大贷款，这一措施可能是精心规划的，也或者是反对意见很少，总之收效很快—消费额增加，就业率也上升了；


Cynical as it might seem, easy credit has been used throughout history as a palliative by governments that are unable to address the deeper anxieties of the middle class directly.	贷款可以推迟到将来再还。 这么说可能有挖苦意味，但在历史上就是这样，面对无法解决的国内中产阶级的深层次忧虑，政府也是一直利用宽松的信贷政策作为权宜之计。


Politicians, however, prefer to couch the objective in more uplifting and persuasive terms than that of crassly increasing consumption.	与其通俗直白的称之为增加消费，政客们更倾向于使用高雅、有说服力的词句来陈述其政策的意义。


In the US, the expansion of home ownership – a key element of the American dream – to low- and middle-income households was the defensible linchpin for the broader aims of expanding credit and consumption.	在美国，美国梦的核心因素—“拥有自己的住宅”便被政府加以利用，政府以向广大低收入及中等收入家庭提供房贷为说辞，来掩盖其扩大信贷及消费的意图。


Why did the US not follow the more direct path of redistribution, of taxing or borrowing and spending on the anxious middle class?	为什么美国政府不采取更直接的经济手段呢，比如再分配、增加税收、发国债、增加开支？


Greece, for example, got into trouble doing precisely this, employing many thousands in the government and overpaying them, even while it ran up public debt to astronomical levels.	希腊陷入困境正因为采取了这些手段，才导致政府人员过度膨胀，开支巨大，国债达到惊人的数字。


In the US, though, there have been strong political forces arrayed against direct redistribution in recent years.	但在美国却不一样，近几年来，再分配政策一直遭到强大政治集团的反对。


Directed housing credit was a policy with broader support, because each side thought that it would benefit.	而房贷政策却广受推崇，因为各方都认为会获利。


The left favored flows to their natural constituency, while the right welcomed new property owners who could, perhaps, be convinced to switch party allegiance.	美国左派希望其选区获得贷款，右派也欢迎产生更多的新房屋业主，认为可能说服这些新业主改变其党派倾向。


More low-income housing credit has been one of the few issues on which President Bill Clinton’s administration, with its affordable-housing mandate, and that of President George W. Bush, with its push for an “ownership” society, agreed.	房贷政策是美国民主共和两党能够达成一致意见、为数不多的几个议题之一。 不管是克林顿政府时期的“经济适用房”法案，还是布什政府推动建立的“业主产权”社会，都对低收入家庭房贷政策给予支持，


In the end, though, the misguided attempt to push home ownership through credit has left the US with houses that no one can afford and households drowning in debt.	但最终，试图通过房贷让民众拥有住房的政策导致美国出现了大量无人买得起的空房，而且许多还贷家庭饱受债务困扰。


Ironically, since 2004, the homeownership rate has been in decline.	具有讽刺意味的是，自2004年以来，美国的居民住宅��有率一直处于下降态势。


The problem, as often is the case with government policies, was not intent.	如同大多数情况一样，这个问题的出现违背了政府政策的初衷。


It rarely is.	政府的意图常常很难得以实现。


But when lots of easy money pushed by a deep-pocketed government comes into contact with the profit motive of a sophisticated, competitive, and amoral financial sector, matters get taken far beyond the government’s intent.	由财大气粗的政府撑腰，固然可以轻松赚大钱，但当撞上复杂、充满竞争和并不道德的金融业时，事情的发展就会远远超出政府的预料。


This is not, of course, the first time in history that credit expansion has been used to assuage the concerns of a group that is being left behind, nor will it be the last.	这种情况不是第一次出现，在历史上，信贷也曾作为一种手段，以缓解社会弱势群体的困境，将来也还会有信贷。


In fact, one does not even need to look outside the US for examples.	不需拿别的国家举例，美国历史上就有这样的例子。


The deregulation and rapid expansion of banking in the US in the early years of the twentieth century was in many ways a response to the Populist movement, backed by small and medium-sized farmers who found themselves falling behind the growing numbers of industrial workers, and demanded easier credit.	19世纪早期，受国内平民主义运动的影响，美国缺乏监管的银行业迅猛扩展，得到许多中小型农场主的支持，这些农场主要求借贷方式更便捷，试图以此摆脱自己落后于产业工人的困境。


Excessive rural credit was one of the important causes of bank failures during the Great Depression.	而农村地区的过度借贷正是大萧条时期金融业崩溃的主要原因之一。


The broader implication is that we need to look beyond greedy bankers and spineless regulators (and there were plenty of both) for the root causes of this crisis.	这次危机更深沉的意义在于，我们要越过贪婪的银行家和懦弱的监管者（这两类人都很多），去寻找这次危机的根本原因。


And the problems are not solved with a financial regulatory bill entrusting more powers to those regulators.	不能依靠一项金融监管法案，通过向监管机构赋予更多的权力来解决问题。


America needs to tackle inequality at its root, by giving more Americans the ability to compete in the global marketplace. This is much harder than doling out credit, but more effective in the long run.	美国需要从根本上解决不平等问题，就要增强本国人民在全球市场上的竞争力，这要比发放贷款困难许多，但从长期看却是更为有效的。


How Japan Fuels Global Financial Instability	日本怎样激化了全球金融的不稳定


Over the past several years, much attention has focused on the role of China’s trade surplus in creating today’s global financial imbalances.	在过去几年里，许多人关注的是中国的贸易顺差怎样导致了今天全球金融的不平衡。


But too little attention has been paid to the role of Japan’s policy of near-zero interest rates in contributing to these imbalances.	但是很少有人去关注日本近乎为零的利率对金融不平衡的影响。


As global financial uncertainty rises, it is time for Japan to change course.	在全球金融的不确定性越来越大的时候，现在是日本改弦更张的时候了。


Japan’s ultra-low interest rate policy was initiated in the 1990’s to put a floor under the economy following the bursting of its asset price bubble.	日本超低的利率政策是在二十世纪九十年代开始实行的。 当时日本的房地产泡沫破裂后，政府期望通过实行超低的利率来避免经济的崩溃。


However, over time these ultra-low interest rates have promoted a highly speculative financial “carry” trade: speculators borrow yen at low interest rates and then buy dollars and other currencies that are invested in higher-yield assets elsewhere.	然而，随着时间的推移，这些超低的利率促进了高度投机的金融“套利”交易，也就是投机商以超低的利率贷来日元用来购买美元或其他货币，然后把这些货币投资到其他高收益的资产上。


There are two key features of this carry trade.	这种套利交易有两个重要的特征。


First, it contributes to yen depreciation and dollar appreciation as carry traders switch out of yen.	一是它促使了日元的贬值和美元的升值，因为从是套利交易需要不断地把日元兑换出去；


Second, it increases global asset demand, generating asset price inflation.	二是它增大全球资产需求，引发资产价格飞涨。


The yen’s depreciation versus the dollar has contributed to continuing large US trade deficits with Japan.	日元兑美元的贬值带来了美国对日贸易持续庞大的赤字。


It has also pressured other East Asian countries to under-value their exchange rates in order to remain competitive with Japan.	它还迫使东亚其他国家压低它们的汇率以保持对日本的竞争力。


Given China’s under-valued currency, East Asia’s two largest economies have thus anchored down exchange rates throughout the region, thereby increasing the region’s trade surplus at the expense of jobs and growth in the rest of the global economy.	考虑到中国被低估的货币，东亚的两大经济体由此压低了整个地区的汇率，在加大了该地区贸易顺差的同时，也使全球其他经济体付出了失业和经济增长缓慢的代价。


Funds switched out of Japan have shifted to other financial markets, with the chase for yield driving up asset prices and lowering interest rates.	流出日本的资金被转移到了其他金融市场，而对于获利的追逐推高了资产的价格，同时也降低了汇率。


In the US, this has complicated the Federal Reserve’s task.	在美国，这使得联邦储备委员会的工作变得异常复杂。


The Fed has been trying to slow demand growth and cool the housing price bubble to avoid inflation, but carry trade speculators have been easing credit.	美联储一直试图降低需求的增长，并且给持续上涨的房地产市场降温以避免通货膨胀，但是套利交易投机商却放宽了信贷条件。


Most importantly, the carry trade generates global financial fragility by creating fundamental – and dangerous –mismatches.	最重要的是，套利交易因为制造了根本性、同时也是危险的不均衡而造成了全球金融的脆弱。


First, carry traders borrow in yen but invest in dollars and other currencies.	首先，套利交易人借的是日元，但是却用美元和其他货币投资。


Second, carry traders borrow short-term money in Japan but may invest in longer-term assets outside Japan.	其次，套利交易人在日本借的是短期贷款，但是却投资在日本之外的长期资产上。


Unexpected yen appreciation could cause large carry trade exchange rate losses, as could unexpected closing of the interest rate gap with Japan.	如果日元出人意料地升值，或者其他货币出人意料地把其利率降低到日本的水平，那么将导致套利交易巨额的汇率损失。


Such losses, or just the thought of them, have the potential to trigger global contagion as carry traders close positions in US markets to repay loans in Japan.	这种损失，或者仅仅是对这种损失的担心，将使套利交易人被迫变卖其在美国市场的资产取偿还其在日本的贷款，从而很有可能会在全球蔓延。


In addition to the global dangers of the carry trade, the policy of ultra-low interest rates may also be bad for Japan.	除套利交易对于全球金融的危害，超低的利率政策对于日本也许也是有害的。


This is because ultra-low interest rates may hurt Japan’s households and lower consumption, and this effect may be larger than the benefit that a weak yen confers on Japan’s exports.	因为超低的利率会伤害日本家庭并且降低消费，而这一影响的坏处也许超出了弱势日元给日本的出口所带来的利益。


Higher interest rates can spur consumption if their impact on income outweighs the increased incentive to save.	更高的利率可以刺激消费，如果对收入的增长超出了人们的储蓄欲望的话。


This may well be the case for Japan, which has a rapidly aging population.	这种情况很有可能会在日本发生，因为它是一个人口快速老龄化的国家。


Current ultra-low interest rates may be scaring people about the adequacy of future income.	目前超低的利率会使人们担心未来是否有足够多的收入。


Raising rates could alleviate those fears, increasing consumer confidence and spending.	提高利率可以减少这种担心，提高消费者的信心和消费。


Additionally, raising interest rates would be a form of expansionary fiscal policy.	除此以外，提高利率可以成为扩张性财政政策。


This is because Japan has a large public debt, and increasing interest payments on that debt would put extra money in the hands of households.	这是因为日本有着规模庞大的公债，提高公债的利息可以使普通家庭得到额外的收入。


The policy of ultra-low interest rates was justified in the aftermath of the bursting of Japan’s asset price bubble, but Japan stabilized its economy long ago.	超低利率政策在日本房地产泡沫破灭后的那段时间实行后确实不无道理，但是日本的经济很早就已经稳定了。


At this stage, the policy has become a contributor to global financial fragility, and it may be retarding Japan’s own prosperity by contributing to consumer anxieties.	当前，这一政策促使了全球金融的脆弱，并且因其使消费者产生忧虑可能还阻碍了日本自身的经济繁荣。


That means Japan should decisively abandon ultra-low interest rates, albeit gradually so as to allow an orderly unwinding of speculative positions.	所以日本应该下决心放弃超低的利率，尽管这需要循序渐进，以便从投机中解套。


How Long for Low Rates?	低利率能维持多久？


CAMBRIDGE – How long can today’s record-low, major-currency interest rates persist?	美国剑桥—当前创纪录低水平的主要货币利率可以维持多久？


Ten-year interest rates in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany have all been hovering around the once unthinkable 1.5% mark.	美国、英国和德国十年期均在以前不可想象的1. 5%水平徘徊。


In Japan, the ten-year rate has drifted to below 0.8%.	在日本，十年期利率已经降至0.


Global investors are apparently willing to accept these extraordinarily low rates, even though they do not appear to compensate for expected inflation.	8%以下。 全球投资者显然愿意接受超低利率，及时这无法补偿预期通胀。


Indeed, the rate on inflation-adjusted US Treasury bills (so-called “TIPS”) is now negative up to 15 years.	事实上，美国通胀调整国债（即所谓的“TIPS”，最高15年）利率目前正处于负水平。


Is this extraordinary situation stable?	这一反常状态稳定吗？


In the very near term, certainly; indeed, interest rates could still fall further.	在极短的短期，答案是肯定的； 事实上，利率还可以进一步下降。


Over the longer term, however, this situation is definitely not stable.	但在较长时期，这一状态显然是不稳定的。


Three major factors underlie today’s low yields.	三大因素导致了当前的低收益率。


First and foremost, there is the “global savings glut,” an idea popularized by current Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke in a 2005 speech.	首先，最重要的是，存在“全球储蓄过剩”。 这一概念由美联储现任主席伯南克在2005年的一次演讲中提出。


For various reasons, savers have become ascendant across many regions.	出于多种原因，储蓄者在诸多地区占据了主导地位。


In Germany and Japan, aging populations need to save for retirement.	在德国和日本，老龄化人口需要储蓄应对退休。


In China, the government holds safe bonds as a hedge against a future banking crisis and, of course, as a byproduct of efforts to stabilize the exchange rate.	在中国，政府持有安全债券作为对冲未来银行危机的手段，当然，这也是稳定汇率的副产品。


Similar motives dictate reserve accumulation in other emerging markets.	相同的动机也导致了其他新兴市场储备的积累。


Finally, oil exporters such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates seek to set aside wealth during the boom years.	最后，沙特和阿联酋等石油出口国也试图在繁荣时期储备财富。


Second, in their efforts to combat the financial crisis, the major central banks have all brought down very short-term policy interest rates to close to zero, with no clear exit in sight.	其次，在与金融危机作斗争的过程中，主要央行均将极短期政策利率降至零水平，且没有给出明确的退出信号。


In normal times, any effort by a central bank to take short-term interest rates too low for too long will boomerang.	在正常时期，央行若在过长时间内将短期利率维持在过低水平将适得其反。


Short-term market interest rates will fall, but, as investors begin to recognize the ultimate inflationary consequences of very loose monetary policy, longer-term interest rates will rise.	短期市场利率会下降，但是，随着投资者最终开始意识到极宽松货币政策的通胀后��，长期利率会上升。


This has not yet happened, as central banks have been careful to repeat their mantra of low long-term inflation.	但这一幕并没有发生，因为央行小心翼翼地反复提及长期利率。


That has been sufficient to convince markets that any stimulus will be withdrawn before significant inflationary forces gather.	这足以让市场认为所有刺激手段都会在大通胀发威前退出。


But a third factor has become manifest recently.	但最近大热的是第三个因素。


Investors are increasingly wary of a global financial meltdown, most likely emanating from Europe, but with the US fiscal cliff, political instability in the Middle East, and a slowdown in China all coming into play.	投资者越来越担心全球金融市场崩盘（最有可能从欧洲开始），此外还有美国财政悬崖、中东政局不稳以及中国减速等状况可能发生。


Meltdown fears, even if remote, directly raise the premium that savers are willing to pay for bonds that they perceive as the most reliable, much as the premium for gold rises.	崩盘恐慌虽然很遥远，却也直接提高了储蓄者愿意为他们所认为的最可靠债券付出的溢价，正如黄金溢价一涨再涨。


These same fears are also restraining business investment, which has remained muted, despite extremely low interest rates for many companies.	相同的恐慌还制约了商业投资，尽管许多公司面临的利率已降至极低水平，但商业投资仍然停滞不前。


It is the combination of all three of these factors that has created a “perfect storm” for super low interest rates.	这三大因素结合在一起，就形成了超低利率的“完美风暴”。


But how long can the storm last?	但这场风暴可以维持多久？


Although highly unpredictable, it is easy to imagine how the process could be reversed.	尽管难以预测，但可以想象整个过程如何逆转。


For starters, the same forces that led to an upward shift in the global savings curve will soon enough begin operating in the other direction.	首先，导致全球储蓄曲线上移的力量很快就会在相反的方向上起作用。


Japan, for example, is starting to experience a huge retirement bulge, implying a sharp reduction in savings as the elderly start to draw down lifetime reserves.	比如，日本已开始经历退休爆炸，这意味着随着老年人开始动用生命储备，储蓄将显著下降。


Japan’s past predilection toward saving has long implied a large trade and current-account surplus, but now these surpluses are starting to swing the other way.	长期以来，日本对储蓄的偏好导致了巨额贸易和经常项目盈余，但现在这些盈余已开始向反方向波动。


Germany will soon be in the same situation.	德国很快也将进入类似的阶段。


Meanwhile, new energy-extraction technologies, combined with a softer trajectory for global growth, are having a marked impact on commodity prices, cutting deeply into the surpluses of commodity exporters from Argentina to Saudi Arabia.	与此同时，新能源开采技术将与全球增长放缓一起对商品价格形成重大影响，从阿根廷到沙特等商品出口国的顺差将因此大幅减少。


Second, many (if not necessarily all) central banks will eventually figure out how to generate higher inflation expectations.	其次，许多（如果不是所有的话）央行最终将考虑如何制造更高的通胀预期。


They will be driven to tolerate higher inflation as a means of forcing investors into real assets, to accelerate deleveraging, and as a mechanism for facilitating downward adjustment in real wages and home prices.	它们将被迫忍受高通胀，将其作为迫使投资者转向实体资产的办法以加速去杠杆化以及作为促进真实工资和房价向下调整的机制。


It is nonsense to argue that central banks are impotent and completely unable to raise inflation expectations, no matter how hard they try.	说央行无论如何努力也无法胜任、完全不能提升通胀标准是没有道理的。


In the extreme, governments can appoint central bank leaders who have a long-standing record of stating a tolerance for moderate inflation – an exact parallel to the idea of appointing “conservative” central bankers as a means of combating high inflation.	极端地说，政府可以任命具有宣扬忍受温和通胀的长期记录的央行领导人，一如任命“保守”央行行长作为对抗高通胀之道。


Third, eventually the clouds over Europe will be resolved, though I admit that this does not seem likely to happen anytime soon.	第三，最终，笼罩在欧洲上空的乌云会退去，尽管我也承认不会很快。


Indeed, things will likely get worse before they get better, and it is not at all difficult to imagine a profound restructuring of the eurozone.	事实上，事情在变好以前可能还要走一段下坡路，不难想象，欧元区将迎来深远的重组。


Nevertheless, whichever direction the euro crisis takes, its ultimate resolution will end the extreme existential uncertainty that clouds the outlook today.	尽管如此，不管欧元危机朝哪个方向发展，其最终解决结果将结束当前极短不确定的状况。


Ultra-low interest rates may persist for some time.	超低利率可能还会维持一段时间。


Certainly Japan’s rates have remained stable at an extraordinarily low level for a considerable period, at times falling further even as it seemed that they could only rise.	毫无疑问，日本利率在相当长的时间里一直维持着超低水平，有时候，看起来利率除了上升已无处可去，却仍然下降了。


But today’s low interest-rate dynamic is not an entirely stable one.	但如今的低利率动态并不是完全稳定的。


It could unwind remarkably quickly.	它可能在眨眼间逆转。


How Military Should Japan Be?	日本需要多强大的武力？


Is it time for Japan to prime its weapons and sail out into the world in defense of peace?	现在是日本厉兵秣马，出师海外，捍卫和平的时机吗？


The very idea still incites howls of protest in Asia - not least in Japan, where popular attachment to the country's postwar "peace" constitution remains powerful.	这种想法仍然在亚洲激起抗议的声浪-不仅仅在对战后"和平"宪法的公众忠诚度仍然高涨的日本。


Yet Japan's modestly named Self-Defense Forces are involved in many regional hot spots (no combat duty, of course) and seek to play a more active part in UN peacekeeping.	然而日本低调的"自卫队"已然介入了许多地区性的热点（当然是非战斗性职责），并寻求在联合国维和行动中扮演更积极的角色。


If a shooting war ever breaks out in Asia, Japan is nowadays prepared to do a lot more than fill the petrol tanks.	如果亚洲爆发热战，现今的日本已做好了比后勤保障更多的准备。


It is past time for these modest changes, because the Asia/Pacific region's many fault lines affect the interests of the world's great and emerging powers in fundamental ways.	这些程度有限的变化已不能适应现实的需要，因为亚太地区的裂隙从根本上影响着世界大国和日益强大的国家的利益。


Northeast Asia contains the last remnants of the Cold War: the divided Korean Peninsula and hostile glares across the Taiwan Straits.	东北亚仍存在着冷战的最后遗迹：分裂的朝鲜半岛和台湾海峡两端的敌对形势。


Southeast Asia forms its own unique geo-political environment, with a wide variety of ethnic groups, cultures, and religions in tension - as the current Islamic unrest in Thailand attests.	东南亚以其多种族集团和文化及宗教压力形成了独特的地缘政治环境-正如泰国的伊斯兰动乱所揭示的那样。


Beyond these conventional strategic concerns, the emergence of global terrorism and the Iraq War re-enforce Japan's sense that the strategic environment has changed profoundly.	除了这些常规的战略考虑之外，全球恐怖主义的抬头和伊拉克战争使日本更加意识到战略环境的深刻变化。


The roles and obligations of the Self-Defense Forces must gradually shift and diversify, and their zone of action broadened.	自卫队的角色和职责必须逐渐转变和多样化，他们的行动区域必须扩大。


Neat binary concepts like "peacetime" and "wartime" are no longer viable.	诸如"和平时期"与"战争时期"一类的简单二元观念已不再适用。


The world must get used to a twilight security environment of sudden and peripheral emergencies.	世界必须习惯于一种突发性和边缘性冲突的模糊的安全环境。


Japan's laws are primed for this change, because the obligations of the Self-Defense Forces are relatively clear in these circumstances.	日本的法律为这样的转变做好了准备，因为自卫队在这样的情况下有着明确的职责。


The "Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law" allows the Self-Defense Forces to participate in the fight against international terrorism, although the form of participation is limited to logistical support.	《反恐怖特别行动法》允许自卫队参与国际反恐怖战争，虽然参与的形式仅限于后勤支持。


Nor are the Self-Defense Forces' operations and obligations any longer restricted to Japanese territory and the adjacent seas.	自卫队行使其职责的范围也不再局限于日本领土和近海。


Ever since Japan dispatched minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after the Gulf War in 1991, the Self-Defense Forces have been expanding their activities beyond Japan and its immediate vicinity to include international peacekeeping missions, emergency relief operations, multilateral military exercises, and naval refueling support in the Indian Ocean.	自从日本在1991年的海湾战争中派遣扫雷艇前往波斯湾，自卫队就开始将其活动范围从日本及邻近区域扩大到包括国际维和行动，紧急救助行动，多边军事演习及印度洋上的海军燃油补给支持。


Self-Defense Force units have been dispatched to southern Iraq to provide humanitarian aid and support reconstruction efforts.	自卫队的士兵被派遣到伊拉克南部参与人道主义援助和战后重建的工作。


Of course, the obligation of the Self-Defense Forces not to engage in offensive combat operations remains unchanged.	当然，自卫队的职责不包括进攻性军事行动的限制仍然没有改变。


With its expanded roles, however, the Self-Defense Forces are well prepared to engage in other military operations, such as shadowing and chasing spy ships, anti-terror activities, and missions to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.	但随着其角色的扩展，自卫队已准备好参与其它形式的军事行动，例如跟踪和追击间谍船只，反恐怖行动及防止大规模杀伤性武器和弹道导弹的扩散。


Japan's warships can help with sanctions monitoring and minesweeping.	日本的战舰可以协助监控禁运和扫雷。


Its ships and aircraft can rescue stranded nationals.	其战舰和飞机可以援救受困的侨民。


But these incremental changes in Japan's military capacity and policies, though necessary and effective, can be sustained only with a clear national consensus on the country's defense interests.	日本的军事潜力和政策的渐进式变化虽然是必要的和有效的，但也只能建立在对其国防利益的全民共识的基础之上。


The international community's demand that Japan participate directly in resolving global tensions has helped, by changing the terms of domestic debate.	国际社会要求日本直接参与缓和国际紧张局势的行动的现实改变了日本国内争论的环境，从而促成了这种变化。


The old deadlock on security issues is relaxing, and the Japanese public, recognizing the changed international environment, mostly embraces the Self-Defense Forces' deployment in pursuit of international and regional responsibilities.	在安全问题上的僵局开始缓和，大多数日本公众在意识到国际环境的变化以后都支持自卫队出兵海外以履行其国际和地区性的责任。


Every Japanese citizen may have his or her own opinion, but a clear majority appear to agree that Japan must become a prominent nation in promoting international and regional security, as well as economic growth.	虽然每一位日本公民的看法会各不相同，但大多数民众似乎都明确赞同日本必须成为一个在促进国际和地区性安全及经济增长方面作用显著的国家。


To achieve these ends, Japan must be endowed with responsibilities equivalent to the country's national power, while securing the safety, comfort, and prosperity of Japan and preserving the people's identity as Japanese with pride and honor.	要达成这样的目标，日本必须在确保自身的安全、稳定和繁荣及其民族自豪感和荣誉感的同时被赋予与其国力相称的责任。


Achieving these goals requires fulfilling several conditions.	实现这些目标需要满足几个条件。


Japan's political leadership needs to be founded on a competitive but stable political structure.	日本的政治领导层需要建立在竞争性，但却稳定的政治架构之上。


Only a truly popular political mandate can assure that the Japanese people are fully aware of their international responsibilities as an influential nation in the international community.	只有真正获得民众支持的政治权力才能确保日本人民充分认识到日本作为国际社会中具有影响力的国家所担负的国际责任。


Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi seems to grasp much of this, and so is undertaking discussions on security and defense that aim to help revise the "National Defense Program Outline."	小泉首相似乎已充分意识到这一点，所以正就安全与防卫的问题进行磋商。 磋商的目的是为了修改"国家防卫计划纲要"。


Those with bitter memories of Japanese behavior half a century ago should be reassured; this debate is about how to defend peace, not about how to promote or wage war.	对于日本人在半个世纪以前的所作所为仍留有痛苦记忆的人们可以放心； 这场争论是关于如何捍卫和平而不是关于如何推进或发动战争。


Many of Japan's neighbors were understandably reassured by the Cold War arrangement whereby America promised to defend Japan, relieving the country of the need for a powerful military.	可以理解的是日本的许多邻国都对美日之间在冷战中的安排感到放心。 在这种安排下，美国承诺保护日本从而使日本不需要一支强大的军队。


The one-sided nature of this alliance rankled little when Japan was just one among many protected by America's global shield.	但当日本只是美国全球保护伞下的一员时，这种单边性的联盟就有些不合时宜了。


As Japan prospered under America's protection, it prided itself on being a "civilian" power, using its trade and aid, rather than tanks and guns, to encourage stability.	当日本在美国的保护下繁荣起来时，它为自己作为一个用贸易和援助而不是坦克和枪炮促进稳定的"平民"强国感到自豪。


But America, in its global war on terror, has justifiably lost interest in bearing Asia's many military burdens alone.	但陷入反恐战争的美国理所当然地对其在亚洲独立担负的众多军事负担丧失了兴趣。


Hence, Japan must be seen to be doing more to support its inseparable ally, as well as international peacekeeping efforts in general.	因此，日本在参与一般性国际维和行动之外还应给与其不可分离的盟友更多的支持。


A rich and powerful Japan in a region as dangerous as East Asia cannot go on playing military bit parts forever.	一个富强的日本不可能在危险的东亚永远扮演微不足道的军事角色。


The question is whether Japan's Self-Defense Forces work alongside America and the world in defense of world peace now, or eventually do so alone in defense of Japan.	问题的关键在于日本的自卫队是从现在起与美国并肩保卫世界和平还是最终出于自卫而独立为之。


How Musharraf Survives	穆沙拉夫的生存之道


The devastating Kashmir earthquake is once again testing the skills of one of the world’s great political survivors.	克什米尔的惨烈地震再一次考验着当今最伟大的政治幸存者之一的执政技能。


General Pervez Musharraf, president of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, has few friends and many enemies.	巴基斯坦伊斯兰共和国总统，佩尔韦兹•穆沙拉夫将军，盟友极少而树敌众多。


Pakistan’s major political parties oppose him.	巴基斯坦主要的政治党派都和他唱对台戏。


For the religious right and the mullahs, he is an agent of America, the great Satan, and has thus betrayed the cause of Islam.	对于宗教右翼和毛拉们而言，他是美国的代理人，邪恶的魔鬼，因而已经背叛了伊斯兰教。


Somewhere out there, gunning for Musharraf, are Islamic militants furious at being dumped after they fought his covert wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir.	在某处，伊斯兰武装分子们正向着穆沙拉夫磨刀霍霍。 他们为他在阿富汗和克什米尔的隐蔽战争中立下汗马功劳，而后却被抛弃。


Many in Musharraf’s own army despise him for the same reason.	为此，他们怒火中烧。 穆沙拉夫的嫡系部队中也有许多人由于同样的原因而蔑视他。


For Pakistan’s small and embattled liberal and left-wing forces, he is yet another military dictator who seized and holds power by force, undermining the development of democracy.	对于巴基斯坦弱小而严阵以待的自由派和左翼力量而言，他是又一个通过武力篡权的军事独裁者，阻碍了民主的发展。


So how does Musharraf survive?	那么穆沙拉夫如何逢凶化吉呢？


In large part, he can thank 9/11.	在很大程度上，他应该感谢“9.


Faced by a United States bent upon bloody vengeance, Pakistan’s military establishment scurried to join the US-led coalition and take up arms against its own creation, the Taliban.	11”事件。 面对美国展开血腥报复的意图，巴基斯坦军政府忙不迭地加入到美国领导的盟军中来，拿起武器反击自己一手缔造的塔利班。


Only a few senior officers with an Islamic bent resisted this straightforward betrayal.	只有少数亲伊斯兰的高层军官抗拒这种赤裸裸的背叛。


They were soon marginalized, drawing praise from Washington.	他们很快就被穆氏边缘化了，此举受到华盛顿的称赞。


With US help, an economy that had nearly run aground was suddenly righted by a wave of international aid and loan write-offs.	有了美国的帮助，一个即将搁浅的经济体突然在一股国际援助和债务勾销的浪潮推动下，修正了航向。


Even more important was a decision, taken in the hope of choking off funds to extremist groups, to require all expatriate Pakistani earnings to be remitted through official banking channels.	更为重要的一个决策是，为了掐断对恐怖组织的资金供给，要求所有旅居海外的巴基斯坦人的收入通过官方银行渠道汇入。


In a curious way, nuclear weapons also are crucial to Musharraf’s survival, for they create conditions that distract Pakistan’s highly ideological army from its objective of war with India.	意想不到的是，核武器对穆沙拉夫的幸存也至关重要。 因为它们营造了使巴基斯坦高度意识形态化的军队从与印度作战的目标上分散注意力的条件。


The dispute over Kashmir had occupied the minds of military planners throughout Pakistan’s history, and war had been the raison d’etre for maintaining the world’s eighth-largest standing army.	在巴基斯坦的整个历史上，克什米尔争端占据了军事规划者们的头脑。 这一战争也是该国维持世界第八大常规部队的初衷。


But nukes, a belief in deterrence, and the growing realization that Kashmir is a lost cause, have freed the army from the hard life of the trenches.	但核威慑的理念和对克什米尔事业注定失败的日渐清醒的认识，将军队从藏身战壕的艰苦生活中解脱出来。


Ideology is increasingly irrelevant as the officer class scrambles to build vast personal fortunes.	当军官阶层忙着敛财时，意识形态也变得越来越无足轻重了。


A look at Pakistan’s economic landscape says it all.	只需看一看巴基斯坦的经济状况就一切明了。


The CEO’s of many, if not most corporations, public and private, are retired military officers – many fairly young.	许多（如果不是大多数）公营及私营公司的首席执行官都是退役军人—许多还相对年轻。


The military owns airlines and freight companies, petrochemical factories, power generation plants, sugar mills, cement and fertilizer plants, construction firms, banks and insurance companies, advertising agencies, and more.	军方拥有航空公司和货运公司、石油化工厂、发电厂、糖厂、水泥和化肥厂、建筑公司、银行和保险公司、广告公司及其他各种企业。


Vast tracts of prime real estate in cities, sold to officers for a pittance, have turned into mega housing developments.	城市中大量的黄金地块以低廉的价格出售给了军官，进而被开发成大型的房地产项目。


Musharraf defends the military acquisitions, claiming that they are economically efficient, and angrily dismisses criticism as the ranting of unpatriotic Pakistani pseudo-intellectuals.	穆沙拉夫为军方的攫取辩护，宣称这样会带来更好的经济效益，并愤怒地驳斥相关的批评，说它们是没有爱国心的巴基斯坦伪知识分子的咆哮。


But they are “efficient” only in the sense that they dampen the threat to Musharraf posed by the military.	但它们的“效益”仅仅在于能够抑制军方对穆沙拉夫的威胁。


No so Pakistan’s Islamists, however, whom Musharraf infuriated yet again last month, when he ordered his foreign minister to initiate the first official contact with Israel.	但巴基斯坦的伊斯兰主义者却未能得到如此安抚。 就在上个月穆沙拉夫命其外交部长展开与以色列的首次官方接触时，他对伊斯兰主义者再次大发雷霆。


But the Islamists’ call for nationwide protests flopped.	但伊斯兰主义者所呼吁的全国性抗议却失败了。


The military, after decades of rule, has dismantled all forms of political organization – parties, trade unions, and student associations – leaving a Pakistani society immobilized, apathetic, and incapable of articulating its preferences.	军方经过数十年的统治，已经废除了所有形式的政治组织—党派、工会和学生协会—使巴基斯坦社会变得停滞、麻木，没有能力宣扬自己的主张。


As Islamists’ anger at Musharraf’s betrayals increases, so does his global standing and image as a world statesman.	随着伊斯兰主义者对穆沙拉夫背叛的愤怒情绪日渐高涨，穆氏在全球的声望和其作为一位世界级政治家的形象也日益提高。


Scenes of wild-eyed mullahs demonstrating in the streets of Pakistani cities are a boon to his position.	怒气冲冲的毛拉们在巴基斯坦城市街头游行示威的情景使他的地位更为稳固。


Surely the Pakistani public needs to be tamed by a strongman.	的确，巴基斯坦的公众需要驯服于一个强有力的人。


No harm if it is an army general.	由一位将军来充当这个角色也并无不妥。


But the truth is more complex.	但真相更为复杂。


Musharraf flits effortlessly between personae.	穆沙拉夫从容自若地周旋在不同角色之间。