In exchange for financing and building the infrastructure that poorer countries need, China demands favorable access to their natural assets, from mineral resources to ports.	中国为穷国提供基础设施融资和建设，作为交换，中国要求优先获得它们的自然资产，如矿产和港口等。


Moreover, as Sri Lanka’s experience starkly illustrates, Chinese financing can shackle its “partner” countries.	此外，斯里兰卡的经历尖锐地说明，中国的融资对于其“伙伴”国家也许是一个“坑”。


Rather than offering grants or concessionary loans, China provides huge project-related loans at market-based rates, without transparency, much less environmental- or social-impact assessments.	中国并不提供援助或优惠贷款，而是提供按市场利率计息的巨额项目相关贷款，这些交易没有什么透明度可言，更不用说环境和社会影响评估了。


As US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson put it recently, with the BRI, China is aiming to define “its own rules and norms.”	美国国务卿蒂勒森（Rex Tillerson）最近指出，中国的一带一路计划旨在定义“其自身的规则和规范”。


To strengthen its position further, China has encouraged its companies to bid for outright purchase of strategic ports, where possible.	为了进一步强化它的地位，中国鼓励中资公司在可能的情况下全额收购战略性港口。 去年，一家中国企业以4.


The Mediterranean port of Piraeus, which a Chinese firm acquired for $436 million from cash-strapped Greece last year, will serve as the BRI’s “dragon head” in Europe.	36亿美元从囿于现金的希腊手中受收购了地中海的比雷埃夫斯（Piraeus）港，它将成为一带一路计划的欧洲“龙头”。


By wielding its financial clout in this manner, China seeks to kill two birds with one stone.	中国用这种方式施展其金融实力，实乃一石二鸟之计。


First, it wants to address overcapacity at home by boosting exports.	首先，中国可以通过提振出口解决国内的产能过剩问题。


And, second, it hopes to advance its strategic interests, including expanding its diplomatic influence, securing natural resources, promoting the international use of its currency, and gaining a relative advantage over other powers.	其次，中国希望推进其战略利益，包括扩大外交影响力、确保自然资源、扩大人民币的国际使用，以及获得相对其他强国的优势。


China’s predatory approach – and its gloating over securing Hambantota – is ironic, to say the least.	中国的侵略性方针——及其因为拿下了汉班托塔而表现出来的踌躇满志——很有讽刺意义。


In its relationships with smaller countries like Sri Lanka, China is replicating the practices used against it in the European-colonial period, which began with the 1839-1860 Opium Wars and ended with the 1949 communist takeover – a period that China bitterly refers to as its “century of humiliation.”	在于斯里兰卡等小国的关系中，中国复制了欧洲殖民时代对它所使用的伎俩。 中国的殖民地时期始于1839—1860年的两次鸦片战争，终于1949年共产党解放全中国，中国人将这段苦涩的时期称为“耻辱的世纪”。


China portrayed the 1997 restoration of its sovereignty over Hong Kong, following more than a century of British administration, as righting a historic injustice.	1997年，中国收回了被英国统治了一个多世纪的香港的主权。 中国称之为对历史不公的拨乱反正。


Yet, as Hambantota shows, China is now establishing its own Hong Kong-style neocolonial arrangements.	但在汉班托塔，中国却在推动自己的香港式新殖民主义安排。


Apparently Xi’s promise of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” is inextricable from the erosion of smaller states’ sovereignty.	显然，习近平的“中华民族的伟大复兴”的承诺无法与侵略小国的主权撇清关系。


Just as European imperial powers employed gunboat diplomacy to open new markets and colonial outposts, China uses sovereign debt to bend other states to its will, without having to fire a single shot.	欧洲帝国主义列强用炮舰外交打开新市场和殖民前哨站，中国则用主权债务令其他国家屈服而不必耗费一枪一弹。


Like the opium the British exported to China, the easy loans China offers are addictive.	就像英国出口给中国的鸦片，中国所提供的便利的贷款也能成瘾。


And, because China chooses its projects according to their long-term strategic value, they may yield short-term returns that are insufficient for countries to repay their debts.	而由于中国根据长期战略价值来遴选项目，这些项目的短期回报可能不足以让所在国偿还债务。


This gives China added leverage, which it can use, say, to force borrowers to swap debt for equity, thereby expanding China’s global footprint by trapping a growing number of countries in debt servitude.	这就给了中国更大的优势，比如，它可以借此迫使债务国以债换股，从而通过债务奴役俘虏越来越多的国家，以此增加其全球影响力。


Even the terms of the 99-year Hambantota port lease echo those used to force China to lease its own ports to Western colonial powers.	汉班托塔港的租期是99年，这也和西方殖民列强当年强迫中国接受的租期相近。


Britain leased the New Territories from China for 99 years in 1898, causing Hong Kong’s landmass to expand by 90%.	1898年，英国从中国手中租借新界，租期99年，从而将香港的土地面积扩大了90%。


Yet the 99-year term was fixed merely to help China’s ethnic-Manchu Qing Dynasty save face; the reality was that all acquisitions were believed to be permanent.	但99年的租期只不过是给中国的满清统治者留个面子； 实际上当时所有的兼并都被认为是永久性的。


Now, China is applying the imperial 99-year lease concept in distant lands.	如今，中国也在遥远的海外用上了99年租期的帝国主义概念。


China’s lease agreement over Hambantota, concluded this summer, included a promise that China would shave $1.1 billion off Sri Lanka’s debt.	中国租借汉班托塔港的租约——敲定于今年夏天——包含了一个承诺，即中国免除斯里兰卡11亿美元债务。


In 2015, a Chinese firm took out a 99-year lease on Australia’s deep-water port of Darwin – home to more than 1,000 US Marines – for $388 million.	2015年，一家中资企业以3. 8亿美元的价格租借澳大利亚深水港达尔文港99年，那里驻扎着1,000多名美国海军陆战队。


Similarly, after lending billions of dollars to heavily indebted Djibouti, China established its first overseas military base this year in that tiny but strategic state, just a few miles from a US naval base – the only permanent American military facility in Africa.	类似地，在向重债国吉布提提供数十亿美元贷款后，今年中国在这个具有战略意义的小国建立了其第一个海外军事基地，距离美国海军基地——也是美国在非洲唯一的永久性军事设施——只有几英里。


Trapped in a debt crisis, Djibouti had no choice but to lease land to China for $20 million per year.	陷入债务危机的吉布提别无选择，只能以每年2,000万美元的价格将土地租给中国。


China has also used its leverage over Turkmenistan to secure natural gas by pipeline largely on Chinese terms.	中国还利用其对土库曼斯坦的债权确保了基本按中国的要求实现的天然气输气管道。


Several other countries, from Argentina to Namibia to Laos, have been ensnared in a Chinese debt trap, forcing them to confront agonizing choices in order to stave off default.	其他一些国家，从阿根廷到纳米比亚再到老挝，也陷入了中国的债务陷阱，为了避免违约，不得不面临痛苦的抉择。


Kenya’s crushing debt to China now threatens to turn its busy port of Mombasa – the gateway to East Africa – into another Hambantota.	肯尼亚高企的对华债务有可能让其繁忙东非门户——蒙巴萨港沦为下一个汉班托塔。


These experiences should serve as a warning that the BRI is essentially an imperial project that aims to bring to fruition the mythical Middle Kingdom.	这些案例应该让人们警觉，一带一路计划本质上是一项帝国主义工程，它的目的是建立那个神话中的中央王国。


States caught in debt bondage to China risk losing both their most valuable natural assets and their very sovereignty.	陷入对华债务陷阱的国家，有可能最宝贵的自然资产和主权都无法保全。


The new imperial giant’s velvet glove cloaks an iron fist – one with the strength to squeeze the vitality out of smaller countries.	新帝国主义巨人天鹅绒手套里包着的是铁拳——扼杀小国自生能力的铁拳。


China’s State-Owned Enterprises at a Crossroads	十字路口的国企


HONG KONG – China has lately been facing harsh criticism for the direction of its reforms of state-owned enterprises, particularly its strengthening of the role of Communist Party committees in SOE management.	香港—最近，有关国企改革问题，出现了一些批评意见，特别是针对强化党委在国企管理中的角色的提法。


But while this might seem like a step backward for China’s market-oriented reforms, there are good reasons to boost oversight, at least for now.	尽管这看似是中国市场经济改革的一步后退，加强对国企的监督实在很有必要，至少目前是如此。


With China undergoing a fundamental transformation into an innovation-driven, knowledge-based, and services-led economy, its leaders must think carefully about how to reform the SOEs so that they can contribute to the new economy.	中国正在经历一个根本性的转型，其目标是以创新为驱动、以知识为基础、靠服务拉动的新的经济发展模式。 中国领导人此刻必须仔细思索如何改革国有企业，使其能够继续为新经济做贡献。


In the past, the role of the SOEs was clear.	在过去，国企的角色是明确的。


Over the last three decades, they underpinned China’s emergence as a global manufacturing powerhouse, by spearheading China’s infrastructure-construction boom.	在过去三十年中，它们是中国基础设施建设繁荣的先锋，为中国崛起成为全球制造业强国构筑了基础。


In the process, they became dominant, especially in sectors prone to natural monopolies (such as telecommunications and power) and key strategic sectors (such as steel, coal, and banking).	在此过程中，它们成为中国经济的一个主导力量，特别是在自然垄断行业（如通讯和电力）和关键战略性行业（如钢铁、煤炭和银行）。


But the traditional single-sided markets where SOEs lead are now being disrupted by new technology firms like Alibaba and Tencent, which straddle multi-sided markets of production, logistics, and distribution by using unified platforms that benefit from economies of scale.	但以国有企业为主导力量的传统单边市场目前正受到阿里巴巴和腾讯等新技术企业的冲击。 后者通过具有规模经济的统一大平台，横跨多边的产品、物流和分销等市场。


By creating platforms for consumers and small-scale producers – what is essentially public infrastructure – these firms have directly challenged the SOE business model.	这些企业通过同时为消费者和小企业打造平台——从根本上说，它们也是在提供一个公共基础设施——直接对国企的传统业务模式构成挑战。


New digital platforms respond quickly and efficiently to public needs.	新数字平台对公共需求的反应迅速而有效。


These businesses are more collaborative or sharing than the traditional business of manufacturing, allowing consumers and smaller start-ups to shape products and services, from design to distribution.	这些企业比传统制造业更能体现合作性和共享性，帮助了消费者和小型初创企业来参与决定产品和服务的内容，包括影响从设计到分销的各个供应链环节。


Given China’s population of 1.3 billion – a major competitive advantage in terms of innovation and purchasing power – these platforms can disrupt the incumbent one-sided market producers by offering superior scale, speed, and convenience, including access to global markets.	对于创新和购买力而言，中国高达13亿的人口是一个巨大的竞争优势。 因此这些数字化平台能够通过提供更胜一筹的规模、速度和便利性（包括与全球市场的对接）来颠覆老牌单边市场生产商（包括一些国企）。


Meanwhile, the SOEs’ obsolete business model – not to mention strong inertia – makes it difficult to identify and respond to new opportunities in providing public goods in a changing economy.	与此同时，国有企业过时的业务模式——更不用说强大的惰性——使其难以辨别在变化的经济中提供公共品的新机会并据此做出反应。


China’s state-owned telecommunication companies and banks, for example, have failed to respond to new technological challenges.	比如，国有通讯公司和银行就没有能够很好地应对新技术的挑战。


Even traditional private companies like Huawei and Midea have done much better, adjusting to shifting consumer demand and changing factor costs by retooling as quickly as possible, acquiring, for example, robot technology and product designs from the West.	而华为和美的等传统民营企业就比国有企业表现好得多，它们通过尽快学习来适应不断变化的需求和要素成本，已经开始使用机器人技术和来自西方的产品设计来提高竞争力。


Such responsiveness is particularly critical today, when the inexorable logic of technological progress is demanding a transformation of China’s growth model.	如今，不可阻挡的技术进步逻辑要求中国增长模式做出改变。 在这样的情况下，对市场的反应能力尤其关键。


With demand for consumer hardware and durables falling, China must begin to develop its own higher-tech products, while building a strong services sector.	例如，在国内消费硬件和耐用商品的需求有所下降的形势下，中国必须开始发展其自身的高科技产品，同时打造强大的服务业。


And with world exports of goods declining – both cyclically and as a result of the growth slowdown in the advanced economies – China must activate its domestic consumer base.	而随着世界商品出口的下降——这既有周期性因素，也受到发达经济体经济增长放缓的影响——中国必须激活其国内庞大的消费市场。


But the inability to update the roles and business models of SOEs is holding China back in this regard.	但是未能重新定位国有企业的新角色及没有找到国企在新形势下的业务模式正在拖累国企。


SOEs may enjoy privileged access to bank credit, natural resources, and land, but they also suffer from rigid governance and high staff turnover, spurred by President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign.	国企可能在银行信用、自然资源和土地方面享有特权，但它们也受到僵化的治理结构和反腐带来的大规模人事流动的困扰。


When it comes to key personnel, the Communist Party establishment calls the shots.	国企的关键人事岗位的变动，需要得到党组织的首肯。


So, for SOEs to make changes, there must be consensus among internal and external officials in charge of business, industrial policy, and politics.	因此，对需要不断适应市场变化的国企来说，其决策必须获得管理企业、执行产业政策和维护政治纪律的企业内部和外部官员的一致同意。


In the late 1990s, public listings of SOEs had the twin benefits of securing new resources for tackling legacy losses and propelling governance and productivity gains.	20世纪90年代末，国企上市获得了双赢的效果，既确保了解决历史遗留的亏损的新资源，又推进了治理水平和生产率的提高。


Today, however, privately owned technology platforms, many of which are listed abroad, have captured much of the valuation gains of the new economy.	但是，如今，民营技术平台中很多在海外上市，它们获得了新经济的大部分估值收益及现代治理的帮助。


As a result, policymakers are struggling to find a way to finance the creative destruction of outdated SOEs burdened by debt, excess capacity, and obsolete equipment.	而对于国企，决策者却难以找到好办法来为债务累累且有过剩产能和陈旧的设备的过时国企提供破产重组的融资。


It is this uncertainty that seems to have spurred the authorities to rethink their original, more aggressive reform plan.	这些对国企的挑战与不确定性迫使当局重新思考其最初的比较激进的改革计划。


They recognize that, when economic and financial systems comprise intricate networks of a variety of interlocking and interdependent elements, changes to one component – especially one as dominant as China’s state sector – can have far-reaching consequences.	他们认识到，当经济和金融体系由各种联动和互相依存的要素网络组成时，改变其中一个组成部分——特别是像国有部门这样的重要组成部分——可能会引起深远的后果。


With the recent adjustments to the reform strategy, China’s leaders have bought themselves some time to figure out where the SOEs can fit into the new economy.	最近的国企改革战略调整让中国领导人获得了一些时间去认识国企在新经济中的合适地位。


The answer probably lies in new public infrastructure challenges – the kind that the advanced economies are already facing – including issues related to information security and competition.	国企改革的答案也许就在应对新经济环境下新的公共基础设施挑战——发达经济体已在面临这一挑战——包括与信息安全及公平竞争相关的问题。


If SOEs shift their business models to provide platform and regulatory services at low cost, taking advantage of economies of scale, they can help, for example, to manage the use of information by the large private platforms.	如果国有企业能够改变其业务模式及角色定位，转为以低成本提供平台和监管服务，抓住规模经济优势，那么它们也许可以有助于管理大型公共平台对信息的使用。


Or they might help to guide the entry of foreign tech giants like Facebook and Google into the Chinese market, to ensure that those companies do not become too dominant.	或者它们可以有助于监督脸谱（Facebook）和谷歌等外国科技巨头进入中国市场，确保这些外国公司可以带来良性竞争及优质服务但不会完全垄断中国市场 。


State-owned banks, for their part, might be able to provide multi-tiered financing for the millions of small and medium-size enterprises that are eager to shape and enrich the new economy.	至于国有银行，也许可以利用它们的规模经济等优势为数以百万计的渴望影响和丰富新经济的中小企业提供多层次金融服务。


Finally, SOEs can enter into public-private partnerships with local businesses to handle the construction and management of transport and traffic systems, urban drainage, and bodies responsible for food safety, pollution control, and public security.	最后，国有企业也许可以涉足公私合作，与地方政府及地方民营企业一起建设交通和运输体系、城市排水系统以及加强在食品安全、污染控制和公共安全等公共领域机构的建设和管理。


The good news is that the Chinese government, at both the national and local levels, has plenty of assets with real value, amounting to more than 140% of GDP.	幸运的是中国国家和地方政府都拥有许多有价值的实物资产，净资产总量高达GDP的140%以上。


Those assets can help to smooth the transition to this new SOE business model, such as by plugging the holes in the social security system and addressing legacy liabilities, including those arising from past corruption, non-performing loans, and inadequate provision of public goods and services.	这些净资产有助于缓和国企转变业务模式和角色定位时所面临的冲击，比如可以填补社会保障系统的赤字及解决历史遗留不良债务（包括过去的腐败、不良贷款和公共设施和服务供给不足所造成的不良债务）。


China’s SOEs are at a crossroads.	中国的国有企业正处在一个重要的十字路口。


Given the high stakes of reform, the country’s leaders are right to take some time to assess their options.	改革兹事体大，中国领导人花一些时间评估及选择是合适的。


Whichever route they take is sure to be challenging.	不管他们选择那条路，都将充满挑战。


But those challenges pale in comparison to the problems that would arise from sticking to the old SOE model.	但这些挑战与坚持旧国企业务模式及角色定位不变将造成的负面后果相比根本不值一提。


The Contradictions of China’s Communist Capitalism	中国共产资本主义的矛盾


BERKELEY – The recent dizzying plunge in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges has posed a unique test for China’s Communist rulers.	伯克利—最近，上海和深圳股市暴跌对中国共产党构成了独特的考验。


So long as the markets were rising, the paradox of vigorous capitalist development overseen by the world’s largest and strongest Communist party confounded only academics and old-school Marxists.	只要市场保持升势，世界最大最强的共产党掌控有力的资本主义式发展这一矛盾就只会引起学者和老派马克思主义者的困惑。


As the Chinese Communist Party elite and their relatives, foreign financial institutions, and some Chinese small investors (enabled by margin lending) made money on stocks, no one bothered to comprehend the mutant creature they were milking.	只要中共精英及其亲属、外国金融机构和一些中国小投资者（得益于保证金贷款）从股市中赚钱，就不会有人会去费心理解他们所哺育的怪物。


But now, as the realization sinks in that Chinese stock prices will not keep rising indefinitely, the CCP is taking desperate, if clumsy, measures to control the correction.	但如今，人们开始认识到中国股价不会永远上涨，而中共也开始了病急乱投医式的控制回调的措施。


All new initial public offerings have been halted, and much trading has been curtailed; the central bank has been asked to help the China Securities Finance Corporation induce investors to buy shares and thus stabilize the market.	所有新股首发被叫停，许多交易被取消； 央行也被要求帮助中国证券金融公司诱导投资者买入股票、稳定市场。


Indeed, even the country’s sovereign wealth fund has gotten into the act.	事实上，就连中国主权财富基金也采取了行动。


But, unlike in other capitalist economies, money is not the only tool at the authorities’ disposal.	但是，与其他资本主义经济不同，钱并非当局所能动用的唯一工具。


If your brokers in China advise you to sell shares, they must be careful not to appear to be rumormongers, subject to official punishment.	在中国，如果经纪人建议你卖出股票，他们必须小心翼翼地避免成为造谣者，这样会受到官方惩罚。


And there are reports that sales of large holdings may trigger investigations by the authorities.	有消息说大宗卖出行为可能招致当局的调查。


Causing public disorder or financial instability can be a serious offense in China, where conspiracy theories about foreigners’ efforts to undermine the economy abound.	在中国，扰乱公共秩序和金融稳定是可能是严重罪名，而关于境外势力暗中破坏经济的阴谋论更是层出不穷。


What Chinese officials desire is a capitalist stock market without the possibility of large losses that can shake confidence in the CCP’s credibility and control.	中国官员想要的是不会引起大损失以至于动摇中共信誉和控制力的资本主义股票市场。


But that is a market that no one has yet invented.	但这样的市场还没有被发明出来。


The spectacle of a communist regime trying to jack up a casino-like capitalist market is just one of the many contradictions that have been accumulating in almost every corner of China’s economy and politics.	共产主义政权试图托起如同赌场的资本主义市场，这一奇观只是几乎遍布中国经济和政治每一个角落的大量矛盾中的一个。


And now, their weight is perhaps becoming too heavy for the Party hierarchy to bear.	而如今，这些矛盾的分量也许已经成为中共政党层级难以承受之重。


Indeed, the composition of the CCP is itself a contradiction.	事实上，中共的组成本身就是一个矛盾。


The revolutionary party of peasants and workers is now dominated by businessmen, college students, and professionals.	这个代表工人和农民的革命党现在被商人、大学生和专业人士所主导。


One-third of the people listed in the Hurun Report, the Shanghai-based monitor of China’s wealthiest people, are Party members.	在胡润中国财富榜上，三分之一的上榜者是党员。


The average wealth of the richest 70 members of the National People’s Congress, China’s parliament, far exceeds $1 billion.	中国人大代表中最富有的70人的平均财富超过10亿美元。


(The richest 70 members of India’s parliament or even the US Congress, both now controlled by right-wing political parties, are substantially less wealthy.)	（印度乃至美国议会——目前均由右翼政党控制——最富有的70名议员的财富值要低得多。 ）


Of course, President Xi Jinping’s recent drive against corruption high and low has made many Communist Party plutocrats jittery.	当然，国家主席习近平最近的反腐运动让很多中共富豪不寒而栗。


But questions abound as to whether the corruption charges being brought against the so-called “tigers” are a fig leaf for an old-fashioned purge of Xi’s rivals in the Party and the military.	但很多人质疑对所谓的“老虎”所提起的腐败指控是否只是障眼法，其实质是对习近平在党内和军中的反对势力的老式清洗。


Ordinary Chinese generally support the anti-corruption drive; it is they who usually initiate protests and point fingers at dishonest officials.	普通中国人大多支持反腐运动； 经常发起示威和指责不诚实官员的也正是他们。


But, if such protests attract too much attention, it is more likely that they will be quashed and their leaders repressed than that the corruption will be stopped.	但是，如果这样的示威引起过多关注，那么更有可能发生的情况是示威被驱散，示威领导人被镇压，而不是腐败得到阻止。


In 2008, for example, following the Sichuan earthquake, thousands of children died when their shoddily built schools collapsed.	比如，2008年四川地震时，数千儿童因为校舍质量低劣而死亡。


For a while, tales of corruption in the schools’ construction dominated even the official news.	有一段时间，官方新闻也充斥着关于学校建设腐败问题的报道。


In the end, however, it was the protesting parents and teachers of the dead children who were detained and harassed by the state.	但是，最终被逮捕、被国家批评的却是示威的死亡儿童的家长和教师。


What the CCP refuses to recognize is that corruption cannot be rooted out as long as the Party maintains its monopoly on political power; with no organized opposition or functioning civil-society institutions, officials will continue to use their positions of public authority as a vehicle to generate personal wealth.	中共拒绝承认，只要它垄断着政治权力，腐败就无法根除； 没有有组织的反对和功能健全的公民社会机构，官员就会继续利用公职作为敛财工具。


The Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress gave primacy to the principle of market competition; but, as a senior Chinese banker commented in a related context some years back: “It’s quite hard to compete when you’re playing against the referee.”	中共十八大三中全会强调市场竞争原则； 但是，一位资深中国银行家在多年前的评论说：“如果你与裁判比赛，你很难去和他竞争。


That observation extends to the rule of law and constitutionalism.	这一观察可以扩大到法治和宪政领域。


Under Xi, the CCP has repeatedly insisted that the rule of law is a “core socialist value” and has pledged to promote the authority of the constitution.	在习近平治下，中共一再强调法治是“社会主义核心价值”，承诺提高宪法的权威。


Yet the rule of law in the Party’s eyes is a law that it dictates, interprets, and enforces.	但在中共眼里，法治就是由党定法，由党释法，由党执法。


Chinese citizens’ references to the constitution (especially article 35, which guarantees freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association) and constitutionalism in general are routinely censored, and lawyers who cite the constitution in court are frequently detained.	中国公民援引宪法（特别是保护言论、出版、集会和结社自由的第35条）和一般地提及宪政主义都要受到审查，在法庭中引用宪法的律师也常常会被关起来。


Mao famously speculated on the nature of contradictions in a 1937 essay: “The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the fundamental law of nature and of society.”	在1937 年的论文中，毛泽东对矛盾的性质做出了著名的总结：“事物矛盾的法则，即对立统一的法则，是自然和社会的根本法则。


One wonders, though, if even he could have grasped, much less managed, the contradictions of communist capitalism.	”尽管如此，我们还是会困惑，就连毛泽东是否也无法抓住、更不用说管理共产资本主义的矛盾。


China’s Painful Structural Transformation	中国经济结构转型之痛


SHANGHAI – For more than a year, headlines worldwide have been pointing to a Chinese economic slowdown.	上海一年多来，全球经济新闻头条纷纷指向中国经济放缓。


But a closer look at regional dynamics within China tells a different story – one that is less about deceleration than changing gears.	但近观国内区域经济的增长动态，看到的东西会有所不同——与其说中国经济处于减速期，不如说处于换挡期。


According to China’s National Bureau of Statistics, the resource-rich province of Shanxi has suffered an economic slowdown, but the southwestern provinces of Chongqing and Guizhou have experienced vibrant growth.	根据中国国家统计局公布的资料，资源丰富的山西省遭遇了经济下滑，但是位于西南部的重庆市和贵州省的经济却增长迅速，生机勃勃。


Hebei and three other northeastern provinces are feeling the effects of recession, but the heavy-industry economies of Tianjin, Shandong, and Jiangsu are booming.	同时，河北省和其他东北三省正在经历经济衰退带来的不良后果，而同样曾是重工业主导的天津市、山东省和江苏省的经济却保持蓬勃发展势头。


After the 2008 financial crisis, when slower growth became the “new normal” for many countries, China began to accelerate its economic rebalancing by shifting the drivers of growth from manufacturing and exports toward goods and services for domestic consumption.	2008年全球金融危机后，经济增长放缓已成为许多国家的“新常态”， 中国也开始加快经济的再平衡，由原来的制造业和出口转向主要用于国内消费的产品的生产与服务的提供。


This transition has had far-reaching implications for the future dynamics of China’s economy.	这一转变给中国未来的经济增长动力带来了深远影响。


With its previous export strategy, the government’s main priority was to integrate domestic manufacturing operations into global production chains.	以前的出口战略中，政府优先考虑的是将国内制造业与全球生产链进行整合。


Now, however, its aim is an economy that meets domestic consumers’ diverse demands, and it is the industries closely connected to those demands that are quickly expanding.	如今的目标则变为满足多样的国内消费需求，并且正是与这些需求紧密相关的产业正在迅猛发展。


Previously, the economic activities that are now flourishing weren’t categorized as manufacturing industries at all, but as “services.” But services do not exist in a vacuum.	现今繁荣的这些经济活动长期以来是被归入服务业，而非制造业的，但是服务业并不意味着脱离实际，与世隔绝。


All businesses need manufactured products, transportation, information and communications technology (ICT), logistics, real estate, finance, insurance, and more.	所有的商业活动都需要制造、运输、信息和通信技术、物流、地产、金融、保险等行业配套。


Thus, new demand for new services has virtuous-cycle effects in terms of capital investment in infrastructure and equipment.	因此，对于新服务的新需求会对基础设施投资和设备投资产生良性循环的效果。


Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the growth of services in China to meet domestic demand does not mean the end of manufacturing and capital investment, much less of economic growth.	不同于传统智慧，服务业的日益增长是为了满足国内消费需求，并不意味着制造业和资本投资的末日，更不意味着经济增长走到尽头。


Service sectors stand to make up for much, if not all, of the growth lost to lower output in export-oriented manufacturing branches.	即便不能完全弥补，服务业也在努力更多地弥补由出口导向型制造业产出降低导致的增长失速。


China’s transportation, ICT, finance, insurance, real estate, education, and health-care sectors have long had inappropriately low labor productivity, which means they have significant room to grow faster.	中国在运输、信息和通信技术、金融、保险、地产、教育、健康等行业的劳动生产率长期以来并不高，反倒证明这些行业有着重要的快速增长空间。


According to a paper by the economists Jong-Wha Lee and Warwick J. McKibbin, service-sector productivity growth in Asia “benefits all sectors eventually, and contributes to the sustained and balanced growth of Asian economies.”	经济学家Jong-Wha Lee 和Warwick J. McKibbin在一篇论文中指出，亚洲的服务业生产率增长将“最终使所有行业受益，并有助于亚洲经济体持续、平衡的增长。


Examining economic development trends in South Korea, the authors find that the average value added per worker in transportation, real estate, and ICT is now higher than the average in manufacturing, and they point to similar dynamics in the United States, Japan, and China.	” 以韩国的经济发展情况为鉴，他们发现运输、地产和信息和通信技术行业的人均附加值要高于制造业的平均值，同时指出在美国、日本和中国也如此。


This finding suggests that rapid development in China’s service economy could reverse the externally triggered dampening of growth since 2008.	这一发现表明中国服务经济的迅猛发展能够逆转2008年以来由外部冲击造成的不景气。


But, as the Japanese and South Korean transitions from export to domestic demand-driven growth demonstrate, structural transformation is a slow and painful process.	然而从日本和韩国从出口转向国内需求导向的增长经验来看，结构转型是一个缓慢而痛苦的过程。


China is in the midst of that process, and it must be careful not to undermine existing sources of growth lest it fall into a structural trap where the cost of transition itself derails new gains.	中国正处于结构转型中，必须警惕避免经济增长对既存增长源泉的削弱，以免掉入结构性陷阱造成结构转型成本过高，抵消转型的好处。


It is not a good sign that the high costs in many Chinese provinces have been weighing down overall growth.	而中国多省出现的转型成本高昂拖累了总体的经济增长趋势，这并不是一个好征兆。


This points to fundamental challenges ahead, notwithstanding the significant economic potential of Chinese consumers.	尽管中国消费者的规模潜力相当巨大，但是上述情况还是指出了发展前路上面临的基本挑战。


For starters, economic development based on diversified domestic demand is more complicated than export-driven development, because these new sectors rely more heavily on sophisticated financial services, free and equitable market access, better educated workers, and higher investment in research and development.	对于新手而言，基于国内需求多元化的经济增长相较于出口导向型发展更为复杂，因为这些新行业的发展更多倚重于复杂的金融服务、自由公平的市场准入资格、受教育程度更高的劳动者以及对研究开发领域更多的投资。


As a result, the new businesses emerging from the shift to a new growth model are demanding far more from China’s current economic-governance system than it can bear.	因此，转向新增长模型的新业态对中国现存经济治理体系提出远超出其所能承载的要求。


Further structural reforms would go a long way toward fixing this problem, but they will also require China’s leaders to make tough political decisions that won’t please everyone.	为解决这些问题，中国的结构性改革还有很长的路要走，即使不会皆大欢喜，这依然要求中国领导人要做出艰难的政治决定。


Another fundamental challenge is China’s slow rate of urbanization, which is still lagging, even after 25 years of export-led growth.	另一项根本挑战是中国的低城市化率，尽管经历了25年的出口拉动型增长，城市化进程依旧步履蹒跚。


Each of a thriving service economy’s major components – ICT, finance, insurance, transportation, and real estate – needs the others to prosper, and cities are what bring them all together – a phenomenon of network externalities.	信息和通信技术、金融、保险、运输、地产，繁荣的服务型经济中每一项主要要素都离不开其他要素的繁荣，而正是城市将这些要素聚拢，即所谓的网络关联外部性现象。


Unfortunately, China’s enduring system of dividing urban and rural regions, together with poor urban planning, has led to fragmented and scattered metropolitan communities without diversified networks that would otherwise have helped boost productivity.	不幸的是，中国长期的城乡二元结构体制与不合理的城市规划，已经导致大城市社区碎片化、分散化并缺乏多样化的城市网群，不然大城市社区本应能促进生产率更大的提高。


China’s cities will be a key ingredient of its long-term economic success.	城市将成为中国经济长期成功发展的核心要素。


Urbanization should start accelerating today, and over the next 10-15 years, with the expansion of metropolitan areas geared toward the needs of services-led economic growth.	城市化应当从现在开始提速，并且未来10到15年间城市规模应当配合服务拉动型经济增长而进行扩张。


If China can rise to that challenge, it will be well positioned to clear the remaining hurdles in its path toward high-income status.	如果中国能够跨越这个挑战，将更有利于为迈向高收入国家扫清现存障碍。


China’s Weapons of Trade War	中国的贸易战武器


BEIJING – China exports more to the United States than the US exports to China.	北京—中国对美出口要比美国对华出口更多。


That makes US President Donald Trump furious – so furious, in fact, that he may be willing to start a trade war over it.	这让美国总统特朗普抓狂——事实上，抓狂到了可能不惜发动贸易战的程度。


Trump has leveled tough protectionist threats against China.	特朗普对中国发出了严厉的保护主义威胁。


As he attempts to consolidate his presidency, he is unlikely to back away from them.	他若想巩固其总统地位，就不可能放弃这些威胁。


And with the Communist Party of China’s 19th National Congress set to take place in Beijing in November, Chinese leaders are unlikely to yield to US pressure.	而随着中共十九大即将于11月在北京召开，中国领导人也不可能屈服于美国的压力。


A trade war would undoubtedly hurt both sides.	毫无疑问，贸易战将是两败俱伤。


But there is reason to believe that the US has more to lose.	但有理由相信美国会输得更惨。


If nothing else, the Chinese seem to know precisely which weapons they have available to them.	不出意外的话，中国似乎知道可以动用哪些武器。


China could stop purchasing US aircraft, impose an embargo on US soybean products, and dump US Treasury securities and other financial assets.	中国可以停止采购美国飞机，对美国大豆制品实施禁运，甩卖美国国债和其他金融资产等。


Chinese enterprises could reduce their demand for US business services, and the government could persuade companies not to buy American.	中国企业可以削减对美国的企业服务的需求，政府也可以说服企业不要买美国货。


The bulk of numerous Fortune 500 companies’ annual sales come from China nowadays – and they already feel increasingly unwelcome.	如今，《财富》500强公司大部分年销售额都来自中国——并且它们已经开始日益不满。


Beyond being America’s second most important trading partner, China is America’s main jobs supplier.	除了是美国的第二重要的贸易伙伴之外，中国还是美国的主要就业岗位提供者。


A trade war could thus cost the US millions of jobs.	因此，贸易战将让美国损失数百万个就业岗位。


If China switched from Boeing to Airbus, for example, the US would lose some 179,000 jobs.	比如，如果中国舍弃波音，采购空中客车，美国将失去179,000个就业岗位。


Reduction in US business services would cost another 85,000 jobs.	减少美国企业服务需求也将让美国失去85,000个就业岗位。


Soybean-producing regions – for example, in Missouri and Mississippi – could lose some 10% of local jobs if China halted imports.	大豆生产区——如密苏里州和密西西比州——将因为中国不再进口美国大豆产品而失去大约10%的本地就业岗位。


Moreover, though the US exports less to China than vice versa, it is China that controls key components in global supply chains and production networks.	此外，尽管美国对华出口要小于中国对美出口，但中国控制着全球供应链和生产网络的关键元件。


Consider the iPhone.	以iPhone为例。


While China provides just 4% of value added, it supplies the core components to Apple at low prices.	中国只提供了4%的增加值，但它以低成本向苹果公司提供核心元件。


Apple cannot build an iPhone from scratch in the US, so it would have to search for alternative suppliers, raising its production costs considerably.	苹果公司不可能在美国从零开始生产iPhone，因此不得不去寻找替代供应商，从而大大增加其生产成本。


This would give Chinese smartphone businesses an opportunity to seize market share from major players.	这将给中国智能手机企业制造从主要竞争对手手中抢夺市场份额的机会。


Today, 80% of global trade comprises international supply chains.	如今，80%的全球贸易在国际供应链中进行。


Declining trade costs have allowed firms to splinter their production lines geographically, with goods processed and value added in multiple countries along the chain.	贸易成本的下降使企业得以将生产线分散到各个地区，在这个链条中，商品的加工和价值的增加在多个国家实现。


If China threw a handful of sand in the gears of these chains, it could disrupt entire production networks, doing serious damage to the US (and, indeed, all the countries participating in such networks).	如果中国向这条供应链的齿轮中惨一些沙子，就能影响到整个生产网络，对美国造成严重打击（事实上，所有参与这些网络的国家都会受到冲击）。


An escalating trade war, with each side erecting symmetric import barriers, would fuel inflationary pressure in the US, potentially driving the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates higher and faster than it would otherwise.	如果贸易战升级，双方都将建立系统性进口壁垒，这将助推美国的通胀压力，有可能促使美联储更快更大幅地提高利率。


That, together with diminished growth prospects, would depress equity markets, and declining employment and household income could lead to a sizeable loss of GDP in both the US and China.	再加上令人堪忧的增长前景，美国股市将承受压力，而就业和家庭收入的下降可能导致美国和中国都蒙受巨大的GDP损失。


A more likely scenario, however, is that both countries would initiate disputes in specific sectors, particularly traditional manufacturing industries like iron and steel production.	但是，更有可能的情景是两国在个别部门发生纠纷，特别是钢铁等传统制造业。


Meanwhile, Trump will continue to accuse China of manipulating its exchange rate, ignoring the recent downward pressure on the renminbi (which indicates that the currency was actually overvalued), not to mention the simple fact that many governments intervene to manage their exchange rates.	与此同时，特朗普将继续谴责中国操纵汇率，无视人民币最近受到的贬值压力（这表明人民币此前其实是高估的），更不用说许多政府都出手干预汇率的简单事实了。


Both Japan and Switzerland have engaged in outright currency intervention in recent years, and the US itself may well join their ranks, when the strong dollar’s impact on US export competitiveness becomes untenable.	日本和瑞士在近几年中都曾大举干预本国货币，美国本身也很有可能加入这一行列，如果强势美元给美国出口造成难以承受的竞争力冲击的话。


In any case, China can probably forget about achieving “market economy status” under World Trade Organization rules until after Trump is out of the White House.	无论如何，中国可能无从实现世贸组织规则所规定的“市场经济地位”，直到特朗普下台。


The trade confrontation between the US and China will also affect bilateral investment flows.	中美贸易冲突还将影响到双边投资流。


The US may cite national security concerns to block Chinese investments.	美国可以以国家安全为借口阻止中国的投资。


It may also stop government purchases from Chinese companies like Huawei, and force Chinese firms and wealthy individuals to reduce investments that have hitherto bolstered US asset prices.	它也可以让政府停止采购华为等中国公司的产品，迫使中国企业和富人收回目前支撑美国资产价格的投资。


A high-quality US-China bilateral investment treaty would create a level playing field for American companies, giving them better access to China’s large market.	高质量的中美双边投资条约可以为美国公司创造公平的竞争环境，让它们更容易打入庞大的中国市场。


But those talks will invariably be pushed back, while disputes over intellectual property rights and cyber security will be reinvigorated.	但这些条约的谈判难免会受到挫折，而关于知识产权和网络安全的纠纷将再度兴起。


For now, China’s leaders seem convinced that they have little reason to bend to US pressure.	目前，中国领导人似乎认为他们没有理由屈从于美国的压力。


For one thing, Trump seems more concerned with other priorities, such as repealing the US Affordable Care Act, reforming the tax system, and investing in infrastructure.	一方面，特朗普似乎更关注其他重点事项，如撤销平价医疗法、改革税收制度、基础设施投资等。


Even if a trade war does happen, China’s leaders assume, it probably would not be sustained for long, given the income and job losses that both sides would suffer.	中国领导人认为，即使真的爆发贸易战，也不会维持太久，因为双方都将付出沉重的收入和就业代价。


In any case, they have no intention of sending any signal of weakness to a leader so intent on testing other’s limits.	无论如何，美国和中国都无意向热衷于试探对方底线的领导人示弱。


For the past five years, China has sought to establish a growth model that is less reliant on exports and more reliant on domestic consumption.	在过去五年中，中国建立了更少依赖出口、更多依赖国内消费的增长模式。


But China often needs a crisis or an external shock to drive reform.	但中国通常需要危机或外部冲击来推动改革。


Perhaps Trump is that shock.	也许特朗普就是这一冲击。


While his policies will be bad for China in the short term, they may also provide the impetus China needs to stop subsidizing exports and perpetuating distortions in the domestic economy.	尽管其政策从短期来讲不利于中国，但有可能为中国提供取消出口补贴、纠正国内经济的长期扭曲的刺激因素。


If this happens, China may actually emerge from the era of Trump better off than before.	果真如此的话，中国反倒可以在特朗普时代获得比以往更多的收益。


Optimizing Decision-Making in a Dangerous World	在危险的世界中优化决策


CAMBRIDGE AND NEW YORK – The United States and China have reached a precarious moment in their relationship.	剑桥城和纽约——美中两国在双边关系中抵达了一个危险时刻。


Ensuring a peaceful outcome will be the greatest geopolitical challenge of the twenty-first century.	21世纪最大的地缘政治挑战将是确保一个和平的结果。


Are our leaders up to it?	我们的领导人是否能够完成这项任务？


As things stand today, the risks seem only to be escalating.	今天的局面是，风险似乎正在升级当中。


US President Donald Trump’s administration has imposed economic sanctions on Chinese entities with financial ties to North Korea, because it does not believe that China has done enough to constrain the North Korean regime.	美国总统唐纳德·特朗普政府已经就与朝鲜的金融关系强制实施了对中国机构的经济制裁，因为它不相信中国已经为约束朝鲜政权做得足够多。


And, as Trump has said bluntly, if the Chinese don’t deal with North Korea, he will.	而且，特朗普直言不讳的表示，如果中国不管束朝鲜，这项工作就由他来做。


As North Korea inches closer to developing a nuclear-tipped missile that can hit the continental US, Trump has threatened the country with “fire and fury like the world has never seen.”	随着朝鲜离研制出能够打到美国大陆的核导弹越来越近，特朗普威胁将用“世界从未见过的战火和愤怒”来摧毁这个国家。


China, for its part, rejects what its foreign ministry has called the “China responsibility theory” regarding North Korea.	中国方面否认其外交部所谓的“中国对朝负责论”。


A recent editorial in a Chinese state-run newspaper asserted that while China would stay neutral if North Korea attacked first, US strikes aimed at regime change would cause China to intervene.	中国一份官方报纸发表社论称尽管中国在朝鲜首先发起攻击的情况下会保持中立，但美国以政权更迭为目标的打击行动将会导致中国介入。


The Chinese also responded furiously to the passage of a US naval warship through disputed waters in the South China Sea last month, a move that the foreign ministry called a “provocation” that “severely undermines China’s sovereignty and security.”	中国还愤怒地回应了美国海军舰艇上月通过南海争议水域，中国外交部称此举为严重损害中国主权和安全的“挑衅行为”。


While these issues are modern, the underlying political dynamic is not new.	虽然这些问题才刚刚出现，但背后的政治动态实际却由来已久。


Describing a similar power struggle in classical Greece, the historian Thucydides wrote that, “It was the rise of Athens, and the fear that this instilled in Sparta, that made war inevitable.”	在描述古希腊一次类似的权力斗争时，历史学家修昔底德写道，“恰恰是雅典的崛起及其带给斯巴达的恐惧，导致了不可避免的战争爆发。 ”


Across the ages, the so-called Thucydides Trap has appeared repeatedly, fueling tensions between rising and reigning powers that caused otherwise manageable events to fuel cycles of action and reaction that ended in devastating wars.	在岁月的长河中，所谓的修昔底德陷阱曾一再出现，加剧了崛起和执政大国之间的关系紧张，导致本来可控的事件推动行动及反制循环，并最终以毁灭性战争的形式结束。


Over the last 500 years, in 16 cases where a rising power threatened to displace a ruling power, 12 led to war.	在过去500年间，在崛起大国威胁要取代执政大国的16个案例中，其中12个以战争结束。


The US and China should take note: business as usual is likely to produce history as usual.	美中两国应当提高警惕：照常行事很可能重复历史的错误。


But, beyond dire warnings, history offers instructive clues for avoiding conflict.	不过除了可怕的警示，历史也为我们提供了避免冲突的有益线索。


Consider the seemingly insurmountable dilemma faced by US President Franklin Roosevelt in 1940, when the United Kingdom was under serious strain in its fight against Nazi Germany.	以1940年美国总统富兰克林·罗斯福面对的看似不可逾越的困境为例，当时英国在反对纳粹德国的战争中正严重承压。


The UK’s supplies and money were running low, but Roosevelt knew that the US Congress would never simply loan Britain the money it needed.	英国的物资和钱正在快速耗尽，但罗斯福知道美国国会永远不会将所需的贷款提供给英国。


Roosevelt’s problem “seemed insoluble,” writes historian Doris Kearns Goodwin in her book No Ordinary Time.	罗斯福的问题看似无法解决，历史学家多丽丝·卡恩斯·古德温在其著作非常时期中写道。


But Roosevelt did something that would seem inconceivable in today’s political climate: he took a ten-day break on a navy ship, and gave the predicament the thought it deserved.	但罗斯福的所作所为在今天的政治气候下却似乎令人难以想象：他登上一艘海军舰艇休假十天，并对这样的困境进行了深入的思考。


Then, too, the idea of the US president escaping from the world at a critical juncture initially drew criticism.	之后，美国总统在如此紧要关头逃避外界的想法最初招致了批评。


“I didn’t know for quite a while what he was thinking about, if anything,” Roosevelt aide Harry Hopkins later said.	“很长一段时间我都不知他在想什么，”罗斯福的助手霍普金斯后来说。


“But then – I began to get the idea that he was refueling, the way he so often does when he seems to be resting and carefree.	“而后——我开始明白他在给自己充电，他看似在休息和无所事事的时候经常这么做。


So I didn’t ask him any questions.	因此我没有问他任何问题。


Then, one evening, he suddenly came out with it – the whole program.”	然后，一天傍晚，他突然想出了办法——并且拿出了整个计划。 ”


Hopkins was referring to the groundbreaking $50 billion Lend-Lease Act, which became the primary means by which the US provided military aid to foreign countries during World War II.	霍普金斯指的是开创性的500亿美元租借法案，该法案成为二战期间美国向国外提供军事援助的主要工具。


Through that program, the president could transfer defense materials for which Congress had appropriated funds to the government of any country whose defense was considered vital to US security, without requiring compensation.	通过这项计划，总统有权无偿向任何国家转移国会已向政府拨款的国防物资，只要接受国被认为对美国的安全至关重要。


Today, leaders are under extraordinary pressure to apply similarly inspired decision-making skills to an array of daunting challenges.	今天，领导人面对一系列艰巨挑战进行类似开创性决策的压力非常大。


Beyond deepening tensions between China and the US, they must confront Russia’s growing assertiveness, the Middle East’s continued instability, and the looming specter of catastrophic climate change.	除中美紧张关系不断加剧外，他们还必须面对俄罗斯日益增长的自信，中东持续的动荡以及逐渐逼近的灾难性气候变化。


How many have the courage to learn from Roosevelt’s approach?	究竟有多少人有勇气学习罗斯福的做法？


It is hard to imagine Trump following in FDR’s footsteps.	很难想象特朗普会跟随罗斯福的脚步。


But to insist that the most certain path to potentially catastrophic decisions begins with an exhausted, intemperate mind is not a partisan observation.	但坚持具有潜在灾难性的决策始于一种疲惫不堪的偏激心态并不是站在党派立场上的观察。


The Stoics understood this.	斯多葛派理解这种状况。


In his 19 years as Rome’s emperor, Marcus Aurelius faced nearly constant war, a horrific plague, and a coup attempt.	在19年的罗马皇帝生涯中，马尔库斯·奥列里乌斯面临几乎不间断的战争、可怕的瘟疫以及一次政变企图。


But instead of lashing out at those he presumed were against him, Aurelius calmly asked himself, “Does what’s happened keep you from acting with justice, generosity, self-control, sanity, prudence, honesty, humility, straightforwardness, and all other qualities that allow a person’s nature to fulfill itself?”	但奥列里乌斯并未抨击那些被认为反对他的人，而是冷静地问自己，“发生的一切是否能阻止你按照正义、慷慨、自控、理智、审慎、诚实、谦卑、直率，以及允许个人发挥天性的所有其他品质的方式做出决策？ ”


Chinese wisdom offers another helpful perspective.	中国智慧提供了另外一个有益的视角。


Central to Taoism is the concept of wu wei, which can be literally translated as “non-action,” but is really much more than that.	无为是道家理念的核心，可以从字面上译为“不采取任何行动”，但实际含义却远不止于此。


In Taoism, when we are in a state of harmony and connection with ourselves, we operate in a kind of effortless, intuitive, and spontaneous way.	在道家理论中，当我们能与自己和睦相处，就能在直觉指引下毫不费力地自发采取行动。


Looking back on his own presidency, Bill Clinton recognized the dangers of burnout.	回顾自己的总统经历，比尔·克林顿认识到精疲力尽所带来的威胁。


“Every important mistake I’ve made in my life, I’ve made because I was too tired,” he once said.	他曾说过，“我一生中所犯的每个重要错误，都是因为太累才犯下的。


David Gergen, in his book Eyewitness to Power, detailed the costs of Clinton’s undisciplined rest habits in the first period of his presidency.	” 大卫·盖根在其著作权力目击者中详细列举了克林顿首任总统期间毫无节制的休息习惯所付出的代价。


“Clinton was still celebrating the victory and loved staying up half the night to laugh and talk with old friends,” he wrote.	“克林顿仍然喜欢庆祝胜利，还喜欢熬夜与老朋友纵情谈笑，”他写道。


This had a visible impact on the president, who according to Gergen, “seemed worn out, puffy, and hyper,” as well as “out of sorts, easily distracted, and impatient.”	这对总统产生了显著的影响，他“显得筋疲力尽、臃肿和极度兴奋，”同时又“情绪低落、无法集中精力和不耐烦。 ”


Creating the time and the space needed to recharge, refuel, and reflect is essential for the human operating system to function optimally.	创造加油、充电和思考所需的时间和空间是人类操作系统发挥最佳水平的关键因素。


That is not a systemic bug; it’s a powerful feature – one that leaders today should be using to its fullest extent.	这不是一种系统错误； 而是一种强大的特点——今天的领导人应当最大限度地对其加以利用。


The China Factor in Kenya and Zimbabwe	肯尼亚和津巴布韦的中国因素


BEIJING – Ask anyone with a basic knowledge of Africa which country is more poised for success – Zimbabwe or Kenya – and he or she will undoubtedly answer “Kenya.”	北京——如果询问一个对非洲有基本知识的人哪个国家更有可能取得成功——津巴布韦还是肯尼亚——他或她会毫不犹豫的回答“肯尼亚”。


Events of the last week would seem to confirm that verdict.	上周发生的事件似乎证实了这样的判决。


On Monday, after Kenya’s Supreme Court upheld the reelection of President Uhuru Kenyatta in the country’s contested presidential election, the rule of law seemed to trump political violence for the first time in years.	周一，在肯尼亚最高法院支持总统乌胡鲁·肯雅塔在该国有争议的总统选举中连任之后，法治似乎多年以来首次战胜了政治暴力。


Zimbabwe, on the other hand, is without President Robert Mugabe for the first time in 37 years.	而另一方面，津巴布韦则在37年来首次失去了总统罗伯特·穆加贝。


And, although the country may be ecstatic now, its political future is far from certain.	而且，尽管该国现在可能欣喜若狂，但其政治未来却距离“确定”还相去甚远。


But as a Kenyan living in China, one of the African continent’s most important development partners, I see one metric that tips the scale in Zimbabwe’s favor: its relationship with my adopted home.	但是作为一名生活在非洲大陆最重要的发展伙伴之一中国的肯尼亚人，我看到有一个衡量标准导致天平向津巴布韦倾斜：那就是这个国家与我第二故乡的关系。


In fact, Zimbabwe’s economic and political ties to China could prove decisive for Africa’s perpetual underdog.	事实上，津巴布韦与中国的经济和政治关系可能被事实证明对这个非洲永久的失败国家具有决定性的意义。


On paper, Kenya clearly has the edge.	从纸面上看，肯尼亚显然具有优势。


Although Zimbabwe has more natural resources and mineral wealth, it has far less land and extreme poverty is much more widespread.	尽管津巴布韦拥有更多的自然资源和矿产财富，但土地面积却小得多，极端贫困的情况也更为普遍。


More than 70% of the country’s 16 million people live on less than $1.90 a day, compared to 46% of Kenya’s 48 million people.	全国1，600万人口中有超过70%每天依靠不到1. 9美元生活，而肯尼亚的4，800万人口中仅有46%处在相同的境遇。


Moreover, as many as 90% of Zimbabweans are unemployed or underemployed, compared to 39% of Kenyans.	此外， 高达90%的津巴布韦人没有工作或就业不足，而只有39%的肯尼亚人处在同等境遇。


Even Kenya’s economic links to China might seem more impressive at first glance.	就连肯尼亚与中国的经济关系乍看上去似乎也更令人钦佩。


Kenya and China have long cooperated on large infrastructure projects.	肯尼亚和中国一直在大型基础设施项目上开展长期合作。


A Chinese-funded railway between Nairobi and Mombasa, which opened earlier this year, is the latest example.	今年早些时候贯通的一条由中国出资修建的内罗毕和蒙巴萨之间的铁路就是最近的例子。


Since 2000, China has offered Kenya $6.8 billion in loans for infrastructure projects, compared to $1.7 billion for Zimbabwe.	2000年以来，中国已经向肯尼亚提供了68亿美元的基础设施项目贷款，而津巴布韦则只有17亿美元。


And, because loan conditions often include a requirement to hire Chinese employees, Kenya had more than 7,400 at the end of 2015, while Zimbabwe had just over 950.	而且，因为贷款条件中往往包括雇用中国雇员等要求，截至2015年底肯尼亚拥有超过7，400名中国员工，而津巴布韦则仅有950多人。


But in the competition for Chinese largesse, Kenya’s advantage over Zimbabwe ends there.	但在对中国慷慨投资的争夺中，肯尼亚对津巴布韦的优势也截止于此。


Cumulative Chinese foreign direct investment since 2003 has reached nearly $7 billion in Zimbabwe, compared to $3.9 billion for Kenya.	2003年来津巴布韦所累计的中国外商直接投资已达近70亿美元，而肯尼亚则只有39亿美元。


Year on year, more Chinese money is flowing to Zimbabwe as well.	按照年同比计算，也有更多的中国资本流往津巴布韦。


Moreover, Zimbabwe’s trade balance with China is far superior to Kenya’s.	此外，津巴布韦与中国的贸易平衡远优于肯尼亚。


In 2015, Kenya’s exports to China totaled $99 million, while it imported from China a staggering 60 times that amount.	2015年，肯尼亚对中国的出口总额为9，900万美元，但从中国的进口却惊人的达到出口额的60倍。


Even taking into account imports of materials tied to Chinese-built infrastructure, this is an exceptionally wide bilateral deficit.	即便考虑到与中国建造基础设施相关的材料进口，这也是非常大的双边赤字。


Zimbabwe, on the other hand, despite its slow growth rate, exported $766 million worth of goods to China in 2015, and imported $546 million.	另一方面，津巴布韦尽管增长缓慢，2015年却向中国出口了7. 6亿美元的商品，而进口额为5.


Most surprisingly, Zimbabwe’s exports were not restricted to minerals and metals, as one might assume, but also included tobacco and cotton, products that are relatively more labor-intensive, meaning more job creation at home.	46亿。 最令人惊讶的是，津巴布韦的出口不仅像人们想象的那样限于矿产和金属，而且还包括烟草和棉花这些劳动密集程度相对较高的产品，这也意味着在国内创造了更多的工作岗位。


And, while Zimbabwe has around 50 fewer registered Chinese companies than Kenya, Kenya’s economy is around 4.5 times the size of Zimbabwe’s, clearly implying that those firms that are operating there contribute more to the country’s economy.	而且，尽管津巴布韦的注册中国企业比肯尼亚少近50家，但肯尼亚经济规模约为津巴布韦的4. 5倍，这显然意味着在津巴布韦运营的中国企业对该国经济的贡献更大。


How has Zimbabwe achieved what looks like, at least from a numerical perspective, a more productive relationship with China than Kenya has?	津巴布韦究竟如何实现了（至少从数字角度看）比肯尼亚与中国更好的关系？


Few beyond Mugabe and his close colleagues, including the country’s new president, Emmerson Mnangagwa, know for sure.	除穆加贝及其亲密同事，包括该国新任总统埃默森·姆南加古瓦外，很少有人确切了解这其中的奥秘。


But one way to make an educated guess is to compare both countries’ history of bilateral engagement with China.	但做出靠谱推测的一个方法是对比两国与中国的双边关系史。


Both Kenya and Zimbabwe have had two visits from Chinese heads of state during their post-colonial histories.	肯尼亚和津巴布韦两国在整个后殖民史上都曾有过两次中国领导人访问的经历。


Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited each country in 1996, while President Hu Jintao visited Kenya in 2006.	中国主席江泽民于1996年分别访问了这两个国家，而胡锦涛主席则在2006年访问肯尼亚。


China’s current president, Xi Jinping, visited Zimbabwe in 2015.	中国的现任主席习近平则在2015年访问了津巴布韦。


State visits in the other direction have been more uneven.	反过来的国家访问更加不平衡。


Mugabe’s first visit to China was in 1980, just six months after independence; he made 13 more during his tenure, and high-level visits by other Zimbabwean officials were even more frequent, occurring roughly once every two years during Mugabe’s reign.	穆加贝首访中国是在1980年，也就是独立六个月后； 他在任期间又曾13次到访中国，而且其他津巴布韦官员的高层访问甚至更为频繁，在穆加贝执政期间大约每两年发生一次。


Kenyan presidents, by contrast, traveled to China just six times during the same period, most recently in May 2017.	相比之下，肯尼亚总统同期仅六次到访中国，其中最近的一次是在2017年5月。


Zimbabwe’s leaders made the most of their visits to press for trade and military cooperation, and likely engaged directly with private Chinese companies.	津巴布韦领导人充分利用访问机会寻求贸易和军事合作，而且很可能直接接触私营中资企业。


This has nurtured a culture of reciprocity.	这营造出一种互惠互利的文化。


Just a few months ago, for example, a Chinese company approached my firm asking for advice about how to enter Zimbabwe’s health-care market.	例如短短几个月前，一家中国企业曾向我的公司咨询如何进入津巴布韦医疗市场的建议。


I have not yet fielded similar questions about gaining access to markets in Kenya.	我还没有就进入肯尼亚市场接到过类似的问题。


China’s role in African economies has been criticized; but, as I have argued before, Chinese investment has also been a lifeline to many on the continent.	中国在非洲经济中所发挥的作用也曾受到批评； 但正如我之前所说的那样，中国投资一直维系着非洲大陆许多人的生命。


From creating employment opportunities to providing direct investment in infrastructure, China has been a partner to Africa when many Western investors preferred to stay away.	从创造就业机会到直接投资基础设施，在许多西方投资者选择远离非洲的时候中国却选择成为非洲的合作伙伴。


How Kenya and Zimbabwe navigate their future relationships with China remains to be seen.	肯尼亚和津巴布韦如何驾驭未来的对华关系依然有待观察。


Both countries have supported Xi’s signature Belt and Road Initiative, which, in theory, should increase their strategic value to China.	两国都支持习近平提出的标志性的一带一路战略，这在理论上应当增加它们对中国的战略价值。


Kenya’s return to political stability should also sustain, if not deepen, the country’s economic engagement with China.	肯尼亚回归政治稳定也应当维持甚至加深该国与中国的经济关系。


Zimbabwe’s historic ties to China will be no less important.	津巴布韦与中国的历史关系同样重要。


Following Mugabe’s resignation, China’s foreign ministry went out of its way to praise the “friendship between China and Zimbabwe,” and Mnangagwa can be expected to continue that relationship.	在穆加贝辞职后，中国外长不遗余力的赞扬“中国和津巴布韦之间的友谊”，而姆南加古瓦肯定会延续这样的关系。


The new president received military training in China, and paid an official visit as speaker of the parliament in 2001.	这位新总统曾在中国接受过军事培训，并在2001年以议会议长的身份进行过正式访问。


There is even speculation that China was warned of the looming coup in Zimbabwe, if not consulted beforehand.	甚至有人猜测中国曾在津巴布韦政变之前收到过警告，甚至事先曾征询过中国的意见。


As Kenya and Zimbabwe navigate their political futures, much in both countries will no doubt change – one hopes for the better.	随着肯尼亚和津巴布韦探索各自的政治未来，两国的很多情况毫无疑问将会发生改变——我们当然希望是向好的方向改变。


Their ties with China will be a key metric in assessing their trajectory.	它们与中国的关系将成为评估各自发展道路的关键标准。


Inclusive Growth Depends on Cities	包容性增长依靠城市


PARIS, WASHINGTON, DC – We live in turbulent times, and popular discontent with the status quo is mounting.	巴黎、华盛顿—我们生活在动荡时代，群众对现状的不满与日俱增。


The reasons for popular frustration vary from country to country, but the common thread everywhere is a growing sense that the economy is rigged in favor of the few.	群众不满的原因各个国家各不相同，但有一个共同线索是越来越多的人感到经济被操纵以满足一小撮人的利益。


Indeed, the gains from economic growth are increasingly going to the very highest earners.	事实上，经济增长的收益越来越多地流向最高薪群体。


In OECD countries, people in the top 10% of the income distribution earn around ten times more than people in the bottom 10% – up from seven times more nearly 30 years ago.	在经合组织国家中，收入分布最顶层10%人群要比最底层10%多赚十倍——近30年前只有七倍。


In 2012, among the 18 OECD countries with comparable data, the top 10% accounted for 50% of total household wealth, while the bottom 40% accounted for only 3%.	2012年，在有可比数据的18个经合组织国家中，最顶层10%拥有50%的家庭总财富，而最底层40%只拥有3%。


We all pay a price when inequality reaches new heights.	当不平等性达到新高度时，我们所有人都要付出代价。


In a range of OECD countries, rising inequality knocked 6-10 percentage points off overall GDP between 1990 and 2010.	在一些经合组织国家，1990—2010年间不平等性加剧造成6—10个百分点的总GDP损失。


When the poorest people are unable to fulfill their potential, economic growth suffers.	当最贫困人群无法充分实现潜能时，经济增长就会受到影响。


As policymakers and political leaders look for ways to make economic growth more inclusive, cities will play a central role in any solution.	决策者和政治领导人都在寻找让经济增长更加包容之道，任何方案都必须以城市为核心要素。


A survey of OECD countries shows that half the total population lives in cities of more than 500,000 inhabitants, and that cities have accounted for 60% of total growth of employment and GDP since 2001.	经合组织国家调查表明，一半人口生活在500,000人以上的城市中，而自2001年以来，城市贡献了60%的总就业和GDP增长。


However, this growth has not been inclusive: income inequality in cities is higher than the national average in all OECD countries surveyed, except Canada.	但是，这一增长不是包容性的：所有经合组织国家的城市收入不平等程度都高于国家平均水平，只有加拿大是例外。


In the United States, 95 of the 100 largest metropolitan areas added jobs and increased their economic output in the five years following the Great Recession, but only 20 experienced median-wage growth.	在美国，100个最大城市中的95个在大衰退后的五年中就业和经济产出有所增加，但只有20个中位工资有所增加。


Economic gains in recent years have not made the typical worker better off, and as wealthy individuals have reaped the benefits of growth, poverty has become more concentrated.	近几年来，经济进步并未让普通工人境况变好，而由于富裕个体攫取了增长的收益，贫困变得更加集中。


According to research by the Brookings Institution, the number of extremely poor neighborhoods in the US has more than doubled since 2000.	据布鲁金斯学会的研究，2000年后美国极端贫困社区数量翻了一番。


This has far-reaching costs.	这带来了巨大的成本。


Growing up in a poor neighborhood has been shown to reduce a person’s life prospects dramatically, even when earnings remain constant.	证据表明，在贫困社区中长大会大幅恶化个人生活前景，即使收入保持不变。


And in metropolitan areas such as London and Baltimore, the difference in life expectancy between poor and wealthy neighborhoods just a few miles apart can be more than 20 years.	而在伦敦和巴尔的摩等大都会地区，相隔数英里的贫穷和富裕社区的预期寿命差距可能高达20多年。


As the site of both economic opportunity and disparity, cities are where we must look to tackle inequality.	城市既是经济机会的集中地，也是经济差异的高发区，我们必须解决城市中的不平等性问题。


In March, the OECD, the Ford Foundation, Brookings, and other institutions launched the Inclusive Growth in Cities Initiative, in partnership with New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio and 20 other mayors from around the world.	3月份，经合组织、福特基金会、布鲁金斯学会和其他机构与纽约市长白思豪和其他20个全球城市市长合作发起了城市包容性增长计划（Inclusive Growth in Cities Initiative）。


By bringing together “Champion Mayors” to define a shared inclusive-growth agenda, the Initiative acknowledges the crucial role mayors play in creating economic opportunity and boosting the productive capacity of individuals and firms.	该计划集中了“顶尖市长”制定了一份包容性增长日程，承认市长在创造机会、增加个体和企业生产力方面所起到的关键作用。


At a recent Brookings event, OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría discussed four key areas where cities can work to reduce inequality.	在最近的布鲁金斯学会活动上，经合组织秘书长古里亚讨论了城市能够着力降低不平等性的四个方面。


These ideas will be developed further at a meeting in Paris on November 21, hosted by Paris Mayor Anne Hidalgo.	这些概念将在11月21日的巴黎会议上进一步探讨，会议将由巴黎市长希达戈（Anne Hidalgo）主持。


First, cities should make education systems more inclusive by investing in vocational schools where people of all ages and backgrounds can learn marketable skills.	首先，城市应该加大职业学校投资，让各个年龄段和背景的人都能学到有销路的技能，从而实现包容性教育系统。


For example, in Atlanta, Mayor Kasim Reed has launched a partnership between a local startup incubator, the city’s workforce development agency, and a coding school to provide young people with mentorship networks, through which they can develop financial literacy and critical thinking skills, while also learning how to write code.	比如，亚特兰大市长里德（Kasim Reed）发起了一项由本地创业孵化器、亚特兰大市劳动力发展机构和一所编程学校组成的合作项目，为年轻人提供指导网络，帮助他们发展财务知识和批判性思考能力，同时也教他们写代码。


Second, cities should ensure that employment and entrepreneurship opportunities are available to all people, including women, young adults, immigrants, and disadvantaged populations.	其次，城市应该确保人人都能就业和创业机会，包括妇女、年轻人、移民和弱势群体。


In Stockholm, which took in 8,000 asylum-seekers between fall 2015 and spring 2016, Mayor Karin Wanngård is developing a new type of school for adults.	斯托克霍姆在2015年秋至2016年春期间接收了8,000名寻求庇护者，市长万加尔德（Karin Wanngård）正在开发一种新型成人学校。


As part of a comprehensive integration strategy, the new schools will teach the language, cultural, and technical proficiencies necessary to participate in Stockholm’s job market.	作为全面的融合战略的一部分，新学校将教授参与斯托克霍姆就业市场所必须的语言、文化和技术技能。


In Seoul, Mayor Park Won-soon is leveling the playing field for small and medium-size enterprises with targeted financial support, fairer transaction and subcontracting rules, and informal-work regularization.	首尔市长朴元淳正在通过定向金融支持、更公平的交易和转包规则以及非正式工作转正等手段为中小企业打造公平的竞争环境。


Third, cities must ensure high-quality, affordable housing for all in safe, healthy neighborhoods.	第三，城市必须确保所有人都能在安全健康的社区获得高质量的平价住房。


In Paris, Hidalgo’s “right of first refusal” plan allows the municipal government to acquire residences that come on the market in selected neighborhoods so that it can provide them to poorer residents at risk of being displaced.	巴黎市长希达戈实施了“优先认购权”计划，市政府可以收购指定社区中挂牌出售的房产，提供给有可能无家可归的贫困居民。


Finally, cities should ensure that public infrastructure and services – including public transportation, water, energy, waste management, and broadband – are easily accessible for all.	最后，城市应该确保公共基础设施和服务——包括公共交通、水、能源、垃圾处理和宽带——人人都能轻松获得。


In New York, de Blasio’s IDNYC initiative is providing free government-issued identification cards for all residents – including the homeless, undocumented immigrants, and former convicts – so that marginalized groups can make use of the city’s resources.	在纽约，白思豪的IDNYC计划为所有居民提供免费的市民卡——包括无家可归者、无证移民和刑满释放人员——从而让边缘化群体也可以使用纽约市的资源。


Efforts such as the Inclusive Growth in Cities Initiative and the United Nation’s Habitat III conference are helping to turn the tide against rising inequality one city at a time.	城市包容性增长计划和联合国第三届人居会议等活动有助于逐一解决城市的不平等性加剧问题。


The more we can capitalize on local solutions for common global problems, the more progress all of us will make.	我们越多利用地方解决方案应对共同全球问题，所能取得进步也越大。


The Hidden Wealth of Cities	隐性城市财富


STOCKHOLM – The world is becoming increasingly urbanized, as more people are choosing to live in towns and cities than ever before.	斯德哥尔摩——世界正越来越城市化，因为越来越多的人选择在城镇和城市中生活。


The trouble is, most urban areas are unprepared to manage the influx.	麻烦的是，多数城市地区均未做好准备管理人口流入。


Cities around the world face a looming investment crisis that makes them less livable than they should be.	世界各地的城市面临着迫在眉睫的投资危机，导致这些城市不适宜居住。


The maintenance of vital social and economic infrastructure, not to mention development planning, is being delayed because of a lack of cash.	重要社会和经济基础设施的维护，更不用说规划发展，正因为缺乏现金而遭遇延误。


With local governments’ finances burdened by continuously expanding spending commitments, public resources in many cities are highly constrained.	随着持续扩大的支出承诺拖累地方政府财政，许多城市的公共资源受到严重的制约。


It doesn’t have to be this way.	事情并不一定非得是这样。


Even struggling cities own a range of commercial assets that can be used to reverse these trends.	就连苦苦挣扎的城市也拥有一系列商业资产能够借以扭转这样的趋势。


Unlocking the public value of poorly utilized real estate, for example, or monetizing transportation and utility assets, could and should become core urban strategies.	例如充分释放利用不足的房地产的公共价值，或者实现交通运输和公用事业资产货币化，不仅可以而且应当成为核心的城市战略。


This does not require privatization, but rather that assets could yield a reasonable return, freeing more resources than most cities currently have on hand.	这并不需要进行私有化，而是要求资产可以产生合理的回报，从而释放出比目前多数城市所拥有的更多的资源。


In fact, through smarter asset management, cities could more than double their investments without having to raise taxes or cut spending.	事实上，通过更智能化的资产管理，城市可以在不增加税收也不削减开支的情况下实现投资翻番。


For the last 50 years, government ownership of vast commercial holdings has triggered a polarized debate, especially in Europe, but recently also in the United States.	过去50年，政府拥有大量商业资产引发了观点截然不同的辩论，尤其是在欧洲，但最近美国也出现了类似的情况。


But private versus public ownership is a false dichotomy.	但将私有和公有对立是一种二分法错误。


What matters most is the quality of professional management of such assets supporting local economies.	最重要的是支持当地经济发展的上述资产的专业管理质量。


Compiling an accurate balance sheet – knowledge that is, despite its importance, shockingly rare in most cities – is a crucial step toward adopting a management-focused approach.	编制准确的资产负债表——尽管这种知识十分重要，但却在多数城市欠缺得令人震惊——是朝着采取以管理为中心策略迈出的关键步骤。


With a list of assets in hand, and a proper understanding of their market value, taxpayers, politicians, and investors can better reckon with the long-term consequences of political decisions.	手握资产清单并准确理解资产的市场价值，纳税人、政治家和投资者就可以更好地思考决策的长期后果。


They can also make better choices about mobilizing returns, and avoid the traditional routes of tax increases, debt-financed spending, or austerity.	他们可以在收益调动方面做出更好的选择，同时避免采用传统的增税、债务融资或紧缩的方法。


For various reasons, cities generally do not assess the market value of their economic assets.	由于各种原因，城市一般不会就其经济资产的市场价值展开评估。


Consider a city like Boston, which, at first glance, does not appear to be particularly wealthy.	比如波士顿这样的城市，这座城市乍看上去似乎并不特别富有。


Its financial statements underestimate the true value of public assets, reporting total assets worth $3.8 billion, of which $1.4 billion is real estate.	这座城市的财务报表低估了公共资产的真实价值，报告总资产为38亿美元，其中14亿美元是以房地产的形式存在的。


That is slightly less than its liabilities of $4.6 billion in 2015.	波士顿按现行口径统计的资产总额比2015年46亿美元的负债略少。


But, like most cities, Boston reports its assets at book value, which are tied to the historic cost.	但像多数城市一样，波士顿报告的资产账面价值与其历史成本挂钩。


If holdings were reported using the International Financial Reporting Standards, which require the use of market value for assets, Boston’s holdings would be worth significantly more than what is currently reported.	如果按照国际财务报告准则来报告财产数量（该准则要求使用资产的市场价值），那么波士顿所持有的资产会比目前所报告的价值大得多。


In other words, the city is operating without fully understanding its hidden wealth.	换句话讲，这座城市正在不完全了解其隐性财富的情况下运营着。


And that wealth is vast.	隐性财富是巨大的。


An estimate of the market value of Boston’s property portfolio suggests that the city’s real estate alone is worth some $55 billion.	对波士顿房地产投资组合的市场估值显示仅这座城市的房地产价值一项就高达约550亿美元。


But, because Boston’s leaders have not accounted for this value, they cannot fully measure the cost of leaving these assets undermanaged.	但因为波士顿领导人并未考虑这一价值，他们就无法充分衡量任由上述资产管理不善所带来的损失。


If they could, they would get a sense of the benefits to be gained by developing these assets more astutely.	如果他们能够了解现有资产的市场价值，他们就会大致了解更为敏锐地开发这些资产所带来的收益将会是什么量级的。


After accounting for the market value of municipal assets, the next step toward sound asset management is to understand the yield that a city earns from the revenue and rising market values of its assets.	在了解市政资产的市场价值后，健全资产管理的下一步就是要了解城市从收入和资产价格上涨中获得的收益是什么量级的。


This is crucial for comparing all investment options, but also for determining whether performance has been satisfactory, and to show stakeholders that their wealth is being managed responsibly.	这对比较所有投资方案至关重要，而且还可以确定资产管理绩效是否令人满意，并向利益相关方证明他们的财富正在被负责任的管理着。


Using Boston as an example again, let’s cautiously assume that the city could earn a 3% yield on its commercial assets with more professional and politically independent management.	再次以波士顿为例，我们保守假设该市商业资产在更具专业和政治独立性的管理下可以产生约3%的回报。


A modest yield of 3% on a portfolio worth $55 billion would amount to an income exceeding its current total revenues, and many times more than Boston’s current capital plan.	对价值550亿美元的投资组合而言，区区3%的收益就将超过该市目前的总收入，而且是波士顿现行资本计划的数倍之多。


Even with a modest yield, Boston could more than double its infrastructure investments.	即使收益率并不十分出色，波士顿也可以实现基础设施投资翻番的目标。


Boston is by no means exceptional.	波士顿绝不是什么特例。


On the contrary, its approach to historical valuation is shared by cities worldwide.	恰恰相反，其所引用的历史估值法仍被世界各地许多城市所沿用着。


As a result, public wealth is trapped in real estate and other non-optimized commercial assets.	结果导致公共财富被困在房地产和其他非优化的商业资产当中。


The best way forward would be to consolidate publicly owned assets in a common investment vehicle that Stefan Fölster and I have called an “urban wealth fund.”	改变现状的最佳方法是将公有资产整合到斯蒂芬·福斯特和我称之为“城市财富基金”的共同投资工具中。


The fund would be managed at arm’s length in a transparent, accountable manner, guided by a city mandate but directed by a dedicated professional staff to keep it free from political influence.	该基金将以透明、可追溯的方式进行商业化管理，这种管理需要在城市委托下进行，但必须由一位敬业的专业人士负责指挥，以使其免受政治影响。


This sounds challenging, but it canbe done.	这听上去颇具挑战性，但却是可以实现的目标。


Hamburg’s HafenCity GmbH, and parts of Copenhagen that were revitalized by the City & Port Development Company, are just two examples of urban areas that have used this type of development mechanism.	汉堡的海港新城有限公司和城市港口开发公司重新开发的哥本哈根部分地区不过是城市地区利用这种发展机制的两个世纪的例子。


These efforts have not only increased the amount of residential housing; they have also funded vital infrastructure such as the Copenhagen Metro, schools, and universities.	上述工作不仅增加了住宅的数量； 而且还资助了哥本哈根地铁、学校和大学等重要基础设施。


In Hamburg, the recently opened Elbe Symphony Hall was also funded via a government-owned holding company.	在汉堡，最近开放的易北河交响乐厅同样由一家政府控股公司出资建设。


Managing city assets better would help local leaders boost their economies, finance social and economic infrastructure, and develop strategies for vibrant and innovative mixed-use projects.	更好的管理城市资产将协助地方领袖发展经济，为社会和经济基础设施融资，并为充满活力和创新的混合用途项目制定战略。


Better management of city assets would also help cover the costs of required maintenance without competing with government budgets, leaving more for spending on health care, education, and other social initiatives.	更好的管理城市资产还将有助于在不与政府预算争夺资源的情况下弥补所需的维护成本，从而将更多的钱留给医疗、教育和其他社会项目。


As urban populations grow, city planners must become more adept at budgeting for the long term.	随着城市人口的增长，城市规划者必须更善于制定长期预算。


And there is no better way to do that than by using the assets that are already in place.	这样做的最好方法是充分利用这座城市已经掌握的资产。


The High Cost of Denying Class War	否认阶级斗争的高昂代价


ATHENS – The Anglosphere’s political atmosphere is thick with bourgeois outrage.	雅典—盎格鲁文化圈的政治氛围充斥着资产阶级之怒。


In the United States, the so-called liberal establishment is convinced it was robbed by an insurgency of “deplorables” weaponized by Vladimir Putin’s hackers and Facebook’s sinister inner workings.	在美国，所谓的自由建制派认定他们被“可怜之徒”的暴乱所劫。 这群可怜之徒从普京的黑客和Facebook的罪恶的内部操作那里获得力量。


In Britain, too, an incensed bourgeoisie are pinching themselves that support for leaving the European Union in favor of an inglorious isolation remains undented, despite a process that can only be described as a dog’s Brexit.	在英国，愤怒的资产阶级正在让自己相信，对脱离欧盟从而实现可耻的孤立主义的支持丝毫未受到影响，尽管整个过程表明退欧非常狼狈。


The range of analysis is staggering.	分析的范围令人咋舌。


The rise of militant parochialism on both sides of the Atlantic is being investigated from every angle imaginable: psychoanalytically, culturally, anthropologically, aesthetically, and of course in terms of identity politics.	激进狭隘（militant parochialism）在大西洋两岸迅速崛起的现象受到了全方位的研究：精神角度、文化角度、人类学角度、审美角度，当然还有身份政治角度。


The only angle that is left largely unexplored is the one that holds the key to understanding what is going on: the unceasing class war unleashed upon the poor since the late 1970s.	仅剩一个尚未受到多少关注的角度正是理解目前所发生的状况的关键：始于20世纪70年代的一场从未停止的指向穷人的阶级斗争。


In 2016, the year of both Brexit and Trump, two pieces of data, dutifully neglected by the shrewdest of establishment analysts, told the story.	2016年，即英国退欧和特朗普当选的这一年，两组被建制派分析师精明而尽责地忽视的数据说明了一切。


In the United States, more than half of American families did not qualify, according to Federal Reserve data, to take out a loan that would allow them to buy the cheapest car for sale (the Nissan Versa sedan, priced at $12,825).	在美国，根据美联储数据，一大半美国家庭没有资格获得能够让他们购买最便宜的在售汽车的贷款（日产骐达轿车，价格为12,825美元）。


Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom, over 40% of families relied on either credit or food banks to feed themselves and cover basic needs.	与此同时，40%多的英国家庭依靠信用卡或食品银行来养活自己，覆盖基本需要。


William of Ockham, the fourteenth-century British philosopher, famously postulated that, when bamboozled in the face of competing explanations, we ought to opt for the one with the fewest assumptions and the greatest simplicity.	十四世纪英国哲学家奥卡姆的威廉（William of Ockham）提出了一个著名的原理，这个原理说，当我们因为不同的解释而迷惑时，应该选择那个假设最少、简洁程度最大的解释。


For all the deftness of establishment commentators in the US and Britain, they seem to have neglected this principle.	而美国和英国的那些经验丰富的建制派评论家们却忽视了这个原理。


Loath to recognize the intensified class war, they bang on interminably with conspiracy theories about Russian influence, spontaneous bursts of misogyny, the tide of migrants, the rise of the machines, and so on.	他们不愿承认阶级斗争加剧的现实，宁愿没完没了地沉迷于关于俄罗斯的阴谋论、自然而然发作的“直男癌”、移民潮、机器的崛起，如此等等。


While all of these fears are highly correlated with the militant parochialism fueling Trump and Brexit, they are only tangential to the deeper cause – class war against the poor – alluded to by the car affordability data in the US and the credit-dependence of much of Britain’s population.	这些担忧固然都与令特朗普和英国退欧大受裨益的激进狭隘密切相关，但它们仅仅是更深层次的根源——针对穷人的阶级斗争——的冰山一角，美国汽车购买力数据和大量英国家庭依赖信用卡的现实都证实了这一点。


True, some relatively affluent middle-class voters also supported Trump and Brexit.	诚然，一些相对较丰裕的中产阶级选民也支持了特朗普和英国退欧。


But much of that support rode on the coattails of the fear caused by observing the classes just below theirs plunge into despair and loathing, while their own children’s prospects dimmed.	但这些支持的产生原因是他们目睹略低于自己的阶级陷入绝望和憎恨，而他们自己的孩子们前景黯淡，这引起了他们的担忧。


Twenty years ago, the same liberal commentators were cultivating the impossible dream that globalizing financialized capitalism would deliver prosperity for most.	二十年前，同一批自由派评论者催生了一个不可能的梦想：让金融化资本主义（financialized capitalism）全球化能为绝大多数人带来繁荣。


At a time when capital was becoming more concentrated on a global scale, and more militant against non-owners of assets, they were declaring the class war over.	当资本日益在全球规模上形成集中之势、同时对不拥有资产的人变得越来越激进时，他们宣布阶级战争已经结束。


As the working class was growing in size worldwide, even though its jobs and employment prospects were shrinking in the Anglosphere, these elites behaved as if class were passé.	尽管工作阶级的职业和就业前景在盎格鲁文化圈江河日下，但就世界而言，工作阶级在不断扩大，而这些精英的行为好像阶级已成往事似的。


The 2008 financial collapse and the subsequent Great Recession buried that dream.	2008年金融崩溃及随后的大衰退葬送了这个梦。


Still, liberals ignored the undeniable fact that the gigantic losses incurred by the quasi-criminal financial sector were cynically transferred onto the shoulders of a working class they thought no longer mattered.	尽管如此，自由派仍然忽视着不容否认的事实，即行为形同犯罪的金融业所导致的巨大损失令人愤怒地被转移到了他们认为早已无关紧要的工作阶级的头上。


For all their self-image as progressives, the elites’ readiness to ignore widening class divisions, and to replace it with class-blind identity politics, was the greatest gift to toxic populism.	精英自视为进步派，但他们心安理得地忽视不断扩大的阶级差距，想要用无视阶级的身份政治取而代之，这成为民粹主义毒瘤的温床。


In Britain, the Labour Party (under Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, and Edward Miliband) was too coy even to mention the post-2008 intensification of the class war against the majority, leading to the rise across the Labour heartland of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), with its Brexit parochialism.	在英国，忸怩作态的工党（在托尼·布莱尔、戈登·布朗和爱德华·米利班德（Edward Miliband）的领导下）甚至对2008年后针对大多数人的阶级斗争的恶化只字不提，这导致英国独立党（UKIP）凭借退欧的狭隘主义，在工党的心脏地带崛起。


Polite society seemed not to give a damn that it had become easier to get into Harvard or Cambridge if you were black than if you were poor.	礼制社会对于身为黑人比身为穷人更容易进入哈佛和剑桥的现象毫无意见。


They deliberately ignored that identity politics can be as divisive as apartheid if allowed to act as a lever for overlooking class conflict.	他们可以忽视了身份政治可能和种族隔离一样具有分裂性，如果放任它成为忽视阶级冲突的操纵杆的话。


Trump had no compunction to speak clearly about class, and to embrace – however deceitfully – those too poor to buy a car, let alone send their children to Harvard.	特朗普面不改色心不跳地高举阶级大旗并吸引——不管多么伪善——穷得买不起车、更不用说把孩子送进哈佛的阶级。


Brexiteers, too, embraced the “great unwashed,” reflected in images of UKIP leader Nigel Farage drinking in pubs with “average blokes.”	英国退欧派也在吸引“普罗大众”，UKIP领导人尼格尔·法拉奇（Nigel Farage）和“普通老百姓”一起在酒吧喝酒的形象就是明证。


And when large swaths of the working class turned against the establishment’s favorite sons and daughters (the Clintons, the Bushes, the Blairs, and the Camerons), endorsing militant parochialism, the commentariat blamed the riffraff’s illusions about capitalism.	而当工作阶级大部转向反对建制派的“二代”（克林顿家、布什家、布莱尔家和卡梅伦家）、认可激进狭隘时，时事评论员们却在批评乌合之众对资本主义的幻觉。


But it was not illusions about capitalism that led to the discontent that fueled Trump and Brexit.	但不是对资本主义的幻觉导致了让特朗普和英国退欧派得势的不满。


Rather, it is the disillusion with middle-of-the-road politics of the kind that intensified the class war against them.	相反，是加剧了针对这些幻觉的阶级斗争的中间道路政治的幻灭导致了让特朗普和英国退欧派得势的不满。


Predictably, the embrace of the working class by Trump and the Brexiteers was always going to arm them with electoral power that, sooner or later, would be deployed against working-class interests and, of course, minorities – always the penchant of populism in power, from the 1930s to today.	可以预言，特朗普和英国退欧派吸引工作阶级的策略会不断地用选举的权力武装他们，迟早，这些权力将用来针对工作阶级，当然还有少数群体的利益——这是民粹主义掌权后的一贯嗜好，从20世纪30年代至今一直是如此。


Trump has thus used his working-class support to usher in scandalous tax reforms, whose naked ambition is to help the plutocracy while millions of Americans face reduced health coverage and, as the federal budget deficit balloons, higher long-term tax bills.	因此，特朗普利用其所获得的工作阶级的支持来推动可耻的税收改革，这项改革赤裸裸地不惜让数百万美国人失去医保覆盖和面对——随着联邦预算赤字的膨胀——更高的税收账单来帮助财阀。


Similarly, Britain’s Tory government, which has espoused Brexit’s populist aims, has recently announced another multi-billion-pound reduction in social security, education, and tax credits for the working poor.	类似地，英国的保守党政府——它支持退欧的民粹主义目的——最近也宣布了新一轮数十亿英镑规模的社会保障、教育和工作阶级税收优惠削减。


Those cuts are matched exactly by reductions in corporate and inheritance tax cuts.	这些削减动作与公司税和遗产税的下调完美匹配。


Today, establishment opinion-makers, who scornfully rejected the pertinence of social class, have contributed to a political environment in which class politics was never more pertinent, toxic, and less discussed.	如今，建制派舆情引导者轻蔑地拒绝接受符合现实的社会阶级论，创造了一个阶级政治无比重要、无比“有毒”和绝少被讨论政治环境。


Speaking on behalf of a ruling class comprising financial experts, bankers, corporate representatives, media owners, and big industry functionaries, they act exactly as if their goal were to deliver the working classes into the grubby hands of the populists and their empty promise of making America and Britain “great again.”	他们替由金融专家、银行家、公司代表、媒体所有者和大产业组织组成的执政阶级发声，好像他们的目标就是要把工作阶级拱手送入民粹主义者和他们的让美国和英国“重新伟大”的空头承诺的怀抱之中。


The only prospect for civilizing society and detoxifying politics is a new political movement that harnesses on behalf of a new humanism the burning injustice that class war manufactures.	文明社会和净化政治的唯一前途在于一场新的政治运动，这场运动代表新人文主义并消灭阶级斗争所产生的不公。


Judging by its callous treatment of US Senator Bernie Sanders and Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, the liberal establishment seems to fear such a movement more than it does Trump and Brexit.	从他们对美国参议员伯尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）和工党领导人杰里米·科尔宾（Jeremy Corbyn）的冷酷对待看，自由建制派似乎担心这场引动更甚于担心特朗普和英国退欧。


In Defense of the 1.5°C Climate Change Threshold	守住1. 5°C 的气候变化临界值


MANILA – The Earth today is more than 1°C hotter than it was in pre-industrial times, and the terrible symptoms of its fever are already showing.	马尼拉——今天的地球气温比前工业化时代高1°C，并且可怕的发烧症状已经显露出来了。


This year alone, back-to-back hurricanes have devastated Caribbean islands, monsoon flooding has displaced tens of millions in South Asia, and fires have raged on nearly every continent.	仅今年一年，接连不断的飓风就已经摧毁了加勒比群岛，季风所引发的洪水已导致南亚数千万人流离失所，而且大火在几乎每一个洲尽情肆虐。


Pulling the planet back from the brink could not be more urgent.	将地球从崩溃的边缘拉回来已经是十万火急的任务。


Those of us who live on the front lines of climate change – on archipelagos, small islands, coastal lowlands, and rapidly desertifying plains – can’t afford to wait and see what another degree of warming will bring.	我们生活在气候变化前沿的人——包括群岛、小岛、沿海低地以及快速荒漠化的平原——绝不能坐视气候变暖升级会带来哪些后果。


Already, far too many lives and livelihoods are being lost.	已经有太多生命和谋生手段正在我们面前消失掉。


People are being uprooted, and vital resources are becoming increasingly scarce, while those suffering the most severe consequences of climate change are also among those who have done the least to cause it.	人们无家可归，重要的资源正日益稀缺，而那些对气候变化最没有责任的人却正在承受最严重的后果。


That is why the Philippines used its chairmanship of the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF) – an alliance of the 48 countries that stand to bear the brunt of climate change – to fight to ensure that the 2015 Paris climate agreement aimed explicitly to cap global warming at 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.	正因如此，菲律宾人利用担任气候变迁脆弱国家论坛（CVF）轮值主席国的机会——该论坛的48个成员国在承受气候变化冲击时首当其冲——竭力确保实现2015年巴黎气候协定明确限制全球温度比前工业化时期高1. 5°C的目标。


For us, 1.5°C isn’t merely a symbolic or “aspirational” number to be plugged into international agreements; it is an existential limit.	对我们而言， 1. 5°C绝不仅仅是国际协定中象征性或“梦寐以求”的数字；


If global temperatures rise above that level, the places we call home – and many other homes on this planet – will become uninhabitable or even disappear completely.	而是摆在面前的生存限度。 如果全球气温高于这个水平，那么我们称之为家的地方——还有这个星球上其他很多家园——都会变得不再适宜居住甚至彻底消失掉。


When we first introduced the 1.5°C target back in 2009, we met substantial resistance.	2009年当我们首次提出1. 5°C的目标时，我们遇到的阻力很大。


Climate-change deniers – those who refuse to believe the science of human-induced global warming – continue to dismiss any such effort to stem the rise in the planet’s temperature as futile and unnecessary.	气候变化否定者——那些拒绝相信人为造成全球变暖这一科学事实的人——继续否定防止地球温度升高的作用，认为这样做既徒劳无功又毫无必要。


But even well-meaning climate advocates and policymakers often opposed the 1.5°C target, arguing that, according to the science, humans had already emitted enough greenhouse gases to make meeting that goal virtually impossible.	但就连善意的气候变化倡导者和决策者往往也反对 1. 5°C的目标，他们认为根据科学，人类已经排放的温室气体已经使得该目标几乎不可能实现了。


Yet, on this front, the science is not as clear-cut as it might have seemed.	不过在这方面，科学的结论并不像看上去那样明确。


According to a recent paper published in Nature, the world’s remaining “carbon budget” – the amount of carbon-dioxide equivalents we can emit before breaching the 1.5°C threshold – is somewhat larger than was previously thought.	《自然》杂志最近一篇论文显示，世界剩余的“碳预算”——也就是我们在跨过1. 5°C的临界值之前还可以排放的二氧化碳量——在某种程度上比之前想象的要多。


This finding is no reason for complacency, as some commentators (not scientists) seem to think.	与某些评论人士（而非科学家）不同的是，这一发现并非自满的理由。


It does not mean that previous climate models were excessively alarmist, or that we can take a more relaxed approach to reining in global warming.	这并不意味着以前的气候模式过于危言耸听，或者我们在控制全球变暖的问题上可以有某种程度的放松。


Instead, the paper should inspire – and, indeed, calls for – more immediate, deliberate, and aggressive action to ensure that greenhouse-gas emissions peak within a few years and net-zero emissions are achieved by mid-century.	相反，这篇论文应当激励——并且在事实上呼吁——采取更加直接、深思熟虑和积极的行动，以确保温室气体排放在几年内达到峰值，并力争在本世纪中叶实现零净排放。


What would such action look like?	这究竟是一次什么样的行动？


Global emissions would need to be reduced by 4-6% every year, until they reached zero.	全球排放每年要减少4~6%，直至实现零排放。


Meanwhile, forest and agricultural lands would have to be restored, so that they could capture and sequester greater amounts of carbon dioxide.	与此同时，我们必须恢复森林和耕地，以便捕获和隔离更多的二氧化碳排放。


Fully decarbonizing our energy and transportation systems in four decades will require a herculean effort, but it is not impossible.	在40年内实现能源和交通系统彻底去碳化需要付出巨大的努力，但却是可能实现的目标。


Beyond their environmental consequences, such efforts would generate major economic gains, boosting the middle class in developed countries and pulling hundreds of millions out of poverty in the developing world, including by fueling job creation.	除环境后果外，这样的努力也将带来巨大的经济效益，其中包括通过促进创造就业机会帮助发达国家中产阶级并促使发展中国家数亿人摆脱贫困。


The energy transition will lead to massive efficiency savings, while improving the resilience of infrastructure, supply chains, and urban services in developing countries, particularly those in vulnerable regions.	能源转型将大大提高节能效率，同时提高发展中国家，尤其是脆弱地区的基础设施、供应链和城市服务弹性。


According to a report published last year by the United Nations Development Programme, maintaining the 1.5°C threshold and creating a low-carbon economy would add as much as $12 trillion to global GDP, compared to a scenario in which the world sticks to current policies and emissions-reduction pledges.	联合国开发计划署去年发布的一份报告显示，保持 1. 5°C的临界值和创造低碳经济与世界延续当前的政策和减排承诺相比，将使全球GDP增加12万亿美元。


The paper asserting that the 1.5°C target is achievable was written by well-respected climate experts and published in a top-ranking journal after extensive peer review.	声称 1. 5°C目标可以实现的论文是由广受尊敬的气候专家撰写，并在经过广泛的同行审议后在一家一流杂志上发表。


But it is just one paper; there is still a lot more to learn about our capacity to limit global warming.	但这仅仅是一篇论文； 了解我们限制全球变暖的能力还有许多工作要做。


That is why top scientists are already discussing and debating its findings; their responses will also be published in top journals.	顶尖科学家因此已经在探讨和争论相关发现； 他们的回应文章同样将发表在一流杂志上。


That is how scientific research works, and it is why we can trust climate science – and its urgent warnings.	这就是科学研究的运作方式，也是我们相信气候科学的理由——我们同样相信它的紧急警告。


Next year, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change will publish its own meta-analysis of all of the science related to the 1.5°C target, in what promises to be the most comprehensive summary of such research.	明年，政府间气候变化委员会将出版有关1. 5°C目标的科学分析荟萃，这很有可能成为对类似研究成果最全面的汇总。


But we cannot afford to wait for that analysis before taking action.	但我们不能坐等分析结果出来才采取行动。


The members of the CVF have already committed to doing our part, pledging at last year’s UN Climate Change Conference in Marrakech to complete the transition to 100% renewable energy as soon as possible.	去年召开的联合国马拉喀什气候变化大会上，气候变迁脆弱国家论坛成员国已经承诺通过尽快完成向100%可再生能源转型的目标来做好本职工作。


Our emissions are already among the world’s smallest, but our climate targets are the world’s most ambitious.	我们的排放已经是世界最小，但我们的气候目标却在全世界最雄心勃勃。


But whether the world manages to curb climate change ultimately will depend on the willingness of the largest current and historical emitters of greenhouse gases to fulfill their moral and ethical responsibility to take strong action.	但世界能否最终遏制气候变化将取决于当前及历史最大温室气体排放国是否愿意履行道德及伦理责任并强力采取行动。 全球温度变化保持在1.


Keeping global temperatures below 1.5°C may not yet be a geophysical impossibility.	5°C以下现在在地球物理学上也许还不是不可能完成的任务。


But, to meet the target, we must ensure that it is not treated as a political and economic impossibility, either.	但为实现这一目标，我们必须保证人们不认为它在政治和经济上是不可能的。


Sounding the Alarm on Biodiversity Loss	敲响生物多样性丧失的警钟


NORWICH – With the United Nations’ climate change conference underway in Bonn, Germany, rising global temperatures are once again at the top of the world’s agenda.	诺维奇—联合国气候变化会议正在德国波恩召开，全球气温的升高再次成为世界议程的焦点。


But why care about the increase in temperature, if not because of its impact on life on Earth, including human life?	但要不是气温升高影响到包括人类在内的地球上的生命，为什么还要关注这个问题？


That is an important question to consider, in view of the relative lack of attention devoted to a closely related and equally important threat to human survival: the startling pace of global biodiversity loss.	这是一个需要考虑的重要问题，因为人们相对来说较少关注一个紧密相关、同样重要的人类生存威胁：令人吃惊的全球生物多样性丧失速度。


The availability of food, water, and energy – fundamental building blocks of every country’s security – depends on healthy, robust, and diverse ecosystems, and on the life that inhabits them.	获得粮食、水和能源——每个国家安全的基本构成要件——取决于健康、鲁棒、多样化的生态系统以及栖息于其中的生命。


But, as a result of human activities, planetary biodiversity is now declining faster than at any point in history.	但是，拜人类行为所赐，如今地球生物多样性的衰减速度比历史上任何时候都要快。


Many policymakers, however, have yet to recognize that biodiversity loss is just as serious a threat as rising sea levels and increasingly frequent extreme weather events.	但是，许多决策者仍然没有认识到生物多样性丧失的威胁，和海平面上升、极端天气事件越来越频繁等量齐观。


This lack of sufficient attention comes despite international commitments to protect biodiversity.	尽管国际社会为保护生物多样性做出了很多努力，但关注度仍然不够。


In October 2010, global leaders met in Aichi, Japan, where they produced the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020, which included 20 ambitious targets – such as halving global habitat loss and ending overfishing – that signatories agreed to meet by 2020.	2010年10月，全球领导人在日本爱知达成了2011—2020年生物多样性战略计划，其中包括了20项宏大的目标——比如将全球栖息地丧失减少一半、结束滥捕滥捞等——签署国同意在2020年前实现这些目标。


Safeguarding biodiversity is also specifically included in the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals.	捍卫生物多样性也被明确写入了联合国可持续发展目标。


Yet progress toward these global biodiversity goals is likely to fall dangerously short of what is needed to ensure an acceptable future for all.	但在这些全球生物多样性目标方面的进展大大低于确保全人类可接受的未来的要求。


Policymakers have largely agreed on the importance of holding the increase in global temperature to less than 2°C above pre-industrial levels – the goal of the Paris climate agreement.	决策者们基本上都同意必须将全球升温幅度限制在前工业化水平以上2℃以内——这也是巴黎气候协定的目标。


But too few leaders have shown any sense of urgency about stemming biodiversity losses.	但很少有领导人表现出阻止生物多样性丧失的紧迫感。


The sustainable future we want depends on ending this indifference.	我们想要的可持续的未来取决于是否能够停止这一冷漠。


Toward that end, the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), which I chair, will release a series of landmark reports next March on the implications of biodiversity decline.	为了向这一目标靠拢，由我主持的生物多样性和生态系统维持政府间科学政策平台（IPBES）将在明年3月发布关于生物多样性损失的影响的一系列地标性报告。


Prepared over three years by more than 550 experts from some 100 countries, these expert assessments will cover four world regions: the Americas, Asia and the Pacific, Africa, and Europe and Central Asia.	这些报告由100个国家的550多位专家经三年多时间酝酿，评估范围涵盖了四个世界地区：美洲、亚洲和太平洋、非洲以及欧洲和中亚。


A fifth report will address the state of land degradation and restoration at regional and global levels.	第五份报告则将针对土地退化和地区和全球层面的重建问题。


The reports will highlight trends and plausible futures, outlining the best policy options available to slow the degradation of ecosystems, from coral reefs to rainforests.	这些报告强调趋势和可能的未来，列举在减缓生态系统（从大堡礁到热带雨林）退化方面可用的最佳政策选项。


Taken together, the IPBES assessments will represent the global scientific community’s consensus view on the state of biodiversity and ecosystem services.	总体看来，IPBES报告可以代表全球科学界在生物多样性和生态系统维持状态问题上的共识。


Moreover, the reports will highlight the close links between biodiversity loss and climate change, which should be addressed simultaneously.	此外，这些报告还将强调生物多样性丧失和气候变化之间的紧密联系，这两个问题可以同时解决。


The world will not be able to meet the goals of the Paris agreement – or many of the SDGs, for that matter – unless it takes into account the state of biodiversity and ecosystem services.	如果世界不考虑生物多样性和生态系统维持的状态，就无法实现巴黎协定的目标——也无法实现许多可持续发展目标。


Today, most governments separate their environmental authorities from those focusing on energy, agriculture, and planning.	如今，大部分政府将环境部门从专注于能源、农业和规划的部门中分离出来。


This makes it difficult to address climate change or biodiversity losses in a holistic way.	这导致难以用综合方法治理气候变化或生物多样性丧失问题。


New types of innovative governance structures are needed to bridge these policy silos.	需要新的创新治理结构将各自为政的政策综合起来。


After the release of IPBES regional reports next year, a global assessment building on them will be published in 2019.	明年IPBES地区报告发布后，2019年还将在此基础上发布全球评估结果。


This will be the first global overview of biodiversity and ecosystem services since the authoritative Millennium Ecosystem Assessment of 2005.	这将是自权威性的2005年千年生态系统评估以来第一份全球性生物多样性和生态系统维持总体评估。


It will examine the health of terrestrial, freshwater, and marine ecosystems, and the impact of factors including acidification, rising sea surface temperatures, trade, invasive species, overfishing, pollution, and land use changes.	它将考察陆地、淡水和海洋生态系统的健康状况，以及包括各种因素的影响，包括酸化、海洋表面温度升高、贸易、入侵物种、过度捕捞、污染和土地用途改变等。


The success of efforts to reverse unsustainable uses of the world’s natural assets will require policymakers to reconsider the value of biodiversity for their people, environments, and economies.	改变对全球自然资产的不可持续的用途的努力要想取得成功，决策者必须反思生物多样性对于人民、环境和经济的意义。


But the first step is ensuring that we have the best peer-reviewed knowledge available to make sound decisions; the forthcoming IPBES assessments will move us in that direction.	但第一步是要确保我们具备最好的同行审议知识来保证可靠的决策； 即将发布的IPBES评估将是迈向这一方向的重要一步。


If the full consequences of climate change are to be addressed in our lifetime, we must recognize that human activity is doing more than just adding a few degrees of temperature to the annual forecast.	要想让气候变化的全面后果在我们这一代人手上得到解决，我们必须承认人类活动不仅仅导致了每年气温预测上升几度。


By early next year, we will have the data on biodiversity and ecosystem services to prove it, and the policy options to change course.	明年年初，我们将拥有关于生物多样性和生态系统维持的数据证明这一点，并了解可以采取哪些政策改变局面。


Carbon Pricing Takes Off	碳定价起飞


BONN – The hurricanes that pummeled the Caribbean, Texas, and Florida this year left highways submerged, homes and businesses demolished, and lives lost.	波恩—今年，重创加勒比地区、德克萨斯州和佛罗里达州的飓风淹没了高速公路，摧毁了住房和企业，造成了人员伤亡。


The floodwaters have since receded, but the images of upheaval remain etched in our collective memory.	洪水已经退去，但剧变的景象仍然镌刻在我们的集体记忆中。


Recovery will take years, perhaps decades, and it will cost billions of dollars.	恢复需要多年甚至几十年，以及数十亿美元资金。


Experts tell us that warming oceans are causing hurricanes to become more powerful, and other consequences of anthropogenic climate change – from severe droughts in the Horn of Africa to extreme flooding in Asia – are leaving millions without food and basic shelter.	专家们告诉我们，海洋变暖让飓风变得更加强力，而人为气候变暖的其他后果——从非洲之角的严重干旱到亚洲的极端洪水——让数百万人失去了粮食和基本住所。


But while the link between burning fossil fuels and deadly weather has been strengthening for years, policymakers have not always heeded the warnings.	但尽管燃烧化石燃料和致命天气之间的关系多年来越来越紧密，决策者却并不总能听进警告声。


This is changing rapidly.	这一点正在迅速改变。


Today, countries, citizens, and a growing number of businesses around the world are finally taking action.	如今，全世界国家、公民和越来越多的企业终于开始行动起来了。


This month, thousands gathered for the UN’s climate change conference in Bonn, Germany, to ratchet up global ambition in the fight against climate change.	这个月，数千人将齐聚德国波恩参加联合国气候变化会议，提升遏制气候变化的全球目标。


Following the successful Paris climate agreement two years ago, expectations for further progress and continued collaboration are high.	两年前巴黎气候协定取得成功后，人们对取得更大进步和保持合作的期望很高。


One of the more promising recent initiatives is the Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition (CPLC), which brings together 30 governments and more than 180 businesses and strategic partners to put a value on carbon dioxide emissions.	近期更令人憧憬的计划之一是碳定价领导联盟（CPLC），该计划集合了30个国家的政府和180多家企业和战略合作伙伴，为二氧化碳排放制定价格。


The idea is simple: if we are to meet the Paris accord’s target of limiting the increase in global average temperature to less than 2° Celsius above preindustrial levels – ideally, to 1.5° above preindustrial levels – we must dramatically cut emissions.	其思想很简单：要想实现巴黎协定的目标，即将全球平均气温限制在前工业化水平以上2℃以内——理想的情况是前工业化水平以上1. 5℃以内——就必须大幅削减排放。


As co-chairs of the CPLC, we believe that one of the best ways to do that is by shifting the social and economic costs of heat-trapping gases from the public to the polluter.	作为CPLC的联职主席，我们相信削减二氧化碳排放的最佳办法之一，是将吸热气体所造成的社会和经济成本，从公众身上转嫁给污染者。


With the sense of climate urgency increasing, it is no longer acceptable to pollute for free and pass the bill to future generations.	随着气候紧迫感的日益增加，免费污染、让子孙后代买单已经日益令人难以接受。


Putting a price on carbon is the most efficient way to reduce global emissions while encouraging sustainable and robust economic growth.	给碳定价是减少全球排放、同时鼓励可持续和稳健经济增长的最有效的办法。


Moreover, by putting a price on pollution, governments can generate revenue for investments like clean energy, schools, and health care, making it a double win.	此外，通过给污染制定价格，政府能够获得收入用于清洁能源、学校和医疗等方面的投资，从而一举两得。


The ultimate goal, of course, is to encourage businesses to clean up their acts, and today, a growing share of business leaders understand that pricing carbon is one of the best ways to combat climate change.	当然，最终的目标是鼓励企业净化它们的行为，如今，越来越多的商界领袖认识到碳定价是遏制气候变化的最佳办法之一。


They also recognize that their businesses can thrive even as they work to reduce emissions.	他们还认识到，即使花力气降低排放，他们的企业仍然可以兴旺发展。


In fact, many business leaders are among the most enthusiastic supporters of effective carbon pricing.	事实上，许多商界领袖是有效碳定价的最热情的支持者。


Just last month, the Carbon Disclosure Project revealed that the number of companies with plans to pursue internal carbon price mechanisms has grown to almost 1,400 globally, up from 150 in 2014.	就在上个月，碳披露计划（Carbon Disclosure Project）指出，全世界制定了内部碳定价机制计划的公司数量已经达到了近1,400家，而2014年只有150家。


This includes more than 100 of the world’s largest companies, with total annual revenues of some $7 trillion.	这其中包括100多家全球最大公司，它们的年收入达到了7万亿美元。


Royal DSM (which is led by one of the authors) has set a carbon price of €50 ($59) per ton, joining other global companies like Michelin, Danone, and General Motors in applying meaningful carbon prices to “future-proof” their business.	皇家帝斯曼公司（Royal DSM由本文作者之一领导）制定了每吨50欧元的碳价格，与米其林、达能和通用汽车等跨国公司一起运用有意义的碳定价来让业务“与时俱进”。


Some 40 countries – including Canada – are also putting a price on carbon pollution, and more governments are planning to implement similar schemes soon.	包括加拿大在内的大约40个国家还为碳污染制定了价格，更多的政府正在准备实施类似的制度。


In 2015, China announced plans to create the world’s largest carbon-pricing system.	2015年，中国宣布建立世界最大规模的碳定价系统。


And earlier this year, Ontario, Québec, and California signed an agreement to create the world’s second-largest carbon market.	今年早些时候，安大略省、魁北克省和加利福尼亚州签订协议，建立了世界第二大碳市场。


This trend must continue – for environmental and economic reasons.	这一趋势必须保持下去——既为了环境，也是出于经济考虑。


A May 2017 study conducted by the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices – led by two of the world’s top economists, Joseph E. Stiglitz and Nicholas Stern – found that setting a “strong carbon price” is essential not only for reducing global emissions, but also for sustaining innovation and growth.	2017年5月的一项碳定价高规格委员会（High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices）的研究——该委员会由两位世界顶尖经济学家约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨（Joseph E. Stiglitz）和尼古拉斯·斯特恩（Nicholas Stern）主持——发现，制定“强势碳定价”不但是减少全球排放的关键，也是保持创新和增长的关键。


To be sure, putting a price on carbon pollution must become part of a broader set of actions to future-proof our economies and societies.	平心而论，为碳污染制定价格必须成为让我们的经济和社会与时俱进的大行动的一部分。


To reduce greenhouse-gas emissions further and foster economic vitality, we must improve public transportation; construct energy-efficient buildings; and support efforts by businesses, innovators, and investors to develop clean-energy solutions.	要进一步减少温室气体排放、培养经济自生能力，我们必须改善公共交通； 建设能源效率高的建筑；


This is what Canada is already doing, because we know that these policies can reduce emissions and help create new, well-paying jobs.	支持企业、创新者和投资者寻找清洁能源方案的努力。 这正是加拿大正在做的，因为我们知道，这些政策能够减少排放，帮助创造高薪新就业岗位。


As is often said, climate change represents both a challenge and an opportunity.	人们常说，气候变化既是挑战，也是机会。


By pricing carbon pollution and harnessing our collective abilities, we can address the former and seize the latter.	通过为碳污染定价、理顺我们的集体能力，我们能够解决挑战，抓住机会。


Pooling the innovative and entrepreneurial spirit found in countries and businesses will enable us to fight climate change, strengthen our economies and societies, and leave our children and grandchildren a healthier planet.	将各国和企业的创新和企业家精神集合起来，我们就能遏制气候变化，强化我们的经济和社会，让我们的子孙后代拥有更加健康的地球。


The Climate-Conflict Nexus	气候-冲突联合威胁


BOSTON – Yemen and South Sudan are, in many ways, worlds apart.	波士顿—从很多方面看，也门和南苏丹是两个世界。


But, despite vast differences in history, tradition, and culture, both countries share one painful feature: their people are now bearing the brunt of two of the most devastating manmade crises: violent conflict and climate change.	但尽管它们的历史、传统和文化大相径庭，两国却有着同一个痛苦：它们的人民正在承受两大最严重的人造危机的重创：暴力冲突和气候变化。


South Sudan has been mired in conflict for nearly a decade.	南苏丹陷入冲突已近十年。


In the last five years alone, tens of thousands have died, and nearly a quarter of the population has been displaced, with many having little choice but to flee to neighboring Kenya, Uganda, or Sudan.	光是在过去五年，就有数万人丧生，近四分之一人口流离失所，其中许多人只能逃往邻近的肯尼亚、乌干达和苏丹。


Yemen, for its part, has emerged as a major front in the ongoing struggle for regional influence between Saudi Arabia, which has ties to Yemen’s government, and Iran, which supports the Houthi rebel group.	也门则成为地区影响力争夺战的前线：一方是力挺也门政府的沙特阿拉伯，另一方是支持胡赛叛军集团的伊朗。


In recent years, Saudi Arabia, in particular, has been carrying out devastating air strikes that have killed countless civilians and reduced Yemen’s infrastructure – including roads, schools, hospitals, apartment complexes, and markets – to rubble, leaving the country’s people without access to essential services.	特别是沙特阿拉伯在最近几年中一直对也门进行毁灭性空袭，杀害了无辜平民，将也门基础设施——包括公路、学校、医院、居民楼和市场——夷为平地，让也门人民无法获得基本服务。


With water and sanitation facilities knocked out, the country is now facing the worst cholera outbreak in modern history.	由于水和卫生设施的破坏，也门爆发了现代史上最严重的霍乱。


The effects of violent conflict are being exacerbated by climate change.	暴力冲突的影响因为气候变化而加剧。


This year’s Climate Change Vulnerability Index ranks South Sudan among the world’s five most vulnerable countries, with the increase in temperature expected to be nearly two and a half times larger than the global average.	今年的气候变化脆弱指数（Climate Change Vulnerability Index）将南苏丹列为全世界五个最脆弱的国家之一，其气温升幅预计将是全球平均水平的近二点五倍。


This will devastate an already-desperate country, where the livelihoods of 95% of the population depend on climate-related services, from agriculture to animal husbandry and fisheries.	这将摧毁这个已经陷入绝望中的国家，其95%的人口的生计都依赖气候相关活动，如农业、畜牧业和渔业。


Yemen, for its part, is considered among the clearest examples of the tangible consequences of climate change.	也门则是气候变化后果最真切的写照之一。


According to the World Bank, since 1970, irrigation in Yemen has increased by a factor of 15, as rain-fed agriculture has declined by nearly 30%.	据世界银行数据，自1970年以来，也门灌溉量增加了15倍，而雨水灌溉农业萎缩了近30%。


The country faces both heavy rains and deadly floods – in 2008, floods in southeastern Yemen resulted in losses equivalent to 6% of GDP – and, at the other extreme, devastating droughts.	也门面临着暴雨和夺命洪水——2008年，也门南部洪灾导致了相当于GDP的6%的损失——而在另一个极端，这里的干旱同样肆虐。


The global health community is now increasingly recognizing the extent to which the traditional consequences of war – such as injury, trauma, and displacement – are being compounded by the effects of climate change, which undermines nutrition and development.	全球医疗业日益认识到，战争的传统后果——如受伤、心理创伤和流离失所——因为气候变化效应而加剧，这影响到营养和发育。


For example, conflict can, as in Yemen, result in the contamination of water resources, which are already being depleted by climate change.	比如，在也门，冲突可能导致因为气候变化而变得十分稀缺的水资源受到污染。


Similarly, malnutrition, rooted in the loss of crops and livelihoods from climate change, undermines people’s ability to recover from injuries sustained in violent conflict or endure the challenges of migration – a situation exacerbated by the destruction of health-care infrastructure.	类似地，气候变化导致庄稼歉收和生计损失，进而造成营养不良，影响到人民从暴力冲突的伤痛中恢复的能力和应对移民挑战的能力——而这一局面因为医疗基础设施被毁而雪上加霜。


The list goes on.	如此等等。


None of this is a matter of coincidence.	所有这些都不是巧合。


In fact, researchers are now concerned that conflict and climate change are mutually reinforcing, with economic and agricultural losses, as well as water shortages, triggering conflicts that then undermine health and livelihoods further.	事实上，如今研究者担心冲突和气候变化之间互相强化，经济和农业损失以及水短缺，所引发的冲突随后进一步影响到健康和生计。


In such an environment, outbreaks of an old disease (such as cholera) or a new one may lead to new regional and global pandemics.	在这样的环境下，旧疾病（如霍乱）或新疾病的爆发可能导致新的地区和全球大流行。