However, in rapidly growing emerging markets, wages are often sufficiently flexible on the upside.	但是，在快速增长的新兴市场，工资通常足够灵活，能够向上调整。


For example, if an employer (particularly an exporter) fears future renminbi appreciation, he may hesitate to raise wages in line with productivity increases, in order to keep his costs under control.	比如，如果雇主（特别是出口商）担心未来人民币升值，他可能会踌躇于让工资随生产率增长而增长，以此控制成本。


But if he can be confident that the exchange rate will remain stable, he will not need to restrain wages – and China has experienced 10-15% annual wage growth already.	但如果他有信心汇率将保持稳定，他就不需要约束工资——而中国目前的年工资增长已经达到了10—15%。


With faster wage growth at a stable nominal exchange rate, and by encouraging unit labor costs to converge to those in developed economies, China’s real international competitiveness would be better calibrated.	随着名义汇率的稳定，工资增长会加快，再辅之以鼓励单位劳动成本向发达国家靠拢，中国的真实国际竞争力将进一步提升。


As a result of policymakers’ heavy focus on the exchange rate, China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange has now accumulated more than $4 trillion in reserves – far exceeding the amount needed to cover any imaginable currency emergency.	由于决策者将大量注意力集中在汇率上，因此中国国家外汇管理局积累起了4万多亿美元的外汇储备——远远超过了抵御任何想象得到的货币紧急情况所需要的量。


Worse, the very act of currency intervention can undermine the PBOC’s control of monetary policy.	更糟糕的是，货币干预行为可能恰恰会妨碍人行对货币政策的控制。


Buying dollars increases the domestic base money supply, risking inflation and asset-price bubbles.	买入美元增加了本国基础货币的供给，带来通货膨胀和资产价格泡沫风险。


Efforts to “sterilize” these purchases and dampen domestic credit expansion also have adverse consequences.	“对冲”这些买入操作、抑制国内信用扩张也具有负面效应。


The PBOC frequently does this by selling bonds to commercial banks or raising their reserve requirements.	人行频繁做这样的操作——将债券出售给商业银行或提高准备金率。


But this has reduced these banks’ effectiveness as financial intermediaries, while encouraging the rise of shadow banking to circumvent the restrictions.	但这降低了银行作为金融中介的效率，同时也助长了影子银行的崛起和绕过限制。


What, then, are the PBOC’s options?	那么，人行有什么选择？


One approach might be simply to let the renminbi float without official intervention or controls on capital inflows.	一种方针是干脆让人民币自由浮动，不进行正式干预或管制资本流入。


Again, this would inevitably trigger hot-money inflows, with speculators taking advantage of the spread between Chinese interest rates and the near-zero, short-term rates in developed economies, thereby driving up the renminbi further (and creating yet more opportunities for speculation).	这难免会再次刺激热钱流入，投机者会利用中国利率和发达国家接近于零的短期利率之间的利差，从而进一步推高人民币（并创造出更多的投机机会）。


There would be no well-defined market equilibrium, or upper bound, for the renminbi/dollar exchange rate.	如此，人民币就不存在明确的兑美元汇率的市场均衡或上限。


Even without hot-money inflows, the renminbi’s exchange rate would face upward pressure, owing to the absence of corresponding outflows to finance the trade (saving) surplus.	即使没有热钱流入，人民币汇率也将面临上��压力，因为中国没有相应的流出以为贸易（储蓄）盈余融资。


As an immature international creditor, China is unable to balance the inflows by making renminbi loans abroad.	中国仍是不成熟的国际债权人，它无法通过人民币贷款国际化平衡流入。


Nor would it want to make dollar-denominated loans.	它也不愿意从事美元贷款业务。


Private banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and so on have limited appetite for building up liquid dollar claims on foreigners when their own liabilities – deposits, insurance claims, and pension obligations – are denominated in renminbi.	私有银行、保险公司、退休基金等也没有什么意愿增加对外国人的流动美元债权，因为它们自己的负债——存款、保险责任和退休金义务——都是人民币计价的。


The potential currency mismatch would require the PBOC (which cares little for exchange-rate risk) to step in as the international financial intermediary and buy liquid dollar assets on a vast scale.	这一潜在的货币错配要求人行（它基本上不关心汇率风险）充当国际金融中介，大规模购买流动性美元。


Moreover, foreign investors remain reluctant to borrow from Chinese banks in renminbi, or to issue renminbi-denominated bonds in Shanghai.	此外，外国投资者仍不愿从中资银行借入人民币，也不愿在上海发行人民币计价债券。


That will remain true as long as they fear continued outside political pressure to appreciate.	只要他们担心存在来自外部的升值政治压力就会如此。


China is therefore caught in a currency trap, owing to its own saving surplus (and America’s saving deficiency) and near-zero interest rates on dollar assets.	因此，中国陷入了一个货币陷阱，这一陷阱的原因是储蓄盈余（和美国的储蓄赤字）和美元资产的近零利率。


Although fully liberalizing China’s domestic financial markets and “internationalizing” the renminbi may be possible one day, that day is far off.	尽管中国国内金融市场的完全自由化和人民币的“国际化”有朝一日可能实现，但这一天还远得很。


For now, if China tries to liberalize its financial markets, hot money will flow the wrong way – into the economy, rather than out.	现在，如果中国试图自由化其金融市场，热钱将向错误的方向流动——流入而不是流出经济。


Thus, China must maintain controls on inflows of financial capital for the time being, with the PBOC intervening to stabilize the renminbi/dollar exchange rate.	因此，眼下中国必须保持对金融资本流入的管制，人行应该干预以稳定人民币/美元汇率。


Until conditions in the world economy improve substantially, China’s policymakers will have no easy way out.	除非世界经济获得重大改善，否则中国决策者都不会太轻松。


But, even if they are constrained, the economy can continue to grow.	但是，即使他们饱受掣肘，中国经济仍然可以继续增长。


The Roots of Middle East Mistrust	中东缺乏信任的根源


DURHAM – The mistrust that pervades Middle Eastern societies is hard to miss.	达勒姆——弥漫在整个中东社会的信任的缺乏很难不被注意到。


As controlled experiments confirm, Arabs have substantially less trust in strangers, foreign or domestic, than, say, Europeans.	对照实验证实，阿拉伯人对国内外陌生人的信任比欧洲人要少得多。


This hampers progress on many fronts, from business development to government reforms.	这阻碍了很多方面的社会进步，从商业开发到政府改革。


Low-trust societies participate disproportionately less in international commerce, and attract less investment.	低信任度社会很少参与国际贸易，也很少吸引投资。


And, indeed, according to the World Values Survey and related research, trust among individuals in the Middle East is low enough to limit commercial transactions to people who know one another either personally or through mutual acquaintances.	而且事实上，按照世界价值观调查和相关研究成果，中东地区个人欠缺信任导致商业交易仅在认识的人或通过熟人介绍的人之间进行。


Because of their lack of trust, Arabs will often pass up potentially lucrative opportunities to gain through exchange.	因为缺乏信任，阿拉伯人常常会错过通过交换得到的有利可图的潜在机会。


Likewise, in their dealings with public institutions, Arabs tend to seek the intermediation of an individual with whom they have some sort of personal connection.	同样，在与公共机构打交道时，阿拉伯人倾向于寻找与他们有某种个人联系的人做中介。


Among the consequences are inequities in what people can expect from such institutions. That undermines their effectiveness.	结果导致了上述机构对民众服务不平等，机构效率也因此遭到了破坏。


Clearly, there is a need to address the Middle East’s trust deficit.	消除中东的信任赤字显然很有必要。


A first step toward doing so is to understand its causes.	其中的首要步骤是要了解为什么会这样。


One potentially important clue lies in the difference between perceptions of Muslims and Christians.	人们对穆斯林和基督徒的不同看法很可能是一条重要线索。


To be sure, there are no official data quantifying the deficit; in most parts of the Middle East, too few Christians are left to make meaningful statistical comparisons.	可以肯定，不存在量化信任赤字的正式数据，因为该地区剩下的基督徒太少，导致已经无法进行有意义的数据比对工作。


But casual evidence suggests that the region’s shoppers, merchants, and investors generally consider local Christians to be more trustworthy than local Muslims.	但非正式证据表明中东地区的买主、商人和投资者普遍认为当地基督徒比穆斯林更值得信任。


“It has always been that way,” they say.	他们说“情况一直就是这个样子的”。


My work with the economic historian Jared Rubin exploring Istanbul’s seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Islamic court records may offer insights into why.	我与经济史学家贾里德·鲁宾合作对伊斯坦布尔17和18世纪伊斯兰法庭记录的研究可以为明确个中原因提供某些启示。


At that time, Istanbul was a cosmopolitan city; around 35% of its local residents were Christian, and 6% were Jewish.	当时的伊斯坦布尔是国际大都会； 那里约35%的当地居民是基督徒、6%是犹太人。


According to Islamic law (Sharia), Muslims had to do business according to Islamic rules, and if they wanted to adjudicate a conflict, they had to use an Islamic court.	根据伊斯兰法（伊斯兰教教法的）规定，穆斯林做生意时必须遵守伊斯兰教规，如果想要审理纠纷，必须提交伊斯兰法庭裁决。


For their part, Christians and Jews could do business under their own rules, though they were free also to follow Islamic rules and to use Islamic courts, if they so desired.	而基督徒和犹太人则可以执行他们自己的规则，但在自愿的前提下也可以自由选择遵守伊斯兰教法和提交伊斯兰法庭裁决。


But, of course, if they were involved in a case against a Muslim, that had to be handled in an Islamic court.	但当然，如果他们的纠纷对象是穆斯林，则必须由伊斯兰法庭来进行裁决。


When a Muslim and a non-Muslim faced each other in a trial, the Muslim enjoyed significant advantages.	当穆斯林和非穆斯林双方在法庭相遇时，穆斯林一方具有显著的优势。


First, the judges’ training predisposed them to give the benefit of any doubt to a fellow Muslim.	首先，法官培训已经决定了法官会对穆斯林教友适用疑罪从无的规定。


Second, the court staff was entirely Muslim, which meant that testimony was viewed solely from a Muslim perspective.	其次，法院工作人员全部由穆斯林组成，这意味着完全从穆斯林的视角来审视证词。


Third, whereas Muslims could testify against anyone, Christians and Jews could testify only against another non-Muslim.	第三，虽然穆斯林可以针对任何人作证，但基督徒和犹太人却只能针对其他非穆斯林提供证词。


But these advantages had a downside.	但这些优势却也有不利的一面。


Because the legal system made it easier for Muslims to breach contracts with impunity, they were more often tempted to default on their debts and to renege on their obligations as business partners and sellers.	因为法律系统降低了穆斯林肆意违反合同的难度，导致他们往往更倾向于拖欠债务和违背作为商业伙伴和卖方的职责。


Meanwhile, non-Muslims, whose obligations were enforced more vigorously, gained a reputation for trustworthiness.	此外，那些义务被执行得格外严厉的非���斯林群体却赢得了诚信的名声。


To reflect differences in perceived risk, lenders, who were predominantly Muslim, charged about two percentage points less for credit to Christian and Jewish borrowers than to Muslims (15% annually, as opposed to 17%).	为了反映主观风险的不同，由穆斯林占绝大多数的放贷人在贷款给基督徒和犹太人时比贷款给其他穆斯林要少收两个百分点的费用（即每年15%，而向穆斯林放贷则为每年17%）。


So it seems that perceptions of trustworthiness in the Arab world are rooted, at least partly, in the uneven enforcement of commitments under Islamic law.	如此看来，阿拉伯世界的诚信观至少部分来源于不平等的执行伊斯兰法规定的义务。


The sectarian differences in legal enforcement did not last.	执法领域的宗派差异并未一直持续下去。


In the mid-nineteenth century, Islamic courts gave way to what were essentially secular courts, at least with respect to commerce and finance.	19世纪，至少在商务和金融方面，伊斯兰法庭让位于实质上的世俗法庭。


The enforcement of commitments then became more balanced.	此后的执法行为变得相对均衡。


The share of non-Muslims in the Middle East’s Muslim-majority countries has since diminished significantly, through emigration and population exchanges.	从那以后，中东以穆斯林为主国家的非穆斯林人口比例因为移民和人口交流而显著下降。


As a result, few Middle Eastern Muslims have personal experience doing business with non-Muslims.	结果只有为数不多的穆斯林有过与非穆斯林做生意的个人经历。


Yet old impressions of Muslims being less trustworthy have endured, passed down through families and networks.	但穆斯林不值得信任的旧有观念却通过家族和社交网络等渠道一直保存了下来。


Old habits of breaching contracts opportunistically have also survived in places, reinforcing the inherited stereotypes.	有些地方投机破坏合同的老习惯依然如故，因此更进一步固化了从上辈人那里继承的传统观念。


The tendency to limit transactions to friends and acquaintances is a natural response in a low-trust environment.	因为环境信任度低，人们倾向于将交易活动限制在朋友和熟人之间是一种自然而然的反应。


It is ironic that these damaging stereotypes emerged from a legal system explicitly intended to give the militarily and politically dominant Muslims an edge in their social and economic relations with Christians and Jews.	颇具讽刺意味的是，如此具有破坏力的传统印象居然来源于一套明显旨在赋予军事和政治上占统治地位的穆斯林相对于基督徒和犹太人社会经济关系优势的法律体系。


Beyond raising the costs of economic transactions among Muslims at the time, rules meant to limit religious freedom – the denial of “choice of law” to Muslims and restrictions on non-Muslim judicial testimony – helped to create a culture of mistrust that now limits progress in various areas.	除抬高当时穆斯林经济交易成本外，伊斯兰教法本意是要限制宗教自由——剥夺了穆斯林“选择法律”的权利，限制了非穆斯林的法律证词——这种做法造成了信任缺乏的文化，时至今日限制了在很多领域取得进步。


Islamic law thus weakened the Muslim communities it was meant to protect.	正是以这种方式，伊斯兰法削弱了它本该保护的穆斯林民众。


At a time when various political movements are seeking to re-impose Sharia, it is more important than ever to recognize the long-term damage caused by doing so already.	值此各种政治运动试图重启伊斯兰教法之际，清醒的认识伊斯兰教法已经造成的长期损害变得更加重要。


What the Middle East needs today is not Islamic law, but wide-ranging efforts to rebuild trust among and within communities, and in private organizations and government.	中东现在需要的不是伊斯兰教法，而是重建民众、私营组织和政府信任的广泛工作。


Reviving Islamic law would only deepen a trust deficit that is a key source of the Middle East’s current economic underdevelopment and political failures.	修改伊斯兰法只会加深导致中东目前经济不发达和政治失败现状的信任赤字这一关键因素。


Round-Trip Freedom	返程的自由


NEW YORK – Western media describe my friend and colleague Chen Guangcheng as a blind activist who made a flight to freedom when China allowed him to journey from Beijing to the United States.	发自纽约——在得到从北京赴美的官方许可之后，西方媒体将我的朋友兼同僚陈光诚称为一个飞向自由的盲人活动家。


What is essential about Chen is neither his blindness nor his family’s visit to the US, but the fact that he upholds a vision of universal human rights, a vision that can be fully realized only when, and if, China honors its promise to allow him one day to return home.	而对中国来说，重要的不是陈光诚作为盲人的事实或者其家人对美国的造访，而是他秉承着一个普世人权的理想，但直到有一天中国能履行自己的承诺让他重归祖国，这个理想才算完全实现。


China has a history of forcing scholars and dissidents like us into exile.	对中国来说，迫使我们这样的学者和异见分子流亡早有先例。


When the Chinese student movement broke out in 1989, I was pursuing a Ph.D. in mathematics at the University of California-Berkeley. I traveled to Beijing to participate as an activist in Tiananmen Square, where I narrowly escaped the massacre and was able to make my way back to the US.	1989年学生运动爆发时，当时正在加州大学伯克利分校攻读数学博士学位的我回到北京参加了天安门广场上的运动，最终也在屠杀之下侥幸逃生并重回美国。


Due to my activism, however, China refused to renew my passport.	由于我的行为，中国拒绝更新我的护照。


So, when I returned to China in 2002 to help the movement for workers’ rights, I used a friend’s passport.	因此当我在2002年回国协助举行工人权益运动时使用的是朋友的护照。


China incarcerated me as a political prisoner for five years, until 2007. For a year and a half of that period, I was held in solitary confinement, without access to visitors, reading materials, or even paper and pen.	为此我被作为政治犯关押了5年之久，其中一年半时间都是在单人牢房度过，不允许人探望，无书可读，连纸笔都摸不到。


Upon my release, China renewed my passport on the condition that I return to the US.	中国最重在释放我的时候给我换了新护照，但条件是我必须回到美国。


I have tried three times to return to my homeland, only to see China block each attempt at the Hong Kong airport.	我曾三次试图回国，但每次都在香港机场遭到了拦截。


So Chen’s case serves as a reminder that those who want to support Chinese activists’ struggle for human rights must support our right to enter and leave China freely.	因此陈光诚事件也给那些希望支持中国异见分子人权抗争的人提了个醒，让他们意识到必须同时支持我们自由进出中国的权力。


It also confirms that China’s top leaders can be moved when the international community, led by the US, puts specific cases like his on the table.	此外可以确定的是，当以美国为首的国家社会把陈光诚这样的特定事件摆上桌面的时候，中国的最高领导人也不能无动于衷。


China’s leaders directed negotiators to resolve the issue before the arrival of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, because she could be counted on to raise the issue in full view of the world’s media.	中国领导人命令谈判者务必要在美国国务卿希拉里访华之前解决这个事情，因为她可能会在全世界媒体面前提起这个事件。


This naming and shaming approach can be more effective than most observers think.	这个指名道姓且羞耻的方式可比大多数观察家想象中更为有效。


Human rights need not take a back seat to doing business with China.	而在与中国谈生意时，人权问题也不需要靠边站。


As a case in point, many Western observers thought that Norway’s trade relations with China would be undermined when dissident Liu Xiaobo was invited to receive the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo in December 2010.	对此有一个绝佳例子：许多西方观察家认为挪威2010年12月邀请异见分子刘晓波赴奥斯陆领取诺贝尔奖的行为会损害中挪贸易关系。


China complained loudly, refused to allow Liu to collect the prize, and even threatened Norway with financial repercussions.	中国大声抗议，不肯放刘晓波去领奖，甚至威胁挪威说会产生经济后果。


The same month, however, one of China’s largest oil companies concluded a drilling contract with Norway’s Statoil, clearly signaling that diplomatic tensions would not stop business.	但就在同一个月，中国其中一家最大的石油企业却与挪威国家石油公司签订了一项钻探协议，也明确体现出外交上的紧张局面其实不会影响商业活动。


So Western diplomats who negotiate with China should call lower-level officials’ bluff, and focus on the signal-to-noise ratio, bearing in mind that, ultimately, decisions are taken quietly at a higher level by pragmatic leaders who are indeed susceptible to pressure.	因此那些和中国谈判的西方外交人员自当无视中方低级官员的虚张声势，并将注意力放在信噪比之上，时刻牢记最终的决定将会由那些事实上对压力非常敏感的务实高层官员做出。


After all, economic growth remains China’s best hope to keep the regime afloat, and it is the main criterion for officials’ promotion through the ranks.	毕竟，经济发展才是维持这个政权的最大希望，也是官员升迁的主要指标。


So the last thing that officials at any level want to do is jeopardize international trade.	因此无论这些官员级别高低，他们最不想做的事就是在国际贸易上惹麻烦。


The strong commitment of US President Barack Obama’s administration in supporting Chen made a difference, and it will make a difference in other cases, too.	奥巴马政府在支持陈光诚方面所做出的强硬承诺使事情发生了转机，也会在其他事件中产生类似的效果。


So we voices for human rights in China have reason to express gratitude to Clinton, Ambassador Gary Locke, House Speaker John Boehner, US Representatives Chris Smith, Frank Wolf, Nancy Pelosi, Jim McGovern, and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, and many citizens who spoke out for Chen.	因此我们在对中国人权的呼声中有必要感谢克林顿女士，骆家辉大使（Gary Locke），众议院议长约翰·伯纳（John Boehner），克里斯·史密夫议员（Chris Smith），法兰克·沃尔夫议员（Frank Wolf），南希·佩洛西议员（Nancy Pelosi），吉姆·麦克格文议员（Jim McGovern）和伊莉娜·罗斯-勒提南议员（Ileana Ros-Lehtinen），感谢这些人为陈光诚奔走呼吁。


Chen had been sentenced to four years and three months in jail because he alienated corrupt local officials.	陈光诚因为检举当地腐败官员而被判处4年零三个月徒刑。


After he served his term, the same officials funneled government funds to hire 200 thugs to punish him further by keeping him confined to his house.	在他服刑期满之后，那名官员竟利用政府财政资金雇佣了200个地痞流氓，强行把他囚禁在家里，继续折磨他。


The resolution of Chen’s dilemma shows that standing up for human rights will gain the grudging respect of China’s leadership and citizenry.	陈光诚困境的解决方案显示在人权方面的抗争能得到中国领导人和市民的不情愿的尊敬。


In addition, promoting democracy and human rights in authoritarian countries such as China will improve their social equality, economic productivity, and political stability in the long run, making them better trading partners.	此外，在中国这类独裁国家推动民主和人权将有助于提升其社会公平，经济生产力和长远的政治稳定，使这些国家成为更好的贸易伙伴。


The right of return and freedom of speech were uppermost in Chen’s mind as he engineered his family’s departure for the US.	虽然陈光诚安排了全家人赴美，但回国的权利以及言论自由是陈光诚心中最重要的东西。


I know because I spoke with him while he was in a hospital, negotiating his release.	我之所以知道这一点，因为我曾在医院与他讨论跟释放有关的问题。


Exile is not freedom.	流放不是自由。


For Chen, as for myself, the true flight to freedom will be made with a return ticket home.	对陈光诚来说，也对我来说，真正的自由航班就是一张回家的机票。


Running From the Ruble	逃离卢布


PARIS – In recent weeks, the fall in the Russian ruble and Russian stock markets closely tracked the declines in global oil prices.	巴黎—最近几周，俄罗斯卢布和俄罗斯股票市场的下跌紧随着全球油价的下降。


But everything changed on December 15.	但12月15日，一切都改变了。


The oil price remained stable, but the ruble and the stock-price indices lost 30% in the subsequent 24 hours.	油价保持稳定，但卢布和股价指数在随后的24小时下降了30%。


An unprecedented effort by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) in the wee hours of December 16 to stabilize the ruble, by hiking the interest rate from 10.5% to 17%, proved useless.	俄罗斯中央银行（CBR）采取了前所未有的行动，将利率从10. 5%升至17%，但这一动作只是将卢布稳定了一小会儿便宣告失败。


The cause of Russia’s “Black Monday” was readily apparent: the government bailout of state-owned Rosneft, the country’s largest oil company.	俄罗斯“黑色星期一”的原因是显而易见的：政府对俄罗斯最大石油公司、国有的俄石油（Rosneft）实施援助。


Usually, bailouts calm markets; but this one recalled early post-Soviet experiments, when the CBR issued direct loans to enterprises – invariably fueling higher inflation.	通常援助会安抚市场； 但这一回援助让人想起了后苏联时代初期的实验——CBR向企业直接提供贷款，导致通胀急速升高。


The CBR’s governor at the time, Viktor Gerashchenko, was once dubbed the world’s worst central banker.	时任CBR行长格拉什琴科（Viktor Gerashchenko）一度被称为全世界最差的央行行长。


In 2014, the CBR is more constrained than it was in Gerashchenko’s era: it cannot lend directly to firms.	2014年CBR的境况比格拉什琴科时期还要糟糕：它无法直接贷款给企业。


Yet it has also become more sophisticated at achieving the same ends that Gerashchenko sought.	但它也变得能够更加复杂地实现与格拉什琴科所追求的一样的结果。


In October, Rosneft issued $11 billion worth of ruble-denominated bonds (an unparalleled amount for the Russian market, equivalent to 70% of the total value of corporate bonds issued in Russia this year).	10月，俄石油发行了价值110亿美元的卢布计价债券（这在俄罗斯市场上是前所未有的，这次发行相当于俄罗斯今年公司债券发行总量的70%）。


The coupon on these bonds was actually 1.5 percentage points below sovereign bonds of similar maturity, which is also unusual, especially given that Rosneft currently is subject to Western sanctions.	这些债券的息票率实际比相近期限的主权债务还要低1. 5个百分点，这也是不同寻常的，特别是考虑到俄石油目前正在被西方制裁。


Then, unnamed investors (allegedly the largest Russian state banks) benefited from the CBR’s decision on December 12 to allow these bonds to be used as collateral for three-year CBR ruble loans at the policy rate.	接着，不知名投资者（据称是最大的几家俄罗斯州银行）因为CBR在12月12日作出的决定而获益——允许这些债券作为抵押换取CBR按政策利率发放的三年期卢布贷款。


Moreover, the CBR scheduled a special auction for such loans on December 15 – with the total amount of the loans similar to that of Rosneft’s bond issue.	此外，CBR还安排在12月15日举行这些贷款的特别拍卖——总贷款额与俄石油的债券发行额相近。


Thus, the CBR would be able to provide a massive pile of rubles to Rosneft at below-market rates.	因此，CBR得以按低于市场水平的利率向俄石油提供巨额卢布。


So why did the deal trigger a panic?	那么，这笔交易为何会引发恐慌？


At first glance, this deal was intended to meet contemporary Russia’s most important economic challenge.	乍一看，这笔交易是为了应对当代俄罗斯最重要的经济挑战。


Sanctions have cut off Russian banks and companies from Western financial markets.	制裁导致俄罗斯银行和公司无法进入西方金融市场。


Russian companies have to repay or refinance about $300 billion of debt over the coming two years.	未来两年，俄罗斯公司需要偿付或再融资大约3,000亿美元债务。


Some of this debt is owed to Russian companies’ offshore owners, who will certainly be happy to roll it over.	其中一些债务的债权人是俄罗斯公司的离岸所有人，他们肯定乐于展期。


But in most cases, firms’ liabilities comprise real debt owed to major international banks.	但在大部分情况下，企业负债构成了欠大型跨国银行的真正债务。


The best example is Rosneft, which borrowed about $40 billion in 2013 to buy its competitor, TNK-BP.	俄石油就是最好的例子，2013年它借贷大约400亿美元b用于收购竞争对手秋明-英石油（TNK-BP）。


About $10 billion of this debt has to be repaid in the fourth quarter of 2014, including a $7 billion payment on December 21 ($20 billion more will have to be repaid in 2015).	这笔债务中有大约100亿美元需要在2014年四季度偿还，包括在12月21日偿还70亿美元（2015年需要偿还另外200亿美元）。


Financial-market investors have been waiting patiently for the government to announce a strategy for addressing the issue of external corporate debt.	金融市场投资者一直在耐心等待政府宣布解决外部公司债务问题的策略。


The CBR did introduce a 12-month dollar facility for up to $50 billion, but this will barely last until the end of 2015.	CBR确实引入了12个月期、最高500亿美元的美元便利，但这最多只能维持到2015年底。


Given that the price of oil is likely to remain low, Asian financiers – even the Chinese – do not seem eager to refinance Russian companies, and sanctions are unlikely to be lifted, investors clearly wanted a bigger and bolder solution.	考虑到油价可能保持低位，亚洲金主——哪怕是中国——对俄罗斯公司的再融资并不热衷，而制裁也不太可能取消，因此，投资者显然希望看到更大手笔的方案。


Rosneft had repeatedly asked for $40 billion from Russia’s sovereign wealth fund.	俄石油已再次要求从俄罗斯主权财富基金获得400亿美元。


But, with that money already committed to other purposes, the government opted for a non-transparent and non-market-based solution that would have made Gerashchenko proud.	但是，这笔钱已经确定用于其他用途，政府选择了一个既不透明，也非基于市场的方案，格拉什琴科也许会因此感到骄傲吧。


Unfortunately, this solution poses several immediate problems.	不幸的是，这一方案马上就造成了一些问题。


For starters, the risk of Rosneft defaulting – as well as the cost of providing subsidized loans – rests with the bondholders.	首先，俄石油违约风险——以及提供补��贷款的成本——需要由债权人承担。


If the bondholders are indeed the largest state-owned banks, the deal actually hurts the banking system: it increases the concentration of risk and implies additional losses from buying bonds with below-market interest rates.	如果债权人确实是国有大银行，则这笔交易实际上损害了银行系统：它增加了风险集中程度，也暗含购买低于市场水平利率的债券的附加损失。


Second, because Rosneft must repay its external debt, it is likely to use its bailout cash to buy dollars, which can only result in further downward pressure on the ruble.	其次，由于俄石油必须偿还其外债，因此它有可能用援助金购买美元，这将导致卢布进一步下跌。


Rosneft has denied this publicly, but the markets nonetheless seem to expect that the newly printed rubles will flood the currency markets.	俄石油已经公开否认了这一点，但市场仍然预期这笔新鲜印出的卢布将涌入货币市场。


Third, the non-transparent structure of the deal undermines trust in the CBR’s integrity and independence.	第三，这笔交易的不透明结构有损于对CBR诚信和独立性的信任。


The day after Black Monday, Minister of Economy Alexey Ulyukaev said that the CBR should have increased interest rates sooner.	黑色星期一后一天，经济部长乌留卡耶夫（Alexey Ulyukaev）表示CBR本应该更快提高利率。


This immediately raised suspicion that the CBR delayed the interest-rate hike in order to complete the deal at the lower rate.	这立刻引起了怀疑——CBR推迟升息是为了以更低利率完成这笔交易。


Finally, this bailout fails to answer the question it was supposed to address.	最后，此次援助并未解决它应该解决的问题。


Investors do not know whether the Rosneft bailout is a one-off deal and, if it is not, which companies can hope to receive similar treatment from the CBR.	投资者仍然不知道俄石油援助是否是一次性交易，如果不是，还有哪些公司能够指望获得来自CBR的类似待遇。


Thus, they do not understand how (and whether) Russian corporate debt will be repaid or refinanced – or how much trust they can place in the ruble.	因此，他们也无法理解俄罗斯公司债券如何（以及是否）能偿还或再融资——或者他们还能在多大程度上信任卢布。


Hungarians and Poles must be reminded that Russian President Vladimir Putin is actively attempting to divide and weaken the EU and NATO.	另外必须提醒匈牙利人和波兰人的一点是俄��斯总统普京一直在积极试图分裂和削弱欧盟和北约。


Rules for Calamity and Crisis	处理灾难和危机的规则


NEW YORK -- Several years ago, my daughter lay in a coma after a serious fall.	纽约--几年前，我的女儿从高处摔下后陷于昏迷。


Two nurses came into her hospital room to prepare for a transfusion.	两个护士进入医院病房准备输血。


One clutched a pouch of blood and the other held my daughter’s medical dossier.	一个拿着一袋血，而另一个则手持我女儿的医疗档案。


The first read aloud from the bag, “Type A blood,” and the other read aloud from the file, “Alexa Holmes, Type A blood.”	第一个读出了袋子上文字：“A型血”，而另一个从档案中读到：“Alexa Holmes，A型血”。


They then proceeded, following a script, to switch props and roles, the first nurse reading from the file, “Alexa Holmes, Type A blood,” and the second reading from the bag, “Type A blood.”	然后她们继续进行。 她们根据说明转换用品和角色，第一个护士读档案的内容：“Alexa Holmes，A型血”，第二个读袋子上的文字：“A型血”。


Why do well-trained professionals, when struggling with a rapidly unfolding emergency, adhere to rules laid down in advance?	为什么训练有素的专业人员在奋力应付快速展开的紧急情况的时候要遵守事先制定好的规则呢？


The principal reason is that in times of crisis people fall into predictable but avoidable errors, largely because of panic.	主要原因是在危机时刻，主要由于慌乱，人们会犯下可以预计但是却可以避免的错误。


Over time, detailed protocols have evolved for such confusing situations to encourage cool-headedness and minimize the risk of avoidable error.	经过一段时间，人们制定了详细的规则应付这样令人疑惑的情况，从而鼓励冷静并且把可以避免的错误风险降低到最低。


The value of improvisation in the face of novel threats does not imply that existing rules should be peremptorily discarded.	在新的威胁下灵活处理的价值并不意味着应当一股脑儿地抛弃现有的规则，这一点几乎为世人皆知。


This point is almost trite, but it remains virtually unnoticed by last-ditch defenders of the Bush administration’s foreign policy.	但是，布什政府外交政策的顽固支持者们还是基本上没有注意到这一点。


Even today, the leading Republican presidential candidates suggest that the rule of law is an unaffordable luxury in the battle with al-Qaeda.	即使今天，主要的共和党总统候选人表示，在与基地组织的斗争中，法治是一个无法承受的奢侈品。


They claim that constitutionalism and due process, if meticulously followed, reduce the government’s “flexibility” in devising ways to prevent terrorist attacks.	他们宣称，如果完全遵守宪法主义和法定程序会降低政府在制定办法防止恐怖主义攻击上的“灵活性”。


It is easy to imagine situations in which flexibility can be increased by curtailing individual rights and abandoning pre-established decision-making rules.	人们很容易就会想象到这样一种情况，也就是通过限制个人权利以及放弃预先制定好的决策规则来增加灵活性。


But generalizing from these exceptions is unwise.	但是从这些例外情况中得出总体上的结论是不明智的。


An administration that has consistently boasted of its willingness to bend (and sometimes break) the law to meet an unprecedented threat has become notorious not for its flexibility, but for its rigidity.	如果政府一贯宣称其愿意扭曲法律(有时违反法律)来应付前所未有的威胁，那么，它就会因为它的顽固而非灵活而臭名昭著。


Might there be a causal relation between the Bush administration’s cavalier, if not hostile, attitude toward law and its dazzling inability to acknowledge mistakes and manage midstream readjustments?	布什政府对于法律并不恭敬，甚至存有敌意，而拒不承认错误并且处理中期的重新调整。 这二者之间是否有着一点联系呢？


Could it be that a willingness to flout the law and circumvent the Constitution tends to produce not nimbleness, but obduracy and intransigence?	是否有人愿意蔑视法律、绕开宪法将会产生顽固和不妥协、而不是灵活性呢？


Just as adherence to rules can improve the performance of emergency-room personnel, so due process and constitutionalism can improve the performance, especially in a crisis, of law-enforcement officers and national-security policymakers.	正如遵守规则可以提高急症病房人员的业绩一样，法定程序和宪法主义可以提高执法人员和国家安全决策者的业绩，特别是在危机时刻。


Requiring the government to test the factual basis of its decision to use force is not a shackle to be thrown off, but an incentive for forethought and a psychologically stabilizing support.	要求政府测试动用武力决定的事实依据并不是一个应当抛弃的枷锁，而是鼓励深谋远虑以及在心理上让人安心的支持。


A government that routinely makes fundamental national-security decisions based on undisclosed information, which no one outside a tiny circle of partisan loyalists ever has a chance to assess, is unlikely to make wise choices.	一个很小的党派忠诚者圈子以外的人没有机会评估未经披露的情报，而一个政府一贯根据这样的情报做出根本性的国家安全决定是难以做出明智决定的。


The idea that executive officials will fight terrorism more effectively when they know that no one is watching is farfetched.	行政官员在得知没有人监督他们的时候可以更为有效地与恐怖主义做斗争的这一说法是不着边际的。


A presidency that, having dismantled traditional checks and balances, is never compelled to provide coherent reasons for its policies, is soon likely to have few coherent reasons for its policies.	总统去除了传统的制衡就从来不必为其政策提供连贯的理由，如果是这样，那么，就会马上不会为其政策提供什么一贯的理由了。


The self-defeating proclivities of such laxly monitored executive power are now visible for all to see.	现在，人们都可以看到无法无天的行政权力倾向于自我毁灭。


Consider the decision radically to loosen evidentiary standards when deciding to incarcerate terrorist suspects in Guantánamo Bay or elsewhere.	让我们考虑一下这一局面，也就是在决定把恐怖疑犯关押在关塔纳摩基地或者其他地方的时候大幅度放松证据标准。


The result has been to encourage liars to clog the system with disinformation and false leads while discouraging honest people from reporting what they observe, lest an innocent neighbor be incarcerated on the basis of misperceptions.	这样做的结果就是鼓励撒谎者用虚假信息和线索阻碍体制，与此同时又不让诚实的人们报告他们的所见所闻，唯恐由于感觉错误而把无辜的邻居关押起来。


Secrecy is, of course, necessary in national-security affairs.	当然，在国家安全问题上保密是必要的。


But excessive secrecy leads to scarce resources being diverted into wild-goose chases.	但是过度的保密将会让稀有的资源引向毫无目标的调查追索之中。


And, to hide from scrutiny, the executive branch inevitably ends up hiding from itself – for example, by preventing well-informed experts in the State Department from independently appraising decisions made in the Pentagon.	而且，为了躲避监督，行政机关通常会把自身藏匿起来。 例如，阻止消息灵通的国务院专家独立地评估五角大楼做出的决定。


Obligatory consultation with independent and informed people may be annoying, but it can avert misunderstandings and accelerate the painful process of correcting blunders.	强制性要求与独立和消息灵通人士协商可能有点讨厌，但是这可以避免误解并且加速纠正错误的痛苦过程。


Having invaded an oil-rich Arab country that played no role in the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, the United States has imprudently allowed itself to be sucked into its attackers’ primitive logic of collective punishment and group revenge.	美国入侵了与2001年9月11日恐怖主义攻击毫无干系、石油储量丰富的阿拉伯国家，这样就鲁莽地让自己也陷入攻击者原始的集体惩罚和报复的逻辑。


It thereby abandoned the most essential pillar of the rule of law, namely the individualization of culpability.	因此，它也就放弃了法制最为根本的支柱，也就是刑责自负。


Restricting criminal liability to actual perpetrators, carefully excluding clansmen and kin, is a fragile historical innovation aimed at interrupting spirals of bloody inter-communal violence.	为了阻止血流成河的部落间暴力螺旋式上升而把刑事责任限制在实际犯罪者身上，仔细地排除族人和亲属是一个脆弱的历史性创新。


The administration arguably devoted most of its counterterrorism efforts not to law enforcement operations, but into “war” in Muslim lands because it failed to keep a cool head in the immediate aftermath of the attacks on New York and Washington.	布什政府无疑并不是将它的大部分反恐措施用于执法行动，而是用于在穆斯林土地上的“战争”，因为它在纽约和华盛顿的攻击之后没有保持清醒的头脑。


It thereby inadvertently confirmed the jihadists’ vilest propaganda, suggesting that Muslims worldwide can, for no apparent reason, become targets of America’s lethal fury.	这样，它也就无意间确认了圣战者最为邪恶的宣传，也就是，穆斯林世界会毫无理由地成为美国致命性愤怒的目标。


The surest way to rouse violent resistance is to communicate to people that there is nothing they can personally do to avoid being attacked.	唤起暴力抵抗的最保险的方式就是告诉人们，他们在避免遭到攻击之上无能为力。


That is yet another reason why flouting inherited rules and protocols, in the name of national security, has made, and will continue to make, the terrorist threat catastrophically worse.	这也是为什么以国家安全的名义蔑视既有的规则让恐怖威胁更为严重，而且将会继续如此。


Running from Musharraf	逃离穆沙拉夫


How times change the man.	时间改变人。


Pakistan’s embattled president, Pervez Musharraf, once declared, “I am not at all a politician.	巴基斯坦身处困境的总统穆沙拉夫曾经放言：“我根本就不是一名政治人物。


I don’t think I’m cut out for politics.”	我认为我不适合从政。


Eight years after seizing power and exiling his main civilian opponents, the general is moving heaven and earth to hold on to political office.	”在夺取政权并且流放其主要文官政敌八年之后，这一将军正在竭力保住其政治职务。


Though he took power in a bloodless coup, there was little doubt about his popularity at the time.	尽管他在一场不流血的政变中上台，但是，当时他的支持率是毫无疑问的。


The public had tired of a civilian regime marked by corruption and economic chaos.	公众对于文官腐败和经济混乱感到厌烦。


Musharraf’s personal frankness and integrity appealed to the street and earned him de facto legitimacy.	穆沙拉夫个性坦率诚实赢得大众的好感并且给了他事实上的合法性。


The general, who offered the father of modern Turkey, Kemal Atatürk, as his model, also seemed to represent a vision for his country that combined economic growth with support for secularizing impulses.	穆沙拉夫把土耳其国父凯末尔奉为楷模，也好像为巴基斯坦代表一种结合经济增长、支持世俗化要求的远景。


But, given his unwillingness to seek support for his regime and his policies from the ballot box, Musharraf succeeded in undermining both.	但是，由于他不愿意通过选举来寻求对其政权和政策的支持，穆沙拉夫结果把两者都破坏了。


Over the years, he rigged referendums, browbeat the judiciary, and asked Islamic parties for support to shore up his government.	多年来，穆沙拉夫操纵全民公决，恐吓司法机关，并且要求伊斯兰政党支持他的政府。


A president’s modernizing vision degenerated into a dictator’s power-driven myopia.	结果，一位总统的现代化远景规划堕落成为独裁者只追求权力的短视。


Musharraf admitted on television this year, “Yes, my popularity has been reduced.”	今年，穆沙拉夫在电视上承认：“是的，我的支持率下降。


Yet he clearly failed to comprehend that this was not just about approval ratings.	”但是他明显地没有认识到这不仅是民意支持率的问题。


The political core of his regime had become hollow.	其政权的政治核心已经荡然无存了。


In March, he sacked the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, probably because Chaudhry objected to Musharraf’s seeking a constitutionally questionable third term as president.	最高法院首席法官乔杜里反对穆沙拉夫寻求第三度担任总统。 这一连任在宪法上存有争议。


It proved to be the tipping point, triggering waves of protests by lawyers and other groups in Pakistan’s main cities.	今年三月，穆沙拉夫大概因此而解除了他的职务。 这一解职成为转折点，引发了律师和其他团体在巴基斯坦主要城市的街道上抗议浪潮。


Unable to vote the general out of office, the public took to the streets.	公众无法通过投票将穆沙拉夫赶下台，于是就上街。


Polls show Musharraf’s support has fallen to a third of the population, and that two-thirds oppose his seeking another presidential term.	民意调查显示穆沙拉夫的支持率下降到了总人口的三分之一，而三分之二的人反对他再度寻求连任总统。


Simultaneously, there has been considerable erosion of support from Musharraf’s strongest external backer, the United States.	与此同时，穆沙拉夫最为强有力的外部支持者美国对其的支持也大为降低。


After he seized power, America welcomed Musharraf’s willingness to fight al-Qaeda and the Taliban on his territory in exchange for large infusions of military aid.	在他夺取政权后，美国欢迎其在国内打击基地组织和塔利班的意愿，以换取大量的军事援助。


The general fought less out of conviction than pragmatism, but the end result was the same.	穆沙拉夫打击恐怖主义更多地出于现实主义而非信念，但是结果是一样的。


Or so the US believed.	美国也大致这样认为。


Given the long-standing relationship between Pakistan’s Islamic militants and the military, it became clear there were limits to how far Musharraf was prepared to go in the “war on terrorism.”	鉴于巴基斯坦伊斯兰武装份子和军方长期的关系，很明显，穆沙拉夫愿意在多大程度上进行“反恐战争”是存有局限的。


Musharraf is now desperate to beg, steal, or borrow any political legitimacy he can get – including from the two civilian political leaders he exiled.	穆沙拉夫现在迫不及待地想要祈求、盗取或者借用任何他能够得到的政治合法性，这包括从两位他所流放的文官政治领导人那里获得。


His most ambitious strategy has been to try to form a partnership with Benazir Bhutto, the head of one of the two largest democratic parties.	他最为具有雄心的策略就是试图与两个最大民主政党首领的布托组成伙伴关系。


Bhutto initially saw this as an opportunity to end her exile and ease herself into the prime ministership with a politically wounded partner.	布托最初认为这是结束其流放并且与政治上元气大伤的穆沙拉夫结盟担任总理的机会。


Her primary demand was that Musharraf surrender his uniform.	她的主要要求是穆沙拉夫放弃军职。


The other civilian leader, Nawaz Sharif, responded by defying his exile, returning to Pakistan, and promptly being re-expelled.	另一位文官领导人沙里夫则以藐视流放令作为回应。 他返回巴基斯坦，随即再度被逐。


But Sharif succeeded in undermining the Bhutto-Musharraf plan, positioning himself as Pakistan’s genuine champion of democracy.	但是沙里夫成功地破坏了布托和穆沙拉夫的计划，将自己放在了巴基斯坦真正的民主斗士的位子上。


In one move, he reversed the Pakistani political dynamic: being farthest from the dictator became more valuable than being closest to him.	通过回国这一举动，他扭转了巴基斯坦的政治能动格局，也就是，与独裁者距离最远要比与其接近对其更具有价值。


Unsurprisingly, Bhutto is now having second thoughts about an alliance with Musharraf, who has been reduced to chasing after her in an effort to salvage the deal.	不出所料，布托现在再度考虑与穆沙拉夫结盟，而穆沙拉夫则四面楚歌，追逐布托来保住结盟协议。


Musharraf, according to his lawyer’s depositions before the Supreme Court, plans to give up his uniform after the indirect presidential elections he scheduled for October 6.	根据其律师在最高法院的证词，穆沙拉夫打算在其预定10月6日举行的间接总统选举后放弃军职。


In preparation, he has replaced senior generals in the Pakistani army with officers considered more beholden to him, evidently hoping that this will ensure the military’s loyalty even after he removes himself from the chain of command.	为此，他撤换了巴基斯坦军队中的高级将领，代之以更为忠诚的军官。 这明显是希望在他自己离开军职后保证军队的忠诚。


However, his options are shrinking rapidly.	但是，他的选择余地正在极度缩小。


The US, concerned with ensuring stability in case of a transition to a new government, is keeping silent about its preference for Musharraf to remain head of both the government and the army.	美国担心向新政府过渡如何确保稳定，因此对于其希望穆沙拉夫继续担任政府和军队的首脑保持缄默。


The Bush administration is slowly recognizing that for a Pakistani leader to be an effective counterterrorism ally, he or she must have a modicum of legitimacy.	布什政府正在慢慢地认识到，要想让巴基斯坦领导人成为有效的反恐同盟，他或她就必须拥有哪怕是一点的合法性。


The two civilian leaders may soon begin vying with each other to see who can claim to be more anti-Musharraf.	这两位文官领导人或许马上就会相互竞争，看谁更为反穆沙拉夫。


Even Osama bin Laden, sensing an opportunity to stir up trouble and win popular support, has issued a video calling for a jihad against Musharraf.	即使是本拉登也感觉到加剧混乱以及赢得大众支持的机会，他公布录像带呼吁对穆沙拉夫进行圣战。


Nor can Musharraf count on the military, despite his recent appointments.	尽管穆沙拉夫最近做出任命，他也无法指望军队。


The generals have always placed the institution of the military above all else, including rulers from their own ranks.	军队将军一向把军队机制放在其他之上，包括自己的上级。


If they come to believe that Musharraf is sinking, they can be counted on to cut him loose, especially if he becomes a civilian.	如果他们认为穆沙拉夫来日无多，他们就会不听从穆沙拉夫的调遣，特别是他成为文官的时候。


Refugees and Rural Poverty	难民和农村贫困


ROME – Development experts and policymakers understandably focus on migration to urban areas and the need for sustainable urbanization.	罗马—不难理解，发展专家和决策者关注向城市地区移民的问题以及可持续城市化的需要。


But they should not lose sight of the dramatic changes happening in rural areas, which are too often ignored.	但他们不应该忽视农村地区正在发生的巨大变化，而这种变化常常没人关注。


While the growing demand for food – driven by rising population and incomes – is creating opportunities for rural people, hunger and poverty remain concentrated in rural parts of developing countries.	粮食需求的增长——受人口和收入增长驱动——给农村人口带来了机会，但饥饿和贫困依然集中在发展中国家的农村地区。


Unless rural development receives more attention, young people will continue to abandon agriculture and rural areas in search of better livelihoods in cities or abroad.	除非农村发展获得更多关注，否则年轻人将继续逃离农业和农村地区，前往城市或国外寻找更好的生活。


Last year at the United Nations General Assembly, world leaders adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which include a commitment to “leave no one behind.”	在去年的联合国大会上，世界领导人通过了2030年可持续发展议程和可持续发展目标 (SDG)，其中就包括“不让一个人落下”的承诺。


And, with the number of forcibly displaced people reaching all-time highs this year, the UN will hold a summit on September 19 to discuss the problem.	今年，被迫流离失所的人数达到了历史新高，联合国也将在9月19日召开峰会讨论这个问题。


But no effort to address the issues surrounding the global surge in migrants and refugees will succeed unless it specifically targets the plight of the world’s rural poor.	但是，除非人们明确地将目标指向世界农村贫困人口的困境，否则解决全球移民和难民数量激增问题的措施就不可能成功。


According to the World Bank, in 1990, some 37% of people in developing regions lived on less than $1.90 a day.	据世界银行，1990年有37%的发展中地区人民每天生活费不足1. 90美元。


By 2012, 12.7% did, amounting to more than one billion people rising out of extreme poverty.	2012年这一比例为12. 7%，即超过十亿人摆脱了极端贫困。


And yet, inequality between rural and urban areas has increased.	但是，农村和城市地区之间的不平等性有所上升。


Today, three-quarters of the world’s poorest and hungriest people live in rural areas.	如今，四分之三的世界最贫困和最饥饿人群生活在农村地区。


Small farms support 2.5 billion people worldwide, accounting for up to 80% of food produced in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.	小农场支撑着全世界25亿人的生活，产出了亚洲和撒哈拉以南非洲地区80%的粮食。


But most smallholder farmers still operate without many of the basic conditions needed to grow their businesses and invest in their communities, such as finance, infrastructure, market access, secure land ownership, and rights to resources.	但大部分小农仍然缺乏许多发展生计和投资社区所需要的基本条件，比如金融、基础设施、市场、有保障的土地所有权以及资源权利等。


This means that efforts to transform rural areas must target these institutional factors (along with improving gender equality and safeguarding the rule of law), while also introducing new technologies to local communities.	这意味着改变农村地区的措施必须针对这些制度因素（此外还要增进性别平等和捍卫法治），同时也要向本地社区引入新技术。


And, most important, rural people themselves must be involved, not only as stakeholders or beneficiaries of aid, but as partners.	而最重要的是，农村人口本身必须参与其中，不仅仅作为相关利益者或援助受益者，也要作为合作者。


Two new studies provide important perspectives on the challenge of reducing poverty, hunger, and inequality worldwide.	两项新研究为减少世界贫困、饥饿和不平等性的挑战提供了重要角度。


The International Fund for Agricultural Development’s (IFAD) Rural Development Report, to be launched on September 14, compiles new research for policymakers and others working to eradicate poverty.	将于9月14日发布的国际农业发展基金会（IFAD）的《农村发展报告》为决策者和其他扶贫工作者提供了新的研究成果。


Leading thinkers analyzed rural-development efforts in more than 60 developing countries, drawing conclusions about what does and doesn’t work.	知名专家分析了60多个国家的农村发展措施，为哪些措施管用、哪些措施不管用提供了论断。


One central finding is that development focused specifically on rural communities has a major positive impact on incomes, security, and food and nutrition.	一个核心发现是专门针对农村社区的发展能带来巨大的收入、安全以及粮食和营养方面的积极效应。


And these quality-of-life improvements then translate into better education, health care, and other critical services.	这些生活质量改善接着转化为更好的教育、医疗和其他关键性服务。


At the same time, these gains have not been evenly distributed, and Sub-Saharan Africa has seen far less progress than other areas.	与此同时，这些收益并不是均匀分布的，撒哈拉以南非洲的进步情况远差于其他地区。


The second study, funded by IFAD and recently released by the International Food Policy Research Institute, examines the worldwide economic downturn starting in 2012 in the context of rural populations.	第二项研究由IFAD提供资金支持，由国际粮食政策研究所（International Food Policy Research Institute）最新发布。 该研究以农村人口为背景考察了2012年开始的全球经济衰退。


It finds that as a result of the downturn, 38 million more people will remain in extreme poverty in 2030 than likely would have otherwise, with farm households in middle-income countries particularly at risk.	研究发现，拜衰退所赐， 2030年仍处于极端贫困状态的人数将因此多出3,800万，中等收入国家的农民家庭尤其危险。


This poses a serious challenge for the SDGs to end poverty “in all its forms everywhere,” and it strengthens the case for policies and investments specifically targeting rural areas, which is where poverty-reduction measures are needed more and will have a larger impact.	这给终结“一切形式、所有地方”的贫困的SDG构成了严重挑战，也突显出专门针对农村地区的政策和投资的重要性，减贫手段在农村地区需求更大、效果也更好。


Rural areas’ progress so far reveals their future potential.	农村地区目前的进步情况表明了它们的未来潜力。


In many cases, their economies have diversified and become more dynamic, and new roads and communication networks have reduced the physical and cultural distance between rural and urban residents.	在许多情形中，农村经济实现了多样化，并且活力倍增，新公路和通讯网络拉近了农村与城市居民的物理和文化距离。


In small towns and villages, new types of societies are evolving wherein agriculture, while still important, is no longer the only thing that defines economic and cultural life.	在小村镇，新型社会正在演化，农业尽管仍然十分重要，已不再是影响经济和文化生活的唯一要素。


It is time to look at development more holistically, acknowledging that rural development and urban development are not mutually exclusive – each needs the other.	现在，应该以更多的历史眼光看待发展，认识到农村发展和城市发展并不互相矛盾，而是相辅相成。


If we neglect rural areas, persistent poverty and hunger will continue to drive migration flows, not only to urban areas, but also to neighboring and nearby countries and destinations farther abroad.	如果我们忽视农村地区，持久的贫困与饥饿将继续带来移民流，不但流向城市地区，也流向邻国、周边国家和更加遥远的外国。


Leaving rural areas behind will not move developing countries forward; on the contrary, for many, it threatens to throw the engines of progress into reverse.	将农村地区抛在身后无法让发展中国家前进，相反，对许多发展中国家来说，进步的引擎有可能因此倒转。


Rushdie a la Russe	Rushdie a la Russe


June will be a cruel month in Russia's courts.	六月将是俄国法庭的残酷之月。


On June 16th, the rebellious oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his comrade-in-arms Platon Lebedev finally began to face the judges of the Meshchansky district court.	6月16日，叛乱寡头米卡耶·霍多尔科夫斯基和他的武装同志列别捷夫终将开始面对Meshchansky地区法庭的审判。


No doubt, this case will attract the Russian and international press.	勿庸置疑，案件的审理将吸引俄国和国外记者的目光。


Hearings began just the day before Khodorkovsky's trial opened in another case that is no less significant.	就在霍多尔科夫斯基案开庭审理的前一天，法院审理了另外一个同样重要的案件。


But this case is not about oligarchs trying to interfere in politics; it is about a group of artists and curators whose professional activities have unexpectedly turned into a political hot potato.	但这次的指控不是寡头干预政治，而是艺术家和博物馆长的职业行为出人意料演变成的政治难题。


In January 2003, a gang of Russian Orthodox activists destroyed an exhibition in the Sakharov Museum and Public Center called "Caution!	2003年1月，一群俄国东正教激进分子砸毁了萨哈罗夫博物馆和公共中心的一次展览，名为"小心！


Religion."	宗教。


The organizers of the exhibition stated that they wanted to attract attention to the new role of religious institutions in Russian life.	"展览的主办者说希望引起人们对俄国生活中宗教组织新作用的关注。


But the Orthodox fundamentalists found the art blasphemous and offensive, and some trashed the exhibition.	但东正教原教旨主义者认为展览亵渎神明，令人不快，于是捣毁了这次活动。


Last December, prosecutors charged two Sakharov Museum officials and three of the exhibition's organizers with inciting religious hatred. They now face prison terms of up to five years.	去年12月，公诉人指控萨哈罗夫博物馆的两名官员和三名展览组织者煽动宗教仇恨，他们面临长达5年的牢狱生涯。


The vandals, meanwhile, were hailed by church officials as heroes. All charges against them were dismissed.	与此同时，破坏者被教职人员奉为英雄，撤销了一切有关他们的指控。


The vandals had influential protectors.	破坏者背后有着强大的保护伞。


All of them were members of the congregation of St. Nicholas in Pyzhi, whose archpriest, Alexander Shargunov, is a well-known radical fundamentalist.	他们都是Pyzhi圣尼古拉教会的成员，该教大祭司，Alexander Shargunov就是著名的极端原教旨主义者。


In 1997, he established a movement called the Social Committee For the Moral Revival of the Fatherland.	1997年，他创办了"祖国道德重生社会委员会"。


In 2001, the committee's Web site carried instructions on how to vandalize "immoral" billboards by splashing paint on them.	2001年，委员会网站登载了如何泼洒颜料，毁坏那些"有伤风化"的广告牌。


Followers promptly destroyed 150 billboards in Moscow.	莫斯科的150座广告牌立即遭到追随者的破坏。


A group of well-known nationalist intellectuals, including film director Nikita Mikhalkov, artist Ilya Glazunov, and writers Valentin Rasputin and Vasily Belov, weighed in with a petition calling the exhibition a "new stage of conscious Satanism."	一些著名民族主义分子，包括电影导演Nikita Mikhalkov，艺术家Ilya Glazunov，作家Valentin Rasputin和Vasily Belov也参与进来，将这次展览称做"新一轮有意的恶魔崇拜。


They wrote that Russia's enemies were bent on humiliating the powerless "Russian people, their objects of worship, and their historic values."	"在他们笔下，俄国的敌人一心想羞辱软弱无力的"俄国人民，羞辱他们的崇拜对象还有历史价值观。 "


Who, precisely, were these powerful enemies?	确切地说，谁才是上面所说的强大敌人？


The intellectuals didn't identify them, but the fascist political party Pamyat (Memory) did not hesitate.	知识分子们没有指明，但法西斯政党Pamyat（记忆党）却毫不犹豫。


The appeal posted on its Web site called on Orthodox Christians to protect "our Lord Jesus Christ" from "Yid-degenerates," using the most derogatory Russian term for Jews.	网站上张贴的内容号召东正教信徒保卫"我们的主耶稣基督"免受"犹太堕落"之害，把极尽贬损的俄语词汇加在犹太人头上。


These alarming events in the art world have taken place against a background of rising nationalism and Orthodox assertiveness in Russia.	艺术世界惊人现象的背后是俄国东正教教旨和民族主义的日渐抬头。


The Orthodox Church has acquired enormous political clout in recent years, and few politicians risk offending it.	东正教堂近年来获得了巨大的政治权力，没有几个政治家敢冒险与之抗衡。


The Sakharov Museum exhibition was subjected to a vituperative media campaign, and the matter was almost immediately taken up in the Duma, where nationalist deputies vied with each other to denounce the artists and laud the vandals.	萨哈罗夫博物馆展览受到媒体的一致责难，几乎立即提交杜马讨论，民族主义的代表竞相谴责艺术家，歌颂破坏者。


In February 2003, the Duma passed a decree stating that the Sakharov museum exhibition's purpose was to incite religious hatred and to insult believers and the Orthodox Church.	2003年2月，杜马通过法令，指出1999年展览的目的是煽动宗教仇恨，羞辱教众和东正教堂。


The state prosecutor was ordered to take action against the organizers, with 265 of 267 deputies approving the measure.	国家公诉人被勒令对组织者采取行动，这项措施得到了267名代表中265人的支持。


In April 2003, the Duma voted to toughen the law against inciting religious hatred by adding prison terms of up to five years for offenders.	2003年4月，杜马投票加大了煽动宗教仇恨的处罚力度，规定了长达5年的监禁条款。


In December 2003, Sakharov Museum director Yuri Samodurov was charged with actions "leading to the provocation of hatred and enmity."	2003年12月，萨哈罗夫博物馆馆长Yuri Samodurov被控从事"煽动仇恨和敌意"的行为。


If found guilty, he could be sentenced to up to five years in prison.	如果被判有罪，他将面临长达5年的牢狱生涯。


Church officials are not calling for that harsh a penalty.	教职人员都没有提倡如此严厉的惩罚。


In March 2004, the Moscow Patriarchy's External Relations Department issued a statement that surprised everyone. It asserted, in effect, that the Sakharov Museum exhibition organizers had committed an administrative rather than a criminal offense.	2004年3月，莫斯科主教对外关系部发表了一份令人惊讶的声明，提出萨哈罗夫博物馆展览主办者的行为属于行政错误，而非刑事犯罪。


The difference is that administrative offenses are punished with fines, at most, not prison terms.	两者的区别在于：行政错误最多通过罚款来进行惩戒，而不应面对刑事处罚。


Such a softening of the church's position was probably the result of the public outcry in Russia's liberal press.	教堂立场的软化也许是公众在俄国自由媒体上疾呼的结果。


Yet the pogrom at the Sakharov museum provoked a chain reaction of similar attacks on contemporary art by Orthodox fundamentalists whom the church has been unable to control.	但萨哈罗夫博物馆的迫害引发了连锁发应，导致东正教旨主义者大肆攻击现代艺术，教堂也对此失去了控制。


Anna Alchuk, an artist who participated in the exhibition in the Sakaharov Center and was later charged, said she had read all 14 volumes of evidence collected by the prosecutor, and that 11 volumes consisted entirely of letters from "working people" expressing outrage at the show and demanding that the artists be punished.	参与萨哈罗夫中心展览的艺术家Anna Alchuk随后遭到了起诉，她说她通读了控诉方搜集的14卷证据，其中11卷仅仅包含"劳动人民"的来信，表达了对展览的愤怒，要求严惩相关艺术家。


Almost none of the writers had seen the exhibition - most had signed form letters.	来信者几乎从未看过展览，很多人都在打印的信件上签了名。


"The events around the exhibition discredit the Russian Orthodox Church, just as the fatwah condemning Salman Rushdie to death discredited Islam," said Elena Bonner, Andrei Sakharov's widow.	"展览事件损害了俄国东正教堂的信用，就像宗教密令诅咒萨勒曼·拉什迪横死让伊斯兰教为之蒙羞，" Andrei Sakharov的遗孀Elena Bonner如是说。


The outcome of the court hearings is difficult to predict, but it will answer the question of whether Russians have lost the freedom artistic self-expression that they gained after communism's fall.	庭审的结果很难预料，但却能表明俄国人是否已经失去共产党垮台后赢得的艺术表现自由。


Disillusion with "democracy Boris Yeltsin-style" has pushed President Vladimir Putin to search for an ideology based on nationalism and the glorification of the state. Putin calls it "managed pluralism."	对"叶利钦式民主"的失望推动普京总统寻找以民族主义和国家荣誉为基础的全新意识形态，这被普京称为"管理下的多元论。


As we can now see, the Social Committee For the Moral Revival of the Fatherland wants to be among the managers.	"正如我们现在看到的，"祖国道德重生社会委员会"希望成为新秩序的管理者。


Russia and the Kosovo Card	俄罗斯和科索牌


TBILISI – Look before you leap is as sound a principle in foreign policy as it is in life.	第比利斯—三思而后行是外交政策中的一个基本原则，正如在生活中一样。


Yet, once again, the Bush administration is preparing to leap into the unknown.	然而，布什政府又一次准备要鲁莽行事了。


Even though lack of foresight is universally viewed as a leading cause of its Iraq debacle, the United States (with British backing probable) is now preparing to recognize Kosovo’s independence unilaterally – irrespective of the consequences for Europe and the world.	尽管缺乏远见被公认是在伊拉克溃败的主要原因，但美国（很可能得到英国的支持）现在正准备单方面承认科索沃独立—而不顾这一立场会给欧洲和世界带来的后果。


Kosovo has been administered since 1999 by a United Nations mission guarded by NATO troops, although it remains formally a part of Serbia.	虽然正式名义上仍是塞尔维亚的一部分，但自1999年开始科索沃就由一个北约部队保护下的联合国委员会托管。


But, with Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian majority demanding its own state, and with Russia refusing to recognize UN mediator Martti Ahtisaari’s plan for conditional independence, the US is preparing to go it alone.	然而，随着科索沃的阿尔巴尼亚族大多数要求建立自己的国家，及俄罗斯拒绝承认联合国斡旋者Martti Ahtisaari提出的有条件独立计划，美国决定单独采取行动了。


Instead of thinking what Ahtisaari deemed unthinkable, a partition of Kosovo with a small part of the north going to Serbia and the rest linked to the Kosovars ethnic brethren in Albania or a separate state, the US plans to act without the UN’s blessing, arguing that only an independent Kosovo will bring stability to the Western Balkans.	美国并没有考虑在Martti Ahtisaari看来是不可想象的方案，即将科索沃分割，北方的一小部分归入塞尔维亚，而其余部分则与其在阿尔巴尼亚的科索沃同胞或与一个分离的国家联系在一起。 美国决定抛开联合国单独行动。


That argument is debatable – and the record of the Kosovar government suggests that it is wrong.	这种观点值得商榷—而科索沃政府的纪录意味着它是错误的。


But the US position is unambiguously misguided in not foreseeing that the “Kosovo precedent” will incite instability and potentially even violence elsewhere.	美国的立场明显是被误导了，因为它没有预见到“科索沃先例”会在别处引发不稳定、甚至潜在的暴力。


Why the rush to give Kosovo independence?	为什么要急于让科索沃独立呢？


Many serious disputes have gone unresolved for decades.	很多严重的争端数十年都未能解决。


The Kashmir question has lingered since 1947, the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus since 1974, and Israel’s occupation of the West Bank from 1967.	克什米尔问题自1947年以来决一直悬而未决，土耳其在1974年以来对北塞浦路斯的占领及以色列自1967年以来对约旦河西岸的占领也是如此。


Yet no one is suggesting that unilateral solutions be imposed in these potential flashpoints.	但没人提议在这些潜在的热点地区实施单方面的解决方案。


Nevertheless, the US – and most European Union members – argue that Kosovo’s situation is sui generis and will set no legally binding international precedent.	不论如何，美国—和大多数的欧盟成员国—认为科索沃的情况是个特例因而不会树立一个合法的国际先例。


But Russia sees things very differently.	但俄罗斯的看法却截然不同。


Indeed, it may seek to use this precedent to re-establish its authority over the nations and territories that were once part of the Soviet Union.	的确，它可能会试图用这一先例来重建对那些曾是前苏联一部分的国家和地区的权威。


Spain and Cyprus with their worries over secessionist-minded regions, are worried by any possible precedent.	对其分离主义地区深感担心的西班牙和塞浦路斯对任何先例都忧心忡忡。


Romania fears the fallout from Kosovo’s unilaterally gaining independence on neighboring Moldova.	罗马尼亚则害怕科索沃单方面获得独立的影响会波及邻国摩尔多瓦。


The worry is that Russia will unilaterally recognize the breakaway Moldovan territory of Transdnistria, which Russian troops and criminal gangs have been propping up for 16 years.	它担忧的是俄罗斯会单方面承认一直具有分离倾向的德涅斯特（Transdnistria）的摩尔多瓦人聚居区。 俄罗斯军队和犯罪团伙16年来一直在支持这一地区。


Ukraine – the great prize in Russia’s bid to recapture its former sphere of influence – is also deeply anxious.	乌克兰—俄罗斯在重建昔日势力范围过程中的战利品—也深感忧虑。


It fears that Russia will encourage separatist tendencies in Crimea, where the ethnic Russian population forms a majority.	它担心俄罗斯会鼓励克里米亚的分离主义倾向。 在克里米亚，俄罗斯族的人口占绝大多数。


(Crimea was ceded to Ukraine by Nikita Khrushchev only in 1954).	（克里米亚在1954年由赫鲁晓夫划给了乌克兰）。


Russia may decide to abuse the Kosovo precedent further to divide Ukraine’s population between Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers.	俄罗斯还可能进一步滥用科索沃的先例来分化乌克兰讲俄语和讲乌克兰语的人口。


But the biggest risks posed by unilateral recognition of Kosovo’s independence are in the South Caucasus, a region that abuts the tinderbox of today’s Middle East.	但单方面承认科索沃独立带来的最大风险在于南高加索。 该地区毗邻当今的中东火药桶。


Here, there is a real danger that Russia may recognize breakaway regions in the South Caucasus, – and back them more strongly than it does now.	在这里，真正的危险是俄罗斯可能承认南高加索的分离主义地区—并给予他们比现在更强有力的支持。


Even before Vladimir Putin became Russia’s president, the Kremlin was making mischief in Georgia, issuing Russian passports to citizens of Abkhazia (the largest breakaway region) and pouring money into its economy.	甚至在普京成为俄罗斯总统之前，克里姆林宫就在格鲁吉亚暗渡陈仓，向Abkhazia（最大的分离主义地区）的公民发放俄罗斯护照，并向其经济注入大量资金。


Russia’s supposed “peacekeeping troops” in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia’s other secession-minded region, have in fact protected their rebel governments.	俄罗斯在Abkhazia和南奥塞梯（格鲁吉亚的另一个企图分裂的地区）的所谓“维和部队”实际上一直在保护叛乱政府。


Russia has also been enforcing a complete trade embargo on Georgia in the hope of weakening the resolve of its pro-Western president, Mikhail Saakashvili.	俄罗斯也一直在强化对格鲁吉亚的全面贸易禁运以期削弱亲西方的总统Mikhail Saakashvili的决心。


Should Russia recognize Abkhazia’s independence, Saakashvili might be tempted to respond militarily to prevent his country from unraveling.	如果俄罗斯承认Abkhazia独立，Saakashvili可能会试图以军事手段回应以防止他的国家分裂。


Renewed conflict in Abkhazia would not only bring the risk of open warfare with Russia, but strain relations with Armenia, as there are near to 50,000 Armenians in Abkhazia who support the breakaway government.	Abkhazia重燃的冲突不仅可能带来与俄罗斯开战的风险，还会造成与亚美尼亚的关系紧张。 因为在Abkhazia有近5万支持分离主义政府的亚美尼亚族人。


Another risk in the South Caucasus is that Russia (with Armenian support) will recognize Nagorno-Karabakh’s self-proclaimed independence from Azerbaijan.	在南高加索的另一个风险是俄罗斯（在亚美尼亚人的支持下）会承认Nagorno-Karabakh从阿塞拜疆宣布独立。 Nagorno-Karabakh在历史上是亚美尼亚领土。


Nagorno-Karabakh, historically Armenian, endured a bloody secessionist war between1988 and 1994, with 30,000 killed and 14% of Azerbaijan’s territory occupied by Russian-backed Armenian forces.	它在1988年至1994年之间经���了一场血腥的分离主义战争，死亡人数超过3万，并致使阿塞拜疆14%的领土被俄罗斯支持下的亚美尼亚军队占领。


Since then, oil has fuelled an Azeri military buildup.	从那以后，丰富的石油资源成为阿塞拜疆军队建设的资金来源。


So the government in Baku is far more prepared to respond to renewed warfare than it was in the 1990’s.	巴库政府对应对再次爆发的战争的准备也比1990年代更为充分。


Moreover, it has neighboring Turkey on its side.	另外，它还得到了邻国土耳其的支持。


Turkey is already enforcing a punitive economic embargo on Armenia, including closure of its border.	土耳其已经对亚美尼亚采取了惩罚性的经济禁运，包括封锁两国边界。


Military projections by the US have repeatedly suggested that Azerbaijan would lose such a battle, even with newly purchased equipment and Turkish military support.	美国的军事预测反复表明，即使拥有新近购买的武器和土耳其的军事支持，阿塞拜疆也会在这样的战斗中失败。


Armenian forces are well dug in and have received a significant boost from Russia’s diversion of heavy weaponry to Armenia from some recently closed Georgian military bases.	亚美尼亚军队工事稳固并接受了俄罗斯繁多的重武器支援。 这些武器是俄罗斯关闭其在格鲁吉亚的军事基地之后运到亚美尼亚的。


Iran also must be factored into this equation, as it is becoming a strategic investor by building an oil refinery just across its border in Armenia, partly as a security measure in case of a US attack and partly to relieve its petrol shortages.	因为伊朗正成为这一地区的一个战略投资者。 它正在离亚美尼亚边境不远处修建一个炼油厂，一方面是将其作为应对美国攻击的安全措施，另一方面也可缓解国内油品供应不足。


Moreover, Iran remains eager to contain Azerbaijani revanchist claims over the large Azeri minority in northern Iran.	此外，伊朗仍然急于遏制阿塞拜疆复仇主义分子对伊朗北部大量阿族人口的主权要求。


The conflicts in Transdnistria and the South Caucasus are usually called “frozen conflicts,” because not much has happened since they began in the early 1990’s.	在德涅斯特（Transdnistria）和南高加索发生的冲突通常被称作“冻结的冲突”，因为自1990年代早期以来没有太多实质性的事件发生。


Any unilateral move to give Kosovo its independence is likely to unfreeze them – fast and bloodily.	任何单方面承认科索沃独立的行动都很可能会以一种快速而血腥的方式解冻它们。


And such potential bloodshed on Russia’s border may give Vladimir Putin the pretext he may desire to extend his rule beyond its constitutionally mandated end next March.	而这种发生在俄罗斯边界的流血事件可能正好给与普京一个求之不得的借口让其将宪法规定的任期延长到明年五月之后。


A New Cold War Order?	新冷战秩序？


MOSCOW – As 2014 comes to a close, it is clear that the European and international political structures that have been in place since 1989 have failed the test of time.	莫斯科—随着2014年临近尾声，显然自1989年以来的欧洲和国际政治结构没有经受住时间的考验。


Indeed, the world has not witnessed such a tense and fraught environment since the Cold War’s end, with bloodshed in Europe and the Middle East coming against the backdrop of a breakdown in dialogue between major powers.	事实上，自冷战结束以来，世界从未面临如此紧张和令人担忧的环境，欧洲和中东因为大国对话破裂而走向流血。


The world, it appears, is on the brink of Cold War II.	世界似乎站在第二次冷战的边缘。


Some even say that it has already begun.	甚至有人已经宣布第二次冷战开始了。


Meanwhile, the world’s key international body – the United Nations Security Council – is scarcely playing a role or taking concrete action to stop the fires and the killing.	与此同时，世界最关键的国际机构——联合国安理会很少起到作用或拿出具体行动阻止战火和杀戮。


Why has it not acted with determination to evaluate the situation and develop a program of joint action?	为何安理会没有拿出评估局面、组织联合行动的计划行动起来？


One primary reason, I believe, is that the trust created by hard work and mutual effort in ending the Cold War has collapsed.	我认为，一个主要原因是结束冷战过程中的艰苦工作和共同努力所建立起来的信任崩溃了。


Without such trust, peaceful international relations in today’s globalized world are inconceivable.	没有这一信任，当今的全球化世界就无从形成和平的国际关系。


But this trust was not undermined only yesterday; it happened long before.	但这一信任不是一夜之间被破坏的； 这是一个很长的过程。


The roots of the current situation lie in the events of the 1990s.	当前局面的根源可以追溯到20世纪90年代的事件。


The Cold War’s end was supposed to mark the beginning of a path toward a new Europe and a safer world order.	人们认为，冷战的结束标志着迈向新欧洲和更安全的世界秩序的开始。


But, instead of building new European security institutions and pursuing the demilitarization of Europe – as promised in NATO’s London Declaration of 1990 – the West, particularly the United States, declared victory.	但是，西方特别是并没有如北约1990年伦敦宣言（London Declaration of 1990）那样建立新的欧洲安全机构并追求欧洲的去军事化，而是宣布自己获胜。


Euphoria and triumphalism went to Western leaders’ heads.	西方领导人脑子里装满了欢欣鼓舞和赢家心态。


Taking advantage of Russia’s weaknesses and the lack of a counterweight, they refused to heed warnings against claiming a monopoly on global leadership.	他们利用俄罗斯的衰落和缺少制衡力量的机会，根本没有注意到对垄断全球领导地位的警告。


The events of the past few months are the consequences of shortsightedly seeking to impose one’s will while ignoring the interests of one’s partners.	过去几个月发生的事件是短视地强加自己的意愿、忽略合作伙伴利益的前因的结果。


A shortlist of such faits accomplis would include NATO enlargement, the war in Yugoslavia (particularly Kosovo), missile-defense plans, Iraq, Libya, and Syria.	这些前因至少包括北约东扩、南斯拉夫战争（特别是科索沃）、导弹防御计划、伊拉克、利比亚和叙利亚。


As a result, what was a blister has now turned into a festering wound.	它们导致癣疥之疾成为现在的心腹大患。


And it is Europe that suffers the most.	而受影响最大的是欧洲。


Instead of leading change in a globalizing world, the continent has turned into an arena of political upheaval, competition for spheres of influence, and military conflict.	欧洲大陆没有在全球化的世界中领导变化，而是成了政治剧变、影响范围竞争和军事冲突的竞技场。


The consequence, inevitably, is that Europe is weakening at a time when other centers of power and influence are strengthening.	结果难免是在其他实力和影响力中心不断变强时欧洲却在不断变弱。


If this continues, Europe will lose its influence in world affairs and gradually become irrelevant.	如果这一趋势继续，欧洲将在世界事务中失去影响力，逐渐沦为无关紧要的地区。


Fortunately, the experience of the 1980s suggests a way forward.	幸运的是，20世纪80年代的经验指明了一个前进方向。


The international situation at the time was no less dangerous than it is today.	当时的国际局势不比今天安全。


Yet we succeeded in ameliorating it – not just normalizing relations but ending the Cold War confrontation itself.	但我们成功地改善了局面——不但实现了关系正常化，还结束了冷战冲突本身。


This was achieved primarily through dialogue.	这一成就主要是通过对话实现的。


But the key to dialogue is political will and setting the right priorities.	但对话的关键是政治意愿和设定正确的优先项。


Today, the foremost priority should be dialogue itself: a renewal of the ability to interact, listen to, and hear one another.	如今，最重要的优先项应该是对话本身：重启彼此互动、倾听（listen to）和聆听（hear）的能力。


Promising signs are now emerging, though initial efforts have yielded only modest and fragile results: the Minsk agreement on a ceasefire and military disengagement in Ukraine; the trilateral gas agreement concluded by Russia, Ukraine, and the European Union; and a halt to the escalation of mutual sanctions.	积极的信号正在显现，尽管初始努力只产生了少量分散的结果：关于乌克兰停火和去军事化的明斯克协议（Minsk agreement）、俄罗斯、乌克兰和欧盟三方天然气协议、停止互相加强制裁等。


We must continue to move from polemics and mutual accusations to a search for points of convergence and a gradual lifting of sanctions, which are damaging to both sides.	我们必须继续沿着与争论和互相指责相反的方向前进，以达到共同点、逐步取消令双方都受害的制裁。


As a first step, the so-called personal sanctions that affect political figures and parliamentarians should be lifted, so that they can rejoin the process of seeking mutually acceptable solutions.	作为第一步，针对政治人物和议会成员的所谓个人制裁应该取消，以便它们重新参与寻求双方都能接受的方案的过程。


One area for interaction could be to help Ukraine overcome the consequences of fratricidal war and rebuild the affected regions.	一个互动领域可以是帮助乌克兰克服手足相残战争的后果、重建冲突影响地区。


The same is true of global challenges and pan-European security.	全球挑战和泛欧洲安全也是如此。


Today’s key global problems – terrorism and extremism, poverty and inequality, climate change, migration, and epidemics – are worsening daily.	当今的关键全球问题——恐怖主义和极端主义、贫困和不平等性、气候变化、移民以及传染病——日趋严重。


And, as different as they are, they share one key feature: none has a military solution.	它们尽管彼此大不相同，但有一个共同点：都不存在军事解决方案。


Yet political mechanisms to solve these problems are lacking or dysfunctional, even as the continuing global crisis should persuade us to seek – without delay – a new model that can ensure political, economic, and environmental sustainability.	但解决这些问题的政治机制要么付诸阙如，要么无法运转，哪怕持续的全球危机理应说服我们刻不容缓地寻求可以确保政治、经济和环境可持续性的新模式。


As for Europe’s security, only a pan-European solution is viable.	至于欧洲安全问题，只有泛欧洲方案才可行。


Indeed, attempts to address the problem by enlarging NATO or through an EU defense policy are counterproductive.	事实上，试图通过扩大北约或通过欧盟防务政策解决问题只能适得其反。


We need more inclusive institutions and mechanisms that provide assurances and guarantees to all.	我们需要更包容的机构和机制为所有人提供担保和保证。


Here the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, to which a lot of hope was attached, has so far not been up to the task.	在这方面，被世人寄予厚望的欧安组织到目前仍毫无举动。


That does not mean that the OSCE should be replaced with something new – especially since it has now assumed important control functions in Ukraine.	这并不意味着应该用新组织取代欧安组织——特别是因为眼下它行使着重要的控制乌克兰的功能。


But the OSCE is, I would say, an edifice that requires major repairs and some new construction.	但我得说，欧安组织是一栋千疮百孔的大厦，需要大修和局部重建。


Years ago, former German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, former US National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, and other policymakers proposed creating a Security Council, or Directorate, for Europe.	多年前，前德国外交部长根舍（Hans Dietrich Genscher）、前美国国家安全顾问斯考克罗夫特（Brent Scowcroft）和其他决策者建议成立以一个欧洲安全委员会或理事会。


I agreed with their approach.	我同意这一方针。


Along the same lines, during Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev’s presidency, he called for the creation of a mechanism for European preventive diplomacy and mandatory consultations in the event of a threat to any state’s security.	与此一致，在俄罗斯总理梅德韦杰夫担任总统期间，他也号召成立一个预防性欧洲外交和强制性磋商机制以应对任何国家安全威胁事件。


Had such a mechanism been established, the worst events in Ukraine could have been averted.	如果这一机制得以建立，乌克兰最糟糕的事件或许可以避免。


Political leaders are, of course, to blame for filing away these and other “European ideas” in the archives.	当然，对于这些和其他“欧洲观念”无功而返，政治领导人难逃其咎。


But the blame must also be shared with the entire European political class, civil-society institutions, and the media.	但是，整个欧洲欧洲政治界、公民社会机构和媒体都有责任。


Though I am, by nature, an optimist, I have to admit that it is very difficult not to be pessimistic as 2014 comes to a close.	我是个天生的乐观主义者，但我得承认，在2014年行将尾声之际，不感到悲观很难。


Nonetheless, we must not submit to panic and despair, or allow ourselves to be drawn into a vortex of negative inertia.	尽管如此，我们也决不能向恐慌和绝望投降，或放任我们自己陷入恶性循环。


The bitter experience of the past few months must be transformed into the will to reengage in dialogue and cooperation.	过去几个月的苦涩经历必须转化为重新参与对话和合作的意愿。


This is my appeal to our leaders, and to all of us, for 2015: Let us think, propose, and act together.	在2015年，我呼吁我们的领导人和我们所有人：让我们一起思考、建议和行动。


A New Sino-Russian Alliance?	新中俄联盟？


CAMBRIDGE – Some analysts believe that 2014 ushered in a new era of Cold War-style geopolitics.	美国剑桥—一些分析家认为，2014年开启了新的冷战式地缘政治时代。


Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was met with heavy economic sanctions from Europe and the United States, weakening Russia’s ties with the West and leaving the Kremlin eager to strengthen ties with China.	俄罗斯总统普京入侵乌克兰和吞并克里米亚的行为遭到欧洲和美国的严厉经济制裁，这削弱了俄罗斯与西方的联系，克里姆林宫也因此急切地要强化与中国的关系。


The question is whether Russia will manage to build a real alliance with the People’s Republic.	问题在于俄罗斯是否会致力于与人民共和国建立真正的联盟。


At first glance, it seems plausible.	乍一看，这似乎很有道理。


Indeed, traditional balance-of-power theory suggests that US primacy in power resources should be offset by a Sino-Russian partnership.	事实上，传统实力平衡理论认为，美国对实力资源的主宰应该被中俄合作所抵消。


Perhaps more convincing, there seems to be historical precedent for such a partnership.	也许更有道理的是，这一合作关系有历史先例。


In the 1950s, China and the Soviet Union were allied against the US.	20世纪50年代，中国和苏联就结盟对付美国。


After US President Richard Nixon’s opening to China in l972, the balance shifted, with the US and China cooperating to limit what they viewed as a dangerous rise in the Soviet Union’s power.	1972年，美国总统尼克松叩开了中国的大门，此后这一平衡就发生了变化，美国和中国联手限制它们认为十分危险的苏联实力的崛起。


With the collapse of the Soviet Union, that de facto US-China alliance ended, and a China-Russia rapprochement began.	随着苏联的接替，中美之间的事实联盟也结束了，而中俄则重新越走越近。 1992年，两国宣布将追求“建设性合作伙伴关系”；


In 1992, the two countries declared that they were pursuing a “constructive partnership”; in 1996, they progressed toward a “strategic partnership”; and in 2001, they signed a treaty of “friendship and cooperation.”	1996年升级为“战略合作伙伴关系”； 2001年两国签署“友好合作”条约。


In recent years, China and Russia have cooperated closely in the UN Security Council and taken similar positions on Internet regulation.	近几年来，中俄在联合国安理会上紧密合作，在互联网监管问题上也立场相似。


They have used diplomatic frameworks – such as the BRICS group of major emerging countries (along with Brazil, India, and South Africa) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (along with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) – to coordinate positions.	它们利用外交框架——如主要新兴国家结成金砖国家集团（巴西、印度和南非）和上海合作组织（哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、塔吉克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦）——协调立场。


And Putin has struck up a good working relationship with Chinese President Xi Jinping, based on their shared domestic illiberalism and desire to counter American ideology and influence.	普京也与中国国家主席习近平建立了良好的工作关系，这一关系的基础是共同的国内不自由以及对制衡美国意识形态和影响的渴望。


Their economic relationship, too, seems to be progressing.	它们的经济关系也在前进。


Last May, shortly after the annexation of Crimea, Russia announced a $400 billion deal to supply 38 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas to China annually for 30 years, beginning in 2019.	去年5月，即在吞并克里米亚后不久，俄罗斯宣布与中国签署了一份为期30年、价值4,000亿美元的协议，从2019年开始每年向中国提供380亿立方米天然气。


The contract, between Russia’s state-owned energy giant Gazprom and the China National Petroleum Corporation, entails the construction of a 2,500-mile gas pipeline to China’s Heilongjiang province (where, incidentally, the two countries nearly went to war a few decades ago).	该合同由俄罗斯国有能源巨头俄天然气（Gazprom）和中石油签署，将修建一条2,500英里长、直达中国黑龙江省的输气管道（这里也恰巧是两国在几十年前几乎开战的地方）。


Though the exact price remains secret, it appears that Russia offered major concessions, after nearly a decade of negotiations, to ensure the deal’s success.	尽管具体的价格信息仍然保密，但看起来俄罗斯在经历了近十年的谈判后做出了很大让步以确保协议达成。


Moreover, in November, Gazprom announced a framework agreement to deliver an additional 30 bcm of gas to China’s Xingjiang Province from western Siberia for 30 years via another new pipeline.	此外，11月，俄石油了一份框架协议，通过另一条起子西西伯利亚的新建管道在30年中每年向中国新疆自治区输送300亿立方米天然气。


If the “eastern” and “western” pipelines are completed as planned, the 68 bcm they deliver to China annually would dwarf the 40 bcm that Russia exports to its current largest customer, Germany.	如果“东”、“西”管道按期完工，它们每年将向中国输送680亿立方米天然气，远超俄罗斯向目前的最大客户德国的输气量。


This may seem to portend an ever-deepening bilateral relationship.	这似乎预示着前所未有的深层次双边关系。


But there is a hitch: the gas deals amplify a significant bilateral trade imbalance, with Russia supplying raw materials to China and importing Chinese manufactures.	但有一个缺陷：天然气协议进一步放大了两国已然十分巨大的双边贸易失衡——俄罗斯向中国出口原材料并从中国进口制造品。


And the gas deals do not make up for Russia’s lost access to the Western technology that it needs to develop frontier Arctic fields and become an energy superpower, not just China’s gas station.	天然气协议也不能弥补俄罗斯失去西方技术的损失。 俄罗斯需要西方技术开发北冰洋边缘油田并成为能源超级大国而不只是中国的天然气站。


In fact, the problems with a Sino-Russian alliance run even deeper.	事实上，中俄联盟还有更深层次的问题。


With its economic, military, and demographic heft – China generates considerable unease in Russia.	中国拥有巨大的经济、军事和人口实力——这令俄罗斯十分不安。


Consider the demographic situation in eastern Siberia, where six million Russians live across the border from up to 120 million Chinese.	以东西伯利亚的人口状况为例，那里生活着600万俄罗斯人，而边境对面的中国拥有1. 2亿人。


Furthermore, Russia’s economic and military power has been in decline, whereas China’s has exploded.	此外，俄罗斯经济和军事实力已经衰落，而中国有所扩张。


Anxiety over China’s conventional military superiority probably motivated, at least partly, Russia’s 2009 announcement of a new military doctrine explicitly reserving the right to first use of nuclear weapons – a stance that resembles America’s Cold War force posture, aimed at deterring superior conventional Soviet forces in Europe.	对中国超群的常规军事实力的担忧至少在一定程度上促使俄罗斯在2009年宣布了新的军事思想，明确保留了首先使用核武器的权利，类似于美国在冷战时期的实力姿态——旨在威慑苏联在欧洲的超强常规军力。


These imbalances suggest that Russia would resist a tight military alliance with China, even as the two countries pursue mutually beneficial tactical diplomatic coordination.	这些失衡表明俄罗斯不会与中国结成紧密军事联盟，即使两国追求双赢的战术性外交合作。


China’s willingness to cooperate with Russia also has its limits.	中国与俄合作的意愿也是有限的。


After all, China’s development strategy depends on its continued integration into the world economy – and, specifically, reliable access to American markets and technology.	毕竟，中国的发展战略依赖于继续融入世界经济——具体而言，依赖于可靠的获得美国市场和技术的方式。


The Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy depends on strong economic growth, and it will not risk this strategy for some “authoritarian alliance” with Russia.	中国共产党的合法性依赖于强劲的经济增长，它不会拿这一战略冒险与俄罗斯结成某种“极权联盟”。


Even within multilateral forums, the relationship between Russia and China is far from balanced.	即使在多边论坛内，中俄关系也极不平衡。


Given that China’s economy is larger than the other four BRICS economies combined, the group’s initiatives – including its new development bank – are likely to reflect a disproportionate Chinese influence.	中国的经济规模比其他四个金砖国家的总和还要大，金砖国家集团的计划——包括其新开发银行——极有可能反映的是中国的巨大影响。


And though the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has facilitated some diplomatic coordination, China and Russia remain locked in a struggle for influence in Central Asia.	而尽管上海合作组织促进了一些外交合作，但中俄仍在竞争中亚影响力。


The Sino-Russian alliance in the twentieth century was a product of China’s weakness following World War II and at the beginning of the Cold War – and, even then, it lasted little more than a decade.	二十世纪的中俄联盟是二战结束、冷战伊始时中国衰落的产物——即便如此仍只维持了不到十年。


Today’s China is strong, and unlikely to get too close to a Russia whose decline has been accelerated by its leader’s poor judgment.	今天的中国十分强大，不可能与因为领导人的错误判断而加速衰落的俄罗斯走得过近。


In short, when it comes to a Sino-Russian alliance challenging the West, history is not likely to repeat itself.	简言之，在中俄联盟挑战西方的问题上，历史不会重复。


Contrary to Putin’s hopes, 2014 will not be remembered as a year of successful Russian foreign policy.	与普京的希望相反，2014年不会以俄罗斯外交政策的成功年被铭记。


The Challenge of Russia’s Decline	俄罗斯衰落的挑战


CAMBRIDGE – As Europe debates whether to maintain its sanctions regime against Russia, the Kremlin’s policy of aggression toward Ukraine continues unabated.	坎布里奇——就在欧洲辩论是否维持对俄制裁之际，俄罗斯对乌克兰的侵略政策没有任何改变。


Russia is in long-term decline, but it still poses a very real threat to the international order in Europe and beyond.	俄罗斯已步入长期下降通道，但仍对欧洲和全球国际秩序造成实实在在的威胁。


Indeed, Russia’s decline may make it even more dangerous.	事实上，俄罗斯的衰退可能令其更加危险。


Make no mistake: what is happening in Ukraine is Russian aggression.	毫无疑问，乌克兰正遭到俄罗斯的侵略。


President Vladimir Putin’s pretense that Russian troops were not participating in the fighting was all but shattered recently, when a Russian fighter in Donetsk confirmed to the BBC Russian service that they are playing a decisive role in rebel advances.	普京总统有关俄军并未参战的假象最近几乎被彻底打破，一名顿涅茨克的俄罗斯战士向BBC俄语广播证实俄军在叛军推进中所起作用是决定性的。


Russian officers, he reported, directly command large military operations in eastern Ukraine, including the siege and capture of the important transport center of Debaltseve in February.	他说俄军官直接指挥二月包围并攻克重要运输中心杰巴利采韦等乌克兰东部大规模军事行动。


But the threat posed by Russia extends far beyond Ukraine.	但遭到俄罗斯威胁的还远不止乌克兰。


After all, Russia is the one country with enough missiles and nuclear warheads to destroy the US.	毕竟，有足够的导弹和核武器摧毁美国的唯一国家就是俄罗斯。


As its economic and geopolitical influence has waned, so has its willingness to consider renouncing its nuclear status.	随着经济和地缘政治影响力不断减弱，同样减弱的还有它考虑放弃核地位的意愿。


Indeed, not only has it revived the Cold War-era tactic of sending military aircraft unannounced into airspace over the Baltic countries and the North Sea; it has also made veiled nuclear threats against countries like Denmark.	事实上，它不仅恢复了冷战时期派战机突然闯入波罗的海国家及北海空域的策略； 还针对丹麦等国发出了隐晦的核威胁。


Weapons are not Russia’s only strength.	武器并非俄罗斯唯一的优势。


The country also benefits from its enormous size, vast natural resources, and educated population, including a multitude of skilled scientists and engineers.	这个国家还拥有辽阔的领土、丰富的自然资源和受过良好教育的民众，包括一大批熟练的科学家和工程师。


But Russia faces serious challenges.	但俄国同样面临严峻的挑战。


It remains a “one-crop economy,” with energy accounting for two-thirds of its exports.	它依然摆脱不了“单作物经济”，能源占其出口总额的三分之二。


And its population is shrinking – not least because the average man in Russia dies at age 65, a full decade earlier than in other developed countries.	此外人口也逐渐萎缩——这不仅因为普通俄国人65岁去世，比其他发达国家早了整整10年。


Though liberalizing reforms could cure Russia’s ailments, such an agenda is unlikely to be embraced in a corruption-plagued country with an emphatically illiberal leadership.	尽管自由化改革可以治愈俄国的顽疾，但改革在实行专制统治的腐败国家不太可能推行下去。


Putin, after all, has sought to promote a neo-Slavophile identity defined above all by suspicion of Western cultural and intellectual influence.	毕竟，普京力求在质疑西方文化和学术影响的前提下推行亲斯拉夫主义。


Instead of developing a strategy for Russia’s long-term recovery, Putin has adopted a reactive and opportunistic approach – one that can sometimes succeed, but only in the short term – to cope with domestic insecurity, perceived external threats, and the weakness of neighbors.	普京采取投机取巧的被动方法（上述方法在某些情况下能够取得短期的成功）来应对国内动荡、国外威胁和邻国颓势，而不是为俄国制定长期的复苏战略。


He has waged unconventional war in the West, while pursuing closer ties with the East, raising the likelihood that Russia will end up acting as China’s junior partner, without access to the Western capital, technology, and contacts that it needs to reverse its decline.	普京在对西方发动非常规战争的同时与东方拉近关系，使俄罗斯最终更有可能成为中国的低级合伙人，而放弃其扭转颓势所需要的西方世界的资金、技术和关系。


But Russia’s problem is not just Putin.	但俄国的问题不仅仅是普京。


Though Putin has cultivated nationalism in Russia – according to Harvard University’s Timothy Colton, at a recent meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club, Putin called himself the country’s “biggest nationalist” – he found fertile ground to plow.	尽管普京一直在俄培植民族主义——按照哈佛大学科尔顿在瓦尔代辩论俱乐部最近一次会议上的说法，普京自称为俄国“最坚定的民族主义者”——俄罗斯的民族主义土壤肥沃。


Given that other high-level figures – for example, Dmitry Rogozin, who last October endorsed a book calling for the return of Alaska – are also highly nationalistic, a successor to Putin would probably not be liberal.	鉴于其他高层人物——比方说去年10月推荐一部呼吁阿拉斯加回归著作的德米特里·罗戈津——同样是民族主义者，普京的继任者不太可能崇尚自由。


The recent assassination of former Deputy Prime Minister and opposition leader Boris Nemtsov reinforces this assumption.	最近前副总理兼反对党领袖鲍里斯·涅姆佐夫遇刺进一步证实了这种假设。


So Russia seems doomed to continue its decline – an outcome that should be no cause for celebration in the West.	因此俄国似乎注定要继续衰落——这样的结果不值得西方为之庆贺。


States in decline – think of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1914 – tend to become less risk-averse and thus much more dangerous.	衰落中的国家——比方说1914年的奥匈帝国——往往更加危险，因为他们规避风险的意愿较弱。


In any case, a thriving Russia has more to offer the international community in the long run.	无论如何，长远来看一个繁荣的俄罗斯将对国际社会更有好处。


In the meantime, the US and Europe face a policy dilemma.	与此同时，美国��欧洲在政策上面临着两难的选择。


On one hand, it is important to resist Putin’s challenge to the fundamental principle that states should not use force to violate one another’s territorial integrity.	一方面必须顶住普京对基本原则的挑战，明确国家不应用武力侵犯别国领土完整。


Though sanctions are unlikely to change Crimea’s status or lead to withdrawal of Russian soldiers from Ukraine, they have upheld that principle, by showing that it cannot be violated with impunity.	尽管制裁不大可能改变克里米亚地位或导致俄罗斯士兵撤出乌克兰，但在证明侵犯别国领土者不能逍遥法外这个意义上，制裁捍卫了这项基本原则。


On the other hand, it is important not to isolate Russia completely, given shared interests with the US and Europe relating to nuclear security and non-proliferation, terrorism, space, the Artic, and Iran and Afghanistan.	另一方面，鉴于美欧与俄罗斯在核安全不扩散、恐怖主义、太空、北极和伊朗阿富汗问题上的共同利益，让俄国陷入彻底孤立不是明智的选择。


No one will benefit from a new Cold War.	我们不能让世界再次陷入冷战的漩涡。


Reconciling these objectives will not be easy, especially given Ukraine’s continuing crisis.	尤其考虑到乌克兰危机的持续性，调和上述目标将变得极其困难。


At February’s Munich Security Conference, many US senators advocated arming Ukraine – an approach that could exacerbate the situation, given Putin’s conventional military dominance there.	在二月慕尼黑安全会议上，很多美国参议院主张武装乌克兰——鉴于普京在那里掌握常规军事优势，这样的措施可能让局势进一步恶化。


With German leaders, including Chancellor Angela Merkel, opposed to this approach, pursuing it would also split the West, strengthening Putin’s hand further.	鉴于总理默克尔等德国领导人的强烈反对，将其付诸实施可能进一步分裂西方诸国并加强普京的优势。


Others at the conference argued that the West should change the game by expelling Russia from SWIFT, the international framework for clearing bank payments.	其他与会人员提出西方应将俄国逐出环球银行金融电信协会（SWIFT），即国际清算银行的支付框架。


But critics point out that this would damage SWIFT and the West, whose banks would lose the hundreds of billions of dollars that Russia currently owes them.	但批评家指出这会损害SWIFT和西方利益，俄国目前成百上千亿的西方银行欠款可能因此付之东流。


For their part, the Russians have warned informally that this would be “the real nuclear option.”	俄国方面已经提出“这一方案破坏力极大”的非正式警告。


Designing and implementing a strategy that constrains Putin’s revisionist behavior, while ensuring Russia’s long-term international engagement, is one of the most important challenges facing the US and its allies today.	设计并执行策略限制普京的修正主义行为并确保俄国长期参与国际事务是美国及其盟友当前面临的最重要挑战。


For now, the policy consensus seems to be to maintain sanctions, help bolster Ukraine’s economy, and continue to strengthen NATO (an outcome that Putin undoubtedly did not intend).	目前的政策共识似乎是保持制裁、协助支持乌克兰经济和继续强化北约建设（这样的结果普京肯定不希望看到）。


Beyond that, what happens is largely up to Putin.	除此之外，普京在很大程度上掌握主动权。


Putting Putin in his Place	让普京回到他应该在的位置


BRUSSELS – At least six crises are testing Europe’s stability: regional chaos caused primarily by the war in Syria, a potential British exit from the European Union, an influx of refugees on a scale not seen since World War II, unresolved financial challenges, Russian expansionism, and the return of nationalism to mainstream politics.	布鲁塞尔—至少有六场危机正在考验欧洲稳定：主要由叙利亚战争引起的地区骚乱、英国可能退出欧盟、规模二战以来所未见的难民潮、尚待解决的金融挑战、俄罗斯扩张主义，以及民族主义回归主流政治。


Russian President Vladimir Putin has intentionally exacerbated at least four of these crises.	俄罗斯总统普京有意识地加剧了其中至少四场危机。


In addition to his adventurism in Ukraine, he has injected obstructionism into European politics through his support of populist and euroskeptic parties, escalated the conflict in the Middle East by his military intervention in Syria and, as a consequence, aggravated the refugee crisis.	除了在乌克兰的冒进，他还通过支持民粹主义和欧元怀疑派政党在欧洲政坛中作梗，通过军事干预叙利亚升级中东冲突并因此加剧难民危机。


The EU must wake up to the threat Putin poses and begin to counter his aggression.	欧盟必须警醒于普京造成的威胁，遏制他的侵犯。


The nationalism sweeping Europe, indeed, has been partly fueled by Russian funding of far-right political parties, the rise of which has prevented Europe from crafting a collective response to the refugee crisis.	事实上，席卷欧洲的民族主义部分受到俄罗斯资助的极右翼政党的煽动，这些政党的崛起让欧洲无法形成针对难民危机的集体应对措施。


In the United Kingdom, the pro-Putin UK Independence Party is nipping at Prime Minister David Cameron’s heels, so the government refuses to commit to taking Britain’s fair share of refugees.	在英国，亲普京的英国独立党（UK Independence Party）正在挖首相卡梅伦的墙角，因此英国政府拒绝承担合理的难民负担。


Similarly, Sweden has closed its borders, in response to the far-right Sweden Democrats’ rapidly rising poll numbers.	类似地，瑞典也关闭了边境，因为极右翼瑞典民主党的支持者迅速膨胀。


This sorry calculus is being carried out across the continent.	这些令人遗憾的局面正在整个欧洲蔓延。


Meanwhile, Putin has derailed the international community’s efforts to negotiate a political solution to the conflict in Syria, the root cause of the refugee crisis.	与此同时，普京阻挠国际社会就叙利亚问题形成政治决议，这是难民危机的根源。


Russia’s support of the Syrian government’s assault on Aleppo has stymied the peace process, which depends on the cooperation of global players, regional powers, and the moderate opposition forces that Putin is bombing.	俄罗斯支持叙利亚政府袭击阿勒颇导致和平进程停顿。 叙利亚和平需要依靠全球行动方、地区力量以及正在遭受普京轰炸的温和反对派的合作。


On February 15, at least 50 people, including women and children, were killed by missile attacks on schools and hospitals in northern Syria, according to the United Nations.	联合国称，2月15日，包括妇女和儿童在内的至少50人被针对叙利亚北部学校和医院的导弹袭击杀害。


The French government called the attacks “war crimes” – and rightly so.	法国政府把这次袭击称为“战争罪行”——确实如此。


Russia denied involvement, but fragments of Russian-built missiles were found at the scene.	俄罗斯否认与此事有涉，但现场发现了俄制导弹碎片。


The aid group Médecins Sans Frontières has said that only Russia or the Syrian government could possibly be responsible for the attacks.	援助组织无国界医生（Médecins Sans Frontières），需要为袭击负责的只能是俄罗斯或叙利亚政府。


Moreover, the fighting around Aleppo has displaced about 50,000 people, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross.	此外，据国际红十字会的数据阿勒颇附近的战斗导致约50,000人流离失所。


Many of these desperate Syrians – consisting primarily of those who could not afford to flee sooner – will head toward Turkey and onward to Europe.	这些绝望的叙利亚人——主要由无力迅速逃离的人组成——中有许多将前往土耳其然后再进入欧洲。


Russia is dropping bombs even as Putin claims to be supporting a ceasefire.	即使普京宣称支持停火，但俄罗斯仍在扔炸弹。


Clearly, he cannot be taken at his word, as the Kremlin’s record in Ukraine also shows.	显然，普京说一套做一套，克里姆林宫在乌克兰的记录亦是如此。


With the United States distracted by its presidential election campaign, Europe’s leaders find themselves huddled alone, with the Russian bear gnawing at the door.	美国被总统选战分心，面对大门口来势汹汹的俄国熊，欧洲领导人孤立无援。


It is time for immediate action.	是时候立刻采取行动了。


First, European governments must put a swift halt to Russian financing of political parties within Europe.	首先，欧洲政府必须立刻切断俄罗斯对欧洲内部政党的资金支持。


If necessary, the US Central Intelligence Agency should be asked to assist in identifying how these funds are transferred.	如有必要，应该要求美国中央情报局协助辨别这些资金是如何转入的。


The effort must be sustained until the pipelines funneling Russian cash to European parties are shut down for good.	这一措施必须一直持续到俄罗斯向欧洲政党的出资渠道完全切断为止。


Second, the EU must prepare to impose enhanced economic sanctions on Russia.	其次，欧洲必须准备好加强对俄经济制裁。


UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which provides a road map for the Syrian peace process, obliges all actors, including Russia, to stop indiscriminate attacks against civilians.	联合国安理会2254号决议为叙利亚和平进程提供了路线图，根据该协议，所有行动方，包括俄罗斯，都有义务停止针对平民的无差别袭击。


If Russia fails to abide by its commitments, these sanctions should be triggered.	如果俄罗斯不遵守这一承诺，就应该触发这些制裁。


Third, the EU must work with Turkey and other regional actors to establish safe havens on the Turkish-Syrian border, where refugees from Aleppo and elsewhere are headed.	第三，欧盟必须与土耳其和其他地区行动方合作在土叙边境建立安全港，接收来自阿勒颇和其他地区的难民。


While this would entail some risk, there are no credible alternatives.	这样做会带来一些风险，但目前没有可信的替代方案。


Finally, Europe must stop making Putin’s job easier for him and implement a collective approach to the influx of refugees.	最后，欧洲必须停止配合普京的工作，实施集体措施应对难民涌入。


As part of an emergency response, a European frontier force and coast guard must be established and charged with helping Greece manage its border, as well as saving lives and processing new arrivals.	作为紧急应对措施的一部分，必须建立一支欧洲边防力量和海岸警卫队，帮助希腊管理其边境，保护生命安全并处置新来移民。


At the same time, EU funds must be used to improve conditions in the refugee camps in Turkey, Jordan, and elsewhere, to provide their residents with at least some hope of being able to meet their basic needs.	与此同时，欧盟必须拿出资金用于改善土耳其、约旦和其他国家难民营的条件，让居住在其中的难民至少看到一些能够满足基本需求的希望。


And, yes, European leaders must agree to take a fair share of those in need, by allowing refugees to apply for asylum in the EU directly from the countries in which they are currently residing.	是的，欧洲领导人还必须同意承担公平负担，允许难民直接在当前所在国申请赴欧洲避难。


George Soros was right when he recently argued that the biggest long-term threat to the stability of the EU is Russia.	乔治·索罗斯（George Soros）最近正确地指出，对欧盟稳定的最大的长期威胁是俄罗斯。


But he was wrong to suggest that the EU is set to buckle and collapse under the weight of the multiple crises it faces.	但他错误地认为欧盟难逃被其所面临的多重危机压垮的命运。


It is time for Europe to assert itself, harness its economic might, and use it to put Putin in his place.	现在，欧洲应该振作精神，拿出经济武器，用来让普京回到他应该在的位置。


Putin’s Winning Streak	普京的连胜


CHENGDU – Since Russia invaded Crimea last summer, the West has relied on a strategy of economic sanctions and international isolation to compel the Kremlin to withdraw its support for the rebels in eastern Ukraine.	成都—自去年夏天俄罗斯入侵克里米亚以来，西方一直依靠经济制裁和国际孤立战略迫使克里姆林宫不再支持对东乌克兰叛乱的支持。


But Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent series of diplomatic successes – in particular, with Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan – has all but negated the effectiveness of this strategy.	但俄罗斯总统普京最近的一系列外交成功——特别是与伊朗、朝鲜和巴基斯坦关系的成功——让这一战略无功而返。


To be sure, Putin was shunned at last month’s G-20 summit in Brisbane, with the Australian hosts and Western leaders berating him in bilateral meetings for violating Ukraine’s sovereignty and creating a rift with its Western economic partners.	诚然，普京在上个月的布里斯班G-20峰会上无人搭理，澳大利亚东道主和西方领导人在双边会晤中纷纷谴责普京侵犯乌克兰主权、制造与西方经济伙伴的不和。


Putin left early, proclaiming that Western sanctions were harming European economies more than Russia anyway.	普京早早离开了峰会，放言西方制裁给欧洲经济体造成的伤害比俄罗斯更大。


But Putin was not deterred, proceeding to launch major initiatives with countries of vital security concern to the West, boosting Russia’s diplomatic leverage and enhancing its value to its most important, albeit still coy, partner: China.	但普京没有被吓住，而是开展了与作为西方主要安全顾虑的国家的重大外交活动，加强了俄罗斯的外交优势，并强化了其对其最重要（尽管仍然虚与委蛇）的伙伴——中国的价值。


As Putin declared in a recent interview, his government is committed to ensuring that Russia does not become internationally isolated behind a new Iron Curtain.	普京在最近的访问中表示，他的政府将致力于确保俄罗斯不会在新铁幕的背后被国际孤立。


With Iran, the Kremlin has launched a joint bank that will enable Russian companies to expand bilateral trade without using Western currencies or worrying about Western financial sanctions.	克里姆林宫与伊朗合作成立了一家合资银行，使俄罗斯公司能够在不使用西方货币或担心西方金融制裁的情况下扩大双边贸易。


The deal builds on this summer’s “oil-for-goods” agreement, whereby Russia will exchange its own goods for as many as 500,000 barrels of Iranian oil daily.	该协议建立在今年夏天“石油换商品”协议的基础上，俄罗斯每天用本国商品换取伊朗的500,000桶石油。


Bilateral security cooperation also progressed, with the Russian Navy holding a three-day maritime exercise with Iran’s Caspian fleet.	双边安全合作也取得了进展，俄罗斯海军与伊朗里海舰队举行了为期三天的军事演习。


So far, efforts to weaken Russia’s relationship with Iran – not to mention its other major Middle Eastern ally, Syria – have repeatedly failed.	目前，削弱俄罗斯和伊朗（更不用说它的另一个中东主要盟友叙利亚了）关系的努力一败再败。


In October, Russia’s United Nations ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, faulted the US-led initiative against the Islamic State for its failure to involve Iran and Syria, which he called “logical allies in the fight against terrorism in the region.”	10月，俄罗斯驻联合国大使丘尔金（Vitaly Churkin）表示，美国所领导打击伊斯兰国行动不把伊朗和叙利亚包括在内是不妥的，他把这两个国家称为“打击地区恐怖主义的天然盟友”。


Moreover, Russia has signed an agreement that will ensure that its own firms remain the dominant foreign players in Iran’s civil nuclear-energy sector, even if a nuclear deal leads Western powers to ease sanctions on Iran.	此外，俄罗斯还签订了一份能确保本国企业保持伊朗民用核能业主要外国行动方地位的协议，虽然核协议让西方列强放松了对伊朗的制裁。


Under the terms of the deal, Russia will help Iran construct at least two more nuclear reactors – and as many as eight.	根据俄罗斯与伊朗的协议，前者将帮助后者建设至少两个新的核反应堆，最多可能达到八个。


The new plants, like Iran’s first Russian-built reactor at Bushehr, would be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring and use only Russian-made nuclear fuel, which would be returned to Russia for storage to prevent Iran from developing dangerous nuclear technologies.	这些新建核电站与位于布什尔（Bushehr）的伊朗首个俄建反应堆一样，将接受国际原子能机构监督并且只使用俄制核燃料，这些核燃料可以运回俄罗斯储存以防止伊朗开发危险的核技术。


Still, Russia has agreed to train more Iranian nuclear experts, and may allow Iran to manufacture some of the components of the uranium fuel rods itself.	但是，俄罗斯还同意训练更多的伊朗核专家，并有可能允许伊朗自己制造一些铀燃料棒元件。


In North Korea, Russian diplomacy has made even more progress.	在朝鲜，俄罗斯的外交进展更多。


Last summer, Putin forgave 90% of North Korea’s $11 billion Soviet-era debt, and announced that the remaining $1 billion could be used as part of a “debt-for-aid” program, funding health, energy, and educational projects in the country.	去年夏天普京免去了朝鲜110亿美元苏联时期债务的90%，并宣布剩余的10亿美元可以作为“债务换援助”计划的一部分，用于朝鲜的医疗、能源和教育工程。


This opened the way for new development projects and increased bilateral and regional investment.	这打开了新的开发项目，也提高了双边和地区投资。


For example, Russian firms are planning to help rebuild North Korea’s railway network in exchange for access to the country’s undeveloped mineral resources.	比如，俄罗斯企业计划帮助朝鲜重建铁路网，以换取获得朝鲜未开发矿产资源的权利。


Russia has hosted more senior North Korean leaders than any other country this year, including the reclusive leader Kim Jong-un’s special envoy, Choe Ryong-hae, a senior official in the ruling Workers’ Party, who spent an entire week meeting with Russian political and economic leaders.	今年，俄罗斯接待朝鲜高级领导人的数量比其他任何国家都要多，包括近乎隐退的最高领袖金正恩的特使、朝鲜劳动党高级官员崔龙海，他花了整整一周时间与俄罗斯政治和经济领导人会晤。


In fact, Russian officials have indicated that Putin is prepared to become the first head of state to meet with Kim, who is eager to deepen ties with Russia to compensate for his faltering relationship with China.	事实上，俄罗斯官员表示，普京准备成为第一个与金正恩会晤的国家元首。 金正恩渴望通过深化朝俄关系补偿朝中关系的恶化。


November was also a good month for Russian diplomacy in Pakistan, with Sergei Shoigu becoming the first Russian defense minister to visit the country since 1969.	11月，俄罗斯与巴基斯坦的外交关系也取得了突破，绍伊古（Sergei Shoigu）成为1969年以来第一个访问巴基斯坦的俄罗斯国防部长。


During his stay in Islamabad, Shoigu and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif signed an unprecedented agreement that could establish a framework for joint military exercises, reciprocal port visits, and a wide-ranging dialogue on regional security issues.	在访问伊斯兰堡期间，绍伊古与巴基斯坦总理谢里夫签署了一份前所未有的协议，为联合军事演习、港口互访和大范围地区安全问题对话制定了一个框架。


Moreover, the Kremlin has relaxed its opposition to Pakistan’s full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, along with China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.	此外，克里姆林宫还放松了反对巴基斯坦完全加入上海合作组织，成为中国、哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、俄罗斯、塔吉克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦的同侪的口风。


And the Russian government has agreed to sell Pakistan as many as 20 Mil Mi-35 “Hind E” heavy attack helicopters to aid in the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking.	俄罗斯政府还同意向巴基斯坦出售最多20架Mil Mi-35 “Hind E” 重型武装直升机以助巴基斯坦打击恐怖主义和贩毒。


Until now, Russia has refrained from selling advanced military equipment to Pakistan, in order to avoid damaging its relationship with India.	此前，俄罗斯一直没有向巴基斯坦出售先进军事装备，以防破坏与印度的关系。


But, as Russia’s strategic relationship with India has strengthened, including through a joint mechanism to purchase and deliver Russian weapons to the Afghan government, Putin has gained the confidence to bolster cooperation with Pakistan.	但是，随着俄罗斯与印度战略伙伴关系的加强，包括通过一个联合机制购买俄制武器并交付给阿富汗政府，普京也获得了加强与巴基斯坦合作的信心。


The announcement of several more bilateral deals during Putin’s recent visit to India suggests that his confidence was merited.	普京最近在访印期间���署了更多的双边协议，这表明他的信心是有根据的。


All of this could augment Russia’s leverage with China, which has an interest in increasing its influence over Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan, but has subtly sought to exploit Russia’s isolation.	所有这些都能增加俄罗斯对华关系的筹码，中国也希望增加对伊朗、朝鲜和巴基斯坦的影响力，但同时也在巧妙地利用俄罗斯的孤立。


Russia’s vast natural-gas wealth also appeals to China, which drove a hard bargain in the two countries’ recently concluded 30-year, $400 billion gas-supply deal.	俄罗斯巨大的天然气财富也吸引着中国，最近两国完成了一项为期30年、价值4,000亿美元的天然气供给协议，中国获得了极为优惠的价格。


By giving key regional actors alternatives to bowing to US pressure on issues like nuclear non-proliferation and the fight against terrorism, Russia’s recent maneuvers have complicated American diplomatic efforts considerably.	俄罗斯让重要地区行动方在核不扩散和打击恐怖主义等问题上有了屈从于美国压力之外的选择，这导致美国的外交局面大大复杂化了。


Though Putin has not broken from the international consensus on these issues, he could block progress in order to compel the US to change its policies toward Ukraine, Syria, and other countries.	尽管普京尚未在这些问题上与国际共识决裂，但他可以阻碍进展以迫使美国改变其对乌克兰、叙利亚和其他国家的政策。


As a result, a dangerous global security situation could become even more so.	结果，危险的全球安全局面可能会进一步恶化。


Why Russia’s Economy Will Not Collapse	为何俄罗斯经济不会崩溃


GENEVA – The rapid depreciation of the ruble, despite a dramatic – and seemingly desperate – late-night interest-rate hike by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) last month, has raised the specter of Russia’s economic meltdown in 1998.	日内瓦—尽管俄罗斯中央银行上个月实施了半夜加息的紧急措施，但卢布看似绝望的急剧贬值仍唤起了1998年俄罗斯经济崩溃的幽灵。


Indeed, the West has sought to animate that specter in its ongoing confrontation with Russian President Vladimir Putin.	事实上，西方在于俄罗斯总统普京的持续对峙中试图强化这一幽灵。


But, though Russia’s economy is undoubtedly in trouble, a full-blown collapse is unlikely.	但是，尽管俄罗斯经济毫无疑问麻烦重重，但全面崩溃是不可能的。


Oil and gas account for more than 60% of Russia’s exports; other primary commodities make up much of the rest.	石油和天然气占据了俄罗斯出口的60%多； 其他主要商品占据了剩余大部分。


Given this, the recent sharp decline in world oil prices obviously represents a major shock – large enough, when combined with the effect of increasingly strict Western sanctions – to provoke a sizeable recession.	基于此，目前世界油价的暴跌显然构成了巨大的冲击——加上日益严厉的西方制裁的效果，足以引发一场大规模衰退。


To make matters worse, commodity prices are expected to remain low for some time.	更糟糕的是，商品价格预计还会保持低位一段时间。


In that case, the income loss would become much more than a temporary setback.	如此看，收入损失将远大于暂时下跌。


But Russia is no economic basket-case-in-waiting – at least not yet.	但俄罗斯并非任人宰割的经济软柿子——至少目前还不是。


The situation today is very different from that in 1998, when Russia was running twin fiscal and current-account deficits.	今天的状况与1998年截然不同。 1998年，俄罗斯存在财政和经常项目双赤字。


Russia needed to borrow, and it was borrowing heavily in foreign currency.	俄罗斯需要贷款，并大量以外币贷款。


This meant that as the ruble depreciated, Russia’s debts rose.	这意味着当卢布贬值时，俄罗斯的债务会增加。


Eventually, default became inevitable.	最终，违约不可避免。


By contrast, in recent years, Russia has enjoyed a sizeable budget surplus, and public debt is below 20% of GDP.	相反，近几年来，俄罗斯一直存在巨大的预算盈余，而公共债务也低于GDP的20%。