Regardless of the Venice Commission’s assessment, the response from Ukraine’s neighbors remains a serious problem, as it represents a flagrant effort to manipulate internal Ukrainian policy through intimidation.	不管威尼斯委员会的评估结论如何，乌克兰各邻国的反应依旧是个严重问题，因为这是一种通过公然恐吓来操纵乌克兰国内政策的行为。


Ukraine, which has been occupied for more than 300 years of its history, knows what it is like to have its language threatened.	但曾经经历了三百多年被占领史的乌克兰深知自己的语言受到威胁是种什么样的状况。


Even its own government, under deposed President Viktor Yanukovych, attempted to undermine the Ukrainian language in 2012 with its Russia-encouraged “Russification” policy.	即使是本国政府，在被罢免的前总统维克托·亚努科维奇（Viktor Yanukovych）治下都曾在2012年试图用俄罗斯支持下的“俄语化”政策来削弱乌克兰语。


Ukrainian is the official language of Ukraine, just as Russian is the official language of the Russian Federation, Hungarian is the official language of Hungary, and Romanian is the official language of Romania.	乌克兰语是乌克兰的官方语言，正如俄罗斯语是俄罗斯联邦的官方语言，匈牙利语是匈牙利的官方语言，罗马尼亚语是罗马尼亚的官方语言一样。


While minority languages are important and the rights of their speakers must be respected – as Ukraine’s new education law does – it is the official language that unites a society and enables citizens to participate in it fully.	虽然少数族裔的语言很重要，而且持这些语言者的权利必须得到尊重——就像乌克兰的新教育法做到的那样——真正将一个社会凝聚起来并使公民得以充分参与社会事务还是要靠官方语言。


Ukraine’s government has the right – indeed, the duty – to ensure that all of its citizens are proficient in it.	对此乌克兰政府有权利——也有责任——确保每一个公民都精通乌克兰语。


Cheating Britain Out of Europe	欺骗英国脱欧


LONDON – Several months ago, I predicted that British Prime Minister Theresa May’s government would fall by next month, when the British people realized that the “soft Brexit” they had been promised was impossible.	伦敦——几个月前，我预测英国首相特雷莎·梅的政府将在下个月倒台，因为英国民众将会认识到他们所承诺的“软脱欧”是不可能的。


How wrong I was!	我错的多么离谱！


May has now called an early election, which she is tipped to win easily.	梅现在要求提前选举，而她可能在此次选举中轻松获胜。


As it turns out, May herself realized what would happen if people discussed and disputed her Brexit plans.	事实证明，梅自己意识到如果民众讨论并就其脱欧计划提出异议将会发生什么。


So she crafted a political strategy that would keep the Brexit debate from opening up again.	因此她制定了一项阻止人们再就英国脱欧进行讨论的政治政策。


This meant never allowing a popular (or even parliamentary) vote on what kind of Brexit May’s government should pursue, let alone a second vote on whether Brexit should happen at all.	这意味着永远不允许民众（甚至议会）投票决定梅的政府应当采取何种脱欧方式，就英国是否应当脱欧进行二次投票更是不可能的。


But it was clearly stated that last June’s referendum on Britain’s European Union membership was merely consultative and not binding on parliament.	但显而易见，去年6月就英国欧盟成员身份举行的全民公投仅具有顾问意义，议会不必受其约束。


Moreover, the various Brexit options were never discussed as alternatives – much less voted upon – during the referendum campaign.	不仅如此，在全民公决拉票期间，各种脱欧方案从未被作为替代选择加以讨论——更不用说投票了。


If anything, the expectation among Brexit voters, created by Brexiteers like Boris Johnson, now May’s foreign secretary, was that they could “have their cake and eat it.”	如果一定要说有什么区别，由鲍里斯·约翰逊这样的脱欧分子（梅的现任外交大臣）灌输给脱欧选民的期望是他们可以“分到自己的蛋糕并吃掉它。


Britain, proclaimed Johnson and other prominent leaders of the “Leave” campaign, would retain easy access to the single market, while being able to block immigration from the EU.	”约翰逊和其他著名的“脱欧”运动领袖称英国将轻而易举的保留单一市场准入，同时还能阻止来自欧盟的移民。


Rather than revisit those issues and reveal just how mendacious the Brexiteers’ promises were, May has pursued a “lockdown” of all discussion.	梅不但没有重新审视问题并揭穿脱欧派的承诺有多么虚伪，反而“严格禁止”所有的讨论活动。


And she has been breathtakingly successful.	而且她令人震惊的取得了成功。


The first step in May’s strategy was to state unequivocally last summer that “there will be no early general election.”	梅既定战略的首要步骤是在去年夏天毫不含糊的声明“不会提前举行大选。


This served to prevent any mobilization of the 48% of the voters who had voted “Remain” and who, contrary to the expectations of most professional politicians, remain strongly opposed to Brexit.	”这起到了防止投票“留欧”的48%的选民可能展开的动员活动，这些人与多数专业政客的预期恰恰相反，仍然强烈反对脱欧。


Had May not taken that step, a political anti-Brexit project – led by, say, the Liberal Democrats or a new center-left party – could have emerged and challenged the Conservatives for power.	如果梅没有采取上述步骤，由自由民主党或新中左翼政党等领导的政治反脱欧运动可能会迅速成形并挑战保守派所掌握的权力。


The result of a “Brexit election,” which took place once voters knew that Brexit really could happen, would have turned into a re-run of the referendum and could have been highly unpredictable.	一旦选民知道英国脱欧真的会发生，那么“脱欧选举”可能会演变成再一次全民公投，而且结果高度不可预测。


But, until May’s announcement, seasoned political players, such as former Prime Minister Tony Blair, thought Brexit would be over before the next general election, so none laid the groundwork for such a project.	但直到梅发表声明前，资深政界人士，如前首相托尼·布莱尔，一直认为脱欧极有可能在下一次大选前结束。 因此，没有人出面为这样的计划奠定基础。


This puts them at a severe disadvantage.	这导致他们明显处于劣势。


The second step in May’s strategy was to avoid any discussion of what kind of Brexit the UK should choose.	梅策略的第二步是避免讨论英国应当选择什么样的方式脱欧。


Contrary to government claims, May’s goal here was not to gain the upper hand in negotiations, by keeping the EU27 in the dark about Britain’s objectives.	与政府声明相反，梅的目标不是通过将英国目标对欧盟27国保密而在谈判中占据上风。


(Britain’s ideal outcome is no secret, after all.)	（归根结底，英国想要的理想结果根本没有秘密。


Instead, May’s government wanted to keep British voters from recognizing the extent to which they had been duped by the Leave campaign.	）相反，梅政府希望阻止英国选民认识到他们在脱欧运动中被欺骗到何种程度。


According to opinion polls, last year, most voters wanted both single-market membership and control over EU immigration.	民意调查结果显示，去年多数选民希望同时实现保留单一市场资格和控制欧盟移民的目标。


If forced to choose, they preferred single-market membership by large majorities.	如果被迫做出选择，他们绝大多数人都会选择单一市场准入。


Yet May’s government is probably going to secure the opposite outcome: control over immigration, but at the cost of what she calls a “clean break” with the single market.	但梅政府很有可能争取相反的结果：即控制移民，并不惜付出她所谓的“彻底脱离”单一市场的代价。


May’s government knew that, if the Leave campaign’s deception had been revealed, her Conservative Party, now tethered to Brexit, would have faced a potentially disastrous backlash.	梅政府知道，如果脱欧运动的欺骗性被公诸于世，她现在与脱欧绑在一起的保守党将很有可能面临潜在的灾难性抵制。


This danger was highlighted last week by a YouGov poll, which for the first time showed a plurality regretting the result of the Brexit referendum.	上周公布的YouGov民调凸显出这种危险，该民调结果首次表明多数人后悔脱欧公投的结果。


So she is attempting to “boil the frog slowly,” ensuring that it doesn’t realize it is being cooked until it is too late to jump out of the pot.	因此她试着“温水煮青蛙”，从而保证青蛙在发现被煮时想从锅里跳出来已经太晚了。


This strategy was nearly thwarted, when government efforts failed to prevent a parliamentary vote on triggering Article 50, officially launching Brexit negotiations.	这一策略近乎受阻，因为政府努力未能阻止议会就触发第五十条进行投票，从而正式启动脱欧谈判进程。


May’s government had resisted the vote precisely because it feared that it would have to provide more details about its aims, either repeating disingenuously the Brexiteers’ pledges, which the EU would quickly declare unacceptable, or owning up to the Brexiteers’ (and its own) deception.	梅政府反对投票，恰恰因为他们害怕提供更多目标细节，或者违心的重复脱欧派所做的承诺（欧盟很快就会宣布拒绝接受这样的条件），或者承认脱欧派（以及政府本身）欺骗民众。


When the Supreme Court ruled that parliament would get a vote, May’s government had to find a third way.	当最高法院裁定议会应当举行投票时，梅政府必须找到第三条路。


It resorted to the same obfuscation that had served the Brexiteers so well during the referendum – and won the vote.	它利用了在公投中曾助脱欧派取得巨大成功的同样的混淆事实的伎俩——并且赢得了这次投票。


The last critical step in May’s plan to push forward a version of Brexit that British voters never wanted is to prevent a vote on the final deal.	梅推进英国选民从未想要的脱欧计划版本的最后一个关键步骤是阻止就最终协议进行投票。


Were May to stick to the normal electoral schedule, negotiations would end just 18 months before the general election.	如果梅执行正常的选举时间表，谈判将在大选前仅仅十八个月结束。


That is not the moment when a government wants its deceit to be exposed, especially given that the agreement May reaches may well divide her own party.	这绝不是政府希望自己骗术被曝光的时间点，尤其考虑到梅所达成的协议很可能分裂她自己的政党。


By holding the election now, May is avoiding this risk.	现在举行选举就可以避免这样的风险。


It is too late for the campaign to focus on whether to trigger Article 50.	因为要筹备竞选，现在关注是否要触发第五十条已经太晚了。


And it is early enough that voters – and even many businesses – remain unaware of what a hard Brexit will mean.	而且，现在还处于脱欧进程的早期，许多选民——甚至还有许多企业——都还没有意识到硬脱欧意味着什么。


In short, the British don’t yet know that they’ve been conned.	简言之，英国人还不知道他们被欺骗了。


In the name of democracy and sovereignty, British voters are being denied any chance to reconsider Brexit, even though many voted for it under false pretenses, or to express an informed opinion on what kind of Brexit their government should pursue.	以民主和主权的名义，虽然很多人当时因为欺诈才选择投票脱欧，但英国选民重新考虑脱欧的任何机会，或者就其政府应当采取何种脱欧方案的知情选择权却完全被剥夺。


Instead, they are being manipulated into voting, yet again, for the impossible.	相反，他们正被操纵再次投票制造不可能的结果。


All of this carries worrisome implications for the state of Britain’s democracy, its political culture, and even its long-term stability.	所有这一切都对英国民主、政治文化、甚至是这个国家的长期稳定造成令人担忧的影响。


When foreigners ask how British democracy can function without a written constitution, the usual answer is that Britons’ common understanding of fair and foul play would lead them to reject undemocratic behavior.	如果外国人问英国民主为什么能在没有书面宪法的条件下运行，常规的答案是英国人对公平和违规行为的共同理解能够引领他们抵制不民主的行动。


How convincing is that answer today?	今天这个答案还能否令人信服？


China’s Volatile Growth	中国的高波动增长


MILAN – Uncertainty about China’s economic prospects is roiling global markets – not least because so many questions are so difficult to answer.	米兰—关于中国经济前景的不确定性正在搅乱全球市场——如此多如此难以回答的问题。


In fact, China’s trajectory has become almost impossible to anticipate, owing to the confusing – if not conflicting – signals being sent by policymakers.	事实上，中国的轨迹已经几乎不可能预测，因为其决策者给出的信号令人困惑甚至互相冲突。


In the real economy, the export-driven tradable sector is contracting, owing to weak foreign demand.	在实体经济中，拜外部需求萎靡所赐，出口驱动的可贸易部门正在萎缩。


Faced with slow growth in Europe and Japan, moderate growth in the United States, and serious challenges in developing countries (with the exception of India), the Chinese trade engine has lost much of its steam.	面对欧洲和日本的缓慢增长，美国的平庸增长，以及发展中国家的诸多严峻挑战（除了印度），中国贸易引擎失去了大部分动力。


At the same time, however, rising domestic demand has kept China’s growth rate relatively high – a feat that has been achieved without a substantial increase in household indebtedness.	但是，与此同时，内需的增加保持着中国相对较高的增长率——而与此同时，家庭债务并未大幅增加。


As private consumption has expanded, services have proliferated, generating employment for many.	随着私人消费的扩张，服务业兴旺发达，为许多人带来了就业岗位。


This is clear evidence of a healthy economic rebalancing.	这是健康的经济再平衡的明证。


The situation in the corporate sector is mixed.	企业部门的状况喜忧参半。


On one hand, highly innovative and dynamic private firms are driving growth.	一方面，创新力和活力强大的民营企业正在推动增长。


Indeed, as a forthcoming book by George S. Yip and Bruce McKern documents, these innovations are occurring in a wide range of areas, from biotechnology to renewable energy.	事实上，叶恩华（George S. Yip）和布鲁斯·迈克尔恩（Bruce McKern）在即将付梓的新书中指出，这些创新范围甚广，从生物科技到可再生能源无所不包。


The most visible progress has come in the information technology sector, thanks to firms like Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, Lenovo, Huawei, and Xiaomi.	最引人瞩目的进步发生在信息科技领域，涌现出阿里巴巴、腾讯、百度、联想、华为和小米等企业。


On the other hand, the corporate sector remains subject to serious vulnerabilities.	另一方面，公司部门仍然十分脆弱。


The rapid expansion of credit in 2009 led to huge over-investment and excess capacity in commodity sectors, basic industries like steel, and especially real estate.	2009年信用迅速扩张导致了大宗商品部门、钢铁等基本产业以及（特别是）房地产业的规模巨大的过度投资和过剩产能。


The now-struggling pillars of China’s old economic-growth model bear considerable responsibility for the current growth slowdown.	如今步履维艰的中国经济增长旧引擎要为目前增长放缓的局面承担重大责任。


Despite these challenges, the reality is that China’s transition to a more innovative, consumer-driven economy is well underway.	尽管面临这些挑战，现实是中国向更具创新性的消费者驱动型经济的转型进展良好。


This suggests that the economy is experiencing a bumpy deceleration, not a meltdown, and that moderate growth can reasonably be expected in the medium term – that is, unless the financial system’s problems intensify.	这表明中国经济正在经历一段“颠簸减速”，而非崩溃，中期看极有可能增长保持温和状态——除非金融体系问题加剧。


As it stands, non-performing loans are on the rise, owing largely to the weaknesses in heavy industry and real estate.	目前，不良贷款正在增加，主要是因为重工业和房地产疲软。


While official sources report that NPLs account for 1.67% of loans held by commercial banks, the Chinese investment bank CICC estimates the figure to be closer to 8%.	官方数据显示不良贷款占商业银行贷款总量的1. 678%，但中金公司估算这一数字接近8%。


If so, the banking sector – and the wider economy – could suffer considerably.	果真如此的话，银行部门——以及整体经济——可能会遭受重创。


Whether it does depends on the decisiveness of the policy response.	是否会如此取决于政策反应的果断性。


As in the late 1990s, after the Asian financial crisis, China may need to rely on the large state balance sheet for loan consolidation, debt write-offs, and bank recapitalization.	就像20世纪90年代末亚洲金融危机爆发后，中国可能需要依靠国家大幅扩大资产负债表来实现贷款整合、债务减记和银行资本重组。


But the concerns do not end there.	但隐患不限于此。


Net private capital outflows remain substantial, and show no signs of slowing.	私人净资本流出依然规模巨大，并且没有放缓迹象。


As a result, the reserves held by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) have declined by roughly $500 billion over the last year, with particularly large declines of some $100 billion in each of the last two months.	因此，在过去的一年中，中国人民银行所持外汇储备减少了约5,000亿美元，特别是过去两个月就大幅减少了1,000亿美元。


These outflows, together with volatility in the stock and currency markets, have left investors and policymakers increasingly worried.	这些资本外流，加上股市和外汇市场波动，让投资者和决策者日益担忧。


Unfortunately, a clear explanation for this behavior has yet to emerge.	不幸的是，目前尚没有对这一行为的明确解释。


Some blame it on the combination of progress toward opening the capital market and an overvalued exchange rate, anticipating that net inflows will resume once the currency resets closer to market level.	一些人认为罪魁是资本市场的逐渐开放和汇率高估并存的局面，并预测只要人民币接近市场水平，就会重新恢复资本流入。


Others suspect the influence of inside information: The capital exodus is a signal that economic conditions and growth prospects are much worse than official figures imply.	也有人怀疑内幕消息的影响：资本外逃是一个信号，表明经济状况和增长前景要比官方数据所表明的糟糕得多。


Still others cite the impact of President Xi Jinping’s intensive anti-corruption campaign and, more generally, declining official tolerance for heterodox views.	还有一些人认为是习近平年主席的反腐运动，以及，在更广的意义上，是官方对异见的容忍度的下降造成了现在的局面。


Those who feel directly threatened by the anti-graft campaign might be inclined to take their money out of China.	感到反腐运动的直接威胁的人倾向于将钱转移出中国。


But many others may be doing so for fear that, far from giving the markets a more “decisive role” in the economy, the government may be moving to assert greater control.	但仍有许多人之所以这样做是因为，政府并没有让市场在经济中起到更多的“决定性作用”，反而在加大政府控制。


Capital tends to flow to places where rules are clear and stable.	资本总是流向规则清晰稳定的地方。


Given China’s systemic importance in the global economy, uncertainty about its plans and prospects is bound to send tremors through global capital markets.	考虑到中国在全球经济中的系统重要性，其计划和前景的不确定性必然会在全球资本市场中掀起轩然大波。


That is why it is so important that the Chinese government increase the transparency of its decision-making, including by communicating its policy decisions more effectively.	因此，中国政府增加决策透明度十分重要，包括通过更有效地进行政策决策沟通。


Consider the soothing impact of PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan’s recent statement (following a long and baffling official silence on exchange-rate policy) that the central bank would keep the renminbi “basically stable” against a basket of currencies and the dollar.	比如，中国人民银行行长周小川最近表示（在官方令人难以理解地对汇率政策迟迟不开口之后），中国人民银行将继续保持人民币对一揽子外币和美元的“基本稳定”。


But the principal unaddressed problem affecting China’s financial system is the pervasiveness of state control and ownership, and the implicit guarantees that pervade asset markets.	但影响中国金融体系的最主要的未解决问题是国有控制和所有权的无处不在，以及遍及资本市场的隐性担保。


This leads to misallocation of capital (with small and medium-size private enterprises struggling the most) and the mispricing of risk, while contributing to a lax credit culture.	这导致资本的错配（中小型民营企业境遇最惨）和风险的错误定价，同时也导致了松散的信用文化。


The absence of credit discipline is particularly problematic when combined with highly accommodative monetary policy, because it can artificially keep zombie companies afloat.	信用纪律的缺失如果与高度宽松的货币政策相结合，将造成巨大的问题，因为这人为地让僵尸公司得以继续苟活。


To resolve this problem, China’s leaders must segregate the state balance sheet from the credit allocation system; but there is no clear roadmap for doing so.	要解决这一问题，中国领导人必须将国家资产负债表与信用配置系统隔离开来； 但这样做没有明确的路线图。


Moreover, they should build on efforts taken to open up the capital account, thereby improving the efficiency of capital allocation over time, though this process is undoubtedly complicated by the capriciousness of cross-border capital flows.	此外，中国领导人的努力必须建立在开放资本账户的基础上，从而逐渐提高资本配置的效率，尽管这一过程毫无疑问会因为跨境资本流的变幻莫测性而复杂化。


China’s current bout of economic volatility is likely to persist, though increased transparency could do much to blunt it.	中国当前的经济波动可能会持续很久，但增加不确定性能大大减轻这一波动。


Add to that the smart use of state resources, together with sure-footed reforms, and China should be able to achieve moderate yet sustainable long-term growth.	再加上灵活运用国家资源以及稳步前进的改革，中国应该能够实现温和但可持续的长期增长。


The New Abnormal in Monetary Policy	货币政策的新非常态


NEW YORK – Financial markets are starting to get rattled by the winding down of unconventional monetary policies in many advanced economies.	纽约—金融市场正在开始因为许多发达经济体逐渐退出非常规货币政策而陷入慌乱。


Soon enough, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) and the Swiss National Bank (SNB) will be the only central banks still maintaining unconventional monetary policies for the long term.	要不了多久，日本银行和瑞士国民银行就将成为仅有的仍保持长期非常规货币政策的央行。


The US Federal Reserve started phasing out its asset-purchase program (quantitative easing, or QE) in 2014, and began normalizing interest rates in late 2015.	美联储从2014年开始逐渐退出其资产购买计划（即量化宽松，简称QE），从2015年年底开始了利率正常化进程。


And the European Central Bank is now pondering just how fast to taper its own QE policy in 2018, and when to start phasing out negative interest rates, too.	欧洲央行现在也在考虑2018年推出其自身的QE政策的节奏，以及何时也开始退出负利率。


Similarly, the Bank of England (BoE) has finished its latest round of QE – which it launched after the Brexit referendum last June – and is considering hiking interest rates.	类似地，英格兰银行已经结束了始于去年英国脱欧公投后的最新一轮QE，并在考虑提高利率。


And the Bank of Canada (BOC) and the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) have both signaled that interest-rate hikes will be forthcoming.	加拿大银行和澳大利亚储备银行都释放出即将提高利率的信号。


Still, all of these central banks will have to reintroduce unconventional monetary policies if another recession or financial crisis occurs.	但是，如果另一场衰退或金融危机发生的话，所有这些央行都必须重新采取非常规货币政策。


Consider the Fed, which is in a stronger position than any other central bank to depart from unconventional monetary policies.	以美联储为例，它退出非常规货币政策的立场比其他所有央行都要强硬。


Even if its normalization policy is successful in bringing interest rates back to an equilibrium level, that level will be no higher than 3%.	即便其正常化政策成功地让利率回升到均衡水平，这一水平也不会高于3%。


It is worth remembering that in the Fed’s previous two tightening cycles, the equilibrium rate was 6.5% and 5.25%, respectively.	不要忘了，在美联储的前两次紧缩周期中，均衡利率分别达到了6. 5%和5.


When the global financial crisis and ensuing recession hit in 2007-2009, the Fed cut its policy rate from 5.25% to 0%.	25%。 2007年—2009年，当全球金融危机爆发、长期衰退来袭时，美联储将其政策利率从5.


When that still did not boost the economy, the Fed began to pursue unconventional monetary policies, by launching QE for the first time.	25%削减至0%。 当这一措施仍无法提振经济时，美联储祭出了非常规货币政策，第一次启动了QE。


As the last few monetary-policy cycles have shown, even if the Fed can get the equilibrium rate back to 3% before the next recession hits, it still will not have enough room to maneuver effectively.	最近几次货币政策周期表明，即使美联储能够在下一次衰退发生之前让均衡利率回到3%，它也没有足够的腾挪空间。


Interest-rate cuts will run into the zero lower bound before they can have a meaningful impact on the economy.	降息措施将在对经济产生有意义的影响之前就下降到零下限。


And when that happens, the Fed and other major central banks will be left with just four options, each with its own costs and benefits.	此外，如果发生了这一情景，美联储和其他主要央行将只有四个选择，每一种都需要衡量成本与收益。


First, central banks could restore quantitative- or credit-easing policies, by purchasing long-term government bonds or private assets to increase liquidity and encourage lending.	首先，央行可以重启量化和信贷宽松政策，买入长期政府债券或私人资产，以增加流动性和鼓励借贷。


But by vastly expanding central banks’ balance sheets, QE is hardly costless or risk-free.	但QE会大大扩张央行的资产负债表，不可能是零成本、零风险的。


Second, central banks could return to negative policy rates, as the ECB, BOJ, SNB, and some other central banks have done, in addition to quantitative and credit easing, in recent years.	其次，央行可以在量化和信贷宽松的同时，回归负利率，欧洲央行、日本银行、瑞士国民银行和其他一些央行在最近几年中就是这么做的。


But negative interest rates impose costs on savers and banks, which are then passed on to customers.	但负利率会给储户和银行造成成本，然后，这一成本会转嫁给客户。


Third, central banks could change their target rate of inflation from 2% to, say, 4%.	第三，央行可以将通胀目标从2%调整到（比如）4%。


The Fed and other central banks are informally exploring this option now, because it could increase the equilibrium interest rate to 5-6%, and reduce the risk of hitting the zero lower bound in another recession.	美联储和其他央行现在都在非正式地探索这一选项，因为这可以将均衡利率提高到5—6%，并降低在新的衰退中触及零下限的风险。


Yet this option is controversial for a few reasons.	但出于一些原因，这一选项存在争议。


Central banks are already struggling to achieve a 2% inflation rate.	央行要实现2%的通胀率已经很难。


To reach a target of 4% inflation, they might have to implement even more unconventional monetary policies over an even longer period of time.	要先4%通胀目标，它们可能必须在更长的时间里，实施更加非常规的货币政策。


Moreover, central banks should not assume that revising inflation expectations from 2% to 4% would go smoothly.	此外，央行不应该认定将通胀预期从2%修改为4%的过程能够进行的很顺利。


When inflation was allowed to drift from 2% to 4% in the 1970s, inflation expectations became unanchored altogether, and price growth far exceeded 4%.	20世纪70年代，当通胀被允许从2%增加到4%时，通胀预期完全失去了锚定效应，物价涨幅远远超过了4%。


The last option for central banks is to lower the inflation target from 2% to, say, 0%, as the Bank for International Settlements has advised.	央行的最后一个选择是将通胀目标从2%降低到（比如）0%，国际清算银行的建议就是如此。


A lower inflation target would alleviate the need for unconventional policies when rates are close to 0% and inflation is still below 2%.	降低通胀目标将减少在利率接近0%、通胀仍然低于2%时采取非常规政策的必要性。


But most central banks have their reasons for not pursuing such a strategy.	但大部分央行都有理由不采取这一战略。


For starters, zero inflation and persistent periods of deflation – when the target is 0% and inflation is below target – may lead to debt deflation.	首先，零通胀和持续的通缩——通胀目标为0%，而实际通胀低于目标——可能导致债务通缩。


If the real (inflation-adjusted) value of nominal debts increases, more debtors could fall into bankruptcy.	如果名义债务的真实（经通胀调整的）价值上升，那么就会有更多的债务人破产。


Moreover, in small, open economies, a 0% target could strengthen the currency, and raise production and wage costs for domestic exporters and import-competing sectors.	此外，在小型开放经济中，0%的目标可能会让货币升值，从而提高国内出口商和进口竞争部门的生产和工资成本。


Ultimately, when the next recession strikes, central banks in advanced economies will have no choice but to plumb the zero lower bound once again while they choose among four unappealing options.	说到底，当新的衰退来临时，发达经济体的央行将别无选择，只能再次将利率削减到零下限，同时在四个聊胜于无的选项中进行选择。


The choices they make will depend on how they weigh the risks of bloating their balance sheets, imposing costs on banks and consumers, pursuing possibly unattainable inflation targets, and hurting debtors and producers at home.	它们的选择将取决于它们如何权衡扩大资产负债表、将成本施加在银行和消费者头上、追求可能无法实现的通胀目标，以及伤害国内债务人和生产者的风险。


In other words, central banks will have to confront the same policy dilemmas that attended the global financial crisis, including the “choice” of whether to pursue unconventional monetary policies.	换句话说，央行将面临与全球金融危机时同样的政策困境，包括“选择”是否采取非常规货币政策。


Given that financial push is bound to come to economic shove once again, unconventional monetary policies, it would seem, are here to stay.	由于金融力量必定会再次造成经济混乱，看起来非常规货币措施还会继续存在。


The Urgency of Refugee Education	难民教育的紧迫性


GENEVA – The world’s refugee crisis is most often measured in numbers.	日内瓦—世界难民危机最常用的衡量指标是数字。


But for young refugees missing out on an education, the crisis can also be tracked by an irreversible metric: the passage of time.	但对失去受教育机会的年轻难民来说，难民危机还可以用不可逆转的指标来追踪：时间的流逝。


Of the 17.2 million people that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (the UN Refugee Agency) is responsible for protecting, roughly half are under the age of 18, meaning that an entire generation of young people, already robbed of their childhood, could lose out on a future as well.	联合国难民高级代表（联合国难民署）需要负责保护1,720万人，其中大约一半不到18岁，这意味着整整一代年轻人，在已经被剥夺了童年的情况下，还面临着失去未来的危险。


School-age children form a large share of the world’s displaced population.	学龄儿童构成了世界流民的很大一部分。


At the end of 2016, there were an estimated 11.6 million refugees experiencing “protracted displacement”: they have been away from their homes for more than five years and have no “immediate prospects” of return.	据估计，到2016年年底，有1,160万难民正在经历“长期流离失所”：他们背井离乡已超五年，没有任何能“立即返乡”的希望。


Of these, 4.1 million have been refugees for at least 20 years, longer than the amount of time the average person spends in school.	在这些人当中，有410万已经至少当了20年难民，这比普通人在学校所呆的时间还要长。


The case for refugee education is clear.	难民教育问题是显而易见的。


Childhood should be spent learning how to read, write, count, inquire, assess, debate, calculate, empathize, and set goals.	童年应该用在学习如何阅读、写作、算数、研究、评估、辩论、推理、产生同理心和制定目标上。


These skills are especially important for those who will be called upon to rebuild their countries when they return home.	这些技能对于有朝一日回到家乡就需要重建家园的人来说尤其重要。


Moreover, education provides refugee children a safe space amid the tumult of displacement.	此外，教育为时刻处在流离失所的动乱中的难民儿童提供了安全控件。


And education can even help ensure the peaceful and sustainable development of the communities that have opened their doors to displaced families.	教育甚至还能有助于确保向流离失所家庭敞开大门的社区的和平可持续的发展。


Unfortunately, for many of the 6.4 million school-age refugees currently under the mandate of the UN Refugee Agency, access to education remains a luxury.	不幸的是，目前联合国难民署需要为640万学龄难民提供保护，对其中许多人来说，受教育仍然是一个奢望。


Whereas 91% of children worldwide attend primary school, enrollment among refugee children is just 61%, and falls to 50% for in low-income countries, where more than a quarter of the world’s displaced people live.	全球而言，91%的儿童能够读上小学，但难民儿童就学率只有61%，低收入国家更是只有50%，而它们接受了全世界流离失所人口的四分之一。


As refugee children get older, the education gap widens.	随着难民儿童的日益年长，教育差距也随之拉大。


Just 23% of refugee adolescents are enrolled in secondary school, compared to 84% globally.	只有23%的难民青少年能入读中学，而全球的这一比例为84%。


In low-income countries, a mere 9% of refugee children are enrolled in secondary school.	在低收入国家，只有9%的难民儿童能入读中学。


As for post-secondary education – the crucible in which tomorrow’s leaders will be forged – the picture is dismal.	而在高等教育方面——高等院校是未来领袖的摇篮——情况更加糟糕。


About a third of young people around the world pursue a college degree or advanced training; but, despite scholarships and other incentives, the percentage of refugees who do so is a mere 1%.	全球而言，三分之一的年轻人有机会追求大学学历或高级培训； 但尽管有奖学金和其他激励手段，难民接受高等教育的比例只有1%。


In September 2016, politicians, diplomats, officials, and activists from around the world gathered at the UN to chart a path forward for addressing the plight of the world’s refugees.	2016年9月，全世界政治家、外交官、官员和活动家在联合国制定了一条解放全世界难民的道路。


The result was the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, signed by 193 countries, which emphasized education as a critical element of the international response.	其成果便是有193个国家签署的难民和移民问题纽约宣言，宣言强调教育应该作为全球应对措施的关键要素。


Furthermore, one of the UN’s 17 Sustainable Development Goals, which are aimed at ending poverty and promoting prosperity by 2030, is designed to deliver “inclusive and quality education for all and to promote lifelong learning” (SDG 4).	此外，联合国17个可持续发展目标（SDG，旨在到2030年消灭贫困、构建繁荣）之一（SDG 4）承诺要实现“所有人的包容和品质教育，构建终身学习”。


But, despite overwhelming support for the New York Declaration, and for the principles set out in SDG 4, young refugees remain in danger of being left behind.	但尽管纽约宣言获得了一致的支持，并且有SDG 4的原则作为指导，年轻难民仍然面临着落后的风险。


The international community must now match its rhetoric with action.	国际社会必须拿出行动来落实承诺。


Education must become an integral part of the emergency response to any refugee crisis.	教育必须成为一切难民危机紧急响应的组成部分。


Classroom learning should be given high priority, to help provide a protective and stable environment for the youngest refugees.	在校学习应该成为工作重点，帮助年轻难民提供保护性的稳定环境。


Because education not only imparts life skills, but also promotes resilience and self-reliance, and helps address the psychological and social needs of children impacted by conflict, it is a basic need for refugees.	教育不但能传授生活技能，更能提高适应力和自力更生的能力，有助于满足受冲突影响的儿童的心理和社会需求，因此，这是难民的一项基本需求。


Providing educational opportunities to displaced young people will require long-term planning and investment; it cannot be an afterthought.	为流离失所的年轻人提供教育机会需要长期规划和投资； 而不是事后思考。


Financing for refugee education must be sustainable, predictable, and holistic, both to enable education systems in refugee-hosting countries to plan accordingly, and to ensure that children’s schooling is not suspended when a new crisis erupts somewhere else.	难民教育融资必须是可持续、可预测、全面性的，既要根据具体情况规划难民接收国的教育系统，也要确保在其他地区爆发新危机时，儿童不会因此辍学。


It is also critical that refugee children are incorporated into the national education systems where they reside.	另一个关键点是要将难民儿童纳入居住地的国民教育体系。


Refugees, like all young people around the world, deserve a quality education – one that follows an accredited curriculum, and is based on a rigorous system of evaluation and advancement.	和全世界所有年轻人一样，难民理应获得品质教育——包含官方认可课程、基于严格的评估和升学制度的教育。


Host countries are best suited to provide that.	难民接收国最适合提供这样的教育。


Where the international community can help is by doing more to support educators, especially teachers, by ensuring suitable pay, adequate teaching materials, and access to expert assistance.	国际社会可以提供的帮助包括加强对教育者尤其是老师的支持力度、确保合理的薪酬、充足的教学素材以及提供专业协助。


The education of refugees is a shared responsibility.	难民的教育是我们共同的责任。


Last year, with the New York Declaration, governments around the world made a collective promise to invest in refugees and the communities hosting them.	去年，随着纽约宣言的发布，全世界各国政府做出了共同承诺要投资于难民和接收难民的社区。


As the UN General Assembly convenes for its annual meetings in New York this week, global leaders must recommit to that pledge.	本周，联合国大会将在纽约召开年会，全球领导人必须重申这一承诺。


Young refugees have no time to lose.	年轻难民的时间已经不容再浪费了。


The Pakistan Conundrum	巴基斯坦迷局


NEW YORK – Harold Brown, the US defense secretary under President Jimmy Carter, was reported to have described the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union in these terms: “When we build, they build.	发自纽约——据报美国总统吉米·卡特手下的国防部长哈罗德·布朗（Harold Brown）曾这样描述美苏军备竞赛：“我们造（武器）时，他们也造；


And when we don’t build, they build.”	我们不造时，他们还在造。 ”


From the US government’s perspective, the state of current relations with Pakistan is remarkably similar: When we support Pakistan, they do things we don’t like; and when we sanction Pakistan, they do things we don’t like.	从美国政府眼中当前与巴基斯坦的关系状况也是如此：当美国支持巴基斯坦时，巴方与美方对着干； 当美国制裁巴基斯坦时，巴方还是与美方对着干。


From the Pakistani perspective, the past would be mostly a narrative of multiple betrayals, featuring a US that gets close to Pakistan for a time, only to cut off aid whenever its leaders see fit.	从巴基斯坦的角度来看，过去这段关系则更多是充满着背叛，美国一时会与巴基斯坦打得火热，可一但其领导人改变了想法，又会随时切断援助。


For example, the US armed the mujahedeen who fought the Soviets in neighboring Afghanistan in the 1980s, but then all but abandoned the region soon after the Soviet military exit in 1989.	例如，美国人在1980年代为在巴基斯坦邻国阿富汗对抗苏联的圣战者提供武装，但是在1989年苏联撤军后不久就抛弃了这个地区。


Conveniently missing from this narrative is that it was Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons in contravention of US law that necessitated the withdrawal of aid.	但这一说法有意遗漏了一点：美国撤回援助正是因为巴基斯坦发展核武器违反了相关美国法律。


Much of that US aid was restored in subsequent years.	大部分美国援助在随后几年中都得到了恢复。


But mutual mistrust remained, in part because the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program (presumably with government knowledge) aided and abetted the nuclear programs of Libya, North Korea, and Iran.	但两国之间的不信任依然存在，部分原因是巴基斯坦的核计划之父（大概是在政府授意下）协助和推动了利比亚，朝鲜和伊朗的核计划。


The two countries grew closer again after 9/11, when George W. Bush’s administration delivered an ultimatum to the Pakistani government, telling it to choose between its relationship with the US and its relationship with the Taliban, which had opened up Afghan territory to al-Qaeda.	两国在“9·11”事件后再次走到了一起，当时小布什政府向巴基斯坦政府发出了最后通牒，要求它在与美国和为基地组织开放阿富汗区域的塔利班之间做出选择。


Pakistan promised that it would be a partner in the war against terror, and was rewarded in 2004 by being designated a “major non-NATO ally,” which qualified it to receive some of the most advanced military hardware and technology.	巴基斯坦承诺会成为反恐战争的合作伙伴，美国的回报则是在2004年将其定义为“重要非北约盟友”，使其有资格获得部分最先进的军事装备和技术。


Now, however, another American president has come to be frustrated with Pakistan.	但如今另一位美国总统却对巴基斯坦感到抓狂。


Rather than delivering the message in private in Washington or Islamabad, Donald Trump opted to go public: “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools.	特朗普没有选择在华盛顿或伊斯兰堡私下传达这一信息，而是公开表态：“美国在过去15年中愚蠢地向巴基斯坦提供了超过330亿美元的援助，但换回来的只有谎言和欺骗，把我们的领导人都当成了傻子。


They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help.	他们不但没有提供多少帮助，还为我们奋力在阿富汗抓捕的恐怖分子提供了安全的避风港。


No more!”	这事情不能再继续下去了！ ”


If asked, which I was not, I would have recommended that such a message be delivered through diplomatic channels, because open, rhetorically charged criticism would make it even more difficult for Pakistan to change its policy course – presumably US officials’ goal – lest it appear to be a client state.	如果咨询我的意见的话（事实上没有），我会建议通过外交途径传达这样一个信息，因为公开且带有批判性的评论使得巴基斯坦更难以改变其政策过程——这大概是美国官员的目标 ——更别说变成一个附庸国了。


And I would have argued against cutting security ties and in favor of linking US support to specific Pakistani actions.	同时我会反对削减安全关系并赞成将美国的支持与某些具体的巴基斯坦行动联系起来。


Indeed, the big US error after 9/11 was to treat Pakistan as if it were an ally.	事实上，“9·11”之后美国犯的大错就是把巴基斯坦视为盟友。


With an ally, it is possible to assume a large degree of policy overlap. With Pakistan, no such assumption can be made.	人们一般都认为盟友之间的政策可以实现很大程度上的同步，但这一假设对巴基斯坦可不管用。


Pakistan has the world’s fastest-growing nuclear arsenal, is home to some of the world’s most dangerous terrorists (including, for a time, Osama bin Laden), and, as Trump suggested, provides sanctuary to the Taliban, who are doing all they can to destabilize Afghanistan.	巴基斯坦拥有世界上增长最快的核武库，也是世界上一批最危险恐怖分子（包括某一时期的本·拉登在内）的家园，同时正如特朗普所说还为塔利班提供庇护，而后者正在想尽一切办法破坏阿富汗的稳定。


Pakistani policy is threatening not only a decade and a half of US effort in Afghanistan, but also the lives of the thousands of American soldiers still stationed there.	巴基斯坦的政策不仅威胁到美国在阿富汗长达十五年的努力，还威胁到数千名驻阿美国士兵的生命。


But even a more calculated, transactional relationship will not bring the US and Pakistan closer together.	但即使是一个筹划更精准的交易关系也不无法使美国和巴基斯坦更加接近。


Pakistan – a democracy in name only, owing to the political dominance of its military and intelligence services – wants an Afghanistan in which the Taliban play a dominant role.	由于军事和情报部门的政治主导地位，巴基斯坦这个名义上的民主国家希望看到一个塔利班占统治地位的阿富汗。


The US, for many reasons, does not.	而美国处于多种原因可不是这样想。


Moreover, in recent years the US has strengthened its ties with Pakistan’s archrival, India, with much economic and strategic momentum now carrying the relationship forward.	此外美国近年来加强了与巴基斯坦的敌对国家印度的关系，同时这个关系正在巨大的经济和战略势能下不断深化。


Pakistan’s natural partner is increasingly China, which is already investing heavily in Pakistani infrastructure and has become a major source of military equipment.	巴基斯坦的天然伙伴选择则越来越偏向中国，而后者已经在巴基斯坦的基础设施上投入巨资并成为军事装备的主要来源。


China, too, is wary of India, which will soon surpass it in population size and is emerging as an economic and strategic competitor – one with which it shares a disputed border.	中国也在防着印度，印度的人口规模很快会超过中国，并逐渐成为一个经济和战略竞争对手——更何况两国之间还存在边界争议。


The US should not, however, drop Pakistan.	但是美国不应放弃巴基斯坦。


Bad situations can always get worse.	不好的情况总是会变得更糟。


Today, Pakistan is a weak state; tomorrow, it could become a failed one.	今天，巴基斯坦还只是管治无力，明天，它可能会成为一个失败国家。


That would be a regional and global nightmare, given the presence of nuclear weapons and terrorists.	鉴于核武器和恐怖分子的存在，这将成为区域和全球的噩梦。


Economic and humanitarian support should thus continue to flow, though with close oversight of how it is used.	因此美国应该在密切监督其使用方式的情况下继续给予巴方经济和人道主义援助。


Some limited cooperation in countering terrorism and in Afghanistan might still be possible.	在打击恐怖主义和阿富汗方面展开一些有限合作仍然是可能的。


To reduce the chance of war, the US should also continue to work with both Indians and Pakistanis to strengthen their relationship (which is still far less developed than the US-Soviet relationship at the height of the Cold War).	为了减少战争爆发的机会，美国还应继续与印度和巴基斯坦合作以增进两国之间的关系（这种关系的密切程度甚至还远远赶不上冷战高峰期的美苏关系）。


It might also make sense for Pakistan to become a regular part of the US-China agenda.	巴基斯坦事务也应该成为美中两个议程的常规部分。


The US and China are discussing various scenarios on the Korean Peninsula involving their troops, nuclear weapons, and local instability.	美国和中国正在讨论朝鲜半岛涉及各自部队，核武器和当地动荡局势的各种情况。


Talks on how to avoid a crisis involving Pakistan – and how to manage one should prevention fail – are no less urgent.	而关于如何避免爆发一场涉及巴基斯坦的危机——以及一旦预防措施失败该如何应对这一危机——的讨论也同样重要。


Life-and-Death Inequality	生死不平等


REYKJAVÍK – Just as some of us live longer than others, countries have different average life expectancies.	雷克雅未克—正如我们中有的人要比其他人活得更长，国家间的平均寿命预期也存在差异。


At the bottom of the scale is Swaziland, the only country in the world where a newborn still cannot expect to reach age 50.	预期寿命垫底的国家是斯威士兰，新生儿预期寿命至今仍未超过50岁。


And at the top is Hong Kong, where a newborn can expect to live to age 84.	最长寿的经济体是香港，新生儿平均可以活到84岁。


In 1960, the world’s countries could be divided into two groups, based on mortality.	1960年，全世界国家可以根据死亡情况分为两类。


Countries in one group had low average life expectancy, from 28 years in Mali to just under 50 years in El Salvador.	第一类国家平均寿命预期较低，从马里的28年到萨尔瓦多的略少于50年。


And countries in the second, much less populous group enjoyed higher average life expectancy – up to 73 years in Norway, Iceland, the Netherlands, and Sweden.	第二类国家人口要少得多，但平均寿命预期更高——挪威、冰岛、荷兰和瑞典人平均可以活73年。


Since then, Hong Kong has surpassed this North European group, as have Japan (84 years), Italy (83), Spain (83), and Switzerland (83).	此后，香港超过了北欧集团，还有日本（84年）、意大利（83）、西班牙（83）和瑞士（83）。


Today, the people of Hong Kong can expect their children to live 17 years longer than in 1960.	如今，香港人可以预期他们的孩子比1960年多活17年。


Japanese newborns can expect to live 16 years longer; and newborn Icelanders can expect to live ten years longer.	日本新生儿可以多活16年； 冰岛新生儿可以多活十年。


Much of this increase in life expectancy around the world is a result of declining child mortality.	全球而言，寿命预期的这一增加是儿童死亡率下降的结果。


And the increase has been more marked for women, who tend to live an average of three years longer than men.	妇女寿命预期增幅尤其可观，平均而言，她们能比男性多活三年。


In Iceland, for example, the average life expectancy for men and women is 81 and 84, respectively.	比如，冰岛男性和女性的寿命预期分别为81岁和84岁。


But life expectancy can also vary significantly within countries, between rich and poor.	但寿命预期在一国内部也有可能表现出重大的贫富差异。


According to a new study by two MIT researchers, the wealthiest 1% of American men tend to live almost 15 years longer than the poorest 1%; and the wealthiest 1% of American women can expect to live ten years longer than their poorer counterparts.	据两位麻省理工学院研究人员的新研究，最富有的1%的美国人要比最穷的1%多活近15年； 而最富有的1%的美国妇女要比最穷妇女多活十年。


Moreover, this gap widened over time.	此外，这一差距随时间而扩大。


In just the last 15 years, the average life expectancy of the wealthiest 5% of Americans has increased by two years for men, and three years for women.	在过去15年中，最富有5%的美国人的平均寿命预期，男性增长了两年，女性增长了三年。


Over the same period, the average life expectancy of the poorest 5% Americans has increased by just three months for men, and hardly at all for women.	与此同时，最贫穷的5%的美国人的平均寿命预期，男性只增加了三个月，女性则几乎保持不变。


Like recent reports about many Americans’ deteriorating health, this difference in life expectancy seems to reflect not just income and wealth inequality, but also unequal access to health care.	与关于许多美国人健康状况恶化的最新报告一样，这一寿命预期的差异不仅仅反映了收入和财富不平等上，也反映了获得医疗资源的不平等。


And yet US President Donald Trump and congressional Republicans seem intent on depriving 23 million more Americans of health insurance by repealing and replacing the 2010 Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”).	而美国总统特朗普和国会共和党似乎还想通过取消和取代2010年平价医疗法（“奥巴马医保”）剥夺2,300万美国人的医疗保险。


If they succeed, life expectancy in the United States would most likely continue to decline, relative to other developed countries.	如果他们得逞的话，美国寿命预期（相对其他发达国家）很可能会继续下降。


Between 1960 and today, for example, average life expectancy in the US increased from 70 to 79 years, whereas in Italy it increased from 69 to 83 years.	比如，1960年至今，美国平均寿命预期从70岁增加到79岁，而意大利从69岁增加到83岁。


While the average American lived one year longer than the average Italian in 1960, the average Italian now lives four years longer than the average American.	1960年，普通美国人要比普通意大利人多活一年，而如今，普通意大利人要比普通美国人多活四年。


Average US life expectancy has increased more slowly than in Europe partly because many white middle-aged Americans have, since 1999, been living shorter lives, owing to lifestyle-related diseases, opioid overdoses, and suicides.	美国平均寿命预期增长速度不及欧洲，部分原因在于1999年以来许多中年美国白人寿命缩短，而这是与生活方式有关的疾病、类鸦片药物使用过量和自杀造成的。


In fact, since 1981, opioid overdoses alone have taken almost as many lives as HIV/AIDS.	事实上，1981年以来，类鸦片药物使用过量所造成的死亡人数几乎和艾滋病一样多。


It is extremely rare for any large cohort in a modern society to suffer such a decline in life expectancy.	现代社会如此大规模的群体出现如此程度的寿命预期下降，这是非常罕见的。


The only other time it has happened in recent decades was in Russia after the collapse of communism, and in Africa after the outbreak of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.	近几十年来，仅有的几次类似的情况发生在共产主义崩溃后的俄罗斯，以及艾滋病爆发后的非洲。


Rising inequality, then, is not just a question of income, wealth, and power; it is, literally, a matter of life and death.	因此，加剧的不平等性不仅仅是一个收入、财富和权力问题； 它是一个名副其实的关乎生死的问题。


This may explain why inequality has shot to the top of the political agenda in the US and Europe in recent years.	这也许可以解释，最近几年以来不平等性成为美国和欧洲政治日程最热烈的话题。


In his 2016 Democratic primary campaign, Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders, a self-proclaimed socialist, condemned America’s rising inequality and actually came closer to being elected president than many had expected.	在2016年的民主党总统初选中，自称社会主义者的佛蒙特州参议员伯尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）抨击了美国不平等性恶化的问题，而事实上，他也比许多人所预料的更加接近于当选总统。


And Trump – like the “Leave” campaign in the United Kingdom – was embraced by many voters who feel left behind.	而特朗普——就像英国的“脱欧”阵营——受到了许多自感被抛下的选民的拥戴。


Despite being founded in 1945, the International Monetary Fund only recently began to pay ample attention to the distribution of income and wealth in its member countries.	尽管1945年就已经成立，但国际货币基金组织（IMF）直到最近才开始对其成员国的收入和财富分配予以足够关注。


Having now realized that inequality can hinder economic growth, the IMF has begun to discuss the inequality-growth relationship with several of its members.	现在，IMF已经意识到不平等性会拖累经济增长，开始与一些成员国讨论不平等性-增长的关系。


Some observers have disparaged the IMF for this new approach, and argue that increased inequality simply reflects what people have voted for.	一些观察者对IMF的这一新方针嗤之以鼻，认为不平等性加剧无非反映了人们赞成什么。


But those who claim that inequality is something to be desired are akin to those who argue that unemployment is always voluntary, as some economists still insist.	但那些宣称应该追求不平等性的人，和那些认为失业永远是自愿的人（一些经济学家至今仍坚持这一点）是一样的。


In fact, when inequality rises, democracy suffers, which is why the demotion of the US in one prominent ranking of the world’s democracies is not particularly surprising.	事实上，当不平等性加剧时，民主会遭到打击，因此，美国在一项著名的世界民主排名中成绩下滑也许并不值得大惊小怪。


Most people do not want to be unemployed, or be left behind, or have his or her life cut short.	大部分人不想沦为失业者，或被社会抛下，或活得更短命。


It only looks that way to those who frame the choices voters make.	只有为选民限定选项的人才这么想。


The International Consequences of US Tax Reform	美国税制改革的国际影响


CAMBRIDGE – The United States Congress is likely to enact a major tax reform sometime during the next six months.	发自剑桥——美国国会有可能会在未来六个月内的某个时间通过一项重大的税制改革。


Although the new rules will apply only to American taxpayers, they will have important consequences for companies and markets around the world.	虽然这套新规则只适用于美国纳税人，但它将对世界各地的企业和市场产生重要影响。


The most important changes will apply to US corporations rather than to individual taxpayers.	其中最重要的一系列变化都针对美国公司而非个人纳税人。


Of these reforms, the one with the most obvious and direct international impact will be the change in the taxation of US corporations’ foreign subsidiaries.	在这些改革中，国际影响最为明显和直接的改革将是针对美国公司下属外国子公司的税制变化。


The current US rule is unique among all major advanced economies. Consider the example of a subsidiary of a US corporation that earns profits in Ireland.	在所有主要发达经济体中，当前的美国税收体制是独一无的。


That subsidiary pays the Irish corporate tax at Ireland’s low 12% rate. It is then free to reinvest the after-tax profits in Ireland, in financial securities, or in operating businesses anywhere in the world – except the US.	举一个例子，如果一个美国公司的附属子公司在爱尔兰赚取利润，那么该子公司只需要按照爱尔兰12％的低税率支付爱尔兰的企业所得税，然后就可以把这些税后利润投资在爱尔兰本地，各类金融证券或者美国以外世界任何地区的经营业务。


If the foreign subsidiary’s parent company brings the after-tax profits back to the US to invest or distribute to its shareholders, it must pay the current US corporate tax rate of 35% on its original pre-tax Irish profits, with a credit for the 12% that it has already paid.	如果该子公司的母公司将税后利润带回美国投资或分配给股东，则必须按照在爱尔兰赚取的税前利润缴纳当前美国35％的企业所得税，其中可以减免已经支付了的12％爱尔兰企业所得税。


Because of this 23% penalty on repatriation, US companies generally choose not to repatriate the profits of their foreign subsidiaries.	由于将资金回流美国意味着着再损失23％，美国公司一般选择将不其外国子公司的利润留在国外。


The Treasury Department estimates that these subsidiaries have accumulated $2.5 trillion of offshore profits.	美国财政部估计这些子公司的离岸利润已累计达2. 5万亿美元。


Congress is now likely to adopt the “territorial” method of taxing the profits of US corporations’ foreign subsidiaries.	对此国会很可能会采用“领土”的方式对美国企业的外国子公司的利润征税。


Under the territorial method, which virtually every other advanced economy uses, US corporations will be able to repatriate their foreign subsidiaries’ after-tax profits with little or no extra tax.	在几乎所有其他先进经济体所采用的领土税制下，美国公司将能以很少或免征额外税收的情况下回流其外国子公司的税后利润。


Congress is also likely to enact a “deemed repatriation tax” on the $2.5 trillion of profits that have been accumulated abroad but never subject to US tax.	国会也有可能针对在国外积累但从未受到美国税收管制的那2. 5万亿美元利润实施“视为回流税”。


Although the details of this provision have not been decided, the basic idea would be to levy a tax of about 10% on the untaxed overseas profits, to be paid over a period of years.	虽然这项规定的细节尚未确定，但基本思路是征收海外利润10％左右的税款，并在几年内支付。


In exchange for this new tax liability, a US corporation could repatriate those accumulated profits whenever it wanted to do so.	在承担了该项新税务责任后，美国公司就可以选择在任何时候回流那些累积利润。


The shift to a territorial tax system is likely to have important effects on US corporations’ behavior.	转向领土税制可能对美国公司的行为产生重要影响。


A large share of their foreign subsidiaries’ future profits, which would be retained abroad under current law, are likely to be returned to the US, reducing investment in Europe and Asia.	其外国子公司原本根据现行法律在国外保留的大部分未来利润将可能回流美国，从而减少对欧洲和亚洲的投资，目前在国外累计的2.


A portion of the $2.5 trillion of past profits now held abroad would be repatriated as well.	5万亿美元往期利润的一部分也将因此回流。


Moreover, US corporations will no longer have an incentive to shift their country of incorporation to other countries in order to be able to distribute their foreign-earned profits to their shareholders.	此外，美国公司也不会再有将注册地转移到其他国家以便能够向其股东分配外国利润的动机。


At the same time, foreign companies will have an incentive to shift their headquarters to the US, where they could enjoy the advantages of being a US corporation without incurring the current tax penalty.	与此同时，外国公司也将有机会将总部转移到美国，在美国，他们既可以享受美国公司的优势，又不会遭到目前的税收惩罚。


Although the shift to a territorial system of taxation would have the most obvious foreign impact, the planned reduction in the corporate tax rate may have an even larger effect.	虽然转向领土税制会产生最为明显的国外影响，但计划中企业税率下降的影响则更大。


The 35% statutory tax rate on corporate profits is one of the highest among all developed countries. The congressional proposal would reduce the corporate rate to 20%.	美国企业利润的35％法定所得税率是所有发达国家中最高的，而国会提案中建议将把此税率降至20％，特朗普总统则呼吁降到15％。


A lower corporate tax rate and the shift to a territorial system would increase the flow of capital to investment in US corporations from abroad and from capital investments in owner-occupied housing and in agriculture.	降低企业税率和转向领土税制将增加国外投资美国企业的资金流以及对自有住房和农业的资本投资。


This would raise productivity and GDP, leading to increases in tax revenue that would partly offset the direct effect of the corporate rate reduction.	这将提高生产率和国内生产总值，令税收收入增加，从而部分抵消了企业所得税下调的直接影响。


But, because corporate tax revenue is now about 1.6% of GDP, the direct effect of halving the tax rate would reduce revenue by about 0.8% of GDP, or $160 billion a year at the current level of output.	但由于企业所得税目前相当于GDP的1. 6％左右，所以减税的直接效应将使目前的收入减少相当于GDP0.


The US cannot afford such a large increase in the fiscal deficit.	美国无法承受财政赤字的大幅增加。


And, because few features of the corporate tax law can be changed to reduce that revenue loss, I think the corporate tax rate will be reduced to about 25%. That would still be substantially less than the current rate and in line with the OECD average.	同时由于公司税法只有很小部分可以改动以减少收入损失，我认为公司税率将降低到25％左右，但这仍将远远低于目前的税率，并向经合组织的平均水平看齐。


Corporate tax rates have been declining around the world in recent decades.	近几十年来，全球企业税率一直在下降。


The US rate was previously 50%, and rates in the other OECD countries were substantially higher than the current 25% average.	美国从前的税率曾经高达50％，其他经合组织国家的税率也大大高于当前25％的平均水平。


It is certainly possible that the reduction of the US rate will cause other developed countries to reduce their corporate tax rates to improve their relative attractiveness to internationally mobile capital.	毫无疑问，降低美国税率会促使其他发达国家进一步降低企业税率，从而提高其对国际流动资本的相对吸引力。


In short, the congressional legislation that is likely in the months ahead will change the tax rules for US companies, but it will also have important effects on international capital flows. It could also have significant effects on tax rules around the world.	简而言之，未来几个月内可能出台的国会立法会改变美国公司的税收规则，也会对国际资本流动产生重要影响，甚至可能对世界各地的税收规则产生重大影响。


What Happens When Primary Health Care Is Universal?	当初级医疗全民化后会发生什么？


BOSTON – Two years after the death of her husband, Valeria, a 67-year-old grandmother in San José, Costa Rica, lives alone.	波士顿—在丈夫去世两年后，67岁的老妪瓦莱里娅（Valeria）独自生活在哥斯达黎加圣何塞。


Last year, she was diagnosed with high blood pressure and diabetes, conditions that, while not immediately life threatening, require health care to manage.	去年，她被诊断为高血压、糖尿病，这类疾病虽然不会立即威胁生命，但需要医疗介入。


But, thanks to the quality of Costa Rica’s primary health-care system, Valeria has been able to maintain her independence and her health, even in the absence of family.	拜哥斯达黎加初级医疗体系的高品质所赐，尽管瓦莱里娅是独居老人，她仍然能够保持独立和健康。


Costa Rica, a middle-income country that is committed to universal health care for its people, produces better health outcomes, while spending less than most other countries in the world.	作为一个中等收入国家，哥斯达黎加致力于普及全民医疗，这带来了较好的健康结果，而花费也比大部分其他国家更低。


In fact, Costa Rica has achieved the third-highest life expectancy in the Americas – behind only Canada and Bermuda, and well ahead of the United States.	事实上，哥斯达黎加的预期寿命名列美洲第三——仅次于加拿大和百慕大，遥遥领先于美国。


The secret of its success is revealed in our new report, “Building a Thriving Primary Health-Care System: The Story of Costa Rica.”	我们的新报告《构建繁荣的初级医疗体系：哥斯达黎加的故事》（Building a Thriving Primary Health-Care System: The Story of Costa Rica）揭示了它的成功奥秘。


After her diabetes diagnosis, Valeria was automatically entered into the diabetes chronic-care program at her assigned clinic, a ten-minute walk from her house.	在确诊为糖尿病后，瓦莱里娅自动加入了糖尿病长期看护计划，由距离她的住所十分钟步行距离的指定诊所负责。


She visits with her primary-care team every three months to have her blood pressure checked, and to make sure her diabetes is under control.	她每三个月去她的初级医疗团队检查血压和确保糖尿病的控制情况。


And, once a year, a community health worker visits her home to ensure that it is safe, to administer vaccinations, and to share information about maintaining a healthy lifestyle.	每年社区卫生工作者会家访一次，以确保安全性、管理接种事宜，并和她分享保持健康生活方式的信息。


As the global health community works to implement the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, including SDG 3 – which targets achievement of wellbeing for all by 2030 – Costa Rica offers a model to consider emulating.	全球医疗界正致力于实施联合国可持续发展目标（SDG），其中的SDG3要求在2030年实现全民福利。 而哥斯达黎加提供了一个可供效仿的榜样。


Around the world, chronic diseases are increasing and populations are aging, making universal access to affordable care a top priority.	放眼全球，慢性病日益普遍，而人口日益老龄化，这让全民平价医疗成为重中之重。


Unfortunately, many patients will suffer far worse health outcomes than Valeria, simply because they are unable to access quality primary health-care services.	不幸的是，许多患者的健康状况比瓦莱里娅差得多，原因就在于他们无法获得高品质的初级医疗服务。


Well-organized primary health systems – which emphasize promotive, preventive, and chronic care, with general practitioners serving as the first point of contact – increase quality and reduce service fragmentation.	组织良好的初级医疗体系——强调增益、预防和长期看护，以全科医生为第一线工作者——能够提高质量、减轻服务的碎片化。


Studies show that areas with more primary-care physicians have lower mortality and better health outcomes than those with fewer primary-care physicians.	研究表明，初级医疗医师数量较多的地区，较之初级医疗医师数量较小的地区死亡率较低，健康状况更好。


Primary health care is also a key pathway to achieving universal health coverage, a stated goal of the international community.	初级医疗也是实现国际社会公开提出的目标——全民健康覆盖的最重要的途径。


Over the past 20 years, Costa Rica’s Department of Social Security has built a primary health-care system that today reaches nearly every person in the country.	在过去20年中，哥斯达黎加社会安全部构建了一套如今几乎覆盖全国所有人口的初级医疗体系。


Primary providers are the first place Costa Ricans turn when they have a health problem, as practitioners offer acute, chronic, and preventive services.	当哥斯达黎加人遇到健康问题时，首先会求助于初级医疗提供者，由他们提供急性、慢性和预防性服务。


A similar system has been used successfully in other countries, such as New Zealand, and allows patients and their families to build long-term relationships with providers.	类似的体系也在新西兰等其他国家得到了成功的应用，患者和他们的家人与初级医疗提供者建立起长期关系。


Costa Rica’s approach began with reforms in the 1990s, when the country committed to a few simple changes designed to upgrade its health-care services.	哥斯达黎加的方法始于20世纪90年代的改革，当时，国家承诺要采取一些简单的改变，旨在升级其医疗服务。


Some of these could be emulated by countries today.	其中一些改革可以供今天的世界各国效仿。


For starters, officials in San José merged multiple health-care agencies into one, giving the new body authority over financing decisions and service delivery – everything from vaccinations to complex surgeries.	首先，圣何塞官员将多个医疗机构合并为一个，并授予这个新机构拨款权和服务提供任务——包括从接种到复杂手术的一切服务。


While a consolidated approach might not work for every country, many could benefit from a more integrated bureaucratic approach.	整合式方针未必适合所有国家，但许多国家都能从更加综合性的官僚方针中获益。


Second, Costa Rica divided the country into 104 coverage areas, assigning every citizen a primary health-care team.	其次，哥斯达黎加将全国划分为104个覆盖区，为每个公民制定一个初级医疗团队。


This helped providers track health trends more precisely, and allowed for proactive and cost-effective health management.	这有助于初级医疗提供者更加准确地追踪健康趋势，也让未雨绸缪的高性价比健康管理成为可能。


Third, the authorities created multidisciplinary primary health-care teams capable of delivering preventive care services, such as vaccinations and education, in conjunction with acute and chronic medical support.	第三，当局成立了多科初级医疗团队，既能够提供接种和教育等预防性看护服务，也能给予急性和慢性病医疗支持。


This holistic approach draws on the combined expertise of physicians, nurses, community health workers, pharmacists, and data clerks.	这一全面方针集中了医生、护士、社区卫生工作者、制药商和数据分析者的专家知识。


Finally, the health department created a system to gauge statistically the quality of the care it was delivering.	最后，卫生部门建立了一套用统计数据追踪其所提供的看护的质量的体系。


The data are currently used for ongoing monitoring to improve health-care provision in real time.	目前，数据被用于不间断监测，以改善医疗服务的实时供给。


These four enhancements have had a dramatic effect on the system.	这四项强化措施给体系带来了巨大的成效。


Access to primary health care has surged, from 25% of the population in the early 1990s to 93% in 2006.	初级医疗普及度大幅提高，从20世纪90年代占人口的25%增加到2006年的93%。


Today, more than 94% of the population is assigned to a specific primary health-care team.	如今，有94%以上的人口拥有指定的初级医疗团队。


Quality has also increased and, thanks to efficiency gains, the costs are a fraction of what other countries pay.	品质也得到了加强，而效率的提高使得其成本只是其他国家的几分之一。


As countries pursue universal health coverage, they will need proven ways to bring higher quality, more affordable care to the underserved.	各国在追求全民医疗覆盖时，需要用被证明有效的方法来为医疗服务不足群体提供品质更高、成本更低的医疗。


Costa Rica offers one successful approach.	哥斯达黎加提供了一个成功的方法。


By placing primary health care at the center of the system, the country has improved coverage rates and outcomes, while delivering more personalized treatment.	通过将初级医疗列为体系的核心，哥斯达黎加改善了覆盖率和结果，同时也提供了更多的个性化治疗。


For patients like Valeria, this has meant a system that is accessible, easy to use, and caring in an ongoing basis.	对于像瓦莱里娅这样的患者，这意味着她能够获得一个易于使用、能够不断提供看护的体系。


Costa Rica’s reforms have greatly improved her quality of life, and no doubt there are many other patients just like her, in every corner of the world, who could benefit from a similar approach.	哥斯达黎加的改革大大改善了她的生活质量，而毫无疑问，像她这样的患者不下千万，遍布世界每一个角落，他们都可以从类似的方法中获益。


The Fight for Ocean Health	海洋健康之战


NEW YORK – The ocean is changing – and not for the better.	纽约——海洋正在发生变化——但不是向着好的方向。


Well-established scientific evidence shows that it is becoming emptier, warmer, and more acidic, putting marine life under serious pressure.	成熟的科学证据表明，海洋变得更空、更暖、酸性更强，导致海洋生物严重承压。


But there is good news: evidence also indicates that the ocean can regenerate, and the world has already agreed to enable that outcome.	但也有好消息：证据同时显示海洋可以再生，世界各国已经就共同实现这一目标达成一致。


The Sustainable Development Goal for the Ocean (SDG 14) was adopted by world leaders in September 2015 as part of the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.	世界领导人于2015年9月通过海洋可持续发展目标（SDG14），也是联合国2030年可持续发展议程的组成部分。


It includes vital targets, such as mitigating ocean acidification, securing habitat and species protections, reducing pollution substantially, and ending illegal fishing and subsidies that lead to overfishing.	该议程包括重要目标，如减轻海洋酸化、保护栖息地及物种保护、大幅减少污染和结束导致非法捕捞和过度捕捞的渔业补贴。


Ultimately, SDG 14 promises to preserve the ocean and ensure its sustainable use in the future.	最终，海洋可持续发展目标承诺保护海洋，并确保人类未来能够对海洋进行持续利用。


But it can be realized only with bold and urgent action, buttressed by solidarity among governments, citizens, and business.	但这只有通过大胆和急迫的行动才能实现，而这样的行动必须得到民众和企业的共同支持。


This week, governments and experts are gathering in New York to begin crafting a global “call for action” to implement SDG 14.	本周，各国政府和专家正齐聚纽约，开始制定落实海洋可持续发展目标的全球“行动呼吁”。


The call, which will be launched in June, at the UN’s first-ever Ocean Conference, should include a firm commitment to protect at least 30% of the ocean by 2030, and ensure that the remaining 70% is sustainably managed.	这次呼吁最初将在联合国有史以来首次海洋会议上发起，应当包括截至2030年保护至少30%海洋面积的坚定承诺，以及确保剩下的70%可以得到持续管理。


UN member states must also pledge to secure the extension of legal protections to high-seas biodiversity by closing the gaping governance loophole that exposes the ocean to plunder.	联合国成员国还必须承诺通过弥补致使海洋遭受掠夺的巨大治理漏洞，从而确保将法律保护拓展至公海生物多样性领域。


There is one more priority area that the call for action must address: climate change.	此外还有一个行动计划必须优先解决的领域：那就是气候变化。


In fact, a healthy ocean will be impossible to secure without also addressing this pressing global challenge.	事实上，如果不解决这个紧迫的全球挑战，保护健康的海洋将成为不可能实现的任务。


Achieving SDG 14 therefore demands that the international community reaffirm its commitment to the Paris climate agreement, and to announce concrete steps toward achieving net-zero carbon emissions by 2050.	因此，实现海洋可持续发展目标要求国际社会重申其对巴黎气候协议的承诺，并宣布截止2050年实现零净排放目标的具体步骤。


To avoid more empty promises, all commitments must be backed up by a clear financing plan and subjected to regular accountability checks.	为了避免做出更多的空洞承诺，所有承诺必须得到明确融资计划支持并受到定期问责制的制约。


Governments, the UN, and other actors should set a schedule for monitoring and check-ins, to keep delivery of the targets transparent, funded, and on schedule.	政府、联合国和其他相关主体应当制定监测和检查的时间表，以确保规定目标透明、资金支持充足和能够按期达成。


To support these efforts, we urge UN Secretary-General António Guterres to appoint a Special Representative for the Ocean, tasked with improving ocean governance and ensuring that the full potential of SDG 14 is realized.	为支持这项工作，我们敦促联合国秘书长安东尼奥·古特雷斯任命一位海洋工作特别代表，任务是改善海洋治理并确保发挥海洋可持续发展目标的全部潜力。


Such a representative must be given sufficient resources to do the job.	必须赋予这位代表充足的资源来完成这项工作。


The ocean has suffered decades of abuse and neglect.	海洋已经遭受了数十年的忽视和虐待。


It has been treated as a free-for-all garbage bin and race-to-the-bottom buffet.	它被视为所有人的免费垃圾桶以及比赛谁更能突破底线的自助餐。


We have financed its destruction, with no regard for the consequences.	我们已经在根本不考虑后果的情况下资助了海洋的毁灭。


But those consequences have become impossible to ignore.	但这些后果现在已经无法忽视。


While we, as previous global ocean commissioners, had to campaign hard in 2014 for the ocean to have its own dedicated global goal, it is now hard to believe that the ocean’s position in the SDGs was ever in question.	虽然我们作为前任全球海洋委员曾在2014年竭力争取让海洋拥有其自身的全球专属目标，但现在已经很难相信海洋在可持续发展目标中的地位曾经受到过质疑。


That is the sense that we should have in 2030, when the targets of SDG 14 are fully met.	2030年当海洋可持续发展目标彻底实现时，我们应当有同样的感觉。


The only way to get there is through concerted effort – and not just by the likes of ocean commissioners.	协调一致的努力是实现目标的唯一途径——而且努力的主体不应仅限于海洋委员。


People everywhere must stand up and demand real action to ensure the ocean’s regeneration.	世界各国民众都必须负起责任，要求真正采取行动以确保海洋的再生。


In short, the ocean must become everyone’s business.	总之，海洋必须得到所有民众的关心。


To kick-start that process, we have joined the Ocean Unite network, which is galvanizing conservationists, business leaders, young people, and activists to take advantage of growing interest in these issues and create coalitions that can drive ocean health to the top of political and economic agendas worldwide.	要想启动这一进程，我们已经加入了海洋联合网，该网激励环保人士、企业领袖、青年才俊及活动人士利用民众对上述问题不断增长的兴趣，尽快创建可以将推动海洋健康发展列入世界各国顶级政治和经济议程的联盟。


Such efforts are already having an impact, with citizens mobilizing to defend the ocean and policymakers beginning to respond to their calls.	这样的努力已经产生了影响，导致民众捍卫海洋权益，而决策者也开始响应他们的呼声。


Now, it is the business community’s turn to step up.	现在，商界作出贡献的时机已经成熟。


Business has a clear interest in reversing the decline in ocean health.	商界有明确兴趣扭转海洋健康状况的下降。


The GDP derived from the ocean amounts to $2.5 trillion, or 5% of the world’s total GDP.	海洋国内产值高达2. 5万亿美元，占全世界GDP总量的5%。


That’s equivalent to the GDP of the world’s seventh-largest economy.	这与世界第七大经济体的GDP相当。


The ocean is also the world’s biggest employer, directly supporting the livelihoods of more than three billion people, and is a source of food for over 2.6 billion.	海洋也是世界上最大的雇主，直接支撑起三十多亿人的生计，而且是26亿人的食物来源。


Restoring the ocean thus amounts to an unparalleled business opportunity.	因此，恢复海洋健康其实是一个无以伦比的商业机会。


But the ocean’s value goes far beyond economics.	但海洋的价值还远远超出经济学范畴。


It provides half of the air we breathe, governs our weather, and helps to support peace and prosperity.	它提供了半数我们呼吸的空气，控制我们的天气，并协助支撑和平与繁荣。


The ocean’s future is the world’s future.	海洋的未来就是世界的未来。


At a time when politics threatens to undermine cooperative action on the environment, fighting for our shared global environment is more important than ever.	值此政界威胁要破坏环境合作行动之际，为我们共同全球环境而战的重要性超过以往。


Our responsibility for the ocean’s health is as deep, fundamental, and permanent as our dependence on it.	我们对海洋健康的责任与我们对它的依赖一样深刻、根本和永久。


No political consideration can compete with that.	没有任何政治考量能够与之竞争。


Now is the time for all of us – citizens, business, and government – to unite and fight for our ocean.	现在我们所有人——包括民众、企业和政府——团结起来为海洋而战的时机已经成熟。


The Old New Financial Risk	旧的新金融风险


WASHINGTON, DC – The main financial risk facing the United States today looks very similar to what caused so much trouble in 2007-2008: big banks with too much debt and too little equity capital on their balance sheets.	华盛顿—如今，美国所面临的主要金融风险与2007—2008年大麻烦的起因十分相似：大银行资产负债表上债务过多，股本过少。


Uneven global regulations, not to mention regulators who fall asleep at the wheel, compound this structural vulnerability.	不平均的全球监管——甚至有些监管者对危险视而不见——进一步加剧了这一结构性弱点。


We already saw this movie, and it ended badly.	我们见过这样的情节，最后的结局是悲哀的。


Next time could be an even worse horror show.	下一次，我们可能迎来更加恐怖的一幕。


All booms are different, but every major financial crisis has at its heart the same issue: major banks get into trouble and teeter on the brink of collapse.	所有的繁荣都是不同的，但每一次大型金融危机本质上都是同一个问题：大银行陷入麻烦，在悬崖边摇摇欲坠。


Disruption at the core of any banking system leads to tight credit, with major negative effects on the real economy.	任何银行体系中心的震动导致信用收紧，给实体经济造成巨大的消极影响。


In our modern world, in which finance is interwoven throughout the economy, the consequences can be particularly severe – as we saw in 2008 and 2009.	在当代世界，金融与整个经济息息相关，其后果也尤其严重——2008年和2009年便是明证。


The most important question to ask of any financial system is how much loss-absorbing equity major banks have on their balance sheets.	对任何金融体系来说，最重要的问题是大银行资产负债表上有多少可用于吸收损失的股本。


When a company suffers losses, its shareholder equity falls in value, and less equity means that the company is more likely to default on its debts.	当一家公司遭遇损失时，其股东权益价值就会下降，而权益减少意味着该公司债务违约的可能性增加。


The capital ratios most frequently highlighted by banks and officials are misleading, because they include items – such as goodwill and deferred tax assets – that are incapable of absorbing losses.	银行和官员常常强调的资本比率有误导作用，因为它们包括了无法用来吸收损失的项目——如商誉和递延税收资产。


We need to look instead at tangible equity relative to tangible assets.	相反，我们需要看有形权益与有形资产之比。


And we should also be very careful about the accounting used for derivatives.	我们还应该对衍生品会计非常小心。


On this technical but crucial point, US generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) are considerably more generous (because they understate potential losses) than International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).	对于这个至关重要的技术问题，美国公认会计准则（GAAP）比国际财务报告标准（IFRS）的要求松得多（因为前者低估潜在损失）。


Thomas Hoenig, vice chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, publishes his own calculation of capital levels at the world’s largest banks, and these data are now available through the end of 2014.	联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）副主席托马斯·霍尼格（Thomas Hoenig）发表了他本人估算的世界最大银行资本水平，目前数据已更新至2014年底。


The most leveraged big US bank, Morgan Stanley, has less than 4% equity, meaning that 96% of its balance sheet is some form of debt.	杠杆率最高的美国银行是摩根士丹利，其股本率还不足4%，也就是说，其资产负债表上有96%左右来自债务。


The average for big US banks is just under 5% equity.	美国大银行平均股本率略低于5%。


This is more – but not much more – capital than some troubled banks had in the run-up to the financial crisis in 2008.	这一比率高于——但只是略高于——一些2008年金融危机时期的受困银行。


Citigroup, for example, had no more than 4.3% equity, according to Hoenig’s calculation, in November 2008.	比如，根据霍尼格的计算，2008年11月花旗集团的股本率不高于4. 3%。


At the end of 2012, when Hoenig started to publish his US GAAP-IFRS adjustment, the average for the largest US banks was roughly 4% equity.	2012年底，霍尼格刚开始发表其美国GAAP-IFRS调整数据时，美国最大银行平均股本率为4%左右。


It is possible to argue that this key measure is moving in the right direction, but the pace of improvement is glacial at best.	也许可以说，这一关键指标在向正确的方向发展，但改善速度实在令人不敢恭维。


More important, 5% equity is unlikely to be enough to absorb the kinds of losses that a highly volatile world will throw up.	更重要的是，5%股本率绝不足以吸收波动剧烈的情况可能引起的损失。


Some major shocks could come from unexpected quarters.	一些大冲击可能发生于意料之外的时刻。


For example, assets may prove less liquid than investors suppose, as happened with money market funds in 2008; today, skeptics worry about exchange-traded funds (ETFs).	比如，资产流动性可能比投资者所认为的更差，2008年货币市场基金就是如此； 如今，怀疑者开始担心交易所交易基金（ETF）。


Or overly complex securities could become hard to price.	而过于复杂的证券可能变得难以定价。


It is a red flag when people selling collateralized loan obligations today cannot fully explain the risks involved.	一个警示信号是，如今，抵押贷款债务的卖家无法充分解释其中包含的风险。


Or perhaps the shock will affect sovereign-debt values in faraway places, as happened in 1982.	冲击或许还会影响万里之外的主权债务价值，如1982年发生的那样。


It is striking that no experts – public or private – really have a firm grip on what could happen if there is another round of difficulties with Greek government debt.	令人震惊的是，没有一位专家——不管是公开还是私下——能够真正确信，如果希腊政府债务出现新一轮困难会发生什么情形。


But the most dangerous shocks may be those that originate with the big banks themselves.	但最危险的冲击也许还要数源自大银行自身的冲击。


The latest significant development to surface is what Better Markets, a pro-reform group that has put out a helpful fact sheet, calls “de facto guaranteed foreign subsidiaries” that trade derivatives – a murky phenomenon that likely involves all the big players.	最新曝光的重大发展趋势是Better Markets（一个支持改革的组织，它发表了一个很有帮助的情况说明书）称之为从事衍生品交易的“获得事实担保海外分支”——这一难以厘清的现象可能将所有大银行一网打尽。


The trick here is that a de jure guaranteed foreign subsidiary of a US bank would have to comply with many US rules, including those governing conduct, transparency, and clearing (how the derivatives are actually traded).	这里的要害是，根据法律，美国银行的担保海外分支必须遵守许多美国规则，包括关于经营、透明度和清算（衍生品如何实际交易）的规则。


A foreign subsidiary that is supposedly independent is exempt from those rules.	被认为是独立的海外分支可以免受这些规则约束。


But, as Dennis Kelleher of Better Markets points out, when pressure mounts and a crisis seems around the corner, banks will face great pressure to bring such subsidiaries back onto their balance sheet.	但是，Better Markets的丹尼斯·凯勒赫（Dennis Kelleher）指出，当压力增加、危机眼看就要来临时，银行将面临巨大的压力将这些分支挪回资产负债表中。


This is exactly what happened in the last crisis, with Citigroup being a leading example.	上一场危机就是如此，花旗集团是最显著的例子。


The main reason why such loopholes are left open is that regulators choose not to close them.	这些漏洞为何听之任之？ 主要原因是监管者选择不去纠正它们。


Sometimes this may be due to lack of information or awareness.	有时这是因为缺少信息或意识。


But, in many cases, the regulators actually believe that there is nothing wrong with the behavior in question – either because they have been persuaded by lobbyists or because they themselves used to work in the industry (or could go work there soon.)	但是，在许多情况中，监管者其实认为问题行为没有问题——要么是因为他们被游说集团说服，要么是因为他们自身曾经在业内工作过（或者可能很快就要去业内工作）。


Sound familiar?	听起来很熟悉？


A Belt and Road for the Americas?	美洲的一带一路？


WASHINGTON, DC – As Canada, Mexico, and the United States focus on the next round of negotiations on modernizing the North American Free Trade Agreement – a highly uncertain endeavor – governments in the rest of the Americas are grappling with a more fundamental question about trade.	华盛顿—加拿大、墨西哥和美国正将注意力集中在北美自由贸易协定（NAFTA）的新一轮现代化谈判上——其结果高度不确定——而其他美洲政府则面对着一个更为根本性的贸易问题。


Who will be their dominant trade partner in the future: the US, Europe, or China?	谁是它们未来的主要贸易伙伴：美国，欧洲还是中国？


For more than a century, the resounding answer to that question has been, “the US.”	一个多世纪以来，这个问题一直有一个响亮的答案：“美国。


The country’s proximity, soft power, and sheer economic might made it the natural center of commercial attention for Latin America.	”美国距离近，软实力强，经济强大，使其成为拉丁美洲天然的商业关注中心。


And Latin America is the first or second most important trading partner for 37 of the 50 US states.	而拉丁美洲也是美国50个州中的37个的第一大或第二大贸易伙伴。


In 2016, US companies exported a total of $515 billion worth of goods and services to Latin America and the Caribbean – nearly three times as much as they exported to China.	2016年，美国公司总共出口了价值5,150亿美元的商品和服务到拉美和加勒比地区——是其对华出口的近三倍。


Moreover, whereas the US has a large and recurring trade deficit with China, the country typically posts a surplus with its southern neighbors, which traditionally favor the high-value goods and sophisticated services that US companies provide.	此外，美国对中国存在巨大的、一贯的贸易赤字，但对其南方邻国，它常常有贸易盈余，后者向来对美国公司提供的高价值商品和成熟的服务青睐有加。


Yet this picture is changing fast.	但这一情景正在迅速变化。


Over the last two decades, Chinese companies have been quietly gaining market share in Latin America and the Caribbean.	在过去二十年里，中国公司一直在静悄悄地蚕食拉美和加勒比地区的市场份额。


The share of US imports in Latin America dropped from 50% in 2000 to 33% in 2016, while China’s share jumped from 3% to 18%.	拉美地区的美国进口品比例从2000年的50%下降到2016年的33%，而中国的份额从3%上升到18%。


In many Latin American homes, Chinese-made laptops, smartphones, televisions, and automobiles have replaced legendary US brands.	在许多拉美家庭中，中国产笔记本电脑、智能手机、电视机和汽车已经取代了美国传奇品牌。


Of course, this shift is partly a result of the secular factors that have driven China’s rapid growth and global expansion.	当然，这一转变部分是推动中国高速增长和全球扩张的长期因素的结果。


But it also reflects China’s long-term strategy to cement its position in one of the world’s most attractive emerging markets.	但这一转变也反映了中国的长期战略：巩固其在全球最有吸引力的新兴市场之一的地位。


By 2030, Latin America and the Caribbean will have a combined population of around 720 million people.	到2030年，拉美和加勒比地区合计将由7. 2亿左右的人口。


According to conservative forecasts, its GDP will amount to around $9 trillion, with just six economies – Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Chile, and Peru –accounting for 86% of that total.	根据保守估计，其GDP将达到9万亿美元，其中六个经济体——巴西、墨西哥、阿根廷、哥伦比亚、智利和秘鲁——贡献了总量的86%。


Moreover, countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are moving toward becoming an integrated bloc.	此外，拉美和加勒比国家正在变成一个统一的区块。


Thanks to a host of agreements, fully 80% of trade among Latin American and Caribbean countries is already tariff-free.	拜一系列协定所赐，拉美和加勒比国家间整整80%的贸易已经实现零关税。


Various trade-facilitation measures, from paperless customs procedures to the harmonization of rules of origin, are steadily dismantling remaining barriers.	各种贸易便利措施，从无纸化报关流程到原产地规则的协调，正在稳步削弱剩下的壁垒。


The two largest regional blocs – Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance, both of which include the region’s six largest economies – are taking seriously the possibility of convergence.	两个最大的地区区块——南方共同市场和太平洋联盟，两者都包括了域内六个最大经济体——正在认真考虑合并的可能。


This trend toward greater regional integration will offer a unique opportunity to tap an entire highly lucrative market from a few beachheads.	这一朝向更大的地区一体化的趋势将形成一个独一无二的机会，如果能够建立一些“滩头阵地”，就有望赢得一整个极为诱人的市场。


Chinese companies that are now making acquisitions and building factories in Brazil, for example, will be able to distribute their products on preferential terms in neighboring countries, while harnessing regional value chains for parts and raw materials.	比如，目前正在巴西从事收购和建造工厂的中国公司将能够以优惠条件将它们的产品销往相邻国家，同时还能利用地区价值链获得零部件和原材料。


Like China, the European Union recognizes Latin America’s vast potential as a trading partner.	和美国一样，欧盟也认识到拉丁美洲作为贸易伙伴的巨大潜力。


To be sure, the EU’s share of total Latin American imports has been declining, and now stands at 13.5%.	平心而论，欧盟占拉美总进口的比重一直在下降，目前为13. 5%。


But it is working hard to reverse this trend, including by completing agreements that cover nearly all of the region’s economies.	但欧盟在努力扭转这一趋势，比如与几乎所有域内经济体都签订了协定。


And negotiations on a free-trade agreement with the Mercosur countries are in the final stages.	而与南方共同市场国家的自由贸易协定谈判是最后的步骤。


This will put Europe ahead of both China and the US in terms of market access.	这能够让欧盟在市场准入方面领先于中国和美国。


But China continues to work hard on many fronts to cement an advantageous position in Latin America, including by pouring large volumes of direct investment into the region.	但中国一直在大力多线出击，以巩固在拉丁美洲的优势地位，比如向该地区投入大量直接投资。


By some estimates, it has plowed more than $106 billion into Latin America in recent years, including $60 billion in Brazil alone.	有人估算近几年来中国向拉丁美洲投入了1,060亿多美元，光是在巴西就投入了600美元。


Chinese investment has so far gone primarily to agriculture, energy, and mining projects.	到目前为止，中国投资的主要去向是农业、能源和矿业项目。


But a growing share is now being channeled to manufacturing in sectors that generate higher-wage jobs and transfer much-needed skills to host economies.	但越来越大的比重正在流入能提供高薪岗位、为东道经济体转移急需的技能的行业的制造项目。


In addition, China has become a major underwriter of the new infrastructure that Latin America urgently needs.	此外，中国已经成为拉丁美洲急需的新基础设施项目的主要承建者。


It is framing these investments within the narrative of its Belt and Road Initiative, a global vision for connectivity, cooperation, and prosperity that resonates powerfully with Latin American leaders.	它将这些投资纳入了其一带一路计划的叙事中。 一带一路计划是一个关于联动、合作和繁荣的全球愿景，得到了拉丁美洲领导人的强烈共鸣。


As China and the EU seize opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean, the US continues to cede market share.	中国和欧盟都在拉美和加勒比地区努力抓住机会，而美国一直在拱手出让市场份额。


Yet this is its neighborhood, and it could easily propose a similar integration initiative here.	但拉美和加勒比地区紧邻着美国，美国能够很容易地推行类似的一体化计划。


And the US certainly has strong incentive to pursue a strategy of active re-engagement with Latin America: the Inter-American Development Bank calculates that if the US were to reclaim the share of Latin American imports that it had in 2000, it could be exporting around $788 billion each year to the region.	并且美国显然也有很强的激励去追求积极再投入拉美的战略：泛美开发银行计算，如果美国要恢复其2000年所占的拉美进口比重，那么每年可以向该地区出口约7,880亿美元。


That is enough to support around one million additional US jobs.	这足以在其国内支撑大约一百万个新增就业岗位。


Such a strategy could harness the goodwill and enterprise of the 57 million US citizens who have roots south of the Rio Grande, including the 3.3 million US Hispanic-owned firms, many of which are eager to expand overseas.	这一战略能够利用5,700万根在格兰德河（Rio Grande）以南的美国公民的肯定和进取心，包括330万美国西班牙裔所拥有的企业，其中许多都渴望去海外扩张。


It might even help to steer the bitter debates over migration and trafficking of drugs and firearms in a more productive direction.	这一战略甚至有可能帮助引导关于移民、贩毒和军火走私的激烈争论向更有建设性的方向转变。


In a time of global uncertainty, a vision of “made in the Americas” prosperity provides a unifying agenda for the continent.	在这个全球不确定性时代，“美洲制造”繁荣的愿景为这片大陆提供了一个联合的日程。


If implemented, the US could reassert its historical leadership among a group of countries that share its fundamental values, as well as an interest in inclusive economic growth and rising living standards.	如果能够得到实施，美国能够重新获得其对这些国家的历史领导力——它们有着共同基本价值观，并且包容性经济增长和生活水平提高符合它们的共同利益。


America’s Looming Debt Decision	美国债务决策渐进


BOGOTÁ – Should the US government lock in today’s ultra-low borrowing costs by issuing longer-term debt?	波哥大—美国政府应该通过发行长期债券锁定今天的极低借贷成本吗？


It’s a tough call, but with overall debt levels already high (not to mention unfunded pension and medical insurance liabilities, which are both likely to rise), perhaps the time has come.	这是个困难的决定，但在总体债务水平已经很高的情况下（更不用说入不敷出的退休基金和医疗保险负债了，这两者都有可能继续增加），时机已经到来。


Until now, the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board, acting in combination, have worked to keep down long-term government debt, in order to reduce interest rates for the private sector.	到目前为止，美国财政部和美联储联手压缩了长期政府债务，目的是降低私人部门的利率。


Indeed, at this point, the average duration of US debt (integrating the Fed’s balance sheet) is now under three years, well below that of most European countries, even taking into account their own central banks’ massive quantitative-easing (QE) programs.	事实上，眼下美国债务平均久期（并入美联储资产负债表）不到三年，远低于大部分欧洲国家，即使后者自身央行采取了大规模量化宽松操作。


The tilt toward short-term borrowing as a way to try to stimulate the economy has made sense until now.	借贷向短期倾斜，试图以此刺激经济，这一策略到目前为止是有效果的。


Given that the interest rate on 30-year US debt is roughly 200 basis points higher than on one-year debt, short-term borrowing has saved the government money as well.	30年期美国国债利率大约比一年期债务高200个基点，短期借贷也有利于节约政府资金。


But the government should not operate like a bank or a hedge fund, loading up on short-term debt to fund long-term projects.	但政府不应该向银行或对冲基金那样操作，用短期债务为长期项目融资。


It is too risky. With net US government debt already running at 82% of national income, the potential fiscal costs of a fast upward shift in interest rates could be massive.	美国政府净债务已经高达国民收入的82%，利率迅速提高所带来的财政成本可能非常巨大。


No one is saying that such a shift is likely or imminent, but the odds aren’t as trivial as some might like to believe.	没人认为这样的转变可能或即将发生，但其概率并不像某些人愿意相信的那样渺茫。


For starters, interest rates could spike in the event of a war or some other catastrophic event.	首先，利率可能因为战争或其他灾难性事件激增。


Less dramatic but more likely is that the Fed will someday find a way to push up inflation expectations, which, as in most advanced economies, have been drifting inexorably downward.	比较平稳但可能性更大的是美联储有一天找到办法推高通胀预期，和大部分发达经济体一样，美国的通胀预期始终顽固地在低位徘徊。


If inflation expectations do start rising, this will push up rates.	如果通胀预期真的开始上升，将推高利率。


A rise in borrowing rates could also come from self-inflicted damage.	借贷利率的上升还可能来自自我造成的伤害。


Suppose, for example, that US voters elect as their president an unpredictable and incompetent businessman, who views bankruptcy as just business as usual.	比如，设想美国选民选择了一位无法预测又没有能力的商人做总统，他认为破产是一件稀松平常的事。


Alternatively, it is not difficult to imagine a sequence of highly populist leaders who embrace the quack idea that the level of government debt is basically irrelevant and should never be an obstacle to maximizing public spending.	或者，不难想象可能出现一连串高度民粹主义的领导人，他们采信江湖骗子的观点——政府债务根本不重要，绝不应该成为公共支出最大化的障碍。


Unfortunately, if the US ever did face an abrupt normalization of interest rates, it could require significant tax and spending adjustments.	不幸的是，如果美国果真面临利率的突然正常化，那么可能需要大规模税收和支出调整。


And the overall burden, including unemployment, would almost surely fall disproportionately on the poor, a fact that populists who believe that debt is a free lunch conveniently ignore.	而总负担——包括失业——几乎肯定将主要落在穷人头上，而相信债务是免费午餐的民粹主义者心安理得地忽视这一事实。


Mind you, lengthening borrowing maturities does not have to imply borrowing less.	提醒诸位，延长借贷期限并不意味着更少借贷。


Most economists agree that larger deficits make sense if used to pay for necessary infrastructure and education improvements, not to mention enhancing domestic physical and cyber security.	大部分经济学家都同意，如果将赤字用于支付必要的基础设施和教育改善，或者强化国内实体和网络安全，那么增加赤字是有意义的。


There is a significant backlog of worthy projects, and real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates are low (though, properly measured, real rates may be significantly higher than official measures suggest, mainly because the government’s inability to account properly for the benefits of new goods causes it to overstate inflation).	美国可以开动大量划算的项目，而真实（经通胀调整的）利率很低（尽管以合理的指标衡量，真实利率可能比官方数字高得多，这主要是因为政府无法合理计算新产品的好处，这导致它高估通胀）。


One hopes that the next president will create an infrastructure task force with substantial independence and technocratic expertise to help curate project proposals, as the United Kingdom’s pre-Brexit government did.	但愿下一任总统能够成立一个具备很高独立性和技术官僚性质的基础设施任务小组，以帮助管理项目方案。 脱欧前的英国政府就是这么做的。


With control of the global reserve currency, the US has room to borrow; nonetheless, it should structure its borrowing wisely.	美国掌握着全球储备货币，拥有接待空间； 尽管如此，它也应该明智地安排借贷结构。


Several years ago, it still made sense for the Fed to do cartwheels to bring down long-term borrowing costs.	几年前，美联储花样百出拉低长期借贷成本仍有其意义。


Today, with the economy normalizing, the case for creative policies like QE, which effectively shortens government debt by sucking long-term bonds out of the market, seems much weaker.	量化宽松通过将长期债券吸出市场有效地缩短了振幅债务期限。 如今，随着经济的正常化，这些创造性政策效果大不如前。


That is why the time has come for the US Treasury to consider borrowing at longer horizons than it has in recent years.	因此，美国财政部是时候考虑比近几年来更长期限的借贷了。


Today, the longest maturity debt issued by the US government is the 30-year bond.	如今，美国政府发行的最长期限债务是30年期国债。


Yet Spain has successfully issued 50-year debt at a very low rate, while Ireland, Belgium, and even Mexico have issued 100-year debt.	但西班牙成功地以非常低的利率发行了50年期债务，而爱尔兰、比利时甚至墨西哥都发行了100年期债务。


Sure, there is no guarantee that rates won’t drop even more in the future, but the point is to have a less risky stream of future interest obligations.	诚然，不能保证未来利率不会进一步降低，但要点是保证风险更小的未来利息流。


Many left-leaning polemicists point to Japan, where net debt is about 140% of GDP, as proof that much higher debt is a great idea, despite the country’s anemic growth record.	许多左倾辩论家拿出日本的例子——日本债务目前大约为GDP的140%——来论证大幅增加债务是一个好主意，丝毫不顾日本萎靡的增长纪录。


The implication is that there is little need to worry about debt at all, much less its maturity structure.	言下之意是没有必要担心债务，更不用说其期限结构了。


In fact, Japanese policymakers and economists are plenty worried and do not recommend that other countries emulate their country’s debt position.	事实上，日本决策者和经济学家都非常担心，并且不推荐其他国家效仿日本的债务状况。


Europe is admittedly in a very different place, with much higher unemployment, and a much stronger argument for continuing to pursue stimulus at the risk of higher debt-service costs in the future.	诚然，欧洲的情况非常不同，它的失业率要高得多，冒着未来债务维持成本增加的风险继续采取刺激的理由也充分得多。


But with the US economy now enjoying a solid recovery, the best approach may be to move faster toward normalizing debt policy, and not to assume that foreign lenders will be patient, regardless of the direction of US politics.	但美国经济现在正在经历扎实的复苏，最佳方针也许是更快实现债务政策正常化，而不是认定外国贷款人不管美国政治方向如何始终会保持耐心。


How Would Health-Care Reform Affect Patient Health?	医疗改革如何影响患者健康？


CAMBRIDGE – Health-care reform is the major policy issue commanding attention in the United States.	坎布里奇—医疗改革是美国最受关注的重大政策问题。


A crucial feature of the debate is the official estimate of the number of individuals who would lose their health insurance under the various plans that have been proposed to repeal and replace the existing Affordable Care Act (better known as “Obamacare”).	医改争论的核心之一，是对于已经提出的、用于取消和取代现有的平价医疗法（更出名的名称是“奥巴马医保”）的各种方案，官方估计会令多少个人失去医疗保险。


The prospect that repealing Obamacare would cause more than 20 million people to lose their formal insurance coverage, as the Congressional Budget Office has estimated, is understandably a serious barrier to legislative progress.	国会预算办公室的估算是，取消奥巴马医保将导致2,000多万人失去正式医保覆盖，不难理解，这成为立法过程的一个重大障碍。


It is important, therefore, to understand just what that would mean in practice, and how much it would actually affect the health of those who lose their formal insurance.	因此，很重要的一点是要认识这在实践中意味着什么，以及将对失去正式医保的人造成多大的实际影响。


The primary reason for the loss of insurance in the proposals to repeal and replace Obamacare is the projected decline in Medicaid coverage.	取消和取代奥巴马医保的方案之所以会造成医保覆盖损失，主要原因是预计医疗补助（Madicaid）覆盖将因此下降。


Medicaid is the joint federal-state health-care program in which the federal government defines who is eligible, stipulates which benefits must be provided, and finances those benefits based on a formula whereby states with low average incomes receive a larger share of federal funding.	医疗补助是一项联邦-州联合医保计划，联邦政府定义谁有资格参加、规定必须提供哪些福利，并根据平均收入较低的州应该获得更大比例的联邦资金的原则，为这些福利提供资金。


People who qualify for Medicaid do receive substantially more care than those without formal insurance – more doctor visits, prescriptions, hospital admissions, etc.	有资格获得医疗补助的人，确实会比没有正式保险的人获得显著更多的看护服务——更多的医生问诊、处方、住院等。


They also have substantially lower out-of-pocket medical costs than the uninsured, including the elimination of “catastrophic” out-of-pocket costs.	他们的医药费用自费比例也会比没有保险者显著更低，包括“大病”自费成本的豁免。


As a result, they are also much less likely to skip paying other bills because of medical debts or to have nonmedical bills sent to collection.	因此，他们因为医药费债务而无力承担其他账单，或非医疗账单积累的可能性也显著更低。


If reform legislation reduces Medicaid benefits, the individuals who lose benefits would continue to receive free care in outpatient departments, emergency rooms, and as hospital in-patients.	如果改革立法削减了医疗补助的福利，失去福利的个人将继续享有门诊、急诊和住院的免费看护。


In general, this is paid for by the states through their “free care” programs.	总体而言，这些费用将由州通过“免费看护”计划支付。


And individuals who are billed for services understand that providers generally do not attempt to collect from low-income patients.	收到医疗服务账单的个人，也明白医疗服务提供商一般不会向低收入患者讨债。


Moreover, those who are no longer in the Medicaid program do not lose care from the many doctors who now refuse to serve Medicaid patients because of the low fees allowed in the program.	此外，那些不再享有医疗补助的人，也不会失去许多现在就因为医疗补助计划所允许的收费过低而拒绝接诊医疗补助患者的医生的服务。


The most important fact to bear in mind is that enrollees in Medicaid show no significant improvement in clinical physical health outcomes.	需要注意的最重要的事实是，医疗补助的参与者并没有表现出更好的临床身体健康结果。


This was the main finding of a large “natural experiment” supported by the federal government.	这是一项联邦政府支持的大型“自然实验”（natural experiment）的主要发现。


The experiment occurred when the state of Oregon opened enrollment to Medicaid in 2008, after the opportunity had been closed for many years.	这场实验始于2008年俄勒冈州开始推行医疗补助计划。 这是该计划取消多年之后再次开启。


Because the state did not have enough funds to accept all 90,000 individuals who wanted to enroll, it conducted a lottery to select about 30,000 individuals who were given the opportunity to apply for Medicaid.	由于俄勒冈州拿不出足够的资金容纳所有90,000意欲加入该计划的个人，因此抽签选出大约30,000个人纳入医疗补助。


A federally financed research team of physicians and health-care economists examined hospital records and other clinical information and also spoke with the enrollees and with those not admitted.	一个由联邦拨款支持的医生和卫生经济学家研究团队考察了病历和其他临床信息，并对医疗补助计划的参与者和未参与者进行了访谈。


The researchers concluded that self-reported overall health and depression improved among those who enrolled in Medicaid, and that there was an increase in the diagnosis and treatment of diabetes for this group.	研究者的结论是，在参加了医疗补助的人中间，自我报告的健康和抑郁情况有所好转，并且这一群体的糖尿病诊断和治疗数量也有所增加。


But there was no significant improvement in clinical physical outcomes for conditions including hypertension, high cholesterol, or diabetes.	但包括高血压、高胆固醇和糖尿病在内的病症的临床身体状况并未出现重大改善。


Although the evidence indicates that the proposed cutbacks in federal dollars for Medicaid would not harm the physical health of those who lost their coverage, the reduction would force states to increase spending on their free-care programs.	尽管证据表明，削减医疗补助计划的联邦最近投入的方案不会影响失去该计划覆盖的人的身体健康，但联邦资金削减将迫使州增加免费看护计划的支出。


The cuts would also increase the costs to hospitals that provide care that is not reimbursed.	联邦资金削减也将增加提供医疗服务的医院的逃费成本。


It is not surprising that the prospect of adding these costs for tens of millions of patients to states’ budgets and to hospital costs causes state governors and hospital administrators to protest when Congress proposes cutting back on the Medicaid program.	毫不奇怪，将这些数千万患者的成本加到州预算和医院成本的头上可能导致州长和医院院长们对国会所提出的削减医疗补助计划的提案投反对票。


But it is important for the public and members of Congress to understand the real reason for their opposition.	但对公众和国会议员来说，很重要的一点是要理解他们的反对的真实原因。


An Agenda for US-Iran Negotiations	美国伊朗谈判议程


DENVER – US President Donald Trump has decided not to certify that Iran is in compliance with the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the agreement constraining Iran’s nuclear-weapons program.	丹佛——美国总统唐纳德·特朗普已决定拒绝承认伊朗履行了限制其核武计划相关协议《全面联合行动计划》（JCPOA）的规定。


In effect, Trump has challenged the US Congress to do what is normally the executive branch’s responsibility: create foreign policy.	事实上，特朗普已经迫使美国国会完成制定外交政策这项本应由行政部门担负的责任。


What that policy will be remains an open question.	究竟应当制定什么样的政策仍然是一个悬而未决的疑问。


While Congress is already preparing sanctions, these will not, on their own, comprise a comprehensive Iran strategy.	尽管国会正在准备制裁，但制裁措施本身并不能构成针对伊朗的全面战略。


Instead, the US and Iran will need to negotiate directly on a range of non-nuclear issues.	相反，美国和伊朗需要就一系列不涉及核能的问题直接展开谈判。


As it stands, few assert that Iran is actually failing to comply with its obligations under the JCPOA.	目前的状况是，很少有人公开认为伊朗实际违反了《全面联合行动计划》 的规定。


Even US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who has made no secret of his disdain for Iran, complains only that Iranian leaders are violating the “spirit” of the deal.	就连毫不掩饰对伊朗鄙视情绪的美国国务卿雷克斯·蒂勒森也只是抱怨伊朗领袖正在违反这项协议的“精神”。


But the JCPOA is clearly – and deliberately – focused on curbing Iran’s nuclear-weapons development, not its missile programs, regional ambitions, or animus toward Israel.	但《全面联合行动计划》明确而专注地聚焦于阻止伊朗的核武器研发而非遏制其导弹计划、地区野心或者对以色列的敌视态度。


The Trump administration also takes issue with the time limits on the JCPOA, with some provisions – such as strict limits on research and development of advanced centrifuges – in effect for just ten years.	特朗普内阁还提出了《全面联合行动计划》某些条款的时效性问题——比如实际在十年时间内严格限制伊朗对高级离心机的研发活动。


Trump’s denunciations of the deal have fueled debate over the appropriateness of the time limits, though such discussions often fail to recognize that Iran agreed to adhere to International Atomic Energy Agency standards, including its advanced inspection protocols.	特朗普对协议内容的谴责引发了人们对时限恰当与否的讨论，尽管这些讨论往往未能认识到伊朗同意遵守国际原子能机构标准，包括该机构的高级核查协定。


In any case, the key to preventing recidivism after the JCPOA sunset provisions expire will be to move Iran toward good-neighbor polices, and to ensure that its economic interests supersede its ambition to become a regional hegemon.	无论如何，在《全面联合行动计划》日落条款终止后防止伊朗重启核计划的关键是将其推向睦邻友好政策，并确保其经济利益超越其谋求地区霸权的野心。


That is where bilateral negotiations come in.	这就是双边谈判的主要内容。


One reason why the JCPOA did not cover non-nuclear issues is that several other partners and allies – namely, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the European Union – were involved, and each had its own perspective and objectives.	《全面联合行动计划》并未涉及核以外问题的原因之一是中国、法国、德国、俄罗斯、英国和欧盟等若干其他盟友及合作伙伴当时也参与了谈判，并且各方都有自己的观点和目标。


Regional powers with ringside seats to the talks, such as Saudi Arabia, also had plenty to say.	沙特等可以近距离观摩谈判的地区强国也有很多自身的诉求。


Reconciling these actors’ conflicting interests and demands concerning the full range of relevant issues would have been next to impossible.	参与者对所有相关问题相互矛盾的利益和诉求几乎不存在调和的可能。


Bilateral negotiations between the US and Iran, however, might allow the US to make progress on the issues that are important to it – and, equally significant, to understand modern Iran better.	但美国和伊朗间的双边谈判可能会在美国认为重要的问题上取得进展——而且同样重要的是，能够加深对现代伊朗的了解。


Such negotiations would likely start with a lengthy discussion of the two sides’ conflicting interpretations of the history of their relationship – in other words, each country’s grievances with the other.	这样的谈判很可能一开始就要花费很长时间讨论双方对双边关系历史的相互矛盾的理解——换言之，表达对对方的不满情绪。


For Iran, such grievances include US support for the 1953 coup in Iran, and America’s subsequent ties to the Shah and his brutal secret police, the Savak.	对伊朗而言，这样的不满包括美国支持伊朗1953年政变，以及接下来美国与伊朗国王及其野蛮的秘密警察萨瓦克所保持的联系。


The US, for its part, would probably raise the 1979 abduction of US embassy staff by Iran’s fledgling Islamic revolutionary regime, and, more recently, its targeting of American troops using Shia militia groups in southern Iraq.	而美国方面则可能提出1979年伊朗羽翼渐丰的伊斯兰革命政权对美国使馆工作人员的绑架，以及最近伊朗利用伊拉克南部的什叶派民兵组织袭击美军。


These discussions should include detailed questions and specific answers.	上述探讨应当包括详细的问题和具体的答案。


Working groups might be created to try to create a common narrative.	谈判过程中可能会设立工作组以求达成双方都同意的陈述方式。


The negotiations would also need to cover contemporary issues, including a tour d’horizon of current hotspots.	谈判内容还必须涉及现代问题，包括对当前热点问题的总结式陈述。


What is Iran doing in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, and especially Syria?	伊朗在也门、黎巴嫩、伊拉克、尤其是叙利亚究竟在干什么？


How does it define its interests in these countries?	它如何界定本国在这些国家的利益？


Does it actually see itself, as many Sunni Arabs assert, as a protector of Shia Arabs?	它是否真的像许多逊尼派穆斯林所宣称的那样将自己视为什叶派阿拉伯人的保护神？


In Iraq, the US invested heavily in toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime and then in supporting a political process that has produced a Shia-led government – a positive outcome, from Iran’s perspective.	美国在伊拉克投入巨资推翻了萨达姆·侯赛因政权，之后又支持建立了什叶派领导的政府——站在伊朗的角度，这其实是个不错的结果。


The key question, then, is why Iran continues to support militia groups that have often undermined Iraq’s government.	那么关键问题在于伊朗为什么一贯对破坏伊拉克政权的民兵团体持支持态度。


As for Syria, Iran moved quickly to support President Bashar al-Assad’s government.	在叙利亚问题上，伊朗迅速支持巴沙尔·阿萨德总统政府。


Iran’s backing of an administration dominated by the minority Alawites (a Shia sect) has clearly unnerved Sunni Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, which regards with great concern this “Shia crescent” just across its northern frontier.	伊朗支持由少数阿拉维派（某什叶部落）所主导的政府显然令逊尼派阿拉伯国家感到紧张，尤其是沙特阿拉伯，该国忧心忡忡地关注着其北部边境外“什叶派新月带”的一举一动。


Iran cannot really expect the Saudis to be indifferent to such a change in their geostrategic position.	伊朗不能指望沙特人对本国地缘政治地位如此明显的改变无动于衷。


But Iran is not the only actor that must explain its Syria strategy.	但并不是只有伊朗必须解释其叙利亚战略。


The US, too, has so far pursued policies that, to put it mildly, have not always had a self-evident rationale.	到目前为止，美国也一直奉行（说得尽可能温和些）并不总能看出明确逻辑的叙利亚政策。


Now is the time for the US to put its cards on the table.	现在美国应当明确自己的意图。


Does it seek regime change, or would it settle for policy changes by whatever government Syrians eventually choose?	美国究竟是要寻求政权更迭，还是可以接受叙利亚人最终选择的政府所推出的改革政策。


And what about Israel?	以色列问题又该如何解决？


During his presidency from 2005 to 2013, Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad inflamed world opinion by repeatedly questioning whether the Holocaust happened.	2005到2013年任总统期间，伊朗的马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪内贾德激怒了整个世界，一再质疑大屠杀是否真的发生过。


Does this kind of ignorance and contempt for the Jewish people persist among Iran’s current leadership, coloring their approach to Israel?	伊朗的现任领导层是否仍然存在对犹太人的这种无知和蔑视，并因此影响他们对以色列的态度？


The final vital issue that must be addressed in any bilateral talks between the US and Iran is the latter’s military activity and, in particular, its missile programs.	美国和伊朗双边谈判必须解决的最后一个关键问题是伊朗军事活动，特别是其导弹计划。


Iran frequently alludes to its right to maintain a modern military, with advanced missiles, though unlike, say, North Korea, it stops short of claiming a right to nuclear weapons.	伊朗常常隐晦地提到其有权保留配备先进导弹的现代部队，虽然它并没有像朝鲜那样提出拥有核武器的要求。


To determine the appropriate role and capabilities of Iran’s military, direct talks between the US and Iranian militaries, like those the US has pursued with China, might be in order.	为了确定伊朗军队合适的作用和能力，（像美中双方那样）在美国和伊朗军队间举行直接谈判可能比较适合。


The US cannot continue to base its policy toward Iran – a huge country with a population of over 80 million, a growing economy, and strong regional influence – on sanctions and vitriol.	因为伊朗是一个拥有超过8000万人口、经济不断发展、地区影响力不断增强的大国，美国不能继续将制裁和伤害作为对伊政策的基础。


Likewise, Iran needs to retire poisonous slogans like “Death to America” and instead work with the US to advance its own interests and aspirations.	同样，伊朗需要放弃像“美国必亡”这样的有毒口号，而是与美国合作实现自己的期望和利益诉求。


Perhaps the mountain of mistrust will turn out to be too high for the two countries to scale.	也许两国最终无法越过互不信任的高山。


But getting to the other side is worth a try.	但向对方靠拢的努力是值得尝试的。


Anti-Trade America?	反贸易的美国?


CAMBRIDGE – The rise of anti-trade populism in the 2016 US election campaign portends a dangerous retreat from the United States’ role in world affairs.	发自剑桥——反贸易民粹主义在2016年美国总统竞选期间的兴起预示着美国在世界事务中所扮演的角色出现了危险的倒退。


In the name of reducing US inequality, presidential candidates in both parties would stymie the aspirations of hundreds of millions of desperately poor people in the developing world to join the middle class.	而在减少美国国内不平等状况的口号下，民主共和两党的总统候选人们很可能令发展中国家中数以亿计的极度贫困人口晋身中产阶层的梦想最终破灭。


If the political appeal of anti-trade policies proves durable, it will mark a historic turning point in global economic affairs, one that bodes ill for the future of American leadership.	如果反贸易政策的政治诉求能最终站稳脚跟的话，这将标志着全球经济事务中的一个历史性转折，并为美国未来领导角色的衰败埋下祸根。


Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump has proposed slapping a 45% tax on Chinese imports into the US, a plan that appeals to many Americans who believe that China is getting rich from unfair trade practices.	共和党总统候选人唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）提出要对中国出口到美国的商品施加45%的税率，并以此招徕了很多相信中国正在通过不公平贸易致富的美国人。


But, for all its extraordinary success in recent decades, China remains a developing country where a significant share of the population live at a level of poverty that would be unimaginable by Western standards.	但即便在近几十年间取得了惊人的成就，中国依然是一个发展中国家，其很大一部分人口仍然生活在按照西方标准根本无法想象的贫穷状况之下。


Consider China’s new five-year plan, which aims to lift 55 million people above the poverty line by 2020, a threshold defined as just CN¥2,300, or $354, per year. This compares with a poverty line of around $12,000 for a single person in the US.	中国新近发布的第十三个五年计划希望在2020年令5500万人脱离贫困线——这只不过意味着年收入2300元人民币或354美元以上，相比之下美国为单身人士划定的贫困线是年入12000美元。


Yes, there are significant cost-of-living differences that make direct comparisons dubious, and, yes, poverty is as much a social condition as an economic one, at least in advanced economies; but the general point that inequality between countries swamps inequality within countries is a very powerful one.	虽然两地的生活成本差异令这种直接比较有点站不住脚，虽然贫穷(至少在发达经济体内部)不仅是经济状况，也有社会因素； 但国家之间的不平等往往大于国家内部不平等的观点还是非常有说服力的。


And China’s poverty problem is hardly the world’s worst.	中国的贫困问题还不是世界上最糟糕的。