The idea is this: to avenge her husband and to take revenge on him, to wash away the stain on the family and show what an unblemished Clinton administration might look like, this woman will sooner or later be a candidate for the presidency of the United States.	这种想法是：为了替丈夫雪耻并对他的行为进行报复，为了洗刷家庭污点并向人们展示完美无瑕的克林顿政府，这个女人迟早会竞选美国总统。


This idea brings to mind Philip Roth’s The Human Stain, published a year after the Senate acquitted her husband of perjury and obstruction-of-justice charges, with its searing portrait of how indelible even an undeserved blot on one’s reputation can be.	这种想法让我不由想起菲利普·罗斯的著作《人性的污点》，这本书在参议院宣布她丈夫作伪证和妨碍司法两项罪名不成立一年后出版，毫不隐晦地描述了对人声誉哪怕是不应有的玷污所留下的印记也同样难以磨灭。


She will strive to enter the Oval Office – the theater of her inner, outer, and planetary misery – on her own terms.	她将力争靠自己的力量入主椭圆形办公室，那里曾向这个世界展示她所承受的世俗和内心苦痛。


And the most likely outcome, my article will conclude, is that she will succeed.	我的文章得出结论，她极有可能最终达到目标。


Fast forward to Paris in May 2011.	让我们快进到2011年5月的巴黎。


The senator from New York has become President Barack Obama’s secretary of state.	这位纽约参议员已经在奥巴马内阁中任职国务卿。


Her aura dominated the just-concluded G-8 summit hosted by France.	刚刚闭幕的法国G-8峰会被她的光环所笼罩。


It is ten in the evening, and I am waiting at the elevators in the lobby of the Hotel Westin with Mahmoud Jibril, one of the leaders of the Libyan insurrection.	晚上10点，我还和马哈茂德·贾布里勒守候在威斯汀酒店大堂的电梯旁，后者是利比亚起义的领导人之一。


Jibril has made a special trip to plead on behalf of the civilians whom Colonel Muammar Qaddafi and his sons have promised to drown in rivers of blood.	贾布里勒专程前来代表民众请命，卡扎菲上校和他的儿子曾发誓要让这些人血流成河。


“I thought you were in Libya!” she exclaims when she sees me.	“我还以为你在利比亚！ ”她一看到我就脱口而出。


“I’ve just returned,” I respond, gesturing toward Jibril.	我答道“我刚回来”，并朝贾布里勒打着手势。


“Really, hidden in a vegetable truck with him?”	“真的，和他一道藏在���菜卡车里？


That triggers one of those great bursts of laughter that, as I noticed in Boston, raise her high cheekbones still higher.	”之后爆发出一连串爽朗的笑声，她原本就高的颧骨笑起来更是进一步提升。


Then, suddenly serious, and accompanied by a man whom I notice for the first time and who turns out to be J. Christopher Stevens, the young US ambassador to Libya who will be murdered a little more than a year later, she leads Jibril to her suite for an interview.	之后，她的表情突然变得严肃，身边站着我初次见面的克里斯多夫·史蒂文斯，这位年轻的美国驻利比亚大使一年后被人谋杀。 她领着贾布里勒到她的套间接受访问。


When, after nearly an hour, Jibril reemerges, he is convinced that the conversation went badly.	一小时后，贾布里勒再度出现时，他坚信谈话没有取得应有的效果。


He grumbles that Clinton hardly opened her mouth, which he interprets to mean that his plea was not well received.	他抱怨克林顿几乎没有开口，他理解为他的请求没有得到重视。


In fact, Clinton was deeply moved by Jibril’s testimony, riveted by the horror of the regime’s tanks grinding toward Benghazi at that very moment.	事实上，贾布里勒的陈述深深打动了克林顿，她为此时此刻政府军坦克隆隆开往班加西的恐怖情景所深深打动。


In the hours that follow, she convinces Obama not to bow to his anti-interventionist secretary of defense, Robert Gates.	在此之后，她说服奥巴马不要向反对干预的国防部长罗伯特·盖茨低头。


She displays emotion and composure, I note.	我再说一遍，她既情感细腻又头脑冷静。


Her humanity and compassion are coupled with an acute sense of the iron discipline required for effective governance.	她集人性同情与有效治理所需的铁一般的纪律感于一身。


These are the reflexes of an impeccable stateswoman.	她是一位无可挑剔的女政治家。


By February 2012, the war in Libya is over, and I am wrapping up my documentary film about the conflict.	2012年2月，利比亚战争结束，我关于冲突的纪录片也拍摄完成。


I am in Washington, DC, in a wood-paneled conference room on the seventh floor of the Department of State’s headquarters, to gather Clinton’s recollections, as I had already done with French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron.	我到华盛顿国务院总部七层镶有木质护墙板的会议室采访克林顿，之前我已经采访过法国总统萨科齐和英国首相卡梅伦。


This is the moment for conclusions and perspective, the always-fascinating moment when the actors in the drama, who have sometimes operated in secret, turn up their last cards.	这是回顾总结的时刻，在这令人神往的时刻有时秘密行动的事件参与者会亮出自己最后的底牌。


Clinton lends herself graciously to the exercise.	克林顿全身心地投入到行动之中。


She evokes her interview with Jibril, a conversation at the White House or the Elysée Palace.	她回忆起与贾布里勒的会面，谈话地点在白宫或爱丽舍宫。


She remembers everything and regrets nothing.	她清楚地记得每一个细节，并且无悔自己的每一个行动。


She feels that, in acting as she did, she was faithful to her most cherished values and beliefs.	她感到自己的所作所为忠实于她最珍视的价值观和信念。


And she has no doubt that the West, in responding to the Arab League’s entreaty to intervene, avoided a replay of Srebrenica in North Africa.	她毫不犹豫地坚信西方因为回应阿拉伯联盟的介入恳求，避免了北非斯雷布雷尼察事件的重演。


What strikes me the most is that she sees, even then, the beginnings of the tribal conflicts and the coming contest among Islamists to outdo one another in fundamentalist purity.	最令我动容的是她在那时就已经预见到部落冲突的开始和伊斯兰主义者在原教旨主义纯洁性领域压倒彼此的竞争。


She worries about the early violations of human rights, particularly women’s rights, which she fears will multiply.	她很早就担心对人权的侵犯，尤其是对妇女权利的侵犯将数倍于当时。


She has no illusions that history turns out the way reason tells you it should.	她坚信历史将按照理性的方向发展。


Time is needed, she says, to build a state and construct a democracy – time and a mixture of pragmatism and faith, of patience and audacity, of respect for others and regard for oneself.	她说成立国家建设民主需要时间——除了时间还需要务实、信念、耐心和大胆，需要尊重他人和自尊自爱。


Was this concern about “nation building” a warning?	这种对“国家建设”的担忧是不是一种警示？


Was it her ideological contribution to an administration that, though she did not know it at the time, would continue without her?	这是不是她对政府的思想贡献，尽管她自己当时并不清楚，但会在没有她的情况下继续下去？


Was she laying down the broad strokes and ambition of her own presidency?	她是否在为以自己为首的政府奠定基础和野心？


One thing is certain: Of my three encounters with Hillary Clinton, this third was the one where I found her the strongest and most passionate, thoroughly imbued with the meaning and pitch of the great American pastoral.	可以肯定：在三次与希拉里的会面中，我发现第三次的她最坚强、最有激情，浑身上下洋溢着光辉和美式田园诗般的激情。


If we meet again, I will not be surprised if I am addressing her as Madam President.	下次再见面时，如果称她为总统女士我一点也不会吃惊。


Hillary Clinton’s Asian Adventure	希拉里·克林顿的亚洲冒险之旅


NEW DELHI – On her recent trip to China, Bangladesh, and India, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was eager to trumpet America’s “New Silk Road” strategy, which she unveiled last September.	新德里——在不久前对中国、孟加拉和印度的访问中，美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿迫不及待地宣扬美国去年9月推出的“新丝路”战略。


But the Silk Road was a trade route, whereas knife-edge diplomacy dominated Clinton’s Asian tour.	但丝绸之路是一条贸易线路，而刀锋外交才是克林顿此次亚洲之行的主基调。


Nothing about Clinton’s trip was as path-breaking as her visit earlier this spring to Myanmar, where she met with opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and President Thein Sein to lend her support to their delicate political dance, which may yet bring the country into the global democratic fold.	克林顿此行在开创性方面与她春天对缅甸的访问不可同日而语，她在那里会见了反对派领袖昂山素季和总统吴登盛，并为他们仍有可能令缅甸融入全球民主架构的微妙的政治舞蹈助力。


Her trip opened with the always-tense annual US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which was threatened at the start by the plight of the blind human-rights activist Chen Guangcheng, who had taken refuge in the United States’ embassy in Beijing.	克林顿此行以紧张的中美年度战略与经济对话开幕，谈判从一开始就受到了正在美国驻北京大使馆避难的盲人人权活动家陈光诚所处困境的威胁。


But Chen was not the only one to upstage Clinton; her boss, President Barack Obama, did so as well, landing at midnight in Kabul, where he executed a strategic pact with Afghanistan, flying back to the US before dawn.	但陈还不是与克林顿抢镜的唯一因素； 她的老板总统奥巴马也盖过了她的风头，奥巴马午夜时分在喀布尔降落，与阿富汗签订战略协议，并在黎明到来前返回美国。


Was this – a negotiation without her participation – the defining event of Clinton’s Asian fortnight?	这次没有克林顿参与的谈判是不是她亚洲十四天之行的决定性事件呢？


Afghanistan’s national security adviser, Rangin Dadfar Spanta, describes the pact as “providing a strong foundation for the security of Afghanistan, (and) a document for the development of the region.”	阿富汗国家安全顾问兰金·达德法尔·斯潘塔称协议“为阿富汗安全奠定了坚实的基础，是地区发展的指导性纲领。


But, while the new pact does clarify America’s post-2014 posture toward Afghanistan, and to some extent has assuaged India’s concerns about that troubled land’s future, anxiety in Pakistan has only deepened.	”但新协议虽然澄清了2014年后美国对阿富汗的态度，并在一定程度上缓解了印度对这片多灾多难土地未来的担忧，但巴基斯坦的担忧却进一步加深了。


Only time will tell whether the pact boosts stability in the region.	只有时间能告诉我们该协议能否增进地区稳定。


Twice upstaged, Clinton’s discussions with China’s leaders took place under the shadow not only of the Chen affair, but also of the recent purge of Bo Xilai from the Communist Party’s senior leadership.	在陈光诚和共产党高级领导层清洗薄熙来这两件事的阴影下，克林顿与中国领导人展开了会谈。


Bo’s ouster, the source of the greatest intra-Party ruckus since the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989, is the sort of dirty linen that China’s leaders never air in public.	薄熙来下台是1989年6月天安门屠杀事件后党内最大的动荡来源，是中国领导人永远不愿外扬的家丑。


So, instead, they “ripped into” the US delegation, in the words of a senior American official, over the Chen affair.	因此，用一位美国官员的话讲，他们借陈光诚问题大肆抨击美国代表团。


At first, with Chen in the US embassy, the Chinese began to suggest canceling the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, scheduled to begin with the arrival of Clinton and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner.	起初，因为陈在美国大使馆，中国提出取消原定在克林顿和财长蒂莫西·盖特纳抵达后即将开始的战略和经济对话。


The Americans also appeared willing to walk away.	美国人似乎也愿意给中国一个台阶。


In the end, both sides blinked: the Americans accepted a deal for Chen to leave the embassy that could not be enforced, and the Chinese ultimately agreed to allow Chen to go to the US to study, just like many thousands of other Chinese do nowadays.	最后，双方互相间心领神会：美国接受了一个无法执行的让陈离开使馆的协议，而中国则最终同意让陈像成千上万中国人那样去美国留学。


The China leg of Clinton’s Asia tour was salvaged – so much so that, at the end of her stay in Beijing, she indulged in the type of diplomatic hyperbole that few would have expected three days earlier: “Our countries are thoroughly, inescapably interdependent,” she said, adding that “a thriving China is good for America…” That may or may not be true; but both countries seem to have reached the conclusion that no human-rights dispute is worth sabotaging the entire bilateral relationship.	这挽救了克林顿亚洲之行的中国站行程，以至于在离开北京前，她发表了三天前还没有人能够想到的夸张的外交声明：“美中两国完完全全、无可避免的互相依存，”她还说“繁荣的中国符合美国的利益…”这或许对或许不对； 但两国似乎都已下定决心为人权争议破坏整个双边关系不太值得。


So it was on to Bangladesh for Clinton.	克林顿下一站是孟加拉。


But here the American propensity for gratuitous preaching led to unnecessary strain in her talks with Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government.	但美国人无端说教的习惯在与总理谢赫·哈西娜政府举行的会谈中导致了不必要的紧张。


This time, the issue was Hasina’s treatment of the Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, the microcredit pioneer and founder of the Grameen Bank.	这次的焦点在于哈西娜如何对待诺贝尔奖得主穆罕默德·尤努斯，尤努斯是小额信贷的先驱和孟加拉乡村银行的创始人。


Unlike the testy Chinese, Hasina’s spokesperson offered only a gentle rejoinder, rejecting Clinton’s suggestions about alleged mistreatment of Yunus.	与暴躁的中国人不同，哈西娜的发言人仅仅做出了温和的反驳，否认了克林顿关于孟加拉政府涉嫌虐待尤努斯的说法。


From Dhaka, Clinton made the short journey to India’s West Bengal, where her host was the diminutive Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, whose election ended 34 years of Communist rule in the state.	经过短途旅行，克林顿从达卡抵达印度的西孟加拉邦，接待她的是身材矮小的首席部长马马塔·班纳吉，她的当选结束了该邦34年的共产党统治。


Assurances of US investment in Bengal’s development flowed; whether funds will actually follow remains to be seen.	克林顿口头承诺美国将投资于西孟加拉邦的发展，但资金是否真的能够到位还有待观察。


Then it was on to India’s capital, New Delhi, for what many took to be Clinton’s farewell visit (assuming, that is, that she steps down at the end of this year as planned) – a visit marred by awkward coincidences and untidy scheduling.	之后是印度首都新德里，这被很多人看作是克林顿的告别访问（假设她将按计划在今年年底下台）——访问中充满了尴尬的巧合和凌乱的调度。


Even as Clinton was cautioning Indian officials about contacts with Iran (demanding, in particular, a reduction in imports of Iranian oil), India was hosting a high-level Iranian trade mission aimed at boosting bilateral economic ties.	就在克林顿警告印度官员不要与伊朗接触的同时（尤其要求减少对伊朗石油的进口），印度正在接待一个伊朗高级贸易代表团，旨在促进双边经济关系。


Finally, Clinton, speaking from Delhi, warned Pakistan not to allow its territory to be used as a “launching pad” by terrorist groups, asserting that al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was hiding in the country.	最后，克林顿在德里讲话时警告巴基斯坦不要让恐怖组织以其领土为“跳板”发动袭击，并宣称基地组织领导人扎瓦希里在该国藏匿。


True to form, Pakistani officials were outraged at the charge, which they promptly refuted with roughly the same vehemence with which they once denied Osama Bin Laden’s presence.	巴基斯坦官员一如既往地表现出强烈的愤怒，并立即以否认拉登藏匿时同样激烈的言辞予以驳斥。


The US responded by announcing that its drone attacks on Pakistan’s North Waziristan region will continue.	美国宣布将继续对巴基斯坦北瓦济里斯坦地区实施无人机攻击。


Was this the long-awaited signal that the US was about to squeeze Pakistan on the issue of terrorism?	这是否是人们期待已久的信号，即美国将在恐怖主义问题上对巴基斯坦施加压力？


With the US blueprint for its withdrawal from Afghanistan completed by Obama earlier on Clinton’s journey, one might think so.	随着奥巴马在克林顿出访早期完成美国从阿富汗撤军的蓝图，人们有理由这么认为。


In any case, Clinton’s tour appears to confirm the central fact of US diplomacy nowadays: the Asia pivot is complete.	无论如何，克林顿之行似乎证实了当今美国外交的核心事实：即美国已经完成以亚洲为核心的外交布局。


The region is now America’s top foreign-policy priority.	当今美国外交政策首先关注亚洲地区。


The Agony of Hillary Clinton	希拉里·克林顿的苦恼


WASHINGTON, DC – Being Hillary Clinton, one of the most celebrated women in the world, holder of some of the highest offices in American politics, and possibly the next president of the United States, has had more than its share of agony.	华盛顿—身为希拉里·克林顿，全世界最著名的女性之一、美国政坛地位最高的人物之一、有可能的下任美国总统，可谓苦恼重重。


Widely regarded a year ago as a shoo-in for the Democratic Party’s nomination, she has faced a far more difficult slog than anyone, including her, ever contemplated.	一年前，她被广泛认为稳操民主党总统候选人提名之胜券，而如今，她面临着比任何人（包括她自己）曾经预想的困难得多的阻力。


Yet most of the problems Clinton is encountering were predictable and foreshadowed in 2008, when she ran against Barack Obama.	然而克林顿所面临的大部分问题早在2008年她与奥巴马竞争时有了预兆。


Others she has brought on herself.	其他问题则完全是她自找的。


For one thing, she’s simply not a very good politician.	一方面，她根本不是非常出色的政客。


Clinton is the only person known to have launched her campaign twice.	克林顿是唯一一位两度启动选举阵营的人。


(The first attempt, in Iowa, where she talked to about eight people in closed meetings, didn’t work out very well.)	（第一次尝试实在艾奥瓦州，她和八人举行了闭门会议，效果不佳。


This impressive, remarkably intelligent woman just doesn’t have the feel for politics that is demanded at the highest levels.	）这一令人印象深刻的绝顶聪明的女人根本不具备最高层政客必须具备的政治感觉。


Success in US presidential politics requires superb intuition, being quick on one’s feet, and, above all, a compelling rationale for running.	在美国总统政治中成功需要超人的直觉，超快的反应，最重要的，还需要令人信服的当选理由。


True, Clinton offers numerous programs that she would push as president; but, to borrow from Winston Churchill, there is no theme to her pudding.	诚然，克林顿拿出了许多当选后就会实施的计划； 但是，借用丘吉尔的话说，她给出的甜头没有重点。


The closest she comes to a message is a less-than-soaring “I’m a progressive who can get things done.”	她给人的印象是不太高明的“我是可以成事的开明派。 ”


By contrast, her rival, Bernie Sanders, has become a serious contender because he brilliantly composed a persuasive message for his campaign: The system is rigged and a corrupt campaign-finance regime is holding it in place.	相反，她的对手伯尔尼·桑德斯已经成为厉害的竞争者，因为他聪明地为他的选战制定了颇具说服力的口号：制度被操纵，腐败的选战金融机制把持了它。


The sweeping programs Sanders is pushing – a single-payer health-care system and free tuition at public colleges – however impracticable, are popular, especially among younger people, who overwhelmingly favor him over Clinton.	桑德斯所提出的全面方案——单一出资者的医疗体系和免费公立大学——不论如何不切实际，总归大受欢迎，特别是年轻人压倒性地支持他而不是克林顿。


Her message is one of incrementalism: Don’t dare to dream big.	她的口号属于渐进主义：要敢于做大梦。


Meanwhile, Sanders is preaching a political revolution.	与此同时，桑德斯正在宣传政治革命。


Then there’s the issue of trustworthiness.	接下来是可信任度问题。


Sanders’s integrity comes across as unimpeachable, while Clinton continues to provide reasons for questioning hers.	桑德斯的诚信无可挑剔，而克林顿一直在为对她的质疑开脱。


She and her advisers are clearly stunned by the force of the challenge she’s facing.	她和她的顾问显然对她所面临的挑战力量之大措手不及。


Sanders appears authentic; Clinton seems programmed.	桑德斯看起来诚实可靠； 克林顿则是按部就班。


She sometimes seems to be tone-deaf, particularly out of tune with the public mood on the subject of money.	她有时候显得不食人间烟火，特别是在钱的问题上与公共情绪背道而驰。


Anger at the growing gap between the very rich and everyone else has been brewing for years.	对于巨富阶层和其他人群差距日益扩大的愤怒已经发酵了多年。


Shortly before she began her campaign, Hillary Clinton said that when they left the White House she and her husband were “dead broke.”	在启动选战前不久，克林顿说，当她和丈夫比尔·克林顿离开白宫时，他们“身无长物”。


If so, they recovered quickly: Bill and Hillary Clinton are believed to be worth well over $100 million, all of it made since they left the White House and most of it through astronomical speaking fees.	果真如此的话，可以说他们致富迅速：据信比尔和希拉里·克林顿的财富远超1亿美元，全部为离开白宫后赚得，其中大部分是通过天价演讲费。


Not unlike other former US presidents – Jimmy Carter is a notable exception – the Clintons exploited their fame and influence to build up a fortune.	和其他前美国总统——吉米·卡特是一个显著的例外——没有什么不同，克林顿夫妇利用他们的名气和影响力致富。


It’s not so much how they made most of their money as who paid them.	他们赚了多少钱不重要，谁给他们钱才重要。


While Bill made business deals with some shady international figures, Hillary made a lot of her fortune by giving speeches to Wall Street firms, the main target of public wrath for causing the Great Recession of 2008.	比尔·克林顿与一些可疑的国际人物做生意，希拉里的很多财富来自为华尔街公司演讲，而华尔街是受千夫所指的2008年大衰退罪魁。


This provided an ideal target for Sanders, who singled out the fact that Clinton earned $675,000 for three speeches she gave to Goldman Sachs.	这给了桑德斯完美的靶子。 桑德斯专门指出一个事实：克林顿为高盛做了三次演讲，赚了675,000美元。


Sanders’s charges put her back on her heels; when asked by the moderator in a CNN Town Hall why she accepted so much money from Goldman Sachs, a nonplussed Clinton shrugged and replied, “That’s what they offered.”	桑德斯的职责大大打击了她的形象； 在CNN大会堂，克林顿被主持人被问及为何收了高盛这么多钱，不知所措的克林顿耸耸肩回答说：“是他们给了这么多。


Then there’s the controversy over her having chosen to use a private, unsecured server installed at her home in Chappaqua, New York to process her emails, business as well as personal, when she was Secretary of State during President Barack Obama’s first term in office.	接下来的争议是她在身为奥巴马第一个总统任期的国务卿时，选择位于其纽约州查帕瓜（Chappaqua）家中的不安全的私人服务器处理公务和私人电子邮件。


The server issue, first revealed in March 2015, now dogs her campaign, speaking not only to her tone-deafness, but, more deadly, to her judgment.	服务器问题首次曝光于2015年3月，现在已经影响到她的选战，不仅说明她不食人间烟火，更致命的是还暴露出她的拙劣的判断。


How could she not know that a Secretary of State will receive and may respond to classified information?	她怎么可能不知道，身为国务卿会收到、可能还要回复保密信息？


After the server became public knowledge, Clinton, as her husband has also done, resorted to legalisms: She hadn’t received or sent information on her server that was “marked classified at the time.”	当服务器成为众人��知的秘密后，克林顿——他的丈夫也是如此——开始讲法律：她从未在她的服务器收发“当时列为保密”的信息。


Students of Hillary-speak immediately sensed something fishy.	希拉里讲话的研究者马上嗅到了血腥味。


The State Department, it turns out, has two email systems: one classified and one unclassified; and one kind of material can’t be sent on the other.	看起来国务院有两套电子邮件系统：一套保密，一套不保密； 并且一套中的材料不能发给另一套。


To avoid sending her classified information on her private server, her aides delivered it by other means – orally or in written summaries.	为了避免在私人服务器上发送保密信息，她的助手用其他手段——口头或书面摘要——传达信息。


Thus, they weren’t “marked classified at the time.”	因此，它们不是“当时列为保密”的信息。


Yet State Department inspectors have found hundreds of emails that had been sent to her server that should have been classified.	但国务院调查者发现了数百封从她的服务器上发送的、应该列为保密的电邮。


An FBI investigation is underway.	FBI已经就此展开调查。


Finally, what was supposed to be a huge asset for her candidacy – the prospect of making history as the first woman president – isn’t working out as she and her campaign had expected.	最后，理应成为让她担任总统候选人的巨大优势——有望成为历史上首位女总统——也没有如她和她的阵营所愿那样发挥作用。


As in 2008, large numbers of women don’t want to be told that they must support Clinton simply because she’s a woman.	2008年，大量女性不希望仅仅因为身为女性被告知必须支持克林顿。


They find that an insult to their intelligence, and young women in particular are largely supporting Sanders; they prefer his platform and are troubled by questions about her integrity.	她们认为这是在侮辱她们的智商，特别是，年轻女性大多支持桑德斯； 她们更喜欢他的竞选平台，质疑她的诚信。


The only group of women that Clinton carried in New Hampshire, where Sanders beat her by 22 percentage points, was those over 65.	克林顿在新罕布什尔州（桑德斯以22个百分点在此击败克林顿）赢得的唯一女性群体是65岁以上妇女。


In the latest caucus, in Nevada, Clinton’s presumed advantage among non-white voters, who are a far greater factor in Nevada than in Iowa or New Hampshire, seems to have served her well, with Sanders failing to win enough African-American voters, in particular, to defeat her.	在最近的内华达州预选中，克林顿的非白领票仓——他们在内华达州的力量远大于艾奥瓦州和新罕布什尔州——十分“给力”，特别是桑德斯没有赢得足够多的非洲裔美国人选票，因此没能击败克林顿。


This augurs well for future nominating contests.	这是后续提名竞争的好兆头。


But the general election could be something else.	但大选可能是另外一番景象。


Hillary in Asia, Round Two	希拉里在亚洲，第二回合


SINGAPORE – US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is scheduled to travel to Asia again in July to meet foreign ministers at the ASEAN Regional Forum, and to visit India.	新加坡——美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿定于7月再访亚洲，与东盟地区论坛外长会晤，并访问印度。


On her first Asian trip in February, she provided a welcome contrast to the past with her openness to others’ views, her willingness to cooperate, and her star power.	2月首访亚洲时，她用开放的态度、合作的意愿和明星的力量形成了与过去可喜的对照。


She made Asians look at America anew.	她让亚洲人重新审视美国。


But this trip will be trickier.	但这次访问更需要技巧。


One challenge is that part of the plot for the US and Clinton is being written by others.	挑战之一美国和克林顿的部分计划是由别人制定的。


North Korea will be on the agenda after its missile tests, as will Myanmar, since its generals persist in prosecuting Aung San Suu Kyi, the world’s most famous political detainee, on trivial charges.	北朝鲜在导弹试验后登上了议事日程，还有缅甸也因将军们坚持以无关紧要的理由起诉世界最著名的在押政治犯昂山素姬登上了议事榜单。


After all that has happened in recent weeks, the definition of “success” must be set low.	在近几个星期发生了种种变故后，我们对“成功”的定义必须低调。


Nothing positive will come from the US condemning these two difficult regimes unilaterally.	美国单方面谴责这两个顽固政府不会带来任何好处。


So a key goal of Clinton’s visit must be to pull together with the Asian leaders present at the ASEAN Regional Forum.	因此克林顿访问的一个关键目标必须是与参加东盟地区论坛的亚洲领袖达成一致。


As for Myanmar, its neighbors and fellow ASEAN members – Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand – are also concerned about Suu Kyi’s continued prosecution.	在缅甸问题上，其邻国和印尼、新加坡、马来西亚和泰国等东盟伙伴也对继续起诉素姬忧心重重。


The US should begin to work with these countries not only on this matter, but also on the elections that Myanmar military junta has promised for 2010.	美国不仅应开始就此事与这些国家展开合作，还要为缅甸军政府承诺的2010年选举做些工作。


Together, they should press for assurances of a free and fair process, with the aim of avoiding the kind of mess that followed the Iranian elections.	他们要施加压力共同确保自由和公正的选举，这样才能避免伊朗选举后的混乱局面。


Indonesia can be one ally.	印尼可以成为盟友。


After decades of autocracy, this vast archipelago of a country just concluded a presidential election that has solidified its transition to democracy.	在数十年独裁统治后，这个大面积岛国刚刚结束了一次总统选举，巩固了其向民主的过渡。


India, proud of its long-standing democracy and fresh from its own elections, shares a border with Myanmar and can also assist efforts there.	为民主传统自豪且刚刚结束了本国选举的印度与缅甸拥有共同的边界，也可以为上述努力提供帮助。


The approach to North Korea is similar.	对北朝鲜也要采用类似的方法。


Kim Jong-il is a naughty boy who wants attention and incentives to behave decently.	金正日是个任性的大男孩，需要关注和激励才能体面行事。


Rather than debate with her counterparts, Clinton needs to ensure that other countries in the six-party framework, especially China and South Korea, are on the same page as the US.	克林顿不需要与同僚辩论，相反，她需要确保六方框架中的其他国家，特别是中国和南朝鲜，和美国保持一致的步调。


On both issues, there is little capacity to exert force or sufficient pressure for solutions any time soon.	在这两个问题上，美国都没有能力诉诸武力或施加足够影响力争取短期解决。


So diplomatic efforts must instead aim to join Americans and like-minded Asians in common cause, to push for steps forward in the medium to longer term.	因此外交努力必须以联合美国和志趣相投的亚洲国家参与共同事业为目标，推动中长期进展的取得。


Others must be brought on board, especially the Regional Forum hosts, ASEAN and Thailand.	必须让其他国家也加入进来，特别是地区论坛的主办国，东盟和泰国。


A moral community should form in Asia, one that displaces its leaders’ usual cynical calculations of power in order to jump on the right bandwagon.	必须在亚洲建立道德联盟，取代其领导人常见的愤世嫉俗的权力考量，才能搭上解决问题的快车。


In all this, China is the 800-pound dragon in the room.	在所有问题上，中国的作用都至关重要。


China is already closer to ASEAN and a key player with respect to Myanmar, North Korea, and other sticky issues.	中国已经靠近东盟，成为缅甸、北朝鲜和其他微妙问题上的关键角色。


A “bamboo” economic zone appears to be emerging, perhaps to replace today’s weakening US-centric trans-Pacific ties.	“竹文化”经济区似乎正在崛起，也许会取代今天日渐式微的以美国为中心的泛太平洋关系。


This is the context for Clinton’s visit to India, as well.	这也是克林顿访印的背景。


George W. Bush’s administration should be credited for giving overdue recognition to India, but this was done primarily on a bilateral basis.	乔治·W·布什政府应该为给予印度迟到的重视而受到赞誉，但布什政府的成果多以双边关系为基础。


The US should now leverage that relationship to work on regional and even global issues.	美国现在应该利用这种关系在地区乃至全球问题上展开合作。


Besides her own work, Clinton is likely to also be inundated during this visit with requests concerning President Barack Obama.	除自身工作外，克林顿很可能在此次访问中被对巴拉克·奥巴马总统的邀请所淹没。


There is still no confirmation concerning when Obama will visit Asia, though many expect that he will attend the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit, to be held in Singapore in November.	奥巴马将何时访问亚洲仍然没有确定，但很多人预期他将会出席11月在新加坡举办的亚太经济合作峰会。


China, Japan, and Indonesia must be among Obama’s priorities, but many others will clamor for him to visit their capitals.	中国、日本和印尼肯定是奥巴马的重点，但其他很多国家也将大声呼吁他访问自己的首都。


Clinton and the US administration would do well to decide which requests are merely photo ops and confine these to meetings at the sidelines of APEC.	克林顿和美国政府应合理确定哪些邀请不过是为了拍照，并将其限定在亚太经济合作组织会议的副业。


The US should insist on a substantive agenda as a precondition for any Obama visit.	美国应坚持把实质性会谈作为奥巴马到访的前提条件。


In China, for example, Clinton successfully established an agenda for the two countries to work together on climate change.	比如在中国，克林顿成功地确立了两国就气候变化合作的日程表。


Plans and resources now must be prepared.	现在必须备齐所需的计划和资源。


Clinton has reopened the doors for Obama in Asia with charm and confidence.	克林顿用魅力和信心为奥巴马重启了亚洲之门。


Obama will eventually come to Asia with many high expectations and star billing.	奥巴马终将带着很高的期望和巨星般的风采来到亚洲。


While his charisma and openness to dialog will be sought after, substance will also be measured and much needed.	在对他的对话魅力和坦诚趋之若鹜的同时，人们将睁大眼睛关注他所说的内容。


By November, after all, it will be more than a year since the global crisis began in the US, and Obama and his team must show tangible prospects for recovery.	毕竟11月份离全球金融危机在美国爆���已超过一年，奥巴马及其团队必须显现出切实的复苏前景。


American leadership – globally and in Asia – can no longer be presumed. It must be earned.	美国的全球和亚洲领导力必须要靠实干，而不能再靠假设。


A Tale of Two Atomic Cities	两个原子城的故事


HIROSHIMA/NAGASAKI – On April 27, representatives of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s 190 member countries will meet in New York for a four-week review of the 45-year-old pact.	广岛/长崎——4月27日，核不扩散条约的190个成员国代表将在纽约召开为期四周的会议审查这项拥有45年历史的协议。


The attendees would be wise to consider an important fact: Although the NPT requires its members to “pursue negotiations in good faith” on nuclear disarmament, a wide legal gap still remains when it comes to eliminating nuclear weapons.	与会者理应思考一项重要事实：虽然核不扩散条约要求其成员就核裁军问题进行“真诚的谈判”，但在销毁核武器问题上依然存在大量的法律空白难以消除。


It is time for the NPT’s signatories to initiate disarmament negotiations.	核不扩散协议的签字国现在启动裁军谈判正是时候。


This year also marks the 70th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on August 6 and 9, when citizens everywhere will have an opportunity to pay their respects to the hundreds of thousands of people who were killed or wounded on those tragic days.	今年恰逢广岛和长崎遭受原子弹轰炸70周年，各地民众将有机会向数十万在那些悲惨日子里死伤的民众表达敬意。 70年前的8月6日及9日是广岛和长崎遭受轰炸的日子。


This is also an occasion to honor the survivors, by supporting their call to eliminate all nuclear weapons, thereby ensuring that no one will ever suffer as they have.	人们还可以通过支持销毁核武器，确保不再有人遭受他们曾经遭受的苦难来对这些幸存者表达敬意。


We, the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, are but two voices among representatives from more than 6,600 cities in 160 countries and regions worldwide who support this historic goal.	我们身为广岛和长崎市的市长，不过是支持这一历史目标的全世界超过160个国家和地区6，600座城市代表中的两人而已。


Our organization, Mayors for Peace, was created in 1982 as a way to transcend national borders and work together toward the abolition of nuclear weapons.	我们所在组织和平市长会议成立于1982年，目的是超越国界的束缚，共同向着销毁核武器的目标努力。


More mayors are joining our cause every year, and our determination to pursue nuclear disarmament will only deepen in the years ahead.	我们的事业每年都会吸引更多的市长投身其中，未来我们实现核裁军的决心只会越来越坚定。


It is fitting that mayors, driven by their sense of responsibility to protect their citizens’ safety and welfare, take a keen interest in this cause.	为了保护市民的福祉和安全，市长们理所当然地对这项事业表现出浓厚的兴趣。


The horrific, indiscriminate, and long-term consequences of nuclear weapons for humanity and the environment cannot be overstated – especially when they target densely populated areas.	怎么形容核武器对人类和环境造成的不加选择的长期危害都不为过——尤其当它们瞄准人口稠密地区。


The danger that nuclear weapons will be used again, either intentionally or accidentally, will exist for as long as they remain available, a conclusion reached at three major international humanitarian conferences and strongly affirmed by the United Nations.	有意无意被滥用的危险只要核武器存在一天就无法消除，三大国际人道主义会议已经就此达成一致，并且得到联合国的坚定支持。


And it is scandalous that vast sums are being devoted to maintaining and modernizing these weapons at a time when budget constraints undermine efforts to address pressing human needs around the world.	巨额资金被用于维护和升级核武器的行为极为可耻，因为预算限制时刻威胁着满足人类迫切需求的努力。


The number of nuclear near-misses – accidents and miscalculations that have almost led to disaster – is shocking.	差一点导致灾难的事故和误算——即未遂核事故的数量令人不寒而栗。


Moreover, such weapons and their related facilities and components are attractive targets for terrorists.	此外，上述武器及其相关设施及零部件对恐怖分子而言极具吸引力。


It is a matter of no small public concern that international security still depends on “nuclear deterrence” – a doctrine based on mutual distrust that aims to keep the peace through the threat of mass killings.	国际安全仍有赖于“核威慑”是引发公众关注的重大问题——这种学说基于缺乏互信，旨在借助大规模屠杀威胁达到维护和平的目的。


Worse, there have been suggestions of their actual use.	更糟的是，甚至有人提出过实际使用核武器的建议。


Military planners who consider the use of nuclear weapons have probably given scant thought to those living in the cities on their target lists.	考虑使用核武器的军事策划者或许很少考虑到生活在其目标名单城市中的市民群体。


For too long, the residents of cities have been used as pawns on a global nuclear chessboard, with little concern for the full implications of playing the game.	长久以来，城市居民被当作全球核棋盘上的人质，很少有人关注过核游戏所隐含的全面涵义。


But, as the public is educated about the specific threats that nuclear weapons continue to pose to the cities in which they live, that stance will be increasingly difficult to maintain.	但随着公众越来越了解核武器对其所在城市构成的具体威胁，这种状况已经越来越难以维持。


At the same time, people worldwide must stop regarding one another as untrustworthy enemies.	与此同时，各国民众将对方视作不值得信赖的敌人的做法必须停止。


That is why Mayors for Peace, together with a wide range of civil-society groups, is striving not only for the abolition of nuclear weapons, but also to cultivate a shared sense of belonging to a single human family, regardless of our cultural, religious, or ethnic differences.	这解释了为什么和平市长会议与涉及面甚广的一系列民间社团一道，正努力在销毁核武器的同时培养无论文化、宗教或种族差异，我们每个人都隶属于同一个人类大家庭的共同意识。


Until now, nuclear-weapon states’ national governments and bureaucracies have preferred to limit the disarmament debate to symbolic measures that imply no deadlines or additional legally binding obligations.	时至今日，核武器国家政府和官僚机构更愿意将核裁军辩论限制在没有最后期限或法律约束义务的象征性措施。


They claim that the security environment is not mature enough to take bold steps toward nuclear disarmament.	他们声称现有安全环境还不够成熟，无法大胆采取核裁军措施。


We disagree.	这种说法我们不能同意。


Concerted efforts – involving national and local governments, universities, workers’ unions, political parties, environmental groups, young people, women’s groups, lawyers, and the business community – can change the world.	国家和地方政府、大学、工会、政党、环保团体、青年、妇女团体、律师和商界的共同努力可以改变世界。


But it is world leaders – in particular, those whose countries maintain nuclear weapons – who must take the first step toward building confidence and initiating meaningful cooperation on disarmament.	但各国领袖——特别是那些保有核武器国家的领袖——必须展开建立信心和启动有意义裁军合作的破冰之旅。


Along the way, they can lay the groundwork for a new kind of security system – one that does not rely on nuclear deterrence.	在此过程中他们可以奠定全新安全体���的基础——而上述安全体系并不依赖于核威胁。


It is crucial that representatives at the NPT review conference work together to bring the rule of law to nuclear disarmament and close the gap in the NPT that has permitted the most inhumane of all weapons of mass destruction to continue to exist.	关键是核不扩散审查会议的代表要共同努力为核裁军建立法治规则，并填补核不扩散条约的空白，使所有大规模杀伤性武器中最不人道的武器再无容身之地。


Mayors for Peace and its civil-society partners will do everything we can do to support them.	和平市长会议及其民间社团伙伴将竭尽全力为他们提供支持。


The tragic tale of our two cities should never become the tale of your city.	我们两座城市的悲惨故事永远不该再发生在你的城市。


Historical Memory and Engineering Failures	历史记忆和技术失败


George Santayana, the Spanish-American poet and philosopher, once warned that "Those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it."	西班牙裔美国诗人和哲学家George Santayana曾警告世人"忘记过去会让历史重演"，在造桥史上更是如此。


This is especially true in the field of bridge building, where over the past 150 years dramatic failures have occurred at surprisingly regular intervals.	过去150年来，几乎每隔一段时间就会出现令人震惊的失败。


In 1847, the first major structural failure on Britain's expanding railway network occurred at Chester, England.	1847年，英格兰切斯特发生了英国铁路扩建工程的首次重大结构事故。


The Dee Bridge, whose cast- and wrought-iron design followed common practice for the period, collapsed under a passing train, killing everyone aboard.	按照当时流行的锻铸方法修建的迪桥（Dee Bridge）在火车开过时突然坍塌，所有乘客全部遇难。


Subsequent investigation revealed that the structure, the longest of its kind, simply pushed the limits of railroad-bridge engineering too far.	随后的调查显示：该桥的锻铸构造在同类桥中历史最为悠久，超出了铁路桥技术所能允许的最大限度。


In 1879, the longest bridge in the world spanned the River Tay at Dundee, Scotland.	1879年，横跨苏格兰敦提泰河的世界第一长桥宣告落成。


Composed of many modest spans, the structure involved no radically new design concepts and seemed to be a mere application of proven technology.	桥身修有很多小拱，没有采用任何全新技术，似乎只是成熟技术的又一次应用。


However, the force of the wind was grossly underestimated and worksmanship was inferior.	然而，这座桥严重低估了风力的影响，修造工艺也十分粗糙。


As a result, the Tay Bridge, vulnerable in a gale, was blown off its supports.	结果是泰桥禁不住狂风的考验，桥身被突如其来的大风吹离了基座。


In 1907, the longest span in the world was being constructed over the St. Lawrence River near Quebec, Canada.	1907年，加拿大魁北克附近的圣劳伦斯河上落成了全球最长的拱桥。


The bridge was of a relatively new type, known as a cantilever, which had become quite fashionable.	该桥采用了比较新颖的悬臂构造，这样的结构非常流行。


Although it was only slightly longer than the highly successful cantilever bridge over the Forth River near Edinburgh, Scotland, the Quebec Bridge was so inadequately designed that it collapsed before it was completed.	尽管只比苏格兰爱丁堡福斯河上非常成功的悬臂大桥稍长一点，但魁北克大桥存在设计问题，还未完工就坍塌了。


In 1940, the third longest suspension bridge in the world was opened in Washington State.	1940年，长度居全球第三的吊桥在华盛顿州落成通车。


The Tacoma Narrows Bridge was designed as state of the art, which included a strong aesthetic preference for slender structures.	Tacoma Narrows大桥的设计代表了当时的最高水平，突出表现了对纤细美感的执着追求。


Within four months of its opening, the bridge was destroyed by winds in a manner totally unanticipated by its engineers.	出乎所有设计师的预料，落成还不到四个月，大桥就在风中坍塌。


In 1970, steel box-girder bridges in Milford Haven, Wales, and in Melbourne, Australia, failed spontaneously while under construction.	1970年，威尔士米尔福德港和澳大利亚墨尔本的箱形钢梁大桥在建筑过程中自然坍塌。


Both were among the longest structures of their kind and were thought to be just natural applications of existing technology.	这两座大桥拥有各自类型中最长的构架，被看成是现有技术的自然应用。


In 2000, the much-anticipated opening of London's Millennium Bridge over the River Thames was followed only three days later by its closure.	2000年，人们翘首以待的横跨泰晤士河的伦敦千禧大桥落成通车，仅仅3天后，千禧大桥被迫关闭。


The sleek footbridge swayed unexpectedly and excessively under the feet of pedestrians, and it was deemed too dangerous to use.	光滑的人行桥在来来往往的人们脚下出人意料地大幅颤抖，所有人都认为在上面行走太过危险。


What should have been a mere extension of the millennia-old art of building pedestrian bridges, proved to be a modern engineering embarrassment.	千禧大桥本该是千年造桥工艺的自然延续，却变成了现代技术难以面对的尴尬。


The thirty-year interval between historic bridge failures was first highlighted by the work of Paul Sibly, who wrote a thesis on the subject, and his University of London advisor, A. C. Walker.	Paul Sibly在其著作中首先提到了历史上每隔30年即有桥梁坍塌的事实，并就此题目撰写了一篇论文，Sibly在伦敦大学的导师A. C.


They noted the cyclical regularity of such occurrences and speculated that it represented a gap in communications between generations of engineers.	Walker也提出了同样的观点。 两位学者强调了事故出现的周期性，并提出这是由身处不同年代的工程人员缺乏交流造成的恶果。


Although each of the notable failures involved a different type of bridge, in no case was the structure radically new.	尽管这些著名事故中涉及的桥梁类型有所不同，但任何结构都不是全新采用的。


Each used technology that engineers had been confidently employing for bridges, and for which the assumed loads and methods of analysis were well established.	所有大桥都采用了令设计人员充满信心的造桥技术，其预计载荷及分析方法都经过了时间的考验。


In every case, engineers believed that they were just building incrementally on successful practice.	每次事故中，工程师们都相信自己不过将现有的成功技术加以发展。


In fact, designing in a climate of success can be dangerous for an engineer.	在成功的氛围中进行设计实际非常危险。


Successful experience teaches us only that what has been accomplished in the past has worked. But things that work on a small scale do not necessarily work when slightly larger.	成功的经验只能说明过去的实践取得了成效，但在小范围内可行的方法在较大的环境中未必可靠。


This was known to Vitruvius, who wrote about Greek and Roman engineering more than 2,000 years ago.	早在2000年前，希腊罗马技术书籍的编纂者维特鲁威就对此了然于胸。


It was also known to Galileo, who noted that Renaissance engineers who followed successful methods of building ships and moving obelisks were often surprised by the spontaneous failures when tried with larger ships and obelisks.	掌握这一原则的还有伽利略，他指出文艺复兴时期采用成功造船和方尖塔迁移技术的工程师时常惊讶地看到，原有技术在大型船舶和方尖塔的建造过程中常常会以失败告终。


Failures always reveal weaknesses and provide incontrovertible evidence of our incomplete understanding of how things work.	失败常会暴露弱点，明白无误地表明我们对规律的了解还很片面。


When the failures described above occurred, engineers were sensitized to their own limitations and so approached subsequent designs - no matter of what kind of bridge - with renewed respect for the laws and forces of nature.	事故发生时，工程师们了解了自身的局限，今后设计桥梁时就会更尊重自然法则。


Unfortunately, human memory fades with time, and new generations of engineers with no vivid experience of past failures can proceed with hubris to design again beyond wise limits.	令人遗憾的是，时间能够冲淡人类的记忆，没有对过去事故有过亲身体验的新一代工程师的设计常会过于自信地越过明智的界线。


The history of engineering is no mere adjunct to technical know-how.	技术史并不仅限于工程技术的范畴。


A historical perspective on bridge building or any other engineering specialty provides a caveat about how our humanity affects our thinking.	桥梁修建或其它技术的历史观点告诫人们：人性会对思维产生哪些影响。


Building a new bridge following a familiar model can lead to complacency. Building a novel bridge, especially in the wake of a spectacular failure, forces engineers to think from scratch and also to think more deeply and critically.	按照熟悉的模式造桥会导致骄傲自满，而在令人震惊的事故之后以新的模式造桥迫使人们从点滴入手，更深入、更批判性地认真思考。


Hence, the paradox that success leads to failure, and failure leads to success.	因此，成功导致失败，而失败又带来成功的悖论始终存在。


The cable-stayed bridge is a form that is currently being pushed to limits and beyond those originally imagined to apply to it.	目前，钢索斜拉桥的技术应用已经达到了极限，远远超乎了设计者们最初的想象。


Widespread successes with cable-stayed structures have made the type almost commonplace.	斜拉构造的普遍成功让这种桥型几乎无处不在。


As such, its development into ever longer spans is following the historic pattern that in the past has led to failures.	于是，桥面长度的日益增长已经步入了曾导致事故的做法后尘。


Whether there will be a major cable-stayed bridge failure soon - or around the year 2030 - will most likely depend not so much on computer analyses as on how well engineers know their history and are determined not to repeat it.	钢索斜拉桥重大事故是否会很快出现，还是会出现在历史提示的2030年，��并不取决于计算机分析，而是取决于桥梁工程师是否了解过去的历史，并下定决心避免事故的重演。


Historic Election in Egypt?	埃及的历史性选举？


Egyptians go to the polls on September 7th to elect a president from among ten contenders, including the incumbent of 24 years, Hosni Mubarak.	埃及人在9月7号会从10位竞选者中选出一位总统。 这些竞选者中也包括了在位24年的穆巴拉克。


While few doubt the outcome will be his re-election, many are intensely following the process.	虽然没有什么人怀疑选举的结果会是穆氏的连任，但还是有很多人对选举进程表示强烈关注。


Some 6000 domestic election monitors have been training for the event, while hundreds of foreign reporters are converging on the country this week.	有约6000名选举监察员正在接受培训，同时数百名外国记者在本周也正向埃及汇集。


Although all the formal trappings of a true electoral contest are in place, important aspects of authenticity are glaringly absent.	虽然选举竞争看起来已万事俱备，但其重要的真实性仍然缺失。


Despite promises to the contrary, this is far from a level playing field.	虽然竞选承诺公平，但事实却并非如此。


Mubarak still commands disproportionate assets: name recognition, a virtual monopoly on state-controlled electronic media and some 85% of the print media.	穆巴拉克依然占据着压倒多数的资产：知名度、对国家控制的电子媒体和85%的纸媒体的实际垄断。


One week before the poll, some opposition candidates have yet to air even one campaign ad on Egyptian television.	在大选投票前一周，有些反对派候选人甚至都还没能在埃及的电视里播放一次竞选广告。


All members of the presidential election commission are Mubarak appointees, and the new election rules eliminated any independent challengers.	总统选举委员会的成员都由穆巴拉克指定，新的选举规则将所有的独立挑战者排除在外。


Since the year 2000, Egypt’s 8000 judges must supervise and certify election results, by ruling of the High Court.	根据高等法院的决定，自2000年起，埃及的8000名法官必须对选举结果进行监督和认证。


This was a major step toward fairer elections, as the judges’ professional union has remained fairly independent over the past half-century of executive power grabs.	鉴于法官的同业公会在过去半个世纪以来一直对行政权力之争保持相对独立的姿态，所以这一决定是向更公平的选举迈进了一大步。


So the Mubarak regime has had to use various ploys to neutralize the judge’s union.	所以穆巴拉克政权不得不使用不同的策略来压制法官工会。 其中一招就是强行扩展“司法”的定义，使其包括数千名拥有法律学位但却没有司法经验的忠诚的政府雇员。


One was to stretch the definition of ‘the judiciary’ to include thousands of loyal government employees who have law degrees but no experience on the bench.  This boxes in the true judges, for if they protest by boycotting their supervisory duties, the task will fall once more to police from the infamous Ministry of the Interior.	这使真正的法官们左右为难。 因为如果他们以抵制监督职责的方式来抗议，那么这个任务就会落入臭名昭著的内政部手中。


Thus, in the past, the judges’ union tended to go along, with predictable results.	因此，在过去法官工会倾向于随大流，接受毫无悬念的选举结果。


In the 2000 parliamentary elections, while Mubarak’s ruling party received roughly 38% of the popular vote in districts supervised by true judges, that percent somehow jumped to 86% where the quasi-judges were in charge.	在2000年的议会选举中，虽然穆巴拉克在由真正的法官监督的选区获得了约38%的选民投票，但在由“准法官”们监督的选区这一比例就猛升到了86%。


This year promises to be very different.	今年的形势却似乎大不相同。


In the spring the judges held a nation-wide assembly and resolved that unless the regime granted them full independence, and exclusive oversight of the voting process they would not supervise the upcoming presidential (or parliamentary) races.	法官们在春季召开了全国性大会，并决议除非执政当局给予他们完全的独立性和对选举进程不受干扰的监督权，否则他们将不会监督即将举行的总统（或议会）选举。


On September 2nd they made their final demands: allow civil society groups to observe the voting process, stop interfering in the definition of legitimate judges for purposes of the election, and agree that no ballot box will leave the presence of a legitimate judge until its contents are counted, certified and reported.	9月2日，他们提出了最后的要求：（当局）允许公民社会团体观察投票过程，停止为了选举目的而扭曲合法法官的定义，同意只有当投票箱中所有选票被计数、认证并报告之后，才能将投票箱从合法的法官处带走。


Thus far, a standoff looks likely, as the head of the presidential election commission has stated publicly on Egyptian television that he refuses all citizen monitoring of the election process.	到目前为止，随着总统选举委员会的负责人在埃及电视上宣布拒绝对选举过程实施全民监督，形势似乎进入了一个平局。


Other interesting developments on the eve of the election include a fierce public debate over whether to vote or to boycott the presidential race.	在大选前夕，还出现了一些其他的有趣现象，其中包括一场关于是投票还是要抵制总统竞选的激烈的公众辩论。


Several opposition parties have called on their members to stay away in protest over restrictive election rules that strongly favor Mubarak.	几个反对党派已经号召其党员不参加投票，以示对有利于穆巴拉克的限制性选举规则的抗议。


On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood, thought to be the single strongest opposition group in Egypt, are urging their followers to caste ballots and vote their conscience but not to give support to any ‘despotic, corrupt rulers.’	但另一方面，被认为是埃及最强的独立反对派集团的“穆斯林兄弟会”，却敦促其追随者凭良心投票，并不要支持任何“专制、腐败的统治者”。


This is a clear if implicit repudiation of Mubarak, the sole ruler for 24 years.	这明显是对独掌大权24年的穆巴拉克的含蓄批判。


Some 34 civil society organizations are preparing thousands of young Egyptians to monitor the elections despite repeated governmental objections.	尽管政府一再反对，还是有34个公民社会组织正准备让数千名年轻的埃及人届时去监督选举。


These groups argue that if the regime is not planning to rig the vote, then domestic as well as foreign observation of the polling process should not be a problem.	这些社团认为，如果现政权无意操纵投票，那么国内外对选举过程的观察就不应成为问题。


The regime response is to say that any outside monitoring is an infringement on Egyptian sovereignty, and that domestic monitors are an affront to the integrity of the judges.	政府的反应则是说任何外来的监督都是对埃及主权的侵犯，而国内的监督员则是对法官操守的公然侮辱。


That argument was quickly undermined when the judges’ union announced their support for civil society monitors.	当法官工会宣布支持公民社会监督员时，政府的这套说辞也很快不攻自破了。


Whether the Mubarak regime is running scared because of the mounting challenges from within and without to hold a free and fair election, or is simply incapable of ridding the party of cheating as a way of life, the present signs do not bode well for next Wednesday’s polls.	不管穆巴拉克政权是在国内外要求自由和公平选举的风起云涌的挑战面前露了怯，还是不能刹住该党一贯盛行的舞弊之风，目前的迹象都让下周三即将进行的投票不容乐观。


Meanwhile, Egyptians for the first time are experiencing the thrilling taste of defying tyranny, and enjoying some newly-found space for freedom.	但与此同时，埃及人第一次尝到了挑战独裁的激动滋味，并正享受着一些新近得来的自由空间。


The Use and Abuse of Monetary History	对货币史的利用及滥用


BERKELEY – Imagine two central banks.	发自伯克利——让我们设想有两种中央银行。


One is hyperactive, responding aggressively to events.	一种是极度活跃且对事件反应迅速有力。


While it certainly cannot be accused of ignoring current developments, its policies are widely criticized as storing up problems for the future.	虽然外界肯定不会指责这种银行忽略了当前事态发展，但会普遍批评其政策将在未来埋下隐患。


The other central bank is unflappable.	另一种央行行事从容不迫。


It remains calm in the face of events, seeking at all cost to avoid doing anything that might be construed as encouraging excessive risk-taking or creating even a whiff of inflation.	事件发生时它依然保持冷静，并会不惜任何代价来避免做出那些可能会被视为鼓励过度冒险或是制造一小轮通胀的举措。


What I have just described is no mere hypothetical, of course.	我刚刚描述的可不仅仅是设想。


It is, in fact, a capsule depiction of the United States Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank.	事实上，这就是对美联储和欧洲央行的简略描述。


One popular explanation for the two banks’ different approaches is that they stem from their societies’ respective historical experiences.	对两大银行不同的应对方式有一种流行的解释，那就是这些差异源自于两个社会各自的历史经验。


The banks’ institutional personalities reflect the role of collective memory in shaping how officials conceptualize the problems that they face.	两家银行的制度特性反映了集体记忆在塑造官员如何概念化其所面对的问题方面所起的作用。


The Great Depression of the 1930’s, when the Fed stood idly by as the economy collapsed, is the molding event seared into the consciousness of every American central banker.	上世纪30年代的大萧条时期——当时美国经济崩溃，美联储却袖手旁观——是深深烙印在每一个美国中央银行家意识中的固化事件。


As a result, the Fed responds aggressively when it perceives even a limited risk of another depression.	结果，当美联储察觉到出现另一次萧条的一点点迹象时，它就开始积极反应。


By contrast, the defining event shaping European monetary policy is the hyperinflation of the 1920’s, filtered through the experience of the 1970’s and 1980’s, when central banks were enlisted once again to finance budget deficits – and again with inflationary consequences.	相比之下，塑造欧洲货币政策的决定性事件是1920年代的恶性通货膨胀，再结合1970~1980年代的经验，当时各国央行再次被召集起来为预算赤字融资——并再一次引发了通货膨胀的后果。


Indeed, delegating national monetary policies to a Europe-wide central bank was intended to solve precisely this problem.	事实上，把国家货币政策委托给欧洲央行正是为了解决这个问题。


It is not only in central banking, of course, that we see the role of historical experience in shaping policymaking.	当然，历史经验在塑造政策制定时起作用的例子并不局限于央行。


President Lyndon Johnson, when deciding to escalate US intervention in Vietnam, drew an analogy with Munich, when the failure to respond to Hitler’s aggression had catastrophic consequences.	当年林登·约翰逊（Lyndon Johnson）总统决定升级美国对越南的干预时，就引用了慕尼黑的例子——后者因坐视希特勒的恶行而导致了灾难性的后果。 四分之一个世纪后，乔治·H·W·布什（George H.


A quarter-century later, President George H.W. Bush, considering how best to roll back Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, drew an analogy with Vietnam, where the absence of an exit strategy had caused US forces to get bogged down.	W. Bush）总统在思考如何击退伊朗对科威特的侵略时也用越南来作类比——由于缺乏退出策略，驻越美军深陷泥潭。


But a key conclusion of research on foreign policy is that decision-makers all too often fail to test their analogies for “fitness.”	但外交政策研究的一个重要结论就是决策者都通常都无法检验这些类推法的“适用性”。


They fail to ask whether there is, in fact, a close correspondence between historical circumstances and current facts.	事实上，他们没有考虑到那些历史环境和当前情况之间是否密切对应。


They invoke specific analogies not so much because they resemble current conditions, but because they are seared into the public’s consciousness.	他们使用这种特定的类推法并不全是因为历史环境与当前的情况相类似，而是因为那些历史事件已经深深嵌入了公众的意识之中。


As a result, analogical reasoning both shapes and distorts policy.	结果，历史类推法既塑造也扭曲了政策。


It misleads decision-makers, as it did both Johnson and Bush.	它误导了决策者，正如它误导了约翰逊总统和布什总统一样。


The same dangers arise for monetary policy.	货币政策也存在同样的危险。


For the Fed, it is important to ask whether the 1930’s, when its premature policy tightening precipitated a double-dip recession, really is the best historical analogy to consider when contemplating how to time the exit from its current accommodating stance.	对美联储来说，重要的是当考虑如何计算退出当前适应性立场的时机时，要搞清楚上世纪30年代——当其过早政策紧缩引发了双重衰退——是否真是用以类比的最佳历史时期。


Certainly, the Great Depression is not the only alternative on offer.	当然，大萧条并不是唯一的类比选择。


The Fed might also consider policy in 1924-1927, when low interest rates fueled stock-market and real-estate bubbles, or 2003-2005, when interest rates were held down in the face of serious financial imbalances.	美联储最好也要考虑一下1924~1927年期间的政策——当时的低利率推动了股市和房地产泡沫，或者2003~2005年期间的政策——当时金融失衡严重，利率被压制。


At a minimum, the Fed might develop a “portfolio” of analogies, test them for fitness, and distill their lessons, as President John F. Kennedy famously did when weighing his options during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.	至少美联储可以举出一个类比例子“列表”，测试它们的适用性并汲取经验，正如1962年约翰·F·肯尼迪（John F. Kennedy）在古巴导弹危机期间权衡选择时所做的那样。


Similarly, the ECB might consider not only how monetary accommodation allowed governments to run large budget deficits in the 1920’s, but also how central bankers’ failure to respond to the financial crisis of the 1930’s fed political extremism and undermined support for responsible government.	同样地，欧洲央行可能不仅要考虑1920年代的货币调节政策如何会允许政府拥有巨额预算赤字，也要考虑中央银行家们在应对1930年代金融危机时怎样激化了政治极端主义并破坏了对负责任政府的支持。


Again, rigorous analysis requires testing these historical analogies for fitness with current circumstances.	再次强调一点，严格的分析需要检验这些历史类推法对当前情况的适用性。


Anyone who does so will find it hard to defend the ECB and its stubborn inaction in the face of events.	采用这种严谨分析方法的人会发现要为欧洲央行及其面对事件时的顽固不作为辩护是极为困难的。


There is exactly zero evidence in Europe today that inflation is just around the corner.	现在根本没有任何证据表明欧洲通货膨胀即将来临。


And, if current European governments are not committed to austerity and fiscal consolidation, then which governments are?	而且，如果目前欧洲国家政府不承诺紧缩和财政巩固，又有哪些政府会呢？


When I consider the European economy, the ECB’s failure to provide more monetary support for economic growth appears to be directly analogous to Europe’s disastrous monetary policies in the 1930’s.	当我思考欧洲经济时，欧洲央行无法为经济增长提供更多货币支持的情况似乎跟欧洲上世纪1930年代灾难性的货币政策很类似。


The political consequences could be similarly devastating.	其政治后果可能也同样会为害甚巨。


Europeans should ponder why the inflationary 1920’s, rather than the politically catastrophic 1930’s, have become the historical lodestar for current monetary policy.	欧洲人应该好好想想为什么是通胀的1920年代而非充满政治灾难的1930年代成为了当前货币政策的历史指南。


On the other hand, when I contemplate the US economy, I conclude that recovery from the Great Depression, and not 1924-1927 or 2003-2005, is the episode that most closely resembles current circumstances.	另外一个方面，当我思考美国经济时，我推断大萧条的复苏——而不是1924~1927年或2003~2005年——是与当前情况最相似的时期。


Only in the 1930’s were interest rates near zero.	只有在1930年代银行利率为零。


Only in the 1930’s was the economy digging itself out from a major financial crisis.	也只有在那时经济正从大型金融危机中摆脱出来。


Then again, perhaps it is to be expected that I find the analogy with the 1930’s compelling.	那么再一次，也许可以预计我将当前与1930年代类比的做法是有说服力的。


That was the defining episode for American monetary policy.	这将会是美国货币政策的决定性片段。


And I am, after all, an American.	而我，毕竟是一个美国人。


A Brief History of (In)equality	（不）平等性简史


BERKELEY – The Berkeley economist Barry Eichengreen recently gave a talk in Lisbon about inequality that demonstrated one of the virtues of being a scholar of economic history.	伯克利—伯克利经济学家巴里·艾肯格林（Barry Eichengreen）最近在里斯本发表了关于不平等性的讲话。 这番讲话体现了作为经济理论学者的优点之一。


Eichengreen, like me, glories in the complexities of every situation, avoiding oversimplification in the pursuit of conceptual clarity.	和我一样，艾肯格林欣然接受每一种状态的复杂性，避免为了追求概念的明晰性而过度简化。


This disposition stays the impulse to try to explain more about the world than we can possibly know with one simple model.	这一倾向是因为想要比通过简单的模型所能了解的程度更多地解释世界。


For his part, with respect to inequality, Eichengreen has identified six first-order processes at work over the past 250 years.	对艾肯格林来说，在不平等性这个话题上，他发现在过去250年中有六大主要（first-order）过程在起作用。


The first is the widening of Britain’s income distribution between 1750 and 1850, as the gains from the British Industrial Revolution went to the urban and rural middle class, but not to the urban and rural poor.	首先是1750年到1850年间英国收入分配的扩大，英国工业革命所产生的收益流向了城市和乡村中产阶级，而不是城市和乡村穷人。


Second, between 1750 and 1975, income distribution also widened globally, as some parts of the world realized gains from industrial and post-industrial technologies, while others did not.	其次，1750年到1975年间，收入分配在全球也呈现出扩大之势，一些地区实现了来自工业和后工业科技的收益，而另一些地区没有。


For example, in 1800, American purchasing power parity was twice that of China; by 1975 it was 30 times that of China.	比如，1800年，美国购买力平价两倍于中国； 到1975年，已是中国的30倍。


The third process is what is known as the First Age of Globalization, between 1850 and 1914, when living standards and labor productivity levels converged in the global north.	第三个过程被称为第一全球化时代，即1850年到1914年全球北方生活水平和劳动生产率趋同期。


During this time, 50 million people left an overcrowded agricultural Europe for resource-rich new settlements.	其间，5,000万人离开拥挤的农业欧洲，寻找资源丰富的新居所。


They brought their institutions, technologies, and capital with them, and the wage differential between Europe and these new economies shrank from roughly 100% to 25%.	他们将制度、科技和资本带到了新的定居地，欧洲和这些新经济体的工资差异从100%左右下降到25%。


This mostly coincided with the Gilded Age between 1870 and 1914, when domestic inequality rose in the global north as entrepreneurship, industrialization, and financial manipulation channeled new gains mostly to the wealthiest families.	这大体上和1870年到1914年间的镀金时代重合，全球北方呈现出国内不平等性加剧，因为企业家精神、工业化和金融操纵将新收益大多引向了最富裕家庭。


Gilded Age inequality was significantly reversed during the period of social democracy in the global north, between 1930 and 1980, when higher taxes on the wealthy helped pay for new government benefits and programs.	镀金时代的不平等性在全球北方的社会民主时期，即1930年到1980年间大幅扭转，其间对富人课税的增加帮助支付了政府福利和计划。


But the subsequent and last stage brings us to the current moment, when economic policy choices have again resulted in a widening of the distribution of gains in the global north, ushering in a new Gilded Age.	但随后的最后阶段把我们带到了现在，经济政策选择在此导致全球北方收益分配的扩大，进入了一个新镀金时代。


Eichengreen’s six processes affecting inequality are a good starting point.	艾肯格林的影响不平等性的六大过程是一个良好的开端。


But I would go further and add six more.	但我想在加上六个过程。


First, there is the stubborn persistence of absolute poverty in some places, despite the extraordinary overall reduction since 1980.	首先，一些地区绝对贫困顽固地存在着，尽管自1980年以来取得了了不起的总体减贫工作。


As the UCLA scholar Ananya Roy points out, people in absolute poverty are deprived of both the opportunities and the means to change their status.	加州大学洛杉矶分校学者阿南亚·罗伊（Ananya Roy）指出，绝对贫困人群被剥夺了机会和改变地位的途径。


They lack what the philosopher Isaiah Berlin called “positive liberty” – empowerment for self-actualization – as well as “negative liberty,” or freedom from obstacles in one’s path of action.	他们缺少哲学家以赛亚·伯林所谓的“积极自由”，即自我实现的禀赋，以及“消极自由”，即在行动路径中避免障碍的自由。


Seen in this light, inequality is an uneven distribution not only of wealth, but also of liberty.	从这个角度讲，不平等性不但是财富分配不公，也是自由分配不公。


Second is the abolition of slavery in many parts of the world during the nineteenth century, followed by, third, the global loosening over time of other caste constraints – race, ethnicity, gender – which deprived even some people with wealth of the opportunities to use it.	其次是十九世纪世界诸多地区废除奴隶制，随之而来的是第三个过程，即全球等级限制——种族、民族、性别等——随时间而放松，就连一些富有之人也因为这些限制而失去了使用机会。


The fourth process consists of two recent high-growth generations in China and one high-growth generation in India, which has been a significant factor underlying global wealth convergence since 1975.	第四个过程包括中国最近高增长的两代人和印度高增长的一代人，他们是1975年以来全球财富趋同的重要支撑因素。


Fifth is the dynamic of compound interest, which through favorable political arrangements allows the wealthy to profit from the economy without actually creating any new wealth.	第五个过程是复利动态，它通过有利的政治安排让富人在不实际创造任何新财富的情况下从经济中获利。


As the French economist Thomas Piketty has observed, this process may have played some role in our past, and will surely play an even bigger role in our future.	法国经济学家托马斯·皮凯蒂（Thomas Piketty）观察到，这一过程可能在我们的过去起到了一定作用，并且必定会在我们的未来起到更大的作用。


At this point, it should be clear why I began by noting the complexity of economic history.	现在，我为何要从认识经济理论的复杂性开始应该已经相当清楚了。


This complexity implies that any adjustments to our political economy should be based on sound social science and directed by elected leaders who are genuinely acting in the interest of the people.	这一复杂性意味着任何对我们的政治经济的调整都应该基于可靠的社会科学，并由真正为人民利益服务的民选领导人来引导。


Emphasizing complexity brings me to a final factor affecting inequality – perhaps the most important of all: populist mobilizations.	强调复杂性让我来到了影响不平等性的最后一个因素——也许是最重要的因素：民粹主义动员。


Democracies are prone to populist uprisings, especially when inequality is on the rise.	民主国家很容易发生民粹主义起义，特别是当不平等性加剧的时候。


But the track record of such uprisings should give us pause.	但这类起义的历史记录应该让我们停下来。


In France, populist mobilizations installed an emperor – Napoleon III, who led a coup in 1851 – and overthrew democratically elected governments during the Second Republic.	在法国，民粹主义动员在第三共和国期间产生了一位皇帝——拿破仑三世，他在1851年领导了一场政变——并颠覆了民选政府。


In the United States, they underpinned discrimination against immigrants and sustained the Jim Crow era of legal racial segregation.	在美国，民粹主义动员是歧视移民和合法种族隔离时代得以维持的基础。


In Central Europe, populist mobilizations have driven imperial conquests under the banner of proletarian internationalism.	在中欧，民粹主义动员推动了打着无产阶级国际主义旗号的帝国主义征服。


In the Soviet Union, they helped Vladimir Lenin consolidate power, with disastrous consequences that were surpassed only by the horrors of Nazism, which also came to power on a populist wave.	在苏联，民粹主义动员帮助列宁巩固了权力，其所造成的可怕后果只有纳粹恐怖方有过之，而纳粹掌权也是凭借民粹主义浪潮。


Constructive populist responses to inequality are fewer, but they should certainly be mentioned.	建设性民粹主义不平等性应对政策较少，但它们显然应该得到提及。 在一些例子中，民粹主义帮助扩大了特许权；


In some cases, populism has helped in extending the franchise; enacting a progressive income tax and social insurance; building physical and human capital; opening economies; prioritizing full employment; and encouraging migration.	带来了累进所得税和社会保险； 构建了实体和人力资本；


History teaches us that these latter responses to inequality have made the world a better place.	历史教导我们，后面那几种不平等性的应对之道让世界变得更加美好。


Unfortunately – and at the risk of oversimplification – we usually fail to heed history’s lessons.	不幸的是——并且在过度简化的风险之下——我们常常不能汲取历史的教训。


History’s Ghosts in Iran	历史的幽灵在伊朗徘徊


Using historical analogies to interpret the present is both tempting and dangerous, for history never truly repeats itself.	利用历史上的相似点来解释现今既诱人而又危险，因为历史从来都不完全重复自己。


Yet, to understand the difficulty of responding to the problems that Iran’s nuclear ambition and anti-Israel obsession now pose, it might be helpful to analyze the three analogies that are most commonly used.	但是，为了理解如何难以应付伊朗的核子野心以及反以色列的成见所带来的种种问题，分析一下最为常用的三个相似点比较可能会有所帮助。


Some compare the Iranian regime to Nazi Germany.	有人将伊朗政权与纳粹德国相比较。


Others believe that the only useful analogy is to Europe’s old balance-of-power games.	其他人相信，唯一有用的相似点就是欧洲古老的大国平衡游戏。


And still others combine the two, pointing to the “balance of terror” during the Cold War.	还有些人将二者结合起来，指出在冷战期间的“恐怖的平衡”。


In other words: is Iran to be treated as Hitler’s Germany in 1938, Prussia in 1756, or Stalin’s Soviet Union?	换言之，是否像对待1938年的德国、1756年的普鲁士或者斯大林世代的苏联那样对付伊朗？


Each analogy contains an element of truth, but none, of course, corresponds to the realities of the challenges Iran represents.	每个相似点都不无道理，但是，当然没有一个符合伊朗所代表的挑战现实。


Above all, each analogy, if taken seriously, should lead to a specific course of action, and this is far from being the case today.	最为重要的是，如果认真看待每一个相似点都会导致采取具体的行动措施，而这就与当今的现实相差甚远。


Let us start with the analogy between Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hitler.	让我们首先比较伊朗总统内贾德和希特勒。


Ahmedinejad pursues a dual objective with his anti-Zionist obsession: to de-legitimize Israel and to re-legitimize Iran’s claim to speak for Muslims over the heads of their more cautious governments.	内贾德的反对犹太复国主义观念根深蒂固，追求着双重目标，那就是消灭以色列以及让伊朗超越各国更为谨慎的政府并作为穆斯林的代言人的权力的合法化。


He very probably means what he says about Jews and Israel, but is he a latter-day Hitler, and is today’s Iran the equivalent of Germany in the 1930’s?	在犹太人和以色列的问题上，他很有可能言行一致，但是，他果真就是后世的希特勒、而今天的伊朗就是三十年代的德国吗？


Hitler came close to developing the nuclear bomb, but never had it, whereas Iran very well might.	希特勒制造原子弹差一点得逞，但是并未真正获得，而伊朗很可能已经得手。


But Hitler’s power over Germany was much more absolute than Ahmadinejad’s power over Iran.	但是希特勒在德国权力比内贾德在伊朗的权力要远远更为绝对。


The results of Iran’s recent municipal elections were humiliating for Ahmadinejad and his supporters.	伊朗最近的市政选举结果对于内贾德及其支持者而言是威风扫地。


Those elections would have been unthinkable in Nazi Germany.	在纳粹德国这些选举是不可思议的。


Although the Iranian regime’s rhetoric may be totalitarian, political power there is much more diffused.	尽管伊朗政权的言辞可能是极权性质的，但是那里的政治权力却是更为分散的。


The analogy with Hitler’s Germany is also problematic because, if it were regarded as true, the only sensible course of action would be a preventive strike on Iran and the removal of Ahmadinejad.	与希特勒的纳粹德国相比也是有问题的，因为，如果当真如此，那么，唯一的行动措施就是对伊朗发动先发制人的攻击以及除掉内贾德。


Given the evolution of American strategic thinking after Iraq (and now Afghanistan), and of Israel’s strategic thinking after Lebanon, a preventive strike is highly unlikely.	鉴于美国在伊拉克占领(现在还有阿富汗) 之后战略思维的演变，以及黎巴嫩战争后以色列战略思维的转变，先发制人的攻击极为不可能。


The second analogy, to the old balance-of-power system in Europe, is especially popular among Israeli and American diplomats.	第二个相似点比较，也就是欧洲古老的大国力量平衡在以色列和美国的外交官之中尤其津津乐道。


According to this view, if Iran wants to de-legitimize Israel and ultimately unite Moslems against the West, the only answer is to isolate Iran in the Middle East, and to create alliances against Iran with moderate Sunni Arab regimes.	根据这一观点，如果伊朗想要消灭以色列并且最终联合穆斯林反对西方，唯一的对应手段就是在中东孤立伊朗并且和温和的逊尼派阿拉伯政权组成反伊朗联盟。


Before the 1979 Iranian revolution, some in Israel advocated an alliance between Israel, Turkey, and Iran, the Middle East’s three non-Arab powers.	在1979年的伊朗革命之前，以色列有人倡导以色列、土耳其以及伊朗这三个中东的非阿拉伯国家之间结盟。


Today, many in the United States and Israel dream of a moderate Arab front, with countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt containing and isolating “radical” Iran.	今天，美国和以色列的许多人梦想一个温和的阿拉伯前线，由类似沙特和埃及这样的国家抑制并孤立“激进”的伊朗。


That diplomatic project is far from absurd.	这一外交工程还谈不上荒谬。


The rise of Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon as instruments of Iranian ambitions can only worry moderate Arab regimes.	巴勒斯坦中的哈马斯以及黎巴嫩的真主党作为伊朗野心工具的崛起只能让温和的阿拉伯政权担忧。


But such an alliance has a price: the resumption of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, with serious territorial concessions on Israel’s part to match the Palestinians’ absolute recognition of Israel.	但是这样的一个联盟却是有代价的，那就是，以色列和巴勒斯坦重开谈判，以色列确实放弃领土以对应巴勒斯坦完全承认以色列。


Moderate Arab regimes will not dare to engage in an open and serious process of rapprochement with Israel in the absence of real progress over the Palestinian issue.	在巴勒斯坦问题上没有取得确实进展之前，温和的阿拉伯国家政权不会敢于同以色列开展公开和认真的建立友好关系的进程。


But are the two parties ready for it?	但是双方是否准备就绪了呢？


Could the US, a wounded power mired in Iraq, implement the part of the Baker report that suggests “Peace in Baghdad goes through Jerusalem”?	美国身陷伊拉克的泥潭不能自拔，遍体鳞伤，它能否落实贝克报告中有关“巴格达的和平之路必须经过耶路撒冷”的建议呢？


While Israel’s non-victory in Lebanon and the Palestinians’ bloody divisions mean that both sides have been humbled, a breakthrough, though possible, remains unlikely.	尽管以色列在黎巴嫩无功而返，巴勒斯坦流血内讧意味着双方都受挫了，然而，实现突破尽管可能，但依旧是不大可能。


The third analogy is reflected in Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s recent references to Israel’s nuclear deterrent, which may have been a mistake, but probably indicate the evolution of Israeli strategic thinking.	第三个相似点的比较反映在以色列总理奥尔默特最近提及以色列的核子威摄能力上。 这一提及可能是一个错误，但是却可能表明了以色列战略思维的转变。


Olmert seemed to be reminding the Iranians of the hard realities of nuclear deterrence: Iran may join the nuclear club someday, but it will return to the Stone Age if it uses those weapons against a country that has a far more advanced nuclear arsenal.	奥尔默特可能是在提醒伊朗有关核子威摄的严酷现实，那就是，伊朗可以在某一天加入核子俱乐部，但是，如果伊朗针对一个拥有远远更为先进的核子弹药库的国家使用这些武器，那么，它就将会回到石器时代。


The comparison here is to the Cold War period.	在这里，就是与冷战世代进行比较。


But can today’s Iran be compared to the Soviet Union?	但是，今天的伊朗能够和苏联相提并论吗？


The success of the “balance of terror” presupposed a mixture of confrontation and dialogue between two “rational actors.”	“恐怖的平衡”的成功预���假定在两个“理性的角色”之间的对抗和对话的混合。


Can Iran under Ahmadinejad be considered a rational actor?	内贾德统治下的伊朗可以被看作是理性的角色吗？


The dilemma concerning Iran is whether a power imbued with an “absolute” ideology can be allowed to be in control of an “absolute” weapon.	有关伊朗的困局就是，一个沉浸于“绝对”意识形态的国家是否能够被允许控制一种“绝对”武器。


Since a military solution is highly improbable, what are the serious alternatives? Can we have a productive dialogue with Iran while rejecting the mad ideology of its president?	我们能否与伊朗进行富有成果的对话，同时又拒绝其总统的疯狂的意识形态？


As the shortcomings of the three most popular historical analogies suggest, the answer is far from obvious.	正如三个最为流行的历史相似点的比较的缺点所揭示的那样，答案决非显而易见。


History, Used and Abused	被利用和滥用的历史


LONDON – In her brilliant book, “The Uses and Abuses of History” the historian Margaret Macmillan tells a story about two Americans discussing the atrocities of September 11, 2001. One draws an analogy with Pearl Harbor, Japan’s attack on the US in 1941.	发自伦敦——在历史学家玛格列特·麦克米兰才华横溢的著作《被滥用和利用的历史》一书中，讲述了一个关于两个美国人讨论“9·11”事件暴行的故事：当其中一人用1941年珍珠港事件来比喻“9·11”的时候，他的同伴却对珍珠港事件一无所知，于是前者就解释说：“你知道么，这就跟越南人轰炸美国舰队并挑起越战一样。


His friend has no idea as to what this means.  “You know,” the first man replies, “It was when the Vietnamese bombed the American fleet and started the Vietnam War.”	”


Historical memory is not always quite as bad as this.  But international politics and diplomacy are riddled with examples of bad and ill-considered precedents being used to justify foreign policy decisions, invariably leading to catastrophe.	虽然对历史的记忆并不总是像上面这个小故事那样颠倒黑白。 不过国际政治和外交场上却充斥着许多错误和被误解的历史案例，人们用这些例子来评价自己的外交政策决策，而这种行为也总能为此后的巨大灾难埋下伏笔。


Munich – the 1938 meeting between Adolf Hitler, Édouard Daladier, Neville Chamberlain, and Benito Mussolini – is a frequent witness summoned to court by politicians trying to argue the case for foreign adventures.	比如阿道夫·希特勒、法国总理达拉第，英国首相张伯伦和墨索里尼于1938年共同策划的“慕尼黑阴谋”就经常被政治家引用来讨论海外用兵的问题。


Britain’s disastrous 1956 invasion of Egypt was talked about as though Gamal Nasser was a throw-back to the fascist dictators of the 1930’s. If he were to be appeased as they had been, the results would be catastrophic in the Middle East.	而在1956年令英国人损失惨重的入侵埃及事件中，埃及领导人伽马尔·纳赛尔就被说成是一个1930年代式的法西斯独裁者，如果像当年对待希特勒那样对纳赛尔执行绥靖政策的话，那么对整个中东地区都将是一场灾难。


Munich was also produced as a justification for the Vietnam War and President Bush’s war of choice in Iraq.	此外慕尼黑阴谋也被用来为越战和小布什的伊拉克战争论调撑腰。


1930’s appeasement – a word that elides diplomatic engagement and the rejection of military options – was said to remind us of what would happen if South Vietnam was not defended and Iraq not invaded.  We know what happened in both countries.	1930年代的绥靖政策——即放弃外交干预以及反对武力解决的做法——当年都被用来说服人们：如果他们不保卫南越以及不入侵伊拉克的话，就会吞下什么样的苦果。 但而今我们也早已明白，自己被蒙骗了。


But analogies are not always wrong, and those that were wrong in the past could prove correct today.  One of the arguments for the Vietnam War was the so-called domino theory.  If South Vietnam was to fall to the Communists, other countries in South-East Asia would tumble before Communist insurgency.	但这类比喻也并不总是错的，而且以前一些被认为是谬误的如今也被证明有理。 其中一个支持发动越战的论点就是所谓的多米诺骨牌效应，认为如果南越落到了共产分子手里，那么随后其他东南亚国家也会纷纷被共产主义运动所颠覆。


Things turned out very different.	但事情却朝着相反的方向发展。


Vietnam proved to be the end not the beginning of the line.	越南成为了一连串骨牌的末尾而不是开端。


Pol Pot’s wicked regime murdered millions in Cambodia until Vietnam intervened.	丧尽天良的波尔布特政权在越南干涉之前竟然杀害了数百万柬埔寨人。


Elsewhere in the region capitalism, promoted by the opening of markets, triggered growth and promoted stability.	而在东南亚其他实行资本主义的地区，市场开放政策却促进了增长并稳定了局势。


Globalisation produced its own domino effect.  The dominoes toppled; GDP rose; millions were lifted out of poverty; literacy rates soared; child mortality figures fell.	全球化效应创造了自己独有的一套多米诺骨牌。 随着骨牌不断倒下，GDP上升，数百万人脱离了贫困，受教育程度飞升，婴儿死亡率也随之下降。


Maybe, if not there and if not then, dominoes are more relevant to foreign and security policy today.	相信可能如果没有上述例子的话，多米诺效应会跟外交和国家安全政策更具相关性。


In America and Europe at the moment, many people are calling for the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan. We are told that NATO and the West cannot build a nation there and that the goals that have been set for establishing democracy and prosperity are unattainable.	而在当今的美国和欧洲，许多人都在呼吁北约部队从阿富汗撤军，因为有人告诉我们说，北约和西方不可能在那里建立一个国家，而且为那里带去民主和繁荣的目标也是镜花水月。


NATO soldiers die in vain.	还有人说，北约士兵只不过是在白白送命。


Sooner or later the Taliban will sweep to power again, at liberty as happened before to throw acid in women’s faces.	因为不久之后塔利班就会重夺政权，并跟从前一样恣意妄为，继续犯下往妇女脸上泼硫酸这类的罪行。


It is vanity to think that anything can be done to prevent this. Better to cut and run than stay and die, and who is to say that the result will embolden Taliban terrorists?	人们根本没法阻止这一切发生，因此最好是一刀两断赶紧回家，而不是留在这等死，反正塔利班分子也不会到西方来搞什么破坏，他们跟基地组织可不是一路人。


They do not necessarily share the same aims as Al Qaeda.


There have certainly been mistakes in Afghanistan.	事实上，我们确实在阿富汗犯了许多错误。


After the overthrow of the Taliban regime, the West did not commit enough troops to extend the national government in Kabul’s authority over the whole country.	比如在推翻了塔利班政权之后，西方并没有提供足够的军队来帮助喀布尔新政权统领全国。


The Bush administration had turned its attention to the preparations for the Iraq war.	而小布什政府干脆就把注意力转到伊拉克战争的筹备上去了。


Development has been slow. The build-up of the Afghan army and police has lagged.  The poppy crop has grown.	在这种情况下，阿富汗的发展异常缓慢，政府军和警察部队的建设也断断续续。


Sometimes the military response to insurgency has been too tough; sometimes too light.	很多地方还种上了鸦片。 政府军针对武装分子的行动时软时硬。


The West has courted trouble in appearing to isolate the Pashtun.	而西方孤立普什图人的做法也引来了很多麻烦。


So the West can do better. There is no doubt about that.	因此毫无疑问，西方在这方面可以做得更好。


But the case for quitting is bad and touches on Pakistan’s future as well as Afghanistan’s.	但上述那些谋求金蝉脱壳逃之夭夭的说法则非常有害，甚至会影响到阿富汗人和巴基斯坦人的未来。


Leave Afghanistan to the Taliban, hoping against hope that they will become better-behaved global citizens, and what is the effect likely to be on Pakistan?	如果西方把阿富汗丢回到塔利班手里，然后寄希望于这些人能逐渐成长为负责任的世界公民，那么此举会对巴斯斯坦人有什么影响？


Here come the dominoes – wrong in Vietnam but not necessarily in the South Asian sub-continent.	在此多尼诺骨牌效应将再次发挥它的威力，它曾经在越南被证明是谬误的，但在南亚次大陆，情况可能会截然不同。


Afghanistan is NATO’s great test.	对于北约来说，阿富汗堪称是最大的考验。


The Alliance has promised to see the job through.  So if it abandons the job now, leaving the country to poverty, prejudice, and poppies, what then will happen?	北约曾经发誓要彻底完成这个任务。 因此如果现在西方三十六计走为上，而让贫穷，苦难和鸦片来统治这个国家，接着又会有什么后果呢？


Why should anyone in Pakistan believe that the West is serious in wanting to sustain that country as a Muslim democratic state?	为什么不让巴基斯坦人相信，西方确实有志于保全一个穆斯林民主国家？


Would such a decision help turn the tide against the Taliban?	这么一个决定是否能有助于改变对抗塔利班的全面形势？


Would it encourage the middle-class professional and urban workers in Pakistan, disgusted by the excesses of the extremists, to dig in and see off fundamentalism?	这是否又能激励那些延误恐怖行动的中产阶级和城市工人阶层，让他们深刻反省并与极端主义思想一刀两断？


Would it strengthen the more moderate elements in politics and the military?	这是否也会增强政界和军界的温和派力量？


You can count on us, the West would be saying, but don’t look next door to Afghanistan, where you will see that you can’t rely on us.	“这没问题，”西方会这样对巴基斯坦人说，“但别看隔壁的阿富汗就是了，看到那你就知道我们是多么不可靠了。 ”


If Pakistan, nuclear weapons and all, was to fall to the extremists, the consequences in terms of encouraging the export of terrorism would be dire.	试想一下，如果整个巴基斯坦，包括其核武器在内，落入了极端分子手中。


Think about Kashmir.  Think about India.	那么对输出恐怖主义行为的推动作用将是灾难性的。


How would India’s government view the future if Pakistan falls into the hands of fundamentalists?	试想如果巴基斯坦被极端分子所控制，印度政府又对自己国家的未来又将作何感想呢？


So the West should see the job through in Afghanistan – do it better but do it.  Sometimes the dominoes do topple over, one by one.	因此西方必须坚持下来，彻底完成他们在阿富汗的使命——既要做得更好，也继续坚持不懈。


That is not a prospect that anyone should welcome in South Asia.	因为有时多米诺骨牌真的会一个接一个倒下，而这对南亚地区的人民来说，肯定不是一个值得庆幸的结果。


Holding Charities Accountable	让慈善组织负责


Suppose you are concerned about children in Africa dying from preventable diseases.	设想一下你关心死于可防治疾病的非洲儿童。


You want to donate money to a charity that is working to reduce the toll.	你想要向努力减少死亡的慈善组织捐款。


But there are many charities doing that.	但是有许多家慈善组织在做这件事情。


How do you choose?	你如何选择呢？


The first thing that many people ask about charities is, “How much of my donation is spent on administration?”	许多人对慈善组织提出的第一个问题就是：我的捐款的多大部分用于行政管理？


In the United States, that figure is readily available from Charity Navigator, a Web site that has five million users.	在美国，一个有五百万用户、叫做慈善导航的网站提供这样的数据。


But the information is taken from forms that the charities themselves complete and send to the tax authorities.	但是这一信息是来自慈善组织自己填写并交给税务机关的表格。


No one checks the forms, and the proportions allocated to administration and program expenses are easily massaged with a little creative accounting.	没有人核对表格，而用于管理和项目费用的比例很容易采用创造性会计来改造。


Worse still, that figure, even if accurate, tells you nothing about the charity’s impact.	更加糟糕的是，这一数据即使精确也不能告诉你慈善组织的影响。


The pressure to keep administrative expenses low can make an organization less effective.	把行政费用维持在较低水准的压力会让组织失去效力。


If, for example, an agency working to reduce poverty in Africa cuts staff with expert knowledge, it is more likely to end up funding projects that fail.	例如，如果一家为减少非洲贫困的机构削减具有专业知识的人员，它就更有可能资助失败的项目。


It may not even know which of its projects fail, because evaluating them, and learning from mistakes, requires staff – and that adds to administrative costs.	它甚至不会知道哪些项目会失败，因为对项目做出评估以及总结经验教训需要人员，而这就增加行政管理开支。


In 2006, Holden Karnofsky and Elie Hassenfeld faced the question of which charity would make the best use of their money.	在2006年，卡诺夫斯基和海森菲尔德面临着哪一家慈善组织可以最大程度利用他们的捐款的问题。


They were in their mid-twenties, earning six-figure incomes at an investment company – more than they needed – and were thinking about donating money to help make the world a better place.	他们二十多岁，在一家投资公司收入达到六位数。 这些钱他们花不完，因此考虑捐款帮助改良世界。


As investment advisers, they would never recommend investing in a company without detailed information about how well it was achieving its goals.	作为投资顾问，他们决不会建议投资一家没有有关其如何实现目标详情的公司。


They wanted to make similarly well-informed choices about the charities to which they contributed.	对于他们捐款的慈善组织，他们想要做出同样明白的选择。


So Karnofsky and Hassenfeld got together with six friends who also worked in finance and divided up the field to find out which charities could be shown to be effective.	所以，卡诺夫斯基和海森菲尔德和六个也是在金融部门工作的朋友分工合作，去寻找哪些慈善组织表现最有效力。


They contacted organizations and received lots of attractive marketing material, but nothing that answered basic questions: what do the charities do with their money, and what evidence do they have that their activities help?	他们联络了不同的组织并且收到了大量吸引人的营销材料，但是没有一样可以回答他们的问题，也就是，慈善组织花钱做什么事情？ 它们有何证据表明它们的活动有所帮助？


They called many charities, but eventually realized something that seemed extraordinary: the information was just not there.	他们给很多慈善组织打电话，但是最后认识到某些不同寻常的事情，那就是说根本就没有这样的信息。


Some foundations said that information on their work’s effectiveness was confidential.	某些基金会说有关它们有效性的信息属于机密。


This, Karnofsky and Hassenfeld thought, is not a good way to go about charitable work.	卡诺夫斯基和海森菲尔德认为这并不是做慈善工作的好方式。


Why should information about how to help people be secret?	为什么有关如何帮助他人的信息是机密呢？


The fact that charities were unprepared for such questions indicated to Karnofsky and Hassenfeld that other donors and foundations give more or less blindly, without the information needed to make sound decisions about whom to support.	慈善组织对于这些问题没有准备这一事实告诉他们二人，其他捐助者和基金会或多或少都是在没有做出支持谁的明智决定所需要的信息的情况下盲目捐款。


Karnofsky and Hassenfeld now had a new goal: to obtain and publicize the information.	卡诺夫斯基和海森菲尔德现在有了一个新目标，那就是搜集和公开信息。


To that end, they founded an organization called GiveWell so that other donors would not have as hard a time extracting it as they had had.	为了这一目标，他们建立了一个叫做善举的组织，这样，别的捐款人就不会像他们那样难以获得信息。


However, it soon became apparent that the task required more than part-time attention, and the following year, after raising $300,000 from their colleagues, Karnofsky and Hassenfeld left their jobs and began working full-time for GiveWell and its associated grant-making body, The Clear Fund.	但是，马上就很清楚这一工作要求的不止是业余时间。 第二年，卡诺夫斯基和海森菲尔德在从同事们那里筹集了三十万美元后辞去了工作并且开始全职为善举组织及其附属的叫做明晰基金的赠款组织工作。


They invited charities to apply for grants of $25,000 in five broad humanitarian categories, with the application process demanding the kind of information that they had been seeking.	他们邀请慈善组织申请两万五千美元的赠款用于五大人道主义领域，而申请程序要求提供他们所一直要求提供的信息。


In this way, a substantial part of the money they had raised would go to the most effective charity in each category, while simultaneously encouraging transparency and rigorous evaluation.	如此，他们所筹集的一大部分钱将会捐给在每一领域最为有效的慈善组织，与此同时鼓励透明和严格的评估。


The first report on which organizations are most effective at saving or transforming lives in Africa is now available on GiveWell’s Web site, www.givewell.net .	现在，善举的网站www. givewell.


Population Services International, which promotes and sells items like condoms, to prevent HIV infection, and bed nets, to prevent malaria, came out on top, followed by Partners in Health, an organization that provides health care to poor rural populations.	net公布了有关哪些组织在挽救或转变非洲人的生活上最有效果的第一份报告。 促进并出售类似避孕套之类的物品来防治艾滋病以及蚊帐来防治霍乱的人居服务国际组织名列榜首。


The third-ranked organization was Interplast, which is more narrowly focused on correcting deformities like cleft palate.	向贫穷的农村人口提供医疗的医疗夥伴组织名列第二。 第三名是Interplast，这一组织较为专注地矫正类似颚裂那样的畸形。


Evaluating charities can be more difficult than making investment decisions.	评估慈善组织要比做出投资决定还要困难。


Investors are interested in financial returns, so there is no problem about measuring distinct values – in the end it all comes down to money.	投资者对财政回报感兴趣，因此不会有衡量独特价值的问题，因为最终都是钱的问题。


It is more difficult to compare the reduction of suffering brought about by correcting a facial deformity with saving a life.	比较通过矫正面部畸形而减少的痛苦与挽救性命则更为困难。


There is no single unit of value.	这里没有单一的价值单元。


In other ways, too, evaluating charities takes time, and can be expensive.	在其他方面也是如此，评估慈善组织需要时间，而且花费不少。


Perhaps for this reason, many organizations, including some of the best-known anti-poverty organizations working in Africa, did not respond to GiveWell’s request for information.	或许是出于这一原因，许多组织，包括某些最有名的在非洲工作的扶贫组织并没有对善举提出的信息要求做出回应。


No doubt they calculated that a chance to get a $25,000 grant wasn’t worth it.	毫无疑问，它们算计获得两万五千美元赠款并不值得。


But if donors start to follow GiveWell’s recommendations, then a high ranking from GiveWell could be worth far more than the value of the grant.	但是如果捐款人开始听取善举的建议，那么，善举打出的高分或许就要比赠款更有价值。


This is why the potential of GiveWell is revolutionary.	这就是为何善举的潜力是巨大无比的。


In the US, individual donors give about $200 billion to charities each year.	在美国，个人捐款者每年向各个慈善组织捐款大约两千亿美元。


No one knows how effective that vast sum is in achieving the goals that donors intend to support.	没人知道这一大数目在取得捐款者想要达到的目标上有多么有效。


By giving charities an incentive to become more transparent and more focused on being demonstrably effective, GiveWell could make our charitable donations do much more good than ever before.	通过激励慈善组织变得更为透明以及在显然有效上更为专注，善举或许会让我们的慈善捐助比以往做更大的好事。


Holland After van Gogh	特奥·范霍赫死后的荷兰


The murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh and the ensuing arson attacks against mosques, churches, and Islamic schools have caused more soul-searching in Dutch homes in the last week than in the past two decades.	电影导演特奥·范霍赫（Theo van Gogh）被杀及清真寺、教堂和伊斯兰学校随后发生的纵火事件上周在荷兰家庭中引起的反思比过去20年里的更多、更深刻。


The old Netherlands, it seems, has ceased to be, never to return.	旧的荷兰似乎已经离我们远去，并且永远不会回来。


The goal now must be to unite the Dutch people. This will require much work on the part of both immigrants and native Dutch.	目前的当务之急是把荷兰人团结在一起，这需要移民和荷兰本国人的共同努力。


As long as moderates keep their heads, a new Netherlands may be born out of the terrible events of the past weeks.	只要温和派能生存下去，新的荷兰就会从过去几周的腥风血雨中再次诞生。


It is often said of the various immigrant groups in the Netherlands that they lack the ability to "cleanse themselves" through honest self-appraisal and criticism.	很多人都说荷兰各种移民团体缺乏通过诚实的自我批评和评价自我"纯洁"的能力。


There are many who acknowledge this and want to change.	很多人都认可这种说法，也愿意加以改变。


Non-committal multiculturalism has long kept the conservatism of Dutch Moroccans and Dutch Turks hidden from the public eye.	对多元文化主义的暧昧态度使得荷兰籍摩洛哥人长久固守着保守作风，也让荷兰籍土耳其人一直避开公众的视线。


Among immigrants, soul-searching is closely related to belonging and commitment, which in practice boils down to feeling part of society and feeling responsible for the city, neighborhood, and street where you live.	移民人群中，灵魂的反省与义务感和归属感息息相关，而现实生活中这两种情感最终归结为把自己作为社会的一员，愿意为身处其中的城市、社区和街道负起责任。


We native Dutch also find it hard to hold a mirror to ourselves.	对镜自省对我们荷兰人自身也绝非易事。


We are bad listeners and air our views whether or not we have thought deeply about them.	我们不习惯听取别人的建议，总是迫不及待地说出自己的想法，也不管考虑得是否成熟。


There is a lack of self-examination.	我们缺乏自我审视的精神。


As a result, many people no longer understand themselves, which makes it hard for them to understand others.	其结果是，很多人不再了解自己，这使他们也很难去了解别人。


Freedom of expression is becoming a caricature.	言论自由渐渐有了讽刺的意味。


When asked what it was like to be interviewed by Theo van Gogh, European Commissioner Frits Bolkestein said, "He was impertinent, and that is a good thing; he was offensive, and that is not."	当被问及接受特奥·范霍赫采访时有何感想，欧盟执行委员鲍克斯坦说："他直截了当是件好事； 可莽撞无礼就不是了。


It is as simple as that.	"回答就这么简单。


In today's Netherlands, assertiveness is seen as a good thing, modesty as a form of self-chastisement.	今天的荷兰，固执己见被看作是件好事，谦虚却被看成是自我惩罚。


Respect is for wimps!	无能的人才会得到尊重！


Moral relativism has damaged public life.	道德相对论破坏了公众生活。


Many youngsters now see politics as a kind of computer game.	很多年轻人把政治看成一场电脑游戏。


It is no longer about message or content - it is just one more form of entertainment, and what matters is who wins and who loses.	重要的已经不再是信息和内容－因为那不过是另一种形式的娱乐，因此重要的是谁输谁赢。


Context has been lost.	事情的前因后果都被省略掉了。


Extreme ideas offer an alternative compass to disoriented souls like Mohammed Bouyeri, van Gogh's suspected murderer.	极端思想给了像Mohammed Bouyeri这样的灵魂扭曲者另外一种方向，就是他涉嫌谋杀了范霍赫。


He is not so much a product of zealous imams from rural Morocco as of the West's information society.	与其说他是被伊玛目（伊斯兰教领袖）热心教导出来的摩洛哥农民，还不如说他是西方信息社会的产物。


The gospel of Muslim extremism has found a global market through the Internet.	穆斯林极端主义教义通过互联网传播到世界各地。


Something similar is happening on the extreme right, with "white power" offering an apparent certainty to youngsters who are adrift.	极右势力也经历着同样的改变，"白人领袖"让犹疑不定的年轻人找到了坚定不移的信仰。


The real struggle is about ideas.	真正的斗争发生在思想领域。


Indeed, what is most ominous is that extremists realize this more clearly than the moderate, silent majority, who find the noise irritating but do not know how to start a serious dialogue.	实际上，可怕的是与温和、沉默的大多数人相比，极端主义者对这一点的认识更加深刻。 多数人只是对觉得极端主义的聒噪令人厌烦，但却不清楚怎样才能开始严肃的对话。


Meanwhile, tolerance degenerates into multicultural segregation.	与此同时，忍让最终蜕变成了不同文化间的隔离。


We do not live together, but in isolation from each other.	我们不是生活在一起，而是彼此隔绝。


The Turkish-Dutch headmaster of the Muslim school in Uden that was burned down after van Gogh's murder voiced the inhibitions we all feel when he asked, rhetorically, "Is the enemy not within us?"	范霍赫死后，被烧毁的于登（Uden）穆斯林小学的土耳其裔荷兰校长一语道出了我们的心声，他反反复复地询问"难道敌人不在我们内部吗？ "


A revived permissive society is not the answer.	重新建设一个过度纵容的社会显然不是答案。


The state must battle terrorism, public space must not be abandoned to extremists, and Islam in Europe must adapt to Europe.	政府必须与恐怖主义作战，公共空间决不能让极端分子占领，欧洲的伊斯兰人也必须融入欧洲。


People who live in a society they hate, amidst people they despise, cannot contribute to a shared future.	如果有人仇恨自己生活的社会和周围的人民，他就不可能为共同的未来做出贡献。


Life in Europe will only remain worth living if all cultures and religions accept the laws that represent the common interest.	只有所有文化和地区都接受代表着共同利益的法律，欧洲人才能够平静地生活下去。


So a European Islam is needed urgently.	因此我们迫切需要欧洲伊斯兰人。


It can be given shape by, for example, training imams in Europe, by encouraging mosques to promote social cohesion in their neighborhoods, and by more active participation by Muslims in the public debate.	实现愿望现实的方法是：训练欧洲自己的伊斯兰教领袖，提高清真寺对周边地区的凝聚力，鼓励穆斯林积极参与公众辩论。


At the same time, native Europeans must learn to accept that Islam may offer new vantage points on such moral issues as euthanasia, abortion, individuality, and solidarity.	与此同时，欧洲本地人也必须接受伊斯兰在某些道德领域提出新的有利观点，上述领域包括安乐死、堕胎、个人自由和团结。


This way Islam could really become a source of inspiration for the European community of values.	如果这样，伊斯兰就可能真正成为欧洲社会价值观重要的灵感源泉。


If we want to build something better on the ruins of multicultural indifference, our dialogue must become more profound.	如果我们真想在多元文化冷漠的废墟上重建美好的社会，就必须进行深刻的对话。


Prejudice must make way for empathy, and alienation for respect.	理解必须取代偏见、尊重也必须取代疏远。


Essentially, this is all about giving a new meaning to solidarity, beyond the left-right dichotomy.	本质上讲，这意味着为团结赋予左右二分法以外新的涵义。


It is time for a civilizing mission that will emerge from society itself and bring people together.	现在是时候完成社会内部产生，能把人们团结在一起的文明使命。


This mission must also reflect a new politics that does not accentuate differences, but helps shape a new sense of who "we" are.	这项使命必须体现不强调分歧的崭新方略，帮助我们认清自己的属性。


The Netherlands need not be the focus of international religious conflict. What is precious must be preserved, and what enriches must be absorbed.	荷兰不会是国际宗教冲突的中心，宝贵的东西必须得到保护，丰富的东西也必须得以吸收。


This process must begin in school.	这个过程必须从学校开始。


Children must learn that they do not live in a monoculture, but in a pluralist society bound together by universal values and common laws.	孩子们必须了解自己不是生活在单一文化的环境中，我们置身其中的是一个由共同价值观和法律维系的多元化的世界。


They must learn that critical thought is valuable, and that doubt is healthy.	他们必须清楚批判性思考是一种宝贵的财富，置疑也是一种健康的习惯。


Restoring the past is not an option.	我们不能恢复过去的一切。


Rudderless societies are easy prey for bigotry.	缺乏领导的社会很容易陷于固执。


This is not just a matter for politicians.	这不只是政治家们所要关心的问题。


All of us must help turn Europe's motto "unity in diversity" into a genuine guiding principle.	我们所有人都必须竭尽全力，使欧洲"多样化团结"的格言成为真正的指导方针。


François Hollande’s Tartuffe Syndrome	奥朗德的伪君子综合征


LONDON – In his classic comedy “Tartuffe, or The Impostor,” Molière shows that allowing pride, rather than reason, to dictate one’s actions invariably ends badly.	发自伦敦——法国作家莫里哀的古典主义喜剧《伪君子》告诉我们，正是放任骄傲——而非诉诸理性——决定了一个人的行为无可避免地以糟糕收场。


French President François Hollande appears to have an advanced case of Tartuffe’s malady, repeatedly making political pledges that he cannot honor, partly because of factors beyond his control – namely, the European Monetary Union (EMU) – but mostly because he lacks the determination.	而法国总统弗朗索瓦•奥朗德（François Hollande）看起来恰恰是这一伪君子病的典型代表，他反复许下无法兑现的政治承诺，一部分原因是出自于他本人无法控制的因素——也就是欧洲货币联盟(EMU)——但更主要的，还是因为优柔寡断，缺乏决心。


For France, the consequences of Hollande’s failures will be much more dramatic than his political downfall.	对法国来说，奥朗德失败所导致的后果将会比他的政治垮台更具戏剧性。


Indeed, the country could be facing catastrophe, as Hollande’s actions risk miring the economy into sustained stagnation and driving an increasingly angry French public to elect the far-right National Front party’s Marine Le Pen as his successor.	事实上，随着奥朗德的行为可能使经济陷入持续停滞，并驱使越来越愤怒的法国公众投票选举其极右政党国民阵线的勒庞（Marine Le Pen）作为其继任者，法国很可能将面临一场灾难,。


France’s economic policies are untenable, meaning that both of the main determinants of those policies, the EMU and Hollande’s approach, must change radically.	法国的经济政策是站不住脚的，也就是说，必须从根本上改变这些政策的主要决定因素——欧洲货币联盟和奥朗德的施政手段。


So far, that does not seem to be happening.	但到目前为止，这些似乎并没有发生。


Earlier this month, an opinion poll showed Hollande’s approval rating plummeting to 12% – the worst result for any French president in the history of modern polling.	本月初，一项民意调查显示奥朗德的支持率从仅仅一个月前令人汗颜的27%暴跌至12%——这是近代史上对历任法国总统民望调查中最糟糕的数据。


On the same day, Hollande gave a long televised interview in which he combined admissions of failure with new promises.	同日，奥朗德接受了一个很长的电视采访，在承认失败的同时又许下了新的承诺。


Consider unemployment, which in September stood at 10.5%, compared to only 5% in Germany.	以失业率为例，今年9月法国的数据高达10. 5%，而同期德国只有5%。


In the interview, Hollande acknowledged that, despite his pledge, a reversal of the negative employment trend “didn’t happen” this year.	在采访中，奥朗德承认，尽管他承诺过，但负面的就业趋势今年“并未逆转”。


(He failed to mention that he had set the same goal last year as well.)	(他没有提及去年也设定了同样的目标。 )


France’s unemployment problem is the result of leviathan labor regulations (the labor code runs 3,648 pages) and, above all, a crippling tax burden on labor.	法国的失业问题是其无比庞大繁杂的劳动法 (厚达3648页)的结果，最重要的是残酷的劳动者税收负担。


Hollande’s main new promise – not to impose any new taxes, beginning next year – might have been an implicit acknowledgement of this.	而奥朗德新承诺的重点——从明年开始不征收任何新税项——也明确证实了这一点。


In the meantime, however, there will be an increase in diesel excise duties, and a 20% surcharge on property taxes will be imposed on unoccupied second homes in densely populated areas.	然而与此同时将会增加柴油消费税，以及对人口稠密地区空置的第二套住房追加征收20%的房产税。


Because these tax hikes will likely be approved by the end of the year, they should be the last – if, that is, Hollande follows through on his pledge.	由于这些税项可能会在年底获得批准，如果奥朗德能遵守他的承诺的话，那这将是最后的新增税项。


Given Hollande’s track record – the tax burden has risen by €40 billion ($50 billion) over the last two years – it seems unlikely that he will.	鉴于奥朗德的过往履历——在过去的两年里税收负担增加了€400亿欧元(合500亿美元)——他似乎不可能兑现承诺。


Indeed, Hollande’s own officials are already backpedaling, with the budget minister, Christian Eckert, stating that more tax hikes could not be ruled out: “You can’t set in stone a situation that depends on an international context that we don’t control.”	事实上，奥朗德靡下的官员已经变卦，预算部长克里斯蒂•埃克（Christian Eckert）声称不能排除增税:“在我们无法控制的国际背景下，你不能一成不变。 ”


Of course, that “international context” is the EMU, which places considerable external constraints on French policy.	当然，“国际背景”指的就是对法国政策外部约束相当大的欧洲货币联盟。


Even without such constraints, it is only prudent for fiscal policymakers to keep their options open.	即使没有这样的约束，财政政策制定者也要谨慎地保留选择权。


Either way, the euro’s creators were wrong to expect that the common currency would promote economic and political convergence among its members.	无论哪种方式，欧元创造者认为共同货币会促进成员之间的经济与政治融合的观点都是错误的。


By ruling out exchange-rate adjustment to address differences in competitiveness, the euro has forced less competitive countries to pursue painful and slow “internal devaluation” (suppressing real wages).	通过排除汇率调整来解决竞争力差异，欧元已迫使缺乏竞争力的国家进行痛苦而缓慢的“内部贬值”(压低实际工资)。


This has driven down demand and prices, causing the disparities among eurozone member countries’ economic performance to widen.	这抑制了需求和价格，导致欧元区成员国的经济表现差距扩大。


France now has a 2%-of-GDP current-account deficit, compared to Germany’s 8%-of-GDP surplus.	法国现在有相当于GDP 2%的经常账户赤字，相比之下德国却有 8%的盈余。


The deflationary impact of internal devaluation is compounded by the rule, reinforced in the 2012 “fiscal compact,” that eurozone countries are wholly responsible for their own debts and thus must adopt strict budgetary discipline.	内部贬值的通紧效应因规则而加剧，在2012年的“财政契约”中被强化，该契约要求欧元区国家对自己的债务负全部责任，因此必须采取严格的预算纪律。


With demand relentlessly squeezed, not even depressed wages can generate adequate employment.	需求被无情挤压，降低工资也无法产生足够的就业机会。


The only solution, many euro supporters now contend, is full political union, which would allow for fiscal transfers from the eurozone’s more competitive countries to their weaker counterparts.	许多欧元支持者认为，唯一的解决方案是建立完整的政治联盟，这将允许欧元区内从竞争力强势国家向弱势国家实施转移支付。


But southern Italy, which has not used the fiscal transfers from the north on which it has long depended to transform its economy or boost productivity, demonstrates how little impact this approach can have.	但意大利南部一直都依赖北部进行财政转移支付，却从未因此实现经济转型或提高生产率，显示了这种方法产生的影响之小。


The notion that a eurozone fiscal union could do better is a dangerous fantasy.	因此建立欧元区财政联盟就能让局面得到改善的想法是一种危险的幻想。


Another potential approach would be for strong eurozone economies, especially Germany, to support productivity-enhancing structural reforms in less competitive countries like France and Italy.	另一个有潜力的方法是让那些强劲的欧元区经济体——尤其是德国——去支持像法国和意大利这样的低竞争力国家进行提高生产率的结构性改革。


This is probably what German Chancellor Angela Merkel meant when, in private discussions at last December’s European Council meeting, she reportedly said that, though Germany “cannot afford transfers to the whole of Europe,” it can “help to pay the doctors’ bills.”	这可能是德国总理安吉拉•默克尔(Angela Merkel) 在去年12月的欧洲理事会会议上私下里讨论所表达的意思。 据报道，她说尽管德国“不能承接整个欧洲的转移支付”,但它可以“帮助支付医生的账单”。


But, sooner or later, the weaker economies will probably opt out of such reforms, reclaiming their monetary sovereignty as a necessary – though far from sufficient – means of averting economic and social breakdown.	但是较弱的经济体迟早会退出这样的改革，回收自身货币主权作为避免经济和社会崩溃的必要——尽管远远不够——手段。


In the meantime, Hollande will continue to channel Tartuffe.	与此同时，奥朗德将继续专注于做一个伪君子。


Locked into the single currency, mainstream French politicians’ powerlessness to take real action renders their promises worthless.	陷入单一货币桎梏的法国主流政客无力采取真正行动的事实，也使得他们的承诺变得一文不值。


As a result, France can expect popular protest, as well as a further increase in support for more extreme parties – above all, Le Pen’s National Front.	因此法国预计将爆发持续不断的民众抗议，以及更极端党派——首先是勒庞的国民阵线——的支持率攀升。


Hollywood’s Favorite Villains	好莱坞最红的反派角色


Once upon a time, Cold War enemies, white supremacists, and evil geniuses reigned supreme as Hollywood’s favorite bad guys.	曾几何时，“冷战”敌人、白人至上主义者和邪恶的天才等反派角色在好莱坞大行其道。


No more.	而现在这些角色已风光不再。


Today, it is multinational corporations that are increasingly being cast as the über-villains of our globalized world.	当今，跨国公司们正越来越被定型为我们全球化的世界里的超级恶棍。


For all their subliminal paid promotions and subtle product placements, corporations are getting drubbed in the main story lines of our popular culture.	由于它们深入人潜意识的促销手段和暗渡陈仓式的产品推介，大公司们正在我们流行文化的故事情节中备受诟病。


This treatment goes far beyond documentaries like Michael Moore’s polemical Fahrenheit 9/11 or The Corporation , an earnest if somewhat paranoid portrayal of multinational companies’ role in globalization.	这种“待遇”远远超过了迈克·穆尔备受争议的《华氏9/11》和《大公司》（The Corporation）,等纪录片里，对跨国公司在全球化中的角色严肃却又有些偏执的描绘。


It extends to mainstream hits like The Constant Gardener , in which the idealistic protagonists do battle with a malicious global pharmaceutical company that is bent on exploiting Africa’s misery to test experimental drugs.	它延伸到了如《不朽的园丁》（The Constant Gardener）这样的主流大片，在片中，理想主义的主人公对抗剥削非洲，进行药物试验的全球性制药公司。


To be sure, sociopathic corporations have populated books and films for more than a century.	确切地说，反社会的大公司成为书籍和电影里的常客已经有一个多世纪了。


But corporate villains, typically multinational companies, have never been so ubiquitous as today.	但以跨国公司为典型的恶棍公司（的形象）从未像今天这样无所不在。


Is it unfair?	这是否有失公允？


Most corporations, after all, are merely convenient mechanisms for ensuring that scarce global capital is used at maximum efficiency, to the benefit of all.	毕竟，大多数的大公司也只不过是为了所有人的利益，确保稀缺的全球资本的使用效益最大化的便利机制罢了。


Are famously liberal Hollywood film directors spending too much time going to anti-globalization rallies?	以开明著称的好莱坞导演们是不是花了过多的时间在反全球化的集会上？


Perhaps.	也许吧。


But I would submit that Hollywood’s misgivings, however untutored, represent only the tip of a growing iceberg of resentment against the perceived injustices of globalization.	但我愿意相信，好莱坞的担忧，不论有多幼稚，也只代表了对全球化的不公正越来越强烈的憎恶情绪的冰山一角。


The simple truth is that corporations represent capital, and capital – in the form of factories, equipment, machines, money, and even houses – has been the single biggest winner in the modern era of globalization.	道理很简单：大公司代表着资本，而资本—以工厂、设备、机器、资金甚至房屋等形式出现—正是全球化时代唯一的大赢家。


Corporate profits are bursting at the seams of investors’ expectations in virtually every corner of the world.	几乎在世界的每一个角落，公司的利润都在突破着投资者的期望。


Even in moribund economies like Germany and Italy, where employment security is vanishing, corporations are swimming in cash.	甚至在德国和意大利这样极不景气的国家，虽然就业保障正在消失，但大公司们仍能遨游在现金的海洋里。


This phenomenon comes as no surprise to economists.	经济学家们对这一现象却不以为奇。


Add two billion Indian and Chinese workers to the global labor force, and the value of other means of production – particularly capital and commodities (for example, gold and oil) – is bound to go up.  And so it has, with capitalists everywhere gaining an ever larger share of the economic pie.	在全球的劳力大军中增加20亿印度和中国工人，那么其它生产资料的价值—特别是资本和商品（例如黄金和石油）--肯定会上涨。 随着世界各地的资本家们掌控的经济份额越来越大，这已是既成事实。


(In theory, capitalists in labor-abundant China and India could end up as losers, but in practice they, too, have benefited thanks to their governments’ success in simultaneously liberalizing and globalizing.)	（从理论上讲，在劳动力丰富的中国和印度，资本家可能成为输家。 但在现实中，由于其政府成功的同步自由化和全球化，他们也受益匪浅。


Many policymakers seem to be under the impression that surging profits are a purely cyclical phenomenon, as economies continue to grow out from the depths of the 2001 recession.	许多政策制定者们似乎有这样一种印象，即由于各大经济体继续摆脱2001年的衰退，利润的暴涨纯粹是一种周期性的现象。


Wait a bit, they predict, and wages will fully catch up later in the cycle.	还有，他们预测说工资会在本周期的后面一段完全追上这种涨势。


Not likely.	而形势却似乎并非如此。


Capital’s piece of the pie has been getting bigger for more than 20 years, and the trend looks set to continue.	资本在整个经济中所占份额在过去20年里不断扩大，而且这种趋势看起来还会持续下去。


Indeed, corporations’ growing share of income has been a major driver behind the long, if uneven, bull market in stocks that began in the early 1990’s.	的确，大公司收入份额的不断增加是1990年代初期以来，长期但不平衡的股票牛市背后的主要驱动力。


At the same time, inflation-adjusted wages for rich-country unskilled workers have barely budged over the last two decades.	但与此同时，富国非熟练工人的工资（计入通胀）在过去20年里却几乎没变。


Some of these trends also have to do with the nature of modern technological change, which seems to favor capital and skilled workers disproportionately.	其中的一些趋势也和现代技术变革的特点有关。 这种特性使其绝对地垂青于资本和熟练工人。


But, regardless of their cause, rapidly growing inequalities are a powerful force for instability everywhere, from wealthy America to rapidly growing China to reform-challenged Europe.	不管这些技术变革初衷如何，由此带来的日益增长的不平等是一种造成世界各地不安定因素的重要力量--从富有的美国，到经济飞速发展的中国，再到面临改革挑战的欧洲。


“A rising tide lifts all boats,” conservatives like to say.	保守人士喜欢说“水涨船高”。