But it is two other obstacles that render CCBT hopeless.	但真正让CCBT实行无望的还是另外两个障碍。


First, the IAS responds to the information needs of financial investors, but it does not provide a reliable definition of income for tax purposes.	首先，IAS回应的是金融投资者的信息需求，但却并没有为税收目的而提供一个公司收入的定义。


The accrual principle typical of financial accounting is incompatible with tax systems’ realization principle.	金融会计中典型的应计原则和税收体系中的实现原则并不兼容。


Moreover, the IAS leaves the allocation of profit and losses to different fiscal years largely undetermined, with each member state choosing different solutions.	此外，IAS在很大程度上没有对损益在不同财政年度的分配作明确规定，而每个成员国在这方面都选择了不同的方案。


Second, common legal rules on group consolidation do not exist; indeed, many EU countries’ commercial law contains no legal definition of a group.	其次，在集团公司统一核算方面并没有共同的法规； 的确，在许多欧盟国家的商法中都没有对集团公司的法律定义。


The attribution of companies to a common group would need to be based on legal control, that is, ownership of some defined threshold of equity – 51% or higher.	多家公司和同一个集团的归属关系需要以合法的控制为基础，即要有某种明确的股份门槛—51%及以上。


But a much lower share of equity often is sufficient to secure de facto control, thus encouraging groups to adapt their capital structure – moving firms in and out of the group’s boundaries – to minimize tax liabilities.	但通常通过低得多的股份也能获得实际上的控制权，因此这就鼓励了各集团调整其资本结构—将公司在集团的边界内外挪移—从而使税收义务最小化。


Clearly, CCBT is a non-starter.	显然，CCBT无法启动。


But this doesn’t mean that EU companies are condemned to live with 25 different national tax systems.	但这并不意味着欧盟的公司们不得不应对25个不同的国家税收体系。


The idea of a common tax base must be preserved in order to simplify the system and narrow the scope for profit-shifting.	必须保留共同税基以简化税制，并缩小利润转移的范围。


However, a radical change in approach is required: the notion of income as a basis for corporate taxation should be scrapped altogether.	但这就需要进行一种激进的改革：将收入作为公司税基础的概念应该被完全废止。


Referring to corporate income made sense when company taxation was seen as a “back stop” within a system of progressive taxation of personal incomes.	当公司税被视为个人所得税递进税制中的“定位杆”时，参考公司收入才是有意义的。


But most countries have now adopted “dual” income taxation that treat the fruits of capital more leniently than other personal income.	但现在大多数国家都采用了“双重”收入税制，对待资本收益要比对待其他个人收入宽松。


More importantly, the notion of corporate income is inherently arbitrary, for it is based on correct measurement of capital consumption in each tax period, which has become less and less reliable owing to the increased importance of intangibles in the value of companies.	更为重要的是，公司收入的概念在本质上是武断的，因为它是基于对每一税期内资本消费的正确度量。 但随着无形资产对公司价值的重要性的增加，这种度量正变得越来越不可靠。


Moreover, any tax whose proceeds increase in line with company returns is bound to discourage investment.	另外，任何税收的递增如果和公司收益联动必定会挫伤投资。


This disincentive disappears if the corporate tax base is decoupled from current profits and linked to some broad measure of activity.	如果公司税基不与目前的利润挂钩，而是和某些更广泛的衡量标准联系，那么这种挫伤因素就会消失。


Indeed, this would create an incentive for each company to outperform the average, since above-average profits would go untaxed.	的确，这样就能激励每一家公司都努力增收，超过平均水平，因为超过平均水平部分的利润是免税的。


Another reason to scrap income and move to presumptive taxation of corporate activities stems from the EU’s decentralized nature.	另一个废止收入税基，转向针对公司经营活动的假定税基的理由来自欧盟分散化的特点。


While taxing the return on capital at the national level could discourage investment, taxing companies in exchange for location advantages might not.	虽然在国家层面上对资本收益征税可能会挫伤投资，但对公司收税以换取区位优势的做法则可能不会。


Countries that offer world-class infrastructure, high-skill staff, and simple business rules may be well entitled to ask companies to pay a commensurate tax in return.	提供世界级基础设施、高素质的员工和简明的商务法规的国家可能有资格向公司征收与其营商环境相称的税。


In sum, the EU “federal” corporate tax should be thought of as a benefit tax, based on a broad measure of activity, applied at a moderate rate, and unrelated to current returns; nor should it be deductible from other taxes.	总之，欧盟的“联邦”公司税应该被看作是一种福利税，它以对广泛的经营行为的度量为基础，采用适中的税率，不与当前收益挂钩； 它也不应该从其他税收中扣除。


Among the various options under consideration, the value-added tax base – perhaps averaged over a number of years – looks best, since the accounting and tax-assessment infrastructures already exist.	在考虑中的各种不同方案里，增值税基—可能在过去若干年里表现平平—似乎是最佳方案。 因为它的会计���税收评估基本框架已经到位了。


Of course, value-added includes profits, and to this extent the incentive for companies to manipulate transfer prices may reappear.	当然，增加值中包括利润，在这一程度上，公司操纵交易价格的动机可能还会出现。


But the incentive would be much weakened, because gross returns typically represent a fairly small share of total value-added.	但这一动机会被极大弱化，因为毛利润通常只代表着全部增加值中的较小一部分。


This model leaves the assessment and administration of corporate taxes entirely in the hands of member states, and would not require harmonization of legal and accounting rules.	这一模式将公司税的评估和管理完全交到各成员国手中，并且也不需要法律和会计规则的协调。


It would be transparent, simple, and easy to administer.	它将会是透明、简单和易于管理的。


The gigantic apparatus for managing transfer prices and tax credit claims with foreign tax authorities could be dismantled.	如此一来，管理交易价格和国外课税扣除申报的庞大机构也可以撤销了。


Indeed, the only losers would be Europe’s outsized army of tax lawyers and accountants.	的确，如果实施该税制，唯一的输家将会是欧洲过于庞大的税务律师和会计队伍。


What do Arabs Want?	阿拉伯人想要什么？


CAIRO – The self-immolation a year ago of Tunisian street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi triggered a wave of popular protests that spread across the Arab world, forcing out dictators in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.	开罗——一年前，突尼斯街头小贩穆罕默德•布瓦吉吉自杀引发了一系列深得人心的抗议活动，席卷了阿拉伯世界，迫使埃及、利比亚和也门的独裁者下台。


Now, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, too, seems near the end of his rule.	目前，叙利亚总统巴沙尔•阿萨德的统治似乎也接近尾声了。


Together, these movements for change have come to be known as the Arab Spring.	这些求变的运动统称为“阿拉伯之春”。


But what values are driving these movements, and what kind of change do their adherents want?	但是什么价值观推动着这些运动，它们的追随者想要什么样的变革？


A series of surveys in the Arab world last summer highlights some significant shifts in public opinion.	去年夏天在阿拉伯世界开展的一系列调查凸显出了民意方面的一些重要变化。


In surveys, 84% of Egyptians and 66% of Lebanese regarded democracy and economic prosperity as the Arab Spring’s goal.	在调查中，84%的埃及人和66%的黎巴嫩人认为民主和经济繁荣是阿拉伯之春的目标。


In both countries, only about 9% believed that these movements aimed to establish an Islamic government.	在这两个国家，只有约9%的人认为这些运动旨在建立伊斯兰政府。


For Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, where trend data are available, the Arab Spring reflected a significant shift in people’s values concerning national identity.	埃及、伊拉克和沙特阿拉伯有趋势数据，阿拉伯之春反映出人们在国家认同感的价值观方面发生了巨大转变。


In 2001, only 8% of Egyptians defined themselves as Egyptians above all, while 81% defined themselves as Muslims.	2001年，最重要的是，只有8%的人自认为是埃及人，81%的人自认为是穆斯林人。


In 2007, the results were roughly the same.	2007年，结果基本相同。


In the wake of the Arab Spring, however, these numbers changed dramatically: those defining themselves as Egyptians rose to 50%, 2% more than those who defined themselves as Muslims.  Among Iraqis, primary self-identification in national terms jumped from 23% of respondents in 2004 to 57% in 2011.	然而，阿拉伯之春之后，这些数字发生了巨大的变化：自认为是埃及人的数量上升到了50%，比自认为是穆斯林人的数量多2%。 在伊拉克人中，主要自认为是伊拉克人的数量占到了2004年回复者中的23%，2011年飙升到了57%。


Among Saudis, the figure jumped from 17% in 2003 to 46% in 2011, while the share of those claiming a primary Muslim identity dropped from 75% to 44%.	在沙特阿拉伯人中，这一数据从2003年的17%蹿升至2011年的46%，而主要自认为是穆斯林人的比重从75%下降到了44%。


There has also been a shift toward secular politics and weakening support for sharia (Islamic religious law).	还在向世俗政治转变，伊斯兰教法的支持率也越来越低。


Among Iraqis, the percentage of those who agreed that Iraq would be a better place if religion and politics were separated increased from 50% in 2004 to almost 70% in 2011.	在伊拉克人中，认为如果政教分离，伊拉克将更好的人的比例从2004年的50%上升到了2011年的近70%。


Similar data are not available for Egypt and Saudi Arabia, but both countries show a decline in support for sharia.	埃及和沙特阿拉伯没有类似的数据可以利用，但是在这两个国家，伊斯兰教法的支持率有所降低。


In Egypt, those considering it “very important” for government to implement sharia declined from 48% in 2001 to 28% in 2011.	在埃及，认为政府实行伊斯兰教法“非常重要”的人从2001年的48%下降到了2011年的28%。


For Saudis, the figure fell from 69% in 2003 to 31% in 2011.	在沙特阿拉伯人中，这一数据从2003年的69%下降到了2011年的31%。


Finally, an analysis of a nationally representative sample of 3,500 Egyptian adults, who rated their participation in the anti-Mubarak movement, showed that participants were more likely to be younger single males with higher socioeconomic status, users of the Internet, newspaper readers, urban residents, and believers in modern values and free will.	3500名埃及成年人（他们参加了反穆巴拉克运动）组成了具有全国代表性的样本。 最后，对这份样本的分析表明，参与者更有可能是社会经济地位较高的较年轻单身男性、互联网用户、新闻报纸的读者、城市居民以及现代价值观和自由意志的信奉者。


They did not mind having Americans, British, or French as neighbors.	他们不介意与美国人、英国人和法国人做邻居。


Religiosity did not predict participation, while religious intolerance reduced participation.	宗教狂热无法预测参与度，但是宗教的不宽容会降低参与度。


These figures seem at odds with the results of Egypt’s recent parliamentary election, in which the Muslim Brothers and the Salafi fundamentalists together gained about 65% of the popular vote.	这些数据似乎与埃及最近的议会选举结果矛盾，在这次议会选举中，穆斯林兄弟会和萨里发原教旨主义者共获得了约65%的大众选票。


It remains true that religion is an important factor for Egyptian voters, as 66% of those surveyed “strongly agree” or “agree” that it would be better if people with strong religious belief held public office; and 57% consider a government’s implementation of sharia “very important” or “important.”	对于埃及选民来说，宗教是一个至关重要的因素，这仍然是事实。 66%的受调查者“非常同意”或“同意”，如果具有强烈宗教信仰的人执政，该国将更美好；


Nonetheless, nationalism trumps religion.	57%的人认为政府实行伊斯兰教法“非常重要”或“重要”。


Fully 78% agreed with the statement that it would be better if more people with a strong commitment to national interests rather than with strong religious views held public office.	尽管如此，民族主义战胜了宗教。 整整78%的人认同如下看法：如果有更多坚定致力于国家利益而不是带有强烈宗教色彩看问题的人执政，该国家将更美好。


How, then, to explain the inconsistency between the survey data and Egypt’s election results?	那么，如何解释调查数据和埃及选举结果之间的不一致性呢？


First, the fundamentalists benefited from years of political organizing and activism, and thus were better able to mobilize their supporters, whereas the liberals, who led the uprising against the former regime, lacked nationwide organization and had little time to translate their newly acquired political capital into votes.	首先，原教旨主义者从多年的政治组织和活动中受益，因此能够更好地动员其支持者，而领导起义对抗前政权的自由主义者缺少全国性的组织，也没有什么时间将刚刚获得的政治资本转化成选票。


Second, the liberals’ priorities were misplaced.	其次，自由主义者的优先任务有问题。


Instead of pushing their agenda forward among Egyptians, they focused on the wrong enemy, spending invaluable time organizing rallies against the army.	他们没有在埃及人中推行其议程，而是把主要精力花在了错误敌人的身上，组织集会反对军队，白白浪费了时间。


Finally, the election outcome is not as bad as it appears.	最后，选举结果并没有其看上去那么糟糕。


Liberalism has been under continuous attack for decades from religious extremists and religious institutions, and liberal organizations were stifled by oppressive rules.	几十年来，自由主义受到宗教极端分子和宗教机构的不断攻击，自由组织也受到了压迫性法规的限制。


If the Mubarak regime had fallen under the banner of political Islam, Muslim fundamentalists would have been in a much better position to advance more exclusivist claims over the revolution and the country.	如果穆巴拉克政权在政治性伊斯兰教的旗帜下垮台，穆斯林原教旨主义者将处于更加有利的位置，对这次革命和国家获得控制权，更加地排外。


But it was the liberals who delivered Egypt from authoritarianism.	但是让埃及摆脱专制统治的是自由主义者。


This, in turn, brought legitimacy to liberalism and generated the powerful feeling of nationalist awareness among Egyptians.	这反过来给自由主义带来了合法性，唤醒了埃及人强烈的民族意识。


As a result, support for sharia declined and national identity soared.	因此，伊斯兰教法的支持率下降，国家认同感增强了。


Insofar as political discourse is focused on national rebuilding and freedom, Islamic fundamentalists, in Egypt and elsewhere, will face an uphill battle.	一定程度上，由于政治论调大多是国家重建和自由，埃及以及其他地方的伊斯兰原教旨主义者将面临一场艰难的战斗。


What do Egypt’s Generals Want?	埃及的将军想要什么？


CAIRO – “Whatever the majority in the People’s Assembly, they are very welcome, because they won’t have the ability to impose anything that the people don’t want.”	开罗——“无论哪个党派在议会获得了绝大多数，他们都是受人欢迎的，因为他们无法实施任何人民不愿意实施的措施。


Thus declared General Mukhtar al-Mulla, a member of Egypt’s ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).	”埃及最高军事委员会委员穆赫塔尔•阿尔•穆拉将军宣布道。


Al-Mulla’s message was that the Islamists’ victory in Egypt’s recent election gives them neither executive power nor control of the framing of a new constitution.	阿尔•穆拉的意思是，虽然伊斯兰主义者在埃及最近的选举中获胜，但是他们既不能获得行政权也无法控制新宪法的形成。


But General Sami Anan, Chief of Staff and the SCAF’s deputy head, quickly countered that al-Mulla’s statement does not necessarily represent the official views of the Council.	但是参谋长兼最高军事委员会副委员长萨米•阿南将军立即反驳说，阿尔•穆拉的观点并不代表该委员会的官方观点。


So, one year after the revolution that overthrew Hosni Mubarak, who, exactly, will set Egypt’s political direction?	革命推翻胡斯尼•穆巴拉克一年后，到底谁将确定埃及的政治方向？


The electoral victory of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing and the Salafi parties, which together won more than 70% of the parliamentary seats, will give them strong influence over the transitional period and in drafting the constitution.	穆斯林兄弟会的政治派和萨拉菲各派在选举中获胜，总共获得了议会中70%的席位，这将在过渡阶段给予他们强大的影响力并制定宪法。


But they are not alone.	但是并不是只有他们。


Aside from the Islamists, two other powerful actors will have their say: the “Tahrirists” and the generals.	除了伊斯兰主义者，还有两个强大的参与者有发言权：解放广场的抗议者和将军们。


Tahrir Square-based activism has not only brought about social and political change, but also has served as the ultimate tool of pro-democracy pressure on Egypt’s military rulers.	以解放广场为基地的活动不仅引发了社会和政治变革，最后还迫使埃及军方领导人支持民主。


Indeed, while the army, the most powerful of the three actors, still officially controls the country, there is little confidence in the generals’ commitment to democracy.	实际上，三个参与者中，军队最强大，还正式控制着这个国家，人们几乎不相信将军们会致力于民主。


“The SCAF are either anti-democratic….or some of their advisers told them that democracy is not in their best interest,” says Hazem Abd al-Azim, a nominee in the first post-Mubarak government.	“最高军事委员会不反对民主……但是其中一些顾问告诉他们，民主并不是最符合他们利益的。 ”穆巴拉克政府倒台后首次选举的候选人哈齐姆•阿卜德•阿尔•阿齐姆说。


If the generals do not want democracy, nor do they want direct military rule à la Augusto Pinochet.	如果将军们不想要民主，他们也不想通过军队直接统治国家。


So, what do they want?	那么，他们想要什么？


Ideally, they would like to combine the Algerian army’s current power and the Turkish army’s legitimacy.	在理想的情况下，他们想融合阿尔及利亚军队当前的权力和土耳其军队的合法性。


This implies a parliament with limited powers, a weak presidency subordinate to the army, and constitutional prerogatives that legitimate the army’s intervention in politics.	这意味着议会的权力有限，软弱的总统受制于于军队，军队享有宪法的特权，能够干预政治事务。


The minimum that they insist on is reflected in statements by Generals al-Mulla, Mamdouh Shahim, Ismail Etman, and others. That would mean a veto in high politics, independence for the army’s budget and vast economic empire, legal immunity from prosecution on charges stemming from corruption or repression, and constitutional prerogatives to guarantee these arrangements.	阿尔•穆拉、马姆杜•沙希姆和伊斯梅尔•伊特曼等将军的声明反映了他们坚持的底线，即在重要政治问题上享有否决权、军队预算和大量的财政收入独立、享有腐败或镇压指控豁免权、享有宪法特权确保这些权益。


The new parliament and constitutional assembly will have to lead the negotiations with the SCAF.	新国会和宪法议会必须与最高军事委员会谈判。


But, given that any successful democratic transition must include meaningful civilian control over the armed forces and the security apparatus, the SCAF’s minimum demands could render the process meaningless.	但是鉴于任何成功的民主转型必须包括文官控制大部分军队和安全机构，最高军事委员会的最低要求可能会使这个过程毫无意义。


The veto in high politics would include any issues that touch on national security or sensitive foreign policy, most importantly the relationship with Israel.	在重要问题上享有否决权意味着在涉及国家安全或敏感外交政策（最重要的是与以色列的关系）等问题时都享有否决权。


With an Islamist majority in the parliament promising to “revise” the peace agreement with Israel, tensions over foreign policy are likely to rise.	伊斯兰主义者在国会中占大多数预示着要“重新修订”与以色列的和平协议，这样外交政策上的紧张关系很可能出现。


The independent military-commercial empire, which benefits from preferential customs and exchange rates, no taxation, land-confiscation rights, and an army of almost-free laborers (conscripted soldiers), is another thorny issue.	独立的军事商业帝国又是一个棘手的难题。 它从优惠的关税和汇率、免税、土地没收权和大批几乎免费的劳动力（入伍的士兵）中受益匪浅。


With the Egyptian economy suffering, elected politicians might seek to improve conditions by moving against the military’s civilian assets – namely, by revising the preferential rates and imposing a form of taxation.	由于埃及的经济萎靡不振，当选的政客可能会试图通过应付军队的民用资产——具体点说就是修订优惠税率并采用新税收形式——来改善经济状况。


Immunity from prosecution is no less salient.	免受指控也很引人注目。


“The Field-Marshal should be in jail now,” screamed the elected leftist MP, Abu Ezz al-Hariri, on the second day of the new parliamentary session.	当选的左翼议员阿布•伊兹•阿尔•哈里利在新国会选举的第二天喊道：“陆军元帅现在应该关在监狱了。


When Mahmoud Ghozlan, the Muslim Brotherhood spokesperson, proposed immunity (known in Egypt as the “safe-exit” option), he faced a wave of harsh criticism.	”当穆斯林兄弟会的发言人马哈茂德•戈兹朗提议豁免权（在埃及称为“安全脱身”的选择）时，他受到��严厉的批评。


Pressure from the United States has also influenced the SCAF’s decision-making.	美国的压力也影响了最高军事委员会的决策。 “埃及军方接受了美国13亿美元的资助……他们很重视美国的要求。


“The military establishment receives $1.3 billion from the US….They are very sensitive to US requests,” according to Saad Eddin Ibrahim, who lobbied the Obama administration to support the revolution in January 2011.	”萨德•埃丁•易卜拉欣说。 2011年1月，他曾游说奥巴马政府支持革命。


But most of the SCAF’s pro-democracy decisions have come as a result of massive pressure from Tahrir Square.	但是最高军事委员会大多数支持民主的决定都是解放广场抗议者大力施压的结果。


This includes the removal of Mubarak, his trial (and that of other regime figures), and bringing forward the presidential election from 2013 to June 2012.	其中包括推翻穆巴拉克政府、庭审穆巴拉克（以及其他穆巴拉克政府的官员）和将总统大选从2013年提前到2012年6月。


Two other factors are equally, if not more, influential: the status quo inherited from the Mubarak era and the army’s internal cohesion.	如果不是更加具有影响力的话，另外两个因素至少具有相同的影响力：从穆巴拉克时代继承下来的现状和军队内部的凝聚力。


With few exceptions, the SCAF’s members benefited significantly from Mubarak’s regime.	几乎没有什么特例，最高军事委员会的委员都从穆巴拉克政府中受益匪浅。


They will attempt to preserve as much of it as possible.	他们将竭尽全力保住尽可能多的利益。


“The sight of officers in uniform protesting in Tahrir Square and speaking on Al Jazeera really worries the Field Marshal,” a former officer told me.	“在解放广场抗议并在阿拉伯半岛新闻电视台讲话的军人实际上是担心陆军统帅，”一位前官员对我说。


And one way to maintain internal cohesion is to create “demons” – a lesson learned from the “dirty wars” in Algeria in the 1990’s and Argentina in the 1970’s and 1980’s.	保持内部凝聚力的一种方法是创造“恶魔”——这是从二十世纪九十年代阿尔及利亚和二十世纪七八十年代阿根廷的“肮脏战争”中学来的。


In particular, Coptic protesters are an easy target against which to rally soldiers and officers.	科普特的抗议者特别容易成为士兵和军官整治的目标。


Last October, amid an unnecessary escalation of sectarian violence, state-owned television featured a hospitalized Egyptian soldier screaming, “The Copts killed my colleague!”	去年10月份，在不必要的宗派暴力升级过程中，国有电视特别报道一位住院的埃及士兵喊道，“科普特人杀了我的同事！


The systematic demonization of the Tahririst groups, and the violent escalation that followed in November and December, served the same purpose.	”有系统地妖魔化解放广场上的抗议者以及11月和12月的暴力升级都是为了达到相同的目的。


Despite everything, democratic Egypt is not a romantic fantasy.	尽管如此，埃及实现民主并不是不切实际的。


A year ago, Saad al-Ketatni, the Muslim Brotherhood leader, would never have dreamed of being Speaker of Parliament.	一年前，穆斯林兄弟会的领袖萨德•阿尔•卡塔尼根本不会想到自己会当上国会的发言人。


The same applies to the leftists and liberals who now hold around 20% of the parliament’s seats.	左翼人士和自由人士也不会想到，他们现在竟然占到了国会大约20%的席位。


If 2011 witnessed the miracle of Mubarak’s removal, a brave parliament’s institutional assertiveness, coupled with non-institutional Tahririst pressure, could force the generals to accept a transfer of power to civilian rule (with some reserved domains for the army establishment) in 2012. What is certain is that this year will not witness a return to the conditions of 2010.	如果2011年见证了穆巴拉克下台的奇迹，2012年将见证勇敢的国会机制力量和解放广场抗议者压力的非机制力量迫使将军们接受向文官统治转变（军方在一些领域将保有权力）。


Egypt may become stuck in democratization’s slow lane, but there will be no U-turn.	埃及可能在民主的慢车道上前行，但是不会倒退。


The hundreds of thousands who marched to Tahrir Square on the revolution’s anniversary will guarantee that.	成千上万的人到解放广场游行纪念革命一周年将保证这种趋势。


What Do Muslim Women Want?	穆斯林女性究竟要什么？


NEW YORK – When caricature takes the place of dialogue, everyone suffers – especially when it comes to understanding issues affecting women, who struggle worldwide against being silenced.	发自纽约——当鹦鹉学舌取代了沟通对话，所有人都深受其害——尤其是当话题关乎如何理解全世界反抗压制的女性之时。


Some right-wing American bloggers recently twisted an article that I wrote in a way that did just that.	但就在最近，一些美国右翼博客写手却曲解了我的一篇有关女性的文章，所用伎俩恰如我在文章开头写的那样。


I wrote that many women activists in Muslim countries tend to emphasize issues such as honor killings, legal inequality, and lack of access to education, and that they express frustration that the obsession among Westerners with Muslim women’s clothing can come at the expense of these concerns.	我在那篇文章中写到，许多穆斯林国家的女性活动家希望将一些诸如“荣誉谋杀”、法律不平等和缺乏受教育机会的问题重点展现给世人，但她们同时也对西方人总把对穆斯林女性穿着的迷思凌驾于这些问题之上感到困惑不满。


I also pointed out that many Muslim feminists defend their dress in terms of nationalism, anti-imperialism, or as a matter of faith.	我还指出，许多穆斯林女权主义者维护她们的穿着方式，目的是捍卫她们的民族主义，反帝国主义理念，或者就是一个信仰问题。


This provoked a small firestorm of distortion in the West: “Wolf Wants to Institutionalize the Burka,” etc.	但上述呼声却在西方掀起了一股歪曲我本意、所谓“沃尔夫想将布卡（穆斯林女性传统服装）合理化”的风暴。


It was depressing to see a simple appeal for Westerners to listen to Muslim women deliberately distorted into a representation of all Muslim women as meek, will-less beings in need of rescue.	而令人沮丧的是：我仅仅是在呼吁西方人倾听穆斯林女性的心声，却被故意歪曲成某种象征，似乎所有穆斯林女性都是些急待拯救的，驯服而缺乏意志的小动物。


I was so sure that Muslim women should be allowed to speak for themselves because of the faces of Muslim feminism I encountered in recent travels – notably in Jordan, a country fascinatingly poised between tradition and innovation, developing under a forward-looking monarchy that is seeking to modernize and, to an extent, democratize.  For those Westerners who worry about Islamic fundamentalism in the Arab world, surely Jordan is a worthy model to understand, support, and engage.	而我之所以对穆斯林女性应拥有为自己说话的权利如此肯定，是缘自于我在最近旅行中遇到的几位穆斯林女权主义者——尤其是在约旦这个在传统与创新中取得完美平衡，并在高瞻远瞩的君主政体领导下走向现代化以及在某种程度上的民主化的国度。 对于那些担忧阿拉伯世界原教旨主义的西方人来说，约旦无疑是一个值得我们理解、支持和加强交往的典型。


The women leaders I met in Amman were not saying, “Please tell the West to save us.” They were too busy making egalitarian, modernist new worlds of their own, with an Arab, and often Islamic, imprimatur.	我在约旦首都阿曼遇到的那些女领导人并没有跟我说，“请转告西方世界快来拯救我们”，因为她们正忙于缔造属于自己的平等和现代主义新世界，并获得了阿拉伯世界甚至时常来自伊斯兰教的认可。


Princess Rym Ali, sister-in-law of Queen Rania – the Chanel-wearing media star who is rebranding a more contemporary Jordan – is one vivid example; Princess Rym is making immense progress in a more behind-the-scenes way.	约旦王后拉尼娅是一位身着香奈尔时装的媒体宠儿，并且正致力将约旦重塑成为一个更加现代化的崭新国家。 而其妯娌丽姆·阿里王妃则更是一位生动的典范；


She met me in a leafy Amman suburb, in the palace that she shares with Prince Ali and their small children.	作为王妃，她本人喜欢在幕后做出自己的巨大贡献。 她与我在阿曼郊外一处树木葱郁的宫殿会面，这是她和阿里王子以及年幼的孩子们共同生活的地方。


A former CNN journalist, her quiet bearing and diplomatic manner belie her courage: she captured her husband’s heart as she was reporting from Baghdad on the eve of “shock and awe,” standing firm before the cameras even as the bombs were falling.	作为一名前CNN记者，丽姆王妃娴静的举止和出色的外交辞令掩盖了她的过人勇气：在美军对伊拉克发动“震撼与威慑”行动前夕，在巴格达的丽姆即便在炸弹乱飞之时依然牢牢站在摄像机面前进行现场报道，并以此俘虏了阿里王子的心。


Princess Rym and Prince Ali have supported a new film institute, the Red Sea Institute of Cinematic Arts, a joint production with the University of Southern California that is bringing together bright young people from all over the Middle East to learn contemporary filmmaking, apprentice with international film productions, and get the region’s stories out.	最近在丽姆王妃与阿里王子的支持下，约旦与南加州大学合作创建了红海电影艺术学院。 学院聚集了来自整个中东的青年才俊，师从国际电影出版公司学习制作现代电影制作，并讲述中东自己的故事。


Though she can no longer practice journalism directly, Princess Rym is also co-founding new Jordanian journalism school. Her aim is to replace journalists’ acceptance of the “party line” – even if the party is her own extended family – with a more critical perspective.	而尽管王妃本人已经不能继续从事新闻事业，她仍然参与合作创建了新的约旦记者学校——目的是让记者们不再做“党派路线”的跟风者——即使这个政党就是她王室家庭的延伸——并具备批判性的判断力。


She directed my attention to Jordanian-made films about the subordination of women inside the home, and to Rana Husseini’s powerful book on honor killings, Murder in the Name of Honor .	她把我的注意力引向多部约旦制作，讲述妇女家庭从属地位的电影，以及一本有关“荣誉谋杀”的大作——由拉娜·胡赛因撰写的《谋杀：以荣誉的名义》。


But her implicit message was that these critical examinations of women’s inequality in the Arab world are most enlightening when they are created by women’s advocates from within that culture, rather than sensationalized or superficial versions of the problem created in the West.	而她的言下之意则是，这些对于阿拉伯世界里女性不平等现象的严厉拷问，来自阿拉伯文化内部妇女的呼声要比耸人听闻或肤浅无比的“西方制造”版本更加发人深省。


Mary Nazzal, owner, with her family, of a chic and bustling boutique hotel, is another dynamo who looks as if she stepped out of a fashion shoot.	还有一位就是玛丽·纳扎尔，作为一座时髦而受欢迎的精品酒店的家族所有人，她也是一位精力充沛，仿佛刚从时尚大片中走出来的女性。


But it would be a mistake to underestimate her seriousness. I call her “Martha Stewart meets Che Guevara,” because, when not renovating the elegant public spaces of her hotel, she is suing Israeli generals for war crimes that she claims were committed against civilians in Gaza.	但不能因此低估她的严肃认真态度：我把纳扎尔称为“玛莎·史都华+切·格瓦拉”式的女性，因为当纳��尔不在酒店里修整那些优雅的公共空间时，她正在国际刑事法院当庭控告以色列将军们对加沙平民所犯下的战争罪行。


Nazzal was trained as a British barrister, and chairs the board of the Human Rights Legal Aid Fund.	纳扎尔接受过英国高级律师的教育，并且是“人权法律援助信托基金”的董事会主席。


Her organization is intent on using international law to hold accountable members of the Israeli military who put civilians in harm’s way during the invasion of Gaza – events that the recent Goldstone Report confirms.	该组织的宗旨就是用国际法制裁那些在入侵加沙行动中对平民伤害事件负有责任的以色列军方成员，而这些暴行都是得到联合国调查小组发布的《戈德斯通报道》确认的。


She is passionate about the Palestinian cause, mixing her cutting-edge legal advocacy with a willingness to listen to decent people from all sides of the conflict, and a fierce attachment to peace in the region based on due process and justice.	纳扎尔对于巴勒斯坦的案例非常积极，她把自己顶尖的法律辩护能力与听取冲突各方正直人士意见的意愿糅合在一起，并热切相信遵循法律程序和公正的审判将能够在地区内建立和平。


Finally there is Rana Husseini herself – a role model for investigative reporters everywhere who began documenting and investigating honor killings in her newspaper, The Jordan Times .	最后一位女性则是拉娜·胡赛因本人——世界各地调查记者的模范典型。 拉娜在她供职的《约旦时报》中首先记录并调查“荣誉谋杀”的问题。


Honor killings claim an estimated 5,000 women every year, and are increasingly common in immigrant communities abroad.	据她估计，每年约有5000名女性被“荣誉谋杀”夺去生命，同时在海外移民社区里的死亡人数也有所增加。


According to her account, a woman can be killed for “laughing at a joke in the street, wearing makeup or a short skirt…or being raped by a brother.”	按照拉娜的解释，一个女人因类似“在大街上被逗笑，化妆，身着短裙”，或者“被某个兄弟强奸”的理由就能被置于死地！


After she began her series of reports, Husseini received death threats at her office almost daily – as well as hundreds of letters of support from readers.	自从拉娜展开一系列报道后，她的办公室几乎每天都收到死亡威胁，但同时也收到了成千上百封读者的支持信。


As a result of her brave investigations, which included interviews in prisons, many Muslim countries are revising their criminal codes, and the issue has taken center stage internationally.	作为她勇敢调查的回报（这些调查甚至包括对狱中女性的采访），许多穆斯林国家正在修订刑法，而这个话题也成为国际关注的中心。


These women are exactly the kind of leaders that everyone should be cultivating and supporting, rather than overlooking because of a belief that they cannot exist in the Middle East.	这些女性正是我们每个人都应该加以培养和支持的领袖人士，而不是用“中东根本不存在这样的女性”的谬论来忽略她们。


We would do better to find out more about them than to waste our time on superficial debates about how they – and many others who are just as accomplished – should dress.	这样我们才能更好的了解她们，而不是把时间都浪费在聒噪地争论这些女性，以及千千万万个同她们一样卓有成就的穆斯林女性应该如何穿着上。


What Euro Crisis?	什么是欧元危机？


FRANKFURT – What constitutes a crisis?	法兰克福——危机的构成要素是什么？


Is it sustained economic decline, high and long-term unemployment, poverty, rampant inflation, a precipitous fall in the exchange rate, fiscal deficits, high borrowing costs, and political dysfunction?	是经济的持续衰退、长期的高失业率、贫困、恶性通货膨胀、汇率的急剧下降、财政赤字、借贷成本高、还是政治问题？


Most would agree that a crisis exists if just some of these “misery indices” are present.	大部分人都认为，如果此类“痛苦指数”中的某些问题出现，就会引发危机。


But, while Europe is widely perceived to be in the grip of crisis, only a handful of them are present, and in only a few eurozone countries.	然而，虽然普遍认为欧洲正面临危机，但欧洲只是存在少数几个问题，而且此危机只存在于几个欧元区国家。


So, why is there a eurozone crisis, and what defines it?	那么，欧元区为什么会出现经济危机呢？


Time and again, it is argued that the single currency does not fit the different needs of its member countries, and that unsustainable economic divergence will ultimately require that the euro be abandoned.	该危机又是如何界定的呢？ 人们屡次争辩称，单一货币不符合各成员国迥然各异的需求，而且非持续性经济分歧最终将要求欧元区放弃欧元。


The fatal divergences that are most frequently cited include differences in growth rates, job-creation, and unemployment rates, as well as dramatic disparities in current-account balances, all of which may be traceable to wide deviations in unit labor costs.	最常提到的致命分歧包括增长率、创造就业、失业率之间的差异以及经常账户余额之间的巨大差距，所有这一切都可能会追溯到单元劳动成本之间的巨大差异。


Perceptions of such divergences force considerable risk premiums on problem countries, inevitably resulting in accelerating capital flight to safe havens.	此分歧给问题国家带来相当大的风险溢价问题，这不可避免地会加快资本向安全地区外逃的速度。


All of these developments are now visible in the eurozone, particularly in its peripheral countries.	在欧元区——尤其是欧元区的边缘国家——存在所有的这些问题。


Risk premiums started rising above benign levels in 2009, and then more strongly in 2011-2012, while capital flight became rampant in 2011.	2009年，风险溢价开始上升到高于良性水平的高度，在2011-2012年上升地更为剧烈； 同时，在2011年资本外逃的问题也十分严重。


But, if one considers what might underlie capital movements of this sort, suspicion must also fall on unsustainable policies that extend to countries well outside the eurozone.	但是，若要考虑这种资本流动的基础是什么的话，人们可能会猜疑是非持续性政策延伸到了欧元区以外的国家。


In the wider European Union, countries like the United Kingdom or Hungary are as much afflicted by structural deficiencies as some peripheral eurozone countries are.	在范围更广的欧洲联盟，如英国和匈牙利等国同某些欧元区边缘国家一样都深受结构性缺陷的影响。


Exchange-rate flexibility has not helped them much, or at least they have chosen not to exploit it.	而灵活的汇率并没有起到多大的作用，或者至少它们都没有启动灵活的货币政策。


Moreover, there are countries with government-debt burdens that are as large, if not larger, than those on Europe’s periphery – the United States and Japan being prime examples.	此外，有些国家的政府债务负担同欧洲边缘国家的债务负担一样大，甚至更大，美国和日本就是两个最好的例子。


Other countries, like Norway and Switzerland, are running current-account surpluses that exceed 10% of their GDP, but are resisting currency revaluation.	而挪威和瑞士等其他国家的经常账户余额已超过本国GDP的10%，但这些国家却拒不对货币进行增值。


It is worth remembering that, for the decade until 2005, Germany was labeled the “sick man of Europe.”	值得记住的是，2005年之前的10年，德国被称为是“欧洲病夫”。


Germany was uncompetitive when it entered the eurozone, owing to excessive wage and price increases following the country’s reunification – a problem that has since been overcome by structural reforms that the country undertook within the single currency.	德国重新统一后，工资和物价过度增长，因此在加入欧元区时德国并无竞争力，但是德国在单一货币区内进行了结构改革，而此问题也得以解决。


The same is true for the most recent eurozone member, Estonia, whose rigorous wage restraint ensured competitiveness in the single market in a short period of time.	最近加入欧元区的成员国爱沙尼亚也面临相同的状况，该国严格的工资限制保证其短期内在这个单一市场上拥有一定的竞争力。


Why, then, is there such strong doubt that the euro can survive?	那么，人们为什么如此强烈地质疑欧元能否继续延用下去呢？


Some say that the current efforts to enforce sound policies in the peripheral countries are bound to fail, and that sacrificing democracy in these countries to keep the monetary union intact is too high a price to pay.	有些人指出，当前旨在促进边缘国家政策实施的措施注定要失败，而且以牺牲这些国家的民主来换取货币联盟的完整要付出的代价过大。


In fact, the efforts of governments and international institutions point the way toward more sustainable solutions.	事实上，各国政府和国际组织试图寻找更持久的解决办法。


Who would have believed at this time last year that the fiscal pact adopted in March would have been possible?	去年的这个时候谁会相信3月份通过的财政协议在此时会成为可能呢？


And, despite fluctuations, has there not been a considerable reduction in risk premiums for problem countries, without adding to the financing costs of donor countries?	此外，在不给捐助国增加财务费用的情况下，问题国家是否可以大幅减少风险溢价呢（尽管会存在波动）？


Much remains unknown.	目前尚存在众多未知因素。


Are we seeing tentative signs of escape from the eurozone’s malaise?	当前欧元区的困境有解决办法吗？


Will debtor countries be able to stick to tough reform programs, or will their citizens reject austerity?	债务国会实行严格的改革方案吗，其公民会拒绝紧缩的经济政策吗？


And will donor countries avoid the sort of populist backlash at home that might push them in a protectionist direction?	若捐助国的民粹主义者在国内发起强烈的抵制，可能会迫使该国实行贸易保护主义，那么捐助国会避免这一情况的发生吗？


Intelligent cooperation that avoids moral hazard should be able to prevent panic, reduce risk premiums, and permit fuller use of resources.	智能合作可以避免道德风险，智能合作应该能够防止恐慌情绪、减少风险溢价、并能使资源得到更充分的利用。


For example, transnational migration flows should certainly be made easier and more attractive.	例如，跨国移民应更容易，更有吸引力。


High levels of unemployment, particularly among young skilled workers, could be avoided if donor countries that need migrants to invigorate their own workforces were able to attract them.	目前失业率——尤其是年轻技术工人的失业率——非常高。 若需要借助移民来激活本国劳动力的捐助国无法吸引移民，该国则无法避免失业率高的困境。


More immigration would strengthen skills and raise income levels, while reducing distressed countries’ expenditure on unemployment benefits.	移民的增加会提高受困国家的技能水平和收入水平，同时也会减少该国在失业津贴上的开支。


Greater labor mobility within the EU would also help to create a more open European mindset, and thus weaken old nationalist prejudices.	若欧盟的劳动力流动性增大，也将使欧洲的思维更加开放，从而削弱旧民族主义的偏见。


So, will Europe commit to moving toward political union, and thereby address what has remained missing, despite the single market, the euro, and the Schengen Agreement’s elimination of internal borders?	因此，欧洲是否会建立一个政治联盟，以此解决当前存在的问题呢？ ——尽管欧洲现在是单一市场，采用的是欧元并制定了消除内部边界的《申根协定》。


The model for a future United States of Europe is Switzerland, a country with four languages and ethnicities, fiscally strong sub-national units (cantons), a single first-rate currency, and a federal government and a parliament that exercises genuine, if limited, fiscal authority.	瑞士是未来欧洲合共国的模型。 在瑞士有四种语言和种族，下属有多个亚国家单位（州），而且各亚国家单元的财政力量都十分强大，整个瑞士使用的是一流的单一货币，由联邦政府和议会行使真正的（若有限）财政权利。


If the EU made the most of the competencies that it already has, and governed more effectively, the Union as a whole could achieve faster economic growth for at least the next decade, with a 2.5% annual rate not out of reach.	如果欧盟能完全发挥现有的能力，并能更有效地进行管理，那么未来的至少十年整个联盟的经济就会得到更快的发展，2. 5%的年增长率也将不再遥不可及。


More generous support for countries in trouble is essential, because the euro must be preserved (albeit not necessarily on the base of a larger eurozone).	为处于困境的国家提供更慷慨的援助是必不可少的重要事项，这是因为必须要保留欧元（虽然这未必是以庞大的欧元区为基础）。


Financial markets would be more easily convinced if such support were complemented by the recipient countries’ acceptance of the fiscal pact, together with technical help to strengthen their governance.	如果受援国就该援助签署财政协议，而且援助国在提供援助时也提供技术支持以增强其统治能力，那么金融市场将更易被折服。


In Greece, anti-corruption officers from the US, Italian tax-efficiency specialists, German privatization experts, and Spanish tourism professionals should be made available to accelerate the pace of modernization.	希腊应任用来自美国的反腐人员、意大利研究税收效率的专家、德国研究私有化的专家以及西班牙的旅游专家来加快现代化的步伐。


All of this amounts to a much-needed and often-advocated Marshall Plan for the periphery.	所有这一切相当于边缘国家所急需并大力提倡的马歇尔计划。


But it recognizes that what Europe’s troubled countries need most is not money, but the planning and administrative capacity to spend it effectively.	但是，其认识到深陷困境的欧洲国家最急需的并非金钱，而是如何有效利用资金的规划和管理能力。


Over the last decade, Greece could absorb only a fifth of the EU modernization funds available to it.	过去的10年，希腊有效吸收的欧盟现代化资金只有5%，但当时希腊未必定要如此。


It didn’t have to be that way then, and Europe cannot afford to let it remain that way now.	而现在欧洲已无力让其保持这样的状态。


What The EU Must Do Now	欧盟必须采取举措


WASHINGTON, DC – The United Kingdom’s Brexit vote is arguably the greatest disaster ever to hit the European Union.	华盛顿——英国的退欧投票可以说是有史以来欧盟面临的最大灾难。


Now, the EU must act fast – not least by ending the post-referendum market turmoil – if it is to survive.	现在欧盟要想生存就必须迅速采取措施——而且目的不仅是结束公投后的市场动荡。


British Prime Minister David Cameron, having lost the referendum, did the obvious thing by resigning.	英国首相戴维·卡梅伦在公投失利后，通过辞职承担了责任。


But the other loser is the European Commission, whose president, Jean-Claude Juncker, did little to change the outcome of the Brexit vote.	但还有一个输家是欧洲委员会，主席让 - 克洛德·容克几乎没有付出什么努力来改变英国退欧投票的结果。


Not since Jacques Delors was President of the Commission, from 1985 to 1995, has that position been filled by a leader with any vision or political clout.	从1985到1995年雅克·德洛尔任委员会主席以来，再也没有有远见或政治影响力的领袖担任过委员会主席职务。


Juncker, like Cameron, should accept responsibility and resign.	像卡梅伦一样，容克应当承担责任并辞去职务。


The EU needs a strong leader again.	欧盟再次需要一位强有力的领导者。


There are many worthy candidates, but I recommend former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt.	其实有很多不错的人选，但我个人推荐瑞典前首相卡尔·比尔特。


Before the post-referendum dust settles, the EU should set an ultimatum with clear and onerous principles for the UK’s exit – clarity to minimize the cost, and severity to deter populists in other member states from calling for exit referenda, too.	在后公投期的尘埃落定之前，欧盟应当为英国退出制定原则明确且严厉的最后通牒——明确是为了尽可能降低成本，严厉是为遏制其他成员国的民粹主义者呼吁进行退欧公投。


Sensibly, European Commission leaders have already moved in this direction by voiding concessions made by the EU to the UK back in February and declaring that there “will be no renegotiation.”	显然，欧洲委员会领袖已经在这方面采取了举措， 宣布今年2月对英国做出的让步无效，并公开宣称“不会再有重新谈判的机会”。


The European Council, for its part, has already called for an immediate summit.	欧洲理事会已经呼吁立即召开峰会。


Having failed for six years to resolve the Greek financial crisis, the EU finally appears to understand that its very survival depends on swift and decisive action.	在6年未能解决希腊金融危机后，欧盟似乎终于明白其自身的生存依赖于能否迅速果断采取行动。


But the EU must go further than just Brexit damage control.	但欧盟的任务不仅局限在英国退欧的损害控制。


For the last four decades, Europe’s fundamental problem has been complacency in the face of low economic growth caused by excessive taxation and regulation.	过去40年来，欧洲的根本问题是面对税收及监管过度所引发的经济增长放缓还洋洋自得。


Europe can no longer afford this standstill.	欧洲已经无法忍受这样的停滞。


It must now begin to carry out fundamental reforms: cut unjustified social benefits; liberalize services, labor markets, and digital markets; reduce labor taxes; deregulate industry; improve education; and promote research and development.	现在必须进行根本性的改革：削减不合理的社会福利； 服务、劳动力和数字市场自由化；


Current EU rules are clear on the responsibilities of EU institutions and national governments, respectively.	目前的欧盟规则明确了欧盟机构和各国政府的责任。


The problem is that most European governments (especially British Tory governments) tend to scapegoat the EU to mask their own political myopia.	问题在于多数欧洲政府（特别是英国保守党政府）倾向于把欧盟当作替罪羊来掩盖其自身政治远见的缺乏。


Little wonder that the EU has grown so unpopular.	欧盟如此不受欢迎因此就不值得大惊小怪了。


Given that it already receives the blame, the European Commission should now be granted the power to act politically.	鉴于欧盟已经承担了责任，现在应当授予欧盟委员会政治行动权。


The EU has a strong case to make for itself, but it needs good-faith leaders to deliver its message to the people.	欧盟有能力在公众面前证明自己，但需要诚实的领导人将消息传递给各国民众。


European populists point to the mishandling of migration issues to justify their cause.	欧洲民粹主义分子用移民问题处理不当来证明他们的观点。


So, for starters, the EU should establish an orderly migration policy with quotas and criteria, as Australia and Canada have successfully done, and impose proper control over its external borders.	因此，首先，欧盟应当像澳大利亚和加拿大那样制定以配额和标准为基础的有序的移民政策，并适当控制其外部边境线。


The EU border control agency, Frontex, needs a stronger mandate and more resources to fulfill this crucial role.	欧盟边境控制机构Frontex需要更有力的授权和更多资源才能完成这项至关重要的任务。


Going further, the EU should institute a joint foreign and defense policy to address the underlying causes of the migration crisis – namely, the conflicts in Libya and Syria.	进一步讲，欧盟需要实行共同的外交和防卫政策，以解决移民危机的根本原因——也就是利比亚和叙利亚发生的冲突。


For a quarter-century, Europe has benefited from the post-Cold War peace dividend and irresponsibly allowed member states’ average defense expenditure to slip to a paltry 1.4% of GDP.	四分之一世纪以来，欧盟得益于后冷战期的和平红利，不负责任地允许成员国将平均国防开支降低到微不足道的GDP的1.


This should be increased to at least the 2% of GDP each NATO member has promised.	4%。 国防开支应至少增加到所有北约成员国承诺的GDP的2%。


Today, only five EU countries have defense expenditures at that level.	今天，只有5个欧盟国家的国防开支达到了承诺的要求。


With good reason, US President Barack Obama has called Europeans “free riders.”	美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马称欧洲人“搭便车”理由非常充分。


Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump, going much further, openly questions both NATO and US military expenditures abroad.	共和党总统候选人唐纳德·特朗普更进一步，公开质疑北约和美国的海外军事开支。


In the near future, Europe may no longer be able to rely on the US to defend it and should prepare for a scenario in which it is forced to fend for itself.	在不久的将来，欧洲可能无法再依赖美国为其提供防御，并应当做好准备防御其自身。


The principle of representative democracy is at the heart of European identity; ironically, only EU non-member Switzerland has a strong tradition of referenda.	代议制民主原则是欧洲共同身份的核心； 但讽刺的是，只有非欧盟成员国的瑞士拥有公民投票的优良传统。


One of the positive consequences of the squalid Brexit campaign is that it demonstrated that referenda and plebiscites are demagogic, not truly democratic.	卑劣的英国退欧活动产生的积极效���之一是向全世界表明全民公决和公民投票富于煽动性，绝不是真正的民主。


EU members should recognize the risks of so-called direct democracy and tighten the criteria for the passage of referenda.	欧盟成员国应认识到所谓直接民主的巨大风险并收紧全民公决通过的标准。


At a minimum, referenda should be required to achieve a supermajority with a high percentage of voter turnout.	最低限度，全民公决应要求在高投票率的情况下达到绝对多数。


The best one can say about Brexit is that it finally may have put an end to European complacency.	英国退欧的最乐观结果可能是最终结束了欧洲的洋洋自得。


We will know for sure only if, and when, Europe chooses to save itself.	只有当欧洲选择自我拯救我们才能知道确切的结果。


Whatever Happened to Wage Insurance?	工资保险怎么了？


A lot of public attention and worry nowadays surrounds the new risks that globalization and information technology create for our wages and livelihoods.	目前，对全球化和信息技术给我们的工资和生计带来的种种新风险，公众倾注了大量的注意力，忧虑重重。


But there has been far less constructive discussion of new ideas about how to confront these risks.	但对与如何应对这些风险相关的新想法的建设性讨论，却要少得多。


In fact, we might be losing the momentum we had a few years ago to implement some of these ideas.	事实上，我们正在逐渐失去将这些想法付诸实施的动力，而这些动力，几年前我们还有。


To be sure, we still sympathize with people who, upon reaching middle age or later, find themselves replaced by lower-paid workers in another part of the world, if not by a computer or a robot.	有些人在步入中年或此后，会发现自己已被世界上其它地方更为廉价的劳动力替代（如果不是被电脑或机器人替代的话），对这些人，我们仍然抱有同情，这点毫无疑问。


But are we really going to do anything about these risks?	但是，我们真打算为这些风险采取什么行动吗？


One new idea that seemed hot a few years ago is “wage insurance.”	数年前似乎热门一时的一个新想法便是“工资保险”。


As then floated, the idea was simple: the government would protect people from the risk of losing their job and being unable to find a new one at the same wage.	如当时所流传的一样，这个想法非常简单：政府保护人民免遭失业且不能找到同样工资水平的新工作的风险。


A government insurance program would pay these people a fraction, say, half, the difference between their old pay and their pay in a new job for a specified period, such as two years.	政府保险计划将在某一特定时间内（如两年）支付给这些人旧有工资和新工作工资的部分差额，比如说一半。


The idea was first proposed by Robert Z. Lawrence and Robert Litan in their 1986 book, Saving Free Trade, andrevived in a 2001 article by Litan and Lori Kletzer.	罗伯特· Z· 劳伦斯（ Robert Z. Lawrence）和罗伯特·利坦（Robert Litan）在其 1986 年出版的《拯救自由贸易》一书中，首次提出了这一想法，利坦和洛丽•克莱策（Lori Kletzer） 在 2001 年联合发表的一篇文章中对此重新提及。


The proposal generated interest.	该提议引起了人们的兴趣。


A demonstration program was adopted in the United States in 2002.	2002 年，美国采纳了一个示范计划。


In 2002, the Hartz Commission recommended a version of it in Germany.	同年，哈尔茨委员会（Hartz Commission）在德国推荐使用其德国版。


Wage insurance programs have been actively talked about or actually implemented in some form in Britain, France, Switzerland, and Ireland.	在英国、法国、瑞士、爱尔兰，工资保险计划都为人们所津津乐道，或以某种形式付诸实际实施。


Despite all the intellectual applause, however, wage insurance programs are still not a significant force in the world economy.	尽管所有的知识分子都对此表示欢迎，但是，在世界经济中，工资保险计划仍然不是什么重要力量。


They should be. But they should also be supplemented by other devices.	虽然本应所此，但还是应该用其它工具来对其加以补充。


One advantage of wage insurance is that it may be a more effective way to subsidize on-the-job training than traditional government-run vocational training programs.	与传统的政府推行的职业培训计划相比，工资保险不失为在职培训更为有效的补助方式，这是工资保险的一大优势。


Often, after completing a government-sponsored program, participants find it impossible to secure a job with the promised higher pay.	计划参与者在完成了政府发起的计划后，往往发现自己不可能找到培训计划所承诺的，报酬较高的工作。


Far better, proponents of wage insurance argue, for the training to be carried out by an employer who wants a job done and knows what the employee needs to learn.	工资保险的倡议者辩论说，培训如果由想让员工完成某一工作的雇主来进行，情况会好得多，因为雇主了解到底员工需要学习什么。


It seems plausible that two years is long enough for retraining, after which the employee might command a higher wage without a government subsidy.	两年时间，对再培训来说也够长了。 两年以后，员工可能不需要政府补贴便能拿到更高的工资，这似乎也合情合理。


But governments, fearing the expense of wage insurance if a lot of people exploit it, have not been willing to implement it on a large scale.	但是，政府担心如果很多人利用工资保险，其费用会非常高，所以不愿意大规模实施此计划。


For example, the US wage insurance program is confined to manufacturing workers over age 50 who are in competitively vulnerable industries and are deemed by the Secretary of Labor to have nontransferable skills.	比如，美国工资保险计划就仅限于 50 岁以上，所在行业竞争力极为低下的制造工人，这些人被劳工部视为不具备可转移技能。


Moreover, the benefit is capped at $5,000 per year.	此外，该福利的上限是每年 5,000 美元。


The program has practically been forgotten, and will expire next year unless it is renewed.	该计划事实上已经被人遗忘，而且除非到时更新，否则明年就要到期了。


With government deficits the norm, that appears unlikely.	而政府赤字已成定则，所以更新看起来可能性很小。


The way to regain lost momentum is to recognize that wage insurance is only one of several new ideas for insuring the emerging risks of this century.	要重获失去的动力，就得承认工资保险不过是本世纪为新出现的风险提供保险的数个新想法之一。


The weakness of the current wage insurance proposal is that it pays benefits only for a limited period and relies for its long-term effect on the retraining incentives that it creates.	当前的工资保险提议的弱点在于：该保险仅为一段有限的时间支付福利，并且依赖于对自己创造的再培训动力的长期效果。


In reality, however, losing a high-paying job may be a lifetime event, and the supposed retraining that wage insurance would encourage for a laid-off 50-year-old worker often may be ineffective.	但是事实上，丢掉高收入工作可能是一辈子的事情，而对一个被裁掉的 50 岁工人而言，工资保险计划所鼓励的再培训往往没有什么效果。


In my 2003 book, New Financial Order: Risk in the 21st Century, I proposed a different idea, which I called “livelihood insurance.”	我在自己 2003 年出版的《金融新秩序：管理 21 世纪的风险》一书中，提出了另外一个不同的想法，我称之为“生计保险”。


As the name implies, livelihood insurance is designed to provide more than just a brief respite or a subsidy for retraining. It is aimed at dealing with long-term changes in the labor market, rather than assuring temporary wage levels.	如其名字所示，设计生计保险不仅仅是为了提供一个短暂的暂缓之计，也不只是为再培训提供补助，而是为了应对劳动力市场的长期变化���而非确保暂时的工资水平。


It would also rely on the market rather than a government program.	生计保险还应该依赖市场，而非政府计划。


With livelihood insurance, a private insurer would pay a stream of income to a policyholder if an index of average income in the insured person’s occupation and region declines substantially.	根据生计保险计划，如果被保险人所在职业和地区的平均收入指数大幅度下降，那么私有保险人就将持续向保单持有人支付收入流。


Moreover, this income stream would continue for as long as the index stays down, not just for a couple of years (or any other arbitrary period).	此外，指数的低水平持续多久，该收入流就该持续多久，而不仅仅是几年（或其它规定的时间期限）。


In other words, this insurance policy would protect against lifetime income risks.	换言之，本保单可为一辈子的收入风险提供保护。


One reason why government-run wage insurance programs must have limited duration is that they involve so-called “moral hazard”: the risk that people will get lazy or would take easier, lower-paying jobs and continue to collect insurance that pays them the wage of a more demanding occupation.	政府经营的工资保险计划为什么一定要有时间限制，原因之一是这些计划涉及所谓的“道德危险”，即人们可能变懒的风险，或人们可能选择从事较为简单的，收入较低的工作，同时继续获取保险收入的风险（保险将支付给他们要求更高的职业所支付的工资）。


But this would not apply to livelihood insurance, because its benefits are tied to the rise and fall of income indices, which are beyond the control of individuals.	这种情况不适用于生计保险，因为生计保险与收入指数的升降紧密相关，而这，不在个人的控制范围之内。


Livelihood insurance would also have another advantage.	生计保险还有另外一大优势。


Since the premium would be determined by the market, it would be higher in occupations that the market believes to be in danger from outsourcing or technical change.	由于保险费由市场来决定，所以市场认为外包或技术变革将给其带来危险的职业，保险费就相应要高。


This, in turn, would give workers a tangible warning and an incentive to anticipate job losses before they occur.	这反过来会给工人以实在的警告与刺激，让其在失业发生之前，便预见到其可能性。


This is not to say that wage insurance is a bad idea, or that it should not be implemented on a wider scale.	这并不是说工资保险就不好，也不是说工资保险不应该大规模实施。


Both wage and livelihood insurance appear to have important risk management functions.	无论是工资保险，还是生计保险，都具有重要的风险管理功能。


Indeed, for the future, it is imperative to think about many new ways, involving both government and the market, to ensure that we manage better the greatest personal risks now faced by workers around the world.	事实上，为了未来着想，我们必须要多想一些新办法出来，这些办法既要把政府包含在内，也要把市场包含在内，这样才能保证我们能更好地管理目前全世界工人所面对的最大的个人风险。


France’s German Mirror	德国映照出的法国镜像


BERLIN – Berlin’s Tegel Airport, which still greets most of the passengers arriving in the capital of Europe’s leading economic power, is outdated and provincial.	柏林——虽然柏林的泰格尔机场依然迎候着飞抵这个欧洲经济大国的多数旅客，但相关的设施却早已落后而破旧不堪。


The opening of Schönefeld Airport, transformed into an international hub, has been delayed for more than a year for technical reasons (a somewhat reassuring challenge to Germany’s reputation for efficiency).	完成向国际枢纽转型的舍内费尔德机场由于技术原因而推迟开放超过一年（这对德国以效率著称的声望构成了某种挑战）。


Yet, despite the gray and chill of March in Central Europe, Berlin exudes confidence.	虽然早春三月的中欧阴沉而寒冷，但柏林仍然散发出自信的气息。


More than ever, the city is a work in progress – confused, not very beautiful, and overcharged with history.	此外，虽然在历史的重压下迷茫而并不美轮美奂，但柏林仍处在发展之中。


Berlin is a construction site that has managed to transform its multiple pasts into positive energy.	柏林是一个将多重过去成功转化为正能量的大工地。


“Diversity destroyed: Berlin 1933-1938” is the unifying theme of a series of exhibits marking the 80th anniversary of Hitler’s coming to power and the 75th of the Pogromnacht.  At the Deutsches Historisches Museum on Unter den Linden, entire classes of young pupils and students flock to see the exhibit’s evocation of destruction by a criminal regime whose objects, from loudspeakers to uniforms and weapons, are displayed in an educational manner.	“柏林1933-1938：多样性的毁灭”是希特勒执政80周年暨水晶之夜75周年系列纪念展的统一主题。 在菩提树下大街的德国历史博物馆，整班的年轻学生蜂拥而来参观犯罪政权所展现的破坏力：从高音喇叭、制服到武器，犯罪政权曾经的历史罪证现在被用于教育目的。


Young Berliners cannot ignore where they come from.	年轻的柏林人不能忘记过去。


Yet, perhaps because the past still rings like a warning – and is still physically visible in the topography and architecture of the city today – Berlin is striking in its simplicity, its radiant modernity (symbolized by the glass dome of the Reichstag, a conception of the British architect Norman Foster), and, above all, its intensity.	但或许因为过去仍然警钟长鸣（而且在今天的城市建筑地貌中仍然依稀可辨），柏林城的简单、（以英国建筑师诺曼·福斯特设计的国会大厦玻璃穹顶为代表的）容光焕发的现代感还有激情都令人忍不住赞叹。


That positive energy contrasts starkly with the decadent beauty of Paris, a city that is on a path of “museification.”	这种正能量与巴黎的颓废美形成了鲜明的对比，后者的一切正日趋“博物馆化”。


Of course, if you can afford to live there, Paris remains a great place to be.	当然，巴黎在能负担得起开销的人眼中仍是好地方。


But Berlin is a better place to work, even if what you do is very poorly paid.	而柏林却是一片工作胜地，即使你的报酬很低。


The porter who brings my luggage to my hotel room is of Tunisian origin. He is a happy Berliner and a proud new German.	将行李送到我酒店房间的勤杂工来自突尼斯，他是个快乐的柏林人、骄傲的德国新移民。


And, even on a low salary, he can live and raise his children in the city itself.	并且即使薪酬很低，他也可以在柏林城里生活和抚养儿女。


Thanks to its moderate housing costs, Berlin has not become, like Paris, a ghetto for the rich.	适度的住房成本使柏林避免了像巴黎一样沦为有钱人的聚居地。


Unlike the French, who are handicapped by the high cost of housing, Germans’ purchasing power is more harmoniously distributed, creating more room for household consumption to contribute to economic growth.	与受困于高房价的法国人相比，德国人的购买力分配更加和谐，为家庭消费贡献于经济增长创造了条件。


Germany’s positive energy is, of course, the result of success translated into confidence, which Chancellor Angela Merkel incarnates with strength and simplicity.	德国的正能量无疑是成就转化为信心的结果，这一点在安格拉·默克尔总理身上得到简洁有力的体现。


Merkel has changed profoundly while in office.	默克尔在任职期间发生了深刻的改变。


Five years ago, she did not exude the natural authority that she now possesses.	五年前，她还不像现在这样散发出自然而然的权威感。


Today, like Pope Francis, she is clearly at ease with herself.	今天，她像弗朗西斯教皇一样达到了精神上的和谐。


Has there been a French president since François Mitterrand who was truly a match for a German chancellor?	弗朗索瓦·密特朗之后有哪任法国总统可以和德国总理相比？


If France has replaced Germany as “the sick man of Europe,” it is for political reasons, above all: vision, courage, and strength on the northern side of the Rhine, and vacillation, inertia, and weakness on the southern.	如果法国取代了德国“欧洲病夫”的位置，归根结底恐怕主要出于政治原因：莱茵河北岸展现的是远见、勇气和力量，而南岸却暴露出动摇、惯性和弱点。


Of course, given its excessively low salaries and adverse demographic trends, Germany will continue to face difficulties.	当然，鉴于工资过低且人口趋势不利，德国仍将继续遭遇困难。


But to emphasize only these problems, as some French do, is pure escapism.	但像某些法国人那样片面强调问题却纯粹是逃避现实的表现。


German demography cannot be described as the solution to French youth unemployment, as though one could rest on a slogan such as: “They lack young people, our young people lack jobs – what a perfect match!”	德国的人口问题不能作为法国年轻人失业的借口，就像一幅标语所说：“他们缺年轻人，我们的年轻人缺工作——真是绝配！


This widespread sentiment irresponsibly assumes that time is working in favor of France, regardless of whether it implements structural reforms.	” 这样的普遍情绪不负责任地假设无论是否进行结构改革，时间都会对法国有利。


France’s current direction is a source of deep concern in Germany, whose evolution should be seen in France as a source of inspiration – an example to be emulated, even if the country must not fall into self-flagellation.	即使不必过于自责，法国也应该仿效德国的榜样。 法国目前的走向在德国备受关注，而法国人应当从德国人走过的道路中汲取教训。


Yet today’s debate in France over the German model reminds one eerily of the discussions that followed France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War.	但今天法国对德国模式的讨论诡异地令人想起普法战争惨败后的情景。


In June 1871, just after the war ended, the French statesman Léon Gambetta declaimed: “Our adversaries have won, because they rallied to their side foresight, discipline, and science.”	1871年6月，战争刚刚结束，法国政治家列昂·甘贝塔就慷慨陈词：“我们的敌人赢了，因为他们拥有远见、纪律和科学。


Germany, it seems, can still rally those eternal values.	”德国似乎仍能凝聚上述价值观。


The major difference now is that the European unification process rules out war – even economic war – between the two countries.	当前的主要差别是欧洲统一进程排除了两国交战、甚至是经济战的可能性。


On the contrary, in the mirror of Germany, the French must ask themselves fundamental questions.	相反，在德国这面镜子面前，法国人必须在根本问题上扪心自问。


Have they made the right choices in terms of leaders and policies in recent decades?	几十年来他们选择的领导人和政策究竟对不对？


The places of power in France do not encourage modesty.	法国的权力场不鼓励谦虚。


In his latest book, Days of Power, the former agriculture minister, Bruno Le Maire, writes condescendingly of the building that houses his Danish counterpart in Copenhagen, which he compares to low-income housing.	前农业部长布鲁诺·勒梅尔在其新著《任职的日子》中不屑地描述其丹麦同行在哥本哈根的住所，并将其比喻成低收入住房。


With too much pomp, too many stumbling blocks, and a dearth of dynamism, France today can and should learn from Germany.	今天的法国太讲排场、有太多掣肘、却鲜有活力，真应该学习德国的榜样。


What Greece Needs to Prosper	希腊繁荣需要什么


NEW YORK – Some economists overlook the modern idea that a country’s prosperity depends on innovation and entrepreneurship.	纽约—一些经济学家忽视了一个现代观点，即，一国的繁荣取决于创新和企业家精神。


They take the mechanistic view that prosperity is a matter of employment, and that employment is determined by “demand” – government spending, household consumption, and investment demand.	他们机械地认为，繁荣事关就业，而就业决定于“需求”——政府支出、家庭消费和投资需求。


Looking at Greece, these economists argue that a shift in fiscal policy to “austerity” – a smaller public sector – has brought an acute deficiency of demand and thus a depression.	在希腊问题上，这些经济学家认为，财政政策转向“紧缩”——即缩小公共部门——导致了需求急剧萎缩，从而发生萧条。


But this claim misreads history and exaggerates the power of government spending.	但这一观点误解了历史，也夸大了政府支出的力量。


Much of the decline in employment in Greece occurred prior to the sharp cuts in spending between 2012 and 2014 – owing, no doubt, to sinking confidence in the government.	希腊就业率下降中有很大一部分发生在2012—2014年支出大幅缩减之前，毫无疑问，这是拜政府信心下降所赐。


Greek government spending per quarter climbed to a plateau of around €13.5 billion ($14.8 billion) in 2009-2012, before falling to roughly €9.6 billion in 2014-2015.	2009—2012年希腊政府每季度支出攀升至135亿欧元左右的高峰，然后在2014—2015年下降至96亿美元左右。


Yet the number of job holders reached its high of 4.5 million in 2006-2009, and had fallen to 3.6 million by 2012.	但有工作者人数在2006—2009年期间达到高峰（450万），到2012年已下降至360万。


By the time Greece began to cut its budget, the rate of unemployment – 9.6% of the labor force in 2009 – had already risen almost to its recent level of 25.5%.	当希腊开始缩减预算时，其失业率——占2009年劳动力比例为9. 6%——几乎已经上升到当前水平（25.


These findings weigh heavily against the hypothesis that “austerity” has brought Greece to its present plight.	这些事实极大地打击了“紧缩”导致希腊当前困境的假说。


They indicate that Greece’s turn away from the high spending of 2008-2013 is not to blame for today’s mass unemployment.	它们表明，希腊2008—2013年间支出由盛转衰并非今天大面积失业的原因。


Another finding casts doubt on whether austerity actually was imposed on Greece.	另一个发现质疑希腊实际上到底有没有实施紧缩。


Government spending has certainly fallen – but only to where it used to be: €9.6 billion in the first quarter of this year is, in fact, higher than it was as recently as 2003.	政府支出显然是下降了——但只是下降到从前的正常水平：今年首季度政府支出为96亿欧元，事实上比2003年还要高。


So the premise of austerity appears to be wrong.	因此，紧缩这一前提似乎是错误的。


Greece has not departed from past fiscal norms; it has returned to them.	希腊并没有远离过去的财政范式； 只是回到从前而已。


Rather than describing current government spending as “austere,” it would be more correct to view it as an end to years of fiscal profligacy, culminating in 2013, when the government’s budget deficit reached 12.3% of GDP and public debt climbed to 175% of GDP.	也许不应该将当前政府支出称为“严苛”，更准确的说法是结束了多年的财政挥霍（以2013年为定点，当时政府预算赤字达到了GDP的12. 3%，公债攀升至GDP的175%）。


The “demand school” might respond that, regardless of whether there is fiscal austerity now, increased government spending (financed, of course, by debt) would impart a permanent boost to employment.	“需求学派”也许会说，不管现在有没有财政紧缩，政府支出增加（当然，资金来自债务）将给就业带来永久提振。


But Greece’s recent experience suggests otherwise.	但希腊最近的经验表明并非如此。


The huge rise in government spending from 2006 to the 2009-2013 period did produce employment gains, but they were not sustained.	从2006年到2009—2013年期间，政府支出大幅增加，确实带来了就业增加，但并未得到持续。


The real sticking point is that the government would have to issue bonds to finance its extra spending.	真正的症结在于政府必须发行债券为增加的支出融资。


Assuming a limit to foreign investors’ willingness to buy these bonds, Greeks would have to buy them.	假设外国投资者购买这些债券的兴趣有限，则剩下的必须由希腊人购买。


In an economy unequipped for growth, household wealth relative to wages would soar, and the labor supply would shrink, causing employment to contract.	在一个增长无力的经济中，家庭财富相对工资将出现飙升，而劳动力供给将下降，导致就业萎缩。


So spending more is not the remedy for Greece’s plight, just as spending less was not the cause.	因此，增加支出并不是解决希腊困境的妙方，正如减少支出并非其根源。


What is the remedy, then?	那么，药方现在在哪里呢？


No amount of debt restructuring, even debt forgiveness, will suffice to achieve prosperity (in the form of low unemployment and high job satisfaction).	债务重组乃至债务豁免都不足以实现繁荣（以低失业和高职业满意度衡量）。


Such measures would only help Greece to revive government spending.	这些措施只能帮助希腊重新增加政府支出。


Then the economy’s stultifying corporatism – clientelism and cronyism in the public sector and vested interests and entrenched elites in the private sector – would gain a new lease on life.	然后，希腊经济中思维迟钝的社团主义——公共部门的官官相护和任人唯亲以及私人部门根深蒂固的精英——将获得新的喘息机会。


The European left may advocate that, but it would hardly be in Europe’s interest.	欧洲左派也许支持这一点，但这绝不符合欧洲的利益。


The remedy must lie in adopting the right structural reforms.	药方必须在于实施正确的结构改革。


Whether or not the reforms sought by the eurozone members raise the chances that their loans will be repaid, these creditors have a political and economic interest in the monetary union’s survival and development.	不论欧元区成员国所寻求的改革是否能提高其贷款得到偿还的机会，货币联盟的生存和发展符合这些债权人的利益。


They should also be ready to help Greece with the costs of making the necessary changes.	它们还应该准备好帮助希腊承担做出必要改变的成本。


But it is Greece itself that must take charge of its reforms.	但希腊的改革必须由希腊自己做主。


And there are encouraging signs that Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras is willing to take up that cause.	令人鼓舞的信号表明，希腊总理齐普拉斯愿意担任这方面的领导。


But he will need a sense of the required reforms.	但他需要采取必要改革的责任感。


Greece must dismantle corporatist arrangements and practices that obstruct whatever innovation and entrepreneurship might emerge.	希腊必须打破阻碍创新家和有活力的企业家出现的社团主义安排和行为。


Nurturing an abundance of imaginative innovators and vibrant entrepreneurs requires embracing a vision of venturesome lives of creativity and discovery.	培养大量有想象力的创新家和有活力的企业家需要有创造力和发现的冒险精神。


What Happened to India?	印度发生了什么？


CHICAGO – Emerging markets around the world – Brazil, China, India, and Russia, to name the largest – are slowing.	芝加哥—全球各新兴市场国家——以巴西、中国、印度和俄罗斯为首——正在减速。


One reason is that they continue to be dependent, directly or indirectly, on exports to advanced industrial countries.	原因之一是它们仍直接或间接地依赖于向工业化国家的出口。


Slow growth there, especially in Europe, is economically depressing.	工业化国家的增长减速，特别是欧洲，具有抑制经济的作用。


But a second reason is that they each have important weaknesses, which they have not overcome in good times.	但第二个原因是它们各自有着重大弱点，并且没能在繁荣期克服这些弱点。


For China, it is excessive reliance on fixed-asset investment for growth.	中国的问题是过度依赖固定资产投资带动增长。


In Brazil, low savings and various institutional impediments keep interest rates high and investment low, while the educational system does not serve significant parts of the population well.	在巴西，低储蓄和各种制度性障碍导致利率高企、投资不足，教育制度也无法给相当多的人口提供良好教育。


And Russia, despite a very well educated population, continues to be reliant on commodity industries for economic growth.	俄罗斯尽管拥有教育程度较高的人口，但仍然需要依赖商品维持经济增长。


Hardest to understand, though, is why India is underperforming so much relative to its potential.	不过，最难以理解的事情是印度的表现为何会大大低于其潜力。


Indeed, annual GDP growth has fallen by five percentage points since 2010.	事实上，2010年以来，印度年GDP增长率降低了5个百分点。


For a country as poor as India, growth should be what Americans call a “no-brainer.”	像印度这样的穷国，增长应该是很容易的事情，用美国人的话说，“闭着眼睛”都能增长。


It is largely a matter of providing public goods: basic infrastructure like roads, bridges, ports, and power, as well as access to education and basic health care.	只消提供公共品就行了：基本基础设施（公路、桥梁、港口和电力）以及教育和基本卫生服务。


And, unlike many equally poor countries, India already has a very strong entrepreneurial class, a reasonably large and well-educated middle class, and a number of world-class corporations that can be enlisted in the effort to provide these public goods.	与其他差不多穷的国家不同，印度已经拥有了强大的创业家阶层、规模足够大且教育程度高者的中产阶级以及众多可以动员起来提供公共品的世界级企业。


Satisfying the demand for such goods is itself a source of growth.	满足公共品需求本身就是增长的动力之一。


But, also, a reliable road creates tremendous additional activity, as trade increases between connected areas, and myriad businesses, restaurants, and hotels spring up along the way.	非但如此，一条可靠的公路可以引来大量额外经济活动，如彼此通路区域之间的贸易增长和各种沿路开办的企业、餐厅和饭店。


As India did away with the stultifying License Raj in the 1990’s, successive governments understood the imperative of economic growth, so much so that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) contested the 2004 election on a pro-development platform, encapsulated in the slogan, “India Shining.”	随着20世纪90年代取消无用的许可证制度，印度各届政府十分理解经济增长的重要性，2004年大选时，印度人民党（BJP）便以促发展为平台，提出了“让印度放光芒”的口号。


But the BJP-led coalition lost that election.	但BJP领导的联盟在大选中失利。


Whether the debacle reflected the BJP’s unfortunate choice of coalition partners or its emphasis on growth when too many Indians had not benefited from it, the lesson for politicians was that growth did not provide electoral rewards.	不管人民党的失败是因为选错了合作伙伴，还是因为在太多印度人没有从中获益时过早地强调发展，政客们得到的教训都是一样的——增长带不来选举胜利。


In any event, that election suggested a need to spread the benefits of growth to rural areas and the poor.	无论如何，那次大选表明，需要把增长得好处带给农村地区和穷人。


There are two ways of going about that.	办法有两个。


The first, which is harder and takes time, is to increase income-generating capabilities in rural areas, and among the poor, by improving access to education, health care, finance, water, and power.	第一个办法比较费时费力：通过普及教育、卫生、金融、和水电增强农村地区和穷人的收入能力。


The second is to increase voters’ spending power through populist subsidies and transfers, which typically tend to be directed toward the politically influential rather than the truly needy.	第二个办法是通过民粹主义补贴和转移支付增加选民的消费力，但补贴和转移通常会流向影响力较大而不是真正需要的地方和人群。


In the years after the BJP’s loss, with a few notable exceptions, India’s political class decided that traditional populism was a surer route to re-election.	BJP失败后的几年中，除了少数显著例外，印度政客们认为传统民粹主义对连任更有利。


This perception also accorded well with the median (typically poor) voter’s low expectation of government in India – seeing it as a source of sporadic handouts rather than of reliable public services.	这种感觉也与中位选民（通常属于穷人阶级）对印度政府期望较低一致——他们认为，印度政府只会零星地做一些施舍，成不了可靠的公共服务提供者。


For a few years, the momentum created by previous reforms, together with strong global growth, carried India forward.	几年来，先期改革所造成的势头以及强劲的全球经济增长给印度带来了进步。


Politicians saw little need to vote for further reforms, especially those that would upset powerful vested interests.	政客们认为不再需要为进一步改革费心了，特别是那些可能让手握重权的既得利益集团不满的改革。


The lurch toward populism was strengthened when the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance concluded that a rural employment-guarantee scheme and a populist farm-loan waiver aided its victory in the 2009 election.	国大党领导的团结进步联盟（United Progressive Alliance）认为，农村就业保障机制和民粹主义农场贷款豁免是其2009年大选获胜原因之一，这强化了印度的民粹主义倾向。


But, while politicians spent the growth dividend on poorly targeted giveaways such as subsidized petrol and cooking gas, the need for further reform only increased.	但是，尽管政客将增长红利以定向馈赠——比如油价和燃气价格补贴——的方式花在了穷人身上，进一步改革的需求却在不断增强。


For example, industrialization requires a transparent system for acquiring land from farmers and tribal people, which in turn presupposes much better land-ownership records than India has.	比如，工业化要求建设运输系统，建设运输系统要求从农民和部落民手中征地，而征地有要求印度目前不具备的完善土地所有权记录。


As demand for land and land prices increased, corruption became rampant, with some politicians, industrialists, and bureaucrats using the lack of transparency in land ownership and zoning to misappropriate assets.	随着土地需求和土地价格升高，腐败逐渐横行，某些政客、企业家和官僚利用土地所有权的不透明中饱私囊。


India’s corrupt elites had moved from controlling licenses to cornering newly valuable resources like land.	腐败的印度精英阶层不再控制许可证，而转向了控制土地等新兴宝贵资源。


The Resource Raj rose from the ashes of the License Raj.	许可证制度已经寿终正寝，资源统治方兴未艾。


India’s citizenry eventually reacted.	印度人民最终觉醒了。


An eclectic mix of idealistic and opportunistic politicians and NGOs mobilized people against land acquisitions.	理想主义政客、机会主义政客和非政府组织形成了一个折中主义群体，动员人们反对土地兼并。


With investigative journalists getting into the act, land acquisition became a political land mine.	随着调查记者的加入其中，土地兼并成了一颗政治地雷。


Moreover, key institutions, such as the Comptroller and Auditor General and the judiciary, staffed by an increasingly angry middle class, also launched investigations.	此外，不少以愤怒的中产阶级为成员主题的重要机构，比如国家审计署（Comptroller and Auditor General）和司法部，也开始了调查。


As evidence emerged of widespread corruption in contracts and resource allocation, ministers, bureaucrats, and high-level corporate officers were arrested, and some have spent long periods in jail.	随着关于合约和资源分配腐败横行的证据浮出水面，政府部长、官僚和企业高管纷纷被捕，一些人被判处长期徒刑。


The collateral effect, however, is that even honest officials are now too frightened to help corporations to navigate India’s maze of bureaucracy.	但是，这样做也有副作用——诚实的官员噤若寒蝉，不再敢引导企业与印度迷宫般的官僚机构打交道。


As a result, industrial, mining, and infrastructure projects have ground to a halt.	结果，工业、矿产和基础设施工程陷入了停滞。


Populist government spending and the inability of the supply side of the economy to keep pace has, in turn, led to elevated inflation, while Indian households, worried that no asset looks safe, have taken to investing in gold.	民粹主义政府支出以及经济的供给端无法跟上需求反过来导致了通胀高企，而印度家庭找不到安全资产，只能投资于黄金。


Because India does not produce much gold itself, these purchases have contributed to an abnormally wide current-account deficit.	由于印度本身黄金产量不高，家庭对黄金的高需求就转变为异常高的经常项目赤字。


Not much more was required to dampen foreign investors’ enthusiasm for the India story, with the rupee falling significantly in recent weeks.	光是这条便已足以打消外国投资者对印度的热情，因此，最近几周卢比出现了狂跌。


As with the other major emerging markets, India’s fate is in its own hands.	与其他主要新兴市场国家一样，印度的命运掌握在自己手中。


Hard times tend to concentrate minds.	艰难时世有利于人心齐。


If its politicians can take a few steps to show that they can overcome narrow partisan interests to establish the more transparent and efficient government that a middle-income country needs, they could quickly re-energize India’s enormous engines of potential growth.	如果印度政客可以迈出几小步，证明他们能够克服狭隘门户之见，建立中等收入国家所需要的更透明、更高效的政府，那么他们将能很快地重新点燃印度强大的潜在增长引擎。


Otherwise, India’s youth, their hopes and ambitions frustrated, could decide to take matters into their own hands.	否则的话，希望和梦想破灭的印度青年一代将会揭竿而起，自己决定自己的未来。


What Happened to Mohamed al-Hanashi?	穆罕默德·阿尔-哈纳什遭遇了什么？


NEW YORK – Mohammed al-Hanashi was a 31-year-old Yemeni citizen who was held at Guantánamo Bay without charge for seven years.	发自纽约——穆罕默德·阿尔-哈纳什，31岁，一位没有受到任何指控就被关在关塔那摩战俘营长达七年的也门公民。


On June 3, while I was visiting Guantánamo with other journalists, the press office there issued a terse announcement that al-Hanashi had had been found dead in his cell – an “apparent suicide.”	在今年6月3日，当我同其他记者一道参观关塔那摩的时候，那里的新闻办公室公布了一则简短的公告：阿尔-哈纳什被发现死在他自己的牢房内——一起“显而易见的自杀事件”。


Because my commercial flight was canceled, I got a ride back to the United States on a military transport.	因为我原本要搭乘的民用航班被取消，只好乘坐军用航班飞回美国。


I happened to be seated next to a military physician who had been flown in to do the autopsy on al-Hanashi.	而恰巧坐在我旁边的是一位军医，正是他为阿尔-哈纳什做的尸检。


When would there be an investigation of the death, I asked him?	于是我问，何时才会进行针对哈纳什死亡的调查？


“That was the investigation,” he replied.	“这就是调查。 ” 他回答道。


The military had investigated the military.	看来是军方自己对自己展开了调查。


This “apparent suicide” seemed immediately suspicious to me.	听他这样一说，这起“显而易见的自杀”在我来看来就迅速变得十分可疑。


I had just toured those cells: it is literally impossible to kill yourself in them.	我刚刚参观了这些牢房：如果身处其中的话，你根本就很难杀死自己。


Their interiors resemble the inside of a smooth plastic jar; there are no hard edges; hooks fold down; there is no bedding that one can use to strangle oneself.	牢房内部看上去就好像一个光滑的塑料瓶内里，没有锋利的边缘，没有弯钩，甚至没有任何床上用品可以用来勒死自己。


Can you bang your head against the wall until you die, theoretically, I asked the doctor?	于是我问这位军医，理论上来讲，一个囚犯能一直用头撞墙直到把自己撞死吗？


“They check on prisoners every three minutes,” he said.	“他们每三分钟就来查看一下囚犯，”他告诉我。


You’d have to be fast.	看来想要这样自杀的话，动作还必须够快。


The story smelled even worse after a bit of digging. Al-Hanashi, it turned out, had been elected by the detainees to serve as their representative.	如果你继续向下挖掘这个问题的话，这就更像一桩疑案：据证实，哈纳什已在狱中被选为在押者代表。


(The Geneva Conventions call for this process but the US did not give it any formal recognition).	（《日内瓦公约》要求进行类似程序，但美国官方并未承认）。


As their designated representative, al-Hanashi knew which prisoners had claimed to have been tortured or abused, and by whom.	而作为代表，哈纳什很清楚哪些囚犯曾受过虐待和折磨，而施暴者又是何人。


On January 17, al-Hanashi, according to his fellow prisoner Binyam Mohamed (who has since been released), was summoned to a meeting with the Admiral of Guantánamo and the head of the Guard Force there.	据哈纳什的狱友宾亚姆·莫哈迈德（随后获释）所说，1月17日，哈纳什被召去，同管辖关塔那摩的海军少将兼看守部队最高长官开了个会。


He never returned to his cell.	接着他就再也没能回到自己的牢房，而是被带到了精神治疗病房。


He was taken to the psychiatric ward, where, according to another prisoner who had been there, he was kept until he died.	根据另一位当时也被关在特别牢房的在押者回忆，哈纳什一直被关在那里，直到死去。


Can you kill yourself in the psych ward?	一个人如何能在一个精神病房里自杀？


According to Cortney Busch of Reprieve, a British organization that represents Guantánamo detainees, there is video running on prisoners in the psychiatric ward at all times, and there is a guard posted there continually, too.	根据来自“解脱行动”（一个代表关塔那摩在押人员的英国组织）的调查员考特尼·布斯克的报道，精神治疗病房内有24小时监控录像，并安排了一名警卫进行不间断监视。


The day after al-Hanashi died, the nurse and psychologist had shown a group of journalists of which I was a part an oddly defensive display of how hunger-striking prisoners are bound in restraint chairs when being “enterally fed” (that is, force-fed).	在哈纳什死后第二天，监狱的护士和心理医生向包括我在内的一群记者进行了一场奇特的医学防御演示，关于绝食的囚犯是如何被固定在椅子上进行“肠道喂食”（实际上就是强制喂食）。


Al Hanashi, the press office at Guantánamo noted, had formerly been a hunger striker.	在关塔那摩新闻办公室的记录里显示，哈纳什就曾是一个绝食者。


It is worth considering how easy it would be to do away with a troublesome prisoner being force-fed by merely adjusting the calorie level.	有一点值得我们考虑：除掉一个令人讨厌的囚犯有多么简单，既然他被“强制喂食”，那么需要做的仅仅是改变他体内卡路里的水平。


If it is too low, the prisoner will starve, but too high a level can also kill, since deliberate liquid overfeeding by tube, to which Guantánamo prisoners have reported being subjected, causes vomiting, diarrhea, and deadly dehydration that can stop one’s heart.	如果卡路里值过低，囚犯会被饿死，但卡路里值过高同样能够杀死他，因为如果有意将过量的液体通过导管输入人体内，就像关塔那摩的犯人据报曾遭受的那样，会最终导致呕吐、腹泻，以及可令人心跳停止的致命脱水症状。


I have been putting questions to Lt. Commander Brook DeWalt, the head spokesman for the Guantánamo press office, about how al-Hanashi died, for eight weeks now.	八周以来，我一直在向海军少校布鲁克·德瓦尔特，这位关塔那摩新闻办公室的首席发言人询问哈纳什的死因。


According to the Yemeni embassy in Washington, al-Hanashi’s body was repatriated in mid-August.	根据也门驻美大使馆的消息，哈纳什的遗体已经于8月中旬遣送回也门国内。


Al Jazeera has reported that the Yemeni government announced only what the US had – that al-Hanashi had died from “asphyxiation.”	卡塔尔半岛电视台报道说，也门政府只宣布了美国的一家之言��也就是声称哈纳什死于“窒息”。


When I noted to DeWalt that self-strangulation was impossible, he said he would get back to me when the inquiry – now including a Naval criminal investigation – was completed.	当我提醒德瓦尔特，哈纳什根本不可能将自己勒毙时，他说等整个调查——如今更包括一份海军犯罪调查——结束之后就会回复我。


I have yet to receive an answer.	但我至今还没能收到任何回应。


The Yemeni government, too, notes that they have yet to receive the coroner’s report from the US.	而也门政府也说他们至今还没有收到来自美国的验尸报告。


An investigation by the military of the death of its own prisoners violates the Geneva Conventions, which demand that illness, transfer, and death of prisoners be registered independently with a neutral authority (such as the ICRC), and that deaths be investigated independently.	由军方自己对其内部囚犯来展开死亡调查的行为，显然违背了《日内瓦公约》的要求：囚犯的病患、移交和死亡都要由某个中立的职权机构进行登记（例如国际红十字会）,而对死亡案例也需进行独立调查。


If governments let no outside entity investigate the circumstances of such deaths, what will keep them from “disappearing” whomever they take into custody, for whatever reason?	如果连政府都禁止其他第三方机构介入调查这类死亡案例的话，那又有什么能制止政府用任何理由去“消灭”任何被关押的人呢？


I sent DeWalt a copy of the relevant section of the Geneva Conventions and asked how the US military’s handling of al-Hanashi’s death conforms to it.	我给德瓦尔特发了一份《日内瓦公约》相关条款的文本，并询问他美国军方是如何根据公约来处理哈纳什的死亡的。


Actually, I sent it twice. Again, no answer.	实际上，我发了两次：结果一样，石沉大海。


Was al-Hanashi suicidal?	阿尔-哈纳什有自杀倾向吗？


Binyam Mohamed told the Associated Press that al-Hanashi was a positive person (and, one can assume, a natural leader) who would never consider suicide.	宾亚姆·莫哈迈德告诉美联社，哈纳什是一个乐观积极的人，（可以想象，他也是一位天生的领导者）一个永远都不会想要自杀的人。


He had been in custody for seven years without a lawyer, and killed himself just two weeks after having finally been assigned one?	他在没有任何律师的情况下被关押了7年，却在刚刚被分配了一个之后仅仅两周时间就结束了自己的生命？


That lawyer, Elizabeth Gilson, probably knows al-Hanashi’s state of mind before he died, but the US government will not allow her to talk about it.	那位名叫伊丽莎白·吉尔森的律师很可能清楚哈纳什死前的心理状况，但美国政府却不会允许她去谈论这些。


What happened to Mohamed al-Hanashi, and why?	究竟哈纳什遭遇了什么，这些遭遇因何而起？


The fact that no one can answer this question yet means that even in Barack Obama’s America, as in Stalin’s Russia or Ahmadinejad’s Iran, people can simply be disappeared without trial.	事实上这个没人能回答的问题意味着，即使是奥巴马治下的美国，仍然好像斯大林时代的苏联或艾哈迈迪·内贾德统治下的伊朗一样，人民凭空“消失”，连审判过程都不必经过。


The world’s law-abiding governments and ordinary citizens should call and email DeWalt, the Pentagon, and the White House press office to demand answers.	世界上所有守法政府和普罗大众都应当致电或发邮件质问德瓦尔特，五角大楼以及白宫新闻办公室，要求他们给出答案。


A young man with a great deal of potentially compromising information died under suspicious circumstances in US custody.	一个知晓众多潜在性危险信息的年轻人在美军监狱中离奇死亡。


The facts concerning his case must be independently verified.	而和他的死亡有关的一切事实，都必须得到独立的查证。


www.defenselink.mil/faq/comment.html , +1 703-428-0711	美国国防部网站：    www. defenselink.


http://www.whitehouse.gov/contact/, +1 202-456-1111	白宫对外联络网址：http://www. whitehouse.


Ireland and the Austerity Debate	爱尔兰和紧缩争论


DUBLIN – Both sides of the austerity debate that is now gripping economists and policymakers cite Ireland’s experience as evidence for their case.	都柏林—如今，让经济学家和决策者深陷其中的紧缩争论的双方都在引用爱尔兰的经验作为论据。


And, however much they try to position the country as a poster-child, neither side is able to convince the other.	而不管他们如何尽力地将爱尔兰树立为榜样模范，都不能让对方就范。


Yet this tug-of-war is important, because it illustrates the complex range of arguments that are in play.	但这场拔河十分重要，因为这说明了观点角逐的复杂程度。


It also demonstrates why more conclusive economic policy making is proving so elusive.	这还说明了为何难以出现决定性的经济决策。


Here is a quick reminder of Ireland’s sad recent economic history.	让我们先来快速回顾一下爱尔兰近期的悲惨经济史。


Lulled into complacency and excess by ample supplies of artificially cheap financing, Irish banks went on a lending binge.	爱尔兰银行因为供应充足的认为廉价金融而得意洋洋，不知节制地进入了信贷款黄。


Irresponsible risk-taking and excessive greed outpaced prudential regulation and supervision.	不负责任的冒险和过度贪婪压倒了审慎监管和监督。


The banking system ended up fueling massive speculation, including a huge run-up in real-estate prices, only to be brought to its knees when the bubbles popped.	最后，银行系统助长了全民投机，包括房地产价格的飙升，而当泡沫破裂时，爱尔兰也轰然倒下。


Unlike the many Irish households that lost jobs and part of their wealth, the banks were deemed to be “too big to fail,” so Ireland’s political elites intervened with state funding.	与许多失去了工作和部分财富的爱尔兰家庭不同，银行被认为“太大而不能倒”，因此爱尔兰政治精英用国家资金出手干预。


But, by under-estimating both the domestic and international aspects of the problem, the authorities transformed a banking problem into a national tragedy.	但是，由于当局在国内和国际两个角度都低估了问题的严重性，银行问题演变成了一场国家悲剧。


Rather than restoring the banks to financial health and ensuring responsible behavior, the Irish economy as a whole was dragged down.	爱尔兰经济并未让银行恢复财务健康、保证其做出负责任的行为。 整个爱尔兰经济都受到了拖累。


Growth collapsed; unemployment spiked.	增长崩盘； 事业飙升。


Lacking opportunities, emigration increased – a vivid reminder of how economic crises have wreaked havoc on the country’s demographics throughout its history.	由于缺少机会，移民人数大增——生动地再次展示了历史上一再发生的经济危机给爱尔兰人口带来的浩劫。


Investors withdrew in droves from what was once deemed the “Celtic Tiger.”	投资者纷纷逃离昔日的“凯尔特之虎”。


The government had no choice but to request a bailout from the “troika” – the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, and the European Commission – thereby transferring an important component of national economic governance to an ad hoc, fragile, and sometimes feuding group of institutions.	政府别无选择，只能从“三驾马车”（IMF、欧洲央行和欧盟委员会）寻求帮助，也因此将国民经济治理的重要部分移交给了临时组建的、脆弱的、时不时互相扯皮的机构集团。


While other struggling eurozone members also turned to the troika, Ireland stands out in at least two notable ways.	其他陷入麻烦的欧元区成员国也转向三驾马车寻求帮助，但至少从两个方面看，爱尔兰特别引人关注。


First, two democratically-elected governments have steadfastly implemented the agreed austerity programs with little need for waivers and modifications – and thus without the associated political drama.	首先，两届民选政府坚定不移地实施了谈定的紧缩计划，几乎没有要求不执行和修改的需要，因此也没有出现相应的政治闹剧。


Second, despite enduring considerable pain, Irish society has stuck with the program, staging few of the street protests that have been common in other austerity-hit countries.	其次，尽管经历了巨大的痛苦，但爱尔兰社会坚持了方案，几乎没有出现其他受紧缩影响的国家所经常出现的街头抗议。


All of this puts Ireland in the middle of three important issues raised in the austerity debates: whether orthodox policy, with its heavy emphasis on immediate budget cuts, can restore conditions for growth, employment gains, and financial stability; whether the benefits of eurozone membership still outweigh the costs for countries that must restructure their economies; and how a small, open economy should strategically position itself in today’s world.	所有这些让爱尔兰处于紧缩争论所引出的三个重要问题的中间地带：正统政策——非常强调马上削减预算——是否能为增长、就业改善和金融稳定重新创造条件？ 对一些国家来说，欧元区成员国的好处是否仍能压倒经济重组的成本？


Austerity’s supporters point to the fact that Ireland is on the verge of “graduating” from the troika’s program.	紧缩支持者指出一个事实：爱尔兰快要从三驾马车方案中“毕业”了。


Growth has resumed, financial-risk premia have fallen sharply, foreign investment is picking up, and exports are booming.	增长重现曙光、金融风险溢价大幅下降、外国投资增加、贸易走向繁荣。


All of this, they argue, provides the basis for sustainable growth and declining unemployment.	他们认为，所有这些为可持续增长和失业下降创造了条件。


Ireland, they conclude, was right to stay in the eurozone, especially because small, open economies that are unanchored can be easily buffeted by a fluid global economy.	他们的结论是，爱尔兰留在欧元区是正确的，特别是因为失去锚的小型开放经济容易被全球经济大潮吞噬。


“Not so fast,” says the other side.	 “还早着呢，”另一方反驳说。


The critics of austerity point to the fact that Irish GDP has still not returned to its 2007 level.	紧缩批评者指出一个事实：爱尔兰GDP仍没有回到2007年的水平。


Unemployment remains far too high, with alarming levels of long-term and youth joblessness.	失业率仍然太高，长期和年轻人失业状况令人警觉。


Public debt remains too high as well, and, making matters worse, much more of it is now owed to official rather than private creditors (which would complicate debt restructuring should it become necessary).	公共债务也依然太高，更加糟糕的是，相比以前，如今多得多的部分持有在官方而不是私人债权人手中（这会导致不得不进行债务重组时局面更加混乱）。


The critics reject the argument that small, open economies are necessarily better off in a monetary union, pointing to how well Switzerland is coping.	批评者还反驳了小型开放经济留在货币联盟中会更好的观点，并以瑞士为例。


And they lament that eurozone membership means that Ireland’s “internal devaluations,” which involve significant cuts in real wages, have not yet run their course.	他们还哀叹，欧元区成员资格意味着爱尔兰“内部贬值”（包括大规模削减真实工资）尚未见效。


The data on the “Irish experiment” – including the lack of solid counterfactuals – are not conclusive enough for one side to declare a decisive victory.	 “爱尔兰实验”数据（包括缺少扎实的对照）不足以让任何一方取得决定性的胜利。


Yet there is some good analytical news.	但也不乏出色的分析性消息。


Ireland provides insights that are helpful in understanding how sociopolitical systems, including economically devastated countries like Cyprus and Greece, have coped so far with shocks that were essentially unthinkable just a few years ago.	爱尔兰提供的洞见有助于理解社会政治系统（包括经济遭受重创的塞浦路斯和希腊等国家）是如何应对几年前无法想象的冲击的。


On my current visit, most of the Irish citizens with whom I have spoken say that the country had no alternative but to follow the path of austerity.	从我最近对爱尔兰的访问看，我所接触的大部分爱尔兰人表示该国别无选择，只能走紧缩之路。


While they appreciate the urgent need for growth and jobs, they believe that this can be achieved only after Ireland’s finances are put back on a sound footing.	他们认同增长和就业的迫切需要，但认为这些只有在爱尔兰金融恢复稳定后才能实现。


They also argue that, given the banks’ irresponsibility, there is no quick way to promote sustained expansion.	他们还指出，由于银行的不负责任，无法快速推进持续扩张。


They are still angry at bankers, but have yet to gain proper retribution.	他们对银行家仍然充满了愤怒，但还没有对他们进行合理的惩罚。


Ireland’s accumulation of wealth during its Celtic Tiger period, when the country surged toward the top of Europe’s economic league table, has also been an effective shock absorber.	在凯尔特之虎时期——在这段时间里，爱尔兰在欧洲经济竞赛中独拔头筹——所积累的财富也是有效的冲击吸收器。


This, together with fears about being left out in the geopolitical cold (despite the country’s historical links with Britain and America), dampens Irish enthusiasm for economic experiments outside the eurozone.	这，以及对被遗弃于地缘政治寒带（尽管爱尔兰历史上与英国和美国关系紧密）的恐惧，抑制了爱尔兰人在欧元区之外做经济实验的热情。


Indeed, Irish society seems remarkably hesitant to change course. Right or wrong, Ireland will stick with austerity.	事实上，爱尔兰社会似乎对转变道路极为犹豫。


Efforts to regain national control of the country’s destiny, the Irish seem to believe, must take time.	不管对错，爱尔兰人认为，重新获得对国家命运的掌握需要时间。


In some of Europe’s other struggling countries, however, citizens may well prove less patient.	但是，其他一些受困欧洲国家的人民似乎没有那么有耐心。


What is Full Employment?	什么是充分就业？


CAMBRIDGE – In an important sense, the US economy is now at full employment.	美国剑桥—在某种很重要的意义上，美国经济目前处于充分就业状态。


The relatively tight labor market is causing wages to rise at an accelerating rate, because employers must pay more to attract and retain employees.	相对较紧的劳动力市场正在让工资加速增长，因为雇主必须提高待遇吸引和留住雇员。


This has important implications for policymakers – and not just at the Federal Reserve.	这给决策者——不仅仅是美联储——带来了重要影响。


Consider this: Average hourly earnings in May were 2.3% higher than in May 2014; but, since the beginning of this year, hourly earnings are up 3.3%, and in May alone rose at a 3.8% rate – a clear sign of full employment.	但是，自今年年初以来，时薪增加了3. 3%，光是5月就增加了3.


The acceleration began in 2013 as labor markets started to tighten.	8%——这是充分就业的明确信号。 工资加速增长始于2013年劳动力市场开始趋紧时。


Average compensation per hour rose just 1.1% from 2012 to 2013, but then increased at a 2.6% rate from 2013 to 2014, and at 3.3% in the first quarter of 2015.	2012—2013年，平均时薪只增长了1. 1%，2013—2014年加快到2.


These wage increases will soon show up in higher price inflation.	这一工资增长很快就会表现在物价通胀中。


The link between wages and prices is currently being offset by the sharp decline in the price of oil and gasoline relative to a year ago, and by the strengthening of the dollar relative to other currencies.	目前，工资和物价的联系因为石油和汽油价格的相对于一年前急剧下跌以及美元相对于其他货币升值而被抵消。


But, as these factors’ impact on the overall price level diminishes, the inflation rate will rise more rapidly.	但是，随着这些因素对总体物价水平的影响的消失，通胀率将以更快的速度升高。


Accelerating wage growth implies that the economy is now at a point at which increases in demand created by easier monetary policy or expansionary fiscal policy would not achieve a sustained rise in output and employment.	工资增长加速意味着经济目前处于由宽松货币政策或扩张性财政政策所制造的需求增长无法带来产出和就业持续增长的状态。


Instead, this demand would be channeled into higher wages and prices.	相反，这一需求将传导给更高的工资和物价。


There are of course other definitions of full employment.	当然，充分就业还有其他定义。


Some would say that the United States is not at full employment, because 8.7 million people – about 6% of those who are employed – are looking for work.	一些人认为美国尚未达到充分就业，因为870万人——相当于被雇用人数的6%——正在找工作。


There are millions more who would like to work but are not actively looking, because they believe that there are no available jobs for people like themselves.	数百万想工作的人没有在积极找工作，因为他们认为像自己这样的人找不到工作。


And an additional 6.7 million are working part-time but would like to work more hours per week.	还有670万人想每周工作更长时间的人正在做兼职。


In many cases, these unemployed and underemployed individuals are experiencing real hardship.	在许多例子中，这些失业和半失业个人正在经历名副其实的困境。


By that indicator, the US economy is not at full employment.	从这个指标看，美国并未达到充分就业。


But, for the Fed, it is, in the sense that excessively easy monetary policy can no longer achieve a sustained increase in employment.	但是，对美联储来说，美国已经达到充分就业，因为过度宽松的货币政策已不再带来就业的持续增加。


At the same time, other types of policies that change incentives or remove barriers can lead to increased employment and higher real incomes, without raising wage and price inflation.	与此同时，其他改变激励或消除壁垒的政策类型可以带来就业增加和真实收入上涨而不会导致工资和物价通胀。


Consider, for example, the high rate of non-employment among men aged 25 to 54, a group too old to be in school and too young to retire.	比如，考虑25—54岁男性的无就业（non-employment）率。 这一群体已经离开校园，但又没有达到退休年龄。


More than 15% of men in this age group are not employed.	其中超过15%的人没有被雇用。


Among those in this age range who have less than a high school education, 35% are not employed.	其中文化程度在高中以下的，有35%没有被雇用。


Programs to provide market-relevant education and training should be able to raise employment among this group.	提供市场相关教育和培训的计划应该能够提高该群体的就业情况。


Or consider the employment experience of men and women over age 65.	或者考虑65岁以上男性和女性的就业经验。


This group is eligible for Social Security (pensions) and Medicare (health insurance), and the majority are retired.	该群体有资格获得社会保障（退休金）和医疗保险（Medicare），其中大部分人都已经退休。


But experience shows that the decision to retire or to work fewer hours is influenced by the compensation that members of this group receive.	但经验表明退休或减少工作时长的决定受到该群体成员能获得多少报酬的影响很大。


And this amount partly reflects the fact that employed people who collect Social Security and Medicare are subject to the payroll tax that finances them.	而这一数字部分反映了一个事实：有社会保障和医疗保险的受雇人群受到为这些收入提供资金的工资税的影响。


The payroll tax paid by employees is 6.65% (employers pay the same rate), and is in addition to the personal income tax.	雇员支付的工资税率为6. 65%（雇主也支付相同税率），这一税种在个人所得税之外额外征收。


Moreover, because of the complex rules that govern the level of Social Security benefits, the older worker who pays this payroll tax is likely to receive no extra benefits.	此外，由于决定社会保障福利水平的规则十分复杂，支付这一工资税的年长工人有可能根本无法获得额外社会保障福利。


For many older workers, the choice is not whether to work, but how much.	对许多年长工人来说，面临的选择不是工不工作，而是工作多少。


We now have less than full employment in the sense that the payroll tax encourages older workers to work fewer hours than they otherwise would.	工资税鼓励年长工人工作更少时间，从这个意义上讲，我们还没有达到充分就业。


The Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) also reduces hours worked, in two different ways.	平价医疗法（Affordable Care Act，即“奥巴马医改”）也从两个不同方面降低了工作时长。


First, for some individuals, working fewer hours reduces incomes enough to entitle them to a larger government subsidy for health insurance.	首先，对一些个人来说，减少工作时长所导致的收入降低足以是他们有资格获得更大的政府医疗保险补贴。


Second, some employers are being incented to reduce the number of working hours for individual employees, because, above a specified number, Obamacare imposes a larger burden on them.	其次，一些雇主获得激励减少个体雇员的工作时长，因为超过一定时常，奥巴马医改就会给它们带来更大的负担。


Or consider minimum-wage legislation, which reduces employers’ willingness to hire low-skilled workers.	或者考虑最低工资立法，该理发降低了雇主聘用低技能工人的意愿。


As the minimum wage is increased, employers’ incentive to substitute equipment or more skilled employees strengthens.	随着最低工资的提高，雇主用设备或熟练雇员的激励也增强了。


This reduction in the demand for low-skilled workers could be offset by taking into account the hourly equivalent of transfer payments when calculating the minimum wage.	这降低了低技能工人的需求，但可以通过在计算最低工资时考虑等价每小时转移支付来抵销。


For example, someone who receives $8,000 a year in transfer payments (such as food stamps, housing assistance, and the Earned Income Tax Credit) might be deemed to have received the equivalent of $4 an hour toward meeting the minimum wage.	比如，某人每年获得8,000美元转移支付（如食品券、住房补贴和工作所得税收优惠），他有可能被认定为获得了相当于4美元时薪，这将被算入他的最低工资。


That individual’s combined income would be achieved with a lower cost to the employer, increasing the individual’s ability to find employment.	因此，在计算总收入时，雇的成本将有所降低，这增加了他找工作的能力。


I could easily extend this list.	我还可以轻松地继续扩展这一清单。


The basic point is that employment can be increased, and unemployment decreased, by removing barriers to job creation and reducing marginal tax rates.	基本要点是就业可以通过消除就业创造壁垒和降低边际税率增加，失业也可以通过这两个办法减少。


By contrast, increasing demand by prolonging easy monetary policy or expanding fiscal spending is likely to result in rising inflation rather than rising employment.	相反，通过延长宽松货币政策或扩张性财政政策增加需求有可能导致通胀抬头而非就业增加。


What is the Deficit Endgame?	财政赤字何去何从？


REYKJAVIK – No one yet has any real idea about when the global financial crisis will end, but one thing is certain: government budget deficits are headed into the stratosphere.	雷克亚未克—— 没有人知道全球金融危机什么时候才会结束。 但有一点是肯定的：政府的财政赤字将达到一个惊人的水平。


Investors in the coming years will need to be persuaded to hold mountains of new debt.	在接下来的日子里，投资者将被迫购买大量的新发国债。


Although governments may try to cram public debt down the throats of local savers (by using, for example, their rising influence over banks to force them to hold a disproportionate quantity of government paper), they will eventually find themselves having to pay much higher interest rates as well.	虽然政府可以将债务转嫁到本国储户的头上（例如，政府利用自身的影响力来迫使银行持有大量的国债。 ），但他们最终也会发现，为此会支付利息也是可观的。


Within a couple years, interest rates on long-term US Treasury notes could easily rise 3-4%, with interest rates on other governments’ paper rising as much, or more.	在接下来的几年中，美国政府长期债券的利率很快就会升到3-4%，其他国家还会更高。


Interest rates will rise to compensate investors both for having to accept a larger share of government bonds in their portfolio and for an increasing risk that governments will be tempted to inflate away the value of their debts, or even default.	利率的升高主要有来自两个方面：一是补偿对投资人大量持有政府债券。 二是补偿国债通货膨胀后的损失，以及违约偿还的风险。


In research that Carmen Reinhart and I have done on the history of financial crises, we find that public debt typically doubles, even adjusting for inflation, in the three years following a crisis.	根据我和卡门·莱因哈特对历史发生上的已经金融危机研究后得出的结果：在金融危机发生后的三年中，即使除去通货膨胀的因素，国债也会翻倍。


Many nations, large and small, are now well on the way to meeting this projection.	现在很多国家都在朝着这个模式发展。


China’s government has clearly indicated that it will use any means necessary to backstop growth in the face of a free fall in exports.	中国政府明确表示，他们会使用一切手段，阻止出口下滑的趋势。


The Chinese have $2 trillion in hard currency reserves to back up their promise.	当然，他们有2万亿美元的外汇储备作为保证。


President Barack Obama’s new budget calls for a stunning $1.75 trillion deficit in the United States, a multiple of the previous record.	美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马最新推出了财政预算，高达1万7千5百亿美元，是以往最高时期的几倍。


Even those countries that are not actively engaged in a fiscal orgy are seeing their surpluses collapse and their deficits soar, mainly in the face of falling tax revenues.	即使那些没有陷于金融危机的国家也会发现，由于税收所得的下降，外汇储备正在崩溃，财政赤字激增。


Indeed, few governments have submitted remotely realistic budget projections, typically relying on overly rosy economic scenarios.	实际上，几乎没有政府会提交符合现实的财政预算报告，通常都描述一个过于乐观的 经济前景。


Unfortunately, in 2009, the global economy will not be a bed of roses.	不幸的是，2009年的经济将不再是“鲜花烂漫”。


Income in the US and euro-area both appear to have declined at an annualized rate of roughly 6% in the fourth quarter of 2008; Japan’s GDP fell at perhaps twice that rate.	如果按年计算的话，08年的第4季度，美国和欧元区国家财政收入几乎都下滑了6%，日本更惨，可能是上者的两倍。


China’s claim that its GDP grew at a 6% rate, during the end of last year, is suspect.	中国公布的数字显示，去年底的GDP增长了6%，这个数字令人怀疑。


Exports have collapsed throughout Asia, including Korea, Japan, and Singapore.  Arguably India, and to a lesser extent Brazil, have been holding out a bit better.	在整个亚洲，出口已经开始崩盘，涉及的国家包括韩国，日本和新加坡，印度或许也能算上。 巴西受害的程度低一些，情况会好一点。


But few emerging markets have reached a stage at which they can withstand a sustained collapse in the developed economies, much less serve as substitute engines of global growth.	但新兴市场的经济发展不可能抗得住来自发达国家那边所承受如此的损失，目前，他们还没有能力带动整个经济走向好转。


With the credit crisis still making it difficult for many small and medium-size businesses to obtain even the minimal level of financing necessary to maintain inventories and conduct trade, global GDP is on a precipice in 2009.	随着信贷危机的加深，中小企业很难获得贷款，连维持他们日常的存货和运营所需的最低水平资金都没有保证。


There is a real possibility that global growth will register its first contraction since World War II.	在2009年，全球的GDP已经处于悬崖边上，有可能出现自从二战以后的首次负增长。


In all likelihood, a slew of countries will see output declines of 4-5% in 2009, with some. having true depression level drops, of 10% or more.	如此说来，2009年许多国家经济会下滑4-5%，一些国家甚至会下降10%甚至更多，进入实际的经济萧条期。


Worse yet, unless financial systems spring back, growth  could disappoint for years to come, especially in “ground zero” countries such as the United States, Britain, Ireland and Spain.  US long-term growth could be particularly dismal, as the Obama administration steers the country toward  more European levels of welfare assistance and income redistribution,	更为糟糕的是，除非金融系统转好，否则经济的增长会在许多年内都不可能发生，尤其是在“零汇率”的国家，例如美国，英国，爱尔兰和西班牙等。 随着奥巴马的社会福利改革及收入再分配的方案，美国也将会越来越倾向于欧洲的模式，长期的经济形势会变得更糟。


Countries with European-style growth rates could handle debt obligations of 60% of GDP when interest rates were low.	目前，利率还维持低水平，欧洲模式国家的债务已经占GDP的60%。


But, with debts in many countries rising to 80% or 90% of GDP, and with today’s low interest rates clearly a temporary phenomenon, trouble is brewing.	而对于那些那些债务高达GDP80%甚至90%的国家来说，问题会变的越来越严重。


Many of the countries that are piling on massive quantities of debt to bail out their banks have only tepid medium term growth prospects, raising real questions of solvency and sustainability	更不用说目前明显偏低利率维持时间不会太长，很多国家为了拯救银行系统已经背负了大量的债务，将来，偿还债务的能力和经济的稳定性也会是个大问题。


Italy, for example with a debt-to-income ratio already exceeding 100%, has been able to manage so far thanks to falling global rates.	意大利就是一个例子，债务和收入的比例已经超过100%，有幸的是下滑的全球利率，目前还暂时能维持。


But as debts mount, and global interest rates rise, investors will become rightly nervous about the risk of debt restructuring.	不过随着债务的增加，全球利率的回升，投资者对债务重组的风险也肯定会越来越担心。


Other countries, such as Ireland, Britain, and the US, started with a much stronger fiscal position, but may not be much better off when the smoke clears.	爱尔兰，英国和美国等国家的经济底子还算厚一些，不过在“警报”解除之前，情况也好不到哪里去。


Exchange rates are another wild card.	汇率也是一个要考虑的因素。


Asian central banks are still nervously clinging to the dollar.  But with the US printing debt and money like it is going out of style, it would appear the euro is set to appreciate against the dollar two or three years down the road, if the euro is still around, that is.	亚洲国家的中央银行正紧张地盯着美元的汇率，但随着美国增发国债和大量印制钞票，以上的做法看来有些过时。 欧元对美元的汇率在最近两三年内一直在升值，欧洲国家的做法好象看起来更为正确，。


As debt mounts and the recession lingers, we are surely going to see a number of governments trying to lighten their load through financial repression, higher inflation, partial default, or a combinations of all three.	随着债务的增加和持续的经济萧条，我们相信，越来越多的国家会采取金融紧缩，高通货膨胀以及债务部分免除等三种方法，也可能是以上方法的组合。


Unfortunately, the endgame to the great recession of the 2000’s will not be a pretty picture.	不幸的是，结束2000年危机的方式将不会是很乐观的。


What is the West?	西方究竟为何物？


PARIS -- Everyone everywhere has by now heard about the “clash of civilizations.”	巴黎--世界各地的人们现在都已经听说了所谓的“文明的冲突”。


This Samuel Huntington concept has become universal.	亨廷顿的这一概念已经家喻户晓。


In the 1950’s, the French economist, Alfred Sauvy had a comparable success with the expression “third world.”	五十年代，法国经济学家索维创造了“第三世界”一词也同样人人皆知。


One reason these phrases gain wide acceptance is their lack of clear definition.	这些词语之所以为大众所接受是因为它们定义模糊。


The “clash of civilizations,” basically the West against the rest, is supposed to describe the world as it is.	“文明的冲突”基本上是西方对抗世界其他部分，它本应描述世界的本来面目。


In reality, the West is vague enough to include a vast array of areas without describing their unifying characteristics.	在现实中，西方是含糊不清的，包括大量领域而并不确定其统一的特征。


So what exactly is West?	那么究竟为何西方呢？


What does Westernization mean?	西方化是什么？


Why is Japan considered Western and China not?	为何认为日本是西方而中国不是？


Where does Shanghai stand?	上海属于哪里？


Is Russia part of the West?	俄国是西方的一部分吗？


From these uncertainties, we can conclude that the West is not a geographic entity.	从这些不确定性中，我们可以得出结论说西方并非一个地理性的实体。


It probably first established itself as a mindset when the Greeks, 25 centuries ago, perceived themselves as Western versus the Oriental Persians.	希腊人在2500年以前把他们自己视为是与东方波斯人对立的西方。 大概在那个时候西方作为一种心态而建立起来。


Since the West has lost any clear territorial basis since then, the phrase “the West” has become a universal not a local notion.	由于西方从那时以来已经失去了明确的领土范围，“西方”一词已经成为普世而非地域概念。


To be Western or Westernized, above all, is a mindset which does not coincide with any continent, nor with any specific nation or religion.	是否西方首先是一种心态，而这一心态并不与任何大陆吻合，也并不与任何具体国家或地区吻合。


Huntington’s mistake, it seems, was to contain the West inside national borders: there is no map of the West.	亨廷顿的错误好像在于把西方局限在国家边界之内，而西方并没有边界。