Just recall the market’s “taper tantrums” in May 2013, when then-Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke suggested a far more modest turn in monetary policy.	想想2013年5月，时任美联储主席伯南克表示货币政策将回到更温和的节奏，结果引起了市场的“收回之怒”（taper tantrums）。


People might well ask why, if central bankers can change their long-term target from 2% to 4%, they could not later decide that it should be 5% or 6%?	人们会问，既然央行行长把长期目标从2%提高到4%，那么难保他们又说应该提高到5%或6%。


Given the likelihood of a confused, mistrustful public, it is hard to find any deep rationale for a 4% target.	考虑到可能引起公众的迷惑和不信任，因此4%的通胀目标没有任何令人信服的理由。


At least the existing 2% inflation target stands for something, because central bankers can portray it as the moral equivalent of zero.	至少2%的通胀目标还有点道理可言，因为央行行长可以说它已经相当接近于零。


(Most experts believe that a true welfare-based price index would show significantly lower inflation than government inflation statistics indicate, because official data fail to capture the benefits of the constant flow of new goods into the economy.)	（大部分专家认为，真正的基于福利的价格指数所表现的通胀将大大低于政府通胀数据，因为官方数据不能体现新产品源源不断进入经济带来的好处。 ）


There is an analogy to the problems countries faced when they tried to re-establish the gold standard after World War I. Until the war, money was backed by gold and could be redeemed at a fixed rate.	这和各国在一战后试图重建金本位时面临的问题有些相似。 开战前，货币由黄金作支撑，并且兑换率可视为固定。


Though the system was highly vulnerable to bank runs and there was little scope for a monetary stabilization policy, people’s confidence in the system enabled it to anchor expectations.	尽管这一体系导致银行挤兑频发、货币稳定政策空间狭小，但人们对这一体系的信心使其能够锚定预期。


Unfortunately, the system completely collapsed after the war broke out in August 1914.	不幸的是，这一体系在1914年8月大战爆发后全盘崩溃了。


Revenue-desperate combatants were forced to turn to inflation finance.	急需收入的参战国被迫转向通胀金融。


They could not simultaneously debase the currency and back it with gold at a fixed rate.	它们无法同时实现货币贬值又维持其与黄金的固定兑换率。


After the war, as things settled down, governments tried to return to gold, partly as a symbol of a return to normalcy.	战后，随着秩序的恢复，政府试图回归黄金，部分也是因为要摆出回归常态的姿态。


But the revived inter-war gold standard ultimately fell apart, in no small part because it was impossible to rebuild public trust.	但两次大战间的金本位复辟最终还是崩溃了，很大程度上是因为无法重新建立公共信任。


A move by central banks to a long-term 4% inflation target risks triggering the same dynamic.	央行将长期通胀目标变为4%有可能导致同样的过程。


Fortunately, there is a much better way.	幸运的是，我们有比这好得多的办法。


Moving to an electronic government currency would not require a destabilizing change in the inflation target.	转向电子政府货币不需要通胀目标的破坏性变化。


Minor technical issues could easily be ironed out.	次要的技术问题也可以轻松解决。


For example, ordinary citizens could be allowed zero-interest-transactions balances (up to a limit).	比如，普通公民将被允许（一定程度的）零利息交易余额。


Presumably, nominal interest rates would move into negative territory only in response to a deep deflationary crisis.	理论上，名义利率只有在发生深度通缩危机时才会跌入负区间。


But when such a crisis does occur, central banks could power out of it far more quickly than is possible today.	但当这样的危机真的发生时，央行可以以比现在可行的快得多的速度采取强力手段解决危机。


And, as I have argued elsewhere, governments have long been penny-wise and pound-foolish to provide large-denomination notes, given that a large share are used in the underground economy and to finance illegal activities.	正如我在别处所指出的，长期以来，政府都在提供大面额钞票，这是拣了芝麻丢了西瓜，因为大面额钞票的大部分都用在了地下经济和非法活动上。


Moving to a twenty-first-century currency system would make it far simpler to move to a twenty-first-century central-banking regime as well.	转向二十一世纪货币体系可以让二十一世纪央行制度也变得更加可行。


Malthus, Marx, and Modern Growth	马尔萨斯、马克思和现代增长


CAMBRIDGE – The promise that each generation will be better off than the last is a fundamental tenet of modern society.	美国剑桥—每一代人都能过得比上一代人更好，这是现代社会的一个基本信条。


By and large, most advanced economies have fulfilled this promise, with living standards rising over recent generations, despite setbacks from wars and financial crises.	总的来说，大部分发达经济体都兑现了这一承诺，最近几代人的社会标准一直在提高，尽管战争和金融危机也会带来一些倒退。


In the developing world, too, the vast majority of people have started to experience sustained improvement in living standards and are rapidly developing similar growth expectations.	发展中国家亦然，大部分人民已开始享受持续的生活水平改善，类似的增长预期也在快速形成。


But will future generations, particularly in advanced economies, realize such expectations?	但子孙后代，特别是发达国家的子孙后代，能够实现这一预期吗？


Though the likely answer is yes, the downside risks seem higher than they did a few decades ago.	尽管可能的答案是肯定的，但下行风险比几十年前已经有所增加。


So far, every prediction in the modern era that mankind’s lot will worsen, from Thomas Malthus to Karl Marx, has turned out to be spectacularly wrong.	到目前为止，从马尔萨斯到马克思，凡是预测现代人的丰裕程度会下降的，最后都被证明错得离谱。


Technological progress has trumped obstacles to economic growth.	技术进步战胜了经济增长的障碍。


Periodic political rebalancing, sometimes peaceful, sometimes not, has ensured that the vast majority of people have benefited, albeit some far more than others.	周期性的权力再平衡——有时是和平的，有时是不和平的——确保了大部分人受益，尽管有些人的受益程度远高于其他人。


As a result, Malthus’s concerns about mass starvation have failed to materialize in any peaceful capitalist economy.	因此，马尔萨斯关于大面积饥荒的担忧在任何和平资本主义经济中都没有发生。


And, despite a disconcerting fall in labor’s share of income in recent decades, the long-run picture still defies Marx’s prediction that capitalism would prove immiserating for workers.	而尽管最近几十年中劳动力占��入的份额的下降令人担忧，但长期趋势仍否定了马克思关于资本主义将让工人万劫不复的预言。


Living standards around the world continue to rise.	全世界的生活水平都在持续上升。


But past growth performance is no guarantee that a broadly similar trajectory can be maintained throughout this century.	但过去的增长表现并不能保证本世纪都能够保持类似的大趋势。


Leaving aside potential geopolitical disruptions, there are some formidable challenges to overcome, mostly stemming from political underperformance and dysfunction.	抛开潜在地缘政治干扰不谈，仍有一些可怕的挑战有待克服，大部分都来自政治表现不力和功能失调。


The first set of issues includes slow-burn problems involving externalities, the leading example being environmental degradation.	第一类问题包括一些缓慢发酵的问题，如外部性，最显著的例子便是环境破坏。


When property rights are ill-defined, as in the case of air and water, government must step in to provide appropriate regulation.	在产权不够明晰时——比如空气和水的产权——政府必须站出来提供恰当的监管。


I do not envy future generations for having to address the possible ramifications of global warming and fresh-water depletion.	子孙后代或许不得不面对全球变暖和清洁水耗竭的难题。


A second set of problems concerns the need to ensure that the economic system is perceived as fundamentally fair, which is the key to its political sustainability.	第二类问题事关确保经济制度能给人民带来公平感，这是政治可持续性的关键。


This perception can no longer be taken for granted, as the interaction of technology and globalization has exacerbated income and wealth inequality within countries, even as cross-country gaps have narrowed.	公平感已不再是理所当然之事，技术和全球化扩大了国家内部的财富不平等，尽管国家间差距已有所缩小。


Until now, our societies have proved remarkably adept at adjusting to disruptive technologies; but the pace of change in recent decades has caused tremendous strains, reflected in huge income disparities within countries, with near-record gaps between the wealthiest and the rest.	到目前为止，我们的社会表现出极强的适应破坏性技术的能力，但近几十年来，变化之迅速带来巨大的紧张局面，体现在国家内部的巨大收入差距上，最富有人群和其他人的差距接近历史记录。


Inequality can corrupt and paralyze a country’s political system – and economic growth along with it.	不平等性可能侵蚀甚至崩坏一国的政治制度，经济增长也将随之东流。


The third problem is that of aging populations, an issue that would pose tough challenges even for the best-designed political system.	第三个问题是人口老化，即使是设计最合理的政治制度也将面临这一问题的严峻挑战。


How will resources be allocated to care for the elderly, especially in slow-growing economies where existing public pension schemes and old-age health plans are patently unsustainable?	如何配置资源以照顾老年人，特别是在现有公共养老金制度和老人医疗计划难以为继的低增长经济体？


Soaring public debts surely exacerbate the problem, because future generations are being asked both to service our debt and to pay for our retirements.	公共债务水平的暴增显然加剧了这一问题，因为子孙后代将不得不在为我们偿债的同时供养我们的退休生活。


The final challenge concerns a wide array of issues that require regulation of rapidly evolving technologies by governments that do not necessarily have the competence or resources to do so effectively.	最后一个挑战关系到一系列问题，这些问题需要政府对快速演进的技术进行监管，而政府并不一定具有进行有效监管的能力和资源。


We have already seen where poor regulation of rapidly evolving financial markets can lead.	我们已经看到，对快速演进的金融市场的拙劣监管导致了怎样的问题。


There are parallel shortcomings in many other markets.	在许多其他市场上也存在相同的不足。


A leading example is food supply – an area where technology has continually produced ever-more highly processed and genetically refined food that scientists are only beginning to assess.	一个显著的例子是食品供给。 在这一领域，科技在持续生产着日益复杂的转基因食品，而科学家对这些食品的评估才刚刚开始。


What is known so far is that childhood obesity has become an epidemic in many countries, with an alarming rise in rates of type 2 diabetes and coronary disease implying a significant negative impact on life expectancy in future generations.	如今，我们知道儿童肥胖已是很多国家的一个普遍问题，2型糖尿病和冠心病的高发也是一个令人警惕的信号，会对子孙后代的预期寿命带来巨大的消极影响。


Many leading health researchers, including Kelly Brownell, David Ludwig, and Walter Willett, have documented these problems.	许多尖端健康研究者，包括布朗尼尔（Kelly Brownell）、路德维格（David Ludwig）、维莱特（Walter Willett），都提出了这一问题。


Government interventions to date, mainly in the form of enhanced education, have proved largely ineffective.	目前政府干预往往以强化教育的形式出现，但收效甚微。


Self-destructive addiction to processed foods, which economists would describe as an “internality,” can lower quality of life for those afflicted, and can eventually lead to externalities for society, such as higher health-care costs.	自我毁灭的加工食品瘾——经济学家称之为“内部性”——会降低成瘾者的生活质量，并最终带来对社会的外部性，如更高的医疗成本。


Again, despite a rising chorus of concern from researchers, political markets have seemed frozen.	在这方面，尽管越来越多的研究者呼吁要引起关注，但政治市场仍是坚冰一块。


All of these problems have solutions, at least in the short to medium run.	所有这些问题都有解决办法，至少在短期和中期是如此。


A global carbon tax would mitigate climate risks while alleviating government debt burdens.	全球碳税能降低气候风险，同时减轻政府债务负担。


Addressing inequality requires greater redistribution through national tax systems, together with enhanced programs for adult education, presumably making heavy use of new technologies.	纠正不平等性需要通过国家税收体系进行更深程度的再分配，并辅之以充分利用高科技手段的强化成人教育。


The negative effects of falling population growth can be mitigated by easing restrictions on international migration, and by encouraging more women and retirees to enter or stay in the workforce.	人口增长下降的消极效应可以通过降低国际移民壁垒和鼓励更多女性和退休者进入或留在工作大军内来抑制。


But how long it will take for governments to act is a wide-open question.	但政府需要多长时间才能有所行动远未可知。


Capitalist economies have been spectacularly efficient at enabling growing consumption of private goods, at least over the long run.	资本主义经济在促进私人商品消费增长方面效率极高，至少在长期是如此。


When it comes to public goods – such as education, the environment, health care, and equal opportunity – the record is not quite as impressive, and the political obstacles to improvement have seemed to grow as capitalist economies have matured.	而对于公共商品——如教育、环境、医疗和机会平等——资本主义经济的记录便不那么令人瞩目了，而随着资本主义经济走向成熟，改善的政治障碍似乎也在提高。


Will each future generation continue to enjoy a better quality of life than its immediate predecessor?	每一代人还能继续比上一代人享受更高的生活质量吗？


In developing countries that have not yet reached the technological frontier, the answer is almost certainly yes.	在尚未抵达技术前沿的发展中国家，答案几乎必然是肯定的。


In advanced economies, though the answer should still be yes, the challenges are becoming formidable.	而在发达经济体，尽管答案应该仍然是肯定的，但挑战已经十分艰巨。


Europe’s Debt Wish	欧洲的债务愿望


CAMBRIDGE – Eurozone leaders continue to debate how best to reinvigorate economic growth, with French and Italian leaders now arguing that the eurozone’s rigid “fiscal compact” should be loosened.	美国剑桥—欧洲领导人仍在争论如何最好地为经济增长注入动力，法国和意大利领导人现在认为，欧元区死板的“财政契约”应该放松。


Meanwhile, the leaders of the eurozone’s northern member countries continue to push for more serious implementation of structural reform.	与此同时，欧元区北欧成员国领导人继续要求更严格地实施结构性改革。


Ideally, both sides will get their way, but it is difficult to see an endgame that does not involve significant debt restructuring or rescheduling.	在理想状况下，双方可以自行其是，但目前难以看到可以免于重大债务重组或期限重排的结局。


The inability of Europe’s politicians to contemplate this scenario is placing a huge burden on the European Central Bank.	欧洲政客不能想象这一情形，这给欧洲央行造成了非常沉重的负担。


Although there are many explanations for the eurozone’s lagging recovery, it is clear that the overhang of both public and private debt looms large.	尽管关于欧元区的复苏迟缓存在许多解释，但显然公共和私人债务积压是很重要的原因。


The gross debts of households and financial institutions are higher today as a share of national income than they were before the financial crisis.	如今，家庭和金融机构总债务占国民收入的比重比金融危机前还要高。


Nonfinancial corporate debt has fallen only slightly.	非金融企业债略有下降。


And government debt, of course, has risen sharply, owing to bank bailouts and a sharp, recession-fueled decline in tax revenues.	而政府债务当然出现了剧增，这是拜银行援助和衰退导致税收收入猛降所赐。


Yes, Europe is also wrestling with an aging population.	是的，欧洲还在与人口老龄化角力。


Southern eurozone countries such as Italy and Spain have suffered from rising competition with China in textiles and light manufacturing industries.	欧元区南部成员国（如意大利和西班牙）日益受到中国纺织和轻型制造业的竞争。


But just as the pre-crisis credit boom masked underlying structural problems, post-crisis credit constraints have greatly amplified the downturn.	但正如危机前信用繁荣掩盖了根本的结构性问题，危机后信用约束也大大加剧了衰退之势。


True, German growth owes much to the country’s willingness a decade ago to engage in painful economic reforms, especially of labor-market rules.	诚然，德国增长在很大程度上要归因于该国在十年前愿意采取痛苦的经济改革，特别是劳动力市场规则。


Today, Germany appears to have full employment and above-trend growth.	如今，德国正处于充分就业状态，增长也高于趋势水平。


German leaders believe, with some justification, that if France and Italy were to adopt similar reforms, the changes would work wonders for their economies’ long-term growth.	德国领导人相信——有一定根据——如果法国和意大利也采取类似的改革，它们的经济长期增长前景将迎来巨大的改观。


Yet what of Portugal, Ireland, and (especially) Spain, all of which have taken significant steps toward reform since the crisis?	但葡萄牙、爱尔兰和（特别是）西班牙呢？


All are still experiencing double-digit unemployment rates amid moribund growth, and, as the last International Monetary Fund Fiscal Monitor made abundantly clear, all still suffer from significant debt problems.	自危机以来，它们已经采取了不少重大改革步骤，但它们都仍在经历两位数的失业率和停滞不前的增长，并且，正如上一期国际货币基金组织《财政观察》（Fiscal Monitor）所揭示的，它们都仍在为严重的债务问题焦头烂额。


Debt overhang traps countries in a vicious circle.	债务积压让国家陷入恶性循环。


Exceptionally high public and private debts constrain a country’s options and are indisputably associated with slower growth, which in turn makes it difficult to escape a debt trap.	过高的公共和私人债务约束了一国的选择，并且毫无例外地伴随着更低的增长，而更低的增长反过来又让国家难以摆脱债务陷阱。


Last spring’s campaign against anyone who dared to worry about the long-run effects of high debt largely ignored the substantial academic literature, just as a remarkably similar recent challenge to Thomas Piketty’s research on inequality took no account of a larger body of evidence.	去年春天针对所有敢于担忧高债务的长期影响者的批评大多对大量学术研究成果视而不见，与此形成惊人相似的是，眼下对托马斯·皮克提（Thomas Piketty）关于不平等性的研究的诘难也根本不顾大量证据。


It is true that not all debt is created equal, and there is a strong case for adding more of it if the purpose is to finance highly productive infrastructure investments.	诚然，并非所有债务都是以相同方式创造出来的，有强烈的理由认为，如果目的是为高生产率的基础设施投资，就应该增加债务。


Europe greatly lags many Asian countries in its efforts to expand the reach of broadband.	欧洲在拓展道路网络方面的措施远远落后于许多亚洲国家。


Outside the Nordic countries, electricity networks are thoroughly Balkanized, and major efforts are needed to integrate them.	除了北欧国家，电网几乎都是地方化的，要实现整合必须投入巨资。


Raising debt for the purposes of significantly increasing or ensuring long-run growth makes sense, especially in an environment of low real interest rates.	为了大幅提高或确保长期增长而正价债务是值得的，特别是在实际利率低下的环境中。


A similar argument can be made for expenditures aimed at improving education, for example to improve Europe’s underfunded universities.	类似的观点也适用于旨在改善教育（如资金短缺的欧洲的大学）的支出。


Beyond growth-enhancing investment, however, the case for greater stimulus becomes more nuanced.	但是，除了强化增长的投资，加强刺激的理由便不再强烈了。


Brad Delong and Larry Summers have argued that in a repressed economy, short-term increases in borrowing can pay for themselves, even if the expenditures do not directly increase long-run potential. By contrast, Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna argue that in an economy with a large and inefficient government, debt-stabilization measures directed at reducing the size of government can actually be expansionary.	布拉德·德隆（Brad Delong ）和拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）指出，在存在庞大而低效的政府的经济中，以收缩政府规模为目标的稳定债务措施实际上可能产生扩张的效果。


I admit to being an outsider to this debate.	我得承认，我并没有加入过这场争论。


(The word “austerity” does not appear once in my 2009 book with Carmen Reinhart on the history of financial crises.)	（“紧缩”一词在我和莱因哈特（Carmen Reinhart）2009年关于金融危机史的著作中一次也没有出现过。


My general sense, however, is that both views are extreme.	）但是，我的总体感觉是，两种观点都有走极端的嫌疑。


In general, neither pure austerity nor crude Keynesian stimulus can help countries escape high-debt traps.	整体而言，不管是单纯的紧缩，还是原始的凯恩斯主义刺激，都不能帮助一国摆脱高债务陷阱。


Throughout history, other measures, including debt rescheduling, inflation, and various forms of wealth taxation (such as financial repression), have typically played a significant role.	纵观历史，其他措施，包括债务期限重排、通胀和各种形式的财富税（如金融抑制），通常都会起到显著作用。


It is hard to see how European countries can indefinitely avoid recourse to the full debt toolkit, especially to repair the fragile economies of the eurozone’s periphery.	很难想象欧洲国家能够永远避免债务工具全开，特别是在修复欧元区外围脆弱的经济时。


The ECB’s expansive “whatever it takes” guarantee may indeed be enough to help finance greater short-term stimulus than is currently being allowed; but the ECB’s guarantee will not solve long-run sustainability problems.	欧洲央行扩张性的“竭尽全力”担保确实可能足以为比目前所允许的更大规模短期刺激提供资金； 但欧洲央行的担保无法解决长期可持续性问题。


Indeed, the ECB will soon have to confront the fact that structural reforms and fiscal austerity fall far short of being a complete solution to Europe’s debt problems.	事实上，欧洲央行很快就必须面对一个事实：结构性改革和财政紧缩远不足以成为解决欧洲债务问题的完整方案。


In October and November, the ECB will announce the results of its bank stress tests.	在10月和11月，欧洲央行将宣布其银行压力测试结果。


Because many banks hold a large volume of eurozone government debt, the results will depend very much on how the ECB assesses sovereign risk.	由于许多银行持有大量欧元区政府债务，其结果将在很大程度上取决于欧洲央行如何评估主权风险。


If the ECB grossly understates the risks, its credibility as a regulator will be badly tarnished.	如果欧洲央行只能大致上理解这些风险，其作为监管者的信誉将受到严重打击。


If it is more forthright about the risks, there is a chance that some periphery countries might have difficulty plugging the holes, and will require help from the north.	如果它能更深入地理解这些风险，那么一些外围国家有可能已难以自保，需要北欧的帮助。


One hopes that the ECB will be forthright.	我们希望欧洲央行的认识深刻一些。


It is high time for a conversation on debt relief for the entire eurozone periphery.	为整个欧元区外围展开债务纾困谈判刻不容缓。


Why Wealth Taxes Are Not Enough	为什么光有财富税是不够的


CAMBRIDGE – Should advanced countries implement wealth taxes as a means of stabilizing and reducing public debt over the medium term?	美国剑桥—发达国家应该实施财富税以作为中期稳定和减少公共债务的手段吗？


The normally conservative International Monetary Fund has given the idea surprisingly emphatic support.	通常较为保守的国际货币基金组织（IMF）出人意料地非常支持这一看法。


The IMF calculates that a one-time 10% wealth levy, if introduced quickly and unexpectedly, could return many European countries to pre-crisis public debt/GDP ratios.	据IMF计算，快速而出乎意料地一次性征收10%的财富税可以让许多欧洲国家的债务/GDP比率回到危机前水平。


It is an intriguing idea.	这是一个颇有吸引力的想法。


The moral case for a wealth tax is more compelling than usual today, with unemployment still at recession levels, and with deep economic inequality straining social norms.	财富税的道德问题在今天比以往更具紧迫性，因为如今的失业率仍处在衰退水平，而深刻的经济不平等正在挑战社会规范。


And, if it were really possible to ensure that the wealth levy would be temporary, such a tax would, in principle, be much less distortionary than imposing higher marginal tax rates on income.	此外，如果真能确保财富税为临时性税种，那么从原理上说，该税比提高边际所得税率所造成的扭曲作用更小。


Unfortunately, while a wealth tax may be a sound way to help a country dig out of a deep fiscal pit, it is hardly a panacea.	不幸的是，尽管财富税可能是帮助一国走出财政泥淖的可靠方法，却难以成为万灵丹。


For starters, the revenue gains from temporary wealth taxes can be very elusive.	首先，来自临时性财富税的收入可能难以计算。


The economist Barry Eichengreen once explored the imposition of capital levies in the aftermath of World Wars I and II.	经济学家巴里·艾肯格林（Barry Eichengreen）曾探索过两次世界大战后资本税的构成。


He found that, owing to capital flight and political pressure for delay, the results were often disappointing.	他发现，由于资本外逃和推迟执行的政治压力，结果通常令人失望。


Italy’s armada of Guardia di Finanza boats would hardly forestall a massive exodus of wealth if Italians see a sizable wealth tax coming.	如果意大利将实施大规模财富税政策，则该国海关很难阻止大规模财富外流。


Over- and under-invoicing of trade, for example, is a time-tested way to spirit money out of a country.	比如，高报和低报贸易是经历了时间考验的将资金抽离一国的良方。


(For example, an exporter under-reports the price received for a foreign shipment, and keeps the extra cash hidden abroad.)	（比如，出口商低报从对外出口获得的价格，将多出来的现金藏在国外。


And there would be a rush into jewelry and other hard-to-detect real assets.	）还有大笔资金将涌入珠宝和其他难以侦测的实体资产。


The distortionary effects of a wealth levy would also be exacerbated by concerns that the “temporary” levy would not be a one-off tax.	财富税的扭曲效应还会因为担心“临时性”税收并非一次性而被放大。


After all, most temporary taxes come for lunch and stay for dinner.	毕竟，大部分临时性税收最后都演变成永久性。


Fears of future wealth taxes could discourage entrepreneurship and lower the saving rate.	对未来财富税的担心可能会阻碍企业家精神、降低储蓄率。


In addition, the administrative difficulties of instituting a comprehensive wealth tax are formidable, raising questions about fairness.	此外，制定全面财富税的行政难处极大，会造成关于公平的质疑。


For example, it would be extremely difficult to place market values on the family-owned businesses that pervade Mediterranean countries.	比如，用市场价值衡量家族企业（在地中海国家颇为常见）是非常困难的。


Wealth taxes that target land and structures are arguably insulated from some of these concerns, and property taxes are relatively underused outside the Anglo-Saxon countries.	针对土地和建筑的财富税基本与这些担心无关，物业税在盎格鲁-撒���逊国家以外的地区也相对少见。


In theory, taxing immobile assets is less distortionary, though taxes on structures obviously can discourage both maintenance and new construction.	理论上，对不动产课税的扭曲效应较低，严厉的建筑税显然不利于建筑的新建和维护。


So what else can eurozone governments do to raise revenue as their economies recover?	那么，随着经济的复苏，欧元区政府还可以从哪里增加收入？


Most economists favor finding ways to broaden the tax base – for example, by eliminating special deductions and privileges – in order to keep marginal tax rates low.	大部分经济学家倾向于扩大税基——比如，取消特殊扣减项和特权——从而保持边际税率的低水平。


Broadening the income-tax base is a central element of the highly regarded Simpson/Bowles proposals for tax reform in the United States.	扩大所得税基是获得盛赞的美国辛普森/鲍尔斯（Simpson/Bowles）税收改革方案的核心要素。


In Europe, efficiency would be enhanced by a unified VAT rate, instead of creating distortions by charging different rates for different goods.	在欧洲，可以用统一的增值税率来增进效率，而不应该通过对不同商品课以不同税率制造扭曲。


In principle, low-income individuals and families could be compensated through lump-sum transfer programs.	理论上，低收入个人和家庭应该通过一次性转移支付计划补偿。


Another idea is to try to raise more revenue from carbon permits or taxes.	另一个思路是试图从碳排许可和碳排税中增加收入。


Raising funds by taxing negative externalities reduces distortions rather than creating them.	通过对负外部性课税筹资能减少而不会创造扭曲。


Though such taxes are spectacularly unpopular – perhaps because individuals refuse to admit that the externalities they themselves create are significant – I regard them as an important direction for future policy (and I intend to suggest other ideas along these lines in future columns).	尽管这些税非常不受欢迎——也许是因为个人拒绝承认他们所造成的外部性十分巨大——但我认为这是未来政策的重要方向（我还会在后续专栏中继续介绍这一方向的其他思路）。


Unfortunately, advanced countries have implemented very little fundamental tax reform so far.	不幸的是，目前发达国家几乎没有实施根本性的税收改革。


Many governments are giving in to higher marginal tax rates rather than overhauling and simplifying the system.	许多政府提高了边际税率，而没有修正和简化税制。


In Europe, officials are also turning to stealth taxes, particularly financial repression, to resolve high public-debt overhangs.	在欧洲，官员还打起了用隐性税（特别是金融抑制）解决公共债务大量积压的问题。


Through regulation and administrative directives, banks, insurance companies, and pension funds are being forced to hold much higher shares of government debt than they might voluntarily choose to do.	通过监管和行政指导，银行、保险公司和退基金进被迫大量增加政府债务的持有比例，远远高出自愿选择情形时的水平。


But this approach is hardly progressive, as the final holders of pensions, insurance contracts, and bank deposits are typically the beleaguered middle class and the elderly.	但这一方法很难具有累进性，因为退休基金、保险合同和银行存款的最终持有者通常是处处受压迫的中产阶级和老年人。


There is also the unresolved question of how much the periphery countries really should be asked to pay on their debilitating debt burdens, whatever the tax instrument.	还有一个未解决的问题：不管使用什么税收工具，外围国在应该被要求偿付多少令其不堪重负的债务。


Although the IMF seems particularly enthusiastic about using wealth taxes to resolve debt overhangs in Spain and Italy, some burden sharing with the north seems reasonable.	尽管IMF似乎十分热衷于用财富税解决西班牙和意大利的债务积压，但北方更多地承担债务共担似乎也是合理的。


As the economists Maurice Obstfeld and Galina Hale recently noted, German and French banks earned large profits intermediating flows between Asian savers and Europe’s periphery.	经济学家毛里斯·奥布斯菲尔德（Maurice Obstfeld）和加里纳·赫尔（Galina Hale）最近指出，德国和法国银行在为亚洲储蓄者和欧洲外围国家充当中介的业务中赚取了大量利润。


Unfortunately, arguing over burden sharing creates more scope for delay, potentially undermining the efficacy of any wealth tax that might finally be instituted.	不幸的是，争论债务共担问题给拖延造成了更大的空间，这可能破坏最终可能实施的财富税的效力。


Still, the IMF is right – on grounds of both fairness and efficiency – to raise the idea of temporary wealth taxes in advanced countries to relieve fiscal distress.	尽管如此，IMF提出在发达国家实施临时性财富税来纾解财政困境的思路是对的——不管从公平还是从效率角度。


However, the revenues will almost certainly be lower, and the costs higher, than calculations used to promote them would imply.	但是，与用来促使财富税实施的推算相比，财富税的收入几乎肯定要更低，成本几乎肯定要更高。


Temporary wealth taxes may well be a part of the answer for countries in fiscal trouble today, and the idea should be taken seriously.	临时性财富税也许最好作为现今陷入财政困境的国家的解决方案的一部分，并且这一思路应该得到认真对待。


But they are no substitute for fundamental long-term reform to make tax systems simpler, fairer, and more efficient.	但它们绝不是让税制更简单、更公平和更高效的根本性长期改革的替代品。


Foreign-Aid Follies	愚蠢的援助


MUMBAI – The huge gap between the world’s richest and poorest countries remains one of the great moral dilemmas for the West. It also presents one of the greatest challenges for development economics.	发自孟买——世界上那些最富有和最贫穷国家之间的巨大鸿沟一直是西方遭遇的道德困境之一，也一直是发达国家所面临的其中一项最大挑战。


Do we really know how to help countries overcome poverty?	那么我们究竟知不知道如何才能帮助那些国家摆脱贫困？


In his eloquently written and deeply researched new book The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality, Princeton University’s Angus Deaton urges caution.	对此普林斯顿大学的安格斯·迪顿教授在他精心研究撰写的新书《大逃亡：健康，财富，以及不平等的本原》中提出了警告。


For those interested in world poverty, it is unquestionably the most important book on development assistance to appear in a long time.	对那些关注世界贫困的人来说，此书无疑是长期来研究发展援助的最重要著作。


Deaton suggests that far too often, Western aid serves to assuage donors’ guilt rather than improve recipients’ plight.	迪顿指出，在很大程度上西方援助都不是要改善受助者的境况，而是为了缓解捐助者的愧疚感。


This is particularly the case when naïve assistance serves to reinforce a dysfunctional status quo.	这在一些草率的援助反而导致糟糕现状不断固化的案例中显得尤为明显。


Although Deaton supports select initiatives, particularly for delivering medical and technological knowledge, he questions whether the vast majority of aid passes the basic Hippocratic litmus test of “first do no harm.”	虽然迪顿支持某些特定的举措——尤其是输送药物和科学知识——但他也质疑大多数援助是否通过了希波克拉底誓言的检验：“首先，不要伤害病人。 ”


For starters, assessing and implementing aid policy requires developing tools to gauge accurately where need is greatest.	首先，获取和实施援助政策要求使用某些工具去准确判定哪些地方最需要帮助。


Economists have developed some useful indicators, but they are vastly less precise than politicians and the media seem to understand.	对此经济学家创立了一些有用的指数，但这些指数的准确度却远不如政治家和媒体以为的那样精确。


Most experts agree, and Deaton concurs, that at least a billion people on the planet live in desperate circumstances resembling conditions that prevailed hundreds of years ago.	大多数专家认定而迪顿也赞成的是，地球上至少有十亿人生活在跟前几个世纪类似的悲惨境地之中。


Our failure to alleviate their plight is morally reprehensible.	我们在缓解这些苦难方面的无能是应当受到道德谴责的。


But where, exactly, are the greatest concentrations of poor people?	但究竟穷人最集中的地方在哪里？


Data are hard to come by and even harder to interpret.	这样的数据非常难以搜集，甚至更难去解读？


Attempts to convert national incomes into a common denominator are fraught with complications.	尝试将国民收入转化为一个普遍标准的做法是充满复杂性的。


To take one prominent example, there is a 25% margin of error on purchasing-power-parity comparisons between GDP in the United States and China.	举一个著名的例子，美国和中国的GDP购买力平价对比之间存在着25%的误差幅度。


In other words, we cannot say whether Chinese output today equals 55% of US GDP or 92%.	换言之，我们无法确定当前的中国生产总值究竟是相当于美国GDP的55%还是92%。


So much for precise forecasts of the date when China will overtake the US as the world’s largest economy; we won’t even know for sure when it happens!	同样我们也无法精确预测中国究竟在何时超越美国成为世界第一大经济体； 我们根本就不知道这事什么时候才会发生！


This problem is hardly unique to comparisons of China and the US; it applies with perhaps even greater force when comparing incomes of the poor in Mumbai with those of the poor in Freetown.	而这个问题可不仅存在于中美对比之中； 甚至在比��印度孟买和塞拉里昂弗里敦两地的贫民收入时差距更大。


Another major problem is measuring progress in a given country over time.	另一个主要问题是如何测量某特定国家随时间不断发展进步的程度。


How can one compare cost-of-living indices in different periods when new goods are constantly upending traditional consumption models?	在新商品不断颠覆传统消费模式的情况下，你该如何比较不同时期的生活成本指数？


Consider the impact of cell phones in Africa, for example, or the Internet in India.	试想手机对非洲的影响，或是互联网对印度的冲击。


Deaton goes on to offer a revealing critique of some of the most hyped and fashionable approaches to improving aid.	迪顿接着对目前最受追捧的流行改善援助手段提出了启发性的批评。


For example, the “hydraulic model” of aid – the idea that if we simply pumped in more aid, better results would gush out – ignores the fact that funds are often fungible.	比如说，援助的“液压模式”——所谓只要简单直接地提供更多援助，就能挤压出更好的结果——却忽略了援助往往是可替换的事实。


Even if aid is narrowly targeted at say, food or health, a government can simply economize on expenditures that it might have made anyway and redirect them elsewhere – for example, to the military.	即便援助仅限于食品或者是医疗药品，受援地政府也可以直接节省下援助所产生的开支并将其转移到其他地方——比如军事用途。


Direct delivery of medical help is one of the best options, but it still can be a huge drain on already-scarce local resources – hospitals, doctors, and nurses.	直接医疗援助是最好的选择之一，但它也可能吞咽掉本已稀缺的当地资源——医院，医生和护士。


An influx of Western NGOs often bids talent away from nascent businesses that could help the country long after the NGOs reset their priorities and move on.	每当大量非政府组织涌入，它们通常会从当地新生的医疗机构中招募人才，一旦这些组织完成任务撤离，就只留下残缺不全的机构长期服务这个国家。


Indeed, there is a striking parallel between the problems caused by aid inflows and the “natural resource curse” (or “Dutch disease” as it is termed in Western countries), whereby inflows into one economic sector – typically oil or minerals – drive up economy-wide prices (including the exchange rate), rendering other sectors uncompetitive.	事实上，援助流入所导致的问题与“自然资源诅咒”（或是西方国家所说的“荷兰病”）之间存在着惊人的相似之处——援助流入某些经济部门（一般是石油或者矿业）导致了整个经济体内部的价格（包括汇率）上升，令到其他经济部门丧失竞争力。


Moreover, a great deal of this aid is delivered in kind and for strategic reasons, often supporting ineffective and kleptocratic governments.	此外，许多这类援助都是用实物支付并出于战略原因，常常被用来支持效率低下的权贵政府。


Deaton observes that, in general, Western countries developed without receiving any aid. (Perhaps America’s post-World War II Marshall Plan in Europe is an exception, but that aid was intended more for reconstruction than for development.)	迪顿观察到，总体才说西方国家都是在毫无援助的情况下发展起来的（或许二战后美国支援欧洲的马歇尔计划是个例外，但该计划更加集中于重建而非发展）。


China and India, too, have succeeded in lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty with relatively little Western aid (particularly China).	中国和印度的成功同样也是在较少西方援助下让数亿人摆脱贫困而取得的。


Deaton argues that aid providers must be extremely careful not to interfere with political and social forces that, over time, can generate organic – and therefore more lasting – internal change.	迪顿指出援助者必须极端谨慎，不要干涉那些随时间推移会引发有机——并因此催生更持续内部变革——的政治和社会力量。


Another intellectually fashionable approach is to conduct small randomized trials to examine, say, the effectiveness of school-attendance incentives or immunization campaigns.	另一个理论上较为流行的手段就是实施小型随机实验去考察提高入学率或者免疫项目的有效性。


Deaton rightly argues that this approach, now enshrined in World Bank procedures, is of very little use for understanding how to help a country develop more broadly.	迪顿正确地指出这个当前世界银行奉为至宝的方法对于认识如何帮助一个国家更大范围地发展是没什么作用的。


The results are often specific to a particular country’s circumstances, and there is no reason to presume that they would scale up when fully confronted with a developing country’s governance problems.	考察结果往往局限于某个国家的独特状况，也无法证明这些结果能广泛推广开来去应对一个发展中国家的治理问题。


The fact that people in several African countries appear to be worse off now than in 1960 is far more related to despotism and internal conflict than it is to the effectiveness of aid-delivery programs.	而多个非洲国家人民的生存状况比1960年代更加恶化的事实其实与专制独裁和内部冲突更加相关，而不是援助项目的有效性。


Despite these caveats, Deaton’s message is fundamentally positive.	尽管提出了这些警告，迪顿所传达出来的信息归根结底是积极正面的。


For most of mankind, now is a better time than ever before to be alive.	对于大多数人来说，如今的生活要比以往更好。


The path to development remains for others to follow.	发展的路径依旧等待其他人去跟随。


Highly targeted Western aid and advice can help, but donors must take more care not to stand in the way of the beneficiaries in assisting them.	高度针对性的西方援助和顾问工作依然有所裨益，但援助者们必须更加谨慎小心，不要阻碍了受援者获取帮助的道路。


A Tear for Argentina	为阿根廷流泪


CAMBRIDGE – Argentina’s latest default poses unsettling questions for policymakers.	美国剑桥—阿根廷最近的违约给决策者造成了令人不安的问题。


True, the country’s periodic debt crises are often the result of self-destructive macroeconomic policies.	诚然，该国时常发生的债务危机大多是自我破坏性宏观经济政策的结果。


But, this time, the default has been triggered by a significant shift in the international sovereign-debt regime.	但是，这一回，违约是由国际主权债务机制的重大变化引发的。


The shift favors hardline creditors in bond issuances governed by US law.	根据美国法律，这一变化有利于债券发行中的强硬债权人。


With emerging-market growth slowing, and external debt rising, new legal interpretations that make debt future write-downs and reschedulings more difficult do not augur well for global financial stability.	随着新兴市场增长放缓和外部债务增加，让未来债务减记和重新安排变得更加困难的新法律解释绝非全球金融稳定的福音。


There are no heroes in this story, certainly not Argentina’s policymakers, who a decade ago attempted unilaterally to force a massive generalized write-down on foreign bondholders.	在这个故事里没有英雄，阿根廷决策者显然不是，十年前他们试图单方面强行对外国债券持有人实施大规模的一般化减记。


Economists who trumpeted the “Buenos Aires consensus” as the new way to run economies also look foolish in hindsight.	有些经济学家将“布宜诺斯艾利斯共识”吹成经济运行新方式，事后看来这一观点也是相当愚蠢。


The International Monetary Fund has long recognized that it made one too many loans to try to save Argentina’s unsustainable dollar peg as it collapsed back in 2001.	国际货币基金组织很早就认识到，2001年不可持续的盯住美元政策崩溃时，它给了阿根廷太多的救命贷款。


This is not the first time that an Argentine default has upended international capital markets.	这不是阿根廷��机第一次扰动资本市场。


According to the tabulation that Carmen Reinhart and I compiled in our 2009 book This Time is Different, Argentina has defaulted on seven previous occasions – in 1827, 1890, 1951, 1956, 1982, 1989, and 2001.	卡门·莱因哈特（Carmen Reinhart）和我在2009年的书《这次不一样》（This Time is Different）总结过一张表格，阿根廷此前已有七次违约记录——分别在1827年、1890年、1951年、1956年、1982年、1989年和2001年。


Argentina may be almost as famous for its defaults as it is for its soccer teams, but it is hardly alone.	阿根廷的违约史和它的足球队一样著名，但它绝非孤例。


Virtually every emerging-market country has experienced recurrent sovereign-debt problems.	几乎所有新兴市场国家都经历过反复的主权债务问题。


Venezuela is the modern-day record holder, with 11 defaults since 1826 and possibly more to come.	委内瑞拉是现代纪录保持着，自1826年以来违约过11次，未来可能还会有更多次。


Back in 2003, partly in response to the Argentine crisis, the IMF proposed a new framework for adjudicating sovereign debts.	2003年，部分出于对阿根廷危机的反应，国际货币基金组织为裁定主权债务提出了一个新框架。


But the proposal faced sharp opposition not only from creditors who feared that the IMF would be too friendly to problem debtors, but also from emerging markets that foresaw no near-term risk to their perceived creditworthiness.	但这一建议不但受到担心国际货币基金组织对问题债务国太友好的债权国的反对，也受到预料到近期信誉可能遭到质疑的新兴市场的反对。


The healthy borrowers worried that creditors would demand higher rates if the penalties for default softened.	健康的债务人担心，如果违约惩罚放松，债权人就会要求更高的利率。


Recently, as an outgrowth of a reconsideration of the IMF’s lending to the periphery of Europe (and Greece in particular), the Fund has advanced another approach to debt rescheduling, one that might be easier to implement.	最近，国际货币基金组织考虑向欧洲外围（特别是希腊）提供贷款，在此过程中，该组织推出了另一个债务重新安排方针，这一方针实施起来更加容易。


The IMF now recognizes that the bulk of its financing was effectively being used to allow short-term creditors to exit loss-free.	国际货币基金组织现在认识到，其融资的大头实际上被用在了让短期债权人毫发无伤地全身而退上。


As a result, there was not enough money left over to help soften budget cuts necessitated by the sudden stop in foreign funding.	结果是没有足够的钱帮助减轻外国融资骤停所带来的不得不削减预算的压力。


The experience of the recent eurozone crisis stands in sharp contrast to the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s, when banks were not allowed to exit precipitously from their loans.	最近的欧元区危机与20世纪80年代的拉美危机形成了鲜明对比。 在拉美危机中，银行不允许突然收回贷款。


If the new proposal is adopted, the IMF would conditionally refuse funds to countries carrying debt burdens that Fund staff determine are most likely unsustainable; creditors would first have to agree to a “reprofiling” of debt.	如果新方案被采用，国际货币进组织将有条件地拒绝将资金投入该组织所认定的债务负担最有可能无法持续下去的国家； 债权人将第一次被迫同意债务的“重估”（reprofiling）。


Reprofiling is a euphemism for debt restructuring, which allows countries to borrow from existing creditors for longer periods and at lower interest rates than they would be able to do on the open market.	重估是债务重组的委婉说法，它让各国以更长期限、更低利率从现有债权人处借钱，债务国在公开市场上无法获得这样的条件。


Although it is far from clear how easily the IMF could hold the line against hard-bargaining creditors, the new policy, if adopted, would toughen the Fund’s approach to cases where it finds itself repeatedly throwing good money after bad.	对于在谈判中态度强硬的债权人，国际货币基金组织是否可以自如地坚持原则还远未可知，但这一新政策如果被采用，将会收紧国际货币基金组织对一再事倍功半的国家的态度。


At present, the United States seems reluctant to go along with the IMF’s proposal.	目前，美国似乎不愿支持国际货币基金组织的方案。


Evidently, US authorities believe that in some situations geopolitics trump economics (reflected, for example, in the IMF’s recent re-entry into Ukraine after a string of failed programs).	显然，美国当局认为，在某些情形中，地缘政治比经济考虑更重要（比如，国际货币基金组织在一系列失败计划后最近再次进入乌克兰就是明证）。


This American resistance is unfortunate.	美国的抵制是不幸的。


It would be far better if the US found ways simply to organize outright grants in exceptional cases like Ukraine, rather than design the international financial system around them.	如果美国能够设法为乌克兰这样的突出事件实施赠款，而不是设计围绕这些事件的国际金融系统，情况将会好得多。


Given the recurring complications of adjudicating sovereign-debt contracts in foreign courts, and the world’s inability to organize a credible and fair procedure for foreign bankruptcies, perhaps the best idea is to steer the bulk of international debt flows through debtor-country courts.	由于在外国法庭裁定主权债务合同会一再引发各种状况，而世界有不能阻止可信而公平的外国破产程序，也许最好的办法是通过债务国法院引导国际债务流大部的流向。


Jeremy Bulow and I made a proposal along these lines 25 years ago; it is still the right approach.	杰雷米·布罗（Jeremy Bulow）和我25年前曾 提出过一个这样的方案； 现在它仍然是正确的方案。


In this scenario, countries interested in borrowing large amounts from abroad would need to develop institutions that made the promise to repay credible.	在这一情形中，有意从海外大量借贷的国家将需要发展让偿付承诺变得可靠的制度。


By and large, experience supports this method.	迄今为止的经验支持这一办法。


Indeed, the huge expansion in emerging-market domestic-debt issuance in recent years has helped reduce market tensions (though continuing reliance by corporates on foreign debt still leaves many countries vulnerable).	事实上，近几年来新兴市场国内债务发行量的暴增有助于减少市场紧张（尽管公司继续依赖外国债务仍然让许多国家十分脆弱）。


But domestic borrowing is not a panacea.	但国内借贷并非万灵丹。


To believe that any country issuing debt in its own currency is risk-free as long as the exchange rate is flexible is astonishingly naive.	相信只要汇率具有弹性，一国以本国货币发行债务就是无风险的，这一观点是非常幼稚的。


For one thing, there is still inflation risk, particularly for countries with weak fiscal institutions and heavy debt burdens.	一方面，仍然需要面对通胀风险，特别是财政制度不健全、背负沉重债务负担的国家。


Nonetheless, Argentina’s latest debt trauma shows that the global system for sovereign-debt workouts remains badly in need of repair.	尽管如此，阿根廷最近的债务灾难表明，全球主权债务系统运转状况急需修正。


Deepening domestic debt markets – and perhaps change along the lines proposed by the IMF – is sorely needed.	深化国内债务市场——也许可以依照国际货币基金组织提出的方针——是极有必要的。


A Massacre in Africa	非洲大屠杀


LONDON – Why is it that schools and schoolchildren have become such high-profile targets for murderous Islamist militants?	伦敦—为什么学校和在校学生成为杀人不眨眼的伊斯兰教武装分子如此的突出目标？


The 147 students killed in an attack by the extremist group Al-Shabab at a college close to Kenya’s border with Somalia are only the latest victims in a succession of outrages in which educational institutions have been singled out for attack.	极端组织青年党（Al-Shabab）最近袭击了一所肯尼亚靠近索马里边境地区的学院、杀戮147名学生。 这只是一连串以教育机构为袭击目标的暴行中的最新一次。


Last December, in Peshawar, Pakistan, seven Taliban gunmen strode from classroom to classroom in the Army Pubic School, executing 145 children and teachers.	去年12月，在巴基斯坦白沙瓦（Peshawar），七名塔利班分子持枪在军人子弟学校（Army Pubic School）杀害了145名儿童和教师。


More recently, as more than 80 pupils in South Sudan were taking their annual exams, fighters invaded their school and kidnapped them at gunpoint.	最近又有80多名南苏丹学生在期末考试时遭遇武装分子闯入学校，持枪将他们绑架。


Their fate has been to join the estimated 12,000 students conscripted into children’s militias in the country’s escalating civil war.	他们的命运是成为童子军加入该国愈演愈烈的内战，据估计和他们命运相同的学生已有12,000人。


Every day, another once-vibrant Syrian school is bombed or militarized, with two million children now in refugee camps or exiled to makeshift tents or huts.	每一天，都有曾经生气勃勃的叙利亚学校被轰炸或武装入侵，200万儿童沦落在难民营或居住在临时搭建的帐篷和小屋中。


And next week will mark the first anniversary of the extremist group Boko Haram’s night-time abduction of 276 schoolgirls from their dormitories in Chibok, in Nigeria’s northern Borno state.	一年前的下周，极端组织博科圣地（Boko Haram）趁夜间闯入尼日利亚北部的博尔诺州（Borno）奇伯克（Chibok）的一间学校，从学生宿舍中绑架了276名女生。


With continued assaults on local schools, Boko Haram has escalated its war against education – making the last two years Nigeria’s worst in terms of the violation of children’s rights.	博科圣地不断地袭击当地学校，掀起了一场针对教育的战争——也让过去两年成为尼日利亚儿童权利侵害最严重的时期。


In the past five years, there have been nearly 10,000 attacks on schools and educational establishments.	在过去五年中，发生了近10,000起袭击学校和教育机构事件。


Why is it that schools, which should be recognized as safe havens, have become instruments of war, and schoolchildren have become pawns in extremists’ strategies?	为什么应该被视作安全港的学校会成为战争的工具，学生会成为极端分子战略中的人质？


And why have such attacks been treated so casually – the February abduction in South Sudan elicited barely any international comment – when they in fact constitute crimes against humanity.	为什么我们对待这些袭击事件如此心不在焉——2月份的南苏丹绑架案几乎没有任何国际评论——它们事实上已经构成了人道主义犯罪行为。


In the depraved minds of terrorists, each attack has its own simple logic; the latest shootings, for example, are revenge by Al-Shabab for Kenya’s intervention in Somalia’s civil war.	在恐怖分子的卑鄙思维中，每一次袭击都有一个自身的简单理由； 比如，最近的枪击事件是青年党对肯尼亚干预索马里内战的报复。


But all of the recent attacks share a new tactic – to create shock by exceeding what even many of the most hardened terrorists had previously considered beyond the pale.	但所有的最近袭击都包含了一项新策略：通过让许多最死硬的恐怖分子此前都感到无法接受的暴行制造冲击波。


They have become eager to stoke publicity from the public outrage at their methods, even transmitting images of their crimes around the world.	他们渴望通过引起公众对他们所作所为的激愤获得知名度，他们甚至将暴行影像向全世界展示。


But there is an even more powerful explanation for this spate of attacks on children.	但对于这一袭击儿童的潮流，还有另一个更有力的解释。


A now-common extremist claim is that education is acculturating African and Asian children to Western ways of thinking (Boko Haram in the local Hausa dialect means “Western education is a sin”).	目前，一个常见的极端主义主张是教育让非洲和亚洲儿童与西方思维同化（博科圣地在其所在地豪萨（Hausa）方言中的意思是“西方教育是一种罪恶”）。


Moreover, extremists like Boko Haram and Al-Shabab calculate that they can attack schools with impunity.	此外，博科圣地和青年党这样的极端组织认为他们可以袭击学校并且逍遥法外。


Hospitals tend to be more secure, because the Geneva Conventions give them special protection as safe havens – a fact often recognized by even the most murderous of terrorist groups.	医院总是更加安全，因为日内瓦公约授予医院作为 安全港的特殊保护——甚至是最杀人不眨眼的极端组织一般也承认这一事实。


Until recently, we have done far too little to protect schools and prevent their militarization during times of conflict.	到目前为止，我们在保护学校、防止学校在冲突期间军事化方面做得远远不够。


But, just as wars should never be waged by targeting hospitals, so combatants should never violate schools.	但是，正如战争绝不应该因为将目标对准医院而起，交战双方也绝不应该侵犯学校。


Once slow to respond, the world is now acting.	曾经反应缓慢的现在正在采取行动。


Thirty countries have recently signed up to the Lucens or Safe School guidelines, which instruct their military authorities how to prevent schools from being used as instruments of war.	最近，三十个国家签署了Lucens或安全学校指引，该指引指导军事当局如何防止学校沦为战争工具。


Leila Zerrougui, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, recommends designating abductions of children from schools a “trigger violation” for the naming of terrorist organizations in the secretary-general’s annual report to the Security Council.	联合俄国秘书长儿童和武装冲突特别代表雷拉·泽罗圭（Leila Zerrougui）建议将从学校绑架儿童作为将极端组织列入联合国秘书长安理会年报的“触发事件”。


And, thanks to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, the Global Business Coalition for Education, and former Nigerian Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Nigeria has now piloted the concept of safe schools. This has meant funding school guards, fortifications, and surveillance equipment to reassure parents and pupils that everything possible is being done to ensure their school is safe to attend.	此外，在联合国儿童基金会（UNICEF）、全球保护教育免受袭击联盟（Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack）、全球教育商业联盟（Global Business Coalition for Education）和前尼日利亚外交部长恩戈齐·奥孔约-伊维拉（Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala）的努力下，尼日利亚已经成为安全学校概念的先锋。


In a year when there are more local conflicts than ever – and in which children have become among the first (and forgotten) casualties – it is urgent that we make stopping attacks on schools a high priority.	在地方冲突比以往任何时候都更频繁的一年里，在儿童成为首要受害群体（并且惨遭遗忘）的一年里，对于我们来说，将阻止袭击学校作为重中之重十分紧迫。


In dark times, children and parents continue to view their schools as sanctuaries, as places of normality and safety.	在黑暗时期，儿童和父母们继续将学校视为圣殿，视为道德和安全之所。


When law and order break down, people need not only material help – food, shelter, and health care – but also hope.	当法律和秩序崩溃时，人们需要的不仅是物质帮助——食品、住所和医疗等——还有希望。


There is no more powerful way to uphold the vision of a future free from conflict than by keeping schools running.	没有比让学校正常运行更强大的捍卫没有冲突的未来愿景的办法了。


Good Fences Make Safe Species	好隔离制造安全物种


NAIROBI – African countries are often criticized for failing to meet their environmental challenges.	内罗毕—非洲国家常常被批评没有很好应对环境挑战。


Observers often cite loss of habitat in the face of population growth, land degradation, and industrialization.	观察者常用的论据包括人口增长导致栖息地收缩、土地退化以及工业化。


And then there is the most frequent charge of all: that an increase in poaching is endangering species such as elephants and rhinos.	还有最常用的指责：非法狩猎的日渐增加正在威胁大象和犀牛等物种的生存。


In Kenya, however, an innovative and extensive conservation project is underway.	但是，在肯尼亚，人们已开始实施一项创新性大范围保护措施。


Begun in the Aberdare mountains in central Kenya, “Rhino Ark,” originally conceived to protect the highly endangered black rhino from the ravages of poachers, is supported by the very people who might have resisted it: the local communities in some of the country’s most productive farming areas.	这项称为“犀牛方舟”（Rhino Ark）措施从肯尼亚中部的亚伯达（Aberdare）山区开始，初衷是为了保护高度濒危的黑犀牛免遭偷猎，并得到了最有可能反对它的人——肯尼亚产量最高的农场地区的本地居民的支持。


In 1988, conservationists decided to finance and build an electrified fence to protect an area of the Aberdare National Park bordering smallholder farms.	1988年，环保人士决定筹资兴建电网以保护毗邻小农农场的亚伯达国家公园。


The fence was designed to prevent intrusion from the human population and degradation of the park’s habitat.	这条电网是为了防止人类闯入保护区和国家公园栖息地的退化。


But it also protected the farmers, whose crops were regularly being destroyed by marauding elephant and other wildlife.	但它也保护了农民，此前他们的庄稼常常被大象和其他野生动物破坏。


Local farmers welcomed the initiative, which influenced the decision to expand the fence to surround the perimeter of the entire Aberdare range.	本地农民很欢迎这项措施，这促使肯尼亚决定将电网范围扩大，将整个亚伯达山区包括进来。


The Aberdare Mountains, encompassing 2,000 square kilometers of indigenous forest and vital water catchment areas, as well as a national park, are vital to Kenya.	亚伯达山区包括2,000平方公里的天然森林和水源汇集区，以及一个国家公园，对肯尼亚来说至关重要。


Four of the country’s largest rivers, flowing north, west, east and south, begin there, providing water and power to seven major towns, including the capital, Nairobi.	肯尼亚的四条最大河流分别从东南西北四个方向汇聚在此，为大城镇提供水和电力，包括首都内罗毕。


On the mountains’ lower slopes, four million farmers benefit from rich soil and plentiful rainfall.	在山区地势较低的地方生活着四百万农民，接受着肥沃的土壤和充足的降水的馈赠。


In the foothills and high slopes, 30% of Kenya’s tea and 70% of its coffee are produced.	山脚和高坡出产了肯尼亚30%的茶叶和70%的咖啡。


For 21 years, the fence around the Aberdares was painstakingly built, supported mainly by Kenya’s corporate sector, individual donors, and innovative fundraising exercises such as the Rhino Charge, an off-road motor event that has captured the Kenyan public’s imagination and annually raises more than $1 million.	21年来，环绕亚伯达的电网的建设可谓费尽心思，其资金主要来自肯尼亚企业、个人捐赠和创新性筹资活动。 后者包括一项名为“犀牛冲锋”（Rhino Charge）的筹资运动，这次越野车比赛吸引了肯尼亚公众的想象力，每年筹资超过100万美元。


But, by the time the fully electrified fence was completed, in 2009, the government, under then-President Mwai Kibaki, had become an essential partner, with the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) and the Kenya Forest Service (KFS) deeply involved in the project.	但是，到2009年电网全部建成时，时任总统齐贝吉（Mwai Kibaki）的政府已成为最重要的合作方，肯尼亚野生动物协会（KWS）和肯尼亚森林协会（KFS）也深深卷入了这一工程。


With Kenyan government backing, Rhino Ark has been able to turn its attention to other forested but degraded areas – such as Mount Eburu in the Mau Forests Complex, overlooking Lake Naivasha, and Mount Kenya, a World Heritage Site that has been heavily affected by human-wildlife conflicts.	在肯尼亚政府的支持下，犀牛方舟得以将注意力转向其他有森林覆盖但已退化的地区——比如鸟瞰纳伊瓦沙湖（Lake Naivasha）马乌林地（Mau Forests Complex）厄布鲁山（Mount Eburu）和饱受人与野生动物冲突困扰的世界遗���肯尼亚山（Mount Kenya）。


The 45-kilometer Mount Eburu fence was completed last year.	45公里长的厄布鲁山电网去年完工。


The Mount Kenya fence, at 450 kilometers, will be longer than the Aberdares’ project and is now making rapid progress, with 80 kilometers completed.	肯尼亚山电网长达450公里，比亚伯达工程还要长，目前正在迅速推进中，已完成80公里。


Of course, building a fence is just the beginning.	当然，建设电网只是开始。


Fences must be managed and maintained (some of the original fence posts in the Aberdares, for example, have had to be replaced), wildlife corridors must be developed, and local communities require support.	电网必须得到管理和维护（比如，亚伯达山区最初建设的一些电网桩已经需要更换），还必须保留野生动物迁徙通道，当地社区也需要支持。


All areas are kept under surveillance by air and foot patrols along the fence line – a constant monitoring process with considerable cost implications.	所有地区都由电网空中和地面巡逻队负责监督——这项长期监督活动将带来巨大的成本。


The benefits, however, are significant.	但是，收益也是巨大的。


The fences keep the authorities fully alert to any incidents of poaching – particularly of elephant, rhino, and exceptionally rare species such as the Mountain Bongo antelope, which now exist only in the Aberdares, Mount Kenya, and the Mau Forests Complex, including Mount Eburu.	电网能够向当局报警任何偷猎事件——特别是大象、犀牛和山地紫羚等濒危物种。 后者现在只生存于亚伯达、肯尼亚山和包括厄布鲁山在内的马乌林地。


Local communities are involved in all areas of fence and forest maintenance.	在所有电网和森林保护区都存在当地社区。


In effect, they are the guardians of the fences, keeping them clear of vegetation and repairing damage caused by wildlife and other factors – and learning new skills in the process.	事实上，他们是电网的守护者，负责清理周边植被和修复因野生动物和其他因素造成的损坏情况——并在此过程中学习新技能。


The longer-term goal is the protection of these critical forests in perpetuity.	长期目标是永远保护这些关键森林。


To achieve this, endowment funds are being established as public-private partnerships, bringing together the Rhino Ark, the KWS and the KFS, and representatives from local communities.	为了实现这一目标，肯尼亚正在建立捐赠基金，由犀牛方舟、KWS和KFS，以及来自地方社区的代表共同商议。


So-called trust deeds, set up locally, will manage these funds, which will eventually pay for the fences’ maintenance.	所谓的（当地）信托契约将负责管理这些资金，最终用于电网的维护。


The Aberdare Trust Deed became effective last October.	亚伯达信托契约已于去年10月生效。


The region’s hard-working farmers can now see added value in co-existing with the fence.	该地区勤劳的农民现在已经看见与电网共存所带来的新价值。


Since the completion of the Aberdares fence, the value of local farmers’ land has quadrupled.	自亚伯达电网完工以来，当地农民的土地价值翻了两番。


They can work their fields in peace for the first time in more than a century, their children can walk to and from school without fear of being attacked by wild animals, and conservation is now part of the curriculum.	一百多年来，他们第一次可以平静地耕种土地，他们的孩子可以往返学校而不必担心受到野生动物的袭击，而环境保护也已列入学校课程。


The main lesson is straightforward: Good fences are good for everyone.	主要教训显而易见：好的隔离对所有人都好。


Kerry and Europe	凯利和欧洲


Those whom the gods would destroy, they grant their wishes.	神要毁灭哪些人，就会实现他们的愿望。


Those in Europe and around the world who yearn for a victory by John Kerry in the US presidential election ought to keep that bit of ancient Greek wisdom in mind.	欧洲和全世界希望约翰·凯利在美国总统大选中获胜的人真该学学这种古希腊智慧。


During the Cold War, America was the natural leader of the Atlantic community, but the price of this leadership was that the US had to accept the autonomy and influence of its European allies.	冷战期间，美国理所当然成了大西洋地区的领袖，但代价就是不得不承认了欧洲盟国的自治，而且要尊重它们的影响。


After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush embarked on a unilateral foreign policy.	2001年9月11日发生恐怖袭击后，布什总统开始推行单边外交政策。


The traditional Atlantic alliance was replaced by what the US called "coalitions of the willing," where "the mission determines the coalition," not historic alliances.	传统上的大西洋区域联盟被美国称为"志愿者同盟"的组织所取代，这里"在联盟中起决定作用的是使命，"而不再是所谓的历史联盟。


This policy divided Europe. It has also fueled deep divisions in the US presidential campaign, with one of the most potent arguments used by Kerry being that he will restore trust between America and its allies; that as president he will recruit international help in Iraq.	这项政策让欧洲四分五裂，也使美国总统大选产生了严重的分歧，凯利手中最有效的杀手锏就是恢复美国和盟友之间的信任，还有他当总统会为伊拉克问题赢得国际支援。


America undoubtedly needs more allies to bring Iraq's chaos under control and to build an Iraqi state that is seen as legitimate both by Iraqis and the world.	勿庸置疑，美国要找到更多盟友，才能控制住伊拉克的混乱局势，建起伊拉克和全世界都能接受的合法政府。


Allies are seen as an answer to America's twin credibility and legitimacy deficits in its occupation of Iraq.	盟友被人们看成美国对伊占领所造成可信性与合法性危机的唯一解决之道。


But can a Kerry-led US get a fresh start in Europe?	但凯利领导的美国真的能在欧洲重新开始吗？


Will a President Kerry really be able to rally allies to America's side?	凯利总统真的能把盟友重新召回美国的旗下？


Iraq's mayhem has hardened the antagonism of countries like France and Germany, which led the opposition to the war in the first place.	对伊拉克的伤害已经加深了法德对我们的敌意，他们最先站出来反对这场战争。


Even countries that rallied to Bush's call for help, like my homeland, Poland, are now wary of their involvement.	即使是那些响应布什号召的国家，像我的家乡波兰，现在也对自己的决定产生了怀疑。


Consider the attitudes of France and Germany.	让我们看看法德两国的态度。


Their leaders can scarcely hold their tongues, so badly do they want a Kerry victory.	他们的领袖很少保持沉默，他们迫切地希望凯利能够获胜。


But they are not going to change their policy to help Kerry win, and they won't change even if he does.	可他们不会改变政策来帮助凯利，即便他真的当选他们的政策也不会有任何改变。


As a gesture intending to boost Kerry's chances, German Defense Minister Peter Struck suggested that his country might reconsider its position on troops in Iraq.	为了替凯利创造更多机会，德国国防部长彼得·斯特拉克曾说德国有可能重新考虑自己在向伊拉克派兵问题上的立场。


But Chancellor Gerhard Schröder instantly shot down that trial balloon, declaring: "To be clear, we will send no troops to Iraq."	但格哈德·施罗德总理立刻打消了这种试探并再次郑重宣布："坦白地说，我们绝不会派兵到伊拉克。 "


Actually, Germany, like most European countries, is politically and logistically unable to send meaningful military forces to Iraq.	实际上，德国和大多数欧洲国家一样，无论从政治还是后勤保障的角度都不可能真正向伊拉克派兵。


France, which did ponder sending 15 000 soldiers to Iraq had the UN given its blessing to the war, is as clear as Schröder.	法国倒确实考虑过如果这场战争能得到联合国的认可，它会派驻15，000名士兵，在这个问题上，法国的立场和施罗德一样明确。


According to Michel Barnier, France's Foreign Minister, "Neither today, nor tomorrow," will French troops be sent.	法国外长米歇尔•巴尼耶说，"法国不仅今天不会派兵，明天也还是不会。


Both countries firmly believe that military success in Iraq is impossible.	"法德两国都坚信：军事成功的可能性在伊拉克近乎为零。


So will transatlantic relations remain as poisoned as they are now if Kerry wins?	那么如果凯利获胜，大西洋关系是否还会像现在一样糟糕？


Is Texas swagger merely to be replaced by the distinguished disdain of a Boston Brahmin?	凯利当选是否只是波士顿贵族取代了德克萨斯牛皮大王？


This is probably too pessimistic.	这种观点可能太悲观了。


Europe cannot give an openly negative answer to Kerry's request for help, because that would be a slap in the face to the most pro-European American likely to be elected president anytime soon.	欧洲无法公开拒绝凯利的援助请求，因为这无异于在可能很快当选美国总统的凯利脸上重重地抽上一记耳光，更何况凯利在总统候选人里与欧洲的关系最为亲密。


Such a rejection would not only put transatlantic relations even more at risk than they are today; it would also put relations	这样的公开拒绝不仅会使大西洋关系变得更加危险，而且还会危及到欧洲国家间的相互关系。


So some compromise must be found should Kerry win.	因此如果凯利当选，双方必须达成某种形式的妥协。


Fortunately, one is possible.	幸运的是，我们有个现成的方案。


The first part is purely face-saving: both parties must simply declare their good will.	首先是纯粹的"面子工程"：双方都必须明确表达自己建立良好关系的意愿。


Today, European leaders are unlikely to throw even that slender lifeline to Bush.	而今天，欧洲领导人就连甩给布什这样一根救命稻草的可能性都微乎其微。


The reality behind such a declaration is that Europe would deliver low-level military and economic involvement in Iraq.	声明背后的事实是：欧洲会派少量部队进驻伊拉克，然后再象征性地给点援助。


Most European leaders understand the tiny wiggle room that Kerry will have if elected.	多数欧洲领袖对凯利当选后狭窄的活动空间心知肚明。


The near certainty that the House of Representatives will be in Republican hands, and perhaps the Senate, too, means that America's Congress will pounce on any supposed attempt by Kerry to "sell out" Bush's war.	共和党几乎肯定会在众议院选举中获胜，参议院也可能会成为他们的囊中之物，也就是说，凯利任何可能"出卖"布什战争的行为都会遭到美国国会的无情镇压。


So Kerry may put even more pressure on Europe to help out in Iraq than the unilateralist Bush ever did.	因此与奉行单边主义的布什相比，凯利可能会给欧洲施加更多的压力，以摆脱美国目前在伊拉克陷入的困境。


But there is a second, more fundamental, part to any viable compromise: a redefinition of transatlantic relations.	但在任何可行的妥协中还有另外一个更重要的部分：那就是重新塑造大西洋地区关系。


The key point here is joint recognition that a fundamental transatlantic community of values exists, and that both sides need each other.	其中的关键是双方都要认识到大西洋地区国家有着共同的基本价值观，而且双方都需要得到对方的支持。


That transatlantic community must jointly feel responsible for maintaining peace and stability in the world.	此外还有一点：大西洋地区必须对维护世界的和平与稳定负起共同的责任。


The US must accept this principle, and recognize that Europe is a partner, not merely a servant, whether willing or unwilling, of American orders.	美国必须接受这一原则，承认欧洲是自己的战略伙伴，而不能不管欧洲愿意与否，都像对待佣人那样强迫它执行命令。


If burdens are to be shared, decisions must be shared as well.	如果需要共同承担责任，那么就必须共同做出决策。


This will require that America recognize the validity of Europe's view of the Israel-Palestinian conflict as the major roadblock toward a peaceful Middle East. Europe, for its part, must not only show that it feels responsible for the world, but that it is ready and willing to act accordingly by contributing in a significant way to reconstructing Iraq.	这意味着美国要接受欧洲的看法，即以色列－巴勒斯坦冲突是中东和平最大的绊脚石，而对欧洲来讲，则需要表明它不仅愿意负起责任，还愿意采取相应的行动，为伊拉克重建做出重要的贡献。


Europe's military means may be limited, but it has important experience in peacekeeping and "state building" that can be brought to bear.	欧洲的军事能力也许有限，但它在维和及"国家建设"方面却有着丰富的经验，能够派上很大的用场。


Is Europe really ready to undertake such an effort if its wish for a Kerry victory comes true?	如果欧洲真的希望凯利获胜，那么它是否已经做好准备，要完成这样艰巨的任务？


Kerry vs. Bush: Will Reason Prevail?	凯利对阵布什：理性能否占据上风？


With over 1,000 US deaths in Iraq, and the huge pressures that the occupation of that benighted country has put on American troops around the world, it is clear that - for the first time in decades - foreign policy issues may determine the outcome of a US presidential election.	随着美国在伊阵亡将士超过千人，以及占领那个蒙昧国家在全球范围内给美军造成的巨大压力，非常明显¾几十年来，外交政策可能首次成为美国总统大选的决定因素。


Ordinary Americans are asking themselves the same questions that people around the world are asking: how should America's global supremacy be used?	全世界各国人民都在问的问题，现在普普通通的美国人也在问：那就是美国的全球霸权到底该如何使用？


What price must be paid for that supremacy to be maintained?	为了维持这样的霸权，到底应该付出多大的代价？


What limits on the use of US military power are acceptable or necessary?	美国军事力量的使用在何种程度上是必要和可以接受的？


These have long been dominant questions in America's strategic debate. But, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, they became confused with another debate, one far more important for a US electorate that feels threatened: how can alliances and multilateral institutions protect Americans?	这个问题早就成了美国战略讨论的重点，但在2001年911恐怖袭击发生后，这个问题又和感觉受到威胁的美国选民心目中另外一个重要问题发生了混淆：盟国和多边机构怎样才能保护美国人的安全？


John Kerry's great virtue has been to resist confusing the demand for security and peace with the hegemonic impulses of America the hyper-power.	约翰·凯利最大的优点就是拒绝把对和平安全的需求与希望美国扮演超级大国的霸权冲动混为一谈。


Nationalist and neo-conservative currents within the Bush administration believe that unilateral action best serves US interests because it handcuffs American power the least.	布什政府中涌动的民族主义和新保守主义浪潮认为：采取单边行动最能保护美国的利益，因为它对美国的军事力量限制最小。


On this view, the security of the US can be guaranteed through energetic military action, with or without allies.	按照这种观点，不管我们有没有盟友，积极地采取军事行动都最能确保美国的安全。


Hence the Bush administration's tendency to weaken the ties of America's permanent alliances, including those that NATO represents.	紧接着就有了布什政府削弱美国永久性联盟的错误倾向，甚至连北约联盟都未能幸免。


Unilateral announcement of troop reductions in Europe and Asia, where US forces primarily serve (as in South Korea) to dissuade aggression, can only be seen as a corollary of this tendency.	单方面宣布在欧亚这些传统驻军地区的裁军计划(比如南朝鲜)来制止侵略，也只能被看成是上述趋势的必然结果。


The Bush doctrine's bedrock notion is that of "pre-emptive war," a doctrine that lacks international legitimacy and that therefore can usually count on only a limited number of allies.	布什信条的理论基础是"把握战争先机"，这样的原则十分缺乏国际基础，因此能得到的支持肯定也非常有限。


The idea behind pre-emptive wars is that American force should be projected through high-tech, blitzkrieg type wars waged from US soil, or from the soil of uncritical allies.	"把握战争先机"背后的理念是：美军应该从美国本土、或不持反对意见的盟国领土发动高科技闪电战。


On this view, NATO is merely to serve as a means to mobilize Europeans to tackle the inevitable postwar stabilization and reconstruction missions - obviating the need for the US to place its forces under NATO command.	在这种情况下，北约不过是动员欧洲人负起不可推卸的战后稳定和重建责任的一种手段－美国也根本用不着把军队置于北约的领导之下。


This is what happened in Afghanistan.	阿富汗的情况就是这样。


But as NATO's Secretary General has said, if it is the mission that defines the coalition, then NATO - a permanent alliance - is no longer needed.	但正如北约秘书长所言，如果这就是北约联盟的所谓使命，那么北约－这个永久性的战略联盟－根本就没有存在的必要。


John Kerry is focused upon the same type of security problems as Bush. This leaves many observers skeptical about the possibility for real change.	约翰·凯利关注的安全问题和布什一样，这也使不少观察家怀疑他能否带来真正的变化。


Where he differs fundamentally from Bush is in his belief that resolving international problems that affect the US almost always calls for the support of others. He therefore considers the revival of America's alliances to be a key foreign policy priority, and he has proposed that US forces in Iraq should be integrated into a NATO operation, as long as this remains under US command.	但他与布什最大的不同之处就是相信解决对美国造成重大影响的国际问题几乎无一例外地需要得到别国的支持，他也因此把美国战略联盟的复兴看作是外交政策的重中之重，而且还建议在保持美国领导的前提下，把驻伊美军纳入北约联盟的控制之中。


Acting jointly means that the US will have to take into account other interests and views - views that may not always be in harmony with its own.	联合行动意味着美国将不得不考虑到别国的利益和看法－尽管这些看法不一定总能与自己保持一致。


America will have to accept a world that is regulated not by the US unilaterally, but by global institutions and permanent alliances.	美国必须接受不由美国单边控制、而由世界组织和永久性联盟管理的世界。


And the norms and rules that govern international institutions constitute a boundary on American power - and thus as a check on its hegemony.	如果这样，管理国际组织的原则和惯例就构成了美国权力的界线¾进而也就阻止了美国的霸权企图。


Kerry and a growing number of Americans recognize that accepting limits on US power and the use of military force are a precondition for America's ultimate security, that what binds can also strengthen, and that such limits will reinforce America's ability to tackle the crisis in Iraq.	凯利和越来越多的美国人都意识到：接受对美国权力和使用军事力量的限制是享受终极安全的前提条件，必要的限制同样能加强美国的力量，而这些限制将增强美国处理伊拉克危机的能力。


Kerry knows that in most cases military power alone cannot be decisive, as there are other dimensions of power - so-called "soft power" - that are essential to resolving crises and establishing peace.	凯利知道在很多情况下仅有军事实力是不够的，因为还存在其它形式的力量－那就是所谓的"软性力量"－这种"软性力量"在解决危机和建立和平方面发挥了关键的作用。


These dimensions include international legitimacy, values (including tolerance), and public opinion.	上述领域涵盖了国际合法性、价值观（其中也包括容忍）和公众舆论。


The coming US election recalls a famous debate described by Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian War, concerning how Athens should respond to the revolt of Mytilene.	即将举行的美国大选让我想起了修西得底斯在《伯罗奔尼撒战史》中所描绘的一个著名争议，讲的就是雅典人该如何对待米蒂利尼人的反抗。


The vote supported those who felt that "those who make wise decisions are more formidable to their enemies than those who rush madly into strong action."	最终的表决结果是：多数人认为"做出明智决定的人比采取疯狂行动的人更能让敌人害怕"。


Let us hope that reason also prevails this time round.	让我们希望这次理性同样能够占据上风。


Stop Subsidizing Climate Change	停止补贴气候变化


LONDON – Next week, governments will gather in Warsaw, Poland, for a crucial round of climate negotiations, with both expectation and ambition running at an all-time low.	伦敦—下周，各国政府将汇聚在波兰华沙展开气候变化谈判的关键轮次，而期望和雄心都处于历史最低点。


But it does not have to be like this: The Warsaw meeting provides an opportunity to galvanize action on one of the most potent forces driving climate change – the billions of dollars spent by governments on fossil-fuel subsidies.	但本来没必要如此：华沙会议提供了一次刺激对最强力地推动气候变化的行为——政府对化石燃料的数十亿美元的补贴采取行动的机会。


The Warsaw talks are a staging post on the route to the 2015 United Nations climate summit in Paris, at which governments will seek to forge an agreement that prevents dangerous climate change, defined as global warming of more than two degrees Celsius.	华沙谈判是2015年巴黎联合国气候峰会之前的预热。 在巴黎峰会上，各国政府将寻求形成防止气候变化（其定义是全球变暖超过二摄氏度）的协定。


Failure would expose future generations to catastrophic climate risks, while trapping millions of people in poverty as a result of more frequent, intense, and protracted droughts, floods, and storms.	失败将让子孙后代面临灾难性气候风险，让几百万人因为更频繁、剧烈和长期的干旱、洪水和风暴而陷入贫困。


Basic carbon arithmetic illustrates the scale of the problem.	基本碳算术说明了问题的严重性。


According to the most recent assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), we are on a trajectory toward exhausting the twenty-first century’s entire carbon budget by 2030.	根据政府间气候变化委员会（IPCC）的最新评估，我们在2030年就将用完二十一世纪的全部碳预算。


So, can we head off the impending collision between the energy systems driving the global economy and our planet’s ecological limits?	那么，我们可以避免推动全球经济的能源体系和地球的生态极限之间的即将到来的碰撞吗？


The necessary innovations are emerging.	必要的创新正在显现。


Recent developments in wind, solar, tidal, bio-energy, geothermal, and fuel-cell technology are transforming the scope for low-carbon energy production.	风能、太阳能、潮汐能、生物能、地热能和燃料电池技术的最新发展正在改变低碳能源产品领域。


Aside from saving the planet, these technologies could open up new investment opportunities, deliver affordable energy, and sustain growth.	除了拯救地球，这些技术可以带来新的投资机会、可负担的能源和持续的增长。


But that potential will be realized only if governments actively pursue green industrial policies.	但要实现这一潜力，政府必须积极地追求绿色产业政策。


They need to align the goal of avoiding dangerous climate change with disincentives for carbon-intensive energy – including taxes, carbon markets, and support for green alternatives.	政府需要将避免危险的气候变化的目标与鼓励远离碳密集能源的手段（包括税收、碳市场和支持绿色替代能源）结合起来。


Fossil-fuel subsidies have the opposite effect.	化石燃料补贴效果则相反。


They actively promote carbon-intensive energy and deter green investment.	它们积极地促进了碳密集能源，阻碍了绿色投资。


According to the International Energy Agency, governments pumped $523 billion into fossil-fuel subsidies in 2011.	根据国际能源署的估计，2011年各国政府在化石燃料补贴上耗资5230亿美元。


From a climate-change perspective, this is a world turned upside down: for every $1 in support for renewable energy, another $6 promotes carbon-intensive fuels.	从气候变化角度看，这是颠倒是非：对应支持可再生能源的每1美元，促进碳密集燃料花费6美元。


Most fossil-fuel subsidies can be traced to developing countries, where they drain budgets and provide transfers to wealthy households.	大部分化石燃料补贴可以追溯到发展中国家，这是在康预算之慨向富裕家庭转移支付。


But rich countries operate their own subsidies, which average $7 for every ton of CO2 they emit.	但富国也有补贴，排放的每一吨二氧化碳中平均包含7美元补贴。


Research by the United Kingdom’s Overseas Development Institute that examined tax and consumer subsidies provided by governments in 11 OECD countries found support equivalent to $72 billion, or around $112 per adult.	英国海外发展研究所的研究考察了11个经合组织国家政府的税收和消费者补贴，结果发现化石燃料支持合720亿美元，或每个成年人112美元。


It is difficult to think of a more irresponsible use of public money.	很难想象还有比这更不负责任的公共资金支出。


The inconsistencies between climate goals and energy policies are becoming increasingly stark.	气候目标和能源政策之间的不一致正变得越来越尖锐。


Germany is providing lavish support for the construction of new coal plants.	德国为新建煤电站提供慷慨的支持。


Britain offers generous tax concessions for oil and gas exploration, including bumper deals for companies involved in fracking.	英国为油气勘探提供慷慨的免税待遇，包括针对液压致裂法有关公司的巨大好处。


The United States spends heavily to subsidize gasoline and other fossil fuels.	美国花巨资补贴汽油和其他化石燃料。


In all of these cases, bold climate-change targets are being undermined by business-as-usual subsidies.	在所有这些例子中，大胆的气候变化目标因为老方一帖的补贴政策而遭到破坏。


Carbon markets could provide a corrective to fossil-fuel subsidies, but they are not doing so.	碳市场可以提供正确的化石燃料补贴，但它们没有这样做。


The European Union claims the mantle of global leadership on climate change, yet its leaders have allowed the price of carbon in the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme to collapse, owing to reckless over-supply of carbon credits.	欧盟号称是全球气候变化领头羊，但其领导人放任欧盟碳排交易机制（Emissions Trading Scheme）碳定价因为鲁莽的碳信用过度供给而崩溃。


By contrast, South Korea has signaled that it will enforce a greenhouse-gas cap that is projected to push prices to 20 times the EU level by 2017 – and green-energy investment there is booming.	相反，韩国释放的信号表明它将强化温室气体上限，预计到2017年将碳排价格推高到欧盟水平的20倍，而韩国的绿色能源投资也迎来了繁荣。


With energy prices moving center stage, there is a danger that already-weak incentives for investment in low-carbon energy will be further undermined.	随着能源价格成为核心问题，已然十分脆弱的低碳能源投资激励有可能被进一步削弱。


Across Europe, calls for “affordable energy” are fast becoming a euphemism for increased fossil-fuel subsidies and a rollback of commitments on green energy.	放眼欧洲，对“可负担能源”的吁求正在快速变为增加化石燃料补贴、收回绿色能源承诺的委婉说法。


Recent debates in the UK illustrate the emerging fault lines.	最近在英国发生的争论表明裂痕正在产生。


Five years ago, Britain broke the international mold by enacting legislation mandating an 80% cut in greenhouse-gas emissions by 2050.	五年前，英国打破国际常规，立法要求到2050年削减80%的温室气体排放量。


Today, political leaders openly attack “burdensome” green taxes.	如今，政治领袖公开攻讦“不堪重负”的绿色税。


The government has delayed setting a decarbonization target for electricity generation, there is uncertainty over pricing for green energy sources, and the Green Investment Bank is under-financed.	政府推迟了电力去碳化目标的设定，绿色能源资源的定价充满了不确定性，而绿色投资银行（Green Investment Bank）也处于资金不足状态。


Unsurprisingly, investment in renewable energy has fallen to a four-year low.	毫不奇怪，可再生能源投资降至四年新低。


Expecting the Warsaw climate negotiations to deliver a major breakthrough would be a triumph of hope over evidence.	期待华沙气候谈判产生重大突破只是没有证据的空想。


Yet the talks provide a platform for practical action – and for governments to demonstrate leadership by example.	但谈判提供了一个实践平台，也提供了政府用榜样证明领导力的平台。


The G-20 countries, which have already agreed, in principle, to phase out fossil-fuel subsidies, should seize the moment.	G-20国家已经在原则上同意逐步取消化石燃料补贴，它们应该抓住这个机会。


They could hold a “side-summit” in Warsaw at which they set a schedule for translating principle into practice.	它们可以在华沙举办一个“方面峰会”，为将原则落实为政策设定时间表。


The target should be full elimination of all fossil-fuel subsidies by 2020.	目标应该是到2020年全部取消化石燃料补贴。


Rich G-20 countries could go further and faster.	G-20富国可以走得更快更远。


They should pledge to eliminate all subsidies by the time they arrive at the UN’s COP 21 climate-change summit in Paris in 2015, starting next year with the withdrawal of all support for gasoline and for coal, oil, and gas exploration.	它们应该承诺在2015年出席联合国COP 21气候变化峰会前取消所有化石燃料补贴，从明年开始取消所有对汽油和煤炭、石油和天然气勘探的支持。


And they should divert part of the savings into energy cooperation aimed at supporting low-carbon transitions in developing countries.	它们还应该将部分储蓄用于旨在支持发展中国家低碳转型的能源合作。


Eliminating fossil-fuel subsidies would be just one small step on the road to a global climate agreement.	取消化石燃料补贴将只是通往全球气候协定道路上的一小步。


But it would at least be a step in the right direction – and it might just restore confidence in a negotiating process that is slowly going nowhere.	但这至少是朝正确方向的一步——或许能够为缓缓滑向僵局的谈判进程树立信心。


Keynes and Social Democracy Today	凯恩斯和今天的社会民主


But John Maynard Keynes’s relationship with social democracy is complex. Although he was an architect of core components of social democratic policy – particularly its emphasis on maintaining full employment – he did not subscribe to other key social democratic objectives, such as public ownership or massive expansion of the welfare state.	伦敦——


In The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Keynes ends by summarizing the strengths and weaknesses of the capitalist system.	数十年以来，凯恩斯主义都和社会民主的大政府主义政策相关联。


On one hand, capitalism offers the best safeguard of individual freedom, choice, and entrepreneurial initiative.	但其实凯恩斯和其关系比较复杂。


On the other hand, unregulated markets fail to achieve two central goals of any civilized society: “The outstanding faults of the economic society in which we live are its failure to provide for full employment and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes.” This suggested an active role for government, which dovetailed with important strands of left-wing thought.	虽然他是社会民主政策核心价值观的设计师——特别是侧重于充分就业方面而言——但他和社会民主的其他政策，例如公有制或福利国家的无限延伸等却并不想关。


Until The General Theory was published in 1936, social democrats did not know how to go about achieving full employment.	在《就业、利息和货币通论》一书中，凯恩斯以资本主义的优劣评判作为结束语。 一方面，资本主义给了个人自由，选择和创新精神以最好的保护。


Their policies were directed at depriving capitalists of the ownership of the means of production.	另一方面，无监管的市场无法实现文明社会的两个中心目标：“经济社会的致命错误在于无法提供充分的就业以及保证社会财富收入分配的公平性。


How this was to produce full employment was never worked out.	”这就凸显出政府在其中的重要性，这也是左派思想的重要观点。


There was an idea, originally derived from Ricardo and Marx, that the capitalist class needed a “reserve army of the unemployed” to maintain its profit share.	在1936年《通论》一书发表之前，社会民主人士并不清楚如何实现就业的充分性。


If profits were eliminated, the need for that reserve army would disappear.	他们只是侧重于剥夺资本家对生产资料的所有权。


Labor would be paid what it was worth, and everyone willing to work would be able to find a job.	对如何实现充分的就业一无所知。


But, apart from the political impossibility of nationalizing the whole economy peacefully, this approach suffered from the fatal flaw of ignoring the role of aggregate demand.	这种理论起源于李嘉图和马克思的思想，所谓资产阶级需要保持“一定数量的失业大军”来维持其利润。 如果消灭了利润，失业大军也没有存在的必要了。


It assumed that demand would always be sufficient if profits were eliminated.	劳动者就会获取应得的报酬，任何想要工作的人都能找到工作。


Keynes demonstrated that the main cause of bouts of heavy and prolonged unemployment was not worker encroachment on profits, but the fluctuating prospects of private investment in an uncertain world.	但是，想用政治的手段和平地实现整个社会财富的公有化几乎不可能，这种方法致命的缺陷在于忽略了人类不断提升的需求。


Nearly all unemployment in a cyclical downturn was the result of the failure of investment demand.	其假设的前提是如果消灭利润，需求一直维持充足。


Thus, the important thing was not to nationalize the capital stock, but to socialize investment. Industry could be safely left in private hands, provided the state guaranteed enough spending power in the economy to maintain a full-employment level of investment.	凯恩斯告诉我们，严重失业现象产生的原因不是劳工受到资本家的剥削，而是在未知世界中的私人投资不确定的投资前景。


This could be achieved by monetary and fiscal policy: low interest rates and large state investment programs.	几乎所有的失业起源于经济萧条周期中的投资需求低迷。


In short, Keynes aimed to achieve a key social democratic objective without changing the ownership of industry.	那么，我们要做的不是将生产资料国有化，而是投资收益的社会化。


Nevertheless, he did think that redistribution would help secure full employment. A greater tendency to consume would “serve to increase at the same time the inducement to invest.”	私人运营不是错误的源泉，如果再加上政府担保足够的支出，就能保证充分的就业。


And the low interest rates needed to maintain full employment would lead in time to the “euthanasia of the rentier” – of those who live off the rents of capital.	这可以通过财政金融政策手段来加以实现：调低利率和加大政府投资。


Moderate re-distribution was the more politically radical implication of Keynes’s economic theory, but the measures outlined above were also the limits of state intervention for him.	简而言之，凯恩斯在没有改变所有权的前提下，实现了社会民主人士的核心目标。 而且他认为，财富的再分配确实能保证充分的就业。


As long as “the state is able to determine the aggregate amount of resources devoted to augmenting the instruments [i.e., the capital base] and the basic reward to those who own them,” there is no “obvious case” for further involvement.	同时，低利率环境下的充分就业可以消灭食利阶层——那些靠利息和租金来存活的人。 适度的财富再分配是凯恩斯经济学理论较为激进的政治理念，但政府的干预也应有一定的限度。


The public was never to substitute for the private, but merely to complement it.	只要“增加的财富是用于改良生产工具，劳动者能得到基本的回报”，政府就不应该干预。 公有不能替代私有，只能作为补充。


Today, ideas about full employment and equality remain at the heart of social democracy.	今天，关于充分就业和平等的理念一直是社会民主的核心。


But the political struggle needs to be conducted along new battle lines.	但政治斗争的方式已经呈现出了新形态。


Whereas the front used to run between government and the owners of the means of production – the industrialists, the rentiers – now, it runs between governments and finance.	政府和生产资料所有者（实业家和剥削者）之争已经演变为政府和金融之争。


Such measures as the efforts by the European Parliament to regulate the derivatives market or the British government’s ban on short selling in the wake of the financial crisis or the demand to caps bankers’ bonuses  are contemporary expressions of the wish to reduce the power of financial speculation to damage the economy.	不论欧洲议会对衍生品市场的监管措施，英国政府在金融危机时禁止卖空的措施，或是对银行家的奖金设置上限，这些都是减少金融投机客破坏经济的现代翻版。


The new focus on the need to tame the power of finance is largely a consequence of globalization.	全球化的结果导致我们要限制金融的权力。


Capital moves across borders more freely and more quickly than goods or people do.	资本比货物人力更易于流动。


Yet, while large global firms habitually use their high concentration of financial resources to press for further de-regulation (“or we will go somewhere else”), the crisis has turned their size into a liability.	然而，跨国公司更习惯于运用其巨大的金融资源来给政府施压，要求放松管制（否则他们就抽走资本），这场危机后果导致规模越大的公司损失越大。


Being too big to fail simply means being too big.	大而不倒就说明太大了。


Keynes saw that “it is the financial markets’ precariousness which creates no small part of our contemporary problem of securing sufficient investment.”	凯恩斯认为“金融市场”不稳定造成了我们当今不算小的问题。


That rings truer today – more than 70 years later – than in his own day. Rather than securing investment for productive sectors of the economy, the financial industry has become adept at securing investment in itself.	”这样的警钟70多年之后依旧有效，如今的金融行业不是为了保障投资者的权益，而是为了自身的权利。


This, once again, calls for an activist government policy.	在这里，我们再一次呼吁政府的积极干预。


Yet, as Keynes would have argued, it is important that the expansion of government involvement is informed by sound economics rather than political ideology, social democratic or otherwise.	然而，凯恩斯认为，政府的干预应由基于成熟的经济经济学，而不是意识形态，社会民主或是其他什么。


State intervention needs to bridge gaps that the private sector cannot reasonably be expected to do on its own.	国家干预用来弥补私人企业非理性行为所导致的缺陷。


The current crisis has shown with utmost clarity that private markets are unable to self-regulate; domestic regulation is therefore a key area in which government has a role to play.	目前的危机非常清楚地表明，市场无法自我监管； 政府对本国监管非常重要。


Similarly, time-inconsistency issues prevent large international firms from compartmentalizing their markets. Re-erecting barriers to capital flows in the form of international taxes, thereby cordoning off crises before they turn global, is therefore another task for government.	同样，时间不一致性问题防止跨国机构操纵市场，征收国际税可以重新对资本流动限制，在危机蔓延到全球之前加以控制，这也是政府应该做的一件事情。


Keynes’s main contribution to social democracy, however, does not lie in the specifics of policy, but in his insistence that the state as ultimate protector of the public good has a duty to supplement and regulate market forces.	然而，凯恩斯对社会民主最大的贡献不在于具体的政策，而是他坚持认为，国家作为公共产品的最终保护者，有着监管和补充市场的责任。


If we need markets to stop the state from behaving badly, we need the state to stop markets from behaving badly.	如果我们需要市场来阻止国家做恶，我们同样需要国家来阻止市场作恶。


Nowadays, that means stopping financial markets from behaving badly.	如今，也就是阻止金融市场来作恶。


That means limiting their power, and their profits.	即限制其权力和利润。


Keynes’s General Theory at 80	凯恩斯《通论》80周年


LONDON – In 1935, John Maynard Keynes wrote to George Bernard Shaw: “I believe myself to be writing a book on economic theory which will largely revolutionize – not, I suppose, at once but in the course of the next ten years – the way the world thinks about its economic problems.”	伦敦—1935年，凯恩斯给萧伯纳写信说：“我在写一本经济理论的书，我自信它将掀起一场世界看待经济问题的大革命——不是立刻，而是在十年后。


And, indeed, Keynes’s magnum opus, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, published in February 1936, transformed economics and economic policymaking.	”确实，1936年2月出版的凯恩斯的名著《就业、利息和货币通论》改变了经济学和经济决策。


Eighty years later, does Keynes’s theory still hold up?	八十年后，凯恩斯的理论仍然成立吗？


Two elements of Keynes’s legacy seem secure.	凯恩斯的遗产中有两个要素地位稳固。


First, Keynes invented macroeconomics – the theory of output as a whole.	首先，凯恩斯发明了宏观经济学——关于作为整体的产出的理论。


He called his theory “general” to distinguish it from the pre-Keynesian theory, which assumed a unique level of output – full employment.	他将他的理论称为“通论”，以区别于凯恩斯之前的理论。 此前的理论假设一个独特的产出水平——充分就业。


In showing how economics could remain stuck in an “underemployment” equilibrium, Keynes challenged the central idea of the orthodox economics of his day: that markets for all commodities, including labor, are simultaneously cleared by prices.	凯恩斯证明了经济可能陷入“就业不足”均衡，从而挑战了当时正统经济学的中心思想：所有商品，包括劳动力在内的市场通过价格同时实现出清。


And his challenge implied a new dimension to policymaking: Governments may need to run deficits to maintain full employment.	他的挑战产生了全新的决策维度：政府可能需要用赤字来维持充分就业。


The aggregate equations that underpin Keynes’s “general theory” still populate economics textbooks and shape macroeconomic policy.	作为凯恩斯“通论”基础的总量方程仍然充斥着经济学教科书，影响着宏观经济政策。


Even those who insist that market economies gravitate toward full employment are forced to argue their case within the framework that Keynes created.	即使那些坚持市场经济自动趋向充分就业的人也被迫在凯恩斯所建立的框架中为自己辩护。


Central bankers adjust interest rates to secure a balance between total demand and supply, because, thanks to Keynes, it is known that equilibrium might not occur automatically.	中央银行调整利率以保证总需求和供给的平衡，因为，拜凯恩斯所赐，人们知道均衡不会自动发生。


Keynes’s second major legacy is the notion that governments can and should prevent depressions.	凯恩斯的第二大遗产是政府可以也应该阻止萧条的概念。


Widespread acceptance of this view can be seen in the difference between the strong policy response to the collapse of 2008-2009 and the passive reaction to the Great Depression of 1929-1932.	这一观点被广泛接受，2008—2009年崩溃引起了强力政策应对措施，而对于1929—1932年大萧条政府只是消极反应。


As the Nobel laureate Robert Lucas, an opponent of Keynes, admitted in 2008: “I guess everyone is a Keynesian in a foxhole.”	诺贝尔奖获得者、凯恩斯的反对者罗伯特·卢卡斯（Robert Lucas）在2008年承认：“我猜每个人都是隐藏很深的凯恩斯主义者。 ”


Having said this, Keynes’s theory of “underemployment” equilibrium is no longer accepted by most economists and policymakers.	话虽如此，凯恩斯“就业不足”均衡理论已不再被大部分经济学家和决策者所接受。


The global financial crisis of 2008 bears this out.	2008年全球金融危机证明了这一点。


The collapse discredited the more extreme version of the optimally self-adjusting economy; but it did not restore the prestige of the Keynesian approach.	这场崩盘让更加极端的自我调整经济最优论信誉扫地，但也没有重塑凯恩斯观点的声望。


To be sure, Keynesian measures halted the global economy’s downward slide.	诚然，凯恩斯主义措施阻止了全球经济雪崩。


But they also saddled governments with large deficits, which soon came to be viewed as an obstacle to recovery – the opposite of what Keynes taught.	但也让政府背上了巨大的赤字，很快这就被视为复苏的障碍——这与凯恩斯的教义背道而驰。


With unemployment still high, governments returned to pre-Keynesian orthodoxy, cutting spending to reduce their deficits – and undercutting economic recovery in the process.	在失业率仍然高企的情况下，政府回归前凯恩斯时代的正统，削减支出以降低赤字——也在此过程中扼杀了经济复苏。


There are three main reasons for this regression.	这一倒退主要原因有三。


First, the belief in the labor-market-clearing power of prices in a capitalist economy was never wholly overturned.	首先，在资本主义经济中，对价格的劳动力市场出清力的信念从未被完全颠覆。


So most economists came to view persistent unemployment as an extraordinary circumstance that arises only when things go terribly wrong, certainly not the normal state of market economies. The rejection of Keynes’ notion of radical uncertainty lay at the heart of this reversion to pre-Keynesian thinking.	因此，大部分经济学家将持续失业视为反常情况，只有在存在大问题时才会出现，绝非市场经济的常态。


Second, post-war Keynesian “demand-management” policies, credited with having produced the long post-1945 boom, ran into inflationary trouble at the end of the 1960s.	其次，战后凯恩斯主义“需求管理”政策因为带来了1945年后的长时间繁荣而声名大振，但在20世纪60年代末陷入了通胀危机。


Alert to a worsening tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, Keynesian policymakers tried to sustain the boom through incomes policy – controlling wage costs by concluding national agreements with trade unions.	受日益恶化的通胀和失业权衡的警示，凯恩斯主义决策者试图通过收入政策维持繁荣——通过国家与工会的协议控制工资成本。


Income policy was tried in many countries from the 1960s to the end of the 1970s.	20世纪60年代至70年代末，许多国家尝试了收入政策。


At best, there were temporary successes, but the policies always broke down.	它们充其量只是起到了暂时的效果，最后无一例外地失败了。


Milton Friedman provided a reason that jibed with growing disenchantment with wage and price controls, and that reasserted the pre-Keynesian view of how market economies work.	米尔顿·弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）解释了为何工资和价格控��日渐走下神坛，以及前凯恩斯时代的市场经济运行观点重新得势。


Inflation, Friedman said, resulted from attempts by Keynesian governments to force down unemployment below its “natural” rate.	弗里德曼说，凯恩斯主义政府迫使失业下降到“自然”率之下导致了通货膨胀。


The key to regaining stable prices was to abandon the full-employment commitment, emasculate the trade unions, and deregulate the financial system.	重新实现价格稳定的关键是抛弃充分就业承诺，削弱工会，减少对金融体系的监管。


And so the old orthodoxy was reborn.	旧正统由此重生。


The full-employment target was replaced by an inflation target, and unemployment was left to find its “natural” rate, whatever that was.	充分就业目标被通胀目标取代，失业被放任寻找其“自然”率（不论为何）。


It was with this defective navigational equipment that politicians sailed full steam ahead into the icebergs of 2008.	政客们就是凭借这一有缺陷的导航设备开足马力撞上了2008年的冰山。


The final reason for Keynesianism’s fall from grace was the rightward ideological shift that began with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US President Ronald Reagan.	凯恩斯主义失势的最后一个原因是始于英国首相撒切尔夫人和美国总统里根的意识形态右倾。


The shift was due less to rejection of Keynesian policy than to hostility toward the enlarged state that emerged after World War II.	这一转变与其说是因为拒绝凯恩斯政策，不如说是因为对二战后出现的国家扩大的不满。


Keynesian fiscal policy was caught in the crossfire, with many on the right condemning it as a manifestation of “excessive” government intervention in the economy.	凯恩斯主义财政政策成为众矢之的，许多右翼人士抨击它代表政府对经济的“过度”干预。


Two final reflections suggest a renewed, if more modest, role for Keynesian economics.	两个最后的沉思暗示了凯恩斯主义的一个新生的、更加现代的角色。


An even bigger shock to the pre-2008 orthodoxy than the collapse itself was the revelation of the corrupt power of the financial system and the extent to which post-crash governments had allowed their policies to be scripted by the bankers.	对2008年前正统的一个更大的冲击（比2008年崩溃还要大）是金融体系的腐败权力被曝光，人们看到崩溃后的政府是如何放任政策被银行家把持的。


To control financial markets in the interests of full employment and social justice lies squarely in the Keynesian tradition.	为了充分就业和社会正义控制金融市场是凯恩斯主义的明确传统。


Second, for new generations of students, Keynes’s relevance may lie less in his specific remedies for unemployment than in his criticism of his profession for modeling on the basis of unreal assumptions.	其次，对新一代学生来说，凯恩斯的重要性与其说在于他所提出的针对失业的具体办法，不如说在于他对经济学所提出的批评——基于不现实的假设建立模型。


Students of economics eager to escape from the skeletal world of optimizing agents into one of fully-rounded humans, set in their histories, cultures, and institutions will find Keynes’s economics inherently sympathetic.	经济学学生急切地渴望杯托优化行为人的抽象世界，进入丰满的人类世界，考虑历史、文化和制度，他们将发现凯恩斯经济学具有内在的共鸣。


That is why I expect Keynes to be a living presence 20 years from now, on the centenary of the General Theory, and well beyond.	正因如此，我认为，直到20年后通论100周年及其后相当长一段时间，凯恩斯主义都将是活跃的存在。


Keynes versus the Classics: Round Two	凯恩斯主义对经典主义：第二轮


LONDON – The economist John Maynard Keynes wrote The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936) to “bring to an issue the deep divergences of opinion between fellow economists which have for the time being almost destroyed the practical influence of economic theory…” Seventy years later, heavyweight economists are still at each other’s throats, in terms almost unchanged from the 1930’s.	伦敦——


The latest slugfest features New Keynesian champion Paul Krugman of Princeton University and New Classical champion John Cochrane of the University of Chicago. Krugman recently published a newspaper article entitled “How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?”	经济学家凯恩斯在《就业，投资和金钱的基本理论》（1936年版）一书中写道：“长期以来一直存在的经济学家在观点上的壁垒鲜明的对立几乎摧毁了经济理论对现实的影响力。


There was nothing in mainstream economics, Krugman wrote, “suggesting the possibility of the kind of collapse that happened last year.”	。 ”70年后的今天，各派重量级的经济学家相互之间依然争斗得你死我活，这和1930年代几乎没什么两样。


The reason was that “economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking math, for truth.” They purveyed an “idealized vision of an economy in which rational individuals interact in perfect markets.”	打得最为激烈的两派代表人物如下：一方是新凯恩斯主义的领军人，普林斯顿大学的保罗·克鲁格曼，一方是新古典主义的首领，芝加哥大学的约翰·科克伦。


Unfortunately “this sanitized vision of the economy led most economists to ignore all the things that could go wrong.”	克鲁格曼近期在报纸上发表了标题为《经济学家这么错得如此离谱？ 》一文。


So now economists will have to accept “the importance of irrational and often unpredictable behavior, face up to the often idiosyncratic imperfections of markets and accept that an elegant economic ‘theory of everything’ is a long way off.”	“在主流经济学中没有这样的说法”，克鲁格曼写道：“可以推论出去年那场经济大崩盘会爆发的可能性。 ”


Krugman’s heavy pounding of Chicago School economics goaded Cochrane, a professor of finance, into some bad-tempered counter-punching on the university’s Web site, much of which consisted of a personal attack on Krugman’s scientific integrity.	原因在于：“经济学家，成为了这么一种团体，他们用具有迷惑力的数学来包装自己，给我们一个美丽的错觉，让我们看不清事情的本质。 ”同时，他们提供一个“理想化的经济模型，即市场是完美的，每个参与者都是理性的。


When he gets around to economics, Cochrane aims his blows at two points: Krugman’s attack on the “efficient market theory” and his advocacy of “fiscal stimulus” for depressed economies.	”“不幸的是”，这种经过简单化的经济模式使得我们绝大多数经济学家忽视了一些要素，从而导致他们出错。 ”于是，现在的经济学家将会不得不知晓“非理性行为，经常发生的不可预测行为的重要性。


Cochrane accuses Krugman of misleading his readers about the efficient market theory, which asserts that, given the available information, financial markets always get asset prices right.	克鲁格曼不断抨击芝加哥学派的经济学家“愤怒”的科克伦，科克伦是经济学教授，他在自己任教大学网站上不断地对克鲁格曼提出挑战，甚至质疑他的学术操守。


Rather than defend that theory, Cochrane admits that “asset prices move more than reasonable expectations of future cash flows.” Unfortunately, “no theory is particularly good at that right now.”	在经济学领域方面，科克伦主要攻击两点：克鲁格曼对“有效市场理论”的抨击，以及他大力提倡的在经济萧条时期的政府“财政刺激”方案。


But it’s theoretical nihilism, Cochrane argues, to ascribe these excessive fluctuations to “irrationality” as Krugman does.	科克伦指责克鲁格曼在有效市场理论的问题上误导读者。 所谓有效市场理论是指，在信息充分的前提下，金融市场中订出的资产价格一向是合理的。


What Krugman is really after (“though he can’t quite come out and say this”) is for the government to “take charge of the allocation of capital.”	科克伦并没有为这个理论辩护，他承认“资产价格比未来预期的合理现金流走得要远”。


And the one thing we do know is that however badly asset markets behave, government control “has always been much worse.”	不幸的是，“目前并没有特别好的理论出现。 ”


Cochrane’s heaviest punching is reserved for Krugman’s support for President Barack Obama’s fiscal stimulus.	但科克伦也指出，这也是一种理论的虚无主义，不能将所有这些价格过度波动都归咎于克鲁格曼所认为的“非理性”。


He invokes the hoary old “Ricardian equivalence theorem,” revived by the Harvard economist Robert Barro, according to whom “debt-financed spending can’t have any effect, because people, seeing the higher future taxes that must pay off the debt, will simply save more.	克鲁格曼真正的目的（当然他不能明着说）是让政府“接管所有的资本”。


They will buy the new government debt and leave all spending decisions unaltered.”	但有一件事情我们是清楚的，那就是虽然资产市场表现糟糕，但政府的接管只能会把问题弄得更糟。


In short, Krugman “has absolutely no idea about what caused the crash, what policies might have prevented it, and what policies we should adopt going forward” – except that the government should now spend money like a drunken sailor.	最令科克伦所诟病的是克鲁格曼对奥巴马总统所采取财政刺激方案的支持。 他引用由哈佛经济学家罗伯特·巴罗翻出来的过时的“李嘉图的等价定理”来说明，“负债救助不会生效，因为人们会预期到现在政府债务会导致未来的税收增加，于是他们就不会存钱。


Far from having too much math, economists need more, in order to “keep the logic straight.”	反而会购买政府新发行的债券，从而使得政府的救助政策失灵。 ”


On the stimulus, though, Krugman achieves a knock-out punch. The view that extra government spending “crowds out” an equal amount of private spending, so that its net stimulus effect is zero, would be true only if the economy were at full employment.	简而言之，克鲁格曼在“经济崩盘的原因，如何防止危机再次发生，以及我们在此问题上能吸取什么教训”等问题上，没有任何贡献。


Indeed, the Chicago School tacitly assumes that economies are always at full employment.	——除了政府应该不断地花钱以外，就像一��醉酒的水手行为没什么两样。


They are unfazed by the fact that America’s economy has shrunk by 4% in the last year and that over 6 million people have been added to the unemployment rolls.	对经济学家来说，目前的数学模型不是太多，而是需要更多才能使得“问题的解决更加有逻辑性”。


To Chicago economists, an increase in the number of idle workers represents a voluntary choice for leisure.	在经济刺激问题上，克鲁格曼获得了全胜。


In a concession to commonsense, they concede that people may make mistakes and, to that extent, a stimulus may be beneficial.	有一种观点认为，政府的救助资金会排挤私人投资，救助的效果为零。 不过这种理论假设的前提条件是就业情况十分充分。


But they insist that the only stimulus that will work is printing money.	实际上，芝加哥学派理论狡猾地将假设的前提设定为就业一直是保持良好的。


This will drive down interest rates and lead to an economic rebound.	而去年美国经济下滑了4%，600万人因此而失业，对于如此现状，他们却装作没看到。


Against this view, Keynes pointed out that interest-rate reductions may not do the job, because at zero or near-zero rates investors hoard cash rather than lend it out.	对于芝加哥学派的经济学家来说，失业率的上升代表人们自愿选择休假。


Hence, as he put it in 1932, there may be “no escape from prolonged and perhaps interminable depression except by direct state intervention to promote and subsidize new investment” – which is what the Obama administration is rightly doing.	如果基于这种判断，那么政府的经济救助无异于错误地鼓励人们休假。 他们认为唯一有效的方法就是多印钞票，这会降低利率，经济从而得以复苏。


On the question of what caused the crash, the debate is more even.	在谈到是什么导致市场崩盘这个问题上，双方打了个平手。


Krugman is hampered by the fact that he attributes the crash to “irrationality,” which, as Cochrane points out, is no theory.	克鲁格曼认为“非理性”是元凶。 而科克伦认为根本就没什么理论。


This is because Krugman refuses to take seriously Keynes’s crucial distinction between risk and uncertainty.	按照凯恩斯的说法，风险和不确定性有着严格的界限。


In my view, Keynes’s major contribution to economic theory was to emphasize the “extreme precariousness of the basis of knowledge on which our estimates of prospective yield have to be made.”	而这也正是克鲁格曼不愿意承认的事情。 在我看来，凯恩斯对于经济学最大的贡献在于，强调了“我们所能考虑到的各种极端的偶然情况。


The fact of their ignorance forces investors to fall back on certain conventions, of which the most important are that the present will continue into the future, that existing share prices sum up future prospects, and that if most people believe something, they must be right.	”投资者往往有盲点，但最为重要的事情是对未来的预期，从现在的股价推算出未来的上升空间，如果绝大多数人都这么认为的话，他们就是对的。


This makes for considerable stability in markets as long as the conventions hold .	只要这种势头一直如此，市场就会一直保持相对的稳定。


But they are liable to being overturned suddenly in the face of passing bad news, because “there is no firm basis of conviction to hold them steady.”	一旦坏消息传播开来，上述情况就会突然完全转变。 因为“没有足够坚实的基础能保证市场的稳定。


It’s like what happens in a crowded theater if someone shouts “Fire!”	”就像在一个拥挤的剧场中，突然有人大喊一声“着火了！


Everyone rushes to get out.	”每个人都想要逃生。


This is not “irrational” behavior.	这并不是“非理性的”行为。


It is reasonable behavior in the face of uncertainty.	而是面对不确定性的一种理性行为。


In essence, this is what happened last autumn.	从本质上来说，去年秋天所发生事情就是这样。


Chicago School economics has never been more vulnerable than it is today – and deservedly so.	芝加哥学派的经济学理论从来就没有这么不堪一击——他们确实也应该这样。


But the attack on it will never succeed unless policy Keynesians like Krugman are willing to work out the implications of irreducible uncertainty for economic theory.	如果克鲁格曼只是攻击他们，当然也不会得到人们的认可，除非他能提出自己在经济学领域中 对于不确定性作出的自己独到见解。


Khrushchev’s Secret Speech and End of Communism	赫鲁晓夫的秘密讲话与共产主义的终结


In history, some events at first appear insignificant, or their significance is hidden, but they turn out to be earthshaking.	历史上，有些事件一开始好像无足轻重，或者其重要意义深藏不露，但随着历史的前进，人们才发现这些事件有着惊天动地的意义。


Such a moment occurred 50 years ago, with Nikita Khrushchev’s so-called “Secret Speech” to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.	50年前就发生了这样一个事件，即所谓的赫鲁晓夫苏共20大“秘密讲话”。


It ranks, I believe, just below the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the start of Hitler’s War in 1939 as the most critical moment of the twentieth century.	我相信，在20世纪重大事件排行榜上，这一事件仅次于“1917年布尔什维克革命”和1939年爆发的“希特勒战争”，位列第三。


At that moment, the communist movement appeared to be riding the tide of history, and not only for those in the Soviet Union.	当时，共产主义运动在苏联和世界各地风起云涌。


In the mid-1950’s, communism was on the offensive in Europe, as well as in the emerging Third World.	20世纪50年代中期，共产主义在欧洲以及新兴的第三世界范围内咄咄逼人。


Capitalism seemed to be dying.	资本主义好像就要寿终正寝。


All of communism’s imperfections were deemed temporary, just bumps on the way to the just society that was then being born.	人们相信，共产主义虽然有不尽如人意之处，但那不过是通向即将诞生的公平社会之路上的颠簸。


A third of humanity saw the Soviet Union as leading the world toward global socialism.	全世界三分之一的人认为苏联正带领世界走向全球共产主义。


The Twentieth Congress put an end to that.	苏共20大宣告了这一切的终结。


It was a moment of truth, a cleansing from within of the brutality of Stalinism.	那是一个获得真相的时刻，从内部清洗斯大林主义的残暴。


Khrushchev’s speech to the Congress inspired doubt and second thoughts throughout the worldwide Communist movement.	赫鲁晓夫此次大会上的讲话在全世界共产主义运动中引发了怀疑和反思。


Khrushchev’s motives as he took the podium on the morning of February 25, 1956, were, in his mind, moral ones.	1956年2月25日上午，当赫鲁晓夫站在讲话台上时，他认为他的动机的出于道德考虑。


After his ouster from power, in the seclusion of his dacha, he wrote: “My hands are covered with blood.	下台之后，在其隐居的乡间别墅里他写道：“我的双手沾满了鲜血。


I did everything that others did.	我做了别人所做的一切事情。


But even today if I have to go to that podium to report on Stalin, I would do it again.	但是即使今天，如果还需要我走上那个讲话台揭露斯大林，我将义无反顾。


One day all that had to be over.”	总有结束这一切的那一天。 ”


Khrushchev had, of course, been an intimate part of Stalin’s repressions, but he also didn’t know half of what was going on.	当然，赫鲁晓夫曾是斯大林专制政权的重要组成部分，但他对所发生的事情也只是知道一半。


The whole Stalinist system of government was built on absolute secrecy, in which only the General Secretary himself knew the whole story.	斯大林主义的整个政府体系都是建立在绝对保密的基础之上，只有总书记本人知道全部的事情。


It wasn’t terror that was the basis of Stalin’s power, but his complete monopoly on information.	恐怖并不是斯大林的政权基础，而是他对信息的绝对垄断。