Until then, decoupling arguments, whether applied to relations between Europe and America or Europe’s financial sector and the rest of the economy, should be seen as having a single purpose – to deny the very real threats to the continued expansion of the European economy.	直到目前为止，脱藕论，不管是针对欧洲与美国的关系还是欧洲的金融业与经济的其他部分而言的，应该被视为只有一个意图，否认对于欧洲经济持续扩张的非常真实的威胁。


Some of this, no doubt, is wishful thinking on the part of economically unsophisticated people.	其中某些无疑是在经济问题上头脑简单的人出于美好愿望的想法。


Others have a special interest.	另外一些人则有着特殊利益。


It makes it easier to sell stocks and other investment vehicles. It makes it easier for politicians to sell their policies, themselves, and their parties.	不管怎样，经济的强劲可以使欧洲央行的鹰派更容易兜售他们大幅度提高利率的主张，使股票和其他投资工具更容易销售，也使政治家更容易兜售他们的政策、他们自己以及他们的政党。


But ordinary Europeans should not be fooled.	但是普通的欧洲民众不应该被愚弄。


The very existence of decoupling arguments is a warning that they should be concerned about the continuing robustness of Europe’s economy.	脱藕论的存在本身就在警告他们应该对欧洲经济能否持续保持繁荣表示担心。


Special interests would not be peddling such dubious pabulum if they felt confident about the economy’s future.	特殊利益群体如果对经济的未来充满信心是不会发表这种可疑的言论的。


The Myth of “Eurabia”	“欧拉比亚”的神话


LONDON – There is a powerful narrative today about how many young European Muslims are susceptible to terrorism, how Islam leads to radicalization, and how Muslims, because of their creed, choose to live in ghettos and therefore create swamps that breed terrorists.	伦敦－当前，关于有多少年青欧洲穆斯林易于受到恐怖主义的影响，伊斯兰教怎样导致激进思想，以及穆斯林怎样因为其信条而选择居住在独立的区域并因此而创造了一个繁殖恐怖分子的沼泽等问题，有一种很盛行的说法。


This narrative’s most extreme form is the idea of “Eurabia,” an incendiary term that purportedly describes a phenomenon by which Muslim hordes are now contaminating Europe’s very DNA.	这种说法最极端的形式是“欧拉比亚”的观点，该观点是一个据称描述了穆斯林群体现在正在污染欧洲真正的DNA这一现象的煽动性术语。


From this narrative, fear of homegrown terrorism resonates the most, as does the impetus to deal with Muslims as a foreign foe. So, too, does the idea that accommodating religious differences is dangerous.	在这种说法中，对产生于国内的恐怖主义的担忧以及将穆斯林作为外国敌人对待的冲动，以及包容宗教差异是很危险的观点，最能产生共鸣。


A false dichotomy is created in which Muslims must choose between a Western and European identity or a supposedly separate Islamic identity.	因此，产生了一个假二歧式，其中，穆斯林必须在西方及欧洲身份或者号称独立的伊斯兰身份之间作出选择。


But the relationship between European Muslims’ faith and identification with European nations seldom conforms to the “Eurabia” stereotype.	但是，欧洲穆斯林的信仰和他们对欧洲国家的认同之间的关系很少符合“欧拉比亚”的定式。 在约翰·L·艾斯泊思托（John L.


A wide-ranging global Gallup study that culminated in the book Who Speaks for Islam: What a Billion Muslims Really Think , by John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, includes detailed and sophisticated analysis of European Muslims’ attitudes.	Esposito）和达利亚·莫加海德（Dalia Mogahed）的作品《谁为伊斯兰教说话：十亿穆斯林真正在想什么》一书中，进行了广泛的全球民意调查研究，这些研究包含了对欧洲穆斯林态度详细而复杂的分析。


The results suggest that religious and national identities are complementary, not competing, concepts.	分析的结果显示，宗教和国家身份是赞美性概念，而不是竞争性概念。


Muslims living in Paris, London, and Berlin are more religious than the general public, but they are just as likely as anyone else to identify with their nation and its democratic institutions, and just as likely to reject violence.	居住在巴黎、伦敦和柏林的穆斯林比普通大众更信奉宗教，但是，他们和其他任何人一样，认同他们的国家及其民主制度，并抵制暴力。


The prevailing narrative often regards mosques and Islamic associations as spaces for radicalization, but I contend that some young people are actively turning away from these peaceful institutions.	主流的说法经常将清真寺和伊斯兰教协会作为激进思想产生的地方，但是，我认为许多信仰伊斯兰教的年青人非常讨厌这些和平组织。


This may be because mosques and Islamic associations find it difficult to compete with the promises of solace available through the Internet, where voices can address political issues, feed off injustices around the world, and launch calls to arms that can ultimately be murderous.	这可能是因为清真寺和伊斯兰教协会发现它们很难和来自互联网的承诺安慰竞争，在互联网上，有各种声音对政治问题进行演讲，从世界各地的不公平现象中获得思想能量，以及发起最终会造成死亡的使用武器的号召。


The Internet is where some young Muslims succumb to the alluring narrative of Islam constructed by those behind the terror attacks of our age.	互联网是一些年青穆斯林接受那些在我们时代制造恐怖袭击的人建立的伊斯兰教的诱惑性描述的地方。


We also know that the Internet’s devastating impact on handfuls of young people is not confined to the Muslim community, as evidenced by the tragic events in Bridgend in the United Kingdom, where 17 young people, seemingly connected through the Internet, committed suicide.	像在英国布里真德发生的悲剧事件所证实的那样——在该事件中，似乎是通过互联网联系的17个年青人，集体自杀了——我们也了解到互联网对少数年青人的毁灭性的冲击，不仅仅局限于伊斯兰团体。


For some young Muslims, the paramount sub-culture is virtual, and it operates on the fringes of Muslim communities, whether in Europe or in the Islamic world.	. 对有些年青穆斯林来说，他们占主导地位的亚文化是虚拟的，并且这种亚文化在穆斯林团体的边缘活动，而不管这些穆斯林团体是在欧洲还是在伊斯兰世界。


The story it presents is of a world beset by real injustices, for which the only solution is violent action that will supposedly lead to the victory of a monolithic Muslim world.	这种亚文化所呈现的故事是一个为真正的不公平所困扰的世界，对这样的不公平的唯一解决方法是按据称会导致一个完全统一的穆斯林世界的胜利的暴力行为。


Never mind the inconvenient truth that the acts may be theologically impermissible; the ends justify the means, and there really is no alternative.	不用担心这些行为可能在神学上不被允许的现实困难； 因为最终的结果会使手段合法化，并且也确实没有可以替代的方法。


Such a narrative is appealing because it feeds into the alienation that many young Muslims feel.	这样的说法是吸引人的，因为这迎合了许多年青穆斯林感觉到的来自其他群体的疏远。


Some may look to unpopular and unjust foreign adventures in Iraq as examples of the futility of lawful political action.	有些穆斯林年青人可能会将在伊拉克不受欢迎及不公正的外国冒险作为合法的政治行为无用的例子；


Others feel suffocated by the prevailing toxic discourse that casts European Muslims as foreign, alien, and suspect.	其他人会对将欧洲穆斯林描述成为外人、异类以及嫌疑犯的流行的具有毒害性的言论感到窒息。


Laws enacted to single out and “persecute” Muslims, and statements that affirm the Islamophobia of our media, buttress the absurd notion that what we are really witnessing is a “war on Islam.”	制定出法律来单独挑出穆斯林并“迫害”他们，我们的媒体确认伊斯兰恐惧症的言论，支持了我们真正看见的东西就是一场“针对伊斯兰的战争”这样荒谬的观点。


In Muslim communities everywhere, there is a need to challenge this narrative by making known Islam’s theological repudiation of violence.	不管哪里的穆斯林团体，都有必要通过让世人知道伊斯兰教对暴力的神学批判的方式来挑战这一说法。


We must redouble our efforts to reach out in local communities and demonstrate the realities of our faith.	我们必须加倍努力，接近当地团体，并展现我们信仰的本来面目。


Thus, one should pay tribute to the resilience of Dutch Muslims as they resist the provocations of the right-wing politician Geert Wilders, who is bent on releasing a film that can only inflame public prejudice against Islam.	因此，人们应该称赞荷兰穆斯林抵抗右翼政治家吉尔特·威尔德（Geert Wilders）时表现出来的灵活性，此人致力于发布一部只会导致公众对伊斯兰教偏见的电影。


Muslims in The Netherlands are responding by opening up their mosques and reaching out to neighbors.	在荷兰的穆斯林通过开放他们的清真寺和接近邻居的方式，来对此作出回应。


There is a collective responsibility to treat such problems not as Muslim issues, but as problems whose solutions will enhance the values on which European society is based.	将这样的问题不是作为穆斯林的问题，而是作为其解决方法能提升欧洲社会建立基础的价值的问题来处理，人们具有共同的责任。


Addressing the sense of injustice, siege, and alienation faced by young Muslims is not a victory for the extremists. Rather, it is a victory for European liberal values because it demonstrates that every individual and every minority is of equal worth.	讨论年青穆斯林面临的不公正感、包围感以及疏离感不是极端主义分子的胜利，相反，它是欧洲民主价值的胜利，因为它证明了每一个人和每一个少数团体都具有平等的价值。


Indeed, we should view neither homegrown terrorism nor the presence of Muslims as new to Europe.	确实，我们既不应该将国内产生的恐怖主义，也不应该将穆斯林在欧洲的存在，作为欧洲的新鲜事物。


Islam’s interaction with European society sparked a flowering of knowledge, and large numbers of Muslims have inhabited the Balkans and eastern and central Europe for hundreds of years.	伊斯兰教和欧洲社会的互动推动了知识的发展，而且许多穆斯林已经在巴尔干和东欧以及中欧居住了几百年。


They helped rebuild the economies of war-torn Europe in the 1950’s, arriving as immigrants and then making Europe their home.	他们以移民的身份到达欧洲然后将欧洲变成自己的家，并在20世纪50年代帮助重建被战争破坏的欧洲经济。


In almost every field of life, Muslims have been an integral part of the European tapestry.	穆斯林几乎在生活的各个领域，都已经成为欧洲生活不可或缺的一部分。


All Europeans, including those who are Muslim, are right to worry about the issue of homegrown terrorism.	所有的欧洲人，包括那些是穆斯林的人，对国内产生的恐怖主义问题的担心都是正确的。


Our right to security and life is paramount, as is the need to inhabit a space free of prejudice and suspicion.	我们的安全和生命权利以及居住在一个没有偏见和怀疑的空间的需要是至关重要的。


The 7/7 bombings in 2005 in my home city of London brought this into sharp relief.	2005年7月7日在我的家乡伦敦发生的爆炸使这样一个问题变成了尖锐的安慰。


The victims were of all faiths and races, including Muslims, as were the heroes who helped London get back on its feet so quickly.	这次爆炸的受害者来自不同的信仰和种族，包括穆斯林，而在帮助伦敦快速恢复元气的英雄中也同样有穆斯林。


Londoners’ collective message after 7/7 was decisive, and it must be Europe’s message as well: we will not allow such atrocities to divide us.	伦敦人在7月7日爆炸后透露的讯息是坚决的，而这也必须是欧洲透露的讯息：我们不会允许这样的暴行来使我们分裂。


The Myth of Rising Protectionism	日益兴起的有关保护主义的迷思


CAMBRIDGE – There was a dog that didn’t bark during the financial crisis: protectionism.	剑桥—— 在金融危机盛行期一直没有这方面的警示——保护主义。


Despite much hue and cry about it, governments have in fact imposed remarkably few trade barriers on imports.	尽管有各种各样的论调和警告出现，但各国政府实际上都没有对进口施加什么限制措施。


Indeed, the world economy remains as open as it was before the crisis struck.	当前的世界还和危机发生之前一样的开放。


Protectionism normally thrives in times of economic peril.	保护主义一般出现在经济出问题之时。


Confronted by economic decline and rising unemployment, governments are much more likely to pay attention to domestic pressure groups than to upholding their international obligations.	随着经济下滑和失业率不断升高，受到国内利益团体的压力，政府一般会更加关注国内事务，而不是坚持在国际上的相关承诺。


As John Maynard Keynes recognized, trade restrictions can protect or generate employment during economic recessions.	正如凯恩斯所言，贸易限制措施在经济萧条期可以保护，甚至提供工作机会。


But what may be desirable under extreme conditions for a single country can be highly detrimental to the world economy.	但是，这种在特殊情况下做出的限制对单个国家可能有好处，对于世界经济来说是有害的。


When everyone raises trade barriers, the volume of trade collapses. No one wins.	当所有人都开始实行贸易壁垒时，贸易就会崩溃，这样就没有人能获利。


That is why the disastrous free-for-all in trade policy during the 1930’s greatly aggravated the Great Depression.	最好的例子就是1930年代大萧条期间，由于无所约束的贸易政策加深了经济形势的恶化。


Many complain that something similar, if less grand in scope, is taking place today.	一些人开始抱怨保护主义的出现，他们认为现在这个现象虽然不是很明显，但还是有所抬头。


An outfit called the Global Trade Alert (GTA) has been at the forefront, raising alarm bells about what it calls “a protectionist juggernaut.”	一种称为“全球贸易警告”（GTA）的衡量指标给我们敲响了警钟：“贸易保护主义壁垒”的出现。


The GTA’s latest report identifies no fewer than 192 separate protectionist actions since November 2008, with China as the most common target. This number has been widely quoted in the financial press.	GTA近期一份报告显示：自从2008年11月份以来，至少有192个贸易保护主义的措施出现，针对的主要目标是中国，相关报道在一些金融报纸中也被广泛地提及。


Taken at face value, it seems to suggest that governments have all but abandoned their commitments to the World Trade Organization and the multilateral trade regime.	从表面上看，这些国家放弃了在WTO上关于多边贸易的相关承诺。


But look more closely at those numbers and you will find much less cause for alarm. Few of those 192 measures are in fact more than a nuisance.	但是，如果你仔细研究这些案例时，就会发现问题并没有这么严重。


The most common among them are the indirect (and often unintended) consequences of the bailouts that governments mounted as a consequence of the crisis. The most frequently affected sector is the financial industry.	这192个措施中的绝大多数都是由于政府在救助金融危机中所采取措施带来的非直接（大多是无意识的）影响，所涉及到的领域也仅限于金融行业，其实并不起什么作用。


Moreover, we do not even know whether these numbers are unusually high when compared to pre-crisis trends.	进一步来说，对比于经济危机爆发之前，我们甚至觉得这些数字其实并不是特别的高。


The GTA report tells us how many measures have been imposed since November 2008, but says nothing about the analogous numbers prior to that date.	GTA的报告指出的是2008年12月份之后的数字，并没有给出之前的数字。


In the absence of a benchmark for comparative assessment, we do not really know whether 192 “protectionist” measures is a big or small number.	在没有对比坐标的情况下，我们真的无法知道这192个保护主义措施到底是多还是少。


What about the recent tariffs imposed by the United States on Chinese tires?	那么近期美国对中国轮胎加税又如何呢？


President Barack Obama’s decision to introduce steep duties (set at 35% in the first year) in response to a US International Trade Commission ruling (sought by US labor unions) has been widely criticized as stoking the protectionist fires.	在回应由美国工会提出的有关美国国际贸易委员会的裁决上，奥巴马总统决定采取逐级增加的方式（第一年是35%）来对中国进口的轮胎征税。 大家都认为，这种举动挑起了保护主义的战火。


But it is easy to overstate the significance of this case, too.	但是，我们很有可能对此作出的过度反应。


The tariff is fully consistent with a special arrangement negotiated at the time of China’s accession to the WTO, which allows the US to impose temporary protection when its markets are “disrupted” by Chinese exports.	此类税收完全是在中国进入WTO谈判时提出的特别条款，前提是如果美国市场在受到来自中国进口产品的“干扰”，美国可以采取“临���性”的保护。


The tariffs that Obama imposed were considerably below what the USITC had recommended.	况且，奥巴马提出的税率明显低于美国国际贸易委员会要求的数字。


And, in any case, the measure affects less than 0.3% of China’s exports to the US.	而且，这仅仅占了中国对美国总出口产品的0. 3%。


The reality is that the international trade regime has passed its greatest test since the Great Depression with flying colors.	现实的情况是，在大萧条出现之后，国际贸易经过了严重挑战之后，获得了巨大成功。


Trade economists who complain about minor instances of protectionism sound like a child whining about a damaged toy in the wake of an earthquake that killed thousands.	对这种不值一提的贸易保护主义措施过分关注，就像是在经历过一场造成数千人死亡的一场地震之后，关注一个孩子哭诉自己损失的玩具那样可笑。


Three things explain this remarkable resilience: ideas, politics, and institutions.	目前，我们要关注三个方面的因素：想法，政治和机构。


Economists have been extraordinarily successful in conveying their message to policymakers – even if ordinary people still regard imports with considerable suspicion.	如今，经济学家对政策的制定者有着明显的影响力——虽然普通百姓对进口深怀疑虑。


Nothing reflects this better than how “protection” and “protectionists” have become terms of derision.	最为明显的例子就是，“保护”和“保护主义”已经变成了一个贬义词。


After all, governments are generally expected to provide protection to its citizens.	不管怎么说，政府的目的就是给国民提供保护。


But if you say that you favor protection from imports , you are painted into a corner with Reed Smoot and Willis C. Hawley, authors of the infamous 1930 US tariff bill.	但如果你倾向于对进口提高保护，那么你就会被描述成像里德·司莫特和威利斯·霍里的同路人。 他俩是1930年代臭名昭著的美国关税保护法案的倡导者。


But economists’ ideas would not have gone very far without significant changes in the underlying configuration of political interests in favor of open trade. For every worker and firm affected adversely by import competition, there is one or more worker and firm expecting to reap the benefits of access to markets abroad.	对于受益于自由贸易的那些利益团体来说，经济学家的论调当然对他们有好处，但对于受到国外商品冲击的国内工人或是公司来看，他们并没有从国外市场中获得一丁点的好处。


The latter have become increasingly vocal and powerful, often represented by large multinational corporations.	后者的声音越来越大，势力也不断增强，他们背后常常是大公司的影子。


In his latest book, Paul Blustein recounts how a former Indian trade minister once asked his American counterpart to bring him a picture of an American farmer: “I have never actually seen one,” the minister quipped. “I have only seen US conglomerates masquerading as farmers.”	在近期的一本新书中，保罗·布卢斯坦写道，当一名印度前部长向一位美国同行要一张美国农工的照片时，“我一张都没有看到”,部长打趣地说，“我看到的都是美国公司巨头装扮成的农工。


But the relative docility of rank-and-file workers on trade issues must ultimately be attributed to something else altogether: the safety nets erected by the welfare state.	但是，对那些在贸易问题一直保持顺从的普通工人来说，他们必须得到某种的保证：由政府福利织成的安全网。


Modern industrial societies now have a wide array of social protections – unemployment compensation, adjustment assistance, and other labor-market tools, as well as health insurance and family support – that mitigate demand for cruder forms of protection.	如今的现代工业社会可以提供各种各样的社会福利——失业补偿金，调整岗位补助金和其他有关劳动力市场的工具，同时配置健康医疗保险和家庭的支持等措施——这样才能减轻那些贸易保护主义的呼声。


The welfare state is the flip side of the open economy.	福利国家是开放经济的另一面。


If the world has not fallen off the protectionist precipice during the crisis, as it did during the 1930’s, much of the credit must go the social programs that conservatives and market fundamentalists would like to see scrapped.	如果说，世界经济在本次危机中之所以没有坠入1930年代那样的深渊，那么，在很大的程度上应该感谢那些一贯被保守派和市场经济的原教旨主义者所唾弃的那些社会措施。


The battle against trade protection has been won – so far.	对于贸易保护主义这场战争上，我们已经取得了的胜利——至少目前是这样。


But, before we relax, let’s remember that we still have not addressed the central challenge the world economy will face as the crisis eases: the inevitable clash between China’s need to produce an ever-growing quantity of manufactured goods and America’s need to maintain a smaller current-account deficit.	在经济危机有所缓和之后，我们还不能掉以轻心，世界经济还面临着真正的挑战——中国需要成为“世界工厂”和美国需要减少赤字之间不可避免的冲突。


Unfortunately, there is little to suggest that policymakers are yet ready to confront this genuine threat.	不幸地是，各国的决策者们还没有意识到这个真正的危险。


The Myth of “Superstar Cities”	“超级明星城市”之谜


In a much-talked-about recent paper entitled “Superstar Cities,” economists Joseph Gyourko, Christopher Mayer, and Todd Sinai argue that such high-status cities – not only London, Paris, and New York, but also cities like Philadelphia and San Diego – may show an “ever-widening gap in housing values” when compared with other cities.	在最近被人们广泛谈论的标题为“超级明星城市”的论文中，经济学家约瑟夫·吉尔科, 克里斯托弗·迈耶和托德·赛奈称这样的重量级城市¾不只伦敦、巴黎和纽约，还包括如费城和圣迭哥¾和其他城市相比，可能会出现“房地产价值上逐渐增大的差距”。


The authors seem to be saying, in effect, that a housing boom in these areas can go on forever.	作者仿佛在说，这些地区的房地产热可能会一直持续下去。


Any claim like that will inevitably attract attention.	任何这样的言论都无疑会引起人们的关注。


As a well-known skeptic about booming housing prices, I have been asked on several recent occasions to participate in debates with one or another of the authors.	作为地产价格走高的著名怀疑论者，我最近被多次邀请与该论文的作者进行辩论。


Many people view the superstar city theory as confirming their hunch that, despite the current slowdown in home prices elsewhere (particularly in the United States), investors can expect to make huge long-term gains by buying homes in these cities, even though the homes there are already expensive.	很多人认为超级明星城市理论证明了他们的预感，亦即尽管在其他地方（特别是美国）房价低迷，投资者们仍可期望在这些超级城市购买房产以获得巨大的长期利益，尽管这些地方的房产已然价格不菲。


But, as I have said in my debates with the authors, if one reads their paper carefully and thinks about the issues, one would see that there is no reason at all to draw such a conclusion.	但正如我在与文章作者的辩论中所说，如果仔细阅读了他们的论文并思考了其中的问题，人们便会发现并没有支持这种结论的理由。


Why should home values in glamour cities increase forever?	为什么房屋价格会在超级明星城市持续走高？


Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai justify their claim by arguing that these cities really are unique.	约瑟夫·吉尔科, 克里斯托弗·迈耶和托德·赛奈给出理由，认为这些城市确实与众不同。


They have only limited land, and if one assumes ever-increasing GDP and rising income inequality, there will always be more and more wealthy people to bid up prices in these scarce areas.	那里只有有限的土地，如果GDP不断增长以及收入不平等地增加，就总会有越来越多的富人在这些面积有限的地方抬高房价。


They show convincing evidence for these basic facts.	他们为这些基本事实提供了有力的证据。


Rich people increasingly populate the most expensive cities.	富人越来越多地居住于最昂贵的城市。


Real GDP has been increasing at around 3% a year in advanced countries, and even faster recently in many emerging countries.	实际GDP在发达国家每年呈大约3%的增长态势。 最近在很多发展中国家增长速度甚至更快。


And, of course, we aren’t getting any more land in these cities.	另外，当然，我们无法增加这些地区的土地面积。


But what do these arguments really mean for the outlook for investments in homes in superstar cities?	但这些理论对于在超级明星城市投资房产到底意味着什么呢？


Let us consider the fixity of land.	让我们考虑一下土地的稳定性。


While there is only so much land in any one of the existing superstar cities, in every case, there are vast amounts of land where a new city could be started. And new cities are started, taking away from the “uniqueness” of existing cities.	现有的超级明星城市只有这么多土地，而每一个新城市初建时却拥有广大的土地，而新城市一旦建立，便会带走现有城市的“独特性”。


The best-known examples of such grand new cities are planned capitals, typically built near countries’ geographic center.	新城市中最有名的例子就是那些精心计划建设的首都，特别是那些建立在国家地理中心的首都。


These include Brasilia (1950’s), Canberra (1910’s), Islamabad (1960’s), New Delhi (1910’s), and Washington DC (1790’s). In each of these cases, a planner built the whole city infrastructure to make it a cohesive, attractive place.	这些城市包括巴西利亚（20世纪50年代）、堪培拉（20世纪10年代）、伊斯兰堡(20世纪60年代)，新德里（20世纪60年代）和华盛顿（20世纪50年代）。


The obvious success of these cities, as both government and economic centers, attests to the fact that urban land derives value from the presence of a well-planned city there.	这些城市，在设计整座城市的基础设施时，都将其建成一个整体化并且充满魅力的地方。


Where land today is cheap, it will have great value in the future if only someone takes the dramatic step of planning and creating a whole city there.	这些城市的成功，作为政府及经济中心，证实了完美设计的城市是能够使城市土地增值的。


True, the establishment of such cities is a relatively rare event.	诚然，建立这样的城市并不多见。


Private developers have trouble getting a large plot free of restrictions.	私人发展商无法使他们的庞大计划不受束缚。


But they tend to be ingenious at developing glamorous new areas from little towns within an hour’s commute from major cities.	但他们可以巧妙地在距离大城市一小时车程内的小城镇开辟出魅力四射的新地区。


It happens in so many places and so regularly that we take it for granted and rarely even notice it.	这种事在很多地方经常出现，以至于我们对此熟视无睹甚至毫无察觉。


Indeed, since the industrial revolution, the development of such new urban areas is a central theme in the history of the world.	确实，自从工业革命以来，发展新的城区便是世界历史的中心主题。


New cities are constantly ripening like so many cherries on a tree, drawing people away from older, original cities.	很多新的城市如树上的樱桃般不断成熟，吸引着人们离开那些老旧的城市。


And the new cities have a way of looking brighter and fresher than the old urban areas, which are often seen as jumbled and decaying.	而且，新的城市比起老城区看起来更阳光更新鲜，而老城区则显得混乱而衰败。


How much might we expect a home in a famous city to outperform other real estate as a long-term investment?	作为长期投资，我们在著名城市买房，其利益大于其他房地产投资的几率有多大？


The answer: not much at all.	回答：不大。


Prices in the cities that Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai identify as superstars generally appreciated by no more than one or two percent a year more than in the average city from 1950 to 2000, and even that difference is probably largely due to an increase in the size and quality of homes.	被约瑟夫·吉尔科, 克里斯托弗·迈耶和托德·赛奈认定的几大超级明星城市中，1950－2000年间每年的房价增值率只比一般城市高1%－2%。 而其中差距也主要得益于房屋面积的扩大和质量的提高。


According to the Coldwell Banker Home Price Comparison Index, which compares the price of a standard 2,200 square-foot four-bedroom house across cities, the most expensive city in the US is Beverly Hills (the legendary home of movie stars).	信义房产住宅价格比较指数（Coldwell Banker Home Price Comparison Index）对比了多座城市中标准的2，200平方英尺的四卧室房屋的价格。 美国最贵的城市是贝弗利山庄（著名的电影明星们的��住地）。


The standard home there is 4.25 times as expensive as one in an average city in the US.	那里标准房屋的价格是美国一般城市的4. 25倍。


Assuming that quadrupling of relative value occurred over a hundred years, the excess return on investment amounts to only 1.5% per year – hardly the kind of performance that real estate enthusiasts are expecting.	假设100年里价值增长4倍，投资的额外回报只有每年1. 5%¾这并不是热衷于房地产的人所期待的。


Finally, as Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai themselves note, even these small long-term differences in home price across cities have tended to be offset by lower rent-price ratios in the superstar cities.	最后，约瑟夫·吉尔科、克里斯托弗·迈耶和托德·赛奈自己也注意到，即便这种房价在长期范围内的小差距也可以被超级明星城市较低的租金率所抵销。


For an investor, the rate of return is the sum of the rate of appreciation and the rent-price ratio, so the low rent-price ratio reduces the advantage of faster appreciation.	作为投资者，回报率是增值率与租金率之和，因此较低的租金率降低了增值率的优势。


Most of the popular attention that the “superstar cities” theory has received merely reflects the psychology of the housing boom that we have been seeing, as well as a wishful thinking bias.	对于超级明星城市理论的广泛关注只是反映了对于房价上涨的一种心理以及人们的一厢情愿。


People want to believe that the boom will continue, and that their investments in their favorite city are thus special and exciting.	人们愿意相信这种地产热会延续下去，因此在所钟爱的城市投资就变得特殊且令人兴奋。


But there is no generally applicable reason to make aggressive investments in superstar cities.	但并没有支持在这些超级明星城市疯狂投资的适当理由。


On the contrary, there are many reasons to worry about investing in such places.	相反对于在这些地方投资的担心却有很多理由。


The Myth of the “Ownership Society”	“产权社会”的神话


"No," said former Fox News journalist Tony Snow, newly appointed as one of George W. Bush’s closest aides, his Press Secretary, when asked recently about his retirement savings.	“不，”前福克斯新闻记者托尼·斯诺说，他刚刚被任命为乔治·W·布什一位最亲密的助手，他的新闻秘书。 近期有人向他问及其退休储蓄时他如是说。


“As a matter of fact, I was even too dopey to get in on a 401(k).	“事实上，我甚至过于愚笨，没能参加401(K)。


So there is actually no Fox pension.	所以，根本没有福克斯退休金。


The only media pension I have is through AFTRA.”	我所拥有的惟一的媒体退休金是通过美国电视广播艺人联盟（AFTRA）获得的。 ”


A 401(k) is a heavily tax-favored account in which workers can save money for their retirement.	401(K)是具有大量税收优惠的账户，据此，员工可存款以备退休之用。


Typically, employers – including Fox News – match workers’ 401(k) contributions, so setting up a 401(k) is an irresistible financial deal, a true no-brainer.	通常，员工—包括福克斯新闻台—缴纳401(K)规定的金额，因而建立401(K)账户是极为诱人的库存融资，是真正不必花脑筋的事情。


Yet Tony Snow didn’t.	然而托尼·斯诺没有建立该账户。


Only the union he was forced to join, the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, has been doing any formal saving and earmarking of his retirement assets.	只有他被迫加入的工会，即美国电视广播艺人联盟，一直在处理他的退休资产的任何正式储蓄和指定用途事宜。


Snow’s case, I think, holds very important lessons, and not just for the United States.	我认为，斯诺的案例提出了极为重要的教训，不仅对于美国而言。


To the extent that the Bush administration has a coherent philosophy for domestic policy, it is the idea of the “ownership society” – the belief that intermediary institutions, whether governments, unions, or the benefits departments of companies, should get out of the business of providing social insurance.	就布什当局对国内政策的一贯理念来说， “产权社会”这一思想或信念就是，中介机构，无论是政府、工会还是各公司福利部门，应逐渐放弃提供社会保险的业务。


Instead, individuals should rely on their own assets to provide them with financial security in retirement or in case of serious illness.	相反，个人应该依靠其自身的资产为其提供退休或严重疾病时的财务保障。


Give people the incentives to plan for their future, ownership-society advocates argue, and they will.	产权社会拥护者主张，要奖励人们去计划其未来，并且他们会这么做。


In the future, Snow will have to stand up at the podium in the White House briefing room and advocate the various components of Bush’s ownership-society proposals.	将来，斯诺不得不站在白宫新闻发布室的讲台，提出布什产权社会提案的各项组成部分。


He will have to praise Health Security Accounts – and argue that people won’t stop going to the doctor for preventive care even if their HSA-tied insurance plan doesn’t pick up any of the bills.	他必须赞扬医疗保障账户（HSA），并主张，即便其HAS维系的保险计划不索取任何账单，人们也不会停止去找医生进行预防保健。


He will have to praise privatization of Social Security – and argue that individuals will make prudent and wise investment decisions with this baseline tranche of their potential retirement resources.	他必须赞扬社会保障的私有化，并主张，个人将根据其潜在的退休资金的基线部分做出谨慎、明智的投资决定。


And he will have to praise the decline of unions and the shedding of benefits by firms – and argue that individuals will make better choices than union experts or firms’ benefit departments.	他还必须赞扬工会的衰落和企业福利的散发，并主张，个人将比工会专家或企业福利部门做出更加合理的选择。


The assembled reporters will look at him, and they will recall that when he was offered an unbelievably good financial deal, he was too “dopey” to take advantage of it.	济济一堂的记者们将看着他，他们会回想起，当他得到难以置信的优惠库存融资时，他过于“愚笨”，没有乘机利用它。


And they might reasonably conclude that his failure to channel some of his Fox News salary into a 401(k) account is a very powerful argument against the words coming out of his mouth.	他们还可能合理地得出结论，他未能将其部分福克斯新闻台的薪金导入401(K)账户，是针对他所述语言的极为有力的论证。


This is not to say that the issues are simple or that there are easy answers.	这并不等于说，这些问题很简单，或答案很容易获得。


America has many people who do not set up 401(k) accounts, despite enormous incentives to do so.	美国有许多人没有建立401(K)账户，尽管这样做有许多奖励。


It also has people who do set up 401(k) accounts and then invest them badly – for example, Enron workers whose 401(k) money was overwhelmingly invested in company stock lost not only their jobs when the company went bankrupt, but also their pension assets.	美国也有人确实建立了401(K)账户，然后将其做出很糟糕的投资—如Enron公司员工的401(K)资金全部投入公司股票，不但公司破产时丢了工作，他们的退休金资产也丧失了。


There are also well-known examples of highly corrupt union pension funds, such as the one bilked for years by the leadership of the Teamsters.	还有一些极端腐败的工会退休金基金的知名范例，如被Teamsters公司领导层欺诈数年。


Finally, there is the example of politicians like George W. Bush, who enacted a government program that promises comprehensive drug benefits to the elderly and mammoth profits to pharmaceutical companies.	最后谈谈乔治·W·布什这样的政治家的例子，他们颁布政府方案，向年长者许诺综合药物福利，向制药公司承诺巨大利润。


His administration may preach the virtues of individual responsibility, but its program makes no provision for how and where the government is going to secure the resources needed to finance its promises.	布什当局可能鼓吹个人责任的优点，但其方案却不规定政府将如何、在哪里为其许诺供资所必需的资金提供保障。


In short, there are psychological and moral failures at all levels – individuals, firms, unions, insurance companies, and governments.	简言之，个人、企业、工会、保险公司和政府各级均存在心理和道德上的失败。


Difficult problems of institutional design compound the difficulty of reforming social-welfare programs.	制度设计的难题增加了改革社会福利计划的困难。


America must also deal with the potential for corruption, both illegal in the case of the diversion of Teamsters’ pension resources and legal in the campaign contributions provided by the pharmaceutical lobby to complaisant members of Congress.	美国还必须处理可能出现的腐败现象，如转移Teamster公司的退休金资源是非法的，而制药公司的游说议员向彬彬有礼的国会成员提供活动捐款是合法的。


These problems are not America’s alone, for they are inherent to all efforts to privatize social welfare.	这些问题并非美国所独有，因为它们是社会福利私有化所固有的。


As Americans and others look at this Gordian knot of public policy problems, we should learn one thing from the example of Tony Snow: the vision of an “ownership society” espoused by Bush is simply not plausible.	正如美国和其他国家看待公共政治问题这一难解的问题一样，我们应该从托尼·斯诺的事例中得到一个教训：布什所支持的“产权社会”的愿景自然不是花言巧语。


If it were, his new press secretary would not be describing himself as “dopey.”	如果是，他的新任新闻秘书就不会自称为“愚笨”了。


The Myth of the Shia Crescent	虚构的什叶派新月


AMMAN – Recently, Israel’s Vice Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz offered an unequivocal veto on a key issue in the Middle East peace process.	安曼--最近，以色列副总理莫法兹坚定地否决了中东和平进程中的一个关键问题。


Any return of the Golan Heights to Syria would result in an “Iranian foothold” on Israel’s border and would thus not only be politically naïve but irrational.	把戈兰高地交还给叙利亚将会形成以色列边境上的“伊朗据点”，这不仅在政治上是天真的，而且也是没有理性的。


Mofaz’s statement is symptomatic of a perception that is now deeply entrenched, not only in the Middle East, but in the United States as well.	莫法兹的言论代表了一种不仅在中东、而且也是在美国也根深蒂固的观念。


That notion is of a hegemonic Iran that is attempting to dominate the region through an array of Shiite proxies.	这一观念就是伊朗正在试图通过一群什叶派代理人来统治中东地区。


This Iranian fifth column is believed to stretch from Beirut via Damascus, Gaza to Baghdad and finally from Iran to Saudi-Arabia to Yemen.  Recent armed clashes between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government are, it is said, just another sign of Iran’s hegemonic reach.	人们相信这一伊朗第五纵队从贝鲁特穿越大马士革、加沙地带到巴格达，最终从伊朗延伸到沙特和也门。 有人讲，最近真主党和黎巴嫩政府军的武装冲突只不过是伊朗霸权行径的另一个信号。


Ironically, this perception brings Israel some rather unlikely partners.	具有讽刺意味的是，这一观念带给以色列一些的确意想不到的夥伴。


President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt claims that Shiites are “always loyal to Iran," while King Abdullah of Jordan has coined the axiom about a rising “Shiite crescent.”	埃及总统穆巴拉克宣称，什叶派“总是忠于伊朗”，而约旦国王阿卜杜拉则创造了正在崛起得“什叶派新月”的名词。


This “rise of the Shiites” and the resulting “Sunni/Shia divide” is alleged to be creating an ever widening chasm in the region.	这一“什叶派崛起”以及随之而来的“逊尼派与什叶派的分裂”据称在中东地区制造了一个不断加大的鸿沟。


Although this perception may convince at first glance, it is ultimately based on generalizations that reveal more about its advocates than the actual reality on the ground.	尽管这一观念在一开始或许让人相信，但是它最终还是建立在泛泛而论的基础之上，更多地说明了其鼓吹者的用心，而非现实具体情况。


Take Iraq, where the looming “Shia crescent” is often blamed for much of the chaos.	让我们看一看伊拉克吧。 伊拉克经常被人指责其不断上升的“什叶派新月”造成了混乱。


Recent developments in Iraq allegedly point to a fundamental clash between Sunnis and Shiites in the region and bear witness to malevolent Iranian interferences.	最近伊拉克的事态发展表明中东地区逊尼派和什叶派的基本冲突以及伊朗居心叵测的干预。


But is Iraq really symptomatic of a greater Shia scheme?	但是伊拉克果真就表明更大规模的什叶派野心吗？


True, sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq have escalated since the fall of Saddam.	的确，伊拉克逊尼派和什叶派的教派冲突从萨达姆倒台以来已经升级。


But contrary to common perception, Iraqi Shiites do not form a homogenous block that opposes the supposedly unified Sunnis.	但是与常人观点相反的是，伊拉克什叶派并不组成单一的、反对好似团结一致的逊尼派的集团。


Indeed, the contrary is true.	实际上，事实恰恰相反。


In the light of Iraqi nationalism that crosses sectarian boundaries, it is farfetched to consider the Iraqi Shia merely proxies of Iran.	鉴于伊拉克民族主义跨越教派界限，人们难以认为伊拉克什叶派仅仅是伊朗的代理人。


Instead, what we are witnessing in Iraq today is not ever increasing friction between religious communities but escalating internal power struggles within the Sunni and Shiite communities.	相反，我们如今在伊拉克所见到的并不是宗教社区之间不断加剧的矛盾，而是什叶派和逊尼派社区内部不断加剧的内部权力斗争。


Ongoing violence in Basra and the fighting between Sunni “Awakening Councils” and Al Qaida in Iraq demonstrate this.	目前巴士拉的暴力以及逊尼派“觉醒委员会”和伊拉克的基地组织表明了这一点。


In fact, the current escalation points to an increasing political struggle between the federalist position of Shia Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki and the centralist position of Shiite cleric Moqtada al Sadr.	实际上，目前冲突加剧表明什叶派总理马利基的联邦主义立场和什叶派教职阿萨德中央制立场之间的斗争。


This struggle will ultimately define the political structure of Iraq.	这一斗争将会最终确定伊拉克的政治结构。


Here is where Sunni-Shiite cooperation comes in.	什叶派和逊尼派可以在这方面合作。


Widely unnoticed, Iraqi Sunni and Shia centralists have managed in the last couple of months to form a united parliamentary platform that leaves sectarian tensions behind.	人们并不知晓的是，伊拉克逊尼派和什叶派的中央制人士在最近几个月里试图组成联合议会纲领，抛弃教派间紧张局势。


More than a hundred followers of Ayad Allawi, Al Sadr, and others have joined their ranks.	一百多个阿拉维、阿萨德以及其他人的追随者已经加入了他们的行列。


This supra-sectarian platform calls for a central government administration of Iraq’s natural resources and the postponement of the looming referendum to settle the status of the city of Kirkuk.	这一超越教派的纲领呼吁对中央政府管理伊拉克的自然资源以及推迟决定基尔库克市地位的全民公决。


Change within the government is also noteworthy.	政府内部的变化也是值得注意的。


Sunni ministers who had been boycotting the government since last year have returned to their posts.	逊尼派部长从去年以来拒绝为政府效力，现在都返回了岗位。


Thus, Iraq is seeing both escalating intra-sectarian violence and cautious steps towards inter-sectarian alliances.	这样，伊拉克目前同时有不断上升的教派之间的暴力以及向教派之间联盟迈出谨慎的步伐。


And what about Iran?	那么伊朗又当如何呢？


Contrary to the blame games being played out in the US, Iran cannot be accused of an unrestrained aggressive stance toward Iraq.	与美国的指责相反的是，人们并不能指责伊朗对伊拉克采取没有限制的激进立场。


Of course, no Iranian decision-maker is interested in a US-success in Iraq that might well put regime-change in Iran back on the agenda.	当然，伊朗的决策者没有人会从美国在伊拉克取得成功受益。 美国成功就会把伊朗政权更迭重新放到议程上去。


But the rationale behind Iran’s policy of economic, social and military engagement seems to be first and foremost, defensive.	但是伊朗的经济、社会以及军事接触政策的基本理论首先是防御性的。


Memories of Iraq’s eight year war of aggression against Iran in the 1980’s have not faded.	八十年代伊拉克入侵伊朗的八年战争的记忆还没有消退。


From Iran’s perspective, any future threat originating from Iraq needs to be averted by ensuring the participation in Iraq’s government of Shiites and Kurds.	从伊朗的角度而言，未来来自伊拉克的任何威胁都需要通过确保什叶派和库尔德人参与伊拉克政府来避免。


These complexities are lost on many observers when matched up against the convenient and catchy rhetoric of the “Shia Crescent.”	许多观察家在涉及到简单时髦的所谓“什叶派新月”的时候都忽略了这些复杂情况。


But they have not gone unnoticed among ordinary Arabs.	但是普通阿拉伯人并没有遗忘。


A recent poll by the University of Maryland indicates that a large majority of Arabs in the region consider Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad one of the three most popular political leaders worldwide.	马里兰大学最近进行的调查显示，中东地区大多数阿拉伯人把伊朗总统内贾德视为全球最受欢迎的三位政治领导人之一。


Only 11% identified Iran as the biggest threat to their security.	只有11%的人把伊朗视为对他们的威胁的最大的威胁。


So if a Shia threat organized by Iran really does exist, why is it being ignored by those that it purportedly targets – the Sunni Arab majorities?	因此，如果由伊朗组织的什叶派威胁果真存在，为何这一威胁针对的逊尼派阿拉伯大多数人却没有注意到呢？


Rather than objectively describing the actual political situation in the Middle East, the notion of a fundamental Iranian threat is being used to continue unconditional Western support for increasingly unstable regimes.	原教旨主义的伊朗威胁论并不客观地描述中东的实际政治形势，而是被用来继续无条件支持日益风雨飘摇的政权。


Moreover, the overstatement of the threat posed by Iran is also being used as a convenient excuse for political inflexibility and stagnating reform processes throughout the region.	而且，过度渲染伊朗构成的威胁也是被用来整个中东地区政治僵化和改革进程停滞的方便的借口而已。


But exaggerating the supposed Shia threat has a price.	但是过分夸张所谓的什叶派威胁也存有代价。


Continuous talk of a “Sunni-Shia divide” might ultimately develop into a self-fulfilling prophecy.	继续谈论“逊尼派和什叶派的分裂”或许最终会成为一个自我实现的危言。


Alarmist rhetoric may, in the end, jeopardize rather than protect the status quo in the region.	最终，警告危机的言论威胁而非保护该地区的现状。


The Naked Euro	欧元的“新衣”


LONDON – Dramatic challenges, and mediocre responses: that is the history of the European Union. All too rarely does the EU rise to the level of events, which is why Europe is fading economically and geopolitically.	伦敦 ——


The 1958 Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community, was Europe’s great leap forward. But the decision to create a common market without a common government was simply storing up trouble for the future.	严峻的挑战面前无所作为，这是欧盟的一贯作风。


Everything since – enlargement to 27 member states and the creation of the 16-member eurozone – has widened the gap between rhetoric and reality. Euroland has gone on promising far more than its history enables it to deliver.	欧盟引起世界关注的时刻少之又少，这正是欧洲在经济和地缘政治上江河日下的原因。


The Greek financial crisis is the latest example of the gap between reality and rhetoric.	1958 年签署的《罗马条约》成立了欧洲经济共同体，成为欧洲的一大进步。


At root, it is a crisis of “enlargement,” in this case enlargement of the eurozone.	然而，建立共同市场的同时却并未成立共同政府，这为日后的种种麻烦埋下了伏笔。


Unprecedented effort at fiscal discipline in the 1990’s – helped in Greece by creative accounting – enabled Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain (disobligingly known as the PIGS) to meet the entry criteria in 2002. But once in, the pressure was off.	自从欧盟东扩至 27 个成员国及其内部 16 个国家组成欧元区之后，虚夸与现实之间的差距进一步拉大了。


Most of the Mediterranean countries continued on their spendthrift ways, confident that the markets would not call them to account.	从历史来看，欧元区许下的种种承诺是它远无法兑现的。


Now Wolfgang Schauble, Germany’s Finance Minister, has said enough is enough.	最近的希腊金融危机是现实与虚夸之间存在鸿沟的又一例证。 事实上，这是一场由 “ 扩大 ” （现在讨论的是欧元区扩大）引发的危机。


True, Germany ultimately acquiesced in a deal that would provide, if needed, a combination of bilateral loans from eurozone members and IMF financing to prevent a Greek default.	上世纪 90 年代，欧盟大力推行前所未有的财政规范 —— 通过伪造账目向希腊施以援手 —— 葡萄牙、意大利、希腊和西班牙（被戏称为 “ 欧猪四国 ” ）于 2002 年借此成功加入了欧盟。 但是，各国此后便又再次肆无忌惮起来。


But that deal is a stopgap measure, and affects only Greece.	地中海国家不断肆意挥霍，自信地认为无需向市场问责。


Schauble advocates a longer-term solution: a European Monetary Fund (EMF) to provide emergency lending to countries at risk of default on their sovereign debt.	眼下，德国财政部长沃尔夫冈 · 朔伊布勒（ Wolfgang Schauble ）表示，一切要适可而止。 他呼吁成立欧洲货币基金（ EMF ），向深陷政府债务拖欠危机的国家提供紧急贷款。


Emergency lending would come with a “prohibitive price tag,” “strict conditions,” and “mandatory penalties” in the event of non-compliance.	有关国家如若不予配合，将面临 “ 高昂代价 ” 、 “ 严格条款 ” 和 “ 强制处罚 ” 。


Translated into ordinary language, this means that the state finances of a country that was granted help from the EMF would be outsourced, for a time, to external commissioners, much as happened in the nineteenth century to Latin American states that wanted their debts re-financed.	简单地说，这意味着在短时间内，欧洲货币基金援助的一国国家财政将外包给对外关系委员，这与 19 世纪急需再融资以摆脱债务的拉美国家的处境如出一辙。


Milton Friedman predicted the single currency would fall apart after a decade or two; this has now become more likely than not.	米尔顿 · 弗里德曼（ Milton Friedman ）曾预言，一、二十年之后的单一货币将轰然倒塌。 眼下，其理论已得到了某种验证。


After all, Schauble knows that the conditions he proposes would be politically unacceptable, so he says that any country unable to meet them “should, as a last resort, exit the monetary union, while being able to remain a member of the EU.”	归根结底，朔伊布勒也明白自己提出的条件并不为政界所接受。 因此，朔伊布勒提出，无法满足其条件的国家 “ 在确保欧盟成员国资格的前提下，最终都应退出货币同盟。


Germany might even exit itself, if it cannot bring its weaker partners to heel.	” 更有甚者，德国如果无法迫使弱小盟国就范，它也将自行退出。


The Mediterranean crisis has exposed the eurozone’s long-standing flaw: the absence of a single government.	在地中海危机面前，欧元区的顽疾暴露无遗，即缺少一个共同政府。


Because the euro-zone is not an “optimal currency area,” it needs tools to deal with so-called “asymmetric shocks” – shocks that affect some members more than others.	欧元区并非 “ 最理想的货币区域 ” ，因此它需要各种手段来应对所谓的 “ 非对称冲击 ” —— 此类冲击能对某些成员国造成更大的影响。


But it lacks those tools, especially a Treasury with powers to tax and borrow, and a central bank that can act as lender of last resort to its member banks.	即便如此，欧元区仍然捉襟见肘，特别是缺少一个有权征税和贷款的财政部，以及一个能为成员国银行提供最后贷款的中央银行。


Schauble’s proposal has both an economic and a geopolitical dimension.	朔伊布勒的提议在经济和���缘政治上都具有重要意义。


Economically, it exposes the deep divide between those who believe that external imbalances are the fault of those who spend too little and those who believe that they are the fault of those who spend too much.	经济上，该提议暴露了两派在外部失衡上的巨大分歧：一派认为应归咎于消费过少，一派认为消费过多难逃其咎。


John Maynard Keynes wanted to force surplus countries to either spend or lend.	约翰 · 梅纳德 · 凯恩斯（ John Maynard Keynes ）曾希望迫使顺差国家增加消费或提高贷款。


But the older doctrine that it was a deficit country’s duty to “put its house in order” survived.	但是，逆差国家有义务 “ 将 内务管理妥当”这一传统教条却占了上风。


The one concession to Keynes was the creation of the International Monetary Fund in 1944 in order to provide short-term assistance to deficit countries under strict conditions.	令凯恩斯欣慰的是，国际货币经济组织于 1944 年成立，以严格的条款向逆差国家提供短期援助。


This, in essence, is the German proposal today in the narrower context of the euro-zone.	事实上，这与眼下德国提出的欧元区提议在本质上是一致的。


Schauble’s view is an expression of Germany’s long-standing deflationary outlook.	朔伊布勒的观点体现了德国挥之不去的通货紧缩前景。


Germany’s fiscally conservative establishment would like other EU countries with large budget deficits to return to economic health through fiscal discipline, reduced domestic demand, and high export growth.	德国当局一向采取保守的财政政策，并希望欧盟其它预算赤字大国通过财政规范、内需下降及出口高增长来恢复经济健康。


The problem, German leaders believe, is not their country’s high saving rate, but other euro-zone members’ excessive spending.	在德国领导人看来，问题不在于德国的高储蓄率，而是欧元区其它国家的过度消费。


Martin Wolf of The Financial Times disagrees.	《金融时报》的马丁 · 沃尔夫（ Martin Wolf ）表达了不同看法。


He also points the finger at China.	他同样将矛头指向了中国。


Both countries have massive surpluses of savings over investment and huge trade surpluses.	德国与中国都存在储蓄相对于投资过剩以及贸易顺差庞大的问题。


Both parade their fiscal virtue and insist that deficit countries stop their irresponsible spending.	它们都对其财政优点大谈特谈，认为逆差国家必须停止不负责任的无度挥霍。


Wolf rightly calls this argument economically incoherent.	沃尔夫正确地指出，这种论点在经济上是自相矛盾的。


Piling up savings in one place imposes unemployment on the rest.	某地区的储蓄积压会为其它地区带来失业。


High savers should consume more, allowing the big spenders to export more and start living within their means without dooming them to hair-shirted stagnation.	忠实的储户应该增加消费，允许消费大户做出更多贡献并保持与其收入相符的生活水平，而不是如苦行者般节衣缩食。


Frugality is no virtue if no one is willing to spend.	如果没人愿意消费，那勤俭节约就不是美德。


But the main impact of Schauble’s bombshell is on the geopolitics of the EU.	朔伊布勒惊人之语的主要影响体现在欧盟的地缘政治上。


Europe’s political elite view the Union as one of the poles in a multi-polar world.	欧洲的政治精英一向将欧盟视为多极世界的一支。


But what is Europe?	但欧洲是何种定位？


Less than a federation, more than a confederation, it lacks any center of gravity, any fixed frontiers.	低于联邦国家却又甚于同盟国，缺少政治重心，缺少固定边界。


When an American, Chinese, or Russian leader wants to speak to Europe, whom does he call?	如果美国、中国或俄罗斯领导人希望与欧洲对话，那他应该和谁联系？


Without internal coherence or external shape, Europe is little more than a geographical expression.	缺少内部统一或外部形态的欧洲不过是个地缘概念而已。


The implication of Schauble’s proposition, therefore, is that Euroland should shrink to a governable dimension.	由此看来，朔伊布勒提议的重要意义在于，欧元区应该回归可治理的较小规模。


In essence, it recapitulates the contrast between the Greater Germany dreamed of by idealists in 1848 and the Smaller Germany created by Bismarck in 1871.	事实上，该提议正是 “ 大德国 ” 与 “ 小德国 ” 之间的强烈对比。 前者由理想主义者于 1848 年所构想，后者由俾斯麦（ Bismarck ）于 1871 年提出。


Like the little boy who was unafraid to declare the emperor naked, Schauble has pointed the finger of realism at the aspirational rhetoric in which all European leaders are still compelled to clothe their utterances.	朔伊布勒就像那个不敢当面说皇帝没穿衣服的小男孩一样，将现实主义的矛头指向了全欧洲领导人至今仍被迫采取的夸夸其谈。


He has broken with the taboo against calling into doubt any aspect of the European project.	面对不向欧洲项目提出任何质疑的禁忌，朔伊布勒选择了与它分道扬镳。


For those who prefer solid construction to wishful thinking, his words are to be welcomed.	在那些注重稳扎稳打而非异想天开的人看来，朔伊布勒的观点是值得欢迎的。


The Narrative Structure of Global Weakening	全球经济走弱的叙事结构


NEW HAVEN – Recent indications of a weakening global economy have led many people to wonder how pervasive poor economic performance will be in the coming years.	发自纽黑文——最近出现的全球经济走弱迹象令许多人开始思考未来几年的恶劣经济表现究竟会蔓延到何种地步。


Are we facing a long global slump, or possibly even a depression?	我们是否正面对着一个长时间的全球低迷期，甚至可能是一场萧条？


A fundamental problem in forecasting nowadays is that the ultimate causes of the slowdown are really psychological and sociological, and relate to fluctuating confidence and changing “animal spirits,” about which George Akerlof and I have written.	当今在预测上的一个根本问题就是经济减缓的最终成因其实是在心理学和社会学意义上的，并与不断波动的信心和变化中的“动物精神（animal spirits）”相关联。


We argue that such shifts reflect changing stories, epidemics of new narratives, and associated views of the world, which are difficult to quantify.	在乔治·阿科洛夫（George Akerlof）与笔者合著的《动物精神》一书中，我们提出这些转化反映了不断改变的故事内容，新叙事方式的流行，以及互相关联的世界观，而这些都是难以被量化的。


In fact, most professional economists do not seem overly glum about the global economy’s prospects.	事实上，大多数专业经济学家似乎并不对全球经济的前景感到极度忧心。


For example, on September 6, the OECD issued an interim assessment on the near-term global outlook, written by Pier Carlo Padoan, that blandly reports “significant risks” on the horizon – the language of uncertainty itself.	比如说，9月6日世界经济合作与发展组织发表了一份针对近期全球经济展望的中期评估，这份由该组织副秘书长兼首席经济学家皮尔·卡罗·帕多安（Pier Carlo Padoan）执笔的报告只是轻描淡写地指出可能很快会出现“重大风险”——这其实就是不确定性的另一种说法。


The problem is that the statistical models that comprise economists’ toolkit are best applied in normal times, so economists naturally like to describe the situation as normal.	问题是经济学家工具箱里的统计模型最适用于正常时期，因此经济学家们自然也喜欢找正常那样描述情况。


If the current slowdown is typical of other slowdowns in recent decades, then we can predict the same kind of recovery.	如果当前的放缓跟近几十年的经济放缓一样具有典型性的话，那么我们就可以预测同一类型的复苏。


For example, in a paper presented last spring at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, James Stock of Harvard University and Mark Watson of Princeton University unveiled a new “dynamic factor model,” estimated using data from 1959 to 2011.	以去年春在华盛顿特区的布鲁金斯学会上发表的一篇论文为例，其作者哈佛大学教授詹姆斯·斯托克（James Stock）和普林斯顿大学教授马克·沃森（Mark Watson）公布了一个新的“动力因素模型”，采用了1959到2011年的数据进行估算。


Having thus excluded the Great Depression, they claimed that the recent slowdown in the United States is basically no different from other recent slowdowns, except larger.	在因此排除了大萧条之后，他们宣称美国当前的放缓基本上跟其他近期放缓并无差异，只不过是幅度更大而已。


Their model reduces the sources of all recessions to just six shocks – “oil, monetary policy, productivity, uncertainty, liquidity/financial risk, and fiscal policy” – and explains most of the post-2007 downturn in terms of just two of these factors: “uncertainty” and “liquidity/financial risk.”	他们的模型将所有衰退的成因缩减为只有6大冲击——“石油、货币政策、生产力、不确定事件，流动性/金融风险和财政政策”——并将2007年前的大多数经济衰退仅仅归因为其中两个因素：“不确定事件”和“流动性/金融风险”。


But, even if we accept that conclusion, we are left to wonder what caused large shocks to “uncertainty” and to “liquidity/financial risk” in recent years, and how reliably such shocks can be predicted.	但即便我们接受了这个结论，但依然要思考究竟是什么导致了近几年的“不确定事件”和“流动性/金融风险”，以及如何有效地预测这些冲击。


When one considers the evidence about external economic shocks over the past year or two, what emerges are stories whose precise significance is unknowable.	当人们对过去一两年的外部经济冲击的迹象进行思考时，脑海里浮现的是那些具体重要性不可知的故事。


We only know that most of us have heard them many times.	我们只知道大多数人都已经听过这些故事许多遍了。


Foremost among those stories is the European financial crisis, which is talked about everywhere around the globe.	首先大部分故事都是关于欧洲金融危机的，全球世界在都在谈论这一点。


The OECD’s interim assessment called it “the most important risk for the global economy.”	经合组织的中期评估将其认定为“全球经济最重要的风险”。


That may seem unlikely: Why should the European crisis be so important elsewhere?	这看上去似乎不太可能：“为什么欧洲的危机对其他地方就那么重要呢？ ”


Part of the reason, of course, is the rise of global trade and financial markets.	当然其中一部分原因就是全球贸易和金融市场的兴起。


But connections between countries do not occur solely through the direct impact of market prices.	但国家之间的联系并不仅仅通过市场价格的直接影响来发生。


Interacting public psychology is likely to play a role as well.	相互作用的公众心理在其中也扮演着一部分角色。


This brings us to the importance of stories – and very far from the kind of statistical analysis exemplified by Stock and Watson.	这令我们认识到故事的重要性——这跟斯托克和沃森列举的那类统计分析相差十万八千里。


Psychologists have stressed that there is a narrative basis to human thinking: people remember – and are motivated by – stories, particularly human-interest stories about real people.	心理学家强调说人类思维是存在着一个叙事基础的：人们会记住这些故事并受其鼓舞——尤其是那些描述某个真实人物的故事。


Popular stories tend to take on moral dimensions, leading people to imagine that bad outcomes reflect some kind of loss of moral resolve.	流行的故事都偏向于道德方面，好让人们联想到坏的结果往往反映出某些道德决心的缺失。


The European crisis began with a Greek meltdown story, and it appears that the entire global economy is threatened by events in a country of only 11 million people.	欧洲危机由一个希腊崩盘的故事作为开端，而且在这个只有1100万人的小国里发生的事件似乎威胁到了全球经济。


But the economic importance of stories bears no close relation to their monetary value (which can be measured only after the fact, if at all). It depends, instead, on their story value.	但这些故事在经济上的重要性与其货币价值（这只能在既成事实之后衡量）之间并无紧密联系，相反，这取决于它们的故事价值。


The Greek crisis story began in 2008 with reports of widespread protests and strikes when the government proposed raising the retirement age to address a pension funding shortfall.	希腊危机故事始于2008年，当时政府提出要延长退休年龄以弥补养老金缺口并随后引发大规模民众抗议示威活动的。


Reports began to appear in global news media portraying an excessive sense of entitlement, with Greeks taking to the streets in protest, even though the increase was modest (for example, women with children or in hazardous jobs would be able to retire with full benefits at just 55, up from 50).	全球各地的新闻媒体开始在报道中描述一个过度的特权感——即便这种年龄延长其实相当温和（比如说有孩子或从事危险工作的妇女就可以在55岁退休并领取全额养老金，只延长了5年），再在这幅图像中加上走上街头抗议的希腊人。


That story might have invited some gossip outside of Greece, but it gained little purchase on international attention until the end of 2009, when the market for Greek debt started to become increasingly unsettled, with rising interest rates causing further problems for the government.	这个故事可能在希腊境外引发了一些闲言碎语，但直到2009年年末才引发了国际关注，因为当时希腊国债市场日渐动荡，而国债利率的上涨又给政府带来了更多问题。


This augmented news reports about Greek profligacy, and thus closed a negative feedback loop by attracting intensifying public interest, which eventually fueled crises in other European countries.	这种对希腊挥霍行为的大肆报道通过吸引不断聚焦的公众兴趣而形成了一个负反馈怪圈，最终在其他欧洲国家引发了危机。


Like a YouTube video, the Greek story went viral.	正如Youtube网站上的视频那样，这个希腊故事开始病毒式传播。


One might object that most people outside of Europe surely were not following the European crisis closely, and the least informed have not even heard of it.	有人可能反对说欧洲以外的大多数人肯定不会密切关注这场危机，那些信息闭塞的人甚至听都没听过。


But opinion leaders, and friends and relatives of the least informed in each country, were following it, and their influence can create an atmosphere that makes everyone less willing to spend.	但每个国家的意见领袖以及那些闭塞者的亲戚朋友却在关注，而他们的影响力可以营造一种令每个人都不太舒服的气氛。


The Greek story seems connected in many people’s minds with the stories of the real-estate and stock-market bubbles that preceded the current crisis in 2007.	在许多人心目中，希腊故事似乎与2007年危机之前的房地产和股票市场泡沫联系在一起。


These asset bubbles were inflated by lax lending standards and an excessive willingness to borrow, which seemed similar to the Greek government’s willingness to take on debt to pay lavish pensions.	这些资产泡沫是由宽松的贷款标准以及过度的贷款意愿支撑起来的，而这似乎跟希腊政府借款来支付慷慨养老金的意愿非常相似。


Thus, people saw the Greek crisis not just as a metaphor, but also as a morality tale.	因此人们不仅将希腊危机视为一个象征，还将其看作是一个道德故事。


The natural consequence was to support government austerity programs, which can only make the situation worse.	后果自然就是对政府紧缩政策予以支持，而该政策只能令事情雪上加霜。


The European story is with us now, all over the world, so vivid that, even if the euro crisis appears to be resolved satisfactorily, it will not be forgotten until some new story diverts public attention.	这个欧洲故事如今正伴随着世界所有人，这个故事是如此生动，即使欧元危机似乎已得到圆满解决，在新的故事分散公众注意力之前也难以被遗忘。


Then as now, we will not be able to understand the world economic outlook fully without considering the story on people’s minds.	如果不考虑人们心目的中故事的话，我们就无法完全了解世界经济的前景，事情从来都是这样的。


The Nation-State Reborn	民族国家的重生


CAMBRIDGE – One of our era’s foundational myths is that globalization has condemned the nation-state to irrelevance.	发自剑桥——我们这个时代的其中一个根本性谬论就是全球化正迫使民族国家走向消亡。


The revolution in transport and communications, we hear, has vaporized borders and shrunk the world.	我们被告知说交通与通讯技术革命已经消弭了边界，让世界变得更小。


New modes of governance, ranging from transnational networks of regulators to international civil-society organizations to multilateral institutions, are transcending and supplanting national lawmakers.	从跨国监管者网络，国际公民社会组织到多边机构，新的治理模型正在超越并取代那些只为单一国家服务的立法者。


Domestic policymakers, it is said, are largely powerless in the face of global markets.	而据说各国国内的政策制定者们在面对全球市场之时也相当软弱无力。


The global financial crisis has shattered this myth.	但全球金融风暴却粉碎了这一谬论。


Who bailed out the banks, pumped in the liquidity, engaged in fiscal stimulus, and provided the safety nets for the unemployed to thwart an escalating catastrophe?	是谁救助了银行，注入流动性，启动财政刺激计划，为失业者们提供了社会安全网，并以此遏制了灾难的进一步升级？


Who is re-writing the rules on financial-market supervision and regulation to prevent another occurrence?	是谁重新制定了金融市场的监管规则以避免重蹈覆辙？


Who gets the lion’s share of the blame for everything that goes wrong?	是谁在事态恶化之时承担了大部分罪责？


The answer is always the same: national governments.	答案总是那么一个：国家政府。


The G-20, the International Monetary Fund, and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have been largely sideshows.	跟它们比起来，G20，世界货币基金组织以及巴塞尔银行业监管委员会都只是些跑龙套的。


Even in Europe, where regional institutions are comparatively strong, it is national interest and national policymakers, largely in the person of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who have dominated policymaking.	即便是在区域性机构势力相对强大的欧洲，主宰政策制定的还是国家利益和各国国内的政策制定者(很大程度上就是德国总理默克尔本人)。


Had Merkel been less enamored of austerity for Europe’s debt-distressed countries, and had she managed to convince her domestic electorate of the need for a different approach, the eurozone crisis would have played out quite differently.	倘若默克尔不是那么着迷于对欧洲高负债国家采取紧缩政策，又如果她能说服自己的选民们接受另一种措施的话，欧元区的危机将都会以一种截然不同的形式发展。


Yet even as the nation-state survives, its reputation lies in tatters. The intellectual assault on it takes two forms.	但即便民族国家得以生还，其本身的声誉却依旧岌岌可危。


First, there is the critique by economists who view governments as an impediment to the freer flow of goods, capital, and people around the world. Prevent domestic policymakers from intervening with their regulations and barriers, they say, and global markets will take care of themselves, in the process creating a more integrated and efficient world economy.	知识界对它的攻击主要集中于两种形式：首先，在那些将政府视为商品，资本和人才自由流动障碍的经济学家眼中，必须阻止国内政策制定者利用法规和壁垒来干涉全球市场，市场能管好自己，并在自救的过程中建立一个更统一也更有效率的世界经济。


But who will provide the market’s rules and regulations, if not nation-states?	但除了民主国家之外，谁能提供市场所需的法则和监管？


Laissez-faire is a recipe for more financial crises and greater political backlash.	放任主义只能换来更多的金融危机和更强劲的政治反作用力。


Moreover, it would require entrusting economic policy to international technocrats, insulated as they are from the push and pull of politics – a stance that severely circumscribes democracy and political accountability.	此外，这还需要将制定经济政策的任务委托给那些跨国机构里的技术官僚，这些人完全与政治绝缘——而这一立场又严重限制了民主以及政治问责制度的作用。


In short, laissez-faire and international technocracy does not provide a plausible alternative to the nation-state.	简而言之，放任主义和国际技术官僚并不能提供一个民族国家以外的可靠替代品。


Indeed, the erosion of the nation-state ultimately does little good for global markets as long as we lack viable mechanisms of global governance.	事实上，只要我们依然缺乏全球治理的有效机制，民族国家的失效对全球市场都没什么好处。


Second, there are cosmopolitan ethicists who decry the artificiality of national borders.	其次，有些世界伦理学家一直在谴责人为设立的国家边界。


As the philosopher Peter Singer has put it, the communications revolution has spawned a “global audience” that creates the basis for a “global ethics.”	正如哲学家彼得·辛格（Peter Singer）所说，通讯革命已经产生了一个“全球受众”并因此为一种“全球伦理”打下了基础。


If we identify ourselves with the nation, our morality remains national.	如果我们以某个国家来定义自己，那么我们的道德也会局限于一个国家。


But, if we increasingly associate ourselves with the world at large, our loyalties will expand, too.	而一旦我们逐步将自己与整个世界结合起来，我们的忠诚也将因此获得延伸。


Similarly, the Nobel laureate economist Amartya Sen speaks of our “multiple identities” – ethnic, religious, national, local, professional, and political – many of which cross national boundaries.	同样，诺贝尔经济学奖获得者阿马蒂亚·森（Amartya Sen）也认为我们拥有“多重身份定义”——民族的，宗教的，国家的，本地的，职业的和政治上的——而其中许多定义都是无国界的。


It is unclear how much of this is wishful thinking and how much is based on real shifts in identities and attachments.	很难说上面这些说法有多少是一厢情愿，又有多少是基于身份定义和情感的真实转变。


Survey evidence shows that attachment to the nation-state remains quite strong.	因为有调查发现人们对民族国家的情感依附依然相当强烈。


A few years ago, the World Values Survey questioned respondents in scores of countries about their attachments to their local communities, their nations, and to the world at large.	几年前，“世界价值观调查”行动询问了数十个国家的民众对本地社区，国家和世界整体的情感依附状态。


Not surprisingly, those who viewed themselves as national citizens greatly outnumbered those who regarded themselves as world citizens.	不出意外，那些将自己视为某国公民的人数远远高于将自认世界公民者的数量。


But, strikingly, national identity overshadowed even local identity in the United States, Europe, India, China, and most other regions.	但令人吃惊的是，在美国、欧洲、印度，中国和其他大部分地区，人们更倾向于认为自己是某一国的公民，而不是属于某一当地社区。


The same surveys indicate that younger people, the highly educated, and those who identify themselves as upper class, are more likely to associate themselves with the world.	而调查也发现年轻群体，高等教育群体，以及那些自认上流阶级的人都倾向于将自身与世界联系起来。


Nevertheless, it is difficult to identify any demographic segment in which attachment to the global community outweighs attachment to the country.	但仍然难以界定哪些人类群体对全球社会的情感依附会高于对国家的依附。


As large as the decline in transport and communications costs has been, it has not obliterated geography.	虽然交通和通讯的成本都大幅下降，但地理的作用却并未磨灭。


Economic, social, and political activity remains clustered on the basis of preferences, needs, and historical trajectories that vary around the globe.	经济，社会和政治活动依然围绕着某些偏好，需求和历史轨迹展开，而这些基本要素互相之间差异极大，无法在全球层面上实现统一。


Geographical distance is as strong a determinant of economic exchange as it was a half-century ago.	地理距离也跟半个世纪前一样深刻影响着经济交换行为。


Even the Internet, it turns out, is not as borderless as it seems: one study found that Americans are much more likely to visit Web sites from countries that are physically close than from countries that are far away, even after controlling for language, income, and many other factors.	甚至连互联网也不像想象中那样没有边界：一项研究发现美国人更喜欢访问那些邻近国家的网站，即便在排除了语言，收入和其他因素的影响之后也是如此。


The trouble is that we are still in the grasp of the myth of the nation-state’s decline.	问题在于我们依然沉迷在民族国家衰落的谬论之中。


Political leaders plead impotence, intellectuals dream up implausible global-governance schemes, and the losers increasingly blame immigrants or imports.	政治领袖们以此为自己的软弱无力辩护，知识分子们仍在幻想着那个可行性极低的全球治理方略，而全球竞争中的失败者也把矛头指向移民或者进口产品。


Talk about re-empowering the nation-state and respectable people run for cover, as if one has proposed reviving the plague.	一旦说起重新向民主国家授权的话题时那些达官贵人们避之唯恐不及，好像这会传染瘟疫似的。


To be sure, the geography of attachments and identities is not fixed; indeed, it has changed over the course of history.	但可以肯定的是，情感依附和身份定义的地理因素不是固定不变的；


That means that we should not entirely dismiss the likelihood that a true global consciousness will develop in the future, along with transnational political communities.	事实上它一直都随历史的进程不断改变着。 这意味着我们不应完全否定一种真正的全球意识以及跨国政治社群在未来出现的可能性。


But today’s challenges cannot be met by institutions that do not (yet) exist.	但当今的挑战无法依靠那些尚未设立的机构来应对。


For now, people still must turn for solutions to their national governments, which remain the best hope for collective action.	今时今日，人们依然要从本国的政府那里寻求解决方案，而这也依然集体行动的最佳选项。


The nation-state may be a relic bequeathed to us by the French Revolution, but it is all that we have.	民族国家可能是法国大革命留给我们的遗产，但它也是我们唯一能依靠的东西。


The Nation State Revisited	重返民族国家


It has become fashionable to claim that the nation state has lost its place.	民族国家已经风光不再成了一种时髦的论调。


Globalization, it is said, means that nations can no longer control their own affairs.	据称全球化意味着国家再也不能掌控自己的内部事务，而是必须与其它国家联合，结成像欧盟、东盟或南方共同市场那样的组织。


They must join with others, as in the European Union or ASEAN or Mercosur, and they must increasingly rely on global institutions like the United Nations, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization.	它们也越来越依赖像联合国、世界银行和世界贸易组织这样的全球性机构。


But such a view is risky.	但这种看法是危险的。


Indeed, on closer inspection, it proves to be dubious, when not simply wrong.	仔细研究之下，实际上这种看法若非根本错误，至少也是非常可疑的。


The nation state, with both its strengths and weaknesses, is alive and well.	民族国家有其自身的优势也有其自身的缺陷，但现在总的势头可谓发展迅猛，生机勃勃。


To begin with its strengths, the nation state remains the only political space in which the constitution of liberty thrives.	首先来看看优势何在。 民族国家迄今为止仍然是自由宪章能够生根发芽的唯一政治土壤。


The democratic credentials of organizations like the EU are doubtful, and entirely absent in the case of the UN and other world institutions.	欧盟等组织是否称得上民主很难确定，而联合国和其它全球机构则根本和民主毫不相关。


Moreover, despite the frequent search for new identities, European or Latin American or otherwise, and despite many references to a new cosmopolitanism, or even a “world civil society,” most people feel at home in their own country – the nation state of which they are citizens.	不仅如此，尽管人们频繁地寻求欧洲、拉美或其它国家的崭新身份，尽管很多人信仰四海大同，甚至是“全球民主社会”，但大多数人还是觉得在本国生活最如鱼得水¾最值得眷恋的还是他们自身所属的民族国家。


Migration is generally migration to other countries.	移民通常是移民到其它国家。


Many countries are currently debating the integration of migrants.	很多国家都在就移民的融合问题争论不休。


What does it take to be British or German or American?	满足哪些条件才能成为英国、德国或美国的公民？


Such debates about immigration make sense only if we recognize that citizenship is defined by and for nations.	只有承认了按照民族划分公众的前提，上述有关移民的争论才会有意义。


This is, for most people, the positive side of the nation state.	对很多人来讲，这是民族国家较为积极的一面。


The nation state has been, and continues to be, the relevant unit of belonging and civic involvement for most human beings for more than two centuries.	200多年来，民族国家一直是、也将继续是大多数人所属的单位和参与的对象，是保卫和毁灭自由无法摆脱的背景。


It is the context in which we find our liberties safeguarded or destroyed. Certainly, the countries freed from communism in 1989 felt that restoring national sovereignty and recovering liberty were bound together.	因此，1989年从共产主义统治下解放出来的国家认为恢复国家主权和重获自由密切联系在一起，这本身也无可厚非。


Yet there is, and always has been, another, uglier face of the nation state: nationalism.	但民族国家也有比较丑陋的一面：那就是民族主义。


The nationalist impulse can be aggressive or defensive, directed against others or inward-looking.	民族主义的冲动分积极和消极两种，它既可以只求自保也可以威胁他人。


Either way, it vitiates all attempts to create an international community of open societies.	无论属于哪种情况，都会损害到建立开放国际社会的努力。


This was the problem in Iraq: a nation state had become a disturber of peace in the region and beyond.	这就是伊拉克的问题所在：这个民族国家已经成为破坏地区乃至世界和平的因素。


More recently, a less violent but equally worrying phenomenon has gained ground, the revival of national protectionism.	近来出现的问题虽然没有那么暴力，但也同样令人忧虑，那就是民族保护主义的复苏。


The Doha Round of trade negotiations is stalled because developed countries do not want to open their markets to cheaper products from developing countries, which in turn try to protect what nascent industries they have.	由于发达国家不愿向发展中国家的廉价产品开放市场，而发展中国家也力求保护自己现有的新生工业，多哈回合贸易谈判陷入了僵局。


Many would prefer privileged relationships to open trade.	很多国家宁愿选择最惠国待遇，也不愿接受开放贸易。


In this regard, the EU has often obliged.	在上述领域，欧盟时常会采取强制性措施。


But now the nationalist bug has infected the EU itself.	但现在连欧盟自己也受到了民族主义病毒的感染。


France, Spain, and Poland have attempted to keep major industries firmly in “national hands.”	法国、西班牙和波兰试图把重要的产业收归国家控制。


Suddenly, the single European market is forgotten, and a return to fragmented markets is taking root.	突然间，所有人都忘记了欧洲统一市场的存在，回归分裂市场的潮流正在慢慢扎根。


Consider, for example, the European Commission’s so-called “services directive.”	举个例子，我们可以研究一下欧盟委员会所谓的“服务指令”。


Although freedom of movement for labor is one of the single market’s “four freedoms,” many EU countries are trying to protect their domestic labor markets by suspending this freedom for as long as possible.	尽管人员流动自由是统一市场“四大自由”之中的一个要素，但很多欧盟国家都力图保护自己的国内劳动力市场，尽可能拖延人员自由流动的最终实现。


Germany, in particular, argues that the high unemployment resulting from reunification in 1990 requires it to close its labor market to the new member states to its east.	尤其是德国提出1990年重新统一所导致的高失业率要求它对东面的欧盟新成员封锁劳动力市场。


Such trends are dangerous.	这样的势头非常危险。


Historically, protectionism has often led to economic conflict, which can rapidly turn into more serious clashes.	从历史上看，保护主义时常会引发经济矛盾，而经济矛盾会很快演化为更加严重的冲突。


The signs are not good, even in Europe.	总体的发展形式并不喜人，即便在欧洲也不例外。


A recent summit of EU leaders addressed energy policy – one area where cooperation is not only highly desirable, but necessary.	欧盟领导人前不久开会讨论了能源政策¾合作在这一领域中不仅有利，而且必须。


Yet even German Chancellor Angela Merkel – clearly a pro-European – went to the meeting with the explicit intention of barring the creation of other European powers in this field.	然而即便是明确表示支持欧洲融合的德国总理安格拉·默克尔（Angela Merkel），在开会时也清楚地表达了不支持建立欧洲其它能源组织的态度。


The German-Russian agreement to build a gas pipeline bypassing Poland and Lithuania, with former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder leading the effort, has already harmed Polish-German relations, to say nothing of European cooperation.	德俄两国建设横穿波兰和立陶宛天然气管道的协议由前总理施罗德领导，已经给波兰和德国的关系造成了损害，更不用说欧洲的合作事业了。


For a time, the pendulum of political opinion may have swung too far against the nation state and its role. This is one reason why so many people have felt estranged from their political leaders.	有的时候，政治舆论的钟摆可能离民族国家及其作用越来越远，这也是很多人远离了政治领袖的原因。


But it would be unfortunate – indeed, dangerous – if the pendulum now swung back to old-fashioned nationalism.	但如果钟摆再次退回到老式的民族主义，那么就不仅令人遗憾，而且非常危险了。


Nation states are welcome; they are important elements of a liberal world order. But they have to be open to cooperation and coordination with others.	民族国家是不错的事物，是自由世界秩序的重要组成因素，但必须与其它国家进行合作和协调。


We must be vigilant in resisting the start of a trend reminiscent of developments in the early years of the twentieth century – a trend that quickly led to global disaster.	我们必须保持警惕，防止20世纪初的发展势头再次重演¾那样的发展势头会迅速导致全球陷入灾难。


Central Banks’ Outdated Independence	过时的央行独立性


BUENOS AIRES – The global financial crisis has raised fundamental questions regarding central banks’ mandates.	布宜诺斯艾利斯—全球金融危机引起了人们对央行权威的根本性质疑。


Over the past few decades, most central banks have focused on price stability as their single and overriding objective.	在过去几十年中，大部分央行将价格稳定性作为它们的唯一的最高目标。


This focus supported the ascendancy of “inflation-targeting” as the favored monetary policy framework and, in turn, led to operational independence for central banks.	这导致了“通胀目标”作为货币政策框架的支配地位，反过来又形成了央行的操作独立性。


The policy was a success: the discipline imposed by strict and rigorous concentration on a sole objective enabled policymakers to control – and then conquer – inflation.	这一政策是成功的：严格而精确的单一目标所带来的纪律让决策者得以控制——并征服——通货膨胀。


But, as a consequence of this narrow approach, policymakers disregarded the formation of asset- and commodity-price bubbles, and overlooked the resulting banking-sector instability.	但是，这一狭隘目标方法的一个后果是决策者无视资产和商品价格泡沫的形成，并忽略由此带来的银行部门不稳定。


This, by itself, calls for a review of the overall efficacy of inflation-targeting.	这本身足以引起对通胀目标总体有效性的反思。


Moreover, after the financial crisis erupted, central banks were increasingly compelled to depart from inflation targeting, and to implement myriad unconventional monetary policies in order to ameliorate the consequences of the crash and facilitate economic recovery.	此外，金融危机爆发后，央行逐渐被迫偏离通胀目标，实施各种非常规货币政策以减轻崩溃的后果，协助经济复苏。


With advanced economies struggling to avoid financial collapse, escape recession, reduce unemployment, and restore growth, central banks are being called upon to address, sometimes simultaneously, growing imbalances.	发达国家挣扎着避免金融崩溃、摆脱衰退、降低失业和重塑增长，有时人们呼吁央行同时纠正日益严重的失衡问题。


This has triggered a search for a radical redefinition of central banks’ objectives – and has cast doubt on the appropriateness of maintaining their independence.	这让人们寻求彻底修改央行目标，也对维持其独立性的合理性产生了质疑。


In particular, central banks’ behavior during the crisis has called into question whether inflation-targeting is an effective framework in the presence of systemic shocks, and, more broadly, whether it can be sustained throughout economic cycles.	特别是，央行在危机期间的行为已让人们怀疑，在系统性冲击下，通胀目标是否是有效的框架，以及（更广泛地说）它能否在整个经济周期中得到维持。


After all, a policy regime that sets aside its only goal during a crisis seems to lack the ability to cope with unexpected challenges.	毕竟，在危机期间放弃其唯一目标的政策机制似乎没有能力处理意外挑战。


Critics identify this “crisis straitjacket syndrome” as the main problem with single-minded inflation targeting.	批评者将这一“危机约束综合症”（crisis straitjacket syndrome）视为一根筋通胀目标的主要问题。


While theoretical arguments can be made to justify recent departures from policy, the reality is that in the post-crisis world, advanced-country central banks’ goals are no longer limited to price stability.	论证最新的政策转向的理论观点不难找，但现实是在后危机时代，发达国家央行的目标不再局限于价格稳定。


In the United States, the Federal Reserve has essentially adopted a quantitative employment target, with nominal GDP targets and other variations under discussion in other countries.	在美国，美联储事实上采取了量化就业目标，其他国家则在讨论名义GDP目标和其他目标。


And financial stability is again a central-bank responsibility, including for the more conservative European Central Bank.	金融稳定性也再次成为央行的责任，包括较为保守的欧洲央行。


This shift toward multiple policy objectives inevitably reduces central-bank independence.	这一变化——转向多重政策目标——难免会削弱央行独立性。


Some analysts have recently claimed that this is because the pursuit of GDP growth, job creation, and financial stability, as well as the establishment of priorities when there are tradeoffs, clearly requires political decisions, which should not be made by unelected officials alone.	一些分析师最近声称这是因为追求GDP增长、就业创造、金融稳定以及在存在权衡时决定孰先孰后显然要求政治决策，而政治决策不应该光由非民选官员做出。


Moreover, by pushing interest rates toward zero, the current policy of quantitative easing (increasing money supply by buying government securities) has strong, often regressive, income effects.	此外，通过将利率推向零水平，当前的量化宽松政策（通过购买政府证券增加货币供给）具有相当强的、通常是累退的收入效应。


Opponents of central-bank independence contend that, given the allocational and distributional consequences of current monetary-policy interventions, central banks’ decision-making should be subject to political control.	央行独立的反对者指出，由于当前货币政策干预的配置和分配后果，央行决策应该受政治控制。


But this argument neglects an important point.	但这一论调忽略了一个要点。


While it is true that multiple policy targets tend to increase the political sensitivity of central banks’ decisions, concentrating only on price stability also has important distributional consequences and political implications.	诚然，多重政策目标会增加央行决策的政治敏感性，但只关注价格稳定也具有重要的分配后果和政治影响。


In fact, politicization is a matter of scale, not a substantive transformation of monetary policymaking.	事实上，政治化是一个规模问题，而不是货币决策的重大变化。


The real reason why central-bank independence tends to create a democratic deficit under a multi-target monetary-policy regime, and why it has become increasingly vulnerable, is that the two main arguments in favor of it no longer apply.	为何在多重目标货币政策机制下央行独立性会产生民主赤字？ 为何央行独立行越来越受到人们的抨击？


The first argument in favor of central-bank independence is that, without it, politicians can exploit expansionary monetary policy’s positive short-run effects at election time, without regard for its long-run inflationary consequences.	支持央行独立的第一个理由是，若非如此，政客可以在选举期间利用扩张性货币政策的积极短期效应而不顾及它的长期通胀性后果。


(By contrast, fiscal and exchange-rate policies rarely imply comparable temporal trade-offs, and thus are difficult to exploit for political gain.)	（相反，财政和汇率政策很少意味着类似的暂时性权衡，从而较难为政治利益所利用。


But this argument becomes irrelevant when ensuring price stability is no longer monetary policymakers’ sole task.	）但当确保价格稳定不再是货币决策者的唯一使命时，这一理由便站不住脚了。


The second argument for institutional independence is that central banks have a clear comparative advantage in dealing with monetary issues, and can therefore be trusted to pursue their targets independently.	制度性独立的第二个理由是央行在处理货币问题上有着显而易见的比较优势，因此应该被信任独立地追求其目标。


But this advantage does not extend to other policy areas.	但这一优势并不能扩展到其他政策领域。


Given that central banks are likely to continue to pursue multiple objectives for a long time, their independence will continue to erode.	由于央行可能在很长一段时间里继续追求多重性目标，其独立性也将继续削弱。


As long as governments do not encroach excessively on central-bank decision-making, this development will restore balance in policymaking and support policy coordination, particularly in times of stress.	只要政府不过分蚕食央行的决策权，这一趋势将重塑决策平衡，支持政策协调，特别是在面对压力时。


To ensure a positive outcome, policymakers should develop a fully transparent framework with well-defined “rules of engagement.”	为了确保积极的结果，决策者应该在明晰的“参与规则”下开发完全透明的框架。


A strict framework for allowing, and at the same time limiting, government’s involvement in central-bank decision-making is particularly crucial in emerging markets, given that, in most of them, central-bank independence has contributed not only to the eradication of inflation, but also to institution-building.	在允许政府参与央行决策的同时限定政府的参与的严格框架对于新兴市场来说特别关键，因为这些国家的大部分央行的独立性不仅事关消灭通胀，也事关制度建设。


Central-bank independence is a peculiar institutional innovation.	央行独立行是一项特殊的制度创新。


Seemingly irrefutable theoretical models underlie a paradigm that has changed in significant ways, and that, if preserved, is bound to cause serious political problems.	看似无可辩驳的理论模型支撑着一个范式，这个范式已经发生了重大变化，如果维持下去，注定会导致严重的政治问题。


Like it or not, policymakers must accept that central-bank independence will continue to weaken, and they should prepare to cope with the consequences.	不管喜不喜欢，决策者必须接受央行独立行将继续削弱的前景，也应该做好准备应对它所带来的后果。


Currency War and Peace	货币战争与和平


WASHINGTON, DC – Much of the hype surrounding last month’s meeting in Moscow of G-20 finance ministers and central bankers was dedicated to so-called “currency wars,” which some developing-country officials have accused advanced countries of waging by pursuing unconventional monetary policies.	华盛顿—对于上个月在莫斯科举行的G20财政部长和央行行长会议，人们的目光集中在所谓的“货币战争”上，一些发展中国家的官员指责发达国家追求非常规呃。


But another crucial issue – that of long-term investment financing – was largely neglected, even though the endgame for unconventional monetary policy will require the revitalization or creation of new long-term assets and liabilities in the global economy.	但另一个关键问题——长期投资融资鲜有人提及，尽管非常规货币政策的结束要求全球经济的长期资产和负债复苏或新生。


The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 drove up risk premia and triggered panic in financial markets, weakening assets in the United States and elsewhere, and threatening to provoke a credit crunch.	2008年雷曼兄弟公司的倒闭推高了风险溢价，引发了金融市场恐慌，打击了美国和其他国家的资产，并产生了信贷动荡危险。


In order to avoid asset fire-sales – which would have led to the disorderly unraveling of private-sector balance sheets, possibly triggering a new “Great Depression” or even bringing down the eurozone – advanced countries’ central banks began to purchase risky assets and increase lending to financial institutions, thus expanding the money supply.	为了避免资产大甩卖——这会导致无序的私人部门资产负债表崩溃，引发新的“大萧条”甚至欧元区解体——发达国家央行开始买入风险资产、增加面向金融机构的贷款，从而扩张了货币供给。


While fears of meltdown have dissipated, these policies have been maintained or extended, with policymakers citing the fragility of the ongoing economic recovery and the absence of other, equally strong policy levers – such as fiscal policy or structural reforms – that could replace monetary policy quickly enough.	崩溃的担忧已经远去，但这些政策仍然继续维持着，决策者声称经济复苏仍然脆弱，没有其他同等效力的政策杠杆——如财政政策和结构性改革——能够迅速取代货币政策。


But several years of ultra-loose monetary policy in the advanced countries has led to significant liquidity spillover abroad, putting excessive upward pressure on higher-yielding developing countries’ currencies.	但发达国家多年的极端宽松货币政策已经导致巨大的流动性溢出，高收益发展中国家货币出现了过度的升值压力。


With developing countries finding it difficult to deter massive capital inflows or mitigate the effects – owing to economic constraints, like high inflation, or to domestic politics – the “currency wars” metaphor, coined in 2010 by Brazil’s finance minister, Guido Mantega, has resonated widely.	发展中国家发现难以阻止巨量资本流入或者减轻其影响——这是拜高通胀等经济约束或国内政治所赐——于是2010年巴西财政部长曼特加提出的“货币战争”比喻得到了热烈响应。


Moreover, only a small portion of the liquidity created by unconventional monetary policy has been channeled toward households and the small and medium-size enterprises that generate most new jobs.	此外，在非常规货币政策所创造出来的流动性中，只有一小部分流入了家庭和创造大部分新就业岗位的中小企业。


Instead, crisis-affected global financial entities have used it to support their efforts to deleverage and to rebuild their capital, while large corporations have been building large cash reserves and refinancing their debt under favorable conditions.	相反，受危机影响的全球金融机构利用其支持去杠杆化和重建资本的过程，而大公司则囤积了大量的现金储备并以有利条件实现债务再融资。


As a result, economic growth and job creation remain lackluster, with the availability of investment finance for long-term productive assets – essential to sustainable growth – severely limited.	结果，经济增长和就业创造依然萎靡逼真，对可持续增长至关重要的长期生产性资产的投资融资严重受限。


Some believe that the elimination of macro-financial tail risks, the gradual strengthening of global economic recovery, and the increase in existing asset prices will eventually convince cash hoarders to increase their exposure to new ventures in advanced economies.	有人认为宏观金融尾部风险的消除、全球经济复苏的逐渐强劲以及资产价格的走高最终将说服现金持有者增加其在发达国家的新企业的投资。


But such optimism may not be warranted.	但如此乐观未必站得住脚。


In fact, at the recent G-20 meeting, the World Bank presented an Umbrella Report on Long-Term Investment Financing for Growth and Development.	事实上，在最新的G20会议中，世界银行发布了《长期增长和发展投资融资综合报告》（Umbrella Report on Long-Term Investment Financing for Growth and Development）。


The report, based on analysis from various international organizations, highlights several areas of concern.	这份基于来自众多国际组织的分析的报告强调了几个值得关注的领域。


For starters, banks’ current retrenchment of long-term investment financing is likely to persist.	首先，银行最近对长期投资融资的削减可能会持续。


After all, many of the advanced-country banks, especially in Europe, that dominated such investment – for example, financing large-scale infrastructure projects – are undergoing deep deleveraging and rebuilding their capital buffers.	毕竟许多主导这类投资——比如大规模基础设施项目——的发达国家银行（特别是欧洲银行）仍在经历深刻的去杠杆化和重建资本缓冲过程。


So far, other banks have been unable to fill the gap.	目前，其他银行仍无法填补这一空缺。


Furthermore, the effect of internationally agreed regulatory reforms – most of which have yet to be implemented – will be to increase banks’ capital requirements while shrinking the scale of maturity transformation risks that they can carry on their balance sheets.	此外，国际一致的监管改革——大部分还未实施—���的作用将是增加银行资本要求，同时降低这给资产负债表带来的期限转换风险的规模。


The “new normal” that results will likely include scarcer, more expensive long-term bank lending.	由此产生的“新常态”可能包括长期银行贷款更稀缺、更昂贵。


The World Bank report also points out that, as a consequence of banking retrenchment, institutional investors with long-term liabilities – such as pension funds, insurers, and sovereign wealth funds – may be called upon to assume a greater role in funding long-term assets.	世界银行还指出，银行紧缩的一个后果是长期负债的机构投资者——如养老基金、保险商和主权财富基金——可能会被号召承担更大的长期资产融资作用。 但是，为了促进这一改变，必须开发合适的融资工具；


But, to facilitate this shift, appropriate financing vehicles must be developed; investment and risk-management expertise will have to be acquired; regulatory frameworks will have to be improved; and adequate data and investment benchmarks will be needed.	必须有投资和风险管理的专业技能； 必须改善监管框架；


These investors must focus on the small and medium-size enterprises that banks often neglect.	还需要有充分的数据和投资基准。 这些投资者必须专注于银行通常忽视的中小企业。


Finally, local-currency bond markets – and, more generally, domestic capital markets – in emerging economies must be explored further, in order to lengthen the tenure of financial flows.	最后，新兴经济体的本币债券市场——以及更一般地，本国资本市场——必须进一步利用，以延长金融流的期限。


Local-currency government-debt markets have performed fairly well during the crisis, while local-currency corporate-debt markets have played a more modest role as a vehicle for longer-term finance.	本币政府债券市场在危机期间表现相当出色，而本币公司债券市场作为长期融资工具也表现得更加稳健。


This suggests that domestic reforms aimed at reducing issuance costs, improving disclosure requirements, enhancing creditors’ rights frameworks, and tackling other inhibiting factors could bring high returns.	这表明旨在降低发行成本、改善披露要求、强化债权人权利框架以及解决其他抑制因素的国内改革可以带来高回报。


Anxiety over unconventional monetary policies and “currency wars” must not continue to dominate global policy discussions, especially given last month’s pledge by G-20 leaders not to engage in competitive currency devaluations.	决不能让对非常规货币政策和“货币战争”的不安继续主宰全球政策讨论，特别是在上个月G20领导人作出不会参与货币贬值竞赛的承诺的情况下。


Instead, global leaders should work to maximize the liquidity that unconventional policy measures have generated, and to use it to support investment in long-term productive assets.	全球领导人应该致力于将非常规政策手段所产生的流动性最大化并将之用于支持长期生产性资产的投资上。


Such an approach is the only way to place the global economy’s recovery on a sustainable footing.	这一方法是将全球经济复苏引向可持续之路的唯一方法。


Inequality is Killing Capitalism	不平等性正在杀死资本主义


LONDON – It is generally agreed that the crisis of 2008-2009 was caused by excessive bank lending, and that the failure to recover adequately from it stems from banks’ refusal to lend, owing to their “broken” balance sheets.	伦敦—一个广泛承认的共识是，2008—2009年的危机肇因在于过度的银行借贷行为，而之所以在危机之后不能完全复苏，也是因为银行由于“损坏的”资产负债表拒绝借贷。


A typical story, much favored by followers of Friedrich von Hayek and the Austrian School of economics, goes like this: In the run up to the crisis, banks lent more money to borrowers than savers would have been prepared to lend otherwise, thanks to excessively cheap money provided by central banks, particularly the United States Federal Reserve.	哈耶克和奥地利学派的追随者最喜欢的故事是：在通向危机的过程中，银行贷给借款人的钱超过了存款人准备贷出的钱，而之所以如此，是因为中央银行——主要是美联储——提供了过多的廉价资金。


Commercial banks, flush with central banks’ money, advanced credit for many unsound investment projects, with the explosion of financial innovation (particularly of derivative instruments) fueling the lending frenzy.	商业银行由于获得了央行的资金而兴奋不已，把钱借给了大量并不靠谱的投资项目，而金融创新的大爆发（特别是衍生工具）更是助长了这一借贷疯狂。


This inverted pyramid of debt collapsed when the Fed finally put a halt to the spending spree by hiking up interest rates.	当美联储最终以升息的动作停止了支出狂欢后，债务的倒金字塔崩塌了。


(The Fed raised its benchmark federal funds rate from 1% in 2004 to 5.25% in 2006 and held it there until August 2007).	（美联储将其基准利率——联邦基金利率从2004年的1%提高到了2006年的5. 25%，并一直维持该水平至2007年8月。


As a result, house prices collapsed, leaving a trail of zombie banks (whose liabilities far exceeded their assets) and ruined borrowers.	）结果，房价崩盘了，留下的是一大批僵尸银行（负债远超资产）和遭受重创的借款人。


The problem now appears to be one of re-starting bank lending.	现在的问题是重新让银行发放贷款。


Impaired banks that do not want to lend must somehow be “made whole.”	不愿借贷的受损银行必须设法“使其完整”。


This has been the purpose of the vast bank bailouts in the US and Europe, followed by several rounds of “quantitative easing,” by which central banks print money and pump it into the banking system through a variety of unorthodox channels.	这便是美国和欧洲大规模银行援助的目的，随之而来的是数轮“量化宽松”，即央行印钱并通过一系列非常规渠道注入银行系统。


(Hayekians object to this, arguing that, because the crisis was caused by excessive credit, it cannot be overcome with more.)	（哈耶克的门徒们反对这样做，指出既然危机原因是过多的信用，那么就不可能以更多的信用克服危机。 ）


At the same time, regulatory regimes have been toughened everywhere to prevent banks from jeopardizing the financial system again.	与此同时，各国监管机制也大大收紧，以防止银行再次拖累金融系统。


For example, in addition to its price-stability mandate, the Bank of England has been given the new task of maintaining “the stability of the financial system.”	比如，英格兰银行在维持价格稳定的基础上，又被赋予了维持“��融系统稳定”的使命。


This analysis, while seemingly plausible, depends on the belief that it is the supply of credit that is essential to economic health: too much money ruins it, while too little destroys it.	这套分析看起来颇有道理，其基础是认为信用供给乃是经济健康的关键：钱太多和太少都会毁灭它。


But one can take another view, which is that demand for credit, rather than supply, is the crucial economic driver.	但你也可以从另一个角度看问题，即信用需求而不是供给才是关键性经济驱动力。


After all, banks are bound to lend on adequate collateral; and, in the run-up to the crisis, rising house prices provided it.	毕竟，银行一定会在抵押品充足的情况下发放贷款； 而在危机酝酿过程中，上涨的房价提供了抵押品。


The supply of credit, in other words, resulted from the demand for credit.	换句话说，信用供给是信用需求的结果。


This puts the question of the origins of the crisis in a somewhat different light.	这使得我们可以以不同的视角来看待危机的起源。


It was not so much predatory lenders as it was imprudent, or deluded, borrowers, who bear the blame.	与掠夺性贷款人相比，鲁莽或受骗的借款人承担的责任更大。


So the question arises: Why did people want to borrow so much?	于是问题产生了：为什么人们想借这么多钱？


Why did the ratio of household debt to income soar to unprecedented heights in the pre-recession days?	为什么家庭债务-收入比率在危机前会升高到前所未有的水平？


Let us agree that people are greedy, and that they always want more than they can afford.	我们先假设人都是贪婪的，总是希望得到比自己所能负担的更多的东西。


Why, then, did this “greed” manifest itself so manically?	那么，为什么这一“贪婪”会如此面目狰狞？


To answer that, we must look at what was happening to the distribution of income.	为了回答这个问题，我们必须看看收入分配情况。


The world was getting steadily richer, but the income distribution within countries was becoming steadily more unequal.	世界在逐渐变富，但各国内部收入分配正在逐渐变得不平等。


Median incomes have been stagnant or even falling for the last 30 years, even as per capita GDP has grown.	中位收入至少有30年不曾增长甚至有所下降，即使人均GDP在上升。


This means that the rich have been creaming off a giant share of productivity growth.	这意味着富人攫走了生产率增长的大部分好处。


And what did the relatively poor do to “keep up with the Joneses” in this world of rising standards?	那么，相对贫困者如何在标准不断提高的社会“赶上邻居”？


They did what the poor have always done: got into debt.	他们做了穷人总是会做的事：借钱。


In an earlier era, they became indebted to the pawnbroker; now they are indebted to banks or credit-card companies.	从前，他们欠当铺老板的钱； 如今，他们欠银行和信用卡公司的钱。


And, because their poverty was only relative and house prices were racing ahead, creditors were happy to let them sink deeper and deeper into debt.	而由于他们的贫困只是相对的，而房价一直在上涨，因此债权人也愿意让他们在债务泥淖中越陷越深。


Of course, some worried about the collapse of the household savings rate, but few were overly concerned.	当然，一些人担心家庭储蓄率的崩溃，但很少有人过度担心。


In one of his last articles, Milton Friedman wrote that savings nowadays took the form of houses.	在米尔顿·弗里德曼最后的几篇文章之一中，他指出，如今，储蓄是以房子为形式。


To me, this view of things explains much better than the orthodox account why, for all the money-pumping by central banks, commercial banks have not started lending again, and the economic recovery has petered out.	对我来说，这一视角远比正统观点解释为何在央行大力注资的情况下，商业银行仍没有开始贷款，而经济复苏在逐渐泯灭。


Just as lenders did not force money on the public before the crisis, so now they cannot force heavily indebted households to borrow, or businesses to seek loans to expand production when markets are flat or shrinking.	正如危机前的资金并非贷款人推到大众面前，如今贷款人也无法强迫负债深重的家庭借钱，也不能强迫企业在市场萎靡不振的情况下借钱扩张产能。


In short, recovery cannot be left to the Fed, the European Central Bank, or the Bank of England.	简言之，复苏不可能来自美联储、欧洲央行或英格兰银行。


It requires the active involvement of fiscal policymakers.	复苏需要积极的财政政策参与。


Our current situation requires not a lender of last resort, but a spender of last resort, and that can only be governments.	我们的现状要求的不是最后贷款人，而是最后支出人，而能够扮演这一角色的唯有政府。


If governments, with their already-high level of indebtedness, believe that they cannot borrow any more from the public, they should borrow from their central banks and spend the extra money themselves on public works and infrastructure projects.	如果债务水平已然很高的政府人为它们不能继续向公众借钱，那么它们应该向央行借钱，并把额外的资金用于公共工程和基础设施项目。


This is the only way to get the big economies of the West moving again.	这是让西方大经济体重新启动的唯一办法。


But, beyond this, we cannot carry on with a system that allows so much of the national income and wealth to pile up in so few hands.	但是，除此之外，我们不能放任如此之多的国民财富流向如此之少的人手中。


Concerted redistribution of wealth and income has frequently been essential to the long-term survival of capitalism.	协调的财富和收入再分配向来是资本主义长期活力的关键。


We are about to learn that lesson again.	我们即将再次领教这一教训。


Nuclear Disarmament’s Asian Pivot	核裁军的亚洲支点


WASHINGTON, DC – In 2009, US President Barack Obama pledged to seek a world without nuclear weapons.	华盛顿——2009年，美国总统奥巴马承诺建设一个没有核武器的世界。


But, while he delivered on his promise to negotiate a New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia a year later, progress has since stalled.	一年后尽管他兑现了与俄国谈判新战略武器削减条约的承诺，但这方面的进展仍然陷于停顿。


To break the deadlock, the current bilateral framework for negotiation, which has remained largely unchanged since the Cold War, must be transformed into a trilateral framework that includes China.	要想打破现有僵局，冷战结束后基本保持不变的双边谈判框架必须转化为三边框架，并邀请中国参与。


To be sure, such a move would significantly complicate negotiations.	这样的举措无疑会让谈判形势复杂化。


After all, while decades of bilateral dialogue have given the United States and Russia a good sense of each other’s strategic perspectives – including the issues on which they disagree – China’s perception of strategic stability is unfamiliar.	毕竟几十年的双边对话已经让美俄双方非常熟悉对方的战略诉求，其中也包括双方的分歧。 但中国对战略稳定的看法却是全新的课题。


But trilateral dialogues, catalyzed by skillful US diplomacy, could also serve as an opportunity to manage the countries’ strategic relations, which currently are characterized by contradictions and mistrust.	尽管存在困难，但在美国外交的巧妙推动下，三边对话也可以成为管理目前充满矛盾和不信任的国家战略关系的一次难得的机遇。


Russia seeks China’s support in opposing American missile-defense systems, and calls for the involvement of all nuclear states in future strategic arms-control talks, but then cites concerns about China’s military modernization to justify its refusal to negotiate with NATO on tactical nuclear-weapon reduction.	俄国需要中国支持对抗美国导弹防御系统，并呼吁未来的战略武器控制谈判要让一切有核国家参与。 但俄国又把中国军事现代化当作挡箭牌来拒绝与北约进行削减战术核武器谈判。


China, which has never adopted legally binding limits on its nuclear weapons or strategic nuclear-delivery vehicles, rejects Russia’s call to join negotiations – a stance that the US supports until the Russian and US nuclear arsenals move closer in size to those of China.	而中国则从未承诺对其核武器或战略运载工具进行任何有约束力的限制，并且拒绝响应俄国加入谈判的呼吁——中国的相关立场在美俄核武库规模接近中国之前一直得到美国的支持。


At the same time, US officials deny that their country’s missile-defense programs are directed against Russia or China, but refuse to offer a legally binding guarantee.	同时美官员否认其导弹防御计划针对俄中两国，但却拒绝做出有约束力的保证。


And the US Department of Defense is developing a robust program of long-range conventional strike weapons, which China and Russia cite to justify their efforts to strengthen their offensive nuclear forces.	美国防部正在实施一项全方位远程常规打击武器计划，而中俄两国则借口该计划加强自身的核进攻力量。


Although multilateral cooperation on nuclear issues has been effective in some cases, such as in ratifying the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, it has been inadequate in others, such as in easing tensions with Iran and North Korea.	就核问题展开多边合作尽管在批准“核不扩散条约”等某些情况下卓有成效，但在缓和伊朗及朝鲜紧张局势方面却心有余而力不足。


In fact, even when China, Russia, and the US share the same agenda, their differing diplomatic tactics often undermine their ability to achieve their objectives.	其实即便中、俄、美三国目标相同，大相径庭的外交策略也往往会影响他们实现目标的能力。


For example, the three countries’ policies are inadvertently contributing to proliferation pressures in Asia and Europe.	举例来讲，俄、美、中三国政策不经意间为欧亚扩散问题制造了新的压力。


US pledges to defend Japan against a nuclear attack from China or North Korea have played a decisive role in dissuading the Japanese from seeking their own nuclear weapons.	美国保护日本免受中朝核打击的承诺在阻止日本研发核武器方面起到决定性作用。


Given this, a Chinese nuclear surge – even one that did not lead to US-China parity – could undermine the credibility of American deterrence commitments, possibly motivating Japan to launch its own nuclear program.	因此，即使无法与美国抗衡，中国核力量的增强也会影响到美国威慑承诺的可信度，进而促使日本推出自己的核计划。


Similarly, some of NATO’s newer members, many of which are former Soviet-bloc states, are anxious about the prospect of Russian rearmament.	同样，很多新加盟北约的前苏联集团成员国担心俄国重整军备。


As a result, they oppose efforts to reduce the number of American nuclear weapons in Europe, part of NATO’s “nuclear sharing” policy.	他们因此反对美国削减部署在欧洲的核武数量，实际掣肘北约的部分“核共享”政策。


Perhaps the biggest obstacle to initiating a trilateral dialogue is Chinese resistance to formal nuclear arms-control agreements, which is rooted in the memory of Cold War-era nonproliferation initiatives aimed partly at preventing China from developing its own nuclear deterrent.	启动三边对话的最大障碍或许是中国对正式核军控协议的抗拒态度。 中���的抵触情绪来源于冷战时期的防扩散协议，该协议部分企图阻止中国发展自身的核威慑力量。


Since then, Chinese officials have insisted that they do not belong in US-Russian strategic-arms talks, because the two countries’ nuclear arsenals dwarf theirs.	从那时起，中国官员就以本国核武库相形见绌为由拒绝参与美俄战略武器谈判。


But, as the US and Russia reduce their nuclear stockpiles, this excuse is becoming less valid, and China’s exclusion from negotiations is becoming an increasingly significant hindrance to disarmament.	但上述借口随着美俄核武库的缩减越来越站不住脚， 而中国游离于谈判之外对裁军的影响越来越显著。


Securing a binding commitment from China’s government to limit its nuclear development is crucial to reassuring the US and Russia that further strategic-weapons cuts will not undermine global or regional stability.	只有中国政府做出限制核武发展的具有约束力的承诺，美俄两国才能确信全球和地区稳定不会因进一步削减战略武器而受到影响。


Several recent developments could help to minimize obstacles to trilateral cooperation.	最近一些事态发展可能有助于消除三方的合作障碍。 中国新任领导不再像毛时代那样本能地抵触核谈判；


China’s new leadership is further removed from Maoist-era reflexive opposition to nuclear negotiations; Russian leaders’ confidence in their economic and military resurgence is waning; and both countries are increasingly frustrated by the lack of progress in nuclear talks with North Korea and Iran.	俄罗斯领导对经济军事复苏的信心正逐渐减弱； 与朝鲜伊朗的核谈判迟迟没有进展也令中俄两国感到沮丧。


Meanwhile, faced with a large federal budget deficit, many American voters would welcome reduced spending on nuclear weapons.	此外，由于巨额联邦预算赤字，削减核武器开支成为众多美国选民的选择。


The US should capitalize on this situation, leveraging Russian concerns and interests to induce China to join strategic arms-control efforts.	美国应当抓住机遇，利用俄国的关切和利益诱使中国参与战略武器控制工作。


China might be willing to make a unilateral, but enforceable, commitment not to augment its nuclear arsenal, if Russia and the US reduce theirs further.	中国也许愿意在俄美两国进一步削减核武库的同时，单方面强制承诺不增加核武库。


Determining the circumstances that might induce such restraint – and the conditions that would be needed to sustain it – is crucial to reinvigorating nuclear disarmament efforts.	确定并保持上述限制所需的条件对重振核裁军努力至关重要。


With Russia ostensibly on board, it is up to the US to initiate a transformation in the nuclear-negotiation framework – and that means convincing China to participate.	因为俄罗斯表面上愿意配合，需要由美国启动核谈判框架的转型工作——这意味着要说服中国参与到谈判过程中。


The Nemesis of Turkish Power	土耳其的复仇


PARIS – A few days ago, Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told Al Jazeera, the pan-Arab television network, that he would use his warships to prevent Israeli commandos from again boarding Gaza-bound ships, as they did last year.	巴黎——前几天，土耳其总理雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安向泛阿拉伯电视网半岛电视台透露他将再次像去年那样，动用军舰阻止以色列突击队员登船驶往加沙。


And in a speech in Cairo, he declared support for the United Nations’ recognition of a Palestinian state “an obligation.”	在开罗的一次讲话中，他还扬言支持联合国承认巴勒斯坦国是一项“义不容辞”的任务。


So, will a “Turkish Summer” be the first, if not the main, strategic result of the “Arab Spring”?	在这种情况下，“土耳其之夏”会不会是“阿拉伯之春”最早出现甚至是最重要的战略成果？


Is the Middle East faced with a neo-Ottoman Turkey’s irresistible rise to regional power?	新奥斯曼土耳其是否会作为地区大国在中东崛起？


And could the world be witnessing the “Orientalization” of Turkey?	世界会不会亲眼目睹土耳其的东方化？


The Arab revolutions, following on the European Union’s resounding “No, Yes, But” to Turkey’s membership bid, have reinforced among Turks the attraction of the Orient while liberating their mix of nationalistic and religious impulses.	欧盟对土耳其成员国资格的“拒绝、同意、但是”言犹在耳，阿拉伯革命又再次增强了土耳其人心目中东方的吸引力，并释放了他们心中的民族主义和宗教冲动。


Indeed, Erdoğan makes more references to God in his public statements nowadays than he ever did in the past.	实际上，埃尔多安目前在公开讲话中比以往更多的谈到上帝。


Over the last few years, the Western world has been asking itself, with a mixture of guilt and apprehension, “Who lost Turkey”?	几年来，西方世界一直带着愧疚和焦虑反复自问，“究竟谁失去了土耳其”？


But is Turkey, enthralled by its economic and diplomatic successes, now running the risk of losing itself?	但现在沉迷于经济外交成就，冒着失去自己危险的是否正是土耳其自己？


Turkey’s government was no better at anticipating the changes in the Arab world than were local regimes and Western powers.	土耳其政府像地区政府和西方强国一样也没有预料到阿拉伯世界的这场变革。


At the end of 2010, Erdoğan was the (last) recipient of a human-rights prize granted by Libya’s Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi.	2010年年底，埃尔多安成为利比亚上校穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲颁发人权奖项的（最后）一位获奖者。


Turkey has also tried, desperately at times, to maintain good relations with Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, despite the Syrian government’s abominable behavior.	尽管叙利亚政府作恶多端，土耳其有时仍竭力保持与巴沙尔·阿萨德政权的良好关系。


Turkey’s position was, to say the least, perceived badly by the “Arab street.”	至少，土耳其的立场被“阿拉伯街”向坏的方面做了理解。


A major reason for Turkey’s tougher position towards Israel, one suspects, is Erdoğan’s attempt to rebalance the country’s regional image.	人们怀疑土耳其对以色列的强硬立场是因为埃尔多安企图重新平衡该国的地区形象。


Despite its difficulty in grasping the reality and depth of the Arab revolutionary process, Turkey is nonetheless more than ever a key player in the region.	虽然难以把握阿拉伯革命进程的现实情况和深入程度，但土耳其在该地区发挥的作用仍然超过以往。


It may not be a model in the strict sense of the term, but it is at least a source of inspiration throughout the region, even though much of its record is ambiguous in both essence and performance.	它可能算不上严格意义上的榜样，但至少是整个中东地区信心的来源，即便它的多数记录无论从实质还是表象层面上都模棱两可。


In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, the “exoticism” of the Ottoman Empire was used as a mirror to project Europeans’ own shortcomings and insecurities.	欧洲的17和18世纪，奥斯曼帝国的“异国情调”被当作反映欧洲自身缺点和不安全感的一面镜子。


In France, one spoke of “Turqueries,” such as in Moliere’s play “The Bourgeois Gentilhomme.”	法国人经常谈起“土耳其风潮”，比方说莫里哀的剧作“贵人迷”。


Today, it is the Arab world that tends to use Turkey the way that Europe did in the past.	今天，阿拉伯世界对土耳其的态度类似过去的欧洲。


This time, however, it is modernity, not exoticism, that is the source of fascination.	不过这次是现代化、而不是异国情调对他们产生了诱惑力。


But, because of its secular tradition (now being challenged by the current regime), its non-Arab identity, its behavior towards its Kurdish minority, and the ambivalence of the Ottoman legacy, Turkey is as much a counter-model as a model.	但是由于土耳其的世俗传统（现在正面临现政府的挑战）、它的非阿拉伯特质、它对库尔德少数族裔的作为和对奥斯曼帝国遗产的矛盾心理，土耳其既是光辉榜样，也是反面典型。


It is a mirror in which the Arab world projects its fears, as well as its hopes.	它是阿拉伯世界投射恐惧和希望的一面镜子。


At a strategic level, Turkey is correct in thinking that the Arab revolutionary process has weakened its direct rivals.	战略层面，土耳其准确地意识到阿拉伯革命进程削弱了直接对手的势力。


Iran, for example, is on the verge of losing the faithful junior partner that it had in Syria.	比方说伊朗正快要失去叙利亚这个忠实的小兄弟。


But what will happen if Turkey has to live next to a nuclear-armed Iran?	但如果土耳其不得不紧挨着装备了核武器的伊朗又会怎样？


Will it have to get the bomb, too?	是不是它也要掌握核武器？


Likewise, while Egypt is in the midst of a messy revolution, and must give priority to internal change, it also intends to regain a more visible and influential role within the Palestinian national movement(s) and in the region as a whole.	同样，尽管埃及正在经历一场混乱的革命，必须重点关注内部变化，但它也想在巴勒斯坦民族运动和整个地区重新发挥有显著作用的影响力。


The “Middle Empire” of the Middle East will no longer remain a sleeping giant.	中东的“中王国”将不再是沉睡的巨人。