CHICAGO – The lawsuit filed by the US Securities and Exchange Commission against Goldman Sachs for securities fraud, charging the bank with misrepresenting the way  a collateralized debt obligations (CDO) had been formed, has revived public disgust at credit default swaps (CDS), the instrument used to bet against these CDOs.	芝加哥——美国证券交易委员会发起对于高盛公司涉嫌欺诈的起诉,指控高盛在一项债券抵押证券(CDO)交易中有歪曲其构成的行为，这使得公众对于信用违约互换（CDS）更加反感，CDS是用于对冲CDO的金融工具。


Before the 2008 financial crisis, CDSs were an esoteric product, known only to a restricted number of sophisticated investors and specialized academics.	在2008年的金融危机之前,信用违约互换(CDS)对于大多数人来说是一种神秘的金融产品,只有一小部分资深投资者和学术研究人员才知晓。


Today, they are a household name, synonymous with unruly speculation, boundless greed, and, ultimately, systemic instability.	如今，这一名字变得家喻户晓，而且和疯狂的投机，无限制的贪婪甚至系统性不稳定成为同等的贬义词。


Indeed, CDSs are blamed as one of the main causes of the financial crisis.	的确，CDS产品被指责为金融危机爆发的主要原因。


The legality of Goldman Sachs’ behavior will be determined by a court of law, but CDSs’ odious reputation is jeopardizing the survival of this instrument in the court of public opinion.	而高盛上述行为的合法性也将被法院裁决，但CDS在公众中糟糕的名声已经威胁到其自身的生存问题。


Riding the populist wave, several politicians have proposed a ban on CDSs.	迎合着民粹主义的浪潮，数位政治家开始呼吁取缔CDS。


The recent Greek crisis has further galvanized the anti-CDS camp.	最近的希腊危机进一步巩固了反CDS的阵营。


After all, isn’t it the fault of the CDS market’s avaricious speculators that Greece was on the verge of default and that Greek public employees have had to endure deep wage cuts?	毕竟，正是希腊政府在CDS市场几近违约的情况使得政府雇员不得不接受大幅降薪，把节省出来的资金补偿贪婪投机者的疯狂行为。


In a word, no.	但是简而言之，取缔CDS是不正确的。


Far from being the spawn of the devil, CDSs are a useful financial instrument that can improve not only financial stability, but also the way that companies and countries are run.	CDS远不是引发危机的罪魁祸首，反而是一种很有效的金融工具，不仅能提升金融体系的稳定性，也是公司和政府参与金融市场运行的方式。


Banning them will do more harm than good.	取缔CDS弊大于利。


Any attempt in that direction is detrimental, because it would divert attention from the useful goal of disciplining the CDS market to make it more transparent, stable, and efficient.	任何朝着取缔CDS方向的努力都会带来负面效应，因为这将分散市场的注意力，原本市场关注的焦点是如何更加有效的监管CDS市场，使得其更加透明，稳定并且有效，从而使其发挥应有的作用。


One key advantage (if not the key advantage) of capitalism over central planning is the information conveyed by market prices.	资本主义制度相比于集中计划经济的一项关键优势（或者说是最主要的优势）在于通过市场价格传递信息。


When the demand for potatoes at the current price exceeds supply, the price of potatoes rises, signaling scarcity.	如果在当前的土豆价格上需求高于供给，那么土豆价格就会上升，传递出土豆供应紧缺的信息。


Individual farmers do not need any bureaucratic directive to decide whether to plant more potatoes: an increase in prices creates an incentive to plant more potatoes; a decrease in prices is a signal that they should plant less.	农业个体户并不需要依靠政府的行政指导来决定是否种植更多土豆。 价格的上升会激励农民种植更多的土豆，价格下降则是供应过剩的信号。


The same is true with stock prices.	在股票价格上也是这样。


An increase in the stock price of steel manufacturers suggests an increase in the demand for steel, which induces entrepreneurs to start more steel plants and investors to provide them with the money.	钢铁企业股价的上升预示着钢铁需求量将会上升，这将指导企业提高钢产量，同时投资者也会向钢厂提供更多的资金。


Conversely, a decrease in the stock price of steel manufacturers leads entrepreneurs to liquidate existing plants and dissuades investors from committing more resources to the sector.	如果反之，钢铁企业股价的下跌预示企业要尽快清空库存，并且告诫投资者停止向钢铁行业提供更多资源。


Unfortunately, sometimes prices fail to perform this signaling function properly, as the dot-com and housing bubbles in recent years showed.	不幸的是，有时股价并不能正确实现信号传递机制，就像近年来的网络泡沫和房地产泡沫显示的那样。


During the dot-com bubble, prices signaled huge demand in the Internet sector.	在网络泡沫期间，股价显示互联网公司的股票的需求远不能得到满足。


For this reason, hundreds of millions of dollars were wasted in advertising improbable companies on TV and building network capacity beyond any foreseeable need.	因此，数亿美元被浪费在那些充满概念的公司广告上，以及构建远远超过当前可以预见到的需求的网络容量。


During the housing bubble, prices signaled a severe scarcity of houses. So billions of dollars were poured into new developments in remote locations where nobody wants to live.	在房地产泡沫时，房价显示房屋的供应量严重不足，因此数十亿美元被投到了那些遥远的没有人愿意住的地方大兴土木。


Given the large misallocation of resources in such cases, it is vital to understand why prices failed to provide an accurate signal to investors.	在这些例子中，大量的资源被错误的分配，因此，理解为什么价格信号没能准确向投资者反应价值至关重要。


Why did the United States, with the most developed financial market in the world, experience two major bubbles in less than a decade?	为什么美国和世界上其他大多数发达的金融市场在10年内经历了两次大的泡沫？


An expansive monetary policy is partly to blame, but the real problem is an institutional setting that favors bullish sentiment.	扩张的货币政策会被归咎于一部分原因，但是真正的问题在于人们由来已久的习惯，更加偏好乐观的消息。


Pension funds, mutual funds, and investment banks are all long in the stock market.	养老基金，共同基金和投资银行都在参与股票市场。


Shorting a stock is difficult and risky: it is difficult because borrowing stocks is hard to do, and it is risky because shorting has limited upside but infinite downside.	做空一只股票很难，而且伴有很大的风险。 之所以难，是因为很难向他人借入股票，而风险大是因为收益总是有限的，可能的损失确却是无限的。


In other words, the traditional securities available to investors make it easier to bet in favor of a company than against it, causing prices to be affected more by irrational exuberance than by panics.	换一句话说，现有的交易性证券使得投资者更容易青睐一只股票，而不是看空它，这也使得股票总是被更多非理性的乐观情绪左右，而不是理性的警惕。


In this respect, CDSs are unique.	从这个角度来说，CDS是独特的。


Because they function as insurance on borrowers’ ability to meet their obligations, they make it easier to express a negative opinion on a company or a security.	因为CDS的作用是对于放款人监管义务能力的一种保险，CDS使得公司或者证券的负面信息更容易被传递出来。


To express a negative view via the CDS market, investors do not need to locate securities to borrow (a prerequisite to shorting), and they risk only a limited premium, while they have the opportunity to gain many times that.	通过CDS市场传递出来的负面观点，将使得投资者不必借入证券（做空行为的先决条件），他们只需要付出一点有限的期权费用，却有机会获得数倍于期权费的收益。


It was the CDS market that allowed the negative – and correct – view of the housing market held by John Paulson and others finally to be embedded into market prices.	正是CDS市场允许那些负面的-而且是正确的-关于房地产市场的信息被约翰•保尔森和其他人所掌握，并最终一切反应到市场价格中去。


They made the bubble burst.	他们戳破了泡沫。


While painful for the rest of society, this is healthy.	虽然这会让其他经济部门阵痛，对于整个社会来说确是健康的。


The longer a bubble lasts, the more damage it causes.	一个泡沫持续的时间越长，那最终造成的损失也越大。


The same reasoning applies to the Greek crisis.	同样的原理也适用于希腊危机。


The CDSs on Greece provide a useful signal of the country’s compromised financial situation.	希腊CDS市场上的信号告诉别人这个国家缺乏风险抵抗力的金融境况。


It is thanks to the spike in the CDS market that the Greek government tightened its budget and improved its fiscal position.	也要感谢CDS市场中的稳定剂，那就是希腊政府缩紧预算并降低财政赤字。


Medical tests, too, often bring bad news, but abolishing medical testing does not solve problems, it only hides them, making them worse.	药物测试也是这样的，经常带来坏消息，但禁止药物测试不会解决问题，只会将问题隐藏的更深也更加糟糕。


The reason that politicians and corporate managers alike hate CDSs is precisely because CDS rates are so useful and so prompt in exposing their mistakes.	政客和公司管理层之所以讨厌CDS的原因主要是因为CDS比率非常敏感有效，而且有助于暴露他们的错误。


Nobody likes to be found wrong.	而没有人愿意被挑错。


For this reason, politicians and powerful businessmen often cajole the press, the credit rating agencies, and even the analysts to portray their actions in a positive light.	正因为如此，政客和有影响力的企业家经常诱哄媒体，评级机构甚至分析师，让他们把自己的证券评级为正面的。


As the main source of negative information that is not sensitive to power, the CDS market is feared, and politicians want to eliminate it.	作为负面信息的主要来源，而且对于那些权威并不感冒，CDS市场才被人们惧怕，政客都想除之以绝后患。


Of course, the CDS market is not perfect.	当然，CDS市场并不完善。


In fact, it is not really an organized market, but only an informal virtual exchange.	事实上这并非一个真正有组织性的市场，而只是一种不正式的虚拟交易。


The existing rules are designed not to make it transparent or resilient, but to make it more profitable for large institutions like Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan.	现行的交易制度在设计之初并非使得这个市场更加透明有效，而是为了使得控制这个市场的大机构获利。


So intervention is needed to formalize the CDS market and force appropriate collateralization, so that no government has to step in to rescue any counterparty.	因此CDS需要外部介入使得CDS市场更加规范化，并且使其合理的向其他地方延伸发展，从而使得政府不再需要介入市场进行救援。


But regulating the CDS market does not mean banning it.	但是监管CDS市场并不意味着取缔它。


To do so would only sow the seeds of the next bubble.	这样做只会为下一轮泡沫埋下种子。


The Moral Economy of Debt	债务的道德经济


LONDON – Every economic collapse brings a demand for debt forgiveness.	伦敦—每一次经济崩溃都会带来债务豁免需求。


The incomes needed to repay loans have evaporated, and assets posted as collateral have lost value.	用来偿还贷款的收入切断了，用来作为抵押品的资产价值崩盘了。


Creditors demand their pound of flesh; debtors clamor for relief.	债权人要求拿回本息，这个要求合法而不合理； 债务人大声嚷嚷着要求豁免。


Consider Strike Debt, an offshoot of the Occupy movement, which calls itself “a nationwide movement of debt resisters fighting for economic justice and democratic freedom.”	以“罢免债务”（Strike Debt）为例。 罢免债务是“占领”（Occupy）运动的变体，它号召“全国债务抵制者联合起来，为经济正义和民主自由而斗争。


Its Web site argues that “[w]ith stagnant wages, systemic unemployment, and public service cuts” people are being forced into debt in order to obtain the most basic necessities of life, leading them to “surrender [their] futures to the banks.”	”其网站指出，“在工资停滞、系统性失业和公共服务削减的情况下，”人们被迫背上债务才能获得最基本的生活必需品，这导致他们“将未来拱手让给银行”。


One of Strike Debt’s initiatives, “Rolling Jubilee,” crowd-sources funds to buy up and extinguish debt, a process that it calls “collective refusal.”	罢免债务运动之一的“滚动禧年”（Rolling Jubilee）采取众筹的方式筹集资金买断和注销债务，其自称这是“集体拒绝式债务抵制”。


The group’s progress has been impressive, raising more than $700,000 so far and extinguishing debt worth almost $18.6 million.	该组织的突飞猛进之势令人瞩目，目前已筹集700,000多美元，注销了价值近1,860万美元的债务。


It is the existence of a secondary debt market that enables Rolling Jubilee to buy debt so cheaply.	滚动禧年运动之所以能够如此廉价地买下债务，是因为存在二级债务市场。


Financial institutions that have come to doubt their borrowers’ ability to repay sell the debt to third parties at knock-down prices, often for as little as five cents on the dollar.	怀疑借款人偿付能力的金融机构以跳楼价将债务卖给第三方，有时候出售价格只有面值的5%。


Buyers then attempt to profit by recouping some or all of the debt from the borrowers.	买家随后要求借款人偿还这笔债务中的一部分，以此获利。


The US student-loan provider Sallie Mae admitted that it sells repackaged debt for as little as 15 cents on the dollar.	美国学生贷款提供商萨利美（Sallie Mae）承认它以一五折的价格出售再打包后的债务。


To draw attention to the often-nefarious practices of debt collectors, Rolling Jubilee recently canceled student debt for 2,761 students of Everest College, a for-profit school whose parent company, Corinthian Colleges, is being sued by the US government for predatory lending.	为了吸引对通常相当邪恶的催帐者行为的注意力，滚动禧年最近取消了艾弗勒斯学院（Everest College）2,761名学生的学生贷款。 艾弗勒斯学院是一所盈利院校，其母公司克林西安学院集团（Corinthian Colleges）被美国政府以掠夺性借贷为由告上了法庭。


Everest College’s loan portfolio was valued at almost $3.9 million.	滚动禧年以106,709.


Rolling Jubilee bought it for $106,709.48, or about three cents on the dollar.	48美元买下了它，相当于面值的3%。


But that is a drop in the ocean.	但这只是沧海一粟。


In the US alone, students owe more than $1 trillion, or around 6% of GDP.	光是在美国，学生贷款就超过1万亿美元，相当于GDP的6%左右。


And the student population is just one of many social groups that lives on debt.	而学生只是许多依靠贷款的社会群体之一。


Indeed, throughout the world, the economic downturn of 2008-2009 increased the burden of private and public debt alike – to the point that the public-private distinction became blurred.	事实上，放眼全球，2008—2009年经济衰退导致私人和公共债务负担上升，以至于公共和私人之间的区分已不再明显。


In a recent speech in Chicago, Irish President Michael D. Higgins explained how private debt became sovereign debt: “As a consequence of the need to borrow so as to finance current expenditure and, above all, as a result of the blanket guarantee extended to the main Irish banks’ assets and liabilities, Ireland’s general government debt increased from 25% of GDP in 2007 to 124% in 2013.”	爱尔兰总统希金斯在最近的芝加哥讲话中解释了私人债务是如何变为主权债务的：“由于需要借钱为当前支出融资，同时也主要因为将全额担保扩大到爱尔兰主要银行的资产和负债，爱尔兰中央政府债务占GDP之比从2007年的25%上升到2013年的124%。 ”


The Irish government’s aim, of course, was to save the banking system.	当然，爱尔兰政府的目的是拯救银行系统。


But the unintended consequence of the bailout was to shatter confidence in the government’s solvency.	但这场援助的意外后果是撼动了人们对政府偿债能力的信心。


In the eurozone, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Cyprus all had to restructure their sovereign debt to avoid outright default.	在欧元区，爱尔兰、希腊、葡萄牙和塞浦路斯都不得不重组主权债务以避免直接违约。


Rising debt/GDP ratios cast a pall over fiscal policy, and became the main justification for austerity policies that prolonged the slump.	升高的债务/GDP之比给财政政策加上了一道枷锁，也成为让经济探底长期化的紧缩政策的主要依据。


None of this is new.	这些都不是新鲜事。


Creditor-debtor conflict has been the stuff of politics since Babylonian times.	债权人-债务人冲突自巴比伦时代以来就是政治问题。


Orthodoxy has always upheld the sacred rights of the creditor; political necessity has frequently demanded relief for the debtor.	正统永远坚持债权人的神圣权利； 而政治需要常常要求减免债务人负担。


Which side wins in any situation depends on the extent of debtor distress and the strength of the opposing creditor-debtor coalitions.	在任何时候，哪一方获胜取决于债务困境的严重程度和对立的债权人-债务人联盟的紧固程度。


Morality has always been the intellectual coin of these conflicts.	道德一直是这些冲突中思想因素。


Creditors, asserting their right to be repaid in full, historically have created as many legal and political obstacles to default as possible, insisting on harsh sanctions – garnishment of income, for example, and, at the extreme, imprisonment or even slavery – for borrowers’ failure to honor their debt obligations.	债权人主张得到足额偿付的权利，在历史上总是尽可能多地给违约设置法律和政治障碍，坚持对不能履行债务义务的借款人实施严厉制裁——比如扣除收入，在极端情形中甚至包括入狱乃至奴役。


Governments that incurred debt in costly wars have been expected to set aside annual “sinking funds” for repayment.	在烧钱的战争中背上债务负担的政府被要求每年计提“偿债基金”（sinking fund）。


Morality, however, has not been entirely on the side of the creditor.	但是，道德并非完全站在债权人一边。


In New Testament Greek, debt means “sin.”	在希腊语《新约》中，债务意味着“罪恶”。


But, though it might be sinful to go into debt, Matthew 6:12 supports absolution: “forgive us our debts, as we also have forgiven our debtors.”	但是，尽管背负债务或许是罪恶的，但《马太福音》6:12节支持赦免：“原谅我们的债务，正如我们也原谅了我们的债务人。


Widespread social resistance to creditors’ claims on debtors’ property for non-payment has meant that “foreclosure” has rarely been carried to extremes.	”社会广泛反对债权人获得不偿还债务的债务人的房产，这意味着“收回按揭偿还权”是很少采用的极端手段。


The position of debtors was further strengthened by the prohibition of usury – charging unreasonably high interest on money.	禁止高利贷进一步强化了债务人的立场。 在英国，利率上限直到1835年才被取消；


Interest-rate caps were abolished in Britain only in 1835; the near-zero central-bank rates prevailing since 2009 are a current example of efforts to protect borrowers.	2009年以来央行普遍采取了近零利率则是保护债务人的最新例子。


The truth of the matter, as David Graeber points out in his majestic Debt: The First 5,000 Years, is that that the creditor-debtor relationship embodies no iron law of morality; rather, it is a social relationship that always must be negotiated.	大卫·格雷柏（David Graeber）在其巨著《债：第一个5,000年》（Debt: The First 5,000 Years）中指出，事实的真相是债权人-债务人关系并不包含什么道德铁律； 相反，这是一种永远可以商量的社会关系。


When quantitative precision and an unyielding approach to debt obligations are the rule, conflict and penury soon follow.	当精确的定量计算和坚持到底要求履行债务义务成为规则时，冲突和贫穷就会接踵而至。


In an effort to stem recurrent debt crises, traditional societies embraced the “Law of Jubilee,” a ceremonial wiping clean of the slate.	为了防止债务危机反覆，传统社会采取了“禧年法”（Law of Jubilee）——将石板清洗干净的仪式。


“The Law of Jubilee,” writes Graeber, “stipulated that all debts be automatically canceled ‘in the Sabbath year’ (that is, after seven years had passed), and that all who languished in bondage owing to such debts would be released.”	格雷柏写道，“禧年法规定，所有债务都在‘安息年’（Sabbath year，即七年后）自动清除，所有因为这类债务而饱受煎熬的人都应被释放。


The Rolling Jubilee is a timely reminder of the continuing relevance of one of the oldest laws of social life.	”滚动禧年及时地提醒我们，这一社会生活的最古老法则至今仍然重要。


The moral of the tale is not, as Polonius instructed his son Laertes, “neither a borrower nor a lender be.”	借贷的道德并非波洛涅斯（Polonius）对其子拉厄耳忒斯（ Laertes）所言“不要借钱，也不要借给人钱。


Without both, humanity might still be living in caves.	”没有借和贷，人类也许还生活在山洞里。


Rather, we need to limit the supply of and demand for credit to what the economy is capable of producing.	但是，我们需要限制信用的供给和需求，使之与荆棘的生产能力相配。


How to do this and maintain freedom of enterprise is one of the great unsettled questions of political economy.	如何实现这一点并保持企业的自由是政治经济学的未解难题之一。


Credit Where Credit is Due	信用应得到遵守


In the old days, when communist central planning suffocated China’s economy, fixed-asset investment was the regime’s measure of economic progress.	过去共产党中央计划抑制中国经济时，固定资产投资成为该政权促进经济发展的衡量标准。


The more tons of steel produced, slabs of concrete poured, and gallons of crude oil pumped out of the ground the better.	出产越多的钢材，越多混凝土灌注下去，越多原油从地下开采出来那么就越好。


The consumption-based economy, to which the capitalist West had apparently succumbed, was written off as a paper tiger.	西方资本主义唯首是瞻的以消费为基础的经济，被当作一只纸老虎甩到了一边。


On the surface, nothing much has changed.	表面上什么都没有改变。


China remains obsessed with investing –construction of factories and infrastructure accounted for 41% of GDP and around half of economic growth in 2005.	中国继续沉迷于投资。 2005年新建工厂和基础设施占到了国民生产总值的41%，占据了几乎一半的经济增长。


Moreover, the country’s continuing high levels of fixed-asset investment make sense – building roads, water pipes, metro systems, telecommunication networks, and electronics factories is what a vast and rapidly modernizing country must do.	此外，国家持续高水平的固定资产投资有其意义所在。 建设道路、水管、地铁系统、通讯网络和电子厂是一个幅员辽阔、快速现代化的国家必须要做的。


But the Communist Party leadership has decided that in the next decade hairdressers, accountants, karaoke hostesses, tour guides, and movie directors will be the new pillars of economic performance.	但是共产党领导人认定在下一个十年，理发师、会计、卡拉OK女服务员、导游和电影导演将成为经济表现的新支柱。


As investment growth slows and export markets endure their unpredictable business cycles and protectionist moods, China will increasingly rely upon consumption for creation of jobs and income – and the service industry is where most consumption occurs.	在投资增长放缓以及出口市场面临不可预测的商业循环和保护主义情绪的情况下，中国将越来越多地依赖消费来增加工作岗位和收入的增长，而服务业正是消费产生最多的产业。


There is only one problem: Chinese people do not seem to want to consume, at least according to commonly cited data.	现在只有一个问题，那就是中国人似乎不愿意消费，至少根据通常引用的数据是如此。


National savings amounted to roughly 50% of GDP in 2005, which apparently means that households are so afraid of hospital bills, school fees, and the down-payment on the new apartment they dream of that they save every penny they earn.	国民储蓄2005年已经差不多占到了国民生产总值的50%，这显然意味着中国家庭对医疗、教育以及他们所梦想拥有的新住房的首期付款惶恐不安。


But that savings number hides something very critical.	但是，那个储蓄数额背后隐藏了某些更为严峻的东西。


Chinese households do save a lot, about one quarter of their income.	中国家庭确实把大约他们收入的四分之一都存进了银行。


But as Louis Kuijs of the World Bank has pointed out, what sets China apart from many other developing countries is not that households save uniquely high levels of their income, but that enterprises do.	但是正像世界银行的Louis Kuijs指出的，中国区别于许多其他发展中国家的地方不是在于中国家庭把他们极大部分的收入存了起来，而是在于企业也是如此。


Indeed, private consumption in China has been growing in real terms at an annual rate of around 10% for the last seven years.	实际上，过去七年间，中国的个人消费以事实上大约10%的速度增长着。


This means that getting Chinese households to spend more is not a hopeless mission.	这意味着要让中国的家庭进行更多的消费并非无望。


According to the credit card provider MasterCard, by 2010 China’s middle class will number 100 million, each with discretionary spending of $5,590, and 7.5 million affluent people, each with $13,500 to spend.	据信用卡提供商万事达公司称，到2010年中国的中产阶级将达到1亿，其人均可自由支配收入为5590美元，而富裕阶层将达到750万人，人均可自由支配收入为13500美元。


But why wait until 2010?	但是为什么一定要等到2010年呢？


If a decent credit culture can be created, people can have access to tomorrow’s income today.	如果能够建立起一种坚实的信用文化的话，人们今天就可以开始支配未来的收入。


People in their twenties could borrow money to buy a house, start a family, and go on holiday, paying the money back when they are in their fifties and would much rather stay at home and enjoy their grandchildren.	二十来岁的人可以借钱去买房子，建立家庭，以及去度假，等他们五十多岁的时候再把钱还回来，然后呆在家里享受天伦之乐。


Consumer credit began in China only in the late 1990’s, with regulations allowing banks to offer mortgage loans, which now amount to about 10% of total loans.	消费信用只是在九十年代后期才开始在中国出现，政策允许银行提供住房抵押贷款，现在这部分的贷款占到贷款总量的10%左右。


According to a recent survey by the People’s Bank (the central bank), households in the ten largest cities spend about 35% of their monthly income on average on mortgage repayments, which is comparable to other countries.	根据人民银行（中央银行）最近的一次调查，在十个最大的城市里的家庭平均将大约35%的月收入用于偿还抵押贷款，这与其他一些国家已经相差无几了。


Loans for education and car purchases are now also possible, and 2% of households have credit cards, which is obviously still low compared to 75% in the United States, but there were no such households just five years ago.	教育贷款和购车贷款现在也可以实现了，已经有2%的家庭拥有了信用卡，这与美国的75%相比虽然显得很低，但是考虑到五年前甚至没有家庭拥有信用卡，这已经很不错了。


Although debit cards remain far more common, banks like China Merchants Bank have been aggressive in issuing real credit cards.	尽管大多数人持有的是借记卡，但是像中国招商银行这样的银行已经不遗余力地发放真正的信用卡了。


A key problem with the credit card rollout is that the payment system is not yet in place.	信用卡正式上市关键的问题在于支付系统还没有建立。


UnionPay, the market leader, is expensive for retailers to install, and many shops prefer cash to avoid tax.	市场上最好的银联系统因为太昂贵而使零售商无力承受，许多商店更喜欢用现金支付以逃税。


However, outstanding credit on cards is growing, more than quadrupling year on year in 2004, to 0.18% of GDP, according to the consulting firm McKinsey.	可是，根据麦肯锡咨询公司提供的数据，没有清偿的信用卡信贷正在快速增长，2004年同比增长了四倍，占国民生产总值0. 18%。


Several other obstacles must nonetheless be surmounted in order to boost consumption.	其他几方面的障碍也必须被克服以刺激消费。


First, banks still have few reliable means of checking borrowers’ creditworthiness, including previous loans from other banks.	首先，银行核查借款者的信用诚信程度，包括以前从其他银行的贷款的可靠手段还是太少。


Educational loans should be booming in urban and rural China, but banks do not know to whom to lend, so they are not.	教育贷款本应在中国的城市和农村快速增长，但是银行不知道应该把钱贷给谁，所以它们没有把钱贷出去。


Second, banks are vulnerable to non-repayment.	其次，银行对欠款不还束手无策。


The car loan market underwent a mini-boom in 2003-04, but non-repayment rates in excess of 50% forced banks to pull back.	车贷市场在2003至2004年间曾经昙花一现，但是欠帐比例超过了50%，迫使银行又退了回去。


The difficulty of repossession (where did the borrower park the car?) and sale (the used-car market is still in its infancy) meant that most of these bad loans had to be written off.	收回汽车的困难（谁知道贷款者把车停在哪儿呢？ ），以及出售收回来的汽车的困难（旧车市场依然处于襁褓中）意味着绝大部分这些坏帐只好一笔勾销了事。


There is also a dark cloud over the mortgage market following a judgment by the Supreme People’s Court in 2003 that banned the repossession of homes that are a primary residence.	��高人民法院2003年颁布的一项禁止收回作为住宅的房子的判决也像乌云一样压在抵押市场的头顶。


A recent revision of that decision permits banks to repossess homes, but only if they help arrange alternative lower-cost housing – an administrative nightmare for lenders, particularly if a lot of people start defaulting at the same time.	最近对于此项规定的修改允许银行收回房子，但是它们必须协助安排贷款者住进价格便宜一些的替代住房。 对于放贷者来说要将此付诸实施简直是一个行政性噩梦，尤其是如果有很多人同时开始违约的话。


Third, consumers are generally not adept at dealing with interest-rate risk.	第三，消费者普遍不善于面对利率波动的风险。


Nearly all mortgages have floating rates that vary with the five-year loan rate set by the People’s Bank.	几乎所有的抵押贷款有着与人民银行规定的五年贷款利率不同的浮动利率。


However, late last year, Everbright Bank and some others began offering fixed-rate mortgages.	尽管如此，去年晚些时候，光大银行和其他一些银行开始提供固定利率的抵押贷款。


Take-up has been slow, but the April 2006 surprise hike in bank rates may help to sow greater public awareness of interest-rate risk.	现金购进已经放缓，但是2006年四月份银行利率的突然上调也许能帮助公众认识到利率波动的风险。


Finally, China needs a greater diversity of financial products.	最后，中国需要使其金融产品多样化。


Until recently, banks could offer only simple savings accounts.	直到最近，银行还只能提供简单的储蓄账户。


But structured deposits – for example, deposits whose rate of return is linked to the performance of the New York Stock Exchange – are becoming increasingly popular.	但是结构性的储蓄，比如，回报率与纽约证券交易所的行情挂钩的存款慢慢开始发展起来。


Securities investment funds now account for roughly 30% of tradable stock market capitalization, although this represents only 0.9% of GDP, compared to more than 5% in India.	证券投资基金现在占到了流通股票市场市值总额的大约30%，尽管它还只占国民生产总值的0. 9%，而印度的这一数字为超出5%。


The economic significance of new financial products is likely to grow more rapidly as foreign banks enter the market.	随着外资银行进入市场，新的金融产品在经济中所占的重要性可能会得到飞速发展。


If China’s regulators issue the right licenses, the financial sector will play a key role in nurturing and sustaining the consumer society of tomorrow.	如果中国政府能合理颁发许可证的话，那金融部门将在培育和维护未来消费社会的进程中扮演重要角色。


Crime and Punishment, Refugee Style	难民式的罪与罚


The horrible murder of Giovanna Reggiani that took place near a Romanian refugee camp in the suburb of Tor di Quinto in Rome shocked both Italy and Romania.	Giovanna Reggianni被谋杀的惨剧发生在罗马郊区的Tor di Quinto，这一案件在意大利和罗马尼亚都引起了震动。


The case gained significance by adding fuel to the fiery public debates now underway not only in Italy but across Europe on the status of refugees and foreign residents.	它进一步激发了关于难民和外国居民问题的热烈公众讨论，这场讨论不但席卷了意大利还波及到整个欧洲，并使该案的意义得到进一步提升。


Some Italians responded violently; some Italian and Romanian politicians, eager to offer quick and tough solutions, made scandalous statements that echoed the xenophobic and totalitarian slogans of the past.	有的意大利人以暴力方式回应； 有些意大利和罗马尼亚的政客，急于诉诸短平快的解决方式，发表了令舆论哗然的言论，与历史上仇外和极权主义的口号如出一辙。


We are encountering, not without irony, a kind of grotesque reverse of the “national pride” seen when cultural and sporting stars are appropriated by the state and presented as part of the collective patrimony.	不无讽刺的是，我们正遭遇着一种怪异的“民族自豪感”的逆转：正如文化和体育明星们被国家利用，作为集体的世袭财产。


Although the murder was an individual crime, to compound the tragedy of a crime through measures that target an entire minority is irresponsible, and will have grave moral and social consequences not only for the unjustly punished but also for the punishers.	虽然谋杀是一种个体犯罪，但通过一种针对整个少数族群的方式使这种犯罪悲剧复杂化是不负责任的，并且对于受到不公正惩罚的人和惩罚者本身都会产生严重的道德和社会后果。


No minority is, after all, homogenous, which was demonstrated by the fact that the person who alerted the police was a compatriot of the killer and from the same camp of refugees.	毕竟，没有一个少数族群是单一化的。 向警方报案的人就是杀人者的同胞并来自同一个难民营的事实就说明了这一点。


Collective punishment also means not only a type of amnesia by Italians and Romanians about what happened under fascism, nazism, communism, but also for their own national histories.	集体惩罚也意味着意大利人和罗马尼亚人不仅对法西斯主义、纳粹主义和共产主义的历史，还对自己的民族历史犯了健忘症。


Italians, after all, migrated not only from Italy’s south to its north, but also to other countries looking for a better life.	毕竟，为了过上更好的生活，意大利人不仅从南方迁移到北方，还移民到其他国家。


They, too, know what it is like to be a refugee, an exile, a stranger.	他们也同样了解作为难民、流亡者和异乡人的感受。


Romania, for its part, has a history not at all admirable in regard to it its “Roma” minority, whose shortcomings and deeds always attract blame but never any real action by the state to improve their condition.	就罗马尼亚而言，其与“罗马”族相关的历史也不甚光彩。 这个民族的缺点和行为常常招致诟病但国家却从未采取过任何的切实行动来改善他们的状况。


The Roma minority first appeared in Romania in the 14th century, but only in 1856 was its slavery abolished!	罗马族最早出现在14世纪的罗马尼亚，但他们的奴隶制却在1856年才被废除！


Romanian society nowadays is dealing with the consequences of decades of terror and lies, of demagogy and poverty that scarred several generations.	罗马尼亚社会现在正应对着伤害了几代人、延续了数十年的恐怖与谎言、煽动与贫穷所种下的后果。


These wounds cannot be instantly healed.	这些伤口不可能很快弥合。


Communism’s fall unleashed a huge surge of human energy, but this started with a bizarre and cynical transfer of privileges and assets within the old “nomenklatura,” and with a new general Darwinian struggle.	共产主义的崩溃释放出一股巨大的人类能量，但它的起点却是特权和资产在老的“精英阶层（nomenklatura）”内部以一种古怪和愤世嫉俗的方式转移，以及一种新的普遍的达尔文主义者的挣扎。


Although economic progress is visible across Romania, and a gradual renewal of a civic conscience through the arrival of democracy has appeared, Romania’s burlesque of a political life – despite its European Union membership – shows how persistent its bad old habits of duplicity, inconsistency, fatalism, inertia, and corruption are.	虽然罗马尼亚在经济上取得了显著的进步，并且随着民主的到来公民道德的重建也在逐渐萌芽，但罗马尼亚的政治秀—尽管它已加入欧盟—也反映出口是心非、自相矛盾、宿命、惯性和腐败等陈年陋习是多么的顽固。


Corruption, indeed, now seems to be the society’s engine.	的确，腐败现在似乎成为了社会的引擎。


There remain in Romania today disadvantaged and neglected groups who are pushed to society’s sordid margins.	当今的罗马尼亚仍然有被排挤到社会边缘的弱势和被忽视的群体。


The Roma population, indeed, has 41% seasonal workers, 33.5 % lack any professional skills, 38.7 % are illiterate.	的确，罗马族的人口中有41%是季节性工人，33. 5%缺乏任何的专业技能，38.


This is not only a Romanian problem, but has become a problem for all of Europe.	7%是文盲。 这不仅是罗马尼亚的问题，还业已成为全欧洲的问题。


Nicolae Romulus Mailat, the young man of 25 accused of Giovanna Reggianni’s murder, had been interned at age 14 in a school for re-education.	被指控谋杀Giovanna Reggianni的25岁青年Nicolae Romulus Mailat在14岁时就被拘押，进入一所工读学校就读。


He was later condemned again for theft, but was pardoned a year before arriving in Italy.	后来他又一次因为偷窃而获罪，但在来意大利的前一年被赦免。


Was poverty the cause of his juvenile offenses in Romania and his crime in Italy?	贫穷是造成他在罗马尼亚的少年犯罪和意大利的罪行的原因么？


In Dostoievski’s great novel Crime and Punishment , Raskolnikov is pushed to committing his crime not only by his nihilism and rebelliousness, but also by poverty.	在陀思妥耶夫斯基的伟大小说《罪与罚》中，把Raskolnikov推向犯罪深渊的不仅是虚无主义和叛逆心态，还有贫穷。


His social identity is not the same as Mailat’s, his spiritual “entity” is drastically different, but his double crime is no less abominable.	他的社会认同与Mailat不同，他的精神“存在”也迥异，但他的双重罪行却同样令人憎恶。


For now, there is no reason to hope that Mailat will find through his crime a new start towards salvation through suffering and spiritual renewal.	目前，人们没有任何理由希望Mailat能通过痛苦和心灵的重建从他的罪行中找到通向救赎的新起点。


But perhaps we should hear again the words of one of Raskolnikov’s interlocutors when he speaks about the “disgusting Sodome” in which he wanders and says that poverty is not a vice, but misery.	但我们也许应该回想一下Raskolnikov的一位对话者在提到他混迹其间的“令人厌恶的索多玛”时所讲的话。 他说贫穷不是一种堕落，而苦难才是。


In poverty one still keeps a kind of “innate noble sentiment,” while in misery moral collapse is inherent and disastrous.	在贫穷中，人们依然可以保持一份“与生俱来的高尚情操”，而在苦难中，道德沦丧是固有和灾难性的。


Mailat sought escape from his Romanian misery and his Romanian past, but could not imagine that he would find in an Italian refugee camp as much misery as before; that the image in the mirror of his daily new life would be that of a killer.	Mailat企图摆脱他的罗马尼亚苦难和过去，但却想像不到自己在意大利的难民营中会经历和先前同样的苦难； 也想像不到自己在镜中的新的日常形象会是一个杀手。


People who know the frightening neighborhood of Tor di Quinto, where Giovanna Reggiani was killed have harsh words to say about the neglect and indifference of Rome’s city government.	了解Tor di Quinto一带可怕的治安状况的人猛烈的抨击了罗马市政府的严重忽视和漠不关心。


This isn’t, of course, an excuse for this crime or for any crime, but it cannot be ignored.	当然，这虽然不是这一桩或任何一桩罪行的借口，但也不容忽视。


Although we cannot expect a miraculous reincarnation of the criminal Mailat, we can and must ask for a radical review of the situation that marginalized people like him face.	虽然我们不能期望Mailat奇迹般转世再生，但我们能够也必须要求对和他一样的边缘人群的情况进行彻底评估。


That review must be done not only by Romanian and Italian states, but by the Roma community in Romania and Italy and also by the European community itself.	这种评估不光要由罗马尼亚和意大利国家实施，也要由罗马尼亚和意大利的罗马族社团和欧盟同时进行。


For the perpetrator is a member of all these communities.	因为该罪犯是所有上述社会组织的一员。


We hear voices now who are exasperated by the EU’s enlargement and the social tensions it provoked.	我们听到被欧盟的扩大及其所造成的社会紧张状况激怒的声音。


Increased migration is, indeed, a daily fact in our centrifugal and global modernity, but it isn’t only a negative one.	的确，日渐汹涌的移民潮是我们离心而又全球化的现代性中不容否认的事实。 而它也不仅仅是负面的。


The free movement of people doesn’t only mean more social conflict and criminality.	人员的自由流动并不只是意味着更多的社会冲突和更高的犯罪率。


It also means a gradual and beneficial cohabitation that began immediately after WWII as a common effort to help out the defeated countries and enhance their chances for democracy and prosperity.	它也意味着从二战以后就立即开始的一种渐进和有益的共同生活状态。 它作为一种共同努力帮助战败国，并提升它们实现民主和繁荣的机会。


When I visited Barcelona and Madrid last year, I was delighted to receive enthusiastic news about the successes of the growing Romanian community in these cities.	当我去年访问巴塞罗纳和马德里时，我对这两个城市里的罗马尼亚人群体正在成功壮大的好消息深感欣慰。


Some Romanian refugees were already candidates for the local elections, praised for their hard work and honesty.	有些罗马尼亚难民已经成为地方选举的候选人，由于勤奋和诚实而为人称道。


It will happen, I hope, also in other places and not only with Romanians but with all the people ready to face the provocations of our time.	我希望这样的情况还会发生在其他地方，不仅是在罗马尼亚人中间，也在所有准备好面对我们这个时代的挑衅的人们中间。


For these are examples not only of individual success, but are victories for the community as well.	因为这些例子不仅是个人的成功，也是群体的胜利。


Europe deserves to prove that it is a real community, one diverse, democratic, spiritual, free, and prosperous.	欧洲应该证明自己是一个真正的社会，一个多元、民主、高尚、自由和繁荣的社会。


Financial Stars Behind Bars?	铁窗后的金融之星？


CHICAGO – Hardly a day goes by without a settlement between a bank and a US government agency or regulator.	发自芝加哥——每天都有银行和美国政府机构或监管机构进行清偿结算。 最近的一个纠纷和解发生在美国银行和政府支持的抵押贷款机构房利美（Fannie Mae）之间，它包括：现金共计35.


The latest one is between Bank of America and the government-backed mortgage underwriter Fannie Mae: $3.55 billion in cash; $6.75 billion in repurchases of bad mortgages that Countrywide, later acquired by BoA, sold to Fannie; and an additional $1.3 billion in cash to resolve Fannie’s servicing issues with BoA.	5亿美元用于回购不良抵押贷款——这是全美金融公司卖给房利美的，前者后来被美国银行收购； 以及额外的13亿现金用以解决房利美与美国银行之间的服务问题。


And yet, as in most settlements, BoA did not admit any fault.	然而，一如在大多数和解中那样，美国银行并没有承认任何错误。


Was BoA tripped up by bad luck or sloppiness?	美国银行犯错是因为运气不好，还是因为行事草率？


Or did it and other financial institutions behave with intent to defraud investors?	还是说它和其他金融机构都在故意欺骗投资者？


As a result of the settlement, we will never learn the truth (at least the version that is established beyond a reasonable doubt in open court).	由于该和解，我们将永远不会知道真相（至少是一个可以经得起公众质疑的版本）是什么。


In each settlement, the investigations are stopped, and whatever has been found is sealed.	在每一个和解里，调查都会被中止，所有发现都会被封存。


Fortunately, academic research may be able to shed some light on this important matter.	幸运地是，学术研究对这个重要的事件也许能够作出一些解释。


In a recent paper, the economists Tomasz Piskorski, Amit Seru, and James Witkin compare the characteristics of securitized mortgages as they were disclosed to investors at the time of sale with these loans’ characteristics as they were recorded in the banks’ proprietary databases.	在最近的一篇论文中，经济学家托马斯·皮茨科斯基（Tomasz Piskorski）、阿米特·塞鲁（Amit Seru）和詹姆斯·维特金（James Witkin）比较了那些证券化抵押贷款在出售时向投资者公开的信息与银行专有数据库内贷款的特征。


The data cover non-agency residential mortgages, which are not the same as those targeted by the settlement, and the data come from a pool of banks, so we do not know which banks were present.	该数据覆盖的是非代理住房抵押贷款，这与和解所针对的贷款并不相同，而且数据来自多家银行，所以我们并不知道哪些银行参与其中。


But their data are similar enough to enable us to learn a lot about what was going on.	但它们的数据竟如此相似，让人不难明白发生了什么。


If the massive wave of defaults on securitized mortgages was purely the result of bad luck, we would expect that the characteristics reported to investors would not differ from those recorded in the banks’ databases.	如果大规模的证券化抵押贷款违约完全是运气不好的结果，我们就会看到报告给投资者的数据特征与银行数据库所记录的数据特征是一样的。


This is especially true of characteristics that are relevant to default risk, such as whether the borrower was an owner or an investor, or whether there was a second lien on the property.	与违约风险相关的数据特征更是如此，比如借款人是业主还是投资者，或者该财产是否有二次质押。


In fact, the authors find that more than 6% of mortgage loans misreport the borrower’s occupancy status, while 7% do not disclose second liens.	事实上，论文的作者们发现超过6%的抵押贷款错报了借款人的房屋使用状况，同时有7%的抵押贷款记录并未公开二次质押状况。


Of course, any database contains errors.	当然，任何数据库都会有误差。


Are these errors large enough to be worrisome?	那么以上所提到的错误大到足以令人担忧吗？


And how can we be sure that the banks knowingly misrepresented this information, rather than that they merely were sloppy in reporting it?	我们如何能确定银行故意虚报了这一信息，而不仅仅只是写报告时不小心犯了错？


The authors provide some interesting evidence in this context.	在这种情况下，该论文的作者们提供了一些有趣的证据。


They show, for example, that the misrepresentation is correlated with higher defaults down the line: delinquent payments on misreported loans are more than 60% higher than on loans that are otherwise similar.	比如，他们表明出错的数据与高违约贷款密切相关：报告出错的贷款违约率比那些在其他方面相似的贷款要高出60%。


Thus, the errors do not seem to be random, but purposeful.	因此，这些错误似乎并不是随机的，而是蓄意人为的。


What the authors do not find is also interesting.	而该论文的作者们并未发现的东西也很有趣。


The degree of misrepresentation seems to be unrelated to the incentives provided to the top management and to the quality of risk-management practices inside these firms.	虚报的程度似乎与提供给高管的激励以及这些公司内实施的风险管理质量并不相关。


In fact, all reputable intermediaries in their sample exhibit a significant degree of misrepresentation.	事实上，所有信誉良好的中介在他们的样品上都表现了很大程度的虚报。


Thus, the problem does not seem to be limited to a few bad apples, but is pervasive.	因此，问题似乎并不仅限于一些害群之马，而是普遍性的。


This makes a solution more difficult to achieve.	如此要找到一个解决方案就更难了。


After all, if the financial industry’s leaders are misleading investors, it is the culture of the entire industry that needs to be changed.	毕竟，如果是金融行业的巨头们在误导投资者，那整个行业的文化都需要被改变。


Unfortunately, these giant settlements are unlikely to make a difference.	不幸的是，这些巨大的清偿和解并没有什么作用。


They are paid by shareholders and taxpayers (most of these settlements are tax-deductible), leaving the people who were ultimately responsible not only to walk away, but to walk away very rich.	这些和解的钱是股东和纳税人出的（大部分结算都是免税的），却让那些最终应该负责的人一走了之，而且他们都能带着一大笔钱离开。


For example, Angelo Mozilo received almost $470 million during his tenure as CEO of Countrywide Financial.	比如，安吉洛·莫兹里奥（Angelo Mozilo）在美国国家金融服务公司任首席执行官期间收入达4. 7亿美元。


As far as I know, he paid nothing of BoA’s $11.6 billion settlement cost.	据我所知，美国银行116亿美元的解决费用，他一分钱也没付。


Mozilo did settle with the SEC, but on different charges (insider trading).	莫兹里奥的确和美国证券交易委员和解了，但费用不一样（内幕交易）。 6.


And he paid only $47.5 million of the $67.5 million settlement, owing to a $20 million indemnification agreement that was part of his employment contract.	75亿美元的费用他只需出4. 75亿美元，因为2亿美元的补偿协议是他雇佣合同的一部分。


Why have Mozilo and others been allowed to pay a relative pittance and avoid criminal proceedings?	为什么莫兹里奥和其他高管能够被允许付相对少的赔偿而又能避免刑事诉讼呢？


A few prominent criminal convictions have sent a powerful signal in the fight against insider trading.	若干重要的刑事定罪已经给打击内幕交易发出了强有力的信号。


If the target is an industry-wide culture of deception, shouldn’t the criminal justice system be mobilized against banks’ mortgage fraud as well?	如果目标是整个行业范围的欺骗文化，刑事司法系统不也应该被动员来打击银行的抵押贷款欺诈吗？


Criminalizing HIV	论对艾滋病毒的刑事犯罪化


JOHANNESBURG – “If the law supposes that,” Mr. Bumble says in Charles Dickens’ novel Oliver Twist, “the law is an ass.”  A criminal law that makes it preferable for carriers of HIV not to know that they are infected and capable of spreading it to others, including their loved ones, seems particularly suited to Mr. Bumble’s condemnation.	约翰内斯堡-“如果法律是这样认定的”，查尔斯·狄更斯的小说《雾都孤儿》中的邦博先生这样说道“ 那么法律就是个屁。 ”有一种刑事法律，它使艾滋病毒携带者宁愿不知道自己已经被感染并能传播给包括亲人在内的其他人，这样的法律似乎特别适合邦博先生的谴责。


Yet tragically, in a misguided attempt to thwart the spread of HIV and AIDS, lawmakers in many parts of the world have passed criminal statues that promote ignorance about the disease, punish its victims, and enhance the chances that the virus will infect new victims.	然而，悲剧性的是，世界上许多地方的立法者们在阻止艾滋病毒和艾滋病蔓延的过程中犯了错误，他们通过了一种能增加人们对艾滋病的无知并惩罚艾滋病的受害者的刑事法，而且还会提高该病毒感染的机率。


Some countries in Western and Central Africa are enacting poorly drafted policies based on the African Model Law, which makes it a criminal offense for any person infected by the virus to transmit it to someone else or to expose another person to it.	一些中部及西部的非洲国家正在颁布仓促起草的基于非洲示范法之上的政策，那么任何感染了这种病毒的人，如果将病毒传染给别人或使另一人受到感染的威胁，这就成了一种刑事犯罪行为。


In some jurisdictions, prosecutors can bring charges against pregnant women who are HIV-positive for potentially exposing the virus to their unborn children.	在一些管辖区，检察机关可以对艾滋病毒抗体呈阳性的孕妇提出起诉，因为她们让未出生的孩子受到病菌感染的危险。


There are, to be sure, rare and dramatic cases in which a person with HIV infects another with the specific intention of inflicting harm.	可以肯定，确实是有罕见的富有戏剧性的案例，如一个艾滋病毒感染者怀着加害别人的意图去感染另一个人。


It is a reality that men infected with HIV or AIDS in some parts of Africa have even raped girls believing that sex with virgins is a cure.	事实上非洲一些地区的男性艾滋病毒感染者或艾滋病患者甚至去强奸少女，因为他们相信与处女发生性行为可以治愈艾滋病。


And some women’s rights advocates have supported laws that criminalize transmitting HIV, arguing that these laws would punish men who concealed their HIV-positive status from their sexual partners, including their wives and girlfriends.	一些妇女权利倡导者支持将传播艾滋病毒刑事化的法律，认为这些法律将严惩向性伴侣包括他们的妻子和女朋友隐瞒自己感染了艾滋病毒的男子。


But existing criminal laws are more than adequate to allow willing justice systems to mete out appropriate sanctions against people who intend harm.	但是，现有的刑事法足以让已有准备的司法系统对打算损害他人者进行恰当的制裁。


Criminal laws targeting all HIV carriers, however, are counter-productive and inherently unjust.	但是，针对所有艾滋病毒携带者的刑事法是起反效果的，本质上也是不公正的。


These laws effectively make criminals out of millions of the disease’s innocent victims, especially its women victims.	这些法律有效地使数以百万计的疾病的无辜受害者特别是其女性受害者沦为犯罪分子。


In Zimbabwe, for example, a woman was recently sentenced for exposing her lover to HIV even though she did not infect him.	例如，在津巴布韦一名妇女最近被判了刑，因为她让的情人处于感染艾滋病毒的危险中，即使她最终没有感染他。


In Ukraine, human rights lawyers report the troubling case of a woman who was convicted for transmitting HIV to her husband even though he had used a condom, and despite the fact that he asked for the charges to be withdrawn.	在乌克兰，人权律师的令人不安的报告中有一名妇女因为传播艾滋病毒给她的丈夫而被定罪，即使他使用了安全套并要求撤回起诉。


Gender bias against women permeates throughout Africa, and women are usually blamed for bringing HIV into a relationship.	对妇女的性别偏见遍及整个非洲，妇女通常被指责为把艾滋病毒带进两人关系。


This popular misconception springs, at least in part, from the fact that women are more likely to know their HIV status because they are routinely tested for HIV at maternity clinics when they seek pregnancy tests or examinations.	这种广泛流行的误解，至少部分源自一个事实，即妇女相对来说更可能知道他们是否感染了艾滋病毒，因为他们在产科诊所作怀孕测试或身体检查时，检查艾滋病毒是常规的检测项目。


Most men on the other hand—deterred by fear, ignorance, pride, and, sometimes, taboo—refuse to be tested voluntarily.	另一方面，大多数男人因为无知和自大，有时还因为忌讳而踌躇不前，拒绝接受自愿检测。


This skews the outcomes of legal cases because the lack of testing of men makes it nearly impossible for a woman infected with HIV to establish before a court of law that her male sex partner infected her.	这损害了法律案件的审判结果的公正性，因为少见测试过HIV的男子，所以一个感染了艾滋病毒的女人在法庭上几乎无法证明是她的男性性伴侣感染了她。


Laws criminalizing the transmission of HIV undermine public health because they deter people who are HIV-positive and those at risk of acquiring the virus from seeking testing, counseling, and treatment.	将传播艾滋病毒刑事化有损于公众健康，因为这些法律阻止了艾滋病毒抗体阳性并有风险感染病毒的人们去寻求测试、辅导和治疗。


When persons face the possibility of criminal sanctions, not knowing their HIV status can be their most-effective legal defense.  Prosecutions will act to deter many people—especially men as well as persons living in areas where HIV treatment is largely unavailable—from being tested because it would expose them to the risk of criminal liability.	当人们面临刑事制裁的可能性时，对自己是否感染的不知晓就可以作为他们最有效的法律辩护手段。 对于许多人，尤其是对男子以及居住在艾滋病毒治疗十分短缺的地区的人们，被起诉的可能性会起到阻止他们寻求检测的作用，以避免担当刑事责任的风险。


Such laws also transform HIV victims into scapegoats for a societal problem for which the governments and broader societies are failing to undertake effective, and sometimes politically or culturally risky, steps that can defeat the disease.	这样的法律还将艾滋病毒的受害者变为社会问题的替罪羊。 战胜这种疾病，需要政府和更广泛的社会群体采取有效的、有时需要冒政治上或文化上的风险的措施，但却没有能做到。


Sadly, these “risky” steps include things as rudimentary as open discussion of the disease, education, and encouraging people, and especially men, to undergo testing.	可悲的是，这些所谓的“冒险”的步骤包括以下这些最基本的事情，例如对疾病的公开讨论、教育和鼓励人们（尤其是男性）去进行检测。


AIDS has claimed more than 25 million lives since medical scientists first identified it in 1981.	自从医学科学家于1981年发现首例艾滋病以来，它已经夺去了2500多万人的生命。


New infections continue to outpace treatment efforts.	在治疗方面所作的努力其速度仍然赶不上新感染的人数。


Basic precautionary options such as HIV testing, male and female condoms, and sterile syringes for drug injection remain out of reach for the vast majority of those who need them.	基本的预防措施如艾滋病毒测试、男用和女用安全套以及注射毒品用的无菌注射针筒对于绝大多数需要它们的人来说，依然不能得到。


This woeful situation demands effective action and not more victims and scapegoats.	这种令人悲伤的情况要求我们采取有效的行动，而不是增加更多的受害者和替罪羊。


Open, informed discussion of the HIV epidemic, education into HIV prevention, distribution of condoms, and other strategies are the only known way of preventing new infections.	公开和知情的对HIV病毒流行的讨论、预防艾滋病感染的教育、安全套的发放以及其它的战略是目前唯一的已知的预防新的感染的方法。


The vulnerability of women to HIV should be addressed by protecting their equal right to marital property, enforcing laws against gender-based violence, including rape in marriage, and empowering them to negotiate safer sex with men.	解决妇女更易感染艾滋病的途径，应该通过保护他们在婚姻财产方面的平等权、实施包括禁止婚内强奸在内的性别暴力的法律以及赋予他们和男子谈判安全性行为的力量的方法。


Libor Unplugged	被断开的伦敦银行间拆借利率


LONDON – Last year’s Libor scandal was a shock to the body politic in London.	发自伦敦——去年的伦敦银行间拆借利率（London Interbank Offered Rate，简称Libor）操纵丑闻对伦敦的政治体来说确实是一大冲击。


Despite all that had gone before, the public and their representatives were stunned to learn that bankers had systematically undermined the foundations of a global market benchmark – one with London in its name to boot – for personal gain.	尽管公众及其民意代表们早已见多识广，但银行家们为了一己私利而有计划有步骤地腐蚀这项全球市场基准指标——还是以伦敦来命名首发——存在基础的行为还是让前者大为震惊。


Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, felt compelled to launch a parliamentary inquiry.	对此英国财政大臣乔治·奥斯本（George Osborne）觉得有必要发起一项议会调查。


On June 19, after a year’s work, the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards finally laid a large egg.	一年之后的6月19号，英国议会银行业标准委员会终于取得了一项重大成果。


Bankers will certainly regard the outcome as what in England we like to call a “curate’s egg” (served a rotten egg by his bishop, a young clergyman, when asked whether the egg was to his liking, replied that it was “good in parts”).	银行家们必将对这个成果视为英格兰人所谓“牧师的鸡蛋”（一位年轻牧师与主教共进早餐但发现端上来的鸡蛋臭了，面对上级的亲切询问而又不敢得罪，牧师无奈回答说这个鸡蛋“肯定有一部分还是好的”）。


They will choke on the commission’s recommendation of a new criminal offense for reckless conduct that leads to taxpayer bailouts, reinforced by a new “senior persons” regime that would ascribe all bank functions to a specific individual, who would be held personally liable when things go wrong.	委员会提出增设一种新的罪名——所谓导致纳税人救助的贸然行为，该罪名同时又被新的“高级人员”管理体制所强化，它会将所有的银行功能归于一个特定的个人，一旦出了问题，他/她就要以个人身份承担责任。


The commission argues that “top bankers dodged accountability for failings on their watch by claiming ignorance or hiding behind collective decision-making.”	委员会认为“高层银行家通过声称不知情或集体决策来逃避自身监管失误所应付的责任”。


Its members aim to make that impossible.	其委员致力于杜绝这类行为。


If they have their way, behaving recklessly with banking assets will result in a prison sentence, with no Monopoly-style “get out of jail free” card for financial masters of the universe.	如果银行家们仍继续为所欲为，肆意处置银行资产将会导致牢狱之灾，对这些世界金融主宰者来说不会再有大富翁游戏式的“脱罪卡”这回事了。


I can already hear the sound of lawyers sharpening their pencils: the offense must be defined specifically enough to withstand a human-rights challenge.	我仿佛已经听到了律师们摩拳擦掌的声音：这种违法行为必须被定义得足够具体以便禁得起人权挑战。


But, if implemented, the commission’s proposed regime would certainly be tougher than what is now on offer in New York or other banking centers.	而一旦实施，委员会建议的管理体制肯定要比现在纽约或其它金融中心推行的更加严厉。


And British MPs are noticeably impatient with what they consider the glacial pace of change in global regulation; they want action now.	而英国的国会议员们显然对现行全球监管的缓慢变革速度极不耐烦； 他们想要马上行动。


If the United Kingdom does proceed in this unilateral way, what would the consequences be for London’s banking industry?	如果英国确实单方面实施了这一措施，对伦敦金融业来说会有什么样的后果呢？


Would New York, Frankfurt, or even Paris receive a competitive boost as international bankers, alarmed at the prospect of time behind bars if their derivative trades blow up again, flee the City?	纽约、法兰克福、甚至巴黎的竞争力会不会因此大幅提升，因为国际银行家们害怕万一自己的衍生品交易再次出事而面临牢狱之灾，纷纷逃离伦敦？


The commission’s members offer two, somewhat contradictory, answers to that question.	委员会成员对这个问题给出了两个有点相互矛盾的答案。


The first is that, frankly, they don’t care.	第一个答案是，坦白地说，他们不在乎。


“The risk of an exodus should be disregarded,” the commission says, noting that the advantages of being a global financial center have been accompanied by serious associated risks to the domestic economy.	委员会认为伦敦“应该忽视大批撤离的风险”，他们注意到作为全球金融中心的优势一直都伴随着国内经济的相关严重风险。


Unlike the United States, where the financial sector is smaller as a share of GDP, the UK economy has still not recovered the output lost in the post-2008 Great Recession, owing to continued retrenchment in the banking sector.	跟金融业只占GDP一小部分的美国不同，由于银行业持续紧缩，英国经济的产出仍然未能从2008年后大萧条的损失中恢复过来。


The commission’s members do recognize that London’s loss of status as a global financial center would be costly in terms of jobs and output, so they developed a second line of argument.	委员会的成员也确实意识到伦敦失去全球金融中心地位对就业和产出来说损失很严重，所以他们还准备了第二套说辞。


“There is nothing inherently optimal,” they say, about a level playing field in international finance.	他们说：在平等的国际金融竞技场上，“没有什么是天生完美的”。


Attempts to develop a single European financial market have, in their view, forced countries to respond to the failings revealed by the 2008 crisis at the speed of the “slowest ship in the convoy.”	在他们看来，试图建立一个单一的欧洲金融市场迫使各国以“船队中最慢的船”的速度来对2008年危机暴露的错误作出反应。


By contrast, the commission argues, “there may be big benefits to the UK as a financial center from demonstrating that it can establish and adhere to standards significantly above the international minimum.”	与此这等慢速相反的是，委员会提出，“如果英国可以表现出自身能建立并坚持远超国际最低限度水平的标准，那么对其作为金融中心可能会有巨大的好处。


In addition to the tough new regime of personal accountability, the commission would supplement the Basel standards on bank capital with a tight leverage ratio.	”除了严格的新个人负责体制之外，委员会将制定一个更保守的杠杆比率来补充巴塞尔银行资本标准。


The British government, preoccupied with finding ways to stimulate growth as the next election approaches, will no doubt think hard before making any changes that might drive business offshore.	随着下一期选举逼近，英国政府一心想要找到刺激经济增长的方法。 他们在做任何改变之前肯定会认真思考，以免做出任何会把商业赶到其它国家的错误决定。


But the government is caught between a rock and a hard place, hemmed in by a parliament that, strongly backed by a bank-hostile press and public opinion, is eager to enact reforms, and by EU directives to implement a tougher regime.	但英国政府同时又受到两方面的压力，一方面国会受到对银行怀有敌意的媒体和公众舆论强烈支持，非常渴望实施改革； 另一方面欧盟又下达指令要实施更严格的管理体制。


So, is the Commission right that the government should move quickly on reform and disregard the consequences?	那么，国会要求政府必须迅速推行改革并忽视其后果的做法是对的么？


Such evidence as one can find from international surveys suggests that the regulatory changes implemented so far have not driven bankers away.	正如人们可以从国际性调查中找到的证据所显示的一样，迄今为止实施的监管变化并没有赶走银行家们。


London has already implemented an approach that is tougher than that of most other financial centers.	伦敦已经实施了一套比其他大多数金融中心现有管理体制严格得多的方法。


Taxes levied on executive bonuses have cost international banks dearly.	对高管奖金征收的税已经让国际银行狠狠地出了一次血。


Regulators are now appreciably tougher and more intrusive than their counterparts in New York.	现在伦敦的银行管理者明显比纽约的同行们要严格并进行着更多的干预。


Bankers don’t like it, but they have not yet left for more congenial locations.	银行家们并不喜欢这种变化，但他们并没有因此离开伦敦去那些看似更适宜的地方。


Nor do they indicate that they will.	他们也没有表示将来会离开。


Indeed, the latest Z-Yen index of global financial centers showed London maintaining its first-place position – and with its margin over New York unchanged.	确实，最新的全球金融中心Z-Yen指数表明伦敦依然保持着榜首位置——而它的利润超过纽约的情况也没有变化。


The Asian centers are catching up, as one would expect, but they are hardly direct competitors for business that would otherwise be done in London.	正如人们所预料的一样，亚洲金融中心正在迎头赶上，但它们还远算不上伦敦某些业务上的直接竞争对手。


Frankfurt and Paris, the most plausible European competitors, languish in tenth and 26th place, respectively.	法兰克福和巴黎看似是伦敦最合理的竞争对手，却分别只在第十和第二十六位徘徊。


Rating agencies and shareholders are nervous when they hear that a stricter regulatory environment is not necessarily a disadvantage.	一个更严格的监管环境并不一定是件坏事的说法会让评级机构和股票持有者们感到非常紧张。


But a regime in which personal responsibility strongly affects individuals in one jurisdiction will give bankers pause for thought, especially in the case of global banks with complex matrix-management systems that enable product heads to be moved elsewhere.	但在一个个人责任强烈影响一个地区内所有个人的管理体制会让银行家们停下来想一想，尤其对那些有着复杂矩阵式管理体系，可以将其产品开发主管转移到别的地方去的国际银行来说。


British legislators will need to be satisfied that any new regime captures the right people, in the right way.	英国的立法者将需要满足于所有可以以恰当方式夺得合适人才的管理体制。


However politically appealing the idea of rogue bankers behind bars might be, putting them there is likely to remain very challenging in practice.	不管这种让狡诈的银行家蹲监狱的想法在政治上多有吸引力，真要把银行家送到监狱是很难实现的。


Crippled Pakistan	跛腿的巴基斯坦


NEW DELHI – The problems and dilemmas confronting Pakistan’s leadership – including a deepening vortex of mutual suspicions, sectarian killings, and brazen terrorism – are almost too numerous to count.	发自新德里——巴基斯坦领导层所面对的问题和困境——包括不断加深的互不信任漩涡，派系仇杀以及厚颜无耻的恐怖主义——简直不可尽数。


And that leadership – whether civilian, military, and also the now politically active judiciary – has proven congenitally ineffective, leaving the country with a broken economy and a paralyzed political system.	而领导层——不管是平民，军人还是目前在政治上最积极的司法人员——都已经被证实是先天不足，令整个国家只剩下残破的经济以及瘫痪了的政治系统。


Central to the world’s concerns about the region is the complex reality of the two Taliban movements – one in Afghanistan, over which Pakistan’s powerful Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence has a great deal of control, and one in Pakistan itself, which is waging an increasingly vicious guerrilla war against the Pakistani government.	全世界对该区域的关注核心就是两场塔利班运动的复杂现实——一个在阿富汗，很大程度上由势力强大的巴基斯坦三军情报局控制着； 还有一个是在巴基斯坦国内，正在资助一场日益邪恶的旨在反对巴基斯坦政府的游击战争。


With the United States and NATO due to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, there is a real possibility that the Taliban will not only regain power there, but will also turn Pakistan into a truly failed state.	由于美国和北约已经决定在2014年末前将所有部队撤离阿富汗，很可能塔利班不但会重新夺回权力，还会将巴基斯坦变成一个真正的失败国家。


Encouragingly, after a gap of seven months when no military supplies could reach Afghanistan via the Khyber Pass – a cutoff that followed the death of Pakistani soldiers at the hands of NATO troops firing across the border – NATO trucks in early July were finally allowed to cross again.	但振奋人心的是，在向阿富汗运输军事补给的开伯尔山口被切断整整7个月后——这起事件因为北约部队向别境地区开火造成巴基斯坦士兵死伤而引起——北约卡车终于在7月初获得通行许可。


Somewhat guardedly, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced: “(Pakistani) Foreign Minister (Hina Rabbani) Khar and I acknowledged the mistakes that resulted in the loss of Pakistani military lives.	而美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿也不无保留地宣称：“（巴基斯坦）外长希娜·拉巴尼·哈尔（Hina Rabbani Khar）和我都认识到了由巴基斯坦军人伤亡所引发的错误事件。


We are sorry for the losses suffered by the Pakistani military.”	我们对巴基斯坦军队所遭受的损失感到抱歉。


Her affirmation of commitment to preventing such an event in the future appears to have sufficed to re-open the border to NATO’s resupply through Pakistan.	”前者保证避免在未来发生这类事件的承诺似乎也满足了巴方重开北约边界补给线的条件。


This self-defeating crisis is now over, but can both sides really prevent further deterioration in their complex, mutually dependent relationship?	这起搬起石头砸自己脚的危机如今已经落幕，但美巴双方是否又能防止本已复杂且相互依赖的关系不再继续恶化。


This question matters principally because Pakistan’s quest for national identity and territorial security is rooted in existential fear of its neighbors.	这个问题之所以如此重要，是因为巴基斯坦对国家定义和区域安全的要求是构建在对其周边邻国的恐惧之上。


Unfortunately, as Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center, an American foreign-policy think tank, observes, official Pakistani tactics sustain the country’s “isolation and decline.”	但不幸的是，正如美国外交智库斯庭森中心（Stimson Center）创始人迈克尔·克里潘所观察到的那样，维持着这个国家的“孤立和下滑”的正是巴基斯坦的官方策略。


Moreover, America’s tactics, Krepon argues, heighten “its estrangement with Pakistan.	此外，克里潘认为美国的策略加深了“它与巴基斯坦的不和”。


As long as current policies remain fixed, new points of contention seem inevitable between Pakistan, its neighbors, and the United States.”	只要当前的政策保持固定不变，新的争执将不可避免地在巴基斯坦，周边邻国以及美国之间出现。


The big question across South Asia is whether or not the withdrawal of US/NATO troops will attenuate Pakistan’s dilemmas or deepen them.	南亚地区最大的问题就是美国/北约的撤军究竟会缓解还是进一步加深巴基斯坦的困境。


Much will depend on how Pakistan addresses its internal turbulence, as well as how the situation in Afghanistan evolves.	而这很大程度上将取决于巴基斯坦如何处理其内部骚乱以及阿富汗局势将如何发展。


Many Pakistanis, including Sartaz Aziz, a former foreign minister who sees a policy vacuum, are not sanguine.	许多巴基斯坦人，包括认为当前处于政治真空的前外长萨尔塔·阿齐兹（Sartaz Aziz），对此都不乐观。


But the problem is deeper than an absence of effective leadership.	但问题要比缺少一个有效的领导层更严重。


As Pakistani journalist Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur has put it, “[W]hen states are formed on an artificial basis of contrived nationhood or on the basis of religion, as was the case with Pakistan, Israel, and Yugoslavia, they of necessity turn into…states dominated by militarist ideology.” Furthermore, “Pakistan, by claiming to be the legatee of the glory of Islam burdened itself with heavy historical baggage.” 	正如巴基斯坦记者米尔·穆罕默德·阿里·塔普尔（Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur）所说：“当国家是构建在一个勉强构造的人造基础或者是宗教基础之上，正如巴基斯坦，以色列和南斯拉夫这样，它们必将转变成为由军国主义理念主导的国家，”此外，“自称是伊斯兰教荣光继承者的巴基斯坦也令自己背上了沉重的历史包袱。


But could it have done otherwise?	但这个国家是否有其他路可走？


The elite of Pakistan, Ali Talpur continues, “subscribing to a statist and militarist ideology,” became “the self-appointed defenders of Islam,” and “even the brigands of Islamic history” were accorded the status of heroes, creating an illusion of invincibility and grandeur that is “not in any way in keeping with reality.”	阿里·塔普尔继续说，这个国家的精英阶层“接受了国家主义和军国主义理念”，因为那些“自我任命的伊斯兰教捍卫者”以及“甚至是伊斯兰历史上的强盗人物”都被授予了英雄的地位，也因此创造了一个“跟现实完全脱节”的战无不胜且冠冕堂皇的幻象。


Here, successive US governments have compounded South Asia’s problems by pursuing only their own national interests, at an incalculable cost to the natural, organic growth of the region’s countries.	在这一点上，历届美国政府都只追求自身的利益，令南亚的问题变得更加复杂，也对该区域各国的自然有机成长造成了数不清的危害。


Without Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran acting in concert, no lasting solutions can be found; they certainly cannot be imposed unilaterally by the US and NATO.	没有俄罗斯、中国、印度、巴基斯坦、阿富汗和伊朗的应和就不可能达成任何长期解决方案； 而这些方案显然也无法由美国和北约单方面推动。


Thus, a dilemma arises: the presence of US/NATO forces in Afghanistan is not in harmony with the natural urges and balance of the region.	因此一个困境逐渐浮现：在阿富汗的美国/北约部队与自然主张和区域平衡无法和谐一致。


After all, Afghanistan can remain only where it is, with or without US troops, which is why its future will remain an issue of great concern to Pakistan (and to India).	毕竟不管有没有美国部队，阿富汗都依然会在那里，而这也是巴基斯坦（和印度）对其未来深切关注的原因。


How are these countries to harmonize their own national interests and priorities with those of the Western powers?	而这些国家又如何能将自身的国家利益和优先事务与西方大国协调一致？


According to Kamran Shafi, a retired Pakistani army officer, Pakistan “has lost the trust of most, if not all of our friends.” Indeed, even Pakistan’s “brotherly” Saudi Arabia has extradited to India the man blamed by the Indians as one of the masterminds of the horrific terror attacks on Mumbai in November 2008.	据退役巴基斯坦高级军官卡姆兰·沙菲（Kamran Shafi）说，巴基斯坦“即便没有彻底名誉扫地，但至少已经失去了绝大多数友邦的信任，”事实上，即便是巴基斯坦的“兄弟国家”沙特阿拉伯都将被指控策划了2008年11月孟买恐怖袭击的嫌疑人引渡到了印度。


In promoting and pursuing terrorism as an instrument of state policy, Pakistan seems intent on never regaining that trust, without which peace, unseen in South Asia since the partition of British India in 1947, is impossible.	通过将推动和推广恐怖主义视为一项国家政策工具，巴基斯坦似乎根本不想重新赢得信任，而没有了信任，自1947年英属印度分裂以来失落的和平就无法归来。


South Asia now seems condemned to something akin to a 100-year war.	南亚地区如今似乎正遭受着某种类似英法百年战争的诅咒。


But, unlike Europe’s Hundred Years’ War, this struggle is shadowed by the potential for mutually assured destruction.	但与百年战争不同的是，这场斗争已经蒙上了“互相确保毁灭”的阴影。


Given the potent Pakistani and Indian nuclear arsenals, the war could be very short indeed.	考虑到印巴双方的核武器库，这场战争将非常漫长。


The Disintegration of Europe	欧洲的分裂


LONDON – If a clear signal was needed that the European Union is falling apart at an alarming rate, Hungary’s construction of razor-wire fences along the border with its fellow EU member Croatia is it.	伦敦—如果说要寻找什么信号证明欧盟正在以令人警惕的速度分崩离析的话，匈牙利沿着其与同为欧盟成员国的克罗地亚的边境修建铁丝网隔离障就是这样的信号。


The crisis in the eurozone has, of course, fragmented financial flows, caused economies to diverge, eroded political support for EU institutions, and set Europeans against one another.	当然，欧元区的危机割裂了金融流，导致不同经济体之间的两极分化，影响了对欧盟机构的政治支持，也让欧洲人民开始彼此反感。


Now, as governments erect barriers and reinstate border controls, the refugee crisis is disrupting flows of people and gumming up trade.	如今，随着各国政府建设隔离障、重启边境控制，难民危机正在阻挡人员流动、制约贸易。


And, as the EU unravels, the risk of Britain voting to leave is rising.	而随着欧盟分裂迹象日益明显，英国全民公决离开欧盟的风险也在增加。


It is often argued that the EU progresses through crises, because they focus minds on the overwhelming need for further integration.	人们常说，欧盟通过危机进步，因为欧盟专注于进一步一体化这一压倒一切的需求。


But such breakthroughs require at least four ingredients: a correct shared understanding of the problem, agreement on an effective way forward, willingness to pool more sovereignty, and political leaders able to drive change forward.	但这样的突破至少需要四个要素：对问题有正确的理解、对有效的前进道路形成一致、愿意将更多的主权集中起来，以及有能力推动变革的政治领袖。


All four are now lacking.	如今，这四个要素都难觅踪影。


EU leaders are weak, divided, and seemingly incapable of setting out a credible vision of the future benefits that European integration could provide, without which they cannot rally popular support and convince recalcitrant governments to bear their fair share of current costs.	欧洲领导人弱势、意见不一，似乎也没有能力勾勒出欧洲一体化所能提供的可信的美好未来前景，而没有这一前景，他们就无法赢得群众支持、说服顽固的政府承担当前成本的合理份额。


In the absence of an effective, common response, Europe’s crises fester, feed on each other, and foment unilateralism.	由于没有有效的共同应对方案，欧洲的危机愈演愈烈、彼此强化，并且煽动起单边主义。


The eurozone and refugee crises have common features that make them tricky to resolve.	欧元区和难民危机有一些共同特征，这些特征让它们变得难以克服。


Both involve disputes about sharing costs, complicated by a clash of values, at the center of which lies a newly dominant Germany.	两场危机都包含如何分担成本的纠纷，都因为价值冲突而变得复杂化，并且其核心都是新晋住在力量德国。


The EU is hopeless at burden sharing.	在负担分担方面，欧盟可谓不可救药。


Rather than agree on a fair division of costs, whether of the financial crisis or of welcoming refugees, governments try to minimize their obligations and shift them onto others – thereby increasing the collective costs.	欧盟各国政府未就公平的成本分配形成一致（不管是金融危机成本还是接收难民成本），而是试图尽量减少自己的义务，把义务转嫁给他人——从而增加了集体成本。


A banking crisis that could have been resolved through a fair and decisive restructuring of unsustainable debts has ballooned into a much greater economic and political crisis that pits creditors against debtors, both within and among countries.	银行危机本可以通过公平果断的重组不可持续债务方案解决，现在演变为一场更大的经济和政治危机，债权人和债务人针锋相对，各国内部和各国之间都是如此。


Likewise, EU rules stipulating that refugees should be granted asylum in the first member country they reach have proved both unworkable and unfair; because asylum-seekers mostly arrive in southern Europe and want to head north, Greece and Italy ignore the rules and facilitate their passage.	类似地，欧盟规则规定，难民应该在他们所到达的第一个欧盟成员国授予避难权，但这一规定根本无法实施，也不公平； 因为寻求庇护者大多从南欧进入，但希望到达北欧，而希腊和意大利无视欧盟规则，还未难民过境提供便利。


Transit countries such as Hungary try to divert refugees elsewhere.	匈牙利等中转国试图将难民转移到别处。


Resettling the almost 750,000 people who have sought asylum in the EU this year – still only 0.14% of the EU population – has thus become an existential crisis.	安置近750,000今年来欧盟寻求避难的难民——只占欧盟人口的0. 14%——也因此成为一场生存危机。


Part of the problem is blinkered decision-making.	问题的一部分在于决策过程缺乏远见。


EU leaders focus narrowly on limiting short-term financial and political costs, rather than thinking strategically about broader longer-term consequences.	欧盟领导人狭隘地只关注限制短期金融和政治成本，而不进行关于更广大的长期后果的战略思考。


Restructuring Greek debt in 2010 would have implied a financial hit for French and German banks (and the governments that stood behind them), but a much smaller loss than that implied by the mushrooming costs of an enduring crisis.	2010年重组希腊债务可能会对法国和德国银行（以及它们背后的两国政府）形成潜在金融冲击，但这一损失将比危机延续所造成的飙升的成本小得多。


Likewise, whereas welcoming refugees requires an initial investment of public funds, it can pay dividends as soon as the newcomers start working.	类似地，欢迎难民需要拿出公共资金进行初始投资，但只要新来者开始工作，就会产生红利。


A graying continent needs dynamic young workers to do jobs that locals spurn (or for which they lack the skills), pay for and care for the old, start businesses, and pursue spark new ideas that boost economic growth.	衰老的欧洲需要有活力的年轻人干本地人不愿意干（或缺少技能干）的工作、为老年人的医疗费用买单、开办企业、追求提振经济增长的新点子。


The clash of values also impedes compromise.	价值冲突也阻碍着妥协。


Germans insist that debtors have a moral obligation to pay what they owe and atone for their sinful profligacy.	德国人坚持债务国有道德义务偿还欠债、补偿他们罪恶的放荡生活。


A Slovak prime minister who rejects refugees on the grounds that “Slovakia is built for Slovaks, not for minorities” is hard to buy off.	斯洛伐克总理拒绝难民的理由是“斯洛伐克是为斯洛伐克人而建，不是为少数群体而建，”这一理由难以服众。


Even though the EU’s plan to resettle refugees would remove unwanted newcomers from Hungary, Viktor Orbán, the country’s authoritarian and nationalist leader, objects to it in principle, accusing Germany of “moral imperialism” in trying to foist its generous attitude toward refugees on its neighbors.	即使欧盟安置难民的计划让不受欢迎的难民离开匈牙利，该国民族主义极权领导人奥班原则上仍然反对，并指责德国试图将其对难民的慷慨态度强加给邻国是“道德帝国主义”。


Until recently, German policymakers sought to atone for the country’s Nazi past by seeking a more European Germany and bankrolling the EU, thus helping to smooth over many disputes.	直到最近，德国决策者都在试图通过寻求更加欧洲的德国和在资金上支持欧盟来为纳粹历史赎罪，这帮助平息了诸多纠纷。


But, with Germany’s position as creditor-in-chief having thrust it into the driver’s seat, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s administration now seeks to create a more Germanic Europe.	但是，德国作为首席债权人的地位让其取得了领头羊的位置，如今，德国总理默克尔政府正在寻求建立一个更加德国的欧洲。


Germany refuses to accept that its beggar-thy-neighbor economic policies – reflected in its massive current-account surpluses – are both a cause of the eurozone crisis and a major impediment to resolving it.	德国拒绝承认其以邻为壑的经济政策——反映在其巨大的经常项目盈余中——既是欧元区危机的原因，也是阻止解决欧元区危机的主要因素。


Instead, it bullies others to get its way, wrongly identifying its narrow interests as a creditor with those of the system as a whole.	相反，德国威胁其他国家为其马首是瞻，错误地将它作为债权人的狭隘利益当作作为一个整体的系统的利益。


Merkel has played a much more positive role in the refugee crisis.	默克尔在难民危机中起到的作用要积极得多。


Germany unilaterally suspended application of the EU’s asylum rules and pledged to accept all arriving Syrian refugees.	德国单方面中止了欧盟庇护申请规则，承诺接受所有到达德国的叙利亚难民。


But Merkel’s failure to offer those refugees safe passage has exacerbated the chaos.	但默克尔没有给这些难民提供安全通道加剧了混乱。


Subsequently reimposing border controls within the supposedly border-free Schengen Area set a terrible precedent, prompting Germany’s neighbors to do likewise.	随后在理应边境开放的申根地区重启边境控制树立了一个可怕的先例，德国的邻国可能会纷纷效仿。


Meanwhile, with the EU increasingly viewed as a source of economic crisis, political turmoil, and unwanted migrants, the risk that Britons will vote to leave in a referendum due before the end of 2017 is rising.	与此同时，随着欧盟被日益视为经济危机、政治动荡和有害移民的来源，英国人将在2017年底前进行的全民公决中离开欧盟的可能性也在增加。


Britain is already semi-detached – outside of Schengen and with opt-outs from the euro and many home-affairs matters (including asylum policy).	英国和欧盟已经处于半脱离状态——它身处申根协议之外，没有参加欧元区，许多内政事务（包括避难政策）也和欧盟不同。


With the government now seeking to negotiate even looser membership terms, Britain will end up more estranged from the EU even if it remains a member.	如今，英国政府正在寻求谈判更宽松的成员资格条件，最后即使留在欧元区，与欧盟的关系也将若即若离。


Polls are finely balanced and referendums unpredictable.	民意呈现出均势，很难预测全民公决的结果。


At a time of anti-establishment rage and political upheaval, anti-EU campaigners can peddle three fantasies of a post-EU future: a free-market, foreigner-free, or socialist Utopia.	在反现状情绪高涨和政治剧变时期，反欧盟阵营可以兜售三种后欧盟未来的梦幻情景：自由市场、没有外国人、社会主义乌托邦。


The pro-EU camp, by contrast, has to sell the reality of the EU as it is, warts and all.	相反，亲欧盟阵营只能立足于欧盟的现状——看起来毫无生气。


Until recently, EU integration seemed inevitable.	直到最近，欧盟一体化看上去都是不可阻挡的。


It might stall, but it would never go into reverse.	这一过程可能停滞，但绝不会逆转。


Countries joined; none left.	越来越多的国家加入欧盟；


But with the EU already crumbling, Brexit could turn that dynamic on its head.	从未有过家退出。 但欧盟裂痕已现英国退出可能让一体化的趋势逆转。


That is all the more reason to fix the EU before it is too late.	这也是必须趁早解决欧盟问题的原因。


Cristina Kirchner’s Choice	克里斯汀·赫尔南的选择


BUENOS AIRES – Bolstered by Argentina’s economic stability and widespread sympathy for her widowhood, President Cristina Kirchner’s easy re-election has confirmed that she can, indeed, govern a complex, contentious, and at times self-destructive society without her husband, Néstor.	布宜诺斯艾利斯——得益于阿根廷的经济稳定和人们对寡妇的同情，总统克里斯汀·赫尔南（Cristina Kirchner）轻松再度当选，这保证了她能够在没有丈夫奈斯托（Néstor）的情况下治理这个复杂、充满争议又经常干出自我毁灭之事的社会。


His presidency paved the way for hers, but she is a leader in her own right.	奈斯托的总统生涯为克里斯汀铺平了道路，但克里斯汀自有一套领导良方。


The question now is what kind of leader she will want to be in today’s more difficult domestic and international context.	现在的问题是，在如今更加困难的国内和国际环境下，她将如何扮演自己的领导者角色。


The Kirchners lifted Argentina out of the deep crisis of 2001, presiding over GDP growth rates similar to those of China.	赫尔南曾在2001年成功地将阿根廷带出了深度危机，让阿根廷的经济增长率能够和中国相媲美。


They partly restored Argentina’s social and political fabric, which had been weakened by the brutal adjustments made during that crisis, which triggered a president’s fall from power, default on the country’s debts, and a dramatic decline in living standards that left more than half of the population below the poverty line.	从某种程度上说，赫尔南重塑了被危机期间的无情调整严重削弱的阿根廷社会和政治生态——当时导致了总统下台、国债违约、生活质量严重下降、一半以上人口陷入贫困的后果。


Their management of the economy, which included a deluge of subsidies, reduced unemployment and poverty.	赫尔南阵营的经济管理（如大面积补贴）减少了失业和贫困。


The opposition underestimates the Kirchners’ achievements, arguing that the international context, particularly high commodity prices – and thus strong export revenues – bailed them out.	反对派贬低赫尔南阵营的成就，指出是国际环境，特别是商品价格高企（因此带来了强劲的出口收入）救了她。


While that is true, high export prices alone were no guarantee for success.	这不无道理，但光凭出口价格有所上涨还不足以保证成功。


But that tailwind may have been squandered, because the Kirchners have yet to make the structural changes – in industry, in the country’s energy policy, in education, and elsewhere – needed to free Argentina from extreme dependence on commodity prices.	但赫尔南阵营并没有充分利用国际环境之东风，他们至今都没有出台能让阿根廷摆脱对商品价格的极端依赖的工业、能源政策、教育及其他领域的结构性改革。


As a result, if the price of soy continues to fall, subsidies – a source of corruption and patronage – will be an increasingly heavy burden for public spending.	因此，如果大豆价格持续下滑，那么补贴——腐败和献金的温床——将日渐成为公共支出的沉重负担。


According to unofficial figures, subsidies already represent 5% of GDP, and only painful adjustments can reduce them.	据非官方数字统计，补贴要占阿根廷GDP的5%，而唯有痛苦的调整才能改变现状。


But what was an emergency remedy has become a long-term policy, because there is no economic activity to take its place.	但本应是紧急修正的方案已经变成了长期政策，因为缺乏将其付诸实践的经济活动。


Few in Argentina, which is enjoying a consumer boom, are worried about inflation.	阿根廷目前享受着消费繁荣，很少有人担心通货膨胀。


But prices are already rising at a 20% annual pace, which, if unchecked, will lead to conflict with the powerful Peronist unions.	但价格的年升高幅度已经达到了20%，如果不加遏制，将导致庇隆主义工会的抗议。


Moreover, given the country’s history of high inflation ravaging the economy, the problem needs to be addressed soon, before it gets out of hand.	此外，阿根廷历史上饱受通胀破坏经济之苦，因此这一问题必须在失控之间尽快解决。


Relations with Brazil expose other difficulties.	和巴西的关系是另一大考验。


Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff’s government, which began its term this year with an understanding that economic growth will slow sharply, devalued the real in order to shore up the country’s competitiveness.	今年开始执政的巴西罗瑟夫总统明白，经济增长将会大大放缓，因此实施了雷亚尔贬值的政策来提振巴西的竞争力。


That was bad news for Argentina, because Brazil, its main trading partner, will now buy less and sell more, undermining Argentina’s external position.	这对阿根廷来说是个坏消息，因为巴西是其主要贸易伙伴，如今从阿根廷买得更少，向阿根廷卖得更多，破坏了阿根廷的外部环境。


In this difficult international context, Cristina Kirchner will need to rebuild relations with the United States and Europe, which have been impaired since the default in 2001.	在如此困难的国际环境下，赫尔南需要重塑因2001年违约而遭到破坏的与美国和欧洲的关系。


Subsequent actions by her husband’s administration and her own have blocked improvement.	其丈夫在违约后的一系列举措以及她本人的措施阻碍了关系改善进程。


Néstor ridiculed President George W. Bush in front of the world: host to a summit of heads of state, he organized a parallel anti-summit with supporters of Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez.	奈斯托当着全世界的面摆了美国总统布什一道：在一次国家元首峰会中，作为东道国总统的他举办了争锋相对的反对峰会，邀请了卡斯特罗和查韦斯的支持者。


More recently, Cristina’s foreign minister presided over the requisitioning of a US military plane on Argentinean soil.	后来，克里斯汀的外交部长又征用过身处阿根廷领土内的美国军用飞机。


These spectacles were intended for national consumption, but the Americans deeply resented them.	这些措施都是为了提振国民消费，但美国人对此意见很大。


As for Europe, the Kirchner’s have not yet paid off Argentina’s debt – pending since the default – to the Paris Club of sovereign creditors.	至于欧洲，赫尔南至今仍未还清阿根廷欠巴黎俱乐部成员国债权人的债务——自违约以来，偿债问题一直悬而未决。


All of this hinders foreign investment and access to international credit.	所有这些都成了吸引外国投资和获得国际信贷的阻碍。


In the meantime, the US is opposed to concessionary loans for Argentina from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.	与此同时，美国反对世界银行和泛美开发银行向阿根廷提供优惠贷款。


In this context, Argentina’s rich and powerful vote with their wallets and send their dollars overseas.	在这样的环境下，阿根廷富裕阶层和权力阶层正在用钱投票，将自己的美元资产转移海外。


This year, the outflow is nearly $20 billion – almost a record.	今年，资本外流为200亿美元，几乎创下了历史记录。


Argentina is a country that lives in an almost continual state of emergency.	阿根廷是一个紧急状况频发的国家。


Its history has seen many coups, tens of thousands of people missing, a war with Great Britain, bouts of hyperinflation, a brutal economic crisis, default on foreign debt, and its most vulnerable citizens going hungry.	阿根廷的历史充满了数不胜数的政变、几万人失踪、马岛战争、反复恶性通胀、严重经济危机、外债违约和饥饿的孱弱公民。


But there is also a theatrical intensity about the Argentine character: we are dramatic like the tango and somber like the novels of Ernesto Sábato.	但阿根廷人极富戏剧天赋：我们像探戈一样热情，像萨瓦托（Ernesto Sábato）的小说一样忧郁。


That exceptional spirit benefited her husband, but the country’s institutions paid a high price.	如此无与伦比的精神让奈斯托获益良多，但阿根廷的政府机构付出了沉重代价。


Néstor convinced Parliament to allow him to modify the budget.	奈斯托说服国会允许他解决改善预算。


Later, he took the liberty of manipulating official statistics in order to hide inflation.	接着，他使出了操纵官方统计数字的伎俩试图隐藏通胀。


And, while building a system that would do whatever the government wanted, he began a struggle against critical journalism that continues under his wife.	此外，他建立了一套让政府为所欲为的体系，但被其妻子所控制的媒体批评得体无完肤。


With hard times approaching, will Cristina try to be a twenty-first-century Evita and create an epic by exploiting Argentines’ flamboyant tendencies, armed with an exceptional power or will she adopt Rouseff’s sensible attitude and combat inefficiency and corruption while strengthening governmental institutions?	艰难岁月就在眼前，克里斯汀是努力成为21世纪的庇隆夫人，利用阿根廷人的火热情怀和无与伦比的权力续写史诗新篇章，还是采取罗瑟夫的明智态度，向低效率和腐败宣战，同时强化政府机构的地位？


If she chooses Rouseff’s approach, she will first have to resist the temptation of perpetual re-election.	如果她选择罗瑟夫的道路，她首先必须抵制住连续当选的诱惑。


She and her husband had hit upon a novel scheme: alternating power between them every four years.	她和她的丈夫开创了有趣的传统：每四年在他俩之间交接一次权力。


Now a widow, she is exposed to the lame-duck syndrome, since she can’t be re-elected again.	如今，克里斯汀已经是一位寡妇，她将面对“跛脚鸭综合症”，因为她无法再度连任了。


The same Peronist caudillos that have obeyed her until now could start a war of succession if she does not find a way to continue in office.	一旦她找不到继续执政的办法，一直对她俯首帖耳的庇隆主义领导人就可以着手掀起权力交接之战了。


If she wants to retain power four years from now, she might do just that.	如果她想在四年后仍然握有大权，她可能会这样做。


After all, she now holds absolute control over a docile parliament.	毕竟，如今她对议会有着绝对的控制权。


In Argentina, as in many Latin American countries, presidents have so much power that other governmental institutions’ authority fades, eradicating the boundaries between the executive and the state.	阿根廷和很多拉美国家一样，总统权力无限，其他政府机构都是花瓶，行政和国家权力的界线很模糊。


If the only limits on Cristina are her own, Argentina will not weather the coming storm well.	如果克里斯汀唯一的障碍就是她本人，那么阿根廷很难组织未来政治风暴的降临。


Crony Central Banking in Hong Kong	任人唯亲的香港中央银行


HONG KONG – Joseph Yam, the head of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) and a career civil servant, is retiring.	香港——香港金融管理局总裁兼职业公务员任志刚就要退休了。


Ordinarily, that should not be a newsworthy event, yet it is, and for good reasons.	正常情况下这件事不该有什么新闻价值，但实际情况却截然相反，而且有正当理由。


Donald Tsang, Chief Executive of Hong Kong’s government, has the opportunity to restore integrity and proper governance in one of the most important statutory bodies in the territory by choosing a person solely on the basis of unimpeachable honesty and competence.	香港政府行政长官曾荫权有机会选择一位诚实和能力都无懈可击的人出任金管局总裁，并借此在香港最重要的法定机构之一恢复诚信和善治。


Yam remains a hero to many in Hong Kong, including journalists unschooled in international finance.	任一直是许多香港人、包括不懂国际金融的记者们心目中的英雄。


To them, he is the guardian of the Hong Kong dollar, which has been fixed at 7.8 to the US dollar for 26 years.	在这些人眼中，他是港元的保护者，26年来，港元与美元间一直维持着7. 8的固定汇率。


During the 1998 financial crisis, devaluation would have hurt those who owned local real estate but had little earnings or assets in US dollars.	1998年金融危机期间，贬值会损及拥有香港本地房产但鲜有美元收入或资产的群体的利益。


Not surprisingly, Hong Kong’s oligopoly of property tycoons opposed changing the peg despite the currency’s gross overvalue at the time.	香港处于寡头垄断地位的地产大亨不顾港币当时处在明显高估的状态，依然反对改革联系汇率。


The 7.8 exchange rate was maintained at the cost – borne by all citizens – of six years of economic stagnation.	香港为保持7. 8的汇率付出了6年经济停滞的代价——上述代价的承担者是全体香港公民。


The currency was in theory governed by a rules-based Currency Board, which the British invented for their smaller colonies.	港元在理论上由照章办事的货币局管理，这是英国人为小块殖民地发明的货币管理机制。


It tied the local currency to the British Pound, giving local authorities no discretion in monetary policy.	这种机制把当地货币与英镑挂钩，当地政府无权自行决定货币政策。


While imperial in origin, the rationale behind the Currency Board was sound.	尽管来源不乏帝国主义色彩，但货币局背后的理论基础却非常扎实。


Colonies were short on expertise.	殖民地缺乏相关的专业知识。


Freedom in money creation or in interest-rate policy could mean economic disaster – as, indeed, it did in many ex-colonies following independence.	自由创制货币或调整利率政策可能是经济灾难的代名词——事实上，众多前殖民地独立后也的确证实了这样的推测。


Yam was always frustrated by the lack of policy freedom under the Currency Board.	任一直以来都因为在货币局的管辖下缺乏政策自由而倍感沮丧。


Before the crisis struck in 1998 he put in place measures giving him room to manipulate liquidity and interest rates.	1998年危机来袭前，他已经把赋予他流动性和利率操控空间的政策落实到位。


His deviation from the system also created loopholes that he did not know about or thought irrelevant.	他背离原有的体制也催生了新的漏洞，他根本不晓得这些漏洞的存在，或者认为它们没什么关系。


This was precisely what the British empire-builders had wanted to prevent.	英帝国的创立者正要试图避免此类问题。


When, during the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, global investment professionals turned their attention from Thailand and Korea to Hong Kong, they quickly spotted structural weaknesses in the way the currency was managed.	1997－98年亚洲金融危机期间，当全球职业投资人把目光从泰国和韩国转到香港的时候，迅速就找到了货币管理方式的结构性缺陷。


Local experts had previously warned Yam about this, but he dismissed their argument in a way that one economist who was present at a meeting with him described as “demeaning and contemptuous”.   Moreover, they left in shock in realizing Yam, and the financial secretary, Donald Tsang, nominally his boss but without real power, didn’t really understand the experts’ economic reasoning.	本地专家此前就曾向任志刚发出过警告，但他对他们的说法不屑一顾，以致于与他一道出席会议的一位经济学家把他的态度形容为“屈尊俯就而且充满蔑视”。 此外，当专家们意识到任、和他没有实权的名义老板曾荫权根本不懂经济推理时，他们在震惊之余转身走开了。


Hong Kong ’s government, led by the HKMA, launched an unprecedented intervention, buying up local shares to “defeat” the speculators, but failed to stop the stampede by global investors, including conservative pension and mutual funds.	香港政府在金管局的领导下，发起了前所未有的干预行动，大量买进当地股票来‘击败’投机商人，但终于未能阻止全球投资者，包括保守的养老基金和共同基金各自四散逃命。


Finally, with the government about to exhaust its entire foreign reserves, Yam realized that he had to change course.	终于，当政府即将耗尽全部外汇储备的时候，任意识到必须改变策略。


He wisely accepted his critics’ suggestions, fixing the problems that he had denied existed.	他明智地接受了批评者的建议，解决了他曾经否认存在的问题。


He was awarded the highest public-service medal by the then Hong Kong Chief Executive Tung Chi-wah, who was later ousted by Beijing for incompetence.	时任香港行政长官的董建华向他颁发了公共服务最高勋章，董后来因能力不够被北京免职。


At this writing, Yam is widely criticized in Hong Kong for failing to protect small investors against the dishonest sales tactics of a number of banks in their selling of toxic Lehman Brothers derivatives disguised as bonds.	写这篇文章时，任因为未能保护小投资者免受若干银行以债券为伪装销售雷曼兄弟有毒衍生品的欺诈销售策略的蒙蔽而广受批评。


He denies any responsibility, even though the HKMA oversees all financial institutions.	他不承认自己有任何责任，尽管金管局负责监管所有的金融机构。


Yam is the highest-paid civil servant in the world, earning US$1.5 million last year.	任是全世界薪酬最高的公务员，去年年薪高达150万美元。


His salary is seven times that of the chairman of the US Federal Reserve and nearly 3 times higher than that of his own superior, the Hong Kong Chief Executive.	他的薪水是美联储主席的7倍，比他自己的顶头上司，香港行政长官高近3倍。


He claims that he should be rewarded as a fund manager supervising a multibillion-dollar fund in the private sector.	他称自己应当为监管私有部门数十亿美元的资金而拿到奖励。


But, whereas private-sector professionals are fired or have their salaries reduced for poor performance, Yam wanted private-sector pay with none of the downside risk.	但在私有部门专业人士被解雇或因业绩不佳而遭降薪的时候，任却希望拿到私有部门的薪酬，而不承担私有部门的风险。


The HKMA’s Compensation Committee had the sole responsibility for setting Yam’s salary.	香港金管局薪酬委员会全权决定任的薪水。


But, during his 16-year tenure, Yam put his own appointees on that committee, choosing them from the financial sector that he regulates.	但在长达16年的任职期间，任把自己任命的委员塞进了薪酬委员会，这些人是他一手从所辖的金融部门选拔出来的。


The Committee routinely rubber-stamped his salary demands.	委员会不经审查就批准他的薪酬要求已成惯例。


Yam’s retirement presents an opportunity for Hong Kong’s government to redress a major issue of governance.	任的退休为香港政府提供了纠正严重治理问题的一次机遇。


It should replace the compensation structure by the same civil-service scale applied to the government of which the HKMA is an integral part.	港府应以下辖金管局的香港政府的薪酬标准来取代金管局的薪酬结构。


Hong Kong ’s civil servants are already the best paid in the world.	香港公务员的薪酬已经堪称世界之最。


Anyone seeking to compare a public-service job with the private sector in negotiating an employment contract should simply seek work in the private sector rather than for the public good.	如果有人试图在谈判雇佣合同时拿公共服务职务的薪酬与私有部门比较，那么他不该来当公务员，而应当直接去私有部门找工作。


Anything else merely opens the door for corruption.	舍此之外的任何方法不过是打开了腐败之门。


There is much speculation that Hong Kong Chief Executive Donald Tsang is about to appoint a generalist civil servant better known for his personal loyalty than for his financial expertise.	流传很广的猜测是香港行政长官曾荫权将任命一位通才来接手金管局的工作，此人在个人效忠方面的知名度远胜于金融专业知识。


Nor is there any sign that the entire HKMA pay scale should be scrapped.	也没有迹象表明香港金管局的薪资标准将遭到废除。


Either outcome would mean that the Chief Executive has missed an opportunity to send the right signal that Hong Kong stands for good public governance rather than cronyism.	无论最后是哪一种结果，都意味着行政长官错失了发送正确信息，表明香港支持良好公共治政，而不是任人唯亲的难得的机遇。


Cross-Border Banking in the Balance	危机中的跨国银行业务


LONDON – The gravity of the eurozone crisis has finally sunk in.	伦敦——欧元区危机的威力终于显现出来了。


The stakes could not be higher.	我们已经投下了最重的赌注。


Governments and international financial institutions have scrambled to put together a solution within exceedingly tight political and economic constraints.	各国政府和金融机构竭尽全力，试图在极其紧张的政治和经济约束中拿出一举解决问题的方案。


Many questions have yet to be answered about the design; implementation will be at least as challenging.	方案的设计还有相当多的问题需要解决； 其中如何实施便是一项重大挑战。


Eurozone leaders must now aim to preserve not only the single currency, but also the gains from financial integration in Europe.	现在，欧元区领导人必须不仅要捍卫单一货币，而且还要捍卫欧洲金融一体化所带来的好处。


No region of the world has benefited more from cross-border banking, yet these achievements are now at risk – and with them the European bank groups themselves.	世界上没有哪个地区比欧洲从跨国银行业务中获得更多的好处，如今，这些成就陷入了危机，各大欧洲银行集团本身也随之岌岌可危。


The threat to cross-border banks comes not only from their deteriorating balance sheets in the face of lower sovereign-debt quality and weaker growth prospects, but also from the policy response itself.	跨国银行所面临的威胁不仅来自因主权债务质量下降和增长前景转坏而恶化的资产负债表，也来自政策应对本身。


The fact that Europe’s banks need massive amounts of new capital is by now generally accepted.	眼下，人们已经接受了欧洲银行需要大笔新资本这一事实。


Yet, despite valiant attempts by the new European Banking Authority to mandate and coordinate the measures that are needed, a European solution must take account of the network of foreign subsidiaries across Europe.	但是，尽管新的欧洲银行监管局（European Banking Authority）当机立断，出台并协调所需要的措施，欧洲方案仍然需要将全欧洲的外国银行支行网络纳入考虑范围。


Mobilizing support for European banks will be hard; extending it to subsidiaries will be even harder.	动员对欧洲银行的支持力量绝非易事； 而将其扩展到所有支行就更加困难了。


But, unlike the ill-advised exposure to sovereign debt across Europe, cross-border banking through foreign subsidiaries has been beneficial for investors, and for home and host countries alike – nowhere more so than in emerging Central and Eastern Europe, still the most important export market for the eurozone.	但是，与让全欧洲银行暴露于主权债务风险之下这一欠妥考虑相比，通过外国支行进行跨国银行业务对投资者、家庭和东道国均有利，其中获益最大的是目前仍为欧元区最大出口市场的中欧和东欧。


For core eurozone banks, this has been a region of extraordinary returns, and it is now integral to their operations.	对于核心欧元区银行来说，中东欧地区能带来超常回报，并已将其纳入经营范围。


In emerging Europe, foreign subsidiaries have helped to build financial systems that are less prone to instability, and have helped economies to converge more rapidly with average European income levels.	在新兴欧洲，外国银行支行有助于建设更加稳定的金融体系，也有助于本国收入水平迅速向欧洲平均水平看齐。


When the global crisis erupted in 2008, there was no regulatory framework to protect the cross-border networks, and large vulnerabilities, in the form of excessive leverage and foreign exchange, were exposed.	2008年全球危机爆发时，我们还没有保护跨国银行业务网的监管框架，因此暴露出了极大的脆弱性，比如杠杆率过高和外汇风险。


Much has been achieved since then: balance sheets have been strengthened and funding models adjusted.	此后，我们已经取得了长足的进步：资产负债表已有所强化，融资模式也有所调整。


Along with institutional reforms at the European level – particularly the creation of the European Systemic Risk Board and the European Banking Authority – regulation and supervision have been reinforced in subsidiaries’ host countries.	在采取欧洲层面的制度改革——特别是欧洲系统性风险委员会（European Systemic Risk Board）和欧洲银行监管局的创设——的同时，支行东道国的监管和监督也在加强。


Some of this might make finance more costly, but it will also make banking operations less risky.	有的措施可能会增加融资成本，但同时也降低了银行经营的风险。


On balance, this is a good thing.	总的来看是利大于弊。


Even so, the threat to financial stability is possibly even graver today than it was in 2008, as the capacity of Western European governments to backstop banking systems is clearly reaching its limits.	尽管如此，今日的金融稳定性威胁比2008年更大，因为西欧各国政府支持银行体系的能力显然已经达到了极限。


Allowing foreign banks’ subsidiaries to become orphaned amid a worsening crisis in home countries would undermine confidence in emerging Europe’s financial systems, which could trigger asset-price declines and precipitous contractions in credit.	外国银行支行因其母国危机深化而成为孤儿将损害新兴欧洲银行体系的信心，从而引发资产价格下跌和信用急剧紧缩。


Ultimately, this would boomerang back on Western European banks, given their deep financial and real linkages with the region.	最终，西欧银行也将受到影响，因为它们与新兴欧洲有着千丝万缕的金融和真实联系。


In 2008, such a catastrophic scenario was narrowly avoided, owing to policy intervention, including the coordination effort under the so-called Vienna Initiative (in which the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, among others, was involved).	2008年，我们曾与这样的可怕情景擦肩而过，这要归功于政策干预，包括在所谓的“维也纳倡议”（Vienna Initiative，参与者包括欧洲复兴开发银行和其他机构）框架下的政策协调。


A new pact to secure the achievements of financial integration is now urgently needed.	如今，我们迫切需要新的维也纳倡议来确保金融一体化成就不会倒退。


Authorities from these banks’ home and host countries must sit down together.	各大银行母国和东道国当局必须精诚合作。


As with the Vienna Initiative, a “Vienna 2.0” would require commitments by all concerned parties.	与维也纳倡议相同，“维也纳2. 0”将要求所有相关方作出承诺。


In responding to the higher capital requirements imposed by authorities, and choosing whether to raise more capital or sell off assets, the banks must take into account the important role that their subsidiaries play in many countries.	当局提出了更高的资本要求，作为回应，各大银行将选择是筹集更多资本还是出售更多资产，在此过程中，银行必须考虑其支行在多个国家的重要作用。


For many banks, this happens naturally – their subsidiaries, as important value creators, are critical to their business models.	对许多银行来说，这是再自然不过的事情了——它们的外国支行是重要的价值创造者，也是业务模式的关键部分。


For some, however, the subsidiaries are smaller relative to the parents’ size – and thus less central to their strategies.	不过，对某些银行来说，外国支行相对于总行来说规模较小，战略地位也较低。


Home countries must also contribute.	母国也应该有所贡献。


Within the eurozone, any recapitalization, guarantees, and other funds offered to parent banks should be made available to subsidiaries in equal measure.	在欧元区内部，任何资本重组、担保和其他总行所获得的资金应该以同样规模提供给外国支行。


Any restructuring requested in return for capital support should take into account the cross-border nature of the groups and not discriminate against subsidiaries abroad.	任何用来换取资本支持的重组都应该考虑银行集团的跨国性质，不能歧视海外支行。


Subsidiaries’ host countries, for their part, must reassure parent banks that financial regulation will remain predictable.	外国支行的东道国则必须给总行吃定心丸——本国金融监管不会朝令夕改。


Some of the recent abrupt – and at times overly ambitious – measures to tax the industry or redistribute the burden of foreign-currency loans have undermined capital cushions and set back recovery in credit and growth.	最近有一些关于金融业税收政策和外汇贷款负担再分配政策的突然变动（往往颇为激进）大大恶化了资本缓冲，也影响到了信用和经济增长的复苏。


All of this requires coordination.	所有这些都需要协调。


The European Banking Authority has a chance to establish itself.	欧洲银行监管局迎来了立威良机。


It must ensure that national interests do not undermine the integrity of the cross-border bank groups.	它必须确保国家利益不会妨碍跨国银行集团的一体性。


Ultimately, we need a Europe-wide deposit insurance and bank-resolution authority that can take over and restructure failed banks.	最终，我们需要一个泛欧洲的存款保险和银行问题解决机构来接管和重组倒闭的银行。


Just as the eurozone has fostered financial development and economic growth among its members, the current crisis now risks inflicting severe collateral damage far beyond its borders.	正如欧元区为其成员国带来了金融发展和经济增长，当前的危机正在造成极大的附带伤害风险，其影响远超国界线。


Any sustainable solution to the crisis must ensure the integrity of the bank groups and respect the interests of these banks’ home and host countries.	任何可持续的危及解决方案都必须确保银行集团的一体性，尊重这些银行母国和东道国的利益。


Ultimately, it is cross-border banking that is in the balance.	说到底，如今真正陷入危机的是跨国银行业务。


Creativity, Corporatism, and Crowds	创造力、社团主义与群体


NEW HAVEN – Economic growth, as we learned long ago from the works of economists like MIT’s Robert M. Solow, is largely driven by learning and innovation, not just saving and the accumulation of capital.	纽黑文—我们很久以前就从麻省理工学院的罗伯特·索洛（Robert M. Solow）等经济学家的工作中学到，经济增长主要靠学习和创新而不仅是储蓄和资本积累驱动。


Ultimately, economic progress depends on creativity.	说到底，经济进步取决于创造力。


That is why fear of “secular stagnation” in today’s advanced economies has many wondering how creativity can be spurred.	正因如此，对当今发达经济体的“长期停滞”的恐慌让很多人不知道如何刺激创造力。


One prominent argument lately has been that what is needed most is Keynesian economic stimulus – for example, deficit spending.	最近的一个主要观点是，我们最需要的是凯恩斯主义经济刺激——比如赤字支出。


After all, people are most creative when they are active, not when they are unemployed.	毕竟，人们在活跃而非失业时最有创造力。


Others see no connection between stimulus and renewed economic dynamism.	其他人认为刺激与经济活力再生没有关系。


As German Chancellor Angela Merkel recently put it, Europe needs “political courage and creativity rather than billions of euros.”	德国总理默克尔最近指出，欧洲需要“政治勇气和创造力，而不是几十亿欧元。 ”


In fact, we need both.	事实上，两者缺一不可。


If we are to encourage dynamism, we need Keynesian stimulus and other policies that encourage creativity – particularly policies that promote solid financial institutions and social innovation.	如果我们要刺激活力，就需要凯恩斯主义刺激和其他鼓励创造力的政策——特别是促进可靠金融机构和社会创新的政策。


In his 2013 book Mass Flourishing, Edmund Phelps argues that we need to promote “a culture protecting and inspiring individuality, imagination, understanding, and self-expression that drives a nation’s indigenous innovation.”	在2013年的著作《大繁荣》（Mass Flourishing）中，埃德蒙德·菲尔普斯（Edmund Phelps）认为我们需要促进“保护和启发推动一国内生性创新的个性、想象力、理解和自我表达的文化。


He believes that creativity has been stifled by a public philosophy described as corporatism, and that only through thorough reform of our private institutions, financial and others, can individuality and dynamism be restored.	”他认为创造力被一种叫社团主义（corporatism）的公共哲学所桎梏，只有通过彻底改革金融和其他领域的私人机构才能重塑个性和活力。


Phelps stresses that corporatist thinking has had a long and enduring history, going back to Saint Paul, the author of as many as 14 books of the New Testament.	菲尔普斯强调，社团主义思维有着悠久的历史，可以追溯到《新约》十四章的作者圣保罗（Saint Paul）。


Paul used the human body (corpus in Latin) as a metaphor for society, suggesting that in a healthy society, as in a healthy body, every organ must be preserved and none permitted to die.	保罗讲人体（拉丁语称为corpus）比喻为社会，指出健康的社会正如健康的人体，每个器官都必须得到保护，不能让任何一个死去。


As a public-policy credo, corporatism has come to mean that the government must support all members of society, whether individuals or organizations, giving support to failing businesses and protecting existing jobs alike.	作为公共政策教条的社团主义则是指政府必须支持所有社会成员，不管是个人还是组织，支持倒闭企业、保护现有工作岗位等。


According to Phelps, Pope Leo XIII advocated a corporatist view in his 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum, and Pope Pius XI amplified these ideas in his 1931 encyclical Quadragesimo Anno.	菲尔普斯说，里奥十三世教皇（Pope Leo XIII）在其1891年的《新视通谕》（Rerum Novarum）中宣扬了社团主义观点，庇护十一世教皇（Pope Pius XI）在其1931年《四十年通谕》（Quadragesimo Anno）扩充了这些思想。


But, in reading these works, I do not find a clear or persuasive statement of any economic doctrine, except for basic notions of fairness and Christian charity.	但是，在阅读这些资料时，我没有发现明确的或有说服力的经济思想观点，只有一些关于公平和基督教慈善的基本概念。


In fact, an Ngrams search of books shows that the term corporatism began to become popular only after the mid-1930s, and achieved broad currency by the 1970s and 1980s.	事实上，Ngrams书籍搜索表明“社团主义”一词直到20世纪30年代中期以后才开始流行，成为热点则是在20世纪七八十年代。


The term seems to have been used most often by critics, often to denounce the defunct Fascist philosophy, or by those extolling elements of a “new” corporatism.	这个词似乎更多地被批评者使用，通常的用途是谴责已成落水狗的法西斯主义，另一个该词汇的使用群体常常歌颂“新”社团主义的要素。


Surely, elements of corporatist thinking persist today.	诚然，社团主义思维的要素至今仍在。


People who might not stress that the government should protect failing businesses or redundant workers still have sympathies that might often lead to such outcomes.	即使不强调政府应该保护企业或冗余工人的人，也仍然会抱有同情心，从而促使这样的结果的产生。


Historically, an important spur toward corporatist thinking was Gustave Le Bon’s 1895 book The Crowd, which coined the terms “crowd psychology” and “collective mind.”	从历史上看，向社团主义思维的一个重要刺激是古斯塔夫·勒庞（Gustave Le Bon）1895年的著作《乌合之众》（The Crowd），该著作提出了“群体心理学”（crowd psychology）和“集体思维”（collective mind）。


For Le Bon, “An individual in a crowd” – not only angry mobs on the street, but also other psychologically interconnected groups of people – “is a grain of sand amid other grains of sand, which the wind stirs up at will.”	对勒庞来说，“群体中的个体”——不但包括街头愤怒的暴民，也包括其他心理相近的人群——“是藏在其他沙粒中的沙粒，风可以随心所欲地将它们扬起。 ”


Le Bon believed that crowds need strong leaders, to distance them from their natural madness and transform them into civilizations of splendor, vigor, and brilliance.	勒庞认为群体需要强大的领袖以使他们脱离天然的疯狂状态，将他们变为壮丽、活力、华美的文明。


Mussolini and Hitler both took inspiration from his book, and incorporated his ideas into Fascist and Nazi ideology; and those ideas did not die with those regimes.	墨索里尼和希特勒都从这本书中获得了灵感，并把勒庞的思想融合到法西斯主义和纳粹主义钟来； 这些思想并未随着政权的倒闭而死去。


Still, the word “crowd” has taken on an entirely different meaning – and political valence – in our century.	但在我们这个世纪中，“群体”（crowd）一词有了截然不同的意义和政治含义。


Crowdsourcing and crowd-funding have created new kinds of crowds, of the sort that Le Bon never could have imagined.	众包（crowdsourcing）和众筹（crowd-funding）产生了勒庞所无法想象的新的群体类型。


As Le Bon emphasized, people cannot easily do great things as individuals.	勒庞强调，人们无法轻易地作为个体干成大事。


They need to operate together within organizations that redirect crowd psychology, facilitate creativity, and are led by people of integrity.	他们需要在重新引导群体心理学、促进创造力的组织内一起行动病接受正直的人的领导。


Any such organizational technology, however, is subject to error and requires experimentation.	但是，任何这类组织技术都会犯错，需要实验法。


When the crowd-sourced Wikipedia was started in 2001, its success was not obvious.	当众包的维基百科（Wikipedia）于2010年上线时，他的成功绝非显而易见。


Even one of its founders, Jimmy Wales, found it a little hard to believe: “It’s kind of surprising that you could just open up a site and let people work.”	甚至其创始者之一吉米·威尔斯（Jimmy Wales）也认为有点难以置信：“你就是开个站点，然后让人们工作，这真是有点令人惊奇。 ”


When the United States’ Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, which facilitated true crowd-funding of enterprises, was signed by President Barack Obama in 2012, it was an experiment, too.	2012年，奥巴马总统签署了便利真正的众筹企业的美国创业企业扶助法（Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act），这也是一项实验。


Many critics said that it would result in the exploitation of naive investors.	许多批评者说，这会导致对天真投资者的利用。


We still do not know whether that is true, or how well the experiment will work.	我们仍不清楚这是否属实，或者这项实验会进行得怎么样。


But if the JOBS Act does not succeed, we should not abandon the idea, but try to modify it.	但如果JOBS法真的以失败告终，我们也不应该抛弃这一思想，而是应该改进它。


Ultimately, we need economic institutions that somehow promote the concerted creative actions of a wide swath of the world’s people.	最终，我们需要能讲世界人民的各种奇思妙想的创新活动集中起来的社会机构。


They should not be corporatist institutions, dominated by central leaders, but should derive their power from the fluid actions of modern crowds.	这些机构不应该是由核心领袖主宰的社团主义机构，这些机构的力量应该来自现代群体的不固定行为。


Some of those actions will have to be disruptive, because the momentum of organizations can carry them beyond their usefulness.	这些行为中有一些必然会起到干扰作用，因为组织的冲力可能导致它们过犹不及。


But there must also be enough continuity that people can trust their careers and futures to such organizations.	但它们也必须有足够的持续性，以使人们将事业和未来托付给这些组织。


Acknowledging the need to experiment and design new forms of economic organization must not mean abandoning fairness and compassion.	承认实验的必要性病设计新形式的经济组织绝不意味着放弃公平和激情。


Cry, Beloved Burma	哭泣吧，可爱的缅甸


YANGON – Religious orders of monks have been the face of Burma ever since Buddhism was introduced here more than 1,000 years ago.	仰光——自从1000多年前佛教传播到缅甸以来，僧侣严格遵守宗教制度就一直是人们对缅甸的印象。


For a monk to involve himself in politics or to hold a political post is contrary to the ethical code of Theravada Buddhism.	上座部佛教的道德规范规定僧侣不得介入政治或者担任政治职务。


But in Burma today, this spiritual philosophy, rooted in compassion and non-violence, has assumed unexpected dimensions of defiance and recalcitrance, as monks challenge the hegemony of the military junta that rules our country.	但是在今天的缅甸，这种以同情心和不使用暴力为根基的精神哲学却随着僧侣们挑战统治我们国家的军人集团的霸权而出人意料地呈现出了反抗和拒不服从的一面。


We are both Burmese Buddhist monks – a leader of the All Burma Sangha Coalition that led the recent protests, and a scholar teaching in the United States.	我们俩都是缅甸的佛教僧侣。 一位是全缅甸僧伽同盟的领导人，领导了最近的抗议活动，另一位是在美国教学的学者。


One of us is in hiding today, because Burma’s military government met the peaceful protests of our Buddhist brothers and sisters with violence and brutality.	我们中的一个目前正在四处藏匿，因为缅甸的军政府用暴力和凶残来镇压我们信仰佛教的兄弟姐妹的和平抗议活动。


Many monks and nuns have been abused and beaten, and thousands who have been arrested endure continued brutality.	许多和尚和尼姑遭到了虐待和殴打，还有数千名被关押起来的僧侣日夜遭受着残忍的虐待。


More than 1,000 are missing, and many are presumed dead.	有1000多民僧侣失踪了，其中有很多可能已经死亡了。


A few weeks ago, Burma’s monks began to march and pray and spread loving kindness in an effort to solve our nation’s problems peacefully.	几个星期前，缅甸的僧侣开始上街游行、祈祷并且传播爱心，希望能够和平地解决我们国家所面临的问题。


Burma is a country rich in natural resources, but its people are poor.	缅甸是一个拥有丰富自然资源的国家，但是它的人民却很贫穷。


When the government suddenly and capriciously increased the price of fuel by as much as 500% overnight, everyone was affected – and made even more desperate.	当政府突然心血来潮地在一夜之间把燃油的价格提高了500%时，每一个人都受到了巨大的影响，许多人甚至处于绝望的境地。