Last week, GEP, along with the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, the Brazilian NGO ANDI, and the city of Medellín co-hosted the Global Entrepreneurship Congress in Medellín, Colombia.	就在上周，全球创业计划（GEP）、考夫曼基金会、巴西非政府组织ANDI会同麦德林市政府在哥伦比亚麦德林市协力召开了全球创业大会。


The gathering brought together entrepreneurs, investors, researchers, and policymakers from more than 160 countries to share best practices and work to bolster startup growth and build the ecosystems in which they operate.	会议聚集了来自160多个国家的创业者、投资人、研究人员和决策者，共同分享最佳经验、支持初创企业的发展并建设有利于其运营的生态系统。


Medellin itself is busy transforming itself from a cocaine capital into a startup hub.	麦德林这个城市本身就在忙于从可卡因之都到创业中心的转型工作。


Silicon Valley seized on this phenomenon some time ago, rolling out the red carpet for world leaders such as Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and China’s President Xi Jinping.	前段时间，硅谷利用了这种现象，在印尼总统佐科威、印度总理莫迪和中国主席习近平面前展开了红毯。


These world leaders are looking for the Silicon Valley secret: the magic ingredients that will create an equally vibrant innovation ecosystem in their countries.	这些世界领袖正在探寻硅谷的奥秘：是哪些神奇的配方能在他们自己的国家创建同样生机勃勃的创新生态系统。


Entrepreneurs themselves, however, do not depend on innovation or technology.	但创业者自身并不依赖于创新或技术。


As Koltai points out, Starbucks built an enormous enterprise around serving a cup of coffee, a centuries old beverage.	正如科尔泰所指出的那样，星巴克围绕咖啡这种有100多年历史的古老饮料建立起了庞大的企业帝国。


Today Starbucks employs roughly 182,000 people worldwide – 50,000 more than Facebook, Google, and Apple combined.	今天的星巴克全球员工约 182,000人——比Facebook、Google和Apple合起来还多50，000人。


An Argentine, Jordanian, Malaysian, or Spaniard who can visualize and create thriving global demand for a product or service – just as Spain’s Amancio Ortega did with Zara – is just as much an entrepreneur as the next Bill Gates is.	能够想象某种产品或服务，并为其创造旺盛全球需求的阿根廷人、约旦人、马来西亚人或西班牙人——就像西班牙的阿曼西奥·奥尔特加扎拉创建Zara一样——将成为不亚于下一个比尔·盖茨的企业家。


From Lahore to Lagos, Mexico City to Mumbai, governments are looking at their own populations as pools of talent waiting to be tapped.	从拉合尔到拉各斯、从墨西哥城到孟买，各国政府正在将其民众视为亟待开发的人才库。


It is time for diplomats to do the same.	外交官们也是时候这样做。


They should support and encourage job creators and problem solvers, and turn development assistance into investments.	他们应当支持和鼓励就业创造和问题解决，并将发展援助转化为投资。


They should include entrepreneurship in economic policies and trade agreements.	他们应当将创业精神融入经济政策和贸易协议当中。


They should press governments to allow entrepreneurs to develop their innovations as a component of human flourishing and as an essential source of sustainable solutions for often-intractable problems such as disease, climate change, migration, and war.	他们应敦促政府允许创业者开发自己的创新成果来推动人类繁荣，并作为疾病、气候变化、移民和战争等棘手问题长期解决方案的重要来源。


Indeed, entrepreneurship, as a channel for young men and women to express themselves, is a compelling weapon in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism.	事实上，创业精神作为青年男女自我表达的渠道是打击恐怖主义和暴力极端主义的有力武器。


It is an outlet to build and add value rather than destroy it.	这条渠道可以实现建设和增值，而不是毁灭。


This is especially important in the Middle East, which is, as the Brookings Institution has noted, experiencing “an unprecedented ‘youth bulge.’”	这对于中东来讲尤为重要，因为布鲁金斯学会指出，中东正在经历一场“前所未有的”大规模青年潮。


More than 30% of the region’s population – over 100 million people – is aged 15-29, and a significant number of these young people are unemployed.	该地区人口的30%以上——也就是超过1亿人——都正处于15到29岁，而且有大量年轻人找不到工作。


For them, entrepreneurship and the ability to gain control over their own destinies isn’t an option; it is an imperative.	对他们而言，创业精神和掌握自身命运的能力绝非可有可无； 而是必须掌握的。


Similarly, entrepreneurship is not just a commercial or economic option for diplomats and policymakers.	同样，创业精神绝不仅仅是外交官和决策者的商业和经济选择。


In a world with ever more pressing challenges – from pandemics to poverty and resource depletion to religious extremists – it is becoming a vital tool of foreign policy.	在一个正在面临急迫挑战的世界——从流行病到贫困、从资源枯竭到宗教极端分子——创业正在成为外交政策一种重要手段。


Planetary Boundaries and Human Prosperity	地球极限和人类繁荣


STOCKHOLM – The future of humanity will depend on mastering a balancing act.	斯德哥尔摩——人类的未来取决于能否把握住平衡。


The challenge will be to provide for the needs of more than ten billion people while safeguarding our planetary life-support systems.	难度在于养活一百多亿人的同时保护地球的生命支持系统。


Recent scientific insights have made us better equipped than ever to strike that balance.	最近的科研发现让我们能更好地把握这种平衡。


Doing so will be our generation’s great task.	完成这项任务将是我们这代人肩负的伟大使命。


Ending poverty has become a realistic goal for the first time in human history.	人类历史上首次能够实实在在地结束贫困。


We have the ability to ensure that every person on the planet has the food, water, shelter, education, health care, and energy needed to lead a life of dignity and opportunity.	我们有能力确保地球上每个人都拥有过上有尊严、有机遇生活所需的食物、水、住房、教育、医疗和能源。


But we will be able to do so only if we simultaneously protect the earth’s critical systems: its climate, ozone layer, soils, biodiversity, fresh water, oceans, forests, and air.	但要想实现这一目标只有同时保护地球关键系统：包括气候、臭氧层、土壤、生物多样性、淡水、海洋、森林和空气。


And those systems are under unprecedented pressure.	而上述系统正承受着前所未有的压力。


For the last 10,000 years, the earth’s climate has been remarkably stable.	过去一万年中，地球的气候一直相当稳定。


Global temperatures rose and fell by no more than one degree Celsius (compared with swings of more than eight degrees Celsius during the last ice age), and resilient ecosystems met humanity’s needs.	全球气温升降不超过一摄氏度（上个冰河期全球气温有超过八摄氏度的波动），生态系统也有着满足人类需求的足够弹性。


This period – known as the Holocene – provided the stability that enabled human civilization to rise and thrive.	这个被称为全新世的时期提供了人类文明崛起和繁荣所需的稳定。


It is the only state of the planet of which we know that can sustain prosperous lives for ten billion people.	据我们所知只有这种状态才能确保上百亿民众生活得富裕繁荣。


But humans have now become the single largest driver of ecosystem change on earth, marking the start of a new geological age that some call the Anthropocene.	但人类已经成为改变地球生态系统的唯一最大力量，标志着世界进入到一个全新的地质时代，有人将其称之为人类世。


Scientists argue over the exact starting point of this epoch, but it can be dated to somewhere around 1945, when modern industry and agriculture began to expand briskly.	科学家们尚未确定这个时代的确切起点，但可以追溯到大约1945年，当时现代工农业开始快速发展。


In the future, geologists will see telltale markers like radioactive carbon – debris from nuclear blasts – and plastic waste scattered across the planet’s surface and embedded in rock.	从那以后，地质学家能看到核爆炸碎片释放的放射性碳原子等警示性标志，以及塑料废弃物嵌入岩石并散落在地球表面。


More recently, human activity has undergone what is being called the Great Acceleration: the rapid intensification of resource consumption and ecological degradation.	最近，人类活动已经进入被称为剧烈加速的阶段：资源消耗和生态退化速度大幅加快。


We risk disrupting the earth’s critical systems, and with them modern civilization itself.	我们有可能破坏地球的关键系统，并威胁现代文明本身的安全。


The planet’s response to our pressures is likely to be unpredictable.	地球对人类压力做出的反应很可能难以预测。


Indeed, the surprises have already begun.	事实上，意想不到的情况已经开始上演。


As we overdraw on our planet’s accounts, it is starting to levy penalties on the global economy, in the form of extreme weather events, accelerated melting of ice sheets, rapid biodiversity loss, and the vast bleaching of coral reefs.	随着我们透支地球资源，地球已经开始以极端天气事件、冰盖加速融化、生物多样性快速丧失和珊瑚礁大面积脱色等形式惩罚全球经济。


We face an urgent need to define a safety zone that prevents us from pushing our planet out of the unusually benevolent Holocene state.	我们迫切需要建立安全区，防止人类将地球推出异常温和的全新世。


The Planetary Boundaries framework, which a group of scientists, including one of us (Johan), first published in 2009, does just that.	2009年几位科学家（包括我们的约翰在内）最先发布的地球极限框架就是要完成这项任务。


It draws on the best science to identify the key planetary processes regulating the earth’s ability to sustain Holocene-like conditions.	框架借鉴了尖端科学，以确定能让地球保持全新世状态的关键行星变化。


For each of those processes, it proposes a boundary – a quantitative ceiling – beyond which we risk inducing abrupt changes that could push our planet into a state that is more hostile to humanity.	该框架为每项变化制定了边界——即量化极限——超出上述极限就有可能带来导致地球不适于人类生存的突发性变化。


These nine boundaries include climate change, ozone depletion, ocean acidification, interference in the global nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, land-use change, global freshwater use, biosphere integrity, air pollution, and novel entities (such as organic pollutants, radioactive materials, nanomaterials, and micro-plastics).	这九大边界包括气候变化、臭氧层破坏、海洋酸化、干扰全球氮磷循环、土地利用变化、全球淡水应用、生物圈完���性、空气污染和一些全新因素（如有机污染物，放射性物质、纳米材料以及微塑料）。


Worryingly, our most recent update in January, which confirms the nine boundaries and improves their quantifications further, indicates that humanity has already transgressed four: climate change, nitrogen and phosphorus use, biodiversity loss, and land-use change.	令人担忧的是，我们在一月做出的确认这九大边界并对其进一步量化的最近一次更新表明人类已经越过了这九大边界中的四个：包括气候变化、氮和磷的使用、生物多样性的丧失和土地利用变化。


Our challenge is to bring the earth’s systems back within the safety zone, while simultaneously ensuring that every person has the resources he or she needs to lead a happy and fulfilling life.	我们所面临的挑战是在把地球系统带回安全区的同时确保每个人拥有足够资源能够快乐充实的生活。


Between these planetary and social boundaries lies humanity’s safe and just operating space: the limits we must respect if we are to create a world that is ecologically resilient and free of poverty.	地球和社会边界之内才是人类安全公正的行动空间：要想建设摆脱贫困、具有生态弹性的世界我们必须尊重上述界限。


Meeting these goals will require a far more equitable distribution of the planet’s resources and far greater efficiency in how we use them.	实现上述目标需要更公平地分配地球资源并提高使用效率。


If we are to ensure that our planet remains one on which all of humanity can thrive, we will have to pursue a new paradigm of prosperity.	要保证地球上所有人都能茁壮成长，我们就必须建立实现繁荣的新典范。


Good and Bad Inequality	好不平等性与坏不平等性


PRINCETON – In the pantheon of economic theories, the tradeoff between equality and efficiency used to occupy an exalted position.	普林斯顿—在经济理论中，平等与效率的权衡占据着崇高地位。


The American economist Arthur Okun, whose classic work on the topic is called Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff, believed that public policies revolved around managing the tension between those two values.	美国经济学家亚瑟·奥肯（Arthur Okun）著有经典名著《平等与效率：大权衡》（Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff），他认为公共政策就是围绕管理这两种价值的冲突而生的。


As recently as 2007, when New York University economist Thomas Sargent, addressing the graduating class at the University of California, Berkeley, summarized the wisdom of economics in 12 short principles, the tradeoff was among them.	2007年，纽约大学经济学家托马斯·萨金特（Thomas Sargent）在为加州大学伯克利分校学生发表毕业演说时总结了12条简短的经济学原理智慧，权衡也在其中。


The belief that boosting equality requires sacrificing economic efficiency is grounded in one of the most cherished ideas in economics: incentives.	增进平等需要牺牲经济效率的观念建立在经济学最重要思想之一上：激励（incentives）。


Firms and individuals need the prospect of higher incomes to save, invest, work hard, and innovate.	企业和个人需要有更高的收入前景才会储蓄、投资、努力工作和创新。


If taxation of profitable firms and rich households blunts those prospects, the result is reduced effort and lower economic growth.	如果盈利企业和富裕家庭的税收影响到这一前景，结果就是偷懒和经济增长下降。


Communist countries, where egalitarian experiments led to economic disaster, long served as “Exhibit A” in the case against redistributive policies.	共产主义国家的平等主义实验往往导致经济灾难，一直是反再分配政策的“呈堂证供”。


In recent years, however, neither economic theory nor empirical evidence has been kind to the presumed tradeoff.	但是，最近几年来，经济学理论和实证经验都倾向于这一假定的权衡。


Economists have produced new arguments showing why good economic performance is not only compatible with distributive fairness, but may even demand it.	经济学家提出了新论据证明为何经济表现不仅相容于分配公平，甚至还有求于它。


For example, in high-inequality societies, where poor households are deprived of economic and educational opportunities, economic growth is depressed.	比如，在高度不平等的社会，穷人家庭被剥夺经济和教育机会，经济增长也受到抑制。


Then there are the Scandinavian countries, where egalitarian policies evidently have not stood in the way of economic prosperity.	另一面是斯堪的纳维亚国家，那里的公平主义政策显然没有妨碍经济繁荣。


Early this year, economists at the International Monetary Fund produced empirical results that seemed to upend the old consensus.	今年早些时候，国际货币基金组织（IMF）的经济学家得出了一个似乎足以颠覆这一旧共识的实证结果。


They found that greater equality is associated with faster subsequent medium-term growth, both across and within countries.	他们发现，更大的不平等性伴随着随后更快的中期增长，不管在国家内部还是在国家间都是如此。


Moreover, redistributive policies did not appear to have any detrimental effects on economic performance.	此外，分配政策并未表现出任何对经济表现的危害。


We can have our cake, it seems, and eat it, too.	看起来我们可以鱼与熊掌兼得。


That is a striking result – all the more so because it comes from the IMF, an institution hardly known for heterodox or radical ideas.	这是一个令人惊讶的结果——考虑到这一结果来自极少出现异端或极端思想的IMF就更加值得惊讶了。


Economics is a science that can claim to have uncovered few, if any, universal truths.	作为一门科学，经济学可以说没有揭示过任何普遍真理。


Like almost everything else in social life, the relationship between equality and economic performance is likely to be contingent rather than fixed, depending on the deeper causes of inequality and many mediating factors.	与社会生活中的几乎所有其他方面一样，平等和经济表现之间的关系可能是偶然的而不是固定的，取决于不平等的更深层次原因和诸多中介因素。


So the emerging new consensus on the harmful effects of inequality is as likely to mislead as the old one was.	因此，关于不平等的有害影响的新共识可能与旧共识一样具有误导性。


Consider, for example, the relationship between industrialization and inequality.	比如，考虑工业化与不平等之间的关系。


In a poor country where the bulk of the workforce is employed in traditional agriculture, the rise of urban industrial opportunities is likely to produce inequality, at least during the early stages of industrialization.	在大部分劳动力受雇于传统农业的穷国，城市工业机会的出现也许能拉低不平等，至少在工业化的早期阶段是如此。


As farmers move to cities and earn higher pay, income gaps open up.	随着农民走向城市、获得更高收入，收入差距也被打开。


And yet this is the same process that produces economic growth; all successful developing countries have gone through it.	但同一过程产生了经济增长； 所有成功的发展中国家都有这一经历。


In China, for example, rapid economic growth after the late 1970s was associated with a significant rise in inequality.	比如，在中国，20世纪70年代末以后的快速经济增长伴随着不平等程度的显著增加。


Roughly half of the increase was the result of urban-rural earnings gaps, which also acted as the engine of growth.	不平等程度增加的大约一半来自城乡收入差距，而这也是经济增长的引擎。


Or consider transfer policies that tax the rich and the middle classes in order to increase the income of poor households.	或者，考虑对富人和中产阶级征税以提高穷人家庭收入的转移支付政策。


Many countries in Latin America, such as Mexico and Bolivia, undertook such policies in a fiscally prudent manner, ensuring that government deficits would not lead to high debt and macroeconomic instability.	许多拉丁美洲国家（如墨西哥和玻利维亚）以财政审慎的方式采取了这类政策，以确保政府赤字不会导致债务高企和宏观经济动荡。


On the other hand, Venezuela’s aggressive redistributive transfers under Hugo Chávez and his successor, Nicolás Maduro, were financed by temporary oil revenues, placing both the transfers and macroeconomic stability at risk.	另一方面，查韦斯及其后继者马杜罗在委内瑞拉所采取的激进再分配转移支付由暂时性石油收入作为资金源，转移支付和公关经济稳定性都受到了威胁。


Even though inequality has been reduced in Venezuela (for the time being), the economy’s growth prospects have been severely weakened.	尽管委内瑞拉（目前的）不平等程度被抑制，但其经济增长前景也被严重削弱。


Latin America is the only world region where inequality has declined since the early 1990s.	20世纪90年代初以来，拉丁美洲是世界上唯一一个不平等程度下降的地区。


Improved social policies and increased investment in education have been substantial factors.	社会政策的改善和教育投资的增加都是重要因素。


But the decline in the pay differential between skilled and unskilled workers – what economists call the “skill premium” – has also played an important role.	但高技能和低技能工人薪酬差距——经济学家称之为“技能溢价”——的下降也起到了重要作用。


Whether this is good news or bad for economic growth depends on why the skill premium has fallen.	对经济增长来说，这是好消息还是坏消息？ 答案取决于技能溢价下降的原因。


If pay differentials have narrowed because of an increase in the relative supply of skilled workers, we can be hopeful that declining inequality in Latin America will not stand in the way of faster growth (and may even be an early indicator of it).	如果薪酬差异是因为高技能工人相对供给增加而收窄，那么我们可以寄希望于拉丁美洲不平等程度的下降不会干扰增长加速（甚至可能是增长加速的早期信号）。


But if the underlying cause is the decline in demand for skilled workers, smaller differentials would suggest that the modern, skill-intensive industries on which future growth depends are not expanding sufficiently.	但如果基础原因是高技能工人需求下降，那么薪酬差异缩小意味着作为未来增长基石的现代技能密集型产业扩张不足。


In the advanced countries, the causes of rising inequality are still being debated.	在发达国家，不平等程度增加的原因仍在争论中。


Automation and other technological changes, globalization, weaker trade unions, erosion of minimum wages, financialization, and changing norms about acceptable pay gaps within enterprises have all played a role, with different weights in the United States relative to Europe.	自动化和其他技术变革、全球化、工会式微、最低工资的侵蚀、金融化和企业内部可接受薪酬差距范式的变化都起到了作用，只不过在美国的权重与在欧洲不同。


Each one of these drivers has a different effect on growth.	所有这些驱动因素对增长都有不同的效应。


While technological progress clearly fosters growth, the rise of finance since the 1990s has probably had an adverse effect, via financial crises and the accumulation of debt.	技术进步显然有利于促进增长，但20世纪90年代以来的金融崛起可能具有消极效应——通过金融危机和债务积累突显。


It is good that economists no longer regard the equality-efficiency tradeoff as an iron law.	经济学家不再把平等-效率权衡看做铁律，这是一件好事。


We should not invert the error and conclude that greater equality and better economic performance always go together.	我们不应该颠倒错误，认为更大的不平等和更好的经济表现永远会同时出现。


After all, there really is only one universal truth in economics: It depends.	毕竟，经济学只有一个普遍真理：视情况而定。


The Stock-Bond Disconnect	股债脱节


CAMBRIDGE – How should one understand the disconnect between the new highs reached by global equity indices and the new depths plumbed by real interest rates worldwide?	坎布里奇——人们应当如何看待全球股指迭创新高和实际利率屡创新低间的脱节关系？


Several competing explanations attempt to reconcile these trends, and getting it right is essential for calibrating monetary and fiscal policy appropriately.	几种截然不同的解释试图理顺上述趋势关系，而且只有把握原因才能精确调整货币和财政政策。


The most popular explanations downplay risk factors in a way that can be dangerously misleading.	最流行的淡化风险因素的解释在某种程度上危险地误导了人们的思维。


For example, the “secular stagnation" theory claims that low interest rates tell the true story.	比方说，“长期停滞”理论认为低利率才是事情的本质。


The global economy is suffering from a chronic demand shortfall, which can be remedied through sustained growth in government spending.	全球经济正受困于长期需求不足，可以通过持续增加政府支出来弥补事态。


According to this view, soaring stock markets merely reflect low discounting of future profits.	按照这种观点，股票市场飙升仅仅反映未来利润折扣降低。


Moreover, labor's share of profits seems to have fallen markedly in recent decades across the world's eight largest economies, with the possible exception of the United Kingdom.	此外，除英国外，纵观全世界八大经济体，劳动力收入占利润份额似乎在 近数十年呈明显下降态势。


Conversely, capital's share of profits has been rising, which of course raises the value of equities (though, stock prices have continued to rise in countries like the US and the UK where labor shares have begun at least a cyclical recovery, and where interest-rate hikes may soon be on the horizon).	反之，资本利润份额持续上行当然引发股价上涨（但股价在英美等劳动力收入占比至少开始周期性复苏且加息渐行渐近的国家依然保持了上升态势）。


Proponents of secular stagnation argue that government spending as a share of GDP, which has more than doubled in most advanced economies since the 1950s, should continue to rise.	长期停滞理论的支持者认为政府支出占GDP份额虽然从20世纪60年代起在最发达经济体增长已超过两倍，但仍将延续上涨态势。


Although one can readily agree that high-yielding government investments in education and infrastructure are especially justified today, the idea that demand permanently constrains supply in a significant way is dubious.	虽然人们很容易认可教育和基础设施领域高效益的政府投资在今天看来尤其必要，但由此推定需求将永远限制供给的看法却在很大程度上值得怀疑。


More refined studies of the recent recession suggest that the lasting so-called “hysteresis" effects on unemployment have been limited, at least in the US.	针对近期衰退更深入的研究表明失业领域所谓的持续“滞后”效应已经相对有限，至少在美国的情况如此。


Another possible explanation of low interest rates is financial repression.	低利率另一种可能的解释是金融抑制。


The European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan, like the Federal Reserve before them, are gluttonously buying bonds.	欧洲央行、日本央行像之前的美联储一样，正进行大规模债券买入。


At the same time, a host of new regulations to promote financial stability are forcing banks, pension funds, and insurance companies to stock up on government securities.	与此同时，一系列促进金融稳定的新法规正迫使银行、养老基金和保险公司对政府债券进行买入。


Thus, today's low interest rates are more a reflection of distortions in financial markets than of low growth expectations.	因此，与其说今天的低利率反应了低增长预期，还不如说是金融市场扭曲所造成的结果。


Proponents of the financial repression explanation essentially view low interest rates as a hidden tax on bondholders, who receive a lower interest rate than they would otherwise.	金融抑制解释的支持者基本将低利率视为对债券持有者的隐形税收，压制了他们原本应得的利益。


This is not necessarily a bad thing, given that all taxes are distorting, and that there really is no way to deal with today's outsize debt burdens that does not impinge on growth in some way.	这倒不一定是件坏事，鉴于所有税收都具有扭曲性，而且也没有更好的办法在缓解今天巨额债务负担的同时能不在某种程度上影响经济。


But the financial repression tax is not nearly as progressive as a more general wealth tax would be, because lower-income households typically have a smaller share of their assets in equities.	但金融抑制税在累进性方面远不如普遍财产税，因为低收入家庭通常所持股权资产占比很低。


In any event, it is unclear how financial repression can be the whole story.	无论如何，目前尚无法确定金融抑制是否是全部因素。


The fall in bond yields has extended to a far broader range of debt than just government paper.	除政府债券外更大范围的债券资产收益都明显下跌。


Other factors are contributing to today's ultra-low interest-rate environment as well.	还有其他因素共同促成了今天的超低利率环境。


Adverse demographics and declining labor-supply growth in most advanced economies are undeniably important.	人口结构恶化和劳动力供给增速下滑在多数发达经济体的重要作用都无可否认。


The puzzle, though, is that this trend has played out in a very gradual and predictable way, whereas the decline in interest rates has been more rapid and somewhat unexpected (certainly by central banks).	但问题在于上述趋势兼具渐进性和可预测性，但利率下滑速度更快，也更超乎预期（从央行层面当然如此）。


And it is difficult to argue that weak demographics is the main driver of strong stock prices, though some have tried.	而且虽然有人做过这方面的努力，但很难认定弱势人口结构就是强势股价的主要推动力。


Curiously, heightened risk and fears of further disruptions – not just another financial crisis, but also geopolitical instability and pandemics – do not seem to carry much weight in current policy discussions, though the idea has been around.	奇怪的是， 虽然提出过这种想法，但高风险和进一步衰退引发的担忧——不止针对再次发生金融危机，而且也包括地缘政治动荡和流行病肆虐——似乎并未在目前的政策讨论中占据多大比例。


Though bonds are hardly a perfect hedge against such risks, they typically beat stocks (except, perhaps, in cases of global conflagration, when both fare badly).	虽然债券很难对这种风险进行完美对冲，但它们的作用通常要好于股票（除非发生波及全球的灾难，两者的回报率都出现问题）。


In recent work with Carmen and Vincent Reinhart, we show that even relatively minor shifts in disaster risk – say, a rise from a normal 2-3% to 3-4% – can lead to a massive decline in global real interest rates, even taking them well into negative territory.	在与卡门和文森特·莱因哈特的近期合作中，我们成功证明即使灾害风险发生相对微小的变化——比方说从正常的2-3%攀升至3-4%——也可能导致全球实际利率大幅下降，甚至将全球带入负利率领域。


This can be the case even if expected growth is strong.	就算预期增长强劲这样的可能性也无法排除。


But the policy implications of this are not straightforward.	但上述政策影响并不简单纯粹。


If the government has superior information and analysis, and correctly assesses that public fear is not justified, then of course it makes sense to take advantage of the information – by issuing more debt, for example.	如果政府掌握信息及分析优势，并正确判断出公众的担忧没有道理，那么当然应该利用上述信息——比如发行更多债券。


If, on the other hand, the public is basically right about heightened disaster risks, the policy issues become much more complex.	但如果公众对灾难风险上升的认知基本正确，那么政策问题就远没有如此简单。


The problem is that the government likely faces high costs if a disaster strikes, which implies a high option value to preserving fiscal space for when it is most needed.	问题在于一旦灾难来袭政府很可能面对高额成本，也就是说政府要在最必要的时刻为保持财政地位付出更高的期权价值。


The idea that hyper-low interest rates are merely symptoms of deficient demand or financial repression is dangerously simplistic.	将超低利率仅仅归结于需求不足和金融抑制的认识简单得有些草率。


Surely heightened public concern about the risk of future economic catastrophe in the wake of the financial crisis is still playing an important role, reinforced by lingering fragility in the eurozone and rising instability in emerging markets.	公众对金融危机后未来经济灾难的担忧仍起到很大作用，欧元区持续脆弱和新兴市场动荡增强都证明了这一点。


This makes the public understandably more cautious.	因此公众的态度谨慎不难理解。


But if the risks that might help explain the price trends for stocks and bonds are real, policymakers, too, should be careful not to throw caution to the wind.	但如果能解释股债走势的风险因素切实存在，那么决策者也不应该过于乐观。


Pakistan’s Polio Tipping Point	巴基斯坦的小儿麻痹症转折点


ISLAMABAD – Early this month, tragedy struck Pakistan’s polio eradication campaign once again with the killing of two more polio workers and a policeman on patrol with the vaccination teams.	伊斯兰堡—本月上旬，巴基斯坦消灭小儿麻痹症的事业再次遭受沉重打击，两名疫苗接种工作人员和一名随行警察被杀。


The latest murders in Pakistan preceded the killing of nine polio workers in Nigeria, and follow the slaying of another nine Pakistani health workers in December and the New Year’s Day murders of development workers affiliated with public-health efforts.	在巴基斯坦谋杀事件之前，12月和元旦分别有9名巴基斯坦卫生工作者和多名卫生事业发展工作人员被杀。 而在巴基斯坦最新谋杀事件之后，又有9名尼日利亚小儿麻痹症工作人员被杀。


The continued targeting of such brave workers is posing a severe challenge to these countries’ public-health communities and their collective ambition to reach every child with lifesaving vaccines.	针对这些勇敢工作人员的持续伤害给这些国家的公共卫生事业以及让所有孩子都获得救命疫苗的集体目标造成了严峻挑战。


For Pakistan, the irony is that the country has been a success story for polio eradication, with the number of cases falling from 197 in 2011 to 58 in 2012.	对巴基斯坦来说，讽刺之处是该国一直是消灭小儿麻痹症的成功样板，病患数量从2011年的197例下降到2012年的58例。


Despite recent challenges, Pakistan put vaccinators back on the job in 28 districts, where 12 million children needed to be reached.	尽管最近遇到了挑战，但巴基斯坦28个区的接种工作人员仍坚守岗位——在这些地区，有1200万儿童需要接种。


Widespread public support for polio eradication efforts has been reflected in a parliamentary resolution.	公众对消灭小儿麻痹症的事业非常支持，这从议会表决就能一窥端倪。


The Ulema Council, a group of influential clerics, has given its backing as well.	由知名牧师组成的伊斯兰学者理事会（Ulema Council）也对这项事业给予了支持。


The most recent report by the Independent Monitoring Board of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, released in November 2012, acknowledged Pakistan’s recent progress – in stark contrast to the bleak outlook of its previous report.	全球消灭小儿麻痹症计划独立监督委员会（ndependent Monitoring Board of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative）2012年11月发布的最新报告承认了巴基斯坦的最新进展，这与该机构此前报告中的消极看法形成了鲜明对比。


But it is critical that the country’s upcoming election does not jeopardize recent gains, particularly during the current low-transmission season, which is the best opportunity to stop the disease in its tracks.	但关键在于即将进行的巴基斯坦选举不要影响最新获得的进展，特别是在目前的低传播率季节（即阻止其传播的最佳机会的节骨眼上）。


All political factions must remain committed to the eradication drive if it is to succeed.	所有政治派系都必须承诺当选后致力于消灭小儿麻痹症。


Indeed, despite progress in 2012, we have not been able fully to interrupt the spread of the poliovirus in Pakistan, owing primarily to obstacles affecting program implementation and management.	事实上，尽管2012年取得了一定的进展，但我们尚不能完全打断小儿麻痹症病毒在巴基斯坦的传播，其主要原因是计划的实施和管理遇到了各种障碍。


These challenges must be addressed through stronger governance at all levels, particularly given that state authority has been badly eroded in roughly a quarter of the country, where complex factors have created distrust in the name of ethnicity, politics, and religion, resulting in a massive breakdown in law and order.	这些障碍必须通过在各个层面上加强治理解决，特别是在约四分之一的邦级政府权威受到严重侵蚀的情况下——复杂的因素导致种族、政见、信仰间的各种不信任，使法律和秩序大规模瘫痪。


Moreover, Pakistan shocked the global public-health community last year by adopting a constitutional amendment that led to the abolition of the national health ministry.	此外，在去年，巴基斯坦还以导致取消国家卫生部的宪法修订震惊了全球公共卫生界。


Unfortunately, the sudden devolution of health responsibilities to the country’s provinces occurred without adequate preparation or oversight.	不幸的是，突然将卫生责任下放给邦级政府的做法并没有充分的准备和监督支持。


The simultaneous scaling back of the local-government system, along with the divisive politics of coalition governments in Pakistan’s fragile democracy, continues to undermine implementation of the polio eradication program.	缩减地方政府系统和巴基斯坦脆弱的民主制度的联合政府的政治分裂的同时发生继续阻碍着消灭小儿麻痹症项目的实施。


The resulting shortcomings in the country’s provincial health systems have manifested themselves not just in the inability to eradicate polio, but also in a recent measles outbreak, which has killed more than 300 children.	由此导致的巴基斯坦邦级卫生体系的缺陷暴露无遗——不但体现在无法消灭小儿麻痹症上，也体现在夺走300多名儿童生命的最新的麻疹大爆发上。


At the same time, local governments’ difficulties are having an adverse effect on provision of clean water and proper sanitation, which are vitally important for polio eradication and public health more broadly.	与此同时，地方政府的困难正在对提供清洁水和良好卫生环境的努力造成消极影响，而后两者对消灭小儿麻痹症、促进公共卫生起着关键作用。


There have also been cases of refusal by parents to vaccinate their children, typically at the behest of clergy members, owing to the belief that such public-health efforts are in fact a covert sterilization program.	还有不少父母拒绝为子女接种疫苗，特别是由神职人员以命令语气要求的疫苗接种，因为他们认为这种公共卫生手段实际上是一种隐蔽的避孕项目。


Indeed, refusal to vaccinate accounts for 2% of the children who are missed.	事实上，拒绝接种要占为接种儿童总数的2%。


A recent smear campaign aimed at discrediting polio vaccination, in which several MPs publicly took part, has complicated matters further.	最近又爆发了一起针对小儿麻痹症疫苗的抹黑事件，数名国会议员公开参与其中，这让问题更加复杂化了。


Daunting as all of this may be, stalling vaccination is not an option.	道路是曲折的，但我们不能让接种工作停下。


It is well established that when vaccination is impeded, the number of cases rises drastically, as was shown in Nigeria in 2003, where a ten-month delay led to the infection of thousands of people domestically, and to reinfection in more than 20 other countries.	众所周知，一旦接种工作停止，患病数量会激增，2003年的尼日利亚就是明证——10个月的拖延导致了当地数千人感染，而且影响到周边20多个国家。


A similar outcome was observed in Pakistan’s Swat Valley after the militant takeover of 2009 rendered the region inaccessible for months.	同样的局面也出现在巴基斯坦的史瓦特河谷（Swat Valley）。 2009年，史瓦特河谷被军事接管，在几个月的时间里，这一地区都无法进入。


This month’s decision to hold back vaccination in Karachi after health workers there were threatened, though understandable, is nonetheless a cause for serious concern in this respect.	由此看来，本月因卫生工作人员受到威胁而取消卡拉奇接种工作的决定虽然可以理解，但会造成严重后果。


As in Nigeria, vaccination delays will be highly detrimental for neighboring countries.	与尼日利亚情形一样，接种工作的中止会对邻国造成极大的负面影响。


Nomadic populations move freely back and forth across the vast and porous Afghanistan-Pakistan border.	在阿富汗-巴基斯坦交界的广大山区，游牧民族自由地迁移着。


In 2011, a polio outbreak in China was traced back to Pakistan.	2011年，中国出现了小儿麻痹症爆发，其源头可以追溯到巴基斯坦。


India, polio-free for the last two years, is well aware that lasting domestic success depends on eradication efforts elsewhere.	过去两年中已经杜绝了小儿麻痹症的印度也如临大敌，充分认识到要在国内继续获得成功，取决于国外的小儿麻痹症消灭情况。


Potential international risks go beyond the immediate neighborhood.	潜在的国际风险并不只局限于邻国。


Already, Pakistan is responsible for the recent appearance of wild poliovirus in Egypt.	最近在埃及出现的脊灰野病毒也来自巴基斯坦。


Fortunately, there is no evidence of transmission, but we may not be so lucky in the future.	幸运的是，没有迹象表明这一病毒在蔓延，但未来是否如此幸运还不好说。


Indeed, the risk that Pakistani pilgrims could carry the problem with them on the 2013 Hajj, the largest annual congregation of Muslims, is not just a theoretical threat.	事实上，在2013年，巴基斯坦朝圣者可能把这一问题带向麦加朝圣——穆斯林世界最隆重的年度机会，这已不仅仅是理论上的危险。


A worst-case outcome there could set back the fight against polio by decades.	若发生最坏情形，可能将数十年来的小儿麻痹症斗争成果毁于一旦。


The scale of the challenge, and hence the multifaceted response that is needed, must not be underestimated.	挑战的规模，以及所需要的多层面应对，必须得到正确理解。


Polio today has become an example of the complex problems plaguing Pakistan’s state and its society.	如今，小儿麻痹症已成为动摇巴基斯坦国基和社会的复杂问题之一。


Pakistan must increase its efforts on polio eradication for reasons that go beyond fulfilling a global health promise (which is reason enough in its own right).	巴基斯坦必须增强在消灭小儿麻痹症方面的努力，这不仅仅是兑现全球卫生承诺的需要（光是这条理由便已足够）。


Success would be a sign of Pakistan’s ability to conquer complex challenges, and it would provide a blueprint for further development interventions.	取得成功能够证明巴基斯坦拥有应对复杂挑战的能力，也为后续发展干预提供了蓝图。


In eradicating polio, Pakistan would not just play its part in eliminating the disease worldwide. It would also reclaim its own global prestige and potential for progress in other areas.	通过消灭小儿麻痹症，巴基斯坦不仅可以在全世界范围内战胜这一疾病作出贡献，也能证明其在其他全球事务中的声望和实力。


Winning the War Against TB	打赢这场反对结核病的战争


SEATTLE – Humans have been battling tuberculosis since the Stone Age.	西雅图——人类自从石器时代起就开始与结核病进行战斗。


But only in the last century has real progress been made against the disease.	但真正取得对这种疾病的进步还仅仅是上个世纪的事情。


A vaccine, first used in humans in 1921, is still in use around the world today.	一种于1921年首先用于人体的疫苗今天仍然在世界各地广泛使用。


And a series of antibiotics, beginning with streptomycin in the 1940s, has proven effective in treating infections.	而从20世纪40年代链霉素开始的系列抗生素已经被证明能对感染起到有效的治疗作用。


Since 1990, TB’s annual death toll has been cut nearly in half.	20世纪90年代开始，肺结核的年死亡人数已减少近半数。


From 2000 to 2014, better diagnosis and treatment saved some 43 million lives.	从2000到2014年，更有效的诊断和治疗技术挽救了约4300万人的生命。


Nonetheless, progress has slowed to a crawl, suggesting that the battle is far from over.	尽管如此，进展依然非常缓慢，说明这场战争还远远没有结束。 过去10年来肺结核发病数的年下降率仅有1.


The annual decline in cases over the past decade has been a mere 1.65%; in 2014, TB killed 1.5 million people.	65%； 而2014年一年，肺结核就夺去了150万人的生命。


Meanwhile, strains of the disease are developing resistance against treatment.	此外，某些结核病菌株正在对治疗产生耐药性。


The misuse and mismanagement of antibiotics has resulted in multidrug-resistant TB.	对于抗生素的滥用和管理不善已经导致耐多药结核病的产生。


These strains must be treated with second-line medications, which are more expensive and often cause worse side effects.	这些菌株必须动用二线药物治疗，而二线药物不仅昂贵而且往往带来更多副作用。


Strains that are resistant to second-line drugs, known as extensively drug-resistant TB (XDR-TB), have also appeared.	而对二线药物同样产生耐药性的菌株（也就是所谓的广泛耐药性结核病（XDR-TB）也已经产生。


Given the enormous economic burden and widespread human suffering caused by TB, a comprehensive effort to tackle the disease is urgently needed.	鉴于结核病造成的巨大的经济负担和大面积人类痛苦，急需开展全面工作应对结核病。


In a series of articles in the British medical journal The Lancet, Salmaan Keshavjee, a professor of global health and social medicine at Harvard Medical School, outlined a strategy for defeating it.	哈佛医学院全球健康及社会医学教授Salmaan Keshavjee在英国医学杂志《柳叶刀》上发表系列文章，明确指出了战胜结核病的对策。


Keshavjee and a group of TB scientists, clinicians, and advocates from governmental and nongovernmental organizations, hospitals, and universities set themselves the goal of bringing TB’s death toll to zero – and outlined the measures needed to achieve it.	Keshavjee和一群研究结核病的科学家、医生及来自政府和非政府组织、医院和大学的倡导者为自己制定的目标是将结核病死亡率降为零——并明确提出了实现这一目标需要采取哪些举措。


The first step is to ramp up data-collection efforts.	首先是要强化数据收集工作。


TB epidemics, like those of other infectious diseases, vary by geography; as result, eradication efforts need to be customized to local conditions.	像其他传染病一样，结核病疫情根据地理位置的不同而变化； 因此，需要根据当地条件来开展根除结核病的工作。


Local TB programs need to make better use of existing data, expand routine collection, modernize data-storage systems, and develop the analytical infrastructure needed to measure the effects of local interventions.	当地结核病项目需要更好地利用现有数据、扩大数据的日常收集、现代化数据存储系统并发展衡量地方干预效果所需的分析基础设施。


These findings need to be made available within the country where data were collected, and the lessons learned must be shared with neighboring countries and regions.	上述研究成果需要在数据来源国公布，而从中所吸取的教训则必须与邻近国家和地区共享。


Moreover, health-care workers must expand efforts to prevent new infections and quickly treat fresh cases.	此外，医疗工作者必须扩大预防新增感染病例的工作并迅速处理新发病例。


By actively seeking out victims and treating them quickly, so that they are no longer infectious, the chain of TB transmission can be broken.	通过积极寻找受害者并迅速对其进行治疗，能使结核病患者不再具有传染性，并借此打破结核病的传播链条。


This strategy has been proven effective by empirical evaluation and mathematical modeling.	实证评价和数学模型已经证实这种方法十分有效。


At the same time, efforts must be made to control the seedbeds of the disease, the latent infections that are the source of virtually all new cases of active TB.	同时，必须努力控制结核病的温床，也就是作为几乎所有新增活动型结核病感染源头的潜伏期感染病例。


Mycobacterium tuberculosis, the bacteria that causes the disease, can lay dormant for long periods, during which the victim shows no symptoms of having been infected.	使人感染结核病的结核病杆菌可以在很长时间内处于休眠状态，而在此期间内受害者并未表现出任何感染症状。


Targeting TB at this stage would stop the bacteria’s spread and reduce the disease’s global burden.	在此阶段治疗结核病可以阻止细菌的传播并减轻结核病的全球负担。


Rolling out preventive therapies in at-risk populations and developing better diagnostic tests to identify those with asymptomatic infections would help drain reservoirs of the bacteria.	针对高危人群推出预防性治疗和研发更有效的诊断测试来确诊那些无症状感染将有助于彻底消灭细菌库。


Developing a more effective vaccine would have the biggest impact on the epidemic.	研发更有效的疫苗可能对疫情影响最大。


The Bacillus Calmette–Guérin vaccine is given to infants in many parts of the world, but its efficacy against pulmonary TB is highly variable.	卡介苗广泛应用于世界众多国家的新生儿，但其抗结核病的功效变化幅度很大。


To eliminate the disease globally, a better vaccine would be crucial.	为了在全球范围内消灭结核病，研发更有效的疫苗至关重要。


Finally, any effort to eradicate TB must acknowledge that the disease is rooted in poverty and social exclusion.	最后，任何根除结核病的工作都必须承认结核病的根源是贫困和社会排斥。


Since the middle of the twentieth century, worldwide efforts to address TB have emphasized biomedical solutions and focused on treating outbreaks.	自20世纪中叶以来，世界各地应对结核病的工作一直强调运用生物医学方法并注重治疗疫情的爆发。


But, before the development of antibiotics, improvements in living standards had helped reduce the impact of TB.	但在抗生素发明之前，生活水平的提高就已经有助于缓解结核病的影响。


Integrating a biomedical approach with an emphasis on the importance of good nutrition, decent housing, and human welfare will be necessary if the disease is to be brought to heel.	只有将生物医学方法与注重良好营养、舒适居所和人类福祉相结合才能实现战胜结核病的目标。


The global community must work together and translate existing knowledge and strategies into effective programmatic interventions in communities most afflicted by TB.	国际社会必须共同努力将现有的知识和对策转化为对受结核病困扰最严重群体有效的项目干预举措。


By developing new tools – including rapid diagnostics, safe and shorter treatment of TB infection and disease, and an efficacious TB vaccine – strengthening health systems, and improving the living conditions of at-risk populations, we can neutralize one of humankind’s oldest killers.	通过研发新工具——包括快速诊断、更安全迅速的治疗结核感染和结核病，以及有效的结核病疫苗——强化卫生系统并改善高危人群的生活条件，我们才能最终战胜这个人类最古老的杀手。


Only then will we be able to consign TB, at long last, to the history books.	只有到那时，我们才能最终将结核病写进历史书。


Erdoğan the Peacemaker?	埃尔多安是和平缔造者吗？


ISTANBUL – Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has taken on a daunting challenge.	伊斯坦布尔 —— 土耳其总理雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安已经开始了一项艰巨的挑战。


After participating in the nuclear-security summit in South Korea at the end of March, he went to Tehran to urge Iran’s leaders to make a deal during the next round of nuclear talks between Iran and the United Nations Security Council’s five permanent members (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States) plus Germany.	在三月底参加了韩国核安全首脑会议后，他便前往德黑兰，敦促伊朗领导人在与联合国安理会五大常任理事国（英国、中国、法国、俄罗斯和美国）及德国进行的下一轮核谈判中达成协议。


And Erdoğan will host those talks in Istanbul in mid-April.	四月中旬，埃尔多安将在伊斯坦布尔主持这些会谈。


Erdoğan last traveled to Tehran in May 2010 to finalize an agreement that he had negotiated under which Iran was to send large quantities of its low-enriched uranium to Turkey in exchange for nuclear fuel for Iran’s research reactor.	埃尔多安上次前往德黑兰是在2010年5月，目的是与伊朗最终达成某项协议，该协议规定伊朗向土耳其提供大量低浓缩铀，而土耳其为伊朗研究核反应堆提供核燃料。


The deal, mediated by Turkey and Brazil, was presented to the rest of the world as a groundbreaking confidence-building initiative.	该协议是在土耳其和巴西的调解下达成的，作为一项突破性的信心建设倡议呈现在世界面前。


But the US and its allies quickly rejected the agreement as an Iranian ploy designed to halt the growing momentum for additional sanctions.	但美国及其盟国很快就拒绝了这项协议，因为它们认为伊朗是在采取伎俩减弱国际社会对其实施额外制裁的增长势头。


Turkey’s insistence on pressing ahead with the deal caused tension with the US and fueled criticism at home and abroad that Erdoğan’s government was shifting away from its long-standing alliance with the West.	土耳其坚持推行该项协议，结果造成本国与美国关系紧张，引发国内外人士的指责——埃尔多安政府正在脱离与西方国家结成的长期联盟。


The memory of this short-lived crisis with the US is still fresh in Turkish government circles.	这场与美国相持的短暂危机在土耳其政界仍然闻所未闻。


So why, despite having burned his fingers two years ago, is Erdoğan taking up the issue again?	两年前埃尔多安就曾提出该问题，结果是自讨苦吃，那么为什么现在又将该问题重提呢？


What did he hope to accomplish in Tehran?	他希望在德黑兰达到什么目的呢？


Much has changed in the Middle East during the past two years, and not to Turkey’s advantage.	在过去两年中中东发生了很大变化，但这一状况对土耳其非常不利。


As a result, Turkey is now seeking to contain a rapidly deteriorating regional security situation.	因此，土耳其正努力遏制地区安全形势迅速恶化的形势。


Events in Syria are forcing Turkish authorities to accept the harsh reality of the Assad regime’s resilience – and now its hostility towards Turkey.	叙利亚事件迫使土耳其当局接受这一严酷的现实——阿萨德政权具有很大柔韧性，而且对土耳其充满敌意。


Iraq, another of Turkey’s neighbors, faces the risk of a protracted sectarian power struggle following withdrawal of US troops.	土耳其的另一邻国伊拉克在美军撤离之后，面临着一场旷日持久的教派权力斗争。


Given this, Turkey’s main objective now is to prevent a military intervention against Iran.	鉴于此，现在土耳其的主要目的是为了防止对伊朗进行军事干预。


From Turkey’s perspective, an Israeli or American strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities would destabilize the region further, as Iran would undoubtedly retaliate by fueling sectarian tensions and undermining the prospects of a settlement in both Syria and Iraq.	从土耳其的角度来看，以色列或美国打击伊朗核设施，将进一步破坏该地区稳定，伊朗无疑将通过加剧教派斗争的紧张局势、破坏叙利亚和伊拉克的和解前景进行报复。


As a result, Turkey wants to prolong, at all costs, the time available for diplomacy.	鉴于此，土耳其希望不惜一切代价延长外交时间。


But Erdoğan’s specific objective was more modest this time than it was in 2010, because Turkey does not want to play the role of mediator and will not seek to negotiate the details of an agreement.	但埃尔多安这次的具体目标与2010年相比较为温和，因为土耳其不希望发挥调解的作用，也不会就该协议的具体细节进行谈判。


Instead, Erdoğan emphasized to his Iranian counterparts the international community’s resolve to bring transparency to Iran’s nuclear program, and insisted on the importance of concrete progress in the next round of the nuclear talks.	相反，埃尔多安向伊朗领导人强调国际社会使伊朗的核计划透明的决心及下一轮核问题会谈具体进展的重要性。


He warned that Iranian intransigence would doom the talks to failure, raising the prospects of yet another military confrontation in the Middle East.	他警告说，如果伊朗不妥协，那么会谈将难逃失败的厄运，中东地区将很可能面临新一轮军事对抗。


In particular, Erdoğan stressed the need for Iran to offer a gesture of goodwill about its nuclear program.	埃尔多安特别强调，伊朗必须对其核计划表现出善意姿态。


The Iranian regime should, at the very least, commit itself to halt uranium enrichment at 20%, a figure short of the threshold needed to produce weapons.	伊朗政权至少应承诺浓缩铀生产减少20％左右——小于武器生产所需的阈值。


Having had direct meetings with both Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Erdoğan was in a unique position, as a prime minister of a NATO country, to convey these critical messages to a regime whose top-level decision-making processes remain as opaque as ever to the West.	同时，埃尔多安同伊朗总统内贾德和最高领袖哈梅内伊曾经直接会晤，作为一个北约国家的总理，他的地位非常独特——他需要将这些重要消息传递给一个顶层决策过程同以往西方一样不透明的政权。


Paradoxically, however, Erdoğan’s task, while more modest than in 2010, is also more difficult, owing to the prospect of new sanctions on Iran, including a ban on oil exports, that are to enter into force in July.	然而，奇怪的是，埃尔多安的任务虽然比2010年更温和了，但同时也更困难了，因为伊朗可能会面临新的制裁措施，包括七月份生效的石油出口禁令。


Advocates of sanctions argue that they are having a crippling effect on the Iranian economy.	支持对伊朗实施制裁的人认为，这些措施会对伊朗的经济可能陷入瘫痪。


The value of the Iranian rial has fallen by 50% against the US dollar since the beginning of the year, and the country is suffering from a severe shortage of foreign exchange. So now is not the time to pull back.	自年初以来，伊朗里亚尔（伊朗货币单位）对美元的汇价下跌了50％，外汇短缺严重。


Moreover, US President Barack Obama, facing an election in November, does not wish to be accused of being soft on Iran, making it difficult for the West to reciprocate potential Iranian overtures.	此外，美国总统奥巴马面临着11月的选举，不希望被指责对伊朗采取姑息态度，因此西方国家很难对伊朗伸出援手。


Yet Erdoğan’s best ally in his risky gambit may be the US consumer.	然而，埃尔多安在冒险开局中最好的盟友可能是美国消费者。


Faced with rising gasoline prices as a result of the ongoing crisis with Iran, Americans’ concerns about the cost of driving have contributed to Obama’s shaky popularity ratings.	由于伊朗危机持续，面对汽油价格上涨，美国人对驾驶成本特别关注，这也导致了奥巴马的民意支持摇摇欲坠。


Thus, the Obama administration may find it more politically expedient to seek a deal with Iran.	因此，奥巴马政府可能会认为，设法与伊朗达成协议是政治上的权宜之计。


If Iran displays a real willingness to compromise, the West should hold off on the new sanctions.	如果伊朗真正愿意妥协，西方应该推迟实施新的制裁。


It will soon become clear whether Erdoğan’s visit succeeds.	埃尔多安的访问是否成功，很快就会��得清晰。


If Iran decides to engage the international community with concrete confidence-building measures at the next round of multilateral talks, Erdoğan will take much of the credit for giving diplomacy a last chance – and quite possibly for averting a disastrous military confrontation in the Middle East.	如果伊朗决定在下一轮多边谈判中参与国际社会，制定具体的信心建立措施，埃尔多安将会因为给外交创造机会——很可能会因为避免一场中东的灾难性军事对抗而获得好评。


Turkey’s Critical Election	土耳其的关键选举


ISTANBUL – In very few democracies could such a small shift in votes lead to outcomes as different as the ones that could result from Turkey’s general election on June 7.	伊斯坦布尔——极少有民主国家像6月7日大选时的土耳其那样因为很小的选票变化而改变最终选局。


A swing of less than 1% of the national vote could decide whether the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is forced to form a coalition government – Turkey’s first after 13 years of single-party rule – leaving it unable to fulfill President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s longstanding desire to strengthen the presidency.	不到1%的国内选票变化就有可能决定执政的正义与发展党（AKP）是否要在土耳其13年的一党执政后被迫组建联合政府——从而使雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安总统无法达成强化总统权力的愿望。


Turkish elections have been boring affairs since the AKP came to power in 2002.	自2002年正义与发展党上台后土耳其大选一直非常沉闷。


The party’s results have been all but preordained: landslide victories and majority governments.	该党取得压倒性胜利和组建多数政府的选举结果几乎是预先注定的。


This year, however, the outlook is different: the results are far from certain, and the stakes could hardly be higher.	但今年的情况却有所不同：选举结果根本无法确定，而其中所牵扯的利益则高得不能再高。


Riding on the outcome is not only Erdoğan’s political future, but also the potential for a long-term settlement with the country’s Kurds and the long-term soundness of Turkish democracy itself.	选举结果不仅将决定埃尔多安的政治命运，还将决定能否与库尔德人达成长期和解以及土耳其民主制度的长期前途。


The uncertainty this time around is attributable to the predominantly Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP).	此次的不确定性是由以库尔德人为主的人民民主党（HDP）造成的。


Kurdish political parties shied away from contesting past elections, owing to their fear of failing to clear the 10% popular-vote threshold needed to enter the parliament.	库尔德政党过去一直回避参选，因为他们害怕凑不够进入议会所需的10%的公众选票。


Instead, Kurdish politicians would run as independent candidates, who are not subject to the threshold.	相反，库尔德政治家会以不受10%门槛限制的独立候选人身份参选。


Once safely in office, they would reunite under the banner of a party.	一旦成功当选，他们再重新集结在库尔德政党的旗帜下。


This year, however, the Kurdish political movement has decided to field its candidates as members of a single party.	但今年，库尔德政治运动已经决定将库尔德候选人以一党参选的身份推出。


This electoral strategy, though risky, could yield large rewards, with the outcome holding significant implications for the party’s immediate fortune – as well as for Turkey’s long-term prospects.	这样的选举策略虽有风险，但却可能带来巨大的回报，其结果不仅将对该党的当前命运产生巨大影响，也将影响到土耳其的长期前途。


The HDP’s failure to clear the 10% threshold would open the way for an overhaul of the country’s political system.	人民民主党达不到10%的议会门槛将启动全面的国内政治体制改革。


With the Kurds and their candidates excluded from the parliament, the AKP would have to do only slightly better than polls are predicting to maintain its political dominance.	如果库尔德人及其候选人被排除在议会之外，正义与发展党只需表现略好于民调就能继续主导国内的政治生活。


If the party is able to secure more than 45% of the national vote, the quirks in Turkey’s electoral law will give it more than 330 representatives in the country’s 550-seat legislature.	如果该党能获得45%以上的国内选票，那么依据土耳其选举法的奇怪规定，就能在550个议会席位中拥有代表超过330个。


Such a result would give Erdoğan the power to put in place the presidential system of governance that he has long sought.	这样的结果将使埃尔多安有权施行他一直期待的总统执政制度。


The AKP’s parliamentary majority would allow the party to draft a new constitution unilaterally and put it to a referendum within a year.	正义与发展党的议会多数将允许其单方面起草新宪法，并在一年内将其付诸公投。


At the same time, the country’s southeastern regions could become vulnerable to civil unrest, as the Kurdish movement – faced with a total lack of national political representation during a time of institutional transition – agitates for greater local autonomy.	与此同时，土耳其东南部地区可能会爆发内乱，因为在制度转轨期完全失去政治话语权的库尔德运动会鼓吹地方自治权的扩大。


If, on the other hand the HDP can reach the 10% threshold, its fortunes – and Erdoğan’s – will swing in the other direction.	另一方面，如果人民民主党能够达到10%的门槛，那么它的命运——连同埃尔多安的命运——都将走向另一个方向。


The party’s candidates would command a sizable minority delegation in parliament, and the AKP would likely become the senior partner of a coalition government.	该党候选人将会掌控可观的议会少数代表权，而正义与发展党则有可能成为联合政府的高级合伙方。


Far from securing a dominant position, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu would be forced to choose between aligning his party with the HDP or the conservative Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).	总理达武特奥卢不仅不能取得主导地位，还将被迫在联合人民民主党抑或保守的民族主义运动党（MHP）之间做出选择。


A grand coalition with the main opposition party, the center-left Republican People’s Party (CHP), though theoretically possible, is not congruous with Turkey’s political culture.	虽然理论上与中左翼共和人民党（CHP）结成大联盟的可能性存在，但这样的假设却与土耳其的政治文化不符。


Such a result would empower the executive, headed by Davutoğlu, to the detriment of the presidency.	这样的结果将授权以达武特奥卢为首的执政官员削弱总统地位。


With the possibility that Erdoğan could become an executive president no longer realistic, his power would quickly begin to wane.	因为已经不可能成为执行主席，埃尔多安的权力将很快开始削弱。


Even assuming that the AKP remained the country’s largest party, the balance of power in Turkish politics would start to turn against him.	即使假设正义与发展党依然是全国最大的政党，但土耳其政治的权力平衡也将开始不利于他。


In liberal democracies, national elections are intended to provide the winning side with a popular mandate to govern and to set policy priorities until the next election.	在自由民主国家，全国选举旨在授权获胜方在下一次选举前执政及确定优先政策。


Only rarely do they hold implications that will last longer than a single electoral cycle.	选举的意义很少延伸到单一选举周期以上。


But that is the case today in Turkey, where the outcome of the upcoming popular vote is likely to determine the rules of political life for years to come.	但当今土耳其的现实却是即将举行的投票结果可能决定土耳其之后多年的政治生活规则。


The HDP is currently polling at around 10%.	人民民主党现在的民调得票率在10%左右。


A little nudge in either direction could make all the difference in the world.	向任何方向的微调带来的改变都可能意义重大。


But Erdoğan’s brutal response to the coup attempt – which may include show trials, in addition to the “cleansing” of public institutions of both remnants of the secularist establishment and his former allies in the Gülen movement – will only deepen the chasms within Turkish society.	但埃尔多安对政变企图的残酷回应——其中可能包括公开审判以及对世俗主义制度及其前葛兰运动盟友残余公共机构的“清洗”行为���—只会导致土耳其社会的分歧进一步深化。


Erdoğan’s Second Chance	埃尔多安的第二次机会


ISTANBUL – The outcome of Turkey’s latest general election – voters have gone to the polls twice in the last five months – reveals important insights into the nature of the country’s democracy and the preferences of its citizens.	伊斯坦布尔—在最近的土耳其大选中，选民在五个月的时间里两次前往投票站，其结果揭示了土耳其民主以及土耳其人民偏好的一些重要特点。


The first of Turkey’s two parliamentary elections this year, in June, was widely viewed as a referendum on President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s efforts to strengthen the powers of his office.	今年，土耳其进行了两次议会选举，第一次是在6月，被广泛认为是总统埃尔多安加强其班子权力的全民公决。


The result was clear.	结果是明确的。


Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) received just 41% of the vote, costing it the majority it had enjoyed since coming to power in 2002.	埃尔多安的正义和发展党（AKP）只获得了41%的选票，失去了自2002年掌权以来的多数支持率。


On November 1, however, after negotiations following the June elections resulted in a hung parliament, Turks voted again, and the outcome could not have been more different.	但是，6月选举后的谈判导致了无多数议会，11月1日，土耳其再次举行投票，结果截然不同。


This time, the election was predominantly perceived as a referendum on the continuation of single-party rule, and the AKP won 49% of the vote, providing it with a comfortable majority.	这一回，选举主要被视为关于继续一党执政的全民公决，AKP赢得49%的选票，获得了令人心安的多数。


In the run-up to the latest election, Erdoğan and the AKP emphasized the importance of the party’s parliamentary majority for Turkey’s political stability.	在最近的选举之前的一段时间，埃尔多安和AKP强调该党占议会多数对于土耳其政治稳定的重要性。


The opposition countered with the argument that a coalition government would counter the country’s deep political polarization, while helping to establish stronger checks and balances.	反对派反驳说，联合政府能够遏制土耳其政治深度两极分化的问题，同时也有助于建立更强的制衡。


The promise of stability proved to be the more resonant message.	看起来，稳定承诺更能引起共鸣。


The political instability following June’s inconclusive election had been compounded by a sharp decline in domestic and regional security.	6月的无果选举所带来的政治动荡因为国内和地区安全局势的急剧恶化而恶化。


A renewed campaign of violence by the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and attacks by the Islamic State, including suicide bombings in Ankara that killed more than 100 people, created a backdrop that reinforced the AKP’s message.	分裂派库尔德工人党（PKK）的暴力行动卷土重来，伊斯兰国的袭击也层出不穷——包括100余人被杀的安卡拉自杀式炸弹袭击——这让AKP的口号更有号召力。


The outcome of the vote attests to the ineffectiveness of Turkey’s parliamentary opposition, which once again failed to make a dent in the AKP’s popularity, almost as if they had set out to disprove the theory that electorates simply tire of long-serving governments.	选举结果印证了土耳其议会反对派的低能，他们再一次没能影响AKP的支持率，好像他们是为了证明选民肯定讨厌长期执政的政府这一理论不正确似的。


Instead the AKP obtained its landslide victory – a major achievement after 13 years of uninterrupted rule – by siphoning voters from its competitors.	相反，AKP获得了压倒性胜利——在不间断地执政13年后，这是一个了不起的成就——靠的是从竞争对手手中争夺选民。


The party received nearly five million more votes than it did in June, corresponding to a 20% increase in its popularity.	AKP比6月多获得了近五百万张选票，相当于支持率升高20%。


Two opposition parties, the conservative Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the predominantly Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), together lost three million votes, while the center-left Republican People’s Party (CHP) held its ground, finishing second with 25% of the vote.	两大反对党——保守派的民族主运动党（MHP）和主要反对党库尔德人民民主党（HDP）——加起来共损失三百万选民，中左翼的共和人民党（CHP）守住了阵地，以25%的支持率名列第二。


Voters punished the nationalist MHP severely for its obstructionism following the June election, when it refused all offers to join a coalition government.	6月选举后，MHP拒绝一切加入联合政府的条件，这一从中作梗的行为受到了选民的严惩。


With 12% of the popular vote, compared to 16% in June, the MHP lost almost half of its parliamentary seats.	HMP只获得12%的支持率，而6月为16%，因此丧失了近一半的议会席位。


The HDP was handicapped by its inability to distance itself from the PKK, which a large section of the electorate regards as being responsible for the upsurge in domestic violence.	HDP的败因在于无法与PKK保持距离，很大一部分选民认为，PKK要为国内暴力升级负责。


Indeed, the HDP seemed at risk of failing to obtain the 10% of the vote it would need to enter parliament, an outcome that would have provided the AKP with a majority large enough to amend the constitution on its own.	事实上，HDP可能无法获得进入议会所需要的10%的支持率，这一结果将让AKP赢得足够大的多数，靠自己修订宪法。


In the end, HDP ended with 10.75% of the vote, down from 13% in the June elections, preventing Erdoğan from securing the compliant parliament he would need to establish an executive presidency.	最终，HDP获得10. 75%的选票，而6月选举时为13%，阻止了埃尔多安获得建立执行总统制所需要的听话的议会。


Nonetheless, Turkey’s new government has been provided with a broad enough mandate to address some of the country’s most difficult and imminent policy challenges – most notably the peace process with the Kurds.	尽管如此，土耳其新政府拥有了足够广泛的权力解决土耳其最困难、最紧迫的政策挑战——其中最引人注目的便是与库尔德人的和平进程。


A previous effort had been suspended ahead of the election, as the PKK returned to violence and the AKP’s leadership adopted increasingly nationalist and hawkish rhetoric.	此前的和平进程在选举前被中止，因为PKK回归暴力，而AKP领导层的口风日益民族主义和强硬。


With the election over, however, there is hope that the new government will restart the negotiations.	但是，选举结束后，新政府有望重启谈判。


If successful, the talks would have a major impact not only domestically, but also on the ongoing fight against the Islamic State.	如果成功，谈判不但将产生巨大的国内影响，也将有利于继续打击伊斯兰国。


The AKP’s majority will also enable it to continue to recalibrate the country’s foreign policy.	AKP的多数地位还让它能够继续改变土耳其外交政策。


Turkey’s policies following the Arab Spring had led to a loss of influence and friends in the region; but recently the country has begun to adapt its approach to the realities on the ground.	阿拉伯之春后，土耳其的政策导致它失去了影响力和盟友； 但最近土耳其开始调整方针适应现实。


For example, Turkey has lifted its objections to a role for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in negotiations to end the civil war in Syria.	比如，土耳其不再反对叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德参加结束叙利亚内战的谈判。


Similarly, a new commitment to the struggle against the Islamic State has eliminated a core point of friction with Turkey’s Western partners.	类似地，打击伊斯兰国的新承诺打消了土耳其西方盟友的一个核心摩擦点。


The main trap the new government must avoid is a return to a heavily paternalistic style of governance.	新政府必须避免的主要陷阱是回归家长式治国。


The AKP should take comfort in its large majority and start to view minority views and even peaceful dissent more benignly, in a way that befits a country negotiating accession to the European Union.	AKP应该对其所获得的大多数感到欣慰，并开始更温和地对待少数派观点甚至和平异见者，以利于土耳其和欧盟的入盟谈判。


The lesson of the two elections is clear: Turkey’s voters want a strong, stable government, but not one that runs roughshod over its opponents.	两次选举的教训是显而易见的：土耳其选民希望看到一个强大、稳定的政府，但也不能冷酷无情的践踏反对派。


Erdoğan’s Tragic Choice	埃尔多安的悲剧性选择


CAMBRIDGE – Ever since Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won his first general election in late 2002, he has been obsessed with the idea that power would be wrested from him through a coup.	发自剑桥——自从土耳其总统雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安（Recep Tayyip Erdoğan）于2002年赢得了第一次大选以来，被政变夺权的梦魇就时时困扰着他。


He had good reason to worry even then.	他的担忧可不是空穴来风。


Turkey’s ultra-secularist establishment, ensconced in the upper echelons of the judiciary and the military at the time, made no secret of its antipathy toward Erdoğan and his political allies.	当年扎根于土耳其司法和军队高层的极端世俗体制一直都毫不掩饰其对埃尔多安本人及其政治盟友的反感。


Erdoğan himself had been jailed for reciting religion-laced poetry, which prevented him from taking office immediately when his Justice and Development Party (AKP) assumed office in November 2002.	埃尔多安本人也曾因当众背诵宗教诗歌而入狱，这令他无法在其领导的土耳其正义与发展党2002年11月赢得议会选举时立刻就职。


In 2007, the military issued a statement opposing the AKP’s candidate for president – then largely a figurehead.	2007年时土耳其军方公开发表声明反对正义与发展党推举的总统候选人选——其实那人基本上就是一个傀儡。


And in 2008, the party narrowly escaped being shut down by the country’s top court for “anti-secular activities.”	而在2008年，该党险些被土耳其最高法院以“反世俗活动”罪名解散。


The old guard’s efforts largely backfired and served only to augment Erdoğan’s popularity.	但这帮老看门人的努力在很大程度上都事与愿违，反而增强了埃尔多安的人气。


His strengthening grip on power might have mollified him and led to a less confrontational political style.	对手中权力的日渐紧握让埃尔多安不急于反抗并衍生出较少对抗性的政治行事风格。


Instead, in the ensuing years, his then-allies the Gülenists – followers of the cleric-in-exile Fethullah Gülen – managed to whip Erdoğan’s obsession into paranoia.	相反在随后几年中，他当时的盟友葛兰主义者——土耳其流亡宗教学者法图拉·葛兰的追随者们——则一手将人们对埃尔多安的崇拜变成了偏执。


From 2008 to 2013, Gülenists in the police, judiciary, and media concocted a series of fictitious conspiracies and plots against Erdoğan, each more gory than the last.	从2008年到2013年，在警界，司法和媒体的葛兰主义者们炮制了一系列据称针对埃尔多安的虚构阴谋事件，而且描绘得一个比一个更绘声绘色。


They ran sensational show trials targeting military officers, journalists, NGOs, professors, and Kurdish politicians.	他们针对一众军官，记者，非政府组织，教授学者和库尔德政治家举行了大张旗鼓的公审。


Erdoğan may not have believed all of the charges – a military chief with whom he had worked closely was among those jailed – but the prosecutions served their purpose.	或许连埃尔多安都无法相信所有的指控——某位曾与他密切共事的高级军官也被投入了监狱——但这些起诉达到了这帮人的目的。


They fed Erdoğan’s fear of being toppled, and eliminated the remaining vestiges of the secularist regime from the military and civilian bureaucracy.	它们缓解了埃尔多安遭遇推翻的忧虑，并在军事和民用机构中铲除了世俗政权的残余遗迹。


The Gülenists had another motive as well.	而这群葛兰主义者还有另外一个小算盘。


They were able to place their own sympathizers in the senior ranks vacated by the military officers targeted by their sham trials.	他们可以通过虚假审判清理一批高级军官，并用自己的同情者取而代之。


The Gülenists had spent decades infiltrating the military; but the commanding heights had remained out of reach.	葛兰主义者们已经花了几十年的时间去渗透军队； 但一直无法染指最高指挥层。


This was their opportunity.	他们急需把握这个机会。


The ultimate irony of July’s failed coup is that it was engineered not by Turkey’s secularists, but by the Gülenist officers Erdoğan had allowed to be promoted in their stead.	而今年七月的未遂政变中最讽刺的一点莫过于它不是由土耳其的世俗主义者策划的，而是出自埃尔多安指派来取代前者的葛兰主义者之手。


By the end of 2013, Erdoğan’s alliance with the Gülenists had turned into open warfare.	到了2013年底，埃尔多安与葛兰主义者公开决裂。


With the common enemy – the secularist old guard – defeated, there was little to hold the alliance together.	随着共同的敌人——世俗主义者——被消灭殆尽，自然也没什么理由继续结盟了。


Erdoğan had begun closing Gülenist schools and businesses and purging them from the state bureaucracy.	埃尔多安已经着手关闭葛兰主义学校和企业，并将其党羽清除出国家机构。


A major purge of the military was on the way, which apparently prompted Gülenist officers to move pre-emptively.	针对军队的大清洗也在酝酿之中，显然这促使葛兰主义军人只得选择先发制人。


In any case, the coup attempt has fully validated Erdoğan’s paranoia, which helps explain why the crackdown on Gülenists and other government opponents has been so ruthless and extensive.	无论如何，这场未遂政变已经完全证实了埃尔多安的被夺权妄想症状，也有助于解释为何针对葛兰主义者和其他政府反对派的打击力度会如此无情和广泛。


In addition to the discharge of nearly 4,000 officers, 85,000 public officials have been dismissed from their jobs since July 15, and 17,000 have been jailed.	近4000名军官被逐出军队，8. 5万名公职人员自7月15日起被革职查办，1.


Scores of journalists have been detained, including many with no links to the Gülen movement.	7万人被判入狱。 数十名记者遭到拘留，其中包括许多跟葛兰运动无关的人。


Any semblance of the rule of law and due process has disappeared.	法治和正当程序规则的任何遮羞布都不复存在了。


A great leader would have responded differently.	而一个伟大的领导者则会做出截然不同的应对。


The failed putsch created a rare opportunity for national unity.	这场未遂政变创造了一个实现民族团结的难得机会。


All political parties, including the Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP), condemned the coup attempt, as did the vast majority of ordinary people, regardless of their political orientation.	所有政党——包括库尔德人民民主党——都跟绝大多数政治倾向各异的普通民众一道谴责这场政变。


Erdoğan could have used the opportunity to rise beyond Islamist, liberal, secularist, and Kurdish identities to establish a new political consensus around democratic norms. He had a chance to become a democratic unifier.	埃尔多安本可利用这个机会去超越伊斯兰，自由主义，世俗主义和库尔德人的身份认知，围绕民主规范构建一个新的政治共识，有机会成为实现一个民主团结的领袖。


Instead, he has chosen to deepen Turkey’s divisions and erode the rule of law even more.	但埃尔多安却选择了深化土耳其内部的分裂并进一步腐蚀法治。


The dismissal and jailing of opponents has gone far beyond those who may have had a role in the putsch.	对政敌的解雇和监禁已经远远超出了政变者的范围。


Marxist academics, Kurdish journalists, and liberal commentators have been swept up alongside Gülenists.	马克思主义学者，库尔德记者，和自由派评论家都与葛兰主义者一起遭到了清洗。


Erdoğan continues to treat the HDP as a pariah. And, far from contemplating peace with the Kurdish rebels, he seems to relish the resumption of war with them.	埃尔多安继续将库尔德人民民主党视为贱民，而且根本不去考虑与库尔德反政府武装之间达成和平，甚至热衷于重新开战。


Unfortunately, this is a winning strategy.	不幸的是，这是一个成功的策略。


Keeping the country on high alert against perceived enemies and inflaming nationalist-religious passions serves to keep Erdoğan’s base mobilized.	让国民对假想敌保持高度警惕并煽动民族宗教情绪可以令埃尔多安的选民基础保持活跃。


And it neutralizes the two main opposition parties; both are highly nationalistic and therefore constitute reliable allies in the war against the Kurdish rebels.	此举还能拉拢两个主要反对党； 这两党都是高度民族主义，并因此构建了针对库尔德反对派战争的可靠联盟。


Similarly, Erdoğan’s offensive against Gülen and his movement seems driven more by political opportunism than by a desire to bring the coup’s organizers to justice.	同样，埃尔多安针对葛兰本人及其运动的打击更像是政治投机而非要将政变组织者绳之于法。


Erdoğan and his ministers have endlessly griped about the United States’ reluctance to extradite Gülen to Turkey.	埃尔多安和他的部长们一直都抱怨美国不愿意将葛兰引渡回土耳其。


Yet, nearly two months after the coup, Turkey has not formally submitted to the US any evidence of Gülen’s culpability.	然而政变至今已近两月，土耳其依然没有正式将葛兰的犯罪证据提交给美国。


Anti-American rhetoric plays well in Turkey, and Erdoğan is not beneath exploiting it.	反美言论在土耳其一直都是很吃香的东西，而埃尔多安在这方面自然也不落人后。


In his testimony to the prosecutors investigating the coup, the army’s top general has said that the putschists who took him hostage offered to put him in contact that night with Gülen.	在一份回答政变调查检察官质询的证词中，土耳其陆军司令兼总参谋长胡卢西·阿卡尔（Hulusi Akar）表示劫持他的政变者在事件发生当晚要求他与葛兰通话。


This remains the strongest evidence that Gülen himself was directly involved.	目前来说这是葛兰本人直接参与政变的最有力证据。


A leader intent on convincing the world of Gülen’s culpability would have paraded his military chief in front of the media to elaborate on what happened that night.	一位试图向全世界证明葛兰意图谋反的领导人肯定会让自己的军界同僚在媒体面前讲述当晚详情。


Yet the general has not been asked – or allowed – to speak in public, fueling speculation about his own role in the attempted coup.	然而这位司令至今未被要求——或者允许——公开讲话，令外界不禁揣测他本人在这场未遂政变中究竟扮演何种角色。


And so Turkey’s never-ending cycle of victimization – of Islamists, communists, secularists, Kurds perennially, and now the Gülenists – has gained velocity.	至此土耳其永无止境受害者螺旋——囊括了伊斯兰主义者、共产主义者、世俗主义者，库尔德人，如今又增添了葛兰主义者——又进一步加速运转。


Erdoğan is making the same tragic mistake he made in 2009-2010: using his vast popularity to undermine democracy and the rule of law rather than restoring them – and thus rendering moderation and political reconciliation all the more difficult in the future.	埃尔多安犯下了跟2009~2010年同样的悲剧性错误：利用自身的民望破坏而非重振民主和法治——从而令温和主义和政治和解在未来变得更加难以实现。


Erdoğan has twice had the chance to be a great leader. At considerable cost to his legacy – and even greater cost to Turkey – he spurned it both times.	埃尔多安曾有两次成为一个伟大的领袖的机会，却两次都将其抛诸脑后——这不仅将令他的政治遗产大打折扣， 也会让土耳其付出更为沉重的代价


Putin’s Turkish Delight	普京的土耳其软糖


BRUSSELS – Beware of czars bearing gifts.	布鲁塞尔——小心带着礼品的沙皇。


It is sound advice for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as he tries to leverage his rapprochement with Russian President Vladimir Putin in his relations with the West.	这是对土耳其总统雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安中肯的建议，埃尔多安正试图在与西方关系中利用土耳其与俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京的友好关系。


Erdoğan’s meeting with Putin in St. Petersburg this month was ostensibly focused on burying the hatchet after Turkey shot down a Russian warplane near its border with Syria last year.	埃尔多安与普京本月在圣彼得堡的会晤表面重点是去年在土叙边境击落俄罗斯战机后与俄冰释前嫌。


But the Kremlin seems to view the visit as an opportunity to convince Erdoğan to “turn east” and join Russia, as well as China and the countries of Central Asia, in a kind of brotherhood of autocracies.	但普京似乎将此次会面视作说服埃尔多安“向东转”并加入俄罗斯、中国及中亚各国独裁兄弟联盟的一次良机。


The question is whether Erdoğan actually plans to take up the offer.	问题在于埃尔多安是否打算接受他的建议。


Erdoğan certainly put on a show with Putin, promising friendship and cooperation.	埃尔多安显然正与普京打得火热，承诺建立友谊与合作联盟。


In doing so, he sent his Western allies – which have criticized the arrests of thousands of perceived opponents, including many journalists, following last month’s failed military coup – a powerful message: “I don’t need you.”	他借此在上个月军事政变失败后向批评他逮捕数千名包括众多新闻记者在内的所谓反对派的西方盟友传递了一条有力的消息：“我并不需要你们。


Putin, by contrast, was the first world leader to call for support for Erdoğan’s government after the coup, which perhaps explains why Russia was Erdoğan’s first destination after the dust had settled.	”相反，普京是政变后首位呼吁支持埃尔多安政府的世界领袖，这或许能够解释埃尔多安为什么在尘埃落定后第一站就拜访俄罗斯。


To be sure, Erdoğan may simply have been seizing an ideal opportunity to boost Turkey’s own security and that of the region.	可以肯定，埃尔多安可能只是抓住了一个巩固土耳其自身及地区安全的理想机会。


After all, it is in nobody’s interest – least of all NATO’s – to have Turkey and Russia at each other’s throats.	归根结底，土耳其与俄罗斯闹得不可开交不符合任何人——包括北约的利益。


But it would be surprising if Erdoğan had no desire to make his NATO allies nervous.	但如果说埃尔多安不想让其北约盟国紧张恐怕没有人相信。


And, in that endeavor, he succeeded.	而且他成功进行了这方面的努力。


At the very least, the EU needs Turkey to continue, according to the deal struck in March, to stem the flow of refugees to its borders; any indication that Erdoğan may be turning against Europe is thus a cause for serious concern.	从最低限度上讲，欧盟需要土耳其继续按照今年3月所达成协议的规定遏制难民流向土欧边界； 因此埃尔多安可能对欧洲不利的任何迹象都应当引起严重的关注。


There may, however, be more to Erdoğan’s rapprochement with Putin.	但埃尔多安与普京的和解或许还有更深层次的内容。


If he is genuinely seeking to deepen Turkey’s relationship with Russia, at the expense of its ties with the EU and the US, as some warn, this would amount to a fundamental geopolitical realignment.	如果他真像某些人所警告的那样试图牺牲与欧盟和美国的关系来深化对俄关系，就很可能会引发根本性的地缘政治重组。


But this seems unlikely.	但这种情况似乎不太可能发生。


The Kremlin has a strong interest in the deterioration of Turkey’s relations with its Western partners.	克里姆林宫对土耳其与西方伙伴关系恶化乐见其成。


Putin has been vocal about his opposition to NATO policies – particularly its role in countries bordering Russia.	普京一直对北约政策（特别是北约的俄罗斯邻国政策）直言不讳地表示反对。


Given that Putin cares little for human rights, the rule of law, or democracy, watching EU and US leaders butt heads with Erdoğan over his post-coup crackdown must have looked like a golden opportunity to weaken NATO.	鉴于普京对人权、法治或民主关注甚少，坐视欧盟与美国领导人与埃尔多安在后政变镇压问题上硬碰硬无疑似乎是一个削弱北约的黄金机会。


Another reason why Russia is keen to extend the hand of friendship to Turkey is the ongoing conflict in Syria, in which the Kremlin has intervened militarily to safeguard Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime.	俄罗斯急于向土耳其伸出友谊之手的另一个原因是叙利亚持续不断的冲突，克里姆林宫已经加入军事干预以保护叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德政府。


Putin needs a win in Syria – and an escape route.	普京需要在叙利亚获胜——而且还需要安全撤出。


To that end, he needs to move Erdoğan, who has been supplying arms and support to the Sunni rebels whom the Russian air force has been hunting, into his camp.	要想达到目的，他需要吸引一直在向俄罗斯空军全力打击的逊尼派反政府武装提供武器和支持的埃尔多安倒戈加入。


But the case for an eastern pivot by Turkey is far weaker.	但土耳其缺��设立东部支点的理由。


True, Turkey needs Russian tourists to bolster its distressed economy.	的确，土耳其需要俄国游客提振其乏力的经济。


But whatever economic benefits Russia can offer are dwarfed by those provided by the EU – a critical trade and business partner that has been indispensable in driving Turkey’s modernization.	但俄国所能提供的经济利益在欧盟这个推动土耳其现代化进程中不可或缺的关键贸易和商业伙伴面前无疑都相形见绌。


Add to that Putin’s track record as an untrustworthy partner, and it is clear that, while a better relationship with Russia can benefit Turkey, Erdoğan cannot afford to abandon his country’s ties with the West.	再加上普京作为合作伙伴的过往记录并不值得信赖，不难得出结论尽管改善土俄关系可以惠及土耳其，但埃尔多安放弃与西方国家关系基本是不可能的。


But while it would be a strategic error for Erdoğan to enter Putin’s orbit, plenty of leaders have made strategic errors before.	尽管埃尔多安进入普京的轨道是个错误，但之前犯下战略错误的领袖绝不在少数。


That is why the next few months, when Turkey and the EU hash out contentious issues, are so critical.	土耳其和欧盟敲定争议问题的未来几个月也因此起着非常关键的作用。


Erdoğan’s post-coup crackdown is far from the only source of tension between Turkey and the West, particularly the EU.	土耳其和西方、尤其是欧盟紧张局势的唯一来源远非埃尔多安的后政变期镇压。


Turkey insists that visa-free travel for Turkish citizens visiting the EU, promised by EU governments in January, should be delivered this year.	土耳其坚持要求欧盟政府兑现今年1月承诺的土耳其公民免签证访问欧盟的承诺。


But, with Turkey having so far failed to meet the agreed conditions, including overhauling its anti-terrorism legislation, that may not happen – an outcome made even more likely by the coup attempt.	但因为土耳其迄今为止未能满足约定条件——包括大规模修改其反恐立法——欧盟不太可能兑现这一承诺，而且政变发生后似乎更不可能。


As a result, the migration deal concluded in March now hangs by a thread.	结果导致今年3月签署的移民协议目前危在旦夕。


To chart a way forward, a sustained dialogue between the EU and Turkey is urgently needed.	要想继续向前推进，欧盟和土耳其之间迫切需要展开持续性的对话。


Rather than allow Erdoğan to use his relationship with Putin to manipulate his NATO allies, the West – and the EU, in particular – must condemn, more clearly than ever, his accelerating shift toward autocracy.	西方国家，尤其是欧盟必须比以往更加明确地谴责埃尔多安朝着专制方向的转变，而不应坐视埃尔多安利用与普京的关系来操纵其北约盟友。


They must make him understand that his current path leads away from EU membership and could cost Turkey some of the economic ties on which it depends.	欧盟必须让埃尔多安明白他现在所走的道路离欧盟成员资格越来越远，而且可能让土耳其付出损失重要经济联系的惨重代价。


It is decision time for Erdoğan.	是该埃尔多安做出决策的时候了。


Either he renews his country’s commitment to a close partnership with the EU, with all of the prosperity that this would entail, or he continues to push Turkey toward a future of despotism and isolation, in which he would receive the occasional comforting phone call from the Kremlin – but little else.	或者他重续与欧盟的亲密关系，并享受由此带来的全部繁荣，或者他继续推动土耳其走向独裁和孤立，在这样的境况下偶尔接到克里姆林宫打来的安慰电话——但没有实质性的帮助。


It’s not much of a choice. For the sake of Turkey’s citizens, one hopes that Erdoğan sees that.	对土耳其民众而言这根本不是选择，希望埃尔多安能认清这一点。


The Ghost of Hirohito	裕仁的幽灵


NEW YORK – The completion by Japan’s Imperial Household Agency of the 61-volume record of the life of Emperor Hirohito (1901-1989) has generated much interest and attention in Japan.	纽约—日本宫内厅完成了61卷本裕仁天皇实录，这在日本引起了广泛的兴趣和关注。


The entire formidable work was recently opened to limited public viewing, with a plan to publish it over the next five years.	这份卷帙浩繁的实录目前对公众有限开放阅览，计划在未来五年中陆续出版。


But it is already clear that the new record inadvertently reflects Japan’s continuing inability to address some fundamental questions about its past.	但很显然，这份新实录在不经意间反映了日本仍然没能解决其历史中的一些基本问题。


Having taken a quarter-century to compile, the project relied on some 40 new sources, most notably the diary and notes of Saburo Hyakutake, an admiral who served as Court Chamberlain from 1936 to 1944.	裕仁实录的编纂经历了四分之一世纪，其材料包括40多项新资料，其中最令人瞩目的是1936—1944年担任天皇侍从长的百武三郎的日记和笔记。


But, while acknowledging the enormous scale of the undertaking, specialists seem to agree that the new account offers no earth-shattering findings or innovative interpretations concerning Hirohito’s many and changing roles in the most tumultuous period of Japan’s modern history.	但是，专家们尽管认可裕仁实录规模之浩大，但似乎也一致认为这份新实录并没有提出震撼性发现，或对裕仁在日本现代史最喧嚣时期中的众多变化的角色提出创新性解读。


Perhaps this is not surprising, coming from a conservative imperial institution’s official team of editors.	也许这并不令人奇怪，因为宫内厅的官方编辑团队相当保守。


The record takes to new lengths the idea that the historian’s task, as Leopold von Ranke put it in the nineteenth century, is to show “what actually happened.”	裕仁实录发扬了利奥波德·冯·兰克（Leopold von Ranke）十九世纪所提出的历史学家的任务——记录“实际发生了什么”。


It is said to be an excellent chronicle of the court’s day-to-day goings-on, revealing, for example, that the emperor celebrated Christmas as a boy, that he had nose surgery in his youth, and how often he met with whom.	据说该实录堪称天皇起居注之典范，比如，它披露裕仁小时候欢庆圣诞节，年轻时鼻子动过手术等等，还记录了他与某人多么频繁地见面。


To be fair, such tidbits can be interesting and useful.	平心而论，这些花边新闻很有趣也很有用。


But the new account fails to explain or analyze crucial events of Hirohito’s reign.	但新实录没有解释或分析裕仁在位期间的关键事件。


Readers will be disappointed if they want to learn more about Japan’s entry into the Pacific War, its defeat, the Allied occupation (especially Hirohito’s relationship with General Douglas MacArthur), or Hirohito’s later reluctance to visit the Yasukuni Shrine, where Imperial Japan’s war dead, including Class-A war criminals, are honored.	希望更深入地了解日本发动太平洋战争、战败、盟军占领（特别是裕仁与麦克阿瑟将军的关系）以及裕仁随后不愿访问供奉包括甲级战犯在内的日本战死者的靖国神社的历史的读者会感到失望。


What is already known about Hirohito is sketchy.	关于裕仁天皇的已知历史十分简略。


That he was a tragically conflicted man is not news.	他是个悲剧的矛盾人物，这是众所周知的。


As a young sovereign (imperial regent at age 20; emperor at 25), he had to assume contradictory roles: divine pater familias of the Japanese state and Supreme Commander of the imperial armed forces that were colonizing Japan’s Asian neighbors.	作为年轻的君主（20岁摄政，25岁即位天皇），他必须扮演互相矛盾的角色：日本国的神主兼正在殖民亚洲邻国的帝国皇军总司令。


He could not have been the bravest or most decisive man, given that he was unable to resist rising militarism.	他不可能是最勇敢、最果断的人，因为他无法抵挡军国主义的崛起。


But to say that he was powerless (and thus blameless) or did nothing to oppose it would also be wrong.	但说他大权旁落（因此没有责任）或没有做出任何反抗也是不正确的。


The conflict between Hirohito’s divine and secular roles became most acute in the autumn of 1941, when Japan’s leaders debated whether to go to war with the United States and its allies.	裕仁神权和世俗角色之间的冲突在1941年秋天最为尖锐。 当时日本领导人就是否要和美国及其盟国开战的问题展开争论。


On September 6, an imperial conference was convened to approve a timetable for war mobilization in the event of a breakdown in US-Japanese diplomatic talks.	9月6日召开了帝国会议，批准了美日外交谈判失败情况下的战争动员时间表。


As was true of all imperial conferences, Hirohito was expected to remain silent and approve a policy that already had been decided.	与所有帝国会议一样，裕仁被认为会保持沉默，批准形成决定的政策。


Breaking with protocol, however, Hirohito cautioned against giving up on diplomacy too soon, and then recited his grandfather Emperor Meiji’s poem from the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, in 1904: “Beyond all four seas, all are brothers and sisters/Then why oh why these rough winds and waves?”	但裕仁打破了默契，提出放弃外交努力操之过急，并引用了其祖父明治天皇在日俄战争开始时所写的诗句：“四海之内皆兄弟，何以无事起风波？


Thus, Hirohito might have been seeking to express his view that Japan should avoid a war with the US, especially given that the country had been fighting a savage and unsuccessful war of conquest in China for more than four years.	”因此，也许裕仁一直在寻求表达自己的观点：日本应该避免与美国开战，特别是已经与中国进行了四年多残酷又不成功的征服战的情况下。


But, whatever Hirohito’s true intentions (which we cannot know for certain), the larger fact remains that he went along with the war mobilization.	但是，不管裕仁的真实意图为何（我们也无从确切知道），更大的事实依然是他遵从了战争动员。


And, while the new official record depicts this well-known episode in some detail, it sheds no new light on how Hirohito understood his own action.	而尽管新官方实录披露了这一众所周知的事实的一些细节，但并未就裕仁如何理解其自身的行动这一问题提供新的信息。


Just as he dithered over going to war with the US, Hirohito was hopelessly ambivalent about how to end it.	正如他在与美国开战问题上犹豫不决，裕仁在如何休战的问题上也陷入了绝望的矛盾。


The new record reports that Hirohito told his closest adviser, Privy Seal Kōichi Kido, on September 26, 1944: “If one could come to a peace without the question of disarmament or war responsibility, I don’t care [if] our conquered territories [are taken away].”	新实录披露，1944年9月26日，裕仁对最紧密的亲信、掌玺官木户幸一说：“如果可以实现和平并且不必背负裁军和战争责任，我才不在乎我们所征服的领土（被收回）。


This is reportedly the first indication in the new account about Hirohito’s desire to end the war.	”据说这是新实录中第一个裕仁渴望结束战争的迹象。


But, whatever his true desire, his subsequent actions were – once again – not those of a man actively trying to find a path to peace.	但是，不管他真正渴望什么，他接下来的行动——再一次地——并非一个积极地试图寻找和平之路的人所应该做的。


For months, he told himself and others that first “Japan must have another brilliant military gain” over the US, so that it would have a modicum of diplomatic clout in negotiating a postwar settlement.	在几个月的时间里，他告诉自己和其他人，首先“日本必须再次取得对美国的军事大胜”，这样就能在战后和解谈判中获得些许外交优势。


Needless to say, many Japanese and non-Japanese lives were lost during those months of indecision.	不消说，无数日本人和非日本人在这几个月的优柔寡断中失去了生命。


Indeed, the very existence of the Japanese nation was endangered, as most cities were bombed, Okinawa was invaded, and atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.	事实上，日本国的生存都收到了威胁，许多城市遭遇轰炸，冲绳被占领，广岛和长崎遭到原子弹打击。


In the end, Japan was disarmed, postwar trials were held, and most of the country’s imperial conquests were reversed.	最终，日本被解除了武装，战后法庭也成立了，许多日本政府的领土被返回。


And yet Hirohito still managed to sidestep the question of his own responsibility in a war that was so obviously fought in his name.	但裕仁仍成功地回避了他在战中的责任问题——而很显然，这场战争是以他的名义发动的。


Amid the postwar devastation, he became a symbol of peace.	在战后的废墟中间，他成了和平的象征。


The most important lesson of the new imperial record, then, might be quite different from what its compilers had intended.	因此，新裕仁实录的最重要教训也许与编纂者的初衷相去甚远。


Japan’s notorious collective inability to come to terms with its past is deeply entwined with its inability to understand this emperor.	日本在面对历史方面的集体无能早已臭名昭著，这其实与其在理解本国天皇上的无能息息相关。


Admittedly, the new account makes only selective use of primary sources, quite a few of which have not been declassified in their entirety.	诚然，新实录只是有选择地使用了原始资料，其中有一些资料尚未完全解密。


It is possible that more revelations will emerge in the future.	未来有可能会有更多的细节披露。


But, for now, Hirohito remains a singularly unfathomable and isolated character who defies common understandings – alas, to the detriment of a better understanding of “what actually happened.”	但是，就目前而言，裕仁仍是一个非常不透明、非常孤立的角色，不同于我们对他的常规理解——呜呼，更好地理解“实际发生了什么”由从何谈起呢。


Turkey’s Failed Bureaucratic Coup	土耳其的失败官僚政变


ANKARA – Last week, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan intensified his government’s response to the corruption investigations that have been roiling the country since December, restructuring the leadership of the judiciary and police.	安卡拉—上周，土耳其总理埃尔多安加强了政府对反腐调查的反应。 自12月以来，反腐调查席卷全国，重构了司法和警察部门领导层。


But it would be a mistake to view this as a fight between the executive and the judiciary, or as an attempt to cover up charges that have led to the resignation of three ministers.	但这并不是行政部门和司法部门之争，也不是为了掩盖导致三名部长辞职的指控。


What is at issue is the law-enforcement authorities’ independence and impartiality.	问题的重点是执法当局的独立性和公正性。


Indeed, amid charges of fabricated evidence, Erdoğan now says that he is not opposed to retrials for senior military officers convicted of plotting to overthrow his government.	事实上，由于编造证据之嫌，埃尔多安现已不再反对重审被判颠覆政府罪的高级军官。


The recent developments reflect the widening rift between Erdoğan’s government and the Gülen movement, led by Fethullah Gülen, a self-exiled Islamic preacher currently residing near Philadelphia.	最近的发展态势反映了埃尔多安政府和葛兰运动之间的日益扩大的分歧。


The Gülen movement was an important backer of the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its efforts to establish civilian control over the military during the AKP’s first two terms in office.	葛兰运动由目前定居费城附近的自我放逐的伊斯兰传教士法法土拉·葛兰（Fethullah Gülen）领导，它是执政的正义和发展党（AKP）及其在执政的前两个任期中实现文官控制军队的努力的重要支持者。


Now, however, the movement appears to have been plotting a coup of its own.	但是，如今，葛兰运动似乎在酝酿自己的政变。


Many members of the judiciary and the police force associated with the wave of corruption charges brought against government officials, businessmen, and politicians’ family members are connected with the Gülen movement.	与针对政府官员、商人和政客家人的腐败指控有染的许多司法和警察部门官员与葛兰运动都有关系。


What started out as an investigation into alleged graft soon became an opposition-supported smear campaign.	以贪污调查开场的反腐运动很快就演变为支持-反对的诋毁运动。


Turkey’s current struggles raise important questions about the appropriate relationship between bureaucrats and elected officials in a pluralist democracy.	土耳其的当前斗争引出了关于多元主义民主中官僚和当选官员的合理关系的问题。


Answering them will require a debate that transcends issues like the separation of powers and judicial independence and elucidates the appropriate relationship between politics and religion.	回答这些问题需要超越权力分割和司法独立、澄清政治和宗教合理关系的讨论。


For that, understanding the historical context of the current crisis is crucial.	对这个问题，理解当前危机的历史背景十分关键。


When Turkey became a democracy in 1950, the previous system’s secular Kemalist elites attempted to harness the power of the military and the bureaucracy to control the elected government.	1950年，土耳其成为民主国家，之前政权的世俗基马尔主义精英试图利用军队和官僚的力量控制当选政府。


In fact, the Turkish military, with the judiciary’s support, explicitly intervened in the civilian government’s functioning in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997, each time in the name of protecting secularism.	事实上，1960年、1971年、1980年和1997年，土耳其军方在司法部门的支持下赤裸裸地干预了文职政府的运作，每一次都打着捍卫世俗主义的名号。


In response, various religious groups, including the Gülen movement, encouraged their followers to take positions in the bureaucracy and the military.	结果，包括葛兰运动在内的许多宗教集团鼓动追随者在官僚和军队中任职。


In the 1990’s, military-backed secularist governments struck back, attempting to purge religious bureaucrats and military leaders: those who did not consume alcohol, or whose family members wore headscarves, were immediately suspected.	20世纪90年代，军方支持的世俗主义政府发动逆袭，试图清洗宗教官僚和军队领导人：不饮酒的人、家庭成员佩戴头纱的人马上受到了怀疑。


With the normalization of Turkish democracy following the AKP’s victory in 2002, restrictions on the recruitment, employment, and promotion of religious citizens in the upper echelons of the bureaucracy were eliminated – a process that especially benefited members of the Gülen movement, with its extensive education, media, and business networks.	2002年AKP在大选中获胜后，土耳其民主实现了正常化，高级官僚序列不再限制对宗教公民的招募、就业和升职——拥有广大的教育、媒体和商业网络的葛兰运动的成员在这一过程中受益最大。


Gülen followers – who claimed to support liberal democracy and the tolerant, modern form of Islam embraced by the AKP – seemed like natural allies of Erdoğan’s government.	葛兰的追随者——声称支持AKP追求的自由民主和容忍、现代的伊斯兰教——似乎是埃尔多安政府的天然盟友。


For a decade, Gülen-connected companies played a widely acknowledged – and appreciated – role in Turkey’s economic growth and development, while Gülen-movement schools trained students to pursue public-service jobs.	在十年的时间里，与葛兰有关的公司对土耳其的经济增长和发展做出了广为人知——和支持——的作用，而葛兰运动学校毕业的学生纷纷追求公务职位。


As long as bureaucrats were recruited and promoted based on merit, the AKP had no problem accepting the over-representation of Gülen followers in certain branches of government.	只要官僚系统根据才能来招聘和升职，AKP就不会无法接受葛兰运动追随者在一些政府机构中人数过多。


This acceptance was rooted in the belief that Gülen members would adhere to the fundamental requirement in a pluralist democracy that bureaucrats – whether Muslims in Turkey, Mormons in the United States, or Buddhists in Japan – do not allow their religious convictions to trump their commitment to public service and the rule of law.	之所以能够接受，是因为AKP认为葛兰运动成员能够坚守多元主义民主的根本要求——官僚不会让宗教信仰压倒对公共服务和法治精神的承诺，土耳其的穆斯林、美国的摩门教徒和日本的和尚都是如此。


What the government did not imagine was that a new vision of bureaucratic tutelage over the civilian government would emerge.	政府没有想到的是会出现一种新形式的官僚对文职政府的控制。


Although Gülen followers have disagreed with several of the government’s policies, they largely backed the AKP in the last three elections.	尽管葛兰运动追随者不同意政府的某些政策，但他们在过去三次选举中仍大多支持AKP。


What drove them to reject the party completely was a policy debate on restructuring “cram schools” – expensive private institutions that prepare high-school seniors for their university entrance examinations.	让他们与AKP决裂的是重组“补习班”的政策争论。 “补习班”是一种昂贵的私人机构，为高中高年级学生提供大学入学考试备战指导。


The Gülen movement operates at least one-quarter of these schools, which form a key component of the movement’s multi-billion-dollar education network and help it recruit new members.	这些学校至少有四分之一是葛兰运动开的，它们也构成了葛兰运动数十亿美元教育网络的关键部分并为之输送新成员。


The movement’s members thus viewed the debate over cram schools as a direct challenge to their influence.	葛兰运动成员因此认为关于补习班的争论是对其影响力的直接挑战。


But their reaction was disproportionate – not least because the government’s plans were not finalized.	但他们的反应有些过火——特别是考虑到政府的计划并未定案。


Moreover, the proposal had nothing to do with the Gülen movement; the government was responding to citizens’ complaints about having to pay extravagant fees to prepare their children for free public universities.	此外，这项计划与葛兰运动毫无关系； 政府是为了应对人民对不得不花费额外的大量费用帮孩子备考免费的公立大学的不满。


And the Gülen movement was not exactly caught off-guard; cram-school representatives had been engaged in a dialogue with education-ministry officials for some time.	葛兰运动也并没有完全失势，补习班代表也参与了与教育部官员的对话。


As in any democracy, public criticism of Turkey’s government policies is normal and healthy.	和任何民主国家一样，对土耳其政府政策公共批评是正常的健康现象。


But attempts by Gülen-aligned members of the judiciary and the police force to blackmail, threaten, and illegally bargain with the government are unacceptable.	但司法和警察部门中的葛兰运动盟军坚决抵制、威胁和非法要挟政府是不可接受的。


Now, it is up to the courts to discern the truth about corruption among Turkey’s so-called “public servants.”	现在，应该由法院来澄清土耳其所谓“公务员”腐败的真相。


But all of the signs point to a coordinated political crusade by Gülen followers, including the chief prosecutors involved in the recent corruption cases and the pro-Gülen media that have steadfastly defended the prosecutors’ impartiality (despite the many irregularities – such as extensive unauthorized wiretaps – that have come to light).	但所有信号都表明，包括最近卷入腐败案的总检察部门高官和坚决捍卫检察官公正形象（尽管他们的许多非法行为——如大量未授权的监听行为——已经遭到了曝光）的亲葛兰运动媒体在内的葛兰运动追随者在组织一场政变。


Moreover, a coordinated group within the judiciary is suspected of planting evidence – allegations that have led to the calls for military personnel to be retried.	此外，司法部门内部的一个有组织团体被质疑编造证据——这项指控导致人们要求军方相关人员辞职。


To be sure, this does not mean that there were no coup attempts by members of the military in the past or cases of corruption by politicians and bureaucrats.	当然，这并不意味着军方人员在过去并没有尝试过政变，也不意味着政客和官僚没有腐败。


The point is that Turkey needs judicial reforms that eliminate the possibility of organized cliques manipulating their constitutional powers to advance their own narrow goals.	要点是土耳其需要司法改革扫除有组织派系操纵宪法权力追求自身狭隘利益的可能。


This is a red line for any pluralist democracy.	这是多元主义民主的一条红线。


Individual citizens should be free to live according to their beliefs; but an unaccountable theological vision must not be allowed to shape their behavior as civil servants and bureaucrats.	个体公民应该拥有信仰自由； 不能允许不受约束的神学观点决定他们作为公务员和官僚的行为。


More generally, the debate about the Gülen movement should serve as an opportunity to clarify the relationship between religion and politics, while reminding the Turkish public – and Muslim-majority countries throughout the region – of the core democratic values that have enabled Turkey to develop and thrive.	更一般地说，关于葛兰运动的争论应该成为一个澄清宗教和政治关系的机会，提醒土耳其公众——以及整个地区的穆斯林多数国家——什么才是让土耳其得以发展和繁荣的核心民主价值。


Escaping the Refugee Crisis	逃离难民危机


PRINCETON – In July, the number of migrants reaching the borders of the European Union passed 100,000 – the third consecutive month in which a new record was set.	普林斯顿 ——7月，抵达欧盟边界的移民数量超过100，000人——已经是连续第三个月刷新移民人数记录。


In one week in August, 21,000 migrants arrived in Greece.	仅8月的1个星期，就有21，000名移民抵达希腊。


Tourists complained that the summer holiday they had planned on a Greek island was now in the midst of a refugee camp.	游客抱怨置身难民营中取代了他们计划中的希腊夏日之旅。


Of course, the refugee crisis has far more serious implications.	当然，难民危机的影响远不止于此。


Last week, Austrian authorities found the decomposing bodies of 71 migrants in a Hungarian truck abandoned near Vienna.	上周，奥地利当局在维也纳附近一辆被遗弃的匈牙利卡车里发现71具腐烂的移民尸体。


And more than 2,500 would-be migrants have drowned in the Mediterranean this year, most of them attempting to cross from North Africa to Italy.	2,500多名潜在移民今年葬身地中海，其中大部分试图从北非穿越至意大利。


Migrants who have made it as far as France are living in tents near Calais, waiting for a chance to get to England by scrambling aboard a freight train passing through the Channel Tunnel.	成功抵达法国的移民都住在加来附近的帐篷里，等待机会搭乘货运列车穿过海峡隧道到英国去。


Some of them die, too, falling off trains or getting run over.	其中有一部分人也会丧命，从火车上摔下来或者被碾死。


Nevertheless, the number of refugees in Europe is still small compared to some other countries.	不过，相比其他一些国家欧洲难民人数仍不算多。


Germany has received more applications for asylum than any other European country, but its six refugees per thousand inhabitants is less than a third of Turkey’s 21 per thousand, which in turn is dwarfed by Lebanon’s 232 per thousand.	德国收到的庇护请求超过其他任何欧洲国家，但其每千名居民不到6名难民的比例还不到土耳其每千名居民21人的三分之一，而黎巴嫩每千名居民232名难民的比例又远非土耳其能比。


At the end of 2014, UNHCR, the United Nations agency for refugees, estimated that there were 59.5 million forcibly displaced people worldwide, the highest level ever recorded.	2014年底，联合国难民机构联合国难民署估计全球有5950万人被迫流离失所，达到有史以来的最高记录。


Of these, 1.8 million are awaiting a decision on their asylum applications, 19.5 million are refugees, and the rest are displaced inside their own countries.	当然，180万人正在等待庇护申请结果，难民有1950万人，而其他人则是在自己国内流离失所。


Syria, Afghanistan, and Somalia are the largest sources of refugees, but many more come from Libya, Eritrea, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.	叙利亚、阿富汗和索马里是难民的最大来源，但更多难民来自利比亚、厄立特里亚、中非共和国、南苏丹、尼日利亚和刚果民主共和国。


In Asia, the persecution of the Muslim Rohingya minority in Myanmar has contributed to a recent increase in the number of refugees.	在亚洲，缅甸对穆斯林罗兴亚少数族裔的迫害也导致了近期难民数量的增加。


We cannot blame people for wishing to leave conflict-ridden, impoverished countries and find a better life elsewhere.	我们不能责怪人们希望离开冲突缠身的贫困国家并在别处找到更好的生活。


In their situation, we would do the same.	如果我们身临其境会做出同样的选择。


But there must be a better way of responding to their needs.	但一定有更好的方式满足他们的需求。


A few bold thinkers advocate a world with open borders, arguing that this would greatly boost both global GDP and average global happiness.	少数大胆的思想家倡导世界开放边界，认为这将极大促进全球GDP和平均幸福指数。


(See, for example, http://openborders.info.)	（参见如http://openborders. info。


Such arguments ignore our species’ lamentable xenophobic tendencies, evidenced all too clearly by the surge in popularity of far-right extremist political parties in Europe.	）上述观点忽略了我们人类可悲的排外倾向，欧洲极右翼极端主义政党飙升的人气就是证据。


For the foreseeable future, no government will open its borders to all who want to enter.	在可以预见的未来，没有哪国政府会对希望入境者开放边界。


Indeed, there is only movement in the opposite direction: Serbia and Hungary are building fences to keep migrants out, and there has been talk of reinstating border controls within the Schengen Area, which currently guarantees freedom of movement among 26 European countries.	事实上，反而存在反向趋势：塞尔维亚和匈牙利正在修建围墙阻挡移民，目前确保26个欧洲国家间人员自由流动的申根地区已经有人开始谈论恢复边境管制。


Instead of simply sealing themselves off, affluent countries should be giving much more support to less affluent countries that are supporting large numbers of refugees: Lebanon, Jordan, Ethiopia, and Pakistan are obvious examples.	与其简单地封闭边境，富裕国家应该为那些支撑大量难民的不那么富裕的国家提供更多支持：黎巴嫩、约旦、埃塞俄比亚和巴基斯坦都是明显的例子。


Refugees living securely in countries that border their own are less likely to attempt hazardous journeys to remote regions and more likely to return home once a conflict is resolved.	安全生活在邻国的难民尝试踏上到遥远地区的危险旅行的可能性较小，一旦冲突解决也更有可能回到国内。


International support for countries bearing the greatest refugee burden also makes economic sense: it costs Jordan about €3,000 ($3,350) to support one refugee for a year; in Germany, the cost is at least €12,000.	为承受最大难民负担的国家提供国际支持也有其经济意义：约旦为一名难民提供一年支持要花3，000欧元（合3，350美元），而德国则要耗费12，000欧元以上。


Ultimately, however, we need to reconsider what for many is a sacred and immutable text: the UN Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.	但归根结底，需要重新思考在许多人看来神圣、不可改变的文字：联合国 有关难民地位的公约和协议。


The Convention, concluded in 1951, was originally limited to persons within Europe fleeing events before that date.	这项1951年签署的公约原本仅对欧洲范围内于该日期前出逃者适用。


It required the signatory countries to allow refugees who reached their territory to stay there, without discrimination or penalty for breaching immigration laws.	它要求缔约国允许抵达其领土的难民留��那里，不加以歧视或因违反移民法而施行惩罚措施。


Refugees were defined as those unable or unwilling to return to their country because of a well-founded fear of persecution on the grounds of “race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.”	难民指那些有充分理由担心因“种族、宗教、国籍、加入特定社会团体或政治观点”而遭受迫害而不能或不愿回国的人。


In 1967, the restrictions of time and geography were removed, making the Convention universal.	1967年，时间和地域限制的消除使得上述公约具有了普遍意义。


That was a noble thing to do, but a key question was never asked: Why should someone who is able to travel to another country have priority over others who are in refugee camps and unable to travel?	这无疑当属高尚之举，但人们却从未对关键问题提出过质疑：为什么有能力前往他国的人较之生活在难民营、无力旅行的人却掌握优先权利？


Affluent countries have a responsibility to take refugees, and many of them can and should accept more than they do.	富裕国家有责任收容难民，其中不少可以而且应该接受更多。


But as the number of people seeking asylum has grown, it has become difficult for tribunals and courts to determine who is a refugee, as defined by the Convention, and who is a well-coached migrant seeking a better life in a more affluent country.	但随着寻求庇护人数的增加，法庭和法院已经越来越难以界定谁是公约规定的难民，谁又是对规则烂熟于胸的移民试图在富裕国家寻求更好的生活。


The Convention has also given rise to the new, often unscrupulous, and sometimes lethal industry of people smuggling.	该公约还开创了通常不择手段、有时甚至是致命的人口走私行业。


If those who claim asylum in a nearby country were sent to a refugee camp, safe from persecution, and supported financially by aid from affluent countries, people smuggling – and deaths in transit – would be eliminated.	如果那些在邻国申请庇护者被送往难民营，在免遭迫害的同时享受来自富裕国家的财政支持，就可以消灭人口走私——和运输途中的人员死亡。


Moreover, the incentive for economic migrants to seek asylum would be reduced, and affluent countries could fulfill their responsibility to accept more refugees from the camps, while maintaining control of their borders.	此外，经济移民寻求庇护的动机将会减少，而富裕国家也可以在保持边界控制的同时，履行从难民营接收更多难民的职责 。


That may not be the best solution, but it may be the most workable.	这或许不是最好的解决办法，但其可行性可能最高。


And it looks a lot better than the chaos and tragedy that many refugees are facing now.	而且较之许多难民目前面临的混乱和悲剧要好得多。


Turning away people who manage to reach one’s country is emotionally difficult, even if they are being sent to a safe haven.	拒绝抵达边境的人入境在感情上非常困难，即使他们被送往一个安全的避风港。


But we should also have compassion for the millions of people who are waiting in refugee camps.	但我们也应该同情在难民营中等待的成百上千万难民。


We need to give them hope, too.	我们需要给予他们希望。


Escaping George Bush’s Future	逃离乔治·布什的未来


It always comes back to oil.	一切都是石油惹的祸。


The continuing misguided interventions in the Middle East by the United States and the United Kingdom have their roots deep in the Arabian sand.	美英对中东不断进行的错误干预，其根源在于阿拉伯的土壤深处。


Ever since Winston Churchill led the conversion of Britain’s navy from coal to oil at the start of the last century, the Western powers have meddled incessantly in the affairs of Middle Eastern countries to keep the oil flowing, toppling governments and taking sides in wars in the supposed “great game” of energy resources.	自从上世纪初温斯顿·丘吉尔领导了英国海军从煤到油的能源转换，西方大国就不断地插手中东国家的事务，为了保持石油流通，颠覆政府，在战争中推波助澜，展开了一场所谓的能源“大竞赛”。


But the game is almost over, because the old approaches are obviously failing.	不过这场竞赛已接近尾声，因为旧的手段显然已力有不逮。


Just when one is lulled into thinking that something other than oil is at the root of current US and UK action in Iraq, reality pulls us back.	就在人们开始相信美英在伊拉克的行动还有石油以外的原因时，现实将我们拉了回来。


Indeed, President Bush recently invited journalists to imagine the world 50 years from now.	布什总统最近邀请记者想象今后50年的世界。


He did not have in mind the future of science and technology, or a global population of nine billion, or the challenges of climate change and biodiversity.	他的心中并没有未来的科技，也不在意高达九十亿的全球人口，或者气候变化及生物多样性的挑战。


Instead, he wanted to know whether Islamic radicals would control the world’s oil.	相反，他想知道的是伊斯兰激进分子是否会控制全球的石油。


Whatever we are worrying about in 50 years, this will surely be near the bottom of the list.	不论50年后有什么问题值得我们担心，这肯定是最次要的问题之一。


Even if it were closer to the top, overthrowing Saddam Hussein to ensure oil supplies in 50 years ranks as the least plausible of strategies.	即便这个问题很重要，为了保证50年内的石油供应而把萨达姆·侯赛因拉下台也是最无理取闹的战略。


Yet we know from a range of evidence that this is what was on Bush’s mind when his government shifted its focus from the search for Osama bin Laden to fighting a war in Iraq.	然而各种各样的证据告诉我们，当布什政府将重点从通缉本·拉登转为向伊拉克开战时，他心里所想的正是这个。


The overthrow of Saddam was the longstanding pet idea of the neoconservative Project for a New American Century, which was already arguing in the 1990’s that Saddam was likely to achieve a stranglehold over “a significant proportion of the world’s oil supplies.”	推翻萨达姆是新保守主义的新美国世纪计划长久以来的执念，早在上世纪90年代他们就坚持认为萨达姆很可能会压制“全球很大一部分石油供应”。


Vice President Dick Cheney reiterated these fears in the run-up to the Iraq War, claiming that Saddam Hussein was building a massive arsenal of weapons of mass destruction to “take control of a great portion of the world’s energy supplies.”	副总统迪克·切尼在酝酿伊拉克战争时多次表示这样的担心，宣称萨达姆·侯赛因为了“控制全球很大一部分能源供应”，在制造大量大规模杀伤性武器。


Cheney’s facts were obviously wrong, but so was his logic.	切尼所谓的事实显然是错误的，而且他的逻辑也不对。


Dictators like Saddam make their living by selling their oil, not by holding it in the ground.	像萨达姆这样的独裁者要靠出售石油生存，而不会任其埋在地底。


Perhaps, though, Saddam was too eager to sell oil concessions to French, Russian, and Italian companies rather than British and US companies.	不过，或许萨达姆太急于将石油开采权卖给法国、俄罗斯和意大利的公司，而不是英美的公司。


In any event, the war in Iraq will not protect the world’s energy supplies in 50 years.	不管怎样，伊拉克战争都不会保障未来50年全球的能源供应。


If anything, the war will threaten those supplies by stoking the very radicalism it claims to be fighting.	这场战争如果有任何作用，那就是给其声称要打击的激进主义火上浇油，从而对能源供应造成威胁。