But FAIRTRADE-labeled products still represent a very small share – typically less than 1% – of global sales of cocoa, tea, coffee, etc.	但这些贴着公平贸易标签的商品（可可，茶叶和咖啡等）依然只占全球市场的一小部分——基本上少于1%。


The economic rationale for guaranteed prices is well known: stabilizing the prices of primary products, which are subject to sharp fluctuations, stabilizes their producers’ incomes.	设立保证收购价的经济逻辑众所周知：稳定这些基本产品的价格，避免出现大起大落，并因此稳定生产者的收入。


This argument inspired proposals – most famously by John Maynard Keynes in 1942 – to create “buffer stocks” for the main commodities, which would take supply off the market when prices fell, and add to supply when prices rose.	而这个引发众多争议的提议——其中最著名的倡议者是约翰•凯恩斯（John Maynard Keynes）——要求为初级商品建立一个“缓冲库存”，当价格下跌时吸纳产品，反之则增加供应量。


Keynes’s proposal never made it into the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944, and, while buffer-stock schemes re-surfaced in the 1970’s, they, too, went nowhere.	凯恩斯的提议最终没能被1944年的布雷顿森林体系采纳，而当缓冲库存方案在1970年代重新抬头之后也最终不了了之.


Left-wing economists like Raúl Prebisch, moreover, later advanced the theory of “declining terms of trade” for primary products: their prices’ long-run tendency to fall relative to the prices of manufactured goods.	此外，类似保罗•普雷维什（Raúl Prebisch）这样的左翼经济学家后来又进一步推广了初级商品的“贸易条件衰退”理论：这些产品的价格相对于制成品价格来说在长期趋势上是下跌的。


This tendency seemed to be at work from the mid-1980’s, as commodity producers experienced a persistent decline in prices.	这一趋势判断在1980年代中期开始似乎都适用，初级产品生产者都经历了价格的持续下跌。


In addition, price fluctuations throughout that decade were huge, with dire effects on sub-Saharan African and other developing countries that were largely dependent on commodities for export earnings.	此外，这段时期的价格波动极为剧烈，对撒哈拉以南非洲以及其他严重依赖初级产品来赚取外汇的发展中国家都造成了恶劣影响。


Since then, however, the price decline has been reversed.	但自那以后价格下跌的趋势却发生了逆转。


Food commodity prices have increased by 150% since 2001.	食品价格自2001年以来已经上涨了150%。


This has raised farm producers’ income independently of the fair-trade movement’s efforts.	这一状况也在排除公平贸易运动影响的情况下提升了农民的收入。


The “declining terms of trade” argument has collapsed.	“贸易条件衰退”理论也宣告破产。


But primary-product prices remain much more volatile than the prices of manufactured goods and services, causing large fluctuations in producers’ incomes.	但初级商品的价格依然比制成品和服务价格更加反复无常，导致生产者收入的极大波动。


This exaggerates the effects of booms and busts.	这也放大了兴衰周期的影响。


So the issue of price stabilization has not gone away.	因此价格稳定问题也依然存在。


It is difficult to see how the fair-trade movement can contribute much to solving this problem, because the only serious policy for stabilizing producers’ incomes is to control supply. But that is beyond the scope of fair trade.	目前依然无法得知公平贸易是否能为解决这个问题做出重大贡献，因为稳定生产者收入的唯一可靠方式就是控制供应，但这已经超出公平贸易的范畴之外了。


The target of all versions of fair trade is “free trade,” and the most damaging attacks on FAIRTRADE have come from free traders.	所有形式的公平贸易的目标就是“公平贸易”，而对公平贸易制度最有力的攻击则来自那些自由贸易者。


In Unfair Trade, a pamphlet published in 2008 by the Adam Smith Institute, Mark Sidwell argues that FAIRTRADE keeps uncompetitive farmers on the land, holding back diversification and mechanization.	在亚当•斯密研究所于2008年发布的一本名为《不公平贸易》的小册子中，马克•斯德维尔（Mark Sidwell）认为公平贸易制度保护了那些竞争力低下的农民，遏制了农产品多样化和机械化的推广。


According to Sidwell, the FAIRTRADE scheme turns developing countries into low-profit, labor-intensive agrarian ghettos, denying future generations the chance of a better life.	据斯德维尔所说，公平贸易方案将发展中国家转变成了低附加值劳动密集型的农业贫民区，剥夺了下一代人追求更优质生活的机会。


This is without considering the effect that FAIRTRADE has on the poorest people in these countries – not farmers but casual laborers – who are excluded from the scheme by its expensive regulations and labor standards.	这还没有考虑到公平贸易制度对那些国家中最贫穷的人民所带来的影响——这些人连农民都不是，只能算是散工——他们被公平贸易所设定的昂贵规章制度和劳工标准排斥在外。


In other words, FAIRTRADE protects farmers against their rivals and against agricultural laborers.	换句话说，公平贸易成为了农民对抗其他竞争者以及农业散工的保护伞。


Consumers, Sidwell argues, are also being duped.	斯德维尔还指出，消费者也遭到了愚弄。


Only a tiny proportion – as little as 1% – of the premium that we pay for a FAIRTRADE chocolate bar will ever make it to cocoa producers.	我们为一个公平贸易巧克力所支付的额外费用中只有极少比例——1%——最终到了可可种植者手里。


Nor is FAIRTRADE necessarily a guarantee of quality: because producers get a minimum price for fair-trade goods, they sell the best of their crop on the open market.	此外公平贸易也不意味着优质：因为种植者可以以一个最低价来出售公平贸易产品，于是他们转而把最优质的产品拿到公开市场上销售。


But, despite its shaky economics, the fair-trade movement should not be despised.	但虽然在经济上站不住脚，公平贸易运动也不应遭到鄙视。


While cynics say that its only achievement is to make consumers feel better about their purchases – rather like buying indulgences in the old Catholic Church – this is to sell fair trade short.	即便批评者们说该运动的唯一成就就是让消费者们对自己感觉良好——就像从前在天主教堂购买赎罪券那样，但这其实是低估了公平贸易。


In fact, the movement represents a spark of protest against mindless consumerism, grass-roots resistance against an impersonal logic, and an expression of communal activism.	事实上，这场运动代表了对愚蠢消费主义的某种抗议，对某些冷漠逻辑的草根反抗以及一种公共行动主义的表达方式。


That justification will not convince economists, who prefer a dryer sort of reasoning.	这一理由也许并不能说服那些喜欢枯燥推理的经济学家。


But it is not out of place to remind ourselves that economists and bureaucrats need not always have things their own way.	但这也提醒了我们：经济学家和政府官僚们不是永远都能按照自己的意愿行事的。


Is US Monetary Policy Made in China?	美国货币政策是中国制造吗？


AMSTERDAM – For much of the year, investors have been fixated on when the Fed will achieve “liftoff” – that is, when it will raise interest rates by 25 basis points, or 0.25%, as a first step toward normalizing monetary conditions.	阿姆斯特丹—在今年大部分时间里，投资者一直关注着美联储何时“升空”——即何时将利率提高25个基点（或0. 25%），作为迈向货币条件正常化的第一步。


Markets have soared and plummeted in response to small changes in Fed statements perceived as affecting the likelihood that liftoff is imminent.	市场因为美联储声明中的微小变化而波动，将这种措辞的变化视为即将“升空”的可能性的影响因素。


But, in seeking to gauge changes in US monetary conditions, investors have been looking in the wrong place.	但是，在寻找美国货币条件变化迹象方面，投资者们找错了目标。


Since mid-August, when Chinese policymakers startled the markets by devaluing the renminbi by 2%, China’s official intervention in foreign-exchange markets has continued, in order to prevent the currency from falling further.	自8月中旬以来，中国决策者让人民币贬值2%，震惊了市场。 为了防止货币进一步贬值，中国官方外汇市场干预还在继续。


The Chinese authorities have been selling foreign securities, mainly United States Treasury bonds, and buying up renminbi.	中国当局一直在出售外汇储备（主要是美国国债），买入人民币。


This is the opposite of what China did when the renminbi was strong.	这与中国在人民币强势期间的做法正好相反。


Back then, China bought US Treasury bonds to keep the currency from rising and eroding the competitiveness of Chinese exporters.	那时，中国买入美国国债，阻止人民币升值和影响其竞争力。


As a result, it accumulated an astounding $4 trillion of foreign reserves.	结果，中国积累了令人咋舌的4万亿美元外汇储备。


And what was true of China was also true of other emerging-market countries receiving capital inflows.	中国的情况也是其他得到资本流入的新兴市场国家的情况。


These countries’ foreign reserves, mainly held in US securities, topped $8 trillion at their peak last year.	这些国家的外汇储备（主要是美国债券），在去年达到了8万亿美元以上的峰值。


The effects of these purchases attracted considerable attention.	这些买入美国国债的行为所造成的效果吸引了大量关注。


In 2005, US Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan pointed to the phenomenon as an explanation for his famous “conundrum”: interest rates on Treasury bonds were lower than market conditions appeared to warrant.	2005年，美联储主席艾伦·格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）用这一现象解释他著名的“谜”论：美国国债利率比市场条件所隐含的水平还要低。


His successor, Ben Bernanke, similarly pointed to purchases of US debt by foreign central banks and governments as a reason why American interest rates were so low.	类似地，他的继任者本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke）也将外国央行购买国债描述为美国利率如此低的一个原因。


Now this process has gone into reverse.	如今，这一过程颠倒过来了。


Although no one outside official Chinese circles knows the exact magnitude of China’s foreign-exchange intervention, informed guesses suggest that it has been running at roughly $100 billion a month since mid-August.	尽管除了中国官方，其他人谁也不知道中国外汇干预的确切程度，但消息灵通人士猜测自8月中旬以来一直保持每个月1,000亿美元的规模。


Observers believe that roughly 60% of China’s liquid reserves are in US Treasury bills.	观察者认为，中国高流动性外汇储备中有60%是美国国债。


Given that reserve managers prefer to avoid unbalancing their carefully composed portfolios, they probably have been selling Treasuries at a rate of roughly $60 billion a month.	储备管理者更愿意避免让他们精心构筑的组合失衡，因此他们抛售美国国债的速度应该在每个月600亿美元。


The effects are analogous – but opposite – to those of quantitative easing.	其效果与量化宽松相当——但方向相反。


Recall that the Fed began its third round of quantitative easing (QE3) by purchasing $40 billion of securities a month, before boosting the volume to $85 billion.	回忆一下，美联储开始其第三轮量化宽松（QE3）时，每个月买入证券量为400亿美元，后来增加到850亿美元。


Monthly sales of $60 billion by China’s government would lie squarely in the middle.	中国政府每月抛售600亿美元正好是其中间量。


Estimates of the effects of QE3 differ.	关于QE3效果的估计莫衷一是。


But the weight of the evidence is that QE3 had a modest but significant downward impact on Treasury yields and a positive effect on demand for riskier assets.	但大量证据表明，QE3对于美国国债收益率从存在温和但显著的抑制作用，对风险资产的需求存在积极影响。


Menzie Chinn of the University of Wisconsin has examined the impact of foreign purchases and sales of US government securities on ten-year Treasury yields.	威斯康辛大学的秦孟席（Menzie Chinn）估算了外国买卖美国政府债券对十年期国债收益率的影响。


His estimates imply that foreign sales at a rate of $60 billion per month raise yields by ten basis points.	他的估算表明，外国以每月600亿美元的速度抛售将让美国国债收益率升高10个基点。


Given that China has been at it for 2.5 months, this implies that the equivalent of a 25-basis-point increase in interest rates has already been injected into the market.	中国的抛售已经维持了2. 5个月，因此其效果相当于市场利率已经提高了25个基点。


Some would object that the renminbi is weak because China is experiencing capital outflows by private investors, and that some of this private money also flows into US financial markets. This is technically correct, but it is already factored into the changes in interest rates described above.	有人会反对说，人民币疲软是因为中国遭遇私人投资者资本外流，其中一些私人资金还流入了美国金融市场。


Recall that capital also flowed out of the US when the Fed was engaged in QE, without vitiating the effects. That was what the earlier debate over “currency wars” – when emerging markets complained about being inundated by financial inflows from the US – was all about.	从技术上说，这是对的，但这一因素已经在上述利率变化中考虑到了。


Another objection is that QE operates not just through the so-called portfolio channel – by changing the mix of securities in the market – but also through the expectations channel.	另一个反对意见是量化宽松操作并不仅仅是通过所谓的投资组合渠道——通过改变市场中的证券的组合——进行的，也通过预期渠道进行。


It signals that the authorities are seriously committed to making the future different from the past.	这表明当局十分认真地想让未来不同于过去。


But if Chinese intervention is just a one-off event, and there are no expectations of it continuing, then this second channel shouldn’t be operative, and the impact will be smaller than that of QE.	但如果中国的干预只是暂时事件，无人预期会持续进行下去，那么第二渠道就没有操作性，其影响也将小于量化宽松。


The problem is that no one knows how long capital outflows from China will persist or how long the Chinese authorities will continue to intervene.	问题在于没人知道中国资本外流会持续多久，或中国当局会坚持干预多久。


From this standpoint, the Fed’s decision to wait to begin liftoff is eminently sensible.	从这一点看，美联储决定推迟升空非常明智。


And, given that China holds (and is therefore now selling) euros as well, the European Central Bank also should bear this in mind when it decides in December whether to ramp up its own program of quantitative easing.	此外，考虑到中国也持有（因此目前正在抛售）欧元，欧洲央行也应该在12月决定是否加码其本身的量化宽松计划是考虑到这一点。


Why Finance Can Save the Planet	为何金融能够拯救地球


PARIS – Most people hate finance, viewing it as the epitome of irresponsibility and greed.	巴黎—大部分人讨厌金融，把金融堪称不负责任和贪婪的同义词。


But, even after causing a once-in-a-century recession and unemployment for millions, finance looks indispensable for preventing an even worse catastrophe: climate change.	但是，即使金融引发了百年一遇的衰退和数百万人失业，但它仍是阻止更糟糕的灾难——气候变化所不可或缺的工具。


Action is urgently needed to contain global warming and prevent a disaster for humanity; yet the global community is desperately short of tools.	急需采取行动遏制气候变暖、阻止人类灾难； 但全球社会极度缺乏工具。


There is not much support for the most desirable solutions advocated by economists, such as a global cap on greenhouse-gas emissions, coupled with a trading system, or the enforcement of a worldwide carbon price through a global tax on CO2 emissions.	经济学家所宣扬的最合理的方案——如全球温室气体排放限额和相关的交易制度，或通过全球二氧化碳排放税执行世界范围内的碳定价——得不到多少支持。


Instead, negotiations for the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris in December are being conducted on the basis of voluntary, unilateral pledges called Intended Nationally Determined Contributions.	相反，12月的巴黎联合国气候变化会议谈判基于被称之为各国自定贡献预案的自愿的单方面承诺。


Although the inclusion of voluntary targets has the merit of creating global momentum, this approach is unlikely to result in commitments that are both binding and commensurate to the challenge.	尽管纳入自愿目标有助于增加全球动力，但这一方针不可能产生具有约束力的、与挑战规模匹配的承诺。


That is why climate advocates are increasingly looking for other means of triggering action.	因此，气候支持者正在日益寻求其他方式促使人们采取行动。


Finance is at the top of their list.	金融在他们的工具清单上位居前茅。


For starters, finance provides an accurate yardstick to gauge if deeds are consistent with words.	首先，金融提供了衡量行动是否与言辞符合的准确准绳。


In 2011, “Unburnable Carbon,” a path-breaking report by the nongovernmental Carbon Tracker Initiative, showed that the proven fossil-fuel reserves owned by governments and private companies exceed by a factor of five the quantity of carbon that can be burned in the next 50 years if global warming is to be kept below two degrees Celsius.	2011年，非政府组织碳追踪计划（Carbon Tracker Initiative）发布了与一份突破性报告《不可燃碳》（Unburnable Carbon），报告指出，政府和私人公司所拥有的已证实化石燃料储备是未来五十年将全球变暖幅度控制在二摄氏度以内所允许燃烧的碳量的五倍。


Reserves held just by the 200 top publicly listed fuel companies – thus excluding state-owned producers such as Saudi Arabia’s Aramco – exceed this carbon budget by one-third.	最大的200家上市燃料公司——因此不包括沙特阿美石油（Aramco）等国有生产商——所持有的储备就比这一碳预算多出三分之一。


And that means that these companies’ stock-market valuation is inconsistent with containing global warning.	这意味着这些公司的股市估值与遏制全球变暖不相符。


This realization prompted a campaign to convince investors to divest from carbon-rich assets.	这一现实激发了一场说服投资者撤回富碳资产投资的运动。


Individuals and institutions representing a $2.6 trillion portfolio have already joined the divestment movement.	个人和机构投资者加起来共有2. 6万亿美元的投资组合加入了这场撤回投资运动。


Furthermore, Bank of England Governor Mark Carney has highlighted the threat represented by potentially stranded carbon assets.	此外，英格兰银行行长卡尼（Mark Carney）强调了隐含碳资产所带来的风险。


Investors are being warned that, from the standpoint of financial stability, “brown” securities bear specific risk.	投资者被警告说，从金融稳定角度，“褐色”证券（”brown” securities） 包含着特殊风险。


The amount of divestment may look big – and it is, particularly given that the campaign started recently.	撤回投资的规模看上去很大——确实如此，特别是考虑到这场运动才刚刚开始。


Yet $2.6 trillion amounts to less than 5% of global private non-financial securities.	答案2. 6万亿美元只占全球私有非金融证券总量的不到5%。


The trend is real, but it is still too little to trigger significant changes in fossil-fuel companies’ valuation and behavior.	趋势确实存在，但力度太小，不足以大幅改变化石燃料公司的估值和行为。


A second reason why finance matters is that the transition to a low-carbon economy requires huge investments.	金融很重要的第二个原因是向低碳经济的转型需要巨量投资。


According to the International Energy Agency, global investment in energy supply currently amounts to $1.6 trillion annually, and 70% of it is still based on oil, coal, or gas.	据国际能源署的数据，目前全球能源供给投资总量为每年1. 6万亿美元，其中70%仍基于石油、煤炭或天然气。


Green investment amounts to only 15% of the total, and investment in energy efficiency – in buildings, transport, and industry – totals a meager $130 billion.	绿色投资只占总量的15%，而能源效率投资——建筑、交通和行业等——总共还不到1,300亿美元。


Containing the increase in average surface temperature to two degrees requires developing clean technologies, and even more important, a four-fold increase in investment in energy efficiency over the next ten years.	将地表平均升温幅度控制在两度以内需要发展清洁技术，更重要的是，未来十年能源效率投资需要增加四倍。


Yet such investment will not be financed easily: its return depends on a still-elusive carbon price and will often materialize only in the long run, while improving energy efficiency implies replacing hundreds of millions of outdated vehicles and refitting hundreds of millions of energy-voracious buildings.	但这笔投资的融资绝不容易：投资回报取决于依然难以理解的碳定价，并且通常需要长期才能收回，而改进能源效率意味着淘汰数亿量陈旧车辆、修缮数亿栋耗能建筑。


Adequate financing instruments are required for the right purpose at the right place and at the right scale.	在正确的地方以正确的规模追求正确的目的需要充足的融资工具。


Development banks and green banks have a huge role to play.	开发银行和绿色银行可以起到巨大的作用。


For example, dedicated long-term loans, coupled with a tax break or a subsidy, would help households decide to modernize their homes.	比如，专用长期贷款与税收减免或补贴一道，有助于家庭对其房屋进行现代化改造。


But the real hope among climate specialists is that innovative finance could help provide the planning clarity that is currently missing.	但气候专家真正的希望是创新金融能有助于提供目前所不具备的计划明确性。


To elicit the investments that are necessary to mitigate climate change and green the economy, the elimination of fossil-fuel subsidies and a credible, fast-rising path for the price of carbon are vital.	为了引出减轻气候变化、绿化经济所必须的投资，至关重要的一点是取消化石燃料补贴并找到可靠、迅速的碳定价方法。


But, because high fuel prices are unpopular with consumers and raise competitiveness concerns among businesses, governments are reluctant to take action today – and may renege on their commitments to act tomorrow.	但是，由于高企的能源价格会引起消费者不满、引起企业关于竞争力的忧虑，政府不愿立刻采取行动——而明天采取行动的承诺也有可能是一纸空文。


To overcome such trepidation, advocates for climate action are turning to incentives.	要克服这些忧虑，气候行动的支持者将目光投向了激励。


Some have recommended that governments issue CO2 performance bonds, whose yield would be reduced if companies exceed their carbon target.	一些人建议政府发行二氧化碳表现债券，这种债券的收益率将因为公司超过碳排目标而降低。


Another idea, put forward in a recent paper by Michel Aglietta and his colleagues, is to map out a path for an indicative price of carbon called its “social value” and provide green project developers a government-guaranteed carbon certificate representing the value of the corresponding emissions reduction.	米切尔·阿格列塔（Michel Aglietta）和他的同事在一篇最新文章中提出了另一个想法，即为碳制定一个参考定价，称之为碳的“社会价值”，并为绿色项目开发者颁发政府担保的、代表相应减排价值的碳证书。


Central banks, they suggest, would then refinance loans to such developers, up to the value of the carbon certificate.	他们建议，接着由中央银行对这些开发者提供再融资贷款，以碳证书的价值为限。


This would amount to a calculated bet.	这就构成了一个算计选择。


If the price of carbon in, say, ten years, actually corresponds to the announced social value, the project will be profitable and the developer will repay the loan.	如果十年后的碳定价果真与宣布的社会价值相符，这个项目就能盈利，开发者将偿还贷款。


But if the government reneges on its commitment, the developer will default, leaving the central bank with a claim on the government.	如果政府违背承诺，开发者将违约，中央银行获得对政府的索偿权。


Failure to increase the price of carbon would result either in higher public debt or, in the case of monetization, inflation.	不能提高碳定价要么导致公共债务负担增加，要么导致通货膨胀（如果货币化的话）。


The idea is to force governments to have skin in the game, by balancing the risk of inaction on the carbon tax with the risk of insolvency or inflation.	这一想法的初衷是迫使政府通过权衡在碳税问题上不作为的风险和破产或通胀风险参与博弈。


There would be no procrastination.	这样不会有任何拖延。


Action against global warming would take place without delay.	遏制全球变暖的行动将毫不迟疑地开始。


But a decade or so later, governments – and societies more broadly – would need to choose between taxation, debt, and inflation.	但过十年左右，政府——以及更广义的政府——将需要在税收、债务和通胀之间做出选择。


Undertaking massive investment now and deciding only later how to finance it looks irresponsible – and so it is.	现在进行大量投资、日后在决定如何为投资融资看上去很不负责任——确实如此。


But not acting at all would be even more irresponsible.	但一点都不行动更加不负责任。


Models Behaving Badly	表现不佳的模型


LONDON – “Why did no one see the crisis coming?”	发自伦敦——“为何没人预料到危机降临？


Queen Elizabeth II asked economists during a visit to the London School of Economics at the end of 2008.	”2008年底，英女王伊丽莎白二世到访伦敦经济学院时曾向经济学家们提出这样一个问题。


Four years later, the repeated failure of economic forecasters to predict the depth and duration of the slump would have elicited a similar question from the queen: Why the overestimate of recovery?	时隔四年，经济预测者在衰退深度以及持续时间上的持续失准又让人们不禁跟女王一样发问：为何会高估了经济复苏？


Consider the facts.	请参考以下事实：2011年，国际货币基金组织预测欧洲经济将在2012年实现2. 1%的增长。


In its 2011 forecast, the International Monetary Fund predicted that the European economy would grow by 2.1% in 2012.	但事实上，今年欧洲经济萎缩0. 2%似乎已成定局。


In fact, it looks certain to shrink this year by 0.2%.	在英国，其预算责任办公室于2010年预测2011年经济会增长2. 6%，而2012年会增长2.


In the United Kingdom, the 2010 forecast of the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) projected 2.6% growth in 2011 and 2.8% growth in 2012; in fact, the UK economy grew by 0.9% in 2011 and will flat-line in 2012.	而实际上英国经济在2011年只增长了0. 9%而2012年将停滞不前。


The OECD’s latest forecast for eurozone GDP in 2012 is 2.3% lower than its projection in 2010.	此外世界经济合作与发展组织对欧元区2012年GDP的最新预测也比其2010的推测要低2. 3%。


Likewise, the IMF now predicts that the European economy will be 7.8% smaller in 2015 than it thought just two years ago.	同样地，国际货币基金组织当前预测的2015年欧洲经济规模将比两年预测要小7. 8%。


Some forecasters are more pessimistic than others (the OBR has a particularly sunny disposition), but no one, it seems, has been pessimistic enough.	其中一些预测者要比另外一些更为悲观（相比之下英国预算责任办公室算是尤其乐观的），但似乎没有人能悲观到足够接近真相的程度。


Economic forecasting is necessarily imprecise: too many things happen for forecasters to be able to foresee all of them.	经济预测必然是不精确的：即将发生的事情如此之多，以致经济预测者们根本无法全部预见。


So judgment calls and best guesses are an inevitable part of “scientific” economic forecasts.	所以判断估计和最佳猜测就成为了“科学的”经济预测中不可分割的一部分。


But imprecision is one thing; the systematic overestimate of the economic recovery in Europe is quite another.	然而不精确是一回事； 对欧洲经济复苏作出系统性高估又是另一回事。


Indeed, the figures have been repeatedly revised, even over quite short periods of time, casting strong doubt on the validity of the economic models being used.	事实上，数据一直被反复修改，有时甚至是在很短的时间内被修改，这就使人们不得不怀疑经济预测者们手中经济模型的有效性。


These models, and the institutions using them, rely on a built-in theory of the economy, which enables them to “assume” certain relationships.	这些模型以及其使用机构都依赖于经济中的固有理论，该理论使得他们能够“假定”某些事物之间的关联。


It is among these assumptions that the source of the errors must lie.	而错误的来源必然存在于这些设想之中。


Two key mistakes stand out.	其中有两个非常突出的关键错误。


The models used by all of the forecasting organizations dramatically underestimated the fiscal multiplier: the impact of changes in government spending on output.	各大预测机构所使用的模型都显著低估了财政乘数：政府支出变化对产出的影响。


Second, they overestimated the extent to which quantitative easing (QE) by the monetary authorities – that is, printing money – could counterbalance fiscal tightening.	第二，他们高估了金融当局实施的量化宽松政策——也就是印钞票——对财政紧缩的抵消程度。


Until recently, the OBR, broadly in line with the IMF, assumed a fiscal multiplier of 0.6: for every dollar cut from government spending, the economy would shrink by only 60 cents.	直到最近，预算责任办公室——大致与国际货币基金组织一样——都依然采用0. 6的财政乘数：也就是政府每减少一美元的支出，经济只会收缩60美分。


This assumes “Ricardian equivalence”: debt-financed public spending at least partly crowds out private spending through its impact on expectations and confidence.	这就假定了“李嘉图等价定理”：举债融资的公共支出通过对预期和信心的影响至少会在某种程度上挤压私人消费。


If households and firms anticipate a tax increase in the future as a result of government borrowing today, they will reduce their consumption and investment accordingly.	如果家庭和公司预期到由于政府借款而导致未来增税的话，他们就将减少相应的消费和投资。


On this view, if fiscal austerity relieves households of the burden of future tax increases, they will increase their spending.	从这一观点来看，如果财政紧缩能减轻未来增税给家庭带来的负担，后者就将增加支出。


This may be true when the economy is operating at full employment – when state and market are in competition for every last resource.	这点或许在经济充分运行时是真实的——当政府和市场都在争夺每一份资源时。


But when there is spare capacity in the economy, the resources “freed up” by public-sector retrenchment may simply be wasted.	但当经济体中出现富余产能时，由公共部门紧缩释放的资源就可能只会被浪费掉。


Forecasting organizations are finally admitting that they underestimated the fiscal multiplier.	预测机构最终承认他们低估了财政乘数。


The OBR, reviewing its recent mistakes, accepted that “the average [fiscal] multiplier over the two years would have needed to be 1.3 – more than double our estimate – to fully explain the weak level of GDP in 2011-12.”	预算责任办公室回顾了其近期的错误，承认“这两年的平均财政乘数应该是1. 3——比我们原来预测的两倍还要多——这才能解释2011到2012年GDP的疲弱水平。


The IMF has conceded that “multipliers have actually been in the 0.9 and 1.7 range since the Great Recession.”	”国际货币基金组织已经承认“自从大萧条以来财政乘数实际上已经处于0. 9到1.


The effect of underestimating the fiscal multiplier has been systematic misjudgment of the damage that “fiscal consolidation” does to the economy.	7之间的水平。 ”对财政乘数的低估已经导致了“财政巩固”对经济影响的系统性判断失误。


This leads us to the second mistake.	而这又导致我们犯下了第二个错误。


Forecasters assumed that monetary expansion would provide an effective antidote to fiscal contraction.	预测者假定货币扩张会有效地消除财政紧缩。


The Bank of England hoped that by printing £375 billion of new money, ($600 billion), it would stimulate total spending to the tune of £50 billion, or 3% of GDP.	英格兰银行过去希望通过加印3750亿英镑新钞（约合6000亿美元）可以刺激共计500亿英镑的支出（或等于3%的GDP）。


But the evidence emerging from successive rounds of QE in the UK and the US suggests that while it did lower bond yields, the extra money was largely retained within the banking system, and never reached the real economy.	然而在英美两国先后几轮量化宽松政策中展现出的事实表明虽然债券收益确实有所降低，但额外加印的货币很大程度上还滞留在银行系统，从未流入实体经济。


This implies that the problem has mainly been a lack of demand for credit – reluctance on the part of businesses and households to borrow on almost any terms in a flat market.	这意味着问题主要是缺乏信贷需求——在这个萧条的市场，无论条件有多优惠，企业和家庭都不愿向银行贷款。


These two mistakes compounded each other: If the negative impact of austerity on economic growth is greater than was originally assumed, and the positive impact of quantitative easing is weaker, then the policy mix favored by practically all European governments has been hugely wrong.	这两种错误相互作用：如果紧缩对经济增长的负面影响比原先估计的要大，而量化宽松政策的积极影响比估计的要弱，那么几乎所有欧洲政府偏爱的政策组合就是一个巨大的错误。


There is much greater scope for fiscal stimulus to boost growth, and much smaller scope for monetary stimulus.	财政刺激促进经济增长的余地很大，而货币刺激就没那么有用。


This is all quite technical, but it matters a great deal for the welfare of populations.	这一切基本上都是些技术问题，但它在很大程度上影响着人们的福祉。


All of these models assume outcomes on the basis of existing policies.	所有的经济模型都在现行政策的基础上假定产出。


Their consistent over-optimism about these policies’ impact on economic growth validates pursuing them, and enables governments to claim that their remedies are “working,” when they clearly are not.	他们一直过于乐观地看待这些政策对经济增长的影响，因此为追求这些政策提供了正当性，并使政府能够声称自身的挽救经济措施正在“起作用”，但事实上却没有。


This is a cruel deception.	这是一个残忍的骗局。


Before they can do any good, the forecasters must go back to the drawing board, and ask themselves whether the theories of the economy underpinning their models are the right ones.	在这些预测者们起到任何作用之前，他们应该回到图表板前，抚心自问那些支撑他们模型的经济理论究竟是不是对的。


Hollande in Mali	奥朗德在马里


PARIS – While hundreds of thousands demonstrated in Paris against the right of homosexual couples to marry and adopt children, French troops were arriving in Mali to stop a coalition of Islamist and rebel forces from taking control of its capital, Bamako, and creating in the Sahel a sanctuary for terrorists.	巴黎—在数十万人在巴黎街头反对同性恋结婚和养育孩子的权利的同时，法军正在开赴马里，阻止伊斯兰武装和叛军组成的联军控制其首都巴马科，让萨赫勒草原成为恐怖分子的避难所。


These are trying times for French President François Hollande.	这些都是对法国总统奥朗德的试金石。


Besieged economically at home, where his popularity is at its lowest since his election last year, can he regain credibility, if not support, as supreme commander of French forces?	在国内，奥朗德饱受经济问题困扰，其支持度已降至去年当选以来最低。 在这样的情况下，他能从新赢得作为法军最高指挥官的信誉（姑且不论支持）吗？


Once upon a time, “I intervene, therefore I am” might as well have been a French motto, particularly in Africa.	曾几何时，“我与故我在”称得上是法国的座右铭，特别是在非洲。


But, while French national identity is intimately bound up with France’s international standing – how it is perceived in the world – enthusiasm for intervention has receded.	但是，尽管法兰西的民族认同与法国的国际地位——即它在世界人民心目中的形象——息息相关，干预的热情却在减退。


The benefits have become more dubious, while the costs and risks have grown increasingly evident.	干预的好处越来越受到质疑，而成本和风险越来越表露无遗。


If France has again become a regional gendarme by default, it is largely for three reasons.	如果法国自动重新成为地区警察，那么主要是出于三方面原因。


American enthusiasm for intervention in Africa has greatly diminished since the operation in Somalia in 1992-1993 – and more globally following the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.	自1992—1993年的索马里以来，特别是在伊拉克和阿富汗打了两场旷日持久的战争之后，美国干预非洲的热情有所消退。


European interest in military intervention in Africa is as low as ever.	欧洲干预非洲的军事利益前所未有地低。


And, as for the region’s governments, it would be an understatement to say that they are not yet ready militarily to take their fate into their own hands.	此外，对该地区的政府来而言，说它们还不具备独立掌握命运的军事实力是站不住脚的。


While France is not alone – manifestations of support have come from its Western and African partners, as well as from the Middle East – it will bear the primary responsibility and the risks.	尽管法国并不孤独——其西方和非洲甚至中东盟国纷纷表示支持——但它将承担主要责任和风险。


For Islamic fundamentalists, France is now the “Great Satan.”	对伊斯兰原教旨主义者来说，法国现在是“大恶魔。 ”


Indeed, the conflict in Mali is taking place geographically in Africa, but in many ways its causes and ramifications lie in the Middle East.	事实上，马里冲突虽然从地理上说发生在非洲，但从很多方面看，其根源和演化都是中东式的。


When France intervened in an African country in the past, there was no risk of terrorist attacks on its territory or on its citizens elsewhere in the world.	过去，法国在干预非洲国家时不会在当地或在世界其他地区遭到该国人策划的恐怖袭击。


That is no longer the case.	现在则非如此。


It is too early to say what will happen in Mali or the Sahel – or, for that matter, in France itself.	现在判断马里和萨赫勒——或者就这个问题而言，在法国本土——将发生什么还为时过早。


For the moment, the French are standing, overwhelmingly, behind Hollande.	现在，法国人一边倒地支持者奥朗德。


They would have criticized him had he remained passive while Bamako fell into the hands of terrorists.	若巴马科落入恐怖分子之手，则奥朗德将被千夫所指。


Yet this support may be fragile, and could collapse if something goes wrong on the ground – or, worse, in France.	但这一支持是脆弱的，如果形势转坏（特别是在法国国内），奥朗德的支持就会轰然瓦解。


Before the intervention, Mali was not a French priority.	在出兵干预之前，马里并非法国日程上的重点。


Rising unemployment at home seemed to be a more urgent task than did addressing instability in Africa.	国内的失业上升之势是比解决非洲不稳定问题更紧迫的任务。


While the French public agrees that Mali cannot be allowed to become a haven for terrorists, the way Afghanistan did in the late 1990’s, attitudes toward intervention have evolved in recent decades.	尽管法国公众都同意不能让马里如同20世纪90年代末的阿富汗那样沦为恐怖分子的避风港，但关于干预的态度，几十年来发生了很大改变。


In the early 1980’s, after a particularly bloody terrorist attack on French and American forces in Lebanon, France’s tolerance for military casualties seemed much higher than that of the United States.	20世纪80年代初，黎巴嫩发生了针对法军和美军的严重流血恐怖袭击，此后法国对军事伤亡的厌恶程度便远远胜过了美国。


But this has changed.	但这已经发生了改变。


The French now find themselves on the front line at a time when they have much less appetite for it.	如今，在法国人对军事伤亡容忍度大大降低的时候，法国又站在了干预的前沿。


Moreover, budget restrictions have severely constrained French military capabilities.	此外，预算限制严重约束着法国的军事实力。


French and British military intervention was successful in Libya in 2011 at least in part as a result of US military procurement.	法国和英国之所以能够在2011年对利比亚成功实施军事干预，部分原因是因为有美国的军事采购支持。


Of course, from a French perspective, the US role is somewhat ironic.	当然，从法国角度看，美国的角色颇有些讽刺意味。


In the years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Americans always had to be on the front line – battling the enemy abroad to avoid having to battle him at home, in the parlance of the time – while the European allies were perceived as the cleaning staff.	2001年9月11日恐怖袭击发生后的几年中，美国一直站在冲突前沿——用当时的话说，就是在国外与敌人战斗以保本土安全——而其欧洲盟国给人的感觉是清道夫。


But imperial fatigue after Iraq and Afghanistan has left its imprint.	但在伊拉克和阿富汗之后，美国疲态尽露。


Americans are starting to enjoy – probably too much for their allies – what President Barack Obama, describing the US role in Libya, called “leading from behind.”	美国人开始乐于接受总统奥巴马用来描述美国在利比亚扮演所边沿角色的话，即“从幕后领导”，或许对于其盟国而言，美国退得太多了。


For Hollande, war in Mali is both an opportunity and a risk.	对奥朗德来说，在马里开展既是机会，也是风险。


If Nicolas Sarkozy, whom he defeated, was widely regarded as “too” presidential, Hollande has given the impression of not being presidential “enough.”	如果被他击败的萨科齐被广泛认为“太”总统了，那么奥朗德给人的印象是“不够”总统。


His fall from public grace – too statist and fiscally intrusive for the right, but too moderate and social democratic for the true left – was more rapid than that of any president of the Fifth Republic.	作为第五共和国总统，奥朗德公众支持度下降之快首屈一指——对右翼来说，他太执着于统计数字，在财政上太过激进； 对于真正的左翼来说，他又太温和，太过于社会民主。


Of course, with unemployment rising every month, it is difficult to remain popular for long.	当然，随着失业率逐月升高，���保持公众支持是很困难的。


As the supreme commander of an army at war, Hollande can now try to reinvent himself.	作为战斗军队的最高指挥官，奥朗德现在可以重新树立自己的形象。


But, successive presidents since Jacques Chirac have failed to reconcile the French with politics.	但是，希拉克之后的法国总统都没有办法实现法国政坛的和谐。


France’s citizens have tended to expect too much from their state, and now they may be expecting too little from politics and politicians at a time when deep divisions on fundamental economic and social issues run not only between the traditional right and left, but also within both camps.	法国人民对国家期待太大，而如今，在基本经济和社会问题的深刻分歧不仅来自传统的左翼和右翼，也来自左右阵营内部的时候，他们对政治和政客的期待又太少。


Will foreign intervention reunite the French?	对外干预会让法国重新团结起来吗？


Will war in Africa be the defining moment of Hollande’s presidency?	在非洲作战会成为奥朗德总统生涯的转折点吗？


Will he be remembered as the French Harry Truman – a discreet, uncharismatic man who, when faced with urgent and dramatic circumstances, ended up doing the right things for lack of a better alternative?	奥朗德会因为成为法国的杜鲁门——一个谨小慎微、毫无魅力可言，但在面临重大紧迫事务时在没有更佳方案时作出正确选择的人——而被人铭记吗？


This is a portentous moment both for Mali and for security in the Sahel and Europe.	这是一个不详的时刻，不管对马里还是对萨赫勒和欧洲安全来说都是如此。


It is no less significant for Hollande and France.	对奥朗德和法国来说，这一时刻的意义也不可小觑。


France Alone?	孤独的法国？


PARIS – In less than two years, France has carried out three decisive foreign military interventions.	巴黎—在不到两年的时间里，法国做出了三次果断的出兵干预决策。


In March 2011, its airstrikes in Libya (alongside those of Great Britain) thwarted Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi’s troops as they prepared to retake the city of Benghazi.	2011年3月，法国（联合英国）对利比亚的空袭挫败了卡扎菲上校准备收复班加西的图谋。


A month later, French forces in Côte d’Ivoire arrested President Laurent Gbagbo, who had refused to recognize his rival’s election victory, putting the country at risk of civil war.	一个月后，法军在科特迪瓦捉拿拒绝承认对手赢得大选的总统巴博，消灭了内战之忧。


Now France has intervened in Mali.	如今，法国又出兵干预马里。


The latest intervention was initially planned as part of a European mission to support African forces, but France abruptly decided to act unilaterally to blunt the advance of Islamists who threatened to overrun Mopti, the last barrier before reaching the capital, Bamako.	这次最新的干预最初是作为欧洲支持非洲军队计划的一部分，但法国突然决定单方面行动，以挫败伊斯兰武装突破首都巴马科的最后屏障——莫普提的图谋。


Beyond that objective, France seeks to protect its many nationals in the region; maintain stability in the Sahel, where states are very weak; and prevent Mali’s transformation into a base of Islamist terrorism directed at Europe.	除了这一目标，法国还想保护在该地区的众多侨民、维持萨赫勒的稳定（那里的国家大多非常孱弱）并阻止马里沦为伊斯兰恐怖主义向欧洲发动攻击的基地。


A lot is at stake – all the more so because French intervention is likely to be extensive.	兹事体大——甚至会进一步加大，因为法国的干预程度可能会加深。


While the Islamists have been temporarily defeated, they are well armed and receive supplies from Libya via Algeria, which has suppressed Islamists at home but seems to turn a blind eye to their transit through its territory.	尽管伊斯兰武装暂时被击败了，但他们装备精良，并有利比亚通过阿尔及利亚予以供给上的支持。 阿尔及利亚在国内镇压伊斯兰武装，但对于取道其国土的转运则是睁只眼闭只眼。


Moreover, the capabilities of the Malian army and those of other West African countries that are supposed to join the operation are too weak to turn the tide.	此外，马里和其他准备加入行动的西非国家军队实力太弱，不足以成事。


The United States tried to train the Malian army, but failed miserably.	美国尝试训练马里军队，但惨遭失败。


So, with the security of Europe as a whole at stake, why is France the only country involved?	那么，既然整个欧洲的安全都系于马里，为何只有法国参与其中？


One explanation is to view the intervention as a neo-colonial bid to protect a French preserve.	一个解释是此次干预是新殖民主义，为的是保护法国领地。


This is a profound error.	这一说法大错特错。


France has no interest in protecting a Malian regime that it knows to be corrupt and incompetent; indeed, France recently refused to support a request from President François Bozizé’s regime in the neighboring Central African Republic for aid in dealing with rebels.	保护马里政权绝不符合法国的利益，其腐败和无能早已众人皆知； 事实上，最近法国拒绝了邻国中非共和国总统博齐泽（François Bozizé）派兵打击叛军的要求。


France’s motivations are broader.	法国的着眼点更加宏大。


In particular, France has always considered Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world to be natural spheres of political and strategic influence that are necessary to maintaining its position as a global power.	特别是，法国向来将撒哈拉以南非洲和阿拉伯世界视为维持其全球强国地位不可或缺的天然政治和战略影响范围。


The second explanation is more credible: France, aside from Great Britain, is Europe’s only true military power.	第二个解释更加可信一些：除了英国以外，法国是欧洲唯一的真正军事强国。


It believes that operational military capability is a condition of power – a view that is not shared by the overwhelming majority of European states, which continue to display a collective aversion to war.	法国相信，展现胜任的军力是实力的表现——对于这一看法，绝大部分欧洲国家都是不认同的，它们对战争持有集体厌恶。


To be sure, Europe has the means for joint action.	平心而论，欧洲具有采取联合行动的方法。


In 2003, following the start of the Iraq war, Europe embraced a strategy prepared by Javier Solana, then the European Union’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy.	2003年，伊拉克���争爆发后，欧洲采取了时任欧盟共同外交和安全政策高级代表索拉纳（Javier Solana）所提出的战略。


But, while a large number of Europeans naively believed that this was the prelude to a joint European strategy, the proposal was drafted in terms that were so vague as to allow any outcome – or none.	但是，尽管众多欧洲人天真地认为欧洲联合战略只是个序幕，但这一方案非常模糊，根本无法形成成果。


The EU’s Lisbon Treaty mentions “permanent structured cooperation” in security and defense policy, and an entire institutional apparatus of political and military committees exists to anticipate, prepare for, and implement military operations at the European level.	欧盟里斯本条约提到在安全和防务政策上实行“永久的结构性合作”，并设立了政治和军事委员会作为完整的制度性机构处理欧洲层面的预测、准备和实施军事行动事宜。


But this mechanism lacks the common political will needed to activate it; the less it is used, the less usable it will become.	但这一机制缺乏激活它所需要的共同政治意愿； 而这一机制使用得越少，其可用性就越低。


During the Libyan crisis, Solana’s successor, Catherine Ashton, deliberately sought to limit the EU’s role to that of a super-NGO focused on humanitarian aid and economic development.	在利比亚危机期间，索拉纳的继任者阿什顿（Catherine Ashton）有意地将欧盟的角色限定在专注于人道主义援助和经济开发的超级非政府组织的范围内。


Recently, during the vote on Palestinian representation at the United Nations, the EU called for its members to abstain – an odd way to affirm Europe’s commitment to global leadership.	最近，在巴勒斯坦地位的联合国投票中，欧盟号召成员国弃权——对于欧洲谋求全球领导权的目标来说，这一做法令人费解。


For Great Britain, Europe-wide defense is a nonstarter.	对英国来说，泛欧洲防务根本毫无意义。


Britain has deviated from this principle only once, when it agreed to participate in the Atalanta anti-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa – probably because it was placed in command.	对于这一原则，英国只偏离过一次，即同意加入非洲之角亚特兰特（Atlante）反海盗行动，这或许是因为它能占据行动指挥的地位。


As a result, those who want a common European defense capability lack the means to create it, while those who have the means to create it do not want it (with the possible exception of France).	于是，希望形成共同欧洲防务能力者缺少实施办法，而手握实施办法者又不愿实施（法国也许是个例外）。


Britain’s bilateral cooperation with France – highlighted during the Libyan crisis – is sometimes very strong.	有时，英国会与法国实施强大的联合行动——利比亚危机期间便是明证。


But, despite the two countries’ 2010 treaty on defense and security cooperation, the British have decided, for budgetary reasons, to acquire aircraft that will not be compatible with French aircraft carriers.	但是，尽管两国在2010年签订了防务和安全合作条约，英国人仍借口预算问题采购与法国航母不兼容的战斗机。


Even Spain and Italy, the two countries most affected by developments in the Mediterranean and the Sahel, have reduced their military expenditures significantly.	就连受地中海和萨赫勒形势最大的两个国家——西班牙和意大利里都大幅削减了军事支出。


Unlike Germany, both participated in the Libyan intervention, but with highly limiting rules of engagement for their forces.	和德国不同，这两个国家都参与了利比亚干预，但军队介入的程度均非常浅。


For example, Italian naval forces were instructed to avoid the waters off the coast of Tripoli, and Spanish tanker aircraft were forbidden to refuel fighter jets.	比如，意大利海军接到的命令是防止海水倒灌的黎波里海岸，西班牙空中加油机则被禁止为战斗机加油。


Europe as a whole currently devotes only 1.6% of its GDP to defense, compared to 4.8% for the US.	欧洲作为一个整体，其防务支出只有GDP的1. 6%，而美国是4.


It is the only world region where military expenditures are decreasing.	8%。 它也是世界上唯一一个军事支出下降的地区。


Its deployed forces are extremely small, accounting for 4% of all military personnel worldwide, versus 14% for the US.	其军队部署规模极小，只占世界军队总规模的4%，而美国是14%。


Industrial cooperation, which could constitute an economic and military asset, is also weakening, as demonstrated by Germany’s successful opposition to the proposed EADS/BAE merger, which was officially canceled in October.	能形成经济和军事资产的产业合作也在弱化，德国成功地反对了EADS/BAE合并计划便是明证，10月，该计划被正式取消。


Germany had seemed to embark on a more robust policy since its participation in military operations in Afghanistan.	自参与阿富汗军事行动后，德国似乎打定主意要采取更稳健的政策。


Now, however, it recoils at any prospect of military intervention, even as it remains the world’s third-largest arms exporter.	但是，如今它在所有军事干预意向之前全面退缩，尽管它仍是世界第三大军备出口国。


Europe is reluctant to develop a substantial military force, because the European project was created in opposition to the idea of power.	欧洲无意发展庞大的军队，因为欧洲工程的基础思想反对实力为王。


Yet this stance has become untenable.	但这一立场已越来越站不住脚。


Europe faces real threats, which France alone cannot contain.	欧洲面临着实实在在的威胁，光靠法国是无法解决的。


Moreover, the international system is increasingly coalescing around national powers that consider military force to be an essential prerequisite of influence.	此外，国际体系正在让认为军事实力是影响力的先决条件的国家联合起来。


Europe does not face a choice between soft and hard power.	欧洲面临的不是软实力还是硬实力的选择。


It must combine both if it is to survive.	欧洲必须将两者联合起来才能生存。


The French Disconnection	法国的单飞


PARIS – Dire conditions can permit what was once unthinkable to push its way into public debate.	发自巴黎——极端的情况可以让原本不可想象的事情变成公众议题。


In France, the idea that now dares to speak its name is that the country will sink into an ever-deeper economic malaise unless it regains its monetary sovereignty.	而在法国，一个大胆出格的说法就是除非恢复其货币主权，否则就将陷入比以往任何时候都更深层次的经济萎缩之中。


Two striking statements on economic policy by France’s leaders in the first weeks of this year have highlighted the force of this logic.	法国领导人在今年最初的那几周里发表的两个引人注目的经济政策声明突显了上述逻辑的力量。


First, President François Hollande, worried about the euro’s appreciation against other major world currencies, called for an exchange-rate target.	首先，总统弗朗索瓦·奥朗德（François Hollande）担心欧元会对其他世界主要货币升值，并呼吁设定汇率目标。


Then, Pierre Moscovici, the finance minister, said that Europe might grant France a delay in meeting the 3%-of-GDP budget-deficit target mandated from this year onward under the eurozone’s newly ratified fiscal compact.	然后财政部长皮埃尔·莫斯科维奇（Pierre Moscovici）说虽然欧元区最近通过的财政契约规定从今年开始各国预算赤字都不得超过GDP的 3%，但欧洲也许会允许法国推迟兑现这一目标。


These positions imply a desire to exercise sovereign power over the Economic and Monetary Union’s rules and decisions.	这些声明意味着法国有意对经济与货币联盟的规则和决策行使主权权力。


Back in 1989-1991, exactly the same motive underlay President François Mitterrand’s imposition of the euro on Germany – that is, to harness the Bundesbank’s monetary power to a framework in which France could be confident of wielding decisive influence.	回顾1989~1991年间，时任法国总统的弗朗索·密特朗（François Mitterrand）基于同样的动机强行向德国推销欧元——就是要用法国有信心发挥起决定性影响的框架来束缚住德国央行的货币实力。


Since the single currency was France’s condition for accepting German reunification, Germany played along.	由于单一货币是当年法国接受德国统一的条件，德国只好照办。


Two decades later, Germany may be in a different mood.	时隔二十年后，德国人的想法可能已经不一样了。


The sovereign-debt-and-banking crisis that has roiled the monetary union since 2010 has steadily exposed the realities at play here, as irrevocably fixed exchange rates lock in and deepen differences in eurozone members’ competitiveness.	自2010年以来一直困扰着货币联盟的主权债务及银行危机已经逐步暴露了当前的现实，这是由于无法取消的固定汇率锁定以及不断分化的欧元区成员国竞争力。


In France’s case, the loss of competitiveness and resulting sharp decline in export performance has been aggravated by relying on crushing taxation of labor to finance generous welfare programs and top-drawer public services (a practice exacerbated by stifling labor-market regulation).	就法国来说，竞争力流失并因此导致的出口急剧下降状况不断加重，因为政府对劳动者施加重税来资助慷慨的社会福利计划以及高端公共服务（这种作为又在极端死板的劳动力市场监管之下进一步恶化了）。


In a monetary union, there are only two ways to close a competitiveness gap between countries: transfers from the more competitive to the less competitive, or internal devaluation, which means real wage cuts.	在一个货币联盟内部，只有两种方法来消除国家之间的竞争力差距：从比较有竞争力的地方转移财富到竞争力较低之处，或者实施内部贬值——这意味着削减实际工资。


Not surprisingly, the preference has been for transfers, which, until the 2008 financial crash, took the form of cross-border private-sector lending to governments and banks.	不出所料，人们一直都倾向于实施转移支付，在2008年金融危机之前以跨国私人部门给政府和银行贷款的形式进行。


Following the credit-bubble burst in 2008, fiscal transfers replaced these private financial flows, causing budget deficits to balloon.	随着2008年信贷泡沫破灭，财政转移取代了这些私人资金流，这导致了预算赤字膨胀。


And now, with the German government, as chief creditor, calling the shots on cross-border transfers to weaker eurozone countries, all such transfers are conditional on austerity (that is, internal devaluation).	而今德国政府作为主要债权人操纵着对弱势欧元区国家的跨国转移支付，而所有这些转移都是以实施紧缩为条件的（也就是内部贬值）。


Bailouts from the European Stability Mechanism represent the clearest example of this, with the fiscal compact now committing signatories to tight deficit targets and structural adjustment.	欧洲稳定机制的救助就是最具代表性的例子——财政契约要求签署国制订严格的赤字目标和结构调整承诺。


And more austerity is a vital, if less well remarked on, condition of the European Central Bank’s declared willingness to buy unlimited quantities of troubled countries’ short-term government debt.	如果要欧洲央行无限量购买受困国家短期政府债务的话，条件就是要实施更多的紧缩（对这一点的讨论不多）。


So far, the “bazooka” represented by the ECB’s “outright monetary transactions” program has had the desired effect – without having to be used.	迄今为止，以欧洲央行的“直接货币交易”项目为代表的“绝招”已经起到了预期效果——根本不需要被使用。


Eurozone financial markets have stabilized, and the euro has appreciated against the dollar and the yen.	欧元区金融市场已经稳定了，且欧元对美元和日元实现了升值。


But, as Hollande’s recent declarations indicate, currency appreciation is the last thing that an uncompetitive country like France needs.	但是正如奥朗德最近的声明所指出的一样，货币升值是法国这样缺乏竞争力的国家最不想看到的。


Although the French government, unlike its Spanish and Italian counterparts, has not yet had any difficulty financing itself at low interest rates, currency appreciation as the economy slides into recession is like fuel poured onto an unlit bonfire.	尽管法国政府跟西班牙和意大利两国政府有所区别，可以毫无困难地以低利率为自身融资，但在国家经济进入衰退时货币升值就像向未点燃的篝火增加燃料一样。


Unless growth is restored, France’s already large public debt will expand unsustainably, heightening the risk that investors will shun French government bonds.	除非恢复增长，否则法国本已庞大的公共债务将会不可持续地扩大下去，这会增加投资者放弃购买法国政府债券的风险。


From this predicament stems the fashionable idea that the bond market would actually welcome less fiscal austerity, because this would boost economic growth, in turn making the level of public debt appear more sustainable in the long run.	在这种困境中催生出一种流行理念：债券市场实际上欢迎更少的财政紧缩，因为这样才能促进经济增长，从而使公共债务水平在长期上显得更可持续。


It is no surprise that Moscovici is beginning to push for a “collective European decision” to relax the fiscal treaty’s terms, given that French compliance would require massive new spending cuts.	所以莫斯科维奇开始努力争取“欧洲集体决策”以放宽财政条约条款的做法就并不奇怪，尤其是考虑到法国许下的承诺将需要新一轮的大规模开支削减。


Will Germany agree to such a relaxation – or, for that matter, to Hollande’s implicit demand that the ECB follow Japan’s example and loosen monetary policy to drive the exchange rate back down?	德国会同意这种的放宽行为吗——或者就此而言，德国会同意奥朗德的隐性要求——欧洲央行跟随日本的步伐放松货币政策让汇率再降回来吗？


Unlike Japan (and, of course, the United States), France, as a member of a monetary union, cannot pursue domestic goals unilaterally.	不似日本（显然也不似美国），法国作为货币联盟的成员国无法单方面追求本国利益。


To avoid disaster, France has only two options: somehow force a change in German policy or go it alone.	为了避免灾难，法国只有两个选择：以某种方式促使德国改变主意，或者单干。


There are two reasons why, until now, the second option – leaving the monetary union – has been unthinkable.	有两种原因可以解释为什么迄今为止第二个选择——脱离货币联盟——是不可想象的。


The first has to do with economic and financial risks.	第一个原因与经济金融风险有关。


Ditching the euro might trigger a banking crisis, capital flight, inflation, and perhaps even sovereign default.	甩开欧元可能会引发银行业危机，资金外流，通货膨胀甚至有可能是主权违约。


On the other hand, higher competitiveness and erosion of the real value of debt would quickly outweigh these costs by restoring confidence in the French economy’s prospects.	但另一方面，更高的竞争力和债务实际价值的腐蚀将使人们对法国经济的前景恢复信心，其收益也会很快高于上述（脱离）所带来的成本。


This strategy’s success, starting with the speed of restored access to external financing, would depend on the credibility of government policies – monetary, fiscal, and, above all, the radical and indispensable supply-side reforms for which there would now be breathing space.	这种策略的成功，从重新获得外部融资的速度开始，将取决于政府政策的公信力——货币的，财政的，尤其是激进且不可或缺的供应方面改革——从而获得喘息的空间。


The specter of continuing economic stagnation and ever-rising unemployment (with the young and older workers being the worst hit) should remove the second, geopolitical obstacle to a French exit from the eurozone.	持续的经济停滞和不断上升的失业率（对年轻和年老的工人影响最大）阴影应该移除了第二个地缘障碍，使得法国可以从欧元区中退出来。


For French elites since World War II, alignment with Germany has been central to projecting French power and influence.	自从二战以后，对法国精英来说，与德国保持一致对突出法国权力和影响力一直很重要。


Such ambitions must now be sacrificed for the sake of the French public’s well-being.	而为了法国的公众利益必须牺牲这种野心。


France will not regain its economic strength without setting aside the euro.	除非退出欧元，否则法国将无法恢复其经济力量。


Even during that adjustment, there is no reason why relations with European partners should suffer in any fundamental sense.	即使是作出了这样的调整，也没有理由会让它与欧洲伙伴关系的基本面受到什么影响。


On the contrary, the sustainable prosperity that would result from that adjustment would create a much healthier long-term foundation for continuing the quest for an “ever closer union” in Europe.	相反，由于这种调整导致的可持续繁荣将会为继续在欧洲寻求一个“更紧密的联盟”创造一个更加健康的长期基础。


Why France Will Sink Europe’s Constitution	法国为何反对欧洲宪法


If public opinion polls are to be believed, on May 29 the French will reject the European Union’s draft constitutional treaty.	如果民意测验可信的话，那么法国人将在5月29号反对欧盟的宪法条约草案。


Because all EU member countries must ratify the constitution, a French “Non” will, in effect, kill it.	因为宪法必须得到所有欧盟成员国的批准，事实上法国的一句“不”将否决此草案。


Amazing as this turn of events seems, it has been long in the making.	尽管这件事情的转折颇让人诧异，但也并非空穴来风。


It is amazing because France is not just a founding member of the European Community, but also has been the main driving force behind all major steps toward “ever closer union.”	它之所以让人诧异是因为法国不仅仅是欧盟共同体的创建国之一，也是为实现“前所未有的紧密联邦”而实施的所有重大步骤背后的主要推动力。


But French opposition was also predictable because, for over a decade now, France has veered away from Europe and now finds itself increasingly isolated.	但是法国会投反对票也并非不可预见，十年多来，法国和欧盟渐行渐远，发现它自己越来越孤立。


Of course, Europe has also moved away from France through successive enlargements, but the main roots of the estrangement lie in France itself.	当然，欧洲也通过不断的扩张和法国越来越疏远。 但是导致这种疏远的主要根源还是在法国本身。


The French regard with great sadness their declining status and prestige – not only in world politics, but also in culture, science and, importantly, language.	法国人十分难过地意识到，他们不仅仅在世界政治，在文化、科学，尤其是语言方面的地位和权威性正在日益下滑。


Europe, in their view, was always a way of reclaiming world influence.	在他们看来，欧洲是一种重新找回世界影响力的方式。


For three decades, this worked.	这种方法三十多年来一直有效。


France and Germany had forged an alliance that called the shots in Europe.	法国和德国已经缔结成一个操纵欧洲的联盟。


Not interested in geopolitical power – a legacy of its Nazi past – Germany was content to back France’s ambitions as long as the Common Market allowed it to be Europe’s economic powerhouse.	德国对它的纳粹历史所留下的地理政治权力并不感兴趣，只要欧洲自由贸易联盟允许它成为欧洲经济强国，德国就会站在法国身后支持它的野心。


But that alliance is unraveling as Germany’s own status declines, owing to its mediocre economic performance and the loss of its prestigious Deutschemark.	但是，由于德国经济表现平平，久负盛名的德国马克又贬值，那个联盟随着德国的地位下降而开始变得清晰。


Moreover, Germany is increasingly interested in exercising political influence on its own; as a result, it is no longer happy with what it gets from the alliance with France.	此外，德国开始越来越有兴趣自己施加政治影响，结果，它再也不满足于那些从与法国的联盟中所获得的东西。


At the same time, successive EU enlargements over the decades have brought in other powerful contenders, chiefly Spain and the UK, as well as smaller countries who are unwilling to bow before French-German leadership.	与此同时，欧盟几十年来的不断扩张也吸引进了其他有力的竞争者，主要是西班牙和英国，以及那些不愿意在法-德领导下俯首称臣的小国家。


In short, France has lost control of Europe.	简而言之，法国已经失去了对欧洲的控制。


This is not new, but it has only recently started to sink in, and it hurts.	这并不新鲜，但是这却是最近才开始被了解，这对法国是个伤害。


France is also economically wounded.	法国在经济上也遭受了损失。


Here is a country that has long cherished its “exception” from the normal rules of market economics, a foggy view that rejects both central planning and free markets and claims to offer a well-balanced middle ground.	法国珍惜它能长期破例游离于市场经济的常规之外，模糊地保持着拒绝中央规划和自由市场的立场，并声称能够在两者之间找到一个更平衡的中立点。


The French do not care that they have never been able to articulate their vision of a “third way,” for they remain deeply convinced that the state has a key role to play in steering markets in order to defend “higher” values from the single-minded pursuit of materialism.	法国人不在乎他们从未能够清楚阐明他们对“第三种办法”的看法，因为他们坚信法国在驾驭市场中要扮演着重要的、在单纯追求物质主义中维护“更高的”价值观的角色。


This view, propagated since World War II by a quasi-Marxist intelligentsia, is so ingrained that the French do not even bother to understand how markets operate.	这个观点的宣扬始于二战期间的一群准马克思主义知识分子，现在这个观点根深蒂固，以至于法国人从来就未尝试去理解市场如何运作。


They look upon economics as an ideological battleground, where all views can be entertained without being confronted with logic, much less with facts.	他们把经济看作意识形态的战场，在那里所有的观点不需要直面逻辑就可得出，更不用说面对事实了。


Yet facts have been hitting hard.	然而，事实犹如一记重拳。


Growth has been lackluster for a quarter of a century and unemployment remains stubbornly high.	二十五年来经济增长毫无亮点，失业率居高不下。


Urban crime, once described as the wages of unfettered individualism, now resembles what is found in the United States, the French model’s bête noire.	曾一度被描写为解放个人主义浪潮代表的城市犯罪率，现在就和美国的差不多，令人深恶痛绝。


What has this to do with Europe?	这和欧洲有什么关系呢？


The EU, by design, increases economic competition, but France is ill equipped.	欧盟故意加强了经济竞争，但是法国毫无准备。


One after the other, most European countries have reformed their economies, shedding the cozy arrangements that used to protect every interest group from the pressure of competition.	欧洲国家一个接一个地进行了经济改革，揭走了原本用以保护每个利益集团免受竞争压力的温暖“外衣”。


Even Germany, after even worse performance than France, has now taken decisive steps.	即使是德国，在经历了比法国更为糟糕的表现之后，现在也采取了决定性的措施。


Unable to reform their labor markets because of the fear of street protests, French governments of all political stripes seek to protect their ailing firms, only to face limits imposed by the rules of the Common Market.	由于害怕改革劳力市场会引发游街抗议，法国政府寻求方法以保护他们体制不全的公司，结果却发现不得不面对共同市场所强加的规定条例。


The bloated French public sector, which many see as the employer of last resort, cannot afford its expensive personnel.	人浮于事的公共部门，虽然被许多人视为最后希望，却难以承受如此昂贵的人员费用。


While many private French firms are thriving, they do so by economizing on manpower and, increasingly, by outsourcing production, often to new EU member countries where labor costs are considerably lower.	但是许多法国私人公司通过节约人力成本以及逐渐通过把生产外包给那些新加入欧盟的成员国（因为它们的劳力成本相对较低）而生意兴隆。


Public education is in shambles and France’s higher education system now faces competition from other European countries.	公共教育步履蹒跚，法国的高等教育体系现在正面临着来自于其他欧洲国家的竞争压力。


Humbled by economic malaise and loss of influence, the French are scared.	受到经济不振和影响力衰退的影响，法国人的恐惧油然而生。


They fear the future, because the future means either market-oriented reforms or further economic and political downgrading, both of which are seen as unacceptable, if only because they clash with French self-esteem.	他们害怕未来，因为未来意味着不是以市场为导向的改革就是经济和政治地位继续下降，只要它们严重挫伤了法国人的自尊，这两者看来都是难以接受的。


The European Constitution has little to do with any of these challenges, but a majority of French people has started questioning the strategy that has long masked France’s diminishing status.	欧洲宪法和这些挑战毫无关系，但是大部分法国人已经开始质疑那个长期以来掩饰着法国日益衰弱的地位的策略。


They are alarmed by what they see as the domination of Anglo-Saxon economic principles – the last nail in the coffin of France’s mythical “exception.”	被他们看作统治地位的盎格鲁-萨克逊的经济政策——法国虚构的“例外”政策的致命一击——向他们发出了警告。


So the EU is now seen as the Trojan horse that threatens the myriad of state-sanctioned benefits and handouts that every citizen enjoys.	因此，现在欧盟被看作一个木马，威胁着无数每个公民所享有的批准认可的利益和福利。


Of course, most French people would ultimately benefit from doing away with this inefficient web of big and small privileges, but most voters, depressed by poor economic prospects and unnerved by high unemployment, are simply unwilling to take the risk.	当然，大多数法国人将最终会从废除这个充斥着大小特权的低效网络中获利，但是由于对萧条的经济前景感到失望，对居高不下的失业率心存不安，多数投票者就是不愿意冒险。


They do not understand the roots of their economic troubles and are nostalgic for better times.	他们并不明白他们经济问题的根源所在，对昔日的繁荣无尽留恋。


They mistakenly see the European Constitution as one more challenge, at a time when they want to be nursed and protected.	在他们想要被照顾和保护的时候，他们错误地把欧洲宪法看作了一个更艰巨的挑战。


Scared people rarely make wise choices.	恐惧的人们很少会做出聪明的抉择。


Bismarck versus Bismarck	俾斯麦与俾斯麦


ATHENS – The centrality of Germany to Europe and, more widely, to world affairs has been amply, and often bloodily, demonstrated over many centuries.	雅典—欧洲，以及更广泛的世界事务德国中心论已经在几百年的历史中印证了多次，且往往是血淋淋的教训。


Indeed, Germany’s strategic position at the heart of Europe, as well as its huge economic and military potential, made it first a prize to be sought, and then, following Otto von Bismarck’s completion of German unification in 1871, a nation-state to be feared.	事实上，德国处于欧洲的战略中心，又具有巨大的经济和军事潜力，这使它成为列强垂涎的肥肉，继而在1871年俾斯麦完成德国统一后又成为可怕的民族国家。


Bismarck’s legacy was a Germany that dominated European politics until the end of World War II.	俾斯麦身后留下的德国一直主导着欧洲政治，直到二战结束。


That legacy is now reasserting itself.	俾斯麦的这一遗产正在卷土重来。


After the interlude of the Cold War, during which Germany served as the center of discord between East and West, reunification permitted the reassertion of German power within the context of the European Union and, most notably, the eurozone.	在冷战的插曲后——此间德国一直是东西方对峙的中心——重新统一让德国的实力在欧盟的环境中（以及更加令人瞩目地在欧元区的环境中）重新崛起。


Today, however, the question is whether Germany is ready and willing to provide leadership in the conduct of the EU’s affairs – and, if so, to what end.	但是，如今，问题变成德国是否做好准备也愿意在欧盟事务上起到领导作用，以及，如果答案是肯定的，它会走得多远。


Europe is currently facing its most challenging crisis of the postwar period.	当前，欧洲正面临战后时期最具挑战性的危机。


After six quarters of recession, the slump is spreading to the eurozone’s core countries.	在六个季度的衰退后，经济崩溃开始蔓延到核心国。


Unemployment, above 12% on average, is at a record high.	平均12%以上的失业率处于历史最高值。


In Spain and Greece, more than one-quarter of the labor force is jobless, while the unemployment rate hovers around 60% among young people.	在西班牙和希腊，四分之一以上劳动力找不到工作，年轻人失业率更是徘徊在60%。


Despite harsh austerity, large fiscal deficits persist, and banks remain undercapitalized and unable to support a sustained economic recovery.	尽管采取了严厉的紧缩，但巨额赤字依然存在，银行依然资金不足，无法支持持续经济复苏。


Social malaise is deepening as expectations – and actual prospects – for economic improvement are likely to remain poor for the foreseeable future.	在可预见的未来，经济改善的预期——以及实际前景——可能仍将萎靡不振，这深化了社会不安。


Faith in the European project is declining, and, given the eurozone’s lack of cohesion, stagnation and recession may lead to popular rejection of the EU, accompanied by serious challenges to democracy, including the rise of neo-fascist parties.	对欧洲工程的新年正在衰退，而由于欧元区缺少团结，停滞和衰退可能导致公众拒绝欧盟，并伴生对民主的严重挑战（比如新法西斯政党的崛起）。


And yet, despite the risks, European leaders remain remarkably inactive, apparently reassured by European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s promise to do “whatever it takes” to protect the monetary union from collapse.	此外，尽管风险重重，但欧洲领导人令人惊讶地鲜有作为，这显然是吃了欧洲央行德拉吉的定心丸——他承诺“竭尽全力”保护货币联盟不会崩溃。


But prolonged inaction, induced by relative calm in financial markets, will perpetuate stagnation and eventually lead to a breakup of one sort or another.	但金融市场的相对冷静所导致的长时间不作为会让停滞长久化，最终形成某种形式的崩溃。


Either gradual attrition, with weaker countries defaulting, will lead to a more restricted German-led club of “virtuous” countries, or Germany itself will choose to pursue a policy of narrow fiscal advantage by seceding from the eurozone.	要么逐渐深化的摩擦以及疲软国的违约导致形成德国领导的“优等”国家俱乐部； 要么德国本身选择通过脱离欧元区缩小财政优势的政策。


The political and economic weakness of France and Italy, together with Britain’s gradual withdrawal from EU affairs, highlight Germany’s key role in rescuing the eurozone from the current crisis.	意大利和法国的政治和经济弱势，以及英国的逐渐从欧盟事务中抽身凸显出德国在当前危机中捍卫欧元区的关键作用。


But true leadership requires a sense of direction and a willingness to pay up, and, here, Germany has lately been found wanting.	但真正的领导力要求方向感以及花血本的意愿，而在这方面，德国不能令人信服。


Despite German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s evident political skills and high domestic standing, her government lacks a concrete design for “ever closer Union” in Europe.	尽管德国总理默克尔拥有令人信服的政治技巧和高度的国内支持，但她的政府缺少关于欧洲“更紧密联盟”的具体设计。


As a result, it, too, is in a weak position to mobilize the resources and competences required to restore Europe.	结果，德国自身在动员重塑欧洲的资源和能力方面所处的位置也相当不利。


Instead, Merkel’s Germany has been doing as little as possible, as late as possible, to prevent the euro’s collapse.	在防止欧元崩溃方面，默克尔的德国能拖则拖，能少做则少做。


This policy cannot endure for long.	这一政策无法长时间持续。


Either stagnation will lead to the eurozone’s breakup, or circumstances will force a policy change.	要么停滞导致欧元区崩溃，要么环境迫使政策变化。


So, in which areas must Germany lead?	那么，在哪些领域德国必须担起领导之责？


First, European public debt should be partly and gradually mutualized.	首先，欧洲公共债务必须部分地、逐渐地共同化。


National banking systems should be unified, in order to separate private losses from sovereign debt, with centralized supervision and resolution authorities, as well as a deposit-insurance scheme, forming the core of a European banking union.	国家银行体系应该统一起来，从而将私人损失与主权债务隔离，并以集中监督和清算当局（以及一个存款保险制度）形成欧洲银行联盟的核心。


Strong central institutions, responsible to a directly elected parliament, are needed to coordinate fiscal and economic policies.	必须由对直选议院负责的强大的中央机构负责协调财政和经济政策。


In the shorter term, the single market should be extended to services, and free-trade arrangements should be promoted either multilaterally or bilaterally with major trading partners such as the United States.	子短期，单一市场应该扩大至服务业，与美国等主要贸易伙伴的自由贸易协定应该在多边和双边维度上都得到促进。


Austerity should be eased, particularly in the fiscally stronger core economies, and substantial resources should be devoted to boosting youth employment and investment in small and medium-size firms in the over-indebted countries.	紧缩应该放松特别是在财政较坚挺的核心经济体，应该将大量资源用于提振过度负债国年轻人就业和中小企业投资上。


Germany’s reluctance to lead on these issues partly reflects historical inhibitions, which are always difficult to overcome.	德国不愿在这些问题上带头，这部分反映了历史性的抑制，很难克服。


The persistence of pre-Keynesian orthodoxy in German economic thought, with its moral abhorrence of the “sin of borrowing” (and thus its neglect of aggregate demand), does not help, either.	德国经济思想以前凯恩斯时代的思想为正统，德国人从道德上讨厌“借贷的罪恶”（而因此忽视总需求），这也起不了促进作用。


The federalist structure of Germany’s political system, moreover, favors parochial approaches over grander designs.	此外，德国政治制度的联邦型结构有利于各自为政，不利于顶层设计。


Nonetheless, Germany must accept that the alternative to a democratically unified currency union is German economic hegemony.	尽管如此，德国必须接受民主统一的货币联盟的替代方案是德国经济霸权。


In the longer run, that outcome would destroy the common European project, in turn undermining Germany’s own economic prosperity and strategic security – a Bismarckian scenario from which Bismarck would have recoiled in horror.	从长期看，这一结果将摧毁共同的欧洲工程，并反过来破坏德国自身的经济繁荣和战略安全——这是俾斯麦都要不寒而栗的俾斯麦式情景。


Why Germany Should Lead or Leave	德国为什么应该负起领导责任或者离开欧盟


NEW YORK – Europe has been in a financial crisis since 2007.	纽约——2007年以来欧洲一直身处金融危机。


When the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers endangered the credit of financial institutions, private credit was replaced by the credit of the state, revealing an unrecognized flaw in the euro.	雷曼兄弟破产危及金融机构信贷导致国家信贷挤出私人信贷，进而彰显了欧元不为人知的问题。


By transferring their right to print money to the European Central Bank (ECB), member countries exposed themselves to the risk of default, like Third World countries heavily indebted in a foreign currency.	因为将印钞权交给欧洲央行（ECB），欧盟成员国像背负巨额外币债的第三世界国家一样承担着债务违约的风险。


Commercial banks loaded with weaker countries’ government bonds became potentially insolvent.	大量持有弱国政府债的商业银行随时可能破产。


There is a parallel between the ongoing euro crisis and the international banking crisis of 1982.	持续不断的欧元危机和1982年的国际金融危机有共通之处。


Back then, the International Monetary Fund saved the global banking system by lending just enough money to heavily indebted countries; default was avoided, but at the cost of a lasting depression.	当时国际货币基金组织借钱给负债累累的国家，将将能够挽救全球银行体系； 债务违约得以避免，但代价却是旷日持久的经���低迷。


Latin America suffered a lost decade.	拉美国家失去了宝贵的十年时光。


Germany is playing the same role today as the IMF did then.	今天的德国扮演了当时国际货币基金组织的角色。


The setting differs, but the effect is the same.	当然环境不同，但效果一致。


Creditors are shifting the entire burden of adjustment on to the debtor countries and avoiding their own responsibility.	债权国把调整的一切负担一股脑推卸给债务国，逃避自己应该承担的责任。


The euro crisis is a complex mixture of banking and sovereign-debt problems, as well as divergences in economic performance that have given rise to balance-of-payments imbalances within the eurozone.	欧元危机综合了银行及主权债务问题，还有因经济表现落差造成的欧元区国际收支失衡。


The authorities did not understand the complexity of the crisis, let alone see a solution.	当局根本不了解这场危机的复杂性，更诓论拿出解决方案。


So they tried to buy time.	因此他们试图争取时间。


Usually, that works.	这种方法往往能够奏效。


Financial panics subside, and the authorities realize a profit on their intervention.	一旦金融恐慌消退，当局的干预行为就可以实现利润。


But not this time, because the financial problems were combined with a process of political disintegration.	可这次不同，因为财政问题还伴随着政治解体的过程。


When the European Union was created, it was the embodiment of an open society – a voluntary association of equal states that surrendered part of their sovereignty for the common good.	欧盟创立时曾是开放社会的化身——平等的国家自愿加入，为了实现共同的利益而放弃部分主权。


The euro crisis is now turning the EU into something fundamentally different, dividing member countries into two classes – creditors and debtors – with the creditors in charge.	但欧元危机彻底改变了欧盟的性质，将成员国区隔为两大类——债权人和债务人——而且由债权人说了算。


As the strongest creditor country, Germany has emerged as the hegemon.	身为最强债权国的德国已经掌握了霸权。


Debtor countries pay substantial risk premiums for financing their government debt.	债务国被迫为政府融资支付巨额的风险溢价。


This is reflected in their cost of financing in general.	这在它们的融资成本中得到充分的体现。


To make matters worse, the Bundesbank remains committed to an outmoded monetary doctrine rooted in Germany’s traumatic experience with inflation.	更有甚者，德国央行（Bundesbank）仍然死抱住从德国惨痛的通胀经历中总结出来的过时的货币学说。


As a result, it recognizes only inflation as a threat to stability, and ignores deflation, which is the real threat today.	因此它只承认通胀会威胁稳定，但却忽视今天造成现实威胁的通货紧缩。


Moreover, Germany’s insistence on austerity for debtor countries can easily become counterproductive by increasing the debt ratio as GDP falls.	此外，德国坚持要求债务国紧缩很容易适得其反，导致国内生产总值下降的同时负债率飙升。


There is a real danger that a two-tier Europe will become permanent.	二元化欧洲永久化的危险是切实存在的。


Both human and financial resources will be attracted to the center, leaving the periphery permanently depressed. But the periphery is seething with discontent.	人力和财力资源都将被吸引到核心国家，导致外围国家经济长期低迷，引发了外围国家的强烈不满。


Europe’s tragedy is not the result of an evil plot, but stems, rather, from a lack of coherent policies.	欧洲的悲剧不是因为邪恶的阴谋，而是缺乏一以贯之的政策。


As in ancient Greek tragedies, misconceptions and a sheer lack of understanding have had unintended but fateful consequences.	这就好比古希腊悲剧，误解和纯粹的理解缺失造成了始料未及但却非常致命的后果。


Germany, as the largest creditor country, is in charge, but refuses to take on additional liabilities; as a result, every opportunity to resolve the crisis has been missed.	最大的债权国德国掌握话语权，但却拒绝负担额外的债务； 结果是解决危机的每一次机会都被白白地错过。


The crisis spread from Greece to other deficit countries, eventually calling into question the euro’s very survival.	危机已经从希腊蔓延到其他赤字国家，最终就连欧元的生存都受到了威胁。


Since a breakup of the euro would cause immense damage, Germany always does the minimum necessary to hold it together.	因为欧元解体会造成巨额损失，德国总是采取最低限度的措施防止欧元垮掉。


Most recently, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has backed ECB President Mario Draghi, leaving Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann isolated.	最近，德国总理安格拉·默克尔（Angela Merkel）表态支持了欧洲央行行长马里奥·德拉吉，从而孤立了德意志联邦银行行长基恩斯·魏德曼。


This will enable the ECB to put a lid on the borrowing costs of countries that submit to an austerity program under the supervision of the Troika (the IMF, the ECB, and the European Commission).	这意味着欧洲央行能为提交由国际货币基金组织、欧洲央行和欧洲委员会这三驾马车共同监管的财政紧缩计划的国家设定借贷成本上限。


That will save the euro, but it is also a step toward the permanent division of Europe into debtors and creditors.	这种做法可以挽救欧元，但同时也朝着将欧洲永久划分为债权国和债务国的情境迈近了一步。


The debtors are bound to reject a two-tier Europe sooner or later.	债务国一方迟早会拒绝接受两元化的欧洲。


If the euro breaks up in disarray, the common market and the EU will be destroyed, leaving Europe worse off than it was when the effort to unite it began, owing to a legacy of mutual mistrust and hostility.	欧元分崩离析会彻底破坏欧盟共同市场，只剩下两大阵营的相互敌视和不信任，从而致使欧洲比欧盟成立以前的情况还要糟糕。


The later the breakup, the worse the ultimate outcome.	分崩离析的时间越长，最终的结果就愈糟。


So it is time to consider alternatives that until recently would have been inconceivable.	因此现在是时候考虑就在不久前还根本无法想象的选择。


In my judgment, the best course of action is to persuade Germany to choose between either leading the creation of a political union with genuine burden-sharing, or leaving the euro.	依我判断，最好的方法莫过于说服德国在带头创建切实分担责任的政治联盟和离开欧元区之间做出选择。


Since all of the accumulated debt is denominated in euros, it makes all the difference who remains in charge of the monetary union.If Germany left, the euro would depreciate.	因为所有累积债务无一例外地采用欧元计价，所以货币联盟由谁来领导效果会截然不同。


Debtor countries would regain their competitiveness; their debt would diminish in real terms; and, with the ECB under their control, the threat of default would disappear and their borrowing costs would fall to levels comparable to that in the United Kingdom.	德国离开会造成欧元贬值，债务国的竞争力就会逐渐恢复； 它们的实际债务将会减少，而且因为控制着欧洲央行，它们违约的风险将会解除，而且它们的借贷成本将下降到和英国差不多。


The creditor countries, by contrast, would incur losses on their claims and investments denominated in euros and encounter stiffer competition at home from other eurozone members.	反之，债权国以欧元计价的投资和债权将会遭受亏损，同时还要面对来自欧元区其他成员国的激烈竞争。


The extent of creditor countries’ losses would depend on the extent of the depreciation, giving them an interest in keeping the depreciation within bounds.	债权国损失的大小将取决于欧元贬值的程度，它们的切身利益会促使它们限制欧元的贬值。


After initial dislocations, the eventual outcome would fulfill John Maynard Keynes’ dream of an international currency system in which both creditors and debtors share responsibility for maintaining stability.	经过最初的错位之后，最终的结果将会实现约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯的梦想，建立债权和债务国共担维稳责任的国际货币制度。


And Europe would avert the looming depression.	这样欧洲就能躲过迫在眉睫的经济衰退。


The same result could be achieved, with less cost to Germany, if Germany chose to behave as a benevolent hegemon.	如果德国选择充当一位仁慈的霸主，那么它可以付出较小的代价取得相同的结果。 其中应当包括落实拟议中的欧洲银行联盟；


That would mean implementing the proposed European banking union; establishing a more or less level playing field between debtor and creditor countries by establishing a Debt Reduction Fund, and eventually converting all debt into Eurobonds; and aiming at nominal GDP growth of up to 5%, so that Europe could grow its way out of excessive indebtedness.	成立减债基金为债权国和债务国创造相对公平的竞争环境，以及最终将所有债务转换成欧元债券的形式。 此外还要设定名义国内生产总值5%的增长目标，这样欧洲就可以通过经济增长摆脱过度负债的困境。


Whether Germany decides to lead or leave, either alternative would be better than creating an unsustainable two-tier Europe.	无论德国最终决定领导还是离开，这两种选择都强过造成一个不可持续的二元化的欧洲。


Why Greece Declined a Euro Holiday	为何希腊拒绝欧元节日


BRUSSELS – For the entire first half of this year, since the far-left, anti-austerity Syriza party came to power in January, the Greek saga virtually monopolized the attention of European policymakers.	布鲁塞尔—在今年整个上半年，自极左翼的反紧缩政党左翼联盟（Syriza）在1月份开始掌权以来，希腊神话几乎垄断了欧洲决策者的注意力。


Even as their country’s economy crashed, Greece’s new government remained adamant in demanding debt relief without austerity – that is, until mid-July, when they suddenly agreed to the creditors’ terms.	虽然希腊经济崩盘，但新政府仍固执地要求不以紧缩为条件的债务纾困——直到7月中旬突然同意债权人的条件。


Indeed, as of July 13, Greece’s staunchly anti-austerity government has been obliged to impose even tougher austerity and pursue painful structural reforms, under its creditors’ close supervision.	事实上，在7月13日，希腊坚定的反紧缩政府被迫在债权人的严密监督下实施更加严厉的紧缩措施、追求痛苦的结构改革。


Why did the Greek government concede to terms that not only controverted its own promises, but also closely resembled those that voters had overwhelmingly rejected in a popular referendum barely a week earlier?	为何希腊政府要屈服于这些条件？ 它们不但有悖于希腊政府自身的承诺，也与选民们在不到一周前的全民公决中一边倒地拒绝了的条件别无二致。


Many believe that Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras was responding to an ultimatum from his European partners: Accept our demands or leave the euro.	许多人认为这是希腊总理齐普拉斯对其欧洲伙伴国最后通牒的反应：要么接受条件，要么离开欧元区。


The question is why a Greek exit from the euro (“Grexit”) amounted to such a potent threat.	问题是为何希腊退出欧元区（“希腊退出”）构成了如此有力的威胁。


In fact, from an economic perspective, Grexit no longer represents the potential catastrophe that it once did.	事实上，从经济角度讲，希腊退出已不再像从前那样是一场潜在的灾难。


After all, the main short-term cost – financial-system disruption – has already materialized in Greece: banks and the stock market have been shut down, and capital controls have been imposed.	毕竟，主要短期成本——金融体系动荡——在希腊已是既成事实：银行和股市关门大吉，资本管制也开始实施。


While those actions were needed to stem large-scale capital flight and prevent the banking system’s collapse, they also caused the Greek economy to contract sharply.	这些动作是阻止大规模资本外逃、防止银行体系崩溃的必要措施，但也导致希腊经济急剧衰退。


In this context, Greek negotiators might have considered another proposal, circulated informally by the German finance ministry, recommending that Greece receive immediate debt forgiveness, in exchange for leaving the euro temporarily.	在这一背景下，希腊谈判者也许想到了由德国财政部长提出的另一个方案，即建议希腊立刻获得债务豁免，条件是它暂时退出欧元区。


If Greece remained in the euro, no relief would be granted – a proviso consistent with the German position that debt restructuring for eurozone countries would be illegal.	如果希腊留在欧元区，就不会有债务纾困——这一附带条件与德国所持的欧元区国家债务重组不合法的立场相符。


While the legal argument is probably spurious, an outright debt reduction for a eurozone country remains politically impossible.	也许法律争议只是借口，但直接减免欧元区国家的债务在政治上仍不可行。


The German proposal, spearheaded by Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, highlights the fundamental change that has occurred in Greece’s relationship with its European partners since its last bailout package three years ago.	由其财政部长朔伊布勒（Wolfgang Schäuble）提出的德国方案凸显出三年前上一次援助方案实施以来希腊与其欧洲伙伴国关系所发生的根本性变化。


In 2012, Greece was offered hundreds of billions of euros in financial support, and its creditors, including Greek commercial banks, were pushed to accept substantial “voluntary” haircuts.	2012年，希腊获得了数千亿美元的金融支持，其包括希腊商业银行在内的债权人被迫接受巨额“自愿”剃头（haircuts）。


Tellingly, when George Papandreou, Greece’s prime minister at the time, proposed a referendum on the existing adjustment program and his country’s continued eurozone membership in 2011, he was warned off in no uncertain terms by France’s then-President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel.	最能说明问题的是，当时任希腊总理帕潘德里欧（George Papandreou）在2011年提出就现有调整计划以及希腊欧元区成员资格进行全民公投的时候，时任法国总统萨科齐（Nicolas Sarkozy）和德国总理默克尔断然警告他不要这样做。


Though Papandreou would have campaigned for the adjustment program and the euro, a referendum was a risk that his European partners were unwilling to take.	尽管帕潘德里欧支持调整计划和欧元，但公投是其欧洲伙伴国不愿承担的风险。


Tsipras’s government, by contrast, was able to hold its referendum, and even campaign against the creditors’ proposed adjustment program (which, it should be noted, was no longer on the table).	相反，齐普拉斯政府能够举行公投，甚至反对债权人提出的调整计划（应该指出，调整计划已不再是谈判内容）。


Even the resounding “no” delivered by Greek voters could not strengthen the government’s negotiating position, for a simple reason: Grexit is no longer considered a threat to the euro’s stability.	而即使是希腊选民掷地有声的“不”，也无法增强希腊政府的谈判立场。 原因很简单：希腊退出已不再被认为是欧元稳定性的威胁。


That is why German officials – especially Schäuble – have been encouraging Greece to leave.	正因如此，德国官员——特别是朔伊布勒——一直在鼓励希腊退出。


One can only speculate about Schäuble’s motivation in pushing for Grexit.	我们只能猜测朔伊布勒鼓动希腊退出的动机。


He seems to believe that a more integrated eurozone, though certainly desirable, is not feasible with a country that cannot be trusted to abide by the terms to which its government has agreed.	他似乎认为，尽管更加一体化的欧元区毫无疑问令人渴望，但如果无法相信其中一个国家会遵守其政府所同意的条件，欧元区就无从实现进一步一体化。


Whatever Schäuble’s reasons, his proposal could have represented a way out for Greece, whose economy had been squeezed dry by austerity and whose banking system was already closed.	不管朔伊布勒的理由为何，他的方案代表了希腊的一条出路。 希腊经济已经被紧缩榨干，其银行体系也已经关门。


Immediate debt reduction and the recovery of economic sovereignty – even at the expense of exiting the euro, at least temporarily – would seem to have offered significant long-term benefits.	立刻获得债务减免和重获经济主权——即使以至少是暂时性地退出欧元区为代价——似乎提供了巨大的长期好处。


In a sense, it amounted to a golden opportunity, with Germany offering to pay for something that many believe Greece should be doing anyway.	从某种程度上讲，这是一个黄金机会，德国提出为某些许多人认为希腊无论如何应该做的事买单。


Nonetheless, the Greek government rejected an exit, and instead accepted the creditors’ tough terms.	尽管如此，希腊政府拒绝退出欧元区，而是接受了债权人的苛刻条件。


This suggests that, during the negotiations, Greece’s leaders were driven by more than economics.	这表明，在谈判期间，希腊领导人并不仅仅受到经济因素的推动。


Perhaps, contrary to popular belief, countries’ political attachment to Europe via the euro remains very strong, even where, as in Greece, people have endured unprecedented hardship since joining the monetary union.	也许与流行的观念相反，各国通过欧元实现欧洲归属的政治愿望仍十分强烈，即使希腊等国家的人民经历了加入货币联盟以来前所未有的困难。


The monetary union’s rationale, as many have noted, was always more political than economic.	如许多人所注意到的，货币联盟存在的理由永远是政治多于经济。


For precisely that reason, it may well be too early to write off the single currency.	正因如此，勾销单一货币还为时过早。


Why India is Riskier than China	为什么印度风险高于中国


NEW HAVEN – Today, fears are growing that China and India are about to be the next victims of the ongoing global economic carnage.	纽黑文——今天，中印两国将成为当前全球经济大屠杀下一个受害者的担忧正越来越强。


This would have enormous consequences.	这将产生严重的后果。


Asia’s developing and newly industrialized economies grew at an 8.5% average annual rate over 2010-11 – nearly triple the 3% growth elsewhere in the world.	亚洲发展中国家及新兴工业化经济体2010－2011年度经济平均年增长速度为8. 5%——接近世界其他地方3%的三倍之多。


If China and India are next to fall, Asia would be at risk, and it would be hard to avoid a global recession.	如果中印两国经济下滑，亚洲将会陷入危险之中，而且全球经济衰退也将很难避免。


In one important sense, these concerns are understandable: both economies depend heavily on the broader global climate.	从中印经济严重依赖于总体全球环境这个重要意义上，这样的担心是可以理解的。


China is sensitive to downside risks to external demand – more relevant than ever since crisis-torn Europe and the United States collectively accounted for 38% of total exports in 2010.	中国对外部需求的下行风险十分敏感——受危机蹂躏的欧洲和美国共同占据了2010年度出口总额的38%。


But India, with its large current-account deficit and external funding needs, is more exposed to tough conditions in global financial markets.	而印度则因其庞大的经常账户赤字和外部资金需求而更多地受到全球金融市场的影响。


Yet fears of hard landings for both economies are overblown, especially regarding China.	但是两国经济硬着陆的担忧被过分夸大，特别是关于中国。


Yes, China is paying a price for aggressive economic stimulus undertaken in the depths of the subprime crisis.	的确，中国正在为其在次贷危机中激进的经济刺激政策而付出代价。


The banking system funded the bulk of the additional spending, and thus is exposed to any deterioration in credit quality that may have arisen from such efforts.	大部分额外支出来自于银行系统，银行因此可能出现由上述措施所导致的信贷质量恶化。


There are also concerns about frothy property markets and mounting inflation.	此外还存在有关房地产市场泡沫化和通胀持续攀升的担忧。


While none of these problems should be minimized, they are unlikely to trigger a hard landing.	尽管上述任何问题都不容小觑，但它们引发经济硬着陆的可能性不大。


Long fixated on stability, Chinese policymakers have been quick to take preemptive action.	一直极端关注稳定的中国决策者已经迅速采取了预防性的行动。


That is particularly evident in Chinese officials’ successful campaign against inflation.	最明显的一点是中国官员已经成功将通胀控制住。


Administrative measures in the agricultural sector, aimed at alleviating supply bottlenecks for pork, cooking oil, fresh vegetables, and fertilizer, have pushed food-price inflation lower.	政府在农业部门采取了旨在缓解猪肉、食用油、蔬菜和化肥等供应瓶颈的行政措施，并成功控制了食品价格的上涨。


This is the main reason why the headline consumer inflation rate receded from 6.5% in July 2011 to 4.2% in November.	整体消费通胀率也因此从2011年7月的6. 5%下降到2011年11月的4.


Meanwhile, the People’s Bank of China, which hiked benchmark one-year lending rates five times in the 12 months ending this October, to 6.5%, now has plenty of scope for monetary easing should economic conditions deteriorate.	此外，中国人民银行在截止今年十月的12个月内将一年期贷款基准利率上调五倍至6. 5%，现在如果经济状况恶化，央行拥有足够的空间放松货币政策。


The same is true with mandatory reserves in the banking sector, where the government has already pruned 50 basis points off the record 21.5% required-reserve ratio.	银行业强制储备金率也是如此。 政府已将处于创纪录高点的21.


Relatively small fiscal deficits – only around 2% of GDP in 2010 – leave China with an added dimension of policy flexibility should circumstances dictate.	5%的强制准备金率调降了50个基点——如果情况需要，中国还拥有更大的政策灵活度。


Nor has China been passive with respect to mounting speculative excesses in residential property.	中国也对房地产愈演愈烈的过度投机采取了积极的对策。


In April 2010, it implemented tough new regulations, raising down-payments from 20% to 30% for a first home, to 50% for a second residence, and to 100% for purchases of three or more units.	2010年4月，中国实施了严厉的新政，将首次置业的首付比例从20%调高至30%，二次置业提高至50%，三次或更多次置业更是提高至100%。


This strategy appears to be working.	这项政策似乎收到了效果。


In November, house prices declined in 49 of the 70 cities that China monitors monthly.	11月，中国实行月度监控的70座城市中有49座出现了房价下降。


Moreover, it is a serious exaggeration to claim, as many do today, that the Chinese economy is one massive real-estate bubble.	此外，今年很多人宣称中国经济是一个巨大的房地产泡沫，这是一种严重夸张的说法。


Yes, total fixed investment is approaching an unprecedented 50% of GDP, but residential and nonresidential real estate, combined, accounts for only 15-20% of that – no more than 10% of the overall economy.	的确，全社会固定投资已前所未有地接近国内生产总值的50%，但住宅及非住宅投资合计仅占其中15－20%的份额——不超过经济总量的10%。


In terms of floor space, residential construction accounts for half of China’s real-estate investment.	具体到楼面面积，住宅建设占据了中国房地产投资的半壁江山。


Identifying the share of residential real estate that goes to private developers in the dozen or so first-tier cities (which account for most of the Chinese property market’s fizz) suggests that less than 1% of GDP would be at risk in the event of a housing-market collapse – not exactly a recipe for a hard landing.	清理十几座一线城市（占中国房地产市场泡沫的绝大部分）私营开发商开发的住宅地产表明，如果房地产市场陷入崩溃，仅有GDP的百分之一将会受到威胁——这并不会切实导致经济硬着陆。


As for Chinese banks, the main problem appears to be exposure to ballooning local-government debt, which, according to the government, totaled $1.7 trillion (roughly 30% of GDP) at the end of 2010.	至于中国的银行，主要问题似乎是地方政府债务膨胀带来的，根据政府数据，截止2010年底的地方政府债务总值达1. 7万亿美元（约占GDP30%的份额）。


Approximately half of this debt was on their books prior to the crisis.	大概近半数的政府债务是危机前遗留下来的。


Some of the new debt that resulted from the stimulus could well end up being impaired, but ongoing urbanization – around 15-20 million people per year move to cities – provides enormous support on the demand side for investment in infrastructure development and residential and commercial construction.	刺激政策导致的一些新增债务可能出现问题，但每年约1500－2000万人进城的持续城市化进程为基础设施开发和住宅及商业建设投资提供了需求方面的支撑。


That tempers the risks to credit quality and, along with relatively low loan-to-deposit ratios of around 65%, should cushion the Chinese banking system.	这些因素缓和了信贷质量的风险，加之65%左右的存贷比相对较低，应该可以为中国的银行系统提供必要的缓冲。


India is more problematic.	印度的问题相对严重。


As the only economy in Asia with a current-account deficit, its external funding problems can hardly be taken lightly.	作为亚洲唯一一个经常账户赤字的经济体，人们很难对它的外部融资问题掉以轻心。


Like China, India’s economic-growth momentum is ebbing.	和中国一样，印度的经济增长势头正在减弱。


But unlike China, the downshift is more pronounced – GDP growth fell through the 7% threshold in the third calendar-year quarter of 2011, and annual industrial output actually fell by 5.1% in October.	但和中国不同的是，印度的下降势头更为显著——2011年第三季度GDP增速低于7%的临界点，而10月年度工业总产值实际下降了5. 1%。


But the real problem is that, in contrast to China, Indian authorities have far less policy leeway.	但真正的问题是和中国相比，印度政府的政策回旋余地远没有那么大。


For starters, the rupee is in near free-fall.	首先，卢比几乎陷入了自由落体。


That means that the Reserve Bank of India – which has hiked its benchmark policy rate 13 times since the start of 2010 to deal with a still-serious inflation problem – can ill afford to ease monetary policy.	这意味着从2010年伊始就开始上调基准政策利率13倍以应对依然严重的通胀局面的印度储备银行很难切实放松货币政策。


Moreover, an outsize consolidated government budget deficit of around 9% of GDP limits India’s fiscal-policy discretion.	���外，政府综合大规模预算赤字占到GDP的9%左右，这严重限制了印度财政政策的自由。


While China is in better shape than India, neither economy is likely to implode on its own.	虽然中国的经济状况好于印度，但中印两国出现经济崩溃的可能性都不大。


It would take another shock to trigger a hard landing in Asia.  	如果没有进一步的经济冲击，亚洲地区不太可能出现经济硬着陆。


One obvious possibility today would be a disruptive breakup of the European Monetary Union.	今天，欧洲货币联盟破坏性解体的可能性是切实存在的。


In that case, both China and India, like most of the world’s economies, could find themselves in serious difficulty – with an outright contraction of Chinese exports, as in late 2008 and early 2009, and heightened external funding pressures for India.	如果这种情况真的发生，中印两国和绝大多数世界经济体可能将面临严重的困难——像2008年末及2009年初那样导致中国出口骤然减少和印度外部融资压力骤然增加。


While I remain a euro-skeptic, I believe that the political will to advance European integration will prevail.	虽然我仍对欧元持怀疑态度，但我相信推动欧洲融合的政治意愿将会占据上风。


Consequently, I attach a low probability to the currency union’s disintegration.	因此，我认为货币联盟解体的可能性不大。


Barring such a worst-case outcome for Europe, the odds of a hard landing in either India or China should remain low.	如果欧洲不出现这种最坏结果，那么印度或中国经济硬着陆的几率应该不大。


Seduced by the political economy of false prosperity, the West has squandered its might.	在政治经济虚假繁荣的引诱下，西方国家白白浪费了自己的力量。


Driven by strategy and stability, Asia has built on its newfound strength.	而在战略及稳定的驱动下，亚洲国家的力量却得到了加强。


But now it must reinvent itself.	但现在亚洲必须实现自我重塑。


Japanese-like stagnation in the developed world is challenging externally dependent Asia to shift its focus to internal demand.	发达国家出现的日本式停滞正在挑战依赖外部需求的亚洲转向依赖内部需求。


Downside pressures currently squeezing China and India underscore that challenge.	正在挤压中国和印度的下行压力凸显了这一挑战。


Asia’s defining moment could be hand.	亚洲正面临决定性的时刻。


Why is China Booming?	中国为什么会经历繁荣？


Providence, R.I.  – China is now celebrating the 30th anniversary of the period officially known as “reform and opening.”	普罗维登斯，罗得岛——中国正在庆祝被官方称之为“改革开放”的30周年纪念日。


Labeling time in this way echoes China’s imperial history.	以这种方式来标注时间映射出中国的帝国历史。


During moments of political transition – a military victory, for example – the emperor might designate a special “era name” to help celebrate the good news.	在政治转型期——比如一场军事胜利——皇帝也许会指定一个特殊的“年号”来帮助庆祝这个好消息。


Or the court might test out a new era name after a political debacle, in an effort to wipe the slate clean.	一次政治崩溃后，朝廷也可能会尝试使用新的年号，以便把过去所犯下的错误一笔勾销。


The last emperor of the Tang Dynasty proclaimed seven era names in fourteen years, as he sought in vain to “re-brand” his reign and avoid his regime’s demise.	唐朝最后一位皇帝在14年中公布了7个年号，徒劳无益地试图重新评价自己的统治，避免政权走向衰亡。


Deng Xiaoping began to champion “reform and opening” in 1978.	1978年，邓小平开始了“改革开放”。


“Reform” suggested a loosening of central controls on economic life, undertaken in a spirit of pragmatism and gradualism, as an antidote to Mao Zedong’s ideology of “revolution.”	“改革”是指本着实事求是、按部就班的原则，放松中央对经济生活的管制，以矫正毛泽东的“革命”理念。


Similarly, “opening” heralded the PRC’s integration into the world community – especially the capitalist West.	与此相似，“开放”则预示着中华人民共和国与国际社会——特别是西方资本主义社会融为一体。


Deng’s principles still guide policy today.	邓的原则直到今天还在发挥着政策指导作用。


One must go back to the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) and its 60-year era of “heavenly flourishing” ( Qianlong ) in the eighteenth century to find a comparable period of coherent political and economic policy.	必须回顾满清王朝（1644-1912）及其在18世纪长达60年的“天朝繁荣”（乾隆）才能找到与之相媲美的连贯的政治和经济政策。


The era of “reform and opening” has outlived its “emperor” by more than a decade, and has been the common thread running through transfers of political authority from Deng to Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.	“改革开放”年代在“始作俑者”逝世后的10多年仍然生机勃勃，而且在从邓到江泽民再到胡锦涛的政治权力更替中成为一根贯穿始终的主线。


Even the largest popular challenge the Chinese Communist Party ever faced, the demonstrations of 1989, now looks like a blip that helped Deng consolidate support for his model of development.	即便是中国共产党有史以来面对的最大的民意挑战——1989年游行，现在看起来也更像是帮助邓巩固对其发展模式支持的一个标记。


If one factor undergirds China’s commitment to “reform and opening,” it is the extraordinary macroeconomic changes of the past 30 years.	如果有一种因素巩固了中国“改革开放”的决心，那就是过去30年来所发生的异乎寻常的宏观经济变化。


In China, people call it fazhan , or “development,” but in much of rest of the world, it is more commonly described simply as the “China Boom,” or the “China Miracle.”	中国人把它叫做发展，也就是“development”，但世界其他国家更普遍地称之为“中国繁荣”，也有人称之为“中国奇迹”。


The boom began in the countryside in the late 1970’s and 1980’s, and was followed by today’s urban, industrial-led growth.	繁荣于20世纪70年代末到80年代始于乡下，随之而来的就是今天以工业为主导的城市发展。


Indeed, there have been many smaller “booms” – in consumption, foreign direct investment, domestic stock markets, trade, travel, overseas study, military modernization, and international diplomacy.	事实上，在消费、国外直接投资、国内股票市场、贸易、旅游、海外留学、军事现代化和国际外交等领域，同样经历了许多小规模的“繁荣”。


There is also a boom in pollution and toxic waste, and booming interest in religion – from Buddhism to Pentecostal Christianity – and in Confucian philosophy.	污染和有毒废物排放也大为增长，同样大涨的还有人们对宗教的兴趣——从佛教到基督教——还有孔子的儒家哲学。


Little in China today speaks of moderation.	今天的中国很少谈及“克制”二字。


A leading fashion industry executive argues that a key engine driving the economic boom has been the influx of women into the workforce, particularly in the manufacturing zones of the south.	一位影响颇大的时尚业主管声称：驱动经济繁荣的关键因素是妇女涌入劳动大军，特别是南方的制造业领域。


Another compelling explanation comes from a venture capitalist who credits Chinese society with copious reserves of entrepreneurial energy that derives, he believes, from the fact that Chinese culture attaches very little shame to failing in a business enterprise.	另外一个有说服力的解释来自一位冒险资本家，他认为中国社会充满了创业能量的丰富储备，而在他看来，这些能量储备都源自于中国文化对创业失败几乎不加任何羞辱的事实。


High tolerance for failure keeps everybody striving to succeed.	对失败的高度包容使得所有人都为成功而拼命努力。


Whatever the cause, the boom seems an unlikely capstone to a century of war, ferment, and revolution, and only adds to the sense of discontinuity that characterizes modern China.	无论原因如何，繁荣都似乎是一个世纪战争、动乱和革命之后难以达到的顶点，因此只会加重现代中国留给人们的缺乏连贯性的印象。


Certainly, few observers looking in 1978 at the smoldering embers of the Cultural Revolution, or at the seeming ruination of the post-1989 years, thought China would emerge as the lightning rod of the world’s developmental hopes.	勿庸置疑，几乎没有研究1978年文革余烬、以及1989年后表面上看去是一片废墟的观察人士认为中国将擎起世界发展希望的火炬。


Paradoxically, the apparently discontinuous and contradictory nature of the “era of reform and opening” may actually help explain how China’s boom came about.	自相矛盾的是，“改革开放时代”看上去充满矛盾且缺乏持续性的特色实际上却有助于解释中国的繁荣从何而来。


The tumult of the Maoist period instilled in a broad cross-section of people a profound appreciation for stability, and a yearning to be left alone.	动荡的毛泽东时代使得许多人对稳定有着深刻的渴望，对自由有着异乎寻常的向往。


Deng capitalized on this revolution-weariness by diminishing the role of politics and the state in people’s private lives and freeing them to release their pent-up energy to pursue their own goals.	邓利用了人们这种厌恶革命的情绪，限制了政治和国家在人们私生活中所发挥的作用，释放了人们压抑已久的能量，鼓励他们追求自己的目标。


Revolutionary communism may well have cleared the path for the boom in other ways as well, suggesting that the shift from socialist utopianism to capitalist pragmatism was less a U-turn than a sequential process of “creative destruction.”	革命共产主义很可能也以其他的方式为繁荣铺平了道路，表明从社会乌托邦主义到资本实用主义的转变与其说是反向逆转还不如说是“扼杀创造力”的后续进程。


After all, Mao’s Cultural Revolution against “feudal society” did raze much of the cultural landscape, denuding it not only of traditional values and institutions, but also of failed socialist efforts, leaving China ready for the seeds of capitalist development.	归根结底，毛针对“封建社会”的文化大革命的确将传统文化夷为平地，不仅毁灭了传统的价值观和制度，也抹去了失败的社会努力，为资本主义发展的种子播撒进中国这片沃土做好了准备。


Mao’s revolution fueled countless rectification movements and campaigns that inverted the once-inviolate primacy of ruler over ruled, scholar over worker, husband over wife, father over son, and family over individual.	毛的革命催生了无数修正运动，逆转了从前从未受到过侵犯的统治者对被统治者、学者对工人、丈夫对妻子、父亲对儿子和家庭对个人的主导地位。


By the time of the reforms of the 1980’s and 1990’s, bonds tying individuals to culture, the state, the work unit, and household-registration systems, for example, had largely unraveled.	到20世纪八九十年代改革之时，将个人捆绑在文化、国家、单位和户口登记制度上的束缚在很大程度上已经不复存在。


The path had been cleared for a vast new population of atomized entrepreneurs and laborers, freed from fealty to family and Party, to storm the marketplace with newly liberated individual energy.	摆在大量新增个人企业主和劳工面前的障碍已经扫清，摆脱了家庭和政党责任的束缚，中国民众以刚刚解放出来的个人力量横扫市场。


Of course, the boom’s costs should not be discounted.	当然，繁荣所付出的代价也不能忽略不计。


Environmental damage has been staggering, the gap between rich and poor has been growing, and urbanization – with all its attendant problems – has surged.	对环境的损害一直如影随形，富人和穷人之间的差距也越拉越大，而与城市化相伴而生的问题——也变得日益严重。


And, at least so far, the boom has not induced the systemic political changes for which many hoped.	而且，至少到目前为止，繁荣还未能带来许多人所期盼的系统性政治变革。


But still, a key question remains unanswered: why did China’s boom happen?	即便如此，一个关键性的问题仍然需要解答：那就是为什么会出现中国的繁荣？


This is one of the great questions of our time, relevant not only to China’s future, but to scores of other developing countries enthralled by China’s extraordinary, but still largely unexplained, success.	这是我们这个时代的一个伟大的疑问，它不仅关系到中国的未来，而且也关系到为中国异乎寻常、但仍然在很大程度上难以解释的成功所着迷的几十个发展中国家的未来。


Why is China Lashing Out?	中国为何发飙？


NEW YORK – It must be galling for the Chinese government to keep seeing Nobel Prizes go to the wrong Chinese.	发自纽约---眼看着诺贝尔奖一次次落入错误的中国人之手，中国政府一定感到怒不可遏吧。


The first wrong Chinese was Gao Xingjian, a critical playwright, artist, and novelist, who received the Nobel Prize for literature in 2000, while living in exile in Paris.	翻开诺贝尔奖的历史，第一位获奖的错误中国人是著名剧作家，艺术家和小说家高行健，他在2000年获得了诺贝尔文学奖，当时他正在巴黎过着流亡的日子。


The latest is Liu Xiaobo, a literary critic and political writer, who was awarded this year’s Nobel Prize for Peace while serving a prison sentence for “subversion” of the Communist regime.	最近的一位则是政治评论家和作家刘晓波，他是今年的和平奖得主，因被判“颠覆”国家政权罪而身陷牢狱。


Since the Dalai Lama is not a Chinese citizen, I will leave out his Nobel Peace Prize, though to China’s rulers it was perhaps the most irritating of all.	鉴于达赖喇嘛不是中国公民，尽管他的得奖是最让中国政府不可容忍的，但我还是没有把他计算在内。


Yet the Chinese government’s response to Liu’s Nobel Prize has been extraordinary.	不过，对刘晓波的获奖，中国政府这回的反应还是有点不同寻常。


Instead of a show of lofty disdain, or official silence, it made a colossal fuss, protesting fiercely about plots to undermine China, and putting dozens of prominent Chinese intellectuals, including Liu’s wife, Liu Xia, under house arrest.	有别于以往蔑视或保持官方沉默的态度，它这回显得极度震惊，强烈抗议这一破坏中国的阴谋，并悍然软禁了数十名国内著名知识分子，其中包括刘晓波的妻子刘霞。


As a result, the utterly powerless, hitherto quite obscure Liu Xiaobo, has become not only world famous, but much better known inside China, too.	结果名不经传又没什么影响力的刘晓波不仅蜚声国际，也为中国国内所家喻户晓了。


Combine this with China’s bullying of Japan, by blocking the export of rare-earth metals vital for Japanese industry, over a few uninhabited islands between Taiwan and Okinawa, and its refusal to let the renminbi appreciate, and one must wonder why China is being so heavy-handed in its foreign relations.	把这件事与在台湾和冲绳之间几个无人小岛的主权问题上以禁止作为日本工业命脉的稀土出口来要挟日本，以及拒绝人民币升值等事件放在一起来看，人们一定会疑惑中国为什么突然采取如此笨拙的外交手段。


These strong-arm tactics stand out even more against the deftness of Chinese diplomacy over the last few decades.	这种铁腕策略明显地违背了中国在过去几十年里一直坚守的灵活外交。


Japan, the old wartime enemy, has been outmaneuvered repeatedly, and a soft touch made South Koreans and Southeast Asians feel relatively comfortable with China’s increasing power.	正是凭借这种灵活的外交手法，中国才使得日本这个战争年代的对手一直处于外交下风，也让韩国和东南亚各国接受了其崛起。


But China’s recent thuggish behavior is changing Asian opinions.	但是，中国现在这种来势汹汹的态度正引起亚洲的警觉。


As the warm welcome given to Hillary Clinton on her recent swing through Asia – even in communist Vietnam – appears to show, Southeast Asians are more than happy to hang on to Pax Americana for a bit longer, out of fear of China.	正如希拉里新近在亚洲（甚至在越南）巡回访问所受到的热烈欢迎所显示，出于对中国崛起的恐惧，东南亚乐于在美国治下的和平待久一点。


Other Asian countries might even be drawn closer to Japan, the only alternative to the US as a counterbalance to the Middle Kingdom.	其他亚洲国家则只能别无选择地更亲近日本，因为它是除美国之外唯一能与中土王朝抗衡的国家。


This cannot be what China wants.	这些当然都不是中国所愿看到的。


So why is China being so severe?	至此，我们不禁要问，为什么中国要如此强势？


One possible explanation is that China is a little drunk on its new great-power status.	一种解释是中国面对其新获得的大国地位有点昏了头。


For the first time in almost 200 years, China can really throw its weight around, and it will do what it wants, regardless of what other countries may think.	在差不多200多年的时间里，中国第一次尝到能够真正地展现它影响力的甜头，它将无视他国的看法而为所欲为。


A few decades ago, it was Japan that thought it was going to be Number One, and its businessmen, politicians, and bureaucrats were not shy about letting the rest of the world know.	几十年前，那时的日本也认为自己是世界第一，它的商人，政治家和官员也禁不住向世界各国耀武扬威。


Call China’s recent actions revenge for a century of humiliation by stronger powers.	同理，我们也可以把中国最近的蛮横看作是用强权对百年屈辱的报复。


But this may not be the best explanation for China’s behavior.	不过，我觉得这不是对中国最近行为最好的解释。


In fact, the reason may be just the opposite: a sense among China’s rulers of weakness at home.	事实上，真正的原因可能正好是这个解释的反面：中国统治者感到在国内统治的衰弱。


At least since 1989, the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party’s monopoly on power has been fragile.	至少从1989年开始，中国共产党独裁的合法性就已经变得很脆弱了。


Communist ideology is a spent force.	共产主义意识形态已是明日黄花。


Using the People’s Liberation Army to murder civilian protesters, not only in Beijing, but all over China in June 1989, further undermined the one-party system’s legitimacy.	1989年6月，人民解放军在北京及去全国各地残杀异见人士的恶劣行径进一步削弱了一党专制的基础。


The way to regain the support of the burgeoning Chinese middle class was to promise a quick leap to greater prosperity through high-speed economic growth.	为了挽回新兴中产阶级的支持，共产党许诺将通过高速经济发展向集体富裕大步迈进。


The ideological vacuum left by the death of Marxist orthodoxy was filled with nationalism.	由于对马克思主义信仰的幻灭而带来的意识形态真空被民族主义所填补。


And nationalism in China, promoted through schools, mass media, and “patriotic” monuments and museums, means one thing: only the firm rule of the CCP will prevent foreigners, especially Westerners and the Japanese, from humiliating Chinese ever again.	而中国通过学校，大众媒体以及“爱国”纪念碑和博物馆所宣扬的民族主义，其核心只有一条：只有在中国共产的领导下，才能避免外国，特别是西方和日本，羞辱中国的历史重演。


This is why anyone, even a relatively unknown intellectual like Liu Xiaobo, who challenges the legitimacy of Communist Party rule by demanding multi-party elections, must be crushed.	这就是为什么任何挑战共产党统治的合法性，提倡多党制的人，即便如刘晓波这样鲜为人知的学者，都必须被打倒。


It is why the government does not dare to let the renminbi appreciate too fast, lest economic growth slow, causing the Party loses face and legitimacy.	这也是为什么中国政府不敢让人民币升值太快的原因，避免经济衰退，导致共产党没面子和丧失统治地位。