Nuclear weapons, components, and materials in a region that is already volatile and violent, and that determines the world’s oil prices, is an appalling scenario.	一个本已如此动荡并充满着暴力的区域中遍布核武器及其组件、材料，并左右着世界油价，这堪称一个骇人听闻的情景。


The market has already taken the measure of the past week’s tensions, driving up the price of some oil contracts to their highest levels in eight months.	市场也已经对上周的紧张局势做出的反应，某些石油合约价格已经飙升到了8个星期以来的最高位。


Trying to force Iran to back down with steadily mounting sanctions has not produced results.	尝试用不断加码的制裁去压服伊朗并没有收到什么效果。


Despite the tightening economic noose – the US imposed sanctions on all companies that do business with Iran’s central bank, and the European Union plans to impose sanctions on Iranian oil exports by the end of January – many nuclear experts now estimate that Iran is very close to enriching enough uranium to build a bomb.	虽然套在伊朗脖子上的经济枷锁不断加重——美国对所有与伊朗中央银行做生意的企业进行制裁，而欧盟也计划从一月底开始制裁伊朗石油出口——许多核专家如今却估计伊朗就快浓缩得到足以制造一枚核弹的铀了。


But how else can the US, the EU, and the United Nations make clear that the “international community” means what it says?	但美国，欧盟和联合国又该如何才能表明“国际社会”是说话算话的呢？


To go soft now is to lose all credibility with respect not only to Iran, but also to any other country thinking about pursuing a nuclear path.	如果现在态度软化的话，那不仅伊朗会看不起它们，其他那些拥有核武野心的国家也不会再听话了。


The logic is compelling enough, except that the current course leaves Iran’s government no alternative between publicly backing down, which it will not do, and escalating its provocations.	虽然这个事件的整个逻辑已经足够有说服力了，但却遗漏了一点：当前的进程使得伊朗政府走投无路，只能从公开服软——这显然不可能——或者进一步挑衅之间选择。


After all, what government wants to be seen as “chickening out”?	试问有哪个政府希望被视为“临阵脱逃”？


And, in this case, decision-makers on both sides face domestic opponents who are only too ready to pounce at the least sign of weakness.	同时在这个事件中，双方的政策制定者都面临着国内反对派的压力，哪怕有一丝服软的迹象，就会遭到政敌的穷追猛打。


In the US, the Republican Party’s leading presidential candidate in this year’s election, Mitt Romney, declared at a recent debate, “If you elect me as President, Iran will not have a nuclear weapon.”	在美国，排名领先的共和党总统候选人米特•罗姆尼在最近一场辩论中声明：“如果你选我为总统，伊朗就不可能拥有核武器。


His principal challenger, Rick Santorum, told NBC News that he would “order air strikes” if it “became clear that [Iran] was going to get nuclear weapons.”	”而他的主要对手里克•桑托勒姆则在接受美国国家广播公司（NBC）采访时说“如果明确知道（伊朗）即将拥有核武器”，他会“下令空袭”。


So this is no time for President Barack Obama to go wobbly.	因此留给总统奥巴马来举棋不定的时间也不多了。


Iranian politics is much harder to read.	而伊朗的政治形势则更加难以解读。


In the ongoing power struggle between President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, each is more likely to out-tough the other than to propose concessions to the West.	在总统内贾德和最高精神领袖哈梅内伊的权力斗争中，双方都想表现得比对方更强硬，而不是向西方提出妥协。


Moreover, many Iranian analysts point out that Khamenei and his inner circle are convinced that the US is ultimately bent on regime change – and is willing to use force to achieve it.	此外许多伊朗分析家都指出哈梅内伊以其同党都坚信美国是想颠覆伊朗政权——甚至愿意动用武力。


Hence Iranian missile tests, threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, and announcements of nuclear progress should be read as efforts to deter more than provoke.	因此伊朗的导弹试射，封锁霍尔木兹海峡的威胁，还有核计划进展的声明都应该被视为一种遏制而非激怒的手段。


The more publicly the West threatens Iran, the more easily Iranian leaders can portray America as the Great Satan to parts of the Iranian population that have recently been inclined to see the US as their friend.	西方越是公开威胁伊朗，伊朗领导人就越容易在那些最近倾向于视美国为友的伊朗人面前将美国人描述成邪恶的撒旦。


The net effect is to keep Iran speeding down the road toward a crash.	而两者叠加之下的净效应就是伊朗在通往碰撞的路上不断加速。


It is time for cooler heads to prevail with a strategy that helps Iran step back.	这也是时候采取更为冷静的思维并推动一个有助于令伊朗让步的策略。


The key players here are Brazil and Turkey, whose governments negotiated an ill-timed deal with Iran in May 2011, whereby Iran would transfer 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium to Turkey in exchange for 1,200 kilograms of medium-enriched uranium for medical research at a Tehran reactor.	而其中的关键参与者则是巴西和土耳其，两国在2011年五月曾试图与伊朗达成了一个不合时宜的交易，让伊朗用1200公斤低浓缩铀向土耳其换取同等重量的中度浓缩铀供德黑兰一个反应堆进行医学研究。


That deal quickly fell apart, but it could be time to try again.	那场交易虽然很快破裂了，但如今却迎来再次尝试的时机。


The stage is already set in Turkey, which agreed on January 6 to host a new round of nuclear talks between Iran and the 5+1 group (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council + Germany).	会场已经在土耳其设置完毕，该国也已经在1月6日同意承办一场伊朗与5+1集团（五大常任理事国+德国）之间的新一轮核谈判。


A new deal would probably have to go beyond the swap proposed in May 2011, but there are other possibilities.	一个新的协议或许必须超越2011年五月提出的那份交换协议，但依然存在其他的可能性。


For example, add Egypt and Qatar to the equation and bring in the UN to provide an umbrella for a proposed regional nuclear-fuel bank, to which Iran would make the first contribution.	比如将埃及和卡塔尔纳入会谈并让联合国提供建立一个区域性核燃料银行的保底承诺，并将伊朗设为该银行的第一个赞助者。


Bring in South Korea (a major customer for Iranian oil) and Russia and begin exploring options for a global fuel bank.	将韩国这个伊朗石油的主要买家以及俄罗斯拉进会谈并尝试构建一个全球核燃料银行。


And ensure that all countries in the region reaffirm the basic rules of freedom of navigation in a way that allows them to claim vindication.	同时还要保证该区域所有国家都能重申自由航行权的基本原则，并以一种允许它们提交辩护的方式。


Where the political will exists to allow the other side sufficient margin to reach an agreement, creative solutions can be found.	而只要有了让另一方拥有足够政治余地去达成协议的政治意愿，就能产生创造性的方案。


Still, diplomats know that war can be preferable to humiliation, which is why saving face is just as important as threatening force – and why other countries should step in and provide the room that both sides need to avoid a head-on collision.	但外交官们也知道战争要比丢脸更好，这也是为何维护面子跟武力威胁同样重要的原因——也是为何其他国家必须介入并提供某些空间，以免双方迎头相撞的原因。


Saving France, Saving Europe	救法国，救欧洲


PARIS – The face of French politics changed dramatically in May and June.	发自巴黎——法国政治的面目在今年五六月间发生了剧变。


First, after 17 years of center-right presidents, François Hollande, a Socialist, was elected.	首先，在历经17年中右翼总统执政后，社会党总统弗朗索瓦·奥朗德粉墨登场。


Then, a month later, a center-left majority took control of the National Assembly, too, after ten years of right-wing domination.	一个月后，中左翼多数派接着夺取了右翼势力把持10年之久的国民议会控制权。


Meanwhile, the Senate, the French parliament’s upper house, a conservative bastion between the two world wars and ever since, swung to a Socialist majority for the first time in history at the end of 2011.	与此同时，法国参议院（法国立法机关由参议院和国民议会两院组成）这座在两次大战之间以及战后时期一直牢不可破的保守派壁垒也在2011年年末有史以来第一次落入了社会党多数派之手。


The Socialists also control 20 of France’s 22 regional governments, a majority of the presidencies of the Departments, and most cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants. In short, we are now witnessing a stunning concentration of power that is unprecedented in French republican history.	社会党人同时还控制了法国22个大区政府中的20个，把持着政府里大多数部门的最高领导权，还掌控了3万人以上规模城市政府中的绝大多数。


All of this occurred very peacefully, with no wave of triumphalism, or even much enthusiasm.	所有这一切都发生得相当平静，没有出现大规模庆祝活动，甚至没有表现出太大的热情。


Indeed, the abstention rate for a presidential election had never been higher before the contest between Hollande and Nicolas Sarkozy.	而事实上，总统大选的投票率在这场奥朗德和萨科齐的比拼中达到了一个历史性的最低位。


France’s profound political shift reflects the persistence of the economic crisis that began in 2008.	法国政治的深刻转换反映了2008年爆发的经济危机依然阴魂不散。


French electors did not vote for a dream.	法国选民并未能为梦想投下一票。


The Socialist Party’s program and its presidential candidate’s campaign promises were considerably less ambitious than they were in 1981, when François Mitterrand was elected.	社会党的政纲及其总统候选人的竞选承诺都被认为是比1981年弗朗索瓦·密特朗胜选时更加缺乏野心。


As a result, the campaign was quiet, almost cautious.	于是乎，整场选举都相当平静，近乎有点小心翼翼。


Indeed, most candidates, notably Sarkozy and Hollande, might have been too cautious: the current crisis and possible future threats received little emphasis, which means that it may be difficult for Hollande to claim a mandate for any painful reforms that he will have to propose.	事实上大多数候选人，尤其是萨科齐和奥朗德，可能都有点太过谨慎了：他们都很少提及当前的危机以及未来可能出现的威胁，而这也意味着如果奥朗德必须要推动一场痛苦改革的话，可能都难以理直气壮地说自己是代表着人民的意愿行事。


And now there is no escape from the difficult reality that the budget deficit remains massive, at more than 4% of GDP in 2011.	而如今也面临着无法逃避一个严峻的事实：2011年的预算赤字依然庞大，规模约为GDP的4%。


Except for creating 60,000 new jobs in education (following controversial cuts last year) and restoring the right (rescinded under Sarkozy) to retire at 60 for roughly 200,000 individuals, Hollande’s administration has barely any room to maneuver, and severe economic measures will have to be introduced in the 2013 budget.	除了在教育界新增了6000个职位（在去年的争议极大的裁员之后）以及恢复了近20万人（由萨科齐废除的）60岁退休权以外，奥朗德政府的腾挪空间近乎用尽，必须在2013年预算案中实施严厉的经济手段。 。


Moreover, France’s rapidly worsening foreign-trade deficit is boosting already-excessive debt levels, while output is falling and unemployment is rising.	此外，法国迅速恶化的外贸逆差也在不断推高业已超标的负债水平，同时社会生产力不断下降，失业率却逐步攀升。


Unfit for modern markets, France’s tax system actually stifles the country’s businesses, reflected in a disturbing increase in bankruptcies among small and medium-size companies.	中小型企业破产数量增加的苦恼现状也反映出与现代市场不相适应的法国税务体系正在扼杀本国商业。


In such conditions, France urgently needs to restore and maintain economic growth, and should seek to coordinate its policies with those of other eurozone member countries.	在这种情况下，法国急需恢复并保持经济增长，并应当与其他欧元区成员国寻求政策协调。


After all, because most of the eurozone’s 17 member states suffer from heavy debt burdens, they are all anxious to find fiscally responsible ways to promote growth.	毕竟17个欧元区成员国中的绝大多数都背负着沉重债务负担，都渴望寻找一些在财政上可靠的方式去推动增长。


Unfortunately, the eurozone’s institutions lack the powers needed to defend the monetary union effectively.	但不幸的是，欧元区体制缺少所需的权力去有效维护这个货币联盟。


Greek debt amounts to less than 2% of European GDP.	希腊债务仅相当于全欧GDP的2%。


Had the European Central Bank been entitled to deploy enough firepower when the Greek crisis first erupted, the threat would have lasted only two hours.	如果当初危机初露端倪时能授权欧洲中央银行动用足够资金去灭火的话，整场威胁的持续时间估计不会超过两小时。


Instead, it took three weeks to grant the ECB only partial authorization to act, causing speculation to take hold and spread to Portuguese, Spanish, and Italian debt, thereby jeopardizing the euro’s survival.	但这个过程却花费了3个星期时间，仅授予了部分的行动权，并因此危害了欧元的生存。


Removing the risk of a euro implosion – which, given massive global imbalances, derivatives markets run amok, and the colossal scale of America’s budget deficit, could catalyze a major international crash – presupposes two fundamental changes in Europe.	考虑到全球的极端不平衡现象，腥风血雨的金融衍生品市场，以及美国的巨额预算赤字都可能引发一场全球性危机——解除欧元内部崩溃的风险意味着要在欧洲推行两场根本性的变革。


The first is political and involves sovereignty: Full European solidarity can be achieved only through stronger fiscal and monetary federalism, which would enable the eurozone to act, despite minority dissent.	其一是政治上的，与主权有关：欧洲的全面团结只能通过更强大的财政和货币联邦主义来实现，这能令欧元区在存在少数反对声音的情况下可以有所行动。


Europe has succeeded in missing this goal for a half-century; now it has no choice but to shoot straight.	欧洲在半个世纪以来一直都未能实现这一目标； 如今他们已经别无选择，只能埋头前进。


The second change involves economic doctrine.	第二个改变则与经济行为准则有关。


If markets self-correct, they do so only when defaults are registered and punished.	如果市场能自我纠正的话，这也只它们的债务违约行为被记录在案并遭到惩罚之后的事情。


But countries and their public services cannot default without inflicting severe pain on entire populations.	但各国及其公共服务都无法在避免全国人民遭受极大痛苦的情况下进行违约。


Europe urgently needs an economic doctrine that, despite today’s deficits, preserves funding for the investments and research that promote growth. Here, Germany’s leaders, in particular, need convincing.	欧洲急需一个经济行为准则，可以在如今出现违约的情况下依然能为推动增长的投资和研究保存所需的资金。


Hollande, backed by Spain and Italy, accomplished a small step in that direction at June’s European Union summit, which finally endorsed the idea of a banking union.	在西班牙和意大利的支持下，奥朗德在今年六月的欧盟峰会上朝这个方向迈进了一小步，最终表态支持成立一个银行联盟的理念。


It is only the beginning, but Europe must start somewhere.	这虽然只是一个开始，但欧洲必须开始有所行动。


So must France, whose great concerns can be resolved solely within the EU – and only if the EU carries out the essential political and economic changes that all of its members need.	法国这个可以在欧盟内部单独解决其极大忧虑的国家也必须如此，而对欧盟来说，只有其承担了所有成员国所需的必需政治和经济改革之后，忧虑才能得到缓解。


Saving Freedom of Movement in Europe	拯救欧洲的迁徙自由


MUNICH – According to a YouGov opinion poll conducted on the day of the referendum on the United Kingdom’s membership in the European Union, migration was the single most important issue for “Leave” supporters, second only to a general preference for independence itself.	慕尼黑—据YouGov在英国欧盟成员资格公投当天进行的民调数据，移民是“脱欧”支持者认为的最重要的问题，仅次于对独立本身的普遍偏好。


But those who consider Brexit voters xenophobic misunderstand the nature of the problem.	但认为脱欧阵营仇外的人误解了问题的性质。


Thanks to the Commonwealth, the UK is one of the most open-minded countries in the world.	拜联邦（Commonwealth）政体所赐，英国是世界上心态最开放的国家之一。


Accusing the British, of all people, of being xenophobic is absurd.	指责全体英国人民都仇外是荒谬的。


In reality, the referendum’s outcome reflects legitimate criticism of the EU’s design, which is largely based on open borders toward the outside world and a combination of freedom of movement and the so-called inclusion principle for EU citizens.	在现实中，公投的结果反映了对欧盟的设计的合理批评。 欧盟的设计主要基于向外部世界开放边境以及自由迁徙和所谓的内部包容原则的结合。


The EU should use this British no-confidence vote as an opportunity to change its migration rules fundamentally.	欧盟应该将此次英国的失去信心公投视为一次从根本上改变其移民规则的机会。


Former UK Prime Minister David Cameron was right to request more concessions in restricting the social inclusion of needy EU citizens.	英国前首相卡梅伦要求在限制欧盟公民自由迁徙的问题上获得更多让步，这是正确的。


And, in its own interest, the EU should now implement what Cameron demanded: delayed integration of migrant EU workers into host countries’ welfare systems.	而从自身利益出发，欧盟现在也应该实施卡梅伦所要求的措施：延迟欧盟移民工人进入东道国福利体系的时间。


If the EU doesn’t eliminate the current welfare magnet, it will disintegrate, because the migration issue is the most important for citizens in much of the Union.	如果欧盟不取消当前的福利诱惑，就会分崩离析，因为移民问题对于欧盟大部分地区的人民来说是最重要的问题。


Political parties that deny this are in for a nasty shock.	否认这一点的政党将自取灭亡。


The fundamental problem is an intractable trilemma.	根本问题是一个棘手的三重困境。


It is impossible to meet all of the following EU goals: internal freedom of movement, a welfare state, and inclusion of migrants in host countries’ welfare systems.	欧盟的以下目标不可能同时满足：内部迁徙自由、福利国家和让移民融入东道国福利体系。


Today, a EU citizen who moves to another EU country will be integrated into the social-welfare system very quickly.	今天，一位迁徙到另一个欧盟国家的欧盟公民很快就能纳入社会福利体系。


Those who are unable to work are fully entitled to tax-financed welfare benefits after five years at the latest.	没有工作能力的人最多只需要五年就可以完整地获得税收融资的福利。


Earlier access is a matter of national law, and in some cases of jurisdiction.	早先是否能够获得福利是一个国际法问题，在某些情况下是一个司法管辖权问题。


In Germany, according to a decision by the Federal Social Court of Germany, EU citizens who seek employment but don’t find any are entitled after only half a year to Hartz IV (unemployment and welfare) benefits, free health insurance, and rent payments for housing classified as adequate.	在德国，据联邦社会法院的一项裁决，寻求就业但没有找到任何工作的欧盟公民立刻可以获得哈茨IV（Hratz IV，失业和福利）保障、免费的医疗保险和适当住房资金。


They are also entitled to child benefits for all children, and if they find work, even if the children still live in their home countries in the care of their grandparents.	他们的所有孩子都能获得儿童福利，即使他们仍然生活在母国，由祖父母照顾。


Those who are self-employed are immediately entitled to supplementary Hartz IV benefits, housing allowance, and the child benefit (which, for a family with five children, is €1,018 ($1,335) per month – more than twice the net salary of an average worker in Bulgaria or Romania.)	自由职业者立刻就可以获得补充性哈茨IV保障、住房津贴和儿童福利（有五个孩子的家庭每月可获1,010欧元，远高于保加利亚或罗马尼亚的平均工人净工资。 ）


If unchanged, the rules of access to national welfare systems will erode the EU’s welfare states, because the most generous countries will increasingly bear the burden of poverty mitigation.	如果不做出改变，国家福利体系准入规则将动摇欧盟福利国家，因为最慷慨的国家将越来越多地承担贫困移民的负担。


The better-developed welfare states to which the poor flock may then find themselves in a ruinous deterrence competition, with local populations taking to the streets to defend “their” benefits.	穷人竞相涌入的较发达福利国家将陷入一场毁灭性的威慑竞争（deterrence competition），本地人口将涌上街头捍卫“他们的”福利。


This outcome can be prevented only by restricting either freedom of movement or the inclusion principle.	要想阻止这一结果，要么限制自由迁徙，要么限制包容原则。


So the EU must acknowledge the tradeoff between the welfare state’s quality, freedom of movement, and inclusion, and it must decide which can be sacrificed.	因此，欧盟必须承认，在福利国家的质量、自由迁徙和包容之间存在一个权衡，并且它必须决定牺牲哪一个。


The best option would be to restrict the inclusion principle for EU migrants, because reducing the size and scope of the welfare state would fuel social instability.	最佳选择是限制欧盟移民的包容原则，因为缩减福利国家的规模和范畴将导致社会动荡。


And restricting mobility would mean violating one of the EU’s fundamental freedoms.	而限制迁徙意味着违反欧盟的一项基本自由。


Restricting the inclusion principle should not pose a fundamental problem, as all EU countries meet the requirements of the Acquis Communautaire (the body of EU law) and guarantee a minimum of social protection.	限制包容原则不应该成为问题，因为所有欧盟国家都满足欧盟既成法规（Acquis Communautaire）要求并保证最低限度的社会保护。


Hence, in the case of unearned welfare benefits, tax-financed benefits, and contribution-financed benefits granted during the first years in the new country of residence – the inclusion principle should give way to the home country principle.	因此，在不劳而获的福利——在新国家定居的前几年所获得的税收和缴纳金融资的福利——问题上，包容原则应该让位给母国原则。


In host countries, they will be granted only benefits that have been earned in an insurance system with fair premiums.	在东道国，移民将只获得与采取成本相关的保险金制度的保险体系中所赚得（earned）的福利。


Furthermore, the EU needs to close its external borders.	此外，欧盟需要关闭其外部边境。


Its labor market, infrastructure, legal system, and welfare benefits represent valuable club goods that cannot be made available for consumption by random economic migrants from all over the world.	其劳动力市场、基础设施、法律制度和福利都是宝贵的俱乐部商品（club goods），不容来自世界各地的随机经济移民消费。


Those who believe that a liberal society requires open borders do not understand that the protection of property is a prerequisite for freedom and efficient exchange.	认为自由社会必须开放边境的人不明白保护产权乃是自由的前提。


Nevertheless, there is still the humanitarian imperative to grant asylum to the politically persecuted and include them in the welfare system.	尽管如此，授予受政治迫害者避难权并将他们纳入福利体系仍是一个人道主义使命。


But separating those few people (just 0.7% of all processed requests in Germany) who fall into this category from economic migrants requires application systems and reception camps, if necessary, where decisions can be made outside the EU’s borders.	但将归为此类的极少数人（在德国，他们进展被处理请求的0. 7%）与经济移民区别开来需要建立申请制度和接待处（如有必要），在欧盟边境外作出决定。


Those who focus only on the angry nationalist rhetoric heard in some corners of the UK’s Leave campaign miss the larger truth.	只注意到英国脱欧阵营的某些角落所发出的愤怒的民族主义言论的人没有看到更大的事实。


Unless the EU abandons the inclusion principle, that rhetoric will grow louder – and more exits will become inevitable.	除非欧盟放弃包容原则，否则这一言论将更加激烈——并且必然会导致更多的脱欧。


Can Global Capitalism Be Saved?	全球资本主义有救吗？


LONDON – The politics of economic anxiety has now driven the electorates of the United Kingdom and the United States into the hands of populists.	伦敦—经济焦虑的政治学现在让英国和美国选民陷入了民粹主义者之手。


If only, so the received wisdom goes, economies could get back to a more “normal” rate of GDP and productivity growth, life would improve for more people, anti-establishment sentiment would wane, and politics would return to “normal” as well.	言下之意，但愿经济能回到比较“正常”的GDP和生产率增长率，更多人的生活能有所好转，反建制情绪能消退，政治也能回归“正常”。


Then, capitalism, globalization, and democracy could continue their forward march.	然后，资本主义、全球化和民主就能继续征程了。


But such thinking reflects an extrapolation from one largely aberrant period in history.	但这样的思维是对历史的反常时期的外推。


That period is over, and the forces that sustained it are unlikely to align again anytime soon.	这一时期已经结束，维持它的力量不可能在短时间内再次聚集。


Technological innovation and demographics are now a headwind, not a tailwind, for growth, and financial engineering can’t save the day.	目前，技术创新和人口都是增长逆风而不是顺风，金融工程也无法独挽狂澜。


The aberrant period in history is the hundred or so years after the US Civil War, during which breakthroughs in energy, electrification, telecommunications, and transportation fundamentally reshaped societies.	这段历史反常时期是美国内战后的一百年间，在此期间，能源、电气化、通讯和交通方面的突破从根本上改变了社会。


Human lives became markedly more productive, and life expectancies rose dramatically.	人类生产率显著提高，寿命预期大幅增加。


The global population grew over 50% between 1800 and 1900, and then more than doubled over the following 50 years, with economies growing much faster than in previous centuries.	全球人口在1800—1900年间增加了50%以上，此后50年再翻一番，尔经济增长率也比此前几百年快得多。


By the end of the 1970s, growth began to slow in many of the developed Western economies, and US President Ronald Reagan and Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan ushered in a debt cycle that supercharged activity.	到20世纪70年代末，许多西方发达经济体的增长开始减慢，美国总统里根和美联储主席格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）引进了债务周期给经济活动增压。


The US, until then a net creditor to the world, became a net borrower, with China and other emerging markets benefiting from America’s rising trade deficit.	在此之前，美国一直是世界净债权人，此后则成为净债务人，而中国和其他新兴市场得益于美国贸易赤字的增加。


Financial leverage drove global growth onward for almost another 30 years.	金融杠杆推动了全球经济近30年的增长。


The 2008 global crisis brought an abrupt end to the era of financial engineering.	2008年全球金融危机让金融工程时代戛然而止。


But policymakers don’t like to see growth slow, and central bankers exhausted their toolkits in an attempt to stimulate economic activity despite insufficient demand.	但决策者不希望看到增长减速，央行更是竭尽全力试图在总需求不足的情况下刺激经济活动。


With less and less yield to be found in traditional fixed-income assets, investors piled into risk assets of all forms, driving up their price; the rich got richer, and the middle class was left further behind.	传统固定收益资产收益率日渐降低，投资者们蜂拥进入各种风险资产，推高了它们的价格； 富人变得更富，中产阶级被进一步抛在身后。


As growth in the real economy continued to stagnate, angry populism surged, resulting in Brexit and President-elect Trump.	实体经济增长继续停滞，导致愤怒民粹主义崛起，其结果是英国退欧和特朗普当选总统。


For all that central bankers have done to revive economic growth, the forces of demographics and innovation have worked against them.	央行使出浑身解数重振经济增长，但人口和创新力量对他们不利。


Advanced economies’ aging populations are drawing more and more on social safety nets.	发达经济体人口老龄化让越来越多的人需要仰仗社会安全网。


China is also aging.	中国也在变老。


Most of today’s (and tomorrow’s) demographic growth is in Africa, where it doesn’t drive global productivity to the extent that it does elsewhere.	大部分今天（以及明天）的人口增长发生在非洲，而它所推动的全球生产率增长不如其他地区。


Furthermore, the current wave of technological innovation is not lifting all boats.	此外，当前技术创新潮并没有载起所有的船。


Even as the likes of Uber and Amazon, and, more fundamentally, robotics, add convenience, they do so by displacing working-class jobs and/or driving down wages.	尽管优步和亚马逊以及——更加基本地——机器人带来了更多便利，但这是以工作阶级岗位被取代和/或工资降低为代价的。


This is typical of the process of “creative destruction” that Joseph Schumpeter famously described as being the handmaiden of growth in capitalist economies.	这是典型的“创造性破坏”过程。 创造性破坏是熊彼特（Joseph Schumpeter）所提出的著名理论，熊彼特称之为资本主义经济增长之基。


The first wave of a breakthrough innovation chiefly benefits a few entrepreneurs.	第一波突破性创新主要让少数企业家获益。


Then comes a wave of displacement, as the technology is adapted to existing industries.	接着是技术被运用到现有行业，形成一波取代（displacement）潮。


Three decades ago, it was Wal-Mart using computers and logistics to wipe out small “mom and pop” stores; today, it is Amazon taking on Wal-Mart.	三十年前，沃尔玛用电脑和物流横扫“夫妻店”； 如今，轮到亚马逊颠覆沃尔玛。


The third wave is the widespread diffusion of the innovation in ways that lift overall productivity and living standards.	第三波则是创新的快速扩散，令总生产率和生活水平得到提升。


This takes much longer.	这一波的时间要漫长得多。


Or, as the Nobel laureate economist Robert Solow observed in 1987, “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics.”	或者用诺贝尔经济学奖得主索洛（Robert Solow）在1987年的观察讲，“电脑时代无处不在，就是不见于生产率统计数字。 ”


Northwestern University’s Robert Gordon has argued that the economic impact of today’s innovations doesn’t hold a candle to that of plumbing or electricity.	西北大学的戈登（Robert Gordon）指出，今天的创新的经济影响无法与管道系统或电力相提并论。


Perhaps, or it may be that we are at an early stage of the Schumpeterian cycle of innovation (enriching a few) and destruction (creating anxiety in vulnerable sectors).	也许吧，也有可能我们仍处于熊彼特创新（让少数人致富）和毁灭（引起脆弱部门的焦虑）周期的早期阶段。


Eventually, average productivity and real incomes are likely to benefit as breakthrough technologies enable new kinds of growth.	最终，平均生产率和真实收入可能随着技术突破带来新型增长而受益。


The problem is that it may take a decade or longer before robotics and the like feed a broader rising tide that lifts all boats.	问题在于，机器人等技术创新形成能载起所有船的浪潮可能需要十年或更久。


And whether Schumpeter or Gordon is right is irrelevant for politicians facing angry voters whose standard of living has declined.	而熊彼特和戈登谁对谁错对于面临生活水平下降的愤怒选民的政客来说并不重要。


Today, their fed-up constituents reject globalization; tomorrow, they may become Luddites.	今天，他们烦躁的选民们拒绝全球化； 明天，他们可能变成卢德派（Luddites）。


The question now is whether a shift in focus from unconventional monetary policies to Keynesian demand management can save the day.	现在的问题是焦点从非传统货币政策转向凯恩斯主义需求管理能否挽回局面。


It is widely assumed that monetary policy is a spent force in the US and Europe, and that fiscal stimulus and expansion – for example, via tax cuts and infrastructure spending – must take over.	人们广泛认为，货币政策在美国和欧洲已是强弩之末，财政刺激和扩张——比如减税和基础设施支出——应该接管局面。


But this requires stable political systems that can sustain long-term fiscal strategies.	但这要求能够维持长期财政战略的稳定的政治制度。


Recent developments, particularly in Europe, suggest that such strategies will be difficult to implement.	最近的发展趋势，特别是欧洲的形势表明这样的战略难以实施。


In the US, Trump’s victory, coupled with Republican majorities in both houses of Congress, paves the way for tax cuts and increased defense spending.	在美国，特朗普的胜利，再加上共和党在国会两院均占据多数，为减税和增加防务支出扫清了障碍。


The pump looks set to be primed.	马达看上去就要启动了。


But fiscal expansion is likely to meet resistance from monetary policy, as the Fed resumes its “normalization” of interest rates.	但财政扩张可能会遭遇来自货币政策的抵制，即美联储重新启动利率“正常化”。


Still, the hope is that faster US growth and rising wages will quell voters’ populist rebellion.	不过希望仍在于美国增长加速和工资上扬能拨乱反正，平息民粹主义。


The onus, ironically, will remain on the Fed to “do the right thing” – namely, to normalize interest rates with extreme caution, while allowing the share of labor income in GDP to rise, even if that requires some overshooting of inflation.	讽刺的是，责任仍在于美联储要“做对的事”——即对利率正常化慎之又慎，同时让劳动力所得占GDP之比上升，即使这要求一定程度的通胀超调。


To paraphrase Dylan Thomas, we believers in markets should not go gently into the populist night.	用托马斯（Dylan Thomas）的话说，我们市场的信徒不应该温柔地走近民粹主义的黑夜。


We should fight against the dying of the light of global capitalism with every tool we can muster.	我们应该拿出一切手段，与全球资本主义之光的熄灭作斗争。


Today’s slowing growth and political backlash is not some “new normal.”	今天的增长减速和政治反动不是什么“新常态”。


Rather, it harks back to an “old normal,” last experienced in the 1930s.	相反，它可以追溯到一个“旧常态”，上一次我们经历这一旧常态是在20世纪30年代。


Whatever the right way forward for the global economy, we know that it cannot mean a return to the isolationism and protectionism of that era.	不管全球经济的正确前进方向为何，我们知道它绝不是回归旧常态时代的孤立主义和保护主义。


Saving Global Order	拯救全球秩序


GENEVA – As 2015 begins, the values enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are under threat.	日内瓦—随着2014年进入尾声，被写入了《联合国宪章》和《世界人权宣言》的价值正在遭遇威胁。


Around the world, personal liberty, human rights, and democracy are at risk – even in countries that have embraced democratic ideals.	放眼全世界，个人自由、人权和民主危机四伏——哪怕是在追逐民主理想的国家。


The international community is deeply divided, blocking progress on a host of global challenges, ranging from the crises in Syria, Iraq, and Ukraine to climate change and international trade.	国际社会陷入了深深的分裂，从叙利亚、伊拉克和乌克兰危机到气候变化和全球贸易的一系列全球挑战的进展遭遇阻碍。


Three factors – all likely to persist this year – are driving these unsettling trends.	三大因素导致了这些令人不安的趋势——并且全部可能在2015年继续存在。


First, globalization may have delivered many benefits, but it has also eroded the capacity of societies to determine their own destinies.	首先，全球化带来了诸多好处，但也侵蚀了社会决定自己命运的能力。


Many modern challenges – including tax avoidance, organized crime, cyber insecurity, terrorism, climate change, international migration, and financial flows, both licit and illicit – have one thing in common: the traditional instruments of a sovereign state have become inadequate to manage them.	许多现代挑战——包括避税、有组织犯罪、网络不安全、恐怖主义、气候变化、国际移民和金融流动，不管是正当的还是非法的——有一个共同点：传统主权国家工具已不足以管理它们。


Second, failed military solutions in Afghanistan and Iraq have played a large role in undermining the international community’s unity, and eroding confidence in intervention in general, even as established powers cut budgets and emerging powers shy away from taking on new responsibilities.	其次，阿富汗和伊拉克军事解决办法失败在很大程度上破坏了国际社会的团结，也腐蚀了对干预的总体信心，即使老牌强国削减了预算而新兴强国回避新责任。


In 2014, leaders in my native Africa and elsewhere challenged the objectivity and effectiveness of the International Criminal Court, the creation of which was a major milestone in the struggle to end impunity for national leaders.	2014年，我祖国所在的非洲和其他地区的领导人挑战了国际刑事法院的客观性和有效性。 国际刑事法院的建立曾经是结束国家领导人可以逍遥法外状况的斗争的里程碑。


Finally, we have failed to modernize the international system’s institutional architecture.	最后，我们没能实现国际体系制度结构的现代化。


The most important institutions – the United Nations Security Council, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund – remain dominated by the European and American victors of World War II, countries that represent an increasingly small minority of the world’s population and a shrinking share of its economic output.	最重要的机构——联合国安理会、世界银行和国际货币基金组织（IMF）——仍由二战的欧洲和美国战胜国主宰，这些国家代表着日益成为少数的人口和日益缩水的经济产出比重。


The failure to reflect the changing balance of global power brought about by the rise of China, Brazil, South Africa, and other emerging countries undermines both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of today’s international system, particularly in the eyes of those who feel denied of proper recognition.	没有反映中国、巴西、南非和其他新兴国家的崛起所带来的全球实力平衡的改变有损于当今国际系统的效率和合法性，特别是在那些自认为没有获得合理承认的人眼里。


And yet, whatever the shortcomings of the international system, it is important to remember that never before in human history have so few people (as a proportion of world population) died from armed conflict.	但是，不管国际体系有什么缺陷，很重要的一点事记住人类历史上从未有如此少的人（以占世界人口比例衡量）因为武装冲突丧生。


It may not make headlines, but the international system, with its rules and institutions, allows states to settle most of their disputes peacefully, most of the time.	这或许登不上头条，但国际体系及其所包含的规则和机构让国家得以在大多数时候和平解决大部分纠纷。


For better or worse, fighting epidemics like Ebola or preventing the most harmful consequences of climate change requires solidarity and cooperation.	无论如何，对抗埃博拉等传染病防止气候变化最危险的后果需要团结与合作。


Retreating into unilateralism, ultra-nationalism, or the politics of identity will produce nothing but a bitter, fragmented, parochial, and dangerous world.	陷入单边主义、极端民族主义或身份政治只能让世界更苦涩、更分列、更狭隘、更危险。


The world desperately needs brave leaders who can take the long view.	放眼2015年及以后，世界迫切需要勇敢的领导人着眼于长期。


In a world where power ebbs and flows, it is in everyone’s interest to adhere to a fair system of rules that respect both national sovereignty and individual rights.	在实力格局不断变化的世界，尊重国家主权和个人权利的公正的规则体系与每个人的利益息息相关。


The heads of the world’s historical powers need to recognize that it is in their interest, too, to follow the rules, and to allow rising states to help write these rules.	世界历史强国的首脑需要认识到，遵守规则、允许崛起国家参与制定规则也符合他们的利益。


As I have often argued, the Security Council must be enlarged, and developing countries should be given greater voting rights in the Bretton Woods institutions: the IMF and the World Bank.	我常常说，安理会必须扩大，发展中国家可以获得布雷顿森林机构——IMF和世界银行更大的投票权。


In exchange, the world’s newest powers must begin to take on a greater share of responsibility for the global order upon which their success depends.	作为交换，世界新晋强国必须开始承担更大部分的全球秩序责任——它们的成功正取决于全球秩序。


They can no longer stand on the sidelines, denouncing the injustices of the past.	它们不能再袖手旁观，谴责过去的不公。


Instead, they must join their peers in building the future.	相反，它们应该与其他强国一起建设未来。


We often hear talk about the shortcomings of the UN, which stands at the heart of the international system.	我们常常听说，作为国际体系核心的联合国有这样那样的缺点。


Too seldom do we note its achievements and successes, of which there have been many.	但我们很少认识到它的成就和成功——也是数不胜数。


Rather than retreat from a system that has yielded exceptional results, we must use the international community’s current crisis as a historic opportunity to reshape the existing order to better meet our modern challenges.	我们不能脱离产生了无与伦比的成果的体系，而应该把国际社会的当前危机当成历史性机会重写现有秩序，从而更好地面对我们的现代挑战。


Bombing for Morality	道德轰炸


NEW YORK – A gift for words was always US President Barack Obama’s strongest asset.	纽约——语言天赋向来是美国总统奥巴马的强项。


Now it looks as if his words have trapped him.	不过现在看来他是被自己说过的话困住了。


Having stated in March that the United States would “not tolerate the use of chemical weapons against the Syrian people,” and having spoken last year about a “red line” that could not be crossed, he will lose face if he fails to react forcefully to the murder, allegedly by the Syrian regime, of more than 1,000 civilians by sarin gas.	奥巴马今年三月曾表示美国“不会容忍使用化学武器袭击叙利亚平民”，他在去年也曾说过有一条“红线”是不能逾越的。 如果奥巴马未能对叙利亚政权使用沙林毒气杀害1，000多名平民的行为做出有力反应他将会颜面扫地。


Of course, the risk of losing face is not a good reason for attacking another country.	当然，不能仅仅因为怕丢面子就向其他国家发动进攻。


But why did Obama fence himself in with such rhetoric in the first place?	但奥巴马当时为什么要用这样的豪言壮语作茧自缚？


Why this particular red line?	划定这条红线究竟有没有合理性？


Secretary of State John Kerry was right to call the use of gas “a moral obscenity.” But so is torturing children, which is how the civil war in Syria actually began more than two years ago.	国务卿约翰·克里将使用毒气称为“道德沦丧”无疑是对的，但同样道德沦丧的还有折磨儿童，而这恰恰是两年前叙利亚内战爆发的原因。


And is killing civilians with chemical agents morally more obscene than shelling, shooting, or starving them to death?	用化学武器杀害平民是否真的比炮轰、枪击或任由他们活活饿死更不道德？


At least since the use of mustard gas in World War I, it has been a common assumption that certain weapons are more immoral than others.	至少从一战使用芥子气以来，某些武器比别的更不道德似乎已经成为普遍共识。


Weapons of mass destruction, nuclear bombs in particular, certainly cause more damage faster than conventional armaments do.	大规模杀伤性武器，尤其是核弹，肯定会比常规武器在更短时间内造成更大的杀伤。


But is there really a clear moral distinction between killing roughly 100,000 people in Hiroshima with one atom bomb and killing even more people in Tokyo in a single night of incendiary bombing?	但用一颗原子弹在广岛杀死100，000人和用燃烧弹整晚对东京进行轰炸造成更多伤亡究竟有没有明确的道德区别？


Was it more immoral to gas Jews than to machine-gun them into open pits?	用毒气熏死犹太人是否比把他们推到坑里用机枪扫射更不道德？


There is an argument, made by Nicholas Kristof in the New York Times, that a swift punishment might persuade Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad to stop using chemical weapons and use “more banal ways to slaughter his people.”	尼古拉斯·克里斯托夫在《纽约时报》上提出迅速实施惩戒可以说服叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德停止使用化学武器，转而用“更平庸的方式屠杀叙利亚民众”。


This does not make sense to me. The problem is surely the slaughter, not the methods used.	这在我看来没有道理，因为有问题的肯定是屠杀，而不是屠杀的方式。


In any case, moral outrage, however justified, is not a sufficient reason for going to war.	在任何情况下，无论道德义愤多么正当，都不能成为发动战争的理由。


Mao Zedong was responsible for the deaths of more than 40 million Chinese in the 1950’s and 1960’s.	毛泽东要为20世纪五六十年代4000多万中国人的死负责。


No one in his right mind suggested that military intervention in China would be a good idea.	但任何精神正常的人都不会提出军事干预中国。


In the 1980’s, Saddam Hussein gassed hundreds of thousands of Iranians and Kurds.	20世纪80年代，萨达姆·侯赛因用毒气杀害了数十万伊朗人和库尔德人。


The US supported him.	他还得到了美国的支持。


So is it a legal issue?	那么这是否属于法律问题？


Using chemical weapons is indeed a breach of international conventions, including the Chemical Weapons Convention, which Syria has never signed, and the Geneva Protocol, to which it is a party.	使用化学武器的确违反了包括《禁止化学武器公约》在内的国际公约（但叙利亚从未签署这一公约），以及叙利亚曾经签署的《日内瓦议定书》。


So there are good reasons to treat Assad as a war criminal, in which case he should be indicted at the International Criminal Court (ICC) – established, incidentally, by a treaty that the US has never ratified.	因此有理由将阿萨德定为战犯，他因此应当在国际刑事法庭（ICC）受到起诉——顺带说一句，美国从来没有批准过这项议定书。


But bypassing the United Nations and unleashing an illegal war to punish an illegal act is not an easy policy to defend.	但绕开联合国并发动非法战争来惩罚非法行为并不是一项容易辩护的政策。


Still, one might say, surely the “international community,” or the West, or the US as the major Western power, must draw the line somewhere.	但人们可能会说，身为西方主要力量的“国际社会”、西方国家或美国必须划出一条底线。


How can responsible governments simply look away when innocent people are being killed in large numbers?	有责任心的政府怎么能对无辜民众遭受杀戮置之不理？


Tolerating genocide is intolerable.	默许种族灭绝行为是不能容忍的。


But where exactly do we draw that line?	但这条线究竟该划在哪里？


How many murders constitute genocide? Thousands?	几千、几十万、几百万？


Hundreds of thousands? Millions?	究竟杀死多少人才构成种族灭绝？


Or is it not a question of numbers?	或者这不是数字的问题？


Genocide, after all, is a matter of intent, of killing or persecuting people on the grounds of their race, ethnicity, or creed.	种族灭绝归根结底是一种目的，是基于种族、民族或信仰而对民众展开杀戮或迫害。


Technically, killing ten people for such reasons – or even two – could be a form of genocide.	技术上讲，因为上述原因杀死十个人——甚至只有两个人——都可以称之为种族灭绝。


There is another way of considering the matter.	思考上述问题还有另一种方式。


The question to ponder before intervening with force in another country is whether doing so is likely to improve matters, save lives, and make the world more secure.	武力干预别国前需要考虑的问题是这样做是否可以扭转局势、挽救生命并让世界变得更加安全。


Yes, violence against citizens, whether by sarin gas or helicopter gunships, is a moral obscenity.	是的，针对民众的暴力行为，无论是沙林毒气还是武装直升机，都是一种道德污点。


The issue is how to respond: What will work?	问题在于如何应对：哪种方法能够奏效。


Justice and morality have little to do with this.	正义和道德与此无关。


Like the ICC, “humanitarian intervention” has more chance of working in the case of a weak country (say, Serbia, Mali, or Sierra Leone) than where a big power is involved.	与国际刑事法庭一样，“人道主义干预”在弱国（如萨尔维亚、马里或塞拉利昂）比强国奏效的可能性更大。


No one is going to shoot missiles into China or Russia for the sake of upholding human rights or international standards of warfare.	没有人会为了捍卫人权或国际战争标准而向中国或俄罗斯发射导弹。


Syria, as many people have pointed out, is not Libya or Mali. Nor is it a great power.	正像很多人指出的那样，叙利亚不是利比亚或马里。


But its civil war has already spread beyond its borders, implicating greater powers like Iran, Turkey, and Russia in the process.	但其内战已经跨越了国界，使伊朗、土耳其和俄罗斯等大国都受到了牵连。


One thing worse than the moral obscenities of a civil war would be a regional conflagration.	比内战道德污点更糟的将是地区冲突。


It is by no means certain that US intervention would do anything to reduce the risk of a wider war.	我们根本无法确定美国干预会降低战火蔓延的风险。


In fact, certain advocates of US intervention – both neo-cons and “liberal hawks” – seem to desire the opposite outcome; they want a war against Iran.	事实上，美国干预的某些倡导者（包括新保守主义者和“自由主义鹰派”）似乎都更期待出现相反的结果；


And there is probably a clear link in Obama’s mind between the red line in Syria and the one he has drawn for Iran, perhaps equally unwisely, to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons.	他们希望对伊朗开战。 奥巴马心中或许为伊朗划定了与叙利亚相似的红线（这两条红线同样不明智），那就是阻止伊朗的核武器研发。


So what is to be achieved by a US strike on Syrian targets, which Obama has already assured the world is not meant to change the Syrian regime?	既然奥巴马已经向世界保证袭击目的不是为了改变叙利亚政权，那么美国对叙利亚的袭击究竟想要达到什么样的目标？


It will not stop the civil war.	袭击不会结束内战。


But even one missile would turn the US into a direct participant, provoking yet more violence.	但即使只发射一枚导弹美国也会成为直接参与者，从而进一步激发暴力活动。


Saving Obama’s honor hardly seems worth that risk.	为捍卫奥巴马的荣誉冒这种风险似乎并不值得。


This is the view of many people in Syria, even among the rebels.	很多叙利亚人持这种看法，叛军也一样。


It is the view of most people in Europe.	这也是多数欧洲和美国人的看法。


It is also the view of most people in the US. Perhaps it is even the view of Obama himself, which is why he is playing for time, desperately turning over approval of an attack on Syria to the US Congress.	也许这甚至是奥巴马自己的看法，这或许可以解释他为什么在拖延时间，绝望地将对叙利亚发动袭击的批准权交给美国国会。


His relations with Congress have been far from smooth.	他与国会的关系远不能用平稳来形容。


But now he needs it more than ever – in order, as they say in America, to cover his ass.	但他现在比以往任何时候都更需要国会——正像美国人所说的那样，为了挽回他自己的过失。


Saving Resources to Save Growth	为挽救增长节约资源


NEW YORK – Reconciling global economic growth, especially in developing countries, with the intensifying constraints on global supplies of energy, food, land, and water is the great question of our time.	纽约－调和全球经济增长－特别是发展中国家的经济增长－与全球能源、粮食、土地和水不断强化的供应制约的矛盾，是我们时代的一个重大课题。


Commodity prices are soaring worldwide, not only for headline items like food and energy, but for metals, arable land, fresh water, and other crucial inputs to growth, because increased demand is pushing up against limited global supplies.	因为需求的增加与有限的全球供应相比，差距越来越大，所以商品价格在全球范围内暴涨，不仅仅是像食品和能源这样饱受关注的商品，而且还有金属、耕地、淡水以及其他对增长至关重要的要素。


Worldwide economic growth is already slowing under the pressures of $135-per-barrel oil and grain prices that have more than doubled in the past year.	在油价每桶135美元以及去年以来谷物价格翻番的压力下，全球经济已经在放缓。


A new global growth strategy is needed to maintain global economic progress.	现在需要一个新的全球增长策略来维持全球经济进步。


The basic issue is that the world economy is now so large that it is hitting against limits never before experienced.  There are 6.7 billion people, and the population continues to rise by around 75 million per year, notably in the world’s poorest countries.	基本问题是，现在全球经济体如此庞大，它正在触及以前从未触及的界限。 全球有67亿人口，并且持续以每年增加750万人的速度增长，特别是在世界上最贫穷的国家人口增长迅速。


Annual output per person, adjusted for price levels in different parts of the world, averages around $10,000, implying total output of around $67 trillion.	按照世界不同地区的价格水平调整后，人均年度产出大约是1万美元，这意味着总产出大约为67万亿美元。


There is, of course, an enormous gap between rich countries, at roughly $40,000 per person, and the poorest, at $1,000 per person or less.	当然，在富裕国家和最贫穷的国家之间有巨大的差距，在富裕国家每人大约是4万美元，在最贫穷的国家每人是1千美元或更少。


But many poor countries, most famously China and India, have achieved extraordinary economic growth in recent years by harnessing cutting-edge technologies.	但是许多贫穷国家，最出名的是中国和印度，通过利用最尖端的技术，在最近几年经济已经获得了巨大的增长。


As a result, the world economy has been growing at around 5% per year in recent years.	结果，全球经济在最近几年以大约每年5%的速度增长。


At that rate, the world economy would double in size in 14 years.	如果这一势头持续，全球经济规模将在14年内翻番。


This is possible, however, only if the key growth inputs remain in ample supply, and if human-made climate change is counteracted.	但是，这只有在关键的增长要素供应充足并且人类活动造成的气候变化得到抵消的情况下才有可能。


If the supply of vital inputs is constrained or the climate destabilized, prices will rise sharply, industrial production and consumer spending will fall, and world economic growth will slow, perhaps sharply.	如果 关键要素的供应受到限制或者气候不稳定，价格会大副急剧上升，工业生产和消费者开支将会下降，全球经济增长将会放缓，或许会急剧放缓。


Many free-market ideologues ridicule the idea that natural resource constraints will now cause a significant slowdown in global growth.	许多自由市场理论家嘲笑现在自然资源限制导致全球经济增长显著放缓的观点。


They say that fears of “running out of resources,” notably food and energy, have been with us for 200 years, and we never succumbed.	他们说对“资源枯竭”的担心，特别是对食品和能源的担心，已经伴随我们200年了，而我们从来没有屈服。


Indeed, output has continued to rise much faster than population.	确实，产出的增长持续比人口的增长快得多。


This view has some truth.	这个观点在某些方面是对的。


Better technologies have allowed the world economy to continue to grow despite tough resource constraints in the past.	在过去，尽管有严峻的资源限制，技术的进步却使全球经济持续增长。


But simplistic free-market optimism is misplaced for at least four reasons.	但是至少由于四方面的原因，过于单纯化的自由市场乐观主义被放错了位置。


First, history has already shown how resource constraints can hinder global economic growth.	首先，历史已经显示资源限制怎样阻碍了全球经济增长。


After the upward jump in energy prices in 1973, annual global growth fell from roughly 5% between 1960 and 1973 to around 3% between 1973 and 1989.	在1973年能源价格跳涨以后，年度全球增长从1960年到1973年的大约5%下降到1973年到1989年的约3%。


Second, the world economy is vastly larger than in the past, so that demand for key commodities and energy inputs is also vastly larger.	第二，全球经济比过去大很多，因此对关键商品和能源要素的需求也比过去大很多。


Third, we have already used up many of the low-cost options that were once available.	第三，我们已经用完了曾经拥有的低成本的资源。


Low-cost oil is rapidly being depleted.	低成本的石油很快被用尽。


The same is true for ground water.	对地下水也是如此。


Land is also increasingly scarce.	土地也日益不足。


Finally, our past technological triumphs did not actually conserve natural resources, but instead enabled humanity to mine and use these resources at a lower overall cost, thereby hastening their depletion.	最后，我们过去的科技成果事实上并不保存自然资源，而且相反，它们使人类能够以低的总成本开采和使用这些资源，从而加速了它们的枯竭。


Looking ahead, the world economy will need to introduce alternative technologies that conserve energy, water, and land, or that enable us to use new forms of renewable energy (such as solar and wind power) at much lower cost than today.	展望未来，世界经济需要引进保存能源，水和土地或者可以使我们以比现在更低的成本使用新型可再生能源（如太阳能和风能）的替代技术。


Many such technologies exist, and even better technologies can be developed.	已经存在许多这样的技术，而且可以开发更好的技术。


One key problem is that the alternative technologies are often more expensive than the resource-depleting technologies now in use.	一个关键的问题是，替代技术通常比现在使用的消耗资源的技术更昂贵。


For example, farmers around the world could reduce their water use dramatically by switching from conventional irrigation to drip irrigation, which uses a series of tubes to deliver water directly to each plant while preserving or raising crop yields.	例如，全球的农民可以通过从传统的灌溉方法转向滴水灌溉法来显著降低他们的灌溉用水使用量，滴水灌溉法在使用一连串的管子将水直接送达每一株植物的同时保存或提高了庄稼产量。


Yet the investment in drip irrigation is generally more expensive than less-efficient irrigation methods.	然而在滴水灌溉法上的投入通常比在不如它有效的灌溉方法上的投入多得多。


Poor farmers may lack the capital to invest in it, or may lack the incentive to do so if water is taken directly from publicly available sources or if the government is subsidizing its use.	贫穷的农民可能没钱在这上面投资，或者没有这样做的动机－如果水能直接从公开的来源获得或者如果政府对这种水的使用提供补助。


Similar examples abound.	类似的例子大量存在。


With greater investments, it will be possible to raise farm yields, lower energy use to heat and cool buildings, achieve greater fuel efficiency for cars, and more.	投入更多，就有可能提高农田产量，消耗更少的能源来给建筑物取暖及制冷，取得更高的汽车燃料效率等等。


With new investments in research and development, still further improvements in technologies can be achieved.	随着在研究及开发上的新投资，技术改进可以更进一步。


Yet investments in new resource-saving technologies are not being made at a sufficient scale, because market signals don’t give the right incentives, and because governments are not yet cooperating adequately to develop and spread their use.	然而因为市场信号没有给出正确的刺激，以及各国政府还没有在这方面进行充分的合作以发展及推广新节能技术的使用，在新节能技术上的投资还没有达到足够的规模。


If we continue on our current course – leaving fate to the markets, and leaving governments to compete with each other over scarce oil and food – global growth will slow under the pressures of resource constraints.	如果我们继续我们现在的进程－让市场决定命运，让政府在稀缺的石油和食品上面相互竞争－全球经济增长将会在资源限制的压力下放缓。


But if the world cooperates on the research, development, demonstration, and diffusion of resource-saving technologies and renewable energy sources, we will be able to continue to achieve rapid economic progress.	但是如果世界各国在研究，开发，示范以及传播节能技术和可再生能源上进行合作，我们将可以继续取得快速的经济增长。


A good place to start would be the climate-change negotiations, now underway.	现在正在进行中的气候变化谈判可以是一个良好开端。


The rich world should commit to financing a massive program of technology development – renewable energy, fuel-efficient cars, and green buildings – and to a program of technology transfer to developing countries.	富裕国家应承诺资助一个庞大的技术开发计划－可再生能源，燃料效率高的汽车以及绿色建筑物－以及承诺向发展中国家转让技术的计划。


Such a commitment would also give crucial confidence to poor countries that climate-change control will not become a barrier to long-term economic development.	这一承诺也可以给贫穷国家至关重要的信心，使他们相信控制气候变化不会成为长期经济发展的障碍。


Saving the Stability Pact from Itself	稳定和发展合约如何从自身寻求出路


At their meeting in Scheveningen, the Netherlands, the EU's economic ministers (Ecofin) once again confronted the need to reform the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).	欧盟各国财长在荷兰斯赫维宁根出席会议期间又一次面临对《稳定和发展合约》作出改革的必要。


The issues surrounding reform remain controversial and unsettled, but this time, the ministers laid their cards on the table.	围绕着改革的一系列问题一直都悬而不决，引起争议，但这次财长们在桌子上摊了牌。


The SGP's fundamental problem is that it must strike a balance between two contradictory goals: it must retain bite against excessive debt accumulation, yet it must also give governments more maneuvering room to enact structural reforms and restore Europe's competitiveness.	《合约》涉及的基本问题就是它必须在两个相互矛盾的目标间找到平衡：一方面它要能够继续削减大规模的债务累积，另一方面它必须给政府更多的尝试空间去实施体制改革和恢复欧洲的竞争力。


As it stands, the SGP is an obstacle to such reforms.	很明显，对于这样的改革，《合约》是一个障碍。


European leaders waste political energy and capital to meet demanding budget targets, while nothing is done to address the really vital challenges: aging populations, high tax burdens, declining competitiveness.	为了达到艰难的预算指标，欧洲国家的领导人浪费了很多政治精力和资本，而同时对于一些真正有挑战性的关键问题却没有采取任何措施：如，人口老龄化，高税负，日益削减的竞争力。


The reason is that structural reforms tend to pay off in the long term, but cost money in the short term.	原因就在于这些体制改革长期看来是获益的，而短期却很耗资。


The SGP originally aimed to protect European citizens from myopic governments, but it has ended up forcing even more myopic behavior.	最初，《合约》是针对那些目光短浅的政府，旨在保护欧洲公民的，而其结果却是导致了更加目光短浅的行为。


Take pension reform, which aims to reduce the scope of state-run, pay-as-you-go systems and expand private, fully funded schemes.	拿养老金改革来说。 此项改革旨在减少那种国有的，离岗付薪的体系的规模，促进私有的，资金充足的项目的发展。


This requires cutting compulsory contributions to the public system, while maintaining benefit levels for current retirees.	这就要求一方面要削减对于公共体系的强制性的投入，同时保持目前退休人员的福利水平。


The result is a temporary increase in budget deficits; the fiscal benefits appear only when private schemes start taking over pension liabilities from the state-run systems.	结果就是预算赤字的暂时增加； 而预算赤字仅在私有项目从国有体系手中接管了养老金债务时才会出现。


But the SGP's current rules discourage this kind of reform by prohibiting temporary increases in the budget deficit - even if they promise long-term fiscal consolidation.	《合约》目前的规则由于禁止预算赤字的暂时增加--甚至这种暂时的增加可以促成长期的财政巩固，而因此妨碍了此类改革。


European policymakers are becoming aware of the problem.	欧洲国家的决策者们开始意识到这一问题。


Some EU countries - particularly new members in Central and Eastern Europe - have committed themselves to use privatization receipts to finance pension reform.	一些欧盟成员国--特别是中欧和东欧的新成员--已经开始使用私有化收入为养老金改革提供资金。


But even this may not be enough to cover the cost.	但即使这样也未必能满足开支。


To overcome the SGP's bias against structural reforms, the European Commission asked at this last Ecofin meeting for more discretion and to put more emphasis on (explicit) debt: countries with a lower debt-to-GDP ratio would have greater freedom in fiscal policy.	为了克服《合约》对体制改革存有的偏见，欧洲委员会在上一次财长会议上要求对这一问题给予更多自由决定的权力，并进一步强调显性债务问题：那些具有较低债务/国内生产总值比率的国家在财政政策方面将会有更大的自由。


Economic ministers suggested that pension reform and long-term fiscal sustainability should also guide country evaluations under the SGP, while some countries insisted that it should be linked to the Lisbon agenda.	一些财长还认为养老金改革和长期的财政可持续性应该对《合约》下对某国家的评估起导向性作用，而另一些国家则坚持《合约》应和《里斯本日程》挂钩。


This would give more flexibility on budget deficits to countries that are making progress towards meeting the agenda's reform targets.	这样，那些正在向达到《日程》目标努力的国家，在预算赤字方面就会有更大的灵活性。


Some of these innovations would be useful.	一些革新性的做法可能会很有用。


But they risk giving too much discretion to the Commission or to future European Council decisions.	但这些做法却冒着给欧洲委员会或者未来的欧洲议会决策过多自由权力的风险。


The rules-based approach of the SGP is fundamentally sound, but it requires operational criteria that can be defined with some precision.	《合约》以规则为依据的做法本质是正确的，但却需要有能够严格定义的操作规定。


Otherwise, the rules become unenforceable.	否则，规则则无法实行。


Consider the proposal to link the SGP to the Lisbon agenda, which contains more than 100 indicators.	再考虑将《合约》同《里斯本日程》挂钩的建议，其中包含了100多项指标。


What happens if a country makes progress in one dimension, but regresses in another dimension?	但是如果某一国家在一方面取得发展，在另一方面出现衰退该如何是好呢？


Inevitably, the Commission would have to decide the relevance of the different indicators - thus intervening in the national policymaking process with no political legitimacy.	委员会不可避免的要分析不同指标之间的相关性--从而，从政治上来讲，不合法的干涉了某国的决策进程。


At the same time, if so much unchecked discretion was left to the Council, rather than to the Commission, "peer pressure" to restore budget balance might easily turn into "peer protection."	同时，如果给欧洲议会，而不是委员会，过多欠考虑的自由决定权，那么恢复预算平衡的'同辈压力'也许会很容易变为'同辈保护'。


So, can the SGP be made to work in favor, rather than against, structural reforms, without abandoning the rules-based approach of the SGP?	那么，能否在不放弃《合约》以规则为依据的方法的条件下，使《合约》能够有利于，而不是妨碍体制改革呢？


We think so.	我们认为可以。


The key is to select some comprehensive but operationally precise indicators of structural reforms, and then apply the same idea suggested by the Commission for public debt: countries that are making more progress on these indicators can get more leeway on their budget deficit.	问题的关键就是选择一些体制改革中综合性的但可以精确操作的指标，然后应用委员会提出的关于公共债务的建议：那些在这些指标方面正取得进步的国家可以在预算赤字方面有更多余地。


An obvious indicator that would meet this purpose is the implicit debt of public pension systems - i.e., the present discounted value of all future pension expenditures under existing legislation.	可以满足这一用���的一个明显指标就是公共养老金体系的隐性债务--即，目前现存司法体制下所有未来养老金开销的折损值。


Future deficits could, in theory, be reduced through higher contributions, but social security contributions are already far too high in Europe, inhibiting job creation and economic growth.	理论上来讲，未来的赤字可以通过增加投入来削减，但是欧洲的社会保障投入已经过高，限制了就业机会的创造和经济发展。


The only way to restore growth without compromising the future is through pension reform that reduces future outlays from the state-run system.	而恢复经济发展，又不对未来造成影响的唯一方法就是进行养老金改革削减国有体系的未来费用。


Of course, any estimate of the implicit pension debt requires caveats and arbitrary assumptions.	当然，任何关于隐性养老金债务的预测都需要警告和主观提出的假设前提。


But so does the SGP's current implementation - for example, in the conventions that define how budget deficit are measured and what qualifies as government revenue.	但《合约》目前的贯彻也是如此--比如，在有关如何计算预算赤字和如何定义政府收入的条款中。


Moreover, the Commission has already worked to harmonize the assumptions needed to forecast public pension outlays and achieve cross-country comparability.	而且，委员会已经开始努力协调各种公共养老金费用预测所需的假设前提，并且实现了跨国可比性。


Finally, to strengthen cross-country comparability further, the benchmark should be  variations in the stock of pension debt under given economic and demographic assumptions, rather than the debt level itself.	最后，为了进一步加强跨国可比性，判断的标准定为一定的经济和人口条件下养老金债务的浮动，而不是债务水平本身。


There is also a more fundamental reason to focus on  future variations in the stock of pension debt associated with pension reforms: the EU has no business interfering with pension liabilities of individual member states.	关于为何将关注点集中在同养老金改革相联系的未来养老金债务浮动上还有一个更加本质的原因：欧盟没有权力干涉个体成员国的养老金债务问题。


Why should the rest of Europe care if, say, Spain preserves a generous pension system?	比如，假设西班牙有着非常慷慨的养老金体系，这又与欧洲的其他国家有什么关系呢？


The extra focus on implicit pension debts would also help to inform citizens.	对隐性养老金债务的额外关注还会更有利于公众了解养老金体系。


Surveys reveal that most European citizens are not fully aware of the extent of intergenerational redistribution.	调查显示，大部分欧洲公民不是特别清楚不同代人之间收入再分配的程度。


Many even believe that their contributions accrue to an individual, capitalized, account, rather than financing the benefits paid to current pensioners.	许多人甚至认为他们的投入会在个人资本账户中逐渐累积，他们并不知道这些钱其实还用于给目前的养老金享受者提供资金。


The good news is that these surveys ( www.frdb.org ) suggest that better-informed citizens are more supportive of reforms and official estimates of the implicit pension debt would increase the transparency of the intergenerational redistribution implicit in pay-as-you-go systems.	frdb. org ) 还显示那些对养老金体系了解更多的公民会更加支持改革，对于隐性养老金债务的预测将会增加以前在离岗付薪体制下隐含的不同代人间收入再分配的透明度。


Thus, governments stand to gain stronger political support for reforms that cannot be postponed any longer.	因此，政府在那些刻不容缓的改革方面会赢得更有力的政治支持的。


Saving the Trees of Life	拯救生命之树


Nobody can get through the day without using a product that comes from a forest.	人们的每一天生活，都离不开源自林木的产品。


To a greater extent than most people realize, the paper we write on, the water that comes out of our taps, the medicine that heals us, the wood that builds our houses and furniture, all originate from forests.	远远超过人们现有认识的是：除了写字用的纸、水龙头流出的水、治病用的药以及修建房子和打家具的木头外，万事万物都源自林木。


Forests provide the fresh air we breathe and habitats for endangered species. They also provide us with recreational opportunities, increasingly important in our complex world.	林木给我们提供呼吸的空气，给濒危物种提供栖息地，还给我们提供消遣放松的机会，这在当今纷繁复杂的世界里显得愈加重要。


Approximately 1.5 billion of the world’s rural poor directly depend on forests for basic needs like food and fuel-wood.	世界上大约有15亿农村贫困人口直接依赖林木满足其对食物和柴火之类的基本需求。


Yet deforestation continues.	然而采伐林木的活动仍在继续。


Every year, we lose 14.6 million hectares (56,000 square miles) of forests – an area almost four times the area of Switzerland.	每年，损失的林木达到1460万公顷（56000平方英里）¾这个数字几乎相当于四个瑞士那么大。


Irresponsible forest management, enhanced by poor governmental regulation and enforcement, and markets that reward illegal logging, are conspiring to denude the world’s most valuable and threatened forests.	政府规范和执法的力度不够，林业管理的不负责任，加之对非法采伐的巨大市场引诱，正在共同把世界上最珍贵和濒危消亡的森林都夷为平地。


Once forests start to disappear, a host of environmental, social, and economic ills usually follow, affecting us all in some way.	一旦森林开始消失，就会引起大量环境、社会和经济问题，这些问题会以某些方式对所有人造成影响。


Indonesia’s Sumatra Island is a good example.	印度尼西亚的苏门答腊岛就是一个很好的例证。


Pulp and paper companies are driving rampant and illegal destruction of forests that contain the richest diversity of plants in the world.	纸浆和造纸公司的存在驱使人们大量、非法的毁坏森林，而这些森林拥有世界上最丰富的植物物种。


It is likely that plants not yet discovered will disappear along the way, as well as such endangered species as the Sumatran rhino and elephant, as well as the orangutan.	很可能一些尚未被发现的植物会在这期间随之消亡，还有像苏门答腊犀牛、大象和猩猩此类的濒危物种。


When Sumatra’s forests disappear, entire communities of people will also find themselves with no proper place to live and no decent way to make a living.	当苏门答腊森林消失时，这里的居民会发现自己也失去了合适的居住地和妥善的谋生渠道。


Moreover, the distortion to global markets caused by trading in illegally, cheaply produced products results in disadvantages for responsible corporate citizens.	此外，非法的低成本贸易造成全球市场的扭曲，使负责任的公司法人处在不利的位置。


Developing countries are losing $15 billion in tax revenues annually due to illegal logging.	发展中国家每年因非法砍伐损失150亿的税收收入。


To make matters worse, the demand for wood for reconstruction following last year’s tsunami is intensifying the already untenable demands being placed on Sumatra’s forests.	雪上加霜的是，去年海啸之后，国家重建对木材的需求加剧了苏门答腊本已超负荷的木材需求。


Similar threats to forests are evident in the Amazon and Congo Basin.	对森林类似的威胁在亚马逊河流域及刚果盆地也很明显。


The recent UN Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) shows that forests in these and other critical regions are in serious decline due to mismanagement and will continue to disappear unless serious measures are taken.	最近联合国“千年生态系统评估”（MEA）显示：这些地区和其它重要区域的森林因管理不善而严重减少，除非采取严肃措施，否则它们会继续消失。


Information released by the government of Brazil indicates that deforestation of the irreplaceable forests of the Amazon, due to factors such as agricultural conversion, reached 2.6 million hectares (roughly 10,000 square miles) in the past year, bringing the total deforested area of the Amazon to 17%.	巴西政府发布的信息指出：在过去一年里，由于农业改造等因素对亚马逊河流域不可再生林木的采伐多达260万公顷（大约一万平方英里），这使亚马逊地区的采伐总面积达到17%。


But the battle against deforestation is not lost.	但抗击采伐的战役没有失败。


Diverse organizations, environmentalists, and corporations concerned with the state of world’s forests are joining forces to reverse deforestation and improve forest management.	关注世界森林状况的组织、环保人士和社团正在联合起来努力改变采伐森林的局面，改善林业管理。


For example, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the World Bank have helped Brazil’s government kick-start an initiative that established over 17 million hectares (69,000 square miles) of new forest-protected areas such as national parks.	比如：世界野生动植物基金组织（WWF）和世界银行已经帮助巴西政府建立了像国家公园一样，新的、面积超过1700万公顷（69000平方英里）的林木保护区。


The WWF/World Bank alliance also motivated partners to establish a trust fund to manage these protected areas in perpetuity.	世界野生动植物基金组织（WWF）和世界银行也共同推动合伙人们设立了一项信任基金，来永久性管理这些保护区。


Similarly, a summit among the leaders of the Congo Basin countries resulted in extraordinary cross-border cooperation on forest conservation and responsible management.	与之类似，刚果盆地的国家首脑会议达成了一个特别的、保护和管理森林的跨国界合作。


This in turn led to a $53 million initiative by the United States State Department to promote Congo forest conservation.	随后，美国国务院启动了投入5300万美元资金的计划，以促进刚果的森林保护。


Since the leaders first met in 1999, 3.5 million hectares (more than 13,000 square miles) of new protected areas have been established in the Congo Basin.	自从这些国家领导人1999年首次会面，刚果盆地已经有350万公顷（13000多平方英里）的新保护区被建立起来了。


Nevertheless, given the effects of last December’s Asian tsunami, the weight of evidence provided by the MEA, and deforestation statistics from key forest regions, our efforts must continue.	然而，由于去年12月份的亚洲海啸，“千年生态系统评估”的数据分量和对主要林木区的采伐统计，我们还必须继续努力。


The World Bank and WWF recently pledged to unite in an effort to assist in reducing the rate of global deforestation by 10% by 2010, and to work with other public and private sector institutions to pursue ambitious targets on forest conservation.	世界银行和世界野生动植物基金组织最近承诺将联合起来，争取在2010年以前把全球的采伐率降低10个百分点，并且和其它公共机构以及私人团体一同朝着森林保护的伟大目标前进。


WWF studies show that if the world’s forests are allotted among a mix of uses and types – including protected areas, responsibly managed commercial forests, and restored forest landscapes – we can provide the world’s needs for forest products while conserving important environmental and social values for the foreseeable future.	世界野生动植物基金组织研究显示：如果把世界林木在用途和种类上加以分配¾包括保护区、被妥善管理的商业林木和被恢复的林场，我们就能够满足世界对林业产品的需求，同时为可以预见的未来保留重要的环境和社会价值。


Business leaders, governments, and civil society organizations must play their part in realizing this vision.	企业领袖、政府和民间社团组织必须为实现这一目标发挥自己的作用。


How to Save the World Bank	如何拯救世界银行


OXFORD – The World Bank is quietly sliding into insignificance, as its core fee-paying clients increasingly seek other lenders.	牛津—世界银行正在悄悄式微，其核心付费客户日益转向其他贷款人。


If it is to survive, its management will need to streamline its loan approval processes and leverage the unique assets that distinguish it from its competitors.	要想生存，世界银行管理层必须优化其贷款批准程序，并利用好使其与竞争者区别开来的独特资产。


The Bank once comfortably earned enough to be self-sustaining.	曾几何时，世界银行能够轻松地通过经营自我维持。


Today, it is rapidly becoming welfare-dependent.	如今，它正在迅速沦为救济依赖者。


Periodic contributions from wealthy governments have propped up lending to poor countries, but these are unlikely to be increased, and some may be discontinued as donors redeploy aid budgets to refugee programs.	来自富裕国政府的定期出资是向贫穷国发放贷款的资金源，但这一资金源不可能增加，而随着出资国将援助预算用于难民计划，其中一些资金还会打个折扣。


The problem is not that emerging economies have no desire to borrow; they desperately need funds for infrastructure and other investments.	问题不在于新兴经济体没有兴趣借钱； 它们急需资金用于基础设施和其他投资。


The problem is that the Bank is too slow to process loans, which has increasingly made it the last choice for many of its potential clients.	问题在于世界银行处理贷款的速度太慢，这让许多潜在客户将它作为没有办法的选择。


Whereas a commercial lender might take three months to prepare and disburse a loan, the Bank takes more than two years.	商业银行大概需要三个月时间准备和发放贷款，而世界银行需要两年多。 它从2013年开始试图加快贷款流程，但平均耗时只是从28个月下降到25.


And its efforts to speed up the process, which began in 2013, have reduced the average time only slightly, from 28 months to 25.2 months; in some regions (accounting for a third of the Bank’s lending), the wait has actually increased.	2个月； 在一些地区（大约占世界银行贷款量的三分之一）等待时间实际上还有所延长。


One clear indicator of the Bank’s performance is how high a premium governments are willing to pay to avoid it.	一个说明世界银行表现的清晰指标是各国政府愿意支付多少溢价避免这一情况。


A 20-year loan from the World Bank has an interest rate of about 4%, and the poorest countries can borrow for less than 1% (“International Development Association loans”).	20年期世界银行贷款利率大约在4%，最贫穷国家可以以不到1%的利率获得贷款（“国际发展援助贷款”，IDA）。


Nonetheless, many countries are choosing much more expensive commercial loans or bond issues.	尽管如此，许多国家选择了昂贵得多的商业贷款或发行债券。


For example, Ghana, despite being eligible for IDA loans, recently chose to raise money from the bond market, from which it received an interest rate several times higher.	比如，加纳符合IDA贷款要求，但最近选择了从债券市场筹资，尽管利率要高出世界银行贷款数倍。


No wonder emerging economies are excited by the establishment of the BRICS countries’ New Development Bank and the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Both institutions have promised faster lending.	无怪乎新兴经济体会对金砖国家的新开发银行和中国领导的亚洲基础设施投资银行欢呼雀跃：这两家机构承诺可以更快地发放贷款。


If the World Bank is to survive, its management must streamline its complicated and unwieldy bureaucracy, fixing what internal reviews described over a decade ago as “fragmentation, duplication, and delay” in assurance, safeguards, and fiduciary processes.	世界银行要想生存，其管理层必须优化其复杂笨拙的官僚体系，解决内部报告十年前描述为“分裂、重复和拖延”的担保、保护和信托流程。


At the same time, the institution must identify what it is uniquely positioned to do.	与此同时，世界银行必须认识清楚哪些领域它拥有独一无二的地位。


In 2013, the Bank declared a new goal – to eradicate extreme poverty by 2030.	2013年，世界银行宣布了一个新目标——到2030年消除极端贫困。


But this makes it just one of a multitude of organizations seeking to address poverty.	但这样只能让它成为众多试图解决贫困问题的组织之一。


What makes the World Bank special is that it is made up of 188 countries and can act on behalf of all of them, rather than being beholden to one or two.	世界银行的特殊性来自它由188个国家组成，能够代表所有这些国家行动，而不只是被一两个国家把持。


Furthermore, its financial structure enables it to be more autonomous, self-sustaining, and resilient than most other multilateral institutions.	此外，其财务结构让它相较其他多边机构拥有更大的自治力、自我维持力和恢复力。


These are the attributes it must leverage.	这些都是它必须利用起来的特点。


For starters, the Bank is uniquely placed to play the role of a “balancer” in the international aid system, helping to ensure that funds flow toward the countries that most need them.	首先，世界银行拥有独一无二的地位：它可以起到国际援助体系的“平衡器”作用，帮助确保资金流向最需要的国家。


Individually, governments give a lot of aid, but most of it goes to recipient countries with which they have special ties or relationships.	从个体而言，各国政府给出了大量援助，但其中大部分都流向了与它们关系特殊的接收国。


This “bilateral aid” is subject to the whims and trends of the aid industry, sometimes flowing only into specific sectors or to back particular approaches.	这“双边援助”容易受到援助行业的趋势和反覆的影响，有时资金全部流向了某些特定部门或支持特定方针。


The result is that some countries get more aid than they need, while others don’t get enough.	结果是一些国家得到了比需要的更多的援助，而其他国家则得不到足够的援助。


According to Britain’s Department for International Development, only five of the 30 countries deserving the largest aid allocations get close to the right level.	据英国国际发展部的数据，在应该获得最大援助配置的30个国家中，只有五个获得了接近正确水平的援助。


The Bank is uniquely placed to counterbalance the caprices of individual donors and ensure a better global allocation.	世界银行拥有独一无二的地位：它能制衡个别出资国的“任性”，确保更好的全球配置。


Until now, however, its lending has tended to follow donor fashions, rather than complementing them.	但是，到目前为止，世界银行贷款总是跟在流行出资趋势背后亦步亦趋，而没有起到补充性作用。


A second rationale for the World Bank is the need for “counter-cyclical” aid.	世界银行存在的第二个理由是需要“反周期”援助。


At present, when the rich part of the world catches an economic cold, the poorer countries face a double contagion: Their trade earnings plummet, and flows of aid and investment from richer countries dries up.	目前，当富裕国家遭遇经济寒流时，贫穷国家将面临双倍传染：它们的贸易盈利剧降，来自富裕国家的援助和投资流也会干涸。


The resulting halts to projects or policies – half-built hospitals, unexpected shortages of medical supplies, bridges to nowhere – play havoc with their economies.	由此造成的工程和政策停顿——烂尾的医院、意料外医疗供给短缺、建造了一半的桥梁——给经济���成毁灭性的打击。


As the Bank reviews its financial-management practices, a more consciously counter-cyclical approach could be adopted.	在世界银行评估其金融管理实践时，应该更有意识地采取反周期的方法。


A third rationale for the Bank has been its ability to share expertise and to develop and reinforce norms among the governments to which it lends.	世界银行存在的第三个理由是它具备分享专家知识、为贷款对象国政府制定和执行规范的能力。


In practice, however, the Bank has struggled to do this effectively.	但是，在实践中，世界银行很难有效实现这一能力。


Borrowers have often been reluctant to accept its advice, which they perceive as driven more by theory and ideology than by evidence and practice.	借款国常常不愿意接受世界银行的建议，它们认为这些建议更多地是根据理论和意识形态，而不是根据证据和实践。


Local officials in charge of implementation know that if the Bank’s advice proves impractical, unrealizable, or flawed in some other way, it is they, not some technocrats sitting in Washington, DC, who will lose their jobs (or the next election).	负责实施的本地官员知道，如果世界银行的建议不具备实践性，无法实现，或在其他方面存在缺陷，那么他们，而不是华盛顿的技术官僚，将丢掉饭碗（或输掉下一次选举）。


Experience suggests that the Bank’s advice has influence only if its messenger is someone who really knows the country (ideally as a resident), is an expert on the issue at hand, and has the power to get approval in Washington.	经验表明，世界银行的建议要想取得影响力，必须具备以下条件：其信使必须真正了解借款国（最好是其居民）； 必须是相关项目的专家，并且必须有能量在华盛顿取得批准。


Senior Bank staff deployed in regions for long periods, such as Jim Adams in Tanzania and Uganda, or David Dollar in China, have enviable track records.	长期派驻某地的高级世界银行员工，比如驻坦桑尼亚和乌干达的吉姆·亚当斯（Jim Adams）和派驻中国的杜大伟（David Dollar）都拥有漂亮的履历。


The Bank as a whole, however, is unlikely to succeed if it continues to attempt to become a centralized provider of solutions.	但总体而言，如果继续试图成为解决方案的集中化提供者，世界银行是不可能取得成功的。


In short, the World Bank’s management and member countries need to work together to create a faster, more responsive institution, one that exploits its unique advantages to balance aid flows, provide counter-cyclical support, and offer meaningful advice.	简言之，世界银行管理层和成员国需要齐心协力打造一家更快、响应力更强的机构，它应该利用其独特优势平衡援助资金流、提供反周期支持，并提供有意义的建议。


This approach could win back the fee-paying clients that comprise its self-sustaining resource base, provide it with its global reach, and allow it to continue to play a vital role in boosting economic growth and reducing poverty in developing countries.	这一方针能够赢得构成其自我维持资源基础的付费客户的支持，使其获得全球影响力，并让其继续在刺激经济发展中国家经济增长、消除发展中国家贫困方面起到关键作用。


Scandinavia’s Accounting Trick	斯堪的那维亚国家的会计花招


While most of the world’s advanced countries face increasing difficulties in coping with the forces of globalization and competition from low-wage countries, the Scandinavian countries -- Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden -- seem to have managed these challenges quite well.	世界上大多数发达国家在应付全球化的影响以及来自低收入国家的竞争中都面临著不断增长的困难。 丹麦、芬兰、挪威以及瑞典好像妥善地处理了这些挑战。


To be sure, Scandinavian growth is mediocre.	实际上，斯堪的那维亚国家的经济增长表现平平。


With average yearly GDP growth of 2.2% from 1995 to 2005 it fell short of the non-Scandinavian countries of the EU-15, which grew by 2.8% on average.	1995年至2995年期间，斯堪的那维亚国家的年平均GDP增长达到2. 2%，低于非斯堪的那维亚的欧元区15国平均2.


But Scandinavia is good in terms of levels of per capita GDP and unemployment.	8%的水平。 但是它们在人均GDP和失业率方面做得却不错。


Its average per capita GDP was 39% above that of the other EU countries, and on average the unemployment rate stood at 6.7%, compared to 8% elsewhere in the old EU.	斯堪的那维亚的人均GDP比其他欧盟国家高出39%，平均失业率为6. 7%，欧盟其他国家则为8%。


What is the secret behind Scandinavia’s success?	斯堪的那维亚国家成功背后有什么秘密吗？


One explanation of Scandinavia’s strong performance is Sweden’s courageous product market liberalization, the reduced generosity of Denmark’s wage replacement system and the Nokia miracle in Finland.	其中的一个解释就是瑞典大胆地进行产品市场自由化，丹麦降低工资安置体系以及芬兰的诺基亚奇迹。


However, while these factors may explain some of Scandinavia’s success, the low rate of unemployment and the high level of GDP per capita also have a much more straightforward explanation: the high share of government employment in the labor force.	但是，尽管这些因素可能部分地解释斯堪的那维亚国家的成功，对于低失业率以及很高的人均GDP水平还有另外一个更为明了的解释，那就是政府在劳动力中雇用了很高的份额。


When private jobs are no longer competitive, government jobs seem an easy solution to keeping people employed.	当私营部门的工作不再具有竞争力，政府工作好像就是让人们就业的简单办法。


Indeed, the share of government in employment in Scandinavia is surprising.	确实，政府就业在斯堪的那维亚国家中的比例令人惊讶。 在瑞典，政府工作占“依赖性就业”(除了自雇以外的所有就业)的33.


In Sweden, it amounts to 33.5% of “dependent employment” (total employment excluding the self-employed), and 32.9% in Denmark.	9%。 平均而言，斯堪的那维亚国家里国家就业的份额在整个就业中占据32.


On average the share of state employment in the workforce across Scandinavia is 32.7%, compared to only 18.5% on average in the non-Scandinavian countries of the EU-15.	7%。 与此相比，非斯堪的那维亚的欧盟15国平均为18.


In Germany, Europe’s largest economy, the government’s share of the workforce is only 12.2%.	5%。 在欧洲最大的经济体德国，政府占就业的比例只有12.


So the high share of government employment contributes to the region’s low unemployment rate.	如此，高政府雇用造就了该地区的低失业率。


Moreover, it also contributes greatly to the high per-capita GDP figures, for the simple reason that the value-added created by these government jobs is part of GDP, even if it could never have been produced in the market economy.	而且，这也极大地造就了很高的人均GDP数值，原因很简单，那就是，即使是在市场经济中这些数目是不会产生的，这些政府工作所创造的附加值也是GDP的一部分。


According to the rules of national income accounting, in the absence of market prices, the contribution of the government sector to GDP is measured by the wages paid out by the government, regardless of how productive or useful the government jobs are.	根据国民收入会计规则，在没有市场价格的情况下，政府部门对GDP的贡献是根据政府支付的工资收入来衡量的，而无论这些活动是否富有成效或者有用。


Thus, the performance difference relative to Germany, say, could be caricatured as follows: while Germans collect part of the private value-added as taxes, which they then spend on unemployment benefits, Scandinavians in addition give their unemployed a desk and count the unemployment benefits as value-added in the government sector and, therefore, a contribution to GDP.	这样，与德国相比的经济表现差别就可以用以下的话来进行讽刺性的描述，那就是，德国征收部分私营部门的增值税用于失业救济，而斯堪的那维亚国家则还给失业的人一张上班的桌子，并且把失业救济计算为政府部门的附加值，从而成为对GDP的贡献。


Apart from the accounting trick implicit in Scandinavia’s success, the high share of government in employment may also make a real contribution to solving one of the most fundamental problems western economies now face.	斯堪的那维亚国家的成功除了内含的会计把戏外，高政府就业份额还可能对解决西方经济体所面临的最为基本的问题之一作出实际的贡献。


Prompted by capital flows to low-wage countries, specialization, outsourcing, and even immigration, the equilibrium price of unskilled labor has fallen throughout the western countries.	受到向低工资国家的资本流动、专业化、外包甚至移民的影响，整个富有世界国家中低技能劳工的平衡价格都已下降。


Yet these countries hesitate to let actual wages fall for obvious social reasons.	但是，出于明显的社会性理由，这些国家却不愿让实际工资下降。


If they want to defend the incomes of the unskilled (or the less motivated), they have four options.	如果它们想要维护低技能者或者动力不足者的收入，它们有四种选择。


The best option is to better educate the unskilled, but this is a cumbersome, time-consuming process that offers no short-term solution.	最佳的选择是让低技能者接收更好的教育，但这却是一个费时费事的过程，也无法提供短期方案。


Thus, only three options remain in the short and medium term.	结果，在中短期内，只有三个选择了。


The first option is to defend the wages of the low skilled through minimum-wage laws or paying social replacement incomes which imply minimum wage demands against the private economy.	第一个选择就是通过最低工资法律或者支付社会安置收入来维护低技能者的收入，这就意味着要求私营部门支付最低工资。


This is the strategy that most EU countries, Germany in particular, have chosen. It results in mass unemployment that is inefficient and financially unsustainable.	大多数欧盟国家特别是德国采用了这一战略，结果造成大量失业，因而没有效率而且在财政上也难以为继。


The second option is to pay wage subsidies instead of wage replacement incomes to allow for the wage dispersion necessary for full employment without letting the incomes of the unskilled fall.	第二个选择是支付工资补贴取代工资安置收入，允许工资分散存在； 而工资分散对于全���就业而不让低技能者收入下降是必要的。


This is the strategy chosen by the United States with its earned-income tax credit.	美国以获取收入税收减免的形式选择这一战略。


Edmund Phelps, this year’s Nobel laureate in economics, has also long advocated it.	今年的诺贝尔经济学奖得主菲尔普斯教授长久以来大力鼓吹这一方法。


The third option is the Scandinavian way.	第三个选择就是斯堪的那维亚途径。


Here government demand for labor keeps wages high.	政府对于劳动力的需求维持了高工资。


While many economists judge Germany’s strategy the worst and America’s the best, the Scandinavian strategy can be considered a second-best strategy.	许多经济学家认为德国的策略最差而美国的最好，斯堪的那维亚国家的战略可以被认为是次佳策略。


Indeed, it is better to let people clean public parks, nurse children, and take care of the old in government facilities than have them do nothing, as in Germany.	确实，让人们打扫公园、照看儿童或者在政府单位照顾老人总要比无所事事要强，就像德国一样。


Even though GDP is artificially inflated, some useful activities are carried out.	即使是DGP被人为地抬高了，还是做了某些有用的活动。


Nevertheless, it might be better to let the market decide what kinds of products the low-skilled and less motivated part of the workforce should and could reasonably produce, which speaks for the American way of subsidizing wages.	但是，让市场决定低技能和低动力部分的劳力应当而且可以合理地制造哪些产品可能更好，这也是美国的补贴工资方式。


Thus, the Scandinavian way is more than a mere accounting trick, but it is also less than a truly recommendable strategy for coping with the challenges of globalization.	这样，斯堪的那维亚的花招也就不仅仅是一个把戏，这也不是一个应付全球化挑战的确实值得推荐的策略。


China’s Flawed Balance-of-Payments Position	诡异的中国国际收支头寸


BEIJING – The balance-of-payments figures that China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) released in April should have triggered serious concern, if not alarm.	发自北京——虽然尚未到达警戒水平，但中国外汇管理局于四月公布的国际收支数字依然引发了外界的严重关注。


The data adjusted China’s investment-income deficit for 2011 from $26.8 billion to $85.3 billion – a massive revision that casts doubt on the reliability of China’s balance-of-payments statistics and exposes a flaw in the economy’s growth path.	该数据将中国2011年度的投资收入逆差从268亿美元调整为853亿美元——这一重大修改不但令人开始怀疑中国国际收支统计的可信度，还暴露出了经济发展路径中存在的一个问题。


But few people seem to care.	然而关心这一点的人似乎并不多。


According to SAFE, as of February 2012, China had accumulated $4.7 trillion in foreign assets through purchases of United States government securities and other investments, and more than $2.9 trillion in foreign liabilities through foreign direct investment (FDI) and borrowing.	根据外管局的报告，截至2012年二月，中国通过购买美国政府债券及其他投资方式积累了4. 7万亿美元的国外资产，同时还存在超过2.


This puts China’s net foreign assets at roughly $1.8 trillion.	9万亿美元的外国直接投资和借款。 这意味着中国拥有的国外净资产总额约达1.


But, despite China’s position as one of the world’s largest creditors, its net investment-income balance is deeply negative.	但尽管中国位列全球几大债权巨头之一，其净投资收入亏损却极为严重。


In fact, China has run investment-account deficits for six of the last nine years, with preliminary statistics suggesting a deficit of $57.4 billion in 2012.	事实上，中国的投资账户在过去9年中有6年都出现逆差，初步统计显示仅在2012年就录得574亿美元的亏损。


Two factors explain this anomaly.	对此有两个因素可以解释这一异常现象。


The first is the high return on foreign investment in China.	首先是外国投资在中国的高回报。


In 2008, US corporations gained a 33% return on their investments in China, while other multinationals got a 22% return.	在2008年度，美国企业在中国的投资回报率高达33%，其他跨国企业也能实现22%的投资效益。


By contrast, the return on US government securities, which form the bulk of China’s foreign assets, was next to nothing.	相比之下，占中国国外资产大头的美国政府债券收益则近乎为零。


Second, China’s foreign assets are denominated almost exclusively in US dollars, while its foreign liabilities are denominated mostly in renminbi.	其二，中国的国外资产基本上全部是以美元计价，而其国外债务则大多以人民币结算。


As a result, whenever the US dollar declines, China’s net international-investment position (the difference between its external financial assets and liabilities) deteriorates – and so does its investment-income balance.	因此只要美元出现贬值，中国的净国际投资头寸（其外部金融资产和债务之间的差额）就会恶化——其投资收入收支也会如此。


China’s drive for renminbi internationalization so far has made the balance-sheet structure even more unfavorable.	目前中国推动人民币国际化的举措甚至令到其资产负债表上的数字更加难看。


According to the economist Geoffrey Crowther, a country’s balance-of-payments position evolves in six stages, with the key variable being net assets – that is, the country’s net international-investment position.	据经济学家杰弗里·克劳瑟（Geoffrey Crowther）的说法，一国的国际收支头寸分为六个不同的发展阶段，而净资产则是其中的关键变量——也就是一国的净国际投资头寸。 在前三个阶段，国家是一个净借款人，投资收入账户也是逆差状态。


In the first three stages, the country is a net borrower with a deficit on the investment-income account.	作为一个“不成熟债务国-借款国（immature debtor-borrower）”，其贸易收支和经常账户都处于逆差状态；


As an “immature debtor-borrower,” its trade balance and current account are also in deficit; as a “mature debtor-borrower,” its trade balance enters surplus; and, as a “debtor-repayer,” its current account moves to surplus.	到达“成熟债务国-借款国（mature debtor-borrower）”阶段时，其贸易收支开始出现顺差； 而成为“债务国-偿还国（debtor-repayer）”后经常账户也会实现顺差。


In the later stages, the country becomes a net creditor, running an investment-income surplus.	在随后的几个阶段中，国家成为一个净债权国，投资收入为正。


As an “immature creditor-lender,” the trade balance and current account are in surplus as well; as a “mature creditor-lender,” the trade balance returns to deficit; finally, as a “creditor-borrower,” the country’s current account swings into deficit.	首先是“不成熟债权国-出借国（immature creditor-lender）”阶段贸易收支和经常账户都实现顺差； 成为“成熟债权国-出借国（mature creditor-lender）后贸易收支回到逆差状况，到了最后的“债权国-借款国（creditor-borrower）”阶段，国家的经常账户收支也转为逆差。


A country in the later stages of development can use investment income from its past accumulation of net foreign assets to compensate for the decline in citizens’ incomes due to aging and other changes.	发展到后面这三个阶段的国家可以动用过去积累下来的净国外资产所产生的投资收益来补偿国内民众因为老龄化和其他变化所导致的收入降低。


China breaks Crowther’s mold.	然而中国却打破了克劳瑟的模式。


Given that it has been running an investment-income deficit, a trade surplus, and current-account surplus, it seems that it should be classified as a “debtor-repayer.”	考虑到该国已经出现了投资账户逆差，贸易顺差以及经常账户顺差，似乎应该将其归入到“债务国-偿还国”的行列。


But China is a net creditor.	但中国却是一个净债权国。


If China runs an investment-income deficit with net assets of almost $2 trillion, how will it make the transition to an investment-income surplus?	如果中国在拥有近2万亿美元净资产的情况下却出现了投资收入逆差，它又如何能转型为一个投资收入顺差呢？


China’s investment-income deficit will probably persist in the foreseeable future.	中国的投资收入逆差可能会在可见的未来持续下去。


Its stock of foreign capital will increase steadily as foreign firms invest and reinvest in China.	其国内外国资产将会随着外国企业的投资与再投资而稳步增加。


FDI in the country will continue to garner substantial returns, partly owing to local-government hospitality.	某种程度上在当地政府的优待下，外国直接投资将继续获得丰厚的收益。


Meanwhile, China’s outward FDI will continue to encounter challenges, as various short- and long-term factors – from weak international demand to an aging population – cause its trade surplus to decline, diminishing its ability to export capital.	与此同时，中国的对外直接投资将不断遭遇挑战，因为各类的短期和长期因素——从国际需求不振到人口老龄化——都将导致其贸易顺差持续缩小，使其输出资本的能力下降。


China’s investment in US government securities and other sovereign debt will continue to yield extremely low returns.	中国对美国政府债券以及其他主权债券的投资将继续收获极低的回报。


In fact, this investment will never be repaid in full, so a large write-off is inevitable.	事实上，这笔投资将永远无法全部收回，因此巨额的债务减免也是不可避免的。


The value of China’s assets as future claims on real resources has already been diluted by dollar depreciation, and calls in the US for inflating away America’s debt burden portend a further decline.	未来可以折算成真实资源的中国资产已经被美元贬值所稀释了，而要求美国通过通胀来卸除债务负担的呼声也意味着将来还会有所损失。


Moreover, while China may have profited from the rise in government-bond prices over the last few years, prices have been inflated artificially by expansionary monetary policy in advanced countries, which implies that the bubble could burst.	此外，虽然中国或许在过去几年中借助外国政府债券价格的上扬赚取了一些利益，但这些价格其实也是在发达国家的扩张性货币政策中人为调高的，这意味着泡沫迟早会有破裂的一天。


Whether through inflation or collapsing government-bond prices, China will suffer significant capital losses on its foreign assets, further damaging its investment-income balance.	无论是通过通胀还是打压政府债券价格，中国的国外资产都会遭受巨额损失，导致其投资收入收支状况进一步恶化。


Without fundamental changes in its economic-growth pattern, it is difficult to imagine how China can become an immature creditor-lender and a mature creditor-lender.	如果缺乏对经济发展模式的根本性改革，我们也难以想象中国如何才能成为一个不成熟债权国-出借国以及成熟债权国-出借国。


A more likely scenario is that China will continue to have a trade surplus (though much smaller) and an investment-income deficit, mirrored by America’s trade deficit and investment-income surplus.	更可能出现的状况是中国将继续出现贸易顺差（虽然规模更小）以及一个投资收入逆差，与美国的贸易逆差和投资收入顺差形成正反对应。


If both countries have balanced current accounts, their balance-of-payments positions can be sustainable.	如果两个国家都能拥有平衡的经常账户，它们的国际收支头寸就是可持续的。


In such a scenario, the US exports to China what Ricardo Hausmann and Federico Sturzenegger have dubbed “dark matter” (unaccounted assets, such as knowledge, which US corporations export through their investments), while China exports consumer goods and services to the US.	在这个情况下，美国向中国出口的将是里卡多·豪斯曼（Ricardo Hausmann）和费德里科·斯图泽內格所谓的“暗物质”（无从计算的资产，比如知识这类美国企业通过投资输出的东西），而中国则出口消费产品和服务到美国。


But would China be happy with this division of labor?	但中国是否会乐于接受这样的分工？


China’s leaders should think hard about this question now – before it is too late to change the situation.	这是中国领导人如今应当认真思考的问题——在一切已经太迟之前。


Schengen and European Security	申根和欧洲安全


BRUSSELS – Another key European project is under threat.	布鲁塞尔—另一项关键性欧洲工程正在遭遇威胁。


Some two decades after border controls were first abolished under the Schengen Agreement – which now includes 26 countries, including four non-members of the European Union – Germany has reinstated controls at its border with Austria, and France at its border with Belgium.	申根协议首次取消边境控制大约二十年后——目前申根协议包括26个国家，其中四个为非欧盟成员国——德国重新开始了奥地利边境的控制，法国也开始了比利时边境的控制。


The controls are meant to be temporary, and the vast majority of other borders remain open.	这些边境控制应该是临时性的，并且其他绝大多数边境仍保持开放。


But more openness does not seem to be the direction in which Europe is headed – and that is a serious problem.	但更加开放似乎并不是欧洲的前进方向——而这是一个严重的问题。


The shift away from a “Europe without borders,” instigated by images of refugees walking across internal frontiers, was fortified by the news that most of those who carried out last month’s Paris attacks came from Belgium, and that some may have entered the EU via the Balkans, posing as refugees.	远离“没有边界的欧洲”的变化因为难民穿越欧洲内部边界的影响而被煽动，因为上个月巴黎袭击的大部分恐怖分子来自比利时、其中一些以难民身份从巴尔干半岛进入欧盟而得到强化。


The underlying assumption – reinforced by many European politicians, especially interior ministers – is that there is a tradeoff between security and openness.	其基础假设是——这一假设获得了许多欧洲政客特别是各国内政部长的支持——在安全和开放之间存在一个权衡。


This is far from accurate.	这大错特错。


In fact, the reinstatement of border controls seems to be an example of “security theater” – a policy intended to make the public feel like something is being done.	事实上，恢复边境控制似乎是“安全戏院”（security theater）的好例子。 安全戏院政策旨在让公众觉得政府正在做一些什么。


But, far from making Europeans safer, rolling back Schengen would actually hinder the fight against terrorism, because countries would be forced to devote valuable resources – thousands of police officers, if the agreement were to be abolished altogether – to checking documents at borders.	但是，退出申根协议绝不可能让欧洲变得更安全，实际上，这会妨碍打击恐怖主义，因为各国不得不将宝贵的资源——成千上万警官，如果申根协议被完全取消的话——用于在边境检查证件。


Those resources would no longer contribute directly to investigations into terrorist activities.	这些资源不再能够直接用于针对恐怖活动的调查。


And those investigations need all the help they can get.	而这些调查活动需要一切可能的帮助。


After all, the objective – to identify a few terrorists hiding among millions of law-abiding citizens, before they commit a violent act – is the equivalent of finding a needle in a haystack.	毕竟，其目标——在暴力行动发生前找出藏身于千百万守法公民中的一小撮恐怖分子——无异于大海捞针。


The recognition of the flawed logic behind reinstating border controls is probably why police officials have remained guarded in discussing the issue.	认识到恢复边境控制背后的逻辑漏洞也许是警察官员仍对这一问题的讨论保持谨慎的原因。


It should be remembered that when five countries – Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands – agreed in 1985 (in the village of Schengen, Luxembourg) to abolish border controls, they did not do so on a whim or because some politicians had a lofty vision.	应该记住，当五个国家——比利时、法国、德国、卢森堡和荷兰——在1985年（于卢森堡小镇申根）同意取消边境控制时，它们并非是心血来潮，也不是因为某些政客的崇高理想。


However symbolic the agreement may have been, symbolism wasn’t the point.	不管这一协议具有多大的象征意义，这绝非它的重点。


Participating countries’ security establishments had recognized that stopping people at the internal borders did not help them counter major threats, such as organized crime and drug smuggling.	申根协议参与国安全部门认识到，将人们阻挡在国境前无助于抵御有组织犯罪和毒品走私等重大威胁。


Truck drivers, who protested against long waits at customs stations, helped spur the effort.	卡车司机举行示威游行反对冗长的通关程序，推动了申根协议的诞生。


But it took another decade of hard-nosed, detailed negotiations, entailing efforts to strengthen the EU’s external borders, to reach the point, in 1995, where internal border controls could actually be lifted.	但事无巨细的艰难谈判进行了十年——并且同时花了巨大的力气强化欧盟外部边界——才在1995年实现基本取消内部边境控制。


The subsequent decision by non-EU countries like Switzerland to join the Schengen Area highlights the massive benefits, including for security, of maintaining open borders.	随后，瑞士等非欧盟国家选择加入申根区，这凸显出开放边境的巨大好处，包括安全方面的好处。


Rather than attempt to control the masses of tourists and business travelers entering the country from all sides – essentially an exercise in futility in Switzerland – the country decided to focus police resources specifically on security threats.	瑞士没有试图控制来自四面八方的大量游客和商务旅行者进入本国——对瑞士来说，这基本上是徒劳的——而是决定将警察资源集中起来应对安全威胁。


By joining Schengen, the Swiss police also gained access to the Schengen Information System and other important European databases on criminal suspects, stolen cars, and more.	加入申根后，瑞士警方也得以进入申根情报系统和疑犯、失窃车辆和其他方面的重要欧洲数据库。


Of course, there are flaws in the Schengen system.	当然，申根体系也存在缺陷。


Like the eurozone, the area began with only a small group of member countries, all of which had a similar outlook and capacity to implement common rules, but soon welcomed many others, some of which, it later became apparent, could not uphold agreed standards.	和欧元区一样，申根区一开始也只有少数几个成员国，它们具备相似的前景和相同实施共同政策的能力。 但很快申根区接纳了其他许多国家，其中一些后来显然无法遵守共同标准。


In the eurozone, imbalances in competitiveness and fiscal positions – which were not noted during the perfunctory check, based on formal criteria, that was conducted before approving new members – led to a protracted economic crisis.	在欧元区，竞争力和财政状况的失衡——这一点在批准新成员前进行的基于正式标准的例行检查中根本没有注意到——导致了一场持久的经济危机。


In the Schengen Area, some countries’ inability to protect external borders adequately – owing to a lack of administrative capacity (especially true in Greece, but also, to some extent, Italy), together with geographic challenges like long and fractured coast lines – have undermined confidence in the face of the refugee crisis.	在申根区，一些国家无法充分保护外部边境——原因是管理能力不足（特别是希腊，某种程度上意大利也是如此）以及地理因素，比如漫长又曲折的海岸线——这破坏了面对难民危机的信心。


The eurozone survived its crisis for two key reasons.	欧元区从危机中存活下来，主要原因有二。


First, a common institution, the European Central Bank, had the power to act.	首先，共同机构——欧洲央行有行动力。


Second, member states relinquished some control over their banks, in order to boost the system’s overall stability.	第二，成员国让渡了一部分银行控制权以提振整个体系的稳定性。


If the Schengen Area is to endure, it needs to evolve in a similar direction, establishing a common institution responsible for securing external borders, while reinforcing the framework for internal security.	如果申根区想要获得持久力，就需要向类似的方向迈进，成立一个负责保护外部边界的共同机构，溶蚀强化内部安全���架。


As it stands, defense of Schengen’s external borders is up to individual member states, including one, Greece, that is already facing a devastating economic crisis.	目前，申根外部边界的防卫由个体成员国负责，其中之一——希腊正在遭遇灾难性的经济危机。


The only EU-wide operation aimed at helping police the external border, called Frontex, is severely limited in scope.	仅有的旨在帮助外部边界管理的泛欧洲项目——欧洲边防局（Frontex）规模严重受限。


What the Schengen Area needs is a true European coast guard, with its own budget, ships, and personnel.	申根区需要的是真正的欧洲海岸警卫队，拥有自己的预算、舰船和人手。


The Mediterranean can be expected to remain the main security challenge for some time, owing both to illegal immigration and its proximity to terrorist training grounds.	在一段时间内，预计地中海仍将是主要安全挑战，因为它是非法移民进入欧洲的路径，并且与恐怖分子训练基地十分接近。


It thus makes sense for the new coast guard, backed by EU funds, to start there.	因此，从地中海开始建立由欧盟资金支持的新海岸警卫队很有意义。


Even a small fraction of the EU budget would far exceed the available resources of any individual country.	只要从欧盟预算中拿出很小一部分，就足以远超任何一个个体国家所能调动的资源。


Moreover, a European coast guard would provide a flexible tool with which to allocate resources as effectively as possible at any given moment.	此外，欧洲海岸警卫队可以在任何时间充当尽可能高效地配置资源的灵活工具。


After all, even if security threats remain concentrated in the same broad area, the most urgent challenges can shift considerably over time.	毕竟，即使安全威胁一直集中在同一片广大区域，最紧迫的挑战也会随着时间的变化而发生很大变化。


Last year, the problem was Southern Italy.	去年的问题是意大利南部。


Today, it is the Aegean.	如今则是爱琴海。


Tomorrow it might be somewhere else.	明天可能又是其他地方。


Europe needs to prepare for any eventuality.	欧洲需要为一切可能结果做好准备。


It is not only possible to have both openness and security; the former can actually bolster the latter.	开放和安全兼得是可能的； 事实上，前者可能促进后者。


The Schengen Area’s members need to recognize that the security rationale for abolishing internal borders remains as compelling today as it was when they joined.	申根区成员国需要认识到，在今天，放弃内部边境的安全理由和它们加入申根区时一样充分。


A Generation Held Hostage?	被绑架的一代？


LONDON – On April 14, 2014, the Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram kidnapped 276 schoolgirls from the government secondary school in Nigeria’s northern town of Chibok.	伦敦—2014年4月14日，伊斯兰教恐怖组织博科圣地（Boko Haram）从尼日利亚北部城镇奇波克（Chibok）的公立中学绑架了276名女生。


Many escaped, but 219 remain in captivity, their whereabouts still unknown.	多名女生已经被释放，但仍有219人仍被劫持，下落不明。


So deep is the despair and desolation felt by the girls’ parents that they are now considering whether to declare their daughters “presumed dead.”	这些女孩的父母们伤心欲绝，正在准备宣布女儿“想必已死”。


According to local custom, funerals are held after loved ones have gone missing for four months, so that a period of mourning can give families some closure.	根据当地风俗，当亲朋失踪四个月后才会举行葬礼，因此，让一定时间的治丧期给家人一些缓冲。


The girls have now been held captive for over five months.	这些女孩已经被劫超过五个月。


No one can overstate the families’ unspeakable anguish from not knowing if their daughters have been raped, beaten, or trafficked out of Nigeria – or even if they are still alive.	这些家庭不知道女儿是否遭到强奸、殴打或被卖到尼日利亚境外——甚至是否活着都成问题——他们的痛苦难以名状。


The rest of the world may have moved on, but the girls’ parents wake each morning to a day of uncertainty and resignation.	地球照常转着，但女孩们的家长每一天都要面临不确定性和听天由命。


Hope is fast evaporating.	希望正在快速消失。


It is difficult to see how the girls could be returned safely.	很难说这些女孩是否能够安全归来。


Launching a military rescue operation would be highly risky.	启动军事营救计划将带来很大风险。


It is believed that the girls have been split into separate groups, so that any attempt to rescue one group would imperil the others.	据信女孩们被分成几组，因此营救其中一组的行动会威胁到其他几组的安全。


Despite talk of the government negotiating a deal with the captors, this option, too, would be fraught with danger.	尽管政府正在与绑架者进行谈判，但这一选择也充满了危险。


Even if all of the girls eventually do come home, nothing will ever be the same again for them or their families.	即使所有女孩最后都回到家中，她们和她们的家庭也不可能当作什么都没发生过。


For some, it is already too late.	对其中一些家庭来说，现在已经太晚了。


Seven parents, despite being relatively young, have died of heart attacks or strokes, to which the intolerable strains of their situation may have contributed.	已有七名年纪相对并不大的家长因为心脏病或中风而死去，女孩安危所造成的紧张极有可能也是诱因之一。


But amid the gloom, there is, perhaps, a glimmer of hope.	但在绝望之中或许已经有了一丝曙光。


While we cannot know the future for the girls still in captivity, 15 of the 57 girls who escaped their kidnappers are now back at school, braving Boko Haram’s threats to return and abduct more students.	尽管我们不知道仍被劫持的女孩的未来，但在57名获救的女孩中，有15名已经回到学校，勇敢地面对博科圣地再次袭击学校、绑架更多学生的危险。


Hundreds of thousands of other girls in northern Nigeria are now too afraid to go to school, but these girls refuse to be cowed.	如今，数十万尼日利亚北方的女生吓得不敢上学，但这些女孩毫不退缩。


They are determined to make up for lost time.	她们决心要追回失去的时间。


This display of astonishing courage and determination to get an education should be an inspiration for us all in the fight against discrimination.	她们所表现出来的令人惊讶的受教育的勇气和决心是对我们所有与歧视做斗争的人的鼓舞。


To support and encourage more girls to attend school in the face of abduction threats, the Nigerian Safe Schools Initiative has been launched to fund fortifications, telecommunications, and security measures aimed at allaying children’s fears about going to what should be a safe haven.	为了支持和鼓励更多女孩克服绑架威胁去学校上学，尼日利亚实施了为安全设施、通信和保安措施融资的安全校园计划（Nigerian Safe Schools Initiative），以减轻孩子们对前往应该是安全避风港之地的担忧。


Sadly, the world’s response to pleas for donations has been slow and miserly.	不幸的是，世界对捐款请求反应缓慢而冷淡。


This indifference mirrors similar reactions to other recent global appeals, such as for schooling for Syrian refugees in Lebanon.	如此冷漠还体现在最近的其他全球诉求中，如让在黎巴嫩的叙利亚难民上学。


The lack of concern seems particularly callous when one considers that the cost of educating a refugee child is no more than $8 a week.	为难民孩子提供教育的成本不过每周8美元，考虑到这一点，如此冷漠就显得更加无情了。


There is simply not enough outrage – except from young people themselves.	勇气也显然是不够的——除了年轻人自己的勇气之外。


They are more assertive in standing up for their right to education than the adults who are supposed to uphold that right.	她们更有决心站出来为自己的受教育权抗争，而理应坚持这一权利的成年人却退缩了。


It was particularly encouraging to see hundreds of global youth ambassadors from 100 countries descend on New York recently to demand the right to education and to support the Bring Back Our Girls campaign in Nigeria.	来自全球一百多个国家的青年大使最近齐聚纽约，主张受教育权并支持尼日利亚的让我们的女孩回家（Bring Back Our Girls）运动，这一幕相当令人鼓舞。


Bring Back Our Girls is the highest-profile campaign highlighting discrimination against girls.	“让我们的女孩回家”是突出女孩歧视的最高规格的运动。


But it is only part of a growing global movement by young people for civil rights.	但它只是日益蓬勃的全球年轻人争取公民权利运动的一部分。


The American civil-rights struggle that reached its height in the 1960s fought racial prejudice and discrimination at home and opposed colonialism abroad.	20世纪60年代达到顶峰的美国公民权力斗争反对的是国内的种族偏见和歧视以及国外的殖民主义。


But there is a war of liberation that remains to be won worldwide – against child labor, child marriage, child trafficking, and discrimination against girls.	但在全世界，还有一场事关解放的战争要打——我们的对手是劳工、童婚、绑架儿童以及重男轻女。


None of these evils will end until basic education is made compulsory for all – just as was done in the West more than a century ago.	所有这些恶习都只有在完全实现基本义务教育——正如西方在一个多世纪前所做的那样——的情况下才能终结。


The campaign for the 219 Nigerian girls – kidnapped simply because they wanted to go to school – is an iconic battle of this freedom struggle.	为219名尼日利亚女孩斗争的运动——她们之所以被绑架，只是因为她们想上学——是这场自由战争的标志性战役。


That struggle will be won some day.	这场战争总有一天会获胜。


No injustice can last forever.	不公绝不可能永远存在。


But for the missing girls and their loved ones, it is a struggle that cannot be won soon enough.	但对失踪的女孩和她们��亲朋而言，这是一场无法马上获胜的战争。


Closing America’s Jobs Deficit	消除美国的就业赤字


BERKELEY – The latest data on employment in the United States confirm that the American economy continues to recover from the Great Recession of 2008-2009, despite the slowdown engulfing the other G-20 nations.	伯克利—最新的美国就业数据确认了美国经济正继续从2008—2009年的大衰退中复苏，尽管其他G20国家仍在减速中挣扎。


Indeed, the pace of private-sector job growth has actually been much stronger during this recovery than during the recovery from the 2001 recession, and is comparable to the recovery from the 1990-1991 recession.	事实上，此次复苏期间，私人部门就业增长的速度要远强于2001年的复苏，可以和1990—1991年衰退后的复苏媲美。


During the last 31 months, private-sector employment has increased by 5.2 million and the unemployment rate has now fallen below 8% for the first time in nearly four years.	过去31个月中，私人部门就业增加了520万，失业率在近四年时间里第一次降到了8%以下。


But the unemployment rate is still more than two percentage points above the long-run value that most economists view as normal when the economy is operating near its potential.	但失业率仍比大部分经济学家所认为的经济在接近潜力水平运行时的长期值低了两个百分点以上。


Moreover, the number of long-term unemployed (27 weeks or longer) is about 40% of the total – thelowest share since 2009, but still far higher than in the previous recessions since the Great Depression, and about double what it would be in a normal labor market.	此外，长期失业（27州或以上）人数大约占总失业人数的40%——为2009年以来最低，但仍比大萧条以来的前几次衰退高得多，更是劳动力市场处于正常状态时的两倍。


So the US labor market, while healing, is still far from where it should be.	因此，美国劳动力市场尽管在升温，仍远没有达到该有的热度。


That is partly because the job losses during the Great Recessionwere so large – twice as large as those of previous recessions since the Great Depression.	这部分是因为大衰退期间所发生的就业岗位减少数量太大——是大萧条以来前几次衰退的两倍。


In terms of US economic history, what is abnormal is not the pace of private-sector job growth since the 2008-2009 recession ended, but rather the length and depth of the recession itself.	从美国经济史看，反常之处并不在于2008—2009年衰退结束以来私人部门就业增长的速度，而在于衰退本身的长度和深度。