The younger generation has learned the lesson: 32% of respondents employed in the financial industry for less than ten years said that, “they would likely engage in insider trading to make $10 million if there was no chance of being arrested.”	年轻一代已经总结了心得：32%在金融业从业不到10年的受调查者表示，“如果没有可能被抓他们很可能会涉足赚取1，000万美元的内幕交易。


The chance of being arrested for such malfeasance is, alas, probably very low.	”从事类似犯罪活动被抓的几率很可能非常之低。


Yet not all societies or sectors are caught in an impunity trap.	但并非所有社会或行业都陷入了免罚陷阱之中。


Some societies, most notably in Scandinavia, maintain the expectation that their public officials and business leaders should and will act ethically and honestly.	有些社会，尤其是在斯堪的纳维亚半岛，依然期望他们的政府官员和商界领袖实际践行道德及诚实的准则。


In these countries, ministers are forced to resign for petty infractions that would seem trivial in other countries.	在这些国家，部长们被迫因为小的违规辞职，这样的违规行为在其他国家看来几乎微不足道。


Convincing American, Russian, Nigerian, or Chinese citizens that corruption can indeed be controlled might seem to be a futile task.	说服美国、俄罗斯、尼日利亚还有中国的民众腐败其实是可以控制的可能看似有些徒劳。


But the goal is certainly worth embracing, because the evidence is overwhelming: impunity is not only morally noxious; it is also economically costly and deeply corrosive to wellbeing.	但我们值得为此而努力，因为有压倒性证据显示：有罪不罚现象不仅在道义上有害； 并且能带来极高的经济成本，破坏人们的幸福生活。


Recent studies have shown that when “generalized trust” in society is high, economic performance is improved and life satisfaction is higher.	最近的研究表明社会“一般信任度”高可以改善经济表现、提高生活满意度。


Among other reasons, commercial agreements are more easily reached and efficiently implemented.	虽然有很多其他理由，但商业协议更容易达成、执行也更为有效。


It is no coincidence that the Scandinavian countries rank among the world’s happiest and most prosperous year after year.	斯堪的纳维亚国家年复一年位列世界最幸福、最繁荣的国家之列并不是巧合。


So what can be done to overcome an impunity trap?	那么跳出有罪不罚的陷阱需要做些什么？


Part of the answer is of course law enforcement (such as the FIFA indictments) and protection for whistleblowers.	部分答案当然是执法（如起诉国际足联）和为举报人提供保护。


Yet law enforcement is not sufficient; public attitudes also play a major role.	但仅靠执法是不够的； 公众态度同样起到重要作用。


If the public expresses contempt and revulsion for bankers who cheat their clients, oil executives who wreck the climate, FIFA officials who countenance kickbacks, and politicians who cozy up to all of them in exchange for campaign funds and bribes, illegality for the few cannot become the norm.	如果公众对欺骗客户的银行家、破坏气候的石油公司高管、纵容回扣的国际足联官员及拉拢上述所有人以换取竞选资金和贿赂的政客表现出鄙视和厌恶，那么少数人的违法行为就不能成为准则。


Public scorn might not end corruption immediately, but it can make life far less pleasant for those who are stealing the commons from the rest of us.	公众蔑视可能无法立即结束腐败，但却可以破坏盗窃公共资源者的生活。


One candidate for US President in 2016, former Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley, recently launched his campaign by asking why not a single Wall Street CEO was convicted of a financial crime in the wake of the 2008 financial meltdown.	2016年美国总统候选人马里兰州前州长马丁·奥马利不久前启动了自己的竞选，质疑2008年金融危机后为什么没有一个华尔街首席执行官被追究金融罪责。


It is a good question, the kind that can help the US to overcome its impunity trap.	这个问题很有价值，类此问题能帮助美国跳出有罪不罚的陷阱。


Yet we can ask an even simpler question.	但我们还可以问个更简单的问题。


Why are those same bankers still fêted by President Barack Obama, invited to glittering state dinners, and reverently interviewed by the media?	为什么那些银行家仍接受奥巴马总统的宴请，出席光彩夺目的国宴，并接受媒体的虔诚采访？


The first thing any society can and should do is deny respectability to political and business leaders who willfully abuse the public trust.	任何社会可以而且应该做的第一件事就是拒绝尊敬那些故意滥用公众信任的政界和商界领袖。


India’s LBW	印度的LBW


NEW DELHI – A casual reader of India’s newspapers for the last several weeks would be forgiven for wondering whether the country was suddenly bereft of political controversy, sex scandals, or official corruption – normally the standard headline fare here.	新德里—翻翻最近几周的印度报纸，你会发现政治争议、性丑闻和官员腐败这些平日里充斥于新闻标题的东西突然不见了。


The newspapers’ front pages have had space – under massive banner headlines – only for a topic normally reserved for the sports pages: cricket.	占据印度报纸头条大号通版标题的只有一件事，这件事原本通常只出现在体育版。 那就是：板球。


The cause is not some particularly exciting test match.	获得如此关注的并不是特别精彩的对抗赛。


Instead, the public has been outraged by lurid accusations concerning the Indian Premier League (IPL) – bribes for bad play, owners betting on games, and players seduced by starlets and call girls.	让公众怒不可遏的是关于印度超级联赛（IPL）的耸人听闻的指控——贿赂比赛、球队老板赌球、球手被三版女郎引诱。


The national captain was revealed to have a conflict of interest, and the son-in-law of Indian cricket’s most powerful official was implicated in an illegal gambling operation run by a sinister network of bookies.	国家队队长被爆陷入了利益冲突，印度板球界最有权势的官员的女婿被爆卷入了地下赌博网络的非法赌局操纵。


The police, whose phone taps led to a wave of arrests, have filed charges alleging involvement by well-known organized crime figures.	警方通过电话监听逮捕了一大群嫌疑犯，并起诉了不少著名有组织犯罪人物。


They have even linked a player for India’s national team to the fugitive Dawood Ibrahim, widely suspected of being the architect of the 1993 Bombay bombings, who has been hiding in Pakistan.	他们甚至将某印度国家队队员和流亡分子伊布拉西姆（Dawood Ibrahim）联系在一起，后者被广泛认为是1993年孟买爆炸案的嫌疑主谋，现藏身于巴基斯坦。


The Indian media have not had it this good in a long time.	印度媒体很久没有如此给力了。


After years of corruption scandals, political dramas, and protest marches, this was manna from heaven – a story combining cricket, the national obsession, with vice, the national weakness.	在多年的腐败丑闻、政治闹剧和示威游行后，这简直是天降馅饼——结合了板球（全民疯狂的运动）和犯罪（国民劣根性）的故事。


India’s 300-plus television news channels have been no better than the print media, devoting almost all of their time to parsing every morsel of information leaked or announced by the police.	印度全国300多家电视新闻频道也和纸媒一样，把所有的时间都花在了分析警方泄漏或公布的蛛丝马迹上。


A country that traditionally grinds to a halt during an exciting cricket match has now been ground into submission by its antithesis – the slow unraveling of illusions about a game that seizes Indians’ imagination like no other.	此前，在印度造成万人空巷盛况的往往是激动人心的半球比赛，如今，整个印度因为其对立面而如痴如狂——这项绝无仅有的能够抓住全体印度人民想象力的运动的面纱正在被缓缓揭开。


Five years ago, I wrote a column about the phenomenal appeal of the IPL and its transformation of cricket in a manner inspired by the televised razzle-dazzle of American sport.	五年前，我在一篇专栏文章中指出了IPL的显著魅力及其将板球转变为电视狂欢式的美国运动。


India not only livened up a game that was originally invented in staid and decorous Victorian England; it also brought the game into the twenty-first century, complete with rampant commercialization.	印度不但让这个起源于保守优雅的维多利亚时期英国的运动活力四射，还把它带入了二十一世纪，用无孔不入的商业化完善了它。


Two-and-a-half minute “strategic timeouts” now interrupt the flow of the game, allowing advertisers to hawk their wares to hundreds of millions of enthralled viewers.	现在，比赛流程会被两分半钟的“策略暂停”打断，让广告商向数以亿计的狂热电视观众推销商品。


The sociologist Ashis Nandy once memorably wrote that “cricket is an Indian game accidentally discovered by the British.”	社会学家南迪（Ashis Nandy）有一句名言：“板球是一项被英国人意外发现的印度运动。


Anyone watching the IPL, however, might be tempted to conclude that Twenty20 cricket, the “instant” form of the game, is actually an American game deliberately rediscovered by the Indians.	”但是，每个IPL观众都会认为，Twenty20板球，即“即时”模式板球，其实是一项印度人有意重新发现的美国运动。


Other countries have followed suit, with tournaments modeled on the IPL springing up throughout the cricketing world.	其他国家纷纷效而仿之，IPL的锦标赛模式在板球界逐渐兴起。


To keen observers, the IPL represented more than a sports league; it signaled nothing less than the emergence of a new India.	对敏锐的观察者来说，IPL代表的不仅仅是一个体育联赛； 它的意义不下于新印度崛起的象征。


In the IPL’s glitz, glamour, and excess lay an antidote to the hidebound statist mentality that had produced economic stagnation in India in the past.	IPL的光芒、魅力和过度是一剂解毒剂，让印度人从导致印度过去经济停滞的刻板集权思维中解救出来。


Here was a venture that opened new vistas for businesses and fired the imaginations of young people to emulate the entrepreneurial energies shown by owners, promoters, players, and fans.	这是一项冒险，为企业开启了新的天地，也点燃了年轻人的想象力去模仿老板、推广者、球星和球迷所展现出来的企业家精气神。


The IPL suggested a new departure for a country inspired by the allure of its own success.	IPL成了印度的新产业，受其自身成功启发的新产业。


Understandably, the exposure of the IPL as a morass of deceit, discredited by “spot-fixing” episodes engineered by unscrupulous bookies and venal players, has deflated such heady notions.	不难理解，IPL遭到扒皮，露出了欺诈的混乱本质，肆无忌惮的赌博和受贿的选手的“现场操纵”败坏了IPL的名声，是它不再是令人振奋的符号。


Cricket continues to hold many Indians in thrall, but many others have forsaken it in the wake of the IPL revelations.	板球依然让众多印度人如痴如醉，但也有很多印度人因为IPL丑闻的曝光而远离板球。


The paroxysm of media flagellation will soon abate, but the excitement with which the public followed the IPL will not return.	媒体的鞭挞来去如风，不消多久就会退去，但公众对IPL趋之若鹜的兴奋不会回来了。


Weighty minds will probably see the IPL’s tawdry underside as emblematic of post-liberalization India’s crony capitalism and business short-termism.	重磅人物可能会把IPL华而不实的阴暗面视为后自由化印度的裙带资本主义和商业短视主义的象征。


But it is always dangerous to find in sports large metaphors for national decline, so the temptation to view the IPL as symptomatic of everything that is wrong with today’s India must be resisted.	但用体育来充当国家衰落的大隐喻永远是危险的，因此必须抵制将IPL视为一切当代印度错误的象征的看法。


Having initially been seduced by the idea that the IPL showcased the alluring face of a brave new entrepreneurial India, I am reluctant to embrace the opposite view instantly.	我一开始也沉迷于IPL堪为勇敢的充满企业家精神的新印度的象征的观点，不愿立刻接受相反的看法。


But there is no doubt that the flaws being exposed daily in the media – cupidity on a colossal, almost suicidal scale, the quest for easy money, the turn to illegality, and the lack of ethical standards at the highest levels – reveal dangerous streaks in our national character.	但毫无疑问，媒体每天都在揭露缺陷——自杀���的贪得无厌、追求一夜暴富、求助非法手段，以及最高层道德败坏——这些缺陷表明印度的国民性有着致命缺点。


The IPL can continue as sporting entertainment, good for a fun evening with the kids in front of the idiot box.	IPL可以继续成为体育娱乐，成为带着孩子在电视前享受快乐夜晚的不错选择。


But what it has revealed to Indians about themselves is far less amusing.	但印度人所获得的关于他们自身的揭露就远远没有那么迷人了。


The call for reform in cricket is really a call for reform in the way India goes about its business.	板球改革的需要就是印度商业改革的需要。


The character flaws laid bare in the IPL must be curbed if India is ever to fulfill its obvious promise and take its place at the front of the world stage in the twenty-first century.	IPL事件所揭露的性格缺陷必须予以纠正，如果印度想要实现其明确承诺、在21世纪的世界舞台上成为主角的话。


The Rising Costs of US Income Inequality	收入失衡引致的高昂社会成本


BERKELEY – During the last several decades, income inequality in the United States has increased significantly – and the trend shows no sign of reversing.	发至伯克利——在过去数十年间，美国的收入失衡现象严重加剧——且未有任何逆转的迹象。


The last time inequality was as high as it is now was just before the Great Depression.	而上次出现如此严重的失衡还是大萧条之前了。


Such a high level of inequality is not only incompatible with widely held norms of social justice and equality of opportunity; it poses a serious threat to America’s economy and democracy.	如此严重的收入失衡不仅与人们普遍信奉的社会公平和机会均等准则无法匹配； 更对美国的经济和民主制度造成了严重威胁。


Underlying the country’s soaring inequality is income stagnation for the majority of Americans.	导致该国收入失衡状况不断加剧的深层次原因则是绝大多数美国民众的收入停滞。


With an expanding share of the gains from economic growth flowing to a tiny fraction of high-income US households, average family income for the bottom 90% has been flat since 1980.	一方面经济增长收益流向了极少数高收入美国家庭的份额越来越大，另一方面下层那90%家庭的平均收入却自1980年以来一直原地踏步。 按照经济顾问委员会最近发布的一份报告。


According to a recent report by the Council of Economic Advisers, if the share of income going to the bottom 90% was the same in 2013 as it was in 1973, median annual household income (adjusted for family size) would be 18%, or about $9,000, higher than it is now.	如果2013年流向下面那90%家庭的收入比例跟1973年一样的话，年均家庭收入中位数（按照家庭成员数量有所调整）将是18%。 或者约9000美元，高于现在的水平。


The disposable (after tax and transfer) incomes of poor families in the US have trailed those of their counterparts in other developed countries for decades.	在缴税和转移支付之后的美国贫穷家庭可支配收入在这数十年中长期落后于其他发达国家的相同人群。


Now the US middle class is also falling behind.	如今美国的中产阶级也步了前者的后尘。


During the last three decades, middle-income households in most developed countries enjoyed larger increases in disposable income than comparable US households.	在过去30年中，绝大多数发达国家中等收入家庭的可支配收入增长要比同等的美国家庭要高。


This year, the US lost the distinction of having the “most affluent” middle class to Canada, with several European countries not far behind.	今年，美国把拥有最富裕中产阶级国家的宝座让给了加拿大，而几个欧洲国家也逐渐赶超了上来。


Once the generous public benefits in education, health care, and retirement are added to estimates of disposable family income in these countries, the relative position of the US middle class slips even further.	而倘若把慷慨的公共教育，医疗，和退休收益都计入这些国家的家庭可支配收入计算中的话，那美国中产阶级的相对位置只会滑向得更远。 。


The main culprit behind the languishing fortunes of America’s middle class is slow wage growth.	而美国中产阶级优越生活逐渐失落的主要原因则是工资增长的放缓。


After peaking in the early 1970s, real (inflation-adjusted) median earnings of full-time workers aged 25-64 stagnated, partly owing to a slowdown in productivity growth and partly because of a yawning gap between productivity and wage growth.	在1970年代的高峰期过后。 计入通胀后的25到64岁全职员工实际收入中位数陷入停滞，这一部分是由于生产率增长的放缓，另一部分则源自于生产率和工资增长之间不断扩大的鸿沟。


Since 1980, average real hourly compensation has increased at an annual rate of 1%, or half the rate of productivity growth.	自1980年以来，平均实际。 时薪增长仅为每年1%，或仅仅是生产力增长率的一半。


Wage gains have also become considerably more unequal, with the biggest increases claimed by the top 10% of earners.	工资收入的不平等状况也变得相当明显，加工资最多的人是那最顶端的10%。


Moreover, technological change and globalization have reduced the share of middle-skill jobs in overall employment, while the share of lower-skill jobs has increased.	此外科学技术变革和全球化减少了中等技能工作在总体就业中的份额，而低技术工种职位的比例则有所增加。


These trends, along with a falling labor-force participation rate during the last decade, explain the stagnation of middle-class incomes.	这些趋势再加上过去十年中劳动力参与率的持续降低，正好解释了中产阶级收入陷入停滞的原因


For most Americans, wages are the primary source of disposable income, which in turn drives personal consumption spending – by far the largest component of aggregate demand.	对大多数美国人来说，工资是可支配收入的主要来源，也反过来驱动着个人消费支出——也是目前总需求中份额最大的一部分。 过去数十年间。


Over the past several decades, as growth in disposable income slowed, middle- and lower-income households turned to debt to sustain consumption.	随着可支配收入的增长不断放缓。 中产和低收入家庭只能靠借贷来维持消费。


Personal savings rates collapsed, and credit and mortgage debt soared, as households attempted to keep pace with the consumption norms of the wealthy.	由于这些家庭努力与富有家庭的消费标准保持同步，导致个人储蓄率急跌，而信贷和抵押贷款负债高涨。


For quite some time, growing income inequality did not slow consumption growth; indeed, “trickle-down consumption” pressures fostered more consumer spending, more debt, more bankruptcy, and more financial stress among middle- and lower-income households.	在相当一段时间中，不断扩大的收入失衡现象并未拉低消费的增长； 事实上，“跟风消费”的压力孕育了更多的消费者支出，更多的借贷，更多的破产，以及中等和低收入家庭越来越大的财务压力。


The moment of reckoning arrived with the 2007-2008 financial crisis.	而秋后算账的时刻也随着2007至2008年的金融危机而到来。


Since then, aggregate consumption growth has been lackluster, as middle- and lower-income families have been forced to reduce their borrowing and pay down their debt, often through painful defaults on their homes – their primary (and often their only) asset.	自那以后，消费总量增长陷入停滞，因为中低收入家庭被迫减少借贷并清偿自身债务，而这往往是通过痛苦的住宅——也是这些家庭的主要（而且往往是唯一）财产——贷款违约行为来实现的。


As these families have tightened their belts, the pace of consumption spending and economic growth has become more dependent on earners at the top of the income distribution.	由于这些家庭开始勒紧裤腰带生活，消费支出和经济增长的速度就更加依赖于收入分配顶层的群体。


Since the recession ended in 2009, real consumption spending by the top 5% has increased by 17%, compared to just 1% for the bottom 95%.	自从衰退在2009年终结之后，社会最顶层的那5%群体的实际消费支出增长了17%，而其他95%的群体的增长仅为1%。


The recovery’s pattern has reinforced longer-run trends.	这个经济复原模式也强化了一个长期趋势。


In 2012, the top 5% of earners accounted for 38% of personal-consumption expenditure, compared to 27% in 1995.	在2012年，收入最高的那5%的群体占据了个人消费支出的38%，而1995年这个数字为27%。


During that period, the consumption share for the bottom 80% of earners dropped from 47% to 39%.	在同一时期。 其他80%的群体消费比例则从47%下降到了39%。


Looking to the future, growing income inequality and stagnant incomes for the majority of Americans mean weaker aggregate demand and slower growth.	展望未来，不断加剧的收入失衡以及大部分��国人的收入停滞意味着更疲软的总需求以及更缓慢的经济增长。


Even more important, income inequality constrains economic growth on the supply side through its adverse effects on educational opportunity and human-capital development.	更重要的是，收入失衡通过其在教育机会和人力资本发展方面的负面作用，又在供应端限制了经济增长。


Children born into low- and high-income families are born with similar abilities.	出生在低收入和高收入家庭的儿童其实有着同样的天赋，但却占据着不同的教育机会。


But they have very different educational opportunities, with children in low-income families less likely to have access to early childhood education, more likely to attend under-resourced schools that deliver inferior K-12 education, and less likely to attend or complete college.	低收入家庭的儿童更缺乏接受早期教育的渠道，更可能就读于那些提供低劣12年制教育的学校，也更少机会去接受或完成大学教育。


The resulting educational-attainment gap between children born into low and high-income families emerges at an early age and grows over time.	这两种家庭孩子之间随之产生的教育成就鸿沟在儿童早年开始出现，并随着时间的推移不断扩大。


By some estimates, the gap today is twice as large as it was two decades ago.	按照某些估算数据，这一鸿沟比20年前扩大了一倍。


So the US is caught in a vicious circle: rising income inequality breeds more inequality in educational opportunity, which generates greater inequality in educational attainment.	至此美国已经陷入了一个恶性循环：不断增长的收入失衡孕育了教育机会的更加不均等，也随之在教育成就方面催生了更大的不平等。


That, in turn, translates into a waste of human talent, a less educated workforce, slower economic growth, and even greater income inequality.	这反过来意味着被浪费了的人类天赋，教育程度更低的劳动力群体，更缓慢的经济增长。 以及更大的收入失衡。


Although the economic costs of income inequality are substantial, the political costs may prove to be the most damaging and dangerous. The rich have both the incentives and the ability to promote policies that maintain or enhance their position.	即便收入失衡的经济成本已经极为庞大，但因此产生的政治成本或许更具破坏性和危险性，因为富人同时具备动机和能力去推动一些政策的实施以维持或强化自身地位。


Given the US Supreme Court’s evisceration of campaign-finance restrictions, it has become easier than ever for concentrated economic power to exercise concentrated political power.	考虑到美国最高法院对选举资助行为限制的松绑，高度集中的经济力量也比以往更容易去操纵高度集中政治权力。


Though campaign contributions do not guarantee victory, they give the economic elite greater access to legislators, regulators, and other public officials, enabling them to shape the political debate in favor of their interests.	虽然选举赞助并不一定能保证胜选，却给了经济精英们更多接触和联络立法者，监管者及其他政府官员的渠道，让他们可以塑造更符合自身利益的政治议程。


As a result, the US political system is increasingly dominated by money.	于是乎，美国的政治就越来越被金钱所操纵。


This is a clear sign that income inequality in the US has risen to levels that threaten not only the economy’s growth, but also the health of its democracy.	这也是一个明确的标志，说明美国的收入失衡状况已经上升到了不仅威胁经济发展，同时也威胁到了民主体制健康运行的程度。


Countdown to Withdrawal from Iraq	伊拉克撤军倒计时


How long will the United States maintain a large deployment of troops in Iraq?	美国在伊拉克大规模的军事部署会维持到何时？


That is now the central question of George W. Bush’s second term.	这正是当前布什第二任总统任期的中心问题。


Until recently, the Bush administration answered with an evasive cliché: “as long as it takes and not one day longer.”	直到最近，布什政府用一句很老套的话作为回答：“到了该撤军的时候，我们一天都不会拖延。


But not anymore.	”这就是他们做出的全部许诺。


The ice began to crack on November 17, when Representative John Murtha, a hawkish Democratic congressman and marine veteran, suggested pulling troops out of Iraq in six months.	11月17日，当民主党鹰派众议员、海军老兵约翰•默撒（John Murtha）提出在六个月内撤出伊拉克的建议时，这种僵持局面才开始得到缓和。


Soon after, the Republican-controlled Senate voted for “a significant transition to full Iraq sovereignty in 2006.”	不久，由共和党控制的参议院对“2006年向实现伊拉克全面主权过渡”的议题进行了投票。


After initial resistance, Bush began to change his rhetoric by suggesting that a troop drawdown would occur sooner than previously expected.	布什开始表示反对，继而改变措辞，表示会比先前预期的时间更早一些削减驻伊部队。


The erosion in public support for Bush’s Iraq policy is stark.	公众对布什伊拉克政策的支持率明显下降。


Fifty-four percent of Americans now say that the US erred in sending troops, up from 24% at the start of the war in March 2003.	54%的美国人现在认为美国派遣部队是个错误，而在2003年战争刚刚开始的时候这个数字只有24%。


In part, this reflects the rising casualty rate, with more than 2,100 American soldiers killed thus far.	这在某种程度上反映出伤亡率的持续上升，现在美国士兵的伤亡数量已经超过2100人。


But it also reflects a growing belief that the war is failing.	但是这也反映出，越来越多的人认为这场战争是令人失望的。


As Duke University’s Peter Feaver, an expert on public opinion who is now serving as a White House advisor, recently pointed out, Americans will tolerate casualties when they believe that a war is just and has a reasonable prospect of success.	民意学专家、现任白宫顾问的杜克大学的彼得•费韦尔（Peter Feaver）最近指出，美国人民在相信战争正义性的前提下尚可以容忍伤亡，并会合乎情理的期待胜利到来。


But citizens now doubt both these points.	但是对于这两点，他们现在均表示出怀疑。


The administration is paying the price for overselling the reasons for the war and bungling the post-invasion occupation.	政府也正在为过分寻找战争借口和侵略后占领的混乱局面付出代价。


Not surprisingly, Bush’s new rhetoric stresses that he has a “strategy for victory.”	布什变换措辞强调说，他有自己的“制胜策略”，这一点儿也不出人意料。


If “victory” remains defined as stable democracy in Iraq, it is unlikely that Bush will have enough time to implement his strategy.	如果我们仍然把胜利定义为伊拉克稳定的民主状态，那么布什似乎就没有充足的时间实施他的“策略”了。


In September, General George Casey, the senior American military commander in Iraq, testified to Congress that modern insurgencies last about a decade, and that the Iraqi army had only one battalion capable of fighting without help from American military forces.	九月，驻伊美军指挥官乔治•凯西（George Casey）将军向国会证实，现代化的武装叛乱已经持续大约十年，在没有美军支援的情况下，伊拉克军队只有一个营的力量可以与之抵抗。


A month later, the influential International Institute for Strategic Studies in London estimated that US troop withdrawals next year were likely to be small, and that it would take at least five years for Iraq to build the 300,000-strong army needed to fight the insurgency on its own.	一个月后，颇具影响力的伦敦国际战略研究所做出预计：明年美国的撤军行动规模会比较小，并且伊拉克要建设30万有能力单独镇压叛乱的强大军队，至少还需要5年时间。


But, with Congressional elections in 2006 and a presidential election in 2008, five years is too long.	但是对即将于2006年开始的国会大选和2008年的总统大选而言，五年的时间毕竟太长。


It seems more realistic that the Republican administration will have only 18 months to two years to implement its strategy.	看来，共和党只有一年半或者两年的时间来实施它的策略了。


The Democrats, meanwhile, are divided.	同时，民主党成员之间的意见也不一致。


Some, like John Murtha and Nancy Pelosi, the minority leader in the House of Representatives, want a short timetable, while others, like Senator Joseph Biden, resists a firm timetable but predicts a withdrawal of 50,000 US troops in 2006, with many of the remaining 100,000 to follow in 2007.	约翰•默撒和众议院少数派领袖南希·珀罗希（Nancy Pelosi）等人要求在短期内完成撤军，而以参议院议员约瑟夫•拜登（Joseph Biden）为代表的人则反对固定的时间表，预期美国将在2006年撤军5万，继而在2007年撤出剩余的10万军队。


Those of us who believe that invading Iraq was a mistake, and that Bush is guilty of hubris in his failure to plan adequately for the aftermath, face a dilemma: if America withdraws too precipitously, it may compound these mistakes.	我们当中坚持侵略伊拉克是错误的，并且坚持布什应该对缺乏战后规划负责的人现在面临着一个两难的境地：如果美国撤军过于仓促，可能又会错上加错。


Iraq is not like Vietnam, where American departure was followed by stability imposed by an authoritarian government.	伊拉克不同于越南，越南在美国撤离之后，进入独裁政府强加的稳定局面。


In Iraq, the danger is that departure could be followed by civil war and chaos – ideal conditions for terrorists to maintain havens.	而伊拉克的危险在于：撤军会导致内战和混乱局面¾而这又为恐怖分子活动提供了最理想的环境。


Iraq differs from Vietnam in another way as well.	伊拉克和越南的区别还体现在另外一个方面。


Unlike the North Vietnamese, the Sunni insurgents will have a difficult time taking over a country where they represent only 20% of the population.	和北越不一样，逊尼派叛乱者只占总人口的20%，要想控制整个国家不是件容易的事。


Indeed, with Shia Arabs and Kurds making up 80% of the country, the insurgency is focused on only four of Iraq’s 18 provinces.	而什叶派和库尔德人却占据了全国人口的80%，叛乱只是集中在伊拉克18个省份中的4个而已。


America’s quandary is that it is both part of the problem and part of the solution.	美国的窘境在于它既是导致问题的一个因素，同时又是解决问题的部分力量。


So long as a large number of American troops remains as an occupying force, they serve as a recruiting tool for insurgents.	只要美国部队占领伊拉克一天，就只会招致更多的叛乱。


As the political scientist Robert Pape has shown in a careful study, resistance to foreign occupation is a prime motivation for suicide bombers.	正像政治学家罗伯特•帕普（Robert Pape）在一项深入研究中揭示的那样，抵制外国军队占领是自杀性爆炸事件的首要诱因。


But, if America leaves too soon, the elected Iraqi government may be unable to cope with the insurgency, sending Iraq the way of Lebanon in the 1980’s or Afghanistan in the 1990’s.	但是如果美国过早撤离，当选的伊拉克政府又可能无力应付叛乱局面，从而使伊拉克陷入上世纪80年代黎巴嫩、或者90年代阿富汗的状态。


Similarly, if Bush sets a short timetable, he may encourage the insurgents to wait him out.	同样，如果布什制定一个短期撤军计划，那他可能鼓励叛乱分子坐等他离开。


But, unless he makes it clear that American troops will leave in the near term, he will reinforce the impression of imperial occupation.	但除非他明确表示美���将在近期撤离，否则只会加深别人心目中美国强权占领的印象。


The key to resolving this dilemma will be to press for local compromises that involve Sunnis in the political process, and to step up the rate of training of Iraqis to manage their own security.	解决这一尴尬局面的关键是要迫使当地势力达成妥协：在政治进程中接纳逊尼派，同时加快伊拉克人管理自身安全问题的的训练步伐。


Even then, success is uncertain.	即便如此，是否会取得成功仍然是个未知数。


One failure is already clear: that of the neo-conservative dream of creating a military ally that could serve as a long-term base for American troops in the campaign to transform and democratize the Middle East.	一个失败已经非常明显，即：创建一个军事联盟的新保守主义梦想，这一联盟曾被看作是美军对中东进行改造和民主化的长久基础。


Three elections have produced some degree of legitimacy for the Shia-dominated Iraqi government, but without a sense of community and effective institutions, elections merely create a tyranny of the majority.	三次竞选为什叶派占主导地位的政府制造了某种程度上的合法性，但如果没有团队意识和有效机制，选举仅仅是产生出一个多数人进行统治的暴政。


That may be better than Saddam Hussein’s tyranny of the minority, but it is hardly modern democracy.	这可能比萨达姆•侯赛因的少数派暴政好一些，但仍然谈不上是现代民主。


Bush compares his goal in Iraq to the democratization of Japan after World War II. But Japan was a totally conquered, ethnically homogeneous country with no insurgency, a large middle class, and previous experience of political openness.	布什把他在伊拉克的目标与二战后日本的民主化相提并论，但当时日本完全处于战败状态，人种单一，没有叛乱发生，存在着大量的中产阶级，并且之前有过政治开放的经验。


Even then, success took seven years.	尽管这样，取得成功还是用了七年时间。


Instead, Bush should plan on a two-year window to give the Iraqi government as strong a chance as possible before the Americans leave, while emphasizing that Iraqis will thereafter be responsible for their own security and political salvation.	恰恰相反，布什应该制定一个两年计划，在美军撤离前，给予伊拉克政府尽可能充分的施展机会，同时还要强调伊拉克在美军撤离之后必须对自身的安全和政治拯救负责。


Local Innovation for Local Problems	解决地方问题的地方创新举措


BOSTON – As we learn more about the threat from substandard and counterfeit medicines, it is becoming clear that it is a far greater problem than previously thought.	波士顿——随着我们对不合格及假冒药品的深入理解，这个问题显然正在超出我们之前的想象。


It is also a scourge that is most acutely felt in developing countries, where fake and low-quality pharmaceuticals kill more than 500,000 people a year and affect millions more by contributing to the emergence of diseases that are resistant to existing treatments.	这也是发展中国家面临的最大隐患，假冒伪劣药品每年造成超过500，000人死亡，还因促使疾病对现有治疗产生抗药性而影响着成百上千万人的健康。


Compounding the problem is the approach taken by policymakers in the developing world, who are far more likely to look for solutions abroad than at home.	发展中国家决策者致使问题愈加严重，他们更愿意抛开国内到国外去寻找解决办法。


This shortsightedness is a grave mistake that impedes innovation and progress.	这种错误的短视行为严重阻碍了创新和进步。


When it comes to tackling high-impact health challenges like the proliferation of fake or inferior drugs, local solutions and local innovations are not only likely to be central to any successful effort; they have the potential to provide benefits that go far beyond the scope of the original problem.	在涉及解决假冒伪劣药品蔓延等极具影响力的健康难题方面，植根于当地的解决办法和创新不仅对成功至关重要； 而且带来的收益还可能远远超出原来问题的范畴。


Throughout the developing world, but most evidently in Africa, two groups are interested in finding tools to combat the menace of bad drugs.	在整个发展中世界，最明显是在非洲，有两大团体对打击伪劣药品兴趣浓厚。


One group, comprising students, entrepreneurs, and researchers, seeks solutions that are local, original, and tailored to the needs of their societies. Its members are quick to share ideas and eager to collaborate.	其中一个由学生、企业家和研究人员组成的团体热衷于合作及思想交流，一直以寻找能满足当地社会需求的创新解决方案为目标。


While this group has produced some innovative solutions – for example, the Ghanaian entrepreneur Bright Simmons is using mobile technology to address the counterfeit-drug problem – many more passionate local inventors and entrepreneurs must get involved.	尽管上述团体已经找到了某种创新方法——如加纳企业家西蒙斯利用移动技术来解决假药问题——但还需要更多热情的当地发明家和企业家的加入。


The other group is made up of government officials, including regulators.	另一个团体的主力是政府官员（包括监管机构）。


They, too, are deeply concerned about the scourge of low-quality and fake drugs, but they are reluctant to rely on local innovation.	他们对假冒伪劣药品泛滥深感忧虑，但却不愿以当地创新为依托。


In their minds, the solutions already exist, in the form of high-end technology designed and developed in the world’s richest countries.	他们认为解决方案已经存在，但是以高端技术的形式存在于全世界最富有的发达国家。


The challenge, for this group, lies in finding the financial resources to import these technologies.	上述团体的难题在于如何寻找财政资源引进这些技术。


For developing-country leaders, the effort needed to create an ecosystem that supports innovation simply appears too great, and the return on investment too little.	对发展中国家领导人而言，创造支持创新生态系统的投资回报少之又少，但所需的工作却似乎太过繁杂。


At countless conferences and symposia, ministry officials and government personnel insist that funds must be found to import solutions, à la carte.	在无数会议和专题讨论会上，各部官员和政府工作人员坚持认为必须找到资金按既有模式进口解决办法。


Research and innovation, or engagement with local entrepreneurs and inventors, is, unfortunately, never on the agenda.	遗憾的是，研究创新、或与当地企业家及发明家合作却从未提上议事日程。


There simply is little interest in tapping into the enormous pool of intellect, passion, and energy at home.	决策者鲜有兴趣挖掘国内巨大的智慧、激情和能量。


Officials would be wise to reconsider.	官员们应当重新思考。


There is mounting evidence that sustainable solutions must have local support and local partners.	越来越多的证据表明必须有当地的支持及合作解决方法才能长久。


Raising funds to import solutions from abroad addresses just one part of the challenge.	募集资金从海外进口技术只是解决方法中的一种。


Many countries lack the resources to install, operate, and maintain equipment that has not been designed locally.	很多国家缺少安装、操作和维护海外设备所需的资源。


As misuse and neglect causes equipment to malfunction, more funds become required or the program simply dies.	如果因误用和忽视引发设备故障，就需要更多资金否则项目就宣告下马。


Not only does this approach fail to nurture local ecosystems of innovation, which is deeply frustrating; it also fails – repeatedly – to solve the problem at hand.	这种方法不仅无法培育当地的创新生态系统（这已经非常令人沮丧）； 同时也反复受困于眼前问题而找不到解决办法。


While some solutions in the area of drug-quality testing have come from African entrepreneurs like Simmons, such examples are extremely rare, and many are developed in the diaspora with the support of organizations from outside the region.	虽然药品质量测试领域某些解决方案来自像西蒙斯那样的非洲企业家，但其中不少都是在区域外机构支持下进行的零散研发。


For the most part, such initiatives never engage local students.	多数研发计划从未邀请过当地的学生参加。


Local curricula do not focus on local challenges or promote local innovation.	解决地方难题或推动地方创新并不是当地教学的主要目标。


And yet local talent is critical for solutions that are both original and sustainable.	但创新、可持续方案不能缺少当地人才。


Indeed, by nurturing an inclusive culture of research, local innovation has the potential to provide benefits that extend far beyond the specific problem that is being addressed.	事实上，通过培育包容性的研究文化，当地创新的潜力绝不局限在具体问题的解决。


Nurturing the participation of underrepresented groups and creating opportunities for education and learning not only creates goodwill and promotes transparency and accountability.	鼓励弱势群体参与并创造教育学习机会在培养善意的同时推进透明和问责。


Building a stable foundation for future research also enables more productive public-private partnerships and stronger links between academia and domestic industry, thereby promoting economic growth.	奠定未来研究的稳定基础在打造高效公私伙伴关系的同时强化学术界和国内产业联系，并因此推动经济增长。


Foreign organizations, such as aid agencies or pharmaceutical companies, do have a role to play in boosting local innovation.	外国机构，比方说援助机构或制药企业，可以在推动本土创新上发挥作用。


They can support it financially, create new partnerships, and encourage policymakers to give it more credence.	他们可以在经济上支持创新，建立新型伙伴关系并鼓励决策者更多信任创新研究。


The international community has a role to play as well.	国际社会也要发挥作用。


This year, the United Nations will adopt the Sustainable Development Goals, marking the start of the next phase of global efforts to eradicate poverty and improve health.	今年，联合国将实行可持续发展目标，标志着正式启动了全球消除贫困和改善健康的下一阶段工作。


As the example of developing countries’ ongoing fight against counterfeit and low-quality medicines shows, success will depend – far more often than not – on local innovation.	正如发展中国家打击假冒伪劣药品的实例所表明的那样，地方创新将决定能否成功实现目标。


Countering the Contagious West	抵御西方传染病


NEWPORT BEACH – Imagine for a moment that you are the chief policymaker in a successful emerging-market country.	纽波特海滩——想象一下，你是某新兴市场国家的主要决策者。


You are watching with legitimate concern (and a mixture of astonishment and anger) as Europe’s crippling debt crisis spreads and America’s dysfunctional politics leave it unable to revive its moribund economy.	自然地，你关注着欧洲愈演愈烈的债务危机，也担心美国政策失当让其无法提振萎靡的经济，心中既有几分震惊，也带着几分愤怒。


Would you draw comfort from your country’s impressive internal resilience and offset the deflationary winds blowing from the West; or would you play it safe and increase your country’s precautionary reserves?	你会因本国令人瞩目的自力更生能力和成功抵挡了席卷西方的通缩风暴而踌躇满志吗？ 还是会继续小心行事，增加本国的预防性储备？


That is the question facing several emerging-market economies, and its impact extends well beyond their borders.	这就是目前不少新兴市场经济体所面临的问题，这一问题的影响范围远远超过了国家层面。


Indeed, it is a question that also speaks to the increasingly worrisome outlook for the global economy.	事实上，这一问题也是令人越来越担心的全球经济前景的写照。


The very fact that we are posing this question is novel and notable it its own right.	我们正面临如此问题，这一事实既令人瞩目，又令人不可思议。


You can add this to the list of previously unthinkable things that we have witnessed lately.	你可以把它加入到曾经不可想象、但最近被我们亲眼目睹的事件的名单中去。


That list includes, just in the last few weeks, America’s loss of its sacred AAA rating; its political flirtation with a debt default; mounting concern about debt restructurings in peripheral European economies and talk about a possible eurozone breakup; and Switzerland’s dramatic steps to reduce (yes, reduce) its safe-haven status.	这一名单包括（就拿过去几周来说）：美国失去了宝贵的AAA信用评级、美国在债务违约问题上的政治闹剧、与日俱增的对欧洲外围国家债务重组的担忧以及欧元区可能分崩离析的传闻、以及瑞士大踏步地削弱（对，就是削弱）自己安全港地位。


The answer to the emerging markets’ question would have been straightforward a few years ago.	换做几年前，新兴市场所面临的问题有着直接明了的答案。


It is not today.	但如今，情况有变。


In the world of old, the West’s economic malaise already would have pulled the rug from beneath most emerging-market countries.	在旧世界，西方经济萎靡或许已经把新兴市场国家拖入了万劫不复。


Indeed, the conventional wisdom – supported by many painful experiences – was that when the industrial countries sneezed, the emerging world caught a cold.	事实上，在传统智慧看来（有大量痛苦的经验支持传统智慧），工业国打个喷嚏，新兴市场就得感冒。


Today, however, several (though not all) emerging-market countries are benefiting from years of considerable efforts to reduce their financial vulnerability by accumulating huge amounts of international reserves.	但是，多年来，不少（虽然不是全部）新兴市场国家在降低金融脆弱性方面取得了长足的进步，他们积累起了巨大的国际储备，这使得它们获益良多。


They have also paid back a significant share of external debt and converted much of what remains into more manageable local-currency liabilities.	它们还偿还了大部分外部债务，剩余部分也大多转换为了更易管理的本币债务。


This sharp balance-sheet improvement has been instrumental in enabling emerging countries to bounce back strongly from the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, whereas the West continues to hobble along.	资产负债表方面的巨大改善使新兴国家能够在2008—2009年的全球金融危机中迅速复苏，而西方国家则一直在泥淖中苦苦挣扎。


Indeed, until the recent renewed downturn in America and Europe, the emerging world’s major policy concern was too much growth, mounting inflationary pressure, and economic overheating.	事实上，在最近欧美衰退卷土重来之前，新兴市场的主要政策难题是增长太快、通胀压力剧增以及经济过热。


Today’s emerging countries have considerable policy flexibility and much greater latitude to act than they had in the past.	如今的新兴国家拥有极大的政策灵活性，行动空间也较过去扩大了很多。


Accordingly, faced with a weakening global economy, they confront two basic policy choices.	因此，在面临疲软的全球经济时，它们有两种基本政策可供选择。


On the one hand, they can compensate for the global weakness by turbo-charging their own internal demand through aggressive fiscal stimulus.	一方面，它们可以采取激进的财政刺激大幅提振内需，从而补偿全球疲软。


This would shield their populations from the West’s problems and, at the global level, provide a counter-impetus to the deteriorating global outlook.	这可以让新兴国家的人民免于遭受西方人所面临的问题，而且，在全球层面，这样的做法也有助于消除全球经济增长阻力。


In the process, they would shift some of the policy emphasis from production to consumption.	在此过程中，新兴国家的部分政策重点将从生产转向消费。


They would run down their trade surpluses and, in some cases, allow their currencies to appreciate.	新兴国家将减少其贸易盈余，在某些情况下还将允许本币升值。


Their international reserves would decline and/or their debt would rise.	它们的国际储备��有所下降，债务（或许）将有所上升。


On the other hand, these economies can opt for greater self-insurance.	另一方面，新兴经济体也可以选择进一步自我保护。


In this scenario, rather than stimulating domestic demand, they would fortify their defenses, positioning themselves for a long and stormy winter for the global economy.	若如此，则它们不会刺激内需，而是高筑墙、广积粮，为全球经济进入漫长严冬做好准备。


Thus, they would minimize the deterioration in their trade surpluses, maintain competitive exchange rates, and safeguard their foreign reserves and net-creditor positions.	因此，它们会尽力避免贸易盈余恶化、维持有竞争力的汇率，并捍卫其外汇储备以及净债权人的地位。


In the process, they would accentuate the pressure on the global economy from the West’s seemingly endless downturn.	在此过程中，它们会强调是西方没完没了的衰退让全球经济承受了巨大压力。


I suspect that emerging-market policymakers’ hearts are advocating the former.	我认为，新兴市场决策者是倾向于前者的。


After all, a domestic stimulus would help maintain economic growth.	毕竟国内财政刺激有助于维持经济增长。


Moreover, a counter-cyclical policy would signal to the world these countries’ willingness to take on global responsibilities.	此外，反周期政策也是在向全世界发出信号：我们愿意承担全球责任。


But I also suspect that their heads are cautioning against spending a lot of money in an attempt to accomplish a difficult, if not impossible, task.	但我还认为，新兴市场首脑对于朝艰巨（甚至是不可能完成的）任务投入重金还是心存顾虑的。


After all, there is little to suggest that emerging economies could counter, effectively and sustainably, a large synchronized slowdown in the West, especially when it comes with the risk of another banking crisis.	毕竟，没有证据表明新兴市场可以持续有效地抵御西方世界的大规模同步衰退，特别是在伴随着另一次银行危机风险的情况下。


My inclination is to believe that the head will prevail – but not completely.	我认为最终首脑会胜出，但会有所妥协。


Emerging-market economies will take some steps, including interest-rate cuts, to safeguard domestic growth.	新兴市场经济体会采取一定的措施（包括削减利率）来捍卫其国内增长。


They will also signal willingness to help the West financially.	同时，它们也会释放信号，表明自己愿意在财政方面帮助西方。


But such steps, while notable, would prove insufficient to counter fully the slowdown emanating from the West; and it certainly would not materially change the outlook for the United States and Europe.	但这些措施虽说引人注目，却不足以完全低效西方世界带来的减速； 也不可能在实质上改变美国和欧洲的增长前景。


Despite their strong fundamentals, emerging countries still feel vulnerable in the face of the West’s economic weakness, policy shortfalls, and political paralysis.	新兴国家有着强劲的基本面，但在面临西方世界经济疲软、政策缺陷以及政治瘫痪时，它们依然不够强大。


Moreover, they know from experience that there are no easy and immediate solutions to the West’s debt overhang and structural impediments to growth.	此外，从经验中它们知道，对于西方债务宿醉和增长的结构性障碍，并不存在轻松速效的药方。


And they have no illusions about the potential for effective global policy coordination.	它们也不会幻想有效的全球政策协调会产生多大作用。


In such circumstances, policymakers in emerging markets will eschew boldness for prudence.	在这样的情况下，新兴市场决策者将避免激进，拥抱审慎。


They will hope for a short winter for the global economy, but they will plan and position for a long one.	他们会希望全球经济严冬赶快过去，但也会对漫长冬天做好准备。


Accordingly, they will show very limited appetite for risking the hard-earned policy gains of the last 10-15 years, and the resilience and self-assurance that has come with those gains.	因此，他们绝不会拿过去10—15年来辛苦赢得的政策收益以及随之获得的强大恢复力和自我保护能力冒很大的风险。


Having put yourself in their position for a moment, can you blame them?	设身处地地设想一下，你又能指责他们什么呢？


Counting Iraqi Casualties	统计伊拉克的伤亡情况


In times of war, accurate figures on the civilian death toll are almost always hard to come by.	战争时期，对平民伤亡数据的统计总是面临着重重困难。


With few exceptions, demographers and epidemiologists have not applied their expertise to making rigorous, credible estimates of civilian mortality and morbidity.	利用自己的专长对平民百姓的死亡率和发病率进行严谨、可信统计的人口统计学家和流行病学家少之又少。


Sometimes, a lack of professional freedom prevents those who may be most familiar with the data – for example, analysts whose livelihoods depend on the government(s) involved in the conflict – from using their expertise for purposes that could be politically damaging.	有些时候，职业自由的匮乏使那些最熟悉情况的人无法将自己的专长用于可能造成政治危害的目的¾举例来讲，很多分析人士需要依赖卷入冲突的政府才能维持自己的生计。


But there are other challenges as well.	对伤亡数据的统计还面临着其他挑战。


Isolating the conflict’s impact from that of other interventions (e.g., economic sanctions) may be impossible.	将冲突与其他干扰（比如经济制裁）的影响截然分开几乎是不可能的。


Moreover, the high-quality population data needed for credible estimates may not be available due to their “sensitive nature,” or because they never have been collected (sometimes the case in developing nations), or because refugee movements have made data obsolete.	不仅如此，可靠估算所需的高质量人口数据也许因其“敏感性”而难以获取，也许根本就没有做过这方面的统计（有时在发展中国家会发生这种情况），也可能随着难民的流动这些数据已经失效。


As a result, the degree of uncertainty in such estimates may be unacceptably high, making them of little real worth.	结果是估计的不确定性高得令人无法接受，使这些数据失去了真正的实用价值。


Consider the different approaches that have been used to examine the Iraq war.	让我们来看看在统计伊拉克战争的伤亡人数统计时所使用的不同方法。


The Iraq Body Count aims to tally only deaths from violence during the current war by creating a data set based on media reports.	伊拉克死亡调查组织试图按照媒体的报导来计算出战争中的死亡人数。


If there is no double counting, and if the incidents included in the data were reported correctly, their tally represents a minimum number, because media reports may not be comprehensive.	如果不存在重复计算、如果媒体对暴力事件的报导准确无误，那么他们所得出的只能是最低数额，因为媒体的报导可能并不完整。


Another approach estimates the total change in mortality that the war caused (including deaths due to the war’s direct and indirect effects) by calculating the change in the death rate from the pre-war period.	另外一种方法通过计算相对于战前的死亡率变化来估算战争所造成的总的死亡率变化（包括因战争原因直接或间接造成的死亡）。


This requires data upon which to base the rise in mortality, usually derived by conducting a household survey on a random sample of the population.	这需要了解死亡率上升的数据，而这样的数据一般通过对现存人口进行随机的家庭抽样调查来取得。


Typically, interviewers ask the head of the household to disclose the number and demographic characteristics of pre-war household members, whether any of the people in the pre-war household had died between the pre-war period and the time of the survey, and the date of any household member’s death.	调查员通常会要求户主填写战前家庭人口的数量和统计特征，以及战前家庭人口中是否有人在从战前到人口调查这段时间内死去，另外还会询问家庭成员具体的死亡时间。


If household surveys are carried out properly, the number of excess deaths during the war can be estimated within a range of statistical uncertainty.	如果家庭调查所采用的方法正确，那么对战争期间额外死亡人数的估算是可以控制在一定的精度范围之内的。


But, when conducted during wartime, risks abound.	但战时进行调查伴随着很高的风险。


Aside from the risks to interviewers collecting such data during a conflict, these include the selection bias of households in the sample, a lack of credible population data to which to apply the changed mortality rates, and mistaken or misleading accounts by participants.	除调查人员战时搜集数据所面临的危险之外，还需要克服取样时的选择偏好，缺乏能够适用改变后的死亡率的可靠的人口数据，以及参与调查者所提供的错误或误导性的信息。


The survey approach was used twice by a group of researchers based primarily at Johns Hopkins University, who published their results in the medical journal  The Lancet .	主要来自约翰·霍普金斯大学的调查人员两次使用了这种调查方法，并将调查结果在医学期刊《柳叶刀》上进行了刊登。


Their estimates have been lauded, but also questioned because of their misinterpretation of their own figures.	他们的估算被人广为称颂，但也由于他们曲解了自己的调查数据而受到了人们的质疑。


For example, in a summary of the 2004 study, they wrote, “Making conservative assumptions we think that about 100,000 excess deaths, or more, have happened since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.”	举个例子，在2004年度的研究总结中，他们写道，“根据保守估计我们认为从2003年入侵伊拉克后死亡人数至少增长了100,000人或者更多。


But the first study yielded very imprecise estimates of the number of deaths, which the authors glossed over.	”但在第一次研究中作者曾对死亡人数做出了非常不准确估计，而他们现在试图对这一数据进行掩饰。


They should have said, “We can say with 95% certainty that between 8,000 and 194,000 excess Iraqi deaths occurred during the period.”	他们应该说，“我们有95%的把握认为，在此期间内伊拉克的死亡人数大致增长了8，000至194,000人”才更准确。


The group essentially repeated the study in 2006, using a larger sample size.	该研究小组在2006年又将调查重新进行了一遍，所不同的是这次调查中选取的样本数量更多。


Again, the researchers had interviewers administer what resembled a typical survey of a random sample of households.	研究人员再次要求调查员进行典型的随机家庭取样。


Appropriately, at the end of the article in  The Lancet , the authors discuss issues that may have resulted in a sample that in fact did not meet the “random” threshold.	在《柳叶刀》期刊文章的末尾，作者适当地探讨了不满足“随机“条件的样本可能带来的问题。


Problems with interpretation also plagued that second effort.	数据解释问题也困扰着第二次调查。


The authors used crude death rates (CDR’s), which reflect the number of deaths per thousand people, in explaining the rise in mortality.	作者用反映每千人死亡数量的总死亡率（CDR’s）来说明死亡率的上升。


But demographers rarely use CDR’s, thinking instead in terms of age- and sex-specific mortality rates, usually summarized as “life expectancy.”	但人口统计学家很少使用总死亡率，而更多地以特定的年龄和性别死亡率来考虑问题，这一般被概括为“寿命”。


That being said, the group reported that the CDR increased from 5.5 per thousand people in 2002 to 13.3 per thousand in the post-invasion period (March 2003-March 2006).	在上述前提下，调研小组报告总死亡率从2002年的千分之五点五增加到了后入侵期（2003年3月－2006年3月）的千分之13. 3。


To put the pre-invasion figure in perspective, consider United Nations Population Division figures, which are generally considered to be of very high quality.	要正确认识入侵前的数据，只需要考虑一下联合国人口司的数据，该机构的统计数据被普遍认为质量很高。


The UN estimates that Iraq’s pre-invasion CDR was 10 per thousand, not the 5 per thousand estimated from the two studies.	联合国估计伊拉克入侵前的总死亡率是千分之十，而不是两次调查中所估计的千分之五。


Comparing internationally, the UN reports that Iran’s CDR in the 2000-2005 period was 5.3 per thousand.	与国际水平横向比较，联合国报告在2000-2005年期间伊朗的总死亡率为千分之五点三。


Prior to the war, most observers thought that the situation in Iraq was considerably worse than in Iran.	战争开始前，多数观察家认为伊拉克的情况比伊朗要糟糕很多。


So the pre-war CDR that the two  Lancet studies yield seems too low.	因此两次《柳叶刀》研究所采用的战前总死亡率似乎太低了。


It may not be wrong, but the authors should provide a credible explanation of why their pre-war CDR is nearly half that of the UN Population Division.	这不一定有错，但作者应该提供令人信服的解释，说明为什么他们的战前总死亡率只有联合国人口司数据的一半。


If the pre-war mortality rate was too low and/or if the population estimates were too high – because, for example, they ignored outflows of refugees from Iraq – the resulting estimates of the number of Iraqi “excess deaths” would be inflated.	如果战前死亡率太低和/或估计人口数太高¾比如，举个例子，他们忽略了伊拉克难民的外逃¾那么由此得出的伊拉克“死亡增量”数据就会被夸大。


More fundamentally, what purpose do these numbers serve?	更重要的是，这些数字能达到什么目的？


Certainly, after the dust has settled, numbers play a role in evaluating the costs and benefits (if any), of a war.	当然，一切尘埃落定之后，数字在估算战争的成本和收益（如果有）时能够起到一定的作用。


But in real time, do the numbers really add to the debate?	但在实际当中，这些数字是否真能引起人们的思索？


Do they really provide us with more information than the Iraq Body Count figures provide?	它给我们带来的启示是否真的比伊拉克死亡调查组织的数据要多？


Do we have the appropriate context to help us interpret the numbers?	我们是否掌握足够的资料，对这些数据做出正确的解释？


The war in Iraq has been exceptionally bloody. For now, that is about all that statistics can safely tell us.	伊拉克战争是一场特别血腥的战争，现在，这似乎是这些数据所能告诉我们的全部。


Couple’s Counseling for the US and China	中美关系婚姻咨询


BEIJING – China has undoubtedly benefited from the world system created and supported by the United States.	北京—毫无疑问，中国从美国所建立和支持的世界体系中获益良多。


Indeed, Richard Nixon’s journey to China in 1972 opened the door for China’s return to the international community.	事实上，是理查德·尼克松1972年访华之旅打开了中国回归国际社会的大门。


Most of the next two decades were a honeymoon for Sino-American relations.	尼克松访华后的20年里，中美关系大体上处于蜜月期。


On the economic front, the US not only granted China most-favored-nation trade status, but also tolerated China’s mercantilist approach to international trade and finance, notably its dual-track exchange-rate regime.	经济方面，美国不但给予中国最惠国待遇，还容忍了中国在国际贸易和金融上的重商主义做法（尤其是双轨制汇率）。


In the 1990’s, bilateral economic ties continued to expand.	20世纪90年代，双边经济关系继续发展。


American support for China’s integration into the world system culminated with the country’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001.	2001年，中国加入世贸组织，这标志着美国对中国进入世界体系的支持达到了最高峰。


Since then, China’s exports have grown five-fold.	加入世贸组织之后，中国的出口额涨了五倍。


Of course, China’s inadequate intellectual-property protection has damaged relations (a shortcoming that may be harming Chinese firms more than US firms by deterring American – and other advanced country – companies from deploying new technologies in China).	当然，中国在知识产权保护方面的欠缺伤害了中美关系（这一缺陷妨碍了美国和其他发达国家将新技术推广到中国，其对中国企业造成的伤害可能更甚于美国企业）。


And the role of China’s state-owned enterprises and official Chinese support for technological “national champions” (privileged companies that almost certainly use government money carelessly) has also hurt relations.	中国国有企业所扮演的角色以及中国政府对技术“国企巨头”（national champion，拥有特权地位、几乎肯定会滥用政府资金的公司）的支持也损害了中美关系。


In fact, China’s approach is akin to gambling against the odds.	事实上，中国的做法是在与概率对着干。


Successful hi-tech innovations are random events that follow the law of large numbers.	成功的高技术创新属于随机事件，遵从大数定律。


When left to the market, many firms and individuals try to innovate, so the overall probability of success can increase dramatically.	在市场经济中，大量公司和个人做着创新尝试，因此极大地提升了成功概率。


The market allows the law of large numbers to work, whereas concentrated government support for a few favored firms undermines it.	市场机制可以让大数定律显灵，而政府集中支持少数企业与此南辕北辙。


But neither of these flaws, nor the exchange rate, is at the root of today’s global imbalances.	但这一缺陷并非如今全球失衡的根源，汇率问题亦然。


Consider the exchange rate.	先说汇率。


The United Kingdom maintained a current-account surplus for the century before World War I, and the US did the same for about 80 years before 1980.	在一战爆发前的一百年中，英国一直维持着经常项目盈余，美国在1900—1980年亦是如此。


But neither country, apparently, did so by manipulating its exchange rate.	但显然，这两个国家都不是通过操纵汇率达到这一成就的。


Moreover, the economies that managed to narrow their external gaps with the US substantially after World War II, notably Germany, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, ran current-account surpluses throughout their rapid-growth periods.	此外，二战后成功将对美国外部缺口大幅缩小的经济体——特别是德国、日本、韩国、新加坡和中国台湾——在快速增长期均存在经常项目盈余。


This contradicts American economists’ conventional wisdom that fast-growing countries should borrow today against their larger future shares in the world economy.	这与美国经济学家的传统智慧——快速增长国应该在当下负债以换取将来在世界经济中的更大比重——相反。


One possible explanation is that the relationship between GDP growth rates and a country’s current-account position is not linear.	一个可能的原因是，GDP增长率与一国经常项目状况之间的关系并不是线性的。


Compared to countries with very slow growth rates, countries with reasonably high growth rates should borrow.	与增长率极低的国家相比，增长率较高的国家应该举债。


But when a country’s growth rate continues to increase, its saving rate would increase faster than its investment rate, so it is more likely to run a current-account surplus.	但若一国经济增长率继续增加，其储蓄率将以快于投资率的速度增长，因此更有可能产生经常项目盈余。


For “catch-up” countries, like China, rapid growth is often accompanied by brisk structural change that moves factors of production, especially labor, from low-productivity activities to economic sectors with much higher productivity.	对于中国这样的“赶超”国家，快速增长通常伴随着活跃的结构性变化，促使生产要素（特别是劳动力）从低生产率部门向高生产率部门转移。


This adds to the surplus by increasing firms’ profitability.	这增加了企业的盈利能力，从而进一步提高了盈余。


China’s exchange-rate policy is problematic not because it promotes exports, but because it has forced the country to accumulate a huge pile of wasteful foreign reserves.	中国的汇率政策之所以有问题，不在于它刺激出口，而在于它迫使中国积累了数量巨大但毫无必要的外汇储备。


The Chinese government’s reluctance to allow faster exchange-rate appreciation may reflect its aversion to large, unforeseeable fluctuations, particularly given its determination to make the renminbi an international reserve currency.	中国政府不愿人民币快速升值可能是因为其厌恶不可预知的大幅波动，特别是在其准备将人民币推向国际储备货币地位的时候。


While China’s economy is hampered by structural difficulties, the US is not free of similar challenges.	中国经济受着结构性问题的妨碍，而美国也面临着类似的挑战。


Frankly, I am always struck by US economists’ reluctance to discuss the structural problems that caused the current crisis, and that hinder America’s recovery.	坦白讲，有一点我一直感到颇为诧异，那就是美国经济学家不愿意讨论引起当前危机并阻碍美国复苏的结构性问题。


Most seem to believe that the crisis result from bad monetary policy and lax financial-sector regulation; some even blame the savings accumulated by Asian countries, especially China.	似乎大部分美国经济学家都认为危机的原因是货币政策失当和金融部门监管过松； 一些人甚至指责亚洲国家（特别是中国）的储蓄引起了危机。


That may be true of the immediate causes of the crisis.	这也许是危机的直接原因。


But its eruption was far more deeply rooted in the American version of capitalism, which aims at high levels of competition, innovation, returns, and compensation.	但危机的爆发自有其深层根源——旨在提升竞争、创新、回报和报酬水平的美国资本主义。


While this model has, of course, helped the US to become the world’s leading economy, it has also delivered severe structural problems.	诚然，这一模���助美国成为世界第一经济体，但它也造成了严重的结构性问题。


For example, to sustain high innovation, the US has maintained the most flexible labor market among mature economies.	比如，为了维持高水平创新，美国的劳动力市场在成熟经济体中是最灵活的。


But this does not come without costs.	但这并不是没有成本的。


Companies often lay off a whole department of scientists to shift to a new product, destroying not only human capital, but also human lives.	公司为了转向新产品而砍掉整个部门的科学家稀松平常，这不仅伤害了人力资本，也有损于人民生活。


Moreover, flexible labor markets imply adversarial labor relations, particularly when compared to northern European countries.	此外，灵活的劳动力市场意味着对立的劳动关系，这一点在与北欧国家作比较时最为明显。


These countries are less innovative than is the US, but their economies and societies may be more resilient.	北欧国家的创新性不及美国，但经济和社会更具韧性。


Meanwhile, the jewel of American capitalism, the financial sector, caused the crisis and is underpinning the US current-account deficit.	与此同时，美国资本主义皇冠上的明珠——金融部门引发了危机，并在恶化美国的经常项目赤字。


Oil exporters aside, countries running current-account surpluses, such as China, Germany, and Japan, have stronger manufacturing sectors relative to their financial sectors, while the relationship is reversed for countries running external deficits, such as the US and the United Kingdom.	除了石油出口国，经常项目盈余国家——如中国、德国和日本——的制造业部门都比金融部门相对更强，而在存在外部赤字的国家——如美国和英国——情况正好相反。


Finally, America’s global hegemony has proven to be a curse as well as a blessing.	最后，美国的全球霸权既可以说是优势，也可以说是诅咒。


The US dollar accounts for 60% of world trade, and the US has the strongest military in the world, making it a safe haven for global investors.	60%的世界贸易用美元结算，美国的军事实力世界最强，这使得美国成为全球投资者的安全港。


But, while large capital inflows reduce borrowing costs, they also tend to cause current-account deficits: lower costs of capital boost asset prices, with the wealth effect then prompting people to consume more than they earn.	但是，大量资本流入既拉低了借贷成本，也导致了经常项目赤字：地资本成本刺激了资产价格，由此产生的财富效应促使美国人的消费超过收入。


The policies adopted or discussed by American policymakers and scholars nowadays – quantitative easing, fiscal-stimulus packages, government-deficit reduction – seek to cure only the symptoms of a deeper malaise.	如今美国政客和学界所讨论和采取的政策——量化宽松、财政刺激、政府赤字削减——都是治疗深层次问题的药方。


As a first step to recovery, the US must undertake serious financial-sector reforms.	作为迈向复苏的第一步，美国必须采取大手笔金融部门改革。


As Lenin pointed out, financial capitalism is the highest form of capitalism – that is, it is the end of capitalism.	正如列宁所指出的，金融资本主义是资本主义的最高形式——换句话说，也就是资本主义的终点。


Lenin may have gotten the underlying analysis wrong, but today we know that his conclusion may have been right for another reason: financial capitalism forces a country into unsustainable indebtedness.	列宁的分析也许是错误的，但如今，我们知道，他的结论是正确的，只是正确的原因是另外一个：金融资本主义迫使一国走向不可持续的负债。


Unfortunately, America’s financial reforms have been half-baked at best.	不幸的是，美国金融改革还远远不够。


For three decades, “reform” was a word reserved for the Chinese side of the Sino-American relationship.	30年来，“改革”一直是中美关系中国端所发出的声音。


The US, one hopes, will grow to like the sound of it.	我们希望，美国也能喜欢“改革”一词。


The End of Cross-Border Surrogacy?	跨境代孕的终结？


LONDON – The global trade in babies born through commercial surrogacy is slowly being shut down.	伦敦——通过商业代孕降生婴儿的全球贸易正在慢慢关闭。


India, Nepal, Thailand, and Mexico have introduced measures that would limit or ban foreigners from hiring locals as surrogate mothers.	印度、尼泊尔、泰国和墨西哥相继出台措施限制或禁止外国人雇用当地人充当代孕母亲的行为。


Cambodia and Malaysia look likely to follow suit.	柬埔寨和马来西亚很可能会紧随其后。


In an industry in which the conventional wisdom has long dismissed efforts to “buck the market,” this is a surprising – and welcome – development.	在这个传统智慧一直在抵制“反市场”努力的行业，这是个令人惊讶——并且受人欢迎的——突破。


Uncritical proponents of biotechnology tend to celebrate the fact that technological breakthroughs have outpaced government regulations, arguing that this has allowed science to progress unfettered.	生物技术不加批判的支持者更愿意宣扬技术突破领先于政府法规的事实，认为科学因此能够无拘无束地向前发展。


But the determination of countries that have historically been centers of commercial surrogacy to stop the practice underscores the naiveté of that position.	但历史上一直作为商业代孕中心的国家停止代孕的决策凸显了上述立场是多么幼稚。


It is no coincidence that the countries cracking down on cross-border surrogacy are those in which the practice takes place.	打击跨境代孕出现在代孕行为的实际发生地绝不是某种巧合。


The argument that all parties – surrogate mothers, babies, and commissioning parents – benefit from the transaction has not withstood scrutiny.	代孕母亲、婴儿和委托父母各方均从交易中受益的观点根本经不起审视。


Consider India, where the surrogacy industry is valued at $400 million per year; until recently, some 3,000 fertility clinics were operating in the country.	以印度为例，其代孕业每年创造4亿美元的产值； 直到不久前，该国还拥有约3，000家生育诊所。


And yet, as worries have mounted that commercial surrogacy leads to human trafficking and the exploitation of women, India’s authorities have concluded that the ethical concerns outweigh the economic benefits.	但因为对代孕可能导致人口贩卖和剥削妇女现象不断增长的担忧，印度当局得出的结论是伦理问题大于经济效益。


India has yet to finalize its anti-surrogacy legislation.	印度的反代孕立法尚有待最终通过。


But the way the debate has evolved since the first bill was proposed in 2008 illustrates the rapid change in how the practice is viewed.	但2008年首份法案提出后辩论的演进状况说明了在实践中人们观点的快速变化。


The earliest drafts of the legislation actually encouraged commercial surrogacy, mandating that mothers employed as surrogates surrender their babies.	最初的立法草案实际鼓励商业代孕，强制受雇的代孕母亲交出她们的婴儿。


Given that under common law, the woman who bears a child is legally its mother, this provision would have been radically pro-surrogacy.	鉴于普通法规定孕育孩子的母亲为其法律上的母亲，可以认定这项法案积极支持代孕行为。


Since then, however, the focus of the discussion has shifted, as unsavory – and sometimes bizarre – aspects of the trade have come to light.	但从那以后，讨论的焦点却发生了改变——因为代孕贸易令人讨厌、有时甚至离奇古怪的一面逐渐显露出来。


For example, in one case, Germany – where surrogacy is illegal – refused to accept twin children of a German father born to an Indian surrogate, while India demurred at giving the father an exit visa so that he could remove the children.	比如，在某案例中，规定代孕行为为非法的德国拒绝接受一位德国父亲委托一位印度女性为其代孕的双胞胎婴儿，而印度则拒绝给这位父亲发放出境签证，拒绝让其带走孩子。


In October 2015, India’s Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, under pressure from the country’s Supreme Court, declared that international commercial surrogacy was unconstitutional.	2015年10月，印度卫生和家庭福利部在最高法院施压下宣布国际商业代孕行为违反宪法。


The Council for Medical Research sent out a notification to all clinics, instructing them not to “entertain” foreign couples – including non-resident Indian citizens and people of Indian origin.	医学研究委员会向所有诊所发出通知，要求他们不要“接待”外国夫妇——包括没有居民身份的印度公民和印度裔民众。


The next month, the Department of Health Research banned the importation of embryos to be implanted into surrogate mothers, making the procedure nearly impossible.	之后一个月，卫生研究署禁止进口植入代孕母亲的胚胎，导致几乎没有可能进行代孕手术。


To be sure, India is not the only country involved in cross-border surrogacy.	可以肯定，印度并非参与跨境代孕的唯一国家。


Indeed, Indian regulations limiting surrogacy services to heterosexual couples who have been married for at least two years had already caused some of the trade to relocate, most notably to Thailand.	事实上，印度限制只为结婚两年以上的异性夫妇提供代孕服务的法规已经导致部分贸易离开印度迁往泰国。


But there, too, attitudes have been shifting, especially after an Australian couple refused to take responsibility for a baby born through surrogacy who was diagnosed with Down Syndrome.	但泰国的态度也正在发生转变，尤其在一对澳大利亚夫妇拒绝为一名被确诊患有唐氏综合症的代孕婴儿负责的事件发生后。


The couple did take the boy’s twin sister, however, making it clear that what they had paid for was not the “service” provided by the mother, but the children themselves – or rather, just the one who met their requirements.	这对夫妇确实带走了这名男婴的双胞胎姐姐，他们的行为明确告诉外界他们为之支付费用的是婴儿本身（或者是符合其要求的一两名婴儿），而并非母���所提供的“服务”。


As a result, it has become harder to deny that cross-border surrogacy is akin to selling babies.	这样一来，很难否认跨境代孕其实与贩卖婴儿非常相似。


In August 2015, Thailand restricted surrogacy to couples in which at least one partner holds Thai nationality.	2015年8月，泰国规定仅限为至少有一人为泰国籍的夫妇提供代孕服务。


Offenses under the law are punishable by up to ten years in prison – for the surrogate and commissioning parents alike.	法律规定违法行为可以判处长达10年监禁——对代孕母亲和委托家长同样适用。


As in India, surrogacy touched a deep nerve in Thailand, where some see it as neo-colonialist exploitation, with babies as the raw commodities being extracted for the benefit of Westerners.	像印度一样，代孕触及了泰国民众的深部神经，有人将其视为新殖民主义剥削，而婴儿则是让西方人受益的原始商品。


“This law aims to stop Thai women’s wombs from becoming the world’s womb,” was how Wanlop Tankananurak, a member of Thailand’s National Legislative Assembly, put it.	就像泰国国家立法会议员Wanlop Tankananurak所形容的那样，“这项法律旨在禁止让泰国妇女的子宫成为世界的子宫。 ”


By November 2015, about a dozen Indian and Thai clinics had shifted operations to Phnom Penh.	到2015年10月，约有十来家印度和泰国诊所已将其营业行为转至金边。


That development might at first seem to support the argument that the trade can never be stamped out – only relocated.	这项进展乍看上去似乎支持这项贸易永远不会被消灭，只会转移的观点。


But, so far, the number of clinics that have set up shop in Cambodia is small.	但迄今为止，在柬埔寨开展业务的诊所数量依然很少。


And some reports indicate that Cambodia’s interior ministry intends to treat commercial surrogacy as human trafficking, with a potential prison sentence.	某些报告显示柬埔寨内政部打算将商业代孕等同于人口贩卖，并可能施以一定的刑期。


Nepal, too, has declared a moratorium on surrogacy, after some in the country denounced the practice as exploitative.	在某些人谴责代孕为剥削行为后，尼泊尔也已宣布终止代孕行为。


In April 2015, after an earthquake struck Kathmandu, Israel evacuated 26 babies born through surrogacy, but left their mothers – most of whom had crossed over from India – stranded in a disaster zone.	2015年4月地震袭击加德满都后，以色列撤离了通过代孕方式出生的26名婴儿，却把他们的母亲——其中多数人从印度跨境来到尼泊尔——留在被困的灾区。


Malaysia also seems on track to ban the practice.	马来西亚似乎也即将禁止代孕行为。


And in Mexico, the state of Tabasco, the only jurisdiction in the country where surrogacy is legal, has restricted it to Mexican heterosexual married couples in which the wife is infertile.	而在墨西哥唯一一个规定代孕行为合法的行政区划塔巴斯科，已经限制只能为妻子不孕的异性已婚夫妇提供代孕服务。


During the legislative debate, Deputy Veronica Perez Rojas denounced surrogacy as a “new form of exploitation of women and trafficking.”	在立法辩论中，代表维罗尼卡·佩雷斯·罗哈斯谴责代孕为“剥削妇女和贩卖人口的一种新形式。 ”


There is the risk, of course, that the ongoing international clampdown will drive commercial surrogacy underground.	当然正在进行的国际取缔运动将商业代孕推入地下的可能性始终存在。


But that risk only underscores the need for clear and strict legislation.	但上述风险只是凸显了出台明确而严格立法的必要性。


Even if some would-be parents are willing to break the law, the vast majority will be deterred by the penalties, including the risk that they will not be allowed to keep the baby or that they will be unable to obtain an exit visa for it.	即使某些想要成为家长的人愿意违法，但绝大多数人会被惩罚所遏制，包括将不允许他们保留婴儿或无法为其取得出境签证。


The pro-surrogacy camp emphasizes the benefits of the practice, which include increased reproductive choice and the accommodation of sexual pluralism.	赞成代孕的阵营强调这种做法的诸多好处，包括增加生育选择和包容性多元化。


But while these may be genuine and important considerations, they cannot be placed above the need to prevent the exploitation of some of the world’s most vulnerable women.	但尽管这些可能是真实且重要的考量，但其重要性绝不能超过防止对世界某些最弱势女性进行剥削。


Create Growth-Linked Bonds	创建增长连动式债券


A year ago, at the Summit of the Americas, 34 western hemisphere heads of state agreed to promote the creation of government-issued growth-linked bonds whose payout is tied to gross domestic product (GDP).	在一年前的美洲峰会上，34个西半球国家领导人达成一致，建立一项由政府发行、支出依赖于国内生产总值的增长连动式债券。


But progress has mostly stalled.	但是这一进程现在却几乎处于停滞状态。


Only one major proposal related to such bonds, from Argentina, is on the table.	仅有一项与这种债券相关的主要提案还在讨论之中。


A unique opportunity to strengthen the world’s financial infrastructure and increase economic efficiency for many years to come could be slipping away.	这项提案来自于阿根廷。 这样一个独一无二、并且能长期加强世界金融基建和提高经济效益的机会眼看就要悄悄溜走。


I have argued for growth-linked bonds since my 1993 book Macro Markets .	自1993年起，我就在我的著作《宏观市场》中提倡增长连动式债券。


GDP is the most comprehensive measure we have of an economy’s success.	国内生产总值是衡量我们的经济制度成功与否最为全面的标准。


The simplest form of growth-linked bonds would be a long-term government security that pays a regular dividend proportional to the GDP of the issuing country.	增长连动债式券中最简单的一种形式就是一项长期的、根据发行国家的GDP比例定期支付红利的政府证券。


Suppose that the Argentine government issued perpetual bonds that paid an annual dividend equal to one ten-billionth of Argentine GDP, payable in pesos. Because Argentina’s annual GDP now runs at about 500 billion pesos, one of these bonds today would pay a dividend of 50 pesos (about $17 or €13) a year.	假设阿根廷政府发行一种永久性债券，每年用比索支付价值相当于阿根廷GDP一亿分之一的年度分红——阿根廷目前的GDP已达五千亿比索，那么每年这些债券只需花费50比索（约合17美元或13英镑）。


The dividend would rise or fall as the success of Argentina’s economy is revealed through time.	这些红利将随着一直被披露的阿根廷经济制度成功的信息而上下浮动


The market for GDP-linked bonds would arrive at a price that makes them attractive to investors, reflecting expectations and uncertainties about the issuing country’s future.	GDP连动式债券市场将会达到一个使其对投资者产生吸引力的价格，反映出投资者对发行债券国未来的期望及不确定性。


Until there is a market for such bonds, we cannot know what the price will be.	在这种债券市场没有形成之前，我们无法预测价格。


But we can expect that the market for long-term GDP-linked bonds from countries like Argentina, where the future of the economy is uncertain, would be volatile, as investors adjust their expectations of future GDP growth up and down in response to new information.	但是当投资者们调整他们对未来GDP增长的期望，却又在新信息中信心一落千丈的时候，我们 能够 预料到，来自阿根廷这样一个未来经济充满不确定因素的国家的长期GDP连动式债券是不稳定的，


What will happen to Argentina in the next 25 years?	未来25年阿根廷会发生什么呢？


Argentina’s long-term GDP growth has been disappointing.	阿根廷的长期GDP增长态势令人失望。


In fact, real GDP per capita declined 15% over the 25-year period from 1965 to 1990 – a period that saw some Asian economies quintuple in size.	事实上，从1965年到1990年，阿根廷的实质人均GDP下降了15%，而这25年期间亚洲某些经济体却增长了5倍。


But the 8% real GDP growth recorded in 2004 might encourage some to expect a surge in economic performance, as has occurred elsewhere in the world.	但是2004年8%的实质GDP增长速度也许会鼓励某些人期待阿根廷的经济与世界其他地方一样就出现猛涨态势。


Could there be another decline in Argentina?	阿根廷经济有可能出现另一次下滑吗？


Or a huge growth breakthrough?	或者大幅增长突破？


Nobody knows.	无人知晓。


The economic costs implied by this uncertainty could be reduced if there were a market for growth risk.	若存在一个成长风险市场，那么就能降低由这种不确定性引起的经济成本。


Indeed, Argentina’s economy would be better off today if Argentina had borrowed in terms linked to its GDP decades ago rather than at an interest rate denominated in dollars.	事实上，如果阿根廷几十年前借用了与其GDP连动而非与以美元计价的利率连动的条款，今日的阿根廷经济会更加繁荣。


Its foreign debt would have declined in line with its GDP, thus sheltering the economy from default and economic disaster.	它的外债将会随其GDP一起下降，也因此能保护其经济远离负债和经济灾难。


To be sure, investors would have then lost on their bet on Argentina’s growth, but they would still have been protected against inflation, even if their bonds had not been denominated in dollars (because Argentina’s nominal GDP would have moved up with inflation).	诚然，投资者将输掉他们押在阿根廷GDP增长上的赌注，但是他们却被免受通货膨胀之灾，即使他们的债券并非以美元计价（因为阿根廷的名义GDP将会随着通货膨胀而上升）。


Can we engineer new debt contracts for countries like Argentina?	我们能再与阿根廷这样的国家签订一个新债务合同吗？


The stumbling block has been potential investors’ fear that accounting fiascos in emerging countries would render the bonds unsafe.	潜在投资者对新兴国家的账目危机可能导致的债券不安全性的担忧就成为了一个绊脚石。


If you don’t trust the numbers, you can’t trust the debt.	如果你不相信数据，你就不会相信债务。


Clearly, more work is needed to improve the quality of the numbers.	当然，要提高数据的质量还要做很多工作。


In the meantime, we should not give up on trying to create these bonds.	与此同时，我们不应该放弃创立新债券的努力。


Instead, advanced countries should issue them first.	相反， 发达 国家应该首先发行它们。


True, advanced economies are relatively more stable, which means that the bonds would have a less distinctive risk-management advantage.	诚然，先进经济体相对来说更为稳固，这意味着债券将具有一个不那么明显的风险管理优势。


But the demonstration effect would be immediate.	但是示范效应是显而易见的。


Once any major country develops a market for GDP-linked debt, the concept will be established, making it much easier for other countries to join in.	一旦任何主要国家发展了一个GDP连动债务市场，这种概念就会被植入人们的脑中，能使其他国家能更为容易地加入其中。


The spread of inflation-indexed bonds serves as a historical precedent.	通货膨胀连动式债券的风行已成一个具有历史意义的例子。


Finland was the first to issue national inflation-indexed bonds, in 1946, in response to massive wartime price growth.	1946年，为了应对战争期间的物价飙升，芬兰第一个开始发行国家通货膨胀连动式债券。


Israel and Iceland were next, in 1955, followed by Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Argentina, the UK, Australia, Mexico, Canada, Sweden, New Zealand, the US, France, Japan, and Italy.	以色列和冰岛随后在1955年发行了该债券，接着，巴西、智利、哥伦比亚、阿根廷、英国、澳大利亚、墨西哥、加拿大、瑞典、新西兰、美国、法国、日本和意大利也开始发行。


It took a long time, but the contagion of a sound financial idea has been unmistakable.	这个过程花了很长时间，但是一个完美的金融概念的普遍运用是不会错的。


GDP-linked bonds would also allow hedging the risk of inflation, plus respond to GDP growth.	GDP增长连动式债券也将能够防范通货膨胀风险，以及对GDP增长的反应。


Some will object that there is little point in creating GDP-linked bonds in advanced countries, because there is little uncertainty about GDP growth there.	有人提出反对意见，认为在发达国家建立GDP连动式债券毫无疑义，因为那里的GDP增长十分稳定。


However, even in the relative calm of the post-war era, long-term real GDP growth in advanced countries has been rather variable.	但是，即使是在相对平稳的战后时代，发达国家的长期实质GDP增长也总是变化无常的。


For example, US real per capita GDP grew by a factor of 1.87 – that is, nearly doubled in size – from 1961 to 1986, but by a factor of only 1.58 from 1978 to 2003.	举例而言，美国实质人均GDP在1961年到1986年间增长了1. 87倍——也就是说，几乎翻了一番。


Such differences in 25-year growth rates are important: if US GDP grows by a factor of 1.87 over the next 25 years, annual GDP will be $3.6 trillion ($10,000 per person) higher than if it grows by a factor of only 1.58.	这两个25年期中的不同增长率非常重要：如果美国GDP增长在第二个25年中增长1. 87倍，那么将比仅增长1.


Much of today’s debates about the future of old-age pensions hinges on this uncertainty.	今天，诸多有关老年人养老金的未来的争论也源于这种不确定性。


If the economy grows rapidly, there will be no problem; if it does not, a pension crisis looms.	如果经济增长迅速，那就毫无问题； 但是如果经济增长滞缓的话，养老金危机就迫在眉睫了。


Creating a marketplace where such uncertainties are traded and hedged would be a fundamental step toward managing the risks involved.	建立一个能够交易并隔离这种不确定性因素的市场，将是迈向解决相关风险的关键一步。


If personal pension accounts or provident funds are invested in GDP-linked bonds, the payments that retirees receive in 25 years will reflect the growth rate of the economy – and that of the tax base – to that date, which all makes good sense.	如果将个人养老金或公积金投资于GDP连动式债券，退休者在25年间的收入将会反映出经济和税基的增长率——到那个时候，一切将合乎情理。


Sweden’s pension system recently created a link between national income growth and benefits, but the reforms did not include creating GDP-linked bonds, a natural adjunct to such a scheme.	瑞典最近在国家收入和效益之间建立一种联系，但是这项改革却没有包括GDP连动式债券，它应当成为如此一项计划中不可或缺的一部分。


At a time when many advanced countries run government deficits, GDP-linked bonds would improve risk management and bring down financing costs.	在一个许多发达国家政府都出现赤字的年代，GDP增长式债券将会加强风险管理，降低金融成本。


They might also spur developing countries to do what it takes to join that market.	它们或许也能鞭策发展中国家为加入那个市场而采取必要行动。


Writing the Future	书写未来


ADDIS ABABA – What does the future hold for the global economy?	亚的斯亚贝巴——全球经济未来将会如何？


Will living standards rise worldwide, as today’s poor countries leapfrog technologies to catch up with richer countries?	全球生活水平是否会随着���天的贫困国家在技术领域跨越式地追赶富裕国家而普遍提高？


Or will prosperity slip through our fingers as greed and corruption lead us to deplete vital resources and degrade the natural environment on which human well-being depends?	抑或随着贪婪腐败耗尽我们的重要资源，破坏人类福祉所依赖的自然环境而只能眼睁睁地看着繁荣从我们的指缝间溜走？


Humanity faces no greater challenge than to ensure a world of prosperity rather than a world that lies in ruins.	人类面临更严峻的挑战保障世界繁荣，防止世界变成一片荒芜。


Like a novel with two possible endings, ours is a story yet to be written in this new century.	我们的故事有待新世纪书写，就像一部结局不同的小说。


There is nothing inevitable about the spread – or the collapse – of prosperity.	繁荣是蔓延抑抑或萎缩都并非命中注定。


More than we know (or perhaps care to admit), the future is a matter of human choice, not mere prediction.	超出我们理解（也许只是不愿承认）的是，未来是人类的选择问题，而并非单纯的预测。


Despite the ongoing economic crisis in Europe and the United States, the developing world has sustained rapid economic growth.	尽管欧洲和美国经历着持续性经济危机，发展中国家经济却实现了持续高速增长。


While the International Monetary Fund forecasts that the advanced economies will grow by just 1.5% in 2013, developing-country growth is projected to reach 5.6%.	尽管国际货币基金组织预测发达经济体2013年的增长率将仅有1. 5%，发展中国家增长率预计将达到5.


Asia’s developing economies, now the world’s pacesetters, are expected to grow by 7.2%, with output in Sub-Saharan Africa set to rise by a healthy 5.7%.	亚洲发展中经济体是当今世界的排头兵，预期增长率7. 2%，而撒哈拉以南非洲国家的发展目标是实现5.


What is happening is both powerful and clear.	我们面对的事实有力而又明确。


Technologies that were once found only in rich countries now belong to the entire world.	曾几何时仅仅归属富裕国家的技术现在全世界均可享用。


Mobile phone coverage in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, has gone from nearly zero subscribers 20 years ago to around 700 million today.	比方说，撒哈拉以南非洲地区移动电话的普及率已经从20年前几乎为零增长到今天的大约7亿。


And those phones are helping to bring banking, health care, education, business, government services, and entertainment to the poor.	那些手机正帮助贫困人口享受到银行、医疗保健、教育、商业、政府服务和娱乐。


Within a few years, the vast majority of the world will have access to wireless broadband.	短短几年内，世界绝大部分地区将能实现无线宽带接入。


Yet there is another truth as well.	但还有一个现实不容忽视。


Last year was the hottest ever recorded in the US.	去年是美国有史以来最热的年份。


Droughts afflicted around 60% of US counties, including the breadbasket states of the Midwest and the Great Plains.	60%的美国县市遭受到干旱的困扰，其中包括中西部和大平原的鱼米之乡。


In October, an extraordinary “superstorm” smashed into the Atlantic coastline around New Jersey, causing losses of around $60 billion.	10月，一场史无前例的“超级风暴”袭击了新泽西州大西洋沿岸，造成约600亿美元的财产损失。


Climate problems – floods, droughts, heat waves, extreme storms, massive forest fires, and more – also ravaged many other parts of the world in 2012, including China, Australia, Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, and Africa’s Sahel region.	2012年，包括中国、澳大利亚、东南亚、加勒比海和非洲萨赫勒地区在内的世界其他地方同样遭受到洪水、干旱、热浪、极端风暴、大面积森林火灾等气候问题的困扰。


These environmental disasters are occurring with rising frequency, as they are partly caused by human actions, such as deforestation, coastal erosion, massive pollution, and, of course, the greenhouse-gas emissions that are changing the world’s climate and acidifying the oceans.	这种环境灾害的发生越来越频繁，因为导致灾害的部分原因是森林砍伐、海岸侵蚀、大规模污染、当然还有正在改变全球气候并造成海洋酸化的温室气体排放等人类活动。


What is new is that scourges like climate change – until recently described as a future threat – are now clear and present dangers.	我们不得不面对这样的新情况：气候变化等灾害不久前还被定义为未来的威胁——现在却已经造成了明确而现实的危险。


Scientists have even given a name to our era, the Anthropocene, in which humanity (“anthropos” in Greek) is having a large-scale impact on the planet’s ecosystems.	科学家们甚至以“人类纪”来命名我们所处的时代，因为人类（希腊语词汇是“anthropos”）正在对地球生态系统造成严重的影响。


Herein lies our great challenge – the one that will determine whether we follow the path of prosperity or ruin.	我们面临着严峻的挑战——能否妥善应对将决定我们走向毁灭还是走向繁荣。


The rapidly growing developing countries cannot simply follow the economic-growth path that today’s rich countries traveled.	迅速增长的发展中国家不能简单重复今天富裕国家曾经走过的经济发展道路。


If they try, the world economy will push the planet beyond safe operating conditions.	如果他们这么做，世界经济将导致我们这个星球超越安全运行所必须的条件。


Temperatures will rise, storms will intensify, the oceans will become more acidic, and species will go extinct in vast numbers as their habitats are destroyed.	气温将会上升、风暴将会加剧、海洋将进一步酸化，而物种则将随着栖息地的被毁而大批走向灭绝。


The simple fact is that humanity faces a stark choice.	人类面临着严峻的选择是一个简单的事实。


If the world economy’s current growth patterns continue, we face ecological disaster.	继续世界经济目前的增长模式将导致我们面临生态灾难。


If the world economy embraces a new growth pattern – one that harnesses advanced technologies like smart phones, broadband, precision agriculture, and solar power – we can spread prosperity while saving the planet.	如果世界经济采用充分运用智能手机、宽带、精细农业和太阳能发电等先进技术的全新增长模式，我们就可以在扩大繁荣的同时拯救地球。


I call today’s growth pattern the business-as-usual option; the smart-technology growth pattern, by contrast, represents the sustainable-development option.	我把当今的经济增长模式称之为“一切照旧”模式； 相反，智能技术增长模式所代表的是可持续发展。


Business as usual can work for a while, but it will end in tears, while the sustainable-development path can lead to long-term prosperity.	一切照旧模式或许仍能维持一段时间，但将在泪水中收场，而可持续发展之路则能带来长期的繁荣。


So, what will it take to write the happy ending?	那么，我们怎样做才能实现幸福的结局？


First, we must recognize that we, as a global society, have a choice to make.	首先，我们必须意识到全球社会必须做出选择。


Business as usual is comfortable.	一切照旧造成的不适也许最少。


We think we understand it.	我们认为对这种模式了解最多。


Yet it is not good enough: on our current trajectory, short-term prosperity is coming at the cost of too many future crises.	但其实我们的理解远远不够：如果继续遵循目前的轨迹，短期的繁荣有可能付出太多未来危机的代价。


Second, we must recognize the powerful new tools and technologies that we have at hand.	其次，必须意识到我们掌握着可供利用的高效的新工具和新技术。


Using advanced information technologies – computers, satellite mapping, image processing, expert systems, and more – we now have the means to grow more food with less environmental damage; improve public health for rich and poor alike; distribute more electricity with lower greenhouse-gas emissions; and make our cities more livable and healthier, even as urbanization raises their populations by billions in the coming decades.	运用计算机、卫星定位、图像处理、专家系统和更多的先进信息技术，我们已经掌握了在减少环境损害的同时生产更多粮食、改善贫富群体公共健康、在降低温室气体排放的同时输送更多电力、以及即使今后几十年城市人口因城镇化增加数十亿，也能使我们的城市更加健康宜居的全新方法。


Third, we should set bold goals for the years ahead – to spread prosperity and improve public health while saving the planet.	第三，我们应当设定今后几年的大胆目标——在推广繁荣并改善公众健康的同时拯救地球。


Fifty years ago, US President John F. Kennedy said that we should to go to the moon not because it was easy, but because it was hard – it tested the best in us.	50年前，美国总统约翰·F·肯尼迪说我们应该登上月球，以此为目标并非因其轻而易举，而是因其难度极大——能以最严峻的方式对我们构成考验。


In our generation, sustainable development will be our test, encouraging us to use our creativity and human values to establish a path of sustainable well-being on our crowded and endangered planet.	对我们这一代而言，可持续发展就是我们的考验，它激励我们运用创造力和人文价值在拥挤而濒危的地球上开拓可持续的幸福之路。


I am proud and honored that United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has asked me to help mobilize the world’s expertise as we seek to achieve that goal.	联合国秘书长潘基文要求我协助动员全世界专业人士实现这一目标，这令我感到万分荣幸和自豪。


The greatest talents in our societies – in universities, businesses, NGOs, and especially among the world’s young people – are ready to take on our greatest challenges, and are joining the UN’s new Sustainable Development Solutions Network.	大学、企业、非政府组织、特别是全球青年中最出色的人才已经做好准备迎接最严峻的挑战，并陆续加盟联合国新的可持续发展方案网络。


In the months and years ahead, these leaders will share their visions of a prosperous and sustainable global society.	在未来的岁月里，这些领头人将把他们建设繁荣及可持续全球社会的愿景与全社会共享。


Governments’ Self-Disruption Challenge	政府的自我否定挑战


LAGUNA BEACH – One of the most difficult challenges facing Western governments today is to enable and channel the transformative – and, for individuals and companies, self-empowering – forces of technological innovation.	发自加州拉古娜海滩——当今西方政府面临的其中一个最艰巨的挑战，就是如何去启动和引导那些转型性的——以及对个人及企业来说，自我赋权（self-empowering）的——科技革新力量。


They will not succeed unless they become more open to creative destruction, allowing not only tools and procedures, but also mindsets, to be revamped and upgraded.	如果它们不能对这种创造性的破坏持更开放的态度，不仅允许工具和程序，更容许人的思想去转变和升级的话，那么这一目标就将无法实现。


The longer it takes them to meet this challenge, the bigger the lost opportunities for current and future generations.	而它们在正确应对这一挑战之前的时间拖得越长，现今和未来一代人丢失的机会也就越多。


Self-empowering technological innovation is all around us, affecting a growing number of people, sectors, and activities worldwide.	这类自我赋权的技术创新已经充斥着我们周围，影响着全球越来越多的人口，经济部门以及人类活动。


Through an ever-increasing number of platforms, it is now easier than ever for households and corporations to access and engage in an expanding range of activities – from urban transportation to accommodation, entertainment, and media. Even the regulation-reinforced, fortress-like walls that have traditionally surrounded finance and medicine are being eroded.	通过数量不断递增的各类平台，家庭和企业也比以往更加容易接触和参与到范围持续扩大的活动当中——从城市交通，到住宿，再到娱乐及媒体。


This historic transformation will continue to gain momentum as it expands in both scale and scope.	这一历史性的转型也将随着其在宽度和广度上的不断扩张而持续获得动力。


But its benefits will not be fully realized unless governments take steps to empower the forces of change, ensure that the massive positive externalities are internalized, and minimize the negative impacts. Unfortunately, this is proving extremely difficult for many advanced-country governments, partly because the failure to recover fully from the recent crisis and recession has undermined their credibility and functioning.	但除非政府能采取措施去推动这股变革的力量，确保大规模的积极外部效应能被内部消化吸收，并减少其负面影响，否则转型的优点将无法被完全展现出来。


The emergence of anti-establishment and non-traditional political parties and candidates on both sides of the Atlantic is complicating even the most basic elements of economic governance, such as enactment of an active budget in the United States.	反现有体制和非传统政治党派及候选人在大西洋两岸的崛起令经济治理中哪怕最基本的元素——例如在美国实施一项积极预算政策——都变得复杂化了。


In this context, taking the steps needed to upgrade economic systems, including infrastructure in the US and the incomplete union in Europe, or to meet historical challenges like the refugee crisis, seems all but impossible.	在这一大背景下，采取升级经济体制所需的措施，包括改善美国的基础设施以及完善欧洲尚未完成构建的联盟，或是应对难民危机这类自古有之的挑战，似乎全都变得不太可能了。


In fact, Western political and economic structures are, in some ways, specifically designed to resist deep and rapid change, if only to prevent temporary and reversible fluctuations from having an undue influence on underlying systems.	事实上，西方的政治和经济架构在某些方面上就是专门设计来抵制深层次及快速变革的，只能用来防止那些对基本体制造成不当影响的临时性和可逆性波动。


This works well when politics and economies are operating in cyclical mode, as they usually have been in the West.	这种做法在政治和经济都运行于西方常见的周期性模式中时可以奏效。


But when major structural and secular challenges arise, as is the case today, the advanced countries’ institutional architecture acts as a major obstacle to effective action.	可一旦出现今天这种重大结构性长期性挑战时，发达国家的制度架构就摇身一变成为了实施有效行动的主要障碍。


The political influence of financial donors and lobby groups add to the challenge.	选举捐款人和游说团体的政治影响力也令这一挑战进一步变得复杂。


Rather than promoting actions aimed at improving the long-term wellbeing of the system as a whole, these actors tend to push micro objectives, some of which help the traditional, often wealthy elements of the establishment maintain their grip on the system.	这些人只愿推动某些狭小的目标，其中一些只是为了帮助那些传统（而且往往有钱）的现有体制成员去维持对社会体系的控制力，而非致力于提高整个体系的长期福祉。


In doing so, they block the small and emerging players that are so vital to upgrading and transformation.	通过这些举措，他们实际上抑制了那些积极推动升级和转型的小型新兴参与者，让后者无从施展。


All of this serves to complicate an imperative that is relevant not just to governments, but also to companies and individuals that must adapt to changing circumstances by upgrading their structures, procedures, skills, and mindsets.	所有这些都使得一个不仅与政府，也跟那些必须通过升级自身架构、程序，技能和思维来适应环境变革的企业和个人相关的必要措施变得更加复杂。


Few are eager to self-disrupt, a process that takes us out of our comfort zone, forcing us to confront our long-standing blind spots and unconscious biases and adopt a new mindset.	有些人渴望进行自我否定，让自己跳出固有的安全区，逼迫自己去面对长期存在的盲点和无意识偏见，进而接纳一个新的思维。


But those who wait until the disruptions are unavoidable – easy to do when governments do not mount a timely response – will miss out on the huge advantages that technology offers.	但那些只会等到否定变得不可避免的人——比如那些无法做出及时反馈的政府——就将错失科技所带来的巨大好处。


Even when governments decide to implement policies that enable economic upgrading and adaptation, they cannot do so in isolation.	即便是在政府已经决定实施那些促进经济升级和调整的政策之时，它们也无法单独孤立地去执行。


With technology enabling unprecedented mobility and connectivity, the jurisdictional power of nation-states is being eroded, meaning that a truly effective response – one that unleashes the full benefits of disruptive technologies – is impossible without multilateral cooperation and coordination.	随着科技带来了史无前例的流动性和连通性，民族国家的管辖权遭到了侵蚀，意味着一个真正有效的应对——某个能释放否定性技术全部好处的政策——在缺乏多边合作和协调的情况下也无法实现。


But multilateralism is undergoing a transformation of its own, driven by doubts about the legitimacy of existing structures.	然而在那些现有架构合法性质疑声的推动下，多边主义也在进行着自身的转型。


With reforms of the traditionally Western-dominated institutions having stalled, there have been moves to create alternatives; China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, for example, competes directly with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank in some areas.	随着传统西方主导的改革陷入僵局，人们转而创造其他替代性措施； 例如中国带头创建的亚洲基础设施投资银行就在某些领域与世界银行以及亚洲开发银行展开了直接竞争。


All of this makes global-level responses more difficult.	所有这些都令全球层面上的应对措施变得更加艰难。


Against this background, a rapid and comprehensive transformation is clearly not feasible. (In fact, it may not even be desirable, given the possibility of collateral damage and unintended consequences.)	在这一背景下，一场迅速且全面的转型显然是不可行的（事实上，考虑到产生间接破坏效应以及意料外后果的可能性，这甚至也不可取）。


The best option for Western governments is thus to pursue gradual change, propelled by a variety of adaptive instruments, which would reach a critical mass over time.	因此西方国家政府的最佳选择就是实施渐进性变革，用一系列适应性手段作推动，并随着时间推移最终惠及大多数人。


Such tools include well-designed public-private partnerships, especially when it comes to modernizing infrastructure; disruptive outside advisers – selected not for what they think, but for how they think – in the government decision-making process; mechanisms to strengthen inter-agency coordination so that it enhances, rather than retards, policy responsiveness; and broader cross-border private-sector linkages to enhance multilateral coordination.	这些工具包括设计合理的公-私伙伴关系，尤其是在基础设施升级换代方面； 在政府决策过程中引入否定性的外部顾问——依据他们的思维方式而非思维内容来选出；


How economies function is changing, as relative power shifts from established, centralized forces toward those that respond to the unprecedented empowerment of individuals. If governments are to overcome the challenges they face and maximize the benefits of this shift for their societies, they need to be a lot more open to self-disruption.	正如与之相对应的权力正从集中化的现有势力向那些针对前所未有的个人赋权转移那样，经济体的功能也在发生改变。 如果各国政府想要克服这一挑战并从这一转移中为本国社会争取最大利益，就必须对自我否定持更开放的态度。


Otherwise, the transformative forces will leave them and their citizens behind.	不然的话，这一转型力量就将把它们及其公民远远抛在身后。


Secular Stagnation or Self-Inflicted Malaise?	长期停滞还是自作自受的衰退？


MUNICH – Almost exactly eight years ago, the Lehman Brothers collapse plunged the global economy into recession.	慕尼黑—将近整整八年前，雷曼兄弟公司倒闭将全球经济拖入衰退深渊。


The interbank market collapsed, and the entire industrialized world was thrown into the worst crisis since the end of World War II.	银行间市场崩溃，整个工业化世界陷入二战以来最严重的危机。


Though central banks have maintained ultra-low interest rates, the crisis hasn’t yet been fully overcome.	尽管中央银行们维持了极低利率，但危机仍未完全克服。


On the contrary, numerous economies, such as the southern European countries and France, simply aren’t making any headway.	相反，许多经济体，如南欧国家和法国，根本没有触底反弹。


And Japan has been on the ropes for a quarter-century.	而日本更是已经衰退了四分之一个世纪。


Some economists believe that this is evidence of “secular stagnation,” a phenomenon described in 1938 by the American economist Alvin Hansen, who drew on Karl Marx’s Law of the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall.	一些经济学家认为这是“长期停滞”的证据。 长期停滞这一现象由美国经济学家埃尔文·汉森（Alvin Hansen）在1938年提出，他的灵感来自马克思的《利润率下降规律》（Law of the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall）。


Owing to the gradual exhaustion of profitable investment projects, according to this view, the natural real interest rate has continued to fall.	根据这一观点，由于有利可图的投资项目逐渐耗尽，自然真实利率也持续下降。


Stabilizing the economy thus is possible only by an equivalent decline in policy interest rates.	因此，只有政策利率也降低相等幅度，才有可能稳定经济。


In view of the huge credit bubble that preceded the crisis in Japan, the United States, and southern Europe, and the aggressive policies pursued by central banks over the last few years, I doubt that this theory is correct.	据我对危机前日本、美国和南欧的巨大信用泡沫以及央行在过去几年中所采取的激进政策的观察，我怀疑这一理论的正确性。


In fact, I find it plausible that a very different mechanism lies behind the post-2008 stagnation, which I refer to as “self-inflicted malaise.”	事实上，我发现很有可能2008年后停滞背后是一个截然不同的机制，我称之为“自作自受的衰退”（self-inflicted malaise）。


This hypothesis is best understood in the context of the economist Joseph Schumpeter’s theory of the business cycle.	该假说最好放在经济学家熊彼特（Joseph Schumpeter）的商业周期理论中去理解。


Faulty expectations on the part of market participants regularly cause credit and asset-price bubbles.	市场参与者的错误预期时不时会引起信用和资产价格泡沫。


Investors, expecting prices and incomes to rise, purchase residential and commercial properties, and they take chances on new business ventures.	投资者预期价格和收入将上升，于是买入住宅和商业地产，并投资新商业机会。


Real-estate prices start to rise, a construction boom occurs, and a new phase of rapid expansion begins, partly sustained by the revitalization of the domestic economy, including services.	房地产价格开始上升，建筑业迎来繁荣，扩张进入高速发展的新阶段，其中部分支持因素来自国内经济包括服务业的复兴。


The growth in incomes increasingly emboldens borrowers, which further heats things up.	收入的增长让借款人胆子越来越大，从而让热门更加炙手可热。


Then the bubble bursts.	然后，泡沫破裂。 投资崩溃，房地产价格下跌；


Investment collapses and real-estate prices fall; businesses and banks go bankrupt; factories and residential buildings are vacated; and employees are laid off.	企业和银行破产； 工厂和住宅建筑空置；


Once prices and wages have fallen, new investors step in with new business ideas and establish new firms.	员工被裁员。 一旦价格和工资下跌，新投资者带着新的商业概念进入并建立新企业。


After this “creative destruction,” a new phase of rapid expansion sets in.	在这一“创新性破坏”后，新的快速扩张阶段开始。


In the current crisis, however, monetary policy preempted the creative destruction that could have formed the basis for a new upswing in growth.	但在当前的危机中，货币政策抢占了创新性破坏，否则增长的新上扬阶段说不定已经形成了。


Asset holders talked central bankers into believing that Schumpeter’s economic cycle could be overcome by large-scale bond purchases financed via the printing press, and by corresponding interest-rate reductions.	资产持有者说服央行相信熊彼特的经济周期可以通过大规模债券购买克服，而买债券的钱来自印钞机并辅之以降息。


To be sure, these measures stopped the fall in asset prices halfway and thus saved much wealth.	诚然，这些措施半途阻止了资产价格下跌，因此拯救了大量财富。


But they also prevented sufficient numbers of young entrepreneurs and investors from risking a new start.	但它们也阻止了足够数量的年轻企业家和投资者冒险成立新企业。


Instead, established firms remained in place, keeping themselves afloat but lacking the wherewithal for new investments.	相反，老牌企业活了下来，苟延残喘，根本无力进行新投资。


In Japan and Europe, in particular, large numbers of such zombie firms and banks survived, and they are now blocking would-be competitors able to drive the next upswing in growth.	特别是在日本和欧洲，大量此类僵尸企业和银行都还活着，阻挠能够推动增长上扬的可能的竞争者。


The resulting economic ossification looks like the secular stagnation that Hansen described; in fact, the malaise is self-inflicted.	由此造成的经济僵化很像是汉森所描绘的长期停滞； 事实上，衰退纯属自作自受。


And, because low interest rates have reduced asset managers’ returns, some central banks – and the European Central Bank, in particular – have relied on successive interest-rate cuts in an effort to engineer ersatz value gains for assets.	此外，由于低利率降低了资产管理者的回报，一些央行——特别是欧洲央行——依靠一轮又一轮的降息试图推动资产价格虚假上涨。


The economy is thus caught in a trap, forcing the ECB to engage in ever more radical monetary-policy measures.	经济因此陷入了陷阱，迫使欧洲央行采取更加激进的货币政策措施。


Its current program of quantitative easing is meant to double the money supply in a very short period.	其当前量化宽松操作意欲在极短时间内将货币供给扩大一倍。


Further guns are being moved into position, such as successively more negative nominal interest rates or so-called helicopter money.	后续政策也准备就绪，如继续扩大负利率或所谓的直升机撒钱。


The only way out of the trap is a hefty dose of creative destruction, which in Europe would have to be accompanied by debt relief and exits from the eurozone, with subsequent currency devaluations.	走出陷阱的唯一办法是大规模的创新性破坏，在欧洲，创新性破坏还必须辅之以债务纾困和退出欧元区然后进行大规模货币贬值。


The shock would be painful for the incumbent wealth owners, but, after a rapid decline in the dollar values of asset prices, including land and real estate, new businesses and investment projects would soon have room to grow, and new jobs would be created.	对现有财富拥有者而言，冲击将是痛苦的，但是，在资产价格（包括土地和房地产）的美元价值经历急跌后，新企业和投资项目很快就将获得成长空间，而新就业岗位也将创造出来。


The natural return on investment would again be high, meaning that the economy could expand once again at normal interest rates.	投资的自然回报率将再次升高，意味着经济可以再次以名义利率的速度扩张。


The sooner this purge is allowed to take place, the milder it will be, and the sooner Europeans and others will be able to breathe easy again.	越早允许这一清洗过程发生，清洗的惨烈程度就越温和，欧洲和其他地区的人也越快能够摆脱困境。


Creative Europe	创意欧洲


LJUBLJANA – At the Spring European Council meeting on March 13-14, EU member states’ leaders will launch the second cycle of the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs, a strategy launched in 2000 with the aim of making the EU the most competitive knowledge-based economy in the world.	卢布尔雅那—在3月13-14日欧盟委员会的春季会议上，欧盟成员国的领导人们会启动第二轮“增长与就业里斯本战略”。 这项在2000年开始实施的战略行动旨在使欧洲成为世界上最具竞争力的经济体。


The EU’s current economic upturn suggests that the strategy is working, particularly after its renewal in 2005.	欧盟目前的经济上升态势说明这一战略是有效的，特别是其在2005年重新生效之后。


But some areas in which Europe could gain a competitive advantage have been neglected.	但有的可以使欧洲获得更强竞争力的领域却被忽略了。


One such area is creativity.	其中之一就是创意产业。


The Lisbon Strategy owes much to the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, who claimed that profit results from innovation.	“里斯本战略”的成形在很大程度上要归功于奥地利经济学家Joseph Schumpeter，他的理念是利润源自创新。


This is an appropriate European compromise between the theory that profit comes from exploitation (Marx) and the view that it results from transactions that make both parties happier than they were before (Friedman).	这是关于利润的两大学说的欧洲式合理折衷，即：利润来自于剥削（马克思）和利润源自使交易双方都比执行交易以前更幸福的交易（弗里德曼）。


It is also appropriate for an economy where goods and services fulfill people’s needs and where products compete on their technical or functional features.	这对一种以商品和服务满足人们的需求和产品在技术和功能上彼此竞争的经济同样适用。


But in post-industrial societies, consumers look for more in a product than just functionality.	但在后工业化的社会，消费者对产品的要求不仅仅是功能性。


Relatively prosperous Europeans tend not to purchase a car merely to get from point A to point B, shoes to keep their feet dry, a watch just to tell the time, or a bottle of water only to quench their thirst.	相对富足的欧洲人不会买一辆车只是为了从A点开到B点； 买一双鞋业仅是为了不湿脚；


We buy things that mean something more to us than what we use them for.	买一只表只是为了看时间或买一瓶水只是为了解渴。 我们买的东西除了使用功能外还有别的意义。


The intangible characteristics that make a product more than simply useful are what differentiate expensive products from cheap products, and include design, brand name, and environmental friendliness.	正是那些让一种产品具有比实用价值更多内涵的无形特点使得昂贵的产品有别于廉价产品。 这些特点包括设计、品牌和环境友好性。


We may also be willing to pay more for products that are manufactured at home, in a safe workplace, without child labor, etc.	我们可能还愿意为在本国、安全的工作场所或是没有童工的工厂生产的产品付更多的钱。


These characteristics are intimately linked to the values and morals – to the general culture – prevailing in the market.	这些特点与价值观和道德观紧密相连—和主导市场的整体文化息息相关。


Companies apparently recognize this.	公司们也显然承认这一点。


According to the popular business writer Daniel Pink, giving meaning or sense to a product or a service is increasingly becoming the main source of added value.	据颇受欢迎的商业作家Daniel Pink称，给某种产品或某项服务赋予意义或诉求正日益成为附加值的主要来源。


This is all the more true as Asian universities turn out vast numbers of engineers and other knowledge workers who are just as qualified as their European colleagues, and as brilliant in technical design as they are in optimizing the manufacturing process.	随着亚洲各大学培养出大量的工程师，这一点更加凸现出来。 这些专业人员绝不输于其欧洲的同事，并且不论是在技术设计还是在制造流程优化方面都同样出色。


Adding value in this non-functional sense is a quintessentially European strength.	在这种非功能性的意义上增加价值恰好是欧洲的强项。


It is at least as much an art as it is a science, and it goes beyond technical and business innovation.	它既是一门科学也是一门艺术，它超越了技术和商业的创新。


World-class design and brands already have a foothold in Europe, where creative industries are stronger that the car industry.	世界级的设计和品牌已经在欧洲有了一席之地，欧洲的创意产业比汽车产业更强。


There are good reasons for that.	在这背后大有原因。


Europe gave the world Hippocrates, da Vinci, Voltaire, Beethoven, Florence Nightingale, Dostoyevski, Nobel, John Lennon, and many others who have shaped world culture.	欧洲奉献出了希波克拉底、达•芬奇、伏尔泰、贝多芬、南丁格尔、陀思妥耶夫斯基、诺贝尔、约翰•列农等许多改变世界的文化巨匠。


Today, Europe is defending the moral high ground when it comes to values such as human rights, peaceful conflict resolution, social welfare, and care for the environment.	当今，欧洲正捍卫着人权、冲突的和平解决、社会福利和环境保护等方面的崇高价值观。


Far from being actual or potential obstacles to material success, it is precisely such values that should be celebrated and actively projected into Europe’s economy.	这些价值观非但不是物质成功的实际或潜在障碍，而恰恰应该是值得庆贺并被积极注入到欧洲经济之中的东西。


Embedding Europe’s cultural and ethical background in goods and services that reflect these values would not only set the European economy apart from the rest of the world, but would also strengthen these values globally.	将欧洲的文化和种族背景融入到反映出这些价值观的商品和服务中不仅能使欧洲经济在世界上独树一帜，还会在全球范围内强化这些价值观。


Perhaps the most urgent example is Europe’s moral leadership on climate change, which, supported through policies such as the Lisbon Strategy, should be translated into technical leadership and early entry into lucrative markets for low-carbon products.	可能最急迫的例子莫过于欧洲在气候变化上的道德领导力。 在“里斯本战略”等政策的支持下，它应该被转化为技术领导力和率先进入低碳（排放）产品的诱人市场的行动。


The “soft power” of goods and services reflects the cultural environment that creative individuals require for their work and growth.	这种商品和服务的“软实力”反映了从事创意工作的个人为了工作和发展所需要的文化环境。


In addition, such goods and services require properly cultivated consumers.	此外，这些商品和服务也需要经过良好熏陶的消费者。


As the urban studies theorist Richard Florida has argued, it is technology and tolerance that attract talents.	正如城市学理论家Richard Florida 所认为的那样，技术和包容吸引人才。


Europe should therefore become a magnet for creative people from all over the world and should, based on its rich cultural heritage, raise its own.	因此欧洲应该成为一块吸引世界各地创意人才的磁石，并还应该在自身丰富文化传统的基础上培养本土人才。


Creating meaning and preserving values is probably the one task that Europe has to undertake on behalf of the entire world.	创造意义并保持价值观可能是欧洲不得不代表全世界来承担的一项重任。


If the EU focuses on infusing its goods and services with Europe’s guiding ideas and values, its economy will reap significant rewards.	如果欧盟专注于将其商品和服务与欧洲的指导思想和价值观融合起来，其经济将会大有斩获。


This will require an explicit emphasis on ensuring the conditions that promote and sustain creativity, and the updated Lisbon Strategy that is to be launched in March should include a commitment that Europe will move in this direction.	这将需要一种对确保促进和维持创造力所需环境的高度重视。 即将在3月份实施的更新后的“里斯本战略”也应该包括一个欧洲会朝着这一方向前进的承诺。


Credit Default Swaps on Trial	CDS受审