With that struggle, in which most of the region’s regimes have exhausted their already-limited stores of legitimacy, a century-old regional order is collapsing.	随着这场耗尽多数政权本就有限的合法性的地区冲突，拥有百年历史的地区秩序顷刻间土崩瓦解。


Indeed, Israel, Iran, and Turkey – all non-Arab-majority countries – are probably the region’s only genuinely cohesive nation-states.	事实上，以色列、伊朗和土耳其——即该地区仅有的几个非阿拉伯人占据多数的国家——很可能是唯一真正有凝聚力的民族政府。


For years, key states in the region – some of them, like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, darlings of the West – have essentially paid protection money to jihadists.	多年来，该地区主要国家——其中包括沙特阿拉伯和卡塔尔等西方的宠儿——实际上已经在向圣战份子缴纳保护费。


Yes, America’s wars in the region – as destructive as they were stupid – bear a substantial part of the blame for the mayhem now engulfing the Fertile Crescent.	的确，美国愚蠢而极富破坏力的中东战争要为目前席卷这块肥沃的新月形地带的混乱局面承担相当一部分罪责。


But that does not exculpate the Arab fundamentalist monarchies for their role in reviving the seventh-century vision that ISIS (and others) seek to realize.	但我们不能以此为理由为试图重现伊斯兰国（和其他势力）期待重现的7世纪情景的阿拉伯原教旨主义君主们开脱。


ISIS’s army of psychopaths and adventurers was launched as a “startup” by Sunni magnates in the Gulf who envied Iran’s success with its Lebanese Shia proxy, Hezbollah.	羡慕伊朗成功及其黎巴嫩什叶派代理——真主党的海湾逊尼派巨头最初“组建”了由精神病患者和冒险家组成的伊斯兰国。


It was the combination of an idea and the money to propagate it that created this monster and nurtured its ambition to forge a totalitarian caliphate.	极端理念和宣传极端理念的资本共同缔造了这个怪物，滋长了它打造极权哈里发政权的野心。


For years, the Wahhabis of Arabia have been the fountainhead of Islamist radicalism and the primary backer and facilitator of extremist groups throughout the region.	多年来，阿拉伯的瓦哈比教派一直是伊斯兰激进主义的源泉，不遗余力地支持和推动整个地区的极端主义组织。


As former US Senator Bob Graham, the lead author of the classified Senate report on the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, put it earlier this year, “ISIS is a product of Saudi ideals” and “Saudi money.”	正如2001年9. 11恐怖袭击参议院机密报告的主要作者美国前参议员鲍勃·格雷厄姆今年初所说的那样，“伊斯兰国是沙特理想”和“沙特资本”的产物。


Indeed, Wikileaks quotes former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton accusing Qatar and Saudi Arabia of collusion “with Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist groups.”	事实上，维基解密曾援引美国前国务卿希拉里·克林顿的演讲指责卡塔尔和沙特阿拉伯勾结“基地、塔利班和其他恐怖组织。 ”


That raises an obvious question: When regimes in the region collaborate with terrorist groups, how can intelligence cooperation with them, let alone a coalition to fight Islamic extremism, be credible?	这就引出了一个显而易见的问题：如果地区政权与恐怖组织合作，那么与他们的情报合作有多大可信度，更不用说与他们组建打击伊斯兰极端主义的联盟？


The so-called pro-Western regimes in the Arab Middle East simply do not see eye to eye with the West about the meaning and implications of the war on terror, or even about what violent radicalism is.	阿拉伯中东地区所谓的亲西方政权在反恐战争的意义和影响、甚至暴力极端主义为何物的问题上根本不同意西方的看法。


That is just one reason why an invasion of the caliphate, with local armies supported by Western airstrikes, could have devastating unintended consequences – think of George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq.	这只是靠西方空袭支持的当地军队入侵哈里发政权可能造成意想不到的灾难性后果的原因之一——布什入侵伊拉克就是一例。


Indeed, even if such a division of labor could be agreed, a ground invasion that denies ISIS its territorial base in Iraq and Syria would merely push it to redeploy in a region that is collapsing into various no man’s lands.	事实上，就算真能达成这样的分工，摧毁伊斯兰国在伊拉克和叙利亚区域基地的地面行动也只能逼迫其撤到无人区。


At that point, “Caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, or some future would-be caliph, would invariably fuse the region’s mounting governance chaos with a global jihadi campaign – a process that, as we have seen in Paris and elsewhere, has already started.	届时，“哈里发”阿布·贝克尔·巴格达迪，或者未来某些自封的哈里发，肯定会像我们在巴黎及其他地方所亲眼目睹的那样把中东日益严重的政治混乱与全球圣战运动扯上关系。


The ideological and strategic rift between ISIS and Al Qaeda notwithstanding, an alliance against the common enemy – the incumbent Arab regimes and the West – cannot be entirely discounted.	虽然伊斯兰国和基地组织存在这样那样的意识形态和战略分歧，但结成抗敌——现任阿拉伯政权和西方——联盟的可能性却无法完全排除。


Osama Bin Laden himself never ruled out the idea of establishing a caliphate.	本·拉登本人从来没有排除建立哈里发政权的想法。


Indeed, his terrorism was perceived as a prelude to it.	事实上，他的恐怖主义被视为哈里发政权的序幕。


At the same time, Syria and Iran might exploit the inevitable chaos to expand their presence in Iraq, and all parties, including Turkey, would oppose a central role for the Kurds.	与此同时，叙利亚和伊朗或许会利用不可避免的混乱扩张其伊拉克势力，所有各方，包括土耳其在内，都会对库尔德人起核心作用持反对态度。


The latter have proven themselves to be tremendously reliable and capable fighters, as the battles to liberate the cities of Kobani and Sinjar from ISIS control have shown.	从伊斯兰国治下解放科巴尼和辛贾尔的战斗证明，库尔德人既可靠而又具有很强的战斗力。


But no one should think that they can be the West’s tool for subduing the Sunni heartland of Iraq and Syria.	但任何人都不应认为他们能够充当西方征服伊拉克和叙利亚逊尼派腹地的工具。


Nor is it clear that the West is capable of compensating the Kurds with full-fledged statehood.	西方能否以全面建国来补偿库尔德人目前也尚不明确。


The geostrategic constraints that have prevented Kurdish independence for centuries are even more acute today.	几个世纪来阻止库尔德人独立的地缘政治限制条件如今甚至更为尖锐。


Some of the consequences of a Western-backed Arab invasion of the caliphate are no less predictable for being “unintended.”	西方支持阿拉伯入侵哈里发的某些后果毫不逊色于西方所谓的“意外”。


It would eventually stir up mass sympathy for the caliphate throughout the region, thus providing ISIS with a propaganda victory and further inspiration for alienated young Muslims in Europe and elsewhere to fight the "Crusaders" and the Muslim "traitors" aligned with them.	它终将激起大众对整个地区哈里发势力的同情，从而让伊斯兰国取得宣传上的胜利，进一步鼓舞欧洲和其他地方的被孤立的年轻穆斯林与十字军和穆斯林叛徒作战。


The only realistic alternative is more – much more – of the same.	唯一现实的解决之道是进一步大规模推行同样的举措。


That means a constant and resolute effort to stop the caliphate’s expansion, cut off its sources of finance, deepen and expand intelligence cooperation among credible allies, end the oil-rich monarchies’ collusion with terrorist groups, and encourage reform (without engaging in grand state-building projects).	这意味着持续坚定地阻止哈里发的扩张、切断其资金来源、深化并拓展与可靠盟友的情报合作、结束盛产石油的君主国“勾结”恐怖组织并鼓励进行改革（不参与大规模国家建设项目）。


The Arab Middle East is not susceptible to quick fixes.	中东阿拉伯国家的形势不可能被快速修复。


It requires profound indigenous change that might take the better part of this century to produce.	它需要倾尽本世纪大部分时间努力方能实现的深刻的本土改革。


For now, turning the caliphate into yet another failed state in the region seems to be the best possible outcome.	现在，让哈里发政权演变为该地区另一个失败国家似乎是最好的预期。


The Ransom Dilemma	赎金困境


PRINCETON – Anyone who does not share the ideology of the so-called “Islamic State” in Iraq and Syria is likely to agree that it is wrong for the group’s adherents to behead some of those they have held hostage.	普林斯顿—任何不赞同伊拉克和叙利亚所谓的“伊斯兰国”的思想的人也许都同意，该集团热衷于斩首人质是错误的。


Much more controversial, however, are the secret decisions by European governments to pay such groups ransoms for the release of their nationals.	但是，较此有很大争议的是欧洲政府的秘密决定——向该集团支付赎金释放它们国民。


Although the Islamic State’s hostages have come from several countries, so far it has beheaded only those from the United States and the United Kingdom.	尽管伊斯兰国人质来自多个国家，但目前它只对来自美国和英国的人质实施了斩首。


The only European hostage reported to have been executed directly by the Islamic State appears to have been a Russian, Sergey Gorbunov, but little is known about him.	唯一一个据报道被伊斯兰国直接触觉的欧洲人质是一名俄罗斯人，名叫谢尔盖·戈尔巴诺夫（ergey Gorbunov），但关于此人的信息我们了解甚少。


No friend or relative has come forward, and no video of his death has been released.	没有朋友或亲人现身，也没有死亡录像放出。


Russian officials have publicly doubted that he was a Russian citizen.	俄罗斯官员公开质疑他的俄罗斯公民身份。


On the other hand, the Islamic State has released 15 hostages, including citizens of Italy, France, Switzerland, Denmark, and Spain.	另一方面，伊斯兰国已经释放了15名人质，包括意大利、法国、瑞士、丹麦和西班牙公民。


Rukmini Callimachi, reporting for the New York Times, has explained the difference in treatment.	为《纽约时报》作报道的茹米妮·卡里玛奇（Rukmini Callimachi）解释了这一差别对待。


The US and UK governments have a long-standing policy of refusing to pay ransoms to terrorist organizations.	美国和英国政府一直拒绝向恐怖组织支付赎金。


Moreover, when Michael Foley, brother of James Foley, one of the hostages, received a ransom demand, the FBI warned him that under US law, to pay money to terrorists is a crime.	此外，人质之一詹姆斯·弗雷（James Foley）的兄弟迈克尔·弗雷（Michael Foley）曾收到过赎金要求，但FBI警告他，根据美国法律，向恐怖分子付钱是刑事罪。


Foley was later executed.	后来，弗雷惨遭处决。


By contrast, for more than a decade several European governments have been willing to pay terrorists millions of euros for the release of their captive citizens, or have facilitated the payment of ransoms by relatives and friends of hostages.	相反，十多年来，多个欧洲国家政府愿意向恐怖分子支付数百万欧元换取被俘公民释放，或协助人质亲人和朋友支付赎金。


This is notwithstanding the United Nations Security Council’s unanimous adoption in January of a resolution opposing payment of such ransoms, and a similar declaration at last year’s G-8 summit – which was signed by some of the governments that have continued to pay.	尽管如此，联合国安理会在1月一致通过一项决议，反对支付这类赎金，去去年的G-8峰会也做了类似宣言——一些在宣言上签字的国家仍在继续支付赎金。


France has, according to Callimachi, paid more ransom money than any other country – a total of $58 million since 2008, including a single payment of $40 million in 2013 for four French citizens captured in Mali.	根据卡里玛奇的说法，法国所支付的赎金比其他任何一个国家都多——自2008年以来总额达5,800万美元，包括2013年为四名在马里被绑架的法国公民一次性支付的4,000万美元。


But French policy may be changing.	但法国的政策正在发生变化。


After France participated in airstrikes against the Islamic State in September 2014, an Algerian jihadist group captured Hervé Gourdel, a French tourist, and threatened to execute him unless France renounced its participation in the operations.	2014年9月法国参与空袭伊斯兰国后，一个阿尔及利亚圣战组织绑架了法国游客赫夫·古德尔（Hervé Gourdel），威胁说除非法国撤出空袭，否则就要处决他。


This time France stood firm, with Prime Minister Manuel Valls saying that to retreat one inch would be to hand victory to the militants.	这一回法国表现得十分坚定，总理瓦尔斯表示，退后一英寸就意味着将胜利拱手让给了伊斯兰国。


Gourdel was beheaded.	古德尔最后被斩首了。


The pressure on governments to pay ransoms, or at least facilitate the payment of ransoms by families desperate to save their loved ones’ lives, is understandable.	向政府施压支付赎金，或至少方便急切地希望拯救爱人生命的家人支付赎金是可以理解的。


It is an application of the so-called “Rule of Rescue”: our perceived duty to spend almost any amount to save an identifiable victim, such as a trapped miner, an injured mountain climber, or an extremely premature baby.	这是对所谓“救援规则”（Rule of Rescue）的应用：我们感到有责任倾尽所有拯救可证明身份的受害者，比如被困矿工、受伤登山者或极早产儿。


We are far less willing to invest in saving lives when the victims cannot be identified in advance, even when the number of lives saved would be higher – for example, by providing better road safety or education in preventive health measures.	如果受害者无法事先确认身份，我们花血本拯救生命的意愿就会小得多，即使被拯救的生命数量会大得多——比如提供更好的道路安全设施或预防性卫生手段教育。


The Rule of Rescue should be understood as a rule about human psychology, not about morality.	救援规则应该被理解为人类心理学规则，而不是道德规则。


Applying it can seem justifiable if we put ourselves in the position of a captive, or imagine that our child, parent, or spouse has been captured by terrorists who make a credible offer to release our loved one for a ransom.	使用这一规则看起来相当合理，如果我们将自己置于被绑架者的处境，或想象我们的孩子、父母或配偶被恐怖分子绑架并且获得交钱放人的可信条件的话。


But this argument trades on our inability to put ourselves in the position of any of the larger number of people killed by the Islamic State and other terrorist groups.	但这一观点的要害在于我们无法将我们自身置于更大数量被伊斯兰国和其他恐怖组织杀害的人的处境上。


They have become victims only because the estimated $125 million in ransom money paid to such groups over the past six years has enabled them to arm more militants to carry out lethal attacks.	他们之所以成为受害者，完全是因为过去六年所支付的大约1. 25亿美元赎金让伊斯兰国能够武装更多的军人实施致命袭击。


We ought to use our resources to save the most lives; and, overall, paying ransoms is likely to lead to more lives being lost.	我们应该用我们的资源拯救最多的生命； 而总体而言，支付赎金可能导致更多的生命损失。


Moreover, the additional military strength that terrorists gain from ransom revenue is not the only harm caused by paying ransoms.	此外，恐怖分子得到赎金收入从而增加军事强度并非支付赎金所造成的唯一伤害。


Ransoming one Western hostage creates an incentive for militants to capture another.	为一名西方人质支付赎金形成了一种激励，刺激伊斯兰国绑架另一名人质。


Graeme Wood, a journalist who spent four years working in the Middle East, notes that journalists in dangerous areas were always at risk of being kidnapped or killed for ideological reasons; but it does not help that a Western journalist could be worth millions of dollars, a sum he calls “universally motivating.”	在中东工作了四年的记者格赖姆·伍德（Graeme Wood）指出，危险地区的记者总是存在因意识形态原因而遭到绑架或杀害的风险； 但这并不意味着一名西方记者价值数百万美元，他认为这一数字“谁都会眼红”。


General John Allen, a former US commander in Afghanistan and now President Barack Obama’s special envoy to the international coalition fighting the Islamic State, argues that we cannot know how many Americans have not been kidnapped because the group knows that it will not receive ransoms for them.	前美国阿富汗司令官、现奥巴马总统打击伊斯兰国国际联盟特使约翰·艾伦（John Allen）上将认为，他无法获知多少美国人因为该组织知道无法从美国获得赎金而没有被绑架。


He points out that “the fact that there are Americans in the region who were never taken because [the Islamic State and its allies] knew there was no advantage to doing so needs to be factored in.”	他指出，“有一些该地区的美国人，因为[伊斯兰国及其盟友]知道绑架他们无利可图而免于绑架，这一事实也应该予以考虑。 ”


Governments that pay ransoms are saving the lives of some of their citizens, but putting the remainder of their citizens – and others – at greater risk.	支付赎金的政府拯救了一些本国公民，但也让其余本国——和他国——公民陷入了更大的危险。


The refusal to pay ransoms to terrorists can seem callous, but in truth it is the only ethical policy.	拒绝向恐怖分子支付赎金看起来也许麻木不仁，但事实上这是唯一合乎伦理的政策。


Every government should adhere to it.	所有政府都应该严守这一准则。


Flights From Freedom	逃离自由


LONDON – Among the most chilling developments in the rise of the Islamic State is that so many citizens of Western countries have joined the group’s ranks, becoming suicide bombers and beheading hostages.	伦敦—在伊斯兰国崛起的过程中，最令人心寒的也许是如此之多的西方国家公民加入其中，沦为人肉炸弹和断头人质。


Why do hundreds of Muslims, many of them educated and from middle-class backgrounds, leave comfortable Western democracies to join a brutally barbaric movement?	为何数以百计的穆斯林——其中许多人受过教育、来自中产阶级家庭——离开舒适的西方民主国家加入这个残忍的野蛮运动？


What makes young men and women susceptible to the extremist Islamist message?	什么导致年轻男女容易受到极端主义伊斯兰信息的影响？


As he watched the rise of the Nazis in the 1930s, Sigmund Freud described the dangerous appeal of authoritarian leaders and the satisfying self-aggrandizement that their followers experience when they subsume their personalities in an ideology or group.	西格蒙德·弗洛伊德（Sigmund Freud）目睹了20世纪30年代纳粹的崛起，他描述了极权领袖的危险号召以及他们的追随者在将个性拱手交给一种意识形态或组织时所体验到的令人满足的自我强化。


For those acolytes, freedom is a psychologically burdensome condition.	对这些党羽来说，自由是一个造成心理负担的环境。


As one of Freud’s disciples, Erich Fromm, famously argued, the urge to escape the demands of free choice – by adopting rigid beliefs or norms of conformity – can be especially compelling for those whose sense of a strong autonomous identity or a capacity to think for themselves is not fully developed.	弗洛伊德的门徒之一、埃里克·弗洛姆（Erich Fromm）指出，急切地想逃离自由选择的要求——通过接受僵化的信仰或一致的规范——对于那些强大的自主身份或为自己着想的能力尚未充分发展出来的人来说特别迫切。


The contemporary democracies from which Western jihadis defect offer an unprecedented degree of freedom.	西方圣战者所叛逃离开的当代民主国家提供了前所未有的自由程度。


It is hard to think of a form of political community that requires so little allegiance from its members, proposes so few shared norms, and enforces so few behavioral guidelines.	很难想象那种形式的政治社会要求如此之少的成员忠诚、施加如此之少的共同规范、实施如此之少的行为准则。


In nearly every aspect of our lives – morals, manners, sexuality, family structure, careers, and religious beliefs – we Westerners are essentially free to do as we like.	在生活中的几乎每一个方面——道德、礼节、性行为、家庭结构、职业和宗教信仰——我们西方人都拥有随心所欲的自由。


This may seem like a highly desirable state of affairs, conducive to the cultivation of a good life.	这似乎是令人十分渴望的状态，有益于培养好生活。


But in the last few decades, Western democracies have been undergoing a marked identity crisis, manifested in an unwillingness to articulate organizing ethical principles or to project democratic values onto the international stage.	但在过去数十年中，西方民主国家经历了显著地身份危机，一个明显的标识是不愿宣扬组织伦理原则或不愿在国际舞台上推进民主价值。


Internally, there is widespread disengagement from the political system and a growing sense of radical disaffection among some citizens, especially the young.	在内部，不愿参与政治制度的情况普遍存在，一些公民特别是年轻人的不满日益激进。


There also appears to be a widespread increase in psychological dysfunction, ranging from anorexia and obesity to attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and widespread depression, all of which have led to a massive increase in the consumption of psychoactive drugs.	心理不健全的情况也日益普遍，从厌食和肥胖到注意力缺陷多动症和无处不在的抑郁症，所有这些导致精神药物消费量大增。


Such symptoms and syndromes cannot be understood in purely economic terms, if only because they are as prevalent among the middle class as they are among the poor.	这些症状和症候用纯粹的经济理论是无法理解的，因为它们在中产阶级中间与在穷人中间一样普遍。


What is possible, however, is that the Western ethos of unhampered freedom and permissive tolerance fails to provide some people with the psychological scaffolding needed to construct an identity that can cope with the demands and pressures of constant individual choice.	但是，有可能西方的无阻碍自由和宽容精神没能为一些人提供构建可以应对持续个人选择的要求和压力的身份的心理基础。


We develop our identities in relation to others.	我们在与他人的关系中发展我们的身份。


The incorporation of cultural assumptions, ideas, and aspirations structures our perception of the world and provides us with psychological and moral orientation.	文化假设、思想和志向的纳入构成了我们对世界的感知，为我们提供心理和道德方向。


In today’s open, multicultural societies, the need to choose is ever-present, whether the issue is banal (Which toothpaste should I buy?) or essential (Where do I find sources of purpose or meaning in my life?).	在当今开放的多文化社会中，选择需要永远存在，不管是平淡无奇的问题（应该买哪个牌子的牙膏？ ）还是至关重要的问题（从哪里去寻找生命的目标和意义？


But, with no shared cultural norms on which to base decisions regarding, say, how to achieve wellbeing or to direct one’s life, how can one distinguish between good and bad choices?	）。 但是，没有共同的文化规范作为与（比如）如何实现福祉或如何引导生活等问题有关的决定的基础，我们如何区分好选择与坏选择？


What counts as right or wrong, serious or spurious?	什么构成了对与错，严肃与伪善？


In a sense, Westerners who choose to embrace fanatical Islamist ideology are an extreme manifestation of a much wider phenomenon.	从某种程度上讲，选择皈依狂热伊斯兰意识形态的西方人是一个极端的例子，体现的是一个广泛得多的现象。


The Islamic State’s ruthlessly rigid creed relieves its followers of the disorienting burden of autonomous thought or choice.	伊斯兰国冷酷严格的教义让其追随者不再需要承担自主思考和选择的迷失负担。


Fromm remains relevant: The flight into the embrace of a virulent movement like the Islamic State is also an escape from freedom by its discontents.	弗洛姆依然是对的：皈依伊斯兰国这样的致命运动也是因为不满而逃离自由。


Some of the jihadis’ statements make the connection explicitly: “The cure for depression is jihad,” one Western recruit declares in an Islamic State video.	一些圣战者的言论清楚地表明了这一联系：“治疗抑郁的良方就是圣战，”一名西方应征者在伊斯兰国视频中如是说。


“Feel the honor we are feeling.	“感受我们真正在感受的光荣。


Feel the happiness we are feeling.”	感受我们正在感受的幸福。


Another one simply states: “No to democracy.”	”另一人明确地说，“不是民主。


Democratic ennui creates the conditions for radicalization, and the extreme Islamist movements know very well how to exploit it.	”民主延误创造了极端化的条件，而极端伊斯兰运动十分了解如何利用这一点。


The seductive call of extremism will not be silenced with pleas to fundamentalist imams in European mosques to stop indoctrinating young Muslim men.	极端主义的迷人召唤是不可能通过恳请欧洲清真寺中的原教旨伊玛目停止灌输年轻穆斯林男性平息下去的。


Initiation into Islamist ideology needs to be countered by a much stronger initiation into the culture of democracy and its fundamental values – and by a much stronger affirmation of these values within our political discourse.	伊斯兰意识形态的召唤需要用更强大的民主及其基本价值召唤来制衡，需要用远为更强大的对我们政治制度中的这些价值的肯定来制衡。


It is through increased confidence and conviction, rather than bland tolerance, that democratic societies can counter the appeal of fanatical causes and their charismatic leaders.	是日益增加的信心和确信，而不是平淡无奇的宽容，让民主社会能够对抗狂热因子及其美丽超凡的领袖的召唤。


Only renewed commitment to the idea of democracy can address the widespread disaffection and disengagement plaguing Western societies, of which the Islamic State jihadis are just the most disturbing and dangerous symptom.	只有重新致力于民主思想能够扭转正在破坏西方社会的普遍的不满和脱离。 伊斯兰国圣战者只不过是西方社会最麻烦、最危险的症候。


Militant Islamism and Vaccine Skepticism	好战伊斯兰主义和疫苗怀疑论


LONDON – We know how to eradicate polio.	伦敦——我们清楚如何根除小儿麻痹症。


Since the 1980s, an international vaccination effort led by the World Health Organization has driven the virus to the cusp of extinction.	20世纪80年代以来，世卫组织领导的一项国际疫苗接种计划让病毒近乎绝迹。


A disease that killed or paralyzed a half-million people annually now infects only a few hundred.	这种曾几何时每年导致50万人死亡或瘫痪的疾病现在只感染几百人。


What is standing in the way of the virus’s eradication is not medical or technical constraints, but political resistance to the vaccination effort.	阻止消灭病毒的不是医学或技术限制，而是对疫苗接种工作的政治抵触情绪。


Indeed, the few areas where the virus continues to hold out share worrying similarities.	事实上，病毒继续肆虐的地区状况令人担忧的相似。


Since 2012, 95% of polio cases have occurred in five countries – Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Somalia, and Syria – all of which are affected by Islamist insurgencies.	2012年后，95%的小儿麻痹病例都出现在五个国家——阿富汗、巴基斯坦、尼日利亚、索马里和叙利亚——它们无一例外都是受伊斯兰叛乱影响的地区。


In order to eradicate polio, we must understand this linkage.	为根除小儿麻痹症，我们必须了解这种联系。


Islamist opposition to vaccination programs is often attributed to the belief that vaccines are a Western conspiracy to harm Muslims, and that the vaccines sterilize children, are infected with HIV, or contain pork.	伊斯兰教反对疫苗接种计划往往因为相信疫苗是西方企图伤害穆斯林的阴谋，疫苗含有艾滋病毒、会导致儿童不育。


But it is important to note that jihadists in Syria and Afghanistan have been largely supportive of polio vaccination campaigns.	但必须强调叙利亚和阿富汗的圣战者在很大程度上支持小儿麻痹疫苗的接种工作。


If the virus is to be defeated, we will have to move beyond caricatures of Islamists as violent zealots opposed to Western science and look closely at the specific political contexts in which the eradication effort has so far been unsuccessful.	要想击败病毒，我们必须摒弃将伊斯兰教徒视为反西方科学暴力狂热份子的讽刺画，���真审视病毒根除工作迄今为止尚未取得成功的特定政治环境。


In Nigeria, for example, the extremist group Boko Haram’s animosity toward vaccination campaigns stems from an intra-Muslim conflict rooted in the colonial era, when the United Kingdom ruled northern Nigeria indirectly through a pro-British indigenous elite.	比方说在尼日利亚，极端组织博科圣地对疫苗接种的敌意最初起源于殖民地时期的穆斯林内部冲突，当时英国通过亲英的本土精英对尼日利亚北部进行间接统治。


The descendants of the colonial elite continue to dominate the region’s state governments, which are responsible for implementing the vaccination programs.	殖民地精英的后裔继续主导该地区的国家政府，并负责疫苗接种计划的实施。


Boko Haram’s opposition to the effort reflects its broader antipathy to what it regards as a corrupt and Westernized political class.	博科圣地反对接种计划其实反映了它对腐败西化的政治阶层的普遍反感情绪。


Similarly, in southern Somalia, attempts by outsiders to impose a stable centralized government have generated resentment toward polio vaccination programs.	同样，在索马里南部，外界试图强加一个稳定中央政府的努力导致民众对疫苗接种计划产生了不满情绪。


Since the early 1990s, interventions by the United Nations and the African Union in Somalia have included troops from the United States and from the country’s predominantly Christian neighbors, Kenya and Ethiopia.	20世纪90年代初以来，联合国和非盟在索马里的干预包括派驻来自美国和该国主要基督教邻国，肯尼亚和埃塞俄比亚的部队。


This has resulted in widespread discontent and has fueled support for Islamist militants, whom many Somalis view as the main bulwark against foreign interference.	上述举措引发了民众的普遍不满，激起了对伊斯兰武装分子的支持。 在很多索马里人眼中，伊斯兰武装分子是反抗外国干涉的主要堡垒。


In recent years, al-Shabaab militants have attacked aid workers, making it very difficult to undertake public-health programs in insurgent-controlled areas.	近年来，青年党激进分子袭击救援人员，导致武装分子控制区域的公共卫生计划很难进行下去。


Médecins Sans Frontières, for example, had to close its Somali programs in 2013.	比如，无国界医生组织被迫在2013年停止其索马里项目。


In Pakistan, opposition to the vaccination effort has its roots in Pashtun communities’ resistance to the national government.	在巴基斯坦，普什图族裔反抗国家政府引发了反对疫苗接种的努力。


Broadly speaking, the Pakistani Taliban is a Pashtun movement, concentrated in the semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas in the northwest of the country.	广义来讲，巴基斯坦塔利班是一项普什图运动，主要集中在该国西北部半自治的联邦直辖部落地区。


This mountainous region was never ruled directly by the British, and the Pashtun have fiercely resisted attempts by the Pakistani state to expand its power.	这片山区从未落入英国的直接统治，普什图人激烈反抗巴基斯坦政府扩大自身权力。


Thus, external interventions like the vaccination program are viewed as a stalking horse for deeper government encroachment into Pashtun areas.	因此，像疫苗接种这样的外部干预计划被视为加强政府对普什图地区侵略的掩护之举。


The Pakistani Taliban’s hostility has been further hardened by US interventions in the country, including the use of a fake hepatitis vaccination campaign to gather DNA from Osama bin Laden’s relatives prior to his assassination.	美国对该国的干预进一步强化了巴基斯坦塔利班的敌意，包括利用虚假的肝炎疫苗接种活动在刺杀奥萨玛·本·拉登前收集其亲属的DNA。


For Islamist militants, this confirmed that polio immunization efforts are a cover for gathering intelligence to identify targets for drone attacks.	在伊斯兰激进分子看来，上述做法证实了小儿麻痹免疫工作的目的是掩护收集情报，确定无人机袭击目标。


The importance of local politics – rather than religious ideology – can be seen in the response to polio vaccination programs on the other side of the Durand Line.	杜兰德线另一边对小儿麻痹疫苗接种计划的反应可以看出地方政治、而非宗教信仰的重要性。


In Afghanistan, the Taliban is also a largely Pashtun movement, but its attitude toward the polio eradication effort could not be more different.	在阿富汗，塔利班很大程度上也是普什图运动，但其对小儿麻痹疫苗根除计划的态度却有着很大差异。


When the Taliban ruled Afghanistan, from 1996 to 2001, it supported the vaccination effort, and indeed it continues to do so; a recent Taliban statement urged its Mujahedeen to provide polio workers with “all necessary support.”	1996至2001年塔利班统治阿富汗时支持疫苗接种工作，现在态度也并未改变； 最新的塔利班声明敦促圣战者为小儿麻痹工作人员提供“一切必要的支持”。


This difference reflects the political position of Pashtuns in the two countries.	上述差异反映了普什图人在两国的政治地位。


In Afghanistan, Pashtun are the majority; as a result, they have a much stronger influence in national politics than their counterparts in Pakistan – and thus view the state with less suspicion.	在阿富汗，普什图是主要民族； 因此他们对国家政治的影响远大于在巴基斯坦的同伴——因此对政府的怀疑也没有那么强烈。


In Syria, the biggest obstacle to the vaccination effort has been the central government.	在叙利亚，疫苗接种工作的最大障碍一直是中央政府。


The refusal of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime to allow WHO to carry out vaccination programs in insurgent-controlled areas directly resulted in a polio outbreak in 2013.	巴沙尔-阿萨德总统政权拒绝允许世卫组织进入反叛分子控制地区接种疫苗，并直接导致了2013年小儿麻痹症的流行。


Moderate opposition groups like the Free Syrian Army, with the help of the Turkish authorities and local non-governmental organizations, have organized their own vaccination program in areas outside Syrian government control.	叙利亚自由军等温和反对团体在土耳其当局和当地非政府组织的帮助下，在叙利亚政府控制以外地区组织了自己的疫苗接种计划。


Islamist militants, including the Islamic State and the al-Nusra Front, have allowed these immunization programs to operate in areas under their control as well, as they are not associated with the Assad regime.	伊斯兰武装分子，包括伊斯兰国和胜利阵线，也允许在其控制地区开展上述免疫计划，因为他们与阿萨德政权没有关系。


The stance Islamist insurgents take toward polio vaccination campaigns has less to do with anti-Western zealotry than with the specific dynamics of the conflict in which they are involved.	伊斯兰武装分子对待小儿麻痹疫苗接种活动的立场与其说源于反西方狂热还不如说与其所卷入冲突的具体动态相关。


This has important implications for public-health policy.	这对公共卫生政策具有重要意义。


Only by understanding the political context in which vaccination programs operate will those committed to eradicating polio succeed.	只有了解了疫苗接种计划实施的政治背景，根除小儿麻痹症的工作才能够取得胜利。


Islam’s Democratic Imperative	伊斯兰的民主必要性


Mahmoud Abbas’s election in Palestine and the forthcoming vote in Iraq on January 30 have pushed the question of Islam’s compatibility with democracy to the center of the world’s agenda.	马哈茂德 · 阿巴斯 在巴勒斯坦的当选以及一月三十日即将在伊拉克举行的大选将把伊斯兰国家与民主制度的相容性问题推到世界议事日程的重要位置。


Sheik Dia al-Shakarchi, a leading Shi’ite theologian, argues that democracy is not only compatible with Islam, but is essential to it.	Sheik Dia al-Shakarchi ，一位重要的什叶派理论家，认为民主制度不仅与伊斯兰国家协调相配，并且还必不可少。


During the last 25 years, Islam has played an increasingly influential role in politics, and not only in the Islamic world, with political Islam frequently expressing itself in radicalism and terror.	在过去的25年中，伊斯兰国家活跃不断的激进运动和恐怖主义活动使其政治影响大大增强，并已超出了伊斯兰世界的范围。


Both Muslims and non-Muslims have not always agreed on the extent to which this is compatible with genuine Islam.	无论是穆斯林还是非穆斯林，在民主制度与真正的伊斯兰精神的相容程度这一问题上总是各执己见。


How Islam is understood varies widely among devout, moderately religious, and non-observant Muslims, as well as among Islamic scholars, political parties, and organizations.	对宗教虔诚但不狂热的、略欠精明的穆斯林份子对伊斯兰教的理解可谓各有不同，更不要说伊斯兰教学者、各个政党以及各种组织了。


Even western experts and critics of Islam hold different views.	即使是西方专家和评论家也都各执其词。


Overall, there are two conflicting images of Islam: a peaceful Islam, which is ready for dialogue and coexistence, and a fundamentalist Islam, which is militant and even terrorist.	总体来说，有两种截然相反的伊斯兰形象：一个是和平的伊斯兰，欢迎对话和共存； 另一个就是原教旨主义伊斯兰世界，好战甚至不惜采用恐怖主义。


There is a widespread misperception that Islam’s holy texts are written in a way that can justify both interpretations.	人们普遍有种错误的理解，认为伊斯兰古兰经的写作方式能为这两种说法提供充足的依据。


But, in my opinion, the reason for different – and frequently contradictory – interpretations is an incompetent and incomplete approach that detaches individual texts from their context and construes them without a thorough understanding of the true spirit of the Koran.	但是，在我看来，导致这种不同——且常常是自相矛盾的——解释是由于使用了不适宜且不完善的办法从古兰经中断章取义，并在没有完全理解古兰经教义的前提下擅作分析。


This approach to Islamic texts – coming from both secular and religiously oriented Muslims, as well as from non-Muslims with an interest in the subject – calls into question the compatibility of Islam and democracy, and also whether Islam is capable with peace and moderation.	这种对于伊斯兰古兰经的理解方法来自现世主义、以宗教为导向的穆斯林和对这一问题颇感兴趣的非穆斯林，并引发了对伊斯兰教和民主制度相容性以及伊斯兰世界是否能达到和平稳定状态的质疑。


But, based on more than a decade of study and debate, I am convinced of the compatibility between Islam and democracy.	但是，根据我十年多来的研究和论战，我对伊斯兰教与民主制度间的相容性深信不疑。


Indeed, in my view, democracy is not only permitted by Islam, but can be regarded as a religious rule.	事实上，我认为，民主制度不仅已被伊斯兰所接受承认，并且已被认为是宗教规则的一部分。


My understanding is drawn from a principle contained by the basic Islamic theory of legal reasoning, which asserts that when strong religious interests can be realized only through a particular path of action, that path itself is no longer a matter of choice.	我的这种理解源于伊斯兰教关于法律推理基本教义中的一条原则。 该原则声称，当强大的宗教利益只能通过一种特殊行动来实现时，这种途径本身就不再是个选择，而是成为了一条宗教规则。


It also becomes a religious rule. Thus, if we can establish that democracy is the means to realize the strong interests of the Muslim community – and I believe we can do this – then democracy may be declared a religious duty in Islam.	因此，如果我们能够确认民主制度是实现穆斯林世界强大利益的方法的话——我相信我们能够确认——那么伊斯兰世界就能够宣称实行民主制度是一种宗教义务。


Even if democracy might be viewed primarily as an evil from an Islamic point of view, there is another principle of interpretation of religious laws in Islam, according to which minor evils – even if religiously impermissible or not recommended at first – become permissible, recommended, and even mandatory if they alone can prevent major evils.	即使伊斯兰人一开始会把民主制度看作一种罪恶，伊斯兰还有这样一条解释宗教法律的原则——就算起初不被宗教所允许或推荐的非严重罪恶，若是它能防止较严重的罪恶发生，也可以被接受或推荐，甚至成为一种义务。


The Muslim interest in democracy is best understood through a clear perception of the reality of how Muslims live.	对于穆斯林的生存现状的深刻了解最能诠释穆斯林在民主制度中享受到的好处。


A country like Iraq, for example, is home to a diverse and varied population: Arab and Kurd, Sunni and Shi’ite, not to mention minorities of other religions and ethnic groups.	譬如，像伊拉克这样的一个国家，拥有多种多样的人口：阿拉伯和库尔德人，逊尼派和什叶派，更不要说各种其它宗教少数民族和民族团体。


Moreover, not all Muslims practice Islam, nor do those who practice do so in the same way.	更何况，并非所有的穆斯林信奉伊斯兰教，即使是那些信奉伊斯兰教的也各有不同。


So religion cannot be imposed; individuals must practice it according to their own decisions.	因此，宗教是不能被强加的，每个人必须根据自己的意愿决定来信奉宗教。


Any enforcement of religious practice only creates hostility toward religion.	任何强制宗教信仰的作为只会制造对宗教的敌意。


Thus, I believe that a political system that best serves free choice – including the choice of people to be practicing Muslims – is the best system for Islam.	因此，我相信，一个能最大程度上尊重自由选择的政治制度——包括人们选择信奉穆斯林的方式——就是伊斯兰最好的制度。


Of course, the problem of Islam’s compatibility with democracy may be analyzed from different points of view.	当然，伊斯兰教与民主制度的相容性问题可以从多种角度来看。


One possible approach is purely practical, comparing democracy with all other conceivable alternatives.	有一种非常切实可行的方法，就是将民主制度与所有其他有可能可行的办法作比较。


In my opinion, there are only five conceivable alternatives in a Muslim country.	我认为适合一个穆斯林国家的方法有五种。


The first is secular dictatorship.	第一种是现世主义独裁。


This is unacceptable for two reasons.	但它有两个理由不被接受。


First, dictatorship itself is ugly and unacceptable; second, secular dictatorship excludes Islamic parties from participating normally in the political system.	其一，独裁制度本身丑陋不堪，难以被接受； 其次，独裁制度排除了伊斯兰各政党在政治体系中参政议政的可能。


We have considerable experience of this in the Middle East.	我们在中东地区有过很多这样的经验了。


Of course, an Islamic dictatorship is also possible.	当然，伊斯兰教独裁也是可能的。


But this, too, is unacceptable.	但是它也同样难以被接受。


As with a secular dictatorship, Islamic dictatorship is ugly and destructive.	和现世主义独裁一样，伊斯兰教独裁制度丑陋且极具破坏性。


Such a dictatorship would damage Islam by associating Islam with unjust rule and creating enemies for Islam.	这种独裁体制将伊斯兰与非公正法则紧密联系并不断制造伊斯兰敌人，由此损害伊斯兰。


A third alternative is democracy, but with secular restrictions on religious parties.	第三种做法是一种对宗教政党采取现世主义约制的民主制度。


In fact, this would be a pseudo-democracy, and would infringe on the rights of religious people to full participation.	事实上，这是一种伪民主，将会完全破坏宗教民众的权利。


Likewise, an Islamic democracy with restrictions on non-religious parties would be a mockery of democracy and harmful to Islam.	同样，一种对非宗教政党进行约束的伊斯兰教民主制度也是对民主制度的践踏，将会损害伊斯兰的利益。


This would also be unrealistic, because in the current age of globalization, any claims to democracy would be exposed as obviously false.	这种做法也是不现实的，因为在当今全球化环境下，任何民主制度的宣称将会被揭穿是个骗局。


So, in my view, true democracy is the only alternative, because it is realistic and promotes peace.	因此，我认为，真正的民主制度才是唯一的选择，因为它现实可行并能推动和平进程。


Call this ideology-free democracy: a political system that tolerates restrictions imposed only from within, never from outside, the democratic process itself.	把这个称作“意识形态自由民主制度”：即一种能容忍来自内部，民主进程内部的制约，而非来自外部限制的政治体系。


We must recognize that democracy has proved its worth around the world.	我们必须认识到民主制度已经在全球范围内证明其价值所在。


It is the best way of organizing a society based on reality and not ideals.	要组织一个建立在现实基础而非理想状态的社会，民主制度是最好的方法。


Why shouldn’t Iraqis benefit from the proven experience of other peoples?	为什么伊拉克人不能从其他民族的经验中收益呢？


Islam\u0027s Electoral Divide	伊斯兰的选举分歧


How to reform the Islamic world will be among the topics NATO's leaders will discuss in Turkey next week.	如何改造伊斯兰世界将是北约领导人下周在土耳其讨论的议题。


Both President Bush and the European Union have proposed bold democratization initiatives in the region. Can such initiatives succeed?	布什总统和欧盟都提出了这一地区大胆的民主改造提案，但他们的提案能否获得成功？


Islam and democracy are frequently presumed to be bitter antagonists.	伊斯兰和民主常被认为不共戴天。


A careful study of the world's 47 Muslim-majority states, however, shows that Islam and democracy can and do co-exist.	但对全球47个以穆斯林为主国家的调查显示，伊斯兰和民主可以和平共存。


The real gap is narrower: it is the Arab world, not Islam, which seems at loggerheads with democracy.	真正的差距在缩小：是阿拉伯而非伊斯兰世界与民主水火不容。


This conclusion is based on comparing Muslim countries' "electoral competitiveness."	上述结论以对比穆斯林国家的"选举竞争力"为基础。


If a government sprang from reasonably fair elections and the elected government is able to fill the most important political offices, the country is deemed "electorally competitive."	如果政府源自相对公平的选举，且当选政府能担任最为重要的政治职务，则我们认定该国"具备选举竞争力。 "


Electorally competitive countries are not necessarily democratic: some do not fully control the state's territory; others violate both their constitutions and human rights.	具备选举竞争力的国家不一定拥有民主：有些不能完全控制国家的领土，还有些侵犯了本国的宪法和人权。


But electoral competitiveness is always a necessary condition for democracy - and therefore a central consideration when evaluating a country's prospects for democratization.	但选举竞争力永远是民族的必要条件¾因此也是评价某国民主化前景的中心因素。


Two initiatives - the Polity Project, founded by political scientist Ted Gurr, and Freedom House's annual Freedom in the World surveys - gauge political rights in almost every country.	政治学家特德·格尔（Ted Gurr）提出的"政治计划"和自由之家组织每年一度的《世界自由》调查几乎囊括了对各个国家的政治权利评价。


The differences between Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries are striking.	阿拉伯和非阿拉伯穆斯林国家的差异令人惊讶。


Of 29 non-Arab Muslim countries evaluated by Polity IV , 11 enjoyed significant political rights for at least three consecutive years in the period from 1972 to 2000, while eight experienced at least five consecutive years of political rights.	《政治》第4期调查的29个非阿拉伯穆斯林国家中，有11个国家从1972到2000年间连续3年以上享有重大的政治权利，其中5年以上连续享有的国家达到了8个。


The Freedom House scores are remarkably similar: 12 of 31 non-Arab Muslim countries had relatively high scores for at least three consecutive years, and eight for five consecutive years.	自由之家组织的评分非常接近：31个非阿拉伯穆斯林国家中，有12个连续3年以上得分较高，其中8个连续5年以上获得了高分。


Both research teams rate Albania, Bangladesh, the Gambia, Malaysia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey as meeting the three-year criterion, with all but Albania and Niger meeting the five-year criterion.	两个调查机构均认为阿尔巴尼亚、孟加拉、冈比亚、马来西亚、马里、尼日尔、巴基斯坦和土耳其达到了连续3年的标准，而且除阿尔巴尼亚和尼日尔以外，上述其它国家都连续5年的得到了高分。


But on the Arab side, only Lebanon had three consecutive years of relatively strong political rights - before the 15-year civil war that began in 1975 - and no country experienced five consecutive years of strong rights.	但在阿拉伯世界，只有黎巴嫩在1975年爆发的15年内战之前，曾连续3年享有较强的政治权利，而没有任何国家能连续5年得到高分。


A non-Arab Muslim country in the period from 1972 to 2000 was almost 20 times more likely to be electorally competitive than an Arab Muslim-majority country.	1972到2000年间，非阿拉伯穆斯林国家拥有"选举竞争力"的几率是阿拉伯穆斯林国家的20倍。


In the non-Arab Muslim-majority subset, both Polity IV and Freedom House rate nine countries as having experienced at least three consecutive years of substantial political rights.	非阿拉伯穆斯林国家集合中，《政治》第四期和自由之家组织都认为有9个国家实现了连续3年享有重大政治权利。


Strikingly, seven of them are clear "overachievers," because they also have low per capita GDP levels. Indeed, five of the nine qualify as "great overachievers" - significant political rights despite annual per capita income of less than $1,500.	引人注目的是，上述国家中的7个政治权利的发展明显超前，因为它们的人均国内生产总值相对较低，9国中的5国甚至"非常超前"，尽管年人均收入还不到1500美元，同样能够拥有重大的政治权利。


By contrast, none of the 16 Arab Muslim-majority countries is an overachiever.	恰恰相反，穆斯林为主的阿拉伯16国中，没有一个超前享有政治权利。


Seven had annual per capita income levels exceeding $5,500 in the period from 1972 to 2000 but no significant political rights for three consecutive years.	从1972到2000年间，16国中7国的年度人均收入超过了5，500美元，但却连续三年不享有重大政治权利。


These states are electoral "underachievers" - weak political rights despite relative affluence.	这些国家是选举"落后国"，尽管相对富有，但在政治权利上却非常软弱。


Elections do occur in the Arab world, and they vary in frequency and significance.	阿拉伯世界也举行选举，其频率和重要性各有不同。


In the complete autocracies - Saudi Arabia, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, Iraq under Saddam, and the United Arab Emirates - there have been no meaningful elections to fill the most important offices.	包括沙特阿拉伯、利比亚、叙利亚、突尼斯、萨达姆统治的伊拉克和阿拉伯联合酋长国在内的完全独裁政府没有真正意义上的选举，选拔和任命政府要职。


The UAE, a somewhat decentralized and consensual federation, is not as dictatorial as the others, but only seven voters - the traditional rulers of the federation's seven emirates - elect the president.	其中阿联酋是权利相对分散的协议联邦，不像其它国家那么独裁，但也只有7个选民有权参与总统选举，他们是传统上统治联邦的7位酋长。


Elections have begun to play a greater role in Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman, but none uses free and fair elections to fill the most important and powerful political offices.	选举的作用在卡塔尔、科威特、巴林和阿曼的作用日益增强，但上述没有哪个国家采用自由公正的选举来任命掌握实权的政治要职。


Traditional monarchs still have broad powers of appointment and decree.	传统的君主仍然有任命和裁决的广泛权力。


Finally, some Arab countries are not electorally competitive now but once did use free and fair elections to fill the state's most politically powerful offices (Lebanon).	最后，某些阿拉伯国家目前并不具备选举竞争力，但以前却曾采用自由公正的选举来决定国家的政治要职（黎巴嫩）。


Others seemed close to doing so (Yemen, Morocco, and Jordan) or had a possible political opening but are now substantially farther away from being electorally competitive (Egypt and, arguably, Algeria).	还有些国家似乎更接近这个目标（包括也门、摩洛哥和约旦），或是曾经有过可能的政治空缺，但现在却离选举竞争力越来越远（埃及和有争议的阿尔及利亚）。


It makes intuitive sense that Islam cannot by itself explain such differences.	伊斯兰国家自己无法解释这样的差异并不奇怪。


All of the world's religions contain some doctrines and practices that are potentially harmful to the emergence of democracy, and others that are potentially beneficial.	世界上所有的宗教都含有某些原则和惯例，会对民主的形成产生潜在的威胁或者促动。


A beneficial Islamic doctrine is the Koranic injunction that "there shall be no compulsion in matters of religion."	有益的伊斯兰教义包括可兰经禁令"在宗教事务上不得实行强迫"。


Others include shura (consultation), ijtihad (independent reasoning), and ijma (consensus).	其它的还有 shura （磋商）， ijtihad （独立思考） 和 ijma （达成共识）。


Perhaps religious and political leaders in electorally overachieving states such as Senegal, Mali, Bangladesh, and Indonesia draw upon some of these concepts.	也许上述理念对塞内加尔、马里、孟加拉和印尼等选举超前国家的宗教政治领袖们有所裨益。


Most political cultures can and do change over time, because to some extent they are socially constructed by new opportunities, threats, and contexts generally.	多数政治文化能够也确实随时间的推移而改变，因为它们在某种程度上受到新的机遇、威胁和宏观社会环境的影响。


Witness Catholicism's pro-democratic transformation.	看看天主教的民主改革进程就明白了。


Unless Arab political culture is shown to be uniquely and permanently inimical to electoral competitiveness, it makes more sense to understand the democratic divide in the Muslim world in terms of the political - as opposed to the ethnic or religious - particularities of the Middle East and North Africa.	除非证明阿拉伯政治文化对选举竞争力有着特别而永久的敌意，否则从中东北非特殊的政治状况而不是种族或宗教的角度来理解穆斯林世界的民主分歧更有实际意义。


One such particularity is that many contemporary Arab states were established with relatively new and arbitrary boundaries, and were then occupied and often reconfigured as European colonies.	上文提到的特殊状况之一是很多现代的阿拉伯国家的边境均系人为划定，而且划定时间不长。 当时，这些国家被占领并改造成了欧洲的殖民地。


The linguistic dominance of Arabic throughout the Middle East and North Africa, together with pan-Arabism, reinforced weak national identities.	中东和北非地区阿拉伯语的主导地位和泛阿拉伯主义一道，进一步削弱了各国自身的民族特征。


Anyone even remotely familiar with the region knows how common is the phrase "the Arab nation" ( watan ).	只要有人对伊斯兰教稍有了解，就知道"阿拉伯民族"（watan）一语的应用有多么广泛。


Furthermore, unlike Latin America, Africa, and elsewhere, Middle East democrats have not benefited from the Cold War's end.	此外，与拉丁美洲、非洲和其它地方不同的是，中东民主并未从冷战结束中有所收获。


The US continues to subsidize authoritarian Arab regimes, such as Egypt (which receives at least $2 billion a year), because it buys peace with Israel and maintains US geopolitical influence in the Arab-Israeli conflict.	美国继续资助埃及这样独裁的阿拉伯政府（年资助额少说也有20亿美元），原因是埃及赞成与以色列实现和平，在阿以冲突中维持了美国对地域政治的影响。


Resolving that conflict - itself a key aspect of Arab political identity - might enable Arab political culture to change.	上述冲突的解决本身成了阿拉伯政治特征的重要方面，并可能促进阿拉伯政治文化发生改变。


But NATO's leaders should bear in mind that, viewed in comparative and historical perspective, such change will be less an imposition from outside and more the result of internal pressures and initiatives.	但北约领导人应该时刻记住：以比较和历史的眼光来看，上述变化更有可能是内部压力和行动的结果，而不会来自外界力量的强迫作用。


Islam’s European Hope	伊斯兰的欧洲梦想


MADRID – Mohamed Merah’s killing spree in and around Toulouse in March, like the 2004 Madrid train bombings and the 2005 suicide attacks in London’s Underground, has highlighted once again the dilemmas that Europe faces with regard to its growing Muslim minority.	马德里---与2004年马德里火车炸弹事件和2005年伦敦地铁自杀袭击如出一辙，三月份杀人狂穆罕默德·默拉在图卢兹的罪行令人毛骨悚然，同时将欧洲如何面对日益增长的穆斯林少数族群的这个两难困境，再次曝光在世人面前。


No social-integration model has proven to be free of flaws.	没有哪个社会整合范例证明是完全没有缺陷的。


But is the picture really so bleak as those who despair of an emerging “Eurabia” would have us believe?	但是面对如此凄凉，令人绝望的社会现象，我们真的相信会有一个“阿拉伯欧洲”出现吗？


Neither the multicultural ethos (respect for “cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance,” as British Labor Minister Roy Jenkins put it in 1966), nor official indifference to religious identities (as in France, where the state, as the nineteenth-century historian Jules Michelet put it, “takes the place of God”) has worked as planned.	不管是多文化特性（英国劳工部部长霍弋·金克斯曾在1966年放言：“多元化的文化生长在相互包容的环境中”），或者官方淡化宗教身份识别（正如19世纪历史学家朱莉·米歇尔所言：法国这个国家正在取代神的位置）都不能按计划进行。


Multiculturalism in Britain has entrenched almost self-contained Muslim communities and turned Islam into a badge of identity to counteract exclusion.	多元化主义在英国根深蒂固，几乎稳固了穆斯林族群的地位，伊斯兰教借此获得了一个身份标记，从而抵消了排外的力量。


Similarly, imposed laïcité(France’s strict republican secularism) seems to have deepened French Muslims’ attachment to their religious identity.	同样地，强制的 政教分离  政策（法国严格的共和世俗主义）似乎加剧了法国的穆斯林的宗教身份认同感。


Devastatingly high unemployment rates among European Muslims (three times higher than the national average in most countries) aggravate their social marginalization and cultural self-segregation.	欧洲穆斯林的惨不忍睹的高失业率（在大多数国家，他们的失业率三倍于国家平均失业率）进一步恶化了他们的社会边缘化处境，加速了他们的文化自我隔离。


Isolated, destitute, and in a state of permanent rage, the French banlieues and immigrant ghettos of British cities have turned into powder kegs where young Muslims easily fall prey to radical religious preaching and political extremism.	孤立，赤贫，身处一直对己抱有敌意的国度，法国的郊区和英国城市的贫民区变成了宗教激进派的布道场所和政治极端分子的滋生温床，那里穆斯林年轻人很容易被上述组织俘获和吸收。


At least 85 sharia courts are now operating in Britain’s parallel Muslim society, while the number of mosques (1,689) now almost equals the number of Anglican churches that have recently closed (1,700).	目前在英国的平行穆斯林社会里，至少存在85座伊斯兰法庭，此外，1689座清真寺也与1700座的国教徒教堂几乎分庭抗礼。


Mohammed is the most popular name for baby boys in Britain.	穆罕默德成为英国男孩最常见的名字。


For Prime Minister David Cameron, all of this, as he implied at the 2011 Munich Security Conference, represents the spoiled fruit of multiculturalism.	英国首相大卫·卡梅伦早就在2011年慕尼黑安全会议上暗指，以上种种都是多元化政策的苦果。


In fact, it should come as no surprise that enthusiasm for religious self-assertion is strongest among young, second-generation immigrants.	因此，年轻人和第二代移民最狂热地笃信宗教的现象就不足为奇了。


Their parents, still influenced by life under the repressive autocracies from which they fled, tend to be submissive to the powers that be.	他们的父辈，由于当初逃离独裁镇压，倾向于顺从现有政权，这种心理影响依然存在。


Younger generations rebel precisely because they have internalized the values of freedom and choice offered by democracy.	年轻一代却选择反叛，因为他们接受并内化了自由思想和民主赋予的自由选择理念。


In a way, their rebellion is the hallmark of their Britishness or Frenchness.	总而言之，他们的反叛带有鲜明的英国或法国印记。


True, some young European Muslims have traveled to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq; some went as far as Yemen and Somalia, and came back as hardened radicals, soldiers in a war against a West that, in their view, dishonors Islam.	事实上，一些欧洲穆斯林曾远赴阿富汗，巴基斯坦和伊拉克； 另外一些曾东渡也门和索马里拜师学艺，学成归来后，他们成为坚定的激进分子和反抗西方的战士，在他们眼中，西方使伊斯兰蒙羞。


As the young Muslim Briton Mohammed Sidique Khan put it (speaking in a heavy Yorkshire accent), he participated in the London Underground bombings “to avenge my Muslim brothers and sisters.”	在此引用一位年轻的英国穆斯林穆罕默德·斯迪克·翰（他参加了伦敦地铁爆炸案，操一口浓重的约克郡口音）的话语：“（我这样做）是为我死去的穆斯林兄弟姐妹报仇。 ”


But becoming a murderous fanatic like Merah or Sidique Khan is the personal choice of a pathological mind, not the trend of a generation.	但是像默拉或斯迪克·翰此类的冷血杀人狂，不是常人所为，而是一种病态思想作祟，这也不是新一代年轻人的趋势。


Social rejection has not turned young French and British Muslims into mass murderers, and the infatuation of many with al-Qaeda has not overwhelmed their desire to fit in.	社会的排斥并不能使年轻的法国和英国穆斯林变成杀人机器，而且对基底组织的迷恋并没有将他们渴望融入社会的愿望彻底泯灭。


The massive influx of Muslims into Europe in the last two generations, it should be remembered, is the largest encounter between Islam and modernity in human history, and it has yielded invaluable benefits, such as a growing Muslim middle class, an emerging intelligentsia, and greater freedom for Muslim women.	我们应该记住，穆斯林过去两代人向欧洲的大量涌入，是人类历史上伊斯兰教和现代化之间的最大碰撞，对伊斯兰教带来了宝贵的益处：不断扩大的穆斯林中产阶级，新兴的知识分子阶级及穆斯林妇女更大的自由度。


Polls in France – where the rate of intermarriages is the highest in Europe – have shown that the majority of Muslims do accept laïcité, gender equality, and other key republican values.	在欧洲通婚率最高的法国，民意调查显示，多数的穆斯林接受性别平等，政教分离和其他主要共和制价值。


Moreover, sizeable segments of the Muslim community are upwardly mobile in socioeconomic terms.	此外，穆斯林社区中大部分人在社会经济中是向上层移动的。


About 30% of those born before 1968 have become middle or senior managers.	1968年以前出生的人中，约30％已成为中级或高级管理人员。


More broadly, Islam has failed to supersede other identity patterns, such as class and economic status.	更大胆的说，伊斯兰教没能取代别的身份模式，如阶级和经济地位。


In Britain, too, immigrants have been changing the ethnic profile of the middle and professional classes.	同样在英国，移民已改变中产阶级和专业人士的民族成分。


Increasingly educated and financially successful, Pakistani Britons are also actively engaged in political life, with more than 200 representing the main political parties in local councils.	越来越多的巴基斯坦籍英国人在教育和经济上的成功，也积极地参与政治生活，他们在地方议会的主要政党中已有200多名的代表。


In the 2010 election, the number of British Muslim members of the House of Commons doubled, to 16.	在2010年的选举中，英国下议院的穆斯林成员数目增加了一倍，到16位。


The most influential Muslim woman in British politics, Baroness Sayeeda Warsi (also the Conservative Party chairperson), joined other Muslims in the House of Lords, such as Lord Ahmed, the most senior Labour peer, and Baroness Kishwer Falkner, a Liberal Democrat.	英国政坛最有影响力的穆斯林妇女，男爵夫人瓦尔西（也是保守党主席），与其他上议院穆斯林联合，如工党上层的主·艾哈迈德，自由民主党的男爵夫人凯什沃·福克纳。


To consider Islam as a civilization that is not susceptible to change is an historical fallacy.	认为伊斯兰是一个不会轻易改变的文明，是一个历史的谬论。


Religious moderation, if not secularization, remains the key not only to social integration, but also to Muslims’ opportunity to influence Europe’s future.	宗教的适度，非世俗化，仍然不仅是社会融合也是穆斯林影响欧洲的未来的关键。


The example of European Jewry is not entirely irrelevant.	欧洲犹太人的例子也有。


An oppressed tribe of Ostjuden, destitute immigrants from the shattered communities of Eastern Europe, was transformed in just two generations from God-fearing shoemakers, tailors, and wandering peddlers into a community of writers, philosophers, scientists, and tycoons.	东方犹太人一个受压迫的部落，从东欧破败社区来的特困���民，仅经过两代人就从敬畏上帝的鞋匠，裁缝，和流浪的小贩转变成作家，哲学家，科学家，和大企业家。


That happened precisely because they reformed their Judaism in the light of Western values.	之所以会成为这样，正是他们将西方的价值观融入犹太教进行改革的结果。


They knew that there was no other way to seize the opportunities for human improvement presented by the West.	他们知道有没有其他办法可以抓住西方提供的得以使人类进步的机会。


Reform Judaism in Germany resulted in religious and cultural particularism yielding to a far greater degree of universalism than was envisaged at any time in the Jewish past.	德国犹太教改革导致其宗教和文化特殊主义与过去任何时候相比，屈服于更大程度的普遍性。


Any religious minority in quest of a place in the European project would do well to reflect on that theological shift.	任何宗教少数派在欧洲计划中探寻一席之地时，都会仔细考虑其在神学上的转变。


Islam’s Forsaken Renaissance	伊斯兰世界被摈弃的复兴


Children often play a game where they sit in a circle.	孩子们常常玩一种游戏。


One whispers something to his neighbor, who then whispers that information to the next child, and so on, around the circle.	大家围成圈坐好，其中一个向身旁的孩子说点悄悄话，然后对方再把听到的话转述给下一个孩子，以此类推，循环一周。


By the time the last child whispers the information to the first, it is totally different from what was originally said.	当最后的孩子把听到的话转述给第一个孩子的时候，其内容已经和最初大相径庭。


Something like that seems to have happened within Islam.	伊斯兰教内似乎发生了类似的事情。


The Prophet of Islam, Muhammad, brought one – and only one – religion.	先知穆罕默德建立了一个——且是唯一的一个——宗教。


Yet today we have perhaps a thousand religions that all claim to be Islam.	然而今天说不定有一千种宗教自称是伊斯兰教。


Divided by their different interpretations, Muslims do not play the role they once did in the world; instead, they are weakened and victimized.	对教义的不同诠释使穆斯林成了一盘散沙，不再扮演他们曾经在世界上扮演的角色； 相反，他们变得虚弱，饱受迫害。


The Shia/Sunni schism is so deep that each side condemns followers of the other as apostates, kafir.	什叶派和逊尼派之间的分歧如此之大，相互指责对方的追随者是叛教者，是卡菲尔(Kafir，阿拉伯语，意为“异教徒”—译者)。


The belief that the other’s religion is not Islam, and its followers not Muslim, has underpinned internecine wars in which millions have died – and continue to die.	他们坚持认为对方的宗教不是伊斯兰教，对方的信徒不是穆斯林。 这样的看法促成了两败俱伤的战争，导致数百万人死去——而且死亡并未停止。


Even among the Sunnis and Shias there are further divisions.	即使在逊尼派和什叶派内部也存在着进一步的分歧。


The Sunnis have four imams and the Shias have twelve; their teachings all differ.	逊尼派内有四位伊玛目，什叶派有十二位，其教义各不相同。


Then there are other divisions, including the Druze, the Alawites, and the Wahabis.	此外还有其他的派别，包括德鲁兹派、阿拉维派和瓦哈比派。


We are also taught by our ulamas (religious instructors) that their teachings must not be questioned.	我们的乌理玛（宗教导师）教导我们不得对教义质疑。


Islam is a faith.	伊斯兰教是一种信仰。


It must be believed.	我们必须要相信它。


Logic and reason play no part in it.	逻辑和理智在这里没有用武之地。


But what is it that we must believe when each branch of Islam thinks the other one is wrong?	但是伊斯兰教的每一个教派都认为别的教派错了，这时，我们必须相信的到底是什么？


The Koran, after all, is one book, not two or three, or a thousand.	古兰经毕竟只有一本，不是两本或三本，更不是一千本。


According to the Koran, a Muslim is anyone who bears witness that “there is no God (Allah) but Allah, and that Muhammad is his Rasul (Messenger).”	古兰经说，穆斯林是所有信奉“安拉是唯一真神，穆罕默德是他的使者”的人。


If no other qualification is added, then all those who subscribe to these precepts must be regarded as Muslims.	如果不添加其他条件，那么所有赞同这些训律的人都必须被当作穆斯林。


But because we Muslims like to add qualifications that often derive from sources other than the Koran, our religion’s unity has been broken.	但是我们穆斯林喜欢从古兰经以外的地方推导出新的条件，结果我们的宗教的统一性被破坏了。


But perhaps the greatest problem is the progressive isolation of Islamic scholarship – and much of Islamic life – from the rest of the modern world.	然而最大的问题或许在于伊斯兰教的教义研究——以及伊斯兰宗教生活的很大一部分——与当今世界其他地方的日益隔绝。


We live in an age of science in which people can see around corners, hear and see things happening in outer space, and clone animals.	我们生活在注重科学的时代，人们能够见微知著，能够听见和看到发生在外太空的事情，能够克隆动物。


And all of these things seem to contradict our belief in the Koran.	所有这一切似乎都与我们对古兰经的信仰相矛盾。


This is so because those who interpret the Koran are learned only in religion, in its laws and practices, and thus are usually unable to understand today’s scientific miracles.	这种情况的形成是因为那些诠释古兰经的人只有宗教及其戒律和修行上的学问，常常不能理解今天的科学奇迹。


The fatwas (legal opinions concerning Islamic law) that they issue appear unreasonable and cannot be accepted by those with scientific knowledge.	他们颁发的法特瓦（伊斯兰戒律方面的法令）不合理，不能为具有科学知识的人所接受。


One learned religious teacher, for example, refused to believe that a man had landed on the moon.	例如，一位渊博的宗教导师拒绝相信人类已经登陆月球。


Others assert that the world was created 2,000 years ago.	还有些人则断言世界是2000年前创造出来的。


The age of the universe and its size measured in light years – these are things that the purely religiously trained ulamas cannot comprehend.	宇宙的年龄和用光年计算的距离——这些是仅仅接受过宗教训练的乌理玛无法理解的东西。


This failure is largely responsible for the sad plight of so many Muslims.	这种无知在很大程度上造成了如今这么多穆斯林的悲惨境遇。


Today’s oppression, the killings and the humiliations of Muslims, occurs because we are weak, unlike the Muslims of the past.	今天穆斯林受到的压迫、屠杀和侮辱之所以发生正是因为我们的软弱，不像过去的穆斯林。


We can feel victimized and criticize the oppressors, but to stop them we need to look at ourselves.	我们可以感受到迫害，可以谴责压迫者，但是要制止这种压迫，我们还需要反省自身。


We must change for our own good.	为了自身的利益，我们必须改变。


We cannot ask our detractors to change, so that Muslims benefit.	我们不可能要求那些恶意诽谤我们的人为了穆斯林的利益而改变。


So what do we need to do?	那么我们应该怎么办？


In the past, Muslims were strong because they were learned.	过去，穆斯林之所以强大是因为他们学识渊博。


Muhammad’s injunction was to read, but the Koran does not say what to read.	穆罕默德的训诫是要读书，可是古兰经并没有说要读什么书。


Indeed, there was no “Muslim scholarship” at the time, so to read meant to read whatever was available.	的确，当时并没有“穆斯林学术研究”，因此读书就意味着拿到什么读什么。


The early Muslims read the works of the great Greek scientists, mathematicians, and philosophers.	早期的穆斯林阅读了伟大的希腊科学家、数学家和哲学家的作品。


They also studied the works of the Persians, the Indians, and the Chinese.	他们还研究了波斯人、印度人和中国人的作品。


The result was a flowering of science and mathematics.	其结果就是自然科学和数学的繁荣。


Muslim scholars added to the body of knowledge and developed new disciplines, such as astronomy, geography, and new branches of mathematics.	穆斯林学者补充了新的知识，开创了新的学科，如天文学、地理学、以及数学新的分支。


They introduced numerals, enabling simple and limitless calculations.	他们还引入了数字，使人们能够进行直观又无限的计算。


But around the fifteenth century, the learned in Islam began to curb scientific study.	但是在15世纪左右，伊斯兰世界的学者开始在科学研究中固步自封。


They began to study religion alone, insisting that only those who study religion – particularly Islamic jurisprudence – gain merit in the afterlife. The result was intellectual regression at the very moment that Europe began embracing scientific and mathematical knowledge.	他们开始专攻宗教，坚持认为只有学习宗教——特别是伊斯兰宗教法学——的人才能为死后积累功德，结果造成理性的衰退，而欧洲却在这个时刻开始飞速发展自然科学和数学知识。


And so, as Muslims were intellectually regressing, Europeans began their renaissance, developing improved ways of meeting their needs, including the manufacture of weapons that eventually allowed them to dominate the world.	于是，在穆斯林世界理性衰退的同时，欧洲人开始了文艺复兴，发展出更好的办法来满足自己的需要，包括武器的制造，并最终凭借这些成就支配了整个世界。


By contrast, Muslims fatally weakened their ability to defend themselves by neglecting, even rejecting, the study of allegedly secular science and mathematics, and this myopia remains a fundamental source of the oppression suffered by Muslims today.	与此相反，穆斯林忽视、甚至排斥所谓世俗科学和数学的研究，从而严重削弱了自卫的能力，并且这种短视的行为至今仍是穆斯林受到压迫的根本缘��。


Many Muslims still condemn the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kamal, because he tried to modernize his country.	许多穆斯林还在谴责现代土耳其的奠基人穆斯塔法·凯末尔，因为他曾尝试使他的国家现代化。


But would Turkey be Muslim today without Ataturk?	但是如果没有凯末尔，土耳其今天还会是穆斯林的吗？


Mustafa Kamal’s clear-sightedness saved Islam in Turkey and saved Turkey for Islam.	穆斯塔法·凯末尔的敏锐眼光拯救了土耳其的伊斯兰教，也为伊斯兰教拯救了土耳其。


Failure to understand and interpret the true and fundamental message of the Koran has brought only misfortune to Muslims.	对古兰经真正的基本教义的不理解和误读给穆斯林带来的只有灾难。


By limiting our reading to religious works and neglecting modern science, we destroyed Islamic civilization and lost our way in the world.	将阅读的范围限制在宗教作品上，忽视现代科学，我们摧毁了伊斯兰文明，在世界上迷失了方向。


The Koran says that “Allah will not change our unfortunate situation unless we make the effort to change it.”	古兰经说：“安拉不会改变我们不幸的境遇，除非我们自己努力改变它。


Many Muslims continue to ignore this and, instead, merely pray to Allah to save us, to bring back our lost glory.	”许多穆斯林还在忽视这句话，只知道祈求安拉拯救我们，重现我们失落的辉煌。


But the Koran is not a talisman to be hung around the neck for protection against evil.	但是古兰经并不是挂在脖子上用来辟邪的护身符。


Allah helps those who improve their minds.	安拉帮助思考的人。


Islam’s Path to Modernity	伊斯兰教的现代性之路


UPPSALA – Many in the Muslim community have long taken issue with the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).	乌普萨拉—穆斯林社会的很多人一直对联合国《世界人权宣言》（UDHR）持有异议。


The declaration, these critics attest, was created by colonial powers with a long history of gross human-rights violations, and amounts to yet another attempt by a few Western players to impose their will upon Muslim countries.	这些批评者认为，制定该宣言的殖民列强长期侵犯草根人权，该宣言只是一小撮西方国家将自己的意志凌驾于穆斯林国家之上的又一阴谋。


Islamic conservatives and fundamentalists go a step further, as they declare that no human invention can equal – much less supersede – sharia law, which amounts to the word of God.	伊斯兰教保守派和原教旨主义者更进一步，认为人一切人类发明都不能与伊斯兰教法——即神相提并论，遑论超越伊斯兰教法。


This clash between the UN’s secular human-rights standards and Muslim religious doctrine mirrors the broader conflict between Islam and modernity – a conflict that has left some citizens of Muslim countries, including women and non-Muslims, highly vulnerable.	联合国的世俗人权标准与穆斯林宗教教条之间的这一冲突体现的是伊斯兰教和现代性之间的更加广义的冲突——这一冲突让一些穆斯林国家公民，包括女性和非穆斯林，处于危险境地。


Fortunately, an emerging school of Muslim thought addresses the question in a new way, emphasizing that the Quran, like any religious text, must be interpreted – and that those interpretations can change over time.	幸运的是，一个新崛起的穆斯林思想流派以一种新方式解决这一问题，它强调古兰经与其他宗教经典一样，必须被解释——并且这些解释可以随时间变化。


In fact, the Quran does defend principles like liberty, impartiality, and righteousness, which indicates a fundamental respect for justice and human dignity.	事实上，古兰经确实捍卫自由、公正、正义等原则，这表明古兰经从根本上尊重正义和人类尊严。


The problem, as emphasized by the Iranian theologian Mohsen Kadivar, is that many parts of sharia law are linked to pre-modern social structures, which deny women or non-Muslims the same protections as Muslim men receive.	如伊朗神学家莫森·卡迪瓦尔（Mohsen Kadivar）所强调，问题在于伊斯兰教法的诸多内容联系的是前现代社会结构，它们否认女性和非穆斯林获得与穆斯林男性一样的保护。


It does not help that, as George Mason University’s Abdulaziz Sachedina points out, men have been the ones to interpret Islam’s holy texts.	如乔治梅森大学的阿卜拉齐兹·萨奇迪纳（Abulaziz Sachedina）所指出的，解读伊斯兰教圣经的一直是男性。


This, rather than those texts’ true content, is the root cause of legal discrimination against women in Muslim countries.	这，而不是这些经文的真实内容，才是穆斯林国家法律歧视女性的根源。


The theologian Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Fazel Meybodi points out that Islamic law regarding punishment – which includes brutal practices like stoning and amputation – originates from the Old Testament.	神学家阿亚图拉（Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Fazel Meybodi）指出，关于惩罚的伊斯兰法律——包括石刑和截肢——源自《旧约》。


Islam did not invent these punishments; they were simply the prevailing practices of the time.	伊斯兰教并没有发明这些惩罚； 它们无非当时流行的惩罚措施。


As societies progress and evolve, so must the rules and standards that govern them.	随着社会的进步和演化，治理社会的规则和标准也必须进步和演化。


As the Iranian theologian Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari of the University of Tehran emphasizes, many of the ideas associated with justice and human rights, as we understand them today, were completely “un-thought” in the pre-modern era.	如伊朗神学家、德黑兰大学的沙贝斯塔利（Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari）所强调的，与正义和人权有关的许多思想——如我们今天所理解的那样——在前现代时期完全是“不可想象的”（un-thought）。


But Muslims cannot simply disregard such ideas on the grounds that humans had not developed them at the time the Quran was written.	但穆斯林不能仅仅依据人类在古兰经形成时还没有发展出这些思想而否定它们。


With the abandonment of outdated notions of tiered justice and the recognition of the liberty and dignity of all individuals, Shabestari believes that it will become possible to realize the Quran’s message that there should be no compulsion in religion.	沙贝斯塔利认为，抛弃过时的分层正义、承认自由和一切个体的尊严，就能认识到古兰经宣扬的宗教中不应该有强迫的思想。


People’s religious decisions should be driven by their sense of faith, rather than their desire to retain their civil rights.	人们的宗教决定应该由信仰驱动，而不是由获得公民权利的渴望驱动。


According to the philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush, this distinction between religious beliefs and civil rights should be obvious.	据哲学家索罗什（Abdolkarim Soroush）的观点，宗教信仰与公民权利的这一区别应该是显而易见的。


But interpretations of Islamic law have traditionally been so focused on questions about mankind’s various duties that they have failed to recognize it.	但对伊斯兰法律的解释传统上完全着重于关于人类各种责任的问题，根本没有认识到这一点。


For Soroush, however, the denial of human rights based on “a person’s beliefs or absence of belief” is undeniably a “crime.”	但是，在索罗什看来，基于“一个人的信仰或缺少信仰”否认人权毫无疑问是“犯罪”。


The school of Muslim thought promoted by these scholars, who come from both Sunni and Shia backgrounds, offers a way forward for Islam.	由这些既有逊尼派、也有什叶派背景的学者推动的穆斯林思想流派为伊斯兰教提供了一个前进方向。


Its adherents know that key Islamic concepts, beliefs, norms, and values can be harmonized with modern social structures and understandings of justice and human rights.	该学派信奉者认为，关键的伊斯兰教概念、信仰、规范和价值可以与现代社会结构以及对正义和人权的理解和谐共处。


By recommending ways to do so, they are reaffirming the durability of the core Islamic tradition.	他们建议了一些这样做的方法，这再次印证了伊斯兰教核心传统的持久性。


To use the language of the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, they are creating “saving translations,” whereby a language, conceptual apparatus, and social system is updated to reflect progress in human reason.	用德国哲学家哈贝马斯（Jürgen Habermas）的话说，他们正在创造“拯救翻译”（saving translations），即更新一种语言、概念装置和社会制度，使之体现人类理性的进步。


Such saving translations in Islam have been emerging for a considerable period of time.	在伊斯兰教中，这样的拯救翻译已经出现了很长一段时间。


Indeed, the late Iranian writer and philosopher Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri fell out with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, after being designated his successor, over policies that he believed infringed on people’s fundamental rights and freedoms.	事实上，已故伊朗作家兼哲学家蒙塔泽里（Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri）与最高领袖霍梅尼在后者指定了接班人后就他所认为的侵犯了人们基本权利和自由的政策进行过争论。


In defending freedom of speech, Montazeri referred to a Quranic verse stating that God taught humans how to express themselves.	蒙塔泽里捍卫言论自由，引用古兰经经文指出神教导人们如何表达自己。


“How can God, on the one hand, teach humans the ability of expression and, on the other hand, limit it?”, he asked.	“神如何一方面教会人们表达的能力，另一方面又限制它？ ”他问道。


The obvious conclusion, he declared, was that “no one should be condemned for heresy, libel, or insult just for expressing his or her opinion.”	显而易见的答案，他说，是“没人应该因为仅仅为了表达自己的观点而做出的宗教异端、诽谤或冒犯而被谴责。 ”


Montazeri, like today’s innovative Muslim thinkers, chose to remain open to alternate interpretations of the Quran, rather than becoming trapped by accepted tradition.	与当今穆斯林创新思想家一样，蒙塔泽里选择以开放态度对待不同的古兰经解释，而不是落入既成传统的窠臼。


The saving translations that these figures have offered demonstrate that modern global norms like the UDHR are not only compatible with Islam; they are deeply embedded within it.	这些人物所带来的拯救翻译表明，UDHR等现代全球规范不但与伊斯兰教相容； 并且深刻地植根于其中。


Reinterpreting – or even abandoning – antiquated rules rooted in outdated social structures does not amount to subverting the word of God.	重新解释——甚至抛弃——源自过时社会结构的古老教条并不会渎神。


On the contrary, it proves the true depth of Islam’s sacred texts.	相反，这能够证明伊斯兰教圣经的真正深度。


Islam\u0027s Reformist Tradition	伊斯兰的改革主义传统


The "clash of civilizations" supposedly underway between the West and the Muslim world, which many see as manifested in Iraq, as well as in Saudi Arabia's growing violence, in fact masks other conflicts - disputes that will probably prove to be far more significant in the long term.	在许多人的臆测中，西方与穆斯林世界之间的"文明的冲突"正通过伊拉克和沙特阿拉伯日渐增长的暴力事件表现出来。 事实上这些表象掩饰了其它的冲突-一些可能具有更深远意义的争端。


One of these struggles is taking place among Muslims themselves over the shape of reform within their own societies.	其中之一就是发生在穆斯林之中的关于其社会内部变革形式的斗争。


The Muslim reformist tradition - the search for an authentic path that links Islam's traditions to the modern world - has deep roots, stretching back to the middle of the 19th century.	穆斯林的改革主义传统-对于将伊斯兰的传统与现代社会联系起来的真正路径的探索-源远流长。 其渊源可以追溯到19世纪中叶。


Back then, Muslim thinkers contrasted the decline of their own societies with Europe's dynamism, a particularly painful distinction in light of European successes in colonizing large parts of the Muslim world.	在那时，穆斯林的思想家们将他们自己社会的衰落与欧洲的活力进行对比。 欧洲成功地将穆斯林世界的很大部分殖民化的事实使得这种差别尤为痛苦。


Then, too, Muslim intellectuals focused on the "decadence" of Muslim societies, their debilitating political and social corruption.	那时的穆斯林知识分子还关注着穆斯林社会的"堕落"及导致这种堕落的政治和社会的腐败。


Many early Muslim reformists were clerics or senior bureaucrats, who had seen first hand how diminished their societies had become.	许多早期的穆斯林改革主义者是神职人员和高级官僚，他们亲眼目睹了其社会的衰败。


More importantly, they were members of a tiny minority that had been educated in the written heritage of Islam.	更重要的是他们是那些受到过书面的伊斯兰文化遗产教益的极少数人中的一部分。


Far beyond Koranic recitation, these men aspired to participate in the centuries-long discussions among Muslim scholars about the proper ordering of Muslim life.	他们的志向远不止于死记硬背《古兰经》，而是渴望参与数世纪以来在穆斯林学者当中进行的关于穆斯林生活的适当秩序的讨论。


This training enabled them to compare the debased state of affairs of their time with the norms and aspirations of earlier generations of clerics and thinkers.	这种训练使他们能够将他们那个时代的恶劣现实与先辈教士和思想家们的祈望进行对比。


Their judgment was clear: Muslims had sunk far below what their religion required them to be, and lagged far behind the accomplishments of their ancestors.	他们的判断是清楚的：穆斯林们已远远沦落与其宗教对他们的要求之下，同时他们的建树也只能望其祖先项背。


For the reformers, normality meant the progressive development of Muslim societies, and they tied this to the interaction of Islamic teaching with relevant, worldly ideas of the time.	对于改革者们来说，现实的常态意味着穆斯林社会与时俱进的发展。 他们还将这一点与伊斯兰的教义和相关的、世俗的时代理念之间的互动联系起来。


So these first reformers sought to engage with the ideas that they saw emerging from Europe: rationality, tolerance and ethically determined behavior.	因此这些最早的改革者试图吸纳他们所发现的兴起于欧洲的理念：理性、宽容和符合伦理的行为方式。


These early reformers, among them Muhammad Abduh and Jamaleddin al-Afghani, did not ignite the mass mobilization they hoped for, and were not able to redress social ills through better implementation of religious prescriptions.	包括穆罕默德•阿卜杜和加马勒丁•阿尔阿富汗尼在内的早期改革者没有能够如其所愿地广泛发动群众，也就未能够通过宗教手段矫治社会的不幸。


But their influence was powerful and lasting, and extended in directions that they could not have anticipated.	但他们的影响却是强大而持久的。 这种影响所延伸的范围也是他们始料不及的。


The paradox here is that the open-minded reformism they espoused helped stir conservative trends among Islamic thinkers, who seized on the reformists' revival of Islamic norms to urge a return to the "purity" of the first Islamic societies.	而矛盾的是他们所倡导的这种开明的改革主义却激发了后辈伊斯兰思想家们的保守倾向。 他们抓住改革主义者复兴伊斯兰教规范这一点，力主向最初的伊斯兰社会的"纯洁性"回归。


This conservative trend did not follow-up on the reformists' engagement with the modern ideas of the European Enlightenment, arguing instead that these represented a further estrangement from authentic Islamic values.	这种保守倾向不是遵循改革主义者们对欧洲启蒙的现代理念的接纳，而是认为这些理念代表着对真正的伊斯兰教价值观的进一步背离。


Thus, the most lasting effect of the first reformist wave was the establishment of a " salafi " (traditionalist) trend and eventually the emergence of an even more radical fundamentalism.	因此，第一次改革主义浪潮所带来的最为持久的影响就是一种"salafi"（传统主义）倾向的确立并最终引发了一种更为激进的原教旨主义。


Both conservative traditionalists and radical fundamentalists were drawn to political activism and came to regard the modern state as a means to liberate Muslims from foreign domination and to re-Islamicize society through a revival of Islam's original norms.	保守的传统主义者和激进的原教旨主义者都不约而同的实践着政治行动主义并都将现代国家视为使穆斯林摆脱外来统治和通过复兴伊斯兰最初的规范而使社会重新伊斯兰化的手段。


Today, we can see the force of this ideology, but it would be a mistake to assume that the spirit of the original Muslim reformists has vanished.	今天我们可以看到这种意识形态的力量，但如果就此认为最初的穆斯林改革者们的精神已不复存在则大错特错了。


Out of the spotlight, countless Muslim scholars and academics have continued to probe the connections between Islamic thought and modern values.	在聚光灯外，还有许多的穆斯林学者在继续探寻伊斯兰教思想和现代价值观之间的联系。


Drawing on critical scholarship in history and theology, they have detailed the ways in which Muslims have changed - and continue to change - their traditions, in different times and places.	通过运用历史和神学的批判性思想，他们已经详尽地记录了穆斯林在不同时代和地点曾经并继续改革其传统的方式。


Thus, a sharp, focused challenge to the assertions of religious orthodoxy has emerged in the work of such important thinkers as Abdolkarim Soroush (Iran), Abdelmajid Charfi (Tunisia), Fazlur Rahman (Pakistan), and Mahmud Muhammad Taha (Sudan).	因此，一种对宗教正统派学说的尖锐而集中的挑战已经出现在一些重要的思想家（如伊朗的阿卜杜卡利姆•索鲁什、突尼斯的阿卜德马吉德•沙非、巴基斯坦的法兹鲁尔•拉曼和苏丹的马赫穆德•穆罕马德•塔哈）的著作之中。


While their work encounters great resistance from traditionalist and fundamentalist circles (whose views are widely covered in mainstream Muslim and Western media), these contemporary reformers - and the questions they have raised - have had a big impact on a rising generation of Muslim intellectuals around the world.	尽管他们的著作遭遇了来自传统主义者和原教旨主义者（他们的观点被主流穆斯林和西方媒体广泛宣传）的强烈抵触，但这些现代的改革家们-及其所提出的问题-对全世界正在崛起的一代穆斯林知识分子产生了重大的影响。


Of course, listeners must strain to hear the voices of reformists amidst the din of those calling for resistance to the enemy and a return to the pure sources of Islam.	当然，听众们只有屏息凝神才能从那些呼吁抵抗敌人和回归伊斯兰纯洁根源的喧嚣中听到改革者们的声音。


However, the seeds of a new wave of "reform" have taken root, and await an early thaw to sprout.	但新一轮"改革"浪潮的种子已生根，只待雪融后就会萌芽。


The reformists of the first wave attempted to "reopen the doors of Ijtihad (religious interpretation)" in order to adapt the inherited systems of Islamic thinking to new conditions.	第一次浪潮中的改革者们企图"重开Ijtihad（宗教解释）之门"从而根据新情况改造伊斯兰思想的传承体系。


Today's reformists are subjecting these traditional frameworks to scrutiny and attempting to separate the core ethical principles of Islam from the various historical adaptations that conservatives have enshrined as sacred.	现今的改革者们正仔细审查这些传统的思想架构，并试图将伊斯兰的核心伦理原则从已被保守派门奉为圣训的不同历史改写中分离出来。


Adapting Islam to modern conditions was the purpose of the first generation of reformers.	根据现代的情况改写伊斯兰教曾是第���代改革家们的目的。


By engaging fully with the main currents of modern thinking, their contemporary successors seek to better understand how universal principles can be expressed through Muslim tradition.	他们当代的继承者通过与主流的现代思想的全面接触，力求更好地了解如何通过穆斯林的传统表达伊斯兰的公理。


Islam Versus Islam	伊斯兰对伊斯兰的战斗


LAHORE – Turmoil has seized much of the Muslim world.	拉合尔——动荡一直困扰着多数穆斯林地区。


In Syria, a brutal war has already taken 250,000 lives, displaced half of the country’s 21 million people, and sent a million refugees to Europe seeking asylum.	叙利亚的残酷战争已经夺去了250，000人的生命、导致2100万民众近半数流离失所，并驱使百万难民赴欧洲寻求庇护。


In Yemen, the Houthi tribe has risen up against the government, and are now facing Saudi-led airstrikes.	也门的胡塞部落已经起来反抗政府，现在正面临着以沙特为首的空袭行动。


Conflicts like these reflect a number of factors, the most prominent of which are the conflicts between Islam’s two sects, Sunni and Shia, and between fundamentalists and reformists.	这些冲突反映出若干因素，其中最明显的莫过于伊斯兰逊尼和什叶两大教派、以及原教旨主义者和改革派之间的冲突。


Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite regime enjoys the support of Shia powers, especially Iran, whose regional influence depends on a Shia regime remaining in power.	叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德的阿拉维派政权拥有什叶派、尤其是伊朗的支持，因为伊朗的地区影响力取决于什叶派政权能否继续执政。


And that is precisely why Sunni powers – most prominently Saudi Arabia – are committed to toppling that regime.	而这也恰恰解释了为什么以沙特为首的逊尼派势力会致力于推翻阿萨德政府。


Yemen’s government, by contrast, is Sunni-led, and thus has Saudi Arabia’s support, hence the bombings of the Iran-backed Shia Houthis.	反过来，也门政权为逊尼派主导并拥有沙特的支持，因此会去轰炸由伊朗支持的什叶派胡塞部落。


Unsurprisingly, tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia have intensified lately, a trend that culminated in the severing of diplomatic relations over Saudi Arabia’s execution of a popular Shia cleric.	不出所料，伊朗和沙特两国的紧张关系近来愈演愈烈，最终因为沙特处决颇具影响力的什叶派教士而达到中断外交关系的高潮。


The chaos fueled by these conflicts – and by instability in other countries in the region, such as Afghanistan and Iraq –has enabled the rise of some truly contemptible forces, beginning with the Islamic State (ISIS).	上述冲突和阿富汗、伊拉克等其他地区国家动荡造成的混乱已导致某些真正卑劣的势力崛起，这样的势力应当首推伊斯兰国。


That group has gained so much influence that US generals have asked President Barack Obama to authorize additional troops to join the fight against it.	该组织的影响力如此之大，以至于美国将军请求奥巴马总统批准增派部队参加反恐战斗。


Moreover, there are reports that the United States may postpone the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan, where an increasingly brutal war against the government has enabled the Taliban to gain territory and created an opening for ISIS to become active.	此外，有迹象表明美国可能推迟其军队撤出阿富汗，塔利班已在越来越残酷的反政府战斗中占据大片领土，并创造机会成就伊斯兰国。


ISIS has also penetrated Pakistan.	伊斯兰国也已渗入巴基斯坦。


The religious element of the conflicts raging in the Middle East today is a major reason why they have been so difficult to defuse.	今天中东冲突如此难以化解缘于其背后大量的宗教因素。


The Sunni-Shia schism goes back to the year 632, when the Prophet Muhammad died without indicating how the fast-growing Islamic community should pick his successor.	逊尼和什叶派分裂可以追溯到632年，当时先知穆罕默德死前未及明确快速扩张的伊斯兰社会应如何挑选继任者。


Those who became the Shia believed that the position should remain in the prophet’s immediate family and supported the selection of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the prophet’s cousin and son-in-law.	认为应当由先知直系亲属继承的人后来演变为什叶派，他们支持先知的堂弟兼女婿阿里·本·阿比塔里布。


Those who became the Sunni supported the choice of the community’s senior members: Abu Bakr, who had served as a close adviser to Muhammad.	而支持选择社会资深人士的力量后来演变为逊尼派，他们支持担任过默罕默德亲密顾问的艾布·伯克尔。


Today, most of the world’s 1.6 billion Muslims are Sunnis.	今天，逊尼派占全球16亿穆斯林的绝大多数。


They are widely dispersed, spread over a vast swath stretching from Morocco to Indonesia.	他们涉及地域广泛，分布在从摩洛哥到印度尼西亚的广袤疆土。


After decades of migration to Europe and North America, there are also strong Sunni communities in several Western countries.	经历了数十年的欧洲和北美移民，逊尼派团体在一些西方国家的力量也非常强大。


The Shia number 225 million and are geographically much more concentrated.	什叶派总人口2. 25亿，并在地理分布上更加集中。


Iran, with 83 million, is the world’s largest Shia-majority country, followed by Pakistan with 30 million and India with 25 million.	拥有8，300万什叶人口的伊朗是世界最大的什叶派多数国，其次是拥有3，000万什叶人口的巴基斯坦和2，500万的印度。


The “Shia crescent” – including Iran and its immediate neighbors Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey – accounts for 70% of the sect’s total population.	包括伊朗及其邻国阿富汗、阿塞拜疆、伊拉克、巴基斯坦和土耳其在内的“什叶派新月地带”占教派总人口的70%。


This geographic distribution is the result of a series of historical accidents, a combination of conquests and (often forced) conversions.	一系列历史事件、历次征服和（往往是被迫的）信仰转变造成了现在的地理分布。


Though Islam arrived in Iran by way of conquest in 637-651, the country did not officially adopt Shi’ism for nearly another millennium, with Shah Ismail I of the Safavid dynasty undertaking in 1501 the forcible conversion of the country’s Sunni population.	尽管 637-651年伊斯兰教以征服的形式进入伊朗，但近一千年后随着1501年萨非王朝的伊斯玛仪一世强制该国逊尼派人口转变信仰，伊朗才正式成为什叶派国家。


Shi’ism spread through South Asia as a result of repeated military incursions by Persia’s rulers into Afghanistan and India.	什叶派教义通过波斯统治者对阿富汗和印度的反复入侵才传播到南亚。


Today, that region’s Shia population is concentrated in urban areas, and largely comprises the descendants of the soldiers and other state functionaries who stayed behind in the conquered territories.	今天，该地区什叶派人口集中在城市地区，主要包括当时留在被占领土上的士兵和其他国家公职人员的后代。


Sunni Islam, for its part, was first spread through South Asia by the Sufi saints, most of whom came from Central Asia and preached a more tolerant and inclusive form of Islam than that of the Arabian Peninsula.	逊尼派伊斯兰教起初通过苏菲派圣徒传播到南亚，圣徒们多来自中亚，宣传一种形式比阿拉伯半岛更宽容、更包容的伊斯兰教。


But the rising influence of Saudi Arabia after the 1970s, when skyrocketing oil prices boosted the country’s wealth considerably, helped to spur the spread of the Kingdom’s dominant and austere Wahhabi sect.	但20世纪70年代石油价格暴涨、沙特财富暴增所导致的影响力扩大刺激了在该国占主要地位的严肃瓦哈比教派的传播。


Beyond attracting millions of Muslim workers from South Asia, Saudi Arabia financed the establishment of Wahabbi madrassas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.	除去吸引南亚成百上千万穆斯林工人，沙特还在阿富汗巴基斯坦边境出资设立瓦哈比宗教学校。


The Taliban (which, in Arabic, means “students”) in both Afghanistan and Pakistan are the products of these seminaries, as are militias like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, which have mounted attacks on religious sites in India.	阿富汗和巴基斯坦塔利班（阿拉伯语意为“学生”），还有曾对印度宗教圣地发起袭击的虔诚军及羌城军等民兵武装都是这些神学院的产物。


Today’s turmoil reflects a clash of worldviews that is both theological and political.	今天的动荡反映出神学和政治世界观的冲突。


Conservative Sunnis, such as those who adhere to fundamentalist Wahhabism, favor theocratic authoritarian rule, whereas more moderate Sufi Sunnis would prefer liberal and inclusive political systems.	保守逊尼派，比方说奉行原教旨主义瓦哈比教派更推崇政教合一的专制统治，而相对温和的苏菲逊尼派则更钟情于自由和包容的政治制度。


The same is true of the Shia.	什叶派的情况也同样如此。


Iran has long stuck to theocratic rule, but now seems to be looking toward reform.	伊朗一直坚持神权统治，但现在似乎正在走向改革。


Whether the sectarian divide can ever be bridged most likely depends on whether reformists can gain sufficient influence in both camps.	宗派分歧最终能否弥合极有可能取决于改革者在两个阵营的影响力是否足够。


If not, the conflict will continue to rage, accelerating the breakdown of regional order we now see.	如果不行冲突仍将继续下去，并加速我们现在所看到的地区秩序崩溃。


Islands of Isolation	孤立之岛


PARIS – The Japanese and the British may seem very different, but a closer look reveals something akin to a parallel destiny for these two island peoples.	巴黎—日本人和英国人也许很不相同，但仔细观察就会发现，这两个岛国的命运颇有些相似之处。


With their old imperial ambitions and widespread distaste for the great continents from which the narrowest of seas divide them, both the British and the Japanese are vulnerable to the siren song of isolationism.	它们都曾经有过帝国雄心，都对隔海相望的古老大陆怀着深刻的厌恶，都对孤立主义的塞壬之歌毫无抵抗力。


Unfortunately, both now appear to be succumbing to that dangerous temptation.	不幸的是，如今，两国再一次屈服于孤立主义的危险诱惑。


Perhaps geography is destiny.	也许地理决定了命运。


As islanders, Britons and Japanese have had wary relations with – and often a superiority complex toward – their great continental neighbors, Europe and China, respectively.	作为岛国，英国和日本对于其大陆邻居欧洲和日本总是小心翼翼，且通常带有自负的优越感。


Both historically compensated for their isolation with strong central governments, powerful navies, dynamic entrepreneurship, vibrant culture, and imperial ambition.	历史上，为了补偿其孤立性，两国均存在强势中央政府、强大的海军、充满活力的企业家精神、生机勃勃的文化和帝国雄心。


Today, Japan and the United Kingdom pretend to be open societies, and to be stakeholders in the globalization process.	如今，日本和英国做出一副开放社会状，也是全球化进程的巨大受益者。


In reality, both remain mostly inward looking and preoccupied with the disintegration of their original culture.	事实上，两国依然十分内向，沉浸在分离主义的传统文化中。


Both try desperately to keep immigrants at bay, whether through cultural segregation in the UK or, in Japan’s case, by mere rejection.	两国均竭尽全力阻挠移民进入，英国的办法是文化隔离，而日本则是断然拒绝。


The more civilizations become intertwined in the new world order, the more the Japanese and British are tempted to remain aloof and apart.	新世界秩序中的各文明越是相互影响，日本和英国就越想冷眼旁观。


In Japan, the isolationist temptation is expressed in the current nostalgia for the Edo period, from 1600 to 1868, before Emperor Meiji opened Japan to the world.	在日本，最能体现孤立主义诱惑的便是最近大热的对江户时代的怀旧。 江户时代从1600年开始，到1868年明治维新打开日本国门为止。


“Back to Edo” has become a dominant mood and theme in public debates, promoted by writers, pundits, and historians like Inose Naoki (who is also Vice Governor of Tokyo), who argue that the Japanese were much happier within their closed world, blissfully insulated from the quest for material success and international status.	“回到江户”已成为日本人民的主流观点，引发了公众争论，各种写手、专家和历史学家在一旁煽风点火，如东京都副知事猪濑直树指出，日本人在封闭时代比现在快乐得多，完全不必受到物质成功要求和国际地位担心的困扰。


This “Back to Edo” discourse translates into the refusal of young Japanese to learn a foreign language or travel abroad.	这种“回到江户”的论调导致日本年轻一代拒绝学习外语和出国旅行。


Indeed, in Europe, North America, and elsewhere, the omnipresent Japanese tourists of the 1970’s have been replaced by Chinese and Koreans.	事实上，在欧洲、美国和其他地区，20世纪70年代无孔不入的日本人已经被中国人和韩国人取代。


The number of Japanese studying abroad is at a new low at the very moment when South Koreans and Chinese are swarming into European and North American universities.	出国留学的日本人数量处于历史新低水平，而同时韩国人和中国人正在占领欧洲和北美的大学。


Even the world’s great universities, from Harvard to Oxford, are seeing fewer Japanese students.	即使在哈佛和牛津这样的世界名校中，日本学生的呃数量也在日渐减少。


Here the British are very much mimicking the Japanese: fewer and fewer are learning foreign languages, studying abroad, and following the old path of working in Hong Kong, Singapore, or Australia.	在这方面，英国像极了日本人：越来越少的年轻人学外语、出国留学，然后沿着传统老路去香港、新加坡和澳大利亚工作。


So prevalent is this “little England” mood that Prime Minister David Cameron’s government is now tempted to hold a referendum to ask the British whether they want to remain within the European Union, a vote that even that arch euro-skeptic, Margaret Thatcher, never risked.	这种“小英格兰”（little England）观念是如此普遍，以致于首相卡梅伦政府意欲举行公投，让英国人选择是否愿意留在欧盟。 这种现象就连在欧元的主要质疑者撒切尔夫人时代都是绝不会发生的。


The prospect of a referendum reflects the overwhelming mood among the Tories, who sometimes mention Norway – a non-EU member whose main role in global affairs is to award the Nobel Peace Prize – as a model for Britain’s role in the world.	可能举行公投反映了保守党内的压倒性情绪。 保守党有时会把挪威当成英国在世界立足的榜样——不加入欧盟，在国际社会中的主要作用是颁发诺贝尔和平奖。


Of course, Norway has the world’s highest per capita income.	当然，挪威拥有全世界最高的人均收入。


But that is not the relevant standard against which the UK or other Western countries should measure themselves, because Norway has a tiny, homogeneous, population and sits on vast – and well-managed – natural resources.	但这并不能当作英国或其他西欧国家衡量自己的标准，因为挪威人口稀少、人种单一，而且坐拥并很好地管理着巨量自然资源。


If asked in a referendum, the British might well leave the EU, which they never liked.	如果用公投来说话，那么英国很可能会离开欧盟，这是他们所不愿看到的。


This would have the unintended consequence of strengthening the federalists on the continent, thereby accelerating the integration dynamic that the British now want to stop.	这样做会产生意外后果——巩固欧洲大陆的联邦主义，从而加速眼下英国所欲停止的一体化进程。


Indeed, the British would leave just when Iceland, Serbia, Turkey, and Ukraine, despite Europe’s current crisis, are trying to get in.	事实上，英国将在爱尔兰、塞尔维亚、土耳其和乌克兰不顾眼下欧洲危机试图加入欧盟的当口退出。


And, while the eurozone may be in crisis, Poland, among others, still want to join in the near future.	此外，尽管欧元区正处于危机，但波兰和其他国家仍然希望在近期加入其中。


The British may turn their nose up at the euro – to which even the supposedly independent Swiss franc is pegged – but it will almost certainly remain the currency of nearly 300 million Europeans.	英国人也许会对欧元——即使被认为是独立货币的瑞士法郎也是盯住欧元的——嗤之以鼻，但欧元几乎肯定仍将作为近3以欧洲人所使用的共同货币。


Isolationism, whether in Japan or the UK, is not only a short-sighted choice; especially for Japan, it may also be a perilous one, given the rise of China next door.	日本也好，英国也罢，孤立主义不但是目光短浅的选择，而且可能非常危险（特别是日本，隔壁的中国正在快速崛起）。


Both Japan and the UK, much as they may not wish to admit it, depend on the global market.	日本和英国都依赖着全球市场，尽管它们自己可能不愿意承认。


Isolationism would leave their citizens ill prepared to confront competition and their governments excluded from decisions that impact the global economy and trade.	孤立主义将导致日本和英国人民无法做好面对竞争的准备，也将导致两国政府被排除在影响全球经济和贸易的决策之外。


Nor can isolationism guarantee national security at a time of rising threats from terrorist groups and rising ambitions on the part of China and Russia.	此外，在恐怖集团威胁与日俱增、中国和俄罗斯雄心与日见长的当下，孤立主义也不能保证国家安全。


The Edo nostalgia in Japan and the Norway model’s appeal in the UK are not rational choices.	日本的江户怀旧热和挪威模式对英国的诱惑绝非理性选择。


They merely channel national wariness at a time of global competition between cultures, economies, and emerging strategic ambitions.	这只是全球文化、经济和新兴战略雄心竞争背景下国民忧虑的体现。


Sometimes nations, like individuals, grow tired and long for their idealized youth – a recurrent phenomenon that historians call “declinism.”	有时候，国家和个人一样会产生疲倦感，对理想的年轻时代艳羡不已，这就是历史学家所谓的周期性“衰落论”现象。


Whether one calls it that or a desire for a holiday from history, Japan and the UK today seem to be choosing a path that will only accelerate decline.	叫它衰落论也好，想在历史长河中休会儿假也罢，日本和英国如今的选择只能让它们衰落得更快。


Islands of Nationalism	民族主义的岛屿


BEIJING – If the recent tension between China and Japan over disputed islands in the East China Sea is any indication, relations between the world’s second and third largest economies will not be smooth for some time to come, despite ever-increasing bilateral trade and investment.	发自北京——如果中日两国最近在中国东海受争议岛屿上的紧张态势有任何指示性意义的话，只能说尽管这两个世界第二大和第三大经济体的相互贸易和投资额都不断上升，但双边关系在未来一段时间内都难有和谐。


That is because both countries’ latest rush to affirm their sovereignty over the islands – called Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese – reflects a sense of insecurity and a perception that the other side is taking an aggressive stand, which means that the issue is unlikely to be resolved in the foreseeable future.	这是因为两国近期争相对这些岛屿——日本称尖阁列岛而中国称为钓鱼岛——宣示主权的行为都反映出一种缺乏安全感的心态以及认定对方正在采取侵略性立场的观念，而这意味着该事件在可见的未来都将难以得到解决。


On the Japanese side, there is growing anxiety over China’s increasing economic and military prowess, such that some nationalists would like to “settle” the matter in Japan’s favor as soon as possible.	在日本方面，对中国强大经济和军事实力的忧虑与日俱增，以至于某些民族主义者想要尽快在对日本有利情况下把这件事“敲定”下来。


Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara’s recent call for Japan’s government to “purchase” the islands from “private” Japanese owners can be explained in this context.	而东京都知事石原慎太郎最近呼吁日本政府从日本“私人”土地所有者手中“买下”这些岛屿的行为就可以在这一背景下得到解释。


On the Chinese side, the maritime quarrels with Japan – and with Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines in the South China Sea – have reignited a national debate about whether China’s foreign policy is too weak in terms of asserting the country’s interests.	而在中国这边，跟日本的海洋争端——还有与文莱，马来西亚，越南和菲律宾的南海主权问题——都再次引发了一场关于中国外交政策在维护本国利益方面是否太过软弱的全国性辩论。


America’s “pivot” to Asia, viewed by many Chinese as an effort by the United States to reassert itself in Asia by supporting other Asian states in “containing” China’s rise, has fueled a siege mentality among Chinese nationalists.	在许多中国人看来，美国“轴心”向亚洲的转移就是想通过支持其他亚洲国家来遏制中国崛起，进而重夺亚洲控制权，而这也导致许多民族主义者心里产生了一种四面楚歌的受围心态。


Their response is to call for tough military action in the South China Sea, and to stage symbolic landings on the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, such as those staged by Hong Kong activists on August 15.	他们对此的回应就是要求在南海实施强硬军事行动，并筹划要象征性地登上钓鱼/尖阁列岛，正如今年8月15日香港保钓人士所做的那样。


Japan arrested the activists, but deported them soon after, thus avoiding a prolonged confrontation with China.	日本逮捕了这些保钓人士，但很快将他们递解出境，以此避免了冲突的继续拖延。


The Japanese authorities clearly learned a lesson from their detention of a Chinese fishing boat captain two years ago, when they eventually acceded to Chinese pressure – which included a range of harsh, and escalating, political and economic measures– to release him.	日本当局显然已经得到了教训，因为两年前他们曾经逮捕了一位中国渔船船长，但最终屈服于中国的压力——包括一系列严厉且不断加码的政治和经济手段——将其释放。


Soon after the Hong Kong activists' protest landing on the disputed islands, Japanese citizens, including local assembly members, staged their own landing there.	就在香港保钓人士登岛抗议后不久，包括一些地区议员在内的日本公民也实施了本方的登岛行动。


Moreover, the Japanese government, while rejecting a further appeal from Ishihara to provide land on the isles to the Tokyo municipality, is, however, raising money to purchase some of the islands from their supposedly bankrupt Japanese owner.	此外，日本政府一方面拒绝了石原慎太郎要求在岛屿上提供土地给东京市政府的进一步请求，另一方面则筹集资金去从那些据称已经破产的日本土地所有者手中购买这些岛屿。


Such mixed signals have further inflamed nationalist sentiments in China, and anti-Japanese demonstrations have broken out in many Chinese cities, including an attack on the Japanese ambassador’s official vehicle.	而这些混杂的信号则进一步激发了中国的民族主义情绪，许多城市爆发了反日游行，连日本大使的专车都遭到了袭击。


Both sides urgently need to cool off, especially in order to contain their extremist elements and prevent them from taking over the issue and setting the policy agenda.	双方都急需冷静下来，尤其是要遏制各自内部的极端主义团体并防止这些人把持了该事件并设定其政治议程。


In the short term, China’s government should discourage further anti-Japanese demonstrations.	短期来说，中国政府应当阻止进一步的反日示威。


Well-educated Chinese should understand that destroying Japanese cars (which are made in China) and similar behavior are not rational ways to express an opinion about a territorial dispute with Japan.	那些受过良好教育的中国人应该认识到打砸日本车（何况是由中国制造的）以及类似行为都不是表达与日本领土争端观点的理性方式。


And China’s government should work with the Hong Kong authorities to prevent another attempt by Chinese activists to land on Senkaku/Diaoyu again in October.	中国政府也要和香港特区政府一道制止中国保钓人士于今年10月再次登岛。


For its part, Japan should suspend its plan to buy the islands, an effort that is certain to make matters worse if it goes ahead.	而在日本方面，购买这些岛屿的方案应该搁置，因为推进这一计划必将令事态变得更糟。


The status quo is that the Chinese government has not challenged Japan’s de facto control of the islands, so further action to force China’s hand would be extremely unwise.	目前的现状其实就是中国政府并未挑战日本对这些岛屿的实际控制，因此迫使中国出手的进一步行动也是不明智的。


In the medium term, the two governments should work out a formula for coping with scenarios that now play out regularly.	在中期来说，两国政府应当制定一个应对方案来处理这些如今定期爆发的情况。


A crisis-management team, composed of representatives of both countries’ foreign ministries, coast guards, and militaries, should not only meet regularly, but should also consult each other in emergency situations, thereby minimizing the risk that matters get out of control.	一个由双方外交部门，海岸警卫和军方代表组成的危机处理团队不但要定期会面，而且要在出现紧急情况时互相商议，以此减少事态失控的风险。


Moreover, such a formula should bar provocative actions by either side, including military exercises, such as those staged recently by China and, jointly, by the US and Japan.	此外，这样一个应对方案应该遏制两方的挑衅性行为，例如中国最近的军事演习以及美日联合军演。


It should also contain a standard procedure for managing the aftermath when behavior by citizens of either country forces the two governments into unexpected situations.	同时还包含一个标准程序来在两国公民行为导致各自政府陷入意外状况时处理善后工作。


In the long run, the best outcome is a peaceful resolution to the sovereignty issue, or, barring that, a compromise that satisfies both sides’ core interests.	长期来说，最佳的结果就是对这一主权问题的和平解决方案，或者至少达成一个能满足双方核心利益的承诺。


Joint development of the area’s resources, which both countries need, should be returned to the bilateral agenda.	既然双方都需要该区域的资源，那么联合开发也需要被重新提上双边议程。


China’s former leader Deng Xiaoping famously proposed that, for the sake of better Sino-Japanese relations, the two countries should shelve the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute for future generations to resolve.	中国前领导人邓小平曾经提出，为了中日关系着想，两国应当把钓鱼/尖阁列岛争端搁置起来等下一代人去解决。


That wisdom remains the best advice to date, especially given that the consequences of a worsening bilateral relationship would extend far beyond China and Japan.	这句箴言到如今依然是最佳建议，尤其考虑到双边关系恶化的影响范围将远远超出中国和日本的范畴之外。


Is Liquidity Enough?	流动性足够了吗？


Every week more liquidity is injected into the global banking system by the United States Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank.	每一周美国联邦储备委员会和欧洲中央银行都向全球银行系统注入更多的流动资金。


The average interest rate paid for overnight reserves in the US has been well below the 5.25% per year that the Fed still publicly says is its target.	美国隔夜储备金的平均利率远远低于美联储依然公开表态要实现的5. 25%这样的目标。


But the market for overnight reserves now appears to be divided into three segments.	但是现在隔夜储备金市场似乎被划分成了三块。 运行健康的银行可以以远低于5.


Banks known to be healthy can borrow at much less than 5.25%.	25%的利率借到钱。 而面临可能的流动性问题的银行——即美联储希望以5.


But banks facing possible liquidity problems – which the Fed wants to be able to borrow at 5.25% – are borrowing from the Fed itself at 5.75%, as are a few big banks that want more liquidity but don’t believe they could get it without disrupting the market.	25%的利率进行借贷的银行，像一些希望获得更多的流动资金但是认为这样做可能会扰乱市场的大银行一样，正以5. 75%的利率从美联储借钱。


Such a difference in the prices charged to “regulated banks” in financial markets is a sign of a potential breakdown.	这种在金融市场向“受管制的银行”收取的价格的差异是一种市场可能发生崩溃的迹象。


To date, the premiums charged are small: for an overnight loan of $100 million, even a one-percentage-point spread in the interest rate is only $3000.	到目前为止，收取的利息是很低的：对于一笔1亿美元的隔夜贷款来说，利率上即便一个百分点的差价也只有3000美元。


That reflects the small probability that the market is assigning to the occurrence of a full-blown financial crisis with bankruptcies and bank failures.	这表明市场爆发破产和银行倒闭这样的全面金融危机的可能性很小。


In normal times, however, there is no such premium at all.	然而，在正常情况下，根本就没有这种差价存在。


The fact that there is even a small liquidity crunch for banks implies larger liquidity crunches for less intensively regulated financial institutions, and even greater liquidity crunches for manufacturing and real-estate companies.	银行存在即便是很小程度的流动性紧缩的事实预示着集中管制程度较低的金融机构面临较大的流动性紧缩，而制造业和房地产公司则面临更大的流动性紧缩。


It is hard to imagine that manufacturers are not now postponing orders of capitals goods, and that new home sales in America are not dropping right now.	很难想象制造商现在会延期预订资产货物，或者美国现在的新房销售没有面临下滑。


How does the Fed deal with such a situation?	美联储怎样应对这样的状况呢？


Gingerly.	小心翼翼。


A decade ago, Alan Greenspan likened his problems of monetary management to driving a new car, having it suddenly stop, opening the hood, and not understanding a thing about what he saw.	十年以前，格林斯潘把他所面临的货币管理问题比作驾驶一辆新车，当车突然停止行进时，打开引擎盖，却对所看到的东西一无所知。


The changes in finance had been that great.	金融市场的变化如此之大。


The Fed’s actions have involved what former Fed governor Larry Meyer calls “liquidity tools,” as opposed to interest rate-based monetary policy.	美联储所采取的行动是美联储前任理事拉里-迈耶所称的与利率为基础的货币政策相对立的“流动性工具”。


The Fed hopes that it can handle the current situation without being forced to rescue market liquidity by cutting interest rates and thus giving what it fears would be an unhealthy boost to spending.	美联储希望可以不必被迫通过降低利率以拯救市场流动性来应对当前的状况，以免引发它所担心的消费受到不健康的刺激。


The Fed still hopes that liquidity and confidence can be restored quickly, and that the summer of 2007 will serve future economists as an example of how de-linked financial markets can be from the flows of spending and production in the real economy.	美联储依然希望流动性和市场信心能够很快被恢复，而2007年的夏天可以为未来的经济学家树立金融市场可以怎样与真实经济中消费和生产的流动脱节的范例。


I think that the Fed is wrong: the fallout from the current liquidity panic means that a year from now we are likely to wish that the Fed had given a boost to spending this month.	我认为美联储的做法是错误的：当前流动性恐慌所产生的负作用意味着一年以后我们很可能希望当初美联储在这个月可以刺激消费。


The reason is that healthy spending and production no longer depend only on the soundness of the banking system and public confidence in its stability.	理由是健康的消费和生产不再仅仅依赖于银行系统的健康和公众对其稳定性的信心。


Nowadays, the banking system is much larger than the set of institutions formally called “banks” that are intensively regulated by central banks and treasuries.	今天，银行系统比由中央银行和国库所集中管制的一群被正式命名为“银行”的机构要大得多。


A bank, at bottom, is something that (a) takes deposits, (b) provides loans, (c) pretends to its depositors that their money (its liabilities) are more liquid than its assets, (d) collects net interest as a result, and (e) gets away with it almost all the time.	一家银行，从本质上讲，是（1）接受存款、（2）提供贷款、（3）向其存款者声称他们的钱（其债权）比其资产更具流动性、（4）目的是获取净利息以及（5）最终几乎总是能实现这些净利息的某种机构。


The deposits can be individuals’ paychecks and the loans can be to small businesses.	存款可以是个人的工资，而贷款可以被贷给小的业务。


Or the deposits can be consumer paper issued by KKR Atlantic Financing, and the loans can be CDO sub-prime mortgage tranches that KKR Atlantic holds in its portfolio.	或者存款可以是KKR大西洋金融公司发行的求购纸，而贷款可以是KKR大西洋投资组合中的债务抵押凭证次级抵押贷款等级块。 或者存款可以是在D.


Or the deposits can be investments in D.E. Shaw’s funds and the loans can be the complex derivatives that make up D.E. Shaw’s portfolio.	E. Shaw基金投资组合的复杂金融衍生产品。


In all these cases, the liability holders – i.e., the depositors – have been promised liquidity, yet that promise cannot be kept if it is ever doubted.	不管怎样，债权持有人，即存款人，并承诺了流动性，然后这种承诺在其遭到质疑的情况下就无法得到保证。


It is being doubted now.	而它现在就遭到了质疑。


Central banks should not focus only on keeping markets liquid.	中央银行不应该仅仅关注市场的流动性。


In the future, even liquid markets will be willing to intermediate fewer transactions than they were two months ago.	在未来，即便流动性市场也会希望较两个月以前介入更少的���易。


So central banks must also focus on how the fall in the volume of money flowing through financial markets will affect spending, and on how much they should cut interest rates and expand money supply to offset these effects.	所以中央银行还必须关注金融市场货币流通量的降低会怎样影响消费，而它们应该削减多少利率以及扩大多少的货币供应来抵消其队消费的影响。


Is Mexico Disintegrating?	墨西哥正在瓦解？


MEXICO CITY – Shortly before America’s elections last November, then vice-presidential candidate Joseph Biden was widely criticized for predicting that an Obama administration would almost certainly be tested by what he called a “generated” international crisis, in much the way that the Soviet Union “tested” John F. Kennedy shortly after he assumed office.	墨西哥城－就在美国去年十一月大选之前，当时的副总统候选人约瑟夫·拜登（Joseph Biden）因为预言奥巴马政府几乎肯定会受到他所谓的“造成”的国际危机的考验，而且受到考验的方式和约翰·肯尼迪任职后不久所受到的苏联的考验的方式非常相似，而遭到了广泛的批评。


Biden did not point to a specific region of the world, but mentioned the Middle East, the Indian sub-continent, and Russia as the likeliest sources of trouble for the new president.	拜登没有具体指出世界上的某个地区，但是提到中东、印度次大陆以及俄罗斯最有可能是给新总统制造麻烦的源头。


Impolitic or not, Biden’s anxieties seem to have informed several of the administration’s early foreign policy decisions.	不管是不是失策，拜登的焦虑似乎提示了奥巴马政府几个最初的外交政策决定。


These include Biden’s own extension of an olive branch to Russia at the recent Munich Security Conference, and Barack Obama’s appointment of Richard Holbrooke as special envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan and of George Mitchell to a similar post for Israel-Palestine.	这包括拜登自己在最近的慕尼黑安全政策会议上向俄罗斯抛出橄榄枝，以及巴拉克·奥巴马任命理查德·霍尔布鲁克（Richard Holbrooke）担任巴基斯坦和阿富汗特使，乔治·米切尔（George Mitchell）担任以色列－巴勒斯坦特使。


But, as pressing as the Middle East, south Asia, and Russia (as well as Iran and North Korea) are, another crisis far closer to home could create as much peril as a nuclear-armed Iran, an aggressively resurgent Russia, or even an Islamist-dominated Pakistan.	但是，和中东、南亚以及俄罗斯（伊朗和北朝鲜）问题一样紧迫的是，另一个更靠近美国本土的危机可以产生和拥有核武器的伊朗，侵略性复活的俄罗斯，甚至是被伊斯兰主义者统治的巴基斯坦同样大的危害。


That crisis is located in Mexico, which is in freefall, its state institutions under threat as they have not been since at least the Cristero Uprising of the late 1920’s and possibly since the Mexican Revolution of 1910.	这一危机位于正在自由坠落的墨西哥，这个国家的国家制度正面临着至少自20时机20年代末克里斯特洛起义（Cristero Uprising）以来，也有可能是自1910年墨西哥革命以来从来没有遇到过的威胁。


While the Obama administration is obviously aware of what is happening south of the Rio Grande, the threat simply does not command the attention that its gravity requires.	虽然奥巴马政府显然知道里奥格兰徳（Rio Grande）南部正在发生的事情，但是，这样的威胁却没有获得其严重性所需要的关注。