The image of the West as an enemy has become the only ideological excuse for Putin’s model of the corporate state.	西方作为敌人的形象已经成为普京公司国模式唯一的意识形态借口。


Third, the soaring price of oil has made the Kremlin’s inhabitants believe that they are all-powerful.	第三，飙升的油价已经让克里姆林宫的居住者认为他们无所不能。


Today’s Russia, which thinks of itself as a “great energy state,” laughs at its previous meager desire to catch up with little Portugal in terms of living standards.	现在的俄罗斯，认为它自己是一个“能源大国”，并为其以前可怜的在生活水平上赶上葡萄牙的愿望而感到可笑。


Finally, a series of Western mistakes and misfortunes, a crisis in transatlantic relations, lack of leadership, and the growing threat of Islamic fundamentalism (in both the Middle East and Europe) have led Russian leaders to believe that the West is a sinking ship, to be abandoned as soon as possible.	最后，西方一系列的错误和不幸，大西洋两岸关系的危机，领导层的缺乏，以及伊斯兰原教旨主义（中东和欧洲都存在）不断增长的威胁，导致俄罗斯领导人认为西方是一艘正在沉没的船舶，应尽快抛弃它。


While this belief unfortunately does have some validity, it requires one very important caveat: Russia is part of that ship.	不幸的是，虽然这个观点有一定的正确性，但是它也包含了一个非常重要的注意事项：俄罗斯是这艘船的一部分。


Russia can make advances to Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, and it can remind the Arab world that the Soviet Union helped it develop and offered it protection in the United Nations Security Council.	俄罗斯可以贷款给哈马斯，真主党以及伊朗，并且可以提醒阿拉伯世界，过去苏联帮助它们发展并在联合国安理会中保护它们。


But in the eyes of Islamic extremists, Russia is part of the “Satanic” West – indeed, its most vulnerable part.	但是在伊斯兰极端主义分子眼中，俄罗斯是“邪恶的”西方的一部分——确实，这是它最脆弱的部分。


Thus, it is Russia, with a soaring birth rate among its Muslim citizens that is the most attractive for expansion and take-over.	因此，是穆斯林人口出生率剧增的俄罗斯，对扩张和政变最具吸引力。


But Russia’s self-destructive confrontation with the West can be halted, and its centuries-old debate between Westernizers and the Slavophiles put to rest once and for all.	但是俄罗斯的自我毁灭式的和西方的对抗可以停止，并且它的在亲西方和亲斯拉夫派之间的争论也可以彻底的告一段落。


This, however, will depend on Ukraine’s success on the path of European development it chose in the Orange Revolution of 2004-2005.	然而，这有赖于乌克兰在2004年到2005年橙色革命中选择的欧洲发展道路的成功。


Ukraine does, indeed, present a threat, but not to Russia’s security, as Kremlin propagandists claim.	像克里姆林宫的宣传家声称的那样，乌克兰确实对俄罗斯构成了威胁，但是不是对俄罗斯安全的威胁。


The real threat is to the Putin model of a corporate, authoritarian state, unfriendly to the West.	真正的威胁是对普京对西方不友好的公司式的独裁国家模式的威胁。


For the Kremlin’s occupants, it is a matter of life and death that countries that were once part of the Soviet Union but chose a different model of development – Ukraine being the chief example – should never become attractive to ordinary Russians.	对克里姆林宫的居住者来说，曾经是苏联的一部分但是选择了不同的发展模式的国家－乌克兰是主要的例子－不应该吸引普通的俄国人，这是生死攸关的大事。


The example posed by the Baltic nations does not threaten the Kremlin much, because they are perceived as foreign to the Russian psyche.	波罗的海国家的例子没有对克里姆林宫构成很大的威胁，因为在俄罗斯观念中是把它们作为外人的。


Indeed, in Soviet films, Baltic actors were usually cast in the roles of Nazi generals and American spies.	确实，在苏联电影中，波罗的海的演员通常被选派扮演纳粹将军和美国间谍的角色。


Ukrainians, on the other hand, are close to us in their culture and mentality.	另一方面，乌克兰人的文化和思想观念和我们都很相近。


If they made a different choice, why can’t we do the same?	如果他们作出了不同的选择，我们为什么不能作同样的事情呢？


Ukraine’s success will mark the political death of Putinism, that squalid philosophy of “KGB Capitalists.”	乌克兰的胜利将标志着普京主义——“克格勃资本家”肮脏的哲学——的政治死亡。


If Ukraine succeeds in its European choice, if it is able to make it work, it can settle the question that has bedeviled Russian culture for centuries – Russia or the West?	如果乌克兰在其欧洲道路上取得成功，如果它能使其起作用，它就可以解决使俄罗斯文化痛苦了几个世纪的问题——俄罗斯还是西方？


So the best way to help Russia today is to support Ukraine’s claim that it belongs to Europe and its institutions.	所以，现在对俄罗斯最好的帮助方法是支持乌克兰其属于欧洲的主张及其制度。


This will influence Russia's political mentality more than anything else.	这将比任何其他东西都更能影响俄罗斯的政治观念。


For if Russia’s anti-Western paranoia continues and the Kremlin’s Eurasian fantasy of allying with China lasts another 10-15 years, Russia will end up seeing China swallowing its Far East and Siberia.	因为如果俄罗斯的反西方偏执狂以及克里姆林宫想与中国结盟的欧亚白日梦再持续另一个10到15年，俄罗斯将最终看到中国吞下它的远东和西伯利亚地区。


Indeed, the weakened Russia that will be Putin’s legacy will then also lose the Northern Caucasus and the Volga region to their growing Muslim populations.	而且，作为普京遗产的被削弱的俄罗斯，也将会向不断增长的穆斯林人口失去其北高加索和伏尔加地区。


The remaining Russian lands would then have no other choice but to attach themselves to Ukraine, which should by then have become a successful member of the European Union.	剩下的俄罗斯领土将除了依附乌克兰以外没有其他的选择，而乌克兰到那时候已经成为欧盟成功的一员。


After 1,000 years, Russia will have come full circle, returning to Kievan Rus after wandering on the roads of the Mongol hordes, empire, communism, and farcical Putinism.	在1000年之后，俄罗斯将回到原地，在漫游过蒙古汗国，帝国，共产主义以及滑稽的普京主义之后，又回到了罗斯国。


So Russia now has a choice: Ukrainian plan A or Ukrainian plan B.	所以，俄罗斯现在有一个选择：乌克兰A计划或乌克兰B计划。


Israel, for its part, risked a diplomatic crisis with Australia last month by abruptly canceling an official visit by President Reuven Rivlin, who instead headed to Moscow for an urgent meeting with Putin. (And this occurred just after Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu canceled a planned meeting with Obama in Washington, without even bothering to communicate that officially to the White House.)	而以色列总统鲁文·里夫林则冒着爆发外交危机的风险在上月突然取消对澳大利亚的正式访问，转而前往莫斯科与普��举行紧急磋商——而就在此前不久以色列总理内塔尼亚胡甚至在没有正式知会白宫的情况下就突然取消了在华盛顿与奥巴马的计划会议。


Darkness on the Edge of Europe	欧洲边缘的黑暗


KYIV – In 2014, Vladimir Putin discovered his inner Trotsky.	基辅——2014年，普京找到了内心的托洛茨基。


For what Russia’s president is now offering Ukraine is a perverse twist on the formula Trotsky proclaimed during the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk in 1918: “No war, no peace.”	之所以这样说是因为俄总统要求乌克兰接受“不战不和”这一1918年托洛茨基曾在布列斯特和谈中用过的恶意扭曲的解决方式。


In doing so, Putin has not only moved to trap my country in a frozen conflict that will prevent both democracy and the economy from flourishing; he has shredded the rules and norms that have kept the peace in Europe for three generations.	普京这样做不仅将我的祖国推入“冷冲突”陷阱，致使民主和经济繁荣不再； 他还亲手撕碎了欧洲三代人赖以维护和平的法律和规则。


No one should believe that the Minsk Protocol – agreed in September by representatives of Ukraine, Russia, and the Kremlin-backed armed militants in the eastern cities of Donetsk and Luhansk – marked the beginning of a return to normalcy in either Ukraine or Europe.	千万不要相信乌克兰、俄罗斯和克里姆林支持的东部城市顿涅茨克和卢甘斯克的武装分子代表9月达成的 明斯克协议标志着乌克兰或者欧洲恢复正常的开始。


Under that agreement, Ukraine’s government ceded de facto control of the Donbas region, supposedly for only three years, to Russia’s hired secessionists.	虽然协议条款规定以三年为限，但乌克兰政府实际放弃了对顿巴斯地区的控制权，并将该地区交给由俄罗斯雇佣的分离主义分子。


But this imported hybrid war – and Russia’s bid to carve up Ukraine – is far from over.	但这场境外输入的混合战争——还有俄罗斯对乌克兰的瓜分——却还远远没有结束。


On the contrary, the Minsk Protocol marked only the end of the beginning of Putin’s program to turn Ukraine into a vassal state, and to restore a Russian veto over its neighbors’ international relations.	相反，明斯克协议仅仅标志着普京将乌克兰重新变为属国、掌握乌克兰与邻国国际关系否决权的初步计划的终结。


His efforts to thwart Ukraine’s European future will continue, as will his efforts to hollow out our democracy and replace it with a Kremlin echo chamber, unless the world imposes such a high price for his imperial ambitions that the Russian people refuse to bear it.	除非世界迫使普京为其帝国主义野心付出俄罗斯民众拒绝承受的代价，否则他将继续阻挠乌克兰在欧洲的未来，竭力掏空我们的民主并让乌克兰成为克里姆林的传声筒。


So, in 2015, the resolve that Europe and the United States have shown in opposing Putin’s designs must not only be maintained; it must be hardened.	因此在2015年，欧洲和美国所表现出来的反普京决心不仅需要维持； 而且必须进一步强化。


Yet, sadly, there have been signs of slackening Western commitment.	然而可悲的是，已经有迹象显示西方放松了既定目标。


The European Commission’s agreement in September to postpone full implementation of Ukraine’s association agreement with the European Union – the agreement that Ukrainians fought and died for in Kyiv last winter – signaled to Putin that cunning, force, and intimidation can win Western acquiescence in his subjugation of Ukraine and theft of Crimea.	欧盟委员会九月同意推迟全面执行乌克兰与欧盟联合协议——去年冬天乌克兰曾在基辅为此协议浴血奋战并付出牺牲——这一举动告诉普京暴力、狡诈和恐吓可以让西方默许其镇压乌克兰并偷走克里米亚。


The delay, intended to show the EU’s determination to make the association agreement work, has instead only whetted Putin’s appetite.	此次推迟的本意是要显示欧盟确保联合协议生效的决心，但相反只是刺激了普京的胃口。


His hope is that some EU members’ interest in securing Russian gas supplies during the winter will cause them to forget their allies’ security interests – a classic divide-and-rule strategy, served chilled.	他希望当寒冬到来，某些欧盟成员国对俄罗斯天然气供应的兴趣会致使他们将盟国的安全利益抛在脑后——这是经典的分而治之策略，再一次被俄国冷冻上桌。


Europe cannot afford to be taken in by it.	欧洲千万不能上当。


Ukraine may now only be passing through the eye of the storm.	乌克兰或许现在只是处在台风眼之中。


Putin, knowing that the Russian Army’s current logistical systems for supplying Crimea are insufficient, appears to be readying plans to secure a land corridor from the Russian border through southeastern Ukraine.	普京知道俄军现有的后勤保障体系不足以覆盖克里米亚，所以似乎正在制定计划，开拓从俄边境到乌克兰东南部的陆路走廊。


That is why some of the most sinister figures behind Russia’s other frozen conflicts, such as Lieutenant-General Vladimir Antyufeyev, the long-serving “state security minister” in Moldova’s breakaway Transnistria region, are now calling the shots among eastern Ukraine’s armed militants.	这也解释了为什么俄罗斯其他冷冲突背后某些最为阴险的势力，如在摩尔多瓦分离主义德涅斯特河地区长期担任“国家安全部长”的中将Vladimir Antyufeyev现在在乌克兰东部的武装分子中扮演指挥角色。


Antyufeyev is using the tenuous ceasefire agreed under the Minsk Protocol to create a cloned KGB service, called the MGB, to intimidate Ukrainian citizens trapped in Donbas into submitting to proxy Kremlin rule.	Antyufeyev 正利用明斯克协议达成的脆弱停火创建克隆的克格勃服务MGB，恐吓被困在顿巴斯的乌克兰民众屈从于克里姆林的代理规则。


And, with the Donbas economy’s crown jewels having been “nationalized” (and the rest eviscerated), the region’s emerging industries are crime and kidnapping, of the sort seen in Transnistria, Georgia’s breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and other Kremlin-backed statelets.	而且随着顿巴斯经济皇冠上的宝石完成“国有化”（其余部分也元气大伤），人们在德涅斯特、格鲁吉亚分离省份阿布哈兹和南奥塞梯、还有其他克里姆林支持的小国所看到的犯罪及绑架已成为该地区的新兴产业。


The desire to secure access to Crimea is also why the Russian Army is now focused on the strategic port of Mariupol, a gateway on the Sea of Azov, for a land bridge.	开拓克里米亚通道同样能解释俄军为什么如此关注亚速海门户具有战略意义的马里乌波尔港，并将其作为通往克里米亚的陆路桥梁。


Europeans should understand the inherent dangers in creating a land corridor through another country, given the Nazis’ use of the Danzig Corridor as a pretext to invade Poland in 1939.	有了1939年纳粹以但泽走廊为入侵波兰借口的前车之鉴，欧洲人应该清楚开拓通过他国陆路走廊的危险性。


Surely, a day of reckoning will come for Putin, whose aggression is slowly wrecking the Russian economy.	当然，普京总有一天会得到报应，其侵略行径正慢慢使俄经济遭受重创。


But when that day arrives remains too uncertain for Europe and the world to let down their guard and ease their pressure on the Kremlin.	但那一天究竟何时到来仍然太不确定，因此欧洲和世界绝不能放松警惕、任由对克里姆林的压力有所放松。


Indeed, if peace is to come to Ukraine – and if Putin is to be prevented from using the same strategy elsewhere – the world must let him know that some lines may never be crossed.	事实上，乌克兰要想实现和平——防止普京把同样的招数用到其他区域——世界各国就必须让他明白有些界限永远不能越过。


After all, Ukraine is not the only country under the gun, as Putin’s recent threats to “protect” Russian citizens in Kazakhstan, not to mention his intimidation of the Baltic states, attest.	毕竟乌克兰不是身处枪口下的唯一国家，普京最近还威胁要保护哈萨克斯坦的俄国公民，更不要说还恐吓波罗的海国家。


This is not an issue that concerns only the West.	这个问题不仅事关西方国家。


China may soon need to decide whether it can sit back and let the Kremlin whittle away the geo-strategic gains and enhanced security that came with the Soviet empire’s demise.	中国或许很快就要做出决策，是否任由克里姆林逐步蚕食随苏维埃帝国灭亡而来的地缘战略利益和安全强化。


After all, it is no coincidence that China’s quarter-century of extraordinary economic growth came after the Soviet threat on its border was eliminated.	毕竟，中国长达四分之一世纪的经济增长发生在边境上的苏联威胁消除之后并非巧合。


Indeed, contrary to what Putin claims to the Russian public, the Chinese are not fully committed to backing him in his confrontation with the West.	事实与普京向俄公众宣扬的恰恰相反，中国并未全力支持他与西方的对抗。


One sign of this is the hard bargain that President Xi Jinping struck in negotiating China’s recent huge gas contracts with Russia; another is that Chinese lending to Russia since the invasion of Crimea has actually declined.	标志之一是习近平主席在最近中俄签署的巨额天然气合同谈判中的大幅杀价； 另一个标志是俄国入侵克里米亚后中国的对俄借贷实际有所下降。


As Ukraine prepares for another year of confrontation, the world should understand that one fact is non-negotiable: our country will be an independent, fully sovereign state.	当乌克兰为新一年对抗做好准备之际，世界各国应当明白有一个事实一点不能商量：我们的国家必须是完全独立的主权国。


No foreign government will gain a veto over any aspect of our internal decision-making.	没有哪个外国政府能对我们任何方面的国内决策投否决票。


Our future is for Ukraine’s citizens to decide, period.	我们的未来由乌克兰民众自主决定，这个问题没有任何余地可以商量。


This rules out our recognition – at any time and in any form – of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and occupation of Donbas.	这排除了我们在任何时候以任何形式承认俄国吞并克里米亚和占领顿巴斯的可能性。


Ukrainians’ unity, spirit, and devotion to their freedom remain undented.	乌克兰民众的团结、进取和为自由献身仍然一如既往。


War has forged a new patriotism that peace will not extinguish.	战争催生了和平无法熄灭的新爱国主义精神。


We will continue to defy Putin and his efforts to reduce Ukraine to a semi-sovereign buffer state.	我们将继续反抗普京和他把乌克兰变为半主权缓冲国的构想。


But Ukraine’s ability to resist, and the international community’s ability to prevent brute force from having free rein, depends on whether world leaders understand that appeasement begets only further aggression.	但乌克兰的抵抗力度和国际社会防止暴力为所欲为的能力取决于世界领导人是否明白绥靖只会引发进一步的侵略。


If they do not, 2015 could mark the return of a European and world order that was supposedly overcome seven decades ago.	如果他们不明白这一点，2015年可能标志着欧洲和世界秩序退回到70年前的老样子。


Putin’s Gas Problem	普京的天然气问题


HOUSTON – Russia watchers are rightly focusing on the latest brittle ceasefire in Ukraine, seeking to discern President Vladimir Putin's intentions there.	休斯顿—俄罗斯观察家正确地将关注焦点集中在最新达成的脆弱的乌克兰停火协议上，试图解读俄罗斯总统普京的意图。


But they would be wise not to overlook another unfolding struggle – one that will have profound long-term consequences for Europe and for Putin's ability to exert pressure on the continent.	但他们最好不要忽视另一场正在展开的斗争——一场对欧洲和普京对欧洲大陆的施压能力具有深远长期影响的斗争。


Last December, Russian's giant gas firm, Gazprom, and a Turkish pipeline company signed a memorandum of understanding to construct a pipeline from Russia to Turkey under the Black Sea.	去年12月，俄罗斯天然气巨头俄天然气（Gazprom）与一家土耳其管道公司签署了一份谅解备忘录，将建设从俄罗斯至土耳其的黑海海底管道。


This new “Turkish Stream" is an alternative to the “South Stream" Black Sea pipeline from Russia to Bulgaria – a project that the Kremlin abandoned in December, in response to the sanctions imposed by the European Union after Russia's invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea.	这条新的“土耳其溪”（Turkish Stream）将成为从俄罗斯至保加利亚的“南溪”（South Stream）黑海管道的替代品。 克里姆林宫在12月放弃了后者，以此作为欧盟在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰、吞并克里米亚后对俄罗斯实施的制裁的回应。


The South Stream project failed to comply with EU competition and energy directives, and the announcement of the $12 billion Turkish Stream is likely to reinforce Russia's reputation as an unreliable partner, thus accelerating Europe's search for alternate supply sources.	南溪工程不符合欧盟的竞争和能源方向，而宣布启动120美元的土耳其溪可能加剧俄罗斯不可靠合作伙伴的恶名，从而加速欧洲寻找替代供给源的进程。


Indeed, in risking his most lucrative market, Putin is exhibiting an almost suicidal disregard for the Russian economy – apparently for no other reason than to cement enmity with Ukraine.	事实上，普京可以说是在拿其最有利可图的市场冒险，可能对俄罗斯经济带来自杀式效应——而其唯一目的显然是加剧对乌克兰的仇恨。


The Kremlin intends to remove Ukraine from a gas-delivery system that has been in place since the 1980s, routing supplies instead through a new and untried network to a market that may not even exist.	克里姆林宫想把乌克兰逐出自20世纪80年代就存在的天然气供应体系，转而使用从未使用过的新网络向也许根本就不存在的市场输气。


Last month, Gazprom announced its intention to cease shipments through Ukraine when the contracts with the country's gas pipeline company, Naftogaz, expire in 2019.	上个月，俄天然气宣布去有意在2019年与乌克兰天然气管道公司乌天然气（Naftogaz）合同到期后停止途经乌克兰的输气。


Gas from the Turkish Stream will be delivered to the Greek border on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.	来自土耳其溪的天然气将输往希腊边境，并且是唯一选择。


Gazprom expects permission to carry out design and survey work “soon," with its first delivery to Turkey to arrive in 2017.	俄天然气预计设计和调查工作将“很快”获得许可，第一批至土耳其的天然气将在2017年抵达。


Gazprom's erratic behavior is not a matter of minor concern for Europe.	俄天然气的古怪行为绝不容欧洲小觑。


The continent relies on Russia for some 30% of its natural gas, 80% of which is transported through Ukraine.	欧洲大陆天然气有30%需要依赖俄罗斯，其中又有80%需要经过乌克兰输送。


And the continent has been left out in the cold once before.	欧洲大陆曾经被断气过。


In January 2009, Gazprom ordered cutbacks of deliveries through Ukraine, causing severe shortages in six countries in eastern and southeastern Europe.	2009年1月，俄天然气决定削减经乌克兰的天然气护送，导致东欧和南欧六国天然气严重短缺。


In late 2014, Russia cut off Ukraine completely, again signaling its readiness to use gas supplies as a weapon of foreign policy.	2014年底，俄罗斯完全切断了乌克兰，再次表明它准备把天然气供给作为外交政策武器。


The EU rushed in to broker a settlement that some contend was against Ukraine's interests.	欧盟紧急调停，达成了一份一些人认为不利于乌克兰的和解。


But, contrary to what Putin seems to believe, neither Europe nor Ukraine is likely to be the biggest loser in Russia's effort to redirect its gas exports.	但是，与普京的算盘相反，欧洲和乌克兰都不会是俄罗斯改变天然气出口方向的最大输家。


Gazprom receives two-thirds of its hard-currency revenues from Europe, and a period of falling exports and domestic economic crisis is not the ideal time to play games with your best customer.	俄天然气三分之二的硬通货收入来自欧洲，一段时期的无法出口和国内经济危机绝不是与最佳客户周旋的理想手段。


Indeed, the European market is already slipping away.	事实上，欧洲市场已经开始逐渐萎缩。


Gazprom's European sales plummeted in the third quarter of last year and fell by 25% in the fourth quarter.	去年三季度，俄天然气欧洲销售额暴跌，四季度又下降25%。


The slump in demand is coming at a time when Russia is desperate for hard currency, owing to sanctions that exclude it from credit markets.	需求暴降恰逢俄罗斯急需硬通货的时期，因为制裁措施使其无法进入信用市场。


Its major companies are facing huge debt refinancing needs, its currency reserves are collapsing, its economy is heading toward a deep recession, and the ruble is plumbing new lows.	俄罗斯大公司正面临巨大的再融资需求，其货币储备正在暴降，其经济正在滑向深度衰退，而卢布也是频创新低。


In redirecting its exports, Russia is in effect demanding that Europe spend billions of euros on new infrastructure to replace a perfectly good pipeline, only to satisfy Putin's desire to cause trouble in Ukraine.	改变出口方向实际上是在要求欧洲投入数十亿欧元修建新基础设施取代完好无损的旧管道，而这样做的目的只是满足普京给乌克兰制造麻烦的愿望。


In January, Gazprom's CEO, Alexey Miller, imperiously brushed off European concerns, stating, “We have informed our European partners, and now it is up to them to put in place the necessary infrastructure starting from the Turkish-Greek border."	俄天然气CEO米勒（Alexey Miller）完全不把欧洲的担忧放在眼里，他在1月份声称，“我们已经通知了我们的欧洲合作伙伴，现在，建造以土耳其-希腊边境为起点的必要基础设施就是他们的事了。 ”


The initial reaction in Europe was that Putin either was bluffing or had taken leave of his senses.	一开始，欧洲以为普京不是虚张声势就是疯了。


“The decision makes no economic sense," was how Maroš Šefčovič, the European Commission's vice president for energy union, put it.	“这个决定在经济上完全不可行，”欧盟委员会负责能源联盟的副主席舍甫科维奇（Maroš Šefčovič）说，“我们是优质客户。


“We're good customers.	我们付好多钱。


We're paying a lot of money.	我们按时付钱。


We're paying on time, and we're paying in hard currency.	我们用硬通货付钱。


So I think we should be treated accordingly."	因此我认为我们应该有所应对。 ”


Putin's erratic and economically oblivious policies are frittering away the last remnants of what was once Gazprom's monopoly position in the European gas market.	普京完全不顾经济后果的怪异政策正在白白浪费俄天然气在欧洲天然气市场上最后的垄断地位。


Clearly, if Europe is to spend billions on pipelines, it would be better off doing so as part of an effort to diversify its sources of natural gas, rather than deepen its dependence on Russia.	显然，如果欧洲要花几十亿用于修管道，还不如将此作为天然气来源多元化的一部分而不是加深对俄罗斯的依赖。


After all, memories are long, especially when it comes to frigid winters of unheated homes and closed factories.	毕竟，记忆总是深刻的，特别是对严冬时节没有暖气的家和关门大吉的工厂的记忆。


When one of Joseph Stalin's chief planners was asked why he was willing to defend a series of ludicrous proposals, he famously replied, “I'd rather stand for unrealistic plans than sit [in jail] for realistic ones."	斯大林的一位主要计划官员层被问及为何要为一系列荒唐的方案辩护，他的回答堪称经典：“我宁可站着制定（stand for）不现实的计划，也不要坐着（牢，sit in jail）制定现实的计划。


One can imagine that Gazprom officials are thinking along the same lines.	”你可以想象，俄天然气官员的想法也是一样的。


If so, they should start thinking differently.	果真如此的话，他们应该转换思维。


Russia cannot afford more economic pain and suffering.	俄罗斯无法再承受更多的经济痛苦和灾难了。


But that is what it will get unless sober heads prevail.	但在头脑清醒之前他们是不会领会到的。


London is the only city in the United Kingdom that ranks in the world’s top 50.	伦敦是英国唯��跻身世界前50大城市的代表。


Sadat’s Journey, 30 Years After	30年以后萨达特的旅程


TOLEDO -- If “one man of courage makes a majority,” as Andrew Jackson said, then 30 years ago, in November 1977, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was such a man.	Toledo——如果有一个人是像安德鲁·杰克逊说的那种“有勇气的人会赢得多数人的钦佩”，那么30年前，1977年11月的埃及总统萨达特就是这样一个人。


His peace overture to Israel stunned the Middle East.	他向以色列作出的和平姿态震惊了整个中东。


He had, as he put it, gone “to the end of the earth” (the Knesset in Jerusalem), and in doing so transformed the region’s politics beyond recognition.	他，像他所说的，走“到世界的尽头”（位于耶路撒冷的以色列国会），并且通过这样的举动使这个地区的政治发生了翻天覆地的变化。


From that moment, the question for the Arabs was no longer how to destroy Israel, but how to reach an accomodation with it.	从那时起，阿拉伯人的问题不再是如何消灭以色列，而是如何与它取得共存。


In his dramatic leap into the future, Sadat taught Arab leaders the realities of a changing world.	在他戏剧性地向未来迈出的这一步中，萨达特告诉了阿拉伯的领导人一个变化中的世界的现实。


For Sadat’s peace overture was born out of a sober strategic analysis of the regional balance of power.	萨达特的和平姿态是在对地区力量平衡冷静的战略分析后作出的。


It was clear to him that Israel was a nuclear power that, in October 1973, had once again proven itself to be unbeatable in a conventional war – a war Sadat himself had never expected to win when he launched it.	他很清楚以色列拥有核力量，并且在1973年10月的战争中，再一次证明了它在常规战争中是无法被击败的。 这是一场萨达特本人在发动时就没指望会获胜的战争。


Understanding Clausewitz’s dictum that war is a continuation of politics by other means, Sadat had sent the Egyptian Army across the Suez Canal in order to unleash a peace process.	作为一个对克劳塞维茨有关战争是政治另一种方式的延续的格言理解颇深的人，萨达特下令埃及军队跨越苏伊士运河，以便启动和平进程。


He was defeated militarily, but his decision to go to Jerusalem meant that he would succeed politically.	他在军事上被打败了，但是他决定前往耶路撒冷意味着他将在政治上取得成功。


During all of their abortive attempts to destroy Israel, the Arabs had relied on the military backing of the Soviet Union.	在所有最后都走向失败的试图消灭以色列的努力中，阿拉伯人依赖的都是苏联在军事上的支持。


But a strategy of peace with Israel, Sadat knew, required an alliance with the United States.	但是萨达特清楚，与以色列的和平战略需要与美国结盟。


This alliance was so vital an objective for Sadat that one may rightly wonder what came first in his strategy.	这种结盟对于萨达特来说是一个如此重要的目标，以致人们不禁会怀疑在他的战略中到底把与哪一国的结盟摆在首位。


Perhaps Sadat might have opted to secure the American alliance without making peace with Israel if he had been able to do so.	如果他能够做到的话，也许萨达特会选择与美国结盟，而不与以色列达成和平。


But he could not, and he knew it.	但是他很清楚他做不到这一点。


Indeed, in 1974, when General Gamasy, the architect of the 1973 war, questioned Sadat’s flexibility in the disengagement talks with Israel, Egypt’s president calmed him down by saying, “Don’t forget, General, we are talking here about peace with the Americans!”	事实上，在1974年，当1973年战争的战略制定者加马西将军质疑萨达特在与以色列进行的撤军谈判中是否让步过大时，埃及总统让他冷静，说道“不要忘记，将军，我们在这里讨论的是与美国的和平！ ”


Another shift implicit in Sadat’s strategy was to keep Egypt at a distance from pan-Arabism.	萨达特所作出的另一个战略上明显的转变是使埃及与泛阿拉伯主义保持距离。


Weary of inter-Arab politics, and tired of the high price Egypt had paid for the Palestinian cause, Sadat wanted to move away from Nasser’s pan-Arab ambitions and an excessive focus on the question of Palestine toward an emphasis on Egypt’s role as a power lying at the strategic crossroads between Asia and Africa.	为阿拉伯内部的政治斗争感到疲惫不堪，同时又厌烦了埃及为巴勒斯坦事业所付出的高昂代价，萨达特希望脱离纳赛尔的泛阿拉伯主义理想以及对巴勒斯坦问题的过分关注，转而强调埃及一个作为连接亚洲和非洲的战略交界点的大国的角色。


Sadat would, of course, continue to champion the Palestinian cause as the heart of an Arab consensus and sometimes as a fig leaf for his own Egypt-focused foreign policy.	当然，萨达特依然会继续支持巴勒斯坦的事业，因为这是阿拉伯人内心的共识，并且有时可以作为他自己以埃及为中心的外交政策的遮羞布。


But, for all practical purposes, Sadat had embarked on a path leading to a separate peace with Israel.	但是，从所有实用的角度，萨达特走上了一条与以色列单独实现和平的道路。


One lesson of Sadat’s initiative is that in protracted conflicts where deep emotions and historical hatreds are involved, when almost every conceivable diplomatic formula has been tried and failed, the shock of a visionary, generous, and imaginative step can open new paths.	萨达特的倡议带给我们的一个教益是在双方都有着很深的仇恨的延续多年的冲突中，当几乎所有可以想到的外交方式都遭到失败时，一个有先见之明、宽宏大量并且富有想象力的举动所带来的震撼可以开辟新的路径。


The major problem in the Arab-Isreli conflict, as in many other intricate disputes, has always been the incapacity or unwillingness of leaders to conduct a peace policy that is not supported by their societies’ prevailing, and frequently paralyzing, consensus.	阿拉伯与以色列冲突的主要问题，像其他许多错综复杂的争执一样，一直以来都是领导人无力或者不愿意执行不受他们社会中占主导地位并且经常使人失去勇气的意见支持的和平政策。


Leaders, more often than not, are hostage to the socio-political environment that produces them, rather than its shapers.	大多数的领导人都是他们所来自的社会政治环境的人质，而不是去塑造这些社会政治环境。


Sadat gained a privileged place in history and achieved immortality the moment he fled from the comfortable prison of inertia, and from the pantomime solidarity and hollow rhetorical cohesion of Arab summits.	当萨达特逃离惰性的安逸的牢笼以及阿拉伯峰会外表上的亲密以及口头上空洞的团结时，他赢得了在历史上的独特地位和不朽的声名。


The test of statesmanship did not end there.	对于一个政治家的才能的测试并不止于此。


Sadat’s spectacular leap into the future needed to be met by Israel’s prime minister, Menachem Begin, at almost every juncture down a tortuous road to peace.	萨达特向未来迈出的惊人一步还需要以色列总理贝京在通往和平的曲折道路上的几乎每一个关口的协作。


Arguably, only a political “hawk” like Begin, a man with a keen sense of the dramatic and a political romantic with a beady eye to the judgment of history, could have responded in such a way to Sadat’s initiative.	大概只有一个像贝京这样的政治“鹰派”，一个对戏剧性有着敏锐触觉的人以及非常在意历史评价的政治浪漫主义者，才会以这样一种方式回应萨达特发出的倡议。


That Begin was able to rise to the occasion had much to do with the psychological impact of Sadat’s astonishing initiative.	贝京能够及时作出应变很大程度上得益于萨达特令人震惊的倡议所带来的心理影响力。


Through his visit to Jerusalem, Sadat made more ordinary the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict.	通过他对耶路撒冷的访问，萨达特把阿拉伯与以色列冲突的性质定性为较为常见的冲突。


Sadat’s initiative transformed the conflict from a fight about Israel’s right to exist into a negotiation of interests between legitimate sovereign states.	萨达特的倡议把冲突的性质从有关以色列生存权的斗争变成了有合法主权的国家之间利益的谈判。


Here, indeed, is the central point: the need to move away from mythological, mutually exclusive rights of existence, conflicting historical narratives, and religious claims of ownership.	事实上，这正是问题的焦点所在：从凭空想象、互相认为对方没有生存权、相互抵触的历史叙述以及在宗教上均宣称拥有主权的斗争中脱离出来。


Sadly, this is where the Palestinian-Israeli tragedy remains stuck to this very day, thus making the conflict practically insoluble.	可悲的是，直到今天巴以悲剧依然深陷于这样的泥潭中，因而使冲突在实际上变得无法解决。


Through his visit to Jerusalem, Sadat shook away Israel’s siege mentality and gave psychological living space to an otherwise claustrophobic nation in the midst of a hostile Arab world.	通过他对耶路撒冷的访问，萨达特解除了以色列受包围的心理，而给这个处于充满敌意的阿拉伯世界包围中、患有幽闭恐怖症的国家以心理上的生存空间。


Peace is never a zero-sum game.	和平从来就不是一场零和博弈。


In its peace with Israel, Egypt reached its strategic objective of an alliance with the US.	通过与以色列实现和平，埃及也实现了它与美国结盟的战略目标。


But Israel was wrong to believe that Egypt could be a gateway into the Arab world.	但是以色列错误地把埃及当成了通往阿拉伯世界的跳板。


The gate to Israeli-Arab reconciliation remains where it was always been – in the hands of the Palestinians.	以色列与阿拉伯世界达成妥协的大门依然在它原来所在的地方，掌握在巴勒斯坦人的手里。


Saddam Hussein Before the Law	审判萨达姆


What is at stake in the trial of Saddam Hussein, which is set to begin on October 19?	定于10月19日开始的对萨达姆的审判有何不妥？


Coming just four days after the referendum on Iraq’s constitution and touted as a “constitutional moment” akin to the trials of Kings Charles X and Louis XVI, the proceedings are supposed to help advance Iraq’s transition from tyranny to democracy.	在伊拉克宪法全民公决之后仅4天就举行的这场审判被鼓吹为可与查理十世和路易十六的审判相提并论的“宪法时刻”。 该审判的进程据称能帮助伊拉克推进从暴政向民主的转变。


Will they?	果真会如此吗？


So far, all signs suggest that the trial is unlikely to meet its ambitious aims.	到目前为止，所有的迹象都表明这场审判不大会实现其宏大的目标。


From the outset in postwar Iraq, criminal justice resembled deracinated constitutionalism: atomistic trials, radical purges, and compromised elections.	在战后的伊拉克，刑事审判从一开始就和其无源之水般的立宪相似：原子论般的审判，激进的肃清和妥协的选举。


Most egregious was the post-invasion rush to “de-Ba’athification,” which eviscerated many of the country’s existing institutions.	最令人惊愕的是在被占领之后急切的“非社会党化”，将许多现行制度都剔除一空。


The mix of individual and collective responsibility associated with repressive regimes often creates a dilemma concerning how to deal with the old institutions.	与压制性的政权相关联的个人和集体责任往往会造成如何应对旧制度方面的困境。


But, in Iraq, flushing out the military and the police merely left the country in a domestic security vacuum.	但在伊拉克，取消军队和警察只是让这个国家陷入国内安全的真空。


By the time that mistake was recognized, the damage was done, needlessly sacrificing security.	当所犯的错误得到承认时，损害已经造成，安全被无谓地牺牲了。


Moreover, potential sources of legitimacy in Iraq’s ongoing constitutional reform, such as parliament, were also destroyed.	另外，伊拉克正在进行的宪法改革的合法性的潜在来源，比如议会，也被摧毁了。


The lack of legitimate institutions needed to rebuild the rule of law is evident in the debate over what authority and whose judgment ought to be exercised over Saddam Hussein.	关于由什么权力机构以及谁来审判萨达姆的争论充分证明了重建法制所需要的合法制度的缺失。


Should the tribunal be national or international?	特别法庭应该是国际性的还是国内的？


This question highlights the problematic relationship of international humanitarian law to the use of force.	这一问题凸现了国际人道主义法律和使用权力之间悬而未决的关系。


In the Balkans, the indictment of Slobodan Milosevic by the United Nations’ International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) provided a boost to political change in the region.	在巴尔干地区，由联合国“前南斯拉夫国际刑事法庭(ICTY)”对米洛舍维奇提起的控诉对该地区的政治改革起到了推进作用。


Regime delegitimation has become a leading function of the new permanent International Criminal Court.	剥夺政权的合法性成为新的永久性国际刑事法院的一项重要职能。


But Iraq was different.	但伊拉克却不同。


Instead of recurring to an international forum, a devastating war was declared that went beyond deposing Saddam, wreaking damage on tens of thousands of civilians, and thus confounding the message of condemnation.	有关各方对其发动了一场破坏性的战争而没有借助于国际论坛。 这场战争不止推翻了萨达姆的统治，也给成千上万的平民造成了伤害。


The origins of successor justice in the war means that the debate over its legitimacy overlaps with the broader schism over the intervention itself.	战争中继任者审判的（不同）原由意味着关于其合法性的辩论与对干涉本身更为广泛的意见不合重叠。


So far, the UN, the European Union, and most human rights groups have not cooperated with the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST), owing to their opposition to the original military intervention, as well as the IST statute’s authorization of the death penalty.	到目前为止，由于在最初的军事干预以及特别法庭宣判死刑的法律权限等方面持反对立场，联合国、欧盟和大多数的人权组织都没有与伊拉克特别法庭(IST)合作。


Ultimately, the debate over international versus national jurisdiction reflects a dichotomy that is no longer apt in contemporary political conditions, for it obscures the fact that international law is increasingly embedded within domestic law.	最后，国际与国内司法权限的争执反映了一种已不再适用于当代政治条件的两分法，因为它模糊了国际法正越来越多地被纳入国内法之中的事实。


Despite being putatively “national,” the Iraq tribunal couches the relevant offenses in terms of “crimes against humanity.”	尽管被称为“国内的”，伊拉克特别法庭还是用“反人类罪”来表述相关的罪行。


But it is only now, after the war, that successor justice is being aimed at refining and consolidating the message of delegitimation and regime change.	然而，正是到了现在，在战后，继任者审判才被设定了提炼及整合剥夺（前政权）合法性和政权变革的目标。


Despite its close links to the invasion, Saddam’s trial is expected somehow to represent an independent Iraqi judgment, thereby constituting local accountability without exacerbating tensions and destabilizing the country further.	尽管与侵略联系紧密，对萨达姆的审判还是被冀望于在一定程度上代表独立的伊拉克判断，从而在建立地方的公信力的同时又不会进一步加剧国内的紧张和不安定局势。


Can it succeed?	它能成功吗？


From the start, the IST must constitute a robust symbol of Iraqi sovereignty.	从一开始，IST就必须建立一种伊拉克主权的健全象征。


But its close association with the United States-led invasion leaves it vulnerable to the charge of “victor’s justice.”	但它与以美国主导下的侵略的密切关联，使其很容易被指责为“胜利者的审判”。


Although officially adopted in December 2003 by the Iraqi Governing Council, the IST’s statute was framed under contract to the US government and approved by L. Paul Bremer, the Coalition Provisional Authority’s Administrator.	虽然在2003年12月得到了“伊拉克管理委员会”的正式批准，但IST的章程是由美国政府按协议制定，并由伊拉克临时权力机构的执行长官L. Paul Bremer批准。


The US remains the driving force behind the IST, supplying the needed expertise.	美国仍然是IST背后的驱动力，并为其提供智力支持。


For many Iraqis, it is hard to view the IST as anything other than an expression of the occupiers’ will.	对许多伊拉克人而言，很难不把IST看作表达占领者意愿的工具。


Indeed, the IST’s close association with the US-backed establishment of a successor regime is fraught with political pitfalls.	的确，IST与美国支持下的继任者政权的紧密联系充满了政治缺陷。


Transitional criminal justice must be broad enough to reconcile a divided Iraq, and, therefore, include Shi’a and Kurdish crimes against humanity, while it apparently must also avoid embarrassing the US or its allies, particularly regarding their extensive dealings with Saddam’s regime.	过渡期的刑事审判必须要足够宽泛，以求在一个分裂的伊拉克达成和解，并进而将什叶派和库尔德人的反人类罪行也纳入其中，当然它还必须避免让美国和盟国难堪，特别是在与萨达姆政权的诸多交易方面。


But the appearance of selective or controlled justice will defeat the tribunal’s purpose.	但选择性和受控制的审判的出现，将会使特别法庭的目标无法实现。


So will the specter of illiberal trial procedures – another reason for the lack of international support for the IST.	狭隘的审判程序也是障碍—这也是IST缺少国际社会支持的另一个原因。


The original selection of judges by what was widely viewed as a wing of the occupation exposes the tribunal to allegations of bias and partiality, as have issues regarding access and transparency for defendants and others.	由被普遍认为是占领者党羽的人进行最初的法官甄选，使特别法庭被斥为带有偏见。 被告和其他人所能获得的资源和透明度也存在同样的问题。


Moreover, the IST statute says nothing about the standard of proof, which means that guilt does not clearly have to be established beyond a reasonable doubt.	另外，IST的章程中除了证据的标准外，什么也没说。 这意味着有合理的怀疑就能定罪。


While the first set of charges concerns the well-documented killings in Dujail and elsewhere in the 1980’s, Milosevic’s trial by the ICTY shows that it is far more difficult to establish “superior authority,” linking the killings to the leader.	虽然第一组指控与在1980���代有详细记录的Dujail和其他地方的屠杀有关，但 ICTY对米洛舍维奇的审判证明通过证实“高层授权”将屠杀与领导人联系起来要困难得多。


According to Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, this problem has ostensibly been “solved” by means of extracted confessions.	据伊拉克总统Jalal Talabani称，这个问题在表面上通过萃取口供的形式“解决”了。


Of course, if the IST’s aim is to evoke the possibility of show trials rather than bolstering the rule of law, Talabani is quite right: problem solved.	当然，如果IST的目标只是做一场审判秀而不是支持法制，那么Talabani完全正确：问题已经解决了。


Criminal proceedings may then be downsized to a confession of a single massacre, as subsequent trials are shelved to open the way for punishment – unlike, say, the Milosevic trial, which is now dragging into its fourth year.	刑事司法的程序则可能被缩减成对一次大屠杀的供认，因而接下来的审判都会被搁置，从而为惩处扫清道路—这和已历时四年的对米洛舍维奇的审判不同。


But rapid punishment – most likely execution – threatens to bury the full record of decades of tyranny under the apparently overriding purpose of fighting the insurgency by other means.	但快速的刑罚—极可能是死刑—在明确用其他手段对抗叛乱的当务之急的影响下，很可能会抹煞数十年暴政的完全纪录。


Saddam’s trial will thus demonstrate the limits of the law in jumpstarting regime transition.	对萨达姆的审判也因此会反映出急于实施政权交替在法律方面的局限。


An intractable dilemma of transitional justice is that societies ravaged by brutal human rights legacies often appeal to the law to shore up the legitimacy of the successor regime, only to see these salutary aims subverted by the challenges and compromises that are inherent to the transition itself.	过渡期司法的一个难以应对的困境在于：被残暴的人权遗策蹂躏过的社会通常要求法律支持继任者政权的合法性，但却往往发现这些健康的目标被过渡期本身所特有的挑战和妥协颠覆了。


Sadiq Khan’s Democratic Islam	萨迪克·汗的民主伊斯兰教


PARIS – The man of the hour in the United Kingdom, if not in Europe, is obviously Sadiq Khan – Pakistani by origin, Muslim by faith, and newly elected Mayor of London.	巴黎——英国、乃至整个欧洲当前的风云人物显然非萨迪克·汗莫属——汉原籍巴基斯坦、信奉伊斯兰教、刚刚当选伦敦市长。


There are several ways to look at Khan’s victory.	可以从若干不同的角度来看待汉的胜利。


One can repeat the litany of complaints that his Conservative opponent leveled against him, legitimately, throughout the campaign.	一是重复其保守党对手合法搜集的对其连篇累牍的投诉，类似这样的抱怨其实贯穿了整个竞选活动的始终。


There was Khan’s September 2004 meeting with Islamic radicals under the auspices of the pro-Palestinian organization Friends of Al-Aqsa. There was his 2009 interview on Iranian television, in which he compared Britain's moderate Muslims to “Uncle Toms.”	2004年9月汉曾在亲巴勒斯坦机构友人阿克萨的主持下与伊斯兰极端分子会面，并曾于2009年接受伊朗电视台的采访，并在采访中将英国温和派穆斯林比作“汤姆叔叔”。


There were also his reported contacts with unsavory characters.	此外还有传说中他与讨厌人物的接触。


One, Yasser al-Sirri, is the Egyptian author of a statement on Osama bin Laden’s “honorable death,” among other pearls.	亚西尔·瑟勒就是这一连串奇葩之一，这位埃及作家曾发表声明称本·拉登“之死非常光荣”。


Another, Sajeel Abu Ibrahim, is a jihadist militant who likely trained others at a camp in Pakistan.	他还接触过萨基尔·阿布·易卜拉欣，后者很可能是曾在巴基斯坦训练营训练恐怖分子的激进圣战者。


And Yusuf al-Qaradawi is a Qatar-based theologian and Al Jazeera preacher who is affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood’s most radical wing.	优素福·卡拉达维是卡塔尔神学家兼半岛电视台传教士，并与穆斯林兄弟会最激进的派别多有牵扯。


Another way to view Khan's election is to listen to what he has consistently said in response to accusations of closet extremism.	看待汗当选的另一种方法是倾听他如何回应私下庇护极端主义的指责。


He has explained that one does not always know in advance with whom one will share a stage.	他的解释是自己并不总是提前知道同台的会是何许人。


The interview on Iranian television was a mistake.	接受伊朗电视台的采访是一个错误。


Muslims wounded by his invocation in that interview of the subservient black slave in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s US Civil War-era novel should accept his deepest apologies.	在那次采访中因为他抛出斯托夫人有关美国南北战争小说所描写的与恭顺黑奴的类比而受到伤害的穆斯林兄弟应当接受他最深切的道歉。


As for al-Qaradawi, everyone, however bad, has the right to a legal defense, and their relationship was always that of a lawyer and his client.	至于卡拉达维，无论多坏的人都有权接受法律辩护，况且他们之间的关系仅仅限于律师和客户。


True? False?	他的话是真是假？


Is election as the first Muslim mayor of a European capital worth, if not a mass (as Henry IV said of Paris and his conversion to Roman Catholicism), then at least accommodation with the facts of life?	汗当选欧洲首都第一任穆斯林市长是否能（像亨利四世评论巴黎及其皈依罗马天主教那样）真实地反映、乃至集中地体现生活的现实？


It’s hard to know, but Khan certainly persists in saying so.	这个问题很难说清，但汗肯定不会改口。


The fact that he distances himself so emphatically from the same Islamist movement with which he has on occasion rubbed elbows, is, at worst, vice’s tribute to virtue.	他如此断然地疏远自己曾亲密接触的同样的伊斯兰运动从最坏的角度解读可能是扬恶抑善。


At best, it is a disavowal by the man he has become of the man he once was, a man who no longer exhibits any sign of complacency about his ambiguous past.	就算是从最好的角度，也不过是现在的他否定曾经的自己，显示出此人对其暧昧的过往不再表现出沾沾自喜的态度。


What is certain – and this is the third way of viewing the issue – is that Khan, while maintaining possibly dangerous contacts, simultaneously held a firm line on the principle that Islam is compatible with secular government.	可以肯定——这是看待这个问题的第三种方式——汗虽然可能仍保持着某些危险的关系，但同时他也坚持着如下的原则：即伊斯兰教可以兼容世俗政府。


For Europe, that is a necessary principle.	对欧洲而言，这一原则无疑是必要的。


Moreover, he has never wavered on the critical questions of legal and practical equality for women or about expressing his dismay at the growing number of niqabs and hijabs now seen on London’s streets – which prevent people, he notes, from speaking face to face.	此外，他从未就女性在法律和现实中地位平等等关键问题产生过任何犹豫，也从不迟疑地表达对越来越多女性在伦敦街道上披上面纱的惊愕态度——他认为这阻碍人们面对面的交流。


Likewise, Khan’s position in favor of gay marriage has earned him a fatwa for apostasy from the fearsome head imam of a Bradford mosque.	同样，汗赞成同性婚姻的立场为他招来了布拉福德清真寺恐怖的伊玛目首领所发布的一份叛教裁定书。


One might say that no less could be expected from a Labour leader with a bright future in the country of Churchill.	有人可能会说这是在丘吉尔的国度拥有光明未来的工党领袖最起码的立场。


But one must still follow through, and it must be admitted that Khan has not yielded in these matters to the facile communitarianism common on the other side of the Channel.	但他还必须坚持到底，而且我们必须承认汗从未在上述问题上像海峡另一端的国家那样对没有原则的群体主义低头。


Khan also is among those Labourites who have taken the loftiest position in the face of the wave of anti-Semitism sweeping through their party.	汗同样是面对席卷全党的反犹主义浪潮选择坚守崇高立场的工党党员之一。


A former Labour MP stigmatized the “nose” of British Jews over social networks.	一位前工党议员在社交媒体上污蔑英国犹太人的“鼻子”。


A current MP proposed to relocate Israel to the United States.	一位现任议员建议把以色列迁到美国。


The charismatic Ken Livingstone, London’s first elected mayor and one of Khan’s predecessors, compared Zionism to Nazism.	魅力四射的利文斯通是汗的前辈，曾经担任伦敦首位民选市长，但却将犹太复国主义和纳粹主义相比较。


And Jeremy Corbyn, the party’s leader, refused in a debate with Prime Minister David Cameron to disavow his “friends” in Hezbollah and Hamas.	而工党领袖杰里米·科尔宾在与首相戴维·卡梅伦的一次辩论中拒绝谴责自己在真主党和哈马斯的“朋友”。


The past few weeks have seemed like a contest to see who in Labour would go the farthest down the path of Islamo-leftism, which is, alas, a strong tendency within the European left and among Britain’s Labourites in particular.	过去几周似乎在竞相比拼工党内部谁在伊斯兰-左翼主义道路上走得最远。 唉，这在欧洲左翼已经形成了难以扭转的趋势，而且最严重的就是英国工党。


In the face of this British socialism of fools, which some portray as inoffensive support for the wretched of the earth in Palestine, Khan has had no trouble voicing strong condemnation.	面对英国的傻瓜社会主义（某些人认为这是对地球上苦难巴勒斯坦人无害的支持表现），汗在表达强烈谴责时从来就没有犹豫过。


His stance was apparent in his insistence that his first act as mayor, on Sunday, May 8, would be to honor, alongside the chief rabbi of London and Israel’s ambassador to the UK, the memory of six million Jews murdered by the Nazis.	他当选市长后坚持举办的首次活动毫无疑义地表明了自己的立场，5月8日星期日，他将携手伦敦首席拉比和以色列驻英国大使纪念被纳粹屠杀的六百万犹太人。


All of this is to say that, while we must of course remain watchful, Khan’s election can and should be seen as a clear victory of enlightened Islam against benighted, reactionary, and intolerant Islam.	所有这一切表明尽管我们当然必须保持警惕，但汗的当选可以而且应当被视作开明伊斯兰教挑战愚昧、反动和狭隘伊斯兰教的一次毫无争议的胜利。


Michel Houellebecq’s prediction in his last novel, Submission, that France would elect a president from an Islamic party in 2022 has been inverted.	米歇尔·维勒贝克在上部小说《投降》中做出的法国将在2022年从伊斯兰党派中选出一位总统的预言已经被逆转了。


What we are witnessing with the election of Khan is the submission not of democracy to Islam, but of Islam to democracy.	从汗的当选中我们看到的不是民主向伊斯兰教投降，而是伊斯兰教投降民主。


That democracy – British democracy – should be proud not only to have welcomed Islam but also to have helped it reform.	那种民主——也就是英国民主——不仅应当为敞开双臂欢迎伊斯兰教而感到骄傲，而且还在欢迎伊斯兰教的同时推动了伊斯兰教的改革。


Safeguarding Asia’s Growth	捍卫亚洲的增长


SEOUL – Emerging Asian countries should be proud of their economic resilience.	首尔—新兴亚洲国家应该为它们的经济韧性自豪。


Despite a global economy plagued by weak growth, persistently high unemployment, and heavy debt loads, the region’s emerging and developing economies grew at an average annual rate of 6.8% from 2000-2010, propping up global output and buttressing recovery efforts.	尽管全球经济受着增长疲软、失业居高不下以及债务负担沉重的困扰，2000—2010年间亚洲新兴和发展中经济体的平均年增长率仍达到了6. 8%，提振了全球产出，支持了全球经济复苏。


The region’s success has been underpinned by dynamic growth in China and India, which account for almost 60% of the continent’s total GDP in purchasing power parity terms.	亚洲地区的成功以中国和印度的增长活力为基础，两国相加占据了亚洲60%的总GDP（用购买力平价衡量）。


Furthermore, economic-policy changes and structural reforms that were enacted in the wake of the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis significantly reduced the region’s vulnerability to financial shocks over the past decade.	此外，经济政策变化和1997—98年亚洲金融危机后实行的结构性改革极大地降低了该地区过去十年中面对金融冲击的脆弱性。


But Asia cannot be complacent: financial systems remain fragile; economies are burdened with high fiscal and current-account deficits; and Asia remains too heavily dependent on North American and European export markets, increasing its vulnerability to external shocks.	经济仍背负着巨额财政和经常项目赤字的包袱； 仍然过度依赖于北美和欧洲出口市场，这使得亚洲对外部冲击相当脆弱。


Moreover, if conditions in the eurozone continue to deteriorate, Asia could be more severely affected.	此外，如果欧元区状况持续恶化，亚洲可能受到严重影响。


Already, spillover effects from trade and financial transmission channels are beginning to take their toll: China’s GDP growth rate in the second quarter of 2012 averaged 7.6%, reflecting a significant slowdown, and India’s growth rate is expected to decline to roughly 6% this year.	贸易和金融传递渠道的溢出效应已经开始显露：2012年，中国GDP增长率只有7. 6%，反映出极大的减速，而印度今年的增长率预计将跌至约6%。


China’s potentially strong domestic-demand base and ample room for policy maneuvers can help it to avoid a hard landing.	中国拥有强大的内需潜能和充足的政策空间，这有助于它避免硬着陆。


It has already aggressively loosened monetary policy, and it can employ further fiscal stimulus.	中国已经积极地放松了其货币政策，还可能进一步实施财政刺激。


But policy mismanagement and structural weaknesses in the financial sector and local governments could undermine efforts to safeguard growth.	但是政策管理失当和金融部门和地方政府的结构性弱点将削弱捍卫增长的努力。


Meanwhile, India, constrained by a high fiscal deficit and persistent inflationary pressure, has less scope for expansionary policies and faces significant challenges in pursuing credible structural reform.	与此同时，印度受困于财政赤字高企和挥之不去的通胀压力，没有多少空间可以用于扩张性政策，此外还面临实施可信结构性改革的重大挑战。


This has serious implications for the rest of Asia.	这对亚洲其余国家来说具有重大影响。


Over the last three decades, increased economic and trade integration has bolstered the region’s growth.	在过去三十年中，日渐加深的经济和贸易一体化提振了该地区的经济增长。


For example, segmented production for global supply chains has stimulated trade in intermediate goods and promoted foreign direct investment.	比如，全球供应链的细分生产刺激了中间产品的贸易，也促进了外国直接投资。


Now, however, closer economic integration means that sluggish growth in China and India will reduce job opportunities and slow the rate of poverty reduction throughout the region.	但是，如今，更紧密的经济一体化意味着中国和印度增长放缓会减少整个亚洲地区的就业机会、放缓减贫速度。


Faced with weak demand in advanced countries, Asian economies are working to rebalance their sources of growth by shifting toward domestic and regional markets.	面临着发达国家需求疲软的状况，亚洲经济体正致力于通过转向国内和地区市场实现增长资源的再平衡。


As a result, growth in intra-regional trade has outpaced overall trade growth, with intra-Asian trade now accounting for more than half of the continent’s total trade turnover.	结果，地区内贸易增长率超过了总体贸易增长率，如今，亚洲内部贸易已占亚洲贸易总额的一半以上。


But China’s established role as the assembly hub for the region’s production-sharing networks means that it is becoming a source of autonomous shocks – with a large and persistent impact on business-cycle fluctuations.	但中国在地区产品分工网络中装配中心的角色意味着它正在成为自发冲击之源，对商业周期波动具有持久的大影响。


So, what policies must emerging Asian economies pursue to reduce their vulnerability to regional and global volatility?	那么，亚洲新兴经济体应该采用什么政策减少它们对地区和全球波动的脆弱性？


The most immediate challenge is to safeguard the financial system’s stability against external shocks.	最紧迫的挑战是捍卫金融系统抵御外部冲击的稳定性。


Policy reform should aim to promote market transparency, improve risk management, and strengthen effective supervision and regulations.	政策改革应该将目标定在增进市场透明度、改善风险管理、强化有效监督和监管上。


Second, emerging countries must develop more effective macroeconomic frameworks, including better macro-prudential regulation and a broader monetary-policy framework that takes into account asset prices and financial-market stability.	其次，新兴国家必须发展出更有效的宏观经济框架，包括更好的宏观审慎监管以及考虑资产价格和金融市场稳定性的货币政策框架。


A wide range of official measures could be employed to support domestic demand while protecting medium-term fiscal sustainability.	多种正式措施都可以用于支持内需、同时保护中期财政稳定性。


And, to address volatile capital flows, countries should increase exchange-rate flexibility, maintain adequate international reserves, and implement carefully designed capital controls.	此外，为了解决资本流剧烈波动的问题，各国应该增加汇率弹性，保持充足的国际储备，并实施精心设计的资本管制。


Third, emerging economies must further rebalance their sources of growth.	第三，新兴经济体必须进一步重新平衡其资源和增长。


Reducing dependence on external demand – for example, by promoting private-sector investment and encouraging household expenditure – is crucial.	降低对外部需求的依赖——比如，通过刺激私人部门投资和鼓励家庭支出——是一大关键。


Supply-side policies that promote small and medium-size enterprises and service industries accommodating domestic demand are also critical to ensuring more inclusive and sustainable growth.	支持中小企业、帮助产业适应内需的供给面政策对于确保包容性和可持续增长也很重要。


Finally, enhanced regional and global financial cooperation – including closer policy coordination at the G-20 and International Monetary Fund – would help countries to respond more effectively to shocks and crises.	最后，增强地区和全球金融合作——包括G20和IMF更紧密的政策协调——将有助于各国更有效地应对冲击和危机。


A key regional initiative is the $240 billion multilateral reserve pool of the ASEAN+3 (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus China, Japan, and South Korea), which can provide short-term liquidity to members when needed.	东盟+3（中国、日本和韩国）共同出资建立的2400亿美元多边储备资金池便是一项关键性的地区计划，可以为有需要的成员国提供短期流动性。


Institutional arrangements in regional liquidity provision and economic surveillance must be enhanced.	地区流动性供应和经济监督的制度性安排必须得到增强。


Asians need not be pessimistic; the perfect storm of a hard landing in China, a double-dip recession in the United States, and a collapse of the eurozone is unlikely.	亚洲人不必感到悲观； 中国硬着陆、美国二次探底和欧元区解体的完美风暴不可能发生。


But they cannot rule out the downside risk of a synchronized global downturn.	但这并不意味着不可能发生全球同步衰退。


Only with preemptive policies designed to manage risk better can emerging Asian countries protect economic growth from the threat of current and future crises.	只有未雨绸缪的改善风险管理的政策才能让亚洲国家保护其经济增长，不致于受到当前和未来危机的威胁。


The Trouble With Schrems	施雷姆斯的麻烦


PARIS – In October 2015, a court case launched by Max Schrems, a 28-year-old Austrian privacy activist and graduate student at the University of Vienna, led to the annulment of the so-called Safe Harbor agreement that governs how United States firms comply with the European Union’s privacy laws.	巴黎—2015年10月，28岁的奥地利隐私维权活动家、维也纳大学研究生马克斯·施雷姆斯（Max Schrems）提起的诉讼给所谓的安全港（Safe Harbor）协议画上了句号。 安全港协议约束美国企业遵守欧盟隐私法。


The decision, by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), threw into legal uncertainty the collection, handling, transfer, and storage of user data by about 4,500 US companies.	欧洲法院（ECJ）的这一裁决给大约4,500家美国公司的数据收集、处理、传输和储存带来了法律不确定性。


The ruling led many in Europe to draw comparisons between Schrems and Edward Snowden, the intelligence contractor who leaked classified information detailing America’s global surveillance programs.	这一裁决让很多欧洲人将施雷姆斯和爱德华·斯诺登（Edward Snowden）相提并论。 斯诺登是一位美国情报承包商，他将关于美国全球监控计划的保密信息泄露给公众。


And, in fact, Schrems’s lawsuit was heavily informed by Snowden’s disclosures, which included details of a US National Security Agency program whereby US companies allegedly handed over to the NSA personal information stored on their computer systems.	事实上，施雷姆斯的官司的许多信息来自斯诺登的披露，其中包括美国国家安全局（NSA）一个计划的细节。 美国公司被控根据该计划向NSA提供储存在公司计算机系统中的个人信息。


According to the ECJ’s ruling, the cooperation between US companies and the country’s intelligence agencies violates the right to privacy and data protection guaranteed by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.	根据ECJ的裁决，美国公司与美国情报机构之间的这一合作违反了欧盟基本权利宪章（EU Charter of Fundamental Rights）关于隐私权利和数据保护的规定。


The court’s message was clear: Unless the US government modified the way it gathers intelligence, by restricting access to personal data and adopting a case-by-case approach to its investigations, it would be impossible for consumer information to be transferred from the EU to the US through the Safe Harbor framework.	ECJ释放出明确的信号：除非美国政府修改收集情报的方式，限制对个人数据的获取并采取具体问题具体分析的调查方针，否则消费者信息就不允许通过安全港框架从欧盟传输给美国。


On February 2, the US and Europe struck a new agreement – the Privacy Shield – to satisfy the court’s stipulations, including “clear limitations, safeguards, and oversight mechanisms” on the use of personal data from Europe by law enforcement and national security officials.	2月2日，美国和欧洲达成新协议——隐私盾（Privacy Shield）——以满足法庭的要求，包括关于执法和国家安全官员使用得自欧洲的个人数据的“明确的限制、安全和监督机制”。


In addition, EU citizens will be given the right to bring civil action related to the protection of their personal data in the US against a US government agency.	此外，欧洲公民将获得就在美国的个人数据保护针对美国政府机构提出民事诉讼的权利。


The Privacy Shield, which the EU’s 28 member states must formally approve, still needs to be endorsed by an “adequacy decision” of the EU Commission, probably in April.	隐私盾必须通过欧盟28个成员国的正式批准，此外还需要获得欧盟委员会“充分决定”（adequacy decision，可能会在4月作出）的支持。


In the meantime, it will be reviewed by the Article 29 Working Party, comprising representatives of member states’ data-protection authorities.	与此同时，该协议将受到第29条工作组（Article 29 Working Party，由成员国数据保护部门的代表组成）的审核。


Until the Privacy Shield is approved, the Article 29 Working Party requests that US companies in Europe use alternative instruments – “Standard Contractual Clauses” and “Binding Corporate Rules” – to transfer their data to the US, so as to avoid being pursued by national data protection regulators in Europe.	在隐私盾获得批准前，第29条工作组将要求在欧洲的美国公司使用其他工具——“标准合同条款”和“有法律约束力的公司规则”——将数据传输到美国，以避免受到欧洲国家数据保护监管机构的追查。


It is unsurprising that a deal was reached.	毫不奇怪会达成这样的协议。


In the wake of the attacks in Paris in November, most EU citizens have placed the highest priority on the fight against Islamic terrorism.	11月巴黎袭击发生后，大部分欧洲公民将打击伊斯兰教恐怖主义列为头等大事。


Governments also want to improve the effectiveness of their intelligence gathering – and isolating themselves from the US would be no way to achieve that.	政府也希望改善情报收集的效率——而自绝于美国绝不是实现这一目标的好办法。


The intense pressure to expand intelligence agencies’ capabilities is evident in the pressure that national governments have put on the European Parliament to adopt legislation allowing for the collection of airline passenger data.	彰显扩大情报机构能力的巨大压力的一个现象是国家政府向欧洲议会施压，要求采取允许收集航空乘客数据的立法。


The directive, which would oblige airlines to provide governments with the names, addresses, phone numbers, credit card details, and travel itineraries of people traveling to and from airports in the EU, is expected to be voted on early this year.	这一法令要求航空公司向政府提供进出欧盟机场的旅客的姓名、地址、电话号码、信用卡详细内容和旅程信息。 预计该法令将在今年早些时候投票表决。


Despite the Privacy Shield agreement, Schrems’s lawsuit will likely continue to reverberate across the EU.	尽管形成了隐私盾协议，但施雷姆斯的官司仍有可能继续在整个欧盟引起回响。


The court’s ruling urges data-protection authorities to ensure that countries to which European citizens’ data are transferred comply with European legislation, and to suspend data transfers to those that don’t.	法庭判决敦促数据保护部门确保接收欧盟公民数据传输的国家遵守欧盟立法，并停止向不遵守欧盟立法的国家传输数据。


As a consequence, in addition to its implications for companies and US intelligence gathering, the ECJ’s decision may call into question the behavior of the intelligence agencies of the EU member states.	因此，除了对公司和美国情报收集的影响，ECJ的这一裁决还给欧盟成员国的情报机构的行为带来了问题。


Indeed, even though the EU Treaty dictates that each member state is solely responsible for its own national security, the way national intelligence agencies use personal data can be expected to come under special scrutiny.	事实上，尽管欧盟条约规定每个成员国都需要独力负责自身国家安全，但国家情报机构使用个人数据的方法可能会遭到特别检查。


Moreover, the application of the court’s jurisprudence to the transfer of data to third-party countries like China, Russia, or India could well cause diplomatic incidents.	此外，将该裁决的法理应用到向第三方国家（如中国、俄罗斯或印度）传输数据的情况可能引起外交事故。


It is unlikely that EU regulators have heard the last from Schrems, who has already filed several claims similar to the one that overturned the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles.	欧盟监管者不可能听从施雷姆斯。 施雷姆斯已经提出了多项类似于推翻了安全港隐私原则的诉讼的指控。


He has suggested a radical solution that would become a condition of doing business in the EU: All data relating to Europeans, he and others argue, must be hosted on EU-based servers.	他提出了一个激进方案，该方案可能成为在欧盟营商的条件：所有与欧洲人相关的数据，他和其他一些人指出，必须托管于在欧盟的服务器上。


If that proposal gains traction, the implications could be far-reaching; indeed, it could prohibit the use of the Internet, with its myriad services valued at hundreds of billions of euros, in its current form.	如果这一提案获得支持，影响可能非常深远； 事实上，它可能导致禁止使用当前形式下的互联网，及其价值数千亿欧元的各种服务。


Can Rouhani Deliver?	鲁哈尼能带来谈判吗？


NEW YORK – As world powers meet in Geneva to begin nuclear talks with Iran, the world awaits the follow-up to the phone call between Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and US President Barack Obama after Rouhani’s visit to the United Nations General Assembly last month.	纽约—在世界各个大国赴日内瓦与伊朗展开核谈判之际，世界翘首等待着伊朗总统鲁哈尼和美国总统奥巴马在鲁哈尼上个月访问联合国大会后的后续通话。


That brief conversation – the first between the two countries’ presidents since 1979 – recalls the last attempt to revive bilateral diplomacy, undertaken 12 years ago by Iran’s then-President Mohammad Khatami.	联大上的简短对话——这是1979年以来两国总统的首次对话——让人想起了上一次恢复双边外交关系的努力。 那是在12年前，伊朗总统是哈塔米。


In both episodes, a missing handshake symbolized the countries’ persistent rift.	不论是这一次还是上一次，美国和伊朗都没有握手，这说明了双方的裂痕之深。


Back then, Khatami and Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi “went shopping,” rather than attend a cultural event at the Asia Society and risk crossing paths – and shaking hands – with US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.	12年前，哈塔米和外交部长哈拉齐是“前去购物”而不是出席亚洲协会的一次文化活动，以避免与美国国务卿奥尔布赖特照面甚至握手。


This time, despite Iran’s avoidance of a presidential handshake at the UN, Rouhani delivered a major address at the Asia Society asserting that his government would pursue policies of “moderation and common sense” and would be willing to work with the West on resolving questions about its nuclear program.	今次，尽管伊朗仍避免在联合国与美国总统握手，但鲁哈尼在亚洲协会做了主旨演讲，声称他的政府将追求“温和和常识”的政策，愿意与西方合作解决伊朗核计划问题。


Moreover, handshakes were exchanged by the two countries’ foreign ministers, when John Kerry and Javad Zarif, joined by the European Union’s top diplomat, Catherine Ashton, held a formal meeting to organize the upcoming nuclear negotiations in Geneva.	此外，两国外交部长已经握了手。 约翰·克里、贾瓦德·扎里夫以及欧盟高级外交官凯瑟琳·阿什顿举行了一次会晤讨论如何组织即将到来的日内瓦核谈判。


Kerry and Zarif shook hands again when the two met separately.	此外，克里和扎里夫在单独会晤时再次握了手。


So what changed?	那么，局面发生了什么变化？


Back then, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, had forbidden Khatami to speak with the Americans.	当时，伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊禁止哈塔米与美国人讲话。


Rouhani, by contrast, proceeded with Khamenei’s blessing.	相反，鲁哈尼得到了哈梅内伊的祝福。


Khamenei, concerned with repairing the damage caused by his acceptance of the fraudulent reelection in 2009 of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was willing to accept the victory in June of Rouhani, a conservative reformist whom he trusted.	哈梅内伊意图修复他接受2009年前总统内贾德不干净的连任所造成的污点，愿意接受6月份鲁哈尼的胜利。 鲁哈尼是他所信任的保守改革派。


He must have calculated that the new president would have to ameliorate the consequences of Ahmadinejad’s foreign-policy freelancing and economic mismanagement, which has had as much to do with the collapse of the Iranian economy as US-led international sanctions.	他一定预料到了新总统必须改善内贾德外交政策放任恣睢和经济治理不善所造成的后果。 伊朗经济之所以崩溃，内贾德的内政外交的“功劳”不下于美国领导的国际制裁。


There had been earlier attempts to improve relations with the Americans.	此前已有改善与美国关系的努力。


Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who became Iran’s president after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s death in 1989, sought such an outcome.	1989年霍梅尼去世后成为伊朗总统的拉夫桑贾尼便追求过这一结果。


In 1995, he sent clear signals of a desire to restore diplomatic relations.	1995年，他释放出明确信号意图重建外交关系。


President Bill Clinton’s administration ignored the overtures and allowed the US Congress to take the initiative.	美国总统克林顿政府无视拉夫桑贾尼的示好，让美国国会采取行动。


Congress responded by unanimously adopting the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996.	国会的反应是一致通过了1996年伊朗和利比亚制裁法案。


Rafsanjani was in a much stronger position vis-à-vis Khamenei, who had just been selected to succeed Khomeini as Supreme Leader, than any of Iran’s subsequent presidents.	在与哈梅内伊的相对地位上，拉夫桑贾尼比其后的所有总统都更加强势，因为当时哈梅内伊刚刚被选为最高领袖霍梅尼的继任者。


His trouble was with powerful opponents in Iran’s security apparatus, who sabotaged his pragmatic foreign-policy initiatives by staging terrorist attacks in France, Germany, and Argentina.	拉夫桑贾尼的麻烦对付伊朗安全部队中有权有势的反对者，他们通过在法国、德国和阿根廷组织恐怖袭击暗中破坏他的务实外交政策。


Khatami’s proposal for a “dialogue among civilizations” in 2000 was an attempt to open a crack in what he described as the wall of mistrust that continued to separate Iran and the US.	哈塔米2000年提出的“文明间对话”方案是在他所谓的持续分离伊朗和美国的不信任之墙上凿开一条缝隙的尝试。


It was only in the last year of his second term that Clinton made a serious effort to respond to Khatami.	在他第二个任期的最后一年，克林顿才认真地回应了了哈塔米。


But Khatami lacked the support of Khamenei, who firmly opposed his reforms.	但哈塔米没有哈梅内伊的支持，后者坚决反对前者的改革。


The aggressive rhetoric of Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, who called Iran part of an “axis of evil” prior to the US-led invasion of Iraq, made Khamenei apprehensive, and he endorsed an initiative for a dialogue with the Americans in 2003.	克林顿的继任者小布什言语咄咄逼人，在美国领导的入侵伊拉克作战前夕，小布什称伊朗是“邪恶轴心”的一部分，这让哈梅内伊十分不安，后者支持了2003年与美国的对话计划。


The Bush administration, in thrall to the idea of regime change, ignored this initiative and rejected the “Big Deal” on nuclear energy negotiated with the EU-3 in Paris in November 2004 by Rouhani, who was then Khamenei’s representative and Chairman of Iran’s National Security Council.	眼中只有颠覆政权的小布什政府无视这一计划，也拒绝了时任哈梅内伊代表和伊朗国家安全委员会主席的鲁哈尼提出的2004年11月与欧盟-3在巴黎开展核能“大交易”（Big Deal）谈判的建议。


The formal rejection of the Iran-EU nuclear agreement in February 2005 was an unintended gift to Iran’s hardliners, led by Ahmadinejad.	2005年2月正是拒绝伊朗-欧盟和协定无意中成为以内贾德为首的伊朗强硬派的福音。


The return of hardliners after the ascendancy of moderates is a little-understood but fairly typical feature of twentieth-century revolutions.	在温和派占绝对优势的情况下回归强硬路线，这令人难以理解，但乃是二十世纪革命的典型特征。


Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005 was a throwback to the populism of Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution and his cult of revolutionary martyrs.	内贾德在2005年的当选恢复了霍梅尼的伊斯兰共和国的民粹主义以及对革命烈士的崇拜。


It went hand in hand with an aggressive foreign policy and a determined nuclear strategy of uranium enrichment that repeatedly frustrated EU negotiators and forced world leaders to fall into line behind America’s crippling sanctions regime.	随之而来的激进的外交政策和浓缩铀核战略决心，后者一再羞辱欧盟��判者，迫使全球领导人集合在美国周围采取严厉制裁措施。


There can be no doubt that before coming to the US, Iran’s new president studied Obama’s letter to Khamenei, who promised “heroic flexibility” in negotiations.	毫无疑问，在来到美国之前，伊朗新总统研究过奥巴马致哈梅内伊的信，后者许诺在谈判中可以行使“英勇的灵活性”。


With Khamenei’s support, Rouhani will be able to rein in recalcitrant forces in Iran’s power structure in a way that his pragmatic predecessors, Rafsanjani and Khatami, could not.	有了哈梅内伊的支持，鲁哈尼能够以他的务实派前任拉夫桑贾尼和哈塔米无法做到的方式驾驭伊朗权力格局中的顽固派。


More than any Iranian president since 1979, Rouhani can deliver his part of the bargain – that is, if and when a bargain is struck.	自1979年以来，没有哪位伊朗总统能够像鲁哈尼那样提出谈判条件——我的意思是，能够决定是否以及何时提出谈判条件。


Remaking Iran	重塑伊朗


TEHRAN – Iranian President Hassan Rouhani recently marked the end of his first year in office not only with smiles, but also with further evidence of his efforts at domestic reform and geostrategic reorientation.	德黑兰—伊朗总统鲁哈尼任期第一年结束了，这一年不光令人满意，也表露出进一步实施国内改革和地缘战略改变的迹象。


In Iran’s case, these two imperatives have long gone hand in hand.	在伊朗，这两大当务之急长期以来一直是齐头并进的。


Rouhani now says that Iran would be willing to work with the United States in Iraq.	如今，鲁哈尼说，伊朗愿意与美国在伊拉克进行合作。


The dire threat to both Iranian and US interests posed by the Islamic State (formerly the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) has, evidently, brought the two countries closer together.	伊斯兰国（即前伊拉克和叙利亚伊斯兰国）给伊朗和美国利益都造成了巨大威胁，显然这是让两国走的更近的原因。


In the days since the anniversary of Rouhani’s election, Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, overcame his earlier reservations and expressed optimism about reaching an international deal on his country’s nuclear program by the original deadline of July 20.	自鲁哈尼当选一周年以来，伊朗外交部长扎里夫（Mohammad Javad Zarif）抛弃了此前的保留意见，表示对在7月20日原定期限前达成关于伊朗核计划的国际协议感到乐观。


If rapprochement with the West can be achieved, the removal of the international sanctions stemming from the nuclear program would give a tremendous boost to Rouhani’s economic policy.	若能与西方重建友好关系，因核计划而遭受的国际制裁有望取消，这将诶鲁哈尼的经济政策带来巨大的提振。


And it is here that Rouhani has invested much of his energy and political capital.	正因如此，鲁哈尼在这方面投入了巨大的能量和政治资本。


Coming into office, Rouhani had a clear priority: fix an economy devastated by eight years of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s demagogic mismanagement.	鲁哈尼是带着明确的当务之急上台的：修复被前总统内贾德蛊惑人心的八年乱政摧毁的经济。


He replaced Ahmadinejad’s incompetent thugs with a reasonably qualified cabinet and capable administrators, and has embarked on an ambitious program of economic development, expanded health care, and environmental protection.	他用能力合适的内阁和能做事的官员替换了内贾德的无能暴徒，并提出了一个雄心勃勃的经济发展、扩大医疗和环境保护计划。


Though Rouhani has made little headway combating rampant inflation, small business and the entrepreneurial middle class seem to be thriving.	尽管鲁哈尼在治理肆虐的通胀方面收效甚微，但小企业和创业中产阶级表现出蒸蒸日上之势。


In early June, I found a recently opened complex of expensive restaurants opposite the new luxury Grand Hotel in Shiraz packed with affluent customers.	6月初，我看到在设拉子（Shiraz）新开张的豪华的大饭店（Grand Hotel）对面开出几家高尚餐馆，顾客盈门。


Rouhani is vigorously cultivating economic ties with Gulf states, including Kuwait, whose ruler he entertained in Tehran in early June before leaving on an official visit to Turkey, where he signed ten deals aimed at doubling bilateral trade, to $30 billion, in 2015.	鲁哈尼大力培养与海湾国家的经济关系，6月初正式出访土耳其前他在德黑兰款待了科威特领导人，而在土耳其之行中，他签署了十项协议，目标到2015年让双边贸易额翻一番，达到300亿美元。


On the environmental front, Rouhani is also busy undoing his predecessor’s damage.	在环境方面，鲁哈尼也在为弥补前任留下的烂摊子奔走。


Tehran’s air pollution, widely blamed by those with respiratory illness on low-octane “Ahmadinejad gasoline,” has visibly declined with the introduction of high-octane fuel and other restrictions.	许多罹患呼吸系统疾病的人指责低辛烷值“内贾德汽油”导致德黑兰空气污染严重，鲁哈尼引入了高辛烷值燃料和其他限制，让空气污染得到了显著改善。


Last but not least, Rouhani has launched his national health-insurance program, and ordered state hospitals, which dominate the health sector, to limit patients’ copayments for all medical expenses to 10%.	最后，鲁哈尼还实施了他的全国健康保险计划，要求国立医院——伊朗医疗部门的主要组成部分——将患者总自费比例控制在10%以内。


Rouhani has made it clear that he wants to pay for the new health care by phasing out the monthly state stipends paid to more than seventy-four million registered citizens, which Ahmadinejad offered when he eliminated a wide range of subsidies.	鲁哈尼明确指出，他想通过取消4,700万注册公民的月度津贴，以此为新医疗保险提供资金。 注册公民月度津贴是内贾德在取消大量补贴后采取的措施。


The strongest factor working in Rouhani’s favor is the support of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the country’s Supreme Leader, for the president’s domestic policies – just as he has fully backed the nuclear negotiations.	对鲁哈尼最有利的因素是伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊对其国内政策的支持——一如他对核谈判的全力支持。


Unlike Ahmadinejad’s reformist predecessor, Mohammad Khatami, who acted more like the leader of the loyal opposition than head of the executive, Rouhani has worked closely with Khamenei.	与内贾德的改革派前任哈塔米不同，鲁哈尼与哈梅内伊合作紧密，而哈塔米看起来更像是反对派领袖，而不是执政者。


In his speech to commemorate the 25th anniversary of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s death on June 4, Khamenei fully appropriated the discourse of the dissident clerics aligned with Khatami.	在6月4日霍梅尼逝世25周年纪念讲话中，哈梅内伊毫无保留地赞颂了与哈塔米同声共气的持异见牧师。


Thus, he described the regime instituted by Khomeini as a religious democracy in which all high state offices, including his own, derive their legitimacy from the will of the people as expressed in elections.	他称哈塔米所构建的体制为宗教民主，所有高等国家机关，包括他本人，都从人民通过选举所表达的意愿中获得合法性。


But Rouhani needs more than Khamenei’s backing.	但鲁哈尼需要的不止是哈梅内伊的支持。


Khamenei is 74 and has health problems.	哈梅内伊已经74岁，并且健康堪忧。


With Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, the 83-year-old chairman of the Council of Experts (the body of clerics that elects the supreme leader) gravely ill, Ghorbanali Dorri-Najafabadi, an influential member and former intelligence and security minister, has suggested that the Council should proceed to elect Khamenei’s successor now.	83岁专家委员会（选举最高领袖的牧师机构）坎尼（Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani）已病入膏肓，影响力极大的选举委员会成员、前情报和安全部长纳贾法巴迪（Ghorbanali Dorri-Najafabadi）表示，现在委员会应该开始遴选哈梅内伊的继任者了。


Clearly, the clerical elite is concerned about the future of its leadership after Khamenei.	显然，宗教精英已开始关注哈梅内伊身后的领导事宜。


Should a succession process begin soon, it would significantly constrain Rouhani’s room for maneuver.	如果接班程序不久后就开始，有可能严重制约鲁哈尼的行动空间。


Rouhani’s relations with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and other security forces are of more immediate concern.	鲁哈尼与伊朗革命卫队（Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps，IRGC）和其他安全部队的关系是更紧迫的问题。


Last month’s unceremonious killing of a billionaire businessman detained by security forces on corruption charges seemed to reflect the tacit division of power between the president and Iran’s security apparatus.	上个月，某被安全部队以腐败罪名拘捕的亿万富翁商人横遭杀害，这或许反映了总统与伊朗安全当局之间沉默的分歧。


Nonetheless, tension is simmering beneath the surface.	尽管如此，紧张局面正在发酵。


Rouhani seems to have halted the expansion of the IRGC’s economic empire.	鲁哈尼似乎中止了IRGC经济帝国的扩张。


The IRGC’s commander, General Mohammad Ali Jafari, has publicly expressed his hostility to Rouhani’s administration, while General Hassan Firouzabadi, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, has countered by expressing his support for the president.	IRGC总司令贾法里将军（Mohammad Ali Jafari）公开表示对鲁哈尼政府的敌意，而武装部队参谋总长菲罗扎巴迪将军（Hassan Firouzabadi）则针锋相对表示支持总统。


It is in Iraq, however, that Iran faces its most complicated mix of challenge and opportunity.	但是，伊朗所面临的最复杂的挑战和机遇在于伊拉克。


Determined to prevent the disintegration of the country, Iran has provided military and political support to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government.	伊朗决心阻止伊拉克分崩离析，为伊拉克总理马利基政府提供军事和政治支持。


This appears to align Iranian and American policies, with both determined to counter the gains of radical Islamist forces in Iraq and Syria.	这似乎让伊朗和美国政策站在同一条阵线上，两国都决心阻止极端伊斯兰武装在伊拉克和叙利亚的扩张。


Rouhani’s circle is fully prepared to address this crisis by talking to the US.	鲁哈尼的阵营已经完全做好了与美国协商解决这场危机的准备。


After a year in power, Rouhani’s program of economic development, environmental cleanup, and improved health care is proceeding smoothly and quietly.	掌权一年以来，鲁哈尼的经济发展、环境清洁和医疗改善计划正在平稳而平静地进行。


But, given the uncertainty of the domestic and international political context, there are no guarantees of success.	但是，由于国内外政治环境的不确定性意味着其成功还远未板上钉钉。


Much depends on whether a nuclear deal with the international community is achieved, and the likelihood of that outcome has unexpectedly increased, owing to the common interest of Iran and the US in coping with the collapse of Iraq.	鲁哈尼能否成功在很大程度上取决于是否能与国际社会达成核协议，而出现这一结果的可能性出人意料地大幅增加了，因为伊朗和美国在阻止伊拉克崩溃的问题上存在共同利益。


Bangladesh’s Fundamentalist Challenge	孟加拉国的原教旨主义挑战


NEW DELHI – In February, while returning from a book fair at Dhaka University, Avijit Roy, a Bangladeshi-American blogger known for his atheism, and his wife were dragged from their rickshaw and hacked with machetes.	新德里—2月，孟加拉裔美国人、著名的无神论博客主阿维吉特·罗伊（Avijit Roy）在达卡大学书展回家途中与妻子一起被拉下乘坐的人力车并遭遇大刀砍杀。


The book fair, held annually to commemorate the 1952 protests that culminated in the Pakistani military opening fire on students at the university, is a typically Bengali response to violence.	此次书展是为了纪念最终导致巴基斯坦军方朝达卡大学学生开火的1952年示威而举办的一年一度的活动，也是典型的孟加拉人应对暴力的方式。


To turn the Nazi leader Hermann Göring’s notorious barb on its head, when Bengalis hear the word “gun,” they reach for their culture.	当孟加拉人听到“枪”这个字时，他们反纳粹头子戈林臭名昭著的“名言”而行之，去寻找他们的文化。


But Roy’s brutal murder (his wife was maimed, but survived) – together with the fatal stabbing of another atheist blogger, Washiqur Rahman, barely a month later – exposes another force at work in Bangladesh, one that is subverting the country’s tradition of secularism and intellectual discourse.	但罗伊的惨死（她的妻子活了下来，但也已致残）——以及一个月后另一位无神论博客主瓦申科·拉曼（Washiqur Rahman）遇刺身亡——暴露了左右孟加拉国的另一股力量，这股力量正在颠覆孟加拉国的世俗和精英话语传统。


That force is Salafist Islamic fundamentalism.	它就是沙拉菲派伊斯兰原教旨主义。


The change in Bangladesh is stark.	孟加拉国的变化是惊人的。


The irreverent secularism and thoughtful inquiry reflected in the works of Roy and Washiqur have long been a hallmark of Bengali writing.	长久以来，罗伊和瓦申科作品中的玩世不恭的世俗主义和深邃研究一直是孟加拉语写作中的一大标志。


A generation ago, their views would have been considered perfectly acceptable, if not mainstream, in the vibrant intellectual culture of Bengal (the Western portion of which is the Indian state of West Bengal).	一代人之前，他们的观点应该是完全可以接受的，即使主流未必如此，生气勃勃的孟加拉（以及印度西孟加拉西部的）知识分子文化也必然可以接受。


That is no longer true.	如今已不再如此。


Backed by lavish financing from abroad, Salafist fundamentalism – an intolerant version of Islam at odds with the more moderate Sufi-influenced variant that prevailed in India for centuries – has been spreading across Bangladesh in recent years.	受国外金主的慷慨支持，近几年来沙拉菲派原教旨主义——一个偏隘的伊斯兰教流派，与几百年来在印度大量存在的更温和的苏菲派变体大相径庭——正在孟加拉国蔓延。


While Bengal’s long secular tradition, which drove its efforts to break away from Pakistan, is still alive and well, the corrosive impact of the radical Islamists – who use force to silence those with whom they disagree – is undeniable.	尽管孟加拉国有着长期世俗传统——正是一传统推动孟加拉国从巴基斯坦分离——依然兴旺，但极端伊斯兰教徒的侵蚀作用——他们使用暴力让与他们思想不同的人闭嘴——不容小觑。


Roy and Washiqur are far from the first Bengali intellectuals to face the Islamists’ particular brand of censorship.	罗伊和瓦申科远非第一批面对伊斯兰教特色审查的知识分子。


The writer Humayun Azad was severely injured in an attack at the annual book fair in 2004.	作家胡马云·阿扎德（Humayun Azad）在2004年的年度书展上遇袭，严重受损伤。


(He survived, but died later that year in Germany.)	（他活了下来，但在当年晚些时候死于德国。


Last year, the atheist blogger Ahmed Rajib Haider was, like Roy, hacked to death in Dhaka.	）去年，无神论博客主艾哈迈德·拉吉卜·海德（Ahmed Rajib Haider）与罗伊一样在达卡遇袭身亡。


Why engage in theoretical debates with your ideological opponents, the Islamists are saying, when one can simply shut them up for good?	伊斯兰教徒说，当闭嘴就能万事大吉的时候，你为何还要和你的意识形态对手作理论之争？


Many Bangladeshi intellectuals have seen the writing on the wall and fled the country, sacrificing daily contact with their rich cultural heritage for the sake of self-preservation.	许多孟加拉知识分子看到了不详的征兆，逃离了孟加拉国，为了自保不得不牺牲与他们丰富的文化遗产的日常联系。


The novelist Taslima Nasrin went into exile in 1994 to escape death threats from Islamist radicals; she now lives in Delhi.	小说家塔斯利马·纳斯林（Taslima Nasrin）1994年因为伊斯兰极端教徒的死亡威胁而流亡，目前她生活在德里。


Daud Haider, a journalist and poet, languishes in Berlin.	记者兼诗人达乌德·海德（Daud Haider）躲在柏林，惶惶不可终日。


Public intellectuals are not the only people in danger.	公共知识分子并非唯一的高危人群。


Ordinary secular Muslims who turn to atheism are more vulnerable to charges of apostasy and, worse, blasphemy.	转为无神论者的普通世俗穆斯林更容易受控判教，更严重者还会受控渎神。


In the old days, such charges might have attracted a fatwa or two and, at worst, social ostracism.	过去，这些指控可能会招致一两次伊斯兰教领袖裁决（fatwa），最糟糕无非是遭到社会排斥。


Today, the threats – say, being murdered in cold blood on a crowded street – are more viscerally compelling.	如今，他们受到的威胁要严重得多，比如在闹市区被残忍谋杀。


For Muslim-majority Bangladesh, this struggle within Islam amounts to a battle for the soul of the country.	对穆斯林占多数的孟加拉国来说，这场伊斯兰教的内斗已经成为国家灵魂的斗争。


But it is not an entirely new battle.	但这并非全新的斗争。


Bangladesh has long faced the claim that, in accordance with the logic of the 1947 Partition of India, which produced what was then East Pakistan, it should be more Islamic.	长期以来，孟加拉国一直面临着一种观点，近，根据1947年从印度脱离、形成当时的东巴基斯坦的逻辑，它应该更加“伊斯兰”。


Others, opposing this claim, insist that the country must live up to the legacy of its 1971 secession from Pakistan, in a revolution that proclaimed Islam insufficient grounds for nationhood and asserted the primacy of Bangladesh’s secular culture and Bengali language over its allegiance to Islamabad.	其他反对这一观点的人坚持认为孟加拉国应该按照1971年从巴基斯坦脱离的逻辑存在。 脱离巴基斯坦的革命宣告伊斯兰教不足以作为立国之际，孟加拉世俗文化和孟加拉语比对伊斯兰堡的忠心更加重要。


This conflict is also reflected in the country’s often bitterly divisive politics.	这一冲突还反映在孟加拉国常常出现的痛苦的政治分裂中。


Each camp has taken its turn controlling the government, under two formidable female leaders: the Awami League’s Sheikh Hasina Wazed, the current prime minister, and her two-term predecessor, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s Begum Khaleda Zia.	每个阵营在两位可怕的女领袖的领导下轮流控制过政府：现任总理、人民联盟（Awami League）的谢赫·哈西娜·瓦吉德（Sheikh Hasina Wazed）以及在她之前连任两届的孟加拉国民党（Bangladesh Nationalist Party）的比格姆·卡勒达·齐亚（Begum Khaleda Zia）。


Though the secularists are currently in power, Zia retains wide support, including among the Islamists.	尽管目前掌权的是世俗派，但齐亚仍拥有广泛的支持，包括伊斯兰教徒的支持。


Her party boycotted the last election, and has provoked political violence that has claimed more than 100 lives this year and left hundreds more injured.	她的政党抵制了上一次选举，并煽动政治暴力，在今年已造成100多人死亡、数百人受伤。


The recent killings have inflamed public opinion, sparking mass demonstrations to demand justice for the victims and more effective government protection of secularist writers.	最近的谋杀行为引起了轩然大波，群众举行示威为受害者寻求正义，要求政府更有效地保护世俗作家。


HT Imam, a senior adviser to Hasina, squarely challenged the police for their inaction on Roy’s murder, telling top police officers to “identify the black sheep among the force and bring them under law and justice to uphold your image.”	哈西娜的高级顾问HT·伊玛目（HT Imam）公然抨击警方不对谋杀罗伊的凶手采取行动，要求警方高级官员“找出队伍中的害群之马，将他们绳之以法，这样才能维持那你们的形象。 ”


Bangladesh is a democracy that upholds freedom of expression, but within limits.	孟加拉国是一个言论自由的民主国家，但言论自由是有限制的。


Though the government is seen as sympathetic to liberal intellectuals, it is also anxious to maintain law and order and avoid provoking the extremists.	尽管政府被认为对自由派知识分子持同情态度，但它也急于保持法律和秩序，避免刺激极端主义者。


As a result, the government has not hesitated to try to curry favor with the Islamists by using legislation that prohibits “hurting religious sentiments” to harass and arrest atheists and liberals.	结果，政府忙不迭地讨好伊斯兰教徒，采取了禁止“伤害宗教情绪”的立法并据此干扰和逮捕无神论者和自由派。


The Islamists, however, want the government to pass a blasphemy law like that in Pakistan, which decrees death for religious dissent.	但是，伊斯兰教徒希望政府通过与巴基斯坦一样的可判宗教异见分子死罪的渎神法。


Though the government has so far stoutly resisted this, its weak-kneed defense of secularism has raised fears that its resistance to theocratic pressure could collapse under sustained pressure.	尽管政府目前坚决拒绝了这一要求，但其对世俗主义的保护可谓无力，这让人们担心它对神权压力的抵抗是否会在持续压力下崩溃。


It must continue to do so.	孟加拉国政府必须坚持下去。


Hasina – the daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the “father” of independent Bangladesh who was assassinated in 1975 – knows that compromising with the Islamists will get her nowhere; she will never be acceptable to them.	哈西娜——1975年遇刺身亡的孟加拉国独立“之父”谢赫·穆吉布·拉曼（Sheikh Mujibur Rahman）的女儿——知道，与伊斯兰教徒妥协对她绝对不利；


Her government must not succumb to the temptation to accommodate the extremists in the name of good governance (or in the cause of political survival).	她从来不被他们所接受。 她的政府决不能以改善治理（或为了政治生存）而对极端主义者让步。


The principles for which Bangladesh bled when it won its independence from Pakistan must not be compromised.	孟加拉国在取得从巴基斯坦独立的胜利时所持有的原则绝不容妥协。


If Hasina gives in to the machete-wielding Islamists, she will sacrifice the Bangladesh that her father fought to free.	如果哈西娜屈服于挥舞大刀的伊斯兰教徒，牺牲的将是乃父未知战斗至死的自由的孟加拉国。


Syria’s Kurdish Hope	叙利亚库尔德人的希望


QAMISHLI, SYRIA – The civil war now engulfing Syria emerged from its people’s desire for political change.	叙利亚卡米什利——目前席卷叙利亚的内战源于叙利亚人政治改革的愿望。


But the war is not universal: since the outbreak of protests in 2011 against President Bashar al-Assad’s regime – and long before – one group of Syrians, the Kurdish community, has consistently sought peaceful change and respect for the rights of all.	但并非所有人都愿意接受战争：自从2011年爆发反对总统巴沙尔·阿萨德政权的抗议活动后——甚至在此之前很久——叙利亚库尔德团体就始终如一地为实现和平变革和尊重所有人权利而努力奋斗。


For Syria’s Kurds, the struggle against more than four decades of the Assad family’s Ba’athist dictatorship became particularly harsh after 2004, when security forces killed dozens of unarmed protesters in the northeastern town of Qamishli.	自从2004年安全部队在卡米什利东北小镇杀害数十名手无寸铁的示威者以来，叙利亚库尔德人反抗执政40余年的阿萨德家族复兴党独裁统治的斗争就变得尤为艰苦。


This ignited the spark for democratic reform, and we were spurred on by the knowledge that our kinsmen had won political autonomy in northern Iraq and were creating a vibrant democracy.	反抗点燃了民主改革的火花，我们也受到伊拉克北部同族成功赢得政治自主权并建立起充满活力的民主国家的鼓舞。


When protests erupted across Syria in 2011, Kurds were at the forefront.	2011年叙利亚抗议活动爆发后，库尔德人率先挺身而出。


Unfortunately, foreign fighters across the Arab and wider Muslim world soon joined the fray, some supporting the regime, and others backing the rebels.	但遗憾的是，阿拉伯和穆斯林世界的外国战士很快加入战团，有人支持叛军，也有人支持现政府。


For the Kurds, the widening conflict meant that, in addition to fighting a brutal dictatorship, we were now confronted by Al Qaeda militants seeking to establish an Islamic emirate in the Middle East.	对库尔德人而言，冲突的扩大化意味着在对抗残酷独裁统治的同时，我们还要面对试图在中东建立伊斯兰酋长国的基地武装分子。


The Kurds have never sought to achieve democratic goals through violence.	库尔德人从未想过利用暴力来实现民主。


We wanted no part of a revolution that massacred children, drove families from their homes, and left millions destitute.	我们绝不参与屠杀儿童、令无数家庭背井离乡并导致数百万人一贫如洗的革命行动。


We took up arms only to protect ourselves and our property from an immediate extreme Islamist threat that tolerated no dissent.	我们拿起武器只为保护生命财产免受极端伊斯兰主义的践踏，这些人对任何不同意见都抱着不容忍的态度。


Radical Islamists targeted us because our people generally hold secular views of politics and society, with women, for example, playing a prominent role in public and professional life.	激进伊斯兰分子以我们为敌是因为我们的民众普遍对政治和社会抱有世俗的态度，比方说在妇女问题上，我们认为女性应该在公共和专业生活中发出突出的作用。


Islamists also abhor us because we demand self-determination, whereas they seek an amorphous emirate that lumps all Muslims together without regard for cultural and historical differences.	伊斯兰主义者痛恨我们还因为我们要求自决，而他们则试图建立无组织酋长国，不顾文化和历史差异将所有穆斯林捆绑在一处。


Indeed, they aim to suppress, and even eliminate, any such difference.	事实上，遏制甚至消除差异是他们所期望的。


While defending ourselves, we have also established our own government in Syria’s Kurdish regions, the only areas that enjoy both order and democracy.	保卫自己的同时我们也在叙利亚库尔德人地区（也是唯一享有秩序和民主的地区）建立了自己的政府。


The streets of Qamishli, Amuda, and Malikiyya are calm and safe.	卡米什利、阿穆达和马利基亚地区的街道是平静和安全的。


The armed gangs that move freely through rebel-controlled cities such as Aleppo are absent in Kurdish areas.	库尔德地区看不到像阿勒颇那样自由穿梭于叛军控制城市的武装团伙。


When people go to the markets they do not fear being kidnapped or killed.	人们到市场买东西时不必害怕遭到绑架或杀戮。


This is the case for people of all ethnic or religious communities in the Kurdish regions.	库尔德地区所有种族或宗教团体民众都处于同样的状况。


Kurds have long been proud of their tolerance.	库尔德人一直自豪我们的宽容大度。


Christians who have fled rebel-controlled areas live peacefully and with equal rights in Kurdish areas.	从叛军控制地区逃出来的基督徒在库尔德地区享有同等权利、和平地生活。


Indeed, these areas have become safe havens for all religious and ethnic groups escaping the war.	事实上，库尔德地区已经成为所有宗教种族群体逃离战争的避风港。


We also know that violence will not solve this conflict.	我们也知道暴力无法解决这场冲突。


That is why Syrian Kurds’ political representatives advocate a negotiated settlement, and are willing to sit down with anyone – regime or rebels – to achieve a peace agreement.	叙利亚库尔德政治代表因此主张谈判解决，并随时准备坐下来与任何人——包括政府或叛军——达成和平协议。


Other rebel factions demand Assad’s resignation; we insist on no such preconditions.	其他反抗者要求阿萨德下台，我们则不会坚持这样的前提。


We do not even seek the creation of an independent Kurdish state – just a guarantee of Kurdish rights in a unified Syria.	我们甚至不寻求建立独立的库尔德国家——只要求统一的叙利亚政府保障库尔德人的权利。


Centralized power has suppressed the country’s diversity and led to appalling abuses.	权力高度集中压制了国家的多样性，导致了骇人听闻的胡作非为。


Our chief goal is to end the persecution and discrimination, including the ban on the Kurdish language and our exclusion from certain professions, and we believe that this can best be achieved through a decentralized political system that devolves power to the provinces.	我们的主要目标是制止迫害和歧视，包括取消库尔德语禁令和允许我们从事某些行业。 我们认为各省分权的政治制度是实现这一目标的最佳方式。


Yet, despite consistently demonstrating a commitment to democracy, the international community has been deaf to our appeals.	然而尽管一贯表现出对民主的信奉，国际社会却一直不理睬我们的呼吁。


The United States, Europe, and other Western governments refuse to negotiate with us, even though neighboring Iraq and Turkey have done so willingly.	美、欧及其他西方政府拒绝与我们谈判，即使相邻的伊拉克和土耳其很愿意这样做。


The region’s new geopolitical realities demand new political arrangements.	该地区新的地缘政治现实需要新的政治制度。


Syria’s Kurds are ready to build a more democratic country.	叙利亚库尔德人随时准备建设更民主的国度。


But we need Western support and expertise to consolidate the free society to which everyone aspires.	但为巩固人人渴望的自由社会我们急需西方的专业知识和支持援助。


By ignoring us, Western governments are disregarding the secular, democratic values that they claim to uphold.	西方国家无视我们的要求就是无视他们自称信奉的世俗、民主的价值观。


Worse, our fragile democracy risks falling victim to extremists who pose a mortal danger not just to Syria, but to the wider Middle East and the world.	更糟糕的是，我们脆弱的民主制度可能成为给叙利亚、中东和全世界带来致命威胁的极端势力的牺牲品。


Gays and the New Public Philosophy	同性恋和新公共哲学


LONDON – With humanity’s millennia-old focus on collective survival no longer a primary concern, a few fortunate societies in the West have become preoccupied with matters of human, or individual, rights.	伦敦—伴随人类数千年的集体生存问题已不再是主要的担忧问题，某些西方丰裕社会开始关注人权或个体权利。


In recent decades, we have experienced a second flowering of the individualism associated with such nineteenth-century thinkers as John Stuart Mill.	近几十年来，我们经历了继19世纪思想家穆勒（John Stuart Mill）等人之后的第二次个人主义浪潮。


The rights of the individual were submerged by the horrors of the first half of the twentieth century.	个体权利被20世纪上半叶的恐怖包围着。


But since the 1960’s, the passions expended until then on righting collective wrongs have been increasingly channeled into securing the rights of humans as individuals.	但自20世纪60年代以来，此前用在纠正集体错误上的热情越来越多地导向了保卫作为个体的人的权利。


Indeed, if the West can be said to have a public philosophy nowadays, it is a philosophy of human rights.	事实上，如果说如今西方有什么大众哲学的话，那就是关于人权的哲学。


A small but significant example of this is the United Kingdom’s recent debate in Parliament of a bill recognizing the right to same-sex marriage, which follows a decision taken in France this spring to legalize same-sex marriage.	一个见微知著的例子是英国国会最近围绕承认同性婚姻权利的法案所进行的争论。 在英国的这个法案之前，法国于今年春天决定将同性婚姻合法化。


Indeed, the UK is something of a latecomer: thirteen countries already allow gay marriage, and the usually conservative current US Supreme Court recently struck down the “Defense of Marriage Act,” adopted in 1996 explicitly to ban gay marriages, and a law prohibiting gay marriage in California.	事实上，英国在这方面已落于人后：十三个国家已经批准了同性婚姻，而通常颇为保守的现任美国最高法院最近也推翻了明确禁止同性婚姻的1996年《婚姻保护法》和加州一部禁止同性婚姻的法律。


Only in 2004 were British gays allowed to form “civil partnerships” – relationships with the same legal status as marriage, but denied the title.	2004年，英国同性恋者才被允许缔结“民事伴侣关系”，这一关系与婚姻有着相同的法律地位，但不能称之为婚姻。


This did not settle the matter; the passion for human rights simply moved to the next level.	这并不解决问题，对人权的热情将同性婚姻合法化运动推到了新的高度。


Denial of gay couples’ legal right to call themselves married is – has become – intolerably discriminatory.	否认同性夫妻自称已婚的法定权利是——或者说变成了——不可忍受的歧视。


But allowing them to marry has proved a harder legislative nut to crack than allowing them civil partnerships.	但允许他们结婚是比允许他们称谓民事伴侣更难攻破的法律堡垒。


The parliamentary debate that has preceded the likely passage of this legislation revealed a classic case of an institution (marriage) coming into conflict with a cause (human rights).	可能批准这一立法之前的国会争论是制度（婚姻）与思想（人权）冲突的经典案例。


Both opponents and supporters of the bill concede that marriage has changed in various ways over time.	该法案的反对者和支持者都承认，随着时间的推移，婚姻也出现了大量变化。


They also agree that a central core has remained constant.	他们也同意，一个核心要素并未改变。


But they disagree about what that core is.	但这一核心要素是什么，他们没有形成一致。


The chief argument of those opposed to the bill is that marriage has always meant a lifelong union aimed at procreation and child-rearing.	反对派的主要论点是婚姻永远意味着一生的结合，其目标繁衍和养育后代。


This is its “normative” meaning – the best that the human race has come up with to secure its survival.	这是其“规范”含义——人类所能想出来的保证生存的最佳方式。


As such, marriage is inescapably to a member of the opposite sex.	因此，婚姻永远应该由不同性别的成员组成。


Against this, supporters of same-sex marriage argue that the one constant that defines the married state is a loving couple’s commitment to “share their journey.”	针对这一点，同性婚姻支持者指出，定义婚姻状态的一个永恒不变的要素是相爱的双方承诺“共度人生”。


Love and commitment are the only relevant criteria.	爱和承诺是唯一的相关标准。


It is simply unfair to withhold the status of marriage from those who want to make this public vow.	剥夺愿意公开许下这一承诺的人婚姻地位是不公平的。


Many and ingenious have been the attempts to split the difference.	为了分离分歧，人们已经做了很多机智的工作。


In the House of Lords, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, a former Lord Chancellor, moved an amendment requiring the bill to distinguish between marriage (same sex) and marriage (opposite sex).	在上议院，前大法官克拉什弗恩的麦凯勋爵（Lord Mackay of Clashfern）建议修订该法，区别婚姻（同性）和婚姻（异性）。


The common word marriage, he argued, would remove any discrimination, but the brackets would recognize that the two states were different.	他说，“婚姻”这个共同词汇可以消除任何歧视意义，但括号中的内容可以区分两种不同的状态。


Supporters of the bill allowing same-sex marriage pooh-poohed “marriage in brackets.”	支持允许同性恋婚姻法案者对“括号中的婚姻”嗤之以鼻。


With the defeat of the Clashfern amendment by 314 votes to 119, much of the bill’s original form remains intact.	克拉什弗恩修正提案被314票对119票否决，该法案的原初形式大体未动。


Churches would not be required to consecrate same-sex unions, or teachers to promote them (against their conscience); but, as far as the state is concerned, marriage would be gender-blind.	同性结伴不要求教会的祝福，也不需要牧师引导他们（违背他们的良心）； 但是，就目前的情况而言，婚姻将不考虑性别。


The arguments on both sides have been of high quality, especially in the House of Lords.	双方的论点质量都很高，特别是在上议院的争论中。


But, as I have sat and listened to the debate, I cannot help wondering what a break it is in human history for so much intellect and feeling to be focused on such a small matter as the state’s withholding of a word, marriage, but not its substance.	但是，就我所听到的争论而言，我不得不疑惑，如此之多��智力和感情聚焦于如此之小的细枝末节——“婚姻”这个词而不是其含义，这也算是人类历史上的奇谈了吧。


On the lexicographic point, opponents of same-sex marriage are surely right.	从词义学角度讲，同性婚姻反对者毫无疑问是正确的。


Historically, marriage has not been, as one peer described it, an “elongated envelope,” into which any expression of love and commitment can be packed.	从历史上看，婚姻并不是如观礼者所言那样是一个“细长的信封”，里面装着爱和承诺的表达。


It is not so regarded in contemporary Britain; and even less so in the non-Western world, where unions of men and women are considered the norm.	在当代英国，并非如此； 对男女结伴才是正统的非西方世界而言，更非如此。


But there is a glaring weakness in the arguments of the bill’s opponents: while they hint darkly at the “unintended consequences” of legalizing same-sex marriage, they cannot spell out exactly what these consequences would be.	但该法案反对者的论点中有一个显著的弱点：他们隐晦地暗示了同性婚姻合法化的“意外后果”，他们不能明确说出这一后果是什么。


It is not obvious that “normal” marriage, procreation, or child-rearing would be threatened by this “add on.”	“正常”婚姻、繁衍和育儿会因为这一“添加”受到什么威胁尚不明确。


In fact, opponents of the bill fail to mention that traditional marriage is in a fairly advanced state of decay in Western societies.	事实上，该法案的反对者没有提到增加的婚姻发生在西方社会高度发达的糜烂之国。


Fewer and fewer people are bothering to get married, and marriage is regarded less and less as a lifelong union.	越来越少的人懒得结婚，婚姻也越来越不被看成是一生的结合。


Families are having fewer and fewer children, and more and more children are born out of wedlock.	家庭中的孩子数量越来越少，越来越多的孩子是非婚生儿。


So one of the “unintended consequences” of the bill might be to add welcome recruits to the ranks of the married, even if these recruits are of a historically unusual kind.	因此该法案的一个“意外后果”可能是将更多的人纳入到已婚人群中，尽管这类人在历史上并不被看成正常人。


After much soul-searching, I voted for the bill, though without any acute sense that I was striking a blow for freedom.	在经过了深思熟虑后，我投票赞成该法案，尽管我并没有为自由出力的突出感觉。


There is a clear status benefit to the minority; no obvious harm is being done to the majority; and the long-term consequences are unfathomable.	对于少数派来说，该法案能带来明显的地位提升，对多数派来说，也没有收到明显的伤害； 而其长期结果是难以臆测的。


In the end, it seemed a no-brainer.	总而言之，这是个容易的选择。


Yet it left me uncomfortable.	但我还是很不舒服。


Every institution, Mill wrote in On Liberty, had to justify its keep; if it could not, it deserved to be swept away.	穆勒在《论自由》中写道，任何制度都必须证明其合理性； 若非如此，就应该推翻它。


But what counts as justification?	但合理理由何在？


The very institution in which I sit, the House of Lords, has no rational justification in terms of its composition or powers, as reformers have been quick to point out.	正如改革者马上就能指出的，我所在的制度——上议院，就其权力组成而言毫无理性理由可言。


But the very longevity of an institution like marriage is some mark of its worth.	但像婚姻这样的制度，其长期存在就是其价值的证明。


At the least, prudence should give the reformer pause.	至少，出于审慎，改革者应该暂停。


The Maternal Thread of Life	母亲生命线


ISLAMABAD – Last month, Oxford University’s Green Templeton College held its annual Emerging Markets Symposium at Egrove Park.	伊斯兰堡—上个月，牛津大学格林坦普顿学院（GTC）在艾格洛夫公园（Egrove Park）召开了一年一度的新兴市场研讨会。


The theme this year was “Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition.”	今年的主题是“母婴健康和营养”。


The final slide of the opening presentation, delivered by GTC fellow Stephen Kennedy, was a cartoon depicting two young contestants set to begin a race: one was strong and healthy, while the other was emaciated, shackled, carrying the baggage of disease, and confronting the massive barrier of malnutrition.	学院学者史蒂芬·肯尼迪（Stephen Kennedy）在开幕致辞的最后演示了一张卡通幻灯片，上面画着两个年轻的选手正在开始一场竞赛：其中一位强壮而健康，另一位又瘦又弱，被束缚着手脚，身患沉疴，还饱受营养不良困扰。


The message was clear: not everyone begins life with the same chance of success.	潜台词显而易见：并非所有人生而具有平等的成功机会。


Of course, this is not a groundbreaking insight.	当然，这算不上什么突破性洞见。


The impact of factors like poverty, maternal literacy, sanitation, and housing conditions on children’s health – and, in turn, on social and economic outcomes – is well documented.	贫困、母亲文化水平、卫生和儿童健康的家庭条件等因素的影响及其反过来对社会和经济结果的冲击一目了然。


The problem is that these factors are not amenable to isolated public-health interventions.	问题在于这些因素是无法通过孤立的公共卫生干预解决的。


But another, less widely discussed social determinant – maternal nutrition – could be.	但另一个讨论较少的社会决定因素——母亲的营养可以。


Since Hippocrates, people have been discussing how “nature” and “nurture” interact to shape a person’s development.	自希波克拉底时代以来，人们一直在讨论“先天”和“后天”如何相互影响以决定一个人的发展。


Indeed, even in ancient civilizations, adequate maternal nutrition was considered essential to ensuring future generations’ survival and prosperity.	事实上，即使在古代文明中，充足的母亲营养也被认为是确保下一代生存和繁荣的关键因素。


But poverty and ignorance can thwart even the best intentions.	但贫困和无知可以让最好的初衷化为泡影。


The consequences of maternal malnutrition are far-reaching, including higher child-mortality rates, more birth defects, increased susceptibility to infection, and specific nutritional deficiencies that can lock a child into a vicious cycle of poor health early in life.	母亲营养不良的后果是影响深远的，包括高儿童夭折率、更多的畸形儿、传染病感染几率增加，更有各种具体的营养素缺乏可能导致儿童的早期生命生活在不健康的恶性循环中。


Moreover, intrauterine malnutrition can increase the risk of chronic conditions like obesity, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease during adulthood.	此外，子宫内营养不良可能会导致成年后肥胖、糖尿病和心血管等慢性疾病风险的增加。


It is telling that most of the symposium’s 47 participants – influential public- and private-sector figures from around the world – were unaware of the extent to which a mother’s nutrition affects her offspring’s wellbeing.	令人瞩目的是，研讨会的47名参与者中——他们是来自世界各地的影响力卓著的公共和私人部门代表——并没有意识到母亲的营养会对她的后代带来怎样的影响。


They were surprised by evidence that babies grow in the same way worldwide, as long as they receive the same care and are not constrained by environmental factors – evidence that challenged the widely held notion that ethnicity and gender are major determinants of a child’s development.	他们对于看到的证据十分吃惊——只要婴儿获得同样的看护、处于同样的环境因素中，他们在全世界的成长状况都是一样的，这一证据挑战了一个被广泛接受的概念，即种族和性别是儿童发展的主要决定因素。


This reflects a fundamental failing on the part of the scientific community to relay relevant data to decision-makers.	这反映出一个根本性的失败，科学界没有向决策者呈现相关数据。


In fact, upon hearing the evidence, a former Pakistani prime minister confessed that he would have been more proactive in this area had he known while he was in office what he knows now.	事实上，在听到这一证据后，一位前巴基斯坦总理坦承如果在任时就了解到这些情况，他本应该做的更加积极一些。


The meeting’s participants agreed that strong efforts to support pre-conception care in the context of maternal- and child-health services were vital.	与会者都同意，在母婴健康服务方面花大力气支持怀孕前保健十分关键。


After all, if an adequately nourished mother provides critical health benefits to her offspring throughout their lives, women can be viewed as the custodians of future generations’ health.	毕竟，如果营养充分的母亲可以为她的孩子们提供关键的终身健康益处，那么女性就可以称为后代健康的看门人。


These inter-generational biological connections are particularly pronounced in the case of female children.	这一代际生物联系在女孩中特别明显。


The influence of the levels and composition of maternal nutrition on a female fetus will carry through to adulthood, when she, too, becomes a mother.	女孩在胚胎期得到的母亲营养水平和成分将会一直影响到她成年，当她自己也称为母亲时。


Given how few scientists have recognized the extent to which a woman’s eggs shape her grandchildren’s prospects, it is not surprising that policymakers remain so oblivious to the long-term impact of women’s health.	极少有科学家注意到女性卵子对她的孙辈前景有多大程度的影响，因此，毫不奇怪决策者会丝毫不顾女性健康的长期影响。


But the evidence is clear, and it demands action.	但证据是明确的，并且需要采取行动。


The good news is that there are solutions.	好消息是有解决办法。


Conditional cash transfers, text-message-based initiatives, school-based food programs, vitamin-fortification schemes, and local leadership have all proved effective in improving maternal nutrition.	有条件的现金转移、基于短信的项目、校园餐计划、维生素强化制度和地方领导力都被证明能够有效改善母亲营养。


Such initiatives should be backed by policies that foster positive nutritional choices.	这些措施应该受到促进积极营养选择的政策的支持。


Compelling policymakers to implement such policies will require a new set of skills that draws upon lessons from around the world.	迫使决策者实施这些郑旭需要性全世界的经验中总结新的技能。


In Brazil, a television program on the role that folic-acid supplementation could play in the prevention of spina bifida (a congenital neural tube defect) immediately grabbed politicians’ attention.	在巴西，一个电视宣传补充叶酸在预防脊柱裂（一种先天性神经管缺陷）方面的功效的节目立刻抓住了政客的眼球。


Initiatives aimed at enhancing the public’s knowledge of nutrition are also crucial – not least because they can motivate citizens to pressure their governments to take action.	旨在增强公众营养知识的项目也十分关键——不仅是因为它们可以动员公民向政府施压，敦促后者采取行动。


To this end, entertainment media like soap operas, which have emerged as important tools for empowering women in conservative Middle Eastern societies, could be employed.	在这方面可以利用肥皂剧等娱乐媒体。 娱乐媒体已成为保守的中东社会中帮助女性的一个重要工具。


Forums like the Emerging Market Symposium can help to bridge the increasingly obvious gap between science and public policy.	新兴市场研讨会等论坛有助于弥合科学和公共政策间日益明显的缺口。


But, without strong domestic support for change, the impact of such meetings is limited.	但是，没有对变化的强大的公共支持，这类论坛的作用就会十分有限。


It is time to demand action – and past time for policymakers to deliver it.	应该马上要求决策者行动起来，拿出真正的动作。


India’s East Asian Dream	印度的东亚梦


SINGAPORE – On August 15, Narendra Modi delivered his first Independence Day speech as Prime Minister.	新加坡—8月15日，莫迪首次以印度总理身份发表了独立日演讲。


Though he continued the tradition of addressing the country from the ramparts of Delhi’s historic Red Fort, the speech broke with convention.	尽管他遵循传统，在德里历史悠久、防卫森严的红堡向全国人民做了这次演讲，但演讲内容仍然打破了常规。


Shunning a written text, Modi extemporized for an hour, mapping out an explicit vision for India, including an economic model that constitutes a clean break from India’s past.	莫迪没有用讲稿，脱口讲了一个小时，为印度勾勒了一幅清晰的愿景，包括一个与印度的过去明确决裂的经济模式。


Since 1991, India has been slowly changing its policy framework away from the socialist vision of its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.	自1991年以来，印度一直在缓慢改变其政策框架，远离其首任总理尼赫鲁所制定的社会主义愿景。


However, for political reasons, the changes were always justified in an almost apologetic way.	但是，出于政治原因，这些变化总是需要通过致歉后补偿的方式实现。


Indeed, many Nehru-era institutions continue to exist – and even thrive.	事实上，许多尼赫鲁时代的机构仍然存在，甚至日益兴旺。


In one fell swoop, Modi announced the abolition of one of the most important of these institutions: the powerful Planning Commission, which had continued to churn out Soviet-style “Five-Year Plans” and remained at the heart of a centralized resource-allocation process.	莫迪赫然宣布将抛弃这些机构中最重要的之一：炙手可热的计划委员会（Planning Commission），该机构一直负责苏联式的“五年计划”，同时也是集中资源配置程序的核心。


Its successor, the National Development and Reform Commission, will probably function more as a think tank – providing ideas and ensuring policy coherence, but with no power to allocate.	其继任机构国家发展和改革委员会（National Development and Reform Commission）可能更加接近于智库——提供观点和确保政策一致性，但不再拥有配置权。


Modi also argued for a new economic-growth model based on export-oriented manufacturing.	莫迪还提出了一个基于出口导向型制造业的经济增长模式。


This means encouraging domestic entrepreneurs to manufacture goods for export and inviting the world’s top companies to relocate production to India.	这意味着鼓励国内企业家制造出口商品、引进世界顶级公司建立生产基地。


This effort is important, because India’s economy and exports are dominated by services, which have grown steadily relative to overall output, now accounting for almost 60% of GDP.	这一方针十分重要，因为印度经济和出口的主力军是服务业，其增长相对总产出而言更加稳定，目前已占印度GDP的近60%。