No number of slaughtered Iraqis will bring peace.	被杀害的伊拉克人没有带来和平的曙光。


The American fantasy of a final battle, in Falluja or elsewhere, or the capture of some terrorist mastermind, perpetuates a cycle of bloodletting that puts the world in peril.	美国在费卢杰（也许是其他地方）的最后一战，对某个恐怖分子首领的成功捕获，带来的是血债血还的冤冤相报，并给全球带来严重危机。


Worse still, America’s public opinion, media, and election results have left the world’s most powerful military without practical restraint.	更可怕的是，美国的舆论、媒体和大选结果，其实都纵容了一支拥有世界最强大军事力量却没有纪律的军队继续恣意妄为。


Apple, Brussels, and Ireland’s Bruised Sovereignty	苹果，布鲁塞尔和爱尔兰的主权损害


ATHENS – Despite their unequivocal Europeanism, the Irish have been serially mistreated by the European Union.	发自雅典——尽管有着明确的亲欧倾向，但爱尔兰却一直遭受着欧盟的错误对待。


When Irish voters rejected the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008, the EU forced them to vote again until they delivered the “right” outcome.	当爱尔兰选民在2008年否决《里斯本条约》时，欧盟迫使他们再次投票直到得出了“正确”的结果。


A year later, when private Irish banks imploded, threatening their (mainly) German private creditors with severe losses, Jean-Claude Trichet, the European Central Bank’s then-president, immediately “informed” the Irish government that the ECB would shut down ATMs across the Emerald Isle unless Ireland’s unsuspecting taxpayers made the German banks whole.	谁料一年后爱尔兰私人银行业崩盘，导致其（主要为德国）私人债权人损失惨重，时任欧洲央行总裁的让-克劳德·特里谢（Jean-Claude Trichet）立即“知会”爱尔兰政府表示除非一直被蒙在鼓里的爱尔兰纳税人补偿德国银行的全部损失，否则欧洲央行将关闭整个爱尔兰的自动取款机。


Ireland acquiesced, its public debt ballooned, emigration returned, and the country remains bruised and despondent.	爱尔兰屈服了，其公共债务激增，移民外流，国家伤痕累累，民众沮丧不已。


With the EU still refusing meaningful reduction of a debt burden unfairly borne by the younger generation, the Irish remain convinced, correctly, that the EU violated their sovereignty on behalf of foreign bankers.	当欧盟坚持拒绝对年轻一代爱尔兰人肩上不公平的负担进行合理债务减免时，爱尔兰却仍然确信欧盟为了外国银行的权益来损害本国主权的做法是正确的。


Ireland’s greatest weapon against the ensuing debt deflation was its ability to attract US-based tech giants, by offering them a combination of EU law, a well-trained English-speaking workforce, and a 12.5% corporate-tax rate.	面对因而产生的债务通缩，爱尔兰最强大的武器在于可以招徕各大美国科技巨头，为它们提供一整套包括欧盟法律，训练有素会讲英语的劳动力，以及12. 5％的企业所得税的组合。


Though the shell-like subsidiaries of global tech conglomerates have little positive impact on most households’ income, Ireland’s establishment is proud of its links with the likes of Apple.	虽然全球高科技企业集团的附属型子公司并不会对大多数家庭的收入带来多少积极影响，但爱尔兰政府也会为能和苹果这类公司建立联系而感到骄傲。


Now, the European Commission is jeopardizing the government’s special relationship with Apple by demanding that it claw back €13 billion ($14.6 billion) in taxes from the company.	而如今欧盟委员会让爱尔兰从苹果公司收回130亿欧元（折和146亿美元）税额的要求则危及到该国政府与苹果公司之间的特殊关系。


Is the Commission’s latest intervention another example of EU bullying, in violation of Ireland’s sovereignty?	那么欧盟委员会最近这一干预行动是否是欧盟欺凌爱尔兰主权的另一个例子？


Comparing Trichet’s 2009 intervention and the current standoff over Apple holds important lessons beyond Ireland and, indeed, Europe.	但对爱尔兰甚至欧洲来说，2009年特里谢的干预行为以及目前苹果事件的僵局都可算是相当重要的一课。


In the eurozone’s early years, German financial institutions channeled a torrent of capital into Ireland’s commercial banks, which then lent it to real-estate developers.	在欧元区成立初期，德国金融机构将大量资本注入爱尔兰的商业银行，后者则将其贷给房地产开发商。


The ensuing property bubble resulted in white elephants in Dublin’s financial district, row upon row of new blocks of flats in the middle of nowhere, and a mountain of mortgage debt.	随之而来的房地产泡沫让都柏林的金融区竖起数十栋无人问津的豪华大楼，偏远地区新楼盘不断涌现，抵押贷款堆积如山。


When the bubble burst after 2008, land prices collapsed, debts went bad, and Ireland’s private banks failed.	后来2008年泡沫破灭后地价暴跌，债务恶化，爱尔兰的私人银行尽数破产。


The ECB, in an affront comparable to British behavior during the 1845-52 Potato Famine, instructed the government to invoke “financial stability” to force Ireland’s weakest citizens to repay every euro the defunct private banks owed to German creditors.	欧洲央行使出了一招足以和英国在1845~1852年爱尔兰马铃薯饥荒期间所作所为比肩的冒犯行动，指示爱尔兰政府援引“金融稳定”的说法，强制在整个事件中最为弱势的普通公民去偿还灰飞烟灭的私人银行所欠下的德国债权人债务。


Financial stability was obviously a smokescreen: taxpayers were forced to repay even the debts of a bank that had already been closed (and thus systemically irrelevant).	金融稳定显然是一个幌子：纳税人被迫偿还一家已经被关闭（并因此不存在系统相关性）的银行所属的债务。


The roots of the Apple deal are older than the ECB.	而苹果业务的根源甚至比欧洲央行更早。


In 1980, a young Steve Jobs visited an Ireland eager to escape underdevelopment. Apple eventually created 6,000 jobs in the country, in exchange for a sweetheart tax deal allowing it to shield its European revenues from taxation by recording them there.	1980年，年轻的史蒂夫·乔布斯（Steve Jobs）到访了渴望摆脱不发达状况的爱尔兰并最终为这个国家创造了6000个就业岗位，作为交换政府提供了减税优惠，允许它在爱尔兰登记收入从而免于为欧洲地区的收入缴纳税款。


To this day, the proceeds of every iPhone sold in Paris or in Stockholm (net of its Chinese assemblers’ production costs) go to Apple’s Irish subsidiary Apple Sales International.	直到今天，每一台在巴黎或斯德哥尔摩出售的苹果手机产品所得的款项（除去在中国装配的生产成本）都会被记入苹果的爱尔兰子公司苹果国际销售公司。


As a result of the original Apple-Ireland deal, ASI pays a miniscule tax on these earnings, effectively exempt from the ultra-low 12.5% corporate-tax rate.	根据苹果和爱尔兰最初的协议，苹果国际销售公司只需为这些利润支付微乎其微的税款，有效地豁免了12. 5％的超低企业所得税。


This arrangement also required the usually vigilant US Internal Revenue Service to play along.	这种布局通常也要需要美国国税局（US Internal Tax Service）的配合。


ASI’s profits stem from Apple’s intellectual property (IP) rights, which are based on research and development conducted exclusively in the US (most of it underpinned by federal government funding). These profits should, therefore, be taxed in the US.	因为苹果国际销售公司的利润来自苹果公司的知识产权，而后者是在美国进行研究和开发的（其中大部分是由联邦政府拨款支撑），因此这些利润也应当向美国缴税。


Curiously, the IRS is choosing not to enforce Apple’s obligation to pay tax on its profits from US-sourced IP returns.	但吊诡的是，美国国税局选择了不去强制苹果公司对使用在美知识产权所获得的收益支付利得税。


Instead, Apple charges ASI a symbolic fee for allowing it to profit from Apple’s IP rights, for which it pays a tiny tax to the IRS.	取而代之的是，苹果总公司仅仅向苹果国际销售公司收取象征性的知识产权得利费用，并为此向美国国税局支付一小笔税金。


Meanwhile, ASI is allowed to keep, in Ireland, profits representing close to two-thirds of the revenue from the sale of every Apple product sold outside the US.	与此同时，苹果国际销售公司被允许在爱尔兰保留相当于在美国以外销售苹果产品的总收入近三分之二的利润。


As a result, Apple has amassed untaxed cash reserves of up to $230 billion.	苹果也因此累积了高达2300亿美元的免税现金储备。


Unlike in 2009, the Irish government is protesting the EU authorities’ recent Apple ruling, pointing out that tax policy is in the purview of national governments, not the Union.	跟2009年不同的是，爱尔兰政府对欧盟当局最近对苹果的裁决提出了抗议，指出税收政策是各国政府而非欧盟的管理范围。


And, in a recent joint letter to German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the EU’s other 27 national governments, 185 American CEOs alleged that the EU had over-reached yet again, resulting in a “self-inflicted wound” for Ireland’s and Europe’s economy.	而且，185个美国CEO最近联名写信给德国总理安吉拉·默克尔（Angela Merkel）和欧盟其他27个国家政府，声称欧盟已经再次越权，对爱尔兰和欧洲经济造成了“自残的伤口”。


But they are wrong: Ireland’s sovereignty is not an issue here.	但他们错了：爱尔兰的主权不是问题的核心。


Apple would not have based itself in Ireland were it not for the EU’s single market, a commons that requires common rules.	如果不是为了欧盟这个必须实施共同规则的单一市场，苹果可不会扎基于爱尔兰。


One of these rules is that governments cannot offer aid to some companies that is not available to others.	而这些规则的其中一项就是某国政府不能为一些公司提供其他公司所不能获得的协助。


Suppose, for example, that the Greek government, seeking to attract 6,000 jobs to its ravaged economy, offered Apple a subsidy of €110,000 per job per year, or €660 million.	举了例子，假设希腊政府希望为其颓败的经济吸引6000个就业岗位而承诺向苹果公司提供每个岗位每年11万欧元，或者一次性6.


Over two decades, the total subsidy would come to slightly more than €13 billion.	6亿欧元的补贴。 二十年后总补贴额将略微高于130亿欧元。


Were the EU to permit Greece to offer Apple such a deal, the other EU member states, including Ireland, would revolt.	如果欧盟允许希腊与苹果进行这样的交易，那么包括爱尔兰在内的其他欧盟成员国都会奋起抗议。


Suppose further that the Greek government proposed waiving corporate tax for 20 years on all revenue Apple earned in the rest of the EU but booked in Athens – say, €13 billion.	再进一步，假设希腊政府提出对苹果在雅典备案的欧洲其他地区的销售收入减免企业所得税20年——比方说130亿欧元。


The European Commission would then have a duty of care to the European commons to demand that Greece immediately recoup that €13 billion – exactly as it is telling Ireland to do today.	对此欧盟委员会将不得不基于对欧洲共同体的照管责任而要求希腊立即收缴那130亿欧元——跟它如今给爱尔兰的指示一样。


Every time the EU acts as a colonial usurper, as it did in 2009, it undermines the legitimacy of its good and proper actions and strengthens the xenophobic, anti-European “Nationalist International.”	每当欧盟像在2009年那样表现得像一个殖民地宗主国的时候，它都破坏了其良好和适当行动的合法性并助长了那些排外反欧洲的“国际国家主义”势力。


Europe’s only beneficiaries, much to the delight of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, are isolationist Brexiteers, the far-right Alternative for Germany, France’s National Front, and illiberal governments in Poland, Hungary, Croatia, and elsewhere.	正如俄罗斯总统普京和唐纳德·特朗普喜闻乐见的那样，欧洲陷入这一状况的唯一受益者是持孤立主义立场的英国脱欧者，极右翼的德国替代方案党（Alternative）和法国国民阵线党，以及波兰，匈牙利，克罗地亚政府和其他地区那些只顾自己一亩三分地的狭隘政府。


The lesson to be learned from comparing Trichet’s 2009 intervention with the European Commission’s current stance on Apple is simple: Europeans’ real enemy is free riding by the few on the backs of the many.	将特里谢2009年干预行动与欧盟委员会当前对苹果所持的立场相比较，就会得出一个简单明确的教益：欧洲的真正敌人是那些踩在大多数人的肩上搭便车的少数人。


Without common institutions, Europeans cannot be defended from the exploitation and anti-social practices that big business and its political agents portray as economic common sense.	如果没有共同体制，欧洲人就无法免于遭受那些被大企业及其政治代理人粉饰成经济常识的剥削和反社会行为的侵害。


Trichet compromised Ireland’s sovereignty to facilitate German bankers’ free ride on the shoulders of Ireland’s taxpayers.	特里谢损害爱尔兰的主权来让德国银行家们踩在爱尔兰纳税人的肩膀上搭便车。


As restitution, the ECB should take on its books part of Ireland’s public debt.	为了纠正这一错误，欧洲央行应当将爱尔兰的一部分公共债务纳入自身的资产负债表。


But the EU must not allow Ireland to abuse the European commons by offering Apple a deal that no other member state could.	但欧盟决不允许爱尔兰与苹果公司通过一项其他成员国无法提供的交易来侵犯欧洲共同规则。


The right response to past injustices is to recover sovereignty in a Europe where the powerful – whether German bankers or American smartphone makers – are prevented from preying on the weak.	对过去不公正行为的正确反应是重新恢复欧洲的主权，让些强者——无论是德国银行家还是美国智能手机制造商——无法再去侵犯弱者的利益。


Ireland Decides, Again	决策权重归爱尔兰


Maynooth, Ireland – On October 2, Irish voters go to the polls for a second time to decide whether to adopt the European Union’s Lisbon Treaty.	发自爱尔兰梅努斯——在10月2日，爱人兰选民将第二次奔赴投票站以决定是否通过欧盟《里斯本条约》。


The mood in EU capitals is one of nervousness as polling day looms, with the future of the EU in the hands of Ireland’s unpredictable voters.	随着投票日期的逐渐逼近，欧盟各国的情绪也越发敏感，因为欧盟的未来将握在那些难以预测的爱尔兰选民手里。


On two of the last three occasions that the Irish have been asked to vote on an EU Treaty, they have rejected the proposal.	在最近三次针对欧盟条约的投票当中，爱尔兰人就投了两次反对票。


For the EU, the stakes could not be higher.	对于欧盟来说，这次下的赌注已经是大得不能再大了。


The Lisbon Treaty was the compromise agreed by EU leaders in the aftermath of the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in popular referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005.	《里斯本条约》是欧盟领导人在检讨了2005年在法国和荷兰公投中遭遇滑铁卢的《欧盟宪法条约》之后的妥协产物。


Much negotiating blood has been spilled on the Treaty, and its rejection a second time by Irish voters would leave the Union unable to ratify and implement its provisions; this would inevitably lead to policy paralysis and institutional decay.	欧盟在《里斯本条约》已经耗费了巨大的谈判代价，因此如果条约第二次还是通不过的话，那么欧盟将无力批准和实现其预定计划，而这无疑将导致政策瘫痪和制度腐化。


The referendum campaign in Ireland has seen a resurgence of conflict between a familiar constellation of forces.	在爱尔兰举行的公投选举造势活动，可以被视为一连串熟悉的政治面孔之间冲突角力的死灰复燃。


On the Yes side are all of the main political parties, trade unions, the business community, and a broad network of civil-society groups.	赞成的那一派由各主要政党，贸易联盟，商界和大批联成网络的市民社会团体组成。


Their campaign has been more coordinated and intense than last time, with the aim of mobilizing the maximum number of supporters and ensuring a high turnout, which most commentators assume will assist the Yes side.	而这些组织的选举活动比上次更加协调集中，为的是尽可能动员支持者并确保高投票率，许多评论家都认为这些活动将对赞成派大有裨益。


On the No side: a disparate coalition drawn from both the far right and the far left, including ultra-Catholics and unreconstructed Marxists, has sought to whip up hysteria about supposed threats ranging from military conscription to euthanasia and abortion.	而反对派则是一个涵盖了从极右到极左势力的奇怪联盟，从极端天主教徒到老派马克思主义者都混杂其中，并试图在海外派兵，安乐死和堕胎这些假设性威胁上挑动民众情绪。


But the No side has struggled to find a coherent point of reference and seems to have none of the dynamism and vigor that it projected last time.	但反对派如今都未能找到一个连贯性的政治基准点，而且仿佛已经失去了上次公投中所表现出来的活力和人力物力。


The main reason for this is that Ireland has been traumatized by economic misfortune over the past year.	而产生这种情况的主要原因则是源自于爱尔兰2008年所遭受的经济危机。


The hubris of the Celtic Tiger years is a distant memory, owing to the worst recession in Ireland’s history as an independent state.	自爱尔兰独立以来最严重的经济衰退已经令凯尔特之虎（爱尔兰的别称）跳跃欢腾的年代变成了遥远的记忆。


In 2009, economists expect growth to contract by up to 8%, with a further steep decline likely next year.	在2009年，经济学家预计爱尔兰经济增长率将锐减8%，而明年的情况估计也是如此。


The budget deficit is now the largest in the EU, and public debt has ballooned, as the government has struggled to compensate for the steep drop in revenues.	在爱尔兰政府税收锐减，又不断尝试补偿的政策举措之下，爱尔兰的预算赤字金额已经爬上了全欧盟之首，而国债数量也不断膨胀。


The Irish banking system approached total collapse in September 2008, and was only saved by a €400 billion government guarantee of all bank deposits.	爱尔兰银行系统在2008年9月几乎到了全面崩溃的境地，只是靠着4000亿欧元的政府存款担保才活了下来。


More recently, the state assumed the liabilities of rogue property developers by setting up a “bad bank” which could potentially saddle Irish taxpayers with a mountain of debt for decades to come.	最近政府则通过设立一个“坏账银行”来处理那些破产地产发展商的负债，这等于让爱尔兰纳税人 在今后数十年都得背上堆积如山的债务。


The depth of the economy’s plunge has helped the Irish government in its effort to secure a Yes vote.	经济的深度下滑有助于爱尔兰政府确保拿下赞成票。


The European Central Bank has provided a monetary lifeline that has provided much needed liquidity within the financial system and helped the government to stem the crisis of confidence created by the banking collapse.	而欧洲中央银行已经为急需流动性的爱尔兰金融系统提供了资金救济，并帮助政府挺过了由银行崩溃引发的信任危机。


Government ministers and EU representatives repeatedly cite the example of Iceland in pointing out what might have happened to Ireland if it had been outside the EU.	爱尔兰政府大臣和欧盟代表们都一再引用冰岛的例子来说明如果爱尔兰不在欧盟之内的话情况会多么的糟。


Thus, the second referendum campaign has brought back into play the economic dimension of Ireland’s EU membership, which was largely absent from the 2008 debate on the Treaty.	因此第二次公投活动就引出了爱尔兰欧盟成员国资格在经济方面的议题，而这方面在2008年第一次公投时却是被忽略的。


Ireland has benefited disproportionately from EU largesse during its 35 years of membership, and, in 2008, was still receiving a net sum of €500 million from the EU budget.	爱尔兰在成为欧盟成员国的35年内几乎享受了不成比例的好处，到了2008年时还从欧盟预算中净赚了5亿欧元。


When voters are reminded of the potentially catastrophic cost of being excluded, not just from the Single Market area, but from the decision-making structures in the Council of Ministers and the European Central Bank, what is at stake in the referendum becomes clear.	当选民们认识到被欧盟排除在外的潜在灾难性后果，而且不仅被“欧盟单一市场”区域排除在外，更要被踢出欧盟部长理事会和欧洲中央银行的决策架构的话，公投所代表的利害关系就一目了然了。


In addition, the Irish government secured legal guarantees from its EU partners on the issues that most concerned voters who voted No or abstained in the first referendum.	此外，针对某些在第一次公投中导致选民投反对票或弃权票的议题，爱尔兰政府还从其欧盟伙伴处得到了法律保证。


These compromises state that nothing in the treaties will affect Irish prerogatives on abortion, military neutrality, and taxation.	这些承诺不会被写进条约之内，但将赋予爱尔兰在堕胎，军事中立和税率方面的特权。


The government also secured EU-wide agreement that, rather than reducing the size of the European Commission, Ireland will be allowed to retain a permanent place at the Commission table.	爱尔兰政府同时也获得了欧盟各国的同意，即便在欧盟委员会缩小的情况下依然能保持一个永久性席位。


This negotiating success has provided the government with considerable breathing space in which to conduct a more effective referendum campaign.	这些成功的谈判成果都令爱尔兰政府得以喘息并组织更有效的公投造势活动。


This combination of legal guarantees and changed economic circumstances is helping to mobilize a majority in favor of the Treaty.	法律保证和经济环境变的变化相结合将有助于动员大多数选民向《里斯本条约》投下赞成票。


Opinion polls conducted in recent weeks indicate that the Yes side commands a strong majority of 62% to 23%, with 15% of the electorate undecided.	而最近几周的民意测验支持者已经以62%的份额压倒了反对者（23%），还有15%选民依然摇摆不定。


But the picture is far from clear-cut.	但形势依然难言清晰。


Surveys indicate that the Irish are strong supporters of EU membership and the integration process.	研究显示爱尔兰人是欧盟成员国资格和欧洲整合进程的强大��持者。


The problem is that these favorable attitudes vary considerably in intensity and constitute a “soft bloc” of support for the EU; in the 2008 referendum, this soft bloc crumbled in the final week of the campaign.	然而问题是这种支持的态度经常急剧变化并形成一个支持欧盟的“软性集团”，但就在2008年公投前最后一周的关键时刻，这个“软性集团”却走向了土崩瓦结。


It seems clear that a second rejection of the Lisbon Treaty by the Irish electorate would plunge the EU into a renewed crisis and threaten to derail the considerable gains in both democratic legitimacy and collective decision-making capacity deriving from the new Treaty.  Everything indicates that voters now look set to approve the Treaty.	很显然，如果《里斯本条约》第二次公投失败，欧盟就将陷入新的架构重建危机，条约即将在民主合法性和集体决策能力方面带来的可观成果也将在此威胁下化为乌有。


But nobody should take Irish voters for granted in the final days of the campaign.	各方面因素都预示着选民们将通过条约，但投票那天真正到来之前，谁也不能把一切都想得理所当然。


The Return of Ireland’s Housing Bubble	爱尔兰房地产泡沫回归


ZURICH – After having endured the collapse of its housing market less than a decade ago, Ireland has lately been experiencing a blistering recovery in prices, which already have risen in Dublin by some 50% from the trough in 2010.	苏黎世—经历上一场房地产市场崩盘还不到十年，爱尔兰最近发生了价格大幅复苏的情况，都柏林房价较2010年上涨了50%左右。


Is Ireland setting itself up for another devastating crash?	爱尔兰又要面临新一场灾难性崩盘吗？


It’s no secret that the collapse of asset bubbles carries massive financial and social costs.	资产泡沫崩盘带来巨大的金融和社会成本，这已不是秘密。


With construction activity and investment spending grinding to a halt, sharp recessions – which cause tax revenues to fall, even as surging unemployment demands increased social spending – are unavoidable.	建筑活动和投资几乎陷入停顿，急剧衰退难以避免，导致税收收入下降，尽管激增的失业要求提高社会支出。


Taxpayers may even be asked to shore up financial institutions’ capital base.	纳税人甚至被要求充实金融机构的资本基础。


The last time that happened in Ireland, it cost more than €60 billion ($67 billion), or about 40% of GDP.	爱尔兰上一次发生这一情况的时候造成了600亿欧元以上的损失，相当于其GDP的40%左右。


Housing bubbles are not difficult to spot; on the contrary, they typically make headlines long before they pop.	房地产泡沫不难看出； 相反，它们常常在形成燎原之势前就占据媒体头条。


Yet they are far from rare.	然而房地产泡沫并不罕见。


Bubbles in Ireland, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States collapsed after the financial crisis that erupted in 2008.	爱尔兰、西班牙、英国和美国的泡沫都在2008年爆发的金融危机后崩溃。


After the Asian financial crisis erupted in 1997, property prices in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand sank by 20-60%.	1997年亚洲金融危机爆发后，香港、印度尼西亚、马来西亚、菲律宾、韩国和泰国的房价下跌了20—60%。


And a decade earlier, Sweden, Norway, and Finland experienced property-price declines of 30-50%.	而十年前，瑞典、挪威和芬兰也经历了30—50%的房价下跌。


The obvious question is why nobody stepped in before it was too late.	显而易见的问题是为何没有人在一切犹未为晚时采取行动。


The answer is simple: while the bubbles are inflating, many people benefit.	答案很简单：随着泡沫的膨胀，许多人从中受益。


With the construction sector thriving, unemployment falling, and banks lending freely, people are happy – and politicians like it that way.	随着建筑业的繁荣，失业下降，银行肆意借贷，人民十分高兴——政客也因此十分高兴。


The process is simple.	这一过程很简单。


Rising prices trigger a surge in building activity, which creates job opportunities for young, low-skill workers, whose employment options are otherwise limited, and generates large profits for property developers and builders.	房价上升引起建筑活动激增，建筑活动激增创造年轻的低技能工人的就业机会（这些人的就业选择十分有限），并为房地产开发商和承建商带来巨额利润。


In fact, a telltale sign of a bubble is that second-rate developers suddenly are able to earn billions.	事实上，泡沫的一个显著信号便是二等开发生突然间也能够赚取数十亿元。


Banks’ profits rise too, because there is plenty of demand for mortgage lending, which is viewed as almost risk-free.	银行利润也跟着上升，因为按揭贷款被视为几乎没有风险，需求充足。


After all, steadily rising property prices mean that, if a borrower defaults, the property can be resold at a profit.	毕竟，稳步上涨的房地产价格意味着，如果借款人违约，房子也可以再出售而盈利。


(The inevitable market correction remains too remote to be taken seriously at the height of the boom.)	（在繁荣期高峰，难免出现的市场纠正被认为过于遥远，没人会认真对待。


Taking advantage of this lending, ordinary people, from taxi drivers to hairdressers, can become millionaires by playing the market on the side.	）利用按揭贷款，普通人——从出租车司机到发型师——都可以通过单边下注市场成为百万富翁。


All of this benefits elected leaders, who win the support of voters who feel wealthier, the formerly unemployed who find jobs, and the homeowners whose houses are rising in value.	所有这些又都有利于当选领导人，感到变富了的选民、找到工作的失业者和房屋价值节节攀升的业主们都支持他们。


Endearing politicians to voters further are new spending increases and tax cuts that can be undertaken, as accelerating economic growth causes the debt-to-GDP ratio to fall.	而随着经济增长加速降低了债务-GDP之比，新的增支减税计划得以实施，这进一步增加了选民对政客的爱戴。


Because bubbles tend to inflate gradually over a number of years before their abrupt collapse, letting them run a little further seems politically astute.	泡沫在突然崩溃前一般都会逐步膨胀多年，这意味着让它们略微多维持一会儿在政治上有利可图。


No one wants to be the one to stop the party – especially if their job is at stake.	没人希望成为结束派对的人——特别是当自己的饭碗因此受到影响时。


But the partygoers of the private sector cannot be counted on to stop themselves.	但你无法指望私人部门的派对参与者自己停下来。


In particular, banks, for which maintaining market share is crucial, cannot be expected to constrain risky lending, especially given the expectation that, if things do go wrong, the taxpayers will fund a bailout.	特别是，对于维持市场份额至关重要的银行来说，你无法期待它们约束高风险贷款，特别是在情况转坏有纳税人援助兜底的情况下。


This leaves only the financial regulator or the central bank, which can use macroprudential tools – such as loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios on new mortgage lending – to limit the deterioration of banks’ balance sheets during boom times.	这意味着只有金融监管者或中央银行能在繁荣时期遏制银行资产负债表的扭曲之势。 它们可以使用宏观审慎工具——比如对新按揭贷款施加贷款-房价比和债务-收入比要求。


But this approach isn’t perfect, either, because the risky borrowers to whom lending is restricted tend to be first-time or low-income buyers.	但这一方针也不完美，因为贷款受限的高风险借款人多是首次或低收入买家。


This may not be a problem in countries with well-developed housing markets, where there are plenty of rental properties available from professional landlords.	在房地产市场发展完好的国家，有充足的职业房东的出租物业可以选择，这也许不是问题。


After all, in such markets, renters can find housing with security of tenure at price levels that are predictable, even as they evolve gradually over time according to market conditions, thereby ensuring that landlords have incentives to maintain the properties.	毕竟，在这些市场，租户可以以可预测的价格找到有租期保障的房子，尽管这些条件根据市场情况随时间逐渐改变，这确保了房东有维护物业的激励。


But in countries where rental markets are small and function poorly – often a result of a widely held belief that all families should own their homes – financial stability and access to mortgage financing are closely linked.	但在租房市场规模很小、运转情况糟糕的国家——常常是因为人们普遍认为所有家庭都应该拥有自己的房子——金融稳定和按揭融资的易得性紧密相关。


By limiting the riskiest borrowers’ access to finance, rules on mortgage lending can trigger a fierce political backlash.	限制风险最高的借款人获得融资的按揭贷款规则可能引发严重的政治后果。


Ireland is a case in point.	爱尔兰就是一个例子。


In January 2015, the central bank sought to protect financial institutions from another catastrophic bubble by restricting their lending to high-risk borrowers.	2015年1月，爱尔兰央行试图通过限制银行向高风险借款人贷款将金融机构救出又一场灾难性泡沫。


As a result, annual growth in property prices fell from a little over 20% to just below 5%.	结果，房地产价格年增长率从略高于20%下降到略低于5%。


But the construction industry, worried about its profits, has been harshly critical of the rules, as have ordinary people who have been denied credit, and thus must struggle to find suitable housing in a small rental market.	但担忧利润的建筑业对这些规则进行了激烈批评，贷款申请被拒、因此不得不在规模很小的租房市场寻找适合房子的普通人也是如此。


Politicians, no surprise, have jumped on the bandwagon, to capitalize on the popular mood.	毫不奇怪，政客也加入战团，利用这一群众情绪。


As the pressure on Irish regulators to relax lending rules intensifies, so do concerns that they will succumb to it.	随着要求爱尔兰监管者放松贷款规则的压力的增加，对它们最终将屈服的担忧也与日俱增。


One hopes that they will continue to resist.	但愿它们能继续坚持。


Would-be borrowers do indeed face genuine challenges as a result of these regulations; but that is nothing compared to the pain that a collapsing bubble would cause.	潜在贷款人确实因为这些监管措施而面临真正的挑战； 但与泡沫崩溃所引起的痛苦相比，这根本不值一提。


In any case, Ireland’s experience with housing bubbles carries a deeper lesson – one that virtually everyone has missed.	无论如何，爱尔兰的房地产泡沫经验带来了一个更深的教训——这个教训几乎所有人都没有认识到。


A housing system that can so easily produce such large and damaging bubbles is fundamentally flawed.	一个如此容易制造如此庞大和危险的泡沫的房地产体系必有其根本性缺陷。


While restrictions on lending may be useful, they are not enough to bring about an efficient and stable housing system.	尽管限制贷款可能有用，但不足以带来高效稳定的房地产体系。


Many in Ireland might find that conclusion overly pessimistic.	许多爱尔兰人也许认为这一结论过于悲观。


Maybe they are simply hoping that, this time, the luck of the Irish will hold.	也许他们只是希望，这一回爱尔兰能获得运气。


Perhaps it will, and this time really is different.	也许会吧，并且这一回果真不同了。


But there isn’t much evidence of that.	但并没有多少证据证明这一点。


Philosopher Kings Versus Philosopher Presidents	哲学家国王和哲学家总统


LONDON – When I recently met Irish President Michael Higgins – sharing a platform for a speech in which he connected his newly launched “ethics initiative” to a book I co-wrote with my son, How Much is Enough?	伦敦—我最近和爱尔兰总统希金斯碰了面，他在一个场合演讲时把他新提出的“伦理计划”（ethics initiative）与我和犬子合著的《多少才够？ 钱和好生活》（How Much is Enough?


Money and the Good Life – I was struck by his devotion to thought.	Money and the Good Life）相提并论。


Indeed, engaging with ideas is a passion for Ireland’s poet-president – one that more heads of states should take up.	他的深思不辍令我动容。 事实上，这位爱尔兰总统一直热衷于参与思想活动柜，其他国家的首脑也应该效仿，


Last May, Higgins told economics students at the University of Chicago that they were studying a deformed discipline, torn from its ethical and philosophical roots.	去年5月，希金斯对芝加哥大学经济学专业的学生们说，他们学习的是一门畸形的学科，从伦理和哲学的基础上就是被扭曲的。


“The recent economic and financial upheavals,” he declared, “have thrown a glaring light on the shortcomings of the intellectual tools provided by mainstream economics and its key assumptions regarding the sustainability of self-regulating markets,” especially “largely unregulated global financial markets.”	“最近的经济和金融剧变，”他说，“凸显出主流经济学及其关于自我监管的市场、特别是基本不受监管的全球金融市场的可持续性的关键假设所提供的知识工具的缺陷。


He then proposed a “critical examination of some of the core assumptions that underpin economics as it is currently taught in university departments across the world.”	”接着他提出一个“对目前全世界各大学经济系所教授的经济学的某些关键假设的批判分析。 ”


What other head of state would be able to pinpoint the deficiencies of economics so accurately, buttressing his arguments with quotations not just from Adam Smith, but also from Max Weber, Thorstein Veblen, and Jürgen Habermas?	极少有其他国家首脑能像他一样如此准确地直击经济学的缺陷并且旁征博引论证自己的观点，不仅引用亚当·斯密，更是引用了马克斯·韦伯（Max Weber）、托尔斯坦·凡伯伦（Thorstein Veblen）和尤尔根·哈贝马斯（Jürgen Habermas）


Higgins’ experience as an academic and his status as an acclaimed poet undoubtedly give him an advantage over other heads of state, enabling him to hold his own with top thinkers in a way that few others can.	毫无疑问，希金斯作为学者的经验极其著名诗人的地位令他在国家首脑之中鹤立鸡群，能够以他人所不能的方式游刃有余地与顶尖思想家周旋。


More important, however, is his recognition that a political leader should also be a leader of thought and culture for his or her country – and the world.	但是，更重要的是，他认识到政治领袖也应该是其祖国乃至全世界的思想领袖和文化领袖。


Such intellectual leadership should be a major function of all titular (non-executive) heads of state, an important way for them to “earn their keep.”	知识领导力应该成为所有名义（非执行）国家首脑的主要功能、令他们“名副其实”的主要方式。


Of course, the head of state – whether the president or the monarch – has other critical duties as well, including acting as guarantor of the constitution and a symbol of national unity.	当然，国家首脑——不管是总统还是君主——都有其他关键职责，包括作为先发捍卫者和国家统一的象征等。


Moreover, in proportional voting systems like Italy’s, where no single political party normally wins a majority of seats in parliament, the president often plays a key role in appointing the prime minister.	此外，在意大利等国家的比例选举制度（proportional voting system）中，通常无法产生单一的议会多数政党，总统往往需要行使任命总理的重要职责。


The Italian president can also compel parliamentary deputies to rethink their decisions (in the United Kingdom, the monarch has outsourced this authority to the House of Lords).	意大利总理还可以强制要求议会二号人物重新考虑他们的决定（在英国，国王将这一权力外包给了上议院）。


But there is also considerable scope for heads of state to behave in accordance with Ecclesiasticus 44:4: “Leaders of the people by their counsels, and by their knowledge of learning meet for the people, wise and eloquent are their instructions.”	但国家首脑仍有很大的余地根据《便西拉智训44:4》（Ecclesiasticus 44:4）行动：“人民领袖之所以为领袖，是因其指引，因其学会满足人民的知识，智慧和雄辩是他们��武器。


This is particularly important today, when public discourse in democracies is relentlessly demotic and academic work is increasingly specialized.	”如今，民主国家的公共辩论无比接近地气，而学术工作日益专业化，这一点也变得尤其重要。


Though some scholars and thinkers are fit to be “leaders of the people,” a favorable environment is needed to coax them out of their ivory towers.	尽管一些学者和思想家适合成为“人民领袖”，但需要有利的环境让他们走出象牙塔。


To this end, an open-minded, culturally literate, and ideas-oriented head of state could play a pivotal role.	在这方面，思想开放、文化素养浓厚、思想导向的国家首脑可以起到关键作用。


Ideally, that head of state would be an elected president, rather than a hereditary monarch.	在理想情况中，这个国家首脑应该是当选总统而不是世袭君主。


Indeed, anything worthwhile that a monarch can do, an elected non-executive president can do better – not least because an elected official is much less likely to be undermined by the scandals of pampered offspring or degraded by the inevitable hypocrisy and servility of a royal court.	事实上，任何值得君主去做并且能做的东西，当选非执行总统都能做得更好——因为当选官员因为子不教而饱受丑闻困扰或因为难以避免的宫廷伪善和奴性而堕落的可能性要小得多。


More important, an elected president has much greater legitimacy than a hereditary monarch, whose claim to authority depends exclusively on tradition and ceremony.	更重要的是，当选总统的合法性比世袭君主大得多，后者的权威完全取决于传统和经济。


With a king or queen unable to say or do anything that may cause a whiff of controversy, the monarchy has been stripped of its power of action or reflection.	国王或女王不能说或做任何可能引起一丁点争议的事情，因此君主制没有行动力和反思力。


To be sure, monarchs – and especially their spouses, heirs, and relations – often carve out niches for themselves, from wildlife protection to sports and charities.	诚然，君主——尤其是他们的配偶、继承人和亲戚——常常会有一些自己的招牌行为，比如保护野生动物、体育、慈善等。


(Architecture has proved distinctly risky, as Prince Charles learned after launching jeremiads against modernism.)	（其中建筑学被证明十分危险，查尔斯王子在发出反对现代主义的哀叹之声后领教了这一点。


Monarchs and their courts can, to some extent, still act as leaders of art, music, and fashion, as they did in the eighteenth century.	）从某种程度上说，君主和王室仍能成为艺术、音乐和时尚界的领袖，十八世纪就是如此。


But this role has atrophied with the rising expectation that they should be “normal,” representing their populations’ habits and tastes as closely as possible.	但随着对他们应该“普通”、尽可能准确地代表其人民的习惯和品位的期望越来越高，这一角色也变得日益不切实际。


An elected president has a stronger mandate to be controversial, especially in areas of thought and culture that lie beyond the domain of quotidian politics but shape the quality of the public space in which politics plays out.	当选总统有更大的引起争议的权力，特别是在日常政治范围之外但又决定着作为政治施展舞台的公共空间的质量的思想和文化领域。


It would be inconceivable for a reigning monarch to attack the financial oligarchy, as Higgins did in his speech in Chicago.	难以想象在位君主会像希金斯在芝加哥的演讲中做的那样攻击金融寡头。


Even in 1936, when King Edward VIII of Britain declared that “something must be done” about unemployment, he was criticized for overstepping his brief.	1936年英国国王爱德华八世宣布“必须做些什么”对付通胀时，即使是这样的话也令他被批评越了界。


Yet, in May, Higgins declared that his position as head of state compelled him “to represent the experience and hardships of the Irish people” in the years since economic crisis befell them.	但是，5月希金斯宣布，身为国家首脑，他不得不“展现爱尔兰人在经济危机爆发后这几年中的体验和艰难。 ”


But the most important reason why an elected president is better equipped than a monarch to catalyze a public conversation about a society’s values and priorities is that he or she is more likely to be a person of superior ability.	但为何当选总统比君主更适合刺激关于社会价值和当务之急的公共争论？ 最重要的原因是他更有可能具有出众的能力。


Indeed, that is why, on balance, a meritocratic system will always produce better results than a hereditary one.	事实上，正因如此，总而言之贤能制度总是能比世袭制度产生更好的结果。


Monarchs today are reared to be ordinary, as suits their diminished role in national life.	今天的君主被塑造成了普通人，以契合他们在国家生活中作用的日益式微。


But democratic countries need symbols of the extraordinary if they are not to sink into permanent mediocrity.	但民主国家如果不想陷入永恒的平庸，就需要代表卓越的象征。


Ireland’s Moment of Fiscal Decision	爱尔兰做出财政决定的时刻


DUBLIN – “The construction of Europe is an art,” former French President Jacques Chirac once said.	发自都柏林——“欧洲的建构是一门艺术，”法国前总统雅克·希拉克曾说，“而且是一门可能性的艺术。


“It is the art of the possible.” If so, then Europe’s deconstruction – or, worse, its collapse – would be a shockingly fearful and painful business.	”而如果欧洲的建构是一门关于可能性的艺术，那么它的分裂——或者更严重地说，崩溃——就将是一个骇人听闻的可怕而痛苦的事情。


That was the situation faced by European leaders last autumn.	这就是欧洲领袖们在去年夏天所面对的情况。


The euro was in serious trouble, buffeted by rumors of imminent banking collapses.	当时欧元正面临着巨大的麻烦，又遭到四处流传的银行系统崩溃谣言的连续打击。


Bond yields in southern Europe were rising, and a pervasive sense of apprehension and fear cloaked governments in European capitals.	南欧国家债券的收益率不断攀升，各国政府内部都笼罩着忧虑和恐惧的气氛。


But political leadership was sorely lacking.	而唯独缺少的则是政治领导力。


Finally, in December, decisive action was taken.	最后的决定性行动终于在去年12月出台。


There would be a “fiscal treaty,” which would reinforce the Stability and Growth Pact and, importantly, entail automatic sanctions to ensure that eurozone members stick to those rules.	各方将达成一个“财政协议”并以此巩固稳定与增长公约，更重要的是，这将出台一系列自动执行的制裁手段以确保欧元区成员能严格准守相关协议条款。


At the same time, the European Central Bank unleashed its €1 trillion ($1.3 trillion) long-term refinancing operation, which pulled the European banking system back from the brink.	与此同时，欧洲中央银行出台了其1万亿欧元（折合1. 3万亿美元）长期再融资行动，将欧洲银行系统从悬崖边缘拉了回来。


These two measures were both timely and vital, creating a much-needed period of calm.	这两大举措都是及时且重要的，为人们带来了一段安定时期以及某些空间。


In March, having agreed on the fiscal treaty, the European Council turned its attention to reviving economic growth, which will be the key to long-term fiscal sustainability.	在今年3月，已经批准财政协议的欧洲理事会将注意力转向了重振经济增长方面，而这也是实现长期财政稳定的关键。


In Ireland, our attorney-general advised on the need to hold a referendum on the fiscal treaty, and we are now in the midst of the campaign.	在爱尔兰，我们的总检查长建议就该财政协议举行全民公决，而我们也正处于对此的选举宣传运动当中。


The government parties, Fine Gael and Labour, as well as the largest opposition party, Fianna Fáil, are campaigning tirelessly for a yes vote.	执政联盟成员爱尔兰统一党和爱尔兰工党，以及最大的反对党爱尔兰共和党都奋力争取选民，希望人们能投下赞成的一票。


The reasons we are backing the fiscal treaty are simple.	而我们支持这项协议的理由很简单。


The treaty would promote stability in the Irish economy and contribute to stabilizing the euro, our currency.	该协议将促进爱尔兰经济的稳定并有助于稳定我们的货币——欧元。


It would increase confidence in Ireland and allow us to increase the existing flow of inward foreign direct investment.	它将增强人们对爱尔兰的信心并使我们可以继续增加现有的外国直接投资流入额。


Ratification would also give us guaranteed access to funding from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), should we ever need it.	同时批准协议也可以确保我们能从欧洲稳定机制（European Stability Mechanism）处得到所需的财政资助。


The ESM is Ireland’s insurance policy as we work our way out of the bailout program with the “troika” (the European Commission, the ECB, and the International Monetary Fund) and return to the markets.	欧洲稳定机制实际上等同于爱尔兰所买的一份保险，我们与三驾马车（欧盟委员会，欧洲央行和国际货币基金组织）共同合作，从拯救计划中走出来并重新回归市场。


Most importantly, the fiscal treaty promises to ensure responsible budgeting throughout the eurozone.	最重要的是，财政协议承诺确保整个欧元区的负责任预算行为。


For us, that means that the economic mismanagement that caused the Irish economy’s collapse would never recur.	对我们来说，这意味着导致爱尔兰经济崩溃的经济错误管理行为永远不会再度复发。


It would also mean stable European economies to which we can export.	它同时也意味着一个可供我国商品出口的更稳固的欧洲经济。


For Ireland to continue on the path of economic recovery, it needs to be seen as part of the solution, not part of the problem.	为了令爱尔兰继续进行经济复原，就需要将财政协议视为解决方案的一部份，而不是问题的一部份。


We are making progress, and we need to continue doing so.	我们正在取得进步，也必须继续这样做下去。


Ireland’s government has exceeded its targets under the troika program, and the economy returned to growth last year.	爱尔兰政府已经超额完成了三驾马车项目所制定的计划，经济也在去年实现了增长。


International investors are increasingly looking at Ireland as a smart place to do business.	国际投资者正逐渐将爱尔兰视为一个做生意的明智之地。


They recognize the dynamic, transparent, and competitive fundamentals of the Irish economy.	他们认识到了爱尔兰经济的活力，透明和富有竞争力的本质。


We are highly regarded around the world as an excellent export base.	全世界都将我们视为一个极佳的出口基地。


Global companies recognize that, as the only English-speaking member of the eurozone, Ireland is ideally placed as a gateway to Europe.	全球企业认识到作为欧元区中唯一一个讲英语的国家，我们是一个通往欧洲的理想关口。


Indeed, Ireland is ranked as the best place in Europe to do business, the easiest in Europe for paying taxes, and number one in Europe for completion of tertiary education.	爱尔兰被排名为欧洲最佳的生意场所，欧洲付税最容易的地方，也是欧洲高等教育最具竞争力的国家。


We are an open, transparent economy with a highly skilled workforce and a market of 500 million people on our doorstep.	我们是一个开放透明的经济体，拥有高技能的劳动力，而且门口就是一个5亿人的庞大市场。


Crucially, we are also a member of the second-largest currency area in the world.	关键是，我们也是全球第二大货币区的成员之一。


Foreign direct investment accounts by more than 1,000 overseas companies translates into 145,000 jobs in Ireland, 70% of total exports, and €2.8 billion in corporate-tax receipts.	由超过1000家海外公司带来的国外直接投资为爱尔兰创造了14. 5万个职位，70%的总出口以及28亿欧元的企业税收。


These companies spend €16 billion per year on goods, services, and wages in Ireland.	这些公司每年在爱尔兰花费160亿欧元来支付商品���服务和工资。


The latest figures show that 2011 was a very strong year for attracting investment into the Irish economy, with a record 148 new projects – a 30% increase in companies investing in Ireland for the first time – implying an additional 13,000 jobs.	最新的数据显示2011年对爱尔兰吸引投资来说是增长非常迅猛的一年，实现了创纪录的148个新项目——首次实现了公司投资增长30%——这也意味着额外增加1. 3万个职位。


Investors come here because they link Ireland’s eurozone membership to our long-term economic stability and access to outside support if necessary.	投资者们之所以来到这里，就是因为他们把爱尔兰的欧元区成员国地位和我国的长期经济稳定以及在有需要的情况下获取外界支持的渠道联系在了一起。


By voting for the fiscal treaty, we can guarantee that stability and support – and thus guarantee continued confidence and investment in the Irish economy.	通过为财政协议投下赞成票，我们可以保证能获得稳定和支持——并因此保证爱尔兰经济的持续信心和投资。


The new treaty reflects clear recognition that the euro’s initial design was flawed.	新协议反映出了一个清晰的认知，明白欧元的原本设计是有缺陷的。


We spoke about European Monetary Union, but we didn’t have it.	我们谈论欧洲货币联盟，但我们却无法拥有它。


The Stability and Growth Pact, contained in the Maastricht Treaty, laid down strict rules of budgetary discipline, which were immediately violated – and not by small countries, but by both France and Germany.	马斯特里赫特条约中的稳定与增长公约为预算纪律订下了严格的规条，但却迅速遭到违反，而且不仅是那些小国，而是法国和德国。


Irish recovery cannot occur without European recovery.	没有欧洲的复原就没有爱尔兰复原。


We must stand together or fall together, because our economies are so interconnected.	我们必须共同进退，因为我们的经济是紧密联系在一起的。


This involves putting our public finances in order, which the fiscal treaty allows.	这包括让我们的公共财政恢复秩序，使之符合财政条约的要求。


We have begun that process; the next stage will be an unwavering focus on growth and economic renewal throughout the European Union.	我们已经开始了整个进程； 下一步就是毫不动摇地将焦点放在遍及全欧洲的增长和经济重建之上。


Ireland Votes, Europe Waits	全欧洲关注爱尔兰投票


MAYNOOTH, IRELAND – On June 12, Irish voters will vote on the European Union’s Lisbon Treaty, the instrument designed to improve the efficiency and legitimacy of the now 27-member bloc.	爱尔兰梅努斯--6月12日，爱尔兰的选民们将对欧盟里斯本条约进行投票。 这一条约的目的在于提高拥有27个成员国的欧盟的效率以及合法性。


Ireland is the only country to put the Treaty to a referendum – all the other member states have chosen to ratify the Treaty by parliamentary means – and everything indicates that the result will be close.	爱尔兰是唯一把条约付诸全民公决的国家，其他所有成员国都决定通过议会表决来批准这一条约。 所有迹象都表明表决结果将会十分接近。


For Prime Minister Brian Cowen’s new government, the risk is that a “No” to the Lisbon Treaty would cripple his administration in its infancy.	对于总理考恩的新政府而言，如果里斯本条约遭到否决，那么他刚刚组建的新政府就会陷于瘫痪。


For the EU, Irish rejection of the Treaty would probably trigger a lengthy period of instability, and perhaps even an end to the European integration process as it is now constituted.	对于欧盟而言，如果爱尔兰拒绝条约，就有可能引发漫长的不稳定时期，甚至会终结目前的欧洲联合进程。


In 2001, Irish voters rejected the Nice Treaty, which threw the EU into a protracted period of crisis and introspection, which ended only with agreement on the so-called Constitutional Treaty in 2005.	2001年，爱尔兰选民们拒绝了尼斯条约，把欧盟推向了漫长的危机和内省。 这一阶段直到2005年对所谓的宪法条约达成协议才告结束。


Almost immediately, however, French and Dutch voters rejected that Treaty, bringing the negotiations back to square one.	但是，法国和荷兰的选民们几乎马上拒绝了这一条约，把谈判重新带回了起点。


Now, after a lengthy and difficult period of reflection and bargaining, those efforts may be in jeopardy again.	现在，经历了漫长而又困难的反省和讨价还价阶段，这些努力可能再一次陷于困境。


The “No” campaign has been vigorous, comprising a motley crew of aging Marxists, anti-globalization protestors, traditional euroskeptics, and obsessive “sovereigntists.”	反对条约的势力十分活跃。 他们主要是一些上了年纪的马克思主义者、反全球化抗议者、传统的欧洲怀疑派以及过分要求国家主权的人混杂在一起的人士。


They have sought to capitalize on the vacuum of knowledge in Ireland regarding EU affairs and the “Yes” side’s relative lateness to mobilize.	他们企图利用爱尔兰对欧盟事务的知识空缺以及支持派相对组织迟缓。


Voters have been subjected to a barrage of outlandish claims: the Treaty would supposedly introduce abortion into Ireland (it is outlawed under Ireland’s constitution), abolish Ireland’s low corporate-tax rate, and introduce a European army that would soon be sending Irish boys home from distant battlefields in body bags.	选民们听到了一大堆怪论。 什么条约将会让堕胎合法化(爱尔兰的宪法禁止堕胎)，取消爱尔兰的低企业税，并且将会建立一支欧洲军队，马上就让在远方征战的爱尔兰士兵在尸体袋中运回来。


Even Ireland’s dismal performance at the recent Eurovision Song Contest has been used to bolster the message: “They didn’t vote for us; why should we vote for them?”	甚至爱尔兰在最近的欧洲歌唱比赛中表现不佳也被利用，说“他们不投我们的票，为什么我们要投他们的票呢？ ”


Though these claims are easily discredited, the “Yes” side has been unable to provide voters with sufficient reasons to vote for the Treaty.	尽管很容易击破这些言论，但是赞成派还是没有能够给选民提供足够多的理由来投票赞成条约。


If that wasn’t enough, the “No” side has also been able to associate the EU with rising fuel and food prices as the campaign draws to a close.	更有甚者，在选举活动接近尾声的时候，反对派还把欧盟同燃油和食品价格上升联系起来。


Two factors that are likely to decide the referendum’s outcome can be singled out: turnout and how the farming community votes.	有两个决定全民公决结果的因素，也就是投票率和农民如何投票。


Opinion polls currently show the “Yes” side leading by two to one (35% to 18%).	民意调查目前表明赞成方以二比一领先(35%对18%) 。


But there is little comfort in these figures for pro-Europeans: polls prior to the failed referendum on the Nice treaty in 2001 demonstrated an even larger “Yes” majority at the same stage.	但是这对于亲欧洲派人士而言并不令人宽慰。 2001年尼斯条约全民公决失败之前的民意调查显示赞成票比现在还要多。


Now as then, “No” voters seem more committed.	现在和当时一样，反对者更为坚决。


The percentage of “Don’t knows” remains high, at about 47%, so there is everything to play for in the campaign’s final days.	那些不知如何投票的人比例还是很高，大约为47%。 因此在竞选的最后关头局势难以预料。


The crucial issue will be turnout.	关键问题是投票率。


In 2001 the ‘Yes’ side lost because it failed to convince enough voters to turn out – almost two thirds of the electorate failed to vote.	在2001年，赞成派失利是因为没有鼓动足够多的选民去投票。 那一次有三分之二的选民没有投票。


In 2002 a second referendum was held which reversed the result and saw the ‘Yes’ side triumph.	2002年举行第二次全民公决逆转了结果，赞成派获胜。


A good part of the explanation for this turnaround was the fact that the government managed to convince enough voters to move from abstention to the ‘Yes’ camp (though the turnout still failed to reach 50%).  All of this suggests that the higher the turnout the greater the likelihood of a ‘Yes’ win.	这一结果翻盘的原因是政府成功地鼓动足够多的选民把弃权票改为赞成票(尽管投票率还是低于50%) 。 所有这些都表明投票率越高，赞成派就越可能赢。


For Irish farmers the campaign has delivered a golden opportunity to engage in a tactical assault on Brussels.	对于爱尔兰农民而言，这一竞选提供了一次绝佳的机会来批评欧盟。


They have sought to link the Treaty to the ongoing Doha Round of World Trade Organization talks.	他们试图把条约与正在进行的世界贸易组织多哈回合谈判联系起来。


Peter Mandelson, the EU’s trade commissioner, has been routinely presented as public enemy number one with his proposals to reduce some agricultural tariffs by up to 70%.	欧盟贸易委员曼德尔森一直被人视为头号敌人，因为他建议降低某些农业关税最高达70%。


Farming organizations threaten to withhold support for the Treaty unless the government threatens to veto Mandelson’s proposals.	农业组织威胁，除非政府威胁否决曼德尔森的建议，否则就不支持条约。


Although the Irish Farmers Association (IFA) has belatedly urged its 85,000 members to support the Treaty, opinion polls show farmers are opposed to Lisbon by a two to one majority.	尽管爱尔兰农民协会有点晚了地敦促其八万五千名成员支持条约，民意调查表明农民们反对里斯本条约的比例达到二比一。


Their votes could prove crucial in a tight contest.	他们的投票将在紧张的竞赛中十分关键。


From the outside looking in it seems almost perverse that Irish voters might reject the Lisbon Treaty.	从局外人角度来看，如果爱尔兰选民拒绝里斯本条约就有点偏执。


After all Ireland has benefited more than other state from the European integration process, garnering almost €60billion in EU subsidies during 35 years of membership.	毕竟，爱尔兰比其他欧盟成员国更多地从欧盟联合进程中获益，加入欧盟35年来获得了几乎600亿欧元的欧盟补贴。


But in a context where the EU remains too remote from citizens and where apathy and confusion define the referendum campaign, the ‘No’ side has cleverly packaged its message of Europe as an existential threat to Irish jobs, investment and sovereignty.	但是，对于民众来说欧盟还是遥远不可及，而且竞选活动充满莫不关心以及混淆。 在这一形势下，反对派聪明地把欧盟说成是对爱尔兰人工作岗位、投资以及主权的事关存亡的威胁。


Ireland, long one of the EU’s bright spots, will be a source of great anxiety in the days to come.	爱尔兰长久以来一直是欧盟的亮点，现在将会在未来几天内让人忧心忡忡。


Is Academic Freedom Worth Its Price?	学术自由物有所值吗？


WARWICK, UK – Is academic freedom affordable in a time of economic crisis?	英国沃里克——经济危机期间，人们是否还能负担得起学术自由？


That was the topic for discussion at the annual signing of the Magna Charta Universitatum at the mother of universities, the University of Bologna, earlier this year.	这一议题在年初有大学之母之称的博洛尼亚大学举行的《大学宪章》年度签字仪式上引发了热烈的讨论。


The Magna Charta is the world’s most visible statement of principles for the promotion and protection of university autonomy.	《大学宪章》是推动并保护大学自治权的世界最著名的原则声明。


Over the past two decades, nearly 700 institutions of higher education on every continent have signed it.	二十多年来，世界各地将近700所高校已经签署这份声明。


Nevertheless, there remains a nagging sense that universities are luxuries now that ordinary people are struggling to make ends meet.	但在普通人为收支平衡绞尽脑汁的今天，总让人感觉大学已经成为一种奢侈品。


There has always been reason for concern.	人们的担忧总是不无道理。


In the past, universities have been created in times of plenty, typically to encourage people to think beyond their immediate need for survival to more edifying spiritual or national goals.	回顾历史，大学一般是在物质丰裕时期建立，目的是鼓励人们跳出基本生存需求的羁绊，献身于更有启迪意义的精神或国家目标。


Nearly 50 years ago, a statistically minded historian of science, Derek de Solla Price, observed that the best indicator of academic research production is a nation’s energy consumption per capita: both grow together.	近50年前，一位注重统计数据的科学史家德里克·德索拉·普赖斯观察到一个国家的人均能源消费是学术研究成果的最佳指标： 两者呈共同增长之势。


This is hardly surprising.	这并不令人意外。


From a strictly economic standpoint, academic freedom requires relative immunity to costs, whether stemming from trial-and-error experimentation or from more radical challenges to the status quo.	从纯粹经济学的角度，无论是试错性的实验方法还是对现状更为激进的挑战，学术自由需要的是对成本相对较低的敏感度。


But should universities now reduce their demands in order to meet the needs of the larger society, not least in terms of their carbon footprint?	但大学是否现在应当降低需求，尤其是碳足迹方面的需求，以适应社会的总体环境？


If universities are to remain universities in the sense originally laid down by the Bolognese lawyers, the answer is no.	如果大学要保持博洛尼亚律师们最初勾勒的大学本色，那么答案是否定的。


Moreover, this is not an affront to economics.	而且这与对经济学的侮辱无关。


The efficiency savings of academia occur downstream from the activities of the universities themselves.	学术界的增效节支恰恰来自于大学的各项活动本身。


Indeed, universities may be the most consistently performing products of long-term capital investment, especially if one is inclined to think about social and economic “investment” in exactly the same terms.	事实上，大学或许是长期资本投资领域效率最高的产品，特别是当我们把社会和经济“投资”放在同等条件下考量时更是如此。


After all, the university’s unique institutional mission is to manufacture knowledge as a public good.	归根结底，为公益目的生产知识是大学独一无二的体制任务。


The new knowledge produced by original research is an instance of social capital formation.	原创研究得出的新知识是社会资本形成的实例。


It results from academics and funders collaborating on projects that aim to increase the competitive advantage of each in their respective domains.	新知识来源于学者与力求在各自领域内获得竞争优势的出资人在各种项目上的合作。


Left at this stage, knowledge is simply intellectual property, access to which is restricted to paying customers.	如果只停留在这个阶段，那么知识不过是一种知识产权，而对知识的利用权也仅限于那些付过钱的客户。


But universities also have an institutional mandate to teach.	但大学还同时担负着教书育人的体制任务。


This forces knowledge to be made more widely available, thereby breaking the effective monopoly that researchers and their funders would otherwise enjoy.	这一特点迫使大学向公众提供知识，并因此打破研究者及其出资人本来有权享受的有效的垄断权利。


Joseph Schumpeter’s phrase “creative destruction,” his definition of entrepreneurship, aptly describes this process.	约瑟夫·熊彼特的名词“创造性破坏”及其为企业家精神所给出的定义对这一过程作出了恰如其分的描述。


Once teaching reduces, if not eliminates, the original competitive advantage associated with a piece of research, academics and their funders are forced to seek new sources of advantage by producing new knowledge.	一旦教学消灭或减少了与某项研究成果相关的竞争优势，学者及其资助者就被迫通过创造新知识的方法来寻求新的优势。


In the process, the larger public – those not involved in the original production of new knowledge – benefit through classroom instruction.	在这一过程中，那些并未参与新知识原始创造过程的广大公众却从课堂教学中受益。


In this sense, the heart of the university is located in its curriculum committee, as the mechanism by which research is regularly translated into teaching, generating new cycles of creative destruction.	从这个意义上讲，大学的核心机构是课程委员会，因为新一轮的创造性破坏循环是由将研究成果经常性转化为教学内容的相关机制开启。


Efficiency-minded knowledge managers nowadays say that the very idea of the university as a place where the same people produce and distribute knowledge is a throwback to the Middle Ages.	当今效率至上的知识管理者们认为将大学视为由同一群人创造并传播知识的场所是一种向中世纪的倒退。


Today, teaching is thus said to be more efficiently delivered on-line, and research best delivered through dedicated “science parks.”	因此今天据说最有效的教学方式是在线授课，而最有效的研究方式是设立专门的“科学园区”。


But, while the sense of “efficiency” that attracted the mendicant Christian orders, the Dominicans and Franciscans, to staff the original universities was rather different, it is no less relevant today.	不过因为吸引以化缘为生的基督教神职人员、道明会和圣方济会人员加盟原创大学的对于“效率”的认识大相庭径，它在今天也依然具有重要的意义。


The Dominicans and Franciscans literally lived by begging – that is, by depending on diverse sources of income, whose return to any particular investor was always unclear.	道明会和圣方济会人士确实以乞讨为生，也就是说他们的收入来源多种多样，而对于某一位投资者的回报也许并不清晰。


The autonomy of these orders rested on a proven long-term ability to do more than expected with what they were given.	这些神职人员的自主权取决于利用赋予他们的资源取得可以证实的长期结果的能力。


The Latin word for this ability was povertas, or “poverty” in English.	这种能力在拉丁语中写作povertas，在英语中则对应“贫困”一词。


While the word does not retain its original virtuous connotations, we still warm to the virtuosity of “doing more with less.”	尽管词汇没有保留住其原有的善良内涵，我们依然热衷于“以较少代价换取更多成果”的精湛技艺。


In the case of the university, this means allowing access to knowledge to students who lack the intellectual, political, or financial resources that might have enabled them to produce it for themselves.	在大学这个个案中，这就意味着允许那些因不具备思想、政治或财政资源而无法独立得出研究成果的学生掌握相关知识。


Universities perform their natural economic function when academics speak and write plainly, demystify jargon, present their ideas in alternative media and stress applications to domains that do not concern the academics themselves.	当学者用简单明了的方式谈话和写作，被剥去神秘外衣的术语理念在其他媒体上得到解释并强调知识在与学者本人无关领域中的应用时，大学就完美履行了它自然的经济任务。


In these ways, academics enable knowledge to do maximum work at minimal cost to its recipients.	学者们借助这些方式让知识以最小代价为受众创造最大的价值。


In short, universities prove their worth if students find it easier to appropriate academic knowledge than the academics themselves originally did.	简言之，如果学生掌握学术知识的难度比最初创造知识的学者本人要小，大学就能够证明自己物有所值。


Is America Healing Fast Enough?	美国经济康复够快吗？


NEWPORT BEACH – Six internal factors suggest that the United States’ economy is slowly healing.	纽波特海滩—六大国内要素表明，美国经济正在缓慢康复。


For some observers, these factors were deemed sufficient to form the critical mass needed to propel the economy into escape velocity.	对某些观察者来说，这些因素已足以形成临界质量，让经济达到逃逸速度。


While I hoped that they might be proven right, the recent stream of weak economic data, including May’s timid net job creation of only 69,000, confirmed my doubts.	尽管我十分希望他们最终能被证明是正确的，但最新的疲软经济数字（包括5月就业岗位净增量仅仅69000个）确认了我的怀疑。


With this and other elements of a disheartening employment report now suddenly raising widespread worries about the underlying health and durability of America’s recovery, it is important to understand the positive factors and why they are not enough as yet.	5月就业报告中的一系列令人沮丧的数字一下子引起了人们对美国经济的健康度和持久力的广泛担忧，认识积极因素并理解它们为何不足以提振经济是很重要的。


For starters, large US multinational companies are as healthy as I have ever seen them.	首先，美国大型跨国公司一直都很健康。


Their cash balances are extremely high, interest payments on debt are low, and principal obligations have been termed out.	它们手握大把现金，债务的利息支出很低，本金负担也可以一再延期。


Many of them are successfully tapping into buoyant demand in emerging economies, generating significant free cash flow.	许多跨国公司都搭上了新兴经济体需求旺盛的东风，大把延揽免费现金流。


Company cash is not the only source of considerable spending power waiting on the sidelines.	公司现金并不是唯一的可观闲置购买力来源。


Rich households also hold significant resources that could be deployed in support of both consumption and investment.	富裕的家庭也可以作为支持消费和投资的重要来源。


The third and fourth positive factors relate to housing and the labor market.	第三和第四个积极因素与房地产和劳动力市场有关。


These two long-standing areas of persistent weakness have constituted a major drag on the type of cyclical dynamics that traditionally thrust the US out of its periodic economic slowdowns.	这两大领域疲软已久，是周期动态中的主要拖累因素，在传统上，周期动态总会将美国带出暂时性的经济减速。


But recent data support the view that the housing sector could be in the process of establishing a bottom, albeit an elongated one.	最近的数据表明，房地产市场可能已开始筑底，尽管筑底过程可能持续较长时间。


Meanwhile, job growth, while anemic, has nonetheless been consistently positive since September 2010.	与此同时，自2010年9月以来，就业一直维持正增长，尽管增速比较缓慢。


Then there is the US Federal Reserve Board.	接下来是美联储董事会。


Despite legitimate questions about the effectiveness of its unconventional and ever-experimental policy stance, the Fed appears willing to be even more activist if the economy weakens.	尽管其前无古人的非常规政策立场招来了颇多不无道理的质疑，但美联储仍准备在经济疲软时采取更加积极的手段。


Indeed, if the Fed makes an inadvertent mistake (the likelihood of this is considerable, given the country’s complex situation and the “unusually uncertain” outlook), it is more likely to err on the side of staying accommodative for too long, rather than tightening monetary policy prematurely.	事实上，如果美联储在无意中犯了什么错误（出现这种情况的可能性相当大，因为美国的情况十分复杂，前景“极其不确定”），那多半是错在松得太久，而不在过早紧缩。


Finally, with the November elections in sight and subsequently out of the way, some believe that politicians in Washington might finally be in a better position to agree to much-needed grand policy bargains.	最后，11月大选即将到来。 因此有人认为，大选结束后华盛顿政客们最终能够更好地在一些颇为紧要的政策讨价还价中形成一致。


In addition to removing the damaging specter of the fiscal cliff – a potentially disruptive economic hindrance equivalent to some 4% of GDP, in the form of excessively blunt spending cuts and across-the-board tax increases – greater political effectiveness would serve to remove other uncertainties that inhibit certain economic activities.	除了消灭财政悬崖这个危险的怪物——可能会对经济造成相当于GDP的4%的损失，其形式包括过度的支出削减和全面的增税——之外，政治效率的改善还能够消除其他困扰经济活动的不确定性。


Each of these six factors suggests actual and potential economic healing.	这六大因素均表明，经济将出现实质和潜在的康复。


So, not surprisingly, they have provoked excitement in some circles that the US may finally be poised to leave behind the depressing trio of unusually sluggish growth, persistently high unemployment, and high and growing inequality.	因此，毫不奇怪，不少人对此欢欣鼓舞，认为美国终于能够摆脱增长反常疲软、失业持续高企和不平等性高企且不断恶化的三重萧条打击。


The problem is that these factors, both individually and in combination, are unlikely to be a game-changer, for four reasons:	问题在于，不管从独立的角度还是从联合的角度看，这六大因素都无法扭转局势，原因有四：


·         The economic and financial headwinds from outside the US are strong and gusting, owing largely to the ever-worsening European crisis, which is now entering an even more disruptive and unpredictable phase as depositors in some countries step up their withdrawals from local banks.	·         美国所面临的外部经济和金融阻力极大，因为欧洲危机在不断恶化，随着某些国家的储户大举逃离本地银行，欧洲危机正在进入更具破坏性、更不可预测的阶段。


But it also reflects the beginning of a growth slowdown in the major emerging countries, including Brazil, China, India, and Russia.	但这还反映出主要新兴国家的增���也开始减速，包括巴西、中国、印度和俄罗斯。


·         Too many sectors of the US economy have not completed their balance-sheet rehabilitation process.	·         美国经济中有太多部门还没有完成资产负债表的修复过程。


This is true for the banking system, which has not de-leveraged to the satisfaction of either regulators or the markets, thus limiting the scope for credit growth.	毫无疑问，银行系统的去杠杆化程度既不能满足监管者，也不能令市场满意，这限制了信用增长的势头。


It is also true for many households.	许多家庭的情况也是如此。


Indeed, with the average household savings rate having dropped recently to below 4%, too many families are in the process of exhausting their cushions of emergency cash, if they have not done so already.	事实上，目前家庭平均储蓄率已跌至4%以下，太多家庭已经或正在耗尽他们的紧急情况应对金


·         The unusual monetary-policy activism of the last few years risks causing collateral damage and producing unintended consequences.	·         过去几年来反常的货币政策积极主义可能会导致附带伤害、造成意外后果。


While no individual issue is overwhelming yet, together they could serve to dampen economic activity and the proper functioning of markets.	分开看，所有问题都不足以致命，但综合起来，它们可能摧毁经济活动，让市场功能瘫痪。


Recall that the Fed’s policy bet was that these “costs and risks,” to use Chairman Ben Bernanke’s phrase, would be more than offset by the improvement in the overall economic situation.	别忘了，美联储的政策赌注是，整体经济情况的改善抵消这些“成本和风险”（美联储主席伯南克语）绰绰有余。


But this generalized benefit has failed to materialize.	但这一总体化的收益并没有实现。


·         Perhaps most importantly, repeated delays in removing the persistent impediments to growth and jobs means that some of them are becoming stubbornly embedded in the structure of the US economy – thus draining its dynamism and reducing its responsiveness.	·         也许最重要的是，增长和就业的持久性障碍迟迟得不到消除意味着其中一些障碍已经深深嵌入了美国经济的结构之中，从而侵蚀了美国经济的活力和响应能力。


For example, with long-term joblessness at 5.4 million and the average duration of unemployment at 2.5 times the historical norm, workers are less able to regain productive employment quickly at anywhere near their previous wages and salaries.	比如，长期失业人口高达540万，平均失业期也达到了历史平均水平的2. 5倍，工人很难快速找到新的工资和薪水与前一份工作相当的生产性岗位。


Similarly, the alarmingly high level of youth joblessness increases the risk of relatively new entrants into the labor force becoming unemployable.	类似地，年轻人失业率水平已达到了足以引起警觉的程度，职场的相对新人刚进入劳动力市场就得面临失业的状况。


The bottom line is unfortunate, but it must be acknowledged.	形势是严峻的，但不得不承认这一点。


While the US economy is gradually healing, a lot more needs to happen – indeed, urgently – to restore its traditional vigor and vitality.	美国经济正在逐渐康复，但做得还远远不够，事实上，我们迫切需要重塑美国经济的传统生气和活力。


Most important, robust recovery requires a degree of seriousness and constructive collaboration in Washington that seems elusive today.	最重要的是，稳健的复苏要求华盛顿形成真心实意的建设性合作，这正是眼下所难寻觅的迹象。


Unless and until this cooperation materializes, the hope of achieving economic escape velocity will remain just that – a hope.	除非形成了这样的合作，否则让经济达到逃逸速度的愿望将永远是愿望。


And, rather than surging forward, the US economy, regrettably and exasperatingly, will remain captive to unusual sluggishness, while its vulnerability to the ill winds blowing from the rest of the world will only increase.	此外，遗憾也好，气愤也罢，美国经济仍然处在反常的停滞阶段，而没有进入大踏步向前的过程，其受世界其他国家恶风冲击的脆弱性还在与日俱增。


Is Azerbaijan Next?	阿塞拜疆是否会成为下一个？


As Azerbaijan gears up for parliamentary elections on November 6, the main question is whether the country is about to undergo its own “color” revolution, along the lines of those that have overthrown post-Soviet elites in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan in the last two years.	随着阿塞拜疆为11月6日举行的议会选举做好了准备，主要的问题集中在该国是否也会步过去两年间推翻了后苏联高层人物的格鲁吉亚、乌克兰和吉尔吉斯斯坦的后尘爆发“色彩”革命。


Such an outcome cannot be ruled out, but the prospects are uncertain at best.	这种可能性无法排除，但如果论及前景至多也就是不能确定。


Azerbaijan’s ruling party, Eni Azerbaijan, faces challenges all around, despite the support of President Ilham Aliyev and privileged access to state resources.	尽管拥有伊尔哈姆·阿利耶夫总统的支持和优先使用国家资源的权利，阿塞拜疆执政党新阿塞拜疆党仍然面临着全面的挑战。


At least three opposition parties – Isa Gambar’s “Mussavat,” Ala Keremela’s “The National Front, and the Social Democratic Party – have maintained support and political influence since Ilham succeeded his late father, Heydar Aliyev, in 2003.	伊萨·甘巴尔的穆萨瓦特党、克瑞姆里的人民阵线党以及阿塞拜疆的民族独立党等至少三个反对派政党从伊尔哈姆2003年接替他已故的父亲盖达尔·阿利耶夫担任总统后就一直保持着自己的支持力量和政治影响。


Moreover, like Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, dynastic politics in Azerbaijan reflects the dominance of clans whose members’ success is determined by proximity to the president.	更有甚者，与格鲁吉亚、乌克兰和吉尔吉斯斯坦一样，阿塞拜疆的王朝政治是各个家族势力的反映，而家族势力的强弱又取决与家族成员与总统的密切关系。


While such systems may appear stable, they are inherently fragile, for they are synonymous with lawlessness, injustice, and abject poverty for the majority of the population.	尽管这样的体系看起来非常稳固，但从本质上讲却十分脆弱，因为对大多数人来讲，无法无天、缺乏公正和一贫如洗与上述体系如影随形。


The opposition has already started preparing the ground for change.	反对派已经开始为变化创造条件。


The leaders of the three-party opposition bloc Azadlyg (Freedom) have declared that they will regard any electoral outcome that gives opposition parties less than 70% of the vote as having been falsified, and that street protests would follow.	三大反对党领袖组成的反对派“自由”联盟已经宣布，如果选举结果中反对派所获票数低于70%，他们就会认定该结果弄虚作假，而后他们将上街游行。


This would conform to the pattern seen in Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003, and Ukraine in 2004.	这和2000年塞尔维亚、2003年格鲁吉亚和2004年乌克兰的模式如出一辙。


But can such a scheme work in Azerbaijan?	但这样一个计划在阿塞拜疆能够奏效吗？


A “dress rehearsal” failed in October 2003, when the opposition, incapable of uniting around a single candidate to challenge Ilham in the presidential election, declared the results to have been falsified and called people into the streets.	2003年10月的“尝试演练”未获成功，因为当时的反对党未能团结在唯一的候选人周围，在总统选举中向伊尔哈姆提出挑战。 反对派宣布选举结果有假，号召人们上街游行。


Only several hundred showed up, and the police quickly dispersed them, arresting dozens.	只有几百人响应了号召，但他们很快就被警察驱散，还有数十人遭到逮捕。


This time, the opposition is united, having found it far easier to agree on mutual support for 125 parliamentary candidates than to settle on a single presidential candidate.	而这一次，反对派终于实现了团结，他们发现共同支持125个议会候选人要比支持唯一一个总统候选人容易得多。


But the authorities may have the upper hand.	但执政当局仍有可能占据上风。


In Tbilisi, Kiev, and Bishkek, the leaders of the “color revolutions” had already held lofty positions in regimes that they now attacked as thoroughly corrupt; yet they succeeded in gaining the population’s trust.	在第比利斯、基辅和比什凯克，“色彩”革命的领导者早已在政权中身居高位，但他们现在反过来攻击执政政权，指责它腐败透顶。 尽管虚伪，他们仍然成功地赢得了公众的信任。


That is far from a foregone conclusion in Azerbaijan, where the last stint in power by some of the opposition leaders in 1992-1993 still evokes bitter memories of a time of war and crisis that few can recall without horror.	但这些还远远不能算阿塞拜疆选举的预计结果，因为1992－1993年掌权的最后一批反对派领袖至今仍然唤起人们痛苦的记忆：那个充满了战争和危机的年代让所有人都毛骨悚然。


Most importantly, however, the previous “color revolutions” underscore the crucial role of world public opinion and the global mass media that shape it.	但最为重要的是，从前的“色彩革命”无不强调了世界舆论和塑造舆论的全球媒体所能起到的关键作用。


As in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, the fate of the regime and the country may well hang on whether the current government is portrayed on the world’s television screens as a violator of human rights that is thwarting the will of the people and thus rejecting “generally accepted democratic values.”	正如在格鲁吉亚、乌克兰和吉尔吉斯斯坦，执政当局和整个国家的命运很可能就取决于世界电视报导是否将现任政府描绘成抵制民意的人权践踏者，因为只有这样，才能促使人们摒弃“被普遍接受的民主价值观”。


Such an image may be less valid in Azerbaijan.	但这样形容阿塞拜疆政府实在欠妥。


After coming to power in 1993, Heydar Aliyev stopped the war with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, secured Azerbaijan’s existence as a sovereign state, and, as the oil-and-gas sector flourished, oversaw the country’s growing international authority.	1993年执政以来，伊尔哈姆·阿利耶夫终止了和亚美尼亚的纳戈尔诺-卡拉巴赫飞地之争，实现了阿塞拜疆的主权独立。 随着石油天然气工业日渐繁盛，在伊尔哈姆管理下阿塞拜疆的国际权威也日益增长。


The transfer of power from father to son took place peacefully, and Ilham’s administration has presided over completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline – to the annoyance of Russia and Armenia.	父子之间的权力过渡和平而宁静，伊尔哈姆政府还主持了巴库－第比利斯－杰伊汉油管的修建－这一举措使俄罗斯和亚美尼亚人大为光火。


At the same time, high oil prices have enabled higher social spending and infrastructure investment.	与此同时，高油价造成社会开支和基础设施投资的居高不下。


Today, the capital, Baku, resembles a huge construction site, with high-rise housing, stores, and roads being built at a breakneck pace – and apparently benefiting the broad strata of the population.	今天，阿塞拜疆的首都巴库就像一个巨大的建筑工地，高层住宅和商铺拔地而起，道路建设的发展也一日千里，这显然使各种各样的阶层都从中受益。


But none of this may ultimately matter if the West – and the United States, in particular – decides that Ilham’s regime is not ensuring its interests and seeks to manipulate the global media image accordingly.	但如果西方各国¾特别是美国，最终认定伊尔哈姆的政权未能确保他们的利益，并以此为导向操纵阿塞拜疆政府在全球媒体上的形象，那么所有这些业绩都将变得毫无用处。


The West’s main interest is not Azerbaijan’s oil reserves, which accounted for just 0.06% of the world’s total in 2004, but its geopolitical position at the crossroads of global energy and transport corridors and as a frontline state vis-à-vis an increasingly assertive Iran.	西方主要的利益并不在于阿塞拜疆的石油储备，2004年那里的石油储备仅占全球总量的0. 06%，西方的利益在于这里地处全球能源与交通走廊交汇点的地理位置及其牵制态度强硬的伊朗所处的前沿位置。


So far, it appears as though the West will back Ilham over the opposition.	至少从目前的情况看，西方会支持伊尔哈姆，而不是反对派。


Former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the president of the European Parliamentary Assembly, Rene Van der Linden, and US Deputy Secretary of State for global affairs Paula Dopryansky have all visited Baku recently.	前美国国务卿玛德琳·奥尔布赖特、欧洲议会议长雷内·范德林登和美国负责全球事务的副国务卿保拉·多布里扬斯基近期内都曾访问巴库。


As US foreign-policy doyen Zbigniew Brzezinski put it in an interview with a German radio station, “The majority of Azeris actually support President Ilham Aliyev.	正如美国资深外交前辈布里辛斯基接受德国电台采访时所概括的那样，“绝大部分阿塞拜疆人实际上支持伊尔哈姆·阿利耶夫总统。


Therefore, we have a situation that differs from those that took place in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.”	正因如此，阿塞拜疆的形势与格鲁吉亚、乌克兰和吉尔吉斯斯坦有着本质的不同。 ”


Nevertheless, the West appears to be hedging its bets by sustaining contacts with the opposition.	尽管如此，西方似乎想隐藏自己的底牌，仍然与反对派保持着密切的接触。


As Brzezinski added, “Of course, it is important for the political regime in Azerbaijan to be as stable and legitimate as possible.”	正如布里辛斯基所补充的那样，“当然，阿塞拜疆政府应尽可能保持自身的稳定性和合法性。


If the West decides that the government has become unreliable, television shots of demonstrators’ weekly clashes with the Baku police, Ilham’s refusal to hold televised debates, and the confiscation of all orange objects from stores will come in handy.	”一旦西方认为阿塞拜疆政府不再可靠，那么抗议者每周与巴库警察发生冲突的电视画面、伊尔哈姆拒绝直播辩论和他从商铺没收所有橙色物品的新闻都是可以信手拈来的素材。


Of course, modern technology alone cannot bring about a revolution.	当然，仅仅靠现代科技还不足以带来革命。


But almost all post-Soviet states remain weak, and therefore vulnerable to domestic turmoil.	但几乎所有的后苏联国家国力都很虚弱，容易发生国内混乱，阿塞拜疆也不例外。


Azerbaijan is no exception, and Russia, having been burned by its naked intervention on behalf of the governments in Georgia and Ukraine, has given every indication that it intends to sit this one out.	而俄罗斯由于刚刚赤裸裸地替格鲁吉亚和乌克兰政府干预两国内政而碰得头破血流，这次早就放出风来要坐观其成。


The government appears confident that high oil prices, administrative resources, and dominance of the local media will ensure an election victory.	阿塞拜疆政府似乎确信居高不下的油价、对行政资源和当地媒体的把握会确保他们在选举中获胜。


That may not be enough.	但只有这些也许并不足够。


Is Bankers’ Pay Really the Root of Financial Evil?	银行的薪酬体系是金融危机的万恶之源么？


CHICAGO – Compensation practices at financial firms stand accused of being a primary cause of the recent global financial crisis.	芝加哥 —— 在本次金融危机中，金融机构的薪酬体系成为主要的攻击目标。


Restricting bankers’ pay is said to be the answer.	舆论一致要求限制银行的薪酬标准。


But will such restrictions work?	但这会起作用么？


Before instituting such invasive regulation, we should examine whether past compensation structures really were the catalysts for our recent problems.	在我们制定相关的法律之前，还是让我们先来看看，过去薪酬体系是否真的是近期危机发生的导火索？ 在得出这个结论之前，显然有这么三点假设：银行的高管们获得了短期的高额奖金；


To say that they were implies three things: top bank executives were rewarded for short-term results with large amounts of up-front cash; bank executives did not hold sufficiently large amounts of stock to align their interests with those of shareholders; and executives with more short-term pay and less stock ownership should have had the greatest incentive to take bad and excessive risks, and thus should have performed worse in the crisis.	银行管理层没有持有足够的公司股票，这就意味着和公司没有一定的利害关系； 基于以上两条，这些高管们因此而过度冒险地经营，最终导致了经济危机的发生。


Two economists, Rudiger Fahlenbrach and Rene Stulz, tested these implications by studying the CEOs of almost 100 large financial institutions from 2006 to 2008.	为了验证以上的观点，经济学家鲁迪格 · 法布奇和勒内 · 斯图尔兹研究了从 2006 年到 2008 年 100 个大型金融机构的 CEO 薪酬。


They start in 2006 because that seems to be the point at which some financial firms took on the risky positions that led to the crisis.	之所以从 2006 年开始，原因是金融机构从那时起，出现过度的冒险行为。


In 2006, the CEOs took home $3.6 million in cash compensation on average, which represented less than half of total compensation.	2006 年， CEO 的平均年收入中，现金有 360 万美元，占了整个薪酬体系的不到一半。


The larger share of pay was in restricted stock and options.	剩余的包括有一定限制的股票和期权。


At the same time, they held an average of $88 million in their firms’ equity and options.	同时，他们人均还拥有 8800 万美元的公司股权和期权。


In other words, they left more than 24 times as much in their firm as they took home.	换句话说，他们到手的现金只占整体的二十五分之一。


So it seems unlikely that this up-front cash provided much of an incentive for the average CEO to knowingly take bad or excessive risks that would jeopardize their much larger equity stakes.	如此看来，这么少的现金不足以导致 CEO 们冒险来使得自己更多的股权蒙受损失。


Moreover, these CEOs lost a lot in the crisis.	进一步来说， CEO 自身在经济危机中也损失惨重。


From 2006 to 2008, the average CEO lost $31 million in his or her holdings of a firm’s stock, dwarfing any gains from cash compensation.	从 2006 到 2008 年， CEO 在股票上的平均损失高达 3100 万美元，这远远高于到手的现金。


The CEOs lost on their options as well.	在期权上的损失同样如此。


So, if pay and front-loaded incentives were not the reason that banks’ CEOs got their firms (and the world) into a mess, what was?	这么一说，薪酬体系不是导致 CEO 冒险的原因，那问题究竟出在哪里呢？


Some economists point to highly expansionary monetary policy in the years leading up to the crisis.	一些经济学家认为，多年以来极度宽松的货币政策是罪魁祸首。


Others cite the so-called “capital glut” – large inflows of external financing from China and much of the developing world.	其他人则认为是所谓的“资本过剩” —— 从中国等发展中国家涌来的大量资本 —— 惹的祸。


Still others highlight the role that the political system played in inflating the banking sector and real-estate prices, particularly the sub-prime sector.	不过，通胀的政策方向和银行系统和房地产价格，特别是次级房贷也是重要诱因。


Ruling out compensation practices hardly leaves us at a loss for culprits.	单单对薪酬体系加强监管很难让我们找到问题的结症。


While today’s proposed pay restrictions are unlikely to stop the next financial crisis, they are likely to damage the financial sector.	虽然薪酬限制不能避免危机发生，但其对金融体系的破坏力不容忽视。


To see why, it is important to understand why bankers are paid so much.	让我们来看看银行家凭什么获得如此高薪 . 。


Over the last two or three decades, technological change and increased scale have led to much greater productivity and much higher incomes for those at the top of society’s income distribution.	在过去的二三十年中，技术变迁和不断增加的市场规模增加了生产力的同时，社会顶尖人才的收入也因此大大增加。


Corporate executives manage larger companies.	公司高管们管理的公司规模越来越大。


Investors manage much larger sums of money. Entertainers and athletes appeal to larger audiences.	投资管理规模也日趋庞大，娱乐界和体育明星的受众群体也在扩大。


Lawyers oversee bigger transactions and cases.	律师面对标的更大的民刑事案件。


Pay for all of these groups has increased by much more than pay for the average worker.	这些人群的收入水平的增幅远高于普通工人。


Given this reality, the best bankers, traders, dealmakers, etc. will work for companies that provide the most attractive compensation.	在这样的环境下，最好的银行家，交易员，中介商等将会选择能给自己提供最好薪酬的公司来服务。


Greater pay regulation will drive the most talented away from regulated banks and towards hedge funds, private equity funds, boutique investment banks, and other unregulated investment firms.	限制薪酬法案显然挫伤那些有才能的银行业者，从而让他们转向对冲基金，私人股权基金，业务更加专注的小型投行或是其他不限薪的行业。


This talent drain is likely to be exacerbated as pay regulations impose a one-size-fits-all regime.	薪酬封顶制度就会限制才能的发挥。


Why impose restrictions on a dealmaker who earns a large fee for arranging a merger that imposes no risk on the bank after the transaction has closed?	为什么对并购行动中赚取巨额利润的中介机构加以限制，而不考虑他们所承担的风险呢？


The same is true for a trader who makes money on spreads rather than from taking on risk.	同样来说，赚取差价的交易员也是如此。


These types of employees will be penalized for no good purpose under the proposed pay regimes.	如果在这样的限制体制下，此类业者的利益就会无端受损。


Perhaps more troubling is that pay restrictions open a Pandora’s box of other restrictions.	恐怕，对薪酬加以限制就像打开了一个潘多拉盒子，为对其他的限制开一个不好的先河。


Indeed, politicians, eager to look good in the eyes of angry voters, are often more interested in setting limits to total compensation than they are in designing the optimal form of compensation.	实际上，为了获取那些愤怒选民的支持，政客对制定这样的限制措施非常感兴趣，这比设计最优的薪酬架构要简单的多。


Banks serve a special function in the economy that does warrant a special role for the government: not in setting pay, but in imposing effective capital requirements.	银行在经济中有着特殊的功能，政府在银行业也扮演着特殊的角色：不是在制定薪酬，而是在控制有效资本范畴。


Higher and pro-cyclical equity-capital requirements on banks, combined with a requirement to raise contingent long-term debt – debt that converts into equity in a crisis – is a better way forward.	对银行的更高和顺周期的股权资本的要求，以及后备长期债券的要求 —— 在危机发生时债权将转换为股权 —— 就是一个更好的解决方式。


The typical bank is capitalized with equity, long-term debt, short-term debt, and deposits.	一个典型的银行是由股权，长期债券，短期债券和存款组成的。


Investment banks like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers got into trouble because they had too little equity capital – far less than 10%.	像贝尔斯登和雷曼兄弟这样的投行之所以会陷入困境，是因为它们所持有的股权资本太少 —— 远低于 10% 的水平。


Regulators might consider imposing pro-cyclical equity requirements – increasing the equity percentage in boom times in order to offset losses in the inevitable bust times.	监管机构应考虑增收反周期的股权要求 —— 增加在市场繁荣时期的股权比例，来防范泡沫破碎时的损失。


In addition, regulators should require banks to issue an additional amount of capital – say, 10% – in the form of long-term debt that is forced to convert into equity if the bank and the overall banking system get into financial difficulty.	此外，一旦银行业陷入困境，监管机构应要求银行发行额外的资本 —— 比如说 10%—— 以长期债券的形式，强迫转换为股权。


In issuing contingent capital, banks would have to pay a higher interest rate than they would on ordinary long-term debt, because debt investors will face the true cost of capital, not the government-subsidized cost.	在发行后备资金之时，银行将支付比长期债券更高的利率，因为债权人将承担发行资本的成本，而不是政府来承担救助费用。


Over time, however, the interest-rate premium is likely to be small, because higher capital requirements and contingent capital should significantly reduce the likelihood of ever reaching the triggers.	额外的利率支付将随着时间逐步变小，因为更高的资本准备金要求和后备资金将大幅减少事态的进一步恶化。


If such a contingent-capital structure had been in place before the crisis, troubled banks would have been recapitalized by the contingent debt holders while avoiding the complications and legal posturing inevitable in formal bankruptcy.	如果这种后备资金的金融体系在危机发生之前就实施，问题银行就会被后备债权人重组，同时避免了正式破产程序所需的复杂的法律程序。


Debt investors, not the government, would have bailed out the banks, making the financial crisis substantially smaller, if it had occurred at all.	债权人就会取代政府救助这些银行，使得可能发生的金融危机的影响力显著缩小。


Is Bernanke Ready?	贝南克准备好了吗？


Ben Bernanke, the nominee to replace Alan Greenspan this month as Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board, is a highly capable economist who has devoted his professional life to understanding the historical role of central banks and the problems that they have faced.	本月将替代格林斯潘出任美联储主席的本·贝南克是一位非常能干的经济学家，他毕生都用来研究中央银行的作用和它们所面对的问题。


His views represent, as much as can be expected, a consensus among those who have studied the issues carefully.	他的观点代表了对这个问题有过深入研究的学者们的共同看法。


But that does not mean that Bernanke is prepared to ensure that healthy economic growth continues in the US in the coming years and provide the kind of leadership that the world needs.	但那并不意味着贝南克做好了确保美国经济在今后几年健康发展，并以合乎需要的方式领导世界的准备。


By the standards of what is generally understood today, he will do a good job.	按照今天人们普遍接受的标准，他会是一个好领导。


Unfortunately, that may not be enough.	但不幸的是，仅有这些还远远不够。


John Maynard Keynes once said that monetary policy may work like a string.	约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯（John Maynard Keynes）曾经说过，货币政策就像一根绳索。


A central bank can pull the string (raise interest rates) to rein in an economy that is galloping ahead unsustainably.	中央银行可以收紧绳索（提高利率），控制飞速发展但却不可持续的经济。


But it cannot push the string up: if economic growth stalls, as when confidence is seriously damaged, lowering interest rates may not be enough to stimulate demand.	但它却无法使绳索垂直立起：如果经济增长像信心严重受损时那样陷入停滞，那么单靠降低利率也许并不足以刺激需求。


In that case, a recession can occur despite the central bank’s best efforts.	如果出现上述情况，那么即便央行竭尽全力，经济衰退也依然会发生。


Bernanke made his name as an economist by analyzing the worldwide Great Depression of the 1930’s – good expertise to have, since preventing such disasters is a central bank head’s most important job.	作为一位经济学家，分析20世纪30年代的全球大萧条曾使贝南克声誉雀起¾拥有这样的专长对他的工作十分有益，因为防止这样的灾难再次发生是央行首脑最重要的工作。


The Great Depression, which followed the stock market crash of 1929, saw unemployment rise sharply in many countries, accompanied by severe deflation.	经济大萧条紧紧伴随着1929年的股市崩溃，导致很多国家的失业率迅速飙升，同时发生的还有严重的通货紧缩。


In the US, consumer prices fell 27% between 1929 and 1933, and the unemployment rate topped out in 1933 at 23%.	在美国，消费价格在1929到1933年间下降了27%，而在1933年失业率却史无前例地达到了23%。


According to Bernanke’s “debt deflation” theory, the collapse in consumer prices was one of the causes of the Great Depression, since deflation raised the real value of debts, making it difficult to repay loans.	根据贝南克的“债务紧缩”理论，消费价格的大副下降是导致大萧条的原因之一，因为通货紧缩提高了债务的实际价值，增大了贷款偿付的困难。


As Bernanke pointed out, 45% of US farms were behind on mortgage payments in 1933, and in 1934, default rates on home mortgages exceeded 38% in half of US cities.	正像贝南克所指出的那样，1933年45%的美国农场主都拖欠按揭还款，而1934年，住宅按揭的拖欠比率在半数以上的美国城市超过了38%。


The debt burden destroyed consumer confidence and undermined the banking system, crippling the economy.	债务负担摧垮了消费信心，破坏了银行系统，削弱了美国经济。


Bernanke’s research also stressed that the sooner a country abandoned the gold standard, the better off it was.	贝南克的研究还强调，一个国家越早放弃金本位制，对它的经济发展就越有利。


Adhering to the gold standard during the Great Depression implied a deflationary monetary-policy bias, since it required keeping interest rates relatively high to encourage investors to hold deposits in banks rather than demanding the gold that backed them.	在经济大萧条时期坚持金本位制实际隐含着紧缩货币政策倾向，因为这样就需要保持较高的利率，才能鼓励投资者将款项存入银行而不是要求把货币兑换成黄金。


Once a country eliminated convertibility into gold, it was free to pursue monetary expansion, and deflation tended to end.	一旦彻底放弃货币与黄金之间的兑换，国家就能够自由自在地进行货币扩张，而此时的通货紧缩也有了结束的趋向。


But Bernanke’s impressive research on the Great Depression does not mean that he can prevent the next recession or depression, for stopping deflation hardly solves all problems.	但贝南克对经济大萧条令人钦佩的研究成果并不意味着他能够阻止下一次经济衰退或经济萧条，因为防止通货紧缩并不能解决所有问题。 归根结底，美国在1933年就废止了金本位制，而且1934年美联储曾把贴现率降至1.


After all, the US went off the gold standard in 1933, and the Fed cut the discount rate to 1.5% in 1934, ending deflation (except for minor episodes); but the unemployment rate did not fall consistently below 15% until 1941 and the onset of World War II.	5%，从此为通货紧缩画上了句号（小范围内的通货紧缩除外）。 虽然如此，直到1941年和第二次世界大战爆发，失业率也并没有稳定地降到15%以下。


Bernanke will therefore have to be careful about over-generalizing from his past research, just as medical specialists must be careful not to over-diagnose diseases in their own specialty and military strategists must be careful not to over-prepare to fight the last war.	因此，贝南克必须保持警惕，不要过度应用自己做过的研究，这正与医药专家和军事战略家必须小心谨慎，不要在自己的专业范围内过度诊断和过度备战是同样的道理。


Of course, this does not mean that we should ignore the past altogether.	当然，这并不意味着我们应该完全忘记过去。


A 2005 study headed by Guillermo Calvo, Chief Economist for the Inter-American Development Bank, found important similarities between the Great Depression of the 1930’s and economic crises since 1980 in 31 emerging countries.	美洲开发银行的首席经济学家古勒莫•卡尔沃（Guillermo Calvo）在2005年主持了一项研究，发现在20世纪30年代的大萧条和1980年后31个新兴国家出现的经济危机之间有很多的相似之处。


But the study also found important differences.	但研究同时也发现它们之间存在着很多差异。


The fundamental experience of the Great Depression has repeated itself, on a smaller scale, many times and in many countries in recent decades: a shock in financial markets, followed by a sharp decline in gross domestic product.	最近几十年来，大萧条最根本的内容在很多国家不断重复，唯一的区别是规模较小而已：通常的表现是金融市场先出现震荡，随之而来的就是国内生产总值急速下降。


But the behavior of consumer prices in the post-1980 crises is fundamentally different from that seen in the 1930’s.	但20世纪80年代以后，经济危机中的消费价格表现与20世纪30年代相比有了很大的不同。


In contrast to the Great Depression, collapsing national output was in recent decades accompanied by accelerating inflation, not deflation.	与大萧条时期相反，近几十年随国内产值下降出现的是通货膨胀，而不是通货紧缩。


The Calvo study thus concludes that Bernanke’s debt deflation theory of the Great Depression does not generally apply to the more recent crises.	因此，卡尔沃的研究表明：贝南克关于大萧条债务紧缩的理论与近期发生的危机并不吻合。


At the same time, Bernanke is inheriting a pair of economic vulnerabilities that are unusual by historical standards, and that did not precede the Great Depression of the 1930’s.	与此同时，贝南克接任以后还要处理两个经济问题，这两个问题在历史上前所未有，而且十分不同寻常，因为它们在20世纪30年代的大萧条之前根本没有出现过。


We are now in the late stages of the biggest real estate boom in US (or world) history, driven by frenzied market psychology.	我们正处在美国（也是世界）历史上房地产最为繁荣的时期，狂热的市场心理推动房地产价格不断攀升。


In contrast, US home prices were uneventful before the Great Depression, and actually fell slightly in real terms between 1925 and 1929.	与此形成鲜明的对照，美国的住宅价格在大萧条之前非常平静，事实上在1925到1929年间还稍有下降。


Moreover, we are now experiencing a fundamental change in expectations about oil prices: not only are today’s prices quite high in real terms by historical standards, but the futures markets indicate that prices are expected to remain high for years to come.	不仅如此，我们对石油价格的预期也在发生着根本的变化：不仅今天的油价与历史标准相比确实处于高位，而且期货市场表明石油价格在今后几年内都会居高不下。


In contrast, real oil prices were flat leading up to 1929, and down nearly 50% in real terms from the 1925-6 “fuel folly” peaks.	恰恰相反，实际油价在1929年之前几年波动不大，与1925到26年的“燃料危机”的高峰时期相比反而降低了近50%。


In the near future, substantially higher oil prices, lower real estate prices, or both, could, depending on public reaction, put Bernanke into uncharted territory for economic stress.	不久后，居高不下的油价，下降的房地产价格，或两者兼而有之，有可能把贝南克引入经济压力的未知地带，公众对上述因素的反应将决定这种情况是否会成为现实。


If confidence declines, his historical understanding of the Great Depression of the 1930’s could leave him ill-equipped to prevent such shocks from sinking the US, and the world, economy.	如果信心下降，他对20世纪30年代大萧条的历史解读不足以使他阻止这样的动荡摧毁美国和世界经济。


He might find himself pushing on a string.	他可能发现自己对经济的绳索无能为力。


Is Capitalism Doomed?	资本主义完蛋了吗？


NEW YORK – The massive volatility and sharp equity-price correction now hitting global financial markets signal that most advanced economies are on the brink of a double-dip recession.	纽约——全球金融市场正在经历的大动荡和股价大修正表明，大多数发达经济体正站在双底衰退的悬崖边上。


A financial and economic crisis caused by too much private-sector debt and leverage led to a massive re-leveraging of the public sector in order to prevent Great Depression 2.0.	这场金融经济危机原本是由过高的私人部门负债和杠杆率所引爆的，政府为防止大萧条再度上演，付出了公共部门严重地再杠杆化的代价。


But the subsequent recovery has been anemic and sub-par in most advanced economies given painful deleveraging.	但换来的经济复苏绵软无力，达不到预期水平，因为大多数发达经济体都还在去杠杆化过程中苦苦挣扎。


Now a combination of high oil and commodity prices, turmoil in the Middle East, Japan’s earthquake and tsunami, eurozone debt crises, and America’s fiscal problems (and now its rating downgrade) have led to a massive increase in risk aversion.	如今，高企的石油和商品价格、中东的乱局、日本的地震海啸、欧元区债务危机，加上美国的财政麻烦（和信用降级），共同推高了风险厌恶情绪。


Economically, the United States, the eurozone, the United Kingdom, and Japan are all idling. Even fast-growing emerging markets (China, emerging Asia, and Latin America), and export-oriented economies that rely on these markets (Germany and resource-rich Australia), are experiencing sharp slowdowns.	美国、欧元区、英国和日本的经济都停滞不前，甚至连快速增长的新兴市场（中国、亚洲新兴经济体、拉美）和依赖这些市场的出口型经济体（德国和盛产资源的澳大利亚），也开始急剧减速。


Until last year, policymakers could always produce a new rabbit from their hat to reflate asset prices and trigger economic recovery.	直到去年，政策制定者还能从帽子里继续变出兔子，靠推高资产价格启动经济复苏。


Fiscal stimulus, near-zero interest rates, two rounds of “quantitative easing,” ring-fencing of bad debt, and trillions of dollars in bailouts and liquidity provision for banks and financial institutions: officials tried them all.	财政刺激、零利率、两轮“量化宽松”、给坏账“扎篱笆”（ring-fencing）、用数万亿美元给银行和金融机构赎身并提供周转资金：官员们使尽了浑身解数。


Now they have run out of rabbits.	如今，兔子用光了。


Fiscal policy currently is a drag on economic growth in both the eurozone and the UK.	眼下欧元区和英国的财政政策都在给经济增长拖后腿。


Even in the US, state and local governments, and now the federal government, are cutting expenditure and reducing transfer payments.	就连美国，各州、地方政府乃至联邦政府都在大砍开支、压缩转移支付。


Soon enough, they will be raising taxes.	很快，它们就得增税了。


Another round of bank bailouts is politically unacceptable and economically unfeasible: most governments, especially in Europe, are so distressed that bailouts are unaffordable; indeed, their sovereign risk is actually fueling concern about the health of Europe’s banks, which hold most of the increasingly shaky government paper.	再搞一轮银行赎身政治上绝难通过，经济上也不可行：大多数国家尤其是欧洲国家的政府已是焦头烂额，囊中羞涩； 说真的，它们的主权风险反倒加深了对欧洲银行业的担忧，因为后者手里大把的政府债已是摇摇欲坠。


Nor could monetary policy help very much.	货币政策也帮不上什么忙。


Quantitative easing is constrained by above-target inflation in the eurozone and UK.	欧元区和英国的通胀超出目标区间，量化宽松面临掣肘。


The US Federal Reserve will likely start a third round of quantitative easing (QE3), but it will be too little too late.	美联储八成要搞第三轮量宽，但规模太小，动手太迟。


Last year’s $600 billion QE2 and $1 trillion in tax cuts and transfers delivered growth of barely 3% for one quarter.	去年6千亿美元的第二轮量宽和1万亿美元的减税和转移支付只勉强促成了3%的增长，而且只持续了一个季度。


Then growth slumped to below 1% in the first half of 2011.	2011年第一季度又跌落到不足1%。


QE3 will be much smaller, and will do much less to reflate asset prices and restore growth.	第三轮量宽规模会小得多，推高资产价格和重启增长的效力也弱得多。


Currency depreciation is not a feasible option for all advanced economies: they all need a weaker currency and better trade balance to restore growth, but they all cannot have it at the same time.	货币贬值这个选项并不是对所有发达经济体而言都可行：它们固然都需要本币走弱，改善贸易平衡，但在同一时间，它们的货币不可能都贬值。


So relying on exchange rates to influence trade balances is a zero-sum game.	所以靠汇率来平衡贸易是一个零和游戏。


Currency wars are thus on the horizon, with Japan and Switzerland engaging in early battles to weaken their exchange rates. Others will soon follow.	货币战争前景已然闪现，日本和瑞士已经先一步投入战斗，其他国家会紧随其后。


Meanwhile, in the eurozone, Italy and Spain are now at risk of losing market access, with financial pressures now mounting on France, too.	与此同时，在欧元区，市场快要把意大利和西班牙扫地出门了，法国的金融压力也在加码。


But Italy and Spain are both too big to fail and too big to be bailed out.	但意大利和西班牙都太大了，既倒不得，又赎不了。


For now, the European Central Bank will purchase some of their bonds as a bridge to the eurozone’s new European Financial Stabilization Facility.	短期内，欧洲央行将持续购入两国债券，以便它们能支撑到新成立的欧洲金融稳定基金（EFSF）来接盘。


But, if Italy and/or Spain lose market access, the EFSF’s €440 billion ($627 billion) war chest could be depleted by the end of this year or early 2012.	然而，只要意大利和西班牙中有一个被市场拒之门外，EFSF的4400亿欧元（6270亿美元）“战备基金”到今年底或明年初就会消耗殆尽。


Then, unless the EFSF pot were  tripled – a move that Germany would resist  – the only option left would become an orderly but coercive restructuring of Italian and Spanish debt, as has happened in Greece.	所以，除非EFSF的池子扩大两倍——德国会抵制——剩下的出路只有意大利和西班牙有序、同步地搞债务重组。


Coercive restructuring of insolvent banks’ unsecured debt would be next. So, although the process of deleveraging has barely started, debt reductions will become necessary if countries cannot grow or save or inflate themselves out of their debt problems.	所以，虽然去杠杆化过程刚刚开始，债务减记已是不得不为了，除非这几个国家能靠增长、储蓄或者通胀从债务泥潭里拔出脚来。


So Karl Marx, it seems, was partly right in arguing that globalization, financial intermediation run amok, and redistribution of income and wealth from labor to capital could lead capitalism to self-destruct (though his view that socialism would be better has proven wrong).	这样看来，马克思也说对了一半：全球化和金融中介会趋于疯狂，收入和财富由劳动向资本再分配，终将导致资本主义的自我毁灭（虽然他说“社会主义更好”后来证明是错的）。


Firms are cutting jobs because there is not enough final demand.	由于最终需求不足，企业正纷纷裁员。


But cutting jobs reduces labor income, increases inequality and reduces final demand.	但裁员减少了劳动者收入，扩大了不平等，进一步打进最终需求。


Recent popular demonstrations, from the Middle East to Israel to the UK, and rising popular anger in China – and soon enough in other advanced economies and emerging markets – are all driven by the same issues and tensions: growing inequality, poverty, unemployment, and hopelessness.	最近的群众抗议，从中东、以色列到英国，以及中国日益上升的不满情绪——很快会传染到其他发达和新兴经济体——根源都一样：不平等加剧、贫困、失业和绝望情绪。


Even the world’s middle classes are feeling the squeeze of falling incomes and opportunities.	就连全世界中等阶层也感到收入缩水，机会稀缺。


To enable market-oriented economies to operate as they should and can, we need to return to the right balance between markets and provision of public goods.	为了让市场经济重新正常运转、发挥作用，我们需要重新发现市场与政府的合理边界。


That means moving away from both the Anglo-Saxon model of laissez-faire and voodoo economics and the continental European model of deficit-driven welfare states.	也就是说，既要远离英美的自由放任模式和里根教义，也要远离欧洲大陆的赤字福利国家模式。


Both are broken.	两种模式都已宣告破产。


The right balance today requires creating jobs partly through additional fiscal stimulus aimed at productive infrastructure investment.	今日的合理均衡包含以下几点：制定新的财政刺激计划，投资于基础设施，创造就业岗位； 提高税收的累进率；


It also requires more progressive taxation; more short-term fiscal stimulus with medium- and long-term fiscal discipline; lender-of-last-resort support by monetary authorities to prevent ruinous runs on banks; reduction of the debt burden for insolvent households and other distressed economic agents; and stricter supervision and regulation of a financial system run amok; breaking up too-big-to-fail banks and oligopolistic trusts.	货币当局承担最终放贷人责任，预防银行挤兑； 为资不抵债的家庭和其他经济参与者减轻债务负担；


Over time, advanced economies will need to invest in human capital, skills and social safety nets to increase productivity and enable workers to compete, be flexible and thrive in a globalized economy.	将来，发达经济体需要扩大投资于人力资本、技能培训与社会安全网络，以提高生产率和工人竞争力，灵活适应经济全球化并从中受益。


The alternative is – like in the 1930s - unending stagnation, depression, currency and trade wars, capital controls, financial crisis, sovereign insolvencies, and massive social and political instability.	如若不然，就会重演20世纪30年代的噩梦：无穷无尽的停滞、萧条、货币和贸易战争、资本管制、金融危机、主权破产和社会政治动荡。


Is Central Bank Independence All It’s Cracked up to Be?	央行果真独立吗？


Alan Greenspan attained an almost iconic status as Governor of the Federal Reserve Board.	艾伦·格林斯潘作为美国联邦储备委员会主席取得了近似偶像的地位。


So, as his term draws to a close and his mantle of infallibility is passed on to his successor, it is worth examining whether his legacy will measure up and what we can expect from the new Fed chief, Ben Bernanke.	因此，当他的任期行将结束、其一贯正确的衣钵传给继任人之际，审视一番其遗产是否合格，以及我们可以从新任美联储主席本·伯南克那里期望得到什么，是大有裨益的。


Few central bank governors have the kind of hagiography lavished upon them, especially in their lifetime, that Greenspan has had.	几乎没有其他的央行行长能够像格林斯潘那样在有生之年得到大书特书的偶像般传记。


But what makes for a great central bank governor in our modern societies, great institutions or great individuals?	但是，在现代社会中，究竟是什么东西造就伟大的央行行长、机构或者个人呢？


In economics, we seldom have a clearly defined counterfactual: Would the economy have performed even better or a little differently if someone else had been at the helm?	在经济学中，我们很难有一个明确定义的反事实条件陈述，亦即：如果另外一个人职掌经济大权，经济是否会表现更好或者有所不同？


We can’t know, but there is little doubt that those “managing” the economy receive more credit than they deserve, if sometimes less blame.	我们不得而知。 但是，毫无疑问，那些“管理”经济的人即使不逃脱诘难，也是盛名之下，其实难副。


Many forces behind the boom of the 1990’s, including advances in technology, were set in motion before Bill Clinton took office (just as the legacy of President George W. Bush’s deficits will be felt long after he leaves).	在比尔·克林顿就任总统之前，成就二十世纪九十年代经济繁荣的众多因素，包括技术进步，都已经发端（而乔治·沃克·布什总统的赤字遗产将会在他离任后很久才会显现）。


So Greenspan cannot be given credit for the boom.	所以，格林斯潘对经济繁荣不能独揽赞誉。


But, while no central bank governor can ensure economic prosperity, mismanagement can cause enormous harm.	然而，尽管没有央行行长可以保证经济繁荣，管理失误却可以造成巨大的损失。


Many of America’s post-World War II recessions were caused by the Fed hiking interest rates too fast and too far.	美国二战后许多经济衰退都是由于美联储加息过快过猛造成的。


There is little doubt that Greenspan had great moments, when one could at least imagine a less deft governor doing the “wrong” thing with disastrous consequences.	格林斯潘无疑有过风光无限之时。 当时，人们至少只能想象，换一个并不如此娴熟的美联储主席操作“有误”，带来灾难性后果。


One such moment was the stock market crash of 1987.	其中一个是1987年的股市崩溃。


Perhaps another occurred in 1998, when the Fed lowered interest rates in the face of what appeared to be an impending global financial crisis.	另外一个可能发生在1998年，当时，另一场全球金融危机呼之欲来，美联储降低了利率。


These successes, combined with the 1990’s boom and the seeming durability of price stability, reinforced Greenspan’s exalted status.	这些成功，连同二十世纪九十年代的经济繁荣和看似持续的价格稳定，都强化了格林斯潘擢升的地位。


But they also led many to forget less successful moments.	但是，这也使得许多人忘记并不成功的时候。


The Fed failed to avert the economic downturn of 1990, and a reading of Greenspan’s testimony to Congress during that period makes clear that the basic nature of the economy’s problems was not well understood.	美联储没有避免二十世纪九十年代的经济衰退。 研究一下格林斯潘当时向国会所做的证词就可以知道经济问题的基本性质并未得到很好地理解。


But the real problem for Greenspan’s legacy concerns what happened to the American economy in the last five years, for which he bears heavy responsibility.	但是，格林斯潘遗产的真正问题在于过去五年中美国经济所发生的事情，对此，他负有重大责任。


Greenspan supported the tax cuts of 2001 with the most specious of arguments – that unless something was done about America’s soaring fiscal surpluses, the national debt would be totally paid off within, say, ten to fifteen years.	格林斯潘用最为似是而非的理由支持2001年的减税，也就是，除非对美国激增的财政盈余采取行动，否则，美国国债将会在10到15年内完全付清。


According to Greenspan, immediate action needed to be taken to avert this looming disaster, which would impede the Fed’s ability to conduct monetary policy!	格林斯潘认为，应当立即采取行动避免这一即将到来的灾难，因为这一灾难将会阻碍美联储实施货币政策的能力！


It says a great deal about the gullibility of financial markets that they took this argument seriously.	金融市场信以为真，这充分说明了金融市场何等容易上当受骗。


More accurately, tax cuts were what Wall Street wanted, and financial professionals were willing to accept any argument that served that purpose.	更为准确而言，华尔街要的就是减税，金融界人士愿意接受符合这一目的的任何观点。


Of course, if, say, by 2008 the disappearing national debt really did appear to pose an imminent danger, Congress would have happily obliged in cutting taxes or increasing expenditures.	当然，如果不断消亡的国债到2008年果真成为急迫的危险，国会将会乐于减税或者增加开支。


Greenspan’s irresponsible support of that tax cut was critical to its passage.	格林斯潘对减税不负责任的支持对减税法案的通过起到至关重要的作用。


The fault was not only in the magnitude of the tax cut, but also in its design; by directing the cuts at upper-income Americans, it provided little economic stimulus.	错误不仅在于减税的力度，而且在于其初衷； 由于减少高收入美国��的税负，因此对经济刺激无足轻重。


But soaring deficits did not return the economy to full employment, so the Fed did what it had to do – cut interest rates.	但是，激增的赤字并未将经济带回到全面就业上来，所以美联储被迫降低利率。


Lower interest rates worked, but not so much because they boosted investment, but because they led households to refinance their mortgages, and fueled a bubble in housing prices.	低利率奏效了，但是效果并不显著。 这并非由于低利率促进了投资，而是低利率让美国家庭重新资助住房贷款，并且助长了房地产价格泡沫。


In short, as Greenspan departs, he leaves behind an American economy burdened with high household and government debt and fragile balance sheets – a legacy that is already contributing to global financial instability.	简而言之，格林斯潘卸任后留下的是背负高昂的家庭和政府债务以及脆弱的资产负债表的美国经济。 这一遗产已经助长了全球金融不稳。


It is still not clear what led Greenspan to support the tax cut.	格林斯潘为何支持减税如今仍然不得而知。


Was it a massive economic misjudgment, or was he currying favor with the Bush administration?	究竟是严重的经济误判，还是迎合讨好布什当局？


The most likely explanation is a combination of the two, for he and Bush were pursuing the same “starve the beast” political strategy, which calls for tax cuts to be used to reduce revenues, thereby forcing the public sector to be downsized.	最为可能的解释是二者兼而有之，因为他和布什都在实施共同的“饿死牲畜”的政治战略，也就是利用减税来降低财政收入，从而迫使公营部门减小规模。


The traditional argument for an independent central bank is that politicians can’t be trusted to conduct monetary and macroeconomic policy.	传统的央行独立观点主张，货币政策和宏观经济政策不应该交给政客们实行。


Neither, evidently, can central bank governors, at least when they opine in areas outside their immediate responsibility.	显而易见，同样不应当交给央行行长们，至少是当他们在对其直接责任之外的领域发表评论之时。


Greenspan was as enthusiastic for a policy that led to soaring deficits as any politician; but the fig leaf of being “above politics” gave credence to that policy, engendering support from some who otherwise would have questioned its economic wisdom.	格林斯潘对于导致赤字猛升的政策如同政客一般充满热情； 但是，“超越政治之上”的遮羞布却给了那一政策可信度，使得那些在另外的情况下会质疑其经济智慧的人支持减税。


This, then, is Greenspan’s second legacy: growing doubt about central bank independence.	从而，这就成为格林斯潘的第二个遗产，也就是对于央行独立不断增加的疑虑。


Macroeconomic policy can never be devoid of politics: it involves fundamental trade-offs and affects different groups differently.	宏观经济政策从来不会不含政治因素，因为它包含根本性的交易，对不同的群体产生不同的影响。


Unemployment harms workers, while the lower interest rates needed to generate more jobs may lead to higher inflation, which especially harms those with nominal assets whose value is eroded.	失业让工人们受害，而用来创造更多就业机会的低利率可能导致更高的通货膨胀； 通货膨胀特别会让拥有名义资产的人由于其价值受损而遭受损失。


Such fundamental issues cannot be relegated to technocrats, particularly when those technocrats place the interests of one segment of society above others.	这样根本性的问题不能降格交给技术官僚处理，特别是当这些技术官僚把社会某一部分的利益置于他人之上时尤其如此。


Indeed, Greenspan’s political stances were so thinly disguised as professional wisdom that his tenure exposed the dubiousness of the very notion of an independent central bank and a non-partisan central banker.	实际上，格林斯潘的政治立场仅仅是草草掩饰为专业智慧，其任期暴露了其作为独立中央银行和没有党派偏见的央行行长的观点是令人怀疑的。


Unfortunately, many countries have committed themselves to precisely this illusion, and it may be a long time before they take heed of Greenspan’s most important lesson.	不幸的是，许多国家恰恰陷于这一幻觉，而且，它们注意到格林斯潘最为重要的经验教训可能需要很长的时间。


Stressing the new Fed chief’s “professionalism” may only delay the moment when this lesson is learned again.	强调新任美联储主席的“专业化”可以只会担搁汲取教训。


Is China Losing the Diplomatic Plot?	中国正在失去外交方略吗？


SINGAPORE – In 2016, China’s share of the global economy will be larger than America’s in purchasing-price-parity terms.	发自新加坡——如果以购买力平价计算的话，中国占全球经济的比重将在2016年超过美国。


This is an earth-shaking development; in 1980, when the United States accounted for 25% of world output, China’s share of the global economy was only 2.2%.	这一切堪称是一场震惊世界的发展：须知1980年时美国占了世界生产总值的1/4，而中国只有区区2. 2%；


And yet, after 30 years of geopolitical competence, the Chinese seem to be on the verge of losing it just when they need it most.	但在展现了30年的地缘政治竞争力之后，中国人似乎正在自废武功的边缘徘徊——何况如今正是最需要这种能力之时。


China’s leaders would be naïve and foolish to bank on their country’s peaceful and quiet rise to global preeminence.	如果中国领导人希望利用本国的和平与低调发展来夺取全球霸主地位的话，那就未免太过天真和愚蠢了。