A democracy born in an open economic environment, with a well functioning market system, widespread foreign direct investment, and sizeable international trade, is likely to consolidate economic liberalism, stabilize expectations, and hence lead to more investment and faster growth.	（如果）一个民主体制诞生在一种市场机制健全、国外直接投资广泛和国际贸易量庞大的开放的经济环境中，那么它就更能够强化经济自由主义、稳定人们的预期从而吸引更多的投资和实现更快的经济增长。


Conversely, if an economy is tightly controlled by the state, has protectionist barriers against foreign imports and capital movements, or relies on rents from exhaustible resources to obtain foreign currency, transition to democracy can be plagued by populism and struggles for redistribution, hurting economic growth.	反之，如果经济被国家严格掌控，针对国外进口和资本流动的壁垒高筑，或依赖出让可耗尽的资源来换取外汇，那么这样的政体向民主转型的过程就会充斥着民粹主义和再分配的麻烦，从而不利于经济增长。


Empirical evidence supports the idea that the success of a democracy depends on the openness of the underlying economic system at the time of political transition.	经验主义的证据支持这样一个观点：即一个民主政体的成功取决于其政治转型期所实行的经济体制的开放度。


In the post-WWII period, the more successful episodes of democratic transitions have been preceded by widespread economic reforms that extended the scope of the market and facilitated international integration.	在二战结束后，更为成功的民主转型都是以广泛的经济改革为先导的。 这些改革延伸了市场范围，从而有利于经济的国际融合。


Examples include Chile and South Korea in the late 1980’s and Mexico in the mid-1990’s.	这样的例子包括1980年代末期的智利和南韩，以及1990年代中期的墨西哥。


Conversely, when democratic transition was attempted in a fragile and closed economic environment, the outcome was much worse.	相反，当一个国家企图在脆弱和封闭的经济环境中实现民主转型时，其结果就会糟糕得多。


This applies to the episodes of democratization in Latin America and the Philippines in the mid-1980’s, but also to Turkey in the early 1980’s and Nepal in 1990.	这样的例子有拉丁美洲和菲律宾在1980年代中期的民主化，还有1980年代早期的土耳其和1990年代的尼泊尔。


The contrast between China and Russia also fits this pattern very well.	中国和俄罗斯之间的对比也很适用于这一类型。


China first opened its economic system to the rest of the world, and only now is it thinking (a bit too slowly) about political reform.	中国首先向世界开放了它的经济体系，并直到现在（步伐太慢了一点）才开始考虑政治改革。


Russia instead jumped into democracy, and only then worried about replacing socialism with a market system.	而俄罗斯却跳跃式地进入民主体制，然后才开始担心用市场体系代替社会主义的问题。


There was probably no other way to do it in Russia, but the Chinese path seems much more likely to lead to lasting economic success.	俄罗斯可能是别无选择，但中国式的道路似乎更能带来持久的经济成功。


This does not mean that democracy is unimportant.	这并不意味着民主无足轻重。


But the sequence of reforms is critical for successful economic development, with economic reforms coming first.	但以经济改革为先的改革次序对于成功的经济发展至关重要。


When an open and well functioning market system is in place, democracy has a much better chance to lead to lasting prosperity.	在有着开放而健全的市场机制的情况下，民主更有机会带来持久的繁荣。


An important reason for this is that, in order to create a successful market system, the state must respect basic individual rights: the rule of law, private property, and the enforcement of justice.	其中一个重要的原因就是，为了创造一个成功的市场体系，国家必须尊重基本的个人权利：法制、私有财产和实施公正。


These fundamental rights are part and parcel of democratic government.	这些根本的权力是民主政府的细胞。


But when it comes to economic development, these fundamental rights are more important than other purely political aspects of democracy, such as universal suffrage and genuine political competition.	但就经济发展而言，这些基本权利比普选权和真正的政治竞争等纯粹的政治权力更为重要。


This is how the Western world became democratic in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.	西方世界正是这样在十九和二十世纪实现民主的。


Economic liberalism came first, political liberalism later.	以经济自由主义为先导，政治自由主义紧随其后。


But today’s young democracies have to do everything much faster.	但当今年轻的民主政体们做任何事都必须更快。


They don’t have the luxury of restricting suffrage to property owners, or to more educated citizens.	它们没有将选举权局限于有产阶级或有更高教育程度的人群的奢侈。


Nevertheless, we should remember the lessons of history.	但无论如何，我们都应该铭记历史的教训。


Political reforms are more likely to be successful if they are preceded by economic reforms.	以经济改革为先导的政治改革更有望成功。


We should insist that Egypt or Pakistan improve their market system, apply the rule of law, and open their economies to international trade and capital movements.	我们必须坚持让埃及和巴基斯坦改善它们的市场体系，实行法制，将经济向国际贸易和资本流动开放。


Allowing free elections and true political competition is also critically important, but this should follow economic reforms, not precede them.	允许自由选举和真正的政治竞争同样至关重要，但这应该在经济改革之后，而不是在其之前进行。


Democracy in Distress	困境中的民主


PARIS – Is democratic time too slow to respond to crises, and too short to plan for the long term?	巴黎——民主主义在应对危机之时是否过于缓慢？ 民主制度在制定长期计划时是否显得过于稚嫩？


At a time of deepening economic and social crisis in many of the world’s rich democracies, that question is highly relevant.	在许多世界上的发达民主国家都处在经济危机和社会危机不断加深的时期，这个问题显得尤为关键。


In Italy, for example, Prime Minister Mario Monti has the necessary and legitimate ambition to carry out comprehensive reform.	例如，意大利首相马里奥·蒙蒂很有必要，用合情合理的雄心壮志出台全方面的改革政策。


He is both competent and honest, but faces a quasi-structural impediment: whereas leaders once had three years to convince voters of their policies’ benefits, they now have three hours to convince global financial markets to back their approach.	他既有能力而且又正直可信赖，但却面临着拟结构性所带来的阻碍。 过去领导人拥有三年的时间使选民们信服他们出台的政策所带来的利益，但当今的临到人却只有三个小时的时间去说服全球金融市场支持他们的政策


Caught between Italian legislators who, deep down, do not understand that change and markets in quest of near-immediate certainties, can Monti transcend his natural prudence and act with sufficient clarity and decisiveness?	蒙蒂被一些意大利的立法委员所阻挠，这些立法委员，从深层次的角度来说，不懂改革和市场，但却要求短期而又立竿见影的明确结果。 蒙蒂能否超越自身与生俱来的聪明才智，运用足够的意志力和阐明事物的透彻能力去实现这一行动？


In the United States, too, the political system is becoming increasingly dysfunctional.	同样，美国的政治体系也变得越来越功能失调。


The political philosopher Francis Fukuyama goes so far as to say that “vetocracy” could triumph over democracy, regardless of who wins the 2012 presidential election.	政治哲学家弗朗西斯日前评论道，无论谁会取得2012年总统选举的胜利，“选民主义”都有可能会压倒“民主主义”。


The separation of powers, a principle established by the US founders under the influence of philosophers such as Montesquieu, is leading today to near-paralysis.	三权分立，是美国建国领导人在Montesquieuz这样的哲学家的影响下建立起来的治国纲领。 但这一原则现如今将美国领向了几近瘫痪的状态。


Democracies suffer not only from their slow reaction time at moments of crisis, but also from the difficulty that they face in projecting themselves into the future and planning for the long term.	民主主义不仅由于其在危机爆发时期反应时间过慢而备受打击； 而且当人们想要对将来制定长期的计划时，把自身因素考虑进去的时候，所面临的困难也使民主遭到不小的冲击。


On both sides of the Atlantic, political leaders know what they must do for their countries, but don’t know how to get re-elected if they actually do it.	在大西洋的两岸的国家，政治领导人知道他们必须要为自己的国家做一些贡献，但是当他们在实际做贡献的时候却不知道应该如何连任。


They seem to be structurally condemned to short-termism.	他们似乎一直由于结构问题而被指责为短期主义。


But it is not because democracies have a “time problem” that their era seems to some to be over.	但是，并不是因为民主主义的“时间问题”，而致使这种民主主义的时代似乎就此宣告结束。


China is rightly proud to be able to project itself into the twenty-second century.	中国将自己国家的计划已经制定到了二十二世纪，并为此感到自豪，这不无道理。


But China owes that quality of long-term thinking much more to its culture than to the nature of its political system.	但是，中国将这种长期的制定计划能力归功于本国的文化积淀，而并非是自身的政治制度。


Chinese think long term because they are Chinese, not because they are not democrats.	中国人喜欢长远的考虑问题，原因是因为中国人自古以来就是这样做的。 这并不是因为他们是非民主人士。


China’s leaders can, of course, react to events without much regard for Chinese public opinion.	当然，中国领导人可以不必太过于担心中国大众的观点就可以对重大事件做出应对。


After all, the great majority of Chinese do not dream of democracy, even if something like a civil society is emerging, generating new interests and demands that can no longer be totally controlled or manipulated, as in the past.	毕竟，对于绝大多数的中国老百姓来说，即使文明的社会正在形成，随之产生了新的利益和需求，并且这些利益和需求再也不能像过去那样完全地被控制和掌控，他们也并不梦寐以求实行民主制度。


But that is precisely the weakness of non-democratic regimes in a global age dominated by transparency: Who dreams of becoming a Chinese citizen, or even a citizen of Singapore?	但是，在一个全球化，透明化起主导位置的时代，这恰恰是非民主政权国家的劣势。 有谁会梦想成为一名中国公民?


In the aftermath of North Korea’s hereditary succession, strategic thinkers rightly emphasize China’s key role in shaping the peninsula’s future.	甚至可以说成为一名新加坡公民？ 在朝鲜世袭连任主席的余波中，一些战略思想家正确地强调了中国在未来朝鲜半岛局势方面的核心作用。


But, despite the scenes of hysteria that followed the death of the “Great Leader” Kim Jong-il, most North Koreans probably dream of joining democratic South Korea (even if many South Koreans fear that prospect).	但是，尽管人们看到了在“伟大的领袖”金正日死后，朝鲜人民表现出来的歇斯底里，极度悲恸的画面，但大多数的朝鲜人民可能梦想着加入民主化的韩国。 （即使许多的韩国民众很惧怕这种情况出现）


The majority of Chinese may not want to be governed like Westerners, but it would be wrong to assume that their only ambition is to spend like Westerners.	大多数的中国人民可能不想向西方人那样去治理国家，但是假设他们唯一的目标是向西方人那样花钱也可能是错误的。


The more successful they are, the more individualistic they will become and the more they will expect the respect and consideration of those who govern them.	他们取得的成功越大，他们就会越发变得个人主义，就会期望从管理他们的人的身上得到更多的尊敬和照顾。


By contrast, if China’s economic growth slows, which is likely in the coming years, protest against corruption – a source of fragility for any regime – will escalate.	相比之下，一旦中国的经济增长衰退，反对腐败呼声则会越来越高，腐败在任何一个国家中都是导致衰败的来源，而经济衰退则可能会在未来数年间出现。


Indeed, it is important to bear in mind that, ahead of the upcoming Chinese leadership transition, new occupants for only the top two posts have been chosen, and that through a process of gradual anointment by roughly a hundred people at most.	事实上，不久到来的中国领导人换届选举中，两个最高领导人的位置已经被选定，这一决定只是通过大约至多100人选举过程产生，而这一过程只是例行公事罢了，记住这一点尤为重要。


The current crisis in the advanced countries, which may very well lead to a global recession (if it is not already doing so), not only reveals the many maladies of democratic regimes, but also acts as their incubator and accelerator.	目前，发达国家的经济危机很有肯能会导致全球经济衰退（即使目前为止还没有造成全球范围内的经济萧条）。 这不仅仅揭露了民主制国家政权的许多弊病，同时这场危机充当了这些弊病的培养基和催化剂。


And yet the crisis may turn out to have an even greater impact on non-democratic systems that seem to be more efficient, but are in reality much more fragile.	然而，这场危机可能会对那些非民主制国家造成更加严重的冲击。 这些国家表面上看起更加有效率，而实际上却更加脆弱。


We see this in mounting unrest in both Russia and China.	我们可以从俄罗斯和中国不断增加的不稳定中得到这一结论。


Contrary to what one might think, democracy is more resilient than the alternatives in the long run.	民主主义比长远的选择更加具有抵抗力，这和某些人的想法背道而驰。


This will remain true as long as democrats remain convinced of it.	但只要民主人士一直坚信这种观点，这种观点就会维���原本的正确性。


Non-democratic models cannot truly challenge democracy.	非民主模式实际上不可能真正挑战民主主义。


Only the misbehavior of democrats can do that.	只有民主人士的错误行为才能够挑战民主主义。


Bring Back Egypt’s Elected Government	迎回埃及民选政府


NEW YORK – Putting an end to Egypt’s deepening polarization and rising bloodshed requires one urgent first step: the reinstatement of Mohamed Morsi as Egypt’s duly elected president.	纽约—停止埃及日渐加深的极端化和日渐增加的流血需要马上采取第一步：恢复穆尔西作为埃及合法当选总统的职位。


His removal by military coup was unjustified.	军事政变推翻他是不公正的。


While it is true that millions of demonstrators opposed Morsi’s rule, even massive street protests do not constitute a valid case for a military coup in the name of the “people” when election results repeatedly say otherwise.	诚然，数百万示威者反对穆尔西执政，但即使是群众街头示威也不构成打着“人民”的旗号行军事政变之实的充分理由，因为选举结果一再表明并非如此。


There is no doubt that Egyptian society is deeply divided along sectarian, ideological, class, and regional lines.	毫无疑问，埃及社会存在深刻的宗派、思想、阶级和种族分歧。


Yet the country has gone to the polls several times since the February 2011 overthrow of Mubarak’s 30-year rule.	但自2011年推翻穆巴拉克30年的统治以来，这个国家进行了好几次投票。


The results have demonstrated strong popular support for Islamist parties and positions, though they also make clear the country’s schisms.	结果表明，伊斯兰政党和立场拥有强大的民众支持率，尽管它们也让埃及的分裂表露无遗。


In late 2011 and early 2012, Egypt held parliamentary elections.	2011年末、2012年初，埃及举行了议会选举。


Morsi’s Freedom and Justice Party, created by the Muslim Brotherhood, secured a plurality, and the two major Islamist blocs together received roughly two-thirds of the vote.	穆尔西的正义和公正党（Freedom and Justice Party，由穆斯林兄弟会创立）赢得多数，伊斯兰两大阵营加起来获得了约三分之二的选票。


In June 2012, Morsi defeated his rival Ahmed Shafik, Mubarak’s final prime minister, by a margin of 52-48% to win the presidency.	2012年6月，穆尔西击以52%对48%的优势败对手、穆巴拉克的最后一任总理沙菲克（Ahmed Shafik）赢得总统选举。


In a national referendum in December 2012, a 64% majority of those voting approved a draft constitution backed by the Muslim Brotherhood (though turnout was low).	在2012年12月的全民公投中，64%多数投票赞成穆斯林兄弟会支持的宪法草案（尽管投票率并不高）。


The secular argument that Morsi’s lust for power jeopardized Egypt’s nascent democracy does not bear scrutiny.	世俗观点——穆尔西的权力欲破坏了萌芽期的埃及民主——根本站不住脚。


Secular, military, and Mubarak-era foes of the Muslim Brotherhood have used every lever at their disposal, democratic or not, to block the Islamist parties’ democratic exercise of power.	穆斯林兄弟会的世俗、军事和穆巴拉克时期反对者用尽一切方法——民主的和不民主的——阻挠其民主权力实践。


This is consistent with a decades-old pattern in Egyptian history, in which the Brothers – and Islamist political forces in general – were outlawed, and their members imprisoned, tortured, and exiled.	这与埃及几十年来的历史惯例一致——作为穆斯林兄弟会和伊斯兰政治力量得不到合法地位，它们的成员被关押、严刑拷打和流放。


Claims that Morsi ruled undemocratically stem from his repeated attempts to extricate the popularly elected parliament and presidency from anti-democratic traps set by the military.	穆尔西的统治不民主的说法产生于他一再试图让民选议会和总统逃脱军队设置的反民主陷阱。


After the Islamist parties’ huge victory in the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections, the military leadership and the Supreme Court (filled with Mubarak-era judges) worked to derail the new parliament and prevent it from establishing an assembly to draft a new constitution.	2011—2012年穆斯林政党在议会选举大获全胜后，军队领导层和最高法院（由穆巴拉克时期法官把持）设法颠覆新议会，阻止它召开大会起草新宪法。


The key action came in June 2012, when the Supreme Court, staffed entirely with Mubarak-era holdovers, nullified the results of the parliamentary elections on specious grounds.	关键动作发生在2012年6月。 当是时，完全由穆巴拉克时代遗老组成的最高法院以似是而非的托辞宣布议会选举结果无效。


The military was set to reassert full legislative powers.	军队将再次获得完全合法的权力。


Morsi’s subsequent victory in the presidential election therefore set up an epic battle over the future of the parliament and the constitution, as Morsi attempted to protect the democratically elected parliament while the military fought to dissolve it.	于是，随后穆尔西在总统选举中的胜出掀起了一场关于议会和宪法未来的大战，穆尔西试图保护民主选出的议会，而军队想要解散它。


In the end, Morsi insisted that the elected parliament create a constitutional assembly, which produced the draft approved in the December 2012 referendum.	最终，穆尔西坚持应该由民选议会召开制宪大会，并最终产生了2012年12月全民公投通过的宪法草案。


As is typical of political revolutions, Egypt’s economic situation has gone from bad to worse in the course of these power struggles.	与典型的政治革命一样，埃及经济状况在这些权力斗争中从恶化走向更加恶化。


Revolutions tend to confront new governments with steeply rising social demands (for wage increases and higher welfare spending, for example) at a time of capital flight, financial turmoil, and deep disruptions of production.	革命往往产生面临急剧上升的社会需求的政府（比如要求涨薪和增加福利支出），与此同时又往往伴随着资本外逃、金融动荡和生产的严重破坏。


In Egypt’s case, the crucial tourist sector contracted sharply after the revolution.	在埃及的例子中，关键的旅游业因为革命而大幅萎缩。


Unemployment soared, the currency depreciated, and food prices rose dangerously.	失业率出现了飙升，货币出现了贬值，食品价格上升到危险的水平。


None of this is surprising, and little of it can be managed by a new government that lacks experience, market confidence, and full control of the levers of power.	所有这些一点都不令人惊奇，也绝非缺乏经验、市场信心和对各级权力完全控制的新政府所能治理。


Historically, outside parties have thus played a decisive role.	从历史上看，外部行为人因此扮演着决定性作用。


Will foreign governments and the International Monetary Fund extend vital finances to the new government, or will they let it flounder and drown in a tsunami of currency depreciation and inflation?	外国政府和IMF会扩大对新政府的救命融资线吗？ 还是会让新政府自生自灭，任由其被货币贬值和通货膨胀的漩涡吞噬？


Here, the feckless West – torn between its democratic rhetoric and its antipathy to the Islamists – showed its hand.	在这方面，不厚道的西方——一边大谈民主，一边唯恐对伊斯兰教避之不及——摊了牌。


The result was equivocation and delay, rather than commitment and assistance.	西方虚与委蛇，极尽拖延，迟迟不给出承诺和援助。


The IMF has talked with the Egyptian government for two and a half years since Mubarak’s overthrow without so much as lending a single cent, sealing the Egyptian economy’s fate and contributing to public unrest and the recent coup.	在穆巴拉克倒台后的两年半时间里，IMF一直在与埃及政府扯皮，却不发放一分钱的贷款，这不啻扼杀埃及的经济前途，助长了埃及的社会动荡，催生了最近的政变。


It appears from press reports that the West finally gave the green light to the Egyptian military to overthrow Morsi, arrest the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership, and repress the Islamist rank and file.	媒体纷纷报道西方最终向埃及军队推翻穆尔西、逮捕穆斯林兄弟会领导层以及镇压伊斯兰教徒开了绿灯。


US President Barack Obama’s unwillingness to stand up for Egypt’s elected leaders, or even to label their overthrow a “coup” (thereby protecting the continued flow of US funds to the Egyptian military), shows that when push came to shove, the West sided with the anti-Islamists in subverting democracy.	美国总统奥巴马不愿意站出来支持埃及民选领导人，甚至不愿称他们的被推翻为“政变”（从而保护了源源不断流向埃及军队的美国资金），这表明事到临头，西方与反伊斯兰阵营穿一条裤子，镇压民主。


Of course, in classic Orwellian fashion, the West did so in democracy’s name.	当然，用经典的奥威尔式调侃说，西方这么做都是以民主的名义。


The coup and the West’s complacency about it (if not complicity in it) could devastate Egypt.	政变和西方对政变的自得（如果说不是共谋的话）会毁掉埃及。


The Islamists are neither a marginal political group nor a terrorist force.	穆斯林既不是边缘政治团体，也不是恐怖主义势力。


They represent a large part of Egypt’s population, perhaps half or more, and are certainly the country’s best-organized political force.	他们代表着埃及人口的很大一部分，可能占一半甚至以上，也显然是埃及组织最好的政治力量。


The attempt to repress the Muslim Brotherhood and to deny Morsi the presidency to which he was elected will most likely lead to massive violence and the strangulation of democracy, however the West and Egyptian anti-Islamists try to justify their actions.	试图镇压穆斯林兄弟会、否认穆尔西通过选举获得的总统位置极有可能导致大规模暴力和扼杀民主，不管西方和埃及反伊斯兰派如何粉饰他们的行为。


At this point, the correct course for the West would be to call on Egypt’s military to reinstate Morsi; to offer prompt financing to help stabilize the Egyptian economy; and to support true pluralism, not the kind that reverts to military coups when elections produce inconvenient results.	在这一点上，西方正确的做法是呼吁埃及军队恢复穆尔西的总统职位、迅速提供资金帮助稳定埃及经济，以及支持真正的多元主义，而不是在选举结果不合意就诉诸军事政变的多元主义。


True pluralism means accepting the strength of Islamist political forces in the new Egypt and other countries in the region.	多元主义意味着接受伊斯兰政治势力在新埃及和该地区其他国家的优势。


Short of this, the West will most likely end up as an accomplice to Egypt’s continuing downward spiral into violence and economic collapse.	没有多元主义，西方极有可能沦为埃及滑向暴力和经济崩溃的帮凶。


Democracy in Inaction at the World Bank	世界银行民主的缺失


James Wolfensohn, the president of the World Bank, has announced his intention to leave, and the search is on for a new head of the world’s most important multilateral organization promoting development.	世界银行行长詹姆斯•沃尔芬森已经公布了离任的打算，现在世行这个全世界最重要的多边发展促进组织正在寻找新的带头人。


The choice is especially important now, when poverty in the Third World is finally being recognized as our greatest problem and challenge.	在第三世界的贫困问题终于被承认为我们面临的最严峻问题和最大挑战的今天，选择谁为世行行长更是至关重要。


The World Bank’s designation as a “bank” understates its importance and its multifaceted roles.	世界银行“银行”的这一称呼削弱了这一组织的重要性，也淡化了其角色的多面性。


It does lend money to countries to undertake a variety of projects, and to help them through crises (such as the $10 billion it provided to Korea in 1997-1998).	世行确实为各国的各种项目提供贷款，也为这些国家渡过危机提供帮助（如在1997-1998年间，为韩国提供了100亿美元的贷款）。


It has been, and is, playing a vital role in post-conflict reconstruction around the world.	在世界各地的战后重建方面，世界银行不管是过去，还是现在都一直发挥了至关重要的作用。


But the Bank also provides grants and low-interest loans to the poorest countries, particularly for education and health, and advises these countries on development strategies.	但世界银行还为最贫困国家的教育、卫生事业等提供赠款及低息贷款，并为这些国家的发展战略提供建议。


It has often joined with the IMF in strong-arming countries into accepting this “advice”: unless they do, they will not only be cut off by the IMF and the World Bank, but also by other donors, and capital markets will be discouraged from providing funds.	世界银行还经常和国际货币基金组织联手，强迫这些国家接受建议。 否则不仅世界银行和国际货币基金组织会中断对该国的援助，而且还会设法阻止其他捐赠者和资本市场为该国提供基金。


Sometimes – its critics will say often – the advice provided by the IMF and World Bank is misguided.	有时—批评者会说是“经常”—国际货币基金组织和世界银行提供的建议具有误导性。


This was certainly true in the 1980’s and early 1990’s, when right-wing ideology dominated, producing a one-size-fits-all prescription entailing privatization, liberalization, and macroeconomic stability (meaning price stability), with little attention to employment, equity, or the environment.	在20世纪80 年代和90年代初，情况确实如此。 当时在国际货币基金组织和世界银行，右翼思潮一统天下，给各国开的处方都是“一刀切”，全都是私有化、自由化、宏观经济稳定（意思是价格稳定）那一套，很少注意到就业问题、公正问题和环境保护问题。


The term “bank” is a misnomer in a second sense: while the World Bank refers to its members as “shareholders,” it is hardly a private bank.	从第二个意义上来说，“银行”这一提法也不妥当：尽管世界银行把其成员都称为“股东”，但它很难算得上是私有银行。


On the contrary, the World Bank is a global public institution.	正相反，世界银行是一个全球性的公共机构。


But, while the G-7 countries, which dominate voting at the Bank, all declare their commitment to democracy and good governance – and espouse promoting them as one of their central objectives – there is a yawning gap between what they preach and what they practice.	尽管在世界银行中控制着投票的七大工业国都宣称他们致力于民主和良性统治，并全力支持将上述两者作为他们的基本目标，但他们的言与行却大相径庭。


Indeed, the entire process of choosing these international institutions’ leaders is a historical anachronism that undermines their effectiveness and makes a mockery of the G-7 countries’ commitment to democracy.	事实上，这些国际机构领导人的整个选举程序都已经过时落伍。 这不仅损害了这些机构的效能，而且对承诺致力于民主的七大工业国来说，也是一种嘲讽。


This process, established at the outset 60 years ago, is framed by an agreement that an American would lead the World Bank and a European would lead the IMF.	这一选举程序始于60年前，并受制于一项协议。 该协议规定世界银行行长只能由美国人来担任，而国际货币基金组织的领袖则非欧洲人莫属。


The American president would choose the Bank’s head, and Europe would collectively decide on the IMF leader, with the understanding that the other side would exercise its veto only if a candidate were totally unacceptable.	世界银行行长由美国总统指定，而国际货币基金组织总裁则由欧洲集体决定，只有在候选人完全不合格时，另外一方才可以行使反对权。


Within the United States, all major presidential appointments must be ratified by the Senate; even if rejections are rare, the vetting process is important, for the president knows that he can go only so far.	在美国，总统所有的任命都必须要经过国会的认可，即使参议院很少提出反对意见，这一审查程序也非常重要，因为总统明白他的权力只能到此为止。


But the presidency of the World Bank is a rare presidential plum – an appointment that is not subject even to Congressional hearings.	但对总统来说，世界银行行长的任命却是一桩少有的美事，任命甚至不必通过国会听证会。


How can advice on democratic reforms be taken seriously when the multilateral institutions that offer it do not subscribe to the same standards of openness, transparency, and participation that they advocate?	如果多边国际机构本身都没有拿自己所提倡的开放、透明与参与的标准来同样要求自己，那他们提出的民主改革建议怎么可能被认真对待？


Why should the search for Wolfensohn’s successor be limited to an American (and especially an American loyal to a particular political party)?	为什么沃尔芬森的接班人只能局限于美国人（尤其是效忠某一政党的美国人）？


Why is the search process going on behind closed doors?	为什么接班人的寻找程序不公开进行？


Shouldn’t these international public institutions be looking for the best-qualified person, regardless of race, religion, gender, or nationality?	难道这些国际公共机构不应该寻找最合格的人选，而不受种族、宗教、性别、民族的限制？


The two names that have been floated so far – presumably leaked as trial balloons – are particularly disturbing.	目前四处传言的两名候选人—这一消息很可能是当成探测气球故意泄漏出来的¾尤其令人觉得不安。


To put it bluntly, given the World Bank’s importance, consideration of either putative US candidate, Assistant Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz or former Hewlett-Packard CEO Carleton Fiorina, have been highly controversial around the world.	直言不讳地说，考虑到世界银行的重要性，两名假定的美国候选人，美国国防部副部长保罗·沃尔福兹（Paul Wolfowitz）和前惠普公司首席执行官卡莉·菲奥瑞娜（Carleton Fiorina），���已经在全球引起了很大争议。


Even if convention allows the American president to appoint the World Bank’s head, the organization’s success depends on the confidence of others.	即使惯例允许美国总统指定世界银行行长，但世行的成功取决于别人的信任。


Neither Wolfowitz nor Fiorina have any training or experience in economic development or financial markets.	在经济发展和金融市场方面，沃尔福兹和菲奥瑞娜都没有经验，也没有接受过任何培训。


Of course, some past appointees turned out to be far better than anticipated; they rose to the occasion, despite qualifications that, in any open and objective selection process, would never even have left them on the short list.	当然，过去指定的一些人员结果表现得比预期的要好得多。 他们能得体应付突如其来的情况，尽管如果按公开的、客观的选举程序，他们的资历根本不足以让他们进入决选名单。


They proved that there is always a chance of outperforming.	他们证明了总有超常发挥的可能存在。


But this does not outweigh the risk of underperforming, which is why the best policy is to look for the best candidate.	但这不能抵消发挥失常的风险，这也就是为什么寻找最佳候选人才是最好的政策的原因。


There are some absolutely first-rate individuals who could step into the job, people who have shown their command of economic development, their intellect and personal integrity, and their political and managerial skills.	有一些绝对一流的人才可以胜任世行行长这一工作。 他们已经展示了他们的智力、人品、政治及管理技能以及对经济发展的控制能力。


Such potential candidates include former Mexican president Ernesto Zedillo, a Yale Ph.D. who now teaches there and has been strongly supported in an editorial in the Financial Times; Arminio Fraga, a Princeton Ph.D. and former head of Brazil’s central bank; and Kemal Dervis, a former World Bank vice-president who has taught at Princeton and successfully managed one of Turkey’s crises as finance minister.	这些潜在的候选人包括墨西哥前总统埃内斯托·塞迪略，他拥有耶鲁大学的博士学位，现在该大学任教，《金融时报》 曾 在一篇社论中对他进行过大力推荐。 阿米尼奥·弗拉革，普林斯顿大学博士、巴西中央银行前任行长。


Why should the world settle for anything less than candidates of this caliber?	德尔维什，世界银行前任副行长，曾在普林斯顿大学任教，并在任土耳其经济事务部部长时使土耳其成功地度过了一次危机。 为什么全世界不接受具备这些才干的候选人，而要满足于接受别人呢？


It is time that the G-7 countries back up their democratic rhetoric with action.	现在是7大工业国用行动来支持自己关于民主的言论的时候了。


Many stood up to the US as it pushed for the war in Iraq.	在美国企图发动伊拉克战争时，很多国家提出反对。


They were right to be skeptical about US claims of an imminent danger from weapons of mass destruction.	他们对美国声称大规模杀伤性武器带来的危险迫在眉睫这点表示怀疑，他们的怀疑是正确的。


What is at stake here is no less important: the lives and well being of billions in the Third World depend on a global war on poverty.	现在处于危急关头的是第三世界数10亿条生命和他们的福利，这些都取决于全球反贫困战争。 比起伊拉克战争来，重要性可谓有增无减。


Choosing the right general in that war will not assure victory, but choosing the wrong one surely enhances the chances of failure.	在这一战争中，选择适合的将军不一定能确保胜利，但错误的选择却肯定会加大失败的可能性。


Democracy in Tea Party America	论美国茶党的民主


BERKELEY – When the French politician and moral philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville published the first volume of his Democracy in America in 1835, he did so because he thought that France was in big trouble and could learn much from America.	伯克利—1835年，法国政治家和道德哲学家托克维尔出版了《论美国的民主》上卷。 他之所以写这么本书，是因为他觉得法国正陷入大麻烦中，可以从美国身上学到很多东西。


So one can only wonder what he would have made of the Republican National Convention in Tampa, Florida.	要是他看了佛罗里达州坦帕市的共和党全国大会上仍作如是观，那真是有鬼了。


For Tocqueville, the grab for centralized power by the absolutist Bourbon monarchs, followed by the French Revolution and Napoleon’s Empire, had destroyed the good with the bad in France’s neo-feudal order.	对托克维尔来说，法国先是被专制的波旁王朝攫取了中央集权，接着又受到大革命和拿破仑帝国的折腾，于是新封建秩序摧毁殆尽，不管是优点还是缺点都没有留下。


Decades later, the new order was still in flux.	几十年后，新秩序仍有待建立。


In Tocqueville’s imagination, at least, the old order’s subjects had been eager to protect their particular liberties and jealous of their spheres of independence.	至少在托克维尔的想象中，旧秩序的国民狂热地保护非同寻常的自由，唯恐失去独立性。


They understood that they were embedded in a web of obligations, powers, responsibilities, and privileges that was as large as France itself.	他们明白，他们被纳入了一张义务、权力、责任和特权之网，这张网就像法兰西一样大。


Among the French of 1835, however, “the doctrine of self-interest” had produced “egotism…no less blind.”	但是，在1835年的法国人中间，“自利主义”已经产生了“自负……毫不逊色的盲目”。


Having “destroyed an aristocracy,” the French were “inclined to survey its ruins with complacency.”	“打倒了贵族”的法国人“心满意足地看着留下的废墟。 ”


To the “sick” France of 1835, Tocqueville counterposed healthy America, where attachment to the idea that people should pursue their self-interest was no less strong, but was different.	针对1835年的“病态”法国，托克维尔用健康的美国作为对比。 在美国，关于应该追求自我利益的观点也像法国一样流行，但两者之间并不一样。


The difference, he thought, was that Americans understood that they could not flourish unless their neighbors prospered as well.	他认为，不同之处就在于美国人明白自己无法在四邻萧条的情况下独自繁荣。


Thus, Americans pursued their self-interest, but in a way that was “rightly understood.”	因此，美国人虽然追求自我利益，但是以一种“正确理解”的方式在进行。


Tocqueville noted that “Americans are fond of explaining…[how] regard for themselves constantly prompts them to assist each other, and inclines them willingly to sacrifice a portion of their time and property to the general welfare.”	托克维尔指出“美国人热衷于解释……为自己考虑是如何一贯地让他们互相帮助，并促使他们牺牲部分时间和财物去创造福利的。


The French, by contrast, faced a future in which “it is difficult to foresee to what pitch of stupid excesses their egotism may lead them,” and “into what disgrace and wretchedness they would plunge themselves, lest they should have to sacrifice something of their own well-being to the prosperity of their fellow-creatures.”	”相反，法国人面临这样一个未来：“很难预测盖过自负的愚蠢会把他们引向何方”以及“他们会让自己陷入怎样的耻辱和不幸，唯恐自己不得不牺牲一些自身福利和成功来为同类造福。 ”


For Tocqueville, France’s sickness in 1835 stemmed from its Bourbon patrimony of a top-down, command-and-control government, whereas America’s health consisted in its bottom-up, grassroots-democratic government.	在托克维尔看来，1835年法国之病源于波旁王朝是一个自上而下的指令-控制型政府，而美国的健康来自它自下而上的草根民主政府。


Give the local community enough control over its own affairs, Tocqueville argued, and one “will see at a glance…the close tie which unites private to general interest.”	托克维尔认为应该给予地方社区足够的权力决定自身事务，这样人们“就能一窥……将私人利益和公众利益连在一起的紧密纽带”。


It was “local freedom which leads a great number of citizens to value the affection of their neighbors and of their kindred, perpetually brings men together, and forces them to help one another, in spite of the propensities which sever them.”	“地方自由让大量公民开始重视邻里和家族影响，永久地将人们团结起来，迫使他们互相帮助，尽管各人的性格癖好各不相同。 ”


Nearly two centuries have passed since Tocqueville wrote his masterpiece.	托克维尔的不朽名著距今已经将近两个世纪了。


The connection between the general interest and the private interest of individual Americans has, if anything, become much stronger, even if their private interest is tied to a post office box in the Cayman Islands.	公共利益和个体美国人的私人利益之间的联系变得更加密切了，尽管他们的私人利益往往系于开曼群岛的某个邮政信箱。


Indeed, no private-equity fortunes were made over the past generation without investing in or trading with the prosperous North Atlantic industrial core of the world economy.	事实上，在过去一代人中，没有哪笔私人股权财富不是通过投资或与这个繁荣的北大西洋世界经济产业核心做交易得到的。


But the mechanisms that individuals can use to join with their immediate neighbors in political action that makes a difference in their lives have become much weaker.	但个人和隔壁邻居联合起来采取共同政治行动改变生活的机制被大大削弱了。


If, say, 25% of the 1,000 households in the 30-block Brookside “fiberhood” in Kansas City, Missouri, pre-subscribe, Google will provide all 1,000 with the opportunity to get very cheap, very fast Internet service very soon.	比如，如果密苏里州堪萨��城30个街区的溪边（Brookside）“光小区”的1000户人家有25%与预先订阅，那么谷歌将会立刻为所有1000户家庭提供价格极低、速度极快的互联网服务。


But that is the proverbial exception that proves the rule.	但这只是证明这一规则的显著例外。


And the Republicans gathered in Tampa to celebrate the rule – to say that the America that Tocqueville saw no longer exists: Americans no longer believe that the wealth of the rich rests on the prosperity of the rest.	而坎帕共和党大会意欲庆祝这一规则——这无异于是在宣布托克维尔所看到的美国已经不复存在：美国人不再相信富人之富是建立在其他人共富的基础上的。


Rather, the rich owe their wealth solely to their own luck and effort.	相反，富人之所以致富，仅仅是因为自身的运气和努力。


The rich – and only the rich – “built” what they have.	富人——只有富人——“创造”了他们自身。


The willingness to sacrifice some part of their private interest to support the public interest damages the souls and portfolios of the 1%.	牺牲他们的部分私人利益支持公众利益的意愿会破坏顶层1%的灵魂和财富。


Perhaps the moral and intellectual tide will be reversed, and America will remain exceptional for the reasons that Tocqueville identified two centuries ago.	也许道德和知识趋势会被逆转，而美国也将继续因托克维尔两个世纪前所观察到的原因而出类拔萃。


Otherwise, Tocqueville would surely say of Americans today what he said of the French then.	否则的话，托克维尔肯定会说，今天的美国正如当年的法国。


The main difference is that it has become all too easy “to foresee to what pitch of stupid excesses their egotism may lead them” and “into what disgrace and wretchedness they would plunge themselves.”	主要区别只在于如今“预测盖过自负的愚蠢会把他们引向何方”以及“他们会让自己陷入怎样的耻辱和不幸”非常容易。


Democracy on the Nile?	尼罗河畔的民主？


The surprise decision by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to propose a constitutional amendment that would allow direct and competitive presidential elections may be a giant step for democracy in Egypt and the Arab World.	埃及总统胡斯尼·穆巴拉克关于修改宪法，从而使总统选举以直接、竞争方式进行的惊人决定，可以说是在埃及和阿拉伯世界的民主道路上迈出了一大步。


Westerners used to pluralistic democracy may find it hard to understand what a potentially huge shift this will be in a country accustomed to military rule for over 50 years.	在多元化民主模式下生活多年的西方人可能很难理解这一举措对于一个50多年持续处于军事统治下的国家来说是一次多么巨大的转变。


Under the current system, Egyptian citizens can only show up on the day of a presidential referendum every six years and say yes or no to the single name that appears on the presidential ballot.	在现有的政治体制下，埃及市民只能在每6年举行一次的全民公决仪式上露一面，对唯一的候选人说赞成或者反对。


This explains why someone like Mubarak always received over 90% of the vote, albeit amid indifferent turnout.	这也是为什么虽然投票者态度冷漠，像穆巴拉克这样的人仍旧能获得超过90%以上选票的原因所在。


Syrian and Iraqi strongmen have done even better with this system, no doubt because they demanded that the names and addresses of voters be put at the bottom of each ballot.	叙利亚和以色列的强硬派使用这一手段做得更为出色。 毫无疑问，原因在于他们要求每一位选举人在所投选票的底部写上自己的名字和地址。


Many people have long argued that democratization in the Middle East will not get far until Egypt becomes fully engaged in the process.	很多人始终认为只有埃及完全参与到中东的民主化进程中去，这一进程才会被快速推进。


Egypt could not truly set out on a path of democratization without first amending its constitution – to downsize the Pharaonic powers of its president and set limits on his term in office.	而埃及若不能首先对其宪法进行修改¾削弱总统的君主权利、限制其任期年限，便不会真正踏上民主化道路。


Mubarak, after all, is already in his 24th year as president. So the announcement that he wants competitive presidential elections is an important first step.	毕竟，今年已经是穆巴拉克当政的第二十四个年头，希望进行公开总统选举的声明迈出了重要的一步。


The regime may assume that it will be able to use the process to its own advantage, but events may not be that easy to control once people begin to feel empowered.	这种政权制度可能会认为它能够把这一程序为己所用，然而一旦人民感到被赋予了权利，局面就未必那样容易控制。


The democratic genie is out of the bottle.	民主的妖怪已经从瓶子里钻出来了。


In any case, Egypt is not the only country in this troubled region that is now embarking on the road of democracy.	不管怎么说，埃及不是这一地区唯一踏上民主道路的国家。


Turkey at one end of the Middle East and Morocco at the other are already well on their way.	在中东一端的土耳其和在另一端的摩洛哥已经顺利上路了。


The real groundswell this time seems to have come from the close timing and positive outcomes of recent elections in Iraq, Palestine, and to a lesser degree in Saudi Arabia.	这一次，真正掀起舆论波澜的似乎应该说是相继进行的，发生在伊拉克、巴勒斯坦以及位居其次的沙特阿拉伯的大选以及已经显露积极态势的大选结果。


The unprecedented demonstrations against Syria’s occupation of Lebanon following the assassination of its former prime minister, Rafiq al-Hariri, show no signs of abating.	在黎巴嫩前总理哈里里遇刺身亡后，反对叙利亚对黎占领的示威规模空前，并且没有减弱趋势。


Egyptian opposition groups, too, have staged increasingly bold marches and other forms of civil disobedience in the last few weeks.	埃及的反对派也在此前几周举行了日趋浩荡的游行以及其它形式的非暴力反抗。


The catalyst for their anger was the arrest and detention of the ailing opposition leader Ayman Nour at the end of January.	民众愤怒的催化剂是一月底反对派领导人Ayman Nour在病中被逮捕并关押这一事件。


The government’s heavy-handed behavior reinvigorated the homegrown “Kifaya” (Enough) movement, which has demanded an end to the Mubarak regime.	政府的粗暴行为再次激起了多次国内运动，要求结束穆巴拉克的统治时代。


Suddenly the popular wisdom that Egyptians are passive and afraid to act did not seem to be holding up.	一时之间，认为埃及人被动、怯于行动的观点似乎站不住脚了。


An alliance of local, regional, and international forces is uniting against tyranny-as-usual on the banks of the Nile.	一个地方、区域、乃至国际力量的联盟正在团结起来与尼罗河畔的一贯暴政抗衡。


The recent wave of popular pressure appears to have shaken the regime.	最近公众压力的浪潮似乎已经动摇了统治政权。


Only a month ago, Mubarak dismissed demands for constitutional reform as “futile.”	就在一个月前，穆巴拉克还认为要求宪法改革是徒劳无益的。


But, whatever combination of events brought about his change of heart, election initiative should be welcomed.	但是，不管是什么因素改变了他的主意，实施大选的决定还是应该受到欢迎的。


It is a necessary – but insufficient – first step for overhauling Egypt’s stagnant political system.	对于修整埃及多年停滞不前的政治体制来说，这只是必要的第一步，但还远远不够。


Egyptians are already wary of token reforms à la Tunisia, where longstanding President Zine El Abidin Bin Ali created a caricature of a constitutional amendment that appeared to open the door for competitive presidential elections, but then staged a sham contest with a few handpicked “opponents.”	埃及人早已对突尼斯象征性的改革有所警觉，在那儿，在位多年的总统本·阿里自己绘制了一幅关于修改宪法的漫画。 他似乎对公开的总统选举敞开大门，然而却在之后精心挑选了几位“对手”，上演了一次伪装竞选。


In previous Tunisian presidential referenda, Bin Ali routinely received 99% of the vote; he now got 96%.	以前对突尼斯总统的全民公决中，本·阿里始终保持获得99%的选票，现在他的得票率是96%。


Let us hope that Mubarak is more serious about electoral reform.	让我们期盼穆巴拉克能够更加认真的对待这次选举改革。


As a measure of sincerity, he needs to order the immediate release of Ayman Nour and take steps to terminate the 24-year-long state of emergency, which effectively prevents political campaigning from taking place.	作为衡量他真诚度的标尺，他首先必须立即释放Ayman Nour，采取措施结束国家长达24年的“紧急状态”，正是这一“紧急状态”有效阻止了政治性竞选活动的发生。


Mubarak should also endorse a limit of no more than two successive five-year terms for any president.	穆巴拉克还应该明确限制：总统执政不得超过连续2届的5年任期。


Equally necessary are confidence-building measures, including open and equal access to the media, which are now state-controlled.	同样必要的还有建立信任体制，包括给予媒体公开和平等的接触机会，而现在媒体是由国家控制。


I have announced that I intend to contest this upcoming presidential election as a way of opening debate on these essential reforms.	我在这里宣布：我打算加入到即将到来的总统大选的角逐中去，从而开启对上述实质性改革的公开讨论。


But I would gladly go back to my life as a private citizen once guaranteed a free and open election this fall.	但是一旦今年秋天的大选能够保证以自由、公开的方式进行，我很乐意重新回到我的个人生活中去，作一个普通的老百姓。


If seriously implemented, these steps will transform Mubarak’s legacy.	如果得以切实贯彻，这些措施将作为穆巴拉克的遗产，传承下去。


Along with events in Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine, it may well usher in an Arab spring of freedom, one long overdue.	连同黎巴嫩、伊拉克和巴勒斯坦事件，它完全有可能给阿拉伯世界带来迟到已久的自由的春天。


Democracy Promotion Reconsidered	民主推进的再思考


Cambridge – President George W. Bush was famous for proclaiming the promotion of democracy a central focus of American foreign policy.	坎布里奇—布什总统以鼓吹推进民主是美国外交政策的核心而闻名。


He was not alone in this rhetoric.	执此论调的并非他一人。


Most American presidents since Woodrow Wilson have made similar statements.	自威尔逊以来的大多数美国总统都做过类似的表示。


So it was striking when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton testified to Congress earlier this year about the “three D’s” of American foreign policy – defense, diplomacy, and development.	因此当国务卿希拉里早些时候在国会就美国对外政策的“三‘D’”—防御（defense）、外交（diplmacy）和发展（development）—作证时就备受关注。


The “D” of democracy was noticeable by its absence, suggesting a change in policy by Barack Obama’s administration.	代表民主（democracy）的“D”显然不在此列，这意味着奥巴马政府的政策变化。


Both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush frequently referred to the beneficial effects of democracy on security.	克林顿和布什都频繁引证民主对安全的有益作用。


They cited social science studies that show that democracies rarely go to war with each other.	他们援引社会科学研究的成果，称民主政体之间几乎不会开战。


But, more carefully stated, what scholars show is that liberal democracies almost never go to war with each other, and it may be that a liberal constitutional culture is more important than the mere fact of elections.	但是，更确切地说，学者们所言是 自由 民主政体之间几乎从不开战，这很可能是因为自由主义宪政文化比仅仅选举的事实更重要。


While elections are important, liberal democracy is more than “electocracy.”	尽管选举重要，但自由民主并不仅仅是“选举民主”。


Elections in the absence of constitutional and cultural constraints can produce violence, as in Bosnia or the Palestinian Authority.	脱离了宪法和文化制约的选举可能造成暴力，就像波斯尼亚和巴勒斯坦权力机构。


And illiberal democracies have fought each other, as Ecuador and Peru did in the 1990’s.	而非自由的民主政体则会相互攻击，如1990年代的厄瓜多尔和秘鲁。


In the eyes of many critics at home and abroad, the Bush administration’s excesses tarnished the idea of democracy promotion.	在国内外的许多批评者眼中，布什政府的过度政策使民主推进的理念黯淡无光。


Bush’s invocation of democracy to justify the invasion of Iraq implied that democracy could be imposed at the barrel of a gun.	布什以民主之名行入侵伊拉克之实就意味着民主可以用枪炮强加于人。


The word democracy came to be associated with its particular American variant, and took on an imperialist connotation.	“民主”一词与其特殊的美国变量相关联就增加了帝国主义的内涵。


Moreover, Bush’s exaggerated rhetoric was often at odds with his practice, giving rise to charges of hypocrisy.	另外，布什的夸张言词又常常与其实际行动不符，从而其虚伪也备受诟病。


It was far easier for him to criticize Zimbabwe, Cuba, and Burma than Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and his initial criticism of Egypt was soon toned down.	对他而言，批评津巴布韦、古巴和缅甸比非议沙特阿拉伯和巴基斯坦要容易得多。 他先前对埃及的批评之声也很快变得温和了。


There is a danger, however, in over-reacting to the failures of the Bush administration’s policies.	然而，在对布什政府政策失败的过度反应中有一种危险。


The growth of democracy is not an American imposition, and it can take many forms.	民主的成长不是美国强加于人的，而它本身也可能有许多形式。


The desire for greater participation is widespread as economies develop and people adjust to modernization.	随着各个经济体的发展和人民对现代化的适应，更大程度参与的愿望广泛存在。


Democracy is not in retreat.	民主并没有遭受挫折。


Freedom House, a non-governmental organization, listed 86 free countries at the beginning of the Bush years, and a slight increase to 89 by the end of his term.	“自由之屋”，一个非政府组织，在布什上任之初列出了86个自由国家，而在他执政末期，这一数字略有增加，达到89个。


Democracy remains a worthy and widespread goal, but it is important to distinguish the goal from the means used to attain it.	民主仍然是个值得为之努力的广泛目标。 但将这个目标与用于实现它的手段区分开来是非常重要的。


There is a difference between assertive promotion and more gentle support of democratization.	武断地推进和较为温和地支持民主化之间是有区别的。


Avoiding coercion, premature elections, and hypocritical rhetoric should not preclude a patient policy that relies on economic assistance, behind-the-scenes diplomacy, and multilateral approaches to aid the development of civil society, the rule of law, and well-managed elections.	避免高压政治、不成熟的选举和虚伪的高调也并不是要排除一种富有耐心的政策—它所依赖的是经济援助、幕后外交、协助公民社会发展的多边策略、法制和管理良好的选举。


Equally important to the foreign-policy methods used to support democracy abroad are the ways in which we practice it at home.	与对支持国外民主的对外政策手段同等重要的是我们在国内实践它的方式。


When we try to impose democracy, we tarnish it.	当我们试图将民主强加于人，我们就玷污了民主。


When we live up to our own best traditions, we can stimulate emulation and create the soft power of attraction.	当我们将自己的最佳传统发挥到极致时，才能激励他人仿效，从而创造吸引的软实力。


This approach is what Ronald Reagan called the “shining city on the hill.”	这种方式就是里根所说的“山丘上的亮丽城市”。


For example, many people both inside and outside the United States had become cynical about the American political system, arguing that it was dominated by money and closed to outsiders.	例如，美国内外的许多人都开始对美国式的政治制度颇有微词。 他们认为这是种被金钱左右并对局外人关闭大门的制度。


The election of Barack Hussein Obama in 2008 did a great deal to restore the soft power of American democracy.	阿巴马在2008年的当选在很大程度上恢复了美国的软实力。


Another aspect of America’s domestic practice of liberal democracy that is currently being debated is how the US deals with the threat of terrorism.	美国国内实践自由民主的另一个方面是当前饱受争议的美国应对恐怖主义威胁的方式。


In the climate of extreme fear that followed the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration engaged in tortured legal interpretations of international and domestic law that tarnished American democracy and diminished its soft power.	在2001年“9. 11”恐怖袭击之后极度恐惧的大气候下，布什政府着手歪曲对国际和国内法的解释，并由此玷污了美国的民主，削弱了其软实力。


Fortunately, a free press, an independent judiciary, and a pluralist legislature helped to hold for such practices up public debate.	幸运的是，在自由的媒体、独立的司法和多元的立法体系帮助下，这些举措被置于公众辩论之中。


Obama has proclaimed that he will close the Guantánamo Bay detention facility within a year, and he has declassified the legal memos that were used to justify what is now widely regarded as torture of detainees.	奥巴马宣称将在一年内关闭关塔纳摩湾的羁押设施，并将相关的法律备忘录公之于众。 这些备忘录是用来开脱那些现在被认为是对被羁押者的折磨行为。


But the problem of how to deal with terrorism is not just a matter of history.	但如何应对恐怖主义的问题不仅事关历史。


The threat remains alive, and it is important to remember that people in democracies want both liberty and security.	这种威胁仍然存在，我们需要记住的一个重点是民主政体中的人民既需要自由也需要安全。


In moments of extreme fear, the pendulum of attitudes swings toward the security end of that spectrum.	在极度恐惧的时刻，态度的钟摆摇向了频谱的“安全”一端。


Abraham Lincoln suspended the right of habeas corpus – the principle that detainees are entitled to challenge their detention in a court of law – during the Civil War, and Franklin Roosevelt interned Japanese-American citizens during the early days of World War II.	在美国内战期间，林肯暂时中止了 habeas corpus 的权利—被羁押者有权在法庭上挑战被羁押事实的原则。 罗斯福在二战初期也拘留了日裔美国公民。


When some of the Bush administration’s more reasonable members are asked today how they could have taken the positions they did in 2002, they cite the anthrax attacks that followed 9/11, the intelligence reports of an impending attack with nuclear materials, and the widespread fear of a second attack against the American people.	当布什政府中一些更具理性的成员现在被问到为何在2002年会采取那样的立场时，他们列举了“9. 11”之后的炭疽袭击和对美国民众遭受第二次袭击的广泛恐惧。


In such circumstances, liberal democracy and security are in tension.	在如此的环境下，自由民主和安全之间关系紧张。


Terrorism is a form of theatre.	恐怖主义是一种表演。


It invokes its effects not by sheer destruction, but by dramatizing atrocious acts against civilians.	它不是通过彻底破坏，而是通过戏剧性地表现对平民的残暴来产生效果。


Terrorism is like Ju-jitsu.	恐怖主义就像柔道。


The weaker adversary wins by leveraging the power of the stronger against itself.	较弱的对手通过借力打力来战胜较强的一方。


Terrorists hope to create a climate of fear and insecurity that will provoke us to harm ourselves by undercutting the quality of our own liberal democracy.	恐怖分子希望创造一种恐惧和不安全的氛围来挑动我们通过降低我们自身自由民主的质量来伤害自己。


Preventing new terrorist attacks while understanding and avoiding the mistakes of the past will be essential if we are to preserve and support liberal democracy both at home and abroad.	如果我们要保全和支持国内外的自由民主，那么在防范新的恐怖袭击的同时了解和避免过去所犯的错误就至关重要。


That is the debate that the Obama administration is leading in the US today.	这就是奥巴马政府在当下的美国引导的一场辩论。


Democracy, Responsibility, and Honor	民主、职责与荣誉


Hardly a day goes by on which we do not hear of a government minister somewhere resigning his or her office.	很少有哪一天过去，而没有传出某位政府部长宣布辞职的消息。


In a sense, this is hardly surprising.	某种意义上讲，这一点不奇怪。


After all, the twenty-five member states of the European Union alone employ hundreds of ministers between them - and even more if junior ministers are included.	毕竟，仅欧盟内部的25个成员国就雇佣了1000多位部长，如果算上副职的话还会翻番。


But why do ministers resign?	但部长们为什么会辞职？


More interestingly still: why do some not resign although there seem to be compelling reasons for some to do so?	更有趣的是：为什么尽管有人早该辞职，却没有这么做？


In the absence of empirical research, generalizations must be guesswork.	不以实际调查为基础的概括肯定是猜测。


Ministers frequently resign because they find themselves involved in scandals, often connected in recent times with financing political parties.	部长们辞职往往由于陷入丑闻，这些丑闻近来常与政党筹资有关。


In Italy, one encounters several ghosts of such past misdeeds.	仅在意大利就能找到好几个牺牲品。


Sometimes ministers resign for what they call "personal reasons."	有些时候，部长们由于所谓的"个人原因"选择辞职。


Such reasons may conceal more compelling factors, as the recent resignation of American CIA Director George Tenet suggests.	这样的理由可能隐藏着更引人注目的因素，比如美国中情局局长乔治·特尼特不久前的辞职。


But Tony Blair lost one of his best and most loyal cabinet friends, Alan Milburn, because he genuinely wanted to spend more time with his family.	但托尼·布莱尔失去最出色、也最忠诚的内阁友人Alan Milburn，则纯粹是因为后者希望有更多时间陪伴家人。


Blair also lost his ministers of foreign affairs and of development assistance, Robin Cook and Clare Short, respectively.	布莱尔同样失去了外交大臣Robin Cook和发展援助大臣Clare Short。


In their case, it was a serious policy disagreement - over the Iraq war - that made them go, and Mr. Cook certainly remains a politician-in-waiting.	两人的辞职源于对伊战争问题上严重的政策分歧，他们最终选择了离开。 Cook先生至今仍活跃在英国政坛。


Yet Geoff Hoon, Prime Minister Blair's defence minister, as well as his American counterpart, Donald Rumsfeld, remain in office.	布莱尔首相的国防大臣杰夫·胡恩和他的美国同僚唐纳德·拉姆斯菲尔德却仍然在位。


Neither, to be sure, is clearly involved in a manifest scandal, nor do they disagree with the policies set by their leaders.	这两人均非丑闻缠身，也不是对领导政策持有疑义。


On the contrary, they not only support these policies but stubbornly defend even their aberrations, like the mistreatment of prisoners of war.	恰恰相反，他们不仅全力支持，而且顽固地捍卫政策执行中存在的偏差，比如说虐俘事件。


These ministers institute investigations, they move generals sideways or even into premature retirement, they haul perpetrators before military tribunals; but they apparently see no reason to respond to those members of Congress or Parliament, let alone of the public, who wonder whether it is not time for the ministers themselves to go.	部长们展开调查，把将军们抛到一边，让他们提前退休。 尽管他们把疟俘者告上军事法庭，但显然不愿回答议员，更不用说来自公众的有关自身去留问题的质问。


The case of crimes in Iraq is particularly dramatic, but less obvious cases make the same point.	伊拉克罪行尤其引人注目，但其它事例也同样能够说明问题。


The German minister of transport, for example, presided over a catastrophic and costly failure of a road toll system that he had proudly announced.	例如德国交通部长主持修建并引以为豪的道路收费系统，最后变成了代价昂贵的毁灭性灾难。


But even he may stay in office to try again, having blamed others - in this case private companies - for the debacle.	但即便如此他也能继续留任，而把失败的责任归咎于人，私有公司成了这次事故的替罪羊。


If something unacceptable happens without a minister's direct involvement, he or she can get away with it, or so it seems, by pointing a finger at the bureaucrats or contractors who are responsible for implementing an approved policy.	如果灾难发生时部长并未直接参与，他或她就可以指责执行既定政策的官僚或承包商，自己却不为此承担任何责任。


Was it always thus?	是否总是如此？


One would like to think not.	我们希望不是。


In any case, two ethical concepts come to mind, neither of which is much in vogue these days when talking about government: responsibility and honor.	每件事都让我们想起两个道德准则，今天谈起政府时这两种观念都已不再时髦：责任和荣誉。


Both values are, or at least used to be, part of the ethics of governance.	但两者都是，至少曾经是管理道德的组成部分。


Responsibility concerns the fact that ministers are accountable for everything that happens within their sphere. In fact, they alone are accountable in the strict sense.	职责意味着部长要对辖区发生的每件事负责，事实上，只有他们要承担严格意义上的责任。


In parliamentary systems, they can and must appear before the elected representatives of the people and explain what happened.	议会制度下，他们能够而且必须面对人民选举的代表，解释曾经发生的一切。


Because they alone are directly accountable, it is not enough for a minister to point to and name the miscreants in any particular case.	由于须负直接责任，因此事故发生后部长们仅查出责任者是不够的。


Civil servants cannot defend themselves in the same way; they have to be defended by their ministers.	公务员不能以同样的方式自我辩白，而必须由部长们代为辩护。


If something of such severity has happened that a minister finds it impossible to defend them, they may have to pay the penalty, but the minister still must assume responsibility.	如果事态严重，部长无法为下属辩护的话，公务员就必须接受惩罚，而部长仍然要承担责任。


It is proper to assume that Secretary Rumsfeld did not condone, let alone order, the abuse of Iraqi prisoners.	我们有理由认为拉姆斯菲尔德部长没有纵容伊拉克的疟俘事件，更不用说下达命令了。


There may be the vexing question of whether instructions or reports passed over his desk that contained relevant information.	也许有人会愤怒地质问交到他办公桌上的说明和报告是否含有相关的内容。


But, either way, the minister is ultimately and uniquely responsible for what happened under his command.	但无论如何，部长都要为领导下的错误勇敢地承担责任。


He cannot escape this responsibility even if the perpetrators are identified and prosecuted.	即便作恶者已经被绳之以法，他也不能逃避理应承担的职责。


This is where the second ethical concept, honor, comes into play.	这也是第二种道德观¾荣誉之所在。


This may seem an old-fashioned term. What it says in Rumsfeld's case is that there may be no legal or constitutional obligation for a responsible minister to resign over the Iraqi abuse scandal; but once upon a time it would have been regarded as a matter of honor that he does resign.	这个词也许听上去老气横秋，但在拉姆斯菲尔德的问题上，它意味着也许宪法或法律没有要求部长为伊拉克疟俘丑闻辞职，但不久前相关人员的主动辞职曾被视作荣誉的象征。


Such a step not only demonstrates that the minister in question is fully aware of the burden of his responsibility, but also that he puts the integrity of democratic institutions above his personal interest, let alone the electoral prospects of those whom he served.	这种做法不仅表明这位部长已经认识到自己肩负的责任，而且表明他将民主制度的完整性置于个人利益之上，更不用说他为之服务的选民的期望了。


Democracy is a precious but also a precarious set of values.	民主不仅宝贵，更是一套不太稳定的价值观。


If we want to persuade others to subscribe to it, we do well to demonstrate that we not only believe in elections and majorities but also in the virtues of responsibility and honor.	如果希望说服他人相信民主，那么最好表明：我们不仅相信选举和多数意志，而且信奉责任与荣誉的美德。


Democracy’s Burning Ships	民主国家的烧船


CHICAGO – Since the late 1970’s, the academic diffusion of game theory has led macroeconomists to emphasize the importance of “commitment,” a strategy that aims to enhance long-term economic outcomes by restricting policymakers’ discretion.	芝加哥—自20世纪70年代以来，博弈论在学术上的流行使得宏观经济学家开始强调“承诺”的重要性。 承诺本是意在通过限制决策者自由裁量权改善长期经济结果的策略。


The idea seems counterintuitive: How can less produce more?	这一观点是反直觉的：更少怎么会产生更多？


While not historically accurate, one of the best examples of a strategic commitment is provided by the legend of Hernán Cortés, according to which, in his quest to conquer Mexico, he decided to burn the ships that had brought his expedition from Spain.	尽管从历史上看并不精确，但策略性承诺的最佳例子是寇蒂斯（Hernán Cortés）的传奇故事：在征服墨西哥的过程中，他决定烧掉西班牙远征队的船。


At first, this might seem like a crazy move: Why intentionally destroy the only possible way out in case of defeat?	乍一看，这是个疯狂举动：为什么自己毁掉万一失败唯一可能的退路？


Cortes allegedly did it to motivate his troops.	据说寇蒂斯这样做是为了激发士气。


With no escape route, soldiers were highly motivated to win.	断了退路，士兵就会有强大动力去大胜仗。


Alexander the Great is said to have done something similar when conquering Persia.	亚历山大大帝据说在征服波斯的过程中也用了同样的计谋。


To produce its benefit, a commitment strategy should be credible – that is, it cannot be reversed quickly.	为了产生效果，承诺战略必须是可信的——也就是说，不能马上食言。


In this sense, Cortés’s strategy was perfect: in case of defeat, the Spanish would have no time to rebuild the burned ships.	从这个角度看，寇蒂斯的策略是完美的：一旦打了败仗，西班牙人根本没时间重新造船。


To work properly, a commitment strategy should also be costly in case of failure: had Cortés lost, no Spanish soldier would have escaped alive.	要想起作用，承诺策略还必须具有万一失败代价沉重的特点：如果寇蒂斯失败，就没有一个西班牙士兵能够生还。


It is precisely this cost that helped motivate his soldiers.	正是这样的成本帮助激发了他的士兵的士气。


The problem is that we are bound to hear about only the successful historical examples of such a strategy.	问题在于，我们注定只能听到运用此类策略获得成功的历史案例。


Had Cortés’s strategy failed, he would have gone down in history – if he was remembered at all – as an arrogant fool who thought that he could defeat a great empire.	如果寇蒂斯失败的话，他早就被遗忘在历史长河中了，即使被记住，也是作为愚蠢的自大狂——居然不自量力地想打败伟大的帝国。


One of the earliest applications of this strategy to economic policy is in the design of central banks.	该策略最早在经济政策中的应用是中央银行。


Monetary policymakers, the argument goes, should be independent from the political system, because, when elections near, politicians will likely pressure them to “buy” temporarily higher employment at the cost of permanently higher inflation.	这里的逻辑是，货币决策者应该独立于政治制度，因为当选举临近时，政客可能会迫使货币当局以持久高通胀的代价“买”来暂时性的高就业。


To prevent this inefficient trade off, governments should tie central bankers’ hands by insulating them from political influence.	为了避免这一低效的权衡，政府应该通过将央行与政治隔离管住了央行行长的双手。


Many macroeconomists attribute the sustained decline in inflation since the early 1980’s to the widespread use of this strategy.	许多宏观经济学家把20世纪80年代通胀的持续下降归功于该策略的广泛应用。


And, encouraged by its success, policymakers started applying it elsewhere.	受此鼓舞，决策者还开始将它应用于其他领域。


Financial liberalization was sold as a commitment to follow market-friendly policies.	金融自由化便是以追随市场友好型政策的承诺为卖点的。


If a future government deviated from the policy, capital flight would bring it to its knees.	如果未来政府抛弃这一政策，则资本外逃将迫使他们就范。


The same applies to extensive government borrowing from abroad, to currency boards, even to currency unions.	同样的策略也可以用于扩大政府外债、货币局制度甚至货币联盟。


The creation of the euro is nothing but an extreme form of commitment: European governments tried to lash themselves to the German mast of fiscal discipline.	欧元的诞生无非是极端形式的承诺：欧洲各国政府将尽力往德国财政纪律标准上靠。


The diffusion of these mechanisms raises the issue of democracy.	这些机制的普及引出了民主难题。


When Cortés allegedly burned the Spanish ships, he did not take a poll.	当寇蒂斯宣布烧掉西班牙战船的时候，他并没有发起投票。


Had he done so, he might have won (the strategy was clever), but it was not a foregone conclusion.	如果他组织了投票，那么他可能也会胜出（这一策略是明智的），但谁也不能保证结果会如何。


But even if the commitment strategy produced beneficial incentives, it might not have been worth the risk.	但即使承诺策略产生了有益激励，也有可能不值得冒险。


Perhaps Cortés, blinded by his dreams of glory, was ready to sacrifice his troops even when the odds of victory were too slim.	寇蒂斯被光荣之梦蒙了心，即使获胜希望渺茫也不惜牺牲手下的军队。


Nowadays, fortunately, democratically elected governments make these decisions, which thus should reflect the people’s will.	幸运的是，如今的民选政府会进行投票，因此它们的所作所为反映的是民意。


Yet, given their nature, these decisions deserve special scrutiny.	但这些决定的性质意味着它们必须被仔细审视。


After all, they are – by design – irreversible decisions that tie the hands of future governments, which makes them tantamount to constitutional norms.	毕竟，它们被设计成不可逆转的决定，将束缚住政府的手脚，成为宪法性质的约束。


As such, they should not be subject to the same approval process as normal legislation.	从这个角度讲，它们不能像常规立法那样走同样的批准程序。


This problem is particularly severe when the up-front action that seals the commitment has short-term benefits that are more attractive than burning the ship.	如果先期作出承诺者具有比烧船更有吸引力的短期好处，则这一问题会变得尤为严重。


When a government starts to borrow abroad or chooses to enter a currency union, these benefits take the form of reduced interest rates.	当一国政府开始借外债或加入货币联盟时，好处是利率的下降。


Thus, the immediate benefits become more politically salient than potential future costs.	因此，立刻获得的好处就会比潜在的未来成本具有更大的政治吸引力。


By using this strategy, a Machiavellian government can induce a reluctant electorate to accept a policy that is contrary to its will.	通过使用该策略，马基雅弗利主义政府能够促使不情愿的选民接受与他们的意愿背道而驰的政策。


Many people would say that this is exactly the point.	许多人会说，这是如此。


For southern European countries, joining the euro was – explicitly or implicitly – a way to force their citizens to accept a degree of fiscal discipline that they were incapable of adopting on their own.	对南欧国家来说，加入欧元���直接或间接地迫使其公民接受了一定程度的他们本无能力接受的财政纪律。


But was this a democratic decision, or one that an “enlightened” elite forced upon its unwitting citizens?	但这到底是民主决策，还是“启蒙”的精英在强迫不知情的公民做选择？


I fear that the latter is true – hence the growing resentment against the European Union.	我担心后者才是正确的，对欧盟反对声四起也是如此。


To add insult to injury, current European leaders do not “own” their past decisions.	让受害者雪上加霜的是，当前的欧洲领导人并不“拥有”过去的决策。


They do not admit that they or their predecessors are the ones who burned the ships.	他们不承认他们或他们的前任烧掉了船。


They blame Europe.	他们把矛头指向了欧洲。


The result is that the euro, sold as a way to integrate Europe further, is tearing it apart.	结果，原本作为促使欧洲进一步一体化的欧元却在让欧洲分崩离析。


Democratic Hysteria	民主狂热症


BERKELEY – In the political impasses that recently paralyzed the world’s two largest democracies, India and the United States, both countries’ usually clear-sighted leaders, to paraphrase William Butler Yeats, lacked all conviction, while the misguided and the shallow were full of passionate intensity.	伯克利——在近来令印美这两个世界最大的民主国家陷入瘫痪的政治僵局中，在威廉·巴特勒·叶芝口中一向精明强干的两国领导人彻底丧失了说服力，而错误肤浅的舆论却愈演愈烈。


Indeed, that passion shows little sign of waning.	事实上，类似这样的狂热几乎没有消退的迹象。


In the US, the economically illiterate, seeing misery all around from lost jobs, foreclosed homes, and the ever more apparent decline in America’s international status, are distilling their frenzy from obsolete advocates of fiscal rectitude, while clutching their Bibles and espousing a juvenile understanding of the US constitution.	对经济问题一无所知的美国人在目睹身边失业、房屋止赎的悲惨景象和美国国际地位江河日下的同时，一边从财政清廉的过时主张中汲取狂热，一边紧紧抓住手里的圣经，拥护对美国宪法做出的幼稚解读。


But their efforts are only digging a bigger hole for the US economy, making recovery much more difficult.	但他们的做法只能令美国经济越陷越深，同时进一步加大经济复苏的难度。


Even their tax-averse sponsors, while appreciative of the rabble’s efforts to protect their wealth, are now fearful of the impact of these wayward ideas on the investment climate and equity prices.	就连他们厌恶税收的金主们也在赞赏这群乌合之众捍卫其财产做法的同时，开始对这种不计后果的想法给投资环境和股票价格造成的冲击表示担忧。


President Barack Obama, elected with a great deal of goodwill and hope in 2008, is now caught like a deer in the headlights.	2008年肩负着美好愿望和期待上任的巴拉克·奥巴马总统现在就像被车灯照着的野鹿般不知所措。


He knows that what the economy needs in the short run is different from what needs to be done to manage public debt in the long run, but he is unable to provide decisive leadership.	他知道经济的短期需要与国债管理的长期需要相左，但是他无力提供果断的领导。


His misguided efforts at compromise only fuel his opponents’ frenzy.	他寻求妥协的错误举动只能进一步激起反对者的狂热。


In India, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who once enjoyed a strong reputation for integrity and intelligence, has been similarly paralyzed, acting erratically in the face of an equally demagogic populist movement – the anti-graft crusade led by a fasting activist, Anna Hazare – which just ended in a frantic and uneasy compromise.	曾经以诚实智慧闻名于世的印度总理曼莫汉·辛格如今也已陷入瘫痪，面对同样蛊惑人心的民粹运动无法采取统一有效的行动。 这次民粹运动是由绝食活动家安纳·赫扎尔领导的反腐败改革运动，前不久刚刚以充满狂热混乱的妥协宣告结束。


Hazare, egged on by a flag-waving and indignant urban middle class and sensation-seeking media, tries mightily to claim Mahatma Gandhi’s mantle; he is good at mimicking Gandhi’s piety, but lacks his root wisdom.	赫扎尔在义愤填膺地挥舞着旗帜的城市中产阶级和以感性为追求目标的媒体怂恿下，用尽一切手段夺取圣雄甘地的衣钵，他善于模仿甘地的虔诚，但却不具备甘地赖以为本的智慧。


Low-level corruption (the police, courts, and government clerks) has always been widespread in India.	基层官员（警察、法院和政府职员）腐败一向在印度屡禁不绝。


The type of corruption that has increased in recent years is partly a consequence of rapid economic growth.	近年来经济的快速发展导致各种腐败花样百出。


Public resources, like land, minerals, and hydrocarbons, and the telecommunications spectrum, have shot up in value, and in the scramble to control them, businessmen seek shortcuts.	像土地、矿产和碳氢化合物这样的公共资源和电信频谱价值迅猛增长，在这场资源控制争夺战中，商人们开始寻求捷径。


Another reason for rising corruption is the soaring expense of elections, with politicians raising money from business as part of a quid pro quo.	腐败愈演愈烈的另一个原因是竞选开支猛增，政客因此从商人那里募集资金，并许诺为其提供报偿。


Both India and the US have little public financing of elections, and large business donations that are legal in the US are often illegal (and hence given underhandedly) in India.	印美两国都不为竞选活动提供公共财政支持，但美国允许大企业为竞选捐款，而印度法律一般不允许这样做（因此企业在竞选捐款时往往都偷偷摸摸）。


But, instead of addressing the structural causes of rising corruption, India’s anti-graft movement bemoans a supposed weakening of ethical values and demands additional agencies with draconian powers to monitor and punish.	但印度的反腐败运动没有针对腐败蔓延的结构性因素，相反却哀叹世风日下，要求额外加设依靠严刑峻法实行监管和惩罚的政府机构。


The urban middle classes, impatient with the slow processes of democracy, latch on to holy men and their magic potions.	对民主进展缓慢感到不满的城市中产阶级转而信奉圣人和他们的魔法圣物。


Just as in the US, public rage is somehow directed away from the rich bribe-givers and onto venal politicians.	就像美国一样，公众的愤怒不知怎样被从行贿的富人身上转向了腐败的政客。


In both countries, the long-run implications of such angry populist movements for the health of democratic institutions need to be pondered.	美印两国都需要思考如此愤怒的民粹运动对民主制度的长期影响。


This is particularly true for India, where elections are vigorous and common people participate in them more enthusiastically than in the US, but other democratic institutions remain weak and sometimes dysfunctional, and the judiciary is too slow and occasionally corrupt.	其中印度尤其如此，因为那里的竞选活动活跃，普通人相比美国参与热情更高，但同时其他民主机构又不够强大，有些甚至无法正常运转，而且司法程序过于缓慢，偶尔还会发生腐败现象。


To loud cheers from the crowds, the populists damn elected politicians as thieves and looters, but in the process disparage the institutions and processes of representative government.	民粹分子向欢呼的人群批评当选政客是小偷和劫匪，但同时也贬低代议政府制度和流程。


In the not-too-distant past, widespread denigration of this sort in Africa, Latin America, and other parts of South Asia often made it easier for populist authoritarianism to take hold.	就在不那么遥远的过去，非洲、拉美和南亚等地区随处可见的这类诋毁往往降低了民粹独裁主义的控制难度。


Indeed, the widely heard slogan “Anna is India, India is Anna” reminds some of the dark days of Indira Gandhi’s emergency rule in 1975-1977, when her followers raised the slogan of “Indira is India”.	事实上，“安纳就是印度，印度就是安纳”这句流传甚广的口号让人回想起1975－1977年英迪拉·甘地紧急统治下的苦难岁月，当时她的追随者就喊出了“英迪拉就是印度”的口号。


But the slogan-mongers overlook India’s extreme diversity.	但这些口号贩子忽略了印度的极端多样性。


Many members of ethnic minorities, including the country’s 150 million Muslims, openly oppose the Hazare movement.	包括印度1. 5亿穆斯林在内的很多少数民族群众就公开反对赫扎尔的活动。


One Dalit (the lowest level of India’s old caste system) leader expressed his fear that Anna’s success might inspire some majoritarian leader to rouse an even larger movement to rescind the protective rights and affirmative-action policies that have brought the lower castes some dignity.	某位贱民（印度古老种姓制度的最底层）领袖担忧安纳的成功会推动某些多数派领导人发起更大规模的运动，废除赋予低种姓民众特定尊严的保护性权利和反歧视性雇佣政策。


And some NGO leaders object that their own, very different anti-corruption agenda is being pre-empted by Hazare’s demands.	一些非政府组织领导人也抗议赫扎尔的要求取代了他们自己截然不同的反腐败计划。


In a populous country, it is not difficult to attract a large crowd.	在人口众多的国家吸引一批人的支持并非难事。


The electronic media are particularly attracted to colorful crowds waving flags and espousing nationalist causes.	电子媒体特别关注挥舞旗帜拥护民族主义事业的色彩斑斓的民众。


As one journalist pointed out, when 400,000 people (far more than Hazare’s followers in Delhi) marched in Kolkata in May 1998 to protest against the government’s nuclear tests, the media barely noticed.	正如某位记者指出，当1998年5月400，000群众（远多于赫扎尔在德里的追随者数量）在加尔各答游行抗议政府的核试验计划时，媒体却几乎没有注意到。


Even when movements have near-universal support (which is not the case with the recent political movements in the US or India), there is a fundamental tension between democracy’s procedural and participatory aspects.	即使几乎所有人都支持某项运动（美国或印度近来的政治运动并非如此），民主在程序和参与层面仍然存在着根本的冲突。


Apart from electoral reform, outlets for political participation and expression of public grievances must be balanced by institutions and procedures that are partly insulated from the rough-and-tumble of politics.	除选举改革外，政治参与渠道和民怨表达都必须遵守制度和程序，而相关制度应当至少可以免受政治混乱的影响。


Of course, representative government does sometimes become unresponsive, particularly between elections, but direct democracy is not the solution.	当然，代议制政府有时的确反应迟钝，特别是在选举间歇期的时候，但直接民主却并非解决之道。


The US state of California, which has become increasingly dysfunctional since a 1978 popular referendum capped property taxes, can attest to that.	1978年美国加州举行的物业税征收限额全民公投导致州政府运转失灵加剧就是明证。


Nor is it an answer to demand hasty enactment of legislation in the face of a threat to cause public disorder by starving oneself to death, as Anna Hazare has done.	像安纳·赫扎尔那样以绝食扰乱公共秩序并胁迫仓促通过立法也绝非解决之道。


Most citizens in the world’s two largest democracies understand that democracy does not offer magic solutions.	世界两个最大民主国家的多数民众都明白民主无法提供神奇的解决方法。


One of the most lamentable developments of our time is that so many are now prepared to try unhealthy palliatives and short cuts.	我们这个时代最可悲的问题就在于太多的人愿意尝试病态的权宜之计和捷径。


Democratic Inequality	民主的不平等性


CHICAGO – Why did the household savings rate in the United States plummet before the Great Recession?	芝加哥—美国家庭储蓄率为什么会在大衰退前剧减？


Two of my colleagues at the University of Chicago, Marianne Bertrand and Adair Morse, offer an intriguing answer: growing income inequality.	我的两位芝加哥大学同事贝特兰（Marianne Bertrand）和摩尔斯（Adair Morse）给出了一个有趣的回答：因为收入不平等性的加剧。


Bertrand and Morse find that in the years before the crisis, in areas (usually states) where consumption was high among households in the top fifth of the income distribution, household consumption was high at lower income levels as well.	贝特兰和摩尔斯发现，在危机爆发的前几年中，收入最高的5%的家庭消费较高的地区（通常以州为单位），收入水平较低的家庭消费也较高。


After ruling out a number of possible explanations, they concluded that poorer households imitated the consumption patterns of richer households in their area.	在剔除了一系列可能的原因后，他们认为，较穷家庭会模仿同一地区较富家庭的消费模式。


Consistent with the idea that households at lower income levels were “keeping up with the Vanderbilts,” the non-rich (but not the really poor) living near high-spending wealthy consumers tended to spend much more on items that richer households usually consumed, such as jewelry, beauty and fitness, and domestic services.	与收入较低家庭“尽力赶上富豪”的观点一致的是，居住在高消费富裕消费者附近的小康之家会将大量支出花在富裕家庭的常见消费项目上，比如珠宝、美容、养生和家政服务等。


Indeed, many borrowed to finance their spending, with the result that the proportion of poorer households in financial distress or filing for bankruptcy was significantly higher in areas where the rich earned (and spent) more.	事实上，许多人通过贷款来维持支持，这导致了在富人收入（和支出）更高的地区，较穷家庭陷入财务困境甚至破产的比例显著较高。


Were it not for such imitative consumption, non-rich households would have saved, on average, more than $800 annually in recent years.	若不是这种模仿性消费的话，小康之家近几年平均应能增加800美元的年储蓄。


This is one of the first detailed studies of the adverse effects of income inequality that I have seen.	这是我所见到的关于收入不平等的弊端第一批详细研究之一。


It goes beyond the headline-grabbing “1%” debate to show that even the everyday inequality that most Americans face – between the incomes of, say, typical readers of this commentary and the rest – has deep pernicious effects.	该研究超越了吸引眼球的“1%”争论，指出即使是大多数美国人每天都碰得到的不平等性——即本文的典型读者和其他人群之间的不平等性——也具有相当大的弊端。


Equally interesting is the link that the study finds between income inequality and pre-crisis economic policy.	同样有趣的还有该研究所发现的收入不平等性与危机前经济政策之间的联系。


Republican Congressmen from districts with higher levels of income inequality were more likely to vote for legislation to expand housing credit to the poor in the years before the crisis (almost all Democrats voted for such legislation, making it hard to distinguish their motives).	在危机爆发的前几年中，来自收入不平等性较严重地区的共和党议员更倾向于赞成扩大穷人的住房信用的立法（但民主党几乎清一色地赞成此类立法，因此较难识别他们的动机）。


And the effect of spending by the rich on non-rich households’ spending was higher in areas where house prices could move more, suggesting that housing credit and the ability to borrow against rising home equity may have supported over-consumption by the non-rich.	而就富人支出对小康家庭支出的影响而言，房价变动更大的地区该影响也越大，这表明住房信用和以上涨的房屋价值作抵押贷款的能力通过小康之家支撑了过度消费。


I was most fascinated, though, by the difference in legislators’ response to inequality now and in the past.	但最令我眼前一亮的是立法者对不平等性的反应的今昔不同之处。


In a study of the congressional vote on the McFadden Act of 1927, which sought to boost competition in lending, Rodney Ramcharan of the US Federal Reserve and I found that legislators from districts with a highly unequal distribution of land holdings – farming was the primary source of income in many districts then – tended to vote against the act.	美联储的拉姆查兰（Rodney Ramcharan）和我对意在刺激贷款竞争的1927年麦克法登法案（McFadden Act）的国会表决进行了研究，我们发现，来自地权分配高度不平等的地区（当时，许多地区的主要收入源是务农）的立法者更倾向于反对该法案。


More inequality led legislators, at least in that case, to prefer less competition and less expansion in lending.	至少是在该案例中，更大的不平等性导致立法者偏向于更少的消费和贷款扩张。


And we found that counties with less bank competition experienced a milder farmland boom, and therefore a smaller bust in the years before the Great Depression.	我们还发现，银行竞争越少的县，农场繁荣月温和，大萧条前泡沫破裂的危害也越轻。


The obvious lesson to be drawn from these episodes is the importance of unintended consequences.	在这些研究中，我们可以得到一个显而易见的教训，即意外后果的重要性。


In the early twentieth century, a congressional district’s rich landowners were likely to own the local banks as well, or to be related to, or friends with, bank owners.	在20世纪初，国会选区中的富裕地主可能同时也是地区银行的所有者，或者与地区银行所有者是亲朋好友。


They benefited from limiting competition and controlling access to finance.	他们可以从限制竞争、控制融资中得到好处。


Representatives voted on behalf of their districts’ powerful interests.	代表们是替所在选区权势利益者投票的。


They preferred less competition in credit markets not out of concern for the unwitting farmers, but in order to defend powerful lenders’ profits.	他们偏向于更少的信用市场竞争，这不是因为担心不知情的农民，而是为了捍卫权势贷款人的利益。


It worked, but an unintended collateral effect was to protect these districts from getting carried away by the financial frenzy.	他们得逞了，但也造成了一个附带效应：保护了这些选区被卷入金融狂热。


Why did twenty-first-century legislators behave differently?	为什么21世纪的立法者会有所不同？


The cynical, and increasingly popular, view is that they were again voting their pocketbooks – all financial legislation in the run-up to the 2008 crisis was supposedly driven by the financial sector’s appetite for more customers to devour with teaser loans and dubious mortgages.	愤世嫉俗（但越来越普遍）的观点是立法者仍然是在为支票投票——2008年危机爆发前的金融立法无不是为了满足金融部门的胃口，让更多的客户去吞下不良贷款和可以按揭。


But, if voting was influenced by the financial sector, the supposed party of the plutocrats, the Republicans, should have voted in unison for the bill.	但是，如果投票被金融部门所影响，那么一贯被视为财阀代言人的共和党应该一边倒地支持立法。


Instead, they split on the basis of whose non-rich constituents were more desirous of obtaining finance.	但他们却分裂为两个阵营，原因在于选区内的小康之家对获得融资的渴望不同。


Twenty-first-century legislators seemed to be more democratic, responding to their voters’ possibly misguided wishes, rather than primarily to powerful financial interests.	21世纪的立法者似乎更加民主，响应着选民或许并不正确的愿望，而不再首先满足权势金融利益者。


Indeed, once the unintended consequences of their actions – more financial duress for the non-rich after the crisis – became clear, Bertrand and Morse show that the legislators in unequal districts moved against the financial sector to protect their constituents, voting to set limits on interest rates charged by “payday” lenders (who lend to over-indebted lower-income borrowers at very high interest rates).	事实上，一旦其行为的意外后果——危机的爆发让小康之家陷入了重重财务困境——变得清晰，贝特兰和摩尔斯的研究表明，来自不平等地区的立法者会反对金融部门，保护自己的选民，投票限制“发薪日”贷款人所能获得的利率（他们以极高利率向过度负债的低收入借款人发放贷款）。


Of course, such legislation will have unanticipated consequences, which future studies will unearth, but the intent behind it cannot be doubted.	当然，这样的立法也会有不可预知的后果，未来的研究将会有所揭示，但其立法动机是无可置疑的。


We should not come away from these episodes thinking that expanding access to finance is bad.	我们不能因为这些就认定扩大融资的可获得性是件坏事。


In general, expanding access is beneficial (just not before a crisis!), but finance is a powerful tool that has to be used sensibly.	总的来说，更易获得融资是件好事（只要不是发生在危机之前！


Access is good; excess is bad.	），但融资这个工具威力太大，必须小心使用，所谓过犹不及是也。


But there is a more important point: while there are many gaps between the intent and consequences of legislation, legislators do seem ultimately to care more about their less-moneyed constituents than they did in the past.	但最重要的一点是，尽管立法的初衷和结果之间存在差别，但与过去相比，现在的立法者更加在乎贫穷选民了。


Democracy is stronger.	民主更强大了。


In these cynical times, that is encouraging.	在这个愤世嫉俗的时代，这一点令人鼓舞。


But not all countries are set to benefit from a “youth bulge.”	但并非所有国家都���得益于“年轻人膨胀”。


Demonetization on Five Continents	遍布五大洲的废止货币流通


CAMBRIDGE – Around the world, several countries are currently undergoing “demonetization,” or currency reforms in which the government removes banknotes of a certain denomination from circulation and replaces them with new notes.	坎布里奇——在世界各地，若干国家正在“废止货币流通”，或者推行由政府出面废除特定面额纸钞流通并代之以新钞的货币改革。


Governments pursue demonetization for a variety of reasons, and some of the recent initiatives are going better than others.	各国政府废止货币流通的原因很多，最近某些举措比其他举措取得了更好的效果。


When demonetization is particularly dramatic and disruptive, it is often a signpost on the road to hyperinflation.	当废止货币流通尤其具有戏剧性和破坏力的时候，它往往构成通往恶性通胀的路标。


This seems to be the case in Venezuela, where President Nicolás Maduro recently recalled the 100-bolivar note, and will replace it with new notes denominated at 500-20,000 bolivars.	委内瑞拉似乎就是这种情况，总统尼古拉斯·马杜罗最近回收了面值为100的玻利瓦尔，并代之以500-20,000玻利瓦尔的纸钞。


Economists define hyperinflation as a pattern of monthly price increases that exceed 50%, which may happen in Venezuela in the next few months.	经济学家将每月价格上涨50%定义为恶性通胀，委内瑞拉可能在未来几个月陷入到恶性通胀的局势当中。


Hyperinflation has been much rarer this century than in the twentieth century, and Venezuela will be the first country to experience it since Zimbabwe in 2008-09.	恶性通胀在本世纪比二十世纪更为罕见，委内瑞拉将成为继2008-09年津巴布韦后首个体验到恶性通胀的国家。


The current Venezuelan episode continues a long tradition of gross currency mismanagement in Latin American and former Soviet-bloc countries, where past governments used demonetization to transfer wealth from the public to themselves.	目前委内瑞拉的局势延续了拉丁美洲及前苏联集团国家货币管理总体不善的长期传统，这些国家过去的政府利用废止货币流通将财富从公众转移到自己手中。


In each case, the fundamental problem is that the government cannot finance its unsustainable spending through taxation or borrowing, so it resorts to debasing the currency.	在所有情况下，根本问题都在于政府无法通过税收或借款支撑其不可持续的支出，因此被迫采用货币贬值的方式来摆脱困境。


The Venezuelan government’s latest “currency reform” may ostensibly be aimed at curbing high inflation.	委内瑞拉政府最新的“货币改革”表面目的可能是抑制高通胀。


But fundamental macroeconomic reform requires that the government rein in its excessive primary budget deficits, so that it does not have to keep printing money.	但根本宏观经济改革要求政府控制过度基本预算赤字，从而不必持续印钞。


Barring that, each new demonetization scheme only furnishes more evidence of mismanagement.	除此之外，每项新的货币废止计划都进一步证明了管理不善的现状。


But governments also decommission and replace bills for more benign, technical reasons, such as to remove unpopular notes; introduce new counterfeit-proof bills; switch national currencies, such as when a country enters the eurozone; or honor a national hero.	但政府也会出于更善意的技术性原因废止或替代货币，比方说废止不受欢迎的纸钞； 采用全新防伪货币；


For example, in April, United States Treasury Secretary Jack Lew announced that the $5, $10, and $20 bills will be replaced with new designs that include women and civil-rights leaders.	更换货币也有可能是为纪念某位民族英雄。 比如在4月，美国财政部部长杰克·卢宣布5、10和20美元的纸币将采用全新图案，上述全新图案包括女性及人权运动领袖。


With this form of demonetization, citizens are given enough time to trade in the old bills for the new, and the monetary authorities plan ahead, so that they have plenty of the new currency available.	在这种形式的货币替代下，民众有充分的时间将旧钞换成新钞，而且货币当局都会提前策划，确保新币供应充足。


In these scenarios, there is minimal economic and social disruption.	在这样的情况下，经济和社会受到的损害最小。


When Lithuania left the litas and adopted the euro in 2015, its currency transition went smoothly, as did Germany and France’s adoption of the euro in cash form in 2002, and so on with all 19 countries that have joined the eurozone.	当立陶宛2015年废除立特并代之以欧元时，其货币转换进展得十分顺利，2002年德法两国和加入欧元区的所有十九国采用欧元现钞时也是一样。


A third form of demonetization is embodied in Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s November 8 announcement that 500- and 1,000-rupee bills – constituting 86% of the cash in circulation in India – would no longer be considered legal tender and should be exchanged for newly issued bills by the end of the year.	印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪11月8日宣布废除占印度现金流通86%的500及1000卢比纸钞代表了第三种形式的去货币化，莫迪宣布相关面额将不再构成法定货币并应在年底前兑换成新发行纸钞。


Since then, the country has been reeling.	自那以后，印度局势就陷入动荡。


Indians have been waiting in long lines at banks, only to discover that the banks had not received enough new bills.	印度人在银行门口排起长队，却发现银行并没有拿到足够的新钞。


Some businesses are unable to operate.	有些企业经营受到很大的影响。


India’s demonetization plan was intended as a way to crack down on illegal activities.	印度的废止货币流通计划旨在打击非法活动。


But its abrupt implementation has inflicted unnecessarily high costs on the Indian economy.	但该计划的突然实施却导致印度经济付出了不必要的惨重代价。


The US had similar motives when it phased out bills denominated at $500 and above, in 1969.	1969年美国废止500及更大面额的纸币时也曾有类似的目标。


So, too, did the European Central Bank, when it commendably decided in May to phase out the €500 note.	想达到类似目的的还有欧洲央行，欧央行于5月决定废止500欧元的纸钞。


High-denomination notes are often used for tax evasion, bribery, drug trafficking, and even terrorism, so governments use demonetization to frustrate criminal enterprise.	高面额纸币往往普遍用于逃税、贿赂、毒品贩运甚至恐怖主义，因此政府打击犯罪集团的一种方式是废止货币流通。


As it happens, such prominent observers as Kenneth Rogoff, Larry Summers, and Peter Sands think the US should even phase out $100 bills, too.	说来凑巧，像肯尼思·罗格夫、拉里·萨默斯和彼得·沙德这样的著名观察家认为美国甚至应逐步淘汰100美元的钞票。


This form of demonetization is typically carried out gradually, and in some cases, indefinitely, by simply letting targeted notes wear out on their own.	这种形式的废止货币流通往往逐步进行，而且在某些情况下通过让目标纸币自己逐渐消失，从而实现无限期废钞的目标。


If leaders are brave and want to invalidate a high-denomination note in less than one year, they can ask tough questions of anyone who tries to exchange a large quantity of them.	如果领导人足够勇敢，想要在不到一年的时间里废止大面额纸币，他们可以向试图大量兑换纸币的任何人提出尖锐的问题。


Rather than just making future illegal activities more difficult, they can also strike a blow against people who stockpiled cash from past illegal activities.	这样做不仅可以使未来的违法活动变得更加困难，也可以对那些从过去的违法活动中囤积现金的人进行打击。


But imposing a short timeframe requires political will.	但强制在短时间内完成兑换需要坚定的政治意愿。


It will be resisted by non-criminals – everyone from survivalists to grandparents who want to give a crisp new $100 bill to a grandchild for a special occasion.	从生存主义者到祖父母辈的老年人等非犯罪分子或将抵制这样的决定，因为爷爷奶奶们希望在特殊场合给孙辈一张簇新的100美元纸钞。


India’s strategy of rapid demonetization has obviously fallen short, because it was unnecessarily abrupt and secretive.	印度快速废止货币的策略显然已经落空，因为实际操作过程中的突然性和秘密性完全没有必要。


What’s more, the Modi government is targeting relatively small notes (worth approximately $7 and $15, respectively) that all Indians use for all purposes.	此外，莫迪政府将目标指向相对小额的纸币（分别价值约7美元和15美元），上述面额印度人在日常生活中处处都要用到。


It should have allowed for more time to print an ample supply of new notes, and to help businesses switch over to non-cash payment methods, such as electronic funds transfers.	莫迪政府应当留出更多时间印刷数量充足的新币，并帮助企业切换到非现金支付方式，比方说电子资金转账。


Even with more warning, people who had stockpiled the targeted bills for illegitimate purposes would have suffered a loss, if they had been unable to demonstrate to a bank the provenance of their currency.	即便给予了更多警告，如果无法向银行证明资金的来路，那些因非法目的而囤积目标货币的人也一样会受到损失。


Their other option would have been to offload the bills at a discount in an unofficial market.	在非官方市场打折处理相关纸币或将成为他们的另一种选项。


Most important, by allowing more time, the government could have avoided inconveniencing ordinary people and disrupting the economy.	更重要的是，如果延长准备时间，政府或可避免为普通民众造成不便及对经济造成破坏性后果。


One possible explanation for Modi’s urgency is that, eyeing the 2017 election in Uttar Pradesh, he was trying to disrupt rival political parties that use cash in their campaigns.	莫迪如此急不可耐采取行动的一个可能解释是面对2017年的北方邦选举，他试图打乱用现金从事竞选活动的竞争政党的步骤。


If true, that would be a rather cynical justification for what is supposed to be a good-government reform.	如若果真如此，这或将成为本该是善政改革之举的一个相当愤世嫉俗的理由。


Western leaders could probably be bolder when they phase out big bills as slowly as they do.	西方领导人或许可以放大胆量，加快废止大额纸币的步伐。


But Modi has been too bold.	但莫迪的胆子却实在太大。


The Looming Death of Homo Economicus	理性人末日临近


KIEL – The world seems to be on the verge of another “great transformation,” with changes far more profound than news-grabbing economic or geopolitical headlines about Asia’s economic rise or the fires in the Middle East.	基尔—世界似乎正站在又一次“大转型”边缘，这次的改变将远比新闻所热切追逐的亚洲经济崛起和中东战火等经济和地缘政治标题更加深远。


The coming changes will fundamentally redefine the nature of our economic interactions – and the social dynamics that underlie them.	即将到来的改变将从根本上重新定义经济互动的性质——以及作为经济互动基础的社会动态。


This is a transformation on the scale of the shift, more than 8,000 years ago, from nomadic hunter-gatherer societies to settled agricultural ones, which eventually led to the rise of cities.	这次转型的规模堪与8,000多年前的那一次相比。 8,000多年前，人类从游牧狩猎采集社会转变为定居农业社会，并最终创造出城市。


A similar transformation occurred in Europe in the tenth century, with the emergence of guilds – associations of skilled workers who controlled the practice of their craft in a particular town – which paved the way for the Industrial Revolution.	十世纪的欧洲再次发生了类似的转型，公会（guild，由控制着某地某门手艺的熟练工组成的联合会）的崛起为工业革命铺平了道路。


The particular characteristics of the impending transformation remain unclear.	即将到来的转型的具体特征尚不清楚。


It may well involve revolutions in bio-, nano-, and digital technology, together with a social-networking revolution that eliminates geographical and cultural barriers.	也许它将包括生物、纳米和数字科技革命以及打破地理和文化壁垒的社交网络革命。


What is already clear, however, is that, like previous transformations, this one will involve a fundamental change in all of our economic relations and the social relations that support them.	但是，已经清楚的是，和前几次转型一样，这次转型也将包括一切作为支持基础的经济关系和社会关系的根本性改变。


Mainstream economics offers a straightforward analysis of and policy response to such a transformation.	主流经济学对这样的转型提供了直白的分析和政策应对。


Whenever technological or other changes allow for people to be compensated for the benefits that they confer on one another (minus the costs), the price-based market system can adjust.	当科技或其他变革让人们能够因为互相给予好处而获得补偿时（扣除成本之后），给予价格的市场系统可以作出调整。


When the changes create externalities, economic restructuring is required – say, adjustments in taxes and subsidies, regulatory shifts, or property-rights upgrading – to offset the costs and benefits for which the market cannot compensate.	当变革创造出外部性，就需要经济重组——如税收和补贴的调整、监管变化和产权升级——以抵消市场无法补偿的成本和收益。


And when the changes give rise to particularly high levels of inequality, redistributive measures are needed.	而当变革带来特别高程度的不平等性时，就需要有再分配计划。


This approach is based on the assumption that, if everyone is fully compensated for the net benefits that they confer on others, individuals pursuing their own self-interest will, as Adam Smith put it, be led, “as if by an invisible hand,” to serve the public interest as well. According to this view, everyone is Homo economicus: a self-interested, fully rational individualist.	这一观点基于一个假设，即如果所有人都因为彼此提供好处而获得充分的净收益补偿，追求自身私利的个人就会像亚当·斯密所说的那样，“如同被看不见的手”引导服务于公共利益。


But, as past “great transformations” demonstrate, this approach is inadequate, because it neglects the social underpinnings of market economies.	但是，过去的“大转型”表明，这一观点有失偏颇，因为它忽略了市场经济的社会基础。


In such economies, contracts tend to be honored voluntarily, not through coercive enforcement.	在这些经济中，契约自愿达成而非通过强制。


What makes these economies function is not a policeman protecting every shop window, but rather people’s trust, fairness, and fellow-feeling to honor promises and obey the prevailing rules.	让这些经济运转起来的不是保护商店窗户不被砸的警察，而是人们的信任、公正，以及对荣誉承诺的归属感和对通行规则的遵守。


Where this social glue is lacking – such as between Israelis and Palestinians – people cannot exploit all of the available economic opportunities.	如果缺少这一社会粘合剂——如同以色列人和巴勒斯坦人——人们就无法利用所有可获得的经济机会。


This link is apparent in the deep social significance of most of an individual’s economic transactions.	这一联系显著地存在于大部分个体的经济交易的深刻社会影响（social significance）中。


When people acquire expensive cars, designer clothing, and opulent houses, they generally seek social recognition.	当人们购买昂贵的汽车、定制服装和豪宅时，他们总体而言是在寻求社会承认。


When couples or friends give gifts to one another or take vacations together, they perform economic transactions inspired by affiliation and care.	当夫妻或朋友彼此送礼物或共同度假时，他们在通过亲密关系和关心做经济交易。


In short, mainstream economics – and the concept of homo economicus – recognizes only half of what makes us human.	简言之，主流经济学——以及理性人的概念——只认识到我们的人性的一半。


We are undoubtedly motivated by self-interest.	我们毫无疑问是受私利推动的。


But we are also fundamentally social creatures.	但我们从根本上也是社会生物。


This oversight is particularly crippling in view of the impending transformation, which will upend the underpinnings of contemporary society.	从即将到来的将颠覆当代社会基础的转型的角度看，忽视这一点后果很严重。


Indeed, at present, despite unprecedented economic integration and new opportunities for cooperation, our social interactions remain atomized.	事实上，从目前看，尽管经济一体化前所未有，新的合作机会层出不穷，但我们的社会互动依然呈现出原子化（atomized）的特征。


The problem lies in deeply ingrained – and divisive – perceptions of identity.	问题在于根深蒂固的身份认知上。 这一认知是分裂的。


The world is divided into nation-states, each controlling many of the instruments of public policy.	世界被分为许多民族国家，每个国家控制着许多公共政策工具。


People’s social allegiances are divided further by religion, race, occupation, gender, and even income bracket.	人们的社会忠诚则进一步被宗教、种族、职业、性别甚至收入档次所分裂。


Where social barriers are sufficiently strong, economic barriers are certain to appear.	在社会壁垒足够强大的地区，经济壁垒必然会出现。


These can range from protectionist trade policies and increasingly strict immigration controls to religious wars and ethnic cleansing.	这些壁垒包括保护主义贸易政策和日益严格的移民控制，甚至宗教战争和种族清洗。


Clearly, economic success vitally depends on how people perceive their social affiliations.	显然，经济成功非常依赖于人们如何看待社会亲密关系。


One view is that our identities are immutable, impermeable, exogenously generated, and intrinsically opposed to one another.	一种观点是我们的身份不���变、不可渗透、外生给定，并且内在地相互排斥。


This classic “us versus them” dichotomy leads to sympathy for one’s in-group and implacable conflict with out-groups – a bottomless source of conflict throughout history.	这一经典的“我们和他们”两分法导致我们同情群体内的人，而与群体外的人产生不可调和的冲突——这也是历史上屡试不爽的冲突与安全。


But another view is possible: each person has multiple identities, the salience of which is shaped by one’s motivations and circumstances.	但另一个观点是可能的：每个人都具有多重身份，表现出哪种身份取决于人的动机和环境。


This idea – which is firmly rooted in neuroscience, psychology, anthropology, and sociology – implies that an individual has significant latitude in shaping his or her identities.	这一观点——其具有牢固的神经科学、心理学、人类学和社会学基础——意味着个体在决定其身份中具有相当的自由。


This is not to say that national and religious identities are not profoundly important.	这并不是说民族和宗教身份不具有深刻的重要性。


Rather, it implies that we are co-creators of our identities.	相反，这意味着我们是我们的身份的共同创造着。


Instead of choosing identities that divide us, making it impossible to tackle multiplying global problems, we can shape identities that extend our sense of compassion and moral responsibility.	我们可以不选择分裂我们的身份，从而让多边全球问题难以处理； 我们可以选择扩大我们的同情心和道德责任心的身份。


A growing body of scientific evidence shows that compassion, like any other skill, can be ingrained and enhanced through teaching and practice.	越来越多的科学证据表明，同情心和其他技能一样，可以通过教授和练习培养和加强。


Educational institutions can thus work to develop students’ capacity for caring in tandem with their cognitive abilities.	因此，教育机构可以致力于让学生的关怀能力与认知能力同步发展。


More broadly, societies everywhere should be driven by a common goal that transcends their diverse backgrounds.	更广泛地说，各地的社会应该由超越多样化背景的共同目标所推动。


Resolving problems that extend across borders is a good place to start, with strategies involving specific tasks for various groups and countries to undertake that advance the greater good.	解决跨境问题是一个很好的起点，给不同群体和国家分配具体任务的战略能推进更大的利益。


Initiatives like conflict-resolution workshops, reconciliation commissions, cross-cultural education programs, and compulsory civic duty for school leavers could also help.	冲突解决讨论组、调解委员会、跨文化交易计划、离校者义务社会责任等办法也有所助益。


The mainstream view that people are wholly self-interested economic actors denies our innate capacity for reciprocity, fairness, and moral responsibility.	人们是完全自利的经济行为人，这一主流观点否定我们与生俱来的互惠能力、公正和社会责任心。


In deepening social affiliations, we can lay the groundwork for a new form of economy in which many more opportunities can be seized.	在深刻的社会亲密关系中，我们可以为新形式的经济打下基础，让我们可以抓住多得多的机会。


Denying Democracy in Hong Kong	拒绝香港的民主


This week marks the 15th Anniversary of the promulgation of Hong Kong’s constitution, the Basic Law, by China’s National People’s Congress.	本周是中国全国人民代表大会颁布香港宪法，《基本法》的15周年纪念。


The Basic Law supposedly established a political framework to accord with the late Deng Xiaoping’s policy of “one country, two systems,” with Hong Kong’s people ruling Hong Kong with a high degree of autonomy.	《基本法》旨在建立一个与已故邓小平的“一国两制”政策相适应的政治框架，以体现港人治港，高度自治的特色。


Under this policy, Hong Kong’s capitalist system, the rule of law, and its people’s freedoms and way of life were to be preserved.	在此政策下，香港的资本主义制度、法制、人民的自由及生活方式保持不变。


It provided for a popularly elected Chief Executive and Legislative Council.	该政策还规定了民选的行政长官和立法委员会的设立。


Indeed, apart from defense and foreign affairs, Hong Kong was to be master of its own house.	的确，除了国防和外交，香港在其他方面均可当家作主。


But, despite its promise of universal suffrage, the Basic Law restricts democratic development during the first ten years after the handover of Hong Kong to China.	但是，尽管《基本法》承诺实行普遍选举权，它仍对香港回归中国后第一个十年内的民主发展加以限制。


As a result, full democracy is to be permitted only in 2007.	其结果是完全的民主要到2007年才被允许实现。


I said in my maiden speech in the Legislative Council in 1985 that the policy of “one country, two systems” cannot work without democracy.	我于1985年在立法会的首次演讲中就指出，没有民主“一国两制”的政策就不会成功。


As Deng once said of China: “With a good system, even evil men cannot do evil. But without a good system, even good men cannot do good, but may be forced to do evil.”	这就如邓小平所言，有一个好的制度，坏人做不出坏事，但没有一个好的制度，好人都做不出好事，甚至因而做出坏事来。


For Hong Kong, the only good system is democracy.	对香港而言，唯一的好制度就是民主。


For under a democratic system, those in power realize that it is the people who put them in office, and they will be voted out if they are perceived to be serving Beijing’s interests rather than Hong Kong’s.	因为在民主制度下，掌权者就会意识到是人民让他们在位，如果人民认为他们是在为北京而不是香港的利益服务时，就会通过选举让他们下台。


Of course, Deng’s policy can work only if Beijing wants it to work.	当然，北京的意志决定着邓小平政策的有效性。


Indeed, not only must China refrain from interfering in Hong Kong’s internal affairs, but it must encourage the people of Hong Kong to defend their much smaller system.	的确，中国不仅必须避免干涉香港的内务，还必须鼓励香港人民保卫他们弱小的制度。


Unfortunately, Beijing has other ideas.	不幸的是北京另有打算。


On July 1, 2003, the sixth anniversary of the handover, nearly a million people took to Hong Kong’s streets in a peaceful protest against an anti-subversion bill that would have eroded freedom of the press, of religion, and of association.	在2003年7月1日，香港回归六周年的纪念日当天，有近百万人走上香港街头举行反对一项反颠覆立法的和平抗议。 该项立法本可能会侵蚀新闻、宗教和集会的自由。


The demonstration led to a postponement of the bill, and ultimately to its withdrawal, as well as to the resignation of the Secretary for Security, who was responsible for it.	示威活动导致了该项法案的推迟和其最终的撤销。 应对此负责的保安局长也被迫辞职。


But that demonstration also spurred a major change in China’s policy towards Hong Kong.	但这场示威也引发了中国对香港政策的重大改变。


Until then, interference from China was covert and subtle, so that the public perception was that Hong Kong’s Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, was in charge.	在此之前，来自中国的干涉是隐蔽而微妙的，因此在公众眼里，香港特首董建华在统领着香港。


After the demonstration, China’s government adopted a hands-on approach, letting the people of Hong Kong know who the boss really is.	示威发生之后，中国政府采取了直接干预的方式，让香港人民知道谁才是真正的老板。


Thus, on April 26, 2004, China announced its unilateral decision that Hong Kong is not to have democracy in 2007 without saying when Hong Kong will have it.	因此，在2004年4月26日，中国宣布了香港不会在2007年实现民主的单方面决定，并且没有说明香港何时实现民主。


Then came Tung’s resignation as Chief Executive in March.	随之而来的，是特首董建华在三月的辞呈。


The popular belief is that Tung was sacked or pressured to step down.	民间普遍认为董是被免职或是在压力下辞职的。


Tung was handpicked by former Chinese President Jiang Zemin in 1996 and was openly endorsed by Jiang for a second term in 2002.	董是由前中国国家主席江泽民在1996年钦定，并由江在2002年公开认可得以连任的。


But he was not popular because the public viewed him as a puppet of China and a crony of big developers, particularly Li Ka-shing, Hong Kong’s richest person.	但他却不得民心。 因为公众将他看作是中国的傀儡并认为他与商业巨子们过从甚密，特别是与香港首富李嘉诚。


Although the election of the next Chief Executive will not take place until July, China has let it be known that our present Chief Secretary, Donald Tsang, is the chosen one.	虽然下一届行政长官选举要到7月才会举行，但中国已经明示现任政务司司长的增荫权就是不二人选。


Moreover, although the Basic Law prescribes a five-year term for the Chief Executive, China is insisting that the winner will only serve for the remainder of Tung’s term, until June 30, 2007.	再者，虽然《基本法》规定行政长官的任期为五年，中国却坚持继任者只能任满董（建华）余下的任期，即到2007年6月30日。


The clear message is that after almost eight years of Chinese rule, China’s leaders do not trust anyone in Hong Kong to govern for five years.	这清楚地表明在被中国统治近8年之后，中国的领导人不放心任何一个香港人对香港进行长达5年的治理。


This, surely, is the greatest indictment of China’s Hong Kong policy since 1997.	这当然是对中国自1997年以来的香港政策的最大一桩控告。


But the solution lies in changing the system, not just the leader.	但解决之道在于改变制度而不仅仅是更换领导人。


The way forward is not more control or suppression, but more trust and democracy.	推动前进的方式不是更多的控制或镇压，而是更多的信任和民主。


The latter leads to the full implementation of Deng’s policy, enshrined in the Basic Law, of “one country, two systems,” while the former turns the Basic Law into a worthless piece of paper.	后者会实现作为《基本法》精髓的，邓小平“一国两制”政策的完全实施，而前者则只会将《基本法》变成一纸空文。


In 1984, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, said of the impending handover of Hong Kong, “The eyes of the world are on us.”	在1984年，当时的英国首相玛格丽特 · 撒切尔提到即将到来的政权交接时称：“世界在注视着我们。


That may or may not be true today, but at least the people of Taiwan are watching.	”且不问这句话在今天是否适用，但至少台湾民众在注视着我们。


Depression Economics	萧条经济学


BERKELEY – A decade ago, the 2008 Nobel laureate in economics, Paul Krugman, wrote a little book entitled The Return of Depression Economics .  It sank like a stone.	伯克利—十年前，2008年诺贝尔经济学奖得主保罗·克鲁格曼写了一本小书，名叫《萧条经济学的回归》，结果石沉大海，几无反响。


The East Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 was sharp but short and quickly cured once the IMF realized that feckless governments were not the problem and then United States Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin parachuted the New York banks into South Korea’s economy.	1997 至1998年发生的东亚经济危机激烈而短暂，一旦国际货币基金组织认识到软弱的政府不成其为问题，然后美国财政部长罗伯特·鲁宾又把纽约的银行空降到韩国的公司里，危机很快就化解了。


The collapse, not long after, of the dot-com bubble in 2000-2001 brought on not a depression but merely an output decline so mild as to barely warrant the name “recession.”	不久之后，2000年到2001年互联网泡沫的破灭带来的不是萧条，而只是一场产量下滑，程度之轻，刚够用得上“衰退”这个词。


Now Krugman is back with a revised and expanded version of his book, and, sadly, the timing is perfect.	现在克鲁格曼携带着改写扩展过的新版书卷土重来。


For there is a much better case to be made today than there was in 1998 that we should be thinking in terms of “depression economics.”	悲哀的是，这个时机堪称完美—如果要用“萧条经济学”的方法来思考的话，现在的情形可比1998年适合的多。


But the book does not tell us what “depression economics” is supposed to replace.	但是这本书并没有告诉我们“萧条经济学”假定将要取代的是什么。


So let me try my hand at defining non-depression economics:	所以让我来试着界定一下非萧条经济学：


·        Short-run economic policy should be left in the hands of the central bank, with the legislature and the executive focusing on the long run and keeping their noses out of year-to-year fluctuations in employment and prices;	·        短期的经济政策应该由央行掌握，立法机构和行政部门关注长期政策，并且不干预每年在用工和价格上出现的波动；


·        Central banks’ highest priority should be to maintain their credibility as guardians of price stability, and only then turn their attention to keeping the economy near full employment, which they should do by influencing asset prices – upward when unemployment threatens to rise, and downward when an inflationary spiral looms;	·        央行最优先的任务是保持自身作为价格稳定性的保护人的诚信，然后才能转而关注保持经济基本实现充分就业。 他们应该通过影响资产的价格—在有失业上升的威胁时上扬价格，在通货膨胀逼近价格攀升时使之下行—来做到这一点；


·        Central banks should influence asset prices through normal open-market operations – by buying and selling short-term government securities for cash, thus changing the “safe” interest rate and the price of longer-duration assets;	·        央行应该通过开放市场中的正常运作来影响资产价格，即通过买卖短期政府公债来筹集现金，从而改变“安全”的利率和更长期资产的价格；


·        While the central bank should stand ready to intervene to prevent bank runs, it should let the financial sector run itself with a light regulatory hand, viewing itself not as a chaperone but rather as the designated driver in the case of speculative excess.	·        当央行准备好介入银行预防挤兑时，它也应该只对金融领域实施温和的调控，把自身视为过度投资中的方向掌控者而不是监督人。


This is the doctrine that Krugman argues is no longer sufficient for our age.	这些是克鲁格曼论证说在我们的时代不再有效的教条。


And he has a very good case.	他有一个极佳的案例。


Nearly all of these principles are, today at least, honored more in the breach than in the observance.	至少在今天，几乎所有这些原则都是不遵守比遵守好。


Today, short-run economic policy cannot just be left to the central bank alone.	今天，短期的经济政策不可能仅由央行掌控。


For one thing, its balance sheet is not big enough.	原因之一是它的资产负债表还不够大。


At a minimum, the central bank now needs the assistance of that part of the government that taxes and borrows.	至少，央行现在需要政府税收和借款部门的援助。


Moreover, the highest priority for central banks can no longer be to maintain their credibility as guardians of price stability, but rather their credibility as guardians of the financial system’s stability and soundness.	而且，央行的首要任务不能再是保持价格稳定性的保护者的诚信了，他们要保持的是作为金融系统稳定良好性保护者的诚信。


Once that highest goal has been achieved, central banks can turn their attention to trying to keep the economy near full employment.	一旦达到了这个首要目标，央行可以转而关注力争让经济基本实现充分就业。