Otherwise, the shift will prove to be only a stop on an uncertain path – politically more complicated and economically harder to navigate – toward an even less stable destination.	否则，这一转变将只是通往更不稳定的目的地的不确定道路上的一站，而这条道路可能变得更加复杂，经济更加难以驾驭。


The evidence of the ongoing political change comes in many forms.	方兴未艾的政治变革迹象呈现出多种形式。


After years of fiscally irresponsible populist rule by the Kirchner family, Argentina has opted for Mauricio Macri, a former businessman running on a right-wing platform.	在经历了多年的基什内尔家族财政失责的民粹主义统治后，阿根廷选择了来自右翼阵营的前商人马克里。


In Brazil, and pending final consideration by the Senate, President Dilma Rousseff has been sidelined by a “temporary impeachment,” with her replacement signaling a shift away from the policies of the leftist Workers’ Party.	在巴西，等待参议院最终考虑结果的总统罗塞夫已经被一边倒地“暂时弹劾”，而她的下台标志着对左翼工党（Workers’ Party）政策的背离。


Even incumbent governments in the region are altering their course.	就连该地区的在任政府也在改变政策。


In Chile, President Michelle Bachelet was reelected, but her government is signaling a move to the right on economic policy.	在智利，总统巴切莱特获得连任，而其政府正在表现出经济政策向右转的迹象。


Cuba, under President Raúl Castro, is enlarging the legal scope for private businesses.	总统劳尔·卡斯特罗治下的古巴也扩大的私营企业的合法范围。


And in Venezuela, a country tragically flirting with “failed state” status, President Nicolás Maduro’s government confronts mounting economic and financial challenges stemming from fiscally unanchored policies begun under his predecessor, Hugo Chávez.	而在悲剧地沦为“失败之国”的委内瑞拉，总统马杜罗政府面临着泰山压顶般的经济和金融挑战，这些挑战的源头可以追溯到其前任查韦斯的不知节制的财政政策。


Facing widespread shortages of goods and malfunctioning markets, including for foreign exchange, his government has already lost control of the National Assembly, and the opposition is now seeking to shorten his term by constitutional means.	面临普遍的商品短缺和市场瘫痪（包括外汇）的马杜罗政府已经失去了对国民大会的控制，反对派正在寻求通过宪法途径缩短他的任期。


Several key factors are driving the region’s political dynamics.	该地区政治动态受几个重要因素推动。


The sharp drop in international prices for commodities, such as oil and copper, together with a slowing Chinese economy, has reduced the region’s export earnings and accentuated domestic economic challenges.	国际大宗商品（如石油和铜）价格暴跌以及中国经济放缓减少了该地区的出口收益，加剧了国内经济挑战。


This has been aggravated by a more volatile environment for financial flows to emerging countries, more tentative foreign direct investment, and concern about the potential fallout for international trade from rising anti-globalization rhetoric in the unusual presidential race in the United States.	流向新兴国家的金融流波动加剧、外国直接投资试探性质加强以及担心反常的美国总统竞选所表现出来的日益严重的反全球化说辞可能波及国际贸易进一步加剧了挑战。


The resulting deterioration in economic performance, including deep recessions in Brazil and Venezuela, has accentuated popular dissatisfaction with public services and amplified long-standing worries about inequality and misappropriation of public funds.	由此带来的经济表现的恶化，包括巴西和委内瑞拉的深度衰退，加剧了公众对公共服务的不满，也加深了长期存在的对不平等性和盗用公款的担心。


Popular dissatisfaction is evident even in traditionally well-managed countries, such as Chile, where lower-income groups have done relatively well in recent years and where the scale of official fraud – documented and alleged – pales in comparison to neighboring countries.	公众不满即使在传统上管理良好的国家也显而易见，比如低收入群体在近几年来表现相对较好，官员渎职现象——坐实的和受控的——远好于邻国的智利。


For now, rightist parties and policy agendas are the main beneficiaries of the region’s economic and social disillusion.	目前，右翼政党和政策日程是该地区经济和社会幻灭的主要受益者。


The hope for many in the region is that political change can catalyze faster growth, by revamping existing policies and pursuing more effective anti-corruption campaigns.	该地区的很多人寄希望于政治变革能改正现有政策、发动更有效的反复运动，从而刺激更快的增长。


But, again, unless today’s political winners deliver notably higher and significantly more inclusive growth, their electorates are likely to move on.	但是，除非今天的政治赢家实现显著更高和包容性大大加强的增长，否则很有可能被选民抛弃。


Viewed from a global perspective, the shift in Latin America is part of a broader rise in discontent with the “establishment.”	从全球角度看，拉丁美洲的变化是更普遍的对“建制”不满的情绪的一部分。


And it is not limited to governments. It also extends to private-sector elites, particularly banks and multinational companies.	并且对象不仅仅局限于政府，也扩大到私人部门精英，特别是银行和跨国公司。


In the US, the result has been a significant shift away from establishment politics, including the unanticipated emergence of Donald Trump as the presumptive Republican candidate and Bernie Sanders’s unexpectedly powerful challenge to Hillary Clinton on the Democratic side.	在美国，其结果是大规模偏离建制政治，包括唐纳德·特朗普出人意料地成为推定共和党候选人和伯尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）出人意料地在民主党内对希拉里·克林顿构成强力挑战。


In Europe, anti-establishment parties have been gaining ground in local, regional, and national elections, complicating government formation (for example, in Spain) and influencing major policy decisions (such as the UK Conservative Party’s decision to hold the upcoming “Brexit” referendum).	在欧洲，反建制政党在地方、地区和国家选举中取得胜利，让政府构成变得更加复杂（比如西班牙），并影响到重大政策决定（如英国保守党决定坚持即将到来的“英国退出”全民公决）。


With the exception of countries like the Philippines, where voters opted in last month’s presidential election for a blatantly anti-establishment candidate in Rodrigo Duterte, the tendency in the emerging world has been for adaptations within the confines of existing political elites.	除了菲律宾等国家（上个月，菲律宾选民在总统大选中选择了大放异彩的反建制候选人杜特尔特），新兴世界的潮流一直是在既有政治精英的边界内进行调整。


That may well be the best way to characterize what is happening in much of Latin America.	这也许最能体现拉丁美洲大部正在发生的情况的特征。


Now it is up to these elites to respond effectively to the causes of popular anger, or risk facing the eventual emergence of anti-establishment movements, like their American and European counterparts.	现在，轮到这些精英对群众愤怒做出有效反应，否则他们有可能面临反建制运动的最终兴起，就像他们的美国和欧洲同侪。


That outcome, by seriously complicating the region’s political landscape, would further reduce governments’ scope for timely economic-policy adaptation.	这一结果将让地区政治局面严重复杂化，进一步缩小政府做出及时经济政策调整的空间。


After the Hurricanes	哈维的教训


NEW YORK – Hurricane Harvey has left in its wake upended lives and enormous property damage, estimated by some at $150-180 billion.	纽约—哈维飓风走了，留下的是生命损失和巨大的财产伤害，据估计高达1,500—1,800亿美元。


But the rains that inundated the Texas coast for the better part of a week, and the hurricane that is about to hit South Florida, also raise deep questions about the United States’ economic system and politics.	但这场席卷德克萨斯州沿岸、维持了大半个星期的风暴，对美国经济体系和制度留下了深刻的问号。


It is ironic, of course, that an event so related to climate change would occur in a state that is home to so many climate-change deniers – and where the economy depends so heavily on the fossil fuels that drive global warming.	当然，一个与气候变化关系甚大的事件，发生在一个存在如此多否认气候变化的人的国度，并且这个国家的经济又如此严重依赖助长全球变暖的化石燃料，这绝对是一个讽刺。


Of course, no particular climate event can be directly related to the increase in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.	当然，具体的气候事件，都未必与大气中温室气体含量上升直接相关。


But scientists have long predicted that such increases would boost not only average temperatures, but also weather variability – and especially the occurrence of extreme events such as Hurricane Harvey.	但科学家早就预测，温室气体含量的上升不但会提高平均温度，还会加剧天气变化——特别是飓风哈维等极端事件的发生。


As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concluded several years ago, “There is evidence that some extremes have changed as a result of anthropogenic influences, including increases in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases.”	气候变化政府间委员会在几年前就推论，“证据表明，人为影响，包括大气中温室气体集中度的上升，已经改变了一些极端。


Astrophysicist Adam Frank succinctly explained: “greater warmth means more moisture in the air which means stronger precipitation.”	”天体物理学家亚当·弗兰克（Adam Frank）简洁地解释道：“变暖意味着空气中水分含量增加，进而意味着更强的降水。 ”


To be sure, Houston and Texas could not have done much by themselves about the increase in greenhouse gases, though they could have taken a more active role in pushing for strong climate policies.	诚然，休斯顿和德州本身并没有让温室气体增加很多，尽管它们本可以在推动强势气候政策方面扮演更加积极的角色。


But local and state authorities could have done a far better job preparing for such events, which hit the area with some frequency.	但地方和州当局可以更好地针对此类事件未雨绸缪，因为该地区遭受此类事件的频率并不低。


In responding to the hurricane – and in funding some of the repair – everyone turns to government, just as they did in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis.	为了应对飓风——以及为灾后重建筹集一些资金——所有人都把目光转向了政府，一如他们在2008年经济危机后所做的那样。


Again, it is ironic that this is now occurring in a part of the country where government and collective action are so frequently rebuked.	讽刺之处又发生了：这样的事情，发生在这个国家中政府和集体行动受到的诘难最多的地方。


It was no less ironic when the titans of US banking, having preached the neoliberal gospel of downsizing government and eliminating regulations that proscribed some of their most dangerous and anti-social activities, turned to government in their moment of need.	美国银行巨头到了有需要的时候就向政府伸手要援助也同样讽刺——它们一直在大肆宣传缩减政府规模、取消禁止它们的一些最危险和最反社会的行为的监管。


There is an obvious lesson to be learned from such episodes: markets on their own are incapable of providing the protection that societies need.	这些事件显然带来了深刻的教训：市场本身不足以提供社会所需要的保护。


When markets fail, as they often do, collective action becomes imperative.	当市场失灵时——它们经常失灵——集体行动就十分迫切。


And, as with financial crises, there is a need for preventive collective action to mitigate the impact of climate change.	此外，和金融危机时一样，需要预防性集体行动减轻气候变化的影响。


That means ensuring that buildings and infrastructure are constructed to withstand extreme events, and are not located in areas that are most vulnerable to severe damage.	这意味着要确保建筑和基础设施的构造能够抵御极端事件，不要坐落在最容易受到严重伤害的地区。


It also means protecting environmental systems, particularly wetlands, which can play an important role in absorbing the impact of storms.	这还意味着要保护环境同，特别是湿地。 湿地对于吸收风暴影响具有重要作用。


It means eliminating the risk that a natural disaster could lead to the discharge of dangerous chemicals, as happened in Houston.	这意味着消除自然灾害导致危险化学品泄露的风险——休斯顿就发生了这样的事情。


And it means having in place adequate response plans, including for evacuation.	这意味着制定充分的响应预案，包括撤离。


Effective government investments and strong regulations are needed to ensure each of these outcomes, regardless of the prevailing political culture in Texas and elsewhere.	需要有效的政府投资和强大的监管以确保所有这些结果，不论德克萨斯州和其他地区的主流政治文化如何。


Without adequate regulations, individuals and firms have no incentive to take adequate precautions, because they know that much of the cost of extreme events will be borne by others. Without adequate public planning and regulation, including of the environment, flooding will be worse.	没有充分的监管，个人和企业就没有激励采取充分的预防措施，因为它们知道，极端事件的大部分成本会由其他人承担。


Without disaster planning and adequate funding, any city can be caught in the dilemma in which Houston found itself: if it does not order an evacuation, many will die; but if it does order an evacuation, people will die in the ensuing chaos, and snarled traffic will prevent people from getting out.	没有充分的公共规划和监管，包括环境方面的规划和监管，洪水将更加严重，没有灾害规划和充分的资金，任何城市都有可能陷入休斯顿所经历的困境：如果不下令撤离，就会有很多人死去； 但如果下令撤离，会有人死于因此导致的混乱，而交通瘫痪也将让人们难以撤出。


America and the world are paying a high price for devotion to the extreme anti-government ideology embraced by President Donald Trump and his Republican Party.	美国和全世界正在为信奉特朗普总统和他的共和党所宣扬的极端反政府思想而付出沉重代价。


The world is paying, because cumulative US greenhouse-gas emissions are greater than those from any other country; even today, the US is one of the world’s leaders in per capita greenhouse-gas emissions.	世界正在付出代价，因为美国的累计温室气体排放量比其他任何国家都要大，即便在今天，美国仍是世界人均温室气体排放量最大的国家之一。


But America is paying a high price as well: other countries, even poor developing countries, like Haiti and Ecuador, seem to have learned (often at great expense and only after some huge calamities) how to manage natural disasters better.	但美国也在付出沉重代价：其他国家，哪怕是海地和厄瓜多尔等贫穷的发展中国家，都已经学会了如何更好地管理自然灾害（常常要在为某个巨灾付出巨大代价之后）。


After the destruction of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the shutdown of much of New York City by Sandy in 2012, the devastation wrought on Texas by Harvey, and now the prospect of Irma pummeling Florida, the US can and should do better.	2005年新奥尔良被卡特里娜飓风摧毁，2012年纽约市大部因为桑迪飓风而瘫痪，如今，哈维给德克萨斯州带来了毁灭性打击，美国能够也应该做得更好。


It has the resources and skills to analyze these complex events and their consequences, and to formulate and implement regulations and investment programs that mitigate the adverse effects on lives and property.	它具备资源和技能分析这些极端事件以及它们的后果，并制定和落实能减轻生命和财产损失的监管和投资计划。


What America doesn’t have is a coherent view of government by those on the right, who, working with special interests that benefit from their extreme policies, continue to speak out of both sides of their mouth.	美国所不具备的是右翼没有形成合理的政府观，这些右翼与从他们的极端政策中获益的特殊利益集团相互勾结，凭借三寸不烂之舌翻云覆雨。


Before a crisis, they resist regulations and oppose government investment and planning; afterwards, they demand – and receive – billions of dollars to compensate them for their losses, even those that could easily have been prevented.	在危机前，他们抵制监管、反对政府投资和规划； 危机后，他们要求——并得到了——数十亿美元补偿自己的损失，即使是那些原本很容易就能预防的损失。


One can only hope that America, and other countries, will not need more natural persuasion before taking to heart the lessons of Hurricane Harvey.	我们只能寄希望于美国，以及其他国家，不要再需要大自然的教训才会去认真汲取哈维飓风的教训。


Ten Lessons from North Korea’s Nuclear Program	朝鲜核计划的十个教训


SEOUL – North Korea has produced a number of nuclear warheads and is developing ballistic missiles capable of delivering them around the world.	首尔—朝鲜制造了大量核弹头，并且在研发能将它们发射到全世界的弹道导弹。


Many governments are debating how to prevent or slow further advances in North Korea’s capacity and what should be done if such efforts fail.	多国政府正在讨论如何阻止或延缓朝鲜核能力的进一步增长，以及如果阻止失败应该怎么做。


These are obviously important questions, but they are not the only ones.	这些都是重要的问题，但不是仅有的问题。


It also is important to understand how North Korea has succeeded in advancing its nuclear and missile programs as far as it has, despite decades of international efforts.	同样重要的是要理解朝鲜如何在几十年的国际遏制行动下，在核和导弹计划上取得了今天的成功；


It may be too late to affect North Korea’s trajectory decisively; but it is not too late to learn from the experience.	但从经验中汲取教训永不嫌晚。


What follows are ten lessons that we ignore at our peril.	下面是被我们忽视，造成朝鲜尾大不掉的十个教训。


First, a government that possesses basic scientific knowhow and modern manufacturing capability, and is determined to develop a number of rudimentary nuclear weapons, will most likely succeed, sooner or later.	首先，具备了基本科学知识和现代制造能力，并且决心开发大量初级核武器的政府，迟早都会取得成功。


Much of the relevant information is widely available.	许多重要的信息唾手可得。


Second, help from the outside can be discouraged and limited but not shut down.	其次，来自外部的帮助可以阻止和遏制，但无法杜绝。


Black markets exist any time there is a profit to be made.	只要有利可图，就会存在黑市。


Certain governments will facilitate such markets, despite their obligation not to do so.	一些政府会为黑市提供便利，尽管它们有义务打击黑市。


Third, there are limits to what economic sanctions can be expected to accomplish.	第三，经济制裁可以打到的效果有限。


Although sanctions may increase the cost of producing nuclear weapons, history suggests that governments are willing to pay a significant price if they place a high enough value on having them.	尽管制裁能够提高制造核武器的成本，但历史表明，如果政府对于拥有核武器足够重视，就愿意承担高昂的代价。


There is also evidence that some or all of the sanctions will eventually disappear, as other governments come to accept the reality of a country’s nuclear status and choose to focus on other objectives.	证据还表明，一些甚至全部制裁，会随着时间最终取消，因为其他政府会接受一国的核地位，而专注于其他目标。


That is what happened in the case of India.	印度就是如此。


Fourth, governments are not always willing to put global considerations (in this case, opposition to nuclear proliferation) ahead of what they see as their immediate strategic interests.	第四，政府并不总是愿意首先从全球角度考虑（在这个例子中，就是反对核扩散），而不是顾及近在咫尺的战略利益。


China opposes proliferation, but not as much as it wants to maintain a divided Korean Peninsula and ensure that North Korea remains a stable buffer state on its borders.	中国反对核扩散，但由于它希望保持朝鲜半岛分裂、确保朝鲜成为其边境上的稳定缓冲国，因此对于反对核扩散并不十分上心。


This limits any economic pressure China is prepared to place on North Korea over its nuclear efforts.	这导致中国因为朝鲜核计划而向其施加的经济压力都十分有限。


The United States opposed Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons, but was slow to act, owing to its desire in the 1980s for Pakistani support in fighting the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan.	美国反对巴基斯坦开发核武器，但动作迟缓，因为在20世纪80年代它想要巴基斯坦支持阿富汗抵抗苏联占领的战争。


Fifth, some three quarters of a century since they were first and last used, and a quarter-century after the Cold War’s end, nuclear weapons are judged to have value.	第五，自核武器第一次也是最后一次被使用以来的四分之三个世纪以来，以及冷战结束四分之一个世纪以来，核武器被认为是有价值的。


This calculation is based on security more than prestige.	这一算盘更多地是基于安全考虑而不是地位考虑。


Decades ago, Israel made such a calculation in the face of Arab threats to eliminate the Jewish state.	几十年前，以色列在面临阿拉伯消灭犹太国家的威胁时，就做出了这样的盘算。


More recently, Ukraine, Libya, and Iraq all gave up their nuclear weapons programs either voluntarily or under pressure. Subsequently, Ukraine was invaded by Russia, Iraq by the US, and Libya by the US and several of its European partners.	此后，乌克兰、利比亚和伊拉克要么自愿，要么迫于压力放弃了核武器计划，结果是乌克兰被俄罗斯入侵，伊拉克被美国入侵，利比亚被美国及其一些欧洲盟友入侵。


Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya were ousted.	伊拉克的萨达姆和利比亚的卡扎菲政权被推翻。


North Korea has avoided such a fate, and the third generation of the Kim family rules with an iron fist.	朝鲜避免了这一命运，而金氏王朝的第三代以铁拳政策治国。


It is doubtful that the lesson is lost on Kim Jong-un.	金正恩是否忘记了这个教训颇可怀疑。


Sixth, the Non-Proliferation Treaty – the 1970 accord that underpins global efforts to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five countries (the US, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France) that are recognized as legitimate nuclear weapons states for an unspecified but limited period of time – is inadequate.	第六，核不扩散条约不够充分。 这份1970年签署的协议是全球阻止核武器扩散到可合法持有核武器的五国（美国、俄罗斯、中国、英国和法国）之外的全球合作的基础，其时效未具体规定，但是有限的。


The NPT is a voluntary agreement.	核不扩散条约是一个自愿加入的协定。


Countries are not obliged to sign it, and they may withdraw from it, with no penalty, if they change their mind.	各国没有义务签署该条约，如果改变主意，各国可以从条约中撤出而不会受到惩罚。


Inspections meant to confirm compliance are conducted largely on the basis of information provided by host governments, which have been known not to reveal all.	旨在确认遵守该条约的核查，基本上都是根据东道国所提供的信息进行，众所周知，东道国不可能披露所有核信息。


Seventh, new diplomatic efforts, like the recent ban on all nuclear weapons organized by the United Nations General Assembly, will have no discernable effect.	第七，新的外交努力，如联合国大会最近组织的禁止一切核武器的禁令，不可能产生多少效果。


Such pacts are the modern-day equivalent of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which outlawed war.	这些契约就好比是1928年的巴黎公约——它规定战争为非法。


Eighth, there is a major gap in the international system.	第八，国际体系中间存在一个巨大缺口。


There is a clear norm against the spread of nuclear weapons, but there is no consensus or treaty on what, if anything, is to be done once a country develops or acquires nuclear weapons.	关于核武器的扩散，有明确的规范，但一旦某国开发或获得了核武器应该怎样做，并没有一致意见或条约。


The legally and diplomatically controversial options of preventive strikes (against a gathering threat) and preemptive strikes (against an imminent threat) make them easier to propose than to implement.	（针对正在形成的威胁的）预防性的打击和（针对迫在眉睫的威胁的）先发制人的打击都是在法律和外交上存在争议的选项，因此提出容易实施难。


Ninth, the alternatives for dealing with nuclear proliferation do not improve with the passage of time.	第九，应对核扩散的替代方案并未随着时间的推移而得到改进。


In the early 1990s, the US considered using military force to nip the North Korean program in the bud, but held off for fear of triggering a second Korean War.	20世纪90年代初，美国就考虑对尚处于萌芽状态的朝鲜核计划予以军事摧毁，但因为担心引发第二次朝鲜战争而作罢。


That remains the case today, when any force used would need to be much larger in scope and uncertain to succeed.	今天仍然是如此，一切动武行动规模都会大大增加，并且无法保证成功。


Finally, not every problem can be solved.	最后，不是所有的问题都能够解决的。


Some can only be managed.	一些问题只能被管理。


It is much too soon, for example, to conclude that Iran will not one day develop nuclear weapons.	比如，你远远无法确认伊朗有朝一日不会开发核武器。


The 2015 accord delayed that risk, but by no means eliminated it.	2015年的协议推迟了这一风险，但绝对没有打消它。


It remains to be seen what can be done vis-à-vis North Korea.	对于朝鲜能做些什么还有待观察。


Managing such challenges may not be satisfying, but often it is the most that can be hoped for.	管理这样的挑战也许无法令人满意，但这往往是人们所能希望的最大成果了。


Life After Pax Americana	后美式和平时代的生活


NEW YORK – The post-1945 order constructed by the US in Europe and East Asia has been fraying at the edges for some time now.	纽约——美国建设的后1945年欧洲和东亚秩序在其边缘地带已经磨损很长时间了。


President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the Paris climate agreement has only hastened its unraveling.	唐纳德·特朗普总统决意退出巴黎气候协定仅仅是加速了美国主导的欧洲和东亚秩序解体的过程。


For the first time since the early years of General Charles de Gaulle’s presidency in France, a major Western leader – German Chancellor Angela Merkel – has stated openly that Europe can no longer rely on US leadership.	自戴高乐将军很久以前担任法国总统以来，西方主要国家领导人德国总理安格拉·默克尔首次公开表示欧洲无法再依赖于美国的领导。


This might seem ironic, coming from a German and a confirmed Atlanticist, but it is actually fitting, because Germany, in its transformation from a murderous dictatorship into a peaceful liberal democracy, needed the US more than any country.	从一位德国人和勿庸置疑的大西洋主义者口中说出这句话或许颇具讽刺意味，但其实却恰如其分，因为德国在从凶残的专制制度转向和平自由民主的过程中比其他任何国家都更需要美国。


Perhaps we should be sanguine about the gradual end of Pax Americana.	或许我们应当乐观地看待美式和平的逐渐终结。


No imperial system lasts forever.	没有任何帝国体制能够永远存在。


An international order that made complete sense when the world was emerging from the ruins of World War II, only to enter a long Cold War between two nuclear superpowers, may no longer be adequate, and may stand in the way of better arrangements.	以美式和平为代表的国际秩序在世界从二战废墟中崛起时充分发挥了作用，但后来却导致了两个超级核大国之间的长期冷战，现在这一秩序可能已不足以维护世界和平，而且可能阻碍了人们做出更好的调整。


NATO’s purpose, in the blunt phrase of its first secretary general, Lord Hastings Ismay, was to “keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.”	北约第一任秘书长黑斯廷·伊斯梅勋爵曾直言不讳，北约的目的就是要“让美国人参与欧洲事务，封锁俄国人和压制德国人。


But Germany no longer needs to be kept “down,” and there is some debate whether Russia should have been kept “out” after the collapse of the Soviet Union.	”但德国已经不需要再被“压制”，而且在苏联解体后人们也在争论是否仍有必要“封锁”俄国。


And Trump is right about one thing, even if he expresses it crudely: Europe, as well as Japan, has become too dependent on American military power.	而且，尽管表达有失粗鲁，但特朗普有一点说得完全正确：欧洲，还有日本，已经太过依赖美国的军事力量。


This dependence on the US for collective security does not make American allies exactly into colonies.	这种对美国集体安全的依赖并不能使美国盟友真正沦为殖民地。


And the US is not formally an imperial power.	而美国也还算不上正式的帝国势力。


But aspects of a common late imperial dilemma are visible in both East Asia and Western Europe today.	但在今天的东亚和西欧，共同的后帝国主义困境都清晰可辨。


If the US were to give up its leadership role too quickly, chaos might follow and less benign powers might jump into the vacuum.	美国过快放弃其领导角色有可能带来混乱，由此带来的真空可能会被不那么善意的势力所填补。


But if the US-led system remains in place for too long, it will prevent American dependencies from taking more responsibility for their security.	但如果美国主导的体系存在太久，就会阻碍那些依赖美国的政体进一步负责自身的安全。


When imperial arrangements are dissolved, violence often results.	帝国制度的解体往往会导致暴力。


The Armenian genocide accompanied the demise of Ottoman power.	亚美尼亚种族灭绝与奥斯曼帝国权力的覆灭如影随形。


Murderous anti-Semitism and radical nationalism followed the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.	凶残的反犹和激进的民族主义伴随着奥匈帝国的垮台。


Something similar happened when Josip Broz Tito’s little Balkan empire of Yugoslavia fell apart.	当约瑟普·布罗兹·铁托的小南斯拉夫巴尔干帝国分崩离隙时也曾发生过类似的杀戮事件。


More than a million Hindus and Muslims lost their lives in horrific sectarian violence when the British Raj left a partitioned country to its devices.	英国统治者抛弃这个分裂的国家令其自生自灭致使一百多万印度和穆斯林教徒在恐怖的宗派暴力活动中丧生。


This is not an argument in favor of imperialism.	我说这些不是要为帝国主义张目。


But the age of Trump should make us ready to face the consequences once the US-led post-1945 order comes to an end.	但特朗普时代我们应当准备好面对美国主导的后1945年秩序终结所带来的后果。


American leadership has obviously been a flawed enterprise, resulting in unnecessary wars, and the support of too many unsavory allies in the struggle with Communism.	美国的领导体系显然存在缺陷，并因此导致了不必要的战争，并在与共产主义的斗争中接受了太多不良盟友的援助。


But there have been many positive factors, too.	但这种体制同时也存在很多积极因素。


Western Europe, Japan, and even, belatedly, South Korea and Taiwan, were able to become free and prosperous under the protection of the US.	西欧、日本甚至后来的韩国和台湾都成功地在美国的庇护下实现了自由和繁荣。


Despite the excesses of anti-Communism, US dominance has also acted as a brake on ideological extremism.	尽管反共言行有些过激，但美国的统治也制止了极端意识形态的进一步蔓延。


Neither Communism, nor variations of fascism, or indeed radical nationalism, had much of a chance to develop in Europe under Pax Americana.	共产主义、法西斯主义亦或事实上的极端民族主义都在美式和平体制下没有多大发展空间。


Recent elections in the Netherlands and France suggest that Trump may be serving as a deterrent, rather than a boost, to populist extremism in Europe.	近期在荷兰和法国的选举表明特朗普可能遏制、而非推动的欧洲的民粹极端力量。


But if the populist wave were to become bigger and more brutal, there is nobody in Washington now to discourage it.	但如果民粹主义浪潮变得更强大、更残酷，现在在华盛顿已经没有人能够阻止它。


In Japan, dependence on the US, and anxiety about Communism, has marginalized the left and kept a conservative party more or less permanently in power.	在日本，对美国的依赖和对共产主义的焦虑已经导致左翼力量边缘化，并多多少少导致保守党掌权常态化。


But the extremes of Japanese revanchism were also kept in check.	但日本复仇主义势力也同样得到遏制。


This may no longer be so easy, once the US is no longer seen as a reliable protector and fear of China turns into a panic.	不过一旦美国不能再扮演可靠的保护者以及对中国的恐惧演变为恐慌，那么保持现状可能就没有那么容易了。


Unlike some of her predecessors as Chancellor, Merkel, who grew up in East Germany, is wary of Russia’s strategic designs.	和其他前任总理不同，默克尔在东德的成长经历让她时刻警惕俄国的战略意图。


There is no doubt that Russia and China will benefit, at least in the short term, from America’s abdication of leadership.	毫无疑问，俄罗斯和中国至少短期内会从美国放弃领导权中受益。


Some people are not too bothered by this.	对这个问题有些人并不过分担忧。


Russia is closer to Berlin or even Paris than Washington or New York.	俄罗斯离柏林甚至巴黎比华盛顿或纽约更近。


There is a great deal of money to be made by cozying up to the Russian and Chinese regimes (as the US president knows only too well).	靠拢俄国和中国政权能够带来不菲的经济利益（最清楚这一点的莫过于美国总统）。


And the chance that either Russia or China would invade NATO countries or Japan might be slim.	而俄罗斯和中国入侵北约国家或日本的概率可能是微乎其微的。


But there will be a price to pay for increased vulnerability to Chinese and Russian encroachments.	但面对中国和俄国的蚕食不断退让同样会付出代价。


No matter how irksome American dominance might have been, or how much people deplored some of the destructive wars that the US unleashed, criticism of US policies, presidents, and even cultural practices was not only permissible, but seen as a healthy sign of liberal democracy.	无论美国的主导地位多么令人生厌，也无论人们如何谴责美国发动的某些破坏性战争，但对美国政策、总统甚至文化习俗的批判不仅能够被允许，甚至被视为标志着自由民主的健康。


This was one of the “common values” that held the West together.	正是它和其他“共同价值观”将西方统一起来。


The same will not be true in a world dominated by China.	由中国所主导的世界将不会是这样。


Criticism will quickly lead to repercussions, especially in the economic sphere.	尤其是在经济领域，批评将很快导致镇压。


Hollywood studios are already censoring the content of movies expected to make money in the Chinese market.	好莱坞工作室已经开始审查面对中国市场的电影内容。


Western news media, eager to maintain access to Moscow or Beijing, will be under increasing pressure to be careful about what they print or broadcast.	急于报道莫斯科或北京事务的西方新闻媒体对印刷或广播内容保持谨慎的压力将越来越大。


This will hurt our own societies, which are built on the principles of openness and freedom of expression.	这将有损于我们自己的社会，因为我们的社会以开放和言论自由为原则。


So even if the end of Pax Americana does not result in military invasions, or world wars, we should ready ourselves for a time when we might recall the American Empire with fond nostalgia.	因此即使美式和平的终结不会导致军事侵略或世界大战，我们仍然应当做好心理准备，未来我们可能会以美好的心态怀念美国曾经主导的帝国时光。


Little England and Not-so-Great Britain	小英伦和不大不列颠


AMSTERDAM – As an Anglo-Dutchman – British mother, Dutch father – I cannot help but take Brexit rather personally.	阿姆斯特丹—作为一名盎格鲁-荷兰人——母亲是英国人，父亲是荷兰人——我无法不将英国退出视为个人大事。


I’m not a wholehearted Euro-enthusiast, but a European Union without Britain feels like losing a limb in a terrible accident.	我算不上铁杆欧洲拥趸，但没有英国的欧盟感觉好像在可怕的事故中失去了肢体。


Not all my fellow citizens are unhappy.	并非我的所有同胞公民都很不高兴。


The Dutch anti-EU, anti-Muslim demagogue Geert Wilders tweeted: “Hurrah for the British!	荷兰反欧盟和反穆斯林煽动家吉尔特·怀尔德斯（Geert Wilders）发推特说：“英国退出万岁！


Now it is our turn.”	现在轮到我们了。


This kind of sentiment is more alarming, and more ominous, than Brexit’s implications for the future of the British economy.	”这种情绪比英国退出对英国经济未来的影响更值得警惕，也更有指导意义。


The urge to destroy can be contagious.	破坏的冲动是可以传染的。


The United Kingdom’s image has changed literally overnight.	英国的形象一夜之间天翻地覆。


For more than 200 years, Britain represented a certain ideal of liberty and tolerance (at least for many Europeans; Indians might have taken a somewhat different view).	两百多年来，英国代表着某种自由和宽容的理想（至少对许多欧洲人而言是如此，印度人大概有不同意见）。


Anglophiles admired Britain for many reasons, including its relative openness to refugees from illiberal continental regimes.	亲英派仰慕英国有诸多理由，包括它对来自不自由的大陆政权的难民的相对开放性。


It was a place where a man of Sephardic Jewish origin, Benjamin Disraeli, could become Prime Minister.	在这里，西班牙裔犹太人出身的本杰明·迪斯累利可以成为首相。


And it stood up to Hitler virtually alone in 1940.	它在1940年几乎单枪匹马阻止了希特勒。


The Hungarian-born writer Arthur Koestler, a former Communist who knew all about European political catastrophes, and was almost executed by Spanish fascists, escaped to Britain in 1940.	出生于匈牙利的作家亚瑟·克斯特勒（Arthur Koestler）从前是共产党，他熟知所有关于欧洲政治灾难的事，曾经险些被西班牙法西斯分子处决，1940年逃到了英国。


He called his adoptive country the “Davos for internally bruised veterans of the totalitarian age.”	他将这个收容他的国家称为“极权主义时代神伤老兵的达沃斯。 ”


My generation, born not long after the war, grew up with myths based on truth, promoted in comic books and Hollywood movies: myths of Spitfires fighting Messerschmitts over the home counties, of Winston Churchill’s growling defiance, and Scottish bagpipers walking onto the beaches of Normandy.	我这一代人出生于战后不久，伴随着基于真实事件、通过漫画书和好莱坞电影深入人心的神话长大：Spitfire战机与Messerschimitt战机在伦敦周边战斗的神话； 丘吉尔咆哮反抗的神话；


The image of Britain as a country of freedom was boosted further by the youth culture of the 1960s.	作为自由国度的英国的形象因为20世纪60年代的青年文化进一步加强。


Spitfire pilots were replaced as vigorous symbols of liberty by the Beatles, the Rolling Stones, and the Kinks, whose music swept across Europe and the United States like a gust of fresh air.	Spitfire战机飞行员被披头士、滚石、奇想等有力的自由象征所取代，他们的音乐如同一股清风横扫欧洲和美国。


Having a British mother filled me with a naive and undeserved sense of pride.	有一个英国母亲让我有一种天真的、受之有愧的自豪感。


For me, despite its industrial decline, shrinking global influence, and increasingly inept football, something about Britain always remained best.	对我来说，尽管英国工业衰落，全球影响力下降，足球队战绩低迷，但关于英国的一些东西永远是最好的。


There were, of course, many reasons why 52% of those who voted backed the “Leave” campaign.	52%的人投票支持“脱欧”阵营，原因当然有很多。


There are reasonable grounds for victims of industrial decline to feel aggrieved.	工业衰落的受害者感到愤愤不平自有其合理之处。


Neither the left nor the right looked after the interests of the old working class in busted mining towns, rusting ports, and decaying smokestack cities.	不管是左派还是右派，都没人照顾衰败的矿业小镇、锈迹斑斑的港口和腐朽的烟囱城市的老工人阶级的利益。


When those left behind by globalization and London’s Big Bang complained that immigrants were making it even harder to find jobs, they were too easily dismissed as racists.	当这些被全球化和伦敦的“大爆炸”抛弃的人抱怨移民让工作变得更加难以找到时，他们往往被轻易地驳斥为种族主义者。


But this cannot excuse an ugly strain of English nationalism, whipped up by Nigel Farage’s UK Independence Party and cynically exploited by the Conservative Party’s Brexiteers, led by former London Mayor Boris Johnson and Michael Gove, the justice secretary in Prime Minister David Cameron’s cabinet.	但这无法作为丑陋的英国民族主义得势的借口。 民族主义由尼格尔·法拉奇（Nigel Farage）的英国独立党煽动，并被以前伦敦市长鲍里斯·约翰逊（Boris Johnson）和首相卡梅伦内阁的司法部长迈克尔·戈夫（Michael Gove）犬儒地加以利用。


English xenophobia has thrived especially in areas where foreigners are rarely seen.	英国仇外主义在很难见到外国人的地区特别兴盛。


London, where most foreigners live, voted to remain in the EU by a wide margin.	外国人定居最多的伦敦以极大的优势投票留在欧盟。


Rural Cornwall, which benefits hugely from EU subsidies, voted to leave.	从欧盟补贴中获益巨大的农村考恩沃尔（Cornwall）支持脱欧。


The most sickening irony for a European of my age and disposition lies in the way narrow-minded and dispiriting nationalism is so often expressed.	对于像我这个年纪和性情的欧洲人来说，最令人作呕的讽刺之处在于目光狭隘、令人丧气的民族主义出现得如此频繁。


Bigotry against immigrants is cloaked in the very symbols of freedom that we grew up admiring, including film clips of Spitfires and references to Churchill’s finest hour.	对移民的偏执被包装成我们从小敬仰的自由象征中，包括Spitfire战机电影片段和对丘吉尔最光辉时刻的引用。


The wilder Brexiteers – shaven heads, national flag tattoos – resemble the English football hooligans infesting European stadiums with their particular brand of violence.	“野生”英国退出派——光头、国旗纹身者——就像是骚扰欧洲球场的英国足球流氓，暴力是他们的招牌。


But the genteel ladies and gentlemen in the shires of Little England, cheering the lies of Farage and Johnson with the kind of ecstasy once reserved for British rock stars abroad, are no less disquieting.	但小英伦（Little England）各郡的优雅的女士和绅士带着从前只属于出国演出的英国摇滚明星的痴迷为法拉奇和约翰逊的谎言欢呼，这同样令人不安。


Many Brexiteers will say that there is no contradiction.	许多英国退出派会说，这并不矛盾。


The wartime symbols were not misplaced at all.	战时象征完全没有错位。


To them, the argument for leaving the EU is no less about freedom than World War II was.	对他们来说，脱离欧盟的理由和第二次世界大战一样，都事关自由。


“Brussels,” after all, is a dictatorship, they say, and the British – or, rather, the English – are standing up for democracy.	毕竟，“布鲁塞尔”搞的是独裁，他们说，而英国人——或者说，英格兰人——为民主而战。


Millions of Europeans, we are told, agree with them.	他们被告知，数百万欧洲人和他们观点一致。


It is indeed true that many Europeans take this view.	诚然，许多欧洲人持这一观点。


But most are followers of Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders, and other populist rabble-rousers, who promote plebiscites to undermine elected governments and abuse popular fears and resentments to clear their own paths to power.	但大部分都是马琳·勒庞（Marine Le Pen）、吉尔特·怀尔德斯和其他民粹主义煽动家的追随者。 这些煽动家鼓吹全民公决来破坏民选政府，滥用群众恐惧和怨恨为他们自己的权力之路扫清障碍。


The EU is not a democracy; nor does it pretend to be one.	欧盟不是民主政体； 它也从不装作是民主政体。


But European decisions are still made by sovereign – and, more important, elected – national governments after endless deliberation.	但欧洲的决定仍由主权——更重要的是民选——国家政府在经过没完没了的审议之后做出。


This process is often opaque and leaves much to be desired.	这一过程常常不透明，令人浮想联翩。


But the liberties of Europeans will not be better served by blowing up the institutions that were carefully constructed in the ruins of the last calamitous European war.	但欧洲人的自由不会因为推翻谨慎建立于上一场欧洲战争浩劫废墟上的机构而得到更好的保护。


If Brexit triggers a Europe-wide revolt against liberal elites, it would be the first time in history that Britain leads a wave of illiberalism in Europe.	如果英国退出应发一场席卷欧洲的对自由派精英的反抗，那么这将是英国在历史上第一次在欧洲领导了一场不自由浪潮。


This would be a great tragedy – for Britain, for Europe, and for a world in which most of the major powers already are turning toward increasingly illiberal politics.	这将是一场大悲剧——对英国，对欧洲，对大部分主要大国都正在转向日益不自由的政治的世界来说都是如此。


The final irony is that the last hope for turning this tide and preserving the freedoms for which so much blood was shed probably now lies with Germany, the country that my generation grew up hating as the symbol of bloody tyranny.	最后一个讽刺之处是，如今扭转这一趋势、保护洒了如此多鲜血才赢得的自由的最后希望也许在于德国。 在我这一代人的成长过程中，德国是作为血腥暴政的象征被厌恶的。


But, so far at least, the Germans appear to have learned the lessons of history better than a disturbing number of Brits.	但是，到目前为止，德国似乎比相当数量的英国人更好地从历史中汲取了教训。


Where to Build Trump’s Wall?	特朗普的墙建在哪里？


CAMBRIDGE – What do Huntsville (Alabama), Princeton (Indiana), Georgetown (Kentucky), Blue Springs (Mississippi), San Antonio (Texas), Buffalo (West Virginia), and Greer (South Carolina) have in common? They are the locations where Toyota and BMW built their manufacturing plants in the United States.	坎布里奇—亨茨维尔（Huntsville，亚拉巴马州）、普林斯顿（印第安纳州）、乔治敦（肯塔基州）、布鲁斯普林斯（Blue Springs，密西西比州）、布法罗（西维吉尼亚州）和格里尔（Greer，南卡罗来纳州）之间有什么共同之处？


None is in the US Rust Belt – the tract of industrial towns stretching from Michigan to eastern Pennsylvania – where much of the car industry and its suppliers were traditionally located.	它们是丰田和宝马在美国的汽车工厂所在地。 没有一个位于锈带——从密歇根州到宾夕法尼亚州东部的工业城镇带，汽车工业及其供应商的传统所在地。


Evidently, the US Rust Belt’s decline was not the exclusive doing of China and Mexico.	显然，美国锈带的衰落并非完全拜中国和墨西哥所赐。


It was also caused by the auto industry’s geographic spread into other regions of the US, out of the clusters in which it had originally been concentrated.	汽车工业在地理上进入了美国其他地区，而不再呆在原本的集中地也是原因之一。


And this shift resulted not so much because GM moved its plants, but because it lost market share to Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Hyundai, BMW, and Mercedes-Benz.	而这一转变的原因主要不是通用汽车搬迁工厂，而是它的市场份额输给了丰田、日产、本田、现代、宝马和奔驰。


Of course, pointing this out does not reduce the pain for those affected.	当然，指出这一点并不能减轻受影响群体的痛苦。


But it does change the policy implications – and the lessons from the US example are relevant worldwide.	但这确实能改变政策影响——而美国的例子的教训对全世界来说都十分重要。


Two approaches have been pursued so far to help communities affected by this phenomenon.	目前，为了帮助受这一现象影响的社区，美国采取了两种办法。


The first is embodied in the US Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program, which provides workers affected by international competition with financial support for retraining, job search, relocation, income maintenance, and health insurance.	第一种是美国贸易调整救济（Trade Adjustment Assistance，TAA）计划，该计划向受国际竞争影响的工人提供再培训、求职、搬迁、收入维持和医保的财务支持。


The second approach is to provide trade protection to affected industries, as US President Donald Trump has promised to do.	第二种方法是为受影响行业提供贸易保护，即美国总统特朗普承诺要采取的方法。


Neither approach is likely to help the Rust Belt.	这两种方法都不可能帮助到锈带。


Any economy’s success is very much affected by the performance of that sliver of activities that can sell their output to outsiders.	任何经济体，它的成功在很大程度上取决于能够将产品卖给外人的产业活动。


And what is true for countries is also true for states, cities, and towns, provided we redefine what we mean by selling to “outsiders.”	对国家是如此，对州、市和镇同样也是如此，无非“外人”的定义不同罢了。


These “export” activities have an outsize and amplified impact on the growth of the local economy as a whole.	这些“出口”活动对于本地整体经济增长有着巨大的放大性影响。


Every geographic area must buy products it does not make and pay for them by selling to outsiders some of the output that it does make.	所有地理区域都必须购买它不生产的产品，并通过把它所生产的某些产出卖给外人来支付货款。


But outsiders have the option of buying from others.	但外人也可以选择在其他人那里购买。


So, these “export” activities face a level of competition that the local grocer, coffee shop, or barber does not.	因此，这些“出口”活动面临着一些本地杂货铺、咖啡店和理发店不会面临的竞争。


Moreover, the income brought into the community by the “exporters” creates a large multiplier effect.	此外，通过“出口商”给社区带来的收入制造了很大的乘数效应。


When a mine shuts down, the result is not just unemployed miners.	当某个矿山被关闭时，造成的后果不仅仅是矿工失业。


The grocer, coffee shop, and barber go out of business, and everybody leaves, turning the place into a ghost town.	杂货店、咖啡店和理发店也会破产，所有人都会离开，社区沦为鬼城。


The disruption can be caused not only by an industrial closure.	造成如此破坏的原因不仅限于产业关门。


Once upon a time, there were many relatively small department-store chains and other retailers with headquarters spread throughout the US and outlets in a few towns.	曾几何时，美国遍布着大量包括一个总店和几个外地分店的相对小规模的连锁百货和其他零售商。


These headquarters brought income into their town by providing back-office services to their network of stores.	这些总店通过为店铺网络提供后台服务给所在城镇创造收入。


But consolidation in the retail industry, driven in part by Walmart and Amazon, dealt a deathblow to many of these companies.	但部分由沃尔玛和亚马逊推动的零售业整合对许多这样的小连锁带来了致命打击。


The impact on the local communities where these retailers were headquartered was as devastating as a mine closure: the “export” activity ceased and towns shrank by a multiple of each “export job” lost.	这些连锁总店所在社区受到的影响的破坏性和关闭一座矿山一样大：“出口”活动停止，城镇的“出口就业”损失效应成倍放大。


Video rentals, bookstore chains, pharmacies, home improvement stores, electronics and camera shops, catalog stores, and more: all went the way of the horse and buggy.	录影带出租点、连锁书店、药店、家装卖场、电子产品和相机店、邮购商店，如此等等：它们都走上了四轮马车的老路。


At the start of 2017, Walmart had 5,332 stores in the US.	2017年初，沃尔玛在美国拥有5,322家店铺。


It is headquartered in Bentonville, Arkansas, where it employs more than 18,000 workers.	其总部位于阿肯色州本顿维尔（Bentonville），总部员工数量超过18,000人。


Clearly, trade protection does not help if Detroit is competing with Blue Springs, Mississippi.	显然，如果底特律要与密西西比州布鲁斯普林斯竞争，贸易保护是没用的。


Nor do import tariffs help those left unemployed by the bankruptcy of Blockbuster Video, Borders Books, CompUSA, Circuit City, Payless, or Virgin Megastores. In the meantime, employment at Amazon grew by 47% over the past year, to 341,000 people.	进口关税对于那些因为百事达音像（Blockbuster Video）、鲍德斯书店（Borders Books）、美国电脑（CompUSA）、电路城（Circuit City）、Payless或维珍超级百货（Virgin Megastores）等公司倒闭而失业的人也无济于事。


But with Amazon employment concentrated in California, Texas, and Washington, the geography of those jobs is very different from that of those it is replacing.	但亚马逊的就业集中在加利福尼亚、德克萨斯和华盛顿州，这些就业岗位的地理位置与那些被取而代之的岗位相去甚远。


As with the geographic relocation of US manufacturing jobs, TAA is not a solution for this kind of ailment.	面对美国制造业岗位的地理变迁，TAA无法对症下药。


After all, whereas TAA targets individuals directly impacted by foreign competition, much of the competition faced by local economies is not coming from abroad, and many of the jobs being lost are not in the industries directly affected by outside competition, but in the surrounding economy.	毕竟，TAA的目标是受到外国竞争直接影响的个人，而地方经济所面临的大部分竞争不是来自海外，并且许多损失的就业岗位并非来自受外部竞争直接影响的行业，而好似来自周边经济。


Facilitating individuals’ relocation does nothing for those left behind in shrinking towns.	个人搬迁便利化根本无助于衰败城镇中的落后群体。


With industry after industry disrupted by technological change, much of this pain is hard to avoid.	随着一个又一个行业被科技变化所颠覆，许多阵痛难以避免。


But interventions at the individual level must be complemented with assistance at the level of local economies.	但个人水平上的干预必须辅之以地方经济水平上的援助。


The goal should be clear: as a town’s “export” industries are disrupted, new “export” activities must take their place, lest the town shrink and become impoverished.	目标应该明确：在城镇的“出口”行业受到打击时，新的“出口”活动必须顶上来，否则城镇就会衰落致穷。


This highlights the need for what UK Prime Minister Theresa May has called a Modern Industrial Strategy, aimed at “delivering jobs and economic growth to every community and corner of the country” to “ensure [that] free trade and globalization work for all.”	这突显出英国首相梅所谓的现代产业战略的必要性。 梅的战略旨在“为国家的每一个社区和每一个角落创造就业岗位和经济增长”以“确保自由贸易和全球化惠及所有人。


To achieve this, a new set of place-based policies will be needed.	要实现这一目标，需要一系列新的基于地方的政策。


The point is not to prop up dying industries, but to increase the birth rate and reduce the infant-mortality rate of firms in industries that can take their place, especially those that can sell to “outsiders,” reconnecting each location with external and increasingly global markets.	重点不是为垂死产业续命，而是增加可以取而代之，特别是可以卖产品给“外人”、让每个地方与外部和日益全球化的市场重新联系起来的行业中的企业的出生率、降低它们的死亡率。


In their recent book The Smartest Places on Earth, Antoine van Agtmael and Fred Bakker document how this is already happening in parts of the US Rust Belt, where many towns – such as Akron, Ohio, or Albany, New York – have reinvented themselves.	在新书《地球上最聪明的地方》（The Smartest Places on Earth）中，安托万·范艾格特迈尔（Antoine van Agtmael）和弗雷德·巴克尔（Fred Bakker）指出，这一点已经在美国锈带的部分地区发生，许多城镇，如俄亥俄州阿克伦（Akron）和纽约州艾尔巴比（Albany），正在涅槃重生。


These places are not only recovering; we know from how they voted last November that they are also not buying into Trump’s wall-building agenda.	这些地方不但在复苏； 从它们在去年11月的投票中的表现我们知道，它们也不买特朗普筑墙计划的帐。


Is Another Debt Crisis On the Way?	下一场债务危机即将到来？


WASHINGTON, DC – Economic growth is accelerating across most of the world.	发自华盛顿特区——全球大部分地区的经济增长正在加速。


Yet the world’s total gross debt-to-GDP ratio has reached nearly 250%, up from 210% before the global economic crisis nearly a decade ago, despite post-crisis efforts by regulators in many important economies to drive the banking sector to deleverage.	但尽管危机后很多重要经济体的监管机构大力推动和银行业去杠杆化，世界的总体债务相对GDP比率却从2008年经济危机前的210％上升到了接近250％。


This has raised doubts about the sustainability of the recovery, with some arguing that a rise in interest rates could trigger another global crisis.	这引发了人们对经济复苏持续性的质疑，甚至有人认为利率上升可能会引发另一场全球危机。


But how likely is that to happen?	那么这种情况发生的可能性又有多大呢？


To answer this question, one must recall that debt is both a liability and an asset.	要回答这个问题，大家首先要记住债务既是负债，也是资产。


In a closed economy – and we don’t owe anything to non-Earthlings – overall debt and the corresponding assets necessarily cancel each other out.	既然我们不欠外星人任何债务，因此在一个封闭经济体中总体债务和相应的资产规模必然相互抵消。


So what really matters is the composition of debts and liabilities – or, to put it simply, who owes what to whom.	因此真正重要的是带息债务和总债务的构成状况——或者简单地说，谁欠了谁什么东西。


High public-sector debt, for example, signals the possible need for tax increases – the opposite of the tax legislation being advanced by Republican legislators in the United States – and/or higher interest rates (real or nominal, depending on monetary policy and inflation).	比如说，高额公共部门负债表明可能需要加税——与美国共和党立法者提出的税收立法相反——和/或利率上升（实际或名义上的，取决于货币政策和通胀率）。


If debt is owed largely to foreign lenders, interest-rate risk is compounded by exchange-rate risk.	如果债务主要是欠外国借款人的话，利率风险就会因汇率风险而加剧。


For private-sector debt, much depends on its type: the hedging sort, where a debtor’s cash flow covers all obligations; the speculative type, where cash flow covers interest only; or the Ponzi kind, where cash flow does not even cover that.	而私人部门债务则很大程度上取决于其类型：对冲型，债务人的现金流能够支付所有负债； 投机型，现金流只够覆盖利息；


As the late American economist Hyman Minsky explained, the higher the share of debt that falls into the speculative or Ponzi categories, the higher the risk that a confidence shock will trigger a sudden wave of deleveraging that quickly morphs into a full-blown financial crisis.	或者是连以上两点都做不到的庞氏（Ponzi）型。 正如美国经济学家海曼·明斯基（Hyman Minsky）所解释的那样，投机型或庞氏骗局型债务的份额越高，因信心冲击而引发突然去杠杆化浪潮的风险就越高，而该浪潮很快就会演变成全面的金融危机。


For both public- and private-sector debt, maturities also play an important role.	到期日对公共和私人部门债务来说也意义重大。


Longer maturities leave more time for adjustment, lowering the risk of a confidence shock.	较长的到期日意味着有更多的时间进行调整，也降低了信心冲击的风险。


Yet while it makes little sense to focus on simple aggregate figures, both public institutions and private researchers tend to do precisely that.	虽然把重点放在简单的总量数字上没什么意义，但公共和私人机构研究人员都倾向于这样做。


Consider the coverage of the Greek debt crisis. Headlines tracked the debt-to-GDP ratio’s climb from 100% in 2007 to 180% this year, yet little attention was paid to private-sector debt.	以希腊债务危机的报道为例，新闻头条都集中在债务相对GDP比率从2007年的100％上升到了今年的180％上，却很少关注私人部门债务。


And, in fact, as foreign public creditors replaced private debt holders and interest rates were lowered, Greece’s overall debt, while still high, became more sustainable.	事实上随着国外公共债权人取代私人债权人以及利率下调，希腊的整体债务虽然仍然很高，却已变得更可持续。


Its continued sustainability will depend partly on the trajectory of Greece’s GDP – the denominator in the debt ratio.	而其可持续性的延续将部分取决于希腊GDP的发展轨迹——也就是债务比率的分母。


A similar mistake is made in assessing China’s debts, about which the world is most concerned.	在评估全球最为关心的中国债务方面也存在着类似错误。


The figures are certainly daunting: China’s debt-to-GDP ratio now stands at about 250%, with private-sector debt amounting to about 210% of GDP.	单看数字显然有点吓人：中国的债务相对GDP比率当前约为250％，私人部门债务则相当于GDP的210％左右。


But about two-thirds of the private-sector debt that is defined as bank loans and corporate bonds is actually held by state-owned enterprises and local-government entities. The central government has considerable control over both.	但在那些被定义为银行贷款和公司债券的私人部门债务中其实有大约2/3实际上是由国有企业和地方政府实体持有的，而中央政府对这两方面都拥有相当的控制力。


For China, the biggest risk probably lies in the shadow banking sector, on which reliable data are not available.	而中国最大的风险可能来自影子银行，因为缺乏可靠的数据。


On the other hand, a significant share of the growth in private debt ratios in recent years may be a result of the “formalization” of parts of the shadow banking system – a trend that would bode well for economic stability.	另一方面，近年来私人债务比率的大部分增长可能是影子银行体系部分“正规化”的结果——这一趋势对经济稳定而言是一个好兆头。


And there is more good news for China.	此外中国还有更多利好因素：大多数债务是以人民币持有的；


Most Chinese debt is held in renminbi; the country possesses massive foreign-exchange reserves of close to $3 trillion; and capital controls are still effective, despite having been eased in recent years.	该国拥有接近3万亿美元的巨额外汇储备； 尽管近年来有所松绑，但资本管制仍然有效。


The country’s leaders thus have a public-policy war chest that they can use to cushion against financial turmoil.	因此国家领导层有一笔公共政策专项资金可以拿来缓和金融动荡。


Among the rest of the emerging economies, there are some sources of concern. But, overall, the situation is relatively stable.	在其他新兴经济体中也有一些关注的问题，但总的来说情况比较稳定。


Though private-sector debt has lately been rising, its levels remain tolerable. And public-sector debt has been growing only moderately, relative to GDP.	尽管私人部门负债额近来一直在上涨，但其水平仍然可以容忍，而公共部门的债务相对GDP而言只算是适度增长。


As for the advanced economies, there is little reason to believe that a debt crisis is around the corner in Japan.	至于发达经济体，没有理由相信日本债务危机即将爆发。


In the US, public debt is set to increase, thanks to the impending tax overhaul; but the blow will be cushioned, at least for the next year or two, by continued growth acceleration.	得益于即将进行的税收大动作，美国的公共债务将有所增加； 但至少在未来一两年内这种冲击会被持续的增长加速所缓冲。


And though low-quality assets held by the banking system are likely to impede Europe’s recovery, they are unlikely to spark a financial crisis.	虽然银行体系持有的低质量资产可能阻碍欧洲经济复苏，但也不太可能引发金融危机。


In short, the world does not seem to face much risk of a debt crisis in the short term.	简而言之，短期内全球不太可能出现大型的债务危机风险。


On the contrary, the stage seems to be set for continued increases in asset valuations and demand-driven growth.	相反，这一阶段似乎是为持续提升资产估值以及需求驱动型增长而度身订造的。


That said, geopolitical risks should not be discounted.	这意味着不要低估了地缘政治风险不应。


While markets tend to shrug off localized political crises and even larger geopolitical challenges, some dramas may be set to spin out of control.	虽然市场倾向于无视本地性政治危机甚至更大的地缘政治挑战，但某些局面可能失控。


In particular, the North Korean nuclear threat remains acute, with the possibility of a sudden escalation raising the risk of conflict between the US and China.	尤其是朝鲜的核威胁依旧严峻，甚至可能突然升级以致美中冲突的风险增加。


The Middle East remains another source of serious instability, with tensions in the Gulf having intensified to the point that hostilities between Iran and Saudi Arabia and/or turmoil within Saudi Arabia are not unthinkable.	中东地区也还是一个严重不稳定性的来源，海湾地区的紧张局势可能加剧，也根本无法排除伊朗和沙特之间的敌对行动和/或沙特境内爆发动荡的可能性。


In this case, it is Russia that might end up clashing with the US.	在这种情况下，俄罗斯可能最终会与美国硬碰硬。


Even barring such a major geopolitical upheaval, which would severely damage the global economy’s prospects in the short run, serious medium- and long-term risks loom.	即使不出现这么一个严重损害全球经济短期前景的重大地缘政治动荡，也会出现严重的中长期风险。


Rising income inequality, exacerbated by the mismatch between skills and jobs in the digital age, will impede growth, unless a wide array of difficult structural reforms are implemented, including reforms aimed at constraining climate change.	除非实施一系列艰难的结构性改革，包括旨在遏制气候变化的改革，否则数字时代技能与就业之间的错配所加剧了的收入不平等状况将阻碍增长。


As long as the geopolitical situation remains manageable, policymakers should have time to implement the needed structural reforms.	只要地缘政治形势依然可控，政策制定者就应该有时间去实施必要的结构改革。


But the window of opportunity will not stay open forever.	但机会之窗不会永远开放。


If policymakers waste time on trickle-down sophistry, as is happening in the US, the world may be headed for severe economic distress.	如果决策者像美国那样把时间都耗费在滴流经济理论的诡辩上，世界就将会面临严重的经济困境。


Why Low Inflation Is No Surprise	为何低通胀本不足为奇


BERKELEY – The fact that inflation has remained stubbornly low across the global North has come as a surprise to many economic observers.	伯克利—通胀在全球北方保持极低水平，这一事实令许多经济观察者感到惊讶。


In September, the always sharp and thoughtful Nouriel Roubini of New York University attributed this trend to positive shocks to aggregate supply – meaning the supply of certain goods has increased, driving down prices.	9月，向来洞见犀利又深邃的纽约大学教授努里埃尔·鲁比尼（Nouriel Roubini）将这一趋势归因为总需求的积极冲击——即某些商品的供给增加，抑制了物价。


As a result, Roubini observed, “core inflation has fallen” even though the “recent growth acceleration in the advanced economies would be expected to bring with it a pickup in inflation.”	因此，鲁比尼观察道，“核心通胀有所下降”，尽管“发达经济体最近的增长加速会让人们认为通胀将有所抬头。


Meanwhile, the US Federal Reserve “has justified its decision to start normalizing rates, despite below-target core inflation, by arguing that the inflation-weakening supply-side shocks are temporary.”	”与此同时，美联储“认为抑制通胀的供给侧冲击是暂时性的，因此，其在核心通胀仍低于目标的情况下便开始利率正常化是合理的。


Roubini concludes that, “even though central banks aren’t willing to give up on their formal 2% inflation target, they are willing to prolong the timeline for achieving it.”	”鲁比尼推论说，“尽管央行不愿意放弃2%的正式通胀目标，但它们愿意延长实现这一目标的时间。 ”


In my view, interpreting today’s low inflation as a symptom of temporary supply-side shocks will most likely prove to be a mistake.	在我看来，将今天的低通胀解释为暂时性供给侧冲击所表现出来的现象很可能是一个错误。


This diagnosis seems to misread the historical evidence from the period between the early 1970s and the late 1990s, and is thus based on a fundamentally flawed assumption about the primary driver of inflation in the global North since World War II.	看起来，这一诊断误读了20世纪70年代初到90年代末的历史证据，因此，它基于一个存在根本缺陷的关于二战以来全球北方通胀的主要推动因素的假设。


Since the 1970s, economists have maintained a near-consensus belief that the Phillips curve has a substantial slope, meaning that prices react strongly to changes in demand.	20世纪70年代以来，经济学家形成了近乎共识的信念：菲利普斯曲线有一个较大的斜率，即价格会对需求变化产生强烈反应。


According to this view, relatively small increases in aggregate demand above levels consistent with full employment will have a substantial impact not just on inflation, but also on expectations of inflation.	根据这一观点，如果总需求位于充分就业对应水平之上，其相对较小的增加就会产生较大的影响——不仅仅是对通胀，也包括通胀预期。


A period of rapidly accelerating inflation in the recent past will lead people to believe that inflation will increase in the future, too.	如果最近一段时间出现通胀加速，将导致人们认为未来通胀将继续上升。


More than 20 years ago, I wrote a paper called “America’s Only Peacetime Inflation: The 1970s,” in which I challenged this narrative.	20多年前，我写了一篇题为《和平时代美国唯一的通胀时期：70年代》（America’s Only Peacetime Inflation: The 1970s）的文章，对这一观点提出了挑战。


I showed that, when the now-standard view about inflation was developed in the 1970s, increases in aggregate demand above levels consistent with full employment were actually few, short-lived, and small, and that past inflation jumps had been incorporated into future expectations not rapidly, but slowly over time.	我指出，今天对通胀的标准看法是在20世纪70年代发展起来的，当时，在总需求水平高于充分就业对应水平的情况下发生总需求增加的现象其实是非常罕见、短暂、小幅的，而过去的通胀急升进入未来预期的过程也比较缓慢而不是非常迅速。


In fact, it took three large adverse supply shocks for expectations to adjust.	事实上，预期在经历了三次不利的供给冲击后才有所调整。


In addition to the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the Iranian Revolution of 1979, productivity growth began to slow at the same time that unions still had substantial pricing power, and previously negotiated wage increases were already locked into many workers’ contracts.	除了1973年赎罪日战争和1979年伊朗革命，生产率增长也开始放缓，而与此同时，工会对仍拥有巨大的定价权，许多工人的合同锁定了事先谈好的加薪。


Despite these shocks, central bankers, chiefly then-Fed Chair Arthur F. Burns, were hesitant to commit to achieving price stability.	尽管发生了这些冲击，央行行长们——以时任美联储主席阿瑟·伯恩斯（Arthur F. Burns）为首——对于物价稳定的使命是犹豫不决的。


Instead, Burns, understandably worried that fighting inflation would bring a deep recession, decided to kick the can down the road.	相反，伯恩斯——不难理解，他担心遏制通胀会造成严重衰退——决定至物价稳定于不顾。


And as we now know, that set the stage for 1979, when Paul Volcker succeeded Burns as Fed Chair, hiked up the federal funds rate (a move now known as the “Volcker disinflation”), and brought on the Near-Great Recession of 1979-1982.	现在我们都知道，这给1979年所发生的事情埋下了伏笔——保罗·沃尔克（Paul Volcker）接替伯恩斯出任买联储主席，大幅提高联邦基金利率（如今，这一动作被称为“沃尔克去通胀”），这造成经济在1979—1982年间陷入了较大衰退（Near-Great Recession）。


Strangely, this history of what actually happened was for some reason swallowed up by an alternative narrative that many still cling to today.	奇怪的是，这段真实发生过的历史被另一种许多人至今仍信奉的叙事所埋没。


According to this pseudo-historical retelling, Keynesian economists in the 1960s did not understand the natural rate of unemployment, so they persuaded central bankers and governments to run overly expansionary policies that pushed aggregate demand above levels consistent with full employment.	根据这一伪历史，20世纪60年代的凯恩斯学派经济学家不懂自然失业率，因此他们说服央行行长和政府采取过度扩张的政策，将总需求推高到充分就业对应水平以上。


This was of course an affront to the gods of the market, who responded by meting out divine retribution in the form of high and persistent inflation.	这显然是对市场之神的亵渎，市场之神立即回报以天罚——持续而高企的通胀。


The Volcker disinflation was thus an act of penance.	因此，沃尔克去通胀是一次忏悔。


To expunge the original sin, millions of workers’ jobs and incomes had to be sacrificed.	为了洗脱原罪，数百万工人的饭碗和薪水被牺牲。


The clear lesson from this telling is that economists and central bankers must never again be allowed to run overly expansionary policies.	这一叙事有一个显而易见的教训，即经济学家和央行行长决不能重蹈坐视过度扩张政策的覆辙。


But that is obviously bad policy advice.	但这显然是糟糕的政策建议。


After all, it has been more than 20 years since economists Douglas Staiger, James H. Stock, and Mark W. Watson showed that the natural rate of unemployment is not a stable parameter that can be estimated precisely.	毕竟，经济学家道格拉斯·斯泰格（Douglas Staiger）、詹姆斯·斯托克（James H. Stock）和马克·沃森（Mark W.


And economists Olivier Blanchard, Eugenio Cerutti, and Lawrence H. Summers have toppled the belief that the Phillips curve has a substantial slope.	Watson）证明自然失业率并非可以准确测算的稳定参数已经过去了20多年。 经济学家奥利佛·布兰查德（Olivier Blanchard）、尤金尼奥·塞鲁蒂（Eugenio Cerutti）和劳伦斯·萨默斯（Lawrence H.


In fact, to say that it had a substantial slope even in the 1970s requires one to avert one’s eyes from the supply shocks of that decade, and attribute to demand outcomes that are more plausibly attributed to supply.	Summers）也颠覆了菲利普斯有显著斜率的信念。 事实上，即使在20世纪70年代，说出菲利普斯必有显著斜率的人也需要“瞎”到对这个十年的供给冲击视而不见，并且将显然更应该归因于供给的现象归因为需求结果的程度。


Those who have used the prevailing economic fable about the 1970s to predict upward outbreaks of inflation in the 1990s, the 2000s, and now the 2010s have all been proven wrong.	关于20世纪70年代的经济学无稽之谈大行其道，有人用它来预测20世纪90年代、21世纪初以及如今的21世纪10年代的物价大爆发，无一例外以错误告终。


Why, then, does the narrative still have such a hold on us today?	那么，为何这一叙事至今仍有如此大的市场？


The best – albeit inadequate and highly tentative – explanation that I have heard is that it fits with our cognitive biases, because it tells us what we want to hear.	我所听到的最好的解释——尽管仍不够充分，也只是个假说——是，这契合了我们的认知偏见，因为它告诉了我们想听的东西。


It seems to be in our nature to look for stories about sin and retribution, crime and punishment, error and comeuppance.	寻找原罪和天谴、罪与罚、错误和报应的故事，这是我们的天性。


Finding out why we have this cognitive bias will no doubt launch many careers in psychology in the future.	当然，找出为什么我们会产生这一认知偏见需要未来许多心理学家的努力。


In the meantime, we should free ourselves from a heuristic prison of our own making.	与此同时，我们应该从我们自己建造的启发式监狱中摆脱出来。


Nothing Natural About the Natural Rate of Unemployment	一点都不自然的自然失业率


NEW YORK – Why is unemployment so low in countries where inflation remains subdued?	纽约—通胀始终萎靡不振的国家，失业率为何如此低？


For economists, this is a fundamental question.	对经济学家来说，这是一个根本性的问题。


And when economists confront a fundamental question, fundamental disagreement often follows.	而当经济学家面对一个根本性的问题时，常常会产生根本性的分歧。


I was one of the rebel economists of the 1960s who rejected the macroeconomics we were taught in the 1950s – the “Keynesian” theory developed by J.R. Hicks, A.W. Phillips and James Tobin, according to which aggregate demand drove everything.	20世纪60年代，我属于叛逆经济学家，拒绝接受我们在50年代所学到的宏观经济学，即由希克斯（J. R.


High unemployment was caused only by deficient demand, and low unemployment only by abnormally high demand.	Phillips）和托宾（James Tobin）发展出来的“凯恩斯主义”理论。 这一理论认为，总需求驱动一切。


This bothered us, because the basic economic theory we were taught – the theory built by Alfred Marshall, Knut Wicksell, and Robert Solow – said everything was driven by structural forces.	这令我们很困扰，因为我们所学到的基本经济理论——由马歇尔（Alfred Marshall）、维克赛尔（Knut Wicksell）和索洛（Robert Solow）所构造的理论——认为一切都由结构性力量驱动。


Faster technological progress and a greater preference to work or to save were to be welcomed, because they would boost the supply of labor and capital – and thus employment and investment.	较快的技术进步和较高的工作或储蓄偏好是一件好事，因为它们能够提振劳动力和资本的供给——从而提振就业和投资。


But the Keynesians maintained that structural forces were bad, because they cost people their jobs, unless policymakers manufactured enough demand to match the increase in supply.	但凯恩斯主义者坚持认为结构性力量是坏东西，因为它们让人们失去工作，除非决策者能制造足够的需求匹配供给的增加。


A conclusion we drew was that, at the very least, the path of an economy, measured by conventional macroeconomic variables of unemployment, inflation, and output growth, is not fully determined by aggregate demand.	我们得出了一个结论，即至少经济的路径——用失业、通胀和产出增长等常规宏观经济变量衡量——不完全由总需求决定。


Structural forces matter.	结构性力量很重要。


Keynesians’ claim that “demand” is all-powerful – that it alone increases employment and thus investment and even growth – was groundless.	凯恩斯主义者宣称“需求”主宰一切——增加就业，从而提振投资乃至增长全靠需求——这站不住脚。


Yet they continue to repeat it.	但他们仍反复强调这一点。


The structuralist perspective on macroeconomic behavior led to the concept that came to be called the “natural” rate of unemployment, borrowing from the notion, which arose in Europe during the interwar years, of a “natural” interest rate.	宏观经济行为的结构主义视角引出了一个被称为“自然”失业率的概念。 这个概念借用两次世界大战期间在欧洲出现的“自然”利率的概念。


Yet the term “natural” was misleading.	但“自然”一词很有误导性。


The basic idea of the structuralist approach is that while market forces are always fluctuating, the unemployment rate actually has a homing tendency.	结构主义观点的基本思想是，市场力量是不断波动的，但失业率其实具有回归倾向。


If it is, say, below its “natural” level, it will rise toward this level – and the rate of inflation will pick up.	比如，如果它低于其“自然”水平，就会向这一水平上升——从而通货膨胀率也会抬头。


(Of course, a fresh shock to demand could send unemployment back up and reduce inflation; but the “natural rate” always exerts its centripetal force.)	（当然，新的需求冲击可能让失业卷土重来，并抑制通胀； 但“自然率”永远实施着它的向心力。


But there is a complication I have long emphasized.	但我一贯强调其中的一个问题。


The “natural rate” itself may be pushed up or pulled down by structural shifts.	“自然率”本身可能因为结构性变化而起落。


Moreover, shifts in human attitudes and norms may also have an impact.	此外，人的态度和规范的变化也有可能造成影响。


Yet a curious development has posed a challenge to this view.	但一个有趣的发展趋势对这一观点构成了挑战。


America and the eurozone are in the midst of a boom.	美国和欧元区正处于繁荣期。


In America, unemployment has reached very low levels and shows no sign of rising back to its former natural rate – whatever its new level may be.	在美国，失业率到达了非常低的水平，并且没有迹象表明正在向此前的自然率（不管其新水平应该是多少）上升靠拢。


With no more evidence than that, a structuralist model would predict an inflation rate that is already elevated and rising – and the inflation rate is not running high, even though the US Federal Reserve has flooded the economy with liquidity.	在除此之外再无证据的情况下，结构主义模型应预测通胀率已经上升并呈现上扬趋势——而通胀率并没有上升，即使美联储用流动性“漫灌”经济。


In the eurozone, too, unemployment is falling, yet inflation rates are still low there, too.	欧元区的失业率也在下降，尽管通胀率也仍然很低。


What explains the paradox of low unemployment despite low inflation (or vice versa)?	如何解释低失业伴随低通胀（或相反）之谜？


So far, economists – structuralists as well as diehard Keynesians – have been stumped.	到目前为止，经济学家——不管是结构主义者还是死硬派凯恩斯主义者——莫衷一是。


The answer must be that the “natural rate” is not a constant of nature, like the speed of light.	答案必然是“自然率”并不像光速那样，是一个自然的常数。


Certainly, it could be moved by structural forces, whether technological or demographic.	它可以被结构性力量（技术或人口等）改变。


It is possible, for example, that demographic trends are slowing wage growth and reducing the natural rate.	比如，人口趋势可能会抑制工资增长，降低自然率。


From the 1970s to the late 2000s, demography was essentially a dormant issue.	从20世纪70年代到21世纪00年代末，人口问题基本上微不足道。


Now, the baby boomers are retiring from relatively high-wage jobs while young people, who start at relatively low wages, are still pouring in to the labor market.	如今，婴儿潮一代在相对高薪的岗位上退休，而工资起步相对较低的年轻人仍在涌入劳动力市场。


This slows the growth of wage rates at a given unemployment rate, leading to lower unemployment at a given rate of wage growth.	这放缓了给定失业率情况下的工资率的增长，导致给定工资增长率情况下失业下降。


More interesting is the possible effect of people’s values and attitudes, and their hopes and fears about the unknown and unknowable, on the natural rate.	更有趣的是人们的价值观和态度，以及他们对未知和不可知因素的希望和恐惧，对自然率可能造成的影响。


Here we are entering terra incognita.	这是一片未知之地。


For me, a compelling hypothesis is that workers, shaken by the 2008 financial crisis and the deep recession that resulted, have grown afraid to demand promotions or to search for better-paying employers – despite the ease of finding work in the recently tight labor market.	对我来说，一个令人信服的假说是，工人受到2008年金融危机及其所造成的深度衰退的恐吓，变得害怕需求提振和寻找更高薪的雇主——尽管在最近劳动力市场趋紧的情况找工作很容易。


A corollary hypothesis is that employers, disturbed by the extremely slow growth of productivity, especially in the past ten years, have grown leery of granting pay raises – despite the return of demand to pre-crisis proportions.	由此可推出一个假说，即雇主受困于极低的生产率增长（尤其是过去十年），也不敢提高工资——尽管需求已经回归危机前水平。


I have also argued, based on a model of mine, that as the return of a strong dollar by early 2015 threatened to inundate American markets with imports, firms became scared to supply more output at the same price.	我还指出，根据我的模型，随着2015年初美元回归强势、从而进口商品有可能大量涌入美国，企业不敢以相同的价格提供更多产出。


Or else they supplied the same output as before at reduced prices.	不然它们以更低的价格提供与以前同样的产出。


And they refused to raise employees’ wages.	它们也拒绝提高雇员的工资。


In short, more competition created “super-employment” – low unemployment and low inflation.	简言之，更多的竞争造成了“超级就业”——低失业和低通胀。


All this does not mean there is no natural unemployment rate, only that there is nothing natural about it. There never was.	所有这些都不意味着不存在自然失业率，而只意味着自然失业率一点都不自然，也从未自然过。


The People’s Corporations	大众的公司


LONDON – Two big power shifts are occurring around the world today.	伦敦——今天世界各地正出现两大权力转型。


First, corporate power is growing relative to that of governments.	首先，企业权力相对于政府不断扩大。


Second, ordinary people are also gaining greater influence.	其次，普通民众的影响力也不断增加。


What does it mean that these seemingly contradictory shifts are happening simultaneously?	这些看似矛盾的变化同时发生又意味着什么？


There is, no doubt, more power in the hands of companies than ever before.	毫无疑问，公司手中的权力比以往任何时候都大。


People who have not been popularly elected control more and more of our daily lives – from entertainment and energy supplies to schools, railways, and postal services.	没有经过公众选举的人越来越多地控制我们的日常生活——从娱乐、能源供应到学校、铁路和邮政服务。


At the same time, the speed of technological innovation is outpacing that of legislation, meaning that corporate activities are routinely entering seemingly gray areas devoid of regulation.	与此同时，技术创新的速度超越了立法，这意味着企业活动经常进入看似缺乏监管的灰色地带。


But, counterbalancing this trend, people now have the means and opportunities to ensure that companies’ behavior does not go unchecked.	但对此形成制衡的是民众现在拥有能力和机会确保公司行为不会失控。


They are becoming more educated and aware of how companies operate, and they are more proactive and outspoken when they believe a company has crossed the line.	他们的受教育程度不断提高，也更清楚公司如何运作。 当他们认为企业行为越界时，他们会比过去更加坦率和积极主动。


The public increasingly acts as the conscience of companies and industries, asking hard questions and holding them to account.	公众越来越多地成为企业和行业的良知，提出尖锐的问题并要求他们负责。


In the past several years, more effective means of collective action – such as social media, open publishing platforms, and online video sharing – have given people more levers to pull.	过去几年来，社交媒体、公共发布平台和在线视频共享等有效的群体行为手段赋予了人们更多的话语权。


As people pursue boycotts and disinvestment, lobby for legislation, and activate social-media campaigns with growing sophistication, they are increasingly able to influence companies’ operational and strategic decision-making, thereby imposing checks and balances on today’s enormous accretions of private power.	随着民众越来越熟练地要求抵制和撤资、游说立法并发起社交媒体宣传，他们越来越多地影响公司的经营和战略决策，从而构成了对今天庞大私人权力的制衡因素。


For some companies, this has come as a thunderbolt.	这对于某些企业不亚于晴天霹雳。


Consider the British Petroleum oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010.	以2010年墨西哥湾石油泄漏事件中的英国石油公司（BP）为例。


The BP spill was one of the first instances in which companies were forced to contend with the power of social media – and in which people realized the potential of the tools at their disposal.	BP漏油事件是企业被迫与社交媒体博弈——也是民众意识到所掌握工具力量的首批实例。


Like most companies at the time, BP was accustomed to communicating with traditional seats of power – the White House, the Kremlin, and so on – and to doing so via traditional modes of communication, such as briefing carefully selected journalists and distributing precisely worded press releases.	BP像当时多数企业一样习惯于通过传统的沟通模式（比方说向精心挑选的记者发布消息、发布措辞准确的新闻公告等）与传统的掌权者（白宫、克里姆林宫等等）进行沟通。


The Gulf oil spill changed all of that.	墨西哥湾漏油事件改变了这一切。


Communities united around an issue and found a voice on Facebook.	人们为应对突发事件而团结起来，在Facebook上表达心声。


There was a massive conversation going on, and BP was neither a part of it nor able to control it via traditional communication-management methods.	Facebook上进行着庞大的对话，BP既没有参与也无法通过传统沟通管理方式来控制对话内容。


Since then, there has been a marked increase in this sort of direct action.	从那以后，这样的直接行动出现了显著的增加。


Social media spread ideas in an immediate and unfettered manner.	社交媒体以直接、不受约束的方式传递想法。


A document, an image, or a video is shared, and suddenly what was secret or shielded is globally exposed.	只需共享一纸文件、一张图片或一段视频，突然间秘密或费尽心机隐藏的事件就大白于天下。


And, though wrong or false information spreads just as quickly as true information, corrections are often swift as well.	虽然错误或虚假信息的传播速度不亚于真实信息，但修正也同样迅速。


For younger people today, using social media as a tool for activism is second nature.	对于今天的年轻人来说，将社交媒体用做行为工具几乎已成为第二天性。


They are fluent in using YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and Reddit to communicate and create a community around an idea, issue, or objection – and to nurture the growth of a small group into a mass movement.	他们能熟练地利用YouTube、Twitter、Facebook和 Reddit进行交流，围绕某个想法、事件或异议创建小规模讨论组，并将其发展成为大规模运动。


And older people are not far behind.	年龄稍大的人也不甘落后。


As corporate power rises, holding companies to account becomes increasingly important.	随着企业实力的上升，让公司为自身的行为负责变得越来越重要。


The scope of accountability must expand as well, in order to affect the behavior of executives and non-executives alike.	为了同时影响高管和普通员工，问责的范围也必须扩大。


And companies’ board members will be increasingly held to account for how well they hold senior management to account.	公司的董事会成员也必须为高管的行为负责。


With all of that comes a culture of questioning that which was previously unquestioned – including how companies are run and whether an organization’s actions are ethical.	随之而来的是对曾经禁区的质疑文化——包括质疑企业的运营方式和机构行为是否合乎道德。


Any action can be questioned by anyone, and if others find it interesting or important, the question will spread – and not just within a small community or a specialist group, but more broadly and around the world.	任何人可以对任何事提出质疑，如果别人也认为有趣或者重要，质疑范围就会扩大——而且不仅仅局限于小团体或专家组，而是涉及面更广，甚至遍及全球。


This shift has changed the nature of activism and collective action.	这一趋势彻底改变了行动主义和集体行为。


It has also made for new kinds of allies, with activist investors like Carl Icahn tweeting their intentions and markets responding.	由此还形成了新的联盟——像卡尔·伊坎这样的活跃投资人士在推特上发表观点并引发市场响应。


Likewise, those who in other circumstances might see activist investors as natural adversaries can agree with the positions that they take, such as concerns about executive compensation or corporate social responsibility.	同样，在其他情况下有可能将活跃投资者视为天敌的人可能会赞同他们的立场，比方说关注高管薪酬或企业的社会责任。


Activist investors can write open letters that may not be picked up by mainstream media outlets, but that can go viral on Twitter or Reddit.	活跃投资者可以发表公开信，虽然他们的观点无法登上主流媒体，但可能在推特或Reddit上疯狂传播。


This is often enough to make boards and executive committees sit up and take notice.	这往往足以引起董事会和执行委员会的重视。


Corporate leaders who embrace this new reality, view it as an opportunity, and resist the inclination to “manage” or avoid issues will have a competitive advantage.	接受新现实、将其视为机遇、抵制住“管理”或逃避倾向的企业领导者将拥有竞争优势。


They will not regard meeting people where they are as a way to manipulate them, but as an opportunity to hear what they are saying.	他们不会借见面之机操纵当地民众，而是聆听他们的诉求。


Their first impulse will not be to figure out how to use modern means of direct communication to persuade customers, employees, and other stakeholders to think and do the things that they want them to think and do.	他们的第一反应不是找到如何利用现代直接沟通工具说服客户、员工和其他利益相关者同意他们的想法和做法。


Instead, they will make real changes – and they will be better off for it.	相反，他们会切实做出改变——并因此获得好处。


Companies make our cars, our phones, and our children’s textbooks – and exercise increasing control over the daily lives and destinies of people worldwide, not only those who use their products, but also those who work for them and those who live in the communities where they are based.	企业生产汽车、电话、孩子们的课本——并越来越多地控制世界各地民众的命运和日常生活。 这种控制不仅限于企业产品的使用者，还包括他们的员工和他们所在社区的生活。


If companies do not take seriously the responsibility that comes with their great and growing power, people will be there to remind them.	如果企业不重视随之而来的责任，人们一定会挺身而出去提醒它。


The Blatterball Diaries	布拉特足球日记


LONDON – The World Cup has concluded with its usual flourish, and much of the world, as usual, couldn’t help but get caught up in the excitement of it all – which is exactly the outcome that Sepp Blatter wants.	伦敦——世界杯结束时仍像以往一样繁花似锦，而世界也像以往一样不由自主地陷入到兴奋之中——这恰恰是布拉特想要看到的结果。


Blatter, the president of FIFA, the Cup’s organizing body, wants the afterglow of an exciting month of play to blot out the corruption and backroom deals – and, most recently, a ticket scandal – that have roiled his tenure.	世界杯主办机构国际足联主席布拉特迫切需要赛事的余辉来遮掩腐败和幕后交易——还有刚刚发生的球票丑闻——此次丑闻已经把他的任期搅得乱七八糟。


Times were very different in 1998, when Blatter took up his role.	布拉特就任时的情况是截然不同的。


Social media did not exist, and the Internet had not yet become a means of spreading the views of the voiceless and disenfranchised.	那时社交媒体尚未诞生，而互联网也还没有成为被剥夺权利的沉默群体表达意见的方法。


Nor was the culture of shareholder activism and corporate social responsibility as strong as it is today.	当时也还没有现在这么强的股东能动性和企业社会责任感文化。


As BP, GM, and Royal Bank of Scotland have discovered, the world is watching, talking, and no longer willing to accept the old way of conducting business.	英国石油公司、 通用汽车公司和 苏格兰皇家银行已经发现全世界都在注目其所作所为并且议论纷纷，人们已经不愿接受原有的商业经营方法。


FIFA has two problems.	国际足联的主要问题有两个。


One is a straightforward lack of compliance with accepted business practices.	其一是根本不遵守公认的商业惯例。


Allegations of wrongdoing range from match-fixing and bribery among members of FIFA’s Executive Committee to questions about how Qatar was chosen to host the World Cup in 2022.	针对国际足联的不当行为指控从国际足联执行委员会委员的假球和贿赂到卡塔尔为何被选为2022年世界杯的主办国。


The second problem is arguably more serious, for it is epiphenomenal: the damage that unethical behavior has done to the ideal of fair play.	第二个问题因为仅仅是附带现象而显得愈加严重：非道德行为已经危及了公平竞赛理想。


When people see an institution that relates to something that they feel passionate about failing so publicly to abide by simple rules, they lose faith not only in that institution, but also in the idea that good governance is achievable at all.	当人们看到管理自己热爱运动的机构竟公然违反简单的行为准则，他们不仅不再相信那家机构，甚至不再相信善政是可以实现的。


The message sent, and understood, is that some institutions – of all kinds – are immune from scrutiny and can play by their own rules.	这样做所传递的信息是某些机构可以不接受审查，完全遵守自己的一套游戏规则。


The code of conduct on the field – where we expect players to give their all under clear rules that are swiftly enforced by independent referees – is fundamentally the same as what we expect from governing bodies off the field.	足球场上的行为准则——我们期待球员在独立裁判当场执行明确规则的情况下尽全力争胜——从根本上讲也是我们希望场下管理机构能够做到的。


In this sense, FIFA is not a special case: All non-profit and for-profit organizations around the world are expected to abide by this code of conduct.	从这个意义上讲，国际足联并非特例：人们要求同样的行为准则适用于世界各地所有的非盈利及盈利机构。


And that is why FIFA’s problems are unlikely to fade from view.	国际足联的问题因此不太可能从人们的视野中淡出。


They must be addressed head-on, with a clean sweep of its leadership and a complete overhaul of its governance structures.	上述问题必须得到正面的解决，包括清理领导层并全方位调整治理结构。


FIFA is as complex as any large multinational private or public organization; how it is governed must reflect that.	国际足联之复杂不亚于任何大型跨国私营或者公共机构； 这一点必须反映在其管理当中。


For starters, FIFA must introduce truly independent board members to the governance process – people who will ask hard questions and challenge the organization’s executives.	首先，国际足联必须引入真正的独立董事管理机制，这些人敢于提出尖锐的问题和挑战组织的高层管理者。


Governance solely by association members has not worked – and, by encouraging a lack of transparency, may have made FIFA more vulnerable to the problems it now faces.	纯粹的委员管理效果不佳——而且因为缺乏透明度，很可能导致国际足联易受当前问题的影响。


No organization that holds so much public influence and importance should be able to operate as a black box.	我们不能允许手握如此公众影响力的组织继续其黑箱操作。


Likewise, FIFA must introduce and adhere to clearer term limits for its president and board members, starting with Blatter – and with immediate effect.	同样，国际足联必须引入并贯彻总裁委员明确任期制，这方面布拉特更要立即以身作则。


More effective checks and balances will not come easily; but they will not come at all without champions.	有效的制衡措施来之不易，但没有始作俑者改革就根本没有可能。


Before the World Cup began, some representatives of FIFA member associations spoke up in opposition to the status quo.	世界杯开始前国际足联某些会员协会代表已明确表示反对现状。


It will now be seen whether their actions reflect their words.	他们能否做到言行一致还有待验证。


There are other glimmers of hope.	其他方面同样闪烁着希望的曙光。


In the world of for-profit companies, investors are increasingly demanding better corporate-governance standards and more diverse boards that include independent members.	盈利企业的投资者要求改善公司治理标准，吸纳独立董事使得董事会更加多元化。


They are taking a much more active and public role in speaking out against bribery, corruption, and excessive pay packages, and in favor of corporate social responsibility and fair labor practices.	他们在公开反对贿赂、腐败和薪酬过高、支持企业社会责任和公平劳动行为方面越来越积极主动。


If their calls go unheeded, they vote at the annual general meeting – or with their feet.	如果管理者对他们的呼声充耳不闻——他们就会在年度股东大会上用脚投票。


FIFA’s sponsors must hold FIFA similarly to account, and there are signs that some are finally beginning – albeit tentatively – to speak out.	国际足联的赞助者必须要求足联承担类似的责任，某些迹象表明有些人尽管小心翼翼，但终于已经开始说话。


If they don’t, sponsors will leave themselves exposed to a consumer backlash as FIFA’s poor reputation rubs off on their brands.	如果他们继续缄默，赞助商会因为足联声名狼藉影响其品牌形象而招致消费者的厌恶。


Customers are savvier than ever before, and they, too, can vote with their feet.	现在的消费者比以往任何时候都更精明，他们完全可以用脚投票。


Ultimately, however, change starts at the top.	但归根结底，改革需要从高层行动。


Consider what a change in leadership has done for the Roman Catholic Church: Pope Francis is transforming an institution that was thought to be so byzantine, opaque, and intractable that change was all but impossible.	想想领导人更替对罗马天主教会意味着什么：教皇弗朗西斯正在改革如此具有拜占庭特色的不透明的顽固机构，改革的难度如此之大乃至一度被外界以为是不可能的。


If the Catholic Church can change, so can the church of football.	如果天主教会都可以改变，足球教会也一样。


There is another lesson here: good leadership also consists in knowing when to step down.	此外还有另一个教训：那就是好的领导还应当把握该何时退休。


If Blatter genuinely cares about FIFA, he knows that remaining there would mean dragging the organization further into disrepute, damaging whatever positive contributions he has made, and quite possibly being forced to leave under a cloud.	如果布拉特真的在意国际足联，他就应该知道继续留任会进一步损害该组织的声誉，有损于他所做出的任何积极贡献，而且很有可能被迫致休。


The caption to a picture of Blatter on page six of FIFA’s 2013 financial report reads: “We have reached very high levels of accountability, transparency, and financial control.”	国际足联2013年财报第六页布拉特照片下面的图片说明写道：“我们已经实现了高水平的问责、透明度和财务控制。


The problem is that no one believes it.	”但问题是没人真的相信这句话。


FIFA desperately needs to restore its public credibility. That can happen only after the necessary changes at the top and throughout the organization have been achieved.	国际足联迫切需要恢复其公信力，而这只有在对高层和机构进行必要的改革后才能做到。


Right, Left, and Macron	左翼，右翼和马克龙


PARIS – French President Emmanuel Macron, once viewed as the quintessential centrist, has lately been labeled a right-wing politician.	巴黎—法国总统马克龙曾经被视为典型的中间派，最近也被贴上了右翼政客的标签。


He has, after all, eliminated the wealth tax, introduced greater labor-market flexibility, cut housing benefits, and introduced reforms to higher education – policies that a majority of right-wing voters embrace.	毕竟，他取消了财富税，增加了劳动力市场灵活性，削减了住房补贴，并引入了高等教育改革——这些政策都是大部分右翼选民所支持的。


But things aren’t quite that cut and dried.	但事情并不是那么死板的。


The right-left divide remains deeply felt in France.	如今，左右分歧在法国仍然十分深刻。


The right has traditionally emphasized freedom – breaking down barriers that impede individuals’ ability to create.	传统上，右翼强调自由——打破妨碍个体创造力的壁垒。


The left has focused on equality, pursuing policies that aim to create a level playing field through redistribution.	左翼则专注于平等，追求旨在通过再分配创造公平竞技场的政策。


This division remains particularly acute in economic and social policy, though it also extends to other areas, like education policy (for example, extended education versus early specialization).	这一分歧在经济和社会政策上尤其尖锐，但也扩展到了其他领域，如教育政策（比如延长教育还是早早地分流）。


Yet the truth is that the fundamentally redistributive nature of the French state has narrowed the gap between the two sides considerably in recent decades.	但事实上，作为一个国家的法国在根本上具有再分配性质，这在近几十年来缩小了两派之间的分野。


At the same time, divergences within the two main camps have grown, making it much more difficult to distinguish clearly two opposing perspectives.	与此同时，两大主要阵营内部日益分裂，从而让清楚地区分两大相反角度变得更加困难。


For example, the far-right National Front denounces “handouts,” as is typical of the right, and yet embraces state-led redistribution.	比如，极右翼的国民阵线（National Front）谴责“施舍”（这通常是右翼的主张）而支持国家领导的再分配。


That leftist demand, however, is mediated by the Front’s identity politics, particularly its vehement opposition to immigration.	但这一左翼式的要求要通过国民阵线的身份政治表达出来，特别是其对移民的强烈反对。


Redistribution, in other words, is only for “us,” the “real” French people.	换句话说，再分配只适用于“我者”，即“真正的”法国人民。


As for the left, it has not become fragmented so much as atomized.	至于左翼，它并没有支离破碎到原子化的程度。


There remains a clear distinction between the “governing left” and its “radical” counterpart.	在“执政左翼”及其“激进”同道之间仍有显而易见的区分。


Yet that divide runs even through the once-dominant Socialist Party.	但这一分歧即使在曾经占主导地位的社会党中间也存在。


The left is deeply divided on virtually all issues – Europe, secularism, education, business, and more – making it extremely difficult to identify what exactly constitutes “leftist” policies nowadays.	左翼在几乎所有问题上都陷入了深度分歧——欧洲、世俗化、教育、商业，等等——因此，要确定哪些要素构成今天的“左派”政策着实困难。


In fact, the Socialists have started distinguishing themselves not by what they are, but by what they are not, touting the line, “neither Macron nor Mélenchon” (a reference to the far-left Jean-Luc Mélenchon).	事实上，社会党已经开始用他们不是什么，而不是他们是什么来区分自己，打出了“既不是马克龙，也不是梅朗雄”的口号，其中后者是极左翼的让-卢克·梅朗雄（Jean-Luc Mélenchon）。


Yet that distinction may not be as powerful as the Socialists may believe.	但这一区分或许并不像社会党认为的那么有力。


After all, it was their center-left voters who got Macron elected.	毕竟，是他们的中左翼选民让马克龙当选了总统。


And they knew what they were voting for: every policy he has implemented thus far was included in his campaign platform.	并且他们知道他们为何而投票：到目前为止，他所实施的每一项政策都是他的竞选纲领中包含的。


This suggests that France’s center-left largely accepts the current approach.	这表明法国中左翼基本上接受了当前的方针。


To be sure, Macron’s incentive-based economic policies are further to the right than anything France has known for a very long time.	平心而论，马克龙的基于激励的经济政策比相当长一段时间以来法国所遇到过的政策都要偏右。


And the center-right has, so far, backed every one of them.	而到目前为止，中右翼支持其中的每一项政策。


(Macron’s cooptation of most of the center-right’s economic program has actually compounded the challenge it faces, leaving it with little choice but to use identity politics to stand out.)	（马克龙选择了大部分中右翼的经济计划，这事实上让中右翼面临的挑战更加复杂，除了用身份政治“出挑”之外几乎别无选择。 ）


At the same time, Macron’s social policies aim to produce roughly the same level of redistribution as before.	与此同时，马克龙的社会政策目标是形成和以前大致相当的再分配水平。


So, while his approach challenges the left’s political template, it comprises what are fundamentally center-left policies.	因此，他的方针对左翼的政治模式构成了挑战，但从根本上说属于中左翼政策。


Of course, it will take some time for these policies’ effects to be felt.	当然，这些政策的效果显现需要时间。


But it will not be the poor who ultimately lose out; it will be the relatively affluent households that were not previously subject to the wealth tax.	但最后的输家不会是穷人； 而将是相对较丰裕、此前不需要缴纳财富税的家庭。


The idea that eliminating a wealth tax can benefit an entire economy is difficult to defend.	取消财富税将惠及整个经济的概念很难论证。


The expectation that the benefits will “trickle down” to the middle and lower classes is highly dubious.	收益将“向下渗透”到中低阶层的预期相当可疑。


Yet, in a country where capitalism has historically been very weak, there is something to be said for the incentive-driven logic behind the move.	但法国的资本主义从来都非常孱弱，对于这一动作背后的激励驱动逻辑还是可以说出一些门道。


In an innovation-oriented economy that is now funded by capital rather than debt, the wealth tax had become a historical handicap, thwarting French industry and entrepreneurship.	在一个如今通过资本而不是债务融资的创新导向的经济，财富税已经成为一个历史包袱，妨碍了法国的工业和企业家精神。


The French model, which focuses on redressing excessive social inequalities through transfers, was built at a time when the number of losers was relatively small.	法国模式注重通过转移支付来解决过度不平等的问题，它建立在输家数量相对较小的时候。


But, as the share of losers has grown alongside the emergence of a postindustrial economy, this model has reached its limits, with the growing amount of redistribution undermining economic efficiency.	但输家比例随着后工业经济的兴起而提高，这一模式也已经抵达了极限，再分配规模的日渐膨胀营销到了经济效率。


What Macron is trying to do is update France’s economic operating system, shifting from the reparative approach of the past to a preparatory model that can better address the challenges generated by digital technology, globalization, and rapid innovation.	马克龙试图做的是更新法国经济运行体系，从过去的小修小补方针变化为预防模式，从而更好地解决数字技术、全球化和迅速的创新所产生的挑战。


Far from ignoring inequalities, this approach aims to prevent them from taking hold.	这一方针并没有忽视不平等性，其目标是防止不平等性根深蒂固。


The traditional redistributive logic will be abandoned in favor of a pre-distributive approach.	传统再分配逻辑将被抛弃，以利于预分配（pre-distributive）方针。


In practice, this means that unemployment would be addressed not by expanding the public-sector workforce, but by strengthening training via programs that reflect businesses’ real needs.	在实践中，这意味着失业不会通过扩大公共部门人手来解决，而是通过强化培训解决，培训的项目要反映企业的真实需要。


It means that educational inequalities would be reduced not simply by increasing resources, but with an interdisciplinary approach that balances early intervention to support the most vulnerable with greater institutional autonomy.	这意味着解决教育不平等性不但要通过投入更多资源，还要通过跨学科方针实现（要在早期干预以支持最脆弱群体和更大的机构自主性之间取得平衡）。


And it means that the health-care system’s quality will be improved not by throwing more money at it, but through a greater emphasis on preventive medicine.	这还意味着医疗体系的质量改善不是通过投入更多的钱来实现，而是通过更加强调预防性治疗来解决。


Macron’s melding of the left and right has created something of an existential dilemma for France’s traditional political parties, which are now struggling for survival.	马克龙对左翼和右翼的融合在如今为存活而挣扎的法国传统政党中间制造了一个生存困境。


The 2019 European parliamentary elections may amount to a kind of reckoning.	2019年欧洲议会选举有可能成为某种形式的清算。


But that isn’t the point.	但这不是重点。


At a time of deepening inequality, the primary challenge France faces is to shift its focus from damage control to damage prevention.	在不平等性深入的时代，法国所面临的首要挑战是将重点从伤害控制转移到伤害预防上来。


Macron’s policies will need to be assessed on the basis of that goal, not according to ideological labels that have lost significance.	马克龙的政策需要基于这一目标来进行评估，而不是基于已经不具有重要性的意识形态标签来评估。


Macron’s Challenge for Europe	欧洲的马克龙挑战


PARIS – In an ambitious, visionary speech at the Sorbonne this week, French President Emmanuel Macron presented his plan for countering the tide of xenophobic nationalism in Europe.	巴黎—本周，法国总统马克龙在索尔伯恩（Sorbonne）发表了一次宏大的空想演讲。 他在演讲中提出了一个抵御欧洲仇外民族主义风潮的计划。


He wants to build a “sovereign, united, and democratic Europe,” where citizens again feel a sense of allegiance to the idea of Europe itself.	他想构建一个“主权、联合、民主的欧洲”，让公民再次对欧洲概念本身产生效忠感。


Macron’s speech was a welcome call to arms for a European Union that is confronting many crises and threats.	马克龙的演讲对于正面临众多危机和威胁的欧盟来说是一次值得欢迎的战斗号角。


But on the crucial and controversial question of fixing the eurozone, his proposals were disappointing.	但在如何解决欧元区的至关重要而充满争议的问题上，他的方案令人失望。


And he will have a hard time winning over his more cautious European counterparts, not least German Chancellor Angela Merkel, whose room for maneuver was crimped by her party’s poor showing in last weekend’s federal election.	而他想要赢得更加谨慎的欧洲同僚也绝非易事，比如，德国总理默克尔的施展空间就因为她的政党在上周末的联邦选举中表现拙劣而大受限制。


Still, Macron made a powerful, positive case for a renewed EU.	尽管如此，马克龙仍然提出了一个强大、积极的新欧洲愿景。


That EU embraces globalization and innovation, while also protecting Europeans, doing more to help them adapt to a changing world.	这个欧盟支持全球化和创新，也将保护欧洲人，加强帮助他们适应变化的世界。


It advances European interests and values in a world otherwise dominated by America and China.	它将推动欧洲利益和价值观，否则世界就将由美国和中国主导。


And it bolsters security at a time of increasing Russian revanchism, Islamist terrorism, and American disengagement under President Donald Trump.	它将在俄罗斯复仇主义日益兴盛、伊斯兰恐怖主义和美国在特朗普总统的领导下日益龟缩的背景下支撑安全。


Macron combined big ideas with many concrete proposals for closer cooperation on defense, migration, the environment, innovation, education, and much else.	马克龙将宏大概念与许多具体的方案结合起来，包括加强防务合作、移民、环境、创新、教育等。


Better still, he outlined a political strategy for seeing his proposals through.	更重要的是，他还列出了如何实现方案的政治策略。


Macron mused that, if he succeeds, a “Brexiting” Britain “may one day find its place again” in an overhauled EU, along with new members from the Western Balkans.	马克龙说，如果他获得成功，那么一个“退欧”的英国“或许会有一天重新找到它的位置”——在一个重生的、有了来自西巴尔干新成员的欧盟中。


Under Macron’s plan, each EU member state would hold democratic conventions to debate citizens’ priorities.	根据马克龙的计划，欧盟各成员国将举行民主会议讨论公民的重点事项。


Their ideas would feed into a broader process involving the EU institutions and governments that want to overhaul Europe.	他们的观点将被纳入一个涉及到欧盟机构和希望重塑欧洲的政府的更广泛的过程中。


Coalitions of willing governments would then integrate faster, with a revitalized Franco-German engine driving the process forward.	有意愿的政府组成的联盟将更快地实现融合，重获动力的法-德引擎将推动这一过程前进。


The ball is now in Germany’s court.	现在，皮球踢给了德国。


Europe could very well succumb to nationalism if Macron’s plan fails.	如果马克龙的计划失败，欧洲很可能陷入民族主义。


That would be devastating for Germany, a country whose economic success, political identity, and security are based on a strong, functioning EU.	这对德国来说将是一场灾难。 德国的经济成功、政治身份和安全都需要以一个能正常运转的强大欧洲为基础。


Macron is the most pro-German French president imaginable, and he has boosted his credibility by pursuing difficult labor-market reforms and unveiling a Teutonically prudent budget.	马克龙是你能想象的到的最亲德的法国总统，他也通过实施艰难的劳动力市场改革和推行德国式审慎预算增强了信誉。


Germany would be committing a monumental strategic blunder if it did not engage seriously with his proposals.	如果德国不认真参与到马克龙的计划中，将是一个严重的战略失误。


Unfortunately, Germany’s domestic politics just got trickier.	不幸的是，德国的国内政坛变得越来越波诡云谲。


Macron had timed his speech to influence the post-election coalition negotiations there, with the hope that Merkel would use her fourth and likely final term to burnish her legacy by enacting bold European reforms.	马克龙如此安排演讲时机，是为了影响德国的选举后执政联盟谈判，希望默克尔利用她的第四个、也可能是最后一个任期，通过实施大胆的欧洲改革留下光辉遗产。


Macron was also counting on Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) to maintain its grand coalition with the Social Democrats (SPD) and their leader, former European Parliament President Martin Schulz.	马克龙也指望默克尔的基督教民主联盟（CDU）保持其与社会民主党（SPD），以及SPD领导人、前欧洲议会主席马丁·舒尔茨（Martin Schulz）的大联合政府。


But German voters had other plans.	但德国选民有其他计划。


The CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), lost support, and the SPD fared so poorly that it has decided to return to the opposition.	CDU及其巴伐利亚州姊妹党基督教社会联盟（CSU）失去了支持，而SPD则表现非常糟糕，以至于它决定转为反对党。


At the same time, the far-right, anti-EU Alternative for Germany (AfD) stormed into the Bundestag with 13% of the vote, and has pledged to “hunt” Merkel down.	与此同时，极右翼的反欧盟德国另类选择党（AfD）大闹德国联邦众议院，卷走13%选票，并誓要“打下”默克尔。


Merkel, now politically weakened, must try to cobble together an unruly coalition that includes both the Europhile Greens, who welcomed Macron’s speech, and the Euroskeptic Free Democrats (FDP), who were hostile to it.	如今，在政治上被削弱的默克尔必须试图组建一个难以驾驭的执政联盟，这个联盟既包括亲欧的绿党（他们欢迎马克龙的演讲），也包括疑欧的自由民主党（FDP，他们对马克龙的演讲持敌对态度）。


And while the AfD attacks her right flank, rivals within her own party will be jostling to succeed her.	而在AfD从右翼攻击默克尔的同时，党内对手也在觊觎取而代之。


Against this backdrop, even small compromises will be politically fraught.	在这样的背景下，即使是微小的妥协，也会引起政治轩然大波。


Macron’s eurozone-reform plans will be the biggest bone of contention.	马克龙的欧元区改革计划是整个拼图中最大的一块。


He wants to create a eurozone budget, funded by corporate-tax revenues.	他希望建立通过公司税收入支持的欧盟预算。


The joint budget, which would make investments and provide a cushion during economic downturns, would be overseen by a eurozone finance minister, who would answer to eurozone countries’ representatives in the European Parliament.	联合预算将负责投资和在经济衰退期间提供缓冲，它将由欧元区财政部主管，欧元财政部长需要在欧洲议会回答欧元区国家代表的提问。


But Germany is skeptical of what it sees as a “transfer union,” in which its taxpayers would hand over cash to profligate countries that have failed to remodel their economies along German lines.	但德国对它认为的“转移联盟”持狐疑态度。 在这个转移联盟中，德国纳税人将把钱交给挥霍浪费的国家，这些国家无法让经济向德国看齐。


Merkel would prefer a small common fund to help member-state governments enact difficult reforms, not a Keynesian fiscal stabilizer.	默克尔会更喜欢建立一个小规模共同基金以帮助成员国政府实施艰难的改革，而不是建立一个凯恩斯式的财政稳定器。


And while Macron envisions a finance minister who would be a political counterpart to European Central Bank President Mario Draghi, Merkel would prefer that the role be limited to enforcing national fiscal discipline.	此外，马克龙设想了一个政治地位与欧洲央行行长德拉吉对应的财政部长，但默克尔会更愿意让这个角色限定于执行国家财政纪律。


The danger now is that Macron will achieve only a token eurozone budget in exchange for even tighter controls on national budgets, which would prove economically harmful and politically poisonous.	现在的危险在于马克龙只能实现一个表面上的欧元区预算，以换取对国家预算的更紧的控制，而这有可能造成经济伤害和政治副作用。


He would also miss his chance to enact the reforms that the eurozone actually needs.	他还将失去实施欧元区真正需要的改革的机会，包括更深度的金融市场一体化； 简化减记银行和政府债务的程序；


These include deeper financial-market integration; an easier process for writing down bank and government debts; greater fiscal flexibility; and more balanced economic-adjustment mechanisms.	增加财政弹性； 更加平衡的经济调整机制等。


Macron’s most promising idea is to “give Europe back to its citizens.”	马克龙最令人憧憬的概念是“将欧洲还给它的公民”。


In my book European Spring, I argue that a flawed, technocratic EU needs bold leaders, political entrepreneurs, grassroots movements, and more experiments with deliberative democracy to deliver change. Macron has proposed all four.	我在我的书《欧洲之春》（European Spring）中指出，一个有缺陷的、技术官僚的欧盟需要果断的领导人、政治企业家、草根运动和更多的协商式民主（deliberative democracy）实验来实现改变。


Macron is right to point out that the EU bureaucracy often seems remote, uninspiring, and ineffectual; but he also rightly rejects referenda that polarize citizens over simplistic binary choices.	马克龙正确地指出，欧盟官僚常常脱离群众，无精打采，软弱无能； 但他也正确地拒绝了通过简单的二元选择让公民两极分化的全民公投。


The big, open democratic conventions that he has proposed for the first half of 2018 could inject fresh ideas into a stale debate, provide legitimacy for bold reforms, and put pressure on recalcitrant governments.	他提出在2018年上半年举行大型公开的民主会议，这能够为陷入僵局的讨论带来新的思维，为大胆的改革提供合法性，同时给不遵守规则的政府施加压力。


Conventions could also foster new political movements like Macron’s own La République En Marche !, which could bring fresh faces into politics, help to open up closed, corrupt party systems, and start to rebuild the public’s trust in politicians.	（La République En Marche ! ）的新政治运动，给政坛带来新面孔，帮助撬动封闭腐败的政党体系，并开始重塑公共对政客的信任。


They could also give Macron more leverage to push through his reforms, by running candidates in national and EU-wide elections.	会议还能让马克龙获得更大的杠杆，培养国家和欧盟选举的候选人，从而推动他的改革。


Macron’s ambition is vast, if not overawing.	马克龙的雄心很大，甚至令人畏缩。


But so are Europe’s challenges.	但欧洲的挑战同样很大，甚至令人畏缩。


Macron may be trying to achieve too much at once, but a more democratic, dynamic, and united EU is a prize worth fighting for.	马克龙也许同时追求过多目标，但一个更加民主、更有活力、更加统一的欧盟值得为之奋斗。


Lessons from the Anti-Globalists	来自反全球化者的教训


NEW YORK – The likely victory of Emmanuel Macron in the French presidential election has elicited a global sigh of relief.	纽约—艾曼努尔·马克龙（Emmanuel Macron）有望赢得法国总统竞选，这让全球看到了松一口气的曙光。


At least Europe is not going down the protectionist path that President Donald Trump is forcing the United States to take.	至少欧洲不会堕入特朗普总统迫使美国所采取的保护主义道路。


But advocates of globalization should keep the champagne on ice: protectionists and advocates of “illiberal democracy” are on the rise in many other countries.	但全球化的支持者不可放松：保护主义者和“反自由民主”支持者在其他许多国家正在得势。


And the fact that an open bigot and habitual liar could get as many votes as Trump did in the US, and that the far-right Marine Le Pen will be in the run-off vote with Macron on May 7, should be deeply worrying.	公开的偏执狂和撒谎成性者有可能像特朗普在美国那样赢得大量选票，极右翼的马丽娜·勒庞（Marine Le Pen）与马克龙一起进入了5月7日的最后决选，这些事实都令人感到非常担忧。


Some assume that Trump’s poor management and obvious incompetence should be enough to dent enthusiasm for populist nostrums elsewhere.	有人认为特朗普糟糕的管理和显然不够格的胜任能力理应足够阻止其他国家的民粹主义热情。


Likewise, the US Rust Belt voters who supported Trump will almost certainly be worse off in four years, and rational voters surely will understand this.	类似地，支持特朗普的美国锈带（Rust Belt）选民几乎肯定会在四年中每况愈下，理性的选民肯定会理解这一点。


But it would be a mistake to conclude that discontent with the global economy – at least how it treats large numbers of those in (or formerly in) the middle class – has crested.	但就此认为对全球经济的不满——至少是对全球经济如何对待中产阶级（或前中产阶级）的不满——已经达到了顶峰将是一个错误。


If the developed liberal democracies maintain status quo policies, displaced workers will continue to be alienated.	如果发达自由民主国家保持当前政策，丢掉饭碗的工人将渐行渐远。


Many will feel that at least Trump, Le Pen, and their ilk profess to feel their pain.	许多人将认为，至少特朗普和勒庞之流还宣称感受到了他们的痛苦。


The idea that voters will turn against protectionism and populism of their own accord may be no more than cosmopolitan wishful thinking.	认为选民将调转枪头反对保护主义和民粹主义，这样的想法和世界大同的一厢情愿差不多。


Advocates of liberal market economies need to grasp that many reforms and technological advances may leave some groups – possibly large groups – worse off.	自由市场经济的支持者需要抓住一个要点：许多改革和科技进步将让一些群体——有可能是人数巨大的群体——境况变差。


In principle, these changes increase economic efficiency, enabling the winners to compensate the losers.	理论上，这些变化能增加经济效率，让赢家能够补偿输家。


But if the losers remain worse off, why should they support globalization and pro-market policies?	但如果输家每况愈下，为什么他们还要支持全球化和亲市场政策？


Indeed, it is in their self-interest to turn to politicians who oppose these changes.	事实上，转向反对这些变化的政客才符合他们的私利。


So the lesson should be obvious: In the absence of progressive policies, including strong social-welfare programs, job retraining, and other forms of assistance for individuals and communities left behind by globalization, Trumpian politicians may become a permanent feature of the landscape.	因此，教训是明显的：如果没有进步政策，包括强力社会福利计划、就业再培训和其他形式的对在全球化中落后的个体和社区的支持，特朗普主义政客可能将在政坛中占据永久的一席之地。


The costs imposed by such politicians are high for all of us, even if they do not fully achieve their protectionist and nativist ambitions, because they prey on fear, inflame bigotry, and thrive on a dangerously polarized us-versus-them approach to governance.	这些政客给我们所有人都带来了高昂的代价，即便他们无法充分实现他们的保护主义和本土主义企图，因为他们利用恐惧，煽动偏隘，依靠危险的极端化我者-他者对立治理方针上位。


Trump has leveled his Twitter attacks against Mexico, China, Germany, Canada, and many others – and the list is sure to grow the longer he is in office.	特朗普利用推特抨击墨西哥、中国、德国、加拿大和其他许多国家——随着其执政的深入，这个名单肯定还会越来越长。


Le Pen has targeted Muslims, but her recent comments denying French responsibility for rounding up Jews during World War II revealed her lingering anti-Semitism.	勒庞将目标对准了穆斯林，但她在最近的评论中否认法国应该为二战期间围捕犹太人负责，这暴露了她由来已久的反犹观点。


Deep and perhaps irreparable national cleavages may be the result.	结果将是深刻的、可能难以逾越的民族鸿沟。


In the US, Trump has already diminished respect for the presidency and will most likely leave behind a more divided country.	在美国，特朗普已经让总统的民望大幅下降，他身后几乎肯定会留下一个更加分裂的国家。


We must not forget that before the dawn of the Enlightenment, with its embrace of science and freedom, incomes and living standards were stagnant for centuries.	我们不能忘记，在启蒙运动的曙光出现之前，在拥抱科学和自由之前，收入和生活水平在几百年里一直停滞不前。


But Trump, Le Pen, and the other populists represent the antithesis of Enlightenment values.	但特朗普、勒庞和其他民粹主义者正反映了启蒙价值观的对立面。