But recently published transcripts of 2008 meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee, the Fed’s main decision-making body, reveal that the Fed has effectively emerged from the crisis as the world’s central bank, while continuing to serve primarily American interests.	但最近公布的联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC，美联储主要决策机构）2008年会议纪要表明，美联储通过危机事实上成了世界央行，并且主要为美国利益服务。


The most significant meetings took place on September 16 and October 28 – in the aftermath of the collapse of the US investment bank Lehman Brothers – and focused on the creation of bilateral currency-swap agreements aimed at ensuring adequate liquidity.	最重要的会议召开于9月16日和10月28日——即美国投资银行雷曼兄弟倒闭后——主要议题是建立双边货币互换安排以确保充足的流动性。


The Fed would extend dollar credits to a foreign bank in exchange for its currency, which the foreign bank agreed to buy back after a specified period at the same exchange rate, plus interest.	美联储扩大了用外国央行货币换取美元信用的规模，其中外国央行同意在规定时期后以相同汇率购回本币加上利息。


This gave central banks – especially those in Europe, which faced a dollar shortage as US investors fled – the dollars they needed to lend to struggling domestic financial institutions.	这一安排给了多国央行——特别是欧洲的央行，由于美国投资者的逃离，它们面临着美元短缺——所需要的美元贷给苦苦挣扎的国内金融机构。


Indeed, the ECB was among the first banks to reach an agreement with the Fed, followed by other major advanced-country central banks, including the Swiss National Bank, the Bank of Japan, and the Bank of Canada.	事实上，欧洲央行是第一批与美联储达成协议的央行之一，随后则是其他主要发达国家央行，包括瑞士国民银行、日本银行和加拿大银行。


At the October meeting, four “diplomatically and economically” important emerging economies – Mexico, Brazil, Singapore, and South Korea – got in on the action, with the Fed agreeing to establish $30 billion swap lines with each of their central banks.	在10月会议上，四个具有“外交和经济”重要性的新兴经济体——墨西哥、巴西、新加坡和韩国——也加入其中，美联储同意与授予上述诸国每国300亿美元的互换配额。


Though the Fed acted as a kind of global central bank, its decisions were shaped, first and foremost, by US interests.	尽管美联储起到了全球央行的作用，但其决策首先根据美国利益做出。


For starters, the Fed rejected applications from some countries – whose names are redacted in the published transcript – to join the currency-swap scheme.	一开始，美联储拒绝了其他国家加入货币互换机制的申请，具体名单纪要中没有提及。


More important, limits were placed on the swaps.	更重要的是，互换是有限度的。


The essence of a central bank’s lender-of-last-resort function has traditionally been the provision of unlimited funds.	央行的最后贷款人功能的关键点在于它可以无限量提供资金。


Because there is no limit on the amount of dollars that the Fed can create, no market participant can take a speculative position against it.	美联储可以创造的美元数量是无限的，因此没有哪个市场参与者可以用投机头寸对抗美联储。


By contrast, the International Monetary Fund has finite resources provided by member countries.	相反，国际货币基金组织（IMF）的资源是有限的——取决于成员国提供了多少。


The Fed’s growing international role since 2008 reflects a fundamental shift in global monetary governance.	2008年以来美联储国际角色的不断增加反映了全球货币治理的一个根本性变化。


The IMF emerged at a time when countries were routinely victimized by New York bankers’ casual assumptions, such as J.P. Morgan’s assessment in the 1920’s that Germans were “fundamentally a second-rate people.”	IMF产生于各国总是被纽约银行家的不当行为拖累的年代，如20世纪20年代JP摩根认为德国“从根本上说只是二等公民”。


The IMF was a critical feature of the post-WWII international order, intended to serve as a universal insurance mechanism – not one that could be harnessed to advance contemporary diplomatic interests.	IMF在二战后国际秩序的重要特征，其成立初衷是作为一个全球保险机制，而不是被用来满足当代外交利益的工具。


Today, as the Fed documents clearly demonstrate, the IMF has become marginalized – not least because of its ineffective policy process.	现在，美联储的会议纪要明白无误地表明IMF已被边缘化——不仅是因为其政策过程效果低下。


Indeed, at the outset of the crisis, the IMF, assuming that demand for its resources would remain low permanently, had already begun to downsize.	事实上，在危机爆发时，IMF认为对其资源的需求将会持久下降，正准备开始收缩规模。


In 2010, the IMF made a play for resurrection, presenting itself as central to solving the euro crisis – beginning with its role in financing the Greek bailout.	2010年，IMF开始寻求振兴，试图在解决欧元危机中表现出核心作用——第一步便是在希腊援助融资中起到作用。


But here, too, a secret history has been revealed – one that highlights just how skewed global monetary governance has become.	但在这方面，秘史再一次凸显出全球货币治理漏洞之严重。


The fact is that only the US and the massively over-represented countries of the European Union supported the Greek bailout.	事实上，只有美国和在代表权过大的欧盟国家支持原主席拉。


Indeed, the major emerging economies all strongly opposed it, with the Brazilian representative calling it “a bailout of Greece’s private debt holders, mainly European financial institutions.”	事实上，主要发展中经济体一致强烈反对原主席拉，巴西代表更是将其称为“援助希腊的私人债权人，主要是欧洲金融机构”。


Even the Swiss representative condemned the measure.	就连瑞士代表也谴责援助希腊的做法。


As fears of a sudden collapse of the eurozone have given way to a prolonged debate about how the costs will be met through bail-ins and write-offs, the IMF’s position will become increasingly convoluted.	随着欧元区突然解体的担忧让位给了如何通过自救（bail-in）和减记解决成本的旷日持久的争论，IMF的立场也变得越来越暧昧。


Though the IMF is supposed to have seniority over other creditors, there will be demands to write down a share of the loans that it has issued.	尽管IMF的地位高于债权人，但也有不少人要求其减记它所发出的贷款。


Poorer emerging-market countries would resist such a move, arguing that their citizens should not have to foot the bill for fiscal profligacy in much wealthier countries.	较穷的新兴市场国家抵制这一做法，它们认为它们的公民不应该掏钱为比它们富得多的国家的财政挥霍买单。


Even the original advocates of IMF involvement are turning against the Fund.	就连一开始支持IMF介入的人也转而反对IMF。


EU officials are outraged by the IMF’s apparent effort to gain support in Europe’s debtor countries by urging write-offs of all debt that it did not issue.	IMF公然敦促所有非其发行的债务减记，以此争取欧洲债务国的支持，这令欧盟官员怒不可遏。


And the US Congress has refused to endorse the expansion of IMF resources – part of an international agreement brokered at the 2010 G-20 summit.	美国国会也拒绝了作为2010年G-20峰会达成的国际协议的一部分的扩大IMF资源的方案。


While the outrage that followed the appointment of another European as IMF Managing Director in 2011 is likely to ensure that the Fund’s next head will not hail from Europe, the IMF’s fast-diminishing role means that it will not matter much.	2011年，新任命的IMF总裁再一次被欧洲人把持，这引起了轩然大波，也确保了IMF的下一任首脑将不太可能继续来自欧洲，但IMF作用的迅速下滑意味着这已经无关紧要。


As 2008’s secret history shows, what matters is who has access to the Fed.	2008年的秘史表明，真正重要的是被美联储接纳。


Falling for Germany	爱上德国


PRINCETON – Germany’s general election in September and the prolonged formation of a new government since then have highlighted a peculiar development.	普林斯顿——德国9月大选及拖沓的新政府组成凸显出独特的事态发展。


Not only does Germany now seem to be running Europe, but the rest of Europe seems to be falling in love with Germany – not least because, in a time of political confusion and economic instability, Germans are the only Europeans who seem to know what they want.	德国不仅在管理欧洲，其他欧洲国家似乎也与德国一见钟情——因为在政治混乱和经济动荡的前提下，德国民众似乎是唯一知道该怎么做的欧洲人。


Germany’s exceptionalism is obvious.	德国的特立独行显而易见。


Whereas electorates across the European Union have punished their governments for the Great Recession and the euro crisis, Germans reelected Chancellor Angela Merkel and displayed strong support for her party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), in the recent election.	在欧盟选民为经济萧条及欧债危机而惩罚政府时，默克尔却在德国竞选连任。 德国人在最近的选举中坚决支持默克尔所在的基督教民主联盟（CDU）。


Indeed, as with postwar Germany’s first leader, Konrad Adenauer, there are jokes about Merkel being Chancellor for life (Germany has no term limits).	其实有玩笑认为默克尔会像战后德国首任领袖康拉德·阿登纳一样终身担任总理职务（德国并没有设立任期限制）。


Elsewhere, populist anti-European parties of the right have been gaining ground with campaigns directed against immigrants and minorities, especially Muslims.	其他国家的民粹主义反欧政党都在反对移民和少数族裔，尤其是穆斯林的运动中取得了进展。


This has fueled concern that the populist bloc will be the largest in the European Parliament after next year’s EU-wide election.	很多人因此担心明年的全欧选举后，民粹主义阵营将成为欧洲议会的龙头。


Germany, by contrast, has no anti-European party with any serious support.	相比之下，德国却没有任何反欧政党得到真正的支持。


Even the newly formed Alternative for Germany – which did unexpectedly well in the recent election, finishing just short of the 5% threshold needed to enter the Bundestag – insists that its anti-euro agenda is not anti-Europe.	即使不久前选举中表现出人意料的新组建的德国新选项党（该党距离加入联邦议会5%的门槛只差了一点点），也一直坚称其反欧元计划并不反欧洲。


They want to end the common currency, because, in their view, it is undermining the European ideal.	该党想要结束共同货币，因为他们认为共同货币破坏了欧洲的理想。


Against this background, Germany’s neighbors have been showing their love – or at least admiration.	在这样的大背景下，邻国已经表露出对德国的爱戴——至少是钦佩。


At the end of 2011, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski called upon Germany to take a stronger leadership role in Europe.	2011年底，波兰外长拉多斯瓦夫·西科尔斯基呼吁德国在欧洲发挥更大的领导作用。


This year, confronted with a revival of nationalist sentiment, former Polish President Lech Wałęsa – the leader of the anti-communist Solidarity movement – suggested that his country should enter into political union with Germany.	今年，面对民族主义情绪的再次兴起，前波兰总统兼反共团结工会运动领导人莱赫·瓦文萨表示波兰应与德国结成政治联盟。


Likewise, as France slides into a governance crisis and its leaders’ credibility rapidly erodes, the leading French intellectual Alain Minc has published Vive l’Allemagne (“Long Live Germany”), in which he argues that Germany is Europe’s healthiest and most democratic country.	同样，在法国陷入执政危机且领导人信誉迅速削弱的情况下，著名法国知识分子阿兰·明克发表了一本名叫Vive l’Allemagne（“德国万岁”）的著作，他在书中明确指出欧洲最健康、最民主的国家是德国。


In Italy, the bourgeoisie of Milan and Rome have made a point of spending winter days dressed in characteristically German Loden overcoats.	意大利米兰和罗马的资产阶级明确表示要穿上典型的德国罗登呢大衣抵御经济的严冬。


When Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben recently appealed for a Latin empire to assert itself against Germany, his call was widely rejected, with several of his contemporaries asserting that, on the contrary, Germany should serve as a model for Italy as it seeks to overcome its current malaise.	意大利哲学家乔治·阿甘本最近要求拉丁帝国对抗德国的号召遭到了普遍的抵制，阿甘本的几位同龄人甚至站出来说事实恰恰相反，意大利应该在力图走出目前困境时向德国学习。


Even in the habitually Euro-skeptical United Kingdom, Prime Minister David Cameron has sought to boost his international credibility by highlighting his close ties with Merkel, rather than by emphasizing the UK’s “special relationship” with the United States.	即使一贯对欧元持怀疑态度的英国首相戴维·卡梅伦也不再强调与美国的“特殊关系”，而是借助凸显与默克尔的亲密关系来提高其国际影响力。


Revealingly, the writer Miranda Seymour’s recently published book Noble Endeavours reminds Britain of the centuries-old love affair between Germany and England.	作家米兰达·西摩最近出版的新书《高尚的事业》颇具启示作用，书中提到德国和英国间历时百年的恋爱关系。


Maybe the royal family will go back to styling itself the House of Hanover?	也许王室应该重新学习汉诺威王朝的威仪？


While this admiration stems partly from Germany’s current economic success, the sentiment runs deeper – and extends beyond Europe.	虽然这种崇拜部分源于德国目前的经济成就，但这种感情却有着更深的渊源，甚至延伸到欧洲以外地区。


China, for example, considers Germany to be much more than a model of export-led growth; for many Chinese, that success highlights the way Germany’s historical trajectory has been shaped by its struggle with the authoritarian spirit of the past.	比如中国就远不止把德国视为出口主导增长模式的榜样； 对很多中国人而言，德国的成功凸显了过去与专制精神的斗争决定德国历史轨迹的方式。


Germany’s constitution – first adopted in West Germany in 1949 – lays out a striking vision, stating the country’s “resolve to preserve its national and political unity and to serve the peace of the World as an equal partner in a united Europe.”	1949年在西德首先生效的德国宪法描绘了一幅引人注目的愿景，表达了德国“维护其民族政治团结，作为统一欧洲平等的合作伙伴为世界和平竭尽全力的决心。


With the division of Germany considered a microcosm of the broader European split during the Cold War, German reunification seemed possible only in the context of an integrated Europe – a point that Chancellor Helmut Kohl emphasized in the debates of 1990, as reunification beckoned.	”因为德国分裂被视为冷战大背景下整个欧洲分裂的缩影，所以似乎只有在欧洲一体化的大背景下德国的统一才成为可能——在国家统一理想的感召下，这一观点在1990年辩论中被赫尔穆特·科尔总理特别提出。


The Germany that emerged from this process is uniquely suited to act as a model for Europe, owing to its federal character, which is reflected in strong constitutional guarantees of states’ rights.	克服重重困难实现统一的德国特别适合成为欧洲的榜样，因为对各州权利牢固的宪法保障凸显出德国的联邦性质。


Germany’s deeply embedded commitment to Europe and insistence on constitutionalism reflect its profound effort to understand what went wrong during the interwar period, the consequences of racism and extreme nationalism, and the legacy of Nazi crimes.	德国对欧洲一体化和宪政坚定不移的追求反映了这个国家对战时问题、种族主义和极端民族主义、以及纳粹罪行后果的深刻反思。


Few countries – if any – have so effectively internalized the lessons of their history.	很少有国家能够如此有效地吸取历史教训。


When Merkel’s new government is in place, Germany will assume an even more important role in the pursuit of greater European integration – a process that will demand additional sacrifices, including the ceding of national sovereignty.	默克尔新政府组阁完毕后，德国将在实现欧洲一体化的过程中发挥更重要的作用——欧洲一体化进程需要作出包括放弃国家主权在内的进一步的牺牲。


In a sense, this will be a continuation of Germany’s long history of self-abolition.	这在某种意义上可以看作德国漫长自我否定史的一种延续。


Roughly every hundred years since the Lutheran Reformation, the number of independent German political units has fallen by a factor of ten.	路德宗教改革后大约每过一百年，德国独立政治单位的数量就下降10倍。


The 1648 Peace of Westphalia reduced the number of independent units in the Holy Roman Empire from 3,000-4,000 to 300-400.	1648年《威斯特伐利亚和约》使神圣罗马帝国的独立政治单位从3,000-4,000骤减至300-400个。


In the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, the number of German states fell to 39.	拿破仑战争后，德国只剩下39个州。


By 1866, only 34 members of the German confederation remained.	到1866年，仅有34个州依然留在德意志联邦。


Another round of wars and peace treaties produced the kleindeutsch German Empire of 1871, and there were only three primarily German-speaking states left in Europe – the German Empire, Austria-Hungary (a dynastic unit, otherwise known as the Habsburg Empire), and the Swiss Confederation – none of which was a conventional nation-state.	另一轮战争和平条约缔造了1871年的大德意志帝国，整个欧洲范围内只剩下德意志帝国、奥匈帝国（这是一个王朝单位，也被称为哈布斯堡帝国）和瑞士联邦等3个主要讲德语的州——其中没有一个是传统意义上的民族国家。


While Germany’s 1949 split into the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic raised the number to four (along with Austria and Switzerland), the overall trajectory has been clear.	1949年分裂成联邦及民主德国导致政治单位增加到4个（算上奥地利和瑞士），总体发展轨迹已经非常明确了。


If Germany’s new government leads the charge toward a stronger, more federal Europe, a century from now, there may well be no sovereign German political unit at all.	如果德国政府带头为建设强大的欧洲联邦而付出努力，那么一百年后，也许根本就不再有作为主权政治单位存在的德国。


Germany and its lovers die in the end, only to live happily ever after.	德国和热爱德国的人终将归于黄土，之后只剩下幸福的生活。


History versus Europe	历史和欧洲


PRINCETON – History matters, but in different ways.	普林斯顿—历史很重要，但是以不同的方式。


In some places and for some people, history means eternal clashes that are shaped by profound geopolitical forces: four centuries ago is the same as yesterday.	对一些地区和一些人来说，历史的含义是影响深远的地缘政治因素决定的永恒的冲突：四百年前和现在别无二致。


Elsewhere and for other people, history suggests a need to find ways to escape from ancient predicaments and outdated prejudices.	对其他地区和其他人来说，历史意味着需要找到摆脱远古先例和陈旧偏见的方法。


It is this cleavage that defines the intellectual battle now taking place in and around Europe.	这一分歧决定了目前欧洲内外所存在的思想战争。


With this year’s centennial of the outbreak of World War I, dozens of new analyses of “the war to end all wars” have rolled off the presses.	今年是第一次世界大战爆发一百周年几年，数十种对这场“终结所有战争的战争”的新分析纷纷出场亮相。


And it is tempting to see contemporary parallels in imperial Europe’s complacency, particularly its firm belief that the world was so interconnected and prosperous that any reversal was unthinkable.	寻找帝国欧洲的自满的当代继承者是一件颇有兴味的事情，特别其是坚定的信念——世界是互相联系、繁荣昌盛的，任何倒退都是不可想象的。


Today, despite the supposed civilizing effects of global supply chains, tinderboxes like Syria or the South China Sea could blow up the world – just as the Bosnian conflict did in 1914.	如今，尽管全球供应链带来了巨大的文明效应，但叙利亚和南海等火药桶仍有可能引爆全世界——一如1914年的波斯尼亚冲突。


Reflecting on the legacy of the Great War has also been an occasion for reviving the era’s mentalities.	反思一战遗产也是振兴时代思维的契机。


In the United Kingdom, Education Secretary Michael Gove recently issued a polemic against historians who emphasized the futility of the war, calling it a “just war” directed against the “ruthless social Darwinism of the German elites.”	在英国，教育达成迈克尔·戈夫（Michael Gove）最近引发了一场针对认为一战是徒劳的历史学家，称一战是为对抗“德国精英的一根筋的社会达尔文主义”的“正义的战争”。


This looks like a thinly veiled allusion to the power struggles of contemporary Europe.	这似乎是对当代欧洲实力斗争的不太含蓄的暗示。


But 1914 is not the only possible or attractive point of comparison in interpreting Britain’s past.	但对于解读英国的过去来说，1914年并非唯一可行的或具有吸引力的比较点。


Next year is the bicentennial of the Battle of Waterloo and the final defeat of Napoleon.	明年将是滑铁卢战役暨拿破仑的最后一败两百周年纪念。


The right-wing British politician Enoch Powell used to claim that the European Common Market was the revenge that the Germans and the French imposed for the defeats that Britain inflicted on them.	右倾的英国政客伊诺克·鲍威尔（Enoch Powell）曾经宣称欧洲共同市场是德国人和法国人被英国打败而施加的报复。


The celebrations and commemorations will be full of symbolism related to contemporary disputes.	庆祝和纪念将是当代纠纷的完美象征。


Already, British Prime Minister David Cameron has had to shift a summit meeting with French President François Hollande from the proposed site, Blenheim Palace, because French diplomats realized that it had been built to celebrate John Churchill, the Duke of Marlborough, who crushed Louis XIV’s forces in 1704, near the small Bavarian town that gave the palace its name.	英国首相卡梅伦已经不得不改变与法国总统奥朗德原定在布伦海姆宫（Blenheim Palace）举行的峰会，因为法国外交官员意识到布伦海姆宫是为了庆祝1704年马尔堡公爵（Duke of Marlborough）约翰·丘吉尔（John Churchill）在巴伐利亚小镇布伦海姆附近打败了路易十四的军队而兴建和命名的。


The year 1704 is packed with meaning.	1704年很有历史意义。


The victory over France laid the foundation for the 1707 Act of Union between England and Scotland.	对法国的胜利为1707年英格兰和苏格兰《统一法案》铺平了道路。


That union is the subject of a vital referendum that will be held this year in Scotland.	而这一统一将成为今年在苏格兰举行的全民公投的主题。


Evocative historical dates are being used or abused in a similar way on the other edge of the European continent, to conjure up images of enemies that resonate in contemporary political debates.	在欧洲大陆的其他方面，历史日期也正在被类似的方式利用或滥用，用来树立敌人形象，与当代政治争论遥相呼应。


A few years ago, a Russian film simply entitled 1612 evoked the Time of Troubles, when weak leadership caused Russia to be invaded and subverted by insidious Polish aristocrats and capitalists.	几年前，一部俄罗斯电影径直以《1672》为题，直指俄罗斯历史上的动荡年代（Time of Troubles），当时，领导不力导致俄罗斯受到波兰贵族和资本家的侵略而亡国。


The film’s director, Vladimir Khotinenko, said that it was important that his audience “didn’t regard it as something that happened in ancient history but as a recent event… that they felt the link between what happened 400 years ago and today.”	电影导演弗拉基米尔·霍金恩科（Vladimir Khotinenko）说，他的观众“不把它看成是古老的历史，而把它看成最近的事件……将400年前和现时代所发生的事情连接起来”是很重要的。


As Russia struggles to bring Ukraine back into its orbit, another ancient date looms large: 1709, when Czar Peter the Great crushed the Swedish and Cossack armies at the Battle of Poltava.	俄罗斯正竭力把乌克兰重新揽入它的轨道，另一个古代日期的重要性因此显现：1709年，彼得大帝在波尔塔瓦战役（Battle of Poltava）中大破瑞典和哥萨克军队。


That battle was also the subject of a recent Russian film, The Sovereign’s Servant.	这场战役也成为一部俄罗斯最新电影《国家主权的仆人》（The Sovereign’s Servant）的主题。


Russian television commentators describe the countries most engaged in supporting a European-oriented Ukraine – Sweden, along with Poland and Lithuania, which had been brought into the Swedish orbit – as seeking revenge for Poltava.	俄罗斯电视评论员把支持欧洲导向的乌克兰的瑞典以及已经被纳入瑞典轨道的波兰和立陶宛称为想为波尔塔瓦战役复仇。


Europe’s western and eastern fringes obsess about dates that recall their struggles with the core: 1914, 1815, 1709, 1707, 1704, and 1612, among others.	欧洲的西线和东线无不存在各种纪念它们与欧洲核心战斗的日子：1914、1815、1709、1707、1704、1612，如此等等。


By contrast, the European core is obsessed with transcending history, with working out institutional mechanisms for overcoming the conflicts that scarred Europe in the first half of the twentieth century.	相反，欧洲核心则热衷于超越历史，致力于建立制度性机制克服在20世纪上半叶摧残欧洲的冲突。


The European integration project is a sort of liberation from the pressures and constraints of the past.	欧洲一体化工程便是从过去的压力和束缚中寻求解放的一种尝试。


After World War II, Charles de Gaulle evolved a complicated metaphysics to explain his country’s relationship with its problematic past.	���战后，戴高乐形成了一种复杂的形而上学来解释法国与其问题重重的过去的关系。


Every European country had been betrayed.	每个欧洲国家都遭遇过背叛。


“France suffered more than others because it was more betrayed than the others.	“法国遭遇的苦难更深，因为它被背叛的次数更多。


That is why it is France that must make the gesture of pardon....It is only I who can reconcile France and Germany, because only I can raise Germany from its decadence.”	正因如此，法国应该拿出原谅的姿态……只有我能够让法国和德国形成妥协，因为只有我可以让德国从堕落中站起来。 ”


Winston Churchill (a direct descendant of the Duke of Marlborough) had a similar postwar vision for overcoming past divisions and nationalistic quarrels. “[T]his noble continent…is the fountain of Christian faith and Christian ethics,” he claimed.	温斯顿·丘吉尔（马尔堡公爵的直系后裔）也有过类似的关于克服过去的分歧和民族主义宿怨的远见：“这片伟大的大陆……是基督教信仰和基督教伦理的泉眼，”他说，“如果欧洲早就通过分享共同遗产得到了统一，那么这将是一片极乐之地，它的三四亿人民将享受到无上的繁荣和光荣。


“If Europe were once united in the sharing of its common inheritance, there would be no limit to the happiness, to the prosperity and glory which its three or four hundred million people would enjoy.”	”


Is the European center currently too naive, or too idealistic?	欧洲的核心现在太天真还是太理想主义？


Is it really possible to escape from history?	摆脱历史真的可行吗？


Or, on the contrary, is there something odd in the way that the European fringes obsessively resort to historical milestones?	或者，反之，是不是存在某种神奇之物让欧洲必须寻找历史里程碑？


In Britain and Russia, this obsession appears to be not just a way to assert national interests, but also a mechanism for appealing to a population disenchanted with the contemporary realities of decline from the imperial past.	在英国和俄罗斯，这一怪癖似乎并不只是一种张扬国家利益的方式，同时也是一种吸引不再对昔日帝国的当代衰落抱有幻想的人民的机制。


De Gaulle and Churchill knew plenty about war, and they wanted to transcend the blood-soaked legacy of Poltava, Blenheim, and Waterloo.	戴高乐和丘吉尔都对战争有充分的了解，他们希望跨越血流成河的波尔塔瓦、布伦海姆和滑铁卢。


They viewed history as offering concrete lessons about the necessity of escaping from the past.	他们把历史当作一种切实的教训，从中学习摆脱过去的必要性。


Today, Europe’s fringes, by contrast, appear determined to escape into it.	与此相反，如今欧洲似乎铁了心要往过去跳。


Harvests of Hunger	饥饿的丰收


New York – Lack of food is rarely the reason people go hungry.	纽约–人们挨饿的原因根本不在于食品的匮乏。


Even now, there is enough food in the world, with a bumper harvest this year, but more people cannot afford to buy the food they need.	今年的大丰收使全世界有足够的食品，但是越来越多的人却无力购买他们所需要的食品了。


Addressing this growing crisis is the aim of the Global Conference on Food Security in Rome on June 3-5.	将于6月3日-5日在罗马召开的全球食品安全大会正是为了应对这个越来越严重的危机。


Even before the recent food price spikes, an estimated billion people were suffering from chronic hunger, while another two billion were experiencing malnutrition, bringing the total number of food-insecure people to around three billion, or almost half the world’s population.	即便在最近食品价格出现暴涨前，全世界估计也有10亿人常年挨饿，还有另外20亿人营养不良，也就是说有大约30亿人约占世界人口的一半处于食品不安全的状况，约占世界人口的一半。


Roughly 18,000 children died daily as a direct or indirect consequence of malnutrition.	每天大约有18000名儿童因为营养不良所造成的直接或间接的结果而死亡。


Obviously, the recent increases in food prices are likely to drive the number of people vulnerable to food stress even higher.	显然，最近食品价格的上涨会使更多的人面临沉重的食品压力。


There is now an urgent need to finance existing food aid programs to address mounting food demands, avert further social unrest, and ensure that farmers get the costlier farm inputs they need for the next planting season.	我们现在迫切需要为现有的食品援助计划注入资金，以应对越来越高的食品需求、消除进一步的社会动荡，并且确保农民能够获得他们所需要的更多的农业投入以便用于下一个播种季节。


But, as we respond to the current humanitarian emergency due to higher food prices, we must not lose sight of the longer-term problems that have undermined food security in recent decades.	但是，在我们因为越来越高的食品价格而产生的人道主义危机时，也不应该忽视在最近几十年来使食品安全受到破坏的更长期的问题。


Clearly, a “new deal” for food security is urgently needed.	显然，我们现在迫切需要为食品安全制定“新政”。


The major increases in food production associated with the Green Revolution in the 1960’s – with considerable government and international not-for-profit support – gave way to new policy priorities in the 1980’s.	食品产量的大幅提升始于二十世纪六十年代的绿色革命，在这期间政府和国际组织为此提供了巨额的非赢利性支持，然而到了二十世纪八十年代这些政策却让位于新的政策倾向。


As food supply growth slowed, demand continued to grow, and not only due to population increase.	随着食品供应量增长的减缓，需求却出现持续增长，而这并不完全是人口的增长所造成的。


With higher incomes, rising meat consumption requires more grain for animal feed.	随着人们收入水平的提高，对肉类消费的越来越高的需求使得需要将更多的粮食用于动物饲料。


Since the 1980’s, governments have been pressed to promote exports to earn foreign exchange and import food.	自从二十世纪八十年代以来，各国政府受到压力，要求推动出口以赚取外汇以及进口食品。


But food cannot be treated as just another commodity, and governments should develop appropriate policies, infrastructure, and institutions to ensure food security (not to be equated with total self-sufficiency) at the national or regional level.	但是食品不应当被看成仅仅是另一种商品，而各国政府应该制定恰当的政策、建造基础设施以及建立恰当的体制以确保在国家和地区层面的食品安全（这并不等同于完全自给自足）。


The problem is that, having neglected food security and the productive sectors of their economies for several decades, many developing countries’ governments now lack the fiscal capacity to increase public spending in order to increase food production and agricultural productivity.	问题在于在忽略食品安全问题以及它们经济中的生产部门达几十年之久后，许多发展中国家的政府现在缺乏足够的财政能力以提高公共支出用于提高食品产量和农业生产力。


Moreover, growing urbanization and other non-agricultural uses of land have reduced acreage available for food production, while agricultural land is increasingly used to produce commodities other than food, such as bio-fuels.	此外，城市化的蔓延和其他非农业用地的增加减少了可以用于提高食品产量的耕地数量，与此同时有越来越多的农业用地却被用来生产食品之外的其他商品，比如生物燃料。


But we should not rush to abandon bio-fuels, despite some undoubtedly poor policies in recent years.	但是我们不应该匆忙地放弃生物燃料，尽管最近几年所实施的某些政策无疑非常糟糕。


Some bio-fuels are far more cost-effective and energy-efficient than others, and different bio-fuel stocks have very different opportunity costs for food agriculture (sugar has not experienced any significant price increase).	某些生物燃料比其他生物燃料更具成本效益并且更节能，而不同的生物燃料储备对于食品农业有着非常不同的机会成本（比如，糖的价格就基本上没有出现很大的上涨）。


Another problem is that fewer and fewer transnational agro-businesses now dominate marketing, production, and inputs. This comes largely at the expense of small farmers and consumers, particularly the poor.	另一个问题是主宰农产品营销、生产和投资的跨国企业出现寡头化倾向，这在很大程度上使小农和消费者，尤其是穷人，遭受损害。


Moreover, with less government support, rural credit has often become prohibitively expensive.	此外，随着政府支持的减少，农民常常因为代价过高而无法获得贷款。


In addition, more securitization, easier online trading, and other financial market developments in recent years have facilitated greater speculative investments, especially in commodity futures and options markets, including those affecting food.	除此之外，最近几年证券化的提高、更便捷的网上交易和其他金融市场的发展使投机性投资愈演愈烈，尤其是商品期货和期权市场，包括那些影响食品价格的期货和期权市场。


Falling asset prices in other financial market segments, following the sub-prime mortgage meltdown in the United States, may be more important for explaining the recent surge in food prices than supply constraints or other factors underlying longer-term gradual upward price trends.	在美国次贷危机后金融市场上其他门类资产价格的下跌也许比供应量的短缺或造成食品价格长期缓慢上涨的其他因素能够更好地解释最近食品价格的暴涨。


Meanwhile, rich countries’ agricultural subsidies and tariffs have undoubtedly undermined food production in developing countries.	与此同时，富裕国家对农业的补贴和关税无疑影响了发展中国家的食品产量。


However, cutting farm subsidies will increase food prices, at least initially, while reducing agricultural tariffs alone will not necessarily lead to an increase in food production in poor countries without complementary support.	但是减少农业补贴会造成食品价格的上升，至少在一开始会这样，而单单降低农业关税在没有配套政策的支持下并不一定能使发展中国家的食品产量出现上升。


Instead, some food security advocates have called for rich countries to compensate for the adverse consequences of their own agricultural subsidies and protectionism by providing additional foreign aid to the developing world, targeting production efforts that enhance food security.	因此，一些呼吁推动食品安全的人士要求富裕国家向发展中国家提高额外的外国援助以及帮助它们提高食品产量以提高食品安全，作为对它们自己的农业补贴和把保护主义所造成的负面影响的补偿。


To avoid catastrophe, the world community must also meet the urgent emergency food and planting requirements mentioned above, including more generous budget and balance-of-payments support for low-income food-importing countries.	为了避免出现灾难，国际社会同时还必须努力应对上文提到的迫切的食品和种植需求，��括大幅增加预算以及向低收入的食品进口国提供更多的国际收支支持。


Finally, as world leaders gather in Rome, the international community must secure a meaningful global commitment to food security that will not be undermined by contradictory policies.	最后，当世界各国的领导聚集在罗马时，国际社会必须对食品安全作出有意义的全球承诺，而不是像现在这样被相互矛盾的政策所削弱。


Has America Lost its Mojo?	美国已经失去了运气吗？


Cambridge – You know that American self-confidence is shaken when even the President starts expressing fear that the financial crisis may turn out worse than the Great Depression of the 1930’s.	坎布里奇—你知道，当连总统也表示担心金融危机可能比1930年代的大萧条还要严重时，美国的自信心就动摇了。


George Bush is not alone in worrying that things might get a lot worse before they get better.	并不是乔治·布什一个人担心在事情变得更好之前将会变得糟糕得多。


A growing number of savvy business people are also starting to wonder whether the United States will be able to right its economy anytime soon.	越来越多精明老练的商界人士也开始想知道美国能否很快恢复经济。


Professional forecasters are considerably more sanguine, with the consensus forecast for US growth in 2009 at around -1.5%, after a similar contraction in the second half of 2008.	在2008年下半年美国经济出现大约1. 5%的收缩之后，舆论预计2009年还将出现同样的负增长。


This would be a painful recession, but far short of the 10-15% output drop normally associated with a full-blown depression.	而专业人士的预测要乐观得多。 这将是是痛苦的衰退，但还远不是彻头彻尾的经济萧条，后者的标准是产量下滑10%至15%。


Of course, economic forecasters have generally been far too optimistic at every turn of late, so the public is understandably leery of their prognostications.	当然，经济预测人士在最近的每一个转折时刻总是过于乐观，所以可以理解大众对他们的预测持怀疑态度。


Consensus forecasts do still seem optimistic.	而舆论的预测似乎 也 是乐观的。


With its financial system on life support, housing prices continuing to plummet, and unemployment rising, the US economy is looking more vulnerable than it has at any time since the 1970’s, and perhaps since World War II.	伴随着勉强支撑的金融体系，持续下跌的房产价格和上升的失业率，美国经济看起来比1970年代或许也是比二战以后的任何时刻都要脆弱。


Still, it must be noted that negative output growth for more than two years is a relatively rare event, even in the aftermath of severe banking crises.	但是，必须注意到产量超过两年出现负增长相对来说是很少发生的，即使是在严重的金融危机之后。


Historical statistical relationships are perhaps cold comfort in a downturn that now seems so insidiously different from previous catastrophes.	在现在这个看上去隐约和过往灾难不同的低迷时期，历史统计数据也许只是冰冷的安慰。


But they should not be dismissed.	但我们不能对这些数据置之不理。


Japan may have taken what seemed like forever to recover from its 1990’s crisis, but it is an exception – the crisis occurred as the Japanese economy needed to restructure in the face of the huge challenges posed by China’s emergence.	日本似乎永远也没能从1990年代的危机中恢复过来，但它是一个例外—危机发生的时候，日本正因为面对中国崛起引发的巨大挑战而需要重组经济。


The complete policy paralysis that has prevailed during the interregnum between Presidents Bush and Obama has not helped.	就布什总统和奥巴马总统任职过渡期内的流行政策进行完整分析已经无济于事了。


US policy has devolved into a sort of “wheel of fortune” game for financial firms.	对于金融公司来说，美国的政策已经退化成了某种“幸运轮盘”游戏。


One day you get bankruptcy, another day loans with few strings attached.	某一天你破产了，另一天几乎没有限制的贷款来了。


One hopes that President-elect Obama’s all-star economic team will at least adopt a coherent and consistent policy.	人们希望当选总统奥巴马的全明星经济团队至少会采取连贯一致的政策。


Consistency alone would be a big boost for confidence.	光是保持政策一致就将极大地提升信心。


The basic elements of a recovery package include, first and foremost, a rational approach to rebooting the financial system.	一揽子复苏计划的基本要素首先包括理性地重新启动金融体系，即对资产实施逐日定价，重组银行，更新银行的资本结构和执行新的管理。


This means mark-to-market pricing of assets, restructuring and recapitalizing banks, and a new approach to regulation that allows creativity while better protecting the public against some of the madness that has prevailed for more than a decade.  Help for housing is required to prevent overshooting in home prices, as is massive macroeconomic stimulus, including a moderately inflationary monetary policy.	这种管理允许创新，同时能够更好地保护大众免受某些盛行了十余年的疯狂行为之害。 帮助房产业和实施大规模宏观经济刺激都要求防止房屋价格过高，包括温和的通货膨胀货币政策。


A number of leaders, most prominently German Chancellor Angela Merkel, are understandably worried about the longer-term consequences of aggressive macroeconomic stimulus.	可以理解，许多领导人（最著名的是德国总理安吉拉·默克尔）担心广泛的宏观经济刺激的长期后果。 这些担心是有根据的。


These concerns are valid, even more so given government’s growing role in the economy.	考虑到政府在经济中日益重要的角色，它们还不只如此。


But, as in wartime, one hopes these effects are temporary.	但是，如同在战时一样，人们希望这些后果是暂时的。


Besides, is inaction a real alternative?	而且，难道不作为真的是另外一种选择吗？


Prior to the 1950’s, output drops of 15-20% in a single year were routine (admittedly, national income accounting was more primitive.)	在1950年以前，单年总产量削减15%至20%很平常（得承认国家收入的计算那时候更原始）。


A number of academic economists say we should simply tough it out as we did back then.	许多学院派经济学家表示，我们应该象过去做过的那样，咬牙挺过去就可以了。


Recessions have important cleansing effects, helping to facilitate painful restructuring.	衰退有重要的清理效果，可以帮助推进棘手的重组工作。


But today’s social, economic, and political systems – at least in developed countries – are unable to withstand a peacetime decline in output of 15-20% within a short period.	但今天的社会、经济和政治体系—至少在发达国家内—无力承担和平时期内短期产量削减15%至20%。


Massive stimulus and intervention – the US Federal Reserve’s current stance – is unavoidable.	美国联邦储备银行现在采取的立场，即实施大规模刺激和进行干预，是不可避免的。


One can only hope that the state can get out of the economy half as fast as it is getting in.	人们只能希望国家摆脱这种经济形势的速度能比卷进来的时候慢一倍。


Nevertheless, the distinct possibility that stimulus and restructuring may work is further cause to hope that the deepening recession will not morph into a full-blown depression.	不论如何，刺激和重组显然可能会起作用，这让人更有理由希望正在加深的衰退不会变成彻底的萧条。


The US may be ground zero for the global financial crisis, but it is not the only country riven by self-doubt.	美国可能是全球金融危机里受害最重的地方，但是被自我怀疑撕裂的绝非仅此一国。


Britain, Ireland, and Spain each face financial crises of a similar magnitude.	英国，爱尔兰，西班牙都面临着同样强度的金融危机。


Some countries that depend on energy exports, particularly governance-challenged ones such as Russia and Venezuela, are experiencing even worse downturns.	一些依赖能源出国的国家，尤其是例如俄国和委内瑞拉这样统治受到挑战的国家正经历着更严重的削减。


Even once-invulnerable China must contemplate a halving of its growth rate.	即使曾经是坚不可摧的中国也必须仔细考虑增长率减半的问题。


Europe and Japan do not have quite as complex financial messes as the US. But these regions are nevertheless mired in recession.	欧洲和日本还没有经历美国这样复杂的金融困境，但这些地区也陷入了衰退。


The global economy is in a pickle.	全球的经济正处于困境之中。


But, just as optimists were too sanguine in the boom, ultra-pessimists probably go too far in forecasting a depression around the corner.	但是，就像繁荣时期的乐观者过于乐观一样，深度悲观者预言萧条已经逼近也许太过悲观。


2009 will be a tough year.	2009年将是艰难的一年。


Yet, absent a large-scale conflagration, there is a fair chance that 2010 will see a restoration of weak growth in the US, Europe, and Japan, and probably robust growth in most emerging markets.	然而，虽然不足燃起熊熊大火，2010年还是很有机会在美国，欧洲和日本目睹经济恢复带来的微弱增长，也许还有最新兴市场里面的强劲增长。


The US economy may have lost a fair chunk of its mojo, but it will require a lot more bad luck and policy blunders to get to a second worldwide Great Depression.	美国经济也许已经丧失了许多运气，但若要卷入第二次世界大萧条，它所需要的坏运气和政策失误还远远不够。


Has Cuba Lost its Last Chance?	古巴是否错失了最后一次机会?


BUENOS AIRES – Raúl Castro’s consolidation of his position as successor to his brother Fidel confirms that his Cuba will give the military domestic hegemony, which makes any serious political or economic opening in the near future seemingly impossible.	发自布宜诺斯艾利斯——劳尔·卡斯特罗巩固自身作为其兄菲德尔·卡斯特罗接班人的举措确认了一点：古巴会将国内的统治权交给军队，同时令未来实施任何重大政治以及经济开放政策的可能性变得微乎其微。


The Cuban Communist Party’s recent Sixth Congress reflected this, offering little new and rehashing a lot of the old.	而最近召开的古巴共产党第六次全国代表大会也反映了这一点，整场大会缺乏新意，相反却重新捡起了许多旧有的东西。


Since ill health forced Fidel Castro to retire from Cuba’s leadership, Raúl has opened the doors to the military and pushed out even those civilians who had been his brother’s trusted associates.	自从健康问题迫使菲德尔·卡斯特罗退出古巴领导班子以来，劳尔彻底向军队敞开了大门并开始排挤那些备受其兄器重的文官。


While Fidel wrote doctrinaire articles in the official press, the armed forces took over politics and production.	当前者在官方媒体上发表教条主义文章时，武装部队却接管了政治和生产。


Fidel’s appearance at the Party’s congress – an event full of political significance, because he has only rarely participated in public events since becoming sick in 2006 – seemed to confirm his support for this outcome.	菲德尔出席古共六大的举动——此次会议的政治意义极为巨大，因为这是这位前领导人在2006年生病之后已经极少在公开场合露面——似乎证实他也对这一安排表示赞同。


We now know that the congress had been put off for 14 years, owing to deep divisions among Cuban leaders.	我们现在知道由于古巴领导层内部的一些重大分歧，这场会议的召开已经被推迟了14年。


The civilian group that was ousted wanted to adapt the “Chinese model” of gradual economic reforms initiated by the Party. Raúl and his military cronies, however, cornered Fidel and imposed their group’s criteria.	被罢黜的文官集团希望能古巴共产党能启动“中国式”的渐进经济改革，而劳尔及其身边的军队势力则孤立了他的哥哥并着手实施自己的一套标准。


In Asian communism – as practiced in China and Vietnam, in particular – the Party leadership rotates periodically, and a civilian leadership controls the military.	在亚洲的共产主义国家——尤其是中国和越南——共产党领导班子是定期更换的，而军队也是由文官领导层来控制的。


Systemic nepotism in the top political and military leadership exists only in North Korea.	只有朝鲜才会出现在最高政治和军事领导层中刻意安插首脑亲信的状况。


By contrast, Cuba’s new Raúlist political structure takes its inspiration from the purest tradition of Latin American military caudillismo, using communist ideology pragmatically.	相比之下，古巴的新劳尔主义政治体系却取材于最纯粹的拉美军事专制传统中，只不过是以共产主义作为幌子而已。


The model is clearly revealed in the nature of Raúl’s proposed reforms.	这一模式在劳尔提出的改革的本质中清晰地反映了出来。


The economy’s most dynamic industries – namely, mining and tourism – are reserved for the military, which manages them in a business-like, profit-seeking way.	整个经济体中最具有活力的产业——采矿业和旅游业——都被预留给了军队，而军队则以一种以赢利为目的商业方式在运作这些产业。


Only in these privileged sectors can some reforms be seen.	只有在这些特殊的产业中才能发现改革的影子。


The “new class” that populates them does not demonize foreign capital.	而把持这些产业的“新阶层”并不会将国外资本妖魔化。


Indeed, there are talks centered on debt, with some creditors interested in the mechanics of capitalization.	事实上他们已经举行了一系列与负债有关的会谈，也有一些借贷人对资本化的运作机制表示了兴趣。


For the rest of the economy, the Party’s position recalls the famous line from Lampedusa’s Il Gattopardo (The Leopard): something must change so that everything else can remain the same.	而在其他经济领域，古巴共产党的立场令人想了意大利著名作家兰佩杜萨（Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedus）在其名作《豹》（Il Gattopardo）中的一段话：有些东西必须改变，好让其他一切维持原状。


The sale of buildings and vehicles will be legalized and self-employment authorized, mainly in the service sector.	政府将使买卖楼房和汽车的行为合法化并批准个体经营（主要是在服务领域）。


But, lacking capital and forced to pay taxes, what fate awaits industries driven by the state into the market?	但这些既缺乏资金又要被征税的行业被政府推向市场后，其命运又将如何呢？


Nearly 1.5 million Cubans will never have a stake in the industries controlled by the military bourgeoisie. Nor was the issue of land ownership resolved: only a few plots will be leased in some form.	近150万古巴人永远无法从这些军事新贵控制的产业中分一杯羹，而土地所有权的问题也无法得到解决：因为只有很少的地皮会以某种形式向公众开放。


As a result, Cuba will continue to import a lot of food, most of it at a price that the population cannot afford.	于是古巴将继续以本国民众无法支付的价格来进口大量食品。


Moreover, ordinary Cubans fear that their ration cards – their only means of getting food – will be canceled.	此外，普通古巴人担心他们的定量配给卡——也是他们得到食物的唯一途径——会被取消。


Indeed, according to Raúl, the state-controlled food-rationing system is a “factor of immobility,” but no one knows what might replace it.	事实上劳尔曾经指出，国家控制的食品配给系统是一个“非流动性因素”，但没人知道这一制度将被何种措施取代。


The Sixth Congress ignored questions of human rights.	本届人民代表大会也忽略了相关人权事务。


Neither freedom of the press nor access to information was on the agenda, and the opposition will continue to be ignored, its only options being conditional freedom or exile.	议程中没有提到任何关于新闻自由或者开辟信息渠道的问题，反对派也继续遭到忽视，只能接受有条件的自由或者流亡。


Migration, an option financed by remittances from relatives in the United States, was not made any more flexible, either.	而移民这个由在美古巴人汇款所资助的政策选项也没有任何松动。


When the Soviet Union collapsed, many believed that the Cuban regime would take the road to reform, however grudgingly.	当苏联解体之时，许多人相信古巴当局会被迫选择一条改革之路。


But the democratic transitions in Eastern Europe made Fidel Castro wary, so the first opportunity for a similar transition in Cuba was lost.	但东欧的民主转型使菲德尔·卡斯特罗顾虑甚多，并因此丧失了古巴实现类似转变的第一个机会。


Now an opportunity to introduce young blood and new ideas has similarly been missed: although the Sixth Congress adopted a ten-year limit for holding office, the two people designated to succeed Raúl Castro are both octogenarians.	如今一个向领导层补充新鲜血液并引入新思维的机会也同样被浪费了：虽然古共六大通过了领导人只能有10年任期的新规定，而选定接任劳尔·卡斯特罗的两个人选都已经垂垂老矣了。


In the 1980’s, Deng Xiaoping warned that China would collapse if it didn’t change; Raúl has said the same thing.	在1980年代，邓小平警告中国如果不进行改革的话就会走向崩溃； 劳尔也发表了同样的言论。


But Deng chose real reform and real change, appealing to overseas Chinese, whom the Party had demonized for many years, to bet on the country’s future and invest. The diaspora listened – the beginning and the secret of the reforms that put China on the path to its current economic success.	但邓小平选择了推行真正的改革和变革，呼吁原本被妖魔化多年的海外华侨为国家的未来下注并归国投资。


Cuba cannot remain isolated, dependent on Venezuelan petrodollars and penalized by America’s ill-conceived trade embargo.	古巴不能继续这样孤立下去，一面靠委内瑞拉的石油美元维持生计，另一面又受困于美国错误推行的贸易禁运措施。


Any realistic agenda for change in Cuba inexorably requires opening up to the world, along with ensuring full freedom within the country.	任何现实的古巴变革议程都无情地要求这个国家向世界敞开大门，并辅以国内的全面自由保障。


Unfortunately, the Sixth Congress demonstrated that the Cuban Communist Party remains in denial about the country’s prospects and options.	但不幸的是，古共六大显示出古巴共产党依旧在与整个国家的繁荣和出路背道而驰。


Has Financial Innovation Been Discredited?	金融创新是否已经令人丧失信心？


MOSCOW – Skeptics of financial liberalization and innovation have been emboldened by the crisis in the world’s credit markets that erupted in mid-2007, when the problems with sub-prime mortgages first appeared in the United States.	莫斯科——当次贷问题在美国首度出现的时候，2007年中爆发的世界信贷市场危机提振了金融自由化和创新怀疑论者站出来说话的勇气。


Are these skeptics right?	这些怀疑论者说得有没有道理？


Should we halt financial liberalization and innovation in order to prevent crises like the sub-prime disaster from recurring?	我们是否应该停下金融自由化和创新的脚步，以便防范像次贷灾难这样的危机再度发生？


The entire sub-prime market is largely a decade-old innovation – the word “sub-prime” did not exist in any language before 1994 – built on such things as option adjustable-rate mortgages (option-ARM’s), new kinds of collateralized debt obligations, and structured investment vehicles.	从总体上讲，整个次贷市场是最近10年的产物——1994年以前，“次贷”一词在任何一种语言中都难觅踪迹——“次贷”是由选择性可调利率抵押贷款（option-ARM）、创新型抵押债权和结构性投资工具逐渐演化而来的。


Previously, private investors in the US simply did not lend to mortgage seekers whose credit history was below prime.	在次贷产生以前，美国的私人投资者根本不会把款贷给信用记录达不到要求的抵押贷款人。


But, while it does sometimes appear that the current crisis is due, at least in part, to financial innovation, financial-market liberalization has been shown to be a good thing overall.	可是，尽管从某些角度看目前的危机至少部分来源于金融创新，但事实却证明金融市场自由化从整体上看仍然利大于弊。


A study published in 2005 by economists Geert Bekaert, Campbell Harvey, and Christian Lundblad found that when countries liberalize their stock markets, allowing them to operate freely without government intervention, economic growth rises by an average of one percentage point annually.	Geert Bekaert，Campbell Harvey和Christian Lundblad等经济学家在2005年发表的一份研究报告显示：当国家实现股市自由化、允许股市自由运行而不受政府干扰时，这个国家的经济增长就会以每年百分之一的速度递增。


The higher growth tends to be associated with an investment boom, which in turn seems to be propelled by the lower cost of capital for firms.	增长速度的加快应该受益于投资的繁荣，而投资繁荣则又似乎得益于企业低成本资金的推动。


Of course, while complicated financial arrangements allow us to move forward economically, they also can create hazards.	有一点勿庸置疑，那就是复杂的金融工具在令我们取得经济进展的同时，也给我们带来了风险。


Think of the scaffolding and equipment around construction sites.	想想建筑工地随处可见的脚手架和设备吧。


Sometimes people trip over the equipment, or a piece of scaffolding falls, with disastrous consequences.	有的时候人们会被机器绊倒，或者脚手架倒塌，这些都会带来灾难性的后果。


Any time you build something, there is always a chance of a setback.	无论任何时候发明任何事物，失败的风险都永远存在。


But, with every setback, we learn.	但我们会从每次失败中汲取教训。


Governments and insurance companies implement better safety requirements in response to construction accidents.	政府和保险公司为应对建筑事故而推行更高标准的安全措施。


The same is true, over time, with financial disasters.	从长期来看，金融灾难也是如此。


The US is one of the world’s most financially liberal countries.	美国是世界上金融自由度最高的国家之一。


Its financial markets’ high quality must be an important reason for America’s relatively strong economic growth.	美国高质量的金融市场肯定是经济增长相对强劲的一个重要原因。


Indeed, given a very low savings rate and high fiscal deficit over the past few decades, the US might otherwise have faced economic disaster.	事实上，考虑到过去几十年内美国存款率一直低迷，而财政赤字却一直高企，如果没有高质量的金融市场，美国也许会面临经济灾难。


The reason is simple.	原因非常简单。


Individual firms might have splendid investment opportunities – to enlarge plant and equipment, capitalize on new software, or exploit new research and new training of key personnel – but might be deterred by cash shortages or perceived macroeconomic risks.	个体公司也许拥有极好的投资机会——来扩建厂房和设备、应用新软件、或者将关键人员的新研究和新训练付诸实施——但在这样做时，单个公司很有可能会受制于资金短缺或者宏观经济的风险因素而无法达到目的。


Effective financial markets enable them to pursue such opportunities despite these constraints by enlisting investors to provide the capital.	有效的金融市场能够通过募集投资者来提供资金，使得企业在存在诸多限制条件的情况下抓住这些机遇。


These investors can, in turn, be encouraged when financial hedging devices and financial diversification protect them.	而这些投资者反过来又可以在存在金融避险工具和金融多样化保护的环境中得到激励。


There has been a longstanding discussion about whether new derivative markets, which provide such financial hedging, tend to increase preexisting financial markets’ volatility.	很长时间以来，人们一直在讨论提供这种金融避险功能的全新衍生品市场是否会加剧金融市场原有的动荡。


The consensus is that they do not.	现在人们已经达成了否定的共识。


In 2000, Stewart Mayhew, Assistant Chief Economist at the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s Office of Economic Analysis, surveyed the extensive literature on this topic.	2000年，美国证监会经济分析办公室助理首席经济学家斯图尔特·梅休（Stewart Mayhew）对涉及到这一主题的文献著作进行了广泛的研究。


Mayhew concluded that it is rather difficult to tell whether derivative markets worsen financial-market volatility, because their creation tends to come when existing financial markets already are more volatile, or can be predicted to become so.	梅休的结论是：确定衍生品市场是否加剧了金融市场的动荡非常困难，因为金融衍生品市场本身就是在现有金融市场波动加剧、或预计有可能波动加剧的情况下才得以创立。


Moreover, he found that there is no evidence that derivative markets create volatility in underlying cash markets; in fact, they may even reduce it.	不仅如此，梅休并没有发现表明衍生品市场在基础现金市场中造成波动的证据，而事实情况却恰恰相反，衍生品市场能够对基础现金市场的波动起到缓解作用。


The effect on underlying financial markets’ volatility may not even be the right question to consider in deciding whether to permit new derivative products.	在决定是否批准新的衍生产品时，对基础金融市场波动性的影响也许不是应该考虑的问题。


The right question is whether these products are conducive to economic success and growth.	真正应该考虑的是这些产品对经济成功和发展是否有益。


Here, Mayhew concludes that new derivative markets clearly increase the liquidity and quality of information in existing financial markets.	在这里，梅休得出结论，那就是新建立的衍生品市场显然增强了现有金融市场信息的流动性和品质。


And it is this liquidity and quality of information that ultimately propels economic growth.	而正是信息的这种流动性和高质量最终推动了经济的增长。


The sub-prime crisis has exposed serious problems that we must address.	次贷危机已经暴露了我们必须解决的问题。


For example, we need stronger consumer protection for retail financial products, stricter disclosure requirements for new securities, and better-designed vehicles for hedging risks.	比如，我们需要加强对零售金融产品消费者的保护，对新债券实行更为严格的披露机制，并且设计出更好的避险工具。


Some of the innovations associated with the sub-prime crisis – notably option-ARM’s, when extended to borrowers who couldn’t handle them – seem to have little redeeming value.	与次贷危机相关的某些金融创新——特别是选择性可调利率贷款——当发放给不具备偿还能力的借款人时——似乎也就没有什么可以挽回的价值。


But others – those involved with the securitization of mortgages – were clearly important long-run innovations, because they can help spread risks better around the world.	但是涉及到抵押贷款证券化的其他金融创新产品——显而易见应该归属于重要的长期创新之列，因为这些产品有助于将风险更好地分散到世界各地。


So, we should not slow down financial innovation in general.	因此，我们不该停下金融创新的脚步。


On the contrary, some of the fixes that result from the sub-prime crisis will probably take the form of still more innovation, further increasing the sophistication of our financial markets.	恰恰相反，次贷危机的某些补救措施也许仍会采取进一步创新的形式，金融市场的复杂性也将由此进一步增强。


Has Global Stag-Deflation Arrived?	全球性的滞缩已经到来了吗？


NEW YORK – The latest macroeconomic news from the United States, other advanced economies, and emerging markets confirms that the global economy will face a severe recession in 2009.	纽约—来自美国、其他发达经济实体和新兴市场的最新宏观经济消息证明全球经济将在2009年面临严重的衰退。


In the US, recession started in December 2007, and will last at least until December 2009 – the longest and deepest US recession since World War II, with the cumulative fall in GDP possibly exceeding 5%.	美国的衰退从2007年12月开始，而且最起码要持续到2009年12月—这是 美国自二战以来持续时间 最长，最严重的 一场危机 ，GDP（国内生产总值）大约将累计下滑超过5%。


The recession in other advanced economies (the euro zone, United Kingdom, European Union, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) started in the second quarter of 2008, before the financial turmoil in September and October further aggravated the global credit crunch.	其他发达经济实体 （欧元区、英国、欧盟、加拿大、日本、澳大利亚及新西兰）从2008年 的第二季度开始衰退，此后发生于9月和10月的金融风暴进一步加剧了全球的信贷萎缩。


This contraction has become even more severe since then.	这种收缩态势自此以后愈演愈烈。


There is now also the beginning of a hard landing in emerging markets as the recession in advanced economies, falling commodity prices, and capital flight take their toll on growth.	随着发达经济实体衰退，商品经济价格下降，资本外流对经济增长造成危害， 新兴市场的经济硬着陆现在也开始发生了。


Indeed, the world should expect a near recession in Russia and Brazil in 2009, owing to low commodity prices, and a sharp slowdown in China and India that will be the equivalent of a hard landing (growth well below potential) for these countries.	事实上，由于商品价格偏低，世界可能将于2009年目睹俄罗斯和巴西的准衰退，中国和印度则会大大放慢速度，这对于这些国家来说就等同于硬着陆（增长大大低于潜能）。


Other emerging markets in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe will not fare better, and some may experience full-fledged financial crises.	位于亚洲、非洲、拉美和欧洲的其他新兴市场也好不到哪儿去，有些可能还会经历彻底的金融危机。


Indeed, more than a dozen emerging-market economies now face severe financial pressures: Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine in Europe; Indonesia, Korea, and Pakistan in Asia; and Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela in Latin America.	其实有超过12个新兴市场经济体现在正面临严重的金融压力： 欧洲的白俄罗斯、保加利亚、爱沙尼亚、匈牙利、拉脱维亚、立陶宛、罗马尼亚、土耳其和乌克兰； 亚洲的印度尼西亚、韩国和巴基斯坦；


Most of these economies can avoid the worst if they implement the appropriate policy adjustments and if the international financial institutions (including the IMF) provide enough lending to cover their external financing needs.	拉丁美洲的阿根廷、厄瓜多尔和委内瑞拉。 如果自身适当调整政策，而国际金融机构（包括国际货币基金组织）也提供足够的借款来满足它们的外部金融需要，上述经济体中的绝大部份都能够避免最坏的情况发生。


With a global recession a near certainty, deflation – rather than inflation – will become the main concern for policymakers.	由于全球性的衰退几乎无法避免，紧缩—而不是膨胀—将变成决策者关注的主要事宜。


The fall in aggregate demand while potential aggregate supply has been rising because of overinvestment by China and other emerging markets will sharply reduce inflation.	当潜在的总供给因为中国和其他新兴市场的过度投资而保持增加的时候，总需求的滑落将极大地削减通胀。


Slack labor markets with rising unemployment rates will cap wage and labor costs.	失业率上升和劳动力市场疲软将会限制工资和劳动力成本。


Further falls in commodity prices – already down 30% from their summer peak – will add to these deflationary pressures.	商品价格的进一步滑落—比起夏季高点它们已经下降了30%—将会加剧紧缩的压力。


Policymakers will have to worry about a strange beast called “stag-deflation” (a combination of economic stagnation/recession and deflation); about liquidity traps (when official interest rates become so close to zero that traditional monetary policy loses effectiveness); and about debt deflation (the rise in the real value of nominal debts, increasing the risk of bankruptcy for distressed households, firms, financial institutions, and governments).	担心流动性陷阱（当官方利率趋近为零时，传统的货币政策就无效了）； 担心债务紧缩（名义负债的实际价值增��，这会加剧受困的家庭，公司，金融机构和政府的破产风险）。


With traditional monetary policy becoming less effective, non-traditional policy tools aimed at generating greater liquidity and credit (via quantitative easing and direct central bank purchases of private illiquid assets) will become necessary.	随着传统的货币政策开始失效，以刺激增加流动性和信贷（通过定量宽松的货币政策和央行直接购买私有的非流动资产）为目标的非传统型政策工具就变得必不可少了。


And, while traditional fiscal policy (government spending and tax cuts) will be pursued aggressively, non- traditional fiscal policy (expenditures to bail out financial institutions, lenders, and borrowers) will also become increasingly important.	而且，当传统的金融政策（政府花费和减税）大行其道时，非传统性的金融政策（花钱帮助金融机构，放贷人和借款人脱离困境）也将变得越来越重要。


In the process, the role of states and governments in economic activity will be vastly expanded.	在这个过程中，国家和政府在经济活动中的作用将大幅度扩张。


Traditionally, central banks have been the lenders of last resort, but now they are becoming the lenders of first and only resort.	中央银行是传统上的最后救助放贷方，但是现在他们变成了最先放贷方和唯一救助方。


As banks curtail lending to each other, to other financial institutions, and to the corporate sector, central banks are becoming the only lenders around.	由于银行限制借钱给彼此，借钱给其他金融机，借钱给公司方，央行正在变成唯一的放贷方。


Likewise, with household consumption and business investment collapsing, governments will soon become the spenders of first and only resort, stimulating demand and rescuing banks, firms, and households.	同样，随着家庭消费和商业投资的崩溃，政府将很快成为第一位的消费者和唯一的救助方来刺激需求，拯救银行、公司和家庭。


The long-term consequences of the resulting surge in fiscal deficits are serious.	造成财政赤字激增的长期后果是严重的。


If the deficits are monetized by central banks, inflation will follow the short-term deflationary pressures; if they are financed by debt, the long-term solvency of some governments may be at stake unless medium-term fiscal discipline is restored.	如果央行把赤字货币化，短期紧缩压力后随之而来的就是通货膨胀，如果使用债务来为赤字筹措资金，某些政府的长期偿还能力会成问题，除非恢复中等期限的财政制度。


Nevertheless, in the short run, very aggressive monetary and fiscal policy actions – both traditional and non-traditional – must be undertaken to ensure that the inevitable stag-deflation of 2009 does not persist into 2010 and beyond.	不过，短期内必须执行非常强硬的货币和财政政策（传统的和非传统的），从而确保滞缩不会延续到2010年及其之后，虽然2009年已经无法避免这次滞缩。


So far, the US response appears to be more aggressive than that of the euro zone, as the European Central Bank falls behind the curve on interest rates and the EU’s fiscal stance remains weak.	到目前为止，美国的反应看上去比欧元区更强硬，因为欧洲央行在利率曲线上已经落后，而欧盟的金融立场依然比较软弱。


Given the severity of this economic and financial crisis, financial markets will not mend for a while.	考虑到这次经济和金融危机的严重性，金融市场不会在短期内恢复。


The downside risks to the prices of a wide variety of risky assets (equities, corporate bonds, commodities, housing, and emerging-market asset classes) will remain until there are true signs – towards the end of 2009 – that the global economy may recover in 2010.	除非趋近2009年年末左右的确有迹象显示全球经济将可能在2010年复苏，多种风险资产（股票，公司债券，商品，房屋，新兴市场的资产类别）的价格将依然面临不利风险。


Has Neo-Liberalism Failed Mexico?	新自由主义败给了墨西哥？ / 新自由主义兵败墨西哥？


Six years ago, I was ready to conclude that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was a major success.	如果是在六年前，我定会告诉你说北美自由贸易协定确实是一大成功之作。


The key argument in favor of NAFTA had been that it was the most promising road the United States could take to raise the chances for Mexico to become democratic and prosperous, and that the US had both a strong selfish interest and a strong neighborly duty to try to help Mexico develop.	对北美自由贸易协定持支持态度的一方之所以看好其前景，主要是认为美国可以借此大大增进墨西哥的民主和繁荣，无论是出于其自身利益还是作为墨西哥的邻国而言，美国都应该并且有责任对其发展施以助力。


Since NAFTA, Mexican real GDP has grown at 3.6% per year, and exports have boomed, going from 10% of GDP in 1990 and 17% of GDP in 1999 to 28% of GDP today.	自协定签订以来，墨西哥的实际国内生产总值已达到了3. 6％的年增长水平，随着出口贸易的日渐兴盛，其国内生产总值也随之持续增长，从1990年的10％，增加至1999年的17％，一直到现在的28％。


Next year, Mexico’s real exports will be five times what they were in 1990.	预计到明年，墨西哥的实际出口量将达到其1990年的五倍水平。


It is here – in the rapid development of export industries and the dramatic rise in export volumes – that NAFTA made the difference.	正因它如此神奇的造就了出口业的飞速发展和出口量的成倍增长，北美自由贸易协定才堪称是一大成功。


NAFTA guarantees Mexican producers tariff and quota-free access to the US market, the largest consumer market in the world.	该协定有效的保障了墨西哥生产商不受关税和配额限制自由进入美国这一全球最大的消费者市场。


Without this guarantee, fewer would have invested in the capacity to satisfy the US market.	如果不是因为这一协定，可能如今也就不会有那么多墨西哥商人为了进军美国市场而追加资本，扩充实力。


Increasing trade between the US and Mexico moves both countries toward a greater degree of specialization and a finer division of labor in important industries like autos, where labor-intensive portions are increasingly accomplished in Mexico, and textiles, where high-tech spinning and weaving is increasingly done in the US, while Mexico carries out lower-tech cutting and sewing.	随着两国之间相互贸易的不断增加，一些主要行业的专业化程度更高，劳动分工也更细，例如：汽车行业――在墨西哥，越来愈多的劳动密集型产业已逐渐成型； 纺织业――美国不断研制出高科技的纺织和编织技术，而墨西哥却还在使用低级的手工裁剪和缝纫。


Such efficiency gains from increasing the extent of the market and promoting specialization should have produced rapid growth in Mexican productivity.	随着市场的扩大和专业化技术的增进，墨西哥的生产能力将会因此而飞速的发展。


Likewise, greater efficiency should have been reinforced by a boom in capital formation, which should have accompanied the guarantee that no future wave of protectionism in the US would shut factories in Mexico.	另外，由于协定的签订，墨西哥将不再收到美国贸易保护主义的影响，资本市场的繁荣也将大大增进其生产效率。


The key word here is “should.”	然而，在上述种种情况的描述中，我们当强调的是 “应该”一词。


Today’s 100 million Mexicans have real incomes – at purchasing power parity – of roughly $10,000 per year, a quarter of the current US level.	目前，墨西哥拥有实际收入的人口大约为1亿，以购买力平价衡量，其平均年收入约为10,000美元，相当于美国目前人均收入水平的四分之一。


They are investing perhaps a fifth of GDP in gross fixed capital formation – a healthy amount – and have greatly expanded their integration into the world (i.e., the North American) economy since NAFTA.	我们可以假设，他们可能是将其国内生产总值的五分之一（一个比较理想的份额）作为固定资本进行投资，并且，在北美自由贸易协定签订以后，他们也更多的投入于国际市场（例如北美）。


But the 3.6% rate of growth of GDP, coupled with a 2.5% per year rate of population and increase, means that Mexicans’ mean income is barely 15% above that of the pre-NAFTA days, and that the gap between their mean income and that of the US has widened.	6％的国内生产总值的增长速度和2. 5％的年平均人口增长速度来看，墨西哥的人均收入水平较协定签订以前，也只不过是提高了15％，而它与美国的人均收入水平之间的差距仍在不断的扩大。


Because of rising inequality, the overwhelming majority of Mexicans live no better off than they did 15 years ago.	由于增长的不平衡，绝大多数墨西哥人的生活和他们15年前相比，实际并没有好多少。


(Indeed, the only part of Mexican development that has been a great success has been the rise in incomes and living standards that comes from increased migration to the US, and increased remittances sent back to Mexico.)	（事实上，在墨西哥的发展过程中，唯一的幸运儿就是那些移民美国的墨西哥人，这些人的收入和生活水平确实有了相当的提高，而随着移民数量的增加，汇往墨西哥国内的汇款当然也就更多了！ ）


Intellectually, this is a great puzzle: we believe in market forces, and in the benefits of trade, specialization, and the international division of labor.	因此，我们感到非常困惑，因为我们深信市场力的作用，相信贸易、专业化和国际分工能推动生产力的发展。


We see the enormous increase in Mexican exports to the US over the past decade.	在过去的十年里，我们看到了墨西哥向美国的出口量的确是大有提高。


We see great strengths in the Mexican economy – a stable macroeconomic environment, fiscal prudence, low inflation, little country risk, a flexible labor force, a strengthened and solvent banking system, successfully reformed poverty-reduction programs, high earnings from oil, and so on.	同时，我们也看到了墨西哥的经济实力，它有稳定的整体经济，财政情况良好，通货膨胀低，国家风险小，劳动力市场灵活，银行系统强健并有一定的偿付能力，政府扶贫计划的有效实施，以��来自原油行业的高额收入等等。


Yet successful neo-liberal policies have not delivered the rapid increases in productivity and working-class wages that neo-liberals like me would have confidently predicted had we been told back in 1995 that Mexican exports would multiply five-fold in the next twelve years.	然而，新自由主义的成功实施并未能带来生产力和工人工资水平的迅速提升，因此，诸如本人这样的新自由主义者甚至有些感怀1995年时的美好时光，至少那时我们还可以信心满满的预言说“在未来的十二年里，墨西哥的出口量将有望增长5倍！ ”


To be sure, economic deficiencies still abound in Mexico.	说的更准确一些，墨西哥的经济其实还是存在很多问题的。


According to the OECD, these include a very low average number of years of schooling, with young workers having almost no more formal education than their older counterparts; little on-the-job training; heavy bureaucratic burdens on firms; corrupt judges and police; high crime rates; and a large, low-productivity informal sector that narrows the tax base and raises tax rates on the rest of the economy.	经合组织（OECD）调查显示，主要的问题是在于墨西哥的人口平均受教育年限较低，很多青年工作者甚至比现有的较为年长的工作者学历水平更低； 在职培训相对较少；


But these deficiencies should not be enough to neutralize Mexico’s powerful geographic advantages and the potent benefits of neo-liberal policies, should they?	以及大量的低生产率的非正式劳动群体对经济其他方面造成影响，限制了税收基数和税率的提高。 然而，我们认为，即使有上述诸多缺陷的存在，墨西哥的强大地理优势以及新自由主义政策实施以后所带来的种种利益应当还不至于被完全抹煞，难道不是吗？


Apparently they are.	可惜事实并非如此。


The demographic burden of a rapidly growing labor force appears to be greatly increased when that labor force is not very literate, especially when inadequate infrastructure, crime, and official corruption also take their toll.	对于未能完全解放的劳动力而言，劳动力的增长速度越快，其人口负担所造成的影响也就越重，如果其基础建设不完全，犯罪问题严重，腐败的官僚还要再剥削一番，那么情况就更加严重了。


We neo-liberals point out that NAFTA did not cause poor infrastructure, high crime, and official corruption.	作为一位新自由主义者，我在这里要声明的是北美自由贸易协定绝对不是导致基础建设薄弱、高犯罪率以及官僚腐败的罪魁祸首。


We thus implicitly suggest that Mexicans would be far wose off today without NAFTA and its effects weighing in on the positive side of the scale.	言下之意，我们认为如果没有北美自由贸易协定，那么墨西哥今天的情况将会更糟，就协定本身而言，它给墨西哥带来的更多的还是积极有利的一面。


That neo-liberal story may be true.	新自由主义的那些故事也许是真的。


But it is an excuse. It may not be true.	当然，我们也有理由说，他们并不是真的。


Having witnessed Mexico’s slow growth over the past 15 years, we can no longer repeat the old mantra that the neo-liberal road of NAFTA and associated reforms is clearly and obviously the right one.	亲眼目睹了墨西哥在过去15年里的缓慢发展，现在，我们不得不质疑北美自由贸易协定的新自由主义和改革之路是否真是一条通向成功的康庄大道呢？


Has Oil Production Peaked?	原油产量已达顶峰？


OXFORD – Throughout the history of the oil industry, fear and concern about the imminent exhaustion of oil reserves has been a recurring theme.	发自牛津——贯穿整个石油工业史，有关石油储量即将枯竭的恐惧和担忧已经成了一个反复翻炒的话题。


Such sentiments often spread and capture the public imagination at times of rapidly rising oil demand, sharp spikes in energy prices, and geo-political uncertainty.	这种情绪还常常四处传播，不时占据公众对于石油需求剧增，能源价格飙升以及由此而来的地缘政治不稳定的想象。


So today’s talk of oil scarcity, which began at the turn of the last century, should come as no surprise.	所以当今对于石油匮乏的讨论只不过是发生在上世纪末本世纪初的讨论的延续，对人们来说应该是见怪不怪了。


Believers in oil scarcity point to the sustained annual average increase of oil prices from 2002 to 2008, declining output in many areas of the world, and the absence (until recently off the coast of Brazil) of large-scale oil discoveries in the last few decades. All these factors lend credence to the view that oil production has peaked.	“石油枯竭论”者指出，自2002年至2008年持续上涨的年平均油价以及全球多个地区不断下滑的石油产量，加上近几十年来大规模油田发现的减少（直到最近巴西海岸大型油田的发现才出现转机），所有事实都证明了一个观点，那就是石油生产量已经达到顶峰。


In the face of relentless demand-side pressure, driven mainly by high-growth countries like China and India, some predict stratospheric energy prices, supply shortages, economic and social hardship, and even resource wars.	面对高速发展的中印等国持续不断的需求压力，有人因此预测说未来能源价格将保持高昂、能源供给短缺，经济和社会都将面临困境，甚至将因此引发能源战争。


Given that oil is a non-renewable resource, in a sense the world is always running out of it.	鉴于石油是种不可再生能源，在某种意义上说全世界确实正在耗尽其储量。


Unless global demand collapses, at some point in the future oil production will peak and eventually be exhausted.	除非国际需求突然萎缩，未来石油生产将会在某一节点上达到顶峰并趋于枯竭。


But this prediction is close to a tautology.	但是这样的预言简直跟废话无异。


For it to be useful, believers in scarce oil must be able to predict such things as the timing of the oil peak, the state of demand when oil production reaches it, and the pattern of decline.	如果想令预言有意义，这些石油恐慌论者们必须同样预言石油生产顶峰到来的时间，那时候的能源需求状况，以及产量的下滑模式。


But the track record of “peak oil” theorists on such matters has not been impressive: their predictions have steadily moved forward the date that global oil production will peak.	然而那些持“石油顶峰论”的理论家们的预测成绩却并不能令人信服； 他们不断推翻自己的预测，将国际石油产量达到顶峰的日期向后推延。


Worse still, they have made no serious attempt to identify why their earlier predictions have had to be revised.	更糟的是，他们也没有认真尝试去说明，自己先前的预测被迫一再修正的原因是什么。


A major problem is that such predictions often confuse resources with reserves.	而这些预言的一个主要的问题，就是他们常常把“资源”同“储量”混为一谈。


Resources are the available volumes of hydrocarbon without reference to constraints as to their accessibility and/or cost.	须知“资源”是指在不考虑可开采性和/或成本限制情况下，碳氢化合物的可利用量。


Resources impose an upper bound on what ultimately can be produced; thus, it is the relevant concept for determining the likely dates of peak production and ultimate exhaustion.	“资源”代表着最终可生产量的最大值，因此，它是决定产量到达最高峰以及最终枯竭日期的相关概念。


If the volume of oil resources were known with certainty, and if we could accurately predict the growth of oil consumption, calculating the imminence of exhaustion would be simple.	如果石油资源的数量是确切可知，又如果可以精确预测石油消费增长趋势的话，计算石油枯竭的日期就变得非常简单。


But these are big “ifs” – especially given the high level of uncertainty regarding the ultimate volume of oil resources.	但这不过是些空乏的“如果”——尤其在考虑到关于石油资源终极储量的如此高的不确定性之时。


While peak oil theorists have strong views about that, they do not allow for all the current and future technological possibilities that might increase resources.	然而当“石油顶峰论”者们对自己的观点自信满满之时，他们却没有考虑到任何目前或者未来在技术上提高资源量的技术可能性。


Indeed, given the difficulty in estimating the total size of resources, many consider peak oil theories irrelevant.	事实上，由于估量整个石油资源数量非常困难，许多人都认为“石油顶峰论”是不切实际的。


Fortunately, the focus of the debate is on reserves and not resources.	但幸运的是，争论的焦点是在于石油的储量，而非资源。


Reserves are defined as the quantities of petroleum that are expected to be commercially recoverable from known fields.	“储量”被定义为“能够从已知油田通过商业化挖掘所获得的原油数量”。


The concept of reserves is technical and economic, not geological.	石油储量的概念是从技术和经济方面，并非是从地质学方面界定的。


It is also a non-static concept, as estimates of reserves will generally be revised upwards or downwards as additional geologic or engineering data become available, as technology improves, and/or as economic conditions (such as oil prices and production costs) change.	石油储量同样也是一个无法统计的概念，它会因为额外的地质或工程数据的采用而在整体上向上或向下调整，也可能随着科技进步，以及/或经济条件（比如原油价格和生产成本）的改变而改变。


In fact, the bulk of recent growth in world reserves is due not to new discoveries, but mainly to reserve growth and improved recovery rates.	其实，近年来国际石油储备增长的绝大部分并不依赖新油田的发现，而是主要依靠提高现有油田产量以及开采速度的提高。


Moreover, despite what many believe, crude oil is far from being a homogenous product.	此外，不管多数人是否相信，原油都远远不是一种单一类型的产品。


There is a fossil carbon continuum ranging from easy, conventional oil, to deep and ultra-deep offshore oil, to extra-heavy crude oil.	原油家族成员从容易获取的常规石油，到深层、超深层海洋石油，再到超重原油，数量众多。


With technological progress and rising oil prices, most of these reserves will become conventional, helping to push back peak oil for years.	随着技术进步和油价的提升，这些石油的开采都将变成常规操作，并将“石油峰值论”再向后推延数年。


The failure to distinguish clearly between resources and reserves – and to recognize the importance of prices, costs, and technology in transforming resources into reserves – results in bad predictions about an imminent peak in oil production and misinformation that has had a negative impact on policymaking.	石油峰值论者没能地清楚区分石油资源和石油储量两者之间的概念——同时也未能认识到把资源转换成储量过程中价格、成本以及技术的因素的重要性——不但导致了他们对即将来临的石油产量峰值的不断估计错误，还导致信息误传，对政策制订产生了负面影响。


Rather than focusing on the major short- and long-term challenges facing the oil industry, the debate about peak oil diverts attention to the wrong problems.	有关石油峰值的争论把公众的注意力引向了错误的话题，而不是将目光集中在石油工业所面临的主要长期与短期挑战之上。


In the short term, there are concerns that oil production will peak soon, owing not to the unavailability of reserves, but to obstacles to investment – for example, access to reserves, sanctions, and policy uncertainty.	在短期来说，有人担忧石油产量很快将在达到顶峰，但不是因为石油储量耗尽，而是由于阻碍投资的因素——比如进入某些石油储备国的路径被切断及对其的制裁，以及政策不确定性。


Some who believe in the imminence of peak oil consider these barriers essentially irrelevant, arguing that their removal would merely delay the peak for a few years.	某些确信石油峰值迫近的人认为，这些障碍影响不大，清除这些障碍只能把峰值的到来拖后几年时间。


But, in the long term, the challenge is how to make the transition to a new and sustainable energy path, and to evaluate the political, economic, social and climate costs associated with this transition.	但是长远来看，真正的挑战在于如何向可持续的新型能源途径转变，并且能够正确评估与这个转变相联系的政治、经济、社会和气候成本。


Unfortunately, that debate has not yet started.	不幸的是，类似的辩论还尚未开始。


The current tone surrounding the peak oil debate is reminiscent of that surrounding the global war on terror, with the phrase “you’re either with us or against us” recycled to polarize observers and analysts.	现在，围绕石油峰值论所产生的论调不禁令人回想起在反恐战争论辩中弥漫的论调：“你要么站在我们这边，要么站在敌人那边”。 如今这句话重新将众多观察员和分析家切割为两派。


But as in any other debate, once extreme positions dominate, the real problems are trivialized and marginalized.	不过就像其他任何论辩一样，一旦极端派占据上风，真正的问题就被众人所忽视，最终被边缘化。


Healing the Depressed Brain	治疗抑郁的大脑


Scientists and mental health professionals have made major strides in understanding and treating major depression, including the discovery of the role played by imbalances in brain chemicals such as serotonin and noradrenaline.	科学家和精神健康专业人士在主导型抑郁症的理解和治疗方面已取得重大的进展，包括发现了血清素和去甲肾上腺素等脑化学物的不平衡所起的作用。


But there is increasing evidence that there is more to the story: depression also involves structural changes in areas of the brain that are involved in mood, memory, and decision-making.	但是，越来越多的证据显示，事情并不仅仅如此：抑郁症还涉及到大脑分管情绪、记忆和做决定的区域发生的结构性变化。


Depression is often precipitated by stressful experiences.	压力过大的经历常会突然引起抑郁症。


The brain interprets our experiences and decides if they are threatening, and then controls our behavioral and physiological responses to them.	大脑会解读我们的经历，判断这些经历是否具有威胁性，从而控制我们相应的行为和生理反应。


Data obtained from animal experiments show that harmful physiological changes result from the inability of the brain and body to respond to repeated stress with adaptive modifications in structure and function.	从动物实验中获得的数据显示，有害的生理变化是因为大脑和身体不能用结构和功能上的适应性调整对反复的压力做出回应而造成的。


Three brain areas - the hippocampus, the prefrontal cortex, and the amygdala - are particularly susceptible to pathological changes in size and function.	三个大脑区域--海马、前额叶皮层、类扁桃体--特别容易受到大小和功能病理变化的影响。


These areas are instrumental in interpreting what is stressful and in determining appropriate responses.	这些区域有助于解读压力，决定恰当的反应。


Many chemical mediators are involved, including cortisol and adrenalin from the adrenal glands, other hormones and neurotransmitters (such as serotonin and noradrenalin), and responses from the autonomic and immune systems.	许多化学调节因子也参与其中，包括肾上腺分泌的血浆皮质醇和肾上腺素、其他的荷尔蒙和神经传递素（如血清素和去甲肾上腺素）、以及自律系统和免疫系统的反应。


Depression thus leads to changes in the rest of the body, owing to long-term chemical imbalances in the systems that control the heart, the immune system, and metabolism.	由于控制心脏、免疫系统和新陈代谢的系统中化学物质长期不平衡，从而发生抑郁症并导致身体其他部位的变化。


The hippocampus, a key structure in the formation of memories of events and contexts, expresses receptors that enable it to respond to stress hormones in the blood.	形成事件和经过的记忆的关键组织海马具有感受器，使它能够对血液中的应激荷尔蒙做出反应。


We now know that it atrophies in a number of psychiatric disorders.	我们现在知道，在许多精神疾病中，海马会萎缩。


Within the hippocampus - a curved elongated ridge located in each of the brain's two temporal lobes - is a structure called the dentate gyrus, which produces new neurons throughout adult life.	海马是大脑两个颞叶上细长弯曲的凸起。 海马内有一个叫做齿状回的组织，在整个成人时期产生新的神经元。


Chronic stress inhibits neurogenesis and also causes many hippocampal neurons to shrink - a process called "remodeling."	慢性压力会抑制神经元的生成，同时致使许多海马神经元收缩--这个过程被称为"再塑"。


Animal studies have shown that the stress hormone cortisol, together with neurotransmitters in the brain, also plays an important role in the remodeling of neurons.	动物研究显示，应激荷尔蒙血浆皮质醇、以及大脑中的神经传递素在神经元的再塑中也发挥着重要作用。


Similarly, there is evidence that the prefrontal cortex - a key structure in emotional regulation as well as in decision-making and working memory - shrinks in major depression.	同样地，有证据显示，在主导型抑郁症中，前额叶皮层--情绪调节、做决定以及工作记忆的关键组织--也会萎缩。


On the other hand, rather than atrophying, the amygdala, the seat of emotional memories, becomes hyperactive both in post-traumatic stress disorder and depressive illness, and there is evidence from animal studies of a hypertrophy of nerve cells after repeated stress.	另一方面，在创伤后压力障碍症和抑郁症中，类扁桃体--感情记忆的所在--非但不萎缩，还会变得亢进。 动物研究得到的证据还显示反复的压力之后神经细胞会变得过度肥大。


A hyperactive amygdala, along with abnormal activity in other regions of the brain, leads to disrupted patterns of sleep and physical activity, as well as irregular patterns of secretion of hormones and other chemical mediators that control many of the body's structures.	亢进的类扁桃体，加上大脑其他区域的不正常活动，会导致中断的睡眠模式和身体活动，以及控制身体许多组织的荷尔蒙和其他化学调节因子的无规律分泌。


For example, levels of the stress hormone cortisol increase in the evening, when they are normally low.	例如，应激荷尔蒙血浆皮质醇水平会在夜间升高，而正常情况下应该保持低水平。


Over time, if uncorrected, major depression can cause such conditions as progressive mineral loss from bones, accumulation of abdominal fat, increased blood platelet reactivity, and increased risk of cardiovascular disease.	如果置之不理，长此以往，主导型抑郁症可能引起进行性骨质流失、腹部脂肪的堆积、血小板反应增强、以及增加罹患心血管疾病的风险。


Moreover, certain types of antidepressants may contribute to some of these conditions.	而且，某些类型的抗抑郁药可也能促成以上疾病的产生。


Nevertheless, one of the most interesting features of these structural changes is that they can be prevented, and potentially reversed, with medication.	不过，这些组织变化最有意思的特点是他们可以用药物预防，甚至逆转。


Indeed, in key respects depression is comparable to Cushing's disease, a disorder cause by excessive production of cortisol.	的确，抑郁症在某些关键方面与库欣氏症（一种因血浆皮质醇的过量产生而导致的疾病）相类。


The elevated cortisol in Cushing's patients is higher than that found in major depression, but the psychiatric and somatic features of Cushing's disease are strikingly similar: melancholia, depression, abdominal obesity, bone mineral loss, and increased risk for cardiovascular disease, along with shrinkage of the hippocampus and memory impairment.	库欣氏症患者体内升高的血浆皮质醇含量高于主导型抑郁症患者，但是库欣氏症的精神和身体特征却惊人相似：忧郁、抑郁、腹部肥大、骨质流失、更高的心血管疾病风险、以及海马的萎缩和记忆障碍。


The good news from Cushing's disease is that hippocampal shrinkage and memory impairment is at least partially reversible over several years after correction of the excess cortisol.	对于库欣氏症的好消息是，在改善了多余的血浆皮质醇后，经过数年，萎缩的海马和记忆障碍可以至少部分地逆转。


This encourages the belief that structural changes in the brain that are associated with major depression can be prevented or even reversed with the right medications and other treatments.	这个消息让人相信，使用正确的药物和其他治疗方法，大脑中因主导型抑郁症引起的组织变化可以得到预防，或者甚至逆转。


For example, neurogenesis in the dentate gyrus that is suppressed by acute and chronic stress is elevated by many antidepressant treatments.	例如，齿状回中因急性或慢性压力而受到抑制的神经元的生成，在经过多种抗抑郁药治疗后得以提高。


Still, one of the problems with many of the current medications is that, even with treatment, the recurrence of major depression is very high - around 70-80%.	而当前许多药物的问题之一是，即使伴随着治疗，主导型抑郁症复发的几率仍非常高--大约70-80%。


This suggests that physiological processes underlying depression - the ones that may also lead to structural changes in the brain - are not being completely arrested, and thus that a new generation of anti-depressant medications is urgently needed.	这意味着抑郁症背后的生理过程--那些可能同时引起大脑组织变化的生理过程--没有被完全抑制，因此，我们急需新一代的抗抑郁药。


If so, new, the new antidepressants would have to target what appear to be progressive neurodegenerative changes in the brain, which we infer are taking place because recurrence of depression is so high under currently available treatments.	如果是这样，新的抗抑郁药必须对准大脑中看起来像进行性神经退化的变化。 我们推断这些变化存在，是因为在当前可用的治疗方法下，抑郁症复发的几率太高。


Lithium, a mood stabilizer and neuroprotective agent, has the properties we are seeking, although its toxicity makes it less than ideal.	锂，一种情绪稳定剂和神经保护剂，就具备我们所寻求的特性，不过其毒性使之不太理想。


As ever, the challenge facing medical researchers is to develop more effective treatments without reducing their safety.	医学研究人员面临的挑战仍然是开发更加有效的治疗方法，同时不降低其安全性。


Healing the Sick Man of South Asia	救治南亚病夫


LAHORE – Pakistan is undergoing three transitions simultaneously.	发自拉合尔——巴基斯坦正在同时进行着三大转型。


How they unfold matters not only for Pakistan, but also for much of the Muslim world, particularly as the Arab Spring forces change upon governments across the wider Middle East.	而这些转型如何展开不仅事关巴基斯坦人自身，还将影响到穆斯林世界中的大部分人，尤其是在阿拉伯之春令大中东地区的许多政府都发生了更替的情况下。


Most Muslim countries were governed for decades by autocrats who had either emerged directly from the armed forces, or had strong “khaki” support.	大多数穆斯林国家都曾长期处于独裁者的统治之下，这些人要么直接崛起于军界，要么背后拥有强大的军队支持。


That was the case in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and, of course, Pakistan.	从前的埃及、利比亚，也门和叙利亚都是如此，当然，巴基斯坦也毫不例外。


The Arab Spring drained away whatever spurious legitimacy that style of governance ever had.	阿拉伯之春使这种管制风格的虚假合法性丧失殆尽。


But, in Pakistan, delegitimation of military rule had actually occurred three years earlier, and the pressure for change came from much the same source – a restive and mobilized new middle class.	但在巴基斯坦，军队统治的去合法化其实在3年前就启动了，而这种变革的力量来源也与阿拉伯之春大同小异——那些不愿屈服于专制且成功动员起来的新中产阶级。


Several decades ago, the American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington argued that economic prosperity in developing countries with weak governing institutions would not necessarily lead to political stability.	数十年前，美国政治科学家萨缪尔森·P·亨廷顿（Samuel P. Huntington）指出发展中国家在弱政府管制下的经济繁荣并不一定会导致政治稳定。


On the contrary, economic growth in such contexts can be – and often is – politically destabilizing.	相反，在这种情况下的经济发展可能——而且经常会——导致政治动荡。


That proved to be the case in Turkey and Pakistan in the 1990’s and early 2000’s, and later in much of the Arab world.	这一推论在1990年代的土耳其以及2000年代初的巴基斯坦都成为了现实，并随后在阿拉伯世界应验了。


Indeed, the rising aspirations of Arab youth in Egypt and Tunisia, the wellspring of the Arab Spring, followed impressive economic growth that had failed to trickle down.	事实上令人瞩目的经济增长带来的就是埃及和突尼斯阿拉伯青年不断上升的预期——也随之推动了阿拉伯之春。


And such rising expectations have been visible in all large Muslim countries.	而这类上升预期在所有大型穆斯林国家都随处可见。


As Huntington suggested, when young people see their economies grow, they begin to demand participation in decisions that affect all aspects of their lives, not just their economic well-being.	正如亨廷顿所说，当青年人见证了经济增长之后，他们开始要求参与到与生活各方面相关的决策之后，而不仅仅是在经济方面。


Military-dominated political systems precluded such participation, so, with economic growth, demilitarization of politics became a rallying cry in all large military-led Muslim states, from Indonesia to the Mediterranean coast.	但由军队占统治地位的政治系统排斥这类参与，因此随着经济不断增长，政治的去军队化成为所有大型军管穆斯林国家——从印尼到地中海沿岸——的群众呼声。


Even Iran, where the Revolutionary Guards control roughly one-third of the economy, was affected when the result of the presidential election in 2009 triggered large anti-government protests in Tehran and other major cities.	即便是伊朗这个革命卫队控制全国经济总量1/3的国家也受到了影响——2009年的总统选举在德黑兰以其各大城市引发了大规模反政府示威。


But demilitarization means more than transferring power and policymaking from the armed forces to elected parliaments.	但去军事化意味着将权力和政治决策从军队更多地转移到选举产生的议会手中。


In their recent book Why Nations Fail, the economists Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson suggest that elections – even those that are free and fair – do not necessarily move societies from what they call “extractive” to “inclusive” systems.	在新书《为何国家会失败》中，经济学家达隆·艾瑟莫戈鲁（Daron Acemoglu）和詹姆斯·鲁宾逊（James Robinson）认为选举——即便是自由和公平的——并不一定能使社会从一个“抽取性”系统转型成为一个“包容性”系统。


Indeed, extraction of a country’s wealth for use by the elite can occur even in democratic societies when those who dominate the political system face no constraints other than periodic elections.	事实上，如果政治系统的支配者们除了周期性选举之外并未受到其他限制的话，那么抽取国家财富来为精英服务的情况在民主社会中也会发生。


This is where the effort to devise institutional mechanisms to check and balance elite behavior enters the picture.	这也是为何要设计体制性机制来制衡精英阶层行为的原因。


Indeed, the search for such mechanisms is precisely what is now underway in Pakistan.	其实对这类机制的探索也在当今的巴基斯坦也已经开展了。


In Pakistan, a discredited military was forced by public opinion to withdraw from power, creating political space for elected representatives.	在巴基斯坦，一个失信的军队在舆论压力下被剥夺了权力，并为民选代表创造了政治空间。


They assumed control (though not over the military), but did not govern wisely.	他们获得了控制权（即便不是通过军队），却不懂得如何明智地行使它。


While their personal wealth increased, living standards for everyone else either stagnated or, for lower-income groups, declined.	于是随着这些代表的财富与日俱增，其他人的生活水平却停滞不前，低收入群体甚至更加贫困。


So, as Pakistan negotiated its political transition, it experienced significant economic decline.	因此在巴基斯坦政治转型的过程中就经历了严重的经济衰退。


As a result, Pakistan’s judiciary, media, and many civil-society organizations are now engaged in attempts not only to keep the soldiers in their barracks, but also to constrain the political establishment’s rapacious behavior.	结果巴基斯坦的司法界，媒体和许多公民社会组织如今不仅致力于限制军队，还要制止新政治体制中的掠夺行为。


Three cases before the country’s increasingly assertive Supreme Court promise to take Pakistan from the phase of demilitarization to a system in which meaningful checks can be exercised on those who wield power.	而在将巴基斯坦从去军事化转型到一个可以对掌权人物实施有效制衡的承诺方面，自信程度日渐增加的巴基斯坦最高法院审理了三大案件。


One case is an attempt to force Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani’s administration to reopen proceedings in a Swiss court that were examining charges of money-laundering and misuse of public funds by President Asif Ali Zardari.	第一个案件就是要求总理吉拉尼的政府重开一个瑞士法庭指控总统扎尔达里洗钱以及挪用公共基金的审判进程。


The Swiss proceedings were stopped at the request of the Pakistani government when Zardari became president.	该进程在扎尔达里当选总统后就在巴基斯坦政府的要求下停止了。


In the second case, the Supreme Court wants Pakistan’s military intelligence agencies to account for hundreds, if not thousands, of missing people who were detained as part of the agencies’ campaign to contain the rise of Islamic extremism, or to undermine separatist aspirations in restive Baluchistan.	第二个案件则是最高法院要求巴基斯坦军方情报机构交代数百名（可能还不止这个数）失踪人员的下落，这些人都是在该机构打击伊斯兰极端势力或者捣毁俾路支省分裂势力时失踪的。


The third case opened an old complaint lodged by a politician decades ago against the “troika” – composed of the president, the prime minister, and the chief of army staff – that then governed Pakistan.	第三个案件则重新揭示了一位政治家在几十年前对巴基斯坦“三驾马车”——总统，总理以及武装部队总参���长——的控诉。


The plaintiff alleged that large amounts of funds were channeled to the troika’s favored candidates to contest the 1990 general election, in which Nawaz Sharif’s party won a big victory over Benazir Bhutto’s Peoples’ Party.	原告声称有巨额资金被输送到三人心仪的候选人身上以帮助其进行1990年的议会大选，当时谢里夫的政党以极大优势击败了贝布托的人民党。


Finally, Pakistan is undergoing a transition in which power is moving from the central administration to sub-national governments.	最后，巴基斯坦还在进行一个权力从中央政府转移到区域政府的转型。


The 18th amendment to the constitution, adopted in 2010, does precisely that, but implementation is being delayed by parties that prefer a highly centralized political structure.	2010年生效的宪法第18次修改案是为了这一目的，但具体的实施却被那些倾向于中央高度集权的党派拖延了。


If Pakistan’s transformation of its political system succeeds, it could serve as a model for other Muslim countries that are attempting to move from extractive to inclusive systems of governance.	如果巴基斯坦的政治系统转型成功的话，它将成为其他穆斯林国家实现从抽取性向包容性管治系统转型的楷模。


Turkey has already traveled some distance along this path.	土耳其在这方面已经取得了一些成果。


If Pakistan also advances, demilitarization of politics elsewhere in the Islamic world might not be far behind.	而如果巴基斯坦也能向前推进的话，伊斯兰世界其他国家的政治去军事化也不会太远了。


New Life in Old Age	老年人的新生活


ZURICH – Many of us have seen our aging parents or grandparents lose their independence.	苏黎世——很多人都看到过自己年迈的父母或祖父母丧失独立性。


In 2012, more than 2.4 million Americans over the age of 65 were treated in emergency rooms for injuries from falls alone.	2012年，仅跌倒受伤一项就将超过240万65岁以上的美国人送进了急诊室。


With populations worldwide aging fast, the scale of such challenges is growing exponentially, affecting not only health-care systems, but also economies, government policies, and, of course, families.	随着全球人口加速老龄化，上述挑战的规模正在呈几何级数增长，结果不仅影响到医疗保健系统，也影响到经济、政府政策、当然也少不了家庭。


The United Nations estimates that, by the middle of this century, the number of people older than 60 will double, with people over the age of 65 outnumbering – for the first time in history – children under the age of five.	联合国预测到本世纪中叶，60岁以上的人口数量将翻番，且65岁以上人口将有史以来首次超过5岁以下儿童。


The explanation for this demographic trend is straightforward: global fertility rates have plummeted, from five children per woman, on average, in 1950-1955, to 2.5 children per woman in 2010-2015.	解释这种人口趋势其实很简单：全球生育率直线下降，从1950-1955年的每位妇女生5个孩子，下降到2010-2015年的2. 5个。


Of course, aging citizens should not be viewed simply as an economic burden.	当然，不应将老年人仅仅视为一种经济负担。


In fact, they can play a positive role as active consumers – a potential that many industries have already recognized and begun to tap.	事实上，他们可以发挥消费者的积极作用——很多行业已经认识到这一潜力并开始发掘。


According to Bank of America Merrill Lynch, people over 50 are responsible for almost 60% of consumer spending in the United States.	据美林银行统计，50岁以上人口在美国消费支出中占近60%的份额。


But that does not ameliorate the seemingly intractable underlying challenge: a shrinking pool of taxpayers to support a growing number of retirees.	但这并未改变看似棘手的基本挑战：纳税人越来越少，而需要赡养的退休人员却越来越多。


This imbalance has already driven some governments to raise their retirement ages and change their pension policies to delay or reduce benefits and keep people in the workforce.	这种不平衡状况已促使一些政府提高退休年龄并修改养老金政策，以延缓或减少福利发放并将老年人留在就业队伍之中。


To keep people working longer, it is crucial to keep them healthy.	延长就业者的工作年限关键是要确保他们的健康。


That is why the health-care industry must play a significant role in efforts to address the challenges of population aging.	医疗行业因此必须在应对人口老龄化挑战方面发挥重要的作用。


Old age must be viewed not simply as an inevitable stage of life, but as an opportunity for health-care companies and systems to help people thrive.	老年不应仅仅被视作人生中的一个必然阶段，而应被视为医疗企业和系统协助人们发掘潜能的机会。


To this end, health-care companies should shift the focus of their research-and-development efforts toward conditions that are prevalent among older patients, including chronic diseases like diabetes, heart disease, glaucoma, rheumatoid arthritis, and cancer.	为此，医疗保健企业应将研发工作重点转向中老年群体易患的慢性病，包括糖尿病、心脏病、青光眼、类风湿性关节炎和癌症。


Such efforts are also vital to find ways to stem more effectively the deterioration of people’s productivity and independence, by preserving their physical strength, mental acuity, and senses like hearing and vision.	上述工作对有效遏制老年人工作效率和独立能力恶化同样至关重要，能够保持他们的体力和敏锐度，并将听力和视力等感官功能维持在一定的水平。


This is important not only for older patients themselves, but also for their families and caregivers.	这对于老年患者自身、对于他们的家人和照料者都非常重要。


One particularly promising area is regenerative medicine, which has many potential applications – including for preventing or reversing hearing loss.	能够有众多潜在应用领域的再生医学是其中一个特别有前途的领域——其中包括预防或逆转听力的丧失。


As it stands, one-third of people aged 65-70 (and half of those over 75) experience significant hearing loss, often caused by damage to or loss of inner-ear hair cells, which sense and transform sound waves into signals that register in the brain.	目前状况是65-70岁的人中有三分之一（75岁以上的人中有二分之一）往往因内耳毛细胞受损��现出显著的听力障碍，内耳毛细胞负责感知声波并将其转换成信号接受大脑的处理。


To address this issue, my company, Novartis, is testing a compound called CGF166, which targets certain healthy cells in the inner ear in order to “turn on” a specific gene that stimulates hair-cell development.	为了解决这一问题，我所在的诺华公司正在测试一种名为CGF166的化合物，该化合物以内耳特定的健康细胞为标靶，争取“激活”刺激毛细胞发育的特定基因。


We have already entered the clinical-trial phase of our research, during which we will assess the tolerability and efficacy of CGF166 in treating patients with severe hearing loss.	我们的研究已经进入到临床试验阶段，在此期间，我们将评估CGF166在治疗重症听力丧失患者过程中的耐受性和有效性。


But such treatments will mean little if they are not affordable or accessible to ordinary people.	但如果普通民众难以负担或者承受，这种治疗的意义就会大打折扣。


And the current trajectory, with the burden of rising health-care costs increasingly being shifted onto patients themselves, is not encouraging.	而目前把不断上升的医疗成本越来越多地转嫁给患者自身的形势的确不容乐观。


To reverse this trend, the health-care industry must work with all stakeholders to support the financial sustainability of health-care systems, so that they can better handle the growing demand for care.	为了扭转这一趋势，医疗保健行业必须与所有利益相关方合作保持医疗保健系统在财政方面的可持续性，使它们能更好地应对不断增长的护理需求。


Success will require innovative strategies for improving patient outcomes in a financially sustainable way.	只有以财务上可以持续的方式改进患者的治疗效果，创新战略才能取得成功。


For example, the health-care industry could work with governments to offer health-enhancing services – such as remote patient monitoring, health apps, and patient-engagement tools – in addition to medications.	举例来讲，医疗保健行业可以与政府合作提供健康促进服务——如远程病人监控、健康程序和患者求诊工具——当然还有药物治疗。


Ensuring the availability of trained health workers or counselors to answer patients’ questions about their treatment or related issues like insurance could also help.	安排训练有素的医疗工作者或顾问解答患者就治疗或保险等相关事务提出的问题也能够有所帮助。


For their part, payers – both governments and private insurers – should create a mechanism for rewarding health-care companies based on the real-world benefits of their products and services.	政府和私营保险公司作为付款人应当建立起依据产品服务的实际效果奖励医疗保健企业的机制。


Beyond the annual payment per patient, the health-care company could receive a bonus or penalty, depending on the outcomes achieved.	除以单位患者为基础的年度付款外，应当按照医疗保健企业实现的实际效果分配奖励或惩罚。


Addressing the needs of aging populations is the biggest challenge facing health-care companies and payers.	满足老龄化人口的需要是医疗保健企业和支付方所面临的最重要挑战。


A successful model will lower health-care costs, increase life expectancy, and improve elderly people’s quality of life.	成功的模式能够降低医疗成本、延长寿命并提高老年人的生存质量。


And, by providing a more comprehensive understanding of the aging process, it could also guide us toward treatments and cures for other diseases – including those affecting the young.	而且，通过全面了解衰老进程，它还可能引导我们找到其他疾病的治疗和痊愈方法——其中也包括影响年轻人的疾病。


Ensuring that every person lives as healthy a life as possible, for as long as possible, is in everyone’s interest.	确保每个人尽量生活得健康长久符合所有人的利益。


That is why it makes sense now to focus on the most senior among us.	因此关注老年人是合情合理的选择。


A New Era of Health-Care Innovation	医疗创新的新时代


ZURICH – We are experiencing a new wave of innovation in health care – one that promises to create the smartest, most connected, and most efficient health systems the world has ever seen.	苏黎世—我们正在经历新一波医疗创新——这次创新潮有望形成世界有史以来最智能、最连通、最高效的卫生体系。


Game-changing new technologies and treatments are transforming the practice of medicine, dramatically altering the patient experience, and creating conditions for even more breakthroughs.	改变局面的新科技和疗法正在转变医学实践，大大扭转患者体验，并未更多的突破创造条件。


The proof is in the data.	证明就在数据中。


Last year, a record 61 drugs were introduced worldwide, compared with an annual average of 34 in the previous decade.	去年，全世界新上市药品达到了创纪录的61种，而过去十年平均每年只有34种。


More than 40% of these treatments were for rare or difficult-to-treat conditions, including hepatitis C, meningococcal B, and metastatic melanoma.	这些医药的40%以上为针对罕见病或疑难杂症的对策，包括丙型肝炎、乙型脑膜炎和转移性黑色素瘤。


And more new breakthroughs are on the horizon.	而更多的新突破已经看到了曙光。


It is estimated that about 70% of the drugs currently in development across the industry are potential “first in class” treatments, meaning that they use a completely new mechanism of action against disease.	据估计，全行业大约70%的目前正在研发的药物为潜在的“同类首种”医药，这意味着它们通过全新的行为机制对抗疾病。


The new wave of innovation is attributable to three key factors: the ability to personalize therapy, the capacity to get treatments to market faster, and improved engagement with patients.	这一新创新潮可以归因于三大基本因素：个性化治疗能力、加快医药上市速度的能力和改善患者参与性。


First, major advances in our knowledge of genomics – specifically, the way diseases manifest and develop in the body at the genetic level – are improving our ability to target illness at each stage and improve the patient experience.	首先，基因组知识的重大进步——具体而言，即疾病在基因层面上的表征和体内发展情况——改善了我们在各个阶段定位疾病的能力，也改善了患者体验。


Genetic markers, for example, can indicate which patients are likely to benefit from a drug, thereby improving outcomes while allowing patients to avoid potentially painful side effects of treatments that are unlikely to work.	比如，基因标记物可以能够说明哪些患者可能从某种药物中获益，从而改进用药结果，同时也让患者避免无用药物给它们带来的痛苦的潜在副作用。


For early-stage breast cancer patients, genetic markers show whether chemotherapy is likely to have an impact, or if hormone therapy alone is the better option.	对早期乳腺癌患者而言，基因标记物能说明化疗是否能够取得效果，还是只靠激素疗法才是更好的选择。


A new lung cancer drug developed by my company, Novartis, is effective only in patients with non-small-cell lung cancer who have a particular genetic mutation.	我的公司诺华所研发的一种新肺癌药物只对发生了一种特殊基因突变的非小细胞（non-small-cell）肺癌患者有效。


The use of genomic expertise to improve health care is just beginning.	用基因组知识改进医疗可谓方兴未艾。


One promising area of investigation is CRISPR – a cutting-edge tool that could allow us to delete, repair, or replace the genes that cause disease.	一个大有前途的研究领域是CRISPR——一种尖端工具，能让我们探测、修复或取代致病基因。


As our understanding of the characteristics of a particular patient’s illness becomes increasingly precise, treatment will become increasingly effective and will reduce the risk of side effects.	随着我们对具体患者的疾病的理解日益精准，对症下药也会变得更加有效，并能降低副作用风险。


Moreover, advances in our understanding of disease are boosting the efficiency of the drug development process, making it possible to bring new innovations to market faster.	此外，我们对疾病的理解的进步正在提高药物研发过程的效率，从而有望加快新创新的上市。


For example, genetic testing is being used to pre-select participants for clinical trials, cutting recruitment times.	比如，基因测试被用在临床试验候选参与者身上以缩短招募时间。


With this approach, research can begin in as little as three weeks, compared to the 34 weeks, on average, for a standard trial.	用这种方法，研究可以在三周之内开始，而标准临床试验的准备过程平均长达34周。


Add to that our ability to analyze data more quickly, and to make more precise decisions about dosing, and the clinical trial timeframe shrinks considerably.	此外，我们现在可以更快地分析数据，更准确地决定剂量，临床试验时间也大幅缩短了。


Finally, real-time data and emerging technology tools have the potential to improve patient engagement and adherence, especially among those with chronic conditions caused by non-communicable diseases (NCDs).	最后，实时数据和新型科技工具有望改善患者的参与和遵守规则，特别是非传染性疾病（NCD）所造成的慢性病症。


As the world’s population ages, the incidence of NCDs is expected to rise, accounting for 52 million deaths annually by 2030.	随着世界人口的老龄化，NCD发病率预计将不断上升，到2030年每年造成5,200万人死亡。


More than 80% of NCD deaths are the result of chronic conditions such as cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, cancer, and diabetes.	80%以上的NCD死亡是慢性病症的结果，包括心血管和呼吸系统疾病、癌症和糖尿病。


As it stands, noncompliance with medication regimes is a major problem in treating NCDs.	目前，不遵守医药效果机制是治疗NCD所面临的主要问题。


For example, diabetes patients in the United States with the lowest level of compliance have a 30% yearly risk of hospitalization, compared to a 13% risk for patients with a high level of adherence.	比如，在美国，最不遵守用药规定的糖尿病患者有30%的年风险必须住院，而最遵守规则的患者的这一风险只有13%。


That implies large costs for health-care systems – about $200 billion in the US and €125 billion ($133 billion) in the European Union each year.	这给医疗体系带来了巨大的成本——美国大约为每年2,000亿美元，欧盟大约为每年1,250亿欧元。


Technologies that engage patients in their own health care and enable more seamless adherence to medication regimes have the potential to improve disease management, reduce hospitalization, and lower costs.	让患者参与到其自身医疗过程、让患者不懈地遵守医药效果极致的技术有望改善疾病管理、降低住院率，也降低成本。


Today’s transformational advances in health care owe much to new genomics information, to the availability of big data to influence decisions in real time, to more targeted and individualized therapies, and to smarter, more connected delivery systems.	今天的变革性医疗进步在很大程度上要归功于基因组信息、可获得大数据给实时决定带来的影响、更有针对性和个性化的疗法，以及更智能、更连通的医疗服务体系。


But they are just the beginning.	但这些只是开始。


Further breakthroughs, enabled by the convergence of science and technology, can be expected, especially as unconventional players enter the health-care sector.	我们可以期待科学与技术的结合能带来后续突破，特别是当非传统参与者进入到医疗业时。


In this process, partnerships between health-care and technology companies will become increasingly important.	在这一过程中，医疗和科技公司的合作将日益重要。


It is an exciting time for health care, with many disruptive innovations on the horizon.	这是医疗业令人振奋的时刻，许多破坏性创新已经隐隐浮现。


For patients and providers alike, this is very good news.	对患者和医疗服务提供者而言，这都是极好的消息。


Health Care’s Frequent Flyers	健康生活的金卡客户


NEW YORK – For those of you who have seen the (American) movie “Up in the Air,” think of the scene where George Clooney meets Vera Farmiga.	发自纽约——看过美国电影《在云端》的朋友，请回想一下剧中乔治·克鲁尼和维拉·法梅加相遇的那一幕。


He’s an outsourced human-resources executive who flies around the country firing people on behalf of timid managers; she’s a counterpart female road warrior.	乔治在剧中饰演一位全年乘飞机穿梭于各地，专门代那些胆小的管理层解雇员工的人力资源专员； 维拉则是位商务女性，当然也是位“空中飞人”。


Their courtship ritual revolves around loyalty cards: he pulls out his American Airlines Executive Platinum card; she matches.	而两人感情的发展始终与会员卡息息相关：他拿出自己的美国航空商务白金卡； 她手中也出现了同样一张。


Next, his Diamond VIP Hilton HHonors card; she calmly slaps hers on the rickety table where they are sharing drinks.	随后在机舱中分享一杯饮料时，他掏出了希尔顿酒店荣誉客会钻石贵宾卡； 而她也不动声色地把自己那张放到了小桌板上。


The unspoken message: points make you sexy. Airlines and hotels have known this for a long time.	这些场面隐含的信息是：积分让你变得性感，而航空公司和酒店早就深谙其中奥妙。


Dean Margolis, who long ago consulted for major airlines and is now applying the same techniques to healthy behavior, recalls wondering how to get executives to fly just a little more.  It’s not by offering discounts, which benefit an executive’s company rather than the executive.	如今，曾为多家大型航空公司担任顾问的迪恩·马戈利斯把相同的技术应用到了人们的健康行为上，他知道在如何让经理们多飞几次的问题上，仅仅打折是行不通，因为那只对经理所在的公司有利，对经理本人却没什么好处。


Margolis asks: “When the boss says ‘Who wants to come to Philadelphia with me?’, what’s going to get two people instead of one to say yes?	马戈利斯问了个问题：“当老板当众询问’谁愿意和我飞一趟费城？ ’，是什么能够吸引两个人，而不仅仅只有一个人说愿意呢？


To abandon their families, stand in line, and perhaps take a middle seat...”	要知道这意味着暂别妻儿，排队等待，甚至被两个人夹在中间的座位上……”


Points, of course, will do the trick.	没错，积分就是个妙方！


The promise of being recognized at the airline counter, ushered to the front of the line, and, yes, looking like a big shot at the airport bar.	一旦出示会员卡，立享专用通道，无须跟那些倒霉蛋一起排队，还能安坐在机场贵宾酒吧中，一副商务精英的派头，感觉真好！


Margolis’s new company, MedRewards, plans to give people points for healthy behavior – everything from taking their medications regularly to signing in at the gym more than five times a week.	马戈利斯的新公司——MedRewards——计划对那些实践健康行为——比如说定期接受治疗，或者一星期健身超过5次——的人们给予积分奖励。


As in the airline business, the actual customers won’t be the users, but rather the vendors who want to influence users’ behavior: pharmaceutical companies who want patients to buy their drugs, along with insurers and employers who want to lower long-term costs. (Employers, bless them, even have an interest in keeping people healthy!)	与航空业一样，真正的客户并不是那些享受积分的人，而是打算影响积分者行为的供应商，包括那些希望病人购买本厂药品的制药公司以及期望降低长期成本的保险公司和雇主（上帝保佑那些老板们，他们倒真的希望员工能保持身体健康）。


How do you translate healthy behavior into status?	那如何把健康习惯转化为某种身份地位的象征呢？


First, of course, you can have cards identifying your compliance behavior – e.g., not how many drugs you take, but how regularly you take them.	你首先得有张会员卡来证明自己确实遵守了健康行为——比如说，重要的不是你吃了多少药，而是你是否定期吃药。


As for the rewards, they could be everything from discounts on energy-saving appliances and posture-enhancing furniture to vouchers from suppliers of “healthy” foods.	而奖励则可以是购买节能家电和塑身器械的折扣，或是某些“健康”食品生产商提供的优惠券。


With the right partner, such a scheme could also include better treatment from the medical establishment: perhaps a separate phone line to call your care provider, free WiFi while you sit in the waiting room (others have to pay), and even room upgrades if you’re unlucky enough to need surgery.	如果有好的合作伙伴，这个计划还可以把医疗机构的更优越待遇纳入其中：比如说一条联系保健服务商的独立热线，或者是在候诊时可以免费使用WiFi（其他人必需付费才能使用），甚至是在你不幸需要手术时可以升级病房。


Just as with flying, which most people (George Clooney’s character excepted) don’t particularly like, users may eagerly sign up in order to collect points.	正如坐飞机一样，尽管大部分人都不是特别喜欢（乔治·克鲁尼那个角色除外），但乘客为了收集积分也是乐于登记成为会员的。


MedRewards is not alone. A variety of other companies are taking different approaches, but all of them have the same goal – to motivate people to engage in healthy behavior.	MedRewards公司并不是独此一家，还有其他公司正尝试使用别的方式，不过，他们都有相同的目标——就是要鼓励人们开展健康行为。


And all of them avoid simply paying them, which is counterproductive over the long run, and may lead to cheating.	所有这些公司都拒绝简单地通过付钱来回馈使用者，因为从长期来看，结果不但适得其反，还会导致欺诈。


While some may think it worth cheating to get money, most people don’t want a gold card that they know in their heart is a fraud.	尽管有些人为了钱不惜铤而走险，但大部分人都不愿意为了获得一张金卡而备受良心谴责。