Its people were first treated by the slave trade as mere commodities, necessary for economic growth elsewhere.	非洲人民先是被当作奴隶像商品一样被贸易，成为其他地区的经济增长之源。


Then colonial powers carved up the continent artificially and arbitrarily, masking their greed behind noble-sounding goals: theirs was a “civilizing” mission.	接着，殖民势力人为地肆意瓜分这块大陆，打着冠冕堂皇的“文明化”的幌子极尽贪婪之能事。


Later, during the first half of the twentieth century, Africa offered the blood of its inhabitants, and then recourse to its territories, to a European continent in the throes of two world wars.	然后，在二十世纪上半叶，欧洲在两次世界大战中泥足深陷，而非洲为此付出了居民的鲜血和资源。


And, in the second half of the twentieth century, after a brutal anti-colonial struggle, Africa’s newly independent countries became proxy battlegrounds in the Cold War.	而在二十世纪下半叶，在经历了残酷的反殖民地斗争后，非洲的新兴独立国家又称为冷战的代理战场。


Today, by contrast, Africa is in the process of returning as a subject of history.	与此形成对比的是，如今非洲正在走向重回历史主体（subject of history）之路。


With more than one billion inhabitants, representing 18% of the world’s population, Africa is regaining the place it occupied at the beginning of the sixteenth century.	非洲有十亿多居民，占世界人口的18%，它正在重新获得十六世纪初的地位。


Then, with 100 million people, it represented 20% of the world’s population.	当时的欧洲有一亿人，占世界人口的20%。


By the middle of the nineteenth century, after more than 200 years of colonialism and slavery, Africa’s population had fallen to 95 million – just 9% of the world total – whereas other continents had experienced a large population increase over the same period.	到十九世纪中叶，在经历了200多年的殖民和奴役后，非洲人口下降到9,500万，只占世界总数的9%，与此同时，其他大洲经历了人口的大规模增长。


Economically, Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced a decade of 5-6% average annual GDP growth.	在经济上，撒哈拉以南非洲过去十年的年均GDP增长为5—6%。


In Tanzania, growth this year should be around 7%.	坦桑尼亚今年的增长应该能达到7%。


At a time when the major emerging economies – with the exception of China – are facing a sharp slowdown, Africa, with its untapped energy resources and precious raw materials, including rare earth minerals, has naturally become a focus of investors’ attention.	当其他主要经济体（除了中国）正面临减速时，非洲携其无穷无尽的能源资源和珍惜原材料（包括稀土元素）自然成为了投资者注意力的焦点。


But, though Africa can be described as the continent of hope, it is unlikely to become the “New Asia” – that is, a long-term dynamo of global growth – for a combination of cultural, political, geopolitical, and perhaps psychological reasons.	但是，尽管非洲可以被认为是希望之洲，它却不可能成为“新亚洲”，即全球增长的长期发动机，这是文化、政治、地缘政治也许还有心理因素共同作用的结果。


Asia has experienced the historical continuity of great empires.	亚洲经历过持续的大一统帝国。


China is the best illustration of this phenomenon.	中国是这一现象的最佳写照。


It is a reemerging power, not an emerging one, a decisive factor that explains Chinese confidence.	中国是一个重新崛起的大国，而不是一个新兴大国，这是能够阐释中国自信的一个决定性因素。


Asia’s long history of rivalry and competition among its various powers has also been an important factor in its recent economic success.	亚洲各大国之间有着悠久的对抗和竞争史，这也是其近期经济成功的一大重要原因。


The dynamic of competition and emulation among China, Japan, and South Korea has not existed in peacefully reconciled post-WWII Europe; there is nothing like it in Africa, either.	中国、日本和韩国之间的竞争和模仿的动态竞争是和平妥协的二战后欧洲所没有的； 非洲亦然。


Nigeria is not Africa’s equivalent of what China is for Asia.	尼日利亚不是非洲的中国。


And post-apartheid South Africa, for all its progress, has not fulfilled the expectations placed on it, and remains unlikely to become the continent’s gendarme.	后种族隔离时代南非尽管取得了显著的进步，也不可能成为非洲的中国，甚至不可能成为非洲大陆警察。


Colonialism and the slave trade constituted a historical rupture for Africa.	殖民主义和奴隶贸易构成了非洲的一大历史裂痕。


Beyond the human toll – including 10-15 million direct victims – absolute subjugation begot a unique loss of confidence.	除了人员伤亡——包括1,000—1,500万直接受害者——绝对镇压也是自信缺失的独特源头。


Who today can name Africa’s great empires and kingdoms?	今天，谁能说出非洲有哪些帝国和王国？


Who knows where the worlds’ gold came from before its discovery in Latin America in the sixteenth century?	有谁知道十六世纪发现拉丁美洲黄金以前黄金来自哪里？


Africa must find the confidence it desperately needs in the way others look at it.	非洲必须找到它所急需的对其他地区看待它的信心。


The problem is that others are abysmally ignorant about the continent’s pre-colonial past.	问题在于其他地区都对非洲大陆的前殖民地时期历史一无所知。


One may criticize the cynicism of the Chinese, but it is China that has contributed more than any other country to the transformation of Africa’s self-image.	你可以批评中国人的愤世嫉俗，但在非洲自我形象的转变方面，中国起到的作用比其他任何国家都要大。


Today, it is Africans themselves who hold their continent’s future in their hands.	如今，非洲的未来掌握在非洲人民自己手里。


And, as Africa returns as a subject, rather than an object, of world history, it appears to embody all the fears and hopes of humanity.	随着非洲回归历史主体而不是客体，它正在体现人类的所有恐惧和希望。


Everything is there in extreme form: desertification, mass movements of populations, and, yes, genocidal violence – but also the hope for new forms of economic growth, if not new modes of governance.	非洲的一切都是极端的：沙漠化、人口的大规模运动，是的，还有种族灭绝暴力，但新式经济增长甚至新治理模式的希望也是如此。


The Trauma of France’s Jews	法国犹太人之伤


PARIS – “Death to the Jews!”	巴黎—“犹太人去死！


In Paris and other French cities, the hate-filled words ring out.	”在巴黎和其他法国城市，这类充满仇恨的字眼纷纷涌现。


Attacks on synagogues have taken place for the first time since the Dreyfus Affair at the end of the nineteenth century.	自从十九世纪末的德雷福斯案（Dreyfus Affair）以来，法国就存在攻击犹太教堂的行为。


In suburban areas near Paris, such as the town of Sarcelles, known for its climate of religious and ethnic tolerance, groups of young people have deliberately targeted Jewish properties.	在法国近郊地区，比如以宗教和种族容忍氛围著名的萨尔塞勒镇（Sarcelles），年轻人们有组织地故意针对犹太人财产发动攻击。


Faced with the spectacular rise of anti-immigrant populism in France, and now with anti-Zionist demonstrations (which often coincide with an updated version of anti-Semitism), the French Jewish community is anguished and puzzled.	法国犹太社会面临着来势汹汹的反移民民粹主义，现在又出现了反犹太复国示威游行（这往往与新形式的反犹主义相辅相成），这令他们非常痛苦又迷惑不解。


Some of its members are quietly asking themselves whether there is a future for them in the land of human rights.	一些犹太人很快开始质疑他们在这个人权之国是否还有未来。


French Jews are rediscovering the dual trauma that they experienced during the twentieth century: the death-camp deportations of World War II and their flight from Algeria following its independence in 1962.	法国犹太人正在重新经历他们在二十世纪所经历的双重伤害：二战中的死亡集中营和1962年阿尔及利亚独立后的大逃亡。


It is to be expected that these episodes color – and tend to exacerbate – the emotions of the present.	预计这两段经历将决定——并放大——当下的感情色彩。


French descendants of Eastern European Jews have not yet fully come to terms with a continent – including Vichy France – that they still associate with the Holocaust, whereas Jews from the Maghreb tend to resent the fact that even in France, they remain surrounded by “Arabs.”	东欧犹太人的法国后裔从未妥协于这片大陆——包括维希政府治下的法国。 在这里他们经历了大屠杀。


Indeed, a significant portion of the Jewish community in the south of France votes for the far-right National Front, which, under the leadership of Marine Le Pen, has concentrated its xenophobia on Muslims.	而来自马格里布（Maghreb）的犹太人憎恨一个事实——他们仍处于“阿拉伯人”的包围中。 事实上，法国南部很大一部分犹太人社区都支持极右翼的国民阵线（National Front），在马琳·勒庞（Marine Le Pen）的领导下，该党对穆斯林掀起了仇外主义。


In this tense setting, it comes as no surprise that the question of whether anti-Semitism has returned to France, after a seven-decade hiatus, is making international headlines.	在如此紧张的局势下，毫不奇怪，在经历了七十年的间断后，反犹主义是否回归法国的问题正在全球引起轩然大波。


British and American media reports have made comparisons to the Nazi era, with some even referring, in the aftermath of attacks on French synagogues, to a French Kristallnacht.	英国和美国媒体将此与纳粹时代相提并论，有的甚至在法国犹太教堂遭袭后认为这是法国的“水晶破碎之夜”（Kristallnacht）。


Such hyperbole must be firmly rejected, for it offends the memory of those who suffered as a result of Vichy France’s collaboration with Nazi Germany.	如此夸张的比较必须严词拒绝，因为这违背了因为维希政府向纳粹德国投降而饱受摧残的犹太人的记忆。


After the Gestapo arrested my father in Nice in 1943, he was escorted by French gendarmes to the transit camp at Drancy, in the Paris suburbs, before being deported to Auschwitz.	1943年，盖世太保在尼斯逮捕了我的父亲，随后他被法国宪兵押送至巴黎市郊德兰西（Drancy）的临时集中营，随后被押解送至奥斯维辛。


In 2014, by contrast, the French state defends the synagogues and denounces any form of anti-Semitism.	相反，2014年，法国对犹太教堂做了保护，并谴责任何形式的反犹主义。


But even if the French state is not anti-Semitic, anti-Semitism does exist in France – and probably more so recently than in the postwar period.	但如果说法国并不反犹，那么反犹主义确实存在于法国——并且在今天比在战后时期更加嚣张。


And the worsening situation in the Middle East has, of course, played a key role in this, particularly the shocking images from Gaza.	而中东局势的恶化当然也在其中起到了重要作用，特别是来自加沙的恐怖画面。


The asymmetrical war being waged there by Israel seems disproportionate to a majority of world opinion, not just Arabs and Muslims.	由以色列发动的不对称战争不但不容于阿拉伯人和穆斯林，世界上大部分人都对此表示不齿。


To be sure, no state can passively accept rocket attacks on its cities.	平心而论，没有哪个国家可以消极接受火箭弹袭击它的城市。


And, yes, Hamas deliberately chooses to place its military arsenal in highly populated areas under the involuntary protective shield of innocent civilians – or those Israeli officials sometimes refer to, with barely concealed mistrust, as the “uninvolved.”	并且，哈马斯也故意选择人口稠密地区部署军事武器，以蒙在鼓里的无辜市民——或者那些有时被以色列官员以毫不掩饰的怀疑��度称为“不相关”的人群——为保护盾。


But the strategy of terror used by the Israeli authorities to deter further attacks or to restore a temporary “quiet” has been costly not only in terms of Palestinian lives lost and Israeli soldiers killed; it has also contributed to the deterioration of the security of Jews around the world.	但以色列采取恐怖战略威慑哈马斯的继续打击或重建暂时“安静”代价沉重，不仅巴勒斯坦人大量伤亡，以色列士兵也损失惨重； 并且全球以色列人的安全状况都因此恶化。


In France, too, many of them express – often quietly – both their deep love for what Israel is and their deep concern for what Israel is now doing.	在法国，许多犹太人既表达出对以色列的深深的爱，也表示对以色列现在的所作所为深感忧虑——他们的表达通常都是安静的。


It is one thing to say that the Middle East conflict should not be exported to France.	认为中东冲突不应该波及法国是一回事。


It is another to recognize the inevitable impact of images of dead Palestinian women and children on communities in France that feel close to Palestine the way that Jews feel close to Israel.	认识到丧生的巴勒斯坦妇孺的景象对法国人所造成的不可避免的印象是另一回事。 他们与巴勒斯坦感同身受，正如犹太人与以色列感同身受。


If the images from Gaza seem to resonate so much in France, it is partly a matter of sheer numbers: the largest Muslim community in Europe faces the largest Jewish community in Europe.	如果说加沙的景象在法国引起了极大共振，那么部分原因就在于惊人的数字：欧洲最大穆斯林社区遇上了欧洲最大犹太社区。


But it is not only a question of numbers.	但这不仅仅是数字的问题。


The young thugs who have attacked synagogues come mostly from the ranks of the unemployed and frustrated.	袭击犹太教堂的年轻暴徒大多来自无业游民、失去生活希望者。


They vent their rage at a system that does not integrate them.	他们将怒气发泄在了没有让他们融入其中的制度上。


They even resent the Republic’s commemoration of Jews’ suffering during WWII.	他们甚至憎恨法兰西共和国对二战期间犹太人苦难的纪念。


For them, past horror is abstract; only the present horror can be felt.	对他们来说，昔日的恐怖是抽象的，只有当下的恐怖才能让他们感同身受。


The encounter between the images of today’s Middle East and the discontent of Muslim minorities (sometimes influenced by radical fundamentalist ideologies) should not be allowed to obscure traditional French anti-Semitism, white and bourgeois, which still lingers and is never far beneath the surface.	今天的中东惨象与穆斯林少数群体的不满（有时受极端原教旨主义意识形态影响）的碰撞不应该混淆传统法国反犹主义（资产阶级白人），他们仍然存在，并且隐藏得并不深。


Thanks to the Internet, it, too, has begun to emerge more often.	拜互联网所赐，这一意识形态已开始日益暴露。


But the French state does what it has to do to repress and contain anti-Semitism.	但法国做了必须做的事镇压和遏制反犹主义。


Comparisons to Nazi-era Europe do nothing to reassure a community that, despite all of the major historical differences between then and now, cannot quite shake the feeling that it is dancing on the rim of a volcano.	与纳粹时代的欧洲相提并论并不能让正在火山边上起舞的法国安下心来——尽管当时和现在存在如此多的重大历史差异。


Turkey’s Lost Illusions	土耳其失去的幻想


PARIS – “Day by day, Europe is moving further away from Turkey,” Egemen Bağış, Turkey’s Minister for European Union Affairs, declared last week.	巴黎—“日复一日，欧洲正在远离土耳其。 ”土耳其欧盟事务部长巴基斯（Egemen Bağış）上周如是说。


But the reverse is equally true: With a mixture of disillusion and defiance, Turkey has been distancing itself from Europe in recent years.	但事实正好相反：在幻想破灭和违抗的共同作用下，近几年来土耳其拉开了自己与欧洲之间的距离。


“If you do not want us,” the Turks appear to be saying, “we really do not want you.”	“如果你们不想要我们”土耳其人不啻于如是说，“我们也真的不想要你们。 ”


In reality, nearly three years after the beginning of the “Arab Spring,” Turkey is more in search of itself than it is of Europe, even if it needs Europe more than Turks are willing to admit.	在现实中，在“阿拉伯之春”爆发近三年后，土耳其迷失自我的程度更甚于欧洲，即使土耳其需要欧洲的程度更甚于土耳其人之所愿承认。


What is Turkey today, what are its values, and what is its destiny in a highly fluid regional environment?	什么是当代土耳其，什么是它的价值，什么是它在快速变化的地区环境中的命运？


The Arab Spring was initially seen as a great opportunity for Turkey, an ideal setting in which to highlight the country’s economic success, democratic political model, and indispensable strategic role in the region.	阿拉伯之春最开始被视为土耳其的良机，一次彰显其国家经济成功、民主政治模式和不可或缺的地区战略作用的理想机会。


The inheritors of one of the world’s great empires were proving to the world that Islam and modernity were perfectly compatible – an inspiring example for Arab countries like Egypt.	作为世界上最伟大帝国之一的继承者，土耳其向世界证明，伊斯兰教可以与现代性完美相容——这对像埃及这样的阿拉伯国家来说是一个鼓舞人心的例子。


Instead, Turkey’s role inspired reservations among Egyptians; after all, the Ottoman Empire had ruled over Egypt.	相反，土耳其的作用激发了埃及人民的保留态度； 毕竟，奥斯曼帝国曾经统治过埃及。


And, on the Turkish side, there was a sense of superiority vis-à-vis the Arab world.	在土耳其方面，则存在主宰阿拉伯世界的情绪。


The collapse of the Soviet Union awakened “neo-Ottoman” Turkish ambitions in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and revolution in the Middle East seemed to offer the heirs (if not orphans) of a long-dead empire an opportunity to avenge its loss.	苏联的解体唤醒了土耳其人在高加索和中亚的“新奥斯曼”雄心，而中东革命似乎给予了早已成为过往云烟的奥斯曼帝国继承者（如果不是孤儿的话）收复失地的机会。


If a lazy and fearful Europe did not want Turkey, so much the worse for Europe; history was offering more glorious alternatives to the Turks.	如果懒散而恐惧的欧洲不想要土耳其，真是太糟糕了； 历史给了土耳其人好得多的替代方案。


Whereas Turkey could appear too Oriental and too religious in Brussels or Paris, when viewed from Cairo or Tunis, it looked like an ideal Muslim bridge to the democratic West and economically dynamic Asia.	尽管土耳其人对布鲁塞尔和巴黎来说太东方、太带宗教色彩，但从开罗和突尼斯城的角度看，土耳其堪称理想的通往民主的西方和经济活力四射的亚洲的穆斯林桥梁。


Moreover, Turkey could play some powerful cards, owing to its “good neighbor” policy with two partners and rivals, Iran and Syria, as well as its support for the short-lived presidency of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt.	此外，土耳其堪称胜负手，因为它对两大伙伴和对手——伊朗和叙利亚采取“睦邻”政策，并支持执政生涯短暂的埃及总统穆尔西。


Unfortunately, Turkish elites’ hopes (if not expectations) were not realized.	不幸的是，土耳其精英的希望（如果不是期望）并没有实现。


The Arab revolutions ended up exposing Turkey’s own weaknesses and contradictions, further aggravated by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s repressive policies and overweening political style.	阿拉伯革命最终暴露了土耳其自身的弱点和矛盾，并且因为总理埃尔多安的镇压政策和自负的政治风格而进一步加剧。


This became clear in the demonstrations that spread this spring from Istanbul’s Taksim Square to much of the rest of the country (though the protests had more in common with Brazil’s recent unrest or the revolt in Paris in 1968 than with the popular movements in Egypt or Tunisia).	一个明证是今春伊斯坦布尔塔克西姆广场（Taksim Square）的游行演变为全国各地开花的示威（尽管示威的性质更接近于巴西最近的骚乱和1968年的巴黎反抗，而不是埃及和土耳其的群众运动）。


What characterizes Turks today is not so much pride and hope in their country’s expanding influence as fear of its disintegration.	如今，土耳其的特点是对该国不断扩大的影响力的骄傲和希望不如对其分崩离析的担忧。


The Kurdish problem preoccupies Turks, as does their growing sense that they are losing control of two essential issues – the Syrian and Iranian crises.	库尔德问题困扰着土耳其，除此之外，越来越多的土耳其人感到他们正在失去对两大关键问题的控制，即叙利亚和伊朗危机。


In recent months, Turkey’s government has adopted an increasingly tougher stance toward Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, convinced that it can only fall.	最近几个月来，土耳其政府对叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德政权的立场越来越强硬，认为必须将他推翻。


The agreement recently reached by the United States and Russia is, from this standpoint, frustrating news: For the price of destroying its chemical arsenal, the regime may have saved itself.	从这个角度看，美国和俄罗斯最近所达成的协议是令人沮丧的消息：作为摧毁其化学武库的交换，巴沙尔政权可能会保留。


So Turkey must wonder what purpose is to be served by courting the West.	于是，土耳其必须思索讨好西方究竟有什么好处。


Why resume, under US pressure, a nearly normal dialogue with Israel if the outcome is to be abandoned, if not betrayed, by American policy?	如果结局是被美国抛弃（如果不是背叛的话），为什么还要在美国的压力下重启与以色列的最新正式对话？


Similarly, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s moderate rhetoric, together with possible progress on Iran’s dispute with the West over its nuclear program, has left Turkey with a sense of uselessness, if not isolation.	类似地，由于伊朗总统鲁哈尼的温和论调，加上伊朗与西方关于其核计划的纠纷有望取得进展，土耳其大有无用（如果不是孤立的话）之感。


How can a country perceive itself, and be perceived by others, as a key regional actor if it finds itself marginalized at the critical moment?	如果一国感到自己在关键时刻被边缘化，它如何自认为以及被别人认为是至关重要的地区行动方？


History is moving in the Middle East, but not in the direction that Turkey would prefer.	历史正在中东演进，但并非按土耳其希望的方向。


And, with their country’s economic growth faltering, its government hardening, and its diplomatic performance a source of growing disappointment, many Turks now openly wonder what happened.	此外，随着土耳其经济增长势头的减弱，其政府立场的强硬，以及其外交表现日益令人失望，许多土耳其人如今公开质疑形势。


But, far from engaging in an open and positive self-examination, they are too often retreating into a strident nationalism that is all the more defensive to the extent that it reflects a growing lack of self-confidence.	但是，他们往往决不会采取开放、积极的自我批评，而是回归咄咄逼人的民族主义，表现出十足的戒心，其实反映的是日益缺失的自信。


Turkey’s current challenge is to overcome lost illusions.	土耳其最近的挑战是克服失去的幻想。


And that means that Turks may need Europe more than they are willing to admit, even to themselves.	而这意味着土耳其人可能比所愿承认的更加需要欧洲。


But is Europe today any more ready and willing than it was yesterday to engage in serious talks with Turkey?	但今天的欧洲比昔日准备得更充分、更愿意与土耳其进行严肃对话吗？


Europe’s Anti-Europeans	欧洲的反欧者


PARIS – In 2005, two founding members of the European Union, France and the Netherlands, rejected by popular referendum the EU’s proposed constitutional treaty.	巴黎—2005年，欧盟的两个创始国法国和荷兰以全民公投拒绝了欧盟宪法条约。


Two far-right parties from these countries, the French National Front and the Dutch Freedom Party, have now formed an alliance ahead of the European Parliament elections in May 2014.	这两个国家的两个极右翼政党——法国国民阵线（French National Front）和荷兰自由党（Dutch Freedom Party）如今抢在2014年5月的欧洲议会选举前结成了同盟。


They hope to attract likeminded parties in other EU countries and form a parliamentary bloc powerful enough to slay “the monster of Europe,” as Geert Wilders, the Freedom Party’s leader, calls the EU.	它们希望吸引欧盟国家立场相似的政党，组成一股强大的议会派别除掉“欧洲恶魔”——自由党领袖怀德斯（Greet Wilders）这样称呼欧盟。


It is no accident that France and the Netherlands have taken the lead in this sordid venture.	法国和荷兰在这场下三滥阴谋中当先并不是巧合。


Both countries are in the midst of a deep identity crisis that is mutating into disdain for Europe, foreigners, migrants, and all who represent the “other.”	这两个国家都处于深刻的身份危机中，身份危机让它们仇视欧洲、外国人、移民和一切代表“其他人”的人。


And both countries are experiencing an increase in popular suspicion toward traditional political elites.	这两个国家都在经历公众对传统政治精英的日渐怀疑。


In this environment, the upcoming European Parliament elections seem tailor-made for extremist parties, with recent public-opinion polls suggesting that the National Front will come out on top in France.	在这样的背景下，即将到来的欧洲议会选举似乎成为为极端主义政党量身定做的机会，最新的公共观点调查表明国民阵线将成为法国首屈一指的政党。


European elections leave most citizens indifferent, which translates into low voter turnout – except among those who, defined by what they oppose, wish to express their anger and frustration with the status quo.	大部分公民对欧洲选举漠不关心，这导致了低投票率——除了那些（根据他们所反对者的定义）想要表达对现状的愤怒和失望的人。


Marine Le Pen, the National Front’s leader, is shrewd and efficient, running on a straightforward message: “Europe is against the people, so the people must mobilize against Europe.”	国民阵线领袖勒庞（Marine Le Pen）精干高效，她提出的口号十分直接：“欧洲反对人民，因此人民必须奋起反对欧洲。


With her semblance of moderation, she is far more appealing than her father and former party leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen.	”她外表上是个温和派，远比其父、国民阵线前领袖让-马里·勒庞（Jean-Marie Le Pen）有号召力。


Her strategy is to enter the mainstream of French politics by shedding all traces of past anti-Semitism, thereby turning the National Front into a seemingly legitimate alternative to a decadent traditional right, which has suffered a prolonged bout of infighting since Nicolas Sarkozy’s defeat in the 2012 presidential election.	她的战略是与过去的反犹主义彻底撇清关系，以此打入法国政坛主流，从而让国民阵线成为式微的传统右翼的貌似合法的替代者。 自萨科齐在2012年总统选举中败北以来，传统右翼一直处于内斗之中。


In the Netherlands, Wilders – more a one-man show than the leader of a real party – has already been in government, thereby providing a veneer of legitimacy to Le Pen simply by forming an alliance with her.	在何来，怀德斯——与其说他是一个真实党派的领袖，不如说他在演独角戏——已经进入了政府，他只需要简单地与勒庞结盟，就能向后者提供合法性的外衣。


Interestingly, the main Danish and British anti-European parties have refused to follow suit, refusing to enter into a pact with a party that was and probably remains anti-Semitic at its core.	有趣的是，主要丹麦和英国反欧政党拒绝步怀德斯后尘，与一个曾经是、现在可能仍以反犹主义为核心的政党订立契约。


And yet what ultimately unites Europe’s far-right parties is similar to what underlies the Tea Party’s rise within America’s Republican Party: covert racism and xenophobia.	但最终让欧洲极右翼政党抱团的东西与让茶党在美国共和党内部崛起东西十分相似：隐蔽的种族主义和排外主义。


Though the Tea Party’s followers – a group that one early opinion poll identified as 89% white and just 1% black – claim to oppose government spending above all else, they accept government help for themselves.	尽管茶党的追随者——早先的一份民调显示89%为白人，只有1%是黑人——以压倒一切的重要性反对的是政府支出，但他们也接受政府对他们自己的帮助。


What they cannot accept is a black president and government spending on “others.”	他们不能接受的是黑人总统和政府为“他人”支出。


Likewise, though Europe’s populists use their opposition to “Brussels” as a rallying flag, their ideology retains the atavism that motivated their forebears.	类似地，尽管欧洲民粹主义者以其对“布鲁塞尔”的反对作为令旗，他们的意识形态与他们的前辈的动机并没有区别。


Today’s far-right forces may be more anti-Muslim than anti-Semitic – Wilders may even be sincerely pro-Israel – but they maintain the anti-humanist, cynical, and racist worldview of their predecessors in the 1930’s.	今天的极右翼势力可能反穆斯林甚于反犹——怀德斯甚至是以色列拥趸——但他们与20世纪30年代前辈的反人类、愤世嫉俗和种族主义的世界观一脉相承。


Of course, a country like France is not returning to the politics of the 1930’s, if only because the memories of the country’s military and moral collapse in 1940 have not faded.	当然，像法国这样的国家不会回到20世纪30年代的政治状态，不仅是因为法国人对1940年的军事和道德崩溃记忆犹新。


But the vicious racist attacks on the justice minister, Christiane Taubira, who is black, would have been unthinkable in past decades.	但对黑人司法部长托比拉（Christiane Taubira）的恶毒的种族主义攻击在过去几十年是不可想象的。


And, throughout Europe, the loss of taboos and the belief that anything can be said – and anyone insulted – has led to an increase in racist incidents that are only superficially isolated.	此外，在整个欧洲，禁忌的缺失以及人为事事可评论、人人可攻讦的观念导致了种族主义事件的增加，尽管从表面上看无不是孤立事件。


Europe is not about to turn fascist; yet it would be dangerous to ignore that it is going astray, or to attribute recent developments solely to economic hard times and high unemployment.	欧洲不会转向法西斯主义； 但忽视欧洲正在走向歧途，或者将近来的发展趋势简单地归因为经济不振和高失业也是十分危险的。


More fundamental causes, political as well as ethical, are at work.	更加基本的因素，包括政治和伦理方面的因素也在起作用。


For example, Germany fares better than other European countries in its resistance to populism, not only because its economy is strong and its history constitutes a form of vaccination.	比如，德国比其他欧洲国家更好地阻止了民粹主义，这不仅是因为德国经济坚挺，德国历史也构成了抵抗力。


Germans can also thank the mettle and competence of their political leaders, including Chancellor Angela Merkel and her predecessor, Gerhard Schröder.	德国人还应该感谢其政治领袖（包括现任总理默克尔和她的前任施罗德）的勇气和能力。


The best response to today’s unholy alliance of populist/racist parties is courage, determination, and clarity of position.	对现今民粹主义/法西斯主义政党的罪恶同盟的最佳应对措施就是勇气、决心和明白无误的立场。


Any alliance by mainstream conservative parties with far-right forces will turn out to be a guarantee of defeat – moral as well as political.	任何主流保守政党和极右翼势力组成的联盟都必然会被打败——不管是在道德上还是在政治上。


That was true in Europe’s past, just as it is true for America’s Republicans today.	这是欧洲历史上已经发生过的事实，也是现今美国共和党发生的事实。


Sometimes no spoon is long enough to sup with the devil.	有时候，我们不能和魔鬼共饮一瓢水。


The Containment Debate, Round Two	第二轮遏制辩论


PARIS – At the Cold War’s outset, there was an intense debate in the United States between those who wanted to contain communism and those who wanted to roll it back.	巴黎——冷战开始时，想要遏制和击退共产主义的美国人曾经展开过激烈的辩论。


Was it sufficient to fix limits on the Soviet Union’s ambitions, or was a more aggressive stance, sometimes described as “containment plus,” necessary?	有时这场辩论也被称之为“遏制升级版”，即应该满足于限制苏联的野心，还是有必要采取更为激进的立场？


The recent spat between US President Barack Obama and his former secretary of state (and possible successor), Hillary Clinton, seems to have revived that debate.	美国总统奥巴马及其前国务卿（和可能的继任者）希拉里·克林顿近来的口水战让这个问题的辩论再度变得火爆。


But are its terms of reference useful today, as the West faces the simultaneous challenges of the Islamic State in the Middle East and a revisionist Russia?	但今天当西方面临中东“伊斯兰国”和俄罗斯修正主义的双重挑战时，这样的辩论是否还有意义？


Are Western leaders right to assume that the two challenges are distinct, and that containment will suffice in the case of Russia, while rollback is absolutely necessary in the case of the Islamic State?	西方领导人认为这两项挑战可以区别对待，即可以对俄罗斯进行遏制，但必须对“伊斯兰国”实施打击的理念是否正确呢？


The West needs Russia as much as Russia needs the West, the thinking goes, whereas no one (to say the least) needs a sanctuary for Islamist fanatics in the heart of the Middle East.	基本的理念是西方需要俄罗斯不亚于俄罗斯需要西方，但谁也不希望中东腹地成为伊斯兰狂热份子的庇护所。


That is why Russia must be persuaded to change course through a combination of economic sanctions, strategic unity, and diplomatic engagement; by contrast, the Islamic State’s ambitions cannot be contained, so they must be suppressed.	因此必须通过经济制裁、战略团结和外交接触说服俄罗斯改弦易辙； 相反，“伊斯兰国”的野心不可遏制，因此只剩下镇压这一项选择。


But the West needs to rethink its strategy, because the two challenges are not entirely distinct.	但西方需要重新审视自己的策略，因为这两项挑战具有相同点。


Had Obama not failed to enforce his chemical-weapons “red line” in Syria a year ago, following an attack on a suburb of Damascus, Russian President Vladimir Putin probably would not have been as daring as he was in Ukraine.	假如奥巴马在一年前大马士革郊区袭击发生后坚持其化武“红线”，那么俄罗斯总统普京可能不会在乌克兰如此有恃无恐。


Likewise, helping the Kurds to confront the Islamic State could send the right message to the Kremlin.	同样，协助库尔德人抵抗“伊斯兰国”能对克里姆林起到警示作用。


Confronting this dual challenge presupposes a combination of long-term, coordinated strategic thinking and pedagogical skill.	面对这样的双重挑战必须具备长期统一的战略思想和教学技能。


Leaders must explain and clarify.	领导人必须善于解释和说明。


To say, “I don’t do stupid things,” as Obama did recently in an interview with the New York Times, is not enough, given the complexity, urgency, and scale of the threats America and the West are facing.	鉴于针对美国和西方大范围挑战的复杂性和紧迫性，像奥巴马最近接受《纽约时报》采访时那样仅仅表示“我不做蠢事”并不足以服众。


The simplicity of the Cold War left little need for explanation.	冷战的单一性几乎不需要任何解释工作。


The West had only one opponent, and both sides understood the rules of the game (that is, the logic of the balance of terror).	西方只有一个对手，而双方都清楚恐怖平衡逻辑的游戏规则。


Above all, the “Soviet mind” was relatively easy to decipher.	总之，“苏联人的心理”相对容易解读。


The complexity of today’s challenges consists not only in there being more than one, but also in the difficulty of understanding the “jihadi mind.”	当今挑战之所���复杂不仅仅因为问题多元，还因为“圣战心理”很难把握。


Of course, one can say that the Islamic State’s dream of restoring a Sunni caliphate is as anachronistic as Putin’s neo-imperial ambition.	当然，我们可以说“伊斯兰国”恢复逊尼哈里发王国的梦想和普京的新帝国主义野心一样不合时宜。


One can also say that both Putin and the Islamic State have drawn much of their strength from the West’s weakness, particularly its failure to have enforced clear and credible limits to their actions.	我们也可以说普京和“伊斯兰国”都从西方的软弱中吸取力量，特别是西方无法明确可靠地限制他们的行动。


But, if Putin and the Islamic State have benefited from the West’s confusion, hesitation, and division in dealing with them, they are not paper tigers.	但即便普京和“伊斯兰国”曾经从西方的困惑、犹豫和分裂中受益，他们也绝不是纸老虎。


If they were, the West would need only to wait for its adversaries to collapse under the weight of their own contradictions: Russia’s overestimation of its means, and, in the case of the Islamic State, the consequences of its appallingly cruel behavior.	如果他们是纸老虎，西方只需等待对手在矛盾的重压下自行崩溃：于俄罗斯而言或许是高估自己的手段，而于“伊斯兰国”而言则是其残暴行为的可怕后果。


That scenario seems optimistic at best.	这种情况似乎有些过于乐观。


Though the Islamic State is resistible, it represents a much bigger challenge than Al Qaeda ever did.	尽管“伊斯兰国”并非不可抵御，但它带来的挑战比基地组织严重得多。


It has set for itself a concrete territorial goal, and has ample financing, sophisticated weapons, and a highly competent military command.	它为自己制定了具体的地区目标，并且拥有充足的资金、先进武器和高素质的军事指挥官。


At the same time, it would be as dangerous to overestimate the Islamic State’s capabilities today as it was to underestimate them yesterday.	与此同时，今天高估“伊斯兰国”的实力和昨天低估他们一样具有危险性。


The same logic applies to Putin’s Russia.	同样的逻辑也适用于俄罗斯的普京。


The seizure of Crimea was a swift, well-executed move, but the same tactics have not worked in the more complex and divided context of eastern Ukraine.	占领克里米亚的闪电行动执行得非常到位，但同样的策略却没有在更复杂分裂的乌克兰东部地区发挥作用。


By winning Crimea the way that it did, Russia may well have lost Ukraine.	虽然俄罗斯赢得了克里米亚，但却很可能失去了乌克兰。


In his classic treatise Strategy: The Indirect Approach, B.H. Liddell Hart, reflecting on his World War I experiences, insisted on the foolhardiness of direct attacks on an entrenched enemy.	在B·H·里德尔·哈特反思一战经验的经典论述战略：间接方法中，哈特坚持认为直接进攻在防御工事中的敌人是匹夫之勇。


“In strategy,” he argued, “the longest way round is often the shortest way there.”	他认为，“战略上最直截了当的方式往往欲速而不达。 ”


Today, Liddell Hart would probably encourage the West to concentrate its efforts on helping the Kurdish fighters in the Middle East and aiding Ukraine’s government in Eastern Europe.	今天，里德尔·哈特也许会鼓励西方集中力量协助中东的库尔德战士和东欧的乌克兰政府。


That dual effort should be pursued without idealizing these partners.	在进行上述努力的同时我们不应将合作方过于理想化。


They are not “good” simply because the West is backing them; but they are, in any case, infinitely better than the forces they are resisting.	并不是西方支持他们他们就“好”； 但无论如何他们比各自的竞争对手好得多。


Be it containment or rollback, the rules of the game should be clear.	无论是遏制还是打击，游戏规则都应该十分清楚。


By setting limits to “them,” the West will define – with newfound clarity – who and what it is.	通过对其进行限制，西方将更清晰地界定对象和规则。


France’s Little Big Man	法国的小巨人


PARIS – National stereotypes do not fade easily, especially if those with the greatest influence seem to be doing their best to justify them.	巴黎—国民刻板影响不易消除，特别是在最有影响力的国民在竭尽所能证明这一印象的情况下。


Consider the case of France.	以法国为例。


To outsiders, the land of Molière is a country where political leaders’ extramarital relationships are tolerated, while badly needed economic reforms are not.	在外国人看来，莫里哀的故乡对政治领袖的偷情容忍度颇高，而对急需的经济改革却正好相反。


But the world could be in for a surprise – or at least half a surprise.	但世界可能要感到惊奇了——或者说至少半惊半奇。


When it comes to politicians’ liaisons, continuity may prevail in France; but on the issue of reform, change may be around the corner.	对政客的暧昧关系来说，典型的法国作风是保持； 而对于改革问题，改变或许即将到来了。


President François Hollande has announced measures that, if implemented, would amount to a peaceful revolution: a major reconciliation with the industrial and business world that even his more energetic predecessor, Nicolas Sarkozy, dared not attempt, despite – or precisely because of – his more conservative inclinations.	奥朗德总统宣布了一系列措施，如果得到实施，将迎来一场和平的革命：一场连他更有魄力的前任萨科齐都不敢尝试的和产业界和商业界的大妥协，尽管他的立场更为保守（或者说这正是他敢于尝试的原因）。


The reality of change, however, has been hampered by the stereotype of continuity.	但是，变革的现实因为“保持”的刻板印象而受阻。


Hollande’s daring pledge of €30 billion ($40.6 billion) in tax cuts to boost the economy has been hijacked, at least in part, by revelations about his private life.	奥朗德大胆的300亿欧元减税以提振经济的计划至少部分地因为他的私生活遭到曝光而受到了阻挠。


Public-opinion polls following the publication of photographs of a helmeted Hollande riding on a scooter behind one of his bodyguards to an assignation with a movie actress suggest that the French are mildly interested.	在一张被曝光的照片上，奥朗德头戴头盔，坐在一辆小轮摩托的后座，由警卫带着去和一位电影女星约会。 曝光后的民意调查现实，法国人对此兴致阑珊。


But the reality is more nuanced.	但现实比这更加微妙。


The French are not morally shocked by such revelations.	对于这种事情的曝光，法国人在道德上并不会受到太大冲击。


Though former President François Mitterrand’s second family was virtually a state secret, known only to a select elite and hidden from the public by a reverential press, his mistress and their daughter attended his funeral.	尽管前总统密特朗的第二家庭几乎完全是国家机密，只有一小撮精英知道，媒体也配合地帮忙隐瞒，但他的情人和他们的女儿仍参加了他的葬礼。


And Sarkozy’s tumultuous private life at the beginning of his presidency was on open display.	而萨科齐在担任总统之初以私生活混乱而著称，全法国都知道。


Unlike the British and the Americans, the French are much less obsessed with sex than they are with financial scandal.	与英国人和美国人不同，法国人对性的沉迷远不及对丑闻的热衷。


Public-opinion surveys reveal an interesting dualism: the French want maximum freedom in the private sphere and maximum protection in the public sphere.	民调显示了一个有趣的二元性：法国人希望私人空间自由的最大化和公共空间保护的最大化。


Thus, the French do not criticize Hollande on the ground of ethics, but on the ground of politics.	因此，法国人不会从道德角度批判奥朗德，但会从政治角度这样做。


The president of “la Grande Nation,” political heir of the Sun King and General de Gaulle, has made a fool of himself: he looked simply ridiculous on his scooter.	这个“伟大国家”的总统、太阳王和戴高乐的政治继承者给自己下了个套：他坐在小轮摩托上的形象太滑稽了。


Victor Hugo coined the formula “Napoleon le petit” to describe Napoleon III.	维克多·雨果创造了“小拿破仑”来形容拿破仑三世。


Will Hollande, who seems to take so much inspiration for both his public and private life from his mentor and model, France’s first-ever Socialist president, one day be described as “Mitterrand le petit”?	从他的导师和榜样身上汲取了如此之多公共和私生活灵感的首位法国社会党总统奥朗德会有一天被称为“小密特朗”吗？


Vaudeville may be a French specialty, like bread, cheese, and wine, but it does not strengthen the dignity and credibility of an already spectacularly unpopular presidency.	综艺节目是法国特色，堪与面包、奶酪和葡萄酒相提并论，但这并没有加强这位支持率已然低得离谱的总统的尊严和信誉。


Hollande wanted to be a “normal president.”	奥朗德希望称为一位“寻常总统”。


In the stolen images of him en route to a tryst, he seems to be outdoing himself.	在这张拍摄于他幽会途中的照片中，他似乎超越了自我。


And French humorists – and even politicians – have been quick to play on his vulnerability.	而法国人的幽默感——哪怕他是政客——马上在他的弱点上体现出来。


Hollande may be in love with another woman; it does happen.	奥朗德也许与另一位女性坠入了爱河；


But, if he is, it could not have been revealed at a worse moment, precisely when he was intent on steering the country onto a new, courageous, and badly needed course.	确实如此。 但是，即使确实如此，也不能在最糟糕的时刻被曝光——恰好赶上他试图把法国引向急需的勇敢新旅程的当口。


One may regret the disappearance of boundaries between private and public life in our global Internet age, but one must adjust to it – and Hollande clearly has not.	你可能会感叹在全球互联网时代再无私人和公共生活的界限，但你必须适应它，而奥朗德显然没有适应。


Of course, the key question is why Hollande waited 18 months before doing the right thing and helping the French economy by alleviating the tax burden that had been reducing French enterprises’ competitiveness.	当然，关键问题是奥朗德为何等了18个月才开始做正确的事情、通过减轻导致法国企业竞争力低下的税务负担提振法国经济。


The official answer is that deteriorating global economic conditions left no other choice.	官方回答是不利的全球经济条件让他别无选择。


For some, including me, Hollande was from the start a true social democrat.	对包括我在内的一些人来说，奥朗德从一开始就是真正的社会民主党。


But, having campaigned as a socialist, and with his own camp’s deep divisions leaving him no real majority in parliament, he could not afford to reveal his pro-industry orientation (he continues to denounce the financial sector) without a significant delay.	但是，由于以社会主义者的形象参与了选战，并且他自己的阵营分歧很深、导致他在议会无法获得真正多数，因此他不得不拖延很久才让其亲产业的立场表露无遗（对金融业，他仍然十分痛恶）。


Whether one calls that realism or lack of political courage, a year and a half has been lost, seriously hampering France and its economy.	你称这是现实主义也好，是政治勇气也罢，一年半的时间已经浪费掉了，法国及其经济遭到了严重拖累。


Now, however, the country may at long last be headed in the right direction.	但是，如今，法国可能终于要进入正确方向了。


But it is likely to have a weaker president at the helm.	但当头的总统却可能变得更加孱弱了。


Hollande now has three years to prove that, animated by the right ideas, he can transform his image – and that of France – with economic results, if not by his personal behavior.	现在奥朗德还有三年时间证明，在正确思想的刺激下，他可以用经济成果，而不是个人行为改变他——以及法国——的形象。


The Congress of Vienna Revisited	回顾维也纳会议


PARIS – Two hundred years ago, on September 25, 1814, Russia’s Czar Alexander I and Friedrich Wilhelm III, the King of Prussia, were greeted at the gates of Vienna by Austria’s Emperor Franz I. The start of the Congress of Vienna ushered in the longest period of peace Europe had known for centuries.	巴黎—两百年前，1814年9月25日，俄国沙皇亚历山大一世和普鲁士国王威廉三世来到维也纳，受到奥地利皇帝弗朗茨一世的欢迎。 维也纳会议的召开带来了数百年以来欧洲最长的和平时期。


So why has its anniversary all but been ignored?	那么，为何此事的纪念日完全被忽视了呢？


True, the Congress of Vienna is mostly viewed as marking the victory of Europe’s reactionary forces after the defeat of Napoleon.	诚然，维也纳会议常常被视为标志着拿破仑倒台后反动势力的胜利。


Yet, given today’s growing global confusion, if not chaos, something like “Proustian” nostalgia for the Congress may not be out of order.	但是，考虑到如今全球一篇混乱甚至动荡的局面，类似于维也纳会议的“普鲁士式”乡愁也许并不算差。


Here, after all, was a meeting that, through tough but successful negotiations, reestablished international order after the upheavals caused by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars.	毕竟，这次会议通过艰难但成功的谈判重建了法国大革命和拿破仑战争所造成动剧变的国际秩序。


Can we apply any of its lessons today?	这给今天带来了什么教训？


To answer that question, we should consider not just the 1815 Treaty of Vienna, but also the 1648 Peace of Westphalia and the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, each of which in its own way brought to an end a bloody chapter in European history.	为了回答这个问题，我们不仅应该考虑1815年的《维也纳条约》（Treaty of Vienna），还应该考虑1648年的《威斯特伐利亚和约》（Peace of Westphalia）和1919年的《凡尔赛和约》（Treaty of Versailles）这三次和约以各自的方式结束了欧洲历史上的血腥篇章。


The treaties signed in 1648 concluded nearly a century of religious warfare by enshrining the principle of cuius regio, eius religio (“whose realm, his religion”).	1648年签订的条约通过信奉“谁的王国，他的宗教”（cuius regio,eius religio）原则结束了近一百年的宗教战争。


The Congress of Vienna reinstated the principle of the balance of power, based on the belief that all parties shared a common interest transcending their respective ambitions, and re-established the Concert of Nations, which for two generations stopped territorial and ideological revisionism of the type seen from 1789 to 1815.	维也纳会议恢复了实力平衡原则，其观念基础是所有各方拥有超越各自野心的共同利益，并重新建立了国联（Concert of Nations）。 国联在两代人的时间里阻止了1789—1815年间领土和思想修正主义。


By contrast, the Treaty of Versailles, too harsh to be honored and too weak to be enforced, paved the way for World War II.	相反，《凡尔赛和约》显得太严厉而无法遵循，同时又太软弱而无法强制执行，反而为二战铺平了道路。


Of the three treaties, the one produced by the Congress of Vienna offers a sort of mirror image to help us understand the specificity of our current conditions.	在这三个条约中，维也纳会议所达成的条约为我们提供了一个镜像，可帮助我们理解当前环境的特征。


In Vienna, the European powers were among themselves.	在维也纳，欧洲列强无不与会。


Their feeling of belonging to a great and unified family was reinforced by the common aristocratic origins of their diplomats.	它们感觉属于一个伟大、团结的家庭，这种感觉因为外交官员的共同贵族血统而得到了加强。


The cultural “other” was not an issue.	没有文化上的“他者”的问题。


Of course, the ambition today cannot be to recreate that world (or to reestablish an anachronistic Westphalian order of religious separation), but rather to devise a new order predicated on different assumptions.	当然，今天我们不可能拥有重建彼时世界（或重建成为时代错误的宗教分裂威斯特伐利亚秩序）的雄心，而拥有建立脱胎于不同假设的新秩序的雄心。


Indeed, one of the keys to our current global disorder is that, in contrast to the Congress of Vienna – or, for that matter, the parties of 1648 – the international system’s main actors are not united by a common will to defend the status quo.	事实上，眼下全球失序的一个关键因素是，与维也纳会议——或者说1648年的各方——相反，国际体系的主要行动方没有因为捍卫现状的共同意愿联合起来。


The main actors fall into three categories: open revisionists, like Russia and the Islamic State; those ready to fight to protect a minimum of order, such as the United States, France, and Great Britain; and ambivalent states – including key regional players in the Middle East, such as Turkey and Iran – whose actions fail to match their rhetoric.	主要行动方可归为三类：公开的修正主义者（如俄罗斯和伊斯兰国）； 准备着为保护最低限度秩序斗争者（如美国、法国和英国），以及言行不一的矛盾国家，包括中东的关键行动方（如土耳��和伊朗）。


In such a divided context, the alliance of “moderates” created by US President Barack Obama to defeat the Islamic State – a group that includes Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates – is weak at best.	在如此分裂的环境中，美国总统奥巴马为击败伊斯兰国而建立的“温和派”联盟——一个包括沙特阿拉伯、卡塔尔和阿联酋在内的集团——是相当脆弱的。


A multicultural coalition is probably a requirement of legitimate military action in the Middle East; the dilemma is that unless Obama’s regional coalition broadens considerably, his current allies’ enthusiasm for US military intervention is likely to diminish quickly.	跨文化联盟也许是中东合法军事行动的先决条件； 困难在于，除非奥巴马的地区联盟得到显著扩大，否则当前盟友对美国军事干预的热情也许很快就会消退。


Or perhaps something like the “bipolar hegemony” of Great Britain and Russia after 1815 (though other players like Austria, Prussia, and France mattered) could be reconstituted, with the US and China substituting for Great Britain and Russia.	也许可以重新建立“两极争霸”格局，就像1815年后的英国和俄国（尽管奥地利、普鲁士和法国等其他行动方也不容小觑），美国和中国分别代替英国和俄国的地位。


This seems to be Henry Kissinger’s ultimate dream – a dream that one can glimpse in his latest book, Germanically entitled World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History.	这似乎也是亨利·基辛格的终极梦想——他用德语做标题的著作《世界秩序：关于国家和历史进程的思考》（World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History）可一窥端倪。


But can we depend on that dream’s realization?	但我们可以依赖这个梦的实现吗？


At a time when we are confronted by Russian expansionism and the extremism of messianic thugs, the lessons from the Congress of Vienna may seem distant and irrelevant.	在这个面临着俄罗斯扩张主义和救世派暴徒的恐怖主义的今天，维也纳会议的教训似乎遥远又不相干。


Yet one is obvious: States possess common interests that should trump national priorities.	但有一点是显而易见的，国家（state）具有超越民族重点问题（national priority）的共同利益。


China, India, and Brazil are stakeholders in the world system, which means that they, too, need a minimum of order.	中国、印度和巴西是世界体系的相关利益方，这意味着他们也需要最低限度的秩序。


But that implies that they also contribute to maintaining it.	但这也意味着它们要为维持这一秩序做出贡献。


China’s interests, for example, would be best served not by playing Russia against the US, but by choosing the party of order over the party of disorder.	比如，追随俄罗斯与美国对立并不能最好地符合中国的利益，中国应该选择秩序的一方，而不应该选择破坏秩序的一方。


A gathering of the modern equivalents of Metternich, Castlereagh, Alexander I, and Talleyrand is also a dream: there are none.	当代梅特涅、卡斯尔雷、亚历山大一世和塔列朗的聚会也是一个梦：根本没有这样的聚会。


But, in confronting today’s growing disorder and escalating violence, the leaders we have would do well to draw some inspiration from their forebears, who 200 years ago this week opened the way to nearly a century of peace.	但是，在面临当今日益失序、暴力日益升级的局面时，我们所有的领导人如能从他们的先辈中汲取一些灵感，将善莫大焉。 200年前的这个星期为近一百年的和平打开了大门。


Donald Rumsfeld and Smart Power	拉姆斯菲尔德和灵巧力量


Donald Rumsfeld, America’s Secretary of Defense, recently spoke about the Bush administration’s global war on terror. “In this war, some of the most critical battles may not be in the mountains of Afghanistan or the streets of Iraq, but in newsrooms in New York, London, Cairo, and elsewhere.	美国国防部长拉姆斯菲尔德最近谈论布什当局的全球性反恐战争时说：“在这场战争中，某些最为关键的战役并不是在阿富汗的山岭或者伊拉克的街巷中进行的，而是在位于纽约、伦敦、开罗以及其他地方的新闻室中开展的。


Our enemies have skillfully adapted to fighting wars in the media age, but for the most part we have not.”	我们的敌人已经娴熟地适应了在媒体时代中作战，但是我们在很大程度上却还没有”。


The good news is that Rumsfeld is beginning to realize that the struggle against terrorism cannot be won by hard military power alone.	好消息是，拉姆斯菲尔德开始意识到无法单纯通过军事力量赢得反恐斗争。


The bad news is that he still does not understand soft power – the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion.	坏消息是，他还是不理解柔性力量，也就是通过吸引而非高压强制达到目的的能力。


As The Economist commented about Rumsfeld’s speech, “until recently he plainly regarded such a focus on ‘soft power’ as, well, soft – part of ‘Old Europe’s’ appeasement of terrorism.”	经济学家杂志评论拉姆斯菲尔德的言论说：“直到最近，他还直截了当地把重视柔性力量视为老欧洲对恐怖主义温柔的绥靖主义”。


Now Rumsfeld finally realizes the importance of winning hearts and minds, but, as The Economist put it, “a good part of his speech was focused on how with slicker PR America could win the propaganda war.”	现在，拉姆斯菲尔德终于认识到赢得人心的重要性，但是，正如经济学家杂志所指出的那样，“他讲话的大部分集中在美国如何运用滑头的公关赢得宣传战争”。


In other words, in blaming the media for America’s problems, Rumsfeld forgot the first rule of marketing: if you have a poor product, not even the best advertising will sell it.	换言之，拉姆斯菲尔德在把美国的问题归咎于媒体的时候，他忘记了市场营销的首要法则，那就是如果你的产品不佳，即使是最好的广告也无法让它畅销。


Rumsfeld’s mistrust of the European approach contains a grain of truth.	拉氏对欧洲方式的不信任包含了真相本质。


Europe has used the attractiveness of its Union to obtain outcomes it wants, just as the US has acted as though its military pre-eminence could solve all problems.	正如美国的行为方式看似其军事独霸可以解决所有问题一样，欧洲利用欧盟的吸引力实现它所要实现的目标。


But it is a mistake to count too much on hard or soft power alone.	但是，仅仅指望钢性力量或者柔性力量都是错误的。


The ability to combine them effectively is “smart power.”	将二者有效结合起来的能力就是“灵巧力量”。


During the Cold War, the West used hard power to deter Soviet aggression, while it used soft power to erode faith in Communism behind the iron curtain.	冷战期间，西方使用钢性力量来威慑苏联侵犯，同时利用柔性力量来腐蚀铁幕背后的共产主义信仰。


That was smart power.	那就是灵巧力量。


To be smart today, Europe should invest more in its hard-power resources, and America should pay more attention to its soft power.	为了实现灵巧目的，欧洲应当更多地投资于其钢性力量资源，而美国则应对其柔性力量予以更大的关注。


During President George W. Bush’s first term, Secretary of State Colin Powell understood and referred to soft power, whereas Rumsfeld, when asked about soft power in 2003, replied “I don’t know what it means.”	在布什总统的第一个任期内，国务卿鲍威尔理解并提出柔性力量，而拉氏在2003年被问及柔性力量的时候回答说：“我根本就不知道它是什么东西”。


A high price was paid for that ignorance.	为了这一无知付出代价是高昂的。


Fortunately, in his second term, with Condoleezza Rice and Karen Hughes at the State Department and Rumsfeld’s reputation dented by failures that in the private sector would have led to his firing or resignation, Bush has shown an increased concern about America’s soft power.	幸运的是，在布什的第二个任期内，莱斯和休斯坐镇国务院，拉氏的声望则由于众多足以令在私营部门解雇或者辞职的失策而受到削弱，布什已经表现出对美国柔性力量更多的关心。


Of course, soft power is no panacea.	当然，柔性力量并非包治百病的灵丹妙药。


For example, soft power got nowhere in attracting the Taliban government away from its support for Al Qaeda in the 1990’s.	例如，柔性力量对在二十世纪九十年代让塔利班停止支持基地组织上就束手无策。


It took hard military power to sever that tie.	只有动用了钢性的军事力量才切断了那一联系。


Similarly, North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il likes to watch Hollywood movies, but that is unlikely to affect his decision about whether to give up his nuclear weapons program.	同理，北韩独裁者金正日喜欢看好莱坞电影，但是，那并不大可能影响他是否放弃核武器项目的决定。


Such a choice will be determined by hard power, particularly if China agrees to economic sanctions.	只有钢性力量才能决定这一选择，特别是如果中国同意经济制裁的话。


Nor will soft power be sufficient to stop Iran’s nuclear program, though the legitimacy of the Bush administration’s current multilateral approach may help to recruit other countries to a coalition that isolates Iran.	尽管布什当局目前的多边外交可能对组织其他国家参加孤立伊朗的联盟有所帮助，但是，柔性力量也无力制止伊朗的核子项目。


But other goals, such as promoting democracy and human rights, are better achieved by soft power.	但是，柔性力量却可以更好地实现其他的目标，例如促进民主和人权。


Coercive democratization has its limits, as the US has learned in Iraq.	正如美国在伊拉克所学习到的那样，高压强制实现民主化是有局限的。


This does not mean that Rumsfeld’s Pentagon is irrelevant to American soft power.	这并不意味着拉氏的五角大楼对美国柔性力量无关紧要。


Military force is sometimes treated as synonymous with hard power, but the same resource can sometimes contribute to soft power.	有时人们把军事力量混同于钢性力量，但是，同样的军力有时却可以有助于柔性力量。


A well-run military can be a source of attraction, and military cooperation and training programs can establish transnational networks that enhance a country’s soft power.	训练有素的军力有时可以引人入胜，而军事合作和培训项目则可以建立起增进国家柔性力量的跨国网络。


The US military’s impressive work in providing humanitarian relief after the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 helped restore America’s attractiveness, and enhanced its soft power.	2004年印度洋海啸后美军提供人道主义救援令人印象深刻，帮助了美国的吸引力并提升了它的柔性力量。


But the misuse of military resources can also undercut soft power.	但是，误用军事资源也可以削弱柔性力量。


The Soviet Union possessed a great deal of soft power in the years after World War II.	苏联在二战后的几年里掌握了大量的柔性力量。


But the Soviets’ attractiveness as liberators was destroyed by the way they later used their hard power against Hungary and Czechoslovakia.	但是，它后来针对匈牙利和捷克斯洛伐克使用钢性力量的方式则摧毁了其作为解放者的吸引力。


Brutality and indifference to “just war” principles of discrimination and proportionality can also destroy legitimacy.	残酷无情和对“正义战争”分清青红皂白以及适度的原则置之不理同样也可以摧毁合法性。


The efficiency of the initial American military invasion of Iraq in 2003 created admiration in the eyes of some foreigners.	2003年美军最初入侵伊拉克势如破竹，某些外国人肃然起敬。


But this soft power was undercut by the inefficiency of the occupation, the mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, and the policy – initiated by Rumsfeld – of detainment without hearings at Guantánamo.	但是，占领伊拉克杂乱无章，阿布格里卜的虐囚事件以及由拉氏提出的在关塔那摩基地不经聆讯关押囚犯的政策等事件破坏了柔性力量。


To be sure, no one expects that we can ever attract people like Mohammed Attta or Osama bin Laden.	的确，没有人会指望我们能够吸引阿塔或者拉登之流。


We need hard power to deal with such cases.	对付他们，我们需要钢性力量。


But today’s terrorist threat is not Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations.	但是，当今的恐怖主义威胁并非亨廷顿的文明的冲突。


It is a civil war within Islam between a majority of normal people and a small minority who want to coerce others into a accepting a highly ideological and politicized version of their religion.	这是一场伊斯兰世界大多数普通人以及一小部分企图压制他人接收其高度意识形态化和政治化的宗教版本的人之间的内战。


We cannot win unless the moderates win.	除非温和派取胜，否则我们就无法得胜。


We cannot win unless the number of people the extremists recruit is lower than the number we kill and deter.	除非极端分子招募的人数低于我们干掉和威慑的人数，否则我们无法取胜。


Rumsfeld may understand this calculus in principle, but his words and actions show that he does not know how to balance the equation in practice.	拉氏可能在原则上理解这一演算，但是其言行表明他并不知道如何在实践中平衡方程式。


Doing so – and thus being in a position to win the war – is impossible without soft power.	没有柔性力量，求得平衡乃至占据获胜的制高点都是不可能的。


The Trumping of American Politics	美国政治的王牌


WASHINGTON, DC – As Republicans and Democrats go through the long process of selecting a nominee for next year’s presidential election, both parties face the same question.	华盛顿—民主党和共产党正在进行漫长的党内遴选程序，以选出明年总统大选的候选人。 两党面临相同的问题。


Will the anti-establishment – even anti-political – mood now dominating the contest last?	目前主导竞争的反现状——甚至反政治——情绪会不会继续下去？


For once, Labor Day (the first Monday in September) was not the presidential race’s demarcation point: the overall themes had already been set.	至少这一回，劳动节（9月的第一个星期一）不再是总统竞争的分界点：总主题早已定下。


Revulsion at government and traditional politicians hit the presidential contest like a tornado in the summer, flattening the campaigns of some who were once seen as serious contenders.	今年夏天，对政府和传统政客的深恶痛绝像龙卷风一样席卷整个总统竞争，一些曾被视为资深竞争者的选战一败涂地。


Among Republicans this sentiment is, of course, no surprise, given their party’s steady rightward drift and consistent antipathy toward President Barack Obama.	当然，共和党有这种情绪并不令人奇怪，因为该党日益右倾，并且一直反对总统奥巴马。


But it suited a wealthy, noisy braggart who barreled into the race attacking conventional politicians as “stupid” and insisting that he alone could get things done.	但共和党推出了一位富有的“大嘴巴”加入战团，他抨击传统政客是“蠢货”，并称他单枪匹马就可以解决战斗。


Those who wrote off Donald Trump as a “buffoon” failed to see that he has shrewdly read the Republican zeitgeist, and that he knows precisely where to stick the knife into competitors.	那些将唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）贬低为“丑角”的人没有看清他早已洞察到共和党的时代精神，并且他精准地知道将利刃插向竞争对手的何处。


His depiction of former Florida governor Jeb Bush as a man of “low energy” has done real damage to a candidate whom many had assumed – even before he formally entered the race – would be the favorite.	他将佛罗里达州前州长杰布·布什（Jeb Bush）称为“低能”人士，这严重挫伤了这位（甚至在他正式加入选战前就）被许多人当成最喜爱的候选人。


“The Donald” (no one has better name recognition than the former TV personality) has pitched his appeal both to American patriotism and the country’s dark side.	“唐纳德”（没有任何人的名字识别度能超过这位前电视人）将他的号召力建立在美国爱国主义和阴暗面上。


His slogan, “Make America Great Again,” is aimed at those who are frustrated that the US can no longer impose its will on an increasingly confusing world.	他提出了“让美国再次伟大”的口号，目标直指那些因为美国不在能够将自己的意志加在日益困惑的世界之上而沮丧的人群。


For them, and for Trump, Obama is to blame: he doesn’t stand up to foreign leaders (Binyamin Netanyahu might disagree); he withdrew from Iraq too soon (though the timetable was set by his Republican predecessor); he even “apologizes” for America.	对他们，也对特朗普而言，奥巴马是罪魁：他没有抵挡住外交领导人（内塔尼亚胡可能会反对这一点）； 他过早从伊拉克撤军（尽管撤军时间表是他的共和党前任制定的）；


Trump plays to America’s persistent veins of racism and nativism: he vows somehow to round up and deport some 11 million undocumented aliens and fortify America’s border with Mexico by building a wall – paid for by Mexico.	特朗普利用了美国长期存在的一定程度的种族主义和本土论：他宣誓要设法围剿和驱逐大约1,100万非法留美外国人，在美墨边境建立一道墙——由墨西哥买单。


His striking narcissism (everything he does is “outstanding, great, terrific, the best”) is both his trademark and his policy.	他的惊人的自恋（他所做的一切都“了不起、伟大、完美、最好”）是他的招牌，也是他的政策。


Around mid-August, as Trump’s poll numbers rose even after public statements that would have brought down mere mortal candidates, it dawned on the pundits that he was no summer infatuation.	8月中旬，即使发表了足以让平庸候选人一败涂地的公开言论，特朗普的支持者数量仍在上升，专家们猛然醒悟，他绝不是这个夏天的“调味品”。


It became evident that he might win the first nominating contest, the Iowa caucuses, and that he was leading in the second, New Hampshire, and other states.	很明显，他有可能赢得第一场提名竞争——艾奥瓦州党代会，并且他在第二场竞争——新罕布什尔州和其他州也处于领先。


It was no longer laughable to say that he could be the Republican nominee.	认为他可能成为共和党候选人已不再是个笑话。


But the “anti-system” mood of this election campaign is not confined to the Republicans.	但“反制度”这场选战的情绪并不局限于共和党。


Bernie Sanders the socialist and Donald Trump the plutocrat are addressing much the same impulse.	社会主义者伯尔尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）和富豪唐纳德·特朗普正在寻找相同的动力。


Speaking in clear, declarative sentences, Sanders sets forth an idealistic conception of government policy that appeals to a great many people on the growing left of the Democratic Party.	桑德斯用明确的陈述句提出了一个政府政策的理想概念，吸引了日益左倾的民主党人士。


By contrast, Jeb Bush and the Democrats’ presumed nominee, Hillary Clinton, embody traditional politics.	相反，杰布·布什和民主党志在必得的提名人希拉里·克林顿采取的是传统政治。


Both come across as focus-grouped, packaged, and cautious, whereas Trump and Sanders are seen by their followers as “telling it like it is.”	布什和克林顿的风格是专注的团队、包装和谨慎； 而特朗普和桑德斯被追随者视为“直言不讳”。


Sanders appeals to the popular frustration with the compromises made by America’s leaders, including the centrist Bill Clinton.	桑德斯切入点是公众对美国领导人——包括中间派的比尔·克林顿——所做出的妥协的沮丧情绪。


Hillary Clinton, trying to straddle the divide between the two wings of the Democratic Party, is increasingly leaning to the left as Sanders draws enormous crowds, something she has yet to accomplish.	希拉里·克林顿试图通吃民主党内分裂的两翼，而随着桑德斯吸引大量群众（这是她所没有做到的），她开始左倾。


Moreover, her campaign is struggling to escape the quagmire produced by revelations that she conducted official business on a private email server during her tenure as Obama’s Secretary of State.	此外，她的阵营正在苦苦摆脱一项披露所造成的困局：在担任奥巴马的国务卿期间，她通过私人邮件服务器处理公务。


Meanwhile, Trump’s appeal among Republicans is across the board: moderates and conservatives, college-educated, Evangelicals, men and women.	与此同时，特朗普受到了共和党内部全方位的支持：温和派和保守派、受过高等教育者、福音派、男性和女性。


It also includes white supremacists: in June Trump was endorsed by The Daily Stormer, America’s largest neo-Nazi “news” website.	他的支持者还包括白人至上论者：6月，特朗普得到了美国最大的新纳粹“新闻”网站The Daily Stormer的支持 。


When two far-right activists in Boston beat a homeless Latino man, with one saying that they had acted in Trump’s name, the candidate commented that some of his followers are “passionate.” A poll of Trump supporters found that 66% believe that Obama is a Muslim, and 61% that he was not born in the US (a claim that Trump continued to trumpet long after it had been disproved).	波士顿的两位极右翼活跃分子殴打了一位无家可归的拉丁裔男子，其中一人说他们是代表特朗普行凶的，特朗普评论说，他的一些追随者“相当热情”一项关于特朗普支持者的民调 发现，66%相信奥巴马是穆斯林，61%相信他非出生在美国（这一点早已被证伪，但此后特朗普仍然在宣传这一点）。


Trump’s closest Republican rival, Ben Carson, a renowned neurosurgeon, also has no political experience and says outlandish things.	与特朗普最接近的共和党竞争者本·卡尔森（Ben Carson）是著名外科医生，他也没有政治经验，常常语出惊人。


But Carson says them quietly, which may be why his favorability rating in Iowa is higher than that of his Republican competitors (pulling even with Trump in one poll).	但卡尔森总是悄悄地说，这也许是他在艾奥瓦州的的支持率高于其他共和党竞争者（在一项民调中与特朗普打了平手）的原因。 比如，卡尔森说，异性恋者蹲过监狱就变成了同性恋；


Carson has said, for example, that people enter prison as heterosexuals and come out gay; that America is like Nazi Germany in suppressing ideas and opponents; and that the president need not enforce the Supreme Court’s recent landmark decision legalizing gay marriage.	美国在镇压思想和反对派方面就像纳粹德国； 总统不需要执行最高法院宣布同性婚姻合法的最近的里程碑式裁决。


Trump and Carson, along with two other candidates running as political outsiders – Ted Cruz, a senator from Texas, and former Hewlett-Packard CEO Carly Fiorina – currently account for around 60% of support among Iowa Republicans.	特朗普和卡尔森，以及其他两位作为政治局外人参选者——德克萨斯州参议员泰德·科鲁兹（Ted Cruz）和惠普公司前CEO卡莉·菲奥丽娜（Carly Fiorina）——目前赢得艾奥瓦州共和党支持率的60%左右。


Bush and the rest of the field, including Rand Paul, Scott Walker, and Marco Rubio – all one-time darlings of the political press – are floundering.	布什和其他人——包括兰德·保罗（Rand Paul）、斯科特·沃克尔（Scott Walker）和马克·卢比奥（Marco Rubio），他们都曾经是政治媒体的宠儿——形势惨淡。


To recover ground, some, especially Walker, have fallen into the trap of trying to out-Trump Trump.	为了收复失地，一些人，特备是沃克尔，已经陷入了试图比特朗普更特朗普的陷阱。


But there’s only one Trump, and his candidacy is causing conniptions on the part of Republican Party officials, particularly given his campaign’s open hostility toward Latinos.	但只有一个特朗普，他的参选正在导致一些共和党官员的震怒，特别是他的竞选策略公然敌视拉丁裔。


Following Obama’s re-election, in 2012, Republican leaders commissioned a study that showed that the party’s nominee will have to win more Latino votes than ever to win the White House.	2012年奥巴马连任后，共和党岭南道人进行了一项研究，研究表明该党候选人必须赢得更多拉丁裔选票才能重新入主白宫。


There is scant chance of that if Trump is the party’s standard-bearer.	如果特朗普成为共和党候选人，这一希望十分渺茫。


So far, Trump has defied the laws of political gravity.	目前，特朗普已经颠覆了政治引力定律。


But it remains possible that his candidacy will crash as some of his rivals drop out and leave their supporters (and wealthy backers) to crystallize around someone they see as a more viable alternative.	但他的获选人资格仍有可能泡汤，因为他的对手出局后，他们的支持者（以及有钱的金主）可能会团结在他们看来更有利的人选周围。


That would be a relief to Republican Party leaders, who recently obtained Trump’s vow (easily undone) not to mount an independent presidential campaign should he fail to win the party’s nomination.	对于共和党领导人来说，这令人松一口气。 最近特朗普已经承诺（很容易推翻），如果竞争共和党内候选人失败，他不会作为独立候选人参选。


In the meantime, both party establishments have reason to be nervous.	与此同时，两党的老牌势力都有理由感到紧张。


With Sanders now polling well ahead of Clinton in New Hampshire, serious commentators have begun speculating that Americans will ultimately be asked to choose between Sanders and Trump.	如今，桑德斯在新罕布什尔州遥遥领先于克林顿，资深评论家开始猜测美国人最终将需要在桑德斯和特朗普之间做出选择。


Which Way for US-China Relations Under Trump?	特朗普治下的美中关系将向何处去？


BEIJING – Donald Trump’s shocking victory in the US presidential election has upended all of the certainties that have shaped not only American politics, but also how the world thinks about the United States.	北京——美国大选中唐纳德·特朗普的惊人胜利已经颠覆了决定美国政治和世界各国对美看法的一切确定因素。


Trump must now confront the nitty-gritty of managing America’s international relationships, and arguably none is more important for the world than that between the US and China.	特朗普现在必须直面美国国际关系管理的本质，可以说，美中关系是全世界最重要的关系。


But it is also the relationship that was put in the most doubt by the tenor of Trump’s campaign.	但这同时也是特朗普竞选期间最受质疑的关系。


The president-elect could complicate bilateral relations, particularly given that his first year in office will coincide with the Chinese Communist Party’s 19th National Congress next fall.	这位当选总统可能导致双边关系复杂化，尤其鉴于他首年任期恰逢中国共产党定于明年秋天召开的第十九次全国代表大会。


In an ideal world, both Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping should want to keep US-China relations stable.	在理想世界里，特朗普和中国国家主席习近平都希望美中关系保持稳定。


But this will prove difficult, given not only Trump’s Sinophobic rhetoric, but also ongoing disagreements about Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.	但鉴于特朗普挑起对中国恐惧的长篇大论和就中国南海领土要求及朝鲜核野心方面的持续分歧，保持中美关系稳定并非易事。


Moreover, US-China relations could fall victim to US domestic disputes about global trade, the value of the dollar, and protectionism.	此外，美中关系可能成为美国国内全球贸易、美元价值和保护主义争端的受害者。


Many Chinese observers accept that Trump will have to grapple with unprecedented divisions at home.	许多中国观察家都认为特朗普被迫将在国内面对前所未有的分歧。


He will be challenged not only by the now shell-shocked Democrats, but also by Republicans who opposed his candidacy, whether openly or covertly.	他不仅将要应对深感震惊的民主党的挑战，而且还要面对公开或秘密反对他候选资格的共和党人。


Under these circumstances, he will have to emphasize putting America’s own house in order.	在这种情况下，他必须先以整肃美国国内秩序为重。


If, however, he confuses such an effort with his campaign’s “America first” thrust, even more tension is likely.	可如果他把这项工作与竞选时“美国第一”的提法相互混淆，就有可能进一步加剧紧张关系。


Beyond domestic politics, the international order has experienced several shocks in recent years, profoundly changing the global context for US-China relations.	除国内政治外，国际秩序在近年来也经历了几次冲击，并深刻改变了美中关系的全球氛围。


Protracted conflicts in Ukraine and Syria hint at a new Cold War between the US and Russia, and the turmoil in those countries, as well as elsewhere, is increasingly disrupting national economies and security regimes.	乌克兰和叙利亚旷日持久的冲突暗示了美俄之间陷入新冷战，这些国家和其他地方的混乱局面正日益严重地影响到国家经济和安全机制。


As the world’s two leading powers, the US and China must figure out how to work together in such unstable conditions.	作为两个主导世界的大国，美中必须探索在如此不稳定的环境下如何共同努力。


Today, their unsteady relationship features cooperation alongside intensifying competition.	今天，它们之间不稳定的关系在合作的同时伴随着激烈竞争。


Not unsurprisingly, the latter has gained more of the world’s attention than the former.	而后者比前者吸引了世界更多的关注，这一点并不令人感到惊奇。


President Barack Obama has been reinforcing the US military presence in and around China’s neighbors, beefing up security alliances in Asia, and very publicly intervening in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea.	奥巴马总统一直在强化美国在中国周边的军事存在、强化亚洲安全联盟，并公开干预南中国海的领土争端。


The Chinese leadership views these moves, as well as the proposed 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal, as an effort to “contain” China.	中国领导层认为这些举措，还有拟议中十二国泛太平洋贸易伙伴协定，共同组成了“遏制”中国战略。


At the same time that the US is rebalancing its geopolitical strategy toward Asia, China is asserting its global presence with new security and international-development initiatives, including the “one belt, one road” project, which will link the Chinese economy with much of Eurasia.	在美国重新平衡对亚洲地缘政治战略的同时，中国也正通过新的安全及全球发展倡议，包括连接中国和欧亚大陆多数经济体的“一带一路”计划，宣示其在全球的实力存在。


Likewise, the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank – which the US views as a Chinese tool for challenging the existing international order – continues to attract such faraway prospective members as Canada, which applied to join in August.	同样，中国主导的亚洲基础设施投资银行（美国认为该行是中国挑战现有国际秩序的工具）继续吸引加拿大等遥远的潜在成员，后者于今年8月时申请加入。


Zero-sum competition between the US and China will make a conflict between the two countries more likely.	中美之间的零和游戏将使两国间更有可能爆发冲突。


One potential flashpoint will be North Korea’s nuclear-weapons program.	潜在的引爆点之一是朝鲜的核武器项目。


The US is already taking measures to prevent North Korea from attacking it, or South Korea, through enhanced ballistic missile defense systems.	美国已经在采取措施通过强化弹道导弹防御系统防止朝鲜对美国本土或韩国发起攻击。


The new Trump administration could supplement those efforts with military action to increase the pressure on China.	新上任的特朗普政府可能辅之以军事行动，以增加对中国的压力。


But any effort to bring nuclear-weapons technology to Japan or the Korean Peninsula, something that Trump declared acceptable during the campaign, would create a crisis in Northeast Asia the likes of which the world has not seen since the Korean War.	但特朗普在竞选期间宣布可以接受将核武器技术带到日本或朝鲜半岛的策略将在东北亚造成自朝鲜战争以来各国再未亲眼目睹过的危机。


The US could also clash with China over Taiwan.	中美两国也有可能因台湾问题而爆发冲突。


Relations between Taiwan and mainland China have been fairly peaceful since the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, when then-US President Bill Clinton sent an American aircraft-carrier battle group into the strait.	1995到1996年台海关系危机以来台湾和中国大陆的关系一直相对和平，时任美国总统比尔·克林顿曾将美国一个航母战斗群派到台湾海峡。


But Taiwan remains a highly sensitive – and emotive – issue for China.	但台湾对中国而言仍然是高度敏感和感性的问题。


If relations with the island sour, so, too, could the US-China relationship.	如果对台关系恶化，也有可能影响到美中关系。


The world benefits when US-China relations stay on track, so both countries should be more transparent about their national interests.	正常的美中关系令世界各国受益，因此两国应当进一步公开它们的国家利益。


With clearly defined positions, each country could pursue a policy of strategic restraint, avoiding the swaggering displays of force that have sometimes tempted them in the past.	在明确立场约束下两国都可以采取战略克制政策，避免像过去那样有时夸张地炫耀武力。


If a conflict between the US and China were to erupt, China’s modernization could be derailed, and the Chinese people would miss out on the “Chinese Dream” that Xi has declared as their goal. For the US, a diplomatic breakdown would indicate that China had been “lost,” as it previously was thought to have been lost when Mao Zedong defeated Chiang Kai-shek’s US-supported Nationalist regime in 1949.	如果美中两国爆发冲突，中国的现代化进程可能脱轨，中国人民可能无法实现习近平所宣布的“中国梦”。 而对美国而言，外交崩溃意味着中国“失控”，美国人普遍认为1949年毛泽东击败美国支持的蒋介石国民党政权时中国曾处在失控状态。


More broadly, US-China hostility would be felt worldwide, and would disrupt international efforts to confront global challenges such as climate change.	更广义地讲，美中敌对会对全世界产生影响，并且会破坏应对气候变化等全球挑战的国际努力。


To avoid that scenario in the short term, the US and China should consider forming a joint team that includes experienced, high-ranking officials and prominent experts from both sides.	为避免短期内陷入这样的局面，美中两国应考虑成立联合小组，聘请两国知名专家和经验丰富的高官。


This group could chart a course for US-China relations in 2017, identify potential conflicts, and recommend solutions before tensions can reach a boiling point.	该小组可以指导2017年的美中关系、识别潜在冲突并在紧张局势达到沸点之前提出解决方案。


With a new diplomatic framework for bilateral relations, the US and China could ward off strategic confrontations.	有了这样的全新双边关系外交框架，美中两国的战略对抗或许可以避���。


In the long term, the US and China need deeper dialogue and a shared vision for the international order, so that individual countries will not be tempted to form rival blocs among themselves.	长远来看，美中需要通过加深对话建立对国际秩序的共同愿景，这样任何一方就不会屈服于诱惑来组建对立集团。


The US and China should also work together toward “globalization 2.0,” by reforming international rules and institutions to accommodate both established and emerging countries.	美中还应合作推进“全球化2. 0”版本，改革能够包容全部发达和新兴国家的国际规则和体制。


While there is much potential for conflict between the US and China in the coming years, there is also space for improved cooperation.	尽管未来几年美中两国冲突的可能性切实存在，但也同样存在改善合作的空间。


Indeed, amid the vast uncertainty created by Trump’s victory, a new relationship now makes more strategic sense than ever, given changing global circumstances, regional geopolitics, and domestic challenges in both the US and China.	事实上，在特朗普取胜造成的重大不确定性下，构建新型关系比以往任何时候更具有战略价值，因为全球环境不断变化，而且美中两国都面临着区域地缘政治和国内挑战。


Trump must now choose between cooperation and confrontation as the framework for US policy toward China.	特朗普现在必须选择以合作还是对抗作为美国对华政策的主基调。


His choice should be obvious: a collaborative effort to reform the international order would benefit both sides.	他的选择应当显而易见：合作改革国际秩序将惠及美中双方。


Clowns on the Campaign Trail	竞选过程中的小丑


NEW YORK – Donald Trump, the real-estate tycoon and reality-show host, also known as “The Donald,” is unlikely to be the next president of the United States.	纽约——被人称为“唐纳德”的房地产大亨兼真人秀主持人唐纳德·特朗普不太可能成为美国的下一任总统。


He is loud, crude, ignorant about most things, and looks absurd in his puffed up blond comb-over hairdo.	他在多数问题上都粗鲁、无知、大嗓门，精心修饰的张狂的金发也令他看上去略显荒唐。


Even ardent Republicans have dismissed him as a “rodeo clown,” and his campaign as a “circus.”	就连狂热的共和党人都不屑地称他为“小丑”，并用“马戏班”来形容他的竞选活动。


The Huffington Post covers Trump’s campaign strictly as entertainment news.	《赫芬顿邮报》纯粹将特朗普的竞选当作娱乐新闻报道。


Yet, for the moment, Trump is leaving all his rivals for the Republican presidential nomination in the dust.	但现在，特朗普遥遥领先于共和党总统竞选提名的所有对手。


Even in US politics, which can be very strange, this is extraordinary.	即使在以怪诞著称的美国政界，这样的情况也非同寻常。


What explains Trump’s popularity?	如何解释特朗普的人气？


Are all his supporters “crazies,” as Senator John McCain, perhaps unwisely, called them?	他的所有支持者是否都是“疯子”，就像参议员约翰·麦凯恩不太明智的指责？


Trump’s critics argue that he is playing to the basest instincts of disaffected voters, who hate foreigners (especially Mexicans), distrust bankers (or anyone with a higher education, for that matter), and still can’t get over the election of a president whose father was black.	特朗普的批评者认为他迎合了愤愤不平的选民们最基本的天性，那就是痛恨外国人（尤其是墨西哥人）、不信任银行家（或者任何接受过高等教育者）、到现在都没法接受父亲是黑人的奥巴马。


Trump, in the comedian Jon Stewart’s words, is “America’s id,” or at least the id of a large number of mostly white, mostly older, mostly small-town Americans.	用喜剧演员乔恩·斯图尔特的话说，特朗普就是美国的代表，或者至少代表为数众多的生活在小镇且年龄偏大的白人一族。


Now, all this may be so.	可能的确是这样。


But Trump is part of a wider phenomenon throughout the democratic world.	但特朗普代表了民主世界一种普遍存在的现象。


Disaffected voters can be found everywhere, whether in the US, Europe, or India.	愤愤不平的选民随处可见，无论是在美国、印度还是欧洲。


But they are not only turning away from mainstream political parties and following populists who promise to clean out the corrupt elites from the centers of power; they also share a taste for political entertainers, or clowns if you like.	但他们不仅远离主流政党转而追随那些信誓旦旦要将腐败精英清理出权力中心者； 他们还喜欢政治娱乐者，如果你愿意也可以称之为小丑。


Beppe Grillo, a real professional comedian, now leads the second largest political party in Italy.	毕普·格里洛，一位真正的职业喜剧演员，现在领导着意大利第二大政党。


His aim is to overturn the country’s political establishment and upset the European Union by taking Italy out of the euro.	他的目标是要推翻该国政治体制，带领意大利退出欧元区从而打击欧盟。


In a sense, of course, Italians already voted three times for a clownish figure as prime minister.	当然，某种意义上，意大利人三次选出的总理都很像小丑。


Silvio Berlusconi, another real-estate billionaire, who began his career as a crooner on a cruise ship, was even more outrageous than Trump, as well as a master of the mass media – literally so, as he owned most of it in his country.	同样是房地产界亿万富翁的贝卢斯科尼甚至比特朗普更加离经叛道，而且同是操纵大众媒体的高手（从字面上看确实如此，因为意大利多数大众媒体都归贝卢斯科尼所有）。


As is true of The Donald, many people, especially men, liked him not despite his outrageous statements and behavior, but because of them.	贝卢斯科尼在职业生涯开始阶段曾在游轮上当过歌手。 特朗普的情况也十分相似，很多人，尤其是男性，喜欢他恰恰是因为他无耻的言论和行动。


A television comic named Victor Trujillo, but better known as Brozo the Creepy Clown, became the most influential political commentator in Mexico.	一位名叫维克多·特鲁希略的电视喜剧演员现在已经是墨西哥最家喻户晓的政治评论人物，但多数人都称之为“恐怖小丑Brozo”。


In the Netherlands, not normally a country known for clownish politicians, the surge of populism was first led by Pim Fortuyn, a flamboyantly gay man who staged provocative, and always richly entertaining, public appearances.	在从不以“丑角政客”闻名的荷兰，皮姆·杜恩是民粹主义崛起早期的领导人物，杜恩是位张扬的同性恋，他在公共场合露面总是既有挑衅性又极富娱乐效果。


Again, his talent for shocking statements was an asset, not a hindrance.	同样，他语出惊人的天分不但不是障碍，反而能帮助他取得成功。


After his violent death in 2002, Geert Wilders, a former punk rocker with a pile of dyed platinum blond hair, shone brightest in the Dutch populist firmament.	2002年杜恩横死后，留着染成银灰色头发的前朋克摇滚歌手威尔德斯就成了荷兰民粹主义天空中最闪亮的角色。


Apart from peculiar hairstyles (the balding Berlusconi has his head painted), the new populists have several things in common.	除了独特的发型（谢顶的贝卢斯科尼让人在他头上作画），新民粹主义者大都有几个共同之处。


Whether billionaires or not, they share a prickly hostility to so-called elites, from whom they feel socially excluded.	无论是不是亿万富翁，他们都对排斥自己的所谓精英阶层有着强烈的敌视。


Wilders and Trump, among others of their ilk, also play on popular anti-immigrant sentiment.	威尔德斯和特朗普之流同样利用了大众的反移民情绪。


Trump called Mexicans in the US “rapists.”	特朗普将美国的墨西哥人称为“强奸犯”。


Wilders wants to ban the Koran and stop Muslims from moving to his country.	威尔德斯则想禁止古兰经并阻止穆斯林移民荷兰。


But this, too, is part of the same resentment against elites, who are blamed for allowing foreigners to arrive in the first place.	但这些同样源于对精英阶层的不满，他们指责精英阶层允许外国人移民到本国。


In Europe, antipathy to immigrants, or Islam, can quickly switch to hostility toward the European Union, which is seen as yet another bastion of entrenched elites.	在欧洲，对移民和伊斯兰教的反感可以迅速转化为敌视被视为根深蒂固的精英们的另���个堡垒的欧盟。


This is what Wilders and Grillo have in common.	这是威尔德斯和格里洛的共同之处。


But I think there is a more basic reason why political clowns are doing so well.	但我认为有一个根本原因让政治小丑们成绩如此之好。


Many people are fed up with the professional political class.	很多人都非常厌恶专业政治阶层。


In the past, politicians of the left often came from the trade unions, while conservatives were rich businessmen or landowners.	过去，左翼政治人物往往来自工会，而保守党则多是富商或地主。


Social classes had their own interests, which were represented by parties divided by clear ideological differences.	社会阶层有其各自的利益，这表现在有明确意识形态差异的截然不同的政党。


Increasingly, however, people see no difference between politicians from one party or another.	但人们感到政党和政党之间的差别越来越小。


They are lumped together under such rubrics as “Washington,” “Brussels,” or “Wall Street.”	他们被归并到“华盛顿”、“布鲁塞尔”或“华尔街”等模糊的分类之中。


This perception is exaggerated, especially in the US.	这种看法可能有所夸大，尤其是在美国。


The country really would be a different place under a Republican president, especially with a Republican majority in both houses of Congress.	美国如果选出共和党总统真会出现截然不同的效果，特别是现在共和党占据了国会两院多数。


But it is certainly true in many places that ideological differences have largely collapsed.	但很多地方意识形态差异在很大程度上已不复存在也是现实状况。


Social democrats govern in coalition governments with laissez-faire conservatives.	社会民主党与奉行不干涉政策的保守派组成政府联合执政。


Neoliberalism reigns.	新自由主义处于主导地位。


More and more, politics looks like a rigged system whereby members of the same political class compete for jobs, rather than for the victory of ideas, or on behalf of larger collective interests.	政治越来越像同阶层成员争夺就业的被操纵的制度，而不是代表集体利益的思想争夺胜利的地方。


Trumpism, then, or Grilloism, is a revolt against the professional politicians.	那么特朗普主义或格里洛主义就是对职业政治家的反抗。


Trump is not just trying to run against a Democrat for the presidency; he is running against his own party’s establishment as well.	特朗普的参选对手不只是民主党。 他同样也在与党内机构竞争。


His supporters are disgusted with the compromises made in Washington between leading Republicans and Democrats.	他的支持者厌倦了共和党和民主党在华盛顿达成的妥协。


To them, bipartisan cooperation is not necessary to the governance of a large and diverse country; it is a form of corruption.	他们认为在治理多元化大国时两党合作没有必要； 它不过是腐败的一种表现形式。


That is why they voted five years ago for Tea Party politicians, who preferred a government shutdown to a negotiated deal with Democrats.	他们因此在五年前投票给茶党政客，后者主张政府不接受与民主党谈判的协议。


And that is why they are cheering for a showy loudmouth like Trump.	他们也因此为特朗普这样华而不实的大嗓门欢呼。


But, without compromise, a democracy becomes ungovernable.	但没有妥协的民主根本无法管理。


The US is in grave danger of this now.	美国正切实面临着这样的威胁。


Even though Trump will not become the next president, the populist damage has already been done.	即使特朗普不会成为下一任总统，民粹主义也已经造成了损失。


Donald Trump’s Foreign-Policy Challenges	唐纳德·特朗普的外交政策挑战


CAMBRIDGE – During his campaign, US President-elect Donald Trump questioned the alliances and institutions that undergird the liberal world order, but he spelled out few specific policies.	坎布里奇—在2016年美国总统选战中，当选总统唐纳德·特朗普对构成自由世界秩序基础的联盟和机构提出了质疑，但他并未提出具体的新政策。


Perhaps the most important question raised by his victory is whether the long phase of globalization that began at the end of World War II is essentially over.	也许他的胜利所引出的最重要的问题是，始于二战结束的漫长的全球化阶段是否实质终结。


Not necessarily.	未必如此。


Even if trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership fail and economic globalization slows, technology is promoting ecological, political, and social globalization in the form of climate change, transnational terrorism, and migration – whether Trump likes it or not.	即使跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）和TTIP等贸易协定失败、全球化速度减慢，技术仍然在推动生态、政治和社会全球化——以气候变化、跨国恐怖主义和移民等形式——不管特朗普是否喜欢。


World order is more than just economics, and the United States remains central to it.	世界秩序不仅只限于经济，而美国仍然是它的核心。


Americans frequently misunderstand our place in the world.	美国人常常误解我们在世界中的地位。


We oscillate between triumphalism and declinism.	我们在扬威论和衰落论之间摇摆。


After the Soviets launched Sputnik in 1957, we believed we were in decline.	1957年苏联发射人造卫星后，我们认为我们衰落了。


In the 1980s, we thought the Japanese were ten feet tall.	20世纪80年代，我们认为日本人有十英尺那么高。


In the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2008, many Americans mistakenly believed that China had become more powerful than the United States.	2008年大衰退后，许多美国人错误地认为中国已经比美国更加强大。


Despite Trump’s campaign rhetoric, the US is not in decline.	尽管特朗普在选战中大放厥词，但美国并未衰落。 拜移民所赐，美国是唯一一个到世纪中叶仍不需担心人口下降的主要发达国家；


Because of immigration, it is the only major developed country that will not suffer a demographic decline by mid-century; its dependence on energy imports is diminishing rather than rising; it is at the forefront of the major technologies (bio, nano, information) that will shape this century; and its universities dominate the world league tables.	其能源进口依赖正在下降而不是升高； 它站在影响本世纪的重要技术发展的最前沿（生物、纳米、信息等）；


Many important issues will crowd Trump’s foreign policy agenda, but a few key issues will likely dominate – namely great power relations with China and Russia and the turmoil in the Middle East.	许多重要问题将挤爆特朗普的外交政策日程，但其中一些问题最为重要——即与中国和俄罗斯的大国关系，以及中东动荡。


A strong American military remains necessary but not sufficient to address all three.	强大的美军仍是解决所有这三个问题的必要条件，但不是充分条件。


Maintaining the military balance in Europe and East Asia is an important source of American influence, but Trump is correct that trying to control the internal politics of nationalistic populations in the Middle East is a recipe for failure.	保持欧洲和东亚军事平衡是美国影响力的重要源泉，但特朗普有一点是���的：控制民族主义人民组成的中东国家的内政将导致失败。


The Middle East is undergoing a complex set of revolutions stemming from artificial post-colonial boundaries; religious sectarian strife, and the delayed modernization described in the United Nations’ Arab Human Development Reports.	中东正在经历一系列复杂的革命，这些革命源于人为划定的后殖民地时代边界线、宗教派系斗争、以及联合国开发规划署的《阿拉伯人道发展报告》（Arab Human Development Reports）中所描述的现代化迟迟无法实现。


The resulting turmoil may last for decades, and it will continue to feed radical jihadist terrorism.	由此导致的动荡可能会持续数十年，并将继续培养激进圣战恐怖主义。


Europe remained unstable for 25 years after the French Revolution, and military interventions by outside powers made things worse.	欧洲在法国大革命后动荡了25年，外部势力的军事干预只能让局面更加糟糕。


But, even with reduced energy imports from the Middle East, the US cannot turn its back on the region, given its interests in Israel, non-proliferation, and human rights, among others.	但是，即使中东能源进口有所减少，美国仍不能放弃中东，因为美国在以色列、核不扩散、人权等问题上都有重大利益。


The civil war in Syria is not only a humanitarian disaster; it is also destabilizing the region and Europe as well.	叙利亚内战不仅仅是一场人道灾难； 它也正在动摇整个地区和欧洲。


The US cannot ignore such events, but its policy should be one of containment, influencing outcomes by nudging and reinforcing our allies, rather than trying to assert direct military control, which would be both costly and counterproductive.	美国无法忽视这些情况，但其政策应该是遏制，是通过推进和强化我们的盟友影响结果，而不是直接军事控制，后者成本既高，还可能适得其反。


In contrast, the regional balance of power in Asia makes the US welcome there.	相反，亚洲地区力量平衡使我们在那里大受欢迎。


The rise of China has fueled concern in India, Japan, Vietnam, and other countries.	中国的崛起让印度、日本、越南和其他国家日益担心。


Managing China’s global rise is one of this century’s great foreign-policy challenges, and America’s bipartisan dual-track strategy of “integrate but insure” – under which the US invited China to join the liberal world order, while reaffirming its security treaty with Japan – remains the right approach.	管理（managing）中国的全球崛起是本世纪外交政策的重大挑战之一，美国跨党派的“融合但保证”（integrate but insure）双轨战略——美国邀请中国加入自由世界秩序，同时重申与日本的安全条约——仍然是正确方针。


Unlike a century ago, when a rising Germany (which had surpassed Britain by 1900) stoked fears that helped precipitate the disaster of 1914, China is not about to pass us in overall power.	一个世纪前，德国崛起（到1900年时已经超越英国）所引起的恐慌促成了1914年的大灾难，与此不同的是，中国在总力量上尚无法超越美国。


Even if China’s economy surpasses America’s in total size by 2030 or 2040, its per capita income (a better measure of an economy’s sophistication) will lag.	即使其经济总量到2030年或2040年超越美国，其人均收入（衡量经济成熟度的更好的指标）仍将落后。


Moreover, China will not equal US military “hard power” or its “soft power” of attraction.	此外，中国的军事“硬实力”和吸引力“软实力”也无法与美国并驾齐驱。


As Lee Kuan Yew once said, so long as the US remains open and attracts the talents of the world, China will “give you a run for your money,” but will not replace the US.	李光耀曾说，只要美国保持开放并吸引世界人才，中国将“让你发财”但不会取代美国。


For these reasons, the US does not need a policy of containment of China.	出于这些原因，美国不需要遏制中国的政策。


The only country that can contain China is China.	唯一一个可以遏制中国的国家就是中国。


As it presses its territorial conflicts with neighbors, China contains itself.	当中国与掀起邻国的领土冲突时，它就遏制了它自己。


The US needs to launch economic initiatives in Southeast Asia, reaffirm its alliances with Japan and Korea, and continue to improve relations with India.	美国需要开展东南亚经济项目，重申其与日本和韩国的联盟关系，并继续改善与印度的关系。


Finally, there is Russia, a country in decline, but with a nuclear arsenal sufficient to destroy the US – and thus still a potential threat to America and others.	最后是俄罗斯，这是一个衰落中的国家，但其核武库仍足以摧毁美国——从而仍然是美国和其他国家的潜在威胁。


Russia, almost entirely dependent on revenues from its energy resources, is a “one crop economy” with corrupt institutions and insurmountable demographic and health problems.	俄罗斯几乎完全依赖能源资源收入，属于“单一作物经济”，机构腐败，人口和卫生问题积重难返。


President Vladimir Putin’s interventions in neighboring countries and the Middle East, and his cyber attacks on the US and others, though intended to make Russia look great again, merely worsen the country’s long-term prospects.	总统普京对邻国和中东的干预，及其针对美国和其他国家的网络攻击，虽然本意是让俄罗斯看上去重新强大起来，但从长期看只能让俄罗斯的长期前景更加恶化。


In the short run, however, declining countries often take more risks and are thus more dangerous – witness the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1914.	不过，在短期，衰落的国家常常会更多地冒险，因此变得更加危险——1914年的奥匈帝国即是明证。


This has created a policy dilemma.	这就形成了一个政治两难。


On the one hand, it is important to resist Putin’s game-changing challenge to the post-1945 liberal order’s prohibition on the use of force by states to seize territory from their neighbors.	一方面，抵御普京对1945年后自有秩序禁止国家动用武力从邻国攫取领土的规定的践踏十分重要。


At the same time, Trump is correct to avoid the complete isolation of a country with which the US has overlapping interests when it comes to nuclear security, non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, the Arctic, and regional issues like Iran and Afghanistan.	与此同时，特朗普正确地提出要避免完全孤立一个在诸多方面——包括核安全、核不扩散、反恐、北冰洋以及伊朗核阿富汗等地区问题——与美国利益重叠的国家。


Financial and energy sanctions are necessary for deterrence; but we also have genuine interests that are best advanced by dealing with Russia.	金融和能源制裁是威慑的必要条件； 但美国必须与俄罗斯做交易，这样才有利于我们的一些真正的利益。


No one would gain from a new Cold War.	掀起新冷战对任何人都没有好处。


The US is not in decline.	美国没有衰落。


The immediate foreign-policy task for Trump will be to adjust his rhetoric and reassure allies and others of America’s continuing role in the liberal world order.	特朗普最紧迫的外交政策任务是调整他的口风，向盟友和其他人保证我们仍将继续充当自由世界秩序的核心角色。


The Age of Incompetence	不称职的年代


BERKELEY – On January 20, 2017, US President-elect Donald Trump will take office having received almost three million fewer votes than his opponent; and he will work with a Republican Senate majority whose members won 13 million fewer votes than their Democratic opponents.	发自伯克利——2017年1月20日，美国总统当选人唐纳德·特朗普就将上任。 作为总统，他的得票数比对手少了近300万票；


Only the Republican majority in the House of Representatives, led by Speaker Paul Ryan, has any claim to represent a numerical majority of the 55% of Americans who voted on Election Day 2016.	而与他一同工作的参议院共和党多数派的总得票数又比民主党参议员要少1300万票。 只有议长保罗·瑞恩（Paul Ryan）率领的众议院共和党团多数人赢得了数量上的多数，代表了在2016年选举日投票的美国人中的55％。


Trump will also begin his presidency with an approval rating below 50%.	特朗普还将在支持率低于50％的情况下开始自己的总统任期。


This is unprecedented – or “unpresidented,” as one of his semi-literate tweets put it (before he deleted it) – in the history of such ratings.	而这个支持率也是前所未有的 ——或者如特朗普的白字推文（随后被删除了）所说的那样，是“不总统的（unpresidented）”。


The government of the world’s oldest democracy is, in fact, not democratic.	美国这个世界上最古老的民主政府，原来是不民主的。


Also unprecedented is the fact that so few members of the president-elect’s own party, and none of the Democratic opposition, consider him to be qualified for the duties of the presidency, apart from serving as Cheerleader-in-Chief.	另一个前所未见的事实是，在特朗普是否够资格担任总统这个问题上，总统所属党派中只有很少成员表示赞同，对手民主党更是全数反对，大家都觉得他更适合当一名啦啦队长。


Of course, the Trump phenomenon has been gestating for a long period.	当然，特朗普现象并非一日之功。


With the honorable exception of George H.W. Bush, who had the requisite knowledge, intelligence, temperament, and values to serve, the last time a fully qualified Republican was inaugurated was in 1957.	除了令人尊敬的老布什之外，上一位具备必要的知识，智慧，气质和价值观的共和党人总统已经是1957年的事情了。


No one denies that Richard Nixon had the knowledge and intelligence to be president; but most people will admit that his temperament and values left something to be desired.	没有人否认理查德·尼克松具被担任总统所需的知识和智慧； 但大多数人会承认他在气质和价值观上都有所欠缺。


Similarly, most people thought that Ronald Reagan lacked the requisite knowledge and intelligence for the office.	同样，大多数人认为罗纳德·里根缺乏执政必备的知识和智慧。


According to the journalist Peter Jenkins, former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once said of Reagan, “Poor dear, there’s nothing between his ears.”	据记者彼得·詹金斯（Peter Jenkins）记载，英国前首相撒切尔夫人曾经评论里根说：“这个可怜的家伙没什么脑子”。


And the qualifications that Reagan did have on Inauguration Day eroded over time, after he was wounded in a failed assassination attempt 69 days into his presidency, and, later, when he began to suffer from Alzheimer’s disease.	而在上任69天后遭刺杀受伤后，里根在就职时表现的总统资质也随着时间的推移而逐渐泯灭，而情况在他罹患阿尔茨海默病后则变得更加糟糕。


Still, Reagan’s temperament and values (generally speaking) were well suited to the presidency.	然而里根的气质和价值观（总的来说）非常适合当总统。


He fully understood that being the star did not mean that he was the boss.	他完全明白身居顶峰并不意味着自己就是老板。


Both as a Hollywood actor and as a US president, Reagan had smart, dedicated, and trained professionals writing his lines and directing his moves.	作为好莱坞演员和美国总统，里根拥有一批聪明，专注和训练有素的专业人员来为他的攥写演讲辞并指导其一举一动。


He knew that his job was to be on screen, and not to interfere with the people behind the camera and in the post-production editing room, who were responsible for the finished product.	他知道自己的工作是在屏幕上做好表演，最好不要干扰摄影机机背后以及后期制作编辑室里那些决定最终出品的人。


This is what most observers expected to see when George W. Bush took office in 2001: a folksy cheerleader who would follow the lead of the wise advisers he had inherited from his father.	而这也是小布什在2001年上任时大多数观察家所希望看到的样子：一个随和谦逊，愿意在那些父亲留下来的优秀顾问团队的指导下行事的啦啦队长。


But the younger Bush came to think of himself not just as the star, but as “the decider,” too.	但是在年轻的小布什的眼中他不仅是个站在台前的明星，还得是个“决策者”。


And while Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had been savvy policymakers back in the 1970s, they had become rather erratic by the early 2000s.	虽然副总统迪克·切尼和国防部长唐纳德·拉姆斯菲尔德在1970年代一直表现成熟老道，但他们在21世纪初就变得不靠谱了。


For whatever reason, Bush bonded with the two, which sealed his fate.	无论出于何种原因，小布什与两个人结盟决定了他的命运。


He has not attended any Republican National Conventions since leaving office, and he may wish that he had he never sent James Baker to Florida in November 2000 to secure his victory over Al Gore.	他自离任以来就没有出席过任何一届共和党全国会议，或许他一直在悔恨，后悔不该在2000年11月派自己的总法律顾问詹姆斯·贝克（James Baker）去佛罗里达州运作重新计票，这样当总统的人就会是阿尔·戈尔了。


Trump clearly has not taken any lessons from the second Bush presidency.	特朗普显然未能从小布什那中吸取任何教训。


He knows that he is the star, but he also wrongly believes that he has the knowledge and intelligence to be the boss.	他知道自己是明星，但也错误地自认有足够的知识和智慧来担任成为老板。


He seems unaware that his campaign is over, that he could fail catastrophically and permanently in his new role, and that it is in his own interest to ensure that his proposals are sound, not just as slogans, but as actual policies that will keep the US safe and create prosperity.	他似乎尚未意识到大选已经结束了，而自己可能在新的总统角色中遭遇突然且永久的挫折，与此同时最符合他自身利益的东西不是那些口号式的提案，而是能为美国带来安全和繁荣的实实在在的政策。


So, what should the millions of Americans who now fear for the future do?	那么，那些对未来感到恐惧的数百万美国人如今该如何是好？


First, we can work at the state level to try to neutralize any Trump policy initiatives that are flawed or infeasible.	首先，我们可以在州一级开展工作，想方设法去减少任何有缺陷或不可行的特朗普政策提案的影响。


Democrats and principled Republicans in state legislatures need to work together to keep tax revenues flowing and to fund the many spending programs that are in the American interest, regardless of what is happening in Washington, DC.	国家立法机构中的民主党人和那些有原则的共和党人需要共同努力，不管华盛顿特区发生了什么，都要确保税收收入的流转并以此资助许多符合美国利益的支出项目。


And they should promise each other that, regardless of who comes to power in 2021, they will not hold each other liable for acting as disruptors today.	他们应该相互承诺，不管谁在2021年上台，他们不会互相为当前作为破坏者的角色而互相指责。


At the national level, we should constantly remind Senate Republicans that they speak for 13 million fewer voters than the Democrats do.	而在国家层面，我们应该不断提醒共和党参议员他们的选民人数比民主党少了1300万。


And we should remind Paul Ryan that he made a mistake by going along with the Bush administration’s discredited economic and foreign-policy initiatives between 2001 and 2008, and that it is a disservice to the country to show unconditional partisan support for an administration that is so obviously unfit.	我们应该提醒保罗·瑞安，他在2001~08年间追随与小布什政府经济和外交政策提案的做法是个错误，而对一个显然不称职的政府表示无条件支持的做法就是对国家的背叛。


And, if all else fails, we should remember that standing up to an unpopular president who received almost three million fewer votes than his opponent is not just the right thing to do; it will also make for great reality TV.	如果这一切努力都告失败，我们也应该记住，与一个比他的对手少了近300万票的不受欢迎的总统做斗争不仅是件正确的事情； 也会成为一场伟大的现实电视直播秀。


Donald Trump’s Choices in the Middle East	唐纳德·特朗普的中东选择


TEL AVIV – US President-elect Donald Trump has said a lot about foreign affairs, without really saying anything at all.	特拉维夫—美国当选总统唐纳德·特朗普说了很多关于外交事务的讲话，但从来没有触及实质。


His muddled statements offer little insight into what kind of foreign policy he will actually pursue, and there is not much reason to believe that, when his approach does become clear, it will be what the United States – or the world – needs.	他虚与委蛇的发言几乎完全没有透露他将采取怎样的外交政策，也没有多少理由可以相信，当他的方针变得明确时，我们将看到美国——或者说全世界—正需要的政策。


Trump is a businessman, not a statesman.	特朗普是一名商人，而不是一名政治家。


He thinks in terms of immediate profits and losses – a worldview that is exemplified in his declarations that US allies need to contribute more to security alliances.	他的思维是有多少利润和损失会立刻兑现——他宣布美国的盟友需要为安全联盟做出更大贡献便是这一世界观的明证。


At a time of evolving challenges and growing threats, adhering to this narrow-minded, isolationist approach is unlikely to do anyone much good.	在挑战不断变化、威胁日益严峻的时代，坚持这一狭隘的孤立主义方针无法给任何人带来好处。


One region that Trump will not be able to ignore is the Middle East.	一个特朗普无法忽视的地区是中东。


The crisis in Syria, in particular, will draw the US in, though Trump’s choices there are limited.	特别是叙利亚危机将让美国深陷其中，但特朗普的选择十分有限。


After all, America’s “moderate” jihadist allies are no more palatable than President Bashar al-Assad, and the so-called Islamic State is far from defeated.	毕竟，美国的“温和”圣战主义盟友绝不比叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德更加“可人”，而所谓的伊斯兰国也还远远没有消灭。


Former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani, a close Trump adviser and possible member of Trump’s cabinet, has identified defeating ISIS as the administration’s first foreign-policy priority.	前纽约市长、特朗普亲信顾问、有可能进入特朗普内阁的朱利安尼（Rudy Giuliani）将消灭伊斯兰国定义为特朗普政府第一外交要务。


Trump has claimed that he knows “more about ISIS than the generals do.”	特朗普宣称他“比将军们更加了解伊斯兰国。


But that is unlikely.	”但这根本不可能。


After all, the only way fully to defeat a movement that thrives amid chaos is to build strong and competent states, a task for which Trump lacks both the inclination and the patience.	毕竟。 彻底消灭一个从混乱中崛起的运动的唯一办法是构建强大称职的国家，特朗普既没有计划，也没有耐心这样做。


If Trump opts for a purely military approach, he will find that every “victory” merely creates space for more violence and terror.	如果特朗普选择纯军事干预，他将发现每一场“胜利”都会给更多的暴力和恐怖制造空间。


While the conquest of Raqqa and Mosul by a US-led military campaign would improve America’s standing among its Sunni allies, it would also relieve pressure on the Russia-Iran-Hezbollah axis.	尽管美国领导的联军相继收复拉卡和摩苏尔能够改善美国在其逊尼派盟友中的地位，但也缓解了俄罗斯—伊朗—真主党轴心的压力。


Iran-backed Shia militias would unleash a killing spree against Sunni communities in Mosul after ISIS withdrew.	伊斯兰国撤出后，伊朗所支持的什叶派军阀将血洗摩苏尔的逊尼派社区。


The ensuing turmoil and pressure on Sunni populations would fuel more terrorism, whether associated with ISIS or with entirely new groups.	持续动荡以及逊尼派所收到的压力将助长更多恐怖主义，不管它们是与伊斯兰国牵扯在一起还是全新集团。


Whatever tack Trump takes in Syria, it will surely be influenced by Russian President Vladimir Putin.	不管特朗普在叙利亚采取何种方针，都必定会受到俄罗斯总统普京的影响。


Trump must cut America’s dependence on Russia in the Syria war, in order to resist Putin’s efforts to use his influence in Syria to gain leverage with regard to Ukraine.	特朗普必须降低美国在叙利亚战争中对俄罗斯的依赖程度，以遏制普京利用其对叙利亚的影响力赢得在乌克兰问题上的筹码。


Of course, Trump’s willingness to challenge Putin, for whom the president-elect has voiced admiration, is uncertain.	当然，特朗普是否愿意挑战他曾经表达过敬仰之情的普京仍不确定。


But America’s security and military establishment, together with Republican senators like John McCain, are unlikely to allow Trump to “Make Russia Great Again” by surrendering both Syria and Ukraine.	但美国的安全和军事建制派，以及约翰·麦凯恩（John McCain）等共和党参议员不可能允许特朗普在叙利亚和乌克兰俯首帖耳，导致“俄罗斯复兴”。


The surrender of Ukraine alone would embolden Russia to reassert itself in its supposed “sphere of influence,” potentially causing NATO to come apart.	在乌克兰屈服便足以俄罗斯在所谓的“影响力范围”耀武扬威，甚至有可能导致北约解体。


Judging by his campaign statements, Trump might not be worried about the unraveling of NATO – or of any US security alliance, at least not yet.	从选战中的言辞看，特朗普可能并不担心北约或任何美国安全联盟的解体，至少目前如此。


But the results could be disastrous, not least because a lack of US security guarantees and structures could spur nuclear proliferation.	但结果可能是灾难性的，因为缺少美国的安全保证和结构可能刺激核扩散。


Trump’s promise to suspend the Iran nuclear deal is particularly worrying.	特朗普承诺中止伊朗核协议尤其令人担忧。


Iran has prepared Hezbollah to be a powerful proxy for precisely those occasions when it needs to strike back at Iran’s enemies.	伊朗已经准备了一个强大的代理人——真主党，正是为了在反击伊朗的敌人利用这样的时机。


Moreover, suspending the nuclear deal would cause Iran to become a nuclear power in no time.	此外，中止核协议将导致伊朗立刻成为核力量。


In a region with no collective security architecture, terrorist groups could easily acquire their own primitive nuclear devices.	在一个不存在集体安全安排的地区，恐怖组织可以轻易得到自己的原始核设施。


Given this, America’s estranged allies in the Middle East – Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel – would be well advised to drop their opposition to the Iran deal, and instead encourage Trump to keep it in place.	因此，美国在中东的疏远盟友——沙特阿拉伯、埃及和以色列——的上策是不再反对伊朗核协议，转而鼓励特朗普保证核协议的实施。


Likewise, Trump’s promise to reduce funding to foreign allies, as part of a broader “America first” strategy, should be tempering their joy at his victory.	类似地，特朗普承诺减少向外国盟友提供资金，以此作为“美国第一”整体战略的一部分，这可能让它们对他当选总统感到不悦。


Another estranged ally that could shape Trump’s choices in the Middle East is Turkey, which has pursued something of a détente with Russia in recent months.	另一个可能影响特朗普在中东的选择的疏远盟友是土耳其。 最近几个月中，土耳其与俄罗斯的关系有所缓和。


To salvage the bilateral relationship, Trump would have to sacrifice America’s partnership with the Kurds, whose militias in Syria and Iraq have been America’s most reliable allies in the battles for Mosul and Raqqa.	为了挽救双边关系，特朗普必须牺牲与库尔德人的合作。 叙利亚和伊拉克的库尔德武装是美国在摩苏尔和拉卡战事中最可靠的盟友。


Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan may want ISIS defeated, but he wants to quell the Kurds’ ambitions of self-rule even more.	土耳其埃尔多安也许也想消灭伊斯兰国，但他更想遏制库尔德人自治的野心。


Rewarding the Kurds for their help by backing their bid for statehood would be so unacceptable that, to prevent it, Erdoğan might even try to thwart the defeat of ISIS.	为了报答库尔德人的帮助而支持他们建国对埃尔多安来说是不可接受的，为了阻止这一幕发生，他甚至可以阻止消灭伊斯兰国。


Add to that opposition from Iraq, Syria, and Iran, and it is clear that Kurdish independence is not in the cards.	此外还有来自伊拉克、叙利亚和伊朗的反对，显然库尔德独立不再选择项之中。


Palestinian statehood, however, should be.	但巴勒斯坦建国应该成为一个选择项。


In his own erratic way, Trump has said as much, fueling hopes among some Palestinians that his election could end up working in their favor.	特朗普以其反复无常的风格对此发表了很多言论，助长了一些巴勒斯坦人的希望，认为特朗普当选将有利于巴勒斯坦。


But Israel’s fanatic settler movement has the opposite impression, viewing Trump’s victory as a license for the unrestrained expansion of settlements in Palestinian lands.	但以色列狂热的定居者的印象正好相反，他们认为特朗普胜选是在巴勒斯坦土地上无限制扩张定居点的通行证。


In the end, how Trump uses US leverage in the Israel-Palestine conflict – the only issue in the Middle East where the US enjoys such indisputable influence – might depend on events on the ground.	最终，特朗普如何打好美国在以巴冲突中的手牌——美国拥有不可或缺的影响力的唯一一个中东问题——可能取决于当事方之间发生了什么。


Specifically, a settlement-building spree might end up triggering a particularly fierce third Palestinian intifada.	具体而言，如果定居点建设风潮大幅扩张，那么最终很可能引发特别激烈的第三次巴勒斯塔起义。


But Trump should not wait for a crisis to impose an agenda on him.	但特朗普不能坐等危机推着他制定日程。


Instead, he should recognize that now, more than at any time since 1948, America’s estranged Sunni allies have a strong incentive to make peace with Israel and collaborate with it on regional security, and that such an arrangement could be legitimate only with the creation of a Palestinian state.	相反他应该认识到，自1948年以来，美国的逊尼派疏远盟友从未向现在那样有如此大的动机与以色列保持和平并与之展开地区安全合作，并且这样的安排只有在巴勒斯坦建国的情况下才能合理化。


Given that this would also support US reconciliation with the Arab peoples, thereby serving America’s national security interests, Trump should not hesitate to seize the initiative.	由于这也有利于美国与阿拉伯民族的和解，童儿有利于美国国家安全利益，因此特朗普应该毫不犹豫地抓住机会。


Ancient Rome’s Donald Trump	古罗马的唐纳德·特朗普


DECORAH, IOWA – Populism has a long and colorful history in American politics, from Huey Long on the left and George Wallace on the right, to – more recently – Ross Perot in 1992 and Donald Trump today.	迪克拉，艾奥瓦—民粹主义在美国政治的历史悠久而丰富，从左翼的休·朗（Huey Long）到右翼的乔治·华莱士（George Wallace），再到——更近一些——1992年的罗斯·佩洛特（Ross Perot）和今天的唐纳德·特朗普。


But the roots of populism stretch much further back in time – more than two millennia, to the beginning of the end of the Roman Republic.	但民粹主义的根源历史要久远得多——超过了两千年，发端于罗马共和国末期。


For most of its history, the Roman Republic was governed by old political families and reliable power brokers who knew how to keep the masses in line.	在罗马共和国的大部分时间里，治国的都是老牌政治家族和知道怎样让民众安顺的可靠的权力掮客。


Elections were held, but they were deliberately designed to give the ruling classes the lion’s share of the popular vote.	选举有之，但有意设计为让执政阶级获得群众选片的大部分。


If the Roman aristocracy, which voted first, chose a man for office, officials often would not even bother to count the ballots cast by the lower classes.	如果率先投票的罗马贵族已经选择了执政官，那么官员常常连下等阶层的投票箱都不愿意开启了。


On occasion, disgruntled farmers, tavern owners, and donkey drivers would rise up and press their rulers for debt relief and a real voice in government, but these revolts were put down quickly with promises of better times ahead and by hiring a few off-duty gladiators to rough up the chief troublemakers.	偶尔，心怀不满的农民、小酒馆老板和赶驴人也会愤起反抗，迫使统治者免除债务或者获得在政府发声的机会，但这些动乱很快就会通过承诺更美好的未来和雇用一些赋闲角斗士抓获首恶来平息。


In the late second century BC, the aristocratic Gracchi brothers tried to bring about a political revolution from within, only to be killed by the conservative nobility.	在公元前二世纪末，贵族格拉古兄弟试图从内部进行政治革命，结果被保守派贵族所杀。


The man who ultimately brought down the system was a wealthy and ambitious nobleman named Publius Clodius Pulcher, a populist demagogue who refused to play by the rules.	最终将这一体系推翻的是一位名叫普布利乌斯·克劳狄乌斯·普尔喀的贵族，他是腰缠万贯又野心勃勃的民粹主义煽动家，解决受规则摆布。


Clodius had always been eccentric and unpredictable in ways that both shocked and amused the Roman populace.	克劳狄乌斯一贯剑走偏锋，不可捉摸，令罗马民众又惊又喜。


As a young man, he had incited a mutiny among his brother-in-law’s troops.	年轻时，他煽动内兄部队哗变。


Then, when pirates captured him, he took deep offense at the small ransom they accepted for his release.	接着，当他被海盗抓住时，由于海盗提出的赎金要求太低而令他勃然大怒。


Nothing was sacred to Clodius.	对克劳狄乌斯来说，没有什么是神圣的。


The more audacious his behavior, the more the public loved him for it.	他的行为越是乖张，民众就越喜欢他。