Because of the way it is structured, the study only suggests a lower bound on the effects of CRA compliance.	出于研究方法构造的原因，该研究只揭示了CRA执法效应存在下限。


It focuses on the differential impact of the CRA on banks undergoing examination and those not undergoing examination.	该研究的注意力集中在CRA对于接受检查和不接受检查��行的效应的差异。


In fact, all banks are likely to have upped their CRA-compliant lending.	事实上，可能所有银行都提高了它们的CRA贷款。


The study cannot measure this increase.	该研究并不能测量这一增量。


There is room in economics for grand speculation – some part intuition, some part common sense, and some part ideology.	经济学具有大胆猜测的空间——一部分来自直觉，一部分来自常识，一部分来自意识形态。


If economists were to wait for careful studies before offering opinions about policy, we would never have anything timely to say.	如果经济学家等到仔细的研究出现之后再给出政策选择建议，我们就不可能及时发出任何声音。


And it is certainly better to have some economic intuition guiding policy than none at all.	显然，让一些经济直觉来指导政策比一刀切杜绝经济直觉好。


But there is a danger that the public mistakes speculation for truth, only because of the speculator’s credentials and assertiveness.	但存在公众将猜测和真相混淆的危险，而公众之所以会混淆，只是因为猜测者的资质和自信。


Studies like this one are useful in setting the record straight.	类似该研究的研究在让记录变得更直观方面很有用。


More broadly, the study suggests that we should move beyond blaming the bankers.	从更广的意义上说，该研究证明我们应该不再把矛头一股脑儿指向银行家。


We must recognize that in the desire to broaden home ownership, essential checks and balances broke down.	我们必须认识到，为了扩大房屋所有权，必要的检查和平衡被打破了。


Households, politicians, and regulators were also complicit.	家庭、政客和监管者都是同谋。


As we go about the process of reform, we should bear in mind that the only thing worse than fighting the last war is fighting the wrong last war.	我们即将进入改革程序，此时应该牢记，唯一比上一场战争更糟糕的事情是打了一场错误的上一场战争。


Why Border Walls Fail	为何边境墙会失败


HONOLULU – Call this the Year of Border Walls.	檀香山—今年可称之为边境墙之年。


In 2015, Estonia, Hungary, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia all announced or began the construction of barriers on their frontiers.	2015年，爱沙尼亚、匈牙利、肯尼亚、沙特阿拉伯博和突尼斯均宣布或开始沿国境线建设隔离屏障。


We may live in an era of globalization, but much of the world is increasingly focused on limiting the free movement of people.	我们也许生活在与一个全球化时代，但世界上很大一部分正日益着重于限制人们的自由迁徙。


At the end of World War II, there were only five border walls around the world.	第二次世界大战结束时，全世界只有五座边境墙。


Today, according to Elisabeth Vallet of the University of Quebec at Montreal, there are 65, three-quarters of them built in the past 20 years.	如今，根据魁北克大学蒙特利尔分校的伊丽莎白·瓦利特（Elisabeth Vallet）的数据，全球有65座边境墙，其中四分之三是在过去20年建设的。


And in the United States, Republican presidential candidates are promising more.	在美国，共和党总统候选人们承诺要建更多边境墙。


The Republican frontrunner, Donald Trump, has repeatedly proposed building a wall along the entire border with Mexico.	在共和党候选人竞争中领跑的唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）一再建议沿着墨西哥边境全线建立一座墙。


And on a Sunday morning talk show, another Republican candidate, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker, described building a wall on the US-Canada border as “a legitimate issue for us to look at.”	在一次周日晨间脱口秀上，另一位共和党候选人、威斯康辛州州长斯科特·沃克尔（Scott Walker）称在加拿大边境建设一座边境墙是“一个我们看来相当合理的事项”。


And yet existing border walls are neither cheap nor effective.	然而现有边境墙可谓事倍功半。


Israel’s wall in the West Bank cost more than $1 million per mile to construct.	以色列在约旦河西岸建立的边境墙每英里耗资超过一百万美元。


According to US Customs and Border Protection, building and maintaining the existing 670 miles of border fencing on the US-Mexico border would cost $6.5 billion over the barrier’s expected 20-year life cycle. At this price, fortifying the remaining 1,300 miles of the Mexico border would cost more than $12.6 billion.	据美国海关与边境保护局的数据，建设和维护现有670英里墨西哥边境隔离障将在隔离障设施20年的生命周期中耗费65亿美元。


Erecting a wall along the 5,525-mile border with Canada would cost almost $50 billion and would cut through an airport runway, an opera house, homes, and businesses that currently straddle the border.	照此推算，在剩余1,300英里墨西哥边境依样画葫芦的代价将超过126亿美元。


Nor is there much evidence that border walls work as intended.	也没有多少证据表明边境墙起到了初衷。


To be sure, prisons demonstrate that short, well-guarded walls can be extremely effective at preventing movement.	诚然，监狱证明了距离较短、看守完善的高墙在阻止人身移动方面非常有效。


But even prison walls are only as effective as the guards who ensure that they are not breached, and guards can be susceptible to bribes.	但即使是监狱高墙，也只有在看守保证它不出现漏洞时有效，而看守是可以贿赂的。


The recent escape of the drug cartel leader Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman from a Mexican prison highlights another vulnerability of border walls: tunnels.	最近，大毒枭“矮子”华金·古兹曼（Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman）从一间墨西哥监狱中越狱，凸显出边境墙的另一个弱点：地道。


Since 1990, the US Border Patrol has found 150 tunnels beneath the US-Mexico border.	1990年以来，美国边防局在美墨边境发现了150条地道。


Those with money will always be able to cross borders using fake documents, bribes, or innovative infrastructure.	只要有钱，就能用假证件、贿赂或创新方法越境。


Indeed, fortified frontiers are most effective at stopping poor migrants and refugees.	事实上，加强的边境阻挡的大多是贫穷的移民和难民。


And even then, rather than preventing migrants from entering, fortifications all too often funnel them toward more dangerous crossing points.	而即使是对贫穷的移民和难民，边防往往也不能阻止他们入境，而是驱使他们前往更加危险的越境点。


The result is a mounting toll of predictable deaths.	结果是可预见死亡人数越来越多。


The International Organization for Migration estimates that from 2005 to 2014, some 40,000 people died attempting to cross a border.	国际移民组织估算，从2005年到2014年，大约40,000人在试图穿越边境时丧生。


Unlike prison perimeters, borders can be thousands of miles long, which makes them difficult to monitor properly.	和监狱不同，边境可能长达数千英里，这意味着很难对其进行恰当的监控。


The US employs more than 20,000 Border Patrol agents; but even if they were all on duty at the same time, each would need to guard a 1,700-foot section of the border.	美国边防局雇用了20,000名雇员； 但即使他们同时出勤，每人也需要看守1,700英尺长的边境线。


Of course, equipment like cameras, motion sensors, drones, helicopters, and vehicles allow agents to watch long sections of the border.	当然，摄像机、运动传感器、无人机、直升机和汽车使得边防人员能够监控相当长的边境线。


But the necessity of monitoring border walls points to one of the fundamental truths about them: historically, most have proved to be pretty useless.	但监控边境墙的必要性直指一个关于它们的基本事实：从历史上看，它们大多毫无用处。


The most famous sections of the Great Wall of China were overrun within a few decades of their construction.	最著名的是中国的长城，建成不过几十年就被穿越。


When Germany invaded France in WWII, it simply went around the Maginot Line.	二战中德国入侵法国时也轻松绕过了马奇诺防线。


The Berlin Wall fell within 30 years of its construction.	柏林墙也在建成后不出30年倒塌。


Indeed, border guards and their equipment can be equally effective without a physical barrier.	事实上，边境看守和他们的设备在没有实体隔离障的情况下同样有效。


At best, walls and fences only slow people down, making them a poor investment from a security standpoint.	高墙和藩篱充其量只能减缓人们越境的速度，这意味着从安全角度，建设边境墙是拙劣的投资。


They are similarly ineffective from a military perspective.	从军事角度，边境墙同样无效。


Missiles and airplanes can fly over them and tanks can smash through them.	导弹和飞机可以飞越它们，坦克可以碾过它们。


And yet, despite their high cost and low efficacy, walls remain popular among policymakers and politicians.	然而，尽管事倍功半，但高墙仍是决策者和政客的最爱。


They provide imposingly tangible evidence that something is being done about migration.	高墙可以提供铁证，证明他们为移民问题做了些什么。


High-tech surveillance and boots on the ground may be more effective at preventing people from crossing a border, but a wall can be used as a political prop.	高科技监控和荷枪实弹也许能更有效地阻止人们穿越边境，但高墙可以作为政治支撑。


If Trump ever builds his wall, he should build a really nice one, like the Great Wall of China.	如果特朗普真的建起了他的边境墙，那么应该会是一座相当漂亮的墙，就像中国的长城。


Then one day it might become a popular tourist attraction – and finally serve a useful purpose.	有一天它会变成热门旅游景点——也算是终于找到了大用场。


Football Fury	足球狂怒


PARIS – Who would have thought it?	巴黎—有谁能想到？


There they were, Brazilians, protesting outside football stadiums against their country hosting the World Cup in 2014 – and this even as their national team was thrashing Spain in the final of the Confederations Cup.	他们，巴西人民，在足球场外抗议祖国举办2014年世界杯——而与此同时，巴西国家足球队在联合会杯决赛上痛宰了西班牙队。


It was as if Catholics were to protest outside the Vatican against picking a new Pope.	这就好比是天主教徒在梵蒂冈外抗议选出新教皇。


What cuisine is to the French, soccer is to Brazilians: a matter of the highest national pride.	足球之于巴西，正如烹饪之于法国，乃国之瑰宝也。


Regardless of their economic, racial, or political differences, all Brazilians are uplifted by having the best team in the world, winning the World Cup many times, and inventing and reinventing “the beautiful game.”	不论他们经济、种族和政治上有什么差别，巴西人因为拥有世界最强足球队而自豪，他们赢得过多次世界杯，上演过一次又一次“完美比赛”。


Staging the next World Cup in Brazil, as well as the Olympic Games in 2016, even though the football tournament alone will cost up to $13 billion, seems a logical move.	下一届世界杯和奥运会（2016年）都将在巴西举行，尽管光是世界杯就要花费130亿美元，但这再自然也没有了。


Rio de Janeiro is where soccer belongs.	里约热内卢是足球的家园。


So what possessed the 19-year-old Brazilian male who told reporters: “We don’t need the World Cup.	那么，是什么让19岁的巴西男子对记者说出“我们不需要世界杯。


We need education, better health services, more humane police.”	我们需要的是教育、更好的服务和更人性的政策。 ”这样惊世骇俗的话？


Many people feel the same way.	许多人都有同样的感觉。


Have millions of Brazilians suddenly lost their passion for the game?	难道数百万巴西人一夜之间失去了对足球运动的热情？


If so, it is not the game itself that they have forsaken, but rather the kind of game that football has become: a billion-dollar business, a prestige object for louche plutocrats, and an extravagant showpiece for corrupt governments and international sporting organizations.	果真如此的话，被他们所放弃的也不是足球运动本身，而是足球运动所变成的样子：一桩10亿美元的生意，富而不仁的显贵拿它来装点门面，沦为腐败的政府和国际运动组织的奢侈展示品。


Football was once a popular sport, rooted in local communities.	曾几何时，足球是一项植根于社区的大众运动。 本地工人阶级男孩为本地俱乐部效力，本地俱乐部拥有非常忠诚的球迷群体。


Local working-class boys played for local clubs that inspired fierce loyalty among fans.	足球沙文主义总是有着暴力之刃，因为它通常包括了种族、宗教和阶级元素：新教徒与天主教徒（在苏格兰）；


Football chauvinism always contained an edge of violence, for it often included an ethnic, religious, or class component: Protestants versus Catholics (in Scotland); “Jewish” clubs (in Amsterdam, Berlin, London, and Budapest), taunted by fans who opposed the “Yids”; posh clubs (like Galatasaray in Istanbul) and resolutely proletarian sides (West Ham in London); clubs that took pride in a strong regional identity (Barcelona); and clubs that were close to the centers of power (Real Madrid).	被反对“犹太佬”的球迷奚落的“犹太”俱乐部（在阿姆斯特丹、柏林、伦敦和布达佩斯）； 奢侈俱乐部（比如伊斯坦布尔的加拉塔萨雷）和纯粹的工人阶级俱乐部（伦敦的西汉姆）；


Some clubs were financed by industrial corporations in order to promote loyalty among their workers: Philips sponsored the Dutch club PSV Eindhoven, for example, while Fiat played the same role for Italy’s Juventus.	一些俱乐部受产业公司的财政支持，以赢得员工支持：比如，飞利浦公司赞助着荷兰俱乐部埃因霍温，菲亚特在意大利的尤文图斯也扮演着同样角色。


But, regardless of the sponsorship or the location, fans felt close to most of the clubs, as well as to their national teams.	但是，不管有没有赞助、位于何处，球迷与大部分俱乐部心心相印，对国家队亦然。


They were part of people’s “identity.”	它们是人们“身份”的一部分。


This is still true to some extent, but something crucial has changed: football, like other types of commerce, has gone global.	从某种程度上说，这一点仍然成立，但一些关键之处已经发生了变化：足球和其他种类的营生一样，已经走向了全球化。


Thanks to new ownership rules, cable television, product endorsements, and other business-related factors, there are probably more supporters of Manchester United in China than there are in the United Kingdom, let alone in the city of Manchester.	新的所有权规则、有线电视、产品代言和其他商业相关因素使得中国的曼联球迷可能比英国还多，更不用说曼彻斯特了。


Football teams are now like multinational franchises, with coaches and players from all over the world.	足球队现在就像是跨国特许精英企业，教练和队员都是全球遴选而得。


But this alone does not account for the kind of alienation from the game expressed by the Brazilian protesters.	但光是这一点无法解释巴西示威者对足球产生的疏离感。


The worldwide reach of football was preceded by that of the Olympic Games, and it is here where we should turn to understand the corruption of globalized sports.	论全球普及，足球不如奥运会，而在这方面，我们得回过头来理解一下全球化运动的腐败问题。


Unlike football, the Olympics were always closely associated with elites: amateur athletes recruited from universities, and so on.	与足球不同，奥运会始终与精英阶层紧密相连：从大学生中遴选出来的业余选手，如此等等。


The father of the modern Olympic Games, Baron de Courbertin, was a French aristocrat who promoted sports to reinvigorate the men of France after their defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1871.	奥运会之父顾拜旦是法国贵族，他推广体育是为了刺激法国人从1871年普法战争的失败中重新振作。


His aim for the Olympic Games was to embody a noble ideal of world peace and brotherhood through athletic competition.	他举办奥运会的目的是通过体育竞赛实现世界和平和四海之内皆兄弟的高尚理想。


How easily this ideal could be corrupted by distinctly ungentlemanly politics was already clear in 1936, when Coubertin’s doddering speech about peace and fair play was played over the loudspeakers of the Olympic Stadium in Berlin, while Hitler and his henchmen raised their arms to salute the Nazi flag.	这一理想极易被毫无优雅性可言的政治所腐蚀，1936年就是明证：老态龙钟的顾拜旦关于和平和公平竞赛的演讲通过扬声器飘荡在柏林奥林匹克体育场���空，而希特勒及其亲信朝纳粹旗帜敬礼。


But even without noisome politics, the sheer amount of money required to stage the Olympic Games – the building contracts for stadiums, transport infrastructure, and hotels, together with all the other commercial razzmatazz – was bound to produce a culture of bribery and kickbacks.	但即使没有臭不可闻的政治，举办奥运会所需要的巨资——建造体育场的合同、交通基础设施、饭店，以及其他各种商业设施——注定会滋生贿赂和回扣文化。


An international elite of Olympic officials arose, living in a self-contained bubble of wealth and privilege.	奥林匹克官员成了国际精英，他们生活在自成体系的财富和地位泡沫中。


I once had occasion to watch these men as they trooped in and out of first-class hotels in an Asian capital, sleek figures in gold-buttoned blazers.	我曾经在亚洲某国首都的一家顶级饭店中巧遇这些人，他们金履华服，风度翩翩。


It was striking to see how often the most prosperous-looking representatives came from the world’s poorest countries.	令人惊异的是，这些最优渥的代表往往来自世界最贫穷的国家。


Football is now like the Olympics (or Formula 1 racing), except that even more money is involved.	如今，足球就和奥运会（或一级方程式赛车）一模一样，除了它所涉及的钱更多之外。


Football clubs have become the status symbols of newly rich tycoons from Russia or the Middle East, and international competitions, especially the World Cup, have become occasions to bolster the prestige, and sometimes even the legitimacy, of national governments.	足球俱乐部已经成为俄罗斯和中东新富豪地位的象征，国际足球比赛，特别是世界杯，已经成为彰显国家政府地位甚至合法性的盛会。


Such events reinforce the tendency of modern political regimes, dictatorships as well as democracies, to measure themselves in monumental building projects – giant new stadiums, gargantuan shopping malls, huge conference halls – which are sometimes needed, but often are not.	这类盛会强化了现代政治体制——不管是民主还是独裁——建造不朽建筑工程的倾向（巨型的新体育场、庞大的购物中心、巨大的会议中心等），有时这些建筑是有必要的，但通常并非如此。


As a result, developers, architects, politicians, tycoons, and international sporting officials are now in charge of the beautiful game.	结果，现如今开发商、建筑商、政客、富豪和国际体育官员主宰了完美比赛。


This adds to their power, wealth, and prestige.	这增加了他们的权势、财富和地位。


But once they have staged their spectacles, at vast expense to the host country, they move on.	但他们在康东道国之慨办了盛会后便拍拍屁股一走了之。


This is especially galling in countries where much of the population is poor and deprived of decent schools or proper medical services.	这让大量人口仍然处于贫困、无法接受体面教育和合适的医疗服务的国家尤其难堪。


Millions of Brazilians have made clear where their priorities lie.	数百万巴西人明确地表明了什么才是他们最先考虑的东西。


They haven’t fallen out of love with football.	他们并没有失去对足球的热爱。


On the contrary, by protesting against the grotesque manipulation of the modern game, they are trying to take it back.	相反，他们在通过抗议对现代足球运动的可笑操纵，试图让足球正本清源。


BRICS Without Mortar	没有泥浆的砖


CAMBRIDGE – Last month, China’s new president, Xi Jinping, chose Moscow for his first foreign visit.	美国剑桥—上个月，中国新国家主席习近平选择莫斯科为出国访问第一站。


He and Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a number of agreements and then traveled to Durban, South Africa, for the fifth “BRICS” summit, where they joined with the leaders of India, Brazil, and South Africa to announce the creation of a new development bank that could challenge the dominance of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.	他和俄罗斯总统普京商定了一系列协议，接着来到南非德班出席第五届“金砖国家”峰会，与印度、巴西和南非领导人宣布将成立能够对世界银行和IMF主导地位形成挑战的新开发银行。


The five leaders’ speeches referred to a shifting world order, and Xi said “the potential of BRICS development is infinite.”	五国领导人在讲话中提到了世界秩序的变迁，习近平表示“金砖国家发展潜力无穷。 ”


It looked as if the BRICS had finally come of age.	看起来金砖国家终于成熟了。


Three years ago, I was skeptical about the BRICS. And, despite the recent summit’s apparent success, I still am.	三年前我对金砖国家持怀疑态度，现在亦然，尽管最新的峰会看上去颇为成功。


Nearly 12 years ago, Jim O’Neill, then the chief economist for Goldman Sachs, coined the term “BRIC” to describe the “emerging markets” of Brazil, Russia, India, and China.	近12年前，高盛首席经济学家奥尼尔（Jim O’Neil）创造了“金砖”一词描述巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国四个“新兴市场”。


From 2000 to 2008, these four countries’ share of global output rose rapidly, from 16% to 22% (in purchasing power parity terms), and their economies performed better than average in the subsequent global recession.	从2000年到2008年，这四个国家占全球产出比重大幅上升，从16%升至22%（以购买力平价衡量），在随后的全球衰退中，它们的经济表现也好于平均水平。


For investors, that outcome justified the creation of the catchy acronym.	对投资者来说，这一结果表明“金砖”一词名副其实。


But then a strange thing happened: the investors’ creature came to life.	但接下来发生了怪事：投资者的创造物开始活跃。


In 2009, the four countries met for the first time in Russia in an effort to forge an international political organization.	2009年，四国在俄罗斯首次举行会晤，试图打造一个国际政治组织。


South Africa joined the bloc in late 2010 primarily for political reasons.	南非在2010年末也加入其中，主要是出于政治考虑。


As O’Neill recently told China Daily, “South Africa is quite fortunate enough to be in the group, as, economically, it is rather small compared to the others.”	奥尼尔最近对《中国日报》表示：“南非加入金砖国家何其幸运，因为从经济上讲，它与其他四国相比规模相当小。


Moreover, its economic performance has been relatively sluggish, with a growth rate of just 2.3% last year.	”此外，它的经济表现也相对萎靡，去年增长率只有2. 3%。


Indeed, while the BRICS may be helpful in coordinating certain diplomatic tactics, the term lumps together highly disparate countries.	事实上，尽管金砖国家或许有助于协调某些外交策略，但这个词所指的五个国家之间情况大不相同。


Not only is South Africa miniscule compared to the others, but China’s economy is larger than those of all of the other members combined.	南非规模太小，而中国经济比其他四国加起来还要打。


Likewise, India, Brazil, and South Africa are democracies, and occasionally meet in an alternative forum that they call “IBSA.”	类似地，印度，巴西和南非是民主国家，有时候会以“IBSA”的名义搞小团体。


And, while the large autocracies, Russia and China, find it diplomatically advantageous to tweak the Americans, both have different but crucial relationships with the United States.	此外，专制大国俄罗斯和中国认为这有助于在外交上与美国角力，但两国各自与美国有着各不相同但至关重要的关系。


And both have worked to thwart efforts by India, Brazil, and South Africa to become permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.	两国也都在致力于阻挠印度、巴西和南非成为联合国安理会常任理事国。


As I wrote three years ago, in analytical terms, it makes little sense to include Russia, a former superpower, with the developing economies.	我在三年前指出，从分析角度讲，把昔日超级大国俄罗斯纳入金砖国家范围、与发展中国家为伍毫无必要。


Russia lacks diversified exports, faces severe demographic and health problems, and, in former President Dmitri Medvedev’s words, “greatly needs modernization.”	俄罗斯没有多样化的出口，面临着严峻的人口和卫生问题，用前总统梅德韦杰夫的话说，俄罗斯“急切地需要现代化。


Little has changed since Putin returned to the presidency last year.	”自去年普京重回总统宝座以来，俄罗斯并没有发生多少变化。


While economic growth benefited from the dramatic growth in oil and gas prices during the last decade, other competitive industries have yet to emerge, and the country now faces the prospect of declining energy prices.	经济增长因过去十年的油价和气价飙升而获益良多，但除此之外便再无竞争力产业，而如今俄罗斯面临着能源价格下跌的前景。


While it aims to maintain 5% annual growth, its economy was relatively flat last year.	尽管俄罗斯仍维持着5%的年经济增长，但去年其经济表现相对较为沉寂。


If Russia’s power resources seem to be declining, Brazil’s appear to be more impressive, given it has a territory nearly three times the size of India’s, a 90% literacy rate, and triple the per capita income of India (and nearly twice that of China).	如果说俄罗斯实力源泉在告竭，那么巴西可谓令人印象深刻，其国土几为印度的三倍，识字率高达90%，人均收入也是印度的三倍（和中国的近两倍）。


But, in the three years since my earlier assessment, Brazil’s performance has slipped: annual economic growth has slowed from 7.5% in 2010 to 1% last year, with a 3.5% rate expected in 2013.	但是，在我的早先评估做出三年后，巴西的表现有所滑坡：经济增长从2010年的7. 5%降至去年的1%，2013年预计也只有3.


Like Brazil, India experienced a spurt of output growth after liberalizing its economy in the 1990’s; indeed, until a few years ago, GDP growth was approaching Chinese-style rates.	与巴西相同，印度在20世纪经济自由化之后出现了产出井喷； 事实上，前些年印度GDP增长堪与中国媲美。


This year, however, output is expected to rise by a relatively sluggish 5.9%.	但是，今年产出增长预计将相对缓慢，只有5. 9%。


Unless it improves its infrastructure and literacy rate (particularly for women), India is unlikely to catch up with China.	除非印度改善其基础设施和识字率（特别是女性识字率），否则绝无可能赶超中国。


So, should we take today’s BRICS more seriously than the BRICs of three years ago?	因此，今天的金砖国家比三年前的金砖四国更值得关注吗？


Tellingly, the meeting in Durban failed to produce any details of the structure of the proposed new development bank, suggesting that little progress had been made in the year since the BRICS’ last meeting in New Delhi, where the plan was announced.	显然，德班会晤并没有就建议中的新开发银行的细节和结构给出多少信息，这表明自上届新德里会晤以来，在这方面并未取得多少进展（开发银行的计划正是在新德里提出的）。


In fact, despite a commitment to launch “formal negotiations” to establish the bank, disagreements about the size and shares of the bank’s capital have not been resolved.	事实上，尽管做出了就成立新开发银行展开“正式谈判”的承诺，但该银行的规模和出资份额等问题仍有待解决。


That lack of unity is symptomatic of the BRICS members’ underlying incompatibilities.	如此缺少统一其实是金砖国家内在不协调的表征。


In political terms, China, India, and Russia are vying with each other for power in Asia.	从政治上讲，中国、印度和俄罗斯是亚洲领导权的竞争对手。


And, in economic terms, Brazil, India, and South Africa are concerned about the effects of China’s undervalued currency on their economies.	从经济上讲，巴西、印度和南非都担心人民币低估对各自经济的影响。


Three years ago, I wrote that, “BRIC is not likely to become a serious political organization of like-minded states.”	三年前我写道，“金砖四国不可能形成由观念一致的国家组成的政治组织。


The BRICS’ most recent meeting has given me no reason to revise that assessment.	”金砖国家的最新会晤并没有让我觉得有必要修正这一论断。


Why Capital Flows Uphill	资金为什么会往高处流


LONDON – At first, it seems difficult to grasp: global capital is flowing from poor to rich countries.	伦敦——起初似乎很难理解全球资本为什么会从穷国倒流向富国。


Emerging-market countries run current-account surpluses, while advanced economies have deficits.	新兴市场国家普遍录得经常账户盈余，而发达经济体则录得赤字。


One would expect fast-growing, capital-scarce (and young) developing countries to be importing capital from the rest of world to finance consumption and investment.	年轻的发展中国家增长速度快，资本匮乏，按常理他们本该从其他国家进口资金以支持金融消费和投资。


So, why are they sending capital to richer countries, instead?	那么为什么事实却恰恰相反，他们在向富裕国家进行资本输出？


China is a case in point.	中国就是一个很好的例子。


With its current-account surplus averaging 5.5% of GDP in 2000-2008, China has become one of the world’s largest lenders.	中国的经常账户盈余在2000－2008年间平均达到5. 5%，已经成为全世界最大的贷款国之一。


Despite its rapid growth and promising investment opportunities, the country has persistently been sending a significant portion of its savings overseas.  	尽管投资机会诱人、经济也快速成长，中国却一直将很大一部分储蓄向海外输出。


And China is not alone.	中国的情况并非个例。


Other emerging markets – including Brazil, Russia, India, Mexico, Argentina, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Middle Eastern oil exporters – have all increased their current-account surpluses significantly since the early 1990’s.	包括巴西、俄罗斯、印度、墨西哥、阿根廷、泰国、印尼、马来西亚和中东石油出口国在内的其他新兴市场经常账户盈余自20世纪90年代初起就显著增加。


Collectively, capital-scarce developing countries are lending to capital-abundant advanced economies.	资金匮乏的发展中国家向资金充裕的发达国家放贷成为一种集体现象。


Many observers believe that these global imbalances reflect developing economies’ financial integration, coupled with underdevelopment of domestic financial markets.	很多观察家认为这样的全球失衡反映了发展中国家金融一体化的现状，以及国内金融市场还很不成熟。


According to this view, these countries’ demand for assets cannot be met – in terms of both quantity and quality – at home, so they deploy part of their savings to countries like the US, which can offer a more diverse array of quality assets.	按照此类说法，这些国家对资产的需求（无论从数量还是质量上）都无法在国内得到满足，因此他们只得将部分储蓄配置到以美国为首的国家，因为这些国家拥有更多样化的优质资产可供选择。


While plausible, this argument suggests that, as financial markets improve over time in developing countries, the global imbalances are bound to shrink.	这种说法虽然有一定道理，但人们因此可以顺理成章地认为随着发展中国家金融市场的逐步发展，全球失衡的现象必然日渐萎缩。


But such a reversal is nowhere in sight.	但这样的逆转似乎还遥遥无期。


Why?	这又是什么原因呢？


A crucial dimension of globalization has been trade liberalization.	全球化的一个重要方面是贸易自由化。


For China, foreign trade as a percentage of GDP soared from 25% in 1989 to 66% in 2006, largely owing to its admission to the World Trade Organization in 2001.  	对中国而言，由于在2001年加入世贸组织，外贸占其国内生产总值的比重从1989年的25%猛增至2006年的66%。


Most of what China and other developing countries produce and export are labor-intensive goods such as textiles and apparel.	中国和其他发展中国家生产出口的多数是劳动密集型产品，如纺织品和服装。


This has allowed advanced economies, in turn, to produce and export more capital-intensive, higher-value-added products.	发达国家则反过来得以从事资本更密集、附加值更高的生产活动。


Globalization of trade enabled countries to tap the efficiency gains that specialization in their sectors of comparative advantage has brought about.	贸易全球化使各国能充分利用专注于比较优势领域所带来的效率回报。


With a slight mental stretch, one can imagine that what a country produces and trades may affect its savings and investment decisions.	稍微发挥一下想象力就不难想见，一个国家的产品和贸易可能会影响其储蓄和投资决策。


An economy in which the main productive activity is berry picking, for example, has little need for investment and capital accumulation.	比方说，一个以浆果采摘为主要生产活动的经济体将鲜有投资和资本积累的需求。


Its laborers earn wages, consume, and save part of that income.	那里的劳动者挣钱、消费，并储存部分劳动收入。


Since the production process requires little capital, there is no demand for domestic investment – and thus no savings vehicles.	因为简单的生产过程不需要多少资金，国内的投资需求比较匮乏——因此也没有多少储蓄工具可供选择。


Instead, the only way to save is by purchasing capital abroad – in economies with capital-intensive production and demand for investment.	相反，唯一的储蓄方法是向从事资本密集型生产并有投资需求的国家购买外国资本。


This economy will always export its savings.	这样的国家总会将储蓄出口。


That may be an extreme example, but it illustrates a more general point about how merchandise trade can influence financial flows.	这或许是个极端的例子，但却足以证明贸易影响资金流动的普遍原则。


Countries that produce and export more labor-intensive goods – perhaps owing to increased trade openness, or faster labor-force and productivity growth, all of which are true of China – may experience a rise in saving, but a less-than-equivalent increase in demand for capital.	像中国这样生产及出口劳动密集型产品的国家可能因为贸易开放或劳动力及生产率快速增长而出现储蓄增长，但是对资金的需求却相对匮乏。


Rich countries, by contrast, are able to export more capital-intensive goods, and thus have a greater need for investment.	相反，富国则可以出口资本更为密集的产品，因此拥有更为强劲的投资需求。


So they may be importing more capital – resulting in a greater current-account deficit – simply because they are producing more capital-intensive goods.	于是他们可能仅仅因为生产资本密集型产品而要进口更多的资金——从而导致经常账户赤字的增加。


With developing countries – in particular, China, India, and the ex-Soviet bloc – bringing almost 1.5 billion workers into the world economy since the early 1990’s, it is not difficult to understand the potential impact of this effect.	因为中国、印度、前苏联等发展中国家从20世纪90年代初起即携带近15亿劳动力融入世界经济，上述效应所产生的潜在影响力并不难想象。


After all, much of this labor force was absorbed by labor-intensive industries that eventually churned out products exported to the rest of the world.	毕竟其中多数人被劳动力密集型行业所吸收，批量制造出各种产品出口到世界各国。


Indeed, that massive addition of labor helped to drive down the relative price of labor-intensive goods, which fell by roughly 15% between 1989 and 2008.	事实上，这些大幅增加的劳动力压低了劳动力密集型产品的相对价格，该类产品从1989到2008年间价格降低了约15%。


As developing countries increased their labor-intensive production and exports, their current-account surpluses rose – by almost 3.6 percentage points, on average, between 1989-1993 and 2002-2006.	1989-1993及2002-2006年间，随着发展中国家加大劳动密集型产品的生产及出口，他们的经常账户盈余平均增长了近3. 6%。


China’s current-account surplus increased by almost 11 percentage points over the same period, India’s by 2.5 percentage points, and Russia’s by seven percentage points.	中国同期内经常账户盈余增长近11%，印度增长2. 5%，而俄罗斯则增长7%。


These countries, as well as other large surplus economies, such as Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, all experienced a simultaneous increase in the labor content of exports.	上述国家及巴西、沙特、伊朗等其他大规模盈余经济体均出现了出口产品劳动力含量同步增长的势头。


This pattern contrasts with that of the United States and many other advanced countries, which have experienced a deterioration of their current-account balances as their production and exports have become more capital-intensive.	美国和其他很多发达国家的模式则恰好相反，随着其国内生产及出口资本密集度的提升，他们的经常账户余额均出现了恶化。


Many might doubt the view that China is exporting more labor-intensive goods, rather than upgrading its exports on the capital- and skill-intensity ladder.	中国仍在出口更多劳动密集型产品，而不是提高其出口产品资金和技术密度的说法可能遭致很多人的怀疑。


But trade data suggest the opposite, perhaps because China’s accession to the WTO led to tariff reductions that released more labor-intensive production.	但贸易数据的显示却恰恰相反，可能因为中国加入WTO所导致的关税下降释放了劳动密集型产业。


In fact, trade data may underestimate the true extent of China’s labor intensity andoverstate the capital and skill intensity of China’s exports.	事实上，贸易数据可能低估中国真实的劳动力密集度，同时高估资本和技术密集度。


China has witnessed rapid growth in the processing trade: assembling intermediate inputs – imported from countries like the US and Japan – that have high capital and skill content.	中国经历了加工贸易的飞速发展：组装从美日等国进口的中间零件，这里所说的中间零件本身具有较高的资金及技术含量。


So, while the exports of these final goods may count towards China’s own capital and skill content, the country’s real role was only in the labor-intensive process of assembly.	因此，虽然上述最终产品的出口可能被算做中国自身的资金和技术含量，但劳动密集型的组装过程才是这个国家所扮演的真正角色。


A country’s production structure may very well determine how much capital it supplies and how much it needs.	一个国家的生产结构完全可以决定它所需求和供应的资金数额。


So the fact that capital may flow towards rich countries that produce and export more capital-intensive goods should not be so puzzling, after all.	因此归根结底，资金流向生产并出口资金密集型产品的富有国家并没有什么值得大惊小怪的。


Why China Can’t Adjust	为什么中国无法调整


CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA – China’s current economic slowdown has no shortage of causes: Europe’s financial turmoil, sputtering recovery in the United States, and weak domestic investment growth, to name the most commonly cited factors.	加州克莱蒙特—中国近期的经济减速原因很多：谈得最多的有欧洲金融动荡、美国复苏萎靡、国内投资增长不振等等。


Since exports and investment account, respectively, for 30% and 40% of China’s GDP growth, its economy is particularly vulnerable to weakening external demand and accumulation of non-performing loans caused by excessive and wasteful spending on fixed assets.	出口和投资分别贡献了中国GDP增长的30%和40%，因此中国经济极易受到外需不振和固定资产开支过度和浪费导致的不良贷款积累的冲击。


But China’s vulnerability to these factors, as serious as they are, is symptomatic of deeper institutional problems.	但中国对这些因素如此脆弱只不过是深层次制度问题的表征。


Until these underlying constraints are addressed, talk of a new consumption-based growth model for China, reflected in the government’s recently approved 12th Five-Year Plan, can be no more than lip service.	除非其基础性约束得到修正，否则关于基于消费的增长模式的说法——见于中国政府最新的十二五规划中——就只能是空谈。


After all, China’s major trading partners, international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and senior Chinese officials themselves have long recognized the structural vulnerabilities caused by excessive investment and low household consumption.	毕竟，中国的主要贸易伙伴、国际金融机构（如世界银行和IMF）以及中国高级官员本身早就知道投资过度和家庭消费不足导致了结构性脆弱性。


And, for nearly a decade, China has been urged to undertake reforms to redress these economic patterns, which have undermined the welfare of ordinary Chinese and strained the global trading system.	近十年来，中国一直迫切地采取改革矫正其经济模式，而这拖累了普通中国百姓的福利，也束缚了全球贸易体系。


The best-known feature of China’s macroeconomic imbalances is heavy dependence on exports for growth, which is typically attributed to weak domestic demand: as a middle-income country, China lacks the purchasing power to consume the goods that it produces.	在中国的宏观失衡中，最著名的便是对出口提振增长的严重依赖，而这通常被归因于内需萎靡：作为中等收入国家，中国缺少消费它所生产的产品的购买力。


With nearly unlimited access to advanced-country markets, China can tap into global external demand and raise its GDP growth potential, as it has done for the past two decades.	中国基本上可以毫无限制地进入发达国家市场，因此可以充分利用全球外需并提升其GDP增长潜力，这正是中国过去二十年来做法。


If this view is right, the solution is straightforward: China can correct its imbalances by increasing its citizens’ incomes (by cutting taxes, raising wages, or increasing social spending), so that they can consume more, thereby reducing the economy’s dependence on exports.	如果这一观点正确，那么解决办法相当简单：中国可以通过增加人民收入（通过减税、增加工资和社会支出实现）纠正失衡，从而增加消费，从而降低经济对出口的依赖度。


Indeed, nearly all mainstream economists prescribe this approach for China.	事实上，几乎所有主流经济学家都给中国开出了这一药方。


But there is another explanation for China’s excessive export dependence, one that has more to do with the country’s poor political and economic institutions.	但对中国过度依赖出口的现象还有另一个解释，即这与中国政治和经济制度缺陷有关。


Specifically, export dependence partly reflects the high degree of difficulty of doing business in China.	具体来说，出口依赖部分反映了在中国做生意的高难度。


Official corruption, insecure property rights, stifling regulatory restraints, weak payment discipline, poor logistics and distribution, widespread counterfeiting, and vulnerability to other forms of intellectual-property theft: all of these obstacles increase transaction costs and make it difficult for entrepreneurs to thrive in domestic markets.	官员腐败、产权保护不力、令人窒息的监管约束、疲软的付款纪律、薄弱的物流和分配、遍地开花的假货，还有各种各样的知识产权侵权：所有这些障碍增加了交易成本，令企业家很难在国内市场上立足。


By contrast, if China’s private firms sell to Western multinationals, such as Wal-Mart, Target, or Home Depot, they do not have to worry about getting paid.	与此形成对比的是，如果中国民营企业把东西卖给沃尔玛、塔吉特（Target）、家得宝（Home Depot）这样的西方跨国公司根本不用担心收不回货款。


They can avoid all of the headaches that they would have encountered at home, because well-established economic institutions and business practices in their export markets protect their interests and greatly reduce transaction costs.	他们可以避免在国内做生意时会遇到的所有问题，因为出口市场所具备的成熟经济制度和商业行为保护了他们的利益，显著地降低了交易成本。


The Chinese economy’s institutional weakness is reflected in international survey data.	中国经济的制度缺陷反映于国际调查数据中。


The World Bank publishes an annual review of “the ease of doing business” for 183 countries and sub-national units.	世界银行出版有关于“商业活动容易度”的年度报告，报告覆盖了183个国家和地区单元。


In its June 2011 survey, China was ranked 91st, behind Mongolia, Albania, and Belarus.	在2011年6月的调查中，中国排名第91位，次于蒙古、阿尔巴尼亚和白俄罗斯。


It is particularly difficult to start a business in China (151st), pay taxes (122nd), obtain construction permits (179th), and get electricity (115th).	在中国，开办企业（排名第151）、纳税（派排名第122）、获得建筑许可（排名第179）、获得电力（排名第115）尤其困难。


Faced with such a hostile environment, Chinese private entrepreneurs have been forced to engage in “institutional arbitrage” – taking advantage of efficient Western economic institutions to expand their business (most export-oriented businesses are owned by private entrepreneurs and foreign firms).	面临如此困难的环境，中国民营企业家被迫进行“制度套利”——利用高校的西方经济制度扩张业务（大部分出口导向企业为民营企业家和外国公司所有）。


Unfortunately, as China has already claimed a large share of the world’s merchandise exports (10.4% in 2010) and economic stagnation in the West is constraining external demand, this strategy can no longer work.	不幸的是，由于中国已经在世界货物出口中占据很大比重（2004年为10. 4%），同时西方经济停滞又束缚着外部需求，出口导向战略难再奏效。


But reorienting their businesses toward the Chinese domestic market requires far more than government policies that put more money in consumers' pockets.	但把业务导向转向中国国内市场需要政府采取措施让消费者的腰包鼓起来。


In order to enjoy the same low transaction costs that they have in exporting, China’s entrepreneurs need a much better business environment: an effective legal system, a sound regulatory framework, a government that protects their brands by fighting intellectual-property theft, dependable logistics and distribution networks, and a graft-resistant bureaucracy.	为了享受到与出口业务相同的低交易成本，中国企业家需要更好的商业环境：高效的法律制度、有效的监管框架、通过消灭产权侵权保护品牌的政府、可靠的物流和分销网络以及清廉的官僚体系。


China cannot create such an environment quickly.	中国不可能很快地建立起这样的环境。


In essence, the Chinese government must transform a predatory state into a nurturing one, and treat private entrepreneurs as creators of wealth rather than targets of extraction.	从根本上说，中国政府需要从掠夺者转型为哺育者，将民营企业家视为财富创造者而不是榨取对象。


In nearly all other countries, such a transformation was accomplished by establishing the rule of law and/or moving from autocracy to democracy.	几乎在所有其他国家，这样的转型都伴随着建立法治精神和/或由独裁转向民主。


The impossibility of sustaining growth in the absence of the rule of law and political accountability presents the Chinese Communist Party with an existential dilemma.	没有法治精神和政治问责，就不可能维持增长，这让中国共产党陷入了存在性难题。


Ever since it crushed the pro-democracy movement in Tiananmen Square in 1989, the party has vowed not to surrender its political monopoly.	自从1989年在天安门广场镇压了民主运动之后，中共便一直紧抓政治垄断权不放。


The investment boom and the globalization dividend of the last two decades allowed the Party to have its cake and eat it – maintaining its rule on the basis of economic prosperity, while failing to establish the institutions critical to sustaining such prosperity.	过去20年的投资繁荣和全球化红利令中共鱼与熊掌兼得——在经济繁荣的基础上保持着执政权，但中共并没有建立起维持繁荣所必须的制度。


Today, this is no longer possible.	如今，繁荣已不可再持续了。


So in a sense, the Chinese bubble – as much an intellectual and political bubble as an economic one – has burst.	因此，从某种程度上说，中国泡沫——智识上、政治上、经济上的泡沫——已经破灭了。


As China’s economic deceleration exposes its structural vulnerabilities and flawed policies, the much-hyped notion of “Chinese exceptionalism” – that China can continue to grow without the rule of law and the other essential institutions that a modern market economy presupposes – is proving to be nothing but a delusion.	随着中国经济的减速暴露了其结构性脆弱性和政策缺陷，如日中天的“中国例外”论——中国可以在不追求法治精神和其他作为市场经济先决条件的关键制度的情况下继续增长——正在露出幻象本质。


The Lessons of the China-India War	中印战争的经验教训


NEW DELHI – This month marks the 50th anniversary of China’s military attack on India, the only foreign war that communist-ruled China has won.	发自新德里——本月是中国对印度发起军事行动五十年的日子，这场战争是共产党领导下的中国所赢的唯一一场对外战争。


Yet that war failed to resolve the disputes between the world’s two most populous countries, and its legacy continues to weigh down the bilateral relationship.	但这场战争却未能解决世界上人口最多的两个国家之间的争端，而其后果至今仍在拖累着双边关系。


While their economic heft is drawing increasing international attention, their underlying strategic rivalry over issues ranging from land and water to geopolitical influence in other regions usually attracts less notice.	当两国的经济实力正得到越来越多的国际关注之时，相对而言中印之间在其他问题上——从土地到水源，再到对其他区域的地缘政治影响——所存在的潜在战略对峙得到的关注就较少了。


The international importance of the China-India relationship reflects the fact that together they account for 37% of humanity.	中印关系在国际上的重要性反映了一个事实——两国人口加起来占了全球人口的37%。


Although they represent markedly different cultures and competing models of development, they share a historical similarity that helps shape both countries’ diplomacy: each freed itself from colonial powers around the same time.	尽管他们代表着截然不同的文化以及相互竞争的发展模式，两国之间仍有着塑造了本国外交政策的相似历史：它们都在几乎同一时期将自身从殖民统治中解放了出来。


Throughout their histories, the Indian and Chinese civilizations were separated by the vast Tibetan plateau, limiting their interaction to sporadic cultural and religious contacts; political relations were absent.	纵观其历史，由于印度和中国的文明被广阔的青藏高原隔开，相互之间的文化和宗教互动因而受到了限制； 而两国之间几乎不存在政治关系。


It was only after China’s annexation of Tibet in 1950-1951 that Han Chinese troops appeared for the first time on India’s Himalayan frontiers.	直到1950-1951年中国吞并了西藏之后，中国的汉族军队才第一次出现在喜马拉雅山的印度边境上。


Just over a decade later, China surprised India’s ill-prepared army by launching a multi-pronged attack across the Himalayas on October 20, 1962.	仅仅十余年后，1962年10月20日中国越过喜马拉雅山发动了令印度军队措手不及的全面进攻。


Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai publicly said that the war was intended “to teach India a lesson.”	中国总理周恩来公开宣称此次战争的目的是要给印度“一个教训”。


Taking an enemy by surprise confers a significant tactical advantage in war, and the invasion inflicted an immense psychological and political shock on India that greatly magnified the initial military advances that China achieved.	意外的袭击使中国在战争中获得显著的战略优势，入侵给印度造成了巨大的心理及政治打击，从而夸大了中国最初所取得的军事进展。


China’s blitzkrieg created a defeatist mindset in India, forcing its army to retreat to defensive positions.	这种“闪电战”引发了印度人的失败主义心态，从而使得印度的军队后退到防守位置。


India, fearing unknown consequences, even shied away from employing its air power, although the Chinese military lacked effective air cover for its advancing forces.	出于对未知后果的恐惧，即便在中国先头部队缺乏有效空中掩护的情况下，印度依然放弃使用空军力量。


After more than a month of fighting, China declared a unilateral ceasefire from a position of strength, having seized Indian territory.	在战斗进行一个多月后，占领了印度领土的中国以强者姿态宣布单方面停火。


The Chinese simultaneously announced that they would begin withdrawing their forces on December 1, 1962, vacating their territorial gains in the eastern sector (where the borders of India, Myanmar, Tibet, and Bhutan converge) but retaining the areas seized in the western sector (in the original princely state of Jammu and Kashmir).	中国同时宣布将从1962年12月1日起开始撤军，并让出其在东部（即印度、缅甸、西藏和不丹交界区域）所占领的土地，但保留对西部（查谟和克什米尔）的占领。


These withdrawal parameters meshed with China’s pre-war aims.	这些撤军行动与中国战前所订立的目标是吻合的。


Just as Mao Zedong started his invasion of Tibet while the world was preoccupied with the Korean War, so he chose a perfect time to invade India, as recommended by the ancient strategist Sun Tzu.	正如中国古代军事家孙子所建议的一样，毛泽东选择在全世界都关注朝鲜战争时吞并西藏，同样他也选择了一个完美的时机入侵印度。


The attack coincided with a major international crisis that brought the United States and the Soviet Union within a whisker of nuclear war over the stealthy deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba.	当袭击发生的时候，正好发生了一个重要的国际危机。 由于苏联在古巴秘密部署苏联导弹，美苏两国差点爆发核战。


China’s unilateral ceasefire coincided with America’s formal termination of its naval blockade of Cuba, marking the end of the missile crisis.	中国宣布单边停火时，美国也刚好正式终止对古巴的海上封锁，从而结束了导弹危机。


Mao’s shrewd timing ensured India’s isolation from sources of international support.	毛泽东所选择的时机确保了印度无法得到国际力量的支持。


Throughout the invasion, the international spotlight was on the potential US-Soviet nuclear showdown, not on the bloody war raging in the Himalayan foothills.	在中国入侵印度的整个过程中，国际关注点一直都放在有可能爆发的美苏核决战上，而不是喜马拉雅山山脚下的血腥鏖战。


India’s humiliating rout hastened the death of its prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru; but it also set in motion the country’s military modernization and political rise.	印度的耻辱溃败加速了其总理贾瓦哈拉尔·尼赫鲁（Jawaharlal Nehru）的死亡，但它也促进了这个国家的军事现代化和政治崛起。


Fifty years later, tensions between India and China are rising again amid an intense geopolitical rivalry.	50年后的今天，中印两国的紧张关系在一场激烈的地缘政治较量中再次加剧。


Their entire 4,057-kilometer border – one of the longest in the world – remains in dispute, without a clearly defined line of control in the Himalayas.	中印之间长达4057公里的边界（世界上最长的边界之一）仍处于争议之中，喜马拉雅山上也没有明确划定的控制线存在。


This situation has persisted despite regular Chinese-Indian talks since 1981.	尽管自1981年以来中印两国定期举行会谈，但这种形势从未改变。


In fact, these talks constitute the longest and most futile negotiating process between any two countries in modern history.	事实上，这些会谈在现代历史上可谓是国家之间最长且最无效的谈判。


During a 2010 visit to New Delhi, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated bluntly that sorting out the border disputes “will take a fairly long period of time.”	在2010年访问新德里期间，中国总理温家宝坦率地说要解决边境争端“需要相当长的一段时间”。


If so, what does China (or India) gain by continuing the negotiations?	如果真是如此，中国（或印度）继续这些谈下去还有什么意义呢？


As old wounds fester, new issues have begun roiling bilateral relations.	过去的争议仍在恶化，又出现了扰乱双边关系的新问题。


For example, since 2006 China has initiated a new territorial dispute by claiming the eastern sector (the Austria-size Arunachal Pradesh state), from which its forces withdrew in 1962, describing it as “Southern Tibet.”	比如，自2006年起中国挑起了一场新的领土争端，它声称东部地区（面积近似奥地利的阿鲁纳恰尔邦）为其领土——1962年中国军队从该地撤军并称之为“藏南”。


A perceptible hardening of China’s stance toward India since then is also reflected in other developments, including Chinese strategic projects and the country’s military presence in the Pakistani-held portion of Kashmir, a region where the disputed borders of India, China, and Pakistan converge.	自从那时起中国对印度的明显强硬姿态还体现在其他事态的发展上，比如中国的战略项目以及该国在巴基斯坦控制克什米尔地区的军事存在——该地是印度、中国和巴基斯坦三国交界的争议地区。


Indian defense officials have reported increased military incursions by Chinese troops in recent years.	印度的国防官员报告说中国军队的军事进犯不断增加。


In response, India has been beefing up its military deployments along the border to prevent any Chinese land grab.	对此印度已经开始加强边境军事部署以防中国蚕食。


It has also launched a crash program to improve its logistical capabilities by constructing new roads, airstrips, and advanced landing stations along the Himalayas.	同时它也启动了一���紧急方案，通过沿喜马拉雅山修建新的公路，飞机跑道和先进的起降平台来提高其后勤能力。


The larger strategic rivalry between the world’s largest autocracy and its biggest democracy has also sharpened, despite their fast-rising trade.	虽然两国贸易额迅速上升，世界上最大独裁国家和最大民主国家之间更大规模的军事战略较量也变得更为尖锐了。


In the past decade, bilateral trade has risen more than 20-fold, to $73.9 billion, making it the only area in which bilateral relations have thrived.	在过去十年中，双边贸易量已经上升了20倍，达到739亿美元，使其成为唯一一个双边关系蓬勃发展的领域。


Far from helping to turn the page on old disputes, this commerce has been accompanied by greater Sino-Indian geopolitical rivalry and military tension.	这种交往根本无助于两国翻过历史上有争议的一页，相反却伴随着越来严重的中印地缘竞争和军事紧张关系。


Booming bilateral trade is no guarantee of moderation between countries.	发展双边贸易并不能保证两国双边关系能有所缓和。


Although China set out to teach India a “lesson,” the 1962 war failed to achieve any lasting political objectives and only embittered bilateral relations.	虽然中国打算给印度一个“教训”，但中国在1962年的战争并未实现什么长久的政治目标，只是损害了两国的双边关系。


The same lesson is applicable to the Sino-Vietnamese context: In 1979, China replicated the 1962 model by launching a surprise blitzkrieg against Vietnam that Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping admitted was designed to “teach a lesson.”	这种教训也适用于中越两国：1979年，中国重施故技，突袭越南。 中国领导人邓小平承认这一袭击就是要给越南“一个教训”。


After 29 days, China ended its invasion, claiming that Vietnam had been sufficiently chastised.  But the lesson that Deng seems to have drawn from the PLA’s poor performance against Vietnam is that China, like India, needed to modernize every aspect of its society.	29天之后，中国结束了它的侵略，宣称越南已经遭到了充分地惩罚。 但似乎邓小平从中国人民解放军对越作战的恶劣表现中所得到的教训却是——中国，跟印度一样，需要在其社会的各个方面都实现现代化。


China is Not Collapsing	中国没有在崩溃


LONDON – One question has dominated the International Monetary Fund’s annual meeting this year in Peru: Will China’s economic downturn trigger a new financial crisis just as the world is putting the last one to bed?	伦敦—一个问题主导了今年国际货币基金组织（IMF）的秘鲁年会：世界刚刚把上一场金融危机平息下去，中国经济减速会引发一场新的金融危机吗？


But the assumption underlying that question – that China is now the global economy’s weakest link – is highly suspect.	但这一问题背后的假设——中国是目前全球经济最弱的一环——颇可商榷。


China certainly experienced a turbulent summer, owing to three factors: economic weakness, financial panic, and the policy response to these problems.	显然，中国经历了一个动荡之夏，原因有三：经济疲软、金融恐慌以及对这些问题的政策应对。


While none on its own would have threatened the world economy, the danger stemmed from a self-reinforcing interaction among them: weak economic data leads to financial turmoil, which induces policy blunders that in turn fuel more financial panic, economic weakness, and policy mistakes.	这些问题中的每一个都不会威胁到世界经济，但危险源自这三个问题自我加强的互动：疲软的经济数据导致金融动荡，金融动荡导致政策错误，政策错误反过来助长更多的金融恐慌、经济疲软和政策错误。


Such self-reinforcing financial feedback is much more powerful in transmitting global economic contagion than ordinary commercial or trade exposures, as the world learned in 2008-2009.	这一自我加强的金融反馈对于传播全球经济传染病的效力远远大于常规商业或贸易风险暴露，2008—2009年的经验已经说明了这一点。


The question now is whether the vicious circle that began in China over the summer will continue.	现在的问题是，整个夏天始于中国的恶性循环是否会持续下去。


A sensible answer must distinguish between financial perceptions and economic reality.	明智的答案必须区分金融感觉和经济现实。


China’s growth slowdown is not in itself surprising or alarming.	中国的增长减速本身并不令人惊奇或值得警惕。


As the IMF noted, China’s growth rate has been declining steadily for five years – from 10.6% in 2010 to a projected rate of 6.8% this year and 6.3% in 2016.	IMF指出，中国增长率稳步下降已有五年——从2010年的10. 6%下降到今年6.


This deceleration was inevitable as China advanced from extreme poverty and technological backwardness to become a middle-income economy powered by external trade and consumer spending.	这一减速是难以避免的，因为中国已经从极端贫困和科技落后中走出，成为受对外贸易和消费支出驱动的中等收入经济体。


It was also desirable, because rapid growth was hitting environmental limits.	这一减速也是合适的，因为高速增长已经触及环境极限。


Even as the pace of growth slows, China is contributing more to the world economy than ever before, because its GDP today is $10.3 trillion, up from just $2.3 trillion in 2005.	即使增长速度有所放缓，中国对世界经济的贡献仍比以往任何时候都要大，因为其GDP如今已达10. 3万亿美元，而2005年只有2.


Simple arithmetic shows that $10.3 trillion growing at 6% or 7% produces much bigger numbers than 10% growth starting from a base that is almost five times smaller.	简单计算就可知道，10. 3万亿美元增长6%或7%所得到的数字要比在基数只有五分之一大小的基础上增长10%大得多。


This base effect also means that China will continue to absorb more natural resources than ever before, despite its diminishing growth prospects.	这一基数效应也意味着中国将继续比以往任何时候吸收更多的自然资源，尽管其增长前景在趋弱。


Yet China is causing high anxiety, especially in emerging countries, largely because financial markets have convinced themselves that its economy is not only slowing, but falling off a cliff.	但中国正在制造很大的焦虑，特别是在新型国家，这在很大程度上是因为金融市场让自己相信，其经济不仅仅是放缓，简直是掉落悬崖。


Many Western analysts, especially in financial institutions, treat China’s official GDP growth of around 7% as a political fabrication – and the IMF’s latest confirmation of its 6.8% estimate is unlikely to convince them.	许多西方分析师，特别是金融机构分析师，认为中国7%左右的官方GDP增长数字是政治造假——IMF最近确认6. 8%的估计值也没能让他们消停。


They point to steel, coal, and construction statistics, which really are collapsing in several Chinese regions, and to exports, which are growing much less than in the past.	他们拿钢铁、煤炭和建筑业数字（在中国的一些地区，这些数字确实呈现出崩溃之势），以及出口数字（增长比以往大幅下降）作为论据。


But why do the skeptics accept the truth of dismal government figures for construction and steel output – down 15% and 4%, respectively, in the year to August – and then dismiss official data showing 10.8% retail-sales growth?	但为何怀疑者接受政府公布的黯淡的建筑业和钢铁产出数字——今年前八个月分别同比下降15%和4%，而抨击零售业销售增长10. 8%的官方数据？


One reason can be found in the financier George Soros’s concept of “reflexivity.”	一个理由可以从金融家乔治·索罗斯（George Soros）的“反身性”中找到。


Soros has argued for years that financial markets can create inaccurate expectations and then change reality to accord with them.	索罗斯多年前就指出，金融市场可以炮制不正确的预期，然后根据这些预期改变现实。


This is the opposite of the process described in textbooks and built into economic models, which always assume that financial expectations adapt to reality, not the other way round.	这与教科书中所描述的、被纳入经济模型的过程正好相反，后者总是假设金融预期根据现实调整，而不是相反。


In a classic example of reflexivity, when China’s stock-market boom turned into July’s bust, the government responded with a $200 billion attempt to support prices, closely followed by a small devaluation of the previously stable renminbi.	一个反身性的经典例子是，今年7月中国股市繁荣转变为萧条时，政府的反应时投入2,000美元托市，并立刻继之以此前一直稳定的人民币小幅贬值。


Financial analysts almost universally ridiculed these policies and castigated Chinese leaders for abandoning their earlier pretenses of market-oriented reforms.	金融分析师几乎一边倒地揶揄这些政策，抨击中国领导人放弃了早前装模作样的市场改革。


The government’s apparent desperation was seen as evidence that China was in far greater trouble than previously revealed.	政府显而易见的焦急之情被视为中国的麻烦远比此前揭示的更严重的证据。


This belief quickly shaped reality, as market analysts blurred the distinction between a growth slowdown and economic collapse.	这一信念很快影响了现实，因为市场分析师混淆了增长放缓与经济崩溃之间的区别。


In mid-September, for example, when the private-sector Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) came out at 47.0, the result was generally reported along these lines: “The index has now indicated contraction in the [manufacturing] sector for seven consecutive months.”	比如，9月中旬，采购经理人指数（PMI）来到了47. 0，当时一般的报道是这样的：“目前，采购经理人指数表明[制造]部门连续七个月萎缩。


In fact, Chinese manufacturing was growing by 5-7% throughout that period.	事实上，在此期间中国制造业以5—7%增长。


The supposed evidence was wrong because 50 is the PMI’s dividing line not between growth and recession, but between accelerating and slowing growth.	这一想当然的证据是错误���，因为50是PMI的分界线，但它不是增长和衰退的分界线，而是增长加速和减速的分界线。


Indeed, for 19 out of the PMI’s 36 months of existence, the value has been below 50, while Chinese manufacturing growth has averaged 7.5%.	事实上，在有PIM数据的36个月中，19个月的数值低于50，而这段时间中国制造业增长率平均为7. 5%。


Exaggerations of this kind have undermined confidence in Chinese policy at a particularly dangerous time.	类似的夸张在最危险的时候破坏了对中国政策的信心。


China is now navigating a complex economic transition that involves three sometimes-conflicting objectives: creating a market-based consumer economy; reforming the financial system; and ensuring an orderly slowdown that avoids the economic collapse often accompanying industrial restructuring and financial liberalization.	如今，中国处于复杂的经济转型中，这一转型包括三个有时互相冲突的目标：建立基于市场的消费经济、改革金融体系，以及确保有序减速，避免常常与产业结构重组和金融自由化相伴而生的经济崩溃。


Managing this trifecta successfully will require skillful juggling of priorities – and that will become much more difficult if Chinese policymakers lose international investors’ trust or, more important, that of China’s own citizens and businesses.	成功管好这三重目标需要纯熟地制定重点——而如果中国决策者失去国际投资者的信任，或者，更重要地，失去中国自身公民和企业的信任，难度将大大增加。


Vicious circles of economic instability, devaluation, and capital flight have brought down seemingly unbreakable regimes throughout history.	在历史上，经济动荡、贬值和资本外逃的恶性循环频频令看似不可动摇的政权轰然倒塌。


This probably explains the whiff of panic that followed China’s tiny, but totally unexpected, devaluation of the renminbi.	这也许可以解释为何人民币小幅（但完全出人意料的）贬值会带来恐慌。


The renminbi, however, has recently stabilized, and capital flight has dwindled, as evidenced by the better-than-expected reserve figures released by the People’s Bank of China on October 7.	但是，人民币最近已经稳定下来，资本外逃也得到了遏制，好于预期的10月7日中国人民银行储备数字证明了这一点。


This suggests that the government’s policy of shifting gradually to a market-based exchange rate may have been better executed than generally believed; even the measures to support the stock market now look less futile than they did in July.	这表明中国政府逐渐朝市场汇率转变的政策也许比一般认为的执行得更好； 即使是支持股市的措施，现在看起来也并不像7月时那样无用。


In short, Chinese economic management seems less incompetent than it did a few months ago.	简言之，中国经济管理似乎不再像几个月前那样无能。


Indeed, China can probably avoid the financial meltdown widely feared in the summer.	事实上，中国也许可以避免夏天人们广泛担忧的金融崩溃。


If so, other emerging economies tied to perceptions about China’s economic health should also stabilize.	果真如此的话，仰仗对中国经济健康程度看法的其他新兴经济体也应该稳定下来。


The world has learned since 2008 how dangerously financial expectations can interact with policy blunders, turning modest economic problems into major catastrophes, first in the US and then in the eurozone.	2008年以来，世界已经领教了金融预期与政策错误的互动是多么危险，这可能将不大的经济问题转变为巨大的灾难，美国和欧元区先后“中招”。


It would be ironic if China’s Communist leaders turned out to have a better understanding of capitalism’s reflexive interactions among finance, the real economy, and government than Western devotees of free markets.	如果中国的共产党领导人对金融、实体经济和政府之间的资本主义反身性互动的理解比西方自由市场信徒还要优秀，这将颇为讽刺。


Why China is Right on the Renminbi	人民币渐进升值完全正确


BERKELEY – After a period of high tension between the United States and China, culminating earlier this month in rumblings of an all-out trade war, it is now evident that a change in Chinese exchange-rate policy is coming.	伯克利——前一阵子，美中关系非常紧张，到4月初最严重的时候，差点爆发一场全面贸易战。 目前，形势已有所缓和，中国即将调整汇率政策这一点，也已经明朗了。


China is finally prepared to let the renminbi resume its slow but steady upward march.	最终，中国准备让人民币重拾缓慢、稳步升值的脚步。


We can now expect the renminbi to begin appreciating again, very gradually, against the dollar, as it did between 2005 and 2007.	我们现在可以预计，人民币将再度开始对美元渐进升值，就像2005到2007年时那样。


Some observers, including those most fearful of a trade war, will be relieved.	一部分观察家，尤其是那些最担心贸易战的人，应该可以放心了。


Others, who see a substantially undervalued renminbi as a significant factor in US unemployment, will be disappointed by gradual adjustment.	但其他一些人，认为人民币低估是造成美国失业的一个重要因素，渐进升值会令他们失望。


They would have preferred a sharp revaluation of perhaps 20% in order to make a noticeable dent in the US unemployment rate.	他们更希望见到人民币一下子升值20%，从而明显地遏制美国的失业上升势头。


Still others dismiss the change in Chinese exchange-rate policy as beside the point.	还有一些人则认为，中国调整汇率政策是避重就轻。


For them, the Chinese current-account surplus and its mirror image, the US current-account deficit, are the central problem.	在他们看来，中国经常账户盈余和相应的美国经常账户赤字才是问题的关键。


They argue that current-account balances reflect national savings and investment rates.	他们说经常账户平衡是国民储蓄—投资率的反映。


China is running external surpluses because its saving exceeds its investment.	中国账上之所以有对外盈余，是因为其国民总储蓄超出其国民总投资。


The US is running external deficits because of a national savings shortfall, which once reflected spendthrift households but now is the fault of a feckless government.	美国账上之所以是对外赤字，是因为其国民总储蓄不足——以前这得怪居民的过度开支，现在则是政府大手大脚的错。


There is no reason, they conclude, why a change in the renminbi-dollar exchange rate should have a first-order impact on savings or investment in China, much less in the US.	他们从而得出结论说，人民币对美元汇率上的调整没有理由对中国的储蓄与投资产生重大影响，更别提对美国的储蓄与投资有什么影响了。


There is no reason, therefore, why it should have a first-order impact on the bilateral current-account balance, or, for that matter, on unemployment, which depends on the same saving and investment behavior.	因此，看不出这个调整能对双方经常账户的平衡起到什么显著作用，换言之，对美国的失业也不会有什么作用，因为后者也是储蓄和投资行为的一种反映。


In fact, both sets of critics have it wrong.	事实上，上述两种批评都错了。


China was right to wait in adjusting its exchange rate, and it is now right to move gradually rather than discontinuously.	不论是之前暂缓调整汇率，还是现在选择渐进调整而非激进调整，中国都是对的。 中国经济的增长率接近潜在增长率：多方预测2010年中国经济将增长10%；


The Chinese economy is growing at potential: forecasts put the prospective rate for 2010 at 10%; the first-quarter flash numbers, at 11.9%, show it expanding as fast as any economy can safely grow.	第一季度的初步统计是11. 9%，表明中国经济的扩张速度已达到安全增长水平的上限，再快就不安全了。


China successfully navigated the crisis, avoiding a significant slowdown, by ramping up public spending.	中国成功地应对了全球金融危机，避免了大幅度的经济减速，靠的是扩大公共支出。


But, as a result, it now has no further scope for increasing public consumption or investment.	但因此，它现在已没有扩大公共开支或投资的余地了。


To be sure, building a social safety net, developing financial markets, and strengthening corporate governance to encourage state enterprises to pay out more of what they earn would encourage Chinese households to consume.	社会保障体系的完善、金融市场的发展、国有企业分红机制的建立等等，固然有助于鼓励中国居民增加消费。


But such reforms take years to complete.	但是这些改革都需要几年时间才能完成。


In the meantime, the rate of spending growth in China will not change dramatically.	在相当长一段时间内，中国的消费不可能有大幅度的增长。


As a result, Chinese policymakers have been waiting to see whether the recovery in the US is real.	所以，中国的决策者需要审时度势，观察美国的经济复苏是否能持续。


If it is, China’s exports will grow more rapidly.	如果是，中国的出口增长将会加快。


And if its exports grow more rapidly, they can allow the renminbi to rise.	如果它的出口增长加快，他们就可以让人民币升值了。


Without that exchange-rate adjustment, faster export growth would expose the Chinese economy to the risk of overheating.	如果出口增速上去了，还不调整汇率的话，将会使中国经济面临过热风险。


But, with the adjustment, Chinese consumers will spend more on imports and less on domestic goods.	调整则会促使中国消费者增加进口商品消费，减少国产商品消费。


Overheating having been avoided, the Chinese economy can keep motoring ahead at its customary 10% annual pace.	过热由此得以避免，中国经济仍能以10%的年增长率大步向前。


Evidence that the US recovery will be sustained is mounting.	有越来越多的证据表明，美国经济复苏的确是可持续的。


As always, there is no guarantee.	当然，这一点永远不能打包票。


But the latest data on sales of light vehicles, as well as the Institute of Supply Management’s manufacturing index and the Bureau of Labor Statistics employment report, all point in this direction.	但最新的轻型车辆销售数据、采购经理指数和劳动统计署发布的失业报告都指向这一方向。


Because the increase in US spending on Chinese exports will be gradual, it also is appropriate for the adjustment in the renminbi-dollar exchange rate to be gradual.  If China recklessly revalued its exchange rate by 20%, as certain foreigners recommend, the result could be a sharp fall in spending on its goods, which would undermine growth.	复苏中的美国会增加其在中国出口产品上的支出，但这将是一个渐进的过程，因此，人民币对美元汇率的调整也应当是渐进的。 如果中国像某些外国专家建议的那样，贸然让人民币一下子升值20%，美国对其出口产品的购买将会骤跌，从而打击中国的经济增长。


Moreover, gradual adjustment in the bilateral exchange rate is needed to prevent global imbalances from blowing out.	此外，如果要避免全球收支不平衡突然崩盘，双边汇率的调整只能是渐进的。


US growth will be driven by the recovery of investment, which fell precipitously during the crisis.	在经历了危机中的暴跌之后已经，美国的投资水平有所恢复，这将驱动美国经济增长。


But, as investment now rises relative to saving, there is a danger that the US current-account deficit, which fell from 6% of GDP in 2006 to barely 2.5% of GDP last year, will widen again.	但是目前也出现了投资增长快于储蓄增长的势头，美国经常账户赤字——从2006年占GDP的6%下降到去年的2. 5%——有再次扩大的危险。


Renminbi appreciation that switches Chinese spending toward foreign goods, including US exports, will work against this tendency.	人民币升值将促使中国人购买更多的外国商品，包括美国商品，这将在一定程度上抵消美国经常账户赤字扩大的势头。


By giving American firms more earnings, it will increase corporate savings in the US.	美国企业营收增加将带动企业储蓄增加。


And it will reconcile recovery in the US with the need to prevent global imbalances from again threatening financial stability.	这一方面有助于美国经济复苏，另一方面也有助于节制全球收支不平衡，防止它再度威胁金融稳定。


Chinese officials have been on the receiving end of a lot of gratuitous advice.	中国官员见多了廉价兜售的忠告。


They have been wise to disregard it.	他们明智地置之不理。


In managing their exchange rate, they have gotten it exactly right.	在管理汇率方面，他们的选择是完全正确的。


China’s Reform Anxiety	中国的改革忧虑症


BEIJING – Since 2010, global financial circles have been obsessing about China’s slowing economy.	发自北京——自2010年以来，全球金融圈都被中国经济的减速所困扰着。


But, while the country barely met the official target of 7.5% annual GDP growth in the second quarter of this year – generating significant anxiety worldwide – China’s government seemingly remains calm, showing no indication that it plans to launch yet another stimulus package.	而在该国今年第二季度勉强实现官方订立的7. 5%年度GDP增长指标之时——这令全球各界一片恐慌——中国政府却表现平静，并未出现计划实施另一轮经济刺激计划的迹象。


Do China’s leaders really have the situation under control?	但中国的领导人们是否真的如此胸有成竹？


In fact, the Chinese government’s stance – based on Premier Li Keqiang’s “Likonomics,” which prioritizes structural reform over rapid GDP growth – will prove to be in the best interests of China and the rest of the world.	事实上，中国政府的立场——构建于国家总理李克强的“李克强经济学理论”之上，即所谓把结构改革摆在比GDP高速长更重要的位置——将最终被证明是符合中国以及全世界利益的。


China’s structural problems – including restrictions on labor mobility, a rigid and risk-laden financial system, and excessive reliance on government investment – are threatening its stability and economic development.	中国的结构性问题，包括对劳动力流动的限制，僵化且背负大量风险的金融系统，以及对政府投资的过度依赖——无一不在威胁着自身的稳定及其经济发展。


Given that China’s GDP growth rate remains respectable relative to the rest of the world, the need to emphasize structural reform is clear.	考虑到中国的GDP增速相对于其他国家来说依然较高，推行结构性改革的需要也更为明确了。


But, despite well-intentioned statements and narrow gestures, China’s new leadership has yet to establish a concrete, bold reform plan capable of resolving the economy’s deep-rooted problems.	但与此同时，虽然发表了充满良好意愿的声明以及相对明确的姿态，中国的新领导层仍未订立一个切实明确，足以解决当前经济中存在的深层次问题的改革计划。


For example, last February, the State Council announced plans to reform the hukou (household registration) system, which assigns legal residency according to a person’s place of birth.	比如说，今年二月，国务院发布了旨在改革户口制度的相关计划。


The system makes relocating very difficult, as those who do not manage to acquire local residency permits face major hurdles in gaining access to public services when they migrate to other provinces.	由于该制度按照公民的出生地来划定其合法居住地，因此对人们的移居流动造成了极大障碍，那些移居其他省份却没能获取当地居留权的人在享受当地公共服务方面也面临重重阻碍。


Indeed, their children are even prohibited from taking college entrance exams.	事实上，这些人的子女甚至没有在当地参加高考的权力。


The reform plan was supposed to improve the situation by allowing migrants in towns and small cities to acquire local residency permits more freely, while easing the requirements in medium-sized cities.	这一改革计划正是为了改善上述状况，允许小型城镇的流动人口更容易获得当地居留资格，同时放宽中型城市的相关限制条件。


But efforts to reform the system have been met with strong resistance, especially from local governments and residents, who fear the strain that unregulated migration to their cities will have on resources, employment, and services.	但改革却遭遇了极大阻力，尤其是各地政府和居民的反对，因为担心不加限制的移民会对本地的资源，就业和公共服务带来压力。


As a result, a genuine hukou reform strategy remains elusive.	结果一场切实的户口改革依然迟迟无法来临。


Similarly, the government has been slow to formulate and implement effective financial-market reforms.	同样，政府在制定和实施有效金融市场改革方面也是极为迟缓。


Hopes were high early this year, when the State Council announced a strategy aimed at liberalizing the capital account, establishing a more flexible exchange-rate policy, and opening the financial sector to domestic private capital.	人们在今年年初之时本来对此充满期望，因为国务院推出了一项战略，目标是放松资本庄户管制，建立一个更加灵活的汇率政策，并允许国内私人资本进入金融部门。


But the government then heeded influential economists’ warnings of the risks of relaxing capital controls too hastily.	但政府随后又听到一些著名经济学家的言论，认为仓促放松资本管制会产生风险。


In fact, the opposite should be happening.	然而事实上，出现的情况将会恰恰相反。


Narrow policies like the government’s recent credit tightening will make it difficult to direct financial resources to the real economy – one of the primary objectives of “Likonomics.”	类似政府最近收紧信贷这样的狭隘政策将使其难以将金融资源导入实体经济——而这正是李克强经济学的一个重要目标。


Genuine progress depends on Chinese leaders’ willingness to address the structural flaws – namely, the restrictions on domestic private capital – that are impeding the financial system’s ability to channel savings to the most promising economic sectors.	真正的推进取决于中国领导人解决结构性缺陷的意愿——换句话说，就是对本国私人资本的管制——也正是这一缺陷限制了金融系统将存款导向那些最具发展潜力经济部门的能力。


Despite several rounds of deregulation, it remains very difficult to establish private banks in China, and rules on non-banking financial institutions are often unclear.	尽管进行了多轮放松管制，民间资本想在银行依然极为困难，而对非银行金融机构的管理条例又往往语焉不详。


As a result, shadow banking, which provides capital at triple the cost implied by the official base interest rate, is flourishing – and generating significant uncertainty and risk.	结果那些以3倍于官方基准理率的贷款利息来放贷的影子银行大量出现——并因此产生了极大的不确定性和风险。


Although the government recently attempted to attract capital back to the official banking sector by eliminating the lending rate’s lower bound, more substantial reform is needed – and that will likely have to wait until the interest rate on deposits is fully liberalized and the financial sector is open to private banks.	虽然政府最近试图通过取消贷款利率下限的方式来吸引资本回归国有银行部门，但外界依然迫切需要更加切实的改革——这很可能要等到存款利率完全放开以及金融部门向私人资本银行开放之后了。


In many other areas, too, China’s government either remains indecisive or is offering only rhetoric and small gestures.	在许多其他领域也是如此，中国政府要么犹豫不决，要么只有一些空话或者微小的动作。


For example, the devolution of some project-approval powers to local governments will not solve the underlying problem of excessive state intervention in the economy; on the contrary, it may even enhance the state’s role by giving local governments more freedom to carry out investment projects.	例如将一些项目审批权移交给当地政府其实无法解决国家过度插手经济的根本问题； 相反，通过给予地方政府更多推行投资项目的自由，国家所扮演的角色甚至更强大了。


China’s leaders know what is wrong with the country’s economy.	中国领导人知道本国的经济出了什么问题。


But, as their efforts over the last several months have highlighted, they are uncertain as to how to go about fixing it – a fact that is generating significant anxiety in financial markets and among the general public.	但正如他们在过去几个月的举动所体现的那样，他们并不知道如何下手去解决这些问题——这在金融市场和人民群众之中造成了极大的担忧。


As senior Chinese officials gather for their annual summer meeting in Beidaihe, a coastal resort near Beijing, they must recognize the need for a bold plan for genuine structural reform.	希望那些高级领导人聚集在北戴河开年度会议时能认识到推行一个实现真正结构性改革的勇敢计划的重要性。


Otherwise, anxiety will eventually give rise to mistrust, making a comprehensive reform strategy even more difficult to implement.	否则的话，担忧将最终升级为不信任，使得一场全面改革更加难以实施。


Is State Capitalism Winning?	国家资本主义赢了吗？


CAMBRIDGE – In the age-old contest of economic-growth models, state capitalism has seemed to be gaining the upper hand in recent years.	美国剑桥—在由来已久的经济增长模式之辨中，国家资本主义似乎在近几年中占了上风。


Avatars of liberal capitalism like the United States and the United Kingdom continued to perform anemically in 2012, while many Asian countries, relying on various versions of dirigisme, have not only grown rapidly and steadily over the last several decades, but have also weathered recent economic storms with surprising grace.	美国和英国等自由资本主义的化身在2012年继续表现萎靡，而许多亚洲国家依靠各式各样的政府干预，不但在过去几十年中实现了快速稳步增长，而且成功抵御了最近的竞技风暴，令人刮目相看。


So, is it time to update the economics textbooks?	那么，经济学教科书应该因此而改写吗？


In fact, economics does not say that unfettered markets are better than state intervention or even state capitalism.	事实上，经济学从未宣布自由放任市场比国家干预甚至国家资本主义更好。


The problems with state capitalism are primarily political, not economic.	国家资本主义的问题主要是政治上的，不是经济上的。


Any real-world economy is riddled with market failures, so a benevolent and omnipotent government could sensibly intervene quite often.	任何现实世界的经济体都会经历市场失灵，因此仁慈的、权力无限的政府很可能会经常出售干预。


But who has ever met a benevolent or omnipotent government?	但你见过权力无限又仁慈的政府吗？


To understand the logic of state capitalism, it is useful to recall some early examples – not the socialist command economies or modern societies seeking to combat market failures, but ancient civilizations.	为了理解国家资本主义的逻辑，回忆一些早期例子是有裨益的——不是社会主义指令经济，也不是试图战胜市场失灵的现代社会，而是古老文明。


Indeed, it seems that, like farming or democracy, state capitalism has been independently invented many times in world history.	事实上，与农业或民主一样，国家资本主义在世界史的各个阶段独立地出现过。


Consider the Greek Bronze Age, during which many powerful states, organized around a city housing the political elite, formed throughout the Mediterranean basin.	比如希腊青铜时代（Greek Bronze Age）。 在此期间，在地中海周围形成了聚集在政治精英周围的城邦国家。


These states had no money and essentially no markets.	这些国家没有货币，事实上也没有市场。


The state taxed agricultural output and controlled nearly all goods production.	国家课以农业产品税，并控制着几乎所有商品的生产。


It monopolized trade, and, in the absence of money, moved all of the goods around by fiat.	国家垄断贸易，并且在没有货币存在的情况下，所有商品的流通都必须得到法令的许可。


It supplied food and inputs to weavers and then took their output.	国家向工人提供食品和原料，收取他们的产出。


In essence, the Greek Bronze Age societies had something that looked remarkably like state capitalism.	本质而言，希腊青铜时代社会的某些元素和国家资本主义极为相似。


So did the Incas as they built their huge Andean empire in the century before the Spanish arrived.	印加人也是如此。 西班牙人到来之前，他们建立了巨大的安第斯帝国。


They, too, had no money (or writing); but the state conducted decennial censuses, built roughly 25,000 miles (40,000 kilometers) of roads, operated a system of runners to send messages and collect information, and recorded it all using knotted strings called quipus, most of which cannot be read today.	他们也没有货币（和文字），但国家会组织十年一次的人口调查，建造了约25000英里（40000公里）的道路，建立了传驿制度用于送信和收集情报，所有信息都用结绳记事的办法传递，大部分今天已无法解读。


All of this was part of their control of land and labor, based on centrally planned allocation of resources and coercion.	所有这些都是他们对土地和劳动的控制的一部分，其基础是中央计划的资源配置和高压。


How is it that societies as disparate as the Greek Bronze Age cities of Knossos, Mycenae, or Pylos, the Inca Empire, Soviet Russia, South Korea, and now China all ended up with state capitalism?	希腊青铜时代城邦（如克诺索斯、迈锡尼和皮洛斯）、印加帝国、苏联、韩国以及现在的中国，这��截然不同的社会是如何最终变为国家资本主义的呢？


The answer lies in recognizing that state capitalism is not about efficient allocation of economic resources, but about maximizing political control over society and the economy.	要知道答案，你必须理解国家资本主义并不是关于有效配置经济资源的问题，而是关于实现对社会和经济的政治控制最大化的问题。


If state managers can grab all productive resources and control access to them, this maximizes control – even if it sacrifices economic efficiency.	如果国家管理者可以攫取所有生产性资源，控制获得这些资源的途径，他们就实现了控制的最大化——即使这会牺牲经济效率。


To be sure, in many parts of the world, state capitalism has helped to consolidate states and centralize authority – preconditions for the development of modern societies and economies.	平心而论，在世界的许多地方，国家资本主义有助于巩固国家和集中权力，而这是现代社会和经济发展的先决条件。


But political control of the economy generally becomes problematic, because those running the state do not have social welfare or optimal resource allocation in mind.	但对经济的政治控制一般总会形成问题，因为治国者头脑中并没有社会福利和最优资源配置的概念。


The state capitalism of the Greek Bronze Age or the Inca Empire was not motivated by economic inefficiency; nor did it necessarily create a more efficient economy.	希腊青铜时代和银家德国的国家资本主义的动机并非经济上的无效； 让经济更具效率也不是它们的目标。


What it did was help to consolidate political power.	它们所做的是巩固政治权力。


At a deeper level, the real dichotomy is not between state capitalism and unfettered markets; it is between extractive and inclusive economic institutions.	从更深层面讲，真正的二分不在于国家资本主义和自由放任的市场； 而在于掠夺性和包容性的经济制度。


Extractive institutions create a non-level playing field, rents, and narrowly concentrated benefits for those with political power and connections.	掠夺性制度创造了不公平的条件、租以及狭隘集中的利益，得利者是掌握政治权力者及其关系网。


Inclusive institutions create a level playing field and give incentives and opportunities to the great mass of people.	包容性制度创造了公平的条件，为普罗大众提供激励和机会。


But herein lies the problem for state capitalism: inclusive institutions require a private sector powerful enough to counterbalance and check the state.	但国家资本主义的问题就在这里：包容性制度要求私人部门强大到足以制衡国家指令。


Thus, state ownership tends naturally to remove one of the key pillars of an inclusive society.	因此，国家所有权自然而然地倾向于毁掉包容性社会的这一支柱。


It should be no surprise that state capitalism is almost always associated with authoritarian regimes and extractive political institutions.	毫不奇怪，国家资本主义几乎总是和独裁政权和掠夺性政治制度一起出现。


This is not an endorsement of unfettered markets.	这可不是对自由放任市场的认同。


The state plays a central role in modern society, and rightly so.	国家在现代社会中扮演着核心角色，理应如此。


Modern economic growth, even under inclusive institutions, often creates deep inequalities and tilted playing fields, endangering those institutions’ very survival.	即使在包容性制度下，现代经济增长也常常会造成严重的不平等和特权，危害这些制度的生存。


The modern regulatory and redistributive state can, within certain bounds, help to redress these problems.	现代管理型和再分配型国家可以在一定的约束内纠正这些问题。


But the success of such a project crucially depends on society having control over the state – not the other way around.	但能否成功关键取决于社会控制国家，而不是相反。


To argue that state capitalism’s success proves its superiority is to put the cart before the horse.	说国家资本主义的成功证明了其优越性无异于本末倒置。


Yes, South Korea grew rapidly under state capitalism, and China is doing likewise today.	是的，韩国在国家资本主义下取得了快速增长，眼下，中国也在重复这一成功。


But state capitalism emerged not because there was no other way to ensure economic growth in these countries, but because it enabled growth without destabilizing the existing power structure.	但国家资本主义的兴起并不是因为没有其他办法可以确保这些国家的经济增长，而是因为它能在不动摇现有权力结构的情况下让增长得以实现。


The genius of China’s state capitalism is that it ensured the continued dominance of Communist Party elites while improving the allocation of resources, not that it alone could have provided price incentives to farmers and then managed liberalization of urban markets.	中国国家资本主义的高明之处在于它确保了中国共产党精英的主导地位，同时又能改善资源配置，而是在于凭此就能为农民提供价格激励，并在此后管理好城市市场的自由化。


State capitalism will persist so long as existing elites are able to maintain it and benefit from it – even if economic growth ultimately stalls.	只要精英能够维持国家资本主义并从中获益，国家资本主义就会存在下去——即使经济增长最终陷入停滞。


And there is a good reason why it eventually will.	有充分的理由表明，最终将会如此。


Sustained economic growth presupposes inclusive institutions, because innovation – and the creative destruction and instability that it wreaks – depends on them.	持续经济增长以包容性制度为先决条件，因为创新——以及创造性破坏及其所蕴含的不稳定性——取决于包容性制度。


Extractive institutions in general, and state capitalism in particular, can support economic growth for a while, but only the sort of catch-up growth that South Korea experienced from the 1960’s to the 1980’s, before starting to transform its society and economy more radically.	掠夺性制度（一般而言）和国家资本主义（尤其如此）能够维持经济增长一阵子，但像韩国在20世纪60—80年代的赶超增长经历已是极限，此后，社会和经济就必须开始更加彻底的转型。


As the low hanging fruit from catch-up growth is consumed, China, too, will be forced to choose between the economic and social freedom, innovation, and instability that only inclusive institutions can underpin and continued economic, political, and social control in the service of the elites who control the state.	中国正在享用唾手可得的赶超增长果实，最终，它也将被迫做出选择：要么是经济和社会自由、创新、和动荡——唯有包容性制度可以承受； 要么是控制国家的精英为饱一己之私继续控制经济、政治和社会。


Quitting the Quota	放弃配额制度难在哪里？


HONG KONG – On March 1, China’s State Council announced a new batch of restrictions aimed at reining in property prices by curbing speculative demand. The measures include tighter limits on home purchases by non-locals in cities with excessive price gains, a reinforced 20% capital-gains tax, mandatory 70% down payments, and a 30% benchmark interest-rate premium for second mortgages.	发自香港——3月1日，中国国务院宣布了新一轮旨在通过遏制投机性需求控制房价的限制措施，其中包括在房价上涨过快的城市严格控制外地户籍人口购房，强制征收20%卖房资产所得税，并将第二套房首付比例设为70%，以及二套房贷相对基准利率上浮30%。


While the previous round of housing-sector restrictions, implemented less than two years ago, dampened market sentiment temporarily, it failed to curb rising property prices.	回顾一年多前，政府实施的上一轮购房限制措施只是短暂地打击了市场热情，却未能遏制房产价格继续上涨。


Likewise, although the latest measures might have some impact, cooling China’s turbulent property market – which relies on cheap credit – in the long term will require addressing underlying monetary-policy weaknesses.	同样，尽管最新的措施可能会发挥一定作用，比如让低利息导致狂热的中国房地产市场降降温，但从长期来看还是需要解决根本的货币政策缺陷。


In order to control the money supply, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has long used credit quotas as “window guidance” to banks.	为了控制货币供给，中国人民银行长期使用信贷配额作为对银行的“窗口指导”。


The policy is rooted in central planning, which, three decades ago, led to artificially low prices and, in turn, to shortages of basic necessities and key production inputs, such as grain and steel.	这项政策源自于中央计划经济。 三十年前的计划经济导致了人为的低物价，并进而导致了基本必需品和关键生产要素，比如粮食和钢材的短缺。


As the free market developed, a dual-price system emerged, in which those with access to quota-allocated goods paid less.	其后随着市场机制在中国的引入及发展，催生了价格双轨制，使得那些有能力获得产品配额的人只需支付较低的价格。


As a result, the government was compelled to grant subsidies to the system’s “losers” – such as urban residents and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) – until strong supply responses to rising market prices eliminated the need for quotas on manufactured products.	政府实际上在补贴双轨制下的“失败者”，比如城市居民和国有企业。 但很快，市场价格的上涨导致了强劲的供给反应，并消除了人们对产品配额的需求。


A decade later, in response to the global financial crisis, China loosened credit quotas and planning controls on SOE-run local-government infrastructure projects.	五年前，为应对全球金融危机，中国放宽了信贷配额和对地方政府基础设施项目（通常由国企执行）的规划控制。


Between November 2008 and June 2009, China’s banks issued more than ¥8.6 trillion ($1.3 trillion) in new loans.	于是在2008年11月至2009年6月间，中国的银行共发放超过8. 6万亿元人民币（合1.


As a result, the rate of credit growth increased from 14% in September 2008 to 35% a year later, and property prices more than doubled in many cities.	3万亿美元）的新增贷款。 信贷增长的速度因此从2008年9月的14%一举上升到一年后的35%，很多城市的房价也随之翻番。


Excessively low interest rates have generated a mismatch between housing prices and the available supply, because they serve as hidden subsidies for those who can borrow – for example, the rich and SOEs – and thus stimulate demand for luxury property.	过低的利率导致了房价与有效供给之间的错配，因为对那些可以从银行获得低息贷款的人（比如富人和国企）来说这其实是一种隐性补贴，从而刺激了高端地产的需求。


In order to curb this trend, policymakers have reverted to the quota as a macroeconomic tool, but this time for housing credit.	为了遏制这种趋势，政策制定者恢���了配额这一宏观经济工具，但这一次是针对住房信贷。


Like quotas on manufactured products, these new quotas are generating a dual-price allocation system, in which SOEs can borrow at significantly lower interest rates than small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs), which must rely on the informal market at interest rates as high as 2% monthly.	正如对制造业产品的配额限制一样，这些新的配额正在催生一个双轨价格分配体系，在该体系下国企可以用远低于中小企业的利率取得贷款，而后者则必须以高达2%的月息从非正式市场融资。


But eliminating quotas in order to allow prices to reach market-clearing levels is not an option this time, owing to the complexity and competitiveness of the real-estate and bank-credit markets.	但由于房地产和银行信贷市场的复杂性和非竞争性，为使价格达到市场均衡水平而取消配额在目前也并非一个好的选择。


Three major factors are impeding policymakers from raising interest rates to market-clearing levels.	有三大主要因素阻碍了政策制定者将利率提高到市场均衡水平。


First, the domestic interest groups that benefit from low borrowing costs have become a barrier to their liberalization.	首先，受益于低息借贷的国内利益集团已成为利率改革与提高利率的障碍。


There is a “common-sense consensus” among borrowers – in China, as well as in highly indebted advanced economies – that raising interest rates would undermine GDP growth, employment, and asset prices.	中国以及高负债发达国家中的贷款者持有一种“常识性共识”——利率的上升不利于GDP增长、就业和资产价格。


Second, many argue that raising interest rates would trigger a flood of speculative capital from low-yielding advanced economies.	其二，许多人认为提高利率会吸引大量来自低收益发达经济体的投机性资本。


With the PBOC unable to sterilize the inflows, upward pressure on the renminbi’s exchange rate would threaten competitiveness.	如果中国人民银行未能恰当对冲这些资本流入，那么人民币汇率的上升压力将会威胁中国企业的竞争力。


Finally, an inadequate understanding of structural inflation (the growth in prices for non-tradable assets) has generated the false belief that China can maintain similar levels of inflation and exchange-rate stability as the OECD economies.	最后，对结构性通胀（无法直接参与国际贸易的资产的价格增长，如房价及农民工的工资）的认识不足导致了一个错误的观点——中国能够保持与经合组织经济体相似的通胀水平及汇率的稳定度。


As a result, over the last decade, the Chinese authorities’ implicit target for annual inflation and currency appreciation has been only about 3%.	这就导致在过去的十年中，当局为年度通胀率和货币升值幅度设立的隐性指标仅为3%左右。


But China has attained much higher GDP growth than the OECD economies, driven largely by the rapid productivity gains that characterize the initial “catch up” phase of emerging-market development.	然而，中国的GDP增长远高于经合组织成员国。 这很大程度上是由快速的生产率增长所驱动，也正是新兴市场初始“追赶”阶段的特征。


As China continues to implement market-oriented reforms, the prices of non-tradable assets – such as property, natural resources, utilities, services, and wages – will continue to rise much faster than in the OECD countries, until they eventually converge.	由于中国继续实施市场化改革，无法直接参与国际贸易的资产——如房地产、自然资源、公共基础设施、本地服务、和非技术工人——其价格的上升速度将继续高于经合组织成员国，直到双方价格最终接近。


This process will inevitably lead to higher structural inflation and currency appreciation in China.	这个过程将不可避免地导致中国出现更高的结构性通胀或货币升值。


If nominal interest rates are lower than the real return on investment – associated with GDP growth – the result is financial repression and increased income and wealth inequality.	如果名义利率比投资的实际回报（这一回报与GDP增长相关）要低，结果就是金融抑制，以及收入与财富不平等加剧。


To avoid this outcome, as long as China’s GDP growth exceeds that of OECD economies, its nominal interest rates must also be higher, its exchange rate must be more flexible, and it must tolerate higher structural inflation.	为了避免这种结果，只要中国的GDP增长超过经合组织成员国，我们的名义利率也应该相应提高，汇率应该更具弹性，而且必须承受更高的结构性通胀或人民币升值。


Indeed, despite domestic resistance, the PBOC must raise nominal interest rates so that they are in line with structural inflation.	事实上，即便面临国内阻力，中国人民银行也需要提高名义利率才能适应中国存在结构性通胀的现实。


Such a move would deter excessive investment in productive capacity, and ease the implementation of a more flexible exchange-rate regime.	这一举措既能抑制在产能方面的过度投资，又可推动实施更有弹性的汇率机制。 但更高的利率会吸引热钱。


At the same time, one need only recall the damage that unregulated carry trades wrought on Asian economies in the 1990’s to understand why China must erect barriers to protect its domestic markets from inflows of hot money.	只需回顾上世纪九十年代使亚洲经济受灾的无监管利差交易，人们就能理解为什么中国必须设置适当的管控机制以防止热钱流入其国内市场。


The alternative to this price-oriented approach – continued dependence on the quota system – would incur considerable administrative expenses, efficiency losses, and social costs stemming from rent-seeking and corruption.	而这些替代市场导向价格机制的管控机措施往往需要持续依赖配额制度，并会产生相当大的行政费用、效率损失及源于寻租和腐败的社会成本。


Much like the quota system of 30 years ago, the current reliance on quotas is unsustainable in the long term.	正如三十年前的配额制度一样，当前对配额的依赖长期来看是不可持续的。


To manage exorbitant demand for financial and physical assets, China’s leaders must address its root cause: the low cost of capital.	要消除对金融及实物资产的过度需求，中国领导人必须解决其根本问题，即资本的价格太低。


Doing so will require maintaining some capital-account control, while raising interest rates to market-clearing levels.	这样做需要将利率提高到市场均衡水平，同时继续实施适当的资本账户管制。


This, not the unsustainable imposition of quotas, is the real monetary-policy challenge facing China today.	当今中国面对的真正货币政策挑战是如何提高利率至市场均衡水平，适当控制资本账户以便资本有序流动，从而创造条件来结束不可持续的配额制度。


Why Cutting Carbon Emissions is not Enough	为什么仅仅削减碳排放是不够的


Twenty years ago, governments adopted the Montreal Protocol, a treaty to protect the Earth’s ozone layer from emissions of destructive chemicals.	就在二十年前，为了保护地球的臭氧层不受有害气体排放的侵袭，全球各国政府共同签署了《蒙特利尔议定书》。


Few could have foreseen how far-reaching that decision would prove to be.	而当年只有少数人能预见到这个决定的意义是如此深远。


The Protocol explicitly aimed at phasing-out substances such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) – found in products such as refrigerators, foams, and hairsprays – in order to repair the thin gassy-shield that filters out the sun’s harmful, ultra-violet rays.	该议定书明确要求逐步减少诸如氟利昂（CFCs）这类物质的使用——这类物质通常存在于冰箱，塑料泡沫和头发定型水当中——以修补过滤阳光中有害紫外线的薄薄臭氧层。


By 2010, close to 100 ozone-depleting substances, including CFCs, will have been phased-out globally.	到2010年时，将有近100种类似氟利昂这类的破坏臭氧层物质在全球范围内遭到淘汰。


Without the decisions taken 20 years ago, atmospheric levels of ozone-depleting substances would have increased ten-fold by 2050.	试想如果没有20年前所做的决定，大气中的破坏臭氧层的物质含量将在2050年时达到1989年的十倍。


This could have led to up to 20 million additional cases of skin cancer and 130 million more cases of eye cataracts, not to speak of damage to human immune systems, wildlife, and agriculture.	这意味着额外增加2000万皮肤癌病例以及1. 3亿白内障患者，更别提对人类免疫系统，野生动物和农业所造成的危害了。


But this is only part of the story that we celebrate on the International Day for the Preservation of the Ozone Layer (September 16).	但这只是我们庆祝世界臭氧层保护日（9月16日）其中一部分原因。


Over the past two years, it has been established that the Montreal Protocol has also spared humanity a significant level of climate change, because the gases that it prohibits also contribute to global warming.	在过去两年来，据估计《蒙特利尔议定书》同样为人类免除了气候变化导致的大量灾害，因为议定书所禁止的气体同样也是全球变暖的始作俑者。


Indeed, a study in 2007 calculated the climate mitigation benefits of the ozone treaty as totalling the equivalent of 135 billion tons of CO2 since 1990, or a delay in global warming of 7-12 years.	事实上，根据2007年进行的一项研究估算，这项臭氧层保护条约所带来的气候红利等同于自1990年以来少排放了1350亿吨二氧化碳，直接将全球变暖效应的到来延缓了7-12年。


So the lessons learned from the Montreal Protocol may have wider significance.	因此我们从《蒙特利尔议定书》中得到的经验的将具有更广泛的意义。


Scientists now estimate that somewhere close to 50% of climate change is being caused by gases and pollutants other than CO2, including nitrogen compounds, low-level ozone formed by pollution, and black carbon.	目前科学家估计约有50%的气候变化是由二氧化碳以外的各种气体和污染物所导致的，其中包括一些氮化合物，由污染产生的低空臭氧以及炭黑。


Of course, a degree of scientific uncertainty about some of these pollutants’ precise contribution to warming remains. But they certainly play a significant role.	当然，这些物质到底对全球变暖影响多大依然有待科学证实，但毫无疑问的是，它们也是极为重要的元凶。


Meanwhile, many of these gases need to be curbed because of their wider environmental impact on public health, agriculture, and the planet’s multi-trillion dollar ecosystems, including forests.	而与此同时，许多这类物质都必须受到限制，因为它们对公众健康，农业以及地球上价值数万亿美元的生态系统（包括森林）都具有广泛的环境影响。


Consider black carbon, a component of the soot emissions from diesel engines and the inefficient burning of biomass cooking stoves that is linked to 1.6 million to 1.8 million premature deaths annually as a result of indoor exposure and 800,000 as a result of outdoor exposure.	比如说炭黑，这种来源于柴油机废气以及家庭煮食燃料不充分燃烧的物质每年都导致160~180万宗室内死亡案例和80万宗室外死亡案例。


Black carbon, which absorbs heat from the sun, also accounts for anywhere from 10% to more than 45% of the contribution to global warming, and is also linked to accelerated losses of glaciers in Asia, because the soot deposits darken, ice making it more vulnerable to melting.	而这种从阳光中吸收热量的物质同时也与10%~45%的全球变暖效应有关，并导致了亚洲地区的冰川加速融化，因为这些沉积物的逐渐堆积使冰变得更黑，也更容易融化。


One study estimates that 26% of black carbon emissions are from stoves for heating and cooking, with more than 40% of this amount from wood burning, roughly 20% from coal, 19% from crop residues, and 10% from dung.	有研究估计26%的炭黑是由家庭生火取暖和烹饪所产生的，其中超过40%来自于烧柴，约20%来自烧煤，19%来自秸秆，10%来自家畜粪便的燃烧。


Some companies have developed stoves that use passive air flows, better insulation, and 60% less wood to reduce black carbon emissions by around 70%.	对此一些企业已经研发出采用喷气助燃技术的炉子，炉膛内部也更加保温隔热，可减少木柴使用量达60%，最终直接减少70%炭黑的产生。


Mass introduction of such stoves could deliver multiple green-economy benefits.	而这类产品的大规模推广将使人们获得来自绿色经济的多方面好处。


While CO2 can remain in the atmosphere for centuries, other pollutants, including black carbon and ozone, remain for relatively periods – days, weeks, months, or years – so that reducing or ending emissions promises almost immediate climate benefits.	而虽然二氧化碳可以在大气中存在数百年，但包括炭黑和臭氧在内其他污染物却只能存在一段时间——数天，数周，数月或者是几年——因此减少或者终止这类物质的排放所获得的好处几乎是立竿见影的。


The international community’s over-arching concern must be to seal a serious and significant deal at the United Nations climate summit in Copenhagen in December to curtail C02 emissions and assist vulnerable countries to adapt.	国际社会压力巨大的关注之声迫切要求在12月于哥本哈根召开的联合国气候峰会上通过一个严肃且意义重大的二氧化碳减排条约，并协助某些成为众矢之的国家举手同意。


If the world also is to deploy all available means to combat climate change, emissions of all substances that contribute to it must be scientifically evaluated and urgently addressed.	而如果全世界要用尽一切手段去对抗气候变化的话，那么所有上述相关气体的排放也都必须得到科学评价，并予以立刻处理。


The Centrists Cannot Hold	中间道路不可行


WASHINGTON – In most advanced democracies, a large center-right party competes with a large center-left party.	华盛顿—在大部分发达民主国家，都是一个中右翼大党和一个中左翼大党在竞争。


Of course, the extent to which an electoral system favors large parties – by having high popular-vote thresholds to enter parliament, or through winner-take-all constituencies – affects the degree of political fragmentation.	当然，选举制度有利于大党的程度——通过议会普选高门槛，或通过选区赢者通吃制——影响着政治碎片化的程度。


But, by and large, the developed democracies are characterized by competition between large parties on the center left and center right.	但是，总的来说，发达民主国家的特征是中左翼大党和中右翼大党竞争。


What, then, are true centrists like Mario Monti, Italy’s respected technocratic prime minister, to do?	那么，像意大利广受尊进的技术官僚型总理蒙蒂这样的真正中间派能做些什么呢？


To be sure, regional and ethnic allegiances play a greater role in some places in Europe – for example, Scotland, Belgium, and Catalonia – but far more so in emerging countries, where political cleavages also reflect specific post-colonial circumstances and often the legacy of single-party rule.	诚然，宗教和血统忠诚度在欧洲某些地方（如苏格兰、比利时和加泰罗尼亚）具有极重要的作用，但这些因素在新兴国家更加重要，那里的政治分裂局面也反映了各自的后殖民时代环境，并且通常属于一党执政的遗留问题。


Nonetheless, even in “emerging market” democracies, such as Chile, Mexico, South Korea, and India, a left-right cleavage plays an important role – while those who claim the political center generally remain weak.	尽管如此，即使是智利、墨西哥、韩国和印度这样的“新兴市场”民主国家，左右对立也扮演着重要角色，而宣布走中间道路的政客往往结果不佳。


The British Liberal Democrats, for example, have tried for decades to become a strong centrist third party, without success.	比如，英国自由民主党几十年来都在寻求成为强大的中间派第三大当，但从未成功。


While the political vocabulary in the United States is different, the Democratic Party, since Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency, is indeed a center-left force, the Republican Party occupies the right, and no other significant party exists.	尽管美国的政治观念有所不同，但民主党自富兰克林·罗斯福以来便是事实上的中左派，而共和党代表右翼，此外再无第三个主要党派出现。


In France and Germany, there is more fragmentation.	法国和德国的情况更加复杂。


Politics is still dominated by a large center-left party and a large center-right party, but smaller groups – some claiming the center and others the right and left extremes – challenge them to various degrees.	政坛主导者仍是中左翼大党和中右翼大党各一，但小党派——走中间道路者有之，走极右和极左道路者亦有之——能够形成不同程度的挑战。


In some countries, the “Greens” have their own identity, close to the left; but, despite remarkable progress in Germany, they remain unable to reach the electoral size of the large center-right and center-left parties.	在一些国家，“绿党”有着自己的身份，与左派关系密切； 但是，尽管绿党在德国进步明显，他们仍无法撼动中右翼和中左翼大党在选举中的地位。


Variations of this basic structure exist in Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, and the Nordic countries.	西班牙、葡萄牙、希腊、土耳其和北欧国家都存在各自不同的这一基本结构。


The situation is particularly interesting in Italy, where Monti, having decided to contest the upcoming general election, has had to position himself on the right (which he signaled by attending a gathering of the leaders of Europe’s center-right parties).	意大利的情况特别有意思，决定参加即将到来的大选的蒙蒂不得不将自己定位为右翼（他参加了欧洲中右翼党派领袖的聚会，以此可知他的立场）。


He and former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi are now fighting for space on the right, with the center-left Democrats leading in the polls.	他和��总理贝卢斯科尼现在正在争夺右翼空间，而在民调中领先的是中左翼民主党。


There are at least four differences between center-right and center-left approaches to social and economic challenges.	就社会和经济挑战观点而言，中右翼和中左翼至少有四个不同点。 右翼对市场配置资源和提供合适激励的能力抱有更大信心；


The right has greater confidence in markets to allocate resources and provide appropriate incentives; favors private consumption over public goods; is minimally concerned with economic inequality; and tends to be more nationalistic and less optimistic about international cooperation.	他们不太担心经济不平等； 对于国际合作，他们更倾向于民主主义，更少乐观主义。


The left, by contrast, believes that markets, particularly financial markets, need considerable government regulation and supervision to function well; gives greater weight to public goods (for example, parks, a clean environment, and mass-transit systems); seeks to reduce economic inequality, believing that it undermines democracy and the sense of fairness that is important to well-being; and is more willing to pursue international cooperation as a means to secure peace and provide global public goods, such as climate protection.	他们寻求降低经济不平等程度，认为不平等性破坏民主和对福祉至关重要的公正感； 他们更愿意追求国际合作，将它视为确保和平、提供全球公共品（如气候保护）的方法。


When looking at actual economic policies as they have evolved over decades, we see that they always combine center-right and center-left elements.	在回顾几十年来的实际经济政策演化时，我们看到它们总是结合了中右翼和中左翼的元素。


Repeated financial crises have tempered even the right’s faith in unregulated markets, while the left has become more realistic and cautious about state planning and bureaucratic processes.	金融危机的反复发生让右翼对不受管制的市场的信念也有所动摇，而左翼对国家计划和官僚主义程序变得更加现实和谨慎。


Likewise, the choice between privately consumed and publicly consumed “goods” is often blurred, as politicians tend to reinforce citizens’ understandable tendency to demand public goods while rejecting the taxes needed to pay for them.	类似地，私人消费和公共消费“商品”之间的选择通常也是模糊的，政客总是强化公民要求公共品同时又拒绝为此纳税的倾向（这一倾向倒是不难理解）。


As income inequality has increased – dramatically in some countries, such as the US – it is moving to the forefront of the debate, reinforcing the traditional political divide.	随着收入不平等性的加剧——某些国家收入不平等性在急剧加剧，比如美国——该问题也逐渐成为争论的焦点，加深了传统政治分歧。


Nonetheless, the center right and the center left are arguing about the degree of redistribution, not about the need for some progressivity in taxes and transfers.	尽管如此，中右翼和中左翼争论的的再分配的程度，而不是税收和转移支付所需要的一定的累进性。


Both also agree on the need for international cooperation in an increasingly interdependent world, with differences mainly concerning how much effort to spend on it.	双方都同意，在一个日渐相互依赖的世界中，国际合作是十分必要的，而分歧之处主要在于应该为此付出多大努力。


So, given that differences in policies as they are implemented have become largely a matter of degree, why do centrist parties remain weak?	那么，既然左右两翼所实施的政策的分歧点大体上只在于程度，为何中间道路党派仍如此弱势？


Why have they failed to unite moderates on both sides of the ideological divide?	为什么他们不能团结意识形态对立的两面的温和派？


One reason is that only a minority of any population is active politically.	一个原因在于在任何社会，都只有少数人是政治活跃的。


Active party members hold more ideologically consistent views – and hold them more strongly – than most of those who are politically less engaged, giving activists disproportionate influence in the political process.	与政治上不太参与的成员相比，活跃的党派成员持有更彻底的意识形态，立场也更坚定，这使得活跃者对政治进程的影响是巨大的。


After all, more nuanced ideas and policy proposals are relatively difficult to propagate effectively enough to generate broad and enthusiastic popular support.	毕竟，相对而言，模棱两可的观点和政策主张更难以有效宣传，从而获得广泛热情的群众支持。


But there also really are fundamental differences in values and economic philosophies, as well as in economic interests, leading to a fairly consistent positioning of voters on the right or left.	但在价值观和经济学方面，也确实存在根本性分歧，经济利益亦然，这导致选民们长期支持右翼或左翼。


Disagreement may lead to compromises, but that does not change the underlying differences in starting positions.	分歧可能带来妥协，但这并不改变一开始的根本性分歧。


It is probably a good thing that structured competition between large center-right and center-left parties persists.	中右翼大党和中左翼大党的持续结构性竞争或许是件好事。


Such parties can help to integrate the extremes into the political mainstream, while facilitating alternation in power, which is essential to any democracy’s dynamism; a system in which a large centrist party remained permanently in power would be far less desirable.	这一党派之争有助于将极端分子纳入政治主流，同时也有助于权力变换，而后者是任何民主国家政治动态的基石； 中间道路大党长期掌权的体系要差得多。


Those, like Monti, who want to mount a challenge from the center, however personally impressive they may be, have steep obstacles to overcome, and for good reasons.	像蒙蒂这样的试图站在中间道路上发动挑战者，不管个人魅力多么强，要想脱颖而出都面临着艰难险阻，而这样的安排有着充分的道理。


Why Democracy Requires Trusted Experts	为什么民主政体需要值得信赖的专家


PARIS – Last month, I wrote a commentary asking why voters in the United Kingdom supported leaving the European Union, defying the overwhelming weight of expert opinion warning of the major economic costs of Brexit.	巴黎——上个月，我写过一篇评论质疑英国选民为什么不顾多数专家脱欧将付出惨重经济代价的警告而支持脱欧？


I observed that many voters in the UK and elsewhere are angry at economic experts.	据我观察，英国和其他国家的许多选民在经济专家面前感到异常愤怒。


They say that the experts failed to foresee the financial crisis of 2008, put efficiency first in their policy advice, and blindly assumed that the losers from their policy prescriptions could be compensated in some unspecified way.	他们说专家未能预见到2008年金融危机、一贯在政策建议中奉行效率第一的原则、并且盲目假设因其施政方略而受损的民众能够以某种不确定的方式得到补偿。


I argued that experts should be humbler and more attentive to distributional issues.	我认为专家应当放低身段，进一步关注分配问题。


The piece elicited far more comments from readers than any of my others.	那篇文章所得到的评论比我其他所有评论文章都多。 评论者的反应基本证实了我刚刚提到的愤怒。


Their reactions mostly confirm the anger I had noted.	他们认为经济学家和其他专家远离普通民众，不关心民众疾苦； 他们的目的不同于普通民众；


They regard economists and other experts as isolated from and indifferent to the concerns of ordinary people; driven by an agenda that does not coincide with that of citizens; often blatantly wrong, and therefore incompetent; biased in favor of, or simply captured by, big business and the financial industry; and naive – failing to see that politicians select analyses that suit their ends and disregard the rest.	他们偏袒大企业和金融业，或者成为利益集团的俘虏； 他们天真幼稚——没有看到政客会选择与其自身目标相符的分析并无视其他。


Experts, said some, are also guilty of fracturing society by segmenting the debate into myriad narrow, specialized discussions.	有人说，专家将辩论分解成无数狭隘、专业探讨的做法客观上要为社会的分裂负责。


Remarkably, I also received comments from professionals in the natural sciences who said that citizens’ growing distrust of experts was pervasive in their disciplines, too.	值得注意的是，我还收获了来自自然科学专业人士的评论，表示民众对专家信任度越来越低的现象在他们的学科领域也普遍存在着。


Scientific views in fields like energy, climate, genetics, and medicine face widespread popular rejection.	诸如能源、气候、遗传学和医学领域的科学观念正面对民众越来越普遍的抵制。


In the United States, for example, a Pew Research survey found that 67% of adults think that scientists lack a clear understanding about the health effects of genetically modified organisms.	比方说在美国，某皮尤研究调查发现67%的成年人认为科学家对转基因生物造成的健康影响缺乏清醒的认识。


Mistrust of GMOs is even higher in Europe.	欧洲对转基因生物的不信任度甚至超过美国。


Whereas overall support for science remains strong, many citizens believe that it is manipulated by special interests, and on some issues, the common view departs from the established evidence.	虽然科学的总体支持率依然强劲，但很多民众认为科学研究受特殊利益集团的操纵，并且在某些问题上，人们的普遍观点与已经掌握的证据不符。


This divide between experts and citizens is a cause for deep concern.	这种专家和民众之间的鸿沟非常值得关注。


Representative democracy is based not only on universal suffrage, but also on reason.	普选加理智构成代议制民主的基础。


Ideally, deliberations and votes result in rational decisions that use the current state of knowledge to deliver policies that advance citizens’ wellbeing.	理想情况下，审议和表决程序能够促进运用目前所掌握的知识制定出推进公民福祉的理性决策。