Yet, despite all the “supply side” reforms introduced by Thatcherite governments, unemployment has been much higher since 1980 than in the 1950’s and 1960’s – 7.4% on average in the United Kingdom, compared to 1.6% in the earlier decades.	尽管当时的撒切尔政府引入了“供给方面”的改革措施，1980年代的失业率达到达7. 4%，仍然高于1950和60年代的1.


What about inflation targeting?	控制通胀的目的是什么呢？


Here, too, the record since 1980 has been patchy, despite the huge deflationary pressure exerted by low-wage competition from Asia.	1980年通货膨胀率已经达到了顶点，尽管有来自亚洲的低工资的竞争而产生的通货紧缩的压力，1980年之前1950年到1973年以及随后的1980年到2007年的通货膨胀��都在3%多一点。


Inflation in 1950-1973 and 1980-2007 was about the same – just over 3% – while inflation targeting has failed to prevent a succession of asset bubbles that have brought recessions in their wake.	——看来，控制了通胀并没有防止随后资产泡沫的出现，最终导致经济进入萧条期。


Nor has Thatcherite policy succeeded in one of its chief aims – to reduce the share of government spending in national income.	撒切尔时期的政策也没有解决当时的主要问题——如何减少政府支出在国民收入中的比例。


The most one can say is that it halted the rise for a time.	最多只能说当时的政策阻止了政府支出的进一步增加的趋势。


Now public spending is on the increase again, and record peacetime deficits of 10% or more of GDP stretch ahead for years.	现在政府开支又有所增加,已经高达GDP的10%，财政赤字也创了和平时期的历史新高。


In de-regulating financial markets worldwide, the Thatcher-Reagan revolution brought about the corruption of money, without improving on the previous growth of wealth – except for the very wealthy.	在全球范围内的降低监管的风潮中，撒切尔—里根式的革命带来了铜臭味的同时，并没有带来财富的增加——当然除了那些富豪阶层之外。


The average world citizen would have been 20% richer had world GDP per capita grown at the same rate between 1980 and 2007 as it did between 1950 and 1973 – and this despite China’s high growth rates in the past 20 years.	如果1980年到2007年全球GDP的增长速度能保持1950年到1973年的增长水平，全球人均GDP将会比现在增加20%——这还不排除中国的因素,因为中国在过去20年一直保持着较高的增长率。


Furthermore, in unleashing the power of money, the Thatcherites, for all their moralizing, contributed to the moral decay of the West.	在撒切尔主义推崇的”金钱至上”的观念之下，西方社会整体的道德开始下滑。


Against these formidable minuses are three pluses.	除了上述三个的缺点之外，撒切尔主义也给我们带来了三点好处。


The first is privatization.	首先是私有化。


By returning most state-owned industries to private ownership, the Thatcher revolution killed off state socialism.	就是将绝大多数的国有企业私有化，撒切尔式的革命消除了国家社会主义。


The British privatization program’s greatest influence was in the former communist states, to which it gave the ideas and techniques needed to dismantle grossly inefficient command economies.	前共产主义国家也可以得到英国私有化运动的启示，他们可以在转型的过程中借鉴有关的思想和手段来转变过去效率低下的计划经济体制。


This gain must be preserved in the face of the current clamor to “nationalize” banks.	当然，同样的理念也可以运用在如今时髦的“国有化”银行的进程中。


Thatcherism’s second success was to weaken trade unions.	撒切尔主义的第二大功劳是削弱了工会的力量。


Set up to protect the weak against the strong, labor unions had become, by the 1970’s, enemies of economic progress, a massive force of social conservatism.	在1970年代，作为弱势群体代言人的工会势力成为了经济发展的阻力，是社会保守主义的主要支持者。


It was right to encourage a new economy to grow outside these congealed structures.	因此，以一种新的经济形式来取代僵化的社会结构未尝不是一种好的选择。


Finally, Thatcherism put paid to the policy of fixing prices and wages by central diktat or by tripartite “bargains” between governments, employers, and trade unions.	最后，撒切尔主义终结了固定价格和固定工资的强制体系，结束了政府，资方和工会组织之间三方博弈游戏。


These were the methods of fascism and communism, and they would, in the end, have destroyed not just economic, but political, liberty.	如果任由这种局面发展下去的话，就会出现法西斯主义和共产主义，最终会摧毁不仅仅是经济，还包括政治和自由。


Political pendulums often swing too far.	政治的摇摆性有时候也会过度。


In rebuilding the shattered post-Thatcherite economy, we should be careful not to revive the failed policies of the past. I still find fruitful Keynes’s distinction between the agenda and the non-agenda of politics.	在重新构建后撒切尔主义经济形态时，我们应该小心谨慎，不能重复过去被验证已经失败的政策。


As long as central government takes responsibility for maintaining a high and stable level of employment, Keynes thought, most of the rest of economic life can be left free of official interference.	只要中央政府能够保持一个充分而且稳定的就业环境，凯恩斯的思想，绝大多数的经济生活应该不受干扰，自由发展。


Building a proper division of responsibility between state and market from this insight is today’s main task.	如何在政府干预和自由市场之间建立一个合适的分界线是我们当前所面临的主要任务。


An Autumn Abyss?	在秋天坠入深渊？


BERLIN – In the coming months, several serious regional economic and political crises could combine into one mega-watershed, fueling an intense global upheaval.	发自柏林——在未来这几个月，几场严重的区域性经济和政治危机将汇集成一个巨大的分水岭，激起一场全球性的剧变。


In the course of the summer, the prospect of a perilous fall has become only more likely.	从今夏的情况看来，一个危机重重的秋天正日益逼近。


The drums of war are being banged ever more loudly in the Middle East.	在中东地区，战鼓擂得比以往任何时候都要响亮。


No one can predict the direction in which Egypt’s Sunni Islamist president and parliamentary majority will lead the country.	没有人能预测埃及的逊尼派伊斯兰总统和议会多数派将带领该国走向何方。


But one thing is clear: the Sunni Islamists are decisively altering the region’s politics.	但有一点是明确的：逊尼派伊斯兰主义者正在决定性地改变着该地区的政治面貌。


This regional re-alignment need not be necessarily anti-Western, but it surely will be if Israel and/or the United States attack Iran militarily.	这场区域性战略的重新调整并不一定是反西方的，然而一旦以色列或美国对伊朗发起军事进攻，那么后果就必将如此。


Meanwhile, civil war is raging in Syria, accompanied by a humanitarian catastrophe.	与此同时，内战和人道主义灾难正蹂躏着叙利亚。


To be sure, President Bashar al-Assad’s regime will not survive, but it is determined to fight until the end.	毫无疑问，总统巴沙尔·阿萨德（Bashar al-Assad）的政权必将垮台，却决心顽抗到底。


Syria’s balkanization among the country’s diverse ethnic and religious groups is a clearly predictable result.	不同种族和宗教群体将叙利亚巴尔干化也将是一个可以清晰预见的结果。


Indeed, a Bosnia-type scenario can no longer be excluded, while the prospect of the Syrian government’s loss of control over its chemical weapons poses an immediate threat of military intervention by Turkey, Israel, or the US.	事实上一个类似当年波斯尼亚问题的解决方案必须被考虑在内，而一旦叙利亚政府丧失对其化学武器的控制权，就将马上遭遇土耳其、以色列或者美国的军事干预威胁。


Moreover, the Syrian civil war has become a proxy in an openly declared battle for regional hegemony between Iran on one side and Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and the US on the other.	此外叙利亚内战也已成为各方公开争夺区域霸主地位的战略节点，一方是伊朗，另一方则是沙特阿拉伯、卡塔尔、土耳其和美国。


Staying on the sidelines of this Arab-Western coalition, Israel is playing its cards close to its chest.	而游走在这个阿拉伯-西方联盟边缘的以色列则在谨慎地观察着事态的发展。


Iran, for its part, has proclaimed Syria an indispensable ally, and is determined to prevent regime change there by all available means.	在伊朗方面，该国已表明叙利亚是不可或缺的盟友，并决心通过一切手段防止政权更迭。


Does that mean that Hezbollah’s militias in neighboring Lebanon will now become directly involved in Syria’s civil war?	这是否意味着邻国黎巴嫩的真主党民兵将直接卷入叙利亚内战？


Would such intervention revive Lebanon’s own long civil war of the 1970’s and 1980’s?	这种干预是否会让黎巴嫩上世纪70~80年代的长期内战死灰复燃？


Is there a threat of a new Arab-Israeli war hanging over the Middle East?	一场新的阿拉伯-以色列战争威胁是否会降临中东？


And, as Kurds inside and outside of Syria grow more assertive, Turkey, with its large and long-restive Kurdish population, is also growing restive.	同时随着叙利亚国内外的库尔德人越发刚愎自用，人口众多且一直心怀不满的土耳其库尔德人也使该国变得越来越动荡不安。


At the same time, the regional struggle currently playing out in Syria is becoming increasingly entangled with the other major source of war sounds: Iran’s nuclear program.	与此同时，在叙利亚上演的区域斗争正日渐与另一个主要战争源头——伊朗核计划——纠缠在一起。


Indeed, parallel to the Syrian drama, the rhetoric in the confrontation between Israel and Iran over the program has become dramatically harsher.	事实上与叙利亚这场大片类似，以色列和伊朗在该计划上的对峙言论也变得越来越刺耳。


Both sides have maneuvered themselves into a dead-end.	双方都把自己逼进了死胡同。


If Iran gives in and agrees to a sustainable diplomatic solution, the regime will lose face on a critical domestic issue, jeopardizing its legitimacy and survival.	如果伊朗屈服，并同意一个可持续的外交解决方案，那该政权将会在一个关键国内问题颜面丧尽，进而危及其合法性和生存。


From the regime’s point of view, the legacy of the 1979 Islamic revolution is at stake.	在该政权看来，1979年伊斯兰革命斗争得来的成果危在旦夕。


But the international sanctions are hurting, and Iran risks losing Syria.	但国际制裁又伤筋动骨，还面临着失去叙利亚的风险。


Everything points to the regime’s need for success – now more than ever – concerning its nuclear program.	一切都表明伊朗政权把对成功的渴求——如今比以往任何时候都更多——都放在了核计划上面。


Similarly, Israel’s government has backed itself into a domestic policy trap of its own.	以色列政府同样也让自己陷入了国内政策困局之中。


Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak cannot accept a nuclear-armed Iran.	总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡（Binyamin Netanyahu）及国防部长埃胡德·巴拉克（Ehud Barak）无法接受一个拥有核武器的伊朗。


They do not fear a nuclear attack against Israel, but rather a nuclear arms race in the region and a dramatic shift in power to Israel’s disadvantage.	他们不是害怕伊朗对以色列发起核攻击，而是害怕地区核军备竞赛和对以色列不利的戏剧性权力更迭。


From their point of view, Israel must either convince the US to attack Iran and its nuclear plants or take on the maximum risk of using its own military forces to do so.	从他们的角度看来，以色列必须要么说服美国袭击伊朗及其核设施，要么承担最大限度的风险去动用本国军队。


Both sides have substantially reduced their options, thereby limiting the possibility of a diplomatic compromise.	双方都极大减少了自身的选项，从而限制了外交妥协的可能性。


And that means that both sides have stopped thinking through the consequences of their actions.	这意味着双方都不再思考自己的行为所带来的后果。


Everywhere there is talk of a “military option,” which means air strikes.	到处都在谈论“军事选项”，也就是是空袭。


But, while advocates speak of a limited “surgical operation,” what they are really talking about is the start of two wars: an aerial war, led by the US and Israel, and an asymmetric war, led by Iran and its allies.	但当那些鼓吹者谈到有限的“外科手术”时，他们实际上谈论的就是两场战争的开始：一场是由美国和以色列主导的空中战争，另一场则是伊朗及其盟友主导的非对称战争。


And what if this “military option” fails?	如果这个“军事选项”失败了呢？


What if Iran becomes a nuclear power, the region’s democratic movements are swept away by a wave of anti-Western Islamic solidarity, and the Iranian regime emerges even stronger?	如果伊朗成为一个核国家，该地区的民主运动被一股反西方的伊斯兰联合力量一扫而空，该政权随之变得更加强大，那该怎么办？


Iran, too, evidently has not thought its position through to its logical conclusion.	伊朗显然也没有好好思考自身所处的位置来��出合乎逻辑的结论。


What does it stand to gain from nuclear status if it comes at the cost of regional isolation and harsh United Nations sanctions for the foreseeable future?	如果要在可预见的未来付出区域孤立和联合国严厉制裁的代价，那么核国家的地位又能带来什么？


And what if it triggers a regional nuclear arms race?	如果它触发了地区核军备竞赛呢？


A war in the Persian Gulf – still the world’s gas station – would affect oil exports for some time, and energy prices would skyrocket, dealing a severe blow to a global economy that is teetering on the brink of recession.	波斯湾仍然是全球加油站，在这里爆发的战争会在一段时间内影响石油出口，导致能源价格飙升，对徘徊在衰退边缘的全球经济造成严重的打击。


China, already in economic trouble, would be hit hardest, along with the whole of East Asia.	中国已经处于经济困境，并将和整个东亚一起遭受最严重的打击。


With the US also economically weakened and facing a presidential election, America’s leadership ability would be seriously constricted.	随着美国经济走弱以及总统选举临近，美国的领导能力将会严重收缩。


And could a weakened Europe cope with an oil shock at all?  A regional and global security shock caused by asymmetric warfare could add still further to the world economy’s troubles, causing exports to slump even more.	而衰弱的欧洲能应对石油危机吗？ 由非对称战争引起的区域和全球安全冲击会进一步加剧世界经济的困境，导致出口进一步暴跌。


Respice finem!	古罗马人常说：“想想后果吧！


(“Consider the end”), the Romans used to say.	”（Respice finem！ ）。


World leaders need to take this timeless wisdom to heart.	世界各国的领导人都需要把这永恒的智慧谨记于心。


And that applies doubly to Europeans.	对欧洲人来说更是如此。


It would be absurd if we had to suffer a real catastrophe again in order to understand what European integration has always been about.	如果我们不得不再次遭受一场真正的灾难才能明白欧洲一体化的意义，那将是荒谬的。


Antarctica’s Point of No Return	南极点的不归路


POTSDAM – Recent satellite observations have confirmed the accuracy of two independent computer simulations that show that the West Antarctic ice sheet has now entered a state of unstoppable collapse.	波茨坦——最新卫星观测证实了两台独立计算机的模拟结果，那就是南极西部冰盖已陷入势不可挡的崩溃状态。


The planet has entered a new era of irreversible consequences from climate change.	地球现已进入气候变化不可逆后果的崭新时代。


The only question now is whether we will do enough to prevent similar developments elsewhere.	现在唯一剩下的问题是我们能否阻止类似状况在其他地方出现。


What the latest findings demonstrate is that crucial parts of the world’s climate system, though massive in size, are so fragile that they can be irremediably disrupted by human activity.	最新研究结果表明世界气候系统的关键部分尽管规模巨大但却极为脆弱，可能受到人类活动难以弥补的破坏。


It is inevitable that the warmer the world gets, the greater the risk that other parts of the Antarctic will reach a similar tipping point; in fact, we now know that the Wilkes Basin in East Antarctica, as big or even bigger than the ice sheet in the West, could be similarly vulnerable.	全球气温越高，南极洲其他部分达到类似临界点的风险必然也就越大； 事实上，我们现在知道南极东部跟西部冰盖面积相仿、甚至更胜一筹的威尔克斯盆地很有可能也面临着同样的威胁。


There are not many human activities whose impact can reasonably be predicted decades, centuries, or even millennia in advance.	我们无法提前数十、数百甚至数千年合理预测某种人类活动的影响。


The fallout from nuclear waste is one; humans’ contribution to global warming through greenhouse-gas emissions from burning fossil fuels, and its impact on rising sea levels, is another.	核废料的影响仅是其中之一； 人类燃烧化石燃料释放温室气体造成海平面上升所导致的全球变暖则是另外一种可能的影响。


Indeed, the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report stated, in uncharacteristically strong terms, that the sea level is “virtually certain” to continue to rise in the coming centuries or millennia.	事实上，最新发布的政府间气候变化专门委员会（IPCC）报告以一反常态的强硬语气表示，海平面“几乎毫无疑问”将在今后几百甚至上千年继续升高。


Moreover, the greater our emissions, the higher the seas will rise.	此外，人类碳排放量越多，海平面升高的幅度也就越大。


But the recent revelations about Antarctica are different.	但这并不符合南极洲所出现的最新情况。


Rather than reacting to global warming with gradual and predictable patterns of change, the West Antarctic ice sheet has suddenly “tipped” into a new state.	南极西部冰盖突然“跨过临界点”进入到一种全新状态，而并没有在全球变暖影响下呈现出可以预测的渐进性改变。


A relatively small amount of melting beneath the Amundsen Sea’s ice shelf has pushed its grounding line to the top of a sub-glacial hill, from which it is now “rolling down.”	阿蒙森海冰架下的少量融冰已将其地平线推到了被冰川掩盖的丘陵上，现在正处在一种“下滑”的状态。


Simply put, one thermal kick was enough to initiate an internal dynamic that will now continue under its own momentum, regardless of any action that humans might take to prevent it.	简言之，只消外部温度的一次剧烈变化就足以启动冰川内部的应激机制，到那时即便人类想要阻止也已经难上加难。


It is not completely clear whether humans have caused this tipping – though nothing like it has ever occurred during the 11,500-year Holocene period before humans started interfering with the planet’s energy balance.	这种临界点是否是人类活动的结果目前尚不清楚——但在人类开始干预地球能量平衡前长达11,500年的全新世时期却从未出现过类似的改变。


But that is not the point.	但这还不是重点。


What is important is that we recognize the existence of gigantic parts of the earth’s climate system – such as West Antarctica’s three-quadrillion-ton ice sheet – that can be tipped when a fractional temperature rise occurs in key locations.	重要的是我们必须认识到地球气候系统存在巨型组成部分——比方说南极洲西部三千万亿吨的冰盖——只消关键部位微不足道的升温就可能打破平衡状态。


This risk is no longer merely theoretical.	这已经不仅仅是理论上的风险。


For the first time, findings based on observations and computer simulations all point to the same conclusion: the huge Amundsen Sea sector of West Antarctica has begun an irreversible ice discharge, and nothing can now halt the subsequent drainage of the entire basin.	观察和计算机模拟演算首次得出了一模一样的结论：南极洲西部巨大的阿蒙森海冰盖已经开始不可逆转的融化，此后的任何因素都无法阻止整个盆地逐渐融化成水。


It has passed the point of no return.	南极洲西部冰盖已经踏上了不归路。


That is why we must now focus on similar topographic conditions elsewhere.	因此我们现在必须关注其他地方相似的地形条件。


If an “ice plug” near the coast of Wilkes Basin melts or breaks off into icebergs, the basin’s huge quantities of water will drain into the ocean.	如果威尔克斯盆地沿岸附近的“冰塞”融化或者断成冰山，那么盆地巨大的储水量终将流入大海。


Although no one knows precisely what might destabilize the Wilkes Basin, we can be fairly certain that further global warming, caused by greenhouse-gas emissions, will increase the risk.	虽然没有人知道什么会破坏威尔克斯盆地的稳定，但我们可以肯定温室气体排放造成的进一步全球变暖会加大这样的风险。


The fact that sea levels will continue to rise is now clear.	海平面将会继续升高的事实已经很清楚了。


But we can still determine how high and how fast levels rise by controlling the degree of global warming that we cause.	但我们仍可以通过控制我们造成的全球变暖来决定海平面以何种幅度和速度升高。


Climate change is caused by mankind, so the good news is that mankind can stop it by cutting greenhouse-gas emissions.	气候变化是人类造成的，所以好消息是人类可以通过减少温室气体排放来遏制气候改变。


Although West Antarctica’s fate is sealed, we may still be able to prevent the collapse of East Antarctica’s marine ice sheet.	虽然南极洲西部冰盖注定已难逃厄运，但我们仍可以保护南极洲东部的海洋冰盖。


That means deciding – sooner rather than later – which path to follow.	这意味着我们必须趁早决定采取何种对策。


The current path risks further destabilization in Antarctica; choosing the alternative path of a new energy system for the planet is our last best hope.	目前的对策可能进一步威胁南极冰盖的稳定； 让地球走上新能源之路是我们最好、也是最后的希望。


And Free Flows the Nile	自由流淌的尼罗河


NEW DELHI – For 18 days, during the ebb and flow of protest, it did not seem possible that the end of the Egyptian Revolution would come so suddenly, in a terse announcement that lasted no more than a half-minute: “President Hosni Mubarak has relinquished office….”	新德里——18天来，随着抗议活动的起起落落，没人能够想到埃及革命的结尾会来得如此突然，不过是一则不到半分钟的简短公告。


With that, amidst roars of victory, an era was ended, reaffirming the old saying that “the graveyards of the world are full of those who considered themselves indispensable to their nations.”	“胡斯尼·穆巴拉克总统已辞去总统职务…” 话音甫落，随着震耳欲聋的胜利的欢呼，一个时代落下了帷幕，这正应验了一句老话“全世界的墓地里都埋葬着自以为对国家不可缺少的角色。 ”


In the days and weeks ahead, there could arise occasions when the news from Cairo is not uplifting, but let us never forget that Egypt has taken a giant step, which in reality is a giant step for all Arabs.	今后从开罗传来的消息也许并不鼓舞人心，但我们永远不要忘记埃及已经迈出重要的一步，这一步对全体阿拉伯人都具有重要的现实意义。


After all, Egypt is the heart, brain, and nerve center of the Arab world.	毕竟，埃及是阿拉伯世界的心脏、大脑和神经中枢。


True, it once spawned the radical Muslim Brotherhood, but it also gave birth to Islamic socialism and anti-colonialism, Arab unity, and now a democratic affirmation of the people’s will.	没错，埃及曾经催生了激进的穆斯林兄弟会，但它也同样是伊斯兰社会主义和反殖民主义、阿拉伯团结的发源地，而今又以民主的方式肯定了人民的意志。


Pernicious talk that Arabs do not want democracy has been exposed as the big lie it is.	阿拉伯人不需要民主的弥天大谎已经被彻底揭露。


Egypt, in the great Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore’s memorable words, is the land “where the head is (now) held high and the mind is (now) without fear…” The consequences will be vast.	在伟大的孟加拉诗人泰戈尔流芳百世的诗句中，埃及（如今）是“昂首挺胸、无所畏惧…”的土地。 此次革命影响之深远毋庸置疑。


Ancient Arab lands are bestirred.	古老的阿拉伯土地欢欣鼓舞。


Decades-old, apparently immovable autocracies are finding their hold on power unhinged; change is invading their static environs.	执政数十年，看似不可动摇的独裁政权发现统治已经不再稳固，变革正在不知不觉中悄然发生。


Yesterday’s treaties, particularly those with the United States and Israel, will no longer inspire the same type of confidence they have long had as instruments of state policy.	过去与美以等国签订的条约已经不再像以往那样是保证国家政策的工具。


Memory of these 18 days is so crowded that it is difficult to separate one event from another, one phase from the next: the dramatic, the moving, the bizarre, and the unreal from the bathetic.	过去18天的记忆如此密集，以致于难以区分不同的事件和阶段： 惊喜、感动、离奇、梦幻和平凡交织在一起。


But the thread that united all, the theme that remained unerringly constant, was the yearning for “change” – immediate, real, and tangible, not a promise or a tantalizing, unreachable mirage.	可是对“变革”的向往是联接这一切的线索和一以贯之的主题——这种变革不是虚无的承诺或诱人却又可望不可及的海市蜃楼，而是近在眼前的现实事件。


Will this yearning travel beyond the Nile, as it did from Tunis to Cairo?	这种向往能否超越尼罗河，就像它从突尼斯来到开罗？


This question haunts other Arab portals of power.	这一问题不断困扰着其他阿拉伯政权。


And not just Arab; globally, foreign policies are being hurriedly – and somewhat confusedly – revised and rewritten.	而且除阿拉伯以外，世界各国都忙碌而茫然地修订和改写自己的外交政策。


This is why US policy oscillated so disconcertingly from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s “Do not rush the pace or else the pro-democracy movement could well be hijacked” to President Barack Obama’s emphatic call for “change now.”	美国的政策也因此令人难堪地摇摆不定，从国务卿希拉里·克林顿的“切勿操之过急，否则民主运动可能被人利用”到巴拉克·奥巴马总统的有力呼吁“立即改革”。


Of course, a grave question arises about the now-ruling Supreme Council of the Military High Command in Egypt: How can the enforcers of the status quo become the agents of change?	当然，关于目前政治的埃及最高军事委员会最高统帅部的严肃问题是： 现状的捍卫者怎能促动改革？


But, then, military rule is only a temporary measure, or so we reason.	但军事统治不过是权宜之计，至少我们是这样认为的。


The great Tunisian poet Abul-Qasim Al Shabi has captured poignantly the spirit of Egypt’s saga: “If one day the people want life, then fate will arise…night fade away, chains broken…” That, in essence, is what the young in Egypt have done.	伟大的突尼斯诗人阿布·卡西姆·阿尔·沙比深刻地领略了埃及传奇的涵义： “如果有一天人们想要真正的生活，就会带来命中注定的劫数…黑夜会消弭于无形，枷锁会被打碎…”。 这就是埃及年轻人的作为。


Their idiom is current; their instruments of change are today’s electronic media.	他们的语言正在流行，今天的电子媒体是他们的改革工具。


They – and we – are very far from the world that Mubarak, or the great Gamal Abdel Nasser, knew and understood.	他们——还有我们——与穆巴拉克、或伟大的纳赛尔熟悉和理解的世界已经拉开了距离。


The Egyptian revolution now faces the exacting task that confronts all successful revolutions: how to define the future.	埃及革命正面对着所有成功革命必需面对的任务： 如何描绘未来的蓝图。


Like the Ottoman Empire’s fragmentation in 1922 or Nasser’s overthrow of King Farouk’s regime in 1952, the current transformation, too, must be shaped.	就像1922年奥斯曼帝国分裂或1952年纳赛尔推翻国王法鲁克政权一样，目前的变革也同样需要孕育。


And how that future is shaped will determine whether or not Mubarak’s end marks the beginning of political transformation throughout the Middle East.	而孕育未来的过程会决定穆巴拉克的终结是否标志着中东地区政治改革的开始。


That is the possibility that is shaking governments from Washington to Beijing.	正是这样的机遇吸引了从华盛顿到北京等各国政府的注意力。


It is not just the reliability of the Suez Canal and oil exports that are now in doubt; decades of fixed strategic certainties must now be reexamined.	未来存疑的不只是苏伊士运河和石油出口，数十年来一成不变的战略确定性现在需要重新审视。


Consider Israel, which has watched the events in Cairo with a degree of worry unfelt since January 1979, when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini unseated the Shah of Iran.	比如以色列，这个国家以1979年1月后从未有过的忧虑密切关注着开罗的事态，1979年1月，阿亚图拉鲁霍拉·霍梅尼将伊朗国王赶下台。


That strategic nightmare cost Israel and the US their closest ally in the region, one that was soon transformed into an implacable enemy.	这场战略噩梦令以色列和美国失去了中东地区最亲密的盟友，这位曾经的盟友迅速转化为不共戴天的仇敌。


Israel’s two most recent wars – against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006, and against Hamas in Gaza in 2009 – were fought against groups sponsored, supplied, and trained by Iran.	以色列最近的两次战争——2006年袭击黎巴嫩真主党和2009年袭击加沙哈��斯——无一例外地针对由伊朗资助、装备和训练的团体。


Clearly, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will also now lie unattended as Israel concentrates on developments in Egypt.	显而易见，以色列对埃及事态的关注将使以巴和谈陷入停滞。


Above all, Israel must wonder if the peace treaty with Egypt will hold, and, if not, how to carry out the massive restructuring of its defense posture that will be required.	以色列肯定首先怀疑与埃及的和平协议能否持续下去，如果不能，它应当如何调整自己的防卫部署。


But it is not only the fate of Israel that has now shocked US policy, in particular, to its core.	不过撼动美国政策根本的并不只有以色列的命运。


Egypt, after all, has been the cornerstone of America’s balancing act in the Middle East – and the Islamic world – for three decades.	毕竟三十年来，埃及一直是美国平衡中东——以及伊斯兰世界的基石。


The Egypt-Israel peace treaty has kept Egypt comfortably neutralized, freeing the US to commit its strategic resources elsewhere.	埃以和平协议巩固了埃及的中立地位，美国也因此得以将战略资源投向别处。


In turn, Egypt, propped up by massive US aid, has secured the region from a larger conflagration, even though the Israel-Palestine conflict has continued to smolder.	反过来，埃及在巨额美国援助的支持下避免中东陷入更大的灾难，尽管在此期间以巴冲突的火焰一直无法熄灭。


Herein lies the core of the dilemma for the US: it wants Egypt’s basic state apparatus to survive, so that the levers of power do not fall into the wrong hands.	美国两难处境的核心正在于此：它希望埃及基本的国家机器继续存在，确保权力不会落入敌对份子手里。


This requires the US to be seen as siding with the public’s demand for change, yet to avoid being identified with political immobility.	这就需要美国看似站在公众改革要求的一边，同时又要避免显露出政治立场的顽固。


There is reason to feel reassured by Obama’s reactions.	奥巴马的反应显然能够打消某些疑虑。


He termed Mubarak’s departure a display of “the power of human dignity,” adding that “the people of Egypt have spoken, their voices have been heard, and Egypt will never be the same.”	他将穆巴拉克下台称为“人类尊严力量的展露”，并说“埃及民众已经面对世界说出了自己的愿望，埃及将不再是以前那个埃及。 ”


But nothing that Obama, or anyone else, says can answer the question now occupying the attention of senior US officials: Will the coming of popular sovereignty to Egypt inevitably lead to anti-Americanism?	但奥巴马或其他人的言辞都无法解答美国高官所关注的问题：埃及人民政权的到来是否不可避免会带来反美主义？


Running in Place	原地踏步


SANTIAGO – A billionaire with a Harvard degree runs for President of Chile promising reforms to enhance productivity and competitiveness, and wins.	圣地亚哥—一位拥有哈佛学位的亿万富翁竞选智利总统，承诺加强提高生产率和竞争力的改革，并在大选中胜出。


Once he takes office in 2010, the economy recovers quickly from the global financial crisis, creates jobs, and continues growing until recently.	2010年开始执政后，智利经济迅速从全球金融危机中复苏，就业机会被创造出来，并一直增长的最近。


The billionaire, never one to shy from publicity, claims the credit.	这位亿万富翁也从来不羞于在公众面前标榜自己的成就。


Chile is a case of successful pro-market reform, argues Sebastián Piñera, who stepped down from the presidency on March 11.	塞巴斯蒂安·皮涅拉（Sebastián Piñera）指出，智利是成功市场改革的例子。 他将于3月11日卸任总统。


He is wrong.	他说错了。


The Chilean economy has expanded, and no one with his or her heart in the right place can fail to celebrate that; but this growth has little to do with the former president’s policies.	智利经济有所扩张，每一个立场正确的人都不会不为此感到欣慰； 但这一增长和这位前总统的政策基本无关。


Even worse, the expansion is proving to be unsustainable, and Chileans will soon feel the consequences of Piñera’s failure to carry out the pro-growth reforms he once promised.	更糟糕的是，经济扩张被证明是不可持续的，智利人将很快感受到皮涅拉没能兑现其促增长承诺的后果。


Chile was hit hard by the 2008-2009 financial crisis: foreign loans vanished and the price of copper, Chile’s main export, collapsed.	2008—2009年金融危机期间，智利遭到重创：外国贷款蒸发殆尽，主要出口品铜价格暴跌。


But this time around, the Chilean economy was in shape to withstand massive external shocks.	但这一回，智利经济的状况足以抵御大规模外部冲击。


The government had been running surpluses, public debt was almost nil, and banks were well regulated.	政府一直有盈余，公债水平可以忽略不计，银行监管也很出色。


As a result, the government of President Michelle Bachelet (who was in office from 2006 to 2010 and has just been sworn in for a second term) was able to launch a potent anti-crisis fiscal stimulus, financed with resources saved from the earlier copper boom.	因此，米歇尔·巴切莱特总统（Michelle Bachelet，2006—2010年在任，并且刚刚宣誓第二次出任总统）能够采取强力反危机财政刺激，用此前铜繁荣期储存下来的资源提供融资。


The central bank, autonomous from political pressures and run by highly respected professionals, did its part by slashing interest rates.	摆脱了政治压力、由广受尊敬的专业人士主导的中央银行也出手干预，大幅降低利率。


In Europe, the recession has lasted six years and counting; in Chile, it lasted ten months.	在欧洲，衰退已经持续了六年并还在继续； 在智利，衰退只维持了十个月。


Tough regulation and record-low interest rates left companies and households with no debt overhang and little need to deleverage.	严格的监管和创纪录的低利率让企业和家庭并未积累债务，因此也不需要去杠杆。


By late 2009, the Chilean economy was growing again, and in the years since, growth has been helped by highly propitious external conditions.	2009今年底，智利经济开始再度增长，此后几年以来，增长受极为有利的外部环境推动。


Sky-high commodity prices, rock-bottom dollar interest rates, and ample international liquidity are what Chile hopes for in the rest of the world; they are also precisely what Chile got since 2010.	智利希望从外部得到高企的商品价格、极低的美元利率和充足的国际流动性； 而自2010年以来，这些都得到了满足。


Unsurprisingly, growth was swift – until late last year, when the combination of the US Federal Reserve’s gradual exit from quantitative easing and lower commodity prices worldwide caused a swift deceleration in economic activity.	毫不奇怪，智利增长十分迅速，直到去年年底美联储开始逐渐退出量化宽松并且世界商品价格下跌导致经济活动迅速减速。


After recording annual GDP growth of more than 5% on average during the last four years, Chile’s economy is expected to grow by 3.7% or less in 2014.	在经历了GDP年增长率平均高达5%以上的过去四年后，2014年智利经济增长率预计将下降至3. 7%或以下。


Piñera blamed the incoming Bachelet administration, and its plan to raise taxes, for the drop in the growth rate.	皮涅拉因此指责即将上任的巴切莱特政府及其增税计划是增长率下降的罪魁。


If so, Bachelet’s economists are very influential indeed, because a similar slowdown has occurred all over Latin America and in emerging countries worldwide.	果真如此的话，巴切莱特的经济学家影响力可真是太大了，因为所有拉丁美洲国家和全世界新兴国家都经历了类似的减速。


The immediate cause of Chile’s slowdown is the decline in investment, particularly in mining; but the underlying problem is that the failure to diversify the economy sufficiently makes it far from clear what new kinds of investment, and which new exports, will take up the slack.	智利减速的直接原因是投资下降，特别是矿业投资下降； 但根本问题在于没有充分实现经济的多样化，这导致了很难弄清哪种新投资以及哪种新出口可以顶上来。


The export basket of economically diversified countries like Thailand, Malaysia, Mexico, and Ireland is entirely different from what it was a generation ago.	泰国、马来西亚、墨西哥和爱尔兰等多样化国家的出口篮子较一代人之前有了彻底的变化。


By contrast, Chile’s export basket has remained unchanged.	相反，智利的出口篮子一成不变。


In 1984, Chile exported copper and other minerals, paper and pulp, fruits and wine, fishmeal, and a smattering of light manufactures.	1984年，智利出口铜和其他原材料、纸和纸浆、水果和酒、鱼粉以及少量轻工业制造品。


Thirty years later, Chile’s exports comprise the same items.	三十年后，智利的出口篮子里依旧是这些东西。


Investment in energy would probably take off – if only Chile’s institutions were modernized to make that possible.	能源投资或许可以启动——但必须在智利机构实现现代化使之成为可能的情况下。


This is another area where Piñera’s legacy is wanting.	这是皮涅拉留下的另一个后遗症。


Chile is unique among its neighbors in having no oil or gas.	智利与邻国有很大区别，它不出产石油和天然气。


Chileans today pay the highest electricity rates in the region, because generating capacity has failed to keep pace with rising demand.	如今，智利的电费是地区追高的，因为发电量赶不上不断增长的需求。


A prolonged dry spell could cause the lights to go off in the next few years.	漫长的干旱期可能导致未来几年中无法点亮电灯。


Ensuring both cheaper energy and a clean environment is a big challenge.	同时确保廉价的能源和清洁的环境是一个巨大的挑战。


Experts agree that it will require a national plan for locating generators across Chile’s mountainous territory, a revamped regime for the transmission of power, more intensive use of natural gas, and a concerted effort to promote renewables, particularly wind and solar.	专家们都同意这需要国家规划部署智利山区的发电厂，修订输电机制，更集约地使用天然气，以及多管齐下促进可再生能源，特别是风能和太阳能的利用。


Regrettably, Piñera took action in none of these areas.	遗憾的是，皮涅拉在这些领域毫无作为。


Employment policy was yet another shortcoming of his administration.	就业政策是皮涅拉政府的又一短板。


With the post-2009 recovery came a drop in measured joblessness, which allowed the government to pay scant attention to a labor market that leaves out far too many women and young Chileans.	2009年后复苏的同时，记录失业率有所下降，这让政府极少关注将无数女性和智利青年排除在外的劳动力市场。


There is broad consensus that Chile must change hiring and firing rules, allow unions to negotiate shifts and working hours, improve on- and off-the-job training, and make more information available to job-seekers.	一个广泛的共识是智利必须改变其雇用和解雇法规，���许工会谈判换班制和工时，改善在职和脱产培训，为寻找工作者提供更多信息。


But these are all politically sensitive areas, where the smallest legal change can elicit howls of opposition.	但这些问题都具有政治敏感性，微小的法律变化也会导致极大的反对。


Piñera took the safe route of attempting no changes at all.	皮涅拉采用了安全做法——不尝试任何改变。


And, of course, those young Chileans will have better prospects of getting a job if they come equipped with a first-rate education.	当然，这些智利青年若能得到第一流的教育，他们找工作的前景也必然会改善。


Chile has succeeded in getting the young into the classroom (enrollment rates are comparable to those in developed countries); but it has had limited success at ensuring that the young – and particularly the children of low-income families – receive a high-quality education once they are there.	智利在普及教育方面做得很成功（入学率已可以和发达国家相媲美）； 但在确保青年——特别是低收入家庭的孩子——获得高质量教育方面并未取得多少成就。


Piñera’s government became embroiled in a fight with protesting students over who should pay for university education.	皮涅拉政府就应该由谁来支付大学学费问题与示威学生产生了对立。


That controversy prevented most other changes in education from going forward.	这场对立阻碍了教育领域其他变革的推进。


Bachelet has vowed to end this paralysis and make educational reform her administration’s top priority.	巴切莱特已承诺要结束这一僵局，并把教育改革作为她的政府的当务之急。


The goal is laudable, but achieving it will not be easy.	目标是值得赞赏的，但实现目标决非易事。


Every year, Chile’s finance ministry asks a group of independent experts how fast Chile can grow without triggering inflation or other imbalances.	每一年，智利财政部都会请独立专家组评估智利可以在不引起通胀和其他失衡的情况下实现多高的增长率。


In 2008, before Chile felt the consequences of the financial crisis, the average answer provided by those experts was 4.83%.	2008年，在智利受金融危机冲击前，专家给出的平均答案是4. 83%。


In 2013, after three years of center-right government in Chile, the corresponding answer was ...4.85%.	2013年，在中右翼政府执政三年后，同样的问题答案是……4. 85%。


Under Piñera’s government, pro-growth rhetoric was abundant.	在皮涅拉政府治下，亲增长的口号喊得很响。


But rhetoric alone cannot boost an economy’s growth trajectory.	但光喊口号是无法提振经济的增长轨迹的。


One Hundred Days of Solitude	百日孤独


SANTIAGO – When violence flared up in Ukraine and protesters began dying at the hands of government agents, the European Union threatened sanctions against Ukrainian officials responsible for “violence and excessive force.”	圣地亚哥—暴力正在乌克兰兴起，示威者开始死于政府代理人之手，而欧盟威胁要制裁负有“暴力和过度使用武力”责任的乌克兰官员。


President Viktor Yanukovych fled Kyiv, leaving behind a private zoo with exotic pigs and goats – and also the foreign ministers of Germany, France, and Poland, who were in town trying to broker a deal to end the violence.	乌克兰总统亚努科维奇逃离基辅，留下一个住着外来猪和羊的私人动物园——以及德国、法国和波兰的外交部长，他们正在致力于牵线结束暴力的协议。


But when violence flared up – virtually simultaneously – in Venezuela and protesters began dying at the hands of government agents, the Organization of American States raised its voice to announce that...it would not raise its voice.	但在几乎相同的时间，暴力也在委内瑞拉兴起，示威者开始死于政府代理人之手，美洲国家组织（Organization of American States，OAS）发声宣布……它不会发声。


The situation was up to Venezuela to sort out, the OAS stated.	OAS说，委内瑞拉自己会解决问题。


Foreign ministers from other Latin American countries are nowhere to be seen in Caracas – certainly not denouncing repression and demanding an end to the violence.	在加拉加斯，你看不到其他拉丁美洲国家的外交部长——他们当然没有在谴责镇压、要求结束暴力。


Meanwhile, the body count keeps rising.	与此同时，死亡人数一直在上升。


The contrast highlights what everyone already knows: Latin America’s regional institutions are weak – even weaker than Europe’s.	如此反差凸显出一个人人皆知的秘密：拉丁美洲地区机构很弱，甚至比欧洲的还弱。


But it also reveals something else: a morally crooked logic that condemns governments and leaders to remain silent in the face of aggression, repression, and even death, because to say anything would be tantamount to “intervention” in another country’s internal affairs.	但这也揭露了令一些东西：政府和领导人在面对侵犯、镇压甚至死亡时保持沉默，因为不论说什么都等同于“干涉”他国内政，谴责这样的政府和领导人的逻辑在道德上是站不住脚的。


It was not always like this.	并非总是如此。


Not long ago in Latin America, life and liberty were deemed to be universal rights, to be defended across national borders.	不久前，在拉丁美洲，生命和自由被视为普世权利，应该超越国界受到保护。


My father was a Chilean lawyer and human-rights activist.	我的父亲是一名智利律师兼人权活动家。


General Augusto Pinochet kicked him and our family out of the country, and I spent my adolescence and early adulthood in exile, sharing hopes and fears with other expatriates from Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay.	皮诺切特将军将他和我们的家庭赶出了智利，我的少年时光和成人的早期阶段都在流亡中度过，我和其他来自智利、阿根廷、巴西和乌拉圭的流亡者具有共同的希望和恐惧。


None of us – and no one on the Latin American left – would have doubted for a moment that defending human rights was everyone’s responsibility, and that the international community should come down hard on governments that tortured and killed their own people.	我们中没有人——拉丁美洲左翼中也没有人——曾经怀疑过捍卫人权是属于每个人的责任、国际社会应该对虐待和杀戮本国人民的政府严加追究。


In Pinochet’s Chile or General Jorge Rafael Videla’s Argentina, anyone who complained about government-sponsored violence was painted as a member of an international communist conspiracy.	在皮诺切特的智利或魏地拉将军的阿根廷，任何指责政府发起的暴力行为的人都会被扣上国际共产主义同谋的帽子。


Today, anyone who complains about violence in Venezuela is, according to President Nicolás Maduro, a fascist and a lackey of the American empire.	如今，任何指责委内瑞拉暴力的人都是——用总统马杜罗的话说——法西斯主义、美帝国主义的走狗。


Everything has changed, yet everything remains the same.	一切都改变了，但一切都和原来一样。


Yes, the situation in Venezuela must be sorted out by Venezuelans.	是的，委内瑞拉的局面必须由委内瑞拉人决定。


The problem is that some Venezuelans today cannot march peacefully on the streets without being shot at.	问题在于如今一些委内瑞拉人无法上街进行和平游行而不被射杀。


Some Venezuelans cannot speak freely to their fellow citizens, because each and every television station that would carry their words has been muzzled or driven off the air.	一些委内瑞拉人无法自由地向同胞讲话，因为任何一个播放了他们的声音的电视台都会被封杀和扼杀。


And some Venezuelans cannot be sure their rights will be respected.	一些委内瑞拉人无法保证他们的权利得到尊重。


Terms in office have expired for the prosecutor-general, members of the national election commission, and supreme court justices, but no successors have been named, because Maduro is unwilling to negotiate with the opposition and lacks the two-thirds majority in the National Assembly needed to appoint officials of his choosing.	总检察长、国家选举委员会委员和最高法院法官任期早已届满，但他们的继任者迟迟没有得到人名，因为马杜罗不愿与反对派展开谈判，又无法达到任命他的心仪人选所必须的国民大会三分之二多数。


Venezuelans would like nothing better than to be the ones who decide their own destiny, but the democratic means to do so are being denied to them.	若能够决定自己的命运，委内瑞拉人将无比开心，但他们无法获得这样做的民主方式。


Indeed, one of the key opposition leaders, Leopoldo López, has been arrested on ludicrous charges of “inciting crime.”	事实上，主要反对派领袖之一洛佩兹（Leopoldo López）因为可笑的“煽动犯罪”指控而被捕。


It would have been preposterous to tell Ukrainian demonstrators facing government storm troopers to just grin and bear it without any external solidarity or support.	要面对政府爪牙的乌克兰示威者在没有外部团结或支持的情况下咬牙坚持是荒谬可笑的。


It is just as preposterous to tell Venezuelan demonstrators the same thing.	要委内瑞拉示威者这样做亦然。


In these circumstances, the principle of self-determination, so beloved of foreign ministries everywhere, becomes an empty slogan.	在这样的环境下，各国外交部动辄挂碍嘴边的自主原则成了一句空洞的口号。


Perhaps the saddest of all foreign reactions came from the University of Chile’s student federation.	或许最悲伤的外国反应来自智利大学学生联合会。


Using language reminiscent of the Stalinist 1950’s, the federation – which has led student protests demanding better education in Chile – condemned their Venezuelan counterparts for “defending the old order” and “deviating from the path the people have chosen.”	该联合会用让人想起20世纪50年代斯大林主义者的语气谴责委内瑞拉学生“捍卫旧秩序”、“偏离了人民所选择的道路”。 而正是这个学生联合会，曾经领导过要求智利政府改善教育的学生示威。


The problem with this argument (if one can call it that) is that “the people” do not speak with one voice, nor do their pronouncements fall fully formed from the sky.	这一观点（如果可以称之为观点的话）的问题在于“人民”并没有用一个声音发声，也无法发出完整的声音。


To figure out what real people actually want and respond accordingly, democracies have procedures, constitutional guarantees, and individual rights.	要想搞清楚真正的人民到底想要什么并据此做出反应，民主国家有程序，有宪法保证，有个人权利。


When these are trampled upon, as they have been in Venezuela, people can neither speak freely nor choose their path.	当这些东西遭到践踏时——就像委内瑞拉一样——人民根本不可能自由地发声，也不可能自由地选择道路。


It is equally silly to argue that Maduro’s actions must be legitimate because he came to power through an election.	认为马杜罗的行动必然是合法的，因为他是通过选举掌权的，这一观点也同样大错特错。


A democratically elected leader retains legitimacy only to the extent that he or she behaves democratically once in office.	民主选出的领袖只有在其执政后民主地治国才具有合法性。


As Georgetown professor Hector Schamis recently recalled, António de Oliveira Salazar in Portugal, Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay, and Suharto in Indonesia attained power through elections, yet no history book calls them democratic.	乔治敦大学教授夏米拉斯（Hector Schamis）最近回忆说，葡萄牙的萨拉扎（António de Oliveira Salazar）、巴拉圭的斯特罗斯纳（Alfredo Stroessner）和印尼的苏哈托都是通过选举掌握权力的，但没有哪本历史书会说他们是民主的。


Yanukovych, too, won an election, but he will be remembered mostly for the bloodshed he unleashed, the bankruptcy that now faces Ukraine’s economy, and, of course, his private zoo and stable of Ferraris.	亚努科维奇也曾赢得选举，但人们对他的记忆只有他所引起的流血、现在的乌克兰所面临的经济破产，当然，还有他的私人动物园和法拉利车库。


Venezuelans, like Ukrainians, should know that they are not alone.	和乌克兰人一样，委内瑞拉人应该明白他们并不孤独。


Their struggle for democratic rights is everyone’s struggle.	他们为民主权利所做的斗争是所有人的斗争。


People in Latin America know this, even if their leaders are not always willing to say it out loud.	拉丁美洲人民知道这一点，即使他们的领导人并不总是愿意大声说出来。


Industrial Policy Reconsidered	产业政策再思考


SANTIAGO – First, the World Bank became a tireless advocate of women’s and gay rights.	圣地亚哥—首先，世界银行成为不遗余力的女性和同性恋权利支持者。


Then the International Monetary Fund backed the use of capital controls and voiced concern over income inequality.	接着，国际货币基金组织支持使用资本管制，并表示关注收入不平等问题。


Next in line for ideological modernization is the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB): in a forthcoming report, the bank calls for industrial policies in Latin America.	这条意识形态现代化阵线的下一个是泛美开发银行：在即将发布的报告中，该银行呼吁拉丁美洲采取产业政策。


This is a welcome development.	这是值得欢迎的发展趋势。


To be sure, the IADB – never as stodgy as the Bretton Woods twins, but still a traditional international financial bureaucracy – does not speak of industrial policies; it uses the politically correct phrase “productive development policies” (PDPs).	平心而论，泛美开发银行虽然不像布雷顿森林体系诞生的两大机构那样顽固，但也属于传统国际金融官僚，没有产业政策置喙； 它使用了政治正确的用词：“生产性发展政策”。


Yet the message is clear: in Latin America, the state and public policy should have a role in deciding what gets produced.	但其中的信号是明确的：在拉丁美洲，公共政策应该在决定生产什么方面起到作用。


A generation ago, this message would have been heretical.	一代人之前，这一信号会被视为异端。


Today, it is a matter of common sense.	如今，这已是常识。


Last week, economists from the IADB brought their gospel to a conference in Santiago, Chile.	上周，来自泛美开发银行的经济学家带着他们的方案来到智利圣地亚哥开会。


The country, for decades the region’s poster-child for good economic management, is also an example of the risks that all Latin American economies face.	几十年来，智利一直是拉丁美洲经济管理的榜样，也是彰显所有拉丁美洲经济体所面临的问题的镜子。


With commodity prices falling and dollar interest rates on the rise, Chilean growth is slowing sharply.	商品价格下跌、美元利率上升导致智利增长大幅减速。


Productivity gains have been sluggish for nearly 15 years, and the country’s export basket is the same as it was in the 1980’s.	近15年来生产率几无增长，而其出口品组成亦与20世纪80年代别无二致。


Chile’s growth problems are among the least severe in the region.	智利的增长问题是地区内最轻微的。


It is one of only four countries (along with Brazil, Panama, and the Dominican Republic) that have managed to reduce the per capita income gap with the United States since 1960.	它是该地区仅有的自1960年以来与美国人均收入差距缩小的四个国家之一（另三国是巴西、巴拿马和多米尼加）。


As the IADB has pointed out in several earlier reports, productivity has been stagnant in most of Latin America for a half-century or more.	泛美开发银行在此前的多份报告中指出，拉丁美洲大部分国家生产率处于停滞状态已逾半个世纪。


What is to be done?	可以做些什么？


The conventional prescription includes improving education (especially the technical kind), modernizing labor markets, reducing bureaucratic red tape, and facilitating foreign investment and technology transfer.	传统药方包括改善教育（特别是技术教育）、现代化劳动力市场、减少官僚主义官样文章以及促进外国投资和技术转移。


To this standard tool kit the IADB now adds PDPs, which can be “horizontal” or “vertical.”	如今，泛美开发银行在这一标准清单上加入了或“横向”或“纵向”的生产性发展政策。


Horizontal PDPs provide the inputs that a broad range of firms, across different sectors, need for their growth and development.	横向生产性发展政策为不同部门的格雷企业提供增长和发展所需要的投入品。


Simple examples include transport infrastructure, trained engineers, and a labor force proficient in English.	简单的例子包括交通基础设施、受过培训的工程师和英语流利的拉动力。


More sophisticated examples can involve systems for health and safety inspection, product-quality certification, or intellectual-property protection.	更复杂的例子包括健康和安全检查体系、产品质量认证或知识产权保护。


The problem is that some of these publicly provided inputs can be sector- or product-specific.	问题在于这些公共提供投入品中有一些只能用于特定的部门或产品。


Roads to remote and beautiful mountains foster eco-tourism but do not help carry merchandise to the nearest port.	通往偏远而美丽的山区的公路能提振生态旅游，但无助于将货物运往最近的港口。


A lab built to certify that beef does not have foot-and-mouth disease is of little use in verifying that fruit and vegetable exports are similarly disease-free.	用于检测牛肉是否含有口蹄疫的实验室对于检验水果和蔬菜出口疫病没有任何用处。


That is where vertical policies – those that favor a particular sector – come in.	这时就需要纵向政策——让具体部门收益的政策——登场了。


Horizontal PDPs are relatively uncontroversial, but vertical PDPs can unleash severe criticism, with skeptics claiming that they involve “picking winners.”	横向生产性发展政策相对来说正以较少，但纵向生产性发展政策可能招致严厉的批评，质疑者称它们涉嫌“挑选赢家”。


But, as the examples given above suggest, the line between horizontal and vertical policies is inevitably fuzzy.	但是，上述例子表明，横向和纵向政策之间的界线难免模糊。


In other words, when a government provides money to train a particular kind of engineer, lay out a particular road, or build a particular lab, it is favoring one sector over others, and hence de facto picking winners.	换句话说，当政府提供资金用于培训某种特定类型的工程师、修建特定公路或建设特定实验室时，就给了某些部门其他部门没有的优待，从而在事实上挑选了赢家。


The IADB argues that it is better to do this consciously, transparently, and with the appropriate checks and balances.	泛美开发银行指出，最好有意识地、透明地实施这一政策，并引入适当的制衡机制。


Vertical policies are also useful in solving coordination failures.	纵向政策还可以用于解决合作失灵问题。


Consider the tourism industry, which has great potential in the beautiful Patagonia region of southern Argentina and Chile.	以旅游业为例。 在阿根廷和智利南部美丽的巴塔哥尼亚地区，旅游业大有可为。


But no private firm will build a hotel in this remote, under-populated region if no road leads there.	但如果没有接通公路，就不会有私人企业会在如此偏远、人口稀少的地区建设饭店。


By the same token, no government official will build a road if there are no hotels or lodges, for the road would lead nowhere.	反之，如果没有饭店和客栈，就不会有政府官员会想到建设公路，因为建了也没有意义。


Without deliberate private-public coordination focused on tourism, the sector may never take off.	旅游业如果不进行深思熟虑的公私合作，就无法起飞。


Skeptics also point out that Latin America already went through a round of industrial policy in the 1960’s and 1970’s, with results that were mediocre at best.	怀疑派还指出，拉丁美洲已经在20世纪六七十年代经历过一轮产业政策，效果只能说差强人意。


The IADB report provides a balanced assessment of that episode.	泛美开发银行的报告提供了关于这段历史的平衡的评估。


Though import substitution and subsidies were initially successful in igniting industrialization, lack of scale soon hindered efforts (a country of a few million cannot hope to have an auto industry aimed only at the domestic market).	尽管进口替代和补贴在点燃工业化方面一开始取得了一些成功，但规模的欠缺很快就形成了掣肘（一个只有几百万人口的国家是不可能拥有只面向国内市场的汽车业的）。


Worse, government help was handed out to strong and weak performers alike.	更糟糕的是，政府帮助不论行业强弱一刀切。


In Asia, many firms that initially received help sooner or later became world-class competitors.	在亚洲，许多一开始获得帮助的企业或早或晚成长为世界级竞争者。


In Latin America, with little market and policy discipline and chronically overvalued exchange rates, that transition seldom happened.	但在几无市场和政策纪律可言并且汇率长期高估的拉丁美洲，这样的转变极少发生。


To be sure, those problems had to be corrected.	平心而论，这些问题都需要克服。


But in doing so, claims the IADB, Latin American governments may have gone too far: “There is now a growing consensus among policymakers and analysts alike that by putting all industrial policy out of bounds, the region may have thrown out the baby with the bathwater.	但泛美开发银行指出，在实践过程中，拉丁美洲政府或许走得太远了：“如今，决策者和分析家正在日益形成共识，一刀切地排斥产业政策可能导致婴儿与洗澡水一起泼出。


More and more, the question is not put in terms of whether to do active productive development policies but rather how to do them.”	越来越明显的是，问题不在于要不要采取生产性发展政策，而是如何采取这一政策。


Unlike 1960’s-vintage industrial policy, modern PDPs aim to correct market failures, not do away with market incentives.	”与20世纪60年代陈旧的产业政策不同，现代生产性发展政策旨在纠正市场失灵，而不是废除市场激励。


Market failure is not the only issue.	市场失灵不是唯一的问题。


The emerging new approach to PDPs is also fearful of state failure.	新兴的生产性发展政策新方针还害怕国家失灵。


State agencies can be captured and aid can be used for private or political gain.	国家机构可能被利益集团俘虏，援助可能被挪用作私人或政治用途。


To prevent this, the report again usefully deviates from reigning orthodoxy, which tells countries to identify and copy “best practices” from abroad.	为了防止这一问题，报告再次偏离了要国家识别和复制海外“最佳实践”的正统做法。


This approach cannot succeed if such practices require what local government cannot deliver.	如果这些最佳实践要求地方政府所无法提供的条件，这一方法就不可能成功。


Hence, “the focus ought to be not on policy best practices but on policy best matches with institutional capabilities.”	因此，“核心不应该放在政策最佳实践上，而应该放在最符合机构能力的政策上。 ”


Latin America will need a great deal of fresh thinking and many policy innovations if it is to keep growing in a post-commodity-boom era.	如果想在后商品繁荣时期保持增长，拉丁美洲需要大量新思维和政策创新。


No policy is failure-proof.	没有哪个政策可以免于失败。


But the approach advocated in the forthcoming IADB report is the region’s best hope today.	但即将发布的泛美开发银行报告所提出的方针是最有希望成功的。


Dead Cow Walking?	死牛迈步？


SANTIAGO – Simón Bolívar, the South American independence hero who hoped to weave the continent into a single nation, would shudder at the disintegration that prevails today in the continent’s energy sector.	圣地亚哥—希望将整个南美大陆统一为一个国家的南美独立英雄玻利瓦尔一定会对如今南美大陆能源部门各自为战的情景痛心疾首。


Surely he would understand that no community can be built on so fragmented a foundation.	毫无疑问，他一眼就能看出没有哪个社会可以建立在如此分散的基础上。


Peru has gas, which it sells to Mexico.	秘鲁有天然气，并向墨西哥出售。


Bolivia also has gas, but it has been under-exploiting it ever since it nationalized the industry in 2006.	玻利维亚也有天然气，但自2006年天然气行业被国有化以来一直处于开发不足的状态。


Argentina used to have a gas industry, but it was decimated by years of misguided government policies.	阿根廷曾经有天然气行业，但毁于多年来的政府政策瞎指挥。


Brazil discovered hydrocarbons deep in the Atlantic Ocean a few years ago and has begun auctioning off rights, but actual production is still years away.	巴西几年前在大西洋深海发现了碳氢化合物并开始拍卖采矿权，但开始实际生产还要等好几年。


Chile has no oil or gas, and no one in the neighborhood will sell it any, so it has to buy its supplies from as far away as Indonesia.	智利没有石油和天然气，也没有哪个邻国会卖给它，因此不得不从遥远的印尼购买。


Moreover, South America’s electricity grids are seldom interconnected, and rates for power vary widely.	此外，南美的电网也往往互不相同，电费也大相径庭。


Brazil and Chile have the region’s highest electricity prices (which are also among the highest in the world).	巴西和智利的电费为南美地区最高（放到却世界也不遑多让）。


The competitiveness of their industries, and consumers’ household budgets, suffer accordingly.	它们的工业竞争力和消费者家庭预算也因此受到影响。


Optimists imagine a scenario in which production is rationalized, pipelines are built, grids are interconnected, and gas from Bolivia, Argentina, or elsewhere fuels growth throughout the continent, benefiting everyone in the process.	乐观者所想象的景象是生产合理、管网建设完全、电网互通，玻利维亚、阿根廷和其他地方的天然气能提振整个南美大陆的增长，并让所有人在此过程中受益。


But such dreams always hit a formidable obstacle: national rivalries that date back decades – in some cases centuries – and that repeatedly keep mutually profitable energy-integration agreements from being signed.	但这一梦想总是遇到可怕的障碍：几十年——有的时候是几百年——之久的民族对立一再将可以创造共同利润的能源一体化协议拒之门外。


Or, if they are signed, they are often broken when compelling short-term considerations intervene.	即使签署了协议，也常常因为强制性短期考虑因素而被破坏。


For example, a decade ago, contracts promising a steady supply of Argentine gas at pre-set prices led Chile to spend billions refitting its power stations.	比如，十年前智利和阿根廷签署了后者以预定价格向前者供应天然气的合约，智利为此花了数十亿改装电站。


But, after a long period of price controls and massive underinvestment, domestic demand in Argentina was far outpacing supply.	但是，在经历了长时间的价格管制和投资严重不足后，阿根廷国内需求远远超过了供给。


So then-President Néstor Kirchner’s government tore up the contracts and cut off exports to Chile, stunting its economic growth and leaving painful memories among its citizens.	于是，时任总统基什内尔政府撕毁了与智利的合约，削减了对智利的天然气出口，给智利经济增长造成了严重打击，也严重伤害了智利人民的感情。


But now a new and powerful factor could change this dismal political equation: shale gas, which is already having an important effect on the United States and its economy.	但如今，一个新的有力因素可能改变这一令人沮丧的政治局面：已经对美国及其经济产生重大影响的页岩气。


With US natural-gas prices down to just over $4 per million BTU (from $13 just a few years ago), even prudent analysts expect the shale-energy revolution to increase America’s potential economic growth and add as many as two million new jobs.	美国天然及价格已经降到略高于4美元/百万英热（几年前高达13美元），即使是谨慎的分析师也认为页岩能源革命将提振美国潜在经济增长并增加多大200万个新工作岗位。


The impact of shale energy on South America is twofold.	页岩能源对南美的影响是两方面的。


For starters, there is the potential for cheaper imports for those countries with no gas (Chile) or where local demand could exceed local supply (Brazil).	首先，没有天然气的国家（如智利）和本地需求超过本地供给的国家（如巴西）的进口成本可能会降低。


For a country like Chile, where large hydroelectric projects have been politically controversial, and where solar and wind power have been too slow in coming, gas imports from the US would be a tremendous boon.	对于像智利这样的国家，大型水电项目总是引起颇多政治争议，太阳能电和风电增长又太慢，来自美国的天然气进口将成为有力的助推器。


In 2013, the US Department of Energy authorized the first substantial gas-export facilities; while the trickle is not yet a steady flow, the gap between US and much-higher world prices implies tremendous potential benefits.	2013年，美国能源部批准了第一批大规模天然气出口设施； 尽管这一气源并未形成稳定的天然气流，但美国和全球气价之间的差异意味着它潜力无限。


Then there is the shale gas to be exploited closer to home.	另一方面则是据本国更近的页岩气开发。


Argentina reportedly has the world’s third-largest shale-gas reserves, after the US and China.	据报道，阿根廷拥有世界第三大页岩气储量，仅次于美国和中国。


The huge Vaca Muerta (Dead Cow) field, owned by the energy company YPF, is just now beginning to be explored.	能源公司YPF拥有巨大的死牛（Vaca Muerta）气田，并刚刚开始勘探。


Argentina’s government expropriated YPF from Spain’s Repsol in 2012, with the resulting suits and countersuits delaying any potential investment in shale.	2012年，阿根廷政府将YPF从西班牙雷普索尔公司（Repsol）手中收归国有，这造成了大量诉讼和反诉讼，拖延了页岩气领域的潜在投资。


But, with Argentina and Repsol recently reaching a settlement, interest has revived.	但是，最近阿根廷和雷普索尔公司达成了和解，对页岩气的投资兴趣也开始激活。


Surely, the technical challenges of exploiting such shale-gas reserves are huge, and only a handful of firms in the world have the necessary knowhow.	诚然，勘探这笔页岩气储量面临着巨大的技术挑战，全世界只有少数几家公司拥有这方面的技能。


The financial challenges are even greater: analysts speak of tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars in required investment.	金融挑战则更加严峻：分析师预测需要投入的资金高达几百甚至几千亿美元。


But the potential for Argentina and the region is tremendous.	但阿根廷和地区潜力是无穷的。


Federico Sturzenegger, an Argentine economist and President of Banco de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, has estimated the value of Vaca Muerta gas (at the prices Argentina currently pays for gas imports) to be equal to nine times the country’s GDP.	阿根廷经济学家、布宜诺斯艾利斯省银行（Banco de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires）行长斯特尔泽尼格（Federico Sturzenegger）估算，死牛气田天然气价值（以阿根廷现行天然气进口价格衡量）是阿根廷GDP的九倍。


But, because world prices are likely to drop fast as the US steps up exports, Argentina has to act quickly in order to capture these potential gains.	但是，由于全球价格可能会因为美国加入出口国行列而快速下跌，阿根廷必须尽快行动以把握这一潜在收益。


Sturzenegger has called the decision about shale gas “the most important” in Argentina’s economic history.	斯特尔泽尼格认为页岩气方面的决定是阿根廷经济史上“最重要的”决定。


Argentina’s choices could matter not just for the region’s economy, but also for its politics.	阿根廷的选择将不仅影响地区经济，还将影响地区政治。


Because Vaca Muerta holds much more gas than Argentina could ever burn, exports are the inescapable way forward, and neighboring Brazil and Chile are among the natural customers.	由于死牛气田的天然气远远超过了阿根廷本国的需求量，出口将是不可避免的，��相邻的巴西和智利则是天然客户。


The shift in the regional balance of gas-based power could in turn cause nationalists in Bolivia, Peru, and elsewhere to rethink their policies.	南美地区天然气实力平衡的变化可能反过来让玻利维亚、秘鲁和其他国家的民族主义者反思他们的政策。


Integration in the oil, gas, and other energy industries, along with the interconnection of national power grids, could follow.	石油、天然气和其他能源业的一体化以及国家电网的连通可能会相继到来。


South America’s economic and political landscape would be changed forever.	南美的经济和政治局面将发生永久改变。


Is this too optimistic?	这样说会不会太乐观了？


Perhaps.	也许会。


The political and legal safeguards needed to make energy flows safe and reliable would have to be built.	在南美，保证能源流安全且可靠的政治和法律保障仍有待建立。


As the region’s history shows, that is no easy task.	正如地区历史所表明的，这不是一个简单的任务。


Time and again, nationalism and shortsighted politics have trumped reason.	民族主义和政治短视曾经一次又一次地压倒了理性。


But the stakes are so high, and the potential so great, that the least one must do is hope.	但既然赌注如此之高、潜力如此之大，我们至少应该保持希望。


Mercosur Blues	令人忧虑的南方共同市场


SANTIAGO – When the leaders of Mercosur met in Caracas this week, the usual bluster about standing up to imperialism filled the air.	圣地亚哥——南方共同市场领导人本周在加拉加斯会面时，空气中充斥着反帝国主义口号。


But so did the unmistakable scent of decay.	但同样弥漫着的是显而易见的腐朽味道。


Mercosur is usually described as a trade grouping; in fact, it has been a political creation from the start.	南方共同市场通常被定义为贸易组织； 事实上，自成立伊始它就与政治挂钩。


Brazil, the regional powerhouse, always viewed it as a counterweight to the United States in hemispheric affairs.	外界总认为地区性大国巴西能在西半球事务中制衡美国。


Peronist governments in Argentina used it to hype integration while doing little or nothing to remove actual barriers to trade.	阿根廷庇隆政府利用该组织在不取消实际贸易壁垒的前提下大肆宣传地区整合。


With the entrance of Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela in 2006, the lurch toward populism became unmistakable.	随着2006委内瑞拉总统查韦斯的加入，民粹主义倾向已经再明显不过。


As a Chilean government minister late last decade, I remember the frustration of attending Mercosur gatherings (Chile is an associate member).	因为近10年来担任过智利政府部长，我清楚地记得南方共同市场会议的无可奈何（智利当时曾以准会员的身份与会）。


They were long on posturing and endless speeches, but short on substantive agreements about anything.	他们长于摆出各种姿态和无休无止的长篇大论，却短于就任何问题达成实质性的一致。


At the 2006 summit in Córdoba, when Chávez and Fidel Castro dueled over who could deliver the longest and most rambling address, spirits were running high.	2006年召开的科尔多瓦峰会上，查韦斯和卡斯特罗大有比拼谁的讲话最长最漫无边际之势，峰会上弥漫着高涨的情绪。


Bolivia, also governed by a charismatic populist, was keen to develop closer ties.	由颇具个人魅力的民粹主义领导者治理的玻利维亚迫不及待想建立更加密切的关系。


Ecuador soon followed suit.	厄瓜多尔很快也积极附议。


And a smattering of smaller countries in Central America and the Caribbean fell into political line in exchange for generous infusions of Venezuelan cash and oil.	少数中美及加勒比小国也为换取慷慨注入的现金和石油而对委内瑞拉的政治路线齐声附和。


Back then, Mercosur leaders could claim to offer an “alternative development model” for the region.	那时南方共同市场领导人还可以声称为地区建立了“替代发展模式”。


No more.	现在已经没人再相信这套谎话。


This week in Caracas, the mood was funereal.	本周的加拉加斯充满了哀伤。


The host, Chávez’s successor Nicolás Maduro, confronts a collapsing economy and tensions within his own party.	查韦斯的继任者马杜罗面临着经济崩溃和党内关系紧张。


Despite relatively high oil prices, Venezuela has a large fiscal deficit and falling foreign-exchange reserves.	虽然油价仍处于相对高位，但并未改变委内瑞拉庞大的财政赤字和外汇储备下降。


The inflation rate is the region’s highest, and the economy is stagnating.	通胀率在区域内高居榜首，而经济正在陷入滞胀。


In the face of popular frustration with worsening living conditions, Maduro’s government has relied on violent repression to put an end to street protests.	面对民众对生活条件恶化的不满，马杜罗政府一直靠暴力镇压来杜绝街头抗议活动。


Opposition leader Leopoldo López spent months in a military prison before recently being put on trial.	反对派领导人莱奥波尔多·洛佩斯在军事监狱里待了几个月才开始受审。


Institutions like Human Rights Watch have repeatedly denounced the government’s rights violations and restrictions on civil liberties.	以人权观察为首的机构已屡次谴责政府侵犯人权及限制公民自由。


Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, arrived in Caracas hoping to rouse support in her fight against the so-called vulture funds that bought her country’s sovereign bonds on the cheap and have successfully sued for payment in full.	阿根廷总统克里斯蒂娜·费尔南德斯·基什内尔飞抵加拉加斯寄希望外界支持她打击所谓秃鹫基金低价购买该国主权债券并成功起诉要求全额支付的行动。


But Fernández found that her colleagues’ polite words of encouragement mattered little.	但费尔南德斯发现同僚礼貌的鼓励其实无关紧要。


The US Supreme Court’s decision last month to uphold a lower court’s ruling against Argentina put her in an impossible situation.	美国最高法院上月维持下级法院对阿根廷不利的裁决令她陷入绝望。


Paying the recalcitrant bondholders would mean losing face and possibly triggering a salvo of copycat lawsuits; not paying would mean technical default and all of its attendant costs.	付款给顽固的债券持有人不仅丢面子，还有可能引发跟风诉讼； 不付款相当于技术违约，并要承担一切由此造成的后果。


She chose the latter option.	她在两难之中选择了后者。


Access to foreign capital matters for Fernández, because, like Maduro, she faces a stalled economy and a growing dollar shortage.	外国资本对费尔南德斯至关重要，因为像马杜罗一样，她也面临着经济停滞及美元短缺问题日益恶化。


Domestic stabilization measures earlier this year bought her some time, yet fear of a recession remains.	今年初的国内稳定措施为她赢得了时间，但并未消除对经济衰退的担忧。


In an effort to regain access to capital markets, her economic team patched up things with the Paris Club of sovereign creditors and Spain’s Repsol (the former owner of nationalized oil giant YPF); but the fight with the vultures has set the country back.	为求重新进入资本市场，她的经济团队修复了与主权债权人巴黎俱乐部和西班牙雷普索尔公司（国有化石油巨头YPF的前任所有者）的关系； 但与秃鹫基金这场战役的失利让她的国家遭受重挫。


With a presidential election looming in October 2015, most potential candidates (even those from her own party) are quickly distancing themselves from her authoritarian style and troubled economic legacy.	随着2015年10月总统大选的临近，绝大多数有潜力的候选人（甚至包括她自己所在党派的候选人）都忙不迭地与她的专制作风和糟糕的经济状况拉开距离。


In Bolivia, President Evo Morales has resorted to legal and constitutional shenanigans to guarantee himself yet another term in office.	玻利维亚总统莫拉莱斯耍尽了宪法和法律花招以确保自己能连续当选。


After two terms, Morales would in theory be prohibited from running again.	本来连任两届的莫拉莱斯理论上禁止再竞选连任。


But Bolivia’s constitutional court has ruled that he can, because the adoption of a new constitution redefined the country as the Plurinational State of Bolivia; Morales, therefore, served his first term as the head of a different state.	但玻利维亚宪法法院却裁定他可以参选，因为新通过的宪法将玻利维亚改名为多民族玻��维亚国； 因此莫拉莱斯之前担任的是另一个国家的元首。


When asked why he will run again, he replied – in a peculiar confession for a nationalist leader – that former Queen Sofía of Spain had encouraged him to “finish the job.”	当被问及为何要再次参选时他回答（这一回答对国家领导人来讲可谓独树一帜），西班牙前王后索菲亚鼓励他“完成这项任务”。


In Ecuador, too, democratic institutions are under siege.	厄瓜多尔的民主制度同样也在遭到围攻。


An independent report has chronicled 12 separate episodes of government meddling with court rulings.	一份独立报告记录了12起政府插手法院裁决的案件。


A controversial gag law on the press that was enacted last year has already ended a major newspaper’s print edition.	去年颁布的有争议的媒体禁言令已经导致主要纸媒体停印。


According to Catalina Botero, the outgoing rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, “Ecuador is, along with Cuba, the country that most restricts freedom of expression.”	即将离任的美洲人权委员会言论自由专员卡特琳娜·波特罗表示，“厄瓜多尔和古巴两国对言论自由的限制最为严重。 ”


Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff faces a situation that is both similar to and different from that of her Mercosur colleagues.	巴西总统迪尔玛·罗塞夫所面临的局势既与南方共同市场的官僚们相似但又略有不同。


Brazil is not the kind of country where a president can manipulate the constitution or close newspapers at will.	巴西总统无权随意操纵宪法或查封媒体。


But malaise is in the air in Brasilia (leaving aside the World Cup thrashing delivered by Germany).	但不满情绪却一直弥漫在巴西利亚的空气中（这还不包括德国对巴西的世界杯大胜）。


Brazil’s swift recovery from the 2008 financial crisis endeared it to international financial markets; but weak growth since then has left yesterday’s promise unfulfilled.	巴西从2008年金融危机中迅速恢复令其成为国际金融市场的新宠； 但自此之后的增长乏力却留下了昨天没有兑现的承诺。


Despite low unemployment, economic anxiety is on the rise – and is beginning to filter to the political realm.	虽然失业率不高但人们却对经济越来越忧虑——而且上述忧虑已经向政治领域渗透。


With Rousseff dropping in the polls and her opponents slowly gaining, the October presidential election – once thought to be a done deal – may be up for grabs.	随着罗塞夫民调支持率降低而其对手缓慢攀升，10月举行的总统大选——之前曾被认为已经没有悬念——现在可能会出现竞争。


Absent from the Caracas summit was Chile’s president, Michelle Bachelet, who blamed a cold and a busy domestic agenda for her inability to travel.	智利总统米歇尔·巴切莱特缺席了加拉加斯峰会，理由是感冒和国内事务繁忙。


Political complications linked to a possible meeting with the Venezuelan opposition, which Bachelet had chosen not to attend (preferring to send her foreign minister), likely also played a part.	与委内瑞拉反对派会晤（巴切莱特已决意不亲自出席而是派外长代表）相关的政治并发症也可能是部分理由。


Rousseff and Bachelet were natural candidates to lead the development of a moderate counterweight to the populism of Maduro, Fernández, Morales, and Correa.	领导温和派对抗马杜罗、费尔南德斯、莫拉莱斯和科雷亚等民粹主义势力的自然是罗塞夫和巴切莱特。


But Rousseff, like her predecessor, the popular Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has chosen not to fill that role, instead cozying up to Venezuela.	但罗塞夫像她享有盛誉的前任路易斯·伊纳西奥·卢拉·达席尔瓦一样选择与其奉迎委内瑞拉，还不如放弃这一角色。


Chile is too small to go it alone, and Bachelet has her hands full with increasingly controversial tax, education, and constitutional reforms.	智利想要单干却实力不足。 而且巴切莱特也疲于应对争议越来越大的税务、教育和宪法改革。


Uruguay’s president, José Mujica, offered the best summary of what happened in Caracas: “We issued a statement.”	乌拉圭总统何塞·穆希卡对加拉加斯形势做出了最好的总结：“我们发表了声明。


In other words, Mercosur remains an irrelevant talking shop – and the emergence of a modern center-left regional leadership in Latin America will have to wait.	”换句话讲，加拉加斯仍然是无关紧要的清谈俱乐部——拉美现代中左翼地区领袖的崛起还不到时候。


The Third Way\u0027s Second Chance	第三条道路的第二次机会


SANTIAGO – Remember Tony Blair and Bill Clinton’s Third Way?	圣地亚哥—还记得布莱尔和克林顿的第三条道路（Third Way）吗？


It is back.	它回来了。


The faces and names have changed, but the idea that governments can – and should – combine social-democratic values and modern liberal economics has returned to center stage.	面貌和名字换过了，但政府可以——也应该——结合社会民主价值和现代自由经济学的思想又回到了中心舞台。


At a June 2000 gathering of leaders in Berlin, hosted by Germany’s then-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, the Third Way seemed like the way of the future.	在2000年6月由时任德国总理施罗德主持的柏林领导人会议上第三条道路似乎成了未来之路。


The gathering was Blair’s brainchild (though he did not attend because his wife had just had a child).	这次会议是布莱尔谋划的产物（尽管他因为妻子生产而没有出席）。


But Clinton held forth eloquently on how new technologies could help to solve age-old social ills.	但克林顿发表了关于新技术如何有助于解决旧时代社会弊端的雄辩的长篇演讲。


Leaders from Sweden and New Zealand argued that you could make the state both leaner and more effective.	瑞典和新西兰领导人指出你可以让国家变得更精干、更有效。


And the Third Way could travel well to what was once called the Third World, claimed South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki, Brazil’s Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and Chile’s Ricardo Lagos (I was present as part of Lagos’s delegation.)	而南非的姆贝基、巴西的卡多佐和智利的拉各斯（我也是拉各斯代表团的成员）宣称，第三条道路可以顺利地套用到所谓的第三世界头上。


Sadly, it was not to last.	不幸的是，这一幕并不长久。


The sound bites about progressive governance did not grow easily into a lasting political philosophy.	掷地有声的进步治理（progressive governance）论并没有轻松地变为持久的政治哲学。


Al Gore traded Clintonomics for traditional populism and was defeated by George W. Bush.	戈尔用克林顿经济学换取传统民粹主义，结果败给了小布什。


Social democrats and their allies lost power in several European countries.	社会民主党及其盟友在多个欧洲国家失去了权力。


The war in Iraq and the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 caused a backlash against some of the policies advocated by Third Way leaders.	伊拉克战争和2008—2009年全球金融危机导致第三条道路领导人所鼓吹的一些政策遭到严重抨击。


Fast forward to the present.	快速回到现状。


Italy’s 39-year-old socialist prime minister, Matteo Renzi, is often described as his country’s last hope.	39岁的意大利社会主义者总理伦齐常常被称为意大利最后的希望。


He is promising (though not quite yet delivering) deep labor-market and fiscal reforms.	他承诺（尽管没怎么兑现过）采取深刻的劳动力市场和财政改革。


After his electoral victory, Renzi received early kudos from Blair himself, who claimed that “Matteo has the dynamism, creativity, and toughness to succeed.”	在选举中胜出后，伦齐获得了来自布莱尔本人的赞美，布莱尔称“伦齐有活力、有创造力、有毅力，能获得成功。 ”


Manuel Valls, France’s Socialist prime minister, is staking his political capital on an ambitious program of tax and spending cuts that does not enjoy the backing of his party’s traditionalist wing.	法国的社会主义者总理瓦尔斯正在把政治资本押注于雄心勃勃的削减税收和支出计划，该计划并不受其所在政党传统派的支持。


Critics from the orthodox left accuse him of “taking solutions from Blair and Schröder.”	来自正统左派的批评指责他“照搬布莱尔和施罗德的方案。 ”


Renzi and Valls – along with Pedro Sánchez of Spain’s Socialist Party – are part of a broader trend.	伦齐和瓦尔斯——以及西班牙社会党（Socialist Party）的桑切斯（Pedro Sánchez）——是更广泛的趋势的一部分。


With the world economy growing slowly, many center-left politicians are trying to mobilize markets and jump-start growth while investing in jobs and skills.	随着世界经济增长放缓，许多中左翼政客试图在投资于就业和技能的同时动员市场、刺激增长。


Thus, dire need is the immediate explanation for the return of Third Way ideas.	因此，迫切的需要是回归第三条道路思想的直接原因。


It is not surprising that deeply indebted European governments are casting about for new social policies at a low fiscal cost.	毫不奇怪，债务重重的欧洲政府正在苦寻低财政成本的新社会政策。


But the harsh austerity advocated by Germany’s conservative government is not the same as the gradual adjustment sought by the new generation of Southern social democrats.	但德国保守主义政府所推行的严厉紧缩与新一代南欧社会民主党人所追求的渐进调整并不相同。


Conservatives demand fiscal adjustment up front, whatever the consequences.	保守派要求将财政调整放在首位，不管结果如何。


Modern social democrats who have read their Keynes understand that some immediate adjustment is necessary to make the program credible.	读过凯恩斯的现代社会民主党知道，一些立刻调整是使计划可信的必要条件。


But they also know that additional spending on human capital and physical infrastructure is necessary to limit the impact of fiscal retrenchment on employment and wages and to strengthen the economy’s growth potential.	但他们还知道，增加人力资本和实体基础设施支出是限制财政收缩对就业和工资的影响、强化经济的增长潜力的必要条件。


The other reason for giving Third Way ideas a second hearing is that they work.	另一个让第三条道路思想重获市场的原因是它管用。


Schröder’s reshaping of Germany’s labor market in the early 2000s was hugely controversial at the time; but, in retrospect, it turned Germany from the sick man of Europe into the continent’s export powerhouse.	施罗德在21世纪初重组德国劳动力市场的努力在当时引起了巨大的争议； 但是，事后看来，施罗德的努力将德国从欧洲病夫变为欧洲大陆的出口冠军。


The Nordic countries have led the way in experimenting with new ways to deliver public services while adopting “flexicurity” in labor relations.	北欧国家是实验新方法提供公共服务、同时采取劳动力关系上的“弹性保障”（flexicurity）的先锋。


The result: they have achieved the trifecta of robust growth, high employment, and low public debt.	结果：它们实现了稳增长、高就业、低公债的三重目标。


The effectiveness of these ideas is not limited to the rich countries of the North.	这���思想的效果并不局限于北欧富国。


The governments of the Concertación in Chile, Alan García in Peru, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil all derived inspiration from the Blair-Clinton-Schröder agenda.	智利民主联盟（Concertación）、秘鲁加西亚、巴西卡多佐政府都从布莱尔-克林顿-施罗德日程中汲取了灵感。


All had (or have) their share of controversies.	他们在各自国家都引起过（或引起着）争议。


But each undeniably launched an unprecedented period of democratic consolidation and economic modernization in their respective countries.	但他们都不可否认地开启了各自国家前所未有的民主整合和经济现代化过程。


In Brazil’s upcoming presidential election, both of the incumbent Dilma Rousseff’s main opponents are advocating policies that hark back to the good old days.	在即将到来的巴西总统选举中，现任总统罗塞夫的两名主要对手都在鼓吹回归昔日好时光的政策。


In the case of Aécio Neves, who belongs to Cardoso’s party, that is not surprising.	与卡多佐同一政党的内弗斯（Aécio Neves）这样做并不令人奇怪。


But it is remarkable in the case of socialist Marina Silva, who is calling for new trade pacts beyond Mercosur and for making the Central Bank of Brazil independent.	但社会主义者席尔瓦（Marina Silva）这么做相当令人瞩目。 她提出了签署超越南方共同市场（Mercosur）的新贸易契约、让巴西中央银行独立等口号。


Blair, who gave the Bank of England its full independence during his first week in office, would be proud.	在出任首相的第一周就授予英格兰银行完全独立地位的布莱尔一定会很自豪。


There are many differences across countries and time, but in the end four ideas are common to these successful experiences.	国家和时间存在很多不同，但最终这些成功经验中包含了四个共同思想。


The first is policy pragmatism.	首先是政策务实主义。


What matters is what works, not what is ideologically pure.	重要的是什么管用，而不是什么在意识形态上纯正。


Instead of the sterile and endless debate as to whether the state should be big or small, it is more fruitful to ask what kind of state intervention, and where.	争论国家应该大些还是小些既冗长又毫无意义，还不如问问什么类型的国家干预、在哪些地方进行干预更有效实在。


The second idea is fiscal realism.	第二个思想是财政现实主义。


Budgetary prudence is both desirable (unsustainable deficits owe their name to the fact that they cannot be sustained) and progressive (when things blow up, it is the poor and the vulnerable who suffer the most).	预算审慎值得追求（不可持续的赤字顾名思义是无法持续下去的），也具有进步性（当情况转坏时，穷人和脆弱群体受创最重）。


The third idea is modern welfarism.	第三个思想是现代福利国家。


The state can and should redistribute income and wealth, but in doing so it should not weaken incentives to work and to save.	国家可以也应该实行收入和财富再分配，但与此同时不能破坏工作和储蓄的激励。


Instead of simply providing handouts, governments should strive to guarantee good jobs at good wages.	政府不能只是做点宣传，而应该致力于保证好工作和好收入。


Finally, the Third Way is defined by progressive liberalism.	最后，第三条道路是由进步自由主义定义的。


Liberty and equality are complementary, not contradictory, principles.	自由和平等是互补而非矛盾的原则。


If the rules are designed properly, a society in which people decide and act freely can also be a society in which opportunities are fairly distributed.	如果规则得到合理制定，人民自由决定和行动的社会可以成为机会公平分布的社会。


And conversely, without minimum opportunity for all, liberty is more illusory than real.	反之，没有最低限度的人人平等，自由就只能是海市蜃楼。


These four ideas animate a Third Way that is now enjoying a second chance – though it should have been the first choice all along.	这四个思想未第三条道路注入了生命力，让它在今天获得了第二次机会——尽管它早就应该成为全人类的第一选择。


The Lawless Sea	无法之海


SANTIAGO – The rule of law is almost entirely absent, with virtually no governance or policing.	圣地亚哥—法治精神几乎完全不存在，基本没有治理和政策可言。


Illegal, unreported, and unregulated economic activities are common.	非法的、地下的、不受监管的经济活动猖獗。


The powerful seize non-renewable resources at the expense of the powerless.	强者蹂躏弱者，抢夺不可再生资源。


Environmental degradation is on the rise.	环境破坏日益加剧。


That may sound like a description of a failed state, a desperately poor country beset by civil war, or a fictional dystopia.	这听起来像是在描述某个失败国家，一个饱受内战摧残的绝望穷国，或是虚构异邦。


But it is none of the above.	非也。


The vast region (45% of the earth’s total surface) with next to no governance or rule of law is the high seas – nearly two-thirds of the global ocean that lies outside of any country’s jurisdiction.	有一片接近无政府状态的广袤之地（占地球表面的45%），它的名字叫作公海。 全球近三分之二的海域处于所有国家的法律辖区之外。


How is this possible?	这是如何形成的？


After all, there is the legally binding 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which has been ratified by 166 states and the European Union.	毕竟，1982年就有了具备法律约束力的联合国海洋法公约（United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea，简称UNCLOS），166个国家和欧盟在公约上签了字。


When UNCLOS was negotiated, the high seas were protected because they were inaccessible.	在UNCLOS尚处于谈判阶段时，公海是受保护的，因为它们很难进入。


But technological advances have enabled the exploitation of resources to extend farther and deeper than ever before.	但科技进步使得资源勘探能够在比以往任何时候更远更深的地方进行。


Fishing vessels can now operate across the ocean, and deep-sea drilling provides a growing proportion of our oil and gas.	如今，渔船可以全球作业，深海钻井提供的石油和天然气比例日益增加。


UNCLOS has not kept pace with these developments.	UNCLOS已经跟不上时代的发展了。


Industries and activities such as fisheries, shipping, and seabed mining are all regulated separately.	渔业、航运和海底采掘等行业和活动的监管是各自独立的。


No governance framework is in place for emerging high-seas industries such as energy production.	对能源生产等新兴公海产业则没有治理框架可言。


Transparency and accountability are weak, and there is little enforcement of rules.	透明和问责情况堪忧，也没有执法活动。


Moreover, the authorities have limited power to intercept vessels suspected of illegal activity.	此外，当局拦截可疑非法活动船只的权力有限。


As a result, international cooperation to counter illegal fishing, smuggling of weapons and drugs, human trafficking, piracy, and the use of vessels in terrorist operations has been greatly hampered.	结果，针对非法捕鱼、武器和毒品走私、人口贩卖、海盗以及从事恐怖活动船只的国际合作大受掣肘。


The consequences are dire.	结果是可怕的。


The ocean is our planet’s life-support-system, keeping it healthy and productive.	海洋是地球的生命支持系统，地球的健康和生产力全仰仗海洋。


But overfishing and pollution are causing tremendous damage.	但过度捕捞和污染正在造成严重伤害。


Marine debris causes the death by drowning, suffocation, or starvation of some one million seabirds and around 100,000 marine mammals (seals, whales, and dolphins) every year, not to mention the hazard posed to shipping by sea junk.	海洋废物每年要导致一百万海鸟和100,000海生哺乳动物（海豹、鲸鱼和海豚）因为溺水、窒息或饥饿而死去。


Plastic pollution – including pellets and micro plastics that enter food chains and can endanger human health – is a growing problem.	塑料污染——包括碎片和进入食物链的有害于人类健康的塑料微粒——正在成为日益严重的问题。


Likewise, rising temperatures are reducing the ocean's oxygen-carrying capacity.	类似地，温度的升高正在导致海水携氧能力下降。


The increasing uptake of carbon dioxide is causing ocean acidification and unprecedented changes in chemical and physical conditions, which in turn are affecting marine organisms and ecosystems.	二氧化碳吸收量的增加正在导致海洋酸化和前所未有的化学和物理性质改变，反过来影响海洋生物和生态系统。


The very life of the global ocean is under threat.	全球海洋中的每一个生命都在受到威胁。


The time has come to bring the rule of law to the high seas.	如今，我们需要将海洋法引入公海，这也是全球海洋委员会（Global Ocean Commission）的初衷。


That is the purpose behind the Global Ocean Commission, an independent international body comprising former heads of state, ministers, and business leaders.	全球海洋委员会是由前国家首脑、政府部长和商界领袖组成的独立国际机构。


I am one of the commissioners.	我也是委员之一。


Last week, we proposed a rescue package that offers eight proposals to improve governance and restore ocean health.	上周，我们提出了包括八项改善治理、重塑海洋健康措施的一揽子补救计划。


To strengthen high-seas governance, the Global Ocean Commission is joining the call for a new agreement under UNCLOS to protect biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction.	为了强化公海治理，全球海洋委员会呼吁形成一个基于UNCLOS的新协议以保护国家法律管辖区之外区域的生物多样性。


Less than 1% of the high seas is currently protected, so it is crucial that this new agreement includes provisions for creating protected areas in the high seas.	目前只有不到1%的公海海域得到了保护，因此新协议包括了在公海建立保护区的条款，这一点十分关键。


We are also proposing that an international convention be adopted to establish liability and compensation for both economic losses and ecological damage caused by offshore oil and gas exploration and production, which should also always be subject to legally binding safety protocols.	我们还建议采取国际公约为离岸油气开采和生产所造成的经济损失和生态破坏规定责任和补偿。 离岸油气开采和生产活动也应该受到具法律约束力的安全协议的管辖。


Despite overfishing, a handful of countries – including the United States, Japan, and China, as well as the EU – are artificially supporting industrial high-seas fishing.	尽管已处于过度捕捞状态，但一小撮国家——包括美国、日本和中国，以及欧盟——仍有意识地支持工业公海捕捞。


Without subsidies, high-seas fisheries would not be financially viable.	若无补贴，公海捕鱼作业根本无利可图。


We are proposing that subsidies be capped immediately and eliminated within five years, and that countries be fully transparent about all fishing subsidies, about 60% of which directly encourage unsustainable practices.	我们建议立刻限制公海捕鱼补贴并在五年内取消这项补贴，各国的渔业补贴应该完全透明，并将60%左右用于直接鼓励可持续渔业作业。


Moreover, to eliminate illegal fishing, which strips our oceans of marine life, we are calling for mandatory identification numbers and the tracking of all high-seas fishing vessels, and a total ban on transshipment at sea.	此外，为了取缔扼住���洋和海洋生命咽喉的非法捕捞，我们呼吁采取强制性身份编号制度，追踪所有公海渔船，并彻底禁止海上转运。


By closing loopholes, we will finally close our ports and markets to illegally obtained fish.	通过填补漏洞，我们最终将让非法捕捞的渔获无法靠岸、失去市场。


An independent Global Ocean Accountability Board – the creation of which we are also proposing – should monitor progress on all of these fronts.	应该由独立的全球海洋问责委员会（Global Ocean Accountability Board，亦是我们建议采取的措施之一）监控所有这些领域的进展。


In five years, if ocean decline continues and adequate prevention measures have not been implemented, the international community should consider turning the high seas – with the exception of those areas where action by regional fisheries management organizations is effective – into a regeneration zone where industrial fishing is forbidden.	如果海洋恶化情况持续，并且不能采取足够的保护措施，那么不出五年，国际社会就不得不考虑将公海——地区渔业管理组织行为有效的区域除外——作为禁止工业捕鱼的保育区。


We can reverse ocean degradation, and turn the cycle of decline into a cycle of renewal.	我们能够扭转海洋环境恶化的局面。 将恶化循环转变为再生循环。


We know what needs to be done to restore ocean health, but we cannot do it alone.	我们知道需要怎样做重塑海洋健康，但我们无法单枪匹马完成。


Delivering change will take political will and require joint efforts by governments, businesses, and civil society.	带来变化需要政治意愿，也需要政府、企业和公民社会的共同努力。


It can and must be done.	这可以做到，也必须做到。


Join our mission at http://missionocean.me.	请加入我们：http://missionocean. me。


The time to act is now.	现在就必须采取行动。


Unless we respond with strong governance and the necessary tools to enforce regulations, ruthless pirate fishing will continue with impunity, there will be no binding international safety standards for deep sea oil and gas drilling, and plastic pollution and abandoned fishing gear will continue to proliferate.	除非我们采取强力治理、动用必要手段执行监管，否则猖獗的盗捕将继续无法无天，将不会有针对深海油气钻井的具有约束力的国际安全标准，塑料污染和废弃捕捞工具将继续增加。


The more the global ocean struggles for life, the more our children and future generations will struggle for theirs.	全球海洋生存状况越恶劣，我们的子孙后代的生存状况也会越恶劣。


Argentina’s Use and Abuse of Keynes	阿根廷利用和滥用凯恩斯理论


BUENOS AIRES – “We are all Keynesians now,” Republican US President Richard Nixon famously said in 1971.	布宜诺斯艾利斯——众所周知，美国共和党总统尼克松曾于1971年公开表示“现在我们都是凯恩斯主义者。


Today, Axel Kicillof, Argentina’s Peronist economy minister, is echoing this sentiment.	”阿根廷奉行庇隆主义的经济部长阿克塞尔·基奇洛夫现在和尼克松的看法如出一辙。


Is he right?	他究竟是对是错？


Kicillof has gained international recognition as the public face of Argentina’s fight against the so-called vulture funds that want to extort full payment on Argentine bonds that they purchased for a few pennies on the dollar.	基奇洛夫举世闻名因为他是阿根廷对抗所谓秃鹫基金的代表人物，这些基金以几美分的价格购入面值1美元的阿根廷债券，并试图勒索阿根廷全额支付。


But, before joining President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s cabinet, Kicillof was known in Argentine intellectual circles as the author of the book Volver a Keynes (Return to Keynes).	但是在加盟克里斯蒂娜·费尔南德斯·基什内尔总统的内阁前，基奇洛夫在阿根廷知识界闻名是因为一本名为回归凯恩斯主义的著作。


Last week, addressing a gilded ballroom packed with the elite of Argentina’s business community, Kicillof explained the government’s policies as a real-world application of Keynesian theories.	上周，在被阿根廷商界精英挤得水泄不通的金色宴会厅讲话时，基奇洛夫将政府政策解释为凯恩斯主义理论的现实应用。


In an hour-long speech, he made two key points.	长达一小时的讲话关键点主要有两个。


First, Kicillof attributed Argentina’s rapid economic growth in the years between its 2001 debt default and the 2008 global financial crisis to a Keynesian reflation of domestic aggregate demand.	首先，基奇洛夫把阿根廷2001年债务违约和2008年全球金融危机间经济快速增长的年份归因为国内总需求的凯恩斯主义景气恢复。


Keynes made a tremendous intellectual contribution in showing that supply in a market economy does not necessarily create its own demand, and that demand shortfalls can cause avoidable recessions.	凯恩斯的巨大贡献在于证明市场经济供给并不一定能够创造需求，而这种需求的缺失可能导致的经济衰退本来是可以避免的。


Is this logic at work in Argentina?	这样的逻辑在阿根廷能否适用？


When the Argentine economy imploded in 2001, citizens lost their jobs and firms lost their access to credit, causing domestic demand to collapse.	2001年阿根廷经济崩盘时，民众丢掉工作企业失去信贷，导致国内需求瞬间萎缩。


Output fell sharply.	产量跌入低谷。


But, as the country abandoned the one-to-one currency peg to the US dollar, the real exchange rate depreciated.	但当阿根廷废除货币与美元1：1挂钩时，实际汇率大幅下降。


This shifted demand away from imports toward domestically produced goods.	这导致了从进口向本国产品的需求转折。


Next, a sharp rise in the price of food exports, heavily taxed in Argentina, augmented government revenues, providing the cash to finance increased expenditure.	之后粮食出口价格大幅上涨，而这部分出口在阿根廷税收很重，政府收入因此而增加，积累了足够的现金用于增加支出。


Given Argentina’s isolation from world financial markets, its central bank could cut domestic interest rates with limited fear of capital flight.	因为阿根廷几乎孤立于国际金融市场，其央行可以在无惧资本外逃的情况下下调国内利率。


The fiscal and monetary impulse supported a rapid recovery.	财政及货币刺激共同支撑了国内经济快速恢复。


At first glance, Kicillof seems to be correct; this looks like textbook Keynesian reflation.	乍看上去基奇洛夫似乎很有道理； 这确实与教科书式的凯恩斯通货再膨胀极为相似。


But Keynes would not have approved of the macroeconomic policies pursued by Fernández and her predecessor and husband, the late Néstor Kirchner.	但凯恩斯本人恐怕并不会赞成费尔南德斯及其前任兼丈夫（已故的内斯托尔·基什内尔）所推行的宏观经济政策。


A Keynesian approach would ensure that demand does not fall short of supply.	凯恩斯主义政策会首先确保需求不会和供应相差甚远。


The Kirchners have made sure that demand far exceeds supply.	基什内尔夫妇已经确保需求远远大于供给水平。


The fact that Argentina’s annual inflation rate has stood at 20% or more for over a decade clearly illustrates this – and cannot be obscured by frozen utility rates and repeated manipulation of the consumer price index.	阿根廷年通胀率10多年来一直维持在20%甚至更高的事实清楚地说明了这一点——人为冻结的公用产品价格和一而再再而三的消费物价指数操纵掩盖不了真正的现实状况。


Kicillof’s second point was that Argentina’s businesses and consumers should not succumb to pessimism.	基奇洛夫在讲话中强调的第二点是阿根廷企业和消费者不应向悲观低头。


Alluding to Keynes’s theories about self-fulfilling expectations, he warned that, if people expect things to go wrong, they will.	他提到了凯恩斯的预期自我实现理论，并警告人们如果预期会出问题，那么预期就会变为现实。


Keynes did say – and it was a very important insight – that a capitalist economy resembles a beauty contest, with judges voting not for the most beautiful contestant, but for the contestant whom they believe their colleagues will find most beautiful.	凯恩斯的确说过资本主义经济就像一场选美比赛，评委们选出的不是最漂亮的选手，而是他们心目中同事认为最漂亮的。 这一观点非常重要。


Shifts in expectations can thus alter the outcome.	预期的变化可以改变结果。


But Argentines are not pessimistic about the economy because other Argentines are pessimistic.	但阿根廷人并不是因为其他阿根廷人悲观才对经济持悲观态度。


They are pessimistic because the economy’s fundamentals are weak – a fundamental difference.	他们悲观是因为经济基本面疲弱——两者之间有着本质的不同。


In 1991, the Nobel laureate economist Paul Krugman, who is perhaps the world’s leading Keynesian today, showed that whether or not expectations are self-fulfilling depends on underlying economic conditions.	1991年，诺贝尔经济学奖得主保罗·克鲁格曼（也许是当今世界最具威望的凯恩斯主义者）告诉人们预期能否自我实现取决于基本的经济条件。 如果经济基本面非常薄弱，危机迟早会不可避免的发生；


If an economy’s fundamentals are very weak, a crisis will inevitably occur sooner or later; if its fundamentals are very strong, a crisis never happens; and if they are in an intermediate range, a crisis happens if – and only if – people expect one.	如果基本面非常强劲，危机永远不会发生； 但如果基本面不上不下，那么危机有且只有在人们预期发生时才会发生。


A couple of years ago, the eurozone was in the latter situation.	几年前欧元区的情况属于后一种。


That is why European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s pledge to do “whatever it takes” to save the euro immediately brought the eurozone’s debt crisis to a halt.	欧洲央行行长德拉吉“不惜一切代价”拯救欧元的承诺即刻阻止了欧元区债务危机。


(The growth crisis, of course, has yet to be resolved.)	（当然，发展危机仍尚未解除。 ）


But Argentina is not the eurozone.	但阿根廷毕竟不是欧元区。


There is nothing that Kicillof could say today that would have the soothing effect that Draghi’s promise did.	无论基奇洛夫说得如何天花乱坠都不可能有德拉吉承诺那样的抚慰效果。


Argentines today feel much like Dorothy did when she first landed in Oz – they are not in the safe and familiar “Kansas” anymore.	今天的阿根廷人感觉很像刚刚踏上奥兹土地的多萝西——他们已经远离了安全熟悉的“堪萨斯”故土。


But Keynes is not to blame. Kicillof and Kirchner are.	但凯恩斯不应为此承担责任，基奇洛夫和基什内尔才是始作俑者。


The High Cost of Ocean Decline	海洋退化的沉重代价


SANTIAGO – The world’s oceans are in trouble.	圣地亚哥—地球的海洋陷入了麻烦。


In late September, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reported that the oceans are warming, seawater is acidifying, and oxygen concentrations are dropping.	在刚刚过去的9月，政府间气候变化委员会（Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change）报告说海洋正在变暖，海水正在变酸，氧气浓度正在下降。


Last week, another initiative, the International Program on the State of the Ocean, outlined the toll that these and other factors, such as destructive fishing and pollution, are having on marine life.	上周，另一个项目国际海洋状态计划（International Program on the State of the Ocean）列出了以上这些因素和其他因素（比如破坏性捕捞和污染）对海洋生物的影响。


Ocean degradation is not as visible as deforestation, but it is at least as dangerous.	海洋环境恶化不像森林退化那样清晰可见，但其危害并不在其下。


The oceans provide at least half of the oxygen we breathe.	我们所呼吸的氧气中至少有一半来自海洋。


They absorb more carbon dioxide than forests do.	海洋吸收的二氧化碳比森林还要多。


Harm to the oceans can have a tremendous global impact.	伤害海洋会给全球带来严重影响。


Degradation is particularly serious in the one substantial part of the world that is governed internationally – the high seas.	环境恶化在由国际治理的广袤公海上尤其严重。 这些水域处于专属经济区海域之外；


These waters are outside maritime states’ exclusive economic zones; they comprise two-thirds of the oceans’ area, covering fully 45% of the earth’s surface.	它们构成了海洋总面积的三分之二，覆盖了整整45%的地球表面。


The Global Ocean Commission, an independent initiative that I joined earlier this year, is reviewing the condition of the high seas.	全球海洋委员会（Global Ocean Commission，这是一项独立项目，我在今年早些时候加入其中）正在检视公海的情况。


Next year, it will produce a set of recommendations concerning how to restore our oceans to full health and ecological productivity.	明年，全球海洋委员会将给出一系列关于如何让海洋恢复健康、重建生态生产力的建议。


One of the first tasks is to quantify the economic losses caused by ocean degradation.	首批任务之一是对海洋环境恶化带来的经济损失做出定量分析。


Back in 1997, a pioneering paper by Robert Costanza and his colleagues put the overall value of marine ecosystem services at $21 trillion.	1997年，克斯坦扎（Robert Costanza）及其同事所撰写的开创性论文推算海洋生态系统功能的总价值为21万亿美元。


Others have estimated that illegal fishing costs the global economy $10-23.5 billion per year, and poor management of fisheries $50 billion per year.	其他人估算每年非法捕捞给全球经济造成100—235亿美元损失； 渔场管理不善每年造成500亿美元损失。


But these figures are nearly a decade old; the Commission will update these estimates and make them more precise.	但这些都是十年前的数字，全球海洋委员会将对这些数字进行更新，使它们更加准确。


It is not enough to document that the losses are big.	光证明损失巨大是不够的。


Obviously, the next question is what to do about it.	显然，下一个问题是对此应该怎样做。


No single official body has overall responsibility for the high seas.	没有哪个官方机构对可以对公海完全负责。


So, even if the economic losses turn out to be much higher than previous estimates, there are currently few effective mechanisms to bring about change.	因此，即使经济损失远高于先前的估计，目前也没有有效的机制能够改变局面。


The basic pillar of ocean governance, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, was established 30 years ago.	海洋治理的主要支柱——联合国海洋法公约（United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea）——是30年前的产物。


Since then, huge technological advances have occurred, and demand for resources has increased massively.	30年来，技术早已日新月异，对资源的需求也有了极大的增长。


So stopping and reversing the degradation of the world’s oceans requires improved governance mechanisms, which must be used to enforce economically sensible and innovative solutions.	因此停止并逆转全球海洋环境破坏之势需要改善治理机制，必须通过改善后的机制强化经济可行性和创新性解决方案。


Here the experience of countries fighting against deforestation is helpful.	在这方面，具有治理森林退化经验的国家可以起到很大帮助。


Costa Rica arguably started a trend in the early 1990’s, when it began levying taxes on fossil fuels and using the revenue to protect forests.	哥斯达黎加的森林治理大约始于20世纪90年代初，该国对化石燃料征税，用所得收入保护森林。


The net result was a reversal of deforestation.	净结果是森林退化之势得到了扭转。


The economy has benefited directly through a growth in tourism, and indirectly by preserving ecosystem services such as pollination.	哥斯达黎加经济也直接受益于旅游业的增长，间接受益于生态系统功能（如授粉）的保护。


The concept of payment for ecosystem services is currently receiving attention from governments around the world.	为生态系统功能而支付的概念目前正在受到全世界各国政府的关注。


Costa Rica and Colombia have both signed up to a program funded by donor governments.	哥斯达黎加和哥伦比亚都签署了由赞助国政府出资的计划。


Brazil has schemes that pay for protecting watercourses.	巴西出台了为保护河道而支付的计划。


An initiative called REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) would pay for ecosystem services on a global scale by rewarding forest conservation, thereby regulating climate change.	REDD（从森林采伐和森林退化中减少排放）计划将通过奖励森林保护为全球范围的生态系统功能支付，从而校正气候变化。


These ideas should receive more attention in the future, as our supplies of non-renewable resources dwindle.	在未来，这些思想应该得到更多的注意，因为我们的不可再生资源供给正在枯竭。


When the Global Ocean Commission issues its recommendations for reform next year, economics will be at their heart.	在全球海洋委员会明年发布其改革建议中，经济分析将是核心内容。


Once we have more accurate data on the value of the ocean, we must decide how we use this information.	掌握了关于海洋价值的更准确的数据后，我们必须决定如何使用这一信息。


Payment for ecosystem services could be a solution, though there are likely to be simpler options.	为生态系统功能支付时解决方案之一，尽管可能还有更简单的选择。


But whichever mechanism is eventually adopted, we must also address the governance question: today’s inadequate system allows both economic and ecological losses to persist.	但不管最后采取何种机制，我们都必须解决治理问题：今天的制度健全将导致经济和生态损失持续发生。


The Commission will share its recommendations with governments.	全球海洋委员会将与各国政府共享其建议。


There are tremendous costs associated with allowing the current laissez-faire regime to continue.	让当前的自由放任机制继续运行下去会带来极高的代价。


We hope leaders understand that the world’s oceans – and the ecosystem services they provide – are too important to be allowed to fail.	我们希望各国领导人明白，地球的海洋——及其所提供的生态系统功能——十分重要，不容我们失败。


Secular Stagnation Heads South	长期停滞南进


SANTIAGO – As commodity prices come back to earth and the Federal Reserve’s gradual exit from quantitative easing leads to higher interest rates in the United States, Latin America’s economies face the challenge of sustaining growth.	圣地亚哥—商品价格重回人间，美联储也将逐渐退出量化宽松，这推高了美国的利率，拉美经济体面临可持续增长的挑战。


The region’s main economies recorded slower GDP growth in 2013, and much the same is being forecast for 2014.	2013年，拉美地区主要经济体增长纷纷减速，预计2014年亦将如此。


It is pretty clear by now that an extraordinarily benevolent external environment, not a revolutionary policy shift, underpinned Latin America’s rapid growth in the years following the 2008-2009 global economic crisis.	如今，显而易见的是，2008—2009年全球经济危机之后几年中拉美的快速增长并非来自革命性的政策变化，而是来自极为有利的外部环境。


As long as the price of soy, wheat, copper, oil, and other raw materials remained stratospheric, commodity-rich countries like Brazil, Chile, and Peru got a tremendous boost; even Argentina grew rapidly, despite terrible economic policies.	只要大豆、小麦、铜、石油和其他原材料价格居高不下，巴西、智利和秘鲁等商品富裕国就能得到很大的提振； 甚至经济政策十分糟糕的阿根廷增长也十分迅速。


But now “secular stagnation” – the concept du jour in US policy debates since former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers argued last November that the US (and perhaps other advanced economies) has entered a long period of anemic GDP growth – may also be coming to Latin America.	但如今，“长期停滞”——自从前美国财政部张拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）在去年11月指出美国（或许也包括其他发达经济体）进入了长期的GDP增长萎靡阶段以来，这个新兴概念便成为美国政策争论中的热词——可能将来到拉丁美洲。


The argument goes like this: high consumer debt, slowing population growth, and rising income inequality have weakened consumer demand and stimulated savings, while slowing growth in productivity and output itself has discouraged investment.	道理是这样的：消费者债务高企、人口增长下降和不平等的恶化削弱了消费需求、刺激了储蓄，而生产率和产出本身增长放缓抑制了投资。


So the “natural” rate of interest – the rate at which the demand for investment equals the supply of savings – has fallen, and arguably has become negative.	因此，“自然”利率——使投资需求等于储蓄供给的利率——下降了，甚至下降到负水平。


But, because real interest rates cannot be strongly negative unless inflation is high (which it is not), there is a savings glut.	但是，由于实际利率不可能处于严重负水平（除非通胀很高，现实并非如此），因此就产生了储蓄过剩。


With consumption and investment lagging, the US economy is bound to stagnate.	在消费和投资的拖累下，美国经济将注定陷入停滞。


But how could such a situation apply to Latin America, where GDP growth is faster, interest rates are higher, and domestic demand is stronger than in the US?	但这套理论为何适用于拉美呢？ 相比美国，拉美的增长更快、利率更高、内需也更强。


Consider the region’s history.	考察一下拉美的历史。


Until the recent commodity-driven boomlet, growth in Latin America was mediocre.	在最近的商品驱动繁荣之前，拉美的增长并无亮点可寻。


The 1980’s are known as the “lost decade,” owing to a debt crisis and massive recessions, while the market-based reforms of the 1990’s did little to reignite short-run growth.	20世纪80年代饱受债务危机和大规模衰退困扰，被称为“失去的十年”，与此同时，20世纪90年代的市场改革也未能提振短期增长。


From 1960 to 2007, only four countries in Latin America and the Caribbean – Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, and Panama – grew faster than the US.	从1996年到2007年，拉美和加勒比地区只有四个国家——巴西、智利、多米尼加和巴拿马——增长快于美国。


So meager growth in the coming years would be a return to Latin America’s historical pattern, not a deviation from it.	因此未来几年增长率下降只不过是回到了拉美的老路上去，而不是脱离历史轨迹。


That brings us back to secular stagnation.	这把我们拉回了长期停滞。


Yes, Latin American countries’ average per capita GDP is only one-quarter that of the US, so they should be growing faster than their rich northern neighbor.	诚然，拉美国家平均人均GDP只有美国的四分之一，因此应该比这个北方邻国增长得更快。


The question is how much faster.	问题在于快多少。


Stagnation in this context means a growth rate that is too low to ensure convergence toward US living standards within a reasonable period of time.	在这一背景下，停滞意味着在相当长的时间内，增长率不足以确保生活水平向美国看齐。


Unlike the US, Latin American economies’ actual output is at or near potential, so growing more means investing more.	与美国不同，拉美经济体的实际产出达到或接近了其潜在水平，因此提振增长需要增加投资。


Yet investment has been disappointing.	但投资一直令人失望。


And the region’s problem is not too much domestic savings, but too little.	拉美地区的问题不是国内储蓄过多，而是过少。


Latin American countries save 18% of GDP, on average, compared to 30% in fast-growing East Asia.	拉美国家储蓄占GDP之比平均为18%，而高增长的东亚为30%。


As a result, every time investment picks up in Latin America, it has to be financed with loans from abroad.	因此，每当拉美投资开始增加，就必须从国外拉贷款。


Foreign investors are willing to live with the resulting current-account deficits, but only up to a point.	外国投资者愿意接受经常项目赤字增加的结果，但有一个限度。


It took only a few words from Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke last May – announcing the eventual end of quantitative easing – for markets to lose confidence in emerging economies with current-account deficits near or above 4% of GDP.	去年5月，美联储主席伯南克只是轻描淡写地说了几句话——宣布量化宽松终于要告一段落了——便摧毁了这批经常项目赤字占GDP的4%上下的新兴经济体的信心。


Brazil was the most prominent among the Latin American economies under attack, but analysts worried about similar vulnerabilities elsewhere in the region.	巴西受到的冲击尤为严重，但分析师担心拉美地区其他国家同样脆弱。


As a result, now, as in the recent past, whenever foreigners get jittery, financing and investment in Latin America are curtailed, and growth suffers.	因此，与过去一样，如今只要外国人感到紧张，拉美的融资和投资就会削减，增长也会受阻。


The scarcity of savings in the region reflects the weak incentives embedded in poorly designed tax and pension systems.	拉美地区的储蓄稀缺反映了设计不合理的税收和退休金制度带来的不良激励。


But savings performance is also related to long-standing fiscal problems.	但储蓄表现也与长期财政问题有关。


To be sure, the fiscal stance improved in many Latin American economies in the years leading up to 2007, so countries like Chile were able to mount a strong anti-crisis fiscal response.	诚然，在2007年前，许多拉美经济体的财政状况有所改善，因此智利等国家能够实施强有力的反危机财政措施。


But, as a 2013 Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) report makes clear, the fiscal stimulus was not always withdrawn in time when the crisis abated, so the fiscal position across the region today is weaker than it was in 2007.	但是，泛美开发银行（IADB）的一份2013年报告明确指出，财政刺激并不总能在危机过去后及时推出，因此现在拉美地区的财政状况比2007年更加疲软。


The composition of government spending is also a problem.	政府支出的组成也有问题。


According to the same IADB report, investment accounts for only 16% of fiscal outlays, less than half the share in emerging Asia.	根据上述IADB报告，投资只占财政总支出的16%，还不到新兴亚洲的比例的一半。


So Latin America suffers from a longstanding infrastructure deficit, which acts as a drag on growth.	因此拉美长期饱受技术设施赤字的困扰，已成为增长的拖累因素。


Even abundant domestic savings in the future would not guarantee higher investment.	即使未来国内储蓄有余也不能保证投资的提高。


Firms’ eagerness to invest depends on how much additional output they can get out of that investment, and recent productivity growth in Latin America – as in the US – has been disappointing.	企业的投资意愿取决于可以从投资中收获多少产出增量，而目前拉美（以及美国）的生产率增长令人失望。


Lagging productivity has many causes, but one is the failure to diversify local economic structures.	生产率滞后的原因问多，但其中之一是没有事先本地经济结构的多样化。


Economies become more productive either by doing what they do more efficiently, or by shifting resources into new sectors in which productivity is higher – a process that can be observed (or not) by looking at export diversification.	要提高经济的生产率，要么增加效率，要么把资源转移到生产率较高的新部门——这一过程是否发生，可以通过观察出口多样化程度了解。


And the sad fact is that today most Latin American countries – Mexico being a notable exception – export pretty much the same goods that they exported a generation ago.	悲惨的事实是，如今大部分拉美国家——墨西哥是个显著的例外——所出口的东西与二十年前几乎没有变化。


That is yet another big difference between the region and East Asia.	这是拉美和东亚的又一显著差异。


So, can Latin American economies keep growing once commodity prices and world interest rates edge back toward normality?	因此，拉美经济体能够在商品价格和世界利率回归正常水平的情况下保持增长吗？


We in the region hope they can.	作为拉美人，我们希望答案是肯定的。


But a return to stagnation is also a possibility – one that can be minimized only if policymakers acknowledge it and begin taking preventive action right away.	但恢复停滞也是可能的——只有决策者承认这一点并正确地采取预防措施，才能让这一可能性最小化。


The Humanities Crisis	人文科学危机


NEW YORK – A striking symmetry is emerging in debates about the future of higher education around the world.	纽约—关于高等教育的未来，全世界的讨论显示出惊人的对称性。


On the one hand, there is growing concern that the United States and many European countries are failing to prepare enough university graduates in the fields driving the twenty-first century “knowledge economy,” such as engineering and information technology.	一方面，越来越多的人担心，在推动二十一世纪“知识经济”的领域，如工程和信息技术，美国和许多欧洲国家无法拿出足够的大学毕业生。


This fear has led to the narrowing of the concept of education to mean the acquisition of practical skills.	这一担忧导致了教育这一概念的狭隘化，使其专指实践技能的获得。