Instead, European companies slashed annual investment by more than €100 billion ($113 billion) a year from 2008 to 2015, and have stockpiled some €700 billion of cash on their balance sheets.	相反，2008—2015年间欧洲公司的年投资规模减少了1,000亿欧元以上，而在资产负债表上囤积了大约7,000亿欧元现金。


This is not surprising – businesses invest when they are confident about future demand and output growth.	这并不令人奇怪——企业在它们对未来需求和产出增长充满信心时投资。


Even before the Brexit vote, European and other global companies were not confident in Europe’s prospects.	即使在英国退出投票前，欧洲和其他全球公司对欧洲的前景也不抱信心。


Now they are confronting elevated risks of a European recession and the real possibility that both the UK and the EU could break up if populist contagion takes hold.	如今，它们面临着欧洲衰退风险升级和民粹主义蔓延导致英国和欧盟解体的实实在在的可能性。


Business investors hate uncertainty and the Brexit vote has created a dramatically more uncertain world in Europe and beyond.	商业投资者厌恶不确定性，而英国退出在欧洲内外造成了巨大的新增不确定性。


Fiscal austerity and ultra-low interest rates have also proven ineffective at stimulating household demand – and they may be backfiring.	财政紧缩和极低利率也没能有效刺激家庭需求——并且可能适得其反。


When individuals cannot find decent yields, they may actually increase their savings to achieve their retirement goals.	当个人无法获得体面的收益率时，他们实际可能增加储蓄以实现退休目标。


And in the typical European city, where land and affordable housing are in short supply, lower interest rates have been driving property prices higher rather than stimulating construction.	而在典型的欧洲城市，土地和平价房产供给短缺，降低利率进一步推高了房价，而不是刺激了建筑业。


It’s well past time to acknowledge the limits of current policy.	承认当前政策的局限性良机已过。


Under today’s precarious conditions, demand could certainly be better supported through strategies other than quantitative easing and ultra-low interest rates.	在眼下的危险情况中，需求显然更应该通过战略而不是量化宽松和极低利率来支持。


Moreover, alternative approaches to stimulate private demand might have fewer undesirable distributional consequences, as MGI has discussed.	此外，如MGI所讨论的，刺激私人需求的其他方法可能产生更少的不良分配后果。


Proponents of helicopter money – directly crediting citizens with central bank funds, or crediting national treasuries to finance infrastructure and other demand-generating activities – rightly argue that it has the advantage of putting money directly into the hands of those who will spend it.	直升机撒钱——直接用央行资金授信给公民，或授信国家财政机关为基础设施和其他产生需求的活动融资——的支持者正确地指出，它具有将钱直接送到会花钱的人手里的优点。


An appropriately sized helicopter-money program might also raise inflation in a measured way, heading off the possibility of a Japanese-style deflationary trap.	规模合理的直升机撒钱计划还可以可控地提高通胀，避免日本式通缩陷阱的风险。


Indeed, the boost to demand might give central banks the opening they need to move interest rates back toward historical norms.	事实上，需求提振可能让央行获得让利率回归历史正常水平所需要的机会。


This could take the air out of incipient assets bubbles that might be forming and ease pressures on institutional investors who are struggling to find the yield they need to meet their insurance and pension commitments.	这可以扼杀萌芽之中的资产泡沫，缓解苦苦寻觅满足保险和退休金要求的收益率的机构投资者的压力。


But a helicopter-money program – a fanciful idea when Milton Friedman proposed it in 1969 – would also be a radical departure for policymakers, requiring an abundance of caution about citizen and investor perception, confidence, and solid governance structures.	但直升机撒钱计划——这一金融概念由弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）于1969年提出——也将是决策者的一次严重的离经叛道，需要公民和投资者认知有充分的谨慎、信心和可靠的治理结构。


And such an approach would cement the notion that central bank policy is “the only game in town,” relieving elected government leaders of their responsibility for pro-growth policies and the fiscal decisions they control.	这一方针将巩固央行政策是“唯一的游戏”的概念，让民选政府摆脱促增长政策的责任，解除它们的财政决定控制权。


A less risky and time-tested route for stimulating demand would be a significant increase in public infrastructure investment funded by government debt.	一个风险较小、经历时间考验的刺激需求的方法是大幅增加政府债务融资的公共基础设施投资。


It is well documented that Europe and the United States have underinvested in infrastructure.	大量证据表明欧洲和美国基础设施投资不足。


From a macroeconomic perspective, infrastructure investment is a “twofer”– it strengthens productivity and competitiveness in the long run and, where there is unused capacity, it boosts demand, output, and employment with significant multiplier effects in the short run.	从宏观经济角度，基础设施是“买一送一”：它增强长期生产率和竞争力，同时，在存在产能过剩的地方，它以显著的短期乘数效应刺激需求、产出和就业。


Yet governments across Europe have clamped down on infrastructure spending for years, giving precedence to fiscal austerity and debt reduction in the misguided belief that government borrowing crowds out private investment and reduces growth.	但整个欧洲的政府多年来都在遏制基础设施支出，在政府借贷挤出私人投资、降低增长的误导信念下，财政紧缩和减少债务才是重点。


But the crowding-out logic applies only to conditions of full employment, conditions that clearly do not exist in most of Europe today.	但挤出逻辑只有在充分就业条件下才成立，而当今欧洲的大部分国家显然不是这样。


In addition, infrastructure investment cannot be deferred forever.	此外，基础设施投资不可能永远推迟。


A new reckoning is warranted, one that accounts for the full costs of underinvestment in terms of foregone employment and growth.	新的算计迟早会降临，考虑就业和增长损失等投资不足的全面成本。


One way to break the stalemate is a change in public accounting standards.	打破僵局的一个办法是改变公共会计准则。


Specifically, if governments were able to treat infrastructure investment just as companies treat capital expenditure – as balance-sheet assets that are depreciated over their lifecycle, rather than as one-off expenses – such investment could then be exempted from Europe’s deficit rules without opening the door to profligate spending or easing the pressure for credible plans for long-term fiscal-consolidation.	具体而言，如果政府可以如公司处理资本支出一样将基础设施投资——作为资产负债表中的资产，按生命周期折旧，而不是一次性支出——这些投资就可以免受欧洲财政规则约束，并且不会开启挥霍性支出的大门或缓解可信长期财政整合计划的压力。


Of course, it would be crucial to improve the planning and oversight of infrastructure projects simultaneously, as MGI has argued.	当然，如MGI所指出的，同时改善基础设施项目的规划和监督至关重要。


Fresh thinking about structural reform is needed, too.	关于结构改革的新鲜思维也必不可少。


For decades, reform discussions in the EU have focused on reducing labor-market regulation, cutting red tape in product markets, privatizing state-owned enterprises, and lowering tax rates.	几十年来，欧盟改革讨论一直聚焦于减少劳动力市场监管、消除产品市场的官样文章、国有企业私有化以及降低税率。


But reform should now work with the grain of efforts to bolster demand – for example, unleashing the silver economy, fostering digital education and innovation, and unlocking urban land markets to pave the way for much-needed investment in housing.	但如今，改革必须与辅之以刺激需求的措施——比如解放银色经济、促进数字教育和创新、解放城市土地市场为急需的房地产投资扫清障碍等。


Each of these options would require robust debate and deeper investigation.	这些选择的每一项都要求进行热烈的讨论和深层次的调查。


But it’s clear that Europe needs a larger set of policy options.	但显然，欧洲需要更大规模的政策选择范围。


Quantitative easing and ultra-low interest rates should no longer be the only arrows in the macroeconomic policy quiver.	量化宽松和极低利率不应该继续成为仅有的宏观经济政策工具。


These tools, along with excessive fiscal austerity, may have higher costs in terms of foregone employment and growth – and rising political discontent – than “risky” alternative options.	它们与财政过度紧缩的结合所造成的代价——以失去的就业和增长以及不断加剧的政治不满衡量——可能比“高风险”替代选择更大。


The Brexit vote is a canary in the coal mine for Europe’s economic policy makers.	对欧洲经济政策决策者而言，英国退出投票好比是煤矿里的金丝雀。


Unconventional times require consideration of bold unconventional policy approaches.	非常规时期需要考虑激进的非常规政策方针。


China’s Untapped Growth Potential	中国增长潜力未竟


SHANGHAI – China’s economic slowdown, from a nearly 10% annual output gain in 2007 to below 8% today, has fueled widespread speculation about the economy’s growth potential.	上海—中国年产出增长率从2007年的近10%下降到如今的8%，经济的减速让关于中国经济增长潜力的猜测四起。


While it is impossible to predict China’s future growth trajectory, understanding the economy’s underlying trends is the best way to derive a meaningful estimate.	预测中国未来增长轨迹是不可能的，但理解中国经济的基本趋势是进行有意义的估计的最佳方法。


Whereas short-term demand largely dictates an economy’s real growth rate, its potential growth rate is determined on the supply side.	短期需求大致上表明了一个经济体的实际增长率，但其潜在增长率由供给面决定。


Some economists – citing indicators like investment ratios, industrial value-added, and employment – compare China to Japan in the early 1970’s.	一些经济学家引用投资比率、工业增加值和就业等指标比较中国和20世纪70年代初的日本。


After more than two decades of sustained rapid growth, Japan’s economy slackened considerably in 1971, leading to four decades of annual growth rates averaging less than 4%.	1971年，在经历了二十多年的持续快速增长后，日本经济显著地放缓了脚步，此后四十年，年均增长率不到4%。


This correlation is reinforced by the convergence hypothesis – the benchmark theory for estimating an economy’s potential growth rate – which states that a rapidly growing developing economy’s real growth rate will slow when it reaches a certain share of the per capita capital stock and income of an advanced economy.	趋同假说——估算一国经济潜在增长率的基本理论——认为快速增长的发展中经济体的实际增长率会在其人均资本存量和收入达到发达经济体的一定比例时出现放缓。 这一假说加强了这一相关性。


According to the economists Barry Eichengreen, Donghyun Park, and Kwanho Shin, that share is about 60% of America’s per capita income (at 2005 international prices).	根据经济学家巴里·艾肯格林（Barry Eichengreen）、朴东炫（Donghyun Park）和康镐炫（Kwanho Shin）的研究，这一比例大约是美国人均收入的60%（以2005年国际价格计算）。


At first glance, the experiences of Asia’s most advanced economies – Japan and the four “Asian Tigers” (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) – seem to be consistent with this theory.	乍一看，亚洲最发达经济体——日本和“亚洲四小龙”（香港、新加坡、韩国和台湾）——都符合这一理论。


In 1971-1973, Japan’s per capita GDP fell to roughly 65% of that of the United States in purchasing-power-parity terms, while the Asian Tigers experienced economic downturns of varying degrees when they reached roughly the same income level relative to Japan.	1971—1973年，按购买力平价计算的日本人均GDP落在美国的65%左右，而亚洲四小龙也在到达相对日本的类似收入水平时经历了不同程度的经济放缓。


But Eichengreen, Park, and Shin also found that once this income level is reached, annual growth rates tend to fall by no more than two percentage points.	但艾肯格林、朴东炫和康镐炫还发现，一旦收入水平达到这一水平，年增长率的下降一般不会超过两个百分点。


This means that GDP growth should have slowed gradually in Japan after 1971, instead of plummeting by more than 50%.	这意味着日本GDP增长应该在1971年后逐渐放缓，而不应该大幅降低超过50%。


Likewise, given the remaining income gap with the US, the Asian Tigers should have grown faster than they have in the last two decades.	类似地，亚洲四小龙与美国仍然存在收入差距，因此在过去二十年中，它们本应增长得更快。


But they each suffered a substantial slowdown (albeit less sharp than Japan’s).	但所有四小龙都经历了大幅放缓（尽管没有日本那么剧烈）。


These inconsistencies can be explained by external shocks – a point emphasized by Hideo Kobayashi in his book Post-War Japanese Economy and Southeast Asia.	这些不一致可以用外部冲击来解释——小林英夫（Hideo Kobayashi）的著作《战后日本经济和东南亚》（Post-War Japanese Economy and Southeast Asia）强调了这一点。


During Japan’s economic boom, its total factor productivity (TFP, or the efficiency with which inputs are used) contributed about 40% to GDP growth.	在日本经济繁荣期，其全要素生产率（TFP，或投入的使用效率）贡献了40%的GDP增长。


When growth plummeted, TFP fell even faster – a dramatic change that was clearly linked to the 1971 yen appreciation and the 1973 oil crisis.	当增长大幅降速时，TFP下降得更快——这一戏剧性变化显然与1971年日元升值和1973年石油危机有关。


From a microeconomic perspective, a sudden exchange-rate shock and sharp increase in oil prices impedes firms’ ability to adjust their technology and production methods to meet new cost conditions, eventually undermining TFP growth.	从微观经济学角度看，突发汇率冲击和石油价格暴涨妨碍了企业调整技术和生产方式从而适应新的成本条件的能力，最终伤害了TFP增长。


Such a cost shock has a more prolonged effect than a negative demand shock.	这样的成本冲击具有比消极需求冲击更长的影响期。


Without negative external shocks, exorbitant TFP growth would have declined gradually, as the returns from institutional adjustment, reallocation of resources, and technological catch-up naturally diminished, in accordance with the convergence hypothesis.	根据趋同假说，制度调整、资源再配置和技术赶超的回报会自然衰减，因此，如果没有消极外部冲击，过高的TFP增长会逐渐下降。


External shocks also explain China’s GDP slowdown since 2007.	外部冲击还解释了中国GDP在2007年之后的减速。


The renminbi’s gradual yet sustained appreciation against the US dollar is the cost shock’s main driver, but the demand shock that followed the 2008 global financial crisis aggravated the situation.	人民币逐渐而持续的对美元升值是成本冲击的主要推动力，但随2008年金融危机到来的需求冲击加重了困局。


It is likely that TFP has declined substantially as China’s economy has slowed in response to these shocks.	有可能中国经济因为这些冲击而出现的减速导致了TFP大幅下降。


Unlike Keynesians, who focus on demand shocks, followers of the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter view cost shocks as important potential catalysts for structural reform and industrial upgrading – both of which are needed to avoid falling into a low-growth rut in the long term.	与关注需求冲击的凯恩斯主义者不同，美国经济学家约瑟夫·熊彼特（Joseph Schumacher）的追随者认为成本冲击是结构性改革和产业升级的重要潜在催化剂，而结构性改革和产业升级又是避免陷入长期低增长陷阱之必须。


In the short term, a cost shock devastates some economic activities, forcing companies either to shut down or move on to another line of business.	在短期，成本冲击会毁灭一些经济活动，迫使公司关门或转向其他业务。


But what Schumpeter called “creative destruction” can facilitate the eventual emergence and expansion of new, more efficient firms.	但熊彼特所谓的“创造性破坏”能够有利于更高效的新企业的最终产生和扩张。


The problem is that many country-specific factors, such as political concerns and pressure from vested interests, can impede this process.	问题在于许多国别因素——比如政治顾虑和来自既得利益的压力——可能阻碍这一过程。


In this sense, China’s government is facing an important test.	从这个角度讲，中国政府正面临着重要考验。


If it fails to take advantage of the opportunity provided by the cost shock and economic slowdown to implement the necessary structural reforms, China’s potential growth rate, as dictated by TFP, will never rebound fully.	如果政府不能利用成本冲击和经济减速带来的机会实施必要的结构性改革，中国的潜在增长率将如TFP所显示的那样永远无法完全恢复。


Given that improving overall productivity is the best way to defend against cost shocks, the new round of structural reform should be aimed at creating conditions for economic transformation and upgrading.	改善总体生产率是抵抗成本冲击的最佳办法，因此新一轮结构性改革应该以创造经济转型和升级的条件为目标。


The key is to establish a level playing field guided by market rules, reduce government intervention in the economy, and stop protecting inefficient businesses.	关键在于建立由市场规则引导的公平平台，减少政府对经济的干预，并停止保护低效率企业。


Such efforts would go a long way toward increasing China’s potential growth rate.	这些举措将大大有利于增加中国的潜在增长率。


Indeed, considering that China’s per capita income amounts to only about 10-20% of that of the US, with massive regional differentials within China, its growth potential, as dictated by the convergence hypothesis, is far from tapped.	事实上，考虑到中国人均收入只有美国的10—20%，且国内地区差距巨大，从趋同假说看，其增长潜力还远远没有到头。


But the degree to which it can fulfill this potential in the coming decades will depend largely on its TFP prospects.	但未来数十年中能在多大程度上实现这一潜力很大程度上取决于其TFP前景。


In 2007, the economists Dwight Perkins and Thomas Rawski estimated that, in order for China’s economy to maintain a 9% growth rate and a 25-35% investment ratio until 2025, it would need to maintain an annual TFP growth rate of 4.3-4.8%.	2007年，经济学家德怀特·珀金斯（Dwight Perkins）和托马斯·罗斯基（Thomas Rawski）估算，中国要想在2025年之前维持9%的增长率和25—35%的投资比率，需要将年TFP增长率保持在4. 3—4.


Given that China’s TFP growth has averaged 4% for more than 30 years, and is likely to slow in the coming decade, this scenario is improbable.	8%。 三十多年来，中国TFP平均增长率为4%，并且可能在未来十年有所下降，因此这一情景可能无法实现。


Maintaining 6% annual GDP growth with the same investment ratio would require annual TFP growth of only 2.2-2.7%.	维持6%的GDP年增长和相同的投资比率要求年TFP增长达到2. 2—2.


With China’s productivity still well below that of developed countries, and allocational efficiency likely to improve in the next ten years as labor and capital are redistributed across the country, 3% TFP growth is feasible.	中国的生产率仍显著低于发达国家； 而随着劳动力和资本在全国的重新分配，未来十年配置效率改进可期，因此，3%的TFP增长率是可行的。


Aided by structural reforms, China’s economy could expand even faster, achieving 7-8% annual growth over the next ten years.	在结构性改革的助力下，未来十年中国经济可以扩张得更快，达到7—8%的年增长。


Either way, convergence will remain swift.	无论如何，趋同都会保持快速。


China’s High-Income Hopes	中国的高收入希望


SHANGHAI – It is widely agreed that economic development means more than GDP growth.	上海—一个被广泛接受的观点是经济发展不仅仅意味着GDP增长。


As China is now learning, one does not guarantee the other.	中国现在知道，增长和发展并非有此即有彼的关系。


Unless China’s leaders upgrade the country’s growth strategy to stimulate technological progress and structural transformation, high-income status will continue to elude the world’s second-largest economy and most populous country.	除非中国领导人改革增长战略以刺激技术进步和制度转型，否则高收入将仍是这个世界第二大经济体和第一大人口国可望而不可及的成就。


To be sure, China’s growth strategy – powered by investment in infrastructure, a massive increase in low-cost manufacturing exports, and technology transfers – has led to some structural change.	平心而论，中国的增长战略——受基础设施、低成本制造业出口大规模增长和技术转移推动——已经带来了可观的结构变化。


As labor and capital moved from low-productivity sectors and regions to high-productivity activities, resource allocation became more efficient, real wages rose, and the economic structure was upgraded.	随着劳动力和资本从低生产率部门和地区转移到高生产率活动去，资源配置也变得更有效率，真实工资有所增长，经济结构也获得了升级。


But the growth strategies that lift a poor country to middle-income levels cannot be counted upon to propel it to high-income status.	但让一个穷国步入中等收入行列的增长战略是无法继续执行同样的增长战略让这个国家实现高收入的。


Indeed, there is no shortage of countries whose leaders have failed to recognize their strategies’ constraints and provide enough incentives to encourage the emergence of a new one, causing their economies to stagnate and leaving them stuck in the so-called “middle-income trap.”	事实上，有许多国家，其领导人没有认识到增长战略的约束条件并给予足够的激励鼓励新战略，结果导致经济陷入停滞，受困于所谓的“中等收入陷阱”。


Perhaps the most notable exceptions to this rule have been in East Asia, where four economies – South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore – responded to external crises and challenges by shifting their growth strategies.	也许这一规律最令人瞩目的例外就在亚洲，四个经济体——韩国、中国台湾、中国香港和新加坡——通过改变增长战略成功地应对了外部危机和挑战。


For China, whose growth model has so far resembled that used by these economies before they attained middle-income status, a similar shift is urgently needed.	对中国来说，其步入中等收入行列前的增长战略一直效仿以上四个经济体，现在也迫切需要类似的转变。


As the late Yale economist Gustav Ranis observed nearly 20 years ago, the key to successful and sustainable development is “avoiding the encrustation of ideas.”	已故的耶鲁经济学家古斯塔夫·拉尼斯（Gustav Ranis）在近20年前观察道，成功而可持续的发展的关键是“避免思维僵化”。


For Chinese policymakers, this means recognizing the need to abandon some of the fundamental ideas that underpinned the economy’s past growth, before they become so firmly encrusted that they jeopardize the country’s development prospects.	对中国决策者来说，这意味着认识到必须在一些作为中国经济过去增长基础的基本思维形成顽固惯性、破坏中国发展前景之前抛弃它们。


The first problem is China’s enduring dependence on exports.	第一个问题是中国对出口战略的可能的长期依赖。


In the early stages of economic development, almost all growth strategies boil down to trade strategies.	在经济发展的早期阶段，几乎所有增长战略都可以归结为贸易战略。


But China’s export-led growth model has limits – and the country is reaching them.	但中国的出口拉动型增长模式存在极限，并且已肯快靠近那个极限。


Unless change comes soon, the foreign-exchange regime and capital controls on which the model relies will become too deeply entrenched, and the window of opportunity for adjustment will be missed.	除非很快采取变化，否则作为这一模式的基础的外汇机制和资本管制将会变得过于根深蒂固，调整的机会窗口也会错失。


Another risk is that China’s leaders continue to delay efforts to expand the services sector – including finance, insurance, wholesale and retail trade, and logistics – in the hope that the economy can continue to depend on manufacturing.	另一个风险是中国领导人可能继续推延开放服务部门的措施——包括金融、保险、批发和零售贸易、物流等诸领域——以期经济能继续依赖制造业。


Given how difficult it can be to gain support for such efforts, especially compared to policies aimed at boosting manufacturing, liberalization and expansion of the services sector will require a strong commitment from China’s government.	开放服务部门的措施很难赢得支持，特别是与旨在提振制造业的政策相比，因此服务部门的自由化和开放需要中国政府的大决心。


Here, Japan’s failure in opening up its services sector – which impeded its ability to adapt its economic structure to its declining demographic dividend – can provide much-needed motivation.	在这方面，日本曾经欲开放服务部门而失败，结果掣肘了其调整经济结构应对人口红利下降局面的能力，这给了中国所急需的鞭策。


The final idea at risk of blocking further progress is that political transformation would undermine social order.	阻碍未来前景的最后一种思维是政治转型会破坏社会秩序。


One of the East Asian economies’ major lessons for developing countries is that economic development leads to institutional transformation, not the other way around.	东亚经济体给发展中国家留下的主要智慧之一是经济发展会导致政治制度转变，而不是相反。


In Taiwan and South Korea, for example, authoritarian governments after World War II compensated for the weakness of the rule of law by creating transitional institutional arrangements to facilitate GDP growth.	比如，在中国台湾和韩国，二战后的威权政府创造了过渡性制度安排来刺激GDP增长，以此弥补法制的不足。


In this sense, China has a significant advantage.	在这方面，中国拥有巨大优势。


Countries with weak government capacity have rarely managed to achieve high-income status.	相反，政府能力不够强的国家很少能够成功步入中等收入行列。


But, as the description of these arrangements as “transitional” suggests, they cannot last indefinitely.	但是，顾名思义，这些“过渡性”安排无法永远持续下去。


After 35 years of dependence on such arrangements, China must embrace the rule of law and establish a reliable, independent judicial system capable of facilitating the liberalization of the services sector, protecting intellectual-property rights, and underpinning a competitive market-based system.	中国依赖这一安排已逾35年，现在必须接受法制精神，建立能够刺激服务部门自由化、保护知识财产权利、成为竞争性市场经济制度基石的可靠而独立的司法体系。


In short, the biggest risk to China’s continued development is not a crisis, but the failure of its political leaders and intellectual elites to recognize the need to transform a growth strategy that has proved successful so far.	简言之，中国后续发展的最大风险不是危机，而是政治领导人和知识精英有没有认识到扬弃到目前为止一直成功的增长战略的必要性。


In fact, to the extent that a crisis could do more good than harm, warnings that the rapid credit expansion of recent years could trigger a debt crisis, or that the real-estate sector is on the verge of collapse, may not be as worrying as many believe.	事实上，危机或许利大于弊，因此警告近几年来的信用高速扩张可能引发债务危机，或者房地产部门眼看就要崩溃或许并不像许多人认为的那样令人担忧。


Ideally, no such crisis would be needed.	在理想状况下，这样的危机并不需要。


In this scenario, China’s economic slowdown since 2008, which could be viewed as China’s first modern growth crisis, would be sufficient to force China’s leaders to shift their focus from supporting double-digit annual GDP increases to restructuring the economy.	在这一情形中，中国经济从2008年开始减速，这可以视为中国的第一次现代增长危机，已足以迫使中国领导人将注意力从支持两位数的年GDP增长率转向重组经济结构。


In fact, a consensus already appears to be emerging concerning the need to reduce China’s dependence on exports, expand trade in services, attract more foreign investment to its services sector, and accelerate the liberalization of exchange rates, interest rates, and cross-border capital flows – exemplified in the establishment of the Shanghai Pilot Free-Trade Zone last year.	事实上，关于降低中国的出口依赖、开放其服务贸易、吸引更多外资投资于服务部门以及加速汇率、利率和跨境资本流自由化的问题似乎已经有了共识，去年的上海自由贸易区试点就是明证。


And, following the Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s 18th Central Committee last November, China’s leaders declared their commitment to allowing the market to play a greater role in shaping economic outcomes.	此外，在去年11月的中共十八大三中全会后，中国领导人承诺要让市场在决定经济结果中起到更大的作用。


These are undoubtedly steps in the right direction.	毫无疑问，这些都是迈向正确方向的步骤。


The question is whether China’s leaders will follow through on their declarations before it is too late.	问题在于中国领导人是否能在仍然来得及的时候兑现承诺。


The ECB’s Leap into the Unknown	欧洲央行跃向未知


FRANKFURT – The European Central Bank is in the middle of a big, risky experiment.	法兰克福—欧洲央行正在实施一项大型高风险实验。


Key interest rates have remained close to zero for six years now.	如今，关键利率保持近零水平已有六年。


Financial markets are flooded with liquidity.	金融市场充斥着流动性。


Crisis management has resulted in major market distortions, with some segments’ performance no longer explainable by fundamental economic data.	危机管理导致了巨大的市场扭曲，一些细分市场的表现已不再能用经济基本面数据解释。


The unintended consequences of this policy are increasingly visible – and will become increasingly tangible with the US Federal Reserve’s exit from post-2008 ultra-loose monetary policy.	这一政策的意外后果正变得日益清晰，随着美联储退出其2008年以来的极度宽松政策，其后果还会变的更加明确。


And yet Europe’s crisis is far from over, as the decisions by the European Central Bank’s Governing Council in June and September demonstrate.	而欧洲危机还远未结束，欧洲央行管理委员会6月和 9月的决定说明了一切。


This reflects two factors: too little ambition in carrying out essential balance-sheet corrections, and slow progress – negligible in France and Italy – in restructuring Europe’s national economies.	这反映出两个因素：实施关键性资产负债表修正的决定不够，以及欧洲各国政府重组进展缓慢（法国和意大利就是明证）。


The ECB’s decision to double down on monetary stimulus should thus be regarded as an act of desperation.	因此，欧洲央行决定将货币刺激加倍的决定应该被视为绝望的行动。


Its key rate has been cut to 0.05%, the deposit rate is negative, and targeted longer-term refinancing operations are supposed to support bank lending.	其关键利率已下降至0. 05%，存款利率已为负值，定向长期再融资操作意在支持银行放贷。


Moreover, the asset-backed securities market is to be revived by the purchase of ABSs.	此外，资产支持证券（ABS）市场将因购买ABS的计划而得到复苏。


All of this is intended to flood the markets, expand the euro system’s balance sheet by €700 billion ($890 billion), and return to the balance-sheet volume recorded at the start of 2012.	所有这些都是为了提振市场、将欧元系统的资产负债表扩大7,000亿欧元，并使其回到2012年初创下的纪录水平。


The expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet and the targeted depreciation of the euro should help to bring the eurozone’s short-term inflation rate close to 2% and thus reduce deflationary risks.	欧洲央行资产负债表的扩张以及欧元的定向贬值应该有助于让欧元区短期通胀率接近2%，从而降低通缩风险。


For the first time in its history, the ECB appears to be pursuing an exchange-rate target.	欧洲央行有史以来第一次开始追求汇率目标。


As was the case for the Bank of Japan, the external value of the currency will become an important instrument in the framework of a new strategic approach.	和日本银行一样，货币的外部价值将成为新战略方针框架中的一个重要工具。


Financial markets have applauded the ECB’s recent decisions.	金融市场非常欢迎欧洲央行的最新举措。


Moreover, having “effectively thrown off all of the Maastricht Treaty restrictions that bound the bank to the model of the Deutsche Bundesbank,” as former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan put it, the ECB is prepared to break further taboos.	此外，如美联储主席艾伦·格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）所指出的，“事实上抛弃了所有马斯特里赫特条约限制、不再受德意志联邦银行模式约束”的欧洲央行已准备好进一步打破更多禁忌。


But for what purpose?	但其目的何在？


Particularly by guaranteeing highly indebted countries’ sovereign bonds, the ECB has actually weakened the willingness to reform, particularly in the larger European Union countries, whose decrepit economic structures are an obstacle to potential growth, and where more room must be given to private initiative.	欧洲央行的行为，特别是担保高负债国家主权债券的行为，实际上削弱了改革意愿，特别是在过时的济结构已成为潜在增长障碍的欧盟中较大的国家以及必须给私人行动更大空间的领域。


The ECB’s willingness to buy ABSs is especially risky and creates a new element of joint liability in the eurozone, with European taxpayers on the hook in the event of a loss.	欧洲央行愿意购买ABS，这已决定风险极高，并且给欧元区注入了新的共同债务因素，如若发生损失，将由欧洲纳税人买单。


The ECB lacks the democratic legitimacy to take such far-reaching decisions, with potentially substantial redistributive effects, which implies an even greater risk to monetary-policy independence.	欧洲央行采取这些影响重大、具有巨大的潜在再分配效应（因此意味着更大的货币政策独立性风险）的决定缺少民主合法性。


Indeed, the ECB already has been driven onto the defensive by the International Monetary Fund, the OECD, financial-market analysts, and Anglo-Saxon economists in the wake of feverish discussion of the risk of deflation in the eurozone.	事实上，在关于欧元区通缩风险的喧闹的争论中，欧洲央行在国际货币基金组织、经合组织、金融市场分析师和盎格鲁-撒克逊经济学家的攻势下相当被动。


But what is the appropriate eurozone inflation rate, given de facto economic stagnation?	但在实际经济停滞的环境下，什么才是欧元区恰当的失业率？


Should higher nominal (that is, inflation-driven) growth replace debt-driven growth?	应该用更高的名义（即通胀驱动的）增长代替债务驱动的增长吗？


Europe must aim for sustainable, non-inflationary growth and the creation of competitive jobs.	欧洲必须将目标放在可持续、非通胀性的增长以及竞争性就业岗位的创造上。


The current inflation rate of 0.3% is due to the significant decline in commodity prices and the painful but unavoidable adjustment of costs and prices in the peripheral countries.	当前0. 3%的通货膨胀率是商品价格的大跌和外围国不可避免的痛苦的成本和价格调整的结果。


Only Greece currently has a slightly negative inflation rate.	只有希腊当前通胀率略为负值。


In other words, price stability reigns in the eurozone.	换句话说，价格稳定是欧元区的普遍现象。


This strengthens purchasing power and ultimately private consumption.	这增强了购买力，最终有利于私人消费。


The ECB has fulfilled its mandate for the present and the foreseeable future.	欧洲央行已经完成了当前和可预见未来的使命。


There is no need for policy action in the short term.	短期没有采取政策动作的必要。


It is, instead, the eurozone governments that must act.	反之，欧元区政府必须行动起来。


But any clear division of tasks and responsibilities between governments and central banks has, it seems, been jettisoned.	但任何各个政府和央行之间的明确的任务和责任分割都被放弃了。


Government action in many problem countries ultimately ends in finger pointing: “Europe,” the ECB, and Germany, with its (relatively) responsible policy, have all been scapegoats.	许多问题国家的政府行动最终沦为互相指责的：“欧洲”、欧洲央行、德国及其（相对）负责任的政策都成了替罪羊。


Against this background, the ECB has yielded to immense political pressure, particularly from France and Italy, to loosen monetary policy further and weaken the exchange rate.	在这样的背景下，欧洲央行屈服于巨大的政治压力，特别是来自法国和意大利的压力，进一步放松了货币政策、贬值了汇率。


But indulging the old political reflex of manipulating the exchange rate to create a competitive advantage will yield a short-term fix at best.	但沉溺于操纵汇率创造竞争优势的旧政治反射充其量只能算是短期解决方案。


It will not eliminate the structural weaknesses of the countries in question.	它无法消除问题国家的结构性弱点。


The ECB is moving ever farther into uncharted territory.	欧洲央行正在朝着未知领域越走越远。


In view of the insufficient balance-sheet corrections in the private sector and inadequate structural reforms, macroeconomic demand-management tools will not work.	从私人部门资产负债表修正不充分和结构性改革不足的观点看，宏观经济需求管理工具是无效的。


Despite the ECB’s aggressive approach, monetary policy in the absence of structural economic reform risks being ineffective.	尽管欧洲央行采取了积极政策，但没有结构型经济改革，货币政策也可能毫无效果。


Simply put, more liquidity will not lead to more active bank lending until there is more transparency regarding the extent of non-performing loans and the relevant economies have become more flexible.	简言之，更多的流动性无法带来更活跃的银行贷款行为，除非不良贷款程度的透明度有所增加，并且相关经济体弹性变得更大。


The ECB’s asset quality review and bank stress tests are expected to bring some clarity to the first question.	欧洲央行的资产质量检查和银行压力测试有望澄清第一个问题。


Then, more lending will occur on acceptable terms – assuming that there is corresponding demand.	接着，就可以在可接受的条件上发生更多的贷款——假设有相应需求的话。


But the uncertainty regarding the extent and pace of economic reforms remains.	但与经济改革程度和节奏有关的不确定性仍然存在。


The ECB’s recent decisions, with their focus on short-term effects, indicate that monetary policy is no longer targeted at the eurozone as a whole, but at its problem members.	欧洲央行最近的决定及其对短期影响的关注表明货币政策的目标已不再是欧元区整体，而是其问题成员国。


Ad hoc decisions have replaced a feasible and principled medium-term strategy.	临时决定取代了可行、审慎的中期战略。


The problems created by this approach will be compounded by the unavoidable conflicts of interest with monetary policy implied by the ECB’s assumption of its new financial-stability and banking-supervision roles.	欧洲央行认为它应该扮演新的金融稳定和银行监督者角色，据此采取的货币政策所带来的不可避免的利益冲突将让这一方针所造成的问题更加复杂。


The first casualty will most likely be price stability.	首当其冲者很有可能是价格稳定性。


Justice for Srebrenica’s Dead	带给斯雷布雷尼察死难者的正义


THE HAGUE – In 1993, atrocities committed against Slavic Muslims near the Bosnian silver-mining town of Srebrenica catalyzed demands to establish a tribunal to try political and military leaders accused of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia.	发自海牙——在1993年，波黑塞族共和国军队侵入波斯尼亚银矿城市斯雷布雷尼察，并对当地斯拉夫族穆斯林所犯下了暴行，而这也引发人们要求建立特别法庭，审判相关军政领导人在前南斯拉夫地区所犯下的战争罪责。


The new United Nations tribunal that was formed – nearly five decades after the final judgments were rendered at Nuremberg and Tokyo – became the forerunner of ad hoc courts to prosecute perpetrators of Rwanda’s genocide, Charles Taylor and his blood-diamond butchers in Sierra Leone, and the Khmer Rouge killers in Cambodia.	而当时为此而新设的联合国特别法庭——在纽伦堡和东京审判结束了近半个世纪之后——也开创了先河，为随后审判卢旺达大屠杀，追究利比里亚前军事独裁者查尔斯·泰勒以及他那帮塞拉利昂滴血钻石屠夫，以及审判柬埔寨红色高棉屠杀者提供了示范。


The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) also gave rise to the permanent International Criminal Court to try war criminals worldwide.	而这个前南斯拉夫问题国际刑事法庭（简称：前南法庭）同时也带动了常设国际刑事法庭的成立。


Undeterred by the still-untested ICTY’s reach, Serb soldiers finally overran Srebrenica itself – despite its status as a “safe area” under UN protection – 15 years ago, on July 11, 1995, and proceeded to expel the town’s people and execute 7,600 captives.	但当时在新生的前南法庭面前，塞族士兵却一意孤行，最终在15年之前的1995年7月11日蹂躏了整个斯雷布雷尼察——尽管该地是受联合国保护的“安全区”——并驱逐了该镇的居民，还处决了7600名俘虏。


Out of this massacre, however, the tribunal and foreign-backed war-crimes courts in Bosnia and Serbia have delivered the international justice effort’s most significant achievement to date.	而在这起大屠杀发生之后，特别法庭和外国在波斯尼亚和塞尔维亚设立的战争罪行法庭都成功地执掌了国际正义，这也是法庭迄今为止最重大的成就。


With no media fanfare and limited arrest and investigative powers, and despite the foreign-policy and military “realists” who dismiss international justice as a pipedream, these judicial institutions have brought justice to Srebrenica’s dead and their survivors, and have demonstrated that justice can be delivered to victims in other conflict areas.	尽管没有媒体的推波助澜，尽管只有有限的拒捕和调查权，尽管那些将国际正义视为白日做梦的外交和军事“现实主义者”们不断冷嘲热讽，这些司法机关依然给斯雷布雷尼察事件的殉难者和生还者带来了正义，并昭示出正义是可以被带给其它地区的受害者的。


It is an imperfect, unsatisfying justice, to be sure, but no more imperfect or unsatisfying than that dispensed by national courts.	虽然这种正义无疑算不上完美，也无法令人完全满意，像相对于那些国内法院的判决来说，已经足够完美，足够令人满意了。


The ICTY ruled the Srebrenica massacre to be an act of genocide.	前南法庭将斯雷布雷尼察大屠杀判定为种族灭绝罪行。


The tribunal and the local courts imprisoned 13 of those who gave the orders, as well as 17 execution-squad members; 11 more men, four of them leaders, are facing their reckoning.	法庭和地方法院将13名屠杀下令者以及17名屠杀小组的成员送入了大牢； 另外还有11人，其中包括4名领导人，也陆续得到了应有的惩罚。


On trial now are Radovan Karadžić, the Bosnian Serb political leader, and Jovica Stanišić, the police minister in Slobodan Milošević’s Serbia.	目前还在受审的是波斯尼亚塞族领导人拉多万·卡拉季奇，还有约维卡·斯塔尼希奇，他可是斯洛博丹·米洛舍维奇领导下的塞尔维亚前国家安全部部长。


Of course, the Bosnian Serb commander, Ratko Mladić remains a fugitive.	当然，波斯尼亚塞族军事领导人拉特科·姆拉迪奇依然在逃。


But Serbia’s authorities, facing economic turmoil, cannot harbor him much longer if the United States and the European Union exert adequate pressure.	但如果美国和欧盟施加足够压力的话，身陷经济困境的塞尔维亚当局不可能包庇此人太久。


Serbia recently surrendered Mladić’s war-time diaries.	塞尔维亚最近还提交了姆拉迪奇的战时日记。


The Srebrenica trials also yielded a soul-testing record of a crime whose gravity Serb political leaders, former UN officials, and others once shamefully denied.	斯雷布雷尼察审判的另一个成果，则是提供了一份关于一项严重罪行的震撼人心的记录，而这项罪行是那些塞族领导人，前联合国官员和其他人曾无耻地否认过的。


Thanks to the ICTY, anyone can read the transcripts of intercepted calls to deliver more “packages” to the killing fields.	多亏有了前南法庭，人们可以看到那些要求“送更多‘包裹’到屠杀现场”的电话录音内容。


A Serb district president, Miroslav Deronjić, testified that Karadžić told him: “Miroslav, those people there must be killed.”	以及一位叫米洛斯拉夫·德容季奇的塞族地方官员的证词——当时卡拉季奇跟他说：“米洛斯拉夫，这些人必须杀掉。 ”


We know when, where, and to whom Mladić issued the kill order.	我们知道姆拉迪奇是在何时，何地以及向何人下达了屠杀命令。


The tribunal’s Web site has video of an execution.	前南法庭的网站上还存有记录当时屠杀过程的录像资料。


We know that a Serb truck driver rescued a boy who survived a firing squad and, crying for his father, crawled from a twisted scrum of bodies.	我们知道一个塞族卡车司机拯救了一个在处决中幸存，哭着找自己的爸爸，从死人堆中爬出来的小男孩。


We know that a Serb officer defied Mladić and refused to order his men to partake in mass murder.	我们知道一名塞族军官反抗姆拉迪奇的命令，拒绝命令他的士兵参加屠杀。


The ICTY is flawed, of course.	当然，前南法庭也是有缺陷的。


Judges and attorneys have treated too many witnesses with condescension, as if the tribunal were doing them a favor.	法官和律师经常以傲慢的姿态去对待那些屠杀的见证者，似乎法庭所做的事对他们的恩赐。


Judges have sentenced too many killers to absurdly lenient prison terms, diminishing any deterrent effect that the tribunal might generate.	法官们对大多的屠杀者都太过仁慈，没有从重判刑，削弱了法庭可能产生的巨大威慑力。


And they threw the book at one of Mladić’s men who pled guilty and gave damning insider testimony, eliminating the prosecution’s leverage to obtain similar admissions.	他们还严惩了一名认罪并提供了关键内幕证词的姆拉迪奇身边人，削弱了检察官获取类似证词的能力。


Prosecution officials also negligently incinerated personal effects of Srebrenica victims, as well as items discovered in Albania and other evidence, and then obfuscated to dodge a scandal.	检察官员同时还疏忽大意地销毁了斯雷布雷尼察受害者的随身物品以及在阿尔巴尼亚和其他地方发现的证物，后来又为了避免丑闻曝光，蓄意混淆视听。


New rules and procedures, as well as better training, can minimize such failings.	而新的规则和程序，以及更良好的训练都可以尽量减少这些失误。


But without the ICTY, impunity would have reigned for the murderers of Srebrenica and of less-renowned scenes of war crimes. Karadžić would still be flogging love potions in Belgrade.	但如果没有了前南法庭的话，斯雷布雷尼察以及其他更不为人知的战争罪行的凶手们就会逍遥法外，卡拉季奇这种人也依然会在贝尔格莱德作威作福。


The retired generals would be tanning beside the Adriatic.	而那些退休将领们则在亚得里亚海边悠闲地晒着太阳。


Overwhelming proof of Croatia’s complicity with Serbia in the dismemberment of Bosnia – something the media have also ignored – would never have emerged.	大量有关克罗地亚串通塞尔维亚分割波斯尼亚的证据——有些是连媒体都忽略的——也不会呈现在世人面前。


And, following this anniversary of the massacre, it is safe to say that, without international justice, all of Srebrenica’s victims – including my brother-in-law’s father, Huso Čelik, and the others who are still missing – would still be moldering anonymously in mass graves.	而在屠杀发生15周年纪念之际，我们可以肯定地说，没有国际正义，所有斯雷布雷尼察的受害者——包括我连襟的父亲，胡梭·塞里克以及其他依然失踪的人——依然只会是万人坑中的无名枯骨。


Their loved ones would be waiting still to gather at the town’s memorial cemetery, where, on this anniversary, they dropped to their knees, drew their hands over their eyes, and recited the funeral prayer to Allah for forgiveness of the living and the dead.	如今他们的亲人在该市的纪念公墓默默等待，在周年忌日之时，亲人们双膝下跪，双手掩面，背诵悼词，请求安拉宽恕这些活着和死去的人们。


Justice Is Reconciliation	和解就是正义


In South Africa, indeed around the world, we are raised on a strict diet of justice as retribution.	在南非，甚至整个世界，我们将伸张正义狭隘地理解为施以惩罚。


With violent crimes on a shocking upsurge, with the hideous crimes of child rape and abuse on the increase, there are nowadays frequent calls – backed by wide public support – to restore capital punishment.	随着暴力犯罪令人震惊地大幅度增加，随着骇人听闻的强奸和虐待儿童罪行变得日益恶化，如今恢复死刑的呼声常常充盈于耳，而且得到了公众的广泛支持。


Mercifully, South Africa’s Constitutional Court has ruled that the death penalty – which South Africans eliminated at the same time we were liberated from apartheid – is unconstitutional.	幸运的是，南非宪法法院已经裁定死刑不合乎宪法，这种刑罚在南非人民从种族隔离制度下解放出来的同时即被宣告废止。


Sadly, in many places in the world, it seems that men and women have not advanced beyond the biblical admonition of “an eye for an eye” in their yearning for retribution.	令人悲哀的是，世界很多地方的男男女女似乎并没有摆脱圣经中“以眼还眼”的训诫，他们渴望对犯罪行为施以惩罚。


Indeed, some Muslim countries amputate the hands of convicted thieves in public.	事实上在一些穆斯林国家，一旦法律认定盗窃罪名成立，窃贼甚至会被当众砍断双手。


But that biblical adage was in fact invoked originally to curb blood feuds from claiming the innocent relatives of the person who committed the killing.	但“以眼还眼”的圣经谚语实际本来意在防止凶手的亲属在家族复仇中无辜丧命。


“An eye for an eye” asks that the culprit should be the sole target, and not others, whose only crime was to be related to him.	“以眼还眼”要求只把犯罪者本人作为目标，而不要波及无辜，如果说那些无辜者有罪，那么他们唯一的过错就是与罪犯沾亲带故。


So the “eye for an eye” adage was not intended to mean what it has come to mean, namely that killing be paid for by another killing.	因此与最初相比，“以眼还眼”的含义已经发生了变化，变成了以杀戮来抗拒杀戮。


Given the brutality of the apartheid era, that would have never worked in my homeland.	种族隔离时期的残忍暴行使得这种做法永远也不可能在我的国家获得成功。


Some South Africans called for Nuremberg-type trials, especially for perpetrators of those atrocities that were designed to maintain the vicious apartheid system.	有些南非人要求举行纽伦堡那样的审判，特别要惩戒那些以维护邪恶的种族隔离制度为目的的施暴者。


There were demands that the guilty be brought to book.	有人提出要对这些罪行展开审判。


But we were fortunate in that Nuremberg was not really an option for us.	幸运的是，纽伦堡审判在南非根本行不通。


Nuremberg happened because the Allies inflicted unconditional surrender on the Nazis and so could impose a so-called victor’s justice.	纽伦堡审判的前提是盟军迫使纳粹无条件投降，然后才能推行所谓胜利者的正义。


In our case, neither the apartheid government nor the liberation movements could defeat each other. We had a military deadlock.	而在我们国内，无论种族隔离政府还是解放运动都无法彻底将对方打垮，于是形成了军事上的僵持局面。


Moreover, in the case of Nuremberg, the prosecutors and judges could pack up their bags after the trial and leave Germany for their several homes.	不仅如此，在纽伦堡案例中，原告和法官都可以在审判结束后收拾行囊，离开德意志回到他们自己的国度。


We had to make our homes in this, our common motherland, and learn to live with one another.	而我们的归宿却只能是这里，我们共同的祖国，因此我们必须学会和平共处。


Such trials would probably have gone on nearly forever, leaving gaping wounds open. It would have been difficult to procure the evidence to get convictions.	这样的审判几乎可以无休止地往复下去，使得战争留下的伤口永远鲜血淋漓、无法愈合。


We all know just how cunning bureaucrats can be in destroying incriminating evidence.	要想获得定罪的证据将非常困难，我们都知道那些官老爷们在销毁罪证方面有多么狡猾。


So it was a mercy that our country chose to go the way of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission – granting amnesty in exchange for the truth.	因此，我们的国家选择追随“真理与和解委员会”的确是件幸事，这意味着只要承认真理，就可以赦免过去犯下的罪过。


This was ultimately based on the principles of restorative justice and ubuntu.	这种做法的终极源泉是恢复性司法和“分享”原则。


At the TRC hearings we were exposed to gruesome details about atrocities that were committed to uphold or to oppose apartheid.	在“真理与和解委员会”举办的听政会上，我们听到了骇人听闻的杀戮细节，而这些杀戮的目的有些是为了维护种族隔离制度，有些是为了反对它。


“We gave him drugged coffee and shot him in the head and then we burned his body.	“我们让他喝下了含有麻醉成分的咖啡，对准他的头部开枪，然后焚烧了尸体。


As it takes 7 – 8 hours for a human body to burn, we had a braaivleis on the side, drinking beer and eating meat.”	因为人体需要7-8个小时才能烧成灰烬，我们就在燃烧的尸体边上开野餐会，吃烤肉、喝啤酒。


How low men can sink in our inhumanity!	”人性竟然可以沉沦到如此的地步！


Each time such horrible stories were published, we had to remind ourselves that, yes indeed, the acts were demonic, but the perpetrators remained each a child of God.	每次这样的恐怖事件公诸于众，我们都不得不提醒自己：是的，这些罪行比魔鬼还要可怕，但它们的制造者却仍然是上帝的子孙。


A monster has no moral responsibility and so cannot be held accountable; but even more seriously, designating someone a monster closes the door to possible rehabilitation.	魔鬼没有任何道德义务，因此也根本不可能承担责任，而更重要的是，把某个人划定为魔鬼就彻底排除了改造的可能性。


Restorative justice and ubuntu are based firmly on the recognition of the fundamental humanity of even the worst possible offender.	承认最可怕的罪犯也有基本的人性是恢复性司法和“分享”原则赖以存在的坚实基础。


We cannot give up on anybody.	我们不能放弃对任何人进行拯救。


If it was true that people could not change, once a murderer always a murderer, then the whole TRC process would have been impossible.	如果人真的无法改变，一日杀人终身嗜血，那么“真理与和解委员会” 也就失去了存在的价值。


It happened because we believed that even the worst racist had the capacity to change.	这个组织之所以存在，就因为我们相信即使是最顽固的种族主义分子也存在改造的可能性。


And I think we in South Africa have not done badly; at least that is what the rest of the world seems to think of our transformation and the TRC process.	而且我认为南非在这方面做得不坏，至少世界其它国家对我们的改造与和解努力都比较认同。


Because an “eye for an eye” can never work when communities are in conflict – reprisal leads to a counter-reprisal in the sort of blood spiral we are seeing in the Middle East.	因为“以眼还眼”在战争中永远不会发挥作用，报复之后是反报复，会使我们陷入中东那样的血腥循环而无力自拔。


The type of justice South Africa practiced, what I call “restorative justice” is, unlike retribution, not basically concerned with punishment, it is not fundamentally punitive.	南非推行的正是我所谓的“恢复性司法”，它不同于报复，从本质上讲与惩戒无关。


It sets high store by healing.	它看重修复。


The offence has caused a breach in relations and this breach needs to be healed.	犯罪行为破坏了社会关系，这种破坏需要人为的修补。


It regards the offender as a person, as a subject with a sense of responsibility and a sense of shame, who needs to be reintegrated into the community and not ostracised.	它把罪犯当成人来看待，把他们当做有责任感、有廉耻心的主体，我们要做的是把他们重新纳入社会，而不是就此排斥在外。


There is a wealth of wisdom in the old ways of African society.	古老的非洲社会蕴藏着很多智慧。


Justice was a communal affair and society set a high store by social harmony and peace.	他们认为司法是一项公共事务，而社会看重的是融洽与和谐。


The belief was that a person is a person only through other persons, and a broken person needed to be helped to be healed .What the offence had disturbed should be restored, and the offender and the victim had to be helped to be reconciled.	他们相信人只有透过他人才能实现自我的完善，而破碎的人格需要别人的帮助才能够得以复原。 犯罪行为破坏的秩序需要得到恢复，而我们必须协助罪犯和受害者实现和解。


Justice as retribution often ignores the victim and the system is usually impersonal and cold.	惩罚性的司法常常忽视受��者的存在，这样的制度冰冷、缺乏人情。


Restorative justice is hopeful.	而恢复性的司法则充满了希望。


It believes that even the worst offender can become a better person.	它相信即便是最恶劣的罪犯也能向好的方面发展。


This does not mean being soft on crime.	这样做并不是对犯罪行为的姑息迁就。


Offenders must realize the seriousness of their offences by the kind of sentences they get, but there must be hope, hope that the offender can become a useful member of society, after paying the price they owe to society.	犯罪分子必须通过审判意识到自身行为的严重后果。 但我们同样不能放弃希望，要让罪犯在付出必要的代价后，重新成为社会中有用的一员。


When we act as if we really believe that someone can be better, is better, then they will often rise to our expectations.	如果我们本着信任的原则去为人处事，那么即使是犯罪分子也不会辜负我们的期望。


Biomedicine in Reverse	生物医学逆风飞扬


LA JOLLA, CALIFORNIA – Pundits have long predicted that biology would dominate the twenty-first century, just as physics dominated the twentieth century.	拉荷亚，加利福尼亚—权威人士早就预测，生物学将主宰二十一世纪，正如物理学主宰二十世纪。


But biomedical research has yet to achieve the kind of productivity increases that accompanied the industrialization of combustion, electricity, and electronics.	但生物医学研究并为实现与伴随燃烧、电力和电子的产业化所出现的那种生产率提升。


Will the “century of biology” turn out to be little more than a fantasy?	“生物学的世纪”最后会成为镜花水月吗？


The problem largely comes down to a decrease in biomedical research-and-development expenditure.	这一问题在很大程度上可以归结为生物医学研发支出的下降。


As it stands, roughly $270 billion is invested in the field each year, producing an impressive half-million research publications, but only 20-30 new medicines.	目前，该领域每年的投资规模大约为2,700亿美元，产生令人瞩目的五十万项发表成果，但只能带来20—30种新药。


The discrepancy between spending and output adheres to what has come to be known as “Eroom’s law” – Moore’s law in reverse.	支出和产出之间的矛盾符合所谓的“逆摩尔定律”。


Moore’s law observes the increase in computer processing power over time – specifically, that the number of transistors that can be placed cheaply on an integrated circuit doubles every 18-24 months.	摩尔定律是关于计算机处理能随时间增长而变化的定律，具体而言，在一块集成电路上所能廉价布置的晶体管数量每18—24个月会翻一番。


By contrast, Eroom’s law charts the regress in new drug approvals, noting that the costs of developing a new medicine double roughly every nine years.	相反，逆摩尔定律是关于新药批准数量的，该定律指出，开发新药的成本大约每九年会翻一番。


This phenomenon is rooted in high rates of drug failure and lengthening technology cycles.	这一现象的根源在于药品失败率极高以及技术周期极长。


The probability that a drug entering clinical trials will gain approval from the US Food and Drug Administration has dropped from 23.9% in 1997 to 10.4% today.	进入临床试验的药品获得美国食品和药品监督局（Food and Drug Administration）批准的概率从1997年的23. 9%下降至如今的10.


While the first recombinant insulin in the 1980’s took less than a decade from testing to approval, monoclonal antibodies and gene therapy took more than 20 years to reach the same milestone.	4%。 20世纪80年代，第一个合成胰岛素花了不到十年的时间走完了从测试到批准的过程，但单株抗体和基因疗法却用了20多年才抵达了同样的目的地。


So far, pharmaceutical and biomedical research firms have responded to Eroom’s law by cutting R&D or moving it to less expensive sites in Asia, shifting their focus to less prevalent diseases, and sourcing innovation externally.	目前，药品和生物医学研究公司应对逆摩尔定律的办法是削减研发或将其转移至成本较低的亚洲、将研发焦点移向重要性较低的疾病，以及将创新外包了事。


As a result, growth in biomedical R&D spending has declined from more than 9% annually in the early 2000’s to less than 3% today.	结果，生物医学研发支出增长率从本世纪之处的年均9%下降到现在的不到3%。


But, while this strategy will moderate the impact of Eroom’s law, it will ultimately prove inadequate to sustain the industry.	但是，尽管这一战略缓和了逆摩尔定律的影响，但最终也无法维持整个行业。


The industry’s ability to support R&D budgets has already led to the closure of more than 30 major research sites.	医药业支持研发预算的能力下降已导致30多家大型研究机构关闭。


The United States bore the brunt of these closures, with biomedical R&D expenditure declining by more than $12 billion from 2007 to 2012.	美国是研究机构关闭的主要地区，从2007年到2012年，美国生物医学研发支出下降了120多亿美元。


And Asia – where biomedical R&D is growing rapidly, but from a small base – is unlikely to pick up the slack.	而亚洲的生物医学研发虽然增长很快，但基数很低，不可能填补空白。


Asian countries have tended to be reluctant to shoulder the cost of developing new medicines, with reimbursements falling far short of US levels, and their R&D productivity will not match that of the US and Europe for several more years.	亚洲国家一向不愿意承担开发新药的成本，新药研发回报远低于美国水平，研发生产率也比美国和欧洲落后多年。


Moreover, biomedical research firms are abandoning certain diseases in order to avoid the large-scale trials that they require, focusing instead on “orphan diseases” like cystic fibrosis, which demand smaller clinical trials that have a higher probability of success, leading to drugs that can cost more than $100,000 annually per patient.	此外，生物医学研究公司正在放弃某些疾病以免去这些疾病所要求的大规模试验，而专注于囊包性纤维症等“孤儿病”（orphan diseases），这些疾病只需要较小规模的临床试验，成功概率更高，而由此产生的新药每年要花费每位病人100,000多美元。


But, with insurers and payers worldwide becoming increasingly vigilant about controlling costs, this business model’s long-term prospects are unclear.	但是，随着全球保险公司和支付人越来越关注成本控制，这一商业模式的长期前景并不乐观。


Finally, while drugs are increasingly produced by small companies that larger pharmaceutical firms then acquire, funding for these start-ups is drying up.	最后，尽管药品日益由小公司生产，获得成功后再由大型制药公司收购，但这些创业企业的资金源正在枯竭。


Likewise, universities – the main source of biomedical innovation – are facing dwindling budgets.	类似地，作为生物医学创新主要源泉的大学也在面临预算缩水问题。


This year, funding for the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) – one of the world’s leading medical research centers – is a billion dollars lower than in 2012.	今年，美国国家卫生研究所（National Institutes of Health，NIH，世界领先的医学研究中心）的资金比2012年减少了十亿美元。


Restoring funding for basic biomedical research appears to have lost favor with policymakers, because it does not offer immediate self-sustaining economic returns.	恢复对基础生物医学研究的拨款似乎并不受决策者待见，因为这无法立刻产生能自我维持的经济回报。


And funding for basic research remains a low priority in emerging economies like China, where it accounts for less than 15 cents for every research dollar spent (compared to 35 cents in the US).	而在中国等新兴经济体，基础研究拨款的优先等级也很低，并且每1美元的研究投入只能产生15美分（美国是35美分）。


With no panacea in sight, several other solutions are gaining traction.	在看不见万灵丹的情况下，一些其他办法正在获得关注。


To maximize investment, the public and private sectors are increasingly pooling resources.	为了实现投资最大化，公私部门正在日益集中资源。


For example, under the Accelerating Medicines Partnership, the NIH and ten biopharmaceutical companies will fund a five-year effort to validate promising targets in three disease areas.	比如，在医学合作出金计划（Accelerating Medicines Partnership）中，NIH和十家生物制药公司将为一个五年计划提供资金，旨在在三种疾病领域实现承诺目标。


Other initiatives include efforts in Alzheimer’s research to test competing drugs against one shared “placebo arm” in clinical trials, and in cancer research to test multiple therapies in a single trial and identify the most responsive patients.	其他项目包括在阿尔兹海默症研究中检测不同药品在临床试验中对同一“安慰剂”的对比效果，以及在癌症研究的单一试验中测试多种疗法和识别反应最强的患者。


These pooled resources will be directed to a few high-priority diseases, identified through an evaluation of the marginal benefit of additional R&D. Japan’s focused strategy to champion stem-cell R&D should serve as a model for other countries.	这些���中起来的资源将被用于一些较紧迫的疾病，通过对研发增量的边际收益来评估。 日本集中资源推进干细胞研发的战略可以作为其他国家的榜样。


At the same time, governments will have to implement policies aimed at guiding investment toward specific diseases.	与此同时，政府必须实施旨在引导针对具体疾病的投资的政策。


For example, increased NIH funding, extended market exclusivity, and relaxed regulatory hurdles in the US resulted in a renaissance in antibiotic drug development.	比如，NIH拨款的增加、广阔的专属市场以及宽松的监管让美国的抗生素药物开发迎来了第二春。


Society will also have to share the cost of drug development.	社会也必须共同承担药品开发的成本。


Regulatory agencies worldwide may follow the United Kingdom’s lead in embracing adaptive licensing.	全球监管机构可以效仿英国的先例，实施适应性许可制度。


Under this approach, drugs are conditionally approved and marketed, with the revenue generated following the conditional approval covering the costly trial for proving efficacy.	根据这一办法，药品被有条件批准和上市，用有条件批准后所获得的收入覆盖昂贵的药效验证试验。


Such a scheme facilitates lower drug pricing, while overcoming the effect of Eroom’s law on investment in treatments for many diseases.	这一制度有助于降低药价，同时克服许多疾病治疗投资上逆摩尔定律。


Whether these efforts will succeed in putting biomedical research on a more sustainable footing remains an open question.	这些方法能否让生物医学研究走上更加可持续的道路仍未可知。


This could still turn out to be biology’s century.	本世纪或许仍然是生物学的世纪。


But it is not a sure thing.	但这绝不是百分百确定的事情。


Infrastructure’s Class of Its Own	基础设施应单独成一类


BEIJING – After several months of disappointing economic indicators, China’s State Council has unveiled a “mini-stimulus” package, focused on social-housing construction and railway expansion.	北京—近几个月来，中国的经济指标令人失望，中国国务院抛出了集中于社会保障房和铁路建设的“迷你刺激”计划。


The decision came a month after Premier Li Keqiang’s declaration that China had set its annual growth target at “around 7.5%” – the same as last year’s goal.	此前一个月，李克强总理宣布中国的年增长目标是“7. 5%左右”，与去年持平。


The implication is clear: While consumption-driven growth remains a long-term goal for China, infrastructure will continue – at least in the short term – to serve as a key driver of China’s economy.	言下之意是明确的：尽管消费推动型增长仍是中国的长期目标，但基础设施——至少在短期——依然是中国经济的重要推动力。


Of course, China is not the only economy that depends on infrastructure investment to buttress economic growth.	当然，中国决非唯一一个依赖基础设施投资支持经济增长的经济体。


The World Bank estimates that infrastructure investments accounted for nearly half of the acceleration in Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic growth in 2001-2005.	世界银行估算，2001—2005年，基础设施投资贡献了撒哈拉以南非洲地区经济增长加速的近一半。


According to the Bank, a 10% increase in infrastructure investment is associated with GDP growth of 1%.	据世界银行的数据，基础设施投资增加10%将伴随GDP增长1%。


Such investment also creates jobs, both in the short term, by creating demand for materials and labor, and in the long term, for related services.	这笔投资还能创造就业——从短期看，是通过创造对原材料和劳动力的需求； 从长期看，是通过创造对相关服务的需求。


For example, every $100 million invested in rural road maintenance translates into an estimated 25,000-50,000 job opportunities.	比如，每1亿美元农村公路维持投���可以创造约25,000—50,000个就业机会。


But these benefits are diluted in China, owing to its excessive reliance on public funding.	但这些好处在中国被稀释了，因为中国过度依赖公共融资。


Indeed, in recent years, less than 0.03% of Chinese infrastructure investment – which amounted to roughly 9% of GDP – was derived from private capital.	事实上，在最近几年中，中国基础设施投资（约占GDP的9%）中只有不到0. 03%来自私人资本。


This problem is not limited to China; of the 7.2% of GDP that Asian countries spend, on average, on infrastructure development, only about 0.2% is privately funded.	平均而言，亚洲国家将GDP的7. 2%花在了基础设施开发上，其中只有0.


By contrast, in Latin America and the Caribbean, private capital finances, respectively, 1.9% and 1.6% of infrastructure investment.	2%为私人供资。 相反，在拉丁美洲和加勒比地区，基础设施投资的私人资本融资比例分别为1.


Discussions within the G-20 have produced two possible explanations for Asian countries’ inability to attract more private capital to infrastructure projects.	二十国集团的内部讨论就亚洲国家无法吸引更多私人资本投向基础设施项目的问题提出了两个解释。


Most developing countries argue that the problem is rooted in the provision of capital, with investors preferring to fill their infrastructure portfolios with low-risk projects, and insurance companies and banks facing overly restrictive regulations.	大部分发展中国家认为问题的根源在于资本供给，投资者更喜欢投资低风险基础设施项目，而保险公司和银行业面临着过度严格的监管。


OECD countries like Germany counter that the problem is the lack of investment-worthy assets; there are simply not enough bankable projects available.	德国等经合组织国家反驳说问题在于缺少值得投资的资产； 即这只不过是可获得银行可接受的项目太少的缘故。


In fact, both explanations are correct – but neither is complete.	事实上，两种解释都是正确的——但都有失偏颇。


It is time for Asia’s leaders to recognize that the lack of private funding for infrastructure projects cannot be reduced to one or even two problems, and to develop comprehensive solutions that account for the full scope of the challenge.	亚洲领导人应该认识到，私人基础设施项目融资的缺乏不是一两个问题那么简单，他们应该寻找全面的解决方案彻底解决这一挑战。


This requires, first and foremost, abandoning the view that infrastructure assets fit into the paradigm of traditional asset classes like equity, debt, or real estate.	这首先需要抛弃一个观点，即基础设施资产可以按照股本、债务或不动产等传统资产类别范式归类。


Infrastructure must be redefined as a new asset class, based on several considerations.	基础设施必须重新定义为新的资产类别，有几个方面需要考虑。


For starters, there is the public-good element of many infrastructure projects, which demands contingent government obligations like universal coverage levels for basic services.	首先，许多基础设施项目包含公共品性质，这意味着或有政府义务，类似于基本服务的普遍覆盖。


In order to make such projects more appealing to private investors, economic externalities should be internalized, and a link should be established between the internal rate of return, which matters to a commercial investor, and the economic rate of return, which matters to society.	要让这类项目产生对私人投资者的吸引力，经济外部性就必须内部化，内在回报率（商业投资者所关心的问题）和经济回报率（社会所关心的问题）之间必须建立联系。


Moreover, innovative mechanisms to supply new assets to investors would be needed – and that requires the creativity found and priced by markets.	此外，需要向投资者提供新资产的创新机制——而这需要市场来发现和定价创造力。


To this end, private-sector sponsors must be given space to initiate valuable projects.	在这方面，私人部门出资者必须获得发起有价值的项目的空间。


The new asset class would need its own standardized risk/return profile, accounting, for example, for the political risks that public-sector involvement may imply and for the lower returns from infrastructure relative to traditional private equity.	新资产类别需要有其自身的风险/回报特征，比如，需要考察公共部门参与所隐含的政治风险以及基础设施回报低于传统私人股权的风险。


Moreover, the risks associated with the new asset class would change as projects progress from feasibility study to construction to operation, implying that each phase would attract different sources of funding.	此外，与新资产类别伴随而生的风险会随着项目从可信性研究演进到建设和经营而变化，这意味着每一阶段吸引的资金源不同。


A clear understanding of this process would enable potential investors to assess projects more effectively, which is critical to encouraging them to put up financing.	清晰理解这一过程将使潜在投资者能够更有效地评估项目，而这是鼓励他们出钱的关键。


Another important consideration is the considerable technical expertise that infrastructure investments demand, which makes them more complex than most assets.	另一个重要的考虑点是基础设施投资需要大量专家知识，这使得它们比大部分资产更复杂。


Similarly, a specialized network of actors would be needed to ensure that intermediation of infrastructure transactions is efficient and cost-effective, instead of fragmented and slow, as it is now.	类似地，还需要行动方的专业化网络以确保基础设施交易中介效率高、成本低，而不是想现在那样分散且行动缓慢。


For countries that lack China’s strong fiscal position, the need to attract private capital to infrastructure investment is obvious.	对于财政状况不如中国的国家来说，吸引私人资本参与基础设施投资的需要是显而易见的。


With nearly 70% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population lacking access to electricity and 65% of South Asians lacking access to basic sanitation, there is no greater imperative than to plan, fund, build, and maintain infrastructure assets.	撒哈拉以南非洲有70%人口无法得到电力，65%的南亚人没有基本卫生设施，规划、融资、建设和维护基础设施资产的需求极其迫切。


But private investment in infrastructure remains vital even in countries like China, because it brings the power and dynamism of the market, which improves the allocation of capital and promotes transparency.	但基础设施私人投资对于中国这样的国家也是至关重要的，因为它能带来市场的力量和活力，从而改善资本配置、增加透明度。


Indeed, more private-sector involvement would make the kind of scandals that have occurred in China’s railway sector far less likely.	事实上，更多私人部门的参与将让类似中国铁路部门腐败这样的丑闻可能性大幅下降。


In short, redefining infrastructure as a new asset class is the only credible way to attract funding for infrastructure construction, and thus to boost long-term economic growth and the employment rate.	简言之，将基础设施重新定义为新资产类别是吸引基础设施建设融资、从而提振长期经济增长和就业率的唯一可行的办法。


It is time for Asia’s leaders to step up.	亚洲领导人应该行动起来。


The West’s Other Trump	西方的另一个特朗普


BRUSSELS – In the second American presidential debate, Donald Trump promised that, if elected, he would appoint a special prosecutor to investigate Hillary Clinton.	布鲁塞尔—在第二场美国总统竞选辩论中，唐纳德·特朗普承诺如果当选将任命一位特别检察官调查希拉里·克林顿。


“You’d be in jail,” Trump told her.	“你会进监狱的，”特朗普对她说。


Trump’s threat to politicize the justice system has received the backlash that it deserves; but, sadly, his cynicism is not unique to the United States.	特朗普的司法体系政治化威胁遭到了应有的口诛笔伐； 但悲哀的是，他的犬儒主义并非美国所独有。


The current Polish government, led by the Law and Justice (PiS) party, which came to power just under a year ago, has displayed a similar authoritarian streak, flouting legal conventions to further its own ends.	现任波兰政府在掌权快一年的法律与正义党（PiS）的领导下，表现出类似的极权主义特征，通过践踏法律推行自己的目标。


PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński has repeatedly called for an inquiry into former Polish Prime Minister and current European Council President Donald Tusk.	PiS领导人雅罗斯瓦夫·卡钦斯基多次要求调查前波兰总理、现任欧洲理事会主席唐纳德·图斯克。


Kaczyński holds Tusk’s former government partially responsible for the April 2010 plane crash in Smolensk, Russia, which killed 96, including Kaczyński’s twin brother, Polish President Lech Kaczyński.	卡钦斯基指责图斯克的前任政府要为2010年4月俄罗斯斯摩棱斯克坠机事件负有部分责任。 该事件导致96人死亡，包括卡钦斯基的双胞胎兄弟、波兰总统莱赫·卡钦斯基。


The Polish government delegation was traveling to a commemoration of the 1940 massacre in Katyn, where Stalin ordered the murder of 22,000 Polish army officers, police officers, and intelligentsia and blamed Hitler for the crime.	遇难的波兰政府代表团前往斯摩棱斯克参加1940年卡廷大屠杀纪念活动。 在卡廷大屠杀中，斯大林下令杀害了22,000名波兰军官、警官和知识分子，并栽赃给希特勒。


When the Cold War ended, the truth about the massacre finally came out, and was officially recognized by Russian President Boris Yeltsin.	冷战结束后，卡廷大屠杀真相大白，并由俄罗斯总统叶利钦予以正式承认。


Jarosław Kaczyński and other PiS members maintain that Russia – with help from some Polish officials – was responsible for the plane crash, too.	雅罗斯拉夫·卡钦斯基和其他PiS党员认为俄罗斯——在一些波兰官员的帮助下——也要为坠机事件负责。


They have relied on this bizarre conspiracy theory in their rise to power, despite having no evidence to support it.	他们依靠这个奇特的阴谋论上台，尽管根本没有证据支持他们的主张。


Indeed, transcripts from the plane’s recovered cockpit voice recorder indicate that the plane crashed during a bad-weather landing.	事实上，复原的飞机驾驶舱录音表明，飞机是在糟糕天气下着陆时坠毁。


Armed with his conspiracy theories, Kaczyński wants to deny Tusk a second term at the helm of one of the European Union’s three main governing institutions, saying, “Should such a person be at the head of the European Council?	卡钦斯基想借助阴谋论阻挠图斯克作为欧盟三大治理机构之一首脑的第二个任期，称“这样一个人可以担任欧洲理事会首脑吗？


I have profound doubts.”	我表示深切的怀疑。


Meanwhile, Poland’s right-wing media has fanned the flames, with one magazine recently depicting Tusk in handcuffs.	”与此同时，波兰右翼媒体也在煽风点火，某杂志最近刊出图斯克戴手铐的漫画。


Kaczyński’s anti-Tusk crusade is a Trump-worthy abuse of political power that foreshadows what life would be like for Trump’s political opponents if he were actually to win.	卡钦斯基的反图斯克运动是特朗普式政治权力的滥用，它预示了如果特朗普真的当选，他的政治对手命运会如何。


It also reflects a broader, raging battle for Poland’s soul.	它也反映了更加宽泛和激烈的波兰心灵之战。


Poland was once Central Europe’s post-Cold War democratic poster child.	波兰曾经是中欧后冷战时代民主榜样。


But now the PiS is pursuing a wide-ranging power grab, seeking control of the country’s constitutional court, public media channels, and security services.	但如今，PiS正在追求权力一把抓，寻求控制波兰宪法法院、公共媒体频道和安全部门。


Instead of cementing Poland’s strategic importance to NATO and its rightful place as a powerful, respected EU member state, the PiS has become obsessed with reversing modernity.	PiS不去巩固波兰对北约的战略重要性，不去追求波兰作为受尊重的强大欧盟成员国的应有地位，而是沉迷于扭转现代性。


As proof, one need look no further than the government’s assault on its own judiciary and democratic institutions, which is raising eyebrows in the US, Brussels, and across Europe.	要想证实这一点，只需要看看政府对其自身司法和民主制度的抨击，这已经引起了美国、布鲁塞尔和整个欧洲的不满。


Poland is experiencing a constitutional crisis that began when PiS-backed Polish President Andrzej Duda refused to swear in three Constitutional Tribunal judges chosen by the previous parliament.	从PiS支持的波兰总统安德烈·杜巴拒绝在前任议会所选定的三位宪法法庭法官面前宣誓就职开始，波兰面临着一场宪政危机。


The PiS then selected its own judges instead, while adopting legislation that essentially paralyzed the court.	PiS随后用自己选择的法官替换之，同时实施了让宪法法庭基本瘫痪的立法。


The court declared the PiS’s judicial rule changes unconstitutional, but the PiS-led government refused to publish the court’s decision, thereby blocking it from taking effect.	宪法法庭宣布PiS的司法规则修订违宪，但PiS领导的政府拒绝公布法庭裁决，从而阻止了它的生效。


It is now all but impossible for the court to assess the constitutionality of the current parliament’s legislation, despite the Polish constitution’s explicit provision authorizing judicial review.	如今，宪法法庭根本无从评估本届议会立法的合宪性，尽管波兰宪法明文规定了授权司法审查。


Now that the PiS’s actions have been universally condemned, it is holding out until the end of the year, when the current constitutional court president’s mandate expires.	由于PiS的行为受到了一致谴责，这一问题将搁置直至年底现任宪法法庭主席任期届满。


After that, the PiS will appoint a friendlier president, who will no doubt dance to whatever tune it plays.	随后，PiS将任命一位更加友好的主席，毫无疑问，他将顺应PiS的要求。


But a newly appointed president likely won’t end Poland’s constitutional crisis, because with valid court judgments from this summer remaining unpublished, there is now a black hole in Poland’s constitutional order.	但新任命主席可能无法结束波兰的宪政危机，因为由于今年夏天的那宗有法律效力的裁决不公布，波兰宪政秩序中产生了一个黑洞。


The EU has started legal proceedings against Poland, and it is calling on the Polish government to work with opposition parties to reform the court.	欧盟已经开始针对波兰的法律程序，要求波兰政府与反对党合作改革宪法法院。


If Poland doesn’t comply, the EU could ultimately strip it of its voting rights.	如果波兰不服从，欧盟可能剥夺其投票权。


But it is unlikely that the EU or other international bodies will ensure a solution to the Polish political problem.	但欧盟或其他国际机构不可能保证找到波兰政治问题的解决办法。


Only Poles can do that.	只有波兰人可以。


In fact, huge protests against a recent bill that would have banned virtually all abortions (under penalty of imprisonment for up to five years) forced the government to back down and withdraw the proposed legislation.	事实上，反对一项新法案的大规模示威已经迫使波兰政府收回立法提案。 该法案将禁止几乎一切堕胎行为（堕胎行为将导致最多五年刑期的处罚）。


This marked a victory for Polish women, and it suggests that Poland is more progressive than Kaczyński would like to believe.	这标志着波兰女性的胜利，并且表明波兰比卡钦斯基所认为的更加进步。


Still, while the government may have suffered one major public defeat, the PiS’s underlying ideological illiberalism remains intact.	但是，尽管波兰政府可能遭到重大公共挫折，作为PiS意识形态基础的反自由主义（illiberalism）仍然完好无损。


That means Polish civil-society advocates will have to fight many more battles in the coming months to contain and reverse the PiS’s lawlessness.	这意味着波兰公民社会支持者必须在未来几个月中进行更多斗争以阻止和扭转PiS对法律的漠视。


The Fertility Conundrum	生育难题


BOSTON – It is perhaps inevitable that contraception and population growth are controversial topics, given the many perspectives brought to bear on them.	波士顿——鉴于认识的角度多种多样，避孕和人口增长不可避免地会成为争议话题。


Reproductive-health activists focus on family planning and a woman’s right to control her own body.	生殖健康活动人士关注计划生育和妇女控制身体的权利。


Economists look at the impact on sustainable growth.	经济学家关注对可持续发展的影响。


Governments fret about over-population and unemployment.	政府则担心人口泛滥和失业问题。


Health workers worry about sexually transmitted diseases and malnutrition.	医务人员担心营养不良和性传播疾病。


Striking the right balance among these different viewpoints is no easy task – but much depends on getting it right.	在不同的诉求之间实现恰到好处的平衡绝非易事——但上述目标能否实现却在很多领域具有决定性意义。


New contraceptive technologies – in the form of condoms, pills, and implantable devices – provide reversible and permanent forms of protection.	避孕套、避孕药和植入器械等全新避孕技术提供了可逆及永久形式的生殖保护。 但具体使用状况差异很大——从乍得年轻女性的4.


But their usage varies widely – from just 4.8% of young women in Chad to 84.6% in China – reflecting differences in cost, availability, and cultural norms.	8%到中国青年女性的84. 6%——反映出不同国家在成本、使用便捷度和文化规范方面的差异。


Contraception indisputably brings health and socioeconomic benefits.	避孕无疑会带来健康和社会经济效益。


A 2012 study reported that its use averted an estimated 272,040 maternal deaths in 2008, 44% fewer than might otherwise have occurred.	2012年的一份研究报告显示避孕措施仅在2008年估计就避免了272,040例产妇死亡，比不采取避孕措施的情况要低44%。


Contraception use has also helped less developed economies by raising women’s employment and earnings potential.	避孕措施的使用还通过提高女性就业及收入能力帮助了欠发达经济体。


But perhaps one of the most important economic effects of contraception concerns the “dependency ratio” – the proportion of available workers to pensioners, children, and the infirm.	但或许避孕最重要的经济影响涉及“抚养比率”——也就是现有劳动力与养老金领取者、儿童和体弱者的比率。


Lowering the birth rate lowers the overall dependency ratio – though at the risk of future labor shortages, weaker consumer spending, and reduced productivity.	降低生育率一般会降低总抚养率——进而有可能造成未来劳动力短缺、消费力和生产力下降。


And, as more people live longer, and the relative size of the working-age population falls, the dependency ratio can begin to rise, with serious socioeconomic repercussions, because older people require more health care and draw pensions.	而且人口寿命增加造成劳动年龄人口相对规模下降及抚养率攀升，并因为老年人需要领取养老金和获取更多医疗保健服务，因而造成严重的社会经济后果。


On the other hand, rapid population growth as a result of higher birth rates can threaten the wellbeing of the poorest communities and countries, by altering the dependency ratio at the other end of the scale.	另一方面，出生率高所导致的人口快速增长通过改变天平另一端的抚养比率，可能威胁到最贫困群体和国家的福祉。


Sub-Saharan Africa and the world’s other poorest regions have recorded significantly more than 2% annual population growth in recent years, whereas the demographic trend in the advanced economies of Europe and Asia has been flat or declining	撒哈拉以南非洲地区和世界其他最贫困地区近年来已经实现超过2%的年人口增长，而欧洲和亚洲先进经济体的人口基本呈平稳或下降趋势。


Simulations indicate that the optimal average number of children born to a woman over her lifetime is around 2.3.	模拟计算显示女性一生的最佳平均产子数约为2. 3个。


This is the total fertility rate (TFR) required to maintain current population levels (the replacement rate).	这是维持目前人口水平（替代率）所需的总生育率（TFR）。


Unfortunately, few countries strike the right balance, with country averages ranging from 6.9 (in Niger) to 0.8 (in Singapore).	遗憾的是，鲜有国家能恰到好处地实现平衡，各国的平均产子数从尼日尔的6. 9人到新加坡的0.


The CIA World Factbook reports that 141 countries (approximately half of the world’s population) fall below the replacement rate, with population decline projected in some cases to reach 20% by 2050.	8人波动很大。 美国中情局世界概况报告显示有141个国家（约占一半的世界人口）处于替代率以下，某些情况下截止2050年的人口下降预计将达到20%。


Some countries, such as Germany and France, are trying to raise their TFR to the replacement level.	有些国家，比方说德国和法国，正努力将总生育率提高到与替代率相等。


Others are struggling to bring down their TFR, because of fears about future mass unemployment and social unrest.	还有些国家因为担心未来大规模失业和社会动荡而努力降低总生育率。


In all cases, economic circumstances and social pressures will dictate the level and speed of population growth.	无论如何，经济环境和社会压力将决定人口增长的水平和速度。


That is why much attention has focused on the impact of a growing global population on food demand.	这解释了人们为什么极为关注世界人口不断增长对粮食需求的影响问题。


A rising population has been associated with starvation and malnutrition in some parts of the world.	人口增长在某些国家一直与饥饿和营养不良息息相关。


Until recently, the global population was predicted to surpass 11 billion by 2050, triggering Malthusian fears.	不久前尚有预测显示全球人口到2050年将超过110亿，而这激起了马尔��斯主义者的忧虑。


Thanks in part to lower fertility rates in industrialized countries, this projection has been adjusted downward, to about 8.9 billion.	幸亏工业化国家生育率较低，该预测数据已向下调整至约89亿。


But such fears remain.	但依然存在这样的忧虑。


The risk is that policymakers and campaigners will conflate the problems of food shortages and starvation with that of population management and its long-term social and economic consequences.	危险在于决策者及活动家把粮食短缺与饥饿问题和人口管理及其长期社会经济影响混淆在一起。


In fact, according to a forecast in 2002 by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), global food production will exceed the needs of the global population by the year 2030, largely owing to the Green Revolution of the past half-century.	事实上，联合国粮农组织（FAO）2002年的一份预测显示全球粮食产量到2030年将超过全球人口需求，这在很大程度上是因为过去半个世纪的绿色革命提高了粮食生产能力。


Arguably, the causes of food shortages are to be found in the organization, distribution, and waste of resources, not population growth.	可以说，是组织、分配和资源浪费，而不是人口增长造成了粮食的短缺。


The United Kingdom’s Institution of Mechanical Engineers estimated in 2013 that 1.2-2 billion tons of food (30-50% of total food production) is wasted annually.	英国机械工程师学会估计2013年每年浪费约12-20亿吨的粮食（相当于粮食总产量的30-50%）。


This far exceeds the 230 million tons of food produced in Sub-Saharan Africa.	这一数字远远超过了撒哈拉以南非洲地区生产的2. 3亿吨粮食。


At the same time, the FAO estimates that 870 million people worldwide – 90% of them living in developing countries – suffer chronic undernourishment.	与此同时，粮农组织估计全球8. 7亿人——其中90%生活在发展中国家——受困于慢性营养不良症。


Furthermore, approximately half of the 10.9 million children who die each year do so as a result of poor nutrition, while more than 1.4 billion adults and 40 million children are overweight or obese.	此外，每年死亡的1，090万儿童中约半数是因为营养不良，而超过14亿成人和4，000万儿童却为超重或肥胖所困。


None of this should divert attention from the need to achieve a balance between population growth, appropriate dependency ratios for countries at different stages of economic development, and the fight for women’s reproductive rights.	这一切均不应将注意力从实现人口增长平衡、在不同经济发展阶段的国家维持恰当的抚养率和为女性生殖权利做斗争中转移开去。


These are long-term issues that require international cooperation and collaborative research.	这些都是需要国际合作和共同研究的长期问题。


Indeed, like climate change, population balance is a global issue that must be addressed carefully and rigorously – and before it is too late.	事实上，就像气候变化一样，人口平衡也是要赶在为时已晚之前认真严肃解决的世界性问题。


Disrupting Putin’s Game Plan	干扰普京的游戏计划


MUNICH – No sooner did the Sochi Winter Games end than Russia bade farewell to the Olympic spirit by invading and occupying a foreign country.	慕尼黑—索契冬奥会一结束，俄罗斯就和奥林匹克精神分道扬镳了——它入侵并占领了外国。


With its aggression against Ukraine, the Kremlin has breached the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and other international agreements, including the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances and the Black Sea basing agreement, which spelled out Russia’s relations with Ukraine.	对乌克兰的侵犯触犯了联合国宪章、赫尔辛基最后议定书（Helsinki Final Act）和其他国际协定，包括确定俄罗斯与乌克兰关系的布达佩斯安全保证备忘录（Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances）和黑海基地协定。


Crimea has been turned into a military zone, and its inhabitants might soon find themselves trapped in the firing line if the crisis continues to escalate.	克里米亚已经变成了军事区，如果危机继续发酵，其居民或许很快就会陷入战场。


Russians now face international diplomatic and economic isolation, thus exacerbating their country’s economic woes.	如今，俄罗斯面临着国际外交和经济孤立，这进一步加剧了俄罗斯的经济混乱。


And Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reckless gamble risks dragging the world into a wider conflict.	而俄罗斯普京的孤注一掷可能把世界拖入更大的冲突。


In light of Putin’s dangerous behavior, the West must rethink its stance toward him.	面对普京的危险行动，西方必须反思对普京的立场。


Here is a leader who read a hidden, menacing agenda into a technical European Union document about export subsidies and anti-fraud provisions.	这位领导人把技术性的关于出口补贴和反欺诈条款的���盟文件解读成隐蔽的威胁论。


More broadly, here is a paranoiac who sees an implausible coalition of liberal Russians, Ukrainian fascists, the CIA, and Islamist terrorists trying to thwart his preferences, if not topple him, at every turn.	更广义地说，他是一位偏执狂，认为自由派俄罗斯人、乌克兰法西斯主义者、CIA和伊斯兰极端分子组成了一个不可思议的联盟，在一切事务上都要和他对着干，甚至试图推翻他。


Indeed, what we are seeing is not an unfortunate over-reaction to recent events, but a result of meticulous preparation.	事实上，我们看到的不是对最新事件的不幸的过度反应，而是精心准备的结果。


Armies do not mobilize 150,000 troops within days, or have vehicles and thousands of uniforms without insignias ready, or hold military exercises in peaceful regions of the world without warning.	否则军队不可能在几天内动员150,000大军，不可能准备好大量汽车和数千名身穿无标识制服的部队，也不可能在没有警告信号的和平地区举行军演。


It would be a mistake for NATO to respond to Russia’s provocations with similar saber rattling.	如果北约对俄罗斯的挑衅以牙还牙，那将是一个错误。


After all, the United States and the EU still have a range of tools to modify Putin’s calculus, or that of those bankrolling his regime.	毕竟，美国和欧盟有很多办法可以改变普京的算盘，或者影响普京政权的收入。


Most important, the US and Europe must cooperate much more closely than they have so far.	最重要的是，美国和欧洲必须比现在更加紧密地合作。


The impression of disunity on sanctions plays into Putin’s hands.	在制裁问题上莫衷一是，得利的是普京。


Some EU members, like Germany, must live up to the expectations they have recently raised.	一些欧盟成员国，比如德国，决不能辜负人们对他们的新近预期。


If German leaders are serious about instituting a “culture of responsibility,” they are obliged to act accordingly, even if doing so entails economic costs.	如果德国领导人所谓树立“责任文化”是认真的，那么他们就有义务据此行动起来，即便这样做会到来经济代价。


The West should also listen carefully to Ukraine’s neighbor, Poland, which probably has the deepest insight into the complexities of the crisis.	西方也必须认真聆听乌克兰的邻国波兰的声音，波兰也许是对这场危机的复杂性洞见最深刻的国家。


Most important, it is essential to adhere to certain key principles:	最重要的是，必须坚守几条关键原则：


Use diplomacy.	利用外交。


Europe, the US, and Japan have already suspended their cooperation with Russia in the G-8.	欧洲、美国和日本已经叫停了与俄罗斯的G-8合作。


Similarly, the OECD should put Russia’s accession process on hold.	类似地，经合组织也把接受俄罗斯的进程冻结了。


Following punitive measures by the US, the EU has now decided on some “soft” sanctions.	跟随美国的惩罚措施，眼下欧洲已决定采取一些“软”制裁。


But modest steps like suspending talks on visa liberalization will not impress the Kremlin much.	但中止签证自由化这样的温和步骤并不会让克里姆林宫感冒。


Stronger signals, such as cancellation or suspension of agreements concerning the South Stream gas pipeline and a trade embargo on arms and dual-use items, merit serious consideration.	更强的信号——比如取消或中止南溪（South Stream）输气管道协议、武器贸易禁令或者双管齐下的选择应该得到认真考虑。


Impose targeted sanctions against those responsible for Russia’s Crimean incursion.	对俄罗斯入侵克里米亚的责任人实施定向制裁。


An obvious tool here is to broaden the US Magnitsky Act, which prohibits the 18 people identified as being directly responsible for the detention, abuse, and death of the Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky from entering the US or using its financial system.	在这方面，一个现成的工具是扩大美国马格尼茨基法（Magnitsky Act）的范围。 马格尼茨基法禁止18位被认定对俄罗斯律师谢尔盖·马格尼茨基的被捕、虐待和死亡负有直接责任的人员禁止进入美国和使用美国的金融服务。


The Magnitsky Act should be amended to include the names of political and military leaders responsible for the invasion of Ukraine.	马格尼茨基法应该做出修订，将应该对入侵乌克兰负责的政治和军事领导人纳入其中。


Moreover, the modified bill should be adopted by the US and the EU simultaneously – thus delivering a credible threat to freeze the foreign assets of Russia’s government, state-owned companies, individual officials, and relevant oligarchs.	此外，修正后的法案应该在美国和欧盟同时获得通过——从而构成可信的冻结俄罗斯政府、国有公司、个别官员和相关寡头的海外资产的威胁。


Engage Russians.	将俄罗斯纳入进来。


The West needs to communicate to ordinary Russians the spuriousness of Putin’s zero-sum, us-versus-them narrative.	西方需要和普通俄罗斯人交流，揭开普京你死我亡的零和博弈论的虚伪。


Closer relations between Ukraine and the EU pose no threat to Russia; on the contrary, a Ukraine closely integrated with its Western neighbors could boost Russia’s economy as well.	乌克兰和欧盟走得更近决不是对俄罗斯的威胁，相反，与西方邻国紧密一体化的乌克兰能够提振俄罗斯的经济。


That may be irrelevant to a leader who is guided by visions of restored imperial glory, but not to the people under his rule.	对于一位着眼于重塑帝国荣光的领导人来说，这或许无关紧要，但对受他统治的人民来说并非如此。


Knocking holes in the Kremlin’s wall of propaganda will not be easy, but it should not be impossible in our hyper-connected world.	在克里姆林宫的宣传机器上寻找破绽决非易事，但在我们的高度互联的世界也并非不可能的任务。


Support Ukraine with financial aid – as the EU has now done –and by securing its upcoming elections.	用金融援助——如欧盟现在所做的那样——和保证即将到来的选举支持乌克兰。


Military assistance should include, at a minimum, Western intelligence sharing and cooperation through the NATO-Ukraine Commission.	军事援助也应该最低限度地包括进来，西方应该与乌克兰共享情报，并通过北约-乌克兰委员会（NATO-Ukraine Commission）展开合作。


Should the situation deteriorate further, the West should also provide medical aid and surveillance assets.	如果局势进一步恶化，西方还应该提供医疗援助和监控设备。


If the 2008 Russo-Georgian war is any guide, NATO’s Cyber Defense Center should help Ukraine prepare for a large-scale digital offensive.	2008年拉索-格鲁吉亚战争的前车之鉴表明，北约的网络防务中心应该帮助乌克兰做好准备抵抗大规模数字攻击。


Defend NATO allies.	捍卫北约盟国。


NATO should discuss concrete steps to protect its members.	北约必须讨论采取保护其成员国的具体步骤。


Ukraine borders four NATO members (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania), while a fifth (Turkey), along with Romania, borders the Black Sea.	乌克兰与四个北约成员国接壤（波兰、斯洛伐克、匈牙利和罗马尼亚），更与和俄罗斯接壤的第五国（土耳其）共享黑海沿岸。


Moreover, Estonia and Latvia are alarmed at Russia’s geopolitical ambitions, especially given the pretext of protecting ethnic kin.	此外，爱沙尼亚和拉脱维亚也对俄罗斯的地缘政治野心引起了警惕，特别是考虑到俄罗斯保护同族人民的借口的情况下。


Both have populations that are about 25% Russian – a legacy of their Soviet past.	两国都有约25%的俄罗斯族人口，这是苏联时代的遗留问题。


Finally, Poland and Lithuania border Kaliningrad, Russia’s exclave in the middle of Europe (and the scene of its most recent combat-readiness exercise).	最后，波兰和立陶宛都和俄罗斯的中欧飞地（及其最近的备战行动地）加里宁格勒接壤。


This is a time for diplomacy, and NATO must try to avoid direct confrontation, but not at all costs.	这是一个外交时机，北约必须试图避免直接冲突，但也不能不惜代价。


It must reckon that Russia’s actions might deliberately run counter to a peaceful settlement.	北约必须认识到，俄罗斯的行动可能是有意地与和平解决方案渐行渐远。


The alliance cannot afford to launch a lengthy and heated debate about the deployment of its forces and capabilities only at the moment diplomatic efforts fail.	北约决不能等到外交手段失败才开始热烈讨论部署它的力量和能力。


When Ukrainians stood up against their corrupt elite, they became the first people to put their lives on the line for the goal of EU membership.	当乌克兰人站起来反对他们的腐败精英时，他们已成为第一批把他们的生命和欧盟成员国目标系在一起的人。


The result was unwarranted retaliation from Russia.	结果，他们招致了俄罗斯毫无理由的打击报复。


So this is not Ukraine’s war.	因此这不是乌克兰的战争。


Ukraine is the immediate victim, but it is by no means Putin’s ultimate target.	乌克兰是首当其冲的受害者，但这决不是普京的最终目标。


This is a blatant attack on the principles of state sovereignty, inviolability of negotiated borders, and adherence to multilateral agreements that underpin today’s rule-based international system.	这是对国家主权原则、议定边界的神圣不可侵犯性以及对作为当今世界基于规则的国际体系的基础的多边协定的赤裸裸的攻击。


Countering Russia’s aggression is thus the responsibility of all who would uphold that system.	因此，制衡俄罗斯的恣睢行为是所有赞成这一体系的人的责任。


How Money is Made	如何创造货币


BERLIN/SOUTHAMPTON – Last month, the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) announced the establishment of their own development bank, which would reduce their dependence on the Western-dominated, dollar-focused World Bank and International Monetary Fund.	柏林/南安普顿—上个月，金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非）宣布成立它们自己的开发银行，该银行可以减少它们对西方主导的、以美元为核心的世界银行和国际货币基金组织（IMF）的依赖。


These economies will benefit from increased monetary-policy agency and flexibility.	这些经济体将从货币政策中介（agency）和弹性增加中获益。


But they should not discount the valuable lessons offered by advanced-country central banks’ recent monetary-policy innovation.	但它们不能低估发达国家央行最近的货币政策干预所提供的重要教训。


In June, the European Central Bank, following the example set by the Bank of England in 2012, identified “bank credit for the real economy” as a new policy goal.	6月，欧洲央行效仿英格兰银行2012年的做法，将“面向实体经济的银行信用”作为新的政策目标。


A couple of weeks later, the Bank of England announced the introduction of a form of credit guidance to limit the amount of credit being used for property-asset transactions.	几周后，英格兰银行宣布引入一种形式的信用指引以限制用于房地产资产交易的信用。


Before the financial crisis hit in 2008, all of these policies would have been disparaged as unwarranted interventions in financial markets.	2008年金融危机爆发前，所有这些政策都被视为毫无根据的金融市场干预。


Indeed, in 2005, when one of us (Werner) recommended such policies to prevent “recurring banking crises,” he faced vehement criticism.	事实上，2005年，当本���作者之一（沃纳）建议采取这些政策以防止“银行危机重现”时，他遭到了猛烈的批评。


This March, however, the Bank of England acknowledged the observation that he and others had made – that, by extending credit, banks actually create 97% of the money supply.	但是，今年3月，英格兰银行承认了他和其他人所做的观察——通过扩张信用，银行实际创造了97%的货币供给。


Given that a dollar in new bank loans increases the money supply by a dollar, banks are not financial intermediaries; they are money creators.	一美元银行贷款可以增加一美元货币供给，因此，银行并非金融中介（intermediary）； 而是货币创造者。


The growing recognition of banks’ true function will be a game-changer in areas like monetary policy and financial regulation, enabling officials to tackle effectively problems like recurring banking crises, unemployment, and underdevelopment.	对银行真正功能的逐渐认识将是货币政策和金融监管等领域的局面改变因素，官员因此得以有效处理银行危机重现、失业和发展不足等问题。


But it will take time to be fully accepted – not least because it challenges a fundamental tenet of traditional economics.	但这一点被完全接受需要时间——因为它挑战了传统经济学的一个基本信条。


Indeed, according to this new paradigm, savings, while useful, are not an essential prerequisite to investment and thus to economic growth.	事实上，根据这一新范式，储蓄尽管有用，并非投资的先决条件，因此也不是经济增长的先决条件。


The United States, which experienced a prolonged period of growth without savings, is a case in point.	在无储蓄条件下经历了长期增长的美国就是明证。


In general, economic growth depends on an increasing number of transactions and an increasing amount of money to finance them.	总体而言，经济增长依赖于交易数量的增加和用于交易融资的货币数量的增加。


Banks provide that finance by extending more credit, the impact of which depends on who receives it.	银行通过扩张信用提供融资，而其影响取决于谁得到融资。


Bank credit for GDP transactions affects nominal GDP, while bank credit for investment in the production of goods and services delivers non-inflationary growth.	用于GDP交易的信用影响名义GDP，用于商品和服务生产投资的银行信用带来无通胀增长。


The problem lies in bank credit-for-asset transactions, which often generate boom-bust cycles.	问题出在银行资产信用（credit-for-asset）交易，这类交易常常引起枯荣循环。


By extending too much of this type of credit, banks pump up asset prices to unsustainable levels.	这类银行信用的过度扩张导致资产价格上升到不可持续的水平。


When credit inevitably slows, prices collapse.	当信用不可避免地放缓时，价格就崩盘了。


As the late-coming speculators go bankrupt, the share of non-performing loans on banks’ balance sheets rises, forcing banks to reduce credit further.	迟来的投机者纷纷破产，银行负债表的不良贷款比例也随之上升，迫使银行进一步缩减信用。


It takes only a 10% decline in banks’ asset values to bankrupt the banking system.	只要银行资产价值下降10%，就可以让整个银行系统破产。


With an understanding of this process, policymakers can take steps to avert future banking crises and resolve post-crisis recessions more effectively.	理解了这一过程，决策者就可以采取行动以更有效地避免未来银行危机和解决后危机衰退。


For starters, they should restrict bank credit for transactions that do not contribute to GDP.	首先，他们应该限制用于无益于GDP的交易的银行信用。


Moreover, in the event of a crisis, central banks should purchase non-performing assets from banks at face value, completely restoring banks’ balance sheets, in exchange for an obligation to submit to credit monitoring.	此外，在出现危机时，央行应该以面值向银行收购不良资产，彻底重塑银行资产负债表，并以银行接受信用监控为交换条件。


Given that no new money would be injected into the rest of the economy, this process – which the US Federal Reserve undertook in 2008 – would not generate inflation.	由于没有新货币会注入经济的其余部分，这一过程——正如2008年美联储所采取的——不会引起通胀。


In order to stimulate productive bank credit – and boost the effectiveness of fiscal policy – governments should stop issuing bonds, and instead borrow from banks through loan contracts, often available at lower rates than bond yields.	为了刺激生产性银行信用——并提振财政政策的效果——政府应该停止发行债券，而应该通过贷款契约向银行借钱，这样做的利率往往会比债券收益率低。


This would bolster bank credit and stimulate demand, employment, GDP, and tax revenues.	这将提振银行信用并刺激需求、就业、GDP和税收收入。


Finally, a network of small not-for-profit local banks should be established to provide universal banking services, and loans to small and medium-size firms, like the scheme that has underpinned Germany’s economic strength and resilience over the last 200 years.	最后，应该建立小型非盈利地方银行网络以提供普惠银行服务以及中小企业贷款，如在过去200年中成为德国经济坚挺和坚韧基础的制度。


Beyond making the banking sector more robust, such an initiative would boost job creation per dollar in bank credit.	这一做法不但能够让银行部门更加强健，也能提高单位美元银行信用所创造的就业岗位数量。


Of course, large multinational banks, which have long benefited from the perception that economies need savings, are likely to resist such reforms.	当然，从经济需要储蓄的观念中长期获益的大型跨国银行可能会抵制这样的改革。


For decades, these banks have been selling “foreign savings” to developing countries by lending at high interest rates and in a foreign currency, fueling the accumulation of massive amounts of foreign debt, which would often be converted into equity.	几十年来，这些银行都在通过高利率外币贷款将“外国储蓄”卖给发展中国家，助长了外债（往往会被转换为股权）的大幅积累。


In other words, they issued credit that contributed little to the local economy, and then drained local resources through interest and exploding foreign currency-denominated debt.	换句话说，它们发行的信用对地方经济几乎毫无用处，随后又通过利息和爆炸式增长的外币计价债务榨干地方资源。


Just as the BRICS have rejected Western-led economic institutions, developing economies would do well to expel foreign banks and allow local financial institutions to create money for productive purposes.	正如金砖银行拒绝西方主导的经济机构，发展中经济体可以很好地驱逐外国银行并允许地方金融机构为生产性目的创造货币。


After all, successful economic development – in countries like the US, Germany, Japan, and China – has depended on domestic credit creation for productive investment.	毕竟，成功的经济发展——如美国、德国、日本和中国——取决于为生产性投资而创造的国内信用。


During the Great Depression of the 1930s, Michael Unterguggenberger, the mayor of the Tyrolean town of Wörgl, performed an experiment.	20世纪30年代大萧条期间，沃格尔（Wörgl）提洛尔镇（Tyrolean）镇长迈克尔·温特古根伯格（Michael Unterguggenberger）做了一个实验。


In order to reduce unemployment and complete much-needed public-works projects, he hired workers and paid them with “work receipts” that could be used to pay local taxes.	为了降低失业、完成急需的公共设施工程，他聘用工人，并用可用于抵付本地税的“工作券”支付工资。


With the local authority effectively issuing money for work performed, the local economy boomed.	这实际上等于是地方当局有效地为完成的工作发行货币，地方经济也因此繁荣。


The central bank, however, was not pleased, and decided to assert its monopoly over currency issuance, forcing Unterguggenberger to scrap the local public money and causing Wörgl to fall back into depression.	但是，央行很不高兴，并决定捍卫其对货币发行的垄断，强迫温特古根伯格废除地方公共货币，而沃格尔也再次陷入萧条。


Some 80 years later, the English city of Hull has begun to implement a similar scheme, using a digital crypto-currency that is, so far, not prohibited by law.	80年后，英国赫尔市（Hull）开始实施类似的计划，启用了一种目前未被法律禁止的数字型秘密货币。


The unfettered creation of money by large private banks has generated overwhelming instability, undermining the fundamental principle that money creation should serve the public good.	大型私人银行自由创造货币产生过不可挽回的动荡，破坏了货币创造必须符合公共利益这一基本原则。


This does not have to be the case.	这并非放之四海而皆准。


By implementing safeguards that ensure that credit serves productive and public purposes, policymakers can achieve debt-free, stable, and sustainable economic growth.	通过实施确保信用服务于生产性和公共目的的保护措施，决策者可以实现无债务的稳定而可持续的经济增长。


Merkel’s American Minders	默克尔的美国看守


BERLIN – Germans used to joke that Chancellor Angela Merkel’s penchant for communicating via fleeting text messages effectively marked the end of traditional historiography.	柏林—德国人曾经打趣说，总理默克尔爱用短消息沟通的习惯实际上标志着传统历史的终结。


Well, at least American spy agencies seem to have kept full track of the behind-the-scenes communications – in Berlin and beyond.	呃，至少美国间谍机构似乎全程跟踪着柏林和其他地方的幕后通信。


Regrettably, US President Barack Obama and his administration have yet to comprehend the scale and severity of the damage caused to America’s credibility among its European allies.	遗憾的是，美国总统奥巴马及其政府仍未能理解这给美国在其欧洲盟友中间的信誉所造成的伤害的广度和严重度。


The problem is not that countries spy on each other (they all do). Rather, it is the extent of US intelligence gathering and America’s attitude toward allies that is most damaging.	问题不在于各国彼此案中监视（所有国家都这么做），而在于美国搜集情报做法的程度和美国对盟友的态度，这才是最危险的。


Previous transatlantic clashes over diverse issues such as climate change, the detainees at Guantánamo Bay, and the Iraq War exposed a breakdown of mutual understanding, sometimes stemming from sharp differences over how best to achieve certain common objectives.	此前，大西洋两岸在气候变化、关塔那摩监狱囚犯和伊拉克战争等诸多问题上的分歧暴露了互相理解方面的裂痕，有时候，分歧来自关于如何达到某些共同目标这一问题上的尖锐不同。


But the wiretapping crisis and other troubling revelations from the former American intelligence contractor Edward J. Snowden point to a deeper problem: a crisis of mutual distrust that risks becoming a serious transatlantic rift at a time when closer political, economic, and security cooperation between Europe and the United States is needed more than ever.	但窃听危机和前美国情报承包商斯诺登所揭露的其他丑闻指向一个更深层次的问题：互相信任危机。 目前正是欧洲和美国之间最需要更紧密地进行政治，经济和安全合作的时候，互相信任危机有可能导致大西洋两岸的严重决裂。


There is probably nothing more destructive to friendly relations among democratic states than behavior by an ally that causes the other side to lose face at home.	对于民主国家之间的友好关系来说，也许没有比盟友让另一方在国内丢脸更具破坏性的了。


After all, it was Merkel who tried to calm the waters after the NSA scandal first hit Europe this summer.	毕竟，今年夏天美国国安局丑闻冲击欧洲时，默克尔还试图息事宁人。


That is why the alleged US wiretapping of her cellphone is so damaging for her, both personally and politically.	正因如此，美国被指窃听其手机令她十分受伤，不管从个人角度还是政治角度都是如此。


As someone who served in Merkel’s government from 2009 to 2011, I must admit that I was rather careless in the use of mobile communication devices while in office.	2009—2011年间，我在默克尔政府供职，必须承认，在此期间我对移动通信的使用并不太当心。


In principle, of course, one should always assume that foreign intelligence services attempt to listen in on other governments’ conversations.	当然，从原则上说，你应该时刻假定外国情报机构试图窃听他国政府的对话。


But it makes a big difference whether such activities are conducted by Russia or China, or by an ally that repeatedly emphasizes the importance of close transatlantic friendship and cooperation.	但这样的行为来自俄罗斯和中国，还是来自一再强调跨大西洋紧密友好和合作关系的盟友，其中的差别是巨大的。


Obama’s personality makes matters more complicated.	奥巴马的个性让事情进一步复杂了。


It is hard to recall any other US president who has been so personally disconnected from other heads of state.	很难想起还有哪位美国总统个性与其他国家首脑如此不同。


Instead of immediately reaching out to a friendly country, he decided to lie low and send White House Press Secretary Jay Carney to issue a rather awkward statement that the US government “is not” and “will not” monitor Merkel’s communications.	事发后，奥巴马并未立刻与友邦取得联系，而决定采取低调免事的态度，派白宫新闻秘书卡尼（Jay Carney）发布了一份蹩脚生命，说美国政府“没有”也“不会”监控默克尔的通信。


Of course, it does not take much interpretive skill to recognize a clumsy attempt to avoid confessing that US intelligence services targeted Merkel in the past.	当然，不需要深入挖掘就能看出，这番对于避免承认美国情报机构过去以默克尔为目标的说辞十分牵强。


The Obama administration appears to have failed to ask itself some basic questions.	奥巴马政府似乎应该扪心自问几个基本问题。


How could it justify spying on a leader who is among America’s closest allies in NATO and in the Afghanistan mission – a leader whom he invited to the Rose Garden to bestow the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest honor that America can give to a foreigner?	监视作为美国在北约和阿富汗任务中最紧密的盟友之一、被奥巴马邀请前往玫瑰花园授予美国对外国人的最高褒奖——总统自由勋章的领导人，这如何说得过去？


Moreover, Merkel was not the only target.	此外，默克尔并非唯一的目标。


In the case of France, how could the Obama administration justify targeting an ally that has tried hard to build trust with the US by providing much-needed military and political cover in Libya and Syria?	就法国而言，奥巴马政府将目标对准通过向利比亚和叙利亚输送急需的军事和政治资源大力建设与美国的信任的盟友，这如何说得过去？


French President François Hollande, too, must feel like a fool – not just as a result of US surveillance, but also because he probably received no advance warning from his intelligence services about Obama’s sudden decision to ask Congress to pass a resolution prior to using military force in Syria.	法国总统奥朗德也一定感到自己被愚弄了——不仅仅是因为美国的监控，也因为对于奥巴马的突然决定要求国会在向叙利亚动武之前批准议案，法国情报机构没有提前向他发出预警。


Finally, how can Obama explain to the EU (whose delegation in Washington, DC, was also bugged) that it is crucially important to enter into honest, serious, and comprehensive negotiations to conclude a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership?	最后，奥巴马如何向欧盟解释，为了完成跨大西洋贸易和投资合作伙伴关系（TTIP），展开诚信、严肃和全面的谈判是至关重要的（欧盟代表团在华盛顿的驻地也被监听了）？


Prominent voices in Europe – including the president of the European Parliament and the leader of Germany’s Social Democrats (who is about to form a coalition government with Merkel) – are already demanding a suspension of the TTIP talks.	欧洲要人——包括欧洲议会主席和德国社民党（马上将与默克尔组建联合政府）——纷纷发声，要求中止TTIP对话。


The potential economic cost of a delay or a failure to achieve closer transatlantic economic integration could total hundreds of billions of dollars – in addition to the incalculable damage done to America’s credibility in Europe.	延迟或不能实现跟紧密的跨大西洋经济一体化有可能带来数千亿美元的代价，除此之外也将给美国在欧信誉造成不可估量的伤害。


There is much talk today about the risks of a new era of American isolationism and a lack of US leadership in the world.	如今人们大谈美国孤立主义和世界缺少美国领导的时期的风险。


It is important to remember that isolationism can be triggered not only by a potential retreat from global affairs, but also by the rather imprudent use of America’s hard and soft power on the world stage.	很重要的一点是要记住，触发孤立主义的不仅可以是从国际事务中的退出，也可以是在国际舞台上滥用美国的软硬实力。


To escape the NSA mess, various options will be discussed.	为了挽救美国国安局带来的混乱，人们讨论了各种方法。


The new Franco-German push for an intelligence-sharing agreement with the US is probably difficult to put into practice, especially considering that spy services operating around the world are not always fully controllable.	法国和德国新提出的与美国共享情报的协议可能很难成为现实，特别是在考虑到全世界间谍活动的操作并不总是完全可控的情况下。


As a first step, Obama must rediscover the great communications skills that propelled him to the White House in the first place.	作为第一部，奥巴马必须重新拿出让他入主白宫的高超沟通技巧。


From a public-diplomacy perspective, his handling of the surveillance scandal has been a complete failure.	从公共外交角度看，他对监控丑闻的处理是一场彻头彻尾的失败。


To contain the damage and begin to rebuild much-needed trust, Obama must issue a credible apology to Merkel, other Western allies, and their citizens.	为了遏制损失并开始重建急需的信任，奥巴马必须向默克尔、其他西方盟友以及这些国家的公民做出可信的道歉。


In the American political context, issuing an apology, especially to foreign governments, is often viewed as a sign of weakness.	从美国政治环境看，做出道歉，特别是向外国政府的道歉，通常被看作软弱的信号。


In the case of the NSA scandal, an unequivocal apology by Obama is the only viable solution to leave the past behind and move forward.	在美国国安局丑闻中，由奥巴马做出明确道歉是告别过去、重新前进的唯一可行办法。


Unfortunately, the window of opportunity for such a gesture to be viewed in Europe as a much-awaited olive branch – and a sign of real American strength and conviction – is closing fast.	不幸的是，摆出这一姿态、让欧洲看到期待已久的橄榄枝——以及美国真正强大和令人信服的信号——的机会窗口正在快速关闭。


America’s Debt-Ceiling Debacle	美国的债务上限乱局


NEW YORK – When Greece’s sovereign-debt crisis threatened the euro’s survival, US officials called their European counterparts to express bewilderment at their inability to resolve the issue.	发自纽约——当希腊主权债务危机威胁到了欧元的生存之时，美国官员致电欧洲方面以表达对后者无力解决这一事件的困惑。


Now, the tables have turned, with American leaders on the receiving end of such calls.	如今反过来是美国领导人接到了这样的电话。


The most recent threat of a US debt default has been avoided, but only temporarily. Another battle looms early next year, when the US government’s debt ceiling will have to be raised again.	虽然最近一次美国债务违约的威胁警报已经解除，但这仅仅是暂时而已，因为另一场斗争将在明年年初美国政府债务上限必须再次调高时爆发。


In Europe, the absence of a political union – considered a necessary precondition for sharing debt obligations and, thus, putting the euro on a sound footing – is widely held to lie at the root of the continent’s crisis.	在欧洲，危机的根源来自于一个单一政治联盟的缺位，因为这是分担债务并以此将欧元构筑在一个合理基础之上的必要前提。


But the US crisis suggests that political union is no panacea for managing sovereign debt.	但美国的危机则表明政治联盟并不是根治危机的一副灵丹妙药。


For weeks, Republicans in the House of Representatives threatened to keep the government shuttered – thereby preventing it from extending its borrowing authority beyond the October 17 deadline – in order to challenge laws that were enacted by Congress as a whole and upheld by the Supreme Court.	数周以来，众议院的共和党议员威胁要让政府继续停摆下去——因此政府也无法在10月17日的到期日之后延长其借款授权——以挑战由国会大多数通过并得到最高法院支持的相关法律。


In the eurozone, the main source of disagreement has been how debts in need of refinancing were incurred – that is, whether they contravened agreed debt limits.	在欧元区，反对的声音主要来自这些需要重新筹钱偿还的债务是如何产生的——也就是说，它们是否与议定的债务上限相抵触。


In the United States, the bone of contention has been the purpose that the funds will serve.	在美国，斗争的核心则是这些资金究竟将用在何种用途。


The difference is ultimately minor, and should not be allowed to overshadow what is really at stake: democratic self-governance in an age of high public debt.	两者的区别其实归根究底也不大，而且也都不应该掩盖了真正的危机：在一个高公共负债时代下的民主自我治理问题。


In 1773, the so-called Sons of Liberty staged the Boston Tea Party under the slogan, “No taxation without representation.”	1773年，一群所谓“自由之子”（Sons of Liberty）在波士顿倾茶事件中喊出了这样一句口号：“无代表，不纳税。


And America’s founders clearly regarded legislative control over the budget as a key pillar of democratic governance.	”而美国的建立者们也很清楚地认定对预算的立法管制是民主治理的一大关键支柱。


Taxation remains the dominant source of government revenue in most developed countries.	在大多数发达国，税款依然是政府收入的主要来源。


But the role of debt finance has been growing – and, with it, the need to refinance old debt when total expenditure, including debt service, exceeds total revenue.	但债务融资所扮演的角色也在不断扩大——而随着该项目的发展，当政府总支出（包括征税行为）超出总收入时为旧债务重新融资的需求也不断扩大。