Between now and the midterms, they can brag about cutting taxes on most households. And they can expect to see the economic-stimulus effects of tax cuts peak in 2019, just before the next presidential election – and long before the bill comes due.	而从现在到中期这段时间他们可以吹嘘说给大部分家庭都减了税，而他们也预计减税的经济刺激效应会在2019年——就是在即将到来的下一轮总统大选之前（以及远在该议案到期之前）——达到顶峰。


Moreover, the final legislation will likely lower the federal deduction for mortgage interest and eliminate deductibility for state and local taxes.	此外，最终的立法可能会降低联邦针对抵押贷款利息的减免额，并消除对各类州和地方税项的减免。


This will hit households in Democratic-leaning states such as New York, New Jersey, and California much harder than households in Republican-leaning states.	为此像纽约，新泽西州和加利福尼亚州这样民主党主导州的家庭将比共和党主导州的家庭受到更大冲击。


Another part of the Republican strategy (known as “starve the beast”) will be to use the higher deficits from tax cuts to argue for cuts in so-called entitlement spending, such as Medicare, Medicaid, food stamps, and Social Security.	共和党战略的另一部分（被称之为“饿死巨兽”策略）将利用因减税导致的更高赤字来争取削减所谓的权益性支出，例如医疗保险，医疗补助，食品券和社会保障。


Again, this is a risky proposition, given that elderly, middle-class, and low-income Americans rely heavily on these programs.	这也是一个冒险的主张，因为老年人，中产阶级和低收入美国人严重依赖这些计划。


Yes, the working and non-working poor who receive welfare payments or food stamps include minorities who tend to vote for Democrats.	虽然获得福利或食品券的就业和失业穷人里包含了倾向于投票给民主党的少数派群体。


But millions of the blue-collar, socially conservative whites who voted for Trump also rely on these and similar programs.	但投票给特朗普的数百万蓝领和社会保守派的白人其实也要依靠上述以及类似的计划。


With the global economy expanding, Trump is probably hoping that tax cuts and deregulation will spur enough growth and create enough jobs that he will have something to brag about.	随着全球经济的扩张，特朗普可能希望减税和放松管制将刺激足够的增长并创造足量的工作岗位来供他夸耀。


A potential growth rate of 2% won’t necessarily do much to help his blue-collar base, but at least it could push the stock market up to its highest point ever.	2％的潜在增长率对于他的蓝领选民来说虽然未必有多大作用，但至少可以推动股市达到有史以来的最高点。


And, of course, Trump will still claim that the US economy can grow at a rate of 4%, even though all mainstream economists, including Republicans, agree that the potential growth rate will remain around 2%, regardless of his policies.	当然，尽管所有主流经济学家（包括共和党员在内）都认为，不管他实施何种政策潜在增长率都将保持在2％左右，特朗普仍然会声称美国经济可以以4％的速度增长。


Whatever happens, Trump will continue to tweet maniacally, promote fake-news stories, and boast about the “biggest and best” economy ever.	无论发生什么事，特朗普都会继续疯狂地发推特，宣传假新闻，并吹嘘有史以来“最大最好”的经济局面。


In doing so, he may even create a circus worthy of a Roman emperor.	他甚至可以以此创造出一场可与罗马皇帝媲美的大角斗盛会。


But if gassy rhetoric alone does not suffice, he may decide to go on the offensive, particularly in the international sphere.	但光吹牛是不够的，他可能会决定继续去四面树敌，特别是在国际上。


That could mean truly withdrawing from NAFTA, taking trade action against China and other trading partners, or doubling down on harsh immigration policies.	这可能意味着真正退出《北美自由贸易协定》，对中国及其他贸易伙伴采取贸易行动，或将加倍收紧移民政策。


And if these measures do not satisfy his base, Trump will still have one last option, long used by Roman emperors and other assorted dictators during times of domestic difficulty.	如果这些措施不能满足他的选民，特朗普还有最后一招，也是罗马皇帝和其他独裁者在国内困难时期经常动用的选项。


Namely, he can try to “wag the dog,” by fabricating an external threat or embarking on foreign military adventures to distract his supporters from what he and congressional Republicans have been doing.	也就是说他可以通过制造外部威胁或者开展外国军事冒险来“转移视线”，从而令支持者们忽视了他和国会共和党人的做所作为。


For example, following the “madman” approach to foreign policy, Trump could start a war with North Korea or Iran.	比如在“疯子式”对外政策下，特朗普可能会与朝鲜或伊朗开战。


Or he could post further inflammatory tweets about the evils of Islam, thereby driving disturbed and marginalized individuals into the arms of the Islamic State (ISIS) or other extremist groups.	或者他可以发布更多关于伊斯兰教邪恶性的煽动性推文，从而将受到骚扰和边缘化的个人驱入伊斯兰国或其他极端主义团体的怀抱。


That would increase the likelihood of ISIS-inspired attacks – for example, “lone wolves” blowing themselves up or driving trucks through crowded pedestrian areas – within the US.	这将增加伊斯兰国发动袭击的可能性，例如在美国境内“独狼式”自杀爆炸或驾驶卡车碾过拥挤的行人区。


With dozens, if not hundreds, slain, Trump could then wrap himself in the flag and say, “I told you so.”	在数十人（但愿不是数百人）因此丧命后，特朗普就可以拉起爱国主义的大旗来装点自己并说：“我早就告诉过你们了。


And if things got bad enough, Trump and his generals could declare a state of emergency, suspend civil liberties, and transform America into a true pluto-populist authoritarian state.	”如果情况变得足够糟糕，特朗普和他的将军们可以宣布进入紧急状态，停止履行公民自由，把美国变成一个真正的财阀民粹主义国家。


You know it’s time to worry when the conservative Republican chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Bob Corker, warns openly that Trump could start World War III.	当保守的共和党参议院外交委员会主席鲍勃·科克尔（Bob Corker）公开警告说特朗普可能发动第三次世界大战的时候，你就知道是时候该有所担心了。


And if you’re not convinced, consider the recent history of Russia or Turkey; or the history of the Roman Empire under Caligula or Nero.	如果你不相信，试着去翻一下俄罗斯或土耳其的近代史，或是卡利古拉（Caligula）或尼禄（Nero）治下的罗马帝国史。


Pluto-populists have been turning democracies into autocracies with the same playbook for thousands of years. There’s no reason to think they would stop now.	数百年来，财阀民粹主义已经用同一本剧本将多个民主国家变成了专制国家，也没有理由说明这场大戏会停止下来。


The reign of Emperor Trump could be just around the corner.	因此特朗普皇帝的统治可能就在不久之后了。


Has Trump Captured the Fed?	特朗普拿下美联储了吗？


NEW YORK – One of the important powers of any US president is to appoint members and heads of the many agencies that are responsible for implementing the country’s laws and regulations and, in many cases, governing the economy.	发自纽约——美国总统的其中一项重要权力就是任命各个机构的成员和负责人，而这些机构不仅负责执行国家的法律法规，在许多情况下还要管理经济。


Perhaps no institution is more important in that regard than the Federal Reserve.	而在这方面也许没有哪个机构比美联储更重要了。


In exercising that power, Donald Trump has broken a long-standing pattern, going back almost a half-century, whereby the president reappoints (on a non-partisan basis) the incumbent Fed chair, if he or she has been seen to be doing a good job.	但特朗普总统却在行使这项权力方面打破了一个可以追溯到将近半个世纪前的悠久模式，即总统会（站在非党派立场上）重新任命表现良好的现任美联储主席。


Probably no chair has done a better job, in a particularly difficult moment, than Janet Yellen.	而在前几年那段特别艰难的时期，可能没有哪个主席比珍妮特·耶伦（Janet Yellen）做得更好了。


Whereas her two immediate predecessors greatly tarnished the Fed’s reputation by looking the other way as massive risk was accumulating – and massive fraud occurring – within the financial sector, Yellen restored the Fed’s reputation.	在两位前任因为玩忽职守而积累了巨量风险（以及大规模欺诈行为）从而令美联储颜面扫地之后，是耶伦挽回了美联储的声誉。


Her calm and balanced hand nurtured broad consensus among a Federal Reserve Board characterized by divergent economic philosophies, and she navigated the economy through a slow recovery in a period when fiscal policy was unnecessarily constrained, as duplicitous Republicans hyped the dangers of deficits.	是她以冷静平衡的手段在一个以多种经济哲学并存著称的联邦储备委员会中孕育了广泛共识，是她在狡诈的共和党人夸大赤字风险导致财政政策受到不必要限制时带领经济实现了缓慢复苏。


The Republicans’ shallow commitment to fiscal rectitude is now being exposed as they advocate massive tax cuts for corporations and billionaires that will add one and half trillion dollars to the deficit over the next decade.	共和党在财政方针一致性方面的肤浅承诺如今已经露出马脚，因为他们主张大幅削减企业和巨富阶层的税收，而这将导致在未来十年内增加一万亿美元的赤字。


To be fair, Trump chose a moderate, when many in his party were pushing for an extremist.	平心而论，当特朗普所属党派中的很多人都推崇一名极端主义者时，他却选择了一位温和派。


Trump, never shy about conflicts of interest, has an uncanny ability to embrace economic policies, such as the proposed tax cuts, that benefit him personally.	从不避讳利益冲突的特朗普拥有一种无以名状的本能去接纳那些对他个人有利的经济政策——比如提议中的减税。


He realized that an extremist would raise interest rates – any real-estate developer’s worst nightmare.	他意识到极端主义者会提高利率，而这显然是任何房地产开发商的噩梦。


Trump broke with precedent in another way: he chose a non-economist.	特朗普还以另一种方式打破了先例：他没有选择一位经济学家。


The Fed will face great challenges in the next five years, as it reverts to more normal policies.	美联储将在回复到更为常规化政策的未来五年间面临巨大的挑战。


Higher interest rates could give rise to market turmoil, as asset prices undergo a significant “correction.”	由于资产价格经历了重大“修正”，利率上升可能引发市场动荡。


And many are expecting a major downturn in the next five years; otherwise, the economy would have experienced an almost unheard-of decade-and-a-half expansion.	许多人都预计未来五年将出现大幅下挫； 否则经济就将经历一场近乎前所未有的十年半扩张。


While the Fed’s tool kit has been greatly expanded in the last decade, the Fed’s low interest rates and huge balance sheet – and the possibly massive increase in debt, should Trump get his tax cuts – would challenge even the best-trained economist.	尽管在过去的十年里美联储的政策工具包已经极大丰富，但面对美联储的低利率以及庞大资产负债表（还有万一特朗普成功实现减税后大幅增加的债务），即使是最训练有素的经济学家也会相当头痛。


Most importantly, there has been a bipartisan (and global) effort to depoliticize monetary policy.	最重要的是，一直以来民主共和两党（以及全球）都在努力推行货币政策的去政治化。


The Fed, through its control of the money supply, has enormous economic power, and such power can easily be abused for political purposes – say, to generate more jobs in the short run.	美联储因为手握货币供应权而坐拥巨大的经济力量，而这种力量也极易被滥用于某些政治目的——比如在短期内创造更多就业机会。


But lack of confidence in central banks in a world of fiat money (where central banks can create money at will) weakens long-term economic performance, owing partly to fears of inflation.	但在这个法定货币的世界里（中央银行可以随意印制钞票），一但各界对央行失去信心就会削弱长期的经济表现，因为大家在某种程度上都担心通货膨胀。


Even in the absence of direct politicization, the Fed always faces a problem of “cognitive capture” by Wall Street. That’s what happened when Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke were in charge.	即使不存在直接的政治化，美联储也总是面临着华尔街的“认知俘获（cognitive capture）”问题，在格林斯潘和伯南克主政时就是如此。


We all know the consequences: the greatest crisis in three quarters of a century, mitigated only by massive government intervention.	后果现在我们都知道了：近3/4个世纪以来的最严重危机，只有靠政府大规模干预有所缓解。


Yet, somehow, the Trump administration seems to have forgotten what happened less than a decade ago.	然而不知何故，特朗普政府似乎已经忘记了不到十年前发生的事情。


How else to explain its efforts to rescind the 2010 Dodd-Frank regulatory reforms, designed to prevent a recurrence?	如何解释其试图撤销旨在防范下一场危机的2010年多德-弗兰克法案监管改革的做法？


The consensus beyond Wall Street is that Dodd-Frank didn’t go far enough.	华尔街以外的共识是多德 - 弗兰克法案还是不够严格。


Excessive risk taking and predatory behavior are still real problems, as we are frequently reminded (for example, by reports about the growing volume of subprime auto loans).	过度风险承担和金融掠夺行为仍然存在，（比如有关次级汽车贷款金额不断增长的报道）。


In one of the more insidious recent instances of malfeasance, bankers at Wells Fargo simply opened accounts on behalf of customers, unbeknownst to them, so that it could collect additional fees.	在最近一起更为隐蔽的渎职行为中，美国富国银行的职员竟然在客户不知情的情况下直接为后者开立账户，并以此收取额外的费用。


None of this bothers Trump, of course, who as a businessman has been no stranger to nefarious practices.	作为一名商人的特朗普对这类不道德做法并不陌生，当然也毫不介意。


Fortunately, it appears that Powell recognizes the importance of well-designed financial regulations.	幸运的是，他选择的下一人美联储主席杰罗姆·鲍威尔（Jerome Powell）似乎对精心设计金融监管规则的重要性表示认同。


But politicization of the Fed should be viewed as just another part of Trump’s battle against what his former chief strategist, Steve Bannon, has referred to as the “administrative state.”	但是美联储的政治化应该被视为特朗普与他的前首席战略家史蒂夫·班农（Steve Bannon）所称的“行政国家”做斗争的另一部分。


That battle, in turn, should be viewed as part of a larger war against the Enlightenment legacy of science, democratic governance, and the rule of law.	而这场斗争反过来应该被看作是一场更大范围战争的一部分——也就是要反对启蒙运动留下的科学，民主治理和法治遗产。


Upholding that legacy entails employing expertise as needed, and creating, as Edward Stiglitz of Cornell Law School has emphasized, trust in public institutions.	坚持这一传统需要聘用专业人才，并像康奈尔大学法学院副教授爱德华·斯蒂格利茨（Edward Stiglitz）所强调的那样创造对公共机构的信任感。


A large body of research now supports the idea that societies perform more poorly without such trust.	如今大量的研究都表明认为一个社会在缺乏这类信任的情况下会运行得更遭。


Every few days, Trump does something to rend the fabric of US society and inflame its already-deep social and partisan divisions.	每隔那么几天，特朗普都会对美国的社会结构动些手脚并激发本已深刻的社会和党派分歧。


The clear and present danger is that the country is growing so accustomed to Trump’s outrages that they now appear “normal.”	而当前最为明显的危险是，这个国家越来越习惯于特朗普的出格行为并将其视之为“正常”。


For more than seven decades, America has fought – often fitfully, to be sure – to redeem its stated values, taking on bigotry, fascism, and nativism in all their forms.	七十多年来，美国一直在奋力（当然往往是断断续续地）兑现其宣扬的价值观，对抗各种形式的偏见，法西斯主义和本土主义。


Now, America’s president is a misogynist, racist xenophobe whose policies embody profound contempt for the cause of human rights.	可如今的美国总统却是一名厌恶女性的种族排外主义者，而他所推行的政策则体现出了对人权事业的极端蔑视。


One may approve or disapprove of the Republicans’ tax proposals, efforts to “reform” health care (oblivious to the tens of millions who might lose insurance coverage), and commitment to financial deregulation (ignoring the consequences of the 2008 crisis).	人们可以选择赞成或不赞成共和党的税收建议，医疗保健“改革”（无视数千万可能失去保险的人）以及放松金融管制的承诺（将2008年危机的后果抛诸脑后）。


But, while the Fed may be safe for now, whatever possible economic benefits this agenda could bring pale in comparison to the magnitude of the political and social risks posed by Trump’s assaults on America’s most cherished institutions and values.	但虽然美联储眼下看似比较安全，可与特朗普攻击美国最为珍视的制度和价值观所造成的严重政治和社会风险相比，这个议程可能带来的任何经济利益都会显得极为苍白。


Trump’s Republican Collaborators	特朗普的共和党合谋者


NEW YORK – After nine months of Donald Trump’s presidency, the leaders of the Republican Party appear finally to be waking up to the harsh reality that their country stands at the edge of an abyss.	纽约—特朗普担任总统九个月后，共和党领导人似乎终于清醒地认识到严峻的现实：这个国家正站在深渊边缘。


They now have a choice: they can either continue to collaborate with Trump, thereby sustaining his destructive leadership and courting disaster, or they can renounce him, finally putting their country’s democracy ahead of loyalty to their party/tribe.	现在，他们有一个选择：要么继续与特朗普合作，从而维持他的破坏性领导并制造灾难； 要么放弃他，最终将国家的民主置于党/派忠诚之前。


Recent statements by a Republican senator from Tennessee, Bob Corker, suggest that the tide is turning against Trump.	最近，田纳西州共和党参议员鲍勃·考尔克（Bob Corker）发言说，潮流正在转向对特朗普不利。


Corker sniped that, “the White House has become an adult day care center,” before warning that Trump’s Twitter threats may put the US “on the path to World War III.”	考尔克抨击说，“白宫已经沦为成人日托班，”然后警告特朗普的推特有可能让美国走上“通往第三次世界大战之路”。


Similarly, Senator John McCain warned of the threat posed by a “half-baked, spurious nationalism.”	类似地，参议员约翰·麦凯恩（John McCain）警告“半吊子伪善民族主义”可能带来的威胁。


But true political honor demands more than veiled condemnations (McCain did not mention Trump by name in his speech), or simply quitting, as Corker and Senior Republican Congressman Pat Tiberi of Ohio are doing.	但真正的政治荣耀（political honor）光有含蓄的批评（麦凯恩没有在他的讲话中指名道姓提到特朗普）或辞职一走了之（如考尔克和共和党资深众议员帕特·蒂贝里（Pat Tiberi）所做的那样）是不够的。


Rather, it calls for crossing the political aisle, as Winston Churchill (no doubt a hero to all of them) did, when he switched from the Liberal to the Conservative Party.	它还需要跨越政治鸿沟，就像丘吉尔（毫无疑问是他们所有人的英雄）从自由党转为保守党一样。


As Churchill demonstrated, there is no shame in shifting political allegiances.	丘吉尔证明，改换政治面貌没有什么可羞耻的。


There is, however, shame in loyalty to a disgraced or deplorable party or cause.	但是，忠于斯文扫地、糟糕透顶的政党或事业倒是一个耻辱。


And any Republicans today who think they can delay breaking definitively with Trump, without irreversibly damaging their own reputations, should recall the fate of others – in the Soviet Union in 1917, in Germany in 1932, and in Russia and Turkey today – who thought they could tame a monster.	今天，任何认为不那么早与特朗普决裂也不会对自身名誉造成不可逆转的损失的共和党人，都应该回忆一下其他人的命运——1917年的苏联人、1932年的德国人，以及今天的俄罗斯人和土耳其人——这些人都认为他们能够驯服魔鬼。


Consider Nikolai Bukharin, a favorite of Vladimir Lenin and the editor of Pravda.	以布哈林为例，他是列宁最喜欢的人，也是《真理报》编辑。


For more than a decade after the Bolshevik Revolution, Bukharin tried to reconcile his academic understanding of “the dictatorship of proletariat” with its real-world implementation.	布尔什维克革命十多年后，布哈林试图让自己对“无产阶级专政”的学术理解与其真实世界的含义协调起来。


This wasn’t so difficult while Lenin was in charge: despite the bloodshed the new regime engendered, mass murder wasn’t its main purpose or source of energy.	在列宁掌权的时代，这并不困难：尽管新的政权造成了大量流血，但大规模杀戮并不是它的主要目的或能量来源。


That changed with the arrival in power of Joseph Stalin, for whom terror was both a means and an end.	这一点随着斯大林的掌权而发生了改变。 对斯大林来说，恐怖既是手段，也是目的。


Nonetheless, Bukharin aligned with Stalin to purge Leon Trotsky and other Bolsheviks who sought to adhere more closely to Lenin’s dictates (and his testament against Stalin).	尽管如此，布哈林仍然配合斯大林清洗托洛茨基和其他坚守列宁遗训（以及他对斯大林的不利批评）的布尔什维克。


Bukharin reasoned that Stalin’s methods were enabling the Soviet Union’s rapid development into an industrial power, and the future of communism was far more important than the loss of a few thousand lives – or even a few million.	布哈林推断，斯大林的方法能让苏联快速发展成工业强国，而共产主义的未来也比牺牲数千乃至数百万条生命更加重要。


Bukharin would soon regret that reasoning.	布哈林很快就后悔做出这一论断。


Once Trotsky was out of the way, Stalin turned on all the other senior Bolsheviks, calling them “enemies of the people” – a phrase that Trump’s populist supporters, like United Kingdom’s hardline Brexiteers, have revived to denounce anyone who dares challenge their “blood and soil” code.	托洛茨基出局后，斯大林将矛头转向了所有其他布尔什维克高层，说他们是“人民的敌人”——特朗普的民粹主义支持者们，比如英国的强硬退欧派，让这个词死灰复燃，拿它来谴责所有胆敢挑战他们的“血和土”（blood and soil）信条的人。


Bukharin was executed in 1938.	布哈林在1938年被处决。


Franz von Papen also bet that he could tame a dictatorial demagogue.	弗朗茨·冯·巴本（Franz von Papen）也认定他可以驯服蛊惑人心的独裁政客。


To advance his own political ends, Papen persuaded German President Paul von Hindenburg to appoint Adolf Hitler as Chancellor in 1933.	为了推进他自己的政治意图，巴本在1933年说服德国总统兴登堡任命希特勒为总理。


A seasoned and autocratically inclined politician, Papen thought that, once Hitler was in power, he could control the Nazi leader, whom Papen regarded as a provincial blowhard.	作为一名理性的、有技术官僚倾向的政客，巴本认为，他能够在希特勒掌权后控制住这位自吹自擂的外省人纳粹领袖。


Instead, on the Night of the Long Knives, the Nazis hunted and executed Papen’s trusted associates, Herbert von Bose and Erich Klausener, and seized control of the government.	相反，纳粹在长剑之夜（Night of the Long Knives）捉住并处决了巴本的亲信助手赫尔伯特·冯·博斯（Herbert von Bose）和埃里克·克劳森纳（Erich Klausener），夺走政府控制权。


Papen’s fate was kinder than Bukharin’s, though: Hitler shipped him off to serve as ambassador to Austria and then to Turkey.	不过巴本的命运比布哈林要强一些：希特勒将他贬为驻奥地利大使，后来又转任驻土耳其大使。


After World War II, Papen was acquitted at the Nuremberg trials.	二战后，巴本在纽伦堡审判中被判无罪。


Boris Berezovsky, Boris Yeltsin’s trusted oligarch-henchman with his own murky reputation, similarly underestimated a would-be autocrat.	类似地，深得叶利钦信任的名声毁誉参半的寡头追随者鲍里斯·别列佐夫斯基（Boris Berezovsky）也低估了一位未来暴君。


It was Berezovsky who brought Vladimir Putin to Yeltsin’s attention, anticipating that the diminutive ex-KGB officer was the ideal candidate to protect the Yeltsin family’s riches – and Berezovsky’s own wealth – once Yeltsin retired.	将普京带入叶利钦注意范围的正是别列佐夫斯基，他认为这位身材矮小的前克格勃官员是在叶利钦隐退后保护叶利钦家族财富——以及别列佐夫斯基本人的财富——的理想人选。


Yet soon after Putin was in power, Berezovsky lost his business empire and was forced to emigrate to England, where he ultimately died under suspicious circumstances.	但普京掌权后不久，别列佐夫斯基就失去了他的商业帝国，并被迫移民英国，最终不明不白地死在那里。


Finally, in Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his predecessor Abdullah Gül worked together to create the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has dominated Turkish politics since 2002.	最后，在土耳其，总统埃尔多安及其前任阿卜杜拉·居尔（r Abdullah Gül）一起创建了自2002年以来主宰土耳其政坛的正义与发展党（AKP）。


But, as Erdoğan has concentrated power in his own hands, he has silenced Gül.	但随着埃尔多安将权力集中到自己手中，他也让居尔日渐沉默。


Likewise, former Prime Minister and AKP leader Ahmet Davutoğlu long supported Erdoğan, until deepening disagreements – at times rooted in Erdoğan’s contempt for the very position of the prime minister – forced Davutoğlu to step down last year.	类似地，前总理兼AKP领导人达武特奥卢（Ahmet Davutoğlu）长期以来一直支持埃尔多安，直到日益深化的分歧——原因往往是埃尔多安根本不把总理放在眼里——迫使达武特奥卢在去年下台。


Of course, America’s democracy is stronger than that of Turkey or Russia.	当然，美国的民主要比土耳其和俄罗斯更加强大。


But with his shameless lies and relentless attacks on those who disagree with him – and his recent suggestion that it might be appropriate to “challenge” a major US news network’s broadcast license – Trump has shown that he is not interested in adhering to democratic norms.	但无耻的谎言和肆无忌惮地批评意见相左者——以及最近表示也许应该“挑战”一家美国主要新闻网络的播出许可证——表明，特朗普已经表现出他没有兴趣坚守民主规范。


A weakened democracy is an exceedingly high price for the US to pay – and for what?	民主被削弱对美国来说代价将极其高昂——为了什么而付出的代价？


At first, Republicans wanted to use Trump to help them pass legislation such as a repeal of the 2010 Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) and tax reform.	首先，共和党希望利用特朗普帮助他们通过诸如取消2010年平价医疗法（“奥巴马医保”）和税收改革等立法项目。


But, after ten months of controlling the presidency and both houses of Congress, Republicans have accomplished almost nothing legislatively.	但是，控制了总统宝座和参议两院十个月之后，共和党在立法方面几乎毫无建树。


At this point, it seems that they simply want power for power’s sake – and that means beating, not cooperating with, the Democrats.	在这一点上，他们似乎仅仅是为了权力而想要权力——而这意味着与民主党斗争，而不是合作。


But that may be changing.	但这可能会有所改变。


Congressional Republicans have already joined with Democrats to enact “Trump-proof” sanctions against Russia, and lately there have been moves toward cooperation on maintaining the subsidies on which Obamacare depends (after Trump cut them by executive order).	国会共和党已经与民主党联手实施了针对俄罗斯的“防特朗普的”制裁，最近（继特朗普用行政命令大幅削减补贴之后）在保持奥巴马医保所需要的补贴方面也有合作迹象。


These are steps in the right direction.	这些举措方向正确。


But, with Trump’s behavior becoming increasingly capricious and dangerous, it is not nearly enough.	但是，随着特朗普的行为变得越来越反覆和危险，仅仅如此是不够的。


Republicans who care about ending up on the right side of history cannot stay on Trump’s side any longer.	关注能以站对了历史的边盖棺定论的共和党人，不能继续站边特朗普了。


The US Donor Relief Act of 2017	2017年《美国金主放心法案》


NEW YORK – Never has a piece of legislation labeled as both a tax cut and a reform been received with as much disapproval and derision as the bill passed by the US Congress and signed into law by President Donald Trump just before Christmas.	发自纽约——从未有一份被贴上减税和改革标签的立法跟美国国会投票通过并由特朗普刚刚在圣诞节前签署生效的这份那样收到如此多的恶评。


The Republicans who voted for the bill (no Democrats did) claim that their gift will come to be appreciated later, as Americans see their take-home pay go up.	投票支持该法案的共和党人（一个赞成的民主党人都没有）声称，他们的圣诞礼物须静待一段时日，等美国民众看到自己拿回家的钱比以前更多了之后才会收获赞赏。


They are almost certainly wrong.	他们几乎肯定是错的。


Rather, the bill wraps into one package all that is wrong with the Republican Party, and to some extent, the debased state of American democracy.	相反，这个法案是共和党的一切错误之处，甚至在一定程度上美国恶劣民主状况的集大成体。


The legislation is not “tax reform” by even the most elastic reading.	就算是按照最不着边际的阅读理解方式，这一立法也跟“税收改革”没有一毛钱关系。


Reform entails closing distortionary loopholes and increasing the fairness of the tax code.	所谓改革必须消除导致税收目的扭曲的漏洞并增加税法的公平性。


Central to fairness is the ability to pay.	而公平的核心则在于支付能力。


But this tax legislation reduces taxes by tens of thousands of dollars, on average, for those most able to pay (the top quintile).	但这项税收立法为那些最具支付能力的人（收入最顶层那20%）平均减少了数万美元税款。


And, when fully implemented (in 2027), it will increase taxes on a majority of Americans in the middle (the second, third, and fourth quintiles).	而在其2027年全面实施时，它将增加大多数中间阶层美国人（位于收入分布中段的那60%）的缴税额。


The US tax code was already regressive long before Trump’s presidency.	在特朗普担任总统之前就美国的税法已经倒退很久了。


Indeed, the billionaire investor Warren Buffett, one of the wealthiest men in the world, famously complained that it was wrong that he paid a lower tax rate than his secretary.	事实上，世界上最富有的人之一，亿万富翁沃伦·巴菲特（Warren Buffett）曾经抱怨说，让他支付的税率低于他秘书的做法是错误的。


The new legislation makes America’s tax system even more regressive.	而新的立法则让美国的税制在回头路上走得更远。


It is now universally recognized that growing inequality is a key economic problem in the United States, with those at the top capturing almost all the gains in GDP over the past quarter-century.	人们当前已经普遍认识到日益严重的不平等现象是美国的一个关键经济问题——在过去25年间最顶层的那批人几乎攫取了GDP增长所带来的全部收益。


The new legislation adds insult to injury: rather than offsetting this disturbing trend, the Republicans’ “reform” gives even more to the top.	而新立法则令这一状况从侮辱变成了损害：共和党的“改革”并未抵消这种令人不安的趋势，反而让位居顶层者获益更多。


A more distorted economy is not a healthy economy.	一个更为扭曲的经济可不是一个健康的经济。


The International Monetary Fund has emphasized that a more unequal society worsens economic performance – and the new tax legislation will lead inexorably to a more unequal society.	国际货币基金组织强调，一个更加不平等的社会将令经济表现恶化——而新税收立法将不可抗拒地为我们带来一个更加不平等的社会。


Much of the complexity and distortion in the US tax code arises from different types of income being taxed at different rates.	美国税法中的大部分复杂性和扭曲性来自于对不同类型的收入以不同税率征税。


Such differential treatment leads not only to the (correct) perception that the tax code is unfair, but also to inefficiencies: resources move to favored sectors, and are wasted as firms try to convert their incomes and activities into the more favored forms.	这种差别待遇不仅会导致税法不公平的（正确）认定，还会导致效率低下：资源被转移到受优待部门，并且在企业试图将其收入和活动转化为更受优待的形式时被浪费掉。


The worst provisions of the old tax code – such as the carried-interest loophole, which allows job-destroying private-equity firms to pay taxes at low rates – have been retained, and new categories of favored income (earned by so-called pass-through entities) have been created.	旧税法中最糟糕的规定——例如允许破坏就业的私募股权公司以低税率纳税的附带权益漏洞——被保留了下来，同时还创建了新的受优待收入类别（通过所谓的传递实体来赚取）。


The hoped-for spur to economic growth is unlikely to materialize, for several reasons.	出于几个原因，人们所期望的经济增长刺激不太可能出台。


First, the economy is already at or near full employment.	首先，经济已经实现或者接近充分就业。


If the US Federal Reserve comes to view that to be the case, it will raise interest rates at the first sign of a significant increase in aggregate demand.	如果美联储也持有同样看法的话，那么一旦出现总需求大幅增加的迹象就会提高利率。


And higher interest rates mean that investment, and thus growth, will slow, even if the consumption of the very rich increases.	而更高的利率意味着即使超级富裕阶层的消费增加，投资和增长也将放缓。


Moreover, squeezing the “blue” (Democratic) states, including California and New York, by including provisions in the tax bill aimed specifically at them, not only further widens America’s political divide; it’s also bad economics.	此外，通过借助税收法案中的针对性条款来压榨包括加利福尼亚州和纽约州在内的“蓝色”（民主党主导）州，不仅进一步扩大了美国的政治分歧，而在经济学上也是败笔。


No sane government would undermine the most dynamic parts of its economy, and yet that is what the Trump administration is doing.	没有一个健全的政府会破坏其经济中最有活力的部分，但这正是特朗普政府的所作所为。


Special tax breaks for the real-estate sector may help Trump and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, but it does not make America great or competitive.	针对房地产领域的特别税收减免可能会对特朗普及其女婿贾瑞德·库什纳（Jared Kushner）有利，但这并不能使美国变得强大或具有竞争力。


And limiting the deductibility of state income tax and property tax will almost surely reduce investment in education and infrastructure – again, not a sound strategy for increasing American competitiveness.	而限制州所得税和房产税的减免额度几乎肯定会压低对教育和基础设施的投资——这也不是一个提高美国国家竞争力的合理策略。


Other new provisions will also hurt the US economy.	此外还有其他一些新规定也将伤害美国经济。


Because the fiscal deficit will increase – the only question is by how much, with my bet being that it will be far larger than current estimates of $1-1.5 trillion – the trade deficit will increase as well, regardless of whether Trump pursues more nativist/protectionist policies.	因为财政赤字会增加——唯一的问题只是增加多少而已，不过我敢打赌这个数字将远大于目前估测的1~1. 5万亿美元——贸易赤字也将增加，无论特朗普是否实施更为本土化/保护主义政策。


Lower exports and higher imports will further undermine US manufacturing.	出口减少和进口增加将进一步削弱美国的制造业。


Once again (as he has done with health care and the tax cuts), Trump is betraying his core supporters.	在此特朗普又一次（正如他们在医疗和减税方面所做的那样）背叛了他的核心支持者。


But the Republican Party is cynical.	但共和党的心态却悲观。


Its leaders are stuffing themselves at the trough – Trump, Kushner, and many others in his administration are among the biggest winners – thinking that this may be their last chance at such a feast.	它的领导者们都在大肆敛财 ——特朗普，库什纳及其政府中的许多人都是大赢家——因为他们觉得这将会是最后一场盛宴。


And no Republican believes the party can get away with it more firmly than Trump does.	同时却没有共和党人像特朗普坚定地相信自己的党派可以全身而退。


That is why the legislation is structured to give individuals temporary tax cuts, with corporations getting a permanent reduction in their tax rate.	这就是为什么立法的架构是给个人临时减税的同时将企业的税率永久降低。


The Republicans seem confident that voters will not see beyond the next paycheck.	共和党似乎有信心认定选民只会把目光集中在眼前的工资条上。


But voters are not so easily manipulated: they have seen through the trick, and are rightly convinced by the numerous studies, from sources in and out of government, showing that the lion’s share of the tax cut goes to corporations and the very rich.	但选民却不那么容易被操纵：他们已经看透了这个伎俩，并且从政府内外的众多研究中正确地明白到大部分的减税其实是流进了企业以及那些有钱人的腰包。


Trump’s tax legislation also attests to many Republicans’ belief that dollars are more important than voters.	特朗普的税收立法也证明许多共和党人相信钞票比选民更重要。


All that matters is pleasing their corporate sponsors, who will reward the party with contributions, which will be used to buy votes, thereby ensuring the perpetuation of a corporate-driven political agenda.	所有重要的事情都是为了取悦他们的企业金主，金主们将用献金来回来这个党派，这些献金将被用来换取选票，从而确保一个由企业驱动的政治议程不断延续下去。


Let’s hope that Americans really are smarter than the greedy corporate CEOs and their cynical Republican servants believe.	让我们期望美国人民真的比贪婪的企业CEO和他们悲观的共和党仆人所相信的更为明智。


With midterm congressional elections coming in November, they will have ample opportunity to prove it.	随着十一月中旬的国会选举即将临近，他们将有充足的机会去证明这一点。


Trump’s Bigger Russia Problem	特朗普更大的俄罗斯问题


WASHINGTON, DC – Shortly before taking office, US President Donald Trump took to Twitter to outline his vision for his country’s relationship with Russia.	华盛顿——上任不久后，美国总统唐纳德·特朗普借助推特来概括美国与俄国的关系。


“Having a good relationship with Russia is a good thing, not a bad thing,” he declared in one tweet.	他在一则推文中说，“与俄罗斯搞好关系是好事，不是坏事。


“When I am President,” he proclaimed in another, Russia and the US “will, perhaps, work together to solve some of the many great and pressing problems and issues of the WORLD!”	”他在另一则推文中说，“在我担任总统期间”，俄罗斯和美国“也许将合作解决世界上某些重大而急迫的事务和问题！ ”


Of course, Trump is not wrong to try to improve relations with Russia.	当然，特朗普试图与俄罗斯改善关系并没有错。


(The last several US presidents all sought the same goal.)	（最近几任美国总统都一致追求改善对俄关系。


But he must recognize that achieving that objective is not worth selling Russia’s pro-democratic activists down the river.	）但特朗普必须认识到出卖俄国亲民主人士来实现这一目标得不偿失。


Russian President Vladimir Putin has effectively eliminated popular dissent in Russia.	俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京基本消除了俄罗斯的民众异议。


In 2012, soon after Putin’s return to the presidency, the Duma enacted the so-called foreign agent law, which focused on silencing organizations that receive funding from abroad and engage in anything that can be labeled “political activity.”	2012年，普京再次担任总统后不久，杜马就颁布了所谓的外国代理人法，重点压制从国外获得资金并参与可以被贴上“政治活动”标签的任何行动的组织。


Since then, Russia’s government has unilaterally declared 88 organizations to be “foreign agents” – a term that sounds a lot like “spy.”	自那以后，俄罗斯政府已经单方面宣布88个组织为“外国代理人”——这个词听起来颇具“间谍”意味。


The list includes a respected election-monitoring group, human-rights activists, pollsters, and even some scientific research groups.	名单中包括一家受人尊敬的选举监督机构、人权活动家、民意调查专家，甚至是某些科学研究组织。


Their mandates vary, but the government’s message to them and others is clear: be critical of the Kremlin, and you will be silenced.	它们的任务各不相同，但政府对他们和其他人发出了明确的信息：批评克里姆林，就会遭到压制。


Russia’s government has taken several more steps to suppress dissent over the last five years, including labeling as “undesirable” several international organizations that have supported democracy activists and criminalizing Russian citizens’ involvement with them.	过去五年来，俄罗斯政府已经采取多项措施来压制持不同政见者，包括为若干支持民主活动人士的国际机构贴上“不受欢迎”的标签，并要求与这些机构有染的俄罗斯公民承担刑事责任。


It has also expanded the security agencies’ authority to track citizens’ online activities and curtail their right to free speech, while intensifying discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals and persecuting religious groups.	俄政府还扩大了安保机构跟踪公民在线活动并限制其言论自由的权利，同时加强了对宗教团体的迫害和对性少数族群和个人的歧视。


And Kremlin critics have been arrested and even assassinated.	而克里姆林宫的批评者则被捕甚至被害。


Such activities have apparently not fazed Trump.	这样的行径显然没有困扰特朗普。


Even after the detention of thousands of anti-corruption protesters in more than 100 cities across Russia in March, the Trump administration issued only a tepid statement.	即使3月在超过一百座城市拘留成千上万名反腐示威民众后，特朗普政府也仅仅发表了一份温和的声明。


On his visit to Moscow the following month, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson mirrored this approach, eschewing the State Department tradition of meeting publicly with civil-society activists, despite urging from the US Congress.	其后一个月访问莫斯科时，国务卿雷克斯·蒂勒森也效法了这样的策略，他不顾美国国会的敦促，避免国务院与民间社会活动家进行公开会面。


Trump and Tillerson, it seems, are fully willing to ignore the Kremlin’s repression of its opponents – not to mention its interference in America’s own democratic election, new evidence of which emerges almost daily – if it means avoiding uncomfortable conversations with Putin.	特朗普和蒂勒森似乎完全愿意忽视克里姆林宫对其竞争对手的镇压——更不要说其干预美国国内的民主大选，这方面的新证据几乎每天都层出不穷——如果这意味着能避免与普京进行尴尬的对话。


They evidently believe that this approach has yielded results – most notably the fragile Syrian ceasefire that the US and Russia brokered in July.	他们显然相信上述策略已经取得了成果——其中最显而易见的是美俄在7月达成的脆弱的叙利亚停火协议。


But Russia took that deal out of self-interest, not because of the Trump administration’s obsequiousness.	但俄罗斯签订这份协议是出于自身的利益考虑，而不是因为特朗普政府的谄媚态度。


In fact, it is American interests that are being undermined by the Trump administration’s determination not to poke the Russian bear.	事实上，特朗普政府决心不刺激俄国熊损害的恰恰是美国的利益。


Whatever short-term “win” Trump might be able to secure by pandering to Russia, it means little compared to America’s long-term interest in the life, liberty, and equality of all human beings, as well as in the safeguarding of self-government.	无论特朗普取悦俄罗斯能得到什么样的短期“利益”，但较之美国在生命、自由和人类普遍平等领域的长期利益和捍卫自主政府而言都是微不足道的。


This is not to say that the US should not engage or collaborate with governments that operate on different principles.	这并不是说美国不应与奉行不同原则的政府展开合作。


But we must be clear about what we are not willing to accept – beginning with the quashing of political dissent.	但我们必须明确能够接受的底线——就从镇压政治分歧开始。


Upholding America’s core principles is not just the right thing to do; it is smart strategy.	坚持美国的核心原则不仅是正确的原则； 也是明智的策略。


Putin’s authority may appear unshakeable, but it is actually propped up by propaganda and fear.	普京的权威可能看起来不可动摇，但其背后的支撑因素其实是宣传和恐惧。


When the US betrays its own values to avoid challenging Russia, it strengthens Putin’s hand considerably.	当美国出卖自身价值观来避免挑战俄国时，普京手中的筹码大大增加。


Meanwhile, the perception that he has the US on the ropes enables Putin to continue silencing his opponents.	与此同时，普京有能力挟制美国的看法致使他能够继续压制敌对势力。


In the run-up to next year’s presidential election, Putin will not hesitate to take advantage of the leeway foreign leaders give him.	在明年总统大选即将开始前，普京会毫不犹豫地利用外国领导人留给他的余地。


Already, he has ensured that the opposition leader Alexei Navalny was convicted of embezzlement, giving the government an excuse to bar him from the ballot.	他已经确保反对派领导人阿列克谢·纳瓦尔尼被判犯有贪污罪，这给了政府禁止他参与投票的借口。


But Navalny, who has already withstood years of Kremlin pressure, will not give up so easily; nor will other opposition activists.	但已经承受克林姆林压力多年的纳瓦尔尼和其他反对派活动家绝不会轻易放弃。


Earlier this month, more than 200 Putin opponents won seats on local councils in Moscow’s municipal elections.	就在上周末，超过200多名普京的反对者在莫斯科市政选举中获得了地方议会席位。


Anti-corruption protests have continued throughout the year.	反腐败抗议运动全年持续不断。


And Navalny has just released a new exposé on Putin’s secret dacha near the border with Finland.	而纳瓦尔尼则刚刚曝光了位于俄国与芬兰边境附近的普京的乡间秘密宅邸。


To be sure, Putin is expected to win a fourth term in office easily.	可以肯定，普京能够轻松赢得第四次总统任期。


But he will not lead Russia forever.	但他不会在俄罗斯永远领导下去。


Until then, the entire Russian population deserves to participate in democratic elections.	在此之前，全体俄罗斯民众都有权参加民主选举。


Yet none of those held during Putin’s long tenure has been assessed as free or fair by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.	但普京漫长任期内所举行的任何一次选举都不符合欧洲安全与合作组织自由或公正的标准。


By extending public support to election monitors and activists working to uphold democratic principles, the Trump administration could hearten the Russian opposition and advance a different vision for Russia’s future.	通过公开支持选举监督机构和努力坚持民主原则的活动家，特朗普政府可以鼓舞俄罗斯反对派并改变俄罗斯未来的前景。


In the short term, a little hypocrisy may seem like a small price to pay for a quick victory.	从短期来看，一点点虚伪可能看似付出很小的代价就能赢得一场快速的胜利。


But both US foreign policy and America’s national narrative are long games.	但美国外交政策和美国的国家故事都是长期的棋局。


And, in the long term, the US would be much better off engaging with a democratic Russia where human rights were protected and political dissent tolerated.	而从长远来看，与保护人权和容忍政治异见的民主俄罗斯打交道显然更符合美国的利益。


Russia’s 2018 elections represent an important opportunity for Trump to advocate for such an outcome, and prove that American values are not up for negotiation.	俄国2018年大选为特朗普提供了倡导上述目标的重要机会，并证明在涉及美国价值观的问题上没有任何谈判的余地。


The US would not stoop to Putin’s level and interfere covertly in Russia’s electoral processes.	美国不会降格到普京的水平去秘密干预俄罗斯大选。


But it should stand up for democracy and human rights – and stand with those who aspire to build free societies.	但它必须坚持民主和人权——并与那些渴望建设自由社会的人站在一起。


The world must know that the US still has a soul.	世界必须知道美国的灵魂并没有丧失。


Trump’s Gift to Europe	特朗普给欧洲的礼物


OXFORD – At a recent conference in France, a number of Europeans surprised their American guests by arguing that US President Donald Trump might be good for Europe.	牛津——在法国最近召开的一次会议上，一些欧洲人提出美国总统唐纳德·特朗普可能对欧洲发展有益的观点令美国客人非常惊讶。


With Trump returning to Europe for the G20 summit in Hamburg, it’s worth asking whether they are right.	在特朗普返回欧洲参加G20汉堡峰会之际，我们应当问问自己他们的观点是否是正确的。


By most accounts, Trump’s presidency has been terrible for Europe.	从绝大多数层面看，特朗普任总统对欧洲来讲都非常可怕。


He seems to disdain the European Union.	他似乎蔑视欧盟。


His relationship with German Chancellor Angela Merkel is cool in comparison to his friendship with Turkey’s authoritarian president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, or his admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin.	他与德国总理安格拉·默克尔的关系比和土耳其独裁总统雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安更加冷淡，他还对俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京十分倾慕。


Moreover, Trump welcomes Britain’s looming exit from the EU; upon meeting Prime Minister Theresa May for the first time, he is alleged to have asked enthusiastically, “Who’s next?”	在首次与特雷莎·梅首相会面时，据称他曾热情地问，“谁是下一个？ ”最后，特朗普拖了太久才重申北约（承诺相互防御的）协定第五条；


Finally, Trump only belatedly reaffirmed NATO’s Article 5 (which pledges mutual defense); he withdrew the US from the Paris climate agreement, which is very popular in Europe; and he has cut US funds for the United Nations, which has strong European support.	他领导美国退出在欧洲非常受欢迎的巴黎气候协定； 而且他削减美国提供给联合国的资金，而联合国一直是欧洲人强力支持的。


Not surprisingly, Trump is personally unpopular across Europe.	特朗普本人在欧洲不受欢迎丝毫不令人意外。


In a recent Pew poll indicates that only 22% of Britons, 14% of French, and 11% of Germans have confidence in him.	最近公布的一次皮尤民意调查显示，仅有22%的英国人、14%的法国人和11%的德国人对特朗普有信心。


But this very unpopularity – more anti-Trump than anti-American – has helped to reinforce European values.	但恰恰是这种不受欢迎——与其说是反美还不如说是反特朗普——却十分有助于强化欧洲的价值观。


Earlier in the year, there was a fear that a rising tide of the type of nationalist populism that brought Trump to office and led to Brexit might be about to sweep Europe, even giving the far-right Marine Le Pen the French presidency.	今年年初，很多人担忧导致特朗普上台和英国脱欧的民族民粹主义大潮涌起可能会横扫欧洲，甚至会导致极右翼候选人马琳·勒庞当选法国总统。 相反，民粹主义浪潮却似乎在特朗普当选达到高潮后逐渐消退。


Instead, the populist wave seemed to have crested with Trump’s election.	从那以后，民粹主义势力在奥地利和荷兰均遭遇了失败；


Since then, populists have been defeated in Austria and the Netherlands; the French elected Emmanuel Macron, a centrist newcomer; and May, the champion of a “hard” Brexit, lost her parliamentary majority in last month’s snap general election.	法国民众选出了伊曼纽尔·马克龙这位中间派新手； 而首推“硬”脱欧的梅在上个月举行的闪电大选中失去了议会多数。


Europe still confronts the slow growth, high unemployment, and political disunity that have plagued it in the decade since the 2008 global financial crisis.	欧洲仍然面对2008年全球金融危机以来已困扰其数十年的增长缓慢、失业率高企和政治不团结的挑战。


But whoever wins the German election this September will be a moderate, not an extreme nationalist, and will understand the importance of working with Macron to restart the Franco-German engine of European progress.	但今年9月赢得德国大选的人一定会是温和派，而不是极端民族主义者，而且这位获胜者必须理解与马克龙合作，重新启动法德欧洲发展引擎有多重要。


The Brexit negotiations promise to be complex and contentious.	英国退欧谈判注定会争议不断，而且错综复杂。


For “soft Brexiteers,” who want to preserve Britain’s access to the European single market, the problem is that the Brexit vote mainly reflected concerns about immigration, not about the minutiae of the single market’s rules.	对希望保留对欧盟单一市场准入权的英国“软脱欧派”来说，问题在于脱欧投票主要反应了对移民问题、而非单一市场规则细节的关注。


Yet Europe refuses to allow goods and services to flow freely without free movement of people.	但欧洲拒绝在不允许人员自由流动的前提下允许货物和服务自由流动。


Some three million Europeans currently live in Britain, and a million Britons reside in Europe.	约有300万欧洲人目前居住在英国，此外还有一百万英国人居住在欧洲。


A possible compromise could be found by creating a new Euro-British entity, one that would guarantee the rights of both sides’ citizens while allowing some limits on immigration as well as on some goods.	或许可以通过成立英欧联合机构来达成可能的妥协，上述机构将负责在确保双方民众权利的同时允许在某种程度上限制移民和某些货物。


One could think of this entity in terms of concentric circles, with free movement characterizing the inner circle of the EU and constraints allowed in the outer circle.	可以将这个机构想象为一个同心圆，自由流动代表欧盟核心集团的特点，而外围则允许采取某种程度的限制举措。


Whether such compromises will be possible depends upon European flexibility.	这样的妥协是否可行取决于欧洲是否灵活。


In the past, Europeans have talked about allowing “variable speeds” toward the implied goal of “ever closer union.”	过去，欧洲人曾说过允许在实现“越来越紧密联盟”的过程中允许各成员国采取“不同的速度”。


This federal goal would have to be replaced, and a metaphor of different levels would have to replace that of different speeds.	现在必须修改这一联盟目标，用不同层次的比喻来取代不同速度。


Many Europeans elites have already become more flexible regarding Europe’s future and have moved past the federalist goal to envision a European entity that is sui generis.	许多欧洲精英已经在欧洲未来问题上采取更加灵活的态度，超越了设想成立独一无二欧洲机构的联盟目标。


They point out that three different levels of participation already exist in Europe: the customs union, the euro currency, and the Schengen Agreement on the removal of internal borders.	他们指出欧洲内部已经存在三种层次的成员关系：即关税同盟、欧元货币和取消内部边境的申根协定签署国。


Defense could become a fourth.	共同防务可能成为第四个。


In the past, European progress on cooperation in defense has been inhibited not only by concerns about sovereignty, but also by the security guarantee offered by the United States.	过去，欧洲防务合作方面的进步不仅受到主权忧虑的钳制，而且还受制于美国提出的安全保障承诺。


With Trump raising doubts about American reliability, the security issue has moved to the foreground.	随着特朗普让欧洲对美国的可靠性产生怀疑，安全问题已经越来越引人注目。


Efforts to build a common European defense system have begun, but the process is slow.	建立欧洲共同防务体系的工作已经开始，但进展是十分缓慢的。


Other than Britain, only the French have major expeditionary force capabilities, while Germany has been inhibited by history from doing more.	除英国外，拥有大规模远征能力的只有法国，而德国则因为历史的原因无法参与进一步的工作。


And Britain was always reluctant to do anything that might compete with NATO.	而且英国一向不愿意与北约产生任何竞争。


But these attitudes are beginning to change.	但这样的态度正在开始发生变化。


Again, the image of concentric circles can help.	这里，借用同心圆的比喻可能再次对理解有所帮助。


In the run-up to the Iraq war in the early 2000s, some argued that, in terms of security, Americans are from Mars, while Europeans are from Venus.	在20世纪早期伊拉克战争爆发之前，有人提出在安全问题上，美国人和欧洲人的差异就像火星和金星一样大。


But the world has changed, and Europe now faces a series of external threats.	但世界已经发生改变，欧洲目前面临着一系列外部威胁。


Russia’s attacks on Georgia and Ukraine have reminded Europeans of the dangers they face from their large neighbor.	俄国对格鲁吉亚和乌克兰的进攻提醒欧洲人他们在强大的邻国面前所面临的危险。


Deterring Russia will still require a strong NATO.	遏制俄罗斯仍然需要北约的强大。


Another set of threats, however, could come from violence in the Balkans.	然而，另外一种威胁可能源自巴尔干半岛的暴力活动。


Some observers believe that civil war was only narrowly averted recently in Macedonia.	某些观察家认为，最近马其顿刚刚与内战擦肩而过。


A European peacekeeping force could make a major contribution to stability in the region.	欧洲维和部队或许会对地区稳定提供重要的帮助。


A third set of threats to Europe originates in North Africa and the Middle East.	欧洲面临的第三种威胁来自北非和中东。


Libya is in chaos and the source of dangerous Mediterranean voyages by desperate migrants, and one can also imagine the need to protect citizens or rescue hostages in the region.	利比亚陷入混乱并成为绝望移民危险地中海之旅的策源地，人们也很容易想见必须保护该地区民众并营救地区人质。


Here the French expeditionary capability, perhaps coupled with Britain’s, could help provide security.	在此，法国的远征能力与英国相结合或许可以保障安全局势。


Even if Britain does not participate, other Europeans could help, as Germany now does in dealing with terrorism in Mali.	即使英国置身事外，其他欧洲国家也可以参与进来，就像德国现在在马里应对恐怖主义。


Europe is a long way from a common defense structure, but the need is growing.	欧洲离共同防御体系还有很长的路要走，但必要性正在与日俱增。


And, ironically, the unpopular Trump may prove more of a help than a hindrance.	而颇具讽刺意味的是，事实可能证明这位不受欢迎的特朗普与其说是一种阻碍还不如说是一种帮助。


Trump’s Tax Plan and the Dollar	特朗普征税计划与美元


CAMBRIDGE – Now that Donald Trump has been elected President of the United States and Republicans control both houses of Congress, corporate tax reform is coming to America.	发自剑桥——如今唐纳德·特朗普即将上任美国总统而共和党人控制了国会参众两院，公司税改革也因此即将降临美国。


The package currently being discussed includes two important features: a cut in the tax rate, from 35% currently to 20% or even 15%; and a “border-adjustment” tax, which is typical of a value-added-tax (VAT) regime, but unusual for corporate taxes.	目前正在讨论的方案涵盖两个重要特征：降低税率，从目前的35％减到20％甚至15％； 以及“边境调整”税，该税具备典型的增值税制特征，但作为公司税则不甚常见。


A border-adjustment tax would treat domestically purchased inputs and imported inputs differently, and encourage exports.	边境调整税会将国内采购的产出和进口产出区分对待，并鼓励出口。


Corporations would no longer be able to deduct the costs of imported inputs from their taxable income; but, at the same time, their export-sales revenue would not be taxed.	企业无法继续从其应税收入中扣除进口产出的成本； 但同时它们的出口销售收入也不会征税。


The proposal has generated an intense debate about whether it will improve the US trade balance.	该提案引发了一场激烈的辩论，双方对于其能否改善美国的贸易平衡状况各执一词。


Having published our own work on “fiscal devaluations,” we believe that a border-adjustment tax would have minimal prospects for success, and that it could significantly undermine America’s net foreign-asset position.	在共同发表了关于“财政贬值”的论文之后，我们认为边境调整税的效果极为有限，并可能严重损害美国的国外资产净头寸。


The idea of using fiscal-policy instruments to improve trade competitiveness dates back to John Maynard Keynes.	使用财政政策工具来提高贸易竞争力的想法可追溯到约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯。


In his 1931 Macmillan Report to the British Parliament, Keynes proposed that an import tariff be paired with an export subsidy, which would mimic the effects of exchange-rate devaluation, while maintaining the gold-pound parity.	凯恩斯在1931年向英国议会提交的《麦克米伦报告（Macmillan Report）》中建议，将进口关税与出口补贴配套使用这将实现与汇率贬值相仿的效应，同时又能维持黄金与英镑的平价关系。


In our own work, we have demonstrated that, in addition to this policy combination, countries that maintain a fixed exchange rate or are in a currency union can achieve the same effect by raising their VAT and cutting payroll taxes by equivalent amounts.	在我们自己的研究证明，在这种政策组合之外，维持固定汇率或在货币联盟中的国家可以通过提高增值税和减少等额的工资税来达到同样的效果。


This tax-swap policy has received a lot of attention in the eurozone, with Germany implementing it in 2006, and France in 2012.	这种税收互换政策在欧元区得到了很多关注，德法两国先后在2006和2012年实施了该政策。


The incoming Trump administration’s proposal to cut corporate-tax rates and impose a border-adjustment tax is similar to the VAT-payroll tax swap, because both strategies raise the cost of imports and subsidize exports.	特朗普政府提出的削减公司税率和实施边境调整税的建议类似于某种增值税-工资税交换，因为这两个战略都提高了进口成本和补贴出口。


But we do not expect such a strategy to improve US competitiveness for the simple reason that the US authorities maintain a flexible exchange rate.	但我们不认为这样的策略能提高美国的竞争力，原因很简单，美国当局保持着灵活的汇率。


If Trump’s proposed tax reforms are implemented in full, the dollar will appreciate along with demand for US goods: a 20% tax cut will push the value of the dollar up by 20%.	如果特朗普提议的税收改革得以全面实施，美元将与美国商品的需求一起受惠：20％的减税将推动美元的价值上升20％。


And this, in turn, will offset any competitiveness gains.	而这反过来将抵消任何竞争优势。


The only way that this would not happen is if the US Federal Reserve prevented the dollar from appreciating by lowering interest rates. But this would fuel domestic inflation, so there is no reason to believe that the Fed would take such a step.	令这一切不会发生的唯一方法是让美联储通过降低利率来阻止美元升值，但这又会反过来刺激国内通胀，所以没有理由相信美联储会走出这一步。


Thus, while a border-adjustment tax can benefit countries that have a fixed exchange rate or are in a currency union, it basically has nothing to offer countries with floating exchange rates, because the resulting currency appreciation offsets the fiscal devaluation.	因此，虽然边境调整税可以惠及那些具有固定汇率或在货币联盟中的国家，但却对那些浮动汇率国家基本无效，因为由此产生的货币升值抵消了财政贬值。


But the effect of a US border-adjustment tax would not be neutral.	但美国边境调整税的效果可不会是中性的。


An appreciating dollar would erode America’s net foreign-asset position, because an overwhelming 85% of its foreign liabilities are denominated in dollars, while around 70% of its foreign assets are denominated in a foreign currency.	美元升值将损害美国的国外资产净头寸，因为其外债总额中有85％以美元计价，而其国外资产中约有70％以外币计值。


With US foreign assets amounting to 140% of its GDP, and its foreign liabilities amounting to 180% of GDP, a dollar appreciation of 20% would result in a capital loss equal to about 13% of GDP.	由于美国的国外资产相当于其GDP的140％，其外债相当于GDP的180％，美元升值20％将导致相当于GDP13％的资本损失。


The fiscal consequences of Trump’s proposals would be mixed.	特朗普提案的财政后果将是混合型的。


On one hand, the border-adjustment tax could push up tax revenues, because the US imports more than it exports.	一方面，由于美国的进口多于出口，边境调整税可能会提升税收收入。


With the US trade deficit at 4% of GDP, a 20% border-adjustment tax would create additional tax revenues equal to about 0.8% of GDP.	鉴于美国贸易赤字相当于GDP的4％，征收20％的边境调整税将带来相当于GDP0. 8％的额外税收收入。


On the other hand, the lower corporate-income-tax rate would decrease revenues and essentially cancel out any gains from the tax on imports.	另一方面，调低企业所得税率将降低税收收入，并基本上抵消来自进口税收的任何收益。


To be sure, a border-adjustment tax would have other benefits that we have not discussed.	当然，边境调整税还有其他在本文中没有讨论的好处。


It might generate additional tax revenues, by discouraging international companies from engaging in “transfer pricing” between their subsidiaries, or from shifting profits to low-tax countries.	它可能通过阻止国际公司在子公司之间实行“转让定价”或者将利润转移到低税率国家，从而创造额外的税收。


And, of course, lower tax rates could provide an economic stimulus and decrease the budget deficit.	当然，降低税率还可以刺激经济及减少预算赤字。


But in terms of international competitiveness, the bottom line is that Trump’s proposed tax plan – particularly the border-adjustment tax – would most likely not have a positive impact on the US trade balance.	但就国际竞争力来说，最基本的一点是特朗普提出的税收计划——特别是边境调整税——很可能不会对美国的贸易平衡产生积极影响。


Worse, it could be very costly in terms of US net foreign assets.	更糟糕的是，就美国的国外净资产而言，这个代价可能是非常昂贵的。


Donald the Destroyer	破坏者特朗普


WASHINGTON, DC – Donald Trump, the Republican Party’s presumptive nominee to contest the United States’ presidential election in November, is clearly not a standard Republican.	华盛顿—唐纳德·特朗普，共和党角逐11月美国总统大选的推定提名人，显然不是标准的共和党。


The party’s leaders and elected officials fought against him during the primary, and many are still reluctant to endorse him.	共和党领导人和当选官员在初选期间一直在与他作对，其中不少至今仍不愿支持他。


Trump is now aligning some of his policy proposals with mainstream Republican ideas, but he is also clearly determined to retain his distinctive identity.	现在，特朗普正在让他的一些政策主张与共和党主流观点相一致，但同时他也显然决定要保留自己与众不同的身份。


The resulting ideological mix comprises three main components: virulent anti-immigrant animus, ignorant anti-trade rhetoric, and extreme anti-government sentiment.	由此产生的意识形态组合主要由三部分构成：恶毒的反移民仇恨，无知的反贸易论调，以及极端的反政府情绪。


Taken separately, any one of these would be damaging.	单独来看，任何一项都具有破坏性。


Together, they would deal a major blow to US and global prosperity, while also weakening national and international security.	合起来，它们可能给美国和全球繁荣带来沉重一击，同时也会削弱国家和国际安全。


Without question, Trump is the most anti-immigrant presidential candidate the US has seen in modern times.	毫无疑问，特朗普是现代美国最反移民的总统候选人。


His first idea and overriding catchphrase is to “build a wall” along the country’s southern border, which would supposedly keep out Mexican and other Latin immigrants.	他提出的以一个观点和首屈一指的名言便是在南边国境上“建设一道墙”，从而将墨西哥和其他拉丁移民排除在国门之外。


He also wants to deport 11 million people and keep out all Muslims.	他还想驱逐1,100万人并拒绝一切穆斯林入境。


This is a recipe for a police state – checking identities, raiding people’s houses, and encouraging neighbors to inform on one another.	这不啻建立一个警察国家——核查身份，突袭人们的住所，鼓励邻里互相揭发。


It is also fundamentally anti-American, in the sense of undermining everything that the country has achieved.	从根本上说，这也是反美国的，因为这破坏了一切美国所实现的东西。


The US is a nation of immigrants – the best in the world at integrating new arrivals.	美国是一个移民国家——是全世界最擅长融合新来者的国家。


After one generation in the country, no one cares where your family came from.	在美国呆了一代人后，没人在乎你的家庭来自哪里。


Trump – and those who bring him to power – would throw all of this out of the window.	特朗普——以及哪些让他问鼎权力的人——将把这一切一股脑儿抛诸脑后。


The associated social disruption would by itself cause not just an economic slowdown, but a sustained decline in GDP and incomes.	由此产生的社会破坏不但将造成经济减速，还将让GDP和收入持续下降。


The Trump campaign’s anti-trade stance is similarly shocking, including to the business community.	特朗普阵营的反贸易立场也非常令人震惊，对商界同样如此。


Trump genuinely wants to confront China and other countries with a potential trade war, ignoring completely the impact on the US (where exports account for around 14% of total economic activity).	特朗普真正希望用潜在贸易战对付中国和其他国家，完全忽视对美国的影响（出口占美国经济活动总量的14%左右）。


The US has spent the past 70 years helping to build a global system that, despite its flaws, for the most part enables countries to trade peacefully and across great distances.	过去70年，美国费尽心机与远交近邻进行和平贸易。


Trump’s vow to tear up the rules is a recipe for another Great Depression, with massive unemployment and millions of people unable to pay their mortgages, student loans, and other debts.	特朗普信誓旦旦要撕毁这些规则，这将导致又一场大萧条，带来大规模失业，让数百万人无法偿还按揭、学生贷款和其他债务。


Trump has added some themes from the Republicans’ traditional anti-government agenda, but with his own grandiose twists.	特朗普在共和党传统的反政府日程上又加上了一些主题，但无不带有特朗普特色的浮夸扭曲。


Financial reform would be repealed completely, regardless of the consequences.	金融改革将被完全废除，不管结果如何。


The US would return to the arrangements that brought the world’s financial system to the brink of complete collapse in 2008 – and caused the country to lose at least one year’s GDP (more than $20 trillion).	美国将回到在2008年几乎让世界金融体系彻底崩溃——也让美国损失了至少一年的GDP（超过20万亿美元）——的安排上。


Moreover, Trump’s proposed tax cuts would be very large – thus increasing the federal budget deficit and driving up national debt substantially.	此外，特朗普提出的减税方案也将规模巨大——从而增加联邦预算赤字，大幅推高国民债务。


Trump will rely on the standard Republican claim that the tax cuts will “pay for themselves” or lead to rapid growth.	特朗普将祭出标准的共和党主张——减税将“自动补偿损失”或带来高速增长。


Such claims are completely at odds with modern American experience, including under George W. Bush.	这些主张与现代美国——包括小布什时期——的经验完全背道而驰。


This approach to economic policy is classic populism: Promise voters impossible things, particularly when the negative fallout from the promises becomes apparent only well down the road.	这一经济政策方针是经典的民粹主义：承诺选民不可能的东西，特别是在承诺的副作用在很久以后才会显现出来的情况下。


If Trump were elected, Americans could expect the same sort of economic cycle seen repeatedly in places like Argentina over the past 100 years.	如果特朗普当选，美国可以期待过去100年阿根廷反复发生的经济周期。


Inequality would widen, with great wealth for the few and low wages for the many, followed by a traumatic bust – in which the wealthy again do fine, the middle class is ground down to poverty, and the social safety net is ripped to shreds.	不平等性将扩大，极少数人暴富，大多数人工资低下，随后是破坏性萧条——富人依旧逍遥，但中产阶级将回到贫困，社会安全网支离破碎。


In our book White House Burning, James Kwak and I emphasized that fiscal sustainability is important not just for economic prosperity but also for national security.	在我们的书《火烧白宫》（White House Burning）中，郭庾信（James Kwak）和我强调财政可持续性不仅对经济繁荣很重要，对国家安全也很重要。


In 1814, the British were able to burn down the White House (and most other official buildings in Washington, DC) because American politicians had almost completely undermined the central government’s fiscal capacity.	1814年，英国人能够火烧白宫（以及华盛顿的大部分官方建筑）的原因正在于美国政客几乎完全破坏了中央政府的财政能力。


The US had no effective navy, a weak army, and insufficient ability to mobilize in the face of an obvious national emergency.	美国没有有效的海军，陆军孱弱，也没有足够能力在面临显而易见的国家紧急状态时全民动员。


Trump’s promise to “Make America Great Again” is a political swindle.	特朗普承诺的“美国复兴”是一个政治骗局。


Populists will promise anything, including policies that are untenable or that will lead to certain disaster.	民粹主义者可以许下任何承诺，包括站不住脚或者将导致灾难的政策。


Trump’s proposed policies are no different: They would undermine America’s security, depress its economy, and destroy the financial system.	特朗普所提出的政策亦然：它们将破坏美国的安全，抑制美国的经济，破坏美国的金融体系。


The authoritarian populism that Trump embodies has challenged democracies at least since the end of the Roman Republic.	特朗普所持有的极权民粹主义有悖于自罗马共和国灭亡以来的民主传统。


Authoritarians have always beaten up their opponents – physically, in the courts, and now on Twitter – to make them keep quiet.	极权主义者总是会不遗余力打压反对者——从肉体上，在法庭上，现在则是在Twitter上——从而让他们闭嘴。


Trump’s opponents must not be intimidated.	特朗普的反对者决不能因此胆怯。


His rise represents the most profound challenge to American democracy since Germany invaded Poland in 1939.	他的崛起反映了1939年德国入侵波兰以来美国民主所面临的最艰巨的挑战。


Rejection of his candidacy is necessary to keep America and the world safe.	拒绝他的当选是保证美国和世界安全的必要条件。


Giving Democracy the Finger	为民主竖起手指


DENVER – Some of the most iconic – and perhaps misleading – news images of the twenty-first century were of smiling Iraqis holding up their purple-ink-stained index fingers to show that they had voted in their country’s January 2005 election.	丹佛—二十一世纪最具标志性——也许也最具误导性——的新形象是2005年1月竖起染着紫色墨水的食指、面带笑容地表示自己投了票的伊拉克人。


For many, it was the first vote they had ever cast.	对很多人来说，这是他们这辈子第一次投票。


The purported story behind the images was that democracy had finally arrived in Iraq.	这些形象所要表达的故事是民主终于来到了伊拉克。


A system without elections cannot claim to be a democracy.	没有选举的制度不可称之为民主。


So, for many, seeing images of a well-run voting process (the ink stains prevented voters from casting more than one ballot) was proof enough that things had changed.	因此，对许多人来说，看到运转良好的投票过程（墨水手印防止选民一票多投）足以证明情况起了变化。


But democracy is an exceedingly complex system, and free elections are only one feature.	但是民主制度过于复杂，自由选举只是其中一个特征。


An absence of elections certainly implies an absence of democracy.	无选举当然意味着不民主。


But it does not follow that the inverse is also true.	但反之未必就是民主。


Elections are a necessary but insufficient condition of democracy, which also requires durable institutions that embody democratic values.	选举是民主的必要而不充分条件，民主还需要秉持民主价值观的经久的机构（institutions）。


Today, more and more countries hold elections, and yet democracy itself is in peril.	如今，举行选举的国家越来越多，但民主自身却深陷重围。


Across developed and developing countries, violation of the public trust and failure to protect democratic institutions are straining systems of checks and balances that, in some cases, have been in place for centuries.	放眼发达和发展中国家，破坏公共信任、无法保护民主机构正在制约制衡制度——其中不乏已经存在了几百年的制衡制度。


Assaults on democratic institutions are not limited to countries with little democratic experience. They can be seen almost everywhere, including in the world’s oldest existing democracy, namely the United States.	对民主机构的攻击不仅限于民主经验十分有限的国家，而是几乎无处不在，包括全世界最古老的老牌民主国家，即美国。


In the West, extolling the virtues of democracy to others has long resembled proselytization of a secular religion, complete with the threat of fire and brimstone for those who do not embrace the democratic creed.	在西方，向别的国家宣扬民主的优点一直类似于传播世俗宗教，对于那些拒绝接受民主教条的人，将威胁以地狱之火。


But the developed world’s lectures to the developing world were never particularly useful.	但发达世界向发展中世界的宣传从未起到特别的用处。


Years ago, after an event in which an international philanthropist lectured about democracy for hours before flying into the sunset on his private jet, a Balkan prime minister in attendance asked me, “What am I supposed to do with that?”	多年前，一位国际慈善家在乘坐私人飞机飞向落日之前，做了几个小时的民主宣传演讲，事后，一位出席演讲的巴尔干地区总理问我：“我应该用民主做什么？


While he was on the front lines grappling with sensitive issues relating to ethnic minorities, interlopers were offering him a constant stream of take-it-or-else advice for which they would never have to assume responsibility.	”他是应对少数民族等敏感问题的第一线官员，而闯入者却向他提供一连串他们永远不用负责任的“照办-否则”建议。


Now, the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction, especially with respect to US foreign policy.	如今，钟摆摆向了另一侧，特别是在美国外交政策方面。


Under President Donald Trump’s administration, the American government does not even bother to pay lip service to democracy anymore.	在特朗普总统的领导下，美国政府不再打民主的“嘴炮”了。


To be sure, this partly reflects fatigue from decades of democracy promotion on the part of the West.	平心而论，这部分反映了对几十年来西方不懈推销民主的疲劳。


But it is more than that.	但还有其他原因。


Democracy is being directly threatened in the country where it should have the deepest cultural and political roots.	在民主的文化和政治根基最深厚的国家，民主正在受到直接威胁。


Trump does not just want to avoid repeating the failed policies of the past, as he puts it.	特朗普不仅仅如他所言，想要避免重蹈过去的失败政策。


He and his supporters also have taken aim at the fundamental institutions upon which American democracy is based, including the courts, the legislative branch, the independent media, and more.	他和他的支持者还将目标对准了作为美国的民主的基础的机构，包括法院、立法机关、独立媒体等。


The nineteenth-century Prussian military officer and theorist Carl von Clausewitz spoke presciently about the age of total war that would arrive less than a century after his death.	十九世纪普鲁士军官兼军事理论家克劳塞维茨（Carl von Clausewitz）有预见性地看到了他死后不到一百年便成为现实的总体战（total war）时代。


What he did not address was the coming age of total politics, whereby all of a society’s institutions would be pressed into the service of a totalizing ideological struggle.	他没能预见到的是即将到来的总体政治（total politics），在总体政治中，一个社会的所有机构都会沦为总体化的意识形态斗争的工具。


America is now in the midst of such a struggle, and how we manage it will inform how other countries handle similar struggles of their own.	美国现在就处在这一斗争之中，我们如何应对这一局面将给其他面对类似斗争的国家提供案例。


America’s crisis at home is now preventing it from performing its traditional international role as both a source of institutional reassurance and an agent of change.	如今，美国的国内危机妨碍了它扮演其传统国际角色——制度保障力量和变革促进力量。


Throughout the post-war period, the US has backstopped collective security through NATO and other institutions, and it has been more than willing to brave regional and global threats, often with few friends at its side.	纵观战后时期，美国通过北约和其他机构支撑着集体安全，并原因面对全新的地区和全球威胁——常常是在没有朋友与它共边的情况下。


Sadly, Trump shows little respect for this legacy, or for America’s tradition of optimism and confidence in its institutions.	悲哀的是，特朗普丝毫不顾这一遗产，也丝毫不顾美国的乐观传统和对其机构的信心。


He either doesn’t realize or doesn’t care that the American system of governance has been the main source of the country’s global prestige.	他要么是不理解，要么是不在乎美国的治理制度早已是美国的全球声望的主要源泉。


Instead, he rejects America’s historical ascent, and reframes it as a parable of self-delusion and naiveté, wherein the US puts on a lavish feast for the world’s freeloaders.	相反，他拒绝接受美国的历史升势，而将其改编为自欺无邪的寓言，其中的美国为全世界的不速之客准备了一场豪华宴会。


Already, America’s silence is deafening.	美国的沉默已经起到了振聋发聩的效果。


In Syria, the US has ceded the field to others, even though the fight there could determine the future of the Muslim Middle East.	在叙利亚，美国拱手将战场让给他人，即便这场战争可能决定着穆斯林中东的未来。


Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s rejection of trans-oceanic trade and investment pacts has confused its friends and emboldened its rivals.	与此同时，特朗普政府拒绝接受跨洋贸易和投资契约令其盟友困惑，让对手有恃无恐。


The US Department of State, regardless of what its beleaguered chief, Rex Tillerson, might say, now lacks global reach.	不论深陷重围的国务卿蒂勒森（Rex Tillerson）如何巧舌如簧，如今的美国国务院无法触及全球。


And without proactive diplomacy, the US will quickly be eclipsed internationally, namely by China.	而没有了积极主动的外交，美国将很快在国际上被别人——就是中国——比下去。


But Trump won an election in 2016, so he is holding up a stained finger as if that is the only thing that matters.	但特朗普赢得了2016年选举，因此他高举染了色的手指，好像这就是唯一重要的事。


In the coming year, it will be up to Americans of all stripes to hold up their own – and to make clear that democracy is about much, much more.	在新的一年里，形形色色的美国人也必须举起自己的手指——清楚地表明民主的意义要比这多得多。


Preparing for the Trump Trade Wars	准备迎接特朗普贸易战


LONDON – Is US President Donald Trump what Maoists used to call a paper tiger, or should his noisy threats be taken seriously?	伦敦—美国总统是毛泽东主义者所谓的纸老虎吗？ 还是应该认真对待他的聒噪式威胁？


That question has loomed particularly large over the North Korean nuclear issue.	这个问题在朝鲜核问题上尤其重要。


But after Trump’s fairly emollient 12-day tour of Asia, fears of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula have ebbed somewhat.	但在特朗普经历了相当低姿态的12天亚洲之行后，关于朝鲜半岛冲突的担忧有所消退。


And yet that same tour raised another threat, which the world has every reason to take seriously.	但这次亚洲之旅带来了另一个问题，世界有充足的理由需要认真以对。


In the second year of his presidency, Trump’s administration will likely set its sights on trade, suggesting that the prospect of more trade wars will increase substantially.	在担任总统的第二年，特朗普政府有可能将目光瞄准贸易，这表明爆发更多贸易战的可能性大大地提高了。


In his first year in office, Trump has often huffed and puffed about other countries’ unfair trade practices, just as he did during the 2016 election campaign; but he has done little to turn words into deeds.	在执政的第一年里，特朗普向其他国家的不公平贸易行为“开炮”，一如他在2016年竞选期间的做派； 但他并没有拿出多少实际行动。


This inaction is understandable.	不作为是可以理解的。


Trump is relying on China – one of America’s largest trade partners – to apply pressure on the North Korean regime, while US businesses have lobbied vigorously against any measures that might inhibit trade.	特朗普要依靠中国——美国最大的贸易伙伴之一向朝鲜政权施压，同时美国企业也在竭力游说不要采取任何可能阻碍贸易的措施。


Still, Trump’s apparent restraint cannot be expected to last.	尽管如此，不可认为特朗普显而易见的克制态度会继续保持。


Trade is one of the few policy areas where he can be said to have an ideology.	贸易是他可以说有一套思想的极少数政策领域之一。


The “logic” of that ideology holds that trade deficits are proof of unfair practices by other countries, and should thus be met with tough and decisive action.	这一思想的“逻辑”认为，贸易赤字证明了其他国家采取了不公平的贸易措施，因此必须拿出严厉果断的行动来应对。


Moreover, Trump has a compelling political interest in maintaining the support of his core supporters.	此外，保持核心支持者的支持对特朗普来说有着不可抗拒的政治利益。


After Twitter, Trump’s trade rhetoric is his most powerful weapon.	除了推特，在贸易问题上的言论是特朗普最有力的武器。


It is never too early to start building a case for re-election in 2020.	开始为2020年连任奠定基础永远不嫌早。


Until now, Trump has been willing to hold back on the trade issue until the Republican Party’s planned tax overhaul makes its way through Congress.	到目前为止，特朗普一直愿意在贸易问题上有所妥协，直到共和党计划的税收改革提到了国会上。


He does not want to risk disrupting his and his party’s last chance to secure a real legislative victory this year.	他不想拿他自己和他的政党在今年的最后一个确保真正的立法胜利的机会冒险。


Once tax legislation is off the table – and especially if it fails ignominiously in the same manner as the Republicans’ health-care-reform effort earlier this year – Trump will want to show that he means what he has said on trade.	一旦税收立法讨论完毕——特别是如果它向今年早些时候的共和党的医疗改革方案那样遭到耻辱性失败——特朗普将会在贸易问题上表现出要言行一致的样子。


Trade is at the center of Trump’s “America First” approach, which he claims will protect and even restore lost American jobs.	贸易是特朗普“美国优先”方针的核心，他声称将保护乃至重塑失去的美国就业。


While some in Trump’s cabinet might reject efforts to apply the slogan to the issues they oversee, Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, and National Trade Council Director Peter Navarro all share Trump’s views on trade.	特朗普的一些内阁成员可能会拒绝将这一口号应用于他们所负责的问题，但商务部长罗斯（Wilbur Ross）、美国贸易代表莱西泽尔（Robert Lighthizer）和全国贸易委员会主席纳瓦罗（Paul Navarro）都同意特朗普的贸易观点。


Each agrees that America’s big bilateral trade deficits with countries such as China, Japan, Germany, and Mexico are proof that America is being taken for a ride by its competitors.	他们所有人都同意，美国对中国、日本、德国和墨西哥等国家的巨额双边贸易赤字证明了竞争对手在欺骗美国。


Trump and his trade advisers believe that by reducing or even eliminating those deficits, they can create well-paid jobs for American workers.	特朗普及其贸易顾问们相信，通过降低乃至消除这些赤字，他们就能为美国工人创造薪酬优渥的岗位。


Trump made his views clear in a speech at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Da Nang, Vietnam, on November 10.	特朗普在其11月10日越南岘港亚太经济合作组织（APEC）峰会上的演讲中明确表达了他的观点。


“We are not going to let the United States be taken advantage of anymore,” he said. “I wish previous administrations in my country saw what was happening and did something about it.	“我们不会再美国被任何人利用了，”他说，“但愿我们国家的前几任政府看到发生了什么并为此做了些什么。


They did not, but I will.”	并没有。 但我会。


But what concrete actions will Trump actually take?	但特朗普会采取哪些实际的具体行动？


So far, he has abandoned the 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership – which his election opponent, Hillary Clinton, had also promised to do – and opened negotiations with Mexico and Canada to update the North American Free-Trade Agreement, which President Bill Clinton signed into law in 1994.	到目前为止，他退出了有12个国家参加的跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）——他的竞选对手克林顿（Hillary Clinton）也承诺会这么做——并启动了与墨西哥和加拿大的北美自由贸易协定（NAFTA）修订谈判。 NAFTA由克林顿总统在1994年签署成为法律。


This is minor stuff.	这些都是小事。


But next year, Trump can be expected to turn rhetoric into action on two main fronts.	但在明年，特朗普预计将在两个方面将言辞转化为行动。


The first is China, which Trump has singled out as the greatest trade exploiter of the US.	首先是中国，特朗普将它称为美国最大的贸易剥削者。


Unless the North Korea standoff escalates critically, he will likely initiate anti-dumping actions against Chinese industries – notably in steel – deemed to be selling their goods below cost; and he will probably launch a broad assault on intellectual-property violations in China.	除非朝鲜僵局出现决定性的升级，否则他极有可能对认定为以低于成本价销售产品的中国行业——主要是钢铁——发动反倾销行动，他还可能对中国侵犯知识产权的行为发动广泛攻击。


These measures will almost certainly provoke retaliation from China.	这些措施几乎肯定会导致中国的报复。


China feels stronger than ever in the Trump era, and in the eyes of Chinese cadres, not responding forcefully would be a sign of weakness.	在特朗普时代，中国自觉比以往任何时候都更加强大，并且在中国官员看来，不做出强烈反应就是示弱的表现。


The other main front for Trump is the World Trade Organization, which America helped establish in the early 1990s as a successor to the post-war General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.	特朗普的另一个主要战线是世界贸易组织。 世贸组织系在美国的帮助下于20世纪90年代作为关税和贸易总协定的继任者成立的。


Lighthizer has gone on record to describe the WTO’s dispute-settlement system as harmful to America.	莱西泽尔公然称世贸组织的纠纷解决体系有害于美国。


And already, the Trump administration is blocking the appointment of new judges to WTO arbitration panels.	而特朗普政府已经在采取行动阻挠世贸组织仲裁委员会新法官的任命。


If it maintains that policy, the WTO’s entire dispute-settlement system will be crippled within months.	如果美国保持这一政策，那么一整套世贸组织纠纷解决体系将在几个月内陷入瘫痪。


With the WTO essentially out of the picture, the US will launch a new initiative to strike bilateral deals on trade rules – an approach that Trump advocated in his APEC speech.	在世贸组织名存实亡的情况下，美国将采取新的行动达成贸易规则方面的双边协议——特朗普在其APEC演讲中就提到了这一方针。


Given that the US remains a vital market for most exporters, such an initiative will have clout.	对于大部分出口国来说，美国仍然是至关重要的市场，因此这一动作将有一定的影响。


Asian and European countries, in particular, should be preparing for the worst by negotiating their own trade agreements with one another to preempt American mercantilism.	特别是亚洲和欧洲国家应该做好最坏的准备，面对美国的重商主义，它们需要先发制人谈判彼此的贸易协定。


After all, taking the initiative to boost trade and other commercial contacts is the best way to resist a trade war.	毕竟，采取提刺激贸易和其他商业合同的措施是阻止贸易战的最佳方式。


By reviving the TPP without US involvement, Japan and other Asia-Pacific countries are already on the right track.	日本和其他亚太国家已经抛开美国重新启动了TPP，开始往正确的方向努力。


But if a Trump trade war is in the offing, they – and other countries – will need to double down on that approach.	但如果特朗普的贸易战马上就会打响，它们——以及其他国家——需要采取更大的力度。


Trump’s Gathering Trade War	特朗普的贸易战集结号


NEW HAVEN – During his campaign, US President-elect Donald Trump used foreign trade as a lightning rod in his supposed defense of the beleaguered American middle class.	纽黑文—竞选总统期间，美国当选总统唐纳德·特朗普在替他所谓的四面楚歌的美国中产阶级辩护时，用对外贸易当替罪羊。


This is not an uncommon tactic for candidates at either end of the political spectrum.	不论是左翼候选人还是右翼候选人，使用这样的策略并不罕见。


What is unusual is that Trump has not moderated his anti-trade tone since winning.	反常的是特朗普在胜选后仍不软化反贸易口风。


Instead, he has upped the ante and fired a series of early warning shots in what could turn into a full-blown global trade war, with disastrous consequences for the United States and the rest of the world.	相反，他变本加厉，多次暗示可能演变为全面全球贸易战的政策，这将给美国和世界其他国家带来灾难性后果。


Consider Trump’s key personnel decisions.	以特朗普的重要人事决定为例。


Industrialist Wilbur Ross, the Commerce Secretary-designate, has been vocal in his desire to abrogate America’s “dumb” trade deals.	实业家威尔伯·罗斯（Wilbur Ross）被提名为商业部长，他向来不遗余力地宣传要废除美国的“愚蠢的”贸易协议。


Peter Navarro, an economics professor at the University of California at Irvine, will be the director of the National Trade Council – a new White House policy shop to be set up on a par with the National Security Council and the National Economic Council.	加州大学欧文分校经济学教授彼得·纳瓦罗（Peter Navarro）将主持国家贸易委员会（National Trade Council）——白宫新设立的与国家安全委员会和国家经济委员会平级的决策机构。


Navarro is one of America’s most extreme China hawks.	纳瓦罗是美国最极端的对华鹰派之一。


The titles of his two most recent books – Death by China (2011) and Crouching Tiger: What China’s Militarism Means for the World (2015) – speak volumes about his tabloid-level biases.	他的两本近著分别起名为《死于中国》（Death by China，2011年）和《卧虎：中国军国主义对世界意味着什么》（Crouching Tiger: What China’s Militarism Means for the World，2015年），里面充斥着地摊文学水平的偏见。


Ross and Navarro were also co-authors of an economic-policy position paper published on the Trump campaign website that stretched any semblance of credibility.	罗斯和纳瓦罗也是特朗普竞选网站上发布的经济政策立场书的作者，该立场书毫无可信度可言。


Now they will get the opportunity to put their ideas into practice.	现在他们有机会将思想转化为实践。


And, in fact, the process has already begun.	事实上，这一过程已经开始了。


Trump has made it clear that he will immediately withdraw the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – in keeping with Ross’s criticism of America’s trade deals.	特朗普已经清楚地表明，他将立刻让美国退出跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）——这与罗斯对美国贸易协议的批评态度一致。


And his brazen willingness to challenge the 40-year-old “One China” policy by speaking directly with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen – to say nothing of his subsequent anti-China tweets – leaves little doubt that his administration will follow Navarro’s prescription and take dead aim at America’s largest and most powerful trading partner.	他还腆着脸挑战40年来的“一个中国”政策，直接与台湾“总统”蔡英文通话——更不用说随后发布的反华tweet了——这毫无疑问地表明，他的政府将遵循纳瓦罗的药方，与美国最大、最强的贸易伙伴死磕到底。


Of course, Trump, a self-proclaimed master dealmaker, may simply be talking tough, in order to put China and the world on notice that the US is now prepared to operate from a position of strength in the foreign-trade arena.	当然，自诩为交易大师的特朗普可能仅仅是嘴硬，这样做的目的是让中国和世界注意现在美国准备开始凭借优势地位在对外贸易的舞台上施展拳脚了。


A bold opening gambit, the argument goes, softens the adversary for a more palatable endgame.	根据这一观点，强势开局能软化对手，从而获得更合意的结果。


But, while such tough talk undoubtedly played well with voters, it fails a key reality check: America’s large trade deficit – a visible manifestation of its low saving – calls into question the very notion of economic strength.	但是尽管嘴硬显然对选民很好使，却经不起现实的检验：美国巨大的贸易赤字——低储蓄的明证——使经济优势这一概念颇为可疑。


A significant domestic saving deficit, such as that which afflicts the US, accounts for America’s insatiable appetite for surplus saving from abroad, which in turn spawns its chronic current-account deficit and a massive trade deficit.	巨大的国内储蓄赤字正在折磨着美国，也是美国不知满足地吸引海外盈余储蓄的原因，海外储蓄的流入反过来又导致长期经常项目赤字和高额贸易赤字。


Dealmakers who try to address this macroeconomic problem one country at a time cannot possibly succeed: the US ran trade deficits with 101 countries in 2015.	试图逐国解决这一宏观经济问题的交易者不可能成功：美2015年，美国对101个国家存在贸易赤字。


There can be no bilateral fix for a multilateral problem.	多边问题无法用双边方法解决。


It’s like the proverbial Dutch boy sticking his finger in a leaky dike.	这就好比是传说中用手指堵住漏水的大坝的荷兰男孩。


Unless the source of the problem – a saving shortfall that is likely to worsen in the face of Trump’s inevitable widening of federal budget deficits –is addressed, America’s current-account and trade deficits will only widen.	除非问题的根源——储蓄短缺，并且面对特朗普不可避免地将扩大联邦预算赤字的局面，这一问题可能进一步恶化——得到解决，否则美国经常项目和贸易赤字将进一步扩大。


Squeezing China would merely shift the trade imbalance to other countries – most likely to higher-cost producers, which would effectively raise the prices of foreign goods sold to hard-pressed American families.	挤兑中国只能让贸易失衡转移到其他国家——最有可能是成本更高的生产国，而这将大大提高压力重重的美国家庭所购买的外国商品的价格。


But the story doesn’t end there.	但故事到这里还没完。


The Trump administration is playing with live ammunition, implying profound, global repercussions.	特朗普政府是在货真价实地玩火，将带来深远的全球影响。


Nowhere is this more evident than in the likely Chinese response to America’s new muscle-flexing.	最明显的证据莫过于中国对美国的新秀肌肉之举的可能反应。


The Trump team is dismissive of China’s reaction to its threats – believing that the US has nothing to lose and everything to gain.	特朗普团队对中国面临威胁的反应不屑一顾——他们认为美国没有什么好输的，无论怎样都是赢。


Alas, that may not be the case.	可惜，未必如此。


Like it or not, America and China are locked in a codependent economic relationship.	不管你喜不喜欢，美国和中国已经陷入了互相依存的经济关系。


Yes, China depends on US demand for its exports, but the US also depends on China: the Chinese own over $1.5 trillion in US Treasury securities and other US dollar-based assets.	诚然，中国的出口依靠美国的需求，但美国也依靠中国：中国拥有1. 5万亿多美元的美国国债和其他美元计价资产。


Moreover, China is America’s third-largest export market (after Canada and Mexico) and the one that is expanding most rapidly – hardly inconsequential for a growth-starved US economy.	此外，中国是美国第三大出口市场（仅次于加拿大和墨西哥），也是扩张最快的出口市场——对于增长萎靡的美国经济来说，中国可谓牵一发而动全身。


It is foolish to think that America holds all the cards in this bilateral economic relationship.	认为美国在这一双边关系中尽占上风愚不可及。


Codependency is a very reactive connection.	互相依存是一种性质非常活泼的关系。


If one partner changes the terms of engagement, the other is likely to respond in kind.	如果一方改变配合条件，另一方也有可能做出类似的反应。


If the US goes after China – as Trump, Navarro, and Ross have long advocated and now seem to be doing – it must also face the consequences.	如果美国逼中国太甚——特朗普、纳瓦罗和罗斯向来鼓吹这样做，并且现在似乎正在这样做——它自己也必须面对后果。


On the economic front, that spells the possibility of reciprocal tariffs on US exports to China, as well as potential ramifications for Chinese purchases of Treasuries.	在经济方面，中国有可能对美国出口品征收报复性关税，其购买美国国债的政策也有可能改变。


And other countries – tightly linked to China through global supply chains – may well impose countervailing tariffs of their own.	其他国家——通过全球供给链与中国密切相连——也可能实施抵消性关税。


Global trade wars are rare.	全球贸易战十分罕见。


But, like military conflicts, they often start with accidental skirmishes or misunderstandings.	但是，和军事冲突一样，它们常常因为偶发小事故或误解而开始。


More than 85 years ago, US Senator Reed Smoot and Representative Willis Hawley fired the first shot in sponsoring the Tariff Act of 1930.	85年前，美国参议员里德·史穆特（Reed Smoot）和众议员威利斯·哈雷（Willis Hawley）打响了第一枪，炮制了1930年关税法案。


That led to a catastrophic global trade war, which many believe turned a serious recession into the Great Depression.	这导致了灾难性的全球贸易战，许多人认为这导致了严重衰退演变为大萧条。


It is the height of folly to ignore the lessons of history.	忽视历史教训愚不可及。


For today’s saving-short, deficit-prone US economy, it will take far more than China-bashing to make America great again.	对当今储蓄不足、赤字累累的美国经济而言，打击中国极其得不偿失。


Turning trade into a weapon of mass economic destruction could be a policy blunder of epic proportions.	让贸易变成大规模经济杀伤性武器可能成为载入史册的政策失误。


A Trump Christmas Carol	特朗普圣诞颂歌


NEW YORK – This Christmas, America’s gift to the world was a $285 million cut in the United Nations’ regular budget.	纽约—这个圣诞节，美国给了世界一份大礼——削减2.


Technically, the UN regular budget reflects a consensus decision of the body’s 193 member states, but the United States was clearly the prime mover in pushing for the cut.	85亿美元联合国固定预算。 联合国固定预算是其193个成员国的共识决定，但美国显然是最主要的削减派。


Indeed, Nikki Haley, the US ambassador to the UN, accompanied the Christmas Eve announcement with a warning that the US would be on the lookout for further reductions.	事实上，除了在圣诞前夜宣布削减预算，美国驻联合国大事尼基·哈雷（Nikki Haley）还警告美国着眼于进一步削减预算。


Ebenezer Scrooge could not have done better.	埃比尼泽·斯克鲁奇（Ebenezer Scrooge）也不过如此了。


The budget cuts will make it that much harder for UN agencies to prevent wars, help millions of people displaced by conflicts, feed and clothe hungry children, fight emerging diseases, provide safe water and sanitation, and promote access to education and health care for the poor.	预算削减将让联合国机构更加难以阻止战争、帮助数百万因为冲突而流离失所的人、给饥饿的儿童提供衣食、打击新出现的疾病、提供安全饮水和卫生设施，以及促进穷人的教育和医疗普及。


President Donald Trump and Haley make much of the bloated costs of UN operations, and there certainly is room for some trimming.	特朗普总统和哈雷批评联合国运营的冗费问题，而改进的空间也确实存在。


But the world receives an astounding return on its investments in the UN, and member countries should be investing far more, not less, in its organizations and programs.	但投资于联合国给世界所带来的回报是巨大的，其成员国应该加大而不是减少对联合国组织和计划的投资。


Consider the sums. The UN regular budget for the two-year period 2018-2019 will stand at around $5.3 billion, $285 million less than the 2016-2017 budget.	从总量看，2018—2019年两年的联合国固定预算将在53亿美元左右，比2016—2017年减少2.


Annual spending will be around $2.7 billion.	85亿美元。 年度支出将在27亿美元左右。


The US share will be 22%, or around $580 million per year, equivalent to around $1.80 per American per year.	美国承担比例为22%，即每年大约5. 8亿美元，相当于每个美国人每年拿出1.


What will Americans get for their $1.80 per year?	这1. 80美元能给美国人带来什么？


For starters, the UN regular budget includes the operations of the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Secretariat (including the Secretary-General’s office, the Department for Economic and Social Affairs, the Department of Political Affairs, and administrative staff).	首先，联合国固定预算包括联合国大会、安理会、秘书处（包括秘书长办公室、经济和社会事务局、政治事务局以及行政人员）的日常运营成本。


When a dire threat to peace arises, such as the current standoff between the US and North Korea, it is the UN’s Department of Political Affairs that often facilitates vital, behind-the-scenes diplomacy.	当和平面临严重威胁时，比如眼下的美朝僵局，联合国政治事务局通常会站出来为重要的幕后外交斡旋提供便利。


In addition, the UN regular budget includes allocations for the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN Development Program, the World Health Organization, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN’s regional bodies (for Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin America), the UN Environment Program, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (for disaster response), the World Meteorological Organization, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, UN Women (for women’s rights), and many other agencies, each specializing in global responses to crises, conflicts, poverty, displacement, environmental hazards, diseases, or other public needs.	此外，联合国固定预算还包括给联合国儿童基金会（UNICEF）、联合国开发署、世界卫生组织、联合国难民高级委员、联合国人权高级委员、联合国地区机构（亚洲、非洲、欧洲、拉丁美洲）、联合国环境署、人权事务协调办公室（负责灾难响应）、世界气象组织、联合国毒品和犯罪办公室、联合国妇女局（负责妇女权利）以及其他机构的配额，这些机构分别负责针对危机、冲突、贫困、流离失所、环境风险、疾病和其他公共需求的全球响应。


Many of the UN organizations receive additional “voluntary” contributions from individual countries interested in supporting specialized initiatives by agencies such as UNICEF and the World Health Organization.	许多联合国组织还接受来自个别国家的额外的“自愿”资助，这些资助用于UNICEF和世界卫生组织等机构的专门项目。


After all, those agencies have a unique global mandate and political legitimacy, and the capacity to operate in all parts of the world.	毕竟，这些组织承担着独特的全球使命和政治合法性，也具备在全世界各地展开工作的能力。


The silliness of the US attack on the size of the UN budget is best seen by comparing it to the Pentagon’s budget.	美国抨击联合国预算规模简直愚不可及，我们不妨将之与其国防预算相比较。


The US currently spends around $700 billion per year on defense, or roughly $2 billion per day.	目前，美国每年要在防务上花费7,000亿美元，即每天20亿美元。


Thus, the total annual UN regular budget amounts to around one day and nine hours of US military spending.	因此，联合国一整年的固定预算，大约相当于一天又九小时的美国军事支出。


The US share of the UN regular budget equals roughly seven hours of Pentagon spending.	美国占联合国固定预算的比例大约等于七小时的国防支出。


Some waste.	真是“浪费”。


Trump and Haley are squeezing the UN budget for three reasons.	特朗普和哈雷挤压联合国预算出于三个原因。


The first is to play to Trump’s political base.	其一是取悦特朗普的政治基本盘。


Most Americans recognize the enormous value of the UN and support it, but the right-wing fringe among Republican voters views the UN as an affront to the US.	大部分美国人认可联合国的巨大价值，也支持联合国，但共和党选民中的右翼认为联合国是美国之耻。


A 2016 Pew Survey put US public approval of the UN at 64%, with just 29% viewing it unfavorably.	2016的一项皮尤（Pew）调查显示，美国公众对联合国的认可度为64%，只有29%对联合国持负面态度。


Yet the Texas Republican Party, for example, has repeatedly called on the US to leave the UN.	但（比如）德克萨斯州共和党反复要求美国退出联合国。


The second reason is to save on wasteful programs, which is necessary in any ongoing organization.	第二个原因是要节约浪费项目上的开支，这对于任何运营中的组织来说都是必要的。


The mistake is to slash the overall budget, rather than reallocate funds and increase outlays on vitally needed programs that fight hunger and disease, educate children, and prevent conflicts.	错误在于压缩总预算，而不是重新配置资金并增加在具有关键必要性的项目——与减少饥饿和疾病、教育儿童和防止冲突有关的项目——上的支出。


The third, and most dangerous reason for cutting the UN’s budget is to weaken multilateralism in the name of American “sovereignty.”	削减联合国预算的第三个也是最危险的原因是以美国“主权”为名弱化多边主义。


America is sovereign, Trump and Haley insist, and therefore can do what it wants, regardless of opposition by the UN or any other group of countries.	美国是主权国家，特朗普和哈雷指出，因此愿意怎么做就可以怎么做，不管联合国或其他国家如何反对。


In her recent speech to the UN General Assembly session on Jerusalem, where member states overwhelmingly rejected America’s unilateral recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, Haley told the rest of the world: “America will put our embassy in Jerusalem.	在最近的联合国大会耶路撒冷问题会议上的讲话中，哈雷告诉全世界：“美国将把大使馆设在耶路撒冷。 这是美国人民要求我们做的，也是正确的事。


That is what the American people want us to do, and it is the right thing to do.	联合国投票不会带来任何不同。


No vote in the United Nations will make any difference on that.”	”在这次会议上，联合国成员国一边倒地反对美国单方面承认耶路撒冷为以色列首都。


This approach to sovereignty is exceedingly risky.	这一主权观极其危险。


Most obviously, it repudiates international law.	显然，它取代了国际法。


In the case of Jerusalem, resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council have repeatedly declared the final status of Jerusalem to be a matter of international law.	在耶路撒冷问题上，联合国大会和安理会所通过的决议一再确认，耶路撒冷的最终地位问题是一个国际法问题。


By brazenly proclaiming the right to override international law, the US threatens the edifice of international cooperation under the UN Charter.	美国厚颜无耻地宣布了它能凌驾于国际法之上，联合国宪章所支持的国际合作岌岌可危。


Yet another grave danger is to the US itself.	但美国自身也面临巨大的危险。


When America stops listening to other countries, its vast military power and arrogance often lead to self-inflicted disasters.	当美国不再聆听其他国家的声音时，其巨大的军力和傲慢常常会导致自作自受的灾难。


America Firsters like Trump and Haley bristle when other countries oppose US foreign policy; but these other countries are usually giving good and frank advice that the US would be wise to heed.	特朗普和哈雷这样的“美国优先”派，每当其他国家反对美国外交政策时便怒不可遏； 但这些其他国家也常常给出美国理应笑纳的谈成的好建议。


The Security Council’s opposition to the US-led war in Iraq in 2003, for example, wasn’t intended to weaken America, but to protect it, Iraq, and indeed the world, from America’s rage and blindness to the facts.	比如，联合国安理会2003年反对美国领导的伊拉克战争不是为了削弱美国，而是为了保护它、伊拉克和全世界不会因为美国的恚怒和无视事实而蒙受损失。


“Bah!	“呸！


Humbug!” said Scrooge.	骗子！ ”斯克鲁奇说。


But Charles Dickens’s point was precisely that Scrooge was the great loser from his arrogance, miserliness, and insolence.	但查尔斯·狄更斯要说的乃是，斯克鲁奇因为他的傲慢、贪婪和无礼而沦为人生大输家。


How to Be a Misleader	如何成为反面领导典型


LONDON – Under President Donald Trump, the United States seems to find itself confronting an extraordinarily ego-driven administration.	伦敦——在唐纳德·特朗普总统领导下，美国似乎发现自己面对着一届特别的由自我意识驱动的政府。


In fact, it’s worse: in his first month in office, Trump appears to be consolidating a type of governance by id.	事实上，情况更加糟糕：在就职的第一个月，特朗普似乎正在强化一种以身份为基础的治理模式。


The chaos now prevailing on the US political scene reflects this.	美国政界现在普遍存在的混乱反映了这一现实。


Policies are based on “alternative facts” and Trump’s own mythology as a straight-talking billionaire business mogul (though his back story is riddled with holes).	“另类事实”和特朗普自身直话直说的亿万商业大亨神话（尽管他的背景故事充满了漏洞）成为制定政策的基础。


Ignorance of the law has become an excuse to flout it, and to engage in ethically dubious behavior, such as inviting Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to his Mar-a-Lago resort, or attacking the department store Nordstrom for dropping his daughter Ivanka’s clothing line.	对法律的无知成为嘲笑法律的借口，还可以以此为掩护从事道德上可疑的举动，例如邀请日本首相安倍晋三前往其马阿拉歌度假村，或者攻击诺德斯特姆百货公司放弃其女伊万卡的服装系列。


(Trump re-tweeted his attack on the company from the official @POTUS account, and his adviser Kellyanne Conway then plugged Ivanka’s line on national television.)	（特朗普从官方的@POTUS账户转发了他对这家企业的攻击言论，其顾问康韦其后在全国电视网插入了推销伊万卡产品的内容。


Not surprisingly, businesses, which tend to be governed by superego, are actively preparing strategies for managing a presidential tweet barrage.	不出所料，往往由超我治理的企业机构正积极筹备管理总统接二连三推特发文的策略。


After all, Nordstrom wasn’t Trump’s first target (though it was the first whose shares actually closed higher that day).	归根结底，诺德斯特姆不是特朗普的首个目标（尽管它是当天股票收盘价上涨的首个目标）。


In fact, many companies are being forced to make firm and public choices about where they stand in relation to Trump, his seemingly endless stream of controversial executive orders, and the politicians who ultimately back him.	事实上，很多企业正在被迫就特朗普、他看似无穷无尽引发争议的行政命令和最终支持他的政治势力在公众面前表明坚定的立场。


This is nowhere near business as usual.	这已经完全偏离了正常情况。


Ironically, this bizarre new operating environment partly reflects Trump’s own business background.	颇具讽刺意味的是，这种奇怪的全新经营环境部分反映了特朗普自身的商业背景。


Trump is used to running his own company with a small team, selected based on his own criteria.	特朗普习惯于借助小规模团队管理自己的企业，而团队的选择则完全基于他自己的标准。


His successes and failures were his own.	他的成功和失败都与别人无关。


He could choose what to withhold from the public, and he could sell whatever people would buy, caveat emptor.	他可以选择哪些事需要向公众隐瞒，并推销人们愿意接受的东西，一经售出概不退换。


His current job is a different story.	他目前这份工作的情况完全不同。


As much as Trump may like to claim that he alone can fix the US, the truth is that government is too complex an enterprise for one person to manage and direct.	虽然特朗普很想告诉外界他凭借一己之力就可以管好美国，但事实是政府这家企业太过复杂，一个人无法管理和指挥。


Nor can he invent his own performance standards – especially if they prize personal loyalty over knowledge and experience.	他也不能凭空制定自己的绩效标准——尤其当这种标准将个人忠诚凌驾于知识和经验之上。


And his failures are not his alone: the entire country – and much of the world – stands to suffer.	他的失败也不属于他自己：整个国家——乃至整个世界——都会因此而遭受痛苦。


But there are some commonalities between running a business and running a country.	但管理企业和管理国家间存在某些共同之处。


In both settings, leaders are expected to act in the best interests of the wider community, not simply their own constituencies, whether voters or shareholders.	在两种情况下，领导人均应为广泛群体的最大利益行事，而不应仅仅顾及自己的选民（无论面对的是选民还是股东）。


Basic principles of good business governance – including transparency, integrity, reliability, trust, and legality – carry over to political leadership.	出色商业治理的基本原则——包括透明、诚信、可靠、信任及合法——既存在于商业治理也存在于政治领导当中。


What Trump can’t ignore are checks on presidential power.	特朗普无法忽视对总统权力的制约。


To be sure, the Republican-led Congress has (so far) been disinclined to fulfill its responsibility to constrain Trump.	可以肯定，共和党领导的国会（迄今为止）一直不愿履行其约束特郎普的职责。


The Senate rejected none of his cabinet picks, despite their lack of relevant experience and inadequate vetting (though two Republicans did vote against Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos).	参议院没有拒绝他选定的任何一位内阁候选人，尽管他们缺乏相关经验并且从未接受充分的审查（虽然两名共和党人的确曾投票反对教育部长贝齐·德沃斯）。


The judicial branch, however, has resisted Trump’s bullying.	但司法部门一直在抵制特朗普的欺凌。


Trump’s executive order to ban people from seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the US has been rejected three times in court, and the White House now says that it will not appeal the case to the Supreme Court.	特朗普禁止七个主要穆斯林国家民众赴美的行政命令已经在法院三次被否决，而白宫现在表示它将不会上诉至最高法院。


But the most vital check on power in a democracy is the people.	但民主政体对权力最主要的限制是民众。


And, in the US, the people – peacefully but resolutely – seem to be finding their voice.	而且，在美国，民众似乎和平而坚定地确定了自己的呼声。


The day after Trump’s inauguration, women led what is estimated to be the largest single-day protest in US history.	特朗普就职典礼后的第二天，女性领导了估计是美国历史上规模最大的单日抗议行动。


Citizens have been contacting their legislators to demand better representation of their interests.	民众已经积极联系议员要求更好地代表他们的利益。


Utah Representative Jason Chaffetz, a Republican, recently faced thousands of his constituents chanting “Do your job!” at what was supposed to be an ordinary town hall meeting.	犹他州代表、共和党人詹森·查夫兹不久前在本该是一次普通的市民会议上面对了呼喊“履行你的职责！ ”的数千名选区民众 。


It’s not just elected officials who are being put on notice.	不仅仅是当选官员接到了通知。


Not long ago, consumers, workers, and community members rose up in a global shareholder spring, aimed at companies that were acting in bad faith, by rewarding failing CEOs, flouting environmental regulations, or failing to respect workers’ rights.	不久前、消费者、工人和社团份子在全球股东大潮中崛起，反对那些从事不诚信行为、 奖励失败的首席执行官、蔑视环境法规或未能尊重工人权利的企业。


We are now seeing a similar movement, with consumers turning against companies that support an administration embodying values they reject.	我们正在目睹一次类似的运动，消费者反对那些支持他们所不齿的政府价值观的企业。


The #GrabYourWallet campaign may have contributed to declining sales of Ivanka Trump’s clothing line (the reason cited by Nordstrom and others for their decision to drop it).	#抓住你的钱包运动可能是伊万卡·特朗普服装系列销量下降的部分原因（诺德斯特姆和其他企业明确表示这是放弃伊万卡品牌的理由）。


The #DeleteUber movement punished the ride-sharing company for undermining a taxi strike at New York City’s Kennedy Airport in support of those caught up in Trump’s travel ban, and helped push the company’s CEO, Travis Kalanick, to resign from Trump’s economic advisory council.	#删除优步运动因为其破坏纽约肯尼迪机场一次支持受特朗普旅行禁令影响者的出租车罢工运动而惩罚这家拼车企业，并促使这家企业的首席执行官特拉维斯·卡拉尼克辞去特朗普经济咨询委员会顾问职务。


When Under Armour’s CEO, Kevin Plank, expressed support for Trump, athletes associated with the brand declared their opposition, compelling the company to issue a statement distancing themselves from Plank’s comments.	在安德玛首席执行官凯文·普朗克表态支持特朗普时，与该品牌相关的运动员站出来表示反对，迫使这家企业发表远离普朗克评论的声明。


Trump is a case study in how not to lead, either in business or in government.	特朗普是领导禁忌的典型案例，无论是在商业领域还是政府。


With his jingoism and hair-trigger temper, Trump’s election seems to be wholly the result of many voters’ wishful thinking and stubborn passivity.	由于他的沙文主义和一触即发的火爆脾气，特朗普的当选似乎完全是许多选民一厢情愿和固执被动的结果。


And perhaps that is the real lesson of Trump’s presidency so far.	也许这才是特朗普任期距今为止的真正教训。


The unthinkable can happen – as it did in the United Kingdom, with the Brexit vote, and as it may in France, if the far-right Marine Le Pen wins the presidency.	不可思议的事情能够发生——就像英国的退欧投票，以及如果极右翼候选人马琳·勒庞当选总统后法国的局势。


But what happens in a democracy is only what the people allow.	但在民主体制下，只有民众允许的情况才会真的发生。


Trump’s UN Hypocrisy	特朗普的联合国托辞


DENVER – US President Donald Trump’s first address to the United Nations General Assembly will be remembered, above all, for its bizarre language, and its descriptions of North Korea as “depraved,” Iran as “murderous,” and Cuba and Venezuela as “corrupt.”	发自丹佛——美国总统特朗普在联合国大会上的首次发言将以其奇谈怪论和对几个国家的描述（“邪恶的”朝鲜，“杀人”的伊朗，和“腐败”的古巴和委内瑞拉）而被记录在案。


And, beyond calling out miscreant member states by name, Trump also offered a fervent defense of his “America First” agenda.	同时除了指名道姓地挑战几个不守规矩的成员国之外，特朗普还为他的“美国优先”议程大肆辩护。


But while Trump’s particular choice of words was new to the UN, his arguments were not.	虽然特朗普特别挑选的词汇对联合国来说相当新鲜，他的论点却还是老一套。


He pointed out, with some justification, that other countries also put their own national interests first.	他指出，其他国家也把自己的国家利益放在第一位（这有一定道理）。


And he reprised a longstanding complaint within US foreign-policymaking circles: that it is somehow excessive and unfair to expect American taxpayers to pay for 22% of the UN’s total budget.	他还重申了美国的外交决策界一直以来的抱怨，认为要美国纳税人承担联合国总预算的22％是过分且不公平的。


After calling on the General Assembly to do its part to implement and then enforce sanctions against North Korea, Trump said, “Let’s see how they do.”	在呼吁大会发挥自身作用去实施并强制执行对朝鲜的制裁后，特朗普说了一句：“让我们看看他们会怎么做。


But referring to the UN as “they” implies that it is something apart from the US.	”但是把联合国称为“他们”则意味着这个事情仿佛跟美国无关。


Trump’s tone was that of a dissatisfied tenant, blaming the landlord for his home’s poor state of repair.	特朗普的口气像是一个不满房东未能合理修缮住宅的租客。


But the UN is only as good as those who inhabit it, not least the US itself.	然而联合国居住在这个房子的人们共同构建的，不仅仅是美国一家。


In his speech, Trump listed America’s many contributions to the world, and suggested that it keeps the UN around as a sort of favor to other countries in need of an international forum.	特朗普在演讲中列举了美国对世界的诸多贡献，并认为是美国维持着联合国以便为其他有需要的国家提供一个国际论坛平台。


He assumed no US responsibility for the UN’s fortunes, failures, or even its achievements.	他觉得美国不应承担对联合国的命运，失败甚至成就的责任。


But, in addition to contributing more than any other country to the UN budget, the US also plays an outsize role within the institution.	但除了为联合国预算捐款超过任何其他国家外，美国在该机构内也扮演了超乎寻常的角色。


The US can thus claim credit for many of the UN’s successes; but it is also responsible for many of its failures.	美国可以因此将联合国许多成绩归功于自身； 但它也应当为许多失败负责。


It is worth remembering that no UN secretary-general assumes office without US support.	值得记住的是，没有联合国秘书长可以在缺乏美国支持的情况下就任。


And, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the US has veto power over any UN action, including sanctions, deployments of peacekeepers, and official condemnations of other member states.	同时作为联合国安理会常任理事国，美国对联合国的任何行动，包括制裁，部署维和部队以及发布对其他成员国的正式谴责都拥有否决权。


Even if the UN’s large institutional bureaucracy can be unwieldy at times, its effectiveness ultimately depends on its most influential members.	即使联合国的大型机构官僚机构有时候会有点尾大不掉，但其执行效力最终会取决于其最具影响力的成员。


Consider the Bosnian conflict in the early 1990s, when the Security Council decided to send in UN peacekeepers, rather than deploying a more robust multilateral presence, as would have been allowed under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.	以1990年代初的波斯尼亚冲突为例，当时安理会决定只派出联合国维和部队，而不是按照《联合国宪章》第七章所允许的方式部署更强大的多边武装。


The United Kingdom and France, which contributed the bulk of the peacekeeping force, insisted on a peacekeeping mandate, because they did not want to put their troops in harm’s way.	而为维和部队贡献了大部分兵力的英国和法国坚持要首先获得一个维持和平任务的授权才采取行动，因为它们不想让自己的部队卷入冲突。


The US, for its part, refused to contribute any troops at all, and thus had no right to call for a stronger mandate that would have allowed UN forces to step in to end the violence.	美国方面则拒绝提供任何部队，因此没有权利去要求获得一个更强有力的任务授权以利联合国部队介入并终结当地的暴力形势。


Although many Americans had witnessed the carnage from their living rooms and wanted the UN to do more to stop it, neither they nor their leaders – first George H.W. Bush and then Bill Clinton – had any interest in sending American troops to be a part of a Bosnian peacekeeping force.	虽然许多美国人都在自家的电视上目睹了大屠杀并希望联合国能做更多的事情来加以阻止，但他们以及他们的领导人——首先是老布什然后是克林顿——都没有兴趣去让美军成为波斯尼亚维和部队的一部分。


The result, as we now know, was that the killing continued, sometimes in the presence of UN peacekeepers whose countries had not given them a strong enough mandate to intervene.	正如我们随后看到的那样，杀戮持续进行，甚至有时就当着联合国维和部队的面，因为他们的国家没有给予足够的授权去干涉。


By the time the US-led Dayton Accords had put an end to the war, in December 1995, the UN’s peacekeeping capacity had been so thoroughly discredited that NATO war-fighting troops were sent in to take over from the UN Protection Force.	当美国领导的《代顿协定》在1995年12月结束战争时，联合国的维和能力已经被彻底唾弃，只得派遣北约的战斗部队去联合国保护部队。


In other words, when the situation required war fighters, peacekeepers were dispatched; and when the situation called for peacekeepers, war fighters were sent.	换句话说，当形势需要战斗人员时派出了维和人员； 当形势要求维和人员时却派出了战斗人员。


None of this apparent dysfunction had anything to do with the UN. It was a direct result of UN member states’ decision-making.	这种明显的运作失调与联合国无关，而是联合国成员国决策的直接结果。


Even Trump’s dystopian and dyspeptic speech conceded that the UN makes valuable contributions to world peace, through peacekeeping missions and other forms of assistance.	即便特朗普的反乌托邦和暴躁言论也承认联合国通过维和行动及其他形式的援助为世界和平作出了宝贵的贡献。


More often than not, this work is done in far-flung countries, where direct US involvement would be unpalatable to many American politicians’ constituents.	通常情况下，这项工作是在遥远的国家完成的，且美国的直接参与又是令许多美国政治家的选民难以接受的。


The UN is far from perfect.	联合国远非完美。


But, rather than bash it, American leaders, starting with Trump, should understand that its actions and decisions are often an extension of their own.	但是与其对此大加抨击，美国领导人（从特朗普开始）应该明白，它的行动和决定往往就是自己的延伸。


Trump’s Reckless Tweets vs. Pakistan’s Democratic Hopes	特朗普鲁莽的推特和巴基斯坦的民主希望