It is true that income from oil and gas, which represents the bulk of government revenues, has been halved when measured in dollars.	诚然，占据政府收入大半壁江山的石油和天然气收入的美元价值遭遇腰斩。


But the Russian currency has fallen by about the same percentage, meaning that the government’s income in rubles remains approximately unchanged.	但俄罗斯货币也贬值了相同幅度，这意味着政府的卢布收入基本上没有变化。


Similarly, Russia’s current-account balance has been mostly in surplus in recent years.	类似地，俄罗斯经常项目余额近几年来也大多为盈余。


Gross public and private external debt is below 40% of GDP, and much of it is denominated in rubles.	毛公共和私人外债还不到GDP的40%，其中许多未卢布计价。


The sharp fall in export income is rapidly changing the situation, but Russia is starting from a comfortable position.	出口收入的急剧减少正在迅速改变这一情况。 但俄罗斯是从一个舒服的位置开始变化的。


To panic would be premature.	现在恐慌和为时过早。


The ruble’s free fall has been driven mainly by capital outflows.	卢布的暴跌主要是因为资本外流。


Russia’s famous oligarchs have already stashed most of their wealth abroad, but they retain significant savings at home.	俄罗斯的著名寡头已将大部分财富转移海外，但他们在国内仍有巨额储蓄。


As the economic and political situation deteriorates, they are most likely pulling more money out.	随着政治和经济局势的恶化，他们极有可能将更多的钱转移。


Small savers have every reason to switch into foreign currency as well.	小储户也有充分的理由将本币兑换为外汇。


This has put the CBR in a challenging position.	这就让俄罗斯央行面临了挑战。


The ruble’s depreciation is bound to fuel inflation, already around 11% and far above the CBR’s 5% target.	卢布贬值眼看就要助长通胀——目前通胀应达到了11%，远超俄罗斯央行5%的目标。


In that context, raising the interest rate sharply makes sense, and officials may be hoping that the hike will stem capital outflows – despite the risk that the decision, if interpreted as being aimed at defending the currency, could have the opposite effect.	在这样的背景下，大幅提升利率有其作用，官员或许也希望加息能阻止资本外逃——尽管如果这一行为被解读为意在捍卫卢布，可能起到相反的作用。


The trouble is that the higher interest rates are bound to deepen Russia’s economic downturn, making the CBR an easy scapegoat.	麻烦在于提高利率可能进一步深化俄罗斯的经济衰退，而俄罗斯央行很容易成为替罪羊。


Never mind that the central bank is not responsible for Russia’s troubles – the run on the ruble, the recession, and the flare-up of inflation – and that using interest rates to prevent capital outflows always fails.	俄央行对俄罗斯的麻烦没有责任——比如卢布挤兑、衰退和狂飙突进的通胀——对于使用利率工具防止资本外流总是失败也没有责任，这些都不重要。


Embattled politicians can be counted on to point the finger.	焦头烂额的政客总要找个人来指责一下。


The threat to Putin is clear.	对普京的威胁是显而易见的。


He risks the fate of his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, who presided during a period of unusually low oil prices.	他有可能面临前任叶利钦的命运，后者在油价反常低迷时期担任俄罗斯总统。


Until now, Putin has been lucky, coming to power just as oil prices started to rise.	到目前为止，普京相当幸运，其执政时期恰逢油价牛市。


Most Russian citizens credit him with two decades of rising living standards, following decades of decline.	大部分俄罗斯公民赞美他，因为二十年来生活水平一直在提高，而此前二十年生活水平一直在下降。


Putin’s decision not to implement the unpopular reforms that would have created a strong non-oil export sector may have been bad for the economy’s long-term health, but it has allowed him to maintain widespread public support.	普京决定不实施不受欢迎但能够打造坚挺的非石油出口部门的改革，这也许不利于经济的长期健康，但让他得以维持广泛的公共支持。


His economic good fortune, combined with his readiness to stand up to the West, has created a misguided impression in Russia that the country is, once again, a world power.	他的经济好运加上时刻准备着与西方对抗的立场在俄罗斯行程了一个错误的印象，即该国再一次成为世界强国。


Many in the United States and Europe believe that ratcheting up economic pressure on Russia will help drive Putin out.	许多美国人和欧洲人认为不断增加对俄经济压力有助于推翻普京。


This is an enormously dangerous gamble.	这是一场极其危险的赌博。


As Russian living standards decline, Putin’s only viable strategy to remain in power will be an aggressive international posture.	随着俄罗斯人生活水平的下降，普京的唯一可行的保持权力的选择是采取激进的国际立场。


Foreign military adventures, after all, are most appealing when the domestic front is on fire.	毕竟，在国内阵线告急时，对外用兵是最有吸引力的做法。


None of this means that the West should bow and forsake its principles.	所有这些都不意味着屈从和放弃其原则。


But it does mean that the time has come for a diplomatic approach that does not depend on the prospect of Russia’s economic collapse.	但这确实意味着是时候应该采取不依赖于俄罗斯经济崩情形的外交手段了。


Russia’s Ephemeral Middle East Alliances	俄罗斯的短暂中东联盟


NEW YORK – The United States has lost two asymmetric wars in modern times: one against the Vietcong in Vietnam, and another against terrorist groups in the Middle East.	纽约—现时代，美国输掉过两场不对称战争：一是在越南输给越共，二是在中东输给恐怖组织。


When its defeat became apparent in Vietnam, the US pivoted away from the region, leaving the victor to clean up the mess – and, ultimately, to join the ASEAN structure of security and cooperation.	当越战败局已定时，美国的重点从该地区离开，让胜利者来收拾残局——并最终加入东盟安全与合作格局。


The Middle East has been more difficult to leave behind, despite America’s best efforts, and remains wracked by conflict and shaken by shifting alliances.	相比之下，尽管美国已经尽了全力，中东但更加难以一走了之，并且仍然饱受冲突困扰和联盟变幻的冲击。


For Russian President Vladimir Putin, the region’s turmoil represents an important opportunity.	对俄罗斯总统普京而言，中东地区的混乱是一个重要机会。


By gaining a foothold in the Middle East, he hopes to revive Russia’s long-faded image as a world power, restore its status as America’s main geopolitical foil, and gain bargaining chips with which to promote his more immediate concerns in Russia’s near-abroad.	他希望通过在中东建立根据地重振俄罗斯已失去多时的世界强国形象，重塑其作为美国主要地缘政治对手的地位，并赢得让他在俄罗斯周边紧迫问题上拥有优势的筹码。


Success in these areas, he calculates, will cement his power and popular support at home.	他的算盘是，如果能在这些方面取得成功，将会巩固他的权力和国内群众支持。


On these fronts, Putin has made some progress, embedding Russia firmly within Middle Eastern politics.	在这些战线上，普京取得了一些进展，俄罗斯已经深深地打入了中东政局。


But Russia’s position in the region remains fragile.	但俄罗斯在该地区的地位仍然十分脆弱。


It is not currently capable of helping to establish – much less oversee – a new regional order, for a simple reason: the Kremlin lacks true allies there.	目前它尚没有能力建立——更不用说监督——新的地区秩序，原因很简单：克里姆林宫在这里缺乏真正的盟友。


To be sure, Russia does wield substantial influence in Syria (a Cold War legacy), and shared interests have enabled Putin to bond with some regional powers.	诚然，俄罗斯在叙利亚影响力甚大（这是冷战的遗产），共同利益也让普京与一些地区力量结成联盟。


But no Middle Eastern country today is a captive client of the Kremlin in the way that, say, Egypt was during the Cold War.	但如今没有一个中东国家如同冷战时期的埃及那样沦为克里姆林宫的“走狗”（captive client）。


Russia’s recent cooperation with Iran, for example, is no sign of a budding friendship, as some experts believe.	比如，最近的俄罗斯-伊朗合作绝非某些专家所认为的那样是友好的信号。


Though both governments support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and Iran allowed Russia to use its airbases in the fight against ISIS, Iran is keen to retain its role as Assad’s main patron.	尽管两国政府都支持叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德，并且伊朗还允许俄罗斯使用空军基地打击伊斯兰国，但伊朗更热衷于保持其阿萨德主要保护者的形象。


Moreover, Iran would not want to jeopardize its efforts to rebuild its economic relations with the West – an objective that underpinned the international agreement on its nuclear program concluded in 2015.	此外，伊朗不想打乱其与西方重新构建经济关系的布局——这一目标也是2015年所达成的伊核国际协议的基础。


As for Russia, cooperating with Iran in a broader Middle East policy would destroy its standing among the region’s Sunni powers.	至于俄罗斯，与伊朗在大中东政策上的合作将有损于其在该地区逊尼派力量中的立场。


Meanwhile, countries like Turkey and Egypt are largely engaging with Russia in a kind of protest, amid tensions with their closer allies in the West.	与此同时，土耳其和埃及等国家走近俄罗斯主要是一种在与西方的更紧密联盟趋于紧张时表现出来的示威姿态。


Turkey, for example, was, until recently, at loggerheads with Russia over Turkey’s downing of a Russian warplane near its border with Syria last November.	比如，土耳其最近才刚刚与俄罗斯因为去年11月土军击落土叙边境的俄战机而关系紧张。


But Turkey has now reconciled with Russia, and wound down its role in the fight against Assad, Russia’s main partner in the region.	但现在土耳其已经向俄罗斯妥协，并收缩其在打击俄罗斯中东主要伙伴阿萨德的战争中的表现。


This does not reflect some realization on Turkey’s part that Russia is a critical actor worth keeping on side.	这并不意味着土耳其方面认识到俄罗斯是一个值得它站队的重要行动方。


Rather, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan wants Russia’s help in Turkey’s fight against Syria’s Kurds, whose nationalist ambitions Erdoğan is eager to contain, lest they incite separatism among Kurds in Turkey.	相反，土耳其总统埃尔多安想要俄罗斯帮助打击叙利亚库尔德人。 埃尔多安急于遏制库尔德民族主义企图，唯恐他们煽动土耳其库尔德人闹独立。


Erdoğan is frustrated with Turkey’s Western allies, which have done his country no favors on the Kurdish issue.	埃尔多安对土耳其的西方盟友感到失望，后者在库尔德问题上对土耳其毫无帮助。


On the contrary, the Syrian Kurds are America’s most efficient partner in the war against the Islamic State (ISIS), which both Turkey and Russia are also fighting.	相反，叙利亚库尔德人是美国与伊斯兰国战斗中最有效的盟友，而土耳其和俄罗斯也在打击伊斯兰国。


Arming the Kurdish militias, as US President Barack Obama is now considering, would push Erdoğan further into Putin’s arms.	美国总统奥巴马现在正在考虑武装库尔德军事力量，而这将进一步把埃尔多安推向俄罗斯的怀抱。


Given Putin’s interest in dividing NATO, he would warmly welcome such an outcome.	考虑到普京分裂北约的企图，他一定会热烈欢迎这一结果。


There are also economic incentives for the Russia-Turkey pairing, including about $30 billion in annual trade.	俄土结盟也有经济动机，包括每年300亿美元的贸易额。


Russia, weighed down by low commodity prices and persistent Western sanctions, is also eager to boost energy exports to Turkey.	受制于大宗商品价格低迷和持久的西方制裁的俄罗斯也急于增加对土能源出口。


But the potential of the Turkey-Russia relationship is limited.	但土俄关系的潜力有限。


For starters, whatever tensions exist between Erdoğan and the West, the Turkish president knows better than to risk the security guarantees afforded by NATO.	首先，不管埃尔多安与西方之间关系怎样紧张，他都不会冒失去北约所提供的安全保障的风险。


Given this, any collusion with Putin in Syria is likely to be shallow and short-lived.	考虑到这一点，他与普京在叙利亚问题上的任何密谋都将是肤浅和短暂的。


Russia, for its part, has no interest in bolstering Turkey’s position as a major regional power.	至于俄罗斯，也没有扶持土耳其成为地区主要力量的兴趣。


After all, it has long competed with Turkey for influence in the Black Sea and the Middle East.	毕竟，长期以来俄罗斯一直与土耳其竞争对黑海和中东的影响。


Russia’s reaction to Turkey’s rapprochement with its erstwhile ally Israel – with which it had been at loggerheads since 2010, when Israeli commandos stormed a Turkish ship that was part of a flotilla seeking to deliver aid to Gaza – reflects this rivalry.	俄罗斯对于土耳其重建与其昔日盟友以色列的外交关系的反应证明了两国的对立关系。 土耳其和以色列2010年因为以色列特种部队突袭一艘参与向加沙运送物资的船队的土耳其船只而断交。


At first, Russia’s reaction was lukewarm, largely because, given Israel’s role as a rising energy power in the Middle East, the reconciliation jeopardized Russia’s plans of boosting energy exports to Turkey.	一开始，俄罗斯的反应是冷淡，这主要是因为，考虑到以色列日益成为中东的一股能源力量，土以关系破冰妨碍了俄罗斯增加对土能源出口的计划。


But Putin subsequently endorsed the move, not because he likes the idea of Turkey, which also has close ties with Hamas, gaining a greater say in the affairs of Gaza, but because he wanted to present Russia as a key regional actor.	但普京随后支持这一动作，不是因为他认可与哈马斯关系密切的土耳其获得更大的加沙事务发言权的想法，而是因为他想表示俄罗斯是该地区的关键行动方。


Indeed, Putin next announced that he would be willing to host peace talks between Israel and Palestine.	事实上，普京随后宣布他愿意主办以色列和巴勒斯坦的和平谈判。


As he surely knows, Russia lacks the leverage, economic and otherwise, that would be needed to produce a deal.	他肯定知道，俄罗斯并不具备��成协议的经济和其他条件。


But he seems to have decided that the suggestion would reinforce the view of Russia as a regional player rivaling in importance Turkey or even the US.	但他似乎认为这一建议能够加强俄罗斯作为与土耳其甚至美国的重要性相抗衡的地区力量的形象。


The truth, however, is that the US remains indispensable to any solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict.	但是，真相是任何以巴冲突解决方案都离不开美国。


More broadly, the urge for Western-style freedom and democracy remains the dream of the Middle East’s younger generations; it has merely been obscured by the autocratic response to the Arab Spring uprisings, and the subsequent proliferation of radical Islamists.	更广泛地说，追求西方式自由和民主仍然是中东年轻一代的梦想； 只不过这一梦想被阿拉伯之春暴动的极权反应及随后激进伊斯兰教的兴盛压制了。


The US is now focused on a rising Asia.	如今，美国专注于应对崛起的亚洲。


Instead of employing the weapons of war, it is using the tools of globalization – in particular, trade and investment linkages – to help shape the region’s development.	它不再动用战争武器，而是动用全球化工具——特别是贸易和投资联系——帮助影响该地区的发展。


When the Middle East is ready, the US will surely do the same there.	一旦中东万事皆备，美国肯定也会依样画葫芦。


And when that happens, whatever isolated military footholds and ephemeral alliances Russia has maintained will quickly be lost.	而当那一天到来时，俄罗斯在中东所维持的孤立军事据点和短暂联盟都将快速失去。


Like the Soviet Union in Central and Eastern Europe, today’s Russia has no place in a region undergoing socioeconomic reform and democratic transitions.	就像苏联在中欧和东欧那样，今天的俄罗斯在正在经历社会经济改革和民主转型的中东地区也无法拥有一席之地。


Getting to Yes with Putin	和普京说“是”


PARIS – In the showdown with Russia over Ukraine, the weaknesses and divisions in European policy have been as encouraging for Russian President Vladimir Putin as America’s hesitant approach to Syria was.	巴黎—在与俄罗斯就乌克兰问题摊牌时，欧洲政策的软弱和分歧不啻对俄罗斯总统普京的鼓励，一如美国在叙利亚问题上的犹豫。


If Europe is to act responsibly, three key concepts should define its policy toward Russia: firmness, clarity, and a willingness to find an acceptable compromise.	如果欧洲要负责任地行动，那么其俄罗斯政策应具有三个关键因素：坚定、明确和找到可接受妥协的意愿。


Without firmness, nothing is possible.	不坚定，就做不成任何事。


To be sure, Europe and the US made mistakes in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse.	平心而论，欧洲和美国在苏联解体后犯了错误。


The US, in particular, can be accused of acting arrogantly and unnecessarily humiliating Russia.	特别是美国，我们可以批评它傲慢地羞辱俄罗斯，这根本没有必要。


But the Soviet Union’s demise was the result of a long string of missteps, beginning with pre-Soviet Russia’s inability to come to terms with modernity.	但苏联的坠落时长期一错再错的结果，起点可以追溯到前苏联时代的俄罗斯无力坚持现代化。


Post-Soviet Russian leaders have yet to confront those failures.	后苏联时代的俄罗斯领导人尚未面临这些失败。


By adopting an aggressive, revisionist stance, Putin has made a historic and strategic mistake.	普京采取了咄咄逼人的修正主义立场，这是一个历史性和战略性错误。


Putin’s model should have been Peter the Great.	普京的榜样应该是彼得大帝。


His ambition should have been to tie Russia’s future to that of Europe.	他的野心应该是将俄罗斯的未来系于欧洲的额未来。


Instead, Putin turned for inspiration to Nicholas I, the most reactionary of Russia’s nineteenth-century czars.	相反，普京转向了俄罗斯最反动的十九世纪沙皇——尼古拉斯一世。


The failure of Putin’s policy can be seen by comparing Russia with China.	普京政策的失败可以通过对比中俄窥见一斑。


The gap between the two – in terms of each country’s behavior and achievements – has never been greater.	两国之间的差距——以各自的行为和成就衡量——从未如此之大。


At the G-20 Summit in Brisbane this month, China played its hand masterfully, highlighting its goodwill, particularly on the issue of climate change.	在本月的布里斯班G-20峰会上，中国尽显大师风度，强调善意，特别是在气候变化问题上。


Russia, meanwhile, appeared self-isolated – pathetically so, given the impact of its seclusion on its economy.	与此同时，俄罗斯则显得自我孤立——这真是太令人遗憾了，俄罗斯的孤立讲给它的经济带来严重影响。


Russia’s stock exchange is collapsing.	俄罗斯股票交易所正在崩溃。


Its currency has lost 30% of its value.	其货币贬值了30%。


The price of oil and gas – the mainstay of the Kremlin’s budget – has fallen by more than 25%.	石油和天然气价格——克里姆林宫预算的主要来源——下跌了25%以上。


In contrast to China, Russia’s economy depends heavily on its energy resources, leaving it vulnerable when global energy markets head south.	与中国相反，俄罗斯经济严重依赖能源资源，当全球能源市场下跌时，其经济也会变得虚弱。


Putin’s only strength lies in Europe’s weakness and irresolution.	普京唯一的优势就在于欧洲的弱势和犹豫。


So Europe’s goal must be to set clear limits on Putin’s ambitions.	因此欧洲的目标必须是为普京的野心设置明确的限制。


Whether he is seeking to weaken Ukraine or to enlarge Russia’s territory, Europe’s response must be firm.	不论普京试图削弱乌克兰还是扩大俄罗斯的领土，欧洲的反应都必须坚定。


Putin must be convinced that he cannot do either without paying a cost that Russians will not willingly bear.	必须让普京明白，如果他不想让俄罗斯付出不愿意付出不愿意付出的代价，这两个意图都无从达到。


Given the Kremlin’s ambiguous behavior – if not its deliberate policy of deceit – it seems obvious that France should not deliver a Mistral-class assault warship, which it previously agreed to sell to Russia.	由于克里姆林宫行为暧昧——如果不是故意采取欺骗政策的话——显然法国不应该交付此前答应卖给俄罗斯的西北风级两栖攻击舰。


It is far better for France to be perceived as an unreliable arms dealer than as an irresponsible strategic actor, caring only about its mercantile interests.	对法国来说，让人们觉得它是不可靠的军火贸易上远比让人们觉得它是靠不住的战略行动者、只考虑自己的商业利益更好。


Firmness must be accompanied by clarity.	坚定必须辅之以明确。


Putin is no longer the leader he was when he came to power in 2000, nor even the leader he was in 2008, when he grabbed pieces of Georgia by force.	普京已不是2000年问鼎权力时的领导人，也不是2008年以武力夺取格鲁吉亚领土时的领导人。


Under his increasingly centralized and authoritarian rule, he has combined ultra-religious nationalism with Soviet-era tactics and practices.	在其日益集中和极权的统治下，他将极端宗教民族主义与苏联时代的战术与行为结合起来。


It is a dangerous and volatile mix, relying on principles and methods that led Russia’s empires – Czarist and Soviet – to failure and ruin.	这是个危险而动荡的组合，其理论和方法基础曾经导致俄罗斯帝国——不管是沙皇帝国还是苏联帝国——失败和毁灭。


Firmness and clarity are indispensable.	坚定和明确是不可或缺的。


But they are not sufficient to formulate a coherent European policy.	但它们不足以形成一致的欧洲政策。


The goal cannot be simply to contain Russia.	目标不能仅仅是遏制俄罗斯。


A compromise must be reached.	必须形成妥协。


True, Russia lacks the means to achieve Putin’s aims.	是的，俄罗斯没有办法实现普京的目标。


But the rest of the world nonetheless needs the Kremlin’s cooperation and goodwill as it pursues efforts such as the containment of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the fight against the Islamic State.	但在追求遏制伊朗核野心、与伊斯兰国斗争等方面，世界其他部分仍需要克里姆林宫的合作与好意。


As long as Russia remains intent on achieving unacceptable outcomes, accompanied by hints of nuclear saber rattling, reaching a compromise will be difficult.	只要俄罗斯试图实现不可实现的结果，并且祭出虚张声势的核暗示，形成妥协就十分困难。


Putin is far from an ideal partner with whom to attempt to reconcile the two key principles of international law: the right of a people to self-determination and the sanctity of national borders.	普京绝不是可以试图与之协调国际法两大关键原则（民族自决权和国界神圣不可侵犯）的理想伙伴。


But doing so is not impossible.	但这样做也不是不可能。


Any compromise will have to address the future of Crimea, now under Russian domination, and maintain Ukraine’s independence.	任何妥协都必须解决克里米亚（目前处于俄罗斯支配下）的未来问题和维持乌克兰的独立。


Putin must be convinced that by gaining Crimea, he has lost Ukraine.	必须让普京知道，他因为获得了克里米亚而失去了乌克兰。


For their part, Ukrainian leaders will have to make a commitment not to join NATO, in exchange for Russia’s acceptance of Ukraine’s right to enter the European Union.	乌克兰领导人必须承诺不加入北约，以换取俄罗斯接受乌克兰进入欧盟的权利。


The progressive removal of sanctions would follow, allowing all parties to concentrate their energies on other priorities, be they economic or strategic.	此后则可以继之以逐步取消制裁，让各方集中力量于其他当务之急，不管是经济还是战略。


In its negotiations with Russia, Europe holds the stronger cards.	在于俄罗斯的谈判中，欧洲的牌面更好。


But as long as they are poorly played, as they have been up to now, Putin will continue to win every hand.	但如果像现在那样出牌出得太烂，普京将继续无往而不利。


A War of Values With Russia	与俄罗斯的价值战争


COPENHAGEN – Russian authorities recently threatened to aim nuclear missiles at Danish warships if Denmark joins NATO’s missile-defense system.	哥本哈根—俄罗斯当局最近威胁称，如果丹麦加入北约导弹防御系统，就将核弹对准丹麦军舰。


This was obviously an outrageous threat against a country that has no intention of attacking Russia.	这显然是对毫无袭击俄罗斯意图的国家的赤裸裸的威胁。


But it also reflects a more fundamental factor in the Kremlin’s foreign policy: desperation to maintain Russia’s strategic influence at a time of unprecedented challenges to its authority.	但这也反映了克里姆林宫外交政策的一个更加基本的因素：在俄罗斯威权受到前所未有的挑战的时期保持战略影响力的渴望。


Of course, Russia’s leaders know very well that NATO’s missile defense is not directed at their country.	当然，俄罗斯领导人十分清楚，北约的导弹防御并没有对准俄罗斯。


When I served as NATO Secretary General from 2009 to 2014, we repeatedly emphasized that the purpose was to defend Alliance members from threats originating outside the Euro-Atlantic area.	2009—2014年我出任北约秘书长期间，我们一再强调，北约导弹防御系统的目的是保护盟友免受来自欧洲-大西洋地区之外的威胁。


Anyone with even a rudimentary knowledge of physics and engineering – two subjects at which Russians excel – can see that the system is designed to do precisely that.	只要你稍懂物理学和工程学——俄罗斯人对这两个学科可是很擅长的——就能看出，该系统正是为了这一目的而设。


Russia’s nuclear threats, against Denmark and others, are the hallmark of a weak country in economic, demographic and political decline.	俄罗斯对丹麦和其他国家的核威胁证明了它是一个经济、人口和政治都在衰落的弱国。


NATO has not aggressively victimized Russia, as Kremlin propaganda claims.	北约并没有像克里姆林宫宣传的那样大肆伤害俄罗斯。


The current conflict between Russia and the West – centered on the crisis in Ukraine – is, at its core, a clash of values.	目前俄罗斯与西方的冲突——以乌克兰危机为中心——从本质上说是价值的碰撞。


Recall how the Ukrainian conflict began: Tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens from all parts of society demanded, in overwhelmingly peaceful demonstrations, an association agreement with the European Union.	想想乌克兰冲突是如何开始的：数万来自社会各界的乌克兰公民以绝对和平的游行示威要求与欧盟达成入盟协议。


No one was calling for a pogrom against Ukraine’s Russian-speakers, despite the Kremlin’s claims to the contrary.	没有人要掀起反乌克兰俄语人群的运动，但克里姆林宫的说法正好相反。


And NATO membership was not part of the deal.	而北约成员资格并非协议的一部分。


Yet Russia reacted swiftly and harshly.	但俄罗斯的反应既快且狠。


Long before violence engulfed the protests, Russian officials began accusing the demonstrators of being neo-Nazis, radicals, and provocateurs.	在示威还远远没有暴力化的时候，俄罗斯官员已经开始将示威者说成是新纳粹、极端分子和煽动分子。


As soon as Ukraine’s then-President Viktor Yanukovych fled Kyiv, Russian President Vladimir Putin began engineering the annexation of Crimea.	时任乌克兰总统亚努科维奇（Viktor Yanukovych）一逃离基辅，俄罗斯总统普京就开始发动对克里米亚的吞并。


This was not only a gross violation of international law; it also directly contravened Russia’s oft-stated insistence that no country has the right to ensure its security at the expense of another.	这不仅是对国际法的粗暴违反； 也直接有悖于俄罗斯再三强调的任何国家都没有权利牺牲他国保证自身安全的说辞。


The Ukrainian demonstrators marched against their government, not Russia’s.	乌克兰示威者游行反对本国政府而不是俄罗斯政府。


Indeed, the notion that Ukraine could pose a military threat to Russia is nothing short of absurd.	事实上，乌克兰可能对俄罗斯造成军事威胁的说法不可不谓荒谬。


Even if Ukraine were a NATO member, a war of aggression against Russia would be an absurd scenario, as it would not serve any of the allies’ interests.	即使乌克兰是北约成员国，其发动侵略俄罗斯的战争也令人无法置信，并且也不符合所有盟国的利益。


For Russia, the threat posed by the Ukrainian protesters was existential.	对俄罗斯来说，乌克兰示威者所构成的威胁是生存威胁。


In demanding change, freedom, and democracy – right on Russia’s doorstep, no less – the protesters challenged Putin’s model of “sovereign democracy,” in which the president eliminates all opposition, restricts media freedom, and then tells citizens that they can choose their leaders.	乌克兰示威者在俄罗斯大门口要求变革、自由和民主，这挑战了普京的“主权民主”（sovereign democracy）模式。 在普京的模式中，总统消灭一切反对，控制言论自由，然后告诉公民他们可以选择他们的领导人。


The Kremlin feared that if the Ukrainians got what they wanted, Russians might be inspired to follow their example.	克里姆林宫害怕，如果乌克兰人得到了他们想要的东西，俄罗斯人也会群起效仿。


That is why Russia’s leaders have been so keen to label Ukraine’s leaders as Russophobes and fascists.	因此，俄罗斯领导人急于给乌克兰领导人贴上仇俄分子和法西斯分子的标签。


It is why they have portrayed the Baltic States for years as dysfunctional oppressors of their Russian citizens.	因此，多年来他们将波罗的海国家描述成混乱的镇压俄罗斯族公民的国家。


And it is why they are now portraying the EU as decadent, immoral, and corrupt.	因此，他们现在把欧盟描述成衰败、不道德和腐败。


The Kremlin is trying desperately to convince Russians that liberal democracy is bad, and that life under Putin is good.	克里姆林宫急切地想让俄罗斯人相信，自由民主是一件坏事，被普京统治的生活很美好。


That requires not only spreading damaging lies at home, but also sowing violence and instability among its neighbors.	这不但需要在国内散布为害甚大的谎言，还需要在邻国煽动暴力和动荡。


In the face of a massive Russian propaganda assault, the West must continue to stand up for Ukraine, as well as for Georgia and NATO members like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.	在面临巨大的俄罗斯宣传攻势时，西方必须继续捍卫乌克兰和格鲁吉亚，以及爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚和立陶宛等北约成员国。


Despite whatever pain we incur, we must maintain – and, if necessary, deepen – sanctions against Russia and reinforce NATO’s front line.	尽管会带来各种痛苦，但我们必须坚持——必要时还必须加强——对俄制裁、强化北约前线。


And we must face up to the reality that, at long last, we may have to pay for our defense.	我们还必须长期面对一个现实——我们必须为我们的防务拿出资金。


The West’s greatest strength is democracy; it is what has enabled us to secure peace for two generations and bring an end to communist rule in Europe almost without a shot being fired.	西方的最大优势是民主； 这也是让我们可以在两代人的时间里确保和平，并且在几乎不发一枪一弹的情况下结束共产主义在欧洲的统治。


Though liberal democracy is far from perfect, it remains the best defense against extremism and intolerance – and the most powerful facilitator of human progress.	尽管自由民主远非完美，但它仍是抵抗极端主义和偏狭的最佳防御——也是人类进步最有力的推动器。


If the West allows Russia to attack its neighbors simply because they might inspire Russians to seek reform, it will send the message that democratic values are not worth defending.	如果西方放任俄罗斯仅仅因为邻国激起俄罗斯人对改革的要求就袭击它们，就会释放出一个信号，即民主价值不值得捍卫。


It will undermine the West’s role as a model of prosperity and freedom that societies worldwide hope to emulate.	这将破坏西方作为全世界社会都希望模仿的繁荣和自由的榜样的角色。


And it will eliminate not only the West’s remaining moral authority, but also the sense of purpose that animates NATO.	这不但会让西方所拥有的道德权威毁于一旦，还会让振兴北约的使命感流产。


Such an approach would expose the West to attacks by Putin and similar aggressors.	这样的方针将让西方暴露在普京和类似入侵者的袭击之下。


And it would be a slap in the face to all of the courageous men and women worldwide who risk their lives every day in the pursuit of freedom and democracy.	西方将无颜面对全世界充满勇气、拿自己的生命冒险追求自由和民主的人们。


No one should be fooled by the Kremlin’s spin doctors.	决不能被克里姆林宫的公关专家所迷惑。


The conflict in Ukraine is not about Ukraine. Nor is it about Russia, or even about NATO.	乌克兰冲突并不关乎乌克兰，也不关乎俄罗斯，甚至不关乎北约，而是关乎民主。


It is about democracy. The West must respond accordingly.	西方必须据此行动。


Putin in Denial	否认问题的普京


WASHINGTON, DC – As 2014 came to a close, an enormous financial crisis erupted in Russia.	华盛顿—2014年行将结束，一场巨大的金融危机在俄罗斯爆发了。


World oil prices had fallen by almost half since mid-June, and the ruble plummeted in December, finishing the year down by a similar margin.	6月以来，世界油价下跌了近一半，12月卢布暴跌，到年底跌幅与石油相当。


Russia’s international reserves have fallen by $135 billion, and inflation has reached double digits.	俄罗斯的国际储备减少了1,350亿美元，通货膨胀则达到了两位数。


Things are only going to get worse.	情况还在变坏。


The current oil price will force Russia to cut its imports by half – a move that, together with the continuing rise in inflation, will diminish Russians’ living standards considerably.	按照当前油价，俄罗斯必须削减一半进口，再加上持续攀升的通货膨胀，俄罗斯人民的生活水平将大幅下降。


Add to that ever-worsening corruption and a severe liquidity freeze, and a financial meltdown, accompanied by an 8-10% decline in output, appears likely.	除此之外，不断恶化的腐败和严重的流动性冻结以及金融崩溃携同8—10%的产出下降步步逼近。


Russia’s ability to negotiate its current predicament hinges on its powerful president, Vladimir Putin.	俄罗斯是否能与当前困境周旋，取决于其强权总统普京。 但普京还没有做好行动的准备；


But Putin remains unprepared to act; in fact, so far, he has pretended that there is no crisis at all.	事实上，到目前为止，他还装作一副根本不存在危机的样子。


In both of his major public appearances in December, Putin referred simply to the “current situation.”	在12月的两次重要公共场合中，普京只是轻描淡写地用了“当前局面”的字眼。


In his New Year greeting, he boasted about the annexation of Crimea and the successful Winter Olympics in Sochi, carefully avoiding any reference to the economy.	在其新年贺词中，他夸赞了对克里米亚的吞并和成功的索契冬奥会，小心翼翼地避免提及任何关于经济的话题。


But, with the economy in free fall, Putin cannot pretend forever.	但是，随着经济呈现出自由落体之势，普京也无法永远装下去。


And when he finally does acknowledge reality, he will have little room for maneuver.	而当他最终承认现实时，他已经没有多少腾挪空间了。


Of course, Putin could withdraw his troops from eastern Ukraine, thereby spurring the United States and Europe to lift economic sanctions against Russia.	当然，普京可以从东乌克兰撤军，从而促使美国和欧洲取消对俄制裁。


But this would amount to admitting defeat – something that Putin is not prone to do.	但这无异于承认失败——这是普京绝不会做的。


Likewise, short of initiating a major war, Putin has few options for driving up oil prices.	类似地，除了掀起一场大战，否则普京很难推高油价。


Moreover, even before the oil-price collapse, crony capitalism had brought growth to a halt – and any serious effort to change the system would destabilize his power base.	此外，即使在油价崩溃前，权贵资本主义已经导致俄罗斯经济增长陷入停滞——而任何改变制度的重大措施都会动摇他的权力基础。


In fact, Putin’s leadership approach seems fundamentally incompatible with any solution to Russia’s current economic woes.	事实上，普京的领导方针从根本上与任何俄罗斯当前经济困境的解决方案都格格不入。


Though accurate and timely statistics on Russia’s economy – needed to guide effective measures to counter the crisis – are readily available to the public online, Putin claims not to use the Internet.	尽管公众可以从网上轻松获得关于俄罗斯经济的准确而及时的数据——俄罗斯需要拿出有效措施解决危机——但普京宣称他不上网。


Instead, the journalist Ben Judah reports, Putin receives daily updates on Kremlin politics, domestic affairs, and foreign relations from his three key intelligence agencies.	相反，记者本·犹大（Ben Judah）报道说，普京每天从其三大关键情报机构中获取关于克里姆林宫政坛、国内事务和对外关系的日报。


His actions suggest that he considers economic data to be far less important than security information – perhaps the natural attitude of a kleptocrat.	他的行为表明，他认为经济数据远不如安全情报重要——这也许是贪官污吏的自然反应吧。


To be clear, there is no dearth of economic expertise among Russian policymakers.	平心而论，俄罗斯决策者中不乏经济能人。


On the contrary, Russia’s key economic institutions boast competent managers.	相反，俄罗斯重要经济机构无不以管理者能力强而引以为豪。


The problem is that policymaking is concentrated in the Kremlin, where economic expertise is lacking.	问题在于决策集中于克里姆林宫，而这里缺少经济专家。


Indeed, the last of the economic heavyweights – all of them holdovers from the 1990s – in Putin’s personal circle was Alexei Kudrin, who resigned as Finance Minister in 2011.	事实上，普京个人圈子中最后一位经济能人——他们都是20世纪90年代留下来的人才——是库德林（Alexei Kudrin），他于2011年辞去了财政部长的职务。


Unlike in the US, none of Russia’s top economic managers sits on the National Security Council.	与美国不同，俄罗斯最高经济官员没有一位跻身国家安全委员会。


Putin has usurped authority not just from his more knowledgeable colleagues, but also from the prime minister, who has traditionally served as Russia’s chief economic policymaker.	普京不但从他的知识渊博的同事手中夺权，也从总理手中夺权。 传统上，俄罗斯总理是这个国家的最高经济决策者。


Indeed, since Putin returned to the presidency in 2012, Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev has been all but irrelevant.	事实上，自2012年普京重新出任总统以来，总理梅德韦杰夫便沦为了可有可无的人物。


In short, Putin – who is no economic expert – makes all major economic policy decisions in Russia, delivering orders to top managers of state-owned enterprises and individual ministers in ad hoc, one-on-one meetings.	简言之，算不上经济专家的普京做出了俄罗斯的所有重大经济政策决定，通过临时性的一对一会面向国有企业的高管和各个部长发出指令。


As a result, Russian economic policymaking is fragmented and dysfunctional.	结果，俄罗斯经济决策支离破碎并且功能失调。


Nowhere is this lack of coordination more obvious than in the sensitive currency market.	敏感的货币市场最能说明缺乏协调的状况。


In Russia, unlike in most other countries, the central bank does not retain the exclusive right to intervene.	与大部分其他国家不同，在俄罗斯，中央银行没有独家干预权。


When the ruble tumbled in December, the finance ministry – which holds almost half of Russia’s foreign reserves, $169 billion, in two sovereign-wealth funds – deemed the central bank’s intervention to be insufficient.	12月，当卢布暴跌时，俄罗斯财政部——它通过两家主权财富基金持有俄罗斯外汇储备的近一半1,690亿美元——认为中央银行的干预不够充分。


So it announced that it would sell $7 billion from its reserves to boost the ruble – a move that caused the exchange rate to overshoot on the upside.	于是它宣布出售它所持有的70亿美元储备以提振卢布——结果导致汇率过度反弹。


When the exchange rate plummeted again, the Kremlin urged the five largest state-owned exporting companies to exchange a portion of their assets into rubles, leading to another overshoot, followed by yet another sharp decline.	当汇率再度暴跌时，克里姆林宫敦促五家最大的国有出口公司将部分资产兑换为卢布，这导致了又一次过度反弹，然后是又一次急剧下跌。


Clearly, such uncoordinated interventions are exacerbating currency-market turmoil, with the ruble’s value fluctuating by 5% – and as much as 10% – in a single day.	显然，这些不协调的干预加剧了货币市场的波动——卢布价值一天之内可以震荡5%乃至10%之多。


Russia’s fiscal situation, determined by Putin’s arbitrary budget management, is hardly better.	由普京随心所欲的预算管理决定的俄罗斯财政状况也好不到哪里去。 普京的优先项是明确的：首先是军事、安全机构和国家行政；


Putin’s priorities are clear: first come the military, the security apparatus, and the state administration; second are the major infrastructure projects from which he and his cronies make their fortunes; social expenditures (primarily pensions), needed to maintain popular support, come last.	然后是他和他的权贵们从中渔利的重大基础设施工程； 维持公共支持所需要的社会支出（主要是养老金）排在最后。


Suddenly, oil revenues are no longer sufficient to cover all three.	突然间，石油收入让这三者都无法满足。


As hard as the finance ministry may try to balance expenditures and revenues, it lacks the needed political weight.	财政部也许在竭尽全力保持收支平衡，但它缺少必要的政治权威。


Last year, the central government delegated more education and health-care expenditures to regional bodies, without allocating more resources – and there was nothing anyone could do about it.	去年，中央政府将更多的教育和医疗支出分给了地区政府，但又没有配置更多资源——也没有人能为此做些什么。


If Putin wants to save Russia’s economy from disaster, he must shift his priorities.	如果普京想力挽狂澜拯救俄罗斯经济，就必须改变优先项。


For starters, he must shelve some of the large, long-term infrastructure projects that he has promoted energetically in the last two years.	首先，他必须搁置一些他在过去两年中大力推进的大型长期基础设施项目。


Though the decision in December to abandon the South Stream gas pipeline is a step in the right direction, it is far from adequate.	尽管12月的放弃南溪（South Stream）输气管道朝着正确方向迈出了一步，但远远不够。


Likewise, Putin should follow Finance Minister Anton Siluanov’s sensible recommendation to cut public expenditure, including on social programs and the military, by 10% this year.	类似地，普京应该遵从财政部长斯卢亚诺夫（Anton Siluanov）的明智建议，将今年的公共开支削减10%（包括社会计划和军事开支）。


But experience suggests that Putin is unlikely to do so.	但经验表明普京不可能这样做。


Russia faces serious – and intensifying – financial problems.	俄罗斯面临着严峻并且不断恶化的金融问题。


But its biggest problem remains its leader, who continues to deny reality while pursuing policies and projects that will only make the situation worse.	但最大的问题仍然是它的领导人。 他继续否认现实，同时追求着只能让情况越变越糟的政策和工程。


Russia’s Hybrid War Against the West	俄罗斯对西方的混合战争


BRUSSELS – The United States FBI and CIA have both concluded that Russia ran a hacking and disinformation campaign aimed at influencing the US presidential election in Donald Trump’s favor.	布鲁塞尔—美国联邦调查局和中央情报局都认定俄罗斯进行了黑客和造谣行动，目标是影响美国总统大选，让唐纳德·特朗普获利。


We may never know how successful Russia’s cyber operation was, but we do know that the Kremlin got the result it wanted.	我们也许永远无法知道俄罗斯的网络行动到底有多成功，但我们确实知道克里姆林宫得到了想要的结果。


Time magazine was wrong to name Trump its person of the year.	《时代》杂志将特朗普列为年度人物是错误的。


Clearly, this was Russian President Vladimir Putin’s year.	显然，今年是俄罗斯总统普京之年。


The attack on the US may have been a precursor to further electoral meddling in Europe, where officials are now racing to counter Russian cyber operations before a series of major elections in 2017, including in the Netherlands, Germany, and France.	对美国发动攻击也许是进一步干涉欧洲选举的先声。 2017年，欧洲将进行一系列选举，包括荷兰、德国和法国等国家，目前官员正在竞相对抗俄罗斯的网络行动。


Past cyber attacks in Europe bear an uncanny resemblance to the alleged Russian-sponsored hack on the Democratic National Committee in the US.	过去对欧洲的网络袭击构成了一副与被控为俄罗斯支持的入侵美国民主党全国委员会的行动极为相似的神秘图景。


In early 2015, a group with ties to the Russian government hacked into the German Bundestag, stole confidential files, and gave them to WikiLeaks, which published them.	2015年初，一个与俄罗斯政府有关的集团侵入德国联邦众议员，窃取机密档案并泄露给维基解密（WikiLeaks）由后者公之于众。


Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution has accused Russia of orchestrating similar attacks on German government computer systems.	德国联邦宪法维护局指责俄罗斯精心策划了针对德国政府计算机系统的类似袭击。


Meanwhile, in November, the European Commission also suffered a large-scale cyber attack, and while the culprit remains unknown, very few people or organizations are capable of carrying out such an operation.	与此同时，11月欧盟委员会也遭遇大规模网络袭击，尽管罪魁仍不清楚，但有能力进行如此行动的人和组织少之又少。


Cyber attacks are just one element in a broader hybrid war that Russia is waging against the West.	网络袭击只不过是俄罗斯正在向西方发起的更广泛的混合战争的一个要素。


Russia has also assisted far-right nationalist organizations and populist movements across Europe, such as by extending loans to Marine Le Pen’s National Front in France, and furnishing UK Independence Party politicians with prime-time media slots on the Russian state-funded television network Russia Today.	俄罗斯还支持欧洲各国的极右翼民族主义组织和民粹主义运动，比如增加对法国国民阵线的马琳·勒庞（Marine Le Pen）的贷款、将俄罗斯国有电视网络今日俄罗斯（Russia Today）黄金档留给英国独立党政客等。


US President Barack Obama has finally vowed to respond to Putin’s assault on American democracy, but he should have done more – and acted much sooner.	美国总统奥巴马终于宣称要对普京攻击美国民主的行为做出反应，但他早就应该这样做，并且应该做得更多。


Europeans would be foolish to expect assistance from the incoming Trump administration.	欧洲人还指望获得即将上任的特朗普政府的支持简直可谓愚蠢。


Trump’s chief strategist, Stephen Bannon – a former executive chairman of the American “alt-right” disinformation website Breitbart News – has openly offered to help Le Pen win the French presidential election next spring.	特朗普的主要战略助手史蒂芬·巴农（Stephen Bannon）是美国“另类右翼”谣言网站Breitbart News的前执行主席，他公开为勒庞提供帮助，以助其赢得明年春天的法国总统大选。


Official Russian sources admit that they spent €1.2 billion ($1.25 billion) on foreign media campaigns just this year.	俄罗斯官方来源也承认，他们今年在外国媒体宣传方面的支出就高达12亿欧元。


In the EU, thousands of fake-news websites have appeared, many of them with unclear ownership: the number of disinformation websites in Hungary doubled in 2014; and in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, some 42 new websites are now polluting the EU’s information ecosystem.	欧盟出现了成千上万家假新闻网站，其中许多所有权十分模糊：匈牙利谣言网站数量在2014年翻了一番； 而在捷克和斯洛伐克，42家新网站正在污染欧盟的信息生态系统。


And, less surreptitiously, the Kremlin has spent hundreds of millions of dollars funding propaganda outfits – such as the Sputnik “news” agency – even as the Russian economy implodes.	此外，克里姆林宫还比较公开地投入数亿美元用于宣传机构——比如Sputnik“新闻”社——虽然俄罗斯经济举步维艰。


Russia’s disinformation campaigns are complex and multifaceted, but the mission they share is to undermine trust in Western democratic authorities.	俄罗斯的谣言运动复杂而多面，但它们的一个共同任务是破坏人们对西方民主当局的信任。


Social-media trolling is one method.	社交媒体“水军”是其中一个方法。


And social media is also a key vector for a Russian strategy that relies on historical revisionism (the claim that Russia alone won World War II is a staple of this approach); on conspiracy theories, promoted among European and American nationalist movements, which blame the West for, say, inciting the war in Ukraine; and denial of reality, such as the presence of Russian troops in Crimea and Ukraine.	社交媒体也是依靠历史修正主义（标志之一是认为俄罗斯独力打赢了二战）、阴谋论（在欧洲和美国民粹主义运动中间推广，一个伎俩��指责西方掀起了乌克兰战争）和否认现实（如俄罗斯出兵克里米亚和乌克兰）的俄罗斯战略的关键要素。


To defend against this onslaught, the West should promote media freedom, reward accountability, and provide legal avenues to shut down systemic disinformation channels.	为了抵御这一攻势，西方应该促进媒体自由，奖励问责，提供关闭系统性造谣的频道的法律途径。


It bodes well that the EU recently amended its 2017 budget to reinforce the European External Action Service’s StratCom team, which had been badly underfunded, despite its critical mission of uncovering and debunking disinformation.	一个好消息是欧盟最新修订了2017年预算，以加强欧洲对外行动局（European External Action Service）的StratCom团队。 StratCom团队一直处于资金严重短缺状态，尽管它肩负揭露和揭穿谣言的重要任务。


But the EU and NATO should also take a lesson from the US election, by bolstering collective European cyber defenses, and pressuring member states to expand their own cyber capabilities.	但欧盟和北约还应该从美国选举中汲取教训，加强欧洲集体网络防御，敦促成员国加强自身网络能力。


On the political front, Putin must be told that foreign interference in national elections will have severe negative consequences for Russian economic interests.	在政治方面，必须让普京知道对国家选举的外部干涉将给俄罗斯经济利益带来严重后果。


Beyond government action, the private sector and civil-society organizations should step up their efforts to verify whether online news stories are accurate, balanced, and credible.	除了政府行动，私人部门和公民社会组织也应该采取行动证实网络新闻报道是否准确、平衡和可信。


Organizations working together can make a difference.	各组织合作能够带来不同。


For example, Russia terminated its Swedish-language edition of Sputnik, because Swedish media organizations were not using its products.	比如，俄罗斯关闭了其Sputnik瑞典语版，因为瑞典媒体组织从不使用它的产品。


But while Facebook has indicated that it will improve the vetting process for its content, voluntary measures may not be enough: some German lawmakers have suggested that legislation may be needed to clean up social-media platforms.	但尽管Facebook已经表示将改善内容审查程序，自愿的措施仍然是不够的：一些德国立法者建议需要通过立法来清理社交媒体平台。


Still, Europe’s strongest defense is its free press, together with nongovernmental organizations working to expose lies.	但欧洲的最强防御乃是其新闻自由，以及致力于揭露谎言的非政府组织。


Europeans must not become complacent about the current state of their free press.	欧洲人决不可对当前的新闻自由状态沾沾自喜。


After all, Breitbart News is already in Britain and is planning to expand across the EU.	毕竟，Breitbart News已经进入英国并计划在全欧洲扩张。


Within days of Trump’s election, the New York Times reported, “Marion Maréchal-Le Pen, Marine Le Pen’s niece and a rising force in the National Front, tweeted, ‘I answer yes to the invitation of Stephen Bannon… to work together.”	特朗普当选后不出几天，《纽约时报》就报道说“马里昂·勒庞，马琳·勒庞的侄女兼国民阵线的新兴力量，发Tweet说‘我答应了史蒂芬·巴农……的合作邀请’。 ”


Western democracies have entered a period of volatility, and Russia is no longer playing by the rules of the game that applied even during the darkest days of the Cold War.	西方民主国家已经进入了动荡期，而俄罗斯也不再按照哪怕在冷战最黑暗的时期也起到效果的游戏规则行事了。


Putin is actively waging a hybrid war against the West, one that we are only just beginning to comprehend, let alone confront.	普京积极地实施着针对西方的混合战争，而我们才刚刚开始理解这场战争，根本无法面对。


It is time to defend our values.	我们应该捍卫我们的价值观。


This year made us fully aware of the scale of the challenge Putin is posing to Western democracy.	今年让我们充分领教了普京对西方民主所造成的挑战。


In 2017, we must confront – and defeat – his tactics head-on.	2017年，我们必须正面面对——并击败——他的战术。


Let Russia Be Russia	让俄罗斯做俄罗斯


TEL AVIV – In his famous “X” article, published in 1947, George F. Kennan argued that the Soviet Union’s hostility toward the United States was virtually inexorable, given that it was rooted not in a classic conflict of interest between great powers, but in a deep-seated nationalism and insecurity.	特拉维夫—在1947年出版的名作《X》中，乔治·凯南（George F. Kennan）指出，苏联对美国的敌意基本上是不可抑制的，因为其根源不仅有超级大国之间的经典利益冲突，也包括根深蒂固的民族主义和不安全感。


The same could be said of the current conflict between Vladimir Putin’s Russia and the West: It is, at root, a collision between the West’s supposedly universal values and Russia’s quest for a distinct identity.	目前普京的俄罗斯与西方的冲突也是如此：根本上，这是一场西方持有的普世价值与俄罗斯所追求的独特身份之间的碰撞。


A country’s struggle for identity can shape its strategic behavior.	一国的身份斗争可以左右它的战略行为。


The missionary ethos of American civilization helps to explain its conduct as a global power.	美国文明中的传教士精神有助于解释它身为全球超级大国的行为。


The resurgence of Islamism is essentially a quest for a fulfilling identity by an ancient civilization overwhelmed by the challenges of modernity.	伊斯兰教的重新崛起本质上是被现代性挑战压制的古老文明对实现身份的追求。


And Israel’s emphasis on its Jewish identity has become a formidable obstacle to peace with the Palestinians.	以色列对其犹太身份的强调也成为与其与巴勒斯坦实现和平的可怕障碍。


Putin’s defiant foreign policy is a response – mediated by an authoritarian political tradition, the reactionary tenets of Orthodox Christianity, and pride in Russia’s vast geography and natural wealth – to the humiliating loss of an empire.	普京的挑衅性外交政策是对帝国耻辱性损失的反应——中间的媒介则是极权政治传统、东正教反动原则以及对俄罗斯广袤领土和充裕自然财富的骄傲。


Seeing in Russia’s Cold War defeat the need to extol the non-Western roots of Russian history and tradition, Putin has fallen back on the same conservative values that emerged in response to the Napoleonic invasion of 1812, frustrating Peter the Great’s modernization efforts.	普京将俄罗斯在冷战中的战败视为颂扬俄罗斯历史和传统中的非西方根基的需要，他实际上是在倒向1812年挫败了彼得大帝现代化大计的拿破仑入侵所引起的保守价值。


When the deputy head of the presidential administration, Vyacheslav Volodin, said during a recent Valdai Discussion Club meeting in Sochi that “Putin is Russia and Russia is Putin,” he was expressing a profound Russian reality.	副总理沃洛金（Vyacheslav Volodin）在最近的索契（Sochi）瓦尔代辩论俱乐部（Valdai Discussion Club）会议上说“普京就是俄罗斯，俄罗斯就是普京。 ”他说出了一个意义深远的俄罗斯现实。


In no other country has the ruler’s persona – from Catherine the Great and Ivan the Terrible to Lenin and Stalin – made such a deep mark on national history.	没有哪个国家，统治者的个人形象可以对国家历史产生如此深的印记——从凯瑟琳大帝和伊凡雷帝到列宁和斯大林。


But Putinism cannot be reduced to sheer lust for power.	但不能把普京贬低为只是无穷尽地追求权力。


Putin knows that Russia’s reemergence on the global stage must be underpinned by a counterpoint to American exceptionalism, a national identity based on a distinct conception of history and distinct ideals.	普京知道，俄罗斯在世界舞台上的重新崛起必须以和美国例外论作对为基础。 美国例外论这一民族身份的历史概念理想基础都和俄罗斯不同。


As Putin declared last year, the Soviet Union’s collapse dealt a “devastating blow” to Russia’s “cultural and spiritual codes,” and subsequent “attempts to civilize Russia from abroad” amounted to “primitive borrowing.”	去年，普京声称苏联的解体是对俄罗斯的“文化和精神”的“灾难性打击”，随后“从海外让俄罗斯文明化的尝试”导致了“原始借贷”。


Instead of expecting a new national ideology to emerge on its own, Russia must pursue and develop its unique identity – with Putin leading the way.	普京不能期待新民族思想会自我产生，而必须追求和发展独特的身份——在普京的领导下。


Securing a place for Russia in a new world order is integral to establishing such an identity.	在新世界秩序中确保俄罗斯的一席之地是建立这一身份的必要条件之一。


To this end, Putin has maximized the foreign-policy value of Russia’s vast oil and gas reserves, enabling the Kremlin to build partnerships with rising Asian powers, especially China.	在这方面，普京实现了俄罗斯巨大的油气储备的外交政策价值最大化，也让克里姆林宫与崛起的亚洲大国（尤其是中国）得以构建关系。


If, as some Russian officials have proposed, Russia begins an identity-defining large-scale project to develop its immense territory east of the Ural Mountains, including Siberia and the Far East, it would have a unique opportunity to deepen these connections further.	如果——如一些俄罗斯官员所提出的——俄罗斯开始一项大规模身份构建工程以开发广袤的乌拉尔山以东领土（包括西伯利亚和远东），它就有了进一步深化这些联系的独特机会。


More broadly, Putin’s defiance of US hegemony could attract support from countries and peoples worldwide that resent American-imposed values and norms.	光广泛地说，普京对美国霸权的挑战可以吸引反对美国施加的价值与规范的国家和民族的支持。


Indeed, for many international actors, Western notions of tolerance and political correctness – for example, acceptance of “non-traditional lifestyles,” such as homosexuality – are, in Putin’s words, an affront to the world’s “God-given diversity.”	事实上，对许多国际行动方来说，西方的宽容和政治正确概念——比如接受同性恋等“非传统生活方式”——用普京的话说，是对“神赐多样性”的侮辱。


But Putin is not merely preaching values.	但普京并非只是在布道。


The annexation of Crimea and continuing destabilization of Ukraine advance his broader ambition of resurrecting Russia’s cultural and political dominance in Eurasia and much of the former Soviet space.	吞并克里米亚和继续动摇乌克兰推进了他的更大野心——重塑俄罗斯在欧亚（Eurasia）和广大前苏联地区的文化和政治主宰地位。


In Putin’s view, the 1945 Yalta Agreement, which divided Europe into Soviet and Western spheres of influence, did not die; its borders simply moved eastward.	在普京看来，将欧洲分为苏联和西方两大势力范围的1945年雅尔塔协议并没有死去； 只是边界有所东移。


Tellingly, following a discussion of numerous global challenges at the recent Valdai meeting, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov identified a demonstration by ethnic Russians in Chișinău (Kishinev), Moldova’s capital, as the “most important question” to be addressed.	很能说明问题的是，在最近的瓦尔代会议上讨论了大量全球挑战后，外交部长拉夫罗夫（Sergei Lavrov）将摩尔多瓦首都基希纳乌俄罗斯族游行称为有待解决的“最重要问题”。


Putin’s Russia is anything but shy when it comes to ethnic unity.	普京的俄罗斯在种族团结问题上毫不含糊。


Of course, the West – particularly the US – bears its share of responsibility for the failure to find a diplomatic solution to the current showdown with Russia.	当然，西方——特别是美国——也需要为没能找到外交途径应对俄罗斯最近的摊牌行为负责。


Before a lasting peace can be achieved, the US will need to reflect on the mistakes that characterized its post-Cold War period of hegemony, when its unilateral military adventures and neo-imperial ambitions left it overstretched, highly indebted, and locked in perpetual war.	在能够实现持续和平之前，美国需要反思其后冷战时代霸权主义的错误——其单边军事行动和新帝国主义野心使其战线过长、负债累累，还陷入了持续不断的战争。


Without such introspection, the US and its European allies will probably continue to depend on economic sanctions to deter Russian aggression.	不进行这样的反省，美国及其欧洲梦游就有可能继续得依靠经济制裁威慑俄罗斯的侵略。


But, though this approach could weaken Putin’s legitimacy by limiting his ability to deliver economic prosperity, it could also result in an anti-Western nationalist backlash.	但是，尽管这一方针能够限制普京带来经济繁荣的能力，从而削弱他的合法性，但也会导致反西方民族主义的反弹。


Moreover, as Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov has shown, sanctions can be presented as a blessing, forcing the Kremlin to diversify Russia’s commodities-based economy.	此外，正如副总理舒瓦洛夫（Igor Shuvalov）所言，制裁或许是件好事，破事克里姆林宫实现俄罗斯基于大宗商品的经济的多样化。


National identities cannot be negotiated away; but diplomacy can dilute their aggressive manifestations.	民族身份不可能通过谈判解决； 但外交可以稀释民族身份的侵略性。


It is time for Russian and Western leaders to devise a grand bargain for peace in eastern Ukraine, one that goes beyond the Minsk Protocol to address the questions of global security and arms control that have impeded cooperation on issues like Syria’s civil war and Iran’s nuclear program.	俄罗斯和西方领导人应该就东乌克兰问题做一笔超过明斯克协议（Minsk Protocol）的大交易，以解决阻挠叙利亚内战和伊朗核计划等问题上的合作的全球安全和武器控制问题。


Russia does not need to upend the existing global order; it simply needs to find its place.	俄罗斯不需要颠覆已有的全球秩序； 它只需要找到自己的位置。


And the US must let it.	而美国必须让它实现这一目标。


Russian Realities	俄罗斯的现实


At first glance, Russia bears many of the hallmarks of a great power.	从表面上看，俄罗斯具有大国列强的许多特征。 它拥有大规模原子武器库；


It possesses a large arsenal of nuclear weapons, a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, enormous reserves of oil and other minerals, a recent record of robust economic growth, and more territory than any other country despite being only three-fourths the size of the former Soviet Union.	近来经济增长强劲； 尽管只是前苏联四分之三大小，但其领土面积仍然大于其他任何国家。


Closer inspection, however, reveals a different Russia.	但是，进一步观察就可以揭示一个不同的俄罗斯。


Much of its wealth reflects the increased value of energy, not productive economic activity.	其大部分财富反映的是增加的能源价值，而非生产性经济活动。


Russia’s armed forces are able to project little in the way of usable military might.	俄罗斯的武装力量在可以使用调遣的军事力量上无所作为。


The country’s population now numbers less than Pakistan’s and is declining by 500,000 people per year, leaving large portions of its vast landmass mostly uninhabited.	该国的人口数量小于巴基斯坦，而且每年减少50万人，其广袤国土的大部分地区荒无人烟。


Male life expectancy is now less than 60 years, owing to alcoholism, crime, drugs, disease, and a dreadful public health system.	由于酗酒、犯罪、毒品、疾病以及糟糕的公共健康体系，其男性寿命预期低于60岁。


All this adds up to a Russia that, if not quite a Potemkin state, is anything but great.	所有这些表明，俄罗斯即使不是外强中干，也称不上一个强国。


There are limits to what Russia can accomplish in the world in any positive sense, although its capacity to be a spoiler or create problems is considerable.	尽管其制造麻烦绰绰有余，但在国际舞台上取得任何积极成就委实勉为其难。


Decisions made in Moscow can affect world energy prices, the future of the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, and the success of terrorists.	莫斯科的决定可以影响国际能源价格、伊朗和北朝鲜的核计划以及恐怖份子的成功。


For better and for worse, Russia still matters.	无论好坏，俄罗斯依然不可低估。


But how much will it matter?	但是，俄罗斯究竟有多重要？


One question concerns political stability.	问题之一涉及政治稳定。


In order to remain intact and functional, the country needs a political system and a society that persuade talented young people to stay in Russia – and that provides them with the education to develop their talent.	为维护国家完整以及正常运转，该国需要建立可以挽留富有才华的年轻人、并给他们提供教育以施展才华的政治体系和社会。


There also must be limits on the power of the central government and the presidency, a degree of regions autonomy, and rule of law – in short, the rudiments of a modern state and democracy.	必须对中央政府和总统的权力加以限制，还要有地方自治和法治。 简而言之，必须具备现代国家和民主的雏形。


Alas, Russia is moving more in the opposite direction; political power is becoming more, not less, concentrated.	然而，俄罗斯却南辕北辙； 政治权力的集中变本加厉。


The economic picture is similarly uncertain.	其经济现状也不明朗。


High energy prices are a boon to Russia’s economy, but, as is often the case in the Middle East and other oil- and gas-rich regions, they can be a burden as well, feeding corruption and discouraging real economic activity.	俄罗斯受益于居高不下的能源价格，但是，正如中东和其他油气资源丰富的地区一样，高能源价格往往助长腐败、抑制真正的经济活动，因此也可以转而成为负担。


The challenge for Russia’s leaders is to use its oil wealth to educate Russia’s people and rebuild Russia’s infrastructure, thereby ensuring global competitiveness and employment growth.	俄罗斯领导人面临的挑战是利用其石油财富教育人民和重建基础设施，从而确保其全球竞争力和就业增长。


Russia also needs a national security strategy to complement its political and economic renewal.	俄罗斯还需要一个全国安全战略以补充其政治和经济复苏。


All stick and little carrot has failed to quell Chechen nationalism, and President Vladimir Putin’s similarly heavy-handed attempts to control Russia’s so-called “near abroad” – as in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution – have proven no more successful.	毫无怀柔可言的高压政策并未平息车臣的民族主义，弗拉基米尔·普京总统在乌克兰橙色革命中用类似的高压手段意图控制俄罗斯所谓的“近外邻”也收效甚微。


Nor will any posture succeed that seeks to put Russia forward as a geopolitical counterweight to the United States.	任何将俄罗斯强装为美国的地缘政治劲敌的企图也无法成功。


Such a strategy might be politically satisfying to some, but Russia lacks the resources to compete with the US and needs good bilateral relations in order to proceed with its own internal transformation.	对于某些人而言，这种战略在政治上可能是令人满意的，但是俄罗斯缺乏同美国竞争的资源，而且它需要良好的双边关系以便继续进行其自身的内部变革。


At the same time, the best way to help bring about a more liberal Russia – one that promises to be more stable at home and more responsible abroad – is by working with it.	与此同时，促成俄罗斯更为自由开明的最佳手段是同其合作。 这样，俄罗斯国内局势更为稳定，对外更为负责。


The outside world can and should support the strengthening of civil society, independent media, and a true transfer of political power in 2008.	外部世界可以而且应当支持强化公众社会、独立媒体以及在2008年真正的政治权力转移。


Isolating Russia makes no sense.	孤立俄罗斯于事无补。


Russian membership in the World Trade Organization has the potential to strengthen the rule of law, combat corruption, and give Russia a stake in better relations with the outside world.	俄罗斯加入世界贸易组织可以加强法治、打击腐败，与外部世界保持良好关系与其休戚相关。


Closer ties between Russia and the European Union make sense for similar reasons.	同理，更为紧密的俄罗斯和欧盟的关系是有益的。


There should also be some understanding for what Russia and the Russian people have gone through over the past two decades.	应当理解俄罗斯及其人民在过去二十年中经历的事情。


Losing a country and a special place in the world is the sort of trauma that could lead to the emergence of extreme and potentially violent nationalism.	国家消亡以及丧失特殊的国际地位令人痛楚，并可能导致出现极端和潜在暴力性的民族主义。


Russia should be treated as a major power, which means consultations on important global issues.	应当以主要大国的身份对待俄罗斯。


Its voice should be heard on matters ranging from terrorism and weapons proliferation to global climate change and energy policy.	这意味着在重要的全球事务上与其磋商���应当让它在恐怖主义、武器扩散、全球气候变化和能源政策等问题上发表看法。


Next year’s G-8 meeting in Russia provides an opportunity to do all of this and more.	明年在俄罗斯举行的工业八强首脑会议为此以及进一步的行动提供了一个机会。


Amid all the attention being devoted to China and the potential for competition or even conflict with the US, it should not be forgotten that Russia’s future hangs in the balance, for history suggests that declining powers can pose as great a challenge to world order as rising ones.	如今，世界对中国及其同美国竞争甚至是冲突的可能性颇为关注。 但是，不应忘记俄罗斯前途难料，因为历史表明，衰败中的列强对世界所构成的挑战不亚于正在崛起的强国。


One need only consider Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Turkey at the start of the twentieth century or the former Yugoslavia at its end.	人们只要看看二十世纪初叶奥匈帝国和奥托曼帝国以及前南斯拉夫瓦解之前的历史就可以知道。


So far, the decline of what was the Soviet Union has proceeded relatively well; Russia, the principal successor state, has avoided all-out civil war and war with its neighbors.	迄今为止，前苏联的衰落相对平缓。 作为前苏联主要继承国家，俄罗斯避免了全面内战以及同邻邦的战争。


But the challenge of integrating Russia remains.	但是，将俄罗斯融入国际社会的挑战依旧存在。


At best, Russia is a potential partner in the effort to manage globalization’s challenges; at worst, it is a potential problem.	最好的局面是俄罗斯成为管理全球化挑战的潜在伙伴； 最坏的局面是它成为潜在的问题。


What is certain is that how Russia develops will be a key factor determining the character of this century, no less than the last.	明确不过的是，俄罗斯如何演变将是决定本世纪大局的一个关键因素，其重要程度并不亚于上世纪。


The Russian Threat Runs Out of Fuel	俄罗斯威胁气数将尽


BRUSSELS – For Europe, the defining event of 2014 was Russia’s annexation of Crimea and military intervention in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.	布鲁塞尔—对欧洲来说，2014年的定性事件是俄罗斯吞并克里米亚和军事干预东乌克兰顿巴斯地区。


The Kremlin’s actions directly challenged key principles that have guided Europe for more than six decades, particularly the renunciation of the use of force to alter national borders.	克里姆林宫的行为直接挑战了六十多年来欧洲的关键指导原则，特别是不再使用武力改变国家边界的原则。


But Russia is in no position to sustain its aggressive foreign policy.	但俄罗斯的侵略性外交政策难以为继。


It has often been argued that Russia was reacting to the perceived encroachment on its “near abroad” by the European Union and NATO.	一个时常出现的论点是，俄罗斯在对其所认定的欧盟和北约入侵其“近邻”的行为做出反应。


But history suggests a simpler explanation: A decade of steadily rising oil prices had emboldened Russia, leaving it ready to seize any opportunity to deploy its military power.	但历史告诉我们一个更加简单的解释：十年来石油价格的稳步上涨培养了俄罗斯的野心，使它准备抓住一切机会部署其军事力量。


Indeed, the Soviet Union had a similar experience 40 years ago, when a protracted period of rising oil revenues fueled an increasingly assertive foreign policy, which culminated in the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.	事实上，40年前的苏联也有过类似的经验，当时，长时期的石油收入增加助长了日益激进的外交政策，其顶峰就是1979年入侵阿富汗。


Oil prices quadrupled following the first oil embargo in 1973, and the discovery of large reserves in the 1970s underpinned a massive increase in Soviet output.	1973年首次石油禁运后，油价翻了四倍，而20世纪70年代大规模储量的发现极大地增加了苏联石油产出。


As a result, from 1965 to 1980, the value of Soviet oil production soared by a factor of almost 20.	结果，从1965年到1980年，苏联石油产量飙升近20倍。


Burgeoning oil wealth bolstered the regime’s credibility – not least by enabling a significant increase in military spending – and rising economic and military strength gave the Soviet Union’s geriatric leadership a rejuvenated sense of invulnerability.	源源不断的石油财富提振了苏联政权的信誉——也让它能够大幅增加军事支出——而经济和军事实力的增加给了苏联老人领导层一种刀枪不入的焕然一新感。


The invasion of Afghanistan was not merely an improvised response to a local development (a putsch in Kabul); it was also a direct result of this trend.	入侵阿富汗并不只是针对地方发展态势（喀布尔动乱）的即兴之作； 它也是这一趋势的直接结果。


Putin’s reaction to the Euromaidan demonstrations in Ukraine followed a similar pattern.	普京对乌克兰亲欧示威的反应与之类似。


In both cases, a seemingly low-cost opportunity was viewed as yielding a large strategic gain – at least in the short run.	不论当时还是今日，一个看似低成本的机会被认为能带来巨大的战略收益——至少在短期是如此。


Indeed, while the devastating consequences of the Soviet Union’s Afghan adventure are now well known, at the time the invasion was viewed as a major defeat for the West.	事实上，尽管如今苏联入侵阿富汗所造成的灾难性后果已是众所周知，但在当时，入侵阿富汗被视为对西方的重大胜利。


The Soviet army’s retreat in 1988 is usually ascribed to the Afghan insurgency, led by Pakistan-trained mujahedeen with support from the United States.	1988年，苏军撤退，人们常常把这归因于由巴基斯坦训练的圣战者领导、获得美国支持的阿富汗叛军。


But the decline in oil prices during the 1980s, which cut the value of Soviet output to one-third of its peak level, undoubtedly played a role.	但20世纪80年代石油价格的下跌让苏联产出的价值骤减三分之二，这毫无疑问也是原因之一。


Indeed, it led to a period of extreme economic weakness – a key factor in the Soviet Union’s dissolution just three years after its withdrawal from Afghanistan.	事实上，这导致了一段经济极其疲软的时期——这也是苏联在从阿富汗撤军后仅仅三年便宣告解体的关键因素。


During the 1990s, Russia was too preoccupied with its own post-Soviet political turmoil to object to EU or NATO enlargement to the east.	20世纪90年代，俄罗斯忙于应付后苏联时期国内政治动荡，无暇反对欧盟或北约向其东部边界扩张。


Nor did it have the wherewithal, as its own production and oil prices continued to decline, hitting a trough of $10 per barrel in 1999-2000.	它也没有必要的资金，因为其石油产出和油价都在持续下跌，1999—2000年间跌到了10美元/桶的谷底。


Russia’s stance changed gradually during the early 2000s, as world oil prices – and Russian output – recovered, reinvigorating the country’s economic base at a time when its leadership was becoming increasingly autocratic.	俄罗斯的立场从21世纪初开始逐渐转变，与此同时，世界石油价格——以及俄罗斯的产出——也出现了复苏，这重振了俄罗斯的经济基础，而它的领导层也变得越来越极权。


Only then did Russia start to claim that the US and its European allies had offered some implicit pledge not to expand NATO eastward.	此后，俄罗斯才开始宣称美国及其欧洲盟国曾经做过北约不东扩的间接承诺。


With oil prices steadily rising, the value of Russian oil production reached a new peak, roughly ten times the 1999 level, in 2008; Russia invaded Georgia the same year.	随着油价的稳步攀升，俄罗斯石油产量的价值达到了新高峰，2008年大约比1999年增加了九倍。 同一年，俄罗斯入侵格鲁吉亚。


Though prices collapsed during the Great Recession of 2009, they quickly recovered, with the value of Russian output reaching another peak in 2012-2013 – precisely when Russia’s position on the EU-Ukraine association agreement hardened.	尽管2009年大衰退时期油价出现了崩盘，但随后又迅速恢复，俄罗斯产出的价值在2012—2013年达到了又一顶峰——这也正是俄罗斯对欧盟-乌克兰入盟协议态度开始强硬的时候。


Given that the EU and Ukraine had already been negotiating the deal for more than two years, without much reaction from Russia, the EU was blindsided by the Kremlin’s sudden sharp objections.	欧盟和乌克兰在两年多前就已开始谈判该协议，俄罗斯对此并没有多大的反应，因此，克里姆林宫突然表现出激烈反对让欧盟措手不及。


Clearly, Russia’s attitude toward its near abroad is not quite as erratic as it may seem.	显然，俄罗斯对其东邻的态度并非如表面上看起来那样飘忽不定。


When oil prices rise, Russia expresses its latent resentments more aggressively, often employing its military.	当石油价格上涨时，俄罗斯会更加激进地表达被压抑的不满，通常的方式是部署军队。


Moreover, at higher prices, the oil industry crowds out other export sectors that support open markets and a less aggressive foreign policy.	此外，在油价较高时，石油行业会挤出支持开放市场和更温和外交政策的其他出口部门。


The Soviet war in Afghanistan was followed by a long-term decline in oil prices.	苏联对阿富汗动武后遇上了油价的长期下跌。


The recent price slide – to $50-60 per barrel, halving the value of Russia’s oil production – suggests that history is about to repeat itself.	而最近的暴跌——跌至50—60美元/桶，令俄罗斯石油产量价值减少了一半——表明历史大有重演之势。


And oil prices are not Russia’s only problem.	而油价并非俄罗斯唯一的问题。


Western sanctions, which seemed to constitute only a pinprick a few months ago, appear to have inflicted serious damage, with the ruble having lost nearly half its value against the US dollar last year.	西方制裁在几个月前看上去还无关痛痒，如今似乎已经造成了严重伤害，去年卢布兑美元几乎贬值了一倍。


Though financial markets will calm down when the ruble’s exchange rate settles into its new equilibrium, Russia’s economy will remain weak, forcing the country’s leaders to make tough choices.	尽管金融市场将在卢布汇率进入新均衡时平静下来，但俄罗斯经济将继续萎靡，迫使俄罗斯领导人作出艰难抉择。


Against this background, a stalemate in the Donbas seems more likely than an outright offensive aimed at occupying the remainder of the region and establishing a land corridor to Crimea – the outcome that many in the West initially feared.	在这样的背景下，顿巴斯僵局更有可能是直接进攻，旨在占领该地区的其余部分并建立通往克里米亚的地面通道——这一结果是许多西方人曾经害怕的。


President Vladimir Putin’s new Novorossya project simply cannot progress with oil prices at their current level.	按照当前的油价水平，俄罗斯总统普京无法推进他的新诺沃罗思雅计划（Novorossya project）。


To be sure, Russia will continue to challenge Europe.	诚然，俄罗斯将继续挑战欧洲。


But no amount of posturing can offset the disintegration of the economy’s material base caused by the new equilibrium in the oil market.	但故作姿态终究无法抵消石油市场信均衡所导致的经济物质基础的崩溃。


In this sense, the US has come to Europe’s rescue in a different way: Its production of shale oil and gas is likely to play a greater role in keeping Russia at bay than NATO troops on Europe’s eastern borders.	从这个角度讲，美国以不一样的方式拯救了欧洲：其页岩油气生产实力也许可以比欧洲东部边界的北约军队更能制衡俄罗斯。


Russia’s Bo-Toxic President Returns	俄罗斯整容总统回归


MOSCOW – When a tsar is treated with mockery, rather than regarded with awe, it is time for him to consider retirement, or to prepare for a palace coup.	莫斯科——当沙皇受到的不是敬畏而是嘲笑时，他就是时候考虑退位或为宫廷政变做好准备了。


Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who intends to stage a glorious return to the Kremlin as President in the election scheduled for March next year, should reflect on that choice.	俄罗斯总理弗拉基米尔•普京应该考量下这个选择。 他有意在明年3月的大选中，光荣回归克林姆林宫担任总统。


This year began with a vigorous (by Russian standards) Internet petition urging Putin to take the first option.	今年年初，爆发了声势浩大（按照俄罗斯人的标准）的互联网请愿运动，敦促普京选择第一个选项。


Then the whole country laughed when, during his customary visit to a patriotic summer camp run by Nashi (a pro-Putin youth movement), he demonstrated his physical prowess by scaling a rock-climbing wall, only to find that he couldn’t climb down.	到由“纳什”（支持普京的青年运动组织）组织的爱国夏令营进行常规拜访期间，他想通过爬攀岩墙展示自己强健的体魄，结果发现自己爬不下了，全国上下笑声一片。


Now Russians wonder what has happened to their leader’s face.	现在俄罗斯人好奇，其领导人的脸怎么了。


His new smooth-faced appearance has sparked rumors of Botox, or even plastic surgery.	他光滑的新脸蛋带来了他注射肉毒杆菌毒素，甚至进行过整容的谣言。


Vampire jokes abound.	吸血鬼玩笑比比皆是。


Recently, during a dive in the waters at Krasnodar, in southern Russia, Putin miraculously salvaged two ancient Greek urns.	最近，在俄罗斯南部克拉斯诺达尔水域潜水期间，普京奇迹般地挽救了两个古希腊的骨灰盒。


Russians’ laughter turned Homeric when Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, inexplicably announced that the urns had been placed there to give Putin a sense of importance.	当普京的发言人德米特里•帕斯科夫令人不解地宣布，那骨灰盒放在那里是为了体现普京的重要性时，俄罗斯人哈哈大笑起来。


If I didn’t take the incompetence of the Russian state at face value, I might suspect a conspiracy to discredit Putin.	如果我没有看到俄罗斯的无能，我可能会怀疑这是有意让普京颜面扫地。


For, make no mistake: Putin has been discredited.	的确没错：普京名誉受损。


After a recent martial-arts match between an American and a Russian, Putin, a judo enthusiast, stepped into the ring to congratulate the Russian victor, a member of his United Russia party.	最近，一名美国人和一名俄罗斯人进行了武术比赛，比赛结束后，普京（柔道爱好者）进入了比赛场地，祝贺那名俄罗斯获胜者，这名俄罗斯人是统一俄罗斯党的成员。


The audience screamed wildly, “Putin, go home!” until he did.	观众都大喊，“普京，走开”，直到他离去。


Politics, the crowd seemed to say, should be taken out of sports – and Putin out of politics.	观众似乎在说，体育运动中不应该有政治，普京应该退出政坛。


Putin thinks that his stunts are essential to governance.	普京觉得自己引人注目的举动对治理必不可少。


He has kissed dolphins and babies, saved tigers and journalists, and posed bare-chested on horseback and on foot in the Siberian wilderness.	他亲过海豚和婴儿，救过老虎和记者，袒胸骑在马背上，在西伯利亚森林中漫步。


But Putin the performer cannot abide a bad review.	但是普京这位表演者无法容忍恶评。


Embarrassed by the judo fiasco, he canceled all of his subsequent unscripted public appearances.	柔道惨败，尴尬不已，随后他取消了所有没有经过精心安排的露面。


In fact, since that incident, Putin has attended just one event – the Congress of United Russia – where 600 delegates voted unanimously for his nomination as the party’s presidential candidate in 2012.	实际上，自那个插曲发生以来，普京只参加过一次大型活动——统一俄罗斯党的国会——在这里，600名代表一致提名他为该党的2012年总统候选人。


But the parliamentary elections held on December 4, which gave barely 50% to United Russia (Putin used to be able to guarantee about 70%), had to be fiercely controlled, with an overwhelming police presence.	但是在12月4日举行的议会选举中，统一俄罗斯党勉强得到了50%的选票（普京曾经能够保证得到约70%的选票）。 这次议会选举还受到了严格控制，周边部署了大量警力。


Observers were harassed and obstructed, and monitoring Web sites were shut down or hacked by the government.	观察人员受到了迫害，监测网站被政府关闭或遭到了政府黑客的攻击。


An elections-observing mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe noted that “most parties have expressed a lack of trust in the fairness of the electoral process.”	欧洲安全与合作组织的一个选举观察团指出“大多数政党对这次选举过程的公正性缺乏信任”。


Putin’s extravagant vanity has severely undermined the strongman image that he has spent the last 12 years building.	普京极大的虚荣心严重破坏了其在过去12年树立起来的强人形象。


After all, narcissistic publicity stunts and facelifts – which worked well for his friend Silvio Berlusconi in Italy (until they didn’t) – don’t inspire fear, or even respect, among Russians, where an iron-fisted ruler is always the preferred choice.	毕竟，在公众面前走秀，进行整容，自我陶醉其中——他的朋友西尔维奥•贝卢斯科尼在意大利这样做受到了很好的效果（后来也不是这样了）——不会让俄罗斯人害怕，甚至得不到俄罗斯人的尊重，在俄罗斯，强硬的统治者常常是宠儿。


So now Putin’s image as the hard man of politics has been lost forever.	因此，如今，普京在政治方面的强人形象已经一去不复返。


It is difficult to assume a despotic countenance when you can’t move your eyebrows.	当你无法移动眉毛时，装出专横的表情就很困难了。


Indeed, Russians heckle Putin not because he has turned Russia into an industrial banana republic, where exports of oil and other commodities sustain a quasi-authoritarian state, but because he no longer inhabits his role convincingly.	实际上，俄罗斯人刁难普京不是因为他把俄罗斯转变成了工业香蕉共和国（石油以及其他大宗商品的出口支持了这个半独裁国家），而是因为他扮演的角色不再令人信服。


All the same, the origin of discontent with Putin is irrelevant; the desire for freedom has to start somewhere.	同理，对普京的不满根源无关紧要，自由的愿望必须从某个地方兴起。


So long as Russians feel empowered to confront the regime, even if only with contempt and laughter, there is hope for change.	只要俄罗斯人觉得有权利对抗该政权，即使只是通过鄙视和嘲笑，俄罗斯就还有变革的希望。


And now, with the election results inciting the largest protests since the collapse of the Soviet Union, that hope is growing.	如今的选举结果导致了苏联解体之后最大的示威抗议，变革的希望也越来越大。


When a tsar loses his image of omnipotence, he eventually loses his grip on authority.	当沙皇失去无所不能的形象时，他最终将无法进行专制统治。


After Putin’s long-running melodrama, the Kremlin’s options for a sequel are quite limited.	普京的传奇大戏之后，克林姆林宫写续篇的选择空间非常有限。


Everyone expects that the current president, the puppet Dmitry Medvedev, to switch roles with Putin after the March elections.	人人都预测，明年3月份大选之后，现任傀儡总统德米特里•梅德韦杰夫与普京将转换角色。


But waiting in the wings is former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, who could replace Medvedev should Russia need a factotum of sincerity about economic reform.	但是候选人还有前财长阿列克谢•库德林，如果俄罗斯需要一位对经济改革满怀热情、鞠躬尽瘁的人，他倒可以接替梅德韦杰夫。


Kudrin’s reputation for placid competence might just buy Putin some extra time.	库德林以心平气和著称，这或许可以为普京争取一些额外的时间。


But, in Putin’s eyes, this is an unlikely scenario.	但是，在普京看来，这种情况是不可能的。


The once and future president argues that he has already made Russia stronger, and that, as financial uncertainty grips much of the developed world in 2012, the country has become an island of stability envied by many.	这位即将重登总统宝座的前总统表示，他已经使俄罗斯更加强大，2012年，在大多数发达国家的金融存在不确定的情况下，俄罗斯已经成为了稳定的国度，令许多国家羡慕不已。


Perhaps, but it is difficult to be a heroic leader and the butt of popular jokes simultaneously.	或许是如此，但是成为公众笑柄的人很难成为伟大的领导人。


Putin is often compared to Joseph Stalin, but nowadays, as the 20th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s collapse at the end of 1991 approaches, he looks increasingly like Leonid Brezhnev – the symbol of a political system that is well past its expiry date.	人们常常拿约瑟夫•斯大林与普京做比较，但是如今，在苏联（1991年底解体）解体20周年纪念日临近之际，他似乎越来越像勃列日涅夫了——与帝国时代格格不入的政治制度的象征。


All that is missing are the jowls.	只是少个下巴而已。


Russia\u0027s Coming Financial Crash	金融风暴将临俄罗斯


WASHINGTON, DC – Today, the whole world is being hit by a tremendous financial crisis, but Russia is facing a perfect storm.	华盛顿特区—当今，全世界正遭受着一次金融危机的重创，但俄罗斯更是面临着一场完美风暴。


The Russian stock market is in free fall, plummeting by 60% since May 19, a loss of $900 billion.	俄罗斯的股市自5月19日以来如自由落体般暴跌60%，市值损失9000亿美金。


And the plunge is accelerating.	而且这种下跌趋势还在加剧。


As a result, Russia’s economic growth is likely to fall sharply and suddenly.	其结果是俄罗斯的经济增长率也会突然猛降。


One problem is that, after a long period of fiscal prudence, Russia’s government has shown extraordinary ineptitude.	有一个问题是，在长期的财政审慎之后，俄罗斯政府的表现及不称职。


Russia has enjoyed average annual economic growth of 7% since 1999.	自1999年以来，俄罗斯的平均经济年增长率为7%。


With huge current-account and budget surpluses, it had accumulated international reserves of $600 billion by July.	在拥有巨额经常项目和预算盈余的情况下，到今年7月为止它已经积累了6000亿美金的外汇储备。


Its public debt was almost eliminated.	其公共债务几乎偿清。


But the open economy that has bred Russia’s economic success requires the maintenance of sensible policies to succeed.	但这个孕育了俄罗斯经济成功的开放经济体需要英明政策的维护才能继续成功。


The initial American financial crisis barely touched Russia, but the global economic slowdown brought about a decline in oil and other commodity prices by more than one-third since July, which was a big blow.	最初的美国金融危机几乎没有影响到俄罗斯，但全球经济放缓导致油价和其他商品价格自7月以来降幅超过了三分之一。 这是沉重的一击。


All the other hits, however, have been self-inflicted.	然而所有其他的打击则是（俄罗斯）咎由自取。


The Russian financial crisis is high drama, best described as a tragedy in five acts.	俄罗斯金融危机极富戏剧性，简直可以被描述为一出五幕悲剧。


On July 24, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin initiated the first act by fiercely attacking, without evidence, the timid owner of the giant coal and steel company Mechel for price-gouging and tax evasion.	7月24日，总理普京拉开了第一幕。 他在毫无证据的情况下，以价格欺诈和逃税为由对巨型煤钢公司Mechel怯懦的所有人发动了猛烈的攻击。


In three days, Mechel’s shares lost half their value, triggering the Russian stock market’s decline.	在三天之内，Mechel的相关股值蒸发了一半，从了触发了俄罗斯股市的下跌。


Then, on August 8, Putin launched the second act of this Russian tragedy, his long-planned attack on Georgia.	然后，在8月8日普京又导演了俄罗斯悲剧的第二幕—发动对格鲁吉亚蓄谋已久的进攻。


Shockingly, Russia argued that it had the right to attack a country that harbored people to whom it had just issued passports, scaring all countries with Russian minorities.	令人震惊的是，俄罗斯争辩说自己有权进攻一个庇护某些人的国家。 而这些人刚刚收到了俄罗斯颁发的护照。


By recognizing the “independence” of the two occupied territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia turned the whole world against it.	这些言辞使所有以俄罗斯人为少数民族的国家感到恐惧。 通过承认两个被占领土，阿布哈兹和南奥塞梯的“独立”，俄罗斯又冒天下之大不韪。


Russia’s leaders have earned a reputation for being unreliable, quixotic, and unpredictable, but markets like trustworthiness, stability, and predictability.	俄罗斯的领导人们素有不可靠、多变和难以捉摸的名声。 但市场青睐的却是可信度、稳定性和可预测性。


Not surprisingly, foreign investors no longer favor Putin’s Russia.	因而外国投资者不再钟情于普京的俄罗斯也就不足为奇了。


Within a week of its attack on Georgia, Russia recorded a capital outflow of $16 billion, which has since increased to $30 billion.	在进攻格鲁吉亚的那一周之内，俄罗斯就出现了160亿美元的资本外流，自那时起外流总额已高达300亿美金。


This is a small sum relative to Russia’s currency reserves, but plenty for the underdeveloped banking system, which experienced a severe credit squeeze.	虽然相对俄罗斯的货币储备这只是一个小数目，但对于该国欠发达的银行体系而言这已属巨额，并由此造成了银行系统的信贷紧缩。


Putin continues to deny that Russia’s financial problems were caused by his war in Georgia, and it took the Central Bank more than a month to provide substantial liquidity injections.	普京继续否认他对格鲁吉亚的战争造成了俄罗斯的金融问题。 俄央行花了一个多月的时间才为市场注入了足够的流动性。


But it was already too late, as the liquidity problem had become a matter of solidity.	但随着流动性的问题变成经营能力的问题，央行的举措也为时已晚。


Overtly, Russian stock valuations look attractive, but by heaping abuse on foreigners, Putin has scared them away, while Russian investors have no money at hand.	表面上看，俄罗斯的股票估值似乎具有吸引力，但普京对外国人的肆意揉搓让他们退避三舍，而俄罗斯投资者的手里又没有资金。


With every statement, Putin erodes Russia’s political risk profile.	普京的每一次声明都使俄罗斯政治风险形象雪上加霜。


As is customary, many Russian businessmen pledged their shares to borrow money for stock purchases.	作为一种惯例，许多俄罗斯商人都通过抵押股票的方式贷款炒股。


As the stock market dives, they receive margin calls and are being forced to sell their shares at ever-lower prices, causing the stock market’s downward spiral to accelerate.	随着股票市场下跌，他们都收到了追加保证金的通知并被迫以越来越低的价格抛售股票，从而又使股市螺旋下挫的趋势进一步加剧。


In Soviet fashion, the Moscow stock exchanges closed for four days in a row in the week of September 15, because stocks plunged too fast.	按苏联式的传统，由于股票跌势过猛，莫斯科股票交易所在9月15的那周连续休市4天。


By denying the problem, the authorities have aggravated the lack of confidence.	由于有关当局否认这一问题，致使（市场）信心不足的情况进一步恶化。


On international financial markets, the war in Georgia has rendered Russian debt and bonds toxic.	在国际金融市场上，对格鲁吉亚的战争使俄罗斯债务和债券成为毒药。


Interest rates on Russia’s bonds have risen by 2-3 percentage points, and many Russian creditors no longer have access to international capital markets.	俄罗斯债券的利率已经上升了2-3个百分点，许多俄罗斯债权人已经不再能进入国际资本市场。


Russia is just about to enter the third act of this tragedy, a banking crisis.	俄罗斯正要进入其悲剧的第三幕，一场银行业危机。


Numerous medium-sized banks, and some large ones, are set to go under in the stock-market turmoil.	无数的中型银行和一些大型银行即将在股市动荡中破产。


Too many big investors can no longer meet their margin calls, while borrowing costs have risen sharply.	许多大投资者无法再追加保证金，而贷款成本已经大幅上升。


The recent appreciation of the dollar adds to their hardship.	最近的美元升值使他们更加举步维艰。


In the fourth act, the real estate bubble will burst.	在第四幕中，房地产泡沫将会崩溃。


A reasonable guess would be that Moscow’s astronomic real-estate prices will fall by at least two-thirds.	一种较为合理的猜想是莫斯科不动产的天价至少会降低三分之二。


That will exacerbate the banking crisis.	那样一来又会加剧银行业危机。


In the fifth act, investment will seize up.	在第五幕中，投资将会停滞。


Why continue building when you can neither finance your investment nor sell real estate?	在既不能为投资融资又无法出售不动产的情况下，为何还要继续大兴土木呢？


Russian consumers are already scared and will cut their consumption, causing aggregate demand to contract.	俄罗斯的消费者们已经感到恐惧，他们会减少消费，从而使总体需求压缩。


In the end, real economic growth will come to a screeching halt, perhaps as early as next year.	最后，真正的经济增长很可能会最早在明年急刹车。


Other factors are likely to aggravate the situation.	其他的因素将很可能使这种情况进一步恶化。


High-level corruption is so rampant that Russia appears unable to build major public infrastructure projects.	高层腐败如此泛滥，以至于俄罗斯似乎无法建设重要的公共基础设施项目。


Oil and other commodity prices are likely to fall further, and oil and gas production have already stagnated.	石油和其他商品价格很可能会进一步下跌，而石油和天然气生产也已陷入停滞。


Putin has turned his back on the World Trade Organization and is promoting protectionism, which will also harm growth.	普京与世界贸易组织已经分道扬镳，并正推行（贸易）保护主义，而这也会危害经济增长。


Strangely, the most solid parts of the Russian financial system are the state budget and the currency reserves, but it is too late for them to prevent this tragedy.  Neither arbitrary state intervention nor brutality will restore investor confidence.	奇怪的是，俄罗斯金融体系中最坚固的部分却是国家预算和货币储备。 但这些也都无力回天。


The villain in this drama is Vladimir Putin, who has thrived on eight years of rapid growth generated by the market reforms of his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin.	这出戏中的恶棍就是弗拉季米尔·普京。 他在前任叶利钦实施的市场改革所带来的经济快速成长之上风光了8年。


Russia had a good chance to escape this international financial crisis, but, through his ruthlessness and ineptitude, Putin has rendered his poor country a prime victim.	俄罗斯曾大有机会逃出这场国际金融危机，但普京的冷酷和无能却使俄罗斯成为其首要的受害者。


How long Russia can afford such an expensive prime minister?	俄罗斯还能承受这位代价高昂的总理多久？


Russia\u0027s Culture of Contempt	俄罗斯的轻蔑文化


Once again, everyone wants to know, where is Russia heading?	再一次，每个人都想知道俄罗斯将何去何从。


The trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the possible bankruptcy of his company Yukos, Russia's biggest company, have incited cries that President Putin is returning the country to the bad old days of dictatorship.	米卡耶·克多可夫斯基一案，以及他旗下尤科斯这一俄罗斯最大公司的破产，已经促使人们抗议总统普京要将俄罗斯退回到以前的集权时代。


But in assessing where Russia is heading, political and economic analysis are of little help.	但在预计俄罗斯今后走向的问题上，政治和经济分析没有太大的用处。


It is Russia's social culture that is determining the country's fate.	俄罗斯的社会文化决定着这个国家的命运。


Russia's political system, indeed, is not what prevents the country from moving forward, and it never has been.	确实，俄罗斯的政治体制并不会阻挡这个国家前进的步伐，而且也从未起过什么不好的作用。


Whether Russians live under monarchy, communism, Yeltsin's cowboy market economy or Putin's supposed dictatorship of law, the result is always the same - the system despises its citizens, eliciting an equal and opposite reaction of derision and distrust.	无论俄罗斯是君主专制、共产主义，叶利钦的牛仔市场经济，还是普京所谓的法律专政，结果都是一样的――制度鄙视公民，从而在国民中引发了与之对等的嘲笑和缺乏信任。


Russian capitalism hates the consumer as much as Russian communism did.	俄罗斯资本主义对消费者的厌恶不亚于俄罗斯共产党。


Russia's people, whether they are waiters or waiting for service, are convinced that they will be ripped off and treated rudely, and so steel themselves with indifference.	俄罗斯人，无论是侍者或是被服务的人，都知道自己将会被欺骗并遭到无理对待，因此便以冷漠来武装自己。


Neither the system nor the people are to blame for this state of affairs.	这种情况，无论是制度还是人都不应受到指责。


It arises partly from the fact that Russia is an "imitation" culture.	其中部分原因在于俄罗斯是一个"模仿式"的文化。


Russia's first rulers were Nordic princes in the 860's, men invited to bring order to the country - even then, or so it seems, Russians didn't trust themselves to rule themselves effectively.	9世纪60年代，俄罗斯最初的统治者是日耳曼王子，他们被邀请到这里来建立秩序。 从那时起，至少看上去，俄罗斯并不相信他们能够很有效地管理自己的国家。


Sometimes, Russian imitation produces works of genius.	有时，俄罗斯的模仿也能够产生天才的作品。


After all, Pushkin and Gogol originally grew out of German and French models, although their sheer originality left the mimicry far behind.	毕竟普希金和果戈里原本出自德国和法国模式，但是他们的独创性大大超越了模仿的范畴。


But Russia is simply not as good at copying practical things like laws and economic models as it is at transforming cultural impulses into works of art with a Russian soul.	比起用俄罗斯的灵魂将文化灵感转化成艺术作品来，俄罗斯显然不擅长模仿诸如法律、经济模式等现实的东西。


Its practical borrowings are invariably stillborn, mostly because of the country's ingrained culture of contempt.	其现实中的借鉴无一例外的是死产，大部分原因在于这个国家根深蒂固的鄙视文化。


Consider Moscow, a highly seasoned imitator (though nowhere in the league of St. Petersburg, that baroque Italianate city on the Neva, as an urban mimic).	想一想莫斯科，这是一个很老练的模仿者（尽管比不上圣彼得堡那个涅瓦河畔模仿意大利的巴洛克风格城市）。


Moscow nowadays has all the trappings of high-end capitalism: Prada, Fouchon, Rolls Royce.	莫斯科现在充满了高档的资本主义的产物：普拉达、Fouchon, 劳斯莱斯。


Its Café des Artistes is as wonderful a French bistro as you will find.	其中的Café des Artistes是个极好的法式小酒馆。


But something is missing in the usual Russian way - proper utensils.	但依据正常的俄罗斯方式，有些东西被省略了――合适的餐具。


Ask a waiter for a steak knife and you will draw a look that suggests you've asked for a sword.	跟侍者要个切牛排的餐刀，侍者的眼神仿佛你要的是宝剑。


Some restaurants greet their customers with a guard who brusquely asks what they want, as if they came to buy stamps, not to have dinner.	有些餐馆一进门便有警卫粗鲁地询问顾客要什么，仿佛他们是来买图章，而不是来进餐的。


Of course, the guards know that their job is to ensure that everyone is safe and comfortable, but the Gulag-type notion of what a guard does is too embedded to be removed.	当然，这些警卫的工作是保证所有顾客的安全及舒适，但古拉格集中营的警卫形象却很难在人们心中摸去。


Their real job is to be "against" - and this time, it is the customers they are to be against.	他们真正的任务是"反对"――这一次，他们反对的是他们的顾客。


The very existence of other people breeds suspicion in Russian guards, and who is to say that they are completely wrong?	其他人的存在本身就能引起俄罗斯警卫们的警觉，而谁又能说他们绝对错了？


After all, contract killings and random shootings in restaurants are common affairs, and the idea of excessive protection from everyone goes back to Soviet days, when social contempt was cloaked in the guise of public safety.	毕竟，在餐馆里的买凶杀人以及随意射击是很普通的事。 这种人人自危的观念要追溯到苏联时代，那时候，社会歧视披着公共安全的外衣。


Small wonder, then, that Russians always cut corners, jump over fences, and never follow a path designated for walking - these paths were built not to make life easier for people, but to control them.	难怪苏联人常常抄捷径，跳围墙，却不走规定好的人行道――因为这些路并不为了人们的生活便利，而为了控制他们。


Indeed, fences and barriers in Russia are usually built where there should be a footpath.	确实，在俄罗斯，篱笆和路障经常搭建在本应该是道路的地方。


But perhaps the authorities are right to want to keep us in line.	也许，当权者们希望我们循规蹈矩是有道理的。


Anyone who has ever flown into Russia will know this scene: the moment the captain requests the passengers to remain seated until the plane comes to a complete stop, all the Russians on board will respond by immediately standing up and piling into the aisles as if it's their last chance to get out.	任何坐飞机去俄罗斯的人都看到过这样的情景：当机长要求乘客坐好，等待飞机完全停稳的时候，所有俄国人都会马上站起来，簇拥在走道上，仿佛这是他们最后的逃生机会。


They know in their bones that the system is out to get them, even if the system is represented by a commercial airliner from a foreign country.	他们从骨子里知道，他们的体制就是要控制他们。 尽管这次的体制是以外国的商业航空公司作代表。


The simplest things are complicated, and then destroyed, by this culture of suspicion and contempt.	在这种怀疑和鄙视的文化下，简单的事物也是复杂的，最终被破坏了。


I once went for lunch to a Swedish-style buffet in Moscow.	我曾经去过莫斯科的一个瑞典式自助餐厅。


The choice of food was great, a sort of post-modern typical Russian kasha: sushi, salad, borsht, meat, and cabbage.	那里有很丰富的食物，所谓后现代的俄罗斯麦片粥，寿司、色拉、罗宋汤、肉和卷心菜。


But customers received only a small saucer for this feast, and the principle of the smorgasbord - all you can eat - was jettisoned.	但面对这样的大餐，顾客们却只得到一个很小的碟子。 而这家瑞典自助餐厅里适用于所有食物的规矩是早被其他地方废弃的。


You were allowed to use the buffet only once.	你只能在餐厅里拿一次食物。


Customers - who know what a smorgasbord is - understandably try to stuff as much food as they can onto the tiny saucer, sushi on top of roast beef.	可以理解，熟悉这家餐厅的顾客们都尽量往自己的小碟子里添加食物，在烤牛排上顶着寿司。


If you dare to ask for a bigger plate or an extra helping, the waitress gives you that withering Soviet look - you want too much.	如果你胆敢要一个大盘子或者额外的帮助，服务小姐便会给你一个俄罗斯式的厌烦眼神――你要得太多了。


Soviet socialism thought its citizens unworthy of any form of service altogether; Russian capitalism doubts that you can control your appetites, so it wants to control them for you.	苏联的社会主义理论就是，其公民不值得享有任何形式的服务； 俄罗斯的资本主义怀疑你能否控制自己的饭量，因此它替你控制了。


In the end, there is very little difference.	总之，这两者没有任何差别。


And so Russia goes on, undertaking revolutionary changes and not changing at all.	俄罗斯就这么继续着，进行着惊天动地的革命，但却什么都改变不了。


Incurable suspicion, mutual fear, ubiquitous contempt - confirmed everyday in large and small ways - are our immutable social condition.	无药可治的猜忌，相互的恐惧，无处不在的鄙视，每天都在大大小小的地方存在着。 这就是我们一成不变的社会状况。


Russia’s Economic Imperialism	俄罗斯的经济霸权主义


Russia’s use of natural gas to exert economic and political pressure on Ukraine has caused grave concern in the West.	俄罗斯用天然气对乌克兰实施经济和政治压力引起了西方严重的关切。


But Russia’s pressure on Georgia has been even heavier – and has scarcely been noticed.	但是，俄罗斯对格鲁吉亚的压力甚至还要巨大，几乎没人注意。


In Georgia, as in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin seeks to implement the doctrine of a “liberal empire” put forward in October 2003 by Anatoli Chubais, the chairman of United Energy System (RAO UES), Russia’s energy monopoly.	正如在乌克兰一样，俄国总统普京寻求在格鲁吉亚实施由俄罗斯电力垄断寡头－联合能源系统董事会主席丘拜斯在2003年10月提出的所谓“自由化帝国”主义。


According to Chubais, Russia will never find a place in either NATO or the European Union, so it must create an alternativeto both, a new empire of its own.	按照丘拜斯的设想，俄罗斯永远也不可能在北约或欧盟立足，所以它必须建立自己的一个帝国，与这两个组织分庭抗礼。


It can do this by using its huge and rich public-private monopolies to take over the key industries and economic institutions of former Soviet republics, thereby laying the groundwork for political domination.	俄罗斯可以通过利用其巨大和丰富的国营和私营垄断寡头接管前苏联共和国的关键产业和经济机构、进而为政治操纵奠定基础而实现这一目标。


The resulting empire will be liberal, according to Chubais’s definition, because it can be built with money rather than tanks.	根据丘拜斯的定义，由此建立起来的帝国将会是自由化的，因为它可以通过金钱、而不是坦克建立起来。


Russia’s first step in fulfilling this plan in the South Caucasus was directed against Armenia, its strategic partner in the region.	俄罗斯在南高加索实施这一规划的第一步针对其在该地区的战略伙伴亚美尼亚。


Seizing on a $93 million debt that Armenia owed to Russia, the Putin administration demanded payment in either cash or equity in Armenia’s major industries.	普京当局紧紧抓住亚美尼亚所欠俄罗斯的9300万美元债务，要求要么用现金支付，要么占有亚美尼亚的主要产业股权。


Cash-strapped Armenia had no alternative but to hand over the shares, which it did in a 2002 treaty candidly titled “Possessions in Exchange for Debt” – a reminder of the infamous “debt-for-equity” swaps of the Yeltsin years (another Chubais invention), which spawned Russia’s oligarchs.	手头拮据的亚美尼亚无计可施，只得在2002年通过美其名曰“消债占有协议”交出股份。 这一协议让人想起叶利钦时代引发寡头统治的、臭名昭著的“债转股”交换（丘拜斯的又一创新）。


Russia’s second step in rebuilding its empire in the Caucasus is to unite itself and Armenia in a single economic zone.	俄罗斯在高加索重建帝国的第二步是与亚美尼亚建立单一经济区。


Because Georgia stands directly in the geographical path to realizing this goal, Russia had to deal with it first.	由于格鲁吉亚直接位于实现其目标的地理通道上，俄罗斯不得不首先对付格鲁吉亚。


In the 1990’s, it used crude political pressure to bring Georgia into line, but it shifted to economic leverage in 2003.	在二十世纪九十年代，俄罗斯用粗暴的政治压力压迫格鲁吉亚就范，但是在2003年，它转向经济手段。


When US-based AES Silk Road failed to transform Georgia’s energy system, Chubais’s RAO UES bought AES’s holdings and other assets that amounted to 75% of the country’s electricity network.	当总部设在美国的AES丝绸之路未能将格鲁吉亚的能源系统转型之时，丘拜斯的联合能源系统购买了AES高达该国电力网络70％的控股以及其他资产。


Then came Georgia’s “Rose Revolution.”	随后格鲁吉亚爆发“玫瑰革命”。


Many state-owned firms were privatized for ten times the sums yielded in asset sales under the previous government of Edvard Shevardnadze.	前谢瓦尔德纳泽政府以资产出售十倍的价格将许多国营公司私有化。


But an utter lack of transparency allowed Russian companies, and their subsidiaries registered in third countries, to snap up most of the new offerings.	但是，暗箱操作使得俄罗斯公司及其在第三国注册的子公司统览了大部分新股发行。


Typical was the Russian holding company Promyslennye investory (Industrial Investors), which managed to get a major gold mine and then half of a plant producing gold alloys.	典型的例子是俄罗斯控股的产业投资者公司获得了一座大金矿，然后又取得一家生产金合金工厂的一半。


Russia’s main foreign policy instrument in Georgia is Gazprom, the state-controlled gas monopoly.	俄罗斯在格鲁吉亚的主要外交手段是国营的天然气垄断寡头－俄罗斯天然气工业公司。


Gazprom’s aim is to control not only the gas industry in Georgia, but also the only pipeline that feeds Russian gas to both Georgia and Armenia.	该公司的目的是不仅控制格鲁吉亚的天然气产业，而且控制将俄罗斯天然气输送到格鲁吉亚和亚美尼亚的唯一的天然气管道。


Had the US not intervened in 2005 with $49.5 million to rehabilitate the pipeline, it would have ended up in Gazprom’s hands.	如果不是美国用4950万美元干预来让这一管道起死回生，它就会落入该公司之手。


Even then, pressure from Moscow may result in joint Russian-Georgian control of the pipeline, if not its outright sale to Gazprom.	甚至在其后，来自莫斯科的压力即使不让该管道完全出售给俄罗斯天然气工业公司，可能也会形成俄罗斯和格鲁吉亚联合控制该管道的局面。


The Georgian government, without clear support from the West, may yet agree to such a deal, something that Moldova, which saw its gas cut off on January 1st, has just done.	格鲁吉亚政府由于没有西方的明确的支持，可能会同意这一交易。 摩尔多瓦的天然气供应在元旦被切断，刚刚同意了类似的交易。


Gazprom is not the only state entity carrying out Russian policy in the South Caucasus.	俄罗斯天然气工业公司并非在南高加索实施俄罗斯政策的唯一的国家实体。


In 2004, Russia’s state-owned Vneshtorgbank acquired a controlling stake in Armenia’s Armsberbank.	2004年，俄罗斯国营外贸银行获得了亚美尼亚Armsber银行的控制股份。


The following year, Vneshtorgbank purchased a controlling stake in the privatized United Georgian Bank, Georgia’s third largest.	第二年，外贸银行又获得格鲁吉亚第三大银行、私营的格鲁吉亚联合银行的控制股份。


In effect, Vneshtorgbank renationalized United Georgian Bank, but the new owner was the Russian state.	实际上，外贸银行将格鲁吉亚联合银行重新国有化，不过，新的主人却是俄罗斯。


Recently, Chubais’s RAO UES has had the lead role in integrating Georgia into Russia’s “liberal empire.”	最近，丘拜斯的联合能源系统在将格鲁吉亚融入俄罗斯的“自由化帝国”上一马当先。


When the Georgian authorities announced plans to privatize the Inguri Power Plant and renew construction of the long-stalled Khudoni Power Plant, slated to become Georgia’s largest, RAO UES immediately began staking out a dominant role for itself in both projects.	当格鲁吉亚政府宣布计划，将英古里水电厂私有化以及重新建造拖延已久的、将成为格鲁吉亚最大的古多尼电厂时，俄罗斯联合能源系统立即开始在这两个项目上大显身手。


The combination of massive pressure from the Russian side and silence from the West could leave Georgia’s entire power system – both gas and electricity – in Russian hands.	俄罗斯方面大力施压加之西方国家默不做声有可能会让格鲁吉亚的包括天然气和电力的整个能源系统落入俄罗斯��手。


Russia’s scheme to rehabilitate the rail line from its territory into the secessionist Georgian province of Abkhazia similarly mixes economics with neo-imperial aspirations.	俄罗斯计划重振从其领土到分裂主义的格鲁吉亚阿布哈兹省的铁路同样也把新帝国主义野心混合在经济事务里。


Even though it is focused on land that the United Nations recognizes as part of Georgia, the main beneficiaries of this project would be Russia and Armenia.	尽管这一项目集中在联合国所承认的格鲁吉亚的领土上，但是，这一项目的主要受益人将会是俄罗斯和亚美尼亚。


If the international community allows this scheme to go forward, it will have endorsed Russia’s effort to separate Abkhazia from Georgia.	如果国际社会允许落实这一项目，将会支持俄罗斯将阿布哈兹从格鲁吉亚分离出去的企图。


Parallel with this, Russia and Armenia are planning a new rail link to Iran.	与此同时，俄罗斯和亚美尼亚正在计划修建一条新的连接伊朗的铁轨。


Besides its obvious benefits to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s retrograde government, this will deftly weaken the South Caucasus’s links with the West, which the US and Europe have spent a decade fostering.	这一铁轨除了会明显让伊朗总统内贾德受益外，还将灵巧地削弱南高加索与西方的联系。 美国和欧洲花了十年时间培植这一联系。


Thus, Russia’s effort to entrap Georgia and its neighbors in the nets of its new “liberal empire” is part of a well coordinated attempt to reorient the South Caucasus as a whole towards the anti-Western coalition of Russia and Iran.	这样，俄罗斯将格鲁吉亚及其邻国诱入其新的“自由化帝国”之网并成为新的、将整个南高加索地区重新转向为俄罗斯和伊朗的反西方联合阵营的企图的一部分。


Western countries, and the US in particular, must provide firm backing and support to the South Caucasus to prevent Russia from realizing its destabilizing and dangerous neo-imperial dream.	西方国家、特别是美国必须向南高加索提供坚定的支持，以防止俄罗斯实现其破坏稳定以及危险的新帝国主义梦想。


Russia’s Eternal Inflation	俄罗斯无休无止的通货膨胀


In eternal Russia, nothing changes when it comes to monetary management.	俄罗斯的货币管理亘古不变。


Year after year, the Russian Central Bank (RCB) blames the weather, the poor harvest, or other non-monetary factors for its feeble performance in lowering the inflation rate.	年复一年，俄罗斯中央银行（RCB）把它在降低通货膨胀率方面虚软无力的表现归咎于天气、收成不好以及其他非货币因素。


Unlike many emerging-market and transition economies in the 1990’s, Russia did not abandon a fixed-exchange rate anchor in favor of an inflation-targeting regime as its guide to monetary-policy.	不同于上世纪90年代的许多新兴市场和过渡经济体，俄罗斯并没有为了通胀目标化政策而放弃固定汇率作为货币政策的导向。


As a result, the period since the financial crisis of 1998 has generated serious problems for monetary and exchange-rate policies.	结果，从1998年金融危机以来的这段时期，货币和汇率政策遇到了严重的问题。


Faced with a balance-of-payments surplus – largely thanks to high oil prices – the RCB’s 2005 Monetary Program fudges: reducing inflation is a priority, but so is exchange-rate targeting in order to support growth.	面对国际收支顺差——主要是依靠高油价，RCB在2005年的《货币计划》中呓语道：为了促进增长，降低通胀是首要任务，但汇率目标化也是。


This “just-do-it” approach works fine in the United States, for example, where the Federal Reserve has established its anti-inflationary credibility.	这种“不管三七二十一”的做法在例如美国等地是行得通的，因为美联储已经建立起自己的反通胀信用。


But the RCB’s track record since 1992 has done little to stabilize inflation expectations and to persuade businessmen, investors, government officials and ordinary Russians that it is genuinely focused on reining in price growth.	但是RCB从1992年以来的表现很难稳定人们对通胀的预期，难以让商人、投资者、政府官员和普通俄罗斯民众相信它的确在努力控制物价增涨。


During the early transition years, the lack of an effective monetary-policy framework reflected the challenge of establishing new institutions and regulations, as well as the difficulty of overcoming the legacy of central planning, under which budget and credit financing were indistinguishable.	过渡初期，有效货币政策框架的缺失反映了建立新制度和规则的难题，以及克服预算与信贷不分的中央计划经济遗留问题的困难。


Sometimes the RCB acted as the government’s banker, providing liquidity without considering the financial markets; at other times, it focused on the financial markets, providing liquidity to banks.	时而，RCB就像政府的银行，在不考虑金融市场的情况下提供流动资金； 时而，它又专注于金融市场，向银行提供流动资金。


In both cases, there is no link between inflation and interest rates.	两种情况下，通货膨胀和利率都没有联系。


To be sure, the muted impact of inflation on interest rates is not surprising in transition economies, where the mechanisms of monetary-policy transmission and financial intermediation took long periods to put in place and still need reform and regulation.	诚然，通货膨胀对利率的无声影响在过渡型经济体中很常见，因为货币政策传播和金融仲裁的机制要很长时间才能建设到位，而且仍需要改革和管理。


It is inevitably a long road from a starting point where credits are channeled to state-owned enterprises through state-owned banks to an economic environment in which interest rates are a proper indicator of monetary policy.	从一个通过国有银行将存款拨入国有企业的起点，到一个以利率为货币政策的正确指标的经济环境，必然要走过一条很长的道路。


Moreover, Russia’s default and devaluation in 1998 undermined the progress that was accomplished – starting in 1996 – in the banking sector and the capital markets in general.	另外，俄罗斯在1998年的拖欠和贬值也破坏了1996年以来在整个银行业和资金市场取得的进步。


But that excuse has worn thin.	然而这样的借口已经难以服众。


In recent years, slowing the pace of real exchange-rate appreciation to shelter domestic producers and employment from import competition seems to have gained clear precedence over disinflation.	近年来，为了保护国内生产商和就业岗位免受进口货竞争威胁而降低实际汇率增幅的措施似乎已经明显获得优先于制止通货膨胀的地位。


At the beginning of June, the RCB’s governor, Sergei Ignatyev, admitted not only that this year’s inflation target would be missed, but also that the RCB is not prepared to pursue inflation targets at the expense of a competitive exchange rate.	六月初，RCB总裁Sergei Ignatyev承认，不但今年的通胀目标无法达到，而且RCB也不准备牺牲具有竞争力的汇率来追求通胀目标的实现。


This helps explain why the inflation rate, as measured by growth in the annual consumer price index, has remained stubbornly high.	这也进一步说明，在每年的消费品价格指数的增长中反映出来的通胀率为什么一直居高不下。 的确，今年的年度通胀率从1998年来首次上升，使官方的目标——2005年达到7.


Indeed, for the first time since 1998, the annual inflation rate has been rising this year, rendering the official targets – 7.5%-8.5% in 2005, 6%-7.5% in 2006 and 5%-6.5% in 2007 – little more than lip service.	5%，2007年达到5%-6. 5%——比纸上谈兵好不了多少。


Of course, many central banks around the world pursue both price stability and growth.	当然，世界上的许多中央银行都同时追求价格稳定和经济增长。


But in Russia, there is no trade-off between the two, at least not using the exchange rate.	但是在俄罗斯，这两者之间是无法实现平衡的，至少无法通过汇率来实现。


As the IMF’s latest annual report on Russia’s economy points out, if the RCB continues to restrain the ruble’s appreciation for the sake of growth, the result will merely be higher inflation, which implies that the ruble would still strengthen in real terms, thereby damaging growth.	正如国际货币基金组织在对俄罗斯经济的年度报告中指出的那样，如果RCB为了追求经济增长继续限制卢布升值，结果将只能得到更严重的通货膨胀，这意味着卢布的实际价值还是会增加，从而损害经济增长。


Russian macroeconomic performance has greatly improved since the 1998 financial crisis, and this success can be attributed in part to improved monetary policy.	从1998年的金融危机至今，俄罗斯的宏观经济表现已有大幅度的改善，而这个成绩可以部分地归功于改良的货币政策。


But the RCB’s lack of resolve in adopting a framework where low inflation is clearly stated as the priority now threatens to undermine what has been achieved.	但是现在，RCB在是否采用明确以低通胀为首要任务的框架问题上的左右摇摆，将损害已经取得的成就。


As a starting point, the RCB should be charged with projecting inflation, formulate policies to stabilize prices, and either implement those polices or explain why it cannot and who could do so.	首先，RCB应该承担起预测通货膨胀的任务，规划稳定物价的政策，实施这些政策或说明为什么它不能实施这些政策以及谁可以。


The correct answer to the latter question – as the IMF suggests – may be the Ministry of Finance: the only sure way for Russia to reduce inflation and sustain growth is to maintain a sound fiscal policy.	后一个问题的正确答案——如国际货币基金组织提议——可以是财政部：俄罗斯降低通货膨胀、维持经济增长的唯一出路就是保持一个健康的财政政策。


The reality is the opposite.	现实刚好相反。


Rather than using the oil windfall to pay for long-overdue reforms in health care, education, and utilities – and thus helping to ensure the macroeconomic stability needed to sustain rapid long-term growth – President Vladimir Putin has chosen large spending increases for public wages and pensions.	弗拉基米尔·普京总统没有利用石油带来的意外之财推进卫生保健、教育和公用事业方面早就应该实施的改革——从而促进宏观经济稳定，以利于保持快速的长期经济增长——反而选择在公众工资和养老金上增加大量开支。


As a result, Putin’s Russia appears headed for the Latin American model of self-inflicted stagflation.	结果，普京治理下的俄罗斯似乎正朝着经济停滞、自作自受的拉丁美洲模式迈进。


Russia’s Fascist Temptation	俄罗斯面临的法西斯主义诱惑


Today’s Kremlin thinks that democracy was being built too quickly in Russia.	当今克里姆林宫认为俄罗斯的民主政治来的太快。


The government does not say that it is against democracy, only that it is untimely and needs to be delayed – a logic that manifests itself in most official decisions.	现在的政府并没有说反对民主政治，只是说它来的不是时候，有必要推迟。 这种逻辑在大多数官方决策中昭然若揭。


Thus, at the beginning of the current decade, the democratic system of political checks and balances that had been created in the 1990’s began to be dismantled.	因此，21世纪第一个十年开始之初，20世纪90年代建立起来的民主政治制衡制度开始被解除。


Before 2000, there was an influential, independent press and a parliament loyal to the president, but still independent.	2000年之前，新闻舆论尚且影响广泛、独立自由，议会虽然效忠总统但仍然保持独立。


The Federation Council (the upper chamber of the Duma), too, was generally loyal to the president, as were regional governors, while remaining independent.	联邦委员会（杜马上议院）以及地区长官也都在原则上效忠总统，但仍然保持独立。


There were also influential entrepreneurs and business organizations that were actively involved in the decision-making process.	同时有影响力的企业家和商界组织也积极参与制定决策。


As a result of the disappearance of these checks and balances, the quality of the government’s decisions has fallen sharply.	随着这些制衡的消失，政府决策的质量急剧下降。


The notorious law on monetization of social benefits, which transforms in-kind benefits into cash, is a typical example.	臭名昭著的社会福利货币化的法律就是一个典型的例子，该法将实物福利变为现金。


Despite the fundamental soundness of the step, it was poorly prepared and implemented, and the government seriously miscalculated its effects on the national budget.	该步骤尽管基本无可挑剔，但是采取这一步骤明显准备不足，执行不力，并且政府对其给国家预算可能带来的效果犯了严重失算。


Moreover, it generated mass social protests, which the government evidently had not envisaged.	而且，该法引发了大规模社会抗议，政府显然没有预料到。


Never would the law in its current form have passed through the old State Duma.	这种法律在从前绝对不可能以目前的这种形式获得国家杜马的通过。


MP’s would have read and analyzed it attentively, asked ministers many questions, and, if necessary, insisted on re-writing various tables presented in the draft.	议员将会对之进行仔细的阅读和分析，询问部长们大量问题，并且在必要的时候会坚持要求改写草案中的各种表格。


They would have understood that the calculations provided were at complete odds with reality, and they would have considered what to do about it.	他们将会明白提供的计算结果与实际大相径庭，所以他们将会考虑采取措施应对。


If there is no independent press able to caution against mistakes and a parliament that can do the same, then the mistakes will eventually manifest themselves on the streets.	如果没有独立的新闻舆论和议会对政府的种种错误进行监督，那么最终将导致街头抗议。


Democracy was not invented by fools.	民主政治不是傻瓜发明的。


Experience tells us that if you don’t let the steam out of a pot, the pot will explode.	经验告诉我们，如果不让蒸汽逸出，茶壶将会爆炸。


But when we stifle, step by step, all that remains of a free press, when even small television channels that provide uncensored information seem dangerous, we are keeping the lid firmly on the pot.	但是，当我们一步一步扼杀自由新闻舆论残余时，甚至当小规模电视频道提供未经审查的信息时都面临危险时，我们正紧紧地捂住茶壶的盖子。