An important characteristic of the risks of a globalized world is that they often become more serious over time.	全球化世界的重要特征之一是风险往往随着时间推移变得更加严重。


As a result, the speed at which they are identified, along with the effectiveness of the response, can determine whether an isolated event becomes a global threat.	因此识别风险的速度以及对策的有效性往往能决定某次孤立事件能否酿成全球恶果。


One need only look at the rise of the Islamic State, the outbreak of Ebola, the fight against climate change, or the financial contagion of 2008 to see what happens when a danger remains unidentified for too long or a coordinated response is missing or mismanaged.	人们只要看看伊斯兰国的崛起、埃博拉病毒的爆发、应对气候变化的斗争或2008年金融危机的蔓延就可以知道如果危险因素长期未被发现或者没有采取协调一致的对策会发生什么。


And yet, just as the need for robust regional and international institutions is at its greatest, support for them is waning.	然而，就在对强有力的地区和国际机构的需求达到顶峰之际，各国对他们的支持却正在减弱。


A growing number of citizens in Europe, North America, and the Middle East blame globalization for unemployment, rising inequality, pandemics, and terrorism.	越来越多的欧洲、北美和中东民众指责全球化导致失业、不平等现象日益严重、流行病和恐怖主义。


Because of these risks, they regard increased integration, openness, and innovation as more of a threat than an opportunity.	因为上述风险，他们更多地把加强融合、开放和创新视为一种风险而不是一次机遇。


This creates a vicious circle.	于是形成了一种恶性循环。


The concerns of the electorate are reflected in rapidly growing support for political parties that advocate increased protectionism, reductions in immigration, and greater national control over the marketplace.	民众对保护主义政党支持日趋增强、移民数量锐减及国家强化市场控制等现象切实反映了选民的担忧。


As a result, governments across Europe, North America, Asia, and Oceania are becoming more parochial in their concerns, starving international agencies and regional organizations of the funding, credibility, and leadership capabilities needed to mount a proper response to the challenges of globalization.	结果是欧洲、北美、亚洲和大洋洲等各国政府所关注领域变得更加狭隘，剥夺了国际和地区机构对全球化采取恰当对策所必需的资金、信誉和领导力量。


In the short term, countries may be able to duck their global responsibilities, but the threat posed by events beyond their borders cannot be kept at bay forever.	国家或许可以在短期内逃避全球责任，但境外事件造成的威胁不可能永远得到控制。


Unaddressed, the endemic dangers of a globalized world will continue to grow.	如果没有得到解决，全球化世界的流行危险将会不断累积。


In confronting dangers such as the Islamic State, Ebola, financial crisis, climate change, or rising inequality, short-term political expediency must be overcome – or the entire world will come to regret it.	在应对伊斯兰国、埃博拉、金融危机、气候变化及不平等日益严重造成的威胁时，必须放弃短期的政治权宜之计——否则整个世界都将为此付出代价。


When Globalization Goes Digital	当全球化走向数字化


WASHINGTON, DC – American voters are angry.	华盛顿—美国选民很愤怒。


But while the ill effects of globalization top their list of grievances, nobody is well served when complex economic issues are reduced to bumper-sticker slogans – as they have been thus far in the presidential campaign.	但尽管全球化的副作用是他们的首要仇恨对象，但当复杂的经济问题落地为汽车保险杠前的标语时，没有人感到满意——到目前为止的总统选战便是如此。


It is unfair to dismiss concerns about globalization as unfounded.	说全球化担忧毫无依据是不公平的。


America deserves to have an honest debate about its effects.	美国理应就全球化的影响做一次诚实的争论。


In order to yield constructive solutions, however, all sides will need to concede some inconvenient truths – and to recognize that globalization is not the same phenomenon it was 20 years ago.	但是，要想获得建设性方案，各方都需要承认一些令人不快的事实——并认识到今天的全球化与二十年前的全球化不是同一个现象。


Protectionists fail to see how the United States’ eroding industrial base is compatible with the principle that globalization boosts growth.	保护主义者没有看到美国工业基础的销蚀与全球化刺激增长的原理并行不悖。


But the evidence supporting that principle is too substantial to ignore.	但支持这一原理的证据显而易见，无法忽视。


Recent research by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) echoes the findings of other academics: global flows of goods, foreign direct investment, and data have increased global GDP by roughly 10% compared to what it would have been had those flows never occurred.	麦肯锡全球研究所（MGI）的最新研究印证了其他学者的发现：全球商品、外国直接投资和数据流让全球GDP较不存在这些流动的情况增加了大约10%。


The extra value provided by globalization amounted to $7.8 trillion in 2014 alone.	全球化所带来的增加值在2014年一年就高达7. 8万亿美元。


And yet, the shuttered factories dotting America’s Midwestern “Rust Belt” are real.	但是，美国中西部“锈带”上星罗棋布的废弃工厂是实实在在的。


Even as globalization generates aggregate growth, it produces winners and losers.	尽管全球化创造了总体增长，但也产生了 赢家和输家。


Exposing local industries to international competition spurs efficiency and innovation, but the resulting creative destruction exacts a substantial toll on families and communities.	将本地产业暴露于国际竞争之下刺激了效率和创新，但 由此带来的创新性破坏给家庭和社区制造了巨大的伤害。


Economists and policymakers alike are guilty of glossing over these distributional consequences.	经济学家和决策者掩饰这些分配后果是不合适的。


Countries that engage in free trade will find new channels for growth in the long run, the thinking goes, and workers who lose their jobs in one industry will find employment in another.	这一思想认为，长期而言，参与自由贸易的国家将发现新的增长渠道，失去了某个产业的工作的工人将在另一个产业找到新工作。


In the real world, however, this process is messy and protracted.	但在现实世界中，这一过程又乱又长。


Workers in a shrinking industry may need entirely new skills to find jobs in other sectors, and they may have to pack up their families and pull up deep roots to pursue these opportunities.	夕阳产业的工人可能需要全新的技能才能在其他部门找到工作，并且他们可能需要举家离开扎根已深的居住地追求这些新机会。


It has taken a popular backlash against free trade for policymakers and the media to acknowledge the extent of this disruption.	已经形成了一种反对自由贸易的群众抵制，使决策者和媒体认识到这一破坏的程度。


That backlash should not have come as a surprise.	这一抵制并不令人惊奇。


Traditional labor-market policies and training systems have not been equal to the task of dealing with the large-scale changes caused by the twin forces of globalization and automation.	传统劳动力市场政策和培训体系无力应对全球化和自动化的双重力量所带来的大规模变化。


The US needs concrete proposals for supporting workers caught up in structural transitions – and a willingness to consider fresh approaches, such as wage insurance.	美国需要具体的方案支持受结构转型冲击的工人——并愿意考虑全新的方法，比如工资保险。


Contrary to campaign rhetoric, simple protectionism would harm consumers.	与竞选口号相反，简单的保护主义将伤害消费者。


A recent study by the US President’s Council of Economic Advisers found that middle-class Americans gain more than a quarter of their purchasing power from trade.	美国总统经济顾问委员会的最新研究发现，美国中产阶级通过贸易增加了四分之一多的购买力。


In any event, imposing tariffs on foreign goods will not bring back lost manufacturing jobs.	无论如何，对外国商品征收关税无法找回失去的制造业岗位。


It is time to change the parameters of the debate and recognize that globalization has become an entirely different animal: The global goods trade has flattened for a variety of reasons, including plummeting commodity prices, sluggishness in many major economies, and a trend toward producing goods closer to the point of consumption.	应该改变在争论的“参数”，承认全球化已经完全今非昔比：全球商品贸易出于多种原因陷入停滞，包括大宗商品价格暴跌、许多主要经济体经济停滞以及在生产地向消费地靠近的趋势。


Cross-border flows of data, by contrast, have grown by a factor of 45 during the past decade, and now generate a greater economic impact than flows of traditional manufactured goods.	相反，跨境数据流在过去十年增加了45倍，目前其所产生的经济影响比传统制造品流更大。


Digitization is changing everything: the nature of the goods changing hands, the universe of potential suppliers and customers, the method of delivery, and the capital and scale required to operate globally.	数字化改变着一切：转手商品的性质、潜在供应商和客户的全球性、交割方法，以及全球经营所需要的资本和规模。


It also means that globalization is no longer exclusively the domain of Fortune 500 firms.	它还意味着全球化不再是《财富》500强企业的专属领域。


Companies interacting with their foreign operations, suppliers, and customers account for a large and growing share of global Internet traffic.	与外国业务、供应商和客户打交道的公司占全球互联网流量的份额十分巨大并且仍在增长。


Already half of the world’s traded services are digitized, and 12% of the global goods trade is conducted via international e-commerce.	世界贸易服务已有一半规模被数字化，全球商品贸易已有12%通过国际电子商务进行。


E-commerce marketplaces such as Alibaba, Amazon, and eBay are turning millions of small enterprises into exporters.	电子商务市场，如阿里巴巴、亚马逊和eBay，让数以百万计的小企业成为出口商。


This remains an enormous untapped opportunity for the US, where fewer than 1% of companies export – a far lower share than in any other advanced economy.	这给美国带来了巨大的未利用机会，美国从事出口的公司还不到1%，远远低于其他发达经济体。


Despite all the anti-trade rhetoric, it is crucial that Americans bear in mind that most of the world’s customers are overseas.	尽管存在所有这些反贸易宣传，但对美国来说，至关重要的是铭记世界客户大部分位于海外。


Fast-growing emerging economies will be the biggest sources of consumption growth in the years ahead.	快速增长的新兴经济体将是未来数年消费增长的主要源泉。


This would be the worst possible moment to erect barriers.	这是最糟糕的建立壁垒的时机。


The new digital landscape is still taking shape, and countries have an opportunity to redefine their comparative advantages.	新数字格局仍在形成中，各国都有机会改变比较优势。


The US may have lost out as the world chased low labor costs; but it operates from a position of strength in a world defined by digital globalization.	随着世界追逐低劳动力成本，美国可能蒙受了损失； 但在以数字全球化为特征的世界中，美国仍有优势。


There is real value in the seamless movement of innovation, information, goods, services, and – yes – people.	在创新、信息、商品、服务，以及——是的——人力的无缝运动中，这是真正的价值。


As the US struggles to jump-start its economy, it cannot afford to seal itself off from an important source of growth.	美国正在竭力促进经济起飞，决不能自绝于重要的增长源泉。


US policymakers must take a nuanced, clear-eyed view of globalization, one that addresses its downsides more effectively, not only when it comes to lost jobs at home, but also when it comes to its trading partners’ labor and environmental standards.	美国决策者必须以细致、清醒的目光看待全球化，利用全球化有效解决美国的劣势，不仅在全球化造成国内就业损失时如此，对于其贸易伙伴的劳动和环境标准也是如此。


Above all, the US needs to stop retrying the past – and start focusing on how it can compete in the next era of globalization.	总之，美国必须停止重复过去——并开始专注于如何在新的全球化时代竞争。


Rethinking Robin Hood	罗宾汉再思考


MADRID – International development aid is based on the Robin Hood principle: take from the rich and give to the poor.	马德里—国际发展援助的基础是罗宾汉原则：劫富济贫。


National development agencies, multilateral organizations, and NGOs currently transfer more than $135 billion a year from rich countries to poor countries with this idea in mind.	在这一原则的指导下，目前国家发展机构、多边组织和非政府组织每年从发达国家那里转移1,350亿多美元给穷国。


A more formal term for the Robin Hood principle is “cosmopolitan prioritarianism,” an ethical rule that says we should think of everyone in the world in the same way, no matter where they live, and then focus help where it helps the most.	罗宾汉原则的更加正式的术语是“大同优先论”（cosmopolitan prioritarianism），这是一条道德原则，认为我们应该以同样方式看待世界上的每一个人，不管他们住在何处，然后在专注于帮助最需要帮助的地方。


Those who have less have priority over those who have more.	拥有的越少，优先级别越高。


This philosophy implicitly or explicitly guides the aid for economic development, aid for health, and aid for humanitarian emergencies.	这一隐含或直接的哲学指导着经济发展援助、卫生援助和人道主义紧急情况援助。


On its face, cosmopolitan prioritarianism makes sense.	表面上，大同优先论有其道理。


People in poor countries have needs that are more pressing, and price levels are much lower in poor countries, so that a dollar or euro goes twice or three times further than it does at home.	穷国人民的需要更加紧迫，并且穷国的物价水平要低得多，因此一美元或一欧元能够买到比美国或欧洲多一两倍的东西。


Spending at home is not only more expensive, but it also goes to those who are already well off (at least relatively, judged by global standards), and so does less good.	把钱花在美国或欧洲不但更加昂贵，其流向也往往是境况很好的人（至少相对很好，从全球标准衡量），因此起不了多少行善的作用。


I have thought about and tried to measure global poverty for many years, and this guide has always seemed broadly right.	多年来，我一直在思考并试图衡量全球贫困，而这一指导原则总是大致正确。


But I currently find myself feeling increasingly unsure about it.	但我最近越来越对它感到迷茫。


Both facts and ethics pose problems.	事实和道德都有问题。


Huge strides have undoubtedly been made in reducing global poverty, more through growth and globalization than through aid from abroad.	毫无疑问，我们在减少全球贫困方面取得了巨大的进步，更多地是通过增长和全球化而不是海外援助。


The number of poor people has fallen in the past 40 years from more than two billion to just under one billion – a remarkable feat, given the increase in world population and the long-term slowing of global economic growth, especially since 2008.	过去40年，穷人的数量从二十亿以上下降到略低于十亿——考虑到世界人口的增加和长期经济增长的放缓（特别是2008年以后），这是一个了不起的成就。


While impressive and wholly welcome, poverty reduction has not come without a cost.	尽管结果令人印象深刻并且值得欢呼雀跃，但减贫不是没有成本的。


The globalization that has rescued so many in poor countries has harmed some people in rich countries, as factories and jobs migrated to where labor is cheaper.	拯救了如此多穷国的全球化伤害了一些发达国家的人民，因为工厂和就业岗位被转移到���动力更加廉价的地方。


This seemed to be an ethically acceptable price to pay, because those who were losing were already so much wealthier (and healthier) than those who were gaining.	在道德上，这似乎是可以接受的代价，因为蒙受损失的人已经比获得收益的人富裕得多（也健康得多）。


A long-standing cause of discomfort is that those of us who make these judgments are not exactly well placed to assess the costs.	一个长期存在的不安的原因是我们这些做出这一判断的人并不是最适合评估成本的人。


Like many in academia and in the development industry, I am among globalization’s greatest beneficiaries – those who are able to sell our services in markets that are larger and richer than our parents could have dreamed of.	和许多学界和发展界人士一样，我也是全球化的最大受益者之一——我们能够将我们的服务在比我们的父辈所能想象的更大更富有的市场上出售。


Globalization is less splendid for those who not only don’t reap its benefits, but suffer from its impact.	全球化对于不但没有获得好处，还因此受到冲击的人来说可没有那么美好。


We have long known that less-educated and lower-income Americans, for example, have seen little economic gain for four decades, and that the bottom end of the US labor market can be a brutal environment.	比如，我们早就知道，教育程度和收入较低的美国人四十年来几乎没有获得经济上的收益，美国劳动力市场底层环境相当残酷。


But just how badly are these Americans suffering from globalization?	但这些美国人蒙受全球化的影响有多严重？


Are they much better off than the Asians now working in the factories that used to be in their hometowns?	他们是否比现在正在原本位于他们的家乡的工厂里做工的亚洲人境况要好得多？


Most undoubtedly are.	对大部分人来说，答案毫无疑问是肯定的。


But several million Americans – black, white, and Hispanic – now live in households with per capita income of less than $2 a day, essentially the same standard that the World Bank uses to define destitution-level poverty in India or Africa.	但几百万美国人——黑人、白人和西班牙裔——目前生活在人均收入不足每天2美元的家庭，每天2美元是世界银行用来定义印度或非洲赤贫级贫困水平的标准。


Finding shelter in the United States on that income is so difficult that $2-a-day poverty is almost certainly much worse in the US than $2-a-day poverty in India or Africa.	凭借这一收入在美国找到容身之所非常难，因此，美国的每天2美元贫困程度几乎必然要比印度或非洲的每天2美元严重得多。


Beyond that, America’s much-vaunted equality of opportunity is under threat.	除此之外，美国人大肆标榜的机会平等正在受到威胁。


Towns and cities that have lost their factories to globalization have also lost their tax base and find it hard to maintain quality schools – the escape route for the next generation.	在全球化中失去工厂的乡镇和城市也失去了税基，因而难以维持下一代“逆袭”的途径——高质量学校。


Elite schools recruit the wealthy to pay their bills, and court minorities to redress centuries of discrimination; but this no doubt fosters resentment among the white working class, whose kids find no place in this brave new world.	精英学校招徕富人掏腰包，吸引少数族裔纠正数百年来的歧视问题，但这毫无疑问在白人工作阶级中间种下了仇恨，他们的孩子在美丽新世界中没有容身之地。


My own work with Anne Case reveals more signs of distress.	我本人与安妮·凯斯（Anne Case）的工作揭示了更多不幸的迹象。


We have documented a rising tide of “deaths of despair” among white non-Hispanics – from suicide, alcohol abuse, and accidental overdoses of prescription and illegal drugs.	我们记录到白人非西班牙裔呈现出上升的“死于绝望”的趋势——包括自杀、酗酒和偶然性处方药和非法药物服用过量。


Overall death rates in the US were higher in 2015 than 2014, and life expectancy has fallen.	2015年美国总死亡率比2014年更高，而寿命预期有所下降。


We can argue about the measurement of material living standards, whether inflation is overstated and the rise in living standards understated, or whether schools are really that bad everywhere.	我们可以讨论物质生活水平的衡量标准，通胀是否高估、生活水平的提高是否低估； 或学校是否真的全面衰败。


But deaths are hard to explain away.	但死亡很难轻描淡写地掩饰过去。


Perhaps it is not so clear that the greatest needs are on the other side of the world.	也许最大的需要存在于地球另一头并非那么明显的事实。


Citizenship comes with a set of rights and responsibilities that we do not share with those in other countries.	公民地位包含着我们不与其他国家的国民共享的各种权利和责任。


Yet the “cosmopolitan” part of the ethical guideline ignores any special obligations we have toward our fellow citizens.	但“大同优先论”的“大同”部分忽略了我们对同胞公民的一切特殊义务。


We can think about these rights and obligations as a kind of mutual insurance contract: We refuse to tolerate certain kinds of inequality for our fellow citizens, and each of us has a responsibility to help – and a right to expect help – in the face of collective threats.	我们可以将这些权利和义务视为某种共同保险契约：我们拒绝忍受同胞公民遭遇某些种类的不平等性，在面临集体威胁时，我们每一个人都有责任提供帮助——也有权利期待得到帮助。


These responsibilities do not invalidate or override our responsibilities to those who are suffering elsewhere in the world, but they do mean that if we judge only by material need, we risk leaving out important considerations.	这些责任不抹杀、也不凌驾于我们对于正在世界其他地方受苦的人的责任，但它们确实意味着如果我们只从物质需要来判断，就有可能将重要的考虑因素排除在外。


When citizens believe that the elite care more about those across the ocean than those across the train tracks, insurance has broken down, we divide into factions, and those who are left behind become angry and disillusioned with a politics that no longer serves them.	当公民相信精英关注大洋彼岸甚于关注眼皮周围时，保险就会破产，我们将分裂成各个派系，而被抛弃的人将变得愤怒不已，对不再服务于他们的政治失望。


We may not agree with the remedies that they seek, but we ignore their real grievances at their peril and ours.	我们也许不同意他们所寻求的解决方案，但我们忽视他们真正的怨气所在对于他们和我们都很危险。


Globalization Marches On	全球化继续前进


LONDON – In a recent symposium in the Financial Times on globalization’s prospects in 2011, the columnist Gideon Rachman observed that, “When Barack Obama visited India recently, the US President warned his hosts that the debate about globalization has reopened in the West,” and that “a backlash…is forming…and growing in advanced economies.”	伦敦——在金融时报刚刚举办的2011年全球化前景研讨会上，专栏作家吉迪恩·拉赫曼提出，“巴拉克·奥巴马最近出访印度时，这位美国总统警告东道国西方已经重新启动了有关全球化议题的辩论，”而且“发达国家对全球化的抵制思潮正在发展和形成。 ”


But Rachman’s alarmism is misplaced.	但拉赫曼的危言耸听并没有充分的依据。


The fear of globalization in the West is nothing new.	全球化在西方国家引起的恐慌早已不是什么新闻。


Articulate intellectuals and groups such as labor unions and environmental organizations in the advanced economies have voiced anti-globalization fears and sentiments for at least a quarter-century.	至少25年来，发达国家能言善道的知识分子及工会和环保组织一直喋喋不休地表达反对全球化的恐惧情绪。


The fear of globalization, however, began historically in the East, not the West.	不过对全球化的恐惧最早并不起源于西方，东方才是它真正的发源地。


After World War II, the West dismantled barriers to trade and investment flows, and worked to eliminate exchange controls and move to currency convertibility.	二战结束后，西方拆除了贸易和投资流动的壁垒，并着手实现货币兑换，解除外汇管制。


What was sometimes called the liberal international economic order was the order of the day, and it was embraced by public opinion as well.	当时所谓的自由国际经济秩序逐渐成为一般惯例，同时成为被公众舆论所接受的话题。


By contrast, the East generally embraced the fearful view that, as the Chilean sociologist Oswaldo Sunkel put it, integration into the international economy would lead to disintegration of the national economy.	恰恰相反，东方人普遍对此持恐惧态度，正如智利社会学家奥斯瓦尔多·桑克尔所说，国际经济融合恐怕会导致国家经济的解体。


Many intellectuals shared this dark anti-globalization vision, and policymakers in much of the East were not far behind.	不少知识分子都赞同这种阴暗的反全球化论点，而绝大多数东方政治家在这方面也不甘落后。


Indeed, the West accepted the view that globalization would result (as with trade) in mutual gain, embracing what I called in 1997 the notion of “benign neglect.”	事实上，西方普遍认为全球化会带来（比方说贸易领域）双赢的结果，我在1997年提出的“善意忽视”观点成为当时的主流。


In the case of foreign investment and aid flows, the West went further, viewing them as being motivated by altruism, or “benign intent,” whereas the East regarded globalization in a world of poor and rich nations as implying “malign impact.”	在外国投资和援助的问题上，西方国家的观念更加超前，将动机归结为“善良意图”或利他主义，而东方国家则将贫富世界中的全球化视为隐藏着“有害影响。


In some analyses, malign impact turned into a more sinister “malign intent.”	” 某些分析甚至将有害影响升级为更为阴险的“邪恶企图。


Thus, foreign aid was regarded as a plot to trap poor nations in a neo-colonial embrace.	”因此，外国援助被看成是让贫困国家落入新殖民陷阱的险恶阴谋。


What happened next was what I have called an “ironic reversal.”	后来发生的事情被我称之为“颇具讽刺意味的逆转。


As the benefits of globalization became manifest, and the damage wrought by autarkic policies also became evident, policymakers in the East began to appreciate that their anti-globalization stance had been a mistake.	” 随着全球化所带来的好处越来越明显，自给自足政策所造成的损害也不言而喻，东方国家的决策者开始明白自己反对全球化的立场是一个错误。


But then fear of globalization moved to the West.	但对全球化的恐惧情绪却逐渐向西方转移。


The East had feared that it could not gain from trade with the West, which had superior infrastructure and human capital; now, the West had come to fear that it would lose from trade with the East, which had abundant, cheap labor.	东方曾经惧怕自己无法从与西方的贸易中得到好处，因为后者有发达的基础设施和人力资本，而时至今日，西方开始害怕会从与东方的贸易中蒙受损失，因为后者劳动力资源廉价而丰富。


The longstanding stagnation in wages for unskilled labor was attributed to low-cost, labor-intensive imports, ignoring the corollary that Western workers’ consumption of labor-intensive Asian goods offset the effect on real wages.	非技术性工种工资增长的长期停滞被归咎于低成本、劳动力密集型的进口产品，同时却有意无意地忽视了西方民众对劳动密集型亚洲产品的消费抵消了实际收入增长停滞这种必然的结果。


To take another example, the East worried about a “brain drain” of professionals to the West, where opportunities seemed to be more plentiful.	再举个例子，东方担心专业人才大规模向西方流失，因为西方专业领域的就业机会似乎更为丰富。


Today, the West is witnessing anti-globalization opposition from members of professional groups, who fear the loss of their jobs to foreign counterparts.	时至今日，专业团体成员反对全球化的潮流已经在西方形成，这些专业人员害怕由于来自国外的竞争而失去自己的工作。


Rudyard Kipling famously wrote in “The Ballad of East and West”:  “Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet.”	鲁德亚德·吉卜林在著名的“东西方民谣”中写道：  “哦，东方就是东方，西方就是西方，这两者永远是泾渭分明的。


Given the ironic reversal of globalization fears, Kipling is still right: convergence has continued to elude East and West.	” 即使将全球化恐惧颇具讽刺意味的逆转考虑进去，吉卜林也是对的： 东西方之间的融合仍然令东西方民众感到困惑。


The current crisis did not create the debate about globalization now heard in the West; it only made it slightly more salient.	时下这场危机并不是西方目前全球化争议的始作俑者，它不过稍稍增加了争论的热度。


Yet the crisis may be tilting Western policy outcomes in favor of globalization.	但这场危机可能使西方政策向有利于全球化的方向倾斜。


For example, on trade, there has been a remarkable commitment to efforts – largely successful – to avoid significant backsliding into protectionism.	比方说在贸易方面，西方国家付出了很大的努力防止保护主义故态复萌，而这种努力从总体上看是相当成功的。


Moreover, the G-20 leaders have continued to express the need to conclude the Doha Round of multilateral trade-liberalization negotiations.	此外，二十国集团领袖继续宣传多哈回合多边贸易自由谈判达成协议的重要性。


There are also initiatives such as the appointment by the governments of Britain, Germany, Indonesia, and Turkey of a High-Level Expert Trade Group, with Peter Sutherland, former Director General of GATT and the WTO, and myself as co-chairs.	值得一提的还有英国、德国、印尼和土耳其政府任命高级专家贸易团的动议，贸易团由前关贸协定和世贸组织总干事彼得·萨瑟兰和我本人担任联席主席。


The four governments will report at this year’s World Economic Forum in Davos on how to conclude Doha this year.	上述四国政府将在今年达沃斯举办的世界经济论坛上汇报将采取何种措施在年内就多哈谈判达成协议。


In other words, Kipling could yet be proved wrong.	换句话讲，我们仍然有机会证明吉卜林是错的。


A reversal in the West is possible, perhaps even likely.	西方的态度逆转完全可能，甚至也许不可避免。


So the current crisis may thus, accidentally, establish a pro-globalization consensus that spans East and West.	因此时下这场危机可能歪打正着地建立起横跨东西方的支持全球化趋势的共识。


Globalization and its New Discontents	全球化及其新的不满情绪


NEW YORK – Fifteen years ago, I wrote a little book, entitled Globalization and its Discontents, describing growing opposition in the developing world to globalizing reforms.	发自纽约——十五年前我写过一本名为《全球化及其不满情绪》的小书，描述发展中国家对全球化改革越来越强烈的抵抗情绪。


It seemed a mystery: people in developing countries had been told that globalization would increase overall wellbeing. So why had so many people become so hostile to it?	这个情况似乎有点莫名其妙：既然面向发展中国家民众的宣传都说全球化能提高整体福利，那么为何又有这么多人对此如此仇视呢？


Now, globalization’s opponents in the emerging markets and developing countries have been joined by tens of millions in the advanced countries.	如今数千万发达国家民众也加入了新兴市场和发展中国家的全球化反对者们队伍之中。


Opinion polls, including a careful study by Stanley Greenberg and his associates for the Roosevelt Institute, show that trade is among the major sources of discontent for a large share of Americans.	民意调查，其中包括斯坦利·格林伯格（Stanley Greenberg）及其在罗斯福研究所的同僚的详细研究，表明贸易是相当一部分美国人的主要不满情绪来源之一。


Similar views are apparent in Europe.	类似的观点在欧洲也是显而易见的。


How can something that our political leaders – and many an economist – said would make everyone better off be so reviled?	那么为什么一个我们的政治领袖——以及许多经济学家——声称会让所有人过得更好的事物会遭到如此唾骂？


One answer occasionally heard from the neoliberal economists who advocated for these policies is that people are better off.	偶尔能从鼓吹这些政策的新自由主义经济学家那里听到的一个答案是人们其实已经过得更好了，只是他们没有意识到而已。


They just don’t know it. Their discontent is a matter for psychiatrists, not economists.	因此控制他们的不满情绪是精神科医生的难题，而不是经济学家的事。


But income data suggest that it is the neoliberals who may benefit from therapy. Large segments of the population in advanced countries have not been doing well: in the US, the bottom 90% has endured income stagnation for a third of a century.	但收入数据表明该接受治疗的是那些新自由主义者：发达国家的大部分人口的生活水平都未能获得改善：美国位于金字塔下层的那90％民众的收入已经停滞了1/3个世纪之久。


Median income for full-time male workers is actually lower in real (inflation-adjusted) terms than it was 42 years ago.	全职男性工人的真实（去除通胀因素后）平均收入相对于42年前其实更低。


At the bottom, real wages are comparable to their level 60 years ago.	本质上实际工资基本维持在60年前的水平。


The effects of the economic pain and dislocation that many Americans are experiencing are even showing up in health statistics.	许多美国人在经济上的痛苦和迷失甚至在卫生统计上显示了出来。


For example, the economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton, this year’s Nobel laureate, have shown that life expectancy among segments of white Americans is declining.	经济学家安��·凯斯（Anne Case）和2015年度诺贝尔经济学奖获得者安格斯·迪顿（Angus Deaton）的研究就显示各阶层的美国白人预期寿命都有所下降。


Things are a little better in Europe – but only a little better.	对此欧洲的情况要好一点——但也只有好一点而已。


Branko Milanovic’s new book Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization provides some vital insights, looking at the big winners and losers in terms of income over the two decades from 1988 to 2008.	布兰科·米拉诺维奇（Branko Milanovic）的新书《全球不平等：一个全球化时代的新手段》为此提供了一些重要的见解，以收入为标准研究了从1988~2008年这二十年间的赢家和输家。


Among the big winners were the global 1%, the world’s plutocrats, but also the middle class in newly emerging economies.	大赢家中既有全球最顶尖的那1％的富豪，也包括在新兴经济体的中产阶级。


Among the big losers – those who gained little or nothing – were those at the bottom and the middle and working classes in the advanced countries.	而大输家——那些得到很少甚至一无所获的人——则包括发达国家的底层贫民和中产工薪阶级。


Globalization is not the only reason, but it is one of the reasons.	全球化并不是造成此状况的唯一原因，但它无疑是原因之一。


Under the assumption of perfect markets (which underlies most neoliberal economic analyses), free trade equalizes the wages of unskilled workers around the world.	在完美市场的假设下——这也是大多数新自由主义经济分析的基础——自由贸易会将世界各地低技术工人的工资水平拉平。


Trade in goods is a substitute for the movement of people. Importing goods from China – goods that require a lot of unskilled workers to produce – reduces the demand for unskilled workers in Europe and the US.	货物贸易实际上替代了劳动者的流动，从中国进口的商品——有大量非技术工人来生产——就减少了欧美地区对低技术工人的需求。


This force is so strong that if there were no transportation costs, and if the US and Europe had no other source of competitive advantage, such as in technology, eventually it would be as if Chinese workers continued to migrate to the US and Europe until wage differences had been eliminated entirely.	这种力量是如此强大，以致如果没有运输成本，如果美国和欧洲没有类似科学技术这样的其他竞争优势来源，最终就等同于中国工人持续向美国和欧洲迁移，直到完全抹平两地工资差别。


Not surprisingly, the neoliberals never advertised this consequence of trade liberalization, as they claimed – one could say lied – that all would benefit.	不出意外，新自由主义者向来都绝口不提自由化的这一后果，因为他们声称——或者说是撒谎——所有人都会受益。


The failure of globalization to deliver on the promises of mainstream politicians has surely undermined trust and confidence in the “establishment.”	由于全球化无法帮助主流政客去兑现他们那些承诺，因此必定令公众对“体制”的信任和信心有所动摇。


And governments’ offers of generous bailouts for the banks that had brought on the 2008 financial crisis, while leaving ordinary citizens largely to fend for themselves, reinforced the view that this failure was not merely a matter of economic misjudgments.	而政府一方面慷慨救助对那些引发2008年金融危机的银行，另一方面基本上坐视普通市民自生自灭，使得人们更加坚信这次崩盘不仅仅是经济误判的问题。


In the US, Congressional Republicans even opposed assistance to those who were directly hurt by globalization.	在美国，国会共和党人甚至反对向那些直接遭受全球化伤害的人给予援助。


More generally, neoliberals, apparently worried about adverse incentive effects, have opposed welfare measures that would have protected the losers.	而宏观上，那些新自由主义者也反对推行保护输家的福利措施——显然他们担心这会导致反向激励效应。


But they can’t have it both ways: if globalization is to benefit most members of society, strong social-protection measures must be in place.	但鱼与熊掌无法兼得：如果全球化要让一个社会的大多数成员受益，那么有力的社会保护措施就必不可少。


The Scandinavians figured this out long ago; it was part of the social contract that maintained an open society – open to globalization and changes in technology.	斯堪的纳维亚人早就想通了这一点：它是维持一个开放社会——全球化和技术变革开放——的社会契约的一部分。


Neoliberals elsewhere have not – and now, in elections in the US and Europe, they are having their comeuppance.	其他地方的新自由主义者都没做到这一点——如今在美国和欧洲选举中就遭到了报应。


Globalization is, of course, only one part of what is going on; technological innovation is another part.	当然全球化只有当前形势的其中一部分； 技术创新则是另一部分。


But all of this openness and disruption were supposed to make us richer, and the advanced countries could have introduced policies to ensure that the gains were widely shared.	但所有这些开放性和破坏性本应使我们更加富有，而那些先进国家本可以出台政策以确保这些好处能被广泛分享。


Instead, they pushed for policies that restructured markets in ways that increased inequality and undermined overall economic performance; growth actually slowed as the rules of the game were rewritten to advance the interests of banks and corporations – the rich and powerful – at the expense of everyone else.	相反，它们用一些增加不平等且破坏整体经济表现的政策来重新塑造市场； 实际上增长放缓，因为游戏规则遭到了改写，牺牲其他人的利益去让本已有钱有势的银行和大型企业得利。


Workers’ bargaining power was weakened; in the US, at least, competition laws didn’t keep up with the times; and existing laws were inadequately enforced.	工人的议价能力被削弱； 至少在美国，那些保护竞争的法案已经落后于时代了；


Financialization continued apace and corporate governance worsened.	现行法律被不恰当地执行。 金融化继续快速推进，公司治理不断恶化。


Now, as I point out in my recent book Rewriting the Rules of the American Economy, the rules of the game need to be changed again – and this must include measures to tame globalization.	现在，正如我在最近出版的《改写美国经济的规则》一书中指出的那样，我们需要再次修改整个游戏规则 ——其中必须包括驯服全球化相关手段。


The two new large agreements that President Barack Obama has been pushing – the Trans-Pacific Partnership between the US and 11 Pacific Rim countries, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the EU and the US – are moves in the wrong direction.	总统奥巴马一直在推动这两个新的大型协议——美国和11个太平洋沿岸国家之间的跨太平洋伙伴协议，欧盟和美国之间的跨大西洋贸易和伙伴关系协议——都是在往错误的方向移动。


The main message of Globalization and its Discontents was that the problem was not globalization, but how the process was being managed.	全球化及其不满情绪所传达的主要讯息是问题并不在于全球化，而是如何管控这一进程。


Unfortunately, the management didn’t change.	不幸的是，管控手段并没未改变。


Fifteen years later, the new discontents have brought that message home to the advanced economies.	在我写完那本小书的十五年后，新的不满情绪终于将这一讯息回传到了发达经济体自己身上。


Debunking America’s Populist Narrative	揭穿美国的民粹主义叙事


BERKELEY – One does not need to be particularly good at hearing to decipher the dog whistles being used during this year’s election campaign in the United States.	伯克利—你不需要特别擅长倾听，就可以破解今年美国选战期间所使用的狗哨（dog whistles）。


Listen even briefly, and you will understand that Mexicans and Chinese are working with Wall Street to forge lousy trade deals that rob American workers of their rightful jobs, and that Muslims want to blow everyone up.	只要稍微听一耳朵，你就能理解墨西哥人和中国人正在与华尔街合作炮制蹩脚的贸易协议抢走美国工人的正当工作，而穆斯林想把所有人都炸了。


All of this fear mongering is scarier than the usual election-year fare.	所有这些营造恐慌的伎俩要比寻常选举年更加令人害怕。


It is frightening to people in foreign countries, who can conclude only that voters in the world’s only superpower have become dangerously unbalanced.	它令外国人害怕，外国人只能推断世界唯一的超级大国的选民已经陷入了危险的失衡。


And it is frightening to Americans, who until recently believed – or perhaps hoped – that they were living in a republic based on the traditions established by George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Teddy and Franklin Roosevelt.	它也令美国人害怕，美国人直到最近都认为——也许是希望——他们生活在一个基于华盛顿、林肯和两位罗斯福所建立的传统的共和国中。


But what is even more unsettling is the political reality this rhetoric reflects.	但更加令人不安的是这一言辞所反映的政治现实。


There can be no comparing Democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders’s policy-oriented critique of neoliberalism to the incoherent bluster of Donald Trump or Ted Cruz on the Republican side.	民主党总统候选人伯尔尼·桑德斯对新自由主义的政策导向批评和共和党阵营的唐纳德·特朗普和泰德·科鲁兹语无伦次的大放厥词之间根本没有可比性。


And yet, on both the right and the left, a common narrative is emerging – one that seeks to explain why the incomes of working- and middle-class Americans have stagnated over the past generation.	但是，左翼和右翼正在浮现一个共同叙事——这一叙事试图解释为何工人和中产阶级美国人的收入在过去的一代人时间里停滞不前。


Unfortunately, this narrative, if used as a basis for policymaking, will benefit neither the US nor the rest of the world; worse, it has yet to be seriously challenged.	不幸的是，这一叙事如果成为政策制定的基础，对于美国和世界其他国家都没什么好处； 更糟糕的是，它尚未受到严肃的挑战。


For decades, senior Republican politicians and intellectuals have been uninterested in educating the American people about the realities of economic policy.	几十年来，自身共和党政客和知识分子根本没兴趣教育美国人民关于经济政策的现实。


And Democratic frontrunner Hillary Clinton has been too busy trying to fend off Sanders’s challenge.	而民主党阵营的领跑者希拉里·克林顿一直太忙而没有回应桑德斯的挑战。


Broadly, the narrative goes something like this.	广义而言，这一叙事就是这样。


American middle- and working-class wages have stagnated because Wall Street pressed companies to outsource the valuable jobs that made up America’s manufacturing base, first to low-wage Mexicans and then to the Chinese.	美国中产和工作阶级工资停滞是因为华尔街迫使公司外包构成美国制造业基础的有价值的岗位，先是外包给低工资的墨西哥人，后来外包给中国人。


Moreover, this was a bipartisan effort, with both parties unified behind financial deregulation and trade deals that undermined the US economy.	此外，这是一项跨党派政策，两党团结在破坏美国经济的金融去监管化和贸易协议幕后。


First, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) led to the export of high-quality manufacturing jobs to Mexico.	首先，北美自由贸易协定（NAFTA）导致高质量制造业岗位输出到墨西哥。


Then the US established permanent normal trade relations with China and refused to brand its government a currency manipulator.	接着，美国与中国建立永久正常贸易关系，拒绝认定中国政府为货币操纵者。


The reason this narrative is wrong is simple.	这一叙事是错误的，原因很简单。


There are good reasons why the US adopted policies that encouraged poorer countries to grow rapidly through export-led industrialization.	美国采取鼓励穷国通过出口拉动的工业化迅速增长的政策有很好的理由。


In helping Mexico, China, and other developing countries grow, the US is gaining richer trading partners.	在帮助墨西哥、中国和其他发展中国家增长的过程中，美国赢得了更加富有的贸易伙伴。


Furthermore, there is a strong case that US national security will be improved if, 50 years from now, schoolchildren around the world learn how America helped their countries prosper, rather than trying to keep them as poor as possible for as long as possible.	此外，很有可能，如果五十年后全世界学龄儿童了解到美国如何帮助他们的国家实现繁荣，而不是试图尽可能长地保持他们的国家尽可能穷，美国的国家安全也会得到改善。


It was not globalization that caused incomes to stagnate.	不是全球化导致收入停滞。


Trade with countries like China and Mexico is just one factor affecting income distribution in the US, and it is by no means the most important one.	与中国和墨西哥等国家的贸易只是影响美国收入分配的一个因素，并且绝不是最重要的因素。


The reason that incomes have stagnated is that American politicians have failed to implement policies to manage globalization’s effects.	收入停滞的原因是美国政客没有实施管理全球化影响的政策。


As Steve Cohen and I argue in our book Concrete Economics, macroeconomic management requires the government to do what it always did before 1980: pragmatically adopt policies that promote equitable growth.	史蒂夫·科恩（Steve Cohen）和我在我们的《具体经济学》（Concrete Economics）一书中指出，宏观经济管理需要政府做它们在1980年前一直做得事情：务实地实施促进平等增长的政策。


There were good reasons for the US to offload industries that required low wages to be globally competitive.	美国有很好的理由为了获得全球竞争力而去除需要低工资的产业。


But there was little reason for the US to offload industries that had become important “technology drivers.”	但美国没有理由去除已经成为重要的“技术推动因素”的产业。


Nor were there good reasons for a lot of other bad decisions, such as allowing the financial industry to profit by convincing investors to bear risks they should not and allowing health-care providers to profit from administration at the expense of the care and treatment of the sick.	美国也没有理由做出其他许多坏决策，如放任金融业通过说服投资者承担他们不应该承担的风险获利，以及放任医疗服务提供者从政府获利而牺牲病人的看护和治疗。


Other bad decisions include incarcerating 2% of the country’s young men and concluding that America’s economic problems would be solved if only the rich could keep more of their money.	其他坏决策包括将2%的美国年轻人投入监狱，以及认��要是富人能够更好地保护他们的钱，美国的经济问题就能解决。


It is not difficult to see where the blame lies.	不难看出罪魁何在。


As Mark Kleiman of NYU’s Marron Institute points out, the Republican Party’s rigid and die-hard ideological opposition to “taxing the rich [has] destroyed, on a practical level, the theoretical basis for believing that free trade benefits everyone.”	纽约大学麦伦研究所（Marron Institute）的马可·克莱曼（Mark Kleiman）指出，共和党僵化而死硬地在思想上反对“向富人征税[已经]在实际层面破坏了相信自由贸易让所有人都能获利的理论基础”。


It is difficult to argue for redistributing the benefits of globalization when you believe that the market channels gains to those who deserve them.	当你认为将收益传输给理应获得收益的人时，你很难提出重新分配全球化的收益的主张。


Nor can you ameliorate the painful effects of globalization if you believe that social-insurance programs turn their beneficiaries into lethargic “takers.”	如果你认为社会保险计划将受益者变为昏睡的“索取者”，你很难改善全球化的令人痛苦的影响。


It is not globalization, poor negotiation tactics, low-wage Mexicans workers, or the overly clever Chinese that bear responsibility for what is ailing America.	不是全球化、糟糕的谈判策略、低工资的墨西哥工人或太聪明的中国人需要为美国病负责。


The responsibility lies instead with politicians peddling ideology over practicality – and thus with the citizens who elect them, as well as those who don’t bother to vote at all.	相反，责任在于鼓吹意识形态大于实事求是的政客——因此也包括选择了他们的公民，以及根本不愿投票的公民。


The West’s Decline Would Hurt China	西方的衰落将伤及中国


HONG KONG – Official Chinese media are having a field day touting the dysfunction of Western democracies.	香港—中国官方媒体现在很“爽”，大肆宣扬西方民主国家发生问题的情况。


Between the British vote to “Brexit” the European Union and the nomination of Donald Trump as the Republican candidate for the US presidency, not to mention increasingly frequent terrorist attacks, they have plenty of evidence.	从英国投票“脱离”欧盟，到唐纳德·特朗普被提名为共和党美国总统候选人，更不用说日益频繁的恐怖袭击，西方民主国家发生问题的证据不胜枚举。


But the truth is that the West’s loss is not China’s gain.	但真相是西方之所失并非中国之所得。


The hope, of course, is that the current travails of democracies around the world could boost the credibility of the Chinese Communist Party.	当然，中国希望目前全球民主国家的艰难状况能够提高中国共产党的信誉。


And, indeed, a commentary in People’s Daily, the CCP’s official newspaper, portrayed the Brexit vote as a reflection of the fundamental flaws of Western democracies.	事实上，中共官方报纸《人民日报》的一篇评论将英国脱欧投票描述为西方民主根本性缺陷的体现。


The same paper used Trump’s rise to show that, in the American system, political leaders are “helpless” to address “complex social conflicts” like racial tensions and other sources of popular discontent.	同一张报纸援引特朗普的崛起证明，在美国制度中，政治领导人在解决种族对峙等“复杂社会冲突”和其他群众不满根源方面很“无助”。


The Global Times, an ultra-nationalist tabloid affiliated with the People’s Daily, seemed to suggest that recent terrorist attacks in the West were a harbinger of some kind of democratic apocalypse.	《人民日报》下属的极端民族主义报纸《环球时报》似乎认为，最近在西方发生的恐怖袭击是民主启示录的先兆。


The West may be facing some mysterious and unthinkable “change,” intoned the tabloid.	西方可能正面临某些神秘的、难以想象的“变化”，《环球时报》说。


Given the CCP’s ideological hostility to the West, and its zero-sum geopolitical mindset, such gloating should come as no surprise.	考虑到中共在意识形态上对西方的敌意及其零和地缘政治思维，这样的幸灾乐祸并不令人奇怪。


Indeed, the CCP has long used challenges that arise in democratic countries as part of its never-ending effort to enhance its own legitimacy.	事实上，中共一直将民主国家所出现的挑战作为其永无止境的加强自身合法性的努力的一部分。


Claiming that democracy barely works in the West, the Party argues that it would be disastrous for China.	中共声称民主在西方并不管用，以此论证它对中国将是一场灾难。


Moreover, so long as China’s government is delivering consistently rising standards of living, as it has been over the last few decades, there is no need, according to the authorities, even to consider alternative systems.	此外，当局认为，只要中国政府能如过去几十年那样一直提高生活水平，就根本没有必要考虑改变制度。


But there is little evidence that democratic tumult translates into autocratic legitimacy.	但没有证据表明民主陷入混乱意味着专制合法。


On the contrary, dictatorships have historically fallen, regardless of the fortune of Western democracies.	相反，在历史上独裁总是会倒台，不管西方民主运道如何。


When the so-called third wave of democratization began in the mid-1970s, Western democracies were mired in stagflation and the political trauma of the Vietnam War.	20世纪70年代所谓的第三波民主化浪潮开始时，西方民主国家陷入了停滞和越南战争的政治创伤中。


The fall of communism in the former Soviet bloc coincided with the reinvigoration of Western democracies in the 1980s.	前苏联阵营共产主义的倒台则正逢20世纪80年代西方民主的复兴。


When the Arab Spring erupted in 2011, Western democracies were struggling with the consequences of the global financial crisis of 2008.	2011年阿拉伯之春爆发时，西方民主因为2008年全球金融危机的而焦头烂额。


All of this suggests that autocrats in China should not be holding their breath for some Brexit-induced surge in support.	所有这些表明，中国的独裁者不必兴冲冲期待英国脱欧能让他们的支持度大增。


Though stories of democratic dysfunction can give people living under autocratic rule a negative impression of democracy, the effect is most likely short-lived.	尽管民主国家出问题的报道能够给生活在专制统治下的人们产生对民主的负面印象，但效果往往十分短暂。


As long as dictatorships mistreat their own people and fail to improve their lives, their legitimacy will be challenged.	只要独裁残酷对待本国人民并且不能改善他们的生活，它们的合法性就将遭到挑战。


Of course, China is no ordinary autocracy.	当然，中国不是普通的专制。


But what makes it unique – the link between the CCP’s authority and its ability to sustain economic growth – does not make its gloating any more rational.	它的独特性——中共的权威与其保持经济增长的能力相挂钩——并不意味着它的幸灾乐祸是理性的。


After all, one of the keys to China’s economic success is its integration into a global economy dominated by the Western democracies, which buy roughly 60% of Chinese exports.	毕竟，中国经济成功的一大关键正是融入西方民主国家主导的全球经济，后者购买了中国出口的六成。


In other words, the CCP derives more legitimacy from Western democracies’ success than it would from their failure.	换句话说，中国的合法性与其说来自西方民主国家的失败，不如说来自它们的成功。


No good businessperson would hope their best customers go bankrupt.	优秀的商人绝不会希望客户破产。


It makes little sense that the CCP is so pleased about the struggles of China’s most valuable trading partners.	中国对中国最宝贵的贸易伙伴深陷麻烦而欢呼雀跃毫无道理。


The factors driving the challenges facing the Western democracies today hold even worse implications for China.	西方民主国家眼下所面临的挑战背后的驱动因素对中国甚至更加不利。


Support for Brexit and Trump is rooted largely in voters’ rejection of globalization.	支持英国脱欧和特朗普大部分是因为选民拒绝全球化。


Regardless of how Brexit or the US election plays out, it is very likely that governments in Western democracies will respond to voter angst and take measures that imply a return to some degree of protectionism.	不管英国脱欧和美国大选结果如何，很有可能西方民主国家政府将对选民的焦虑做出反应，采取回归某种程度的保护主义的措施。


As the world’s largest exporter, China will not escape the damaging economic consequences of such efforts.	作为世界上最大的出口国，中国无法摆脱这些措施对经济造成的破坏性后果。


In that context, the legitimacy of the CCP, already challenged by China’s economic slowdown, could erode further.	在这样的情况下，已经因为中国经济减速而受到挑战的中共合法性将进一步减弱。


Instead of gloating, China’s leaders should be watching developments in the Western democracies with concern – and start planning for their own difficult times ahead.	因此，中国领导人不应该对西方幸灾乐祸，而应该关注西方民主国家的发展趋势——并开始为未来自身的艰难日子做好准备。


But they also included workers – both blue- and white-collar – who were among the losers from globalization, but who nonetheless remained loyal, either because they were socially and religiously conservative, or because center-left parties were formally supporters of unions, workers’ rights, and entitlement programs.	加入工会的白领和蓝领员工——的控制之下。 但这些政党里也包括了一些沦为全球化输家的蓝领和白领劳动者，但这些人仍然保持忠诚，要么是因为他们在社会和宗教上较为保守，要么是因为左翼政党一直都是工会，工人权益与福利项目的正式支持���。


Globalization’s Assassin	全球化的刺客


The world’s first wave of economic globalization, led by the British Empire in the nineteenth century, came to an end literally with a bang on a Sunday afternoon in 1914, when Gavrilo Princip killed (with two uncannily well-aimed bullets) Austria’s Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife.	大英帝国在十九世纪领导的世界上第一波经济全球化浪潮随着1914年一个星期天下午的一声枪响而告终结。 普林茨用两颗瞄准的并不准确的子弹刺死了奥地利的斐迪南大公夫妇。


The years that followed witnessed pan-European carnage, instability throughout the 1920’s, and the rise of fascism and communism, culminating in the death of countless millions during World War II.	随后数年里全欧洲尸横遍野，整个二十年代都是风雨飘摇，法西斯主义和共产主义上台，最终导致在二次大战期间死亡无以计数的数百万人口。


Is today’s globalizing era also coming to an end?	今天的全球化时代是否也在终结呢？


If so, it may not necessarily end with a repeat of the slaughters of the last century, but with an economic retrenchment that brings economic stagnation and consigns billions of people to grinding poverty.	如果是这样的话，倒不一定会以重复上世纪的大屠杀而告结束，而是以带来经济停滞并让数十亿计的人口限于赤贫的经济萎缩而告终结。


Various candidates have been proposed for the role of globalization’s assassin.	全球化的刺客候选人已经被提出了好几个。


But one little noticed, yet likely, aspirant has been sneaking up on the world economy: the growing tendency to limit the free circulation of people, to “fence in” the rich world.	但是一个被人忽略、但却是可能的渴求者一直潜伏在世界经济当中，那就是不断增长的限制人口自由流通的、“隔离”富国的趋势。


We see the menace of this tendency constantly nowadays, but we perceive it in such a seemingly unthreatening way that we may well become accustomed to it rather than arresting it.	如今，我们不断地看到这一趋势的威胁，但是，我们对此不以为然乃至于我们会习以为常，而不是予以解决。


Globalization means free movement of capital, goods, technology, ideas, and, yes, people.	全球化意味着资本、商品、技术、观念而且也是人员的自由流动。


Any globalization that is limited to the first three or four freedoms but omits the last one is partial and not sustainable.	任何限制于前三个或者前四个自由流动的全球化都是不完整的也是难以为继的。


As soon as people cannot move, there will be little to stop governments from limiting the free movement of goods or other factors of production.	只要人们无法流动，就难以制止政府限制商品或者其他生产要素的自由流动。


After all, if over-populated countries with high unemployment cannot export people, why not reach for higher tariff barriers to protect the jobs they have?	毕竟，如果人口过剩、高失业率的国家无法出口人口，为什么不设置高关税壁垒来保护他们拥有的就业岗位呢？


But what of the unemployed who become locked into their societies?	但是，那些被锁死在社会中的失业者又当如何呢？


The war on terror has shown us the dangers that can arise from the social frustrations that often result.	反恐战争告诉我们，危险来自于经常随之而来的社会挫折。


Nevertheless, the “fencing-in” of the rich world continues apace.	但是，“隔离”富国继续迅速发展。


The United States plans to construct a veritable “Mexican Wall” to keep poor people from crossing into Texas or California.	美国计划修建一个名副其实的“墨西哥长城”，来阻止穷人进入得克萨斯或者加利福尼亚。


Likewise, hundreds, if not thousands, of Africans die every year trying to reach the shores of Fortress Europe.	同样，每年如果不是数以千计也是数以百计的非洲人死于前往欧洲城堡的路上。


Efforts to restrict people’s movement between countries expose the soft underbelly of globalization: the deepening gap between countries’ mean incomes.	限制国家间人员流动的努力暴露了全球化的软肋，那就是不同国家中等收入之间不断加深的差异。


Rather than poor countries growing faster than the rich (as we would expect from Economics 101), mainly the reverse is true.	穷国的增长不仅没有超过富国（这是我们从经济学原理所预期的），情况恰恰相反。


Between 1980 and 2002, average annual per capita income growth in the rich world (defined as the “old” OECD members) was almost 2%, compared to just 0.1% in the 42 least developed countries.	1980年至2002年之间，富国（也就是“老的”经合组织成员国）的平均人年均收入增长几乎2％，与之相比，42个最不发达国家只有0. 1％。


Indeed, average income in Latin America is now barely above its 1980 level.	事实上，拉美国家的平均收入只比1980年的水平高一点点。


This huge gap spurs migration.	这种巨大差异促发了移民。


People nowadays know much more about conditions in different countries than they did in the past, and if moving across a border means that their income can be multiplied several-fold, they will try to do it.	现在人们要比以前更为了解不同国家的情况，而且，如果跨过边境就意味着他们的收入可以翻几番，那么何乐而不为呢？


This is why today’s most contentious borders separate economies where the income gaps between people on the two sides are the greatest.	这就是为什么当今大多数充满争议的边界分隔了两边人们之间收入差异最大的经济体。


There are four such global hot spots: the borders between the US and Mexico, Spain and Morocco, Greece (and Italy) and the southern Balkans, and Indonesia and Singapore (or Malaysia).	一共有四个全球性的热点：美国和墨西哥、西班牙和摩洛哥、希腊（和意大利）和南巴尔干以及印尼和新加坡（或者马来西亚）之间的边界。 收入差距从后者的超过七比一，西班牙和摩洛哥之间的4.


The income gaps range from more than seven to one in the latter case to 4.5 to one in the case of Spain and Morocco, 4.3 to one between the US and Mexico, and four to one between Greece and Albania.	5比1，美国和墨西哥之间的4. 3比1一直到希腊和阿尔巴尼亚之间的四比一。


Income differences were not always so huge.	收入差异并非总是如此悬殊。


In 1980, average income in the US was a little more than three times that of Mexico, the gap between Singapore and Indonesia was 5.3 to one, and the difference between Spain and Morocco 3.5 to one.	1980年的时候，美国的平均收入只是墨西哥的三倍多一点，新加坡和印尼是5. 3比1，西班牙和摩洛哥之间是3.


Even the gap between Greece and Albania, at three to one, was narrower than it is now.	5比1。 即使是希腊和阿尔巴尼亚之间的差异当时是3比1，也要比现在低。


So income gaps between all these contiguous countries have increased significantly during the last quarter-century.	所以，所有这些邻国间的差异在过去的二十五年里都大幅增长。


So it is little wonder that it is in these places that most illegal immigration and human trafficking occurs – pirates in the Straits of Malacca, fast boats between Albania and Italy, and desperate human cargoes from Africa and Latin America.	因此，大多数非法移民和人口走私发生在这些地方也就不足为奇了。 马六甲海峡海岛猖獗，阿尔巴尼亚和意大利的水稻上快艇出没，而绝望的人口货物从非洲和拉美铤而走险。


If today’s globalization continues to widen income gaps, the waves of migration will grow.	如果今天的全球化继续扩大收入差距，那么，移民浪潮将增加。


So the rich world will, in a knee-jerk response, erect ever-higher barriers to stem the human tide.	所以，富国将会作出条件反射，修建更高的���垒来阻止人潮。


If globalization, which has so enriched the world’s wealthiest countries, is to continue, governments must find ways to increase incomes more evenly.	全球化令世界最富有国家致富。 如果想要让它继续，各国政府就必须找到更为均衡地增加收入的途径。


Otherwise, today’s “fencing in” of the rich world will increase the risk of a backlash against free circulation of goods and capital, as well as of political instability punctuated by terrorism.	不然，当今“隔离”富国将会增加反对商品和资本自由流通以及因恐怖主义而加剧的政治不稳定的风险。


Global income redistribution by the rich countries should be viewed as a matter not of charity, but of enlightened self-interest.	富国重新分配全球收入不应当被视为慈善的举动，而是一种开明的维护自我利益之举。


Globalization’s Government	全球化之下的政府


NEW YORK – We live in an era in which the most important forces affecting every economy are global, not local.	发自纽约——在我们生活的这个时代，大多数影响经济运行的重要力量并非由本地产生，而是发端于全球层面。


What happens “abroad” – in China, India, and elsewhere – powerfully affects even an economy as large as the United States.	即便如美国这般庞大的经济体也难免受到那些“国外”（比如中国，印度或者其他地方）事务的重大影响。


Economic globalization has, of course, produced some large benefits for the world, including the rapid spread of advanced technologies such as the Internet and mobile telephony.	当然，经济全球化为全世界带来了某些巨大的好处，比如互联网和手机这类先进技术的迅速扩散。


It has also reduced poverty sharply in many emerging economies – indeed, for this reason alone, the world economy needs to remain open and interconnected.	它同时也大幅降低了许多新兴经济体的贫困率——事实上单凭这一点，世界经济就应当继续保持开放和互联。


Yet globalization has also created major problems that need to be addressed.	但全球化同时也滋生了某些亟待解决的严重问题。


First, it has increased the scope for tax evasion, owing to a rapid proliferation of tax havens around the world. Multinational companies have many more opportunities than before to dodge their fair and efficient share of taxation.	首先，鉴于避税天堂在全球的迅速滋长，逃税行为的操作空间大幅增加，跨国企业逃避合理税款的机会也比以往要多得多。


Moreover, globalization has created losers as well as winners.	此外，全球化在产生受益者的同时也产生了一批受害者。


In high-income countries, notably the US, Europe, and Japan, the biggest losers are workers who lack the education to compete effectively with low-paid workers in developing countries.	在美国，欧洲和日本这类高收入国家，最大的受害者莫过于那些缺乏教育因而无法和发展中国家低收入劳动者有效竞争的工人。


Hardest hit are workers in rich countries who lack a college education. Such workers have lost jobs by the millions.	受难最深的就是发达国家中那些缺乏高等文凭的工人，这类失业者的数量已达数百万之巨。


Those who have kept their jobs have seen their wages stagnate or decline.	而那些侥幸保全工作的工人们只能看着自己的工资原地踏步或者遭到扣减。


Globalization has also fueled contagion.	全球化同时也促进了灾难的扩散。


The 2008 financial crisis started on Wall Street, but quickly spread to the entire world, pointing to the need for global cooperation on banking and finance.	2008年金融危机始于华尔街，随即迅速扩散到全世界，说明了推动全球银行与金融合作的必要性。


Climate change, infectious diseases, terrorism, and other ills that can easily cross borders demand a similar global response.	而那些能轻易在国家间传播的气候变化、传染病，恐怖主义以及其他灾难性问题也都需要一个类似的全球性应对措施。


What globalization requires, therefore, are smart government policies.	因此全球化所需要的就是明智的政府政策。


Governments should promote high-quality education, to ensure that young people are prepared to face global competition.	各国政府应当推动高质量教育以确保年轻一代有足够能力面对全球竞争。


They should raise productivity by building modern infrastructure and promoting science and technology. And governments should cooperate globally to regulate those parts of the economy – notably finance and the environment – in which problems in one country can spill over to other parts of the world.	政府应当通过建设现代化基础设施和推动科学技术发展来提高生产力水平，并展开全球范围的政府合作来规管某些极易将问题从一个国家传染到全世界的经济部门——尤其是金融以及环境方面。


The need for highly effective government in the era of globalization is the key message of my new book, The Price of Civilization.	全球化时代对高效率政府的需求正是笔者新作《文明的代价》的重点。


Simply put, we need more government nowadays, not less.	简而言之，如今我们需要扩大而非缩小政府管理。


Yet the role of government also needs to be modernized, in line with the specific challenges posed by an interconnected world economy.	而政府所扮演的角色也必须实现现代化，以便与紧密相连的世界经济所带来的独特挑战相适应。


I wrote The Price of Civilization out of the conviction that the US government has failed to understand and respond to the challenges of globalization ever since it began to impact America’s economy in the 1970’s.	《文明代价》一书的基本观点就是美国政府其实并未理解并应对全球化的挑战，而这种失败自1970年代全球化开始影响美国经济时已初现端倪。


Rather than respond to globalization with more government spending on education, infrastructure, and technology, Ronald Reagan won the presidency in 1980 by pledging to slash government spending and cut taxes.	罗纳德·里根非但没能通过增加政府在教育，基础设施以及科技放方面的支出来应对全球化，反而利用大幅压低政府开支和减税的口号赢得了1980年大选。


For 30 years, the US has been going in the wrong direction, cutting the role of government in the domestic economy rather than promoting the investments needed to modernize the economy and workforce.	30年来美国一直走在了错误的道路上，一味限制政府在国内经济中所扮演的角色，而不是推动经济和劳动力现代化所需要的投资。


The rich have benefited in the short run, by getting massive tax breaks. The poor have suffered from job losses and cuts in government services.	富人们借大幅减税在短期内受益，而穷人却苦于职位和政府服务的流失。


Economic inequality has reached a high not seen since the Great Depression.	经济失衡的程度已经上升到了自大萧条以来的最高水平。


These adverse trends have been exacerbated by domestic politics. The rich have used their wealth to strengthen their grip on power.	这些相反的趋势又在地方政治的影响下进一步恶化，富人利用手中的金钱巩固了手中的权力。


They pay for the expensive campaigns of presidents and congressmen, so presidents and congressmen help the rich – often at the expense of the rest of society.  The same syndrome – in which the rich have gained control of the political system (or strengthened their control of it) – now afflicts many other countries.	他们资助那些总统和议员候选人的昂贵竞选活动，于是总统和国会议员们都为富人出力——往往以牺牲其他社会成员为代价。 同样的社会综合症如今也蔓延到了世界其他国家——整个政治系统都沦为富人的玩物（或者被富人进一步控制）。


Yet there are some important signs around the world that people are fed up with governments that cater to the rich while ignoring everyone else.	但世界上也出现了许多重要的信号，显示人们已经厌倦了那些只讨好富人却罔顾社会其他成员的政府。


Start with the growing calls for greater social justice.	首先是要求实现更多社会正义的呼声。


The upheavals in Tunis and Cairo were first called the Arab Spring, because they seemed to be contained to the Arab world.	突尼斯和开罗的起义一开始被称为阿拉伯之春，因为它们似乎是阿拉伯世界的内部事务。


But then we saw protests in Tel Aviv, Santiago, London, and now even in the US.	但我们随后又看到发生在特拉维夫、圣地亚哥，伦敦甚至是美国的示威。


These protests have called first and foremost for more inclusive politics, rather than the corrupt politics of oligarchy.	这些示威的首要诉求并非打倒寡头统治下的腐败政治，而是建立更加具有包容性的政治。


Moreover, US President Barack Obama is gradually shifting toward the left.	此外，美国总统奥巴马的立场也逐渐左倾。


After three years in which his administration coddled corporate lobbyists, he has finally begun to emphasize the need for the rich to pay more taxes.	在关照了企业国会游说者整整三年之后，他最终开始强调富人多交税的必要性。


This has come late in his term, and he might well continue to favor the rich and Wall Street in exchange for campaign contributions in 2012, but there is a glimmer of hope that Obama will defend a fairer budget policy.	由于任期将尽，他可能会继续倾向富人和华尔街去换取2012年连任的竞选经费。 但这也有意味着一线希望，或许奥巴马会维护一个更公平的预算政策。


Several European governments, including Spain, Denmark, and Greece, also seem to be moving in the same direction.	包括西班牙，丹麦和希腊在内的几个欧洲政府似乎也正在转向同一个方向。


Spain recently imposed a new wealth tax on high-net-worth taxpayers.	西班牙最近对富裕纳税者征收一项新财产税。


Denmark elected a center-left government committed to higher government spending financed by new taxes on the rich.	丹麦则选出了一个承诺要向富人征收新税并以此资助更大规模政府开支的中左翼政府。


And Greece has just voted for a new property tax to help close its yawning fiscal deficit.	而希腊人刚刚投票通过一项新的财产税来帮助缩小其不断增大的财政赤字。


The European Commission has also called for a new Financial Transactions Tax (FTT) to raise around $75 billion per year.	欧盟委员会呼吁实施一项新的金融交易税以获取每年约750亿欧元的税收。


The Commission has finally agreed that Europe’s financial sector has been under-taxed.	委员会也最终认同对欧洲各国的金融部门执行的税率都过低。


The new FTT might still face political opposition in Europe, especially in the United Kingdom, with its large and influential banking sector, but at least the principle of greater tax fairness is high on the European agenda.	新的金融交易税可能依然会面对来自欧洲内部（尤其是银行部门规模和影响力都相当庞大的英国）的政治阻力，但至少制定体现更高税负公平的规则已经排到了欧洲议程的前列。


The world’s most successful economies today are in Scandinavia.	目前世界上最成功的经济体都在斯堪的纳维亚半岛。


By using high taxes to finance a high level of government services, these countries have balanced high prosperity with social justice and environmental sustainability.	通过高税率来资助高质量的政府服务，这些国家得以在高度繁荣和社会正义环境可持续之间实现平衡。


This is the key to well-being in today’s globalized economy.	而这也是在当今的全球化经济下实现社会福祉的关键。


Perhaps more parts of the world – and especially the world’s young people – are beginning to recognize this new reality.	或许世界上能有更多国家——尤其是世界上的年轻人们——正开始认识到这个新现实。


Globalizing NATO	北约全球化


PRINCETON – Next week, NATO’s 28 members will meet in Chicago for their annual summit.	普林斯顿——下周，北约28个成员国将在芝加哥举行年度首脑会议。


Sixty-two years after the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, binding the United States, Canada, and ten European states to consider an attack on one an attack on all, NATO is transforming itself into a twenty-first-century global security organization.	六十二年前，“北大西洋公约”的签订令美国、加拿大和10个欧洲国家将针对一国的攻击视为针对全体的攻击，六十二年后，北约正逐步转变为二十一世纪的全球安全组织。


The result will be a safer world.	结果将会带来一个更加安全的世界。


In 1949, the world was rapidly dividing into two principle political-military blocs, East and West, alongside a large “non-aligned movement.”	1949年，整个世界迅速分裂为东西两大政治军事集团，与这两大集团并存的还有声势浩大的“不结盟运动”。


NATO faced off against the Warsaw Pact, created by the Soviet Union and its allies in 1955.	苏联及其盟国在1955年创建了华沙条约组织，该组织最终与北约形成对峙之势。


Within both blocs, smaller powers clustered around the superpower.	这两大集团的共同点是小国聚集在超级大国周围。


No flexibility existed within either bloc for smaller groups of members to deploy alliance assets.	无论在北约还是华约内部，由次要国家组成的小团体都无力完成联盟资产调配。


Today, NATO is becoming, in the words of its secretary-general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “a hub of a network of security partnerships and a center for consultation on global security issues.”	今天，用北约秘书长拉斯穆森的话说，北约正逐步演变为“安全伙伴关系的网络枢纽和全球安全事务的咨询中心。


It is a “globally connected institution,” with more than 40 individual country partners and growing ties to other international organizations.	”北约是一个“联系遍布全球”的机构，拥有40多个合作伙伴国，与其他国际组织的关系也越来越牢固。


Indeed, the country partners include all of Europe’s non-NATO countries, such as Austria, Switzerland, Finland, and Sweden, and aspiring and possible NATO members such as Bosnia, Serbia, Macedonia, Ukraine, Belarus, and even Russia.	事实上，合作伙伴国包括欧洲所有的非北约国家，如奥地利、瑞士、芬兰和瑞典，以及有意加入北约的波斯尼亚、塞尔维亚、马其顿、乌克兰、白俄罗斯，甚至还有俄国。


Virtually all of the Central Asian countries – from Turkmenistan to Kazakhstan, as well as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – are partners, as is the entire Maghreb, from Morocco to Egypt, as well as Israel, Jordan, Iraq, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates.	此外还包括几乎所有中亚国家——从土库曼斯坦到哈萨克斯坦，以及亚美尼亚、阿塞拜疆、阿富汗、巴基斯坦，以及整个马格里布地区，从摩洛哥到埃及，还有以色列、约旦、伊拉克、巴林、卡塔尔、科威特和阿拉伯联合酋长国。


Finally, Pacific partners include Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Mongolia.	最后，太平洋地区的合作伙伴包括日本、韩国、澳大利亚、新西兰和蒙古。


On the organizational side, NATO describes itself as having developed “close working relations” with the United Nations, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.	在组织结构方面，北约号称自己与联合国、欧盟、欧洲安全与合作组织建立了“密切的工作关系”。


It also collaborates regularly with the African Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, the World Bank, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.	北约还与非洲联盟、国际红十字委员会、国际移民组织、世界银行、国际民用航空组织以及禁止化学武器组织等国际机构建立了常规合作关系。


If one draws links radiating outward from NATO to all of these different countries and organizations, the result is a security network that has multiple hubs and clusters – much like a map of the Internet or of planets and galaxies.	如果从北约画出到这些国家和组织的辐射线，就可以形成拥有多个核心和集群的全球安全网络——类似于一张互联网地图，或者是一张行星星系图。


This world is no longer unipolar, bipolar, or even multipolar, because the actors that matter are not single states but groups of states that are more or less densely connected.	我们所处的不再是一个单极、双极、甚至是多极化的世界，因为参与者不再是单一的国家，而是或多或少联系密切的国家群体。


It is a multi-hub security network, in which the hubs are regional organizations of different sizes and strengths.	这是一张多中心的安全网络，而中心是规模和实力各异的区域组织。


This structural shift has enormous practical significance.	这种结构性变化具有重大的现实意义。


For starters, it means that not only NATO’s military resources, but also its human capital and practical knowledge in combating many different kinds of threats are available globally.	首先，它意味着世界各国在应对形形色色的各种威胁时不仅可以利用北约的军事资源，而且可以利用它积累的人力资源和实用知识。


NATO has created a Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Center that brings together civilian and military expertise on crisis identification, planning, operations, reconstruction, and stabilization capabilities in ways that are explicitly designed to connect NATO headquarters in Europe to “the networked world.”	北约已经建立了综合危机和行动管理中心，汇集了民用和军事领域的危机识别、策划、行动、重建和稳定能力，目的是在欧洲的北约总部和“联网世界”之间加强联系。


Second, NATO’s own identity is becoming that of an alliance that exists to empower – to offer assistance and partnership – as much as to overpower.	其次，北约自身的特点也从单纯的压制逐渐转变为支持（提供协助及合作）和压制并举。


NATO is no longer just a hammer; it is an entire toolbox of security options.	北约不再仅仅是一柄铁锤，而是满载安全方案的整套工具盒。


These options include developing counter-networks to meet networked security threats such as terrorism and proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological materials, as well as highly decentralized threats such as piracy.	相关方案包括建立对抗恐怖主义及核武器、化学或生物材料扩散，以及盗版等高度分散威胁的应对网络。


As a result, when a crisis like the war in East Timor in 1999 or last year’s political stalemate in Côte d’Ivoire arises, NATO can backstop whichever country or group of countries chooses to take the lead in carrying out a UN mandate.	结果是当1999年东帝汶爆发战争危机或去年科特迪瓦陷入政治僵局时，北约可以为任何愿意带头执行联合国授权的国家或国家集团提供支持。


NATO members themselves also have much more flexibility to draw on NATO’s collective assets.	北约成员国自身也能更灵活地运用北约的集体资产。


Even skeptics of NATO expansion and operations like the intervention in Libya now recognize that joint operations by member countries, operating under a UN mandate and in conjunction with regional partners, is likely to be a model for the future.	即使是对北约东扩和利比亚干预行动持怀疑态度的人现在也意识到，在联合国授权下与区域伙伴一同采取的联合行动很可能在未来成为一种模式。


As General Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser for President George H.W. Bush, observed recently, the UN Charter originally envisioned a standing military force to enforce Security Council resolutions – a vision that the NATO partner model might ultimately realize.	正如布什总统国家安全顾问斯考克罗夫特将军不久前所说的那样，“联合国宪章”最初设想由一支常设军事力量来执行安理会决议，这样的愿景有可能借助北约伙伴模式最终变成现实。


Power in a network flows from connectedness, or what network theorists call “centrality.”	网络联结的力量来源于互联互通，也就是网络理论家所说的“集中”。


The most powerful member of a network is the node that has the most connections to others, which means that a node can increase its power not only by adding connections directly, but also by increasing the connectedness of nearby nodes.	实力最强的网络节点与各方联系最为密切，也就是说各节点不仅可以通过直接增加联系点来强化自己的实力，还可以通过增强与附近节点的联系来达到同样的目标。


In other words, the US can increase its own power both by connecting to other NATO members (and then ensuring that NATO is connected to as many other countries and organizations as possible) and by increasing the connectedness of those other countries and organizations.	换句话讲，美国可以通过两种方式增强其自身的实力：与其他北约国家建立联系（而后确保北约尽可能多地与其他国家和组织联系）和强化其他国家和组织间的联系状况。


If NATO connects with the African Union, for example, and increases the AU’s connectedness, then both NATO and the AU become more central to the network and hence more powerful in terms of their ability to exercise influence and marshal resources.	例如如果北约与非洲联盟建立联系，并改善非盟与其他各方的联系状况，那么北约和非盟在网络中的地位都会加强，其行使影响力和调动资源的能力也因此进一步增强。


The logic of centrality as a source of power creates a virtuous circle, in which members of a network gain advantage by bringing more members into the network and connecting more densely to them.	以核心逻辑为实力来源形成了一个良性循环，即网络成员通过吸纳更多成员并强化相互联系来取得优势地位。


That is exactly the logic behind NATO’s transformation.	这正是北约转型背后的逻辑。


The immediate topic on the agenda in Chicago next week will be getting NATO forces out of Afghanistan.	下周芝加哥马上要讨论的主题是从阿富汗撤出北约军队。


But the longer-term subject will be getting as many countries as possible into the global NATO security network.	但长远问题是怎样将尽可能多的国家纳入北约全球安全网络。


Global Justice and Military Intervention	全球正义和军事干预


MELBOURNE – The world has watched in horror as Libya’s Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi uses his military to attack protesters opposed to his rule, killing hundreds or possibly thousands of unarmed civilians. Many of his own men have refused to fire on their own people, instead defecting to the rebels or flying their planes to nearby Malta, so Qaddafi has called in mercenaries from neighboring countries who are more willing to obey his orders.	墨尔本——


World leaders were quick to condemn Qaddafi’s actions.	卡扎菲上校动用军队对付反对统治的示威者，屠杀了数以百计（也可能上千）手无寸铁的人民，让却世界惊得目瞪口呆。


On February 26, the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to impose an arms embargo on Libya, urge member nations to freeze assets owned by Qaddafi and his family, and refer the regime’s violence to the International Criminal Court for possible prosecution of those responsible.	不少手下拒绝向同胞开火，有的倒戈加入示威，有的将飞机开到了临近的马耳他。 于是卡扎菲招徕了邻国雇佣兵，这些人比他自己的士兵更听话。


This is the first time that the Security Council has unanimously referred a situation involving human rights violations to the International Criminal Court, and it is remarkable that countries that are not members of the Court – including the United States, Russia, and China – nevertheless supported the referral.	世界领导人们迅速地行动了起来，纷纷谴责卡扎菲的行径。


The resolution can thus be seen as another incremental step towards the establishment of a global system of justice able to punish those who commit gross violations of human rights, regardless of their political or legal status in their own country.	2月26日，联合国安理会以无记名投票的方式通过针对利比亚的武器禁运案，敦促成员国冻结卡扎菲及其家人所有的资产，并将卡扎菲的暴力行为上诉到国际刑事法庭，将对可能的罪犯提起诉讼。


Yet, in another way, the Security Council resolution was a disappointment. The situation in Libya became a test of how seriously the international community takes the idea of a responsibility to protect people from their rulers.	这是安理会首次一直同意向国际刑事法庭提起人权暴力诉讼，尤其令人瞩目的是，包括中美俄在内的非国际法庭成员国也支持诉讼。


The idea is an old one, but its modern form is rooted in the tragic failure to intervene in the Rwandan genocide in 1994. A subsequent UN inquiry concluded that as few as 2,500 properly trained military personnel could have prevented the massacre of 800,000 Tutsis.	因此，这项决议可以看作一个里程碑,朝着建立能够惩罚犯有严重侵犯人权罪行者的全球司法体系又迈进了一步，不管被告在在本国的政治和法律地位多么崇高，都逃脱不了法律的制裁。


Former US President Bill Clinton has said that the mistake he most regrets making during his presidency was his failure to push for intervention in Rwanda.	但是，从另一个方面讲，安理会的这项决议并不令人满意。 利比亚的现状可谓是一次考验：在保护人民不受统治者鱼肉这个问题上，国际社会是否会动真格？


Kofi Annan, who was then UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations, described the situation at the UN at the time as a “terrible and humiliating” paralysis.	这个问题由来已久，但其现代形式之滥觞要追溯到1994年干预卢旺达种族灭行径绝的惨痛失败。 联合国的事后调查指出，当时只要派遣2 500名训练有素的士兵，就能阻止800 000名图西族人遭到屠杀。


When Annan became Secretary-General, he urged the development of principles that would indicate when it is justifiable for the international community to intervene to prevent gross violations of human rights. In response, Canada’s government established an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which recommended that military intervention could be justified, as an extraordinary measure, where large-scale loss of life is occurring or imminent, owing to deliberate state action or the state’s refusal or failure to act.	美国前总统克林顿曾说，他任期内最遗憾的事情就是未能成功干预卢旺达事件。


These principles were endorsed by the UN General Assembly at its special World Summit in 2005 and discussed again in 2009, with an overwhelming majority of states supporting them.	时任联合国主管维和行动的常务副秘书长科菲·安南将当时联合国的情况描述为“可怕而可耻地”的瘫痪。


The principle fits the situation in Libya today.	接任联合国秘书长后，安南要求尽快为国际社会何时能够干预严重侵犯人权行为制定一套原则。


Yet the Security Council resolution contains no mention of the possibility of military intervention – not even the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya to prevent Qaddafi from using planes to attack protesters.	结果加拿大政府成立了国际干预和主权委员会（International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty），建议若因国家的故意行为或拒绝行动或行动不力而导致发生或即将发生大规模死亡事件时，应当将军事干预作为一项合理的外部手段。 这套原则于2005年在联合国大会特别世界峰会（special World Summit）上通过，在2009年被再次讨论，得到了联大压倒多数成员国的支持。


One body with a special concern to transform the idea of the responsibility to protect into a cause for action is the Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, at the City University of New York. It has called on UN members to uphold their 2005 commitments and put the responsibility to protect into action in Libya.	任何军事干预，甚至连在利比亚设置禁飞区以防止卡扎菲使用飞机对付反对者的措施都没有采取。


In addition to arguing that the responsibility to protect can justify military intervention, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty recommended a set of precautionary principles.	不少机构对保护责任是否能转化为实际行动忧心忡忡，纽约城市大学全球保护责任中心(Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect)便是其中之一。


For example, military intervention should be a last resort, and the consequences of action should not be likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction.	该中心呼吁联合国成员国担起2005年所承诺的职责，将保护责任在利比亚付诸实践。 该中心敦促联合国实施一系列措施，不仅包括安理会决议中的各项动作，也包括设立禁飞区。


Whether these precautionary principles are satisfied in Libya requires expert judgment of the specifics of the situation. No one wants another drawn-out war like those in Iraq and Afghanistan.	除了认定保护责任可以作为军事干预的依据，国际干预和主权委员会还提出了一套谨慎原则。


But Libya is not Iraq or Afghanistan – its population is only about one-fifth of either country’s, and there is a strong popular movement for a democratic form of government. Assuming that foreign military forces rapidly overwhelmed Qaddafi’s troops, they would soon be able to withdraw and leave the Libyan people to decide their own future.	比如，军事干预应当属于不得已为之的手段，且采取行动的后果不得坏于不采取行动。


At the time of writing, it is arguable that other sanctions or threats, short of military intervention, would be sufficient to deter more widespread bloodshed.	谨慎原则是否适用于利比亚？ 这还需要专家对利比亚现状进行细致评估后才能确定。


Perhaps the rebels and the sanctions can overthrow Qaddafi unaided, without great loss of life.	没人希望再打一场如同伊拉克和阿富汗那样旷日持久的战争。 但利比亚不是伊拉克，也不是阿富汗，其人口只有前两者的五分之一，其现状是深得民心的政府民主化运动。


It is also unclear whether military intervention would cause more deaths than it prevented.	假设外国军队能够很快击溃卡扎菲的部队，完成任务后也可以马上撤离，让利比亚人民自己决定自己的未来。


But these are questions that the international community needs to ask, and that the Security Council should have been discussing, so that the principle of the responsibility to protect – and its possible implications for military action – become part of our understanding of the requirements of international law and global ethics.	当我写这篇文章的时候，有理由相信，即使没有军事干预，其他制裁或威胁也已足够避免利比亚人民流更多的血。 也许光靠叛变和制裁就能在不造成大规模人员伤亡的情况下让卡扎菲众叛亲离。


Read more from the "An Ethical Mind" Focal Point.	但这些都是国际社会需要提出、安理会应该早已讨论的问题。 解决了这些问题，才能使保护责任原则——以及该原则对军事行动可能产生的影响——成为我们所理解的国际法和全球伦理要求的一部分。


Global Macroeconomic Cooperation	全球范围的宏观经济合作


NEW YORK – The world has yet to achieve the macroeconomic policy coordination that will be needed to restore economic growth following the Great Crash of 2008.	纽约—2008年的大衰退之后，为了恢复经济增长，世界需要协调宏观经济政策。


In much of the world, consumers are now cutting their spending in response to a fall in their wealth and a fear of unemployment.	在全球的很多地方，消费者们正在削减开支来应对财富缩水和失业恐惧。


The overwhelming force behind the current collapse of jobs, output, and trade flows, is even more important than the financial panic that followed Lehman Brothers’ default in September 2008.	此刻的工作萎缩，产量下滑和贸易流动下挫后面还存在着一股压倒性的力量， 它甚至比2008年9月雷曼兄弟银行破产后的金融恐慌更值得重视。


There is, of course, no return to the situation that preceded the Great Crash.	当然，大衰退之前的情形是一去不复返了。


The worldwide financial bubble cannot and should not be recreated.	世界范围内的金融泡沫不可能，也不应该被再度制造出来。


But if the world cooperates effectively, the decline in consumer demand can be offset by a valuable increase in investment spending to address the most critical needs on the planet: sustainable energy, safe water and sanitation, a reduction of pollution, improved public health, and increased food production for the poor.	但是假如世界采取有效合作，消费需求上的削减可以被宝贵的投资增长所抵消。 这些增长的投资将被用于满足这个星球最迫切的需求：可持续性能源，安全饮水和卫生问题，削减污染，改善公共健康，增加为穷人生产的食品。


The United States, Europe, and Asia have all experienced a collapse of wealth due to the fall of stock markets and housing prices.	由于股市和房价暴跌，美国，欧洲和亚洲的财富都已经大幅度削减。


There is not yet an authoritative measurement of the wealth decline and of how it is distributed worldwide, but it is probably around $15 trillion lower than the peak in the US, and perhaps $10 trillion lower in both Europe and Asia.	虽然还没有关于财富缩水以及它在全球分布状况的权威测算，但是比起高峰期，美国的财富可能下降了15万亿美元，欧洲和亚洲则一共下降了10万亿美元。


A combined wealth decline of around $25 trillion would be roughly 60% of one year’s global income.	合计约25万亿美元的损失几乎是全球年收入的60%。


The decline in US wealth as a share of the US economy is even larger, around 100% of annual income, and perhaps 70% of annual income in Europe and Asia.	美国的财富损失在经济中所占的份额更大，差不多是本国年收入的100%， 欧洲和亚洲则几乎损失了年收入的约70%。


The usual assumption is that household consumption falls by around $0.05 for each $1 decline in household wealth.	通常的推论是：家庭财富每损失1美元，家庭消费就要下降大约0. 05美元。


This would mean a direct negative shock to household spending in the US of around 5% of national income, and of around 3.5% in Europe and Asia.	这就意味着美国家庭消费将会直接遭受负面打击，国家收入会削减5%。 同理，欧洲和亚洲的国家收入会减少3.


The size of this downturn is so large that unemployment will rise sharply in all major regions of the world economy, perhaps reaching 9-10% in the US.	这次衰退的规模如此巨大，以至于世界经济所有主要地区的失业率都将大幅度攀升，美国的失业率可能会达到9%—10%。


Households will gradually save enough to restore their wealth, and household consumption will gradually recover as well.	各家各户会施行节约，逐渐恢复财产，家庭消费也会慢慢复苏。


Yet this will occur too slowly to prevent a rapid rise in unemployment and a massive shortfall of production relative to potential output.	但是这一切将会缓慢发生，从而无法防止失业率激增，也无力阻挡与将来产量相关的生产出现巨大缺口。


The world therefore needs to stimulate other kinds of spending.	因此，世界需要刺激其他类型的消费。


One powerful way to boost the world economy and to help meet future needs is to increase spending on key infrastructure projects, mainly directed at transportation (roads, ports, rail, and mass transit), sustainable energy (wind, solar, geothermal, carbon-capture and sequestration, and long-distance power transmission grids), pollution control, and water and sanitation.	拉升世界经济，应付未来之需的一条有力举措是增加对重点基础设施的投资，主要致力于交通（公路，港口，铁路，大运量客运），可持续性能源（风力，太阳能，地热，碳捕捉和碳封存，还有电力远距离传输系统网络），污染控制，以及用水及卫生事业。


There is a strong case for global cooperation to increase these public investments in the developing economies, and especially in the world’s poorest regions.	有强有力的论据来支持全球应该合作，增加发展中经济体的上述公共投资，尤其是针对世界上最贫困的地区。


These regions, including Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia, are suffering harshly from the global crisis, owing to falling export earnings, remittances, and capital inflows.	这些地区包括撒哈拉以南的非洲地区和中亚在内，由于出口收入，订单和资本流入出现下降，它们正在备受全球危机的折磨。


Poor regions are also suffering from climate changes such as more frequent droughts, caused by rich countries’ greenhouse-gas emissions.	贫困地区同样深受气候变化之苦，譬如经常发生��干旱。 而这些气候变化是由富裕国家排放温室气体造成的。


At the same time, impoverished countries have huge needs for infrastructure, especially roads, rail, renewable energy, water and sanitation, and for improved current delivery of vital life-saving services, including health care and support for food production.	与此同时，贫困国家亟需基础设施，尤其是公路，铁路，可再生能源，用水和卫生事业，还需要改进生命拯救服务的现存传送方式，这些服务极为重要，包括保健和食品生产。


The G-20, which comprises the world’s largest economies, offers the natural setting for global policy coordination.	由世界最大的经济体参加组成的20国集团（G-20）为协调全球政策提供了一个天然平台。


The next G-20 meeting in London in early April is a crucial opportunity for timely action.	将于四月早期在伦敦举行的下一届20国集团会议将是采取及时行动的重要机遇。


The leading economies – especially the US, European Union, and Japan – should establish new programs to finance infrastructure investments in low-income countries.	主要的经济体，尤其是美国，欧盟和日本，应该建立新的计划，为低收入国家的基础设施投资注入资金。


The new lending should be at least $100 billion per year, directed towards developing countries.	新一轮的借款要针对发展中国家，额度至少应该是每年1000亿美元。


The new financing would include direct loans from rich countries’ export-credit agencies to enable poor countries to borrow long term (for example, 40 years) to build roads, power grids, renewable energy generation, ports, fiber optic networks, and water and sanitation systems.	新的资金将包括来自富裕国家出口信贷机构的直接贷款，以便使贫穷国家能够长期借款（比如为期40年）来建设公路，电网，再生能源发电站，港口，光纤网以及用水和卫生系统。


The G-20 should also increase the lending capacity of the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and other international financial institutions.	20国集团还应该增加世界银行，非洲发展银行和其他国际金融机构的借款能力。


Japan, with a surplus of saving, a strong currency, massive foreign exchange reserves, and factories without domestic orders, should take the lead in providing this funding for infrastructure.	日本的储蓄富余，货币坚挺，握有大量外汇储备，但是工厂没有国内订单。 因此，它应该率先为基础设施提供资金。


Moreover, Japan can boost its own economy and those of the poorest countries by directing its own industrial production to the infrastructure needs of the developing world.	而且，通过引领本国的工业生产来满足发展中国家对基础设施的需求，日本可以拉升本国经济和最贫困国家的经济。


Cooperation can turn the sharp and frightening decline in worldwide consumption spending into a global opportunity to invest more in the world’s future well being.	虽然消费支出在全球范围内出现了猛烈可怕的削减，合作却能将之转化为一次全球良机，促成更多的资金投向世界的未来繁荣。


By directing resources away from rich countries’ consumption to developing countries’ investment needs, the world can achieve a “triple” victory.	通过把资源从富裕国家的消费中移出，转而满足发展中国家的投资需求，世界能够获得“三赢”。


Higher investment and social spending in poor countries will stimulate the entire world economy, spur economic development, and promote environmental sustainability through investments in renewable energy, efficient water use, and sustainable agriculture.	贫穷国家提高投资和社会支出将会刺激全球经济，推动经济发展，还能通过注资给可持续能源，有效的水资源利用和可持续性农业来提升环境的可持续性。


Global Malaise in 2006?	2006，全球隐忧重重？


The almighty American consumer had another banner year in 2005, helping sustain global economic growth, albeit at a slower pace than in 2004.	2005 年，无所不能的美国消费者又度过了胜利的一年，尽管增长步伐慢于 2004 年，但总算还是帮助维持住了全球经济的继续增长。


As in recent years, he consumed at or above his income level, and the United States as a whole spent well beyond its means, borrowing from the rest of the world at a feverish pace in 2005 – more than $2 billion a day.	近年来，美国消费者的消费水平都相当于或高于其收入水平，美国整个国家的开支也远远大于其财力。 2005 年，美国以狂热的步伐向世界其它国家借款，每天超过 20 亿美元。


A year ago, most pundits argued that this was unsustainable.	一年前，多数权威评论人士辩论说这种现象不可能持续下去。


It evidently was sustainable, at least for one more year.	但显然这种现象确实是持续下去了，至少多持续了一年。


But it nonetheless remains true that whatever is unsustainable will not be sustained, which creates great risks for the US and global economy in 2006.	但无论如何，不可持续的东西是不能持续下去的，这点千真万确，所以这给 2006 年的美国和全球经济带来了巨大的风险。


Two economic surprises prolonged the good times in 2005.	2005 年两大出人意表的经济事件延长了这种好日子。


First, while the US Federal Reserve continued hiking short-term interest rates, long-terms rates did not increase in tandem, which allowed housing prices to continue rising.	首先，尽管联邦储备局继续提高短期利率，但长期利率却没有随之协调增长，这使得房价继续上涨。


This was centrally important to sustaining global growth, for the performance of world’s largest economy has been fueled by real estate in recent years, with individuals refinancing their mortgages and spending some of the proceeds, and with high prices leading to more construction.	在维持全球增长方面，房价上涨具有至关重要的作用，因为近年来，全球最大经济强国的表现是依靠房地产维持下去的：个人将自己的住房抵押进行再贷款，并将由此而来的部分收入用于支出； 高房价也会带来更多的建筑项目。


But this is unlikely to continue.	但是，这种情况不太可能持续下去。


Long-term interest rates almost certainly will eventually start to rise – and “eventually” increasingly looks like next year.	几乎可以肯定，长期利率“终于”要开始上涨了—“终于”看起来可能发生在明年。


If so, Americans will have to spend more money on debt service, leaving them with less to spend on consumption of goods and services.	如果是这样，美国消费者在债息上的开支将增加，而商品与服务方面的消费就会相应减少。


Moreover, real estate prices will most likely stop rising rapidly – indeed, they may even decline.	此外，房地产价格急速上涨的趋势很可能要停下来，事实上，甚至还有可能降下来。


As a result, refinancing of mortgages will grind to a halt, leaving no money to draw out of housing to sustain Americans’ consumption binge.	其结果是，住房抵押再融资将慢慢停止，再不能从房地产中抽取出资金来维持美国的消费狂欢。


On both accounts, aggregate demand will decline.	由于这两个原因，总需求将会下降。


Is it possible that the cash-rich corporate sector will more than make up for the slack by increasing investment?	现金雄厚的企业部门有可能通过增加投资来弥补这种经济萧条吗？


There may well be some increase in gross investment, as obsolete equipment and software are replaced. But there also is some evidence that innovation is slowing – perhaps the result of reduced investment in research in the past five years.	由于过时的设备和软件需要替换，所以总投资可能会有所增长，但也有证据表明，创新的步伐正在减慢——也许这是近五年来在研究方面投资减少的结果。


In any case, even if firms are cash-rich, they do not typically expand investment during periods when consumption is slowing.	不管怎样，在消费逐步减慢的阶段，即使公司富有现金，一般情况下也不会去扩大投资。


Uncertainties about the economy are likely to insert an element of caution into companies’ investment decisions.	经济的不确定性可能让公司的投资决策更为谨慎。


In short, it is more likely that moderating investment will exacerbate the consumer slowdown than that an acceleration of investment will offset it.	总而言之，与加速投资抵消消费减缓相比，节制投资更有可能加剧这种趋势。


But this is not the only reason for bleaker prospects for America and the world in 2006.	但这并非 2006 年美国和全球前景暗淡的唯一原因。


The second surprise in 2005 was that while oil prices increased far more than expected, the economic dampening effect seemed somewhat muted in most places, at least until the last part of the year.	2005 年第二件出人意表的事件是在油价涨幅大大超过预期的同时，在绝大多数地区，经济的抑制性效果好象没有怎么表现出来，至少到今年最近一段时间为止，情况是这样。


Because of higher oil prices, for example, America’s spending on oil imports has increased by roughly $50 billion a year – money that otherwise would have been spent mostly on goods made in America.	比如，因为油价上涨，美国在石油进口上的支出一年内增加了约 500 亿美元，而这些钱本来会主要花费在美国制造的商品上。


For most of 2005, Americans behaved as if they didn’t really believe that oil prices would remain high, at least for a while.	在 2005 年大多数时间，美国消费者的表现好像是没有真正相信油价会居高不下，或至少暂时会居高不下。


This is less startling than it may appear: econometric studies suggest that it takes a year to two before the full effects of oil-price increases are felt.	这种现象并不像表面上那样惊人：计量经济学研究表明，油价上涨所带来的种种后果要在一到两年之后才会全面感觉到。


Now, with futures markets predicting that oil will be $50 to $60 a barrel for the next two years, demand for gas-guzzlers has evaporated, taking with it the prospects for America’s auto companies, whose corporate strategies have bet on low oil prices and America’s love affair with the SUV.	现在，由于期货交易市场预测在未来两年里，油价将会达到 50-60 美元一桶，对高耗油车辆的需求已经逐渐消散，与之一起消散的还有美国汽车公司的前景。 这些公司的战略将赌注押在低油价和美国与 SUV的良好关系上。


High oil prices are set to dampen economic performance in the rest of the world as well, although growth prospects look better than in the US.	世界其它地方的增长前景看起来虽然比美国好，但高油价也很有可能会抑制这些地方的经济表现。


China’s growth continues to astound the world; indeed, new GDP data suggest that its economy is 20% larger than previously thought.	中国的增长将继续让世界震惊，事实上，新的国民生产总值（GDP）数据显示中国经济比以前人们认为的要强大 20%。


Moreover, China’s surging growth will echo throughout much of Asia, including (in somewhat muted form) in Japan.	此外，中国汹涌澎湃的增长将在亚洲的很多地方，包括日本（以某种不太显眼的形式）引起回响。


Europe continues to be a mixed picture, with the European Central Bank almost perversely raising interest rates even as Europe’s economy needs further stimulation to ensure its recovery.	欧洲的情况继续喜忧参半。 尽管欧洲经济需要进一步刺激，以确保复苏，但欧洲中央银行还是一意孤行地提高了利率。


As if that were not bad enough, Germany’s new government is promising to raise taxes.	德国新任政府好像还怕这样不够糟糕，居然承诺要增加税收。


Fiscal rectitude in the right place and the right time is to be commended; but this is the wrong place and the wrong time – and Germany’s recovery prospects will be dampened.	财务方面刚正不阿，如果用在正确的地方，正确的时间，值得赞扬，但是现在是错误的地方，错误的时间，而德国复苏的前景将因此而黯淡。


The main risk in 2006 is that America’s long-brewing problems come to a head globally: investors, finally taking heed of the large structural fiscal deficit, the yawning trade gap, and the high level of household indebtedness, may pull money out of the US in a panic.	2006 年的主要风险是美国长期酝酿的问题在全球达到了顶峰：投资者在最终注意到巨额结构性财务赤字、巨大的贸易���口、 高水平的家庭负债后，可能会在恐慌中将资金从美国抽出。


Alternatively, rising interest rates and a downturn in the real estate market could so weaken consumer demand that the economy slips into recession, squeezing exporters in other countries that depend on the US market.	另一种情况是：利率上涨、房地产市场衰落可能会严重减弱消费需求，使经济滑坡，直至萧条，给依赖于美国市场的其它国家的出口商造成巨大压力。


In either case, the US government, hamstrung by already-wide deficits, may feel powerless to respond with countercyclical fiscal policy.	不管是哪种情况，已经为巨额赤字所累的美国政府都可能会感到无力拿出反周期性财政政策加以应对。


With confidence in Bush’s economic management almost as low as confidence in his management of the Iraq war, there is every reason to worry that should one of these crises emerge, it will not be well managed.	人们对布什管理经济的信心，几乎和对他管理伊拉格战争的信心一样低，所以，我们有充足的理由担心，如果这些危机出现，将得不到良好管理。


But it is more likely that 2006 will just be another year of malaise: China’s significance within the global economy is still not large enough to offset weaknesses in the rest of the world.	但 2006 年更可能不过是隐忧重重的又一年而已：中国在全球经济中的重要性还没有大到足以抵消世界上其余地方的种种不足。


America, too, will manage to muddle through again – leaving even higher levels of debt for the future.	美国也会设法再次应付过去，但会给未来留下更高的债务。


In short, 2006 will be marked by mounting uncertainty about prospects for global economic growth, even as the distribution of the fruits of that growth remain dismally predictable.	总而言之，在 2006 年，即使全球经济增长果实的分配还能如以前一样可以预测，增长前景的不确定性也会不断增加。


In America, at least, 2006 is likely to be another year in which stagnant real wages freeze, or even erode, the living standards of those in the middle.	至少，在美国，2006 年可能又是实际工资无所提高，导致中间阶层的生活水平停滞不前，甚至下滑的一年。


And, everywhere, it is likely to be another year in which the gap between the haves and the have-nots will widen.	而且，在全球各地，这一年也可能是贫富差距继续加大的一年。


A Global Marshall Plan	全球马歇尔计划


ROME – Despite ongoing efforts to catalyze global development cooperation, there have been significant obstacles to progress in recent years.	罗马—尽管人们一直在努力促进全球发展合作，但近几年来仍遇到了大量前进阻力。


Fortunately, with major international meetings set for the second half of 2015, world leaders have an important opportunity to overcome them.	幸运的是，2015年下半年有不少大型国际会议，世界领导人可以抓住这一重要机会克服这些阻力。


Such a turnaround has happened before.	从前也发生过这样的情况。


At the turn of the century, international negotiations on economic development had also come to a grinding halt.	在世纪之交，关于经济发展的国际谈判几乎陷入了彻底停顿。


The Seattle ministerial of the World Trade Organization ended without decision, and after two decades of the Washington Consensus, developing countries were frustrated at the US-led international financial institutions.	西雅图世界贸易组织部长级会议没有产生任何决定，而在华盛顿共识（Washington Consensus）产生二十年后，发展中国家终于对美国领导的国际金融机构失去了耐心。


Negotiations for the inaugural United Nations Financing for Development (FfD) conference in Monterrey, Mexico, seemed to be headed nowhere.	墨西哥蒙特雷联合国发展金融（FfD）启动谈判看起来也将无果而终。


Then, on September 11, 2001, the United States was hit with major terrorist attacks – a tragic development that somehow catalyzed progress.	接着，2001年9月11日，美国遭遇恐怖袭击——这一悲剧事件��多或少刺激了进展。


World leaders agreed to begin the Doha Development Round to ensure that trade negotiations would serve developing countries’ development aspirations.	世界领导人同意开始多哈发展回合以确保贸易谈判有利于发展中国家的发展愿景。


And the 2002 Monterrey FfD conference produced major breakthroughs on foreign and domestic investment, foreign debt, international cooperation, trade, and systemic governance issues.	2002年蒙特雷发展金融会议在国外和国内投资、对外债务、国际合作、贸易和系统治理问题上取得了重大突破。


Of course, tragedy is not needed to kick-start progress.	当然，悲剧不是必不可少的进步推进因素。


This year’s major global meetings – the Conference on Financing for Development in July, the meeting at the United Nations to adopt Sustainable Development Goals in September, and the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris in December – should be sufficient.	今年的重大全球会议——7月的发展金融会议、9月的联合国可持续发展目标会议，以及12月的联合国巴黎气候变化会议——足以推动进步。


And the efforts that have gone into preparing for these meetings suggest that there is a will to move forward.	为这些会议进行的准备工作表明世界有向前进的意愿。


But the right program is key.	但正确的计划时关键。


The world needs a well-designed and far-reaching strategy to stimulate industrialization, modeled after the European Recovery Program – the American initiative that enabled Europe to rebuild after World War II.	世界需要一套设计良好、意义深远的战略刺激工业化。 二战后美国帮助欧洲重建所实施的欧洲复兴计划（European Recovery Program）是一个榜样。


The Marshall Plan, as it is better known, entailed a massive infusion of US aid to support national development efforts in Europe, and is still viewed by many Europeans as America’s finest hour.	该计划更出名的叫法是马歇尔计划，它包括美国大量出资援助支持欧洲的国家发展项目，迄今仍有许多欧洲人认为这是美国的光辉时刻。


The Marshall Plan’s impact was felt far beyond Europe’s borders, developing over the following decade into what is probably the most successful economic-development assistance project in human history.	马歇尔计划的影响绝不仅限于欧洲，在此后的十年中，它成为也许是人类历史上最成功的经济发展援助工程。


Similar policies were introduced in Northeast Asia following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China and the Korean War.	在中华人民共和国成立和朝鲜战争爆发后，东北亚也引入了类似的政策。


Of course, there was a political motivation behind the Marshall Plan’s expansion.	当然，马歇尔计划的扩张背后有其政治动机。


By creating a cordon sanitaire of wealthy countries from Western Europe to Northeast Asia, the US hoped to contain the spread of communism at the start of the Cold War.	美国希望通过打造一条从西欧到东北亚的富裕国家封锁线，从冷战伊始就遏制住共产主义的蔓延。


Developing countries that did not serve the same political ends were left out.	无助于这一政治目的的发展中国家都被排除在外。


At its core, however, the Marshall Plan was an economic strategy – and a sound one at that.	但是，从本质上说，马歇尔计划是经济战略，并且是可靠的经济战略。


Crucially, it represented a complete reversal of its predecessor, the Morgenthau Plan, which focused on de-industrialization – with poor results.	关键是，它完全反其前任——以去工业化为核心、结果糟糕的摩根索计划（Morgenthau Plan）之道而行之。


The plan’s aim – articulated by Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr., in his 1945 book Germany is Our Problem – was to convert Germany into a “principally agricultural and pastoral” country, in order to prevent its involvement in any new wars.	美国财政部长小摩根索（Henry Morgenthau, Jr. ）在1945年的著作《德国是我们的问题》（Germany is Our Problem）中指出，摩根索计划的目的是将德国转变为“以农业和牧业为主”的国家，以此防止它参与新战争。


By late 1946, however, economic hardship and unemployment in Germany spurred former US President Herbert Hoover to visit the country on a fact-finding mission.	但是，到1946年底，德国经济困境和失业问题促使美国派出前总统胡佛前往访问并考察实施。


Hoover’s third report of March 18, 1947, called the notion that Germany could be reduced to a pastoral state an “illusion,” which could not be achieved without exterminating or moving 25,000,000 people out of the country.	胡佛在其1947年3月18日的第三份报告中认为，德国可以降级为牧业国家的概念是一个“幻觉”，除非让25,000,000德国人灭绝或迁出德国，否则绝不可能实现。


The only alternative was re-industrialization.	唯一的替代方案是再工业化。


Less than three months later, Secretary of State George Marshall made his landmark speech at Harvard University announcing the policy reversal.	不出三个月，国务卿马歇尔（George Marshall）在哈佛大学发表了标志性演讲，宣布取消摩根索计划。


Germany and the rest of Europe were to be re-industrialized, he stated, including through heavy-handed state interventions, such as high duties, quotas, and import prohibitions.	德国和欧洲区其他国家将实施再工业化，他指出，手段包括大规模国家干预，如高关税、配额和进口禁运。


Free trade would be possible only after reconstruction, when European countries could compete in international markets.	自由贸易只有在复兴之后、欧洲国家可以在国际市场上竞争时才可能重启。


Marshall made three other important points in his short speech.	马歇尔在他的简短演讲中还提出了其他三个要点。


First, in noting the role that the breakdown of trade between urban and rural areas played in Germany’s economic slowdown, he recalled a centuries-old European economic insight: all wealthy countries have cities with a manufacturing sector.	首先，他指出，城市和农村地区之间的贸易的断裂是德国经济崩溃的重要原因，并回顾了已有几百年历史的欧洲经济洞见：所有富裕国家都具备拥有制造业的城市。


“The remedy,” Marshall explained, “lies in…restoring the confidence of the European people,” so that “the manufacturer and the farmer” would be “able and willing to exchange their products for currencies, the continuing value of which is not open to question.”	“解决办法，”马歇尔解释说，“就在于……重塑欧洲人民的信心，”从而“制造业者和农民”将“有能力也有意愿用产品交换货币，这一点的持续价值是无可争议的。 ”


Second, Marshall argued that participatory institutions emerge from economic progress, not the other way around – the opposite of today’s conventional wisdom.	其次，马歇尔指出，参与机构产生于经济进步，而不是其他办法——这与今天的传统智慧相反。


As he put it, the policy’s “purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world, so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.”	他说，政策的“目的应该是复兴世界工作经济（working economy），从而产生自由机构能够生存其中的政治和社会条件。 ”


Third, Marshall emphasized that aid should be comprehensive and strategic, in order to foster real progress and development.	第三，马歇尔强调援助必须是全面的、战略性的，其目的是推动真正的进步和发展。


“Such assistance,” he declared, “must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop.	“这类援助，”他宣称，“决不能建立在随各种危机发展的碎片化的基础上。


Any assistance that this government may render in the future should provide a cure, rather than a mere palliative.”	我国政府在未来给予的任何援助应该起到治病的效果，而不仅仅是缓解症状。 ”


Marshall’s vision offers important lessons for world leaders seeking to accelerate development today, beginning with the need to reverse the effects of the Washington Consensus on developing and transition economies – effects that resemble those of the Morgenthau Plan.	马歇尔的愿景为如今寻求加速发展的世界领导人提供了重要教训。 首先要做的是消除华盛顿共识对发展中和转型经济体的影响——类似于摩根索计划的影响。


Some countries – including large economies like China and India, which have long protected domestic industry – have been in a better position to benefit from economic globalization.	一些国家——包括中国和印度等长期保护本国工业的大型经济体——所处的地位更加有利于从经济全球化中获益。


Others have experienced a decline in economic growth and real per capita income, as their industry and agricultural capacity have fallen, especially over the last two decades of the last century.	其他国家经历了经济增长和真实人均收入的下降，因为它们的工业和农业产能出现了下降，特别是在上个世纪的最后二十年中。


It is time to increase poor economies’ productive capacity and purchasing power, as occurred in Europe in the decade after Marshall’s speech.	如今，应该提高贫穷经济体的生产力和购买力，一如马歇尔演讲后十年中的欧洲。


Marshall’s insight that such shared economic development is the only way to create a lasting peace remains as true as ever.	马歇尔的洞见——共同的经济发展是产生持续和平的唯一途径——依然如当时那样正确。


The Global Obesity Threat	全球肥胖威胁


LONDON/MELBOURNE – In 2010, humanity passed an important milestone.	伦敦/墨尔本—2010年，人类跨越了一个重要里程碑。


According to the Global Burden of Disease Study, published in the British medical journal The Lancet, obesity became a bigger public-health problem than hunger.	据发表于英国医学杂志《柳叶刀》的全球疾病负担研究（Global Burden of Disease Study），肥胖已成为比饥饿更加严重的公共健康问题。


Today, according to the latest edition of the study, more than 2.1 billion people – nearly 30% of the global population – are overweight or obese.	根据最新版全球疾病负担研究，超过21亿人——接近全球人口的30%——超重或肥胖。


That is nearly two and a half times the number of adults and children who are undernourished.	这相当于营养不良成人和儿童数字的两倍半。


Obesity is responsible for about 5% of deaths worldwide.	从全球看，肥胖构成了约5%的死因。


This crisis is not just a pressing health concern; it is also a threat to the global economy.	这场危机不仅是紧迫的健康威胁，也是全球经济威胁。


The total economic impact of obesity is about $2 trillion a year, or 2.8% of world GDP – roughly equivalent to the economic damage caused by smoking or armed violence, war, and terrorism, according to new research by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI).	据麦肯锡全球研究所（MGI）的新研究，肥胖的总经济影响高达每年2万亿美元左右，或世界GDP的2. 8%——大约相当于吸烟或武装暴力、战争和恐怖主义造成的经济损失。


And the problem is likely to worsen.	而问题可能还要严重。


If the current trend continues, almost half of the world’s adult population will be overweight or obese by 2030.	如果当前趋势持续下去，到2030年全球将有近一半的成年人超重。


As World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General Margaret Chan has noted, “Not one single country has managed to turn around its obesity epidemic in all age groups.”	世界卫生组织总干事陈冯富珍指出，“没有一个国家能在所有年龄段都成功扭转肥胖状况。


According to the OECD, from 2000 to 2013, the prevalence of obesity increased by at least 0.5% per year in 130 of the 196 countries for which data were collected.	”据经合组织的数据，从2000年到2013年，在196个数据源国家中，有130个肥胖率每年至少增加0. 5%


This global epidemic is not confined to advanced countries.	这一全球趋势不仅限于发达国家。


As emerging economies climb out of poverty, their citizens are becoming fatter.	随着新兴经济体走出贫困，它们的公民也日益发胖。


More than 60% of the world’s obese people live in developing countries, where rapid industrialization and urbanization are boosting incomes and therefore calorie intake.	60%多肥胖人群生活在发展中国家，发展中国家的快速工业化和城市化啊提高了收入，因此也提高了卡路里摄入。


In India and China, the prevalence of obesity in cities is 3-4 times the rate in rural areas.	在印度和中国，城市肥胖率比农村高2—3倍。


Indeed, the evidence suggests that developing countries are especially vulnerable to the epidemic.	事实上，证据表明发展中国家尤其容易受到肥胖影响。


Obesity rates tend to explode in countries where food was once scarce and suddenly becomes plentiful.	粮食曾经稀缺、猛然间又充足的国家，肥胖率总是会出现飙升。


In the mid-twentieth century, for example, a boom in phosphate mining transformed the Micronesian island state of Nauru from a land of food shortages and starvation to the world’s leader in obesity and type-2 diabetes.	比如，20世纪中叶，磷矿开采带来的繁荣让密克罗尼西亚岛国瑙鲁从粮食短缺和饥饿之地变成全球肥胖和2型糖尿病最严重的国家。


In 2005, according to the WHO, 94% of men and 93% of women in Nauru were overweight, and more than 70% of the population was obese.	据世卫组织数据，2005年瑙鲁94%的男性和93%的女性超重，70%的人口肥胖。


To make matters worse, in countries with limited public-health services, the cost of health care falls directly on the afflicted households.	更糟糕的是，在公共卫生服务有限的国家，医疗成本直接落在了受影响家庭��上。


As a result, obesity can lock in poverty and perpetuate inequality.	结果，肥胖让贫穷固化，也加剧了不平等性。


Through a review of 500 intervention trials around the world, MGI has identified 74 potential interventions that could be used to address obesity.	MGI评估了全球500项干预实验，筛选出74种有望解决肥胖问题的干预手段。


These include subsidized school meals, urban design that encourages walking, better nutritional labeling, restrictions on the advertising of high-calorie food and drinks, and fiscal measures.	这些手段包括补贴校园餐、鼓励步行的城市设计、改进营养标示、限制高热量食品和饮料广告，以及财政手段。


Education concerning the risks of obesity is important, as is taking personal responsibility for one’s health, fitness, and weight.	肥胖风险教育很重要，你必须为自己的健康、身材和体重负责。