All relevant regulators were present: Mary Miller, Under Secretary for Domestic Finance at the Treasury Department; Dan Tarullo, Governor of the Federal Reserve System; Marty Gruenberg, Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); Tom Curry, Comptroller of the Currency; Richard Cordray, Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; Elisse Walter, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission; and Gary Gensler, Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.	所有的相关监管官员都出席了：在财政部负责国内金融的副国务卿玛丽·米勒（Mary Miller）、美联储理事丹·塔鲁罗（Dan Tarullo）、联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）主席马提·古伦伯格（Marty Gruenberg）、货币监理署署长汤姆·库里（Tom Curry）、消费金融保护局主席理查德·考德雷（Richard Cordray）、证券交易委员会主席艾利瑟·沃尔特（Elisse Walter）以及商品期货交易委员会主席加里·金斯勒（Gary Gensler）。


Their answers ranged from unimpressive to downright evasive.	他们的回答或平庸无奇，或闪烁其词。


(The Fed, the Treasury, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency bear most responsibility, together with the Department of Justice, which was not at the hearing.)	（美联储、财政部和货币监理署以及未出席的司法部承担了大部分责任。 ）


Then Warren hit them where it hurt.	接着，沃伦直击他们的痛处。


“There are district attorneys and United States attorneys out there every day squeezing ordinary citizens on sometimes very thin grounds and taking them to trial in order to make an example, as they put it.	“我们有地方检察官和联邦检察官，每天他们都会吹毛求疵地把普通公民送上法庭，用他们的话说，这叫以儆效尤。


I’m really concerned that ‘too big to fail’ has become ‘too big for trial.’”	我真的担心‘太大而不能倒’已经变成了‘太大而不能诉’。


After the video of Warren’s statement went viral, more than 13,000 people signed a petition demanding real accountability.	”沃伦发言的视频发布后，13 000多人联署请愿，要求真正的问责。


The conventional narrative – comforting to the big banks and their friends in the Obama administration – is that the Treasury has done everything within its power to reform the system.	令大银行和它们在奥巴马政府中的朋友感到舒服的套话是财政部已在其权力范围内竭尽全力改革金融系统。


In this account, anyone now complaining about, for example, the lack of legal charges against the banks is some form of dangerous demagogue.	按照这套说辞，只要你有所抱怨，比如没人对银行提起法律诉讼，那你就是危险的煽动者。


But 12 Federal Reserve Bank presidents are pushing for more progress on money market reform.	但12位联邦储备银行行长正在推进进一步的货币市场改革。


The Special Inspector General for TARP, based within the Treasury, continues to express reservations about the consequences of unconditional bailouts.	财政部出身的TARP特别调查长沃伦接着表示，自己对无条件援助的后果持保留态度。


Credible figures, such as Richard Fisher (Dallas Fed president), Tom Hoenig (FDIC), and Jeremiah Norton (FDIC) speak publically about the continuing problems posed by “too big to fail.”	理查德·菲舍尔（Richard Fisher，达拉斯联邦储备银行行长）、汤姆·霍尼格（Tom Hoenig，FDIC）和耶利米·诺顿（Jeremiah Norton，FDIC）等拥有崇高威信的人士公开谈论“太大而不能倒”带来的持续不断的问题。


Jeremy Stein, a relatively new appointment to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, recently gave a speech explaining why dangerous incentive problems within large financial institutions will not be fixed by regulation.	资历较浅的美联储理事杰里米·斯坦因（Jeremy Stein）最近在一次演讲中解释了为什么大型金融机构内部的危险激励问题不可能通过监管得以纠正。


Yet a senior Department of Justice official recently said that criminal charges could not be brought against big financial institutions, because experts tell him that to do so would damage the economy.	但司法部的一位高级官员最近表示，不能对大型金融机构提起刑事诉讼，因为专家告诉他这样做有害于经济。


In other words, equality before the law – a fundamental principle of American justice – has vanished.	换句话说，作为美国司法基石之一的法律面前人人平等原则已不复存在。


The political power of global megabanks is out of control.	全球大银行的政治权力已经失控。


They aim to run Washington just as effectively as they did in the run-up to the 2007-2008 crisis.	他们对华盛顿的掌控力与2007—2008危机前并无区别。


Sensible officials resist this, but they need political cover – elected representatives who will support them on Capitol Hill.	明智的官员会阻止这一幕发生，但他们需要政治掩护——在国会山支持他们的当选代表。


The group of core senators pushing for financial reform is already strong, including Sherrod Brown, Jeff Merkley, Carl Levin, and Jack Reed.	推行金融改革的核心参议员集体已相当强大，包括谢罗德·布朗（Sherrod Brown）、杰夫·莫克雷（Jeff Merkley）、卡尔·列文（Carl Levin）和杰克·里德（Jack Reed）。


And now Elizabeth Warren is working hard with her Senate colleagues – Democrat and Republican – to bring responsible, well-informed pressure to bear on regulators and prosecutors.	如今，伊丽莎白·沃伦正在与民主党和共和党参议员同事精诚合作，形成负责、内行的压力鞭策监管者和检察官。


As Christy Romero, TARP’s current Special Inspector General, put it in written testimony submitted for the February 14 hearing, our largest financial institutions “…continue to be dangerously interconnected.	正如TARP现任特别调查长克里斯蒂·罗梅罗（Christy Romero）在2月14日听证会上递交的书面证词所言，我们的最大金融机构间“仍然存在危险的半根错节的关系。


And, in fact, they have only gotten bigger in the past four years.”	事实上，它们比四年前变得更大了。 ”


A broad coalition of reformers is hammering home this point at every opportunity.	眼下，改革联军正在抓住一切机会打扫房子。


The political narrative is changing – and Warren is leading the way.	政治口风在变化，而沃伦是其中的领军人物。


Embracing Science	拥抱科学


Long-term economic progress comes mainly from the invention and spread of improved technologies.	从长远来看，经济发展主要来源于革新技术的发明与推广。


The scientific revolution was made possible by the printing press, the industrial revolution by the steam engine, and India’s escape from famine by increased farm yields – the so-called “Green Revolution.”	印刷机的发明使科技革命成为可能，蒸气机的发明为工业革命创造了条件，而印度摆脱饥荒则主要依靠提高农业产出¾也就是所谓的“绿色革命”。


Today’s era of globalization emerged with the spread of computers and the Internet.	计算机和互联网的普及带来了今天的全球化时代。


Thus, when we seek solutions to some of the world’s toughest problems, they, too, are likely to be found, at least in part, in new technologies that can resolve old and seemingly intractable problems.	因此，很多全球最困难问题的解决，至少是部分解决实际就有赖于新的技术，这些技术可以让许多原有的复杂问题迎刃而解。


Consider poverty in Africa.	比如非洲的贫困问题。


Every conceivable explanation has been given, usually focusing on what Africans do wrong.	人们做出了能够想到的所有解释，这些说法都一味强调非洲人自身的原因。


But a visit to Africa’s villages makes clear that the problems have more to do with the struggle for survival under difficult physical conditions than with any special problems that are unique to African societies.	但只要到非洲村庄里亲自走走，就不难发现问题更多地涉及在恶劣自然条件下人类的生存努力，而不是非洲所特有的所谓独特社会问题。


Africa’s farmers produce roughly one-third or less food per hectare of farmland than their counterparts around the world, resulting in massive hunger, which is exacerbated by a heavy disease burden.	非洲农民每公顷土地的粮食产量小于等于世界其它地方农民的三分之一，这导致了饥荒泛滥，而沉重的疾病负担更让本来困难的境况雪上加霜。


Malaria poses a unique challenge, owing in large part to Africa’s mosquito species, which are especially adept at transmitting the disease.	疟疾是非洲面临的独特挑战，这在很大程度上要归咎于非洲的蚊虫种类，它们把传播疟疾病毒当成了家常便饭。


Other tropical parasitic diseases imply similarly extraordinary burdens in Africa.	其它热带寄生虫病也给非洲造成了沉重的负担。


Add the practical difficulties of broken-down roads and few cars and trucks, and economic isolation follows.	如果再加上道路破旧、车辆稀少等诸如此类的实际困难，就演变成了经济上的隔离和闭塞。


So the challenges of survival are enormous.	正因为如此，生存的挑战才变得异常严峻。


Yet practical solutions are at hand, because simple and low-cost technologies can address specific problems.	但我们有着实际的解决办法，因为简单、廉价的技术可以解决很多具体问题。


Low farm yields can be addressed through improved seed varieties specially adapted for African conditions, combined with technologies for replenishing soil and managing water.	比如可以用改进作物品种适应非洲自然条件的办法提高农作物产量，此外补充土壤和管理水资源也可以对产量有所帮助。


Malaria can be controlled through newly designed long-lasting mosquito nets and a new generation of effective medicines.	疟疾可以通过新型长效蚊虫网和新一代特效药加以控制。


Other tropical diseases also can be controlled, and practical technologies for safe drinking water can dramatically reduce diarrheal diseases.	其它的热带疾病也能够很好地加以控制，而且安全饮用水领域的实用技术也可以大幅度降低腹泻的发病率。


Mobile phones, local wireless Internet, and more paved roads could do much to break the economic isolation of Africa’s villages.	手机、当地无线互联网和更多修建公路能够有效地打破非洲村庄在经济上与世隔绝的地位。


Donor countries incessantly ask Africans to change their trade policies, government institutions, public administration, and more.	捐助国不断要求非洲人改变贸易政策、改革政府机构、公共管理部门，以及采取其它方面的改革措施。


Some of these changes are important, but the role of the rich countries has been lopsided, focusing on everything except how to finance and introduce practical technologies to solve practical problems.	其中有些改革意义重大，但富国所起的作用却极不均衡，它们什么都要插手，却惟独忽视了能解决具体问题的资金援助和实用技术推广。


The rich countries’ mistakes wouldn’t matter if African countries had enough money to adopt the needed technologies on their own, but Africa is so poor that it must get financial help to escape poverty.	如果非洲国家有足够的资金自主采用所需技术，那么富裕国家的错误就没那么重要，但问题恰恰在于非洲国家太过贫困，它们必须获得金融援助才有可能摆脱贫困。


The development challenges in Africa are just one example of how tough societal problems can be addressed by the design and spread of improved technologies.	非洲的发展挑战只是设计推广革新技术能如何解决棘手社会问题的一个例证。


The same will be true of how the world best addresses manmade climate change – another of those seemingly intractable global problems.	技术革新在应对人为气候变化时同样适用，而后者是看来让人束手无策的另一个全球问题。


Right now, rich countries are changing the world’s climate by emitting billions of tons of carbon dioxide each year from the use of coal, oil, and natural gas.	目前，富裕国家每年使用煤炭、石油和天然气时会排出成百上千亿吨的二氧化碳，逐年改变着全球气候。


In future years, China and India also will make massive contributions to increased carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.	未来几年内，中国和印度也会向大气中排放大量的二氧化碳。


Yet no country, rich or poor, is keen to cut its energy use, owing to concern that to do so would threaten jobs, incomes, and economic growth.	但所有国家，无论贫富，都并不热衷于缩减能源使用，因为它们担心这么做可能会对就业、收入和经济增长造成威胁。


New technologies will provide a key part of the solution.	新技术会成为解决问题的关键因素。


Already, “hybrid” automobiles, which combine gasoline and battery power, can roughly double fuel efficiency, cutting carbon dioxide emissions by half.	现在，“混合能源”汽车已经可以同时使用汽油和电池能源，这种汽车可以将汽油的燃烧效率提高近一倍，并减少一半的二氧化碳排放量。


Similarly, engineers have developed ways to capture the carbon dioxide that results from burning coal in power plants and store it safely underground.	与此相似，工程人员已经发明了新的方法，收集发电厂烧煤产生的二氧化碳，并把它们安全地储存在地下。


This new technology, called “carbon capture and sequestration,” can cut by 80% the carbon dioxide emitted during the production of electricity.	这种新技术被称为“碳搜集隔离技术”，能够将发电过程中排放的二氧化碳降低近80%。


The costs appear relatively small.	与此相比，这项新技术的成本也显得微不足道。


Consider also the depletion of ocean fisheries through over-fishing.	再比如由于过度捕捞造成的海洋鱼类资源枯竭。


Global demand for fish consumption is growing, and so, too, is the global capacity to catch fish, driving some species to the point of extinction.	全球鱼类需求不断攀升，于是捕鱼能力也日益增强，这把某些物种推到了灭绝���边缘。


Improved aquaculture, in which fish are grown at manmade fishponds and reservoirs is still far from being a perfect technology, mainly for environmental reasons, yet it is enormously promising.	经过改良的水产养殖业可以将鱼类饲养在人工管理的池塘和水库，但这种技术目前还有待完善，特别是在环境保护领域还存在不少问题。 尽管存在种种缺点，但水产养殖技术的前景一片光明。


On a recent visit to Africa, a senior agricultural scientist said that in today’s world, the scientist is closer than ever before to the farmer, but farther away than ever from the policymakers.	不久前访问非洲后，一位资深的农业科学家认为在当今世界，科学家离农民之间的距离越来越近，但和决策者之间的距离却越来越远。


Politicians don’t understand science, and rarely seek the advice of scientists and engineers in addressing major issues.	政治家根本不懂科学，在解决重大问题时也很少征求科学家和工程师的意见。


Everything is viewed as politics and votes, not as technical problems requiring technological expertise, which is why Africa’s poverty is so often attributed to corruption rather than to ecological challenges.	所有问题都被当作政治和选举问题简单处理，而没有被看做需要运用专业技术知识才能解决的技术挑战。 这解释了为什么人们经常把非洲贫穷的原因归结为腐败，而不是把它看成一种生态挑战。


It is easy to dismiss the suggestion that technology can save the day.	对技术拯救未来的说法置之不理也很容易。


After all, technological advance also requires good governance, market forces, effective universities, and more.	毕竟，技术进步也需要好的管理、市场机制、高效大学和诸多其它因素进行支撑。


Politics will still play its role.	其中，政治仍然起着至关重要的作用。


Nevertheless, it’s time to recognize that governments are ill-equipped to understand the sophisticated technological challenges and opportunities facing the world, and that new ways are needed to ensure that science and technology are given the prominence needed to address a wide range of increasingly urgent global problems.	但无论如何，我们应该认识到政府在理解世界所面临的复杂技术挑战和机遇时做得远远不够，我们必须采用新的方法来确保科学技术得到应有的重视，解决各式各样日益迫切的全球问题。


Now is the time for every major international agency and national government to assume responsibility for gaining the scientific and technological expertise that they will need in the twenty-first century.	现在是时候让所有重要的国际机构和国家政府负起责任，掌握处理21世纪问题所需的科学和技术专长。


Embracing the Empire	迎接帝国


Bernard Kouchner, France’s new foreign minister, has a long and distinguished record as an advocate of intervention in countries where human rights are abused.	法国新外长库施奈尔长久以来一直呼吁对人权遭到践踏的国家进行干预，其记录非同一般。


As a co-founder of Doctors Without Borders, he stated that “we were establishing the moral right to interfere inside someone else’s country.”	作为医生无疆界组织的创始人，他说过“我们是在建立一种可以在其他国家实行干预的道德权利。


Saddam Hussein’s mass murder of Iraqi citizens is why he supported the war in Iraq.	”萨达姆大肆屠杀伊拉克人是他支持伊拉克战争的理由。


One should always be careful about attributing motives to other people’s views.	在确定人们观点的动机的时候要小心谨慎。


But Kouchner himself has often said that the murder of his Russian-Jewish grandparents in Auschwitz inspired his humanitarian interventionism.	但是，库施奈尔本人经常说他的俄罗斯犹太裔祖父母在奥斯威辛集中营被害激发了他的人道干预主义。


One may or may not agree with Kouchner’s policies, but his motives are surely impeccable.	人们或许同意或许不同意库施奈尔的政策，但是他的动机却是无可指摘的。


The fact that many prominent Jewish intellectuals in Europe and the United States – often, like Kouchner, with a leftist past – are sympathetic to the idea of using American armed force to further the cause of human rights and democracy in the world, may derive from the same wellspring.	欧洲和美国的众多著名犹太裔知识分子都经常像库施奈尔一样有过左倾历史。 他们对使用美国武力在世界上促进人权和民主事业表示同情。


Any force is justified to avoid another Shoah, and those who shirk their duty to support such force are regarded as no better than collaborators with evil.	他们的观点可能也来自同样的源泉。 他们认为，为了避免另一场犹太人浩劫，使用武力都是应该的，而那些逃避支持使用武力责任的人则被认为是邪恶的同犯。


If we were less haunted by memories of appeasing the Nazi regime, and of the ensuing genocide, people might not be as concerned about human rights as they are.	如果我们不是那么被绥靖纳粹政权的记忆以及随后的种族屠杀所困扰，那么人们就可能不会如此关心人权问题了。


And by no means do all those who work to protect the rights of others invoke the horrors of the Third Reich to justify Anglo-American armed intervention.	而且，那些保护他人人权的人不用引用第三帝国的恐怖来给英美武装干预提供理由。


But the term “Islamofascism” was not coined for nothing.	但是“伊斯兰法西斯主义”这一词汇并非空穴来风。


It invites us to see a big part of the Islamic world as a natural extension of Nazism.	这会让我们将伊斯兰世界的一大部分视为纳粹主义的自然延伸。


Saddam Hussein, who was hardly an Islamist, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is, are often described as natural successors to Adolf Hitler.	萨达姆根本就不是什么伊斯兰主义者，而伊朗总统内贾德则经常被描绘成为希特勒天然的继承人。


And European weakness, not to mention the “treason” of its liberal scribes, paving the way to an Islamist conquest of Europe (“Eurabia”) is seen as a ghastly echo of the appeasement of the Nazi threat.	而欧洲的软弱，更不要说对其自由主义的“背叛”，进而造成伊斯兰对欧洲的征服（所谓“欧洲伊斯兰”）则被认为是对纳粹威胁采取绥靖主义的可怕回响。


Revolutionary Islamism is undoubtedly dangerous and bloody.	革命伊斯兰主义毫无疑问是危险和充满暴力流血的。


Yet analogies with the Third Reich, although highly effective as a way to denounce people with whose views one disagrees, are usually false.	但是，把它和第三帝国相比较尽管在谴责政见不同的人士上高度有效，却通常是错误的。


No Islamist armies are about to march into Europe – indeed, most victims of Revolutionary Islamism live in the Middle East, not in Europe – and Ahmadinejad, his nasty rhetoric notwithstanding, does not have a fraction of Hitler’s power.	没有什么伊斯兰军队会入侵欧洲。 实际上，大多数革命伊斯兰主义的受害者居住在中东，而非欧洲，而内贾德尽管其言辞可恶但是其实力不可与希特勒相提并论。


The refusal of many Muslims to integrate into Western societies, as well as high levels of unemployment and ready access to revolutionary propaganda, can easily explode in acts of violence.	许多穆斯林人拒绝融入西方社会、高失业率以及随处可见的革命性宣传会轻而易举地爆发为暴力事件。


But the prospect of an “Islamized” Europe is also remote.	但是，将欧洲“伊斯兰化”也遥不可及。


We are not living a replay of 1938.	我们并不生活在1938年的重演之中。


So why the high alarm about European appeasement, especially among the neo-conservatives?	那么，人们特别是新保守主义者为什么对欧洲的绥靖如此警觉呢？


Why the easy equation of Islamism with Nazism?	为什么轻易地把伊斯兰主义与纳粹主义相提并论呢？


Israel is often mentioned as a reason.	人们经常把以色列提为一个原因。


But Israel can mean different things to different people.	但是，对于不同的人来说，以色列具有不同的含义。


To certain evangelical Christians, it is the holy site of the Second Coming of the Messiah.	对于某些福音基督徒来说，以色列是耶稣复生的地方。


To many Jews, it is the one state that will always offer refuge.	对于许多犹太人来说，她是一个永远可以避难的地方。


To neo-conservative ideologues, it is the democratic oasis in a desert of tyrannies.	对于新保守主义意识形态者而言，她是在专制主义沙漠中的民主绿洲。


Defending Israel against its Islamic enemies may indeed be a factor in the existential alarmism that underlies the present “war on terror.”	保护以色列不受伊斯兰敌人的侵犯可能确实是当前“反恐战争”基础的存在主义危言耸听的一个因素。


A nuclear-armed Iran would certainly make Israel feel more vulnerable.	拥有核子武装的伊朗必定会让以色列感到更加脆弱。


But it is probably overstated as an explanation.	但是，人们可能把这一局面夸大成为了一个解释。


Kouchner did not advocate Western intervention in Bosnia or Kosovo because of Israel.	库施奈尔并没有因为以色列而主张干预波斯尼亚或者科索沃。


If concern for Israel played a part in Paul Wolfowitz’s advocacy of war in Iraq, it was probably a minor one.	如果对于以色列的忧虑在沃尔福威茨主张对伊拉克动武中发挥了部分作用，那可能也是很小的作用。


Both men were motivated by common concerns for human rights and democracy, as well as perhaps by geopolitical considerations.	对于人权和民主的共同担忧，也许还有地缘政治的考虑可能是这两个人的动机。


Still, Islamist rhetoric, adopted by Ahmedinejad among others, is deliberately designed to stir up memories of the Shoah.	内贾德和其他人所采纳的伊斯兰言论依旧是有意用来挑起犹太人大浩劫的回忆。


So perhaps the existential fear of some Western intellectuals is easier to explain than their remarkable, sometimes fawning trust in the US government to save the world by force.	所以，某些西方知识分子的存在主义担忧可能要比他们非常甚至是奉承地信任美国政府用武力来挽救世界较为容易解释。


The explanation of this mysterious trust may lie elsewhere.	对于这一神秘信赖的解释可能在其他地方。


Many neo-cons emerged from a leftist past, in which a belief in revolution from above was commonplace: “people’s democracies” yesterday, “liberal democracies” today.	许多新保守主义者从左倾的过去演变出来。 左倾主义相信自上而下的革命是司空见惯的。


Among Jews and other minorities, another historical memory may also play a part: the protection of the imperial state.	昨天是“人民的民主”，今天是“自由民主”。 在犹太人和其他少数族裔中，另一个历史记忆可能也发挥了作用， 那就是帝国的保护。


Austrian and Hungarian Jews were among the most fiercely loyal subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Emperor, because he shielded them from the violent nationalism of the majority populations.	奥地利和匈牙利犹太人是奥匈国王最为忠诚的支持者，因为他让犹太人免受占人口多数���的暴力性收归国有。


Polish and Russian Jews, at least at the beginning of the communist era, were often loyal subjects of the communist state, because it promised (falsely, as it turned out) to protect them against the violence of anti-Semitic nationalists.	波兰和俄罗斯犹太人至少在共产主义初期经常使共产国家的忠诚臣民，因为共产国家担保（结果是虚假的）不让他们受到反犹太主义民族主义者的暴力攻击。


If it were really true that the fundamental existence of our democratic Western world were about to be destroyed by an Islamist revolution, it would only make sense to seek protection in the full force of the US informal empire.	如果民主西方世界的根本生存果真会被一场伊斯兰革命所摧毁，只有寻求美国非正式帝国的全力保护才会有道理。


But if one sees our current problems in less apocalyptic terms, then another kind of trahison des clercs comes into view: the blind cheering on of a sometimes foolish military power embarked on unnecessary wars that cost more lives than they were intended to save.	但是，如果人们并不使用这种大难临头的观点看待当前的问题的话，那么就会看到另一种教士的背叛，也就是说，某些时候愚蠢的军事强国进行不必要的战争，造成人的死亡要比战争想要挽救的人还要多，对此却不问原味地喝彩。


Emerging Economies’ Demographic Challenge	新兴经济体的人口挑战


WASHINGTON, DC – Population aging is often cited as a major economic challenge for the developed world.	发自华盛顿特区——人口老化常常被认为是发达国家所面对的一项重大经济挑战。


But a new report from the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) shows that shifting demographics pose an even greater threat to the growth prospects of many emerging economies.	而由麦肯锡国际研究中心所发布的一项最新报告则显示，不断转化的人口构成已经对许多新兴经济体的增长前景构成了更为重大的威胁。


Over the last 50 years, the world's 1.6% annual population growth fueled a surging labor force and a rapid increase in GDP in many emerging economies.	在过去50年间，全球1. 6%的年均人口增长率为许多新兴经济体带来了一大波劳动力大军以及迅速的GDP增长。


Employment more than doubled in China and South Africa, and at least tripled in Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and Nigeria.	中国和南非的就业数量翻了一番以上，而在巴西、印度、印尼，墨西哥和尼日利亚则增加了至少三倍。


In Saudi Arabia, employment increased almost nine-fold.	沙特的就业职位则增长了几乎九倍。


But, with population growth slowing, average annual employment growth in emerging economies is expected to drop from 1.9% to 0.4%.	但随着人口增长逐渐放缓，新兴经济体的年均就业增长率预计也将由1. 9%下跌到0.


In absolute terms, the decline will exceed that of developed economies, where annual employment growth is expected to fall from 0.9% to 0.1% the coming years.	以绝对值计算，这一下跌幅度将远超发达国家，而后者在未来几年的下跌幅度为从0. 9%跌至0.


In most economies, employment is expected to reach its peak within the next half-century; in China, the labor force could shrink by 20% over this period.	在大多数经济体中，就业职位预计在未来50年内到达顶峰； 而在中国，劳动人口数量将在这一时期内减少20%。


Of course, there are exceptions to this trend.	当然，有些国家也独立于这一趋势之外。


Indonesia and South Africa are projected to continue to experience rising employment (albeit at slower rates).	印尼和南非两国预计将持续出现就业增加的局面（尽管增长率有所降低）。


Nigeria's labor force is expected to triple from 2014 to 2064, and many other economies in Sub-Saharan Africa will experience similar levels of growth.	尼日利亚的劳动人口有望在2014到2064年间达到目前的三倍，而其他许多撒哈拉以南非洲的经济体也将出现类似规模的增长。


But, overall, economies' demographic tailwinds will wane, with serious consequences for GDP growth.	但总体来说，各经济体的人口顺景将出现逆转，并带来影响GDP增长的严重后果。


With no other change in current trends, emerging economies' rates of GDP growth would fall by one-third, from 4.8% to 3.1% annually, by 2064.	如果这一趋势不发生改变的话，到2064年新兴经济体的GDP增长率将下降三分之一，从年均4. 8%下跌到3.


More problematic, the declining share of the working-age population is set to cause per capita GDP to decline by more than 30% in some countries – most notably, Brazil, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia.	1%。 令问题更加恶化的是，适龄劳动人口比例的下跌也将导致某些国家的人均GDP产值下跌超过30%——其中最为显著的莫过于巴西，墨西哥和沙特。


The good news is that emerging economies have at their disposal a powerful means to offset these trends: productivity growth.	然而好消息是新兴经济体拥有一项强大的工具去抵消这些趋势：生产力提升。 无可否认，新兴经济体的年均生产力增长需要提升57%，也就是从2.


To be sure, annual productivity growth in emerging economies would need to accelerate by 57%, from 2.8% to 4.4%, to compensate fully for the demographic shift.	8%上升到4. 4%，才能完全补偿由于人口构成变化所带来的负面效应。


But, even if that ambitious goal is not achievable everywhere, emerging economies have considerable scope for catch-up productivity growth.	但即便这一雄心勃勃的目标无法在所有各国都同时实现，新兴经济体依然拥有相当大的空间去实现生产力增长的赶超。


After all, over the last 50 years, the productivity gap between emerging and developed economies has barely narrowed; in absolute terms, it has more than doubled.	毕竟在过去50年中，新兴和发达经济体之间的生产力鸿沟并未得到有效弥合； 按绝对值计算甚至翻了一番。


Indeed, though average productivity growth in emerging economies has accelerated in every decade since the 1970s, this largely reflects rapid productivity growth in just one country: China, where the annual average has been 5.7% since 1964.	事实上，虽然新兴经济体的平均生产力增长自1970年代以来的每十年间都不断加速，但这在很大程度上仅仅是体现了一个国家的迅速生产力增长：中国——该国自1964年以来实现了年均5. 7%的增长率。


Elsewhere, the record has been patchy.	而在其他地方，这一数字则显得差强人意。


Mexico and Saudi Arabia improved their productivity by less than 1% per year over this period; Argentina, Brazil, Russia, and South Africa managed productivity growth of 1.2-1.5%.	在同一时期，墨西哥和沙特的年均生产力增长都不到1%； 阿根廷、巴西，俄罗斯和南非也只实现了年均1.


There is reason to believe that these economies can do much better.	我们有理由相信这些经济体可以表现得更好。


With a comprehensive approach, 11 emerging economies (Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey) could, on average, boost their annual productivity growth to as much as 6% by 2025.	借助综合性的手段，11个新兴经济体（阿根廷、巴西、中国、印度、印尼、墨西哥、尼日利亚、俄罗斯、沙特，南非和土耳其）可以在2025年平均将各自的年均生产力增长率推高到6%。


Four-fifths of that growth would be achieved through the adoption of approaches that have already been successful elsewhere, with new technological, operational, and business innovations covering the rest.	而这一增长成果中的4/5可以通过借鉴已经在其他地方取得成功的手段来实现，再辅以科学技术，运营和商业模式上的革新。


Opportunities to catch up to developed-country productivity levels abound across key sectors.	赶超发达国家生产力水平的机遇在各个关键部门都极为充裕。


In retail, emerging economies could double their productivity by 2025, largely by adopting modern store formats, such as supermarkets and hypermarkets, which are at least three times more productive than traditional small shops.	在零售领域，新兴经济体可以在很大程度上通过采用类似超级市场和超大型超市等现代商铺运营模式，在2025年令自身生产力翻一番，因为这两者的生产力是传统小商铺的至少三倍。


In Mexico, boosting the share of modern retailers by 10% would yield a 25% increase in the sector's total productivity.	在墨西哥，将现代零售商的市场份额提升10%将令该部门的整体生产力提升25%。


Similarly, if China's huge automotive industry consolidated operations into a smaller number of larger plants operating close to capacity, the sector's productivity – which is well below the developed-country average – could rise by up to 50%.	同样，如果中国的庞大汽车产业可以被整合成为产能相当的几个更大型车厂，该部门原本远低于发达国家水平的生产力将有望提升50%。


And many countries can improve the efficiency of food value chains considerably, such as by mechanizing agriculture.	许多国家也可以通过实施农业机械化等方式大幅提升食品价值链的效率。


There is also enormous scope for productivity-enhancing innovation, particularly in health care, a sector that is just evolving in most emerging countries.	同时在提升生产力的创新方面也存在着极大的空间，尤其是在健康这一在大多数新兴国家都方兴未艾的产业上。


Digitization of health records enabled India's Bhorugram Rural Dispensary nearly to double the number of immunizations it provided in just four years.	卫生病历信息的数码化令印度的布鲁格兰农村诊所（Bhorugram Rural Dispensary）得以在短短四年间将免疫接种的数量翻了近一番。


Likewise, it allowed clerks at western Kenya's Mosoriot Rural Health Center to spend two-thirds less time interacting with other staff on administrative tasks, and almost twice as much time registering patients.	同样，此举也令肯尼亚西部的莫索里奥农村卫生中心的行政人员互相之间减少了2/3的行政事务沟通时间，并将接诊病人数量提高了一倍。


In terms of operational innovations, there is the example of India's Aravind Eye Care System, which, by applying principles of industrial engineering to its work flow, has become the world's largest eye-care provider. Aravind can carry out two-thirds the number of operations conducted by the United Kingdom's entire National Health Service at one-sixth the cost – and with a lower infection rate.	在运营创新方面的一个例子就是印度的阿拉凡眼科卫生系统（Aravind Eye Care System），通过将工业工程运作法则引入到自身工作流程中，该企业已经成长为了全球最大的眼科健康服务提供商，甚至可以仅用1/6的成本承担整个英国国民健康服务体系（National Health Service）2/3的手术——而且感染率更低。


Governments can play an important role in promoting such innovation.	政府可以在推动这类创新方面扮演一个重要角色。


Brazil's deregulation of agriculture and encouragement of R&D enabled the Brazilian Agriculture Research Corporation to pioneer more than 9,000 technology projects, including the design of a tropical soybean strain that can thrive in Brazil's climate.	巴西的农业放松管治措施以及对研究的鼓励使巴西农业研究公司得以开发超过9000项技术项目，包括培育一种可以在巴西气候下茁壮成长的热带大豆品种。


Efficiency soared, placing Brazil's crop yields on par with those of developed economies.	随着效率提升，巴西的农作物产量得以与众发达国家并驾齐驱。


The era of “easy" GDP growth driven by a massive army of young workers is ending.	那个简单通过大量年轻劳动者来推动的“简单”GDP增长时代已经走向终结。


Emerging economies must face the resulting growth challenge head-on, by pursuing sweeping changes in policies, incentives, and established practices to boost productivity.	而新兴经济体必须借助推动对政策，法案和现有做法的颠覆性改革来直面因此而产生的增长挑战。


Recognizing this imperative is the first step. Now the hard work must begin.	认识到这一点的紧迫性只是开端，而如今是时候挽起衣袖，迎难而上了。


Reigniting Emerging-Economy Growth	重燃新兴经济体的增长之火


HONG KONG – It is no secret that emerging economies are facing serious challenges, which have undermined their once-explosive growth and weakened their development prospects.	发自香港——毫无疑问，各新兴经济体都正面临着严峻的挑战，并在阻碍了它们过往那种爆发式增长的同时削弱了其发展前景。


Whether they return to the path of convergence with the advanced economies will largely depend on how they approach an increasingly complex economic environment.	而它们是否能回归到不断缩小与发达经济体之间差距的路径则在很大程度上取决于它们将如何应对日益复杂的经济环境。


Of course, these economies’ development path was never simple or smooth.	当然，这些经济体的发展之路从来就不是一帆风顺的。 但在二战后的大多数时期一直到最近十年以前，形势还是比较明朗的。


But for most of the post-World War II period, until as recently as ten years ago, it was relatively clear-cut.	各国都以合理的步伐逐步开放其经济； 借助全球的技术和需求；


Countries needed to open their economies at a sensible pace; leverage global technology and demand; specialize in tradable sectors; pursue a lot of investment (some 30% of GDP); and promote foreign direct investment, with appropriate provisions for knowledge transfer.	追求大量的投资（占GDP的30％左右）； 促进外国直接投资，并适当地吸收了转移过来的知识。


Throughout this process, the emerging economies recognized the importance of allowing market mechanisms to work, guaranteeing property rights, and safeguarding macroeconomic and financial stability.	在这一过程中，新兴经济体认识到了允许市场机制按照自身规律运作、保证财产权利，维护宏观经济和金融稳定等事务的重要性。


Perhaps most important, they knew that they had to focus on generating employment, particularly in urban areas and modernizing sectors, and on inclusiveness more broadly.	也许最重要的是，它们知道必须把重点放在创造就业机会——尤其是在城市地区以及现代化部门，以及更广泛的包容性发展方面。


As they pursued this agenda, emerging economies experienced stuttering starts and numerous crises, often associated with excessive debt, currency traps, and high inflation.	在奉行这一议程的过程中，新兴经济体经历了艰难的开端和无数危机，还往往伴随着过度负债，货币陷阱和高通胀率。


And, upon reaching middle-income levels, countries confronted the policy and structural pitfalls that accompany the transition to high-income status.	而达到中等收入水平的国家则遭遇到向高收入状态过渡过程中的政策和结构性缺陷。


Nonetheless, in an increasingly open global environment, characterized by strong growth (and demand) in the advanced economies, the emerging economies managed to make huge and rapid progress.	即便如此，在以发达经济体的强劲增长（及强劲需求）为特征的日益开放的全球环境中，新兴经济体奋力实现了巨大且迅速的进步。


That all changed after the 2008 global financial crisis.	但在2008年全球金融危机之后一切都改变了。


To be sure, the core of the development agenda remains the same.	可以肯定的是发展议程的核心仍旧相同。


But it is vastly more complicated.	但却变得更为复杂了。


One set of complications arises from external global imbalances, distortions, and heightened volatility in capital flows, exchange rates, and relative prices.	其中一组复杂因素源于外部的全球经济失衡，扭曲以及不断加剧的资本流动，汇率和相对价格波动。


Given that such challenges are essentially new, there is no proven roadmap for overcoming them.	由于这基本上是种全新的挑战，因此各国手中也没有成熟的方案去应对。


After all, the developed economies have not previously engaged in the kind of unconventional monetary policy seen in recent years – a period characterized by ultra-low interest rates and ultra-fast cross-border capital flows.	毕竟发达经济体以前并未实施过近年这种非常规货币政策——这个时期是以超低利率和超迅速的跨境资本流动为特点的。


For the emerging economies, with their relatively illiquid financial markets, such trends encourage over-dependence on low-cost external capital, which can be withdrawn in a heartbeat.	对于新兴经济体来说，由于其金融市场相对缺乏流动性，这种趋势促进了对低成本外部资本的过度依赖，而且这些资本可以瞬间撤走。


Rock-bottom borrowing costs also spur excessive reliance on leverage, weakening the will to undertake reforms needed to boost potential growth – and further exacerbating the economy’s vulnerability to a shift in interest rates or investor sentiment.	超低的借贷成本也刺激了对杠杆的过度依赖，弱化了提振潜在增长所需的改革意愿——从而进一步加剧了经济遭遇利率或投资者情绪转变时的脆弱性。


Making matters worse for the resource-rich emerging economies, commodity prices have plummeted since 2014.	令那些资源型新兴经济体情况更糟的则是2014年以来大宗商品价格的暴跌。


After a prolonged period of accelerating demand growth, notably from China, governments came to regard high commodity prices as semi-permanent – an assumption that caused them to overestimate their future revenues.	在经历了相当长时期的加速需求增长（特别是来自中国）之后，各国政府纷纷觉得商品价格会近乎永久性地维持高位——这导致它们高估了自身的未来收入。


Now that prices have dropped, these countries are facing huge imbalances and fiscal strain.	如今价格走低，这些国家都面临着巨大的经济失衡和财政压力。


And governments are not alone; the private sector, too, relied on rosy assumptions to justify imprudently high levels of leverage.	而且不仅仅是政府； 私营部门也一样依据乐观的假设而贸然动用了高杠杆。


Slower growth in the advanced economies has also weakened trade flows, adding to the headwinds.	发达经济体的增长放缓也削弱了贸易流动，进一步增大了经济发展的阻力。


As Mohamed El-Erian has observed, in the global economy, your neighborhood – the economies to which you have economic or financial links – matters.	正如穆罕默德·埃尔-埃利安观察到的那样，在全球经济中，你的邻国——那些与你有经济或金融联系的经济体——是相当重要的。


That is all the more true for the emerging economies, which have become highly dependent on their neighbors.	这对于��度依赖于自身邻国的新兴经济体来说更是如此。


In short, emerging economies have been challenged by externally generated macroeconomic shifts, unconventional monetary policies, widespread volatility, and slow growth in developed markets.	总而言之，新兴经济体遭遇的是由外部产生的宏观经济转变，非常规货币政策，大范围的市场波动以及发达市场缓慢增长所带来的挑战。


Without much of a playbook to guide them, it is unsurprising that their ability to cope with these challenges has varied considerably.	在缺乏明确指引的情况下，也难怪各国在应对这些挑战的能力方面存在极大差别。


Generally, those that have fared better, such as India, have combined sound growth fundamentals and reforms with pragmatic and activist measures to counter the external sources of volatility.	总体来说，那些表现较好的新兴经济体（比如印度）已经将健康的增长基本面和改革与务实积极的措施结合起来对抗外部波动。


India has also, of course, benefited from lower oil prices.	当然印度同时也从油价下跌中受益。


Commodity exporters like Brazil have struggled more, but not just because of falling natural-resource prices.	而巴西这类商品出口国则会经历更多挣扎，这可不仅仅是因为自然资源价格下跌。


In fact, the decline in prices, together with the reversal of capital flows, exposed weaknesses in the underlying growth patterns that had previously been masked by favorable conditions.	事实上，价格的下降以及资本流向逆转同时作用，暴露了以前被有利条件所掩盖了的增长模式缺陷。


Now there is yet another challenge, which is becoming larger by the year.	如此还有另一种在今年不断加剧的挑战。


Whichever path emerging economies choose for addressing these challenges must also account for the fundamental shift driven by digital capital-intensive technologies.	新兴经济体应对这些挑战的路径选择还必须考虑到由数字资本密集型技术所驱动的根本性转变。


While digital technologies have created new kinds of jobs in high-tech sectors and the sharing economy, among others, they have been reducing and dis-intermediating “routine” white- and blue-collar jobs.	虽然数字技术在高科技领域和分享经济交中创造了新的工作类型，却也减少和消灭了许多“常规的”白领和蓝领工作。


Here, rapid advances in robotics are particularly relevant, as increasingly sophisticated machines threaten to supplant low-cost labor in a variety of sectors.	在这里，机器人技术的快速发展尤其重要，因为越来越精密的机器对各部门的廉价劳动力构成了威胁。


The high fixed and low variable costs of these technologies mean that once robots become more cost-effective than human labor, the trend will not reverse, especially given that automated assembly can be located close to markets, rather than where labor is cheapest.	这些技术的高固定/低可变成本意味着一旦机器人变得比人类劳动更具成本效益，这种趋势就不会扭转，尤其是自动化组装线可以被布局在更靠近市场的地方，而非被迫选择劳动最便宜的地方。


Jobs in electronics assembly, which plays a huge role in global trade and has helped to drive growth in many emerging economies – notably, China – are particularly vulnerable.	在全球贸易中扮演重大角色并有助于推动许多新兴经济体经济——特别是中国——增长的电子产品装配业职位尤其脆弱。


While trades involving sewing – textiles, apparel, shoes – are not yet being automated much, it is probably only a matter of time before they are.	虽然制衣行业——纺织品，服装，鞋——还未被自动化，但最终可能也只是一个时间问题。


As the classic sources of early comparative advantage dwindle, countries – particularly earlier-stage developing countries – will need to implement policies that feature services (including tradable services) more prominently; they will also need to adjust their investment in human capital.	由于早期比较优势的经典来源出现萎缩，各国——尤其处于较初级阶段的发展中国家——将需要实施以服务业（包括交易类服务）为重点的政策； 它们还需要调整自身对人力资本的投资。


Whether this amounts to removing the bottom rungs on the ladder of development remains to be seen.	但这是否相当于直接跳过最底层的发展阶段还有待观察。


The relatively unconventional growth pattern in India, with its early emphasis on services, may hold important lessons.	印度相对非常规的增长模式，及其较早关注服务业的发展步骤，可以成为重要的经验。


In any case, the developing countries – and especially the emerging economies – clearly have a lot on their plates.	无论如何，发展中国家——特别是新兴经济体——显然都有很多需要考虑的地方。


As these economies add items – protecting themselves from volatility, countering unfavorable external conditions, and adapting to powerful technological trends – to their core structural growth agendas, they will invariably make mistakes, and even stumble.	随着这些经济体不断在自身的核心增长议程中添加项目——保护自身免遭波动性影响，应对不利的外部环境，并适应强大的技术趋势——它们不可避免地会犯错误，甚至遭受重大挫折。


This will produce high variance in performance across countries and probably reduce the average pace of convergence.	这将使各国的经济表现出现差异并降低追赶发达国家的平均速度。


But it will not, in my estimation, derail convergence completely.	但在我看来，这一切都不会阻止它们追赶的步伐。


The Submerging-Market Threat	淹没市场的威胁


WASHINGTON, DC – It is time to put the rise of the emerging economies in perspective.	华盛顿—是时候正确地审视新兴经济体的崛起了。


The rapid economic growth in much of the developing world since the beginning of the century was fueled by a commodity boom and an overextension of credit.	自世纪之交以来，发展中世界大部分国家经济高速增长，其背后是大宗商品繁荣和信用扩张过度。


But, because the emerging-market boom was not accompanied by sufficient structural reforms, it was not sustainable.	但是，由于新兴市场繁荣没有伴随充分的结构改革，因此是不可持续的。


Today, most of the major emerging economies have experienced a severe reversal of fortune.	如今，大部分主要新兴经济体都经历了财富的严重逆转。


Russia and Brazil have plunged into severe crises, with double-digit inflation accompanying a 4% contraction in GDP last year.	俄罗斯和巴西陷入严重危机，通胀达到两位数，同时去年GDP萎缩4%。


South Africa is barely growing.	南非几乎没有增长。


China’s phenomenal rate of expansion has slowed to below 7%.	中国的现象级扩张速度已经放缓至7%以下。


Unsurprisingly, Goldman Sachs has closed its money-losing BRIC fund for investment in Brazil, Russia, India, and China.	毫不奇怪，高盛已经关闭了亏损的投资于巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国的金砖四国基金。


Indeed, the future of the BRICS (including South Africa) – and that of other emerging markets – looks gloomy.	事实上，未来金砖国家（也包括南非）——以及其他新兴市场——前景堪忧。


Outside of Asia, most developing economies are principally commodity exporters, and thus are highly exposed to price shocks.	在亚洲之外，大部分发展中经济体大多为大宗商品出口国，因此极易受到价格冲击影响。


Plunging oil prices have cut the value of the Russian ruble by more than half against the US dollar, and further declines appear likely – especially if the US Federal Reserve continues to hike interest rates.	暴跌的油价导致俄罗斯卢布兑美元贬值超过一半，未来有可能继续贬值——特别是如果美联储继续提高利率的话。


Commodity prices are likely to stay low for one or two decades, as they did in the 1980s and 1990s.	大宗商品价格可能会维持低位一二十年，20世纪80和90年代便是如此。


When it comes to oil, for example, shale gas, tight oil, liquefied natural gas, and increasingly competitive solar and wind energy are boosting energy supply, even as a decade of high prices has spurred conservation and reduced demand.	比如，对石油来说，页岩气、致密油、液化天然气和竞争力日益增强的太阳能和风能正在刺激能源供给，即使十年来的高价刺激了储备，降低了需求。


The commodity crunch is likely to prove painful to people in emerging markets, who often measure their income in US dollars.	大宗商品动荡可能给新兴市场的人民带来痛苦，他们常常用美元来计算收入。


As exchange rates fall, they will quickly feel much poorer.	随着汇率下跌，他们将很快觉得自己变穷了。


Governments will suffer, too, as their foreign debt – boosted by fiscal and monetary expansion that yielded little growth – becomes much more burdensome, while the export stimulus from lower exchange rates will be small, owing to the absence of new capacity outside the commodity sectors.	政府也会遭遇损失，它们的外债——因几乎没有刺激增长的财政和货币扩张而大幅增加——负担越来越重，而降低汇率对贸易的刺激作用将十分有限，因为除了大宗商品部门之外它们没有新的能力。


As countries come under pressure to make payments, multiple emerging-market debt crises are likely.	随着各国日渐遭受偿付压力，可能出现多场新兴市场债务危机。


In the short term, Brazil arouses the most worry, given its large public debt and its vast budget deficit.	在短期，巴西的情况最令人担忧，其外债和预算赤字规模巨大。


In the medium term, however, China appears even more frightening.	但是，在中期，中国的情况更加可怕。


As a rule of thumb, an emerging economy’s total private- and public-sector debt should not exceed 100% of GDP.	经验证据表明，新兴经济体的私人和公共部门债务总和不应超过GDP的100%。


China’s total debt is now more than 250% of GDP.	而中国的债务总量已经超过GDP的250%。


The BRICS countries’ critical shortcoming is poor governance.	金砖国家的关键短处是拙劣的治理。


On its corruption perception index of 175 countries, Transparency International ranks South Africa 61st, Brazil and India 76th, China 83rd, and Russia 119th.	在透明国际的腐败印象指数上，南非名列第61名，巴西和印度第76名，中国第83名，俄罗斯第119名。


Poor governance limits a country’s ability to create lasting wealth and productive capacity – even if the shortcomings become evident and damaging only when booms turn to busts.	治理不善限制了一国建设创造持久财富和生产力的能力——即使这些短处要到繁荣破灭时才会显现和形成伤害。


As Warren Buffet has put it, “You only find out who is swimming naked when the tide goes out.”	沃伦·巴菲特说：“只有在退潮后才能发现谁在裸泳。 ”


To combat corruption effectively, people need to oust corrupt leaders, which is why democracy is vital.	要有效地打击腐败，人们需要罢免腐败的领导人，而这正是民主的重要之处。


The regime changes in Ukraine and Argentina, and the opposition’s victory in Venezuela’s recent parliamentary election, are harbingers of what is to come.	乌克兰和阿根廷的政权更迭，以及反对派最近在委内瑞拉议会选举中所取得的胜利，预示着未来走势。


Brazil may be next.	下一个可能是巴西。


The emerging markets may rise again, if and when improved governance and structural reforms are implemented to boost potential growth.	新兴市场可能再次崛起，如果实施治理改善和结构改革提振潜在增长的话。


But that will take time.	但这需���时间。


We should not be surprised to see two decades of slow global growth.	全球低增长局面持续二十年不足为奇。


The West cannot afford to be complacent.	西方决不能自满。


After having focused too much on demand management, Europe should be trying to reduce the fiscal and regulatory burden of the state, so that its economies can start growing again.	欧洲过于关注需求管理，应该试图降低国家的财政和监管负担，以使经济能够再次启动增长。


It should also open up stunted markets for labor, services, capital, and digital products.	欧洲还应该开放缺陷重重的劳动力、服务、资本和数字产品市场。


The West needs to work together to set global standards while it still can.	西方需要齐心协力在仍有能力的时候制定全球标准。


Democracy, the rule of law, and market-based economies are all worth fighting for.	民主、法治和市场经济都值得为之奋斗。


Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and the wars in North Africa and the Middle East have demonstrated why NATO should be strengthened, and that Europe must become serious about defending itself – rather than simply continuing to depend on the United States.	俄罗斯入侵乌克兰和北非和中东战事说明了为何北约应该得到加强，也说明了为何欧洲必须认真对待自卫问题——而不是继续依赖美国。


In coordinating Western sanctions against Russia, the G7 has already achieved renewed significance.	在协调西方对俄制裁过程中，G7重新焕发的重要性。


This should be followed by efforts to manage the coming stagnation.	接下来应该合力治理即将到来的停滞。


The Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership are both important initiatives in this regard.	跨太平洋合作伙伴关系和跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系都是这方面的重要举措。


Western-led organizations and institutional arrangements will become especially important as international organizations struggle to remain relevant.	随着国际组织难以保持重要性，西方领导的组织和机构安排将变得尤其重要。


The United Nations, in particular, will likely be crippled by Russian and Chinese vetoes in the Security Council.	特别是，联合国可能因为俄罗斯和中国在安理会行使否决权而大受掣肘。


Only the International Monetary Fund can be expected to rise in prominence, as major emerging economies – most likely Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil – end up as its wards.	只有国际货币基金组织（IMF）有望提升地位，因为主要新兴经济体——最有可能的是委内瑞拉、阿根廷和巴西——终将向其求助。


Economics aside, China and Russia are likely to pose the biggest challenge.	除了经济问题，中国和俄罗斯可能陈伟最大的挑战。


These two large emerging countries are still led by authoritarian governments, headed by ruling elites who – given how much wealth they have amassed – may be the most corrupt in history.	这两个新兴大国仍由极权政府领导，主宰它们的执政精英之腐败——从他们所聚敛的财富看——堪称历史之最。


As they come under pressure, their transformations are unlikely to be peaceful.	随着他们承受压力，转型不可能和平。


The Kremlin has already shown, with its wars in Ukraine and Syria, that it is ready to counter domestic malaise with external aggression.	克里姆林宫已经通过其在乌克兰和叙利亚的战争表明，它准备用对外侵略对抗国内问题。


That is unlikely to change unless something is done to stop it.	除非我们做些什么阻止这一点，否则情况不可能改变。


The fall of the emerging economies could have a far more lasting impact than their rise.	新兴经济体的坠落可能带来比它们的崛起大得多的影响。


Emerging Infectious Diseases	新发传染性疾病


Today’s bio-diversity crisis is not just one of lost habitats and extinct species. It is also a crisis of emerging infectious diseases (EID’s), such as HIV in humans, Ebola in humans and gorillas, West Nile virus and Avian Influenza in humans and birds, chytrid fungi in amphibians, and distemper in sea lions.	如今的生物多样性危机已经不仅仅是栖息地消失和物种灭绝了，它还是新发传染性疾病（EID’s）——诸如艾滋病（人类）、埃博拉（人类和猩猩）、西尼罗河病毒和禽流感（人和鸟类）， chytrid壶菌（两栖动物）以及瘟热（海狮）等所引发的危机。


There is every reason to take these events seriously, because EID’s appear to have a long evolutionary history.	我们有足够理由来严肃对待这些事件，因为EID’s看来已经经历了很长时间的进化过程。


This is because many pathogens are capable of infecting a range of hosts, but evolved in places where only some of those hosts live.	这是因为许多病原体能够传染诸多宿主，但是却只在某些宿主居住的地方才能进化。


Pathogens also have specialized means of transmission from host to host.	病菌通过独特的方式在宿主之间传播。


If, for example, a pathogen is transmitted by an insect that lives in the tops of trees, susceptible hosts will not be infected if they never leave the ground.	举例来说，若某种病菌是通过某种居住在树顶的昆虫传播的，那么那些从不离开地面的宿主就不可能被传染。


For humans, HIV, Ebola, West Nile virus, and Avian flu are only the latest in a long line of EID’s.	对人类而言，艾滋病、埃博拉、西尼罗河病毒和禽流感只是无数EID’s中最新出现的几种。


When our ancestors moved out of the African forest onto the savannah more than a million years ago, they rapidly became effective predators.	一百万年前，当我们的祖先从非洲丛林搬迁至大草原时，他们很快就成为了战斗力极强的肉食动物。


Sharing prey with pre-existing carnivores, they acquired tapeworms that originally inhabited only hyenas, large cats, and African hunting dogs.	由于和那些早就存在的肉食动物一起食用猎物，他们得上了原先只在狼狗、大型猫科动物和非洲猎狗身上才会寄居的绦虫。


When humans began to move out of Africa, they carried some of their pathogens to new areas, where they switched over to native hosts while native pathogens took up residence in the newly arrived humans.	当人类开始迁徙出非洲的时候，他们把一部分病菌携带到了新地区，在那里他们把病菌传给了当地人，而当地的病菌也在新来人群身上定居下来。


Agriculture and urbanization subsequently exposed us to yet more pathogens.	农业和城市化使我们接触了更多的病菌。


If doctors were around back then, they would have called all these occurrences EID’s.	如果那时候就有医生的话，他们会把所有这些都称为EID’s。


Geographical restriction and specialized transmission mean that in most time periods, most pathogens occur in a small number of host species, often only one, but retain the ability to infect more.	地域限制和特殊的传播方式意味着在大多数情况下，大部分病菌只在一小部分宿主物种上出现，通常情况下是只在一种物种上出现，但却保持着感染更多物种的能力。


But climate change alters everything.	但是气候变化改变了一切。


Species move out of their areas of origin and ecosystems change.	物种离开了他们原本生存的地区，生态系统因此发生改变。


Pathogens come into contact with susceptible hosts that they have never before encountered, and that never had the opportunity to evolve resistance.	病菌开始接触那些它们以前从未碰到过、易受感染的、也从未有机会发展免疫力的宿主。


As a result, EID’s are not just possible; they are inevitable.	结果，EID’s不仅仅成为可能； 而是成为一种必然。


Indeed, every episode of climate change has produced them.	事实上，气候变化的每一步都产生了EID’s。


Anticipating a problem is always more effective in terms of time and cost than responding to a crisis, no matter how viable the response.	从时间和成本角度来看，对问题先知先觉总比到时候再应对危机来得有效。


Unfortunately, we usually fight existing diseases but neglect looking forward.	不幸的是，我们通常忙于与现存的疾病作战而未能将目光放远。


For example, white-tailed deer living in northwestern Costa Rica host six species of tick. None of the ticks is known to carry Lyme Disease, which has never been reported in Costa Rica.	举例来说，栖居在哥斯达黎加的白尾鹿身上有六种蜱，但是没有一种携带当地报道的莱姆病（Lyme Disease）。


As a result, there are no public health advisories about Lyme Disease there.	结果，那里就没有任何有关莱姆病的公共健康咨询。


But some of the ticks are closely related to known carriers, and thus are potential carriers themselves.	但是某些蜱与已知的莱姆病携带者极为相近，因此他们是潜在的携带者。


This debilitating – and difficult to diagnose – illness could thus be introduced to Costa Rica inadvertently by something as simple as an asymptomatic eco-tourist.	这种古老的——但却难以诊断的疾病就会在无意中由诸如一个无症状的生态旅行家这样简单的人或物带进哥斯达黎加。


The information about Costa Rican deer ticks comes from an inventory of parasites of vertebrates in northern Costa Rica, but it is the only inventory of its kind ever undertaken.	有关哥斯达黎加鹿蜱的信息来源于北哥斯达黎加的脊椎动物寄生虫目录，但同类目录却只有这么一本。


We must do better.	我们还得做得更好一点。


More than 50% of the species on this planet are parasites of some form, including pathogens affecting humans, livestock, crops, and wildlife.	这个星球超过50%的物种是某种形态的寄生虫，包括影响人类的病菌，牲畜，庄稼和野生动物。


But, relative to our overall knowledge of biodiversity, we have documented less than 10% of the world’s pathogens.	但是，相对于我们对生物多样性的全部了解程度，我们只记录了全世界病菌的10%还不到。


The remaining 90% are potential EID’s.	其余的90%就是潜在的EID’s。


We face a potential crisis, therefore, that stems from our fundamental ignorance about the biosphere, for it is impossible to be proactive about species of pathogens whose existence has not been documented.	因此，由于我们无法对未被证明存在性的病菌物种先发制“菌”，我们面临着一个潜在危机，而这个危机产生于我们对生物圈的根本性忽略。


This makes many pathogens “evolutionary land mines” awaiting us as we relocate to novel habitats, move species around, and alter existing ecosystems.	这使很多病菌在我们重新找到新栖息地、把物种带到四处并改变现行生态系统的时候，成为等候我们的“进化中的地雷”。


Nevertheless, most resources are still being allocated for responses to known EID’s rather than to assessing the risk of potential EID’s.	但是，大部分资源仍然被用于应付已知的EID’s，而不是对潜在EID’s的风险进行评估，。


Simply put, we must complete the global inventory of species.	简而言之，我们必须完善全球物种目录。


Now.	就从现在开始。


Five hundred thousand years of experience in hunting and gathering, coupled with cheaper and faster molecular analysis, performed by faster and cheaper computers makes this task economically feasible.	用更快更便宜的计算机来演绎的这五十万年以来的搜寻和收集经验，结合以价钱更低速度更快的分子分析，使得这个工作可行且经济。


Rapid identification using genetic “bar codes” can increase the rate of discovering species and determining the transmission dynamics of potential EID’s.	使用基因“条形码”进行快速鉴定能够提高发现物种并确定潜在EID’s传播动力的效率。


Pathogens have highly specialized transmission modes, and groups of closely related species tend to be very similar.	病菌拥有尤为特别的传播模式，而密切相关的物种群的传播模式可能颇为相像。


All species of malaria, for example, are transmitted by mosquitos.	例如，所有类型的疟疾都是通过蚊子传播的。


Once classified, we will then be able to make predictions about two closely related species based on incomplete information about either, buying time and saving money.	一旦能够将它们分类，我们就能够在对两者都知之甚少的基础上对两种密切相关的物种进行预测，既省时间又省钱。


Finally, this information should be digitized and made freely available over the Internet to all concerned researchers and parties.	最终，这些信息将被数字化并在国际互联网上免费向所有有关的研究者和党派公开。


If EID’s were rare, management through crisis response might be cost-effective.	如果EID’s寥寥无几，在应对危机过程中所采取的手段也许是划算的。


But EID’s are not rare at all.	但是EID’s绝非寥若晨星。


Rather, they are a common outcome of geographic dispersal associated with large-scale environmental changes.	相反，它们是大规模环境变化下地理分布的自然产物。


So we must cease being ignorant and reactive, and become informed and proactive.	所以我们再也不能视而不见、消极行事，我们应该变得博学多闻并采取积极态度。


As a common sports adage puts it: never change a winning game, but always change a losing one.	正如常说的运动谚语那样：赢要保持，输要改变。


The Coming Emerging-Market Debt Squeeze	即将到来的新兴市场债务踩踏


SANTIAGO – Consider the following scenario, one that has played out time and again in emerging-market countries.	圣地亚哥—考虑以下情形。 这一情形在新兴市场国家一再上演过。


Local banks and firms go on a borrowing binge and pile up dollar-denominated debt – debt that pundits consider perfectly sustainable, as long as the local currency is strong.	本地银行和企业继续着借贷狂欢，积累了大量美元计价债务——专家们认为这些债务可以完美维持，只要本币保持坚挺。


Suddenly, something (an increase in United States interest rates, a drop in commodity prices, a domestic political conflict) causes the local currency to drop in value against the dollar.	突然间，一些事情（美国利率升高、大宗商品价格下跌、本国政治冲突等）导致本币兑美元贬值。


The debt burden, measured in domestic currency, is now much higher.	用本币衡量的债务负担大大增加。


Some borrowers miss interest payments; others are unable to roll over principal.	一些借款人无法偿付利息； 另一些借款人无法延期本金。


Financial mayhem ensues.	金融损失随之而来。


This is how the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, the Mexican Tequila crisis of 1994, the Asian debt crisis of 1997, and the Russian crisis of 1998 unfolded.	这就是20世纪80年代拉丁美洲债务危机、1994年墨西哥龙舌兰危机、1997年亚洲债务危机 和1998年俄罗斯危机的发生方式。


It was also how the financial crisis of 2008-2009 transmitted itself to emerging markets.	这也是2008—2009年金融危机传染到新兴市场的方式。


Every time, borrowers and lenders claimed to have learned their lesson.	每一次，借款人和贷款人都宣称汲取了教训。


Not only could it happen again today; it could happen on a much larger scale than in the past.	如今，这一情形不但可能再度发生，其规模也可能比以往大得多。


Taking advantage of ultra-low interest rates in advanced countries, emerging-market banks and firms have been borrowing like never before.	利用发达国家极低利率的条件，新兴市场银行和政府以前所未有的规模借贷。


A recent paper by the Bank of International Settlements shows that since the global financial crisis, outstanding dollar credit to non-bank borrowers outside the US has risen by half, from $6 trillion to $9 trillion.	国际清算银行（BIS）的最新报告表明，自全球金融危机爆发以来，美国之外非银行借款人的未偿还美国信用增加了一半，从6万亿美元增至9万亿美元。


The bulk of that debt is in Asia, with China alone accounting for approximately $1 trillion.	其中大部分债务在亚洲，光是中国就占了大约1万亿美元。


Other big dollar borrowers include Brazil (over $300 billion) and India ($125 billion).	其他主要美元借款人包括巴西（3,000亿美元以上）和印度（1,250亿美元）。


Countries such as Malaysia, South Africa, and Turkey, plus Latin America’s more financially open economies, also have rising foreign-currency debts.	马来西亚、南非、土耳其以及金融较开放的拉美国家的外币债务也出现了大幅增加。


Yes, the almighty dollar is not as mighty as it was before the US Federal Reserve surprised markets with a more-dovish-than-expected communiqué earlier this month.	是的，在美联储本月早些时候出人意料地释放出比预期更为“鸽派”的立场后，美元的强势有些减弱。


But, given the likely interest-rate differential between the US and other advanced economies (particularly the eurozone and Japan), together with a more robust US economic recovery, an era of dollar strength – and, almost by definition, weak emerging-market currencies – is here to stay.	但是，考虑到美国和其他发达经济体（特别是欧元和日本）之间可能的利差，再加上美国经济复苏的日益稳健，美元升值的时代——这几乎是新兴市场货币贬值的代名词——也许还将持续。


This likely means trouble for the firm that borrowed in dollars to build a shopping mall in São Paulo or Kuala Lumpur, and now must devote a much larger share of its revenues in depreciated real or ringgit to service its debt.	这也许意味着借入美元在圣保罗或吉隆坡建造购物城的企业将遇到麻烦，如今，它们得拿出比以往大得多比例的里亚尔或林吉特收入来维持美元债务。


How did we get here?	我们是如何走到这一步的？


Once upon a time, conventional wisdom maintained that curbing governments’ appetite for debt would put an end to over-borrowing, because private agents would know to act prudently and weigh the costs and benefits of one more dollar of debt.	曾经的传统智慧认为，遏制政府负债偏好就能结束过度负债，因为私人部门将知道要审慎，也会衡量增加美元债务的利弊。


Not even stern University of Chicago economists believe that anymore.	如今，即使是顽固的芝加哥大学经济学家也不再相信这一点了。


The fiscal and debt position of many emerging economies (though not of Argentina, Venezuela, and other poster children for mismanagement) is much stronger than it once was.	许多新兴经济体（即使不包括阿根廷、委内瑞拉和其他以管理不善闻名的国家）的财政和债务情况比以往好得多。


But private-sector CFOs seem determined to prove that they can borrow as lavishly as their public-sector colleagues once did.	但私人部门财务主管们似乎决心证明他们可以像公共部门同道曾经所做的那样肆意借贷。


Conventional wisdom also once held that dollar borrowing binges occur only in countries with fixed exchange rates, with the central bank de facto insuring borrowers against currency risk.	传统智慧曾经还认为，美元借贷狂欢只发生在固定汇率国家，由中央银行为借款人提供货币风险的事实保险。


Today, most emerging-market economies have (or at least pretend to have) floating exchange rates, and yet locals continue to borrow heavily in foreign currency.	如今，大部分新兴市场经济体已经（或至少看似已经）采取了浮动汇率，但本地人仍大量借入外币。


This partly reflects borrowing-cost differentials.	这部分反映了借贷成本差。


If the local interest rate is 17% per year and the dollar interest rate is 2%, it still makes sense to borrow in dollars as long as the domestic currency is expected to depreciate 15% or less.	如果本币利率为每年17%而美元利率为2%，那么借入美元仍然有利可图，只要本币不会贬值15%以上。


The other part of the explanation follows from what the economists Guillermo Calvo and Carmen Reinhart call “fear of floating.”	另一种解释来自经济学家吉列莫·卡沃（Guillermo Calvo）和卡门·莱因哈特（Carmen Reinhart）所谓的“浮动恐惧”。


Many market participants know from past experience (recall 2008-2009, for example) that emerging economies’ central banks fear sharp depreciations, and that in moments of stress they tend to intervene, at least temporarily, to support the exchange rate, “smoothing” its decline.	许多市场参与者从过去的经验（比如2008—2009年）中知道，新兴经济体央行害怕急剧贬值，在面临压力时它们倾向于干预，至少是暂时干预，以支持汇率，“平滑”其下降趋势。


So a speculator who is quick on his feet can make a handsome profit and get out while the music is still playing.	因此动作迅速的投机客能够攫取不错的利润，在音乐还没有停止时逃之夭夭。


How vulnerable are emerging economies because of all this dollar debt?	新兴市场因为其美元债务而脆弱到何种程度？


Optimists like to point out that emerging markets have accumulated a huge stock of international reserves since 2010, enabling them to self-insure against a run on their currencies or their foreign debt.	乐观者喜欢说，2010年以来，新兴市场积累了巨量国际储备，这使得它们可以在面临货币或外部债务挤兑时保护自己。


That is true, but only up to a point.	的确如此，但是有限度。


Having tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars in the central bank’s vault sounds reassuring until you realize that dollar debt coming due in the next 12 months may not be that much smaller.	在中央银行的金库中存放数百上千亿美元看上去���当可靠，直到你认识到未来12个月中到期的美元债务并不比这个数字小多少。


The data are not fully reliable or comparable across countries, but quick calculations reveal that there are many emerging markets where such short-term debt is 50% or more of the stock of international reserves.	尽管数据并不完全可靠，国家之间也未必可比，但稍做计算即可发现，许多新兴市场的短期债务可达国际储备存量的50%甚至更多。


And dollar debtors may not be alone in staking a claim on those reserves.	而美元债务人也许并非唯一指望这笔储备的人。


In a squeeze, holders of domestic currency will want to exchange it for greenbacks.	发生踩踏时，本币持有人也想把钱换成美元。


If the central bank is serious about floating, it will hike local interest rates to limit price increases, causing a painful recession.	如果央行的浮动政策是严肃的，将提高本币利息以限制价格上涨，从而导致痛苦的衰退。


Alternatively, it may intervene and sell international reserves, reducing the stock available to repay dollar debt.	或者，它可以干预并出售国际储备，导致可用于偿还美元债务的存量下降。


Optimists also argue that some local borrowers are naturally hedged.	乐观者还指出，一些本地借款人天然对冲了风险。


Yes, some export companies that borrow dollars also earn dollars.	诚然，一些借入美元的出口公司也赚取美元。


But they are in the minority, and even they can have problems, because depreciation reduces the dollar value of their domestic assets, causing breaches in loan covenants and potentially impairing access to credit.	但它们是少数，而即使是它们也可能会有问题，以往内贬值降低了它们的本币资产的美元价值，导致违反贷款契约的情况，并有可能让它们无法获得信用。


There are risks even for banks that make the effort to match their dollar borrowing from abroad with dollar loans extended at home.	哪怕是那些试图用国内美元贷款与国外美元借款相匹配的银行也存在风险。


There may be no obvious currency mismatch for the bank, but if the local borrowers’ revenues are only in domestic currency, they may become unable to service their debt.	也许这些银行并不存在显而易见的货币错配，但如果本地借款人的收入全部为本币，就有可能无法维持债务。


Risk eliminated by regulations in one place reappears somewhere else.	在一地通过监管消除的风险在另一地重新出现。


For the many emerging-market firms that borrowed in dollars to generate local-currency revenue, the recent depreciation is triggering plenty of financial trouble.	对许多借入美元产生本币收入的新兴市场企业来说，目前的贬值正在触发大量金融困难。


How much trouble will ultimately depend on factors that are very hard to forecast, including markets’ responses to Fed tightening and political shocks (say, the scandal enveloping Petrobras in Brazil) that shake investors’ faith in local policies and markets.	困难有多大最终取决于它们难以预测的因素，包括市场对美联储紧缩和影响投资者对本地政策和市场新型的政治冲击（比如与巴西石油公司有关的丑闻）如何反应。


One can predict only one outcome with confidence: a bumpy ride.	只有一个结果是肯定的：剧烈波动。


The Future for Emerging Markets	新兴市场的未来


BERKELEY – Over the past year, the global economic environment changed markedly and in unexpected ways.	伯克利—过去几年来，全球经济环境发生了意料之外的巨大变化。


Energy and commodity prices plunged.	能源和大宗商品暴跌。


Growth in China (which accounts for about 40% of global growth) fell to its lowest rate since 1996, even as its stock market soared to unsustainable heights.	中国的增长（占全球增长的40%左右）下降到1996年以来的最低水平，尽管其股市暴涨至不可持续的高位。


The United States and the European Union ratcheted up economic sanctions on Russia in response to its military excursions in Ukraine, highlighting the geopolitical risks associated with cross-border investments.	美国和欧盟加码对俄制裁，以此作为俄罗斯军事入侵乌克兰的回应，这突显出与跨国投资相关的地缘政治风险。


And there have been large swings in exchange rates, fueled by actual or, in the case of the Federal Reserve, anticipated changes in monetary policy.	而由于实际或预期的货币政策变化（如美联储），汇率也出现了剧烈波动。


These rapid changes have rattled global financial markets and spooked investors, reducing their appetite for risk – a cautious attitude that has been reflected in emerging markets.	来势迅猛的变化让全球金融市场措手不及，也吓坏了投资者，降低了他们的风险偏好——在新兴市场已经表现出相当谨慎的态度。


Investors have sat on the sidelines, and the MSCI index that tracks returns on emerging-market equities has stagnated.	投资者开始旁观，追踪新兴市场股市回报的MSCI指数陷入停滞。


During the second half of last year, the 15 largest emerging-market economies experienced the biggest capital outflows since the 2008 global financial crisis.	去年下半年，15个最大的新兴市场经济体经历了自2008年全球金融危机以来最大的资本外流。


And the aggregate foreign-exchange reserves held by emerging countries declined for the first time since 1994, when they began the steep upward climb that has been a defining feature of the global economy during the last two decades.	新兴国家外汇储备总量自1994年以来首次出现下降。 从1994年开始，新兴市场外汇储备大幅攀升，成为过去二十年来全球经济的一个显著特征。


One major factor driving the lackluster performance of investments in emerging markets is the expectation that the Fed will begin to raise interest rates and normalize monetary policy later this year.	导致新兴市场投资不振的一个主要因素是人们预期美联储将在今年晚些时候提高利率和货币政策正常化。


In a recent speech, Fed Chair Janet Yellen confirmed that such steps would be “appropriate” if the economy continues to improve, stating that “delaying action to tighten monetary policy until employment and inflation are already back to our objectives would risk overheating the economy.”	在最近的讲话中，美联储主席耶伦确认，如果经济继续改善，这些措施将是“合适的”，并表示“推迟收紧货币政策，到就业和通胀回到我们的目标水平再采取行动将有可能导致经济过热。 ”


Expectations of a rate hike have restricted flows to emerging markets ever since 2013, when the Fed triggered what came to be called the “taper tantrum” by announcing that it was likely to reduce its bond-buying program.	升息预期从2013年就开始限制流向新兴市场的资本流，当时，美联储宣布有可能缩减其债券购买计划，这引起了所谓的“削减恐慌”。


The resulting alarm roiled US financial markets and spilled over internationally.	由此带来的警报引起了美国金融市场动荡和国际影响。


Emerging-market economies came under intense pressure, with inflows to investment funds falling sharply, asset prices declining, and many currencies losing value against the dollar.	新兴市场经济体承受了巨大的压力，投资资金流入剧减，资产价格下跌，许多货币兑美元汇率也纷纷贬值。


Fortunately, the worst of the taper tantrum proved temporary.	幸运的是，削减恐慌的高潮是短暂的。


Capital inflows recovered somewhat, and most emerging-market economies weathered the financial distress in their capital markets.	随后资本流入有所恢复，大部分新兴市场经济体都抵挡住了资本市场的这一金融波动。


But the experience raised questions about the effects of future moves by the Fed.	但这一经验让人们质疑美联储后续措施的效果。


Stanley Fischer, the Fed’s vice chairman, said recently that he expects the anticipated increase in the Fed’s policy interest rate later this year to “prove manageable” for emerging-market economies.	美联储副主席斯坦利·费舍尔（Stanley Fischer）最近表示，据他预计，美联储今年晚些时候的政策利率升息幅度对于新兴市场经济体来说将是“可管理的”。


But sudden steep declines in foreign capital inflows triggered by the Fed’s action could exacerbate the challenges that even the best-performing Asian economies are facing, as anemic demand in their export markets causes growth to slow.	但美联储动作所导致的外资流入的骤降可能放大哪怕是表现最好的亚洲经济体所面临的挑战，出口市场需求的萎靡不振将导致它们增长放缓。


The Fed has tried hard to be very clear about its policy intentions, strategies, and timing to ensure that investors are not surprised.	美联储试图将其政策意图、战略和时机表述得一清二楚，以确保投资者不会感到意外。


In recent years, assets in emerging-market economies – especially currencies – have depreciated by 5-50% relative to the dollar, reflecting both external imbalances and the broader macro conditions of individual countries.	近几年来，新兴市场经济体资产——特别是货币——相对美元编制了5—50%，既反映了外部失衡，也反映了个体国家更广义的宏观情况。


There is a widespread view that most emerging financial markets have already priced in the effects of a gradual increase in interest rates.	一个广泛存在的观点是大部分新兴金融市场价格已经体现了逐渐升高利率的影响。


But that does not mean that these effects will be insignificant for countries that investors already regard as risky.	但这并不意味着这一影响将对已被投资者认为是高风险的国家无关紧要。


As investors have become more cautious, they have also become more discriminating.	随着投资者日渐谨慎，他们也变得越来越挑剔。


The difference in returns across emerging countries and among sectors within them has grown.	新兴市场之间以及市场内部不同部门之间的回报差异已经扩大。


The countries at greatest risk of large capital outflows include those that are dependent on external financing, those with commodity-heavy economies, and those with uncertain political conditions.	资本大量外流风险最大的国家包括那些依赖外部融资的国家、依赖大宗商品的经济体和那些政治环境不确定的国家。


Many of the best performers are in Asia – the only region where several economies have grown by 5% or more for at least four decades.	许多表现最佳的国家在亚洲——唯一一个有多个经济体在至少四时年的时间里保持5%或以上增长速度的地区。


Over the last year, the MSCI index for Asia increased by 10%, even as it fell by roughly 14% for emerging and frontier markets and by 21% for emerging markets in Latin America.	去年MSCI亚洲指数上涨10%，尽管新兴和前沿市场指数下跌14%，拉丁美洲新兴市场下跌21%。


And, indeed, Asia’s two largest emerging economies offer reasons for cautious optimism.	而事实上，亚洲最大的两个新兴经济体让我们感到谨慎乐观。


China is certainly not free from risk.	中国显然不是没有风险。


The recent equity-market rally is largely divorced from fundamentals and is driven by speculative, debt-financed purchases.	最近的股市暴涨与基本面完全脱离，是由投机性债务融资买入行为驱动的。


The outlook for corporate profits remains weak; the country’s equity supply is growing; and valuations are stretched.	公司利润前景仍然萎靡； 股票供给正在增加；


Up to 10% of China’s equity market cap is funded by credit – five times the average in developed economies.	估值高企。 中国股市市值有高达10%为信用融资——是发达经济体平均水平的五倍。


But China also has substantial wriggle room in its monetary and fiscal policy to contain the adverse consequences of its debt buildup, real-estate boom, and irrationally exuberant stock market, while simultaneously pursuing bold structural reforms in its economy and capital markets.	但中国有大量货币和财政政策空间遏制债务累积、房地产繁荣和股市非理性繁荣所带来的不利后果，同时追求大胆的经济和资本市场结构改革。


China’s growth rate may have dropped from a three-decade average of 10% to a 25-year low of 7%, but that slowdown has been largely the result of policies to reduce fixed investment and move the economy from manufacturing to services.	中国增长率也许已经从三十年来的平均水平10%下降到25年来的最低值7%，但这一减速基本上是降低固定投资、促使经济从制造业转向服务业的政策的结果。


Employment remains strong, and the middle class is growing rapidly.	就业依然强劲，中产阶级也在快速成长。


Meanwhile, in India, the implementation of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ambitious reform agenda has been slower than anticipated.	与此同时，在印度，总理莫迪的宏大改革日程的实施比预计的更加缓慢。 但通胀已经降了下来；


But inflation is down; the fiscal situation has improved; and the economy has benefitted from the drop in oil and commodity prices.	财政状况也有所改善，而印度经济也因为石油和大宗商品价格下跌而受益。


Growth of 6-7% seems achievable, and Modi remains a popular reform-minded leader whose policies are attracting the support of domestic investors.	6—7%的增长率似乎是可以实现的，而莫迪仍然是受民众支持的改革派领导人，他的政策吸引了国内投资者的支持。


As global investors navigate the uncertain waters of emerging markets in the next few years, they should remember that, for these economies, the wave of industrialization and urbanization and the associated productivity gains are far from over.	未来五年，全球投资者将面临新兴市场水深难测的局面，他们应该记住，对这些经济体来说，工业化和城市化浪潮以及随之而来的生产率提高还远未结束。


With their faster-growing populations and productivity, they will enjoy a growth advantage over developed economies for some time to come.	它们拥有更快的人口和生产率增长速度，将在相当长一段时间内获得相对发达经济体的增长优势。


Back to Fundamentals in Emerging Markets	回归新兴市场基本面


CAMBRIDGE – Following 15 years of hype, a new conventional wisdom has taken hold: emerging markets are in deep trouble.	坎布里奇——经过15年的大肆炒作，新兴市场深陷困境这一新的传统智慧已经站稳了脚跟。


Many analysts had extrapolated rapid growth in countries such as Brazil, Russia, Turkey, and India into the indefinite future, calling them the new engines of the world economy.	许多分析人士曾预测巴西、俄罗斯、土耳其和印度等国未来将维持快速增长，并将其赞誉为世界经济的新引擎。


Now growth is down in almost all of them, and investors are pulling their money out – prompted in part by the expectation that the US Federal Reserve will raise interest rates in September.	现在几乎上述所有国家都出现了增速放缓，因为美联储今年9月预期加息，投资者正忙着撤出资金。


Their currencies have tumbled, while corruption scandals and other political difficulties have overwhelmed the economic narrative in places like Brazil and Turkey.	上述国家货币持续下跌，而腐败丑闻和其他政治困难已经在巴西和土耳其等地压倒了经济诉求。


With hindsight, it has become clear that there was in fact no coherent growth story for most emerging markets.	事后看来，多数新兴市场国家显然没有连贯的增长前景。


Scratch the surface, and you found high growth rates driven not by productive transformation but by domestic demand, in turn fueled by temporary commodity booms and unsustainable levels of public or, more often, private borrowing.	究其原因，你会发现它们的高增速源于需求拉动而非生产率转变，反过来又受到不可持续的公私借贷所带来的暂时商品繁荣的驱动。


Yes, there are plenty of world-class firms in emerging markets, and the expansion of the middle-class is unmistakable.	的确，新兴市场涌现出许多世界级公司，而且中产阶级的扩张也明白无误。


But only a tiny share of these economies’ labor is employed in productive enterprises, while informal, unproductive firms absorb the rest.	但生产企业仅雇佣了很少一部分劳动力，而非正式的非生产企业则吸纳了大部分工人。


Compare this with the experience of the few countries that did emerge successfully, “graduating” to advanced-country status, and you can see the missing ingredient.	与成功跨入到发达国家行列的少数国家进行对比，你就能找到所缺少的要素。


South Korea and Taiwan grew on the back of rapid industrialization.	快速工业化是韩国和台湾增长的背景。


As South Korean and Taiwanese peasants became factory workers, the economies of both countries – and, with a lag, their politics – were transformed.	随着韩国和台湾农民变身为工厂工人，两国经济——其后还有政治——都经历了转型过程。


South Korea and Taiwan eventually became rich democracies.	韩国和台湾最终成为富裕的民主国家。


By contrast, most of today’s emerging markets are deindustrializing prematurely.	相比之下，今天的多数新兴市场都过早开始了去工业化进程。


Services are not tradable to the same extent as manufactured goods, and for the most part do not exhibit the same technological dynamism.	服务的贸易性与工业产品不可同日而语，同等的技术活力也难以体现其中。


As a result, services have proved to be a poor substitute to export-oriented industrialization so far.	因此迄今为止的事实已经证明服务并非出口导向型工业化的合格替代品。


But emerging markets do not deserve the doom-and-gloom treatment they are getting these days.	新兴市场并非无法避免今天所遭受的厄运。


The real lesson from the collapse of the emerging-market hype is the need to pay closer attention to growth fundamentals and to recognize the diversity of circumstances among a group of economies needlessly lumped together.	新兴市场经济停滞的真正教训是必须更多关注增长的基本面，并清醒地认识到被强行划归一类的不同经济体具有各自局面的多样性。


For developing economies, the three key growth fundamentals are acquisition of skills and education by the workforce; improvement of institutions and governance; and structural transformation from low-productivity to high-productivity activities (as typified by industrialization).	对发展中经济体而言，劳动力教育和技能培训、机构及治理改善和从低生产率到高生产率活动的结构转型（例如工业化）是三大关键增长基本面。


East Asian-style rapid growth has typically required a heavy dose of structural transformation for a number of decades, with steady progress on education and institutions providing the longer-term underpinnings of convergence with advanced economies.	东亚式快速增长通常需要长达数十年的大规模结构转型，靠教育和体制的平稳进步为接轨发达经济提供长期支撑。


Unlike East Asian economies, today’s emerging markets cannot rely on export surpluses in manufactures as their engine of structural transformation and growth.	与东亚经济体不同的是，今天的新兴市场不能继续依赖制造业出口盈余作为结构转型和增长的引擎。


So they are forced to rely more on the longer-term fundamentals of education and institutions.	因此，他们不得不更多地依赖于教育和制度等长期基本面因素。


These do generate growth – and indeed are ultimately indispensable to it.	这些确实会带来经济增长，并且实际上是增长不可或缺的要素。


But they generate 2-3% annual growth at best, not East Asia’s 7-8% rates.	但它们最多只能带来每年2-3%的增长，远远落后于东亚7-8%的增速。


Compare China and India.	我们来对比一下中国和印度。


China grew by building factories and filling them with peasants who had little education, which generated an instant boost in productivity.	中国增长依靠建设工厂并吸纳受教育程度不高的农民，借此为生产力带来立竿见影的好处。


India’s comparative advantage lies in relatively skill-intensive services – such as information technology – which can absorb no more than a tiny slice of the country’s largely unskilled labor force.	印度的比较优势在于相对的技术密集型服务——比如信息技术——但只能吸纳该国极小比例的非技术劳动人口。


It will take many decades for the average skill level in India to rise to the point that it can pull the economy’s overall productivity significantly higher.	印度的平均技术水平需要几十年才能提升到能显著提高经济整体生产率的程度。


So India’s medium-term growth potential lies well below that of China in recent decades.	因此印度的中期增长潜力远低于近几十年来的中国。


A significant boost in infrastructure spending and policy reforms can make a difference, but it cannot close the gap.	显著推动基础设施开支和政策改革可能会有所改变，但却不可能完全填补两国间的鸿沟。


On the other hand, being the tortoise rather than the hare in the growth race can be an advantage.	另一方面，在发展竞赛中乌龟与兔子相比有着独到的优势。


Countries that rely on steady, economy-wide accumulation of skills and improved governance may not grow as fast, but they may be more stable, less prone to crises, and more likely to converge with advanced countries eventually.	依赖稳定的技术积累和治理改善的国家可能不会发展得非常快，但却可能发展得更稳、不容易出现危机、更有可能最终跨入发达国家的行列。


China’s economic achievements are undeniable.	中国取得的经济成就不可否认。


But it remains an authoritarian country where the Communist Party retains its political monopoly.	但它依然是由共产党掌握政治垄断权的专制国家。


So the challenges of political and institutional transformation are immeasurably greater than in India. The uncertainty that confronts a long-term investor in China is correspondingly higher.	所以政治和体制转型的挑战远大于印度��中国的长期投资者面临的不确定性相对较高。


Or compare Brazil with other emerging markets.	或者对比巴西与其他新兴市场。


Among these countries, Brazil has arguably taken the greatest hit recently.	在这些国家中，可以说巴西近来遭受的打击最大。


The corruption scandal surrounding the flagship state-owned oil company, Petrobras, has produced an economic crisis, with the currency tanking and growth grinding to a halt.	围绕国有旗舰石油公司巴西石油（Petrobras）的腐败丑闻引发了一场经济危机，导致货币跳水，经济增长陷入停滞状态。


Yet Brazil’s political crisis demonstrates the country’s democratic maturity, and arguably is a sign of strength rather than weakness.	但巴西对政治危机的处理表明其国内民主日臻成熟，甚至可以说表现出一种力量而非软弱。


The ability of prosecutors to investigate payment irregularities reaching into the highest ranks of Brazilian society and government without political interference – or the process turning into a witch hunt – would be exemplary in many advanced countries.	检察官有能力在不受政府政治干扰——或确保不将调查过程演变为政治迫害的情况下深入巴西社会和政府的最高层级对支付违规行为展开调查。 巴西的这种能力甚至为许多发达国家树立了榜样。


The contrast with Turkey could not be more striking.	巴西与土耳其的对比极为引人注目。


Corruption of a much greater magnitude there, implicating President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his family, has gone untouched.	牵扯到总统埃尔多安及其家人的规模大得多的腐败都没有得到调查。


A probe by Turkish prosecutors against Erdoğan in 2013 was clearly politically motivated (and driven by Erdoğan’s foes in the movement headed by Fethullah Gülen, a self-exiled Islamic preacher), which gave the government the cover needed to quash the investigation.	土耳其检察官2013年对埃尔多安的调查明显出于政治动机（背后的推动者是反对运动领导人法土拉·葛兰，埃尔多安自我流放的伊斯兰传教士对手），而这给了政府所需的撤销调查的借口。


Turkey’s economy has not suffered nearly as much as Brazil’s, but its rot will cause greater long-term damage.	土耳其经济并没有遭受像巴西那么大的损失，但腐败带来的长期破坏将更为显著。


Cheap external finance, plentiful capital inflows, and commodity booms helped hide many such shortcomings and fueled 15 years of emerging-market growth.	廉价的外部融资、充足的资本流入和大宗商品繁荣掩盖了诸多这样的缺陷，推动新兴市场快速增长了15年。


As the world economy generates stronger headwinds in the years ahead, it will become easier to distinguish countries that have truly strengthened their economic and political fundamentals from those that have coasted on false narratives and the tenuous strength of fickle investor sentiment.	随着世界经济未来几年内所产生的较强阻力，真正强化经济政治基本面和依靠弄虚作假及浮躁的投资者情绪的国家将变得很容易区分。


The Emerging-Market Currency Rout	新兴市场货币暴动


SANTIAGO – With the currencies of Malaysia, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Mexico hitting record lows recently, currency traders around the world are asking: How much further can emerging-market currencies weaken?	圣地亚哥—马来西亚、印度尼西亚、南非、土耳其、巴西、哥伦比亚、智利和墨西哥货币最近纷纷创出新低，全世界货币交易者都在问：新兴市场货币要跌到什么时候？


The standard approach to answering this question takes a relatively normal base year and measures how much a country’s currency has depreciated since then.	会的这一问题的标准方法是选取一个相对正常的基年，然后测量一国货币自该年以来贬值了多少。


That number is then adjusted for the inflation differential between the country and its trading partners.	然后将这个数字用该国及其贸易伙伴的通货膨胀差异进行调整。


If the resulting real exchange rate is not too far from that of the base year, the market is said to be in equilibrium, and little or no further depreciation should be expected.	如果由此得到的真实汇率与基年相去不远，那么就可以说市场位于均衡，不会产生多少后续贬值。


Now consider an alternative method.	现在，考虑另一种方法。


Take the same country’s current-account deficit and ask how large a real depreciation is needed (making some assumptions about trade elasticities along the way) to close that external gap.	观察同一国的经常项目赤字，计算需要真实贬值多大幅度（需要做一些关于贸易弹性的假设）方能填补这一外部缺口。


If the recent real depreciation achieves that threshold, no further change in the exchange rate should be expected.	如果当前真实贬值已经达到这一阈值，那么就不会产生后续贬值。


These are the right answers, but to the wrong question.	这些都是正确的答案，但问题错了。


Over the medium to long term, exchange rates are indeed driven by what happens in the real economy.	从中期到长期，汇率实际上是由实体经济情况驱动的。


Or, more precisely, they reflect the requirement that the real exchange rate be such that the economy attains both external balance (a small and manageable current-account deficit) and internal balance (no inflationary pressures at home).	或者，更准确地说，汇率反映了，要让经济同时实现外部平衡（小规模、可管理的经常项目赤字）和内部平衡（国内没有通胀压力），真实汇率应该是多少。


But that need not happen until many months – perhaps years – after a shock.	但这要到冲击发生好几个月甚至多年后才会成为现实。


In the short run, exchange rates are driven by purely financial considerations.	在短期，汇率完全由金融条件决定。


That is why they are prone to overshooting.	因此，汇率很容易超调。


Even small changes in fundamentals can have large effects on exchange rates, with up-front movements that far exceed what long-run adjustment requires.	即使是微小的基本面变动也可能对汇率产生重大影响，导致远超长期调整需要的事先波动。


And the potential for volatility is particularly great if domestic corporations have large foreign-currency debts, which is true in all of the emerging economies under stress today.	而如果国内企业存在大量外币债务，潜在波动将非常巨大，所有如今陷入压力的新兴经济体莫不如此。


Consider the case of a hypothetical Latin American retail company that borrowed abroad in dollars to build a shopping mall at home.	假象有一家拉丁美洲零售公司，它从海外借入美元在国内建造购物城。


Such borrowing calls for collateral – in this case, the land on which construction will take place.	这笔借款需要抵押品——在这个例子中是准备用于建造购物城的土地。


The larger the value of the collateral, typically measured in domestic currency (or in an inflation-indexed unit, such as Chile’s Unidad de Fomento), the larger the size of the dollar loan.	抵押品的价值越大（常常用本币衡量，或者，在智利Unidad de Fomento公司的案例中，用通胀指数单位衡量），美元贷款的规模也越大。


Next, suppose that the price of the natural resource that is the country’s largest export suddenly dips sharply (as has happened recently).	再假设自然资源是该国最大出口项，其价格突然跳水（就像最近所发生的那样）。


The exchange rate (both nominal and real) will depreciate accordingly, thereby setting in motion the standard, textbook adjustment process.	汇率（不管是名义值还是真实值）也将随之贬值，进入教科书上的标准调整过程。


But in this case, a second, non-standard factor comes into play.	但在这个例子中，还有一个非标准因素起作用。


After the depreciation, the collateral, valued in dollars, is worth less.	贬值后，用美元衡量的抵押品价值下降了。


Loan covenants have likely been broken, and lenders begin demanding that the borrower either put up new collateral or deleverage and repay part of the loan.	贷款合同有可能无法维持，贷款人将开始要求借款人要么拿出新抵押品，要么去杠杆并偿还部分贷款。


To repay, the firm must purchase dollars.	要偿还贷款，该企业必须买入美元。


If there are large dollar debts outstanding, and many firms find themselves in the same position, the additional demand for dollars will cause the exchange rate to depreciate even further.	如果存在大量美元债务，并且许多企业都陷入了这一状况，那么新增美元需求将推动汇率进一步贬值。


And that, of course, causes the dollar value of the collateral to fall yet again.	当然，抵押品的美元价值也会随之进一步下跌。


You can see where this story is going.	你可以看到这个故事的结局了。


The process plays out until the domestic currency has lost a good deal of its value.	这一过程会一直持续下去，直到本币失去相当大一部分价值。


After a few days or weeks, the exchange rate is likely to be weaker than is warranted by the need to adjust the current account.	不出几天或几周，汇率就有可能跌到比调整经常项目的需要更深的程度。


The overshooting is caused by the coexistence of sizeable foreign-currency debts and financial (collateral) constraints.	超调由大规模外币债务和金融（抵押品）约束的同时作用导致。


Notice that if in the long run the debt is reduced sufficiently, and the terms-of-trade shock abates somewhat, the real exchange rate need not depreciate that much, and may even end up appreciating a bit.	注意，如果在长期债务大幅减少，并且贸易条件冲击有所缓和，真实汇率就不需要贬值如此程度，最终甚至略有升值。


This is overshooting on steroids: a very sharp initial loss of value for the domestic currency, followed by a gain that may leave the exchange rate, measured in inflation-adjusted terms, stronger than it was at the start.	超调就好像打了类固醇：一开始本币急剧大幅贬值，然后反弹，最后，以经通胀调整的标准衡量的汇率可能比一开始更强。


For many emerging-market economies, this is, alas, a painfully realistic scenario.	唉，对许多新兴市场经济体来说，这是一个痛苦的现实情景。


Since the subprime crisis, ultra-low interest rates in the rich world have caused emerging-market firms to borrow like never before.	自次贷危机以来，发达世界的极低利率导致新兴市场企业的借贷行为与以往发生了很大变化。


Some of the debt does not even appear in the official statistics of borrowing countries, because it was often taken on not by domestically-based firms, but by their offshore subsidiaries.	一些债务甚至根本不出现在借款国的官方统计数字中，因为它们由本国企业通过离岸分支借入。


The Bank for International Settlements estimates outstanding dollar credit to non-bank borrowers outside the United States at $9 trillion.	国际清算银行测算，美国之外的非银行借款人未偿还美元信用高达9万亿美元。


Big debtors include some of those countries whose currencies have come under downward pressure recently: China ($1 trillion), Brazil (more than $300 billion), India ($125 billion), plus Malaysia, South Africa, Turkey, and Latin America’s financially open economies: Colombia, Chile, Peru, and Mexico.	大债务人包括一些最近货币承受贬值压力的国家：中国（1万亿美元）、巴西（超过3,000亿美元）、印度（1,250亿美元），以及马来西亚、南非、土耳其和哥伦比亚、智利、秘鲁、墨西哥等拉美金融开放经济体。


Central banks can intervene in the currency markets and sell reserves, thereby offsetting the withdrawal of financing by foreign lenders.	中央银行可以干预货币市场，出售外汇储备，从而抵消外国贷款人融资撤出��影响。


But intervention requires that the authorities first have both the reserves and the will to abandon (at least temporarily) their hands-off commitment to a floating exchange rate.	但干预首先要求当局拥有储备，并愿意放弃（至少暂时放弃）它们不干涉浮动汇率的承诺。


Not all emerging-market central banks are in a position to fulfill both of these requirements.	并非所有新兴市场中央银行都符合这两个要求。


A sharp growth slowdown is the other component of this overshooting adjustment pattern.	增长急剧放缓是这一超调模式的另一个因素。


The initial export shock was likely to reduce growth.	最初的出口冲击可能影响增长。


The sudden deleveraging imposed by foreign creditors requires the current-account balance to adjust further and faster.	外国债权人所要求的突然的去杠杆使经常项目平衡需要更深更快地调整。


The additional exports triggered by the depreciated currency can help, but they are often slow in coming.	货币贬值带来的出口增加有所帮助，但常常姗姗来迟。


The fastest way to adjust is via reduced demand and imports, and that is what almost always ends up happening.	更快的调整方式是通过降低需求和进口，这也是几乎每一次都最终发生的事。


Growth and job creation take the hit, as we are seeing today in emerging market economies around the world.	增长和就业创造遭受打击，这就是现在我们在全球新兴市场经济体所看到的。


In these circumstances, currency traders suffer.	在这样的环境下，货币交易者遭遇打击。


But citizens of indebted middle-income countries are likely to suffer far more.	但中等收入债务国公民可能遭遇更大的打击。


Today’s emerging-market turmoil is here to stay, and they are the true victims.	如今，新兴市场动荡已是既成事实，而他们是真正的受害者。


Emerging Markets’ Europe Problem	新兴市场的欧洲问题


PARIS – From Hong Kong to São Paulo, and all points between, one word dominates all others among big investors: Greece.	巴黎——从香港到圣保罗，以及中间的所有地区，所有大投资商都在谈论一个词：希腊。


Will the Greeks remain in the eurozone?	希腊人会不会留在欧元区？


What will happen to the European Union and the global economy if they do not?	如果他们选择退出，欧盟和全球经济将向何处去？


Until recently, Europe was a sort of mirror that confirmed for the major emerging economies the spectacular nature of their own success.	直到不久前，欧洲还是主要新兴经济体证实自身骄人成就的一面镜子。


They could contrast their high growth rates with Europe’s high levels of debt.	他们可以用自身的高增长与欧洲的高债务尽情的对比。


They could oppose their “positive energy” with the pessimism dominating European minds.	他们可以对比自身的“积极活力”和主宰欧洲人思想的悲观情绪。


They were only too willing to advise Europe to work harder and spend less, as legitimate pride mingled with an understandable desire to settle historical scores and attenuate their legacies of colonial submission and humiliation.	他们洋洋得意地建议欧洲努力工作、节约开支，因为合情合理的骄傲中掺杂着可以理解的清算历史欠账、借以减轻他们曾经接受殖民的痛苦和屈辱的情绪。


But, today, emerging countries are growing very concerned with what they rightly perceive as the serious risks to their own economies implied by excessive weakness in Europe, which remains the world’s trade leader.	但今天，新兴国家越来越忧虑欧洲过度疲软对其各自经济的严重威胁，他们的这种担忧不无道理，因为欧洲仍然领导着世界贸易。


Moreover, Europe’s malaise threatens many of these countries’ political stability as well, given the close connection – especially in China – between the legitimacy of existing arrangements and the continuation of rapid economic growth.	此外，鉴于现有制度的合法性和延续快速经济增长之间的紧密关系，欧洲经济的萎靡不振甚至威胁到上述很多国家、特别是中国的政治稳定。


If the crisis in Europe were to cause annual GDP growth to fall below 7% in China, 5% in India, and 3% in Brazil, these countries’ most vulnerable citizens would be hardest hit.	如果欧洲危机导致中国的全年GDP增长低于7％、印度低于5%、巴西低于3%，这些新兴国家最弱势的民众将会受到最沉重的打击。


They were never part of the “culture of hope,” based largely on material success, that played a key role in these countries’ success. If social inequalities were to reach new heights, their frustration and resentment could manifest itself fully.	在这些国家的成功中曾经发挥重要作用的“希望文化”在很大程度上以物质成功为基础，“希望文化”从来未曾真正属于这些弱势民众。


In that case, Europe could suddenly become a very different mirror for emerging countries, revealing, if not accentuating, their own structural weaknesses.	鉴于这种情况，欧洲可能突然成为新兴国家一面完全不同的镜子，暴露出他们自身存在的结构性缺陷，甚至导致这些缺陷进一步加剧。


And that is why, just as Europe must save the Greek economy or Spain’s banks at all costs, emerging countries must do whatever they can to contribute to the rescue of the European economy.	正如欧洲必须不惜一切代价挽救希腊经济或西班牙银行系统，新兴国家也出于同样原因必须尽一切可能为挽救欧洲经济出力。


As Europe has learned, the longer one waits, the higher the cost – and the lower the chance of success.	欧洲的教训告诉我们，等待时间越长，成本越高——而成功的机会越低。


Unfortunately, a group of countries that are united above all by a common denial of their global responsibilities is unlikely to reach such a conclusion.	然而不幸的是，由同样拒绝全球责任的国家联合组成的团体不太可能这样思考问题。


Indeed, most emerging countries would balk at the idea of coming to Europe’s financial rescue for several reasons.	事实上，多数新兴市场国家面对为欧洲提供金融援助的提议望而生畏有以下几种原因。


First, there is no such thing as a bloc of emerging countries.	首先，目前还不存在新兴国家集团这样的组织。


They are not united by a common vision of their future, or by a common political ideal, such as democracy in the Western world.	即没有共同的愿景或共同的政治理想（类似于西方的民主制度）将他们团结在一起。


Whatever the limits or contradictions of shared values, it would be naive to dismiss their importance.	无论共同价值观有多少矛盾或局限性，忽视其重要性都将犯下幼稚的错误。


Europe and the United States will remain allies even if Barack Obama, like Nicolas Sarkozy in France, turns out to be a one-term president.	即使奥巴马像法国的尼古拉斯·萨科齐那样只担任一届总统，欧洲和美国仍将继续是盟友。


Second, emerging countries are more Europe’s rivals than its partners.	其次，新兴国家与其说是欧洲的伙伴还不如说是对手。


They are united only by their shared suspicion of China.	对中国的怀疑是他们唯一的共同之处。


In such a context, a common long-term strategy is extremely difficult to conceive.	鉴于这种情况，极难想象他们能制定统一的长期战略。


The Chinese may proclaim that they tend to think over a “longer” term than Americans, who think more “broadly,” and Europeans, who think more “deeply,” as a well-known Chinese international relations expert has put it.	正如一位著名的中国国际关系专家所说，中国人可能认为他们思考问题比美国更“长远”，而美国思考问题更“广泛”，欧洲则更“深入”。


But, when it comes to the European financial crisis, China’s behavior seems to be determined by purely short-term tactical considerations, even as Chinese investments in Europe tripled in 2011.	但是当面对欧洲的金融危机时，即使中国2011年对欧洲的投资达到之前的三倍，但短期的战术考量似乎是决定中国所作所为的唯一因素。


To buy half of the Piraeus harbor at a knockdown price may seem more advantageous than investing in the long-term consolidation of the Greek economy and its finances, but is that really the case?	以低廉的价格购买一半的比雷埃夫斯港与其说是从长远角度投资希腊的经济和金融，还不如说是趁火打劫占取便宜。 但实际情况是否真的如此？


Third, emerging countries’ short-term opportunism is based on a double distrust: towards Europe, of course, but also, paradoxically, towards themselves.	其三，新兴国家的短期机会主义是基于所谓的双重不信任：其中当然有不信任欧洲，但荒谬的是同样有不信任他们自己。


That is, they lack confidence in their ability to do their part to save the sick man of the global economy that Europe has become.	也就是说，他们不相信自己能完成拯救欧洲这个全球经济病夫的任务。


To be sure, this runs counter to the triumphalism emanating from Asia, in particular.	可以肯定，这与亚洲散发的必胜信念尤其背道而驰。


Kishore Mahbubani, a leading foreign-policy thinker from Singapore, recently proclaimed in Vienna, at a conference organized by my institute, that the next millennium would be Asian.	新加坡权威外交政策思想家马凯硕不久前刚在我院在维也纳组织的一次会议上宣布下世纪将是属于亚洲的世纪。


And yet one senses among elites from emerging countries something akin to existential doubt, which the European crisis has served to reinforce.	但可以感觉到新兴国家精英阶层内心隐藏着挥之不去的疑问，而这些在欧洲危机中只能是进一步加剧而已。


This insecurity manifests itself in many ways: from the accumulation of liquid wealth as insurance against foreign and domestic uncertainties to the choice of many, if not most, to educate their children abroad.	这种不安全感表现在诸多方面：当很多人，甚至是大多数人会选择让子女到国外接受教育的情况下，他们却忙于积累流动性财富来对抗国内外不确定局势。


In fact, the sick man – undeniably European, if not Western – could reveal himself to be more resilient, owing to the strength of his own natural defenses: democracy and the rule of law.	无可否认，欧洲甚至是西方病夫可能有着很强的恢复能力，而这来源于其民主和法治的天然防御力量。


That is why the current European crisis may well prove to be a crucial test for emerging countries that are more dynamic than Europe economically, but ultimately more fragile politically.	这也是为什么当前的欧洲危机可能被证明是对新兴国家的一次关键的考验，他们在经济活力上胜于欧洲，但在政治上却远比欧洲更加脆弱。


The Great Emerging-Market Bubble	新兴市场大泡沫


LONDON – Something has gone badly wrong in the emerging economies that were supposed to be shaping, even dominating, the future of the world.	伦敦—人们认为将会影响甚至主导世界未来的新兴经济体发生了非常严重的问题。


The search for culprits is under way: commodity prices, fracking, US interest rates, El Nino, China, these and others lead the field.	目前正在寻找罪魁：大宗商品价格、液压致裂法、美国利率、厄尔尼诺、中国都是热门。


But the answer is simpler and more traditional. It is politics.	但答案其实更加简单，也更加传统，那就是政治。


Look at Brazil.	以巴西为例。


There an economy once tipped for ever-lasting boom has barely grown for more than two years, and is currently shrinking.	这个曾经似乎已经走上永续繁荣的经济体两年多来现有增长，目前更是陷入了衰退。


Falling prices for its commodity exports haven’t helped, but Brazil’s economy was supposed to be about far more than just harvests and extractive industries.	大宗商品出口价格的下跌绝非福音，但巴西经济应该绝不仅限于收成和炼制产业。


Or look at Indonesia.	再看看印度尼西亚。


That economy is still expanding, but at a rate – 4.7% annually in the latest quarter – that is disappointing in terms both of previous expectations and of population growth.	印尼经济仍在扩张，但增长率——上季度年化增长率4. 7%——与此前的预期和人口增长率相比相当令人失望。


The same can be said of Turkey, where growth has sagged to 2.3% in the latest quarter – which at least beats population growth but is meager compared with the country’s go-go years of 2010 and 2011, when it expanded by 9%.	土耳其也是如此，上季度增长率下降至2. 3%——总算胜过了人口增长率，但与2010年和2011年的突飞猛进（增长率高达9%）相比显得相当疲软。


Or South Africa, where economic progress has constantly been too slow, whether in boom years for gold and other resources or busts, to make any real dent in poverty levels.	南非亦然，其经济进步一直过于缓慢，不管是在黄金和其他资源的繁荣期还是萧条期，减贫方面也几无进展。


Then there is China itself, whose slowdown is everybody else’s favorite explanation for their own sluggishness.	还有中国本身，它的减速是其他所有人用来解释自身迟滞的最佳借口。


There, private economists are back enjoying their favorite pastime during periods of economic stress, namely trying to construct their own indices for GDP growth as at such times they do not believe the official statistics.	中国的私人经济学家又回到了过去他们最喜欢的经济压力期，也就是推算自己的GDP增长指标而不信任官方统计数字的时期。


Officially, Chinese growth is rock-steady at 7% per year, which happens to be the government’s declared target, but private economists’ estimates mostly range between 4% and 6%.	从官方数据看，中国增长仍保持在稳健的7%，也就是政府宣布的增长目标，但私人经济学家的测算大多在4—6%。


One mantra of recent years has been that, whatever the twists and turns of global economic growth, of commodities or of financial markets, “the emerging-economy story remains intact.”	近几年来有个魔咒，即，不管全球经济增、大宗商品或金融市场长发生什么扭曲或转折，“新兴市场的故事总能岿然不动。


By this, corporate boards and investment strategists mean that they still believe that emerging economies are destined to grow a lot faster than the developed world, importing technology and management techniques while exporting goods and services, thereby exploiting a winning combination of low wages and rising productivity.	”公司董事会和投资策略师这样说的意思是他们仍然相信新兴经济体必然比发达世界增长快得多，在进口科技和管理的同时出口商品和服务，从而获得低工资和生产率提高的胜利组合。


There is, however, a problem with this mantra, beyond the simple fact that it must by definition be too general to cover such a wide range of economies in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe.	但是，这个魔咒有个问题。 一个简单的事实是，顾名思义，这一魔咒定义太一般，难以覆盖全部亚洲、拉美、非洲和东欧的各种类型的经济体。


It is that if convergence and outperformance were merely a matter of logic and destiny, as the idea of an “emerging-economy story” implies, then that logic ought also to have applied during the decades before developing-country growth started to catch the eye.	如果如“新兴市场故事”观点所隐含的那样，趋同和赶超只是一个逻辑和宿命的问题，那么这一逻辑应该也适用于发展中国家增长开始吸引人们眼球之前的几十年。


But it didn’t.	但并非如此。


The reason why it didn’t is the same reason why so many emerging economies are having trouble now. It is that the main determinants of an emerging-economy’s ability actually to emerge, sustainably, are politics, policy and all that is meant by the institutions of governance.	之所以并非如此，其原因与如此多的新兴经济体现在陷入了麻烦的原因相同。


More precisely, although countries can ride waves of growth and exploit commodity cycles despite having dysfunctional political institutions, the real test comes when times turn less favorable and a country needs to change course.	这一原因是，新兴经济体的实际持续兴起的主要决定因素是政治、政策和由治理制度决定的一切。


That is what Brazil has been finding so difficult for the past four disappointing years.	这就是巴西在令人失望的四年中所存在的难点。


Unable to keep inflation under control without causing a recession, the country has, since 2010, got stuck not because of bad luck, or any loss of entrepreneurial spirit in its private sector, but because of political failings.	巴西无法在不引起衰退的情况下控制通货膨胀，其自2010年以来的颓势并不是因为运气不好或私人部门企业家精神流失，而是因为政治失败。


Brazil’s government has been unwilling or unable to cut back its bloated public sector, has been mired in vast corruption scandals, and yet its president Dilma Rousseff continues to evince a fondness for just the sort of state-led capitalism that leads to exactly these problems.	巴西政府一直不愿或无法裁减臃肿的公共部门、深陷各种腐败丑闻，而其总统罗塞夫一直表现出对导致这些问题出现的国家领导资本主义情有独钟。


The democracies of Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, and South Africa are all currently failing to perform what is a basic task for any political system: to mediate smoothly between competing interest groups and power blocs in order to permit a broader public interest to prevail.	巴西、印尼、土耳其和南非等民主国家都没有能做好任何政治制度的基本任务：平稳协调互相竞争的利益集团和权力派系以使更最广泛的公共利益最终胜出。


By that is meant essentially a public interest in allowing the economy to evolve flexibly, so that resources move from uses that have become unprofitable to ones that have a higher potential.	这本质上意味着公共利益：让经济灵活演化，从而让资源从无法盈利的用途流向潜力更大的用途。


A clogged up economy, one that does not permit such creative destruction and adaptation to new circumstances, is one that will not grow sustainably.	一个拥塞的经济，一个无法发生创造性破坏和适应新环境的经济是无法持续低增长的。


Is this something that democracies, especially immature ones with fragile institutions of the rule of law and freedom of speech, are simply bad at, when compared with authoritarian regimes?	这是民主国家，特别是法治制度和言论自由脆弱的不成熟民主国家与极权体制相比的天然劣势吗？


Certainly, what these stumbling economies are guilty of is a failure to learn from Singapore, a system whose managed democracy is celebrating its 50th anniversary this year, and which has successfully avoided the sort of interest-group sclerosis and corruption that is holding back Brazil, for example.	显然，这些步履蹒跚的经济体所犯的一个错误是没有向新加坡学习。 新加坡采取有管理的民主制度，今年迎来建国50周年，它成功地避免了掣肘（比如）巴西的利益集团硬化症和腐败。


One comfort, perhaps, for the democrats is that right now China is failing to learn the Singaporean lesson, too.	也许对民主派来说，一个福音是最近中国也没有学习新加坡的经验。


Its current slowdown appears to arise from a failure by the Communist Party to challenge the monopoly powers of state-owned enterprises and to free up new sectors for private enterprise.	中国经济最近的减速似乎是因为中共没能解决国有企业权力垄断、向民营企业自由开放新部门的问题。


No matter.	这些都不重要。


It is not a question of whether democracy or authoritarianism is best.	这不是一个民主和极权谁更好的问题。


The bottom line is that unless emerging economies can ensure that they remain flexible and adaptable, they will not continue to “emerge.”	其本质是，除非新兴经济体能保证灵活性和适应力，否则它们无法继续“新兴”。


And the determinant of that flexibility and ability to adapt lies in political institutions and their willingness to challenge interest groups, mediate social conflicts, and maintain the rule of law.	而这一灵活性和适应力的决定因素在于政治制度以及它们挑战利益集团、协调社会冲突、维护法治的意愿。


It’s the politics, stupid.	重要的是政治，笨蛋。


Empowering Africa’s Women	授予非洲妇女权力


JOHANNESBURG – Africa is again high on the global agenda, and this time for all the right reasons. As the kickoff to the World Cup in South Africa approaches, people are seeing not just South Africa but our entire continent as equal partners in this extraordinary global celebration.	约翰内斯堡——非洲再次成为全球焦点，但这次是出于正当的理由。 随着南非世界杯开幕式的临近，人们不仅将南非、也将整个非洲大陆视为此次全球盛大庆典活动中平等的伙伴。


So, as the world’s eyes turn to Africa, we should take the opportunity to showcase the key role that Africa’s women are increasingly playing in the continent’s success.	因此，随着世界对非洲关注度的提升，我们应当抓住这次机会向世界展示非洲女性在非洲大陆成功中所发挥的关键作用。


Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf’s election as President of Liberia, the first women elected to run an African country, was symbolic of the progress of women across the continent.	埃伦·约翰逊·瑟利夫当选利比里亚总统标志着女性在非洲大陆所取得的进步，埃伦是受到推举管理非洲国家的首位女性。


We are proud as well that women make up more than 50% of MPs in Rwanda – the highest proportion in the world.	女性占卢旺达议会50%以上的席位也让我们感到骄傲，卢旺达女性议员的比例居世界之首。


South Africa and Lesotho are just two other African countries that sit near the top of the gender-equality league table.	在两性平等排名表中名列前茅的还有南非和莱索托。


It is women as well who are helping to calm tensions and heal Africa’s terrible wounds of conflict and violence.	女性也在为缓解紧张局势、治疗冲突和暴力给非洲留下的后遗症贡献自己的力量。


Women are in the lead in conflict resolution, in reconciliation, and in drafting the legal and constitutional framework to secure peace and prevent abuses.	妇女在冲突解决、纠纷和解、以及起草法律和宪法框架实现和平及防止虐待方面都发挥了领导作用。


In the media, civil society, and in communities up and down the African continent, women are taking on major responsibilities.	在遍布非洲大陆的媒体、民间团体和社团中，女性大都承担着重要的责任。


There is a huge amount more to do, but women are winning the fight to have their voices heard and help shape solutions and map priorities.	虽然前途仍任重道远，但女性在获得话语权，协助制定解决方案和确定政策重点方面已经取得了长足的进步。


The gender gap in schooling remains a concern.	教育方面的性别差异仍然令人担忧。


Africa still lags behind many parts of the world in educating its girls from primary school through to university.	在从小学到大学的女童教育层面，非洲仍然落后于世界许多国家。


But many more girls are attending and completing school now than a decade ago.	但现在参与并完成学业的女孩已经比十年前多得多。


Education is the bedrock for progress and educated women will empower Africa, so the focus now must be on those countries that are failing to close the gap.	教育是进步的基石，受过教育的女性会给非洲带来力量，因此目前的当务之急是督促未能缩小差异的国家改变现状。


Governments need to implement the right strategies and find the political will and resources to succeed.	政府需要推行正确的方略，找到获得成功所需的政治意愿和资源。