In fact, the current evidence, to be examined in greater detail next year, suggests that the bold goal of reducing under-five mortality rates to below 30 deaths per 1,000 births has been achieved or is within reach by 2015, and at a remarkably low cost to the health system.	事实上，就目前的证据而言（这些证据将在明年接受更详尽的考察），我们已经实现了让五岁以下儿童致死率下降至千分之三十以下的宏伟目标（或者说可以在2015年实现），并且这是在极低的医疗体系成本的条件下实现的。


Recently, one of the Gates Foundation’s senior staff members visited the Millennium Village site in northern Nigeria.	最近，一名盖茨基金会的高级工作人员访问了尼日利亚北部的千年村站点。


Afterwards, he confirmed to me personally that he and his team were deeply impressed by what they saw of the Millennium Village health system in operation.	事后他以个人名义像我确认，他和他的团队对于他们所目睹的千年村医疗体系运营情况印象深刻。


So let me take this opportunity to reiterate a challenge that I have posed to Bill.	在此容我重申一下我对比尔发起的挑战。


He can pick any district in rural Africa, and our team will work with the local communities using the Millennium Village health approach to reduce the under-five mortality rate to below 30/1,000 – a rate characteristic of many middle-income countries – at an annual health-sector cost of just $60 per person.	他可以在非洲农村地区人选一片区域，我们的团队将与当地社区合作，用千年村医疗方法将五岁以下儿童致死率降低到30/1,000——与许多中等收入国家相当的水平——并且每年每人的医疗相关成本只要60美元。


And we will do it in five years or less.	我们可以在五年以内达到这一目标。


That success, I believe, would help Bill and others to recognize the remarkable value of investing in low-cost rural health systems that follow the design principles of the Millennium Village Project.	我相信，这样的成功例子能有助于比尔和其他人认识到，遵循千年村计划的设计原则投资于低成本农村医疗体系大有可为。


Finally, given concerns, shared by Bill, about the MVP’s sustainability and scalability, it is no small matter that host governments are strong advocates of the approach.	最后，出于比尔和其他人对千年村计划的可持续性和可扩展性的担忧，东道国政府强力支持这一方针意义重大。


These governments’ leaders have seen the Millennium Villages day in and day out over almost a decade.	这些政府的领导人在十年的时间里几乎每天都关注着千年村。


They are putting their own money and policies behind expanded implementation of the MVP’s guiding concepts.	他们投入自己的资金和政策支持千年村计划指导概念的日益扩大的实施。


For example, Nigeria has used the MVP concepts for national-scale delivery of health and education services in all 774 of the country’s Local Government Areas.	比如，尼日利亚用千年村计划概念提供全国规模的健康和教育服务，该国774个地方政府区（Local Government Areas）都获得了覆盖。


Governments across the region have taken over $100 million in financing from the Islamic Development Bank to scale up the MVP concepts themselves.	整个地区的各个政府获得了来自伊斯兰开发银行（Islamic Development Bank）的1亿多美元融资用于推广千年村计划概念本身。


Around a dozen countries are now starting or have approached the Millennium Village Project to help them start their own Millennium Villages.	大约十二个国家目前正在接触或已经接触千年村计划帮助建设它们自己的千年村。


And the Pan African Youth Leadership Network, Africa’s own young people, recently visited the Millennium Village in Senegal, and requested the support of the MVP to expand the Millennium Village Project’s techniques and strategies in their home countries and regions.	而由非洲本土年轻人组成的泛非洲青年领导网络（Pan African Youth Leadership Network）最近访问了塞内加尔的千年村，并要求千年村计划支持扩大他们所在国家和地区的千年村计划技术和策略。


This spread of the Millennium Village approach throughout Africa shows that African political and community leaders consider the MVP’s methods, strategies, and systems to be highly useful in combating poverty in rural Africa.	千年村方法在整个非洲的推广表明非洲政治和社会领导人认为千年村计划的方法、策略和体系在帮助非洲农村脱贫方面具有重大意义。


Nina Munk’s book is out of date and misses the mark.	妮娜·孟克的书早已过时，并且没有触及核心。


I invite Bill Gates to visit one or more Millennium Village sites on an upcoming trip to Africa to see first hand why the approach is of such practical interest across the continent.	我邀请比尔·盖茨在即将到来的非洲之行中访问一个或几个千年村站点，现场看一看为何这一方法对整个非洲大陆具有如此重大的意义。


Winning the Fight Against Killer Diseases	打赢与致命疾病的斗争


MAPUTO – One of the greatest successes in development aid in the past decade has been the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.	发自莫桑比克首都马普托——在过去十年的发展援助中所取得的其中一项重大成就莫过于对抗艾滋病，肺结核及疟疾的全球援助。


The Global Fund has saved millions of lives and helped countries around the world beat back three epidemic diseases.	该全球援助基金拯救了数百万条生命并帮助许多国家对抗这三种流行性疾病。


Now it is appealing to the world’s governments and the private sector for another three years of funding, with governments set to decide on further financing in early December in Washington, DC.	如今全球各国将在11月初会聚华盛顿特区讨论是否继续资助的决定，而基金则呼吁各国和私人部门能再追加3年的资助。


Back in 2000, the HIV/AIDS epidemic was devastating the world’s poorest countries, especially in Africa.	让我们回想2000年的时候，艾滋病正在全球最贫穷的国家肆虐，尤其是在非洲。


New antiretroviral medicines had been developed and were being used in rich countries, but were too expensive for the poorest.	而新的抗病毒逆转录药物已经发明并在发达国家推广，但其价格却让穷国望而却步。


Millions of poor people were dying of AIDS, even though the new medicines could have kept them alive.	数百万人因为等不到新药的到来而丧命。


Two other major killer diseases, malaria and TB, were also resurgent.	另外两个主要的致命流行病，疟疾和肺结核，也在卷土重来。


Deaths from malaria were soaring, partly because poor countries’ health systems were dramatically underfunded, and partly because the malaria parasite had developed resistance to the usual medicines.	因疟疾丧生的人数不断攀升，一部分原因是由于穷国的卫生体系严重缺乏资金，另一部分是因为传染疟疾的寄生虫对常用药物已经具有的抗药性。


Yet the potential to control malaria was actually improving, thanks to several newly emerging technologies: long-lasting insecticide-treated bed nets to prevent the mosquitos from biting, better diagnostics to identify infections, and a new generation of highly effective medicines.	然而人们控制虐疾的潜在能力实际上在不断改善，因为一系列新型科技：用长效杀虫剂处理过的蚊帐可以防止蚊虫叮咬； 更优良的诊断技术去确诊感染疟疾；


TB was also running out of control, with a massive disease burden in both Asia and Africa.	肺结核同样也呈现��控状态，为亚洲和非洲国家都带来了巨大的卫生负担。


As with malaria, the TB bacteria had developed resistance to the traditional therapeutic drugs.	跟疟疾类似，肺结核细菌对传统治疗药物产生了抗药性。


A frightening new epidemic of multi-drug-resistant TB – or MDR-TB, which was much harder to treat than mainstream TB – had erupted.	一股令人胆寒的多种抗药性肺结核流行病——比常见肺结核更难医治——已经爆发。


There were also cases of extreme MDR-TB, soon called XDR-TB, which resisted even the back-up medicines.	还有一些极端多种抗药性肺结核的病例连后备的最强效药物都对其无效。


Back in 2000, the rich countries were not taking adequate steps to fight AIDS, TB, and malaria. Aid flows were tiny.	而在2000年时，发达国家也没有采取足够的步骤去对抗这三大疾病，援助金额也不大。


At the time, I had recently been appointed by the Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) to help bring finance ministers and health ministers together to see what could be done, both immediately and in the longer term.	那是我刚刚被世界卫生组织总干事任命去召集各国财政和卫生部长共同商议我们在近期和长期上可以做些什么。


Our advisory group, known as the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, recommended that rich countries scale up their health-care aid to poor countries, including efforts to fight AIDS, TB, and malaria.	我们这个名为宏观经济与卫生委员会的顾问团队建议富裕国家扩大对穷国的卫生援助，包括对抗三大疾病的相关行动。


This aid would save lives, improve well-being, and help strengthen economic development.	这些援助将拯救生命，改善社会福祉，并有助于增强经济发展。


Former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, the remarkable director-general of the WHO at the time, strongly supported this recommendation.	时任世界卫生组织总干事的前挪威首相格罗·哈莱姆·布伦特兰（Gro Harlem Brundtland）大力支持该建议。


At the international AIDS conference in Durban, South Africa, in July 2000, I described why a new global fund was needed to fight AIDS.	在2000年7月于南非德班市举行的国际对抗艾滋病大会上，我上台阐述了为何需要建立一个新的全球基金来对抗艾滋病。


In early 2001, former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan launched a powerful and persuasive appeal to establish the Global Fund.	在2001年初，前联合国秘书长科菲·安南（Kofi Annan）启动了一场强大并极具说服力的呼吁行动来建立全球基金会。


Leaders around the world responded to Annan’s call; within months, the Global Fund was born.	世界各国的领袖们都对安南的呼吁做出了回应； 几个月内，全球基金会宣告成立。


I remember those days vividly.	那些情景依然在我的脑海里萦绕着。


In international public-health circles, there was great excitement.	对国际卫生健康圈内人来说，这是件极为振奋人心的事情。


Yet there was also frustration and bewilderment, as vocal opponents of foreign aid began to oppose the increased funding for disease control.	但除此之外也有挫折和困惑，因为那些对外援助的反对者开始抗议对疾病控制增加资助。


Several economists with little knowledge of public health became outspoken opponents.	一些对公共卫生知之甚少的经济学家变成了极富煽动性的反对者。


They argued on the basis of free-market ideology rather than evidence, claiming that foreign aid always fails.	他们的观点并非基于事实证据而是来自于自由市场理念，认定对外援助总是以失败告终。


Fortunately, world leaders listened to public-health specialists and not to the aid skeptics.	幸运的是，各国领袖们在这些援助质疑者和公共卫生专家和之间选择了后者。


US President George W. Bush’s administration provided strong and important support for the Global Fund – and also created new US programs to fight AIDS and malaria.	美国的小布什政府为全球基金会提供了强大而重要的支持——同时也创立了一系列对抗艾滋和疟疾的新美国公共项目。


By the second half of the 2000’s, programs to fight the three main killer communicable diseases were scaling up around the world.	在2005~2010年间，对抗这三种致命传染性疾病的项目在全球广泛推广开来。


Over the objection of the aid skeptics, the Global Fund provided financial support for massive free distribution of bed nets, diagnostics, and medicines to address malaria.	在援助质疑者的反对声中，全球基金会为大规模发放蚊帐，诊断技术和抗疟疾药物提供了资金支持。


Lo and behold, for the first time in a generation, deaths from malaria in Africa began to fall (steeply in some places).	令人惊叹地，在这一代人的时间中，非洲的疟疾死亡人数首次出现了下降（尤其是在某些地区）。


Hundreds of thousands of lives, mainly African children, were now being saved every year.	每年都有数十万条生命（主要是儿童）得到了挽救。


Children were spared not only death but also debilitating infections, enabling them to attend school and lead more productive lives in the future.	这些孩子们不但远离了死亡还避免了导致虚弱的感染，使他们得以上学并拥有一个更加丰硕的未来生活。


The same thing happened with HIV/AIDS and TB.	同样的事情也发生在艾滋病和肺结核方面。


Back in 2000, before the Global Fund was established, infected people in developing countries died of AIDS without any chance to receive life-saving antiretroviral medicines.	在全球基金会尚未创立的2000年时，发展中国家的艾滋病感染者根本无法获得任何维持生命以及抗病毒逆转录药物。


By 2010, more than six million people in developing countries were receiving antiretroviral treatment.	而到了2010年，超过600万发展中国家感染者得到了抗病毒逆转录治疗。


Similarly, testing and treatment for TB rose sharply, including a strong increase in several heavily affected Asian countries.	类似的是，针对肺结核患者的检测和治疗数量大幅上升，包括在几个患者数量极大的亚洲国家。


The aid skeptics were proved wrong.	援助质疑者们的观点最终被证明是错误的。


Aid for health has worked.	卫生援助是有效的。


The world has benefited enormously from the triumph of generosity, professionalism, common decency, and good sense.	全世界都从这场慷慨，专业主义，高尚公益理念以及良好意愿的胜利中大大受益。


Yet the battle to mobilize adequate financing remains.	然而动员足够资助的挑战依然在继续。


The same skeptics repeat their tired opposition without reference to a decade of evidence.	那些质疑者们依然无视十年以来的成果，继续他们的那套陈词滥调。


It is shocking how their free-market fundamentalism (or simply ideological opposition to aid of any kind) can blind them to life-and-death needs and the efficacy of practical approaches that are well known to health professionals. (They are also blind to professional methods in other areas, such as food production.)	令人震惊的是他们那套自由市场原教旨主义（或者对任何援助都统统反对的意识形态）令他们无视关乎他人生死的需要以及卫生专家们熟知的操作手段所产生的效力（这些反对者们也无视其它领域的专业运作方式，比如食品行业）。


The Global Fund is urgently appealing for a minimum of $5 billion per year for the next three years – a tiny sum relative to the world economy (and equal to roughly $5 per person in the high-income countries).	全球基金会正迫切呼吁在未来3年内每年最少筹集50亿美元——这相对于全球经济总量来说只是九牛一毛（或等于发达国家每人拿出大约5美元）。


It could wisely use twice that amount.	就算把这个金额加多一倍基金会也会明智地去运用。


It seems likely that the US Government will agree to contribute one-third of the $5 billion if the rest of the world delivers the remainder.	目前看来如果世界其它国家能提供这50亿美元的2/3的话美国政府就会补齐剩下的1/3。


The United Kingdom recently made a strong pledge, and the world now awaits the announcements of Germany, Canada, Australia, Japan, and other long-standing and new donor countries in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.	英国政府最近做出了一个明确承诺，而世界正等待着德国、加拿大、澳大利亚，日本以及其它来自欧洲，中东和亚洲的长期和新捐助国做出行动。


Millions of people around the world will live, or die, depending on what these governments decide in December.	各国政府在11月的决定将影响数百万人的生死。


May they, and we, choose life.	希望这些政府以及我们每一个人都能选择生命的一方。


Responding to Ebola	响应埃博拉


NEW YORK – The horrific Ebola epidemic in at least four West African countries (Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria) demands not only an emergency response to halt the outbreak; it also calls for re-thinking some basic assumptions of global public health.	纽约—可怕的埃博拉瘟疫在至少四个西非国家肆虐（几内亚、利比里亚、塞拉利昂和尼日利亚），我们不仅需要紧急响应以阻止瘟疫爆发，还必须反思全球公共健康的一些基本假设。


We live in an age of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases that can spread quickly through global networks.	我们生活在一个传染病新发和再发频繁、能够迅速通过全球网络蔓延的时代。


We therefore need a global disease-control system commensurate with that reality.	因此，我们需要一个与适应这一现实的全球疾病控制体系。


Fortunately, such a system is within reach if we invest appropriately.	幸运的是，只要我们投资得当，这样一个体系是可以获得的。


Ebola is the latest of many recent epidemics, also including AIDS, SARS, H1N1 flu, H7N9 flu, and others.	埃博拉是大量新近爆发的瘟疫的最新例子，其他还有艾滋病、非典、H1N1流感、H7N9流感等。


AIDS is the deadliest of these killers, claiming nearly 36 million lives since 1981.	艾滋病是这些致命瘟疫中最凶险的，自1981年以来已夺走了近3,600万人的生命。


Of course, even larger and more sudden epidemics are possible, such as the 1918 influenza during World War I, which claimed 50-100 million lives (far more than the war itself).	当然，还有可能爆发更大更突然的瘟疫，如爆发于1918年一战期间、夺走5,000万—1亿人生命（远远多于战争本身）的大流感。


And, though the 2003 SARS outbreak was contained, causing fewer than 1,000 deaths, the disease was on the verge of deeply disrupting several East Asian economies including China’s.	而尽管2003年非典爆发得到了遏制，只有不到1,000人死亡，但仍险些给多个东亚经济体（包括中国）造成巨大影响。


There are four crucial facts to understand about Ebola and the other epidemics.	要理解埃博拉和其他瘟疫，需要考察四个事实。


First, most emerging infectious diseases are zoonoses, meaning that they start in animal populations, sometimes with a genetic mutation that enables the jump to humans.	首先，大部分新发传染病是人畜共患病，这意味着它们首先在动物中间流传，有时通过基因突变获得人传染性。 埃博拉可能是从蝙蝠身上传来的；


Ebola may have been transmitted from bats; HIV/AIDS emerged from chimpanzees; SARS most likely came from civets traded in animal markets in southern China; and influenza strains such as H1N1 and H7N9 arose from genetic re-combinations of viruses among wild and farm animals.	非典可能来自华南动物市场贸易中的果子狸； H1N1和H7N9等流感菌株来自野生和圈养动物病毒的基因重组。


New zoonotic diseases are inevitable as humanity pushes into new ecosystems (such as formerly remote forest regions); the food industry creates more conditions for genetic recombination; and climate change scrambles natural habitats and species interactions. 	随着人类进入新生态系统（如此前地处偏远的森林地区），新的人畜共患病是难以避免的； 食品业为基因重组创造了更好的条件；


Second, once a new infectious disease appears, its spread through airlines, ships, megacities, and trade in animal products is likely to be extremely rapid.	其次，一旦新传染病出现，就可以通过航空、水路、大城市和动物产品贸易传播，蔓延速度可能及其迅速。


These epidemic diseases are new markers of globalization, revealing through their chain of death how vulnerable the world has become from the pervasive movement of people and goods.	这些传染病是全球化的新标签，通过死亡链条凸显出无处不在的人流和物流让世界变得多么脆弱。


Third, the poor are the first to suffer and the worst affected.	第三，穷人首当其冲并且受影响最大。


The rural poor live closest to the infected animals that first transmit the disease.	农村贫困人口与受感染动物生活得最近，也是第一个染上疾病的群体。


They often hunt and eat bushmeat, leaving them vulnerable to infection.	他们常吃野味，因此很容易被传染。


Poor, often illiterate, individuals are generally unaware of how infectious diseases – especially unfamiliar diseases – are transmitted, making them much more likely to become infected and to infect others.	贫穷（通常没什么文化的）个人一般而言不了解传染病（特别是不熟悉的传染病）是如何传播的，这使得他们更加容易被感染并传染给别人。


Moreover, given poor nutrition and lack of access to basic health services, their weakened immune systems are easily overcome by infections that better nourished and treated individuals can survive.	此外，由于营养不良和难以获得基本卫生服务，他们的免疫系统较弱，即使是可以通过充分的营养和得当的治疗攻克的瘟疫也能轻易摧毁他们。


And “de-medicalized” conditions – with few if any professional health workers to ensure an appropriate public-health response to an epidemic (such as isolation of infected individuals, tracing of contacts, surveillance, and so forth) – make initial outbreaks more severe. 	而“无医”（de-medicalized）环境——没有或很少有专业卫生工作者确保针对瘟疫的合理公共委身响应（如隔离被传染者、跟踪社交情况、监控病情，等等）——导致初始爆发更加严重。


Finally, the required medical responses, including diagnostic tools and effective medications and vaccines, inevitably lag behind the emerging diseases.	最后，必要的卫生响应，包括诊断工具和特效医药和疫苗，难免会落后于新瘟疫的爆发。


In any event, such tools must be continually replenished.	无论如何，这些工具必须随时保持充分。


This requires cutting-edge biotechnology, immunology, and ultimately bioengineering to create large-scale industrial responses (such as millions of doses of vaccines or medicines in the case of large epidemics).	这需要尖端生物技术、免疫学和生物工程以形成大规模工业响应能力（如在大瘟疫爆发时生产几百万分疫苗或药品）。


The AIDS crisis, for example, called forth tens of billions of dollars for research and development – and similarly substantial commitments by the pharmaceutical industry – to produce lifesaving antiretroviral drugs at global scale.	比如，艾滋病危机促使人们投入数十亿美元用于研发——制药业也投入了相当规模的资金——以生产救命的抗逆转录药物供全球使用。


Yet each breakthrough inevitably leads to the pathogen’s mutation, rendering previous treatments less effective.	但每一次突破都免不了导致病原体的变异，让此前的疗法效果减弱。


There is no ultimate victory, only a constant arms race between humanity and disease-causing agents.	没有最终胜利，只有人类和致病菌株之间的永恒的军备竞赛。


So, is the world ready for Ebola, a newly lethal influenza, a mutation of HIV that could speed the transfer of the disease, or the development of new multi-drug-resistant strains of malaria or other pathogens?	那么，世界准备好迎接埃博拉、新致命流感、能够加速艾滋病蔓延的病毒变异，或新的具有多重抗药性的疟疾或其他细菌病毒了吗？


The answer is no.	答案是否定的。


Though investment in public health increased significantly after 2000, leading to notable successes in the fights against AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, there has recently been a marked shortfall in global spending on public health relative to need.	尽管自2000年以来公共卫生投资显著增长，并在与艾滋病、结核病和疟疾的斗争中取得了重大胜利，但最近全球公共卫生支出的规模与需要之间出现了显著差距。


Donor countries, failing to anticipate and respond adequately to new and ongoing challenges, have subjected the World Health Organization to a debilitating budget squeeze, while funding for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria has fallen far short of the sums needed to win the war against these diseases.	出资国没有充分预料和响应新旧挑战，这导致世界卫生组织（World Health Organization）饱受预算不足掣肘，而全球对抗艾滋病、结核病和疟疾基金（Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria）远远不足以让我们在这场战争中取得胜利。


Here is a shortlist of what urgently needs to be done.	有一些问题紧迫地需要解决。


First, the United States, the European Union, the Gulf countries, and East Asian states should establish a flexible fund under WHO leadership to combat the current Ebola epidemic, probably at an initial level of $50-$100 million, pending further developments.	首先，美国、欧盟、海湾国家和东亚国家应该在世卫组织的领导下建立一个灵活的基金以对抗当前的埃博拉疫情，初始规模可以在5,000万到1亿美元，未来可以按需追加。


This would allow a rapid public-health response that is commensurate to the immediate challenge.	这将让我们得以建立针对眼前的紧迫挑战的快速公共卫生响应。


Second, donor countries should quickly expand both the Global Fund’s budget and mandate, so that it becomes a global health fund for low-income countries.	其次，出资国应该迅速增加全球基金的预算和权限，以使其成为低收入国家的全球健康基金。


The main goal would be to help the poorest countries establish basic health systems in every slum and rural community, a concept known as Universal Health Coverage (UHC).	主要目标应是帮助最贫穷国家在每一个贫民窟和农村社区建立基本卫生体系，这一概念被称为全球卫生覆盖（Universal Health Coverage，UHC）。


The greatest urgency lies in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, where health conditions and extreme poverty are worst, and preventable and controllable infectious diseases continue to rage.	最紧迫的地区是撒哈拉以南非洲和南亚，那里的卫生条件最差，极端贫困最严重，可防可控瘟疫仍在肆虐。


In particular, these regions should train and deploy a new cadre of community health workers, trained to recognize disease symptoms, provide surveillance, and administer diagnoses and appropriate treatments.	特别是，这些地区应该培训和部署新的社区卫生工作者骨干队伍，识别疾病症状、提供疫情监控，并实施诊断和合理治疗。


At a cost of just $5 billion per year, it would be possible to ensure that well-trained health workers are present in every African community to provide lifesaving interventions and respond effectively to health emergencies like Ebola.	只要每年花50亿美元，就有望保证受过良好训练的工作者遍布每一个非洲社区提供救命干预、有效响应埃博拉等卫生经济状况。


Finally, high-income countries must continue to invest adequately in global disease surveillance, the WHO’s outreach capacities, and life-saving biomedical research, which has consistently delivered massive benefits for humanity during the past century.	最后，高收入国家必须继续投入充足资金用于全球疾病监控、增加世卫组织的能力、救命的生物医学研究。 在过去一百年中，生物医学一直在为人类提供大量好处。


Despite tight national budgets, it would be reckless to put our very survival on the fiscal chopping block.	尽管国家预算吃紧，但放任我们的生存被财政问题束缚住是极不负责任的。


The Limits of Climate Negotiations	气候谈判的局限


NEW YORK – If the world is to solve the climate-change crisis, we will need a new approach.	纽约—如果世界想要解决气候变化危机，我们就需要新方法。


Currently, the major powers view climate change as a negotiation over who will reduce their CO2 emissions (mainly from the use of coal, oil, and gas).	目前，主要大国将气候变化视为一场关于谁减少二氧化碳排放（主要来自煤炭、石油和天然气的使用）的谈判。


Each agrees to small “contributions” of emission reduction, trying to nudge the other countries to do more.	所有人都同意为减排做出小“贡献”，而让其他国家承担更多责任。


The United States, for example, will “concede” a little bit of CO2 reduction if China will do the same.	比如，美国将在减少二氧化碳方面做出一些“让步”，条件是中国也这样做。


For two decades, we have been trapped in this minimalist and incremental mindset, which is wrong in two key ways.	二十年来，我们一直陷于这一最小值和增量思维陷阱中。 这一思维存在两个关键问题。


First, it is not working: CO2 emissions are rising, not falling.	首先，它并没有奏效：CO2 排放在增加而不是在减少。


The global oil industry is having a field day – fracking, drilling, exploring in the Arctic, gasifying coal, and building new liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities.	全球石油工业正在开动马力——致裂、钻井、在北冰洋勘探、煤气化、建设新的液化天然气设施。


The world is wrecking the climate and food-supply systems at a breakneck pace.	世界正在以极快的速度威胁气候和粮食供给系统。


Second, “decarbonizing” the energy system is technologically complicated.	其次，能源系统的“去碳化”在技术上十分复杂。 美国的真正问题不是来自中国的竞争；


America’s real problem is not competition from China; it’s the complexity of shifting a $17.5 trillion economy from fossil fuels to low-carbon alternatives.	而是实现规模达到17. 5万亿美元的经济从化石燃料转向低碳替代燃料的复杂性。


China’s problem is not the US, but how to wean the world’s largest, or second largest economy (depending on which data are used) off its deeply entrenched dependence on coal.	中国的问题不在于美国，而在于如何让这个世界第一大或第二大（取决于使用和中数据）经济体摆脱对煤炭的深度依赖。


These are mainly engineering problems, not negotiating problems.	这些问题主要是工程问题，而不是谈判问题。


To be sure, both economies could decarbonize if they cut output sharply.	平信而乱，若能大幅削减产出，中美都可以去碳化。


But neither the US nor China is ready to sacrifice millions of jobs and trillions of dollars to do so.	但中美都不准备为这一目的而牺牲数百万工作岗位和数万亿美���。


Indeed, the question is how to decarbonize while remaining economically strong.	事实上，问题在于如何既实现去碳化，有保持经济强劲。


Climate negotiators cannot answer that question, but innovators like Elon Musk of Tesla, and scientists like Klaus Lackner of Columbia University, can.	气候谈判员无法回答这个问题，但特斯拉（Tesla）的艾龙·马斯克（Elon Musk）这样的创新者和哥伦比亚大学的克劳斯·莱克纳（Klaus Lackner）这样的科学家可以。


Decarbonizing the world’s energy system requires preventing our production of vast and growing amounts of electricity from boosting atmospheric CO2 emissions.	实现世界能源系统去碳化需要阻止我们规模巨大并且仍在日渐增长的发电活动增加大气中的二氧化碳排放；


It also presupposes a switchover to a zero-carbon transport fleet and a lot more production per kilowatt-hour of energy.	也需要世界向零碳交通和大幅提高每千瓦时能源产量靠拢。


Zero-carbon electricity is within reach.	零碳电已有希望实现。


Solar and wind power can deliver that already, but not necessarily when and where needed.	太阳能电和风电即属此列，但还无法实现全天候、全覆盖。


We need storage breakthroughs for these intermittent clean-energy sources.	我们需要实现这些间歇性清洁能源资源储存方面的突破。


Nuclear power, another important source of zero-carbon energy, will also need to play a big role in the future, implying the need to bolster public confidence in its safety.	另一个重要的零碳能源资源——核电也应该在未来大放异彩，这意味着需要增加公众对核电安全的信心。


Even fossil fuels can produce zero-carbon electricity, if carbon capture and storage is used.	即使是化石燃料，也可以产生零碳电，如果采取碳捕捉和储存（碳捕存）技术的话。


Lackner is a world leader in new CCS strategies.	莱克纳便是新碳捕存战略的世界领袖。


Electrification of transport is already with us, and Tesla, with its sophisticated electric vehicles, is capturing the public’s imagination and interest.	交通电气化已经成为了现实，特斯拉公司携其先进的电动汽车抓住了公众的想象力和兴趣。


Yet further technological advances are needed in order to reduce electric vehicles’ costs, increase their reliability, and extend their range.	但我们需要进一步的科技进步以降低电动汽车成本、增加电动汽车可靠性、扩大电动汽车范围。


Musk, eager to spur rapid development of the vehicles, made history last week by opening Tesla’s patents for use by competitors.	马斯克热切地希望刺激电动汽车的开发，在上周做出了历史性的决定，向竞争对手开放特斯拉的专利。


Technology offers new breakthroughs in energy efficiency as well.	科技也在能源效率方面带来了新突破。


New building designs have slashed heating and cooling costs by relying much more on insulation, natural ventilation, and solar power.	新建筑设计通过更多依靠隔离、自然通风和太阳能降低取暖和制冷成本。


Advances in nanotechnology offer the prospect of lighter construction materials that require much less energy to produce, making both buildings and vehicles far more energy efficient.	纳米技术的进步为我们提供了更轻质、生产过程消耗能源更少的建筑材料，大大提高了建筑和汽车的能源效率。


The world needs a concerted push to adopt to low-carbon electricity, not another “us-versus-them” negotiation.	世界需要集中力量推动低碳电的普及，而不需要另一场“我们和他们”的谈判。


All countries need new, low-carbon technologies, many of which are still out of commercial reach.	所有国家都需要新的低碳科技，其中许多仍不具有经济可行性。


Climate negotiators should therefore be focusing on how to cooperate to ensure that technology breakthroughs are achieved and benefit all countries.	因此，气候谈判员应该将注意力集中在如何合作以确保实现科技突破并惠及所有国家上。


They should take their cue from other cases in which government, scientists, and industry teamed up to produce major changes.	他们应该从政府、科学家和产业界合作带来重大变化的例子中吸取教训。


For example, in carrying out the Manhattan Project (to produce the atomic bomb during World War II) and the first moon landing, the US government set a remarkable technological goal, established a bold timetable, and committed the financial resources needed to get the job done.	比如，在曼哈顿计划（二战期间制造原子弹的计划）和首次登月中，美国政府设立了一个宏大的技术目标，制定了雄心勃勃的时间表，并投入必要的金融资源实现目标。


In both cases, the scientists and engineers delivered on time.	在这两个计划中，科学家和工程师按时完成了任务。


The example of atomic bombs might seem an unpleasant one, yet it raises an important question: If we ask governments and scientists to cooperate on war technology, shouldn’t we do at least the same to save the planet from carbon pollution?	原子弹的例子也许令人不快，但它引出了一个一个重要问题：既然我们要求政府和科学家合作开发战争技术，为何不在拯救地球免于碳污染的问题上也这样做呢？


In fact, the process of “directed technological change,” in which bold objectives are set, milestones are identified, and timelines are put into place, is much more common than many realize.	事实上，“有指导的科技变迁”（directed technological change）过程——包括宏伟的目标、各个里程碑事件的确定以及实施时间表——比许多人认为的要普遍得多。


The information-technology revolution that has brought us computers, smart phones, GPS, and much more, was built on a series of industry and government roadmaps.	给我们带来电脑、智能电话、GPS和其他许多东西的信息技术革命便建立在一系列产业和政府路线图的基础上。


The human genome was mapped through such a government-led effort – one that ultimately brought in the private sector as well.	人类基因组也是通过这样的政府领导（最终页引入了私人部门）项目被勾勒出来的。


More recently, government and industry got together to cut the costs of sequencing an individual genome from around $100 million in 2001 to just $1,000 today.	更晚近一些，2001年政府和产业界合力将个人基因组测序成本从2001年的大约1亿美元下降到今天的区区1,000美元。


A dramatic cost-cutting goal was set, scientists went to work, and the targeted breakthrough was achieved on time.	此过程设立了一个巨幅削减成本的目标，科学家们孜孜以求并按时实现了预定的突破。


Fighting climate change does depend on all countries having confidence that their competitors will follow suit.	遏制气候变化确实依赖于每个国家都相信竞争对手也会齐头并进的信心。


So, yes, let the upcoming climate negotiations spell out shared actions by the US, China, Europe, and others.	因此，诚然，让即将到来的气候谈判使美国、中国、欧洲和其他地区精诚合作。


But let’s stop pretending that this is a poker game, rather than a scientific and technological puzzle of the highest order.	但我们不能假装这只不过是一场扑克游戏，而不是最高级别的科学和科技难题。


We need the likes of Musk, Lackner, General Electric, Siemens, Ericsson, Intel, Electricité de France, Huawei, Google, Baidu, Samsung, Apple, and others in laboratories, power plants, and cities around the world to forge the technological breakthroughs that will reduce global CO2 emissions.	我们需要马斯克、莱克纳、通用电气、西门子、爱立信、英特尔、法国电力、华为、谷歌、百度、三星、苹果以及其他世界各地的实验室、发电厂和城市齐心协力促进能减少全球二氧化碳排放的科技突破。


There is even a place at the table for ExxonMobil, Chevron, BP, Peabody, Koch Industries, and other oil and coal giants.	甚至埃克森美孚、雪佛龙、英国石油、皮博迪（Peabody）、柯氏工业（Koch Industries）和其他石油和煤炭巨头也能有所助益。


If they expect their products to be used in the future, they had better make them safe through the deployment of advanced CCS technologies.	如果它们期待它们的产品在未来仍有用途，就必须通过开发先进的碳捕存技术让产品更加安全。


The point is that targeted and deep decarbonization is a job for all stakeholders, including the fossil-fuel industry, and one in which we must all be on the side of human survival and wellbeing.	要点在于定向的深度去碳化是所有相关利益方的共同责任，包括化石燃料业； 也是一个我们必须一致站在人类生存和福利立场上的责任。


Deep Decarbonization	深度脱碳


NEW YORK – Have a look at what happened around the world this past month.	纽约—看看世界在即将过去的一个月中发生了什么。


Australia’s heat wave filled headlines when temperatures reaching 45° Celsius disrupted the Australian Open tennis tournament.	澳大利亚45℃的热浪上了新闻，甚至影响了澳大利亚网球公开赛。


California’s extreme drought forced the governor to declare a state of emergency.	加州极度干旱迫使州长宣布进入紧急状态。


Major floods in Indonesia killed dozens and displaced tens of thousands.	印尼大洪水夺走了几十人的生命，并导致数万人流离失所。


Beijing’s coal-induced smog forced people to stay in their homes, closed highways, and diverted flights.	北京煤炭引起的雾霾迫使人们不敢外出、高速公路关闭、航班延误。


Such events are daily warnings to the world: wake up before it is too late.	这些事件无不在警告世界：再不警醒，悔之晚矣。


We have entered the Age of Sustainable Development.	我们已经进入可持续发展时代。


Either we make peace with the planet, or we destroy our hard-won prosperity.	要么与地球和平共处，要么摧毁得之不易的繁荣。


The choice seems obvious, but our actions speak louder than words. Humanity continues on a path of ruin, driven by short-term greed and ignorance.	选择似乎是毫无疑问的，但所谓行胜于言，人类仍走在破坏的道路上，其背后的推动力是短期贪婪和无知。


Much (though not all) of the global environmental crisis stems from the world’s fossil-fuel-based energy system.	许多（尽管不是全部）全球环境危机来自以化石燃料为基础的世界能源体系。


More than 80% of all primary energy in the world comes from coal, oil, and gas.	全世界80%以上的初级能源来自煤炭、石油和天然气。


When these fossil fuels are burned, they emit carbon dioxide, which in turn changes the Earth’s climate.	当这些化石燃料燃烧时，会释放二氧化碳，而二氧化碳会改变地球的气候。


The basic physics has been known for more than a century.	其中的物理学原理我们一个世纪前就已经知晓了。


Unfortunately, a few oil companies (ExxonMobil and Koch Industries are the most notorious) have devoted enormous resources to sowing confusion even where there is clear scientific consensus.	不幸的是，一小撮石油公司（埃克森美孚和柯氏工业集团（Koch Industries）是其中最臭名昭著者）花大力气混淆视听，哪怕科学界早已形成了共识。


But, in order to save the planet we know, and to preserve the world’s food supply and the well-being of future generations, there is no alternative to shifting to a new, low-carbon energy system.	但是，为了拯救我们所熟悉的地球、保证世界粮食供应和子孙后代的福利，我们只有切换到新的低碳能源体系一途可走。


There are three parts to this transition.	这一转变有三个部分。


The first is improved energy efficiency, meaning that we should use much less energy to achieve the same level of well-being.	首先是改善能源效率，这意味着我们可以使用少得多的能源实现相同水平的福利。


For example, we can design our buildings to use sunlight and natural-air circulation so that they require far less commercial energy for heating, cooling, and ventilation.	比如，我们可以设计利用阳光和天然空气循环的建筑，这样就可以使用少得多的商业能源用于制热、制冷和通风。


Second, we need to shift to solar, wind, hydro, nuclear, geothermal, and other forms of energy that are not based on fossil fuels.	其次，我们需要转向太阳能、风能、水能、核能、地热能和其他形式的不基于化石燃料的能源。


The technology exists to use these alternatives safely, affordably, and at a scale large enough to replace almost all of the coal, and much of the oil, that we use today.	我们已经用了技术可以以安全、廉价和足够大的规模使用这些替代能源取代几乎所有我们现在所使用的煤炭和大部分的石油。


Only natural gas (the cleanest-burning fossil fuel) would remain a significant source of energy by mid-century.	只有天然气（最清洁的化石燃料）将继续充当主要能源来源直到本世纪中叶。


Finally, to the extent that we continue to rely on fossil fuels, we must capture the resulting CO2 emissions at power plants before they escape into the atmosphere.	最后，由于我们要继续依赖化石燃料，因此我们必须捕捉发电厂产生的二氧化碳而不让它们逃逸到大气中。


The captured CO2 would then be injected underground or under the ocean floor for safe long-term storage.	捕捉到的二氧化碳可以注入地下或海地，做长期的安全储藏。


Carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) is already being used successfully on a very small scale (mainly to enhance oil recovery in depleted wells).	碳捕捉和隔离（CCS）已经实现了相当小规模的成功应用（主要用于枯竭油井的油气回收）。


If (and only if) it proves successful for large-scale use, coal-dependent countries like China, India, and the United States could continue to use their reserves.	当（且仅当）CCS可以成功地得到大规模应用时，中国、印度和美国等依赖煤炭的国家便（才）可以继续使用它们的储量。


American politicians have proved to be incapable of designing policies to shift the US to low-carbon energy use.	美国政客证明他们在设计让美国转向低碳能源使用方面的政策上十分无能。


Such policies would include a rising tax on CO2 emissions, large-scale research-and-development efforts in low-carbon technologies, a shift to electric vehicles, and regulations to phase out all coal-fired power plants except those that install CCS.	这些政策应该包括提高二氧化碳排放税、大规模低碳技术研发、推广电动汽车以及通过监管取缔纯火电厂（除非它们采用了CCS）。


Yet politicians are pursuing none of these policies adequately.	但政客在所有这些政策上都没有充分的作为。


Climate-change foes have spent billions of dollars to influence policymakers, support election campaigns by defenders of fossil fuels, and defeat candidates who dare to promote clean energy.	气候变化的生产者花了数十亿美元影响决策者、支持化石燃料捍卫者的竞选活动、拆敢于推广清洁能源的候选人的台。


The Republican Party as a whole attracts massive financial support from opponents of decarbonization, and these donors aggressively fight even the smallest step toward renewable energy.	总体而言，共和党获得了来自脱碳反对派的巨额金融支持，这些赞助者积极地与哪怕是最微小的迈向可再生能源的步伐做着斗争。


For their part, many Democratic members of the US Congress are also in the pro-fossil-fuel camp.	美国国会中的很多民主党议员和站在亲化石燃料阵营。


A few big players in the energy industry, showing no concern for truth (much less for our children, who will bear the consequences of our present folly), have teamed up with Rupert Murdoch.	能源业的一些巨头无视事实（更不为我们的孩子们考虑，他们将承担我们现在的荒唐行为的后果），与鲁珀特·默多克（Rupert Murdoch）勾结在一起。


Indeed, Murdoch, the Koch Brothers, and their allies behave just like Big Tobacco in denying scientific truths; even use the same experts for hire.	事实上，默多克、柯氏兄弟和他们的盟友在否认科学事实方面与大烟草公司是一丘之貉，甚至他们聘请的专家都是同一批人。


The situation is generally the same around the world.	全世界面临的局面总体上是一样的。


Wherever powerful lobbies defend existing coal or oil interests, politicians typically are afraid to tell the truth about the need for low-carbon energy.	在权势游说集团捍卫现有煤炭和石油利益的地方，政客通常不敢告诉人民需要低碳能源的真相。


Brave politicians who do tell the truth about climate change are found mainly in countries that do not have a powerful fossil-fuel lobby.	勇敢说出气候变化真相的政客往往存在于不存在权势化石燃料游说集团的国家。


Consider the fate of one courageous exception to this rule.	以这一规则的一个勇敢的挑战者的命运为例。


Kevin Rudd, the former Australian prime minister, tried to implement a clean-energy policy in his coal-producing country.	澳大利亚前总理陆克文试图实施一项清洁能源政策。 而他的国家是一个产煤国。


Rudd was defeated in his re-election bid by a candidate whose backing from an alliance of Murdoch and coal companies enabled him to outspend Rudd by a huge margin.	陆克文在连任竞争中败给了一位背后有默多克和煤炭公司支持的候选人。 后两者的支持让他以压倒性优势战胜了陆克文。


Murdoch’s tabloids pump out anti-scientific propaganda opposing climate-change policies not only in Australia, but also in the US and elsewhere.	默多克旗下的报纸大量灌输反对气候变化政策的反科学宣传，不仅在澳大利亚如此，在美国和其他国家也如此。


The reason all of this matters is that the path to deep decarbonization is open to us.	所有这些之所以事关重大，是因为深度脱碳之路是一条开放之路。


Yet time is very short.	但时间不等人。


The world needs to stop building new coal-fired power plants (except those that implement CCS) and to shift to low-carbon electricity.	世界必须停止建设新的火电厂（除非采取CCS）并转向低碳电能。


It needs to phase out the internal combustion engine for almost all new passenger vehicles by around 2030, shifting to vehicles powered by electricity.	世界必须在2030年左右彻底淘汰使用内燃机的新造乘用车，采用电动汽车。


And it needs to adopt energy-saving technologies that consume less commercial energy.	世界还必须采取能源节约技术以更少地使用商业能源。


The technologies are available and will get better and cheaper with use, if only fossil-fuel lobbies can be held at bay.	技术已经存在，并将变得更出色、更廉价，要是能成功抵制化石燃料游说集团就更好了。


If this happens, people around the world will discover something wonderful.	果真如此的话，全世界人民将会发现美好的新事物。


Not only will they have saved the planet for the next generation; they will also enjoy sunshine and clean, healthy air.	他们不但为下一代挽救了地球； 还享受到了阳光和清洁健康的空气。


And they will ask what took so long when the Earth itself was at dire risk.	他们会问，在地球岌岌可危时，是什么让人们拖延了这么久才采取行动。


Let the Middle East Govern Itself	让中东自治


NEW YORK – It is time for the United States and other powers to let the Middle East govern itself in line with national sovereignty and the United Nations Charter.	纽约—美国和其他强国应该让中东根据国家主权和《联合国宪章》自治（govern itself）了。


As the US contemplates yet another round of military action in Iraq and intervention in Syria, it should recognize two basic truths.	美国正在考虑新一轮伊拉克军事行动和叙利亚干预，眼下它应该认识到两大基本事实。


First, US interventions, which have cost the country trillions of dollars and thousands of lives over the past decade, have consistently destabilized the Middle East, while causing massive suffering in the affected countries.	首先，美国的干预在过去十年里耗费了数万亿美元和数千条人命，却一直在动摇中东，给受影响国家造成了巨大灾难。


Second, the region’s governments – in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and elsewhere – have both the incentive and the means to reach mutual accommodations.	其次，该地区的各国政府——叙利亚、沙特阿拉伯、土耳其、伊朗、伊拉克、埃及等——有动力也有办法达成互相妥协。


What is stopping them is the belief that the US or some other outside power (such as Russia) will deliver a decisive victory on their behalf.	让它们无法达成妥协的是这样一种观点：美国或其他外部势力（如俄罗斯）会代表它们带来决定性胜利。


When the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the end of World War I, the great powers of the day, Britain and France, carved out successor states in order to ensure their control over the Middle East’s oil, geopolitics, and transit routes to Asia.	一战结束，奥斯曼帝国崩溃，当时的列强英国和法国根据它们控制中东石油、地缘政治和至亚洲运输线路的需要划分新的国家。


Their cynicism – reflected, for example, in the Sykes-Picot Agreement – established a lasting pattern of destructive outside meddling.	它们的猜忌——体现于赛克斯-皮科协定（Sykes-Picot Agreement）中——造成了持续不断的破坏性外部干预。


With America’s subsequent emergence as a global power, it treated the Middle East in the same way, relentlessly installing, toppling, bribing, or manipulating the region’s governments, all the while mouthing democratic rhetoric.	随后美国崛起成为超级大国，它对待中东的方式并未改变，鲁莽地扶持、颠覆、贿赂或操纵地区各国政府，每一次都打折民主的口号。


For example, less than two years after Iran’s democratically elected parliament and prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951, the US and Britain used their secret services to topple Mossadegh and install the incompetent, violent, and authoritarian Shah Reza Pahlavi.	比如，1951年，在通过民主选举成为伊朗总理不到两年的摩萨德（Mohammad Mossadegh）对盎格鲁-伊朗石油公司（Anglo-Iranian Oil Company）实施了国有化，结果美国和英国通过秘密特工颠覆了摩萨德，扶持了一个拙劣、暴力、极权的巴拉维（Shah Reza Pahlav）。


Not surprisingly, the Islamic Revolution that overthrew the Shah in 1979 brought a wave of virulent anti-Americanism in its wake.	毫不奇怪，1979年推翻巴拉维的伊斯兰革命掀起了一股致命的反美旋风。


Rather than seeking rapprochement, however, the US supported Saddam Hussein during Iraq’s eight-year war with Iran in the 1980s.	但是，美国并没有寻求重建外交关系，而是在20世纪80年代伊拉克与伊朗的八年战争中支持了萨达姆。


Iraq fared no better with the British and Americans.	伊拉克与英国和美国的关系也并不比伊朗融洽。


Britain ruthlessly created a subservient Iraqi state after WWI, backing Sunni elites to control the majority Shia population.	一战后，英国残酷地建立了顺从的伊拉克国，支持逊尼派精英控制占多数的什叶派人口。


After oil was discovered in the 1920s, Britain assumed control over the new oil fields, using military force as needed.	20世纪20年代石油被发现后，英国又控制了仅有的几个油田，必要时甚至不惜动用武力。


The US supported the 1968 coup that brought the Ba’ath Party – and Saddam – to power.	在美国的支持下，1968年复兴党（Ba���ath Party）和萨达姆通过政变问鼎权力。


With Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, however, the US turned on him, and has been entwined in Iraq’s politics ever since, including two wars, sanction regimes, the toppling of Saddam in 2003, and repeated attempts, as recently as this month, to install a government that it considered acceptable.	但是，1990年萨达姆入侵科威特后，美国又把枪口对准了他，并且越来越深地干预伊拉克政治，包括发动两场战争、制裁伊拉克政府、2003年推翻萨达姆以及反复尝试（如这个月所发生的事情所证明的）扶持它认为可接受的政府。


The result has been an unmitigated catastrophe: the destruction of Iraq as a functioning society in an ongoing civil war, fueled by outside powers, that has caused economic ruin and collapsing living standards.	结果造成了彻头彻尾的灾难：外部势力煽风点火的持续内战破坏了经济，大大打击了生活水平，伊拉克社会功能被彻底摧毁。


Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have died in the violence since 1990.	1990年以来，数十万伊拉克人死于暴力。


Syria endured decades of French dominance after WWI, and then alternatingly hot and cold relations with the US and Europe since the 1960s.	在一战后的几十年里，叙利亚一直由法国主宰，随后，自20世纪60年代以来，与美国和欧洲保持着时冷时热的关系。


During the past decade, the US and its allies have tried to weaken, and then, starting in 2011, to topple President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, mainly in a proxy war to undermine Iranian influence in Syria.	在过去十年中，美国及其盟友试图削弱总统巴沙尔·阿萨德政权，从2011年开始更是试图推翻他，主要方式是通过代理战争破坏伊朗对叙利亚的影响。


The results have been devastating for the Syrian people.	结果是叙利亚人民都灾难。


Assad remains in power, but more than 190,000 Syrians are dead and millions have been displaced as a result of an insurrection supported by the US and its allies (with Assad backed by Russia and Iran).	巴沙尔仍在掌权，但190,000多叙利亚人因为美国及其盟友所支持的暴乱（针对俄罗斯和伊朗所支持的巴沙尔）失去了生命，更有数百万人流离失所。


Some US officials are now reportedly considering an alliance with Assad to fight the militant Islamic State, whose rise was enabled by the US-backed insurrection.	据说一些美国官员现在正在考虑与巴沙尔结盟与伊斯兰国进行军事对抗，而后者的崛起正是拜美国所支持的暴乱所赐。


After decades of cynical and often secret interventions by the US, Britain, France, Russia, and other outside powers, the region’s political institutions are based largely on corruption, sectarian politics, and brute force.	在经历了几十年来自美国、英国、法国、俄罗斯和其他外部势力自私并且通常是秘密的干预后，该地区的政治制度可以说是建立在腐败、宗派政治和野蛮武力的基础上。


Yet whenever a new Middle East crisis erupts, the latest being triggered by the Islamic State’s recent gains, the US intervenes again, perhaps to change a government (as it has just orchestrated in Iraq) or to launch a new bombing assault.	但每当新的中东危机爆发时——最新的例子是伊斯兰国的狂飙突进——美国就会再次干预，或者是改变政府（如刚刚在伊拉克所导演的），或者是发动新一轮轰炸袭击。


Backroom dealings and violence continue to rule the day.	幕后交易和暴力仍是日常规则。


Pundits claim that Arabs cannot manage democracy.	专家们说，阿拉伯人没有能力管理民主。


In fact, the US and its allies simply don’t like the results of Arab democracy, which all too often produces governments that are nationalist, anti-Israel, Islamist, and dangerous to America’s oil interests.	事实上，美国及其盟友根本不喜欢阿拉伯民主的结果——通常产生民族主义、反以色列、伊斯兰教的政府，并对美国石油利益构成威胁。


When the ballots go in that direction, the US simply ignores the election results (as it did, for example, in 2006, when Hamas won a large majority of the popular vote in Gaza).	当选举形势向这方面发展时，美国就会无视选举结果（比如，2006年哈马斯赢得加沙民选大胜时就是如此）。


The US cannot stop the spiral of violence in the Middle East.	美国无法结束中东的暴力循环。


The damage in Libya, Gaza, Syria, and Iraq demands that a political solution be found within the region, not imposed from the outside.	利比亚、加沙、叙利亚和伊拉克的破坏需要在该地区内部寻找政治解决方案，而不是由外部强加。


The UN Security Council should provide an international framework in which the major powers pull back, lift crippling economic sanctions, and abide by political agreements reached by the region’s own governments and factions. 	联合国安理会应该提供一个国际框架让主要大国写上，取消后果严重的经济制裁，并遵守该地区各国政府和各派系之间自身达成的政治协议。


Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other neighbors know one another well enough – thanks to 2,000-plus years of trade and war – to sort out the pieces themselves, without interference from the US, Russia, and the former colonial powers of Europe.	伊朗、土耳其、埃及、叙利亚、沙特阿拉伯、阿联酋和其他邻国十分了解彼此——这是2,000多年贸易和战争史的结果——足以自力更生走出残局，不需要劳烦美国、俄罗斯和欧洲的其他前殖民国家。


The countries of the Middle East have a common interest in starving hyper-violent groups like the Islamic State of arms, money, and media attention.	中东各国有着共同利益切断伊斯兰国等极端暴力组织的武器、资金和媒体关注。


They also share an interest in keeping oil flowing to world markets – and in capturing the bulk of the revenues.	它们也有着共同利益让石油流向世界市场，并获得其中的大部分收入。


I am not claiming that all will be well if the US and other powers pull back.	我并不是说美国和其他强国一走了之就万事大吉。


There is enough hatred, corruption, and arms in the region to keep it in crisis for years to come.	中东地区存在着大量的仇恨、腐败和武器，足以在多年时间里让该地区处于危机状态。


And nobody should expect stable democracies any time soon.	没有人可以期待很快就会出现稳定的民主。


But lasting solutions will not be found as long as the US and other foreign powers continue to meddle in the region.	但只要美国和其他外部势力继续在中东搅局，就无法形成持久的解决方案。


One hundred years after the start of WWI, colonial practices must finally come to an end.	一战爆发已经过去了一个世纪，殖民主义行为必须结束。


The Middle East needs the opportunity to govern itself, protected and supported by the UN Charter, not by any individual great power.	中东需要自治的机会，并且这一机会应该得到《联合国宪章》而不是某个超级大国的保护和支持。


Our Last Chance for a Safe Planet	拯救地球的最后机会


MELBOURNE – Humanity has just about run out of time to address climate change.	墨尔本—人类再不解决气候变化问题就快没有时间了。


Scientists have pointed out that a rise in temperature of 2º Celsius above pre-industrial levels will put the Earth in dangerous, uncharted territory.	科学家指出，如若气温较前工业化水平升高2℃，地球就将进入前所未知的危险状态。


Yet we currently are on a path toward an increase of 4º or more this century.	但照现在的势头，到本世纪末气温将上升4℃。


The last chance for action has arrived.	我们面临着采取行动的最后机会。


That chance lies in Paris in December 2015, when the world’s governments meet for the 21st annual United Nations climate-change meeting.	这一机会就在2015年的巴黎，世界各国政府将在此召开第21届联合国气候变化年会。


But this time will be different.	但这次年会有所不同。


Either governments will agree to decisive action, as they have promised, or we will look back at 2015 as the year when climate sanity slipped through our fingers.	各国政府必须如承诺的那样同意采取果断行动，否则从未来回头望，2015年将是我们彻底丧失清醒的气候意识之年。


In 1992, the world’s governments adopted the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, promising to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic [human-induced] interference in the climate system” by reducing the rate of emission of greenhouse gases, especially carbon dioxide.	1992年，世界政府通过了联合国气候变化框架公约（UN Framework Convention on Climate Change），承诺通过削减温室气体特别是二氧化碳排放避免“对气候系统的危险的人为干预”。


But, though the treaty entered into force in 1994, the rate of emissions of greenhouse gases, including CO2, has actually increased.	但是，尽管该条约从1994年开始生效，但温室气体包括二氧化碳的排放速度实际上有所增加。


In 1992, global combustion of coal, oil, and gas, plus cement production, released 22.6 billion tons of CO2 into the air.	1992年，全��煤炭、石油和天然气燃烧加上水泥生产总共向大气中释放了226亿吨二氧化碳。


In 2012, the most recent year for which comparable data are available, emissions were 34.5 billion tons.	2012年（可获得可比数据的最近年份），排放量是345亿吨。


Humanity has accelerated, rather than controlled, human-induced climate change.	人类正在加速而不是控制人为气候变化。


This is now the greatest moral issue of our time.	这就是现时代的道德大问题。


Global fossil-fuel use gravely threatens the poor, who are the most vulnerable to climate change (though the rich are the main cause), and future generations, who will inherit a planet that has become unlivable in many places, with food supply subject to massive shocks.	全球化石燃料使用大大地威胁到穷人（他们是最易受气候变化影响的群体，尽管富人才是引起气候变化的主因）和子孙后代（他们将继承一个许多地方不再适合居住的地球，粮食供应也将受到巨大冲击）。


We are causing this harm in an age when technological breakthroughs enable the world to shift from dangerous fossil fuels to low-carbon energy sources, such as wind, solar, nuclear, and hydro, and reduce the impact of fossil fuels by using carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology.	而在造成这一伤害的同一时代，科技突破使世界能够从危险的化石燃料转向低碳能源资源，如风能、太阳能、核能和水能，并且通过碳捕捉和存储（CCS）技术减少化石燃料的影响。


Pope Francis recently put it just right: “Safeguard Creation,” he said. “Because if we destroy Creation, Creation will destroy us!	方济各教皇最近正确地指出：“捍卫造化，”他说，“因为如果我们摧毁造化，造化也会摧毁我们！


Never forget this!”	切记切记！ ”


Yet, for the many powerful interests, climate change remains a game, with the goal being to delay action for as long as possible.	但是，对许多强大的既得利益而言，气候变化仍然是一场博弈，目标是尽可能推迟行动。


The giant fossil-fuel companies have continued to lobby behind the scenes against the shift to low-carbon energy, and have used their vast wealth to buy media coverage designed to sow confusion.	化石燃料巨头公司继续在幕后游说阻止转向低碳能源，并利用巨大的财力收买媒体混淆视听。


Rupert Murdoch’s media empire in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and elsewhere stands out as playing a particularly cynical and harmful role in spreading anti-scientific propaganda.	在美国、英国、澳大利亚和其他地方，鲁珀特·默多克（Rupert Murdoch）的媒体帝国充当着传播反科学宣传的急先锋。


Even so, the politics of climate change may be changing for the better – a change reflected in the Pope’s forceful message.	尽管如此，气候变化的政治仍可能在向好的方向发展——教皇的训令即是明证。


Here are six reasons why the stalemate might soon end.	有六大理由可以认为停滞不前的状态马上就会结束。


First, the world is waking up to the calamity that we are causing.	首先，世界正在警醒我们正在造成的灾难。


Though the Murdoch propaganda machine churns out a daily stream of anti-scientific falsehoods, the public also sees prolonged droughts (now in parts of Brazil, California, and Southeast Asia, to name a few places), massive floods (recently in Bosnia and Serbia), and lethal heat waves (in many parts of the world).	尽管默多克的宣传机器每天都在炮制反科学谎言，但公众也目睹了挥之不去的旱灾（目前正在巴西、加州、东南亚等地区肆虐）、大洪水（波斯尼亚和塞尔维亚）和致命热浪（世界多地）。


Second, the world’s citizens do not want to go down in flames.	其次，世界人民不希望看到地球毁灭。


Public opinion has so far succeeded in blocking the construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline, which would accelerate the production of Canada’s oil sands – a shocking prospect, given that neither Canada nor the US yet have committed to a climate plan.	民意已成功地抵制了加速加拿大油砂生产的Keystone XL管道——该项目是十分危险的，因为加拿大和美国都没有做出气候计划承诺。


Third, more severe climate shocks may lie ahead.	第三，更严重的气候冲击摆在我们面前。


This year could prove to be a major El Niño year, when the waters of the Eastern Pacific warm and create global climate disruptions.	今年可能是厄尔尼诺之年，东太平洋的海水会升温，造成全球气候扰动。


A big El Niño now would be even more dangerous than usual, because it would add to the overall rising trend in global temperatures.	如今，大型厄尔尼诺现象的危害将比以往更甚，因为这会进一步加剧全球气温升高的总体趋势。


Indeed, many scientists believe that a big El Niño could make 2015 the hottest year in the Earth’s history.	事实上，许多科学家认为大型厄尔尼诺现象将让2015年成为地球历史上最热的年份。


Fourth, both the US and China, the two largest emitters of CO2, are finally beginning to get serious.	第四，最大的两个二氧化碳排放国——美国和中国最终开始认真对待这一问题。


President Barack Obama’s administration is trying to stop the construction of new coal-fired power plants, unless they are equipped with CCS technology.	奥巴马总统政府试图停滞新煤电站的建设，除非采用CCS技术。


China, for its part, has realized that its heavy dependence on coal is causing such devastating pollution and smog that it is leading to massive loss of life, with life expectancy down as much as five years in regions with heavy coal consumption.	中国也认识到其对煤炭的严重依赖正在造成了能导致重大生命损失的灾难性的污染和雾霾，主要煤炭消费地区预期寿命将下降五年之多。


Fifth, the Paris negotiations are finally beginning to attract global attention from both the public and world leaders.	第五，巴黎谈判终于开始吸引包括公众和世界领袖在内的全球目光。


UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has called for political leaders to attend a special summit in September 2014, 14 months ahead of the Paris meeting, to launch intensive negotiations.	联合国秘书长潘基文呼吁政治领导人出席2014年9月（巴黎会议前14个月）举行的特别峰会，开战密集谈判。


The UN expert network that I direct, the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (UN SDSN), will issue a major report in July on how each of the major economies can successfully decarbonize the energy system.	由我牵头的联合国专家网络——可持续发展方案网络（Sustainable Development Solutions Network）将在7月发布重要报告，指出各主要经济体应如何实现能源体系的去碳化。


Finally, technological advances in low-carbon energy systems, including photovoltaics, electric vehicles, CCS, and fourth-generation nuclear power with greatly enhanced safety features, all help make the transition to low-cost, low-carbon energy technologically realistic, with huge benefits for human health and planetary safety.	最后，低碳能源体系的技术进步，包括光伏电池、电动汽车、CCS和安全性能显著增强的第四代核电，都有助于实现向低成本、低碳能源技术的转型，人类健康和地球安全将大受裨益。


Starting this fall, the UN SDSN will create a platform for all global citizens to participate in the hard work of saving the planet.	从今年秋季开始，联合国SDSN将打造一个平台方便全体地球公民参与拯救地球的艰巨事业中。


The SDSN will offer a free, online introductory course to climate change, and then host a global online “negotiation” of a global climate agreement.	SDSN将提供免费的在线介课程介绍气候变化，并组织全球气候协议的全球在线“谈判”。


We expect that hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of interested citizens worldwide will participate online, showing the way for the politicians.	我们期待能有几十万甚至几百万有兴趣的世界公民在线参与，向政客表达民意。


The control of climate change is a moral imperative and a practical necessity – far too important to be left to politicians, Big Oil, and their media propagandists.	控制气候变化既是道德需求，也是现实必要——这个重要任务不能只由政客、石油巨头及其媒体宣传机器参与。


The Dollar and Its Rivals	美元和它的对手


CAMBRIDGE – Since 1976, the US dollar’s role as an international currency has been slowly waning.	美国剑桥—1976年以来，美元作为国际货币的角色一直在缓慢减弱。


International use of the dollar to hold foreign-exchange reserves, denominate financial transactions, invoice trade, and as a vehicle in currency markets is below its level during the heyday of the Bretton Woods era, from 1945 to 1971.	国际上用美元作为外汇储备、为金融交易计价、结算贸易以及货币市场载体的程度还不如1945—1971年布雷顿森林时代的鼎盛期。


But most people would be surprised by what the most recent numbers show.	但大部分人会对最新数字所揭示的东西感到震惊。


There is an abundance of explanations for the downward trend.	对于这一衰落趋势，解释层出不穷。


Since the Vietnam War, US budget deficits, money creation, and current-account deficits have often been high.	自越战以来，美国的预算赤字、货币创造和经常项目赤字总是非常高。


Presumably as a result, the dollar has lost value relative to other major currencies or in terms of purchasing power.	美元相对其他主要货币的价值或者美元的购买力有所损失也不足为奇。


Meanwhile, the US share of global output has declined.	与此同时，美国站全球产出的份额也有所下降。


And, most recently, the disturbing willingness of some members of the US Congress to pursue a strategy that would cause the Treasury to default on legal obligations has undermined global confidence in the dollar’s privileged status.	而在最近，美国国会的一些议员有一种危险的意图——追求将导致财政部对其法定债务违约的战略，这影响了全球对美元特权地位的信心。


Moreover, some emerging-market currencies are joining the club of international currencies for the first time.	此外，一些新兴市场货币正在首次进入国际货币俱乐部。


Indeed, some analysts have suggested that the Chinese renminbi may rival the dollar as the leading international currency by the end of the decade.	事实上，一些分析师指出，到这个十年结束时，人民币可能挑战美元作为领先国际货币的地位。


But the dollar’s status as an international currency has not fallen uniformly.	但美元作为国际货币的地位并没有一路下降。


Interestingly, the periods when the public is most concerned about the issue do not coincide with the periods when the dollar’s share in international transactions is in fact falling.	有趣的是，公众最担心这一问题的时期往往并不是美元在国际交易中的份额下降的时期。


By the criteria of international use as a reserve currency among central banks and as a vehicle in foreign-exchange markets, the most rapid declines took place from 1978 to 1991 and from 2001 to 2010.	以作为各央行储备货币的国际使用以及作为外汇市场载体的标准看，美元坠落速度最快的阶段是1978—1991年和2001—2010年。


Between these two intervals, from 1992 to 2000, there was a clear reversal of the trend, notwithstanding a popular orgy of dollar declinism around the middle of that decade.	在这两个时期之间，即1992—2000年，美元的衰落之势出现了显而易见的反转，尽管在这个十年中间美元衰落论甚嚣尘上。


Central banks held only an estimated 46% of their foreign-exchange reserves in dollars in 1992, but that share rebounded to almost 70% by 2000.	1992年，在各国央行所持有的外汇储备中，大概只有46%是美元，但在2000年这一比例上升到约70%。


Subsequently, the long-term downward trend resumed.	接着，长期衰落之势恢复。


According to one estimate, the dollar’s share in central-banks’ foreign reserves declined from about 70% in 2001 to barely 60% in 2010.	根据一项估算，美元在央行外汇储备中所占比重从2001年的约70%下降到2010年的60%略多。


During the same decade, its share in the foreign-exchange market also declined: the dollar constituted one side or the other in 90% of foreign-exchange trades in 2001, but only 85% in 2010.	在同一时期，美元占外汇市场的比重也有所下降：2001年，以美元为一方的交易占外汇交易的90%，到2010年，这一比例为85%。


The International Monetary Fund’s most recent statistics suggest, unexpectedly, another pause in the dollar’s long-term decline.	国际货币基金组织（IMF）的最新数字表明，出乎意料，美元的长期衰落之势再一次停了下来。


According to the IMF, the dollar’s share in foreign-exchange reserves stopped falling in 2010 and has been flat since then.	根据IMF的数据，美元占外汇储备的比重在2010年停止下降，此后一直保持稳定。


If anything, the share is up slightly thus far in 2013.	2013年（到目前为止）还略有上升。


Similarly, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) reported in its recent triennial survey that the dollar’s share in the world’s foreign-exchange trades rose from 85% in 2010 to 87% in 2013.	类似地，国际清算银行（BIS）在其最新一期三年调查中指出美元占世界外汇交易的比重从2010年的85%提高到2013年的87%。


Given dysfunctional US fiscal policy, the dollar’s resilience is surprising.	考虑到美国财政政策功能失调的状况，美元的恢复力令人吃惊。


Or maybe we should no longer be surprised.	也许我们本不应该吃惊。


After all, when the global financial crisis erupted in 2008 from the bowels of the American subprime-mortgage market, global investors responded by fleeing to the US, not from it.	毕竟，当美国次贷市场引发2008年全球金融危机时，全球投资者的反应是逃向美国，而不是从美国出逃。


They obviously still regard US Treasury bills as a safe haven and the dollar as the top international currency, especially given the absence of good alternatives.	他们显然仍把美国国债视为安全港，把美元视为顶级国际货币，特别是在没有出色替代品的情况下。


In particular, the euro has its own all-too-obvious problems.	特别地，欧元有其自身的一目了然的问题。


Indeed, the euro’s share in reserve holdings and foreign-exchange transactions have both declined by several percentage points in the most recent statistics.	事实上，在最新的统计数字中，欧元在储备和外汇交易中的比重均下降了几个百分点。


At the same time, the IMF’s data indicate that the vaunted renminbi is not yet among the top seven currencies in terms of central-bank reserve holdings.	与此同时，IMF数据表明，从央行储备货币角度讲，受到热捧的人民币还拍不到前七名。


And, according to the BIS, while the renminbi has finally broken into the top ten currencies in foreign-exchange markets, it still accounts for only 2.2% of all transactions, just behind the Mexican peso’s 2.5% share.	而根据BIS的数据，尽管人民币终于进入了外汇市场前十名，但只占全部交易的2. 2%，还不如墨西哥比索的2.


Despite recent moves by the Chinese government, the renminbi still has a long way to go.	5%。 尽管中国政府最近出台了一些措施，但人民币还有很长的路要走。


To try to explain the recent stabilization of the dollar’s status, one might note something that the last three years have in common with the previous period of temporary reversal from 1992 to 2000: striking improvements in the US budget deficit.	要想解释最近的美元地位趋稳之势，可以把注意力放在过去三年与1992—2000年衰落之势暂时扭转期间的相似之处：美国预算赤字大幅改善。


By the end of the 1990’s, the record deficits of the 1980’s had been transformed into record surpluses; today, the federal deficit is less than half its 2010 level.	到20世纪90年代末，80年代创纪录的赤字变为创纪录的盈余； 如今，联邦赤字也不到2010年水平的一半。


Perhaps the fiscal observation is a coincidence.	也许这一财政现象是一种巧合。


After all, it would be foolish to read too much into two historical data points.	毕竟，对两组历史数据点做过多解读是十分愚蠢的。


It would be even more foolish to believe that just because American politicians have failed to dislodge the US dollar from its paramount status over the last 40 years, they could not accomplish the job with another few decades of effort.	更加愚蠢的是相信正如美国政客在过去四十年都破坏美元至高无上的地位，他们在今后几十年也无法做到。


It is not an eternal law of nature that the dollar shall always be number one.	美元永远是第一，这决非宇宙真理。


The pound sterling had the top spot in the nineteenth century, only to be surpassed by the dollar in the first half of the twentieth century.	十九世纪拥有顶级地位的是英镑，但在二十世纪上半叶就被美元超越。


The day may come when the dollar, too, succumbs to a rival. But today is not that day.	美元也有被后浪拍死在沙滩上的一天，但肯定不是今天。


Absent America	缺席的美国


CAMBRIDGE – The US Congress has now carelessly blocked a long-awaited reform of the International Monetary Fund.	发自剑桥——美国国会草率地阻止了国际货币基金组织一项期待已久的改革。


That would be bad enough if it were an isolated episode. But this is just the latest in a series of self-inflicted blows since the turn of the century that have needlessly undermined the United States’ claim to global leadership.	如果这只是一起孤立事件那也够糟糕的了，但这仅仅是自世纪之交以来一系列自毁行动的最新一起而已，对美国所企求的全球领导力造成了毫不必要的削弱。


The IMF reform would have been an important step in updating the allocations of quotas, which determine member states’ monetary contributions and voting power.	国际货币基金组织的改革本是更新配额分配的重要一步，它决定了成员国货币的赞助额和投票权。


The US was not being asked to contribute more money or lose its voting weight, which has always given it a unique veto power.	这并没有要求美国赞助更多或是降低其投票权重，以及一直给予它的特殊否决权。


Instead, the proposed increase in quotas for China, India, Brazil, and other emerging economies would have come largely at the expense of European countries.	相反，提案所增加的中国，印度，巴西以及其他新兴经济体配额主要是通过缩小欧洲国家的相关配额来实现的。


The change in IMF quotas is a partial and overdue response to the newcomers’ rising economic weight and Europe’s outdated dominance.	国际货币基金组织配额的变化是对新力量崛起以及欧洲统治衰落的一个局部而滞后的响应。


Indeed, the principle of matching representation to countries’ contributions – sometimes known as the Golden Rule (“He who has the gold, rules”) – is probably one of the reasons that the IMF has usually been more effective than other international organizations (for example, the United Nations General Assembly).	事实上，把各国的赞助额与其责任相匹配的准则——有时被称为黄金准则（“谁拥有黄金，谁制定规则”）——也许是国际货币基金组织通常比其他国际组织（例如联合国大会）更有效的原因。


To be sure, US President Barack Obama has tried to exercise global leadership.	无可否认，美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马试图实施全球领导。


He pushed for the agreement to reform the IMF at the G-20 summit in Seoul in November 2010 (the first meeting to be hosted by a non-G-7 country), and he prevailed over understandable European reluctance to cede power.	他在2010年11月首尔G20峰会（第一届由非G7国家举办的会议）上推动改革国际货币基金组织的协议，并且成功说服了那些显然不愿放弃权力的欧洲国家。


But congressional rejection of an international agreement that the president had painstakingly persuaded the rest of the world to accept is not a new pattern.	但是国会否决一个总统煞费苦心说服世界接受的国际协议可不是什么新鲜事。


It goes back a century, to President Woodrow Wilson’s inability in 1919 to persuade a myopically isolationist Congress to approve the League of Nations.	这可以追溯到一个世纪以前，伍德罗·威尔逊总统在1919年就无法说服短视且奉行孤立主义的国会批准国际联盟成立。


Since then, Congress has rejected the International Trade Organization (1948), the SALT II nuclear agreement (1979), and the Kyoto Protocol (1997), among others.	自那以后，国会否决过国际贸易组织（1948年），《第二阶段限制战略武器条约》（1979年），以及《京都议定书》（1997年）等等。


A history of trying to reopen international negotiations that the executive has already concluded is also the reason why Congress has to give Obama so-called trade promotion authority (which entails fast-track congressional votes on trade agreements).	而历史上也不乏重开已关闭国际谈判的尝试，这也是为何国会必须向奥巴马授予所谓的“贸易促进授权”（以加快贸易协议方面的国会投票进程）。


Otherwise, America’s trading partners will not negotiate seriously in ongoing regional and global trade negotiations.	不然的话美国的贸易伙伴们就不会认真进行现有的区域和全球贸易谈判。


Commentators have been warning since the 1980’s that the US may lose its global hegemony for economic reasons – budget deficits, a declining share of global GDP, and the switch from net international creditor to net debtor – with the historical hypothesis of imperial overreach gaining renewed attention.	自1980年代以来评论家们一直警告美国可能会由于经济上的原因——预算赤字，全球GDP份额的下降，从净债权国变为净债务国——而丢失其世界霸权，同时帝国过度扩张的历史假说也重新得到关注。


But the main problem seems to be a lack of will rather than a thin wallet.	但主要的问题似乎是缺乏意愿而不是经济的匮乏。


Or perhaps it would be more accurate to describe the problem as one of wild swings in US domestic politics between excessive isolationism and excessive foreign intervention in response to short-term events, and untempered by any longer-term historical perspective.	或者可以把问题更准确的描述为：美国国内政治在应对某些短期事件时在过度孤立主义和过度干涉行为之间大幅摇摆，并缺乏任何长期历史视角的指导。


These days, after a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan at an estimated cost of $4 trillion (including the medical care that veterans will need for the rest of their lives), the pendulum has apparently swung back in the direction of isolationism.	到目前为止，也就是伊拉克和阿富汗战争结束十年以来，估计花费了4万亿美元（包括老兵们养老送终所需的医疗保健），钟摆的方向显然已经回到孤立主义那一侧。


One had hoped that the shortsighted members of Congress who foolishly shut down the US government three months ago had become aware of the damage caused to America’s credibility and global leadership.	人们希望，那些在三个月前愚蠢地让美国政府关门的，目光短浅的国会成员已经意识到该事件对美国造成的信誉和全球领导力的损害。


Most visibly, the Obama administration had to cancel its participation at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Bali in October, impeding progress on the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership.	最明显的是，奥巴马政府不得不缺席十月在巴厘岛举行的亚太经济合作组织（APEC）峰会，阻碍了美国���主导的跨太平洋伙伴关系的进程。


It was widely reported that Asian countries concluded from Obama’s absence that they should cultivate ties with China instead.	大量报道称，亚洲国家从奥巴马的缺席中得出结论：它们应该转而培养与中国的关系。


The growing power of China and other major emerging-market countries is a reality.	中国以及其他主要新兴市场国家权力日益膨胀是一个现实。


That is precisely why it is so important that the US support a greater role for these countries in international institutions such as the IMF, the G-20, and APEC.	这正是为何美国支持这些国家在国际货币基金组织，20国集团，亚太经合组织等国际机构承担更大作用是如此重要。


The rise of China could go well or badly, depending in part on whether the status quo powers make room for the newcomer – a risk to international stability first noted by Thucydides, who traced the cause of the Peloponnesian War to Sparta’s response to the rising power of Athens.	中国的崛起是好是坏，在某种程度上取决于现有势力是否能为新人腾出空间——这是最早被古希腊历史学家修昔底德所意识到的一项国际稳定风险，他发现伯罗奔尼撒战争的原因正是斯巴达对雅典力量崛起的回应。


Likewise, failure to accommodate Germany’s rise contributed a century ago to the outbreak of World War I.	同样，一个世纪以前，对德国崛起的无法容纳导致了一战的爆发


Though Chinese President Xi Jinping’s call for “a new type of great power relations” may sound anodyne, the phrase apparently demonstrates awareness of the “Thucydides trap.”	尽管中国国家主席习近平呼吁“一个新的大国关系模式”听起来很平淡无奇，但这句话显然表明了对“修昔底德陷阱”的警觉。


It signals China’s openness to working with other countries to avoid a repetition of the tragedies of 431 BC and 1914 AD.	它体现出中国愿意与其他国家开放合作以避免重复公元前431年和公元1914年的大悲剧。


It is only sensible to take him up on his offer.	唯一明智的方法就是接受他的提议。


The continuing potential for US global leadership, despite America’s move from global creditor to debtor, has partly been a matter of luck.	除了从全球债权人变成了债务人之外，美国全球领导力的持续延续在某种程度上只是碰运气而已。


In the Asia-Pacific region, historical and territorial frictions among Japan, Korea, and China have ensured that America’s presence remains more welcome than it otherwise would be.	在亚太地区，日本，韩国和中国的历史和领土摩擦保证了美国的存在仍然比它的缺席更受欢迎。


Meanwhile, Europe’s fiscal follies have been even more egregious than America’s.	与此同时，欧洲财政政策的愚蠢程度甚至已经超过了美国。


Asians are acutely aware that the IMF has intervened in the euro crisis with much greater support than it provided during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, and they understandably feel entitled to a larger say in how the Fund is run.	亚洲人清醒地意识到，国际货币基金组织在介入欧元危机时提供了比1997-1998年亚洲金融危机时期更多的支持，因此也顺理成章地认定应该对组织的运作有更多的话语权。


But the emerging-market countries have been so disunited that in 2011 they failed to support a common candidate for IMF Managing Director.	但新兴市场国家是如此难以团结，以致在2011年它们未能推举自己的共同候选人去竞选国际货币基金组织主席的。


As a result, though the three previous incumbents were Europeans who did not complete their terms in office, another European, Christine Lagarde, won the top spot yet again.	结果尽管前三任未能完成任期的主席都是欧洲人，但另一个欧洲人，克里斯蒂娜·拉加德再次夺得头把交椅。


(Lagarde has done a good job, rather than kowtowing to Europe, but that is beside the point.)	（拉加德工作非常出色，并没有对欧洲唯命是从，但这不是重点。 ）


Latent global demand for enlightened US leadership, which first appeared at the end of World War I, can survive budgetary constraints and even misguided military interventions. What it cannot survive is an abdication of interest by the US Congress.	对美国开明领导的潜在全球需求最早始于第一次世界大战结束之时，并能在预算收缩甚至误入歧途的军事干预中保存下来，但却逃不过美国国会对这一利益的主动放弃。


Market Failure and Political Failure	市场失灵与政治失灵


PARIS – Markets can fail.	发自巴黎——市场会出现失灵。


But, as has been demonstrated in areas like air pollution, traffic congestion, spectrum allocation, and tobacco consumption, market mechanisms are often the best way for governments to address such failures.	但正如类似空气污染，交通拥堵，电信频率分配以及香烟消费等问题所展现的那样，市场机制往往是政府应对这类失灵问题的最佳手段。


So why are such mechanisms now in retreat?	但为何如今这些机制却逐渐失去了用武之地？


Consider markets for emissions allowances, in which firms that can cheaply cut air pollution trade with those that cannot.	以排放配额市场为例，在市场里那些可以低成本减少排放的企业可以和其他企业做交易。


A decade ago, the idea that such markets could achieve desired environmental goals at relatively low cost was widely recognized and implemented.	十年前，一直有主张认为这类市场可以用相对低廉的成本来实现既定的环保目标，并且得到了广泛的认同和实施。


Today, however, politics is killing “cap and trade.”	但如今政治却在扼杀“设限+交易”（cap and trade）方案。


In the United States, the highly successful cap-and-trade system for sulfur-dioxide emissions has effectively vanished.	在美国，取得了极大成功的二氧化硫“设限+交易”系统基本上销声匿迹了。


In Europe, the Emissions Trading System (ETS), the world’s largest market for carbon allowances, has become increasingly irrelevant as well.	欧洲的排放交易系统这个全球最大的碳排放配额市场也逐渐变得形同虚设。


On both sides of the Atlantic, market-oriented environmental regulation has in effect been superseded over the last five years by older “command-and-control” approaches, by which the government dictates who should use which technologies, in what amounts, to reduce which emissions.	在大西洋另一端，市场主导的环境监管在过去5年中被旧式的“命令+控制”（command  and control）手段所取代，谁要用哪种技术去减少某个数量的特定排放物，一切都由政府说了算。


Cap and trade was originally supposed to be a Republican idea in the US: its backers were those who considered themselves pro-market, not those who considered themselves pro-regulation.	在美国，设限+交易原本应当被视为一个共和党方案：其背后的支持者都是那些自认为倾向市场而非偏好管制的人。


Most environmental organizations initially opposed it, with many believing it immoral for corporations to be able to pay for the right to pollute.	大多数环保组织原本反对这一方案，许多人认为该方案有违道德，因为它容许企业付钱去购买污染的权利。


Indeed, it was Ronald Reagan’s administration that pioneered the use of cap and trade to phase out leaded gasoline in the 1980’s.	事实上，是罗纳德·里根总统的政府率先在1980年代运用设限+交易手段去淘汰含铅汽油。


George H. W. Bush’s administration used it to reduce SO2 emissions from power plants in the 1990’s, and his son’s administration sought to use it to reduce SO2 and other emissions further in the 2000’s.	老布什政府在1990年代沿用这一手段去减少发电厂的二氧化硫并取得了成功，随后其子小布什又试图用它进一步减少二氧化硫以及其他污染物排放。


The problem is not that cap and trade is an ivory-tower theory that cannot work in the real world; on the contrary, its performance surpassed expectations.	设限+交易并是一个不切实际的象牙塔理论； 相反，它的效果超出了预期。


In the 1980’s, it enabled lead to be phased out more rapidly than predicted and at an estimated annual savings of $250 million relative to the command-and-control approach.	在1980年代它以超乎预计的速度淘汰了含铅燃料，并且估计比命令+控制政策每年节省2. 5亿美元。


Similarly, emissions of SO2 were curbed at a much lower cost than even cap-and-trade proponents had predicted before 1995.	同样，限制二氧化硫排放的成本甚至比设限+交易的支持者们在1995年前预估的还要低


As recently as 2008, the Republican candidate for US president, Senator John McCain, had sponsored legislative proposals to use cap and trade to address emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases.	到了近一点的2008年，共和党推举参议员约翰·麦凯恩（John McCain）为总统候选人，而他本人也支持美国立法使用设限+交易手段去应对二氧化碳和其他温室气体的排放问题。


But Republican politicians now seem to have forgotten that this approach was once their policy.	但如今共和党政治家们似乎忘记了自己曾有这么一个政策。


In 2009, they worked to defeat climate-change legislation by relying on anti-regulation rhetoric that demonized their own creation.	为了抵制2009年的气候变化立法，他们转而用反管制言论去把自身的产物妖魔化了。


This left only less market-friendly alternatives – especially after court cases upheld the validity of the 1970 Clean Air Act.	结果就只剩下不那么市场化的备选方案——尤其是在相关诉讼维持了1970年洁净空气法案的法律效力之后。


Though such alternatives are less efficient, they are again the operative regime.	虽然这些备选方案效率不高，却依然占据主流地位。


Likewise, the European Union adopted the ETS in 2003 as a cost-effective way to achieve the commitments it had made under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.	在欧洲，设限+交易在十年前成为主导。


The ETS rapidly became the world’s largest system for putting a market price on environmental damage.	欧盟在2003年将排放交易系统采纳为兑现其1997年京都议定书承诺的一个高性价比手段，同时还迅速建立了全球最大的系统去为环境污染设定市场价格。


But now it has been pushed aside by other kinds of regulation.	但如今排放交易系统却被其他类型的管制手段排挤到了一边。


European directives require that 20% of energy must come from renewables by 2020.	欧洲的方针要求在2020年时必须有20%的能源来自于可再生能源。


But, while policymakers have helped drive down the price of emissions permits in the ETS by mandating and subsidizing renewable energy, the supply of permits has not been reduced.	政策制定者们通过批准和补贴可再生能源使得排放交易系统中的许可价格降低���但这类许可的供应却下降了。


As a result, demand now falls short of any binding constraint.	结果对许可的需求低到无法附加任何捆绑条款。


Indeed, the price of permits fell below three euros a ton in April 2013, rendering the emissions-trading market almost irrelevant.	到了2013年4月，许可价格已经跌到3欧元每吨，导致排放交易市场基本停滞。


This, in turn, has encouraged greater reliance on highly polluting coal – the worst energy source, from the standpoint of global warming. That would not have happened if the price mechanism still underpinned climate-change policy.	这反过来鼓励了企业更多地使用污染更严重的煤——在全球变暖问题上危害最大的燃料——而如果气候变化政策依然是以价格机制为的基础的话，这一切都不会发生。


Moreover, the EU’s renewables policy has also proved to be ruinously expensive.	此外，欧盟的可再生能源政策已经被证明是极端昂贵。


All of this should give pause to the European Council when it meets in March to consider how to extend the 2020 goals to 2030.	而这一切应该在3月欧洲议会商议如何将2020年目标延长到2030年时扭转过来。


There is a fascinating parallel between the evolution of American political attitudes toward market mechanisms in environmental regulation and Republican hostility to “Obamacare” (the 2010 Affordable Care Act).	美国针对环境管制中市场机制的政治态度的演化与共和党人对“奥巴马医改”（2010年《合理医疗费用法案》）的敌意之间存在着一个令人惊叹的平行关系。


The core of Obamacare is an attempt to ensure that all Americans have health insurance, via the individual mandate.	奥巴马医改的核心在于通过强制参保的方式确保所有美国人都能享有医疗保险。


But it is a market-oriented program insofar as health insurers and health-care providers remain private and compete against one other.	但这是一个市场主导的项目，因为医疗保险公司和医疗服务提供者都是私营企业而且相互竞争。


This was originally a conservative approach.	这原本是个保守的方法。


The two major alternatives to it are much further removed from the marketplace: a “single payer” system, as in Canada (or America’s Medicare system for the elderly), with the government providing health insurance, or “socialized medicine,” as in the United Kingdom (or the US Veterans Health Administration), with the government providing health care directly.	相比之下另外两个主要的替代方案都离市场更远：一个“单一付款人”体系，比如加拿大（或者美国的长者医疗体系），由政府提供医疗保险； 或者是“公费医疗”，比如英国（或者美国退伍军人卫生署），由政政府直接提供医疗保障。


The approach taken by Obamacare was proposed in conservative think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation and enacted in Massachusetts by Republican Governor Mitt Romney.	而奥巴马医改所采用的方案是当年由美国传统基金会这类保守智库所提议，并由时任州长的共和党人米特·罗姆尼在马萨诸塞州推广应用。


But, by the time Obama adopted it, it had become anathema to Republicans, forcing Romney, the party’s presidential candidate in 2012, to run against his own record.	谁知当奥巴马采纳这一方法的时候，它却变成了共和党人的眼中钉，迫使罗姆尼这位2012年美国总统共和党候选人推翻自己过去的做法。


The market failure in the case of air pollution is what economists call an “externality”: those who pollute do not bear the entire cost.	在空气污染方面的市场失灵就是经济学家所说的“外部性”：那些污染者并未承担所有的成本。


The market failure in the case of health care is what economists call “adverse selection”: insurers may not provide insurance, especially to patients with pre-existing conditions, if they fear that healthy customers have already taken themselves out of the risk pool.	而在医疗保险方面的市场失灵则可归之为“逆向选择”：如果承保者有理由担心医疗消费者自身已经处于风险之下，那么他们就可能不会提供保障，尤其是对那些已经患病的病人。


But, again, government attempts to address market failures can themselves fail.	但与此同时，那些尝试应对市场失灵的政府自身也可能会失灵。


In the case of the environment, command-and-control regulation is inefficient, discourages innovation, and can have unintended consequences (like Europe’s growing reliance on coal).	在环境事务上，命令+管制监管手段效率低下，遏制创新，并可能引发意外后果（正如欧洲对煤的依赖上升）。


In the case of health care, a national monopoly can forestall innovation and provide inadequate care with long waits.	而在医疗方面，一个国家垄断将会抑制创新，服务不充足，还会让患者轮候更长时间。


In general, the best government interventions target failures precisely – using cap and trade to put a price on air pollution, for example, or relying on the individual mandate to curtail adverse selection in health insurance – while letting market forces do the rest more efficiently than bureaucrats can.	总而言之，最佳的政府介入手段应当精确定位失灵之处——使用设限+交易去给空气污染定价或者强制参保去减少医疗保险中的逆向选择——并让市场力量比官僚更高效地去解决余下的其他问题。


African Leaders’ Eyes on the Prize	非洲领袖眼中的巨奖


CAMBRIDGE – On October 14, the Mo Ibrahim Prize Committee announced that for the second year in a row it had not found anyone to whom to award its Prize for Achievement in African Leadership. Why is that important?	发自剑桥——10月14日，莫·易卜拉欣奖（Mo Ibrahim Prize）评选委员会宣布其已经连续第二年无法找到非洲领导成就奖的得主，而这又意味着什么呢？


The prize is given to a recently retired African head of state or government who was democratically elected, stepped down at the end of his or her constitutionally mandated term, and demonstrated exceptional leadership.	这个奖项会颁发给一位新近退休的非洲国家领袖，前提是这位领袖必须是由民主选举产生，在宪法规定的任期结束后退位，并展现出了杰出的领导能力。


The winner receives $5 million paid over ten years, followed by $200,000 annually for life, making it the world’s most valuable annual award.	得奖者将在头10年内领取500万美元奖金，然后每年领取20万美金直至过世，而这也令此奖成为了世界上最丰厚的年度奖项。


The Mo Ibrahim Foundation supports other important activities, particularly the annual Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), which was also released on October 14.	莫·易卜拉欣基金会同时也赞助其他一些重要的活动，例如每年评定一次，同样在10月14日发布的易卜拉欣非洲治理指数。


But I am especially intrigued by the prize.	但笔者最感到好奇的仍然是那个奖项。


It is a fascinating social-policy experiment, which deserves to be more widely known.	这是一场令人着迷的社会政策试验，也理应得到更多的关注。


Critics of the Ibrahim Prize argue that it makes Africa look bad, because in four out of seven years it has not been awarded to anyone.	有批评认为这个奖令非洲蒙羞，因为自该奖设立7年以来已经有4年出现的得奖者空缺。


It has also been argued that leaders should not have to be “bribed” into being good.	另一种说法认为领导人不应在这些巨奖的“贿赂”下去有所作为。


The good will be good, and the bad will be bad, regardless of the prize.	不管这个奖存不存在，开明者行仁政，暴君则祸国殃民，不会有任何改变。


I don’t buy these criticisms.	笔者不敢苟同这些批评。


Yes, other parts of the world also suffer from governance problems.	没错，世界其他地方也面对着治理问题。


And more people should be aware that many African countries have made substantial progress over the last decade, particularly with respect to economic growth, health, and education.	更多人也应该认识到许多非洲国家都在过去十年中取得了长足的进步，尤其是在经济发展，卫生和教育方面。


But those are not arguments against highlighting the important role of leadership in African countries’ success.	但这些论点都不能掩盖领导人在这些非洲国家取得的成就中所扮演的重要作用。


Given the abundant attention received by Africa’s truly awful leaders, it is useful to focus on its good ones.	考虑到人们已经对那些非洲暴君们给予了足够的关注，也是时候把目光移向那些好的领导人了。


And the money that comes with the Ibrahim Prize is enough that it could affect leaders’ behavior.	而莫·易卜拉欣奖的奖金也足以去影响这些领导人的行为。


The Ibrahim Prize was awarded in 2007, 2008, and 2011 to Presidents Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique, Festus Mogae of Botswana, and Pedro Verona Pires of Cape Verde, respectively.	莫·易卜拉欣奖曾分别颁发给莫桑比克前总统阿金·希萨诺（Joaquim Chissano，2007年度），博茨瓦纳前总统费斯图斯·莫哈埃（Festus Mogae，2008年度）以及佛得角前总统佩德罗·皮雷斯（Pedro Verona Pires，2011年度）。


Botswana and Cape Verde are two of the small-population countries that are consistently placed near the top in rankings of African governance, human development, and economic performance.	博茨瓦纳和佛得角这两个人口较少的非洲国家一般都会在非洲治理水平，人文发展和经济表现方面排名前列。


Mozambique is different: larger and historically in much worse shape, it suffered a terrible civil war from 1977 to 1992.	而莫桑比克则截然不同：国家更大，历史问题更多，1977年~1992年间曾持续内战。


Even after two decades of strong political and economic improvement, it still ranks low on most development indicators.	即便在经历了20年的强劲政治和经济发展，该国在大多数发展指数中的排名依旧偏低。


What defines good leadership is a notoriously complicated question.	优秀的领导该如何定义是一个极端复杂的问题。


Should leadership be evaluated according to criteria like economic prosperity, public health, respect for human rights, personal security, and peace?	它是否应该依据经济繁荣程度，公共卫生，人权状况，个人人身安全以及国家和平状态来评定？


Or are the proper criteria the leader’s character and competence, including his or her ability to inspire the country, choose good officials, formulate good policies, and implement them?	或者应该着眼于领袖的个人品质和治国方略，包括鼓舞国民奋发的魅力，甄选官员的眼光，制定和实施良好政策的能力？


In a word, is leadership a matter of outcomes or inputs?	简而言之，领导能力究竟是一个关于能力注入还是成果输出的事物？


Successful outcomes are obviously the ultimate objective.	虽然成功的成果输出显然是最终的目标。


But it is not useful to rely solely or primarily on outcomes to judge a leader.	但仅仅依靠成果来评断一位领袖是不行的。


Many factors beyond a leader’s control can block his or her country’s progress.	许多超出这位领导人控制的因素都会阻碍其国家的进步。


Even if good leadership means a demonstrated ability to prevail in the face of intransigent domestic political opposition, coup attempts, and invasions, surely no leader can be held responsible for the effects of droughts, floods, or other natural disasters.	即便优秀的领导才能意味着在面对国内顽固反对派，政变企图或者入侵时能展现其雄才大略，但显然没有谁能可以为干旱，洪涝或者其他自然灾害负责。


Admittedly, a leader’s integrity and competence are more difficult to measure than outcomes (such as per capita income, life expectancy, infant mortality, literacy, and crime).	必须承认，一个领导人的品质和能力要比其成果（诸如人均收入、预期寿命、新生儿死亡率，识字率和犯罪率）更加难以测量。


But some of the component indicators of the IIAG (such as rule of law, bureaucratic red tape, and fiscal policy) are more directly under government control.	但易卜拉欣非洲治理指数中的某些成分指数（例如法治成都，官僚办事作风以及财政政策）都更直接地处于政府当局控制之下。


In any case, one would not expect prize committees or historians to judge leaders solely by quantitative criteria.	无论如何，我们都不会期望评选委员会或者历史学家会仅仅依靠量化指标去评价一个领导人。


Few Americans thought Harry Truman had been a good president immediately after he left office, but now he is rated very high.	在美国总统哈里·杜鲁门（Harry Truman）下台时民望很低，但今时今日人们却对他评价甚高。


In Mexico, Carlos Salinas looked good at the time, but is now viewed poorly, while the accomplishments of his successor, Ernesto Zedillo, now appear bold, historic, innovative, and valuable.	在墨西哥，前总统卡洛斯·萨利纳斯（Carlos Salinas）当年非常风光，如今却遭到甚多批评，因为他的继任者埃内斯托. 塞迪略（Ernesto Zedillo）所取得成就在今天看来更为大刀阔斧，具历史意义，别开生面且有价值。


The list of eligible candidates for the Ibrahim Prize begins with those who were democratically elected and left office constitutionally within the preceding three years.	莫·易卜拉欣奖的候选名单首先会从那些民选上台并在随后三年内依宪法规定离任的领导人开始。


In a typical year, there may be as few as three candidates who meet these qualifications.	一般来说，在一年里都会有三位领导人符合这一条件。


The question is then whether any candidate demonstrated the necessary level of excellence in office.	但问题是这些人是否于在位之时体现出了足够优秀的治国能力。


In 2009, 2010, 2012, and now 2013, the prize committee decided that none had.	在2009，2010，2012和今年，评奖委员的决议是没人能做到这一点。


Does that mean that the prize has failed to meet the objective of encouraging good leadership in Africa?	拿这是否意味着该奖项无法实现其鼓励非洲优秀领导实践的目标？


Consider a ruler who comes to power with good intentions and great abilities.	试想一位才能卓越的统治者胸怀治国雄心上台执政。


Assume that he accomplishes much for his country during his first term (or his first two or three terms if the constitution allows it). But he stays too long (Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni comes to mind).	假设他在自己的第一个任期内（或者包含宪法许可下最初的一两次连任内）为国家做了许多实事，但他却过于恋栈——正如乌干达总统约韦里·穆塞韦尼（Yoweri Museveni）。


He forces through constitutional changes so that he can run for more terms.	他强制修改宪法条文好让自己能继续连任下去。


Then he starts rigging elections and suppressing opposition.	然后此人开始操纵选举和镇压反对派。


He or members of his family nurture large overseas bank accounts.	而自己及其亲属则向海外转移了巨额财富。


Such leaders’ personalities may have changed.	这种领导人的品质或许已经发生了变化。


They may now regard themselves as indispensable.	他们也许觉得自己是必不可少的。


They have been corrupted by power, like the porcine elite in George Orwell’s Animal Farm.	他们被权力所腐蚀，正如乔治·奥威尔（George Orwell）在其名著《动物农场》中所描写的猪族精英那样。


At this point, they are unlikely to be influenced by the money that comes with the Ibrahim Prize.	到这个时候，这些人也不会被莫·易卜拉欣奖的奖金所打动了。


But now consider a leader who would prefer to serve honestly throughout his term and depart voluntarily. This path might leave a retirement with few resources for him and his family, little in the way of prestige or a platform from which to speak, and perhaps persecution by his successors.	但如果换成是一位愿意在自己任期内忠心服务国家并在任期届满时自愿下台的领导人，他的清廉可能意味着自己和家人的退休生活不甚宽裕，没有什么提升社会地位的途径也缺乏可供发声的平台，甚至可能遭到继任者的迫害。


It is precisely such a leader for whom the Ibrahim Prize could make the difference, influencing him to continue on the high road.	那么莫·易卜拉欣奖就能改变这样一位领导人的际遇，令他可以继续尊贵地活着。


If the experiment works, however, the main fruits will lie in the future.	然而，如果这个实验有效的话，主要的成果将体现在未来。


The Ibrahim Prize was established only in 2007, which means that the candidates have served most of their terms in office at a time when the prize could not have influenced their behavior.	莫·易卜拉欣奖在2007年才成立，意味着候选人们的任期主要都是在奖项设立之前，因此也无法为了奖金改变其行为。


If it does have the desired effect, we should start seeing winners in more years.	如果该奖确实能实现其预想效果的话，那么我们将在未来看见更多的获奖者。


Sovereign Debt at Square One	回到起点的主权债务


CAMBRIDGE – Argentina and its bankers have been barred from making payments to fulfill debt-restructuring agreements reached with the country’s creditors, unless the 7% of creditors who rejected the agreements are paid in full – a judgment that is likely to stick, now that the US Supreme Court has upheld it.	美国剑桥—阿根廷及其银行家被禁止偿还债务以履行与该国债权人达成的债务重组协议，除非拒绝该协议的7%债权人获得足额偿付——美国最高法院支持的情况看，这一判决可能无法推翻了。


Though it is hard to cry for Argentina, the ruling in favor of the holdouts is bad news for the global financial system and sets back the evolution of the international regime for restructuring sovereign debt.	尽管我们大可不必为阿根廷哭泣，但这一有利于顽固坚持的判决对全球金融体系来说是一个坏消息，也让重组主权债务的国际机制发生了倒退。


Why is it so hard to feel sympathy for a developing country that can’t pay its debts?	为何同情无法偿付债务的发展中国家如此困难？


For starters, in 2001, Argentina unilaterally defaulted on its entire $100 billion debt, an unusual step, rather than negotiating new terms with its creditors.	首先，2001年，阿根廷单方面对其全部1,000亿美元债务违了约，而不是与债权人协商新条款，这是颇为反常的。


When, in 2005, the government finally got around to negotiating a debt swap, it could almost dictate the terms – a 70% “haircut.”	2005年，阿根廷政府终于拨冗参与债务互换谈判时，它几乎可以任意指定条件——70%的“剃头”（haircut）。


In the intervening decade, President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and her late husband and predecessor, Néstor Kirchner, have pursued a variety of spectacularly bad economic policies.	在此间的十年中，阿根廷总统费尔南德兹·基什内尔及其已故丈夫兼前任总统捏斯托·基什内尔实施了一系列糟糕透顶的经济政策。


The independence of the central bank and the statistical agency have been severely compromised, with Fernández forcing the adoption, for example, of a consumer price index that grossly understates the inflation rate.	中央银行和统计部门的独立性遭到了严重破坏，比如，费尔南德兹强迫采取了严重低估通胀率的消费物价指数。


Contracts have been violated and foreign-owned companies have been nationalized.	契约被恣意破坏，外资公司被国有化。


And when soaring global prices for Argentina’s leading agricultural commodities provided a golden opportunity to boost output and raise chronically insufficient foreign-currency earnings, Fernández imposed heavy tariffs and quotas on exports of soy, wheat, and beef.	而当主产农作物全球价格飙升为阿根廷提供了提振产出、增加长期不足的外汇收入时，费尔南德兹又给大豆、小麦和牛肉出口施加了沉重的关税。


Some might counter that the holdout hedge funds that sued Argentina deserve no sympathy, either.	也许会有人反驳说，起诉阿根廷的顽固坚持对冲基金也不值得同情。


Many are called “vulture funds” because they bought the debt at a steep discount from the original creditors, hoping to profit subsequently through court decisions.	许多这样的基金被称为“兀鹫基金”，因为它们以深度折价从原始债权人手中购买债务，期望通过法院裁决斩获丰厚利润。


But the problem with the Argentine debt case has little to do with the moral failings of either the plaintiffs or the defendant.	但阿根廷债务案的问题关税或被告的道德失当没有关系。


The problem is the precedent that the case establishes for resolving future international debt crises.	问题在于该案为解决未来国际债务危机所树立的先例。


The most common reaction to the recent rulings is pro-holdout.	对最新判决的最常见反应是支持顽固坚持。


After all, the judge is only enforcing the legal contract embodied in the original bonds, isn’t he?	毕竟，法官只不过是在强制执行初始债券中所包含的法律契约，不是吗？


As President Calvin Coolidge supposedly said of the American loans to the World War I allies, “They hired the money, didn’t they?”	据说美国总统柯立芝这样评价美国对一战协约国的贷款：“它们租用了钱，不是吗？ ”


If only the world were so simple.	要是世界如此简单就好了。


If only a regime of consistent enforcement of all loan contracts’ explicit terms were sufficiently practical to be worth pursuing.	要是一致执行所有贷款契约的明白条款的机制足够实用、值得追求就好了。


But we have long since recognized the need for procedures to rewrite the terms of debt contracts under extreme circumstances.	但我们早就认识到需要依靠程序重写极端情形下的贷款契约条件。


The British Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856, for example, established the principle of limited liability for corporations.	比如，1856年英国合股公司法（Joint Stock Companies Act）规定了公司的有限责任原则。


Indentured servitude and debtors’ prisons have also been illegal since the nineteenth century.	自十九世纪以来，卖身契和债务人监狱也变为非法。


And individuals and corporations can declare bankruptcy.	个人和公司可以宣布破产。


There will always be times when it is impossible for a debtor to pay.	总有债务人无法偿还的时候。


As for corporate bankruptcy, it is recognized that a poor legal system is one that keeps otherwise viable factories shuttered while assets are frittered away in expensive legal wrangling, leaving everyone – managers, workers, and shareholders – worse off.	而对于公司破产，我们已经意识到，在糟糕的法律体系中，本可以存活的工厂倒闭，而资产在昂贵的法律扯皮中灰飞烟灭，所有人——管理者、工人和股东——都遭受损失。 而良好的法律体系让招聘和生产在经济活动仍然可行时能够继续；


A good legal system permits employment and production to continue in cases where the economic activity is still viable; divides up the remaining assets in an orderly and generally accepted way; and makes these determinations as efficiently and speedily as possible, while discouraging future carelessness by imposing costs on managers, shareholders, and – if necessary – creditors.	以有序的、能被总体接受的方式分割剩余资产； 并以尽可能快的速度和尽可能高的效率做出决定，同时通过让管理者、股东以及——如有必要的话——债权人承担代价，以阻止未来的不审慎行为。


No such body of law exists at the international level.	在国际层面不存在这样一个法律体系。


Some believe that this vacuum is the primary difficulty with the international debt system.	有人认为这一真空是国际债务体系的主要难点。


Ambitious proposals to redress it, such as a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) housed at the International Monetary Fund, have always run into political roadblocks.	雄心勃勃的解决方案，如国际货币基金组织（IMF）所属的主权债务重组机制（Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism，SDRM），总是陷入政治障碍。


But incremental steps had been slowly moving the system in the right direction since the 1980s.	但自20世纪80年代以来，实质步骤一开始逐渐将体系推向正确的方向。


In the international debt crisis that began in 1982, IMF country adjustment programs went hand in hand with “bailing in” creditor banks through “voluntary” coordinated loan rollovers.	在肇始于1982年的国际债务危机中，IMF国家调整计划与通过“自愿”合作贷款展期进行的债权人“自救”（bailing in）双管齐下。


Eventually, it was recognized that a debt overhang was inhibiting investment and growth in Latin America, to the detriment of debtors and creditors alike.	最终，人们意识到是债务积压制约了拉丁美洲的投资与增长，债务人和债权人都受到了伤害。


Subsequent programs to deal with emerging-market crises featured an analogous combination of country adjustment and “private sector involvement.”	此后处理新兴市场危机的计划都有类似的国家调整和“私人部门参与”结合。


Voluntary debt exchanges worked, roughly speaking, with investors accepting haircuts.	总的来说，如果投资者可以接受“剃头”，自愿债务交换是有效的。


After Argentina’s unilateral default in 2001, many investors saw more clearly the need to allow explicitly for less drastic alternatives ahead of time, and so incorporated so-called “collective action clauses” into debt contracts.	2001年阿根廷单方面违约后，许多投资者更加认清了需要事先明确允许不太极端的替代方案，因此在债务契约中引入了所谓的“集体诉讼条款”。


If the borrower runs into trouble, CACs make it possible to restructure debt with the agreement of a substantial majority of creditors (usually around 70%).	如果债务人陷入麻烦，根据集体诉讼条款，如果绝对多数债权人（通常在70%左右）形成协议，就可以进行债务重组。


The minority is then bound by the agreement.	这样一来，少数派就受到了协议的约束。


Such incremental steps gave rise to a loose system of debt restructuring.	这些实质步骤促成了宽松的债务重组制度。


To be sure, it still had many deficiencies.	诚然，它的缺陷仍然很多。


Restructuring often came too late and provided too little relief to restore debt sustainability.	重组往往来得太晚，提供的纾困也不足以重塑债务可持续性。


But it worked, more or less.	但它多多少少是有效的。


By contrast, the US court rulings’ indulgence of a parochial instinct to enforce written contracts will undermine the possibility of negotiated re-structuring in future debt crises.	相反，美国法院裁决囿于狭隘的执行书面契约本能，破坏了未来债务危机协商重组的可能性。


Time will run out for Argentina at the end of July.	阿根廷的时间到7月底为止。


Unable to pay all of its debts, perhaps it will be forced to default on all of them.	如果不能偿付所有债务，它就有可能被迫对所有债务违约。


The more likely outcome is that it will manage to come to some accommodation that the holdouts find more attractive than the deal accepted by the other creditors.	更有可能的结果是它设法向顽固坚持者提出比被其他债权人所接受的更有吸引力的建议。


Either way, future voluntary debt-workout agreements have just become more difficult to reach, which will leave debtors and creditors alike worse off.	无论哪种情况发生，未来自愿债务解决方案都会更加难以达成，债务人和债权人都会因此蒙受损失。


The Subsidy Trap	补贴陷阱


CAMBRIDGE – Few policies place good economics so directly at odds with good politics as subsidies for food and energy.	美国剑桥—没有哪个政策像食品和能源补贴那样让好经济学如此直接地与好政治学对立起来。


The issue of unaffordable subsidies is now front and center for three of the world’s most important new leaders: Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Indonesian President-elect Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.	无法负担的补贴正在成为三位世界最重要新领导人所面临的的核心问题。 他们是埃及总统西西、印尼总统“佐科维”维多多以及印度总理莫迪。


Sisi is confronting the need to cut subsidies better than might have been expected.	西西所面临的的削减补贴需要比预想中好一些。


Modi, by contrast, is doing worse than expected – even torpedoing a long-anticipated Word Trade Organization agreement.	相反，莫迪面临着比预想更糟糕的局面，甚至有可能破坏期待已久的世贸组织协定。


With Jokowi, it is too soon to tell.	而佐科维面临的局面尚不明朗。


In July, Sisi accomplished what few leaders in North Africa or the Middle East have: he sharply cut longstanding fuel subsidies and allowed prices to rise by 41-78%.	7月，西西完成了北非和中东很少有领导人能够完成的成就：他大幅削减了存在已久的能源补贴，让价格提高了41-78%。


Surprisingly, few protests materialized.	令人奇怪的是，几乎没有发生反对示威。


Egypt’s food subsidy program, which costs more than $5 billion a year, is in urgent need of reform as well.	埃及的食品补贴计划每年耗费50亿美元以上，也迫切地需要改革。


The price of bread has been kept so low that it is often fed to animals.	面包价格一直保持在极低水平，以至于常常被拿来喂动物。


Past attempts to reduce such subsidies in North African countries have brought unrest and even toppled governments.	在过去，北非国家削减这类补贴的努力常常引发动乱，甚至颠覆政府。


But the Sisi government appears to be making progress here as well.	但西西政府似乎在这方面也能够取得进展。


Bread subsidies have already been cut by 13%.	面包补贴已经被削减了13%。


Sisi had little choice.	西西别无选择。


Even with subsidy cuts, the current government is targeting a budget deficit of 10% of GDP in the coming fiscal year (compared to 14% otherwise).	即使在补贴缩减后，现任政府下一个财年的预算赤字目标仍达到了GDP的10%（若无补贴削减将达到14%）。


Still, few expected Sisi, who took office in a fragile political environment, to move faster than Modi, who was elected with a whopping democratic majority amid hopes for sweeping economic reform.	但是，几乎没人预料到在动荡政治环境中上台的西西能够比莫迪行动更加迅速。 莫迪在迫切希望彻底经济改革的印度通过压倒性民主多数问鼎总理宝座。


In Indonesia, when Jokowi takes office in October, he will inherit a long history of fuel subsidies that, at $21 billion a year (up to 20% of government spending), the country can no longer afford.	在印尼，10月开始执政的佐科维继承的是长期存在的燃料补贴，规模高达每年210亿美元（相当于政府支出的20%），已令国家不堪重负。


Outgoing President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono took a first courageous step by raising fuel prices a year ago.	下台的苏西洛在一年前已经采取了勇敢的第一步，提高了燃料价格。


Jokowi’s advisers favor cutting the remaining subsidies, and he has already forthrightly said that he plans to do so gradually, over a four-year period.	佐科维的顾问们建议裁减剩下的补贴，而他也直率地表示计划在四年时间里逐步落实。


Economists feel confident in opposing commodity subsidies because agricultural and energy markets tend to approach the ideal of perfect competition, with a large number of consumers on the demand side and producers on the supply side.	经济学家信心十足地反对商品补贴，因为农业和能源市场接近于完美竞争，需求端有大量消费者，供给端有大量生产者。


Where competition is imperfect, government, not large private monopolies, is usually the reason.	在竞争不完美的领域，政府——而不是大型私有垄断商——才是根源。


Critics of the invisible hand point out that, left to themselves, private markets can fail in a number of ways.	看不见的手的批评者指出，自我运转的私人市场可能以各种方式失灵。


For example, income inequality and environmental externalities are two of the most prominent justifications for government intervention.	比如，收入不平等和环境外部性便是政府干预最主要的两大理由。


What is striking about food and fossil-fuel subsidies is that they are often promoted in the name of the environment or equity, but usually do little to achieve these goals, and often have the opposite effect.	让食品和化石燃料补贴引起尖锐争议的是它们常常打着环境或平等的旗号推行，但实际上对于这些目标于事无补，反而常常适得其反。


Less than 20% of Egyptian food subsidies benefit poor people.	埃及食品补贴只有不到20%给了穷人。


Gasoline subsidies in most countries benefit the middle class, while the poor walk or take public transportation.	大部分国家的汽油补贴肥了中产阶级，而穷人依靠步行或公共交通。 在印度，只有不到0.


In India, less than 0.1% of rural subsidies for Liquefied Petroleum Gas go to the poorest quintile, while 52.6% go to the wealthiest.	1%的液化石油气补贴给了最贫困人口，倒有52. 6%流入了最富人群的口袋。


Worldwide, far less than 20% of fossil-fuel subsidies benefit the poorest 20% of the population.	就全世界而言，只有远不足 20%的化石燃料补贴给了最贫困的20%人口。


Food and energy subsidies can also distort public policy, as Modi’s government, seeking to protect India’s agricultural subsidies, has shown.	食品和能源补贴也有可能扭曲公共政策，意在保护印度农业补贴的莫迪政府就是明证。


Indeed, its veto of a WTO compromise has derailed the most important progress in multilateral trade negotiations of the last ten years.	事实上，莫迪政府否决世贸组织妥协让过去十年多边贸易谈判最重要的进展毁于一旦。


Agricultural subsidies sometimes seek to benefit consumers at the expense of producers, especially in poor countries, and sometimes seek to benefit producers at the expense of consumers, especially in rich countries.	农业补贴有时是康生产商之慨让消费者获益，特别是在穷国； 而有时则是康消费者之慨让生产商获益，特别是在富国。


India’s policies try to do both.	印度的政策则以兼而有之为目标。


As a result, India has accomplished the extraordinary feat of rationing grain to consumers at artificially low prices, while simultaneously suffering excess supply, because farmers are paid high prices.	结果，印度完成了一个壮举：以人为压低的价格为消费者配给小麦，同时又经历过度供给，因为农民可以获得高价。


(Farmers are also subsidized via agricultural inputs – electricity, water, and fertilizer – to the detriment of the environment.)	（农民还通过农业投入品——电、水和肥料获得补贴，而环境遭到了破坏。


The government has purchased huge stockpiles of rotting rice and wheat, while the limited amount available to consumers is allocated in ways that are corrupt and inconsistent with the stated goal of helping the poor.	）政府收购了大量腐败稻米和小麦，而消费者所能得到的一小部分的分配方式既腐败又不符合帮助穷人的目标。


The government would like to keep its subsidies and stockpiles.	政府可能会继续保持补贴和收储。


But it knows that this would violate WTO rules.	但它知道，这会违反世贸组织规则。


Unable to obtain a permanent change in these rules, Modi vetoed the WTO’s eagerly anticipated Trade Facilitation Agreement.	既然无法永久地改变这些规则，莫迪干脆否决了世贸组织热切期待的贸易促进协定（Trade Facilitation Agreement）。


Once subsidies are in place, they are extraordinarily difficult to remove.	一旦补贴实施，就很难收回。


When world commodity prices rise, as they often have over the last decade, citizens who are accustomed to the domestic price being set in the market are more likely to accept the reality that officials cannot insulate them from the shock.	当世界商品价格上涨时（如过去十年那样），习惯于市场决定的国内价格的公民更有可能接受官员无法将他们与冲击隔离开来的现实。


But people who are accustomed to administratively established food and energy prices hold the government responsible.	但习惯于官定食品和能源价格的人民会要求政府负责。


That is a strong reason not to adopt such subsidies in the first place.	这就构成了一个很强的理由，从一开始就不应该实施补贴。


But it does not necessarily mean that, once subsidies are in place, keeping them is a savvy politician’s best option.	但这并不意味着一旦补贴实施，保持补贴就一定是精明政客的最佳选择。


If the alternative to raising the price is shortages or rationing, angry protesters may mobilize anyway.	如果涨价的替代方案是短缺或配给，愤怒的反对者也有可能爆发。


Similarly, the procrastinating leader is unlikely to benefit if ever-widening gaps force an even bigger retail-price rise when the day of reckoning comes.	类似地，如果不断扩大的差距最终导致更大的零售价格攀升，那么动作缓慢的领导人也不可能得到好处。