A deliberative approach to engaging the public on other aspects of migration also could help quell anti-migrant sentiment.	审慎地引导公众参与移民问题的其他发面也有助于减少反移民情绪。


For example, recent research in several countries shows that immigrants as a whole contribute more economically to their communities than they take from them.	比如，一些国家的最新研究表明，移民作为一个整体，在经济上对所在社区的贡献大于索取。


In Germany, a study by the Bertelsmann Foundation, to be released next month, shows that the net fiscal contribution per migrant amounted to €3,300 ($4,260) in 2012.	在德国，将于下个个月发布的贝塔斯曼基金会（Transatlantic Trends survey）调查表明，2012年每位移民的净财政贡献为3,300欧元。


Such data upend the conventional wisdom that migrants are a drain on public services.	这一数据颠覆了一项传统智慧——移民会消耗公共服务。


Of course, migration creates real challenges for communities and can lead to job losses and lower wages for native workers.	当然，移民给社区带来了现实挑战，也可能造成本国工人失业和工资降低。


But here, too, it is the absence of attention to these issues, not necessarily the presence of migrants, that is the problem.	但是，在这里，问题同样在于没有对这方面引起重视，而不在于移民的出现。


Implementing vigorous retraining policies, for example, would be a better way to counter these adverse effects than calling for mass deportations.	比如，实施严格的限制政策是比大规模遣返更好的抵消这些消极影响的办法。


This is one reason why labor unions, which once opposed immigration across the board, are now far more supportive of measures that would legalize undocumented workers and create more pathways for migration.	这也是曾经毫无例外地反对移民的工会如今也开始更多地支持能让未登记工人获得合法身份、创造更多移民途径的措施了的原因。


Informed public debate is the sine qua non of a democratic polity.	信息充分的公共争论是民主政体的必要条件。


In its absence, bias and populism prevail.	否则偏见和民粹主义就将横行。


The immigration debate will never be an easy one, but it can become less tendentious and more deliberative if its participants consider the facts.	移民争论永远都不是一个轻松的话题，但如果参与者能够认识事实，那么就将少一分偏见，多一分审慎。


Buy Back or Pay Forward?	回购还是为未来出资


LONDON – When British Prime Minister David Cameron asked me to lead a review into the problem of antimicrobial resistance, the last thing I expected was that accepting the position would lead me to question one of the most popular tools for corporate financial management: share buybacks.	伦敦—英国首相卡梅伦要我担任抗耐药性问题评估的主管，当时我最没有想到的是这一职位会让我质疑公司财务管理最常用的工具之一：股票回购。


The problem of antimicrobial resistance is a serious one.	抗耐药性问题是一个严重的问题。


Left unaddressed, it could be responsible by 2050 for the deaths of some ten million people a year, more than currently die of cancer, along with an astonishing $100 trillion in economic damage.	如果不解决，到2050年每年都将有1,000万人因此死去，比目前癌症死亡人数还要多，经济损失更是高达100万亿美元。


Fortunately, however, there is much we can do to mitigate the threat – provided that adequate resources are made available.	但是，幸运的是，我们可以做很多事情减轻这一威胁——只要我们可以获得足够的资源。


One important avenue to pursue is the development of new drugs.	实现这一点的一个重要途径是开发新药。


In a forthcoming paper, the Review on Antimicrobial Resistance estimates that bringing new antimicrobials to market and improving their administration will cost about $25 billion – a significant sum, but one that pales in comparison to the costs to society if the problem is not checked.	在一篇即将发表的文章中，抗耐药性评估（Review on Antimicrobial Resistance）估计，实现新抗生素上市并改善它们的管理需要耗资大约250亿美元——一笔巨款，但和问题得不到解决所引起的社会成本相比只是九牛一毛。


It is also roughly what two of the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies will spend this year buying back their own shares.	而这也是世界最大的两家制药公司今年用于回购本公司股票的金额。


While the review has yet to come up with recommendations for financing the development of new drugs, it seems clear to me that it is well within the capacity of the pharmaceutical industry to contribute.	抗耐药性评估没有提出新药开发融资的建议，但对我来说，显然这在制药业的能力范围内。


A common argument made by drug companies is that they need to be guaranteed a reward if they are to invest in developing medicines that are unlikely to deliver the kind of returns that other investments may provide.	制药公司的一个共同观点是，如果要投资开发不可能带来其他投资可提供的回报的药物，就必须获得担保。


The only sure way to guarantee drug development, the argument goes, is to allow prices to rise until demand matches supply.	该观点还认为，担保药物开发的唯一办法是允许提高价格直到需求匹配供给。


And yet there is a good reason why the pharmaceutical industry can and should play a major role in financing something like a common “Innovation Fund” to provide financing for early-stage research into solving the problem of antimicrobial resistance.	有一个重要理由认为制药业能够也应该在融资中扮演类似于共同“创新基金”的角色，为解决抗耐药性的早期研究提供资金。


And that reason is one that I became familiar with during my years at Goldman Sachs: enlightened self-interest.	而这个理由是我在高盛公司任职期间耳熟能详的：开明自利（enlightened self-interest）


Six years after the eruption of the global financial crisis, the banking industry is still widely blamed for the catastrophe.	全球金融危机爆发六年来，银行业仍受到千夫之指。


And, as a result, banks are being hit with regulatory constraints that limit some aspects of their business.	结果，银行饱受监管约束打击，限制了一些方面的业务。


I suspect that if the industry had shown greater leadership on issues – for example, excessive executive pay – they would have found themselves in a much more favorable environment today.	我认为，如果银行业在诸如高管薪酬过高等问题上表现出更强的领导力，它们今天所面临的环境将有利得多。


The same is true of the pharmaceutical industry.	制药业也是如此。


Share buybacks can sometimes be legitimate, but on other occasions they do not seem justified – especially when considered from the standpoint of enlightened self-interest.	股票回购有时是合理的，但有时并非如此——特别是从开明自利的角度考虑的话。


In December, the pharmaceutical giant Merck spent $8.4 billion to acquire Cubist Pharmaceuticals, a Massachusetts-based drug-maker that specializes in combating Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), a bacteria that has become resistant to many types of antibiotics.	12月，制药业巨头默克公司以84亿美元收购了位于马萨诸塞州的丘比斯特制药公司（Cubist Pharmaceuticals）。 丘比斯特公司专长于解决抗甲氧西林金黄酿脓葡萄球菌（MRSA，一种可耐多种抗生素的细菌）问题。


In early March – less than three months after the acquisition – Merck announced it would close down Cubist’s early-stage research unit, laying off some 120 staff and perhaps crippling its efforts to introduce new drugs into the pipeline.	3月初——也就是收购完成不到三个月——默克宣布将关闭丘比斯特早期研究团队，裁员120人，也许还要削减新药开发的投入。


Three weeks later, Merck announced that it would spend an additional $10 billion to buy back some of its shares.	三周后，默克公司宣布它将增加100亿美元用于回购本公司股票。


It is difficult for an outside observer not to draw a connection between the two decisions.	作为外部观��者，你很难不把这两件事联系起来。


Of course, dubious buybacks are not confined to the pharmaceutical industry.	当然，可疑的回购并不局限于制药业。


Apple is another good example.	苹果公司是另一个例子。


The company’s latest quarterly sales results show how the company has become something more than a technology firm; it is now a major middle-class Chinese consumer brand.	该公司最近一个季度的销售报告表明，该公司已不再仅仅是一个科技企业； 而是已经成为一个中国中产阶级消费者的主打品牌。


Within a year, China will likely be a bigger market for its products than the United States.	中国将在一年内成为苹果公司比美国更大的产品市场。


And yet, even more striking than this confirmation of the still-rising importance of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) economies is the sheer size of Apple’s ongoing buyback program.	而比这一金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国）重要性不断上升的明证更加令人震惊的是苹果公司正在进行的回购计划。


In April, the company announced it had authorized an additional $50 billion to be used for repurchasing shares, bringing the total to $140 billion.	4月，该公司宣布加批500亿美元用于回购股份，回购总额达到了1,400亿美元。


Coming at a time when the technology industry is under increasing scrutiny in the developed world as governments struggle with budget shortfalls and rising debt, this seems to me to be a questionable decision.	由于政府苦于预算不足和债务上升，高科技行业正在接受日益严格的监督，在这样的背景下的这样一则消息让我有些怀疑这个决定。


Companies’ ability to minimize their global tax burden, while boosting their earnings per share through buybacks – in some cases financed with debt – does not strike me as a stable trend.	公司通过股票回购——有时用债务融资进行——最小化其全球税负、同时刺激每股收益的能力作为一个稳定的趋势，并不让我惊讶。


When companies are genuinely unable to identify areas of research and investment that would help their business (and employees and clients), they are better off returning the savings to shareholders in the form of higher dividends than authorizing buybacks.	当公司的无法找出有助于业务（以及员工和客户）的研发领域时，将储蓄以更高的分红和批准回购的方式返回给股东更加合适。


Or, better yet, in a world confronted with a host of problems – from climate change to antimicrobial resistance – industry leaders should begin asking themselves how they can contribute to averting the crises of the future.	或者，更好的办法是，在面临从气候变化到耐药性的诸多问题的情况下，行业领袖应该开始扪心自问，应该如何为避免未来危机做出贡献。


Megafunding Drug Research	药物研发巨型基金


SEATTLE – As price-gouging practices by a handful of drug companies attract headlines, one troubling aspect of the story remains underplayed.	西雅图—某些公司哄抬价格的行为引起了关注，但有一个令人担忧的情况还没有水落石出。


Exorbitant increases in the prices of existing drugs, including generics, are motivated not just by crass profiteering but by a deep skepticism about the economic feasibility of developing new drugs.	现有药物（包括非专利药）价格增幅过快背后的动机并不仅仅是唯利是图，而是对研发新药可行性的深切怀疑。


That skepticism is justified.	这一怀疑不无道理。


Traditional models for funding drug development are faltering.	传统药物研发融资模式岌岌可危。


In the US and many other developed countries, the average cost of bringing a new drug to market has skyrocketed, even as patents on some of the industry’s most profitable drugs have expired.	在美国和其他许多发达国家，虽然一些利润最大的药物专利已经过期，但向市场推出新药的平均成本仍然水涨船高。


Venture capital has pulled back from early-stage life-sciences companies, and big pharmaceutical companies have seen fewer drugs reach the market per dollar spent on research and development.	风险资本纷纷从初创生命科学公司退出，大型制药公司每一美元研发支出所对应的上市新药数量也在下降。


Indeed, on average, only one of every 10,000 compounds identified as potentially useful in early-stage research will ultimately win approval from regulators.	事实上，平均而言，在早期研究阶段被认为具有潜在��途的化合物中，只有万分之一能够最终获得监管者的批准。


The approval process can take as long as 15 years and errs on the side of caution.	批准过程可能长达15年，过于谨小慎微。


Even among drugs that make it to human clinical trials, only one in five will clear that final hurdle.	即使进入了人类临床试验阶段，也只有五分之一能够跨越这一最后一关。


The price tag for these “slow fails” can be enormous.	这些“缓慢失败”的代价十分高昂。


Pfizer, for example, spent a reported $800 million on its cholesterol-lowering drug, torcetrapib, before pulling it from phase III clinical trials in 2006.	比如，辉瑞制药公司据称花了8亿美元用于其降胆固醇药物torcetrapib，最后在2006年退出了临床试验第III阶段。


That’s an unappealing prospect for most investors.	对于大部分投资者而言，这样的前景毫无吸引力。


Because the risk of backing any one compound, or even a particular company, is so high, vast pools of investment capital lie out of reach for drug developers.	支持任何一种药用化合物甚至某家公司的风险太大，因此大量投资资本迟迟不肯投向药物研发机构。


Spurred by these pressures, finance experts have proposed several funding alternatives that reduce the risk of biopharma investments while improving the efficiency and productivity of the R&D pipeline.	受这些压力推动，金融专家提出了一些另类融资办法以降低生物制药投资的风险，同时提高研发部门的效率和生产率。


Although industry incumbents may be slow to shift gears, developing countries creating next-generation biopharma hubs have a unique opportunity to adopt and benefit from alternative models.	行业巨头也许需要很长时间才能改变方针，但正在打造新一代生物制药枢纽的发展中国家有很好的机会实施这些另类模式并从中获益。


Many of those models build upon a common strategy for de-risking investments: assembling a diversified portfolio.	许多这类模式的基础是十分普通的去风险化投资战略：构建一个多样化投资组合。


Two decades ago, a company called Royalty Pharma launched a diversified model, building a fund of ownership interests in multiple drug royalty streams.	二十年前，一家名叫特许费制药（Royalty Pharma）的公司推出了一种多样化模式，成立了一个基于多种药物特许费收入流的所有者权益基金。


Royalty Pharma focused on approved drugs with blockbuster potential, creating stable revenue streams and impressive equity returns – even during periods of extreme stock-market volatility.	特许费制药公司专注于有可能一炮而红的已批准药物，实现了稳定的收入流和令人印象深刻的股东回报——即使在股市波动最剧烈的时期。


But Royalty Pharma’s model will not bridge the funding gap between the basic research supported by government grants and the late-stage development of drugs that are in clinical trials.	但特许费制药公司的模式无法填补从政府出资支持的基础研究到已进入临床试验的最后阶段研发之间的资金缺口。


Because the candidate drugs in this R&D “valley of death” are riskier than anything in which Royalty Pharma invests, an even larger portfolio of compounds would be needed to yield levels of risk and rates of return that are acceptable to typical investors.	由于这一研发“死亡谷”的潜在候选药物风险远大于所有特许费制药公司的投资项目，因此需要比之大得多的投资组合才能获得普通投资者可接受的风险和回报率水平。


How large would that portfolio have to be?	那么，这一投资组合要大到什么程度？


One of us (Lo) has carried out simulations of diversified funds for early- and mid-stage cancer drugs, which show that a so-called megafund of $5-30 billion, comprising 100-200 compounds, could sufficiently de-risk the investment while generating returns of between 9-11%.	作者之一（罗闻全）模拟了癌症药物早期和中期研发的多样化基金，结果表明，所谓的巨型基金（megafund）——规模在50—300亿美元，包含100—200种药物——能够有效降低投资风险，同时产生9—11%的回报。


That’s not exciting territory for venture capitalists and private-equity investors, but it is in keeping with the expectations of institutional investors, such as pension funds, endowments, and sovereign wealth funds.	对于风险资本家和私募股权投资者来说，这算不上令人振奋的东西，但这符合机构投资者（如退休基金、捐赠基金和主权财富基金）的预期。


Moreover, the risk reduction from diversification would allow the megafund to issue large amounts of debt as well as equity, further broadening the pool of potential investors.	此外，多样化带来的风险降低能够让巨型基金发行大量债务和股本，进一步拓宽潜在投资者范围。


To put these numbers in context, consider that the US National Institutes of Health funds just over $30 billion annually in basic medical research, and members of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America spent about $51 billion last year on R&D. A megafund approach would help to make both investments more productive by filling the funding gap between them.	基于这些数字，我们再想一下，美国国家卫生研究所（National Institutes of Health）每年的基础医学研究拨款只有300多亿美元，而美国药品研究和制造协会（Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America）成员去年的研发支出大约为510亿美元。 巨型基金方案能够填补两者之间的资金缺口，从而有助于提高前两种投资的生产率。


Moreover, this model may work on a smaller scale.	此外，这一模式也许可以在更小的规模上起作用。


Further simulations suggest that funds specializing in some drug classes, such as therapies for orphan diseases, could achieve double-digit rates of return with just $250-500 million dollars and fewer compounds in the portfolio.	进一步的模拟表明，专注于某些药物类型——如“孤儿病”药物——的激进可能只需要2. 5—5亿美元规模、包含较少的 药物就可以实现两位数的回报率。


Of course, this approach faces challenges.	当然，这一方案也面临挑战。


It won’t be easy to manage a large pool of candidate compounds and dozens of simultaneous drug trials.	管理为数巨大的潜在药物和几十宗同时进行的药物测试绝非易事。


Simulations show that megafunds will not work for all classes of drugs in all therapeutic areas.	模拟表明，巨型基金无法对所有疾病类型的所有药物起作用。


Development of Alzheimers’ therapies, for example, is unlikely to benefit from the megafund model.	比如，奥尔茨海默症药物研发就无法从巨型基金模式中获益。


But where they do work, megafunds could make drug development vastly more efficient, and therefore less costly.	但在巨型基金能起作用的领域，它可以显著提高药物研发的效率，从而降低成本。


No single company possesses the scale or finances to deploy all the advances in science and technology since the genomics revolution, but a megafund-backed effort could.	没有哪家公司拥有独自部署自基因组革命以来所有科学和技术进步的财力，但巨型基金支持的项目可以。


Researchers employed by the fund could share knowledge, facilities, and state-of-the-art equipment, data, and computing resources, spread over a wide array of projects.	基金所聘用的研究者可以共享知识、设施和最先进的设备、数据和计算资源，并且跨越各种项目。


Failures would be faster – and much cheaper – because stakeholders would be less dependent on any one project.	失败的发生会更快——成本也更低——因为相关利益方并不依赖某一个项目。


Emerging-market countries should take note.	新兴市场国家需要注意。


Most are chasing the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries.	大部分新兴市场国家都在追逐制药和生物科技行业。


China has established hundreds of life-sciences research parks and committed billions of dollars in national funds for drug development; comparable programs are under way in India, Singapore, and South Korea.	中国建立了数百家生命科学研究产业园，并投入数十亿美元的国家资金用于药品研发； 印度、新加坡和韩国也在实施类似的计划。


For these countries, forming a megafund to test a few hundred compounds could be a much better bet than seeding biotech startups or offering incentives to big pharmaceutical firms.	对这些国家来说，成立一个巨型基金测试数百种药物是比培育生物科技初创企业或为大型制药企业提供激励好得多的赌注。


A biopharma megafund would offer a competitive edge in the industry, with lower development costs, a higher success rate, and faster time to market.	一家生物制药巨型基金能给全行业带来竞争优势，降低研发成本、提高研发成功率、缩短上市时间。


Regional economies would benefit from the same networks of high-paying research jobs, entrepreneurs, investors, and service providers that traditional life-sciences innovation hubs create.	地区经济体也能够从传统生命科学创新枢纽所形成的高薪研究岗位、企业家、投资者和服务提供商网络中获益。


London’s mayor recently embraced this approach, proposing a $15 billion megafund to help the United Kingdom maintain a leadership role in drug development.	伦敦市长最近采取了这一方案，提出建立一个150亿美元的巨型基金帮助英国保持其在药物研发方面的领导地位。


In addition to direct investment, governments can also create incentives for the formation of these kinds of funds – for example, by guaranteeing bonds issued for biopharma research.	除了直接投资，政府还可以为建立这类基金提供激励——比如为生物制药研究债券提供担保。


Ushering a drug from lab bench to bedside requires investing vast sums of money over long horizons.	让药物从实验室走向床头的过程需要长期巨额投资。


That funding must pay off for both society and investors.	这笔资金必须产生社会和投资两方面的回报。


Emerging countries can lead the world to better health and greater wealth by pioneering new ways to finance drug development.	新兴国家能够通过引领药物研发融资新方法领导世界走向更健康、更富有的未来。


The Disenchantment of Europe	欧洲的觉悟


LONDON – The recent European Parliament elections were dominated by disillusion and despair.	伦敦—最近的欧洲议会选举被幻灭和绝望所主导。


Only 43% of Europeans bothered to vote – and many of them deserted establishment parties, often for anti-EU extremists.	只有43%的欧洲人愿意参与选举——其中许多人还抛弃了老牌政党，大量涌向反欧盟极端主义者。


Indeed, the official results understate the extent of popular dissatisfaction; many who stuck with traditional parties did so reluctantly, faute de mieux.	事实上，官方结果低估了民众不满的程度； 许多仍投票给传统政党的人其实并不甘心，只是两劣相权取其轻而已。


There are many reasons for this political earthquake, but the biggest are the enduring misery of depressed living standards, double-digit unemployment rates, and diminished hopes for the future.	这场政治地震的原因有很多，但最大的原因是生活水平持续受到抑制、高达两位数的失业率以及对未来失去希望。


Europe’s rolling crisis has shredded trust in the competence and motives of policymakers, who failed to prevent it, have so far failed to resolve it, and bailed out banks and their creditors while inflicting pain on voters (but not on themselves).	欧洲的深刻危机摧毁了人们对决策者能力与动机的信任——后者既没有能够预防危机，现在也没有解决危机，还以选民的痛苦为代价援助银行及其债权人，当然他们自己并没有受到影响。


The crisis has lasted so long that most governing parties (and technocrats) have been found wanting.	危机持续得如此之久，以至于大部分执政党（和技术官僚）都无法令人满意。


In the eurozone, successive governments of all stripes have been bullied into implementing flawed and unjust policies demanded by Germany’s government and imposed by the European Commission.	在欧元区，形形色色的政府你方唱罢我登场，一直在威胁实施德国政府所要求、欧盟委员会所采取的漏洞百出又不公平的政策。


Though German Chancellor Angela Merkel calls the surge in support for extremists “regrettable,” her administration – and EU institutions more generally – is substantially responsible for it.	尽管德国总理默克尔称极端主义支持者激增“令人遗憾”，但她的政府——以及范围更广的欧盟机构——对此要负很大责任。


Start with Greece.	从希腊开始。


Merkel, together with the European Commission and the European Central Bank, threatened to deprive Greeks of the use of their own currency, the euro, unless their government accepted punitive conditions.	默克尔与欧盟委员会和欧洲央行一起威胁剥夺希腊人使用欧元的权利，除非他们的政府接受惩罚性条件。


Greeks have been forced to accept brutal austerity measures in order to continue to service an unbearable debt burden, thereby limiting losses for French and German banks and for eurozone taxpayers whose loans to Greece bailed out those banks.	希腊人被迫接受了严厉的紧缩措施以继续维持难以承担的债务负担，以此控制法国和德国银行的损失以及欧洲纳税人（他们借给希腊人的贷款被用来援助这些银行）的损失。


As a result, Greece has suffered a slump worse than Germany’s in the 1930’s.	结果，希腊经历了比20世纪30年代的德国还要糟糕的衰退。


Is it really any wonder that popular support for the governing parties that complied with this diktat plunged from 69% in the 2009 European Parliament election to 31% in 2014, that a far-left coalition demanding debt justice topped the poll, or that the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party finished third?	遵守这一��方面苛刻条件的政党在欧洲议会的支持率从2009年选举的69%降低到2014年的31%、要求债务公平的极左翼联盟在选举中拔得头筹、甚至新纳粹主义政党金色黎明党（Golden Dawn）名列第三，这真的令人惊奇吗？


In Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, the bad lending of German and French banks in the bubble years was primarily to local banks rather than to the government.	在爱尔兰、葡萄牙和西班牙，德国和法国银行的泡沫年份坏账主要是贷给当地银行而非政府的。


But here, too, the Berlin-Brussels-Frankfurt axis blackmailed local taxpayers into paying for foreign banks’ mistakes – presenting the Irish with a €64 billion ($87 billion) bill, roughly €14,000 per person, for banks’ bad debt – while imposing massive austerity.	但在这方面，柏林-布鲁塞尔-法兰克福轴心仍强迫本地纳税人为外国银行的错误买单——要爱尔兰为银行不良债务拿出640亿欧元，相当于每人14,000欧元——并且还要实施大规模紧缩。


Support for compliant establishment parties duly collapsed – from 81% in 2009 to 49% in 2014 in Spain.	顺从的老牌政党的支持率也相应的下跌了——在西班牙，从2009年的81%降至2014年的49%。


Fortunately, memories of fascist dictatorship may have inoculated Spain and Portugal against the far-right virus, with left-wing anti-austerity parties and regionalists benefiting instead.	幸运的是，对法西斯独裁的记忆让西班牙和葡萄牙能够对极右翼病毒免疫，而左翼反紧缩政党和地方主义者因此得福。


In Ireland, independents topped the poll.	在爱尔兰，独立派的支持度最高。


The misconception that northern European taxpayers are bailing out southern ones also prompted a backlash in Finland, where the far-right Finns won 13% of the vote, and in Germany, where the new anti-euro Alternative für Deutschland won 7%.	北欧纳税人在援助南欧人的错觉也助长了芬兰和德国的国内阻力，极右翼的芬兰人党（Finns）赢得13%选票，德国的反欧元政党德意志替代方案党（Alternative für Deutschland）赢得7%选票。


At Merkel’s behest and with the complicity of the ECB, which waited until July 2012 to quell a bond-market panic sparked by eurozone policymakers’ mistakes, the Commission also imposed eurozone-wide austerity, causing a cumulative loss of nearly 10% of GDP in 2011-13, according to the Commission’s own economic model.	面对默克尔的要求和欧洲央行的顺从（欧洲央行直到2012年7月才出手平抑由欧元区决策者错误导致的债券市场恐慌），欧盟委员会也在全欧元区推出了紧缩政策，导致2011—2013年接近GDP的10%的总损失（据欧盟委员会自己的经济模型数据）。


By plunging Italy into a deep recession (from which it has yet to recover), austerity sank interim Prime Minister Mario Monti’s broad-based coalition and boosted Beppe Grillo’s anti-establishment, anti-euro Five Star Movement, which finished second in the European Parliament election.	紧缩让意大利陷入深度衰退（至今仍未恢复），让总理蒙蒂的广泛联合过渡政府半途而废，让格里洛（Beppe Grillo）的反现状、反欧盟政党——五星运动（Five Star Movement）得以兴起，并在欧洲议会选举中名列第二。


Merkel also demanded a stifling and undemocratic EU fiscal straightjacket, which the Commission duly enforces.	默克尔还要求采取严厉的不民主的欧盟财政紧缩，欧盟委员会照办不误。


So when voters throw out a government, EU fiscal enforcer Olli Rehn immediately insists that the new administration stick to its predecessor’s failed policies, alienating voters from the EU and pushing them toward the extremes.	因此，当选民将一个政府赶下台时，欧盟财政政策执行者雷恩（Olli Rehn）立刻要求新政府继续遵循前任的失败政策，这让选民与欧盟渐行渐远，将他们推向了极端主义者。


Consider France.	以法国为例。


After François Hollande became President in 2012 on a pledge to end austerity, his Socialist Party won a large majority in parliamentary elections.	2012年，奥朗德以结束紧缩的承诺问鼎总统宝座，他的社会党也在随后的议会选举中大获全胜。


But Berlin browbeat him into further austerity.	但柏林以恐吓迫使他采取进一步紧缩。


Now, with both the center right and the center left discredited – together, they received only 35% of the popular vote – Marine Le Pen’s racist Front National topped the poll by promising radical change.	如今，中右翼和中左翼均大失信誉——加起来只获得了35%的支持度——而勒庞（Marine Le Pen）的法西斯主义政党国民阵线（Front National）以彻底变革的承诺在选举中拔得头筹。


Along with a chronic economic crisis, Europe now has an acute political crisis.	眼下，陷入长期经济危机的欧洲又面临着尖锐的政治危机。


Yet the EU establishment seems bent on pursuing business as usual.	但欧盟现任官员似乎决心老方一帖。


In the parliament, a vocal but fragmented minority of critics, cranks, and bigots is likely to push the center-right and center-left groups, which still have a combined majority, to club together even more closely.	在欧洲议会，一群掷地有声但一盘散沙的批评者、怪人和偏执狂少数派可能把中右翼和中左翼团体——他们加起来仍占有多数——推向更紧密的联盟。


The low turnout and weakening of mainstream parties gives the European Council – national leaders of the EU’s member states – a pretext to continue cutting deals in smoke-free rooms.	低投票率和主流政党的弱势给了欧洲理事会——欧盟成员国的国家领导人们——继续在没有硝烟的房间里讨价还价的条件。


First up will be the choice of the European Commission’s next president.	首先是欧盟委员会下一任主席的人选问题。


The outgoing president, José Manuel Barroso, claims that “the political forces that led and supported…the Union’s joint crisis response…have overall won once again.”	即将卸任的主席巴罗佐（José Manuel Barroso）称“领导和支持……欧盟的共同危机应对措施的政治力量又一次获得了总体胜利。


Merkel wants to stick to current policies that have failed to deliver growth and jobs.	”默克尔想继续坚持并没有带来增长和就业的当前政策。


Perhaps the man to shake things up is Matteo Renzi, Italy’s dynamic 39-year-old prime minister.	也许能让局面有所改变的从满活力的39岁的意大利总理伦齐。


In office since February, he won a resounding 41% of the vote, twice that of his nearest rival.	自2月履新以来，他赢得了令人瞩目的41%的支持率，是最接近的对手的两倍。


Already committed to reforming his country’s crony capitalism, he now has a mandate to challenge Merkel’s crisis response.	他承诺改革意大利的权贵资本主义，现在，他具备了挑战默克尔的危机应对措施的权威。


The timing is perfect: Italy takes over the EU’s rotating presidency in July.	时机正合适：意大利将在7月成为欧盟轮值主席国。


Renzi has already called for a €150 billion EU investment boost and greater fiscal flexibility.	伦齐已经要求实施1,500亿欧元的欧盟投资计划和更大的财政灵活度。


Instead of a eurozone caged in by Germany’s narrow interests as a creditor, Europe needs a monetary union that works for all of its citizens.	欧洲不能受制于作为债权人的德国的狭隘利益，而需要为所有公民服务的货币联盟。


Zombie banks should be restructured, excessive debts (both private and public) written down, and increased investment combined with reforms to boost productivity (and thus wages).	僵尸银行应该予以重组，过度的债务（不管是公是私）应该予以减记，并增加投资、实施改革以提高生产率（从而提高工资）。


The fiscal straightjacket should be scrapped, with governments that borrow too much allowed to default.	财政紧缩必须取消，过度借贷的政府应该允许违约。


Ultimately, the fairer, freer, and richer eurozone that would emerge is in Germany’s interest, too.	最终，由此产生的更公正、更自由、更富裕的欧元区也将符合德国的利益。


Europeans also need a greater say over the EU’s direction – and the right to change course.	欧洲人还需要对欧盟方向的更大的决定权——以及改变发展进程的权利。


They need a European Spring of economic and political renewal.	他们需要一场让经济和政治重生的欧洲之春。


Germany’s Economic Mirage	德国的经济幻象


LONDON – For 60 years, successive German governments sought a more European Germany. But now, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s administration wants to reshape Europe’s economies in Germany’s image.	发自伦敦——近60年来，历届德国政府都试图把自己的国家变成一个更欧洲的德国，如今，德国首相安吉拉默克尔（Angela Merkel）的政府则希望按照德国的形式来重塑欧洲各经济体，这不仅在政治上是不明智的，在经济上也是非常危险的。


This is politically unwise and economically dangerous. Far from being Europe’s most successful economy – as German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble and others boast – Germany’s economy is dysfunctional.	德国经济远没有该国财政部长沃尔夫冈·朔伊布勒（Wolfgang Schäuble）及其他人所自夸的那样极为成功———事实上，该国经济其实处于机能失调的状态。


To be sure, Germany has its strengths: world-renowned companies, low unemployment, and an excellent credit rating. But it also has stagnant wages, busted banks, inadequate investment, weak productivity gains, dismal demographics, and anemic output growth.	无可否认德国有其自身优势，世界知名的企业，较低的失业率，以及极佳的信贷评级，但它同时也拥有停滞不前的工资水平，破产倒闭的银行，不恰当的投资，较低的生产力提升，令人沮丧的人口年龄构成，以及缓慢的生产力增长。


Its “beggar-thy-neighbor” economic model – suppressing wages to subsidize exports – should not serve as an example for the rest of the eurozone to follow.	而其“以邻为壑”的经济模式——通过压制工资来补贴出口——不应成为其他欧元区国家效仿的模板。


Germany’s economy contracted in the second quarter of 2014, and has grown by a mere 3.6% since the 2008 global financial crisis – slightly more than France and the United Kingdom, but less than half the rate in Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.	德国经济在2014年第二季度出现了收缩，而且自2008年全球金融危机以来仅仅增长了3. 6%，这仅仅比法国和英国高一点，却只是瑞典，瑞士和美国的不到二分之一。


Since 2000, GDP growth has averaged just 1.1% annually, ranking 13th in the 18-member eurozone.	自2000年以来，德国的GDP增长仅为年均1. 1个百分点，在拥有十八个成员国的欧元区中排名第十三。


Written off as the “sick man of Europe” when the euro was launched in 1999, Germany responded not by boosting dynamism, but by cutting costs.	在1999年启动欧元时摆脱了“欧洲病夫”外号的德国并没有尝试去激发自身的活力，而是通过削减成本来应对。


Investment has fallen from 22.3% of GDP in 2000 to 17% in 2013.	投资规模从2000年占GDP的22.


Infrastructure, such as highways, bridges, and even the Kiel Canal, is crumbling after years of neglect.	3%下降到2013年的17%，包括高速公路，桥梁甚至基尔运河这样的基础设施项目都在遭到数年的冷落后最终下马。


The education system is creaking: the number of new apprentices is at a post-reunification low, the country has fewer young graduates (29%) than Greece (34%), and its best universities barely scrape into the global top 50.	教育系统也是问题丛生，新生数量处于德国统一以来的最低值，年轻毕业生的比例（29%）甚至低于希腊（34%），而德国最优秀的大学都很少能进入全球前五十名大学榜单。


Hobbled by underinvestment, Germany’s arthritic economy struggles to adapt.	在投资不足的制肘之下，德国步履蹒跚的经济只能努力适应。


Despite former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s labor-market reforms, it is harder to lay off a permanent employee in Germany than anywhere else in the OECD. Germany languishes in 111th place globally for ease of starting a business, according to the World Bank’s Doing Business rankings.	尽管前总理格哈德·施罗德（Gerhard Schröder）推行了劳动力市场改革，但是要解雇一名长期员工的难度依然比在其他的经合组织国家要高，根据世界银行的营商排名报告，在德国创建一个新企业的容易度处于全球第111位，该国的大型企业都非常古老而僵化，完全无法和谷歌或者是Facebook媲美，其服务部门尤其守旧。


Its largest firms are old and entrenched; it has produced no equivalent of Google or Facebook; and the service sector is particularly hidebound.	根据世界经合组织的报告，相对于其他发达经济体，德国政府在过去七年中只推行了很少的增长改革。


The government has introduced fewer pro-growth reforms over the past seven years than any other advanced economy, according to the OECD.	在过去十年内的平均年生产力增长仅为0.


Average annual productivity growth over the past decade, at a mere 0.9%, has been slower even than Portugal’s.	9%，甚至比葡萄牙还低。


The brunt of the stagnation has been borne by German workers.	这种停滞不前的冲击只能由德国劳动者来承受，虽然他们的生产力在过去15年间提升了17.


Though their productivity has risen by 17.8% over the past 15 years, they now earn less in real terms than in 1999, when a tripartite agreement among the government, companies, and unions effectively capped wages.	8%。 但他们现在的实际收入甚至比1999年更低，因为当时政府企业和工会达成了一个三方协议将工资增长牢牢控制了起来。


Business owners might cheer, but suppressing wages harms the economy’s longer-term prospects by discouraging workers from upgrading skills, and companies from investing in higher-value production.	这或许会得到企业老板的欢迎，但压制工资同时也破坏了经济的长期繁荣，因为劳动者��缺乏动力去提升自身技能，企业也不愿意投资高产值生产设备。


Wage compression saps domestic demand, while subsidizing exports, on which Germany’s growth relies.	压抑工资导致国内需求停滞不前，却补贴了出口，而德国的经济增长正是依赖于后者。


The euro, which is undoubtedly much weaker than the Deutschmark would have been, has also helped, by reducing the prices of German goods and preventing France and Italy from pursuing currency depreciation.	与此同时，显然比德国马克更加弱势的欧元也有助于降低德国产品的价格，并防止法国和意大利实施货币贬值。


Until recently, the euro also provided booming external demand in southern Europe, while China’s breakneck industrial development raised demand for Germany’s traditional exports.	当中国的高速工业发展提升了对德国传统出口需求的同时，欧元也为德国在欧洲南部地区创造了极为蓬勃的外部需求。


But, with southern Europe now depressed, and China’s economy decelerating and shifting away from investment spending, the German export machine has slowed.	但随着南欧地区经济萎靡不振，以及中国出现经济减速以及脱离以投资为主导的转型。 德国的出口机器也因此放缓。


Its share of global exports fell from 9.1% in 2007 to 8% in 2013 – as low as in the “sick man” era, when Germany was struggling with reunification.	德国占全球出口的份额从2007年的9. 1%下降到2013年的8%——这个数字跟两德刚刚统一的“病人时期”相同。


Because cars and other exports “made in Germany” now contain many parts produced in central and eastern Europe, Germany’s share of global exports is at a record low in value-added terms.	因为很多所谓“德国生产”的汽车及其他出口产品也包含了许多生产自中东欧地区的零件，所以在增值方面，德国占全球出口的比例已经到了历史的最低点。 。


German policymakers pride themselves on the country’s vast current-account surplus – €197 billion ($262 billion) as of June 2014 – viewing it as a sign of Germany’s superior competitiveness.	德国的政策制定者们为该国巨大的经常账户盈余感到自豪——在2014年6月达到1970亿欧元（折合2620亿美元）——并将其视为德国巨大竞争力优势的体现。


Why, then, are businesses unwilling to invest more in the country?	那么为何如今企业却不愿意在德国追加投资？


External surpluses are in fact symptomatic of an ailing economy.	外部盈余其实是一个病态经济的症状。


Stagnant wages boost corporate surpluses, while subdued spending, a stifled service sector, and stunted start-ups suppress domestic investment, with the resulting surplus savings often squandered overseas.	工资增长停滞不前为企业带来了盈利，但与此同时消费的停滞，服务部门的僵化以及以及对新企业的压制却压抑了国内投资，于是所有的盈余都被投向了国外。


The Berlin-based DIW institute calculates that from 2006 to 2012, the value of Germany’s foreign portfolio holdings fell by €600 billion, or 22% of GDP.	而根据位于德国柏林的DIW研究所测算，在2006年至2012年间德国持有海外资本价值下跌了六千亿欧元，相当于GDP的22%。


Worse, rather than being an “anchor of stability” for the eurozone, as Schäuble claims, Germany spreads instability.	更糟糕的是，相对于成为欧元区的“稳定之锚”（朔伊布勒所言），德国实际上是在散布不稳定。


Its banks’ poor approach to lending their surplus savings inflated asset-price bubbles in the run-up to the financial crisis, and have imposed debt deflation since then.	在金融危机不断积蓄的过程中，德国各大银行拙劣的盈余储蓄投资手段推高了资产价格泡沫，又在随后引发了债务萎缩。


Nor is Germany a “growth engine” for the eurozone.	同时德国也不是欧元区的“增长引擎”。


In fact, its weak domestic demand has dampened growth elsewhere.	实际上，该国疲软的国内需求也拖累了其他地区的增长。


As a result, German banks and taxpayers are less likely to recover their bad loans to southern Europe.	因此估计德国银行和纳税人也难以追回自己在欧洲南部地区留下的坏账。


Given how bad wage compression has been for Germany’s economy, foisting wage cuts on the rest of the eurozone would be disastrous.	考虑到压抑工资对德国经济造成了如此恶劣的影响，强制要求欧元区其他国家实施工资削减将是灾难性的。


Slashing incomes depresses domestic spending and makes debts even less manageable.	收入下滑会压抑国内消费并导致债务变得更加难以管理。


With global demand weak, the eurozone as a whole cannot rely on exports to grow out of its debts.	随着全球需求走弱，欧元区整体也无法依靠出口来摆脱自身债务。


For struggling southern European economies whose traditional exports have been undercut by Chinese and Turkish competition, the solution is to invest in moving up the value chain by producing new and better products.	对于那些传统出口在中国和土耳其的竞争下陷于困境的欧洲南部经济体来说，最好的解决方案应该是通过生产更新及更好的产品向价值链上游迁移。


Germany’s economy needs an overhaul.	德国的经济则需要彻底重整。


Policymakers should focus on boosting productivity, not “competitiveness,” with workers being paid their due.	政策制定者们需要把焦点放在通过让工人们得到自身合理所得进而促进生产力，而不是所谓“竞争力”之上。


The government should take advantage of near-zero interest rates to invest, and encourage businesses – especially start-ups – to do likewise.	政府应该借助近乎于零的利率水平去进行投资，并鼓励企业——尤其是新企业——实施投资。


Finally, Germany should welcome more dynamic young immigrants to stem its demographic decline.	最后为了改善其不断老化的人口构成，德国应该欢迎更加多有活力的年轻移民。


This would be a better economic model for Germany.	对于德国来说这将是一个更好的经济模式。


It would also set the right example for the rest of Europe.	而它也将成为值得欧洲其他国家仿效的正确楷模。


Europe’s Bogus Banking Union	虚假的欧洲银行联盟


LONDON – After a 16-hour marathon negotiating session ending on March 20, politicians, technocrats, and journalists were all keen to declare the deal on the final piece of Europe’s banking union a success.	发自伦敦——在经历了一场于3月20日终结的16小时马拉松谈判后，政治家，技术官僚以及媒体记者都急于宣布欧洲银行联盟的最后协定已经成功达成。


But appearances are deceptive.	但这些表象是骗不了人的。


While the “banking union” may soon exist on paper, in practice the eurozone banking system is likely to remain fragmented along national lines and divided between a northern “core,” where governments continue to stand behind local banks, and a southern “periphery,” where governments have run out of money.	虽然这个“银行联盟”可能很快出现在各种纸面文件上，但实际上欧元区的银行体系依然处于各国的条块分割之下，一边是不断为本国银行作后盾的北部“核心国家”，一边是早已耗尽货币资源的南部“外围国家”。


Think back to June 2012.	回想2012年6月。


Spain’s busted banks threatened to drag down the Spanish state, as Ireland’s had done to the Irish state 18 months earlier, while panic tore through the eurozone.	当时西班牙银行危机的爆发差点拖垮西班牙政府，眼看18个月前的爱尔兰危机即将再次上演，欧元区一片恐慌。


European Union leaders resolved to break the link between weak banks and cash-strapped governments.	对此欧盟领导人决定要切断那些问题银行和缺钱政府之间的联系。


A European banking union would move responsibility for dealing with bank failures to the eurozone level – akin to America, where distressed banks in, say, Florida are dealt with by federal authorities with the power to bail in bondholders, inject federal funds, and close down financial institutions.	一个欧洲银行联盟则可以负责在欧元区层面上处理银行破产问题——这跟美国有点类似，比如佛罗里达州就把权力移交给了联邦政府，让后者处理援助债务持有者，注入联邦基金以及关闭金融机构等事宜。


But, a month later, the European Central Bank finally intervened to quell the panic.	但就在一个月之后，欧洲中央银行最终介入以缓解恐慌。


That saved the euro, but it also relieved the pressure on Germany to cede control of its oft-distressed banks.	此举拯救了欧元，但也令德国可以不用放弃对其经常犹如惊弓之鸟的银行进行控制。


Since then, the German government has used its clout to eviscerate the proposed banking union; all that remains is a shell to keep up appearances.	自那以后，德国政府就不断利用其政治影响力去挖空原本提出的银行联盟方案； 最后剩下的就只是一个徒有其表的躯壳。


For starters, it will not apply to the huge losses incurred during the current crisis.	首先，这将不适用于当前危机所导致的庞大损失。


The ECB will directly supervise bigger eurozone banks starting in November (the first step of the banking union), and now it is assessing the strength of their balance sheets.	欧洲央行将在今年11月开始直接监管较大型的欧元区银行（作为银行联盟的第一步），目前它正在对这些银行的资产负债表进行评估。


If this exercise is conducted properly – a big if – undercapitalized banks that are viable would be forced to raise additional equity, from bondholders if necessary, while unviable ones would be wound down.	如果这一行动能得到合理执行的话——那些大型但可能——资本充足率不足但而还能自负盈亏的银行将被迫额外筹集资本（如果有必要的话将来自债券持有人），而那些无法正常运行的银行则会被关停。


But EU rules on national bank resolution will not yet be in force, while the eurozone’s single resolution mechanism will be initiated only in 2015.	但欧盟对国家银行解决方案的监管尚未开始施行，而欧元区的单一解决方案机制也只会在2015年才启动。


So banks in northern Europe that are still backed by creditworthy governments would be treated differently than those in cash-strapped southern Europe: Germany can afford to bail out its banks; Italy cannot.	因此那些依然有高信誉政府撑腰的欧洲北���国家银行将受到与南部缺钱国家银行不同的待遇：德国有能力援助本国的银行，意大利就做不到。


More likely, the ECB will fudge the exercise, owing to fear of reigniting the financial crisis and pressure from national governments.	更可能出现的情况是，由于害怕会重新引发金融危机以及来自各国政府的压力，欧洲央行的举措只是走走过场。


Small countries will be singled out to make the exercise look tough, while bigger problems will be swept under the carpet: German banks have already succeeded in excluding many of their assets from the assessment.	他们会专门挑出几个小国来杀鸡儆猴，而更严重的问题则被掩盖起来：德国各大银行早已成功把自己名下的大批资产排除在了评估之外。


One argument for making the ECB the watchdog for eurozone banks was that it was less captured by the banks than national supervisors were.	一种要求让欧洲央行成为欧元区银行监管者的说法就是认为前者受银行的影响要比各国的监管者要小。


But its behavior throughout the crisis suggests otherwise.	但它在整个危机过程中的行为却与此大相径庭。


It has repeatedly prioritized the interests of banks in “core” countries and proved more pliable to political pressure from Berlin and Paris than from Madrid or Rome, let alone Dublin or Athens.	欧洲央行不断把“核心国家”银行的利益放在首位，而且也更加顺从于来自柏林和巴黎的压力，而不是马德里或者罗马，更别提都柏林和雅典了。


Even after the new banking union framework is fully in place, it will be full of holes.	即便在新的银行联盟框架完全就位之后，它也会充满漏洞。


At Germany’s insistence, the ECB will supervise only the eurozone’s 130 or so biggest banks.	在德国的坚持之下，欧洲央行只会监管欧元区内130家左右的最大型银行。


That will leave the smaller Ländesbanks (state-owned regional banks), many of which made spectacularly bad lending decisions in the bubble years, and Sparkassen (smaller savings banks) in the hands of local politicians and Germany’s pliable financial supervisor.	这会令那些更小型的国有区域性银行——它们在泡沫繁荣时期发放了大量高风险贷款——以及小型储蓄银行落到了当地政客以及德国那些不公正的金融监管者手里。


The argument that smaller lenders are not a systemic threat is spurious: consider Spain’s cajas.	那种认为小型贷款者并未遭遇系统性威胁的说法是错误的：试想西班牙的那些储蓄银行。


In any case, there will not be a level playing field.	无论在任何情况下，这场竞争都不会是公平的。


Above all, the single resolution mechanism is a mirage, because national governments retain a veto over closing down any bank.	最重要的是，所有的单一解决方案机制都是一个假象，因为各国政府都对关闭任何银行保留有一个否定权。


The mechanism is deliberately complex to the point of being unworkable; it is inconceivable that a bank could be wound down over a weekend to avert market panic.	这个机制就是被故意复杂化了以致无法运作； 那种在一个周末的时间内就草草关闭一家银行以遏制市场恐慌情绪的做法是不可想象的。


And the collective funds that eventually will be at its disposal are meager: a mere €55 billion ($76 billion).	而最终将出手救助的集体基金根本不够规模：仅为550亿欧元（合760亿美元）。


In practice, then, rescuing banks will remain in the hands of national governments, all of which are captured by “their” banks but whose capacity to bail them out varies: French and German banks will be rescued; Cypriot banks will not.	而在实际操作中，拯救银行的行为依然由各国政府主导，所有的国家都是被“自己的”银行困扰但援助的能力就大不相同：法国和德国的银行将被拯救；


To increase their chances of a bailout, banks in the eurozone periphery will doubtless borrow as much as they can from politically connected banks and investors in the core countries.	塞浦路斯的银行就没那么好运了。 为了增加自身被援助的几率，欧元区外围的银行将尽可能地从那些在核心国家有政治背景的银行和投资者借款。


Thus, national taxpayers will remain on the hook for bankers’ losses.	因此各国的纳税人最终依旧要为银行家的损失买单。


The upshot is that the eurozone as a whole is likely to struggle with a zombie banking system, with only patchy efforts to restructure banks decisively and fairly.	结果就是欧元区整体将受困于一个僵尸银行系统，只有零零散散的努力去果断而公平地重组银行。


Worse, the north-south, core-periphery divide will harden, with taxpayer-backed banks on one side and banks that must fend for themselves on the other.	更糟的是，南/北以及核心/外围的分裂将依旧存在，一些银行有纳税人撑腰，其他银行只能自谋生路。


That is a bonus for struggling southern taxpayers, but it implies that even sound banks could have higher funding costs than dubious northern European banks for the foreseeable future. Southern businesses would then face higher borrowing costs than northern businesses, hindering growth.	对在危机中挣扎的南欧纳税人来说是个额外的好处，但它也暗示着即便是那些较好的南部银行都会在可见的未来承担比一些不太好的北部银行更高的融资成本，因此也阻碍了其发展。


The bogus banking union is thus a recipe for entrenching economic and political division.	这些虚假的银行联盟也因此成为不断固化的经济和政治分裂的原因。


Disaster and Development	灾难与发展


NEW YORK – When Typhoon Hagupit made landfall in the Philippines on December 6, memories of Typhoon Haiyan, which killed more than 6,300 people, were fresh in people’s minds.	纽约—12月6日，当黑格比台风在菲律宾登陆时，对夺走6,300多条生命的海燕台风的记忆犹新。


Some 227,000 families – more than a million people – were evacuated ahead of Hagupit’s arrival, according to the United Nations.	根据联合国的统计，黑格比登陆前，227,000个家庭——超过一百万人——提前疏散。


The typhoon, one of the strongest of the season, killed some 30 people.	这场本年最强烈之一的台风造成大约30人死亡。


All deaths from disasters are a tragedy, but the fact that this number was not much higher attests to the efforts that the Philippines has made to prepare for natural disasters.	所有的因灾死亡都是一场悲剧，但这一数字没有变得更高这一事实印证了菲律宾在自然灾难准备方面的努力成果。


As Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, I have seen firsthand the devastation and heartbreak caused by disasters around the world.	作为联合国发展计划署（United Nations Development Program）署长，我在第一现场目睹过全球灾难所造成的破坏和悲伤。


Since the beginning of the century, more than a million people have died in storms like Hagupit and other major disasters, such as the 2010 Haitian earthquake, with economic damage totaling nearly $2 trillion.	本世纪以来，有一百多万人因为黑格比和其他大灾难而丧生——如2010年的海地地震，造成的总经济损失接近2万亿美元。


These losses are tragic, but they are also avoidable.	这些损失是悲剧性的，但也是可以避免的。


They serve as a reminder that disaster preparedness is not an optional luxury; it is a constant, intensive process that is necessary to save lives, protect infrastructure, and safeguard development.	它们提醒我们，灾难预防并非可选择的奢侈品； 它是一个持续的、密集的过程，是拯救生命、保护基础设施和捍卫发展的必要条件。


The argument for investing in disaster preparedness is simple.	投资灾难预防的理由很简单。


If countries expect to experience natural hazards, such as violent storm seasons or major earthquakes, then investing time and resources in preparing for shocks will save lives and protect communities from other losses.	如果国家预计会经历自然风险，比如破坏性暴风季或大地震，那么投资时间和资源用于为冲击做好准备就能够拯救生命、保护社会免受其他损失。


Unfortunately, governments often put different priorities ahead of disaster preparation.	不幸的是，政府常常将其他事项置于比灾难预防更加优先的地位。


Other investments often take precedence, and donors have historically funded emergency relief much more readily than pre-disaster preparedness.	其他投资往往更加优先，而在历史上，出资者对紧急援助也远比灾前预防更加热衷。


The measures that are implemented tend to be stand-alone and piecemeal, rather than part of a larger, systematic risk-reduction plan.	所实施的措施往往是孤立而零碎的，而不是作为更大的系统性降低风险计划的一部分。


That needs to change.	这需要改变。


Countries like the Philippines continue to demonstrate the benefits of investing in preparedness, especially when done as part of a larger risk-mitigation effort.	菲律宾等国家继续表明，投资于灾难预防——特别是作为更大的降低风险计划的一部分——能带来好处。


Typhoon Hagupit is just the latest event to showcase this.	黑格比台风就是最新证明。


The Philippine government’s quick, effective response saved many lives.	菲律宾政府快速有效的应对拯救了大量生命。


But it is important to note that its efforts were not simply an overnight reaction to the oncoming storm.	但很重要的是，菲律宾政府的措施绝不仅仅是对即将到来的风暴启动紧急响应。


They were part of a national, comprehensive effort that was long in the making.	菲律宾政府的措施使一整套全国性完整计划的一部分，这一计划实施已有多时。


Officials were wise to acknowledge their country’s vulnerabilities and to commit the resources and capital needed to build resilience.	官员明智地承认菲律宾的脆弱性，并致力于筹集构建恢复力所需要的资源和资本。


The Philippines includes preparedness as a core component in its overall strategy for reducing disaster risk.	菲律宾将预防作为降低灾难风险总战略的核心要素。


Over the last decade, the country’s authorities have raised awareness, established and strengthened disaster-management institutions, and worked on recovering from past disasters, including Typhoon Haiyan.	在过去十年中，菲律宾当局提高了警惕，成立并强化了灾难管理机构，并致力于过去灾难（包括海燕台风）的重建工作。


National and local disaster plans have been improved, standard operating procedures have been developed, and early warning systems have been put in place.	全国和地方灾难计划得到了改善，开发出标准化操作程序，早期预警系统也已就位。


The end result has been nothing short of a transformation of how the Philippines reacts to disasters.	最终结果是菲律宾应对灾难的表现焕然一新。


The UNDP, and the wider UN system, is supporting governments as they place greater emphasis on disaster-risk reduction, including preparedness, by strengthening their institutional capacity to plan and act when needed.	联合国发展计划署以及整个联合国体系都支持政府更加强调通过强化计划和按需行动的机构能力以降低灾难风险的措施（包括灾难预防）。


In addition to assisting with emergency relief, it is crucial that the international community help to introduce basic procedures for responding long before disaster strikes.	除了支持救灾，关键之处在于国际社会帮助引入在灾难到来之前就开始响应的基本程序。


First responders, for example, need training and tools.	比如，第一反应部队需要训练和工具。


Emergency shelters and evacuation routes must be planned and established using risk assessments and actual simulations.	必须利用风险评估和事实模拟提前规划和建立紧急住所和疏散路径。


If communities are to be expected to make use of available resources, they need to be involved in the design and development of emergency plans.	如果预计社区需要用到可得资源，就需要将它们纳入紧急计划的设计和开发中。


Risk reduction, including preparedness, is also, first and foremost, rooted in responsive governance.	降低风险（包括预防）首先应植根于响应式治理。


In March 2015 a new global framework for disaster reduction will be agreed in Sendai, Japan.	2015年3月，新的全球减灾框架将在日本仙台达成。


It is crucial that delegates push for transformational change that enables preparedness and saves lives.	一个关键点是代表们要推进让预防和拯救生命成为可能的转型变革。


Furthermore, risk reduction needs to be integral to sustainable-development strategies.	此外，降低风险还需要被纳入可持续发展战略中。


The Philippines can serve as an example.	菲律宾可以提供一个榜样。


The archipelago will always be in the path of tropical storms.	这个群岛国家永远位于热带风暴的路径上。


There is little officials can do about that.	官方对此毫无办法。


But what they can do – and have done – is emphasize risk reduction and strengthen preparedness, thereby saving lives and building greater resilience.	但他们可以做的——也确实做了的——是强调降低风险和强化预防，从而拯救无数人的生命、构建更强的恢复力。


That is a lesson that all of us must learn.	这是我们所有人都应该学习的经验。


Physics Confidential	物理学的暗伤


PRINCETON – Each February, I begin the introductory electricity and magnetism course at Princeton University by telling my students that the material we will cover during the semester provides the basis for modern civilization.	发自普林斯顿——每年2月笔者都要在普林斯顿大学开设一门叫“电磁导论”的课程，并且在第一堂课上告诉学生们：正是在本学期所讲到的内容奠定了现代文明.


Who could quibble with such an innocent statement?	试问谁会质疑这么一个简单直白的观点？


Without the discoveries of nineteenth-century physicists and their successors, we could hardly imagine today’s world: no electrical power grid, no televisions, no satellites, no iPads.	没有19世纪物理学家及其后继者的发现，当今世界简直无法想象：没有输电网，没有电视机，没有卫星，连iPad都不存在。


Physicists are justly proud of the many ways that their achievements have benefited humankind.	物理学家们有理由为他们对人类所做出的众多贡献而感到自豪。


But building a light bulb or a telephone doesn’t mean that you understand its basic principles (Thomas Edison and Alexander Bell certainly didn’t).	但能制造一个电灯泡或者电话并不意味着你就一定懂得其基本原理（爱迪生和亚历山大·贝尔显然都不懂）。


Unfortunately, many of my colleagues – particularly those who write textbooks – present physics as a towering, seamless basilica, ignoring the gaps in our hodge-podge of skewed models.	不幸的是，我的许多同僚——特别是编教科书的那几位——将物理学描绘成一座壮丽无瑕的万丈高楼，却忽视了这个由众多古怪模型所构成的理论大杂烩其实早已千疮百孔。


In fact, what is presented as a shimmering cathedral often more closely resembles a hastily erected shantytown.	事实上与其说这是座光彩照人的大教堂，不如说是一座仓促搭建起来的贫民窟。


For example, one needs only first-semester equations to describe reasonably well the behavior of a gyroscope; engineers can then go off and build gyrocompasses that guide aircraft or missiles to their destinations.	比如说，一个学生只需运用第一学期所学的公式就能完美解释陀螺仪的运作特性； 随后工程师们就可以着手制造旋转罗盘来引导飞机或导弹飞向指定目标。


But if you merely ask, “At what, exactly, is the gyroscope pointed?” you are plunged headlong into one of physics’ deepest questions, one that led Einstein to develop his general theory of relativity – and that, even today, has no definitive answer.	但如果你简单地问一句：“陀螺仪指向的究竟什么？ ”那你就当即遭遇了物理学其中一个最深奥的问题，这个问题引导爱因斯坦创立了广义相对论——甚至至今都没有一个明确的答案。


I know of no undergraduate textbook that acknowledges the question.	而在我印象中也没有任何本科生教材提到过这一问题。


On a more blatant, if less exalted, level, the force of friction makes its appearance in the first days of any first-year course.	换一个更加显浅，也不那么深奥的理论层面，所有大学一年级物理教材都会提到摩擦力。


We declare, as if there can be no doubt, that friction impedes the motion between two bodies, and we invoke sophisticated microscopic models that show how the soles of running shoes bind to a track.	我们似乎斩钉截铁的宣称：摩擦力阻碍了两个互相接触的物体之间的相对运动，而且还运用精密的显微镜模型来展示跑步者的鞋底是如何抓紧跑道的。


Yet friction produces heat and thus an increase in entropy – which measures the amount of energy that cannot be used to perform work – and it therefore distinguishes past from future.	但摩擦力产生热量并因此导致熵的增加——熵代表一种测量在动力学方面不能做功的能量总数——并因此将过去和未来区分开来。


The increase in entropy – the second law of thermodynamics – is the only law of nature that makes this fundamental distinction.	而熵的增加——热力学第二定律——则是唯一个描述这一基本差别的自然定律。


If Newtonian mechanics is at the bottom of everything, then one should be able to derive the second law of thermodynamics from Newtonian physics.	如果牛顿力学是一切的基础，那么就必然能从其中推导出热力学第二定律。


But this has never been accomplished satisfactorily: the incompatibility of the second law with the other fundamental laws is perhaps the greatest paradox in all of physics.	但这点却从未被完美地实现过：因为该定律与其他基本定律的不相容性或许已成为了物理学中最大的矛盾难题。


Still, we brazenly drop this enigma into the first days of a first-year course without batting an eye.	但我们却对此视若无睹，依然厚着脸皮将这一难题编入大学一年级课程中。


We write down equations that show how friction slows the motion of sliding objects or dampens the vibrations in springs, but, ultimately, the math merely reproduces our observations while disguising our ignorance of what underlies them.	我们写下那些解释摩擦力为何减慢滑动物体相对运动或者减弱弹簧往复振动的公式，但归根结底，这些数学公式只不过是重现了我们——在故意忽略这些现象真正内部原因的情况下——观察的结果。


After decades – indeed, centuries – of employing such tricks, physicists have forgotten that they are modeling phenomena, not necessarily uncovering Divine Truth.	在连续几十年（事实上是几百年）运用这些伎俩之后，物理学家已经忘记了自己其实在模拟某些现象，而非发现绝对真理。


For instance, we can easily write down the equations for a ball on a swinging spring, but if we stretch the spring enough and swing the ball hard enough, we can’t solve those equations.	比如我们可以轻易写出公式来描述一个悬挂在弹簧上的小球如何运动，但如果我们拉伸弹簧且晃动小球到一定程度，这些公式就失效了。


The motion becomes chaotic, making an exact mathematical solution impossible.	整个运动变得一片混沌，根本无法得出一个精确的数学解释。


Nowadays, with computers, we can approximate the trajectory as closely as we want.	如今随着电脑的运用，我们可以尽可能精确地估算物体的运行轨道。


But that is the point: most physicists and students have lost sight of the distinction between the approximate and the exact.	但问题在于：大多数物理学家和学生都忘记了估算和精确值之间的区别。


We can certainly learn something about chaotic systems without actually solving the equations, but if an old-fashioned mathematician demanded that a student predict where that ball was heading, the student would inevitably fail.	当然我们也可以在不解开这些公式的情况下学习一些关于混沌系统的东西，但如果一个老派数学家要求一个学生用数学方式精确预测球究竟将落在何处，那么学生铁定无法满足他的要求。


Even something as fundamental as Newton’s law of gravity is ultimately an approximation.	甚至连牛顿万有引力定律这样的基础理论都是某些估算。


Textbook authors dutifully write down the famous law without remarking that it results in infinite forces when the two attracting objects get infinitely close together.	教科书作者们恭敬地将这条定律写在书中，却没有提到这条定律推导出当两个互相吸引的物体无限接近时，相互产生的引力也将无限大。


Never mind that infinite forces are a sure sign that your theory has gone up in smoke: in the current crop of textbooks sitting on my desk, not one mentions the obvious pathology.	只要一触及到引力无限大这一点，整个理论都变得站不住脚：但笔者桌面的众多教科书却集体失明，无一提到这一硬伤。


Our Princeton text compounds the oversight by declaring that, “strictly speaking” Newton’s law of gravity is valid only for particles.	而普林斯顿大学教材则使这一失明状况进一步恶化，宣称“严格来说”，牛顿万有引力定律只适用于质点。


Well, particles are exactly where Newton goes awry – and not just in first-semester physics.	但质点恰好才是牛顿出错的地方——而且不仅涉及到第一学期物理课程。


The basic equation of electricity is “Coulomb’s law,” which governs the electrical attraction or repulsion between charged particles and looks exactly like Newton’s law of gravity.	关于电的基本定律是“库仑定律”，主要描述带电荷粒子之间的吸引和排斥力，并与牛顿万有引力定律看上去极为相似。


Now, we always tell students to imagine electrons as point particles, in which case they really do need to worry about those infinite forces.	如今我们却常常在需要考虑无限大引力影响的情况下要求学生们将这些电子假设成质点。


The problems that arise from modeling particles as vanishingly small points infect all advanced areas of physics.	这种将粒子假设为无限小的点的错误已经蔓延到了物理学的所有前沿领域。


Central to any quantum mechanics course is the concept of electron “spin,” but what, exactly, is spinning is never made clear.	任何量子力学课程的核心都是电子“自旋”，但究竟是什么东西在自旋却没人说得清楚。


Wolfgang Pauli, one of the concept’s originators, at first rejected the idea, because if the electron has a finite radius, then the surface would be spinning faster than the speed of light.	该概念的创始人之一沃尔夫冈·鲍利最初曾反对这一理念，因为如果电子真的拥有一个确定的半径，那么其表面的旋转速度将大于光速。


On the other hand, if you view the electron as a point particle, how are you to imagine something without a radius spinning?	另一方面，如果你将电子视为一个质点，那又该如何想象一个连半径都没有的东西在自旋呢？


To cure the point-particle pathologies, physicists invented modern field theories, with impressive names such as quantum electrodynamics.	为了解决这个点-粒子难题，物理学家们发明了现代场理论，还创造出类似量子电气力学这样的光鲜名词。


But these theories turned out to be as riddled with infinities as their grandparents, and elaborate ad hoc schemes were invented to deal with the new problems encountered.	但这��理论和它们的祖父母（万有引力定律和库仑定律）一样在无限的问题上纠缠不清，结果物理学家们只好又发明出复杂的专门理论来解释这些新产生的问题。


And so, despite headline-grabbing advances such as string theory, it goes to this very day.	因此，尽管也取得了弦理论这种举世闻名的进步，物理学却走到了如斯境地。


One can hardly challenge the predictive success of modern physics, but one should remember that one is describing nature, and not always understanding it.	没人能质疑现代物理学所取得的预测性成就，但人们也必须牢记：当一个人在解释自然的时候，他其实不一定懂得自然。


Pigs, Calves, and American Democracy	猪、牛和美国民主


Amidst all the headlines about the Democrats gaining control of the United States Congress in the November elections, one big election result was largely ignored.	在所有关于民主党在11月选举中掌控美国议会的头条新闻中，一个重要的选举结果没有引起人们的注意。


Although it illuminated the flaws of America’s political system, it also restored my belief in the compassion of ordinary Americans.	尽管这个结果凸显出美国政治制度的缺陷，但也恢复了我对美国民众同情心的信心。


In Arizona, citizens can, by gathering a sufficient number of signatures, put a proposed law to a direct popular vote.	在亚利桑那，居民们可以通过搜集足够数量的签名，将拟议中的法律直接付诸表决。


This year, one of the issues on the ballot was an act to prohibit tethering or confining a pregnant pig, or a calf raised for veal, in a manner that prevents the animal from turning around freely, lying down, and fully extending his or her limbs.	今年，表决的问题之一是一项禁止圈养或禁锢怀孕母猪或肉用小牛的法案，这样的圈养方式造成动物无法自由转身、躺卧和充分伸展四肢。


Those who know little about modern factory farming may wonder why such legislation would be necessary.	那些不太了解现代化工厂养殖的人可能会疑惑有什么必要制定这样的法律。


Under farming methods that were universal 50 years ago, and that are still common in some countries today, all animals have the space to turn around and stretch their limbs.	按照50年非常流行、今天在某些乡村地区也仍在沿用的养殖方式，所有动物都不缺少转身和伸展肢体的空间。


Today, however, about 90% of US breeding sows – the mothers of the pigs that are raised and killed for pork, bacon, and ham – spend most of their lives locked in cages that measure about two feet by seven feet (0.6 meters by 2.2 meters).	但今天，约90%的美国育种母猪¾也就是人类饲养和宰杀后制成鲜肉、咸肉和火腿的肉用猪的母亲¾一生绝大多数时间都是在只有2英尺乘7英尺（0. 6米乘2.


They are unable to turn around, lie down with their legs fully extended, or move more than a step forward or backward.	2米）的铁笼中渡过的。 它们不能转身、伸开四肢躺卧、也无法前进或后退哪怕一步的距离。


Other sows are kept on short tethers that also prevent them turning around.	另外10%的母猪的饲养空间也非常狭小，同样无法自由移动。


Veal calves are similarly confined for all their lives in individual stalls that do not permit them to turn around, lie down, or stretch their limbs.	肉牛的一生同样在独立的畜栏中渡过，根本无法转身、躺卧或者伸展肢体。


These methods are, essentially, labor-saving devices – they make management of the animals easier and enable units with thousands or tens of thousands of animals to employ fewer and less skilled workers.	这样的饲养方法在本质上是要节约人工，从而降低牲畜管理的难度，使饲养着数以万计甚至十万计牲畜的养殖场能够减少雇工人数，降低对所雇人员的技能要求。


They also prevent the animals from wasting energy by moving around or fighting with each other.	这种饲养方法也防止了牲畜因来回走动或相互争斗而浪费能量。


Several years ago, following protests from animal welfare organizations, the European Union commissioned a report from its Scientific Veterinary Committee on these methods.	几年前，由于动物福利组织的抗议，欧盟委托兽医科学委员会对上述饲养方法进行了调查。


The committee found that animals suffer from being unable to move freely and from the total lack of anything to do all day.	委员会的结论是，动物因无法自由走动和整天无所事事而深受痛苦。


Common sense would, of course, have reached the same conclusion.	勿庸置疑，任何有常识的人都会得出同样的结论。


Following the report, the EU set dates by which close confinement of these animals would be prohibited.	接到这份报告后，欧盟确定了禁锢动物禁令的生效日期。


For veal calves, that date, January 1, 2007, is almost here.	禁锢肉牛的禁令定于2007年1月1日生效，而这一日期已经近在眼前。


Individual stalls for sows, already outlawed in the United Kingdom and Sweden, will be banned across the entire EU from 2013.	英国和瑞典已经禁止用独立畜栏饲养育种母猪，并且从2013年开始，欧盟所有国家都将禁止采用这样的饲养方式。


Measures to improve the welfare of laying hens, which are typically kept crammed into bare wire cages with no room to stretch their wings, are also being phased in.	改善蛋鸡福利的举措也正在实行，在此之前，多数蛋鸡被硬塞进小的可怜的铁丝鸡笼，甚至没有空间伸展自己的翅膀。


In the US, no such national measures are anywhere in sight.	而在美国，这样的全国性举措迄今仍遥不可及。


In the past, when my European friends have asked me why the US lags so far behind Europe in matters of animal welfare, I have had no answer.	过去，每当欧洲的朋友问及为什么在涉及动物福利的问题上美国与欧洲相去甚远，我都无话可说。


When they pressed me, I had to admit that the explanation could be that Americans care less about animals than Europeans.	如果他们进一步逼问，我就不得不承认可能是美国人不像欧洲人那样关心动物。


Then, in 2002, animal welfare advocates put a proposal to ban sow stalls on the ballot in Florida.	接着在2002年，动物保护主义者在佛罗里达州表决了禁用独立畜栏饲养育种母猪的提案。


To the surprise of many, it gained the approval of 55% of those voting.	出人意料的是，55%的投票者批准了这项提案。


Last month in Arizona, despite well-funded opposition from agribusiness, the ban on small cages for sows and veal calves also passed, with 62% support.	上个月在亚利桑那州，尽管当地农场主花重金游说表示反对，禁止用小笼饲喂母猪和肉牛的法案仍然以62%的得票获得了通过。


Neither Florida nor Arizona are particularly progressive states – both voted for George W. Bush over John Kerry in 2004.	佛罗里达和亚利桑那两个州都并非特别主张进步—2004年的总统选举中，这两个州都���票选择了乔治·W·布什，而不是约翰·凯利。


So the results strongly suggest that if all Americans were given a chance to vote on keeping pregnant pigs and calves in such tight confinement, the majority would vote no.	因此这一结果强烈表明：如果所有美国人都有机会对禁锢怀孕母猪和肉牛的问题投票表决，绝大多数人会选择说不。


Americans seem to care just as much about animal welfare as Europeans do.	美国人似乎与欧洲人同样关注动物福利。


So, to explain the gap between Europe and the US on farm animal welfare, we should look to the political system.	因此，要解释欧洲和美国在农场动物福利方面的差距，我们要从政治制度上寻找根源。


In Europe, the concerns of voters about animal welfare have been effective in influencing members of national parliaments, as well as members of the European Parliament, resulting in national legislation and EU directives that respond to those concerns.	在欧洲，选民有关动物福利的忧虑有效地影响了国家议会和欧洲议会的议员，导致国家和欧盟制定法律对此做出回应。


In the US, by contrast, similar concerns have had no discernible effect on members of Congress.	而恰恰相反，在美国，类似的忧虑并未对议会议员产生可以觉察的影响。


There is no federal legislation at all on the welfare of farm animals – and very little state legislation, either.	根本就不存在规范农场动物福利的联邦法律，就连这方面的州法律都寥寥无几。


That, I believe, is because agribusiness is able to put tens of millions of dollars into the pockets of congressional representatives seeking re-election.	我认为，个中原因是农场主能够向寻求连任的议会代表口袋里塞进成百上千万的美钞。


The animal welfare movement, despite its broad public support, has been unable to compete in the arena of political lobbying and campaign donations.	而动物福利运动，尽管公众支持非常广泛，却无法在政治游说和竞选献金等领域与农业势力相抗衡。


In US electoral politics, money counts for more than the opinions of voters.	在美国的选举政治中，金钱比选民的意愿更加至高无上。


Party discipline is weak, and Congressmen must themselves raise most of the money that they need for re-election – and that happens every two years for members of the House of Representatives.	党派纪律虚弱，议员们必须自筹谋求连任所需的绝大部分资金—而众议院的议员每两年就要竞选一次。


In Europe, where party discipline is strong and the parties, not the individual candidates, finance election campaigns, money plays a smaller role.	而在欧洲，党派纪律非常强大，并且由党派、而不是候选者个人，负责为竞选活动提供资金，因此金钱所起的作用相对就没有那么重要。


In the US, a nation that prides itself on its democratic traditions, pigs and calves are hardly the only losers.	在民主传统被所有民众引以为豪的美国，猪和牛恐怕不会是唯一的受害者。


The Invention of Inequality	不平等的诞生


LONDON – Everyone seems to be talking about – and condemning – today’s rising level of economic inequality.	发自伦敦——每个人似乎都在谈论——以及谴责——当今不断攀升的经济不平等程度。


Fueled by jarring statistics like Oxfam’s recent revelation that the world’s richest 62 people own as much wealth as the poorest 3.6 billion, popular support for left-wing figures like America’s Bernie Sanders and Britain’s Jeremy Corbyn is rising.	在乐施会最近披露的统计数据——世界上最富有的62人拥有的财富总额相当于全球最穷的36亿人的财产之和——的推波助澜下，像美国的伯尼·桑德斯和英国的杰里米·科宾这类左翼人物的民众支持率节节拔高。


But today’s ideology-driven debates oversimplify an issue that is exceedingly complex – and affected by processes that we do not fully understand.	但是如今这场意识形态驱动的争论过于简单化了一个极其复杂的问题——并被一些我们并不完全了解的过程所影响。


Many of those engaged in the debate on inequality nowadays cite the French economist Thomas Piketty’s 2014 book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, which makes three key points.	许多参与时下这场不平等之争的人都会援引法国经济学家汤玛斯·皮克提（Thomas Piketty）2014年出版的著作《二十一世纪资本论》，并依此提出三个关键点。


First, over the last 30 years, the ratio of wealth to income has steadily increased.	首先，在过去的30年中，财富相对收入的比率稳步提升。


Second, if the total return on wealth is higher than the growth in incomes, wealth is necessarily becoming increasingly concentrated.	其次，如果对财富的总回报比收入增速要高，财富必然会越来越集中。


Third, this rising inequality must be reversed through confiscatory taxation before it destroys society.	第三，这种日益加剧的不平等状况都必须在其最终破坏社会之前通过没收性征税来逆转。


The points might seem convincing at first glance.	这些论点可能乍看上去有说服力。


But the first statement is little more than a truism, and the second is falsified by Piketty’s own data, making the third irrelevant.	但第一点只不过是老生常谈，而第二点则被皮克提自己的数据所证伪，使得第三点变得无关紧要。


Piketty observes a rising wealth-to-income ratio from 1970 to 2010 – a period divided by a significant change in the monetary environment.	皮克提观察到财富/收入比率在1970至2010年——该时期被货币环境的显著变化一分为二——出现了上升。


From 1970 to 1980, the Western economies experienced rising inflation, accompanied by interest-rate hikes.	从1970年到1980年，西方经济经历了通胀上升，伴随着加息。


During that period, the wealth-to-income ratio increased only modestly, if at all, in these countries.	在此期间，所有这些国家的财富/收入比率仅仅出现了温和增长。


From 1980 on, nominal interest rates fell dramatically.	从1980年开始，名义利率急剧下降。


Not surprisingly, the value of wealth rose much faster than that of income during this period, because the value of the assets that comprise wealth amounts essentially to the net present value of their expected future cash flows, discounted at the current interest rate.	不出意外，在此期间财富的增值比收入快得多，因为构成财富的资产价值基本上等同于它们预计未来现金流量的净现值，并以当时的利率贴现。


The most straightforward example is a government bond.	对此最直观的例子就是政府债券。


But the value of a house is determined in a similar manner: according to the rent it is expected to generate, capitalized at the current nominal interest rate.	但住宅的价值也是以类似的方式来确定的：根据预计将产生的租金来以当前名义利率为其估值。


Equities, too, are valued at a higher multiple of earnings when interest rates fall.	股市也一样，在利率下降时期的市盈率更高。


In determining the value of total wealth, Piketty included both the income generated by assets and their appreciation.	在确定总财富的价值时，皮克提涵盖了通过资产所产生的收入及其升值。


Meanwhile, incomes were capitalized at declining interest rates for more than a generation.	与此同时，收入则以不断下降的利率来估值。


By this approach, his finding that wealth grew faster than incomes makes perfect sense – it is a direct consequence of falling interest rates.	通过这种方法，他发现，财富的增长快于收入增长是非常合情合理的——这是利率下降的直接后果。


What impact do lower interest rates have on measured inequality?	那么更低的利率对衡量不平等有何影响？


If I own one house and my neighbor owns two, and falling interest rates cause the value of those houses to double, the monetary inequality between us also doubles, affecting a variety of statistical indicators and triggering much well-intended concern.	如果我自己有一栋房子和我邻居有两栋，而利率下降导致这些房屋的价值增加了一倍，我们之间的货币不平等状况也因此而加倍，影响到各种统计指标并触发很多善意的关注。


But the reality is that I still own one house and my neighbor still owns two.	但现实是，我依然拥有自己的一栋房子，我的邻居也还是拥有两栋。


Even the relative affordability of houses doesn’t change much, because lower interest rates make larger mortgages possible.	即便这些房屋的相对负担能力也没多大变化，因为较低的利率使得人们能申请更多贷款。


For further evidence of this phenomenon, consider Piketty’s own data.	对于这一现象的进一步证据可参考皮克提自己列出的数据。


In Europe, Piketty singles out Italy as the country where the wealth-to-income ratio rose the most, to about 680% in 2010, compared to 230% in 1970.	在欧洲，皮克提指出意大利为财富/收入比率涨幅最大的国家，2010年时约为680％，而相比之下1970年只有230%。


Germany appears to be a more “virtuous” country, with a wealth-to-income ratio of 400%, up from 210% in 1970. What Piketty fails to highlight is that, over this period, interest rates fell much more in Italy (from 20% to 4%) than in Germany (from 10% to 2%).	德国似乎是一个更加“良性”的国家，2010年比率约为400％，1970年为210％，但皮克提没有指出的是，在此期间，意大利的利率比德国跌得更多（从20％至4％），而后者为从10％到2％。


The real-world impact of this dynamic on inequality is precisely the opposite of what Piketty would expect.	这种现实世界对不平等动态的影响恰恰与皮克提的期望相反。


Indeed, not only are Italians, on average, much richer than Germans; Italy’s overall wealth distribution is much more balanced.	事实上意大利人不仅平均下来比德国人富裕得多； 意大利的整体财富分配也更为平衡。


A 2013 study of household finances in the eurozone, conducted by the European Central Bank, showed that in 2010 – the last year in Piketty’s research – the average Italian household was 41% richer than the average German household.	欧洲央行于2013年进行的欧��区家庭财政状况研究显示，在2010年——皮克提研究的最后一年 ——处于平均值上的意大利家庭的财富比对应的德国家庭多出41％。


Moreover, whereas the difference between mean and median household wealth is 59% in Italy, it is a whopping 282% in Germany.	此外，平均数和中位数家庭财富之间的差距在意大利是59％，在德国则高达282％。


This difference can be explained largely by the fact that 59% of households in Italy own homes, compared to only 26% in Germany.	这种差异可以在很大程度上由以下事实来说明：意大利59%的家庭拥有自有住宅，而在德国只有26％。


A larger share of Italians has thus benefited more from a larger drop in interest rates.	因此很大一部分意大利人也在利率出现更大回落时受益更多。


This example highlights how household investment decisions shape wealth outcomes.	这个例子突出了家庭投资决定是如何塑造财富成果的。


Complicating wealth measurements further is the fact that, as Martin Feldstein recently pointed out, for the vast majority of households, a large proportion of wealth is in the form of unaccounted future social benefits.	而令财富测量进一步复杂化的事实是，正如马丁·费尔德斯坦近日所指出的那样，对于绝大多数家庭而言，财富的很大一部分都是以无法计算的未来社会收益的形式存在的。


Then there are the numerous factors affecting incomes, such as demand for particular skills.	其次就是存在着无数种影响收入的因素，如对特殊技能的需求。


For those whose skills are not in demand, the availability of skills upgrading or training opportunities will have a significant impact on income prospects.	对于那些手中技能乏人问津的人来说，获取技能升级或培训的机会高低将对收入前景产生显著的影响。


At the same time, above certain income levels, a person might require a substantial monetary incentive to take the quality-of-life hit associated with increased work responsibilities.	与此同时，超过一定收入水平后，一个人可能需要大量货币激励才会接受因增加工作负担所导致的生活质量下降。


Clearly, economic inequality is a highly complex phenomenon, affected by a wide variety of factors – many of which we do not fully understand, much less control.	显然，经济不平等是一个高度复杂的现象，受多种因素——其中许多我们并不完全了解，更谈不上控制——的影响。


Given this, we should be wary of the kinds of radical policies that some politicians are promoting today.	有鉴于此，我们应该警惕的是一些政界人士当前推动的各类激进政策。


Their impact is unpredictable, and that may end up doing more harm than good.	它们的影响是不可预测的，甚至可能最终弊大于利。


Perhaps a new approach is not necessary at all.	也许一个全新的做法是完全没必要的。


After all, globally, standards of living are continuously improving and converging.	毕竟全球生活水平都在不断提高和拉近。


That is something that everyone, from the emerging populists to the hardened capitalists, should be able to agree on.	这才是每个人——从崭露头角的民粹主义者到死硬派资本主义者——应该能够达成一致的一点。


Ping-Pong and Political Economy	乒乓和政治经济学


PRINCETON – For the last century, economic-policy debate has been locked in orbit around the respective roles and virtues of the state and the market.	普林斯顿—上个世纪，政治经济学的争论一直围绕在国家和市场各有什么作用和有点的问题上。


Does the market control the state, in the sense that it sets a limit on governments’ ability to borrow?	是市场控制着国家，因为它限制了政府借钱的能力？


Or does the state take charge when the market fails to perform socially necessary functions – such as fighting wars or maintaining full employment?	还是国家利用市场无法产生社会所需的功能——比如抵抗战争和保持充分就业——而获得了优势？


This old debate is at the core of today’s profound divisions over how Europe should respond to its debt crisis.	这一古老争论正是如今的深刻分歧——欧洲应该如何应对深刻的债务危机——的核心。


The same question is dividing American politics in the lead-up to November’s presidential and congressional elections.	随着11月总统和国会选举的到来，同样的问题也在让美国政坛一分为二。


During the two decades prior to the financial crisis, most people – including most politicians – assumed that the market was supreme.	在金融危机之前的二十年里，大部分人——包括大部分政客——认为市场才是主导者。


Now the intellectual pendulum may be swinging back to the belief that state action can mop up markets’ messes – just as veneration of the state in the 1930’s followed market worship in the 1920’s.	如今，理论天平大概回到了国家行为可以收拾市场混乱的信条上，正如紧随20世纪20年代的市场崇拜之后出现的是国家崇拜。


Two decades ago, judicious European politicians looked for a “third way,” steering a zigzag course between the importance of market mechanisms and that of other social priorities, according to which the market needed to be directed.	二十年前，英明的欧洲政客开始寻找“第三条路”，在市场机制的重要性以及根据需要如何引导市场而定的其他社会优先事项之间左右摇摆。


For example, when the Delors Committee prepared its report in 1988-1989 on how a monetary union could be established in Europe, experts devoted considerable attention to the issue of whether market pressure would suffice to discipline states.	比如，当德洛尔委员会（Delors Committee）在准备其1988—1989年关于如何在欧洲建设货币联盟的报告时，各路专家花了相当多的心血关注市场压力是否足以让国家遵守纪律的问题。


Many warned that it would not – that bond yields might converge at the outset, permitting spendthrift countries to borrow more cheaply than they otherwise could.	许多专家警告说办不到——债券收益率可能在一开始就收敛，让挥霍无度的国家以原本得不到的低利率借贷。


The result of the debates of the early 1990’s was a set of rough and ready rules on deficits and debt levels that was never taken quite seriously.	20世纪90年代早期争论的成果是一系列关于赤字和债务水平的严格成文规则，但这些规则从未被认真遵守过。


Economists mocked them and Romano Prodi, the president of the European Commission at the time, called them “stupid.”	经济学家对这些规则嗤之以鼻而时任欧洲委员会主席普罗迪则称它们“愚蠢”。


Until the second half of 2008, Europe seemed to have reached fiscal Paradise: the market did not differentiate between eurozone governments’ bonds.	在2008年下半年之前，欧洲似乎一直身处财政天堂：市场无差别地对待欧元区政府债务。


Some assumed an implicit debt guarantee, but that was always implausible, given that the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union explicitly ruled it out.	一些人认为存在隐含的债务担保，但这一判断是站不住脚的，因为《欧盟运作条约》（Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union）明确地否定了这一点。


Rather, investors’ undivided confidence in all eurozone borrowers reflected something else – a general belief in the capacity of rich countries’ governments.	但是，投资者对所有欧元区借款人无差别地充满信心反映的是另外的东西——对富国政府的一致信任。


According to this view, advanced countries have a greater degree of fiscal sophistication.	根据这一观点，发达国家具有更成熟的财政。


They are always able to raise tax rates in order to service their debt.	它们总是能够提高税收以维持债务。


In poor countries, by contrast, powerful vested interests often resist higher taxes on the wealthy, and widespread poverty makes it difficult to impose universal consumption taxes on the poor.	而穷国正好相反，权势既得利益通常会抵制提高富人税负，而普遍存在的贫困又使得对穷人征收通用消费税的做法难以行得通。


That lesson was reinforced by the experience of countless debt crises in peripheral countries, the most destructive of which hit Latin America exactly 30 years ago, after ecstatic borrowing fueled economic booms.	让人们获得深刻教训的是数不尽的外围国债务危机，其中最具破坏力的要数30年前袭击拉丁美洲的那一次。 那次危机发生在借贷狂热刺激了经济繁荣之后。


Sometimes these were simply consumption booms – whether for households or for military outlays and presidential palaces – and sometimes they were investment booms, though much of the investment had been misallocated as a result of political priorities.	有时，这类经济繁荣只是消费繁荣——不管消费者是家庭，还是军队，还是权贵； 有时候则是投资繁荣——尽管很大一部分投资因政治优先级顺序问题而配置不当。


The novelty of the world since 2008 is that, for the first time in more than a generation, advanced countries are experiencing debt crises – and starting to look like poor countries with weak institutions.	2008年之后发生的事情的新鲜之处在于，这是在一代人的时间里第一次发生发达国家债务危机，而且看起来与制度落后的穷国别无二致。


Was this just a peculiarity of the eurozone, in which sovereign countries did not control their own currencies?	这仅仅是发生在主权国家无法控制自己的货币的欧元区的例外吗？


Europe’s debt crisis has produced a profound division of political – and also economic – opinion.	欧洲债务危机已经造成了政治（以及经济）观点的深刻分歧。


Those who emphasize the historical uniqueness of Europe’s monetary solution insist that other countries – which control their own monies – could not possibly fall into such a predicament.	有些人强调欧洲货币方案的历史独特性，坚持认为其他国家——能够控制自己的货币——不可能陷入如此窘境。


Here the statist thesis is reflected in its boldest form: there cannot be a bond strike in the United States or the United Kingdom, because their central banks have at their disposal the full panoply of policy tools – including unconventional operations – needed to ensure that debt is monetized.	在这个问题上，统计数字发挥了振聋发聩的效果：美国和英国不会发生债券暴涨暴跌，因为这两国的中央银行可以随心所欲地动用包括非常规操作在内的整套政策工具确保债务货币化。


That theory runs counter to much historical experience, as well as to the prevailing approach to central banking that emerged in the 1990’s.	这一理论与历史经验并不相符，也与20世纪90年代所产生的主流中央银行观点背道而驰。


According to that view, investors punish profligate states by demanding higher interest rates to hedge against the likelihood of inflation; so the best way to ensure low borrowing costs is to give central banks as much independence from politicians as possible, and then make price stability their primary mandate.	根据这一理论，投资者通过要求高利率以对冲通胀风险来惩罚挥霍国； 因此确保低借贷成本的最佳办法是尽可能地给予中央银行以政治独立性，然后将保持价格稳定作为中央银行的首要任务。


The European Central Bank is probably the most perfect expression of this philosophy.	欧洲央行也许是这一理论的最佳写照。


Its independence was secured not only by national legislation within the member states, but also by a treaty between them.	其独立性不仅受成员国国内法律的保护，也受成员国之间所立条约的保护。


Treaties are more binding than national legislation, because they are more difficult to revoke, amend, or repeal.	条约的约束力要高于国内立法，因为条约更加难以取消、修改和废除。


Because the debts of the large industrial borrowers – the UK and the US – are externally financed, the argument that their governments can always monetize debt is not convincing.	由于工业化大国的债务——如英国的和美国的——都依靠外部融资，因此它们的政府总是可以将债务货币化也是站不住脚的。


A moment may come when foreign investors do not believe that their sterling or dollar assets are protected against inflation, and at that point their willingness to hold low-yield sterling and dollar assets will end.	总会有那么一天，投资者不再相信英镑和美元资产会免受通胀影响，那时，他们持有低收益率英镑或美元资产的意愿就会消失。


The thinking behind the 1990’s approach to monetary policy is still fundamentally valid, but it requires institutional strengthening.	从根本上说，20世纪90年代的货币政策观背后的思想至今仍然有效，但这需要增强制度建设。


It would be better to stop the twentieth-century ideological pendulum and return to some older precepts.	我们最好抛弃20世纪的思想摇摆，回归某些旧观念。


Both states and markets work well only when adequately enforced legal rules provide the necessary certainty.	国家和政府都只有在充分强的法规提供必要的确定性的基础上才能良好运转。


Planting the Seeds of Africa’s Growth	播下非洲发展的种子


WEST LAFAYETTE, INDIANA – After decades of bad news, at least three major trends are turning Africa’s way: agricultural policies, rural demography, and farm productivity all promise improved opportunities for farm families across the continent.	印第安纳州西拉法叶市——经历了数十年的低迷后，非洲发展终于出现了三大良好势头： 这三大势头为全非洲的农村家庭带来了更大的机遇。


These trends move too slowly to make headlines, but cumulatively they offer a whole new world of bigger payoffs from public and private investment in agriculture and rural development.	这些势头发展非常缓慢，很难成为报纸的头条，但它们合在一起却为农业和农村发展领域的公共和私人投资提供了更为诱人的回报。


Each country in every year faces a unique set of circumstances.	每个国家每年面临的发展情况都不尽相同。


Novelties get the most attention, like the possibility that outside investors might control large areas of farmland.	新鲜事物总是最先引起人们的关注，比如由外来投资者控制大片耕地的可能性。


Spatial diversity is also important, because it ensures that each place differs from the aggregate average.	空间多样性也十分重要，因为这样才能保证每个地方都能保留自己的特色。


For Africa as a whole, however, at least three slow trends have recent turning points that offer game-changing new incentives for entrepreneurs and governments.	但就非洲整体而言，三大势头发展虽然缓慢，但却在不久前为企业家和政府提供了改变局势的全新动力。


The first turning point is political.	首先是政治转机。


New data from a World Bank study that compares farm policies around the world since 1955 shows for the first time just how far today’s African governments have gone to reduce the cost to farmers of the export taxes, marketing boards, and other interventions imposed by previous regimes (www.worldbank.org/agdistortions).	世界银行对比1955年来世界各国农业政策的全新研究数据首次揭示现任非洲政府竭尽全力降低前任向农民收取的出口税、农产品销售费及其他各项干扰性收费（www. worldbank.


Africa’s policy-induced price distortions peaked in the late 1970’s, and reforms since then have removed about two-thirds of that burden, greatly facilitating productivity growth and poverty alleviation.	org/agdistortions）。 非洲地区由政策导致的价格扭曲在20世纪70年代末达到了顶峰，此后实行的改革政策减轻了农民负担的三分之二，极大地推动了生产力和扶贫事业的发展。


Further reforms could yield additional benefits, but much of the handicap imposed on African farmers by post-colonial governments has now been removed.	进一步推行改革措施可能带来的好处更多，但后殖民地政府强加在非洲农民身上的不利因素现在多数已经去除。


The second transition is demographic.	其次是人口转机。


Census data compiled in recent revisions of United Nations population projections reveal the slowly unfolding implications of African history.	联合国人口预测项目最新统计搜集的人口普查数据显示，非洲正在慢慢显现出它历史的作用。


African households obtained access to modern medicine much later and more suddenly than people in other regions.	非洲家庭接触现代医药技术比其他地区民众晚得多，也突然得多。


The resulting improvement in child survival rates and population growth during the 1970’s and 1980’s were faster than those seen earlier in Asia or Latin America.	由此造成的二十世纪七八十年代儿童存活率的提高和人口数量的增长也比此前亚洲或拉美更快。


Africa’s towns and cities have been growing at some of the world’s fastest rates, but their absolute size is so small that they can absorb only a fraction of all new workers.	非洲城镇和城市的发展速度居世界之首，但它们的绝对规模太小，只能吸收一小部分新增劳动力。


Consequently, Africa’s rural population has been growing faster and for longer than any other in human history, with a correspondingly rapid and prolonged decline in per-capita endowments of land and other natural resources.	因此，非洲农村人口的增长速度比人类历史上其他国家更快，时间也更长，因此造成土地和其他自然资源的人均占有量也长时间迅速下降。


Moreover, post-independence improvements in child survival triggered a rise in child dependency rates, which also reached historically unprecedented levels in the 1970’s and 1980’s.	此外，非洲独立后儿童存活率的提高导致儿童抚养率大幅攀升，这一比率在二十世纪七八十年代也达到了历史最高水平。


Africa’s demographic burdens began to lighten in the 1990’s, thanks to gradual reduction in fertility rates and continued urbanization.	多亏了人口出生率下降和城市化过程的延续，非洲人口负担于二十世纪九十年代开始减轻。


As seen earlier in Asia, the slowdown in rural population growth and the reduced burden of childcare creates a window of opportunity for new investment to bring larger year-on-year increases in output per capita.	与亚洲早先的情况一样，农村人口增长放缓和抚养负担的减轻为新增投资开启了一扇人均产出逐年递增的机会之窗。


The third turning point in this sequence is technological: national estimates of cereal crop productivity show how, after decades of stagnation during the Asian green revolution, African yields have grown steadily over the past decade, so that estimated cereal grain output per capita now equals that of South Asia.	第三是技术转机： 对谷类作物产量的国家评估表明在亚洲绿色革命数十年的停滞之后，十年来非洲是怎样实现了产量的稳步增长，非洲现在的人均预计谷物产量几乎与亚洲的水平相当。


The start of this turnaround could be associated with the other two trends, as the cumulative result of more favorable policies and increased labor per hectare, but it could also reflect the gradual spread of improved crop varieties that resulted from earlier investment in agricultural technology.	此次转机的形成还与其他两种趋势有关，一是优惠政策和加大每公顷土地劳动力投入的累计效果，再有就是对农业技术早期投入所研制的改良作物品种的逐步推广。


The inflow of foreign aid to boost agricultural production did not rise until after the world food crisis of the 1970’s, and it peaked in the late 1980’s, yielding payoffs some years later.	在二十世纪七十年代世界粮食危机后提升农业生产的外国援助并没有更多流入，此类援助在二十世纪八十年代达到顶峰，并在若干年后开始产生回报。


Taken together, African politics, demography, and the delayed arrival of new technologies imposed severe headwinds against per-capita growth of agricultural output in the last quarter of the twentieth century.	总的来讲，非洲政局、人口分布和对新技术的延迟应用在二十世纪的最后二十五年为人均农业产量的增长造成了严重的障碍。


But, looking forward, as these headwinds fade, faster growth and poverty alleviation are becoming easier to achieve.	但从长远来看，随着这些阻力的逐渐消退，实现脱贫和快速增长难度正在减小。


Of course there is no guarantee of further progress.	当然，谁也无法保证能取得更深入的进展。


The engines of growth include public and private investment, particularly for the new technologies needed to raise farm productivity.	推动增长的力量包括公共和私人投资，特别是投资于提高农业生产率的全新技术。


Past efforts have been victims of their own success: as the burst of worldwide agricultural research and development in the 1970’s and 1980’s led to global food abundance in the 1990’s and 2000’s, foreign-aid donors turned to other priorities, and their per-capita support for African agriculture fell to a historical low in 2006 of around one dollar per year.	过去的成功却阻碍了更深层次的努力： 因为二十世纪七八十年代世界范围内的农业研发浪潮带来了二十世纪九十年代和二十一世纪的粮食丰收，以致于国外援助团体开始更多地关注其他发展目标，致使他们对非洲农业的人均支持力度跌至2006年年均约一美元的历史最低谷。


The global food crisis of 2007-2008 brought a brutal end to that complacency, and many investors have pledged a renewed focus on agriculture, but the proof will be in the spending.	2007-2008年爆发的全球粮食危机让这种沾沾自喜戛然而止，很多投资者重新开始关注农业，唯一的证明是增加经费投入。


African agriculture continues to face serious challenges.	非洲农业仍然面临着严峻的挑战。


Soil nutrients are being depleted, soil moisture is falling, temperatures are rising, and disease pressures are worsening.	土壤肥力正在枯竭，水分含量正在下降，气温正在升高，病害压力不断恶化。


Fortunately, a growing arsenal of solutions is available through local innovations that are increasingly well adapted to Africa’s unique needs.	幸运的是，当地创新正在创造出适应非洲特殊需要的越来越多的解决办法。


Generalizations and predictions rarely survive for long on a continent as diverse and volatile as Africa is.	概括和预测很难在非洲这样一块多样而又善变的土地上持久存在下去。


But African countries do have some things in common: widespread improvements in farm policy, improved demographic conditions, and the availability of new technologies create new opportunities for the decade ahead.	但非洲国家的确具有某些共同之处：农业政策领域的大规模改善，人口状况的提高以及新技术在未来十年间创造的崭新机遇。


These three mega-trends put African farmers in a better position than ever before to take advantage of increased public and private investment.	这三种了不起的趋势使非洲农民能够对不断增长的公共和私人投资更好地加以利用。


As the obstacles created by previous government policies and past population growth are gradually removed, adopting successful innovations will yield increasingly large payoffs and faster per-capita growth over time.	随着此前的政府政策和过去的人口增长所造成的障碍逐步消除，成功应用创新将会随着时间的推移创造越来越快的人均增长，并带来越来越高的回报。


For investors, the deepest obstacles are informational: what works best, and under which circumstances?	对投资者而言，最深层次的障碍存在于信息层面上：在哪种情况下什么效果最好？


New data sources about relative impacts are becoming available, and are desperately needed.	关于相对影响的全新资料来源正在形成，而这满足了人们对信息的迫切需要。


Governments, donors, and other investors can still make bad choices, but there are unprecedented opportunities for high-payoff growth.	政府、捐助团体和其他投资者仍然有可能做出错误的决策，但实现高回报增长的机遇前所未有。


If funders take notice, farmers are poised to respond – and 2010 could mark the start of a bright new era in African agriculture.	如果出资者加以留意，农民们肯定会积极响应——2010年可能标志着非洲农业光明新纪元的开始。


Playboy and the Mullah	花花公子和毛拉


Indonesia recently witnessed a pair of dramatic releases: one a radical Muslim cleric from prison, the other a saucy men’s magazine from its editors.	印度尼西亚最近发生了两件戏剧性的释放事件：一是一位激进的穆斯林教士被从监狱里释放了出来，另一件是一份漂亮的男性杂志被投入了市场。


Both Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Playboy are now out on the streets and in the public eye, but neither is as significant as its opponents claim.	阿布·巴卡尔·巴希尔和《花花公子》现在都出现了大街上并受到了公众的关注，但是他们没有一个有其反对派主张得那么重要。


Their releases and the public debate to which they have contributed, however, cut straight to the heart of the ongoing struggle for Indonesia’s self-identity – a struggle which has taken a dramatic turn of late.	他们的释放和由此引发的公众争论直接反映了印尼在抉择自我身份方面的斗争。 这场斗争最近发生了戏剧性的转变。


Abu Bakar Ba’asyir is a radical Muslim cleric who was convicted of blessing the original 2002 Bali bombing, and suspected by some of providing much more.	激进的穆斯林教士阿布·巴卡尔·巴希尔因为公开赞颂2002年巴厘岛爆炸案，并被怀疑可能有更多的不法行为而被判刑。


His name is on a UN list of terrorists, and undoubtedly Indonesia and the rest of the world would be safer if he were still in prison.	他被列入一份联合国恐怖分子的名单，无疑，如果他一直呆在监狱里的话印尼和整个世界都将太平许多。


But his release in itself is not, as some charge, evidence that Indonesia is becoming more radicalized.	但是他的被释放本身并不像有些人所说的那样表明印尼已经变得越来越激进。


Ba’asyir was released for the simple reason that the law required it: he had completed his 30-month sentence.	他被释放只是因为法律要求这样做：因为他已经服完了他30个月的刑期。


Indonesia’s government would undoubtedly prefer to see Ba’asyir languish in jail, but without any legal measure to justify continued detention, it had little option but to release him.	印尼政府无疑更希望看到巴希尔继续呆在监狱里，但是由于缺乏任何法律手段能够为延续对他的监禁提供理由，从而不得不释放他出狱。


Having done so, the government has been quick to impose a travel ban, freeze his bank accounts, and make clear that it will monitor his activities closely.	不过，在把他释放后，政府很快就颁布了对他的旅行禁令，冻结了他的银行帐号，并且明确指出将密切监视他的活动。


Ba’asyir’s release is undeniably unfortunate and possibly dangerous – but it is the consequence of legal proceedings, not any sudden radicalization of Indonesia.	巴希尔被释放毫无疑问是不幸并且也许是危险的，但这是法律程序的结果，不是出于印尼突然变得激进的缘故。


The case of Playboy is a much more accurate barometer of the state of religious radicalism in Indonesia.	《花花公子》事件是一个更能准确反映印尼宗教激进主义状况的晴雨表。


When Playboy unveiled plans for a nudity-free Indonesian edition early this year, it was denounced by politicians and conservative religious leaders as a threat to traditional values.	当《花花公子》今年早些时候宣布它计划在印尼发行没有裸体的版本时遭到了政治家和保守宗教领导人的强烈谴责，他们认为这是对传统价值观的一种威胁。


The national parliament introduced an “Anti-Pornography Bill,” which turned out to be a vaguely-worded document with the potential to outlaw not only pornography, but also certain traditional dances, sunbathing, and public kissing.	议会提出了一份“反色情议案”，这份措辞模糊的法案可能将不仅使色情变得非法，甚至可能使某些传统舞蹈、太阳浴和在公众场合接吻也变得非法。


The proposed bill attracted support from moderate Muslim leaders, but its most vocal advocates were a collection of radical religious groups with a predilection for violence, led by the Islamic Defenders Front (known by its Indonesian acronym, FPI).	这份提议中的议案得到了温和穆斯林领导人的支持，但是支持声音最强烈的是一些倾向于暴力的激进宗教团体，为首的是伊斯兰抵抗主义阵线（在印尼语中缩写简称FPI）。


This year alone, these self-appointed moral vigilantes have ransacked bars and nightclubs, attacked the American and Danish embassies, and stoned the offices of Playboy after its first edition – all with only occasional protests from the police.	单单在今年，这些自诩为道德卫士的人就洗劫了酒吧和夜总会，袭击了美国和丹麦大使馆，还在《花花公子》首期发行后用石块砸他们的办公大楼。 这些事件警方只不过偶尔干预了一下。


The FPI and its brethren took up the anti-pornography bill with vigor, organizing demonstrations in support and denouncing anyone who dared oppose it.	伊斯兰抵抗主义阵线及其同党极力鼓吹反色情议案，组织示威游行以示支持，并激烈谴责任何反对这一议案的人。


In the months following Playboy’s announcement, the public backlash against the magazine appeared to have pushed the Indonesian mainstream firmly to the right, an impression only furthered by the high visibility and loud belligerence of radical groups.	在《花花公子》宣布它的计划后数月时间里，公众对于这份杂志的强烈反对似乎使大家认为印尼社会的主流变得右倾了，而激进组织大张旗鼓、越来越响亮地表达他们的声音更加深了这种印象。


Moderate Muslim activists and intellectuals tried valiantly to counter the radicals, but seemed unable to gain traction.	温和的穆斯林活动家和知识分子试图勇敢地对抗这些激进分子，但似乎力不从心。


Late this spring, something changed, and within a few weeks moderates made dramatic public advances.	今年的晚春，事情发生了转变。 在几周的时间里温和派取得了戏剧性的公开进展。


The most striking demonstration of this political shift came after an incident in central Java, in which a speech by former President Gus Dur was interrupted by FPI members who denounced him for supporting pluralism and opposing the anti-pornography bill.	这一政治转变最引人注目的例子来自爪哇中部的一次事件，前总统瓦希德在发表演讲时被伊斯兰抵抗主义阵线打断了，他们指责他支持多元文化以及反对反色情议案。


It was a public attack on a respected national and religious leader, and it was answered quickly by the leaders of the two most important Muslim organizations in the country.	这是对于一位受人尊敬的国家和宗教领导人的公开攻击，该国两个最重要的穆斯林组织的领导人很快作出了反应。


Representing a combined membership of more than sixty million Indonesians, they called directly upon the government to act against groups who engage in violence in the name of Islam, and denounced the behavior of such groups as un-Islamic, criminal, and a threat to national unity.	这两个在印尼共拥有超过六千万成员的组织直接要求政府打击以伊斯兰的名义进行暴力活动的团体，并且宣布他的行为是非伊斯兰主义的，是犯罪行为，并且是对国家统一的威胁。


Newly emboldened, the government pledged to crackdown on groups that engage in violence, and announced plans to empower authorities to disband organizations that threaten ‘security and order.’	受到支持的政府发誓将镇压那些进行暴力活动的团体，并宣布计划赋予执法机关权力使他们有权解散威胁“安全和社会秩序”的组织。


The Jakarta police have begun acting with new vigor: they charged one prominent radical leader with defamation for publicly calling women opposed to the anti-pornography bill “evil, wretched, and immoral,” and then arrested the chairman and twenty members of FPI for attacking a group of cafes.	雅加达警方迅速行动起来。 他们指控一位有名的激进派别领导人涉嫌在公开场合诬蔑那些反对反色情议案的妇女“邪恶、肮脏、伤风败俗”，随后又由于袭击咖啡厅而拘捕了伊斯兰抵抗主义阵线的主席和二十几个成员。


A national dialogue about fostering pluralism is now in progress, and has inspired renewed public interest in Pancasila, the national philosophy discredited during the Suharto years but now seen by some as a symbol of Indonesia’s historic pluralism.	关于推进多元文化的一场举国讨论正在进行中，并且使公众对建国五项原则又重燃兴趣，这一民族哲学思想在苏哈托统治时期被受到质疑，而现在它被一些人看作是印尼历史上多元文化的一种象征。


Meanwhile, legislators have said they will work to transform the controversial anti-pornography bill into a more targeted anti-smut ordinance.	同时，立法者声称他们将把引起争议的反色情议案转变成一项更有针对性的反淫秽法令。


As for the Playboy , it has been met with the expected criticism – but no attacks and indeed, not even any demonstrations.	至于《花花公子》，它受到了预想中的批评，但是没有受到攻击，事实上，甚至没有什么示威游行。


In sum, a remarkable shift in the national debate -- from how to make Indonesia more conservatively Islamic, to how to sustain Indonesia’s tradition of religious pluralism into the future – has taken place.	总之，这场举国辩论已经发生了引人瞩目的转向，从怎样使印尼倾向于更为保守的伊斯兰主义，到怎样保持印尼传统上的宗教多元化。


The releases of Ba’asyir and publication of Playboy , however controversial, will not themselves alter this new discourse, but they offer an insightful glimpse into just how dramatically things are changing in Indonesia.	巴希尔的释放和《花花公子》的发行，无论多么引发争议，都无法改变这一新的辩论，但是它们可以使人看到印尼社会的变化是多么地具有戏剧性。


The moderate agenda has gained important ground this month – but the struggle to establish Indonesia’s political and religious identity is far from over.	这个月温和派占据了优势，但是建立印尼政治和宗教个性的斗争还远远没有结束。


Playing Defense in Europe	欧洲的守势


LONDON – The most frightening periods in history have often been interregnums – moments between the death of one king and the rise of the next.	伦敦—历史上最可怕的时期往往是权力真空期，即老王驾崩到新王继位之间的时期。


Disorder, war, and even disease can flood into the vacuum when, as Antonio Gramsci put it in his Prison Notebooks, “the old is dying and the new cannot be born.”	如安东尼奥·葛兰姆西（Antonio Gramsci）在其《狱中笔记》（Prison Notebooks）所言，当“老王将逝、新王未生”时，混乱、战争乃至死亡纷至沓来。


The dislocation and confusion of 2016 do not rival the turmoil of the interwar period, when Gramsci wrote, but they are certainly symptoms of a new interregnum.	2016年的错位与混乱和葛兰姆西写《狱中笔记》的两次大战之间无法相提并论，但也显然是权力真空的症候。


After the end of the Cold War, the world was held together by an American-policed security order and a European-inspired legal order.	冷战结束后，世界通过美国所主管的安全秩序和欧洲所启发的法律秩序维持。


Now, however, both are fraying, and no candidates to replace them have yet emerged.	但是，如今，这两大秩序都在消失，而能够取而代之的候选者尚未浮现。


Indeed, unlike in 1989, this is not a crisis of a single type of system.	事实上，与1989年不同，这不是一场一种类型的制度的危机。


Countries as different as Brazil, China, Russia, and Turkey are coming under heightened political and economic pressure.	巴西、中国、俄罗斯和土耳其情况各异，但都出现了严重的政治和经济压力。


Even if the nightmare of a President Donald Trump is avoided, as appears increasingly likely, the United States can no longer be the world’s policeman.	即使唐纳德·特朗普当选总统的噩梦被成功避免——这种可能性越来越大——美国也不再能够成为世界警察。


Powers such as Russia, Iran, and China are probing US reactions in Ukraine, Syria, and the South China Sea.	俄罗斯、伊朗和中国等强国正在乌克兰、叙利亚和南海试探美国的反应。


And US allies like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Poland, and Japan are forging independent and assertive foreign policies to make up for a US that cannot and will not carry its previous burdens.	而土耳其、沙特阿拉伯、波兰和日本等美国的盟国正在构建独立自主的外交政策，以备美国无法或不愿承担此前的责任。


Meanwhile, the European Union’s declining cohesion is undermining its moral authority on the world stage.	与此同时，欧盟凝聚力江河日下正在危及其在世界舞台上的道德权威。


Many of the global institutions that reflect European values and norms – from the World Trade Organization and the International Criminal Court to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change – are gridlocked.	许多反映欧洲价值观和范式的全球机构——从世界贸易组织和国际刑事法庭到联合国气候变化框架公约——都陷入了僵局。


Regionally, the three strands of the European order are unraveling: the US is seeking to reduce its investment in NATO, the EU is de-emphasizing enlargement, and the chaos in the Middle East and Ukraine is making a mockery of the European Neighborhood Policy.	在地区层面，三大欧洲秩序正在解体：美国正在寻求降低对北约的投入； 欧盟不再强调扩张；


The rise – and rapprochement – of illiberal forces in Russia and Turkey mean that the EU is no longer the only pole of attraction in the region.	中东和乌克兰乱局使欧洲睦邻政策沦为笑柄。 俄罗斯和土耳其的反自由力量（illiberal forces）的崛起和复兴意味着欧洲不再是地区内唯一的吸引力。


Worse, EU integration has gone into reverse, with member states seeking to insulate themselves from the outside world, rather than trying to export their shared values.	更糟糕的是，欧盟一体化已经走向了反面，成员国寻求与外部世界隔绝，而不是输出共同价值观。


As a result, the biggest threats to free trade and the open society stem from domestic sources, not external enemies.	结果，自由贸易和开放社会的最大威胁来自国内，而不是外部敌人。


Even in Germany, which had long seemed immune to such pressures, the interior minister talks of banning burkas (a policy that would affect 300 people), while the vice-chancellor has declared the death of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the US even before the body is cold.	即使是长期以来似乎与这些压力绝缘的德国，内政部长也开始谈论禁止布尔卡（该项政策将影响300人），而其副总理更是在欧盟与美国之间的跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系（TTIP）余息尚存时便已宣布它已经死亡。


The EU proved over the last few decades that it could be a force for globalization – tearing down barriers between peoples and nations.	过去几十年来，欧盟证明了它能够成为支持全球化的力量——碾碎民族与国家间的壁垒。


But today its survival depends on showing that it can protect citizens from the very forces it has promoted.	但如今，其生存取决于它能否证明有能力保护公民免受它所推动的力量的影响。


Maintaining the four freedoms at the heart of the European project – the free movement of people, goods, capital, and services within Europe – will be possible only if EU governments have credible policies to protect the most vulnerable in their societies.	欧洲工程的核心是四大自由——欧洲内部人员、商品、资本和服务的自由流动。 要想保持这四大自由，欧盟政府必须拿出可信政策保护社会中最脆弱的群体。


That will mean improving protection of the EU’s external borders, compensating domestic losers from migration and free trade, and soothing public fears about terrorism.	这意味着改进欧盟外部边境的保护、补偿内部移民和自由贸易的输家、平息民众对恐怖主义的恐惧。


The danger is that much of what the EU rightly pushed for during the good times could hasten its unraveling now, during the current interregnum.	危险在于欧盟在好光景时所正确地推动的东西在如今的权力真空时期可能加速其分崩离析。


For example, given so much uncertainty about the future state of Europe and the world, debating enlargement or the TTIP seems pointless – or worse, because even opening such discussions is certain to play into the hands of Euroskeptics.	比如，欧洲和世界的未来状态充满了不确定性，争论扩张或TTIP似乎毫无意义——甚至更加糟糕，因为即使开放这些讨论也必然正中欧洲怀疑派下怀。


The EU needs to distinguish between core and peripheral priorities.	欧盟需要区分核心和外围重点。


For issues such as EU relations with Russia and Turkey (and these two countries’ relations with each other), member states need to agree on a policy that recognizes the interests of all.	对于欧盟与俄罗斯和土耳其的关系（以及俄土两国关系）的问题，成员国需要形成一致的承认所有各方利益的政策。


But much greater flexibility is advisable in other areas, including commitments to refugee re-allocation and eurozone rules, where excessive rigidity could cause European unity to buckle and snap.	但其他领域可以追求更大的灵活性，包括承诺重新分配难民和欧元区规则，在这些方面过于僵化可能导致欧洲团结崩溃。


In addition to preventing an alliance between Russia and Ankara, the EU should rethink its goals in its neighborhood.	除了防止俄罗斯与安卡拉结盟，欧盟应该反思其周边目标。


Although the Balkan countries that are outside the EU will remain there for many years, they are in the European security space already, and Europeans should be prepared to intervene militarily if outbreaks of violence recur.	尽管位于欧盟之外的巴尔干国家在多年内都不会加入欧盟，但它们已经身处欧洲安全空间之内，而欧洲人也应该在暴力死灰复燃时准备进行军事干预。


Moreover, EU leaders should pursue a broader definition of peace than the absence of war, including political and social stability and preventing radicalization in Bosnia and Kosovo.	此外，欧盟领导人应该追求更广义的和平定义，而不仅仅局限于不发生战争，和平应该包括政治与社会稳定以及防止波斯尼亚和科索沃局势极端化。


For Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, the goal should be to promote stable and predictable governments.	对格鲁吉亚、乌克兰和摩尔多瓦，目标应该是推动稳定的、可预测的政府。


For the next few years, the EU should view them as independent buffer states rather than as member-states-in-waiting.	未来几年中，欧盟应该将它们视为独立的缓冲国家，而不是候选成员国。


It will be particularly important not to set red lines that the EU is not willing to defend.	尤其重要的是不可设置欧盟不愿意捍卫的红线。


In the troubled Middle East, the EU cannot hope to be the central actor.	在麻烦的中东，欧盟不可能指望成为主角。


But EU countries cannot protect their populations from instability if they are only spectators.	但如果欧盟国家只是旁观，也无法保护人民不受动荡影响。


Particularly in Syria and Libya, the EU needs to playing a more concerted role with regional powers – as well as with the US and Russia – to advance political processes that could help reduce violence, provide humanitarian aid, and stem the flow of refugees.	特别是在叙利亚和利比亚，欧盟需要与地区力量以及美国和俄罗斯进行更加一致的合作以推进有助于减少暴力、提供人道援助和阻止难民流的政治进程。


One of the EU’s main challenges is to define success in a defensive era.	欧盟的主要挑战之一是定义防御年代的成功。


During the heyday of enlargement, the goal was to deepen integration and broaden its reach across Europe.	在扩张的高峰期，目标是深化一体化和推广其在欧洲的接触面。