It constitutes a pragmatic set of policies that has been enormously successful in keeping economic insecurity at bay.	它由务实政策组合构成，在预防经济不安全方面取得了巨大的成功。


Despite coming under relentless attack for decades, it remains indispensable for providing the public goods that markets cannot supply efficiently, equitably, or in sufficient quantity.	尽管几十年来饱受攻讦，社会民主仍然是提供市场无法高效、公平、充足地提供的公共品的不可或缺的关键。


But the lack of formal intellectual support means that even nominally social-democratic parties do not entirely understand how well social democracy works.	但缺乏正式的学界支持意味着即便名义上打着社会民主旗号的政党也无法完全理解社会民主运行得如何。


Unlike markets, which reward the wealthy and successful, social democracy is premised on the principle of civic equality.	市场奖励有钱人和成功者，与此不同，社会民主建立在公民平等（civic equality）的前提上。


This creates a bias for “one-size-fits-all” entitlements; but there have long been ways to manage this constraint.	这造成了有利于“一刀切”权利的偏见； 但对于这一约束条件早已有了应对之道。


Because economics appears to be compelling, and because social democracy is indispensable, the two doctrines have mutated to accommodate each other – which is not to say that their marriage is a happy one.	由于经济学有着引人入胜的外表，而社会民主不可或缺，因此两种思想发生了演变以互相适应——这并不是说他们的结合是和谐的。


As with many unhappy marriages, divorce is not an option.	与许多不和谐的回音一样，离婚不是选项之一。


Many economists have responded to the failure of their discipline’s core premises by retreating into empirical investigation.	许多经济学家应对经济学核心假设的失灵的办法是撤退到实证调查领域。


But the resulting validity comes at the cost of generality: randomized controlled trials in the form of local experiments cannot replace an overarching vision of the social good.	但由此带来的合理性是有代价的，即丧失一般性：以地方实验为形式的随机化控制实验无法取代放之四海而皆准的社会公益观。


A good way to begin acknowledging this would be to select Nobel Prize recipients accordingly.	承认这一点的一个好的起点是据此遴选诺贝尔经济学奖得住。


The Economist’s Concubine	经济学家的娼妓


LONDON – In recent decades, economics has been colonizing the study of human activities hitherto considered exempt from formal calculus.	伦敦—近几十年来，经济学一直在入侵迄今为止被认为不能进行正式数学分析的人类活动研究。


What critics call “economics imperialism” has given rise to an economics of love, of art, of music, of language, of literature, and of much else.	批评者称之为“经济学帝国主义”，它产生了爱情经济学、艺术经济学、音乐经济学、语言经济学、文学经济学，还有其他各种各样的经济学。


The unifying idea underlying this extension of economics is that whatever people do, whether it is making love or making widgets, they aim to achieve the best results at the least cost.	经济学的如此扩张背后的统一的基本思想是不管人们做什么，是做爱还是做小东西，他们的目标都是以最小的代价获得最好的结果。


These benefits and costs can be reduced to money.	这些成本和收益可以简化为钱。


So people are always looking for the best financial return on their transactions.	因此，人们总是追求交易的最佳财务回报。


This is contrary to the popular separation of activities in which it is right (and rational) to count the cost, and those in which people do not (and should not) count the cost.	这与流行的行为区分相反。 流行的区分将行为分为算计成本是正确（也是理性）的行为和不（也不应该）算计成本的行为。


To say that affairs of the heart are subject to cold calculation is, say the critics, to miss the point.	批评者认为，认为良心可以进行冰冷的算计没有抓住重点。


But cold-hearted calculation, reply the economists, is exactly the point.	但经济学家的回答是，冰冷的算计正是重点。


The pioneer of the economic approach to love was the Nobel laureate Gary Becker, who spent most of his career at the University of Chicago (where else?).	将经济学方法应用于爱情的先锋是诺贝尔经济学奖加里·贝克尔（Gary Becker），他的大部分职业生涯都在芝加哥大学度过（还能在哪里呢？


In his seminal paper, “A Theory of Marriage,” published in 1973, Becker argued that selecting a partner is its own kind of market, and marriages occur only when both partners gain.	）。 在他1973年发表的讨论班论文《婚姻论》（A Theory of Marriage）中，贝克尔指出，挑选伴侣本身是一类市场，婚姻仅当伴侣双方都获益时才发生。


It’s a very sophisticated theory, relying on the complementary nature of male and female work, but which tends to treat love as a cost-reducing mechanism.	这是一个非常漂亮的理论，以男女互补的性质为基础，但只把爱情作为降低成本的机制对待。


More recently, economists such as Columbia University’s Lena Edlund and University of Marburg’s Evelyn Korn, as well as Marina Della Giusta of Reading University, Maria Laura di Tommaso of the University of Turin, and Steiner Strøm of the University of Oslo, have applied the same approach to prostitution.	接着，哥伦比亚大学的莱纳·埃德伦德（Lena Edlund）和马尔堡大学的伊芙琳·科恩（Evelyn Korn），以及雷丁大学的马琳娜·德拉·吉乌斯塔（Marina Della Giusta）、都灵大学的玛利亚·劳拉·迪托马索（Maria Laura di Tommaso）和奥斯陆大学的斯坦纳·斯特罗姆（Steiner Strøm）等经济学家应用同样的方法研究卖淫。


Here, the economic approach might seem to work better, given that money is, admittedly, the only relevant currency.	在这里，经济学方法似乎效果更好，因为钱确实是唯一重要的因素。


Edlund and Korn treat wives and prostitutes as substitutes.	埃德伦德和科恩将妻子和妓女处理为替代品。


A third alternative, working in a regular job, is ruled out by assumption.	第三种方案，即定期性伴侣，被假设排除在外。


According to the data, prostitutes make a lot more money than women working in ordinary jobs.	根据数据，妓女比从事普通工作的妇女收入高得多。


So the question is: why is there such a high premium for such low skills?	那么问题来了：为何对于如此低级的技能会有如此高昂的溢价？


On the demand side is the randy male, often in transit, who weighs the benefits of going with prostitutes against the costs of getting caught.	在需求端是登徒子，常常是旅行途中的登徒子，他们掂量与妓女共度春宵的收益和被抓包的成本。


On the supply side the prostitute will require higher earnings to compensate for her higher risk of disease, violence, and blighted marriage prospects.	在供给端，妓女要求更高的收入以补偿更高的患病、遭遇暴力和难以获得理想婚姻的风险。


“If marriage is a source of income for women,” write Edlund and Korn “then the prostitute has to be compensated for foregone marriage market opportunities.”	“如果婚姻是女性的一个收入源，”埃德伦德和科恩写道，“那么妓女必须获得远离婚姻市场机会的补偿。


So the premium reflects the opportunity cost to the prostitute of performing sex work.	”因此，妓女收入的高溢价体现了从事性工作的机会成本。


There is a ready answer to the question of why competition does not drive down sex workers’ rewards.	对于为何竞争没有拉低性工作者的奖励的问题，有一个现成的答案。


They have a “reservation wage”: If they are offered less, they will choose a less risky line of work.	她们有一个“保留工资”：如果出价太低，她们就会换一个风险较低的工作。


What warrant does the state have to interfere with the contracts that are struck within this market of willing buyers and sellers?	如果国家要干预这个由自愿买家和卖家组成的市场中的契约，依据何在？


Why not decriminalize the market altogether, as many sex workers want?	为何不遂了许多性工作者的愿，让这个市场整体脱罪？


Like all markets, the sex market needs regulation, particularly to protect the health and safety of its workers.	和所有市场一样，性市场需要监管，特别是为了保护性工作者的健康和安全。


And, as in all markets, criminal activity, including violence, is already illegal.	此外，和所有市场一样，犯罪活动，包括暴力，也是非法的。


But on the other side, there is a strong movement to ban buying sex altogether.	但另一方面，一刀切禁止买春的呼声很高。


The so-called Sex Buyer Law, criminalizing the purchase, though not the sale, of sexual services has been implemented in Sweden, Norway, Iceland, and Northern Ireland.	所谓的买春法规定购买性服务为犯罪（但出卖性服务非罪），瑞典、挪威、冰岛和北爱尔兰都已经实施了该法。


The enforced reduction of demand is expected to reduce supply, without the need to criminalize the supplier.	人们预期强制减少需求能减少供给，而不必让供给者入罪。


There is some evidence that it has had the intended effect.	一些证据表明，这确实起到了一些效果。


(Though supporters of the so-called Nordic System ignore the effect of criminalizing the purchase of sex on the earnings of those who supply it, or would have supplied it.)	（尽管这一所谓的北欧制度的支持者忽视了买春入罪对性服务供给者或曾经的供给者的收入的影响。 ）


The movement to ban buying sex has been strengthened by the growth of international trafficking in women (as well as drugs).	禁止买春运动因为国际贩卖妇女（以及毒品）活动的日益猖獗而加强。


This may be counted as a cost of globalization, especially when it involves an influx into the West from countries where attitudes toward women are very different.	这可以算作全球化的一个成本，特别是当许多妇女从对待女性的态度截然不同的国家涌入西方的时候。


But the proposed remedy is too extreme.	但人们提出的解决办法太过极端。


The premise of the Sex Buyer Law is that prostitution is always involuntary for women – that it is an organic form of violence against women and girls.	买春法假定妓女不可能是自愿的——这是一种针对妇女和女孩的有机（organic）暴力形式。


But I see no reason to believe this.	但我认为没有理由这样认为。


The key question concerns the definition of the word “voluntary.”	关键在于“自愿”一词的定义。


True, some prostitutes are enslaved, and the men who use their services should be prosecuted.	诚然，一些妓女被奴役，使用她们的服务的男性应该被起诉。


But there are already laws on the books against the use of slave labor.	但对于禁止使用奴工已经有了成文法。


I would guess that most prostitutes have chosen their work reluctantly, under pressure of need, not involuntarily.	我猜大部分妓女是只是不情愿（reluctantly）地选择了她们的工作，迫于压力才这么做，但不是不自愿（involuntarily）。


If men who use their services are criminalized, then so should people who use the services of supermarket checkout employees, call-center workers, and so on.	如果使用她们的服务的男性被入罪，那么使用超市收银员、呼叫中心工人等服务的人也应该背入罪。


Then there are some prostitutes (a minority, to be sure) who claim to enjoy their work.	还有一些妓女（诚然，只是少数）声称享受自己的工作。


And, of course, there are male prostitutes, gay and straight, who are typically ignored by feminist critics of prostitution.	当然，也有男妓（不管是同性恋还是直男），他们常常被妓女的女权主义批评者所忽略。


In short, the view of human nature of those who seek to ban the purchase of sex is as constricted as that of the economists.	简言之，寻求禁止买春者的人性观和经济学家一样狭隘。


As St. Augustine put it, “If you do away with harlots, the world will be convulsed with lust.”	圣奥古斯丁曾说：“远离娼妓，世界饱受淫欲折磨。 ”


Ultimately, all arguments against prostitution based on notions of inequality and coercion are superficial.	最后，所有基于不平等和胁迫的概念而反对妓女的观点都是肤浅的。


There is, of course, a strong ethical argument against prostitution.	当然，反对妓女有强大的道德正确性。


But unless we are prepared to engage with that – and our liberal civilization is not – the best we can do is to regulate the trade.	但除非我们准备好坦然接受它——而我们的自由文明并没有做好准备——否则我们能做的最佳办法就是监管性交易。


Secular Stagnation for Free	免费之下的长期性经济停滞


CAMBRIDGE – Something is definitely rotten in the state of capitalism.	发自剑桥——在资本主义世界肯定有些什么东西彻底出问题了。


Despite unprecedentedly low interest rates, investment in most advanced countries is significantly below where it was in the years prior to the 2008 crisis, while employment rates remain stubbornly low.	尽管采取了前所未有的低利率，大多数发达国家的投资水平依然远远低于2008年经济危机之前，而就业率则依旧一蹶不振。


And even investment in the pre-crisis period was unimpressive, given low prevailing interest rates.	但即便是在危机之前，就算利率普遍低下，投资也不见起色。


For some reason, achieving a level of investment that would generate full employment seems to require negative real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates, which is another way of saying that people have to be paid to invest.	不知什么原因，获取达致完全就业的投资水平似乎需要实际负利率（排除通胀）才能实现，以致出现某种说法，认为必须先发钱给人们然后能产生投资。


But in a world of low inflation and zero nominal interest rates, getting to the required negative real rate may be a challenge.	但在一个低通胀和零名义利率的世界上，达到所需的负实际利率其实较为困难。


This is the ailment that Larry Summers, recalling a 1938 paper by Alvin Hansen, has dubbed “secular stagnation.”	这也是拉里·萨莫斯（Larry Summers）引用埃尔文·汉森（Alvin Hansen）在1938年发表的一篇论文里提到的“长期性经济停滞”概念。 。


The policy consequences of this state of affairs remain open to debate (the issues are well summarized in an e-book edited by Coen Teulings and Richard Baldwin).	这种事态的政策后果依然有待讨论——所有相关问题在科恩·图林斯（Coen Teulings） 理查德·鲍德温（Richard Baldwin）编纂的一本电子图书上都有涵盖。


For Keynesians, the answer is unconventional monetary policy (for example, quantitative easing), fiscal stimulus, and a higher target inflation rate.	对凯恩斯主义者来说，解决方法就是实施非常规货币政策（比如量化宽松），财政刺激，以及制定更高的通胀率目标。


But, as Summers and others point out, lax monetary policies may trigger asset bubbles, and prolonged fiscal stimulus may end in a debt crisis.	但正如萨莫斯和其他人指出的那样，宽松货币政策或许会引发资产泡沫，而旷日持久的财政刺激则会导致一场债务危机。


Moreover, the Keynesians’ preferred policies address only the consequences of secular stagnation, not its causes – about which there is even less agreement.	此外，凯恩斯主义者所偏爱的政策只能应对长期性经济停滞的后果，而非其成因——而对后者的说法更是众说纷纭，莫衷一是。


For some, the problem is a savings glut associated with slower demographic growth, rising life expectancy, and static retirement thresholds – a combination that forces people to save more for their old age.	某些人认为，问题出在于与人口增长放缓，预期寿命延长，以及一成不变的退休年龄界定相关的过度储蓄之上——这迫使人们要为自己的老年准备更多的钱。


But, as Barry Eichengreen points out, the rise in savings appears to be too small to explain this.	但正如巴里·艾申格林（Barry Eichengreen）所指出的那样，当前储蓄额的增量太少，根本不足以解释这一点。


For others, the problem is lower investment demand, caused partly by the fact that machines are now much cheaper and that technological progress has slowed since 1970.	在另一些人看来，问题的根本是更低的投资需求，在某种程度上是因为机器的价格更加便宜且科技进步自1970年以来逐步放缓。


Economists like Robert Gordon and Tyler Cowen argue that the technological breakthroughs of the past, including piped water, air conditioning, and commercial air travel, had a greater social impact – giving rise to the suburban lifestyle of cars and shopping malls, for example – than many of today’s advances.	罗伯特·戈登（Robert Gordon）和泰勒·柯文（Tyler Cowen）等经济学家因为过去的科技突破，包括管道自来水，空调和商业化航班，都都比当今许多科技进步拥有更大的社会影响力——比如推动了汽车和大型购物广场等郊区生活方式的崛起。 。


This assessment bothers optimists like Joel Mokyr or Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, who do not believe that technological progress has slowed. Instead, they argue that the traditional concept used to measure economic output and growth, gross domestic product, understates that progress.	这一论断让乔尔·莫基（Joel Mokyr） 或者埃里克· 比约诺夫森和安德烈·麦卡菲（Erik Bryjnolfsson & Andrew McAfee）这些乐观主义者感到不满，因为因为他们并不认为技术发展正在放缓，并认为就GDP这种衡量经济总量和发展的传统概念低估了发展的程度。


After all, our lives have been made dramatically more productive thanks to Google, Wikipedia, Skype, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Waze, Yelp, Hipmunk, Pandora, and many other companies.	毕竟在谷歌、维基百科、Skype、推特、脸书、YouTube、位智（Waze）、Yelp（点评网站）、Hipmunk（机票预订网站）、Pandora（定制电台）等其他许多公司的帮助下我们的生活效率和生产力比过去提高了许多。


But all deliver their services for free, which means that the benefits they provide are not counted in GDP.	但这些公司都是免费提供服务的，也就意味着这些好处无法为计算在GDP里。


As Edward Glaeser has argued, it is hard to believe that the median family in the United States, which supposedly is worse off than in 1970, would be willing to give up its cell phones, Internet access, and new health technologies in order to return to that halcyon era.	正如爱德华·格拉瑟（Edward Glaeser）所指出的那样，我们无法相信那些据说比1970年代境况更差的美国中等收入家庭会愿意放弃自己的手机，网络和崭新的健康科技以回到过去的时代。


Thus, the GDP numbers must be excluding much progress.	由此可见，GDP数字必须将这类进步包含在内。


The fact that so much innovation is given away for free does not only create a measurement problem for economists; it is also a real problem for those trying to find investment opportunities.	而如此多的创新都是免费提供的事实不仅仅为经济学家带来了测量方面的难题； 同时也为那些尝试寻找投资机会的人造成了困扰。


In the good old days of the post-World War II boom, if you wanted an air conditioner, a car, or a newspaper, you had to buy one, making it possible for producers to earn money by providing them.	在二战后高速发展的那段好时光里，如果你想��一台空调，一辆汽车或一份报纸，你就必须付钱，而生产商就可以通过提供这些产品来获得利润。


Information-intensive products – typical of today’s technologically advanced economies – are different.	而那些信息密集型的产品——当今这些科技发达经济体中非常常见——则完全不同。


Because the cost of providing an extra copy is almost nil, it is hard to charge for them.	因为多生产一份内容的成本基本为零，因此也很难对此收费。


Broadcast radio and television were the first to confront this problem, because they could not prevent those with a receiver from getting the signal.	其中电台广播和电视首当其冲，因为他们无法阻止那些拥有接收终端的人收到信号。


They had to develop an advertising-based model, making it possible for others to pay for the benefits received by the consumer.	他们只能发展一个一广告为基础的模式，找其他人来为消费者所获得的好处买单。


This is supposedly what makes Google so profitable, though I have trouble believing that the enormous benefits I receive as an assiduous and happy user are paid for by my rather infrequent Internet purchases.	这大概也是谷歌能赚那么多钱的原因，虽然我一直难以相信作为身为一个勤奋而幸福的互联网用户自己所得到的巨大好处竟然是由本人相当稀少的互联网购买行为所支撑的。


So we live in a world where much of the progress that new technology permits is embodied in products that must be given away for free.	因此我们生活在这么一个世界上：新技术所承载的进步附着于一些免费的产品之上。


A somewhat haphazard sub-set of potential products can, with the right business model, be profitable – say, through advertising or by selling the information that they passively collect from users.	一个潜在产品某种程度上任意的一部分，只要采取了正确的商业模式，就可以赚钱——比如说出售从用户那里顺便收集的信息或是拿来做广告。 。


But many others, like Wikipedia and public radio, have trouble making ends meet.	在许多其他产品，比如维基百科和公共电台，却难以实现收支平衡。


Free products also depress the value of close substitutes.	因为免费的产品同时也压低了近似替代品的价值。


While it may require charging $100 per ticket to recover the costs of a $1 million theater play, some filmmakers can make money on a $200 million film by selling $10 tickets to consumers who are unwilling to wait a few weeks until their cable TV provider offers it.	有些花掉100万制作费的舞台剧可能需要100块钱门票，但某些电影制片人可以通过出售10块钱门票给那些不愿等到电视播放才看的消费者来赚钱，虽然他们的电影成本是2个亿。


The e-book mentioned above, which prompted this column, is available to you, the reader, for free (as is this column).	上文中提到激发本文创作灵感的电子书也是免费的（正如这篇专栏文章）。


No wonder so many people have trouble making ends meet.	无怪乎那么多商家都难以做到收支平衡。


But the Center for Economic Policy Research, which published the e-book, and Project Syndicate, which distributes this column, are both (at least to some extent) donor-funded.	但发布这部电子书的智库机构经济政策研究中心（Center for Economic Policy Research），以及分发这一专栏文章的世界报业辛迪加机构（Project Syndicate）都是（至少在某种程度上）由捐款来维持运作的。


This may not be a coincidence.	这可能不是一个巧合。


To harness the possibilities of new technology, we may need non-market forms of payment for valuable contributions.	为了驾驭新技术所带来的多种可能性，我们或许需要利用一些非市场形式的手段来支付那些有价值的贡献。


The traditional capitalist model may have made Bill Gates rich, but his foundation now finances valuable technological breakthroughs in unprofitable ways.	传统的资本主义模式让比尔·盖茨成为了一个富人，但他创立的基金会正在资助那些非营利的重大技术突破。


As with negative real interest rates, but in a more targeted and efficient manner, we may have to pay to make valuable investments happen.	在负实际利率的情况下，我们或许要付钱才能推动那些有价值的投资，但必须以一个更加精准而高效率的方式。


Missing the Economic Big Picture	忽视经济大局


BERKELEY – I recently heard former World Trade Organization Director-General Pascal Lamy paraphrasing a classic Buddhist proverb, wherein China’s Sixth Buddhist Patriarch Huineng tells the nun Wu Jincang: “When the philosopher points at the moon, the fool looks at the finger.”	伯克利—我最近听世贸组织前总干事拉米（Pascal Lamy）转述了一则佛教传说，禅宗六世祖惠能对无尽藏比丘尼说：“智者指月，愚者见指不见月。


Lamy added that, “Market capitalism is the moon.	”拉米补充说：“市场资本主义就是月。


Globalization is the finger.”	全球化就是指。 ”


With anti-globalization sentiment now on the rise throughout the West, this has been quite a year for finger-watching.	如今，反全球化情绪在西方全面崛起，今年也成为望指（finger-watching）的一年。


In the United Kingdom’s Brexit referendum, “Little Englanders” voted to leave the European Union; and in the United States, Donald Trump won the presidency because he convinced enough voters in crucial states that he will “make America great again,” not least by negotiating very different trade “deals” for the country.	在英国退欧公投中，“小英国人”投票脱离欧盟； 在美国，唐纳德·特朗普赢得总统大选，因为他让足够多的关键州选民相信他将“让美国再次伟大”，而其手段就包括为美国重新谈判各不相同的贸易“协议”。


Let us orient ourselves by considering what the economic-policy moon looks like today, particularly with respect to growth and inequality.	让我们这样引导我们自己：想一想经济政策之月现在是怎么一副模样，特别是从增长和不平等的角度看。


For starters, technological innovation in areas such as information processing, robotics, and biotechnology continues to accelerate at a remarkable pace.	首先，信息处理、机器人和生物技术等领域的技术创新仍然在以惊人的速度加速。


But annual productivity growth in North Atlantic countries has fallen from the 2% rate to which we have been accustomed since 1870 to about 1% now.	但北大西洋国家的年生产率增长从1870年以来早已习以为常的2%的水平下降到如今的1%左右。


Productivity growth is an important economic indicator, because it measures the year-on-year decline in resources or manpower needed to achieve the same level of economic output.	生产率增长是一个重要的经济指标，因为它衡量实现相同水平经济产出的资源和人力同比下降率。


Northwestern University economist Robert J. Gordon maintains that all of the true “game-changing” innovations that have fueled past economic growth – electric power, flight, modern sanitation, and so forth – have already been exhausted, and that we should not expect growth to continue indefinitely.	西北大学经济学家罗伯特·戈登（Robert J. Gordon）认为，在过去推动经济增长的所有真正的“改变大局”的创新——电力、飞行、现代卫生设施等——都已是明日黄花，我们不应该再期待增长永无止境地继续下去。


But Gordon is almost surely wrong: game-changing inventions fundamentally transform or redefine lived experience, which means that they often fall outside the scope of conventional measurements of economic growth.	但戈登几乎肯定是错的：改变大局的发明从根本上改变或重新定义生活体验，这意味着它们往往落在经济增长的常规衡量手段适用范围之外。


If anything, we should expect to see only more game changers, given the current pace of innovation.	如果说有什么期待的话，也应该期待当前的创新速度将带来更多的改变大局的创新。


Measures of productivity growth or technology’s added value include only market-based production and consumption.	生产率增长或技术增加值的衡量指标只包括了基于市场的生产和消费。


But one’s material wealth is not synonymous with one’s true wealth, which is to say, one’s freedom and ability to lead a fulfilling life.	但一个人的物质财富并不等同于一个人的真实财富——即一个人过上充实生活的自由和能力。


Much of our true wealth is constituted within the household, where we can combine non-market temporal, informational, and social inputs with market goods and services to accomplish various ends of our own choosing.	我们的真实财富大部分由家庭构成，在家庭中，我们可以将非市场的时间、信息和社会投入与市场产品和服务结合起来，实现我们的自我选择的各种结果。


While standard measures show productivity growth falling, all other indicators suggest that true productivity growth is leaping ahead, owing to synergies between market goods and services and emerging information and communication technologies.	标准衡量指标表明生产率增长有所下降，但所有其他指标显示真实生产率增长正在上升，原因在于市场产品和服务于新兴信息和通讯技术的协同效应。


But when countries with low-growth economies do not sufficiently educate their populations, nearly everyone below the top income quintile misses out on the gains from measured economic growth, while still benefiting from new technologies that can improve their lives and wellbeing.	但如果经济增长较低的国家不能为人民提供充分的教育，那么几乎所有不能进入收入顶层五分之一的人口都无法获得测得经济增长的收益，但仍能够得益于改善他们的生活和福利的新技术。


As economist Karl Polanyi pointed out in the 1930s and 1940s, if an economic system promises to create shared prosperity but only seems to serve the top 20% of earners, it has disappointed the vast majority of economic participants’ expectations.	经济学家卡尔·波兰尼（Karl Polanyi）在20世纪三四十年代指出，如果经济制度承诺创造共同繁荣，但最终只服务于收入顶层的20%，它就会令绝大多数经济参与者的期望落空。


And market capitalism, for its part, has not delivered the ever-more affordable 1980s lifestyle that so many back then expected it would.	而在这方面，市场资本主义没能提供物廉价美的20世纪80年代生活方式，而当时有很多人期待能够得到这种生活方式。


Instead, during the past 30 years, an “overclass” has emerged, one that exercises even more relative economic power than Gilded Age robber barons did.	相反，在过去30年，一个“卓越阶级”（overclass）浮现，这一阶级比镀金时代的强盗大亨的相对经济实力还要强。


The factors contributing to its rise and undue power, however, remain unclear.	但是，导致这一阶级崛起和拥有过度权力的的因素仍不清楚。


Elsewhere, China, India, and some Pacific Rim countries have matched, or will soon match, North Atlantic countries’ productivity and prosperity.	在其他地区，中国、印度和一些环太平洋国家已经或即将赶超北大西洋国家的生产率和繁荣。


The rest of the world is no longer falling further behind the North Atlantic, but nor is it closing the productivity and prosperity gap, implying that these countries will continue to lag behind indefinitely.	其余地区也不再被北大西��越甩越后，但也没能缩小生产率和繁荣差距，这意味着这些国家将继续无穷无尽地落后。


The aforementioned features are all constituent parts of our proverbial market capitalist moon.	上述特点都是传说中市场资本主义之月的要素。


As it develops and interacts with social, political, and technological forces, it creates elation alongside distress.	随着它与社会、政治和技术力量互动，它将创造出欢乐和悲伤。


Globalization is one piece in a larger puzzle: while it is important that we determine the best way to manage the global trade system, doing so cannot substitute for the much larger challenge of managing market capitalism itself.	全球化是更大的拼图中的一块：我们找到全球贸易体系的最佳管理之道固然重要，但这不能取代管理市场资本主义本身这一大得多的挑战。


By focusing on individual free-trade agreements, whether proposed or already existing, or on closing national borders to immigrants, we are looking at the finger and missing the moon.	我们只关注个别自由贸易协定——不管是草案还是已经存在的协定——或聚焦于对移民关闭国家边境，这就是见指不见月。


If we are to get a grip on the global economy’s trajectory, is time to look up.	要想控制全球经济的运行轨迹，现在我们必须抬头看月。


Economics and Its Critics	经济学及其批评


MUNICH – There is much to criticize in economics nowadays.	慕尼黑—如今，经济学的“吐槽点”可谓多矣。


For example, the profession focuses far too little on political issues and far too much on beating students to death with mathematics.	比如，经济学关注政治问题实在太少，而用数学折磨学生又是在太甚。


But much current criticism of the profession is based on misunderstanding and ignorance.	但当前大量对经济学的批评却是建立在误解和无知的基础上。


Consider Adam Smith’s concept of the “invisible hand,” which implies that a market equilibrium is efficient if perfect competition prevails and well-defined property rights exist.	以亚当·斯密的“看不见的手”的概念为例。 这一概念认为市场均衡是有效的，如果竞争是完美的并且产权是明晰的话。


Contrary to what many critics suppose, mainstream economists do not assume that these ideal conditions are always present.	与许多批评主张相反，主流经济学家并不假设这些理想条件总是成立。


On the contrary, economists tend to use these conditions as a benchmark for analyzing market failures.	相反，经济学家一般将这些条件作为分析市场失灵的基准。


Like sniffer dogs, they search the economy for such defects and ponder how they can be corrected through intelligent state intervention.	他们就像是嗅探犬，寻找经济中的缺陷，并提出如何通过明智的政府干预纠正这些缺陷。


In this respect, economists are like doctors, who have to know what a healthy body looks like before they can diagnose disease and prescribe treatment.	从这个角度看，经济学家就好比是医生，在能够诊断病情、开出治疗方案之前，他们必须知道健康的体魄是怎样的。


A good doctor does not intervene arbitrarily in the body’s processes, but only in cases where there is objective proof of a disease and an effective treatment can be prescribed.	好医生不会肆意干预身体过程，而只有在有客观证据证明存在疾病并且可以开出有效治疗方案的情况下才会干预。


Environmental regulation addresses a particularly striking example of market failure.	环境监管解决了市场失灵的一个尤其显著的例子。


Markets are generally efficient if companies’ revenues correctly reflect all the benefits that their output bestows on third parties, while their costs reflect all the harms.	市场是总体有效的，如果公司收入正确地反应了它们的产出给予第三方的一切好处、并且它们的成本反映了一切坏处的话。


In this case, maximizing profit leads to maximizing social welfare.	在此情形中，利润最大化带来社会福利最大化。


But if production entails environmental damage for which companies do not pay, incentives are distorted; companies may turn a profit, but they function inefficiently in economic terms.	但如果生产造成公司不承担成本的环境破坏，激励就被扭曲了； 公司或许会有利润，但从经济标准看，它们的运营是低效的。


So the state “corrects” firms’ incentives by levying fines or issuing bans.	因此，国家通过课以罚款或实施禁令“纠正”企业的激励。


Another malady that economists sometimes diagnose might be called “Keynes disease.”	另一种经济学家有时诊断的病例或许可称之为“凯恩斯病”。


If demand is too weak, it can lead to a sharp drop in employment (because wages and prices are rigid in the short term).	如果需求太疲软，就有可能导致就业的急剧恶化（因为工资和价格在短期是刚性的）。


The disease can be cured with injections of public, debt-financed stimulus – like giving a cardiac patient doses of nitroglycerine to keep his heart going.	凯恩斯病课以通过注入债务融资的公共刺激来治疗——就像给心脏病人吃硝化甘油以维持他的心脏跳动。


Contrary to what many think, there is no fundamental bias against this medicine in mainstream economics today.	与许多人想象的相反，今天的主流经济学中并不存在针对这一药方的根本性偏见。


But stimulus cannot be seen as a universal remedy.	但刺激不能视为万灵丹。


Many ailments that may afflict an economy are chronic, not acute, and thus call for other types of treatment.	许多折磨经济的疾病是慢性而非急性的，因此需要其他治疗方法。


Trying Keynesian therapy to resolve, say, the structural problems currently affecting the countries of southern Europe would be like trying to cure a broken leg with heart medicine.	用凯恩斯疗法解决（比如）目前正在影响南欧的结构性问题就好比是用心脏病药物治疗腿疾。


Nitroglycerine addresses the risk of circulatory collapse.	硝化甘油可以解决循环系统衰竭的风险。


In economic terms, that is what was needed following the 2008 global financial crisis.	放到经济学里讲，这就是2008年全球金融危机爆发后所需要的。


But long-term use of such medication can be fatal.	但长期使用这类药物可能是致命的。


Here and elsewhere, ideology causes conceptual confusion.	意识形态总是导致概念混淆。


For example, Smith viewed competition as a basic condition of the invisible hand’s operation, because monopolies and oligopolies exploit consumers and restrict production.	比如，斯密认为竞争是看不见的手运行的基本条件，因为垄断和寡头会剥削消费者、限制生产。


But only competition among providers of similar products is beneficial.	但只有相似产品提供商之间的竞争才是有益的。


Competition among providers of complementary goods or services is harmful, and can be even worse than a monopoly.	互补商品或服务供应商之间的竞争是有害的，甚至可能比垄断更糟糕。


(That is why train drivers and pilots, for example, should be forced into monopoly unions that represent all of the other employees of their respective companies.)	（正因如此，（比如）火车司机和飞行员应该强制加入代表所在公司其他所有员工的垄断工会。 ）


The market failures that initially give rise to public-sector intervention tend to recur internationally, which means that competition between states is usually not efficient, either.	最初导致公共部门干预的市场失灵往往会在国际上重现，这意味着国家间竞争也常常是低效的。


Examples include competition between welfare states to deter economic migrants, the race to the bottom in taxation, and regulatory rivalry in the banking and insurance sectors.	这方面的例子包括福利国家之间阻止经济移民的竞争、税收方面的逐底竞争、银行和保险部门的监管竞争等。


Competition, contrary to what many on the right believe, is not always good.	与许多右翼人士所认为的相反，竞争并不总是好事。


Of course, ideology often overwhelms terminology on the left as well.	当然，意识形态也常常蒙蔽左翼的双眼。


Consider “neoliberalism,” a term of derision for many because it has come to be viewed as a doctrine of deregulation and pure laissez-faire.	以“新自由主义”为例，许多人对这个词嗤之以鼻，因为它被认为是去监管化和放任自由思想。


But in Europe, at least, neoliberalism has a very different meaning.	但至少在欧洲，新自由主义的含义与此大相径庭。


It was coined by Alexander Rüstow, who in 1932 proclaimed the end of old liberalism and called for a new liberalism featuring a strong state that lays down a solid legal framework within which firms operate.	这个词由亚历山大·罗斯托（Alexander Rüstow）提出。 1932年，罗斯托宣称旧自由主义已经终结，呼吁采取以强国家角色为企业经营打造扎实法律基础为特征的新的自由主义。


Homo economicus, the rationally acting egoist who populates economists’ models, has recently attracted criticism as well, because all too often he does not represent the real behavior of individuals.	经济人，即经济学家的模型中的理性的利己者，最近也遭到了批评，因为他们常常并不代表现实中的个体行为。


Behavioral experiments have shown conclusively the limited predictive value of this artificial construct.	行为实验令人信服地表明这一人为构造的预测价值十分有限。


But homo economicus was never intended to be used for forecasting; its real purpose is to make it easier to distinguish between market failures and mental failures.	但经济人的概念从来不是为了预测才发明的； 它的真正目的是更容易地区分市场失灵和思想失灵。


Economists seek to detect collective irrationality, and economic models that assume individual rationality facilitate that.	经济学家试图寻找集体不理性，而假设个体理性的经济模型对此大有裨益。


By ensuring that policies respond to flaws in the rules of the game, not to individuals’ fallibility or irrationality, this “methodological individualism” saves us from dictatorial paternalism.	通过保证政策响应游戏规则中的漏洞而不是个体错误或不理性，这一“方法论个体主义”（methodological individualism）使我们免于独裁式家长作风。


Banks that grant risky loans on too little equity illustrate the analytical value of homo economicus particularly clearly.	发放高风险贷款而股本不足的银行相当清楚地说明了“经济人”的分析价值。


Their profits are privatized, but any losses exceeding their equity are dumped on their creditors, or, even better for them, on the taxpayers.	它们的利润被私人化，而任何超出它们的股本的损失被推给了债权人或者——更妙的是——推给了纳税人。


This asymmetry turns banking into a casino: The house always wins.	这一不对称性让银行变成了赌场：庄家永远是赢家。


Banks choose particularly risky investment projects, which may be profitable but are economically damaging.	银行选择风险畸高的投资项目，这些项目或许有利可图，但在经济上弊大于利。


The problem is not caused by human irrationality; on the contrary, it arises precisely because bankers are acting rationally.	问题的原因不是人类不理性； 相反，问题发生的原因正在与银行家的理性行为。


As we know from environmental regulation, preaching common sense or ethics to bankers will not help; but changing bankers’ incentives – by, say, requiring higher equity-asset ratios – would work wonders.	我们从环境监管中知道，向银行家宣讲常识和道德无济于事； 但改变银行家的激励——比如通过要求更高的股本-资产比率——会收到奇效。


Economists’ New World Order	经济学家的世界新秩序


Most academic economics rely on concepts laid down at the beginning of the twentieth century by the British economist Alfred Marshall, who said that “nature does not make leaps.”	大多数学院派经济学理论都建立在20世纪初英国经济学家阿尔弗雷德·马歇尔提出的概念上。 他曾说过，“自然不允许跃进”。


Yet we economists find ourselves increasingly disturbed by the apparent inadequacy of the neo-Marshallian toolkit that we have built to explain our world.	然而我们经济学家却发现自己越来越被我们构建出来解释世界的新马歇尔主义的明显不足所困扰。


The central bias of this toolkit is that we should trust the market to solve the problems we set it, and that we should not expect small (or even large) changes to have huge effects.	这套理论的核心成见是，我们应该相信市场能解决我们交给它的问题； 我们不应该期望小变化（或甚至大变化）能产生巨大的效果。


A technological leap that raises the wages of the skilled and educated will induce others to become skilled and educated, restoring balance so that inequality does not grow too much.	一项技术的进步会给有技术的人和受过教育的人带来更高的收入，也会诱使其他人也来掌握技术和受教育，从而恢复平衡，避免不平等过度发展。


So a country where labor productivity is low will become an attractive location for foreign direct investment, and the resulting increase in the capital-labor ratio will raise productivity.	因此，一个劳动生产力低的国家会吸引外国直接投资，接着资金和劳动力比率的上升会提高生产力。


Wherever one looks, using Marshall’s toolkit, one sees economic equilibrium pulling things back to normal, compensating for and attenuating the effects of shocks and disturbances.	运用马歇尔的理论，不论你看向何处，都会看到经济平衡将一切拖回原状，补偿和削弱所有震动与干扰的影响。


Marshall’s economics has had a marvelous run, and has helped economists make sense of the world.	马歇尔的经济理论长期以来产生了极大的影响，也帮助了经济学家们认知世界。


Yet there is a sense that progress and understanding will require something new – an economics of virtuous circles, thresholds, and butterfly effects, in which small changes have very large effects.	然而进步和理解似乎还需要新的东西——一种由良性循环、临界值和蝴蝶效应构成的经济理论，一种小变化能产生大影响的理论。


Perhaps this has always been so.	或许事实一直就是如此。


By the standards of centuries ago, we live in a world of unbelievable wealth.	按照几百年前的标准，我们现在生活的世界拥有难以置信的财富。


Within two generations human literacy will be nearly universal.	两代之内，人类就会基本上扫除文盲。


Yet three centuries ago there was also technological progress, from the mechanical clock and the watermill to the cannon and the caravel, and on to strains of rice that can be cropped three times a year in Guangzhou and the breeding of merino sheep that can flourish in the hills of Spain.	然而三百年前也存在技术进步，从机械钟和水磨坊到大炮和轻型多桅帆船，再到广州每年可以收割三次的水稻品种，和可以在西班牙的山丘上繁衍的美利奴细毛羊的培育。


But these innovations served only to increase the human population, not raise median standards of living.	但是这些创新只是促进了人类人口的增加，没有提高生活水平的中线。


Today, if we divided up equally what we produce worldwide, would it give us a standard of living ten times that of our pre-industrial ancestors?	今天，如果我们把全世界生产的产品平分，会不会得到比工业时代以前的祖辈们高十倍的生活水平？


Twenty times?	二十倍？


A hundred times?	一百倍？


Does the question even have meaning?	这样的问题到底有没有意义？


David Landes likes to tell the story of Nathan Meyer Rothschild, the richest man in the world in the first half of the nineteenth century, dead in his fifties of an infected abscess.	David Landes喜欢讲述Nathan Meyer Rothschild的故事。 这个19世纪前半叶全世界最富有的人在50多岁时死于脓肿感染。


If you gave him the choice of the life he led as the finance-prince of Europe or a life today low-down in the income distribution but with thirty extra years to see his great-grandchildren, which would he choose?	如果你让他选择是在欧洲过着金融帝王的生活，还是在今天过着收入不高但有三十年额外寿命、可以看到自己曾孙的生活，他会如何抉择？


No doubt, we live today in an extraordinarily unequal world.	毫无疑问，我们今天生活在一个非常不公平的世界里。


There are families today near Xian, in what was the heartland of the Tang Dynasty Empire, with two-acre dry wheat farms and a single goat.	今天的西安，这个曾经是唐王朝都城的地方，还有靠两亩麦田和一只山羊过活的家庭。


There are other families throughout the world that could buy that wheat farm with one day’s wages.	全世界还有着其他的家庭，用一天的工资就可以买下那片麦田。


Marshall’s economics – the equilibrium economics of comparative statics, of shifts in supply and demand curves, and of accommodating responses – is of almost no help in accounting for this.	马歇尔的经济理论——由相对静态、供求曲线变换、以及随和反应构成的平衡经济学——几乎无力解释这个现象。


Why, worldwide, did median standards of living stagnate for so long?	为什么全世界生活水平的中线在如此长的时间内停滞不前？


Why has the rate of growth undergone an acceleration that is extraordinarily rapid over so short a period?	为什么在如此短的时期内增长速度经历了超高速的提升？


Where is the economics of invention, innovation, adaptation, and diffusion?	发明、创新、适应与传播的经济学在哪里？


Not in Marshall.	反正不在马歇尔的理论中。


And why is today’s world so unequal that it is hard to find any measures of global distribution that do not show divergence at least up until the 1980’s?	为什么当今世界如此不平等，甚至找不到任何衡量全球分配的方法可以至少不显示20世纪80年代以前的分化？


It has been generations since economists Robert Solow and Moses Abramovitz pointed out that Marshall’s toolkit is a poor aid for understanding modern economic growth.	几代以前，经济学家Robert Solow和Moses Abramovitz就指出马歇尔的理论无法帮助人们理解现代经济增长。


The real sources of growth are not to be found in supplies and demands and the allocation of scarce resources to alternative uses, but in technological and organizational change – about which economists have too little to say.	增长的真正源头不在于供求关系，也不在于将稀缺资源分配给其他用途，而在于技术和机构的改变——而在这方面，经济学家们几乎无话可说。


Economic historians like Ken Pomeranz rightly point out that before the Industrial Revolution, differences in median standards of living across the high civilizations of Eurasia were relatively small.	Ken Pomeranz等经济史学家正确地指出，在工业革命以前，亚欧大陆高度文明社会生活水平中线的差距相对较小。


A peasant in the Yangtze Valley in the late seventeenth century had a different style of life than his or her contemporary peasant in the Thames Valley, but not one that was clearly better or worse.	17世纪末长江流域的农民过着与同时代泰晤士河流域的农民不同的生活方式，但这些生活方式本身却并没有明显的优劣之分。


Two centuries later that was no longer the case: by the end of the nineteenth century, median living standards in Britain and other countries to which the Industrial Revolution had spread were, for the first time in recorded history, light-years above any neo-Malthusian benchmark of subsistence.	两个世纪后情况就不一样了：到19世纪末，在英国和工业革命波及到的其他国家，生活水平的中线在有记录的历史上首次远远超出新马尔萨斯生存基准点。


The early industrial-era economic accomplishments occurred despite the loss of a substantial proportion of national income to support a corrupt, decadent, and profligate aristocracy. They occurred despite a tripling of the population, which put extraordinary Malthusian pressure on the economy underlying natural resource base, and despite the mobilization of an unprecedented proportion of national income for nearly a century of intensive war against France, a power with three times Britain’s population.	尽管国民收入的很大一部分被用来供养一个腐败、颓废、放荡的贵族阶层，尽管人口增加了两倍、对以自然资源为基础的经济造成了极大的人口压力，尽管空前比例的国民收入被动员起来用于和法国，一个三倍于英国人口的强国，进行一场纠缠了近一个世纪的猛烈战争，工业时代初期的成就还是有目共睹。


How, exactly, did these accomplishments occur?	这些成就到底是如何发生的？


What were the small differences that turned out to matter so much?	那些最终产生如此重大影响的小小变化是什么？


Economists are now awakening to the realization that the most interesting questions they face were always beyond the reach of Marshall’s toolkit.	现在的经济学家们正在醒悟到他们面临的最有意义的问题一直是马歇尔的理论所不能解答的。


Clearly, economics – if it is to succeed and progress – must be very different in a generation from what it is today.	显然，经济学——如果它要成功和进步——必定会在一代人的时间里变得与现在极为不同。


Economists vs. Economics	经济学家与经济学


CAMBRIDGE – Ever since the late nineteenth century, when economics, increasingly embracing mathematics and statistics, developed scientific pretensions, its practitioners have been accused of a variety of sins.	美国剑桥—十九世纪末以来，日益数学化和统计化的经济学表现出科学的虚荣，而经济学界被指责犯下了各种罪行。


The charges – including hubris, neglect of social goals beyond incomes, excessive attention to formal techniques, and failure to predict major economic developments such as financial crises – have usually come from outsiders, or from a heterodox fringe.	这些指控——包括傲慢、无视收入以外的社会目标、过度专注于正规技术、没能预测到金融危机等重大经济发展态势等——常常来自外部人士非正统的边缘派。


But lately it seems that even the field’s leaders are unhappy.	但最近，似乎经济学的领导者也开始感到不快了。


Paul Krugman, a Nobel laureate who also writes a newspaper column, has made a habit of slamming the latest generation of models in macroeconomics for neglecting old-fashioned Keynesian truths.	诺贝尔经济学家获得者兼报纸专栏作家保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）染上了抨击最新一代宏观经济学模型忽视老派凯恩斯主义真理的习惯。


Paul Romer, one of the originators of new growth theory, has accused some leading names, including the Nobel laureate Robert Lucas, of what he calls “mathiness” – using math to obfuscate rather than clarify.	新增长理论创始人之一的保罗·罗默（Paul Romer）也批评一些著名经济学家，包括诺贝尔奖获得者罗伯特·卢卡斯（Robert Lucas）在内，说他们“数学性”（罗默的用语）太重，结果是让问题变得更加模糊而不是更加清晰。


Richard Thaler, a distinguished behavioral economist at the University of Chicago, has taken the profession to task for ignoring real-world behavior in favor of models that assume people are rational optimizers.	在芝加哥大学杰出行为经济学家理查德·泰勒（Richard Thaler）认为，这一学科为了便利假设人是理性最优化者的模型而忽视真实世界的行为。


And finance professor Luigi Zingales, also at the University of Chicago, has charged that his fellow finance specialists have led society astray by overstating the benefits produced by the financial industry.	同样来自芝加哥大学的金融学教授路易吉·津加莱斯（Luigi Zingales）指责同侪过度强调金融产品的好处，导致了社会动荡。


This kind of critical examination by the discipline’s big names is healthy and welcome – especially in a field that has often lacked much self-reflection.	经济学巨擘的这些批判性考察是健康的，值得欢迎——特别是在这个常常缺乏自我反省的领域。


I, too, have taken aim at the discipline’s sacred cows – free markets and free trade – often enough.	我也常常把目标对准经济学的圣域——自由市场和自由贸易。


But there is a disconcerting undertone to this new round of criticism that needs to be made explicit – and rejected.	但对于这轮新批判，有一些令人不安的潜台词需要澄清——并且拒绝。


Economics is not the kind of science in which there could ever be one true model that works best in all contexts.	经济学不是那种存在放之四海而皆准的真理模型的科学。


The point is not “to reach a consensus about which model is right,” as Romer puts it, but to figure out which model applies best in a given setting.	问题不在于“达成关于哪个模型是对的的共识”（罗默语），而是指出哪个模型最适合给定的条件。


And doing that will always remain a craft, not a science, especially when the choice has to be made in real time.	而这样做永远带有一些艺术而非科学的成分，特别是不得不实时做出决定的时候。


The social world differs from the physical world because it is man-made and hence almost infinitely malleable.	社会世界与物理世界不同，因为它是人造的，因此有几乎无穷种可能。


So, unlike the natural sciences, economics advances scientifically not by replacing old models with better ones, but by expanding its library of models, with each shedding light on a different social contingency.	所以，与自然科学不同，经济学的科学进步不是来自用更好的模型取代就模型，而是扩大模型数量，每个模型让我们能够认识不同的社会现象。


For example, we now have many models of markets with imperfect competition or asymmetric information.	比如，我们现在有许多关于竞争不完美或信息不对称的市场的模型。


These models have not made their predecessors, based on perfect competition, obsolete or irrelevant.	这些模型并不意味着基于完美竞争假设的旧模型过时或不重要。


They have simply made us more aware that different circumstances call for different models.	它们只是让我们能够更好地认识不同环境需要不同模型。


Similarly, behavioral models that emphasize heuristic decision-making make us better analysts of environments where such considerations may be important.	类似地，强调启发式决策的行为模型让我们能更好地分析这一因素可能十分重要的环境。


They do not displace rational-choice models, which remain the go-to tool in other settings.	它们并没有取代理性选择模型，理性选择模型也仍然是其他条件下的首选工具。


A growth model that applies to advanced countries may be a poor guide in developing countries.	适用于发达国家的增长模型也许是发展中国家的拙劣指导。


Models that emphasize expectations are sometimes best for analyzing inflation and unemployment levels; at other times, models with Keynesian elements will do a superior job.	强调预期的模型有时最好用于分析通货膨胀和失业水平，在其他时候，具备凯恩斯主义要素的模型更好。


Jorge Luis Borges, the Argentine writer, once wrote a short story – a single paragraph – that is perhaps the best guide to the scientific method.	阿根廷作家博尔赫斯曾经写过一则短故事——只有一段的短故事——也许能作为科学方法的最佳指导。


In it, he described a distant land where cartography – the science of making maps – was taken to ridiculous extremes.	在这个故事里，他描述了一篇遥远的陆地，在那里，地图学达到了荒谬的极端。


A map of a province was so detailed that it was the size of an entire city.	一个省的地图详细到需要用整整一个市的地盘才能把它展开。


The map of the empire occupied an entire province.	帝国全景地图需要整个省的地盘才能展开。


In time, the cartographers became even more ambitious: they drew a map that was an exact, one-to-one replica of the whole empire.	而地图师的目标更加宏大：他们绘制了一张精确的一比一比例的帝国全图。


As Borges wryly notes, subsequent generations could find no practical use for such an unwieldy map.	博尔赫斯讽刺地写道，子孙后代根本找不到这张笨重的地图的实际用处。


So the map was left to rot in the desert, along with the science of geography that it represented.	于是这张地图就这样烂在了沙漠中，和它所代表的地理学一起随风而逝。


Borges’s point still eludes many social scientists today: understanding requires simplification.	许多当今社会学家无法抓住博尔赫斯的中心思想：理解需要简化。


The best way to respond to the complexity of social life is not to devise ever-more elaborate models, but to learn how different causal mechanisms work, one at a time, and then figure out which ones are most relevant in a particular setting.	应对社会生活的复杂性的最佳办法不是设计详尽无比的模型，而是了解不同的因果关系在每一次如何起作用，然后指出哪些在某个具体环境中最重要。


We use one map if we are driving from home to work, another one if we are traveling to another city.	我们在上下班路上使用某张地图，在去另一个城市旅行时使用另一张地图。


Yet other kinds of maps are needed if we are on a bike, on foot, or planning to take public transport.	但如果我们是骑车、步行或计划乘坐公共交通工具出行，那么还需要其他类型的地图。


Navigating among economic models – choosing which one will work better – is considerably more difficult than choosing the right map.	在不同的经济学模型中导航——选择哪个模型更有效——比选择正确的地图难得多。


Practitioners use a variety of formal and informal empirical methods with varying skill.	经济学者用各种技巧使用各种正式和非正式实证方法。


And, in my forthcoming book Economics Rules, I criticize economics training for not properly equipping students for the empirical diagnostics that the discipline requires.	在我即将出版的新书《经济学规则》（Economics Rules）中，我批评了经济学训练没有让学生具备该学科所要求的实证诊断能力。


But the profession’s internal critics are wrong to claim that the discipline has gone wrong because economists have yet to reach consensus on the “correct” models (their preferred ones of course).	但经济学的内部批评者宣称经济学错在经济学家没有形成关于“正确的”模型（当然也就是他们所钟爱的模型）的共识，这是错误的。


Let us cherish economics in all its diversity – rational and behavioral, Keynesian and Classical, first-best and second-best, orthodox and heterodox – and devote our energy to becoming wiser at picking which framework to apply when.	我们应该珍视经济学的多样性——理性人和行为人、凯恩斯主义和古典主义、最优和次优、正统和非正统——把精力用在更明智地选择何时应该选择何种框架上。


Economizing Life and Death	更有效地筹划生与死


Have you ever sat at the deathbed of a statistical life?	你是否看到过统计生命的行将就木？


“Statistical lives” are what politicians save, or let die, or kill, when they decide on resource allocations for health care.	在政治家决定医疗拨款时，就确定了“统计生命”是重归生天、自生自灭、还是加速死亡。


Health care is not the only area where political decisions are matters of life and death.	医疗绝不是政治决策能关乎生死的唯一领域。


Environmental programs to reduce air pollution, educational efforts to publicize the adverse effects of smoking, traffic measures that lower the risk of car accidents: many policies save lives – and omit other lives that would have been saved if the money had been spent otherwise.	减轻空气污染的环境项目、宣传吸烟负作用的教育计划、降低车祸风险的交通措施：很多政策在拯救生命的同时，也忽略了那些其它拨款方式本来可以拯救的千千万万的生命。


So, if you have ever sat at somebody’s deathbed, the answer may very well be yes: you sat at the deathbed of a statistical life.	因此如果你亲身经历过垂死的场面，其实多数人都有过这样的经历：你也就看到过统计生命的行将消失。


Even so, we say that John died from cancer, not that he died from a policy decision to stop payment for cancer screening.	即便如此，我们说约翰死于癌症，而不说他死于停止对癌症筛查付款的政策。


We say that Mary died in a car accident, not that she was a casualty of the Road Traffic Act.	我们说玛丽死于车祸，而不说她是道路交通法的牺牲者。


In short, we do not usually identify policy decisions as the causes of individual deaths.	简而言之，我们通常并不把政治决策当做个体死亡的直接原因。


This would be quite different if the identities of future victims were known at the time such decisions are taken.	如果决策时就能够了解未来牺牲者的身份，情况就会大大的不同。


Imagine that they were known, and that the individual victims of policy decisions would somehow stare into the faces of decision makers just as if they were being held at gunpoint.	假如他们能未卜先知，政治决策中的个体牺牲者就会对决策者们怒目而视，就像自己时时刻刻都受到枪口的威胁。


Policy making, I am sure, would suddenly halt.	如果这样，我敢断定决策过程会嘎然而止。


In fact, the analogy of holding victims at gunpoint is misleading, because in public decision-making we can hardly claim that everything is all right as long as we don’t pull the trigger.	实际上，用枪口瞄准被害人的比喻并不恰当，因为在公共决策领域很难不扣动扳机就说明一切正常。


Given that everything that happens is somehow a consequence of decision-making, the distinction between killing someone and letting her die is unconvincing.	因为实际发生的一切都是决策的结果，杀害某人和任其自生自灭之间的界限往往并不令人信服。


So perhaps decision makers, faced with the victims of previous policies and the future victims of current ones, would simply be happy that at last they could allocate resources in an optimally efficient way.	因此也许当决策者们面对着以往政策的受害者和目前政策将来可能的受害者时，能最终把资源利用得相对高效就已经算是不错的选择。


That seems unlikely.	对号入座的想法的确有些荒谬。


Indeed, the thought experiment of turning statistical lives into identifiable lives highlights an important point about policy-making: much, if not all, of the appeal of “efficient” resource allocation depends on the anonymity of the victims.	实际上，把统计生命转化为鲜活生命的思想尝试强调了决策的一个重要前提：那就是决策中资源有效分配的全部、至少也是大部分前提取决于受害者的不为人知。


Full anonymity explains why efficiency rules – say, leaving the most “expensive” patients untreated when resources are scarce – meet with no protest.	完全匿名的做法解释了效率法则为什么没有引来抗议，比如当资源有限的时候放弃救治诊疗成本最为“昂贵”的病人。


Such anonymity also holds for those who are left untreated in “triage” – the sorting of casualties when natural or man-made disasters strike.	在自然或者人为灾难爆发时，对伤员的分类鉴别也同样适用不为人知的法则，结果往往使治疗费用昂贵的人得不到救治。


But, for the same reason, efficiency rules often do meet with protest when they are used or proposed for rationing medical services in everyday medicine.	但由于同样的原因，效率法则用来调配日常医疗服务时却常常会引起人们的不满。


It is part of the everyday life of many citizens – even part of their identities – that they suffer from an expensive health problem.	很多人饱受费用高昂的健康问题困扰，这成了他们日常生活、甚至是自身特点的组成部分。


Under an efficiency regime, they might as well bear a target on their foreheads.	而在效率制度下，这些人也成为受到威胁的目标。


What about young and healthy citizens?	年轻健康的人们又会怎样？


Many will develop expensive health problems in the future.	他们中的很多人未来也会患上需要昂贵诊疗费用的疾病。


But their future is unknown, as is the fate of future disaster victims.	但像未来灾难牺牲者的命运一样，他们的未来也无法预知。


Why should they not fully embrace efficient resource allocation?	他们为什么不能完全接受资源的高效分配？


Many statistical lives – your own, perhaps – could be saved by excluding future payment for some expensive medical treatment (say, hemodialysis) for those who are now healthy and reallocating the funds to cheap but effective prevention programs.	如果未来拒绝为现在健康的人支付某些昂贵的治疗费用（比如血液透析），并把节省下来的款项分配给廉价然而有效的预防计划，那么千千万万条统计生命，你自己的生命也许也包括在内，就都能够得到挽救。


Since there is no fairness problem here, would it not simply be irrational to reject efficiency?	因为这里根本牵涉不到公平问题，因此拒绝效率是不是有些不可理喻？


After all, saving statistical lives does save individuals.	归根结底，挽救统计生命就等于挽救活生生的个人。


Whether or not you see a distinction between statistical lives and individual lives depends on whether you accord value not only to when you die, but also to how you die.	你能否看到统计生命和个体生命之间的区别取决于你是否不仅关注死亡的时间、也关注死亡的方式。


Dying is hard. But it is our fate as humans, and it is usually accepted with dignity when the hour comes.	死是困难的，但死亡却是人类的归宿，所以当死亡最终降临的时候，我们都能够坦然的面对。


Nevertheless, as long as we see a chance to escape death, we run from it, and we expect those who take care of us to look for the escape routes.	尽管如此，只要我们看到一线生机，我们就会竭尽全力躲避，而且期待决策者能帮助们找到逃离的方法。


So here is a difference: when you die from lack of medical care, there is an escape route.	这里就存在着区别：当你死于得不到治疗，你的面前似乎还有一条生路。


It is clearly marked, but nobody helps you get to it.	这条生路清晰可辨，但你得不到别人的帮助。


They stand idly by, abandoning you to death.	所有人都若无其事，眼睁睁看着你走向死亡。


By contrast, when you die from the absence of prevention policies, you may be dying sooner than you otherwise would, but you are not being left to die.	恰恰相反，当你由于缺乏预防政策而濒临绝境，对你来讲死亡可能是提前来临，但人们却不会让你自生自灭。


This is why sitting beside, and even lying on, the deathbed of a statistical life may be more tolerable after all.	这就是为什么归根结底，坐视一个统计生命的消失也许更加有情可原。


Perhaps a maximally extended life expectancy is of higher value to you than living in a society where doctors do not leave curable patients to die if they cannot pay for the required treatment out of their own pockets.	也许对你个人来讲，最大限度的延长寿命比医生不放弃那些病情尚可医治、但却无钱医治的病人更为重要。


But there is nothing irrational in deciding otherwise.	但如果做出相反的决策也情有可原。


It all depends on a value judgment – one of the many value judgments societies must make with respect to modern medicine.	这最终取决于对价值的判断¾这只是社会在现代医疗领域需要做出的多种价值判断之一。


The higher the technical capabilities, and the costs, of modern medicine become, the more contested this particular value judgment will be.	现代医疗的技术能力越强、成本越昂贵，这一价值判断引发的争议也就越多。


An Even More Dismal Science	更加沉闷的科学


BERKELEY – For the past 25 years, a debate has raged among some of the world’s leading economists.	伯克利—过去25年来，世界最顶尖经济学家中间起了一场激烈的争论。


At issue has been whether the nature of the business cycle underwent a fundamental change after the end of the “30 glorious years” that followed World War II, when the economy was characterized by rapid growth, full employment, and a bias toward moderate inflation.	争论的问题是商业周期的性质是否随着二战结束后的“辉煌30年”的结束而发生了根本性转变。 在这30年终，经济增长迅速、就业充分，并且通胀十分温和。


Three positions have been staked out.	经济学家的观点可以分为三派。


First out of the gate, in 1991, was Larry Summers, with his seminal paper, “How Should Long-Term Monetary Policy Be Determined?”	首先亮出观点的是拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）1991年的讨论论文《长期货币决策应该如何决定？ 》（How Should Long-Term Monetary Policy Be Determined?


Summers was unconvinced that the underlying economic reality had changed, so his focus was technical – an attempt to guard against a repetition of the inflationary disturbances of the 1970s that marked the end of the glory years.	）。 萨默斯不相信经济学的基本现实已经发生了改变，因此他的关注点在于技术性问题——试图防止20世纪70年代标志辉煌年代结束的通胀性扰动卷土重来。


His prescription was to strengthen the technocratic independence of central banks.	他的办法是加强中央银行的技术官僚独立性。


Politicians should set goals, but they should avoid micromanaging the economy or imposing strict rules that would inevitably fail in unexpected circumstances.	政客应该设定目标，但应该避免微观管理经济或实施遇到意料外情况必然失败的严格规则。


Technocrats were far better placed to carry the policy forward, Summers argued, guided by a target of 2-3% annual inflation.	萨默斯指出，技术官僚更适合根据2—3%的年度通胀目标推进政策。


The debate continued with Paul Krugman’s 1998 paper, “It’s Baaack: Japan’s Slump and the Return of the Liquidity Trap” and his book The Return of Depression Economics, published the following year. Krugman made the case that central banks had already succeeded in anchoring inflation expectations to low levels, but had nonetheless failed to put the economy back on track.	接着加入争论的是保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）1998年的论文《归来兮：日本的崩溃和流动性陷阱的回归》（It’s Baaack: Japan’s Slump and the Return of the Liquidity Trap）和第二年出版的著作《萧条经济学的回归》（The Return of Depression Economics）。


The economy in Europe and the United States, Krugman argued, had fallen from glory and returned to a pre-World War II pattern of “depression economics,” in which its dominant features were shortages of aggregate demand, risks of deflation, financial crises, and liquidity traps.	克鲁格曼认为，央行已经成功地将通胀预期锚定在低水平，但没能让经济回归正轨。 欧洲和美国的经济，克鲁格曼指出，已经告别了辉煌，回到了二战前的“萧条经济学”模式，其主要特征是总需求不足、通缩风险、金融危机和流动性陷阱。


Then Ken Rogoff entered the fray with a comment on Krugman’s paper.	接着是肯·罗格夫（Ken Rogoff）对克鲁格曼论文的评论。


In Rogoff’s view, what Krugman described as a long-term return to “depression economics” was a temporary condition, the consequence of failures to regulate properly and curb debt accumulation.	在罗格夫看来，克鲁格曼描述为“萧条经济学”回归的东西只是暂时情况，是没能恰当监管和遏制债务积累的结果。


This phenomenon, which he identified as the cause of the economic turbulence, inevitably ended in catastrophe, which could be resolved only through painful deleveraging and heterodox government-enforced debt write-downs.	这一现象——他认为这是经济动荡的根源——必然以灾难为结局，而灾难只有通过痛苦的去杠杆和非正统的政府强迫债务减记才能解决。


Other prominent economists – including Joseph Stiglitz, Ben Bernanke, and Martin Feldstein – contributed to the debate as well. But, for the most part, they have not staked out their own positions as much as sat in Schroedingerian superposition, sometimes writing as if they believed that the post-war glory years had never ended, at other times making arguments that echo those of Krugman, Summers, or Rogoff.	其他著名经济学家——包括约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨（Joseph Stiglitz）、本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke）和马丁·费尔德斯坦（Martin Feldstein）——更多地处于薛定谔叠加态中，而没有明确站队，有时他们的论著表明他们相信战后辉煌年代从未结束，有时他们提出的观点又与克鲁格曼、萨默斯或罗格夫遥相呼应。


Today, a degree of consensus has emerged.	如今，已经出现了一定程度的共识。


There is no longer much point in questioning whether the glory days are over.	已很少有人质疑辉煌年代是否已经结束。


The models and approaches developed to understand the post-war business cycle and its bias toward moderate inflation are worse than useless today.	如今为理解战后商业周期及其温和通胀倾向而发展出来的模型和方法纯属无用功。


Disagreement among economists nowadays reflects different positions not so much on the state of the economy, but on whether macroeconomic policy can provide an effective cure.	现在，经济学家之间的分歧反映的并非对经济状态的不同立场，而是对宏观经济政策是否提供了有效疗方的不同看法。


Summers has more or less abandoned his belief that central banks can, will, and perhaps even should attempt to prevent the return of depression economics.	萨默斯已经或多或少地抛弃了自己的观点，即央行能够、愿意，甚至或许应该尝试防止萧条经济学回归。


Central banks might have been able to attain the technocratic ideal of macroeconomic business-cycle management that Summers hoped for back in 1991, but they failed to do so.	央行也许能够实现萨默斯在1991年所希望看到的宏观经济商业周期管理的技术官僚理想，但并没有如此。


And few central bankers, if any, seem to have good ideas concerning institutional changes that could strengthen their ability to accomplish that mission.	而新的央行行长们似乎���不缺少关于能加强他们完成这一任务的能力的制度变革的好主意。


In Summers’s view, with which I concur, governments need to assume greater responsibility for risk-bearing, long-term planning, and investment.	在萨默斯看来——我也同意他的看法——政府需要承担更大的冒险、长期规划和投资责任。


Indeed, those governments lucky enough to issue the world’s reserve currencies are able to take on this role without overloading future taxpayers with inordinate debt burdens.	事实上，幸运地获得世界储备货币发行权的政府能够实现这一目标而不必让未来纳税人背上过度沉重的债务负担。


But, although Summers and Krugman now believe that more expansionary fiscal policies could accomplish a great deal of good, Rogoff continues to adhere to the Minskyite position that has underpinned his thinking since at least 1998: successful macroeconomic performance requires regulating finance and curbing debt accumulation during boom times.	但是，尽管萨默斯和克鲁格曼现在认为更为扩张性的财政政策能够带来巨大的好处，罗格夫仍继续坚持明斯基主义立场，这一立场至少从1998年就一直是他的思考基础：成功的宏观经济表现需要在繁荣时期监管金融、遏制债务积累。


Attempting to cure an overhang of private debt by issuing mountains of “safe” government debt is too dangerous.	试图通过发行巨量“安全”政府债务解决私人债务积压的问题太危险了。


After all, when the private debt was issued, it, too, was considered safe.	毕竟，私人债务在发行时也被认为是安全的。


Whichever policies – macro or micro – turn out to work best for addressing today’s economic problems, one thing has become abundantly clear: optimism is out of fashion.	不管何种政策——宏观或围观——在解决当今经济问题上效果最大，有一件事已经足够清楚：乐观已不再是时尚。


Economy, Insure Thyself	为自身投保的经济体


NEW HAVEN – The basic principle of financial risk management is sharing.	发自纽黑文——金融风险管理的基本原则就是分散投资。


The more broadly diversified our financial portfolios, the more people there are who share in the inevitable risks – and the less an individual is affected by any given risk.	你的投资组合越是多样化，就越多人跟你分担那些无法避免的风险——于是个人所要承担的风险也就越少。


The theoretical ideal occurs when financial contracts spread the risks all over the world, so that billions of willing investors each own a tiny share, and no one is over-exposed.	这条理论假设伴随着金融合同向全世界分散风险而推而广之，于是数十亿投资者每人都分担了一点风险，也没人会被暴露在过高风险之下。


The case of Japan shows that, despite some of our financial markets’ great sophistication, we are still a long way from the theoretical ideal.	但这几个月在日本所发生的事件却证明，虽然我们的某些金融市场已经高度完善，但距离上述理论的实现依然有很长一段距离。


Considering the huge risks that are not managed well, finance, even in the twenty-first century, is actually still rather primitive.	考虑到那些未能得到妥善管理的巨大风险，即便是在二十一世纪，金融业依然堪称相当原始稚嫩的行业。


A recent World Bank study estimated that the damage from the triple disaster (earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis) in March might ultimately cost Japan $235 billion (excluding the value of lives tragically lost). That is about 4% of Japanese GDP in 2010.	世界银行最近发布的一项研究估计今年3月在日本爆发的三大连环灾害（地震，海啸和核危机）将给该国带来2350亿美元的损失（还不包括人员伤亡），而这个数字大约相当于2010年度日本国民生产总值的4%。


Given wide publicity about international charitable relief efforts and voluntary contributions to Japan, one might think that the country’s economic loss was shared internationally.	在大肆宣传的国际慈善援助和志愿行动下，人们会觉得该国的经济损失已经被分散到了全世界。


But newspaper accounts suggest that such contributions from foreign countries should be put in the hundreds of millions of US dollars – well below 1% of the total losses.	但新闻报道显示这类国外捐赠的总数大概只有几亿美元——还不到总损失的1%。


Japan needed real financial risk sharing: charity rarely amounts to much.	日本需要真实有效的金融风险分担：而慈善却很少能承担起这个重任。


Insurance companies operating in Japan repaid some of the losses.	在日本运营的各大保险公司赔付了大部分损失。


The same World Bank study estimates that total claims accruing to insurers in Japan might ultimately cost these companies $33 billion.	而世界银行所预计的赔付总金额为330亿美元。


Clearly, the insured risks were a small part of the total risk.	可见保险风险也只占总风险的极小部分。


Moreover, much of that risk, even if insured, continues to be borne in Japan, rather than being spread effectively to foreign investors, so Japan is still alone in bearing the costs.	此外大部分风险（即便购买了保险）依然要由日本来承担，而非有效地分散到了外国投资者手中，因此日本依然要独自承受损失。


Before the disaster, Japan issued about $1.5 billion in earthquake-related catastrophe bonds as a risk-management device: the debt is canceled if a precisely defined seismic event occurs.	在灾难发生之前，日本发行了大概15亿美元地震相关灾难债券作为其风险管理机制：他们对地震相关灾难进行了精确界定，一旦这样的灾难发生，这些债券就不能被兑现。


This design helped spread the earthquake risk from Japan to foreign investors, who could accept the risk and were enticed by higher expected yields.	而这一金融设计确实有助于将地震风险分散到那些能承担风险并且追求高额回报的外国投资者身上。


Unfortunately, $1.5 billion is little better than what charity could do – and still only a drop in the bucket compared to the extent of the damage.	不幸的是，15亿美元跟国际捐助相比也是半斤八两——相对于地震所造成的破坏来说也只是杯水车薪。


Worse yet, even this triple disaster often did not fit the definition of the seismic event defined by the bond indentures.	更糟糕的是，即便是那三大连环灾害也往往无法符合债券对地震相关灾害所做的定义。


We need far more – and better – catastrophe bonds.	可见我们需要更大量且设计更完善的灾难债券。


Of course, compared to Japan’s two “lost decades” since 1990, even this year’s triple disaster pales in significance.	当然，相对于日本自1990年起经历的两个“失落的十年”，连今年的三连环灾害也相形见绌。


Japanese real per capita GDP growth averaged 3.9% a year in the 1980��s, but only 1.4% since 1990.	日本的实际人均GDP在1980年代年均增长3. 9%，但1990年以后则下滑到1.


If real per capita GDP growth had continued after 1990 at the rate of the 1980’s, Japan’s economy would be 60% larger than it is today – implying losses in the trillions of dollars.	如果实际人均GDP增长能以1980年代的速度继续在1990年后增长下去，日本的经济总量将相当于当前量的1. 6倍——这意味着日本人损失了数万亿美元。


Japan could have insulated itself from a good deal of the effects of GDP fluctuations if it had managed this risk accordingly.	日本原本可以通过合理的风险管理来避免GDP增长波动所带来的一系列效应。


Though no country has ever practiced risk management on such a massive scale, it is important to consider such an innovation now.	虽然历史上从未有国家执行过如此大范围的风险管理，但如今也是时候考虑实施这一创举了。


I (among others) have been arguing for years that countries should cover their risks by issuing a different kind of national debt, tied to their own GDP or a similar measure of economic success.	笔者（以及其他各界人士）多年以来都呼吁各国通过发行各类国债的方式来防范风险，并与本国的GDP或者其他类似的经济成就指标挂钩。


In its simplest form, the securities could be shares in GDP.	简而言之，这些证券可以是GDP的股份。


My Canadian colleague Mark Kamstra and I have proposed issuing shares called “trills,” which would pay a dividend each year equal to a trillionth of that year’s GDP, in domestic currency.	笔者和加拿大同僚马克·坎斯特拉（Mark Kamstra）共同倡议发行一种名为“万亿票（trills）”的股份，该股份每年分红一次，每次分红数额相当于本年度GDP的万亿分之一，以当地货币支付。


If the Japanese government had issued trills in 1990, when Japan’s nominal GDP was ¥443 trillion, the dividend paid to investors the first year would have been ¥443.	如果日本在1990年发行该股份的话，当年的名义GDP总量为443万亿日元，因此给投资者的分红则为443日元。


Every year thereafter, the dividend paid would fluctuate in response to changes in GDP.	往后数年的分红数量将随GDP的变化而波动。


Investors around the world would take on Japanese GDP risk in return for an expected yield, just as with catastrophe bonds.	全世界的投资者都能在有预期收益的情况下承担日本的GDP风险，就跟灾难债券一样。


The trills would most likely have sold for a very high price in 1990, perhaps with a dividend yield under 1%.	1990年的“万亿票”很可能会以极高价格出售，或许其分红收益还不到1%。


After all, people in 1990, witnessing recent high growth rates, would have expected Japanese GDP to grow rapidly in subsequent decades.	毕竟1990年的人们在见证了连续多年的高增长率后会预期日本GDP将在未来几十年内继续高速膨胀。


In 2010, when GDP was still only ¥479 trillion, the same trills would pay a dividend of ¥479, not much larger than the initial yield and no doubt disappointing many investors.	谁知到了2010年，日本GDP还停留在479万亿日元的水平，同样的万亿票只能分发479日元的红利，相比最初收益并无多少起色，也令许多投资者深感失望。


So, with lower growth expectations, the trills would likely have a much lower price now.	因此在这一低增长预期下，万亿票的价格也将大幅降低。


That lower price would be a bane to investors but a boon to Japanese, compensating them for the losses that they have suffered.	这对于投资者来说或许是一场灾难，但对日本来说却是幸事，因为这补偿了他们在经济下滑中所遭受的损失。


When considering today’s concern about Japan’s high public debt-to-GDP ratio, now at 202% on a gross basis, one needs to reflect that the ratio would most likely be profoundly lower if Japan had in the past financed more of its deficit spending with trills instead of conventional debt, and issued them to investors around the world.	考虑到日本目前高达202%的负债对GDP比率，人们就会回想如果当年选择用万亿票而不是常规借债来支持其赤字政府支出，并向全世界发行这种证券的话，这个比值将大幅降低。


A lower debt burden would certainly help Japan deal with its economic slowdown.	而更少的债务负担显然有助于日本应对其经济增长放缓问题。


There is nothing we can do now to compensate for failures to manage risks in the past.	如今的我们显然无法补偿前人在风险管理上所造成的失误。


But disasters and economic crises can have a silver lining if they spur fundamental innovation by forcing us to think about how to manage risks in the future.	但灾难和金融危机也能迫使我们思考如果管理未来的风险，并因此促成某些根本性革新的话，那真可谓塞翁失马，焉知非福？


Edmund Phelps’s Journey	埃德蒙德·菲尔普斯的历程


The winner of this year’s Nobel prize for economics, Edmund Phelps, is a giant in the field.	今年的诺贝尔经济学奖获得者菲尔普斯是经济学领域的一个巨人。


His contributions have been, and remain, so important as that they have altered traditional ways of thinking.	他的贡献极为重要，足以改变传统的思维方式。 这一点过去如此，现在也是一样。


According to the social science citations index, he ranks well among the most important economists since Adam Smith.	社会学的引用指数显示，他是亚当·斯密之后最为重要的经济学家之一。


Economists working on the macro economy, its micro foundations, exogenous and endogenous growth theory, the formation of expectations and problems of information and discrimination all refer back to Phelps.	经济学家在研究宏观经济、微观基础、外生和内生增长理论、预期的形成以及信息和差别待遇的问题时都会引用到菲尔普斯的理论。


After a brilliant secondary education, Phelps entered Amherst College in Massachusetts without any specific idea about which discipline to embrace or which career to follow.	在接受过良好的中等教育后，菲尔普斯进入了马萨诸塞州的阿姆赫斯特学院，当时他对于应该学哪一门学科或者今后从事何种事业并没有一个明确的观念。


He was passionate about philosophy but, at the insistence of his father, took classes in economics.	他对哲学很热衷，但是在父亲的坚持下，他参加了经济学的课程。


As nearly always happens, Phelps’s choice of vocation came after meeting an important professor, in this case the Harvard economist James Nelson.	就像总是会发生的那样， 菲尔普斯在与一位重要的教授碰面后最终选择了他的职业，在这里这位重要的教授是哈佛大学的经济学家尼尔森。


After some hesitation, Phelps decided to pursue graduate education.	在犹豫一段时间后，菲尔普斯 决定研读研究生。


Paul Samuelson admits that he agreed to do a conference at Amherst with the sole aim of recruiting Phelps to MIT.	萨缪尔森承认，他同意在阿姆赫斯特学院召开一次会议，唯一的目标就是把菲尔普斯招募进麻省理工学院。


But Phelps chose Yale, where he came into direct contact with James Tobin and Thomas Schelling.	但是菲尔普斯选择了耶鲁大学，在那里他遇到了James Tobin 和Thomas Schelling。


He wrote his thesis under Tobin’s supervision.	他的论文就是在Tobin的指导下完成的。


With Ph.D. in hand, Phelps spent a year at the Rand Corporation in Los Angeles before returning to Yale.	拿到博士学位后，菲尔普斯在洛杉矶的兰德公司呆了一年然后又回到了耶鲁大学。


He spent another year at MIT, where he taught with Robert Solow and met Samuelson and Franco Modigliani.	他在麻省理工学院呆了一年，在那里他和Robert Solow一起执教并且遇到了萨缪尔森和Franco Modigliani。


Stints at the University of Pennsylvania and Columbia University followed.	后来他就职于宾夕法尼亚大学和哥伦比亚大学。


By this point, Phelps had already acquired an international reputation through his work on the golden rule of capital accumulation (he was 28).	到那个时候，菲尔普斯已经通过有关资本累计的黄金法则的研究获得了国际声誉。 当时他只有28岁。


This concept now appears in the toolbox of every economist, is taught in all classes on growth, and serves as a reference in all works on the macro economy.	这一概念现在出现在每个经济学家的工具盒里，所有有关经济增长的课程都讲授这一概念，而且所有有关宏观经济的研究工作都引用这一理论。


Later, Phelps developed a long-term growth theory based on education and technical advances.	后来，菲尔普斯发展了基于教育和技术进步的长期增长理论。


However, this contribution was so far ahead of its time that the profession did not discover its importance until a quarter-century later, when theorists were developing endogenous growth theories.	但是，这一贡献是如此超前，以致直到15年后当理论学家在研究了内生增长理论时才发现了它的重要性。


Phelps was also 10 to 20 years ahead of the profession when he developed the theories of wage efficiency and inflation targeting, which are now considered to be the state of the art concerning the labour market and monetary management.	菲尔普斯在发展工资效力和通货膨胀指标的理论也比他的同行超前了10到20年时间，这些理论现在被认为是有关劳动力市场和货币管理方面最先进的理论。


In the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, Phelps’s encounters with Amartya Sen, John Rawls, and Kenneth Arrow at Stanford revived his philosophical streak.	在二十世纪六十年代后期和七十年代早期，菲尔普斯在斯坦福大学遇到了 Amartya Sen、John Rawls和 Kenneth Arrow，这使他对哲学又重新感起了兴趣。


He had extremely valuable intellectual conversations with Rawls, prompting him to write several essays on the theory of economic justice and publish a book on the subject in 1974 – a book still used today.	他与Rawls进行过极其有价值的智慧讨论，这促使他写了几篇有关经济公正理论的论文以及在1974年出版了一本专著，这本书今天仍在被使用。


Phelps was behind the modern reworking of the macro economy – and, according to Samuelson, the micro economy, too.	菲尔普斯还参与了对宏观经济的修订。 据萨缪尔森讲，还有微观经济的修订。


His research programme consisted of introducing the imperfection of information and knowledge into economic theory, which he then reformulated, giving serious consideration to agents’ expectations.	他的研究课题包括把信息和知识的不完整性引入经济理论，他对此又再次进行了系统论述，以及对于经纪人的预期给予高度重视。


In  Microeconomic Foundations of Employment and Inflation Theory , a famous work that he published and to which he made three major contributions, he set the scene for what would become the greatest revolution in economic theory of the last 50 years.	在他出版的一本著名的以及包含有他的三个重要贡献的名为《关于就业和通货膨胀的微观经济基础的理论》的著作中，他阐述了在过去50年间成为经济学理论中最伟大革命的理论。


It is to Phelps that we owe the theory of the natural unemployment rate – a cornerstone of modern macroeconomic theory and economic policy that Milton Friedman rediscovered a year later, albeit heuristically.	正是因为有了菲尔普斯，才给我们带来了自然失业理论，这是现代宏观经济理论和经济政策的基石，该理论被弗里德曼在一年后重新发现，尽管也许只是受到了启发。


Phelps was also responsible for the “island parable,” which helped explain why monetary policy can have temporary real effects as a result of imperfect information.	菲尔普斯提出“孤岛比喻”，该比喻帮助解释了为什么货币政策作为一种不确切的信息能产生暂时性的真正的效果。


The bulk of Phelps’s current work consists of a new reworking of structuralist theory, in an effort to show how changes in interest rates and asset prices affect the equilibrium unemployment rate over the medium term.	菲尔普斯大量的工作还包括结构学理论的重新修订，以显示利率和资产价格的变化怎样在一定的时间内影响了失业率的平衡。


Phelps’s new theory provides a logical backdrop against which we can assess the consequences of fluctuations in share prices, exchange rates, and, more generally, the value of physical assets and human capital under the powerful influence of new technologies and innovation.	菲尔普斯的新理论提供了一个逻辑背景，凭借这一背景我们可以评估在新技术和创新的强有力的影响下股票价格、汇率以及更常见的有形资产和人力资本的价值波动所带来的后果。


These are, of course, the main phenomena that economic theory struggles to explain nowadays.	这些当然正是今天的经济理论极力想要解释的东西。


So it is easy to understand why Phelps still leads the way.	所以我们很容易理解为什么至今菲尔普斯还站在这一领域的前沿。


Indeed, we can expect his new theoretical framework to become a reference point in a decade or two.	事实上，我们完全可以期待在今后的一二十年间他新的理论体系会成为一个基准点。


When recommending an Indian mathematician to a Harvard colleague, Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote that: “scientific geniuses generally have one great idea in their life; he has had two.”	在介绍一位印度数学家进入哈佛大学时，Ludwig Wittgenstein这样写道：“科学方面的天才通常在其一生中能有一个伟大的观点； 他有两个。


What could we say about Phelps?	”那么我们该怎么去说菲尔普斯呢？


Educating Americans about Muslim Voices	让美国人去聆听穆斯林之声


NEW YORK – President Barack Obama has extended an open hand of friendship in his landmark Cairo speech to the Muslim world – seeking to engage Muslims with a commitment of mutual respect. No one can doubt his sincerity.	发自纽约——在具有历史里程碑意义的开罗讲话中，美国总统奥巴马向穆斯林世界伸出了友谊之手——他尝试与穆斯林达成一种相互尊重的共同承诺。


From his first days in office, he has emphasized the importance of embarking on a new chapter in relations between the United States and the world’s Muslims.	没人会怀疑他的真诚，因为自就职以来总统就一直强调，要着手为美国与伊斯兰世界的关系揭开新的篇章。


But this aspiration will remain elusive without acknowledging the sad fact that most Americans remain woefully ignorant about the basic facts of Islam, and about the broad geographic and cultural diversity of Muslim cultures.	但不幸的是，如果大多数美国人依然忽视关于伊斯兰教的某些基本事实，并对穆斯林文明广阔的地理分布差异和文化多样性视而不见，那么总统的热切渴望将依然只是泡影。


A majority of public opinion polls taken in the last four years show that the views of Americans about Islam continue to be a casualty of the attacks of September 11, 2001.	近四年来的大多数民意调查显示，美国人对伊斯兰教的观感依然走不出“9·11”事件的阴影；


Washington Post/ABC News polls from 2006, for example, found that nearly half of Americans regard Islam “unfavorably,” while one in four admits to prejudicial feelings against Muslims.	比如在2006年由《华盛顿邮报》和ABC新闻网发起的民意调查就显示，近半数美国人认为伊斯兰教是“不利的”，而1/4的收访者则承认自己对穆斯林有偏见。


American views of the Muslim world are so colored by the conflict in the Middle East and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that US citizens have no collective appreciation of the fact that most Muslims live in Asia. Or that the four countries with the largest Muslim populations – Indonesia, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh – are all cultures with millennia-old histories of coexisting with other religions and cultures.	中东冲突、伊拉克战争和阿富汗战争严重误导了美国人对穆斯林世界的观感，以致美国普通民众甚至对大多数穆斯林其实居住在亚洲这样的事实都表现出集体性的无知，也忽视了印尼，巴基斯坦，印度和孟加拉这四个穆斯林人口最多的文明国家，都有着和其他宗教文化和平并存数千年的历史。


A 2005 report by the US State Department’s Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy called for a new vision of cultural diplomacy that “can enhance US national security in subtle, wide-ranging and sustainable ways.”	对此，美国国务院下属的文化外交事务咨询委员会在2005年发布的一份报告中就呼吁必须给文化外交找到一个能“以微妙，广泛和可持续方式促进美国国家安全”的新视角。


In 2008, a bipartisan group of American leaders—the US-Muslim Engagement Project— convened by Search for Common Ground and the Consensus Building Institute, issued a report calling for a new direction for US relations with the Muslim world. A primary goal of this effort would be “to improve of mutual respect and understanding between Americans and Muslims around the world.”	而在2008年，一个由共识寻求与构建研究所召集，民主共和两党领导人联合组成的“美国-穆斯林合作项目组”则发表报告，呼吁美国必须找到与穆斯林世界关系��展的新方针,而项目组的主要目标就是“促进美国人和全世界穆斯林之间的相互尊重和理解 ”。


It is time for US citizens to commit themselves to working alongside the Obama administration to turn a new leaf in relations with the Muslim world.	而如今就是美国民众与奥巴马政府携手翻开与穆斯林世界关系新一页的时候了。


The first step is to make a concerted effort to become better educated about the multifaceted societies that comprise the one billion-strong Muslim population throughout the world.	我们要采取的第一步则是必须采取切实措施，教育美国人并让他们明白：全世界10亿穆斯林其实是分布在各种多元化的社会当中的。


The power of culture resides in its ability to transform perceptions.	因为文化拥有转变人们观感的力量。


From June 5-14, New Yorkers are experiencing the rich diversity of Muslim cultures through a city-wide initiative, entitled “Muslim Voices: Arts and Ideas.”	因此在2009年6月5号到14号，纽约人经历了一场全市范围的穆斯林多元文化洗礼——命名为“穆斯林之声：艺术与理念”的一连串节日和会议活动。


More than 300 artists, writers, performers, and scholars from more than 25 countries, including the US, are gathering for this unprecedented festival and conference.	包括美国在内的25个国家的300多名艺术家、作家、表演家和学者汇聚一堂，共同参与这场盛况空前的文化盛宴。


Presentations include a dizzying variety of artistic forms from the Muslim world, ranging from the traditional (calligraphy, Sufi devotional voices) to the contemporary (video installations, avant-garde Indonesian theater, and Arabic hip-hop).	本次活动呈现了一系列来自穆斯林世界的令人眼花缭乱的艺术形式——涵盖从传统（阿拉伯文书法、穆斯林苏菲派祭典唱腔）到现代（视觉装置艺术、印尼先锋剧场艺术和阿拉伯说唱音乐）的各种表现形式。


A companion policy conference has attracted scholars and artists from around the world exploring the relationship between cultural practice and public policy and suggesting new directions for cultural diplomacy.	而同期举行的合作政策会议则聚集了全球的学者和艺术家，共同探讨文化习俗和公共政策的关系并提出文化外交的新方向。


A critical goal of this project is to help break stereotypes and create a more nuanced understanding of Muslim societies.	整个活动则旨在打破人们的旧观念，并让民众对穆斯林社会有更细微的了解。


Despite our enthusiasm for the possibilities of what this initiative can do to broaden understanding, a performance, a film, or an art exhibition cannot find solutions to all of the problems that divide Americans and the Muslim world.	但尽管我们以无限的热忱寄望这次盛会能够增进人们互相之间的了解，但一场表演，一部电影或者一场艺术展显然并不能解决所有那些割裂美国与伊斯兰世界的难题。


The current distance is rooted as much in ignorance as in hard political issues, many of which go beyond what arts and culture can realistically address.	因为目前在两种文明的对立问题上，距离感植根于与棘手政治问题同等严峻的文化无知之上，而其中许多问题已经超出了艺术与文化所能解决的范畴。


However, cultural diplomacy and initiatives such as “Muslim Voices” can open the door to the reality of the Muslim world as a rich space for world-class artistic production.	然而，类似“穆斯林之声”这样的文化外交行动可以让世界更加了解穆斯林世界的现实——她其实和其他文明一样，是一片孕育世界级艺术品的广阔天地。


That, in turn, can encourage an interest in addressing the harder political issues with respect and a sense of equity.	这反过来可以鼓励人们用尊重和平等的意识去处理那些棘手的政治问题。


For too long, the differences between the US and the Muslim world have been framed not in terms of diversity, but as the foundations of a permanent global conflict.	长期以来，人们早已习惯于采用全球利益冲突的框架，而不是用文化差异的角度来理解美国和穆斯林世界的分别。


But when people participate in an aesthetic experience that both addresses and transcends a particular culture, perceptions are bound to change.	因此当人们进入到这种体现并超越特定文化的审美体验中时，观念也必然发生变化。


America has reached a pivotal moment in its national and global history, with new hopes for intercultural exchange, dialogue, and mutual understanding.	通过重新寄望于文化间交流，对话和相互理解，美国已经步入了本国乃至全球历史的关键时刻。


President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton say that theirs will be an age of “smart power” that will effectively use all tools of diplomacy at their disposal, including cultural diplomacy.	总统奥巴马和国务卿希拉里·克林顿声称他们已经进入了“巧实力”的时代，这意味着他们将有效地采用一切外交手段去取得外交成果，文化外交当然也赫然在列。


The US must focus once again on the arts as a meaningful way to promote stronger cultural engagement and, ultimately, to find new channels of communication with the Muslim world.	因此美国必须再次将艺术视为一种能进一步加强文化交流的有力手段，并最终找到与穆斯林世界之间的沟通新渠道。


Doing so will show that relations need not be defined only through political conflict. Rather, there is now an opportunity to define connections between America and the Muslim world by sharing the richness and complexity of Muslim artistic expressions – as a vital step in finding grounds for mutual respect.	这样做的目则是为了表明：文明间的关系并不只是以政治冲突来界定，相反，美国和穆斯林世界有机会通过分享穆斯林丰富复杂的艺术表现形式来重新定义彼此的联系——而这更是探索相互尊重共识所需的至关重要一步。


Educating Europe	教育欧洲


Education has played a big part in healing Europe's divisions.	教育在结束欧洲分裂的过程中扮演着重要的角色。


Four decades ago, Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer approved the creation of new textbooks that children in both countries would use to help heal the century-long Franco-German antagonism.	四十年前，查尔斯•戴•高乐和康拉德•阿登纳批准为两国的儿童分别编写新的课本。 使用新课本有助于结束法德之间一个世纪以来的对抗状态。


Today's challenges call for such a dynamic use of educational policy.	当今的挑战需要我们积极地采用这样的教育政策。


With the May accession of the ten central, eastern, and southern European candidate states, the European Union will be more politically, economically, and socially diverse than ever.	随着10个来自中、东、和南欧的国家在五月加入欧盟，欧盟在政治、经济和社会方面将会变得前所未有地多元化。


This entails new opportunities, no doubt, but also new risks.	这无疑会带来新的机遇，但同时也会催生新的风险。


Because an enlarged Union will become a reality in just two months, it is imperative to develop concepts for cultural understanding that contribute to the successful integration of the new members.	因为一个扩大的欧盟在两个月内就会变成现实，所以我们必须树立文化谅解的观念从而帮助新成员国顺利地融入欧盟大家庭。


Some values, long espoused by the Union, should be relatively easy to convey.	一些欧盟长期奉行的价值观在传达给新成员国时应该相对容易。


A decade ago, with the Maastricht Treaty, EU members agreed to respect the history, culture, and traditions of all of their constituent peoples.	在十年前的《马斯特里赫特条约》中，欧盟的成员国们一致同意尊重所有成员民族的历史、文化和传统。


The draft constitution that recently failed to gain acceptance in the first round of negotiations not only promises to respect cultural heritage; it obliges the Union actively to protect, maintain, and develop the wealth of Europe's cultural and linguistic diversity.	在最近的第一轮谈判中未被接受的欧盟宪法草案不仅承诺尊重文化传统，还责成欧盟采取积极的措施保护、维持和发展欧洲的文化和语言多样性。


But Europe can succeed in this task only if its various constituent cultures do not seal themselves off from one another.	然而只有在各成员文化都不闭关自守的情况下，欧洲才能完成这项任务。


Within a mobile and open Europe, there can be no fencing off of foreign cultures; contact cannot be avoided.	在一个交融而开放的欧洲，就不会有对外来文化的抵制； 接触是不可避免的。


Diversity has to be lived, which means establishing one's own uniqueness and learning to cope in and with other regions and mindsets.	多样性必须是充满活力的，这就意味着在树立我们自己的文化独特性的同时还要学习与其它的地区和思维方式相融相处。


Goethe already spoke of this in his play "Torquato Tasso," when he cried out: "Compare yourself!	歌德在其戏剧《塔索》中已提到过这一点。 他大声疾呼："比较你自己！


Discover what you are!"	了解你是谁！ "


Indeed, Europeans will only succeed in building the wider Europe if they are open to what is foreign to them.	确实，欧洲人只有对外来事物持开放的态度才能够成功地建立一个更为广泛的欧洲。


Xenophobia is a sign of education gone wrong - an expression of narrow-mindedness and the inability to put oneself in the position of others.	恐外是教育失误的信号-是心胸狭隘和不能设身处地为他人着想的表现。


So, rather than embarking on a search for a European identity, we should agree on mutual educational objectives to increase the awareness of all Europeans of the "others" who are their brethren in Europe.	因此，与其寻求一种欧洲同一性，还不如达成共同的教育目标以加强欧洲人对于作为其兄弟姊妹的"他人"的意识。


A thirst for knowledge, a delight in engaging with the world, and empathy with people from different cultures are qualities that can ensure diversity in unity, and unity in diversity.	对知识的渴望、与世界交流的欣喜和对不同民族文化的同理心是确保我们能异中求同，同中存异的基本素质。


The same is true for the virtue of tolerance and for multilingualism.	宽容和使用多种语言的素质同样不可或缺。


Only those who are familiar with European history and who engage in discussion with the candidate countries about what Europe is and should be will be able to bridge the gap between different cultures and religions.	只有那些熟悉欧洲历史并积极地与准成员国就欧洲的现实和未来进行探讨的人才能在不同的文化和宗教之间担当桥梁的作用。


This implies critical faculties and the ability to tolerate criticism.	这还意味着批评和容忍批评的能力。


Moreover, the current EU member states will not only have to be able to tolerate the criticism by central, eastern, and southern Europeans of western civilization, but also to take such criticism into consideration as they ponder policy.	欧盟现有的成员国不但要能够容忍来自西方文明的中、东和南方的欧洲人的批评，还要在制定政策时考虑到这些批评。


A successful education teaches us to treat others with dignity, regardless of religion, race, origin, or gender.	成功的教育教会我们在对待他人时不论宗教、种族、出身和性别而一视同仁。


A significant element of a successful education is the willingness to be tolerant of others.	成功教育的一个重要元素就是宽以待人的意愿。


Psychologically, this virtue implies the ability to put oneself in others' position.	从心理学的角度讲，这种美德意味着设身处地为他人着想的能力。


Communication between members of different cultures fails so often because we know too little about one another.	不同文化的成员之间交流失败的原因通常是因为我们对彼此的文化知之甚少。


Travel broadens the mind, they say, but for that to happen, more is required than merely frequent changes of location.	人们说旅行能开阔心胸，但要做到这一点仅凭地理位置的经常改变远远不够。


To acquire an insight into how people from other cultures perceive the world, what is required is knowledge of how they live and experience life.	要深入地了解来自不同文化的人们的世界观，就需要了解他们体验生活的方式。


A newer insight would be: multilingualism broadens the mind.	一种更新的洞察告诉我们：使用多种语言的能力能够开阔我们的心胸。


Language is not just a means of communication.	语言不仅仅是交流的工具。


Language is culture.	语言是文化。


The very question of which states of mind, characteristics, and circumstances a language has words for tells us something about cultural peculiarities.	一种语言用以描绘某种思想状态、特征和环境的词汇就能向我们展示一些文化特性。


For the German language, let me point here to Weltschmerz , Weltgeist , Zeitgeist , Schadenfreude , Realpolitik , or Bildung - all of them words for which other languages often lack precise equivalents.	以德语为例，诸如 Weltschmerz , Weltgeist , Zeitgeist , Schadenfreude , Realpolitik , 和 Bildung 这些词在其它语言中都通常缺少与之等价的准确词汇。


Moreover, by learning a foreign language, one acquires a new understanding of one's own.	另外，学习一门外语也能促进我们对自身的新的认识。


Most importantly, though, language provides access to the other culture.	但最重要的是语言是我们通往其它文化的门户。


Calls for attendance in a foreign school - if possible for at least one year - as part of a future European curriculum should be heard and seriously considered.	到国外留学的倡议-如果可能至少为期一年-作为未来欧洲课程的一部分应该得到大力宣传和认真考虑。


Of course, multilingualism, empathy, tolerance, and the acquisition of knowledge about foreign cultures cannot be decreed like taxes.	当然，使用多种语言的能力，同理心，宽容和获取关于外来文化的知识不能像税收那样实施。


But the state can and should organize a good ethical and political education that affords young people the opportunity to interact with others and recognize and accept their equality.	但国家可以也应该为年轻人提供良好的伦理和政治教育，从而让他们有机会与不同的文化互动并认识和接受文化的平等。


Liberal democracy, in its search for civic-mindedness, depends on people and institutions that can guide the way by their example, beliefs, or worldview.	在探求公民意识的过程中，自由民主所依靠的是用榜样、信念和世界观指明前进方向的人和制度。


Time and again throughout the course of our lives, we must bring ourselves to tolerate opinions and behaviours that seem contrary to our own.	在一生中，我们需要无数次地让自己容忍与我们相左的观念和行为。


In this effort, we are sustained only by education.	这种宽容只能通过教育来维持。


The actor and writer Peter Ustinov found a graphic image for this: "Education is important, especially when it comes to dismantling prejudices.	演员兼作家彼得·乌斯蒂诺夫对此有一个形象的描述："教育是重要的，特别是在解除偏见方面。


You can't help being a prisoner within your own mind, but the least you can do is ensure that the cell is decently furnished."	即便我们会不可避免地成为自己思想的囚徒，但至少我们可以确保自己的牢房摆设得体。 "


The Education Myth	教育神话


TIRANA – In an era characterized by political polarization and policy paralysis, we should celebrate broad agreement on economic strategy wherever we find it.	地拉那——在这样一个政治极化、政策瘫痪的时代，人们应当为能就经济战略达成广泛的一致而感到庆幸。


One such area of agreement is the idea that the key to inclusive growth is, as then-British Prime Minister Tony Blair put in his 2001 reelection campaign, “education, education, education.”	其中一个理念得到了人们的一致认同，正如时任英国首相托尼·布莱尔在2001年竞选连任时所说的那样，“教育、教育、还是教育”是共享式增长的核心内容。


If we broaden access to schools and improve their quality, economic growth will be both substantial and equitable.	降低入学门槛、改善教育质量不仅能实现经济快速增长，而且能收获经济增长中的公平。


As the Italians would say: magari fosse vero. If only it were true.	意大利人说：magari fosse vero，多希望这是真的。


Enthusiasm for education is perfectly understandable.	完全可以理解人们对教育的热情。


We want the best education possible for our children, because we want them to have a full range of options in life, to be able to appreciate its many marvels and participate in its challenges.	我们希望自己的孩子受到最好的教育，因为我们希望他们拥有全方位的生活选择，能够亲身体味生活的奇迹，迎接生活的挑战。


We also know that better educated people tend to earn more.	我们还知道受过良好教育的人往往能拿到高收入。


Education’s importance is incontrovertible – teaching is my day job, so I certainly hope it is of some value.	教育的重要性毋庸置疑 ——教学是我的日常工作，因此我当然希望它有价值。


But whether it constitutes a strategy for economic growth is another matter.	但它是否构成经济增长战略是另一回事。


What most people mean by better education is more schooling; and, by higher-quality education, they mean the effective acquisition of skills (as revealed, say, by the test scores in the OECD’s standardized PISA exam).	多数人眼中更好的教育是接受更多教育； 而更高质量教育是指有效地学会技能（比方说像经合组织标准化PISA考试成绩）。


But does that really drive economic growth?	但这是否真是经济增长的推动力？


In fact, the push for better education is an experiment that has already been carried out globally.	事实上，推动更好教育的试验已经在全球范围内进行。


And, as my Harvard colleague Lant Pritchett has pointed out, the long-term payoff has been surprisingly disappointing.	而且，就像我在哈佛的同事 兰特·普里切特已经指出的那样，这项试验出乎意料地取得了令人失望的长期效果。


In the 50 years from 1960 to 2010, the global labor force’s average time in school essentially tripled, from 2.8 years to 8.3 years.	从1960到2010年这五十年里，全球劳动人口的平均在校时间从2. 8年增长至8.


This means that the average worker in a median country went from less than half a primary education to more than half a high school education.	3年，基本达到原来的三倍。 也就是说一个中等国家的普通工人从还差一点完不成一半的小学教育演变成今天的完成高中教育的一半以上。


How much richer should these countries have expected to become?	那么这些国家现在应该有多富？


In 1965, France had a labor force that averaged less than five years of schooling and a per capita income of $14,000 (at 2005 prices).	1965年，法国劳动力所受平均教育不满五年，大致有14，000美元的人均收入（按2005年价格计算）。


In 2010, countries with a similar level of education had a per capita income of less than $1,000.	而2010年，教育水准相似的国家却只有不到1，000美元的人均收入。


In 1960, countries with an education level of 8.3 years of schooling were 5.5 times richer than those with 2.8 year of schooling.	1960年，学校教育达8. 3年的国家比只有2.


By contrast, countries that had increased their education from 2.8 years of schooling in 1960 to 8.3 years of schooling in 2010 were only 167% richer.	相比之下，1960年只有2. 8年而到2010年增加到8.


Moreover, much of this increase cannot possibly be attributed to education, as workers in 2010 had the advantage of technologies that were 50 years more advanced than those in 1960.	3年的国家却只富167%。 此外，即便上述增长也在很大程度上并非归功于教育，因为2010年的工人拥有比1960年工人先进50年的技术优势。


Clearly, something other than education is needed to generate prosperity.	显然，繁荣除了教育还需要别的东西。


As is often the case, the experience of individual countries is more revealing than the averages.	通常情况下，各个国家的经验比平均值更能说明问题。


China started with less education than Tunisia, Mexico, Kenya, or Iran in 1960, and had made less progress than them by 2010.	中国1960年开始时教育程度还不如突尼斯、墨西哥、肯尼亚或伊朗，到2010年所取得的进步也不如上述国家。


And yet, in terms of economic growth, China blew all of them out of the water.	但在经济增长方面，中国却完爆这些国家。


The same can be said of Thailand and Indonesia vis-à-vis the Philippines, Cameroon, Ghana, or Panama.	同样的情况也出现在泰国、印度尼西亚与菲律宾、喀麦隆、加纳或巴拿马的比拼之中。


Again, the fast growers must be doing something in addition to providing education.	同样，增长较快的一方除教育外还做了其他工作。


The experience within countries is also revealing.	各国的国内经验也同样发人深思。


In Mexico, the average income of men aged 25-30 with a full primary education differs by more than a factor of three between poorer municipalities and richer ones.	墨西哥25-30岁小学毕业男性的平均收入在穷市和富市相差3倍。


The difference cannot possibly be related to educational quality, because those who moved from poor municipalities to richer ones also earned more.	造成上述差异的不可能是教育质量，因为那些从穷市迁移到富市的劳动力同样赚得更多。


And there is more bad news for the “education, education, education” crowd: Most of the skills that a labor force possesses were acquired on the job.	对“教育、教育、教育”的鼓吹者而言还有进一步的坏消息：劳动者的绝大多数技能都是从工作中获得。


What a society knows how to do is known mainly in its firms, not in its schools.	这个社会知道做什么的主要是公司而不是学校。


At most modern firms, fewer than 15% of the positions are open for entry-level workers, meaning that employers demand something that the education system cannot – and is not expected – to provide.	多数公司对入门级员工开放的岗位只有不到15%，也就是说雇主所要求的东西教育系统不能——也不会——提供。


When presented with these facts, education enthusiasts often argue that education is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for growth.	面对上述情况，教育爱好者们往往提出教育是增长的必要而非充分条件。


But in that case, investment in education is unlikely to deliver much if the other conditions are missing.	但如果真的如此，在缺少其他条件的情况下教育投资不太可能取得多大效果。


After all, though the typical country with ten years of schooling had a per capita income of $30,000 in 2010, per capita income in Albania, Armenia, and Sri Lanka, which have achieved that level of schooling, was less than $5,000.	毕竟，虽然满足10年学校教育的国家2010年一般人均收入为30,000美元，但达到同样教育水平的阿尔巴尼亚、亚美尼亚和斯里兰卡的人均收入还不到5，000美元。


Whatever is preventing these countries from becoming richer, it is not lack of education.	妨碍这些国家富裕起来不是教育而是其他因素。


A country’s income is the sum of the output produced by each worker.	一个国家的收入是每位工人的产量总和。


To increase income, we need to increase worker productivity.	增加收入需要工人生产率的提高。


Evidently, “something in the water,” other than education, makes people much more productive in some places than in others.	显然，“除教育以外的某些隐形因素”让某些地方的工人效率比其他地方更高。


A successful growth strategy needs to figure out what this is.	成功的发展战略需要弄清楚这究竟是什么。


Make no mistake: education presumably does raise productivity.	不要误会，教育确有提高生产率之功效。


But to say that education is your growth strategy means that you are giving up on everyone who has already gone through the school system – most people over 18, and almost all over 25.	但说教育是本国的增长战略却意味着放弃了离开学校的全部劳动力——18岁以上的人多数均已离校，而25岁以上的几乎全部离校。


It is a strategy that ignores the potential that is in 100% of today’s labor force, 98% of next year’s, and a huge number of people who will be around for the next half-century.	如此的战略无视今天100%劳动力的潜力，明年98%，以及今后半个世纪仍有劳动能力的数量巨大的民众。


An education-only strategy is bound to make all of them regret having been born too soon.	唯教育战略注定让所有人都遗憾自己出生太早。


This generation is too old for education to be its growth strategy.	教育增长战略已经不能为现在这代人提供帮助。


It needs a growth strategy that will make it more productive – and thus able to create the resources to invest more in the education of the next generation.	这代人需要某种战略来提高他们的效率——这样才能创造出更多资源投入到下一代的教育当中。


Our generation owes it to theirs to have a growth strategy for ourselves.	我们这代人即使为后辈着想也应该有自己的发展战略。


And that strategy will not be about us going back to school.	而这种战略并不一定要我们回归学校。


The Lost Generations	失去的一代又一代


NEW YORK – A country’s economic success depends on the education, skills, and health of its population.	纽约—一国的经济成功取决于其国民的教育、技能和健康程度。


When its young people are healthy and well educated, they can find gainful employment, achieve dignity, and succeed in adjusting to the fluctuations of the global labor market.	当一国年轻人身体健康、受到良好教育时，他们就能找到高薪工作，赢得尊严并成功地调整渡过全球劳动力市场的波动期。


Businesses invest more, knowing that their workers will be productive.	企业会增加投资，因为它们知道员工生产率很高。


Yet many societies around the world do not meet the challenge of ensuring basic health and a decent education for each generation of children.	但世界上有许多国家没能应对好保证每一代儿童获得基本健康和优秀教育的挑战。


Why is the challenge of education unmet in so many countries?	为何如此之多的国家不能很好地应对教育挑战？


Some are simply too poor to provide decent schools.	一些国家太穷，无法提供优质教育。


Parents themselves may lack adequate education, leaving them unable to help their own children beyond the first year or two of school, so that illiteracy and innumeracy are transmitted from one generation to the next.	父母亲自己也许也没有受过充分的教育，这让他们在孩子入学一两年之后便无力供养，这导致了文盲和科学盲代代相传。


The situation is most difficult in large families (say, six or seven children), because parents invest little in the health, nutrition, and education of each child.	多子女家庭（比如有六七个孩子的家庭）的这一困境尤为突出，因为父母亲在每个孩子身上的卫生、营养和教育投资极为有限。


Yet rich countries also fail.	但发达国家也做得不好。


The United States, for example, cruelly allows its poorest children to suffer.	比如，美国残忍地对最贫困儿童的惨状熟视无睹。


Poor people live in poor neighborhoods with poor schools.	穷人生活在贫民区，上烂学校。


Parents are often unemployed, ill, divorced, or even incarcerated.	他们的父母亲通常是失业者、疾病缠身、离婚甚至入狱。


Children become trapped in a persistent generational cycle of poverty, despite the society’s general affluence.	尽管总体而言美国已经进入了丰裕社会，但儿童却陷入了永恒的代际贫困循环。


Too often, children growing up in poverty end up as poor adults.	穷孩子通常最后会变成穷大人。


A remarkable new documentary film, The House I Live In, shows that America’s story is even sadder and crueler than that, owing to disastrous policies.	令人瞩目的新纪录片《我所居住的房子》（The House I Live In）表明，美国的情况甚至刚才我所描述的更凄惨、更残酷。


Starting around 40 years ago, America’s politicians declared a “war on drugs,” ostensibly to fight the use of addictive drugs like cocaine.	这一切都是拜灾难性的政策所赐。 大约40年前，美国政客开始“像毒品宣战”，表面上摆出杜绝致瘾药物（如可卡因）的姿态。


As the film clearly shows, however, the war on drugs became a war on the poor, especially on poor minority groups.	但是，正如该片所清楚显示的，毒品战争演变成了一场穷人战争，特别是针对贫穷少数族裔的战争。


In fact, the war on drugs led to mass incarceration of poor, minority young men.	事实上，毒品战争造成大量贫穷少数��裔青年入狱。


The US now imprisons around 2.3 million people at any time, a substantial number of whom are poor people who are arrested for selling drugs to support their own addiction.	如今，美国时时刻刻都有约230万年轻人在蹲班房，其中相当数量是因贩卖毒品以解决自己的药瘾而被捕的穷人。


As a result, the US has ended up with the world’s highest incarceration rate – a shocking 743 people per 100,000!	结果，美国的入狱率为世界之最，平均每10万人中有令人咋舌的743人坐牢！


The film depicts a nightmarish world in which poverty in one generation is passed on to the next, with the cruel, costly, and inefficient “war on drugs” facilitating the process.	该片描绘了一个噩梦般的世界，贫穷从一代人传给下一代，残酷的、费时费力的、事倍功半的“毒品战争”贯穿着整个过程。


Poor people, often African-Americans, cannot find jobs or have returned from military service without skills or employment contacts.	穷人——通常是非洲裔美国人——在从军队退役后由于无一技之长和雇用合同而无法找到工作。


They fall into poverty and turn to drugs.	他们陷入了贫穷，并转向了毒品。


Instead of receiving social and medical assistance, they are arrested and turned into felons.	他们没有获得社会和医疗补助，而是被逮捕入狱，打为重犯。


From that point on, they are in and out of the prison system, and have little chance of ever getting a legal job that enables them to escape poverty.	从此，他们便成为班房的常客，几乎不可能找到可以让他们摆脱贫困的合法工作。


Their children grow up without a parent at home – and without hope and support.	他们的孩子在父母不在家的环境中长大，感受不到希望和支持。


The children of drug users often become drug users themselves; they, too, frequently end up in jail or suffer violence or early death.	瘾君子的孩子通常自己也会变成瘾君子； 也会成为班房常客、遭受暴力甚至早夭。


What is crazy about this is that the US has missed the obvious point – and has missed it for 40 years.	这一问题的疯狂之处在于美国对显而易见的一点视而不见，而且这一视而不见维持了40年。


To break the cycle of poverty, a country needs to invest in its children’s future, not in the imprisonment of 2.3 million people a year, many for non-violent crimes that are symptoms of poverty.	为了打破贫穷循环，一国需要投资于儿童的未来，而不是每年将230万人投入班房——他们中有许多都不是暴力罪犯，而是贫穷的受害者。


Many politicians are eager accomplices to this lunacy.	许多政客是这一不正常现象的共谋。


They play to the fears of the middle class, especially middle-class fear of minority groups, to perpetuate this misdirection of social efforts and government spending.	他们煽动中产阶级的恐慌，特别是针对少数族裔的恐慌，将这一社会行为和政府支出的错误方向永久化。


The general point is this: Governments have a unique role to play to ensure that all young members of a generation – poor children as well as rich ones – have a chance.	基本要点是这样的：政府在保证所有年轻人——不论贫富——都拥有机会方面扮演着独一无二的角色。


A poor kid is unlikely to break free of his or her parents’ poverty without strong and effective government programs that support high-quality education, health care, and decent nutrition.	穷孩子不可能在没有强力而有效的支持高质量教育、卫生保健和全面营养的政府计划的情况下摆脱自身和父母的贫穷状态。


This is the genius of “social democracy,” the philosophy pioneered in Scandinavia, but also deployed in many developing countries, such as Costa Rica.	这才是“社会民主”的实质。 社会民主由斯堪的纳维亚国家率先实施，哥斯达黎加等许多发展中国家也已经推行。


The idea is simple and powerful: All people deserve a chance, and society needs to help everybody to secure that chance.	其中的思想简单而有力：所有人都应该得到机会，而社会应该帮助所有人得到这个机会。


Most important, families need help to raise healthy, well-nourished, and educated children.	最重要的是，家庭必须帮助儿童健康成长、完善营养、接受教育。


Social investments are large, financed by high taxes, which rich people actually pay, rather than evade.	社会投资是巨大的，钱来自高税收——富人得缴税，而不是逃税。


This is the basic method to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty.	这是打破贫穷代际传递的基本方法。


A poor child in Sweden has benefits from the start.	瑞典的穷孩子从出生就可以享受福利。


The child’s parents have guaranteed maternity/paternity leave to help them nurture the infant.	孩子的双亲可以获得母亲/父亲产假以便于照顾婴儿。


The government then provides high-quality day care, enabling the mother – knowing that the child is in a safe environment – to return to work.	政府还提供高质量的日托服务，以便母亲安心回到工作中去，不必担心孩子呆在不安全的环境中。