For five months, they fought.	他们战斗了五个月。


And perhaps 80% of them died in the ruins of the city.	80%的人丧生于斯大林格勒的废墟。


On October 15 – a typical day – Chuikov’s battle diary records that a radio message was received from the 416th Regiment at 12:20 PM: “Have been encircled, ammunition and water available, death before surrender!”	10月15日——一个平常的日子——崔可夫在战争日记中写道，下午12:20，收到416团无线电报：“我军被包围，弹药和水源充足，誓死不降！


At 4:35 PM, Lieutenant Colonel Ustinov called down the artillery on his own encircled command post.	”下午4:35，乌斯季诺夫（Ustinov）陆军中校要求将炮口对准他被包围的指挥所。


But they held on.	但他们坚持住了。


And so, 70 years ago this November – on November 19 to be precise – the million-soldier reserve of the Red Army was transferred to General Nikolai Vatutin’s Southwestern Front, Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky’s Don Front, and Marshal Andrei Yeremenko’s Stalingrad Front.	同样是在70年前的这个11月——确切地说，是11月19日——百万苏联预备役大军开入瓦图京大将的西南前线、罗科索夫斯基的顿河前线以及叶廖缅科元帅的斯大林格勒前线。


They went on to spring the trap of Operation Uranus, the code name for the planned encirclement and annihilation of the German Sixth Army and Fourth Panzer Army.	他们开始准备天王星行动的陷阱。 天王星行动是围歼德国第六集团军和第四庄家集团军的计划的代号。


They would fight, die, win, and thus destroy the Nazi hope of dominating Eurasia for even one more year – let alone of establishing Hitler’s 1,000-year Reich.	他们将战斗、牺牲、获胜并消灭纳粹主宰欧亚大陆（哪怕继续主宰一年）的希望，让希特勒建立千年帝国的大梦毁灭。


Together, these 1.2 million Red Army soldiers, the workers who armed them, and the peasants who fed them turned the Battle of Stalingrad into the fight that, of any battle in human history, has made the greatest positive difference for humanity.	这120万红军战士、武装他们的工人以及为他们提供粮食的农民将斯大林格勒战役变成了一场对人类具有最积极影响的战役，胜过人类历史上任何一次战役。


The Allies probably would have eventually won World War II even had the Nazis conquered Stalingrad, redistributed their spearhead forces as mobile reserves, repelled the Red Army’s subsequent winter 1942 offensive, and seized the Caucasus oil fields, thus depriving the Red Army of 90% of its motor fuel.	也许即使纳粹占领了斯大林格勒，将其先头部队调拨为机动储备军，击退随后的1942���冬季红军反击攻势，夺取高加索油田从而剥夺红军90%的汽车燃料，盟军最终也能赢得第二次世界大战。


But any Allied victory would have required the large-scale use of nuclear weapons, and a death toll in Europe that would most likely have been twice the actual World War II death toll of perhaps 40 million.	但盟军的胜利必将大规模使用核武器，欧洲死亡人数极有可能达到第二次世界大战实际死亡人数（可能超过4000万）的两倍。


May there never be another such battle.	但愿永远不会再有这样的战役。


May we never need another one.	但愿永远不需要再有这样一场战役。


The soldiers of the Red Army, and the workers and peasants of the Soviet Union who armed and fed them, allowed their dictatorial masters to commit crimes – and committed crimes themselves.	红军战士，以及武装和给养他们的苏联工人和农民，允许他们的独裁领导犯下罪行，他们自己也犯下了罪行。


But these crimes fall short by an order of magnitude of the great service to humanity – and especially to western European humanity – that they gave in the rubble along the Volga River 70 years ago this fall.	但这些罪行和他们70年前在伏尔加河畔对人类——特别是对西欧人——做出的贡献一比不值一提。


We are the heirs to their accomplishments.	我们是他们的成就的继承者。


We are their debtors.	我们欠着他们的。


And we cannot repay what we owe to them.	我们无法还清这笔欠他们的债务。


We can only remember it.	我们唯能永远铭记。


But how many NATO leaders or European Union presidents and prime ministers have ever taken the time to visit the battle site, and perhaps lay a wreath to those whose sacrifice saved their civilization?	但有多少北约领导人和欧盟主席和首相曾经花时间去参观过战场、向牺牲生命拯救他们的文明的战士们敬献过花圈？


Seven Years in Afghanistan	Seven Years in Afghanistan


KABUL –We began a journey in Afghanistan seven years ago with the war that ousted the Taliban from power.	喀布尔-七年前，随着那场推翻了塔利班政权的战争，我们在阿富汗踏上了征程。


Much has been accomplished along the way, for Afghanistan and for the world.	自从那时起，无论对于阿富汗还是对于全世界来说，我们在前进的道路上已取得了很大的成就。


In less than 45 days in 2001, we Afghans were freed from the menace of terrorism and the Taliban.	2001年中，在不到45天的时间里，我们阿富汗人摆脱了恐怖主义和塔利班的威胁。


Back then, Afghanistan’s people held great hopes for an immediately wonderful future.	当时的阿富汗人民充满了憧憬，盼望着美好的未来立即来临。


Some of those hopes were fulfilled. Our children are back in school.	现在，一些憧憬已经实现：我们的孩子回到了学校读书；


Roughly 85% of Afghans now have access to some health care, up from 9% before 2001.	大约85 ％的阿富汗人民目前享有某种医疗保健，而在2001年之前，这个比例仅为9 ％ ；


Child mortality – among the worst in the world in 2001 – has dropped by 25%.	2000年的世界上最高的儿童死亡率在阿富汗，目前已经下降了2 5 ％。


Democracy, a free press, economic gains, and better livelihoods – all of that is there.	民主、新闻自由、经济上的成就和改善的民生，所有上述这一切都成为现实。


But, sadly, we are still fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda.	但遗憾的是，我们仍然在与塔利班和基地组织作战。


What is it that we have not done right that makes us – and the rest of the world – less secure?	到底是什么我们做得不对，从而让我们和全世界感到不安全呢？


After the liberation in 2001, the international community concentrated on Afghanistan alone as the place to fight extremism and terrorism, while we Afghans argued that our country is not the right place to fight.	2001年阿富汗获得自由后，国际社会聚焦于阿富汗，把我国视为打击极端主义和恐怖主义的唯一的地方。 而我们阿富汗人则认为，我国不是打仗的好地方；


The war on terrorism cannot be fought in Afghan villages.	反恐战争不能在阿富汗的村庄里打。


Instead, a regional approach was and is needed.	相反，打赢这场战争需要整个区域的合作。


It must be concentrated on the sanctuaries of those who train, equip, and motivate the extremists and send them out to hurt us all.	它必须瞄准那些避难所，而在这些避难所里藏着训练、装备和鼓动极端主义分子并把他们派出来伤害我们大家的人。


But we were not heard.	但是，我们的声音没有被重视。


Regardless of whether that was the result of a lack of knowledge or a lack of will, events have proven us right.	不管这种情况是由于缺乏知识还是缺乏诚意所导致，但所发生的一些事件却证明了我们是对的。


Unfortunately, for the past two years, Pakistan has been suffering as much or perhaps more than Afghanistan has suffered.	不幸的是，在过去的两年中，巴基斯坦所遭受的苦难和阿富汗一样多，甚至更多。


Almost the entire tribal belt along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border is suffering.	几乎巴基斯坦和阿富汗边境的整个部落地带都蒙受了灾难。


Just as schools were burned in Afghanistan from 2004 onwards, for the past year schools – especially for girls – have been burned there, leaving 80,000 children without facilities.	正如阿富汗的学校从2004年起开始被烧毁，在过去的一年中，那里的学校-特别是女校-也被烧毁，让八万名儿童无法上学。


Bridges have been blown up, soldiers and police killed.	桥梁被炸毁，士兵和警察被杀害。


Bombs have exploded from Karachi to Lahore to Islamabad.	从卡拉奇到拉合尔一直到伊斯兰堡，炸弹遍地爆炸。


The violence has spread to India as well, with bombings in Gujarat, Bangalore, and Delhi.	暴力事件也已蔓延到印度，古吉拉特邦、班加罗尔和新德里都发生了爆炸事件。


So the problem is regional, and it concerns institutional support for extremism that incites terrorism.	所以，问题是整个区域性的，它涉及到有组织地支持和煽动恐怖主义的极端主义。


Unless we collectively address the roots of the problem by ending that support, as well as financial support for radicalism in all forms, we will not defeat terrorism.	除非我们共同从根源上解决问题，即铲除他们的支持力量以及对一切形式的激进主义的财政支持，否则，我们是打败不了恐怖主义的。


This has not been properly understood in the West, which has been fighting the symptoms of terrorism, but has failed to attack its underlying causes.	这一点在西方没有被恰当地理解，西方一直在同恐怖主义的现象作斗争，但却没有打击到其根源。


Fortunately, today I see signs of recognition of this malaise.	幸运的是，如今有迹象显示，人们已经开始认识到这一弊端。


And democratic change in Pakistan is good news for Afghans, Pakistani people, and, by extension, many others around the world.	而且巴基斯坦的民主变革，无论对阿富汗人还是巴基斯坦人，或推而广之，对世界上其他许多人，都是个好消息。


Pakistan’s new president, Asif Ali Zardari, has suffered from terrorism as we have suffered.	巴基斯坦新总统，阿西夫·阿里·扎尔达里，和我们一样，曾遭受恐怖主义之害。


His wife, Benazir Bhutto, was killed by terrorists.	他的妻子，贝·布托被恐怖分子所杀害。


I visited Pakistan for President Zardari’s inauguration, and for the first time I saw a dim ray of hope.	我参加了巴基斯坦总统扎尔达里的就职典礼，我第一次看到了一线希望。


If we can all work together – Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, the United States, and our allies – I see a possibility of moving beyond the days when a government thinks it needs extremism as an instrument of policy.	如果我们能够齐心协力-阿富汗、巴基斯坦、印度、美国，还有我们的盟友们-我看到了希望，政府需要利用极端主义作为政策工具的日子可能会一去不复返了。


When all governments in the region reject extremism, there will be no place for extremists, and terrorism will wither away.	当该地区所有国家的政府抛弃极端主义的时候，就不再有极端分子的立足之地，而恐怖主义也将消亡。


But this also requires helping those people who out of desperation have fallen prey to extremist forces.	但是，这还需要我们去帮助那些因绝望而沦为极端主义牺牲品的人们。


Last year, I pardoned a 14-year-old boy from the Pakistan tribal area in Waziristan who had come to Afghanistan to blow himself up as a suicide bomber.	去年，我赦免了一名从巴基斯坦的部落地区瓦济里斯坦来的14岁的男孩。 他作为一名人体自杀炸弹来到阿富汗。


Only utter hopelessness can drive so young a man to such an act.	只有彻底的绝望才能使这样年轻的孩子去从事这种行为。


We must rescue these people by giving them a better future, which only more education and new opportunities can bring.	我们必须拯救这些人，给他们一个更美好的未来，而只有更多的教育和新的机会才可以带给他们这样的未来。


Desperation and poverty are the tools used by evil forces to raise their terrorist cadres.	绝望和贫困，是邪恶势力招募他们的恐怖人员的时候被利用的工具。


But that environment will not change if political will is lacking, and if there is no action by the US and the governments of the region to get our economies to create jobs that offer hope.	但是，如果缺乏政治意愿，如果美国和该地区各国政府不采取行动让其经济体创造就业机会给人们提供希望，这样的环境是不会改变的。


Moreover, in order to deny terrorists institutional support, we must bring institutional strength to Afghanistan.	此外，为了不让恐怖分子得到有组织的支持，我们必须把有组织的力量带到阿富汗来。


We must enable Afghans to look after themselves and defend their country, to have a future in Afghanistan, to have hope of raising their children in Afghanistan.	我们必须使阿富汗人民有能力照顾自己，保卫自己的国家，看到阿富汗的前途，希望在阿富汗养育他们的子女。


Recently, I spoke to an Afghan man very close to me.	最近，我有一个和我非常熟识的阿富汗人和我交谈。


He has a son who works in the Afghan Foreign Office.	他的儿子在阿富汗外交部工作。


That young man was born in the US but returned to Afghanistan four years ago.	他儿子在美国出生，但四年前返回阿富汗。


The father asked, “Do you think I should take my son back to the US?”	他父亲问我： “你认为我应该考虑把我的儿子送回美国吗？


I said, “Why?	”我说， “这是为什么？


Let him live here, let him work here, let him be an Afghan.”	让他住在这里，让他在这里工作，让他成为一个阿富汗人吧。


He said, “Yes, but will he have a future?”	“他说： ”是，但他会不会有前途呢？ “


A viable future means security as well as bread.	可靠的前途意味着安全以及温饱。


We have started to bring hope by educating young Afghans, but we have not yet succeeded in bringing them a secure life, free from the danger of bombs and aerial bombardment.	我们已经以教育年轻的阿富汗人为开始，为人民带来希望，但我们还没有在给他们带来生活的安全感，让他们免受炸弹和空袭的威胁。


Only when that happens will Afghanistan be secure.	只有到那时，阿富汗才能获得安全。


And if the two other conditions are fulfilled – removal of political backing for radicalism and help for the desperate – we will have a safer life not only in Afghanistan, but in Pakistan, India, and the rest of the world.	如果另外两个条件得到满足，即消除对激进主义的政治支持并帮助绝望的人们，我们的生活才会过得更安全，不仅在阿富汗，而且在巴基斯坦、印度和全世界其它地方都是如此。


Sex, Berlusconi, and Putin’s Bed	性关系、贝卢斯科尼和普京的床


ROME – Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s political and sexual exploits make headlines around the world, and not just in the tabloid press.	罗马——不光是小报，世界各地的媒体都在头版头条报道了意大利总理西尔维奥·贝卢斯科尼的政治和性爱功绩。


These stories would be no more than funny – which they are certainly are – if they were not so damaging to Italy and revelatory of the country’s immobile politics.	如果这些报道不是有损意大利形象、并无情揭示了这个国家毫无活力的政治局面的话，其充其量不过是笑话而已——这种事当然让人感到可笑。


For, despite the rampant scandals, “national Silvio” (“Il Silvio Nazionale”) remains by far Italy’s most popular and successful politician (though his approval ratings have now dipped below the 50% mark in opinion polls for the first time since his second return to the premiership in 2008).	因为尽管丑闻迭出，“公民西尔维奥”（Il Silvio Nazionale）仍然毫无争议地当选为意大利最受欢迎、也最成功的政治家（尽管从2008年再次担任总理以后，他在民意测验中的支持率如今已首次跌到了50%的标志线以下）。


Part of the reason for Berlusconi’s longevity despite his many stumbles is cultural.	错误百出的贝卢斯科尼之所以能如此长盛不衰，文化方面的原因恐怕功不可没。


As in other Latin or Mediterranean countries with a strong Catholic tradition, Italian society long ago learned to accept serenely a life of duplicity: on the one hand, a strong attachment to church and family values, and on the other a second life – often lived in plain sight – composed of mistresses and other “dubious” connections.	就像其他具有很强天主教传统的拉丁或地中海国家一样，意大利社会在很久以前就学会了平静地接受生活的两重性：一方面极其看重教堂和家庭观念，而另一方面则毫不掩饰地拥有由情人和其他“可疑”关系构成的另外一种生活。


Today’s Italian Catholic political leaders often embrace such a lifestyle.	今天的意大利天主教政治领袖经常采取这样一种生活方式。


In recent years, aside from Berlusconi himself, other divorcés like Centrist Catholic Party Leader Pier Ferdinando Casini and Parliament Speaker Gianfranco Fini could easily deliver passionate speeches in the morning on the importance of the traditional family unit and the sacredness of marriage, attend a touching audience with the Pope in the afternoon, and then rush off in the evening to their unmarried partners and mothers of their latest offspring.	近年来，除贝卢斯科尼本人以外，其他像中间天主教党派领袖皮埃尔·费尔迪南多·卡西尼和议会发言人詹弗兰科·菲尼这样的离婚政治家们都能轻而易举地在早晨发表传统家庭单位多重要以及婚姻多神圣的热情洋溢的演讲，在下午聆听教皇的感人至深的教诲，然后再在傍晚时分赶去会他们最小孩子的母亲和未婚伴侣。


Italian society’s tacit acceptance of such behavior has become more openly acknowledged in recent years, thanks perhaps to Berlusconi and his vast media holdings.	意大利社会对此类行为默许的态度在近年来变得愈加公开化，这恐怕要归功于贝卢斯科尼和他对媒体的广泛把持。


In the 1970’s, the average Italian working-class family’s major ambition for its children was for them to study, go to university, and become a doctor or a lawyer.	20世纪70年代，普通意大利工薪阶层家庭对子女最大的希望是让他们学习，取得大学学位，然后成为医生或者律师。


Since the late 1970’s, and especially during the 1980’s and 1990’s, Berlusconi's three private TV channels have portrayed a false and illusory model of quick success, as seen in American soap operas such as “Dallas.”	20世纪70年代后，特别是20世纪八九十年代，贝卢斯科尼的三家私人电视台一直在宣传像美国肥皂剧《达拉斯》中那样一种虚幻的快速成功模式。


Since the 1990’s, his channels broadcast “Big Brother” and Italian variety shows dominated by male comedians, musclemen, and scantily clad young girls, popularly known as “veline.”	从20世纪90年代起，他的电视台就开始播放意大利杂耍，里面充斥着意大利喜剧男星、打手和几乎一丝不挂的被称为“伴舞女郎”的年轻女孩子。


In the space of just 30 years, Berlusconi's TV stations managed to impose this illusory portrait of success on Italian society.	短短三十年里，贝卢斯科尼的电视台成功地在意大利社会树立起了这种虚幻的成功模式。


And today, the ambition of many working-class Italian mothers is to see their daughters become a successful scantily clad “velina” who, in turn, manages to hit the gossip columns by flirting with the latest muscleman-turned-TV heartthrob or some budding young football player.	时至今日，许多意大利工薪阶层母亲的理想就是看到她们的女儿成为几乎一丝不挂的成功的“伴舞女郎”，然后再通过与刚从打手转行成为电视人的情人或者某个崭露头架的年轻足球明星调情成功地在流言专栏中占据一席之地。


Graduating as a doctor or a lawyer is no longer a mark of success.	大学毕业后成为医生或律师已经不再是成功的标志。


Despite his lack of muscles and hair, Berlusconi is the embodiment of this form of success.	虽然既没有几块肌肉也几根没有头发，但贝卢斯科尼却是这种成功的标志。


The former cabaret singer who became one of the richest businessman in the world, has also managed to become Italy’s most powerful politician – and one of the world’s most colorful.	这位曾在餐厅里演唱助兴歌曲的歌手后来成了全世界最富有的商人，又成功地成了意大利最有权势、也是世界上最富于色彩的政治家。


Until a few weeks ago, the average Italian viewed him as a role model, someone who had succeeded in many spheres of life.	直到几个星期前，普通的意大利人还把他看成在生活的很多领域都取得了成功的榜样。


That has now changed.	现在已经不再如此。


People have become less admiring of Berlusconi, because the hypocrisy has gone too far.	因为所作所为太过虚伪，人们已经不再如此崇拜贝卢斯科尼。


It may be trendy for an Italian politician to flaunt his Mediterranean macho image, but that image becomes hard to stomach when the prime minister launches a campaign to eradicate street prostitution, with possible jail sentences for clients, while sleeping with paid escorts.	意大利政治家炫耀自己的地中海男性形象可能非常时尚，但当总理一边与收费伴侣睡觉，一边却发起一场消灭街头妓女的运动、甚至可能让光顾这些妓女的客户蹲监狱，这样一种形象就变得让人难以接受了。


Nor are Italians reassured to learn that Berlusconi fielded a number of candidates during the recent European Parliament elections whose only discernible qualification was that they were pretty young girls who had possibly spent some time in the prime minister’s company at his Sardinian Villa or Roman Palazzo.	贝卢斯科尼在不久前的欧洲议会选举中任命了几位候选人的事也无法让意大利人感到安心，这几位候选人唯一有迹可循的资格就是她们都是漂亮的年轻女孩，而且可能花了一些时间在撒丁岛别墅或者罗马官邸中陪伴总理。


Today, it seems all but certain that Berlusconi will never be elected President of Italy, the post to which he has always aspired.	今天，几乎可以肯定贝卢斯科尼永远不会当选他一直渴望担任的意大利总统职务。


Moreover, rumors are rife that he is now being attacked for his behavior by members of his own party.	此外，有谣言盛传他因为自己的所作所为受到党内成员的攻击。


Indeed, some maintain that Berlusconi will be forced to resign as prime minister by the end of the year.	事实上，有些人坚持认为贝卢斯科尼将在年末被迫辞去总理一职。


Such rumors may well turn out to be true, for the heart of the scandal now concerns the taped conversations between a paid escort and Berlusconi during their romps in his Sardinian villa on the big bed given to him by his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin.	如此谣言很可能会得到证实，因为丑闻的核心现在涉及到贝卢斯科尼和一位收费性伴侣在撒丁岛别墅俄罗斯总理弗拉基米尔·普京赠送的那张大床上的交谈录音。


A downfall plotted to happen on a Kremlin-supplied bed would be a denouement that not even one of Berlusconi’s TV channels could dream up.	在一张由克里姆林宫赠送的大床上发生阴谋毁灭将会是一个就连贝卢斯科尼的电视台都无法想象的结局。


Sexy Culture	性文化


Why is there culture?	文化缘何存在？


What motivates people to write poems, paint, or sing?	是什么触动人们写诗、绘画、歌唱？


Most people engaged in these activities would respond with answers like, “because I like to” or, “because it fulfills me,” if not, “I feel obliged not to waste my talent.”	大多数从事这些活动的人会这样回答：“因为我喜欢”或“因为它令我实现价值”，要不就是，“我不想荒废自己的才能。


They tend to believe that culture reflects the existence of a soul type, or that it's an expression of humans’ intelligence and creativity.	”他们一向认为，文化反映了一种灵魂的存在，或者说文化表现了人类的智慧和创造性。


Natural science – as so often – has a more mundane answer, one that has to do with natural selection.	自然科学往往有一个更为寻常的答案，它与物竞天择有关。


In his seminal work on evolution, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life, Charles Darwin used the much-cited expression “survival of the fittest.”	在其有关进化的著作中，即《根据物竞天择—亦即在生存竞争中适种留存—的物种起源》，查尔斯·达尔文使用了广为引用的“适者生存”一词。


Most people find it easy to understand that being especially strong or fast, or able to withstand hunger, heat, or cold, can increase the chances of survival.	大多数人认为该词浅显易懂，即强壮、快速或能够经受饥饿、酷热或严寒者，其生存的可能性更大。


Intelligence also falls into that category.	智慧也属于这一类别。


But to squeeze cultural excellence into the group of characteristics defining “the fittest” is not so easy and requires some leap of faith.	但是，要将卓越文化揉进定义“适者”的特征群体却并非易事，需要信念的跨越。


In his later work, Darwin introduced another selection criteria that may be just as important, but which has received much less attention: mating preference, or sexual selection.	在其后期作品中，达尔文提出了另一个选择标准：配偶选择，又称性别选择，这一标准同样重要，但却鲜为关注。


His reason for doing so was to explain male peacocks’ obviously hindering tail feathers and male lions’ apparently useless manes.	他提出这一标准是为了解释雄孔雀的尾翎显然具有阻碍作用以及雄狮子的鬃毛明显无用。


These characteristics would reduce rather than enhance the bearer’s chances of survival, but obviously they prevailed in generation after generation.	这些特征会减少而不是增加孔雀或狮子生存的可能性，但它们却一代一代地占据优势。


Thus, Darwin argued, they must increase the probability of more offspring by making the males more attractive to female mates.	因此，达尔文认为，它们一定是令雄孔雀或雄狮子对其雌性同伴更具吸引力，从而增加了繁衍后代的可能性。


As Darwin did not believe that pure aesthetics would guide female peacocks and lions in their choice of mating partners, he had to find a rational reason for females’ preference for males with hindering characteristics.	达尔文认为，并非纯粹的美观引导雌孔雀或雌狮子去选择其配偶，因此他必须找出雌性动物偏爱具有阻碍性特征的雄性动物的合理原因。


The very fact, he reasoned, that these features make life harder signals to prospective partners that individuals who can do reasonably well with them have an especially good genetic set-up and are thus likely to produce strong offspring.	他推断，事实是，这些令生存更为艰难的特征向未来的配偶表明，能够合理地处理这些阻碍性特征的个体会拥有极好的遗传结构，因而可能产生强壮的后代。


They should therefore be preferred mates.	它们因此为雌性动物所偏爱。


Evolutionary biologists have since taken the concept further.	进化生物学家自此发展了这一概念。


If someone can do difficult things, not only carrying peacock tail feathers or a long dark lion mane, but also things that require much practice without contributing to physical fitness and survival, and yet stay alive, that individual must have especially good genes.	如果有人能做有难度的事情，不仅能长出孔雀尾翎或狮子长长的黑色鬃毛，而且能够处理需要更多练习却无助于身体健康和生存的事情，并且能够生存下来，该个体一定拥有极好的基因。


They are therefore sexually attractive.	它们因而具有性别魅力。


Culture – at least the culture we are proud of and don’t sneer at – is highly elitist.	文化，至少是我们引以为豪、绝不讥笑嘲讽的文化，是属于杰出人物的。


We admire the best, and only the best, according to some cultural and time-dependent standard.	根据某种文化和时间相关标准，我们崇尚最优秀的文化，也仅限于最优秀的文化。


It does not help much to sing pop songs or opera arias in the bathroom.	在浴室唱流行歌曲或歌剧选段毫无用处。


You must be able to draw a listening and cheering crowd to qualify for the elite.	你必须能够吸引一群听众和欢呼的人群，这样你就有资格成为杰出人物。


Likewise, the amateur painter does not increase her or his attractiveness much compared to a van Gogh or a Picasso.	同样，比起梵高和毕加索，业余画家并不没有多少魅力。


The same goes for writers.	作家亦如此。


A vanity press autobiography does not bring you to the top.	虚荣的新闻自传不会令你出类拔萃。


For that, you have to be a Nobel laureate or at least the author of a couple of well regarded books.	你要想出类拔萃，就必须获得诺贝尔桂冠，或至少写出了若干颇受欢迎的作品。


The bottom line is that while many are called, few are chosen.	最重要的是，虽然被提名的不少，而选中的却寥寥无几。


Reaching the top requires not only talent and luck, but also a lot of practices – that is, time wasted from the point of view of survival.	位居榜首不仅需要才能和运气，还需要诸多实践，即从生存角度而言所浪费的时间。


Sport is in this respect also a form of culture, albeit one that is often sneered at by those engaged in pursuits like classical music or serious literature.	从这方面来看，体育也是一种文化，尽管是那些从事经典音乐或严肃文学等研究的人所嘲讽的文化。


Most sports certainly contribute to physical fitness – as do some other expressions of culture, such as ballet – but what we admire in a player who can do extraordinary things with a ball is a technique that is utterly useless outside the playing field and has taken thousands of hours of practice to bring to perfection.	大多数体育无疑有助于身体健康—如其他一些文化所表现的一样，如芭蕾—但是，我们对有特殊球类技能的运动员所崇拜的是一种技巧，这种技巧在运动场外一无是处，并且花费了大量的时间练习，以求尽善尽美。


Here, of course, it’s only the best that become local or national heroes.	诚然，唯有最优秀的运动员成为地方或民族的英雄。


To be a devoted football or basketball player in the lowest series brings ridicule rather than fame.	投身于最低系列的足球或篮球的运动员得到的只是嘲讽而不是名气。


It must be hard and require enormous effort to acquire the unique skills that mark the superstar and earn societies’ respect and admiration.	这必然很艰难，并且需要做出巨大努力来获取代表超级明星的独特技能以及全社会的尊重和崇敬。


Following this reasoning, what makes the poet, the painter, and the singer attractive is uselessness combined with the difficulty of their activity.	根据这一推论，造就诗人、画家和歌唱家的魅力的是与其工作难度相伴而来的无效努力。


The harder and more futile the activity, the better and more sexually attractive is the performer.	活动越艰难、越无效，表演者便越优秀，越具有性别魅力。


Naturally, self-awareness of this underlying wish to be sexually attractive is not required.	自然，无需对性别魅力这一基本愿望有自我认识。


The mechanism works all the same.	机制依然会起作用。


The poet, painter, and singer may think they do what they do for more high-minded reasons, but scientists know otherwise.	诗人、画家和歌唱家可能认为，他们行动的理由是高尚的，但科学家们却另有解释。


Hey, science is hard, too!	嗨，科学也很艰难啊！


But, in line with the logic of natural selection, to become sexually attractive, the scientist only has make sure that the results of his or her work are useless.	但是，根据物竞天择的逻辑，要想拥有性别魅力，科学家只需确保自己的工作成果毫无用处。


Shades of Gray	阴影下的老人


It takes a very close look at the results of the recent elections in the German state of North-Rhine-Westphalia to find among the list of “Others” the tally for “The Greys”: they got 0.1% of the vote.	要想找到“灰党”的得票状况，就必须在德国北莱茵－威斯特法伦州计票清单的“其它政党”一栏中仔细搜寻：他们获得了总票数的0.


In other words, one in a thousand voted for them, although they claimed to speak for that state’s retired and elderly people – over 30% of the population.	1%。 换句话说，尽管他们自称代表了占该州总人口数30%的退休老人的利益，却只赢得了千分之一的选票。


“Generation consciousness,” unlike the “class consciousness” of old, is obviously not a defining factor in people’s political preferences.	老年人的“年代意识”和“阶级意识”不同，显然并非政治偏好的决定因素。


Many more “Greys” voted for the Greens than for their “own” party.	给“绿党”投票的老人要比给“自己”政党投票的老人多得多。


This is an important fact.	这个事实至关重要。


Most Europeans – and many in other parts of the world – live in rapidly aging societies.	绝大多数欧洲人和世界很多地方的人一样，都生活在快速老龄化的社会之中。


Nurseries and schools are closed while retirement homes and hospices spring up everywhere.	到处都在停办幼儿园和学校，开办养老院和收容所。


Rising life expectancy coupled with low birth rates shape the demography of almost all prosperous countries.	平均寿命增加、出生率下降是发达国家人口统计的主要特点。


By the middle of the century – unless there is a dramatic turnaround – about half the population will be economically inactive for reasons of age.	除非发生戏剧性的改变，否则到本世纪中叶，约有半数的人口将由于年龄原因而丧失经济活力。


This trend will have many consequences, most obviously for the welfare state, notably pensions and healthcare.	上述发展势头会带来多种后果，影响最显著的是福利国家，也就是养老金和医疗保健制度。


While expenditure for both is rising rapidly, the offsetting revenues are coming from ever fewer people in employment.	尽管上述两项开支都迅速飙升，但承担开支的在职人员人数却跌到了历史上的低点。


As a result, the “generational contract” looks less and less viable, because we can no longer rely on today’s workers to pay for today’s pensioners.	因此，“世代合约”的可行性越来越差，因为我们已经无法再靠今天的劳动者为今天的退休人员买单。


Insurance-based systems of entitlements created by personal contributions are increasingly taking the place of national health and pension services. This is a profound change that creates much friction in the transitional phase.	以个人贡献为基础的保险权益体系正日益取代国家卫生和养老制度，这项变革意义深远，但在过渡期内却带来了不少问题。


For example, the transitional phase is a period in which public debt inevitably increases.	举例来讲，过渡期内的公共债务会不可避免地增长。


Governments must continue to pay benefits to today’s pensioners, and they can do so only by borrowing money to replace the revenues that tomorrow’s pensioners are now diverting to personal insurance schemes.	政府必须为今天的退休人员继续支付费用，而且只能靠借款来填补将来退休人员转移到个人保险体系中的费用空缺，来保证目前养老金的足额发放。


Debt, however, is a burden imposed by current citizens on future generations.	但这笔债务却成了现世公民强加在后世子孙身上的一项负担。


Understandably, there are signs that younger politicians of all parties are resisting this development.	种种迹象表明各政党内部的年轻人都反对这种做法，这也可以理解。


Indeed, a party of the young might well have better prospects than the “Greys.”	的确，年轻人组成的政党完全可能比“老人”政党有着更光明的前景。


Shifting political interests are, however, but one part of the changes in an aging society.	政治兴趣的变化只是老龄化社会中一系列改变的组成部分。


More visible are changes in lifestyle.	更显而易见的是生活方式的改变。


People who live longer while not being in employment want to enjoy their lives. A plethora of magazines tell pensioners what they can do.	长寿而又无需工作的老年人希望能享受生活，于是大量面向退休人员，告诉他们该做些什么的杂志应运而生。


Advice ranges from sex in old age to tourism.	其中的建议可谓五花八门，从老年性生活到老年旅游无所不包。


Tourism, in particular – cruises as well as more adventurous trips – has become a favorite pastime for the elderly.	特别值得一提的是，旅游已经成了老年人最为喜爱的消遣娱乐，其中包括漫游和探险之旅。


At the same time, images of life in our own societies are shifting.	与此同时，我们自己的社会生活也发生了改变。


No one is surprised to see grey-haired people dancing and singing and petting.	看到满头银发的老年人载歌载舞、嬉笑调情，再也没有人感到吃惊。


For many of them, life seems to become an almost permanent holiday.	对很多老人来讲，生活似乎成了永无休止的假期。


To be sure, the impression is deceptive.	可以肯定的讲，这种印象是有欺骗性的。


Old people who have families are often found in a new role as educators of the young.	生活在家庭中的老年人通常会负担起教育年轻人的责任。


While their sons and daughters go to work, they become the real parents of the next generation.	子女们忙于工作，他们就成了下一代真正的父母。


Today’s young children often see more of their grandmother than of their mother.	今天的小孩与祖母待在一起的时间常常比母亲多。


One may well wonder what this means in terms of social values.	人们尽可以质疑这在社会价值领域究竟意味着什么。


The impression of a generation on permanent holiday is deceptive in another respect. Much public debate is devoted to child poverty and how to relieve it.	从另一个方面讲，老年人无休止度假的印象也是错误的。


However, there is at least as much old-age poverty. The point is that it is less visible.	很多公众辩论都围绕着如何才能消除儿童贫困，但老年人的贫困问题实际也同样严重，只不过没有那么显著。


Occasionally, newspapers report that an old person has been found dead after days, having suffered a lonely demise from illness or even starvation.	我们偶尔会在报纸上读到报道，说老年人死了几天才被人们发现，死前忍受着病痛甚至是饥饿的折磨。


For the most part, old-age poverty is hidden, often by the victims themselves, who are too proud to talk about their condition.	在多数情况下，老年贫困问题是隐形的，常常被受害者自己所掩盖，这些老年人太骄傲，他们不愿提到自己的困境。


This is in part the explanation for the failure of the “Greys,” that is, of political groups catering to the interests of the elderly.	这在一定程度上解释了“灰党”，也就是迎合老人利益的政党为什么会在选举中失败。


While such interests do exist, they do not lead older people to close ranks and organize themselves.	尽管上述利益确实存在，但却没有拉近老年人的距离、使他们形成共同的组织。


If they are poor or otherwise disadvantaged, they are most likely to regard this as their personal, almost private destiny.	如果他们穷困潦倒、身处困境，他们最有可能还是把这当作自己个人、甚至是隐秘的命运。


Like the unemployed, they do not want a political party devoted to their plight.	和失业工人一样，他们并不希望出现专注于自身命运的政党。


Beyond that, the key feature of an aging society is the independence of the elderly.	除此以外，老龄化社会的重要特点就是老年人的独立。


Their vote is precisely not an expression of group interest.	他们的投票肯定不是群体利益的反映。


They make up their own minds and contribute to the unpredictability of modern elections.	他们有着自己的想法，增加了现代选举的不确定性。


In that sense, too, an aging society adds to the responsibilities of the young.	从这种意义上，老龄化社会赋予了年轻人更多的责任。


Pakistan’s War at Home	巴基斯坦的国内战争


SINGAPORE – Last month, after years of indecision, Pakistan’s military launched a full-scale military operation in the North Waziristan Tribal Agency aimed at eliminating terrorist bases and ending the region’s lawlessness.	新加坡——上个月，在多年的犹豫不决之后，巴基斯坦军方在北瓦济里斯坦部落机构展开了清剿恐怖分子基地和结束该地区无法无天状况的全面军事行动。


In particular, the army wants to clear out foreign fighters who are using the territory as a base for various jihads around the Muslim world.	军队的首要目的是要清除利用该地区发动穆斯林国家各式圣战的外国武装份子。


But, by triggering yet another refugee crisis, the operation risks spreading the terrorist threat to other parts of Pakistan, including its largest city and commercial center, Karachi.	但由此触发的又一次难民危机可能导致恐怖威胁蔓延到巴基斯坦的其余国土，其中包括最大的城市和商业中心卡拉奇。


Operating from sanctuaries established in the tribal agency, various terrorist groups, in association with organizations elsewhere in the country, have already attacked Pakistan’s four neighbors – Afghanistan, China, India, and Iran.	各色恐怖组织以部落机构庇护所为据点、与国内其他机构合谋组织恐怖活动。 他们已经向阿富汗、中国、印度和伊朗等巴基斯坦四大邻国发动了恐怖袭击。


Of the region’s foreign fighters, Uzbeks belonging to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan have recently become the most visible threat, taking responsibility for the June 8-9 attack on Karachi’s Jinnah International Airport, in which 30 people, including all ten of the militants, were killed.	该地区的外国武装分子中，隶属于乌兹别克斯坦伊斯兰运动的乌兹别克武装份子近来造成的威胁最大，该组织宣称对6月8-9日袭击卡拉奇真纳国际机场的恐怖行为负责，此次袭击造成30人死亡，其中包括全部10名武装分子。


In launching the North Waziristan operation, General Raheel Sharif, Pakistan’s new Chief of Army Staff, stated that his forces would draw no distinction between supposedly “good” and “bad” Taliban.	在北瓦济里斯坦行动的执行过程中，巴基斯坦新任陆军参谋长谢里夫将军明确表示他的军队不会在所谓“好”“坏”塔利班之间进行区分。


The former, including the Haqqanis – named after Jalaluddin Haqqani, who led the Islamic resistance against Soviet forces in Afghanistan – had been trained and equipped by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s main security agency.	前者包括以曾领导反对苏联的阿富汗伊斯兰抵抗运动的贾拉勒丁·哈卡尼命名的哈卡尼运动——他们的训练和装备由巴基斯坦主要安全机构三军情报局（ISI）负责提供。


Following the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the Haqqanis created a sanctuary in the North Waziristan Tribal Agency.	在美国入侵阿富汗之后的2001年，哈卡尼在北瓦济里斯坦部落机构建立了庇护所。


The ISI countenanced this in the hope that the Pashtun group would later act as Pakistan’s proxies in Afghanistan after US combat troops depart at the end of 2014.	三军情报局容忍了这种行为，寄希望于普什图团体在2014年底美国作战部队撤离后作为巴基斯坦在阿富汗的代理发挥作用。


But the Haqqanis, it appears, did not keep to any such bargain, and allowed their Uzbek guests in North Waziristan to launch the Karachi airport attack.	但实际情况是哈卡尼并未兑现交易条款，并默许客居北瓦济里斯坦的乌兹别克武装袭击卡拉奇机场。


This conflict, however, will not be easy to contain or manage.	控制或管理上述冲突的难度很大。


Pashtuns, the main ethnic group on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, are engaged in a bitter struggle in both countries to assert what they consider to be their legitimate political and economic rights.	阿富汗和巴基斯坦边境两侧的主要群体普什图人在两国同时发起艰苦卓绝的斗争，以争取在他们看来他们合法的政治和经济权利。


Karachi, hundreds of miles to the south, will not escape the fallout from the North Waziristan operation.	地处南部数百英里的卡拉奇也无法摆脱北瓦济里斯坦行动的后果。


The military, which planned to flush out the main militant hideouts with air strikes, and then send in ground troops, instructed residents to leave the area beforehand.	军队计划借助空中打击将武装份子主力赶出巢穴后再派入地面部队，他们��知居民在袭击前离开目标区域。


Some 350,000 people have already fled, creating a humanitarian crisis on a scale similar to that in 2009 when the military broke the Taliban’s grip on the Swat Valley.	约350,000人已经逃离，由此造成的人道主义危机或许可以和2009年军队打破塔利班对斯瓦特山谷控制时的情况相媲美。


The movement of so many people is likely to have a profound effect on Pakistan.	如此多的人流离失所很可能对巴基斯坦产生深远的影响。


According to a report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, released just five days after the assault, at the end of 2013 there were 51.2 million forcibly displaced people in the world, six million more than the year before, and the largest number since World War II.	袭击发生仅五天后联合国难民事务高级专员发布的一份报告显示，截止2013年底全世界被迫流离失所者约为5120万人，比上年增长600万人，达到二战以来的最高峰。


Pakistan plays host to more refugees than any other country, with 1.5 million registered in the country, in addition to an estimated 3.5 million internally displaced people.	巴基斯坦接纳的难民数量超过其他任何国家，国内记录在册的约150万人，还有350万人在国内流离失所。


As has been the case on previous occasions, internally displaced people from North Waziristan are unlikely to remain in the camps set up for them in adjoining districts.	同此前的情况一样，从北瓦济里斯坦涌出的流离失所的难民留在临近地区当局为其设立的难民营的可能性很小。


Many will head for Pakistan’s large cities, particularly Karachi.	许多人会前往以卡拉奇为首的巴基斯坦大城市。


The city’s population of 20 million already includes around six million Pashtuns, more than the number in Kabul and Peshawar combined.	卡拉奇近2000万人口中已经包含了约600万普什图人，超过了喀布尔和白沙瓦普什图人的总和。


Indeed, Karachi is sometimes called an “instant city,” having grown 50-fold as a result of several waves of migration since Pakistan gained independence in 1947.	事实上，卡拉奇有时也被称为“瞬间出现的城市”，自1947年巴基斯坦独立后人口因数次移民潮增长五十倍之多。


The first wave, of around two million people, arrived in Karachi when eight million Muslims fled India for Pakistan.	首波约200万人在800万穆斯林从印度逃往巴基斯坦时抵达卡拉奇。


The second wave included Pashtun construction workers who helped build the new commercial capital.	第二波包括普什图建筑工人，他们洒下汗水将这座城市建成了新的商业之都。


The third wave comprised refugees displaced during Afghanistan’s war against Soviet occupation.	第三波以阿富汗反抗苏联占领战争中流离失所的难民为主。


And the fourth began in the early 2000s, following the US invasion of Afghanistan, which also gave rise to Pashtun resistance on both sides of the border, and contributed in turn to Islamic extremism in the tribal areas.	第四波则始于21世纪初美国入侵阿富汗后，此次入侵也催生了边境两侧的普什图抵抗运动，并反过来推动了部落地区的伊斯兰极端主义。


The current displacement from North Waziristan, therefore, can be seen as part of this fourth wave.	因此当前来自北瓦济里斯坦的难民可以被归为难民潮的第四波。


Even if the army succeeds in clearing out the militants, some of the internally displaced people, bearing battle scars, will end up in Karachi.	即便军队成功地消灭了武装分子，一些承受战争创伤的流离失所的国内难民仍将涌入卡拉奇谋生。


They will be in no mood to lay down their arms if the municipal authorities fail to develop inclusive political institutions that give minority ethnic groups a fair political voice.	如果市政当局未能建立各民族一体的政治机构，赋予少数民族团体公平的话语权，他们就绝不会心甘情愿放下武器。


In that case, the long-term consequence of the military’s North Waziristan campaign may well be more violence where it can cause the most damage.	在这种情况下，军方北瓦济里斯坦行动的长期后果很可能导致更多暴力，进而造成更大的创伤。


Pakistan’s Political Renaissance	巴基斯坦的政治复兴


LAHORE – Pakistani institutions are evolving rapidly.	拉合尔—巴基斯坦制度正在快速演化。


With executive authority increasingly in the hands of elected representatives, rather than dispersed among various competing institutions, the political establishment has been revitalized – and it has taken three important steps toward strengthening democracy and the rule of law.	行政当局日益由当选代表控制，而不是由各相互竞争的机构夺来夺去； 政治体制已经重获生机——并且已采取三个重要步骤朝强化民主和法治精神迈进。


Is Pakistan, a country long prone to military coups, finally developing a well-functioning political system?	作为长期处于军事政变阴云之下的国家，巴基斯坦能否最终发展出运转良好的政治制度？


On November 27, Pakistani President Mamnoon Hussain – acting on the prime minister’s advice, as the constitution dictates – announced that General Raheel Sharif would succeed General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani as Chief of Army Staff, even though Sharif was not among the military establishment’s favored candidates.	11月27日，巴基斯坦总统侯赛因（Mamnoon Hussain）——根据宪法，在总理的建议下——宣布沙里夫将军（Raheel Sharif）继任卡亚尼将军（Ashfaq Parvez Kayani）的陆军首长一职，尽管沙里夫并非军方中意的候选者。


Unlike Kayani – who has directed the Directorate-General of Military Operations and the Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan’s spy agency) – Sharif has not served in any of the positions that typically prepare someone to lead Pakistan’s best-funded and most influential institution.	与卡亚尼不同——卡亚尼军事行动总指挥（Directorate-General of Military Operations）和三军情报局（Inter-Services Intelligence，巴基斯坦情报机构）主管——沙里夫并未就任过这些职位，而这些职位通常是为日后领导巴基斯坦资金最充足、影响力最大的机构的人准备的。


This was not Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s first act of defiance against the military.	这已不是总理沙里夫（Nawaz Sharif）第一次挑战军方。


Just days earlier, he asked the Supreme Court to appoint a three-judge special tribunal to investigate charges of treason against Pakistan’s former president, General Pervez Musharraf, for imposing emergency military rule and suspending the constitution in November 2007.	几天前，他要求最高法院任命三名特别法官调查针对前总统穆沙拉夫的叛国指控。 穆沙拉夫的罪名是在2007年11月采取紧急军事统治并中止宪法。


The decision, which Musharraf claimed was intended to stabilize the country and stem the tide of Islamist extremism, facilitated the removal of dozens of senior judges from the Supreme Court and the provincial high courts – including Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, Pakistan’s highest-ranking judge.	穆沙拉夫声称如此决定是为了稳定国家、阻止伊斯兰教极端势力，而该决定加速了数十位最高法院和省级高等法院法官——包括巴基斯坦排名最高的首席大法官乔杜里（Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry）——的下台。


Chaudhry’s suspension the previous March, following his refusal to bow to government pressure to resign, had incited relentless protests by Pakistan’s legal community and made him a symbol of the people’s desire for a fairer, more independent judicial system.	乔杜里的下台是因为在当年3月拒绝迫于政府压力而辞职，他的下台激发了巴基斯坦司法系统大示威，并把他视为人民追求更公正、更独立的司法制度的象征。


In a sense, this movement, which contributed to Musharraf’s electoral defeat the following February and the return of democracy to Pakistan, prefigured the 2010-2011 revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt that sparked the Arab Spring.	从某种程度上说，这场运动导致了后一年2月穆沙拉夫的选举失败和巴基斯坦回归民主，也是2010—2011年突尼斯和埃及革命及其后的阿拉伯之春的预演。


Musharraf will be tried under Article Six of Pakistan’s constitution, according to which “any person who abrogates or subverts or suspends or holds in abeyance…the Constitution by use of force or show of force or by any other unconstitutional means shall be guilty of high treason.”	穆沙拉夫的起诉依据是巴基斯坦宪法第六条，该条款说“任何通过使用武力、展示武力或其他任何违宪手段废除、推翻、中止或停止……宪法的个人都是叛国者。


Parliament has defined high treason as a capital offense.	”议会将叛国罪定为死罪。


By appointing a special tribunal to try Musharraf, the Sharif government is sending a strong signal to the military – particularly its senior commanders – that they are not above the law.	沙里夫政府通过任命特别法庭处理穆沙拉夫案向军方（特别是军方高级军官）释放了强烈的信号——他们不能凌驾于法律之上。


This message is especially important now, given doubts about the government’s resolve stemming from its decision last June to drop high-treason charges against Musharraf for leading, while serving as Chief of Army Staff, the 1999 coup against the elected government, headed by Sharif himself.	这一信号在当下尤其重要，因为政府在去年6月决定撤销对穆沙拉夫1999年出任陆军首长期间亲自领导针对当选政府的政变的叛国罪指控，这引起了人们对政府决心的怀疑。


The Pakistani government’s third move to tame the military was the announcement that Justice Tassaduq Hussain Jillani, the Supreme Court’s second most senior judge, would succeed Chaudhry, who was reinstated in 2009, after his mandatory retirement this year.	巴基斯坦政府的第三个驯服军方的动作是宣布由最高法院排名第二的吉拉尼法官（Tassaduq Hussain Jillani）接替乔杜里。 乔杜里于2009年复职，并将在今年强制退休。


(Jillani will serve for only seven months before he, too, retires.)	（吉拉尼的任期将只有7个月，此后他也将退休。


By establishing the seniority rule for the most important Supreme Court appointment, Sharif has depoliticized the process.	）沙里夫为最重要的最高法院任命设立了按年资排序的方针，从而实现了这一程序的去政治化。


These three moves promise, at long last, to establish civilian control over the military and ensure judicial independence.	这三个动作有利于最终建立对军队的文职控制以及确保司法独立。


This would put Pakistan on sounder political footing than several other large Muslim countries, which are currently engaged in similar – but far less successful – efforts to institute more accountable governance.	这将使让巴基斯坦迈出扎实的政治步子，胜过其他目前也处于类似局面（即建立更具可问责性的治理）但进展甚少的穆斯林大国。


For example, in Bangladesh, the executive – namely, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League government – is attempting to monopolize political power.	比如，在孟加拉国，行政系统——即总理哈希纳（Sheikh Hasina）及其人民联盟（Awami League）政府——正在试图垄断政治权力。


The judiciary already does the executive’s bidding; if current plans succeed, the ruling party will soon dominate the legislature as well.	司法部已经抛出了行政系统的方案； 如果当前的计划成功，执政党很快就将主宰司法系统。


Although the Bangladeshi military is watching events unfold with some apprehension, it lacks the will to install a caretaker government, as it did in 2007, when it brought peace and stability to the country by establishing a nonpartisan technocratic administration.	尽管孟加拉国军方不无担忧地关注着事态的发展，但它并不愿如2007年那样成立看守政府。 2007年，军方通过成立无党派的技术官僚政府实现了孟加拉国的和平和稳定。


Unfortunately, unlike Sharif’s actions in Pakistan, this effort did not spur the development of a more stable political order.	不幸的是，与沙里夫在巴基斯坦的行动不同，这一措施并没有刺激更稳定的政治秩序的发展。


In Egypt, supporters of the democratically elected President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood are still battling the army and security forces, which deposed him in July.	在埃及，民选总统、穆斯林兄弟会的穆尔西的支持正仍在与军方和安全部队作斗争。 穆尔西于今年6月被军方推翻。


With the liberal opposition apparently unable to create a political organization capable of challenging the Brotherhood within a recognized framework – and, indeed, largely supporting the military coup – Egypt’s fate is increasingly being decided on the street.	自由主义反对行动显然无法形成能够在有组织的框架内挑战穆兄会的政治组织——事实上，反对者大多支持军事政变——埃及的命运将越来越多地取决于街头。


Even in Turkey, where the rule of law is relatively strong and the constitution well established, the opposition has failed to organize a credible political party with broad public support.	即使是法治精神相对较强、宪法较完善的土耳其，反对者也没有在获得广大公众支持的情况下组织起可信的政党。


Thanks to the efforts of Sharif’s government, Pakistan now has reasonably well-developed political parties, which compete in regularly scheduled elections; an autonomous judiciary capable of defending the constitution; and a military that appears to have accepted civilian control.	感谢沙里夫政府的举动，如今巴基斯坦可以说已经有了发育完善的政党并通过定期举行的选举竞争，有了能捍卫宪法的自主的司法，有了似乎接受文职控制的军方。


After nearly seven decades of tumult, Pakistan may soon serve as a model for other large Muslim countries.	在经历了近七十年的混乱后，巴基斯坦有望很快为其他穆斯林大国树立榜样。


Shaky Social Contracts	摇摇欲坠的社会契约


LONDON – “Enrich yourselves,” China’s Deng Xiaoping told his fellow countrymen when he started dismantling Mao Zedong’s failed socialist model.	伦敦—“让你自己富起来”，当邓小平在中国开始废除毛泽东的社会主义模式时（这一模式已经失败），他这样告诉自己的同胞。


In fact, elites everywhere have always lived by this injunction, and ordinary people have not minded very much, provided that the elites fulfill their part of the bargain: protect the country against its enemies and improve living conditions.	实际上，各地的精英都靠这样的信条过活，而普通人也并不怎么介意，条件是精英履行了他们在交易里的责任：在敌人面前保护国家，并且改善生活条件。


It is this implied social contract that is now endangered by economic collapse.	正是这条暗含的社会契约现在因为经济崩溃而被置于危险之中。


Of course, the terms of the contract vary with place and time.	当然，这一契约的条款因时因地而异。


In nineteenth-century Europe, the rich were expected to be frugal.	在19世纪的欧洲，人们期望富人节俭，铺张浪费是要避免的。


Conspicuous consumption was eschewed. The rich were supposed to save much of their income, as saving was both a fund for investment and a moral virtue.	人们认为有钱人应该节约收入里的大头，因为施行节约既为投资准备了经费，也是一种道德上的美德。


And, in the days before the welfare state, the rich were also expected to be philanthropists.	而且，在福利国家出现之前，人们还指望富人担任慈善家。


In the opportunity culture of the United States, by contrast, conspicuous consumption was more tolerated.	相反，美国的机会平等文化对铺张浪费的容忍度要高一些。


High spending was a mark of success: what Americans demanded of their rich was conspicuous enterprise.	高消费是成功的标志：美国人对本国富人的要求是高度进取。


Societies have also differed in how wealthy they allow their elites to become, and in their tolerance of the means by which wealth is acquired and used.	在允许精英们富到哪种程度和容忍采取什么方式来获得和使用财富方面，各个社会之间也存在差异。


One dividing line is between societies that tolerate self-enrichment through politics, and those that demand that the two spheres be kept separate.	有一条分界线横亘在两种社会之间：容忍通过政治来实现自身富裕的社会，以及要求政治和财富相互分离的社会。


In Western countries, politicians and civil servants are expected to be relatively poor.	在西方国家里，人们期望政治家和公务员要相对贫困。


In most of the rest of the world, a political career is regarded as a quasi-legitimate road to wealth.	而在全球余下的大部分地方，政治生涯被视为通往财富的准合法道路。


But the broad conclusion remains: wealth is conditional on services.	不过总的结论依然是：财富取决于服务。


When the services fail, the position of the wealthy is threatened.	当服务未能奏效时，富裕者的地位就会面临威胁。


In the current crisis, popular anger is – no surprise – directed against bankers.	毫不奇怪，在目前的危机中大众的怒火指向了银行家。


Their speculative frenzies ruined shareholders, customers, and the economy.	他们的疯狂投机毁掉了股东，客户还有经济。


Anger has come to focus on banking executives’ huge compensation packages, composed largely of bonuses.	怒气集中在银行管理层的高额补偿金上，这些补偿主要由奖金组成。


Rewarding success is acceptable; rewarding failure is not.	为成功支付酬劳是可以接受的，但给失败支付却不是。


Governments face a dilemma. Big banks cannot be allowed to fail; but the public expects bankers to be punished.	政府进退维谷：不能允许大银行破产，而公众又期待银行家们受到惩罚。


Few will be ruined or imprisoned.	很少有银行家会被毁掉或是坐牢。


But the banking system is sure to be re-regulated, as it was after the Great Crash of 1929-1932, when President Franklin Roosevelt promised to drive the money changers from the temple.	但是银行系统肯定要重新调整。 同样的调整发生在1929—1932年的大萧条之后，当时富兰克林·罗斯福总统承诺要把放贷者赶出神庙。


The global economy’s downturn increases countries’ political risk to varying degrees, depending on the severity of the shock and the nature of the implied social contract.	根据动荡的烈度和暗含的社会契约的性质，全球的经济衰退在不同程度上加剧了各国的政治风险。


Political systems in which power is least controlled, and the abuse of wealth greatest, are most at risk.	那些权力控制最薄弱，而财富滥用最严重的政治体制是最危险的。


The more corrupt the system of capitalism, the more vulnerable it is to attack.	资本主义体制越腐败，在攻击面前就越是脆弱不堪。


The general problem is that all of today’s versions of capitalism are more or less corrupt.	普遍的问题是：现在的每一种资本主义或多或少都是腐败的。


“Enrich yourselves” is the clarion call of our era; and in that moral blind spot lies a great danger.	我们的时代响亮地号召着“让你自己富起来”，而在这个道德盲点里存在着巨大的风险。


Despite efforts to give it precision, estimating political risk is not an exact science.	估算政治风险不是一门精确的科学，虽然人们努力来使之精确。


It requires political theory, not econometrics.	它需要的是政治理论而非经济计量学。


Forecasting models, based on “normal distributions” of risk over short slices of recent time, are notoriously incapable of capturing the real amount of risk in a political system.	有模型根据近年来风险在短暂时间段里的“正态分布”来进行预测，然而这些模型声名狼藉，因为它们不能捕捉政治体制里风险的真实数量。


One of the “safest” political systems of recent times was President Suharto’s regime in Indonesia.	近年来最“安全”的政治制度之一就是苏哈托总统在印尼的体制。


Suharto came to power in 1966, establishing a quasi-military dictatorship and encouraging Indonesians to “enrich themselves.”	1966年，苏哈托开始掌权，建立了一个类似于军事独裁的体制，鼓励印尼人“自己富起来”。


Despite the depredations of his family, enough Indonesians did so over the next 30 years to make his rule seem exceptionally stable – until the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 sent the Indonesian economy into a tailspin, triggering violent riots that forced Suharto out.	虽然苏哈托家族大肆劫掠，仍然有足够多的印尼人在接下来的30年中的确富起来了。 这使得苏哈托的统治极为稳固，直到1997—1998年的东亚金融危机搅乱了印尼的经济，从而引发暴力骚乱，迫使苏哈托出局。


Similarly, few regimes seemed more stable than that of the Shah of Iran, another long-term ruler, who, having bankrupted his country, was forced to flee the fury of a mob in 1979.	同样，很少有体制比伊朗国王的统治更牢固。 他也是一个长期在位的统治者，在搞得国家破产之后，他被迫在1979年出逃，躲开民众的怒火。


The lesson is clear.	教训是清晰的。


Autocracies, which are much praised for their decisiveness, and for guaranteeing “law and order,” are paper tigers.	因为具有决断性和保证“法律和秩序”而备受赞扬的专制体制不过是纸老虎。


They appear immovable until the moment they are evicted by popular anger.	在被民众的怒火驱逐之前，这些体制���上去不可撼动。


In face of economic failure or military defeat, their emperors turn out to be naked.	面对经济失利或军事溃败，专制体制的统治者却毫无还手之力。


In such situations, the great advantage of democracies is that they allow a change of rulers without a change of regime.	民主政体在这种情况下的巨大优势是：可以变换统治者而不必改变体制。


Failure discredits only the party or coalition in power, not the entire political system.	在失败中信用破产的只是掌权的政党或是联合体，但不是整个政治体制。


Popular anger is channeled to the ballot box.	民众的愤怒会在投票箱里呈现出来。


In such countries, there may be “New Deals,” but no revolutions.	这样的国家可能会发生“新政”，但不会出现革命。


In estimating political risk today, analysts must pay particular attention to the character of the political system.	估算今日的政治风险时，分析家们必须特别注意政治体制的特征。


Does it allow for an orderly transition?	这个体制允许和平过渡吗？


Is it competitive enough to prevent discredited leaders from clinging to power?	它的竞争是否足以防止信用破产的领袖继续掌权？


Analysts also must pay attention to the nature of the implied social contract.	分析家们还必须特别关注隐含的社会契约的性质。


Broadly speaking, the weakest contracts are those that allow wealth and power to be concentrated in the same few hands, while the strongest are built on significant dispersal of both.	广义而言，最脆弱的契约允许财富和权力集中在同一批的极少数人手中，而最强力的契约则建立在财富和权力显著分散的基础上。


Deepening economic recession is bound to catalyze political change.	正在加深的经济衰退会引发政治上的变化。


The Western democracies will survive with only modest changes. But strongmen who rely on the secret police and a controlled media to maintain their rule will be quaking in their shoes.	西方民主国家将在仅仅发生温和变更之后得以幸存，但是依赖秘密警察和媒体控制来维持统治的强人政客则会在他们鞋子里吓得发抖。


Even Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, who built his power on populist anti-Americanism, must be praying for the success of US President Barack Obama’s stimulus package to lift his falling oil revenues.	即使是把自己的权力建立在民粹反美主义基础上的委内瑞拉总统雨果·查韦斯也肯定正在祈祷美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马的一揽子经济刺激计划能够成功，从而抬高委内瑞拉下滑的石油收益。


The big countries with the highest political risk are Russia and China.	俄罗斯和中国是政治风险最高的大国。


The legitimacy of their autocratic systems is almost entirely dependent on their success in delivering rapid economic growth.	他们专制政体的合法性几乎完全仰仗于成功地推进了经济的快速增长。


When growth falters, or goes into reverse, there is no one to blame but “the system.”	当增长摇摇欲坠，或是掉头向下，除了“体制”就没有什么可供责备了。


Igor Yurgens, one of Russia’s most creative political analysts, has been quick to draw the moral: “the social contract consisted of limiting civil rights in exchange for economic well-being.	俄国最富创造力的政治分析家之一，伊戈尔·尤尔金已经迅速总结了教训：“社会契约由限制民权来换取经济繁荣组成。


At the current moment, economic well-being is shrinking. Correspondingly, civil rights should expand.	在目前这个时刻，经济繁荣正在缩水，民权就会相应扩张。


It’s just simple logic.”	这就是个简单的道理。


The rulers in Moscow and Beijing would do well to heed this warning.	”莫斯科和北京的统治者将会认真听从这一警告。


Shards of Europe	易碎的欧洲


PRINCETON – As European leaders struggle after another failed summit, they should think hard about what their continent – and the world – might look like if they continue to produce unsatisfactory solutions to Europe’s financial and economic problems.	普林斯顿—在又一次失败的峰会后，欧洲领导人又要挣扎一番了。 他们应该仔细想想，如果他们仍不能为欧洲金融和经济问题找出令人满意的解决办法，欧洲大陆——以及全世界——会变成什么样子。


What would follow the disintegration of the eurozone and – almost certainly with it – that of the European Union?	如果欧元崩溃，那么欧盟几乎肯定也将步其后尘，接下去又会发生什么？


The best place to consider that question would not be Brussels, but Tiraspol, the capital of the entity that calls itself the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, or Trans-Dniestr.	思考这个问题的最佳地点不是布鲁塞尔，而是蒂拉斯波尔，自称普列德涅斯特罗瓦（Pridnestrovian）摩尔多瓦共和国（或称德涅斯特河沿岸）的实体的首都。


This territorial sliver with a population of a half-million emerged in the early 1990’s, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (population almost 300 million), when it broke away from the Republic of Moldova (population four million), which had separated in the 1940’s from Ukraine (population 50 million).	这个诞生于20世纪90年代苏联解体之后的狭长“国家”拥有50万人口（前苏联有3亿人）。 它是从摩尔多瓦共和国（人口400万）分裂出来的，而摩尔多瓦又是20世纪40年代从乌克兰（人口5000万）分裂出来的。


Trans-Dniestr has its own government and parliament, army, constitution, flag, and a rousing Soviet-style national anthem; of course, its nationhood would be incomplete without its own currency.	德涅斯特河沿岸拥有自己的政府和议会、军队、宪法、国旗，以及令人热血沸腾的苏联式国歌； 当然，没有自己的货币，其国基就不可谓稳固。


This political entity is a precise counterpart in the political world to a well-known physical phenomenon of splintering or fissuring.	这个政治实体是著名的分裂或裂解物理现象在政治世界的完美写照。


When stressed, a big surface bifurcates in big chunks, but then the disintegration continues into smaller and smaller fragments.	当受到挤压时，一个大的表面会裂为几大块，但随后，这些大块又会继续分裂为越来越小的小块。


Of the six larger EU states, only France has a really well-defined centralized political system.  Poland’s centralism comes close, but strong regional differences persist – a legacy of the three large and quite different imperial systems that encompassed today’s Poland in the nineteenth century.	在六个较大的欧盟国家中，只有法国形成了明确的中央集权政治制度。 与之较接近的是波兰，但存在历久弥深的地区差异——这是因为几天的波兰是由19世纪的三个制度大相径庭的帝国组成的。


Italy and Germany were nineteenth-century amalgamations of a colorful variety of small and medium-size political units.	意大利和德国也形成于19世纪，由众多小型和中型政治单元组成。


The United Kingdom looks older and more stable, but Scotland today is controlled by a political party that wants to repeal the 1707 Act of Union, with the future to be determined by a Scottish referendum in 2014.	英国看起来历史更久也更稳定，但眼下苏格兰执政党正在寻求废除1707年统一法，苏格兰的命运将由2014年全民公投决定。


Spain after the Franco dictatorship stabilized itself by granting autonomy to its regions, which in many ways now behave like independent units.	西班牙在告别弗朗哥独裁时代后通过给予地区自治权而实现了稳定，各自治区如今可以视为独立的单元。


In these fragmented political areas, the logic of integration in the past depended on areas that were dissatisfied with political outcomes appealing to new allies in larger units.	在这些碎片化的政治地区，统一的逻辑在过去依赖于不满于政治结果、寻求在更大单元中形成新联盟的地区。


Franconians in southern Germany disliked the fact that the Napoleonic Wars subjected them to Bavarian rule; they saw German nationalism as a way to use Prussia and Berlin as a counterweight to Munich’s hegemony.	德国南部的法兰克人讨厌拿破仑战争迫使他们遵守巴伐利亚规则这一事实，他们将建立德国视为利用普鲁士和柏林作为制衡慕尼黑领导权的机制。


But, once Germany was united, Bavarians did not like the outcome, and then thought of a united Europe as a counterweight to the German state.	但是，在德国统一之后，巴伐利亚人并不喜欢这一结果，他们将统一的欧洲视为对德国的制衡。


Indeed, Bavaria became adept at using European Community resources to bolster its own political system.	事实上，巴伐利亚在利用欧共体资源支持其自身政治制度方面早已驾轻就熟。


Integration had its own historical momentum; if and when it goes into reverse, that process will have a counter-momentum.	统一自有其历史惯性； 当统一之势逆转时，整个过程就会产生反向惯性。


The argument against European structures depends on hostility to a transfer union that might lead to some redistribution of resources.	反对欧洲结构的观点依赖于对可能导致资源再分配的转移联盟的敌意。


Why should our money be taken away and given to people in a very different area?	为什么我的钱要交出来送给与我家迥异地区的人？


What sort of claim do those people have?	那里的人有什么权利？


Germans thinking about the likelihood of transfers to southern Europe doubtless recall their country’s reunification after the collapse of communist East Germany in 1989-1990.	顾虑对南欧国家的转移支付的德国人显然对德国在1989—1990年共产主义东德崩溃后实现重新统一记忆犹新。


There were massive transfers, and national resources were devoted to gigantic infrastructure projects.	当时发生了大规模转移支付，国家资源被大量用于大型基础设施项目。


That was not enough to halt the hollowing out of the eastern Länder, as many of the ablest and most entrepreneurial people left – an experience that put enormous strain on national solidarity.	但饶是如此，东部联邦仍然没能摆脱空心化的命运，因为大量最有能力、最具企业家精神的东德人都离开了那里，这段经历为民族凝聚力蒙上了厚厚一层阴影。


Problems of transfers in a large political unit are at the heart of federalism.	在一个庞大的政治单元中进行转移支付的问题是联邦主义的核心问题。


The United States’ early history was dominated by a passionate debate about the issue of solidarity.	美国建国之初便充斥着关于凝聚力问题的激烈争论。


In 1790, when Alexander Hamilton argued that the new federal government should assume the states’ debts from the War of Independence, he encountered fierce hostility.	1790年，汉密尔顿指出联邦政府应该承担独立战争导致的州债务，结果受到了猛烈抨击。


The only way to sustain such a new political order, James Madison argued in The Federalist Papers, was to ensure that federal powers were few and limited.	麦迪逊在《联邦党人文集》中指出，维持这一新政治秩序的唯一办法是确保联邦权力最小化并最大限度地得到限制。


Europe is confronting a similar moment of destiny.	欧洲正面临着类似的命运决定时刻。


It is now mired in an existential crisis more profound than at any point since 1945.	眼下，欧洲已陷入了1945年以来最严重的生存危机。


And, while muddling through is a characteristic response of complex political systems, it is deeply destructive.	得过且过算得是复杂政治制度最典型的反应，但为害甚深。


If Europe’s political center is widely perceived to be arbitrary and overweening, its authority will be rejected and resisted.	如若欧洲政治中心被广泛认为是专断自负的，那么其权威性就会被拒绝和抵制。


While adopting a new treaty may look like an unwieldy process, ill-suited to managing a fast-moving modern financial crisis, it is the only way to generate legitimacy for the institutions that are needed to address that crisis – in particular to provide reassurance that transfers will not be indefinite and unlimited.	接受新条约看起来会是个艰难的过程，不适合用来处理瞬息万变的现代金融危机，但这却是赋予解决危机所需制度的合法性的唯一途径，特别是在保证转移支付不会是个无底洞方面。


If European integration shifts into reverse, the outcome will not be a series of happy and prosperous nation-states, living in a sort of replica of the 1950’s or 1960’s.	如果欧洲统一之势逆转，那么产生的结果将不可能是一系列幸福繁荣的民族国家，其人民也不可能重温20世纪五六十年代的好日子。


Southern Germans would wonder whether they were not transferring too much to the north’s old industrial rustbelt; northern Italians who support the anti-EU Lega Nord in the self-styled unit of “Padania” would want to escape from the rule of Rome and the south.	德国南部会怀疑他们是否向北部的萧条老工业区支付了太多的转移支付； 支持自称帕达尼亚（Padania）的反欧盟北方联盟（Lega Nord）的意大利北方人也将试图摆脱罗马和南方的统治。


Setting the clock back would thus not simply return Europe to the mid-twentieth century.	因此，开倒车不会简单地让欧洲回到20世纪中叶。


The small states of the mid-nineteenth century, with no fiscal transfers out of a relatively limited area, might be recreated.	19世纪中叶的小国——只在相对较小区域内实现转移支付——可能会卷土重来。


But the dynamic might go further: the German territories had around 350 independent political entities in the mid-eighteenth century, and more than 3,000 before the middle of the seventeenth century.	但整个动态会走得更远：在18世纪中叶，今天德国领土上存在大约350个独立的政治实体，17世纪中叶则多达3000多个。


Watch out, Trans-Dniestr.	当心德涅斯特河沿岸一语成谶。


Share the Work	分享工作


BERKELEY – The United States today is facing a crisis of long-term unemployment unlike anything it has seen since the 1930’s.	发自伯克利——美国目前正面临着一场自1930年代以来从未有过的长期失业危机。


Some 40% of the unemployed have been out of work for six months or more, which, as US Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke noted in a recent speech, is far higher than in any other post-World War II recession.	正如美联储主席伯南克（Ben Bernanke）在最近一次演说中提到的那样：大概有40%的失业者已失业超过6个月，比二战后任何一次衰退中出现的比率都要高。


This crisis of long-term unemployment is having a profoundly damaging impact on the lives of those bearing the brunt of it.	这场长期失业危机正在对那些受影响者的生活造成深远的影响。


We know this thanks to a series of careful studies of the problem conducted in the depths of the 1930’s Great Depression.	而我们之所以知道这一点，就是得益于一系列对1930年代大萧条的深入细致研究。


The most famous such study, of the long-term unemployed in New Haven, Connecticut, was conducted by E. Wight Bakke, a graduate student and subsequently a professor of economics at Yale University.	其中最广为人知的是E·怀特·巴克（E. Wight Bakke）——此君当时还是位研究生，后来成为耶鲁大学经济学教授——对康涅狄格州纽黑文市长期失业的研究。


Through participant interviews, personal observation, time diaries, and longitudinal studies, Bakke showed how extended spells of unemployment caused workers’ skills to deteriorate and made it difficult for them to acquire new ones.	通过参与者访谈，个人观察，时间日志和纵向研究等方式，巴克说明了失业期的不断延长是如何导致劳动者丧失其技能并使之更难以找到新工作的。


The long-term unemployed also experienced a variety of physical and psychological problems, among them demoralization, apathy, and a sense of social isolation.	长期失业同时也会引发一系列生理和心理问题，其中包括意志消沉，对事物丧失兴趣以及社会孤立感。


For those unfortunate enough to experience it, long-term unemployment – now, as in the 1930’s – is a tragedy.	对那些不幸经历这些的人来说，长期失业——如今，正如1930年代的一样——是一场悲剧。


And, for society as a whole, there is the danger that the productive capacity of a significant portion of the labor force will be impaired.	同时对于社会这个整体来说，有相当一部分劳动者的生产力将存在遭到破坏的危险。


What is not well known, however, is that in the 1930’s, the United States, to a much greater extent than today, succeeded in mitigating these problems.	但鲜为人知的是，在比当今波及范围更大的情况下，1930年代的美国成功地缓和了这些问题。


Rather than resorting to extensive layoffs, firms had their employees work a partial week.	企业并未进行大规模裁员，而是让其雇员不足时工作。


The average workweek in manufacturing and mining fell from 45 hours in 1929 to 35 hours in 1932.	制造业和采矿业的每周平均工作时间从1929年的45小时下降到1932年的35小时。


We know this from a 1986 article by my Berkeley colleague James Powell and his co-author, none other than – wait for it – Ben Bernanke.	而我们正在1986年发表的一篇文章上看到这些的，该文的合著者之一是笔者在伯克利的同事詹姆斯·鲍威尔（James Powell），而另一位作者不是别人——答案揭晓——正是伯南克本人。


The 24% unemployment reached at the depths of the Great Depression was no picnic.	在大萧条最严重时出现的24%失业率可不是开玩笑的。


But that rate would have been even higher had average weekly hours for workers in manufacturing remained at 45.	而如果制造业劳动者的每周平均工作时间依然维持在45小时的话，那这个比率估计要升得更高。


Cutting hours by 20% allowed millions of additional workers to stay on the job. They continued to earn an income.	减少20%的工作时间可以额外令数百万劳动者得以留在工作岗位上。


They continued to acquire skills. They had hope and the possibility of advancement.	他们持续获得收入，不断学习技能，有了希望，也保留着晋升的机会。


Why was there so much work-sharing in the 1930’s?	为什么1930年代会出现那么多的工作分享行为？


One reason is that government pushed for it.	其中一个原因是有政府在背后推动这一点。


In his memoirs, President Herbert Hoover estimated that as many as two million workers avoided unemployment as a result of his efforts to promote work-sharing.	在回忆录中，时任总统的赫尔伯特·胡佛估计有200万名劳动者因为他的这一政策而避免了失业。


Second, legislation encouraged it.	其二，法律法规也鼓励这一点。


The industrial codes of the New Deal set ceilings on the workweek for specified industries and workers.	新政的工业法规为特定行业的每周工作时间设定了上限。


The Fair Labor Standards Act provided financial incentives by requiring overtime pay for employees working long hours.	而《公平劳动标准法案》也为那些长时间工作的雇员们提供了争取加班酬劳的激励。


Third, there was no unemployment insurance to discourage it.	第三，也不存在失业保险这个阻碍因素。


An individual today, faced with the option of working 20 hours a week or drawing unemployment benefits, might be tempted by the latter.	对当今的个人来说，在每周工作20小时和领取失业保险之间往往会选择后者。


But, back in the 1930’s, before unemployment insurance, 20 hours was better than nothing.	但在1930年代失业保险出台之前，20小时总比什么都没有强。


Of course, unemployment insurance replaces only a fraction of most workers’ previous wages, which suggests that its effect in this regard is not very strong.	当然，失业保险仅仅只能补偿大多数工人先前收入的一小部分，也意味着其在这方面的影响并不是那么强。


But, even if unemployment insurance does not discourage work-sharing, it could be restructured to encourage it.	但即便失业保险没有阻碍工作分享，也可以对其进行重新设计以产生激励作用。


Partial benefits could be paid to workers on short hours, rather than limiting payments to those who are fully unemployed.	可以向那些短时间工作的劳动者们支付部分的救济，而不是向那些完全失业者发放限定的款项。


The program would at least partly pay for itself, with additional payments to workers on short hours offset by lower unemployment (and thus lower payments to those who are completely without work).	这个项目至少可以在一定程度上自给自足，同时对那些遭到更低失业率影响的短时间劳动者发放额外的款项（并因此向那些完全没有工作的人发放更少的钱）。


In fact, the US already has something along these lines: a program known as Short-Time Compensation.	事实上，美国已经在这方面有所行动了：这是一个被称为“短时补偿”（Short-Time Compensation）的项目。


Workers can collect unemployment benefits pro-rated according to their hours when their employer submits an approved work-sharing plan, while the federal government compensates the states for a portion of the set-up costs.	在雇主提交一份得到批准的工作分享方案之后，劳动者们可以领取依照其工作时间分配的失业补贴，而联邦政府则会补偿各州政府的一部分项目构建启动成本。


At last count, 24 states have begun adapting their unemployment-insurance systems to take advantage of the measure.	而迄今为止已经有24个州开始对自身失业保险系统进行调整以利用这一政策。


Unfortunately, the financial incentives that the federal government provides are mainly limited to helping the states to advertise and automate their programs.	但不幸的是，联邦政府所提供的财政激励主要局限在帮助各州进行宣传以及项目的自动化运作之上。


And those programs, in turn, are too modest, especially for senior workers with a reasonable expectation of remaining in a full-time job, to make work-sharing an attractive option.	而那些项目自身的力度反过来则不够强，根本不足以令工作分享成为一个有吸引力的选项——尤其是对那些有理由期望一份全职工作的高级劳动者来说。


Other countries have gone further.	其他国家在这方面走得更远。


In Germany, for example, the federal government’s Kurzarbeit program makes up a significant fraction of the difference when, owing to short hours, a worker’s earnings fall by more than 10%.	例如在德国，联邦政府的缩短工时（Kurzarbeit）项目规定如果一个劳动者因为工时缩短而导致收入下降超过10%时，政府将给予占该下降幅度相当一部份的补偿。


The US federal government could emulate this example by compensating the states more generously for their Short-Term Compensation programs.	美国联邦政府可以通过对各州的短时补偿项目发放更加慷慨的补贴来效仿上述例子。


Its failure to do so not only inflicts avoidable pain and suffering on the unemployed, but also threatens to inflict long-term costs on American society.	而如果做不到这一点的话，不仅会令那些失业者遭受不必要的伤害，同时也会让美国社会背负上一笔长期支出。


Man Bites Shark	人吃鲨鱼


BONN – Sharks have long been portrayed as man-eaters, a menace to any swimmer brave (or foolish) enough to share the water with them.	波恩——鲨鱼一直被描写成食人鱼，对敢于（或愚蠢到）与它们共处一片水域的游泳者构成威胁。


But this depiction could not be further from reality.	但这种看法其实非常脱离实际。


In fact, sharks are extremely vulnerable, and their dwindling populations – largely owing to human behavior – urgently need global protection.	事实上，鲨鱼非常脆弱，它们的数量因人类行为而迅速减少——迫切需要全球保护。


To be sure, there have been many laudable shark-protection efforts in the last few years. A campaign spearheaded by the United States-based organization Wild Aid has contributed to a major decline in demand for shark fin across Asia.	由美国野生动物援助组织发起的一场运动已成功导致亚洲鱼翅需求量的大幅降低。


China, for example, has banned shark-fin soup, a traditional delicacy, at official government dinners and functions – a move that contributed to a 30% drop in shark-fin sales from last December to April.	比如中国就已禁止消费鱼翅汤，这是当地官方政府晚宴和典礼上的一种传统美食——此举从去年12月到今年4月已导致鱼翅销量下降30%。


In the southern city of Guangzhou, the center of China’s shark-fin trade, vendors have reported an 82% decline in sales over the last two years.	在中国鱼翅贸易中心的南部城市广州，经销商报告在过去两年的时间里销售下降了82%。


It should not be difficult to spur countries to take action to protect their shark populations, given that a shark’s economic value plummets when it is killed.	敦促各国采取护鲨行动应该并非难事，因为鲨鱼一旦被杀其经济价值就大幅降低。


A study by the Australian Marine Institute found that Palau’s shark-diving industry is worth far more than its shark-fishing industry.	澳大利亚海洋研究所的一项研究发现帕劳鲨鱼潜水业的价值远非鲨鱼捕捞业可比。


A single reef shark that frequents major dive sites in Palau is worth roughly $179,000 annually, or $1.9 million over its lifetime; the same shark would be worth about $108 dead.	一头经常出没于帕劳各大潜水点的礁鲨年价值约合179,000美元，终生价值约合190万美元； 而同一头鲨鱼如果被杀死只值约108美元。


Similarly, the shark-diving industry has brought in an estimated $110 million annually to Thailand, $22 million to the Canary Islands, and a massive $800 million to the Bahamas over the last 20 years.	同样，鲨鱼潜水业过去20年间带给泰国约合1. 1亿美元，加那利群岛约合2200万美元、巴哈马群岛高达8亿美元的年收入。


It is not difficult to see why allowing fisherman to decimate these countries’ shark populations would be counter-productive.	因此不难看出坐视渔民消灭上述国家的鲨鱼种群为什么起到适得其反的效果。


Developing protected areas and corridors for shark migration is also important.	划定鲨鱼迁徙的保护区和走廊也有着非常重要的意义。


Last month, US President Barack Obama extended the maritime boundary of the Pacific Remote Islands Marine National Monument from 50 miles to the 200-mile limit, effectively merging the region’s national parks into one massive protected area, in which commercial fishing is prohibited.	去年，美国总统奥巴马批准将太平洋偏远岛屿海洋国家纪念碑的海上边界从20英里拓展至200英里的上限，实际将该地区的国家公园有效连成了一片禁止商业捕鱼行为的巨大的保护区。


Similar protected areas have been created over the last couple of years in Palau, Micronesia, Indonesia, and the Maldives.	帕劳、密克罗尼西亚、印度尼西亚和马尔代夫过去几年也建立了类似的保护区。


But the new sanctuary in the Pacific – with an area equivalent in size to Texas, California, Montana, and Arizona combined – could be the largest such zone in the world.	但太平洋上新的避难所——其面积相当于得克萨斯、加利福尼亚、蒙大拿和亚利桑那州的总和——可能是全世界最大的此类保护区。


Though these measures are certainly positive steps, no country acting alone can ensure adequate protection of shark populations.	虽然这些措施无疑可以算作积极步骤，但没有哪个国家单凭一己之力就足以保护鲨鱼种群。


After all, sharks are global wanderers; they have no regard for the boundaries of economic exclusion zones, protected areas, or countries’ territorial waters.	归根结底，鲨鱼是全球迁徙的物种； 它们根本不管国家领海、专属经济区或保护区。


Shark-protection efforts cannot truly be effective without coordinated international action.	没有国际协调行动，鲨鱼保护行动就不可能取得真正的效果。


Such action must not only aim to protect shark populations directly; it must also address major threats to sharks, such as illegal trade, bycatch, and overfishing.	此类行动不仅要致力于鲨鱼种群的直接保护； 还必须消除非法贸易、误捕以及过度捕捞等鲨鱼所面临的主要威胁。


Consider climate change.	比方说气候变化。


A recent study by the University of Lisbon’s Center for Oceanography reports that acidification from CO2 emissions could cause the global shark population to decline by as much as 40% by 2100.	里斯本中心大学最近一项海洋学研究表明二氧化碳排放所导致的酸化可能导致到2100年全球鲨鱼数量骤降40%。


Add to that the more than 73 million individual sharks that are already lost annually, and the situation is clearly unsustainable.	再加上鲨鱼数量每年已经减少7，300万头，由此产生的状况显然不可持续。


As it stands, there is no global treaty to protect sharks.	目前并不存在保护鲨鱼的全球公约。


But frameworks are in place for the development of international conservation measures.	但制定国际保护措施的框架已经到位。


The Convention on Migratory Species, for example, has a track record of working with countries – as well as international organizations, NGOs, media, and the private sector – to spur coordinated action that meets international standards.	比如迁徙物种公约历史上曾经与国家政府、国际组织、非政府组织、媒体和私营部门合作，以推动采取符合国际标准的统一措施。


The Convention’s memorandum of understanding on shark conservation, which lists seven endangered species, has attracted 35 signatories so far.	公约有关鲨鱼保护问题的备忘录列举了7个濒危物种，目前已有35个国家签署了该公约。


Next month, representatives from these countries will meet in Quito, Ecuador, to discuss extending the list to include the great and scalloped hammerheads, the silky shark, thresher sharks, sawfish, and mobula rays.	下个月，这些国家将派代表在厄瓜多尔基多召开会议，探讨拓展濒危种群范围，将双髻鲨、锤头鲨、丝鲨、长尾鲨、锯鳐和蝠鲼囊括进去。


Given how many shark species have been proposed, some have begun referring to the Convention’s Conference of the Parties as the “shark COP.”	由于拟保护的鲨鱼种群数量庞大，有人已开始将公约的缔约国会议称为“鲨鱼缔约国会议”。


But proposals must give way to action.	但提议必须让位于行动。


The threats facing sharks are well documented.	鲨鱼所面临的威胁的确有据可查。


It is time to launch concerted global efforts to protect some of the oldest, most vulnerable – and most valuable – species in our seas.	现在是时候启动协调一致的全球行动，保护海洋中某些最古老、最脆弱——也是最宝贵的——鲨鱼种群。


Sharm el-Sheikh Redux	又回到沙姆沙伊赫


Driven by a common fear of Islamic fundamentalism, and by a false assumption that it is an illegitimate political force, the Middle East’s so-called “moderates” have once again gathered at the Egyptian seaside resort of Sharm el-Sheikh, the traditional venue for emergency regional summits, to rally “moderates” against “extremists.”	出于对伊斯兰原教旨主义共同的担心以及出于对它是一支非法的政治力量的错误臆断，中东所谓的“温和派”再一次聚集到埃及的海滨度假胜地沙姆沙伊赫，这一召开紧急地区峰会的传统地点，以便让“温和派”联合起来对抗“极端主义者”。


In the spring of 1996, the so-called “moderates” – Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Jordan’s King Hussein, Yasser Arafat, and even some representatives of the Gulf dynasties – convened in Sharm el-Shekh with President Bill Clinton and United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan in a desperate bid to block radical Islam’s emergence.	在1996年的春天，所谓的“温和派”，即埃及总统穆巴拉克、约旦国王侯赛因、阿拉法特、甚至一些海湾君主国家的代表与克林顿总统和联合国秘书长安南在沙姆沙伊赫召开会议以极力阻止伊斯兰激进组织的崛起。


They were also expected to give an electoral boost to Prime Minister Shimon Peres of Israel who, severely undermined by Hamas’s devastating campaign of suicide terrorism, was on the verge of electoral defeat at the hands of Benjamin Netanyahu.	他们还被期望能够为佩雷斯总理在选举上助一臂之力，后者的地位因为哈马斯通过自杀性恐怖袭击发起的破坏活动而被严重削弱，从而很可能在选举中败给内塔尼亚胡。


But Islamic fundamentalism remained unimpressed.	但是伊斯兰原教旨主义根本没有受到任何影响。


Both its jihadist and political identity have, indeed, only gained momentum ever since.	事实上，它的军事力量和政治地位自那以后更加壮大了。


In October 2000, Sharm el-Sheikh was the scene of another summit, with most of the same actors.	2000年的10月，沙姆沙伊赫迎来了又一场峰会，与会者绝大多数还是上次的那些人。


This time, the call went out for an end to the Palestinian Intifada and for Israelis and Palestinians to reach a final peace agreement.	这一次，他们呼吁结束巴勒斯坦人的暴动以及要求以色列和巴勒斯坦达成一份最终的和平协议。


Both objectives were endorsed by all the participants; neither was implemented.	两项动议都得到了所有与会者的赞成； 但是没有一项得到实施。


As one of the players at that summit, I understand the reason for the gap between what was agreed by the “moderates” and the harsh realities that have driven the “extremists” forward.	作为与会者之一，我认识到存在于“温和派”所赞成的与推动“极端主义者”向前的残酷现实之间的距离的原因所在。


The only way Arafat could stop the Intifada and stem the advance of Hamas was through an especially generous peace deal from Israel.	只有获得一份来自以色列方面的特别慷慨的和平协议，阿拉法特才能做到停止巴勒斯坦人的暴动以及阻止哈马斯的壮大。


But such a deal became impossible precisely because the Intifada had raised Palestinian expectations to such heights that it became impossible for Israel to meet them.	但是这样的协议因为巴勒斯坦人的暴动已经把巴勒斯坦人的期望推到了以色列根本无法接受的高度而变得毫无可能。


Notwithstanding Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s commendable gestures at Sharm el-Sheikh in 2007, the summit’s achievements are bound to be short-lived.	尽管以色列总理奥尔默特在2007年沙姆沙伊赫峰会上作出了值得称赞的姿态，但是峰会的成果注定是短命的。


It is unrealistic to believe that transferring to the Palestinians tax revenues that are owed to them, removing a limited number of checkpoints in the occupied West Bank, and even releasing 250 Fatah prisoners “with no blood on their hands” will calm the Palestinian volcano, and thus enhance Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’s leadership and Fatah’s edge over Hamas.	认为仅仅靠向巴勒斯坦转交本来就属于他们的税收、移走在西岸占领区的少量检查站甚至释放250名“并没有沾染鲜血”的法塔赫囚犯就能够平息巴勒斯坦的风暴以及由此加强巴勒斯坦民族权力机构主席阿巴斯的领导和法塔赫对哈马斯的优势是不现实的。


Indeed, all indications are that Hamas might soon boost its popularity by exchanging Israeli corporal Gilad Shalit for even more prisoners, including some “with blood on their hands.”	事实上，所有的现象都显示哈马斯可能通过用以军下士Gilad Shalit交换更多的囚犯、甚至包括“手上沾有鲜血”的囚犯而迅速壮大它的力量。


This alliance of Middle East moderates comes with a price that neither Israel nor the Bush administration seems ready to pay.	中东地区温和派的联合所带来的代价可能是以色列和布什政府都还没有准备好要付出的。


The Israeli-American strategy of driving a wedge between Gaza and the West Bank while shunning negotiations on a peace settlement that could give Abbas the ultimate tool to undermine Hamas is a policy at war with itself.	以色列和美国分裂加沙和西岸同时回避在能够使阿巴斯最终削弱哈马斯的和平协议上的谈判的策略本身就是一场战争。


Moreover, no matter how critical the moderate Arabs may be of the Hamas coup in Gaza, the Arab leaders cannot afford the domestic fallout of shunning Hamas.	此外，不管阿拉伯温和派能够对哈马斯在加沙的政变产生多关键的作用，阿拉伯的领导人是绝对无法承受撇开哈马斯会给他们国内带来的负面影响的。


Indeed, Mubarak has already called for a resumption of inter-Palestinian dialogue, which might lead to yet another attempt at a national unity government, the same kind of government with which both Israel and the US refused to do business.	事实上，穆巴拉克已经呼吁巴勒斯坦内部重开对话，这样的努力可能会带来再次成立民族联合政府，也就是以色列和美国拒绝与之打交道的同样类型的政府。


Abbas is being asked to play for high stakes – defeating Hamas and with it the cause of Islamic fundamentalism in the region – with inadequate resources.	阿巴斯被要求以不足的资源进行不太可能成功的赌博，也就是击败哈马斯以及该地区的伊斯兰原教旨主义运动。


And, by mortgaging his entire Middle East policy to the concept of an “ideological confrontation” against the forces of evil, Bush is putting his entire strategy on the weary shoulders of a defeated Palestinian president without really providing him with the necessary tools.	此外，通过把他的整个中东政策全部压在与邪恶势力的“意识形态对抗”的理念上，布什正把他的全部战略压在一位被击败的巴勒斯坦民族权力机构主席脆弱的肩膀上，同时却没有真正提供给他必需的工具。


Worse still, by ladling money and arms to Abbas without offering him a political horizon that would deepen his support among ordinary Palestinians, while at the same time imprisoning all Hamas leaders in the West Bank, Israel and the United States are condemning Abbas to seeming a collaborator in the eyes of his people.	更糟糕的是，因为在把资金和武器提供给阿巴斯的同时并没有为他提供能够增强普通巴勒斯坦民众对他的支持的政治平台，与此同时把所有哈马斯的领导都囚禁在西岸，以色列和美国正使阿巴斯在他的人民眼里似乎是它们的一个合作者。


Of course the Arabs are not free of blame either.	当然阿拉伯人本身也并非没有责任。


No Israeli government will risk making a far-reaching peace offer to a Palestinian Authority whose rule is characterized by abdication and anarchy.	没有哪个以色列会冒险与一个已经放弃权力、处于无政府状态的巴勒斯坦权力机构作出一项影响深远的和平��议。


Hamas’s emergence as a formidable military force also reflects the Egyptians’ inept performance in preventing the smuggling of weapons into Gaza.	哈马斯作为一支难以对付的军事力量的崛起同样反映了埃及在阻止向加沙走私武器上的无能表现。


Taming Hamas is in Egypt’s interest, but it refuses to pay the price of a direct confrontation because that might lead Egyptian forces to be perceived as Israel’s protectors.	驯服哈马斯符合埃及的利益，但是它拒绝直接与它进行对抗，因为这会使埃及的军队看起来像是以色列的保护者。


Indeed, Mubarak’s strategic vision is desperately narrow.	事实上，穆巴拉克的战略眼光是极其狭隘的。


His role as a broker of sorts is mostly aimed at endearing himself to the US, where Congress is highly critical of his human rights record.	他作为一个调停人的角色主要是为了讨好美国，因为美国国会强烈批评他的人权记录。


On his home front, he needs to cultivate, at the lowest possible price, an image as a champion of the Palestinian cause.	在他自己的地区，他需要以尽可能最低的代价捍卫他作为一个巴勒斯坦事业的捍卫者的形象。


The latest Sharm el-Sheikh summit is also a message to the Saudis: Cairo, not Mecca, is the center of Middle East politics.	最近的沙姆沙伊赫峰会同时也向沙特人发出了一个信号：开罗，而不是麦加，是中东政治的中心。


Calling for Israeli concessions is perfectly legitimate, even necessary.	要求以色列做出让步是完成合情合理、甚至是必需的。


But the credibility of such demands is undermined by the Arabs’ inability to alleviate Palestinian misery and, no less importantly, by their failure to help the Palestinians face the hard choices they will need to make if an orderly Palestinian state is ever to emerge.	但是这些要求的可信性因为阿拉伯人无法减轻巴勒斯坦人的痛苦以及同等重要地，没能帮助巴勒斯坦人面对如果要实现一个有序的巴勒斯坦国他们将要面临的艰难选择而大打了折扣。


Sharon’s Triumph	沙龙的胜利


Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s disabling stroke has thrown Israeli politics into turmoil yet again.	以色列总理沙龙导致瘫痪的中风再次将以色列政治带入风暴之中。


Or so it seems.	或者看起来是这样的。


Sharon was considered a certain victor in the planned March elections, for which he had organized his own Kadima (Forward) party, attracting leading figures from the Labor party on the left and the Likud party on the right.	沙龙被认为是在预定三月份举行的大选的确定的得胜者。 他为此次大选组建了自己的前进党。


But will his departure from public life really be as destabilizing as many observers suggest?	该党从左翼工党以及右翼利库德集团吸纳重要人物。 但是，他离开政治生活果真就会象许多观察家所说的那样导致不稳定吗？


To be sure, it was Sharon’s personal appeal that made Kadima so popular.	的确，沙龙的个人魅力使得前进党广受欢迎。


His conservative and nationalist credentials sustained his popularity on the right, while his new security strategy – including full withdrawal from the Gaza Strip – attracted supporters from the left.	他的保守主义和民族主义历练维持了其在右翼的欢迎程度。 而其新的安全战略，包括从加沙地带全部撤军，又从左翼吸引了支持者。


In short, Sharon was the ideal center candidate: a leader who reconciled a dovish approach with a hawkish outlook.	简而言之，沙龙是理想的中间派候选人，他是一个调和了鸽派手段和鹰派观念的领导人。


Yet Sharon’s untimely departure has by no means reversed the fundamental political and strategic shifts that he initiated.	但是，沙龙不合时宜的退局决未逆转他所引发的根本性的政治和战略转移。


In the short term, while Kadima will get fewer votes without Sharon at the helm, some voters will be swayed by sympathy for the stricken leader.	从短期来看，尽管没有沙龙的领导，前进党得到的选票会减少，但是某些选民将会因同情病难中的领导人而受到影响。


Indeed, polls show that the party could still finish first.	实际上，民意调查表明该党仍将会获得最多的选票。


Moreover, Kadima still has an impressive triumvirate at the top of its list.	而且，前进党仍然具有令人印象深刻的三位领导人。


Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, a veteran political maverick and former mayor of Jerusalem, inspired several of Sharon’s initiatives.	资深政治独立人士以及耶路撒冷市前市长、代理总理奥尔莫特促成了沙龙的几项措施。


Shimon Peres, a former prime minister and Labor party leader, appeals to many voters from the left.	前总理以及工党领导人佩雷斯吸引左翼的许多选票。


Former chief of staff and defense minister Shaul Mufaz provides the security expertise.	前任办公厅主任以及国防部长穆法兹则提供安全方面的专长。


Their differences will be harder to patch up without Sharon, but they have closed ranks and could well lead Kadima to victory.	他们之间的分歧由于没有沙龙而将很难修补，但是他们已经消除了等级并且将会将前进党带入胜利。


At the same time, the main alternative candidates on the left and right have positioned themselves too far toward the extremes to recapture the center easily.	同时，左翼和右翼的主要替换候选人将自身过度定位于极端立场，从而无法轻易重新夺回中间地带。


On the left is Amir Peretz of the Labor party, a populist and trade-union federation leader with little national leadership experience and even less familiarity with security matters.	左翼工党的佩雷茨是一个民粹主义者和工会联合会领导人，几乎没有什么全国性的领导经验，甚至在安全问题上更为生疏。


Many Israelis distrust his ability to lead the country.	许多以色列人不信任他的治国能力。


It had generally been expected that Labor would come in second in the election and form a coalition government with Kadima.	一般预计，该党会在大选中名列第二并与前进党组成联合政府。


Without Sharon, Peretz might have more leverage in the partnership, particularly since Olmert has been more willing than Sharon to embrace policy changes perceived as dovish.	没有了沙龙，佩雷茨可能在联合政府中具有更大的力量，特别是奥尔莫特比沙龙更愿意采纳被人感觉是鸽派的政策变化。


A Kadima-Labor coalition would have its problems, but it would still form the basis of a solid government.	前进党和工党的联合政府将会出现问题，但是这仍将组成稳固政府的基础。


On the right is Bibi Netanyahu, a former prime minister and leader of Sharon’s old Likud party.	右翼则是前总理以及沙龙的旧的利库德集团领导人内塔尼亚胡。


A year ago, Netanyahu seemed certain to succeed Sharon.	一年前，内塔尼亚胡看起来无疑将会继承沙龙的领导地位。


But his opposition to the Gaza Strip withdrawal, coupled with his strong criticism of Sharon, cost him his position as heir apparent.	但是，由于他反对从加沙地带撤军，又强烈批评沙龙，从而失去了王位继承人的地位。


To gain control of the rump Likud, Netanyahu had to move sharply to the right.	为了赢得对利库德集团的残余旧部的控制，内塔尼亚胡不得不大范围向右翼转向。


In the longer term, Netanyahu may again rise to the top in a post-Sharon era, if he is able to regain the center.	从产远看，内塔尼亚胡如果能够重新赢的中间地带就可能在后沙龙时代东山再起。


But in the upcoming elections, he is likely to be left out in the cold.	但是在即将到来的选举中，选民可能对他置之不理。


More importantly, continuity on the political front is likely to extend to strategy and policy.	更为重要的是，政治前线中的连续性可能会延伸到战略和政策上来。


Sharon embodied a new national consensus, accepted by at least two-thirds of the population, that reflects deep-seated changes in the country and its situation.	沙龙代表了一个新的全国性一致意见。 人口中至少三分之二接受这一一致意见，反映的是国家及其形势中深刻的变革。


From the left comes the idea that, in return for full peace, Israel is ready to withdraw from most of the territory captured in 1967 and accept a Palestinian state.	左翼主张，为了换取全面和平，以色列愿意从1967年占领领土的绝大部分撤军并接受巴勒斯坦国。


From the right, the consensus acknowledges that currently there is no Palestinian partner for real peace.	右翼的一致观点是，目前，巴勒斯坦并非是真正和平的伙伴。


The left’s advocacy of territorial withdrawal gained currency as a result of a general recognition that holding onto land, especially Palestinian-populated areas, is not in the national interest.	由于以色列人总体承认，继续占领土地，特别是巴勒斯坦人聚居的地区，并不符合国家利益，左翼的撤军主张因此得到支持。


Israel does not intend to claim this land in the future, never derived any economic benefit from it, and now regards staying there as a security problem rather than an asset.	以色列并不打算将来宣布拥有这片土地，以前从来也没有从那里得到任何经济利益，现在将留守在那里视为一个安全问题，而不是一个资产。


With the Cold War over, the USSR gone, and the Arab world weakened, a conventional war with the armies of Arab states is no longer likely, rendering obsolete the strategic considerations underlying Israel’s occupation of this territory.	冷战已经结束，苏联解体，阿拉伯世界受到削弱，与阿拉伯国家发生常规战争已经不再可能。 以色列占领这一领土的战略考虑已经过时了。


At the same time, though, there is no hesitation about waging a tough defensive war against Palestinian terrorism.	但是，与此同时，以色列对巴勒斯坦恐怖主义发动艰苦的防卫性战争并不迟疑。


Israel will complete its defensive security fence and strike back against terrorists and those who fire missiles at Israeli civilian targets.	以色列将完成它的防御性安全防护墙，反击恐怖分子以及向以色列平民目标发射导弹的人。


No one believes that Palestinian leader Abu Mazin can or will do anything to stop such attacks.	无人相信巴勒斯坦领导人阿巴斯能够或者将会采取措施来制止此类攻击。


Indeed, it is understood on both the left and the right that he and his colleagues will not live up to any commitment they make.	实际上，左右两翼都知道，阿巴斯及其同僚不会遵守他们所做的任何承诺。


The Palestinian movement is falling apart, the radicals are gaining control, and nobody is going to make peace.	巴勒斯坦运动正在分化，激进分子正在赢得控制权，没有人会媾和。


The bad news, then, is that the conflict will go on for decades, owing to intransigence and growing chaos on the Palestinian side.	因此，坏消息就是，由于巴勒斯坦方面的不妥协以及日益严重的混乱，这一冲突会持续几十年。


The good news is that Israel can defend itself with relatively low casualties, its economy is improving, and tourism is recovering.	好消息是，以色列可以保护自己，死亡人数相对较低，其经济正在提升，而旅游业也在复苏。


As Palestinian extremism and anarchy become clearer, Israel’s stance may gain greater international sympathy, strengthening prospects for better relations with the Arab world and the West.	巴勒斯坦的极端主义和无政府状态变得愈发清楚，以色列的立场可能会得到国际社会更大的同情，从而加强与阿拉伯世界和西方建立更好关系的可能性。


It was Sharon who sensed a sea change in Israeli sentiment and acted upon it.	是沙龙感觉到了以色列情绪中的巨变并因势利导。


But Sharon was the messenger, not the message.	但是，沙龙只是一个信使，而不是信息。


The era of Israeli pragmatism that he opened will not end with his departure.	他所开启的以色列实用主义时代不会随着他的离去而终结。


Modi’s Hypocrisy	莫迪的伪善


NEW DELHI – According to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s supporters, his overwhelming victory in India’s general elections was a sweeping repudiation of everything for which the previous United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, led by the Indian National Congress, stood.	新德里—根据总理纳兰德拉·莫迪的支持者的说法，他在印度大选中的压倒性胜利表明印度人民全盘否定由印度国大党领导的前团结进步联盟（United Progressive Alliance，UPA）政府的一切。


Will Modi live up to voters’ expectations?	莫迪等满足选民的期望吗？


There has certainly been a lot of hype.	毫无疑问，这其中宣传的成分很大。


Modi, it was claimed during the election campaign, would reverse the UPA’s “poor governance” and “policy paralysis,” introducing a radically new approach, based on his corporatist “Gujarat development model.”	在选战过程中，莫迪宣称将反UPA的“拙劣治理”和“政策瘫痪”之道而行之，引入全新的方针，以其社团主义“古吉拉特邦发展模式”为基础。


In doing so, he would transform India, liberating it from the UPA’s exhausted and ineffective policies and thus improving the lives of millions.	如此，他将让印度焕然一新，摆脱UPA技穷而低效的政策，从而改善几百万人的生活。


“Achhe din aane wale hain” – “the good days are coming” – his supporters declared upon his victory.	“好日子就在前面”他的支持者这样评价他的胜利。


In particular, the Modi public-relations machine proclaimed an end to the sops and compromises that supposedly characterized the UPA coalition.	特别是，莫迪的公共关系团队宣告了UPA执政联盟特色的标准流程和妥协的终结。


Modi pledged to make the tough decisions that the UPA could not, weaning Indians from the statist culture of “doles” and subsidies, while pursuing bold policies aimed at spurring economic growth and job creation.	莫迪承诺要做出UPA无法做出的艰难决定，让印度摆脱“施舍”和补贴的国家控制文化，同时追求旨在刺激经济增长和就业创造的果断措施。


Indians today, he averred, want jobs, not handouts.	他说，今天的印度人需要的是工作，不是宣传册。


It took just a few weeks for the hollowness of these claims to become apparent.	这些宣言有多么大而无当，不出几周就表露无遗。


A commonly cited example of the outgoing government’s alleged economic mismanagement was its sugar-price policy.	下台政府的一个经常被引用的经济治理不当的例子是其糖价政策。


Powerful sugarcane cooperatives, led by major UPA supporters, supposedly drove the government to fix extravagant prices and write off sugar farmers’ bad debts, leading to over-production.	据信，强大的糖业公司在UPA主要支持者的领导下，要求政府将价格维持在过高水平，并减记糖农的坏账，从而导致生产过剩。


Instead of eliminating this system, as expected, Modi’s government has augmented subsidies for sugar exports to support higher output, raised import duties on sugar to discourage foreign competition, and increased the percentage of sugar-based ethanol that must be blended with petrol.	莫迪政府并没有如预期那样取消这一制度，而是扩大了糖出口补贴以支持提高产量，提高糖进口关税遏制外国竞争者，并提高汽油中糖基乙醇添加百分比。


His motivation is not difficult to discern: his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) hopes that such concessions will help it to wrest control of Maharashtra, India’s main sugar-producing state, from the UPA in the upcoming state assembly election.	他这样做的动机不难判断：他的印度人民党（BJP）希望这样的让步有助于其与UPA争夺即将到来的印度糖主产邦马哈拉施特拉邦议会选举的控制权。


This goal explains another policy reversal as well.	这一目的还解释了另一项政策变化。


The UPA’s critics long claimed that unsustainably low, state-dictated passenger fares and freight charges for rail services – which could not cover the cost of maintenance to ensure the safety of trains and tracks, much less enable expansion and improvement of service – reflected the government’s inability to make tough decisions.	UPA批评者一直认为，国定铁路客运和货运价格处于不可持续的低水平，无法覆盖确保客车和货车安全的成本，更不用说扩大和改善服务了。 这表明政府无力做出艰难决定。


It is true that coalition politics prevented decisive action, with a railway minister being summarily dismissed by his own party leader – whom the UPA was politically unable to confront – after attempting to raise fares.	诚然，联盟执政阻止了果断行动，铁道部长在试图提价后立刻被其所在政党领导人——对于此人，UPA在政治上不能其产生冲突——就地免职。


But, in the pre-election interim budget, the UPA government finally bit the bullet, proposing a 14.2% increase in rail fares and a 6.5% hike in freight rates.	但是，在选举前临时预算中，UPA政府最终还是下了决心，提出将铁路客运费用提高14. 2%，货运费用提高6.


Per India’s code of political conduct, the budget changes were deferred until after the election.	5%。 按照印度政治惯例，预算变化要推迟到选举结束后实施。


Soon after taking office, the Modi government announced its intention to implement the price increases, though officials made sure to emphasize that they were merely following through on an existing mandate.	执政后不久， 莫迪政府宣布其准备实施涨价，但官员强调他们只是按照既定指令办事。


Then, faced with public resistance, they moderated the planned hikes, particularly of the significantly discounted monthly pass currently available to suburban commuters – an important segment of the electorate in Mumbai, Maharashtra’s capital.	接着，在面临公众抵制时，他们又调低了计划涨幅，特别是市郊通勤人士目前所享有的极其优惠的月票价格。 市郊通勤人群是马哈拉施特拉邦首付孟买的重要选民群体。


Modi had previously derided the UPA’s populist railway ministers for distorted policies that punished businesses, declaring during his election campaign that India’s railways should be run more like China’s, with increased government investment, including for bullet trains.	莫迪早先嘲弄UPA的民粹主义铁道部长，称其扭曲的政策是在惩罚企业，并在选战期间宣布印度铁路应该向中国看齐，增加政府投入，建设高铁。


Yet, no sooner had he been sworn in than he acquiesced in precisely the kind of political compromise to which he and the BJP – which won a parliamentary majority, and thus does not depend on coalition partners for its government’s survival – was supposed to be immune.	但是，宣誓就职声音刚落，莫迪就采取了他和BJP应该敬而远之的政治妥协之道。 BJP赢得了议会多数，因此不需要依靠执政联盟维系政府生存。


Modi’s government has adopted an even weaker stance on another unpopular but necessary decision: fuel-price increases.	莫迪政府在另一个不受欢迎但必须的决定上的立场更不坚定：提高燃料价格。


In order to align Indian fuel prices more closely with world market prices, thereby enabling domestic oil and gas producers to finance exploration and extraction, the UPA government had announced that natural-gas prices would be doubled from April 1.	为了让印度燃料价格更好地与全球市场价格接轨，从而使印度国内石油天然气生产商获得��探和开采所需要的资金，UPA政府宣布了一项将天然气价格提高一倍的计划，这一计划从4月1日开始实施。


But, as with railway fares, the final decision was left up to Modi.	但是，与铁路客货运费的问题一样，最终决定将由莫迪来做。


And, instead of doing what was needed – even while blaming his predecessors – Modi postponed the decision until September.	而莫迪并没有做应做之事——尽管他以此批评前任——而是将这一决定推迟到9月。


This hypocrisy has characterized virtually every policy decision that the BJP government has taken so far.	类似的伪善几乎存在于BJP政府目前所实施的每一项政策决定中。


Despite the BJP’s strident criticism of the United States-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation deal – the UPA administration’s signature foreign-policy triumph – Modi’s government has just ratified an India-specific “additional protocol,” granting the International Atomic Energy Agency access to India’s civilian nuclear sites.	尽管BJP尖锐批评美国-印度民用核合作（United States-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation）协议——UPA政府的招牌式外交政策胜利——莫迪政府最近仍签署了只适用印度的“附加协议”，授权国际原子能机构进入印度民用核设施。


Moreover, the BJP had opposed interaction with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, pending satisfactory progress on the prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which killed 164 people and injured more than 300.	此外，BJP此前反对与巴基斯坦总理沙里夫互动，叫停了起诉和惩罚2008年孟买袭击实施者的程序。 孟买袭击案造成164人死亡，300多人受伤，其起诉该案实施者是一件深得人心的事。


Yet Sharif was an honored guest at Modi’s inauguration, exchanging gifts with India’s newly affable leader.	但沙里夫是莫迪就职仪式的座上宾，还与面容和蔼的印度新领导人交换了礼物。


The Modi government has also adopted the UPA-proposed Goods and Services Tax, which had been stalled by opposition from BJP-ruled states (including Modi’s Gujarat).	莫迪政府还采取了UPA提出的商品和服务税，这项议案原本因为BJP执政各邦（包括莫迪的古吉拉特邦）的反对而叫停。


And it will strengthen the national anti-terrorism effort, which Modi previously denounced as an assault on Indian federalism.	此外，莫迪政府还将强化全国反恐，而此前莫迪称此为对印度联邦主义的攻击。


Many Modi supporters in the media have already begun to decry the series of policy abdications Modi has conducted since his campaign.	莫迪的许多媒体支持者已开始诘难其在选战以来所采取的一系列政策让步。


Indian citizens who thought that they voted for change are beginning to wonder if the BJP has simply reprised the UPA government’s policies.	以为选出了带来变革的领导人的印度人民开始质疑BJP是否只是在重复UPA政府的政策。


As a member of the previous government, I must say that that may not be such a bad thing.	作为前政府的一员，我必须说，这或许不是一件坏事。


Gurus and Governors	大师和邦长


NEW DELHI – The ongoing general election in India has brought to prominence not only the usual cast of political aspirants, campaign managers, publicists, and vote-brokers, but also an array of astrologers, numerologists, and pandits.	新德里——印度正在举行的大选不仅使雄心勃勃的政治家、竞选经理、公关人员和投票经纪人引起了人们的注意，同时也让占星师、算命师和梵学家站到了聚光灯下。


Candidates have been flocking to such soothsayers in large numbers, seeking advice on everything from the precise minute to file their nomination forms to the appropriate alignment of the doors of their campaign offices.	大批候选人纷纷涌向这些算命者，征询从提交报名表的精确时间到竞选办公室的门该如何排列等各种意见。


Indians, after all, manage to live in that rare combination of modernity and superstition that defines them as a breed apart.	归根结底，只有印度人能够将现代化和令他们与众不同的迷信完美结合。


Where else in the world is so much made of an individual’s astrological chart, that mysterious celestial database that determines one’s life opportunities, marital prospects, and willingness to take on certain risks?	全世界还有哪个地方靠个人星象图来解释一切，由神秘的天体数据库决定某人一生的机会、婚姻前途和冒险的意愿？


I once wrote that an Indian without a horoscope is like an American without a credit card.	我曾写道印度人没有星象就像美国人没有信用卡。


That observation shows no sign of losing its validity in the twenty-first century.	这样的观察结果在进入21世纪后并没有任何变化。


It is a truth that seems particularly entrenched in Indian politics.	这似乎是印度政界根深蒂固的真相。


As a believing Hindu, I make no claims to pure rationalism myself.	身为印度教徒的我并不以纯理性主义者自居。


But I am bemused when a minister’s swearing-in ceremony is delayed because an astrologer told him that the time was not auspicious to take the oath, or when a candidate’s election papers are filed at the last possible minute to avoid the malign influences of the stars at other times of the day.	但每当看到有部长因为占星家认为不吉利而推迟就职典礼，或者候选人为了避免一天中其他时间星象的恶劣影响而拖到最后一刻才提交选举文件，我总是感到非常困惑。


Both are frequent occurrences in Indian political life.	这两种情况在印度的政治生活中经常会遇到。


It is not just a question of taking the oath of office at a time determined by an astrologer; the stars also decide when a minister moves into his office and begins his work.	占星家还不止能够决定什么时间举行就职仪式； 星象还可以决定部长什么时候进入办公室开始工作。


Many ministers do not report to work for days after being sworn in; files pend while the planets realign themselves more favorably.	许多部长宣誓就职后好几天都不去办公室； 文件暂停处理等候星宿移动到更加有利的位置。


Superstition can also influence the selection of the minister’s office, housing, and furniture, guided (if not actually directed) by gurus and pandits on the basis of time-honored, if scientifically unproven, principles.	在源远流长、但却未经科学证实的原则指引下，迷信也能借助大师和梵学家之口影响部长们对办公室、住宅和家具的选择。


My favorite story of this type involves a chief minister who refused to move into his official residence because a pandit claimed that it was not built according to the correct spiritual principles of vaastu (India’s version of feng shui), and that he would not fare well in it.	我最偏爱的故事是一位首席部长拒绝搬进自己的官邸，因为梵学家称官邸会对其造成不好的影响，因为没有按照vaastu（印度版风水）的正确原则建设。


The bungalow was reconstructed accordingly, at great public expense, with new doorways and windows realigned to satisfy the pundit.	公共财政因此出资对官邸进行了改造，门窗的位置都严格按照梵学家的要求。


At last, the chief minister moved in, only to lose his job – and his new home – the next day in an unexpected political crisis.	最后首席部长刚搬进去就丢掉了工作和新官邸，因为官邸建好的第二天意想不到的政治危机就发生了。


Why do otherwise intelligent, educated people put themselves in thrall to superstition?	本来应当受过教育的聪明人为什么会被迷信所奴役？


I am all in favor of the innate human desire to propitiate the heavens.	我完全赞成人类与生俱来的媚天欲望。


I am even prepared to entertain the notion that the cosmos might be sending us signals in every planetary alignment.	我甚至愿意接受宇宙可能会通过星辰排布的方式向我们发出信号。


But what makes us so credulous as to believe that soothsayers understand the code?	但我们为什么如此轻信占卜者能够读懂上天的密码？


Not long ago, the chief minister of Tamil Nadu state, the former actress Jayalalitha, decided to add an extra “a” to the end of her name because a numerologist told her that the new spelling would be beneficial to her turbulent political career.	不久前，泰米尔纳德邦首席部长昔日女星亚拉利塔（Jayalalitha）决定在名字后面加上一个“a”，因为算命师告诉她新拼法可能对她动荡的政治事业有所帮助。


She promptly went on to win an election in her state, lost the next one, and now is back in power again.	她立即在本邦选举中获胜，紧接着输给对手，现在又重新把权力掌握在手中。


I suppose it is entirely possible that “Jayalalithaa” has attained political successes that might have eluded a mere “Jayalalitha.”	我认为她改叫“Jayalalithaa” 时完全有可能取得了超过“Jayalalitha”的政治成就。


But on what possible basis can it be argued that the addition of a superfluous vowel made all the difference?	但我们凭什么认为多加一个元音就会产生如此神奇的效果？


One can scarcely believe that the heavens dispense their favors according to the number of vowels in mortals’ names.	人们很难相信上天会根据凡人姓名中元音的多少来决定谁获得的青睐更多。


But many Indians are firm believers, as the increasingly eccentric spellings of film titles and movie stars’ names confirm.	但片名和影星姓名拼法越来越古怪证明了许多印度人对此都深信不疑。


One of India’s finest actors, Irfan Khan, suddenly re-baptized himself Irrfan, a change that many swear prefigured the transformation of his career.	印度一位最优秀的演员Irfan Khan突然间接受洗礼并改名Irrfan，很多人信誓旦旦地认为这预示着他的演艺生涯即将转型。


New Delhi’s political circles are rife with gossip about a former prime minister who was guided daily by a godman, and a former finance minister whose decisions were influenced by astrology (though tempered, it seems, by a former cabinet secretary who passed himself off as an amateur astrologer).	新德里政界充斥着有关前总理每日接受仙人指导的闲言碎语，还有占星学影响了前财长的决策（虽然这名业余占星家是由前内阁秘书长冒充的）。


The leader of Bihar state’s Rashtriya Janata Dal party, Laloo Prasad Yadav, reportedly filled his swimming pool with mud and garbage because a pandit told him it would stop the “leak” of defecting members.	比哈尔邦人民党领袖Laloo Prasad Yadav据报导在自己的泳池里填满了泥浆和垃圾，因为有位梵学家告诉他这样做能够防止叛逃党员对消息的“泄漏”。


Most Indian politicians wear rings with stones tailored to specific planetary conjunctions that are providential for them, or designed to ward off malefic influences from planets unfavorably situated on their birth charts.	多数印度政客佩戴镶有各自幸运星座宝石的订制戒指，还有些意在抵御出生图上不利星座造成的影响。 很多人信誓旦旦认为这非常有效；


Many swear it works for them; others take the agnostic view that one has nothing to lose by indulging such beliefs, except the price of the ring – a sort of Hindu version of Pascal’s famous wager.	还有些不可知论者认为相信这些除了花个戒指钱以外并没有什么坏处——就像是印度教版本的著名的帕斯��赌注。


It turns out, however, that Indian politicians are not the only ones vulnerable to seduction by the Indian “miracle mafia.”	但事实证明不止是印度政治家容易受到印度“奇迹派”的诱惑。