Developing countries ask why they should pay attention to global warming if rich countries are not prepared to curtail their own emissions sharply?	发展中国家问道，如果富国不愿意大幅度限制它们自身的排放，为什么它们就应该关注全球气候变暖问题呢？


Why should poor countries worry about how deforestation contributes to global warming when rich countries remain so profligate?	如果富国如此肆意挥霍，为何穷国就应该担心森林退化造成全球变暖的问题呢？


The scientific evidence suggests that carbon emissions from anywhere in the world have about the same impact on global warming.	科学证据表明，世界任何地方的碳排放对于全球变暖具有大致相同的影响。


For this reason, a wide range of economists favor a uniform (“harmonized”) global tax that would tax carbon emissions equally everywhere in the world, and from whatever source – whether coal, oil, or gas, and whether consumers or businesses.	出于这一原因，许多经济学家赞同一项统一（协调）的全球税收来对世界上所有地方、所有来源的碳排放平等征税，无论来源是煤炭、石油或者天然气，无论消费者还是商家所排放。


Such a tax is the most flexible and market-friendly approach, and would have the least impact on economic growth.	这样的税收是最为灵活、也是亲市场的途径，而且对经济增长的影响最小。


Instead, the complex system of quotas favored by the Europeans and embodied in the Kyoto Protocol is likely to lead to much larger inefficiencies and costs.	相反，由欧洲所倾向并且体现在京都议定书中的复杂的配额制度有可能导致更大规模的低效率和成本。


For this reason, England’s Stern Report is probably far too optimistic when it calculates that an eclectic approach to reducing carbon emissions will cost the world only 1% per year of income.	出于这一理由，英国的斯特恩报告中有关减少碳排放的折中途径将每年只花费1％的收入的估计未免过于乐观。


But the Stern Report is still right to argue that the potential risks of continued inaction are far greater.	但是斯特恩报告主张继续无动于衷潜在的风险远远更为巨大则是正确的。


America’s unwillingness to take the lead on environmental issues may some day be regarded as one of the country’s most profound political failures.	某一天，美国不愿意在环境问题上发挥领导作用将会被认为是国家最为深重的政治失策。


One hopes that it changes course soon, before we all are forced to wear swimsuits to work.	人们希望在我们所有人被迫穿游泳衣上班之前美国马上改弦更张。


A New Low for China Bashing	诋毁中国行动的新低点


NEW HAVEN – As America’s election season nears its finish, the debate seems to have come unhinged.	发自纽黑文——随着美国的大选季节接近尾声，与选举有关的辩论似乎也变得精神错乱起来。


Nowhere is that more evident than in the fixation on China – singled out by both President Barack Obama and his Republican challenger, Mitt Romney, as a major source of pressure bearing down on American workers and their families.	对此没有比对中国的迷恋更能证明这一点的地方了——现任总统奥巴马及其共和党挑战者米特·罗姆尼（Mitt Romney）都将中国单独提出来并称之为美国工人及其家庭所受压力的主要来源。


Get tough with China, both stressed in the presidential debates, and the pain will ease.	两人都在大选辩论中强调：只要对中国强硬，美国人的痛苦自会有所减轻。


Nothing could be further from the truth. Consider the following charges:	没有事情是能偏离真相的，请思考下面的这些指控：


Currency manipulation.	货币操纵。


Since China reformed its exchange-rate regime in July 2005, the renminbi has risen 32% relative to the dollar and about 30% in inflation-adjusted terms against a broad basket of currencies.	自从中国在2005年7月实施汇率调控机制改革以来，人民币兑美国升值了32%，并在去除通胀因素后对一揽子货币升值了约30%。


These are hardly trivial amounts, and more renminbi appreciation can be expected in the years to come.	这并不是一个微不足道的数目，而且预计未来数年人民币汇率还将继续上升。


Unlike Japan, which was pressured by the West into a large yen revaluation in 1985 (the “Plaza Accord”), the Chinese have opted to move gradually and deliberately.	跟1985年在西方压力下被迫进行日元大幅升值（“广场协议”）的日本不同，中国人选择更为渐进而谨慎地行事。


American officials call this “manipulation,” arguing that market forces would have resulted in a sharper renminbi appreciation than has occurred.	美国官员们把这个视为“操纵”，认为市场的力量本应使人民币实现比当前更大幅度的升值。


Fixated on stability – a concept alien to US politicians and policymakers – the Chinese prefer, instead, to play a more active role in managing the adjustment of their currency.	而相反中国人则痴迷于维护稳定——这是一个美国政客和政策制定者都不熟悉的概念——也因此喜欢在管理调整自身货币方面承担更积极的角色。


I call that prudence – perhaps even wisdom.	我把这称之为谨慎——或者甚至是明智。


Two lost decades later, the guinea pig, Japan, might have a view on which approach works best.	在经历了20年的迷失之后，日本这个实验品或许会知道哪种方法更加合适。


Outsourcing and intellectual property.	业务外包和知识产权。


Notwithstanding some recent modest improvements in the US labor market, America’s job situation remains terrible.	尽管美国的劳动力市行在最近稍有起色，美国的就业情况依然糟糕。


Private-sector employment is still down 4.1 million from its January 2008 peak.	私人部门的就业人数依然比2008年1月的高峰期少了410万。


Yet there is not a shred of evidence to support bipartisan claims that this ongoing carnage is the result of outsourcing US manufacturing jobs to China.	但这根本不足以支撑两党关于当前危机源于美国制造业职位外包给中国的论调。 虽然制造业占私人部门就业的比例从2008年1月的11.


While the manufacturing sector’s share of private employment fell from 11.9% in January 2008 to 10.7% in September 2012, this is only a small portion of the enormous secular decline since the early 1970’s, when manufacturing accounted for more than 30% of private-sector employment.	9%下跌到2012年9月的10. 7%，但这只是自1970年代早期出现的长期大幅下滑趋势的其中一小部分而已，须知当时制造业所占的份额可是超过30%。


Weak demand – especially the post-crisis collapse in consumer spending growth – is a far more likely culprit than China in explaining the recent hiring shortfall.	相比于中国来说，需求疲软——尤其是消费者支出增长在危机爆发后的暴跌——更像是最近雇佣需求下滑的罪魁祸首。


China, for its part, has become a major workhorse of globalization – an assembly hub for inputs produced by multi-country supply chains and an offshore efficiency solution for hard-pressed Western multinational corporations.	而中国自身则成为了全球化的主要出力者——它既是一个多国供应链生产产品的组装中心，又是囊中羞涩的西方跨国企业的高效离岸解决方案。


About 50% of all exports leaving China have been processed previously by other economies, and close to 60% are shipped by Chinese subsidiaries of “foreign-invested enterprises.”	约有50%的中国出口商品之前曾在其他经济体中进行加工，近60%的产品都是由所谓“外资企业”的中国子公司送出国外的。


While these trends benefit Chinese workers, they also support America and other countries by holding down inflation and making it possible for their companies to cope with tough competitive pressures. They allow beleaguered American families to stretch their paychecks (think Wal-Mart).	这些趋势在令中国工人受益的同时还造福了美国以及其他国家，因为这既帮助控制了通胀，同时也使各国企业得以应对严酷的竞争压力。


And they have not stopped innovative Western companies from putting their intellectual property and new technologies on the line in China in order to deliver spectacular new products to US customers (think Apple).	此外这也没有阻止那些西方创新企业将知识产权和新技术投放在中国的生产线上来为美国消费者提供令人赞叹的新产品（比如苹果公司）。


The trade deficit.	贸易逆差。


Yes, the US runs a massive trade deficit with China – around $295 billion in 2011, or fully 40% of America’s total merchandise trade gap of $738 billion.	没错，美国对中国存在着巨大的贸易逆差——2011年约为2950亿美元，相当于美国7380亿美元商品贸易总缺口的40%。


Republicans and Democrats alike argue that this is the crux of America’s jobs problem.	共和民主两党都一直认定这是美国就业问题的关键。


After all, trade deficits mean job losses.	毕竟贸易逆差意味着职位流失。


Because the biggest share of the US trade gap is with China, a country vilified as a currency-manipulating cheater, the bilateral trade deficit has become the lightening rod for China bashers.	由于美国贸易缺口的最大一部分来自中国这个被诽谤为货币操纵作弊者的国家，双边贸易逆差因而成为了诋毁中国者的指路明灯。


It is what has driven Obama to go to the mat with China on recent disputes within the World Trade Organization and on restrictions on Chinese investment in Oregon wind farms, and what has led to saber-rattling by Romney on currency manipulation and trade sanctions.	这正是驱使奥巴马最近在WTO与中国唇枪舌战并限制中国投资俄勒冈州风力发电厂的背后原因，也是罗姆尼在货币操纵和贸易制裁等方面大肆叫嚣的幕后推手。


But neither candidate acknowledges the much bigger elephant in the room.	但两个候选人都没有意识到更大的症结所在。


In 2011, the US had trade deficits with 98 countries.	美国在2011年与98个国家之间出现了贸易逆差。


The other 97 deficits did not magically appear.	其他97项逆差也并未凭空消失。


They are all part of an enormous multilateral trade deficit that stems from America’s unprecedented shortfall of saving – a depreciation-adjusted “net national saving rate” (combining businesses, households, and the government sector) that has been negative since 2008.	它们都是源自于美国前所未有的储蓄下滑——计入了贬值因素的“国民净储蓄率”（结合企业，家庭和政府）自2008年一直为负值——所导致的大规模多边贸易逆差的一部分。


Lacking in savings and wanting to grow, the US runs massive current-account and multilateral trade deficits in order to import other countries’ surplus savings.	缺少储蓄却期望增长，美国唯有在巨额经常账户和多边贸易逆差下运作来进口其他国家的多余储蓄。


This goes to the heart of the folly of China bashing.	这触及到了诋毁中国愚蠢行为的核心。


No leading country in world history has persistently maintained a negative saving rate.	历史上没有一个领导国家会一直维持着负储蓄率的。


Trade deficits – with China or any other country – are part of the price that America pays for its unbridled profligacy.	贸易逆差——来自中国或者其他国家——就是美国为其肆意挥霍所付出的代价之一。


Unless and until the US faces up to its chronic aversion to saving – namely, by reducing massive federal budget deficits and encouraging the rebuilding of severely depleted household saving – multilateral trade deficits will persist.	除非并直至美国能直接面对自身在储蓄上的长期背离——也就是说，通过削减大规模联邦预算支出并鼓励重建早已严重枯竭的家庭储蓄——否则多边贸易逆差将继续存在下去。


Simple arithmetic and basic economics tell us that a multilateral problem cannot be addressed by a bilateral solution.	简单的计算和基本的经济学原理告诉我们：你是无法通过一个双边解决方案来解决多边问题的。


Politicians have a penchant for simple and powerful messages.	政客们都非常嗜好一些简明有力的信息。


Yet those messages are often more spin than substance.	但那些信息往往都言过其实。


American families are hurting, and elected officials want to pin the blame on China, thereby deflecting attention from the difficult task of rebuilding saving, restoring competitiveness, and living within the country’s means.	众多美国家庭正在受害，而选举产生的官员则希望把指责推到中国身上，并以此把民众的注意力从重建储蓄，恢复竞争力以及量入为出等艰巨任务上引开。


Indeed, one could argue that it is the American public that is being manipulated by the erroneous charges leveled at China.	事实上，可以说正是美国公众被那些瞄准中国的错误指控所操纵了。


Fortunately, the campaign season is nearly over.	但幸运的是，大选期正在接近尾声。


Left unanswered, however, is what comes next.	但那些未能回答的问题则是下一次又将会出现什么情况。


China bashers typically change their tune after a presidential election.	那些诋毁中国的人一般都会在总统选举之后调转话头。


But there is nothing typical about the pressures that are likely to continue squeezing American families long after November 6.	但估计会在11月6号过后继续高悬在美国家庭头上的压力可不会消失。


Both Obama and Romney run the risk of painting themselves into a corner when it comes to China.	无论是奥巴马还是罗姆尼都面临着在中国问题上自断后路的风险。


That could take all of us to the edge of a slippery slope.	这可能把我们所有人都推向一个下滑的深渊。


America’s leaders need to come clean with the American people – before it is too late.	在一切都已经无法挽回之前，美国领导人必须向自己的人民坦白。


America’s Coming Social Democracy?	社会民主体制走近美国？


Almost all of the world’s developed countries consider themselves, and are, social democracies: mixed economies with very large governments performing a wide array of welfare and social insurance functions, and removing large chunks of wealth and commodity distribution from the market.	几乎所有的世界发达国家都自认为是社会民主政体，奉行混合经济体制，由庞大的政府实行多种社会福利和保障体制，以政府行为代替市场调节进行大部分社会财富和生活物资的分配调节工作。


The United States is something different. Or is it?	美利坚合众国也许略有不同，真的吗？


Whatever it has been in the past, the US in the future will have to choose whether, and how much, it will be a social democracy.	不管它过去如何，美国在不久的将来必须决定是否成为一个社会民主政体，以及在多大程度上接受社会民主体制？


Once upon a time, according to mythology at least, America had little downward mobility.	过去，至少从以往种种传说来看，美国几乎没有发生过“整体下流”的情形。


On the contrary, before the Civil War you could start out splitting rails, light out for the Western Territory, make a success of yourself on the frontier, and wind up as President – if you were named Abraham Lincoln.	相反，在美国内战前，你可以从劈铁轨开始，接着迅速转战到西部地区，在前线一举获胜，最后问鼎白宫成为总统——如果你叫亚伯拉罕·林肯的话。


In the generation after World War II, you could secure a blue-collar unionized manufacturing job or climb to the top of a white collar bureaucracy that offered job security, relatively high salaries, and long, stable career ladders.	在二战时期，你可以在工会联盟的制造企业中保全一份蓝领工作，或辛苦爬至管理机构最高层，享受良好的职业保障，相对丰厚的薪酬，以及长期稳定的职业发展生涯。


This was always half myth.	但这些传说至少一半被神化了。


Setting out for the Western Territory was expensive. Covered wagons were not cheap.	向西北地区进军得付出昂贵代价，隐蔽的篷车造价不菲。


Even in the first post-WWII generation, only a minority of Americans – a largely white, male minority – found well-paying stable jobs at large, unionized, capital-intensive manufacturing companies like GM, GE, or AT&T.	即使是在后二战时期，只有一小部分美国人——大多为白人男性——才能在大规模资本集约型的工会联盟制造企业，诸如GM, GE或者AT&T中获得一份收入不错且安定的工作。


But if this story was half myth, it was also half true, particularly in the years after WWII.	但若这种说法一半是吹嘘，那么还有一半总是真的。


Largely independent of education or family, those Americans who did value stability and security could grasp it in the form of jobs with “a future.”	尤其在二战后的几年内，多数未受教育或不依赖家庭生活的美国人，都能找到一份“有前途的”工作，过上经济稳定、安全有保障的生活。


Even for those not so lucky, economic risks were usually fairly low: the unemployment rate for married men during the 1960’s averaged 2.7%, and finding a new job was a relatively simple matter.	即使是那些不太幸运的人，也通常无须承受什么经济风险：上世纪60年代已婚男性的平均失业率只有2. 7%，找份新工作是件再简单不过的事情。


It was during this era – roughly from 1948 to 1973 – that sociologists found that a majority of Americans had come to define themselves not as working class, but as middle class.	大约就是在1948年到1973年这一阶段，社会学家们开始发现，大部分美国人开始将自己定位为中产阶级而不是工人阶级了。


The post-WWII period stands as a reference point in America’s collective memory, but it was in all likelihood an aberration.	在美国人的集体记忆中，后二战时期是个参考点，尽管这多半是段非正常的时期。


In the early postwar decades, foreign competition exerted virtually no pressure on the economy, owing to the isolation of America’s continental market from the devastation of WWII.	在二战刚结束的十年里，由于美国市场与战后萧条的欧洲大陆市场的完全隔离，海外竞争实质上对美国经济毫无影响。


At the same time, the war left enormous pent-up demand for the products of mass production: cars, washing machines, refrigerators, lawn mowers, television sets, and more.	与此同时，这场战争反而刺激了人们对于汽车、洗衣机、冰箱、割草机、电视机等批量化生产的产品的大量需求，这种需求在战时已经被压抑过久。


Government policy back then began with a permanent military program of spending and R&D and continued through massive public works program and suburbanization, underpinned by the Federal Highway Program and subsidized home ownership loans from the Federal Housing Administration.	政府随即回来使用政策指挥棒，开始实施一个有关费用和调查发展的永久性军事项目，并将此项目持续在民众的工作计划和郊区化项目中推进，并得到了联邦高速公路项目的支持，资助人们向联邦房屋管理局进行房屋贷款。


The regulatory institutions and behavioral norms that originated in the New Deal and developed during WWII came into full force: social security, a system of unionized labor relations, market regulation.	由“新政主义”提出、并在二战中得以发展的监管机制和行为准则得以全部生效。 它们包括：社会安全、工会劳动力关系体系和市场规范。


Favorable macroeconomic circumstances, the absence of foreign competition, a system of government support and regulation, and large-scale private provision of what in Europe would have been public social insurance all combined to give post-WWII America many of social democracy’s benefits without the costs. The economy did not stagger under the weight of ample benefits or high taxes.	在无海外竞争的环境中，在有利的宏观经济环境下，加之政府部门的大力支持和有效调节，以及大规模的私人保险（在欧洲却是公共社会保险），以上四者合在一起，使二战后的美国不费什么成本，就得到了社会民主体制的诸多效益利润。


Americans – at least white, male Americans – did not have to worry about tradeoffs between security and opportunity, because the US offered the advantages of both.	美国人——尤其是白人男性——根本不用在机会和保障之间权衡两难，因为美国对这两种情况有给予优先照顾。


Corporate welfare capitalism substituted for what in Europe would have been government provided social democracy.	公司福利资本主义代替了欧洲模式中政府调控的社会民主制度。


America was thus a special place.	美国因此成为了一个特别的地方。


It had its cake and ate it, too: a combination of security with opportunity and entrepreneurship.	他独享着自己的（市场）蛋糕，其同时也并合了一个机会与创业的保障体系。


It seemed that this was the natural order of things.	看起来这正是事物发展的自然规律。


Hence there was little pressure for government-sponsored social democracy: Why bother?	因此政府一手操办的社会民主体制几乎无甚压力。


What would it add?	既然如此，何须费神再加一个新体制呢？


Now things are very different.	只因如今形势不同往昔。


The typical American employer is no longer General Motors.	通用汽车公司已不再代表典型的美国雇主。


It is Wal-Mart.	沃尔马已经取而代之。


Private businesses are providing their workers with less and less in the form of defined-benefit pensions, health insurance, and other forms of insurance against life’s economic risks.	私人企业正在通过不断减少其员工的固定福利，如养老金、健康保险及其他形式的保险，以减低经济风险。


Sharply rising income inequality has raised the stakes of the economic game.	日益突出的收入不平衡矛盾提升了经济游戏的投资额度。


A government that cannot balance its own finances cannot be relied on to provide macroeconomic stability.	一个不能平衡国内财政情况的国家不可能提供一个稳定的宏观经济环境。


Indeed, former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Paul Volcker sees the US as so macroeconomically vulnerable as to be running a 75% chance of a full-fledged dollar crisis over the next several years.	事实上，前美国联邦储备主席保罗·沃尔克已经预见到这一点，认为美国的宏观经济情形岌岌可危，将难以承受货币危机，其在未来几年中发生的可能性高达75%。


The coming generation will be one of massive downward mobility for many Americans.	美国的下一代将会是替大部分美国人承受“整体下流”的一代。


The political struggles that this generates will determine whether America will move more closely to the social democratic norm for developed countries, or find some way to accept and rationalize its existence as a country of high economic risk and deep divisions of income and wealth.	由此产生的政治斗争将会决定，美国究竟是越来越靠近其他发达国家的社会民主制度规范，还是另辟蹊径，找寻能承受美国的高经济风险和悬殊的贫富收入差距，并合理地解决这一问题的办法。


Syria and September 11	叙利亚和911


PARIS – By chance, it appears that the US Congress will decide on or around September 11 whether to endorse President Barack Obama’s proposal to respond militarily to the Syrian government’s use of poison gas against civilians.	巴黎—说来也巧，美国国会有可能在9月11日左右决定是否支持奥巴马就叙利亚政府对平民使用毒气采取军事行动的方案。


The shadow of two previous events that took place on September 11 looms over the outcome – indeed, over the fact that the question is even being considered at all.	此前两次发生在9月11日的事件的阴影影响着结果——事实上，是影响着这个问题是否会被考虑。


Long before September 11 became a day of infamy in the United States, it acquired similar significance in Chile, where 40 years ago, on September 11, 1973, the armed forces, led by General Augusto Pinochet, overthrew the country’s democratically elected government.	在9月11日成为美国的特殊日子之前四十年，它就在智利获得了相似的重要性。 1973年9月11日，皮诺切特将军领导的军队推翻了民选政府。


More than any other event of our era, that violent coup was responsible for launching both the contemporary global movement for human rights and the American movement to promote human rights internationally.	从当代全球人权运动和美国在国际上推行人权的角度，这次暴力政变可谓居功至伟。


In part, this reflected the new regime’s cruelty.	从某些角度，这反映了新政权的残酷性。


More than three thousand people were murdered or “disappeared” during Pinochet’s rule, thousands more were tortured by his forces, and tens of thousands were forcibly exiled.	皮诺切特统治期间，三千多人被杀或“被消失”，数千人遭遇军方虐待，数万人被迫流亡。


To an even greater extent, however, the motivation that spurred the human-rights movement was revulsion worldwide, including in the US, against American aid to Pinochet’s forces, a policy directed by President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.	但是，从更深层次看，刺激了人权运动的是全世界——包括美国国内——对美国总统尼克松和国务卿基辛格援助皮诺切特军队的厌憎。


In the US, members of Congress turned the coup into a platform for efforts to promote human rights.	在美国国内，国会议员将这次政变变成了推行人权运动的平台。


They condemned developments in Chile, held hearings about the importance of promoting human rights, and adopted legislation – over President Gerald Ford’s veto – requiring that human-rights standards guide US foreign policy.	他们谴责智利的事态，举行关于推行人权重要性的听证，并克服了总统福特的否决，通过立法要求用人权标准作为美国对外政策的指导。


A slightly revised version of that legislation remains in force.	如今，这一立法仍然有效，只是略微做了一些修订。


Obama’s proclamation that the use of chemical weapons in Syria would cross a “red line” – and his implicit threat to use force if that line were crossed – reflects the commitment that the US has made during the past four decades to promote human rights worldwide.	奥巴马宣布，叙利亚使用化学武器将跨越“红线”——并暗示如果越线将动用武力——这反映了美国过去四十年来所形成的在世界范围内推行人权的承诺。


The events of September 11, 2001, are also playing a crucial role in deciding the question of a punitive strike against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime.	2001年9月11日发生的事件也对向叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德政权采取惩罚性打击的问题起到了关键作用。


One consequence of the terrorist attacks 12 years ago is that Americans and others in the West became aware that developments in the Middle East could affect their own safety and security.	12年前的恐怖袭击的一个后果是美国和其他西方国家认识到，中东的发展可能影响其自身安全和保障。


Initially, the attacks unleashed a strong desire to retaliate, which later gave way to caution about intervention, owing to unforeseen consequences.	一开始，袭击造成了极强的复仇欲望，随后，由于后果不可预测，复仇欲望被谨慎干预取代。


In Britain, continuing intense resentment over the deceptions that led to the country’s engagement in the Iraq war seems to be the main reason for Parliament’s refusal to back a strike against Syria.	在英国，人们对国家被骗参与伊拉克战争的骗局一直满怀憎恨，这成为国会拒绝支持打击叙利亚的主要原因。


Wariness of another Middle East war has also underpinned Obama’s unwillingness to go beyond a one-time punitive strike on Syria – with some in Congress opposed to even that.	担心又一场中东战争也是奥巴马只愿意对叙利亚采取一次性惩罚性打击的原因，一些国会议员甚至连这一点都反对。


Though Congress must guard against repeating its disastrous mistake in 2003, when it supported the war in Iraq, the commitment to promote human rights that the US made following September 11, 1973, seems a more appropriate standard for weighing Obama’s proposal for US military action in Syria.	国会必须小心避免重蹈2003年支持伊拉克战争的灾难性错误的覆辙，但美国在1973年9月11日后所秉承的推行人权承诺似乎才是评估奥巴马的美国军事干预叙利亚方案的更合适的标准。


Maintaining the international prohibition on the use of chemical weapons is an urgent concern.	维护使用化学武器的国际禁令是迫切的问题。


The Assad regime’s culpability for using these weapons is not in doubt.	巴沙尔政权使用化学武器的罪行是毋庸置疑的。


If the US Congress deals with Obama’s proposal responsibly, and does not yield to those motivated by a partisan desire to embarrass him at every turn, it will enhance its own claim to recapture the constitutional power to authorize military conflict – a power that has been disregarded more often than not in the past half-century.	如果美国国会负责任地考虑奥巴马的计划，而不是屈服于次次让他难堪的党派私利，那么就能增强其夺回宪法权力授权军事冲突的立场——在过去半个世纪中，这一权力往往遭受削弱而不是增强。


A critical part of its role must be to consider with care the limits that should be placed on a punitive strike.	这一角色的一个关键部分是谨慎考虑惩罚性打击的界线。


The war in Iraq was misconceived from the start, because it was an attempt to avenge the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by invading and occupying a country that had no part in them.	伊拉克战争从一开始就被误解了，因为这是以侵略和占领与事无干的国家报复2001年9月11日的恐怖袭击。


Obama’s proposal to strike Syria, by contrast, is an attempt to enforce an important human-rights norm by directly punishing – through means that do not involve invasion and occupation – those who committed a gross violation.	相反，奥巴马打击叙利亚的方案是为了强化重要的人权规范，其手段并不包括侵略和占领，而是直接惩罚犯下重罪的对象。


It restores human rights to the central place in American foreign policy set forth after September 11, 1973.	这让人权重新回到了1973年9月11日后设定的美国对外政策核心位置上。


America’s Constrained Choice	约束重重的美国选择


NEWPORT BEACH – The conventional wisdom about the November presidential election in the United States is only partly correct.	纽波特海滩—关于11月的美国总统大选，传统智慧只能说是部分正确。


Yes, economic issues will play a large role in determining the outcome.	是的，经济问题将在结果决定中起到很大作用。


But the next step in the argument – that the winner of an increasingly ugly contest will have the luxury of pursuing significantly different policies from his opponent – is much more uncertain.	但下一个阶段——在日趋丑陋的竞赛中获胜的那一方是否拥有采取与其对手截然不同的政策的奢侈——的不确定性要大得多。


By the time the next presidential term starts in January 2013, and contrary to the current narratives advanced by the Obama and Romney campaigns, the incumbent will find himself with limited room for maneuver on economic policy.	新总统的任期将从2013年1月开始，与目前奥巴马和罗姆尼竞争口号中所描述的情形相反，上台者将会发现没有多少空间可以用于调整经济政策。


Indeed, the potential differences for America are elsewhere, and have yet to be adequately understood by voters.	事实上，美国的潜在分歧随处可见，选民们对此并没有充分的认识。


They center on the social policies that would accompany a broadly similar set of economic measures; and, here, the differences between the candidates are consequential.	他们将注意力集中在伴随着范围甚广的类似经济政策的社会政策上； 而在这方面，候选人之间的分歧将产生重大后果。


Whoever wins will face an economy growing at a sluggish 2% or less next year, with a nagging risk of stalling completely.	不管谁当选，都将在明年面临经济增长只有2%的局面，并伴随着完全停滞的风险。


Unemployment will still be far too high, and almost half of it will be hard-to-solve, long-term joblessness – and even more if we count (as we should) the millions of Americans who have dropped out of the labor force.	失业率仍处于过高的水平，大约有一半的失业者是难以找到工作的长期失业者——要是我们把退出劳动力市场的美国人也算上的话（理应如此）这个比例还会更高。


The financial side of the economy will also be a source of concern.	经济的财政面也值得担忧。


The fiscal deficit will continue to flirt with the 10%-of-GDP level, adding to worries about the country’s medium-term debt dynamics.	财政赤字将继续在10%GDP的水平上徘徊，令人对美国中期债务动态愈加担心了。


The banking sector will still be “de-risking,” limiting the flow of credit to small and medium-size companies and undermining hiring and investment in plant and equipment.	银行部门仍在“去风险”，因此限制了流向中小企业、提振招聘和产房设备投资所必须的信贷流。


And the household sector will be only partly through its painful de-leveraging phase.	而家庭部门痛苦的去杠杆化阶段也只进行了一半。


The policy front will be equally unsettling.	政策面也同样令人不安。


Having dithered and bickered for too long, the US Congress will find it increasingly difficult to postpone action on these challenges.	在犹豫和扯皮了太久之后，美国国会将发现，不能在拖延应对这些挑战的措施了。


Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve’s unusual activism, including an ever-expanding list of experimental measures, will yield fewer benefits and entail growing costs and risks.	与此同时，美联储翻唱的激进主义——包括不断延长的“摸石头过河”措施清单——收效将越来越少，而成本与风险将越来越大。


The US economy will also be operating in a more difficult global environment.	美国经济运行的全球环境也越来越困难。


In the next few months, Europe’s debt crisis will most likely worsen.	在未来几个月中，欧洲债务危机极有可能会继续恶化。


With emerging economies (including China) slowing, and with meaningful multilateral policy coordination remaining inadequate, protectionist pressures will mount as major trading powers compete for a stagnant pie.	由于新兴市场（包括中国）的减速，同时有意义的多边政策协调始终不够充分，主要贸易大国将竞争一块不再变大的饼，因此保护主义压力将会大增。


So, whether President Barack Obama or Mitt Romney prevails in November, the next president will be constrained by the twin need for urgent economic stabilization and longer-term reforms.	因此，不管现任总统奥巴马还是罗姆尼在11月胜出，新总统都将受到双重压力的约束——一边是急需稳定经济，一边是长期改革。


And, with headwinds from Europe and a synchronized global slowdown, the candidates will have no choice but to pursue, at least initially, similar economic policies to restore dynamic job creation and financial stability.	而在欧洲危机和世界各国同时放缓的压力下，两位候选人别无选择，只能采取相似的经济政策重建就业创造活力和金融稳定，至少在任期开始时是如此。


In striking the right balance between immediate economic stimulus and medium-term fiscal sustainability, the most urgent step will be to counter properly the looming fiscal cliff, as temporary tax cuts expire and deep, across-the-board spending reductions kick in automatically.	在寻求短期经济刺激和中期财政可持续性之间的平衡的过程中，最要紧的步骤是合理处置因暂时性减税政策到期结束以及深度跨部门削减支出自动开始所导致的财政悬崖。


Failure to do so would significantly increase the risk of an outright American recession.	在这方面失败将大大增加美国陷入全面衰退的风险。


Serious medium-term budget reforms are needed to deal with the legacy of repeated congressional failures.	深度中期预算改革是应对国会一再不作为所造成的问题之所必须。


And, if provided with realistic numbers, the next president will soon recognize that the right mix of tax and spending reforms falls into a much narrower range than today’s competing political narratives suggest.	此外，如能了解到真实的数字，下任总统很快就会认识到，正确的税收和支出改革之路已经非常狭窄，远非今天竞争性政治口号所描绘得那样宽阔。


It is certainly not an either/or proposition.	这绝对不是一个要么/要么命题。


Fiscal reforms work best in a dynamic economy.	财政改革在充满活力的经济中才能取得最佳效果。


To this end, Obama and Romney will need to lift the impediments to growth and job creation.	在这方面，奥巴马和罗姆尼必须排除万难，实现增长和就业创造。


Here again – in areas like housing, the labor market, credit intermediation, and infrastructure – there is less room for maneuver than most politicians would like us to believe.	与房地产、劳动力市场、信用中介和基础设施等领域一样，在这一领域，办法并不像政客们希望我们所认为的那样多。


But this does not mean that there is no scope for differences.	但这并不意味着一点改变都无法做出。


There is, and they reflect the fact that general economic tendencies will be accompanied by multi-speed dynamics at many levels.	改变的空间是有的，这反映出一个事实：总体经济趋势将伴随多重水平不同速度的动态。


From persistent differences in unemployment rates depending on skills and education to record-high income and wealth inequalities, each economic decision will be accompanied by the need for social judgment – whether explicit or, more likely, implicit – regarding its distributional impact.	根据技能和教育程度的不同，失业率存在持久差异； 收入和财富不平等性正在创出历史记录——从分配效应看，任何经济决策都将伴随着社会调整的需要，这种需要可能是直接的，但更多情况下将是隐含的。


After an “age” of excessive leverage, debt creation, and credit entitlement that culminated in the 2008 global financial crisis, America still faces the tricky challenge of allocating cumulative losses that continuously inhibit investment, jobs, and competitiveness.	在经历了过度杠杆化、债务创造和信贷泛滥、并在2008年全球金融危机爆发前达到顶峰的“时代”后，美国仍然面临着一项艰巨的挑战——如何分配持久抑制投资、就业和竞争力的累积损失。


Until now, Congress’s excessive political polarization has translated into an approach that has pushed more of the burden of adjustment onto those who are less able to bear it.	到目前为止，国会的过度政治极端化已经产生了让承受能力较弱者经受更多调整负担的效果。


In an ideal world, America’s next president would rapidly embark on a two-step approach to restoring job dynamism and financial soundness.	在理想世界中，美国新总统应快速实施两步走计划以重塑就业活力、重振金融稳定性。


First, he would devise a comprehensive set of economic-policy initiatives that are both feasible and desirable – and, again, the scope for major differences here is limited.	首先，他应该设计可行而令人满意的全面经济政策计划组合——在这方面，做出重大不同的空间是有限的。


Second, he would accompany this with an explicit set of social policies – and here the potential differences are profound – that addresses the need for equitable burden-sharing.	其次，对于这些经济政策，应辅之以明确的社会政策组合——在这方面，潜在改变空间极大——以满足公平负担共担的需要。


This is not really an election about such hotly-debated issues as outsourcing, tax increases versus entitlement reforms, government control of production versus unfettered private sector activity, or job creators versus free riders.	其实，此次选举绝非选择外包和增税还是福利改革； 选择政府控制生产还是自由放任私人部门活动；


It is much more about the accompanying concepts of social fairness, entitlement, equality and, yes, standards of behavior for a rich and civilized society.	选择就业创造还是免费搭车等热门���题。 此次选举中兹事体大者在于它所伴随的社会公平、福利、平等呢个性以及富庶文明社会行为准则等概念。


This is an election about social responsibility – a society’s obligation to support those who are struggling, through no fault of their own, to find jobs and make ends meet.	这是一场事关社会责任的选举。 所谓社会责任，即社会支持因并非由其自身造成的错误而承受寻找工作、实现收支平衡压力的群体的义务。


It is about protecting the most vulnerable segments of society, including by providing them access to proper health coverage.	这场选举事关通过让他们获得健康保险保护社会最脆弱群体。


It is about reforming an education system that fails America’s young people (and about providing appropriate retraining to those who need it).	这场选举事关改革让美国年轻人落于人后的教育制度（以及向需要者提供合适的再培训）。


Among the numerous issues of fairness and equality, it is about the rich giving back to a system that has brought them unimaginable wealth.	在诸多公平和公正问题中，让富人回馈给他们带来不可想象的财富的制度才是此次选举的重点。


It is here where the differences between Obama and Romney are important.	奥巴马和罗姆尼的分歧之所以重要，原因就在这里。


The sooner the campaign debate pivots to this, the greater the probability that Americans will make a more informed choice and, thus, buy into the collective effort needed to escape national malaise.	竞选活动越早以此为重心，美国人民就越有可能做出信息更充分的选择，从而采取必须的集体行动让美国免蹈倾覆之辙。


America’s Crony Capitalism	美国的裙带资本主义


Buenos Aires – For 20 years, Americans have denounced the “crony capitalism” of Third World countries, especially in Asia.	布宜诺斯艾利斯－20年来，美国一直在公开抨击第三世界国家，特别是亚洲国家的“裙带资本主义”。


But, just as those regions have been improving their public and corporate governance – Hong Kong just witnessed a breakthrough court decision against a telecom tycoon who is the son of the province’s richest and most powerful man – crony capitalism is taking root in the United States, a country that the world long considered the gold standard of a level playing field in business.	然而，就在这些受到美国抨击的地区一直在改善其政府和公司治理的时候——香港法院刚刚作出了一个对当地电信巨头不利的具有突破性的判决，该电信巨头是香港地区最富有和最有权势的人的儿子——裙带资本主义却在美国这样一个长期以来被世界看作是公平商业竞争环境卓越典范的国家，生根发芽了。


The recently completed “stress tests” of US banks are but the latest indication that crony capitalists have now captured Washington, DC.	美国财政部最近完成的银行 “压力测试”，只是裙带资本主义占领华盛顿特区的一个最新标志而已。


It is no surprise that stock markets liked the results of the stress tests that US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner administered to America’s big banks, for the general outcome had been leaked weeks before.	美国财政部长蒂莫西·盖特纳（Timothy Geithner）对美国大银行进行了压力测试，而在测试结果正式公布的几个星期之前，其大致结果就被泄露了，这就难怪股票市场会欢迎压力测试的结果了。


Indeed, most professional investors trashed the tests as dishonest even as their holdings benefited from a rising market.	事实上，许多专业投资者即使因为持有股票而从股市的上涨中获益，也仍然认为压力测试是不诚实的。


Even The Wall Street Journal , usually financial markets’ loudest cheerleader, openly disparaged the tests’ integrity. The government had allowed bankers to “negotiate” the results, like a student taking a final examination and then negotiating her grade.	就连通常是金融市场声音最响亮的拉拉队长的《华尔街日报》，也公开怀疑测试的诚实性，因为美国政府允许银行家就压力测试的结果进行“谈判”，这就像是一个学生参加期末考试后和老师谈判其成绩一样。


The tests were supposed to reveal the true conditions of banks saddled with unaudited toxic assets in housing loans and financial derivatives. The reasoning behind the tests seemed unimpeachable.	压力测试是用来反映大量持有房屋贷款和金融衍生产品的银行未经审计的有害资产的真实情况的，因而，进行压力测试背后的理由似乎是无懈可击的。


But was it?	但是，事实果真如此吗？


As any seasoned banker knows, a well-managed bank should undertake internal “stress tests” regularly as a matter of good housekeeping.	任何经验丰富的银行家都知道，管理良好的银行应该将定期进行内部“压力测试”作为良好的企业管理的一部分。


The financial crisis should have mandated a running stress test to keep senior management up to date daily. Why, then, did the US need the government to conduct a financial exercise that bankers themselves could and should have done far better and faster?	金融危机本来应该已经迫使银行自己进行持续的压力测试，以便银行高层知道银行的最新情况，然而事实却并非如此。 那么，为什么美国需要政府来进行银行家自己能够进行并且应该做得更快更好的金融行为呢？


The truth is that the tests were not designed to find answers.	这背后的真相是，美国进行压力测试的目的不是为了找到问题的答案。


Both Wall Street’s chieftains and the Obama administration already knew the truth.	华尔街的巨头们和奥巴马政府都已经知道了问题的真相。


They knew that if the true conditions at many big banks were publicly revealed, many would have been immediately declared bankrupt, necessitating government receivership to stop a tsunami of bank runs.	他们知道，如果公开披露美国大银行的真实情况，许多银行就会立即被宣布破产，而这会迫使政府的破产管理机构来阻止由此而引发的银行挤兑浪潮。


But the Obama administration did not want to be tagged as “socialist” for nationalizing banks, however temporarily, even though experts such as former US Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker had recommended just that.	虽然像美联储前主席保罗·沃尔克（Paul Volcker）这样的专家都推荐美国进行银行国有化，但是，奥巴马政府却连非常短暂的国有化也不愿意进行，因为它不想因为国有化银行而被贴上“社会主义者”的标签。


Moreover, nationalizing banks would have required dismissing Wall Street captains and their boards for grossly mismanaging their firms.	而且，如果美国进行银行国有化，就一定会有一些华尔街巨头及其同僚因为严重经营不善而遭到解雇。


Wall Street’s titans, however, had convinced Obama and his team that their continued stewardship was essential to getting the world out of its crisis.	然而，华尔街的巨头们已经让奥巴马及其政府成员相信，他们持续工作对世界经济摆脱当前的危机至关重要。


They successfully portrayed themselves as victims of a firestorm, rather than as accessories to arson.	而且，他们还成功地将自己描绘成经济危机的受害者，而不是引发经济危机的帮凶。


Geithner and Larry Summers, Obama’s chief economic advisor, share Wall Street’s culture as protégés of Robert Rubin, the former treasury secretary who went on to serve as a director and senior counselor at Citigroup. Neither man found it difficult to accept the bankers’ absurd logic.	盖特纳和奥巴马的首席经济顾问拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers），是曾任美国财政部长、后来担任花旗集团董事会主席和高级顾问的罗伯特·鲁宾（Robert Rubin）的门徒，他们认同华尔街的文化，因而都不觉得接受华尔街银行家荒谬的逻辑是很困难的。


The stress tests were meant to signal to the public that there was no immediate threat of bank failures.	压力测试本来是要告诉公众，银行没有迫在眉睫的破产威胁。


This message, it was hoped, would stabilize the market so that prices for “toxic” assets could rise to a level at which bankers might feel comfortable selling them.	政府希望，这样的信息可以稳定市场，以便“有毒”资产的价格可以上涨到银行家在卖掉它们时可以感觉不太为难的水平。


After all, senior bankers had been claiming that these assets were “mispriced,” and that pricing them at market levels would penalize the banks unnecessarily.	毕竟，高级银行家曾经声称这些银行资产的“价格定错了”，将它们按市场水平定价会使银行遭受了不必要地惩罚。


So far, Geithner seems to have succeeded in his “tests,” as the stock market has indeed more than stabilized, with prices of bank shares such as Citigroup and Bank of America quadrupling from their lows.	目前看来，盖特纳的“压力测试”似乎成功了，因为事实上，股票市场不只是稳定下来而已，像花旗集团和美国银行这样的银行股票的价格，还从最低点上涨了四倍。


The feared implosion of Wall Street seems to have been avoided.	以前人们所担忧的华尔街的破产，现��似乎已经避免了。


But no one ever seriously thought that the US would allow Citigroup and Bank of America, to name just two, to fail.	但是，从来没有人真正地认为美国会让花旗集团和美国银行——在此，我仅列举两家银行——破产。


In fact, the stock market bottomed out last winter.	事实上，股票市场在去年冬天就已经见底了。


Markets had factored into share prices the belief that the US government would not allow any more banks to collapse.	市场已经将人们对美国政府不会让更多的银行破产的看法，反应到股票的价格中去了。


What the world wanted was an accurate picture of what the banks were worth and “mark-to-market” valuations to guide investors as to how much new capital they needed.	世界想要的东西，是有关银行价值的准确数据和根据银行还需要多少注资所确定的引导投资者的“市价”估值。


The world also wanted to see the US retaking the high road in reinforcing business ethics and integrity – so lacking under the last administration.	世界也希望看到，美国能够重新回到增强商业道德和诚实信用的道路上来——上一届的美国政府非常缺乏这两样东西。


As taxpayers had already put huge sums into rescuing failing banks, with the prospect of more to come, a transparent process to reveal how the money was being used was imperative.	因为纳税人已经为挽救濒临破产的银行投入了巨额资金，并且可能还要投入更多的资金，所以，有一个表明这些钱是怎样使用的透明的程序，势在必行。


Substantial public rescue funds have reportedly been siphoned off to foreign banks, Goldman Sachs, and staff bonuses for purposes unrelated to protecting public interests.	据报道，美国有大量的公共援救资金，不是为了保护公共利益的目的而被转移到了外国银行、高盛手中或者被当作金融机构员工的奖金。


None of this was either revealed or debunked by Geithner’s tests.	盖特纳的压力测试没有披露或拆穿这些情况。


Instead, public servants now appear to be in cahoots with Wall Street to engineer an artificial aura of profitability.	相反，美国政府的工作人员现在却似乎在和华尔街沆瀣一气，营造出一个虚假的盈利氛围。


Moreover, the value of toxic assets remains as murky as ever.	而且，美国对有毒资产的价值和以前一样讳莫如深。


Once sacrosanct accounting principles have been amended at Wall Street’s behest in order to allow banks to report essentially whatever they want.	为了让银行基本上能够随心所欲的进行报告，在华尔街的要求下，美国政府将神圣的会计准则都进行了修改。


And now negotiated stress test results have been released to “prove” that the banks are a lot healthier.	现在，美国公布了由美国政府和银行进行谈判形成的压力测试结果，想以此 “证明”美国的银行比人们想象的要健康得多。


Calling this a Ponzi scheme might be too harsh.	虽然将这种行为称为旁氏骗局可能太尖刻了，但是它们却有相似的地方。


But few financial professionals have been fooled.	这种骗局愚弄不了大多数的金融专业人士。


Meanwhile, Wall Street chieftains and their boards of directors have nothing to fear from government. On the contrary, they are now the government’s partners in a joint venture to manage this dishonest scheme.	同时，华尔街巨头及其董事们对美国政府已经没什么好担心的了，相反，他们现在在完成这个不诚实的计划的共同冒险中，成为了美国政府的合作伙伴。


Like swine flu, crony capitalism has migrated from corrupt Third World countries to America, once the citadel of sound public and private governance.	像猪流感那样，裙带资本主义已经从腐败的第三世界国家转移到了曾经是可靠的政府和公司治理根据地的美国。


Is it any wonder that China is perceived as an increasingly credible model for much of the developing world, while the US is now viewed as a symbol of hypocrisy and double standards?	所以，对中国被认为是发展中国家越来越可靠的典范，而美国现在被认为是伪善和双重标志的象征，我们有什么好奇怪的呢?


America’s Dangerous Debt Ceiling Debate	引火烧身的美国债务限额之辩


NEWPORT BEACH – It has been raised more than 70 times in the last 50 years, mostly without commotion.	发自纽波特滩——美国政府的债务限额在过去50年内已经上调了超过70次，一般都没有什么异议。


It must be raised again this summer if the United States government is to continue paying its bills on time.	而当今美国政府如果还想继续按时还债的话，就必须在今年夏天再次上调这一限额。


But now America’s debt ceiling has become the subject of intense political posturing and touch-and-go negotiations behind closed doors. And, obviously, the outcome has implications that go well beyond the US.	于是该额度就成为了政治家们私下频繁政治表态和紧急谈判的议题，而其最终结果显然也将对美国以外的世界各地造成广泛影响。


As part of America’s system of checks and balances, Congress gets to do more than just approve the annual federal budget. It also sets a limit on how much debt the US Treasury is allowed to issue.	作为美国制衡政治体制的组成部分，国会不仅扮演着审批联邦预算的角色，还负责制定美国财政部的债务限额。


Beyond this ceiling, the government can spend only from current revenues.	一旦超出该限额，政府就只好从当年财政收入中掏钱支出了。


US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner recently informed members of Congress that the government will be in this situation on or around August 2.	美国财政部长盖特纳最近就政府将在8月2日左右触及债务限额一事向国会作了汇报。


Having already officially hit the ceiling, the Treasury is moving money around and tapping various pots of unused funds to pay its bills.	在借债总额已经到达上限的情况下，财政部当前正在东挪西凑地动用各种闲置资金还债。


In a few weeks, this “flexibility” will be used up.	而再过几个星期，这些“流动性”也将告罄。


With the US government now borrowing around 40% of every dollar it spends, a truly binding debt ceiling would immediately force the government to reduce spending radically and in a disorderly fashion.	考虑到美国政府当前每1美元的支出中就有40美分债务的处境，一个真正具有约束力的债务限额将迫使其不顾一切地大幅削减支出。


Politicians across the political spectrum know that such a situation would unsettle an already fragile US economy, severely weaken the dollar, and raise serious concerns about the country's ability to meet its debt-service obligations, including to the many foreign creditors that the US will need in the future.	各党政治家们都知道这一状况将动摇早已脆弱不堪的美国经济，严重削弱美元，并引发包括美国未来仍需仰仗的国外债权人在内的市场各方对美国还债能力的高度怀疑。


Yet, in today’s polarized environment in Washington, Republicans and Democrats are unwilling to compromise – or at least to compromise “too early.”	但在华盛顿当前极端对立的政治环境下，共和党和民主党彼此都不愿妥协——或者认为现在妥协还为时尚早。


By holding out, Republicans wish to force President Barack Obama’s administration into massive spending cuts.	共和党人想利用僵持来迫使奥巴马当局大规模消减开支。


Democrats respond that such a one-sided approach would be economically harmful and socially unjust.	民主党则辩称这个不考虑其他因素的单一手段不但会损害经济，还会造成社会不公。


In the meantime, both sides risk disrupting transfer payments (including to the elderly) and the provision of public services, as well as eroding further America’s global credit standing.	与此同时，双方都冒着扰乱转移支付（包括老人补助）和公共服务供给的风险，甚至进一步威胁到美国的全球信用。


The overwhelming – and sensible – expectation is that the two parties will compromise and raise the debt ceiling before inflicting serious economic and financial dislocations.	目前主流（也合理）的期望是，两党能在国内经济和金融严重扭曲前不计前嫌，调高债务限额。


The most recent precedent was the bipartisan agreement reached earlier this year on another fiscal issue that threatened to disrupt the normal functioning of government: the absence of a formally approved budget for this year.	而最近的范例就是在今年早些时候的本年度财政预算案，当时这一预算案一直未能得到国会批准，进而威胁到政府的正常运行，最后终于在妥协中过关。


A compromise would allow both parties to declare partial victory, for it would likely entail commitments to cut spending and some steps to make taxation more socially just.	彼此妥协则双方都能各得其所，既能让政府承诺减少支出，又能采取一系列步骤来使税收具有更多的社会正义性。


But, like many last-minute agreements, it would have little durable impact.	但正如众多最后一刻达成的协议一样，这个协议也缺乏长期效力。


In effect, the political system would again be kicking the can down the road, with real progress on necessary fiscal reforms expected only after the November 2012 presidential election.	事实上，美国的政治系统很快又会故伎重演，对协议敷衍塞责，而人们所期望的财政改革只有在2012年总统大选之后才能取得实质性进展。


Two scenarios for the timing of an interim compromise are possible, depending on whether it is a one- or two-step process. Most observers expect a one-step process for bipartisan agreement before August 2.	两党暂时取得妥协的时间点将取决于是一步到位还是分两步走，因此可能出现两种情况：大多数人认为在8月2日之前两党会选择直接达成妥协协议。


But politicians may need two steps: an initial failure to agree, and then a quick deal in response to the resulting financial-market convulsions.	此外就是政治家们需要分两步走：首先是协议失败，��后在引发金融市场动荡后迅速妥协。


In the meantime, the Treasury would temporarily re-prioritize and slow outgoing payments.	同时财政部会暂时重新安排还款优先次序并延缓付款。


This two-step process would be similar to what happened in 2008, when Congress was confronted with another cliffhanger: the Bush administration’s request for $700 billion to prevent a financial-market collapse and an economic depression.	这个两步走的过程与2008年的情况有点相似，当时国会面对的是另一种危险状况：布什政府要求动用700亿美元来防止金融市场崩溃和经济衰退。


Congress initially rejected the measure, but a dramatic 770-point drop in the stock market focused politicians’ minds, bringing them back to the table – and to agreement.	国会一开始拒绝了这一要求，但股市急挫770点使得政治家无暇旁顾，随后将这一提案重新提上议程并最终通过。


But the two-step scenario involves incremental risks to the US economy, and to its standing in the global system. And the longer America’s politicians take to resolve the debt-ceiling issue, the greater the risk of an inadvertent accident.	但这个方案会为美国经济及其全球地位埋下众多慢性风险，而美国政治家解决债务限额问题所耗费的时间越长，则发生意外事故的风险越大。


This brings us to a third, and even more unsettling possibility: a longer and more protracted negotiation, resulting in greater disruptions to government entitlement payments, other contractual obligations, and public services.	这样一来就可能引发更为令人担忧的第三种情况：谈判旷日持久，遥遥无期，给政府的财政支付，履行其他合同义务以及公共服务造成更大的紊乱。


Creditors would then ask many more questions before adding to their already-considerable holdings of US government debt, generating still more headwinds in a US economy that already faces an unemployment crisis and uneven growth.	而那些已经大量持有美国债券的债权人则会在继续购买时表达更严重的忧虑，从而使已经面临失业危机和不稳定增长的美国经济遭遇更多阻力。


The next few weeks will provide plenty of political drama.	未来5个星期的政治舞台必有众多好戏上演。


The baseline expectation, albeit subject to risk, is that Democrats and Republicans will find a way to avoid disruptions that would damage the fragile US economy, but that the compromise will not meaningfully address the need for sensible medium-term fiscal reforms.	而我们的最基本期望是民主党和共和党能在风险之下想办法避免给脆弱的美国经济制造紊乱，只是这一妥协并不能带来有实质意义的中期财政改革。


Such political paralysis on key economic issues is increasingly unsettling for the US private sector, and for other countries that rely on a strong US at the core of the global economy.	对美国的私人企业以及依赖美国在全球经济中扮演核心角色的国家来说，美国政治体制在面临如此关键的经济问题时所发生的瘫痪更加令他们感到不安。


This helps to explain why so many companies continue to hoard cash, rather than investing domestically, and why a growing number of countries want to diversify gradually away from dependence on the dollar as the reserve currency and on US financial markets for intermediation of their hard-earned savings.	这就解释了为什么这么多企业愿意继续持有现金而不进行国内投资，也解释了为什么越来越多的国家想方设法逐步实施多元化策略，不再将美元作为单一储备货币，也不愿借助美国金融市场来管理他们辛苦积蓄的血汗钱。


The world economy is hard-wired to the assumption of a strong America, and Americans benefit from this.	全球经济与一个强势美国的假设紧密相连，而美国人也从中大获其利。


But the more their politicians argue over the debt ceiling, the greater the risk that the wiring will become irreparably frayed.	但美国政治家在债务限额问题上的争论越激烈，这一关联就越有可能发生无法挽回的断裂。


America’s Deepening Moral Crisis	不断恶化的美国道德危机


NEW YORK – America’s political and economic crisis is set to worsen following the upcoming November elections.	发自纽约——美国的政治和经济危机必将在11月国会中期选举之后进一步恶化。


President Barack Obama will lose any hope for passing progressive legislation aimed at helping the poor or the environment.	而一直致力于推动扶助贫困阶层和环保立法的奥巴马也将失去最后一丝希望。


Indeed, all major legislation and reforms are likely to be stalemated until 2013, following a new presidential election.	事实上，所有重要的立法和改革都将停滞不前，直到2013年的新一轮总统大选之后才有转机。


An already bad situation marked by deadlock and vitriol is likely to worsen, and the world should not expect much leadership from a bitterly divided United States.	而这个充斥着僵局和刻薄攻击的可悲状况很可能会愈演愈烈，因此世界也不必指望这个内部急剧分化的美国能表现出多少全球领导力。


Much of America is in a nasty mood, and the language of compassion has more or less been abandoned.	大部分美国人如今都怀着一种丑陋的心态，而同情和怜悯之心则被抛到了九霄云外。


Both political parties serve their rich campaign contributors, while proclaiming that they defend the middle class.	两大党虽然都自称捍卫中产阶级利益，但其实只为那些富有的选举捐款人服务。


Neither party even mentions the poor, who now officially make up 15% of the population but in fact are even more numerous, when we count all those households struggling with health care, housing, jobs, and other needs.	官方统计说美国有15%的贫困人口，但如果我们把那些在医疗，住房，就业等方面苦苦挣扎的家庭计算在内的话，实际的数目会更加庞大，但民主共和两党却对此绝口不提。


The Republican Party recently issued a “Pledge to America” to explain its beliefs and campaign promises.	共和党最近发布了一份名为《向美国宣誓：新共和党议程》的宣言来阐述自己的信念和选举承诺。


The document is filled with nonsense, such as the fatuous claim that high taxes and over-regulation explain America’s high unemployment.	但宣言中却充斥着类似“高税率和过度监管导致了美国高失业率”这样的荒唐言论，堪称一派胡言。


It is also filled with propaganda. A quotation by President John F. Kennedy states that high tax rates can strangle the economy, but Kennedy’s was speaking a half-century ago, when the top marginal tax rates were twice what they are today.	此外宣言还蓄意误导公众，比如引用美国前总统约翰·F·肯尼迪关于“高税率会令经济窒息”的语录，却不知道这番话发表于半个世纪之前，而当时的最高边际税率是如今的两倍。


Most of all, the Republican platform is devoid of compassion.	最糟糕的是，共和党阵营根本就毫无同情心可言。


America today presents the paradox of a rich country falling apart because of the collapse of its core values.	而美国之所以发生这种富裕国家内部解体现象，就是因为其核心价值已经崩溃。


American productivity is among the highest in the world.	美国的生产力居世界前列。 人均国民收入高达4.


Average national income per person is about $46,000 – enough not only to live on, but to prosper.	6万美元——不仅能保证温饱，还足以令民众过上富足的生活。


Yet the country is in the throes of an ugly moral crisis.	但整个国家却被一场严重的道德危机所荼毒。


Income inequality is at historic highs, but the rich claim that they have no responsibility to the rest of society.	收入不均程度已经达到了历史最高点，但富人们却宣称自己不需要对其他国民负责。


They refuse to come to the aid of the destitute, and defend tax cuts at every opportunity.	他们不愿扶助贫困阶层，而且尽可能地为减税政策辩护。


Almost everybody complains, almost everybody aggressively defends their own narrow and short-term interests, and almost everybody abandons any pretense of looking ahead or addressing the needs of others.	所有人都在抱怨，所有人在维护自己那些狭隘的短期利益，所有人都将社会长远利益和推己及人的理念抛诸脑后。


What passes for American political debate is a contest between the parties to give bigger promises to the middle class, mainly in the form of budget-busting tax cuts at a time when the fiscal deficit is already more than 10% of GDP.	在美国当前的政治辩论中，最流行的做法莫过于两党争相向中产阶级做出更大的政治承诺，而且主要集中在削减政府预算和减税上，但与此同时美国的财政赤字却已经超过了GDP的10%。


Americans seem to believe that they have a natural right to government services without paying taxes.	美国人似乎相信他们本来就该免费享用政府服务而无需缴税。


In the American political lexicon, taxes are defined as a denial of liberty.	在美国的政治词汇中，“税”就意味着“限制自由”。


There was a time, not long ago, when Americans talked of ending poverty at home and abroad.	但就在不久之前的一个时期，美国人其实非常热衷于在国内外谈论消除贫困问题。


Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty in the mid-1960’s reflected an era of national optimism and the belief that society should make collective efforts to solve common problems, such as poverty, pollution, and health care. America in the 1960’s enacted programs to rebuild poor communities, to fight air and water pollution, and to ensure health care for the elderly.	1960年代中期林登·约翰逊的“向贫困宣战”运动就反映了当时的风貌，全国上下都弥漫着乐观情绪，相信整个社会必须联合行动来解决贫困，污染和医疗卫生这类宏观问题，还执行了一系列贫民区重建，改善空气和水污染以及老年人医疗保障的项目。


Then the deep divisions over Vietnam and civil rights, combined with a surge of consumerism and advertising, seemed to end an era of shared sacrifice for the common good.	但随后全社会在越战和民权议题上爆发分歧，加上消费主义和广告的入侵，似乎最终令这个为公共福利共同付出的时代走向了终结。


For 40 years, compassion in politics receded.	其后40年间，我们的政治同情心不断消退。


Ronald Reagan gained popularity by cutting social benefits for the poor (claiming that the poor cheated to receive extra payments).	罗纳德·里根通过减少贫困阶层的社会福利（他宣称穷人经常用欺骗的手段获取额外福利）并赢得了支持。


Bill Clinton continued those cuts in the 1990’s.	而比尔·克林顿则在1990年代故伎重施。


Today, no politician even dares to mention help for poor people.	时至今日，甚至没有政治家敢于提起任何扶贫政策了。


The big campaign contributors to both parties pay to ensure that their vested interests dominate political debates.	那些财大气粗的选举捐款人花钱的目的就是为了确保他们的既得利益能主导整个政治辩论的方向。


That means that both parties increasingly defend the interests of the rich, though Republicans do so slightly more than Democrats.	这意味着两大党都不断为富人的利益辩护，只不过共和党的作为比民主党稍稍多一点而已。


Even a modest tax increase on the rich is unlikely to find support in American politics.	即便是某个针对富人的温和加税政策在美国也是无人问津的。


The result of all of this is likely to be a long-term decline of US power and prosperity, because Americans no longer invest collectively in their common future.	所有这一切的最终结果就是美国实力和繁荣的长期衰退，因为美国人再也不集体投资于他们的共同未来了。


America will remain a rich society for a long time to come, but one that is increasingly divided and unstable.	美国在一段长时期内依然会是一个富裕的国家，但同时也会逐渐走向分化和动荡。


Fear and propaganda may lead to more US-led international wars, as in the past decade.	恐惧和误导性宣传将导致美国发起更多国际战争，正如过去十年那样。


And what is happening in America is likely to be repeated elsewhere.	而发生在美国的一切也会在世界其他地方重演。


America is vulnerable to social breakdown because it is a highly diverse society.	社会的高度分化导致美国极其容易发生社会崩溃。


Racism and anti-immigrant sentiments are an important part of the attack on the poor, or at least the reason why so many are willing to heed the propaganda against helping the poor.	而种族主义和反移民思潮其实就是对贫困人口的攻击的重要部分，或者至少是人们愿意听信那些反对扶助贫困阶层的政治宣传的原因。


As other societies grapple with their own increasing diversity, they may follow the US into crisis.	随着其他各国社会内部分化的恶化，他们最终也会步美国后尘。


Swedes recently gave enough votes to a right-wing, anti-immigrant party to give it representation in parliament, reflecting a growing backlash against the rising number of immigrants in Swedish society.	瑞典选民最近给一个右翼反移民政党投下了足够多的选票，足以让其在议会拥有一席之地，这反映出瑞典人对外国移民越来越强烈的抵制心理。


In France, Nicolas Sarkozy’s government has tried to regain popularity with the working class by deporting Roma migrants, a target of widespread hatred and ethnic attacks.	在法国，萨科齐政府尝试通过将吉普赛移民驱逐出境的方式来赢得工薪阶层支持，而这些人在法国早已成为种族仇恨和攻击的众矢之的。


Both examples show that Europe, like the US, is vulnerable to the politics of division, as our societies become more ethnically diverse.	这两个例子都显示出随着我们的社会在种族上越来越多元化，欧洲也无法克服随之诱发的政治分裂现象，正如美国一样。


The lesson from America is that economic growth is no guarantee of wellbeing or political stability.	美国的教训就是经济发展并不能确保人民幸福和政治稳定。


American society has become increasingly harsh, where the richest Americans buy their way to political power, and the poor are abandoned to their fate.	美国的社会形势正不断恶化，富人们用钱来换取政治权力，而穷人则自生自灭。


In their private lives, Americans have become addicted to consumerism, which drains their time, savings, attention, and inclination to engage in acts of collective compassion.	在私人生活中，美国人已经深陷于消费主义无法自拔，而消费主义则反过来吞噬了美国人的时间、金钱、精力，以及致力于集体福祉的倾向。


The world should beware.	全世界都必须引以为戒。


Unless we break the ugly trends of big money in politics and rampant consumerism, we risk winning economic productivity at the price of our humanity.	除非我们能摆脱这种权钱交易和病态消费主义的怪圈，否则的话，每增加一点生产力，我们就会多丢失一点人性。


America’s Economic Stalemate	美国的经济僵局


CAMBRIDGE – The United States appears trapped in a dangerous economic stalemate.  The refusal by both Republicans and Democrats to give ground on the budget is preventing the government from dealing with its massive fiscal deficit and rapidly rising national debt.	坎布里奇——美国似乎陷入了危险的经济停滞陷阱。 共和党和民主党均拒绝在预算问题上让步，这让美国政府无法处理大规模财政赤字和快速上升的国民债务问题。


Indeed, the Congressional Budget Office projects that the national debt could increase to 82% of GDP over the next ten years – more than double the debt ratio as recently as 2008.	事实上，国会预算办公室估计，国民债务将在未来十年内上升至GDP的82%，即2008年水平的两倍。


That forecast, moreover, is based on quite optimistic assumptions of strong economic growth and low interest rates.	此外，这一估计是建立在十分乐观的经济增长和低利率假设上的。


With slower growth and more normal interest rates, the debt ratio could easily rise to more than 100% in 2021, and exceed 150% by 2030.	如果增长率没有那么高，名义利率没有那么低，则债务比率将在2021年突破100%，在2030年超过150%。


A major reason for the accelerating growth in government debt is America’s rapidly aging population and the resulting increase in the cost of the universal pension and health-care programs – Social Security and Medicare.	政府债务上升越来越快的一个主要原因是美国人口在迅速老龄化，这导致全民退休金和医保项目——社会福利和医疗保险（Social Security and Medicare）——成本节节攀升。


Most experts believe that limiting the rise in debt will require slowing the growth of these “entitlement” programs and increasing taxes as a share of GDP.	大多数专家认为，欲限制债务增长，就必须降低这些“福利”项目占GDP的比重，同时提高税收占GDP的比重。


But President Barack Obama and the congressional Democrats oppose any reduction in future entitlement programs, while the Republican presidential candidates and their party’s congressional delegation oppose any increase in tax revenues.	但奥巴马总统和国会中的民主党反对任何福利项目削减计划，而共和党总统候选人及其国会代表反对任何税收增加计划。


The result is the current stalemate in reducing the fiscal deficit and reversing the growth of the national debt.	结果就是当前的僵局——无法削减财政赤字，也无法扭转国民债务的上升趋势。


Republicans argue that the national debt’s growth should be limited only by cutting government spending.	共和党指出，国民债务增长只能通过削减政府支出来限制。


Although some cuts in traditional outlays should be part of efforts to rein in spending, this approach should be supplemented by reducing “tax expenditures” – the special features of the tax code that subsidize health care, mortgage borrowing, local-government taxes, etc..	尽管一些传统开支的削减原本就是支出控制的一部分，但这一办法需要辅之以削减“税收支出”——即税法中补贴医保、按揭贷款和地方政府税收之类的部分。


Limiting tax expenditures could reduce the annual deficit by as much as 2% of GDP, thereby reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio in 2021 by more than 25 percentage points.	限制税收支出可以削减相当于2%GDP的年度赤字，从而在2021年将债务-GDP比率拉低25个百分点以上。


Republicans generally reject this form of spending reduction, because it results in additional tax revenue.	共和党普遍拒绝这种形式的支出削减，因为这会导致税收增加。


While this method does indeed increase total revenue, the economic effect of limiting tax expenditures is the same as it is under any other method of cutting spending on those programs.	该方法确实会让总税收收入增加，但限制税收支出的经济效应与通过其他方法减少这些项目的支出是完全一样的。


But the Republicans’ opposition to anything that raises revenue means that this key to breaking the budget stalemate won’t be implemented.	但共和党反对任何令税收收入增加的办法，这意味着这一打破预算僵局的关键永远不会得到实施。


The budget cost of Social Security pensions could be gradually reduced by substituting annuities generated by investment-based personal retirement accounts for part of the current tax-financed benefits.	社会福利的预算成本可以通过用基于投资的个人退休金账户所产生的年金替代部分目前靠税收支付的福利项目来实现逐步削减。


But even though such a reform could maintain income levels for retirees, Democrats oppose it, because it lowers traditional government benefits.	但即使这样的改革可以维持退休者的收入水平，民主党也会反对，因为这会让传统政府福利减少。


This reinforces the stalemate.	于是，僵局会因此加深。


The two parties’ hardline stances anticipate the upcoming congressional and presidential elections in November 2012.	两党立场均十分强硬，这将影响到2012年的国会和总统选举。


The Republicans, in effect, face the voters with a sign that says, “We won’t raise your taxes, but the Democrats will.”	事实上，共和党向选民打出的口号将是“我们不会对你们增税，但民主党会。


The Democrats’ sign, by contrast, says, “We won’t reduce your pension or health benefits, but the Republicans will.”	”而民主党将针锋相对，树立“我们不会削减退休金和医保福利，但共和党会”的大旗。


Neither side wants any ambiguity in their message before the election, thus ruling out the possibility of any immediate changes in tax expenditures or future Social Security pensions.	双方在大选前都将保持鲜明的立场，因此，马上实现税收支出和未来社保退休金变化是不可能的。


But, for the same reason, I am optimistic that the stalemate will end after the election.	但是，出于同样的理由，我对僵局将在大选后不复存在十分乐观。


At that point, both Republicans and Democrats will be able to accept reforms that they must reject now.	那时候，不论是共和党还是民主党，都可以接受当前必须拒绝的改革。


Another post-election route to deficit reduction would be to lower marginal tax rates and balance that revenue loss with cuts in tax expenditures.	另一条在选举后赤字削减的办法是降低边际税率，同时用削减税收支出来弥补收入的减少。


Official analyses downplay the effect of lower marginal tax rates on taxable income, but experience shows that taxable income rises substantially as taxpayers respond to lower marginal rates by working more, taking more of their compensation in taxable cash than in fringe benefits, and reducing their tax-deductible consumption.	官方分析低估了降低边际税率对可征税收入的影响，但经验表明，边际税率降低会让纳税人工作更卖命、更多地以可征税现金而不是以额外津贴的形式获得报酬，并减少退税消费，从而使可征税收入水平大幅提高。


Reducing tax expenditures while lowering marginal tax rates can produce substantial revenue by increasing the level of taxable income. 	削减税收支出和降低边际税率双管齐下可以通过增加可纳税收入水平大大增加税收收入。


The current economic stalemate is troubling, because financial markets could react adversely, and because delays in addressing the fiscal deficit means a higher national debt.	当前的经济僵局十分危险，因为金融市场可能对此产生负面反应，且推迟解决财政赤字问题意味着国民债务会继续攀升。


I may be too optimistic, but I think there is good reason to believe that the current budget stalemate reflects election posturing, and that the US political system will prove more effective at making progress on fiscal consolidation once the election is past.	我也许有些过于乐观了，但我认为有很好的理由相信当前的预算僵局���粹是为了给选举造势，一旦选举结果尘埃落定，美国政治体系将在财政整合问题上显示出高效率。


America’s Election and the Global Economy	美国大选和全球经济


STANFORD – As America’s elections approach, with President Barack Obama slightly in front of his Republican challenger, former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney, pollsters still rate the races for control of the presidency and the United States Senate too close to call, with the House of Representatives likely to remain in Republican hands.	斯坦福—美国大选临近，总统奥巴马以微弱优势领先于共和党挑战者、马萨诸塞州州长罗姆尼，民意专家则仍然认为美国总统和参议员选举还远未分出胜负，众议院则极有可能仍保持在共和党手里。


The differences between the candidates are considerable, and highly consequential for American economic policy and the global economy, although enactment of their programs will depend on the makeup of Congress.	候选人之间的差异是显而易见的，对美国经济政策和全球经济的影响是重大的，尽管总统经济政策的实施还要看众议院的脸色。


The most important differences between the two candidates can be summarized as follows:	两大总统候选人的主要差别可以总结如下：


Spending.	指出。 奥巴马大举增加了支出。


Obama has dramatically increased spending.	他可能会继续实施临时性措施（正如米尔顿·弗里德曼曾经观察到的，“没有什么比政府临时政策更持久的了。 ”）；


He would likely continue many of his temporary programs (as Milton Friedman once observed, “There is nothing so permanent as a temporary government program.”); double down on having government pick winners and losers in green energy; expand spending on education and infrastructure; and substantially reduce defense expenditures.	增加一倍投入让政府来决定绿色能源领域的赢家和输家； 扩大教育和基础设施支出；


Romney, by contrast, favors limiting overall federal spending, currently 24% of GDP, to 20%, and keeping defense at 4%.	相反，罗姆尼支持限制联邦总支出，将其规模从目前占GDP的24%缩减至20%，并将赤字维持在GDP的4%的水平。


He wants private markets, not government, to choose winning firms and technologies.	他希望让私人市场而不是政府来选择企业和技术赢家。


Democrats oppose most nondefense spending cuts, arguing that reductions would cause the economy to contract.	民主党反对大多数非防务支出削减，他们指出，削减支出将导致经济衰退。


That case is strongest if the spending reductions are large and abrupt in a weak economy.	当支出削减突然性地发生在疲软经济时，这种效应最为强烈。


If phased in over a multi-year period as the economy recovers, as Romney proposes, thrift would likely be expansionary.	如果在多年的经济复苏过程中实现（如罗姆尼所规划的），那么节流可能会收到扩张性的效果。


For example, federal spending relative to GDP fell by five percentage points from the mid-1980’s to the late 1990’s in the US, and by an even larger margin in recent decades in Canada – that is, through periods of strong economic growth.	比如，美国联邦支出占GDP的比重在20世纪80年代中期至90年代末之间下降了5个百分点，在最近几十年的加拿大，支出-GDP比下降得更多——都是在经济强劲增长期间发生的。


Taxes.	税收。


Obama would raise the top marginal tax rates on wages, capital gains, dividends, interest, and estates, especially on higher-income individuals and small businesses.	奥巴马将提高工资、资本利得、分红、利息和房地产的最高边际税率，特别是对高收入个人和小企业。


Yet he has never proposed comprehensive reform of either the personal or corporate income tax.	但不论是在个人还是在公司所得税方面，他都没有提出全面的改革计划。


By contrast, Romney would reduce America’s corporate tax rate (the highest in the OECD) to 25% and tax American multinationals on a territorial, rather than a worldwide, basis in order to increase their tax competitiveness.	相反，罗姆尼将把美国公司税率（为经合组织国家的最高水平）降至25%，并将对美国跨国公司的税基从全世界改为地方，以增加税收竞争力。


He would also lower personal tax rates by 20%, and make up lost revenue by limiting tax deductions and credits, particularly at the upper end, thereby raising about 18.5% of GDP, just above the historical average, at full employment. Romney’s fiscal plan thus reduces deficits sufficiently to decrease the debt-to-GDP ratio.	他还将把个人税率降低20%，并通过限制税收减免（特别是高端人群的税收减免，该措施可以筹集相当于充分就业水平GDP的18.


He favors a balanced-budget amendment to the Constitution, and hopes to balance the budget over eight years.	5%的税收，略高于历史平均水平）冲抵收入的下降。


Obama, by contrast, would run larger deficits – his spending increase is much larger than his tax increase – which imply large tax hikes in the future.	相反，奥巴马将扩大赤字——他的增支计划远比增税计划庞大——这意味着未来会发生大规模增税。


Moreover, he would run far larger debt ratios than Romney, because the main driver of the debt is entitlement spending.	此外，奥巴马的税收比率将远高于罗姆尼，因为债务的最大原因的福利支出。


Entitlements.	福利。


Obama has remained silent about reform of Medicare and Social Security, whose long-run deficits are several times the national debt.	奥巴马在医疗保险和社会保障方面的改革一直缄口不言，这些计划的长期赤字是国民债务的数倍。


Vice President Joe Biden has even said that “no changes” to Social Security are to be made.	副总统拜登甚至说社会保障计划“不会有变化”。


Romney supports gradually increasing retirement ages, a premium-support model for Medicare, and shifting Medicaid (health insurance for the poor) to the states via block grants.	罗姆尼支持逐渐提高退休年林、以保险金支持的医疗保险模式、以及将医疗补助（面向穷人的医保）通过取消补助移交给各州。


The Obama campaign is pummeling Romney on Medicare, and the Romney campaign is hammering Obama for his refusal to negotiate or even propose a solution.	奥巴马的竞选方针是攻击罗姆尼的医疗保险计划，而罗姆尼的策略是攻击奥巴马拒绝讨论该问题甚至拿不出解决方案草案。


The Obama policy would thus lead to ever-higher deficits and debt ratios well over 100% of GDP, a level that numerous studies imply would reduce US economic growth by one-third or more and might induce a sovereign-debt crisis.	因此，奥巴马的政策将导致更高的赤字水平，债务比率将远高于GDP的100%，大量研究表明，如此水平将导致美国经济增长率萎缩三分之一以上，并引发主权债务危机。


Some observers suggest that Obama’s unspoken plan is ever-growing entitlements eventually paid for by a European-style value-added tax.	一些观察者认为奥巴马未明言的计划是用欧洲式的增值税来为不断增加的福利支出买单。


Trade.	贸易。


Obama is the first US president in a long time who has not played a leading role on global trade liberalization.	奥巴马是相当长的一段时间以来第一位没有在全球贸易自由化方面起到领导作用的美国总统。


The Doha Round of global trade talks remains stalled, and Obama delayed the three bilateral free-trade agreements that awaited approval when he came into office.	世贸谈判多哈回合依然停滞不前，并推迟了三项自他入主白宫以来一直等在签署的双边自由贸易协定。


Romney is a proponent of free trade, but has said that he would be tougher on China’s trade practices and currency policies.	罗姆尼是自由贸易的支持者，但也表示将对中国贸易行为和货币政策采取更强硬的立场。


Regulation.	监管。


Obama wants to expand federal command-and-control regulation further (though the courts have stopped his extension of some regulatory powers).	奥巴马希望进一步扩大联邦指令-控制（command-and-control）监管（尽管法院已经叫停了他的某些监管权力的扩张）。


Romney vows an economically balanced approach that would reform Obama’s major health-care, environmental, and financial-services regulations.	罗姆尼的方案采取经济平衡的立场，将改革奥巴马的主要卫生、环境和金融服务监管。


Appointments.	任命。


Every US president appoints thousands of officials, many with considerable power.	每位美国总统都会任命几千官员，其中许多人将掌握重权。


Romney has said that he would not reappoint Ben Bernanke as Fed Chairman (likely candidates: economists Glenn Hubbard, Greg Mankiw, John Taylor, and Martin Feldstein).	罗姆尼声称他将不会任命伯南克为美联储主席（可能的候选人选包括胡巴德（Glenn Hubbard）、曼昆（Greg Mankiw）、泰勒（John Taylor）、费尔德斯坦（Martin Feldstein）等经济学家）。


Other presidential appointees exert considerable influence on firms, industries, or the entire economy.	其他总统任命职位将对企业、产业甚至整个经济产生重大影响。


For example, Obama’s appointees to the obscure National Labor Relations Board tried to prevent Boeing from expanding in South Carolina, despite the state’s anti-union “right to work” legislation.	比如，奥巴马授命成立的神秘的美国劳工关系委员会（National Labor Relations Board）试图阻止波音公司在南卡罗来纳州的扩张，尽管该州通过了反工会的“工作权利”立法。


These policies would affect US economic growth, the budget deficit, national saving, and hence global trade and capital flows.	这些政策将影响到美国的经济增长、预算赤字、国民储蓄，从而影响全球贸易和资本流。


With larger deficits under Obama than under Romney, America would need more capital from Europe, Latin America, and Asia, while higher taxes and debt would impede US growth and thus undermine these regions’ exports.	奥巴马的赤字将高于罗姆尼，因此美国也将更需要来自欧洲、拉美和亚洲的资本，与此同时，税收和债务的增加将阻碍美国的经济增长，从而破坏这些地区的出口。


Obama would steer America in the direction of European social-welfare states; Romney’s agenda is designed to prevent that.	奥巴马将把美国驶上欧洲式社会福利国家的道路； 而罗姆尼的方案是阻止这一幕的发生。


Whoever wins, a fiscal cliff looms at the end of 2012.	不论谁获胜，财政悬崖都将是2012年底的一打阴影。


Previous legislation, if not reversed, will lead to large abrupt tax hikes and spending cuts, which the Congressional Budget Office forecasts would likely cause a recession in 2013.	此前的立法如果不能扭转，将导致突发性的大规模增税和减支，据联邦预算委员会的预计，这极有可能在2013年导致衰退。


While a post-election, lame-duck session of Congress will address the fiscal cliff, the deep differences between Republicans and Democrats on taxes and spending remain wide and difficult to bridge.	选举之后的国会免不了像只跛脚鸭，尽管它会解决财政悬崖，但共和党和民主党之间在税收和支出问题上的重大差异依然难以弥合。


With uncertainty plaguing Europe’s finances and China slowing, the last thing the global economy needs is a stagnant or shrinking US economy.	不确定性正在折磨欧洲财政，中国正在经历减速，如果美国经济再停滞不前甚至衰退，那世界经济就完了。


But it will take strong leadership by the president-elect to avoid it.	但要阻止这一幕，就需要总统大选选出强大的领袖。


America’s Exceptional Fiscal Conservatism	美国的另类财政保守主义


WASHINGTON, DC – In most countries, to be “fiscally conservative” means to worry a great deal about the budget deficit and debt levels – and to push these issues to the top of the policy agenda.	华盛顿—在大多数国家，身为“财政保守派”意味着你非常担心预算赤字和债务水平，并将这类问题置于政策日程的最优先位置。


In many eurozone countries today, “fiscal conservatives” are a powerful group, insisting on the need to boost government revenue while bringing spending under control.	如今，在许多欧元区国家，“财政保守派”是一个很有力量的集团，他们坚持政府需要增加收入，同时控制支出。


In Great Britain, too, leading Conservatives have recently proved willing to raise taxes and attempted to limit future spending.	在英国，执政的保守党最近也显示出征税和限制未来支出的意愿。


The United States is very different in this respect.	在这方面，美国显得极为不同。


There, leading politicians who choose to call themselves “fiscal conservatives” – such as Paul Ryan, now the Republican Party’s presumptive vice-presidential nominee to run alongside presidential candidate Mitt Romney in November’s election – care more about cutting taxes, regardless of the effect on the federal deficit and total outstanding debt.	在美国，自称“财政保守派”的政治领袖——比如共和党确定的与总统候选人罗姆尼共同挑战11月大选的副总统人选保罗·莱恩——更关注减税，而不管这会对联邦赤字和总未偿还债务水平的影响。


Why do US fiscal conservatives care so little about government debt, relative to their counterparts in other countries?	为什么与其他国家的同道相比，美国的财政保守派基本不关注政府债务呢？


It has not always been this way.	并非总是如此。


For example, in 1960, President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s advisers suggested that he should cut taxes in order to pave the way for his vice president, Richard Nixon, to be elected to the presidency.	比如，1960年，艾森豪威尔总统的顾问就建议他减税从而为其副总统尼克松问鼎总统宝座创造条件。


Eisenhower declined, partly because he did not particularly like or trust Nixon, but mostly because he thought it was important to hand over a more nearly balanced budget to his successor.	艾森豪威尔拒绝了这一建议，部分是因为他并不是很喜欢和信任尼克松，但主要原因是他认为给继任者留下更接近收支平衡的预算非常重要。


The framework for US macroeconomic policy changed dramatically when the international monetary system broke down in 1971.	1971年国际货币体系崩溃后，美国宏观政策框架有了极大的改变。


The US could no longer maintain a fixed exchange rate between the dollar and gold – the cornerstone of the postwar Bretton Woods system.	美国不再能够维持美元和黄金之间的固定兑换率，而这正是战后布雷顿森林体系的基石。


The arrangement collapsed because the US did not want to tighten monetary policy and run more restrictive fiscal policy: keeping US voters happy was understandably more important to President Nixon than maintaining a global system of fixed exchange rates.	该安排之所以崩溃，是因为美国不再愿意紧缩货币政策以及采取更严格的财政政策：不难理解，对尼克松总统来说，取悦美国选民要比维持全球固定汇率体系更加重要。


Ironically, however, rather than undermining the predominant international role of the US dollar, the end of Bretton Woods actually boosted its use around the world.	不过，讽刺的是，布雷顿森林体系的终结并没有动摇美元在国际上的主导地位，实际上反而增加了美元在世界范围的使用。


Much has been written, and many hands wrung, about the dollar’s decline over the last four decades, but the fact remains that holdings of US dollar assets by foreigners today are vastly greater than they were in 1971.	过去四十年来，关于美元将要衰落的言论和行为层出不穷，但事实却是如今由外国人持有的美元资产比1971年规模大多了。


This turns out to be a mixed blessing, because it has allowed the US to become less careful about its fiscal accounts.	这是一柄双刃剑，因为这导致美国不再关注财政账户。


Foreigners now hold roughly half of all US federal government debt, and they are willing to hold it when it yields a very low return in dollars (and even when the dollar depreciates).	如今，外国人大约持有了美国联邦政府债务的一半，而即使在这笔债务的美元回报率极低（以及美元出现贬值）的情况下，他们也愿意持有


In fact, whenever the world looks unstable, investors want to hold more dollar assets – even when the US is the cause of the instability.	事实上，每当世界不太稳定的时候，投资者就会愿意持有更多的美元——即使不稳定的根源正是来自美国。


When big US banks are in trouble or Americans are having another debilitating political fight over their public finances, global investors scramble into US Treasuries.	当美国大银行陷入麻烦或美国陷入危害甚深的公共财政政治斗争时，全球投资者忙不迭地买入美国国债。


Last year’s congressional showdown over the federal debt ceiling may have cost the US its AAA sovereign rating with Standard & Poor’s, but the federal government’s borrowing costs are actually lower now than they were then.	去年国会关于联邦债务上限的大斗争导致美国失去了标注普尔AAA级主权评级，但如今联邦政府的借贷成本却比那时候更低了。


What has America done with this opportunity – arguably the lowest-cost funding in the history of humankind?	美国利用这一机会做了些什么呢——这也许是人类历史上最低廉的融资成本了？


Not much, in terms of productive investment, strengthening education, or maintaining essential infrastructure.	没做什么，如果你从生产性投资、加强教育或维持基本基础设施角度来看的话。


But the US has done a great deal in terms of adopting tax cuts that boost consumption relative to income and lower government revenue relative to expenditure.	但若从采取减税措施以增加消费相对收入的比例以及降低政府收入相对支出的比例来说，美国又做了很多。


This is the lasting legacy of the “temporary” tax cuts adopted by George W. Bush’s administration in the early 2000’s.	这是小布什政府在21世纪初所采取的“临时”减税措施的最后遗留效应。


And Americans have shifted greatly toward political philosophies – on the right and on the left – that regard public debt merely as a distraction. Or, as former vice president Dick Cheney put it, “Reagan taught us that deficits do not matter” – meaning that Ronald Reagan cut taxes, ran bigger deficits, and did not suffer any adverse political consequences.	而美国人的政治观念有了很大改变，不管是左派还是右派，都把公债问题视为仅仅是个干扰因素��或者用前副总统切尼的话说，“里根教导我们，赤字不是问题”——他指的是罗纳德·里根减了税、增加了赤字，却没有因此承受任何不利的整治后果。


Ryan and members of the Tea Party wing of the Republican Party undoubtedly want to cut the size of the federal government, and they have articulated plans to do this over several decades.	莱恩和共和党中的茶党成员毫无疑问希望削减联邦政府的规模，他们交流这方面的计划已经几十年了。


But, in the near term, what they promise is primarily tax cuts: their entire practical program is front-loaded in that direction.	但是，在短期，他们的承诺主要是减税：他们的整个实用性规划是一个朝着这个方向前进的前瞻性计划。


The calculation is that this will prove politically popular (probably true) while making it easier to implement spending cuts down the road (less obvious).	他们的算盘是，政治上，这会得到民众支持（也许是对的），与此同时，这会让后续的减支计划更容易实施（正确性不那么明显）。


The vulnerability caused by higher public debt over the next few decades is simply ignored.	而未来数十年公债增加所引起的脆弱性完全不在他们的考虑范围内。


For example, Ryan supported George W. Bush’s spending spree.	比如，莱恩支持小布什的无节制支出。


He also supports maintaining defense spending at or near its current level – resisting the cuts that were put in place under the Budget Control Act of 2011.	他还支持将防务开支维持在（接近）现有水平，拒绝接受根据2011年预算控制法实施的防务开支缩减。


The assumption here – unstated and highly questionable – is that the US will be able to sell an unlimited amount of government debt at low interest rates for the foreseeable future.	他们的假设——并没有明说，也很可疑——是在可预见的未来，美国仍能以极低的利率出售任意数量的国债。


There is no other country in the world where fiscal conservatives would want to be associated with such a high-stakes gamble.	在其他国家，没有哪个财政保守派愿意进行如此高赌注的豪赌。


America’s Failed Militarized Foreign Policy	美国失败的军事化外交政策


Many of today’s war zones – including Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, and Sudan – share basic problems that lie at the root of their conflicts.	当今许多战火不断的地区—包括阿富汗、埃塞俄比亚、伊朗、伊拉克、巴基斯坦、索马里和苏丹—都有着植根于它们冲突之中的基本问题。


They are all poor, buffeted by natural disasters – especially floods, droughts, and earthquakes – and have rapidly growing populations that are pressing on the capacity of the land to feed them.	它们都很贫穷，饱受自然灾害之苦—特别是洪水、干旱和地震—并且都有着急速增长的人口，给土地的承载力带来巨大的压力。


And the proportion of youth is very high, with a bulging population of young men of military age (15-24 years).	年轻人口的比例很高，达到入伍年龄(15-24 岁)的年轻人数量也在不断增加。


All of these problems can be solved only through long-term sustainable economic development.	所有的这些问题通过长期可持续的经济发展都可以解决。


Yet the United States persists in responding to symptoms rather than to underlying conditions by trying to address every conflict by military means.	然而，美国的反应却是治标不治本，试图通过军事手段应对每一场冲突。


It backs the Ethiopian army in Somalia.	它在索马里支持埃塞俄比亚军队。


It occupies Iraq and Afghanistan.	它占领了伊拉克和阿富汗。


It threatens to bomb Iran.	它威胁轰炸伊朗。


It supports the military dictatorship in Pakistan.	它支持巴基斯坦的军事独裁政权。


None of these military actions addresses the problems that led to conflict in the first place.	没有一项这样的军事行动是旨在解决引发冲突的问题。


On the contrary, American policies typically inflame the situation rather than solve it.	相反，美国的政策通常是给当前的局势火上浇油。


Time and again, this military approach comes back to haunt the US.	这种军事手段使得美国屡屡自酿苦酒。


The US embraced the Shah of Iran by sending massive armaments, which fell into the hands of Iran’s Revolutionary Government after 1979.	它曾以提供大量武器装备的形式支持伊朗国王，但这些装备在1979年以后却落入了伊朗“革命政府”手中。


The US then backed Saddam Hussein in his attack on Iran, until the US ended up attacking Saddam himself.	美国在那时支持萨达姆攻打伊朗，直到调转枪头对准萨达姆本人。


The US backed Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan against the Soviets, until the US ended up fighting bin Laden.	美国曾在阿富汗支持本•拉登抵抗苏联，直到他最终成为美国的头号敌人。


Since 2001 the US has supported Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan with more than $10 billion in aid, and now faces an unstable regime that just barely survives.	自2001年起，美国给巴基斯坦的穆沙拉夫提供了超过100亿美金的援助支持，而现在所面对的却是一个摇摇欲坠的政权。


US foreign policy is so ineffective because it has been taken over by the military.	美国的外交政策如此低效的原因是它被军方控制了。


Even postwar reconstruction in Iraq under the US-led occupation was run by the Pentagon rather than by civilian agencies.	就连美国占领下的伊拉克战后重建也是由五角大楼而不是民间机构主导的。


The US military budget dominates everything about foreign policy.	美国的军事预算主导着外交政策的方方面面。


Adding up the budgets of the Pentagon, the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the Department of Homeland Security, nuclear weapons programs, and the State Department’s military assistance operations, the US will spend around $800 billion this year on security, compared with less than $20 billion for economic development.	将五角大楼、伊拉克及阿富汗战争、国土安全部、核武计划和国务院的军事协助项目的预算加在一起，美国今年将在安全方面花费约8000亿美元，而用于经济发展的预算却只有200亿美元。


In a stunning article on aid to Pakistan during the Bush administration, Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet demonstrated the disastrous nature of this militarized approach – even before the tottering Musharraf regime’s latest crackdown.	在一篇关于布什政府对巴基斯坦的援助的文章中，Craig Cohen 和 Derek Chollet赫然揭示了这种军事化手段的灾难性特质—甚至在岌岌可危的穆沙拉夫政权最近的镇压行动之前。


They show that even though Pakistan faces huge problems of poverty, population, and environment, 75% of the $10 billion in US aid has gone to the Pakistani military, ostensibly to reimburse Pakistan for its contribution to the “war on terror,” and to help it buy F-16s and other weapons systems.	文章透露尽管巴基斯坦面临贫困、人口和环境的巨大难题，100亿美援中仍有75%流向了巴勒斯坦军方，公然对巴基斯坦在“反恐战争”中所做的贡献进行偿付，并帮助其购买F16战斗机和其他武器系统。


Another 16% went straight to the Pakistani budget, no questions asked.	另有16%直接流入巴基斯坦的预算，具体去向不明。


That left less than 10% for development and humanitarian assistance.	所剩给发展与人道主义援助的部分不足10%。


Annual US aid for education in Pakistan has amounted to just $64 million, or $1.16 per school-aged child.	用于巴基斯坦教育方面的年度美国援助总额仅有6400万美元，平均到每个学龄儿童身上只有1. 16美元。


The authors note that “the strategic direction for Pakistan was set early by a narrow circle at the top of the Bush administration and has been largely focused on the war effort rather than on Pakistan’s internal situation.”	该文的两位作者还指出“巴基斯坦的战略方向早先是由布什政府高层的一个小圈子设定的，其中心是战争而不是巴基斯坦的国内状况。


They also emphasize that “US engagement with Pakistan is highly militarized and centralized, with very little reaching the vast majority of Pakistanis.”	”他们还强调“美国与巴基斯坦的接触是高度军事化和集中化的，与广大巴基斯坦民众几乎不相干。


They quote George Bush as saying, “When [Musharraf] looks me in the eye and says…there won’t be a Taliban and won’t be al-Qaeda, I believe him, you know?”	”他们援引布什的话：“当（穆沙拉夫）直视着我的眼睛说……将不会有塔利班也不会有基地组织时，我相信他，你���白么？ ”


This militarized approach is leading the world into a downward spiral of violence and conflict.	这种军事化的手段正将世界引入无止境的暴力与冲突之中。


Each new US weapons system “sold” or given to the region increases the chances of expanded war and further military coups, and to the chance that the arms will be turned on the US itself.	“出售”或给予该地区的每一件新的美国武器系统都会增加战争扩大和进一步军事政变的几率，也会增加将这些武器用来对付美国自身的几率。


None of it helps to address the underlying problems of poverty, child mortality, water scarcity, and lack of livelihoods in places like Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province, Sudan’s Darfur region, or Somalia.	它们对解决那些重要的问题毫无帮助：如在巴基斯坦西北的边疆省、苏丹的达尔富尔地区或索马里的贫困、儿童死亡、水源缺乏及缺少谋生手段。


These places are bulging with people facing a tightening squeeze of insufficient rainfall and degraded pasturelands.	这些地区的众多人口都面临着降雨不足和草场退化的严重威胁。


Naturally, many join radical causes.	很自然，在这样的情况下很多人加入了激进组织。


The Bush administration fails to recognize these fundamental demographic and environmental challenges, that $800 billion of security spending won’t bring irrigation to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, and Somalia, and therefore won’t bring peace.	布什政府没有意识到这些人口和环境方面的挑战，8000亿的安全支出不会给阿富汗、巴基斯坦、苏丹和索马里带来灌溉，因此也无法带来和平。


Instead of seeing real people in crisis, they see caricatures, a terrorist around every corner.	他们看不到危机中的真实民众，而只看得到漫画般的，藏匿在每个角落的恐怖分子。


A more peaceful world will be possible only when Americans and others begin to see things through the eyes of their supposed enemies, and realize that today’s conflicts, having resulted from desperation and despair, can be solved through economic development rather than war.	只有当美国人及其盟友开始从他们假想敌的视角看问题，并意识到当今源自于绝望的冲突只能通过经济发展而不是战争来解决时，我们才可能拥有一个更为和平的世界。


We will have peace when we heed the words of President John F. Kennedy, who said, a few months before his death, “For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet.	如果我们注意聆听肯尼迪总统在遇刺前的几个月所说的话，就能得到和平—他说：“因为，终究我们最基本的共同联系是我们都生活在这个小小的星球；


We all breathe the same air.	我们都呼吸着同样的空气；


We all cherish our children’s future.	我们都珍惜孩子们的未来，而且我们都是凡人。


And we are all mortal.”	”


America’s Financial Leviathan	美国的金融利维坦


BERKELEY – In 1950, finance and insurance in the United States accounted for 2.8% of GDP, according to US Department of Commerce estimates.	伯克利——根据美国商业部的统计数字，1950年，美国金融和保险业占GDP的比重为2. 8%。


By 1960, that share had grown to 3.8% of GDP, and reached 6% of GDP in 1990.	1960年，这一比重已上升为3. 8%，1990年则达到了6%。


Today, it is 8.4% of GDP, and it is not shrinking.	今天，这一数字是8. 4%，而且并没有出现下滑。


The Wall Street Journal’s Justin Lahart reports that the 2010 share was higher than the previous peak share in 2006.	《华尔街日报》的贾斯丁·莱哈特（Justin Lahart）报道说，2010年，该比重超过了2006年前一次高峰值。


Lahart goes on to say that growth in the finance-and-insurance share of the economy has “not, by and large, been a bad thing....Deploying capital to the places where it can be best used helps the economy grow...”	莱哈特继续指出，金融和保险占经济比重的增加“大体而言并非坏事……让资本流到用场最大的地方有助于经济的增长……”


But if the US were getting good value from the extra 5.6% of GDP that it is now spending on finance and insurance – the extra $750 billion diverted annually from paying people who make directly useful goods and provide directly useful services – it would be obvious in the statistics.	但如果美国从这如今付给金融和保险业的额外资金——占GDP的5. 6%，相当于从付给直接生产有用商品和直接提供有用服务的人的钱中每年抽出7 500亿美元——中得到好处的话，那么统计数字应该有所体现。


At a typical 5% annual real interest rate for risky cash flows, diverting that large a share of resources away from goods and services directly useful this year is a good bargain only if it boosts overall annual economic growth by 0.3% – or 6% per 25-year generation.	按风险现金流实际利率的通常水平5%计算，在今年将如此大比重的资源从直接可用的商品和服务中抽出，如果要让其不至于得不偿失，就意味着这笔资源能够提振0. 3%的年经济增长——或在25年的一代人的时间里提振6%。


There have been many shocks to the US economy over the past couple of generations, and many factors have added to or subtracted from economic growth.	过去几代人经历了多次对美国经济的冲击，诸多因素都领经济增长雪上加霜。


But it is not obvious that the US economy today would be 6% less productive if it had had the finance-insurance system of 1950 rather than the one that prevailed during the past 20 years.	但没有明显的证据表明，如果金融-保险系统维持1950年的水平，而没有像过去20年那样出现爆发式增长，那么今天美国经济的生产率会比现在低6%。


There are five ways that an economy gains from a well-functioning finance-insurance system.	经济从运转良好的金融-保险系统中获益，存在五种途径。


First, people are no longer as vulnerable to the effects of fires, floods, medical disasters, unemployment, business collapses, sectoral shifts, and so forth, because a well-working finance-insurance system diversifies and thus dissipates some risks, and deals with others by matching those who fear risk with those who can comfortably bear it.	其一，人们不再会因火灾、水灾、疾病、失业、企业倒闭、部门兴衰等因素而遭受打击，因为运转良好的金融-保险系统会分散从而消解一部分风险，并能将惧怕某种风险的人与能够安然承受这种风险等人之间匹配交易。


While it might be true that America’s current finance-insurance system better distributes risk in some sense, it is hard to see how that could be the case, given the experience of investors in equities and housing over the past two decades.	诚然，美国当前的金融-保险系统在某种程度上说也许更好地分散了风险，但从过去二十年的股票和房地产投资者的经历看，很难判定这一点是否真的成立。


Second, well-functioning financial systems match large, illiquid investment projects with the relatively small pools of money contributed by individual savers who value liquidity highly.	其二，运转良好的金融-保险系统将大规模、低流动性的投资项目与相对较小、由看重流动性的个人储蓄者提供的资金组成的资金池匹配了起来。


There has been one important innovation over the past two generations: businesses can now issue high-yield bonds.	在过去两代人的时间里，有一项重要创新：现在，企业可以发行高收益债券。


But, given the costs of the bankruptcy process, it has never been clear why a business would rather issue high-yield bonds (besides gaming the tax system), or why investors would rather buy them than take an equity stake.	但是，处于破产过程成本的考虑，企业为什么喜欢发行高收益债券（除了与税收系统周旋的原因之外）、投资者为什么喜欢购买高收益债券，而不采用股票发行和购买的方式还并没有水落石出。


Third, improved opportunities to borrow allow one to spend more now, when one is poor, and save more later, when one is rich.	其三，借贷机会的改善使得人们可以在今天（较穷时）支出得更多，在未来（较富时）储蓄得更多。


Households are certainly much more able to borrow, thanks to home-equity loans, credit-card balances, and payday loans.	家庭的借贷机会有了明显的提高，这得归功于住房所有权贷款、信用卡账户和发薪日贷款。


But what are they really buying?	但实际上他们买了些什么呢？


Many are not buying the ability to spend when they are poor and save when they are rich, but instead appear to be buying postponement of the “unpleasant financial retrenchment” talk with the other members of their household.	许多人并没有买到较穷时支出、较富时储蓄的能力，而是买到了暂时不必与其他家庭成员讨论“不愉快的财务紧缩”的机会。


And that is not something you want to buy.	而这正是你所想买到的。


Fourth, we have seen major improvements in the ease of transactions.	其四，我们看到，交易的便利性有了极大的改善。


But, while electronic transactions have made a great deal of financial life much easier, this should have been accompanied by a decrease, not an increase, in the finance share of GDP, just as automated switching in telecommunications led to a decrease in the number of telephone switchboard operators per phone call.	但是，尽管电子交易让金融生活有了极大的便利，但这应该伴随着GDP的金融比重的下降而不是上升，正如通信设备的自动开关应该使手机上的电话按键操作减少一样。


Indeed, the operations of those parts of the financial system most closely related to technological improvements have slimmed down markedly: consider what has happened to the checking operations of the regional Federal Reserve Banks.	事实上，与���术进步关系最密切的那部分金融系统的操作有了显著的简化，地区联邦储备银行的核对操作就是明证。


Finally, better finance should mean better corporate governance.	最后，更棒的金融意味着更棒的公司治理。


Since shareholder democracy does not provide effective control over entrenched, runaway, self-indulgent management, finance has a potentially powerful role to play in ensuring that corporate managers work in the interest of shareholders.	由于股东民主没能有效控制管理层的放任恣睢，金融扮演着保证公司管理者按股东利益行事的重要角色。


And a substantial change has indeed occurred over the past two generations: CEOs focus much more attention than they used to on pleasing the stock market, and this is likely to be a good thing.	而在过去两代人的时间里，的确发生了深远的变化：CEO们比以前更关注股市表现了，这或许是件好事。


Overall, however, it remains disturbing that we do not see the obvious large benefits, at either the micro or macro level, in the US economy’s efficiency that would justify spending an extra 5.6% of GDP every year on finance and insurance.	不过，总的来说，不管是在围观还是宏观层面，我们并没有看见显而易见的大好处，这一点始终令人不安。 美国经济的效率并没有提高到能证明将这笔相当于GDP的5.


Lahart cites the conclusion of New York University’s Thomas Philippon that today’s US financial sector is outsized by two percentage points of GDP.	6%的额外资金花在金融和保险上物有所值的程度。 莱哈特引用了纽约大学的托马斯·菲力彭（Thomas Philippon）的结论：今日美国的金融部门显得太大了，占GDP的比重至少比合理水平高2个百分点。


And it is very possible that Philippon’s estimate of the size of the US financial sector’s hypertrophy is too small.	而且菲力彭对美国金融部门规模的估计很有可能是低估的。


Why has the devotion of a great deal of skill and enterprise to finance and insurance sector not paid obvious economic dividends?	为什么投入金融和保险部门的技能和创业精神没有产生显而易见的经济红利？


There are two sustainable ways to make money in finance: find people with risks that need to be carried and match them with people with unused risk-bearing capacity, or find people with such risks and match them with people who are clueless but who have money.	在金融业中赚钱的可持续之道有二：找到有风险可转的人，并将他们与有风险承担能力的人相匹配； 或找到有风险的人，并将他们与身份不明但手握重金的人相匹配。


Are we sure that most of the growth in finance stems from a rising share of financial professionals who undertake the former rather than the latter?	金融业的增长主要来自从事前一种业务还是后一种业务的专业人士，这个问题的答案有谁能确切知道吗？


America’s Fiscal Isolationism	美国的财政孤立主义


DENVER – Patience might be a virtue, but not necessarily when it comes to American foreign policy.	丹佛——耐心是一种美德，但在美国外交政策上绝非如此。


Consider “the long war,” a bold concept embraced a few years ago to describe the continuing struggle against terrorism, the grudging progress that could realistically be achieved, and the enormous financial burden that it would impose for years to come.	想想“漫长的战争”吧，这一醒目的概念是几年前用来描述与恐怖主义旷日持久的战争的，获胜可以做到，但其巨大的财政负担将在多年内都无法消除。


It was also a realpolitik acknowledgement of the setbacks to be expected along the way (the “slog,” as then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld put it).	这一概念也是对预期中的挫折的强权政治式的承认（用当时国防部长拉姆斯菲尔德的话说，就是“决胜”）。


Above all, the term was an effort to communicate to Americans, accustomed to waging war with speed and decisiveness (and insistent on it since Vietnam), the long-term sacrifice and commitment needed to win a war of survival.	无论如何，这个词是说给美国人听的，美国人习惯于发动决定性速决战（自越战以来这就是美军所坚持的方针），为事关存亡的战争作出长期牺牲和奋斗。


Its proponents also understood that the war would not be limited to weapons, but would need to be a sustained effort, involving, as they put it, the “whole of government,” with civilian agencies marshaled behind military – or paramilitary – objectives.	其拥护者也明白，战争并非只是武器的比拼，而是连续不断的付出，用他们的话说，要摧毁“政府全力投入”不仅是军事或准军事实体，还有其背后的民事机构。


Daunting as the effort would be, its advocates assumed a sustainable political consensus to support it.	这样的付出令人生畏，因此其鼓吹者需要可持续的政治一致来支持它。


After all, the United States had been attacked.	毕竟，美国也曾被攻击过。


Today, that consensus is unraveling as America’s politicians wrestle with a federal budget that is itself turning into a long war – one with its own casualties.	如今，随着美国政客在旷日持久的联邦预算论战中斗得不可开交，这个一致条件已不再成立。


The battle lines in this struggle suggest that there is little accord among political elites for any spending, let alone for a long war with far-flung commitments.	这场论战表明，政治精英在所有支出方案上都存在分歧，更不用说劳师远征事宜了。


As a result, basic assumptions are being questioned at every turn.	结果，每走一步，基本条件就会受到质疑。


Indeed, the current budget war seems to be reopening old divisions about America’s view of itself and the world.	事实上，当前预算论战似乎重新撕开了美国对其自身以及世界看法的旧有分歧。


The outcome is far from certain, but even isolationism, a perennial American malady, seems to be making a comeback.	论战结果远未明了，甚至有孤立主义（在美国由来已久的弊端）卷土重来的可能。


Isolationism is a familiar refrain in US foreign policy among those elements of the right that consider the US too good for the world, as well as among those on the left who consider America a destructive global force.	美国外交政策经常陷入孤立主义的囹圄，孤立主义者既包括总是认为美国在全世界鹤立鸡群的美国右派，也包括认为美国是全球不稳定因素的左派。


But this time, as perhaps never before, a bipartisan isolationist impulse is being driven by the budget.	但这一回可能与前几次都不一样，预算问题正在催生跨党派孤立主义。


America’s fiscal crisis is profound, and it is not just about numbers.	美国的财政危机影响深远，绝对不是几个数字那么简单。


As the emotions in Washington today suggest, the aversion to tax increases runs far deeper than concern about their effect on current economic performance and job growth.	华盛顿的情绪表明，对加税的厌恶要远胜于当前经济和就业表现。


In part, it represents a fundamental – some would say fundamentalist – view that taxes are to government what a bottle of whisky is to an alcoholic.	从某种程度上说，这代表着一种正统——一些人称之为正统派——观点，即税收之于政府，就像威士忌之于酒鬼。


Government, as Ronald Reagan told us, is the problem, not the solution.	罗纳德·里根告诉我们，政府不是解决方案，政府本身就是问题。


That message is bad news for American diplomacy.	这对美国外交来说可是个坏消息。


The linkage between politicians’ unwillingness to fund domestic programs and the imperiled commitment to “the long war” might elude those in US foreign-policy circles, but it is not lost on the rest of the country.	政客一方面不愿为国内计划提供资金，一方面又在大打“漫长的战争”，美国外交圈可能会忽视两者之间的联系，但其他美国人可不会。


Opinion surveys suggest that Americans want to maintain many of the “discretionary” domestic programs – schools, hospitals, transportation infrastructure, recreational parks, etc. – that are now on the chopping block in budget negotiations.	民意调查显示，美国人愿意维持许多“自由裁量”国内计划——学校、医院、交通基础设施，休闲公园等——而这些计划如今成了预算谈判樽俎上的鱼肉。


In places like rural El Paso County, on the eastern plains of Colorado, far from the federal budget debate’s epicenter, spending cuts are the order of the day.	在艾尔帕索县（El Paso County）农村等地区，在科罗拉多州东部平原，在那些远离联邦预算论战中心的地区，支出削减已经提上了议程。


School districts are increasing class sizes as they shed teachers, as well as deferring maintenance projects and curtailing the school-bus service.	随着教师裁员，各学区纷纷提高了班级规模，校舍修缮计划被推迟，校车服务也收到了影响。


These cuts are having a very real and immediate impact on El Paso County’s residents.	支出削减正在对艾尔帕索县居民造成直接影响。


Can they, and other Americans who are losing vital services, really be expected to rise above it all and support funding to build new schools in Afghanistan?	他们（以及其他正在失去生活必须服务的美国人）真的会期待付出更多的税收来为阿富汗建设新学校提供资金？


Not only are America’s public schools starting to look second-rate, but so is its infrastructure, which had long been a source of national pride.	不但美国公立学校正在沦为二等，美国基础设施亦然，而这长期以来一直是美国人民的骄傲。


How many travelers nowadays can fail to note the difference between Asia’s new, efficient airports and the aging, clogged antiques in some major US cities?	现在，有多少旅行者会分不清亚洲的新建高效机场和美国各主要城市那老迈低效的古董机场？


The budget war is not producing any consensus on fixing America’s infrastructure, but it is beginning to produce a view that Afghanistan and Pakistan are far from being core US national interests.	预算论战并没有就修补美国基础设施���成任何一致，倒是在造成这样的印象：阿富汗和巴基斯坦才是美国的核心国家利益。


Why, people ask, are schools and roads in Afghanistan and Iraq more important than those in Colorado or California?	人们不禁要问，为什么阿富汗和伊拉克的学校和道路比科罗拉多和加利福尼亚更重要？


At one point in 2008, the US military picked up the cost of transporting a tiger for the Baghdad zoo.	在2008年，美国军队承担了向巴格达动物园运送一只老虎的费用。


When was the last time the US government did that for a US zoo (outside of Washington, of course)?	美国政府上一次为美国动物园做同样的事情要追溯到何年何月了（当然，华盛顿除外）？


How this debate sorts itself out will have profound consequences for how America conducts itself in the world.	这场论战如何收场将对美国如何在世界上给自己定位造成深远影响。


But it might also take a toll on how the world reacts to America’s fastest-growing export: unsolicited advice.	但这也将有损于世界对美国增长最快的出口项目——主动提供意见——的反应。


Countries take others’ advice for many reasons.	一国接受他人意见的原因很多。


Sometimes they respect the adviser’s wisdom and insights (fairly rare in diplomacy).	有时他们尊重意见提供者的智慧和洞见（这在外交中非常罕见）。


Or they might fear the consequences of not taking the advice (an offer one cannot refuse, so to speak).	有时他们害怕拒绝建议的后果（及不得不接受的意见）。


Or, as is true of many of America’s diplomatic transactions, accepting advice could open the way to a better relationship and to additional assistance.	有时（正如大量美国外交交易所显示的）接受建议开启改善关系之门，从而带来进一步的援助。


In short, diplomacy – and US diplomacy, in particular – often involves money.	简言之，外交——特别是美国外交——通常与金钱有关。


But what if there is no money to offer?	但没钱进行外交会怎么样呢？


What if Americans, tired of the budget cuts in their neighborhoods, refuse to support funds even for “the long war”?	如果美国人厌恶了对自己所住社区预算的削减，从而拒绝为“漫长的战争”掏腰包，情况又会如何？


At that point, senior US officials might well arrive in a country, offer advice, and find that nobody is bothering to listen.	真到了这一步，可能会是这样：美国高官抵达某个国家，给出一些建议，结果发现根本没人理他。


Obama’s Underachieving Foreign Policy	奥巴马外交政策差强人意


PARIS – To evaluate an American president’s foreign-policy performance after one term is challenging, given the complex diplomatic and strategic environment and significant domestic constraints that confront every US president.	巴黎—在美国总统的一个任期之后评估其外交政策表现是一个挑战，因为每一位美国总统都面临着复杂多变的外交和战略环境以及严峻的国内约束。


Nevertheless, in advance of November’s presidential election, it is important to distinguish the forces that have shaped Barack Obama’s foreign policy, and to assess his handling of them.	尽管如此，在11月总统大选即将到来之际，认识一下什么驱动力决定了奥巴马的外交政策并评估他在处理外交问题上的表现仍然是非常重要的。


Obama kept his promise to withdraw American forces from Iraq during his first term.	在其第一个任期中，奥巴马履行了从伊拉克撤军的承诺。


But the move proved to be a strategic defeat, given that it significantly diminished the United States’ political influence in Iraq.	但这一行动是一场战略失败，因为这极大地削弱了美国在伊拉克的政治影响力。


Indeed, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government is becoming increasingly allied with Iran.	事实上，总理马利基政府正在倒向与伊朗结盟。


Obama, who opposed the Iraq war, should not be blamed for current circumstances there.	反对伊拉克战争的奥巴马不应该成为伊拉克如此现状的替罪羊。


But he was unable to improve the situation or help Iraq’s Shias and Sunnis reach a political compromise.	但他也没能改善这一状况或帮助伊拉克的什叶派和逊尼派达成政治妥协。


In contrast, Obama expanded the war in Afghanistan – which he considered to be a war of necessity – and put the Taliban on the defensive.	与之相对的是，奥巴马扩大了阿富汗战争（他认为这是一场必要之仗），并迫使塔利班采取了守势。


But the US will begin to withdraw troops after 2014, without having defined a political solution in line with its interests.	但美国将在2014年后开始撤军，与此同时，与其利益一致的政治解决方案并没有产生。


Meanwhile, America’s strategic partnership with Pakistan, where Obama won a significant symbolic victory by eliminating Osama bin Laden, is in tatters.	与此同时，美国与巴基斯坦的战略合作关系（在这方面，奥巴马除掉了本·拉登，赢得了重要的象征性胜利）也是千疮百孔。


US-Pakistan relations have regressed to their level before September 11, 2001, with mutual distrust minimizing cooperation.	美巴关系已经退回了2001年9月11日之前的水平，相互不信任使得两国无法精诚合作。


In fact, in all of the strategic challenges to US security that Obama inherited – Iran, North Korea, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – he has made virtually no significant political gains.	事实上，在奥巴马接手的所有美国安全战略挑战中——包括朝鲜、伊拉克、阿富汗、巴基斯坦和以色列-巴勒斯坦冲突——他几乎没有取得任何重大政治成果。


Notwithstanding Obama’s skillful response to the Arab Spring – the only strategic surprise that he has faced as president – his credibility in the Muslim world has steadily declined.	尽管奥巴马对于阿拉伯之春的反应可谓灵巧——这也是他作为总统所面临的唯一一次战略惊奇——但其在穆斯林世界中的信誉在稳步下降。


He has failed to deliver on the key promise of his Cairo speech in 2009: “to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world.”	他没能兑现2009年开罗演讲所作出的重要承诺：“寻求美国和全世界穆斯林的新关系”。


Moreover, Obama’s efforts to improve relations with Russia – embodied in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) – did not lead to a genuine “reset” in bilateral ties, largely because an increasingly Soviet-style Russian leadership distrusts a US establishment that still regards Russia as a foe.	此外，奥巴马与俄罗斯改善关系的努力——体现在战略武器削���条约（START）中——并没有让两国关系真正实现“重置”，这主要是因为越来越苏维埃化的俄罗斯领导层不信任仍然将俄罗斯视为敌人的美国。