And the US-China relationship has deteriorated, with America seeking to manage China’s rise strategically – for example, through regional trade agreements and an enhanced military presence in Asia.	美中关系也出现了倒退，美国寻求遏制中国的战略崛起，比如通过地区贸易协定以及增加在亚洲的军事部署。


On multilateral issues, Obama’s performance is equally unimpressive.	在多边问题方面，奥巴马的表现也同样不尽如人意。


After committing to a 17% reduction of greenhouse-gas emissions by 2020 – and despite his declaration that he would not tolerate inaction in this area – he simply stopped raising the issue after the Republicans’ sweeping victory in the November 2010 mid-term elections.	他承诺在2020年削减温室气体排放量的17%，并声称他无法容忍在该领域无所作为，但在2010年中期选举共和党大获全胜后，他便不再提及这一问题。


Likewise, domestic pressure has caused Obama to neglect trade issues.	类似地，国内压力还迫使奥巴马忽视贸易问题。


The US is largely responsible for the failure of the Doha Round of global trade talks.	美国要为全球贸易谈判多哈回合的失败负主要责任。


Obama’s one significant foreign-policy breakthrough has been to release the US from the grip of the “global war on terror.”	奥巴马的重大外交政策突破之一是把美国从“全球恐怖战争”的束缚中解放了出来。


Jettisoning the Manichean rhetoric of that “war” allowed the US to regain the political legitimacy that former President George W. Bush had lost, without diminishing its strategic credibility.	放弃这场对“战争”的摩尼教式的口吻，美国重新赢得了前总统小布什所丢掉的政治合法性，同时又没有降低其战略信誉。


After the Vietnam War, Jimmy Carter hoped to make a break with established US policy.	越南战争后，卡特希望在既成美国政策中取得突破。


But his administration’s actions – including serious blunders in Iran and Afghanistan – made the US appear weak and indecisive.	但他的政府的行为——包括在伊朗和阿富汗所犯下的重大错误——让美国显得孱弱而犹豫。


While Obama’s policies have not weakened America’s international standing, they also have not led to achievements comparable to Richard Nixon’s rapprochement with China, largely owing to what might be described as the dogmatic pragmatism that underlies them – an emphasis on avoiding the worst, rather than on striving for the best.	奥巴马的政策尽管没有削弱了美国的国际立场，但也没有带来堪与尼克松与中国建交相比的成就，主要的原因在于奥巴马外交政策背后的教条实用主义——强调避免最坏结果，而不是追求最好结果。


Moreover, Obama has been confronted with significant constraints, including the global economic crisis, domestic political polarization, a hostile Congress, and the rise of emerging powers that need the US but are unwilling to accept its dominance.	此外，奥巴马还面临了重大约束，包括全球经济危机、国内政治两极分化、敌意国会，以及需要美国又不愿接受美国主导的新兴大国的崛起。


As a result, he has failed to change strategic realities by, for example, reconciling America’s broader interests with those of Iran (a declared enemy), Pakistan (a “frenemy”), and Israel (a key ally).	结果，奥巴马没能通过（比如）将美国与伊朗（明确宣布的敌人）、巴基斯坦（亦敌亦友）和以色列（关键盟友）的更广泛的利益协调起来改变战略现实。


To be sure, Obama faces a more complex diplomatic and strategic environment than Nixon faced in the 1970’s.	平心而论，奥巴马所面临的外交和战略环境比20世纪70年代尼克松更复杂。


Unstable coalitions in Iran prevent any substantive negotiations between the two countries, while political fragmentation in Pakistan significantly hinders US policy there.	伊朗内部联盟的不稳定性决定了美伊之间不可能开展任何有意义的谈判，而巴基斯坦的政治分裂局面也极大地拖累了美国的巴基斯坦政策。


And the fragility of Israel’s ruling coalition, combined with strong congressional support for Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, makes it difficult to influence the country’s policies, despite Israel’s significant impact on US strategy in the Arab world.	以色列执政联盟的脆弱性，加上国会对总理内塔尼亚胡的强烈支持导致美国很难影响以色列的政策，尽管以色列对美国的阿拉伯政策具有重大影响。


But Obama has also struggled to define the terms of a possible grand bargain.	但奥巴马仍然勉强地给出了可能的大谈判的条件。


Any agreement with Iran would require consent from Israel and the Gulf countries, which do not share the same objectives.	任何与伊朗达成的协议都必须经过以色列和海湾国家同意，而后两者的目标并不相同。


And the US cannot reach an accord with Pakistan without India’s consent, which America would be unable to force, especially given that it relies on India to counterbalance China’s growing clout in Asia.	美国也不可能在印度不同意的情况下与巴基斯坦达成协议，而印度是否同意并不由美国说了算，特别是在美国需要依赖印度制衡中国在亚洲的影响力的情况下。


With Israel, the terms are ostensibly simpler: in exchange for a stronger US security guarantee, Israel would accept the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders.	至于以色列，条件看上去更简单：作为对美国加强其安全保证的交换，以色列将接受巴勒斯坦沿1967年边境建国。


But Israel is also a crucial domestic political topic in the US; indeed, any distancing from Israel is unacceptable to most Americans.	但以色列也是美国的主要国内政治话题之一； 事实上，任何远离以色列的做法对于大部分美国人来说都是不可接受的。


While Obama’s first term could not be called a foreign-policy disappointment, his achievements – although not trivial – have been limited.	尽管奥巴马的第一个任期的外交政策算不上令人失望，但他的成就——虽说不小——极其有限。


If he wins a second term, he is likely to find it increasingly difficult to win by playing not to lose.	如果他能够赢得第二个任期，那么他可能会更加难以通过立足不败之地获得胜利。


America’s Groucho Marxists	美国的“格鲁乔”马克思主义者


LONDON – Groucho Marx has always been my favorite Marxist.	发自伦敦——美国喜剧明星格鲁乔·马克思一直是我最钟爱的“马克思主义者”。


One of his jokes goes to the heart of the failure of the ideology – the dogmatic religion – inflicted on our poor world by his namesake, Karl.	他的其中一条笑料道破了马克思主义意识形态——既所谓教条化的信仰——为何失败的核心原因，而这个信仰曾被他的同族人卡尔·马克思所利用，令我们这个悲惨的世界饱受折磨。


“Who are you going to believe,” Groucho once asked, “me, or your own eyes?”	“你到底要信谁，“格鲁乔曾经这样问道，“是我，还是你自己的眼睛？


For hundreds of millions of citizens in Communist-run countries in the twentieth century, the “me” in the question was a dictator or oligarchy ruling with totalitarian or authoritarian powers.	”对于成千上万名生活在20世纪社会主义国家的公民来说，问题中的“我”是一个用极权主义或者强权主义来进行统治的独裁者或者政治寡头集团。


It didn’t matter what you could see with your own eyes. You had to accept what you were told the world was like.	你自己的眼睛看到的一切并不重要，你必须接受世界就是他们所说的样子。


Reality was whatever the ruling party said it was.	执政党说它是什么它就是什么，这就是现实。


The designated successor to Mao Zedong in China, Hua Guofeng, raised this attitude to an art form. He was known as a “whateverist.”	在中国，毛泽东指定的继承人华国锋把这个观点发挥到了极致：众所周知，他是个“凡是主义者”。


The Party and people should faithfully follow whatever Mao instructed them to do.	中国共产党和人民就该一心一意遵照毛主席曾经指示的去办。


Groucho posed two insuperable problems for the “whateverists” of communism. First, your own eyes and your reason would surely tell you before long that the communist idyll – the withering away of the state and the triumph over need – would never come.	而格鲁乔则向这种“凡是主义者”提出了两个无法回答的难题：首先，你的两只眼睛和理智相当肯定地告诉你自己，类似“国家消亡”和征服市场需求理论这号共产主义田园牧歌式景象将永远不会到来。


Communism, like the horizon, was always just beyond reach.	共产主义更像天边的地平线，永远可望而不可及。


It would be interesting to know how many of those at Beijing’s Central Party School – the party’s main educational institute – believe that the Chinese state is about to wither away, or ever will.	而如果能让我们了解一下在北京中央党校——这个中国共产党最主要的教育机构——进修的人之中究竟有多少会相信作为一个国家形式的中国即将消亡，或者总有一天会消亡，这都会是一件挺有趣的事。


The second application of Groucho’s question was that citizens of most Communist countries soon learned that the loss of freedom that they suffered was not compensated by greater prosperity or a higher quality of life.	格鲁乔难题在现实中的第二个体现，则是大多数共产主义国家的国民都很快发现，他们丧失自由的痛苦并没有换来更多的繁荣或者更高的生活水平。 生活在俄罗斯、波兰、捷克和其他社会主义国家的人们越多看到西方民主国家的生活方式，他们就越质疑自己的社会体系。


The more that Russians, Poles, Czechs, and others saw of the life-style in the Western democracies, the more they questioned their own system. In his magisterial book	在阿奇·布朗的权威性著作《共产主义兴衰论》中就记述了出国访问是怎样打开了米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫的眼界，令其发现了一生寄身其中的社会体系的失败之处。


So, in the political sphere, reason has trumped both faith in an unattainable goal and self-delusion about the consequences of its pursuit.	因此在政治范畴内，理性既战胜了那种追求遥不可及目标的信念，也击败了那种为这一追求而放弃某些权利的自欺欺人之举。


Authoritarian party-states, such as China and Vietnam, survive, but not through commitment to communism. Their legitimacy depends on their ability to deliver economic growth through state-managed capitalism.	虽然中国和越南这类独裁政党统治下的国家最终生存了下来，但这并不是通过笃行共产主义那一套，而是依靠由国家主导的资本主义来发展经济，最终保住了自己的统治合法性。


Democracies, of course, allow people to use their reason to make choices based on the evidence of their own eyes.	而民主国家这一边，人民能够运用自身的理智，根据他们亲眼所见来作出选择。


When you don’t like a government, you can turn the rascals out without overthrowing the whole system.	当你不喜欢某届政府，你可以将这些混蛋赶下台，而不必去推翻整个政体。


Change can be made in an evolutionary, rather than a revolutionary, way.	改变是渐进式的，而不是一场彻底革命。


But no one should think that debate in democracies is always based on reason, or that democracy necessarily makes people more rational.	但人们也不应认为民主国家里的政治争论就总是建筑在理性之上的，或者想当然地认为民主制度必然会令人民变得更加理性。


Sometimes reason does prevail.	有时候理性确实能够获胜，正如最近一届印度大选；


This is what appeared to happen in the last Indian election, and the election in the United States of President Barack Obama was also plainly a supremely rational moment.	美国总统奥巴马的当选也无疑是个崇高的理性时刻。


But reason does not seem to be getting much of a hearing during the current health-care debate in the US.	然而，在目前关于美国医疗保健改革的争论当中，理性似乎没占到什么便宜。


Outsiders, even admirers, have often wondered how the most globalized country in the world – a continent inhabited by people from every land – can be so irrationally insular on some issues.	局外人，甚至是仰慕者们都经常感到诧异——美国这个世界上全球化程度最高的国度、一块由各大洲移民居住的大陆怎么会在某些问题上显得如此狭隘而不理智。


We scratch our heads about America’s gun laws. We were astonished during President George W. Bush’s first term at the administration’s hostility to science, reflected in its stance on climate change and Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution.	美国的枪支法令我们摸不着头脑，我们也曾震惊于乔治·W·布什总统在其第一届任期内那种对科学的敌视态度，比如此人在气候变化和达尔文进化论上竟会如此顽固不化。


The opposition to health-care reform is a similar cause of bemusement.	而对医疗改革的反对，也引起了我们同样的困惑。


We know that despite its great wealth – and its groundbreaking medical research – America’s health-care system is awful. It is hugely expensive.	众所周知，除了巨大的财富与其不断创新突破的医药研究之外，美国的医疗体系其实非常糟糕：它异常昂贵，并且花费高得令工作场所健康保险体系都负担不住。


Its costs overwhelm workplace health-insurance schemes. The poor go unprotected.	穷人缺乏保护，很多疾病也不在保障范围之内。


Too many of the sick are untreated. Overall health statistics are worse than those in comparable countries.	总的来说，美国的健康统计数据比其他类似国家都要差得多。


Yet Obama’s attempts to reform health care have run into hysterical opposition.	但即便如此，奥巴马试图改革医疗体系的举措还是遭到了近乎疯狂的反对。


His proposals would lead, it is said, to the state murdering the elderly.	有人说他的提案意味着国家在谋杀那些年老的公民。


They would introduce Soviet communism into the US – just like what apparently exists in Canada and Britain, with their state-sponsored health systems.	并认为政府这种由各州提供财政支持的医疗体系将等同于把苏联社会主义引入美国——就像已经明确存在于加拿大和英国的那样。


Communism in Toronto and London?	那么此举究竟有没有让多伦多和伦敦笼罩在共产主义的阴影之下？


Or just better, cheaper, more reliable health care for all?	还是创造了一个面向所有人，更好、更经济实惠并且值得信赖的医疗体系呢？


Reason seems to be having a hard time of it in the US just now.	如今在美国国内，理性似乎正举步维艰。


Maybe it’s no coincidence that Groucho Marx was an American citizen.	也许只有这样一个国度才能孕育出格鲁乔这种能深入思考教条主义的奇人。


But surely the way a society cares for its sick and needy and elderly is sufficiently important to deserve serious and thoughtful argument based on what we really can see with our own eyes rather than on uninformed partisan prejudice.	但能够肯定的是，一个社会如何关照老弱病残等弱势群体的问题非常有必要得到人们严肃而周全的讨论，而这些讨论的依据必须是人们的亲眼所见，而不是那些愚昧无知的党派成见。


Gun Control After Newtown	纽顿之后话枪管


NEW YORK – The brutal murder of 20 children and seven adults in Newtown, Connecticut, shakes us to the core as individuals and requires a response as citizens.	纽约—康涅狄格州纽顿市20名儿童、7名成人遇害惨案骇人心魄，作为公民，我们必须对此有所反应。


The United States seems to reel from one mass gun killing to another – roughly one a month this year alone.	美国似乎陷入了大规模枪击杀人的怪圈，光是今年，几乎每个月都要发生一起。


Easy access to guns in the US leads to horrific murder rates relative to other highly educated and wealthy societies.	在美国，得到枪支易如反掌，这导致与其他教育程度较高的富裕社会相比，美国的谋杀大案率较高。


America needs to find a better way.	美国必须找到一条更好的道路。


Other countries have done so.	其他国家已经找到了这样的道路。


Between the mid-1970’s and the mid-1990’s, Australia had several mass shootings.	20世纪70年代中期至90年代中期，澳大利亚发生过数起大规模枪击案。


After a particularly horrible massacre in 1996, a new prime minister, John Howard, declared that enough was enough.	1996年的特别重大杀戮事件后，新任总理霍华德（John Howard）宣布，够了已经够了（enough was enough）。


He instituted a severe crackdown on gun ownership, and forced would-be gun owners to submit to a rigorous application process, and to document why they would need a gun.	他严厉打击枪支保有，强迫潜在持枪者走严格的申请程序，且必须说明需要持枪的原因。


Conditions for gun ownership in Australia are now very strict, and the registration and approval process can take a year or more.	如今，澳大利亚的持枪条件十分严格，注册和批准程序长达一年或以上。


Howard’s government also implemented a rigorous “buyback” policy, to enable the government to purchase guns already owned by the public.	霍华德政府还实施了严格的“回购”政策，允许政府收购已被公众所拥有的枪支。


The policy worked.	这一政策起到了效果。


While violent crime has not ended in Australia, murders are down, and, even more dramatically, there has not been a single mass shooting since 1996 in which three or more people died (the definition used in many studies of mass shootings).	尽管澳大利亚的暴力犯罪并未因此销声匿迹，但谋杀案有所下降，更重要的是，1996年之后再未发生过死亡人数三人或以上的大规模枪击时间（3人死亡是很多研究中所定义的大规模枪击事件标准）。


Before the crackdown, there had been 13 such massacres in 18 years.	而在打击枪击保有之前，18年中澳大利亚发生了13起大规模杀戮事件。


Yet the US still refuses to act, even after this year’s string of shocking incidents: the massacre in a movie theatre in Colorado, an attack on a Sikh community in Milwaukee, another on a shopping mall in Oregon, and many more before the ruthless slaughter of first graders and school staff in Newtown.	但在美国，尽管今年发生了一系列枪击事件，人们仍然拒绝采取行动：科罗拉多州电影院大屠杀、密尔沃基锡克教社区和俄勒冈州购物中心枪击案，以及纽顿市一年级学生和教工血腥大屠杀之前所发生的多起案件。


The gun lobby in the US remains powerful, and politicians are afraid to counter it.	枪支游说集团在美国仍然势力强大，政客不敢得罪他们。


Given the shooting of then-Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords in 2011, perhaps they even fear that they, too, might be targeted.	2011年，国会议员吉福斯（Gabrielle Giffords）遭遇枪击，这使得政客们甚至害怕自己也成为目标。


There can be little doubt that some societies are more steeped in violence than others, even controlling for obvious factors like income levels and education.	毫无疑问，即使控制了收入水平和教育等显而易见的因素，某些社仍比其他社会更具暴力倾向。


The US homicide rate is roughly four times that of comparable societies in Western Europe, and Latin America’s homicide rates are even higher than in the US (and dramatically higher than Asian countries at roughly the same income level).	美国杀人率大约是可比西欧社会的四倍，而拉美的杀人率比美国还高（比收入水平相当的亚洲高得多）。


What accounts for staggeringly high rates in the US and Latin America?	美国和拉美杀人率如此之高的原因是什么？


American violence is rooted in history.	美国的暴力有其历史根源。


The US and Latin American countries are all “conquest” societies, in which Europeans ruled over multi-racial societies.	美国和拉美国家都是“��征服”社会，是由欧洲人统治的多种族社会。


In many of these countries, including the US, the European conquerors and their descendants nearly wiped out the indigenous populations, partly through disease, but also through war, starvation, death marches, and forced labor.	在这些国家中，有很多国家（包括美国在内）的土著被欧洲征服者及其子孙后代赶尽杀绝，部分是通过疾病，但也有战争、饥饿、被迫迁徙和强制劳动的因素。


In the US and many Latin American countries, slaveholding fueled mass violence as well.	在美国和许多拉美国家，蓄奴也是大规模暴力的助长原因。


The slaves – and generations of their descendants – were routinely murdered.	奴隶——以及他们的后代——经常被杀致死。


The US also developed a particular populist belief that gun ownership constitutes a vital protection against government tyranny.	美国还形成了一种带浓厚民粹主义色彩的信念：拥有枪支是抵抗暴政的关键手段。


The US was born in a citizens’ revolt against British imperial power.	美国诞生在公民反抗英国帝国主义霸权的过程中。


The right of citizens to organize militias to fight government tyranny was therefore a founding idea of the new country, enshrined in the Second Amendment to the US Constitution, which declares that, because a country needs a well-regulated militia, the people have the right to bear arms.	公民组织军队抵抗暴政的权利因此成为美国建国的基础性思想，被写进了美国宪法第二修正案中，第二修正案规定，由于国家需要治理有方的军队，因此人民有权利拥有武器。


Since citizens’ militias are anachronistic, gun owners now use the second amendment merely to defend individual gun ownership, as if that somehow offers protection against tyranny.	公民建军权已经过时，因此如今搬出第二修正案的持枪者捍卫的只是个人枪支拥有权，看起来好像这样能够提供抵御暴政的保护。


A reckless, right-wing Supreme Court has agreed with them.	鲁莽的右倾最高法院也站在持枪者一边。


As a result, gun ownership has become perversely linked to freedom in the vast gun-owning American sub-culture.	于是持枪权与大规模持枪自由的美国亚文化紧密地联系在了一起。


But, instead of protection of freedom, Americans nowadays are getting massive bloodshed and fear.	但是，如今，美国人并没有得到自由的保护，反而经受着大规模的流血事件和恐慌。


The claim that gun ownership ensures freedom is especially absurd, given that most of the world’s vibrant democracies have long since cracked down on private gun ownership.	持枪保证自由的说法尤其荒谬——世界上生机勃勃的民主国家早就撤消了私人枪支拥有权。


No tyrant has risen in Australia since Howard’s gun-control reforms.	在霍华德枪支管制改革后，澳大利亚也没有出现暴君。


Simply put, freedom in the twenty-first century does not depend on unregulated gun ownership.	简言之，21世纪的自由并不取决于受管制的持枪权。


Indeed, America’s gun culture is a threat to freedom, after the murder of a president, senator, and other public leaders, and countless assassination attempts against public officials over recent decades.	事实上，美国的枪文化已是自由的威胁——近几十年来，总统、参议员、公众领袖都被枪杀过，更有数不清的刺杀官员事件发生。


Yet US gun culture remains as pervasive as it is unrecorded.	但美国枪文化仍然无处不在，且鲜有报道。


America reels from one shooting disaster to the next, and on nearly every occasion, politicians dutifully declare their continued devotion to unregulated gun ownership.	美国接二连三遭遇枪击灾难，而在几乎每一次枪击案中，政客都会誓言旦旦地表示将继续打击不受管制的枪支持有。


Indeed, no one even knows how many guns Americans hold.	事实上，没有人知道美国人到底拥有多少枪。


The number is estimated to be around 270 million, or almost one per person on average.	据估计，枪支数量在2. 7亿枝，平均人手一把。


According to one recent poll, 47% of households have a gun at home.	一份最新的民调显示，47%的家庭在家里藏着枪。


The shooting in Newtown was not only especially horrific and heartbreaking, but is also part of an increasingly common pattern – a specific kind of murder-suicide that has been carefully studied by psychologists and psychiatrists.	纽顿的枪击事件不但可怕可悯，而且反映了日趋常见的模式——心理学家和精神专家已有深入研究的一种特殊的杀戮式自杀（murder-suicide）。


Loners, often with paranoid tendencies, commit these heinous acts as part of their own suicide.	孤独者——往往有偏执倾向——将这种可怕的行为作为自杀过程的一部分。


They use carefully planned and staged mass murders of innocents in order to take revenge on society and to glorify themselves as they take their own lives.	他们精心计划和实施针对无辜群众的大规模屠杀，目的是报复社会，然后光荣地自我了断。


The perpetrators are not hardened criminals; many have no previous criminal record.	凶犯并不是顽固不化的罪犯； 许多人都没有犯罪记录。


They are pathetic, deranged, and often have struggled with mental instability for much of their lives.	他们是可怜的精神错乱者，常常在精神异常中苦苦挣扎。


They need help – and society needs to keep guns out of their reach.	他们需要帮助——而社会需要让枪支远离他们。


America has now suffered around 30 shooting massacres over the past 30 years, including this year’s deadly dozen; each is a gut-wrenching tragedy for many families.	过去30年来，美国已经经历了30次大规模枪击，包括今年所发生的12次； 每一次惨案都会让许多家庭陷入悲剧。


And yet, each time, gun owners scream that freedom will be eliminated if they are unable to buy assault weapons and 100-round clips.	而每一次，枪支拥有着都在叫嚣，如果他们无法买到攻击性武器百发装子弹，自由就会被剥夺。


The bloodbath in Newtown is the time to stop feeding this gun frenzy.	纽顿血案是叫停这一枪支狂热的良机。


Australia and other countries provide models of how to do it: regulate and limit gun ownership to approved uses.	澳大利亚和其他国家给美国树立了榜样：管制和限制持枪和用枪的批准。


America’s real freedoms depend on sane public policy.	美国的真正自由取决于明智的公共政策。


America’s G-Zero Moment	美国的G0时刻


NEW YORK – The 2008 financial crisis marked the end of the global order as we knew it.	纽约—2008年的金融危机宣告了我们所熟悉的全球秩序寿终正寝。


In advance of the upcoming G-8 summit, it is impossible to overlook the fact that, for the first time in seven decades, the United States cannot drive the international agenda or provide global leadership on all of today’s most pressing problems.	在G8峰会即将到来之际，我们不能不注意到这样一个事实：70年来，美国第一次不再能够推行国际日程和在当今最紧迫的问题上成为全球领袖。


Indeed, the US has trimmed its presence abroad by refusing to contribute to a eurozone bailout, intervene in Syria, or use force to contain Iran’s nuclear breakout (despite strong Israeli support).	事实上，美国拒绝在拯救欧元区、干预叙利亚以及动用武力解决伊朗核问题（尽管以色列强烈支持这样做）已经表明它的海外形象有所调整。


President Barack Obama officially ended the war in Iraq, and is withdrawing US troops from Afghanistan at a pace constrained only by the need to save face.	总统奥巴马正式结束了伊拉克战争，并正在从阿富汗撤军——只能用控制撤军节奏来挽回最后的颜面。


America is handing off the leadership baton – even if no other country or group of countries is willing or able to grasp it.	美国正在交出领导权杖——尽管还没有哪个国家或国家组织愿意或能够接过它。


In short, US foreign policy may be as active as ever, but it is downsizing and becoming more exacting about its priorities.	简而言之，美国的外交政策或许亦然像从前那样积极，但免不了正在走下坡路，越来越难以维持其超然的地位。


As a result, many global challenges – climate change, trade, resource scarcity, international security, cyber-warfare, and nuclear proliferation, to name a few – are bound to loom larger.	结果，诸多全球性挑战——气候变化、贸易、资源稀缺性、国际安全、网络战、核扩散等等——将注定愈演愈烈。


Welcome to the G-Zero world, a more turbulent, uncertain environment in which coordination on global policy issues falls by the wayside.	欢迎来到G0世界，这是一个更动荡、更不确定的环境，全球政策问题的协调早已被抛诸脑后。


Paradoxically, this new environment, though daunting, is less troublesome for the US; in fact, it provides fresh opportunities for the US to capitalize on its unique position.	讽刺的是，这一令人沮丧的新环境倒让美国落得了清净； 事实上，这给了美国一个全新的利用其独一无二地位的机会。


The G-Zero world is not all bad for the US – if it plays its cards right.	G0世界对美国来说并不是件坏事——只要美国能打好手里的牌。


Many residual strengths take on greater importance in such a world, and America remains the world’s only true superpower and its largest economy – still more than twice the size of China’s.	在这样一个世界中，诸多剩余力量将扮演更加重要的角色，而美国仍然是唯一的真正超级大国和第一大经济体，比中国大出一倍有余。


Its defense expenditures represent nearly half the world total, and exceed those of the next 17 countries combined.	美国的国防支出几乎占据了全球总数的半壁江山，比随后的17国的总和还要多。


The dollar remains the world’s reserve currency, and investors’ scramble into US government debt at every peak in the crisis since 2008 has underscored America’s safe-haven status (even in crises that America caused).	美元仍是世界储备货币，2008年，危机一冒头，投资者们便纷纷涌向美国国债，这表明美国仍然拥有安全港的地位（尽管美国正是危机的始作俑者）。


Likewise, the US continues to lead in entrepreneurship, research and development, higher education, and technological innovation.	类似地，美国在企业家精神、研发、高等教育和技术创新领域依然无人能出其右。


Moreover, it is now the world’s largest natural-gas producer and calorie exporter, which has reduced its vulnerability to price shocks or food shortages.	此外，如今美国还是世界最大的天然气产国和热量出口国，这降低了价格冲击或食品短缺对美国的冲击力。


No country rivals America’s promotion of the rule of law, liberal democracy, transparency, and free enterprise.	没有哪个国家可以在推进法治精神、自由民主、透明和自由企业方面能与美国相媲美。


While other countries certainly support these values, only the US has been willing, healthy, and big enough to ensure that they prevail.	尽管其他国家显然也支持这些价值，但只有美国一直愿意、也足够坚挺和强大以保证这些价值的推行。


So, as America curtails its global leadership, it will find itself in more demand.	因此，随着美国全球领导力的收缩，它会发现自己变得更受欢迎。


Consider Asia, for example. As China’s economic importance and regional influence grows, its neighbors are seeking to deepen ties with the US.	以亚洲为例。 随着中国的经济实力以及地区影响力的提升，其邻国纷纷开始寻求与美国的深度合作。


Japan, Australia, Indonesia, and Taiwan have all recently closed trade and security-related deals with the US.	日本、澳大利亚、印尼和台湾地区最近都与美国展开了密切的贸易和安全相关问题的交流。


Even Burma has gotten on board, resuming diplomatic engagement with the US while trying to work its way out of China’s shadow.	甚至缅甸也开始倒向美国，重启了与美国的外交关系，并竭力摆脱中国的阴影。


In other words, in a G-Zero world, an increasingly aggressive global environment makes the US all the more appealing to countries seeking to hedge their bets. As a result, the US has an opportunity to act more precisely in its own interests.	换句话说，在G0世界中，越来越波起云涌的国际环境使得美国对不想孤注一掷的国家的吸引力更大了。 结果，美国赢得了更精确地按自己利益行事的机会。


Supplying less leadership allows the US to weigh opportunity costs before taking action, and to select the issues and circumstances that suit it the best. In this environment, military intervention in Libya does not necessitate the same in Syria.	减弱领导者角色让美国得以在行动前掂量机会成本，选择最合适自身的问题和环境展开行动。 在这样一种环境下，军事干预利比亚和叙利亚不可同日而语。


The extent to which the US will capitalize on these opportunities remains to be seen.	美国可以多大程度上利用这些机会还有待观察。


In fact, America’s short-term advantages pose the biggest obstacle to its long-term outlook.	事实上，美国的短期优势正是其长期前景的障碍所在。


Call this the “safe-haven curse”: as long as the US remains the safest port in any storm, it faces no immediate pressure to address its weaknesses.	不妨将这称为“安全港诅咒”：只要美国仍然是任何风暴最安全的避风港，那么它就没有动力马上修复自己的弱点。


For example, for all of the hand-wringing about America’s national debt, investors will continue to loan the US money.	比如，所有关于美国国民债务的文章都说，投资者会继续借钱给美国。


Over the long term, however, US policymakers must make steady progress in restoring confidence in the nation’s fiscal health by cutting politically sacred programs like social security, Medicare, and defense.	但是，从长期看，美国决策者必须通过削减社会保障、医疗和防务等具有政治不可动摇性的项目开支，从而在重塑人们对其国民财政健康度信心方面取得实实在在的进步。


Officials will have to put aside short-term motives and party orthodoxy to bolster America’s aging infrastructure, reform its education and immigration systems, and pursue long-term fiscal consolidation.	官员必须抛弃短视和政治正确性， 改善美国老化的基础设施，改革其教育和移民制���，追求长期财政整合。


America’s advantages in the G-Zero world afford it the chance to invest in the future.	美国在G0世界中的超然地位给予了它为未来投资的机会。


But, by cushioning against sufficiently calamitous risks, the same advantages allow the US to procrastinate.	但是，正是这种超然地位消除了形成灾难性后果的风险，从而让美国安于现状，不思进取。


American politicians need to recognize the new G-Zero reality and rebuild America’s domestic sources of strength, even if only incrementally. If they do, the US will have the vigor and flexibility to shape the next world order.	美国政客应该认清G0的现实，重塑美国强盛的内生源泉，即使只能逐渐进步。 惟其如此，美国才能拥有主导下一个世界秩序的力量和灵活性。


America’s political system usually works well in crises. But, thanks to its residual advantages in a leaderless world, the US need not rely on a crisis to precipitate action.	美国的政治制度通常能在危机中运转良好。 但是，由于美国在缺少领袖的世界中还拥有一些残存优势，因此它并不需要一场危机来刺激行动。


It need only seize the G-Zero moment.	它所需要的，只是抓住G0时刻的机会。


America’s Houses of Cards	美国的房产危机


There are times when being proven right brings no pleasure.	有些时候即便证明自己正确也毫无快感可言。


For several years, I argued that America’s economy was being supported by a housing bubble that had replaced the stock market bubble of the 1990’s.	过去几年来，我一直认为美国的经济是由房地产泡沫支撑着。 这种泡沫取代了1990年代的股市泡沫。


But no bubble can expand forever.	但没有泡沫可以无限膨胀。


With middle-class incomes in the United States stagnating, Americans could not afford ever more expensive homes.	随着美国中产阶级的收入滞胀，美国人买不起越来越贵的房产了。


As one of my predecessors as Chairman of the US President’s Council of Economic Advisers famously put it, “that which is not sustainable will not be sustained.”	作为美国总统经济顾问委员会主席，我的一位前任曾有一句名言：“不可持续的东西是不会受到支撑的。


Economists, as opposed to those who make their living gambling on stocks, make no claim to being able to predict when the day of reckoning will come, much less identifying the event that will bring down the house of cards.	”相对于那些靠在股市搏杀为生的人，经济学家们从未声称能预测清算日何时到来，更别说确认什么事件会令房产市场崩盘。


But the patterns are systematic, with consequences that unfold gradually, and painfully, over time.	但有些征兆是系统的，其后果也随着时间的推移逐渐而痛苦地显露出来。


There is a macro-story and a micro-story here.	这里有宏观和微观层面的原因。


The macro-story is simple, but dramatic.	宏观原因简单但又富有戏剧性。


Some, observing the crash of the sub-prime mortgage market, say, “Don’t worry, it is only a problem in the real estate sector.”	有些观察到次级贷市场崩溃的人说：“别担心，这只是不动产行业的问题。


But this overlooks the key role that the housing sector has played in the US economy recently, with direct investment in real estate and money taken out of houses through refinancing mortgages accounting for two-thirds to three-quarters of growth over the last six years.	”但这种说法忽视了房产市场近年来在美国经济中扮演的角色。 在过去六年里，对不动产市场的直接投资和通过重新融资按揭从房产市场抽出的资金占整个经济增长量的三分之二到四分之三。


Booming home prices gave Americans the confidence, and the financial wherewithal, to spend more than their income.	房产价格的一路飙升给了美国人信心和资金让他们可以超前消费。


America’s household savings rate was at levels not seen since the Great Depression, either negative or zero.	美国的家庭储蓄率降到大萧条以来的最低点，不是为负就是为零。


With higher interest rates depressing housing prices, the game is over.	随着高利率对房价的压制，游戏结束了。


As America moves to, say, a 4% savings rate (still small by normal standards), aggregate demand will weaken, and with it, the economy.	当美国的储蓄率达到4%（就一般标准来看仍然很低），累计总需求就会减弱，随之而来的就是经济走弱。


The micro-story is more dramatic.	微观的分析则更具戏剧性。


Record-low interest rates in 2001, 2002 and 2003 did not lead Americans to invest more – there was already excess capacity.	2001、2002、2003年创纪录的低利率并未引发美国人更大的投资热情—超额产能（excess capacity）已经出现。


Instead, easy money stimulated the economy by inducing households to refinance their mortgages, and to spend some of their capital.	相反，赚快钱的心态诱使美国家庭将他们的按揭重新融资并支出部分资本从而刺激美国经济。


It is one thing to borrow to make an investment, which strengthens balance sheets; it is another thing to borrow to finance a vacation or a consumption binge.	借钱投资是一回事，这能强化我们的资产负债表； 但把借来的钱用于度假和疯狂消费那就是另一码事了。


But this is what Alan Greenspan encouraged Americans to do.	而这正是格林斯潘鼓励美国人做的。


When normal mortgages did not prime the pump enough, he encouraged them to take out variable-rate mortgages – at a time when interest rates had nowhere to go but up.	当普通贷款不能满足需求时，他鼓励美国人进行可变汇率按揭—而且在利率只升不降的时期。


Predatory lenders went further, offering negative amortization loans, so the amount owed went up year after year.	贪婪的贷方进而推出了负摊销贷款（negative amortization loans），从而使借款人的负债连年攀升。


Sometime in the future, payments would rise, but borrowers were told, again, not to worry: house prices would rise faster, making it easy to refinance with another negative amortization loan.	在未来的某个时候，还款额会提高，但借款人会又一次被告知，别担心：房价上涨会更快，因此再借一笔负摊销贷款会很容易。


The only way (in this view) not to win was to sit on the sidelines.	（在这种观点下）不能受益的只有那些静观其变的人。


All of this amounted to a human and economic disaster in the making.	这样的推波助澜最终导致了人类和经济的灾难。


Now reality has hit: newspapers report cases of borrowers whose mortgage payments exceed their entire income.	现实显露出残酷的一面：报纸上报导着借款人的总收入不够偿还按揭的案例。


Globalization implies that America’s mortgage problem has worldwide repercussions.	全球化意味着美国的贷款问题已经造成了世界范围内的影响。


The first run on a bank occurred against the British mortgage lender Northern Rock.	第一波受到冲击的是英国按揭贷款银行Northern Rock。


America managed to pass off bad mortgages worth hundreds of billions of dollars to investors (including banks) around the world.	美国成功地将数以千亿计的不良贷款转卖给全世界的投资者（包括银行）。


They buried the bad mortgages in complicated instruments, buried them so deep that no one knew exactly how badly they were impaired, and no one could calculate how to re-price them quickly.	他们通过复杂的金融工具埋葬这些坏账，埋葬得如此之深以至于没人知道这些坏账究竟有多坏，也没人能够很快地为它们重新定价。


In the face of such uncertainty, markets froze.	面对这样的不确定性，市场就冻结了。


Those in financial markets who believe in free markets have temporarily abandoned their faith.	那些笃信自由市场原则的金融从业人士也暂时将他们的信念抛诸脑后。


For the greater good of all (of course, it is never for their own selfish interests), they argued a bailout was necessary.	他们说为了所有人的更大福祉（当然，他们从来就是为他人利益着想），政府救市是必要的。


While the US Treasury and the IMF warned East Asian countries facing financial crises ten years ago against the risks of bail-outs and told them not to raise their interest rates, the US ignored its own lectures about moral hazard effects, bought up billions in mortgages, and lowered interest rates.	尽管美国财政部和国际货币��金组织在十年前警告面临金融危机的东亚各国政府救市有风险并告诫它们不要提高利率，但今天美国却全然不顾对其他国家有关道德危险的教导，收购了巨额的（不良）贷款，并降低了利率。


But lower short-term interest rates have led to higher medium-term interest rates, which are more relevant for the mortgage market, perhaps because of increasing worries about inflationary pressures.	但更低的短期利率导致了更高的中期利率，而后者与按揭贷款市场更有关联或许是因为对通胀压力的担心日益增加。


It may make sense for central banks (or Fannie Mae, America’s major government-sponsored mortgage company) to buy mortgage-backed securities in order to help provide market liquidity.	各中央银行（或美国主要的政府主办贷款银行—美国联邦国民抵押贷款协会Fannie Mae）购入抵押贷款支持证券以增加市场的流动性可能会起到一些作用。


But those from whom they buy them should provide a guarantee, so the public does not have to pay the price for their bad investment decisions.	但证券的出售方应该提供某种担保，这样公众就不必为他们糟糕的投资决策埋单。


Equity owners in banks should not get a free ride.	银行的股权拥有者也不应该搭顺风车。


Securitization, with all of its advantages in sharing risk, has three problems that were not adequately anticipated.	证券化在分担风险方面虽然有其优势，但也存在三个让人没有充分认识到的问题。


While it meant that American banks were not hit as hard as they would otherwise, America’s bad lending practices have had global effects.	尽管这意味着美国的银行所遭受的打击还不算最坏，但美国的不良贷款方式却已经产生了全球性的影响。


Moreover, securitization contributed to bad lending: in the old days, banks that originated bad loans bore the consequences; in the new world of securitization, the originators could pass the loans onto others.	另外，证券化也为不良贷款火上浇油：在过去，产生不良贷款的银行自食其果； 但在证券化的新世界里，坏账的始作俑者可以将其转嫁给他人。


(As economists would say, problems of asymmetric information have increased.)	（就像经济学家们会讲，信息不对称的问题更严重了。 ）


In the old days, when borrowers found it impossible to make their payments, mortgages would be restructured; foreclosures were bad for both the borrower and the lender.	在过去，当借款人发现无法负担他们的还款时，按揭贷款就会从新组合； 抵押赎回对借贷双方都不是好事。


Securitization made debt restructuring difficult, if not impossible.	证券化使债务重组变得困难（如果不是不可能的话）。


It is the victims of predatory lenders who need government help.	掠夺性贷方的受害者们才是需要政府帮助的人。


With mortgages amounting to 95% or more of the value of the house, debt restructuring will not be easy.	当按揭总额达到房产价值的95%或以上时，债务重组就不那么容易了。


What is required is to give individuals with excessive indebtedness an expedited way to a fresh start – for example, a special bankruptcy provision allowing them to recover, say, 75% of the equity they originally put into the house, with the lenders bearing the cost.	需要给予过度负债的个人一种重新开始的快速通道—例如通过一项特别的破产规定允许他们重新获得起初投入房产的75%的资产，而贷方会承担相应成本。


There are many lessons for America, and the rest of the world; but among them is the need for greater financial sector regulation, especially better protection against predatory lending, and more transparency.	美国和世界其他国家都应该从中汲取许多教训； 其中最重要的是对金融行业更严格的监管，特别是针对掠夺性的贷方提供更好的保护和更高的透明度。


America’s Interest-Rate Puzzle	美国利率之谜


A great puzzle in today’s world economy is the continued low level of long-term real interest rates in the United States.	美国的长期实际利率一直维持着较低水平，这可以算是当今世界经济的一大难解之谜。


Conventional macroeconomists like me look at America’s current-account deficit, now running at 7% of GDP, and know that such vast deficits are inevitably followed by large currency depreciations.	现在，美国的经常项目赤字已达到国内生产总值的7%。 看到这种情况，像我这样的传统宏观经济学家都清楚，在巨额赤字后，会不可避免地出现大幅度货币贬值。


So we expect a substantial depreciation premium on US interest rates.	所以，我们预测美国利率溢价会出现大幅度的下降。


If the dollar falls 20% more against the euro sometime in the next ten years, US long-term interest rates should be two percentage points higher than euro rates.	如果在未来十年的某一天，美元与欧元的汇率再下跌20%，美国的长期利率就会比欧元高出2个百分点。


If it falls 40% against the yen sometime in the next ten years, US long-term interest rates should be four percentage points higher than Japanese rates.	如果在未来十年的某一天，美元与日元之比下跌40%，美国的长期利率就会比日本高出4个百分点。


If it falls 60% against China’s currency, the yuan, sometime in the next ten years, US long-term interest rates should be six percentage points higher than Chinese rates.	如果在未来十年的某一天，美元与人民币之比下跌60%，美国的长期利率就会比中国高出6个百分点。


But we are not seeing signs of anything like this.	但是，现在我们却看不到一点这样的迹象。


The puzzle is not only that long-term rates are too low when viewed in the international context, but also that they are too low when viewed in America’s domestic context.	让人不解的是，不仅从国际上看长期利率太低，而且就是从美国国内来看，这一利率也非常低。


The Bush administration continues to have no plans to sew up the veins it has opened with its medieval economic policy, which holds that bleeding revenue from the government cures all economic problems.	布什政府还是拿不出任何计划来缝合自己用所奉行的中世纪经济政策割开的血管，上述政策认为，只要政府出血，让出部分税收，就可以解决一切经济问题。


This means that unless America’s domestic savings rate rises mightily – which it shows no signs of doing – and unless investment expenditure remains abnormally low for the rest of this decade, the supply of loanable funds to finance investment will soon be much less than demand when the current-account deficit narrows to sustainable levels. But when supply is less than demand, prices rise sharply.	这就意味着除非美国国内存款率大幅度上升（目前还没有这种迹象），除非2010年以前，投资支出依然保持现在这种不正常的超低状态，否则当经常项目赤字降低到可持续水平时，用以支持投资的信贷资金很快就会严重供不应求，而当供不应求时，价格就会直线上升。


In this case, the price of loanable funds is the real interest rate.	在这种情况下，信贷资金价格就等于实际利率。


An expectation that interest rates will be high sometime in the next decade should mean high interest rates on long-term bonds today.	如果期望在未来十年的某一天利率走高，就意味着要提高目前长期债券的利率。


Yet financial markets are not pricing dollar depreciation and a rise in long-term US interest rates accordingly.	但金融市场并没有美元贬值、美国长期利率上涨的相应计划。


When we macroeconomists talk to our friends on Wall Street, we find that they don’t view this as a puzzle at all.	当我们这些宏观经济学家和华尔街的朋友们谈起这个问题时，发现他们根本不觉得这有什么难理解的。


On the contrary, they are puzzled about why we view the current low level of US long-term interest rates as worrisome.	正相反，他们不明白的是为什么在我们眼里，目前美国长期利率低是件令人担心的事情。


From their perspective, today’s high demand for long-term dollar-denominated securities is easily explained: Asian central banks are buying in order to hold down their currencies, the US Treasury is borrowing short (and thus not issuing that many long-term securities), and US companies are not undertaking the kinds of investments that would lead them to issue many long-term bonds.	他们认为，目前对长期美元计价证券的高需求很容易解释：亚洲中央银行正在买进以稳定自己的货币，美国财政部正在借进短期债券（因此，不会大量发行长期债券），美国公司目前进行的种种投资，也不会导致大量长期债券的发行。


But for every market mispricing there is a profit opportunity: if long-term interest rates are, indeed, too low and long-term bond prices too high, investors will short long-term US bonds, park the money elsewhere, wait for bond prices to return to fundamentals, and then cover their short positions.	但市场上的每一种价格偏离，总会带来盈利机会：如果长期利率确实过低，而长期债券价格过高，做空仓的美国长期债券投资者将钱投到别的地方，等待债券价格回落到基点，再开始补仓。


By doing so, they will push prices close to fundamentals today.	如此一来，他们就能驱使价格接近今天的基点。


Wall Streeters, however, offer a counterargument: for any financial institution to, say, bet on the decline of the dollar against the yuan over the next five years in a serious, leveraged way is to put its survival at risk should the trades go wrong.	华尔街的朋友们却提出了相反的论调：如果任何金融机构很认真地，甚至举债来赌未来5年内美元与人民币之比会大幅度下降，那么，一旦交易出了问题，该机构就会面临生存危机。


And trades do go wrong: remember the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management.	而交易确实出了问题：别忘了美国长期资本管理公司的倒闭。


The existence of large financial-market actors that do not care about maximizing their profits magnifies the riskiness of the bets.	金融市场上还有一些大户，他们对最大化自己的利润并不关心。 他们的存在更加大了投资的风险。


If, say, the Bank of China and the Federal Reserve decided to teach speculators a lesson by pushing the dollar’s value relative to the yuan up by 20% for a month, they could do so, bankrupting many financial institutions with short positions.	比如说，如果中国银行和美联储决定教训教训投机者，将美元与人民币的比价推高20%，并保持一个月，它们这样做是完全可能的，能让大量做空仓的金融机构破产。


Similarly, any financial institution that bets on a sharp rise in long-term interest rates over the next five years in a serious, leveraged way also puts its survival at risk.	与此相似，如果任何金融机构很认真地，举债来赌未来5年内长期利率会大幅度上涨，那它也是在拿自己的生存冒险。


For where should they park their money?	他们该把钱投在什么地方？


Real estate rental yields and stock-market payouts are low, and real estate and stock prices may well fall as much as or more than bond prices if interest rates spike.	房地产租金收益和股市盈利率都太低。 此外，如果利率激增，房地产和股票价格会下跌，跌幅可能等于或大于债券价格的涨幅。


Only businesses that can borrow long-term now, lock in a low real interest rate, and invest in expanding their capacity can make the domestic bet that interest rates will rise.	只有那些现在能借进长期贷款，锁定目前较低的实际利率，并投资扩大规模的企业可以在国内下注，赌利率上涨。


But America’s businesses see enough risk in the future to be wary of getting stuck with unutilized capacity.	但是美国的企业都看到了未来的风险，并时刻保持警惕，不让自己被无用规模所套住。


Economists believe that market forces drive prices to fundamentals.	经济学家们相信市场力量会驱使价格回到基点。


But we are not careful enough to distinguish situations in which equilibrium-restoring forces are strong from those in which such forces are weak.	但我们总是不够仔细，不能把平衡恢复力强与弱的情况区分开来。


The dollar will fall and US long-term interest rates will rise, but only when traders on Wall Street and elsewhere decide that holding dollars and long-term US bonds is more risky in the short run.	只有华尔街和别的地方的交易者都认定从短期看，持有美元和长期美国债券风险更大时，美元才会下跌，美国长期利率才会上升。


When that happens, the long-run future will be now.	等到这种情况发生时，长远的未来形势还是会和现在一样。


America’s Islamist Allies of Convenience	便利思维下的美国伊斯兰盟友


NEW DELHI – In just one decade, the United States has intervened militarily in three Muslim-majority countries and overthrown their governments.	新德里—短短十年间，美国军事干预了三个穆斯林占多数国家并颠覆了它们的政府。


Now the same coalition of American liberal interventionists and neoconservatives that promoted those wars is pushing for punitive airstrikes in Syria without reflecting on how US policy has ended up strengthening Islamists and fostering anti-Americanism.	如今，发动了这些战争的美国自由派干涉主义者和新保守主义者联盟又在推动对叙利亚的惩罚性打击，他们丝毫不顾美国政策的结局往往是增强了伊斯兰教徒、铸造了反美主义。


Indeed, the last “humanitarian intervention” has clearly backfired, turning Libya into a breeding ground for transnational militants.	事实上，上一次“人道主义干预”显然适得其反，把叙利亚变成了跨国部队的流血场。


As the intense US debate about President Barack Obama’s proposed use of military force highlights, the attack-Syria push is not about upholding America’s national interest.	关于总统奥巴马的动武计划的激烈争论凸显出，打击叙利亚的举动并不符合美国的国家利益。


Rather, the desire to protect US “credibility” has become the last refuge of those seeking yet another war in the wider Middle East.	相反，保护美国“信誉”的渴望成了那些寻求在大中东地区发动又一场战争的人的最后庇护所。


If “credibility” were purged from the debate and the focus placed squarely on advancing long-term US interests, it would become apparent that an attack on Syria might not yield even temporary geopolitical gains.	如果“信誉”因为争论和真正将推进美国长期利益作为关注焦点而得到净化，那么显然对叙利亚的打击并不能产生哪怕暂时性的地缘政治好处。


Beyond the short term, it would unleash major unintended consequences, potentially including an Iraq-style “soft” partition of Syria and the creation of a haven for extremists stretching across much of Islamist-controlled northern Syria and into the Sunni areas of Iraq.	从超越短期的视角看，这会产生意料之外的重大后果，有可能使叙利亚发生伊拉克式的“软”分裂以及在伊斯兰教控制的叙利亚北部和伊拉克逊尼派势力区形成大量极端主义者避风港。


Indeed, an attack would most likely increase America’s reliance on unsavory Islamist rulers in countries ranging from Saudi Arabia and Qatar to Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.	事实上，打击叙利亚很可能让美国更加依赖于从沙特到卡塔尔和从土耳其到阿联酋的不受欢迎的伊斯兰统治者。


Some Arab monarchs have pledged to bankroll the US attack – an investment that they would easily recover, given that the war talk has already increased oil prices.	一些阿拉伯君主承诺为美国的打击提供资金——这笔投资很容易就能回本，因为战争言论已经使石油价格上涨。


Al Qaeda-type groups already have gained ground in the Middle East and North Africa as an unintended byproduct of US policies, creating fertile conditions for stepped-up international terrorism in the coming years.	基地组织已经在中东和北非生根发芽，给未来几年国际恐怖主义逐步升级创造了良好条件，这便是美国政策的一个意料之外的后果。


The US invasion and occupation of Iraq, for example, created a major opening for Al Qaeda, whose affiliates now represent the Sunni struggle against the Shia-dominated government.	比如，美国对伊拉克的入侵和占领给基地组织敞开了大门，其附属组织目前代表着逊尼派与什叶派控制的政府作对。


Likewise, regime change in Libya aided the rise of Al Qaeda-linked militants, leading to the killing in Benghazi of the US ambassador.	类似地，利比亚的政权变化也助长了与基地组织有涉的军事势力，导致班加西美国大使遇刺。


A system based on sharia (Islamic law) has been imposed, human-rights abuses are legion, and cross-border movement of weapons and militants has undermined the security of Libya’s neighbors.	基于伊斯兰法律的制度已经建立，侵害人权的状况比比皆是，武器和军队的跨境流动破坏着利比亚邻国的安全。


Meanwhile, America’s support for the regimes in Yemen and Saudi Arabia has contributed to the rise of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.	与此同时，美国对也门和沙特政权的支持也有利于基地组织在阿拉伯半岛的兴盛。


In parts of southern Yemen, an Al Qaeda affiliate, Ansar al-Sharia, functions as a de facto government.	在也门南部的一些地区，基地组织附属机构Ansar al-Sharia才是事实上的政府。


In Syria, where sizable chunks of territory are already under Islamist control and the pro-Al Qaeda Al Nusra Front overshadows the US-backed Free Syrian Army, the Obama administration is staring at the bitter harvest of its previous policy choices.	在叙利亚，大量领土已经落入伊斯兰教徒之手，亲基地组织的Al Nusra Front的阴影在美国支持的自由叙利亚军（FSA）头上挥之不去，奥巴马政府正在感受此前政策选择带来的苦果。


Airstrikes now would merely make matters worse by undercutting the FSA’s grassroots legitimacy and aiding Islamist forces.	目前，空袭将破坏让FSA的草根合法性，倒过来帮助伊斯兰势力，让情况更加恶化。


Farther east, the US wants an “honorable” exit from Afghanistan – the longest war in its history – through a peace deal with the Taliban, its main battlefield opponent.	在更向东的地方，美国希望与其在阿富汗的主要战斗对手塔利班达成和平协议，从而“光荣”地退出这场美国历史上历时最长的战争。


In seeking to co-opt the Taliban – an effort that has resulted in the Taliban establishing what amounts to a diplomatic mission in Doha, Qatar – the US is bestowing legitimacy on a thuggish militia that enforces medieval practices in the areas under its control.	在拉拢塔利班的过程中——之所以如此，是因为塔利班已经与卡塔尔形成了外交关系——美国授予了这个在其控制地区推行中世纪统治的嗜血武装力量合法性。


America’s dalliances with Islamist-leaning political forces – and governments – have been guided by the notion that the cloak of Islam helps to protect the credibility of leaders who might otherwise be seen as foreign puppets.	美国与亲伊斯兰政治力量和政府的结盟的指导思想是伊斯兰教的外衣有助于保护可能被视为外国傀儡的领导人的信誉。


That simply will not work, even in the short term.	这一套根本不管用，即使在短期也是如此。


On the contrary, until the Egyptian army removed him from the presidency, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi was coming to be seen by many as America’s man in Cairo.	相反，在埃及军队将穆斯林兄弟会的穆尔西赶下总统宝座前，许多埃及人一直把他当成美国在开罗的代言人。


In the long term, the US will gain nothing – and risk much – by continuing to back oil sheikhdoms that fund Muslim extremist groups and madrasas from the Philippines and India to South Africa and Venezuela.	从长期看，美国什么也得不到，风险倒是很大——如果它继续支持资助穆斯林极端主义集团的石油酋长和从菲律宾和印度到南非和委内瑞拉的宗教学校的话。


By supporting Islamist rulers, the US is contributing to a trend evident from the Maghreb to the badlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan – Muslims killing Muslims.	支持伊斯兰统治者的美国在助长从马格利布到阿富汗和巴基斯坦山沟的穆斯林杀戮穆斯林的趋势。


American policy has also contributed to a growing conflict between Islamist and secular forces in Muslim countries.	美国的政策还在助长伊斯兰教徒和穆斯林国家的世俗势力之间的冲突。


This is best illustrated by Turkey, where Obama has ignored Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s heavy-handed efforts to annul free speech and turn himself into a twenty-first-century Sultan.	最佳的写照就是土耳其，奥巴马对总理埃尔多安辣手摧毁言论自由、使自己称为21世纪苏丹的行为视而不见。


There and elsewhere, the US, motivated by the larger geopolitical goal of containing Shia Iran and its regional allies, has embraced Sunni rulers steeped in religious and political bigotry, even though they pose a transnational threat to the values of freedom and secularism.	土耳其和别的国家，美国为了遏制什叶派伊朗及其地区盟友这一更大的地缘政治目标，放任逊尼派统治者迈向宗教和政治极端，即使它们对自由和世俗主义价值造成了跨国威胁。


Moreover, the clash within Islam is likely to be destabilizing regionally and counterproductive to the interests of the free world.	此外，伊斯兰教内部的冲突也可能成为地区动荡因素，破坏自由世界的利益。


Against this background, Obama should heed the doctrine proposed in 1991 by General Colin Powell.	在这一背景下，奥巴马应该遵循鲍威尔将军在1991年提出的思想。


The Powell doctrine stipulates that the US should use military force only when a vital national-security interest is at stake; the strategic objective is clear and attainable; the benefits are likely to outweigh the costs; adverse consequences can be limited; broad international and domestic support has been obtained; and a plausible exit strategy is in place.	鲍威尔思想认为，只有在关键性国家利益受到威胁、战略目标明确且可以达到、收益可能大于成本、消极影响可以得到限制、获得广泛的国内和国际支持、并存在可靠的退出战略时，美国才应该动用武力。


Given the US record since the doctrine was formulated, another criterion should be added: the main beneficiaries of military intervention are not America’s mortal enemies.	美国在这一思想提出后的记录表明，应该在这些标准之上再增加一条：军事干预的主要受益者不是美国的道德对手。


Drone Wars	无人机战争


BRUSSELS – “Sometime they’ll give a war and nobody will come,” the American poet Carl Sandburg wrote hopefully in 1936.	布鲁塞尔——1936年美国诗人卡尔·桑德伯格曾满怀希望地写道，“总有一天他们会发动战争但是没有人来响应。


His sentiment seems more apt than ever nowadays, but not because humanity has turned pacifistic.	” 他的这种感觉比以往任何时候都更正确，但却不是因为人类比以往更加向往和平。


Rather, wars are increasingly fought remotely, with drones – or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – doing the killing.	相反，人类越来越多地依靠无人机——或无人驾驶飞行器（UAV）——进行远程杀戮。


Under President Barack Obama, the number of drone strikes carried out by the United States has soared, with more than 300 UAV attacks reported in Pakistan alone.	在巴拉克·奥巴马总统治下，美国由无人机发起的攻击数量猛增，仅巴基斯坦一地报告的无人机攻击就超过300次之多。


In March 2011, the US Air Force for the first time trained more pilots for drones than for any other purpose.	2011年3月，美国空军培训的无人机驾驶员首次超过其他机种。


This raises serious ethical questions.	这种情况引发了严重的道德问题。


With no military personnel risking their lives, UAVs make it easier to kill, and to justify war operations to the public at home.	因为没有军事人员需要冒生命危险，无人机降低了杀戮和向国内公众证明战争合法性的难度。


Moreover, a human being’s reticence to kill is inversely related to the distance between attacker and target.	此外，袭击者和目标之间的距离越远人类进行杀戮的顾虑就越小。


In the case of a pilot flying drones over Yemen by operating a joystick in Nevada, the threshold to pulling the trigger is dangerously low.	如果无人机飞行员在内华达用操纵杆在也门上空驾驶无人机，那么扣动扳机的临界点会低到十分危险的程度。


Killing is just a part of the job, to be followed by bowling, perhaps, or a quiet evening at home.	杀戮仅仅是工作的一部分，之后或许会去打保龄球，也可能静静地在家中渡过整个晚上。


Meanwhile, the mere sound of drones terrorizes whole populations, indicating to enemies and civilians alike that they are being watched and might be attacked at any moment – which could well play into the hands of terrorist recruiters.	此外，单单听到无人机的响声也会令所有人毛骨悚然，因为它向敌人和平民宣告他们正同时受到监视并随时有可能遭到进攻——这一点可能会被恐怖分子招募者所利用。


From a legal and human-rights point of view, the US drone program is even more alarming.	从法律和人权角度看，美国的无人机发展计划更为惊人。


After all, countries such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia do not belong to declared war zones.	毕竟，巴基斯坦、也门和索马里等国不属于公认战区的范畴。


Outside the context of war, in turn, state killings are legal only if they prove absolutely necessary to save lives.	在战争以外的情况下，只有证明对挽救生命绝对必要才能允许国家采取杀戮行动。


They must be conducted either in self-defense after an attack, or in anticipatory self-defense against an immediate threat, when taking time to discuss non-lethal alternatives is not feasible.	反击必须在受到攻击后以自卫为目的，或者为了应对可能发生的直接威胁而采取自卫行动，无论是上述哪种情况，都不可能有时间去讨论非致命的替代行动。


More than a decade after September 11, America’s drone program does not fall into the first category of reactive self-defense.	9. 11事件过去10年后，美国无人机计划已无法再划入第一类反应性自卫的范畴。


Likewise, there is no evidence that any presumed terrorist who was killed outside of official war zones in the last few years represented a threat so immediate to US citizens’ lives that preventive and premeditated killing was the only option.	同样，也没有证据表明过去数年内在正式战区外打死的所谓恐怖分子对美国公民的生命安全造成了直接的威胁，而这种威胁又非得靠预防及预谋性的杀戮来解决不可。


Unless US leaders prove otherwise in every case, American UAV attacks in countries like Pakistan or Yemen should be called what they are: extrajudicial killings.	除非美国领导人能够一一证明，否则美国无人机在巴基斯坦和也门等国发动的攻击应该还原其法外处决的本来面目。


US State Department legal adviser Harold Koh disagrees, arguing that America is involved in a worldwide “armed conflict with Al Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces.”	美国国务院法律顾问高洪柱不同意这种说法，并提出美国正在打一场世界范围内“与基地组织和塔利班及相关势力的武装战争。


So, Koh claims, drone attacks are part of a global war, fought both in declared war zones and non-war countries; therefore, they are legal.	”因此高洪柱声称无人机攻击是战区及非战区国家全球战争的组成部分，因此其具有合法性。


But, even under this adventurous assumption, human-rights issues arise.	但即使我们接受这一冒险的假设，仍然无法对人权问题做出合理的解释。


The laws of war condone targeted killings only of “combatants” who “directly participate in hostilities.”	战争法只容许定点清除“直接参与敌对行动”的“战斗分子”。


The killings must be proportionate, strategically necessary, and publicly justified.	而且杀戮行为必须有所控制、具有战略必要性、且能为公众所接受。


Avoiding harm to civilians should be the top priority.	避免伤害平民应当成为重中之重。


At the slightest sign of illegality, an investigation must be conducted, offenders prosecuted, and victims compensated.	必须对一丝一毫的非法行为展开调查，对行凶者提起诉讼，并对受害者进行赔偿。


The US drone program’s legal basis is entirely unclear, however.	但美军无人机计划的法律基础完全不明确。


Given that most information about UAV activity is classified, it is impossible to know whether all drone targets directly participated in hostilities.	鉴于多数无人机活动信息属保密级别，几乎不可能了解是否所有无人机目标都直接参与了敌对行动。


And, while the Obama administration’s claim of zero or single-digit civilian fatalities may be true according to the official definition, it rests on the premise that any military-age male killed in a drone strike is a militant, unless intelligence posthumously proves otherwise.	并且虽然奥巴马政府所称的零或个位数的平民死亡数字按照官方定义可能确有其事，但其前提是无人机袭击中丧生的任何适龄参军男子都是武装分子，除非其后的情报能做出相反的证明。


A recent report by the law schools at Stanford University and New York University concludes that, in reality, civilian casualties in Pakistan may have accounted for up to 75% of all UAV victims between 2008 and 2011.	斯坦福大学和纽约大学法学院在最近一份报告中做出结论，2008到2011年实际的巴基斯坦平民伤亡数量在所有无人机受害者中占比可能高达75%。


Others estimate a lower, but still alarming, rate of 30%.	其他报告虽然估值略低，但仍然达到了30%的惊人比率。


The legal obligation of proportionality is clearly being violated.	这显然违反了适度采取行动的法律义务。


Accountability is also being flouted.	问责制同样遭到了蔑视。


Drone operations are carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency, an organization whose activities are shrouded in secrecy.	无人机行动的执行者是中央情报局，该组织的所有活动无不是秘密进行的。


And, unlike military personnel, CIA agents enjoy extensive immunity, undermining international legal standards.	而且与军事人员不同，中央情报局特工享有全方位的豁免权，这已经破坏了国际法律的基础。


Without increased transparency, to declare America’s UAV campaign legal is impossible, both in the context of war and outside of armed conflict.	无论在战争还是武装冲突以外的情况下，要想宣布美国无人机行动合法就必须增加透明度。


As long as the US keeps the rest of the world in the dark, illegal acts – including possible war crimes – may be committed with impunity.	只要美国仍然不让世界其他国家了解真相，那么违法行为——包括可能发生的战争罪行——就有可能继续逍遥法外。


Just as citizens worldwide are demanding increased economic and financial accountability, more pressure must be placed on the US to either prove that its drone activities are necessary and legal, or to stop them immediately.	正如世界各国公民要求扩大经济和财政问责范围一样，我们也必须向美国进一步施压要求其证明无人机行动的必要性及合法性，或者要求他们立即停止行动。


Victims of UAV attacks, their families, and civil-society groups have begun to speak out against America’s questionable drone campaign, and to pursue legal action.	无人机攻击的受害者及其家属和民间社会团体已经开始站出来反对美国可疑的无人机行动，并且提起法律诉讼。


Others should feel encouraged to follow suit.	应该鼓励其他人也这么做。


In the meantime, every drone strike will not only undermine human rights and international humanitarian law, but will also further widen a legal loophole that other governments and armed groups will not hesitate to exploit.	与此同时，每次无人机进攻不仅会损害人权和国际人道主义法律，而且会制造其他政府和武装组织会毫不犹豫加以利用的法律漏洞。


The US drone program does not make the world a safer place; it creates an environment in which unlawful killings can happen virtually anywhere, at any time, violating the fundamental human right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s life.	美国的无人机计划不但没有令世界更加安全，反而创造出非法杀戮几乎随时随地可能发生恐怖环境，违反了不得强制剥夺他人生命的基本人权要求。


America’s Locust Years	美国的灾年


BERKELEY – It is hard right now to write about American political economy.	伯克利——现在写点关于美国政治经济学的文章可不容易。 没人不知道债务上限这根紧绷的弦会不会松下来；


Nobody knows whether the debt-ceiling tripwire will be evaded; if so, how; or what will happen if it is not.	如何松下来； 如果不松下来又会发生什么。


If no deal to raise the debt ceiling is reached by August 3, interest rates on United States Treasury bonds could spike, or they could remain stable, as investors decide they have other problems to worry about.	如果到8月3日还不能就债务上限问题达成一致，那么美国国债利率可能会飙升，但也可能维持稳定（因为投资者会认为还有其他更加值得担忧的东西）。


Or the US Federal Reserve, the Peoples Bank of China (PBC), or both – or even some other body – could support the market.	美联储和中国人民银行（以及其他机构）也可能会出手支撑市场。


Or interest rates could rise if people expect a much weaker global economy – and, in a weaker global economy with no inflation, investors should be holding more US Treasuries, not fewer.	如果人们预期全球经济会进一步疲软，那么利率也可能会上升，而如果此时没有通胀之忧，那么投资者会更多（而不是更少）地持有美国国债。


Frankly, no one knows what legislative deal will be struck to raise the debt ceiling.	坦白讲，没人知道到底会达成什么样的方案来提高债务上限。


All we know as of this writing is that a deal would probably involve cuts in near-term spending, meaning weaker growth and higher unemployment over the next 18 months.	我们所能知道的是，该方案可能会包括削减近期支出的措施，这意味着在未来18个月里，增长会进一步放慢，失业率会进一步增加。


And we can assume that it would be repealed and replaced by something else come January 2013, either by a re-elected President Barack Obama, or by a new, Republican president.	我们还可以认为这些措施会在2013年1月结束，届时将会有新动作，抛出新措施的既可能是连任的奥巴马，也可能是新的共和党总统。


So, rather than talking about the US debt ceiling, let us think instead about all of the things that the debt-ceiling impasse has prevented the US government from doing during the past six months – all of the useful policies that might have been debated and enacted, but were not.	因此，我们还是把美国债务上限放在一边，先想一想债务上限僵局在过去半年以来是如何束缚住了美国政府的手脚的吧，让我们想一想到底有哪些有用的政策是应该讨论而未讨论的。


The risks imposed by global warming, for example, have not gone away.	比如，全球变暖的威胁并未消除。


The sooner the world starts preparing to deal with those threats, the better.	对于这一威胁，越早准备越好。


Another six months should not be lost.	我们不应该再浪费另一个半年。


The employment-to-population ratio in the US remains flat – mired at the very low levels to which it fell during the recession.	美国就业-人口比率仍然停滞不前，维持在衰退期间的极低水平。


With households desperately trying to rebuild their balance sheets, and with capital investment remarkably healthy, the only places to boost spending to restore capacity utilization and unemployment to normal levels are exports, government purchases, and construction investment.	美国家庭正在竭尽全力重塑自己的资产负债表，而资本投资相当健康，因此唯一能够刺激提振生产利用率支出的地方只剩下出口、政府购买和建设投资了。


But opportunities to pursue the necessary policies have not been grasped.	但我们并没有抓住实施必要措施的机会。


Here, too, another six months should not be lost.	在这一方面，我们也不应该再浪费另一个半年了。


Likewise, the US could have fulfilled its normal role as the conductor of the international economic orchestra. It has not, even as the European Union continues to respond inadequately to its own slow-moving solvency crises.	类似地，美国本能胜任其国际经济总指挥的日常职责，但它没有做到，甚至连欧盟无法处理好其缓慢发酵的债务危机时也没能挺身而出。


The mandarins of northern Europe continue to measure out a drip-feed of support with coffee spoons.	北欧的政要们惜钱如金，支持政策大大地不给力。


Another six months have been lost.	于是，又一个半年浪费了。


America faces long-run and short-run problems: decaying infrastructure, weakening educational systems, and a dysfunctional health-care system that produces sub-standard outcomes at twice the cost of any other industrial country.	美国面临着长期和短期问题：破败不堪的基础设施、江河日下的教育体系，还有那功能障碍、事倍功半的医疗体系。


Solving any of these three problems would go a long way toward resolving the long-run financing imbalance between current tax rates and America’s long-run social-insurance promises that the debt-ceiling debate’s instigators supposedly want to address.	解决这三个问题中的任何一个都将是迈向解决美国长期财政失衡——当前税率与美国债务上限争论煽动者所欲解决的长期社会保障费用之间的矛盾——的重大进步。


But the US government won’t address them. Six months that could have been spent boosting the long-run growth potential of the American economy through infrastructure investment, educational reform, or an overhaul of health-care financing – greatly easing America's long-run deficit and debt dilemmas in the process – have been lost.	但美国政府解决不了这些问题，而且已经浪费了半年——这半年本来可以花在通过基础设施投资、教育改革以及医保融资方案修正来提振美国经济长期潜力上，从而大大纾解美国长期赤字问题和债务困境。


During the run-up to World War II, Winston Churchill, speaking in Parliament, lamented “the years that the locusts hath eaten” – the period during which preparatory action to face the great crisis of his day (the rise of Continental fascism) could have been taken, but was not.	二战战备期间，丘吉尔在议会演讲中哀悼了“灾难般的这几年”——他指的是那段本应为他那个年代的大危机（欧洲大陆法西斯主义的崛起）做好战斗准备但却没有如此行动的时期。


Over the past century – with the notable exception of the Great Depression – the US political system has been remarkably good at foreseeing crises long before they have happened, and at least setting the foundation for dealing with them when they have occurred.	在整个20世纪中——大萧条是个显著例外——美国政治体系总是能够十分出色地预见很久以后才会发生的危机，而当危机发生时，美国至少已经为此打好了应对基础。


But so far in the third millennium, this skill – or simply run of luck – has deserted the US.	但在第三个千禧年中，这项技能（也许只是运气）离美国而去了。


My view is that the problem would fix itself easily if only the Republican Party of Dwight D. Eisenhower could stage a comeback (though without Richard Nixon and Joseph McCarthy).	在我看来，要是艾森豪威尔治下的共和党能起死回生就好了（可别是尼克松和约瑟夫·麦卡锡的共和党），这样的话，这个问题就能自动修正了。


It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that the problem is one not only for the US, but for the rest of the world as well.	不过，形势已经越来越明朗，问题不仅出在美国，也出在世界其他地方。


Since December 7, 1941, the world has in large part been able to rely on global governance by a somewhat-competent hyperpower.	自从1941年12月7日以来，在大部分时间里，世界一直依赖某个还算胜任的超级大国的治理。


That America may be gone for good.	这样的一个美国也许已是前尘往事了。


If it is, the world needs to develop other institutions for global management – and quickly.	果真如此的话，世界就需要另外的制度来管理全球事务，越快越好。


America’s Misguided Immigration Debate	美国有关移民的辩论被引入歧途


A debate on immigration is beginning in the United States Senate, which will take up several proposals.	美国参议院正在展开一场有关移民问题的辩论，这场辩论将讨论数个建议。


These include a hateful bill – which the House of Representatives has already approved – that provides for the construction of a wall along the US-Mexican border and makes unauthorized entry into the US a felony.	这些建议包括一项令人憎恨的法案，即规定沿着美国和墨西哥边境修筑一堵高墙，并且将非法进入美国定为一项重罪。 美国众议院已经批准了这一法案。


The US Senate will also consider a bill co-authored by Senator Edward Kennedy and Senator John McCain, which proposes stronger border enforcement, a temporary workers program with a path to residency and citizenship, and legalization for people already in the US without papers.	美国参议院还将考虑一项由参议员肯尼迪和麦肯恩联合提出的法案。 这一法案建议加强边境执法，设立可以导向居留权和国籍的临时工作项目以及将美国境内的无证人员合法化。


Another idea is to require anyone in the US wanting to regularize their immigration status to go home and wait in line there.	另一个主张是要求任何在美国境内想要获得正常移民资格的人返回祖国并在那里等候。


This last component is largely rhetoric; it is hard to imagine any Mexican already in the US voluntarily returning to, say, Zacatecas to wait patiently in line for a new visa.	最后一项建议基本上是夸夸其谈。 很难想象任何一个已经在美国的墨西哥人主动返回到比如卡萨特卡斯的地方耐心排队等候新的签证。


President George W. Bush has been skirting the question ever since he committed himself to an immigration agreement with Mexico when he visited President Vicente Fox in Guanajuato almost exactly five years ago.	几乎在五年前，当布什总统在瓜纳华托拜访福克斯总统的时候承诺与墨西哥签订一项移民协议以来，他一直就躲避这个问题。


Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter’s compromise proposal.	最后，也许是最为重要的是参议院司法委员会主席斯佩克特的妥协性建议。


Specter’s proposal also provides for reinforced security at the border, as well as a six-year non-renewable Temporary Workers Program without a path to residency, although it would allow unauthorized immigrants to remain in the US with a new, non-immigrant status.	斯佩克特的建议同样规定加强边界安全，以及为期六年的不可续签无法获得居留权的临时工作项目。 这一项目允许非法移民以新的非移民身份留在美国。


The latter status may or may not include a path to residency and citizenship; fudging the issue may be a negotiating tactic to avoid debate over whether this is a form of disguised amnesty (which, fortunately, to a certain extent, it is).	回避这一问题可能是为避免讨论这是否是一种变相大赦的谈判战术而已。 而不幸的是，在某种程度上这的确是一种变相的大赦。


What’s missing in the debate is the Latin American context.	这一辩论缺乏的是考虑到拉美大环境。


There was a time when north-south migratory flows in the western hemisphere were limited to Mexico and the Caribbean.	先前有段时期，西半球的南北向移民流动局限于墨西哥以及加勒比。


That changed in the 1980’s, when Central America’s civil wars sent hundreds of thousands of migrants thru Mexico to the US, and then in the 1990’s, when people fleeing violence in Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Ecuador also began searching for opportunity.	二十世纪八十年代，当中美洲的内战将数十万移民通过墨西哥送进美国时，这一情况发生了改变。 九十年代，当逃避发生在哥伦比亚、委内瑞拉、秘鲁以及厄瓜多尔暴力的人们同样开始寻找机会时，形势又发生了变化。


Today, even Brazil, traditionally a country of immigration, has become one of emigration.	巴西传统上是一个吸纳移民的国家。 如今，它也成为了输出移民的国家。


Moreover, these migrants are no longer exclusively of rural origin, nor do they travel only to traditional areas in the US; they are, literally, everywhere.	更为重要的是，这些移民不再局限于农村人口，而且他们不再只是前往移民在美国的传统落脚点。 事实上，他们无处不在。


Their remittances contribute immensely to the economic welfare of their families, communities, and home countries’ economies.	他们的汇款为他们的家庭和社区的经济状况以及祖国的经济做出了巨大贡献。


Thus, whatever immigration policy emerges in the US will have an enormous impact south of the Rio Grande well beyond Mexico.	如此，美国无论出现何种移民政策都将会对里奥格兰德以南墨西哥以外的地区产生重大影响。


This will occur precisely at a time when Latin America is swerving left, with country after country drifting back to anti-American, populist stances: Venezuela in 1999, Bolivia last year, perhaps Mexico, Peru, and Nicaragua later this year.	而这一情况恰恰发生在拉美向左转，一个接着一个回到反美主义和民粹主义的立场。 先是1999年的委内瑞拉，然后是去年的玻利维亚，今年晚些时候可能还有墨西哥、秘鲁和尼加拉瓜。


If the perception of further US hostility toward Latin America persists, the tilt toward an irresponsible, demagogic left will harden.	如果人们依旧感觉美国敌视拉美的话，将会硬化不负责任以及蛊惑人心的左派倾向。


The responsible left in Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay are an exception to the emerging rule set by Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez.	对于委内瑞拉总统查韦斯所确立的新兴规则而言，智利、巴西以及乌拉圭负责任的左派人士是例外。


The best way to accentuate the region’s growing anti-American sentiment is to try to close the US-Mexican border (which will be futile).	恶化该地区不断增长的反美情绪的最佳办法就是试图关闭美墨边境（这将会是徒劳的）。


Instead, the US should establish humane, secure, and legal mechanisms of temporary or permanent entry for people the American economy needs and wants, and it should work with, not against, governments in Latin America.	相反，美国应该为美国经济所需要而且想要的人们临时或者永久进入美国建立人道的、安���的以及合法的机制，而且，美国应该与拉美国家政府合作，而不应该与之作对。


Five years ago, Mexico’s President Vicente Fox tried to convince Bush that something had to be done before a nativist backlash in the US complicated its relations with Latin America and made goals such as a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) impossible.	五年前，墨西哥总统福克斯试图让布什相信，为了防止美国内部的排外强烈反应把它与拉美的关系复杂化，而且使得类似美洲国家自由贸易协定等目标付诸东流，就必须采取行动。


But matters have gotten worse: border tensions between the US and Mexico have grown, the proposed wall has rightly provoked indignation, more unauthorized immigrants than ever are entering the US, and the FTAA has collapsed.	但是形势却变得更差。 美墨边境的紧张局势有所增长，修建高墙的建议正好挑起了愤怒，前所未有、更多的非法移民正在进入美国，而美洲国家自由贸易协定则无果而终。


Bush must begin to use what political capital he has left to support enlightened immigration reform, along the lines of the Kennedy-McCain bill.	布什必须开始利用他所剩下的政治资本，沿着肯尼迪和麦肯恩法案的路线来支持开明的移民改革。


He will never get a guest-worker program without Democratic support, which in turn is unlikely unless the White House supports access to a program for unauthorized immigrants already in the US that includes some type of path to residence and citizenship.	没有民主党人的支持，他就永远无法获得外来工人项目，而除非白宫支持包含某种永久居留以及国籍的、为已经在美国的非法移民制定的项目，否则就无法得到民主党人的支持。


Mexico and the US must be sensitive to domestic political concerns in both countries.	墨西哥和美国必须对各自国家的国内政治关切保持敏感。


No immigration deal is feasible north of the border without addressing security matters; south of the border, there is no conceivable Mexican cooperation on border security or on a Temporary Workers Program if immigration reform ignores the nearly five million Mexican citizens without papers currently living in the US.	不解决安全问题就不可能在边界的北边处理好移民问题。 而在边界南边，如果移民改革忽视目前居住在美国的将近五百万墨西哥非法移民，就无法想象墨西哥会在边境安全以及临时工人项目上进行合作。


Mexico must act on what Fox has called “shared responsibility.”	墨西哥必须在福克斯总统所说的“共同责任”上采取行动。


The best imaginable deal between the US and Mexico, or the best imaginable US immigration reform, will not eliminate the flow of undocumented migrants from Mexico and South America overnight.	美墨之间最为可行的协议、或者说可以想象得到的最佳的美国移民改革，并非是一夜之间就消除来自墨西哥以及南美的无合法证件的移民。


Mexico has to assume responsibility for regulating this traffic, which means more than sealing off its southern border.	墨西哥必须承担责任对这一人流设施管理，这就意味着做比关闭南部边境更多的事情。


The government could, for example, double welfare payments to households whose male heads stay home, threaten to revoke land reform rights after years of absence in rural communities, and establish choke points on highways at the Tehuantepec Isthmus.	例如，墨西哥政府可以加倍支付男子家长留在家里的家庭的福利，威胁在离开农村社区几年后就取消土地改革的权利，并且在特万特佩克地峡的高速公路上设立检查站。


Fox has said that he is willing to break with old Mexican taboos, but the Bush administration has never taken him up on it.	福克斯总统已经说过，他愿意与旧的墨西哥禁忌决裂，但是布什行政当局从来没有认真对待过。


That is unfortunate, because Fox will not be around forever.	这是不幸的，因为福克斯总统不会永远当政。


Immigration has always been an immensely complex and delicate issue inside the US, and now for Latin America as well.	移民问题总是美国国内的一个极为复杂和微妙的问题，现在对于拉美国家也是一样。


A window of opportunity opened at the beginning of Bush’s first term, and closed shut after the terrorist attacks of September 2001.	布什第一个任期内开启的机会之窗在2001年9月份的恐怖主义攻击后关闭了。


It is opening again and should be taken advantage of before it is too late.	现在这个窗户在一次开启，就应当在过于后迟之前加以利用。


Why Iran Won’t Budge	伊朗为什么不会让步


TEL AVIV – No one really believed that the latest round of international negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program would produce a breakthrough.	特拉维夫——没有人真的相信与伊朗的新一轮核计划国际谈判能够取得突破。


So it was no surprise that itdid not, despite the concessions that were made at the meeting in Kazakhstan by the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus Germany).	因此尽管P5+1集团（中国、法国、俄罗斯、英国、美国，再加上德国）在哈萨克斯坦会议上已做出让步，谈判没有进展也并不出人意料。


America’s belief that a harsh sanctions regime could coax Iran into a deal has proved – at least so far – to be unrealistic.	美国认为严厉的制裁制度可以劝诱伊朗达成协议的想法至少目前看来是不切实际的。


Despite being isolated and ostracized, Iran has managed to gain some strategic breathing room with the help of countries like China, Russia, India, Syria, and Venezuela, allowing it to resist Western pressure.	尽管遭到孤立和排斥，伊朗在中国、俄罗斯、印度、叙利亚和委内瑞拉等国的帮助下得到了对抗西方压力的战略喘息空间。


More important, even though the severe sanctions regime led by the United States is bound to be imperfect – it only hardens further Iran’s resistance to “America’s designs.”	更重要的是，即使美国领导的严厉制裁制度注定并不完美——它只能进一步增强伊朗对“美国阴谋”的抵触情绪。


To be sure, Iran’s alliances are vulnerable to erosion and, in the case of two staunch allies, Syria and Venezuela, to outright collapse.	可以肯定伊朗的战略联盟并不稳固，叙利亚和委内瑞拉这两大坚定盟友甚至有可能彻底崩溃。


The end of Chavismo would threaten Iran’s vast interests in Venezuela and its considerable presence in the Andes, while the fall of the Assad dynasty would be a devastating blow to Iran’s regional strategy.	查韦斯政权终结有可能威胁伊朗在委内瑞拉的庞大利益，同时伊朗在安第斯山脉的势力也有可能遭到破坏。 阿萨德王朝的垮台将对伊朗地区战略构成毁灭性的打击。


Even so, Russia and China continue to take a much more lenient approach to Iran than Europe and the US have since the International Atomic Energy Agency’s report in November 2011 described in detail Iran’s activities in pursuing the capability to produce nuclear weapons.	尽管如此，从2011年11月国际原子能机构报告详细阐述伊朗追求核武器制造能力的所作所为以来，俄罗斯和中国对于伊朗的态度依然比欧美国家更为宽松。


While the Western powers have embraced ever-harsher sanctions, Russia and China view Iran as a tool in their global competition with the US.	尽管西方列强采取的制裁措施比以往任何时候都更严厉，但俄罗斯和中国却把伊朗作为工具与美国展开全球竞争。


China’s Iranian interests boil down to economics.	中国在伊朗的利益归根结底是经济利益。


Bilateral trade stands at about $40 billion a year, and China is not only Iran’s largest customer for crude oil, but also a colossal investor – somewhere between $40 billion and $100 billion – in Iran’s energy and transport sectors.	中伊双边贸易额每年约为400亿美元，且中国不仅是伊朗最大的原油客户，同时也是能源运输业的巨额投资人（投资额为400亿到1000亿美元不等）。


True, China cannot entirely overlook US pressure and the staunch opposition of its top oil supplier, Saudi Arabia, to Iran’s nuclear program.	诚然，中国无法完全忽视来自美国的压力及其头号原油供应国沙特阿拉伯对伊朗核计划的坚决反对。


But, while China has supported the mandatory sanctions set by the United Nations Security Council, it has rejected the West’s unilateral measures.	但在支持联合国安理会强制制裁措施的同时，中国拒绝承认西方国家的单边制裁措施。


With bilateral trade worth only about $5 billion annually, Russia’s economic interests in Iran are fairly modest.	俄伊的双边年度贸易总值仅50亿美元，因此俄国在伊朗的经济利益微乎其微。


But it fears Iran’s ability to cause trouble, particularly by stirring up unrest among Russia’s Muslim citizens.	但俄国担心伊朗制造麻烦，特别是挑动俄国内的穆斯林民众闹事。


Moreover, America has refused to pay the Kremlin’s high price – curtailment of congressional human-rights legislation, repeal of Cold-War-era restrictions on Russian-US trade, and abandonment of plans for ballistic missile defense in Europe – for Russian support on Iran (or, for that matter, on any other trouble spot, such as Syria).	此外，美国拒绝了克里姆林宫开出的高价——限制国会人权立法、废除冷战时期俄美贸易限制和放弃欧洲弹道导弹防御计划，以换取俄国在伊朗（或在叙利亚等其他任何动荡地区）问题上对于美国的支持。


The problem with the US drive to have key stakeholders join its anti-Iran crusade is that some of them live in neighborhoods where Iran is an important factor.	美国要求关键利益方参与对伊讨伐运动的问题在于伊朗在某些国家所处的区域发挥着重要作用。


India is a case in point.	印度就是一个很好的例子。


India is certainly alarmed at the possibility of Iran developing nuclear weapons, not to mention its concern at the possible effects of Iran’s Islamist fundamentalism on Kashmiri Muslims.	印度肯定警惕伊朗发展核武器的可能性，更不用说它对伊朗伊斯兰原教旨主义可能对克什米尔穆斯林造成的影响表示关注。


But its $14 billion in annual bilateral trade, and dependence on Iranian oil – many of India’s refineries have been built to run solely on Iranian crude – are key strategic considerations.	但140亿美元的年度双边贸易和对伊朗石油的依赖（印度许多炼油厂完全依赖伊朗原油进口）却是印度必需思考的关键战略问题。


Moreover, India needs Iran as an alternative trade and energy conduit to Central Asia, bypassing rival Pakistan, and also as a hedge against an uncertain future in Afghanistan after America’s withdrawal in 2014.	此外，印度需要伊朗这条绕过巴基斯坦的中亚能源贸易替代通道，还需要伊朗在2014年美国撤出阿富汗之后对未来的不确定性进行对冲。


As a result, India’s policy mirrors China’s: it has aligned itself with mandatory international sanctions, but has abjured voluntary Western financial restrictions.	因此印度的政策和中国如出一辙：那就是赞同强制性的国际制裁，但拒绝执行西方的自愿金融限制政策。


The best one can expect is that India continues to act at the margin – for example, by reducing dependence on Iranian oil while increasing imports from Saudi Arabia, already its largest supplier of crude.	可以想见的最好情况是印度继续执行这种擦边球政策——比如在降低对伊朗石油依赖的同时扩大从沙特阿拉伯的石油进口，目前沙特已经是印度排名第一的原油供应国。


The equivocal nature of Iran’s alliances, however, can be a mixed blessing.	伊朗联盟的暧昧态度其实好坏参半。


Yes, a harsh sanctions regime might still gain additional supporters, but an Iran with its back against the wall would probably be even more obstinate in its nuclear drive.	多一些国家支持严厉制裁当然是好事，但被逼入绝境的伊朗可能会更顽强地研制核武器。


After all, Iraq was an easy target in the first Gulf War precisely because it had abandoned its nuclear program, and possessed no weapons of mass destruction.	毕竟，伊拉克正是因为放弃核计划且不拥有大规模杀伤性武器而成为第一次海湾战争的靶子。


Similarly, Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi exposed himself to a NATO onslaught by relinquishing his WMDs.	同样，利比亚的卡扎菲也因为放弃了大规模杀伤性武器才成为北约的攻击对象。


By contrast, North Korea shows that defiance, rather than accommodation, is a strategy that works.	相反，朝鲜的例子表明真正奏效的对策不是妥协而是挑战。


That is why Syria, with North Korean assistance, tried to develop a nuclear program (presumably destroyed by Israel’s officially unacknowledged “Operation Orchard” in 2007).Iran will not consider abandoning its nuclear insurance policy unless a broad agenda is agreed upon that addresses Iran’s concerns as a regional power and secures the immunity of its Islamist regime from American actions.	叙利亚因此在朝鲜的协助下试图发展核计划（这项计划有可能被以色列2007年未公开承认的“果园行动”所摧毁）。 除非制定全方位计划解决伊朗身为地区强国的关注并确保美国不对伊斯兰政权采取行动，否则伊朗绝不会考虑放弃核保险政策。


Albert Einstein’s definition of insanity as “doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results” could be applied to America’s Iran policy.	爱因斯坦用“反复做同样的事，却期待不同结果”来定义精神错乱，这恰好适用于描述美国的伊朗政策。


The diplomacy of sanctions, ostracism, and brinkmanship has failed resoundingly.	外交制裁、排斥和边缘化政策已经彻底失败。


As Iran’s uranium-enrichment and other weapons-development activities continue unabated, the US needs to make a break with the old rules of engagement.	由于伊朗铀浓缩和其他武器研发活动有增无减，美国需要彻底改变原有的交往规则。


America’s Misplaced Deficit Complacency	错误的赤字满意


CAMBRIDGE – The United States still faces a dangerous fiscal deficit, but one might not know it from the complacency that dominates budget discussions in Washington.	美国剑桥—美国依然面临着危险的预算赤字，但这个赤字可能无法从华盛顿预算讨论中所弥漫的自鸣得意之情中获知。


Regarded as an urgent problem until recently, the federal deficit is now being placed on the back burner of American politics.	此前联邦赤字被视为一个紧迫问题，但现在已经沦为美国政坛的次等问题。


The shift in thinking was triggered by the revised deficit forecasts recently published by the Congressional Budget Office, the independent technical agency responsible for advising Congress on budget issues.	触发观点改变的是国会预算办公室（CBO，这是一个独立的技术机构，负责向过会提供预算问题的建议）最新公布的赤字预测。


According to the CBO’s report, the US fiscal deficit will decline from 7% of GDP in 2012 to 4% in 2013.	根据CBO的报告，美国财政赤字将从2012年的占GDP的7%降至2013年的占GDP的4%。


This reduction reflects the cuts in government spending on defense and non-defense programs mandated by the budget “sequester” that took effect in March, as well as the rise in revenue caused by higher rates for income and payroll taxes since the end of 2012.	这一减少幅度反映了去年3月生效的国防和非国防项目上的预算“封顶”所带来支出削减以及2012年底生效的提高所得税和工资税税率所带来的收入增加。


More striking is the CBO’s projection that the deficit will continue to decline rapidly, reaching just 2.1% of GDP in 2015, before rising gradually to just 3.5% of GDP in 2023, the end of the CBO’s official forecast period.	更令人瞩目的是CBO预测赤字将持续快速减少，2015年将减至GDP的2. 1%，此后会逐渐上升，到2023年（CBO正式预测期的期末）将占GDP的3.


That path of deficits implies that the government debt/GDP ratio will remain at about the current level of 75% for the next ten years.	5%。 预算变化路径意味着未来十年的政府债务/GDP比率将维持在75%左右。


Unfortunately, these headline-grabbing numbers are not likely to be borne out in reality; indeed, even the CBO does not believe that they represent what will occur.	不幸的是，这些吸引眼球的数字不可能成为现实； 事实上，即便是CBO也不相信它们代表将来发生的事情。


Instead, these official forecasts represent a “baseline” scenario that the CBO is required to present.	相反，这些官方预测代表一种CBO被要求给出的“基线”情形。


The CBO’s “baseline budget” assumes that all of the deficit-reducing features in current law will remain unchanged.	CBO的“基线预算”假设当前法律的所有赤字削减内容都保持不变。


These include, for example, an old legislative requirement that payments to physicians in the government’s Medicare program be reduced sharply in future years, a requirement that Congress has voted each year to “postpone.”	这些内容包括（比如）一个旧的立法要求——政府医疗保险（Medicare）项目内支付给医生的数字将在未来数年大幅下降，对于这一要求，过会每年都投票“暂停”。


In order to provide better guidance, the CBO presents an “alternative fiscal scenario,” in which such very unlikely features are removed from the forecast.	为了提供更好的指导，CBO给出了“替代财政情景”，在这一情景中，可能性极低的内容被剔除出预测。


The alternative forecast implies that the annual budget deficit at the end of ten years will be back up to 4.7% of GDP, with the debt/GDP ratio at 83% and rising.	替代预测表明，十年后的年度预算赤字将回升至GDP的4. 7%，债务/GDP比率为83%并呈上升趋势。


And those estimates are based on the optimistic assumption that the economy will have returned gradually to full employment with low inflation and moderate interest rates.	且这些估算基于乐观的假设——经济将逐渐恢复充分就业，通胀较低，利率也很温和。


Officials and others who favor stimulating growth through increased government spending ignore the CBO’s more realistic alternative scenario.	官员和其他支持通过增加政府支出刺激增长的人士忽略了CBO更为现实的替代情景。


They buttress their argument that the deficit is not an immediate problem by pointing to very low interest rates on long-term government debt, with a 2% yield on the ten-year Treasury bond and a negative real interest rate on Treasury inflation-protected bonds (TIPS).	他们用长期政府债务利率极低——十年期美国国债收益率只有2%，通胀保护国债（TIPS）实际利率为负——为依据论证预算并非紧迫问题。


But such low rates do not reflect ordinary market sentiment; rather, they stem from the fact that the Federal Reserve is now buying more long-term securities than the government is issuing to finance the budget deficit.	但如此低利率并不反映正常的市场情绪； 相反，低利率的原因是美联储正在买入更多长期证券，数量超过了政府为预算赤字融资所发行的量。


Looking further ahead, the CBO warns that the combination of a rapidly aging population and the increase in medical costs will cause the deficit to rise rapidly, driven by the higher costs of pension and health-care benefits for middle-income retirees.	方言未来，CBO警告快速老龄化的人口和医疗成本的上升相结合将导致赤字快速增加，其推动力来自退休成本和中产阶级退休者医疗福利成本的增加。


According to the CBO, without legislative changes, the fiscal deficit in 2037 will be 17% of GDP, while the national debt will increase to more than 195% of GDP.	据CBO的数字，若无立法变化，2037年财政赤字将为GDP的1. 7%，而国民债务将升至GDP的195%以上。


A large and rising national debt is a serious danger to an economy’s health.	庞大且增长的国民债务对经济健康而言是一个严重威胁。


Higher debt-service costs require higher tax rates, which in turn weaken incentives and reduce economic growth.	债务维持成本的上升要求提高税率，而这反过来又削弱了激励、抑制了经济增长。


By the end of the decade, the US will have to pay an amount equivalent to more than one-third of the revenue from personal-income taxes just to pay the interest on the national debt.	十年后，美国需要付出相当于个人所得税收入三分之一多的资金用来偿付国民债务利息。


Foreign investors now hold more than half of that debt.	目前，外国投资者持有了一大半债务。


Paying interest to them requires sending more goods and services to the rest of the world than the US receives from the rest of the world.	向他们支付利息需要向世界其他地区输送商品和服务，其数量超过了美国得自世界其他地区的数量。


That requires a weaker dollar to make US goods more attractive to foreign buyers and to make foreign goods more expensive to American consumers.	这要求美元贬值以使美国商品对外国买家更有吸引力，而使外国商品对美国消费者来说更贵。


The weaker dollar reduces the US standard of living.	美元贬值会降低美国的生活水平。


A large national debt also limits the government’s ability to respond to emergencies, including both military threats and economic downturns.	庞大的国民债务还限制了政府响应紧急情况的能力，包括军事威胁和经济衰退。


And it makes the US vulnerable to changes in financial-market sentiment, as the European experience has shown.	这还让美国易受金融市场情绪变化的影响，如欧洲经验所显示的那样。


Reducing future deficits and reversing the rise in the national debt require raising tax revenue and slowing the growth of government pension and health-care programs.	降低未来赤字、扭转国民债务的上升之势要求提高税收收入和降低政府退休和医疗计划的增长率。


Tax revenue can be raised without increasing marginal tax rates by limiting the tax subsidies that are built into the current tax code.	税收收入可以通过限制现行税法中的税收补贴在不增加边际税率的情况下实现。


Those subsidies are a hidden form of government spending on everything from home mortgages and health insurance to the purchase of hybrid cars and residential solar panels.	这些补贴是隐性政府支出，其范围从家庭按揭和医疗保险到混合动力汽车和家用太阳能板无所不包。


Slowing the growth of the pension and health-care programs for middle-class retirees cannot be done abruptly.	降低中产阶级退休和医疗项目支出增长不是一夜之间就能完成的任务。


It must begin by giving notice to those who are now a decade away from retirement – which is why it is important to launch such reforms now.	它必须以警示离退休尚有十年的人群为起点——这也是为何需要从现在就开始改革的原因。


Unfortunately, the new complacency about future deficits makes it difficult, if not impossible, to enact the legislation needed to begin the process of trimming America’s long-term fiscal deficit.	不幸的是，对未来赤字的新出现的自鸣得意之情让实施开启美国长期预算赤字整合过程所需要的立法变得十分困难（如果不是不可能的话）。


It is important for policymakers and the public alike to understand the real fiscal outlook and the damage that high deficits will cause if prompt action is not taken.	对决策者和公众来说，很重要的一点事要理解真实的财政前景和在不立刻采取行动的情况下高赤字所带来的后果。


Merely moving the problem to the back burner will not prevent it from boiling over.	仅仅把问题移至次要地位是无法防止它爆发的。


Meeting America’s Growth Challenge	面对美国的增长挑战


BERKELEY – The United States continues to recover from its deepest economic slump since the Great Depression, but the pace of recovery remains frustratingly slow.	伯克利—美国一直处在大萧条以来最深经济衰退之后的复苏中，但复苏的速度仍然低得令人沮丧。


There are several reasons to anticipate modest improvement in 2013, although, as usual, there are downside risks.	有理由表明2013年会出现一些好转，尽管与往常一样，下行风险依然存在。


Prolonged recession or a financial crisis in Europe and slower growth in emerging markets are the main external sources of potential danger.	欧洲衰退延续或爆发金融危机以及新兴市场增长放缓是主要的外部忧虑来源。


At home, political infighting underlies the two greatest risks: failure to reach a deal to raise the debt ceiling and an additional round of fiscal contraction that stymies economic growth.	在国内，政治斗争体现了两个最大的风险：无法达成提高债务上限的协议以及妨碍经济增长的新一轮财政紧缩。


Since 2010, tepid average annual GDP growth of 2.1% has meant weak job creation.	自2010年以来，平均年GDP增长率只有2.


In both this recovery and the previous two, the rebound in employment growth has been weaker and later than the rebound in GDP growth.	1%，这意味着就业岗位创造不振。 在此次和前两次复苏中，就业增长的反弹都比GDP弱，而且滞后于GDP。


But the loss of jobs in the most recent recession was more than twice as large as in previous recessions, so a slow recovery has meant a much higher unemployment rate for a much longer period.	但最新衰退中的就业岗位减少量比前两次多两倍，因此缓慢的复苏意味着在长得多的时间里存在高得多的失业率。


Weak aggregate demand is the primary culprit for subdued GDP and employment growth.	总需求疲软被指为GDP和就业增长不振的罪魁。


The 2008 recession was triggered by a financial crisis that erupted after the collapse of a credit-fueled asset bubble decimated the housing market.	2008年衰退由金融危机引发，而金融危机由信用催生的资产泡沫破裂摧毁了房地产市场引发。


Private-sector demand contracts sharply and recovers only slowly after such crises.	在这类危机后，私人部门需求会急剧下降，复苏会极为缓慢。


The private-sector financial balance swung from a deficit of 3.7% of GDP in 2006, at the height of the boom, to a surplus of about 6.8% of GDP in 2010 and about 5% today.	私人部门财务收支的波动情况是：2006年存在相当于GDP的3. 7%的赤字（繁荣期最高值），2010出现了相当于GDP的6.


This represents the sharpest contraction and weakest recovery in private-sector demand since the end of World War II.	8%左右的盈余，目前盈余约为GDP的5%。 这意味着这是二战结束以来私人部门需求最剧烈的衰退和最疲软的复苏。


Growth in two components of private demand, residential investment and consumption, which account for more than 75% of total spending in the US economy, has been especially slow.	私人需求的两大组成部分——占美国经济总支出额75%以上的住宅投资和消费增长特别缓慢。


Both sources of demand are likely to strengthen in 2013.	两大需求源都有望在2013年有所增强。


Residential investment is still at an historic low as a share of GDP as a result of overbuilding during the 2003-2008 housing boom and the tsunami of foreclosures that followed.	用占GDP比重衡量，住房投资仍处在历史低点，这是2003—2008年房地产泡沫期的过度建房以及随后按揭止赎风暴带来的后果。


But the headwinds in the housing market are dissipating.	但房地产市场的阻力正在消散。


Home sales, prices, and construction all rose last year, while foreclosures declined.	去年，住房销量、价格和建筑量均有所上升，而按揭止赎有所下降。


Residential investment should be a source of output and job growth this year.	住房投资应能成为今年产出和就业增长的一大源泉。


Large losses in household wealth, deleveraging from unsustainable debt, weak wage growth, and a decline in labor’s share of national income to a historic low have combined to constrain consumption growth.	家庭财富的巨大损失、在不可持续的债务水平上的去杠杆化过程、疲软的工资增长以及劳动收入占国民收入比重降至历史低点，这些因素形成的合力约束了消费增长。


Real median household income is still nearly 7% below its 2007 peak, real median household net worth dropped by 35% between 2005 and 2010 (and remains significantly below its pre-recession peak), and about 90% of the income gains during the recovery have gone to the top 1%.	真实中位家庭收入仍比2007年的峰值低7%，真实中位家庭净财富在2005—2010年间下跌了35%（目前仍显著低于危机前峰值），复苏期间90%的收入增长流入了最顶层1%人的腰包。


To be sure, the balance-sheet headwinds holding back consumption have eased.	实事求是地说，消费的资产负债表阻力已有所减缓。


Households have slashed their debt – often through painful foreclosures and bankruptcies – and their debt relative to income has sunk to its 2005 level, significantly below its 2008 peak.  Helped by low interest rates, debt service relative to household income has fallen back to levels not seen since the early 1980’s.	家庭债务已得到了削减——往往是通过痛苦的按揭止赎和破产实现——家庭债务/收入比率已降至2005年的水平，显著低于2008年的峰值。 受低利率推动，债务偿付占家庭收入比重已降至20世纪80年代初的水平。


But consumption will be hit by the expiration of the payroll tax cut, which will reduce household income by about $125 billion this year.	但消费将因工资税减免计划到期而受到影响，今年的家庭收入将因此减少1 250亿美元。


Another factor holding back recovery has been weak growth in spending on goods and services by both state and local governments, and more recently by the federal government.	妨碍复苏的另一大因素是州和地方政府商品和服务支出增长疲软，最近，联邦政府也加入了这一行列。


Indeed, since the recession’s onset, state and local governments have cut nearly 600,000 jobs and reduced spending for infrastructure projects by 20%.	事实上，自衰退发生以来，州和地方政府裁掉了600 000个工作岗位和20%的基础设施项目支出。


The fiscal trends for 2013 are mixed, but negative overall.	2013年的财政趋势仍不明朗，但总的来说是消极的。


While state and local government cutbacks in spending and employment are ending as the recovery boosts their tax revenues, the fiscal drag at the federal level is strengthening.	州和地方政府的减支和裁员过程正在随复苏提振税收收入而结束，联邦层面的财政后腿则日趋严重。


The American Taxpayer Relief Act – the tax deal reached in early January to avoid the “fiscal cliff” – shaves about $750 billion from the deficit over the next ten years and could take a percentage point off the 2013 growth rate.	美国纳税人援助法（American Taxpayer Relief Act）——1月初为避免“财政悬崖”而达成的税收协议——裁掉了未来十年的7 500亿美元赤字，这将拖累2013年增长率1个百分点。


In addition, although less widely appreciated, significant reductions in federal spending are already under way, with more likely to come.	此外，尽管大幅削减联邦支出的方案支持者要少一些，但该方案已经步入了实施阶段，未来可能还会加码。


Spending cuts and revenue increases that have been legislated since 2011 will reduce the projected deficit by $2.4 trillion over the next decade, with three-quarters coming from spending cuts, almost exclusively in non-defense discretionary programs.	2011年写入法律的支出削减和收入增加预计将在未来十年减少2. 4万亿美元的赤字，其中四分之三来自减支，几乎全是非国防自由裁量项目。


Based on current economic assumptions, the US needs about $4 trillion in savings to stabilize the debt/GDP ratio over the next decade.	根据当前的经济假设，美国需要约4万亿美元储蓄才能在未来十年中保持债务/GDP比率稳定。


It is already three-fifths of the way there.	其中五分之三已有了着落。


The so-called sequester (the across-the-board spending cuts scheduled to begin in March), would slash another $100 billion this year and $1.2 trillion over the next decade.	所谓的扣押（将于3月开始的全面减支）将在今年减少1 000亿美元、未来十年减少1. 2万亿美元赤字。


Although it could stabilize the debt/GDP ratio, the sequester would be a mistake: it fails to distinguish among spending priorities, would undermine essential programs, and would mean another significant dent in growth this year.	尽管这可以稳定债务/GDP比率，但扣押将是一个错误：它无法区分支出优先级，会破坏重要项目，并会导致今年增长的严重削弱。


Moreover, despite the warnings of deficit alarmists, the US does not face an imminent debt crisis.	此外，尽管赤字悲观派频发警告，但美国仍没有迫在眉睫的债务危机。


Currently, the federal debt held by the public is just over 70% of GDP, a level not seen since the early 1950’s.	最近，公共部门持有的联邦债务略高于GDP的70%，这是20世纪50年代初以来不曾有过的情况。


However, government debt soars by an average of 86% after severe financial crises, so the increase in the federal debt by 70% between 2008 and 2012 is not surprising.	尽管如此，平均而言政府债务会在严重金融危机后增加86%，因此2008—2012年联邦债务增加70%并不令人奇怪。


Nor is it alarming.	这也没什么值得担忧的。


The US economy grew rapidly for several years after WWII with a higher debt/GDP ratio, and today’s ratio is lower than in all other major industrial countries (and roughly half that of Greece, analogies to which are absurd and misleading).	美国经济二战后债务/GDP比率要高得多，但经济增长也快得多，如今的比率低于任何其他主要工业化国家（大约只有希腊的一半，用它来作类比是荒谬的，极易引人入歧途）。


During the last two years, Washington has been obsessed with the need to cut the deficit and put the debt/GDP ratio on a “sustainable” path, even as global investors have flocked to US government debt, driving interest rates to historic lows.	过去两年来，华盛顿沉溺于削减赤字、将债务/GDP比率保持在“可持续”路径上，尽管全球投资者纷纷涌向美国国债，把利率推向了历史低点。


The considerable progress that has been made on deficit reduction over the next ten years has been overlooked.	未来十年赤字削减取得重大进步被忽视了。


Also overlooked have been the immediate challenges of low growth, weak investment, and high unemployment.	同样被忽视的还有低增长、投资不振以及失业高企所带来的即期挑战。


It is time to refocus.	是时候转变专注点了。


The US needs a plan for faster growth, not more deficit reduction.	美国需要提振增长速度的计划，而不是更多的赤字削减。


Evsey Domar, a legendary growth economist (and one of my MIT professors) counseled that the problem of alleviating the debt burden is essentially a problem of achieving growth in national income.	杰出的增长经济学家多马尔（Evsey Domar，我在MIT的教授之一）建议，缓解债务负担的问题本质上是取得国民收入增长的问题。


We should heed his wisdom.	我们应该遵循他的智慧。


America’s New Progressive Era?	美国的新进步时代？


NEW YORK – In 1981, US President Ronald Reagan came to office famously declaring that, “Government is not the solution to our problem.	纽约—1981年，美国总统里根以一句名言入主白宫：“政府不是问题的解决方案。


Government is the problem.”	政府是问题。


Thirty-two years and four presidents later, Barack Obama’s recent inaugural address, with its ringing endorsement of a larger role for government in addressing America’s – and the world’s – most urgent challenges, looks like it may bring down the curtain on that era.	”三十二年、四任总统过去了，如今奥巴马的最新就职演说响亮地喊出了支持政府在抵御美国——以及世界——所面临的最紧迫挑战中扩大作用的口号，似乎将再一次拉开这一时代的序幕。


Reagan’s statement in 1981 was extraordinary.	里根1981年的名言是不同寻常的。


It signaled that America’s new president was less interested in using government to solve society’s problems than he was in cutting taxes, mainly for the benefit of the wealthy.	它表明这位美国新总统对用政府来解决社会问题不像他对减税（主要受益者是富人）那样热衷。


More important, his presidency began a “revolution” from the political right – against the poor, the environment, and science and technology – that lasted for three decades, its tenets upheld, more or less, by all who followed him: George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and, in some respects, by Obama in his first term.	更重要的是，他在任上开启了来自政治右翼的“革命”——不利于穷人、环境和科技的“革命”，这场“革命”持续了三十年，随后的各届总统——老布什、克林顿、小布什——或多或少都从某些角度支持里根的思想，奥巴马在第一个任期内也不例外。


The “Reagan Revolution” had four main components: tax cuts for the rich; spending cuts on education, infrastructure, energy, climate change, and job training; massive growth in the defense budget; and economic deregulation, including privatization of core government functions, like operating military bases and prisons.	 “里根革命”有四个主要组成部分：为富人减税； 削减教育、基础设施、能源、气候变化和职业培训支出；


Billed as a “free-market” revolution, because it promised to reduce the role of government, in practice it was the beginning of an assault on the middle class and the poor by wealthy special interests.	以及经济去监管化，包括核心政府功能的私有化，比如经营军事基地和监狱。 这场革命被称为“自由市场”革命，因为它致力于减少政府的作用，在实践中，它是富贵特殊利益打击中产阶级和穷人的开端。


These special interests included Wall Street, Big Oil, the big health insurers, and arms manufacturers.	这些特殊利益包括华尔街、大石油公司、大人寿保险商以及军火商。 它们要求减税，得到了满足；


They demanded tax cuts, and got them; they demanded a rollback of environmental protection, and got it; they demanded, and received, the right to attack unions; and they demanded lucrative government contracts, even for paramilitary operations, and got those, too.	它们要求并获得了打击工会的权利； 它们还要求诱人的政府合同甚至经营准军事活动，也得到了满足。


For more than three decades, no one really challenged the consequences of turning political power over to the highest bidders.	三十多年来，没有人真正挑战过将政治权力交给出价最高者的后果。


In the meantime, America went from being a middle-class society to one increasingly divided between rich and poor.	与此同时，美国从中产阶级社会变得日益贫富分化。


CEOs who were once paid around 30 times what their average workers earned now make around 230 times that amount.	从前，CEO的薪水是普通员工的30倍，如今是230倍。


Once a world leader in the fight against environmental degradation, America was the last major economy to acknowledge the reality of climate change.	从前，美国是对抗环境恶化的世界领袖，后来却成为最后一个承认气候变化现实的大国。


Financial deregulation enriched Wall Street, but ended up creating a global economic crisis through fraud, excessive risk-taking, incompetence, and insider dealing.	金融去监管化肥了华尔街，但最终因为欺诈、过度冒险、不胜任和内幕交易造成了全球经济危机。


Maybe, just maybe, Obama’s recent address marks not only the end of this destructive agenda, but also the start of a new era.	也许，仅仅是也许，奥巴马最新的就职演说不但标志着这一毁灭性过程的结束，也标志着新时代的开端。


Indeed, he devoted almost the entire speech to the positive role of government in providing education, fighting climate change, rebuilding infrastructure, taking care of the poor and disabled, and generally investing in the future.	事实上，他的就职演说几乎全篇都在大谈政府在提供教育、对抗气候变化、重建基础设施、照顾穷人和残疾人以及一般化的未来投资方面的积极作用。


It was the first inaugural address of its kind since Reagan turned America away from government in 1981.	这是自1981年里根让美国原理政府以来第一个这样说的总统就职演说。


If Obama’s speech turns out to mark the start of a new era of progressive politics in America, it would fit a pattern explored by one of America’s great historians, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who documented roughly 30-year intervals between periods of what he called “private interest” and “public purpose.”	如果奥巴马的演说真的成为美国新进步政治时代的开端，则这将契合伟大的美国历史学家小亚瑟·施莱辛格（Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. ）所探索的路径：他指出，美国存在“私人利益”和“公共目标”的交替，每个时期大约30年。


In the late 1800’s, America had its Gilded Age, with the creation of large new industries by the era’s “robber barons” accompanied by massive inequality and corruption.	十九世纪末，美国来到了镀金时代，这一时代的“强盗资本家”建立了大规模的新产业，社会也滋生了大量的不平等和腐败。


The subsequent Progressive Era was followed by a temporary return to plutocracy in the 1920’s.	随后的进步时代引来的是20世纪20年代富豪统治的暂时复辟。


Then came the Great Depression, Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, and another 30 years of progressive politics, from the 1930’s to the 1960’s.	接着发生了大萧条、罗斯福新政和新的30年进步政治——20世纪30—60年代。


The 1970’s were a transition period to the Age of Reagan – 30 years of conservative politics led by powerful corporate interests.	70年代是向里根时代的过渡期——权势公司利益把持的30年保守政治。


It is certainly time for a rebirth of public purpose and government leadership in the US to fight climate change, help the poor, promote sustainable technologies, and modernize America’s infrastructure.	显然，是时候让公共目标和政府领导复苏，让美国对抗气候变化、帮助穷人、促进可持续技术并实现美国基础设施现代化了。


If America realizes these bold steps through purposeful public policies, as Obama outlined, the innovative science, new technology, and powerful demonstration effects that result will benefit countries around the world.	如果美国通过有的放矢的公共政策实现这些重大步骤——这也是奥巴马的规划——那么由此产生的创新科学、新技术和强大的示范效应将会让全世界所有国家受益。


It is certainly too early to declare a new Progressive Era in America.	现在就宣布美国进入了新进步时代显然还为时过早。


Vested interests remain powerful, certainly in Congress – and even within the White House.	既得利益仍然十分强大，特别是在国会——甚至是在白宫中。


These wealthy groups and individuals gave billions of dollars to the candidates in the recent election campaign, and they expect their contributions to yield benefits.	这些权贵集团和个人在最近的竞选过程中向候选人提供了数十亿美元，并期待他们的付出能产生回报。


Moreover, 30 years of tax cutting has left the US government without the financial resources needed to carry out effective programs in key areas such as the transition to low-carbon energy.	此外，30年的减税也让美国政府失去了实施关键领域（如面向低碳能源的转型）的财源。


Still, Obama has wisely thrown down the gauntlet, calling for a new era of government activism.	尽管如此，奥巴马仍然明智地下达了战书，发出了新政府积极主义时代的呼声。 这样做是正确的，因为当今许多关键挑战——从我们的过度行为中拯救地球；


He is right to do so, because many of today’s crucial challenges – saving the planet from our own excesses; ensuring that technological advances benefit all members of society; and building the new infrastructure that we need nationally and globally for a sustainable future – demand collective solutions.	确保技术进步让所有社会成员受益； 以及建设国家和全球可持续未来所需要的新基础设施——要求集体坚决方案。


Implementation of public policy is just as important to good governance as the vision that underlies it.	对良好的治理来说，公共政策实施与实施它们的愿景一样重要。


So the next task is to design wise, innovative, and cost-effective programs to address these challenges.	因此下一个任务是设计明智、新颖、低成本的方案解决这些挑战。


Unfortunately, when it comes to bold and innovative programs to meet critical human needs, America is out of practice.	不幸的是，当需要采取大胆的创新方案满足关键人类需求时，美国总是行动的矮子。


It is time to begin anew, and Obama’s full-throated defense of a progressive vision points the US in the right direction.	美国是时候脱胎换骨了，而奥巴马全力为进步主义愿景辩护的举动为美国指明了正确的方向。


America’s New Trade Hypocrisy	美国新的贸易伪善


As the current “development round” of trade talks moves into its final stages, it is becoming increasingly clear that the goal of promoting development will not be served, and that the multilateral trade system will be undermined.	正值当前的“发展回合”贸易谈判进入最后阶段之际，人们越来越清楚地看到促进发展的目标无法实现，而且多边贸易体系将会受到损害。


Nowhere is this clearer than in a provision that is supposed to give the least developed countries almost duty-free access to developed countries’ markets.	有一项条款让这一现象再清楚不过了，那就是看似给予最不发达国家几乎免税的发达国家的市场准入。


A year ago, the leaders of the world’s richest countries committed themselves to alleviating the plight of the poorest.	一年前，世界最富有国家的领导人承诺缓解最穷国家的困境。