It also became the currency of the Finns, runners-up in innovation and market flexibility, and of Italy, which lacked both, earning the apt moniker “the sick man of Europe.”	与此同时，欧元也在芬兰和意大利流通，前者高居创新及市场灵活性第二位，而后者却在这两方面无所作为，当之无愧地获得了 “ 欧洲病夫 ” 的称号。


Such differences were a highly complicating factor for the newly established European Central Bank (ECB), which had to determine the appropriate interest rate for all members (the so-called “one size fits all” policy).	此类差距极大增加了新成立的欧洲中央银行（ ECB ）工作的复杂性，因为后者的职责正是为所有成员国制定适当利率（即所谓的 “ 一体适用 ” 政策）。


The larger the differences have become during the euro’s first decade, the more the ECB’s policy could be described as “one size fits none.”	各国差距在欧元第一个 10 年不断拉大，欧洲央行的政策不断被调侃为 “ 一无是处 ” 。


We have compared the performance of the best-performing and worst-performing euro-zone countries between 1999 and 2009.	我们对 1999-2009 年间欧元区经济表现最佳和最差的国家做了比较。


To avoid comparing apples and oranges, we have compared the data for the 11 countries that were included in the first wave in 1999, supplemented by Greece, which joined shortly thereafter.	为避免牛头对马嘴，我们比较了 1999 年第一批 11 个欧元国家的数据，并将之后不久加入欧元区的希腊并扩其中。


(All data are from Eurostat, the European statistics bureau.)	（所有数据均来自负责欧洲统计事务的欧盟统计局。 ）


Because the ECB was given the sole task of achieving and maintaining price stability in the euro area, inflation rates seem the most logical starting point for comparison.	欧洲央行仅负责实现并维持欧元区物价稳定，因此，最合理的便是先比较通货膨胀率。


In 1999, the difference between the euro-zone countries with the lowest and highest inflation rate was two percentage points.	欧元区国家通货膨胀率高低两级的差值已从 1999 年的 2 个百分点达到老 2009 年底的 5.


By the end of 2009, the difference had almost tripled, to 5.9 percentage points.	9 ，几乎翻了 3 倍。


As for economic growth, we have made an exception. For that variable, we looked at the average yearly GDP growth in the first five years after the introduction of euro banknotes and coins in 2002.	然而，我们却将经济增长作为例外，考察了自 2002 年引入欧元纸币和硬币后各国前五年 GDP 年均增长。


The difference between Ireland and Portugal in the first half of the decade was 4.8 percentage points.	期间，爱尔兰与葡萄牙的 GDP 相差 4. 8 个百分点。


By 2009, it had increased to six percentage points.	2009 年，差值升至 6 个百分点。


Moreover, the productivity difference increased from 25 index points in 1999 to 66.2 in 2008; the difference in unit labor costs went from 5.4 percentage points to 31.8; and the difference in the unemployment rate rose from 10.1 percentage points to 15.4.	此外，二��的生产率、单位劳动成本及失业率差距在 1999-2009 年间，分别从 25 个索引点、 5. 4 和 10.


Nor could we find any convergence regarding government deficits and debt.	我们并未发现政府赤字与债务方面有任何同化趋势。


In 1999, Finland boasted the smallest government debt, equal to 45.5% of GDP.	1999 年，芬兰的政府债务创欧元区最低，占其 GDP 的 45. 5% 。


The difference with the largest debtor in the euro area, Italy, was 68.2 percentage points.	与欧元区最大的债务国意大利相比，少了 68. 2 个百分点。


Despite the most severe financial and economic crisis in almost a century, the Finnish national debt actually decreased by 2009, to 39.7%.	芬兰虽然经历了近一个世纪以来最为严重的金融和经济危机，但截至 2009 年，其国债事实上却减少了 39. 7% 。


Italy, meanwhile, failed to use the significant windfall from the steep decline in long-term interest rates caused by the introduction of the euro and a decade of rapid economic growth to repair its debt position.	与此同时，意大利在欧元引发了长期利率大幅下调、此后十年经济快速增长的情况下，却未能抓住机遇扭转债务状况。


Italy’s debt barely budged and stayed well above 100% of GDP.	国债毫无改观，债务总额远超其 GDP 。


As a result, the difference between the debt positions of Finland and Italy, the most prudent and most profligate euro-zone members, shot up to 73.3 percentage points in 2009.	随之而来的，便是 2009 年欧元区最审慎的芬兰与最挥霍的意大利之间债务差距激增至 73. 3% 。


(The situation is even worse for government deficits.)	（政府赤字方面更为糟糕。 ）


The implications of these increasing differences could be severe.	差距不断拉大，所透露出的信息令人甚为担忧。


Increasing tensions between the euro countries on economic policy are likely, as are growing rifts within the ECB governing council in the coming years.	欧元区各国有可能在经济政策上进一步较劲，未来几年中欧洲央行管理委员会内部的分歧也将扩大。


We might get a sneak preview this year and in 2011, when European leaders must select a new ECB president and vice-president.	我们或许能从今年和 2011 年的态势中看出一些端倪（欧盟首脑们将于 2011 年重新选举欧洲央行行长及 副行长 ）。


As always, those seats will be hotly contested, but, with more at stake than ever, the fight for them could be fiercer than it would otherwise.	与往常一样，这两个职位将引发激烈争论，角逐之惨烈将胜于以往。


Tensions at the ECB and between the euro-zone countries do not bode well for the stability of the common currency, both externally, vis-à-vis other currencies, and internally, in terms of inflation.	欧洲央行与欧元区国家关系紧张，无论针对外部的其他货币，或是内部的通货膨胀，都不利于维持共同货币稳定。


The ECB will be scapegoated for that. If it keeps its interest rate too low for too long, countries like Germany and the Netherlands will protest.	到时，欧洲央行便会背上黑锅：一方面，持续过长的过低利率将遭到德国、荷兰等国的抗议；


If it hikes the interest rate, the southern euro-zone countries will complain.	另一方面，利率过高将引起南部欧元区国家的不满。


In any case, support for the euro, already fragile, will erode further, weakening the common currency and fueling even greater tensions.	无论如何，人们对早已脆弱不堪的欧元的支持将会进一步土崩瓦解。 这将影响共同货币，并引发进一步紧张情绪。


In 1990, the Italian singer Toto Cutugno won the annual Eurovision song contest with his passionate call to Europeans to unite.	1990 年，意大利歌手托托·库图诺曾饱含激情地号召全欧洲联合起来，并以此夺得了一年一度的欧洲电视网歌唱大赛桂冠。


The refrain of his winning song, “Together: 1992,” was “Unite, unite Europe.”	他的冠军单曲的副歌部分“ Together: 1992 ”便是“欧洲联合起来，联合起来”。


Almost 20 years later, the Swedish band Europe’s hit song, “The Final Countdown,” seems more appropriate for the euro area with every passing day.	20 年后，瑞典乐队 Europe 的热门单曲《最后倒数》（ The Final Countdown ）似乎与欧元区的境况越来越贴切。


The Euro’s Imagined Community	欧元的想象共同体


NEW HAVEN – Great significance – probably too much – has been attached to a possible breakup of the eurozone.	纽黑文—人们把欧元区崩溃的影响看得相当严重——也许有些太严重了。


Many believe that such a breakup – if, say, Greece abandoned the euro and reintroduced the drachma – would constitute a political failure that would ultimately threaten Europe’s stability.	许多人认为，欧元区的崩溃——比如希腊放弃欧元，重新使用德拉克马——将造成政治上的失败，最终威胁到欧洲的稳定。


Speaking before the Bundestag last October, German Chancellor Angela Merkel put the matter starkly:	德国总理默克尔在去年10月的联邦议会演讲中毫不掩饰地指出：


“Nobody should believe that another half-century of peace and prosperity in Europe is guaranteed.	 “没有人能保证欧洲能迎来又一个和平而繁荣的50年。


It is not.	没有。


So I say: If the euro fails, Europe fails.	因此，我要说：如果欧元失败，欧洲也将失败。


That must not happen.	这一幕决不能发生。


We have a historical obligation to protect by all prudent means at our disposal Europe's unification process begun by our forefathers more than fifty years ago after centuries of hatred and spilling of blood.	我们身上承载着历史的使命，我们必须动用可以动用的一切审慎办法，捍卫欧洲的统一进程。 五十多年前，在经历了千百年的仇恨和流血之后，我们的先辈终于开创了欧洲统一进程。


None of us can foresee what the consequences would be if we were to fail.”	如果我们最终失败，没有人能预见到会导致什么样的后果。 ”


Europe has had more than 250 wars since the beginning of the Renaissance in the mid-fifteenth century.	自15世纪中期文艺复兴时代开始以来，欧洲经历了250多起战争。


So, it is not alarmist to worry aloud about preserving the sense of community that Europe has enjoyed for the past half-century.	因此，为存在了50多年的欧洲统一的观念而忧心忡忡绝不是没有道理的。


In a fascinating, but largely overlooked book, How Enemies Become Friends,Charles A. Kupchan reviews many historical case studies of how nation-states with a long history of conflict managed eventually to become secure and peaceful friends.	在引人入胜但被人们所忽略的著作《化敌为友》（How Enemies Become Friends）中，查尔斯·库普乾（Charles A. Kupchan）研究了大量长时间冲突对立的民族国家如何成功地转变为可靠的和平伙伴的历史案例。


His examples include the formation of the Swiss Confederation (1291-1848); the creation of the Iroquois Confederation in the century or so before the first Europeans arrived in America; the establishment of the United States (1776-1789); the unification of Italy (1861), and of Germany (1871); the Norway-Sweden rapprochement (1905-1935); the formation of the United Arab Emirates (1971); and the Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement of the 1970’s.	他研究的例子包括瑞士联邦的形成（1291—1848）、在欧洲人首次踏上美洲领土前一个世纪中易洛魁部落联盟的形成、美国的建立（1776—1789）、意大利（1861）和德国（1871）的统一、挪威-瑞典外交关系的建立（1905—1935）、阿联酋的形成（1971）以及阿根廷和巴西的建交（20世纪70年代）。


Kupchan also examines some notable failures of friendship: the United States’ Civil War (1861-65); the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1923); the breakdown of Sino-Soviet relations (1960); the demise of the United Arab Republic (1961); and the expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia (1965).	库普乾还考察了一些著名的化敌为友未果的例子：美国内战（1861—1865）、英日同盟的破裂（1923）、中苏关系的破裂（1960）、阿拉伯联合共和国的分裂（1961年）以及新加坡脱离马拉西亚独立（1965年）。


Kupchan never mentions a common currency as a condition of comity among nations; in fact, economic integration tends to follow, rather than precede, achievement of political unity.	库普乾并没有提及共同货币是国家间友好的条件； 事实上，经济一体化总是在政治联合之后（而不是之前）才出现的。


Rather, he regards diplomatic engagement as the essential element to strategic accommodation and mutual trust, and this is more easily accomplished if the states have similar social orders and ethnicities.	库普乾认为，外交才是战略融合和互信的基本要素，而具有相似社会秩序和民族成分的国家间更容易建立和谐的外交关系。


But Kupchan’s analysis implies that a common currency can help nation-states to build lasting friendships, for he argues that friendship-building is most secure after an identity-changing “narrative” takes root, leading to a sense that the nations are like members of a family.	但库普乾的分析也表明，共同货币有助于民族国家建立持久的友好关系，因为他指出，友好关系的建设在身份变换“故事”（narrative）已经完成时最为稳固，此时，各民族彼此认同为同一个大家族的成员。


A common currency can help to generate such a narrative.	共同货币有助于产生这样的“故事”。


For example, the Iroquois tell the story of a great warrior and skilled orator named Hiawatha, who, traveling with the mystic Deganawidah, negotiated the treaties that established their confederation.	比如，易洛魁人中间流传着一个关于伟大勇士和演说家海华沙（Hiawatha）的传说，他与神秘的德甘纳威达（Deganawidah）一起穿行于美洲大陆，谈判确定了易洛魁部落联盟的相关条约。


He advocated new condolence ceremonies to commemorate lost warriors – and to replace wars of vengeance.	他建议使用���的悼念仪式纪念逝去的战士，从而避免冤冤相报的战争。


The new narrative was reinforced with physical symbols, akin to a currency or a flag, in the form of belts of beads made of wampum, the Iroquois’ money.	这一新“故事”由实物符号来强化，该符号类似于货币或旗帜，是一种用易洛魁货币——贝壳做成的数珠带。


A surviving Hiawatha belt, dating from the eighteenth century (and probably a copy of earlier belts), contains symbols of the five nations – Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, Oneida, and Mohawk – much as the US flag contains stars representing each of its states.	在现今保存完好的一条海华沙带（大约是18世纪的产物，也可能是更早的海华沙带的复制品）包括了五个易洛魁部落——塞内卡（Seneca）、卡育加（Cayuga）、奥内达加（Onondaga）、奥奈达（Oneida）和莫霍克（Mohawk）——的符号，这与美国国旗包括了象征各州的五角星类似。


The belt also preserves Hiawatha’s status as the confederation’s forefather.	这条海华沙带还保留了海华沙作为易洛魁部落联盟高祖的地位。


Flags may be a more inspiring symbol of common destiny, but most of us do not carry them around, and many people never display them, except perhaps at major sports events; their origin, rooted in battle standards, can seem uncomfortably aggressive.	旗帜也许是较能激发共同命运感的符号，但我们大多数人不会随身携带旗帜，许多人也不会随便展示旗帜，除非是遇到大型运动会这样的场合； 旗帜的起源——战斗标志——带有令人不安的侵略性。


There is a European Union flag, but it is rarely seen anywhere but outside of EU government buildings.	欧盟就有自己的旗帜，但除了欧盟政府大楼门外，你很难在其他地方见到它。


A British schoolteacher expressed the sentiment well in 1910: “We suspect the man who talks patriotism and imperialism, just as we suspect him who talks religion or any of the things that are of deepest value in life.	一位英国教师很好地阐述了1910年时的情绪：“我们怀疑大谈爱国主义和帝国主义者，正如我们怀疑大谈宗教或其他任何与生命最深刻价值相关的东西的人。


We think him either a humbug or a shallow person who has not realized the inadequacy of words to express what is deepest.”	我们认为，他不是骗子，就是俗不可耐，根本不懂最深刻的东西根本无法用语言表达的道理。 ”


And yet national currency, which we display every time we make a cash purchase, arouses no such suspicions.	但国家货币——我们每次支付现金时都会展示一下——则没有引起这样的怀疑。


So currency works as a constant, if latent, reminder of identity.	因此，货币可以作为恒久的（潜在）身份提醒器。


In using it, one has the psychological experience of participating with others in a common venture, and thus developing a sense of trust in both the endeavor and one’s fellow-participants.	使用货币时，我们就有了与其他人共荣辱的潜在心理体验，从而发展出一种对方会尽心尽力与你并肩作战的信任感。


Every currency union chooses symbols of common cultural values for its coins and notes, and these symbols become part of the sense of shared identity.	所有货币联盟都会选择硬币和钞票上的共同文化价值符号，这些符号也将成为共同身份感的一部分。


We see the human faces on the notes so often that they come to seem like family, creating what the political scientist Benedict Anderson called the “imagined community” that underlies and sustains a sense of nationhood.	我们与钞票上的面孔朝夕相处，他们就好像是我们的家人一样，这催生出一种政治学家本尼迪克特·安德森（Benedict Anderson）所谓的“想象共同体”，而想象共同体正是产生和维持民族感的基础。


The euro notes feature bridges as they appeared throughout Europe in various epochs, rather than images of actual structures that might seem to imply preferential regard for some countries.	欧元钞票上印的是欧洲各个时期的桥梁，而不是可能暗示某些国家特殊地位的头像。


The town of Spijkenisse in the Netherlands is now in the process of building all seven bridges depicted on the euro notes.	荷兰鹿特丹正在建造欧元钞票上所印的七座桥梁。


But the bridges remain symbols of European culture, in which presumably all Europeans share.	但这些桥梁保留了欧洲文化的符号，而文化被认为是所有欧洲人所共有的。


Modern electronic technology will not eliminate paper notes and coins soon, so there is still plenty of time to make use of the symbolic value of a common currency.	现代电子技术短时间内还无法取代纸币和银币，因此欧洲还有充足的时间利用共同货币的象征性价值。


Indeed, even if the eurozone breaks up, each European country could adopt a different currency but retain common symbols.	事实上，就算欧元区崩溃，各个欧洲国家也可以使用不同货币但保留共同符号。


For example, there could be a Greek euro, a Spanish euro, etc.	比如，可以让希腊欧元、西班牙欧元之类的共存。


The notes could even show the same pictures of bridges.	这些钞票甚至可以印上相同的桥梁图案。


Even electronic transactions should be able to generate symbols of peace, trust, and unity.	即使是电子交易，应该也能够产生和平、信任和统一的符号。


The point is that if Europe can keep these symbols alive, even a eurozone breakup would not have the dire political consequences for Europe that so many predict.	关键在于欧洲要能保住这些符号的活力，果真如此的话，即便欧元区崩溃，也不会造成许多人所预言的政治后果。


The Euro’s Latest Reprieve	欧元区的最新缓刑


NEW YORK – Like an inmate on death row, the euro has received another last-minute stay of execution.	纽约——正如一位被判死刑的犯人一样，欧元区又获得另外一个在最后一刻延缓执行的机会。


It will survive a little longer.	它挣扎的时间又长了一点。


The markets are celebrating, as they have after each of the four previous “euro crisis” summits – until they come to understand that the fundamental problems have yet to be addressed.	之前有四场“欧元危机”的峰会，每一场峰会结束，各类市场都会欢呼庆祝，直到它们明白根本问题还尚未解决。


There was good news in this summit: Europe’s leaders have finally understood that the bootstrap operation by which Europe lends money to the banks to save the sovereigns, and to the sovereigns to save the banks, will not work.	这次峰会带来了好消息：欧洲各国的领导人终于意识到欧洲借钱给银行来拯救主权国家，借钱给主权国家来拯救银行的措施毫无成效。


Likewise, they now recognize that bailout loans that give the new lender seniority over other creditors worsen the position of private investors, who will simply demand even higher interest rates.	同样，他们现在也认识到紧急援助贷款使得新的贷款者的资历高于其它债权人，这恶化了个人投资者的处境，他们只会要求更高的利率。


It is deeply troubling that it took Europe’s leaders so long to see something so obvious (and evident more than a decade and half ago in the East Asia crisis).	难以理解欧洲的领导人用了这么长的时间才看清这么明显的问题，而这一问题比15年前的东亚危机表现还明显。


But what is missing from the agreement is even more significant than what is there.	但是协议中缺失的部分比存在的部分更为重要。


A year ago, European leaders acknowledged that Greece could not recover without growth, and that growth could not be achieved by austerity alone.	一年前，欧洲领导人们就承认如果没有经济增长，希腊的状况便无法得到恢复，并且只是通过紧缩政策经济不会得到增长。


Yet little was done.	但是几乎没有采取什么实际行动。


What is now proposed is recapitalization of the European Investment Bank, part of a growth package of some $150 billion.	如今欧洲领导人建议要将欧洲投资银行进行资本重组，这属于约1500亿美元的一揽子增长计划的一部分。


But politicians are good at repackaging, and, by some accounts, the new money is a small fraction of that amount, and even that will not get into the system immediately.	但是政治家们善于进行重新包装，并且，根据有些数据，这些新资金只占所需总资金的一小部分，即使这一小部分的资金也不会立即投入到系统中来。


In short: the remedies – far too little and too late – are based on a misdiagnosis of the problem and flawed economics.	总而言之：在对问题处理有误，经济体存在缺陷的基础上的这些补救措施来得太晚并且太微不足道了。


The hope is that markets will reward virtue, which is defined as austerity.	希望在于市场会奖赏美德，此处美德被定义为紧缩。


But markets are more pragmatic: if, as is almost surely the case, austerity weakens economic growth, and thus undermines the capacity to service debt, interest rates will not fall.	但市场更奉行实用主义：几乎总是如此，如果紧缩政策削弱了经济的增长，便破坏了偿债能力，利率就不会下降。


In fact, investment will decline – a vicious downward spiral on which Greece and Spain have already embarked.	事实上，投资会下滑，这便是希腊和西班牙已经开始的恶性循环了。


Germany seems surprised by this.	德国似乎对此感到很惊讶。


Like medieval blood-letters, the country’s leaders refuse to see that the medicine does not work, and insist on more of it – until the patient finally dies.	就像中世纪施行放血术的医生一样，德国领导人拒绝承认该药物不奏效，并且坚持应该用更多的药物——直到病人最终死去。


Eurobonds and a solidarity fund could promote growth and stabilize the interest rates faced by governments in crisis.	欧洲债券和团结基金能够促进经济的增长并且稳定处在危机中的各国的利率。


Lower interest rates, for example, would free up money so that even countries with tight budget constraints could spend more on growth-enhancing investments.	比如，更低的利率能够挤出钱来让那些即使是预算吃紧的国家也能花更多的钱用于投资促进经济增长。


Matters are worse in the banking sector.	银行业的情况更糟。


Each country’s banking system is backed by its own government; if the government’s ability to support the banks erodes, so will confidence in the banks.	每个国家的银行系统都有其政府做后盾，但如果政府支持银行的能力受到削弱，银行的信心也随之减弱。


Even well-managed banking systems would face problems in an economic downturn of Greek and Spanish magnitude; with the collapse of Spain’s real-estate bubble, its banks are even more at risk.	即使是运营良好的银行系统在希腊和西班牙这一级别的经济衰退中也会面临问题，随着西班牙房地产泡沫的崩溃，其银行的风险更大。


In their enthusiasm for creating a “single market,” European leaders did not recognize that governments provide an implicit subsidy to their banking systems.	当欧洲领导人热衷于创造一个“单一市场”时，他们没有意识到是政府在为他们的银行系统提供隐性补贴。


It is confidence that if trouble arises the government will support the banks that gives confidence in the banks; and, when some governments are in a much stronger position than others, the implicit subsidy is larger for those countries.	如果问题出现，政府对银行的支持会给银行带去信心； 并且，当一些国家的政府比其它国家的政府处境好很多时，其对于银行的隐性补贴也比别的国家大很多。


In the absence of a level playing field, why shouldn’t money flee the weaker countries, going to the financial institutions in the stronger?	在缺乏公平竞争的环境下，为什么资金不应该逃离较弱的国家，去更强大的金融机构呢？


Indeed, it is remarkable that there has not been more capital flight.	确实，令人奇怪的是没有更多的资本外流。


Europe’s leaders did not recognize this rising danger, which could easily be averted by a common guarantee, which would simultaneously correct the market distortion arising from the differential implicit subsidy.	欧洲领导人没有意识到这一危险在不断上升，而这一危险本通过共同担保就可以很容易地被避免掉，同时也能纠正由不同的隐性补贴引起的市场扭曲状况。


The euro was flawed from the outset, but it was clear that the consequences would become apparent only in a crisis.	欧元的产生从一开始就是有缺陷的，但很明显只有在危机中它的后果才能显现出来。


Politically and economically, it came with the best intentions. The single-market principle was supposed to promote the efficient allocation of capital and labor.	虽然在政治上和经济上它本来都怀着良好的意愿，并且单一市场的原则也都是为了促进资本和劳动力的有效分配。


But details matter.	但是细节至关重要。


Tax competition means that capital may go not to where its social return is highest, but to where it can find the best deal.	税收竞争意味着资本不会去那些社会回报最高的地方，而是去那些能找到最好生意的地方。


The implicit subsidy to banks means that German banks have an advantage over those of other countries.	对于银行的隐性补贴表明德国的银行会比其余国家的银行更有优势。


Workers may leave Ireland or Greece not because their productivity there is lower, but because, by leaving, they can escape the debt burden incurred by their parents.	劳动者们离开爱尔兰或者希腊并不是因为那里的生产力低下，而是因为只有离开那里，他们才能摆脱掉父母遭受的债务负担。


The European Central Bank’s mandate is to ensure price stability, but inflation is far from Europe’s most important macroeconomic problem today.	欧洲中央银行受命来确保价格稳定，但是通货膨胀已经远非现今欧洲最重要的宏观经济问题了。


Germany worries that, without strict supervision of banks and budgets, it will be left holding the bag for its more profligate neighbors. But that misses the key point: Spain, Ireland, and many other distressed countries ran budget surpluses before the crisis.	德国担心没有了银行和预算的严格监督，它得为那些肆意挥霍的邻国兜底，但那不是重点：西班牙，爱尔兰和其它许多陷入困境的国家在危机之前预算都有盈余，是经济的衰退导致了赤字，不是赤字导致衰退。


If these countries made a mistake, it was only that, like Germany today, they were overly credulous of markets, so they (like the United States and so many others) allowed an asset bubble to grow unchecked.	如果说这些国家犯了一个错误的话，只是如同今天的德国一样——太轻信市场了。 因此他们才像美国及其他国家一样允许资产泡沫恣意生长。


If sound policies are implemented and better institutions established – which does not mean only more austerity and better supervision of banks, budgets, and deficits – and growth is restored, these countries will be able to meet their debt obligations, and there will be no need to call upon the guarantees.	如果实施了健全的政策，建立了更好的制度，当然这些政策和制度不是指更多的紧缩措施和银行、预算及赤字更强有力的监管，同时经济恢复增长，这些国家就能够偿还其债务，也就没有必要号召担保了。


Moreover, Germany is on the hook in either case: if the euro or the economies on the periphery collapse, the costs to Germany will be high.	此外，无论哪种情况德国都会陷入泥潭中：如果欧元或者外围的经济体崩溃，德国付出的代价都会很高。


Europe has great strengths.	欧洲也有很大的优势。


Its weaknesses today mainly reflect flawed policies and institutional arrangements.	它现在的弱点主要都反映了其有缺陷的政策和制度安排。


These can be changed, but only if their fundamental weaknesses are recognized – a task that is far more important than structural reforms within the individual countries.	但只有在认识到他们的根本缺陷后，这些弱点才能得到改进。 这是一项比在每个单独国家进行结构改革更为重要的任务。


While structural problems have weakened competitiveness and GDP growth in particular countries, they did not bring about the crisis, and addressing them will not resolve it.	因为在某些国家虽然结构上的问题削弱了竞争力，减慢了国内生产总值的增长，但它不会引起危机，解决结构上的问题并不能解决危机。


Europe’s temporizing approach to the crisis cannot work indefinitely.	欧洲用敷衍了事的方法应对危机并不能无限期地奏效。


It is not just confidence in Europe’s periphery that is waning. The survival of the euro itself is being put in doubt.	欧洲周边国家正逐渐减弱的不仅仅是信心，欧元本身的生存能力现在受到了质疑。


The False Promise of a Eurozone Budget	欧元区预算的虚假希望


BRUSSELS – A key question confronts the four presidents of Europe’s major institutions (the European Commission, the European Council, the European Central Bank, and the Eurogroup) as they prepare their report on how to reform the common currency: Does the eurozone need its own budget?	布鲁塞尔—欧洲主要机构（欧盟委员会、欧洲委员会、欧洲央行和欧元集团）在准备它们关于如何改革共同货币的报告时所面临的一个关键问题是：欧元区需要其自身的预算吗？


They are facing the argument that the United States’ monetary union works much better because there is a large federal budget to smooth the impact of asymmetric shocks – that is, shocks to individual states.	它们面临着这样的观点：美国货币联盟运转得比欧洲好得多，这是因为美国有一个大的联邦预算平滑不对称冲击（即针对个别州的冲击）。


The eurozone, it is claimed, should have its own budget to provide similarly automatic insurance to its members.	根据这一观点，欧元区应该有自己的预算向成员国提供类似的自动保险。


This argument, however, misreads the US experience.	但这一观点误读了美国的经验。


True, in the US, as in most existing federal states, the federal budget redistributes income across regions, thus offsetting at least part of the interregional differences in income.	的确，美国和大部分联邦国家一样，其联邦预算可以在各地区间再分配收入，从而抵消至少部分跨地区收入差异。


But, while this has been repeatedly documented in many cases, the inference that redistribution is equivalent to a shock absorber is wrong.	但是，尽管这一点被一再提及，却没人注意到再分配等于冲击吸收器这一看法是错误的。


For example, in the US, the federal budget offsets a substantial part (estimated at 30-40%) of the differences in per capita income levels across states, because poorer states contribute less income tax, on average, and receive higher transfer payments.	比如，在美国，联邦预算打消了各州之间人均收入差异的很大一部分（据估计可达30—40%），因为平均而言，较穷州贡献的所得税较少，而收到的转移支付较多。


But this does not imply that these mechanisms also provide insurance against shocks (sudden changes in income for individual states).	但这并不意味着这一机制能够提供冲击保险（所谓冲击是指个别州收入的突然变化）。


Many of the transfers from the federal government – especially basic social support like food stamps – vary little with the local business cycle.	联邦政府的转移支付中有很多与当地商业周期没什么关系，特别是食品券等基本社会支持支付。


On the revenue side, the degree to which federal taxation absorbs shocks at the state level cannot be very large for the simple reason that the main source of federal revenues that does react to the business cycle, the federal income tax, accounts for less than 10% of GDP.	从收入端看，联邦税吸收州层面冲击的程度不可能很大，原因很简单：会对商业周期做出反应的联邦收入主源——联邦所得税只占GDP的不到10%。


The low sensitivity of both federal expenditure and federal revenues to local business-cycle conditions explains why only a small fraction (estimated at about 10-15 %) of any shock to the GDP of any individual state is absorbed via automatic transfers to and from the US federal budget.	联邦支出和联邦收入对于地方商业周期都不敏感，这解释了为什么在冲击所造成的个别州GDP损失中，只有一小部分（据估计只有10—15%）可以通过自动转移支付（向美国联邦预算贡献或从联邦预算中得到）吸收。


One idea that has been mooted repeatedly in Europe is to create some European, or at least eurozone, unemployment insurance fund.	在欧洲被一再提起的一个观点是成立欧洲（或至少是欧元区）失业保险基金。


This idea is attractive at first sight.	这一观点乍看上去极具吸引力。


But here, too, the reference to the US experience is misleading.	但是，在这方面，参考美国经验也有误导之嫌。


In the US, unemployment insurance is organized at the state level.	在美国，失业保险是州层面组织的。


The federal government intervenes only in the case of major nationwide recessions and provides some supplementary benefits for the long-term unemployed.	联邦政府只有在发生大规模全国性衰退时才会干预，为长期失业者提供一定程度的补充性救济。


But this support is given to all states and thus does not provide those most affected with much more support than the others receive.	但这一支持对所有州一视同仁，因此受影响最严重的州并不会比其他州获得更多支持。


Moreover, unemployment benefits are not as important as is often assumed.	此外，失业救济并不像通常认为的那样重要。


In most countries, they amount to only about 2-3% of GDP, even during a major recession.	在大部分国家，它们只占GDP的2—3%，即使在发生严重衰退时也是如此。


In the US, the annual supplementary federal expenditure has amounted to only about 1% of GDP in recent years.	在美国，年度补充性联邦支出在近几年只占GDP的1%。


It is thus clear that a eurozone unemployment insurance system would never be able to offset major shocks, such as those hitting Ireland or Greece, where GDP has shrunk by more than 10%.	因此，显然，欧元区失业保险体系不可能抵消主要冲击，如爱尔兰和希腊受到的冲击，这两个国家的GDP下降了超过10%。


The case of Spain illustrates another feature of European economies that makes it difficult to argue for a federal unemployment scheme.	西班牙说明了欧洲经济的另一个使其很难适用于联邦失业机制的特征。


Spanish unemployment is now close to 30%, which a priori should be a good justification for some form of shock absorber.	西班牙失业率目前已接近30%，乍一看，应该是需要某种形式的冲击吸收器的最好例证。


But Spanish unemployment has typically been consistently higher than the eurozone average, and fell to single-digit levels only as a result of an unsustainable building boom.	但西班牙失业率一直高于欧元区平均水平，只有在发生了不可持续的建筑业繁荣后，其失业率才掉到了一位数。


Any common eurozone unemployment scheme would thus risk financing the long-term unemployment created by rigid national labor-market institutions, which for decades have proved impervious to reforms.	因此，欧元区共同失业机制将面临为个别国家僵化的劳动市场制度所造成的长期失业提供资金的风险，而几十年来，后者一直没有得到改革。


All in all, it is difficult to base the argument for some eurozone shock absorber on the US experience.	总而言之，很难以美国的经验作为成立欧元区冲击吸收器的支持案例。


But how can one explain the fact that the global financial crisis led to no regional banking crises in the US, whereas several eurozone countries’ banking systems are under such stress that their governments have had to rescue them (and then be rescued in turn by the eurozone’s bailout fund)?	但你如何解释全球金融危机并未在美国引发地区性银行危机，而不少欧元区国家的银行系统却受到了严重的压力，以至于政府不得不出手相救（最后反顾来又被欧元区援助基金所救）？


This reflects another aspect of US arrangements that, again, is not widely appreciated.	这反映了美国安排的另一个侧面，而这一侧面也不为人所熟知。


The US “banking union” provides tangible insurance against local financial shocks.	美国“银行联盟”为地方金融冲击提供有形保险。


For example, the local real-estate boom and bust in Nevada was as severe as that in Spain or Ireland.	比如，内华达州地方房地产业的枯荣循环与西班牙和爱尔兰一样猛烈。


But, in Nevada, which is similar in size to Ireland, the local banking system’s losses were absorbed to a large extent by US “banking union” institutions, particularly the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the federal mortgage-refinancing agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.	但是，在内华达州（和爱尔兰规模相当），地方银行体系的损失很大程度上被美国“银行联盟”机构吸收了，特别是联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）和联邦按揭再融资机构房利美和房贷美。


For Nevada, such support can be estimated at 10-20% of its “national” income.	对内华达州来说，这样的支持可达其“国民”收入的10—20%。


Ireland would certainly be in much better shape if it had received a similar transfer.	如果爱尔兰也得到了类似的转移支付，其状况肯定也会好得多。


This leads to a simple conclusion: The euro’s long-term stability depends far more on completing plans for a European banking union than it does on creating some new budget for the eurozone.	如此，我们可以得到一个简单的结论：欧元区长期稳定更加取决于完整的欧洲银行联盟计划，而不是为欧元区建立新的预算。


The Eurozone’s Last Stand	欧元区到了最危险的时候


NEW YORK – The eurozone crisis is reaching its climax.	纽约——欧元区危机迎来高潮。


Greece is insolvent.	希腊丧失了偿债能力。


Portugal and Ireland have recently seen their bonds downgraded to junk status.	葡萄牙和爱尔兰的公债信用新近被调低至垃圾级。


Spain could still lose market access as political uncertainty adds to its fiscal and financial woes.	西班牙的政局不明朗，使财政和金融困境雪上加霜，令其仍被资本市场拒之门外。


Financial pressure on Italy is now mounting.	意大利的金融压力也陡然加剧。


By 2012, Greek public debt will be above 160% of GDP and rising.	到2012年，希腊公债的GDP占比将攀升至160%。


Alternatives to a debt restructuring are fast disappearing.	除了债务重组，其他的出路变得越来越渺茫。


A full-blown official bailout of Greece’s public sector (by the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, and the European Financial Stability Facility) would be the mother of all moral-hazard plays: extremely expensive and politically near-impossible, owing to resistance from core eurozone voters – starting with the Germans.	如果彻底由欧洲各国和有关国际组织（IMF、欧洲央行、欧洲金融稳定基金等等）来保释希腊公共部门，将会引发前所未有的道德风险：代价极其昂贵且政治上几乎无望，因为欧元区核心国家的选民会强烈抵制，德国选民首先就会说“不”。


Meanwhile, the current French proposal of a voluntary rollover by banks is flopping, as it would impose prohibitively high interest rates on the Greeks.	与此同时，法国提议的由债权银行自愿滚仓的办法也没用，因为那会使希腊债券的息率高得吓人。


Likewise, debt buybacks would be a massive waste of official resources, as the residual value of the debt increases as it is bought, benefiting creditors far more than the sovereign debtor.	同样，债务回购也将是对官方资源的严重浪费，因为回购使会高估这些债券的折余价值，从中受益的将主要是债权人，而不是主权债务人。


So the only realistic and sensible solution is an orderly and market-oriented – but coercive – restructuring of the entire Greek public debt.	所以，唯一现实有效的解决方案就是，由官方协调，市场主导，对希腊的全部公债进行有序重组。


But how can debt relief be achieved for the sovereign without imposing massive losses on Greek banks and foreign banks holding Greek bonds?	然而如何才能既清理了主权债务，又避免希腊的银行和持有希腊债券的外国银行遭受巨亏呢？


The answer is to emulate the response to sovereign-debt crises in Uruguay, Pakistan, Ukraine, and many other emerging-market economies, where orderly exchange of old debt for new debt had three features: an identical face value (so-called “par” bonds); a long maturity (20-30 years); and interest set well below the currently unsustainable market rates – and close to or below the original coupon.	答案是仿效乌拉圭、巴基斯坦、乌克兰和其他新兴市场经济体应对主权债务危机的办法，它们以新债有序替代旧债的办法有三个关键：同样的面值（所谓的票面债券）、很长的满期期限（20~30年）与合理息率（远低于当时过高的市场息率，接近或低于发行息率）。


Even if the face value of the Greek debt were not reduced, a maturity extension would still provide massive debt relief – on a present-value basis – to Greece as a euro of debt owed 30 years from now is worth much less today than the same euro owed a year from now.	即便希腊债券的面值不打折，展期也能大大缓解其债务负担，因为从现在开始欠30年的1欧元肯定比欠1年的1欧元便宜多了。


Moreover, a maturity extension resolves rollover risk for the coming decades.	此外，展期也可以消除未来几十年需要不停滚仓的风险。


The advantage of a par bond is that Greece’s creditors – banks, insurance companies, and pension funds – would be able and allowed to continue valuing their Greek bonds at 100 cents on the euro, thereby avoiding massive losses on their balance sheets.	票面债券的优点在于，希腊的债权人——银行、保险公司和退休基金等等——能够以十足的价值来为它们持有的希腊债券定价，从而避免资产负债表上的巨亏。


That, in turn, would sharply contain the risk of financial contagion.	那样一来，还可以大大减小金融传染的风险。


Rating agencies would consider this debt exchange a “credit event,” but only for a very short period – a matter of a few weeks.	评级机构可能会把这种债务互换视作“信贷事件”，但只会持续很短时间，不过几周而已。


Consider Uruguay, whose rating was downgraded to “selective default” for two weeks while the exchange was occurring, and then was upgraded (though not to investment grade) when, thanks to the exchange’s success, its public debt became more sustainable.	想一想乌拉圭当��搞互换时，曾有两周被降级为“选择性违约”，后来又升级了（虽然未达投资级），恰恰是互换的成功，令其公债变得可持续了。


The ECB and creditor banks can live for two or three weeks with a temporary downgrade of Greece’s debt.	希腊临时降级两三周，欧洲央行和其他的债权银行不会受不了。


Moreover, there would be few holdouts that refuse to participate in the exchange.	不过，可能会有少数钉子户拒不参与这项互换。


Previous experience suggests that most hold-to-maturity investors would accept a par bond, while most mark-to-market investors would accept a discount bond with a higher coupon (that is, a bond with a lower face value) – an alternative that could be offered (and has been in the past) to such investors.	先前的经验表明，大多数“持有到期满”的投资者都会接受票面债券，而大多数“紧盯市场”的投资者会接受息率较高而面值打折的债券——后者可以是提供给此类投资者的一种选择。


At the same time, the best way to contain financial contagion would be to implement a pan-European plan to recapitalize eurozone banks.	与此同时，遏制金融传染最好的办法是在全欧洲范围内贯彻欧元区银行再注资方案。


This implies using official resources like the EFSF not to backstop an insolvent Greece, but to recapitalize the country’s banks – and those in Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and even Germany and Belgium that need more capital.	这将意味着动用官方资源，例如欧洲金融稳定基金，但不是救助资不抵债的希腊，而是对该国以及爱尔兰、西班牙、葡萄牙、意大利甚至德国和比利时的有关银行进行注资。


In the meantime, the ECB must continue to provide unlimited resources to banks under liquidity stress.	同时，欧洲央行必须继续向面临周转压力的银行无限度提供资金。


To reduce the risk of financial pressures on Italy and Spain, both countries need to press ahead with fiscal austerity and structural reforms.	为了减小意大利和西班牙的金融压力，两国都需要大力推进财政瘦身和结构改革。


Moreover, their debt could be ring-fenced with a larger package of EFSF resources and/or with the issuance of Eurobonds – a further step towards European fiscal integration.	此外，还可以通过欧洲金融稳定基金拨出较多资金，或通过发行欧元债券，把两国的债务隔离保护起来——这也将是促进欧洲财政一体化的一个举措。


Finally, the eurozone needs policies to restart economic growth on its periphery.	最后，欧元区需要出台政策，重启边缘国家的经济增长。


Without growth, any austerity and reform will deliver only social unrest and the constant threat of a political backlash, without restoring debt sustainability.	没有增长，瘦身和改革只会造成社会动荡和持续的政治反弹，而不会恢复债务的可持续性。


To revive growth, the ECB needs to stop raising interest rates and reverse course.	为促进增长，欧洲央行必须停止加息甚至减息。


The eurozone should also pursue a policy – partially via looser monetary policy – that weakens the value of the euro significantly and restores the periphery’s competitiveness.	欧元区也应当执行政策——部分通过宽松的货币政策——令欧元显著贬值，恢复边缘国家的出口竞争力。


And Germany should delay its austerity plan, as the last thing that the eurozone needs is a massive fiscal drag.	德国瘦身计划应该缓行，因为欧元区最终还需要一记有力的财政拉动。


The eurozone’s current muddle-through approach is an unstable disequilibrium: kicking the can down the road, and throwing good money after bad, will not work.	欧元区目前的拖延战术是一个不稳定均衡：把问题留到明天，为了坏钱仍好钱，不会有用的。


Either the eurozone moves toward a different equilibrium – greater economic, fiscal, and political integration, with policies that restore growth and competitiveness, including orderly debt restructurings and a weaker euro – or it will end up with disorderly defaults, banking crises, and eventually a break-up of the monetary union.	欧元区要么走向一个不同的均衡——更高程度的经济、财政和政治一体化，促进增长和竞争力复苏的政策，包括债务重组和弱势欧元——要么它逃不过无序违约、银行危机和货币联盟最终阶梯的结局。


The status quo is no longer sustainable.	现状已无法维持。


Only a comprehensive strategy can rescue the eurozone now.	只有统筹兼顾的战略能拯救欧元区。


The Eurozone’s Strategy of Pain	欧元区的苦肉计


BRUSSELS – For the third year in a row, the eurozone is the weakest link in the world economy.	发自布鲁塞尔——欧元区已经连续第三年成为全球经济最薄弱的一环。


In 2010, attention was focused on responses to the crisis on the eurozone periphery – Greece, Portugal, and Ireland.	在2010年，焦点集中在希腊，葡萄牙和爱尔兰等欧元区外围国家的危机。


In 2011, the crisis moved to the core, with Italy and Spain feeling the heat, and concerns mounting about the viability of the eurozone itself.	到了2011年，危机逐渐向核心区域转移，意大利和西班牙开始坐立不安，甚至有越来越多的人开始质疑欧元区本身的生存能力。


The question for 2012 is whether those tensions will abate or reach a new climax.	而2012年所面临的问题则是这种紧张态势是否将得到缓解，还是掀起下一个新的高潮。


Once again, the Greek crisis is the focus of attention and epitomizes Europe’s failings.	再一次，希腊危机成为众人的焦点以及欧洲自身缺陷的缩影；


Once again, hard decisions have to be made about debt restructuring and the provision of further assistance to Athens.	再一次，人们必须在债务重组和向雅典提供进一步援助方面做出艰难的决定；


And once again, the Europeans have to accept that the situation is more serious than they thought.	也再一次，欧洲人必须认识到情况要比他们想象中更为严峻。


But the depth of Greece’s woes should not obscure the fact that it is a small economy and, in many respects, an extreme, special case.	但希腊的苦况也不应掩盖一个事实：它只是一个小型经济体，而且在许多方面都是一个极端而特别的例子。


No other country flouted the European Union’s budget rules the way Greece did, or has accumulated as large a public-debt burden, and no other EU country combines to the same extent a dysfunctional state and an uncompetitive private economy.	没有任何一个国家胆敢如此漠视欧盟的预算规定，或是积累了如此巨大的公共债务负担，也没有一个欧盟国家能将一个无法运作的国家机器和一个缺乏竞争力的私营经济结合到如此恶劣的程度。


The real battle is being fought in Italy and Spain.	但意大利和西班牙所面对的才是硬仗。


Both countries’ borrowing conditions deteriorated in the second half of 2011.	两国的借债状况都在2011年下半年出现恶化；


Both are so large – accounting for 17% and 11% of eurozone GDP, respectively – that financing them through multilateral assistance would strain, if not exhaust, the resources of the eurozone and the International Monetary Fund.	两国都是大型经济体——分别占欧元区GDP总量的17%和11%，以致任何多边资金援助手段都将大量占用（甚至可能耗尽）欧元区和世界货币基金组织的资源；


Both recently installed new, reform-minded governments.	两国最近都组建了新的改革派政府；


And both are struggling to rebuild competitiveness, foster growth, restore fiscal soundness, and clean up banks’ balance sheets.	两国都尽力重建竞争力，促进增长，恢复财政稳定，并着手清理银行的资产负债表。


If they succeed, the euro will survive; if they fail, it won’t, at least in its present form.	如果这些措施能成功的话，欧元就能存活下来； 反之则将走向衰亡，至少无法维持现有的形式。


That is why discussions over the last few months have largely, if implicitly, been about how to support adjustment and reform in Italy and Spain.	这也是为何过去几个月的讨论大多——如果没有异议的话——集中在如何支持意西两国的调整和改革之上。


Proposals to permit the European Central Bank to intervene more decisively in bond markets, or to increase the size of the “firewall” by leveraging the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), were intended to set an upper limit on interest rates paid by Italy and Spain on their debt emissions.	类似允许欧洲央行更强力干涉债券市场或者通过杠杆化欧洲金融稳定基金的方式来增加“放火墙”厚度的提议，都在试图为两国释放债务时所需支付的利率设定一个上限。


Similarly, proposals to create common bonds were intended to quell expectations of insolvency by ensuring that these countries would eventually be able to borrow against their eurozone partners’ guarantee.	同样，那些设定共同债券的提议都试图说服人们：这些国家最终一定能在其他欧元区伙伴国的保证下获得借款，破产预期是不可取的。


All of the discussions were couched in general terms, but everybody had the same specific countries in mind.	虽然所有这些讨论都用一些笼统的词汇来表达，但大家其实心中都明白说的就是那几个国家。


None of these proposals, it seems, will be implemented anytime soon.	但似乎上述几个提议中没有几个能在近期推行。


The ECB has bought some Italian and Spanish bonds, and it might buy more, but it has made clear that it is not ready to commit to a ceiling for long-term interest rates.	欧洲央行已经买入了一些两国国债，甚至可能再多买一点，但该行同时也明确表示不会为长期利率设定一个上限。


The EFSF’s size will be increased by accelerating the creation of the permanent European Stability Mechanism, and by letting it overlap with the EFSF.	欧洲金融稳定基金的规模已经通过永久性的欧洲稳定机制（European Stability Mechanism）的加速创设以及允许后者与前者进行重叠而得以扩大。


But the EFSF’s capacity will remain at roughly €500 billion – well below the €1 trillion-plus envisaged by those who advocate bringing massive financial firepower to bear (the so-called “bazooka solution”).	但基金依然会维持在大约5000亿欧元的水平，依旧远低于那些鼓吹实施1万亿欧元以上大规模金融火力——所谓“巴祖卡火箭炮方案（bazooka solution）”——的成员所设想的规模。


Likewise, Eurobonds are officially off the agenda, at least for now.	同样，欧洲债券也被正式排除在议程之外——至少目前如此。


Rather, Europe is putting in place a new fiscal compact to ensure that all eurozone countries adopt and implement stringent budgetary rules.	取而代之的则是欧洲推行一个新的财政协议以确保所有欧元区国家都能采纳和实施严格的预算管制。


These choices partly reflect pragmatic concerns: all of the financial-engineering schemes that have been proposed to protect Italy and Spain from aggravated borrowing conditions raise legal, political, or governance difficulties.	这些选择都在某种程度上反映了实用主义的观点：所有旨在防止意西两国借债状况恶化的金融推进方案都会引发诸多法律，政治和治理难题。


But there is a principle at issue as well: it is thought (particularly in Germany) that protection from market pressure would only impede adjustment and reform.	但其中也存在着一个流行的理念（尤其是在德国国内）：认为保护这些国家免遭市场压力只能阻碍调整和改革。


Indeed, the perception in Northern Europe is that only serious strains provide the required incentives to overcome domestic political and social obstacles to slashing public spending and reforming labor markets.	事实上，欧洲北部各国的看法就是只有高压才能提供克服国内政治和社会障碍所需的激励因素，最终实现支出削减以及劳动力市场改革。


For Southern Europe, no pain means no gain: a deep recession and a sharp increase in unemployment may be the price of lasting improvements in productivity and competitiveness.	而对南欧国家来说，没有牺牲何来收获：一场大衰退和失业率的大增或许是生产力和竞争力持续改善所必须付出的代价。


This reasoning is not without justification.	这个推论也不是没有道理的。


Soon after the ECB began buying Italian bonds last August, then-Prime minister Silvio Berlusconi’s government backtracked on its commitments to tax reform.	就在欧洲央行于去年八月开始购买意大利债券的时候，时任意大利总理的贝卢斯科尼却突然放弃了推行税收改革的承诺。


Even though it later reversed its stance, the episode was widely regarded as clear evidence of the moral-hazard effect of ECB support.	即便该政府后来又重新回到了原来的立场，这一幕也被广泛认为是欧洲央行所提供的支持所带来的道德破坏效应的明确证明。


Only after the bond market turned on Berlusconi again was he replaced by the reform-minded Mario Monti.	也只有在贝卢斯科尼被改革派的马里奥·蒙蒂所取代之后债券市场才抛弃了前者。


But the strategy is a high-risk gamble.	但这个策略其实是一场高风险的赌博。


Governments may need incentives to act, but they also need to be able to show their citizens that reform pays.	各国政府或许需要在激励因素的刺激之下才能行动，但他们也需要告诉市民们改革是可以带来好处的。


If, after a few quarters of fiscal adjustment and painful reform, output is lower, unemployment higher, and the outlook darker, governments may soon lose public support and reform may stall, as we have seen in Greece.	如果在一系列财政调整和痛苦改革之后产能，失业率和前景进一步恶化，那么这些政府将迅速失去公众支持而改革也将陷入停滞，正如我们在希腊看见的那样。


Reform-minded teams may lose power to populists.	改革派团队也将大权旁落，让位给那些民粹主义者。


Furthermore, a degraded macroeconomic and financial environment increases the likelihood of bank failures, with immediate consequences for public finances and economic confidence.	此外，一个恶化的宏观经济和金融环境增加了银行破产的可能性，也将迅速影响公共财政状况和市场信心。


These risks are compounded by the need for reform in several countries at once.	在多国急需立刻改革的需要之下风险也进一步加大了。


Indeed, there is a “fallacy of composition” in the current approach: the countries in need of serious adjustment and improved competitiveness include the whole of Southern Europe and France, and jointly account for more than one-half of eurozone GDP.	事实上，目前的手段中存在着一个“混合的错误推论”：那些急需大幅调整并提升竞争力的国家包含了整个南欧地区以及法国，经济总量相当于欧元区GDP的一半。


True, competition for investment is an incentive to act.	对投资的竞争毫无疑问是一个行动起来的激励因素。


But macroeconomic and financial interdependence may render success elusive if reforming countries face an adverse regional environment of stagnating or falling demand.	但如果那些改革中的国家面对经济停滞或者需求下降这类负面区域环境的话，宏观经济以及金融方面的独立性就将反过来阻碍改革的成功。


It is one thing to believe that governments act only under pressure, and that societies accept reforms only if they believe that there is no other alternative; it is quite another to believe that adjustment and reform will proceed if all of Southern Europe is struggling with recession.	可以确信的只有一点：政府只有受到了压力才会行动，各国社会也只有在无路可走的情况下才选择改革； 还有一点则是只有所有南欧国家都在衰退中挣扎的情况下改革才能继续下去。


Keeping Southern Europe on a short leash would be a more credible strategy if accompanied by a growth program for the entire eurozone.	将南欧国家管束起来是一个策略，但只有在与一个针对全欧元区的增长计划相结合的情况下这一策略才能变得更加可靠。


And, at this stage, such a program is nowhere in sight.	但在现阶段，这么一个计划还无影无踪。


The Eurozone’s Strength in Disunity	欧元区政治无能恰恰是欧元之福


FLORENCE – For months, an increasingly frenetic, even apocalyptic, debate about the fate of the euro has been the major driver of global instability.	佛罗伦萨——数月来，关于欧元命运的争论不仅日趋激烈，而且日益带有末世论的色彩，已经成了全球不稳定的一个主要推力。


Can Europe’s common currency survive?  No less a figure than former United States Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has now declared that it cannot.	欧洲共同货币能不能活下去？ 如今，像美联储前主席格林斯潘这么一位大人物出来宣称：它不能。


But the euro also seems surprisingly resilient in the face of this woe.	虽然是悲声一片，欧元却异乎寻常地坚挺。


Unlike in the early summer of 2010, it has been largely stable relative to the dollar on foreign-exchange markets.	一改2010年夏天的颓势，这一段时间，欧元兑美元汇率基本稳定。


That stability is puzzling.	这种稳定真是令人不解。


Skeptics have plenty of ammunition for their critique of the euro.	怀疑论者批判欧元的弹药充足。


European governments’ high-level crisis diplomacy and new and ever more complex mechanisms sometimes briefly calm the markets, but the tide of doubt quickly sweeps back in.	虽然欧洲各国政府祭出高规格危机外交和比以往还要复杂的新机制等“利器”，间或能安抚一下市场情绪，但怀疑浪潮很快就会卷土重来。


For a day, or sometimes only for a few hours, traders succumb to the illusion of stability, fueling a euphoric but ephemeral financial-market rally.	在一日内，甚至短至几个小时，交易员会沉醉于稳定的幻觉，金融市场于是启动一轮癫喜然而短命的反弹。


Then they awaken to the reality that not much has really changed, and that in a few weeks or months the problems will reappear in a seemingly even more intractable form.	然后，他们又清醒过来，看清了现实：其实没什么大的改变，几周或几月之后，老问题会重新出现，而且变得更棘手。


All manner of new legal and constitutional difficulties constantly arise.	各式各样的法律和宪法难题层出不穷。


Is an amendment to the EU treaty required?	是不是有必要修改欧盟宪章呢？


Isn’t that politically unthinkable?	那在政治上是不可思议的吗？


One is ineluctably led to the conclusion that governance of the eurozone is irredeemably flawed.	人们不得不承认，欧元区的治理无可救药。


But the persistence of these difficulties sheds light on why the eurozone was established in the first place.	然而，这些难题首先恰恰反映了一个问题——当年为什么要建立欧元区。


Market turbulence demonstrates a need for some institutional mechanism that can ensure greater currency stability.	市场动荡表明，需要某种制度性工具来确保汇率稳定性。


An international currency is the most obvious solution.	建立国际货币是一个最自然的办法。


The euro originated from the harmful effects of international currency instability in the wake of the collapse of fixed-exchange-rate regimes in the early 1970’s.	欧元的创生，原本就是为了抵御20世纪70年代早期固定汇率体系崩溃后，国际汇率不稳定的种种恶果。


Whenever the dollar was weak, capital surged into alternative currencies, notably the Japanese yen and the German Mark.	当年，只要美元一走弱，资本就会涌向其他货币，尤其是日元和德国马克。


But exchange-rate appreciation put great strain on the export industries that were central to these countries’ economic performance; and both countries tried desperately to avoid becoming reserve currencies.	但本币升值造成的出口压力令这些出口导向型经济体不堪重负，所以两国都极力避免本币成为储备货币。


Today, the major “beneficiaries” – in fact, victims – of dollar doubts are economies that are much smaller than Japan or Germany.	如今，美元失信的主要“受益者”——实际上是受害者——是一些规模远小于日本和德国的经济体。


Nowadays, capital flows are driving up the Swiss franc, the Swedish and Norwegian krone, and the Canadian and Australian dollars, causing profound dislocations in these small economies as their products and services become uncompetitive.	目前，资本流正在推高瑞士法郎、瑞典和挪威克朗、加拿大元和澳大利亚元，削弱其制造与服务业的竞争力，导致产业外逃。


The managers of these new safe-haven currencies are now desperately seeking at least a temporary peg or some system of bands relative to the exchange rates of their big neighbors.	在绝望之中，这些新避风港货币的管理者试图把本币同较大邻国的货币临时挂钩。


Such a policy is fraught with danger; indeed, it is inherently self-defeating, as the establishment of a peg or a band provides an obvious target against which speculators can take huge positions.	而这种政策隐含危险，甚至可以说是自掘坟墓——这种挂钩会给货币狙击手提供一个显眼的靶子。


The current turmoil eventually will lead smaller European countries to look for ways to tie themselves much more closely to the euro.	汇率乱局实际上会迫使较小的欧洲国家想办法同欧元联系得更紧。


That is what happened in the 1970’s, during the original wave of currency turmoil: the Scandinavians and the Swiss negotiated to associate themselves with a European currency regime.	那正是20世纪70年代发生的情形，在第一波汇率乱局中，北欧和瑞士向欧洲汇率机制伸出了橄榄枝。


Today, the logic of that strategy has become even more compelling.	今日，这种策略会显得更有必要。


The benefits of euro membership are also clear to many other small economies.	对另一些小经济体而言，欧元区成员资格的好处也很明显。


Slovenia, which entered the eurozone in 2007, and Slovakia, which joined at the beginning of 2009 – just as the cresting financial crisis slammed shut the door to further euro enlargement – have enjoyed much greater financial stability than their untied neighbors.	斯洛文尼亚和斯洛伐克有幸分别于2007年和2009年初加入欧元区，恰好赶在金融危机关上欧元区扩大之门的前夕，后来，它们都享受到那些未加入的邻国所没有的金融稳定性。


Part of those neighbors’ problem was that domestic borrowing costs looked so high that many small borrowers, including many house buyers, turned to low-interest Swiss-franc loans and were then hit by the franc’s massive appreciation.	那些邻国的麻烦，一部分在于，国内借债成本过高，许多小借款人，包括许多购房者，纷纷转向低息的瑞郎贷款等融资方式，然后被瑞郎升值重创。


The turbulence reinforces the lesson – fundamental to the rationale of establishing the euro – that ordinary people and businesses should not be exposed to exchange-rate risk.	危机强化了一个教训：普通老百姓和小企业，不应暴露于汇率风险中——这也正是建立欧元的一个基本考量。


Even in larger countries, the costs and benefits of membership in a currency union are under renewed consideration.	甚至在一些较大的国家，人们也在重新估计加入货币同盟的成本和收益。


In the initial aftermath of the financial crisis, it was widely assumed that currency flexibility gave the United Kingdom an advantage over eurozone members like Spain.	在金融危机爆发之处，人们普遍认为英国的货币灵活性使它具有某种优势，是欧元区成员国如西班牙等国所不具备的。


But Spanish exports recovered more quickly than British exports, and inflationary pressure via the exchange rate is now a major constraint on future British monetary policy.	但西班牙的出口比英国的出口复苏得快，而由汇率所传导的通胀压力目前已成为英国未来货币政策的主要制约因素。


Of course, there are obvious governance problems with the eurozone.	当然，欧元区的治理明显有问题。


Most glaringly, the question of how to allocate the costs of some member countries’ unsustainable debt overhang has not been adequately addressed.	尤其突出的是，为了治理某些成员国的过高债务，其成本如何分摊这个问题没有得到妥善解决。


It is easy to conclude that no one is in charge: not the national governments, and certainly not the ineffective European Commission in Brussels, with which the large member countries seem to be practically at war.	很容易得出结论说这事儿没人管：各国政府不管，效率低下的欧盟委员会显然也不管——在布鲁塞尔，欧盟各大国没完没了地扯皮。


And yet, paradoxically, the absence of control is what makes the euro attractive.	但现实很诡异，欧元的失控状态恰恰是欧元的吸引力所在。


Unlike the US dollar, there is no obvious way to put pressure on the European Central Bank to depreciate the currency in order to obtain a competitive advantage over other economies.	跟美元不同，没有什么渠道可以向欧洲央行施压，让欧元贬值以提升某些国家的出口竞争力。


European governments are not in a position to instruct the ECB to purchase government bonds.	欧洲各国政府也无权要求欧洲央行购买其国债。


The more the eurozone’s ineffective governance is criticized, the greater becomes the euro’s importance as a non-political currency that represents a secure store of value.	欧元区的政治无能越是遭人诟病，欧元就越是一种免受政治操纵的货币，越是一种可靠的价值贮藏手段。


In a stable world of confident markets, small countries can rest easy with their own monetary regimes.	当世界太平无事，市场信心满满，小国完全可以保留自家货币体制。


In a turbulent world of market volatility, however, they risk being overwhelmed.	当世界动荡不安，市场振荡不已，它们面临的风险就压倒了保持独立的需要。


There is thus a surprising resilience in the European project.	因此，欧洲一体化方案的奇异坚挺也就不难解释。


A bundle of logs lashed together in a raft – even if it lacks a rudder – has a clear advantage over a single storm-tossed trunk.	在惊涛骇浪中，许多木头结成木筏，总比一根木头来的稳健，即使这个木筏没有舵。


The higher the waves of doubt and uncertainty become, the more the common approach is needed.	怀疑与不确定的风浪越高，就越是需要共进退。


A Breach in the Eurozone Dike	欧元区大坝上的蚁穴


PRINCETON – While all eyes have been on the European periphery, has the core been cracking?	普林斯顿—所有人的眼睛都盯着欧洲外围国，然则核心区安否？


The Bundesbank has lowered its forecast for German annual GDP growth in 2013 to 0.4%.	德国央行将其2013年德国年GDP增长预期降低到了0. 4%。


The Central Bank of the Netherlands expects Dutch GDP to shrink by -0.5% this year – following a contraction of about 1% in 2012.	荷兰央行预计今年荷兰GDP将下降0. 5%，2014年降幅还将扩大。


The eurozone crisis may be entering its third stage.	欧元区危机或许正在步入第三阶段。


In the first stage, beginning in the spring of 2008, the locus of the North Atlantic crisis moved from the United States to the eurozone.	第一阶段始于2008年春，北大西洋危机从美国转移到了欧元区。


Banks in the eurozone came under pressure, and interbank tensions increased.	欧元区银行承压，银行间市场开始紧张起来。


In the second stage, starting in the spring of 2009, the crisis spread to the sovereigns, as investors grew increasingly worried that propping up banks would strain government finances.	第二阶段始于2009年春，危机蔓延到主权债务，因为投资者越来越担心支持银行会拖累政府财政。


In turn, sovereign weakness made the banks appear riskier, and the banks and their home governments became joined at the hip.	反过来，主权弱势导致银行风险增加，银行和母国政府成了一条绳上的蚂蚱。


Throughout the crisis, it has been widely assumed – at least so far – that the eurozone core would remain solid, and would continue to write the checks for the periphery’s distressed governments and banks.	在整个危机过程中——至少到目前为止是如此——人们都认为欧元区核心国将保持坚挺，并会不断向外围国受困政府和银行输血。


That assumption appeared plausible.	这一观点看起来颇有道理。


A “two-speed” Europe was the new normal.	“两速”欧洲乃是新常态。


In particular, Germany stood above the fray.	特别是德国的独树一帜。


Following strong performance in 2010, Germany’s GDP exceeded pre-crisis levels by early 2011, a somewhat better achievement than that of the US.	继2010年的强劲表现后，德国GDP在2011年年初超越了危机前水平，这是比美国更了不起的成就。


Indeed, given Germany’s surprisingly impressive employment performance, another Wirtschaftswunder appeared to be in the making.	德国令人惊喜的就业表现表明，另一场经济奇迹正在酝酿中。


Then a subtle change occurred.	接着发生了微妙的变化。


The US – despite a historically slow return to normalcy – pulled ahead of Germany.	美国——尽管它恢复常态的速度之慢为历史罕见——又超越了德国。


Absent a prolonged fiscal-cliff and debt-ceiling mess, the US may be cobbling together a sustainable recovery.	要不是悬而未决的财政悬崖和债务上限问题，美国已经走上了持续复苏之路。


Following the German economy’s sharp contraction in the last quarter of 2012, the question for the country today is whether it can avoid a technical recession (defined as two consecutive quarters of economic contraction).	德国在2012年最后一个季度出现了急剧下滑，如今，德国面临着是否可以避免技术性衰退（即连续两季经济收缩）的问题。


Europe does not have its own growth engine.	欧洲缺少自身的增长引擎。


The German rebound was initially robust because world trade rose rapidly after a precipitous fall.	德国的反弹一开始之所以文件，是因为世界贸易在前期下降后大幅增长。


China’s voracious appetite for German cars and machines provided the needed boost, even as Germany’s traditional trade partners in Europe struggled.	尽管德国的传统欧洲贸易伙伴陷入了麻烦，但中国对德国汽车和机械的无尽的胃口提供了必要的支撑。


Since then, however, Chinese demand growth has slowed, and Germany’s European trading partners are in even deeper trouble.	但是，随后中国需求增长开始放缓，而德国的欧洲贸易伙伴麻烦也加深了。


Fiscal austerity in the periphery requires cutting back on imports; hence, the countries exporting to the periphery need to curtail their own imports – and so the process cascades.	外围国的财政紧缩要求削减进口； 于是，向外围国出口的国家需要降低其自身的进口——收缩就此开始。


This trade multiplier is causing European economies to drag each other down, and the rest of the world is feeling the effects.	这一贸易乘数导致欧洲各国互相拖累，世界其他地区也受到了影响。


The Dutch economy’s poor prospects are similarly alarming.	荷兰经济的黯淡前景同样值得警惕。


The Netherlands is second only to Germany in the volume of credit that it channels through the so-called “Target 2” system to the eurozone periphery, and it is the periphery’s largest creditor in per capita terms.	在面向欧元区外围国的信用渠道，即所谓的“Target 2”体系中，荷兰的信用量仅次于德国，排名第二，以人均信用衡量，荷兰是欧元区外围国的第一大债权人。


Economic forecasters continue to promise that growth will revive.	经济预测家仍然认为增长会重振。


Things will begin to look up in the second half of 2013, we are told.	他们告诉我们，事情将在2013年下半年好转。


But the track record of charting this recovery has been discouraging.	但此次复苏的历史记录令人沮丧。


In his book The Signal and the Noise, the American statistician Nate Silver says that forecasters perform worst when faced with a circumstance that they have not encountered before.	美国统计学家奈特·希尔沃（Nate Silver）在其著作《信号与噪音》（The Signal and the Noise）中指出，在面临此前未遇到过的环境时，预测表现会变差。


This is such a circumstance.	现在的环境就属于从未遇到过的范畴。


In April 2010, the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook projected 1.8% annual GDP growth in Germany and the Netherlands in 2013.	2010年4月，IMF的《世界经济展望》预测2013年德国和荷兰年GDP增长为1. 8%。


In October of last year, the IMF lowered its 2013 growth forecast for Germany to 0.9% and to 0.4% for the Netherlands.	去年10月，IMF将德国和荷兰2013年GDP增长预测分别调低至0. 9%和0.


And, a mere two months later, both countries’ central banks report that even these reduced expectations are too optimistic.	4%。 又过了两个月，两国央行报告说即便是降低了的预期仍显得过于乐观了。


Who is to say that the second half of 2013 will bring more hope and cheer?	谁能担保2013年下半年会出现更多的希望和兴奋？


The European crisis-management process has been predicated on the Scarlett O’Hara principle that “tomorrow will be a better day.”	欧洲危机治理过程一直可以用斯嘉丽·奥哈拉（Scarlett O’Hara）的“明天会更好”原则预测。


Although everyone knows that postponing hard decisions only makes the problem larger, they could still believe that there would always be a firm line of defense.	尽管所有人都知道暂停艰难抉择只能让问题变得跟严重，但他们仍然相信，总会找到一条稳固的防线。


That may be changing.	这一点或许正在发生变化。


The third stage of the eurozone crisis will arrive when the economic strength of the core is in doubt.	欧元区危机的第三阶段将在核心国的经济坚挺度遭受怀疑时到来。


Those very doubts undermine the credibility of the safety net that has been supporting the European periphery.	这种怀疑将破坏一直支撑着欧洲外围过的安全网的信誉。


A solution to the eurozone crisis that relies on Germany has always been politically uncertain.	依靠德国的欧元区危机解决方案永远是政治上不确定的。


It may soon become economically untenable.	或许很快这一方案在经济上也站不住脚了。


A Green European Budget	绿色欧洲预算


PARIS – However predictable the difficult negotiations that accompany European politics may seem to be, in the end they seldom fail to surprise.	巴黎—不管欧洲政治谈判的困难性多么显而易见，最终的结果总是不出人意料。


A crucial European Union summit aimed at securing a deal on the EU budget for 2014-2020, the so-called multi-annual financial framework (MFF), will take place later this week, and the mood music surrounding it has been intense, to say the least.	旨在确保达成2014—2020年欧盟预算协议（即所谓的多年财政框架，MFF）的欧盟峰会将在本周晚些时候举行，这场峰会的背景基调可以用两个字形容：紧张。


Before even a word has been spoken, Europeans are being told that the negotiations in Brussels will be “bad-tempered,” with vetoes by individual member states looming large.	在还没有发出任何声响之前，欧洲人已被告知，在布鲁塞尔举行的这场谈判将是“难惹”的，各成员国很可能会投出否决票。


Unfortunately, such talk could well become a self-fulfilling prophecy.	不幸的是，这样的论调很可能成为自我实现的预言 。


Consider this: A group of major companies based in various EU countries – the likes of Tesco, Shell, Barilla, and Philips – are insisting that whatever its final size, the MFF deal should commit to a proposed minimum of 20% of spending in 2014-2020 on green and low-carbon growth.	现象一下：一批来自不同欧盟国家的大公司——如乐购、壳牌、百味来、飞利浦——坚持认为，不管最终规模如何，MFF协议应该规定2014—2020年间至少将20%的支出用于绿色和低碳增长。


These are the same companies that Europe’s national governments court and listen to on a daily basis.	平时，欧洲各国政府对这些公司可谓言听计从。


But, when it comes to the MFF, Europe’s national leaders appear not to be listening closely.	但是，在MFF协议问题上，欧洲各国领导人似乎不愿意听它们的话。


Nor do they say much about the obvious dividends that such spending could provide, from the United Kingdom in the west to the EU’s newest candidate country, Croatia, in the east.	从欧盟西端的英国到最新的申请加入国克罗地亚，他们也不愿谈及这类支出所能带来的显而易见的好处。


Europe’s 500 million citizens may not be surprised by what is playing out in the corridors of power, but they ought to find it very disturbing.	欧洲的5亿人民也许不会因为正在权力走廊上演的戏码而感到惊奇，但应该会对此感到十分不安。


The issue is not only what could be lost in the race to the bottom in which many EU national governments are now engaging, but also the manipulative anti-EU sentiment coming from many quarters of the European press, which appears intent on pushing various national leaders into another budget showdown.	问题不仅在于输掉这场欧盟各国政府都加入其中的向下竞争的代价几何，也在于欧洲各大媒体所操纵的反欧盟情绪，后者似乎不把众多国家领导人拖入另一场预算危机不罢休。


In the EU’s western, net-contributor states, the MFF debate remains narrowly focused on how much money can be cut from the European Commission’s proposed €1.033 trillion ($1.3 trillion) budget for 2014-2020.	在欧盟的西部净出资国，MFF争论仍旧狭隘地局限在欧盟给出的2014—2020年预算规模1. 033万亿欧元可以削减多少。


Next to nothing, though, is being said about the Commission’s more important, and more integral, proposal: the 20% spending commitment for projects and initiatives that can stimulate resource-efficient business, protect Europe’s collective, boundary-less environment, and ensure a better future for families across the continent.	但对于委员会更重要也更完整的方案——承诺将20%的支出用于可以刺激资源高效型业务、保护欧洲不分界集体环境以及确保整个欧洲大陆人民更美好未来却几乎无人提及。


The dividends promised by a “green” MFF (which recently received the support of the European Parliament) are at least threefold: a higher share of jobs in one of the world’s fastest-growing economic sectors; lower energy bills for households throughout Europe; and help in achieving the reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions to which all EU states have agreed as part of their “Europe 2020” commitments.	 “绿色”MFF（刚刚获得欧洲议会的支持）所能带来的好处至少包括三个方面：提高世界增长最快经济部门的就业岗位比例、降低整个欧洲的家庭能源账单，以及有助于所有欧盟国家达到它们所同意的作为“欧洲2020”承诺一部分的温室气体减排目标。


The green potential within EU spending has already taken root.	欧盟内部支出的绿色潜力已经生根。


In France, for example, social housing organizations have rapidly deployed €320 million of EU money in the last few years to improve energy efficiency in existing housing stock.	比如，过去几年中，在法国，社会家庭组织迅速地将3. 2亿欧元的欧盟资金用于改善建成住房的能源效率。


This European finance triggered additional investment of €2.2 billion, created 15,000 local jobs, and has resulted in savings of €98 per month per household, thanks to a 40% average decrease in heating costs.	这笔欧洲资金引来了22亿欧元的附加投资，创造了15000个本地就业岗位，并通过节省40%的取暖费使每户家庭每月储蓄增加了98欧元。


Recently, Michael Heseltine, a former minister in Margaret Thatcher’s government, stressed the importance of wind energy for deprived regions of the United Kingdom, such as the northeast of England.	最近，撒切尔夫人政府内阁大臣迈克尔·赫塞尔廷（Michael Heseltine）强调风能对于英国贫困地区（如英格兰东北部）的重要性。


And yet the penny has not dropped in London that focusing European investment funds accordingly would create opportunities to build stronger businesses and increase competitiveness in the technologies of the future – and to share these gains within and beyond the EU.	但资金并没有投于英国，英国也无法专注于欧洲投资资金能够创造出机会以建设更强大的企业、增加未来技术的竞争力，并在欧盟内外分享好处。


Instead, in the UK and elsewhere, the predictable MFF chest-thumping that is now underway threatens to dispatch this kind of opportunity to the bin beneath the negotiating table.	相反，在英国和其他地方，可预见的MFF空头承诺（现在正在发生）有可能使这类机会无法登上谈判桌。


Europe has come a long way since 1951 and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, the forerunner of the EU.	自1951年欧洲煤炭和钢铁共同体（欧盟前身）成立以来，欧洲已经走过了很长的路。


But we are now in the process of constructing the EU economy anew, striving to overcome the economic crisis, and creating a more sustainable, globally competitive, and resilient European economy – an economy that can be green as well as productive.	但如今，我们正处在把欧盟建设为全新经济体的过程中，竭尽全力克服经济危机并创造更加可持续、具有全球竞争力和韧性的欧洲经济——一个既绿色，又富于生产力的经济。


The EU’s heads of government need to understand the bigger picture as they prepare for this week’s MFF summit.	在准备本周的MFF峰会时，欧盟各国领导人必须看清更宏观的图景。


Europe’s common good – indeed, its most promising path to a prosperous future – is at stake.	欧洲的共同前途——事实上，是其通往繁荣未来的道路——正在接受考验。


The EU’s Global Mission	欧盟的全球使命


In some quarters, pessimism, sad to say, dominated the recent celebrations marking the European Union’s 50th birthday.	在某些角落，悲观主义笼罩了最近庆祝欧盟成立50周年的活动。 这是令人难过的。


Unease about the EU’s future is, of course, understandable, especially given the uncertainty surrounding efforts to revive the Constitutional Treaty.	当然，担忧欧盟的未来，特别是考虑到重新启动欧盟宪法的努力难以确定是可以理解的。


But the European project has been an enormous success, not only for Europe, but also for the world.	但是欧洲联合进程不仅对于欧洲，乃至整个世界都是巨大的成功。


Europeans should not be dismayed by comparisons of GDP growth in Europe and, say, the United States.	欧洲人对于其GDP增长与美国相比不应当感到沮丧。


Of course, Europe faces great challenges in perfecting its economic union, including the need to reduce unemployment and boost the economy’s dynamism.	当然，在完善其经济联盟、包括降低失业率以及振兴经济活力上欧洲面临巨大的挑战。


But, while GDP per capita has been rising in the US, most Americans are worse off today than they were five years ago.	但是，尽管美国的人均GDP一直在上升，大多数美国人现在不如五年前。


An economy that, year after year, leaves most of its citizens worse off is not a success.	年复一年地让大多数公民不如从前的经济不是一个成功的经济。


More importantly, the EU’s success should not be measured only by particular pieces of legislation and regulation, or even in the prosperity that economic integration has brought.	更为重要的是，欧盟的成功不应当仅仅用某一具体的法规、甚至是经济联合所带来的繁荣来衡量。


After all, the driving motivation of the EU’s founders was long-lasting peace.	毕竟，欧盟创立者的策动力是长久的和平。


Economic integration, it was hoped, would lead to greater understanding, underpinned by the myriad interactions that inevitably flow from commerce.	他们希望，经济联合将会导致更大程度的理解，贸易最终产生极大的相互交往支持促进相互理解。


Increased interdependence would make conflict unthinkable.	相互依存增加将会使得冲突难以想象。


The EU has realized that dream.	欧盟已经实现了这一梦想。


Nowhere in the world do neighbors live together more peacefully, and people move more freely and with greater security, than in Europe, owing in part to a new European identity that is not bound to national citizenship.	世界上没有其他地方比欧洲的人们更为和平共处，可以更为自由安全地移动，部分原因是新的、不局限于国籍的欧洲身份。


This stands as an example that the world should emulate – one of shared rights and responsibilities, including the obligation to help the less fortunate.	这是全世界应当加以学习借鉴的榜样，即责任和权力共享，包括帮助穷苦人的义务。


Here, too, Europe has led the way, providing more assistance to developing countries than anyone else (and at a markedly higher fraction of its GDP than the US).	欧洲在这一点上也是领先的，它比其他地方给发展中国家提供更多的援助(其援助占GDP的份额远远高于美国)。


The world has faced a difficult period during the past six years.	过去六年中世界面临着一个不同的时期。


The commitment to democratic multilateralism has been challenged, and rights guaranteed under international conventions, such as the Convention Against Torture, have been abrogated.	致力于民主多元主义受到了挑战，而例如反酷刑公约等国际公约所保证的权利遭受侵犯。


Many lessons have emerged, including the dangers of hubris and the limits of military power, and the need for a multi-polar world.	人们知道了许多教训，包括傲慢的危险、军事实力的局限以及多极世界的必要性。


Europe, with more people than any nation except China and India, and the largest GDP in the world, must become one of the central pillars of such a world by projecting what has come to be called “soft power” – the power and influence of ideas and example.	它必须成为这样一个世界的中心支柱之一。 其方式就是发挥人们所说的“软实力”，也就是观念和范例所发挥出的实力和影响力。


Indeed, Europe’s success is due in part to its promotion of a set of values that, while quintessentially European, are at the same time global.	的确，欧洲的成功部分要归于其促进一整套价值观念。 这些价值观在精髓上是欧洲的，但是同时也是全球的。


The most fundamental of these values is democracy, understood to entail not merely periodic elections, but also active and meaningful participation in decision making, which requires an engaged civil society, strong freedom of information norms, and a vibrant and diversified media that are not controlled by the state or a few oligarchs.	所谓民主，不仅是要求定期选举，同时也是在决策中积极和富有意义地参与。 这就要求公民社会的参与、强大的信息自由规则以及不受国家和几个寡头操控的富有活力和多元化的媒体。


The second value is social justice.	第二个价值观是社会公正。


An economic and political system is to be judged by the extent to which individuals are able to flourish and realize their potential.	应当用个人可以在多大程度上实现自我和个人潜力来评判经济和政治制度。


As individuals, we are part of an ever-widening circle of communities, and we can realize our potential only if we live in harmony with each other.	作为个人，我们是不断加宽的社区圈子的一部分，只有我们和平共处才能够实现我们的潜力。


This, in turn, requires a sense of responsibility and solidarity.	这反过来就要求要有责任感和凝聚感。


The EU demonstrated that sense powerfully by its assistance to Europe’s post-Communist countries.	欧盟通过向欧洲的后共产国家提供援助而有力地表现了这一感觉。


The transition from Communism to the market has not been easy, but Europe’s unprecedented generosity has paid off: the countries that have joined the EU have outperformed all the others, and not just because of access to Europe’s markets.	从共产主义的转型并非轻而易举，但是欧盟前所未有的大度已经获得了回报。 加入欧盟的国家发展得比其他所有国家都要好，这并不仅仅是由于可以进入欧盟的市场。


Even more important was the institutional infrastructure, including the binding commitment to democracy and the vast array of laws and regulations that we too often take for granted.	更为重要的是机制性基础，包括对民主有约束力的承诺以及我们经常习以为常的大量法规。


Europe has succeeded in part because it recognizes that the rights of individuals are inalienable and universal, and because it created institutions to protect those rights.	欧洲在某些程度上取得了成功，因为它认识到个人的权利是不可分割和普世的，而且是因为它建立了保护这些权利的机制。


America, by contrast, has witnessed a massive assault on those rights, including that of habeas corpus – the right to challenge one’s detention before an independent judge.	与此相比，美国则见证了对这些权利的大规模侵犯，包括在独立法官面前反对拘禁的权利。


Fine distinctions are made, for example, between the rights of citizens and non-citizens.	例如，在公民和非公民之间就存在微妙的差别。


Today, only Europe can speak with credibility on the subject of universal human rights.	今天，只有欧洲才可以在普遍性的人权问题上具有可信度地发言。


For the sake of all of us, Europe must continue to speak out – even more forcibly than it has in the past.	未了其他人的利益，欧洲必须继续如此发言，甚至比以前还要强烈。


Likewise, while the European project sought to bring about the “harmony” of people living together in peace, we also must live in harmony with our environment – the scarcest of all of our resources.	同样，欧洲联合目的是让人与人之间“和谐”共处，我们还要与我们的环境和谐共处。 环境是我们所有资源中最为缺乏的。


In this area, too, Europe has taken the lead, especially concerning global warming, showing that petty selfishness can be put aside to achieve a common good.	在这一领域，欧洲也一马当先，特别是在全球气候变暖问题上，这表明人们可以抛弃渺小的自私来实现共同的福祉。


In today’s world, too, there is much that is not working well.	在当今世界，很多事情都不尽如人意。


While economic integration helped achieve a broader set of goals in Europe, elsewhere, economic globalization has contributed to widening the divide between rich and poor within countries and between rich and poor countries.	经济联合在欧洲帮助实现了更大范围的目标，但是在其他地方，经济全球化在国家内部以及国与国之间造成了贫富差异的日益扩大。


Another world is possible.	另一个世界是可能的。


But it is up to Europe to take the lead in achieving it.	但是，这还需要欧洲敢为天下先来实现这一世界。


The EU’s Hour, or Europe’s Darkest Hour?	欧盟的时刻？ 欧洲最黑暗的时刻？


COPENHAGEN – So far, Europe’s leaders seem to be mostly preoccupied with finding national answers to the global economic crisis.	哥本哈根－到目前为止，欧洲各国的领导人似乎还在把主要精力用在为全球经济危机寻找国内对策上。


In particular, the leaders of “Old Europe” have been reluctant to open up their coffers for the countries of “New Europe.”	特别引人注意的是，“老欧洲”国家的领导人不愿意为“新欧洲”国家提供资金。


If this attitude prevails, there is a grave risk that the European Project will become paralyzed.	如果这种态度占据了主导地位，欧洲一体化进程就会有瘫痪的严重风险。


This will not only delay the restoration of economic growth, but will also have dire political consequences.	而这不仅会延缓经济增长恢复的时间，还会产生可怕的政治后果。


The European Union’s new members from eastern and central Europe have been hit much harder by the crisis than the old member states; they are also much less prepared to confront the situation psychologically and socially.	东欧和中欧的欧盟新成员国所遭受的经济危机的打击，要比原欧盟成员国遭受的打击大得多； 这些欧盟新成员国对抗经济危机的心理和社会准备，也没有老的欧盟成员国充分。


Many were gravely disappointed when European leaders earlier this month rejected pleas to establish a special support program for them.	本月初，在欧洲领导人拒绝了为这些欧盟新成员国设立一个特别支持项目的请求时，许多人感到非常失望。


Of course, German Chancellor Angela Merkel was right to point out that each country should be dealt with according to its situation. But she and her colleagues should have voiced clearer and more emphatic support for the new member states.	当然，德国总理安吉拉·默克尔指出，每个欧盟新成员国要根据其具体情形分别对待，这是正确的，但是，她和她的同僚应该为这些欧盟新成员国表达出更明确和有力的支持。


Emotions and expectations ran high when the new democracies from the former East Bloc joined the EU only five years ago.	仅仅在五年前，当来自前社会主义阵营的新兴民主国家加入欧盟时，人们对此还怀有很强烈的感情，并抱有很大的期望。


Until the crisis hit last year, the enlargement had proven to be a profitable business for Old Europe: high growth rates in most of New Europe injected energy into Old Europe’s sagging economies, much to the surprise of those who had predicted that enlargement would become an economic millstone around the neck of the established member states.	直到去年经济危机爆发之前，欧盟的扩大被证明对“老欧洲”国家来说，是一件有利可图事情：大多数新欧洲国家经济的高速增长，为老欧洲国家低迷的经济注入了活力，这出乎了那些预测欧盟扩大会成为压在欧盟原成员国身上的沉重负担的人的意料。


But then the financial system crumbled growth rates fell like a ton of bricks.	但是这些欧盟新成员国的金融体系不久之后就因为金融危机而崩溃了，它们的经济增长率也像自由落体一样下降。


The new democracies were shaken as public protests erupted in some of their capitals, and some governments have fallen.	有些新兴民主国家的首都爆发的公众抗议，令这些国家岌岌可危，而且有些国家的政府已经倒台了。


Expectations and confidence in democracy, the market economy, and the larger European project have suffered as well.	人们对民主、市场经济和更广泛的欧洲一体化的期望和信心，也遭受了重创。


If this is allowed to continue, we might end up opening a Pandora’s Box, setting free the nationalistic and xenophobic ghosts of the past.	如果我们对此听之任之，最后可能会导致潘多拉的盒子被打开，关在里面的民族主义和排外主义幽灵都会被放出来。


Some of these democracies are very young and fragile.	这些民主国家中的有些国家经验不足，而且还不稳固。


The optimism created by their peaceful return to a free and democratic Europe has been shattered to a degree that none of us could have foreseen.	经济危机对由于它们和平回归自由民主的欧洲所建立起来的乐观情绪造成的破坏，已经超出了我们能够预见的程度。


This is where political leadership is needed.	现在正是需要政治领导的时候。


The leaders of the well established European democracies must explain to their own voters that enlargement has greatly benefited them, and that it will also be to their benefit to share the responsibilities and costs of steering the hardest-hit countries through the crisis.	制度稳固的欧洲民主国家的领导人，必须向他们自己的选民说明，欧盟扩大已经使他们受益匪浅，现在，分担带领遭受经济危机最严重打击的国家走出经济危机的责任和费用，也符合他们的利益。


There were always exaggerated claims that bringing in the new members would be a costly affair, just as petty and narrow prejudices blemished the willingness to open up Europe’s borders for “Polish plumbers.”	在欧洲，总是有夸大其词的观点，认为欧盟接受新成员国代价很大，这和自私狭隘的偏见歪曲为“来自中欧的廉价劳工”开放边境的意愿是一样的。


Any sober appraisal of what has actually happened since expansion would put the problems in perspective: when enlargement was agreed, the combined size of the ten new members’ economies roughly equaled that of the Netherlands.	如果对欧盟扩大以来所发生事情进行冷静的评估，我们就能正确地处理当前的问题：在欧洲各国对扩大欧盟达成共识的时候，十个欧盟新成员国的经济总量大约和荷兰的经济总量相当。


Today, after five years of much stronger growth among the newcomers, their combined GNP is somewhat smaller than that of the Benelux countries.	现在，在这些欧盟新成员国的经济比加入欧盟之前更加强劲地增长了五年之后，它们国民生产总值的总和只比比利时、荷兰和卢森堡三国的总量稍小。


Thus, the sheer magnitude of the task of reviving these economies is not overwhelming.	因此，振兴这些欧盟新成员国经济的任务的难度，不是令人无法承受的。


But the political consequences of failure to deliver a message of genuine European solidarity will be.	但是，如果欧盟老的成员国未能传达出真正的欧洲团结的信息，��政治后果却会令欧洲无法承受。


This is, indeed, “the hour of Europe.”	事实上现在是“欧洲时刻”了。


I remember when this phrase was last used: in 1991, when the chairman of the European Council of Ministers visited what was still Yugoslavia and eagerly accepted the empty promises of Slobodan Milosevic and his clique that they were ready to accept European pleas for a peaceful resolution to the conflicts there.	我记得“欧洲时刻”这个说法上一次使用的时间 ：1991年，在欧盟部长理事会主席访问当时的南斯拉夫，并且热切地接受了斯洛博丹·米洛舍维奇及其同僚作出的他们准备接受对该地区冲突的和平解决方案的空洞承诺时，用到了这一说法。


The chairman stated: “This is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans.”	欧盟部长理事会主席宣布：“现在是欧洲的时刻，不是美国人的时刻。


As we all are embarrassingly aware, it was the Americans who had to produce the intervention that finally stopped the bloodshed in the Balkans.	”虽然我们都尴尬地意识到，是美国进行的干预最终结束了巴尔干半岛的流血冲突。


But this time we Europeans cannot expect others to step in.	但是，这一次，我们欧洲人不能再期望他人的介入了。


Turning to the International Monetary Fund or others when it comes to pulling our chestnuts out of the fire will not bring us the needed confidence in the European project.	当我们要将自己的栗子从火中取出来的时候，求助于国际货币基金组织或者其他人，不会为我们带来欧洲一体化中所需的信心。


So this must be the hour of Europe.	所以，现在 必须 是欧洲的时刻。


And that means that a clear message should be sent to those who are becoming doubtful about the EU’s worth: We are in this together.	这意味着，我们必须向那些对欧盟的价值产生怀疑的人传达出明确的信息：我们团结在一起。


We will find common European solutions. Solidarity among members is not just something we talk about when the future looks bright and rosy.	我们会找到共同的欧洲解决办法，欧盟成员的团结不是我们只有在未来看起来光明而美好的时候，才会谈论的。


The EU’s Kosovo Catalyst	欧盟的科索沃催化剂


Kosovo’s declaration of independence has put stability in the Western Balkans back on Europe’s agenda.	科索沃的宣布独立把西巴尔干地区的稳定问题又重新被摆上了欧盟的议事日程。


Unless the European Union acts quickly, the whole region could slide backwards, with dire social, economic, and security consequences.	除欧盟立即展开行动，否则整个地区将发生倒退，并且带来严重的社会、经济和安全后果。


The EU needs a comprehensive regional approach, focusing on the remaining steps that would lead each country towards membership.	欧盟需要在整个地区采取统揽全局的方法，重点关注为使每个国家都朝获得成员国资格的方向努力而在接下来需要采取的步骤。


The Western Balkans − a term used only since 1999 − comprises Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia (FYROM), Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo, with a combined population of roughly 22 million.	西巴尔干地区这个自1999年起开始使用的名词包含了阿尔巴尼亚、波斯尼亚、黑塞哥维那、克罗地亚、马其顿、黑山、塞尔维亚和科索沃，总人口大约为2200万。


Economic developments in the region are promising, with almost all its economies posting high growth, fueled by increasing industrial output and exports.	这个地区的经济发展前景非常好，受工业产值和出口量持续增长的推动，几乎所有经济行业都保持了高速增长。


Inward investment is steadily rising, as business seems to believe that the remaining political and security challenges – the possible negative effects of post-independence Kosovo and Bosnia’s malaise – will be overcome sooner rather than later.	国内投资也在稳步上升，因为企业似乎相信现有的政治和安全挑战也就是科索沃独立后以及波斯尼亚的不安定可能造成的负面影响将很快被克服。


Much work has already been done to re-establish and improve regional relations.	为了重建和改善地区关系已经做了大量的工作。


The EU-led Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe has since 1999 successfully stimulated regional cross-border cooperation, for the first time since the breakdown of Yugoslavia.	欧盟领导的《东南欧稳定公约》自1999年以来成功地促进了地区间的跨国界合作，在南斯拉夫解体后还是第一次有这样的合作。


Energy, transport infrastructure – roads, railways, and waterways – and crime prevention have all benefited.	它们在能源、交通基础设施（公路、铁路和水道）以及预防犯罪方面都展开了良好的合作。


The Stability Pact has now been transferred to local control, re-emerging as the Sarajevo-based Regional Cooperation Council, ready to develop regional and multilateral standards for its members.	《稳定公约》现在已经被转交给地区管理，新的管理部门是总部设于萨拉热窝的地区合作委员会，它将为其成员国制定地区和多边关系标准。


The recently revived Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) is meant to be the main regional engine for trade and business generally, and will adhere both to WTO rules and the parties’ obligations towards the EU.	最近重新恢复的中欧自由贸易协定旨在成为地区总体贸易和商业发展的主要推动力，并且将遵照世界贸易组织的规则和欧盟成员国的义务。


Similarly, the South-East European Cooperation Process is one of the relatively new regional organizations that contribute to candidate and potential candidate countries’ preparations for EU membership, providing the first genuine region-wide policy forum where both EU members and candidates participate.	同样地，东南欧合作进程也是也是相关的新的地区组织之一，它将为准备加入以及潜在将要加入欧盟的国家应做的准备工作提供指导，并且将提供第一个真正的由欧盟成员国和候选加入欧盟的国家参加的覆盖整个地区的政策论坛。


But these bodies must not be seen as substitutes for the far more comprehensive accession process, which only the EU itself can initiate.	但是这些机构绝对不能被视为更全面的入盟进程的替代物，这样的工作只能由欧盟来启动。


And yet, despite the region’s favorable prospects and relatively small size, the Union has been slow in doing so.	然而，尽管这个地区良好的前景和相对较小的规模，欧盟在这方面的反应还是非常缓慢。


Certainly, the pace of candidate countries’ approach to the Union depends on the speed of their reforms.	当然，候选国家加入欧盟的步伐取决于它们改革的速度。


And Europe, with the vital support of the United States, worked hard to stop the carnage of the 1990’s and subsequently to help rebuild the Balkan countries.	而欧洲，在美国的大力支持下，努力地制止了二十世纪九十年代的大屠杀并且随后帮助这些巴尔干国家进行了重建。


But the EU has so far failed to prepare the Western Balkans for accession, in line with its leaders’ promise at their Thessaloniki summit in 2003 to admit the Western Balkan states when they  meet the Union’s standards.	但是欧盟迄今为止并没有为西巴尔干地区国家加入联盟做好准备，尽管它的领导人在2003年的特沙洛尼奇峰会上承诺当这些西巴尔干地区国家达到入盟的标准将把它们吸收进来。


That promise was not a matter of charity; the Balkans would add value to the EU.	那个承诺并不是什么施舍行为； 巴尔干国家可以为欧盟增添价值。


To be sure, the EU’s lengthy internal crisis over the proposed constitution was a major distraction, and damaged the Union’s reputation in the Balkans.	当然我们应该看到，欧盟在拟议的宪法问题上漫长的内部危机严重分散了它的注意力并且破坏了它在巴尔干地区的声誉。


Let us hope that the new Reform Treaty will help to reassure the critics and pave the way for a new – and more robust – phase of integration.	让我们希望新的《改革条约》能够帮助使批评家确信欧盟将进入一个新的并且更积极的一体化阶段，并且条约能够为这一进程铺平道路。


If not, one would have to ask what had happened to the European spirit of the 1970’s and 1980’s, when countries such as Greece, Portugal, and Spain, which had just emerged from dictatorship and civil unrest, were welcomed into the European community of democratic states.	如果不是这样，人们会不得不问二十世纪七十年代和八十年代的欧洲精神到哪里去了。 当时像希腊、葡萄牙和西班牙这些刚刚从独裁统治和内乱中摆脱出来的国家被欢迎加入了欧洲民主国家的大家庭。


Political decisions taken then were far more risky than those at hand in the Balkans, and the Greek and Iberian success stories demonstrate the wisdom of the courageous decisions taken at that time.	当时所做出的政治决策远比在巴尔干地区做出的决策风险更大，而希腊和伊比利亚的成功故事充分表明了当时所做出的勇敢决定的睿智。


What about today?	那么今天又是怎样的情况呢？


The most recent EU members, Bulgaria and Romania, are both in the Balkans  and  both are examples of countries with special needs.	最近加入欧盟的国家保加利亚和罗马尼亚都位于巴尔干地区，并且两国都有着特殊的需求。


While the EU at first took their accession negotiations a bit too casually, it subsequently decided to continue monitoring the two countries even after accession in order to ensure that they develop the effective administrative and judicial systems that are an obligation of membership.	由于欧盟一开始对它的入盟谈判处理得过于草率，它随后决定在两国入盟后继续对它们进行监督，以确保它们能够发展作为成员国应尽义务的有效的行政和司法体系。


The EU must learn from this experience to develop an accession strategy for the Western Balkans, whose development has been delayed by a complex post-conflict transition process.	欧盟在为西巴尔干地区国家制定入��策略时必须从中吸取经验教训。


Their special needs should be taken into account in any new EU approach, giving them hope while mitigating the fallout from Kosovo.	因为复杂的冲突后的过渡进程，这些策略的制定被拖延了。


It is in Europe’s interest as much as it is in the interest of the region to accelerate the integration process.	加快一体化进程既符合欧洲的利益也符合这个地区的利益。


A reinvigorated accession process would contribute to the EU’s consolidation, both territorially and politically, while strengthening its role in its wider neighborhood – the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and around the Black Sea.	一个重新活跃的入盟进程将会有助于欧盟在地区和政治的稳固，同时提高它在周边地区包括地中海、中东和黑海地区的地位。


The EU’s Kyoto Shell Game	欧盟的京都骗局


RIGA – With each passing year, the impending crisis of global warming looms closer and closer.	里加－在过去的每一年，迫近的全球变暖危机步步进逼。


Time is running out for preventative action to be taken.	已经没有时间采取预防性措施了。


The European Union’s “20-20-20” mantra aims to cut greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 20% relative to their level in 1990 and to increase the share of renewable resources to 20% by the year 2020.	欧盟有一个“20-20-20”计划，其目标是：到2020年，与1990年的温室气体(GHG)排放量水平相比，减少20%，同时，增加可再生资源的使用量使其达到20%。


Is it really viable?	这个计划真的可行吗？


The EU seemingly has a long-term record of championing action to prevent climate change.	欧盟表面上长期以来支持阻止气候变化的行动。


In 1994, the EU committed itself to the GHG reductions set forth by the Kyoto Protocol and ratified it in 2002.	在1994年，欧盟承诺按照京都议定书的要求减少温室气体排放量并于2002年批准了该协议。


The EU-15 promised an 8% reduction in GHG emissions by 2010.	欧盟15国承诺到2010年减少8%的温室气体排放量。


Every the industrial nation that has not ratified the Kyoto protocol, first and foremost the United States, has been criticized for being “environmentally irresponsible.”	每一个没有批准京都议定书的工业化国家，特别是美国，都被批评为是“对环境不负责任”的国家。


But in the 15-year period between 1990 and 2005, the EU-15 managed to reduce GHG emissions by only 2%, and it is now obvious that the EU-15 will not fulfill its Kyoto commitment.	但是在1990年到2005年间的15年间，欧盟15国的温室气体排放量仅仅减少了2%，并且现在很明显，欧盟15国将不会履行它们的京都议定书承诺。


Only five of the EU-15 countries are on track to meet their targets.	欧盟15国中只有5个国家在按照既定的计划来达到它们的目标。


The EU-15 could, under the best of circumstances, reduce its emissions by 4.6% by 2010.	在最好的情况下，到2010年，欧盟15国可以减少4. 6%的温室气体排放量。


The failure of the EU-15 to meet its Kyoto target does not come as a big surprise.	欧盟15国没有达到它们的京都议定书目标并不是一个很大的意外。


However, what is surprising is that the EU-15 have managed to market their failure as a success.	但是，令人意外的是欧盟15国把它们的失败努力推销成一个成功。


When the 20-20-20 commitment was adopted in March 2007, the decision was much trumpeted and sold to the public as another success for EU climate change policy.	在2007年三月20-20-20承诺被通过的时候，这个决定被作为欧盟气候变化政策的又一个成功向公众大力宣传和兜售。


Then EU Council President Angela Merkel called it “a breakthrough,” and European Commission President José Manuel Barroso proclaimed it “the most ambitious package ever.”	接着欧盟理事会主席安吉拉·默克尔把它称为一个“突破”，欧洲委员会主席若泽·曼努埃尔·巴罗佐宣布它是“历史上最有雄心的一揽子计划”。


However, when it came to sharing the burden of emissions reduction among EU member states, the European Commission proposed in January 2008 to change the base year from 1990 to 2005.	但是，当要在欧盟成员国之间分担排放量削减份额的时候，欧洲委员会在2008一月份提议将基准年从1990年改为2005年。


This approach – endorsed as a basis for negotiation in the recent EU Council – amounted to allowing some member states not to fulfill their supposedly binding Kyoto burden-sharing targets.	这个方案－在最近的欧盟理事会上被作为谈判的基础通过－总体上允许一些成员国可以不履行它们按理应当履行的京都议定书排放量分担目标。


The reason was simple: The EU-12 – the new members admitted in 2004 – have been outperforming the EU-15.	这样做的原因很简单：欧盟12国－在2004被接纳为新成员的国家－已经比原欧盟15国做得好。


The new members have not agreed to a collective Kyoto goal, but as a group they are projected to reduce emissions relative to 1990 by around 20% by 2010.	新成员国没有就集体的京都议定书目标达成共识，但是作为一个群体，它们计划到2010年，比 1990年削减大约20%的排放量。


Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have, for example, managed to more than halve their 1990 emissions by 2005.	例如，拉脱维亚，立陶宛和爱沙尼亚已经努力在2005使其温室气体排放量和1990年相比，减少了一半。


This can partly be attributed to the collapse of heavily polluting Soviet-style industry.	这部分是因为苏联式的污染严重的工业的瓦解。


But, in changing the base year for absolute emission levels from 1990 to 2005, the Commission also seems to be trying to cover up the EU-15’s failure while pushing excessively large reduction targets onto the EU member states that are already the most environmentally efficient.	但是，在将绝对排放水平基准年从1990年变为2005年的时候，欧洲委员会似乎在急切的向已经是环境效率最高的欧盟成员国推行非常大的消减目标的同时，也在努力掩盖欧盟15国的失败。


By sacrificing the needs of growing economies that have met their goals to those of more established markets, the Commission is rewarding inefficiency and reducing the effectiveness of the European Union’s climate change policy and its common market.	通过向更发达的市场经济体牺牲已经完成它们目标的成长经济体的需要，欧洲委员会正在制造无效率和降低欧盟气候变化政策和其共同市场的效力。 因为欧盟15国占欧盟所有温室气体排放量的80%左右，它们应该在欧盟的气候变化政策中起主导作用。


With the EU-15 comprising around 80% of all EU GHG emissions, these countries should be the ones taking a leading role in EU climate change policy.  It is past time that they step up their efforts.	By 2050 global GHG emissions need to be half of 1990's level to avoid surpassing this. With the failure of the EU-15 to honor its Kyoto commitment and the EU-15 switching to less ambitious emission reduction targets currently this seems out of reach.


Israel’s European Peace?	以色列的欧洲和平？


MADRID – As the dramatic events unfolding across the Middle East capture global attention, the numerous challenges facing Israel are being largely overlooked.	马德里—随着中东的戏剧性事件吸引了全球目光，以色列所面临的诸多挑战纷纷被忽视。


In fact, Israel is confronting one of the most dangerous periods in its existence.	事实上，以色列正处于其建国以来最危险的时期。


Not only do long-standing concerns like the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran remain unresolved; all of Israel’s neighbors are now either beset by or hurtling toward upheaval.	有核伊朗等长期存在的威胁仍然没有解决，而以色列的所有邻国眼下要么陷入了重重包围，要么正在快速走向动荡。


And, though US-brokered peace talks with Palestine have resumed, they are likely to end in failure.	而尽管美国牵线的以巴和谈重新启动，但失败的可能性仍然很大。


But there is one promising development: the European Union, in an uncharacteristic show of backbone, has issued written guidelines prohibiting cooperation with Israeli companies operating in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.	但希望还是有的：欧盟以罕见的决心发布了书面指导原则，禁止与在约旦河西岸和东耶路撒冷经营的以色列公司合作。


This bold move could presage a game-changing role for the EU in bringing about a long-awaited resolution to the Israel-Palestine conflict.	这一果断的动作可能让欧盟成为局面改变者，给巴以冲突带来期待已久的解决方案。


Such an outcome could not arrive soon enough, especially given the unprecedented chaos on Israel’s borders.	这一结果不会很快来临，特别是考虑到以色列边界前所未有的混乱情况。


In Egypt, the tense, polarized environment following the military’s overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi has created the real possibility of civil conflict.	在埃及，军队推翻穆尔西后形成的紧张、极化的环境使内战成为了实实在在的威胁。


Although Israel was initially apprehensive about an Islamist government across its Sinai border, the Muslim Brotherhood’s value – its ability to influence Hamas, the dominant political force in Gaza – quickly became apparent.	尽管以色列一开始担心在西奈半岛边境另一端出现伊斯兰政府，但穆斯林兄弟会的价值——其影响加沙主要政治势力哈马斯的能力——很快凸显无疑。


The nature and posture of the new military-led regime remains to be seen.	新的军政体制的性质和立场还有待观察。


Meanwhile, Syria’s civil war has begun to spill over into Israel’s Golan Heights.	与此同时，叙利亚内战开始溢出至以色列的戈兰高地。


The introduction of chemical weapons and the possibility of Western military intervention threaten to draw Israel directly into the conflict.	化学武器的使用以及西方可能进行军事干预有可能让以色列直接卷入冲突。


The spillover effects of the Syrian crisis have also unsettled Lebanon, exemplified in the recent spate of sectarian violence, and threaten to destabilize Jordan, which is struggling under the burden of more than 500,000 Syrian refugees.	叙利亚危机的溢出效应还影响了黎巴嫩（近期宗派暴力频发就是明证）、威胁了约旦的稳定（50万叙利亚难民令约旦疲于应付）。


It is in this highly uncertain context that US Secretary of State John Kerry sought to restart Israel-Palestine peace negotiations.	正是在这个具有高度不确定性的环境下，美国国务卿克里寻求重启巴以和平谈判。 三种潜在方案被提上了台面：无条件谈判；


Three potential approaches were discussed: talks without preconditions, talks following a settlement freeze, and talks following the release of Palestinian prisoners.	在冻结定居点基础上的谈判； 以及在释放巴勒斯坦囚犯基础上的谈判。


Unexpectedly, a modified version of the third option – whereby 104 Palestinian prisoners will be released in phases over the course of the negotiations – ultimately facilitated the resumption of talks.	出人意料的是，低三种选择的修正版——104名巴勒斯坦囚犯将在谈判的各阶段被释放——最终促成了谈判重启。


Despite its apparent success, however, the bargain dealt a serious blow to the legitimacy of the peace process.	但是，尽管获得了这一显著的成功，讨价还价过程却给和平进程的合法性蒙上了厚厚一层阴影。


The first tranche of 26 prisoners – all of them tried and convicted by Israeli courts for their involvement in the killing of Israelis – were released from custody in July, ahead of the second round of talks.	首批释放的26名囚犯——他们都是以与杀害以色列人有涉的罪名被以色列法庭定罪和判刑的——在7月第二轮谈判开始前恢复了自由。


The problem is that many of their victims were civilians, not military personnel or government officials, causing outrage among the Israeli public.	问题在于，他们的受害者中有很多平民而不是军人或政府官员，这引起了以色列民众的极大愤怒。


Yet the Palestinian Authority demanded their release, Israel’s government obliged, and the US supported the transaction.	但巴勒斯坦权力机构要求将他们释放，以色列政府责成了释放，而美国也支持这笔交易。


By endorsing a false peace-justice tradeoff, instead of insisting on the more politically difficult option of a settlement freeze, or on the removal of preconditions, the US has jettisoned legality from the peace process.	美国支持了错误的和平-正义权衡，没有坚持要求在政治上更加困难的定居点冻结方案或要求无条件谈判，这让和平进程失去了合法性。


Furthermore, this approach undercuts the credibility of the rule of law in Israel.	此外，这一方案损害了以色列法治精神的信誉。


As Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu put it, the agreement “collides with the incomparably important value of justice.”	以色列总理内塔尼亚胡说，这一协议“与无比重要的正义价值发生了碰撞。 ”


That collision is all the more jarring, given that the prisoners are not being released in support of a final agreement; they are merely facilitating the initiation of a negotiation process that appears to lack commitment from either side.	这一碰撞的冲击力巨大，因为释放囚犯并不是为了支持最终协议，而只是为了促使谈判过程的启动，而谈判双方似乎都没有拿出谈成的诚意。


Just days before the second round of talks began, Israel announced plans to proceed with the construction of 1,200 homes in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.	在第二轮谈判开始前几天，以色列宣布了在约旦河西岸和东耶路撒冷建设1200户家庭的计划。


This suggests that, while the prisoner release may lead to a short-term agreement, it is not backed by a genuine effort to develop the kind of trust-based arrangements that are needed for lasting peace.	这表明，尽管释放囚犯可以促成短期协议，但并没有带来旨在形成基于信任的、能带来持续和平的协议的真正努力。


Against this background, the EU’s unexpected stand is notable, not only for its technical features, but also for its practical and symbolic implications.	基于这一背景，欧盟出人意料的立场值得关注，不仅是因为其技术上的特点，也是因为其务实性和象征性。


In all future agreements with the EU or any of its member states, Israel’s government will have to acknowledge explicitly that territories beyond the pre-1967 borders are not part of Israel.	在以色列政府与欧盟或其任意成员国达成的未来协议中，前者都必须明确承认1967年前边界之外的领土都不是以色列的一部分。


While the guidelines simply formalized existing EU policy, they drew immediate criticism, with Netanyahu declaring that they “undermined peace” and “hardened Palestinian positions” during negotiations.	这一指导原则只是将已有的欧盟政策正式化，但它还是立刻引来了批评，内塔尼亚胡说这“破坏了和平”，并在谈判中让“让巴勒斯坦更加被动”。


This strong reaction reflects the profound importance of the EU’s ties with Israel, undercutting the long-held assumption that the US is the only outside actor that can influence Israeli policy.	这一强烈的反应凸显出欧盟与以色列联系的极端重要性，也打破了美国式影响以色列政策的唯一外部行为人的长期观点。


Given the EU’s robust relationship with Israel – underpinned by its role as Israel’s largest trade partner, accounting for roughly 26% of total Israeli exports and 34% of its imports – it can develop powerful incentives that could provide the impetus that the peace process needs to succeed.	由于欧盟与以色列的鲁棒关系——建立在欧盟是以色列最大贸易伙伴的基础上，占以色列总出口的26%，总进口的34%——欧盟可以给与强大的激励，为和平进程提供成功必须的动力。


The easiest option would be conditional liberalization of trade in services within the existing framework of the EU-Israel Association Agreement.	最容易的选择是符合现有欧盟-以色列合作协定框架的有条件的贸易自由化。


But the challenging strategic environment and legacy of failed negotiations call for a more daring approach: The EU should take the initiative in persuading its partners in the European Economic Area to offer Israel membership, conditional on the completion of a peace agreement.	但挑战性的战略环境和谈判失败的阴影要求欧洲采取更大胆的方针：欧盟应该采取行动说服其欧洲经济区伙伴国给予以色列成员地位，但以完成和平协议为条件。


Beyond deepening the EU’s internal market, such a move would serve as a powerful symbol of the value and potential of the EU-Israel relationship, opening the way to further integration in the future.	这一动作除了能深化欧盟的内部市场，也是一个强有力的价值符号和欧盟-以色列关系潜力的象征，打开未来进一步一体化的大门。


Europe has an historic opportunity to help resolve one of the world’s longest-running and seemingly most intractable conflicts.	一个帮助解决世界上为时最久、也最棘手的冲突的历史性机会正摆在欧洲面前。


It is thus simultaneously an opportunity for the EU to assert itself, at long last, as an effective force in world affairs.	这同时也是欧盟证明自己是国际事务长期有力角色的机会。


The EU’s Small Leaders	欧盟的小国领导人


The defeat of the EU’s Constitutional Treaty in referendums in France and the Netherlands has, it seems, given rise to a new consensus that further enlargement of the Union should be slowed down, or even stopped.	欧盟宪法条约在法国和荷兰公投中所遭遇的挫败看来已经引发新的舆论导向，即应该放缓欧盟进一步扩张的脚步，甚至应该停止。


Advocates of this position see EU voters as terrified by the consequences of the May 2004 enlargement of the EU, when eight formerly communist states joined, and angry that they were not consulted about it.	这个观点的鼓吹者认为欧盟选民已经被2004年5月八个前共产主义国家加入欧盟的扩张结果给吓坏了，并对他们未被征求意见而感到愤怒。


One set of fears concerns the labor market – the so-called “Polish plumber” question.	一种恐惧出于对劳力市场的担心——也就是所谓的“波兰水电工”问题。


In this interpretation, wages were eroded and jobs were lost because of the inflow of poorly qualified and cheap central Europeans.	从这个含义来说，由于低质廉价的中欧劳力的涌入，引发了工资水平的下降和工作岗位的缺失。


Particular cases, such as the elimination of German meat processing and packing jobs, or casual workers in France, were widely discussed as evidence of a new threat.	诸如德国肉类加工和包装工作岗位或法国散工的消失等特别案例正被作为新威胁的证据广泛讨论。


But the “Polish plumber” is actually a weak bogeyman.	但是“波兰水电工”事实上丝毫不足畏惧。


First, there had already been a substantial flow of workers before enlargement.	首先，在扩张之前，巨大的工人潮已经存在。


Poles had worked in some agricultural jobs – in sugar beet and wine harvesting – even during the communist era.	波兰人已经在某些农业岗位上工作——种植糖用甜菜和酿造葡萄酒，甚至在他们还是共产主义时代就已经这样了。


With the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, labor flows, both legal and illegal, became much greater.	随着1989年铁幕落下，劳力大潮——无论是合法还是非法的——都变得更为汹涌了。


Second, inflows of new workers bring substantial benefits as well as losses: in France, which suffers a shortage of some 6,000 plumbers, there must be plenty of households that would be pleased to find someone qualified to do repair work.	其次，新工人的涌入带来了与损失同样巨大的好处：在法国这样一个水电工短缺6,000人的地方，一定有许多家庭很高兴找到合格的水电工来做维修的活儿。


Finally, the enlargements of the 1980’s, when Greece and then Spain and Portugal joined the then European Community, were not very disruptive.	最后一点，1980年代希腊、西班牙和葡萄牙先后加入当时的欧共体的这次扩张并非破坏性的。


By themselves, the labor-market implications of poor countries’ accession to the EU simply are not very dislocating. 	贫穷国家加入欧盟后的劳力市场所给出的反应本身并不混乱。


What makes the debate so passionate in 2005 is a new fear that did not exist in the 1980’s: that the new members have a different social model, in which workers’ rights and the welfare state will be eroded.	促使2005年的辩论如此激烈的是一种1980年代所没有的新的恐惧：新成员国拥有一种不同社会模式，在这种模式中工人们的权利和福利国家制度将逐渐受到腐蚀。


It is not so much the Polish plumber as it is the Slovak 19% flat tax that is the challenge to the older West European social model and welfare state.	比起波兰水电工，斯洛伐克19%的单一税率才是对老的西欧国家的社会模式和福利国家制度的真正挑战。


The EU’s large states feel particularly vulnerable, and it is there that the biggest shock to expectations has occurred.	欧盟的大国们已经宛如惊弓之鸟，并且他们的期望已经遭受了最大的打击。


In the past, France and Germany were the motors of European integration.	过去，法国和德国是欧洲一体化的发动机。


Now they are the countries that feel most threatened, and bookshops in both countries are full of alarmist and sensational accounts of national decline.	现在他们是最受威胁的国家，两国的书店中充斥着杞人忧天、耸人听闻的有关国家衰亡的描述。


Germany’s post-1949 Federal Republic was accustomed to being regarded as Europe’s great economic success story, but it never really recovered from the post-unification recession of the early 1990’s, with growth sluggish to non-existent.	1949年后的德国联邦共和国已经习惯被看作欧洲伟大经济的一个成功传奇，但是它却从未真正从1990年代早期东西德统一后的经济衰退中恢复，疲软的经济增长毫无成效。


The consensual society that was at the center of the Federal Republic’s Wirtschaftswunder now looks inflexible, throwing up obstacles to change. 	那个曾经一度是联邦共和国的经济奇迹（Wirtschaftswunder）中心的协议社会现在看来顽固僵硬，抛出种种有阻改革的障碍。


Germany is surrounded by small states that all seem to be prospering more in today’s geo-political and geo-economic environment.	在如今地缘政治和地缘经济的环境下，德国包围在一群日益繁荣的小国中。


These include not only the rapidly growing formerly communist countries to the east, Poland and the Czech Republic, but also Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland, upon which Germans traditionally looked down.	这不仅包括远至东边的迅速发展的前共产主义国家波兰和捷克共和国，还包括了丹麦、荷兰、奥地利、瑞士这些德国向来轻视的国家。


Now, as one mordant and widespread slogan puts it, Austria is “the better Germany.”	而现在，正如一句广泛流传的讽刺性标语所说的那样，奥地利是“更佳的德国”。


Many French writers also express a vivid feeling of national decline, and many ordinary citizens believe that the rules of the global economy work against French national interests.	许多法国作家也对国家衰弱的状况表达了他们真实的感受，许多普通百姓则相信全球经济规则与法国国家利益背道而驰。


In short, the large states still have illusions, encouraged by their political elites, about what the state can do to guide economic development.	简而言之，在大国们的政治精英鼓励下，它们仍对能引导经济发展的措施抱有幻想。


By contrast, the small European states – whether in Eastern or Western Europe – have been much more flexible in responding to the challenges of the modern globalized economy.	与之形成对比的是，欧洲小国——无论是在东欧还是西欧——在应对现代全球化经济的挑战时候更为灵活。