Given banks’ fiduciary obligations to their customers, this is not an entirely bad trait.	鉴于银行对客户负有信托责任，这种特征并不完全错误。


Yet banks and other financial institutions should realize that risk protection is perfectly compatible with service to poor customers.	但银行和其他金融机构应当意识到风险防护能够与为贫困客户提供服务实现完美兼容。


By ignoring poor people’s needs, financial institutions are overlooking a massive potential market.	因为忽视贫困群体的需求，金融机构正在忽视规模巨大的潜在市场。


To reach hundreds of millions of new clients, the world’s financial institutions need only walk a metaphorical mile in the shoes of a poor person. They would then see that no one should be excluded because of inaccurate, outdated, or unfair assumptions.	要想接触到数以亿计的新客户，全球金融机构只需要站在穷人的角度进行某种象征性的思考，而后他们就会发现不应当因为过时、不准确或不公平的假设而剥夺任何人的金融服务。


Today, more people than ever are benefiting from access to modern and responsible financial services.	今天，从负责任的现代金融服务中获益的普通人正越来越多。


No doubt, next year’s World Bank data will indicate even greater gains.	毫无疑问，明年的世行数据将会展现出更丰硕的成果。


But to achieve a world where no one is excluded, the industry must place the needs of poor clients at the center of its business strategies.	但要想创造一个没有人被排斥在外的世界，金融业必须把业务核心转移到关注贫困客户的需求。


Only then will the good news about financial inclusion become great.	只有到那时，关于金融包容性的好消息才会结出丰硕的成果。


Why Financial Markets Underestimate Risk	为何金融市场低估风险


CAMBRIDGE – During most of 2017, the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) has been at the lowest levels of the last decade.	坎布里奇—在2017年的大部分时间里，芝加哥期权交易所波动指数（VIX）一直位于过去十年来的最低水平。


Recently, the VIX dipped below nine, even lower than in March 2007, just before the subprime mortgage crisis nearly blew up the global financial system.	最近，VIX跌破了9，比2007年次贷危机几乎引爆全球金融体系前夕还要低。


Investors, it seems, are once again failing to appreciate just how risky the world is.	看起来，投资者再一次无视世界到底有多危险。


Known colloquially as the “fear index,” the VIX measures financial markets’ sensitivity to uncertainty – that is, the perceived probability of large fluctuations in the stock market’s value – as conveyed by stock index option prices.	VIX又被称为“恐慌指数”，它测量通过股票指数期权价格表现的金融市场对不确定性的敏感程度，即人们认为股市价值发生重大波动的概率。


A low VIX signals a “risk-on” period, when investors “reach for yield,” exchanging US Treasury bills and other safe-haven securities for riskier assets like stocks, corporate bonds, real estate, and carry-trade currencies.	VIX水平较低表示“冒险”期，投资者“寻找收益率”，减仓美国国债和其他安全港证券，加仓股票、公司债券、不动产和套息交易货币等高风险资产。


This is where we are today, despite the variety of actual risks facing the economy.	我们现在就处于VIX极低的水平，尽管经济面临着众多切实的风险。


While each of those risks will probably remain low in a given month, the unusually large number of them implies a reasonably strong chance that at least one will materialize over the next few years.	对于某个给定的月份，这些风险中的每一个都有可能继续保持低位，但保持低位的风险反常地多，这表明有很大的可能至少其中之一会在未来几年中变为现实。


The first major risk is the bursting of a stock-market bubble.	主要风险之一是股市泡沫破裂。


Major stock-market indices hit record highs in September, in the United States and elsewhere, and equity prices are high relative to benchmarks like earnings and dividends.	在美国和其他地区，主要股市指数在9月纷纷创出新高，并且股价与收益和分红等基准的比值也非常高。


Robert Shiller’s cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio is now above 30 – a level previously reached only twice, at the peaks of 1929 and 2000, both of which were followed by stock-market crashes.	罗伯特·希勒（Robert Shiller）的经周期调整的市盈率目前已高于30——此前这种情况只出现过两次，即1929年和2000年股市顶部，随后都发生了股市崩盘。


We also face the risk of a bursting bond-market bubble.	我们还面临着债券市场泡沫破灭的风险。


Former US Federal Reserve Board Chair Alan Greenspan recently suggested that the bond market is even more overvalued (or “irrationally exuberant”) than the stock market.	美联储前主席艾伦·格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）最近表示，债券市场要比股票市场还要高估（或“非理性繁荣”）。


The market is accustomed to falling bond yields: both corporate and government bonds were on a downward trend from 1981 to 2016.	市场已经习惯于债券收益率不断下降：1981年—2016年间，公司和政府债券都表现出下降趋势。


But interest rates can’t go much lower than they are today; in fact, they are expected to rise, particularly in the US, though the European Central Bank and other major central banks also appear to be entering a tightening cycle.	但利率不可能比今天的水平再低多少了； 事实上，预计利率将出现上升，特别是在美国，而欧洲央行和其他主要央行也可能即将进入紧缩周期。


If, say, an increase in inflation generates expectations that the Fed will raise interest rates more aggressively, a stock- or bond-market crash might result.	如果，（比如）通胀升高形成了对美联储更快加息的预期，股票或债券市场崩盘可能随之而来。


Geopolitical risk is also high – indeed, it has rarely been higher than it is today, just as faith in the stabilizing influence of US global leadership has rarely been lower.	地缘政治风险也很高——事实上，历史上地缘政治风险很少有和现在那么高的时候，正如美国全球领导力的稳定作用很少有和现在那么低的时候。


The most acute risk relates to North Korea’s advancing nuclear program, but there are also substantial risks in the Middle East and elsewhere.	最尖锐的风险是朝鲜不断推进其核计划，但在中东和其他地区也存在很大风险。


These risks are being exacerbated by US President Donald Trump, who has made a number of foreign-policy missteps, from mishandling the North Korea crisis to threatening to abrogate the Iran nuclear agreement.	美国总统特朗普放大了这些风险，他在外交政策上犯了许多错误，既没能处理好朝鲜危机，还威胁要废除伊朗核协议。


So far, the consequences of Trump’s wild rhetoric on the domestic front have been limited, because most of it has not been translated into legislation.	目前，特朗普对国内事务大放厥词的后果尚且颇为有限，因为大部分内容都还没有转化为立法。


But on the international front, it could have disastrous implications.	但在国际事务上，后果可能十分严重。


Beyond Trump’s capriciousness is a broader crisis in US politics.	除了特朗普的变幻莫测之外，美国还面临更大的增值危机。


Though showdowns in the US Congress over the debt ceiling did not result in a government shutdown this month, US leaders have only kicked the can down the road to the end of the year, when the stakes could well be higher and the stalemate more intractable.	尽管美国国会就债务上限问题的“决战”没有导致政府在这个月惨遭关门，但美国领导人只是把大限延后到今年年底，到那时，这个问题的后果可能会更加严重，僵局可能更加难以克服。


The US may even face a constitutional crisis, if Special Counsel Robert Mueller were to find, for example, evidence of illegal contact between the Trump campaign and the Russian government.	美国还有可能面临一场宪政危机，如果特别检察官罗伯特·穆勒（Robert Mueller）找到（比如）特朗普选举阵营与俄罗斯政府进行非法联系的证据的话。


The last time the VIX was as low as it is today, in 2006 and early 2007, one could also draw up a lengthy list of potential crises.	VIX上一次跌到今天这么低的水平实在2006年到2007年初期间，当时，你也可以找到一长串潜在风险。


Most obvious, housing prices in the United Kingdom and the US were at record highs relative to benchmarks like rent, raising the risk of a collapse.	最显而易见的是英国和美国房价相对租金等基准的水平达到了历史新高，积累了崩盘风险。


Yet markets acted as if risk was low, driving down the VIX and US Treasury bill rates, and driving up prices of stocks, junk bonds, and emerging-market securities.	但市场表现得好像风险很低一样，让VIX和美国国债利率节节下跌，而股票、垃圾债券和新兴市场证券节节走高。


When the housing market did crash, it was regarded as a surprise.	当住房市场真的崩盘时，人们认为这是一场意外。


The crash lay outside any standard probability distribution that could have been estimated from past data, analysts declared, and was therefore a black swan event, or a case of “Knightian uncertainty,” radical uncertainty, or unknown unknowns.	分析师说，这场危机位于可用过去的数据进行估算的一切正态概率分布之外，因此属于黑天鹅事件，或“奈特式不确定性”（即彻底的不确定性，亦即未知的未知）。


After all, the analysts argued, housing prices had never fallen in nominal terms before.	分析师说，毕竟，住房价格此前从未出现过名义下跌。


But, while nominal housing prices had not fallen in the US in the previous 70 years, they had fallen in Japan in the 1990s and in the US in the 1930s.	但是，尽管美国名义住房价格在此前70年里从未下跌，但20世纪90年代的日本和20世纪30年代的美国曾经出现过这种情况。


This was, therefore, not a case of Knightian uncertainty, but of classical uncertainty, in which the data set generating the probability distribution was unnecessarily limited to a few decades of domestic observations.	因此，这不是奈特式不确定性，而是古典不确定性，即产生概率分布的数据集毫无必要地被限定在近几十年中的国内情况。


In this sense, it is the “black swan” term that fits best – indeed, better than those who use it realize.	从这个角度讲，“黑天鹅”这个描述最为恰当——事实上，要比它的使用者所认识到的更加恰当。


Nineteenth-century British philosophers cited black swans as the quintessential example of a phenomenon whose occurrence could not be inferred from observed data.	十九世纪英国哲学家用黑天鹅作为经典例子，来说明发生与否无法用观察到的数据进行推断的现象。


But that, too, reflected a failure to consider data from enough countries or centuries.	但这也体现出他们没有考虑足够多的国家或世纪。


(The black swan is an Australian species that had been identified by ornithologists in the eighteenth century.)	（黑天鹅是一个澳大利亚物种，在十八世纪被鸟类学家命名。 ）


This type of failure to take a sufficiently broad view turns out to be a key reason why investors periodically underestimate risk.	这类没能采用充分广泛的视野的谬误，成了投资者反复低估风险的关键原因。


The formulas for pricing options, for example, require a statistical estimate of the variance.	比如，期权定价公式需要对方差进行统计估计。


Likewise, the formula for pricing mortgage-backed securities requires a statistical estimate of the frequency distribution of defaults.	类似地，按揭支持证券定价公式需要对违约的频率分布进行统计估计。


Analysts estimate these parameters by plugging in just the last few years of data for the given country.	分析师在估计这些参数时，只使用了给定国家过去几年的数据。


Moreover, in the boom-bust cycle described by Hyman Minsky, a period of low volatility lulls investors into a false sense of security, leading them to become over-leveraged and ultimately producing a crash.	此外，在海曼·明斯基（Hyman Minsky）所描述的枯荣循环中，低波动时期诱使投资者产生错误地安全感，导致他们过度举债，最终引发崩盘。


Perhaps investors will re-evaluate the risks affecting the economy today, and the VIX will adjust.	也许投资者会重新评估目前影响经济的风险，VIX也将做出调整。


But, if history is any guide, this will not happen until the negative shock, whatever it is, actually hits.	但如果说历史有什么借鉴意义的话，那就是，这一幕要等到负面冲击（不论它是什么）真的发生时才会发生。


Fighting the Next Global Financial Crisis	打赢下一次全球金融危机


NEW HAVEN – What do people mean when they criticize generals for “fighting the last war”?	纽黑文—当人们批评将军们“打上一场战争”时，他们是什么意思？


It’s not that generals ever think they will face the same weapon systems and the same battlefields.	并不是将军们会认为他们将在同一片战场上面临同一套武器系统。


They certainly know better.	他们显然知道得更多。


The error, to the extent that the generals make it, must operate at a more subtle level.	就将军们所犯下的错误而言，必然是在更加微妙的层面犯下的。


Generals are sometimes slow to get around to developing plans and ordnance for those new weapon systems and battlefields.	有时候，将军们为这些新武器系统和战场制定计划和装备的动作缓慢。


And, just as important, they sometimes assume that the public psychology and narratives that influence their soldiers' morale are the same as in the last war.	同样重要的是，有时候他们假设大众心理，以及影响对获胜至关重要的士气的叙事，与上一场战争是一样的。


That is also true for regulators whose job is to prevent financial crises.	对于负有预防金融危机责任的监管者来说也是如此。


For the same reasons, they may be slow to change in response to new situations.	出于同样的原因，他们应对新情况可能动作缓慢。


They tend to adapt only gradually to changing public psychology.	他们总是很慢地适应变化的大众心理。


The need for regulation depends on public perceptions of the last crisis, and, as George Akerlof and I argued in Animal Spirits, these perceptions depend heavily on changing popular narratives.	监管需要取决于大众对上一场危机的感知，乔治·阿克洛夫（George Akerlof）和我在《动物精神》（Animal Spirits）中指出，这一感知严重取决于变化的流行叙事。


The latest progress reports from the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in Basel outline definite improvements in stability-enhancing financial regulations in 24 of the world’s largest economies.	巴塞尔金融稳定委员会（FSB）最新进展报告列出了全球24个最大经济体在强化稳定的金融监管方面所做出的切实改进。


Their “Dashboard” tabulates progress in 14 different regulatory areas.	它们的“仪表板”上标明了14个不同监管领域的进展。


For example, the FSB gives high marks for all 24 countries in implementing the Basel III risk-based capital requirements.	比如，FSB给所有24国对基于风险的巴塞尔III要求的实施情况都打了高分。


But the situation is not altogether reassuring.	但情况根本不是那么令人放心。


These risk-based capital requirements may not be high enough, as Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig argued in their influential book The Bankers New Clothes.	这些基于风险的资本要求可能不够高。 安纳特·阿德马迪（Anat Admati）和马丁·赫尔维格（Martin Hellwig）在他们影响甚广的著作《银行家的新衣》（The Bankers New Clothes）中指出了这一点。


And there has been much less progress in a dozen other regulatory areas that the FSB tabulates.	而在FSB追踪的十多项其他监管领域中，进展情况要差得多。


Consider, for example, regulations regarding money market funds, which, according to the FSB, only a few countries have developed since 2008.	比如，以对货币市场基金的监管为例。 据FSB的数据，自2008年以来，只有少数国家制定了这项监管。


Money market funds are an alternative to banks for storing one’s money, offering somewhat higher interest rates, but without the insurance that protects bank deposits in many countries.	货币市场基金常常是人们除银行之外的另一条存钱途径，它们提供较高的利率，但在许多国家不提供类似银行存款的保险。


As with bank deposits, investors can take their money out at any time.	和银行存款一样，投资者可以随时取出。


And, like bank deposits, the funds are potentially subject to a run if a large number of people try to withdraw their money at the same time.	同样，如果同时有许多人要求取回资金，就可能引起货币市场基金挤兑。


On September 16, 2008, a few days after the run on the US bank Washington Mutual began and the day after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy was announced, a major United States money market fund, Reserve Primary Fund, which had invested in Lehman debt, was in serious trouble.	2008年9月16日，即美国华盛顿互助银行（Washington Mutual）挤兑开始后几天、雷曼兄弟（Lehman Brothers）宣布破产后一天，美国的一家主要货币市场基金、投资雷曼债务的Reserve Primary Fund（以下简称RPF）陷入了严重的麻烦。


With assets totaling less than it owed to investors, the fund seemed to be on the verge of a run.	其总资产已不足以覆盖投资者权益，挤兑一触即发。


As panic rose among the public, the federal government, fearing a major run on other money market funds, guaranteed all such funds for one year, starting September 19, 2008.	随着恐慌在大众中间蔓延，联邦政府担心爆发针对其他货币市场基金的大挤兑，宣布从2008年9月19日开始对所有这类基金提供一年担保。


The reason why this run was so alarming as to require unprecedented government support stems from the narratives underlying it.	这一挤兑如此紧急，以至于要求前所未有的政府支持，原因就在于其背后的叙事。


In fact, the Reserve Primary Fund did not lose everything.	事实上，RPF并没有亏掉一切。


It merely “broke the buck,” meaning that it couldn’t pay one dollar for a dollar on the books; but it could still pay $0.97.	它只是“跌破面值”，即对于其账上的一美元无法十足偿付一美元； 但仍能够偿付0.


So why a crisis?	97美元。


After all, bank depositors regularly lose more when unexpected inflation erodes their savings’ real purchasing power (only the nominal value of those deposits is insured).	那么，为什么这是一场危机？ 毕竟，银行储户在意料外通货膨胀侵蚀他们的储蓄的真实购买力（只有存款的名义价值可以获得保险）时常常损失更多。


But the narratives don’t focus on that.	但叙事并不关注这一点。


The loss of real value due to inflation hasn’t been a prominent theme of the public narrative in the US for decades, because sustained price stability has caused people to forget about it.	几十年来，通胀造成的真实价值损失从未成为美国大众叙事的主角，因为持续价格稳定让人们早就忘记了这一茬。


But they hadn’t forgotten about the Great Depression of the 1930s, even though most people alive today weren’t alive then.	但他们没有忘记20世纪30年代的大萧条，即使大多数今天活着的人那时还没有出生。


In 2008, the Great Depression narrative was being recycled everywhere, with all its colorful stories of financial panic and angry crowds forming around closed banks.	2008年，大萧条叙事再次风靡一时，各种关于金融恐慌和围聚在关门银行周围的愤怒人群的生动故事不绝于耳。


Moreover, trusted authorities had seemed to say again and again that such events were historically remote and could not happen again.	此外，受信任的当局似乎再三强调，这类事件已是遥远的过去，不会再现。


In the 2008 angry zeitgeist, the public reaction to a relatively minor event took on stunning proportions.	在2008年的愤怒的时代精神中，大众对相对次要的事件的反应之大令人咋舌。


It took almost six years after the crisis for the US Securities and Exchange Commission to reduce money market funds’ vulnerability, by requiring in 2014 a “floating NAV” (net asset value), which means that prime money market funds no longer promise to pay out a dollar for a dollar’s nominal value.	危机过去后，美国证券和交易委员会花了近六年时间降低货币市场基金的脆弱性，2014年提出了“浮动NAV”（净资产价值）的要求，这意味着主要货币市场基金不再承诺对一美元的名义价值偿付一美元。


They will pay out whatever the depositor’s share in the accounts is.	它们将根据存款人在其账户中的比重偿付。


This does not insure the funds’ investors against losses.	这意味着基金投资人无法得到损失保险。


Yet this plausibly will help prevent runs because it means sudden withdrawals by some won’t damage the accounts of others who did not withdraw.	但这很有可能有助于预防挤兑，因为这意味着一些人的突然提现不会影响尚未提现者的账户。


The international regulatory framework has changed for the better since 2008, but no such changes can anticipate all the kinds of change in narratives that underlie public animal spirits.	2008年以来，国际监管框架有所改善，但这些变化无法预测作为大众动物精神基础的叙事的变化方式。


Regulators could have imposed a floating NAV decades ago; they didn’t because they didn’t foresee a narrative that would make money market funds unstable.	监管者可以在多年前就实施浮动NAV； 它们不这样做是因为它们没有预见到动摇货币市场基金的叙事。


Regulatory authorities could not have been expected to predict the sudden public attention to the newly discovered risk of runs on nonbank financial companies.	你不能预期监管当局预测到大众突然开始关注新发现的非银行金融公司的挤兑风险。


As long as we have an economic system that produces growth by rewarding inspired actors and investors, we will face the risk that adverse talk and stories can suddenly and temporarily overwhelm the inspiration.	只要我们的经济制度通过奖励受激励的行动者和投资者的方式产生增长，我们就面临消极言论和故事可能突然间暂时性地压倒激励。


Regulators must counter the risks implied by structures that are intrinsically destabilizing, as the money market funds were.	监管者必须遏制具有内在破坏稳定性的结构所隐含的风险，货币市场基金便是如此。


But the most urgent regulations will always be time- and context-specific, because narratives change.	但最紧迫的监管永远因时而异、因具体状况而异，因为叙事会发生变化。


And how these narratives resonate with the public may once again reveal chinks in our financial armor.	而这些叙事引起大众怎样的共鸣可能再次在我们的金融盔甲上曝出漏洞。


The Promise of Fiscal Money	财政货币的憧憬


ATHENS – Western capitalism has few sacred cows left.	雅典—西方资本主义已经基本没有什么不易之论了。


It is time to question one of them: the independence of central banks from elected governments.	在这里，我们要质疑硕果仅存的几个神圣理论之一：央行独立于民选政府。


The rationale for entrusting monetary policy fully to central banks is well understood: politicians, overly tempted during the electoral cycle to create more money, pose a threat to economic stability.	将货币政策完全委托给中央银行，这样做的原因早已众所周知：政客在选举周期中有太大的诱惑去创造更多的货币，给经济稳定造成威胁。


While progressives have always protested that central banks can never be truly independent, because their autonomy from elected officials increases their dependence on the financiers they are meant to keep in check, the argument in favor of removing monetary policy from democratic politics has prevailed since the 1970s.	尽管进步派一直反对说，央行永远不可能真正独立，因为它们脱离民选官员的自主权，导致了它们更加依赖它们原本应该去制衡的金融家，但自20世纪70年代以来，支持货币政策与民主政治分离的观点取得了胜利。


Setting aside the political controversy, central bank independence is predicated on an economic axiom: that money and debt (or credit) are strictly separable.	除开政治争论，央行独立性基于一条经济学公理：货币和债务（或信用）是严格可分的。


Debt – for example, a government or corporate bond that is bought and sold for a price that is a function of inflation and default risk – can be traded domestically.	债务——比如某种政府或企业债券，它以某个价格买卖，这个价格又是通货膨胀和违约风险的函数——可以在国内交易。


Money, on the other hand, cannot default and is a means, rather than an object, of exchange (the currency market notwithstanding).	另一方面，货币不能违约，它是交换的手段而不是对象（尽管存在货币市场）。


But this axiom no longer holds.	但这一公理不再成立。


With the rise of financialization, commercial banks have become increasingly reliant on one another for short-term loans, mostly backed by government bonds, to finance their daily operations.	随着金融化的兴盛，商业银行越来越依靠彼此之间的短期贷款为日常经营融资，这些贷款大多有政府债券作支持。


This liquidity acquires familiar properties: used as a means of exchange and as a store of value, it becomes a form of money.	这一流动性具有常见的性质：它被用作交换手段和价值储藏手段，因此也成为一种货币。


And there’s the rub: as banks issue more inter-bank money, the financial system requires more government bonds to back the increase.	问题就在这里：随着银行发行越来越多的银行间货币，金融系统也要求更多的政府证券来支持这种货币的增加。


The growing inter-bank money supply fuels demand for government debt, in a never-ending cycle that generates tides of liquidity over which central banks have little control.	银行间货币供给的增加助长了政府债务需求，这个永无止境的循环产生了央行很难控制的流动性潮汐。


In this brave new financial world, central banks’ independence is becoming meaningless, because the money they create represents a shrinking share of the total money supply.	在这个全新的金融世界里，央行独立性变得没有意义，因为它们创造的货币占总货币供给的比例越来越低。


With the rise of inter-bank money, backed mostly by government debt, fiscal policy has become an essential factor in determining the quantity of actual money lubricating modern capitalism.	随着银行间货币的崛起——大部分靠政府债券支持——财政政策已经成为决定润滑现代资本主义的实际货币数量的关键性因素。


Indeed, the more independent a central bank is, the greater the role of fiscal policy in determining the quantity of money in an economy.	事实上，央行越独立，财政政策对经济中货币数量的决定性就越大。


For example, in the eurozone, Germany’s tight fiscal policy is creating a shortage of bunds (German government bonds), which is limiting both the European Central Bank’s capacity to implement its quantitative easing policy and commercial banks’ ability to produce more inter-bank money.	比如，在欧元区，德国的紧缩财政政策造成了德国国债短缺，这既限制了欧洲央行实施量化宽松政策的能力，也限制了商业银行创造更多银行间货币的能力。


Money and government debt are now so intertwined that the analytical basis for central bank autonomy has disappeared.	如今，货币和政府债务彼此交融，央行自主权的分析基础已经不复存在。


Of course, any attempt to bring treasuries and central banks back under one roof would expose politicians to accusations of trying to get their grubby hands on the levers of monetary policy.	当然，一切将财政部和央行合而为一的尝试都将让政客饱受指责：他们一定是想用自己的脏手染指货币政策。


But another response to the new reality is available: Leave central banks alone, but give governments a greater say in domestic money creation – and, indeed, greater independence from the central bank – by establishing a parallel payments system based on fiscal money or, more precisely, money backed by future taxes.	但对于这一新现实，还有一种可行的反应：通过建立基于财政货币——或者跟准确地说，基于由未来税收支持的货币——的平行支付体系，在保留央行独立性的同时，给予政府更大的国内货币创造权——亦即更大的脱离央行的独立性。


How would fiscal money work?	财政货币如何起作用？


For starters, it would “live” on the tax authority’s digital platform, using the existing tax file numbers of individuals and companies.	首先，它将“活”在税收当局的数字平台上，利用现有的个人和公司税收档案数字。


Anyone with a tax file number (TFN) in some country receives a free account linked to their TFN.	任何拥有某国税收档案号（TFN）者，都获得一个与TFN连接的免费账户。


Individuals and firms will then be able to add credit to their TFN-linked account by transferring money from their normal bank account, in the same way that they do today to pay their taxes.	于是，个人和企业能够通过将钱从常规银行账户，以类同于他们今天缴税的方式，转移到TFN连接账户，增加其信用。


And they will do so well in advance of tax payments because the state guarantees to extinguish in, say, a year €1,080 ($1,289) of the tax owed for every €1,000 transferred today – an effective annual interest rate of 8% payable to those willing to pay their taxes a year early.	他们将会在纳税之前就这样做，因为政府将保证，对于今天转入TFN连接账户的每1,000欧元，都能在一年后享受1,080欧元的抵税——即提前一年缴税者，都能获得应付税款形式的8%的有效年利率。


In practice, once, say, €1,000 has been transferred to one’s TFN-linked account, a personal identification number (the familiar PIN) is issued, which can be used either to transfer the €1,000 credit to someone else’s TFN-linked account or to pay taxes in the future.	在实践中，一旦（比如）1,000欧元转入某人的TFN连接账户，就将产生一个个人身份号（常见的PIN），它可以用于将1,000欧元信用转入另一个人的TFN连接账户，或者用于偿付未来税收。


These time-stamped future tax euros, or fiscal euros, can be held for a year until maturity or be used to make payments to other taxpayers.	这些有时间戳记的未来税收欧元，或财政欧元，可以持有一年至到期，或用于向其他纳税人的偿付。


Smartphone apps and even government-issued cards (doubling as, say, social security ID) will make the transactions easy, fast, and virtually indistinguishable from other transactions involving central bank money.	智能手机应用，甚至政府发行的卡片（数量将比（比如）社会福利ID翻倍），将让这些交易十分容易、快捷，事实上与涉及央行货币的其他交易没有什么两样。


In this closed payments system, as fiscal money approaches maturity, taxpayers not in possession of that vintage will fuel rising demand for it.	在这个封闭的支付体系中，随着财政货币接近到期，不拥有该年份财政货币的纳税人将会推高它的需求。


To ensure the system’s viability, the Treasury would control the total supply of fiscal money, using the effective interest rate to guarantee that the nominal value of the total supply never exceeds a percentage of national income, or of aggregate taxes, agreed by the legislature.	为了确保体系的自生能力，财政部应该控制财政货币的总供给，用有效的汇率保证总供给的名义价值不会超过国民收入或总税收的某个比例，并用立法形式规定下来。


To ensure full transparency, and thus trust, a blockchain algorithm, designed and supervised by an independent national authority, could settle transactions in fiscal money.	为了确保完全透明，从而确保信誉，可以用区块链（blockchain，由一个独立的国家机关设计和监督）算法结算财政货币交易。


The advantages of fiscal money are legion.	财政货币好处多多。


It would provide a source of liquidity for governments, bypassing the bond markets.	它能够为政府提供一个流动性源泉，绕过债券市场。


It would limit the extent to which government borrowing fuels inter-bank money creation, or at least force financiers to tie up some of their inter-bank money in the closed, domestic fiscal money system, thereby minimizing shocks from sudden capital flight.	它可以限制政府借贷助长银行间货币创造的程度，或至少能够迫使银行家的一部分银行间货币锁定在封闭的国内财政货币体系中，从而让突发资本外逃的冲击最小化。


And, by competing with the banks’ payment system, it would reduce the cost of fees customers currently pay.	此外，通过与银行支付体系竞争，它还能降低顾客目前的成本和费用水平。


Indeed, owing to the blockchain technology, fiscal money constitutes a fully transparent, transaction-cost-free, public payment system monitored jointly by every citizen (and non-citizen) who participates in it.	事实上，在区块链技术的支持下，财政货币构成了一个完全透明的、没有交易成本的公共支付体系，每个参与其中的公民（和非公民）一起行使监督作用。


Fiscal money is politically attractive as well.	财政货币在政治上也很有吸引力。


Governments could use any slack in money supply to top up the FTN-linked accounts of families in need, or to pay for public works, making it appealing to progressives.	政府可以将任意数量的货币供给用于补充有需要的家庭的FTN连接账户，或者支付公共建设，让它们能够吸引进步派。


And conservatives should be encouraged by a system that promises significant tax relief for those who help the government create fiscal money, without impinging on the central bank’s role in setting interest rates.	保守派也可以被这一体系所鼓舞，因为该体系可以大大减轻帮助政府创造财政货币者的税收负担，而不会影响到央行制定利率的角色。


The potential transnational advantages of fiscal money are also significant.	财政货币的潜在国际优势也非常巨大。


For example, fiscal money would have helped Greece resist our creditors’ encroachments in 2015, and it was at the heart of my plan for dealing with a predatory bank holiday enforced by the ECB at the end of that June.	比如，财政货币有可能帮助希腊抵御2015年的债权人攻击，它也是当年6月我应对欧洲央行强制推行的掠夺性银行假期（bank holiday）的计划的核心。


Today, it would give Italy, France, and other eurozone members much needed fiscal space, and possibly provide a foundation for a revamped eurozone with interlocking domestic fiscal euros, rather than parallel currencies, playing a stabilizing macroeconomic role.	如今，它可以给予意大利、法国和其他欧元区成员国大量必须的财政空间，并有望为欧元区提供复兴的基础，形成联动的本国财政欧元而不是各自为政的货币，对宏观经济起到稳定作用。


And then, perhaps, it could become the basis for a New Bretton Woods, functioning like an overarching clearing union of many different fiscal money systems.	它还可以成为新布雷顿森林体系的基础，行使一个由许多不同财政货币体系组成的最高清算联盟的功能。


Fixing Fixed-Investment Incentives	解决固定资产投资激励的问题


LONDON – Back in February, I noted that the global economy at the end of 2016 was in a stronger cyclical position than most people had expected, given the political upheavals of the previous 12 months.	伦敦—2月份时，我注意到，考虑到此前12个月的政治剧变， 2016年底全球经济处于比许多人所预料的更强的周期位置。


That upward momentum carried through to the first quarter of 2017.	这一上扬之势贯穿了2017年一季度。


According to the latest “nowcast”-type indicators, world GDP growth is exceeding 4% – perhaps the strongest performance seen since before the 2008 financial crisis.	据最新“临近预报”型指标，世界GDP增长将超过4%——也许是自2008年金融危机前夕以来最强劲的经济表现。


Still, some observers – and not just chronic pessimists – have countered that the evidence remains anecdotal, and that it is impossible to predict how long the current economic moment will last.	但是，一些观察者——而不仅仅是一贯的悲观派——反驳说证据仍然只是偶然的，无法预测当前经济状况会持续多久。


Indeed, there have been other periods in the long post-2008 recovery when growth returned, only to peter out quickly and become sluggish again.	确实，2008年以来的漫长复苏中出现过几次增长反弹，但最后都快速湮灭，回归停滞。


To bolster long-term economic growth, business investment will have to increase.	要提振长期经济增长，商业投资必须增加。


Unfortunately, this is easier said than done.	不幸的是，这说起来容易做起来难。


In Western economies in particular, non-residential fixed investment is precisely the factor that was missing in previous, short-lived cycles of acceleration.	特别是西方经济体，非住宅固定投资正是此前短暂的加速周期中所缺失的因素。


No one can say for sure why non-residential business investment has failed to recover in recent years.	没人能够肯定地说为何非住宅商业投资在近几年来无法复苏。


But I suspect that the slightly pessimistic conventional wisdom on this question is wrong.	但我怀疑，对于这一问题的略显悲观的传统智慧是错误的。


The conventional argument asserts that wary CEOs have come to see long-term risks as “just not worth it.”	传统观点认为，忧心忡忡的CEO们认为长期风险“不值得冒”。


The many uncertainties they face include concerns about excessive regulation, burdensome corporate taxation, high debt levels, erratic policymaking, the political backlash against globalization, and doubts that consumer spending outside (or even within) the United States will last.	他们所面临的诸多不确定性包括担心过度监管、令人不堪重负的公司税、债务水平高企、朝令夕改的政策、对全球化的政治抵制，以及对美国之外（甚至美国国内）消费支出能否持续的怀疑。


A less pessimistic view holds that, after 2008, it became inevitable that the global economy would unhitch itself from the US consumer engine and adjust to the rise of emerging consumer economies, not least China.	比较不悲观的观点认为，2008年后，全球经济难免需要摆脱美国消费引擎，适应新型消费经济体（如中国）的崛起。


When that happens, we can all live happily ever after.	到那时，好日子就要来了。


I tend to side with this less pessimistic crowd.	我倾向于这一比较不悲观的阵营。


As I pointed out in March, China’s economy did surprisingly well in the first quarter of 2017, and that seems to be the case in the second quarter as well.	我在3月份时 指出，中国经济在2017年一季度表现令人惊喜，并且很有可能延续到第二季度。


In fact, China’s latest monthly data show signs of economic acceleration, especially in consumption.	事实上，中国最新月度数据表现出经济加速的信号，特别是消费。


And it was evident in the first-quarter data that Chinese consumers are becoming an increasingly important driver of economic growth.	此外，第一季度数据明显地显示，中国消费者正在成为经济增长越来越重要的推动力。


When confronted with the numbers, pessimists respond by insisting that China’s recent strong economic performance is only temporary – a product of yet more unsustainable stimulus.	面对这样的数字时，悲观者的回应是坚持中国最近的强劲经济表现只是暂时的——是更加不可持续的刺激的产物。


And even if growth does last, they argue, the Chinese authorities will not allow Western businesses – or even Chinese businesses, according to ultra-pessimists – to benefit from it.	而即使增长得到保持，他们指出，中国当局也不会让西方企业——根据极端悲观者的说法，甚至中国企业也不行——从中获益。


But whether or not the pessimists turn out to be right about China, it is odd that business investment remains tepid even during times when the engine of global growth is located elsewhere, such as in the US or Europe (Germany in particular).	但不论悲观者对中国的看法是否正确，商业投资在全球增长引擎坐落在别的国家（如美国和欧洲特别是德国）时仍然不温不火，这一点十分奇怪。


During my time as the head of the British government’s Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, I had to develop a better understanding of the pharmaceutical industry, and I learned that there is something to be said for microeconomic forces – and for basic common sense.	在我担任英国政府抗生素耐药性评估（Review on Antimicrobial Resistance）主管时，我必须对制药业进行更好的理解，我了解到，必须为微观力量——以及常识——说几句话。


Consider the future, which always has been uncertain and always will be.	以未来为例。 未来从来都是不确定的，也永远如此。


And yet the biggest economic busts have happened when businesses were not uncertain enough – when they were sure that the future would be rosy.	但最大规模的经济萧条发生在企业还没有那么不确定时——即它们笃定地认为未来是光明的时。


An overabundance of certainty might explain the 2000-2001 dot-com bubble, and many others.	确定性泛滥可以解释2000—2001年的互联网泡沫和其他许多泡沫。


But if, thanks to the increased availability of so much information (including different viewpoints and opinions), we now know that the future is always uncertain, the behavior of Western businesses (and many in the emerging world) is eminently logical, especially given the current workings of the financial system.	但是，拜信息（包括不同观点和立场）易得性的大大增加所赐，现在我们知道未来永远是不确定的，西方（以及新兴世界的许多）企业的行为完全符合逻辑，特别是考虑到金融系统的当前运行状况。


Why would business leaders invest in an uncertain world, rather than paying dividends to demanding (but generally risk-averse) investors, or buying back some of their companies’ own shares (thereby improving the price/earnings ratio and, better yet, increasing their own remuneration)?	为何企业领导人要在不确定的世界投资，而不是满足要求很高（但总体而言又厌恶风险的）投资者而发放股息，或回购公司自己的股票（从而改善市盈率，如果能因此提高自己的薪水就更好了）呢？


At the end of the day, the CEOs and the most aggressive investors are all happy with this approach.	最终，CEO们和大部分激进投资者都乐于见到这一方法。


Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the company’s employees, past and present, who reap no benefits in their paychecks or pensions (which are actually being eroded by the low yields on government bonds across Western countries).	不幸的是，公司员工并不是这样，不论是过去还是现在，他们的薪水和养老金都没有得到任何好处（养老金事实上还因为西方国家政府债券收益率的普遍下降而受损了）。


It is past time for our elected governments to change the rules of the game.	民选政府改变游戏规则的时间已经过去了。


For starters, that means updating the tax code to make debt issuance far less attractive, especially when the proceeds are being used to buy back shares.	首先，这意味着改变税法，大大减小发债的吸引力，特别是当所筹资金用于回购股票时。


At a minimum, it should be harder to buy back shares than to issue true dividend payments.	在最低程度上，必须让回购股票比进行支付真正的股息更难。


That way, at least all shareholders, not just senior-executive insiders, will benefit.	如此，至少所有股东，而不是仅仅是高管内部人士，都能获益。


Furthermore, those same executives should not be remunerated on the basis of short-term price-to-equity targets.	此外，同样是这群高管，他们的薪酬不应该基于短期市盈率指标。


More investors should be demanding that the incentives change to reflect true measures of long-term performance.	更多投资者应该要求激励有所改变，以反映真正的长期业绩指标。


To its credit, the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund recently spoke out in favor of such changes.	挪威主权财富基金最近发声支持这样的变化，值得赞扬。


Other large institutional investors and policymakers should follow suit, to give the corporate world a nudge.	其他大型机构投资者和决策者也应该跟进，轻轻地推公司界一把。


If we change the incentives, we just might finally see business investment make a comeback.	如果我们改变了激励，就有可能最终看见商业投资复兴。


The Elusive Benefits of Flexible Exchange Rates	难以捉摸的灵活汇率得益


CAMBRIDGE – In 1953, Milton Friedman published an essay called “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates,” arguing that they cushion an economy from internal and external shocks by bringing about just the right price changes required to keep the economy at full employment.	发自剑桥——1953年，米尔顿·弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）发表了一篇名为《实施灵活汇率的理由》的论文，认为这些汇率可以通过带来保持经济充分就业所需的适当价格变动来缓解经济遭受的内部和外部冲击。


But after almost half-a-century of floating exchange rates, the reality is more complicated than that.	然而在实施了近半个世纪的浮动汇率制度后，大家发现现实要比这来得更复杂。


To understand Friedman’s logic, consider a scenario in which productivity in the United States rises.	要理解弗里德曼的逻辑，我们可以设定一个情境：美国的生产率正在上升。


In an efficient system, this should reduce the price of US goods relative to those of the rest of the world, with US exports becoming cheaper than imports.	在一个有效的体制下，这应该会降低美国商品相对于世界其他地区商品的价格，美国的出口比进口更便宜。


As America’s terms of trade (the ratio of export prices to import prices) deteriorate, demand is shifted toward US goods, keeping the economy at full employment.	随着美国的贸易条件（出口价格与进口价格的比率）持续恶化，需求转向美国商品，令经济可以保持充分就业。


If prices are “sticky” (in the producer’s currency), however, a potential hitch emerges.	但如果价格存在“粘性”（用生产者的货币计算），那么潜在的症结就会浮现。


Say the prices of US imports from Japan are sticky in Japanese yen and the prices of US exports to Japan are sticky in dollars.	比如说美国从日本进口的价格对日元是有粘性的，美国对日本的出口价格对美元是有粘性的。


The terms of trade will thus remain unchanged, as long as the exchange rate does as well.	只要汇率不变，贸易条件也就不会改变。


Here is where a floating exchange rate comes in.	这就是浮动汇率现身的地方。


By enabling monetary expansion, and thus causing the US dollar to depreciate, the logic goes, a floating exchange rate allows the prices of US exports to decline relative to its imports.	照逻辑推导下去，通过货币扩张从而令美元贬值，浮动汇率使得美国出口价格相对于其进口价格下降。


The result is the desired deterioration of the producer’s terms of trade and the maintenance of full employment.	其结果是生产者的贸易条件出现了符合期望的恶化，充分就业得以维持。


But this line of reasoning assumes that a country’s terms of trade move in lockstep with its exchange rate.	但这条推理的假设前提是一个国家的贸易条件会与汇率同步。


And that, as history over a quarter-century has shown, does not seem to be the case.	但正如1/4个世纪以来的历史所显示的那样，情况似乎并非如此。


In a recent paper, the International Monetary Fund’s Emine Boz, Princeton’s Mikkel Plagborg-Møller, and I construct bilateral export- and import-price indices for 2,500 country pairs, covering 91% of world trade for the period 1989-2015.	在最近发表的一篇论文中，国际货币基金组织的艾敏·博兹（Emine Boz），普林斯顿大学的米盖尔·普拉博-穆勒（Mikkel Plagborg-Møller）和笔者构建了涵盖1989 ~2015年间全球91%贸易额的2500个国家的双边进出口价格配对指数。


We exclude the prices of commodities (oil, copper, and other such goods that are traded on an exchange), as these prices are not sticky.	我们排除了大宗商品（石油，铜以及其他在交易所交易的商品）的价格，因为它们并不具备粘性。


As it turns out, there is no evidence that the terms of trade and the exchange rate move in tandem.	研究发现没有证据表明贸易条件会和汇率协调一致。


On the contrary, a 1% depreciation in the bilateral exchange rate is associated with only a 0.1% depreciation in the bilateral terms of trade in the year of the depreciation.	相反，就算双边汇率下跌1％，也只与同年的双边贸易条件存在0. 1％的下跌相关性。


The origin of this disconnect – which Camila Casas, Federico Diez, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, and I describe in a 2016 paper – seems to be that, for the vast majority of internationally traded goods, prices are sticky in dollars, not in the producer’s currency, as Friedman’s reasoning required.	卡里拉·卡萨斯（Camila Casas），费德里科·迪亚斯（Federico Diez），皮埃尔-奥利维尔·古里查斯（Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas）和笔者在2016年发表的另一篇论文中描述了这种脱节的根源，情况似乎表明对绝大多数国际贸易商品来说，有粘性的是价格，而不是弗里德曼推理中所要求的生产者货币。


Consider the case of the US and Japan.	以美国和日本为例。


Almost 100% of US exports to Japan are priced in dollars, meaning that they, as in Friedman’s version, are sticky in dollars.	美国对日本的出口几乎100％都是以美元计价的，意味着这些出口就像弗里德曼的版本一样是对美元有粘性的。


But 80% of US imports from Japan are invoiced in dollars, meaning that those prices, too, are sticky in dollars, rather than in Japanese yen.	但是美国从日本进口的货物中有80％是以美元计价的，也就是说这些价格也对美元——而不是日元——有粘性。


As a result, the terms of trade change very little, even if the exchange rate fluctuates.	结果即使汇率上下波动，贸易条件的变化也很小。


This means that, even if the US dollar depreciates, it does not become more expensive for US importers to buy Japanese goods, so there is limited incentive to switch from Japanese to US goods. A weaker dollar thus has limited impact on US imports.	这意味着即使美元贬值，美国进口商采购的日本商品也不会变得更加昂贵，因此从日本商品转向美国商品的动机有限，美元疲软对美国进口的影响也有限。


Likewise, a weaker yen does little to spur Japanese exports to the US, because the dollar price of those exports remains roughly constant.	同理，日元疲软也不会刺激日本对美出口，因为这些出口商品的美元价格大致保持不变。


This phenomenon applies even to trade transactions that do not include the US.	这种现象甚至适用于跟美国无关的其他贸易交易。


As I documented in a 2015 paper, the share of world imports invoiced in US dollars is 4.7 times larger than the share of world imports involving the US.	正如笔者在2015年发表的一篇论文中所记录的那样，以美元计价的全球进口份额是全球进口中涉及美国份额的4.


For world exports, that figure is 3.1.	7倍，在全球出口方面这个数字则为3.


This “dominant currency paradigm” lies at the root of the terms-of-trade disconnect.	1。 而这种“主导货币范式”正是导致贸易条件脱节现象的根源。


In fact, we document that global trade prices and volumes are driven by the dollar exchange rate, rather than the exchange rate between the two trading partners’ currencies.	事实上，我们证明了全球贸易价格和交易量并非由两个贸易伙伴之间的货币汇率决定，而是由美元汇率所驱动。


So fluctuations in the price and quantity of India’s imports from China, for example, depend on the rupee-dollar exchange rate, rather than the rupee-renminbi exchange rate.	因此印度从中国进口商品价格和数量的波动取决于卢比和美元之间的汇率，而不是卢比和人民币之间的汇率。


The strength of the US dollar is thus a key predictor of aggregate trade volume and consumer/producer price inflation worldwide.	因此美元的强弱变化会是预测全球总贸易量以及消费者/生产者价格通胀的一个重要指标。


Friedman was right about one thing: flexible exchange rates do provide valuable monetary-policy independence.	弗里德曼说对了一件事：灵活的汇率确实提供了可贵的货币政策独立性。


But, in a dollar-dominated trade environment, their ability to support full employment is severely limited.	但在一个以美元为主的贸易环境下，这些汇率支撑充分就业的能力则是严重受限的。


From Economic Analysis to Inclusive Growth	从经济分析到包容性增长


WASHINGTON, DC – Most economies are seeking a recipe for inclusive economic growth, whereby high rates of investment, rapid innovation, and strong GDP gains are pursued alongside measures to reduce income inequality.	华盛顿—大部分经济体正在寻找包容性经济增长的秘诀，即在追求高投资率、快速创新和强劲GDP增长的同时降低收入不平等性。


Conservatives insist that growth requires low taxes and incentives such as flexible labor markets to encourage entrepreneurship.	保守派说增长需要低税收和激励（如灵活的劳动力市场）以鼓励企业家精神。


But reducing inequality requires higher levels of government spending and taxation (except when government is pursuing deficit spending to stimulate a depressed economy).	但降低不平等性需要高水平的政府支出和税收（除非政府追求赤字支出以刺激萧条的经济）。


The Scandinavian economic model is often invoked to bridge this gap.	斯堪的纳维亚经济模式经常被用来填补这一缺口。


The Danish “flexicurity” system, in particular, has historically delivered solid economic performance alongside low inequality.	特别是丹麦的“弹性保障”制度在历史上实现了良好的经济表现和较低的不平等性。


Leading economists such as Philippe Aghion have published excellent analyses of how this model could balance growth, equality, and overall satisfaction of citizens elsewhere in the world.	菲利普·阿格希翁（Philippe Aghion）等著名经济学家发表了出色的分析研究这一模式如何在世界其他地区平衡增长、平等性和公民的总体满意度。


These economists argue that labor markets with few restrictions on hiring and firing, low taxes on entrepreneurship, and generous incentives for innovation are compatible with a relatively equal income distribution, high social spending by government, and equalizing social policies such as universal free education.	这些经济学家认为，不对雇用和解雇行为做限制的劳动力市场、对企业家精神课以低税收，以及慷慨的创新激励与相对平等的收入分配、较高的政府社会支出和全民免费教育等平等化社会政策是相容的。


This model has sustained an ongoing debate in Europe, one that is now relevant in the United States, because Donald Trump’s new administration has promised to help globalization’s “losers” while improving innovation and growth.	这一模式在欧洲仍在引起争论，而这个争论如今在美国也变得重要起来，因为特朗普的新政府承诺要帮助全球化的“输家”同时又要改善创新和增长。


But in the US, it is far more difficult, politically, to argue for generous public spending on education, health care, and financial security for retirees, because doing so always raises the specter of high taxes.	但在美国，主张慷慨的教育、医疗和退休者财务保障的公共支出在政治上要困难得多，因为这样会招来高税收的幽灵。


An inclusive growth model would seem to have to square the policy circle.	包容性增长模式必须协调政策周期。


It would have to increase substantially public spending, particularly on education, unemployment benefits and training, and health.	它必须可持续地增加公共支出，特别是教育、失业救济和培训、卫生等方面的支出。


It is useful to look at the numbers from the oft-cited Danish and Swedish examples.	看一看经常被提及的丹麦和瑞典的范例的数字是有裨益的。


Generally speaking, these countries have excellent economic indicators.	总体而言，这些国家的经济指标十分出色。


Although GDP growth is not higher than in the US, most people share a high standard of living, and surveys show that Scandinavians (particularly Danes) are some of the happiest people in the world.	尽管GDP增长不比美国高，但大部分人都拥有较高的生活水平，民调显示斯堪的纳维亚人（特别是丹麦人）是世界上最快乐的人群之一。


But, as the following chart shows, these countries also have some of the highest government spending- and taxation-to-GDP ratios in the OECD.	但是，如下图所示，这些国家的政府支出和税收占GDP之比也是经合组织中最高的。


Hypothetically, if the US adopted Denmark’s universal free education policy, but kept its tax-to-GDP ratio unchanged, its fiscal deficit would exceed 6% of GDP.	假定美国采取丹麦的全民免费教育政策，同时保持其税收-GDP之比不变，那么其财政赤字将超过GDP的6%。


The US has run deficits that high only during World War II and the Great Recession of 2008-2009, when a huge stimulus package was implemented to spur recovery.	美国财政赤字如此高的时候只有二战期间和2008—2009年大衰退期间，后者是因为采取了规模巨大的刺激方案以提振复苏。


So, just providing universal free education in the US would run the country’s deficit up to the highest level ever recorded in normal times.	因此，美国仅仅是提供全民免费教育就将导致赤字水平升高到常态下的最高纪录。


In the context of this comparison, it would seem that the circle cannot be squared without a major macroeconomic shift.	在这一比较和环境中，似乎不发生重大宏观经济变化就无法协调矛盾。


Scandinavian countries are smaller and can more efficiently collect revenues and administer public services.	斯堪的纳维亚国家比较小，能更有效地收税和管理公共服务。


But even if the US approached this efficiency – a difficult feat in such a large and diverse country – social solidarity still would demand high effective taxes, as it does in Denmark and Sweden.	但即使美国也向这一效率靠拢——对美国这样的庞大的多样化国家来说，这是一个艰巨的任务——社会凝聚仍然需要较高的有效税收，一如丹麦和瑞典。


Another crucial component of the Scandinavian model is labor-market flexibility.	斯堪的纳维亚模式的另一个关键要素是劳动力市场灵活性。


On the OECD “Employment Protection Legislation” index, the US scores a 1.2 on a 0-5 scale, where zero indicates full flexibility.	在经合组织的“就业保护立法”指数中，美国获得5分制（0分表示充分灵活）的1. 2分。


Meanwhile, France and Germany come in at 2.8, Italy at 2.9, and Denmark and Sweden at 2.3 and 2.5, respectively.	与此同时，法国和德国的得分为2. 8分，意大利是2.


This shows that, though Scandinavian labor markets are more flexible than elsewhere in continental Europe, the US labor market is far more flexible – and provides less security – than any of them.	5分。 这表明，尽管斯堪的纳维亚国家劳动力市场比其他欧洲大陆国家更加灵活，但美国劳动力市场比所有这些国家都要灵活得多——提供的保障也要少得多。


Such broad static accounting suggests that we should proceed cautiously in applying lessons from the Scandinavian model to large countries like the US.	这一广义静态计分表明，我们在将斯堪的纳维亚模式的经验用于像美国这样的大国时必须慎之又慎。


Then again, to assess a model’s long-term impact on citizens’ welfare, we would need a more dynamic analysis over the course of at least a decade.	再次强调，要评估一种模式对公民福利的长期影响，我们需要更加动态的分析，至少要跨越十年。


Only then could we gauge how strongly investment and innovation would respond to incentives, how much free universal education would cost in the medium term, or how demographic structures would affect different social policies.	惟其如此，我们才能看清投资和创新对激励的反应有多大，免费全民教育的中期成本有多大，人口结构如何影响不同的社会政策。


Economic analysis alone cannot settle the political debate between right and left.	光凭经济分析无法对左右政治之争一锤定音。


What it can do is help to narrow and focus that debate.	经济分析的作用是帮助收窄争论的焦点。


The key is for participants on both sides to be more explicit about the values and objectives they believe that society should pursue, and to quantify their assumptions about how dynamic performance will respond to particular incentives.	关键在于争论双方都更加明确他们认为社会应该追求怎样的价值观和目标，并对他们关于动态表现如何响应特定的激励的假设进行量化。


Only then can a democracy choose effectively between potential paths.	惟其如此，民主国家才能有效地从可能的路径中做出选择。


Good economic analysis can enable “constructive populists” to debate the “post-fact, fanciful populists” who seem to be on the rise, with a realistic alternative discourse – one that is transparent and based on credible expectations of economic policies and outcomes.	好的经济分析能够让“建设性民粹主义者”有能力与大有崛起之势的“事后空想民粹主义者”争论现实的替代方案——一个透明的、基于可信的经济政策和结果的预期的方案。


In other words, economic analysis can facilitate good choices; it cannot make them.	换句话说，经济分析可以协助好选择，但无法做出选择。


Exposing Climate Change Obstruction	撕下气候变化否定者的面具


STANFORD – Twenty-five years after the adoption of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change on May 9, 1992, the world has yet to implement a treaty that effectively addresses global warming.	斯坦福——1992年5月9日通过联合国气候框架公约25年后，世界仍未能落实一项有效解决全球变暖问题的条约。


Now, following President Donald Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the Paris climate agreement, it is time to investigate more deeply the forces driving delay.	现在，随着唐纳德·特朗普总统退出巴黎气候协定，深入调查延误背后推动势力的时机已经成熟。


Throughout the 1990s, the American Petroleum Institute (API) – the largest oil and gas trade association and lobbying group in the US – repeatedly relied on economic models created by two economists, Paul Bernstein and W. David Montgomery, to argue that pro-climate policies would be devastatingly expensive.	贯穿20世纪90年代，美国最大的石油和天然气贸易协会及游说集团美国石油学会（API）一而再再而三地根据由保罗·伯恩斯坦（Paul Bernstein）和大卫·蒙哥马利（W. David Montgomery）这两位经济学家所创造的经济模型，提出推行有利于气候的政策将会极其昂贵。


API successfully lobbied for delaying measures to address climate change solutions, using Bernstein and Montgomery’s projections to claim that job losses and economic costs would outweigh environmental benefits.	美国石油学会利用伯恩斯坦和蒙哥马利的预测声称就业损失和经济成本将超过环境效益，从而成功地延缓了气候变化解决方案的实施。


These arguments were used in 1991, to torpedo the idea of carbon dioxide controls; in 1993, against the Clinton administration’s proposed BTU tax (an energy surcharge that would have taxed sources based on their heat and carbon content); in 1996, against the goals of the UN Conference of Parties in Geneva (COP2); in 1997, against the goals of the UN Conference of Parties in Kyoto (COP3); and in 1998, against the Kyoto Protocol’s implementation.	上述论据在1991年被用来破坏控制二氧化碳理念； 1993年，反对克林顿政府提出的BTU税（即按照热量和碳含量征收的能源附加费）；


The API’s lobbying plan was repetitive.	1996年，反对联合国日内瓦会议目标（COP2）； 1997年，反对联合国京都会议目标（COP3）；


It also worked.	并在1998年，反对京都议定书的落实。 美国石油学会的游说计划不止一次得到了运用，并且也取得了效果。


The oil and gas industry portrayed the reports it commissioned from Bernstein, who once worked at the Hawaiian Electric Company, and Montgomery, a former deputy assistant secretary for policy in the US Department of Energy, as factual, independent, and products of genuine economic debate.	石油天然气行业称其委托曾在夏威夷电气公司供职的伯恩斯坦和曾任美国能源部政策副助理部长的蒙哥马利所写的报告为客观、独立，且是真正经济辩论的产物。


In the run-up to the 1997 meeting in Kyoto, Japan, for example, the oil company Mobil claimed in an advertisement placed in The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times that “the cost of limiting emissions could range from $200 to $580 per ton of carbon,” based on “a study just issued by Charles River Associates.”	比如在日本京都会议1997年召开前，石油公司在华尔街日报和纽约时报刊登的一则广告中称基于一项查尔斯里弗公司（CRA）刚刚发布的研究结果，“限制碳排放的成本可能在每吨碳200美元到580美元之间”。


Mobil didn’t name who wrote the CRA report (Bernstein and Montgomery were the first two authors) or who funded it (API).	美孚公司并未指明谁是这篇CRA报告的作者（伯恩斯坦和蒙哥马利是两位最主要的作者），也没有指明谁为这份报告提供了资金（出资人是美国石油学会）。


Mobil’s message was misleading, but was the analysis that Bernstein and Montgomery authored truly flawed?	美孚公司的信息颇具误导性，但伯恩斯坦和蒙哥马利的分析是否真有缺陷？


Consider this: they ignored the negative costs of climate change, and suggested that clean energy would never be price competitive with fossil fuels, which is simply not true.	想想看：他们忽略了气候变化的负面成本，提出清洁能源在价格方面永远无法和化石燃料竞争，但事实其实并非如此。


They assumed the result that they claimed to show.	他们声称得到的结果其实已经被事先设定。


The oil and gas industry was richly rewarded for abusing the public trust.	石油天然气行业因为践踏公众信任而获得了丰厚的回报。


Americans eventually elected a president, George W. Bush, who bought the industry’s claims and pulled the US out of the Kyoto Protocol.	美国人民最终选出的小布什总统相信了石油行业的谎言，并下令美国退出京都议定书。


Sixteen years later, Trump stood in the White House Rose Garden and announced, with equal sophistry, that the Paris climate agreement would devastate the US economy and cost America some 2.7 million jobs, mostly in the construction industry, by 2025.	六年后，特朗普在白宫玫瑰园用同样的诡辩宣布，巴黎气候协定将破坏美国经济，而且截止2025年将令美国损失约270万个工作岗位，其中多数是建筑业岗位。


That accounting, Trump said last month, was “according to the National Economic Research Associates.”	特朗普上个月透露这种计算方法“来源于国家经济研究学会。 ”


In case you’re wondering, the first two authors of the report Trump cited – just published in March – are Bernstein and Montgomery.	如果你想知道刚刚在3月发表的特朗普所引述报告的前两位作者——他们是伯恩斯坦和蒙哥马利。


This time, they were hired by the American Council for Capital Formation, a Washington, DC-based think tank and lobbying group with a history of commissioning deeply flawed work used to challenge climate policy.	这次，他们的雇主是美国资本形成理事会，这是一家总部设在华盛顿的智囊和游说组织，曾多次委托进行存在严重缺陷的研究工作，目的是挑战气候政策。


Throughout the 1990s, the oil and gas industry and its allies perfected the art of blocking America’s support for key global climate-change initiatives.	整个20世纪90年代，石油天然气行业及其盟友完善了阻止美国支持重大全球气候变化举措的艺术。


The maestros, it appears, are back, and their repertoire hasn’t changed.	大师似乎已经回归，而且他们的主张没有改变。


It never had to.	他们的主张从来未曾改变。


In addition to commissioning studies claiming that climate policies would hurt the US economy, the industry also consistently claimed that efforts to address global warming would be uniquely harmful to the US, would not reduce the risks of climate change, and would prevent poverty alleviation.	除出资进行声称气候政策会损害美国经济的研究活动以外，石油业还一贯宣称应对全球变暖的举措会对美国产生特别的损害，这些举措不会降低风险，而且可能防止缓解贫困。


All three of these additional arguments also appear in Trump’s announcement on the Paris accord.	上述所有三个附加论点也同样出现在特朗普有关巴黎协议的公告当中。


When a tortoise is sitting on a post, you know it didn’t get there by itself.	当乌龟爬到旗杆顶端，你当然知道它不是凭借自己的力量。


The reappearance of the same four arguments developed a quarter-century ago by an industry that benefits from delaying climate policies – arguments used with great success precisely because their origin and true purpose were hidden from the public – looks a lot like the tortoise’s four wiggling feet.	与25年前一模一样的四个论点重新出现，这些论点最早来源于因延缓气候政策而获益的行业——这些论点之所以能够大获成功，恰恰因为他们在公众面前隐藏了自己的来源和真正目的——这与乌龟扭动的四只脚何其相似。


If history rhymes, here’s what we may expect in the months ahead: industry-sponsored economic “studies,” flashy online content, think tank reports, and polished front groups posing as grassroots organizations.	如果历史重演，下面的事件会在今后几个月内发生：行业赞助的经济“研究”、华而不实的在线内容、智囊报告、以及经过粉饰的合法组织假扮基层机构。


These are time-tested components of the strategy used by the fossil fuel industry and others to block, obstruct, and control climate policy.	这些是经过时间检验的石油及其他行业战略，用于阻止、阻挠和控制气候政策。


We must not let the industry continue to obstruct climate policy.	我们决不能容许业界继续阻挠气候政策。


That means following the money that funds the pseudo-science of delay, and exposing the co-opted scholars who feed false images of debate to the public.	这意味着追踪支持拖延改革的伪科学的资金，并且揭露向公众兜售虚假辩论结果的相互勾结的学者。


The same arguments – and people – used by the fossil fuel industry to block climate policies decades ago are back.	数十年前被化石燃料行业利用来阻止气候政策的同样的观点和人又回来了。


For the sake of humanity, we must not let them succeed again.	为了人类的利益，我们决不能让他们再次得逞。


Climate Leadership Means Ending Fossil-Fuel Production	气候领导力意味着结束生产化石燃料


VANCOUVER/BERLIN – The end of the fossil-fuel era is on the horizon.	温哥华/柏林—化石燃料生产的重点已经可以望见。


With renewables like solar and wind consistently outperforming expectations, growth in electric vehicles far exceeding projections, and governments worldwide acknowledging the urgency of tackling climate change, the writing is on the wall.	随着风能和太阳能等新能源表现屡屡超出人们的期望，电动汽车增长远超预测，全世界政府认识到应对气候变化的紧迫性，化石燃料生产的终结已是板上钉钉。


And yet somehow, the question central to it all is not being seriously addressed: what is the plan for weaning ourselves off oil, coal, and gas?	但从某种程度上说，最为核心的问题并没有得到严肃的回答：我们有哪些告别石油、煤炭和天然气的计划？


That question is becoming increasingly urgent, because governments around the world, from Argentina to Canada to Norway, are supporting plans to continue producing fossil fuels and explore for more.	这个问题变得越来越紧迫，因为从阿根廷到印度再到挪威，全世界政府都在支持继续生产化石燃料、勘探更多化石燃料的计划。


These governments claim that new fossil-fuel projects are consistent with their commitments under the Paris climate agreement, despite the fact that burning even the fossil fuels in already-existing reserves would push global temperatures higher than 2°C above pre-industrial levels – and thus far beyond the threshold established in that accord.	这些政府现成新的化石燃料工程与它们根据巴黎协定所做出的承诺并不冲突，但事实是，即便是燃烧现有储量的化石燃料，也足以让全球气温升高到前工业化水平以上2℃以上——从而远超巴黎协定所自定的阈值。


It is a startling display of cognitive dissonance.	这充分体现了认知冲突。


The reality is that limiting fossil-fuel production today is essential to avoid continued entrenchment of energy infrastructure and political dynamics that will make shifting away from fossil fuels later more difficult and expensive.	现实是，从现在开始今天限制化石燃料生产，对于避免让日后退出化石燃料的转型变得更困难、代价更高昂的能源基础设施和政治动态的永久化至关重要。


Important questions about equity will arise: Who gets to sell the last barrel of oil?	这就引出了关于股权的重要问题：由谁来出售最后一桶石油？


Who pays for the transition to renewables?	谁来为向可再生能源的转型买单？


And who compensates affected communities and workers?	谁来补偿受影响的社区和工人？


But, ultimately, these questions must be addressed, within a broader context of climate justice.	但说到底，这些问题都必须解决，在气候正义的大环境中解决。


Climate change has been called the moral challenge of our age.	气候变化被称为现时代的道德挑战。


This year alone, the world has faced unprecedented floods, hurricanes, wildfires, and droughts on virtually every continent.	光是在今年，全世界就遭遇到前所未见的洪水、飓风、山火和旱灾，几乎没有一个大洲可以幸免。


Yet the real storm is yet to come.	但真正的风暴还没有到来。


If we are to avoid its most devastating impacts, phasing out coal – climate killer number one – will not be enough.	如果我们想避免其最恶劣的影响，仅仅告别头号气候杀手——煤炭是不够的。


A safe climate future requires ending the age of Big Oil.	安全的气候未来还需要终结大石油（Big Oil）时代。


The good news is that social change is not a gradual, linear process.	好消息是社会变迁不是一个渐进的线性过程。


Rather, it often happens in waves, characterized by “tipping point” moments brought on by the confluence of technological progress, financial incentives, political leadership, policy change, and, most important, social mobilization.	相反，它常常呈现出波浪式运动，技术进步、金融激励、政治领导、政策变化，以及——最重要的——社会动员所形成的合力，总是会给这些运动带来“引爆点”。


We seem to be closing in on just such a moment.	如今，我们正在接近这样一个时刻。


For starters, technology is advancing faster than anyone thought possible.	首先，技术进步比任何人所想象的更快。


Twenty years ago, when we started working on climate issues, we sent faxes, made phone calls from landlines, and developed photos taken on 35mm film in darkrooms.	二十年前，当我们刚开始致力于气候问题时，我们的工作方式是发送传真、打固定电话、在暗室中冲洗35毫米胶卷拍摄的照片。


Another 20 years from now, we will be living in a world that is powered by the sun, the waves, and the wind.	再过二十年，我们将生活在一个由太阳、潮汐和风来提供电能的世界。


Moreover, popular opposition to fossil-fuel development is mounting, generating political pressure and financial and legal risks.	此外，反对化石燃料发展的民意十分旺盛，这带来了政治压力和金融和法律风险。


Ordinary people everywhere have been working hard to halt projects inconsistent with a climate-safe future, whether by protesting against the Dakota Access Pipeline in the United States or the Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain Pipeline System in Canada; by joining the blockade by “kayactivists” of drilling rigs in the Arctic; or by using local referenda to stop oil and mining projects in Colombia.	全世界普通老百姓都在努力阻止与气候安全的未来不相容的工程，比如举行游行反对美国达科塔输油管道（Dakota Access Pipeline）和英国金德尔摩根穿山管道系统（Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain Pipeline System）； 加入阻止北冰洋钻井活动的“爱斯基摩独木舟运动”（kayactivists）；


Recently, over 450 organizations from more than 70 countries signed the Lofoten Declaration, which explicitly calls for the managed decline of the fossil-fuel sector.	最近，来自70多个国家的450多家组织签署了《罗佛敦宣言》（Lofoten Declaration），宣言明确呼吁有序退出化石燃料行业。 宣言要求有能力者承担起领导责任；


The declaration demands leadership from those who can afford it, a just transition for those affected, and support for countries that face the most significant challenges.	实现受影响群体的公平转型； 以及为面临最艰巨挑战的国家提供支持。


Wealthy countries should lead the way.	富裕国家应该起到领导作用。


Norway, for example, is not just one of the world’s richest countries; it is also the seventh-largest exporter of carbon dioxide emissions, and it continues to permit exploration and development of new oil and gas fields.	比如，挪威不但是全世界最富裕的国家之一； 也是第七大二氧化碳排放输出国，它仍在允许勘探和开发新的石油和天然气田。


Proposed and prospective new projects could increase the amount of emissions Norway enables by 150%.	讨论中和即将开工的新项目可能让挪威所引发的排放提高150%。


If Norway is to fulfill its proclaimed role as a leader in international climate discussions, its government must work actively to reduce production, while supporting affected workers and communities during the transition.	如果挪威想要兑现其所自称的全球气候讨论领导者的角色，挪威政府就必须积极行动起来降低产量，同时支持转型期间受影响的工人和社区。


Canada, another wealthy country that considers itself a climate leader yet continues to pursue new oil and gas projects, should do the same.	另一个自视为气候领导者，但仍在继续开发新石油和天然气项目的富裕国家加拿大，也应该如此。


Some countries are already moving in the right direction.	一些国家已经开始朝正确的方向前进。


French President Emmanuel Macron has introduced a bill to phase out all oil and gas exploration and production in France and its overseas territories by 2040; the Scottish government has banned fracking altogether; and Costa Rica now produces the vast majority of its electricity without oil.	法国总统马克龙引入了一项法案，将在2040年全面禁止法国及其海外领地进行石油和天然勘探； 苏格兰政府全面禁止了液压致裂法；


But the real work is yet to come, with countries not only canceling plans for new fossil-fuel infrastructure, but also winding down existing systems.	哥斯达黎加现在绝大部分电力已不再依靠石油发出。 但真正的工作还没有到来，即各国不但要取消新的化石燃料基础设施计划，还要退出已有体系。


A fossil-free economy can happen by design or by default.	摆脱化石燃料的经济可以通过设计实现，也可以自然形成。


If we build it purposefully, we can address issues of equity and human rights, ensuring that the transition is fair and smooth, and that new energy infrastructure is ecologically sound and democratically controlled.	通过有目的的建设，我们可以解决股权和人权问题，确保转型的公平性和平稳性，以及能源基础设施具备生态可靠性和民主控制。


If we allow it simply to happen on its own, many jurisdictions will be stuck with pipelines to nowhere, half-built mega-mines, and stranded assets that weaken the economy and contribute to political polarization and social unrest.	如果我们完全放任情况自发发展，许多地区将充斥毫无用处的管道、烂尾的巨型矿井和削弱经济、导致政治极化和社会动荡的资产搁置。


There is only one sensible option.	明智的选项只有一个。


Citizens around the world are championing a vision of a better future – a future in which communities, not corporations, manage their natural resources and ecosystems as commons, and people consume less, create less toxic plastic waste, and enjoy a generally healthier environment.	全世界公民正在领衔奔向更好的未来的愿景——在这个未来中，社区而非公司负责管理作为公地（commons）的自然资源和生态系统，人民消费得更少，制造的有毒塑料垃圾也更少，享受一个总体更加健康的环境。


It is up to our political leaders to deliver that vision.	实现这一愿景要依靠我们的未来领袖。


They should be working actively to engineer a just and smart shift to a future free of fossil fuels, not making that future harder and more expensive to achieve.	他们必须积极致力于推动公正、智能地向未来无化石燃料社会的转变，而不是让这个未来变得更加难以实现、代价更加高昂。


(The authors wish to thank Hannah McKinnon of Oil Change International for her help with this commentary.)	（作者要感谢国际石油变化组织（Oil Change International）的汉娜·麦金农（Hannah McKinnon）对本评论的帮助。 ）


Shaping the Fourth Industrial Revolution	塑造第四次工业革命


GENEVA – Of the myriad challenges the world faces today, perhaps the most overwhelming is how to shape the Fourth Industrial Revolution that began at the turn of the century.	日内瓦—在当今世界所面临的诸多挑战中，也许最艰巨的要数如何塑造始于世纪之交的第四次工业革命。


New technologies and approaches are merging the physical, digital, and biological worlds in ways that will fundamentally transform humankind.	新科技和方法正在以从根本上改变人类的方式融合物理、数字和生物世界。


The extent to which that transformation is positive will depend on how we navigate the risks and opportunities that arise along the way.	这一改变能带来多大程度的积极效应取决于我们如何处理在此过程中所出现的风险和机会。


The Fourth Industrial Revolution builds on the Third Industrial Revolution, also known as the Digital Revolution, which entailed the proliferation of computers and the automation of record keeping; but the new wave of transformation differs from its predecessors in a few key ways.	第四次工业革命建立在第三次工业革命即数字革命的基础上。 数字革命包括计算机的普及和记录存储的自动化；


First, innovations can be developed and diffused faster than ever.	但新一轮变化潮在一些关键方面不同于前几次。


Second, falling marginal production costs and the rise of platforms that aggregate and concentrate activity in multiple sectors augment returns to scale.	首先，创新的发展和传播比以往任何时候都要快。 其次，边际生产成本的下降和汇聚和集中各行业活动的平台的崛起增加了规模报酬。


Third, this global revolution will affect – and be shaped by – all countries, and have a systems-level impact in many areas.	第三，这场全球革命将影响所有国家并有所有国家塑造，在多个领域形成系统层次的影响。


The Fourth Industrial Revolution has the potential to empower individuals and communities, as it creates new opportunities for economic, social, and personal development.	第四次工业革命可能让个体和社区获得强大的力量，因为它开创了经济、社会和个人发展的新机会。


But it also could lead to the marginalization of some groups, exacerbate inequality, create new security risks, and undermine human relationships.	但它也可能导致一些群体的边缘化，加剧不平等性，制造新的安全风险以及破坏人际关系。


If we are to seize the opportunities, and avoid the pitfalls, of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, we must consider carefully the questions that it raises.	想要抓住第四次工业革命的机会并避免陷阱，我们必须仔细思考它所带来的问题。


We must rethink our ideas about economic and social development, value creation, privacy and ownership, and even individual identity.	我们必须反思我们的经济和社会发展观念、价值创造观念、隐私和所有权观念甚至个体身份观念。


We must address, individually and collectively, moral and ethical issues raised by cutting-edge research in artificial intelligence and biotechnology, which will enable significant life extension, designer babies, and memory extraction.	我们必须从个体和集体角度解决人工智能和生物技术等方面的尖端研究所带来的道德和伦理问题。 新科技将大大延长寿命，实现定制婴儿和记忆提取。


And we must adapt to new approaches to meeting people and nurturing relationships.	我们还必须采取新方法来会面和培养关系。


The scale of the challenge should not be underestimated.	切不可低估挑战规模。


The Fourth Industrial Revolution could lead to forms of human augmentation that cause us to question the very nature of human existence – and even sooner than one might imagine.	第四次工业革命产生的人类智能增进形式可能会让我们质疑人类存在的性质——并且这一天很快就会到来，比你想象的都要早。


Consider the impact that mobile technology has already made on our lives and relationships.	想象一下移动技术给我们的生活和关系所造成的影响。


As the novelty of wearable tech gives way to necessity – and, later, as wearable tech becomes embedded tech – will we be deprived of the chance to pause, reflect, and engage in meaningful, substantive conversations?	随着可穿戴技术从新奇的概念变成了必需品——然后，可穿戴技术将变成植入技术——我们会被剥夺暂停、思考和参与有意义、有内涵的对话的机会吗？


How will our inner lives and ties to those around us change?	我们的内心以及我们与周边人群的关系会怎样变化？


These are weighty questions, about which debate will probably intensify in the coming years.	这些都是很重要的问题，关于它们的争论在未来几年可能愈演愈烈。


Of course, technology is not an exogenous force over which humans have no control.	当然，科技并非人类毫无控制能力的外生力量。


We are not constrained by a binary choice between acceptance and rejection.	我们并不只有接受和拒绝这一二元选择。


Rather, the decisions we make every day as citizens, consumers, and investors guide technological progress.	相反，我们作为公民、消费者和投资者的日常决定指引着科技进步。


The more we think about those decisions, the more we examine ourselves and the social models on which we depend, the better our chances are of shaping the revolution in a way that advances our common objectives and upholds our values.	我们对这些决定思考越多，自省和考察我们所依赖的社会模式越多，我们将这场革命塑造为推动共同目标、捍卫共同价值的革命的机会就越大。


In this effort, new forms of collaboration and governance, accompanied by a positive shared narrative, will be essential.	在此过程中，新型合作和治理，以及积极的共同叙事（shared narrative）是至关重要的。


To this end, three key steps are needed.	在这方面，我们需要采取三项关键措施。


First, we must continue to raise awareness and understanding of the issues at stake.	首先，我们必须继续提升我们对重要问题的认识和理解。


Decision-making cannot occur in isolation.	决策无法孤立地做出。


We need an inclusive approach that brings together top minds from all over the world, from both the public and private sectors.	我们需要包容性方法，集中来自公共和私人部门的全球最顶尖的智慧。


Second, we must develop comprehensive, constructive narratives about how the Fourth Industrial Revolution should develop.	第二，我们必须制定一套关于第四次工业革命如何发展的全面的建设性叙事。


For example, we should ensure that values and ethics are at the heart of our individual and collective behaviors, including in capital and financial markets.	比如，我们应该确保价值和伦理作为我们个体和集体行为的核心，包括资本和金融市场行为。


We must move beyond tolerance and respect to genuine care and compassion, with empowerment and inclusiveness becoming guiding principles of our actions.	我们必须超越宽容和尊重，达到真诚的关心和怜悯，将赋权和包容作为行动的指导原则。


Third, we must move to restructure our economic, social, and political systems.	第三，我们必须重组我们的经济、社会和政治制度。


It is clear that our current governance structures and dominant models of wealth creation are not equipped to meet current or, more important, future needs.	显然，当前的治理结构和财富创造的主要模式并不符合当前以及更重要的未来需要。


What is needed now is not small-scale adjustments or marginal reforms, but comprehensive and innovative systemic transformation.	现在所需要的不是小规模调整和边缘改革，而是全面创新的系统性变化。


How the Fourth Industrial Revolution progresses will come down to people, culture, and values.	第四次工业革命如何进步将取决于人、文化和价值。


New technologies, however remarkable they might seem, are fundamentally just tools made by people for people.	新科技不管看上去多么引人注目，其本质都只是人做出来为人服务的工具。


We must keep this in mind, and ensure that innovation and technology continue to put people first, propelling us toward sustainable and inclusive development.	我们必须时刻牢记这一点，并确保创新和科技继续以人为本，帮助我们迈向可持续和包容发展。


Once we get there, we can go even further.	如果我们实现了这一点，就可以更进一步。


I firmly believe that the new technology age, if shaped in a responsive and responsible way, could catalyze a new cultural renaissance that will create the sense that we are part of something much larger than ourselves – a true global civilization.	我坚信，只要以敏感和负责的方式塑造新科技时代，它就能够刺激一场新的文化复兴，让我们感到我们是比我们自身大得多的东西——真正的全球文明的一部分。


The Fourth Industrial Revolution can compromise humanity’s traditional sources of meaning – work, community, family, and identity – or it can lift humanity into a new collective and moral consciousness based on a sense of shared destiny.	第四次工业革命可以妥协于人性传统的意义源泉——工作、社会、家庭和身份——也可以将人性升华为新的基于共同身份感的集体和道德意识。


The choice is ours.	选择取决于我们。


The Coming French Revolution	即将来临的法国革命


PARIS – In a few weeks, France will elect its next president.	巴黎——接下来的几周，法国将会选出下一任总统。


Given the French executive’s considerable powers, including the authority to dissolve the National Assembly, the presidential election, held every five years, is France’s most important.	鉴于法国行政当局握有相当大的权力，包括解散国民议会，因此每五年举行一次的总统大选是法国最重要的活动。


But the stakes are higher than ever this time.	但这次选举的赌注高于以往任何时候。


The two frontrunners are the far-right National Front’s Marine Le Pen and Emmanuel Macron, who served as economy minister under Socialist President François Hollande, but is running as an independent.	极右翼国民阵线的马琳·勒庞和伊曼纽尔·马克龙是两位领跑者，马克龙曾任社会党总统弗朗索瓦·奥朗德的经济部长，但此次参选却是以独立候选人的身份。


If, as expected, Le Pen and Macron face off in the election’s second round on May 7, it will be a political watershed for France: the first time in 60 years that the main parties of the left and the right are not represented in the second round.	如果勒庞和马克龙如人们所料在5月7日举行的第二轮选举中脱颖而出，这将成为法国历史上的一道政治分水岭：六十年来首次没有左翼和右翼主流党派的代表进入到总统选举的第二轮。


France has not endured such political turmoil since 1958, when, in the midst of the Algerian War, General Charles de Gaulle came to power and crafted the Constitution of the Fifth Republic.	1958年阿尔及利亚战争期间，戴高乐将军上台并制定第五共和国宪法，自那以后，法国还从未出现过这样的政治困境。


That shift, like any great political rupture, was driven by a combination of deep underlying dynamics and the particular circumstances of the moment.	那次转变像任何一次伟大的政治决裂一样，都是由背后深层次动力和当时的特殊情况所共同驱动。


Today is no different.	今天也没有什么不同。


First, the underlying dynamic: the rise, as in most developed countries nowadays, of popular mistrust of elites, feelings of disempowerment, fear of economic globalization and immigration, and anxiety over downward social mobility and growing inequality.	首先，根本的驱动力量：像当今绝大多数发达国家一样，人们对精英阶层越来越不信任、感觉权利被剥夺、害怕经济全球化和移民，以及担忧社会阶层向下流动和日益严重的不平等。


These sentiments – together with the French state’s historical role in fostering national identity and economic growth – have contributed to a surge in support for the National Front.	这些情绪——加之法国政府在促进民族认同和经济发展方面的历史作用——已经导致对国民阵线的支持率激增。


Le Pen’s nationalist, xenophobic message and populist economic policies resemble those of the far-left candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon.	勒庞仇外的民族主义立场和民粹主义经济政策类似于极左翼候选人让·吕克·梅朗雄。


Although support for the National Front has been growing for more than a decade, the party has so far been kept out of power by France’s two-round electoral system, which enables voters to unite against it in the second round.	尽管十多年来国民阵线的支持率一直在上升，但由于法国独特的两轮选举制度，该党迄今为止一直未能染指总统，因为两轮选举制使得选民能够在第二轮团结起来击败极右翼势力的进攻。


And, given the National Front’s inability to make alliances, power has remained in the hands of the main parties of the left and the right, even as France has moved toward a tripartite political system.	而且，因为国民阵线无法组成联盟，所以即便法国已经过渡到三足鼎立的政治制度，但权力仍然掌握在左翼和右翼主流政党的手中。


Now, Macron is taking advantage of current circumstances to blow up the tripartite system.	现在，马克龙正在利用现状来彻底破坏三足鼎立的系统。


Macron’s great insight, which few initially recognized, was that the right-left divide was blocking progress, and that the presidential election amounted to a golden opportunity to move beyond it, without the help of an organized political movement.	马克龙的杰出政见最初几乎没有人注意到，他认为右翼和左翼之间的分歧阻碍了进步的产生，而且总统选举是一次在没有有组织政治运动支持的情况下超越左右翼分歧的黄金机会。


At a time when the French people are increasingly rejecting the traditional party system, Macron’s initial weakness quickly became his strength.	值此法国民众越来越抗拒传统党派制度的时候，马克龙最初的弱点迅速转化为他的优势。


It helped that, as Macron himself recognized, both the right and the left have fragmented in recent years.	就像马克龙本人所认识到的那样，近年来，右翼和左翼都趋向分裂为他的崛起提供了帮助。


This is particularly true on the left, where a clear division has emerged between a reformist current, led by former Prime Minister Manuel Valls, and traditionalists, represented by the Socialist Party candidate, Benoît Hamon.	对于左翼势力而言尤其如此，因为前总理曼努埃尔·瓦尔斯率领的潮流改革派和社会党候选人贝诺瓦·阿蒙所代表的传统主义者之间出现了显著的分歧。


The Socialists’ problems are compounded by the existence of a radical left working actively to eliminate them, much as Spain’s left-wing Podemos party has sought to replace the Socialist Workers’ Party there.	极左翼政治力量积极消灭社会主义者导致社会党的问题更加复杂，这与西班牙左翼“我们可以”党一直试图取代那里的社会工人党非常相似。


The source of the mainstream right’s travails is less clear.	主流右翼所面临的问题来源并不那么清晰。


Its forces remain generally united on economic and social issues.	他们在经济和社会问题上仍基本保持团结。


In fact, until a few months ago, its presidential candidate, the Republicans’ François Fillon, was expected to lead the pack in the first round by a wide margin.	事实上，几个月前，人们还普遍预期主流右翼总统候选人共和党人弗朗索瓦·菲永能够在首轮选举中以较大优势领先其他候选人。


But a scandal over his personal conduct (he allegedly paid his wife and children for non-existent jobs while he was a member of parliament) damaged his candidacy – probably fatally.	但一则他个人行为所引发的丑闻（据称他曾在担任议员期间因为根本不存在的工作而向自己的妻子和儿女支付薪水）损害了他的候选人资格——这对他造成的打击很可能非常致命。


Whatever the reason for the right’s decline, Macron has benefited substantially from it, as well as from the rifts afflicting the left.	无论右翼的衰落是出于何种原因，马克龙都从中大幅受益，同样令马克龙受益的还有困扰左翼的裂痕问题。


Now, there is a real chance the young independent could be elected president on May 7, upending the Fifth Republic’s political system.	现在，这位年轻的独立候选人真的可能在5月7日举行的总统选举中当选，并因此彻底破坏第五共和国的政治制度。


But an electoral victory is just a first step.	但选举胜利仅仅是第一步。


To govern in France’s hybrid presidential-parliamentary system, Macron would need to secure a majority in the National Assembly.	要想在法国的混合总统议会制的情况下成功执政，马克龙需要在国民议会中赢得多数。


This opens the possibility of two scenarios.	这使得两种情况成为可能。


In the first scenario, Macron quickly gains a parliamentary majority, as French voters seek to reinforce his mandate in June’s National Assembly election.	第一种情况是马克龙迅速赢得议会多数，因为法国选民会在6月举行的国民议会选举中试图巩固对他的委任。


This is conceivable, but not certain: it is here where the lack of an organized political movement on the ground remains a weakness for Macron.	这种情况虽然有可能，但并不确定：恰恰在这个问题上，缺乏有组织的政治运动支持仍然困扰着马克龙。


That is why the June election could give rise to the second scenario: cohabitation with a parliamentary coalition comprising a small right-wing faction, a large centrist faction, and a hopelessly divided left-wing faction.	因此6月选举可能导致第二种状况：与一小撮右翼阵营、大部分中间阵营和陷入绝望分裂的左翼阵营所组成的议会联盟共同执政。


Such a development would be familiar in many European countries.	这样一种情况或许在许多欧洲国家都并不陌生。


But in France, where republicanism gave rise to the left-right ideological spectrum that shapes politics throughout the West today, it would be a genuine revolution – one that could spell the end of the Socialist Party.	但在共和主义崛起引导左右翼意识形态从而塑造当今西方政治的法国，这不亚于是一场真正的革命——社会党可能因此而寿终正寝。


Given the symbolic power of the left-right divide, France’s voters and political leaders alike have long tended to frame virtually all of the country’s problems in ideological terms.	鉴于左翼和右翼分歧的象征意义，法国的选民和政治领导者长期以来都一直倾向于以意识形态的词汇来描述这个国家的所有问题。


The public and its politicians have little experience with government based on broad coalition agreements.	公众及政治家对基于广泛联盟协议的政府经验甚少。


This partly explains why the political system becomes gridlocked, sometimes making reforms difficult to implement, and why Macron’s message, which includes clear reform plans, is so unusual for France.	这部分解释了为什么政治制度日益僵化有时使得改革难以实行，它还能够解释包括明确改革计划的马克龙的观点为什么对法国而言有着如此非同寻常的意义。


If Le Pen somehow comes out on top, French politics – not to mention the European Union – will be turned upside.	如果勒庞以某种形式最终胜出，法国的政治——更不要说欧盟——将会被彻底颠覆。


But even the ostensibly moderate Macron represents, in his own way, a truly radical stance.	但就连表面温和的马克龙也以他自己的方式代表了某种真正的激进立场。


With both candidates likely to make it to the second round, France is on the verge of a political revolution, regardless of who wins.	随着两位候选人很可能进入第二轮，法国正处在政治革命的边缘，无论这两者谁能最终获胜。


France’s Model of Resilience to Terror	法国的恐怖主义恢复力模式


PARIS – In a recent tweetstorm, US President Donald Trump shared anti-Muslim smears from the extreme-right hate group Britain First, thus reminding us of the deep divisions and fears that terrorism has injected into Western democracies.	巴黎—在最近的推特风波中，美国总统特朗普转发了来自极右翼仇恨组织英国优先（Britain First）的反穆斯林材料，这提醒我们恐怖主义给西方民主社会带来了多么深刻的分裂和恐惧。


But not everyone responds to terrorist attacks with the atavism of Trump or Britain First.	但并不是所有人都像特朗普或英国优先那样，因为恐怖袭击就倒行逆施。


Take France, where on November 13, 2015, Islamic State (ISIS) militants carried out terror attacks on the Bataclan concert hall and other sites in Paris.	以法国为例。 2015年11月13日，伊斯兰国激进分子在巴黎巴塔克兰（Bataclan）剧院和其他地点发动了恐怖袭击。


Although 130 people were murdered – more than in any other episode of violence against civilians in France since World War II – France’s commemoration of the second anniversary was extremely subdued.	130人被杀——这是自二战以来法国所发生的最严重的针对平民的暴力事件——但法国对该事件两周年的纪念活动保持了相当的克制。


French authorities, it seems, wanted to avoid reawakening the painful trauma of the event.	法国当局似乎是向避免揭开此事件的令人痛苦的旧伤口。


That trauma is a very real fact of life for the families who lost a loved one, and are permanently devastated, and for the survivors, whose experience has received little attention.	这个创伤对于失去挚爱的家庭来说是铁一样的事实，这些家庭被永远地摧毁了。 对幸存者也是一样，他们的经历没有引起多少关注。


Much of the news coverage accompanying this anniversary showed that for most victims, even those who were not physically harmed, relearning “the next life” is an everyday ordeal.	对纪念活动的相关报道表明，大部分受害者，即便身体没有受伤，也再次领略到“来世”是一种日常折磨。


Since the attacks, their relationship with their surroundings has been upset.	自袭击发生以来，他们与周围的关系就变得不同了。


Sleep disorders, hallucinations, and depressive syndromes are common.	失眠、幻觉也抑郁症成为常见情况。


Entire lives have been transformed.	他们的全部生活都发生了剧变。


In a November survey published in Le Monde, many victims reported an inability to return to work.	在11月在《世界报》（Le Monde）发表的一项调查中，许多受害者表示自己无法回归工作。


And with each new attack, in France or elsewhere, the trauma is reawakened.	而伴随着法国和其他国家的每一次新袭击，这个创口都会被再次揭开。


“Life goes on,” writes one survivor.	“生活在继续，”一位幸存者写道，“但是，什么生活？


“But what life?”	”


On the other hand, French society has proved resilient.	另一方面，法国社会表现出很强的恢复力。


After the Paris attacks, the French quickly showed that they would not give up their way of life, nor would they give in to the temptation of civil war.	巴黎袭击发生后，法国人很快就表现出他们不会放弃自己的生活方式，也不会落入内战的陷阱。


There have been no significant outbursts against the country’s Muslim population.	没有发生针对法国穆斯林人口的重大事件。


The state of emergency that former President François Hollande declared immediately after the attacks allowed French authorities to ensure public order, by detaining suspects, conducting home searches, and closing certain places of worship.	前总统奥朗德在袭击后宣布进入紧急状态，以便法国当局通过捉拿嫌犯、入室搜查和关闭一些宗教场所来保证公共秩序。


Human-rights groups criticized some of these measures as violations of civil liberties; but, for the most part, they were applied smoothly.	人权组织批评其中一些措施侵犯了公民自由； 但在大部分情况下，它们平稳的实施了。


On November 1, 2017, many of the same state-of-emergency measures, with some adjustments, were codified in law.	2017年11月1日，许多这些紧急状态经修订后写入了法律。


Despite some expected protests, the new anti-terrorism legislation enjoys wide support among the French, who seem willing to accept certain limitations to personal freedoms in the name of collective security.	尽管爆发了一些意料之中的反对示威，但新的反恐立法仍得到了法国人民的广泛支持，他们似乎愿意为了集体安全的名义而接受牺牲一定程度的个体自由。


Another consequence of the attacks is that international cooperation among security services has strengthened, new technologies have been adopted, and video surveillance has been implemented more widely.	这些袭击的另一个后果是安全方面的国际合作得到了加强，新技术被采用，视频监控也被更广泛地使用。


Earlier this year, French President Emmanuel Macron established a specialized counter-terror task force at the Élysée Palace.	今年早些时候，法国总统马克龙在爱丽舍宫成立了一支反恐特遣队。


And, over time, armed soldiers – some of whom have been targets of new attacks – have become a familiar presence on French streets.	随着时间的推移，武装士兵——其中一些成了新袭击的目标——已经成为法国街头的惯常风景。


Still, a majority of French citizens remain deeply concerned about the threat of terrorism not just from abroad, but from people living in France, often with French citizenship.	尽管如此，大部分法国人仍然十分担心恐怖主义威胁——它们不仅来自海外，也来自生活在法国、通常拥有法国公民身份的人。


And similar fears about homegrown extremism can be observed in many other European countries.	类似的关于本土极端主义的恐慌也可以在其他欧洲国家观察到。


In recent years, some of those drawn to Islamist-inspired extremism have carried out attacks with rudimentary instruments, from cars and delivery trucks to kitchen knives.	近几年来，一些被伊斯兰极端主义蛊惑的人用最原始的工具发动袭击，比如汽车、送货卡车和厨房刀具等。


Although violent extremists are an ultra-minority in the Muslim population, their actions have fueled a growing distrust in French society.	尽管暴力极端分子只是穆斯林人口中的极少数，但他们的行为助长了法国社会日益严重的不信任。


Worse still, the successful military campaign against ISIS raises new fears about violent extremists returning from Syria.	更糟糕的是，成功剿灭伊斯兰国的成果引起了关于暴力极端分子从叙利亚回流的新恐慌。


Already, more than 250 people, including nearly 60 children, have returned to France.	目前，已经有250多人，其中包括近60名儿童，回到了法国。


More often than not, they are picked up by law enforcement and brought to justice.	他们大部分人都被执法部门控制起来，并被送上法庭。


Yet dealing with returning women and children has become another controversy in itself.	但如何处理回归的妇女和儿童本身成了新的争议点。


And, in addition to the known militants, law-enforcement agencies must monitor thousands of other suspects.	此外，除了已知的激进分子，执法部门还必须监控数以千计的其他嫌疑人。


This state of affairs inevitably affects French attitudes toward receiving migrants and refugees, most of whom come from predominantly Muslim countries.	这种状态难免会影响法国人对接收移民和难民的态度，这些移民和难民大部分来自穆斯林占多数的国家。


It also has a profound impact on the unspoken but constant debate in France about the place of Muslims in French society.	这种状态也严重影响到法国国内一个没有明言但一直存在的争论，即关于穆斯林在法国社会的地位问题。


While visible expressions of Islam have long been a source of controversy in France – owing to the country’s political and colonial history, conception of national identity, and cultural and legal secularism – similar debates are also playing out in Germany, the Netherlands, and other European countries.	公开传播伊斯兰教在法国早已成为争议之源——这是法国政治和殖民史、国家身份的概念以及文化和法律的世俗主义所导致的——而类似的争论也出现在德国、荷兰以及其他欧洲国家。


In the two years since the ISIS attacks in Paris, France has readied itself to face the terrorist threat.	在巴黎伊斯兰国袭击发生以来的两年中，法国做好了面对恐怖主义威胁的准备。


But the political consensus about how to tackle terrorism, which prevailed after the January 2015 attacks on Charlie Hebdo and the Hypercacher kosher supermarket, has eroded.	但关于如何处理恐怖主义政治共识——形成于2015年1月的《查理周刊》和Hypercacher犹太超市袭击之后——却受到了削弱。


Some now want to dismiss terrorism as a feature of everyday life, as if extremist violence posed a danger similar to traffic accidents, alcohol, or disease.	如今，一些人拒绝接受恐怖主义是日常生活的一部分，就像极端暴力是与交通事故、酒精或疾病一样的危险。


These arguments will likely fall flat in France.	这些观点可能无法在法国形成气候。


Even if the threat of terrorism will always exist, resilience must not become resignation.	即使恐怖主义会一直存在，恢复力也不能变成任命。


If there is another serious attack, the French will undoubtedly hold their leaders accountable for failing to protect them.	如果再一次发生严重袭击，法国人必然会问责领导人不能保护他们。


And if elected officials have failed to take necessary precautions or demonstrated a sense of resignation, voters will let them know at the ballot box.	而如果当选官员不能采取必要的预防措施，或表现出任命的感觉，选民就会让他领教投票箱的厉害。


For proof, look no further than the success of right-wing parties in the last German and Austrian elections.	如果你想要证明的话，只需要看一看极右翼政党在最近的德国和奥地利选举中所取得的成功。


The Case Against Free-Market Capitalism	反对自由市场资本主义的控诉


OXFORD – Free-market capitalism is on trial.	牛津—自由市场资本主义正在受到审判。


In the United Kingdom, Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn accuses neoliberalism of increasing homelessness, throwing children into poverty, and causing wages to fall below subsistence level.	工党领袖杰里米·科尔宾（Jeremy Corbyn）指责新自由主义要为越来越多的人无家可归、儿童陷入贫困以及工资跌落到生存线以下负责。


For the defense, Conservative Prime Minister Theresa May cites the immense potential of an open, innovative, free-market economy.	保守党首相梅为此做出反驳，认为开放、创新的自由市场经济拥有巨大潜力。


Similar “proceedings” are taking place around the world.	类似的“控辩”正在全世界展开。


Just a quarter-century ago, the debate about economic systems – state-managed socialism or liberal democracy and capitalism – seemed to have been settled.	仅仅四分之一个世纪之前，关于经济制度的争论——国家管理的社会主义还是自由民主和资本主义——似乎已经尘埃落定。


With the Soviet Union’s collapse, the case was closed – or so it seemed.	苏联解体让它板上钉钉——表面上看是如此。


Since then, the rise of China has belied the view that a state-led strategy will always fail, and the global financial crisis exposed the perils of inadequately regulated markets.	此后，中国的崛起证明了国家领导战略总是会失败的看法是错误的，而全球金融危机则暴露了监管不充分的市场的缺陷。


In 2017, few of the world’s fastest-growing economies (Ethiopia, Uzbekistan, Nepal, India, Tanzania, Djibouti, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and the Philippines) have free markets.	2017年，高速增长经济体（埃塞俄比亚、乌兹别克斯坦、尼泊尔、印度、坦桑尼亚、吉布提、老挝、柬埔寨、缅甸和菲律宾）几乎没有一个是自由市场。


And many free-market economies are suffering from growth slowdowns and rapidly rising inequality.	而许多自由市场经济体遭遇了经济减速和不平等性的迅速加剧。


Against this background, some politicians are no longer defending free-market capitalism in terms of economic growth or the gains from globalization.	在这样的背景下，一些政客不再用经济增长和全球化的收益来为自由市场资本主义辩护。


Instead, they focus on individual opportunity.	他们转而聚焦于个体机会。


May, for example, has credited the system with reducing infant mortality, increasing life expectancy, driving down absolute poverty, boosting disposable incomes, expanding access to education, and slashing illiteracy rates.	比如，梅称赞自由市场制度降低了婴儿死亡率，提高了寿命预期，减少了绝对贫困，刺激了可支配收入，扩大了教育普及，大大抑制了文盲率。


But these claims aren’t in line with the facts.	但这些论据与事实并不相符。


Start with maternal mortality.	从分娩死亡率开始。


Much of the world has made great strides in making childbirth safer.	世界绝大部分地区，在让分娩变得更加安全方面都取得了巨大进步。


From 1990 to 2015, Albania reduced its maternal deaths per 100,000 live births from 29.3 to 9.6.	1999—2015年间，阿尔巴尼亚分娩死亡率从每100,000例分娩死亡29. 3人下降到9.


China, the poster child for state-led growth, reduced its rate from 114.2 to 17.7.	国家领导型增长的模范中国的这一比率从114. 2下降到17.


Meanwhile, the trend in the United States, the paragon of free-market democracy, has gone in the opposite direction, with maternal deaths per 100,000 live births actually rising, from 16.9 in 1990 to 26.4 in 2015.	与此同时，自由市场民主的灯塔美国的这一比例呈现出相反的趋势，每100,000例分娩死亡率实际有所上升，从1990年的16. 9变为2015年的26.


Equally shocking, the morbidity and mortality of white (non-Hispanic) middle-aged men and women in the US increased between 1999 and 2013.	4。 同样令人震惊的是，美国中等年龄白人（非西班牙裔）男女的发病率和死亡率在1999—2013年间呈现上涨。


The claim that free-market policies “slash illiteracy” is also misleading.	自由市场政策“大大抑制文盲率”的说法也同样具有误导性。


In England, some 15% of adults (5.1 million people) are still “functionally illiterate,” meaning that they have literacy levels at or below those expected of an 11-year-old.	在英国，大约15%的成年人（510万人）仍为“半文盲”，即识字水平不高于11岁孩童的期望值。


Scotland’s most recent survey showed a decline in literacy, with less than half of the country’s 13- and 14-year-olds now performing well in writing.	苏格兰的最新调查表明，识字率呈现出下降，该国13—14岁年龄段群体只有不到一半写作表现良好。


In fact, if you Google “successful literacy campaign,” the country with astonishing literacy gains that fills your screen is Cuba – hardly a free-market system.	事实上，如果你用谷歌搜索“成功的识字运动”，那么在你的屏幕上列出的识字率进步巨大的国家是古巴——它绝对不属于自由市场制度。


The conservative case, eloquently articulated by May, is that a free-market economy, operating under the right rules and regulations, is the greatest agent of collective human progress ever created.	梅雄辩地说出了保守党的立场，认为自由市场经济在正确的规则和监管之下运行，它是人类集体进步的最佳代表。


If that claim is true, the only logical conclusion is that we are doing it wrong.	如果这一论断正确，那么唯一合乎逻辑的结果就是我们现在正在做错事。


So what measures are needed to get it right?	那么，应该怎么做来进行纠正？


The practical solutions on offer seem to be fairly consistent across the political spectrum.	不同政治立场的党派所提出的实际的方案几乎完美一致。


Indeed, for all their furious positioning, the differences between left and right seem to have collapsed in this regard.	事实上，尽管他们表现得怒发冲冠，其实在这方面，左派和右派的区别可以说已经完全崩塌了。


In the UK, the first suggestion is to ensure economy-wide investment and growth, which will require government intervention.	在英国，第一项建议是确保整个经济的投资和增长，而这需要政府干预。


Corbyn proposes a National Investment Bank and Transformation Fund to mobilize public investment and create wealth and good jobs.	科尔宾提出成立一个国家投资银行和转移基金来动员公共投资、创造财富和优质工作岗位。


May, for her part, suggests an industrial strategy to promote “growth across the whole country,” helping to “turn local areas of excellence into national export champions.”	梅则建议采取产业战略推动“全国增长”，以助“将出色的地方领域变成全国出口冠军。 ”


Second, private-sector leadership must change, in order to prevent short-term thinking, tax avoidance, and other forms of opportunism and personal enrichment.	其次，私人部门领导层必须有所改变，以防止短期思维、避税和其他形式的机会主义和中饱私囊。


Here, Corbyn focuses on accountability in corporate boardrooms, while May calls for giving workers and shareholders a stronger voice in firms’ decision-making and ensuring that the largest companies have incentives to think long term.	在这方面，科尔宾注重公司董事会的问责情况，而梅要求给予工人和股东更大的话语权影响企业决策和确保最大的公司有长期思维的激励。


A third corrective is to improve employees’ pay and working conditions.	第三项纠正措施是改善员工薪酬和工作条件。


In Britain, even as the economy has grown, wages have been dropping – by 10% from 2007 to 2014.	在英国，即便经济有所增长，工资也一直在下降——从2007年到2014年下降了10%。


Corbyn promises to take action to stop employers from driving down pay and working conditions.	科尔宾承诺要采取行动阻止雇主降薪和降低工作条件。


For May, “all work should be fair and decent, with scope for development and fulfillment.”	梅则说“所有工作都应该是公平体面的，有发展和实现的空间。


Both make the case for improving vocational training and technical education.	”两人都表示要改善在职培训和技术教育。


Fourth, in Britain, the government must address the public-housing crisis.	第四，英国政府必须解决公共住房危机。


In the 1950s and 1960s, an average of some 300,000 houses were being built every year; that figure has now dropped to less than half.	在20世纪50和60年代，平均每年都要建造300,000间左右的房屋； 如今还不到这一数字的一半。


Corbyn proposes a review of social housing, rent control, and regeneration for the people.	科尔宾建议重新评估社会住房、租金控制和房屋改造。


May has announced the creation of a £2 billion ($2.62 billion) fund for building more council housing.	梅则宣布成立一个20亿英镑的激进来构建更多公屋。


Finally, Britain needs more effective rules and regulations to ensure that privatized utilities deliver cheaper, more sustainable services.	最后，英国需要更有效的规则和监管以确保私有化的公用事业能提供更廉价、更可持续的服务。


Corbyn accuses companies of handing out large dividends to shareholders, while infrastructure crumbles, service deteriorates, and companies pay far too little in taxes.	科尔宾指责公司给股东发放大量红利，而与此同时，基础设施日益破败，服务日益恶化，公司纳税也少得可怜。


May promises to end “rip-off energy prices.”	梅承诺要结束“能源价格过高”。


The orthodoxy established by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s – to roll back the state, after a decade of profligate and bloated government – is guilty as charged.	20世纪80年代由撒切尔夫人和里根建立的正统——在经历了十年的政府挥霍和不断臃肿之后，开始国退民进——正是罪魁。


A new consensus is emerging that more active and effective government is required to boost growth and expand opportunity.	新的共识正在产生：需要更积极、更有效的政府来刺激增长、扩大机会。


The jury is still out, however, on whether governments will be given the tools and support they need to rehabilitate the defendant.	但对于政府能否获得恢复辩方名誉的工具和支持，陪审团还没有做出定论。


The Not-So-Dire Future of Work	算不上可怕的未来就业


WASHINGTON, DC – The future of work is a hot topic nowadays.	发自华盛顿特区——就业的未来是当今的热门话题。


It has inspired a seemingly endless train of analyses, commentaries, and conferences, and it featured prominently in last week’s annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.	它催生了一系列看似无休止的分析，评论和会议，并成为了上周国际货币基金组织和世界银行年度会议上的主要内容。


For good reason: new technologies – namely, digitization, robotics, and artificial intelligence – have far-reaching implications for employment.	原因很简单：新技术——即数字化，机器人技术和人工智能——对就业具有深远的影响。


But, contrary to how the story is often framed, a happy ending is possible.	但是，与经常听到的故事描述相反，我们是有可能迎来一个大团圆结局的。


The current debate often skews toward the melodramatic, foretelling a future in which machines drive humans out of work.	当前的辩论往往倾向于耸人听闻地预言一个机器将人们驱逐出就业的未来。 据一些悲观的估计，美国有47％的就业岗位岌岌可危；


According to some bleak estimates, 47% of jobs are at risk in the United States; 57% in the OECD countries; two thirds in developing economies; and half of all jobs globally (around two billion).	发展中经济体为2/3； 全球则为1/2（相当于20亿份工作）。


But similarly dire predictions of large-scale job destruction and high technology-driven structural unemployment accompanied previous major episodes of automation, including by renowned economists.	但同样危言耸听的大规模工作流失和高技术驱动下的结构性失业预测其实并不新鲜，每当历史上出现重大自动化发展事件时都会出现，而且都得到了那一时期著名经济学家的背书。


John Maynard Keynes offered one; Wassily Leontief provided another.	约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯（John Maynard Keynes）提出过一个；


Neither materialized.	华西里·列昂惕夫也（Wassily Leontief）提出过另一个。


Instead, technological change acted as a powerful driver of productivity and employment growth.	但这两个预测都未能兑现。 相反，技术变革成为了生产力和就业增长的强大动力。


One key reason is that the technological innovations that destroy some existing jobs also create new ones.	一个主要原因是技术创新在淘汰了一些现有工作的同时也创造了新的工作。


While new technologies reduce demand for low- to middle-skill workers in routine jobs, such as clerical work and repetitive production, they also raise demand for higher-skill workers in technical, creative, and managerial fields.	虽然新技术降低了常规工作中对低技能工人的需求——如文书工作和重复性生产——但也增加了对技术，创意和管理领域高技能劳动者的需求。


A recent analysis estimates that new tasks and job titles explain about half of the recent employment growth in the US.	最近发布的一项分析估计近期近一半的美国就业增长都是由新工种和职位贡献的。


Given this, the evolution of work should be viewed as a process of dynamic adjustment, not as a fundamentally destructive process that we should seek to slow.	有鉴于此，就业的演变应该被看作是一个动态调整的过程，而非我们应当尝试去减缓的根本性破坏进程。


To erect barriers to innovation, such as taxes on robots, which some have proposed as a way to ease the pressure on workers, would be counterproductive.	而有些人提出的类似向机器人征税这类创新设置障碍以减轻对工人压力的方法只会适得其反。


Instead, measures should focus on equipping workers with the higher-level skills that a changing labor market demands, and supporting workers during the adjustment process.	相反，相关措施应着重为工人提供适应不断变化的劳动力市场需求的更高级别技能，并在调整过程中支持他们。


So far, education and training have been losing the race with technology.	到目前为止，教育和培训一直无法追上技术的脚步。


Shortages of the technical and higher-level skills demanded by new technologies are partly responsible for the paradox of booming technology and slowing productivity growth in advanced economies: skills shortages have constrained the diffusion of innovations.	新技术所需的技术和高级技能的短缺，部分原因是发达经济体科技蓬勃发展和生产力增长放缓之间的矛盾：技能短缺限制了创新的传播。


Imbalances between supply and demand have also fueled income inequality, by increasing the wage premia that those with the right skills can command.	供需之间的不平衡也强化了收入不平等，因为这提高那些具有合适技能者的工资上限。


To address these shortcomings, education and training programs must be revamped and expanded.	要应对这些缺点就必须改革和扩大教育和培训方案。


As the old career path of “learn, work, retire” gives way to one of continuous learning – a process reinforced by the aging of many economies’ workforces – options for reskilling and lifelong education must be scaled up.	随着“学习，工作，退休”的老职业路径让位于持续学习——也是一个被许多经济体的劳动力老龄化所加剧的过程——提供重新培养和终身教育的选项必须扩大。


This will demand innovations in the content, delivery, and financing of training, as well as new models for public-private partnerships.	这就要求在培训的内容，输送和资助方面进行创新，并建立一系列公私伙伴关系的新模式。


The potential of technology-enabled solutions must be harnessed, supported by a stronger foundation of digital literacy.	必须释放出科技支持下的解决方案的潜力，并由数字技能普及化的坚实基础来支撑。


At a time of rising inequality – in the US, for example, gaps in higher education attainment by family income level have widened – a strong commitment to improving access for the economically disadvantaged is also vital.	在这个日益不平等的时代——例如在美国，由于家庭收入水平导致的受高等教育程度差距不断扩大——对改善经济弱势群体受教育渠道的坚定承诺也至关重要。


At the same time, countries must facilitate workers’ ability to change jobs through reforms to their labor markets and social safety nets.	与此同时，各国必须通过对劳动力市场和社会安全网的改革来提升劳动者的换岗能力。


This means shifting the focus from backward-looking labor-market policies, which seek to protect workers in existing jobs, to future-oriented measures, such as innovative insurance mechanisms and active labor-market policies.	这意味着将重点从当前这种试图保护已就业劳动者的倒退式劳动力市场政策转向面向未来的多种措施，比如创新的保险机制和积极的劳动力市场政策。


Moreover, social contracts based on formal long-term employer-employee relationships will need to be overhauled, with benefits such as retirement and health care made more portable and adapted to evolving work arrangements, including the expanding “gig” economy.	此外，基于正式长期雇主与雇员关系的社会契约需要进行大改，退休和医疗保健福利的流转应该更为便利以适应不断发展的工作安排，包括不断扩大的“共享”经济。


Here, several proposals have already been put forward, including a universal basic income, currently being piloted in Finland and some sub-national jurisdictions such as Ontario, Canada; a negative income tax; and various types of portable social security accounts that pool workers’ benefits.	在此已经有人提出了几项建议，其中包括普遍发放的基本收入，目前在芬兰和类似加拿大安大略省的一些地方性区域进行试点； 推行负所得税；


On both of these fronts, France is setting a positive example.	在这两个方面法国正在树立一个积极的榜样。


Early this year, the country launched a portable “personal activity account,” which enables workers to accrue rights to training across multiple jobs, rather than accumulating such rights only within a specific position or company.	今年年初，该国推出了一个随劳动者个人转移的“个人活动账户”，使得劳动者能够在多个工作岗位上获得受培训的权利，而不仅仅在特定职位或企业内累计这些权利。


President Emmanuel Macron’s administration is now undertaking reforms to France’s stringent job protections, in order to boost labor-market flexibility.	埃马纽埃尔·马克龙总统的行政当局正在对法国严格的工作保护制度进行改革以提高劳动力市场的灵活性。


Pursuing such initiatives simultaneously will enable France to capture reform synergies and ease the adjustment for workers.	同时追求这一举措将使法国能够抓住改革的协同效应并缓解劳动者的调整压力。


Technological change will continue to pose momentous challenges to labor markets across economies, just as it has in the past.	技术变革将继续对各经济体的劳动力市场构成重大挑战，正如过去一样。


But, with smart, forward-looking policies, we can meet those challenges head on – and ensure that the future of work is a better job.	但通过明智的前瞻性政策，我们可以迎接挑战——并确保未来的就业变得更好。


A Volvo Moment for Antimicrobial Resistance	抗生素耐药性的沃尔沃时刻


LONDON – Last week, Volvo issued an inspiring announcement: it will no longer produce gasoline- or diesel-fueled cars after 2019.	伦敦—上周，沃尔沃发布了一个令人鼓舞的消息，2019年后，该公司将不再生产汽油和柴油汽车。


Volvo executives may be anticipating that traditional vehicles will be less profitable in the future.	沃尔沃高管也许是认为传统汽车在未来已经无利可图。


But whatever their motive, their decision has resonated widely.	但不管动机如何，他们的决定引起了热烈反响。


Within 24 hours, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that France would prohibit the sale of gasoline- and diesel-fueled cars by 2040.	不出24小时，法国总统马克龙就宣布，法国将在2040年禁止汽油和柴油汽车销售。


Volvo’s decision confirms that things are changing for the auto industry, and it sends a positive message in the fight against climate change.	沃尔沃的决定证明，汽车行业正在其变化，并且这也为对抗气候变化带来了积极的信号。


But, more important, it demonstrates that people and organizations are still capable of taking big, bold steps to solve major challenges.	但更重要的是，这表明个人和组织仍然能够采取果断的重大措施解决重大挑战。


Among the many global problems today, the fight against antimicrobial resistance (AMR) desperately needs a similar breakthrough commitment.	在当今的诸多全球性问题中，对抗抗生素耐药性（AMR）急需类似的突破性承诺。


For advocates, AMR’s appearance on the G20’s agenda last year, at the group’s summit in Hangzhou, China, represented a major triumph.	对支持者来说，AMR被列入去年的G20杭州峰会议程是一次重大胜利。


But G20 leaders’ 2016 statement on AMR was not as bold as it could have been, because they did not want to set the bar too high.	但2016年G20领导人对AMR的陈述仍不够果断，因为他们不想把旗帜立得太高。


They knew that Germany, an enthusiastic champion in the fight against AMR, would be chairing the G20 this year, and could be expected to bring bold proposals to the table.	他们知道，德国非常想在AMR问题上起领导作用，而德国是今年G20的主席国，届时有可能会拿出更加果断的方案。


In the run-up to this year’s G20 summit in Hamburg, I started to worry that Germany would fall short of these expectations.	随着今年G20汉堡峰会的临近，我开始担心德国无法达到人们的预期。


But, if anything, Germany under-promised and over-delivered.	但无论如何，德国承诺但不多，兑现得不少。