Some progress has been made, but more is needed – for example, getting China to join the World Trade Organization’s Government Procurement Agreement.	这方面已经取得了一定的进步，但还不够——比如让中国加入世贸组织政府采购协定。


At the same time, the US should reconsider antiquated Cold War restrictions on Chinese purchases of technology-intensive items.	与此同时，美国必须反思限制中国采购技术密集型商品的过时冷战思维。


For a growth-starved US, the opportunities of market access far outweigh the currency threat.	对可望增长的美国来说，进入市场的机会远大于货币威胁。


The long-dormant Chinese consumer is about to be unleashed.	沉睡已久的中国消费者马上就要觉醒了。


This plays to one of America’s greatest strengths – its zeal to compete in new markets.	这正好契合美国最大的优势之一——摩拳擦掌竞相进入新市场。


Shame on the US if it squanders this extraordinary chance by digging in its heels at the upcoming Strategic and Economic dialogue.	如果美国在即将举行的战略和经济对话中顽固不化从而浪费掉这一千载难逢的机会，那着实是一件丢人之事。


America\u0027s Retreat from Asia	美国从亚洲撤军


The United States' planned withdrawal of troops from Asia, which President George W. Bush announced on August 16, need not harm peace and stability in the region and particularly in Korea.	8月16日，乔治·W·布什总统宣布美国打算从亚洲撤军。 虽然撤军不一定会影响到亚太地区、特别是朝鲜的和平稳定，但重新部署的顺利进行有个重要条件，就是美国与盟国间的密切协商。


But a key condition for a smooth redeployment of US troops is close consultations by America with its allies, something it has not done well up to now.	但直到现在，美国在这方面做得都不好。


South Korea and Japan need to have their views taken into serious account if this now inevitable withdrawal is to succeed.	如果这次现在看来无可避免的撤军想获得成功，就要认真考虑韩国和日本的需求。


By contrast, unilaterally announcing the withdrawal - and then unilaterally implementing it - may harm the very purpose that the remaining US troops in Asia are intended to serve: assuring deterrence, stability, and nonproliferation in Korea and Asia.	恰恰相反，单方面宣布撤军后再单方面执行，可能会损害留亚美军的根本使命：那就是确保朝鲜和整个亚洲地区的威慑力、稳定及核不扩散。


The withdrawal plan is causing countless worries.	撤军计划引发了很多忧虑。


In Japan, there are concerns that it will make the country America's frontline command post in Asia, possibly beyond the scope of its bilateral security treaty with the US.	很多日本人担心日本会变成美国在亚洲的前哨指挥部，这可能超越了日美双边安全协议规定的范畴。


One result is that China feels nervous about the implications of any expansion of the American-Japanese military partnership.	美日军事合作的任何扩大都会引起中国的警觉。


But the impact of America's planned troop withdrawals is felt most keenly in South Korea.	但受美军撤离计划影响最大的是韩国。


In June, the Bush administration revealed its plan to withdraw some 12,500 of the 37,000 US soldiers stationed in South Korea by the end of 2005. These include 3,600 troops from the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division, who are already earmarked for redeployment in Iraq.	6月，布什政府宣布要在2005年前从37，000名驻韩美军中撤出约12，500人，其中包括第二步兵师的第二装甲旅，已经确定这支部队要重新派驻伊拉克。


The US Defense Department justifies this change as part of the so-called "Global Posture Review" that it has been carrying out to provide more flexibility and mobility in deploying troops to more urgently needed places around the world.	美国防部称上述变动是所谓"驻外美军重新部署计划"的组成部分，目的是更灵活机动地把军队部署到全球更急需的地区。


But the unilateral nature of the announcement, and the abrupt timing of the plan, has incited alarm in South Korea, and perhaps in Japan, that withdrawal could pose serious risks to the vital role that US forces have performed in deterring another war in Korea.	但通告的单边性质和撤军的紧迫日程在韩国引起了恐慌，日本可能也一样，害怕这次撤军会使美军遏制另一次朝鲜战争的任务面临严重的危机。


South Koreans genuinely fear that the plan may weaken deterrence by sending North Korea - which is demanding a US military withdrawal while refusing to abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions - the message that intransigence pays.	韩国真心害怕撤军计划会使北朝鲜认为固执己见产生了作用，进而会削弱遏制的效果。 北朝鲜一直要求美国撤军，却不肯放弃自己的核武器目标。


Indeed, it should not be forgotten that North Korea maintains an army of 1.1 million troops.	实际上，我们不该忘记北朝鲜仍保留着110万人的部队。


Moreover, the manner in which the Bush administration unveiled its withdrawal plan has weakened the credibility of the US-Korean alliance.	此外，布什政府宣布撤军计划的方式削弱了美韩联盟的信任基础。


America's unilateral announcement has fuelled rumors to the effect that withdrawal must have something to do with the rising tide of anti-Americanism in South Korea, and especially with the country's reluctance and delay in dispatching an additional 3,600 of its own soldiers to Iraq.	美国的单方面宣布使韩国国内谣言四起，说这次撤军肯定与韩国国内日益高涨的反美风潮有关，特别是韩国不情愿并拖延再次派遣3，600名本土士兵到伊拉克，是这次撤军直接的导火索。


The Bush administration tries to rebut these charges by saying that the plan will not weaken the deterrence capabilities of American forces, for America's far more powerful air and naval presence in the area will be maintained.	布什政府试图对流言进行回击，声明撤军不会削弱美军的遏制能力，因为美国将在该地区保留占绝对优势的海空部署。


Moreover, the US plans to strengthen South Korea's own forces by supplying some $11 billion worth of high-technology equipment over the next five years.	不仅如此，美国还计划在5年内批准对韩出售约110亿美元的高科技装备，以加强韩国自身的部队建设。


Militarily, this argument does make sense.	军事上看，这种说法有一定道理。


Politically and psychologically, however, the method, let alone the timing and implementation of the withdrawals, raises many questions about the ongoing viability of the US-Korean security alliance, for the alliance now seems adrift, without a common purpose and with little direction from either side.	但从政治和心理的角度，这次撤军的方式，更不用说具体的日程和安排，都给美韩安全联盟今后的可行性带来了不少问题。 美韩联盟似乎飘浮不定，既缺乏共同的目标，也不知要去往何处。


Yet the Bush administration insists: "The US views South Korea as a strong and steadfast ally. We are committed to South Korea's security and to our alliance and partnership with Seoul."	而布什政府强调："美国眼中的韩国是强大稳定的联盟，我们会全力维护韩国的安全，维护与汉城的盟友和伙伴关系。


If Washington is serious about these words, it should transform this commitment into a long-term and comprehensive alliance that can survive the current estrangement - and continue even after Korean unification - by making a joint declaration with South Korea's government at the highest level.	"如果华盛顿把这个承诺当真，就应该将其转化为长期全面的联盟，能够顺利地渡过眼前的危机－即便朝韩统一之后也始终不改－布什应该与韩国政府首脑联合发表声明。


In order to allay misgivings and restore trust in the alliance, it is necessary for the US and South Korea to reaffirm their common interests and values in pursuing deterrence, nonproliferation, stability, and democracy on the Korean peninsula and across Asia.	为了减少顾虑，恢复信任，美韩需要重申两国的共同利益，那就是在亚洲和朝鲜半岛追求遏制、不扩散、稳定和民主的目标。


Once they resolve to continue their alliance with these purposes in mind, it should be possible for responsible officials to work out guiding principles for concrete security cooperation.	一旦它们决意出于上述目的将联盟继续下去，相关官员就有可能确定具体安全合作的指导原则。


Specific negotiations on withdrawing American troops from Korea or on redeploying them from the DMZ to south of Seoul must be carried out according to these principles.	无论是美军撤离韩国，还是从非军事区到汉城南部的重新调动，都必须遵照原则加以实行。


In so doing, America must treat South Korea as a full partner with its own voice in making decisions that affect its security interests.	要实现这个目标，美国必须完全把韩国作为伙伴，在涉及他们自身安全利益的问题上有权发言。


As an American ally for 51 years, and as East Asia's third-largest economy, South Korea is entitled to be fully consulted on such decisions.	韩国是51年的美国伙伴，东亚第三的经济大国，他们有权在上述问题上充分表态。


Despite anti-American sentiments among some South Koreans, a majority of the country's people wants American forces to remain as a stabilizing force.	尽管有些韩国人存在着反美情绪，但多数人还是希望美军稳定部队留在韩国。


Securing a peaceful and nuclear-free Korean peninsula, a place where the interests of China, Japan, Russia, and America directly intersect, is one of the most important security goals anywhere on the planet.	朝鲜半岛上，中国、日本、俄国和美国的利益直接交叉，在这里实现和平和无核化是全球最重要的安全目标之一。


For this reason, America and South Korea must restore a strategic vision for the future.	也正因为如此，美国和韩国必须重新以战略的眼光审视未来。


America\u0027s Schizophrenic Economy	矛盾式发展的美国经济


The news about America's economy that dribbled out over the first half of March painted - once again - a picture that only a schizophrenic could create.	美国经济在三月上旬渐行渐弱的消息又一次为我们描绘了一幅只有精神分裂症患者才能画出的情景。


Real investment (investment adjusted for the declining prices of high-tech and information-related capital goods) continued to roar ahead.	实际投资（由于高科技和与信息有关的资本货物价格下跌而调整后的投资）继续大幅增长。


Production and sales were consistent with the consensus forecast of real GDP growth at an annual rate of 4% or more.	生产和销售与公认的4%或以上的实际GDP年增长率预测保持一致。


Yet, despite all this, employment remained stagnant: net job creation in the United States continues to stall.	可尽管如此，就业情况仍不景气：美国的净工作创造量仍然停滞不前。


This does not mean that employment in America cannot grow.	这并不意味着美国的就业率不能增长了。


Roughly 300,000 more Americans are employed in education and health care than a year ago - an annual rate of employment growth of 1.7%.	于去年相比，美国的教育和医疗行业多雇佣了约30万人-就业年增长率达1. 7%。


A quarter of a million more Americans are employed in business and professional services than a year ago - a 1.6% annual rate of employment growth.	商业和专业服务行业多雇佣了25万人-就业年增长率为1. 6%。


The logic of stagnant employment is not that adding jobs to the American economy is impossible, but that demand growth is insufficient to create more jobs than are lost.	就业状况不景气的逻辑并不是美国经济不可能创造新的工作，而是需求的增长不足以创造足够的工作机会以吸纳失业者。


This is easy to demonstrate.	这点很容易说明。


Total nominal spending in America grows at 5.5% per year.	美国的总名目支出年增长5.


Inflation is 1.5% per year.	5%，年通货膨胀率为1. 5%。


And overall productivity growth is 3.5% per year.	全员劳动生产率的年增长率为3. 5%。


So the equation is simple: 5.5%-1.5%-3.5% = 0.5%.	所以用一个简单的等式表示：5. 5%-1.


That 0.5% is all that is left for job growth, because that's all the job growth required to meet demand given the remarkably strong rate of growth of productivity.	而就业率的增长就只能达到0. 5%，因为尽管劳动生产率增长强劲，要满足需求却只需要这样就业率增长。


Where America's productivity growth is coming from is clear.	美国劳动生产率的增长从何而来是显而易见的。


A relatively small part of it is coming from simple speed-up: in an economy where the amount of time it takes for the unemployed to find new jobs is close to a post-WWII record high, demands for speeding-up the pace of work will be met with a "Yes, boss!" rather than a "Take this job and shove it!"	其较小的部分增长是来自简单的加速：在目前的经济形势下，美国的失业人口找到新工作的间隔时间逼近二战后的历史高点。 因此对于加快工作节奏的要求，雇员的态度总是"是，老板！


A bigger part of this increased productivity comes from the extraordinary technological revolutions in computers and communications that have led to dramatic increases in the usefulness - and decreases in the cost - of high-tech capital.	劳动生产率的较大部分增长来自于计算机和通信技术的革命-这使得高科技资本的有效性大幅增加，而其成本则大幅降低。


The boost to wealth provided by the "new economy" is exceeding even its most avid boosters' wildest dreams.	"新经济"对财富增长的驱动力让其最热忱的推动者也难以想象。


What is unexpected is that the new wealth is flowing not to the shareholders of dot-com companies, but to purchasers and users of high-tech capital and the consumers they serve.	出人意料的是新的财富并没有流向dot-com公司的股东，而是流向高科技资本的购买者和使用者，以及他们所服务的消费者。


But why does this seem so surprising?	可为什么这种情况让人如此惊异呢？


At the end of the nineteenth century the huge amount of investment and technological progress in America's railroads appeared to benefit everyone but the stockholders and bondholders of railroad companies, as bust followed boom and ramming worthless securities down the throats of investors became Wall Street's favorite sport.	19世纪末，美国铁路系统获得的巨额投资和技术进步似乎使除了铁路公司股东和债主之外的所有人受益。 当铁路经济泡沫在繁荣之后破裂时，投资者自食垃圾证券的苦果成为华尔街最受欢迎的游戏。


Yet another part of US productivity growth due to the fact that high-tech capital gives America's firms enormous incentives to make massive but hard to see - and even harder to measure - investments in organization and business processes that are complementary to computerization and networking.	还有一部分美国劳动生产率的增长来自于这样一个事实：高科技资本给美国公司带来的巨大动力以促使它们投入巨资改造组织和商务流程从而使其适应计算机化和网络化的需求。 可这些投资往往是难以发觉，甚至难以衡量的。


For the US to have a rate of productivity growth of 3.5% per annum rather than the pre-1995 rate of 1.2% is amazing.	对于美国来说，劳动生产率的年增长达到3. 5%而非1995年之前的1.


That means an annual increment to world income of $250 billion from this source alone.	2%是难能可贵的。 这意味着仅这一个国家就为世界收入带来了2500亿美金的年增加值。


That's the equivalent of adding productive power equal to a quarter of the economy of India - and adding it every year.	这相当于每年为世界增加等同于1/4个印度的生产力。


This persistent acceleration in American productivity growth has, however, created a massive political problem for President George W. Bush.	然而，美国劳动生产率的持续攀升却为乔治·W·布什总统带来了一个巨大的政治问题。


Demand growth at a pace that in any previous decade would have been seen as highly satisfactory is suddenly desperately insufficient, and Bush is being blamed (with some justice) for the slack labor market that has resulted.	在前几十年一路凯歌的内需增长突然变得严重不足，由此造成的劳动力市场疲软也使布什备受指责（他在一定程度上的确难辞其咎）。


But for everyone except Bush - and those left unemployed by the lag in demand - it is an extraordinary opportunity.	但对于所有人来说-除了布什和那些由于内需乏力而失业的人-这都是一个绝佳的机会。


The remarkable boosts to productivity that have been within America's grasp will ultimately lead to accelerating growth of real profits and real wages, if only US policy makers resist the temptation to pursue politically expedient, but economically damaging, measures to "protect" output and employment.	只要美国的决策者们抗拒诱惑，不从政治利益出发追求"保护"产量和就业但却会破坏经济发展的政策，那么美国现在伸手可及的对生产率的显著推动力会最终带来真正利润和薪酬的强劲增长。


As the world's leading-edge economy, America faces the hardest work in ensuring growth, for it must create - not only copy and adapt - new technologies, better forms of capital, and more productive business organizations.	作为领军世界的经济体，美国在确保经济增长方面任务艰巨。 因为它必须创造-并不仅仅是摹仿和改良-新技术、更佳的资本形式和更有生产效率的商业组织。


If America can grow as fast as it is now, that is very good news for other, less-developed economies, especially since one powerful effect of ongoing technological revolutions in computers and communications is to make it much easier to participate in the global division of labor now centered in the US.	如果美国的经济能够以现在的速度发展，这对于其它较不发达的经济体来说是个好消息。 特别是因为在发展中的计算机和通信技术革命的强大推动作用下，世界各国能够更容易地参与到以美国为中心的全球劳动分工之中。


So the schizophrenic American economy is a sign that the world is entering an economic era of truly wonderful things - if only we properly, and patiently, grasp them.	因此美国经济的矛盾式发展昭示着世界已进入了一个有着非凡机遇的经济时代-前提是我们要彻底而耐心地抓住它们。


America’s Scorched Earth Management	美国的焦土管理


Signs of the American economy’s perilous condition are everywhere – from yawning fiscal and current-account deficits to plummeting home prices and a feeble dollar.	显示美国经济处于危险境地的迹象到处可见——从巨大的财政以及经常账户赤字缺口到快速下降的房价和弱势美元的价格。


But something that shows up in none of the economic indicators may be driving many of them: the deterioration of American management, which is undermining not only many of America’s great enterprises, but also its legendary spirit of enterprise.	但是，有些没有在任何经济指标中显现的东西可能驱动着许多经济指标：美国管理的恶化——它不仅削弱了许多美国大企业，也削弱了美国企业书写传奇的精神。


Paradoxically, one indicator that has been improving steadily in the US – productivity – may be the clearest sign of the problem.	荒谬的是，在美国有一个指标一直在稳健增长——生产率——可能是这一问题最明显的迹象。


When it comes to productivity, managers either invest in employee training, more efficient manufacturing processes, and the like, or they take steps that appear to boost productivity in the short run but that erode it in the long run.	当说到生产率的时候，经理们要么在员工培训、更高效的制造工艺等等上进行投资，要么采取似乎能在短期内推进生产率但是在长期内损害生产率的措施。


Productivity is a measure of output per hour worked.	生产率是度量每工作小时产出的标准。


So a company that fires all its workers and then ships from stock can look very productive – until it runs outs of stock.	所以，一个解雇其所有工人然后运输库存的公司可以看起来很多产——直到它将库存用尽。


Of course, no company can do that, but many US companies have been shedding workers and middle managers in great numbers – the figures for January 2008 were up 19% from a year earlier.	当然，没有公司能这样做，但是许多美国公司已经在大量剥离工人和中层经理——2008年1月份的数字比去年同期增加了19%。


Meanwhile, those employees left behind must work that much harder, often without increased compensation.	同时，那些留下来的员工必须更加努力地工作，而且通常没有增加工资。


Workers’ wages, adjusted for inflation, fell in 2007, continuing a trend throughout this decade.	工人的工资按通货膨胀调整后，在2007年是下降的，继续了这十年的趋势。


That, too, is “productive” – until these overworked people quit or burn out.	这也是“多产的”——直到这些工作过度的人们辞职或者工作能力枯竭。


A sustainable company is not a collection of “human resources.” It is a community of human beings.	一个可持续的公司不是一个“人力资源”的集合，而是一个人的团体。


Its strength resides in its people, its culture, and the goodwill it has built up among its customers and suppliers.	它的力量植根于它的人，它的文化以及在它的客户和供应商中建立起来的商誉。


So, as workers and middle managers have been departing these companies, they have taken with them not only much critical information, but often also the hearts and souls of their enterprises, with profound effects on American competitiveness.	所以，当工人和中层经理离开这些公司的时候，他们带走的不仅是许多重要的信息，而且通常也带走了他们公司的心脏和灵魂，从而对美国的竞争力产生深远的影响。


Consider high technology, where America is supposed to excel.	想想高科技，在这个领域人们认为美国应该超过其他国家。


According to a November 2006 report by The Task Force on the Future of American Innovation, made up of prominent universities, think tanks, industry trade associations, and corporations, the high-tech trade deficit widened in 2005, for the third consecutive year.	根据由知名的大学、智囊团、工业同业公会以及企业组成的美国创新前景工作小组2006年11月的报告，高科技贸易赤字到2005年已经连续三年扩大。


This is not clothing or cars, but America’s largest, and most renowned, export sector.	这不是服装或汽车，而是美国最大最有名的出口部门。


This deficit reflects an underlying research deficit.	这个赤字反映了一个潜在的研究不足。


Of the 25 companies granted the most US patents in 2006, only eight were American; 12 were Japanese.	在2006年取得美国专利最多的25个公司中，只有8家是美国公司，有12家日本公司。


Perhaps this helps to explain why, in a survey of more than 60,000 people in 29 countries conducted in 2007 by the New York-based Reputation Institute to rank the “world’s most respected companies,” the first US company on the list appeared in 15th place; the second was in 25th place.	或许，这可以帮助说明为什么位于纽约的声誉研究所在2007年对29个国家超过6万人进行调查从而对“世界上最受尊敬的企业” 的排序中，出现在这个名单的第一家美国公司排在第15位，第二家美国公司排在第25位。


No one can determine how much of America’s productivity gains in recent years have resulted from squeezing human capital, because such things are not measured.	没有人能够确定最近几年美国生产率的提高有多少是由于压榨人力资本取得的，因为这样的东西没有办法进行测量的。


But there has clearly been a great deal of reliance on this strategy, with companies shedding employees not only because they must, but often because they have not met Wall Street analysts’ financial expectations.	但是很明显，美国对这个策略有很大的依赖，因为公司剥离员工不仅仅是因为它们必须这么做，而且通常是因为它们没有达到华尔街分析家的财务预期。


Managers’ increased focus on maximizing shareholder value won many adherents when the idea was introduced in the 1980’s: the impersonal discipline of financial markets would force companies to become more productive and innovative.	经理们增加对最大化股东价值的关注在20世纪80年代这个观点被引进来的时候赢得了许多的支持者：不考虑个人情感的金融市场法则会迫使公司变得更多产，更能创新。


And, in fact, much of the US productivity increase in the 1980’s and 1990’s can likely be attributed to large-scale investment in information and communications technology.	而且，事实上，美国在20世纪80年代和90年代生产率的提高很大一部分可能要归功于在信息通信技术上的大规模投资。


But, as the marginal productivity gains from such investment began to fall, senior managers’ survival and compensation continued to be tied to stock-market performance.	但是，当从这些投资中取得的边际生产率增加开始下降的时候，高级经理们的去留和报酬继续和股票市场的表现联系在一起。


As a result, many simply learned to manage their companies’ short-term share price at the expense of attention to their products and customers.	结果，许多高级经理仅仅学会了以牺牲对他们的产品和顾客的关注为代价来管理他们公司短期的股票价格。


Moreover, because maximizing shareholder value is a poor incentive for workers and middle managers, companies’ boards have increasingly centralized power around chief executives, thereby encouraging a “heroic” form of leadership that is detached from the rest of the enterprise.	而且，因为最大化股东价值对工人和中层经理来说并不是一个很好的激励因素，公司的董事会不断的以首席执行官为中心集中权力，由此鼓励了一个和公司其他人脱离的“英雄”式的领导层。


Indeed, in many cases, the CEO – frequently a Wall Street-endorsed “superstar” parachuted in to “shake things up” – now	确实，在许多情况下，CEO——通常是华尔街认可的“超级明星”空降下来“进行彻底的整合”——现在就是公司，尽管其对公司的产品、客户和竞争对手知之甚少。


This shift to “heroic” leadership can be seen in ballooning CEO compensation.	这种向“英雄”领导的转变可以从不断膨胀的CEO报酬可以看出。


According to a January 2008 report by the Hay Group, the CEO’s of the 50 largest US companies are now paid almost three times what their European counterparts receive – which is many hundreds of times more than their own workers.	根据合益集团（Hay Group）2008年1月份的一份报告，最大的50家美国企业的CEO现在的报酬几乎是欧洲相当职位人员的三倍——这比他们自己的工人的报酬多几百倍。


Until recently, the US asset-price bubble – first in the stock market, then in real estate – masked the underlying depreciation of American enterprises.	直到最近，美国的资产泡沫——首先是股票市场的泡沫，接着是房地产市场的泡沫——掩盖了美国公司潜在的衰落。


But the bubble itself resulted from the same management pathologies as those afflicting the real economy.	但是，泡沫本身是由和那些危害实体经济相同的管理弊端造成的。


After all, managing for the short run encouraged mortgage lenders to offer artificially low “teaser” interest rates to lure potential homeowners.	毕竟，管理的短期化鼓励了抵押贷款人提供人为的低“诱惑”利率来引诱潜在的购房者。


And then those who bought these mortgages never bothered to investigate their underlying value – a spectacular abdication of managerial responsibility.	然后，那些购买了这些抵押的人从来不劳烦去调查它们的潜在价值——这是对管理责任的严重的不负责。


Now that the bubble has burst, America’s current economic downturn is likely to be far worse than previous ones, because US enterprises will have to be rebuilt, slowly and carefully.	现在，泡沫已经破灭，然而美国当前的经济低迷可能比以前的低迷严重得多，因为美国企业不得不缓慢而小心地进行重建。


The dramatic weakening of the US dollar may help America to narrow its massive trade deficit, but we should not expect any sustained improvement without drastic changes in American management.	美元的急剧贬值可能会帮助美国缩减其巨额的贸易赤字，但是，如果在美国的管理上没有巨大的改变，我们不应该期望能够有任何持续的改进。


Fortunately, it may be possible to minimize the fallout for the rest of the world.	幸运的是，或许可以将它对世界其他地区的不利影响降到最低。


While American economists, politicians, and business leaders have for years sought to sell their model of management abroad, many companies elsewhere have not been buying it.	虽然美国的经济学家、政治家和商业领袖多年来一直寻求将他们的管理模式兜售到国外，但是其他地区的许多公司还没有买账。


As a result, other key economies remain healthier than America’s.	结果，其他主要经济体的经济比美国的经济要健康得多。


Make no mistake: this problem was made in America, and that is where it will have to be solved.	别搞错：这个问题是在美国产生的，也只能在美国得到解决。


America’s Self-Defeating Hegemony	把美国自己击败的霸权


When I wrote about the “end of history” almost twenty years ago, one thing that I did not anticipate was the degree to which American behavior and misjudgments would make anti-Americanism one of the chief fault-lines of global politics.	20年前撰写“历史的终结”一文时，我没有料到美国的行为和错误判断竟会使反美主义成为全球政治的重要标志线。


And yet, particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, that is precisely what has happened, owing to four key mistakes made by the Bush administration.	但特别是在2001年9月11日的恐怖袭击后，这一事实已经摆在面前，究其原因与布什政府所犯的四大错误有关。


First, the doctrine of “preemption,” which was devised in response to the 2001 attacks, was inappropriately broadened to include Iraq and other so-called “rogue states” that threatened to develop weapons of mass destruction.	首先，为回应2001年袭击制定的“先发制人”的总体策略被不恰当地扩大到涵盖伊拉克和其它威胁要发展大规模杀伤性武器的其它所谓“流氓”国家。


To be sure, preemption is fully justified vis-à-vis stateless terrorists wielding such weapons.	可以肯定的是，用先发制人的策略对待挥舞大规模杀伤性武器的无国家恐怖分子是合理的。


But it cannot be the core of a general non-proliferation policy, whereby the United States intervenes militarily everywhere to prevent the development of nuclear weapons.	但这样的策略却不能成为所有不扩散政策的核心，在这种政策的指导下，美国四处进行军事干预，目的是防止核武器的发展。


The cost of executing such a policy simply would be too high (several hundred billion dollars and tens of thousands of casualties in Iraq and still counting).	执行上述政策的成本太过昂贵（在伊拉克造成了数千亿美元的损失和数万平民的伤亡，这个数字还在不断扩大）。


This is why the Bush administration has shied away from military confrontations with North Korea and Iran, despite its veneration of Israel’s air strike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981, which set back Saddam Hussein’s nuclear program by several years.	布什政府也因此躲避与北朝鲜和伊朗的军事对峙，尽管美国对以色列1981年空袭伊拉克的奥西拉克反应堆表示赞赏，因为那次行动使萨达姆的核计划延迟了几年之久。


After all, the very success of that attack meant that such limited intervention could never be repeated, because would-be proliferators learned to bury, hide, or duplicate their nascent weapons programs.	但归根结底，那次袭击的成功本身意味着这样有限度的干涉不可能复制，因为可能的扩散者都学会了埋藏、隐蔽或复制它们新生的武器计划。


The second important miscalculation concerned the likely global reaction to America’s exercise of its hegemonic power.	重要失误二是错误地判断了世界各国对美国行使霸权可能做出的反应。


Many people within the Bush administration believed that even without approval by the UN Security Council or NATO, American power would be legitimized by its successful use.	布什政府中很多人认为即使没有得到联合国安理会或北约的批准，出兵成功也会让美国使用军事力量变得合法化。


This had been the pattern for many US initiatives during the Cold War, and in the Balkans during the 1990’s; back then, it was known as “leadership” rather than “unilateralism.”	这在冷战期间和20世纪90年代的巴尔干是许多美国行动的惯用模式，那时候，人们把这称之为“领导”而不是“单边主义”。


But, by the time of the Iraq war, conditions had changed: the US had grown so powerful relative to the rest of the world that the lack of reciprocity became an intense source of irritation even to America’s closest allies.	但是，伊拉克战争爆发时，条件已经发生了变化：美国相对于世界其它国家力量变得如此强大，缺乏协商互动即便对美国最亲密的盟友来说也成为了愤怒的源泉。


The structural anti-Americanism arising from the global distribution of power was evident well before the Iraq war, in the opposition to American-led globalization during the Clinton years.	全球权力分配所引发的结构性反美运动在伊拉克战争爆发前就非常明显，这与克林顿在任时由美国领导的全球化形成了鲜明的对照。


But it was exacerbated by the Bush administration’s “in-your-face” disregard for a variety of international institutions as soon it came into office – a pattern that continued through the onset of the Iraq war.	但布什政府上任后“当面”对很多国际机构不理不睬使反美情绪进一步恶化——这种模式通过发动伊拉克战争仍然得以延续。


America’s third mistake was to overestimate how effective conventional military power would be in dealing with the weak states and networked transnational organizations that characterize international politics, at least in the broader Middle East.	美国的第三个错误是过高估计了传统军事力量在对待国际政治中典型的弱国和跨国组织网络中所起的作用，至少在泛中东地区的确如此。


It is worth pondering why a country with more military power than any other in human history, and that spends as much on its military as virtually the rest of the world combined, cannot bring security to a small country of 24 million people after more than three years of occupation.	值得思考的是，为什么一个军事力量超过人类历史上任何国家，并且在军事上所耗资金相当于所有其它国家总和的民族，在长达3年的占领后仍然不能在一个只有2400万人口的小国实现和平。


At least part of the problem is that it is dealing with complex social forces that are not organized into centralized hierarchies that can enforce rules, and thus be deterred, coerced, or otherwise manipulated through conventional power.	这其中至少部分原因在于美国所面对的不是能执行规则的集中的社会力量，因此也就无法通过传统军力对它们进行牵制、强迫或者操纵。


Israel made a similar mistake in thinking that it could use its enormous margin of conventional military power to destroy Hezbollah in last summer’s Lebanon War.	在认为能够利用强大的常规军事力量在去年夏天的黎巴嫩战争中摧毁真主党的问题上，以色列也犯下了类似的错误。


Both Israel and the US are nostalgic for a twentieth-century world of nation-states, which is understandable, since that is the world to which the kind of conventional power they possess is best suited.	以色列和美国都非常怀念21世纪的民族国家世界，它们有这样的想法顺理成章，因为在那个世界里，它们所拥有的传统力量最容易发挥作用。


But nostalgia has led both states to misinterpret the challenges they now face, whether by linking al-Qaeda to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, or Hezbollah to Iran and Syria.	可是怀旧情绪使得这两个国家错误地估计了目前所面临的挑战，无论是把基地组织与萨达姆·侯赛因的伊拉克连在一起，还是把真主党与伊朗和叙利亚扯到一块都是这种错误的典型表现。


This linkage does exist in the case of Hezbollah, but the networked actors have their own social roots and are not simply pawns used by regional powers.	在涉及真主党的问题上这种联系的确存在，但网络之中的各派势力有着它们自身的社会根基，而并不单纯是被地区力量操纵的木偶。


This is why the exercise of conventional power has become frustrating.	这就解释了为什么使用传统力量只能带来令人沮丧的结果。


Finally, the Bush administration’s use of power has lacked not only a compelling strategy or doctrine, but also simple competence.	最后，布什政府对军力的运用不仅缺乏强制性的策略或规范，单就实力而言也明显不足。


In Iraq alone, the administration misestimated the threat of WMD, failed to plan adequately for the occupation, and then proved unable to adjust quickly when things went wrong.	仅就伊拉克来讲，布什政府错误地估计了大规模杀伤性武器的力量，也未能制定充分的占领计划，而后又在情况发生时未能迅速地适应调节。


To this day, it has dropped the ball on very straightforward operational issues in Iraq, such as funding democracy promotion efforts.	迄今为止，美国已经在伊拉克所有简单问题，比如为民主宣传筹集资金上暂停了一切运作。


Incompetence in implementation has strategic consequences.	执行方面的受阻带来了战略性的恶果。


Many of the voices that called for, and then bungled, military intervention in Iraq are now calling for war with Iran.	那些高声呼吁对伊拉克作战，而后又把局势搞得一团糟的势力现在又在煽动对伊朗作战。


Why should the rest of the world think that conflict with a larger and more resolute enemy would be handled any more capably?	世界其它国家凭什么要相信这些人在与更大更坚决的��人作战时能处理得更好？


But the fundamental problem remains the lopsided distribution of power in the international system.	但最根本的问题依然是国际体系中不平衡的权力分配。


Any country in the same position as the US, even a democracy, would be tempted to exercise its hegemonic power with less and less restraint.	任何与美国有同等地位的国家，即使是民主国家，都会经不住诱惑越来越肆无忌惮地行使自己的支配权力。


America’s founding fathers were motivated by a similar belief that unchecked power, even when democratically legitimated, could be dangerous, which is why they created a constitutional system of internally separated powers to limit the executive.	美国的建国之父们同样认为不受任何限制的权力，即使在政治上合理合法，同样也充满了危险，也正基于这样的考虑，他们才建立了内部分权的宪法制度，以便对领导人进行牵制。


Such a system does not exist on a global scale today, which may explain how America got into such trouble.	今天全球范围内并没有这样的体系存在，这也许可以解释美国陷入麻烦的原因。


A smoother international distribution of power, even in a global system that is less than fully democratic, would pose fewer temptations to abandon the prudent exercise of power.	更为均衡的权力分配，即便在不完全民主的全球体制下，也会减少放弃谨慎使用权力的诱惑。


America’s Self-Inflicted Decline	美国自作自受的衰退


MELBOURNE – If the broad post-World War II prosperity that has endured for six decades comes to an end, both the United States and Europe will be responsible.	墨尔本——如果持续了六十年之久的二战后大面积繁荣嘎然而止，美国和欧洲都要对此负责。


With rare exceptions, politics has become a discredited profession throughout the West.	政治已经在整个西方世界成为令人不齿的职业，在这个问题上几乎没有任何区别。


Tomorrow is always treated as more important than next week, and next week prevails over next year, with no one seeking to secure the long-term future.	明天总是比下周重要、而下周比明年重要，没有人努力追求长远的未来。


Now the West is paying the price.	现在西方正在为此付出代价。


President Barack Obama’s instincts may be an exception here, but he is fighting powerful hidebound forces in the United States, as well as a demagogic populism, in the form of the Tea Party, that is far worse – and that might defeat him in 2012, seriously damaging America in the process.	巴拉克·奥巴马总统的直觉或许是个例外，但他不仅要对抗美国强大的保守势力，还要对抗比保守势力更糟的以茶党形式存在的蛊惑人心的民粹主义——这可能导致他在2012年竞选失败，并进而严重损害美国的利益。


America’s friends around the world watched with dismay the recent brawl in over raising the federal government’s debt ceiling, and the US Congress’s inability to come to anything like a balanced and forward-looking compromise.	美国在世界各地的盟友惊异地注视着最近因提高联邦政府债务上限而引发的口水战，他们惊讶于美国国会无法达成任何均衡而具前瞻性的折衷协议。


On the contrary, the outcome represents a significant victory for the Tea Party’s minions, whose purpose seems to be to reduce government obligations and expenditures to a bare minimum (some object even to having a central bank), and to maintain President George W. Bush’s outrageous tax breaks for the wealthy.	相反，这样的结果代表着茶党喽罗的巨大胜利，他们的目标是最大限度地压缩政府的债务和开支（某些人甚至反对设立央行），并继续实行乔治·W·布什总统令人愤慨的富裕阶层减税优惠。


America’s current fiscal problems are rooted in a long period of unfunded spending.	美国目前财政问题的根源在于长期没有来源的开支。


Bush’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the manner in which he conducted the “global war on terror” made matters much worse, contributing to a totally unsustainable situation.	布什的阿富汗和伊拉克战争和他开展“全球反恐战争”的做法使得整体状况迅速恶化，导致局势完全无法持续。


Indeed, Obama inherited an almost impossible legacy.	事实上，奥巴马接过的是几乎毫无希望的烂摊子。


In the weeks since the debt ceiling agreement, it has become increasingly clear that good government might be impossible in the US.	债务上限协议达成数周后，人们越来越清楚地意识到合理治政在美国或许是不可能的。


The coming months of campaigning for the US presidency will be spent in petty brawling over what should be cut.	今后几个月的美国总统竞选将会争论哪些开支应该削减，而类似的争吵其实毫无意义。


The example of recent weeks gives us no cause for optimism that US legislators will rise above partisan politics and ask themselves what is best for America.	近几周的例子让我们没有理由乐观地认为美国议员会摆脱党派之争的束缚，扪心自问怎样做才最符合美国的利益。


In these circumstances, it is not surprising that financial markets have returned to extreme volatility.	在这种情况下，金融市场回归极度动荡原本不足为奇。


The expenditure cuts mandated by the outcome of the debt-ceiling debate will reduce economic activity, thereby undermining growth and making debt reduction even more difficult.	债务上限辩论结果授权的开支削减将压缩经济活动，进而破坏增长，进一步增加减债的难度。


Providing further fiscal stimulus to boost economic growth would carry its own risks, owing to the debt ceiling and another, more ominous factor: America is already overly indebted, and there are signs that major holders of US government securities are finally tired of being repaid in depreciated currency.	进一步施加财政刺激推动经济发展也将伴随相应的风险，既因为债务上限，也因为另一种更为不详的因素：美国已经过度负债，有迹象表明美国国债主要持有人最终厌倦了被偿以贬值的货币。


Most importantly, China’s call for the introduction of a new reserve currency stems from its frustration with the failure of major governments – whether in the US or Europe – to govern their economic affairs with realism and good sense.	更为重要的是，中国呼吁引入全新储备货币是因其懊恼于美国和欧洲等主要国家政府无力在管理自己的经济事务时表现出现实的态度和良好的判断力。


China recognizes that America is in great difficulty (indeed, it recognizes this more clearly than the US itself), and that, given the poisonous political atmosphere prevailing in Washington, there will be no easy return to good government, economic stability, and strong growth.	中国认识到美国面临的巨大困难（事实上，中国对这一点的认识比美国本身更清晰），而且鉴于目前在华盛顿占主导地位的有毒政治氛围，回归合理执政、经济稳定和强劲增长的健康状况其实并不容易。


America’s leadership in world affairs began to weaken with the unilateralism of Bush, and today’s economic problems are reinforcing this tendency.	美国对世界事务的领导力随布什奉行单边主义开始削弱，而今天的经济问题正在强化这一趋势。


To reverse America’s decline, Obama needs bipartisan support for his (quite mainstream) policies, but so far the US Congress has shown no stomach for a principled approach to its legislative duties.	奥巴马需要两党协力支持其（相当主流的）政策来扭转美国衰落的颓势，但截至目前美国国会对履行立法责任时秉承坚持原则的态度似乎不感兴趣。


If Germany’s half-hearted efforts to stabilize Europe somehow turn out to be successful, America’s position will be further eroded, and central banks around the world will begin to regard the euro once again as a reliable alternative to the dollar as a reserve currency.	如果德国三心二意的欧洲稳定行动不知怎样取得了成功，美国的地位会遭到进一步侵蚀，而世界各国的中央银行也将开始再次将欧元视为替代美元的可靠储备货币。


The alternative, as China has suggested, would be to develop a new reserve currency.	中国已经提出的替代方案是推出新的储备货币。


These realities represent a power shift of a kind that we have not experienced in our lifetimes.	当前的现实状况折射出我们这一生中从未经历过的���种权力转移。


China’s economic power over the US is now substantial, and will limit not only America’s influence in the financial markets, but also its capacity to use military power.	中国相对于美国已经积累了可观的经济优势，这不仅会制约美国在金融市场的影响，而且会限制其动用军力的能力。


If this forces America back towards what the international-relations scholar Joseph Nye calls “soft power and multilateral diplomacy,” it may well be a good thing.	如果美国能因此被迫退回到国际关系学者约瑟夫·奈所谓的“软实力和多边外交”时代，这很可能不失为一件好事。


But such approaches are anathema to the US Republican Party, and to its Tea Party faction in particular, and they might unnerve the many Asians who are nervous at China’s growing military might.	但这种处事方式在美国共和党，特别是其茶党派系看来无异于一种诅咒，他们可能让被中国日益增长的军事实力弄得紧张兮兮的众多亚洲人丧失勇气。


The counter-argument – that any sell-off or failure by China to continue to buy US government securities would hurt China as much as America – is not valid.	中国卖出或不再继续买入美国国债会像伤及美国那样有损于中国的反面论调并没有充分的依据。


As each year passes, China’s markets expand worldwide, and its domestic market comes to represent a greater percentage of its own GDP.	年复一年，中国市场日益向全球拓展，其国内市场也在国内生产总值中开始占据越来越大的百分比。


As a result, China will not need a strong dollar in the long term.	这将导致中国长期来看不再需要强势美元的支持。


Americans need to get their economic house in order before China loses its incentive to support the dollar.	美国必须在中国丧失支持美元的兴趣之前整顿好国内经济秩序。


On several occasions in the post-WWII period, the US has learned with great pain that there are limits to the effective use of military power.	在二战结束后的几次战争中，美国从惨痛的代价中学到了军事实力的有效运用无法解决所有问题。


American objectives could not be achieved in Vietnam.	美国的目标无法在越南实现。


The outcome in Iraq will not be determined until the last American troops have been withdrawn.	美国军队从伊拉克撤军前根本无法确定伊拉克的最终局势。


In Afghanistan, where withdrawal dates have already been set, it is difficult to believe that a cohesive unified state can be established.	在撤军日期已经确定的阿富汗，很难相信有凝聚力的统一国家将得以最终建立。


As the efficacy of military power is reduced, so the importance of economic power grows.	随着军事力量效果的削弱，经济力量的重要性却越来越突出。


Recognition of these central realities – and bipartisanship in addressing them – is critical for America’s future, and that of the West.	切实承认上述核心现实和最终解决所需的两党合作对美国、还有西方的未来都是至关重要的。


America’s Socialism for the Rich	美国针对富人的“社会主义”


With all the talk of “green shoots” of economic recovery, America’s banks are pushing back on efforts to regulate them.	正当人们谈论金融危机复苏之际，美国的银行业同时在重新考虑如何加强监管。


While politicians talk about their commitment to regulatory reform to prevent a recurrence of the crisis, this is one area where the devil really is in the details – and the banks will muster what muscle they have left to ensure that they have ample room to continue as they have in the past.	为了以防止另一次危机的发生，政治人物也在谈论如何改革监管规范。 还有一个我们必须关注的领域——银行正在重整旗鼓，想要回复到往日的辉煌。


The old system worked well for the bankers (if not for their shareholders), so why should they embrace change?	过去的体系对银行非常有利（虽然对股东是否有利就另说了），如此说来，他们为什么要改变呢？


Indeed, the efforts to rescue them devoted so little thought to the kind of post-crisis financial system we want that we will end up with a banking system that is less competitive, with the large banks that were too big too fail even larger.	实际上，我们在危机后作出了的大量努力，但收效却甚微，银行比以前更没有竞争力，那些因为规模庞大而没法倒闭的银行变得规模更加庞大。


It has long been recognized that those America’s banks that are too big to fail are also too big to be managed.	大家早就知道一个事实：美国银行不仅大的不能倒闭，而且如此庞大的规模也不利于管理。


That is one reason that the performance of several of them has been so dismal.	这也是他们一直经营不善的原因所在。


Because government provides deposit insurance, it plays a large role in restructuring (unlike other sectors).  Normally, when a bank fails, the government engineers a financial restructuring; if it has to put in money, it, of course, gains a stake in the future.	每当他们运转失灵之时，政府就出面重组，提供存款信用保险，同时持有银行的股份。


Officials know that if they wait too long, zombie or near zombie banks – with little or no net worth, but treated as if they were viable institutions – are likely to “gamble on resurrection.”	政府官员们深知，如果他们救援稍缓出台，那些“僵尸”或是濒临“僵尸”银行——几乎没有净资产，“死马”还被当作“活马”来医——为了自保，很有可能会放手一搏。


If they take big bets and win, they walk away with the proceeds; if they fail, the government picks up the tab.	如果冒险成功，他们自然会转危为安，如果失败，那就留给政府来“埋单”了。


This is not just theory; it is a lesson we learned, at great expense, during the Savings & Loan crisis of the 1980’s.	这不仅仅是我们的想象，而是有前车之鉴。


When the ATM machine says, “insufficient funds,” the government doesn’t want this to mean that the bank, rather than your account, is out of money, so it intervenes before the till is empty.	在1980年代时发生的储贷危机中，当时的ATM机没有“足够现金”，政府被迫出手救助，以避免资金枯竭导致存款人血本无归。


In a financial restructuring, shareholders typically get wiped out, and bondholders become the new shareholders.	在通常的金融重组中，股东一般承担损失所有的投资损失，而债券持有人往往成为新的股东。


Sometimes, the government must provide additional funds; sometimes it looks for a new investor to take over the failed bank.	政府有可能提供额外的资金，而新的投资者必须接管倒闭的银行。


The Obama administration has, however, introduced a new concept: too big to be financially restructured.	然而，奥巴马政府引入一个新的概念：过于庞大的银行不能进行重组。


The administration argues that all hell would break loose if we tried to play by the usual rules with these big banks.	不能以常规的方法来治理这些规模庞大的银行。


Markets would panic.	因为如果想要改组银行,市场会出现恐慌。


So, not only can’t we touch the bondholders, we can’t even touch the shareholders – even if most of the shares’ existing value merely reflects a bet on a government bailout.	所以说不仅不能碰债券人，甚至连股东都不能碰——所有的一切只能依赖于政府的救助计划。


I think this judgment is wrong.	我个人认为这个思路是错误的。


I think the Obama administration has succumbed to political pressure and scare-mongering by the big banks.	奥巴马政府可能是在政治的压力和大银行的误导下作出的判断。


As a result, the administration has confused bailing out the bankers and their shareholders with bailing out the banks.	他把救助银行和救助银行的股东和债权人混为一谈了。


Restructuring gives banks a chance for a new start: new potential investors (whether in equity or debt instruments) will have more confidence, other banks will be more willing to lend to them, and they will be more willing to lend to others.	  重组给了银行一个新生的机会：新的投资者（不论是资产抵押或是债券重组）将更有信心，其他银行也会乐于把资金借给他们。 对于债券人来说。


The bondholders will gain from an orderly restructuring, and if the value of the assets is truly greater than the market (and outside analysts) believe, they will eventually reap the gains.	如果银行资产的实际价值比市场的价格要高，他们自然会得到补偿。 由此而受益。


But what is clear is that the Obama strategy’s current and future costs are very high – and so far, it has not achieved its limited objective of restarting lending.	显而易见的是，奥巴马的战略在目前和将来成本都会很高——目前看来，他并没有实现预定的有限目标：那就是重新启动借贷活动。


The taxpayer has had to pony up billions, and has provided billions more in guarantees – bills that are likely to come due in the future.	纳税人已经掏出了数百亿美元，而且很可能在将来掏出更多个百亿美元来担保。


Rewriting the rules of the market economy – in a way that has benefited those that have caused so much pain to the entire global economy – is worse than financially costly.	重新改写市场经济的规则不仅仅是金融业蒙受到损失，获利者往往是那些金融危机的始作俑者。


Most Americans view it as grossly unjust, especially after they saw the banks divert the billions intended to enable them to revive lending to payments of outsized bonuses and dividends.	绝大多数的美国人认为这非常不公平，特别是他们看到银行接受到数百亿美元救助后，忙着给自己支付巨额的奖金和分红之后。


Tearing up the social contract is something that should not be done lightly.	撕毁社会合同不能如此的轻率。


But this new form of ersatz capitalism, in which losses are socialized and profits privatized, is doomed to failure.	如果采取如此的改革方案：也就是赚钱归个人，赔钱则由社会大众承担。


Incentives are distorted.	这样的做法注定要失败。


There is no market discipline.	既然激励机制失灵了，哪里有什么市场游戏的规则可言？


The too-big-to-be-restructured banks know that they can gamble with impunity – and, with the Federal Reserve making funds available at near-zero interest rates, there are ample funds to do so.	那些庞大到不能被重组的银行知道他们可以毫无顾忌地赌博——因为美联储提供利率几乎为零的资金，而资金可以源源不断地提供。


Some have called this new economic regime “socialism with American characteristics.”	一些人把这种新的经济形式成为“美国式的社会主义”。


But socialism is concerned about ordinary individuals.	但社会主义关注的是普通人的利益。


By contrast, the United States has provided little help for the millions of Americans who are losing their homes.	与此相反的是，美国并没有给数百万失去家园的普通美国人提供帮助。


Workers who lose their jobs receive only 39 weeks of limited unemployment benefits, and are then left on their own.	失业的工人仅仅得到39个星期的有限失业救助，之后只能自谋出路。


And, when they lose their jobs, most lose their health insurance, too.	当他们失去了工作，同时也失去了健康医疗保险。


America has expanded its corporate safety net in unprecedented ways, from commercial banks to investment banks, then to insurance, and now to automobiles, with no end in sight.	美国正在无休止地对公司提供安全保障，从商业银行到投资银行，然后是保险公司，现在是汽车行业，看来被救助的名单还远远没有完结。


In truth, this is not socialism, but an extension of long standing corporate welfarism.	实际上，这不是社会主义，而是长期的公司福利主义的延伸。


The rich and powerful turn to the government to help them whenever they can, while needy individuals get little social protection.	有钱有权的人可以伸手向政府求助，而普通大众却没什么社会保障。


We need to break up the too-big-to-fail banks; there is no evidence that these behemoths deliver societal benefits that are commensurate with the costs they have imposed on others.	我们必须拆分这些庞大而不能倒闭的银行。 没有任何证据可以说明这些“金融怪兽”在接受救援后，会给社会大众带来任何好处。


And, if we don’t break them up, then we have to severely limit what they do.	如果他们不被拆分，我们也要大大限制他们的权限。


They can’t be allowed to do what they did in the past – gamble at others’ expenses.	让他们不能还像过去那样为所欲为——赌博后的损失由其他人来承担。


This raises another problem with America’s too-big-to-fail, too-big-to-be-restructured banks: they are too politically powerful.	对于这些金融怪兽来说，还有一个值得关注的问题：他们有着非常强大的政治势力。


Their lobbying efforts worked well, first to deregulate, and then to have taxpayers pay for the cleanup.	他们游说团的工作非常有效：先是减少监管，然后是纳税人来给他们收拾残局。


Their hope is that it will work once again to keep them free to do as they please, regardless of the risks for taxpayers and the economy.	正如他们所述求的那样，不顾纳税人和全球经济的死活，还想再一次地全身而退。


We cannot afford to let that happen.	这次，我们不能再让他们得逞。


America’s Sputnik Moment in Beijing	美国坐视中国崛起


NEW YORK – August 8, 2008, may someday be remembered as the first day of the post-American era.	纽约--2008年8月8日或许会成为后美国时代的第一天，也许会是另一个“人造卫星”升天的日子。


Or it could be remembered as another “Sputnik moment,” when, as with the Soviet foray into outer space in 1957, the American people realized that the country had lost its footing and decided it was time for the United States to get its act together.	1957年，苏联进入外层空间，美国人民意识到他们的国家衰落了，于是就决心重振旗鼓。


There was no mistaking the power and symbolism of the opening ceremonies for the Beijing Olympic Games on August 8.	人们不会误解8月8日北京奥运会开幕式的象征意义和震撼力。


That multimedia spectacular did far more than trace China’s 5,000-year history; it was a statement that China is a major civilization that demands and deserves its rightful place in the global hierarchy.	这一多媒体盛会绝不仅仅是回顾中国五千年的文明史； 它也是向世人宣布，中国是一个文明古国，要求在全球体系中占有一席之地，而且也理应如此。


There was also no mistaking the symbolism of seeing President Bush, waving cheerfully from his spot in the bleachers while Chinese President Hu Jintao sat behind what looked more like a throne.	美国总统布什从露天看台高兴地挥手示意，而中国主席胡锦涛则端坐在好似王座的位置上。 人们也不会误解这里的象征意义。


It is hard to imagine that China’s government, which obsesses over every minute issue of diplomatic protocol, had not orchestrated this stark image of America’s decline relative to the country to which it owes $1.4 trillion.	中国政府一向对外交礼节斤斤计较，因此，人们难以想象，中国政府并无刻意安排，从而显示出美国相对于持有一万四千亿美元国债的国家衰落这一鲜明形象。


It would be hard to imagine Franklin Roosevelt or Ronald Reagan accepting a similar relative position.	难以想象罗斯福或者里根会接受这样类似的居于人下的位置。


At the very same time that Bush was waving from the stands, Russia was invading Georgia, America’s closest partner in the Caucasus.	就在布什在看台上挥手的时候，俄国正在入侵美国在高加索最紧密的伙伴格鲁吉亚。


Russia’s message to other West-leaning countries in the former Soviet world was clear: America cannot protect you.	俄国明确向倾西方的前苏联加盟共和国发出信号，那就是，美国保护不了你们。


Frighteningly, the Russians were likely correct.	令人害怕的是，俄国或许是对的。 美国本来就身陷伊拉克泥潭，难以在全球施加实力。


While the Iraq quagmire has made it difficult for America to project force around the world, America’s growing debt, conflicts with friends and enemies alike, absence of any perceivable strategy for changing times, and its political system’s seeming inability to take action to address these challenges have combined to turn America into a struggling giant.	加之美国债务不断加重，与敌友发生冲突，对于正在改变的世界没有任何现实的应对战略，而其政治体制看似无法采取行动来处理这些挑战。 这些因素汇集起来把美国变成了一个疲于奔命的巨人。


Today, from Iran to Darfur to Zimbabwe to Georgia, the world is witnessing the effects of a budding post-American world, and the picture does not look pretty.	如今，在达尔富尔、津巴布韦以及格鲁吉亚等世界各地，人们正在见证正在成形的后美国世界的影响，而这一景象并不十分好看。


As much as we all value the rise of new powers like China and India, it remains to be seen whether these countries will become as benevolent a power as America, however flawed, has been over the past half-century.	美国在过去五十年里无论有多少缺陷，但毕竟还是一个良性的强国。 尽管我们重视中国和印度等新强国的兴起，但是，这些国家是否会像美国那样还有待观察。


Neo-colonialism is returning to Africa, the global project of human rights is in retreat, and the world trade system is becoming far less open.	新殖民主义正在重返非洲，全球人权事业正在倒退，而世界贸易体系则相比变得远为封闭。


Brutal dictators go unpunished because their interests are protected by large powers with stakes in their natural resources.	残忍的独裁者逍遥法外，因为他们受到在其自然资源中应有利益的大国保护。


Reversing this trend is not only in America’s interest, but also in the world’s interest.	扭转这一趋势不仅符合美国的利益，也符合世界的利益。


To do so, Americans must identify and address the great challenges the United States faces, starting from the ground up.	为此，美国必须确认其所面临的巨大挑战并且加以解决，这要从零做起。 美国的政治竞选经费结构导致政府资金大量误用，必须加以解决。


Fixing America’s campaign finance structure, which leads to massive misallocations of government funds, resuscitating America’s wildly uneven and often moribund education system, building an immigration system that actively recruits the most talented people from around the world via a fast track to US citizenship, and developing a national energy policy that moves the US far more quickly toward energy independence would all be important steps in this direction.	美国的教育体系参差不齐，病态百出，必须予以恢复生机。 要建立积极从全球招募精英的移民体系，迅速赋予他们美国公民资格。


Working to rebuild the traditional bipartisan foreign-policy consensus would also make the US a far more predictable partner to friends and allies around the world.	努力重新建立起超越党派分歧的外交政策共识也将会让美国成为一个对于全球友邦和盟国而言更为可以预料的伙伴国家。


And America must be a respectful partner in order to encourage rising powers like India and China to play more constructive roles in international affairs.	而且，美国也必须是一个值得尊重的伙伴国家，从而鼓励中国和印度等崛起大国在国际事务中发挥更为具有建设性的作用。


The world is not ready for the post-American era, and countries like China and India must play a far greater role in strengthening the existing institutions of world peace and, where appropriate, building new ones that can promote a positive agenda of security, dignity, rights, and prosperity across the globe.	世界尚未准备好迎接后美国时代，而印度和中国等国家必须在巩固现有世界和平机制上发挥远远更大的作用。 在必要的时候要建立新的机制以促进全球安全、尊严、人权和繁荣议程。


The world community is not there yet, and until it is, the world needs a new kind of American leader – a leader able to inspire Americans to fix their problems at home and work with partners across the globe in promoting a common agenda as bold and progressive as the order built from the ashes of World War II 60 years ago.	而且，在做到以前，世界需要一种新型的美国领导人。 这一领导人应该能够鼓舞美国人民和全球伙伴一道解决其国内外问题，促进建立共同议程，而这一议程应当像六十年前从二战废墟上建立起来的秩序一样果敢和进步。


The Beijing Olympics could be remembered as a new “Sputnik moment” for the US, inspiring the country to meaningfully face the music of a changing world.	北京奥运会对于美国而言也许会成为苏联卫星升天时刻，鼓舞这一国家有意义地面对纷繁变化的世界。


But America can make it so only by recognizing the great challenges it faces and taking bold steps towards addressing them, at home and with allies abroad.	但是只有直面其所面临的巨大挑战并且采取大胆的步骤解决这些挑战，美国才能在国内外与盟友携手取得成功。


America’s Perilous Pivot	美国的支点岌岌可危


MADRID – The Pacific or the Middle East?	马德里——太平洋还是中东？


For the United States, that is now the primary strategic question.	这是美国当前面临的首要战略问题。


The violence in Gaza, coming as President Barack Obama was meeting Asia’s leaders in Phnom Penh, perfectly encapsulates America’s dilemma.	美国总统奥巴马在金边会见亚洲领导人时加沙发生暴力事件是对美国两难困境的完美诠释。


Instead of being able to focus on US foreign policy’s “pivot” to Asia, Obama was forced to spend many hours in conversation with the leaders of Egypt and Israel, and to dispatch Secretary of State Hillary Clinton from Asia, in order to facilitate a cease-fire in Gaza.	奥巴马非但无法关注亚洲这个美国外交政策的“支点”，反而被迫在与埃及和以色列领导人的谈判中耗费大量时间，并指派国务卿希拉里·克林顿离开亚洲，以便促成在加沙地区达成停火协议。


Of the two geopolitical focal points demanding America’s attention, one represents the future and the other the past.	上述两个吸引美国关注的地缘政治焦点中，一个代表未来、另一个则代表过去。


Whereas Asia played an important role in a US presidential election campaign that was marked by often-heated references to China’s rise, the Middle East has kept the US bogged down for decades.	尽管亚洲在美国总统竞选中发挥了重要作用，中国的崛起问题被反复提及，但美国数十年来一直深陷于中东问题。


In addition to the eternal Israel-Palestine conflict, Iraq’s instability, the Arab Spring, Syria’s civil war, and the ongoing nuclear standoff with Iran all demand America’s attention.	除永恒不变的巴以冲突外，伊拉克的混乱局势、阿拉伯之春、叙利亚内战和伊朗目前的核僵局都吸引着美国的注意力。


If the Iran crisis were to boil over, the pivot to Asia would no longer be America’s main foreign-policy priority.	如果伊朗危机失控，美国的外交重点将不再是亚洲问题。


But if the dispute with Iran is resolved diplomatically, the Middle East might, perhaps, be relegated to a position of lesser importance, as Obama clearly desires.	但如果能以外交手段解决和伊朗的争端，中东问题或许可能像奥巴马总统明确期望的那样转移到不那么重要的位置。


The question, therefore, is whether the US will find itself drawn into another war in a region on which it depends less and less for energy.	因此问题在于美国是否会在对中东能源依赖度日益降低的同时被该地区爆发的另一场战争所波及。


Indeed, the revolution in non-conventional hydrocarbons, particularly shale gas and oil, which the International Energy Agency recently predicted would make the US the world’s largest oil producer by 2020, and the top energy producer overall by 2030, will have enormous global repercussions.	事实上，根据国际能源机构的近期预测，打破常规的碳氢化合物（特别是页岩油气）革命到2020年将使美国成为世界最大产油国，而到2030年则将成为最大产能国，由此产生的全球反响将不容小觑。


For the US, energy self-sufficiency is the perfect excuse for a phased withdrawal from the Middle East; freed from energy dependency, America should be able to concentrate on the Pacific.	对美国而言，能源自给是分阶段从中东撤军的完美借口； 一旦摆脱对能源的依赖，美国就可以集中精力处理太平洋事务。


Although maintaining stable global energy prices and its alliance with Israel means that the US cannot cut itself off completely from the Middle East’s troubles, the shift in focus to Asia began early in Obama’s first administration, with Clinton announcing America’s strategic reorientation even before US troops began withdrawing from Iraq.	尽管保持全球能源价格稳定和与以色列联盟的需要意味着美国无法从中东烦恼中彻底脱身， 但战略重点向亚洲的转移早在奥巴马的首届任期内已经开始，克林顿甚至早在美国从伊拉克撤军前就宣布了美国战略重点的转移。


Following his re-election, Obama’s first foreign visit was to Myanmar, Thailand, and Cambodia – a choice that cannot have pleased China, as all three are ASEAN members, while Myanmar was, until it began its democratic transition, a close Chinese ally.	竞选连任后，奥巴马的首次国外访问选择了缅甸、泰国和柬埔寨——中国不可能喜欢这样的选择，因为上述三国均为东盟成员，而缅甸直到开始民主过渡前一直是中国的亲密盟友。


Asia is, of course, experiencing rapid economic growth, but managing the region’s strong nationalist tensions calls for the creation of regional security structures, together with closer economic integration.	当然，亚洲经济飞速发展，但需要依靠地区安全机制和经济一体化来控制该地区剑拔弩张的民族紧张局势。


Complicating matters even more is what US scholar Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, the dean of international studies at Peking University, called in a recent paper for the Brookings Institution “strategic distrust.”	美国学者李侃如和北京大学国际研究院院长王缉思近期在一篇布鲁金斯学会论文中指出，“战略不信任”已进一步恶化了本已复杂的局势。


Cultivating strategic trust between the twenty-first century’s leading powers will be fundamental to the international system’s harmonious functioning.	国际体系和谐运转的基础将取决于能否培养二十一世纪大国之间的战略互信。


But how can this be achieved?	但上述目标怎样才能实现？


As China will be importing three-quarters of its oil from the Middle East by 2020, one step forward would be China’s cooperation in finding solutions to the region’s problems.	因为到2020年中国石油进口量的四分之三将来源于中东，一个重要的步骤��争取中国的合作以解决该地区的问题。


After the January 2013 Israeli elections, Iran will again move to the top of Obama’s foreign-policy agenda.	2013年1月以色列大选后，伊朗将再次成为奥巴马外交政策议程中的首要问题。


Military intervention in Iran – which itself will be holding a presidential election in June – would incite not only regional, but global, instability.	对伊朗实施军事干预可能引发地区、乃至全球动荡，伊朗国内将于6月举行总统选举。


The Arab world, Russia, and China would be forced to take sides, straining global relations between the different poles of power and raising tensions in the Pacific.	阿拉伯世界、俄罗斯和中国将被迫表明立场，导致全球处在权力两极的大国间关系紧张，并加剧太平洋地区的紧张局势。


So China has a large strategic interest in working with the US to avoid a showdown.	因此同美国合作避免决一胜负完全符合中国的战略利益。


Beyond Iran, the volatile situation throughout the Middle East urgently demands solutions.	除伊朗问题外，迫切需要稳定整个中东地区的动荡局势。


The latest eruption of violent conflict between Hamas and Israel underscores the importance of reviving the peace process.	哈马斯和以色列之间最新爆发的暴力冲突凸显了恢复和平进程的重要性。


Syria’s civil war, in which a growing number of regional players have become involved, is beginning to look increasingly like a trial run for all-out war between Sunni Muslims (Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States, Turkey, and Egypt) and Shia Muslims (Iran and Hezbollah) for regional dominance.	导致越来越多地区力量卷入其中的叙利亚内战已经越来越像是（沙特阿拉伯及其他海湾国家、土耳其、埃及的）逊尼派穆斯林和（伊朗及真主党的）什叶派穆斯林之间为争夺区域霸权发动全面战争的试验场。


Iran’s leaders appear to believe that the US, having incurred extremely high economic and human costs from more than a decade of war, would rather avoid another military intervention.	伊朗领导人似乎深信美国在承受了十余年战争所带来的极高的经济及人员损失后，更愿意尽力避免另一次军事行动。


US public opinion seems to confirm this.	这种看法在美国舆论中似乎也得到了印证。


A recent survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs indicated that 67% of Americans believe that the Iraq war was not worthwhile.	芝加哥全球事务理事会近来的一次调查表明，67%的美国人认为伊拉克战争得不偿失。


Moreover, 69% do not believe that the US is safer from terrorism since the war in Afghanistan, and 71% say that the experience in Iraq shows that the US should take greater care in how it uses force.	此外，69%的人认为美国在阿富汗战争后面临的恐怖主义威胁并未减弱，而71%的人表示伊拉克的经验表明美国应该更加谨慎地使用武力。


But, if Americans seem unlikely to be willing to invest billions of dollars in another dead-end foreign adventure, Iran’s leaders, for their part, are increasingly hemmed in by international sanctions, which are beginning to wreak havoc on the country’s economy.	但即便美国人似乎不愿为又一次没有出路的国外冒险投资数十亿美元，伊朗领导人却越来越深地陷入破坏该国经济的国际制裁的包围。


Both sides may believe that their best option – at least for now – is to negotiate.	双方也许认为至少从目前的情况看，谈判才是他们最好的选择。


Peaceful resolution of the Iranian question would help the US to complete its shift toward Asia.	和平解决伊朗问题将帮助美国完成向亚洲的过渡。


China may not wish for that outcome, but its own vital interest in the security of Middle East energy supplies should compel it to cooperate.	中国可能不希望看到这样的结果，但它在中东能源供应安全领域的切身利益迫使它不得不合作。


After all, another Middle East conflict would poison and distort relations in the region for decades, which would be the worst of all possible consequences – for the US and China alike.	毕竟，再次爆发中东冲突将在未来几十年中毒害和扭曲该地区关系，而对美中两国而言，这将是可能出现的最坏结果。


America’s Suicidal Statecraft	美国自杀式的治国之策


Since its victory in the Cold War, America’s global hegemony has rested on three pillars: economic power, military might, and a vast capacity to export its popular culture.	自从赢得冷战以来，美国的全球性霸权依赖于三大支柱，即经济实力、军事力量及其输出大众文化的巨大能力。


The recent emergence of additional powers – the European Union, China, India, and a Russia driven to recover its lost status – has eroded America’s capacity to shape events unilaterally.	最近新的强权像欧盟、中国、印度以及力争恢复其失去的地位的俄国等的兴起已经侵蚀了美国单方面主宰世界事务的能力。


Even so, America remains by far the world’s most powerful country; its decline has more to do with its incompetent use of power than with the emergence of competitors.	即使如此，美国依旧是世界上最为强大的国家； 其衰落与其运用其实力不当有关，其程度超过竞争对手的崛起。


It is American leaders’ “suicidal statecraft,” to use Arnold Toynbee’s pithy phrase for what he considered the ultimate cause of imperial collapse, that is to blame for America’s plight.	借用英国历史学家汤因比简练又力的话来说，美国的境况应当归咎于美国领导人“自杀式的治国之策”。 汤因比用这一词语来总结帝国崩溃的最终原因。


Consider the Middle East.	让我们来考虑一下中东的情况。


Nothing reveals the decline of the United States in the region better than the contrast between America’s sober use of power in the first Gulf War in 1991 and the hubris and deceit of today’s Iraq war.	美国在1991年第一次海湾战争期间冷静地使用武力，而在如今的伊拉克战争中却充满傲慢和欺骗。 没有任何事情比这两者的对比更可以解释美国在该地区的衰落了。


In 1991, America forged the most formidable international coalition since World War II, and led it in a fully legitimate war aimed at restoring regional balance after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait.	在1991年，美国组建了自二战以来最为强大的国际联合部队，并且在一场完全合法的战争中率领这一部队。 那一场战争的目的是为了在萨达姆入侵科威特后恢复地区平衡。


In 2003, America went to war without its trans-Atlantic allies after manipulating false assertions.	在2003年，美国在操纵虚假的开战主张后抛开其跨大西洋盟国发动战争。


In doing so, the US embarked on a preposterous grand strategy that aimed no less at simultaneously dismantling Iraq’s tyrannical regime, restructuring the entire Middle East, destroying al-Qaeda, and helping democracy to take root throughout the Arab world.	美国这样做就实施了一个荒唐的宏观战略。 这一战略目的在于同时消灭伊拉克的独裁政权、重建整个中东地区、摧毁基地组织并且帮助民主在整个阿拉伯世界生根。


The result has been utter failure: military defeat and a severe degradation of America’s moral standing.	这一战略的结果却是完全失败，那就是军事失败以及美国的道义地位大为降低。


Rather than undermining radical Islam, the US has legitimized it, in Iraq and beyond.	美国不仅没有破坏极端伊斯兰主义，还在伊拉克及其以外的国家使得其合法化了。


Indeed, what will now shape the future of the region is not democracy, but the violent divide between Shiites and Sunnis that the Iraq war precipitated.	的确，构成该地区未来的不是民主，而是伊拉克战争所促成的什叶派和逊尼派的暴力分歧。


It is this Muslim civil war that is allowing al-Qaeda to gain a larger pool of recruits.	正是这一场穆斯林内战才允许基地组织得以大量招募人员。


With Iraq probably becoming the first Arab country to be ruled by Shiites, and hence integrated into an expanding Shiite Iranian empire, America’s Sunni allies in the region now view the US as unreliable.	伊拉克有可能成为第一个什叶派穆斯林统治的阿拉伯国家，进而融入到不断扩张中的伊朗什叶派帝国之中。 在这种情况下，美国在该地区的逊尼派盟国现在认为美国是不可靠的。


Indeed, the US is seen as practically complicit in inciting a monumental reversal of Islam’s fortunes, the Shia revival.	确实，美国被认为是激发什叶派复兴这一伊斯兰运程大逆转的事实上的同谋。


Nor is the gospel of democracy especially dear to America’s Arab allies, for the call to democratize has only emboldened the Islamists to challenge the incumbent elites for power.	民主的福音对于美国的阿拉伯盟国而言也并不十分可爱，因为呼吁实行民主只不过是鼓励了伊斯兰分子挑战现今的精英阶层来获取权力。


Admittedly, violent Islamic fundamentalism has deeper roots in the fading promise of Arab nationalism.	毫无疑问，暴力伊斯兰原教旨主义在阿拉伯民族主义不断衰退的保证中有着更深的原因。


But America’s misbegotten democratic message has ended up alienating both its conservative regional allies, as it gave a new lease on life to political Islam, which can use the ballot box as a route to power, and the Islamists, whose electoral gains are then rejected by the US.	但是美国拙劣的民主主张结果是同时疏远了其保守派的地区盟国以及伊斯兰分子。 疏远保守派给了政治伊斯兰新的生机，他们可以利用投票箱来作为获得权力的途径，而伊斯兰分子所获得的选举胜利却被美国所拒绝。


America’s biggest strategic blunder in the Middle East arguably concerns the emergence of Iranian power.	美国在中东地区的最大的战略错误应当是与伊朗实力的涌现有关。


By destroying Iraq as a counterbalancing regional force, the US dealt a major blow to its traditional Gulf allies, for whom Iraq served as a barrier against Iran’s ambitions.	美国摧毁了作为制约性的地区力量的伊拉克，从而给其传统上的海湾盟国以强烈的一击，因为伊拉克是伊朗的野心的障碍。


America offered Iran on a silver platter strategic assets that Khomeini’s revolution failed to acquire either in eight years of war against Saddam or in its abortive attempts to export the Islamic revolution throughout the region.	美国将某些战略资产拱手让给伊朗。 霍梅尼的革命在与萨达姆八年之久的战争中以及在整个地区输出伊斯兰革命都未能取得这些战略资产。


Likewise, Iran’s nuclear program gained momentum thanks to its sense of impunity following the colossal failure in Iraq of America’s concept of “preventive war.”	同样，由于伊朗觉得美国“先发制人的战争”的概念在伊拉克惨败就可以为所欲为，它的核子规划也咄咄逼人。


The calamitous US military experience in Iraq has left it strategically diminished.	美国在伊拉克军事行动是灾难性的，使得其在战略上被压低了。


Iraq has now become God’s playground, and America can hope to achieve a modicum of stability there only with the help of other regional powers.	伊拉克现在已经成为上帝的游乐场，而美国只有依靠其他地区大国的帮助才能够指望在那里实现些许的稳定。


Nevertheless, the US will remain the most influential external actor in the Middle East, for its failure is one of leadership, not of actual power.	但是，美国仍将是中东地区最为具有影响力的外部国家，因为它的失利是领导不力，而非实际实力不济。


Humbled by military defeat, America can recover its regional relevance only by avoiding the sin of hubris, and learning to lead without attempting to dominate.	美国由于军事失败而变得谦逊，只有通过避免傲慢的罪恶以及学习再不试图操控他人的情况下发挥领导作用才能够恢复其在该地区的作用。


This requires engaging revolutionary forces like Iran and Syria; respecting, rather than ostracizing, those Islamist movements that have opted out from jihadism in favor of political participation; and leading an international alliance for an Arab-Israeli peace based on the Arab League initiative.	这就要求与像伊朗和叙利亚那样的革命性国家接触、尊重而不是孤立那些脱离圣战主义赞成政治参与的伊斯兰运动并且率领国际同盟来实现以阿拉伯联盟的倡议为基础的阿以和平。


Indeed, the paradox of America’s pernicious policies in Iraq is that they have created favorable conditions for an Arab-Israeli peace, as the emergence of Iran and the threat of a fundamentalist tsunami have focused Arab minds on the urgency of a settlement with Israel.	确实，美国险恶的伊拉克政策的自相矛盾之处在于，由于伊朗崛起以及大范围的原教旨主义威胁让阿拉伯人把注意力集中到与以色列和解的急迫性上来，因此这些政策创造了阿以和平的有利条件。


The Palestinian issue is not the source of all the Middle East’s ills, but its resolution would dramatically improve America’s standing among Arabs.	巴勒斯坦问题并不是所有中东麻烦问题的源泉，但是解决巴勒斯坦问题却可以极大地改善美国在阿拉伯人中的地位。


More importantly, it would deny Iran the ability to link popular Islamic and Arab causes with its own hegemonic ambitions.	更为重要的是，这将不让伊朗具有把令世人瞩目的伊斯兰和阿拉伯事业与其自身的霸权主义野心连接起来的能力。


America’s Threat to Trans-Pacific Trade	美国对跨太平洋贸易的威胁


MUMBAI – As if undermining the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round of global free-trade talks was not bad enough (the last ministerial meeting in Geneva produced barely a squeak), the United States has compounded its folly by actively promoting the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).	发自孟买——似乎暗中破坏世界贸易组织多哈回合全球自由贸易谈判还不够出格（在日内瓦举行的最后一次部长级会议在一片废话中闭幕），美国又继续做出愚蠢举动——积极推动跨太平洋伙伴关系协议（简称TPP）。


President Barack Obama announced this with nine Asian countries during his recent trip to the region.	美国总统奥巴马在最近出访该地区时和九个亚洲国家一道宣布了这一消息。


The TPP is being sold in the US to a compliant media and unsuspecting public as evidence of American leadership on trade.	在顺从的媒体和轻信的公众眼中，该协议被视为美国贸易领先地位的证明。


But the opposite is true, and it is important that those who care about the global trading system know what is happening.	但真相恰恰相反，而那些关注全球贸易体系的人也有必要知道这究竟是怎么回事。


One hopes that this knowledge will trigger what I call the “Dracula effect”: expose that which would prefer to remain hidden to sunlight and it will shrivel up and die.	我希望这些知识能触发所谓的“吸血僵尸效应”：那些藏在暗处的东西能被曝光，并随之枯萎消亡。


The TPP is a testament to the ability of US industrial lobbies, Congress, and presidents to obfuscate public policy.	跨太平洋伙伴关系协议其实是美国工业政治游说者，国会和总统共同搞乱公共政策的最好证明。


It is widely understood today that free-trade agreements (FTAs), whether bilateral or plurilateral (among more than two countries but fewer than all) are built on discrimination.	如今大家都知道自由贸易协定，不管是双边还是多边的（在超过两个国家但不针对全部国家），都是构建在歧视之上。


That is why economists typically call them preferential-trade agreements (PTAs).	这也是为什么经济学家一般将其称为优先贸易协定。


And that is why the US government’s public-relations machine calls what is in fact a discriminatory plurilateral FTA, a “partnership” invoking a false aura of cooperation and cosmopolitanism.	而这也是为何美国政府的公关机器把这个实际上歧视性的多边贸易协定称之为“伙伴关系”，试图为其安上一个似乎体现合作与世界性的虚伪光环。


Countries are, in principle, free to join the TPP.	原则上各国都可以自由加入协议。


Japan and Canada have said they plan to do so.	日本和加拿大也宣称计划加入。


But a closer look reveals that China is not a part of this agenda.	但仔细观察之下就会发现中国并不在这个议程之内。


The TPP is also a political response to China's new aggressiveness, built therefore in a spirit of confrontation and containment, not of cooperation.	跨太平洋伙伴关系协议其实也是一个对中国新进攻态势的政治回应，因此也构建于对抗和遏制之上，与合作毫不相干。


The US has been establishing a template for its PTAs that includes several items unrelated to trade. So it is no surprise that the TPP template includes numerous agendas unrelated to trade, such as labor standards and restraints on the use of capital-account controls, many of which preclude China’s accession.	美国对它的优先贸易伙伴附加了许多与贸易无关的条款，因此不出意外在跨太平洋伙伴关系协议上也附加了许多与贸易无关的议程，包括劳工标准以及对资本账户控制的限制，而这些议程中的许多条款都试图将中国排除在外。


From the outset, the TPP’s supposed openness has been wholly misleading.	从一开始，跨太平洋伙伴关系协议中所谓的开放式就是一场彻头彻尾的骗局。


Towards this end, the TPP was negotiated with the weaker countries like Vietnam, Singapore, and New Zealand, which were easily bamboozled into accepting such conditions.	为了实现这一点，协议的谈判都在那些包括越南，新加坡和新西兰这些国力较弱，容易被迷惑并接受这类条款的国家间展开。


Only then were bigger countries like Japan offered membership on a “take it or leave it” basis.	只有像日本这样实力较强的国家才能被赋予“进出自由”的谈判基础。


The PR machine then went into overdrive by calling the inclusion of these extraneous conditions as making the TPP a “high-quality” trade agreement for the twenty-first century, when in fact it was a rip-off by several domestic lobbies.	随后那些公关机器又被急速开动起来，宣传这些不相关的条款能使跨太平洋伙伴关系协议成为21世纪的“高质量”贸易协议，而实际上这只不过美国国内众多游说团体趁机敲竹杠的说辞而已。


American regionalism closer to home shows the US now trying to promote the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA).	美国对本国周边的区域主义行为显示它目前正试图推广美洲自由贸易协定（简称FTAA）。


But its preferred template was to expand the North America Free Trade Agreement (Canada, Mexico, and the US) to the Andean countries and include huge doses of non-trade-related issues, which they swallowed.	但其喜欢的模式就是将北美自由贸易协定（加拿大，墨西哥和美国）扩展到南美国家并夹带大量与贸易无关而且必须强逼这些国家接受的事务。


This was not acceptable to Brazil, the leading force behind the FTAA, which focuses exclusively on trade issues.	而这对于巴西这个美洲自由贸易协定的幕后领导势力来说无法接受，因为该国只愿着眼于贸易事务。


Brazil’s former President Luiz Lula Inácio da Silva, one of the world’s great trade-union leaders, rejected the inclusion of labor standards in trade treaties and institutions.	巴西前总统卢拉，也是世界上其中一位伟大的贸易联盟领袖，拒绝在贸易协定和体制中涵盖劳工标准。


The result of US efforts in South America, therefore, has been to fragment the region into two blocs, and the same is likely to happen in Asia.	而美国在南美的行为所产生的结果就是将该区域分裂成了两个不同的集团，而这种状况也可能在亚洲出现。


Ever since the US realized that it had chosen the wrong region to be regional with, it has been trying to win a seat at the Asian table.	在美国发现自己选择了错误的区域来推行区域化之后，它就开始在亚洲寻找一席之地。


The US finally got it with the TPP, simply because China had become aggressive in asserting its territorial claims in the South China Sea, the South China Sea, and vis-à-vis India and Japan.	美国之所以最终选择了跨太平洋伙伴关系协议，只是因为中国在宣示其南海主权以及中印中日领土冲突方面过于激进。


Many Asian countries joined the TPP to “keep the US in the region” in the face of Chinese heavy-handedness.	许多亚洲国家选择加入协议就是为了在面对中国粗暴行为时“把美国留在这个区域”。


They embraced the US in the same way that East Europeans rushed to join NATO and the European Union in the face of the threat, real or imagined, posed by post-Soviet Russia.	而他们这种行为跟东欧国家在面对苏联解体后的俄罗斯（无论是现实还是想象的）威胁时抢着加入北约或者欧盟的做法如出一辙。


America’s design for Asian trade is inspired by the goal of containing China, and the TPP template effectively excludes it, owing to the non-trade-related conditions imposed by US lobbies.	美国对亚洲贸易的设计就是源自于遏制中国的目标，而跨太平洋伙伴关系协议的条款实际上也将中国排除在外。


The only way that a Chinese merger with the TPP could gain credibility would be to make all non-trade-related provisions optional.	而唯一能使中国融入协议使之具备获得公信力的方法就是将所有与贸易无关的条款列为可选项。


Of course, the US lobbies would have none of it.	当然，美国的国会游说者们可不想令这种状况发生。


America’s Three Deficits	美国的三大赤字


BERKELEY – This year began with a series of reports providing tantalizing evidence that economic recovery in the United States is strengthening.	伯克利——新年伊始的一系列报告都在令人兴奋地表明，美国经济复苏得到了提振。


The pace of job creation has increased, indicators for manufacturing and services have improved, and consumption spending has been stronger than anticipated.	就业岗位创造速度增加了，制造业和服务业指标改善了，消费支出也要强于预期。


But it is too early to celebrate.	但是，不要高兴得太早了。


Output growth in the US remains anemic, and the economy continues to face three significant deficits: a jobs deficit, an investment deficit, and a long-run fiscal deficit, none of which is likely to be addressed in an election year.	美国的产出增长依然相当低迷，美国经济依然面临三大赤字：就业赤字、投资赤字和长期财政赤字，这三大赤字都不可能在选举年得到解决。


Although output is now higher than it was in the fourth quarter of 2007, it remains far below what could be produced if labor and capacity were fully utilized.	尽管如今产出已经高于2007年第四季度，但仍要比劳动力和产能充分调动情形低很多。


That gap – between actual and potential output – is estimated at more than 7% of GDP (more than $1 trillion).	其中的缺口——即实际产出和潜在产出之差——大约在GDP的7%（1万亿美元）以上。


The output gap reflects a deficit of more than 12 million jobs – the number of jobs needed to return to the economy’s peak 2007 employment level and absorb the 125,000 people who enter the labor force each month.	产出缺口反映了超过1 200万的就业赤字，即使就业率达到2007年顶峰时期的水平并吸收每个月进入劳动力市场的125 000人所需要增加的就业量。


Even if the economy grows at 2.5% in 2012, as most forecasts anticipate, the jobs deficit will remain – and will not be closed until 2024.	即使2012年经济增长如许多人预计的那样达到2. 5%，就业赤字仍然无法消除，可能将一直持续到2024年。


America’s jobs deficit is primarily the result of inadequate aggregate demand.	美国就业赤字的主因是总需求不足。


Consumption, which accounts for about 70% of total spending, is constrained by high unemployment, weak wage gains, and a steep decline in home values and consumer wealth.	占美国总支出水平七成的消费受高失业、低工资增长和房价及消费者财富快速缩水的约束。


The uptick in consumption in the last months of 2011 was financed by a decline in the household saving rate and a large increase in consumer credit.	2011年12月消费水平的上升是受家庭储蓄下降和消费信贷大增的提振。


Neither of these trends is healthy or sustainable.	这两个趋势都不是健康趋势，也不可能持续。


With an unemployment rate of 8.5%, a labor-force participation rate of only 64%, and stagnant real wages, labor income has fallen to an historic low of 44% of national income.	目前失业率高达8. 5%，劳动市场参与率只有64%，真实工资一直停滞不前，这导致劳动收入占国民收入的比重只有44%，为历史最低值。


And labor income is the most important component of household earnings, the major driver of consumption spending.	劳动收入是家庭收入的最重要组成部分，也是消费支出的主要推动力。


Even before the Great Recession, American workers and households were in trouble.	在大衰退之前，美国工人和家庭便已经陷入了困境。


The rate of job growth between 2000 and 2007 slowed to only half its level in the three preceding decades.	2000—2007年就业增长率较之前30年下降了整整一半。


Productivity growth was strong, but far outpaced wage growth, and workers’ real hourly compensation declined, on average, even for those with a university education.	生产率的增长相当强劲，但远远超出了工资增长，而工人的平均真实时薪在下降，即使是大学生也无法幸免。


Indeed, the 2002-2007 period was the only recovery on record during which the median family’s real income declined.	事实上，2000—2007年这段时期只是中位家庭真实收入下降趋势中的一次反弹。


Moreover, job opportunities continued to polarize, with employment growing in high-wage professional, technical, and managerial occupations, as well as in low-wage food-service, personal-care, and protective-service occupations.	此外，就业机会继续呈现两极分化的态势，高收入的专业、技术和管理职位，以及低工资的食品服务、个人看护和防护职位的数量在增长。


By contrast, employment in middle-skill, white-collar, and blue-collar occupations fell, particularly in manufacturing.	相反，技能要求中等的白领和蓝领职位在减少，尤其是制造业职位。


Hard-pressed American households slashed their savings rates, borrowed against their home equity, and increased their debt to maintain consumption, contributing to the housing and credit bubbles that burst in 2008, requiring painful deleveraging ever since.	压力重重的美国家庭不得不削减储蓄率、用房屋所有权作抵押借贷，以债务的增加为代价维持消费水平，这导致了房地产和信贷泡沫。 2008年，这一泡沫破裂，此后便开始了痛苦的去杠杆化过程。


Three forces have driven the US labor market’s adverse structural changes:	三大因素导致了美国劳动力市场的有害结构变化：


·         Skill-biased technological change, which has automated routine work while boosting demand for highly educated workers with at least a college degree.	·         基于技能的技术变迁，即传统工作的自动化和至少需要本科学历的高技能员工需求增加同时发生。


·         Global competition and the integration of labor markets through trade and outsourcing, which have eliminated jobs and depressed wages.	·         贸易和外包带来的全球劳动市场竞争和一体化减少了就业岗位，压低了工资。


·         America’s declining competitiveness as an attractive place to locate production and employment.	·         美国竞争力下降，不再具有对生产和岗位的吸引力。


Technological change and globalization have created similar labor-market challenges in other developed countries.	技术变迁和全球化在其他发达国家也造成了类似的劳动力市场挑战。


But US policy choices are responsible for the erosion of America’s competitiveness.	但美国竞争力下降却是政策选择的结果。


In particular, the US is underinvesting in three major areas that help countries to create and retain high-wage jobs: skills and training, infrastructure, and research and development.	特别是，在创造和维持高工资岗位等方面，美国在三个领域上投资不足：技能与培训、基础设施，以及研发。


Spending in these areas accounts for less than 10% of US government spending, and this share has been declining over time.	美国政府在这三个领域的支出只有总支出的不到10%，而且这一比重还在不断下降。


The federal government can currently borrow at record-low interest rates, and there are many projects in education, infrastructure, and research that would earn a higher return, create jobs now, and bolster US competitiveness in attracting high-wage jobs.	当前，联邦政府能够以极低利率借钱，而在教育、基础设施和研究领域，有很多项目都能带来较高的回报、立刻产生新增就业并提振美国吸引高工资岗位的竞争力。


President Barack Obama has offered numerous proposals to invest in the foundations of national competitiveness, but Congressional Republicans have rebuffed them, claiming that the US faces an impending fiscal crisis.	奥巴马总统提出了大量方案投资于美国国家竞争力基础，但国会中的共和党拒绝了这些方案，他们说，美国的当务之急的财政危机。


In fact, the federal deficit as a share of GDP will shrink significantly over the next several years, even without further deficit-reduction measures, before rising to unsustainable levels by 2030.	事实上，在2030年上升到不可持续水平之前，联邦赤字占GDP的比重将在未来数年内大幅下降，就算没有进一步的赤字削减手段也是如此。


The US does indeed face a long-run fiscal deficit, largely the result of rising health-care costs and an aging population.	美国确实面临着长期财政赤字��题，这是由上涨的医保成本和老龄化的人口导致的。


But the current fiscal deficit mainly reflects weak tax revenues, owing to slow growth and high unemployment, and temporary stimulus measures that are fading away at a time when aggregate demand remains weak and additional fiscal stimulus is warranted.	但当前财政赤字主要是由税收收入不足造成的，其原因是低增长、高失业以及在总需求依然疲软的情况下，暂时性刺激措施到期、需要投入新的刺激措施。


At the very least, to keep the economy on course for 2.5% growth this year, the payroll tax cut and unemployment benefits proposed by Obama should be extended through the end of the year.	无论如何，为了保证美国经济今年能有2. 5%的增长，奥巴马所提出的工资税削减和失业救济方案应该延期到今年年底。


These measures would provide insurance to the fragile recovery and add nothing to the long-run fiscal gap.	这些措施能够为脆弱的复苏上保险，而对长期财政缺口毫无影响。


So, how should the US economy’s jobs deficit, investment deficit, and long-run fiscal deficit be addressed?	那么，如何解决美国经济的就业赤字、投资池子和长期财政赤字呢？


Policymakers should pair fiscal measures to ameliorate the jobs and investment deficits now with a multi-year plan to reduce the long-run fiscal deficit gradually.	决策者应该在财政政策方面双管齐下，在当下消除就业和投资池子，同时提出一个多年计划逐渐削减长期财政赤字。


This long-run plan should increase spending on education, infrastructure, and research, while curbing future growth in health-care spending through the cost-containment mechanisms contained in Obama’s health-reform legislation.	这一长期计划应该增加教育、基础设施和研究方面的支出，同时限制医保支出的进一步增长（比如通过奥巴马医疗改革立法中提出的成本限制机制）。


Approving a long-run deficit-reduction plan now but deferring its starting date until the economy is near full employment would prevent premature fiscal contraction from tipping the economy back into recession.	现在就通过长期赤字削减计划，但推迟到经济达到接近充分就业时再实施，这样可以防止财政收缩操之过急，把经济重新拖入衰退。


Indeed, enactment of such a package could bolster output and employment growth by easing investor concerns about future deficits and strengthening consumer and business confidence.	事实上，颁布这一揽子计划可以大小投资者对未来赤字的担忧，提振消费者和商业信心，从而增加产出和就业。


Painful choices about how to close the long-run fiscal gap should be decided now and implemented promptly once the economy has recovered.	怎样填补长期财政缺口？ 痛苦的选择应该马上做出，并等到经济复苏后大力推行。


But, for the next few years, the priorities of fiscal policy should be jobs, investment, and growth.	但是，在未来几年中，财政政策的额当务之急是就业、投资和增长。


America’s Ungovernable Budget	无药可救的美国预算


NEW YORK – The heart of any government is found in its budget.	纽约——任何政府的核心都是预算问题。


Politicians can make endless promises, but if the budget doesn’t add up, politics is little more than mere words.	政治家尽可以没完没了地许诺，但如果预算跟不上，政治就不过是空话而已。


The United States is now caught in such a bind.	这样的窘境已经在美国成为现实。


In his recent State of the Union address, President Barack Obama painted a convincing picture of modern, twenty-first-century government.	在刚刚发表的国情咨文中，巴拉克·奥巴马总统描绘出二十一世纪现代政府的一幅诱人图景。


His Republican Party opponents complained that Obama’s proposals would bust the budget.	奥巴马的共和党对手抱怨这项提案会让政府破产。


But the truth is that both parties are hiding from the reality: without more taxes, a modern, competitive US economy is not possible.	可事实是两党都没有勇气承认现实： 如果不增加税收，就不可能缔造出现代化、有竞争力的美国经济。


Obama rightly emphasized that competitiveness in the world today depends on an educated workforce and modern infrastructure.	奥巴马明智地认识到当今世界的竞争力取决于现代化的基础设施和知识型劳动力。


That is true for any country, but it is especially relevant for rich countries.	这条规律对任何国家均不例外，但对富裕国家尤其如此。


The US and Europe are in direct competition with Brazil, China, India, and other emerging economies, where wage levels are sometimes one-quarter those in high-income countries (if not even lower).	美国和欧洲必须与巴西、中国、印度和其他新兴国家直接竞争，而他们的工资水平在某些情况下只有高收入国家的四分之一（甚至更低）。


America and Europe will keep their high living standards only by basing their competitiveness on advanced skills, cutting-edge technologies, and modern infrastructure.	只有将竞争力建立在先进技术、尖端科技和现代化基础设施之上，美国和欧洲才能保持自己的生活水平。


That is why Obama called for an increase in US public investment in three areas: education, science and technology, and infrastructure (including broadband Internet, fast rail, and clean energy).	奥巴马也因此呼吁美国加大对以下三大领域的公共投资： 教育、科学技术和基础设施（包括宽带网络、快速轨道交通和清洁能源）。


He spelled out a vision of future growth in which public and private investment would be complementary, mutually supportive pillars.	他详细描绘了一幅未来公共和私人投资相互补充、相互支持的经济发展愿景。


Obama emphasized these themes for good reason.	奥巴马有充分理由强调这些主题。


Unemployment in the US now stands at nearly 10% of the labor force, in part because more new jobs are being created in the emerging economies, and many of the jobs now being created in the US pay less than in the past, owing to greater global competition.	目前美国失业率持续在10%附近徘徊，部分原因是新兴经济体分得更多的新增就业机会，同时由于全球竞争日趋激烈，现在美国创造的许多工作机会薪酬都与过去不可同日而语。


Unless the US steps up its investment in education, science, technology, and infrastructure, these adverse trends will continue.	除非美国加大对教育、科学、技术和基础设施的投入，否则这样的不利趋势将会继续下去。


But Obama’s message lost touch with reality when he turned his attention to the budget deficit.	可当转向预算赤字问题时，奥巴马的讲话便开始脱离现实。


Acknowledging that recent fiscal policies had put the US on an unsustainable trajectory of rising public debt, Obama said that moving towards budget balance was now essential for fiscal stability.	在承认近期财政政策导致公共债务不可持续膨胀的同时，奥巴马表示争取预算平衡是实现财政稳定的关键问题。


So he called for a five-year freeze on what the US government calls “discretionary” civilian spending.	因此他呼吁在五年内冻结美国政府所谓“有决定权”的公众开支。


The problem is that more than half of such spending is on education, science and technology, and infrastructure – the areas that Obama had just argued should be strengthened.	问题在于上述开支的超过半数用于教育、科技和基础设施领域——奥巴马刚刚提出要加大对上述领域的投资力度。


After telling Americans how important government investment is for modern growth, he promised to freeze that spending for the next five years!	就在告诉美国人政府投资对现代化发展何等重要后，他承诺要在今后五年内冻结这笔开支！


Politicians often change their message from one speech to the next, but rarely contradict it so glaringly in the same speech.	政治家经常在不同演讲中变换不同的观点，但在同一次讲话中却极少出现如此明显矛盾的命题。


That contradiction highlights the sad and self-defeating nature of US budget policies over the past 25 years, and most likely in the years to come.	这种矛盾凸显了25年来美国预算政策适得其反的无奈特点，而今后这种特点仍有可能持续下去。


On the one hand, the US government must invest more to promote economic competitiveness.	一方面，美国政府必须加大投资推动经济竞争力的发展。


On the other hand, US taxes are chronically too low to support the level of government investment that is needed.	而另一方面，美国长期过低的税收却又无法支持必需的政府投资。


America’s fiscal reality was made painfully clear two days after Obama’s speech, in a new study from the Congressional Budget Office, which revealed that the budget deficit this year will reach nearly $1.5 trillion – a sum almost unimaginable even for an economy the size of the US.	奥巴马讲话两天后，国会预算办公室发表的最新研究���告显示今年的预算赤字将达1. 5万亿美元，如此庞大的赤字即使就美国的经济规模而言也远超人们的想象力。


At nearly 10% of GDP, the deficit is resulting in a mountain of debt that threatens America’s future.	近国内生产总值10%的巨额赤字让政府债台高筑，严重威胁到今后的美国经济。


The CBO study also made clear that December’s tax-cut agreement between Obama and the Republican opposition willfully and deliberately increased the budget deficit sharply.	国会预算办公室研究报告进一步表明，十二月奥巴马和共和党反对派达成的减税协议明知故犯地大幅度增加了财政预算赤字。


Various tax cuts initiated by George W. Bush were set to expire at the end of 2010.	乔治·W·布什实行的各项减税政策原定于2010年底到期终止。


Obama and the Republicans agreed to continue those tax cuts for at least two years (they will now probably continue beyond that), thereby lowering tax revenue by $350 billion this year and again in 2012.	奥巴马和共和党人同意将上述减税政策延长至少两年（现在看来两年后继续延长的可能性极大），也因此造成今年税收收入降低3500亿美元，且2012年还会进一步降低。


Tax cuts for the richest Americans were part of the package.	为最富裕的美国人减税也是方案的内容之一。


The truth of US politics today is simple.	当今美国政治的现实情况再简单不过。


The key policy for the leaders of both political parties is tax cuts, especially for the rich.	两党领袖在以减税（特别是为富人减税）为重要政策方面达成了共识。


Both political parties, and the White House, would rather cut taxes than spend more on education, science and technology, and infrastructure.	无论民主共和两党还是白宫都宁愿减税而非在教育、科技和基础设施领域增加开支。


And the explanation is straightforward: the richest households fund political campaigns.	其中的原因简单明了： 最富裕的美国家庭为政治竞选提供资金。


Both parties therefore cater to their wishes.	因此两党无不以满足他们的愿望为第一要著。


As a result, America’s total tax revenues as a share of national income are among the lowest of all high-income countries, roughly 30%, compared to around 40% in Europe.  But 30% of GDP is not enough to cover the needs of health, education, science and technology, social security, infrastructure, and other vital government responsibilities.	正因如此，美国30%的税收收入占国民收入比例在所有高收入国家中排行末尾，而欧洲国家的一般占比在40%左右。   但国内生产总值的30%不够满足医疗、教育、科技、社保、基础设施和其他重要的政府责任需求。


One budget area can and should be cut: military spending.	有一个预算领域可以而且应当进行削减： 这就是军事开支。


But even if America’s wildly excessive military budget is cut sharply (and politicians in both parties are resisting that), there will still be a need for new taxes.	不过即便美国极端过分的军事预算得到大幅削减（目前这项计划遭到两党的一致反对），仍有必要增加新的税收。


The economic and social consequences of a generation of tax cutting are clear.	长时间减税的经济和社会后果已经毋庸置疑。


America is losing its international competitiveness, neglecting its poor – one in five American children is trapped in poverty – and leaving a mountain of debt to its young.	美国的国际竞争力正在衰退，穷人则受到忽视——五分之一的美国儿童陷于贫困——而且给年轻人留下堆积如山的债务。


For all of the Obama administration’s lofty rhetoric, his fiscal-policy proposals make no serious attempt to address these problems.	虽然奥巴马政府嘴上高谈阔论，但其财政政策提案并未认真努力解决上述问题。


To do so would require calling for higher taxes, and that – as George H. W. Bush learned in 1992 – is no way to get re-elected.	解决问题需要呼吁增加税收，而乔治·W·布什1992年得到的教训是，这样做必将失去连任的机会。


America’s Unhinged “Pivot”	美国精神错乱的“重心”


NEW DELHI – President Barack Obama’s first foreign trip since winning a second term highlights Asia’s new centrality to America’s economy and security.	新德里—奥巴马总统第二个任期的首次出访彰显亚洲在美国经济和安全领域的新核心地位。


But Obama’s Asian tour also underscores the main question about American policy in the region: Will the United States’ “pivot” to Asia acquire concrete strategic content, or will it remain largely a rhetorical repackaging of old policies?	但奥巴马的亚洲之行也敲响了美国的亚洲政策的主要问题：美国的亚洲“重心”有具体的战略内容吗？ 还是仍然是老政策的新瓶装旧酒？


The United States, quick to capitalize on regional concerns triggered by China’s increasingly muscular self-assertion, has strengthened its military ties with its existing Asian allies and forged security relationships with new friends.	美国很快地利用了亚洲地区由中国日渐增长的实力自信所触发的担忧情绪，强化了与原有亚洲盟国的军事关系，并打造了一批新的安全伙伴。


But the heady glow of America’s return to center stage in Asia has obscured key challenges in remaining the region’s principal security anchor in the face of China’s strategic ambitions.	但美国回归亚洲中心舞台的风光面临着中国战略雄心的制约，其充当亚洲主要安全锚所要面对着诸多关键性的挑战。


One challenge is the need to arrest the erosion of America’s relative power, which in turn requires comprehensive domestic renewal, including fiscal consolidation.	挑战之一是阻止美国相对实力的滑落，而这反过来需要全面的国内革新，包括财政整合。


But the need for spending cuts also raises the prospect that the US might be unable to finance a military shift toward the Asia-Pacific region – or, worse, that it will be forced to retrench there.	但削减支出的需要也让人感觉美国可能无法为其将军事重心转向亚太地区的转变融资，甚至可能被迫减弱这方面的支出。


The US under Obama has increasingly ceded ground to China, a trend that admittedly began when the Bush administration became preoccupied with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.	奥巴马治下的美国一再对中国让步，这一趋势其实从布什政府陷入阿富汗和伊拉克战争泥淖就开始了。


This has spurred doubts about America’s ability to provide strategic heft to its “pivot” by sustaining a higher level of commitment in the Asia-Pacific region, where it already maintains 320,000 troops.	这激起了关于美国是否有能力通过更高层次的亚太地区承诺（美国在该地区已有320 000驻军）支持这一战略“重心”的能力的质疑。


The proposed deployment of an additional 2,500 Marines in Australia is largely symbolic.	美国计划在澳大利亚增加2500名海军驻军基本上只是象征性的行动。


In fact, after raising Asians’ expectations of a more robust US response to China’s growing assertiveness, the Obama administration has started to tamp down the military aspects of its “pivot,” emphasizing instead greater US economic engagement.	事实上，在提高了亚洲人民对美国针对中国崛起的稳健反应的预期后，奥巴马政府开始减少其“重心”的军事部署，转而强调美国的经济参与。


That change has come as a relief to those in the region who fear being forced to choose between the US and China.	这一变化让亚洲地区担心必须在美国和中国之间二选一的国家舒了口气。


But, for the countries bearing the brunt of China’s recalcitrant approach to territorial and maritime disputes, this emphasis raises new doubts about America’s commitment.	但是，对于承受着中国关于领土和领海纠纷的坚决主张压力的国家来说，美国的强调经济参与激发了对其承诺的新疑虑。


In fact, the economic reorientation of the US “pivot” corrects a policy that had overemphasized the military component and put the US on a path toward conflict with China.	事实上，美国“重心”的经济再定位纠正了过度强调军事内容、让美国和中国走上冲突之路的政策。


It was Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who signaled a more hawkish US stance on China with her tough talk at the 2010 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum in Hanoi; now she is moderating that position by promoting trade and investment during her visits to Asian countries.	国务卿希拉里·克林顿在河内2010年东盟地区论坛措辞强硬，表达出美国对中国的鹰派立场； 如今，她的语气缓和了许多，在访问亚洲国家期间敦促贸易和投资。


Obama, too, is highlighting the economic aspects of the US “pivot,” portraying his Asia tour as an effort to generate more domestic manufacturing jobs through higher exports to “the most rapidly growing and dynamic region in the world.”	奥巴马也在强调美国“重心”的经济方面，将其亚洲之行描述意在为通过增加对“世界增长最快、最有活力的地区的出口”来早就更多国内制造业岗位。


Even his historic visit to Myanmar – the first ever by a US president – is as much about trade as it is about weaning a strategically located, resource-rich country from Chinese influence.	即使是他对缅甸的历史性访问——他是第一个访问该国的美国总统——对贸易的关注也将不亚于促使这个具有战略地理重要性的资源丰富国家摆脱中国的影响。


The refocus on trade and economic issues has also prompted Washington to promote the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which aims to create a new Asia-Pacific free-trade group that excludes China.	将注意力转向贸易和经济问题还促使华盛顿推出了泛太平洋伙伴关系协定，该协定意在打造一个不包括中国的亚太自由贸易集团。


Moreover, the US is emphasizing the importance of the East Asia Summit and ASEAN, whose summit overlaps with the EAS meeting in Phnom Penh that Obama will be attending.	此外，美国还在强调东亚峰会和东盟的重要性，后者的峰会与奥巴马将出席的金边东亚峰会重叠。


The US course correction is being dictated by another consideration as well: America has nothing to gain from taking sides in China’s disputes with its neighbors – unless, of course, US interests are directly at stake, as in the South China Sea, where Chinese maritime claims threaten freedom of navigation in some of the world’s most heavily trafficked shipping lanes.	美国路线的调整也受到其他考虑因素的影响：对于中国和邻国的争端问题，站队对美国来说没有任何好处——当然，除非美国的直接利益受到了影响，南海问题便是如此，美国的领海主张威胁到某些世界最繁忙的海运路线。


Concern for its own national interest explains why America has charted a course of tacit neutrality regarding the revival of Sino-Indian territorial disputes, including China’s sudden resurrection of a claim to the large Himalayan Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.	对其自身国家里的关心可以解释为何美国在中印领土纠纷重燃——包括中国突然重新提出对广袤的印度喜马拉雅山区的阿鲁纳恰尔邦的领土主张——时保持中立。


Similarly, the US has urged both China and Japan to resolve peacefully their dispute over the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands.	类似地，美国也在敦促中国和日本和平解决日本控制的钓鱼岛的争端。


America’s main goal is to prevent the standoff from escalating to the point that it would be forced – against its own interests – to take Japan’s side.	美国的主要目的是防止僵局发展到它不得不站到日本一边的程度——这与其自身利益不符。


When US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta met Chinese leader Xi Jinping in China in September, he got “an earful” that the US should stay out of the Sino-Japanese dispute. Indeed, amid the orchestrated anti-Japanese protests in China in September, Panetta – instead of advising China to rein in the often-violent demonstrations – publicly reiterated America’s neutrality in the struggle over control of the islands.	美国国防部长帕内塔与中国领导人习近平9月份会面时，他听到了“令人吃惊的要求”——美国应该置身中日纠纷之外，事实上，在9月份精心安排的中国反日游行期间，帕内塔并没有建议中国压制通常导致暴力的示威活动，而是公开重申美国在钓鱼岛纠纷中的中立态度。


The correction in US policy actually extends even to terminology.	美国政策的修正事实上已经扩展到了用语方面。


American diplomats have now abandoned the term “pivot” altogether, owing to its military connotation, in favor of “rebalancing.”	美国外交官已经不再使用“重心”一词，因为暗含军事动向，转而使用“再平衡”。


Whatever one calls it, the new policy approach is all about China, with America bolstering alliances and friendships with countries around China’s periphery, including India, Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and South Korea.	不管你如何称呼它，新政策方针的唯一目标就是中国，美国在强化中国周边的盟友和友邦，包括印度、日本、菲律宾、越南、印尼和韩国。


Yet the Obama administration continues to deny that China is at the center of its strategy. In fact, it is reluctant to say or do anything publicly that might raise China’s hackles.	但奥巴马政府继续否认中国是其战略核心，事实上，奥巴马政府不愿意说、也不愿意做任何可能引起中国反感的事情。


The Asia-Pacific region will loom larger in Obama’s second-term agenda, especially as the ongoing US troop withdrawal ends the Afghanistan war by 2014.	亚太地区将在奥巴马的第二个任期日程表中占据更加重要的位置，特别是美国将在2014年完成撤军结束阿富汗战争。


But Obama will have to define a clearer US policy, addressing China’s rapid rise under an authoritarian regime that aggressively pursues border claims and whips up nationalism at home.	但奥巴马必须给出更加明确的美国政策，遏制独裁统治中国的快速崛起，对外积极主张领土要求，对内激发民族主义情绪。


The US and the rest of Asia must not merely adjust to China; they must seek to shape a China that plays by the rules.	美国和亚洲其他国家不能被中国牵着鼻子走，它们必须寻求让中国遵守规则。


America’s War-Torn Economy	美国战痕累累的经济


NEW YORK – Some say there are two issues in the coming American elections: the Iraq war and the economy.	纽约--有人说在即将来临的美国选举中有两大议题，就是伊拉克战争和经济。


On days when the war seems to be going better than expected, and the economy worse, the economy eclipses the war; but neither is faring well.	当伊拉克战事比预料的要好、而经济要差的时候，经济问题掩盖了战争问题。 但是这两个哪一个也不好。


In some sense, there is only one issue, and that is the war, which has exacerbated America’s economic problems.	在某些意义上只有一个议题，那就是伊拉克战争。 这一战争加剧了美国经济问题。


And when the world’s largest economy is sick – and it is now very sick – the entire world suffers.	当世界上最大经济体生病的时候，而且病得不轻，整个世界都遭殃。


It used to be thought that wars were good for the economy.	人们以往认为战争有利于经济。


After all, World War II is widely thought to have helped lift the global economy out of the Great Depression.	毕竟，很多人认为第二次世界大战帮助全球经济摆脱了大萧条。


But, at least since Keynes, we know how to stimulate the economy more effectively, and in ways that increase long-term productivity and enhance living standards.	但是，我们至少从凯恩斯时代以来知道如何更为有效地刺激经济，而且其方法也提高长期的生产效劳和提高生活水平。


This war, in particular, has not been good for the economy, for three reasons.	这一场战争尤其对经济不利有三个原因。


First, it has contributed to rising oil prices.	首先，它造成石油价格上升。


When the United States went to war, oil cost less than $25 a barrel, and futures markets expected it to remain there for a decade.	美国开战的时候，石油价格是25美元不到，而期货市场预计价格会在十年内保持这一水平。


Futures traders knew about the growth of China and other emerging markets; but they expected supply – mainly from low-cost Middle East providers – to increase in tandem with demand.	期货交易员了解中国和其他新兴市场的增长。 但是他们预计主要来自中东产油国的石油供给与需求增长同步。


The war changed that equation.	这一战争改变了这一等式。


Higher oil prices mean that Americans (and Europeans and Japanese) are paying hundreds of millions of dollars to Middle East oil dictators and oil exporters elsewhere in the world rather than spending it at home.	高油价意味着美国人(以及欧洲人和日本人) 向中东石油独裁者以及其他地方的出口国支付数以亿计的美元，而不是用在国内。


Moreover, money spent on the Iraq war does not stimulate the economy today as much as money spent at home on roads, hospitals, or schools, and it doesn’t contribute as much to long-term growth.	而且，花费在伊拉克战争上的金钱如今并不像花在国内道路、医院或者学校那样刺激经济，而且也并不有利于长期经济增长。


Economists talk about “bang for the buck” – how much economic stimulus is provided by each dollar of spending.	经济学家谈论所谓如何通过花钱来刺激经济。


It’s hard to imagine less bang than from bucks spent on a Nepalese contractor working in Iraq.	难以想像把钱花在在伊拉克工作的尼泊尔承包商身上可以如何刺激经济。


With so many dollars going abroad, the American economy should have been in a much weaker shape than it appeared.	随着美元大量外流，美国经济理应比现在看起来的要差劲。


But, much as the Bush administration tried to hide the true costs of the war by incomplete and misleading accounting, the economy’s flaws were covered up by a flood of liquidity from the Federal Reserve and by lax financial regulation.	但是，正如布什政府竭力通过不完整和误导的会计手法来掩盖战争的实际代价，美联储提供了大量的流动资金而且金融行业监管松弛掩盖了经济缺陷。


So much money was pumped into the economy and so lax were regulators that one leading American bank advertised its loans with the slogan “qualified at birth” – a clear indication that there were, in effect, no credit standards.	如此众多的钱涌入经济之中，而监管又如此不力，乃至于一家美国大银行的贷款广告是“生而合格”。 这清楚地表明了实际上就没有什么信贷标准。


In a sense, the strategy worked: a housing bubble fed a consumption boom, as savings rates plummeted to zero.  The economic weaknesses were simply being postponed to some future date; the Bush administration hoped that the day of reckoning would come after November 2008.  Instead, things began to unravel in August 2007.	布什政府希望清算的日子在2008年11月以后到来。 相反，2007年8月局面就显现出来了。


Now it has responded, with a stimulus package that is too little, too late, and badly designed.	现在布什政府的反应是一项综合经济刺激办法，而这一办法来得太少太迟，而且结构粗糙。


To see the inadequacy of that package, compare it with the more than $1.5 trillion that was borrowed in home equity loans in recent years, most of it spent on consumption.	近年来，房产股本贷款超过一万五千亿美元。 跟这个相比较就可以看出这一办法是不够的了。


That game – based on a belief in ever-spiraling home prices – is over.	基于房产价格只会上升这一信念的游戏结束了。


With home prices falling (and set to continue to fall), and with banks uncertain of their financial position, lenders will not lend and households will not borrow.	随着房产价格下降(而且会继续下降)以及银行对自身的财政状态不确信，贷款者不愿意借钱给人而各个家庭又不愿意借钱。


So, while the additional liquidity injected into the financial system by the Fed may have prevented a meltdown, it won’t stimulate much consumption or investment.	因此，尽管美联储向金融系统注入的额外流动资金或许防止了崩溃，但是它并不会刺激多少消费或者投资。


Instead, much of it will find its way abroad.	相反，大部分钱会流向国外。


China, for example, is worried that the Fed’s stimulus will increase its domestic inflation.	例如中国就担心美联储的刺激手段将会提高其国内的通货膨胀。


There is a third reason that this war is economically bad for America.	这一战争对于美国经济不利还有第三个原因。


Not only has America already spent a great deal on this war – $12 billion a month, and counting – but much of the bill remains to be paid, such as compensation and health care for the 40% of veterans who are returning with disabilities, many of which are very serious.	美国不仅已经在这一战争上花费巨资每月高达一千二百亿美元，而且还在增加，但是大部分的账单还是没有支付，例如从战场返回的40%残疾老兵的补偿和医疗费用。 许多士兵的伤势严重。


Moreover, this war has been funded differently from any other war in America’s history –perhaps in any country’s recent history.	而且，为这一战争提供资金的方式与美国历史上的任何其他战争都不同，可能与任何国家近来的历史都不同。


Normally, countries ask for shared sacrifice, as they ask their young men and women to risk their lives.	一般情况下，交战国家在要求年轻男女承受生命危险的时候会要求大家共��风险。


Taxes are raised.	税收会提高。


There is a discussion of how much of the burden to pass on to future generations.  In this war, there was no such discussion.	还有人讨论应该把多少负担转嫁到后人身上。 在这一战争中，没有人讨论这些。


When America went to war, there was a deficit.	美国开战的时候还有赤字。


Yet remarkably, Bush asked for, and got, a reckless tax cut for the rich.	但是令人惊奇的是，布什却要求为富人鲁莽地减税并且还如愿以偿。


That means that every dollar of war spending has in effect been borrowed.	这就意味着花在战争上的前事实上是借来的。


For the first time since the Revolutionary War, two centuries ago, America has had to turn to foreigners for financing, because US households have been saving nothing .	两个世纪以前的独立战争以来第一次美国向外国人借钱用来打仗，因为美国家庭没有储蓄。


The numbers are hard to believe.	这一数字难以置信。


The national debt has increased by 50% in eight years, with almost $1 trillion of this increase due to the war – an amount likely to more than double within ten years.	国家债务在八年时间里增加了50%，而增加的一万亿美元花在了打仗上面。 这一数目在十年内可能会增加两倍多。


Who would have believed that one administration could do so much damage so quickly?	谁会相信一个政府会这么快做了这么多破坏？