Chemistry is largely a study of molecules, and when they are complex, there is the mysterious transition to life and biology.	化学很大程度上是对分子的研究，尽管它们很复杂，但是却可以很神秘地转换到生命和生物学上。


At all stages of the science curriculum, basic questions must be asked.	在科学课程的各个等级都会被问到一些基本的问题。


How does something work?	它是怎么工作的？


How do we know?	我们如何去了解？


What are the common laws?	一般规律是什么？


It was not a physicist, but a biologist, Julius Meyer, who first proposed the law of conservation of energy from a study of biological energy processes.	不是一位物理学家，而是一位生物学家里乌斯·迈尔，在对生物能过程的研究中最先提出了能量守恒定律。


The chemist Dalton first gave a proof of the existence of atoms and the engineer Sadi Carnot first gave a proof of the Second Law of Thermodynamics.	化学家道尔顿最先证明了原子的存在，工程师萨迪·卡诺第一个证明了热力学第二定律。


The sequence Physics-Chemistry-Biology implies that continuous collegial professional development for teachers is essential.	物理-化学-生物学的学习顺序表明对教师进行持续的大学专业发展非常重要。


Teachers (including those in mathematics) should meet regularly to plot the evolution of their courses, their essential coherence, and the inclusion of stories that illustrate how science works.	教师们（包括数学教师）应该经常碰面商讨对他们课程的改进、课程之间重要的相干性以及如何在课堂上讲一些描述科学是怎样工作的故事。


Teachers need time to talk together.	教师们需要时间一起讨论。


I know of more than 1,000 high schools that have implemented the P-C-B sequence.	据我了解有1000多所中学实施了物理-化学-生物学的学习顺序。


There is almost universal joy as students begin to grasp the whole picture.	当学生们开始了解整个的画面时，他们几乎无一例外地感到兴奋不已。


Elective science courses zoom up in popularity.	科学选修课越来越多地受到欢迎。


Because this sequence is for all students, what will be retained in the future are the stories and, most importantly, a scientific way of thinking.	因为这种学习顺序是适用于所有学生的，将来他们能记住的是那些故事，更重要的是，科学的思考方式。


There is no job, no profession, civic activity that will not profit from this kind of education.	没有哪项工作、专业或者公民活动不会从这种教育中受益。


But to restore the vitality of science, we need to look at the entire educational system: teachers from pre-school through high school, state and national standards, productive and educationally reinforcing assessments, teaching materials and educational technology, and progress in the neurosciences, cognitive psychology, developmental biology, and nutrition.	但是要恢复科学的活力，我们需要检查整个教育体系：从幼稚园到中学的教师、州及国家的标准、生产力以及教育强化评估、教材和教育技术以及神经系统科学、认知心理学、进化生物学和营养上的进展。


And leadership for this huge revolutionary effort will probably have to come from visionary business executives whose profits depend on education and rationality.	这个巨大的变革行动也许必须要由那些有远见的企业主管来领导，因为他们的利润依赖于教育和理性。


The Trans-Pacific Free-Trade Charade	跨太平洋自由贸易迷局


NEW YORK – As negotiators and ministers from the United States and 11 other Pacific Rim countries meet in Atlanta in an effort to finalize the details of the sweeping new Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), some sober analysis is warranted.	纽约—当来自美国和其他11个环太平洋国家的谈判员和部长们将在亚特兰大为完成全新的跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）细节而努力之际，有必要做一些冷静的分析。


The biggest regional trade and investment agreement in history is not what it seems.	历史上最大的地区贸易和投资协定也许和看上去不一样。


You will hear much about the importance of the TPP for “free trade.”	你将会听到大量关于TPP对“自由贸易”有多重要的声音。


The reality is that this is an agreement to manage its members’ trade and investment relations – and to do so on behalf of each country’s most powerful business lobbies.	现实是这是一个管理成员国贸易和投资关系的协定——并且是代表每个国家最强大的商业游说集团这样做。


Make no mistake: It is evident from the main outstanding issues, over which negotiators are still haggling, that the TPP is not about “free” trade.	不要弄错了：从最主要的仍有待解决的问题看（谈判员们仍在这些问题上扯皮），显然TPP并不是关于“自由”贸易的。


New Zealand has threatened to walk away from the agreement over the way Canada and the US manage trade in dairy products.	出于对加拿大和美国所提出的乳制品贸易管理办法的愤慨，新西兰威胁要退出该协定。


Australia is not happy with how the US and Mexico manage trade in sugar.	澳大利亚也因为美国和墨西哥所提出的糖贸易管理办法而十分不快。


And the US is not happy with how Japan manages trade in rice.	美国则对日本如何管理大米贸易感到不快。


These industries are backed by significant voting blocs in their respective countries.	这些行业背后都有各自国家强大的选民集团支持。


And they represent just the tip of the iceberg in terms of how the TPP would advance an agenda that actually runs counter to free trade.	而它们实际起到阻挠自由贸易效果的TPP条款的冰山一角。


For starters, consider what the agreement would do to expand intellectual property rights for big pharmaceutical companies, as we learned from leaked versions of the negotiating text.	首先，我们来看看该协定将如何扩大大型制药公司的知识产权，泄露的谈判文本透露了这一点。


Economic research clearly shows the argument that such intellectual property rights promote research to be weak at best.	经济学研究清楚地显示，这类知识产权对研究的刺激十分有限。


In fact, there is evidence to the contrary: When the Supreme Court invalidated Myriad’s patent on the BRCA gene, it led to a burst of innovation that resulted in better tests at lower costs.	事实上，证据指向了相反的方向：最高法院裁定Myriad公司的BRCA（乳腺癌）基因专利无效催生了大量创新，带来了成本更低、效果更好的测试手段。


Indeed, provisions in the TPP would restrain open competition and raise prices for consumers in the US and around the world – anathema to free trade.	事实上，TPP条款将遏制开放竞争，提高美国和全球消费者所面临的价格——与自由贸易背道而驰。


The TPP would manage trade in pharmaceuticals through a variety of seemingly arcane rule changes on issues such as “patent linkage,” “data exclusivity,” and “biologics.”	TPP将通过在“专利联系”、“数据专属性”和“生物制剂”等问题上的各种难以理解的规则变化来管理药品贸易。


The upshot is that pharmaceutical companies would effectively be allowed to extend – sometimes almost indefinitely – their monopolies on patented medicines, keep cheaper generics off the market, and block “biosimilar” competitors from introducing new medicines for years.	要点是制药公司将在实际上被允许延长——有时几乎无限延长——它们对专利药的垄断，让更廉价的非专利药在市场上销声匿迹，并在多年内阻碍“生物仿制”竞争者推出新药。


That is how the TPP will manage trade for the pharmaceutical industry if the US gets its way.	如果美国得逞，TPP就将这样管理制药行业的贸易。


Similarly, consider how the US hopes to use the TPP to manage trade for the tobacco industry.	类似地，我们看看美国希望如何利用TPP管理烟草业。


For decades, US-based tobacco companies have used foreign investor adjudication mechanisms created by agreements like the TPP to fight regulations intended to curb the public-health scourge of smoking.	几十年来，美国烟草公司利用类似于TPP的协定所制定的外国投资者裁决机制对抗旨在遏制吸烟所造成的公共卫生危害的监管。


Under these investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) systems, foreign investors gain new rights to sue national governments in binding private arbitration for regulations they see as diminishing the expected profitability of their investments.	在这些投资者-国家纠纷和解（ISDS）机制中，外国投资者获得了新的起诉国家政府的权利，对于它们认为降低了它们的投资的预期盈利能力的监管采取私人仲裁。


International corporate interests tout ISDS as necessary to protect property rights where the rule of law and credible courts are lacking.	国际公司利益集团鼓吹ISDS，称之为在缺少法治和可靠法院的地区保护知识产权的必要条件。


But that argument is nonsense.	但这一观点根本是无稽之谈。


The US is seeking the same mechanism in a similar mega-deal with the European Union, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, even though there is little question about the quality of Europe’s legal and judicial systems.	在与欧洲的大型协议跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系谈判中，美国也在追求类似的机制，尽管毫无疑问欧洲立法和司法制度非常健全。


To be sure, investors – wherever they call home – deserve protection from expropriation or discriminatory regulations.	诚然，投资者——不管他们来自何方——都应该获得免于没收或歧视性监管的保护。


But ISDS goes much further: The obligation to compensate investors for losses of expected profits can and has been applied even where rules are nondiscriminatory and profits are made from causing public harm.	但ISDS步子迈得太大：补偿投资者预期利润的损失的义务可以并已经适用于规则没有歧视、利润来自公共伤害的领域。


Philip Morris International is currently prosecuting such cases against Australia and Uruguay (not a TPP partner) for requiring cigarettes to carry warning labels.	那家以前叫做菲利普莫里斯（Philip Morris）的公司，目前正在类似的案件中起诉澳大利亚和乌拉圭（非TPP伙伴国）要求香烟加注警告标识。


Canada, under threat of a similar suit, backed down from introducing a similarly effective warning label a few years back.	面临同样诉讼威胁的加拿大几年前就不再要求类似的有效警告标识。


Given the veil of secrecy surrounding the TPP negotiations, it is not clear whether tobacco will be excluded from some aspects of ISDS.	TPP谈判可谓密不透风，不清楚烟草是否被排除在ISDS的某些角度之外。


Either way, the broader issue remains: Such provisions make it hard for governments to conduct their basic functions – protecting their citizens’ health and safety, ensuring economic stability, and safeguarding the environment.	无论如何，更大的问题仍然是：这些条款让政府难以行使其基本职能——保护公民健康和安全、保证经济稳定、保护环境。


Imagine what would have happened if these provisions had been in place when the lethal effects of asbestos were discovered.	想象一下，如果石棉的致命弊端被发现时存在这些条款的话会怎样。


Rather than shutting down manufacturers and forcing them to compensate those who had been harmed, under ISDS, governments would have had to pay the manufacturers not to kill their citizens.	根据ISDS，政府不可关闭制造商并钱坡他们赔偿受害者，而必须付钱给这些制造商让他们不要杀害公民。


Taxpayers would have been hit twice – first to pay for the health damage caused by asbestos, and then to compensate manufacturers for their lost profits when the government stepped in to regulate a dangerous product.	纳税人将遭遇双重打击——先是花钱治疗石棉导致的健康伤害，然后在政府介入监管危险产品时补偿制造商利润损失。


It should surprise no one that America’s international agreements produce managed rather than free trade.	美国的国际贸易协定产生的都是受管制而非自由的贸易，这一点都不令人奇怪。


That is what happens when the policymaking process is closed to non-business stakeholders – not to mention the people’s elected representatives in Congress.	当决策过程对非商业利益相关者——更不用说人民选出来的国会代表——关闭时就会发生这种情况。


Good Trade Intentions Gone Bad	贸易好心变坏事


WASHINGTON, DC – The debate in the United States about trade has taken an unfortunate turn.	华盛顿—美国的贸易争论发生了不幸的转折。


Instead of discussing the detailed issues on their merits, President Barack Obama’s administration has chosen to emphasize the need for fast-track procedures (also known as trade promotion authority, or TPA) to negotiate any trade agreement.	总统奥巴马政府不去详细讨论贸易的利弊问题，而是选择强调贸易谈判中的“快车道”程序（fast-track procedures，也被称为促进贸易权限，简称TPA）。


The administration may win that fight, but there could be real damage as a result.	奥巴马政府也许能赢得争论，但可能因此造成真正的伤害。


The current battle is over the precise content of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a complex 12-country free-trade agreement.	目前的斗争集中在跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（ Trans-Pacific Partnership，TPP）的具体内容上。


Unfortunately, the TPP’s provisions remain secret – meaning that it cannot be seen or discussed by members of the public.	TPP是一个包含了12个国家的复杂的贸易协定。 不幸的是，TPP条款仍处于保密状态——这意味着公众无法窥探和讨论它们。


(Members of Congress may read the technical text, under restricted conditions, but are not allowed to describe its contents in detail.)	（国会议员可以在严格的条件下阅读技术文档，但禁止详细描述其内容。 ）


Anyone who raises legitimate concerns about any aspect of the TPP deal is immediately branded “protectionist.”	任何对TPP协议的任何方面产生合理担忧的人立刻被扣以“保护主义者”的帽子。


The line from the White House is: TPP will lower barriers to US exports, and thus increase jobs and wages.	白宫的口风是：TPP将降低美国的出口壁垒，从而增加就业和工资。


Everything else, in this view, is a distraction.	根据这一观点，其他任何东西都是无用功。


In fact, TPP will do little for exports – and for an obvious reason.	事实上，TPP对出口基本无用——原因显而易见。


The US already has standard tariff-lowering agreements with almost all of the participating countries.	美国已经与几乎所有TPP参与国签订了降低关税协定。


Almost all tariffs on trade among Canada, Mexico, and the US are long gone – that was the effect of the North American Free Trade Agreement.	加拿大、墨西哥和美国之间的所有贸易关税早就已经不复存在——这是 北美自由贸易协定的效果。


Under the Australia and Singapore free-trade agreements as well, almost all tariffs on US goods sold in those countries have been eliminated.	根据与澳大利亚和新加坡的自由贸易协定，美国在两国出售的商品也将免除所有关税。


Goods from the US have entered Chile without tariffs since January 1; and most tariffs imposed by Peru have already been phased out.	从1月1日开始，从美国进入智利的商品将免征关税； 秘鲁的关税也已经大部分被取消。


The TPP will amount to a free-trade agreement with Brunei Darussalam (with a population of less than 500,000) and New Zealand (less than five million).	TPP将形成与文莱（人口还不到500,000）和新西兰（人口不到五百万）的自由贸易协定。


Encouraging exports to these countries is surely desirable, but the economic impact on the US is unlikely to be more than a rounding error.	刺激对这些国家的出口固然很好，但对美国的经济影响也许微不足道。


That leaves three larger countries where the issues are more complex: Japan (about 125 million people), Malaysia (around 30 million people), and Vietnam (90 million people).	其他三个较大国家的问题比较复杂：日本（人口1. 25亿左右）、马来西亚 （人口3,000万）、和越南（人口9,000万）。


Japan resists reducing import tariffs on hundreds of agricultural goods, including meat from the US.	日本抵制降低数百种农产品的进口关税，包括来自美国的肉类。


In addition, non-tariff barriers have long impeded, for example, the export of American-made cars to the Japanese market.	此外，非关税壁垒也长期阻碍着（比如）美国汽车出口日本市场。


It remains unclear to what extent TPP will really open the Japanese market for auto-related products.	目前仍不清楚TPP将在何种程度上实现日本汽车相关产品市场的真正开放。


And Japan has had a history of currency intervention, holding down the yen’s exchange rate to boost exports and discourage imports – with major negative consequences for the US, among others.	并且日本有货币干预的历史，压低日元汇率刺激出口、阻挠进口——这对美国和其他国家造成了巨大的消极结果。


Japan does not engage in such currency manipulation currently, and TPP represents a good opportunity to ask the Japanese for a commitment to abandon the practice.	日本目前没有进行这类货币操纵，而TPP也是一次良机要求日本人承诺不再进行操纵。


Unfortunately, the Obama administration has declined to go down this path – currency manipulation is off the table as far as it is concerned.	不幸的是，奥巴马政府决定不这样做——到目前为止，货币操纵不在谈判之列。


As for Malaysia, important issues regarding forced labor in the export sector have emerged – and there should be full compliance with labor standards before the TPP deal is signed.	至于马来西亚，已经出现了与出口部门强迫劳工有关的问题——在TPP协议签订前应该充分履行劳动标准。


There are some grounds for optimism here, but promises to implement changes in labor standards after a trade agreement takes effect are seldom fulfilled.	这方面有一些乐观的理由，但在贸易协定生效后实施劳动标准的变化的承诺很少兑现。


In Vietnam, moving large subsidies provided to state-owned enterprises onto a measurable, market basis would be a sensible goal.	在越南，让国有企业获得巨额补贴变得可衡量并以市场为基础是一个明智的目标。


Workers’ rights are also a significant issue.	工人权利也是重要问题。


Indications are that the TPP negotiations are making little progress – though, again, key details and potential agreements remain highly confidential.	迹象表明TPP谈判几乎没有取得进展——尽管关键细节和潜在协定照例也是高度机密的。


In addition to trade, TPP includes important provisions related to investment, the most prominent of which concern intellectual property rights, such as patents.	除了贸易，TPP还包括了与投资有关的重要条款，首屈一指的便是知识产权（如专利）问题。


Although Obama says that the TPP is the most progressive trade agreement in history, Sander Levin, the ranking Democrat on the House Ways and Means Committee – and someone will full access to the text – disagrees.	尽管奥巴马声称TPP是历史上最进步的贸易协定，但众议院筹款委员会（Ways and Means Committee）主席、民主党员桑德尔·莱文（Sander Levin）——他可以接触到TPP协定全文——不同意这一说法。


He says that access to low-cost medicine in poor countries, for example, will be restricted.	他说，（比如）穷国获得低成本药物的图景就将被限制。


Médecins Sans Frontières, the Nobel Peace Prize-winning humanitarian organization, agrees.	获得过诺贝尔和平奖的人道组织无国界医生（Médecins Sans Frontières）同意莱文的说法。


(These and related issues were raised at a recent event on Capitol Hill in which I took part.)	（这些问题以及相关问题在最近的国会山会议上被提出，我也参与了这次会议。 ）


And TPP will also confer special status on foreign investors, allowing them to sue for financial judgments against host-country regulations.	TPP还给予外国投资者特殊待遇，允许他们 起诉 东道国监管要求金融裁决。


Why we would want to provide such differential protection to non-domestic companies is a mystery.	我们为什么想给非本国公司提供不同的保护是一个谜。


Creating a quasi-legal process outside the regular court system, just for foreigners, can go wrong in many ways.	在常规法庭系统之外建立一套准司法程序可能造成诸多问题。


As Levin recently argued in a detailed and persuasive speech, the US should be having a full and open debate about these dimensions of the TPP deal.	莱文在最近的一次详细而雄辩的讲话中指出，美国应该全面而公开地争论TPP协议的这些方面。


It needs thoughtful, public deliberation about the provisions that are included, as they can have important consequences for the US and its trading partners.	美国需要关于所包括的条款的有思想深度的公共考虑，这对于美国及其贸易伙伴都有着重要影响。


Unfortunately, the Obama administration prefers to avoid public debate on substantive issues, instead merely insisting on using the fast-track TPA procedures for whatever TPP is agreed.	不幸的是，奥巴马政府更想在实质性问题上避免公共争论，而一味坚持通过快车道TPA程序实现TPP已达成一致的所有东西。


That is a mistake.	这是一个错误。


If the administration gets a trade agreement and it goes bad – on workers’ rights, access to medicines, state subsidies, or anything else – how does that help trade, America’s foreign partners, or the US economy?	如果奥巴马政府得到了贸易协定并且这一贸易协定变坏——在工人权利、获取药品、国家补贴或其他任何问题上——那么它如何帮助贸易、美国的外国伙伴以及美国经济？


That will give pharmaceutical companies much longer monopolies on patented medicines and keep cheaper options – both generics and alternatives that are deemed too similar – off the market, hurting both consumers and governments that provide subsidies.	这将大大延长制药公司对专利药的垄断，让更廉价的选择——不管是非专利药还是被认为过于相似的替代品——无法进入市场，对消费者和提供补���的政府都构成了伤害。


Treason in the Air	大气层中的背叛


COPENHAGEN – Discussions about global warming are marked by an increasing desire to stamp out “impure” thinking, to the point of questioning the value of democratic debate.	发自哥本哈根——针对全球变暖问题的讨论正越来越被某种思维所占据：它试图消灭那些“动机不纯”的想法，甚至还质疑民主辩论本身的价值。


But shutting down discussion simply means the disappearance of reason from public policy.	而这种关闭辩论之门的思维方式只能意味着理性在公共政策中的消亡。


In March, Al Gore’s science adviser and prominent climate researcher, Jim Hansen, proclaimed that when it comes to dealing with global warming, the “democratic process isn’t working.”	在3月份时，美国前副总统阿尔·戈尔的科学顾问，著名气候研究专家吉姆·汉森公开宣称，当面对全球变暖问题时“民主程序不管用”。


Although science has demonstrated that CO2 from fossil fuels is heating the planet, politicians are unwilling to follow his advice and stop building coal-fired power plants.	因为虽然科学业已证明由矿石燃料燃烧所产生的二氧化碳正令地球不断升温，政治家们却不愿听从汉森的建议并停建火电厂。


Hansen argues that, “the first action that people should take is to use the democratic process.	汉森认为“人们所要采取的第一步行动就是利用民主程序。


What is frustrating people, me included, is that democratic action affects elections, but what we get then from political leaders is greenwash.”	但最困扰所有人，包括他本人的，则是民主行动虽然影响了选举，但从政治领导人那得到的却只不过是假惺惺的表态。


Although he doesn’t tell us what the second or third action is, he has turned up in a British court to defend six activists who damaged a coal power station. He argues that we need “more people chaining themselves to coal plants,” a point repeated by Gore.	”尽管汉森没有告诉我们第二步或者第三步行动是什么，但他最近却出现在一个英国法庭上为6个破坏火电厂的环保分子出庭辩护，并宣称需要“更多人把自己捆绑在火电厂（来阻止其正常运行），”而这个观点也是戈尔所反复强调的。


The Nobel laureate in economics Paul Krugman goes further.	而诺贝尔经济学奖得主保罗·克鲁格曼在这方面则走得更远。


After the narrow passage of the Waxman-Markey climate-change bill in the United States House of Representatives, Krugman said that there was no justification for a vote against it. He called virtually all of the members who voted against it, “climate deniers” who were committing “treason against the planet.”	在华克斯曼-马基气候变化法案在美国众议院以微弱优势通过之后，克鲁格曼说那些反对票都是无理取闹，还把那些投了反对票的议员都认定为触犯了“背叛地球罪”的“气候否定者”。


Krugman said that the “irresponsibility and immorality” of the representatives’ democratic viewpoints were “unforgivable” and a “betrayal.”	克鲁格曼说那些议员民主观点中的“不负责任和不道德”是“不可原谅的”和“背叛”。


He thus accused almost half of the democratically elected members of the House, from both parties, of treason for holding the views that they do – thereby essentially negating democracy.	他因此指责来自民主共和两党的近半数众议员，认为他们坚持自己观点的做法就是背叛——这种看法显然是从本质上否定了民主制度。


Less well-known pundits make similar points, suggesting that people with “incorrect” views on global warming should face Nuremburg-style trials or be tried for crimes against humanity.	更多不那么有名的学者也持相似的观点，建议对那些对全球变暖问题持有“不正确”想法的人来一场二战后纽伦堡式的审判或者被控以反人类罪。


There is clearly a trend. The climate threat is so great – and democracies are doing so little about it – that people conclude that maybe democracy is part of the problem, and that perhaps people ought not to be allowed to express heterodox opinions on such an important topic.	这个趋势显而易见，因为气候变化的威胁如此之大——而民主制度对此却鲜有建树——因此人们得出结论说民主制度也是问题的一部分，并以此认为不该有人在这么一个重要的议题上表达离经叛道的观点。


This is scary, although not without historical precedent.	但上述看法不但耸人听闻，而且也是有历史教训的。


Much of the American McCarthyism of the 1940’s and 1950’s was driven by the same burning faith in the righteousness of the mission – a faith that saw fundamental rights abrogated.	比如1940~1950年代美国的麦卡锡主义，其绝大部分行动就是被同样一种义愤填膺，且自以为正当的所谓使命感所推动——而正是这种使命感剥夺了人们的基本权利。


We would be well served to go down a different path.	如果我们选择第二条道路，那我们的境况会变得更好。


Gore and others often argue that if the science of climate change concludes that CO2 emissions are harmful, it follows that we should stop those harmful emissions – and that we are morally obliged to do so.	戈尔和其他人经常争辩说如果气候变化研究能证明二氧化碳排放是有害的，那么人们就该停止排放——而人们是有道义责任去这样做的。


But this misses half the story. We could just as well point out that since science tells us that speeding cars kill many people, we should cut speed limits to almost nothing.	但这些话只说对了一半，因为研究同样也证明超速驾车造成了大量伤亡，因此把限速指标下降到蜗牛那样就最好了。


We do no such thing, because we recognize that the costs of high-speed cars must be weighed against the benefits of a mobile society.	但没人这么做，因为大家都意识到，必须在车速所引致的伤亡和汽车带来的好处之间权衡利弊。


Indeed, nobody emits CO2 for fun.	事实上，没人会闲着无聊去排放什么二氧化碳。


CO2 emissions result from other, generally beneficial acts, such as burning coal to keep warm, burning kerosene to cook, or burning gas to transport people.	二氧化碳的排放是其他行为的结果，而这些行为往往是有益的，比如燃煤取暖，烧油煮饭或者是消耗汽油用于交通运输。


The benefits of fossil fuels must be weighed against the costs of global warming.	因此燃烧矿物燃料所带来的好处应该和全球变暖所带来的成本相权衡。


Gore and Hansen want a moratorium on coal-fired power plants, but neglect the fact that the hundreds of new power plants that will be opened in China and India in the coming years could lift a billion people out of poverty.	戈尔和汉森希望能推迟火电厂的建设，但却忽视了未来几年即将在中国和���度建成的数百座火电厂将帮助近十亿人脱离贫困。


Negating this outcome through a moratorium is clearly no unmitigated good.	相比之下，用推迟的方式毁掉了这一成果显然得不偿失。


Likewise, reasonable people can differ on their interpretation of the Waxman-Markey bill.	同样地，理性的人们可以对华克斯曼-马基气候变化法案进行不同的解读。


Even if we set aside its masses of pork-barrel spending, and analyses that show it may allow more emissions in the US for the first decades, there are more fundamental problems with this legislation.	即使我们把法案中大量公饱私囊的“政治分肥”忽略不计，并将法案可能允许美国在其生效的头十年内排放更多温室气体的分析放在一边，这一立法依然存在着许多根本性问题。


At a cost of hundreds of billions of dollars annually, it will have virtually no impact on climate change.	作为一个每年耗费上千亿美元的法案，它却对气候变化实际上没有任何影响。


If all of the bill’s many provisions were entirely fulfilled, economic models show that it would reduce the temperature by the end of the century by 0.11°C (0.2°F) – reducing warming by less than 4%.	如果这一法案的所有预期目标都得以实现的话，经济模型演算得出它将在本世纪末把温度降低0. 11摄氏度（0.


Even if every Kyoto-obligated country passed its own, duplicate Waxman-Markey bills – which is implausible and would incur significantly higher costs – the global reduction would amount to just 0.22°C (0.35°F) by the end of this century.	而假设那些签订了京都议定书的国家都参照华克斯曼-马基气候变化法案来制定自己的法案——这些法案不仅前景难料，且耗资巨大——在本世纪末全球温度也将仅仅下降0. 22摄氏度（0.


The reduction in global temperature would not be measurable in a hundred years, yet the cost would be significant and payable now.	35华氏度）。 况且全球气候的下降幅度需要数百年时间来测算，但人们为此所需支付的巨大成本却迫在眉睫。


Is it really treason against the planet to express some skepticism about whether this is the right way forward?	照这样说，质疑这一法案的正当性是不是就是“背叛地球罪”？


Is it treason to question throwing huge sums of money at a policy that will do virtually no good in a hundred years?	是不是质疑这个耗资巨大却在百年以内都得不到好处的政策就是背叛？


Is it unreasonable to point out that the inevitable creation of trade barriers that will ensue from Waxman-Markey could eventually cost the world ten times more than the damage climate change could ever have wrought?	是不是指出华克斯曼-马基气候变化法案所产生的贸易壁垒将最终令全球付出比气候变化多十倍的成本就是蛮不讲理？


Today’s focus on ineffective and costly climate policies shows poor judgment.	由此可见，当今那些针对效率极低且耗资巨大的气候政策的关注言论，只能显示出某些人判断力的低劣。


But I would never want to shut down discussion about these issues – whether it is with Gore, Hansen, or Krugman.	但我永远不会试图去压制对这些事务的讨论——不管对方是戈尔，汉森还是克鲁格曼。


Everybody involved in this discussion should spend more time building and acknowledging good arguments, and less time telling others what they cannot say.	每一位参与这场讨论的人都需要花更多时间去建构和获取好的论据，而不是去告诉别人什么能说什么不能说。


Wanting to shut down the discussion is simply treason against reason.	而那些试图压制讨论的做法，根本就是对理性的背叛。


How Trees Make Cities Healthier	树木如何改善城市健康


WASHINGTON, DC – Last May, I had the dubious fortune of visiting Mumbai, India during the city’s hottest month on record.	华盛顿——去年5月，我有幸在有历史记录以来最热的月份访问印度孟买。


Temperatures remained at over 40°C (104°F) for days at time.	连续几天的某些时候，温度都保持在40°C （104°F）以上。


The difference between standing in the shade of a tree and standing in full sunlight was like night and day.	站在树荫下和顶着太阳光的差异就像白天和晚上。


Such heat waves are not merely uncomfortable.	这样的热浪不仅令人不适。


They pose a serious health threat – one that is often overlooked when addressing extreme weather.	在应对极端天气时常常被忽略的是它们严重威胁健康。


In fact, heat waves account for more deaths than any other type of weather-related event, killing more than 12,000 people worldwide each year.	事实上，热浪致死人数超过其他任何类型的天气相关事件，全球范围内，每年超过12，000人因此而死亡。


The danger is particularly pronounced in cities, where the “urban heat island” effect results in temperatures as much as 12°C higher than in less-developed areas nearby.	这种危险在城市里尤为显著，“城市热岛”效应导致温度比附近欠发达地区高12°C 之多。


And the issue is not confined to tropical cities like Mumbai.	而且问题不仅限于孟买这样的热带城市。


In August 2003, a devastating heat wave across Europe killed more than 3,000 people in Paris alone.	2003年8月，一场破坏性的热浪侵袭欧洲，仅巴黎一地就有超过3，000人因此而死亡。


Making matters worse, cities tend to have higher rates of air pollution, especially fine particulate matter (PM) resulting from the combustion of fossil fuels and biomass, which contributes to up to three million deaths every year.	更严重的是，城市的空气污染率往往更高，尤其是化石燃料和生物质燃烧所产生的微细颗粒物（PM）每年造成高达三百万人死亡。


For many city residents, the greatest health and safety threat is the air around them.	对许多城市居民而言，周围的空气是最严重的健康和安全威胁。


Already, the World Health Organization estimates that 92% of the world’s population is exposed to dangerous air pollution.	世界卫生组织已经估计92%的世界人口面临危险的空气污染。


Given rapid urbanization – up to 70% of all people will live in cities by 2050 – the rate of exposure to higher levels of pollution is rising rapidly.	由于快速城市化——截止2050年，高达70%的人将生活在城市——暴露在更高污染水平中的人群占比正在迅速攀升。


But urbanization doesn’t have to create a health crisis.	但城市化并不一定造成健康危机。


In fact, there is a beautifully simple action that municipal leaders can take to reduce both extreme heat and air pollution: plant more trees.	事实上，市政领导们可以采取一项非常简单的行动来缓解极端炎热和空气污染：那就是种植更多树木。


Trees and other vegetation naturally cool the air around them by shading surfaces and releasing water vapor.	树木和其他植被通过遮蔽表面和释放水蒸气对周遭空气自然起到冷却作用。


Moreover, their leaves act as filters, reducing PM levels in the surrounding 30 meters (nearly 100 feet) by as much as one-quarter.	此外，它们的叶子就像过滤器，降低高达四分之一的周遭30米（将近100英尺）内微细颗粒物含量。


It is a one-two punch of environmental action.	种树在环保行动中往往能够一箭双雕。


My organization, The Nature Conservancy, has carried out a study of 245 cities around the world that stand to benefit from tree-planting initiatives, estimating their potential return on investment in terms of both temperature and PM.	我所在的自然保护协会对世界各地受益于植树计划的245座城市进行了研究，测算了它们在温度和微细颗粒物方面植树投资的潜在回报。


Given that the most significant effects of trees are highly localized, we found that densely populated megacities in Pakistan, India, and other parts of South and Southeast Asia would benefit most.	鉴于树木的重要影响高度地方化，我们发现巴基斯坦、印度、南亚及东南亚其它地区人口稠密的大城市从中受益最多。


The highly localized effects of trees mean that planting them can provide highly targeted benefits, even in cities that ostensibly have plenty of green space.	即使在表面看来已经有充足绿色空间的城市，植树影响高度局部化也意味着它们可以取得高度有针对性的效果。


Consider Louisville, Kentucky.	我们来看看肯塔基州的路易斯维尔。


With its lush parks and shaded neighborhoods, it would appear to have little in common with Mumbai or Karachi.	拥有遮天蔽日公园和树影婆娑社区的路易斯维尔表面看去与孟买和卡拉奇完全不同。


Yet there are neighborhoods in Louisville with minimal tree cover, making the city one of the fastest-growing heat islands in the United States – and prompting The Nature Conservancy to initiate a targeted tree-planting effort.	但路易斯维尔某些社区仅有最低限度的林木覆盖，导致这座城市成为美国发展最快的热岛之一——并促使自然保护协会开展有针对性的植树工作。


Countless other neighborhoods worldwide could benefit from similar initiatives.	世界各地有无数其他社区可以从类似的计划中受益。


Areas with vulnerable populations – near schools and hospitals, for example – are particularly good candidates for such efforts.	弱势群体集中分布的地区——比如靠近学校和医院——尤其适合参与这项工作。


Trees can even be used as a natural screen against pollution from highways or industrial areas.	甚至可以将树木作为抵御高速路或工业区污染的自然屏障。


Worldwide, $100 million of annual investment in tree-planting initiatives could provide as many as 68 million people with significant reductions in PM levels, while also providing 77 million people a reduction of 1°C in air temperature.	在世界范围内，每年投资1亿美元实施植树计划可以显著降低6，800万人周遭空气中的微细颗粒物，同时让7，700万人的日常气温降低1°C。


An investment equivalent to $4 per person could save 11,000-36,000 lives annually and reduce adverse health effects for tens of millions of people.	每人每年投资四美元就可以挽救11，000到36，000人的生命，并减轻对成百上千万人造成的负面健康影响。


That return on investment is comparable to estimates for other strategies, such as industrial scrubbers, limits on automobile traffic, and use of light-colored building materials that absorb less heat.	上述投资回报的预期效果与采用工业洗涤器、限制汽车应用及采用吸收热量较少的浅色建筑材料相当。


All of these strategies have a part to play; trees alone won’t solve all of our heat and air-quality issues.	上述所有策略都将发挥作用； 单靠植树无法解决我们所有的温度和空气质量问题。


But only tree-planting addresses both urban heat and air pollution.	但只有植树可以同时解决城市热岛和空气污染问题。


Trees also offer a host of other benefits for cities.	植树还可以为城市带来一系列其它好处。


They provide habitat for wildlife, reduce storm-water runoff, and sequester carbon from the atmosphere, which helps to mitigate climate change.	树木为野生动物提供栖息地、减少雨水径流并从大气中吸收碳元素，从而有助于缓解气候变化。


There is also a growing body of research showing that exposure to trees and other vegetation has a positive effect on mental health, especially for children.	还有越来越多的研究表明特别是对孩子来讲，接触树木和其他植物有益身心健康。


All of these co-benefits speak to the wisdom of greater investment in trees and urban green infrastructure such as parks and rain gardens.	上述所有协同效应都说明应当加大对树木和公园及雨水花园等城市绿色基础设施的投资。


The Sustainable Development Goals, which include a dedicated goal for sustainable cities, have established rising temperatures and urban air quality as urgent global issues.	专注建设可持续城市等可持续发展目标已经把气温升高和城市空气质量列为亟待解决的全球目标。


Both will be discussed extensively at the annual United Nations Climate Change Conference, which starts next week in Marrakech, Morocco.	下周将在摩洛哥马拉喀什召开的年度联合国气候变化会议将对这一问题展开广泛探讨。


But these are also local issues, experienced very differently in each city – and even in each neighborhood.	但这些问题同时具有地方性——每座城市、甚至每个社区的感受都不尽相同。


As global action on climate change and sustainability moves forward, municipal leaders can take their own steps, starting with a targeted, localized, and replicable tree-planting strategy that improves the health and wellbeing of their residents.	随着气候变化和可持续发展全球行动不断向前推进，市政领导可以在各自的城市从改善居民健康和福祉的有针对性、本地化和可以复制的植树战略开始采取行动。


Time to get planting.	掀起植树运动高潮的时机已经成熟。


Trends and Trendiness at Davos	达沃斯的趋势和时尚


The annual World Economic Forum is rightly perceived as a global “barometer.”	每年一度的世界经济论坛被誉为全球的“晴雨表”。


But the superb sunshine in Davos these days cannot avoid the shadows of the financial crisis that have enveloped the world, casting an atmosphere of gloom and doom on this year’s meeting.	但是这些天达沃斯上空耀眼的阳光并不能掩盖笼罩全球的金融危机所带来的阴影，从而使今年的会议充塞了沮丧和灾难的气氛。


Today, more than ever, the Forum’s proud motto, “Committed to the improvement of the world,” seems disconnected from reality.	今天，论坛引以为荣的口号“致力于世界的发展”却似乎前所未有地与现实脱节了。


It is not confidence that dominates Davos 2008, but rather a sense of impotence, if not bewilderment, at the world’s growing complexity.	2008年的达沃斯会议弥漫的不是信心，而更是一种对世界日益复杂的局面的无能为力，如果不是困惑的话。


In fact, Davos is less a barometer that helps us to understand the deep trends that are shaping the world than a mirror that reflects trendy ideas, worries, and perhaps gossip.	事实上。 与其说达沃斯是帮助我们理解世界深层趋势的晴雨表，倒不如说它是反映流行的思想、担忧还有也许流言的一面镜子。


From formal debates and informal schmoozing with fellow members of the Davos crowd, one gets a sense of who the American establishment favors to win the next presidential election (Hillary Clinton), predictions for the upcoming referendum in Ireland on the European “simplified” treaty (it will be very close), and French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s international image (not good).	通过与聚集在达沃斯的与会代表的正式辩论或非正式的闲谈中，人们会了解到美国的领导核心人物认为谁将赢得先一届总统大选（希拉里·克林顿）、对爱尔兰即将举行的有关欧盟“简化”了的条约的公投表决的预测（正反两方的得票率会很接近）以及法国总统萨科齐的国际形象（不太好）。


You do not need to go to Davos for this, but in the Swiss mountains these ideas acquire an aura of legitimacy – call it the “I was told in Davos” imprimatur – which explains why political and economic analysts and commentators keep coming back, despite the Forum’s combination of pomposity and intellectual vacuity.	你不需要专门跑到达沃斯去了解这些信息，但是在瑞士的山脉中这些观点获得了一种合法性的气息。 “这是我在达沃斯听说的”，这解释了为什么政治和经济界的分析师和评论家一直都来参加会议，尽管论坛上充斥了炫耀和知识分子的空谈。


The eminent people who pass through are given opportunities only for sound bites, developed thoughts.	经历过这些的杰出人士只有机会去发表一些尖刻的言论和经过演化的思想。


As for business leaders, despite the hefty fees they must pay to become members of the “Davos Family,” they, too, keep coming because for them the Forum ultimately represents a time- and money-saving investment.	至于商界的领导人，尽管他们必须为成为“达沃斯”家庭的一员而付出高昂的费用，却还是一直来参加会议，因为对于他们来说这个论坛是一个既能节约时间又能节能金钱的投资良机。


Where else in the world could they meet so many of their potential partners or customers, including heads of emerging states, in one place?	世界上还有哪个地方能让他们一次就遇到如此多潜在的合作伙伴或客户，包括新兴国家的领导人的呢？


Of course, the danger of Davos lies in this concentrated commingling of the chattering classes and the real world of politics and business.	当然，达沃斯的危险也正在于这里集中地混合着喜欢夸夸其谈的人和真实世界中的政治与商业。


Conformism flows naturally from these encounters and creates a world in which everybody tends to think alike, as if a truly global community could create a global way of thinking, even if positions on how to address the current financial crisis are varied.	循规蹈矩在这些会面中自然地流淌，并且创造了一个每一个人都倾向于共同的想法的世界，似乎一个真正的全球社区能够创造出一种全球一致的思维方式，即便大家对于如何看待目前的金融危机看法各不相同。


What is trendy at Davos this year is to view the crisis as reflecting two deep global trends – for example, the declining clout of the United States.	今年的达沃斯流行的是把这场危机看成是反映了两个深刻的全球趋势，比如，美国影响力的衰退。


After the war in Iraq and the Bush administration’s slow reaction to Hurricane Katrina, America’s subprime mortgage crisis is perceived by many as simply accelerating the irresistible rise of Asia and the shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world, even if the wider financial crisis will equally affect Asia’s growth.	在伊拉克战争以及布什政府在卡特林娜飓风后缓慢的反应后，美国的次贷危机被许多人看成不过是加速了亚洲的地位不可抗拒的上升以及世界从单极转向多极化的趋势，即便更大范围的金融危机也会影响亚洲的增长。


For countries like China or India, the scaling down of growth from 8% to 5% is nearly the equivalent of a recession in the West.	对于像中国和印度这样的国家来说，增长率从8%降到5%几乎等同于西方的衰退。


Yesterday, when America sneezed, the world caught a cold.	昨天，当美国咳嗽时，整个世界都得了感冒。


Today, when America catches pneumonia, can Asia only sneeze?	今天，当美国得了肺炎，难道亚洲只会打个喷嚏吗？


The second trend underlined at Davos is the return of the state.	达沃斯流行的第二个趋势是国家地位的回归。


In the latest issue of Foreign Affairs, Forum‘s founder and president, Klaus Schwab, asks “How can business help save the world?”	在谈多最近的外交关系时，论坛的创始人和总裁施瓦布问道：“商界应该怎样拯救世界？


But, with the financial crisis hanging over Davos participants’ heads like the sword of Damocles, the question is becoming, “Can states and international institutions save business?”	”但是当金融危机像达摩克利斯剑悬在达沃斯与会代表的头上时，问题正在变成“国家和国际组织怎样拯救商界？ ”


The return of the state, even when it is the power of the European Commission to sanction Microsoft, is on everyone’s lips.	国家地位的回归，即便是欧盟动用权力惩罚了微软，正成为大家议论的焦点。


Such a return further underlines a growing skepticism about the market and its key actors’ infectious and dangerous greed.	这种回归进一步加深了大家对于市场及其主要参与者传染性的并且危险的贪婪的怀疑态度。


This trend, if it is confirmed by reality, could signify the end of what Davos stands for: an open, global, and transparent world.	这种趋势，如果它被现实所证实的话，将意味着达沃斯所标榜的理念，也就是一个开放、全球性的、透明的世界的终结。


But is the world ready for a return to protectionist policies and nationalist reflexes?	但是世界真的准备好面对保护主义政策和民族主义反应的回归了吗？


Will today’s freedom and transparency, having led to undesired results, result in a return to restrictions on movements of goods, people, and capital?	今天给我们带来我们不想要的结果的自由和透明将会回归到对商品、人还有资金的限制运动上去吗？


In Davos this year, great hopes have given way to great apprehensions.	在今年的达沃斯会议上，巨大的希望让位给了巨大的担忧。


How can you pretend to be acting to change the world if you no longer understand it?	如果你甚至不再理解它时，你怎么能假装要去努力改变这个世界呢？


Trichet Takes Control At The ECB	特里歇 在欧洲央行取得控制权


The announcement by the President of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet, that interest rates would be raised at the next meeting of the bank’s Governing Council on December 1st,could be a defining moment in his presidency.	欧洲中央银行（ECB）行长让·克鲁得·特里歇（Jean-Claude Trichet ）宣布，该行管理委员会将在 12 月 1 日举行的下一次会议上，提高利率。 这一宣告可能成为 特里歇担任行长期间，厘清其职责的时刻。


By pre-announcing the rate increase, which senior ECB officials call a move towards greater transparency, Trichet firmly demonstrated his leadership of the Governing Council.	通过提前宣布利率上涨，特里歇坚定地展示了自己在管理委员会中的领导地位。 欧洲央行高级官员称此次提前宣告为向更大的透明度迈进的一步。


Press leaks by dissident members had sowed confusion in the public’s mind as to the bank’s concerns and intentions before the announcement.	在此次宣告前，银行中持异议的成员向新闻界透露的消息就已经在公众心中播下了困惑的种子，不清楚银行的顾虑与意图何在。


Even though a consensus had emerged in the Council that a December interest rate hike would be necessary, a handful of holdouts on the ECB Governing Council – some with their own very private agendas – leaked misleading and, in one instance, clearly false information to the press in a futile attempt to thwart the increase.	尽管在欧洲央行委员会上，已经出现一致意见，认为12 月的利率上涨势在必行，但委员会中还是有少数人（这些人中，部分有着自己的打算）拒不让步，将具有误导性的，有一次甚至是明显虚假的信息透露给新闻界，试图阻挠利率上涨，却徒劳无功。


In an anonymous leak to a major financial news service, an ECB official falsely maintained that unanimity was needed for a rate hike, implying a single dove could stop it.	一名欧洲央行官员曾经匿名向一家主要的金融新闻机构透露了虚假消息，称利率上涨需要取得全体成员一致同意，暗示只需一名鸽派成员便能阻止利率上涨。


Infuriated by what he considered to be guerilla tactics, Trichet effectively silenced the mischief-makers by the bold stroke of pre-announcing the rate hike two weeks before the meeting.	在特里歇看来，此举无异为游击战术，让他非常恼火，于是在会议前两周便预先宣布了利率上涨。 这一大胆举措有效地让那些挑拨离间的人闭了嘴。


This is not the first time communications has been a problem for the ECB.	交流成为问题，对欧洲央行来说，这不是第一次。


On more than one occasion, under both Trichet and former ECB chairman Wim Duisenberg before him, press leaks and the tit-for-tat responses they engender, made the Governing Council sound more like a cacophony of discordant voices than a serious deliberative body.	在特里歇和其前任欧洲央行主席德伊森贝赫（Wim Duisenberg ）治下，都不止一次出现过向新闻界泄露消息的情况，并带来以牙还牙的反应。 这让管理委员会听起来更像是个多种杂乱声音构成的不和谐音，而非严肃谨慎的机构。


Now, to his credit, Trichet has done something about this long-standing problem, although not without ruffling some feathers in the process.	现在， 特里歇采取了一些措施，来解决这一长期存在的问题，为自己赢得了荣誉，尽管在这一过程中，也惹怒了一些人。


The doves are furious about the pre-announcement, and some hawks – perhaps nostalgic for the more collegial style of Wim Duisenberg – regard Trichet’s move as “showing off” and “taking control.”	对预先宣告，鸽派感到恼火不已，而一些鹰派成员，也许是留恋德伊森贝赫更注重权力共享的风格，认为特里歇的举动是“炫耀”，是“控制”。


Indeed, a leading Dutch financial newspaper attacked the pre-announcement as a sign of Trichet’s weakness rather than strength, implying that he had lost control of the Governing Council.	事实上，荷兰一家业界领先的金融报就攻击说，这一预先宣告是特里歇 弱点的象征，而非其实力的标志，暗示特里歇已经失去了对管理委员会的控制。


This is unfair.	这种说法不公平。


The recalcitrance of the holdouts against the consensus – a direct challenge to Trichet’s leadership – gave the ECB president little alternative.	拒绝达成一致意见的成员的顽固抵抗是对 特里歇的领导地位的直接挑战，让这位欧洲央行行长别无选择。


What was he to do?	他能做什么？


Let the holdouts undermine his personal credibility and that of the bank?	让这些拒不让步的成员逐渐破坏他个人的信誉和银行的信誉？


The unwillingness of frustrated minorities to accept consensus may well require the ECB president to take more control of the governing board than it has been used to in the past or, indeed, feel comfortable with in the future.	少数派非常沮丧，拒绝接受大家的一致意见。 这一情况大有理由要求欧洲央行行长对管理董事会行使比过去习惯的，或将来觉得舒服的多的控制权。


More than anything, the pre-announcement controversy demonstrates that a renewed spirit of consensus and collegiality in the ECB’s Governing Council is sorely needed.	最为重要的是，对预先宣告的争议表明在欧洲央行的管理委员会中，迫切需要一致精神和权力分享精神的重新兴起。


Because Trichet’s pre-announcement of a moderate interest rate hike conjures up visions of a Fed-like series of small interest rate hikes over an extended period of time, the ECB president also pre-announced his disinclination to follow in US Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan’s footsteps in this regard.	特里歇对利率适度上涨的预先宣告引发了联邦系列利率在长期内小幅度上涨的远景，因此，这位欧洲央行行长还预先宣布，在这方面，他无意跟随美联储主席格林斯潘的步伐。


Indeed, a case even can be made that with the new leadership at the Federal Reserve expected to embrace European-style “inflation targeting,” we may be entering a period in which the Fed follows the ECB on critical monetary matters rather than the other way round.	事实上，还有可能出现这种情况：由于联邦储备的新任领导有望接受欧洲风格的“以通货膨胀为针对目标”，我们可能会进入一个在重大货币问题上，美联储跟随 欧洲央行，而非反之的阶段。


“Inflation targeting” means that a central bank puts the pursuit of price stability above all other objectives.	“以通货膨胀为针对目标”意味着中央银行将对价格稳定的追求置于其它目标之上。


This is what the ECB does – and what the Fed’s Alan Greenspan does not do.	这是欧洲央行的做法，也是美联储的格林斯潘没有采取的做法。


“Inflation targeting” also means the central bank follows certain specified rules.	“以通货膨胀为针对目标”也意味着中央银行遵循某些特定规则。


This too is what the ECB does and Greenspan doesn’t do.	这也是欧洲央行采取而格林斯潘没有采取的做法。


Ironically, the “inflation targeting” advocated by Greenspan’s nominated successor, Ben Bernanke, lies closer to ECB monetary policy than to the discretionary activism that the Fed has practiced during Greenspan’s long tenure.	讽刺的是，格林斯潘指定的继承人——本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke ）所提倡的“以通货膨胀为针对目标” 更接近于欧洲央行的货币政策，而非美联储在格林斯潘长期领导下所采取的无条件行动主义。


Trick or Treat?	诡计还是招待


OXFORD – A new way of thinking about individual choice has taken the political landscape by storm.  America’s new president Barack Obama and the leader of the British Conservatives, David Cameron (just to drop a couple of names) have shown an interest in it.	牛津－对个人选择的新思考方法已经以风暴之势席卷了政治领域。 美国新总统巴拉克·奥巴马和英国保守党领袖大卫·卡梅隆（仅仅只提这几个名字）已经对此表示出了兴趣。


Its intellectual and academic pedigree is impeccable.	这种新思考方法的学术和理论基础无懈可击。


It is said to be effective, evidence-based, and cheap to implement.	据说，它很有效，有证据作为基础并且实施起来所付出的代价很小。


Most of all, it stakes a claim to a degree of philosophical coherence of which the various “third ways” of the last decade could only dream.	最重要的是，它声称具有过去十年中各种各样的“第三条道路”思潮只能梦想的一定程度上的哲学连贯性。


The novel idea, elucidated in Cass Sunstein’s and Richard Thaler’s book Nudge , is that skillfully controlling the way alternatives are presented to us can “nudge” us toward making the choices that our own “better selves” would make.	这个在凯斯·桑斯坦（Cass Sunstein）和理查德·萨勒（Richard Thaler）的著作《推动》（ Nudge） 中阐明的新颖观点是，巧妙地控制选择呈现在我们面前的方式，可以“推动”我们作出 “更好的自我”会作出的选择。


“Libertarian paternalists” like Sunstein and Thaler claim that we have two different ways of making decisions: one “from the gut” (called System I), and the other more deliberative and far more effective (called System II).	像桑斯坦和萨勒这样的“自由家长主义者”（Libertarian paternalists）声称，我们有两种不同的决策方法：一种是“直截了当”（被称为方法I）的方法，另一种是更加慎重并且更加有效的方法（被称为方法II）。


But, while System II choices may be more effective than System-I decisions, they are more “expensive” to make: one needs data, analysis, and concentration.	但是，虽然方法II作出的选择比方法I作出的选择更为有效，但是，作出这样的选择更为“昂贵”：人们需要数据、分析以及专注来作出这样的选择。


Only when the importance of the task warrants the effort do we shift gear and deploy the System-II heavy artillery.	只有当任务的重要性使这样的努力成为必要时，我们才改变方法，部署方法II的重型火炮。


This division of labor between the System-I and System-II mechanisms would work well were it not for the fact that our lazy and cheap decision-making mode tends to take over in situations that should command our fullest attention: choosing a pension plan or a health care scheme, for example.	这种对方法I和方法II机制之间所作的劳动区分，如果没有我们懒惰并且便宜的决策方式倾向于在要求我们全力关注的情况下——例如，选择一个养老金计划或者卫生保健计划——会占优势这样的事实，会运行良好。


As one can imagine, the results of this System-I coup d’etat are not pretty.	像人们可以想象的那样，方法I的这种 政变 的结果并不美妙。


Old-fashioned paternalists have always been very well aware of this.	老式的家长主义者对这一点一直都很清楚。


In these situations, liberal paternalists feel no qualms about taking control and forcing choices upon us (“Wear seat belts and enroll in the pension plan, and in the end you’ll thank me”).	在这些情形中，自由家长主义者对控制并向我们强加选择并没有感到不安（“系好安全带参加养老金计划，最终你会感谢我”）。


The criticisms of this attitude boil down to a simple question: “Who is better equipped than I am to make choices about my welfare?”	对这种态度的批评可以归结为一个简单的问题：“对我的社会福利，谁有比我更好的条件作出选择呢？ ”


Libertarian paternalists are different.	自由家长主义者与众不同。


To make us choose what is good for us, they avoid fines, compulsion, and prohibition in favor of “nudges” – institutional arrangements that we could, in principle, easily override, but that, given our tendency to rely on System I, we end up going along with.	为了使我们作出对我们有利的选择，他们没有进行罚款，强制以及禁止，而是使用“推动”——原则上我们会轻易忽略，但是考虑到我们依靠方法I的倾向性，我们最终会赞同的制度安排。


With a neat twist of logic, our cognitive imperfections are turned on their heads, and made to work to achieve System-II choices.	我们的认知缺陷随着一个灵巧的逻辑扭曲，在他们的脑中显现出来，并被用来努力去获得方法II的选择。


And, indeed, well-chosen nudges have been shown to be extremely effective in altering choices that make a substantive difference to the lives of many (say, enrollment in pension plans).	事实上，精心选择的推动已经显示出在改变使许多人的生命有重大不同的选择上（例如，加入养老金计划），极其有效。


But here lies the rub: if the architecture of choice is truly so important in determining outcomes, does it really matter if manipulation rather than coercion is used to make us choose what someone else has decided is ultimately good for us?	但是，这里存在困难：如果选择的结构在决定结果上真的是如此重要，是用操纵而不是用强迫来使我们选择其它人已经决定的对我们完全有好处的东西，重要吗？


What is gained by tricking rather than forcing people into making choices they wouldn’t have made?	通过使用诡计而不是强迫来使人们作出他们原本不会作出的选择，获得的是什么呢？


Isn’t the power of the manipulator more insidious, and perhaps to be more greatly feared, than that of the policeman?	操纵者的权力不是比警察的权力更阴险，或许比警察的权力更令人害怕吗？


In short, what is so libertarian about “nudging”?	简而言之，“推动”中什么是如此自由的呢？


Libertarian paternalists offer a novel answer to these questions.	自由家长主义者为这些问题提供了一个新颖的回答。


As long as choice engineering tricks us into making choices that our own more deliberate self would make , they say, manipulation is justifiable.	他们说，只要选择工程骗我们作出更深思熟虑的自我会作出的选择，操纵就是正当的。


Nudges should be so chosen as to prod us toward those choices that we ourselves would make, if we would only sit down and think carefully about the matter at hand.	如果我们能够坐下来并仔细思考手头的事情的话，我们应该对推动进行仔细选择，以刺激我们作出我们 自我 会作出的选择。


There are, unfortunately, some logical problems with this apparently elegant solution.	不幸的是，这个表面上高雅的解决方案有一些逻辑问题。


Is it really always so reasonable and effective to listen to System-II preferences?	倾听方法II的偏向真的总是如此合理并有效吗？


According to neo-classical economists, the answer is a resounding “yes,” and, in many cases, they can point to substantial evidence to validate their claim.	根据新古典主义经济学家的观点，答案是一个响亮的“是”，并且，在许多情况下，他们能够指出证实他们观点的重要证据。


Unfortunately, however, hyper-rationality does not always produce attractive outcomes when social , rather than individual , choices are concerned.	然而不幸的是，当考虑社会选择而不是个人选择时，超理性并不总是能产生有吸引力的结果。


Indeed, sometimes it leads to results that are inefficient, “nasty,” or both.	事实上，它有时会导致低效率或者“糟糕”的结果，或者是两者兼而有之的结果。


The benefits of tax evasion may far outweigh the risk of getting caught, but imagine if everyone decided to evade taxes at the same time.	逃税的好处可能远远超过了被抓住的风险，但是想象一下，如果每个人都同时决定逃税会是什么结果。


In these situations, the System-II decision maker has no tools to resort to in order to escape the sub-optimality (and social nastiness) of the rational decision.	在这些情况下，为了逃避理性决策的次优性（以及社会后果），方法II的决策者没有可以借助的手段。


It gets worse. Consider the following example.	想想下面的例子，情形就更糟了。


I am an organ donor.	我是一个器官捐献者。


Thaler and Sunstein also believe that donating organs is a good thing.	萨勒和桑斯坦也认为捐献器官是个好事情。


Therefore, one of the “nudges” they recommend is to make organ donation as the default option in the case of a fatal accident.	因此，他们推荐的一个“推动”是，在发生致命事故的情况下，将器官捐献作为默认选择。


But there is nothing irrational in having a very strong preference not to have one’s body used for spare parts after one’s death.	但是，如果强烈支持在一个人死后不将其身体作为备用件使用的观点，也没有什么不合理的。


We cannot use System II to fault this preference.	我们不能用方法II来挑这种观点的毛病。


How would we feel if we used the System-I decisional laziness about changing defaults to “trick” someone into a course of action to which she would have violently objected, perhaps on religious grounds?	如果我们利用方法I中有关改变默认选择的决策懒惰，来“欺骗”一个人采取她原本会强烈反对的行动，而这样的反对有可能是建立在宗教基础上的，我们会有什么感觉呢？


Ultimately, there is a fundamental and unresolved accountability deficit in the way libertarian paternalists go about nudging us.	最后，在自由家长主义者推动我们的方式中，有一个基本而且没有解决的责任欠缺问题。


The Enlightenment idea that our System-II rationality can always point to an optimal choice about which every reasonable individual would agree clashes with the widely accepted modern idea that there is a plurality of reasonable choices.	我们的方法II的理性总是能够指向每个理性的个人都会同意的最优选择的��蒙观点，和多数 合理 选择这一广泛接受的现代观点相冲突。


If this is the case, who is to decide in what areas individuals can be fairly nudged by social engineers?	如果是这种情况，谁来决定在哪个领域个人能够公平地得到社会工程师的推动？


Whose and which choices are the nudgers suppose to encourage?	推动者应该鼓励谁的哪些选择？


And who will nudge the nudgers?	谁来推动推动者？


These questions, I am afraid, still await a convincing answer.	恐怕这些问题仍然在等待令人信服的答案。


America, the Balanced	平衡的美国


CAMBRIDGE – When the United States’ current account fell into deficit in 1982, the US Council of Economic Advisers accurately predicted record deficits for years to come, owing to budget deficits, a low national saving rate, and an overvalued dollar.	美国剑桥—1982年，当美国经常项目陷入赤字时，美国经济顾问委员会（US Council of Economic Advisers）准确地预测出多年后创纪录的赤字，经常项目赤字的原因包括预算赤字、低国民储蓄率和美元高估。


If the US did not adjust, knowledgeable forecasters intoned, it would go from being the world’s largest creditor to its largest debtor.	学富五车的预测者指出，如果美国不调整，它将从世界最大债权国变为最大债务国。


Many of us worried that the imbalances were unsustainable, and might end in a “hard landing” for the dollar if and when global investors tired of holding it.	我们中有许多人担心这些失衡不可持续，有可能以美元的“硬着陆”告终——如果全球投资者不再愿意持有美元的话。


The indebtedness forecasts were correct.	负债预言是正确的。


Indeed, every year for more than three decades, the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) has reported a current-account deficit.	事实上，在过去三十多年中，每年美国经济分析局（US Bureau of Economic Analysis，BEA）都记录到经常项目赤字。


And yet now we must ask whether the US current-account deficit is still a problem.	而如今，我们必须问问美国的经常项目赤字是否仍然是个问题。


For starters, the world’s investors declared loud and clear in 2008 that they were not concerned about the sustainability of US deficits.	首先，全球投资者在2008年响亮而明确地宣告他们并不担心美国赤字的可持续性。


When the global financial crisis erupted, they flooded into dollar assets, even though the crisis originated in the United States.	全球金融危机爆发后，他们争相买入美元资产，丝毫不顾美国正是危机的发源地。


Moreover, a substantial amount of US adjustment has taken place since 1982 – for example, the dollar depreciations of 1985-1987 and 2002-2007 and the fiscal retrenchments of 1992-2000 and 2009-2014.	此后，自1982年以来，美国发生了不少大调整，比如1985—1987年和2002—2007年的美元贬值以及1992—2000年和2009—2014年的财政紧缩。


The big increase in domestic output of shale oil and gas has also helped the trade balance recently.	页岩油气国内产量的巨大上升也有助于目前的贸易平衡。


As a result, the US current-account deficit in 2013 had narrowed by half in dollar terms from its 2006 peak, and from 5.8% of GDP to 2.4%.	结果，用美元衡量，2013年美国经常项目赤字较2006年减少了一半，占GDP之比从5. 8%下降到2.


This is a decline of two-thirds when expressed as a share of global output.	4%。 以占全球产出比衡量，降幅为三分之二。


A symmetric adjustment has also occurred in China, via real appreciation of its currency and higher prices for labor and land.	对称的调整发生在中国——通过人民币实际升值和劳动力及土地价格升高实现。


China’s current-account surplus peaked in 2008 at more than 10% of GDP and has since narrowed dramatically, to 1.9% last year.	中国经常项目盈余在2008年达到峰值，占 GDP比例超过了10%，此后大幅下降，去年只占GDP的1. 9%。


China’s trade adjustment in some respects followed that of Japan, the original focus of American trade anxieties in the 1980s.	从某些角度，中国的贸易调整是在步日本后尘。 20世纪80年代，日本是美国贸易焦虑的最初焦点。


I propose a third, more speculative reason why it may be time to stop worrying about the US current-account deficit.	我提出了第三个更具猜测性的原因解释为何或许应该停止担心对美国经常项目赤字的担忧。


It is possible that, properly measured, the true deficits were smaller than has been reported, and even that, in some years, they were not there at all.	若以恰当手段测算，美国真实赤字或许比报告的要小，甚至在有的年份中根本没有经常项目赤字。


Every year, US residents take some of what they earn in overseas investment income – interest on bonds, dividends on equities, and repatriated profits on direct investment – and reinvest it then and there. For example, corporations plow overseas profits back into their operations, often to avoid paying the high US corporate income tax implied by repatriating those earnings.	每一年，美国居民都会获得来自海外投资的所得——债券利息、股票红利、直接投资的留存利润等——将其中一部分就地重新投资。


Technically, this should be recorded as a bigger surplus on the investment-income account, matched by greater acquisition of assets overseas. Often it is counted correctly.	比如，公司将海外利润重新投入经营——通常是为了避免留存这些利润所带来的高额美国公司所得税。


The world has long run a substantial deficit in investment income, even though the correct numbers should sum to zero.	长久以来，世界一直存在巨大的投资所得赤字，尽管正确的数字总和应该为零。


The missing income must be going somewhere.	丢失的所得一定有去向。


Even for officials as highly competent as those at the BEA, it is impossible to keep track of all of the stocks and flows in the international economy.	即使是BEA这样有能力的机构官员，也无法追踪国际经济的所有存量和流量。


Everyone knows that errors and omissions are large, especially when it comes to financial transactions.	所有人都知道错误和遗漏很大，特别是金融交易。


Underfunding of statistical agencies exacerbates measurement problems, but it does not create them.	统计机构资金不足加剧了测算问题，但并非造成问题的原因。


Less well known, however, is a particular pattern in the revisions of the US international investment position.	但是，比较鲜为人知的是修订美国国际投资头寸数字的特殊方法。


The currently available historical statistics show that in every year from 1982 to 2000, the initial estimate of the net international investment position was subsequently revised upward, as statisticians found overseas assets about which they previously had no way of knowing.	目前所能获得的历史数据表明，从1982年到2000年期间的每一年，净国际投资头寸的初始估算值最后都会被大幅向上修正，因为统计者发现了此前无从获知的海外资产。


Since then, some subsequent revisions have been positive and some negative.	自此以后，修正方向有时为正有时为负。


But, despite more frequent surveys of portfolio holdings in recent years, certain new asset acquisitions – for example, some held with foreign custodians – still most likely go unreported.	但是，尽管近几年来投资组合调查频率有所增加，但一些新资产收购——比如由外国保管人代持的资产——仍极有可能在报告中遗漏。


The numbers are potentially large.	这一数字可能极其巨大。


The reported US current-account deficits from 1982 to 2013, based on subsequent revisions, total $9.5 trillion.	1982年—2013年，报告的美国经常项目赤字（基于随后的修正值）总数为9. 5万亿美元。


And yet the deterioration in the US international investment position over this period was not much more than half of that amount ($5.7 trillion if measured relative to the revised estimate for 1981).	但同期美国国际投资头寸恶化程度只比这个数字的一半略高（5. 7万亿美元，以相对于1981年的修正估算值衡量）。


Certainly a lot of the discrepancy is attributable to valuation effects: since 1982, the dollar value of overseas assets has increased repeatedly, owing to increases in the dollar value of foreign currency and increases in the assets’ foreign-currency value.	显然，这一差异中的很大一部分可以归因于估值效应：1982年以来，海外资产的美元价值一再上升，原因在于外币美元价值的升高和资产外币价值的升高。


But part of the discrepancy also reflects the discovery of missing assets, some of which may have originated in the reinvestment of overseas income.	但是这一差异中的一部分也反映了遗漏资产的发现，其中一些可能源于海外所得再投资。


The missing credits also originally could have been earned in other ways.	遗漏的数字也可能源于其他原因。


For example, US multinational corporations sometimes over-invoice import bills or under-report export earnings to reduce their tax obligations.	比如，美国跨国公司有时会多计进口账单，少报出口利润，以减轻税负。


Again, this would work to overstate the recorded current-account deficit.	这也会高估录得经常项目赤字。


Consider an (admittedly extreme) illustration.	举个例子（平心而论，这是个极端例子）。


If true investment income were double what is reported, the difference was reinvested abroad in the years 1982-2000, and those assets were discovered by 2014, that would explain about half of the upward revision in the US net international investment position.	如果真实投资所得比报告数字大一倍，1982—2000年间的差值被用于海外再投资，并且这些资产在2014年被发现，这样就可以解释美国净国际投资头寸向上修正幅度的一半。


If something like this under-reporting of reinvested earnings or other balance-of-payments credits has gone on in the past, it may still be going on today – especially with US firms becoming aggressive about arbitraging corporate income tax.	如果类似于这一低报再投资利润或其他收支平衡盈余的行为过去存在，那么今天可能依然存在——特别是考虑到美国企业正热衷于公司所得税套利。


And if true investment income is indeed as large as double what is reported, the true US current-account balance entered the black in 2009 and has been in surplus ever since.	而如果真正的投资所得实际上要比报告数字大一倍，那么真正的美国经常项目余额在2009年就不再是赤字，并在此后一直是盈余。


Is the Fed Playing Politics?	美联储在玩政治吗？


CAMBRIDGE – In his recent debate with his opponent Hillary Clinton, Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump pressed his claim that US Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen is politically motivated.	美国剑桥—在最近与对手希拉里·克林顿的辩论中，共和党总统候选人唐纳德·特朗普表达了他的观点：美联储主席耶伦有政治动机。


The Fed, Trump claims, is applying overdoses of monetary stimulus to hypnotize voters into believing that economic recovery is underway.	特朗普说，美联储用过度货币刺激催眠选民，让他们相信经济正在复苏。


It’s not a completely crazy idea, but I just don’t see it.	这并不是十足的疯狂观念，但我没有看到这一点。


If Yellen is so determined to keep interest rates in a deep freeze, why has she been trying in recent months to talk up longer-term rates by insisting that the Fed is likely to hike rates faster than the market currently believes?	如果耶伦决心要深度冻结利率，为什么还要在最近几个月中一直坚持美联储可能比市场目前所认为的更早提高利率，以此引导长期利率升高？


Central bankers have of course been known to help incumbents before elections, by allowing inflation to drift up and keep employment booming.	当然，周所周知，央行行长在选举前总是会助现任一臂之力，允许通货膨胀略微提高，保持就业繁荣。


During US President Richard Nixon’s 1972 re-election campaign, he sternly lectured Fed chair Arthur Burns on the need for pump-priming the economy to help him defeat his Democratic challenger, George McGovern.	在1972年尼克松总统连任选战期间，他严厉训诫美联储主席亚瑟·伯恩斯（Arthur Burns）要向经济中注资助其击败民主党挑战者乔治·麦戈文（George McGovern）。


Nixon won resoundingly, but Burns’ policies helped set off the worldwide inflation of the 1970s and brought forward the breakup of the post-war system of fixed exchange rates.	尼克松最后大获全胜，但伯恩斯的政策导致了20世纪70年代的世界性通胀，也让战后固定汇率体系走向崩溃。


The long-term effects were catastrophic.	长期影响是灾难性的。


Will Yellen launch a rerun of the bad old 1970s, when US inflation hit double digits?	耶伦会让糟糕的20世纪70年代回归吗？ 当时，美国通胀达到了两位数。


I doubt it.	我表示怀疑。


Although it is not hard to imagine that Yellen privately holds Trump in the same low regard he holds her, most observers see no signs that inflation is just around the corner.	尽管不难想象耶伦对特朗普的评价和特朗普对她的评价一样低，但大部分观察者没有看到通胀起势的信号。


True, some people still insist that if the Fed doesn’t urgently raise interest rates and rein in the money supply, the US economy will go the way of Zimbabwe (where inflation far exceeded 25,000% in late 2008).	诚然，一些人仍坚持认为如果美联储不尽快提高利率、控制货币供给，美国经济将步津巴布韦的后尘（津巴布韦通胀率在2008年底远远超过了25,000%）。


But the argument that Fed balance-sheet expansion will translate into high inflation has been colossally wrong for the past six years.	但美联储资产负债表扩张将转化为高通胀的观点在过去六年一直打错特错。


Inflation in the US has been consistently below target and, even today, bond yields reflect deep skepticism about whether the Fed has the will or the capacity to sustain price growth at the official 2% target on a consistent basis.	美国通胀一直低于目标值，即使在今天，债券收益率仍表明人们对美联储是否有意愿或能力将物价增长稳步保持在官方水平2%表示深刻怀疑。


Indeed, those central banks that have tried raising interest rates prematurely, including the European Central Bank and the Swedish National Bank, have been forced to reverse course, and the Fed wants to avoid that fate.	事实上，过早提高利率的央行，包括欧洲央行和瑞士国民银行，被迫反向操作，而美联储想要避免这一命运。


The US economy is performing far better these days, and the moment for raising rates further is likely near.	美国经济近期表现要好得多，并且进一步提高利率的日子可能已经很近了。


But to infer that an immediate start to further hikes is a no-brainer is ludicrous.	但就此推断应该立刻无脑提高利率也是荒谬的。


In fact, there is still a worldwide downward draft on interest rates, with the ECB and the Bank of Japan still very much in easing mode, as are many smaller central banks.	事实上，全世界仍存在巨大的利率下降趋势，欧洲央行和日本银行仍在大力宽松，许多小央行亦然。


The Fed is already allowing some tightening simply by not playing along, and letting the US dollar appreciate.	美联储不采取行动并允许美元升值已经相当于采取了一些紧缩措施。


To be fair, central banks are not immune to manipulation, and fighting off political pressures is an endless battle.	平心而论，央行也不能免于操纵，而对抗政治压力是一场没有终点的战争。


During the financial crisis, the monetary authorities were called on to assume temporary emergency powers, including massive purchases of government and private-sector bonds.	在金融危机期间，货币当局被授予临时紧急权力，包括大量购买政府和私人部门债券。


For most, including the Fed, there is still no clean exit in sight, and this has made the problem of political insulation more difficult, with or without an election.	对大部货币当局（包括美联储）而言，目前仍没有明确的退出日期，而这让政治独立问题变得更加困难，不管是否面临选举。


Some believe the only salvation is a return to the gold standard era of the late 1800s, when governments fixed the price of their currency in gold, leaving little scope for political interference.	有人认为唯一的解决之道是回归19世纪末的金本位，政府将货币价格与黄金挂钩，这样就杜绝了政治干预空间。


Unfortunately, gold bugs seem surprisingly – or perhaps willfully – ignorant of the chronic financial crises and deep recessions of that era.	不幸的是，黄金信徒令人震惊——或者是有意为之——无视了金本位时期的长期金融危机和深度衰退。


Ultimately, the gold standard collapsed, after governments were forced to abandon it during World War I and thereafter were never able fully to re-establish public trust.	最终，政府在第一次世界大战期间被迫放弃金本位并且在此后再也无法充分重塑公众信任，金本位也寿终正寝。


More forward-looking thinkers point to private cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin as the future of money, arguing that they take politics out of the equation entirely.	眼光更远的思想家提出让私人加密货币，如比特币来充当未来货币，认为这能完全将政治排除在外。


But this, too, is very naive.	但这也相当天真。


Governments already can block cryptocurrencies from circulating in the legal economy by restricting bank access, imposing tax laws, and by also impeding retail stores’ ability to accept it.	政府已经通过限制银行业务、实施税法、阻止零售商店接受等方式阻碍加密货币在合法经济中流通。


(And, as I explain in my new book The Curse of Cash, Bitcoin can hardly be considered a long-term substitute for large-denomination bills.)	（我在新书《现金的诅咒》（The Curse of Cash）中认为，比特币很难成为大规模计价货币的长期替代品。 ）


Yes, blockchain technology is very exciting and will likely have many applications in banking, finance, and across the economy.	诚然，块链技术非常令人兴奋，并有可能给银行、金融和整个经济带来许多应用。


But it is no guarantee against political influence on inflation.	但这并不能保证不受通胀受政治影响。


In the long history of currency, from coinage to the advent of paper money, the private sector may innovate, but ultimately the public sector appropriates.	在漫长的货币史上，从硬币时代到纸币时代，私人部门或许能够创新，但最终必须受到公共部门的接受。


At the end of the day, the government will always be able to control the rules.	说到底，政府将永远控制规则。


Ironically, the best way to insulate central banks from political pressure would be to expand their toolkit to allow for effective negative-interest-rate policy, though this will take time (as I also discuss in my book).	讽刺的是，让央行隔绝政治压力的最佳办法是扩大它们的工具包，允许使用有效的负利率政策，尽管这需要时间（我在我的书中也讨论了这个问题）。


In the meantime, the Fed and other central banks will have to keep walking a tightrope that leaves them especially vulnerable to outside pressure.	与此同时，美联储和其他央行得一直走钢丝，这让它们十分容易受到外界压力的影响。


Fortunately, the Fed has a chair right now who is able and willing to stand up to it.	幸运的是，美联储现任主席有能力也有决心抵制这一点。


Who Is President Trump?	谁是特朗普总统？


CAMBRIDGE – Donald Trump’s stunning election victory has pushed the United States – and the world – into uncharted territory.	坎布里奇—唐纳德·特朗普令人震惊地赢得大选把美国——以及全世界——推向了未知领域。


The US has never before had a president with no political or military experience, nor one who so routinely shirks the truth, embraces conspiracy theories, and contradicts himself.	美国此前从未有过没有从政或从军经验的总统，也未有过如此将逃避真相、采用阴谋论和自相矛盾当成家常便饭的总统。


All of this makes it almost impossible to know how he will govern.	所有这些让人们几乎无从了解他会如何治国。


But Trump’s looming presidency does have a precedent: George W. Bush’s.	但即将开始的特朗普总统任期倒是的确有一个先例：小布什。


Several parallels stand out.	两者有诸多相似点。


For starters, like Bush, Trump did not win the popular vote, but may nonetheless assume that he has a mandate for sweeping change.	首先，和布什一样，特朗普没有赢得普选，但仍可以说获得了大变革的授权。


And the direction of that change may produce results that not even his supporters like.	而这一大变革的方向可能带来连他的支持者也不想看到的结果。


Among Trump’s economic-policy promises, his fiscal proposals are most likely to be enacted: big tax cuts for the rich and increased spending on defense and other items.	在特朗普的经济政策承诺中，他的财政方案是最有可能得到实施的：为富人大幅减税并增加防务和其他项目的支出。


The result will probably be the same as when Bush pursued similar policies: income inequality will widen, and budget deficits will grow.	其结果可能与布什所采取的类似政策相同：收入不平等性扩大，财政赤字增加。


Moreover, the stock market’s seven-year bullish streak may end.	此外，七年的股票牛市可能结束。


And it is very likely that Trump, who attacked the US Federal Reserve’s easy monetary policy during his campaign, will quickly reverse that position and press the Fed not to raise interest rates.	并且很有可能，在选战中抨击美联储宽松货币政策的特朗普将马上改变立场，敦促美联储不要升息。


Trump will probably be unable to fulfill his promise to increase the US economy’s export share.	特朗普可能无法实现增加美国经济中的出口比例的承诺。


And he certainly will not be able to bring back the manufacturing jobs that the US, like all industrialized countries, has lost in recent decades.	并且他显然无法让美国——与其他所有工业化国家一样——在最近几十年中失去的制造业岗位回来。


Income inequality will likely start widening again, despite striking improvements in median family income and the poverty rate last year.	收入不平等可能再次开始扩大，尽管去年的中位家庭收入和贫困率指标有了重大改善。


A recession at some point during Trump’s presidency is probable, judging from Republican presidents’ remarkable historical track record.	从共和党总统令人瞩目的历史追踪记录看，衰退很有可能在特朗普任期中的某个时点降临。


Two recessions began during Bush’s administration; in fact, most of the recessions since the Great Depression began under Republican presidents.	布什执政期间开始过两次衰退； 事实上，自大萧条以来的大部分衰退都始于共和党总统任期。


Trump’s presidency is most worrisome on the foreign-policy front, where many potential disasters await.	特朗普任期中最可担忧的方面是外交政策，许多潜在风险等着我们。


We have reason to fear that miscalculations will lead to tragedies, just as Bush fumbled the response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack, failed to capture Osama bin Laden, and invaded Iraq.	我们有理由担心误判将导致悲剧，一如布什在2001年9月11日恐怖袭击后匆忙应对没有抓获本·拉登，却入侵了伊拉克。


America’s role as a global leader will surely suffer, as will the “soft power” that it previously derived from being a model of liberal democracy for others to emulate.	美国作为 全球领导者的作用肯定将受到影响，其“软实力”亦然。 美国的软实力来自此前作为其他国家效仿的自由民主榜样。


Meanwhile, Trump’s cluelessness will likely embolden traditional US adversaries, such as Russia, Syria, and North Korea.	与此同时，特朗普的无知可能会令美国的传统对手，如俄罗斯、叙利亚和朝鲜蠢蠢欲动。


The Republicans kept control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives, so Trump will be able to fulfill his promises to roll back Obama’s biggest legislative achievements, starting with the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare).	共和党同时控制了参众两院，因此特朗普将能够实现其反转奥巴马最大的立法成就的承诺，首先是平价医疗法（奥巴马医保）。


But this will be an interesting test.	但这将是一场有趣的考验。


How will Trump handle the backlash when people start losing their health insurance?	当人们开始失去医疗保险，特朗普将如何处理他们的反弹？


Trump and congressional Republicans will also try to roll back the Dodd-Frank financial regulations that were enacted after the 2008 financial crisis, thereby giving banks and other financial institutions freer rein.	特朗普和国会共和党还将试图撤销2008年金融危机后实施的多德-弗兰克（Dodd-Frank）金融监管，从而让银行和其他金融机构获得更大的自由。


And, beyond Wall Street, they will try to cut back on anti-trust and environmental regulations, especially those limiting greenhouse-gas emissions.	此外，除了华尔街，他们还将削弱反垄断和环境监管，特别是限制温室气体排放的监管。


Finally, Trump will nominate conservative justices for the Supreme Court, which has had one vacancy since Justice Antonin Scalia died in February.	最后，特朗普将提名保守派法官进入最高法院，2月份安东宁·斯卡利亚（Antonin Scalia）法官逝世后，最高法院已经出现了一个空缺。


We should be thankful, however, that at least Trump’s more outrageous campaign proposals will likely never be enacted.	但是，我们应该感到欣慰，至少特朗普的更加骇人听闻的竞选纲领可能永远得不到实施。


He will not build a “big, beautiful” new wall along the US-Mexico border, and Mexico certainly wouldn’t pay for it if he did.	他不会在美墨边境建立一座“巨大美丽”的新墙，即使他这么做了，墨西哥也绝不会为此买单。


Likewise, he will not ban Muslim immigrants, because doing so would violate bedrock American principles, and would be struck down even by a right-wing Supreme Court.	类似地，他不会禁止穆斯林移民，因为这样做将违反作为国基的美国原则，即使是右倾的最高法院也不会允许。


It is also unlikely that Trump will follow through on his proposal to deport 6-11 million undocumented immigrants.	特朗普也不可能根据他的竞选纲领驱逐600—1,100万无证移民。


But he will probably end President Barack Obama’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, which granted temporary work permits to many “Dreamers” (young people without legal status who grew up in the US).	但他可能撤销奥巴马总统的暂缓驱逐少儿移民（Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals）计划，该计划为大量“梦想者”（无法享受在美国出生者的法律地位的年轻人）提供暂时工作许可。


Similarly, Trump may not actually tear up the North American Free Trade Agreement or raise tariffs dramatically.	类似地，特朗普不会真撕毁北美自由贸易协定或大幅提高关税。


Nor will he scrap NATO, other important alliances, or the Geneva Convention (authorizing the military and CIA to use torture).	他也不会废除北约、其他重要盟友关系或日内瓦公约（授权军方和中央情报局使用酷刑）。


Though Trump seemed to suggest during the campaign that he would do all of these things, he will inevitably be confronted with the far-reaching consequences of decisions that would destroy the global order.	尽管特朗普似乎在选战期间表明他将完成上述所有动作，但如果他做出将摧毁全球秩序的决定，也难免会面临影响深远的后果。


The US is about to experience life under a fully Republican government led by a callow and mercurial populist tycoon.	美国即将体验由共和党完全把持的政府，而领导这个政府的是一位毫无执政经验、变化莫测的民粹主义大亨。


Let us hope that voters hold the Trump administration and its congressional enablers accountable for the setbacks that Americans will suffer.	但愿当美国人蒙受挫败时，选民能保持对特朗普政府及其国会后台的问责。


What America’s Economy Needs from Trump	来自特朗普的美国经济需要


NEW YORK – Donald Trump’s astonishing victory in the United States presidential election has made one thing abundantly clear: too many Americans – particularly white male Americans – feel left behind.	纽约—唐纳德·特朗普在美国总统大选中令人震惊地取得胜利，这非常清楚地表明了一点：太多美国人——特别是白人男性——感到落后。


It is not just a feeling; many Americans really have been left behind.	这不只是一种感觉； 许多美国人其实一直感觉落后。


It can be seen in the data no less clearly than in their anger.	数据与他们的愤怒一样清晰的证明了这一点。


And, as I have argued repeatedly, an economic system that doesn’t “deliver” for large parts of the population is a failed economic system.	我反复指出，一个不能让人口中大部分人“实现”的经济制度是失败的经济制度。


So what should President-elect Trump do about it?	那么，当选总统特朗普应该对此做些什么？


Over the last third of a century, the rules of America’s economic system have been rewritten in ways that serve a few at the top, while harming the economy as a whole, and especially the bottom 80%.	在过去三分之一世纪中，美国经济制度的规则被改写，它有利于顶层，有害于整体经济，特别有害于底层80%。


The irony of Trump’s victory is that it was the Republican Party he now leads that pushed for extreme globalization and against the policy frameworks that would have mitigated the trauma associated it.	特朗普获胜的讽刺之处是他现在所领导的共和党正是极端全球化的推手、也是能减轻极端全球化所带来的影响的政策框架的反对者。


But history matters: China and India are now integrated into the global economy.	但历史很重要：如今中国和印度已经融入了全球经济。


Besides, technology has been advancing so fast that the number of jobs globally in manufacturing is declining.	此外，技术一直在飞速进步，以至于全球制造业工作岗位数量不断下降。


The implication is that there is no way Trump can bring a significant number of well-paying manufacturing jobs back to the US.	其影响是特朗普没有办法让大量高薪制造业岗位回归美国。


He can bring manufacturing back, through advanced manufacturing, but there will be few jobs.	他可以通过先进制造业让制造业回来，但不会产生多少新岗位。


And he can bring jobs back, but they will be low-wage jobs, not the high-paying jobs of the 1950’s.	他也可以让工作岗位回来，但都将是低薪岗位，而不是20世纪50年代的高薪岗位。


If Trump is serious about tackling inequality, he must rewrite the rules yet again, in a way that serves all of society, not just people like him.	如果特朗普真心要解决不平等性问题，他必须再次改写规则，让它有利于全社会而不只是和他一样的人。


The first order of business is to boost investment, thereby restoring robust long-term growth.	首要任务的提振投资，从而重塑强劲的长期增长。


Specifically, Trump should emphasize spending on infrastructure and research.	具体而言，特朗普应该着重于基础设施和研究支出。


Shockingly for a country whose economic success is based on technological innovation, the GDP share of investment in basic research is lower today than it was a half-century ago.	对一个经济成功基于技术创新的国家来说，目前基础研究投资占GDP之比还不如半个世纪前，这简直令人震惊。


Improved infrastructure would enhance the returns from private investment, which has been lagging as well.	改善基础设施能增进同样滞后的私人投资回报。


Ensuring greater financial access for small and medium-size enterprises, including those headed by women, would also stimulate private investment.	确保中小企业——包括女性所领导的中小企业——能获得更多融资也能刺激私人投资。


A carbon tax would provide a welfare trifecta: higher growth as firms retrofit to reflect the increased costs of carbon dioxide emissions; a cleaner environment; and revenue that could be used to finance infrastructure and direct efforts to narrow America’s economic divide.	碳税能提供三重福利：企业因为二氧化碳排放成本增加而作出调整进而带来更高的增长； 环境变得更加清洁；


But, given Trump’s position as a climate change denier, he is unlikely to take advantage of this (which could also induce the world to start imposing tariffs against US products made in ways that violate global climate-change rules).	税收收入可以用于基础设施融资和引导缩小美国经济差异的措施。 但是，考虑到特朗普否认气候变化，他不可能会利用碳税（这还可能导致全世界开始对生产方式违反全球气候变化规则的美国产品征收关税。


A comprehensive approach is also needed to improve America’s income distribution, which is one of the worst among advanced economies.	美国还需要全面仿真改善收入分配。 美国的收入分配情况是发达经济体中最糟糕的之一。


While Trump has promised to raise the minimum wage, he is unlikely to undertake other critical changes, like strengthening workers’ collective-bargaining rights and negotiating power, and restraining CEO compensation and financialization.	特朗普承诺提高最低工资，但他不可能实施其他关键变化，比如增强工人的集体议价权利和谈判实力、限制CEO薪酬和金融化等。


Regulatory reform must move beyond limiting the damage that the financial sector can do and ensure that the sector genuinely serves society.	监管改革必须超越限制金融部门作恶的范畴，确保金融业真正服务于社会。


In April, President Barack Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers released a brief showing increasing market concentration in many sectors.	4月，奥巴马总统经济顾问委员会发布了一份简报，指出诸多行业出现了市场集中度增加的趋势。


That means less competition and higher prices – as sure a way to lower real incomes as lowering wages directly.	这意味着竞争减少、价格升高——从而必然导致真实收入降低，效果等价于直接降低工资。


The US needs to tackle these concentrations of market power, including the newest manifestations in the so-called sharing economy.	美国需要阻止市场力量的集中，包括所谓的共享经济所表现出来的集中。


America’s regressive tax system – which fuels inequality by helping the rich (but no one else) get richer – must also be reformed.	美国的累退税制也必须改革。 这一税制有利（且只有利）于富人更富。


An obvious target should be to eliminate the special treatment of capital gains and dividends.	一个显而易见的目标应该是取消资本利得和股息的特殊待遇。


Another is to ensure that companies pay taxes – perhaps by lowering the corporate-tax rate for companies that invest and create jobs in America, and raising it for those that do not.	另一个目标是确保公司缴税——一个或许可行的方法是降低在美国投资和创造就业机会的企业的公司税率，而提高不在美国投资和创造就业机会的企业的公司税率。


As a major beneficiary of this system, however, Trump’s pledges to pursue reforms that benefit ordinary Americans are not credible; as usual with Republicans, tax changes will largely benefit the rich.	但是，身为这一制度的主要受益者之一，特朗普承诺推行有利于普通美国百姓的承诺是不可信的； 共和党的税收改革通常大大有利于富人。


Trump will probably also fall short on enhancing equality of opportunity.	特朗普很有可能也无法推进机会平等。


Ensuring preschool education for all and investing more in public schools is essential if the US is to avoid becoming a neo-feudal country where advantages and disadvantages are passed on from one generation to the next.	如果美国想避免沦为新封建国家，让发达与落后在代际之间传递，那么确保全民学前教育和加大公立学校投资至关重要。


But Trump has been virtually silent on this topic.	但特朗普对这一问题几乎没有提及。


Restoring shared prosperity would require policies that expand access to affordable housing and medical care, secure retirement with a modicum of dignity, and allow every American, regardless of family wealth, to afford a post-secondary education commensurate with his or her abilities and interests.	重塑共同繁荣需要扩大平价住房和医疗、确保退休基本尊严、让所有美国人（不论家庭贫富）都上得起与其能力和兴趣相配的大学的政策。


But while I could see Trump, a real-estate magnate, supporting a massive housing program (with most of the benefits going to developers like himself), his promised repeal of the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) would leave millions of Americans without health insurance.	我可以看到身为 房地产大亨的特朗普支持群众住房计划（大部分好处将流向像他这样的开发商），但他承诺废除平价医疗法（奥巴马医保）将让数百万美国人失去医疗保险。


(Soon after the election, he suggested he may move cautiously in this area.)	（大选后不久，他表示他会在这个问题上保持谨慎。 ）


The problems posed by the disaffected Americans – resulting from decades of neglect – will not be solved quickly or by conventional tools.	不满的美国人——他们的不满来自几十年的被忽视的历史——所造成的问题不可能马上解决或用传统工具解决。


An effective strategy will need to consider more unconventional solutions, which Republican corporate interests are unlikely to favor.	一套有效的战略必须考虑更加非常规的解决方案，而共和党公司利益集团是不会同意的。


For example, individuals could be allowed to increase their retirement security by putting more money into their Social Security accounts, with commensurate increases in pension benefits.	比如，应该允许个人通过增加社会保险账户投入，从而相应地提高退休金来增加退休保障。


And comprehensive family and sick leave policies would help Americans achieve a less stressful work/life balance.	而全面的探亲假和病假政策有助于美国实现压力较小的工作/生活平衡。


Likewise, a public option for housing finance could entitle anyone who has paid taxes regularly to a 20% down-payment mortgage, commensurate with their ability to service the debt, at an interest rate slightly higher than that at which the government can borrow and service its own debt.	类似地，按时缴税者买房应该获得首付20%、与他们维持债务能力相称的住房融资公共选项，其利率应该略高于政府借贷和维持债务的利率。


Payments would be channeled through the income-tax system.	偿债可以通过所得税渠道。


Much has changed since President Ronald Reagan began hollowing out the middle class and skewing the benefits of growth to those at the top, and US policies and institutions have not kept pace.	自罗纳德·里根总统挖空中产阶级、让增长的收益向顶层集中以来，许多事情发生了变化，而美国的政策和制度跟不上变化的节奏。


From the role of women in the workforce to the rise of the Internet to increasing cultural diversity, twenty-first century America is fundamentally different from the America of the 1980s.	从女性在劳动力中的角色，到互联网的崛起和文化多样性的增加，二十一世纪的美国已经从根本上不同于20世纪80年代的美国。


If Trump actually wants to help those who have been left behind, he must go beyond the ideological battles of the past.	如果特朗普真的想帮助感觉落后的人群，他必须超越过去的意识形态斗争。


The agenda I have just sketched is not only about the economy: it is about nurturing a dynamic, open, and just society that fulfills the promise of Americans’ most cherished values.	我刚刚提出的日程不仅仅事关经济，也事关培养一个有活力的、开放的、公正的社会，以实现美国人最珍视的价值观憧憬。


But while it is, in some ways, somewhat consistent with Trump’s campaign promises, in many other ways, it is the antithesis of them.	但尽管这在某种程度上与特朗普的竞选承诺一致，但在某种程度上，它们之间是对立的。


My very cloudy crystal ball shows a rewriting of the rules, but not to correct the grave mistakes of the Reagan revolution, a milestone on the sordid journey that left so many behind.	我通过模糊的水晶球预测规则将改写，但并不会纠正里根革命——让如此多的人落后的罪恶之旅的里程碑——的巨大错误。


Rather, the new rules will make the situation worse, excluding even more people from the American dream.	相反，新规则将让制度更加糟糕，将更多的人排斥出美国梦。


America and the World in Transition	美国和世界的转型


NEW YORK – In less than two months, the American political transition will be over.	纽约——在不到两个月的时间里，美国的政治转型即将结束了。


The 45th president of the United States will settle into the Oval Office.	第45届美国总统将入主椭圆形办公室。


President-elect Donald Trump will become President Trump; President Barack Obama will join Jimmy Carter, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush as a living former president.	当选总统唐纳德·特朗普将成为特朗普总统； 巴拉克·奥巴马总统则将与吉米·卡特、乔治·H·W·布什、比尔·克林顿和乔治·W·布什一道成为仍然在世的前总统。


Speculation about Trump’s likely foreign and domestic policies is rampant, but little if any of it is meaningful.	关于特朗普可能的国内国外政策的猜测多如牛毛，但其中没有多少是真有意义的。


Campaigning and governing are two very different activities, and there is no reason to assume that how Trump conducted the former will dictate how he approaches the latter.	竞选和执政是两种完全不同的行为，没有理由以特朗普处理前者的方式来确定后者。


We also do not yet know who all the principal advisers will be and how (and how well) they will work together.	我们也还不知道主要顾问是谁以及他们将以何种方式合作（以及合作的成效如何）。


But amidst this uncertainty, there are some things we do know.	但在所有这些不确定性中，有些事情我们是确定知道的。


The first is that Trump will be greeted by an inbox piled high with difficult international challenges.	首先是塞满高难度国际挑战的收件箱将会等待着特朗普。


To be sure, no single problem compares with the Cold War at its height, but the sheer number and complexity of difficult issues is without precedent in modern times.	可以肯定，没有哪个问题能与巅峰时期的冷战相媲美，但单是困难问题的数量和复杂性就是现代以来史无前例的。


Topping the list will be the Middle East, a region in an advanced stage of unraveling.	位列榜首的将是中东问题，该地区已经陷入严重解体状态。


Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya are all dealing with a mix of civil and proxy wars.	叙利亚、伊拉克、也门和利比亚都面临着内战和代理战争的威胁。


The Iran nuclear pact at best manages one aspect of Iranian power, and only for a limited duration.	伊朗核条约最多只能在未来有限的时间内管理伊朗政权的一个方面。


The Islamic State (ISIS) may lose its territorial dimension; but it, along with other groups, will continue to pose a terrorist threat for years to come.	伊斯兰国（ISIS）可能失去其根据地； 但它和其他恐怖组织将继续在未来数年造成恐怖主义威胁。


The plight of millions of refugees constitutes not just a humanitarian tragedy, but also an economic and strategic burden to countries in the region and in Europe.	成百上千万难民的困境不仅造成人道主义悲剧，而且也为地区和欧洲国家带来经济和战略负担。


And Europe is already confronting many significant challenges, including Russian aggression against Ukraine, Brexit, the rise of populism and nationalism, and low rates of economic growth.	欧洲已经面临许多重大挑战，包括俄罗斯入侵乌克兰、英国脱欧、民粹主义和民族主义的兴起以及低迷的经济增长速度。


Turkey poses a special problem given its increasing illiberalism at home and mercurial behavior abroad.	土耳其国内反自由主义日趋抬头和国外的善变举止造成了特殊的问题。


The fact that Syria’s Kurds have proven to be America’s best partner against ISIS adds to the complexity of the foreign policy choices that await.	叙利亚库尔德人是美国反对伊斯兰国最佳拍档的事实进一步加大了即将做出的外交政策选择的难度。


East Asia’s stability is jeopardized by China’s rise and strategic ambitions, North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile advances, and a host of contested maritime and territorial claims.	中国的崛起和战略野心、朝鲜的核弹道导弹发展及诸多有争议的海洋和领土要求严重威胁到东亚地区的稳定。


In South Asia, there is renewed tension between India and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed rivals with a history of conflict.	在南亚，印度和巴基斯坦两个有武装冲突史的有核国家间再次出现了紧张局势。


Just as uncertain is the future of Afghanistan, where more than a decade of international involvement and assistance has failed to bring about a capable government or quell the Taliban and other armed opposition groups.	阿富汗的未来同样无法确定，十多年的国际参与和援助都未能建立起一个有能力的政府，也未能平息塔利班及其他武装反对派。


Closer to home, oil-rich Venezuela has many of the characteristics of a failed state.	在家门口，石油资源丰富的委内瑞拉有不少与失败国家相吻合的特点。


In Africa, too, a mix of poor governance, low economic growth, and terrorism, civil war, or both is overwhelming many countries.	在非洲，治理不善、经济增长低迷、恐怖主义、内战或两者兼备正在吞噬很多国家。


And at the global level, few if any rules or penalties for reckless behavior apply in important domains (cyberspace being paramount among them).	在全球层面，对于重要领域鲁莽行为的规则和处罚少之又少（其中最至关重要的是网络空间）。


While campaigning isn’t the same as governing, Trump’s campaign has added to the difficulties he will face.	尽管竞选与执政不同，但特朗普的竞选加剧了他所面临的困难。


By running on a platform of “America first,” Trump has raised questions among America’s allies about the wisdom of continued reliance on the US.	通过在“美国第一”的平台上展开竞选活动，特朗普已经迫使美国盟友就继续依赖美国是否明智的问题提出了质疑。


The apparent demise of the Trans-Pacific Partnership has created unease in Asia and South America about US predictability and about whether the US will remain a champion of global trade or embrace something closer to protectionism.	跨太平洋伙伴关系的明确消亡已经使亚洲和南美对美国政策的可预见性产生了不安，他们怀疑美国是否将继续主导全球贸易抑或接受某种形式的保护主义政策。


Mexico, singled out for criticism by Trump during the campaign, faces a unique set of issues concerning both trade and immigration.	墨西哥在竞选期间受到了特朗普的单独批评，因此在贸易和移民方面都面临着一系列独特的问题。


The incoming president and those around him will come under pressure to address all these issues and concerns quickly, but they would be well advised to take their time.	即将上任的总统及其周围的顾问将面对压力迅速解决所有这些关注和问题，但他们在上述领域循序渐进才是明智之举。


The priority for now and for months to come ought to be to staff up the new administration.	现在及未来几个月的优先事项将是确定新政府成员。


Some 4,000 positions must be filled.	约有四千个职位必须被填满。


The new administration will also need to learn to work together and review existing policies before it can decide on new ones.	新政府还要学会合作并审查现有政策，之后才能进入新政策的确定阶段。


There will be considerable focus on – and expectations built up about –the administration’s first hundred days.	新政府的头100天将面临高度关注——以及迫切的期待。


But there is nothing magical about the first hundred days of a 1,460-day presidency.	但在1，460天的总统任期中头100天并不具备神奇的魔力。


It’s better to get things done right than to get them done by Tuesday.	最重要的是把事情做好，而不是在星期二之前把事情做完。


Other governments would be smart to do more than watch and wait for the new US administration to sort itself out.	其他政府不应坐等新一届美国政府尘埃落定，而应当抓紧自己的时间。


Allies need to consider what more they might do on behalf of common defense.	盟国们必须思考他们还能为共同防御作出哪些贡献。


They can develop and share their ideas about how best to deal with Russia, China, ISIS, North Korea, and Iran.	他们可以提出并分享关于如何应对俄罗斯、中国、伊斯兰国、朝鲜和伊朗的理念。


Similarly, they can begin to think about how to protect and promote global trade in the absence of new US-led accords.	同样，他们可以开始思考如何在缺少全新美国主导协议的情况下保护并推动全球贸易发展。


In this new era, the balance between global order and disorder will be determined not just by US actions, but also and increasingly by what others long aligned with America are prepared to do.	在这个全新时代，全球秩序和混乱之间的平衡不仅取决于美国的行动，而且越来越多地取决于其他美国长期盟国的所作所为。


Exactly how much Trump’s policies will raise output and inflation is hard to know.	特朗普的政策将在多大程度上提高产出和通胀难以知���。


Will Trump Get Trumped?	特朗普会被压制吗？


WASHINGTON, DC – This is not a city overflowing with the holiday spirit.	华盛顿—这不是一个洋溢着假日喜庆心情的城市。


As the US Congress heads home for the holidays, there’s a sense that something ominous lies over the horizon.	美国国会议员们回家休假的时候，有一种不祥的预兆正在出现。


People might try to avoid discussing the pending inauguration, on January 20, of President-elect Donald Trump but the topic rarely stays out of conversations for long.	人们也许在试图避免讨论1月20日当选总统唐纳德·特朗普的就职仪式，但很长一段时间以来，这个话题很少不在对话中提及。


At last week’s White House Christmas party for the press, reporters speculated about whether this might be the last such party for years to come.	在上周的白宫媒体圣诞派对上，记者们纷纷猜测这兴许是未来几年最后一次这样的派对了。


It’s difficult to imagine that Trump, no fan of the press, would host such an event, much less stand stoically with his wife Melania greeting each individual guest, as Barack and Michelle Obama did for eight years.	很难想象不喜欢媒体的特朗普会主持这样的场合，更不用说与夫人梅拉尼娅（Melania）一起笔挺地站着迎候每一位访客、就像巴拉克和米歇尔·奥巴马八年来所做的那样了。


One reporter joked that the next press Christmas party would be held at the recently opened Trump International Hotel down the street from the White House, and there would be a cash bar.	一位记者打趣道，下一次媒体圣诞派对将会在与白宫位于同一条街道上的最新开张的特朗普国际饭店（Trump International Hotel）召开，并且顺带着做做与会者的酒水生意。


Of course, if the press Christmas party was the only precedent Trump and his team broke, no one would be too distraught.	当然，如果媒体圣诞派对是唯一一个特朗普及其团队准备打破的先例的话，没人会为此心神不宁。


But Trump has so far shown such indifference to rules and norms, such a disregard for limits, and such unpredictability, that the prevailing mood among Democrats and Republicans alike is one of uncertainty and unease.	但到目前为止，特朗普表现出对规则和规范漠不关心，表现出对界限的无视，表现出极端的反复无常，以至于民主党和共和党都弥漫着一种不确定和不安的情绪。


But the concern goes beyond Washington: many ordinary citizens in the US and elsewhere genuinely fear the consequences of a Trump administration.	但担忧绝不仅限于华盛顿，许多美国和其他国家的普罗大众也对特朗普政府的后果真正地忧心忡忡。


Given Trump’s capriciousness, many are looking to his cabinet for clues about the country’s direction over the next four years.	从特朗普的“任性”出发，许多人从他的内阁中寻找美国未来四年方向的线索。


The results thus far aren’t comforting, not least because he’s shown a predilection for choosing generals to run civilian agencies – three thus far – and even more so because several of Trump’s nominees will, if the Senate confirms them, be heading agencies whose missions they have opposed.	到目前为止，结果并不令人放心，这不仅是因为他似乎喜欢选择将军来管理文职机构——目前已有三位将军入阁——更多地是因为特朗普的一些提名人选——如果参议院批准的话——将主管使命为他们所反对的机构。


Trump’s choice for Secretary of Education, Betsy DeVos, is an ultra-wealthy heiress whose résumé includes a disastrous effort to privatize Michigan’s schools.	特朗普的教育部长人选贝西·德沃斯（Betsy DeVos）是一位富豪女继承人，她的履历表上赫然记录着灾难性的密歇根州学校私有化政策。


Trump’s pick for Labor Secretary, Andy Puzder, is a fast-food chain owner who opposes raising the minimum wage to livable levels or expanding overtime pay; indeed, his company has run afoul of overtime laws.	特朗普的劳工部长人选安迪·普兹德（Andy Puzder）是一家连锁快餐公司所有者，他反对将最低工资提高到足以维持生计的水平，也反对增加加班工资； 事实上，他的公司就违反了加班法。


Trump’s pick for Attorney General, Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions, cares little for civil-rights laws or immigration.	特朗普的司法部长人选、亚拉巴马州参议员杰夫·赛森斯（Jeff Sessions）对民事权利法和移民等闲视之。


Then there is Trump’s choice to head the Department of Housing and Urban Development.	再来看特朗普的住房和城市发展部长人选。


Ben Carson – the retired neurosurgeon who endorsed Trump after bowing out of the Republican primary – is no fan of social programs or fair-housing initiatives.	本·卡尔森（Ben Carson）——在共和党初选后力挺特朗普的退休外科医生——很不喜欢社会保障计划或公平住房计划。


Perhaps Trump thought that naming a black man to lead the dismantling of public housing, which largely supports African Americans, would be good cover.	也许特朗普认为任命一位黑人主导取消公屋是很好的掩护。 公屋计划的主要受益者是非洲裔美国人。


To lead the Environmental Protection Agency, Trump has nominated Scott Pruitt – the Attorney General of Oklahoma, an oil- and gas-producing state, and an avid climate-change denier, who has brought several suits against the EPA.	至于环境保护署（EPA），特朗普认命了斯科特·普利特（Scott Pruitt）——石油和天然气生产州俄克拉荷马州检察长，也是一位顽固的气候变化否认者，曾经对EPA发动多次诉讼。


Pruitt’s selection was announced soon after Trump’s transition team delivered a questionnaire to employees of the Department of Energy, asking whether they had attended meetings where climate change was discussed.	普利特的提名在特朗普过渡团队对能源部雇员进行了问卷调查后很快就公布了。 问卷调查的内容是他们是否出席过讨论气候变化的会议。


More recently came the stunning news that, after a protracted search, Trump has settled on Rex Tillerson, CEO of Exxon-Mobil, to serve as Secretary of State.	然后是令人震惊的消息，在进行了漫长的寻觅后，特朗普选定埃克森美孚公司首席执行官雷克斯·蒂勒森（Rex Tillerson）出任国务卿。


In his extensive international deal-making – which isn’t the same as diplomacy – Tillerson has developed a close relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, toward whom Trump has been notably soft.	在蒂勒森漫长的国际交易经验中——这和外交并不是一回事——他与俄罗斯总统普京建立了紧密的关系，而特朗普对普京的太对相当“软”。


More worrying, the news of Trump’s intention to nominate Tillerson emerged on the same day that the Washington Post reported the CIA’s disturbing conclusion that Russia had interfered in the presidential election to help Trump win.	更令人担心的是，在特朗普准备提名蒂勒森的消息曝出的同一天，《华盛顿邮报》报道中央情报局得出一个令人不安的结论：俄罗斯干预了美国总统大选，帮助特朗普获胜。


Trump also looks likely to name John Bolton – a bombastic neo-conservative who still defends the Iraq war and thinks the US should bomb Iran – to be Tillerson’s deputy.	特朗普还有可能会任命约翰·博尔顿（John Bolton，一位夸夸其谈的新保守派，至今仍在为伊拉克战争辩护并认为美国应该轰炸伊朗）充当蒂勒森的副手。


Trump’s highly conservative cabinet choices – who include an uncommon number of billionaires – are not at all consonant with his campaign, during which he presented himself as the champion of blue-collar workers, the non-ideological businessman who would make the government work.	特朗普高度保守的内阁人选——其中的亿万富翁数量反常地多——与他的竞选纲领格格不入。 竞选期间，他将自己包装成蓝领工人的领袖、一位能让政府正常运转的没有意识形态立场的商人。


But his choices place him firmly in the camp of plutocrats with little concern for workers and the middle class.	但他的提名人选坐实了他丝毫不顾工人和中产阶级的财阀代言人身份。


Trump seems to think that if he offers enough bread and circuses, he can distract his supporters from the real direction his administration is taking.	特朗普似乎认为，只要能给足小恩小惠，就可以让支持者不再关心其政府所采取的真正方向。


He’s taken time off from managing his transition to hold a few rallies – which he apparently enjoys more than the chores of governing – and to pull off stunts, such as lauding his deal with Carrier, which manufactures furnaces and air conditioners, to keep jobs in the US.	他没有将时间用于管理过渡期，而是用于举办集会——显然和治国的杂务比起来，他更享受这样的场合——和搞点小噱头，比如吹嘘他的锅炉和空调制造商开利（Carrier）公司达成的协议能把就业岗位留在美国。


But it took only a couple of days for the public to learn that Trump had saved far fewer jobs than he had claimed.	但不出几日，公众就看穿特朗普所拯救的岗位远远少于他所吹嘘的。


When the local United Steelworkers union president complained publicly, the famously thin-skinned Trump responded by getting into a Twitter spat, blaming the union president for the lost jobs.	当地方美国钢铁工人工会主席公开抱怨时，著名的薄脸皮特朗普用Twitter吐槽的方式回应，指责工会主席要为岗位流失负责。


That sort of thing won’t go over well with many of the white blue-collar workers Trump so assiduously courted during his campaign.	这样的做法在许多白人蓝领工人那里可不讨好，而特朗普在竞选期间是腆着脸讨好这些工人的。


And his uncontrolled use of Twitter as his literal bully pulpit may wear thin.	而他不受约束地使用Twitter作为谕告平台可能也会效果每况愈下。


Trump may also run up against more opposition than he expects in other areas.	在其他领域，特朗普也有可能遇到比预想更多的反对。


As his administration proceeds to dismantle environmental rules, he’s likely to find that there’s a much stronger constituency for clean air and clean water than he apparently thinks.	他的政府正在着力于废除环保规则，而他可能会发现，清洁空气和干净水源的拥趸可能要比他显然认为的要多得多。


The Democrats, in the minority in the Senate, will give Trump’s Cabinet nominees a tough grilling, potentially defeating one or two.	在参议院处于少数地位的民主党将严厉盘问特朗普的内阁提名人选，并有可能驳回一到两人。


But the Republicans are the ones to watch.	但共和党才是众目所指。


Leading Republicans have already dissented from Trump’s threats to start trade wars.	共和党领袖已经不满于特朗普发动贸易战的威胁。


If he pushes them too far, Trump may be a general with few troops.	如果他在这些政策上走得太远，可能沦为光杆司令。


Republicans’ disaffection could be enhanced if – as now appears likely – Trump’s private interests are not sufficiently disentangled from his public responsibilities, making him something of an embarrassment.	如果——现在看起来颇有可能——特朗普的私人利益不能与公共责任充分剥离，共和党的不满有可能加剧，这将让特朗普陷入难堪。


There’s nothing like a good scandal or two to discourage already unenthusiastic followers.	让已经失去热情的追随者“反水”不需要丑闻。


Trump’s campaign against Hillary Clinton should have taught him that.	特朗普与希拉里·克林顿的选战应该已经教会了他这一点。


Trump’s Train Wreck	特朗普的火车事故


WASHINGTON, DC – Donald Trump, the US Republican Party’s presidential nominee, has again shaken up his campaign organization.	华盛顿——美国共和党总统候选人唐纳德·特朗普已经再次改组了他的竞选组织。


In doing so, he is revealing more about himself and his so-called management style than he may want people to see.	在此过程中，他透露了比预想中更多的有关其自身和所谓管理风格的信息。


Few presidential campaigns have featured such evident chaos and churn in personnel.	鲜有总统竞选活动表现出这样明显的混乱和人员流失。


Two people who have never run a presidential campaign, and whose political instincts contradict each other’s, are now running Trump’s operation.	两个从未管理过总统竞选、且政治直觉相互矛盾的人正在管理特朗普的总统选举。


Kellyanne Conway, his new campaign manager, is a pollster who has been mining survey data from the mainstream Republican right for years (the party’s right wing is its “mainstream,” because its center is essentially gone).	特朗普新的竞选经理康韦是负责挖掘共和党主流右翼民调数据多年的民调负责人（共和党右翼成为“主流”，因为其中间派别已经基本消失）。


During the Republican primary, she worked for the “super PAC” that backed Trump’s bitter rival, Ted Cruz.	共和党初选期间，她曾为支持特朗普死敌泰德·克鲁斯的“超级委员会”效力。


Conway is a smart, tough partisan who is expected to be a steady and sensible influence in the campaign.	康韦是个聪明、强硬的党派主义者，我们大都认为她会稳定、理智地影响特朗普的竞选活动。


If she prevails – and Trump can stick to a theme – we’ll see a more reasonable Republican candidate.	如果她最终胜出——并且特朗普能够坚持一个主题——我们会看到一个更为理性的共和党候选人。


On the other hand, Trump’s decision to appoint Steven Bannon as his campaign CEO foretells anything but steadiness and sensibility.	另一方面，特朗普任命史蒂芬·班农为竞选活动首席执行官预示着其竞选活动可能与稳定性和敏感度渐行渐远。


Prior to his appointment, Bannon was the executive chairman of Breitbart News, a far-right, hyper-nationalist – indeed white supremacist – online publication.	在接受任命前，班农曾出任布莱巴特新闻的执行主席，他是一位极右翼超民族主义者——实际是奉行白人至上的——在线刊物主席。


He is known to be a combative nihilist who will stoop to any depth to win.	他是人尽皆知的好斗的虚无主义者，为了获胜堕落到任何地步都在所不惜。


Bannon’s appointment caused mainstream Republican jaws to drop.	班农的任命让主流共和党人瞠目结舌。


Trump, trailing Hillary Clinton badly in August polls, has come under growing pressure to move closer to the Republican Party establishment.	在8月民调中大幅落后于希拉里·克林顿的特朗普承受着向共和党体制靠拢的越来越大的压力。


Unless he adopts a more mainstream approach, he will not be able to attract white suburbanites – a key constituency still up for grabs.	除非他接受更为主流的做法，否则将无法吸引尚未决定归属的一个关键选区——白人郊区居民。


But Bannon is no fan of the Republican establishment.	但班农对共和党体制并无好感。


Under Bannon, Breitbart News routinely assailed Republican Speaker of the House Paul Ryan.	在班农管理时，布莱巴特新闻经常抨击共和党议长保罗·瑞安。


Earlier this summer, it attacked Ryan for supporting an omnibus spending bill that funds President Barack Obama’s Syrian refugee program, and for sending his children to a private Catholic school.	今年夏初，布莱巴特新闻因为支持为奥巴马总统叙利亚难民项目出资的综合开支法案和将子女送到一所私立天主教学校而抨击瑞安。


It even backed Ryan’s Wisconsin congressional primary opponent, a Trump supporter whom Ryan defeated in an 84-16% landslide.	该刊物甚至支持瑞安在威斯康星州的主要对手，那位候选人最终被瑞安以84-16%的压倒性优势所击败。


Breitbart News also condemned the Republican Senate leader, Mitch McConnell, publishing a column that accused McConnell of being soft on Clinton to remain in the good graces of donors who oppose Trump.	布莱巴特新闻还谴责共和党参议院领袖麦康奈尔，发表了指责麦康奈尔对克林顿心慈手软以获得反对特郎普捐助者青睐的一份社评。


What has the Conway-Bannon dichotomy produced?	康韦-班农格格不入的结果是什么？


Early signs suggest that Conway is sanding down some of Trump’s rougher edges.	早期迹象显示康韦正在改造特朗普某些不被人接受的方面。


For example, Trump, who never apologizes, recently expressed vague “regret” for offending people.	比如从不道歉的特朗普最近曾为得罪民众表达过模模糊糊的“遗憾”。


More important, Trump has been moving away from his tough anti-immigration stance, such as his pledge to establish a special “deportation force” to round up all 11 million undocumented immigrants in the US.	更重要的是，特朗普正在逐渐放弃其强硬的反移民立场，比如他曾承诺要组建一支特殊的驱逐部队来围捕所有1100万美国非法移民。


What Trump is moving toward, however, remains unclear, as is whether his supporters will let him get away with this shift.	但特朗普的走向到目前仍不清楚，也不清楚他的支持者能否接受他的这种转变。


By contrast, Bannon apparently wants to “let Trump be Trump.”	相比之下，班农显然希望“让特朗普保持本色”。


He seems to support Trump’s refusal to “pivot” from the divisive rhetoric of the primary season to a more “presidential” approach.	他似乎支持特朗普拒绝将重心从初选期间的分裂言论过渡到更像“总统”的观点。


Presumably, he hopes to free Trump to follow his basest instincts, spewing vile invective against Clinton as the election contest heats up.	人们推测他希望放手让特朗普追随最基础的本能，随着选举竞争日趋激烈而对克林顿大肆口吐恶言。


That won’t go down well with the constituency that Conway is trying to win over to Trump.	这在康韦试图为特朗普争取的选区下场肯定非常悲惨。


There is little reason to think Trump’s new staffing arrangement will yield a new, more coherent candidate.	没什么理由认为特朗普新的人事安排策略能够带来态度更加连贯的新的候选人。


Throughout the campaign, he has vacillated wildly between poise and pugilism, sometimes in the same day.	整个竞选过程，他都在风度和恶毒攻击间大幅摇摆，有时从一种策略切换到另一种策略仅仅在一天之间。


Trump’s appointment of Bannon, in particular, suggests that he is desperate, scared, and lost.	特别是特朗普任命班农的举动显示出他绝望、害怕和迷茫的���态。