For example, the Tibetan Plateau, which contains the world’s third-largest store of ice, is warming at almost twice the average global rate, owing to the rare convergence of high altitudes and low latitudes – with potentially serious consequences for Asia’s freshwater supply.	比方说，由于罕见的高海拔及低纬度，冰储量居世界第三位的青藏高原升温速度几乎是全球平均速度的两倍，对亚洲的淡水供应造成严重的潜在威胁。


In other words, three interconnected crises – a resource crisis, an environmental crisis, and a climate crisis – are threatening Asia’s economic, social, and ecological future.	换言之，资源危机、环境危机和气候危机相互影响，对亚洲的经济、社会和生态未来构成严重的威胁。


Population growth, urbanization, and industrialization are exacerbating resource-related stresses, with some cities experiencing severe water shortages, and degrading the environment (as anyone who has experienced Beijing’s smog can attest).	城市化、工业化和人口增长进一步加剧了资源压力，造成某些城市水资源严重短缺、环境日趋恶化（经历过北京雾霾天的人都可以作证）。


Fossil-fuel and water subsidies have contributed to both problems.	化石燃料及用水补贴致使这两个问题进一步恶化。


Faced with severe supply constraints, Asian economies are increasingly tapping other continents’ fossil fuels, mineral ores, and timber.	在严重的供应短缺面前，亚洲经济体正越来越多地从其他大陆进口化石燃料、矿石和木材。


But water is extremely difficult – and prohibitively expensive – to import.	但水资源进口却极其困难，而且代价昂贵。


And Asia has less fresh water per person than any continent other than Antarctica, and some of the world’s worst water pollution.	亚洲人均淡水储量少于除南极洲以外的所有大陆，而水资源污染却在全球名列前茅。


Likewise, food scarcity is a growing problem for Asian countries, with crop yields and overall food production growing more slowly than demand.	同样，亚洲国家的粮食匮乏问题日益严重，作物产量及粮食总产量的增速赶不上需求。


At the same time, rising incomes are altering people’s diets, which now include more animal-based proteins, further compounding Asia’s food challenges.	此外收入提高正在改变民众的饮食结构，动物蛋白消费量增加导致亚洲粮食问题进一步复杂化。


The intensifying competition over natural resources among Asian countries is shaping resource geopolitics, including the construction of oil and gas pipelines.	亚洲国家对自然资源的激烈争夺造就了资源地缘政治，包括石油天然气管道建设。


China has managed to secure new hydrocarbon supplies through pipelines from Kazakhstan and Russia.	中国已经通过管道从哈萨克斯坦和俄罗斯获得新的油气供应。


But this option is not available to Asia’s other leading economies – Japan, India, and South Korea – which are not contiguous with suppliers in Central Asia, Iran, or Russia.	但日本、印度和韩国等不与中亚、伊朗或俄罗斯等供应国接壤的亚洲其他主要经济体却不存在这样的选择。


These countries will remain dependent on oil imports from an increasingly unstable Persian Gulf.	这些国家只能继续依赖从动荡的波斯湾进口石油。


Furthermore, China’s fears that hostile naval forces could hold its economy hostage by interdicting its oil imports have prompted it to build a massive oil reserve, and to plan two strategic energy corridors in southern Asia.	此外，中国对敌对海军力量通过拦截其石油进口挟制其经济发展的顾虑促使其建设庞大的石油储备，并计划在南亚修建两条战略能源通道。


The corridors will provide a more direct transport route for oil and liquefied gas from Africa and the Persian Gulf, while minimizing exposure to sea-lanes policed by the United States Navy.	通道可以将非洲和波斯湾的石油及液化天然气直接运送至国内，最大限度地避开了美国海军控制的海上通道。


One such corridor extends 800 kilometers from the Bay of Bengal across Burma to southern China.	其中一条通道绵延800公里，从孟加拉湾经由缅甸直抵中国南部。


In addition to gas pipelines – the first is scheduled to be completed this year – it will include a high-speed railroad and a highway from the Burmese coast to China’s Yunnan province, offering China’s remote interior provinces an outlet to the sea for the first time.	除今年即将首度建成的天然气管道外，能源走廊还包括从缅甸海岸到中国云南的一条高速路和一条铁路，使中国偏远的内陆省份云南首次能够直达出海口。


The other corridor – work on which has been delayed, owing to an insurrection in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province – will stretch from the Chinese-operated port at Gwadar, near Pakistan’s border with Iran, through the Karakoram mountains to the landlocked, energy-producing Xinjiang province.	因巴基斯坦俾路支省叛乱而导致工期延误的另一条能源通道将从靠近巴基斯坦及伊朗边界并由中国控制的瓜达尔港出发，途经喀喇昆仑山抵达内陆能源大省新疆。


Notably, in giving China control of its strategic Gwadar port in February, Pakistan has permitted the Chinese government to build a naval base there.	值得一提的是，2月将具有战略意义的瓜达尔港控制权移交中国时，巴基斯坦已允许中国政府在那里建立海军基地。


Given the significant role that natural resources have historically played in global strategic relations – including driving armed interventions and full-scale wars – increasingly murky resource geopolitics threatens to exacerbate existing tensions among Asian countries.	鉴于一直以来自然资源在��球战略关系（包括发动武装干预及大规模战争）中所发挥的重要作用，越来越阴暗的资源地缘政治有可能导致亚洲国家间现有的紧张关系进一步恶化。


Rising dependence on energy imports has already been used to rationalize an increased emphasis on maritime power, raising new concerns about sea-lane safety and vulnerability to supply disruptions.	对能源进口依存度越来越高已经成为日益重视海上军力的借口，也导致了对海上通道安全性及供应中断可能性的全新担忧。


This partly explains the current tensions between China and Japan over their conflicting territorial claims to islands in the East China Sea, which occupy an area of only seven square kilometers, but are surrounded by rich hydrocarbon reserves.	这一定程度上可以解释中日之间目前因领土要求而导致的局势紧张，东海的海上小岛占地仅7平方公里，但周围却环绕着丰富的油气储量。


Disputes in the South China Sea involving China and five of its neighbors, and in southern Asia, are equally resource-driven.	南海争端涉及中国及五个邻国，而南亚争端背后同样存在着资源驱动。


While strategic competition for resources will continue to shape Asia’s security dynamics, the associated risks can be moderated if Asia’s leaders establish norms and institutions aimed at building rule-based cooperation.	尽管由资源引发的战略竞争将持续影响亚洲的安全态势，但如果亚洲领导人建立以规则为基础的合作规则和制度其风险也可以相应减轻。


Unfortunately, little progress has been made in this area.	遗憾的是，这方面几乎没有取得什么进展。


For example, 53 of Asia’s 57 transnational river basins lack any water-sharing or cooperative arrangement.	举例来讲，亚洲57个跨国河流流域有53个未制定任何水资源共享或合作计划。


Indeed, Asia is one of only two continents, along with Africa, where regional integration has yet to take hold, largely because political and cultural diversity, together with historical animosities, have hindered institution-building.	事实上，亚洲和非洲是区域一体化尚未成形的仅有的两个大洲，究其原因主要是政治文化多样性和历史仇恨阻碍了制度建设。


Strained political relations among most of Asia’s sub-regions make a region-wide security structure or more effective resource cooperation difficult to achieve.	亚洲多数次区域间紧张的政治关系导致难以实现地区安全结构或更有效的资源合作。


This could have significant implications for Asia’s ostensibly unstoppable rise – and thus for the West’s supposedly inevitable decline.	这可能会严重影响亚洲看似不可阻挡的崛起和西方所谓必然的衰落。


After all, Asian economies cannot sustain their impressive economic growth without addressing their resource, environmental, and security challenges – and no single country can do it alone.	归根结底，不解决资源、环境和安全挑战亚洲经济体就无法持续快速发展——没有哪个国家能独立做到这一切。


Developing Economies’ Long-Term Financing Shortfall	发展中经济体的长期融资难


WASHINGTON, DC – Since the global financial crisis, “banking” has practically become a swear word.	华盛顿—自全球金融危机以来，“银行”事实上已沦为一句骂人的脏话。


But, while banks undoubtedly have the capacity to inflict serious damage on economies and livelihoods, a well-run financial system can offer significant benefits.	但是，尽管银行毫无疑问可以给经济和生活带来严重伤害，但运转良好的金融系统可以带来极大的好处。


A growing body of evidence, highlighted in the World Bank Group’s recent Global Financial Development Report,shows that financial institutions and markets have a profound influence on economic development, poverty alleviation, and the stability of economies worldwide, and that a pragmatic assessment of the state’s role in finance is warranted.	越来越多的证据表明——世界银行最新的《全球金融发展报告》对此做了强调——金融机构和市场对经济发展、消除贫困和世界经济的稳定有着深远影响，国家对于金融的务实态度应该得到保障。


On the surface, the most unusual feature of the ongoing financial crisis is that developed economies have been affected much more strongly and directly than developing economies, many of which have learned from previous crises, put their fiscal houses in order, made progress on structural reforms, and improved supervision and regulation.	从表面上看，没完没了的金融危机最反常的特征是发达经济体比发展中经济体受到了更大更直接的影响。 很多发展中国家从前几次危机中吸取了教训，理顺了财政顺序，进行了结构性改革，也改善了监督和监管。


But this distinction misses the larger point: the quality of policy matters much more than the level of economic development.	但这一区分漏掉了更大的关键点：政策的质量远比经济发展水平重要。


Some financial systems in developed economies – for example, in Australia, Canada, and Singapore – have shown remarkable resilience, while others have gotten into trouble.	一些发达经济特的金融制度——如澳大利亚、加拿大和新加坡——显示出了卓著的韧性，但其他则陷入了麻烦。


At the same time, the focus on financial reform in developed economies, while warranted, has contributed to complacency in developing economies.	与此同时，发达经济体的金融改革尽管得到了保证，但远远不如发展中经济体。


For example, many are facing their own version of the “too big to fail” problem – which the crisis reinforced – but have done little to address it.	比如，许多发达国家面临自身的“太大而不能倒”问题——危机加剧了这一问题——但并未采取措施纠正它。


Moreover, measures taken during the crisis may have helped to mitigate financial contagion, but some do not support robust long-term development of the sector.	此外，危机期间实施的措施可能有助于减轻金融传染，但并没有支持该部门的长期稳健发展。


Many developing economies weathered the crisis at the cost of massive direct state intervention, while their financial sectors lack breadth and access.	许多发展中经济体抵御了危机，为此付出的代价是大规模直接国家干预，而它们的金融部门缺少广度和市场。


The financial crisis has had a particularly profound impact on the supply of finance at longer maturities.	金融危机对于期限较长的融资的供给影响特别深远。


To some extent, this is understandable, given the focus on short-term liquidity and capital flows.	从某种程度这不难的理解，因为政策焦点集中在短期流动性和资本流。


But the sharply decreased availability of longer-term funding is heightening financial-sector vulnerabilities.	但长期资金的急剧枯竭凸显了金融部门的脆弱。


While developing economies’ share of the global economy has risen from roughly one-third to one-half over the last decade, developed economies continue to dominate the supply of long-term funding.	在过去的十年中，发展中经济体在全球经济中的份额从约三分之一增加到了一半，但发达国家掌握着长期资金的主导权。


The mismatch between the time horizon of available funding and that of investors and entrepreneurs, particularly those in developing economies, is a source of vulnerability that acts as an impediment to growth.	这一可获得资金和投资者和企业家需求（特别是发展中国家的投资者和企业家）在时界上的不匹配是阻挠增长的脆弱性的源头。


Several factors have diminished investors’ willingness to extend long-term credit.	几大因素削弱了投资者扩展长期信用的意愿。


The financial crisis reduced private financiers’ risk appetite, making long-term exposures unappealing.	金融危机抑制了私人金融家的风险胃口，长期风险敞口不再具有吸引力。


Net private capital flows, particularly to developing economies, have become more volatile.	净私人资本流——特别是流向发展中经济体的部分——变得更加波动了。


Private capital, which accounts for more than 90% of capital flows to developing economies, will remain the dominant source of long-term financing.	私人资本占据了发展中经济体资本流的九成以上，并将继续充任长期融资的主要来源。


But the availability of long-term capital appears to have been impaired, as traditional providers of equity to infrastructure projects, for example, have become less able or willing to invest.	但长期资本的可获得性已经受损，因为（比如）基础设施项目的传统权益资本提供者已不再能够或愿意投资。


Financing from banks has also been constrained owing to deleveraging, particularly by European banks.	从银行获得融资也因去杠杆化（特别是欧洲银行）而被束缚了手脚。


The new Basel III package of global banking reforms may increase funding costs further for some borrowers, while reducing the availability of finance, especially for longer-term debt.	新巴塞尔III全球银行改革规则将导致某些借款人的借贷成本进一步上升，同时减弱资金的可获得性，特别是长期债务。


Institutional investors, such as pension funds and life-insurance companies, with more than $70 trillion in assets, are a major additional source of long-term capital.	机构投资者——比如养老基金和寿险公司，它们手握70万亿美元资产——是长期资本的主要新来源。


While such investment in long-term productive assets like infrastructure is essential to generating the income that these investors demand, less than 1% of pension-fund assets are allocated directly to infrastructure projects.	尽管长期生产性资产（如基础设施）投资是制造投资者所要求的收益的关键，但养老基金资产直接配置于基础设施项目的比例还不到1%。


Meanwhile, net savings in developing economies are increasing, and low yields in developed economies are providing an incentive for investors to channel more resources to productive investment in these countries.	与此同时，发展中国家的净储蓄在增加，而发达经济体的低收益率正在促使投资者寻找更多投资这些国家生产性项目的渠道。


Recently, several banks have been able to issue long-term bonds at affordable rates.	最近，一些银行以可以以实惠的利率发行长期债券。


Another promising development is the growth of local-currency bond markets.	另一个有希望的发展之路是本地货币债券市场的成长。


These markets can become a strong source of financing for longer-term domestic investment, including in infrastructure, thereby reducing currency risk for borrowers and investors.	这类市场可以称为坚挺的长期国内投资项目（包括基础设施）融资源，从而降低借款人和投资者的货币风险。


But strong and sustainable development of these markets cannot occur without institutional and regulatory reforms that ensure an attractive environment, as well as capacity-building in both the public and private sectors to facilitate further market development.	但这类市场的坚挺而可持续的发展是有条件的：确保具吸引力的环境的制度和监管改革以及便利后续市场发展的公共和私人部门的能力建设。


Investors’ willingness to make capital available over the longer term for infrastructure development, job creation, and economic growth depends on their perceptions of various kinds of risk.	投资者为基础设施开发、就业创造和经济增长提供长期资本的意愿取决于他们对各种风险的感知。


Policymakers can manage these perceptions by improving public-sector governance, ensuring sound macroeconomic management, promoting a transparent and supportive legal framework for private-sector activity, building debt-management capacity, and protecting investors from expropriation.	决策者可以通过改善公共部门治理、保证可靠宏观经济管理、为私人部门活动促进透明和支持性法律框架、建设债务管理能力以及保护投资者免于征用等手段管理这类感知。


Moving away from a one-size-fits-all approach to financial reform means committing the time and effort needed to understand the political economy, as well as establishing partnerships with representatives from government, civil society, and the private sector.	从寻找万灵药的办法转向金融改革意味着拿出时间和努力来理解政治经济学，并建立政府代表、公民社会和私人部门的伙伴关系。


Such tailored solutions are essential to bolstering economic performance in developed and developing economies alike.	这类量身定做的解决方案是提振经济绩效的关键，不管发达经济体还是发展中经济体都适用。


Emerging Markets’ Feminine Future	新兴市场的女性未来


LONDON – According to the United Nations, 70% of women worldwide experience violence in their lifetime.	伦敦—根据联合国的数据，全世界有70%的女性经历过暴力。


The World Bank adds that women aged 15-44 are more likely to experience rape or domestic violence than cancer, car accidents, war, or malaria.	世界银行则说，15—44岁年龄段的女性遭遇强奸和家庭暴力的机会比癌症、车祸、战争、疟疾还大。


Such indicators are even more alarming in emerging markets, where discrimination and gender inequality are particularly prevalent.	新兴市场的数字更加触目惊心，这些国家的歧视和性别不平等特别普遍。


This partly reflects the failure of public policy to ameliorate the distributive consequences of rapid economic growth.	这部分反映出公共政策没能解决快速经济增长的分配问题。


With the informal sector continuing to play a major role in emerging economies, women often have access to only unreliable and transitory employment that offers casual and irregular wages.	在新兴经济体中，地下部门仍占据重要作用，女性通常只能找到不稳定的临时性工作，收入低廉且无保障。


Meanwhile, unprecedented urbanization has disrupted traditional family structures, further undermining the role that women can play in economies and societies.	与此同时，前所未有的城市化摧毁了传统家庭结构，进一步破坏了女性可以在经济和社会中所能扮演的角色。


The damaging impact of active gender discrimination – such as bride burning and female infanticide – is clear.	性别歧视（如索奁焚妻和扼杀女婴）猖獗的破坏性影响是显而易见的。


But passive discrimination – tolerating rules and institutions that deny women equal say in reproductive decisions, equal access to education and employment, equal pay for equal work, equal rights before the law, and equal political influence – is similarly destructive.	但被动歧视——忍受否认女性在生育问题上的平等权利、平等接受教育和工作的权利、获得平等薪酬的权利、获得平等法律对待的权利、获得平等政治影响的权利的规则和制度——具有同样的破坏性。


In all of its forms, gender discrimination makes women vulnerable to sexual slavery, trafficking, and forced marriage, deprives women of their inalienable rights, and diminishes their quality of life.	各种各样的性别歧视让女性处于性奴役、人口买卖、包办婚姻的风险之下，剥夺了女性不可侵犯的权利，也破坏了生命的平等性。


At the same time, it stunts the capacity of boys and men to understand women’s plight, thus diminishing their motivation to change the situation.	与此同时，这也阻碍了男孩和男人理解女性权利的能力，从而抑制了他们改变现状的动力。


While these issues are global, they are most urgent in emerging markets, where they are undermining the social and economic progress on which the rest of the world increasingly relies.	尽管这些问题是全球性的，但在新兴市场中最为紧迫，新兴市场的社会和经济进步正在因此受到打击，而世界越来越依赖新兴市场的社会和经济进步。


In the wake of the global economic crisis, emerging markets have become the engines of worldwide growth.	全球金融危机爆发以来，新兴市场成为全球增长引擎。


But these countries face growing constraints to sustainability, social cohesion, and political stability, including erosion of their international competitiveness, environmental degradation, weaknesses (including corruption) in national, local, and corporate governance, wasted human capital, and growing social, economic, and gender inequality.	但这些国家面临日渐加剧的可持续性、社会凝聚力和政治稳定性约束，包括国际竞争力的衰落、环境破坏、国家、地方和公司治理不振（包括腐败）、人力资本浪费以及越来越多的社会、经济和性别不平等。


Failure to make full use of women’s talents undermines emerging markets’ economic development, while the marginalization and abuse of women threatens their social advancement and impairs their political stability.	没能充分利用女性天赋阻碍了新兴市场的经济发展，而边缘化和虐待女性威胁着它们的进步、破坏者它们的政治稳定。


With most countries worldwide facing continued economic uncertainty, the international community has a vested interest in emerging economies’ resilience, collective capacity to sustain global demand for goods and services, and ability to confront the challenges, such as gender inequality, that threaten their success.	全世界大部分国家面临着持续的经济不确定性，国际社会对新兴经济体的韧性、维持全球商品和服务需求的集体能力以及应对性别不平等等威胁其策划你公公的挑战的能力翘首以待。


The importance of overcoming these barriers to development was emphasized at a recent symposium (of which I was the chair) at Green Templeton College, Oxford.	最近在牛津格林坦普顿学院举行的研讨会强调了克服这些发展障碍的重要性（我是研讨会的主席）。


Fifty leaders from government, business, civil society, and academia identified gender inequality as the most urgent constraint to sustainable growth, social cohesion, and political stability, and agreed on the steps needed to address the issue effectively.	五十位来自政府、企业、公民社会和学界的领袖将性别不平等视为可持续发展、社会凝聚力和政治稳定性的最紧迫约束，并同意采取必要措施有效解决这一问题。


First and foremost, national policymakers must take concrete, comprehensive action to ensure that women are forced to abandon neither productive nor reproductive activities.	首先，国家级决策者必须采取具体全面的行动确保女性不至于被迫放弃生产和生育活动。


To this end, governments should implement measures that guarantee, directly or indirectly, affordable child- and elder-care support systems for working parents.	在这方面，各国政府应该实施直接或间接保证职业父母能够负担得起的育幼和赡老制度。


Moreover, private employers should be encouraged to build supportive workplaces by implementing creative solutions to common constraints.	此外，应该鼓励私营业主通过实施创造性的常规约束解决方案建立支持性工作场所。


For example, MAS Holdings in Sri Lanka has incorporated into the workplace nursing stations, on-site banking, and company buses that ease employees’ commutes and facilitate participation in sports programs.	比如，斯里兰卡MAS控股集团（MAS Holdings）在工作场所中嵌入了护士站、现场银行服务以及解决雇员上下班问题、方便他们参与体育活动的通勤巴士。


Such measures not only lead to increased productivity; they also bolster loyalty, morale, and thus employee retention.	这些措施不仅提高了生产率，也提振了忠诚度、士气，从而稳定了员工。


At the same time, it is crucial that women enjoy total reproductive autonomy and sexual sovereignty.	与此同时，一个关键点是女性能充分获得生育自主权和性主权。


This can be achieved only with the provision of universal and unfettered access to reproductive and other relevant health-care services.	这只有通过提供普遍且自由的生育和其他相关医疗服务才能实现。


But even healthy reproduction has a dark side.	但即便健康生育也有阴暗面。


Neonaticide (killing infants that are less than one day old), infanticide (killing infants that are more than one day old), and the practice of disposing of female children in favor of male offspring are not only barbaric; they have led to imbalanced gender ratios in many emerging markets.	当日杀婴（对象是出生不到一天的新生儿）、杀婴（对象是出生已满一天的新生儿）和抛弃女婴的重男轻女行为不但野蛮； 还在许多新兴市场国家造成了性别比率失衡。


Policymakers must enforce criminal sanctions against these practices.	决策者必须强制追究这些行为的刑事责任。


Subsequently, educational programs for children and adults should be launched, in collaboration with religious groups, in order to improve public understanding of gender inequality.	除此之外，还必须推行儿童和成人教育计划并与宗教团体合作，以此改善公众对性别不平等问题的认识。


By promoting a shift in public perceptions, such programs can catalyze fundamental behavioral changes.	通过促进公共观点的改变，这些项目可以催化根本性的行为改变。


International action is also crucial.	国际行动也很关键。


The World Bank and regional development banks should be encouraged to incorporate gender-equality criteria into their eligibility criteria for loans and credit to emerging-market governments and private-sector corporations.	应该鼓励世界银行和地区开发银行将性别平等标准纳入新兴市场政府和私营企业贷款和信用合格标准中。


Such a clear economic link would help to motivate local policymakers to take strong action, while helping to bolster public support for policies promoting gender equality.	明确的经济联系有助于激励地方决策者采取强硬措施，同时有助于提高公众对促进性别平等政策的支持。


The international community has a profound stake in the future performance of emerging markets.	对国际社会来说，新兴市场的未来表现所涉甚多。


In order to bolster these countries’ social and economic advancement, the development agenda in the coming years should include a robust commitment to promoting gender equality.	为了促进这些国家的社会和经济进步，未来数年的发展日程应该包括促进性别平等的强力承诺。


The Impotence of the Federal Reserve	美联储的无能


CAMBRIDGE – The United States Federal Reserve’s recent announcement that it will extend its “Operation Twist” by buying an additional $267 billion of long-term Treasury bonds over the next six months - to reach a total of $667 billion this year - had virtually no impact on either interest rates or equity prices.	美国剑桥— 美联储最近宣布将延长“扭曲操作”，在未来6个月中再购买2670亿美元的长期美国国债，使今年的国债购买总量达到6700亿美元，但这对利率和股价基本无影响。


The market’s lack of response was an important indicator that monetary easing is no longer a useful tool for increasing economic activity.	市场对此毫无反应便表明货币宽松已不再是促进经济活动的良药。


The Fed has repeatedly said that it will do whatever it can to stimulate growth. This led to a plan to keep short-term interest rates near zero until late 2014, as well as to massive quantitative easing, followed by Operation Twist, in which the Fed substitutes short-term Treasuries for long-term bonds.	美联储一再声称将采取一切办法刺激增长，因此，它将至少保持短期零利率状态至2014年年底，同时实施大规模量化宽松，继之以扭曲操作（以短期国债替代长期国债）。


These policies did succeed in lowering long-term interest rates.	这些政策在降低长期利率方面确实收到了成效。


The yield on ten-year Treasuries is now 1.6%, down from 3.4% at the start of 2011.	目前10年期美国国债收益率为1. 6%，2011年年初为3.


Although it is difficult to know how much of this decline reflected higher demand for Treasury bonds from risk-averse global investors, the Fed’s policies undoubtedly deserve some of the credit.	4%。 尽管很难知道如此下降有多少是因为风险厌恶的全球投资者对美国国债需求增加所致，但毫无疑问，美联储的政策在其中居功至伟。


The lower long-term interest rates contributed to the small 4% rise in the S&P 500 share-price index over the same period.	长期利率的下降促使标普500股票指数在同期上涨了4%。


The Fed is unlikely to be able to reduce long-term rates any further.	美联储已不可能继续压低长期利率了。


Their level is now so low that many investors rightly fear that we are looking at a bubble in bond and stock prices.	长期利率之低已使许多投资者大为担心，唯恐债券和股票价格产生泡沫。


The result could be a substantial market-driven rise in long-term rates that the Fed would be unable to prevent.	结果，长期利率可能会在市场力量下大幅上升，美联储将对此毫无办法。


A shift in foreign investors’ portfolio preferences away from long-term bonds could easily trigger such a run-up in rates.	外国投资者投资组合不再偏好长期债券，这将很轻易地触发利率飙升。


Moreover, while the Fed’s actions have helped the owners of bonds and stocks, it is not clear that they have stimulated real economic activity.	此外，美联储的行动尽管对债券和股票所有者有利，但是否刺激了实体经济行为还未可知。


The US economy is still limping along with very slow growth and a high rate of unemployment.	美国经济仍然在极低增长率和极高失业率之间步履蹒跚。


Although the economy has been expanding for three years, the level of GDP is still only 1% higher than it was nearly five years ago, when the recession began.	尽管三年来经济一直在增长，但GDP水平只比5年危机肇始时前高出1%。


The GDP growth rate was only 1.7% in 2011, and it is not significantly higher now.	2011年GDP增长率只有1. 7%，现在也好不到哪里去。


Indeed, recent data show falling real personal incomes, declining employment gains, and lower retail sales.	事实上，最新数据表明，个人真实收入在下降，就业增长持续萎靡，零售额也在缩水。


The primary impact of monetary easing is usually to stimulate demand for housing and thus the volume of construction.	货币宽松的主要影响通常是刺激住房需求，从而提振建筑量。


But this time, despite historically low mortgage interest rates, house prices have continued to fall and are now more than 10% lower in real terms than they were two years ago.	但这一回尽管按揭利率降到了历史最低水平，房价仍在下跌，以真实水平衡量，比两年前低10%。


The level of real residential investment is still less than half its level before the recession began.	住宅投资真实水平只有危机开始前的一半。


The Fed has noted that structural problems in the housing market have impaired its ability to stimulate the economy through this channel.	美联储注意到，住房市场的结构性问题已损害了其通过这一渠道刺激经济的能力。


Business investment is also weak, even though large corporations have very high cash balances.	商业投资也非常萎靡，尽管大公司手握里握有大把现金。


With so much internal liquidity, these businesses are not sensitive to reductions in market interest rates.	企业拥有如此巨大的内部流动性，对市场利率的下降将不甚敏感。


At the same time, many very small businesses cannot get credit, because the local banks on which they depend have inadequate capital, owing to accrued losses on commercial real-estate loans.	与此同时，大量微小企业得不到信贷，因为它们所倚赖的本地银行因商业地产贷款损失的不断积累而导致资本不足。


These small businesses, too, are not helped by lower interest rates.	这些小企业也没有得到利率降低带来的好处。


The Fed’s monetary easing did temporarily contribute to a weaker dollar, which boosted net exports.	美联储的货币宽松确实暂时地压低了美元，从而提振了净出口。


But the dollar’s decline has more recently been reversed by the global flight to safety by investors abandoning the euro.	但最近，美元的下跌势头因投资者抛弃欧元、逃向安全资产而发生了逆转。


Even if the US economy continues to stumble in the months ahead, the Fed is unlikely to do anything more before the end of the year.	即使未来几个月中美国经济持续萎靡，美联储也不可能在年底前有所作为。


The next policy moves to help the economy must come from the US Congress and the administration after the November election.	提振经济的下一步必须等11月大选尘埃落定后由国会和政府决定。


Nonetheless, what needs to be done is already clear.	尽管如此，需要做什么已经显而易见。


The cloud of a sharp rise in personal and corporate income-tax rates, now scheduled to occur automatically at the start of 2013, must be removed.	个人和企业所得税率将在2013年自动开始大增这一阴云必须移除。


The projected increase in the long-term fiscal deficit must be reversed by stemming the growth in transfers to middle-class retirees.	长期财政赤字增加预期必须通过阻止中产阶级退休者转移支付增长予以逆转。


Fundamental tax reform must strengthen incentives, reduce distorting “tax expenditures,” and raise revenue.	基本税收改革必须加强激励、减少扭曲性“税收开支”，同时增加岁入。


Finally, the relationship between government and business, now quite combative, must be improved.	最后，政府和企业当前的紧张关系必须缓解。


If these things happen in 2013, the US economy can return to a more normal path of economic expansion and rising employment.	如果这些都在2013年得以实现，美国经济将能回到正常的经济扩张和就业增长之路上来。


At that point, the Fed can focus on its fundamental mandate of preventing a rise in the rate of inflation.	到那时，美联储便可以专注于其基本使命——防止通货膨胀。


Until then, it is powerless.	在此之前，美联储已力不从心。


Why Bo Stole the Show	薄熙来为何出尽了风头


CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA – As show trials go, the drama featuring Bo Xilai, the once-swaggering, media-savvy former Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chief of Chongqing, veered anomalously into improvisation.	加州克莱蒙特——随着审判秀的进行，以神气活现、面对媒体应付自如著称的前中共重庆市委书记薄熙来为主角的这场闹剧出人意料地演变成了即兴表演。


Before the proceedings began, the conventional wisdom was that Bo’s trial had been carefully scripted and rehearsed to portray a forlorn and penitent sinner confessing his crimes and apologizing to the Party.	审判开始前，传统观点是对薄熙来的审判经过精心的编制和排练，薄本该扮演一个为自己罪行忏悔、向党致歉的绝望悔过的罪人。


But the historic five-day trial dispelled any notion that Bo would go quietly to his cell in Beijing’s infamous Qincheng Prison, where China’s fallen top leaders are incarcerated.	但此次历史性的五天公审彻底打消了薄会静悄悄被关进北京臭名昭著的秦城监狱的假设，这座监狱关押着中国落马的高层领导人。


He challenged the prosecution vigorously, defending himself with a feistiness that surprised nearly all who read the transcripts released by the court in real time on the trial’s first day.	薄不遗余力地挑战公诉人为自己辩护，这让看到法院实时发布首日审判记录的所有人都感到吃惊。


Bo dismissed one of his accusers as having “sold his soul.”	薄指责其中一名证人“出卖灵魂”。


He characterized testimony given by his wife, Gu Kailai, now serving a suspended death sentence for murdering the British businessman Neil Heywood in 2011, as “comical” and “fictional,” and he called her “crazy.”	他用“虚构”和“可笑”来形容妻子谷开来的证词，并指因谋杀英国商人尼尔·海伍德而被判死缓、目前正在服刑的谷开来是“疯子”。


Throughout the trial, Bo flatly denied most of the corruption charges, often professed ignorance of the facts, and claimed to be unable to recall any details of the matters in question.	庭审过程自始至终，薄熙来常常以不知情、想不起细节为由断然否认绝大多数腐败指控。


He even retracted his confession to the CCP’s anti-graft agency, blaming mental stress for his admission that he accepted bribes from a man he called “soulless” in court.	他甚至推翻了曾向中纪委做出的供述，称自己是因为精神压力才供认从一个被他称为“卑鄙小人”的人那里接受贿赂。


In his closing statement, he dropped a bombshell: he claimed that Wang Lijun, his former police chief and henchman (and a “vile character”), was secretly in love with his wife.	他在结束陈词中扔下一枚重磅炸弹：称曾是他手下警察局长兼左膀右臂（而且没有“做人的基本道德”）的王立军暗恋他的妻子。


The trial transcripts create an impression of a man who, had he not gone into politics, would have excelled as a trial lawyer.	庭审笔录让人感觉如果薄没有从政，可能会是一名出色的辩护律师。


Bo made the prosecution look sloppy and incompetent.	薄让公诉方看上去既无能又马虎。


However, anyone who believes that the courtroom drama in the provincial capital of Jinan will determine the trial’s outcome (the verdict and sentence will be announced in September) is seriously mistaken.	但认为省会济南上演的这场法庭闹剧将决定最终的庭审结果（判决和刑期将在9月宣布）将是大错特错。


The CCP’s leaders have already decided that Bo is guilty and must spend years in jail (the scale of Bo’s alleged bribe-taking ensures a sentence of 15-20 years).	中共领导人已经确定薄熙来有罪并将服刑（薄所涉嫌的受贿数额将保证他被判处15－20年徒刑）。


A logical question to ask, then, is why the Party allowed an unprecedented degree of openness at the trial.	因此合乎逻辑的问题是党为什么允许进行这场前所未有的公开审判。


The two most recently purged Politburo members were tried in secret, as were Bo’s wife, and his former police chief.	最近两名受到清洗的政治局委员审判是秘密进行的，薄的妻子和重庆市前警察局长也是如此。


The optimistic view is that China’s new leadership wants to demonstrate its commitment to the rule of law and fairness.	乐观的看法认为中国新一届领导班子希望向人们展示其致力维护法治和公平。


But that is a naive interpretation.	但这种解释未免过于天真。


While the trial proceedings on the first day were refreshingly open by Chinese standards, that quickly changed.	虽然首日的审判程序以中国的标准而言可谓前所未有的公开化，但这样的做法很快就已经停止。


Transcripts were not released in real time on subsequent days, and they omitted some crucial details (for example, Bo claimed that the Party’s representatives threatened to execute his wife and prosecute his son if he refused to cooperate).	之后几天的庭审记录不再实时发布，并且省略掉某些关键的细节（比方说薄声称检方曾威胁如果他拒绝合作，就要判他的妻子死刑并起诉他的儿子）。


Perhaps worried that Bo’s defiant behavior was winning the public-relations battle, the official media also launched a media blitz savaging Bo’s character and all but pronouncing him guilty.	也许是担心薄在法庭上的精彩表演将为他赢得公关战，官方媒体也组织媒体闪电战攻击薄的人格，就差宣判他有罪。


Even more disturbing, on the second day of the trial, the Chinese police formally arrested Xu Zhiyong, a human-rights lawyer who was leading a campaign to force mandatory disclosure of the wealth of senior officials and their family members.	更令人不安的是，审判第二天，中国警方正式逮捕了人权律师许志永，许在被捕前是强制公开高官及其家属财产运动的领导者。


The Chinese government has also begun a ferocious crackdown on social media, arresting prominent activists on dubious charges.	中国政府还开始凶狠地镇压社交媒体，以可疑罪名逮捕著名的社会网络评论家。


So there must be a different – and more political – interpretation of the Chinese government’s handling of Bo’s trial.	因此中国政府对薄熙来审判的处理方式肯定有更加政治化的解释。


It is worth recalling that purging him was a deeply divisive affair at the CCP’s highest levels.	值得注意的是中共最高层在薄的清洗问题上分歧很深。


His patrons and allies could not save him, but they were well positioned to demand that his trial be conducted as openly as possible.	他的保护人和盟友救不了他，但他们手握的权力足以要求他的审判尽可能公开进行。


Given Bo’s gift for dazzling an audience, his allies must have felt confident that a spirited defense would serve him well, both legally and politically.	考虑到他争取受众的能力，薄的盟友肯定对一场积极辩护在法律和政治上维护他的利益很有信心。


Bo certainly did not disappoint.	薄显然没有令他们失望。


He could have groveled his way through the trial, like other senior Party officials brought down by corruption scandals, and as most defendants have done in the long grim history of communist show trials beginning with Stalin.	薄原本可以在庭审过程中卑躬屈膝，就像其他因腐败丑闻落马的中共高官和从斯大林开始的长期残酷的共产党审判秀中绝大多数被告人一样。


But Bo apparently is not accepting his political demise as a final act – in his closing statement, he told the court that he wanted to keep his Party membership (he was expelled anyway) – and a comeback calculus may well have motivated his spirited performance.	但薄显然并不接受以政治消亡的形式谢幕——在结束陈词中，薄���诉他法庭希望保留党籍（尽管如此他还是被开除了）——积极的表现背后可能摆脱不了卷土重来的打算。


Bo understands that he should not be perceived as a pitiful loser who gutlessly besmirches his honor.	薄知道自己不能被看作因怯懦玷污名誉的可怜的失败者。


By appearing dignified, defiant, and forceful, Bo evidently sought to preserve his image among his allies and supporters as a strong leader.	通过展示有尊严、反抗、坚强的一面，薄显然试图维护其在盟友和支持者中间强有力领导形象。


Denouncing himself in order to gain leniency – in a case that he portrayed as a grievous miscarriage of justice – would have made him look like a coward.	在一场他自己形容为严重扭曲正义的审判中自我批判以求宽大处理会使他看起来像个懦夫。


Bo may be heading to jail, but he retains some chance of political rehabilitation should things change dramatically in China.	薄或许难逃牢狱之灾，但如果中国形势急剧变化他也并非没有政治平反的机会。


His botched – but riveting – trial may be over, but the Bo Xilai show will go on.	离谱又充满戏剧性审判或许已经结束，但薄熙来大剧将会继续上演。


Economic Rebalancing Acts	经济的再平衡举措


LONDON – We all know how the global economic crisis began.	发自伦敦——我们都知道全球经济危机是如何发生的。


The banks over-lent to the housing market.	首先是银行过度贷款给房地产市场。


The subsequent burst of the housing bubble in the United States caused banks to fail, because banking had gone global and the big banks held one another’s bad loans.	随后美国房地产泡沫破灭导致银行破产，这是因为银行业已经全球化而大银行之间都对方持有对方的不良贷款。


Banking failure caused a credit crunch.	银行破产导致信贷危机。


Lending dried up and economies started shrinking.	贷款枯竭，经济开始萎缩。


So governments bailed out banks and economies, producing a sovereign debt crisis.	于是政府出手拯救银行和经济，从而产生主权债务危机。


With everyone busy deleveraging, economies failed to recover.	由于每个人都忙于减少债务，经济就无法复苏。


Much of the world, especially Europe, but also the slightly less sickly US, remains stuck in a semi-slump.	世界上很多地方——尤其是欧洲，当然也包括受影响稍微没这么严重的美国，仍身陷于半衰退之中。


So how do we escape from this hole?	那么我们如何从这种萧条中走出来呢？


The familiar debate is between austerity and stimulus.	比较多的讨论是要进行财政紧缩还是要经济刺激。


“Austerians” believe that only balancing government budgets and shrinking national debts will restore investor confidence.	“紧缩派们”认为只有平衡政府预算并减少国家债务才能重振投资者的信心。


The Keynesians believe that without a large fiscal stimulus – a deliberate temporary increase of the deficit – the European and US economies will remain stuck in recession for years to come.	凯恩斯主义者们则认为如果不实施大型财政刺激——也就是在短期内故意提升赤字——欧洲和美国经济将会在未来几年继续陷在衰退中。


I am one of those who believe that recovery from the crisis requires fiscal stimulus.	我也认为要从危机中恢复需要财政刺激。


I don’t think monetary policy, even unorthodox monetary policy, can do the job.	但同时我认为货币政策，即使是非常规的货币政策，也无法达到这种效果。


Confidence is too low for commercial banks to create credit on the scale needed to return to full employment and the pre-crisis growth trend, however many hundreds of billions of whatever cash central banks pour into them.	尽管央行注入了数千亿的现金，商业银行仍没有多少信心来创造足够多的信贷以让经济回复到充分就业和危机前的增长趋势。


We are learning all over again that the central bank cannot create whatever level of credit it wants!	我们也再一次明白到央行其实也无法任意创造出它们所期望的信贷水平。


So, like Paul Krugman, Martin Wolf, and others, I would expand fiscal deficits, not try to shrink them.	所以正如保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）、马丁·沃尔夫（Martin Wolf）和其他人一样，我会支持扩大财政赤字，而不是缩小。 我之所以提倡这种政策，是出于老式凯恩斯主义的逻辑——我们当前的总需求不足；


I advocate this for the old-fashioned Keynesian reason that we are suffering from a deficiency of aggregate demand, that the multiplier is positive, and that the most effective way to reduce the private and public debts a year or two down the line is by taking steps to boost growth in national income now.	财政乘数是正的； 当前一两年内减少私人和公共债务最有效的方式是采取措施提高国民收入增长。


But the argument between austerians and Keynesians over how to encourage sustained recovery intersects with another debate.	但紧缩主义者和凯恩斯主义者之间对如何鼓励持续复苏的争论其实会与别的争论之间产生相互影响。


Simply put, what kind of post-recovery economy do we want?	简而言之，我们想要怎样的后复苏经济？


This is where economics becomes political economy.	而对这个问题的回答正是经济变身为政治经济之处。


Those who believe that all was fine with the pre-crisis economy except for banks making crazy loans are convinced that preventing such crises in the future requires only banking reform.	那些认为危机爆发前除了银行在疯狂放贷之外经济一切都好的人相信未来要防止这样的危机只需要进行银行业的改革。


The new reform orthodoxy is “macro-prudential regulation” of commercial banks by the central bank.	新的改革正道是央行对商业银行进行“宏观审慎管理”。


Some would go further and either nationalize the banks or break them up.	有些人会进一步将这些商业银行国有化或解散这些银行。


But their horizon of reform is similarly confined to the banking sector, and they rarely ask what caused the banks to behave so badly.	但他们对改革的视野同样是局限于银行业，他们几乎不会去想是什么因素促使银行表现得如此恶劣。


In fact, it is possible to regard excessive bank lending as a symptom of deeper economic flaws.	事实上，我们可以把银行过度放债看作更深层次经济缺陷的表现。


The economist Thomas Palley sees it as a means of offsetting growth in income inequality, with access to cheap credit replacing the broken welfare guarantee of social democracy.	经济学家托马斯·帕利（Thomas Palley）将其视作一种抵消收入差距扩大的手段，利用廉价信贷来代替失败的社会民主福利。


So reform requires redistribution of wealth and incomes.	所以改革需要对财富和收入进行重新分配。


Redistributive measures go quite well with stimulus policies, because they may be expected to increase aggregate demand in the short term (owing to lower-income households’ higher propensity to consume) and minimize the economy’s dependence on debt financing in the long term.	重新分配措施与财政刺激政策相互配合得很好，因为人们期待它们能够在短期内提高总需求（低收入家庭具有更高的消费倾向）并在长期将经济对债务融资的依赖最小化。


Initial damage to the confidence of the business class caused by higher taxes on the wealthy would be balanced by the prospect of higher overall consumption.	对富人征收更高的税一开始损害了商业阶层的信心，但这种损害将会被更高的总体消费前景所平衡。


Others argue that we should try to rebalance the economy not just from rich to poor, but also from energy-wasting to energy-saving.	另外一些人认为我们不仅应该尝试调整贫富之间的财富分配，同时也要从高资源耗费型向节能型转变。


The premise of the green economic agenda is that we have reached the ecological limits of our current growth model, and that we will need to find ways of living that reduce demands on non-renewable sources of energy.	绿色经济议程的前提是我们已经达到我们当前经济模型的生态极限，因此我们需要寻找减少使用不可再生能源的生活方式。


So stimulus policies should aim to stimulate not just demand per se; they must focus, instead, on stimulating ecologically-friendly demand.	所以刺激政策的目标应该不仅在于刺激需求本身； 相反，它们应该将精力集中在刺激人们对生态型经济的需求。


For example, greens advocate free municipal transport in major cities.	比如，环保主义者提出在大城市成立市立免费运输。


In general, they argue, we need more care, not more cars, so stimulus money should go to health, education, and the protection of the environment.	总体而言，他们认为我们需要更加关心地球，而不是要更多的车，所以经济刺激支出应该用于保健、教育和环保。


The truth is that any fiscally-driven recovery policy is bound to have reformist implications.	事实上任何由财政推动的复苏政策必然会有改革派的影响。


That is why the austerians are so against it, and why even those who accept the theoretical case for a stimulus insist on implementing it through monetary policy alone.	这就是为什么紧缩主义者如此反对它，也是为什么即使是那些接受财政刺激理论的人也会坚持通过单独的货币政策来实施。


Re-balancing the economy from gas-guzzling to energy-saving – and from private to public consumption – is bound to alter the goal of economic policy.	将经济从高耗能型调整到节能型——从个体到公共消费——必然会改变经济政策的目的。


Maximizing GDP growth will no longer be the top priority; rather, it should be something we might want to call “happiness,” or “well-being,” or the “good life.”	GDP增长最大化将不再会是最重要的； 相反，最重要的应该是我们想要叫做“幸福”、“康乐”或“美好生活”的事物。


The radical case is that the pre-crisis economy crashed not because of preventable mistakes in banking, but because money had become the sole arbiter of value.	而最激进的情况，莫过于危机前的经济崩溃并非源自于那些可以预防的银行业失误，而是钱已经成为价值的唯一衡量标准。


So we should be energetic in seeking recovery, but not in a way that simply reproduces the structural flaws of the past.	因此我们虽然应该积极寻求经济复苏，但不可以再去复制过去结构性缺陷的方式。


As Dani Rodrik has well put it: “If economics were only about profit maximization, it would be just another name for business administration.	正如达·罗德里克（Dani Rodrik）所说：“如果经济只不过是利润最大化，那它也只不过是工商管理而已。


It is a social discipline, and society has other means of cost accounting beside market prices.”	经济是一门社会科学，而社会除了市场价格外，还是存在其它经济核算手段的。 ”


The Incredible Vanishing Asset	不可思议的消逝性资产


ROME – Back in the late 1980’s, I attended a conference on “revenue management,” or the art of pricing airline seats to get maximize yield.	发自罗马——上世纪80时代末的时候，我曾参加过一场名为“收入管理”，实际上关于如何为航班座位定价以获得最大收益的会议。


Too high, and you lost business; too low, and you got less than people were willing to pay.	这玩意堪称一门艺术，须知如果机票定价太高，你就没有生意； 定得太低，你赚到的钱就比人们愿意支付的要少。


Most of the speakers were from the airline industry, which already knew the tricks.	会上大部分演讲者都是航空业的行家，对其中的窍门早就烂熟于心。


Many of the listeners were from the hotel business; they were just learning.	台下大部分听众则来自酒店业，就是来取经的。


As a customer, I felt as if I had penetrated the enemy’s strategy session.	而作为一名消费者，我当时觉得自己好像是混进了竞争对手的战略会议一样。


Over the years, I watched as more and more markets picked up two related concepts: time-based pricing and more efficient use of so-called “vanishing assets” – or capital goods that generate revenue only as they are used.	从那以后，我看到两个相关联的概念在越来越多的市场上流行：基于时间的定价以及对所谓“消逝性资产”的更有效利用——“消逝性资产”指的是那些只有被使用才能产生收益的生产资料。


In the old days, before computers, it was hard to manage complex pricing – or, for that matter, to reach the right customers with specific time-based or location-based offers.	在没有电脑的年代，综合性定价是很难实施的——或者具体来说，很难为基于特定交易时间和地点的报价找到合适的顾客。


Hotels and airlines were a special case: their business is dependent on shared use of capital assets.	而酒店和航空业就是专门的例子：这两个行业的业务都依赖于对资本资产的分摊使用。


Of course, some businesses do use blunt versions of time-of-day or seasonal pricing.	当然，某些行业仍在沿用僵化的按天或按季定价的模式。


We take it for granted that health clubs charge more for memberships that include peak hours.	我们对那些健身俱乐部向涵盖高峰时段的会员资格收费更高的做法已经习以为常。


But, in general, an asset is an asset, and you still hear complaints from people who don’t understand why the guy next to them in an airplane paid a lower price.	而总的来说，虽然资产还是那个资产，但你仍会听到人们抱怨为什么同坐一个航班，坐他们旁边那人怎么花的钱就比自己少。


As real-time information about customers’ needs and vendors’ offers combines with a new concern for efficiency and optimization, there is a widespread shift to make use of the opportunities to personalize offers around location and time.	随着有关顾客需求和卖方报价的实时信息与追求高效和优化的新思维相结合，利用此机会来实现根据时间地点转换的个人化报价也成为了业界广泛使用的手段。


The cost of complexity and targeting has dropped, even as the demand for return on assets has increased.	因此虽然人们对资产收益率的期望有增无减，但花在综合性定价和顾客定位上的成本却下降了。


You can see this in housing rentals, hotels and hospitality, and rental and leasing in general.	你可以在房屋租赁，酒店接待以及其他常规租赁业上印证上述观点。


Zipcar, for example, lets people share cars. (Let’s hope the Chinese discover this before everyone in China buys their own car!)	比如美国最大的网上汽车租赁公司Zipcar可以让人们分享使用同一辆车（但愿在每个中国人都拥有自己的私家车之前，他们能发现这个行业！


And Worktopia is an online marketplace for business meeting rooms.	）。 而Worktopia这个在线市场则专门提供商务会议室服务。


Overall, I see a broad shift from understanding assets as something you have, to looking for a stream of utility.	总的来说，我看到了从把资产理解为你所占有的东西，到把资产运作起来产生效用的显著转变。


To illustrate, here are three start-ups that take the concept to individuals or small businesses; call it peer-to-peer timesharing.	为了阐明清楚，下面是三家把这一概念应用到个人或小型业务上的新公司。


(Yes, I am betting on this trend: I am an investor in one, LendAround, and considering an investment in the other two.)	（没错，我看好这个趋势：我投资了其中的一间叫LendAround的公司，并考虑对其他两间进行投资。 ）


LendAround, in the United States, enables individuals to lend their DVDs to strangers, with the company charging a transaction fee for managing the process.	LendAround是在美国成立的一家公司，主要业务是帮助个人把自己的DVD出租给其他不认识的人，公司在这个过程中收取一定的交易费用。


A DVD is about the smallest, cheapest item for which the logistical costs do not outweigh the value.	一张DVD可以说是最小，最廉价而且物流成本不超出其价值的产品。


This market probably won’t last forever, but I suspect that LendAround ultimately may move on to other items.	尽管这个市场可能不会长久存在，但我想LendAround公司到时会转而出租其他的物品。


For now, DVDs are a convenient, commodity-like object to start with: once you specify which title, there’s no variation in quality (unlike with houses or other goods) or terms and conditions.	就目前来说，作为起步业务，DVD是一个方便而具有商品属性的选择：你只需确定DVD的名称，此外在质量（不像房子或其他物品），使用条款和碟片成色方面都不存在差异。


Next is Xtify, founded by long-time entrepreneur Andrew Weinreich, which is focused on time-of-day pricing targeted at people who are nearby and reachable on their mobile phones.	另外一间企业则叫做Xtify，是老牌企业家安德鲁·韦里奇创立的一间公司，主要业务是帮助企业向顾客提供当日报价，而这种顾客则是在附近活动并可以用手机联系得到的那一群人。


To some extent, Xtify is an echo of Weinreich’s other venture, MeetMoi, a real-time dating site that uses mobile-phone location technology and interest profiles to help users find like-minded strangers.	在某种程度上，Xtify与韦瑞奇的另一间公司MeetMoi堪称遥相呼应。 而MeetMoi则是一家借助移动电话定位技术和兴趣分析来帮用户找到志趣相投者的实时约会网站。


Xtify lets its users – mostly small retailers and service providers – offer real-time pricing or discounts with the added precision of targeting by real-time geo-location.	Xtify让它的用户——主要是小零售商和服务供应商——提供实时报价或折扣，并利用实时地理定位技术来增加顾客投放的精确性。


With Xtify, service vendors can appeal to customers who are conveniently placed in both space and time – so they can come in now for, say, a discount latte.	通过Xtify，服务供应商能够吸引那些在空间和时间上都能够方便到达的顾客——因此这些人能立刻前来购买。


The latte’s ingredients will remain available, but the space in the shop and the work of the people who will prepare the latte are vanishing assets.	比如一杯打折的拿铁咖啡。 虽然拿铁的制作原料随取随有，但商店的空间以及咖啡制作者的劳动却是消逝性资产。


Xtify’s challenge will be to get distribution; users will need to add the app to their cell phone in order to be targeted by anyone from a manicurist to an airport massage booth.	而Xtify要面对的挑战则是软件的推广问题； 用户需要在他们的手机上安装特定的软件，才能让从指甲修饰师到机场按摩师的其他人找到你。


Finally, there is Rezz.it, focused on larger, planned transactions – but, again, transactions that might not have happened because willing sellers would never have found eager buyers.	最后一家公司是Rezz. it，主要从事规模较大而且计划好了的交易——但同样关注于那些一旦有意出售的卖方无法找到有购买欲的买方，就不可能发生的交易。


The basic idea is that people can post items they have to rent, with a broad variety of descriptions and conditions.	公司运营的基本构思是人们可以把自己用有的东西贴到网站上并出租，不管这个东西的描述和状况如何。


You can limit the visibility to people you know.	你也可以设定只对你认识的人可见。


The function may be to make money, or simply to remind your brother-in-law that you need the lawnmower back.	这个功能可以用来赚钱，也可以仅仅用来提醒你姐夫你想要回你的剪草机。


If he forgets, Rezz.it will remind him so that you don’t have to.	如果他忘记了，Rezz. it会提醒他，而无须你亲自动口。


And if you want him to pay, Rezz.it will help you to collect without feeling like a cheapskate.	如果你向他收点使用费，Rezz. it会帮你收，而不至于让你感到自己像个吝啬鬼。


Or you may have a set of under-used dining room chairs.	兴许你有一套不常用的餐厅椅。


You don’t particularly want to lend them out every day, but if someone is willing to pay, say, $200 to rent them for a dinner party, the trouble might be worth it.	虽然你并不特别想每天都将其租出去，但如果有人愿意支付200美元租来开个家宴，那麻烦一下也是可以接受的。


So you can set a high price to offset the inconvenience and make money on the side.	这样的话，你大可以开个高价来补偿给自己造成麻烦，顺便赚点钱。


And you can post different prices for different times: $20,000 to rent my house in London during the Olympics, $10,000 over Christmas, or $1,000 any other time.	此外你还可以为不同的时段开出不同的价格：在奥运期间，租我在伦敦的房子要2万美元，而在圣诞节期间则要1万美元，其他时间只要1千美元就够了。


At the other end of the spectrum, you could rent baby clothes for three months at a time.	在另一个方面，你也可以以三个月为一周期出租自己的婴儿衣服。


In the end, Rezz.it is unlikely to replace current real-estate rental sites, but its software may provide enabling technology for some of them.	总的来说，Rezz. it无意取代现有房产租赁网站，不过它的软件可以为部分网站提供可行的技术。


And it will enable other markets – for everything from lawnmowers to clothing, handbags, and cooking equipment – to become more efficient.	同时，它还能使其他市场——从剪草机到衣服，手袋和厨具——变得更为有效率。


The first impact of monetizing vanishing assets could be to lower demand for such goods, since one lawnmower, for example, can serve many people.	而将消逝性资产货币化所产生的首要影响就是降低了对这些产品的需求，因为一台剪草机可供多个人分享使用了。


But it will also lower the cost of using them. Just imagine if there were no way to use an airplane other than by owning it.	但这也同样降低了这些产品的使用成本，难道非得买一架飞机才能坐飞机么！


By sharing capital equipment, we make it more accessible to more people – and ultimately increase demand.	通过分享这些固定设备，我们使得这些设备为更多人所用——最终还是增加了需求。


The Indian Tortoise and the Chinese Hare	中印之间的龟兔赛跑


“India everywhere” was the theme at this year’s World Economic Forum.	“印度无处不在”是今年世界经济论坛的主题。


In the West, there is so much focus on China that India’s achievements are often acknowledged only as an afterthought.	在西方，对中国的关注如此巨大，以至于把印度的成就仅仅视为事后的想法。


As if to underscore the point that political stability must triumph in the long run, the Indians plastered Swiss buses with the banner: “India: The World’s Fastest Growing Democracy.”	好像是为了突出强调从长远看政治稳定必然获胜，印度人把瑞士的公共汽车上涂满了这样的横幅：“印度：世界上成长最快的民主国家。 ”


The India media blitz was a huge success.	有关印度的媒体轰炸成效显著。


In Davos, speaker after speaker touted the idea that even if China is ahead now, over the longer run, the race between Asia’s two giants is a toss-up.	在达沃斯，发言者们异口同声地说，即使中国现在领先，从长远来看，亚洲两大巨人的竞赛胜负难料。


For a few days at least, India’s emergence as a superpower on par with China was taken as a fait accompli.	至少在几天内，印度崛起成为与中国平起平坐的超级大国被看作了是一个既成事实。


But what is the reality in the race between economies with more than a billion people each?	但是，在这两个人口都超过10亿人的经济体之间的竞赛的事实又是如何呢？


On the surface, China has opened up quite a lead on India.	从表面上看，中国大大领先于印度。


Twenty-five years ago, at the start of the contemporary wave of globalization, national output in India and China was about the same.	25年前，当代全球化浪潮方兴未艾，中印两国的国民产量几乎相等。


Now, by any measure, China is more than twice as rich.	现在，无论用哪种标准衡量，中国都是两倍于印度的富有。


But the real difference is not so much that successful Chinese are doing better than successful Indians.	但是，实际区别并非是成功的中国人做的要比成功的印度人要好。


After all, the Indian elite are world-beaters, as Lakshmi Mittal’s bold $22 billion bid for French steelmaker Arcelor shows.	毕竟，正如印度的米塔尔公司用220亿美元收购法国钢铁企业阿塞洛公司那样，印度的精英们是举世无双的。


No, the real difference – whether we like to admit it or not – is that China’s communist government has succeeded in globalizing a much larger share of its population than India’s democratic government has managed to do.	不，无论我们是否愿意承认，真正的区别是中共政府成功地将其人口中的很大一部分全球化了，远远超过印度民主政府所达到的水平。


Not that China is exactly egalitarian.	并非是中国人人平等。


It is only along the coast, home to roughly one in three Chinese citizens, that most people can be said to have really joined the twenty-first century.	只有在居住者三分之一人口的中国沿海地区，大多数人才称得上加入了二十一世纪。


Much of rural China is still miserable, with 150 million people effectively unemployed and health and education standards often befitting an earlier century.	中国农村大多还很悲惨，1亿5千万人口实际上失业，医疗和教育标准还是上个世纪的水平。


But caste-bound India’s record of exclusion is worse.	但是，实行种姓制度的印度的排斥记录更为严重。


Perhaps only one in five persons are integrated into the global economy.	大约只有五分之一的人口被融入到了全球经济之中。


For every call center employee, there are many more people still eking out a subsistence living on the land.	对于每一个客服中心的雇员而言，还有许多人仍然在农地里艰难度日。


Whereas China probably has about 450 million people in its globalized economy, India has at most 200-250 million.	中国大约有4亿5千万人口处在其全球化的经济之中，印度最多只有2亿到2亿5千万。


It is this difference, more than anything else, that sets the two economies apart.	正是这一差距，而不是其他，才使得这两大经济体拉开了距离。


What can India do to close the gap?	印度怎样做才能消除差距呢？


Its biggest shortcoming is its lack of roads, bridges, ports, and other infrastructure, where the contrast with China is just stunning.	它的最大的缺点是缺乏道路、桥梁、港口以及其他基础设施，与中国的对比是惊人的。


If your products can’t get to the global economy, you cannot conquer it.	如果你无法把你的产品运送到全球经济中，你就无法征服它。


Over the past five years, China has multiplied its highway system five-fold.	在过去五年里，中国把高速公路扩大了五倍。


Its 50,000 kilometers of new roads are built to handle even large aircraft, which is more than one can say about some of the runways at India’s shambolic airports.	它正在修建5万公里甚至可以应付大型飞机的马路，这些马路比印度破旧不堪的机场的跑道还要好。


It is not just a matter of money – India’s central bank is rolling in cash, which it has mainly invested in low-yield foreign treasury bills.	这不仅仅是一个钱的问题。 印度的中央银行现金滚滚而来，主要投资在了低回报的外国政府债券上。


The real problem is that China’s authoritarian system faces little opposition when it decides to bulldoze a shantytown that stands in the way of a new airport.	真正的问题是中国的独裁制度在决定铲平阻挡修建新机场的棚户建筑时不会遇到什么阻力。


India’s government, by contrast, has neither the power nor the inclination to trample over poor people to make rich people richer.	与之相反，印度政府既没有权力也没有愿望来让富人更富。


Unfortunately, without infrastructure, the 800 million-plus Indians who have not yet “made it” don’t have a chance.	不幸的是，没有基础设施，8亿多还没有富起来的印度人就没有机会成功。


India will never be able to create enough jobs in services alone; it must be able to compete in low-end manufacturing areas as well.	印度永远无法在服务领域制造足够多的就业机会。 它必须也在低端的制造业领域竞争。


Without better infrastructure, the majority of India’s citizens will remain frozen out of globalization.	没有比较好的基础设施，印度人中的大多数将被冰冻在全球化之外。


So, is the idea that India’s economy could overtake China’s hopeless romanticism?	这样来说，印度经济赶超中国是否成为毫无希望的浪漫主义呢？


Not necessarily, if only because the areas where India excels, notably services, have far higher potential margins than manufacturing.	不尽如此，如果仅仅是在印度领先的领域，主要是服务业，潜在的利润要高于制造业。


Here, the Chinese, hampered by a vastly inferior legal system, will not be able to compete easily.	在这一方面，由于受到大为低下的法律制度的阻碍，中国无法轻而易举地竞争。


Western companies are far more inclined to trust Indian firms with sensitive financial information or patents than they are in the case of China.	西方公司更为愿意把敏感的财务信息或者专利交付给印度公司而不是中国公司。


Foreign companies know that if they outsource any high-tech process to China, they might as well publish their blueprints on the Internet.	外国公司知道，如果它们把任何高科技流程外包给中国，就等于在互联网上公布其蓝图。


India also has a much better developed financial system than China, an advantage that will be increasingly important as the two countries develop.	印度还具有比中国远远更为发达的金融体系，这一优势在两国发展过程中将日益重要。


Command and control financing (“directed lending,” as economists call it) works well when it comes to building bridges; it is a lot less effective when it comes to choosing what companies deserve to survive.	命令和控制性的贷款资助（也被经济学家称为“指令性贷款”）在修建桥梁的时候还可以奏效。 但是在选择哪些公司值得存活的时候，它就相形见绌了。


The challenge for the Indians, and, indeed, for other emerging markets like Brazil, Russia, and Mexico, is that they need to find ways to broaden the successful sectors of their economies without strangling them.	对于印度以及其他新兴市场，例如巴西、俄罗斯以及墨西哥而言的挑战是，它们需要找到途径在不勒死其经济体中成功的部门的情况下将其扩大。


If India is to ever catch up with China, it must globalize more of its citizens, through better provision of health, education and infrastructure.	如果印度想赶上中国，它就必须通过提供更好的医疗、教育以及基础设施来将其人口中的更多的人全球化。


Only then will we truly start seeing “India everywhere.”	只有在那时，我们才可以真正开始看见“印度无处不在”。


The India Option	选择印度


French President Jacques Chirac’s visit to India this month to complete the sale of 6 attack submarines to India will confirm once more India’s emergence as an economic and diplomatic powerhouse.	法国总统希拉克本月晚些时候访问印度并签署向印度出售六架攻击潜艇的协议。 这将再一次确认印度正在崛起成为经济和外交大国。


The “strategic partnership” that both America and the European Union have at times sought with China looks both more plausible and more desirable with democratic India.	美国和欧盟在某些时候寻求同中国建立的“战略伙伴关系”看起来与民主的印度更为可行和可取。


With a Muslim President, a Sikh Prime Minister, a Hindu Foreign Minister, and a foreign-born Christian President of its ruling Congress party, India is as remarkable a success story as the twenty-year boom that China’s Communist Party has delivered.	印度总统是穆斯林，总理是锡客人，外长是印度教徒，而其执政的国大党主席则是出生在国外的基督徒。 正如中共在过去二十年中所做的一样，印度的成功毫不逊色。


Indeed, since 1991, when a balance-of-payments crisis loomed, India has been shedding its socialist legacies and posting 7.5% average annual GDP growth – only marginally slower than China.	实际上，从1991年国际收支平衡危机爆发以来，印度一直在摈弃其社会主义遗产而且其年度经济增长率达到7. 5％，只比中国略低。


India has opened up its economy to world trade and started to privatize many of its state-owned industries (albeit often too slowly).	印度已经向世界贸易开放其经济，并且开始对其许多的国营产业实行私有化（尽管经常很慢）。


High-tech businesses have helped enormously in this effort by showing that India has more to gain than lose from competing in the global marketplace.	在这一努力中，高科技产业通过表明在全球市场中竞争利大于弊而功不可抹。


Perhaps for the first time since inventing the zero, India has a hot product to sell – and, this time, it can keep the profits for itself.	也许自发明数字以来，印度第一次有了一个热销产品，而且这一次它可以保留其利润。


Moreover, a global bidding war has broken out for Indian brains.	全球都对印度人才趋之若鹜。


The EU is keen to link into India’s boom.	欧盟很愿意参与到印度的繁荣当中。


The first EU Galileo satellite – intended as an alternative to America’s GPS system – was launched in late December with India as a full partner.	欧盟的伽利略卫星计划被计划用来替代美国全球定位系统。 去年12月，其首颗卫星升空，印度就是一个全面伙伴。


Also in December, India became the latest nation to join the EU in the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) team, which aims to produce electricity using nuclear fusion, as happens in the sun.	同样在12月，印度成为国际热核实验反应堆队伍中最新加入欧盟的国家。 该计划的目的是像太阳一样利用核聚变来产生电力。


For obvious historical reasons, the United Kingdom has led the way in building EU links with India.	出于明显的历史原因，英国在欧盟与印度建立关系中一马当先。


Indian businesses naturally chose Britain over other locations in Europe for reasons of language and cultural ties, but even that is changing, as Indian investments spread across the Continent.	由于语言和文化联系的原因，印度商界自然地在欧洲其他地方中优先选择英国。 但是随着印度投资遍布欧洲大陆各地，就是这一情况也在变化。


In a sense, India’s democracy sometimes hinders immediate growth.	从某种意义上说，印度的民主有时候阻挡快速增长。


Unlike in China, India’s government cannot simply ride roughshod over local interests by, say, leveling a village to build a roadway or a dam.	不像在中国那样，印度政府根本不可能横行霸道、鱼肉乡里，把一个村庄铲平来修建道路或者水坝。


But this is a sacrifice that India seems more than willing to make to safeguard its freedoms.	但是，印度看起来更愿意作出这样的牺牲从而维护自由。


That sacrifice is particularly visible in today’s Congress-led Indian government, which relies on support from the Left Front Communist Party.	这一牺牲在今天国大党领导的印度政府中尤为显著。 该政府依赖于左翼阵线共产党的支持。


India’s communists (unlike China’s) remain ideologically driven, and the Left Front is resisting privatization of state assets, lifting caps on foreign direct investment, and creating a more flexible labor market.	印度的共产主义者（不像中国的那样）仍然受到意识形态的驱动，而左翼阵线还在抵制将国家资产私有化、提高外国直接投资的上限以及建立更为灵活的劳工市场。


Yet the essential reforms, which date back to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s time as finance minister in 1991 and include liberalization of external trade and dismantling the “license raj,” remain on track.	印度的基本改革发端于现总理辛格1991年任财政部长时期，包括实行外贸自由化以及结束“许可证统治”。 这些改革依旧在进行中。


It is clearly in India’s interests to join forces with the EU in negotiations within the World Trade Organization to lower protectionist barriers, particularly in services such as accounting, law, and finance, as this will free up trade and generate greater investment flows.	加入欧盟并与之一道在世界贸易组织的降低保护主义壁垒，特别是在会计、法律以及金融等服务领域的谈判显然符合印度的利益，因为这会将贸易自由化并且产生更大的投资。


India already is being treated with growing respect in global economic councils.	在全球经济领域中，印度受到的尊重日益增加。


When “new economy” issues such as e-commerce come up at the WTO, India, the EU and the United States often find themselves on the same side.	当世贸组织讨论电子商务等“新经济”问题时，印度、欧盟以及美国时常持相同立场。


On “old economy” issues, ideological clashes have given way to tough-minded bargaining, as has happened in the Doha round of trade talks.	正如在多哈回合贸易谈判中所发生的一样，在有关“旧经济”问题上，意识形态的冲突让位于激烈的讨价还价。


India supports a Millennium Round of trade talks, but rejects any linkage of trade to labor standards.	印度支持千年回合贸易谈判，但是拒绝将贸易与劳工标准挂钩。


The Indians want faster liberalization of the textile and clothing trades; the EU wants better enforcement of intellectual- property protection.	印度想要在纺织品和服装贸易中更快的自由化； 而欧盟则想更好地实施知识产权保护。


Indeed, India is keen to share intelligence with the EU in the fight against international terrorism.	实际上，印度愿意在反对国际恐怖主义的斗争中同欧盟分享情报。


The main problem in pushing this strategic partnership ahead lies mostly within the EU, where there is a split between protectionists and advocates of free trade.	推动这一战略伙伴关系中的问题主要存在于欧盟。 欧盟的贸易保护主义与自由贸易鼓动者存有分歧。


In particular the EU must resist calls for higher tariffs from southern European textile manufacturers, as these businesses have failed to restructure, despite ample warnings over the last decade to do so.	特别是，欧盟必须抵制南欧纺织品厂商提高关税的呼吁。 尽管过去十年里警告不断，这些厂商并没有实行重组。


Indeed, the EU should regard growth in India not as a competitive threat but as a golden opportunity that will benefit everyone.	确实，欧盟应当把印度的经济增长视为将会造福于每个人的黄金机会，而不是一个竞争性的威胁。


The global economy is not a zero-sum game, and the challenge for European politicians will be to explain this to EU members, particularly countries like France that are resistant to globalization and keen on building a “Fortress Europe.”	全球经济并非一个零和游戏，欧盟政治家们的挑战是向欧盟成员，特别是像法国那样拒绝全球化以及想要建立“城堡欧洲”的国家解释这一道理。


Chirac’s visit provides a perfect moment for India to make it clear that strategic partnerships and protectionism (as seems to be occurring in the French effort to block Mittal’s bid for the Belgian-French steel group Arcelor.) don’t mix.	希拉克的访问为印度表明战略伙伴关系与保护主义（法国力图阻拦米塔尔公司收购法国和比利时合营的阿塞洛钢铁集团似乎就表现出这一点）并不相混提供了一个极佳的机会。


The second point of convergence between Indian and Western interests is one that will probably get no public mention during Chirac’s visit: India can perhaps serve as a counterweight to China.	印度与西方之间的第二个重合点大概不会在希拉克访问期间公诸于众。 那就是，印度说不定可以成为中国的制衡。


The world is beginning to notice that India has nearly the same number of people as China, plus a more benign system of government and no designs on its neighbors.	世界正在开始注意到印度的人口与中国几乎一样多，而政府制度良好，对邻国没有觊觎。


China hawks in both India and the West dream that “strategic partnership” will link the world’s great democracies.	在印度和西方有关“战略伙伴关系”将会联接世界民主大国的梦想中，中国鼓吹强硬路线。


That will not happen soon.	这不会马上就发生。


To be sure, India is as wary of China as some in Europe and America are.	的确，印度就如同欧���和美国的某些人一样对中国抱有戒心。


After all, China supplied much of Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons technology and beat India in a 1962 war; their borders remain disputed in places.	毕竟，巴基斯坦的核武器技术主要由中国提供，而且中国在1962年的战争中击败了印度。 中印边界还存有争议。


Yet neither India nor the EU wants their friendship to be part of an anti-China axis.	但是，印度和欧盟都不想让它们之间的友谊成为反华轴心的一部分。


Indeed, India has mostly succeeded in ending the chill that set in after 1998, when it declared China to be the main target of its nuclear weapons.	1998年印度宣布，中国是其核武器的主要打击目标。 实际上，印度已经成功地结束了这一冷淡关系。


Nonetheless, Europe, India, and America are all aware that today’s friendship could become tomorrow's alliance if China turns hostile.	但是，欧洲、印度以及美国都清楚，如果中国变得敌意，今天的友谊就会成为明天的联盟。


The Indispensable UN	联合国不可或缺


The United Nations’ sixtieth anniversary summit in September reflected its strengths and importance in the many areas in which the international community must work together.	九月举行的联合国第六十届首脑高峰会议反映了联合国在诸多领域中的力量和重要性。 国际社会必须在这些领域内通力协作。


Unfortunately, the summit also exposed the UN’s weaknesses and limitations.	不幸的是，这次高峰会议也暴露了联合国的弱点和局限性。


Founded at the end of World War II to prevent another major disaster of that kind, the UN has now vastly expanded its mandate beyond peacekeeping, as important as that is.  For instance, the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), adopted at the UN Millennium summit five years ago, proclaimed the international community’s resolve to reduce poverty in all of its manifestations and set concrete goals to be achieved by 2015.	目前，联合国的职责已大大超出维护和平的范畴，而这些新职责与维和同样重要。 例如，五年前在联合国千年首脑会议上通过的千年发展目标宣告了国际社会决心降低各种形式的贫困，并确定了在2015年前所要实现的明确目标。


Reaching political consensus on such complex issues is never easy, given the diversity of interests that must be addressed.	鉴于必须调和各种利益，在这些复杂的问题上达成政治上一致绝非易事。


Success requires diplomacy and patience, and the UN’s latest summit continued the march forward in the creation of a community of nations responsible for the well being of all.	成功需要外交斡旋和耐心，联合国本次峰会朝着建立担负人类福祉的国际社会的方向继续前进。


To be sure, the attempt by America’s new UN ambassador, John Bolton, to introduce hundreds of last-minute changes to the summit’s concluding declaration doomed the agreement – perhaps deliberately – to being less comprehensive and forceful than had been hoped.	无可否认，美国新任驻联合国大使约翰·博尔顿试图在最后时刻将数以百计的修改加入首脑会议宣言，使得该宣言不如先前期望的全面有力。 他的企图可能是有意的。


Indeed, Bolton even wanted to eliminate any reference to the MDG.	事实上，博尔顿甚至想要删除提及千年发展目标的地方。


Nevertheless, even the United States had to give way in the end to this moral imperative.	但是，即使美国最终也不得不向这一道义需要让步。


The summit’s declaration also enunciated, in refined diplomatic language, new rights and obligations concerning international intervention in a country’s internal matters, as in Darfur.	高峰会议宣言还用修饰的外交语言阐述了国际社会新的干预他国内部事务的权利和义务，正如在苏丹达尔福尔所为一样。


We are, it seems, at last becoming a world in which each of us is our brother’s keeper.	我们看似最终正在成为一个相互关照的世界。


Some have suggested that the Iraq war proved the UN’s irrelevance.	有人说伊拉克战争证明联合国无足轻重。


On the contrary, I believe that the Iraq debacle underscores the value of the UN, and the need to strengthen it further.	我相信，恰恰相反，伊拉克灾难突出了联合国的价值以及进一步加强联合国的需要。


Let’s not forget that, within the limits of its powers, the UN worked.	不要忘记，联合国在其职权范围内发挥了作用。


It was asked to judge whether there was an imminent threat to world peace requiring pre-emptive military action.	它被要求判定是否存在威胁世界和平、从而要求采取先发制人的军事行动的急迫的威胁。


After reviewing the evidence, it concluded that the case for going to war had not been made, while the risk of turmoil – about which most experts in the region warned – almost certainly weighed on the deliberations.	联合国审查证据后认为并没有理由开战，而该地区大多数专家所警告的混乱的危险几乎肯定地影响了有关的审议。


Since then, evidence has mounted not only that there were no weapons of mass destruction, but that the American and British governments provided deceptive, distorted, and misleading information.	自此以后，证据表明，不仅伊拉克没有大规模杀伤性武器，而且，美国和英国政府提供了欺骗性的、扭曲的以及误导的信息。


Similarly, the evidence is overwhelming that there was little if any link between Iraq and Al-Qaeda – at least before the war.	同时，有充分的证据表明，至少在战争之前，伊拉克和盖达组织之间并没有联系。


In other words, deliberative democracy – perhaps our most important safeguard against headstrong and reckless action – worked at the UN, but not in the US.	换言之，审议式民主可能是我们对付刚愎自用、不计后果的行动的最重要的防范措施。 它在联合国、而不是美国发挥了作用。


Unfortunately, the UN could not prevent the US and other countries from taking actions that almost surely contravene international law.	不幸的是，联合国却无力阻止美国和其他国家采取几乎肯定违反国际法的行动。


The story since then is well known.	伊拉克战争以来的事情众所周知。


When weapons of mass destruction were not found, the US and its small (and dwindling) “coalition of the willing” conjured up a new rationale – the struggle for democracy.	当大规模杀伤性武器并没有发现时，美国和其微小（而且不断萎缩的）“自愿联盟”编造了新的理由，即为民主而战。


But if that were the objective, clearly a long list of countries should have been drawn up, and it is hardly certain that Iraq would have come out on top.	但是，如果那是目的的话，应该有一个长长的国家名单，而伊拉克几乎很难位居首位。


Replacing repressive dictatorships would, in fact, represent a vast expansion of the UN’s mandate, one that I suspect the US would not support.	更换压制人民的独裁者将会在事实上大为扩大联合国的职责范围。 我怀疑美国会对此予以支持。


More to the point, it did not bode well for a supposedly democratizing project to reject democratic processes at the UN.	更为重要的是，一个据称为促进民主的工程却在联合国拒绝民主进程。 这并非吉兆。


The US had made it clear that it would abide by only one outcome at the UN – a principle under which no democratic body can operate, for to insist that a decision must accord with the wishes of one member is dictatorship.  Subsequent events have shown how difficult it is – even for the strongest country in the world – to impose a stable democratic regime.	坚持联合国的决定必须符合某一成员国的愿望是专制主义行为，没有一个民主机构可以在这一原则下运作。 随后的事件表明，即使是全球最强大的国家也很难硬性建立一个稳定的民主政权。


Iraq thus showed both the strength and the limitations of the UN.	如此，伊拉克战争显示出联合国的力量和局限性。


Inevitably, its major source of strength is moral suasion.	道义劝导不可避免地是联合国的主要力量源泉。


Even most Americans were reluctant to enter Iraq without the UN’s blessing.	没有联合国的授权，即使是大多数美国人也不愿进入伊拉克。


The democratic deliberative process worked, and it yielded the right answer.	民主化的讨论进程是奏效的，而且也产生了正确的答案。


This should enhance confidence in the UN.	这应当提升对联合国的信任。


But the UN needs to be strengthened, by, for example, funding a permanent peacekeeping force.	但是，联合国需要得到加强。 例如，可以通过资助一支永久性维和部队来做到这一点。


Too often, UN peacekeeping missions require passing the hat among the advanced industrial countries, giving them virtual veto power over when, where, and how the UN acts.	在太多的情形下，联合国维和使命有赖于在发达的工业化国家中筹集资金，从而给了它们在联合国何时、何地以及如何作为上事实上的否决权。


At the same time, a strengthened economic and social security council would enable the UN to shape more effectively debates about reforming the global economic and financial system.	同时，加强经济和社会安全委员会将会使得联合国更为有效地开展有关改革全球经济和金融体系的讨论。


Today, by contrast, such debates are too often centered at the IMF, where the financial interests of the advanced industrial countries predominate.	与之相比，如今，此类讨论大多集中在国际货币基金组织，而发达的工业化国家的财政金融利益在该组织中独具鳌头。


These reforms will eventually come.	这些改革最终将会到来。


Globalization has meant closer international integration, and that in turn has meant a greater need for collective action.	全球化意味着更为紧密的国际融合，而更为紧密的国际融合意味着更加需要集体行动。


The UN is the international institution created for that purpose, and as the world changes, the UN must change with it.	联合国就是这样的一个应运而生的国际组织。 而且，联合国也必须随着世界的变化而变化。


But meaningful reform will almost surely have to await an American administration that is committed to global democracy in deed as well as rhetoric.	但是，只有等到美国当局不仅在辞令上，而且在行动上都致力于全球民主，有意义的改革才能够到来。


The Inequality Trap	不平等性陷阱


WASHINGTON, DC – As evidence mounts that income inequality is increasing in many parts of the world, the problem has received growing attention from academics and policymakers.	华盛顿—越来越多的证据表明，不平等性正在世界诸多国家加剧，这一问题也随之引起了学者和政客的越来越多的关注。


In the United States, for example, the income share of the top 1% of the population has more than doubled since the late 1970’s, from about 8% of annual GDP to more than 20% recently, a level not reached since the 1920’s.	比如，在美国，最顶端的1%人口占收入的比例比20世纪70年代末翻了一番多，从年GDP的8%上升为目前的20%以上，上一次达到如此程度还是在20世纪20年代。


While there are ethical and social reasons to worry about inequality, they do not have much to do with macroeconomic policy per se.	不平等性引起了人们关于道德和社会的担忧，但实际上，这些问题与宏观经济政策本身关系不大。


But such a link was seen in the early part of the twentieth century: capitalism, some argued, tends to generate chronic weakness in effective demand due to growing concentration of income, leading to a “savings glut,” because the very rich save a lot.	不过，在20世纪早期，人们发现了这样的联系：有人指出，随着收入的逐渐集中，资本主义会导致有效需求的慢性疲软，导致“储蓄过剩”，因为富人大量囤积储蓄。


This would spur “trade wars” as countries tried to find more demand abroad.	者会促使国家转而寻求外部需求，从而引发“贸易战”。


From the late 1930’s onward, however, this argument faded as the market economies of the West grew rapidly in the post-World War II period and income distributions became more equal.	但是，自20世纪30年代末以来，随着西方市场经济在二战结束后的快速增长和收入分配变得越来越公正，这一观点也逐渐销声匿迹了。


While there was a business cycle, no perceptible tendency toward chronic demand weakness appeared.	虽然存在商业周期，但从未出现过需求的慢性疲软趋势。


Short-term interest rates, most macroeconomists would say, could always be set low enough to generate reasonable rates of employment and demand.	大部分宏观经济学家会说，短期利率总是可以降至足够的水平，刺激合理的就业率和需求。


Now, however, with inequality on the rise once more, arguments linking income concentration to macroeconomic problems have returned.	然而，如今，随着不平等性再一次恶化，将收入集中和宏观经济问题联系起来的观点也死灰复燃了。


The University of Chicago’s Raghuram Rajan, a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, tells a plausible story in his recent award-winning book Fault Lines about the connection between income inequality and the financial crisis of 2008.	前IMF首席经济学家、芝加哥大学的拉古兰·拉贾（Raghuram Rajan）在其获奖近著《断层线》（Fault Lines）中令人信服描述了收入不平等性和2008年金融危机之间的关系。


Rajan argues that huge income concentration at the top in the US led to policies aimed at encouraging unsustainable borrowing by lower- and middle-income groups, through subsidies and loan guarantees in the housing sector and loose monetary policy.	拉贾指出，收入大量向顶端人群集中致使美国采取了鼓励中低收入群体进行不可持续借贷行为的政策，具体办法是通过对房地产部门的补贴和贷款担保以及宽松的货币政策。


There was also an explosion of credit-card debt.	此外，信用卡债务也出现了井喷。


These groups protected the growth in consumption to which they had become accustomed by going more deeply into debt.	中低收入群体通过更深地负债维持了早已习惯的消费增长模式。


Indirectly, the very rich, some of them outside the US, lent to the other income groups, with the financial sector intermediating in aggressive ways.	巨富阶层（其中一些并非美国人）间接借钱给其他收入群体，金融部门则在其中开足马力充当中介。


This unsustainable process came to a crashing halt in 2008.	这一不可持续过程在2008年戛然而止。


Joseph Stiglitz in his book Freefall, and Robert Reich in his Aftershock, have told similar stories, while the economists Michael Kumhof and Romain Ranciere have devised a formal mathematical version of the possible link between income concentration and financial crisis.	约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨（Joseph Stiglitz）的《自由坠落》（Freefall）和罗伯特·里奇（Robert Reich）的《余震》（Aftershock）也描述了相同的观点，而经济学家迈克尔·昆霍夫（Michael Kumhof）和罗曼·兰塞勒（Romain Ranciere）为收入集中和金融危机之间的可能联系提供了数学模型。


While the underlying models differ, the Keynesian versions emphasize that if the super-rich save a lot, ever-increasing income concentration can be expected to lead to a chronic excess of planned savings over investment.	尽管基本模型与此不同，但凯恩斯主义者也强调，如果巨富阶层大量储蓄，那么可以预期，不断增加的收入集中度将导致计划储蓄长期超过投资。


Macroeconomic policy can try to compensate through deficit spending and very low interest rates.	宏观经济政策可以通过赤字支出和极低利率来抵消这一点。


Or an undervalued exchange rate can help to export the lack of domestic demand.	或者，也可以通过汇率贬值提振弥补国内需求的不足。


But if the share of the highest income groups keeps rising, the problem will remain chronic.	但如果最高收入群体所占比重持续增加，这一问题将成为慢性问题。


And, at some point, when public debt has become too large to allow continued deficit spending, or when interest rates are close to their zero lower bound, the system runs out of solutions.	迟早——当公债数量太大因而无法继续赤字支出政策，或当利率已降至近零区间时——系统将不再能够解决这一问题。


This story has a counterintuitive dimension.	这一问题还有一个反直觉的地方。


Is it not the case that the problem in the US has been too little savings, rather than too much?	美国的问题并不在于储蓄太少，而是在于储蓄太多？


Doesn’t the country’s persistent current-account deficit reflect excessive consumption, rather than weak effective demand?	该国持久的经常项目赤字所反映的并不是消费过度，而是有效需求不足？


The recent work by Rajan, Stiglitz, Kumhof and Ranciere, and others explains the apparent paradox: those at the very top financed the demand of everyone else, which enabled both high employment levels and large current-account deficits.	拉贾、斯蒂格利茨、昆霍夫和兰塞勒以及其他人最新的成果解释了这一显而易见的悖论：最顶层群体为其他人的需求提供融资，这便是高就业水平和巨额经常项目赤字得以并存的原因。


When the crash came in 2008, massive fiscal and monetary expansion prevented US consumption from collapsing.	当2008年危机爆发时，大规模财政和货币扩张防止了美国消费出现崩溃。


But did it cure the underlying problem?	但这真的解决了基本问题吗？


Although the dynamics leading to increased income concentration have not changed, it is no longer easy to borrow, and in that sense another boom-and-bust cycle is unlikely.	尽管导致收入不断集中的链条并没有改变，但现在借钱越来越困难了，因此，再出现一次枯荣循环的可能性很低。


But that raises another difficulty.	但这又引发了另一个难题。


When asked why they do not invest more, most firms cite insufficient demand.	在被问及为何不再投资时，大部分企业的回答是需求不足。


But how can domestic demand be strong if income continues to flow to the top?	但只要收入不断地流向最顶层，国内需求又如何能够得到提振呢？


Consumption demand for luxury goods is unlikely to solve the problem.	奢侈品消费需求是不能解决问题的。


Moreover, interest rates cannot become negative in nominal terms, and rising public debt may increasingly disable fiscal policy.	此外，名义利率也不可能为负，同时不断增加的公债水平也在日益束缚财政政策。


So, if the dynamics fueling income concentration cannot be reversed, the super-rich save a large fraction of their income, luxury goods cannot fuel sufficient demand, lower-income groups can no longer borrow, fiscal and monetary policies have reached their limits, and unemployment cannot be exported, an economy may become stuck.	因此，如果助长收入集中的链条得不到逆转，巨富阶层继续把很大一部分收入储蓄起来，奢侈品无法提振充足的需求，低收入群体无法再借到钱，财政和货币政策已经走到了极限，失业又无法转嫁给外国，那么经济就会陷入停滞。


The early 2012 upturn in US economic activity still owes a lot to extraordinarily expansionary monetary policy and unsustainable fiscal deficits.	美国经济活动在2012年的好转仍要归功于反常宽松的货币政策和不可持续的财政赤字。


If income concentration could be reduced as the budget deficit was reduced, demand could be financed by sustainable, broad-based private incomes.	如果哦收入不平等性能得到减弱，同时预算赤字能有所削减，需求就可以通过可持续的、基础更广的私人收入得到融资。


Public debt could be reduced without fear of recession, because private demand would be stronger.	公债水平可以在不引起衰退担忧的情况下得到削减，因为私人需求能够得到提振。


Investment would increase as demand prospects improved.	投资也会随着需求前景的改善而增加。


This line of reasoning is particularly relevant to the US, given the extent of income concentration and the fiscal challenges that lie ahead.	这条逻辑链对美国尤其适用，这是由该国收入集中度和所面临的未来财政挑战决定的。


But the broad trend toward larger income shares at the top is global, and the difficulties that it may create for macroeconomic policy should no longer be ignored.	但收入比重向最顶端人群集中是一个全球性的大趋势，我们不能继续忽视其可能带来的宏观经济政策难题了。


Regime Change in China?	中国的政权变更？


CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA – One question that should have been asked about the Chinese Communist Party’s just-completed leadership transition is whether the entire elaborately choreographed exercise was akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.	加利福尼亚州克莱蒙特——针对中国共产党刚刚完成的领导层过渡，该问的问题是整个精心设计的动作是否类似于泰坦尼克号躺椅的重新分配。


The installation of a new leadership may matter little if the end of CCP rule is both foreseeable and highly probable.	在中共统治结束可以预见并且极有可能的情况下，新领导班子的上任也许没有什么意义。


Many observers would find this assertion shocking.	很多观察家可能认为这种说法耸人听闻。


The CCP, they insist, has proved its resilience since the Tiananmen crisis in 1989 and the collapse of Soviet communism in 1991.	他们坚称中共从1989年的天安门危机和1991年苏共垮台后即证明了自身超强的适应力。


Why should predictions of the collapse of CCP rule be taken seriously now?	为什么预测中共统治崩溃的说法现在应当受到重视？


While the future of China is unpredictable, the durability of its post-totalitarian regime can be estimated with some confidence.	尽管中国的未来不可预测，但在一定程度上却可以准确预测其后极权主义政权的寿命。


China may be unique in many ways, but its one-party rule is hardly exceptional.	中国在很多方面都非常独特，但它的一党专治政权却没有什么稀奇之处。


Indeed, its political order suffers from the same self-destructive dynamics that have sent countless autocratic regimes to their graves.	其实中国的政治秩序也逃脱不了已经将无数独裁政权送入坟墓的一模一样的自我毁灭力。


Among many of the systemic flaws of autocracy, degeneration at the top, epitomized by ever-weaker leaders, is progressive and incurable.	在专制制度的众多系统性缺陷中，以领导者越来越弱为表象的最高领导层退化是一个无法避免的渐进过程。


The exclusive and closed nature of autocracy bars many talented individuals from rising to senior government positions, owing to a pattern of succession that rewards political loyalty over capabilities.	因为看重政治忠诚度高于能力的继任模式，排外封闭的专制制度阻碍了众多才华横溢的人被提拔到高级领导岗位。


In fact, savvy autocratic rulers favor less talented successors, because they are easier to groom and control on their way to power.	事实上，精明的独裁统治者青睐天赋平庸的继任者，因为培养控制这样的人接掌政权相对容易。


Leadership degeneration accelerates as the autocratic regime ages and grows more bureaucratic.	专制政权官僚化及老化加速了领导层的退化。


As individuals in such regimes ascend the hierarchy, patronage and risk-aversion become the most critical factors in determining their chances for promotion.	个人要想在这样的政权中更进一步，寻求庇护和规避风险成为决定他们升迁机会的关键因素。


Consequently, such regimes grow increasingly sclerotic as they select leaders with stellar resumes but mediocre records.	结果，这样的政权因为挑选履历光鲜但行为平庸的领导人而变得愈加僵化。


The most lethal strain of leadership degeneration is escalating predation among the ruling elites.  The most visible symptom is corruption, but the cause is intrinsic to autocratic rule.	领导层退化最致命的问题是统治精英阶层越来越疯狂的掠夺。 最明显的症状是腐败，但专制统治才是其内在的原因。


Typically, first-generation revolutionaries have a strong emotional and ideological attachment to certain ideals, however misguided they may be.	通常第一代革命者无论受到何种误导，都对某种理想和意识形态投入了强烈的感情。


But the post-revolutionary elites are ideologically cynical and opportunistic.	而后革命精英们却信奉玩世不恭和机会主义。


They view their work for the regime merely as a form of investment.	在他们看来为政府工作不过是某种形式的投资。


And, like investors, they seek ever-higher returns.	不过像其他投资者一样，他们要求更高的回报。


As each preceding generation of rulers cashes in its illicit gains from holding power, the successors are motivated by both the desire to loot even more and the fear that there may not be much left by the time they get their turn at the trough.	每当上一代统治者兑现掌权的非法收益，都会引发继任者更为强烈的掠夺欲望，他们害怕轮到自己掌权时利益已经被瓜分殆尽。


This is the underlying dynamic driving corruption in China today.	这就是今天推动中国腐败的根本动力。


In fact, the consequences of leadership degeneration are easy to see: faltering economic dynamism and growth, rising social tensions, and loss of government credibility.	其实，领导层退化的后果显而易见：摇摇欲坠的经济活力和经纪增长、日益恶化的社会紧张局势和政府公信力的丧失。


The puzzle is why neither the compelling self-destructive logic of autocratic rule nor the mounting evidence of deteriorating regime performance in China has persuaded even some of the most knowledgeable observers that the end of CCP rule is now a distinct possibility.	奇怪的是无论是令人信服的自我毁灭逻辑还是中国政权表现日趋恶化的证据都没有让哪怕某些最博学的观察家认识到已经切实存在结束中共统治的可能性。


An obvious explanation is the power of conventional thinking.	常规思维的力量恐怕是最明显的解释。


Long-ruling regimes – think of the Soviet Communist Party, Indonesia’s Suharto, and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak – are typically considered invulnerable, even just before they collapse.	苏联共产党、印尼苏哈托和埃及的胡斯尼·穆巴拉克等长期执政政权往往直到崩溃前夜仍被外界视为无懈可击。


But those who believe that the CCP can defy both the internal degenerative dynamics of autocracy and the historical record of failed one-party regimes might benefit from reading Leon Trotsky, who knew something about revolutions.	但那些相信中共可以无视专制政权内部退化动力和一党专政必将失败的历史记录的人可能受益于阅读托洛茨基的著作，托洛茨基在某种程度上理解革命的规律。


Dictatorships are regarded as indestructible before they fall, Trotsky reminds us, but their demise is viewed as inevitable once they are toppled.	托洛茨基提醒我们独裁政权往往在最终倒台前仍被视为坚不可摧，不过一旦推翻后其崩溃却被视为无可避免的结局。


Another explanation is fear of contemplating the unknown.	另一种解释是未知所带来的恐惧。


CCP rule may not last, but the alternative – state failure and civil chaos – could be far worse than the status quo.	中共的统治可能不会持久，但取而代之的国家失灵和民间混乱或许比现状更有破坏力。


But the record of democratic transitions since 1974 suggests that regime change in China is unlikely to be calamitous.	但1974年来中国民主过渡的记录表明中国的政权更迭不太可能出现灾难性的后果。


The decisive factor will be whether it is initiated and managed by the ruling elites, as in Taiwan, Mexico, Brazil, and Spain.	政权变更是否像台湾、墨西哥、巴西和西班牙那样由执政精英发起和控制将成为其中的决定因素。


Managed transitions produce more stable democracies.	处于控制下的过渡将产生更为稳定的民主政体。


Should such a process occur in China, the CCP could transform itself into a major political party competing with others for power, as formerly autocratic parties have done in Mexico and Taiwan.	如果这样的进程发生在中国，中国共产党可以转型为与他人竞争权力的一个主要政党，这与此前墨西哥和台湾专制政党的作为非常相似。


Even a disorderly regime transition, however traumatic and chaotic in the short term, could yield a system that, on balance, is an improvement over a stagnant, repressive, and corrupt autocracy.	退一万步讲，无论无序的政权过渡在短期内造成何种创伤和混乱，但由此产生的制度总体而言都要优于停滞、镇压和腐败的专制统治。


Indonesia’s new democracy may be imperfect, but has thrived despite its initial poor prospects.	印尼的新兴民主可能并不完美，但尽管最初不被看好却依然经历了蓬勃的发展。


Likewise, Vladimir Putin’s Russia, a deeply flawed hybrid autocracy, is nonetheless a far better place to live than the Soviet Union was.	同样，弗拉基米��·普京领导下的俄罗斯是一个有严重缺陷的混合独裁政权，但生活在那里仍然远强过生活在苏联。


If there is one lesson to be learned from the remarkable history of the democratic transitions of the past 38 years, it is that when elites and the public reject authoritarian rule, they do their best to make the new system work.	如果说过去38年民主过渡的辉煌历史给我们留下了什么经验，那就是当精英和公众反抗独裁统治，他们就会竭尽所能建设新的体系。


Should such a transition occur in China, there is no reason to think that the process and the outcome will be fundamentally different.	如果这样一种转变发生在中国，人们没有理由认为过程和结果会有什么根本的差别。


The Inevitable Re-Birth of European Integration	欧洲一体化不可避免的重生


ATHENS – European integration implies successive transfers of national sovereignty to the Union.	雅典——欧洲一体化意味着国家主权陆陆续续向欧盟的转移。


But, while member states readily comply with decisions that abolish protective measures – say, import duties – they hesitate to formulate or advance policies that would grant the European Union discretionary powers to take initiatives.	可是，当成员国乐于在取消保护措施方面合作的同时——比如取消进口税——它们却在制定和推行相关政策，赋予欧盟采取行动的自主权方面一直犹豫不决。


Typical examples of this are the stalled Lisbon Strategy, the incomplete Economic and Monetary Union, and now, following the Irish public’s blocking maneuver, the uncertain fate of the new EU Constitutional Treaty (the “Lisbon Treaty”).	这一现状的典型事例就是延迟批准《里斯本战略》，建立不完整的欧洲经济和货币联盟，以及在爱尔兰共和国目前实行阻碍政策之后，新《欧盟宪法条约》（也就是《里斯本条约》）前途未卜的命运。


A similar weakness is evident in the EU’s attempt to define itself in the global system.	在欧洲为在全球体系里寻找一席之地所付出的艰苦努力中，同样的弱点也清晰可见。


Energy security, climate change, the rise of China, and the revival of Russia are among the many issues that require effective responses.	能源安全、气候变化、中国崛起、俄国复兴是需要进行有效应对的众多问题之中的几个。


Often, however, the EU cannot respond or can do so only slowly, because its structure obstructs quick decisions and fast action.	通常情况下，欧盟根本无法做出回应，或者回应的速度非常缓慢，因为欧盟自身的构造令它无法迅速做出决定并快速采取行动。


This structure was appropriate in an era when the free market was practically the only issue that the EU had to confront at the global level.	这样的构造在已经过去的年代曾经发挥过积极的作用，那时候自由市场几乎是欧盟在全球范围内需要面对的唯一一个问题。


But that era is over.	但那样的时代已经一去不复返了。


Change is rendered more difficult by the insufficient democratic legitimacy of EU bodies.	欧盟机构民主合法性的缺失使得变化的到来困难重重。


The lack of a direct relationship with Europe’s people deprives these bodies of the pressure required to bring about rapid action and responsive policies.	与欧洲民众缺乏直接的联系导致这些机构失去了必要的压力，而只有压力才能带来敏锐的政策和快速的行动。


There is no easy solution to these problems.	这个问题没有简单的解决方案。


Democracy in the EU cannot be guaranteed by the models and rules that apply in the member states.	各成员国实行的模式和规则根本无法确保在欧盟范围内实现民主。


The scale of the problems makes more elaborate solutions necessary.	这个问题所涉及的范围需要更为复杂详尽的解决方案。


When dealing with the EU, member states usually aim for arrangements and regulations that ensure cooperation within agreed-upon frameworks.	在处理涉及到欧盟的问题时，各成员国通常的目标是达成确保能在协议框架内进行合作的协议和法令。


And, as the Irish referendum showed, they do not readily accept unifying initiatives that would make the EU an autonomous center of power.	但正如爱尔兰全民公决所显示的那样，他们并没有做好准备接受统一的行动计划，让欧盟成为自治权力的中心。


But, assuming that the obstacle thrown up by Ireland’s voters can be overcome, experience has shown that the EU’s future evolution will be marked by increasingly centralized power in Brussels and the retreat of individual states.	可是，假定我们能克服爱尔兰选民所设置的障碍，经验也表明布鲁塞尔日益发展的集权和各成员国在权力上的撤退将会成为欧盟未来发展的标志。


The lever for this process will continue to be the EU’s central bureaucracy, the mechanism that formulates the member states’ common interests and whose field of action is determined by loose, and periodic, inter-governmental collaboration.	欧盟的核心官僚机构将继续成为集权进程的推动力量，这样的核心官僚机构体制明确了各成员国的共同利益，而周期性松散的政府间合作则确定了它们的行动范畴。


The more responsibilities the Brussels bureaucracy acquires, the more independent it will become.	布鲁塞尔官僚机构所承担的责任越大，它相应的独立性也就越强。


The prime concern for the EU bureaucracy is to find compromises that meet the wishes of member states, and to accommodate often divergent and contradictory national preferences.	欧盟官僚机构的主要任务是找到符合各成员国期望的妥协方案，照顾到经常出现分歧甚至是冲突的不同的国家偏好。


A common will usually emerges without any emphasis on conflicting political tendencies and ambitions.	共同的意愿通常根本不会强调相互矛盾的政治倾向和政治目标。


In fact, de-politicization is seen to be advisable because it allows for the easy achievement of balances.	事实上，非政治化被看作是一种明智的做法，因为这样能够比较容易地实现平衡的目标。


Bolstering democracy, however, requires emphasizing the political dimension and public debate that is free and open to all.	尽管如此，民主仍需要对全体民众自由和公开的对政治局势和公众辩论的密切关注作为支撑因素。


National forums must make it their concern to discuss common European issues, thereby ensuring information for all, transparency, control, and accountability.	国家论坛必须把探讨欧洲共同事务作为自己一项重要任务，这样才能确保全体民众拥有知情权，实现透明、可控和可靠的目标。


Instituting public debate on European policy throughout the Union will help clarify the aims of the unification project, make common interests apparent, and determine Europe’s institutional shape.	在欧盟范围内开展对欧洲政策的公众辩论可以明确统一计划的目标，凸显欧盟的共同利益，并确定欧洲的制度框架。


This is why the Lisbon Treaty is so important.	这也解释了为什么《里斯本条约》会如此重要。


The provisions in the chapter on democratic principles, which concern the EU’s institutions and procedural functions, lay the groundwork for a system that is more open to public debate on EU policies.	《条约》民主原则章节中有关欧盟制度和程序职能的规定，为建立对欧盟政策公共辩论更为开放的体制打下了坚实的基础。


The Lisbon Treaty also succeeds in tackling another major weakness of the EU – its ineffectiveness.	《里斯本条约》也成功解决了欧盟的另一个重要弱点——那就是办事效率低下。


By means of extensive reforms to the structure, operation, and decision-making processes of EU institutions, the treaty enhances their effectiveness and enables greater dynamism.	通过彻底改革欧盟机构的构造、运行和决策程序，《条约》提高了它们的办事效率，从而使欧盟机构更加生机勃勃。


True, many ordinary Europeans do not think that Europe should play an important part in global developments.	没错，许多普通的欧洲人并不认同欧洲应该在全球发展中发挥重要作用。


They believe that foreign policy should be handled by their national governments.	他们认为外交应该属于各国政府的权力范畴。


This view is outdated.	但这肯定是过时的观点。


Even in bilateral or regional crises, viable solutions are possible only at the supranational level.	即使在解决双边或地区危机的时候，也只有在超越国家的层次上才有可能找到可行的解决办法。


The Lisbon Treaty envisages the EU as a highly outward-looking entity on the international stage.	《里斯本条约》把欧盟看作是国际舞台上一个高度外向的整体。


But there are limits to what the EU can do, limits determined by the Union’s inter-governmental nature.	可是欧盟的所作所为同样存在限制，而限制的程度则由欧盟的政府间性质所决定。


Indeed, on crucial issues, it is the 27 members, not the Union, that will decide.	事实上，在关键问题上，起决定作用的并不是欧盟这个整体，而是组成欧盟的27个成员国。


Internally, the treaty takes a big step toward creating a Europe of freedom, security, and justice.	从欧盟内部的角度看，《条约》向着建立一个自由、安全和公正的欧洲迈出了重要的一步。


It both sets the normative framework for EU policy and establishes institutions and procedures for policies on border controls, asylum, reception of migrants, and cooperation between judicial and police authorities.	《条约》在制定欧盟政策标准框架的同时，也建立了边境控制、避难、移民接收以及司法和警察当局合作政策的程序和制度。


Thus, it creates greater security for people in their everyday lives.	正因为如此，《条约》使人们的日常生活更为安全。


The treaty is less detailed in other areas, particularly in achieving an economic union equivalent to the currency union, because it was simply not possible to reach agreement.	《条约》在其他领域的规定并没有那么细致，特别是在实现能够与货币统一相媲美的经济统一领域，原因也很简单，那就是在这方面根本不可能达成协议。


Nonetheless, the Lisbon Treaty paves the way for planning and implementing policies needed to tackle crucial contemporary challenges, such as climate change, energy, research, technology, and tourism.	尽管如此，《里斯本条约》还是为制定和执行应对现代重要挑战所需的政策铺平了道路，其中包括气候变化、能源、研究、技术和旅游等相关领域。


Whatever Irish voters intended by rejecting the treaty, socio-economic change will continue to force the EU to seek new forms of organization, combining inter-governmental and federal approaches.	无论爱尔兰选民想通过否决《条约》达到什么样的目的，社会经济变化将会继续迫使欧盟寻求全新的组织形式，从而把政府间和联邦因素结合在一起。


For example, the need to adapt the operation of the European Central Bank to a policy of development for Europe, as laid out by the Ecofin Council, is already apparent.	比如，按照欧盟财政经济部长理事会的规定，调整欧洲央行的运营，使之更加适合欧洲发展政策需要的必要性已经显而易见。


The EMU is evidence of that.	经济货币联盟就是很好的证明。


More generally, however the problem of the Irish referendum result is addressed, the EU will gradually acquire its definitive shape on the basis of the ongoing problems that it must address, because as the dimensions of these problems grow, their management will require solid and durable forms of cooperation.	从更为广义的角度讲，无论爱尔兰全民公决的问题最终如何解决，欧盟都将逐渐在必须解决的持续性问题上获得确定的权力，因为随着这些问题的影响日益扩大，管理这些问题也需要更为长期可靠的合作模式。


The Pope and the Party	教皇和政党


ALBERTA – As the twentieth century neared, Pope Leo XIII, grieving for humanity’s choice between atheistic socialism and venal liberalism, commissioned Catholic intellectuals to devise a better solution.	阿尔伯塔——临近二十世纪时，为人类在无神论社会主义和腐败自由主义间的选择而备感神伤的教皇利奥十三世委托天主教知识分子设计一种更好的方式。


Named Corporatism and set forth in the 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum, Leo’s interwar successor, Pius XI, recounted that it “laid down for all mankind the surest rules to solve aright that difficult problem of human relations called ‘the social question.’”	利奥在两次大战间的继任者庇护十一世率先在1891年通谕Rerun Novarum中为社团主义命名，并认为它“规定了人类正确解决‘社会’难题的最可靠的规则。 ”


Corporatism (which should be distinguished from the tripartite bargaining structures that emerged in many countries in the 1970’s under the name “neo-corporatism”)became the most influential ethically motivated intervention into economics in modern history.	社团主义（有别于20世纪70年代以“新社团主义”名义在众多国家兴起的三方谈判机制）成为现代经济学史上最具影响力的道德干预制度。


As Catholic social doctrine until the late twentieth century, Corporatism still shapes constitutions, laws, and attitudes throughout the world.	作为天主教社会教义的社团主义直到二十世纪末仍然影响着世界各地的宪法、法律和处事态度。


It can be distilled into four tenets:	社团主义可以提炼为四个原则：


·         Equality is a cruel illusion: people are happiest if rightly placed in a hierarchy legitimized by Catholic teachings.	·         平等仅仅是种残酷的幻觉：由天主教义合法指定等级地位的人是最幸福的。


·         Competition is spiritually demeaning.	·         竞争是一种精神上的贬损。


Associations – committees of Catholic business owners, labor leaders, and officials – must set quotas, prices, and wages within vertically connected swaths of the economy called corporations.	天主教企业主、劳工领袖和官员委员会社团必须以纵向联系的经济实体（称之为企业）为单位制定配额、价格和工资。


A typical Corporatist economy might contain thirty or so corporations – foods, heavy industry, textiles, chemicals, etc. – each encompassing raw materials, production, distribution, and retailing firms.	一个典型的社团经济包含食品、重工业、纺织、化工等各个领域共30家左右的公司——每家公司都下辖原材料、生产、分销及零售企业。


International trade and new firms are undesirable, because they undermine associations’ power.	国际贸易和新企业不受欢迎，因为它们有损于协会的权力。


·         Private property is legitimatized by owners’ obedience to Church and association, but delegitimized by competition.	·         服从教会和协会的业主私有财产可以合法化，但竞争将导致财产失去合法性。


·         The principle of subsidiarity devolves authority unneeded at higher levels to the lowest feasible level throughout the hierarchy.	·         辅助原则将高层不必要的权力尽可能向等级制度的底层转移。


Mussolini established the first Corporatist economy, albeit substituting “Fascist” for “Catholic” throughout.	墨索里尼建成首个社团经济，但所有的“天主教”元素都用“法西斯”代替。


State holding companies controlled key listed firms directly; and associations controlled the rest, reconciling totalitarianism with nominally private ownership.	国有控股公司直接控制关键上市企业，其余企业则由协会控制，将极权主义和名义上的私有制结合在一起。


Italy, its foreign trade peremptorily suppressed, escaped the trade wars of the Great Depression.  In 1931, Pius XI took credit.	由于彻底压制对外贸易，意大利躲过了“大萧条”时期的贸易战。 1931年庇护十一世出来邀功。


“Anyone who gives even slight attention to the matter will easily see…the obvious advantages in the system….The various classes work together peacefully; socialist organizations and their activities are repressed.”	“哪怕对这个问题有一点点关注的人也能轻松看出…这套制度的明显优势…社会各阶层共同和平努力； 社会主义组织及其活动因此受到抑制。


He exulted that Leo’s “Catholic principles on the social question have…passed little by little into the patrimony of all human society…not only in non-Catholic books and journals, but also in legislative halls and courts of justice.”	”他欣喜地断言利奥“在社会问题上的天主教原则已经…逐渐成为人类社会的世袭遗产…在非天主教书籍刊物和立法及司法法院中均有所体现。 ”


Indeed, Corporatism spread to country after country. In 1932, it was embraced by clerico-fascist Austria, under Engelbert Dollfuss.	事实上，社团主义在国家间迅速传播，并于1932年受到恩格尔贝特·道尔福斯治下奥地利法西斯份子克莱里科的推崇。


Falangist Spain under Francisco Franco and Portugal under António de Oliveira Salazar followed.	推崇社团主义的还有弗朗西斯科·佛朗哥治下的西班牙长枪党和安东尼奥·奥利维拉·萨拉萨尔治下的葡萄牙。


Interwar Poland, Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania adopted forms of Corporatism.	两次大战间的波兰、希腊、阿尔巴尼亚、保加利亚、爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚和立陶宛也采用社团主义的形式。


So did Hitler’s Germany, though in greatly modified form.	同样采用改良社团主义制度的还有希特勒治下的德国。


Vichy France embraced Catholic Corporatism, as did German protectorates over Belgium and the Czech lands, as well as nominally independent Slovakia under Monsignor Jozef Tiso.	法国维希政权信奉天主教社团主义，持同样观点的还有遍布比利时和捷克各地的德国保护国，以及约瑟夫·蒂索治下在名义上保持独立的斯洛伐克。


By the 1960’s, most Latin American countries were avowedly corporatist dictatorships.	截止20世纪60年代，多数拉美国家公然实行社团独裁统治。


Lebanon’s Falangist Party gave voice to its Maronite Catholics.	黎巴嫩长枪党则是马龙派天主教徒的代表。


Corporatism spread beyond Christendom – to Turkey under Atatürk and, using aliases to hide its Catholic provenance, to other Arab countries.	社团主义扩展到基督教国家以外，包括阿塔图尔克治下的土耳其和其他阿拉伯国家（并用别名来掩盖其天主教出处）。


Elite Catholic schools taught Corporatism to independence leaders in French, Spanish, and Portuguese colonies.	精英天主教学校面向法国、西班牙和葡萄牙殖民地的独立领袖讲授社团主义。


Indeed, the prominence of Corporatism in Catholic education is remarkable.	事实上，社团主义在天主教教育中的地位非常显著。


In their book Young Trudeau, Max Nemni, Monique Nemni, and William Johnson quote from Canadian leader Pierre Trudeau’s 1930’s notes on Corporatism from a class at the elite Jesuit academy where he studied: “The democratic principle has contributed to the undermining of civilization by impeding the development of the elite.”	在三人合著的《年轻的特鲁多》中，马克斯·奈姆尼、莫妮卡·奈姆尼和威廉·约翰逊引用加拿大领导人皮埃尔·特鲁多1930年代在精英耶稣会学院课堂上针对社团主义问题的笔记：“民主原则通过阻碍精英发展起到破坏文明的作用。


Likewise, “Liberalism leads to excesses: to unemployment, anarchy.	”同样，自由主义很容易引发失业和无政府状态等过激行为。


The ideal is corporatism, which does not separate people into parties, but unites their interests.”	理想状态是不分党派、而能够联合利益的社团主义。 ”


Today, Catholic and Islamic countries, as well as former French, Spanish, and Portuguese colonies, all of which tend to have Corporatist institutional residues, also correlate with depressed living standards.	今天，天主教和伊斯兰教国家，以及前法国、西班牙和葡萄牙殖民地往往残留着社团制机构的痕迹，而且生活水平也受到压制。


That is not surprising: Corporatist institutions plausibly retard development.	这种现象并不奇怪：社团机构确实在经济发展中起阻碍作用。


Sanctified hierarchies stifle initiative.	神圣的等级制能够扼杀积极性。


Pius XI thought that “the leadership and teaching guidance of the Church...in this field also” precluded abuse of authority.	庇护十一世认为“教会在上述领域的领导和训诫指引也”能避免滥用权力。


It seems to have evaded him that unchecked power might be more spiritually demeaning than competition.	但他似乎并未意识到不受制约的权力丝毫不亚于竞争对精神的贬损程度。


Corporatist subsidiarity lets the top of the hierarchy determine its own powers, while banishing competition and lauding private property generates inequality and inefficiency simultaneously.	社团原则让等级结构的最高层决定其自身权力，而废除竞争和颂扬私有财产能同时产生不平等和低效率。


As these failings grew manifest, the Church back-pedaled in the 1960’s, and John Paul II finally repudiated Corporatism.	由于上述缺陷在1960年代越来越明显，约翰·保罗二世终于否定了社团制度。


Today, few Catholics even know of the doctrine.	如今，多数天主教徒甚至从未听说过这项制度。


But interwar Corporatism is resurrected.	但两次大战间的社团主义却借尸还魂。


Forsaking socialism, China did not adopt capitalism, but kept the Communist Party atop a self-legitimized hierarchy.	中国没有实行资本主义，共产党却自封于等级制度的顶部。


True, central planners no longer set wages, prices, interest rates, and quotas; but party cadres, not market forces, control the economy’s commanding heights.	诚然，中央计划不再设定工资、物价、利率和配额； 但经济制高点仍由党的干部、而非市场力量来掌握。


Industry ministries oversee vertical swaths of firms.	工业部负责管理纵向的公司阵列。


State-controlled banks allocate capital.	国有银行负责资本的分配工作。


State-owned enterprises, or their subsidiaries, dominate key markets, as in interwar Italy.	国有企业或其附属机构在市场占据主导地位，这与意大利在两次大战间的情况如出一辙。


A subsidiarity principle even grants senior cadres discretion in delegating powers to underlings.	辅助原则甚至规定高级干部有权向下属放权。


How odd of Mao’s heirs, however accidentally, to resurrect this forsaken Catholic ideology.	无论偶然与否，毛泽东的继承人恢复已被遗忘的天主教思想实为咄咄怪事。