Reinforcing both countries’ military capacities indirectly reinforces those of the EU. The quest for synergies and efficiency that is implied by the agreement could well become a driving force for the European Defense Agency.	增强两国的军事实力实际上也是间接增强了欧盟的军事实力，条约所暗含的对协同和效率的要求将成为欧洲防务局（European Defense Agency）背后的驱动力。


The British may now consider the EDA a defense expenditure, but, when better defined, it could represent a source of savings for every EU country.	当前英国人可能认为防务局是个虚耗国防支出的累赘，但如果能更好地定位其职能的话，它将成为每个欧盟国家节省国防经费的源头。


Moreover, the agreements foresee cooperation on cyber-security, terrorism, satellite communications, and maritime security, which are also key elements of the Lisbon Treaty.	此外，协议也预示着在网络安全、恐怖主义，卫星通信和航海安全方面的合作，而这几个方面也是《里斯本条约》的关键内容。


Likewise, the joint expeditionary forces established under the treaties could lead to the eventual creation of a wider structure, as they already contemplate “bilateral cooperation with NATO, the European Union, the United Nations, or other operations.”	与此同时，依据条约所设立��联合派遣部队将最终催生一个更宏大的架构，因为他们已经将“与北约、欧盟，联合国或者其他行动之间的多边合作”考虑在内了。


Solidarity and agreement on political objectives are the pressing concerns of our age.	围绕着某些政治目标的团结一致已成为我们这个时代的迫切问题。


The new pact between France and the UK could be a historic step toward rationalizing defense spending rather than toward demilitarizing Europe.	而英法新协议将成为迈向合理安排国防支出而非解除欧洲武装的历史性步骤。


It all depends on the path chosen.	须知最终的走向将由我们选择的路线所决定。


In times of financial crisis, EU member states are unlikely to increase defense spending.	在金融危机之下，各欧盟成员国已不再可能增加国防开支。


But if France and the UK understand how much their projection of power is linked to that of Europe, if they make cooperation reciprocal and expand it to other European countries – according to the formula foreseen in the treaties – we could eventually see an EU with the ability to assume the defense role expected of it by the global community.	但如果法国和英国能意识到自身武装力量的投送能力的大小将关系到整个欧洲，如果它们都能从合作中获益并将其扩展到其他欧洲国家（依照条约所包含的模式），我们将最终看到一个足以承担国际社会所赋予的防卫角色的欧盟。


By forcing greater efficiency and collaboration, misfortune can yield benefit.	通过推进更高效率和更深入合作，经济危机这类坏事也能催生出好的结果。


This path can also ease US concerns about lower European defense spending.	这条道路也可以减少美国对欧洲国防预算缩水的担忧。


The Franco-British treaties do not address commitments to NATO, a key US interest, because any reduction in the number of European troops deployed abroad inevitably implies a greater economic burden for the US.	英法协议并不影响两国对北约的承诺，须知作为美国的一项核心利益，任何驻外欧洲部队的削减都不可避免地意味着美国更沉重的财政负担。


The Franco-British agreement does, however, imply progress toward joint European military action, both in Europe and on the international scene, which will encourage the US.	但英法协议显示出欧洲在联合军事行动（无论是在欧洲内部还是全球范围）方面的进步，这将对美国产生鼓舞作用。


So will the fact that the initiative comes from Europe’s two major military powers (whose combined defense spending represents half of the Continent’s total), both of which have permanent seats on the UN Security Council.	而这一创举来自于欧洲两大重要军事强国（两国军费开支占全欧军费总额的一半），更何况两国还都是联合国安理会常任理事国。


All of this is part of the transatlantic community’s continuing transformation from a set of organizations designed to defend territory against a known aggressor to something more flexible and dynamic.	所有这一切都是跨大西洋国家集团持续转型过程的其中一部分：由一系列专为防御某个已知入侵者设计的组织，转向应对某些更加灵活机动的威胁。


Establishing joint management and overhauling conventional defense capacities will be a two-pronged challenge: functional, owing to the traditional schema of defense organizations, and political, inasmuch as a cession of state sovereignty will be required.	建立联合管理机制和削减常规防卫力量将成为两大长期挑战：在功能上颠覆了传统防卫组织以国家为组成元素的构成机制； 而在政治上则必须对某些国家主权做出让渡。


Another, equally important challenge is cooperation between NATO and Russia, which agreed at NATO’s Lisbon summit in November to collaborate on the Alliance’s anti-missile defenses.	另一个同样重要的挑战则是北约与俄罗斯之间的合作，双方于今年11月的北约里斯本峰会上同意在导弹防御系统上展开合作。


This relationship must be based on cooperation that benefits both sides, and that respects certain common principals of governance and non-interference.	这个关系必须建立在双方互助互利，以及对某些共同的治理和不干涉理念的尊重之上。


But coordinating and sharing capacities can help both partners deal with the new nature of conflicts.	但合作和分享将有助于双方应对新形式的冲突。


Here, the EU can exercise leadership, for this is a political process that has only just begun.	在这方面欧盟可以锻炼自己的领导能力，因为这个政治进程才刚刚开始。


As British Prime Minister David Cameron said of the agreement with France: “This is the beginning of something new, not an end in itself” – words that echo those of Jean Monet, one of the Union’s founding fathers, on cooperation in the West. “This is not an end in itself,” Monet said.	正如英国首相戴维·卡梅隆对于法国协议的评价：“这一切是某种新生事物的开端，而非为了协议而协议”——此番言论其实也是欧元缔造者之一的让·莫内当年对西欧合作的评价类似，莫内当时说：“我们不是为了拥有欧元而创设欧元，而是通往一个更有秩序，不再步向毁灭的世界的开端。


“It is the beginning of the path toward a more ordered world that we must attain if we want to escape destruction.”	”


The Franco-British agreement in 2010 was one hopeful sign for 2011 and beyond: a step along the arduous but necessary path toward greater European security.	2010年签订的英法协议是2011年及未来的一个希望之象：实现更高程度欧洲安全的这条道路虽然艰辛，但却是非常必要的，而协议本身则是在这条道路上迈出的坚实一步。


A World Bank for a New World	新世界需要新世行


NEW YORK – The world is at a crossroads.	纽约—世界正站在十字路口。


Either the global community will join together to fight poverty, resource depletion, and climate change, or it will face a generation of resource wars, political instability, and environmental ruin.	国际社会要么团结起来，共同应对贫困、资源耗尽和气候变化，要么下一代将面临资源战争、政治动荡和环境崩溃。


The World Bank, if properly led, can play a key role in averting these threats and the risks that they imply.	世界银行如果能够担当起合适的领导角色，将能在消除这些威胁及其隐含风险方面起到关键作用。


The global stakes are thus very high this spring as the Bank’s 187 member countries choose a new president to succeed Robert Zoellick, whose term ends in July.	因此，世界银行的187各成员国今春如何选择将于7月卸任的罗伯特·佐利克的新行长，将事关全球重大利益。


The World Bank was established in 1944 to promote economic development, and virtually every country is now a member.	世界银行成立于1944年，初衷是促进经济发展，如今，基本上所有国家都已成为它的成员。


Its central mission is to reduce global poverty and ensure that global development is environmentally sound and socially inclusive.	其核心任务是消除世界贫困以及确保环境友好、社会普惠的全球发展。


Achieving these goals would not only improve the lives of billions of people, but would also forestall violent conflicts that are stoked by poverty, famine, and struggles over scarce resources.	实现这些目标不仅能够改善数十亿人民的生活，还能将因贫困、饥荒和争夺稀缺资源而引发的暴力冲突扼杀于未萌。


American officials have traditionally viewed the World Bank as an extension of United States foreign policy and commercial interests.	美国官员习惯于将世界银行视为美国外交政策和商业利益的延伸。


With the Bank just two blocks away from the White House on Pennsylvania Avenue, it has been all too easy for the US to dominate the institution.	世行坐落于华盛顿宾夕法尼亚大道，与白宫只隔着两个街区，因此美国人一直主导着这个机构也就不足为奇了。


Now many members, including Brazil, China, India, and several African countries, are raising their voices in support of more collegial leadership and an improved strategy that works for all.	如今，不少成员国——包括巴西、中国、印度和数个非洲国家——正在发声支持合议领导以及改善世行战略使之适用于所有成员国。


From the Bank’s establishment until today, the unwritten rule has been that the US government simply designates each new president: all 11 have been Americans, and not a single one has been an expert in economic development, the Bank’s core responsibility, or had a career in fighting poverty or promoting environmental sustainability.	自世行成立至今，一直有一条不成文的规矩：行长人选由美国政府决定。 成立至今的11位行长均是美国人，而且没有一位是世行核心责任——经济发展方面的专家，也没有一位拥有扶贫或促进环境可持续性的职业经验。


Instead, the US has selected Wall Street bankers and politicians, presumably to ensure that the Bank’s policies are suitably friendly to US commercial and political interests.	相反，美国总是选择华尔街银行家和政客来担任这一职务，大概是为了保证世行政策能够符合美国商业和政治利益吧。


Yet the policy is backfiring on the US and badly hurting the world.	但这一政策却令美国弄巧成拙，也严重地伤害了全世界。


Because of a long-standing lack of strategic expertise at the top, the Bank has lacked a clear direction.	由于世行最高层长期缺乏战略上的专业知识和技能，因此该行一直没有明确的方向。


Many projects have catered to US corporate interests rather than to sustainable development.	许多项目与其说是为了可持续发展，不如说是为了迎合美国公司的利益。


The Bank has cut a lot of ribbons on development projects, but has solved far too few global problems.	世行弄砸了大量的发展项目，解决的全球问题却少之又少。


For too long, the Bank’s leadership has imposed US concepts that are often utterly inappropriate for the poorest countries and their poorest people.	长久以来，在世行的领导下，许多完全不适合最贫困过家及其中的最贫困人口的美国式概念被强加于他们头上。


For example, the Bank completely fumbled the exploding pandemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria during the 1990’s, failing to get help to where it was needed to curb these outbreaks and save millions of lives.	比如，世行完全没能处理好20世纪90年代艾滋病、结核病和疟疾的大爆发，没能给予疾病暴发、数百万生命危在旦夕的国家足够的帮助。


Even worse, the Bank advocated user fees and “cost recovery” for health services, thereby putting life-saving health care beyond the reach of the poorest of the poor – precisely those most in need of it.	更糟糕的是，世行主张采取使用者付费和“覆盖成本”的医疗服务，这导致穷国的最贫困人口——最需要服务的人群——根本无法获得赖以救命的医疗服务。


In 2000, at the Durban AIDS Summit, I recommended a new “Global Fund” to fight these diseases, precisely on the grounds that the World Bank was not doing its job.	2000年，在德班艾滋病峰会上，我建议成立新的“全球基金”来对抗这些疾病，而我之所以如此建议，正是因为世行的不作为。


The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria emerged, and has since saved millions of lives, with malaria deaths in Africa alone falling by at least 30%.	全球艾滋病、结核病和疟疾对抗基金（Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria）成立了，并挽救了数百万的生命，光是在非洲，疟疾致死率就至少降低30%。


The Bank similarly missed crucial opportunities to support smallholder subsistence farmers and to promote integrated rural development more generally in impoverished rural communities in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.	类似地，世行错失了在非洲、亚洲和拉美贫困农村地区支持自耕小农、普及促进农村综合发展的关键机会。


For around 20 years, roughly from 1985 to 2005, the Bank resisted the well-proven use of targeted support for small landholders to enable impoverished subsistence farmers to improve yields and break out of poverty.	从1985年到2005年的近20年时间里，世行一直拒绝使用已被证明效果良好的定向小地主支持项目以帮助贫困自耕农提高产量、走出贫困。


More recently, the Bank has increased its support for smallholders, but there is still far more that it can and should do.	而在最近，世行已增加了其对小农的支持，但距离它所能做到也应该做到的还差得很远。


The Bank’s staff is highly professional, and would accomplish much more if freed from the dominance of narrow US interests and viewpoints.	世行的工作人员是高度职业化的，只要摆脱狭隘的美国利益和视角的束缚，他们能够取得更大的成就。


The Bank has the potential to be a catalyst of progress in key areas that will shape the world’s future.	世行具有成为催化决定世界未来的关键领域进步的潜力。


Its priorities should include agricultural productivity; mobilization of information technologies for sustainable development; deployment of low-carbon energy systems; and quality education for all, with greater reliance on new forms of communication to reach hundreds of millions of under-served students.	其优先项目应该包括农业生产率、为可持续发展动员信息技术、开发低碳能源体系以及促进有教无类式的平等教育（更多地依靠新型通讯手段让数以百万计的原本得不到优质教育的学生获得优质教育来实现）。


The Bank’s activities currently touch on all of these areas, but it fails to lead effectively on any of them.	世行的行动目前涉及到所有这些领域，但没有在其中任何一个起到实质上的领导作用。


Despite the excellence of its staff, the Bank has not been strategic or agile enough to be an effective agent of change.	尽管其工作人员想到那个优秀，但世行缺乏战略眼光，也不够灵活，无法担起变革代理人的责任。


Getting the Bank’s role right will be hard work, requiring expertise at the top.	让世行做该做的事需要艰苦的努力，要求其最高层具有专家知识和技能。


Most importantly, the Bank’s new president should have first-hand professional experience regarding the range of pressing development challenges.	最重要的是，世行的新行长应该具有应对发展挑战方面的第一首职业经验。


The world should not accept the status quo.	世界不应该甘于现状。


A World Bank leader who once again comes from Wall Street or from US politics would be a heavy blow for a planet in need of creative solutions to complex development challenges.	地球需要创造性的解决方案来应对复杂的发展挑战，又一位来自华尔街或美国政坛的世行行长将是对地球的重大打击。


The Bank needs an accomplished professional who is ready to tackle the great challenges of sustainable development from day one. 	世行需要一位成就卓著的专业人士，他从上任的第一天起就必须做好应对可持续发展的重大挑战的准备。


A World of Convergence	趋同的世界


WASHINGTON, DC – For almost two centuries, starting around 1800, the history of the global economy was broadly one of divergence in average incomes.	华盛顿—从大约1800年开始，近两个世界以来，全球经济大体上是一部平均收入逐渐分化的历史。


In relative terms, rich countries got even richer.	从相对值看，发达国家越来越富。


There was growth in the poorer countries, too, but it was slower than rich-country growth, and the discrepancy in prosperity between rich and poor countries increased.	穷国也有经济增长，但比不上发达国家，发达国家和贫困国家之间的繁荣差距越拉越大。


This “divergence” was very pronounced in colonial times.	 “分化”在殖民地时代便已十分显著。


It slowed after the 1940’s, but it was only around 1990 that an entirely new trend could be observed – convergence between average incomes in the group of rich countries and the rest of the world.	20世纪40年代以后，分化之势有所放缓，但直到1990年前后，新的趋势才开始浮现——即发达国家的平均收入和世界其他部分开始趋同。


From 1990 to 2010, average per capita income in the emerging and developing countries grew almost three times as fast as average income in Europe, North America, and Japan, compared to lower or, at most, equal growth rates for almost two centuries.	从1990年到2010年，新兴和发展中国家平均人均收入比欧洲、北美和日本增长快出两倍，而在此前近两个世纪中，一直是后者胜出或打成平手。


This has been a revolutionary change, but will this 20-year-old trend continue?	这是一个革命性的变化，但这20年来的趋势会持续下去吗？


Will convergence remain rapid, or will it be a passing phase in world economic history?	趋同会保持现在的快进趋势，还是会成为世界经济史上被翻过去的一页？


Long-term projections based on short-term trends have often been mistaken.	基于短期趋势的长期预测通常是错误的。


In the late 1950’s, after the Soviet Union launched the first spacecraft, eminent Western economists predicted that Soviet income would overtake that of the United States in a few decades.	在20世纪50年代末，苏联发射了第一艘宇宙飞船后，西方经济学名家纷纷预测苏联收入在几十年内就能超过美国。


After all, the Soviet Union was investing close to 40% of its GDP, twice the ratio in the West.	毕竟，苏联将其GDP的近40%用于投资，这一比例是西方的两倍。


Later, in the 1980’s, Japan’s spectacular growth led some to predict that it would overtake the US, not only in per capita terms, but even in terms of some measures of “economic power.”	接着，在20世纪80年代，日本强劲的增长让一些人预测它将超过美国——不仅是人均水平，也包括某些衡量“经济实力”的指标。


These kinds of projections have often been based on simple extrapolations of exponential trends.	这类预测通常基于简单的指数趋势外推。


Over two or three decades, substantial differences in compound growth rates quickly generate huge changes in economic size or per capita income.	在20或30年的时界上，复合增长率的重大差异能很快造成经济规模和人均收入上的巨大变化。


Will the recent predictions of rapid ongoing global convergence similarly turn out to be wrong, or will most of the emerging countries sustain a large positive growth differential and get much closer to the advanced economies’ income levels?	当前全球快速持续趋同的预测也会想往常那样以失败告终吗？ 还是说，大部分新兴国家会持续大幅为正的增长差，从而极大地接近发达经济体的收入水平？


Understanding the phenomenon of “catch-up” growth is key to answering this question.	理解“赶超”增长现象是回答这一问题的关键。


Trade and foreign direct investment have made it much easier for emerging countries to absorb and adapt best-practice technology invented in the advanced economies.	贸易和外国直接投资使得新兴市场更易吸收和适应发达经济体所发明的实用技术。


The information revolution, allowing much easier access to and diffusion of knowledge, has accelerated the process.	信息革命使得知识的获得和扩散变得更加容易，从而加速了这一过程。


Once they developed the basic institutions needed for a market economy and learned how to avoid serious macroeconomic policy mistakes, emerging countries started benefiting from catch-up growth.	一旦它们发展出市场经济所需要的基本制度、学会如何避免严重宏观经济政策失误，新兴国家就开始从赶超增长中获益。


Those with very high investment rates, mostly in East Asia, grew faster than those with lower investment rates; but, overall, catch-up growth probably has been adding 2-4 percentage points to many emerging and developing countries’ annual growth rates.	投资率极高的国家（大多在亚洲）获得了比投资率较低的国家更快的增长； 但是，总体而言，赶超增长使得许多新兴和发展中国家年增长率提高了2—4个百分点。


At the same time, population growth decreased, adding at least another point to the pace of per capita growth.	与此同时，人口增长在下降，从而进一步推高了人均增长速度。


This process will likely continue for another decade or two, depending on where in the process particular countries are.	这一过程可能还会持续一二十年，取决于具体国家的具体状况。


It is true that catch-up growth is easier in manufacturing than in other sectors, a point recently emphasized by Dani Rodrik of Harvard University, and it may be that a good portion of it has been exhausted in manufacturing by the best-performing firms in emerging countries.	哈佛大学的丹尼·罗德里克（Dani Rodrik）最近正确地指出，相比其他部门，赶超增长在制造业更容易实现，而新兴国家的某些表现卓著的企业可能已经用尽了赶超增长在制造业的潜力。


But there is still a lot of “internal” room for catch-up growth, as less efficient domestic firms become more competitive with more efficient ones.	但随着效率较低的国内企业对高效企业的竞争力有所提高，还有大量“内部”空间可用于赶超增长。


The dispersion of “total factor productivity” – the joint productivity of capital and labor – inside emerging countries has been found to be large.	新兴国家内部的“全要素生产率”——即资本和劳动的联合生产率——的分散度很大。


Moreover, sectors such as agriculture, energy, transport, and trade also have catch-up-growth potential, through imports of technology, institutional know-how, and organizational models.	此外，农业、能源、运���和贸易等部门也具有赶超增长潜力，可以通过进技术口、制度诀窍和组织模式实现。


Of course, temporary disturbances, a worsening of global payments imbalances, or macroeconomic policy mistakes, including those made in advanced economies and affecting the entire world economy, could undermine global growth.	当然，暂时性的动荡、全球收支失衡恶化以及宏观经济政策失误（包括哪些源自发达经济体但影响到全世界经济的失误）可能会破坏全球增长。


But the underlying “convergence differential,” owing to catch-up growth, is likely to continue to reduce the income gap between the old advanced economies and emerging-market countries.	但赶超增长所带来的基本的“趋同差”可能将继续减少老牌发达经济体和新兴市场国家间的收入差距。


The Soviet Union never was able to build the institutions to allow for catch-up economic growth.	苏联一直没有能够建立能实现赶超增长的制度。


Japan slowed down after it had basically caught up.	日本在基本实现赶超后速度就慢了下来。


China, India, Brazil, Turkey, and others may have firms operating close to the world’s technological frontier, but they still have a lot of unused catch-up potential.	中国、印度、巴西、土耳其和其他国家可能会有经营水平接近世界技术前沿的企业，但它们仍拥有大量待开发赶超潜力。


The more that these countries can invest while ensuring macroeconomic stability and balance-of-payments sustainability, the faster they can adopt better technology and production processes.	这些国家在确保宏观经济稳定和收支平衡可持续的基础上投资得越多，它们适应新技术和新生产程序就越快。


In that case, they can continue to catch up, at least for the next decade or more.	这样，它们就能继续赶超，至少在未来十年二十年内是如此。


The convergence process is going to slow, but not yet.	趋同过程迟早会放缓，但还不是现在。


A World of Regions	区域化的世界


NEW YORK – In almost every part of the world, long-festering problems can be solved through closer cooperation among neighboring countries.	发自纽约——在世界上几乎每一处地方，那些长期存在的顽固问题都可以通过邻近国家之间的紧密合作而得以解决。


The European Union provides the best model for how neighbors that have long fought each other can come together for mutual benefit.	在这方面欧盟堪称最佳范例，证明那些历史上斗争不断的国家是可以联合起来实现共同利益的。


Ironically, today’s decline in American global power may lead to more effective regional cooperation.	而讽刺的是，如今美国全球实力的衰退则会引发更多富有成效的区域合作。


This may seem an odd time to praise the EU, given the economic crises in Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland.	在希腊、西班牙，葡萄牙和爱尔兰经济危机的背景下去夸奖欧盟似乎有点不合时宜。


Europe has not solved the problem of balancing the interests of strong economies in the North and those of weaker economies in the South.	实际上欧洲也依然未能成功平衡在那些北欧强势经济体和南部弱势经济体之间的利益。


Still, the EU’s accomplishments vastly outweigh its current difficulties.	但相比当前所面临的困难，欧盟所取得的成显然更加意义重大。


The EU has created a zone of peace where once there was relentless war. It has provided the institutional framework for reuniting Western and Eastern Europe.	欧盟成功在一个曾经反复被战争蹂躏的区域内创造了和平，同时也为东欧和西欧的重新联合提供了制度框架，还推动了区域内部的基础设施建设。


The single market has been crucial to making Europe one of the most prosperous places on the planet. And the EU has been a global leader on environmental sustainability.	内部的单一市场对欧盟得以成为全球最繁荣区域至关重要，而在环境可持续发展方面欧盟在世界上也扮演着领导角色。


For these reasons, the EU provides a unique model for other regions that remain stuck in a mire of conflict, poverty, lack of infrastructure, and environmental crisis.	因此欧洲也为那些依旧在冲突、贫困，基础设施缺乏和环境危机中挣扎的区域提供了一个独特的范例。


New regional organizations, such as the African Union, look to the EU as a role model for regional problem-solving and integration.	新的区域性组织，比如非洲联盟，将欧盟视为解决区域性问题以及国家间整合的榜样。


Yet, to this day, most regional groupings remain too weak to solve their members’ pressing problems.	但时至今日，大多数区域性组织依然太过弱势，无法解决其成员国所面对的紧迫问题。


In most other regions, ongoing political divisions have their roots in the Cold War or the colonial era. During the Cold War, neighbors often competed with each other by “choosing sides” – allying themselves with either the United States or the Soviet Union.  Pakistan tilted towards the Americans; India towards the Soviets.	在其他大部分区域，现有的政治分歧往往来自于冷战或者是殖民时期，当时各国之间通过“站队”的方式来互相竞争——就是宣称自己属于苏联阵营或者美国阵营。


Countries had little incentive to make peace with their neighbors as long as they enjoyed the financial support of the US or the USSR.	巴基斯坦站在苏联一边，印度则于美国为伍。 只要能享受到苏联或者美国的财政援助，各国就缺乏动力去和邻国握手言和。


On the contrary, continued conflict often led directly to more financial aid.	相反，卷入长期冲突的国家还能受到更多资助。


Indeed, the US and Europe often acted to undermine regional integration, which they believed would limit their roles as power brokers.	其实当年美国和欧洲还经常阻挠区域整合，因为这会影响他们作为权力调停者的角色。


Thus, when Gamal Abdel Nasser launched a call for Arab unity in the 1950’s, the US and Europe viewed him as a threat.  The US undercut his call for strong Arab cooperation and nationalism, fearing a loss of American influence in the Middle East.	因此当埃及前总统贾迈勒·阿卜杜勒·纳赛尔在1950年代开始呼吁阿拉伯国家联合时，美欧都将其视为威胁。 美国害怕自己从此失去对中东的影响力，于是暗中破坏纳赛尔实现阿拉伯国家紧密合作和鼓动民族主义的努力。


As a result, Nasser increasingly aligned Egypt with the Soviet Union, and ultimately failed in the quest to unite Arab interests.	于是纳赛尔逐渐向苏联靠拢，最终也无法实现阿拉伯国家整体利益的整合。


Today’s reality, however, is that great powers can no longer divide and conquer other regions, even if they try.	而如今的现实则是这些强国已经无力（尽管依然想方设法）去分裂和征服其他区域了。


The age of colonialism is finished, and we are now moving beyond the age of US global dominance.	殖民时代已成往事，现在美国作为全球霸主的时代也正渐行渐远。


Recent events in the Middle East and Central Asia, for example, clearly reflect the decline of US influence.	最近在中东和中亚地区发生的事件则明显反映出美国影响力的衰退。


America’s failure to win any lasting geopolitical advantage through the use of military force in Iraq and Afghanistan underscore the limits of its power, while its budget crisis ensures that it will cut its military resources sooner rather than later.	美国无法通过在伊拉克和阿富汗用兵来获取任何长期地缘政治优势的事实暴露了其全球实力的局限性，而预算危机又迫使其在短期内削减军事资源。


Similarly, the US played no role in the political revolutions underway in the Arab world, and still has not demonstrated any clear policy response to them.	同样，美国在中东政治革命中也未能发挥任何作用，至今都未能对该事件作出任何明确的政治回应。


President Barack Obama’s recent speech on the Middle East is a further display of America’s declining influence in the region.	美国总统奥巴马最近针对中东的讲话则进一步反映了美国影响力减弱的事实。


The speech drew the most attention for calling on Israel to return to its 1967 borders, but the effect was undercut when Israel flatly rejected the US position.	讲话大部分内容都是呼吁以色列退回到1967年边界，但其效果在遭到以色列断然回绝后大打折扣。


The world could see that there would be little practical follow-up.	全世界都将发现美国将不会实施任何后续动作。


The rest of the speech was even more revealing, though it drew little public notice.	而公众关注更少的讲话余下部分更有说服力。


When Obama discussed the Arab political upheavals, he noted the importance of economic development.	当奥巴马说到阿拉伯政治剧变时，他提到了经济发展的重要性。


Yet when it came to US action, the most that the US could offer financially was slight debt relief for Egypt ($1 billion), scant loan guarantees ($1 billion), and some insurance coverage for private investments.	但当轮到美国出手的时候，美国最大限度仅能减免埃及一亿美元债务，提供一亿美元贷款担保以及对私人投资的更多保险保障。


The real message was that the US government would contribute very little financially to the region’s economic recovery.	其中传达的真实信息就是美国政府在该区域经济复苏方面只能提供极少的经济援助。


The days when a country could depend on large-scale American financing are over.	可见那些国家依靠大规模美援的时代也一去不返了。


We are, in short, moving to a multi-polar world.	简而言之，我们正在进入一个多极世界。


The Cold War’s end has not led to greater US dominance, but rather to the dissemination of global power to many regions.  East Asia, South Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East have new geopolitical and economic influence.	冷战的结束并未引发美国全球统治力的上涨，反而将这股力量分散到了各个区域。 东亚、南亚，拉美和中东都分别获得了新的地缘政治和经济影响力。


Each region, increasingly, must find its own path to economic development, energy and food security, and effective infrastructure, and must do so in a world threatened by climate change and resource scarcity.	各个区域也将逐渐找到了实现自身经济发展，能源和食品安全，以及基础设施建设的路径，也必须在这个面临着气候变化和能源短缺威胁的世界上立刻着手整合。


Each region, therefore, will have to secure its own future.	因此每个区域都必须确保自身的未来发展。


Of course, this should occur in a context of cooperation across regions as well as within them.	当然，这也应该在区域间合作以及区域内合作的背景下实现。


The Middle East is in a strong position to help itself.	对此中东地区在扶助自身方面拥有巨大优势。


There is a high degree of economic complementarity between Egypt and the oil-rich Gulf States.	埃及和其他富裕产油国之间存在着高度的经济互补。


Egypt can supply technology, manpower, and considerable expertise for the Arab region, while the Gulf provides energy and finance, as well as some specialists.	埃及能为阿拉伯地区提供技科技，人力以及大量的专业技能，而海湾国家则提供能源和资金还有某些领域的专业人士。


The long-delayed vision of Arab economic unity should be returned to the table.	长期搁置的阿拉伯经济整合前景也应该被重新摆在谈判桌上。


Israel, too, should recognize that its long-term security and prosperity will be enhanced as part of an economically stronger region.	以色列也应该意识到自身的长治久安和繁荣只能在成为一个经济繁荣区域的一部分后才能得到加强。


For the sake of its own national interests, Israel must come to terms with its neighbors.	为了确保其国家利益，以色列必须与其邻国达成协议。


Other regions also will find that the decline of US power increases the urgency of stronger cooperation between neighbors.	其他区域也将发现美国实力的衰退增加了各邻国进行更紧密合作的紧迫性。


Some of the greatest tensions in the world – say India and Pakistan, or North and South Korea – should be defused as part of region-wide strengthening.	某些世界上最紧张的对立关系——比如印度和巴基斯坦，朝鲜和韩国——都应该被作为区域强化的一部份而得到解决。


As the EU shows, ancient enmities and battle lines can be turned into mutually beneficial cooperation if a region looks forward, to resolving its long-term needs, rather than backward, to its long-standing rivalries and conflicts.	正如欧盟所体现的那样，只要一个区域能把目光面向未来着手处理其长远需要，而不是倒退到长期存在的对立和冲突，历史上的敌意和战线是可以转化为互利合作的。


A World of Trouble	一个充满烦恼的世界


So you thought this year was bad!	那么在你看来，今年已经够糟的了。


2009 began with the flattening of Gaza.	2009年的大幕，是在加沙城毁于炮火这一序曲中拉开的。


Unemployment is surging in many countries, even though we can detect the first signs of recovery from the recession.	现在尽管我们已能觉察到经济从衰退走向复苏的第一丝信号，但不少国家的失业率却正在快速攀升；


Many bankers, meanwhile, are back to the trough as though nothing had happened.	与此同时，许多银行家却仿佛什么事情也没有发生过那样，又开始重操旧业；


Greed was just taking a temporary break.	贪婪之心只不过曾被一时收起而已。


Pakistan is hit hard by a wave of monstrous Taleban attacks, and in Afghanistan NATO troops die and are terribly injured in large numbers.	巴基斯坦在塔利班的凶猛攻势面前深受重创； 北约士兵则在阿富汗伤亡惨重；


The “Peace Process” in the Middle East becomes ever more clearly the great oxymoron in international relations.	而中东地区所谓“和平进程”只是矛盾修饰法在国际关系中的一大应用这一点，也变得更加清晰了。


Preparations for the climate change conference in Copenhagen are dominated by charges and recriminations. Even President Barack Obama, of whom miracles were expected, turns out to be no more than a very talented mortal.	为将于哥本哈根举行的气候变化大会所进行的准备工作，正被彼此间的唇枪舌战所主导，甚至连被人们期望能带来奇迹的巴拉克·奥巴马总统，也被证明只不过是一个颇具才干的凡人而已；


He receives the Nobel Peace Prize in the hope that maybe he can make next year better.	在他或许能使来年变得更好的期待中，奥巴马获得了诺贝尔和平奖；


He’ll certainly have his work cut out.	接下来，他肯定有的忙了。


Will 2010 see a recovery shaped like a “V” or a “W,” or will there simply be an anemic tilt towards a very distant prospect of better times?	2010年，是将会出现V型或W型的经济复苏，还是将会在萎靡中滑向好日子遥遥无期的境地呢？


I suspect the latter, with unemployment and cuts in public spending – certainly in much of Europe and the United States – constraining economic confidence.	我怀疑后一种情况将成为现实，因为在欧洲大部分地区以及美国，失业问题和公共开支的削减将使经济方面的信心难以得到提振；


That will make the politics of dealing with global imbalances all the more difficult.	而这又会导致解决全球失衡这一政治任务变得愈加棘手。


Let’s be clear about what is happening.	让我们先来弄清正在发生的一切。


The deliberate undervaluation of China’s currency, and the fall in the dollar, are both putting a squeeze on the export prospects of the European Union members and other countries like Canada and Mexico, and China’s covert and not so covert export subsidies and import barriers exacerbate the problem.	人民币被人为低估以及美元的贬值，给欧盟成员国以及加拿大和墨西哥等其他国家的出口前景蒙上了阴影； 而中国或明或暗的出口补贴与进口壁垒，更令情况雪上加霜。


American exasperation has probably been curbed by its need to borrow so much money – much of it from China.	可能是由于其大量借款的需求（其中有许多便借自中国），美国的怒火被抑于胸中。


But Obama’s recent tariffs on tire imports may be a sign of things to come.	不过奥巴马近期对轮胎进口加征关税之举，或许是一个情况将发生变化的信号。


Chinese behavior will put increasing political pressure on those of us in Europe and the US who are delighted about China’s economic success and who argue for free trade.	对于我们这些身处欧美、却为中国的经济成功感到欣喜、并支持自由贸易的人士而言，中国的行为将会给我们带来不断增大的政治压力；


Weaker economies will also feel the pinch.	较弱的经济体也将感受到这份紧张。


I hope that China’s sophisticated economic managers understand that either their country’s behavior will have to change, or we are likely to face a massive trade conflict and disruption of global commerce.	我希望中国精明的经济管理者们能够明白：中国必须改变其做法，如若不能，则世界或将面临巨大的贸易冲突以及全球商业的混乱景象。


The patience even of free traders will wear thin in 2010.	即便是自由贸易者，也将在2010年逐渐失去耐心。


Rows about the short-term costs of dealing with climate change won’t make it any easier to keep markets open.	就应对气候变化之短期成本所进行的争吵，并不会令各国继续讨价还价变得更为简单。


But failure to act now will only raise the price of delayed action at some moment in the future.	但现在若无所作为，只会在未来的某一时刻、使我们为受到延误的行动付出更高的代价。


While the most hopeful outcome of the Copenhagen summit – a global pact limiting carbon emissions – has now been all but ruled out, the second-best outcome – negotiations on specific measures continue within a framework of general goodwill – would not be a disaster.	尽管哥本哈根峰会原本最有希望实现的成果（一份限制碳排放的全球协定），目前已几乎无望成为现实； 但其次优结果（关于具体措施的谈判将在普遍善意之框架内继续进行）也并不很糟。


Anything short of that would be very bad news.	若连后一种情况也无法实现的话，那么情况就非常糟糕了。


In either of these two more optimistic scenarios, one consequence will be the transfer – actual or putative – of considerable sums of money from developed to emerging or developing countries to cover some of their costs for emissions abatement and environmental protection.	在这两种更为乐观的情景之中，将会出现这样一种结果：巨额资金被发达国家（实际或假定地）转移给新兴国家或发展中国家，以对后者在减少排放及保护环境方面的开支提供部分补偿。


Now just imagine the problems that legislators in developed democracies will face when they must explain why billions of dollars and euros should be handed over to China, whose deliberately undervalued currency is costing their constituents their jobs.	现在就让我们设想一下，发达民主国家的立法者在必须就为何一方面中国被人为低估的货币正使发达国家的选民失去工作、另一方面这些国家却将数以十亿计的美金与欧元交给中国作出解释时，所将面对的难题吧。


Obama’s commitment to substantial nuclear disarmament bodes well for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Renewal Conference in 2010.	奥巴马对于实质性核裁军的承诺，为2010年核不扩散条约审议大会带来了福音。


But, even with progress there, the problems created by the threat of nuclear weapons development in North Korea and Iran will remain.	不过纵使大会取得了进展，朝鲜与伊朗核武器研发威胁所带来的问题却依然存在。


American and European diplomatic engagement with Iran is welcome.	美欧与伊朗的外交接触受人欢迎；


But what happens if this brings either no Iranian commitment to refrain from weaponizing nuclear power, or no acceptance of tough monitoring of such a pledge?	但若外交接触无法令伊朗就不将核能用于军事目的作出承诺，或无法使伊朗同意就此承诺的履行状况接受严格监督的话，情况又会变成什么样呢？


China and Russia seem unlikely to support any further sanctions against Iran if diplomacy fails.	如果外交努力失败，中俄两国看起来不太可能为针对伊朗的进一步制裁提供支持。


China’s energy relationship with Iran grows ever stronger, and Russia continues to see its mission internationally as making trouble wherever it can.	中国与伊朗的能源关系正愈发紧密，而俄国继续将尽力在一切可能的地区制造麻烦视为其国际使命。


This is just a little of what 2010 perhaps has in store – and no mention yet of Israeli settlement building on the West Bank, Pakistan’s struggle against murderous extremists, and NATO’s bloody difficulties in propping up a discredited and corrupt Afghan regime in order to prevent the country from falling back into the hands of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.	以上仅仅是2010年可能正在等着我们的巨大麻烦之冰山一角，还有很多问题没有谈到，比如以色列在西岸的定居点建设问题、巴基斯坦对抗嗜杀成性的极端分子的斗争、以及北约为支撑起一个声名狼藉、且腐化成风的阿富汗政权（此举旨在防止阿富汗重新落入塔利班与基地组织之手）所需面对的血腥困难等等。


Still, however gloomy the outlook, we do stagger on – the flowers still bloom, the breeze stirs the trees, the birds sing, and children laugh.	然而无论前景多么黯淡，我们蹒跚前行的脚步却不能停下——因为鸟语花香、清风拂树之景如常，笑容也依旧会绽放在孩子们的脸上。


The rest of us can enjoy life while Obama does the heavy lifting.	当奥巴马担起重负之时，其他人尽可享受生活。


A Year of Anniversaries and Uncertainties	具有纪念意义和不确定性的一年


ALBERTA – As China enters the “Year of the Ox,” there is much to reflect on from the past 12 months and even more to speculate about regarding the coming year.	阿尔伯塔——随着中国迈入“牛年”，我们要思考过去12个月中的许多问题，即将到来的一年则有更多的问题需要深思熟虑。


2008 began with devastating snowstorms that paralyzed most of central and southern China’s transport system, interrupting lives and causing severe material damage.	2008年伊始的破坏性暴风雪致使中国中南部多数交通系统陷入瘫痪、人们的生活陷入中断并导致了严重的物质损失。


Then came the riots in Tibet, which caught the government off guard, followed by embarrassing protests over China’s Olympic torch relay in several Western and Asian countries.	接下来在政府猝不及防的时刻爆发了西藏叛乱，而后若干西方和亚洲国家又在中国的奥运火炬传递仪式上演出了令人尴尬的抗议问题。


Then, as Chinese were wondering why 2008, a year of supposed good fortune marked by the lucky number eight, had started with so much misfortune, a deadly earthquake struck Sichuan province, killing 80,000 people and leaving millions homeless.	而后，正当中国人奇怪2008年这个以幸运数字8结尾的人们眼中的幸运年份为什么一开始就会发生一连串的不幸，致命的地震又在四川省发生，这次地震夺去了80，000人的生命，致使数百万人无家可归。


Emerging more united from this tragedy, the country welcomed the world to the long-anticipated Olympics, which were remarkably successful, but were soon superseded by the tainted-dairy-product scandal in which many babies became ill, and some died.	这次悲剧让中国人更加团结一心，中国在期盼已久的奥运上欢迎世界各国的人民，奥运会取得了令人赞叹的成功，但很快却又被乳制品的污染丑闻所取代，这次乳制品污染事件导致许多婴儿生病，甚至夺去了一些婴儿的生命。


In contrast to last year, when the rush home for the lunar New Year celebration was hampered by freak storms, this year millions of migrant workers have already returned to their rural homes.	去年那次反常的暴风雪阻断了人们回家庆祝农历新年的旅程，而今年则恰恰相反，数以百万计的离乡民工已经回到了他们在农村的家中。


Many will be staying there, because the global economic downturn has hit China hard, costing them their jobs.	许多人将会留在家里，因为全球经济放缓给中国造成了沉重的打击，致使他们失去了工作。


Littered with a host of extremely sensitive anniversaries, 2009 could prove even more dramatic and unpredictable than 2008.	夹杂着一系列极为敏感的纪念日，2009年可能会被事实证明比2008年更难预测，也更富戏剧性。


Fast approaching is not only the March anniversary of last year’s disturbances in Tibet, but also the 50th anniversary of the Tibetan unrest in 1959 that led to the exile of the Dalai Lama and his supporters.	很快到来的不仅是去年西藏三月动乱的纪念日，西藏1959年动乱的50周年纪念日也紧随其后，达赖喇嘛及其支持者在那次动乱以后开始了国外流亡生活。


Since the riots last spring, China’s government has taken many pro-active measures, even adopting a “Serf Liberation Day,” to defend its record in Tibet of the past 50 years, while continuing to talk with the Dalai Lama’s representatives.	去年春天的暴乱以后，中国政府已经采取了许多积极的措施，甚至设立了一个“农奴解放日”，以捍卫过去50年中其在西藏的记录，并继续与达赖喇嘛的代表进行谈判。


But it has also implemented heavy-handed police and military controls.	与此同时中国政府也实行了严厉的政策和军事控制。


Then comes the 20th anniversary of the June 4 crackdown on the Tiananmen Square student demonstrations.	接下来是天安门广场镇压六四学生示威活动的20周年纪念日。


Calls to re-evaluate the official response began when President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao came to power seven years ago.	胡锦涛主席和温家宝总理7年前就职时，就开始听到重新评价官方应对措施的呼吁。


But recently the pressure has intensified, especially with the publication of “Charter 08,” a manifesto signed by hundreds of Chinese intellectuals, journalists, lawyers, and ordinary citizens, condemning the government’s human rights record and demanding more democratic reform, press freedom, governmental transparency, and societal openness.	但最近这种压力有所增大，特别是在“08宪章”发表之后，这是一份由数百名中国学者、记者、律师和普通公民签署的宣言，谴责政府的人权记录并要求实行更多的民主改革、言论自由、政府透明和社会开放的政策。


Although neither Hu nor Wen were directly involved in the crackdown, they nonetheless must tread carefully.	尽管胡温都没有直接参与镇压行动，但他们也必须在处理问题时保持谨慎。


Doing everything possible to avoid a repeat of the 1989 scenario may well be the Communist Party leadership’s top priority in 2009.	尽一切力量避免1989年的一幕重演很可能是共产党领导层在2009年的首要任务。


And, given the economic slowdown, widening income disparity, rising unemployment, and growing popular discontent over corruption, China’s leaders will have their hands full.	同时，由于经济放缓、收入差距拉大、失业率升高和腐败引起的民怨加大，中国领导人将面临着严峻的任务。


Of course, the inspiration for almost every political reform movement in China is the May 4th Movement of 1919, when Chinese students protested against a weak and corrupt government and called for China to strengthen itself by adopting two key Western ideals: democracy and science.	当然，中国几乎一切政治改革运动的灵感都来自于1919年的五四运动，当时的中国学生抗议腐败虚弱的政府，呼吁追求两个关键的西方理想：民主和科学，从而增强自己的实力。


As the 90th anniversary approaches, China has made great strides in science, but still has a long way to go in terms of democracy.	在纪念五四运动九十周年之际，中国在科学领域已经取得了长足的进步，但在民主领域却还有很长的路要走。


This year also marks the 50th anniversary of the Great Leap Forward, when 20-40 million Chinese died of starvation, as well as the tenth anniversary of the government’s ban on Falun gong, an organization of self-claimed religious and meditation practitioners that has challenged the Communist Party’s legitimacy.	今年也是大跃进50周年，有2000－4000万中国人在大跃进中饿死。 还有政府取缔法轮功10周年，这个自封的宗教和冥想组织挑战了共产党的合法性。


Though largely discredited inside the country, this militant movement still has a following around the world, and further protests may come at any time and in unpredictable forms.	尽管在国内基本上已经声名狼藉，这个好战组织仍然在世界各地有一批追随者，而且可能以意想不到的形式在任何时候爆发进一步的抗议活动。


While some of the plethora of anniversaries that China’s leaders must confront are potentially very destabilizing, several have, and will, work in their favor.	尽管中国领导人必须面对的诸多纪念日中有些可能会威胁到稳定，但也有几个纪念日能为政府所用。


For example, the 30th anniversary of China’s reform movement and the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States has been a much-celebrated event this January.	比如，今年1月就举行了中国改革开放30周年纪念日和中美建交纪念日的大规模庆祝活动。


More importantly, October will mark the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Peoples’ Republic of China, an occasion that the Party will commemorate in grand style.	更为重要的是，10月将迎来中华人民共和国成立60周年，党会举办盛大的活动来纪念这一时刻。


After all, the Middle Kingdom has re-emerged as the world’s third-largest economy (having recently replaced Germany), sent astronauts into space, dispatched advanced naval destroyers to the Horn of Africa, and become the largest holder of US foreign debt.	归根结底，中国已经作为世界第三大经济体（不久前刚刚取代了德国的位置）重新崛起、成功地将宇航员送入了太空、向非洲之角派遣了先进的海军驱逐舰、并且成为持有美国外债最多的债主。


China will want to flex its muscles and proclaim to the world that the Party has delivered the goods to its people, while making the country strong and prosperous.	中国将要展示自己的力量，同时向全世界宣告党给中国民众带来了好处，实现了国家的强大与繁荣。


As the worst recession since the1930’s continues, both the American and Chinese economies are bound to suffer further setbacks.	随着从20世纪30年代以来最严重经济衰退的深入，美国和中国的经济肯定会遇到更多的难题。


There is no guarantee that protectionist and xenophobic sentiment in America will not hit China-US relations, or that the economic downturn will not fuel new unrest in China.	我们无法确保美国的保护主义和仇外情绪不会影响到中美关系，也无法确保经济下行不会在中国引发新的动荡。


The world should not misjudge the effect of such troubles on China.	但世界不该错误地估计这些麻烦在中国产生的效果。


Nor should it forget China’s fierce display of nationalism in response to Western protests of the Olympic touch relay, the extraordinary patriotism that swept the country in response to the Sichuan earthquake, and the national pride evinced by the Olympic Games.	人们也不该忘记西方在抗议奥运火炬接力时中国民族主义情绪的强烈展示、四川地震时席卷中国的非同寻常的爱国主义浪潮，以及奥运会向外界展示的中国的民族自豪感。


But, in 2009, it would not hurt if China’s leadership also took note of the need to continue assuring the world of its commitment to a “peaceful rise,” and to do so by boldly addressing some of the unresolved issues that this year’s anniversaries will highlight.	可是，在2009年，中国领导人如果关注继续向世界兑现其“和平崛起”承诺的必要性，并大胆解决今年一系列纪念日将进一步凸显的悬而未决的问题，将不会给国家的发展带来任何坏处。


A Year of US-China Discord?	中美纷争的一年？


NEW YORK – In 2009, Forbes magazine named US President Barack Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao the “world’s most powerful people.”	发自纽约 —— 就在 2009 年，《福布斯》杂志把美国总统奥巴马和中国国家主席胡锦涛并列为 “ 世界最有权势的人 ” 。


In 2010, we will discover that neither has the power to keep US-Chinese relations on track.	然而到了 2010 年，我们会发现这两位都无法将中美关系维持在一个正常的轨道上。


That is bad news for those who believe that US-China cooperation is essential for reviving the global economy, meeting the challenge of climate change, containing threats of nuclear proliferation, and managing a host of other problems without borders.	这对于那些将中美合作视为重振全球经济，迎接气候变化挑战，遏制核扩散威胁，以及跨国合作应对各类难题所必不可少的前提的人来说，这是个坏消息。


It is also bad news for America and China.	而与此同时，这对中美两国来说，也是一个坏消息。


Ten is the number to watch: America's 10% unemployment and China’s potential 10% GDP growth are set to collide like weather fronts generating a storm.	10 是个值得关注的数字：美国 10% 的失业率和中国 10% 的潜在 GDP 增长注定了两国要发生摩擦，正如不同气候相遇会产生风暴一样。


American populism will meet Chinese pride. And the fevered political climate created by US mid-term elections means that the world’s most important bilateral relationship is headed for real turbulence this year.	美国的民粹主义将与中国的傲慢态度直接碰撞，而由美国中期大选所营造的狂热政治气氛则意味着，世界上最重要的双边关系将在今年走向真正的动荡。


America and China now live with a kind of mutually assured economic destruction, and both presidents know it.	中美双方目前无疑正处于一种相互毁灭的经济关系之下，而双方领导人对此也都心知肚明。


The US needs China to finance its mounting debt, and China needs Americans to buy its products.	美国需要中国为其巨额债务融资，而中国则需要美国人购买“中国制造”。


Indeed, the short, sharp shock that China absorbed from the financial crisis has proven that its economic growth still depends on consumer demand in America, Europe, and Japan – and will for some time to come.	事实上，中国受到来自金融危机的短暂而又猛烈的冲击证明了一点，那就是该国的经济增长仍然依赖来自美国，欧洲和日本的消费需求 —— 而且这种态势还将持续一段时间。


Chinese leaders would like to shift China’s growth model toward greater reliance on domestic consumption, but that is a long-term project.	中国领导人期望能把中国的经济增长模式更多地向内需方面转化，但这是一个长期的工程。


For the foreseeable future, they will depend on local manufacturers to create the jobs that protect both China’s development goals and the Communist Party’s monopoly on domestic political power.	在可预见的未来，他们将依靠国内生产者来创造就业，以维护其发展目标以及共产党对国内政权的垄断。


Fear of shuttered factories and lost wages pushed China’s government last year to launch a massive stimulus program to protect jobs and restore growth.	出于对工厂倒闭和降薪的忧虑，去年，中国政府启动了大规模的刺激计划以保证就业和经济增长的恢复。


It worked. China, with much less exposure than the West to toxic banking assets, is off to the races again as America struggles to its feet.	这套计划很奏效，由于跟西方相比中国国内银行的有毒资产较少，当美国刚刚才从危机中直起腰来来的时候，中国已经再次上路了。


As long as voters are worried about their wallets, Democrats and Republicans will compete to defend American workers. As November’s elections approach, many US lawmakers will demand that the country with 10% unemployment persuade the country with 10% growth to stop bending trade rules and manipulating the value of its currency.	对此在最近一次的佩尤民调中，有


China	而在中国领导人这方面，他们会好奇为什么身处华盛顿的自由市场领导者会威胁要颁布更多的保护主义政策。 那是因为随着中国经济增长的加速，贸易失衡将增加美国的挫折感，加上选举临近，美国两大政党的立法者都会在各个议题上威胁对中国采取惩罚性行动。


The Obama administration has already moved against Chinese exports of tires and steel pipes, but this year’s confrontation will extend well beyond trade.	但尽管奥巴马政府已经对中国出口的轮胎和钢管采取抵制行动，今年的冲突还是会远远超出贸易的范畴。


When Congress takes up the debate over climate change, for example, and some lawmakers call for a cap-and-trade system, others will demand to know why America should accept binding commitments to limit emissions while the Chinese refuse.	比如当美国国会就气候变化问题展开辩论，其中一些立法者呼吁建立一个温室气体总量限制和排放交易系统时，那么另一些立法者就要问，为什么在中国声言拒绝的同时美国却要接受一个有约束力的承诺方案呢？


China	近年以来，中国政府大量投资于国有企业以及国内排名前列的私有企业，其目的主要是想在确保中国能从市场力量中获利的同时领导阶层也能捞到尽可能多的好处。 为了扶持这些国有强势集团增加其市场权重，政府通常以牺牲外国竞争对手为代价来支持他们，而美国恶意的言辞和贸易行动将给中国领导人提供扩大这种趋势的口实。


The Obama administration also wants China to share more of the burdens of international leadership.	奥巴马政府也希望中国能承担更多世界领导者的责任。


This includes helping the US to apply pressure on countries like Iran, Sudan, and Myanmar that continue to defy the will of the international community – and with which those Chinese state-owned companies have established lucrative commercial relationships that serve the Chinese government’s economic and political interests.	这包括了协助美国向诸如伊朗，苏丹和缅甸这类中国国有企业已经在当地建立了利润可观的商业联系的，为中国政府的经济和政治利益服务，同时又不断藐视国际社会意志的国家施加压力。


China’s leaders, unwilling to compromise on any issue that might undermine their domestic goals, continue to resist.	而中国的领导人也不愿意在任何会损害其国内发展目标的议题上做出屈服，故而将继续采取抵制的态度。


A full-scale trade war is unlikely. Both governments know the stakes are too high for both economies, and Obama and Hu will continue to work hard to try to keep things moving in a constructive direction.	全面的贸易战看来不大可能爆发，因为两国政府都深知其中蕴含的风险对各自经济来说都太大了，所以，奥巴马和胡锦涛将继续努力使事态向建设性的方向上发展。


But neither president can guarantee that recrimination and reproach will not take on a life of its own.	但双方的领导人都无法保证在此过程中就不会出现指责和批评。


For example, if another product-safety issue involving Chinese imports makes headlines in the US, things could move quickly from disappointment to real anger.	比如说，如果中国出口产品的安全问题再次出现在美国报刊头条的话，那么民众的情绪可能很快就会从失望发展到彻底愤怒。


Most Americans care little about China's currency policy or its stance on intellectual property rights. But if Chinese-made products threaten their health and safety, there are sure to be opportunistic lawmakers ready to fan the flames.	虽然大部分美国人都不关心中国的货币政策或者其对保护知识产权的立场，但如果中国制造的产品威胁到了他们的健康和安全，那么可以肯定，必定会有善于投机的立法者准备好出来煽风点火了。


The 2008 US presidential election was the last in which the overwhelming majority of American voters neither knew nor cared about where the candidates stood on China.	因此， 2008 年的美国大选将会是最后一场绝大部分美国选民既不了解也不关心候选人对中国的立场的选举。


Officials in Beijing, increasingly sensitive to US criticism, will prove as ready to trade accusations as goods and services or good ideas.	而对美国批评越来越敏感的北京官员也将证明自己已经准备好跟对方在贸易指控上你来我往，就像两国从前互相交易商品和服务或好点子那样。


That is why the “world’s most powerful people” will now have a much harder time working together to meet today’s toughest challenges.	这也是为什么两位 “ 世界最有权势的人 ” 现在更加难以合作来应对当今最棘手挑战的原因。


Disciplining the Sharing Economy	规范共享经济


SINGAPORE – The increasing ability of people to exchange goods, services, and labor directly, via online platforms, is transforming how modern economies operate.	新加坡—人们通过在线平台直接交换商品、服务和劳动的恩呢管理越来越强，这改变了现代经济的运转方式。


But to ensure that the rise of the “sharing economy” works efficiently and improves conditions for all parties, some regulation is needed.	但为了保证“共享经济”的崛起有效进行并能够改善所有各方的境况，需要一些监管来约束它。


People can now circumvent many traditional service businesses.	如今，人们可以绕过许多传统服务企业。 人们可以使用Uber、 Lyft或 RelayRides共享交通工具；


They can share transport, using Uber, Lyft, or RelayRides; provide accommodation through Airbnb; tender household chores via TaskRabbit, Fiverr, or Mechanical Turk; and arrange their grocery deliveries using Favor and Instacart.	通过Airbnb提供住宿； 通过TaskRabbit、 Fiverr或 Mechanical Turk提供家政服务；


Similarly, crowdfunding platforms, such as Kickstarter and Lending Club, allow start-ups to raise grants, loans, or investment from the general population, rather than relying on a financial intermediary.	使用Favor 和 Instacart安排送货上门。 类似地，Kickstarter和 Lending Club等众筹平台让创业企业得以从普罗大众手中筹集援助金、贷款或投资，而不需要依靠金融中介。


By cutting out the middleman, these online platforms empower individuals, reduce transaction costs, and create a more inclusive economy.	这些在线平台绕过了中介，让个人大展身手，降低了交易成本，创造了更加包容的经济。


But their evolution is far from straightforward, and many such services will require careful regulation if they are to flourish – as protests and court rulings in Europe against Uber demonstrate.	但它们的演变绝不是直来直去的，要想繁荣，这类服务中有许多需要小心监管——欧洲针对Uber的示威和不利裁决就是明证。


One reason why Uber and other sharing-economy pioneers are so disruptive is that they represent a highly efficient form of peer-to-peer capitalism.	Uber和其他共享经济先锋为何如此具有破坏力？ 一个原因是代表着一种效率极高的点对点资本主义形式。


Buyers and sellers can agree directly on the price of every transaction, and business reputations depend on transparent customer feedback, generating continuous pressure to improve performance.	买家和卖家可以就每笔交易直接商谈价格，商业声誉取决于透明的客户反馈，这带来了持续不断的改善表现的压力。


The sharing economy also boosts entrepreneurship, as people see new ways to fill gaps in the market.	共享经济还刺激了企业家精神，不断有人发现新的填补市场空白的方式。


What began as a simple way for households to boost incomes – by renting out one’s apartment or car – has become a formidable disruptive force.	起出只不过是让家庭提高收入的简单方法——让你出租公寓或汽车——后来演变为可怕的破坏力量。


Forbes magazine estimates that the sharing economy’s 2013 revenues topped $3.5 billion.	《福布斯》杂志估计，2013年共享经济总收入在35亿美元以上。


During the 2014 soccer World Cup in Brazil, a country with a chronic shortage of hotel rooms, more than 100,000 people used home-sharing Web sites to find accommodation.	2014年世界杯期间，10万多人通过住房共享网站在饭店房间长期短缺的巴西找到了住宿场所。


The opportunity to buy or sell has also become much more inclusive: half of Airbnb hosts in the United States have low to moderate incomes, and 90% of hosts globally rent their primary residence.	买卖机会也变得更加包容：一半的Airbnb美国房东处于中低收入水平，而全球90%的房东出租的是他们的主宅。


Several cities have recognized the benefits to be gained from promoting a sharing economy.	不少城市已认识到促进共享经济所带来的好处。


Seattle, for example, has deregulated its transportation and hospitality sectors, challenging the city’s taxi and hotel monopolies.	比如，西雅图减少了交通和饭店业的管制，这对该市出租车和饭店垄断商构成了挑战。


But economic change of this magnitude inevitably has its opponents, some with legitimate concerns.	但如此程度的经济变化难免会招致反对者，其中一些是出于法律担忧。


Do peer-to-peer businesses undercut incumbents by not paying similar taxes?	不用纳税的点对点商业是否会因此削弱现有商家？


Are such businesses – flush with venture capital – running their operations at a loss in order to capture market share?	点对点商家——风险资本的宠儿——是否在亏本运营争夺市场份额？


And should these firms be allowed to access telecoms data to learn about customers’ habits and movements, thus giving them an unfair advantage?	是否应该允许这些企业获得通信数据研究客户习惯和动作，从而获得不公平的优势？


Some firms have set their own operating standards.	一些企业已经设定了自己的业务标准。


TaskRabbit, which subcontracts household jobs like assembling Ikea furniture, requires participants to pay a minimum wage, and has launched an insurance scheme to protect its US workers.	组装宜家家具等家政职位的转包商TaskRabbit要求参与者支付最低工资，并成立了保险制度以保护美国工人。


On the other hand, technology platforms that use “algorithmic scheduling” to align workers’ shifts and hours with business cycles automatically, continue to disrupt family life and cause unnecessary stress.	另一方面，使用“算法调度”将工人的变化和时间与商业周期自动匹配的高科技平台仍在破坏家庭生活，引起不必要的压力。


Policymakers need to stay ahead of these sharing-economy trends.	决策者应该超前于这些共享经济趋势。


As services and software converge, public officials must enhance their technical skills and work with the private sector to ensure market fairness and efficiency.	由于服务和软件的趋同，公共官员必须加强技术技能、与私人部门共同保证市场公平和效率。


For example, they must prevent the manipulation of reviews and other practices that mislead consumers trying to assess the quality of a company’s service.	比如，他们必须阻止操纵评价和其他误导试图了解某公司服务质量的消费者的行为。


Airbnb and the online travel agent Expedia allow reviews only by customers who have actually used their services; that could become a regulatory norm throughout the sharing economy.	Airbnb和在线旅行社Expedia只允许实际使用过服务的客户评价； 这有可能成为整个共享经济的监管规范。


Governments also have a broader role to play.	政府也可以起到更广的作用。


As more people adopt “portfolio careers” – relying on several sources of income, rather than a single job – it becomes harder to collect and analyze labor-market data.	随着跟多的人拥有了“职业生涯组合”——依靠多重收入源而不仅仅是一个工作——收集和分析劳动力市场数据变得更加困难。


Governments will need new accounting and reporting standards to calculate wages, forecast incomes, and categorize workers within the growing ranks of the self-employed.	政府需要新的会计和报告准则来计算工资、预测收入、在归类越来越多各种的自由职业者。


Such standards, coupled with data-sharing guidelines, will help determine when, and how much, to tax sharing-economy transactions.	这些准则加上数据共享指导原则能有助于确定何时对共享经济交易征税、征多少税。


None of this will be easy.	所有这些都不容易。


Though self-employment and part-time labor are hardly new, the sharing economy is different, because it allows freelancers to become “nano-workers,” shifting among employers not just monthly or even weekly, but several times a day.	尽管自由职业和兼职劳动并非新鲜事，但共享经济不同，因为它让自由职业者变成了“纳米工人”（nano-worker），他们改换雇主不是以月乃至于周计算，而是以日计算。


As US and European unemployment rates remain high and wages stagnate, people increasingly rely on such diverse income streams.	美国和欧洲的失业率仍处于高位，工资也停滞不前，因此人们越来越多地依靠这些多样化收入源。


Today, almost 27 million Americans survive on part-time and project-based incomes.	如今，近2,700万美国人靠兼职和临时项目收入过活。


With nearly half of all services jobs in the OECD at risk of automation, the sharing economy can smooth the disruption caused to displaced workers as they upgrade their skills.	经合组织国家有近一半的服务业岗位面临被自动化的局面，共享经济能够让造成工人失业的破坏平滑发生，使他们能从容更新技能。


Indeed, sharing-economy data can help governments identify those workers at greatest risk and support their retraining.	事实上，共享经济数据有助于政府识别风险最高的工人，为他们提供再培训支持。


The sharing economy reflects the convergence of entrepreneurialism and technological connectivity.	共享经济反映了企业家精神和技术连通性的趋同。


Taxi drivers and hotel owners may feel threatened, but the sharing economy has the potential to increase and redistribute earnings in cities that are already struggling with poverty and inequality.	出租车司机和饭店所有者也许会感到威胁，但共享经济有可能在陷入贫困和不平等陷阱的城市增加收入、改变收入分配。


Those who are displaced will have far better prospects in the more prosperous and inclusive environment that the sharing economy promises to create.	共享经济有望带来更繁荣、更包容的社会，在这样的社会里，失业工人的前景要光明得多。


A \	投给欧洲怀疑主义的


The drubbing that many governments suffered in the recent elections to the European Union Parliament places them in a difficult position as they maneuver ahead of this week's EU Summit.	很多政府在不久前的欧盟议会选举中遭受重创使它们筹备本周欧盟峰会的工作变得困难重重。


Only an incurable optimist can hope that the summit will bring glory to any of them.	只有无可救药的乐观主义者才寄希望于峰会给它们带来荣耀。


The summit has two purposes: to finalize the text of a new EU Constitution, and to appoint the next President of the Commission.	这次峰会有双重目标：最终确定新的欧盟宪法，和任命下一任委员会主席。


These negotiations will be much harder in view of the spectacular repudiation of a number of key governments at the ballot box, together with the potent rise of protest and Euroskeptic parties in several member states.	考虑到几个重要政府对投票抱有顽固的批评立场，以及若干成员国内部抗议和欧洲怀疑主义党派的势力陡增，将要进行的谈判面临着巨大的困难。


The problem for Europe's leaders is that their own repudiation by voters does not necessarily carry the same message as the rise of the Euroskeptic parties.	欧洲领导人面临的问题是：他们在投票中的失败并不一定与欧洲怀疑主义党派的崛起传递的信息相同。


The record slump in the vote for Gerhard Schröder's governing Social Democrats in Germany has little to do with his policy towards Europe, but a great deal to do with the perceived failure of his economic policies - and the persistence of low growth and high unemployment - at home.	德国选举中格哈德·施罗德领导的社民党创记录的一落千丈与它的欧洲政策没多大关系，但却与经济政策的失败和国内长期以来的低增长和高失业率密切相关。


Despite nationalist parties' success in France, the same is true of the setback for President Jacques Chirac's centre-right party.	尽管国民党在法国取得了胜利，雅克·希拉克总统领导下的中右翼党派的失败也源于此因。


In Britain, by contrast, where the economy is strong and unemployment low, the main factor behind the collapse in the vote for the governing Labor Party has been anger with Tony Blair's determination to go to war in Iraq beside George Bush.	那里的经济增长强劲，失业率也维持在较低的水平。 导致执政的工党在选举中一败涂地的主要因素是：人们对托尼·布莱尔与乔治·布什在伊拉克并肩作战的决定满怀愤怒。


Nevertheless, the rise of Euroskeptic parties, in a number of countries including Britain, France, Belgium, Poland, and the Czech Republic, has worrying implications for a summit meeting whose purpose is to take European integration a small but unmistakable step forward.	无论怎样，欧洲怀疑主义党派在英、法、比利时、波兰和捷克共和国崛起的涵义令人忧虑，对以逐步稳定地促进欧洲融合为己任的本届峰会更是如此。


In Britain, in particular, the spectacular surge of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) can only strengthen the government's long-standing latent Euroskepticism.	特别是在英国，英国独立党（UKIP）蔚为壮观的崛起只能使政府久已隐藏的欧洲怀疑主义暴露出来。


The proposed constitution will contain a Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is intended to enhance the political and moral legitimacy of the EU.	拟议中的宪法将包含《基本权利宪章》，旨在提高欧盟政治和道德的合法性。


But will it really enhance the rights of EU citizens?	但《宪章》真的能改善欧盟公民的权利吗？


Or, as the British government insists, will it merely be a declaratory document that only describes rights already existing under national legislation in the member states.	还是像英国政府强调的那样，沦为一部重复成员国现有法律规定权利的文件声明？


The draft constitution would enhance the policymaking powers of the Union, with a bit more majority voting in the Council of Ministers, and a stronger role for the European Parliament.	宪法草案将通过增强部长理事会的多数票机制和欧洲议会所起的作用，改善欧盟组织的决策能力。


But, despite Tony Blair's one-time declaration that he would take Britain "into the heart of Europe," he remains viscerally opposed to the prospect of further integration, and he will resist any new encroachment on British sovereignty in his "red line" areas of tax, foreign policy, and EU budget finance.	但尽管托尼·布莱尔曾经宣布他会把英国变成"欧洲的中心"，但仍然发自内心地反对深层次融合，阻止在税收、外交和欧盟预算等"红线区域"内对英国主权的新一轮侵蚀。


Blair's Euroskepticism is understandable insofar as it chimes with the British mood.	布莱尔的欧洲怀疑主义与英国的总体情绪相互一致，因此很容易被人理解。


Opinion polls consistently show that British voters are unenthusiastic about the EU, and the picture is confirmed by the latest Eurobarometer poll, conducted throughout the Union for the Commission - but before the recent enlargement from 15 to 25 member states.	民意调查一直显示：英国选民对欧盟缺乏热情，这一点也被欧洲民意调查局随后的调查所证实，最近由15国扩展到25国之前，这次调查在原有15国的范围内广泛进行。


One question always asked in this poll is whether voters tend to trust or mistrust different institutions, such as national parliaments, national governments, and the European Union.	上述调查中始终涉及的一个问题是：选民们是否相信像国家议会、国民政府和欧洲联盟这样的政治机构。


Overall, the general level of trust in the European Union is not high: only 41% of voters tend to trust the EU, whereas 42% tend not to trust it.	总的来讲，对欧盟的信任程度并不算高：只有41%的选民选择信任欧盟，而有42%的人不愿信任它。


But in Britain, the figures are dramatically different: only 19% trust the EU, while 55% distrust it.	英国的数字却大不相同：只有19%的被调查者相信欧盟，而55%的人选择了不信任。


By contrast, the European Parliament has a better reputation than the EU as a whole: the average EU-wide level of trust in the European Parliament is 54%, whereas in Britain it is 30%.	相对来讲，欧洲议会从总体上比欧盟更具信誉：欧洲内部对议会的平均信任比率高达54%，即便英国也达到了30%。


Across the EU, 48% think EU membership is a good thing; in Britain, this figure falls to 29%.	在欧盟内部，48%的被调查者认为成为欧盟成员是件好事，而在英国，这个数字降到了29%。


On virtually every question, British voters are less enthusiastic about the EU than voters in any other country.	几乎在所有问题上，英国选民都比其它国家的选民更缺乏热情。


One might think that Britons' aversion to the EU would be reflected in support for, and pride in, their national institutions.	有人可能认为：英国人讨厌欧盟，可能更支持国内机构。


Not so.	事实并非如此。


British trust in the European Parliament may stand at only 30%; but trust in the Westminster Parliament is much lower, at only 19% - the lowest figure in the EU.	英国选民对欧洲议会的信任率可能维持在30%，但对威斯敏斯特议会的信任率可能更低，只有19%，创下了欧盟的最低记录。


Trust in the national government is a bit higher, but still only 25%, while trust in national political parties is only 10%.	对国家政府的信任率略有升高，但也只达到25%，而对国家政党的信任率只有可怜的10%。


Both figures are, again, the lowest in the EU.	这两个数字也创下了欧盟国家的最低记录。


Voters in other states have more confidence in EU institutions, but their opinion of their own institutions is also low.	其它国家的选民对欧盟机构更有信心，但对本国机构的信任度也令人忧虑。


In France, 57% trust the European Parliament, but only 29% trust the French parliament; while the corresponding figures for Germany are 51% and 23%.	在法国，57%的选民信任欧洲议会，但信任法国议会的只有29%，而德国的两个数字分别为51%和23%。


But the puzzle in the poll is that, even if Europe's voters are unenthusiastic about the EU and its existing institutions as they stand now, 65% of them would support a common foreign policy for Europe, and 72% would support a common defense and security policy; even in Britain, there is 52% support for the idea of a common defense policy.	但调查结果令人不解的地方是：即便欧洲选民对欧盟及其现存机构缺乏热情，但65%的人支持统一欧洲外交政策，72%的人支持统一国防和安全政策，即便在英国，支持共同防卫政策的比例也有52%。


This may be a reaction to the American-led war in Iraq; but Tony Blair will exclude it precisely for that reason, and a common European defense policy without Britain makes little sense.	这可能是对美国领导的对伊战争做出的反应，但正因为此托尼·布莱尔一定会投票否决，而统一的欧洲防卫政策如果没有英国的参与会变得毫无意义。


The predicament for Europe's leaders at this week's summit is that they stand at the cusp of an unstable process of European integration.	本周峰会上欧洲领导人的困境是身处欧洲不稳定融合进程的风口浪尖。


With the accession of 10 new members, the EU must become more integrated if it is to function.	随着10个新成员的最终加入，欧盟要想发挥作用就必须加速融合。


But it is not at all clear that those governments that would normally support more integration can sell it to their disillusioned electorates.	但支持融合进程的政府根本没有把握说服国内倍感失望的选民。


Tony Blair has promised a referendum on the new EU constitution, which he cannot possibly win.	托尼·布莱尔承诺举行欧盟新宪法的全民公决，在全民公决中他根本不可能有获胜的把握。


The central question will be whether Europe's "leaders" deliberately play for failure, in the hope that the problem will go away.	现在的核心问题是：欧洲领导人是否在飞蛾扑火，保持问题自行消失的不切实际的希望。


Latin America’s Foxy Leaders	拉丁美洲的狐狸式领导人


SANTIAGO – “Every country gets the leaders it deserves,” the French counter-revolutionary Joseph de Maistre quipped.	圣地亚哥—“什么样的国家配什么样的领导人，”法国反革命分子约瑟夫·德梅斯特尔（Joseph de Maistre）嘲讽道。


He was wrong.	他错了。


The countries of Latin America did not deserve the blustering demagogues and iron-fisted generals who, until recently, often occupied the seats of government.	拉丁美洲口若悬河的煽动家和铁腕将军配不上拉丁美洲国家，但直到最近，他们常常把持着政府职位。


A look at Venezuela or Nicaragua reminds us that the demagogues and the populists are not yet gone.	委内瑞拉和尼加拉瓜的情况提醒我们，煽动家和民促主义者没有消失。


But a new kind of leader – moderate, intellectually humble, and prone to gradualism – has been in ascendance since the 1990s.	但一种新的领导人——他们温和，知书达理，常常采取渐进主义——自20世纪90年代以来取得了优势。


This is the kind of leadership Latin America does indeed deserve.	这才是真正配得上拉丁美洲的领导力类型。


The elder statesman of this generation of pragmatists died last week.	这一代务实主义者的老大哥上周逝世了。


In a continent of loud-mouthed leaders, Patricio Aylwin, who led Chile from dictatorship to democracy in 1990, was an oddity: a soft-spoken professor whose great love was the study of the more abstruse aspects of administrative law.	在这个领导人喜欢高谈阔论的大洲，20世纪90年代领导智利从独裁走向民主的埃尔文（Patricio Aylwin）是一个异类：他是一位轻声细语的教授，热爱研究更加艰深的行政法。


His legacy sheds light on what moderate leaders in Latin America must do if they are to succeed.	他的遗产是一盏明灯，为拉丁美洲温和派领导人指出了想要成功必须怎么做。


Aylwin faced one of the toughest moral choices any leader of a newly re-established democracy can confront: how far to push prosecution of those who had abducted, tortured, and killed thousands of Chileans during General Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship.	埃尔文面临着任何新建立的民主国家的领导人所面临的最艰难的道德选择之一：对在皮诺切特将军独裁期间绑架、虐待和杀害成千上万智利人的人的起诉应该进行到何种程度。


His answer remains controversial to this day.	他的答案至今仍有争议。


He would, he said, pursue justice “to the extent [that it is] possible.”	他说，他将追求“尽可能大”的正义。


At first, the idea seems shocking: Isn’t justice supposed to be an absolute moral imperative?	乍一看，这一思想令人震惊：难道正义不是绝对的道德使命吗？


It is.	是的。


But history shows that it is an imperative that cannot always be perfectly achieved.	但历史表明这是一个并不总是能够完美实现的使命。


Obtaining justice, however imperfect, is itself a moral goal.	实现正义，不管多么不完美，其本身即是一个道德目标。


Aylwin understood this, and acted accordingly.	埃尔文明白这一点，并据此行动。


The coalition he led boldly took up Pinochet’s challenge to participate in a 1988 referendum on extending his rule, won the vote against all odds, and in 1990 removed the dictator from office.	他所领导的联盟勇敢地接受了皮诺切特的挑战，参与到1988年关于延长其统治的全民公决，排除万难赢得胜利，并在1990年将独裁者赶下台。


If there was ever a case of a dictator going not by the sword, but by the mighty pen, this was it.	如果说曾经有独裁者是被有力的笔而不是剑赶下台，智利就是其中之一。


Once in office, the new democratic government decided that before punishment could be meted out, the whole truth about the violation of human rights should be established.	上台执政后，新的民主政府决定，在可以给出惩罚前，应该弄清楚关于侵害人权的全部事实。


Chile’s “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” became a model for similar bodies established in the 1990s in South Africa and other countries worldwide.	智利“真相和协调委员会”（Truth and Reconciliation Commission）成为20世纪90年代南非和全世界其他国家成立的类似机构的榜样。


Aylwin went on television to share the grim truth with citizens.	埃尔文现身电视，与公民分享残酷的事实。


His voice breaking, he apologized on behalf of the state for the crimes committed.	他声音哽咽地代表国家为犯下的罪行致歉。


The voices of Chileans of my generation still break when we recall that moment.	我这一代智利人回忆起这一时刻无不眼含热泪。


The courts did their job.	法庭尽到了责任。


Pinochet never saw the inside of a cell, but many of his henchmen – including the head of his secret police – served long sentences.	皮诺切特从未进班房，但他的许多爪牙——包括秘密警察头子——被判长期徒刑。


How many countries emerging from dark authoritarian rule (one thinks of Russia, East Germany, Spain, Portugal, or Brazil) can claim the same?	有多少从黑暗极权统治走出的国家（你可以想到俄罗斯、东德、西班牙、葡萄牙或巴西）能做到这一点？


Justice in Aylwin’s Chile was carried out to the extent possible, but it was nothing to scoff at.	埃尔文的智利的正义尽可能地得到了伸张，但这没什么好嘲笑的。


Aylwin belonged to the Christian Democratic Party, which in Chile emerged from the ashes of the old Conservative Party.	埃尔文属于基督教民主党（Christian Democratic Party），在智利，该党从旧保守党的废墟的基础上建立。


He was a practicing Catholic.	他是一个身体力行的天主教徒。


He would not have liked to be called a liberal.	他不可能喜欢被称为自由派。


Yet he governed in the style of the philosopher Isaiah Berlin’s liberal fox, who knows many things, as opposed to Berlin’s hedgehog, who knows one big thing.	但他的治国风格属于哲学家以赛亚·柏林所谓的自由派狐狸（知道很多事），而不是柏林所谓的刺猬（知道一样大事）。


Populists, in Latin America and elsewhere, are always hedgehogs.	在拉丁美洲和其他地区，民粹主义者永远是刺猬。


They are dogmatic.	他们十分教条。


The world has to adapt to their monolithic ideology, not vice versa.	世界必须适应他们的一整套意识形态，而不是反过来。


Pragmatism, policy experimentation, gradual learning – this is not their thing.	务实主义、政策实验、渐进学习——这些都不是他们的“菜”。


“When the facts change, I change my mind.	“当事实改变时，我改变我的思维。


What do you do, sir?”	您呢，先生？


The spirit behind this famous quip, attributed to John Maynard Keynes, would be alien to the populist camp, but not to the generation of Latin American pragmatists epitomized by Aylwin.	”这一据说是凯恩斯所说的俏皮话背后的精神与民粹主义阵营背道而驰，但以埃尔文为缩影的一代拉丁美洲务实主义者并非如此。


He was the anti-populist.	他是反民粹主义者。


Coming to office after 17 years of right-wing authoritarian rule, the temptation to promise handsomely and spend lavishly was enormous.	在经历了17年的右翼极权统治后上台执政，慷慨承诺、大手支出的诱惑是巨大的。


Instead, he practiced fiscal austerity and offered Chileans dignity, plus sweat and toil (though no blood or tears).	但他采取了务实的财政紧缩，带来了智利人的尊严，加上汗水和劳动（但不是血水和泪水）。


Aylwin was instinctively wary of markets and once proudly claimed never to have set foot in a shopping mall.	埃尔文本能地警惕市场，曾经骄傲地宣称从未踏进购物城一步。


Yet, upon becoming president, he did not simply maintain Chile’s free-market system; he deepened it, signing free-trade agreements with a slew of countries.	但是，在成为总统后，他不仅仅保持了智利的自由市场制度； 还进行了深化，与诸多国家签署了自由贸易协定。


At the same time, his government raised taxes, increased social expenditures, and strengthened collective bargaining in a deal with the unions.	与此同时，他���政府提高了税收，增加了社会支出，在与工会的协议中加强了集体讨价还价。


His was foxy leadership at its best.	他是最好的狐狸式领导者。


The results were encouraging.	结果令人振奋。


In the years since 1990, per capita income in Chile has tripled.	自1990年以来，智利人均收入增加了两倍。


Back then, 40% of Chileans lived below the poverty line; today, the figure is around 10%.	1990年，40%的智利人生活在贫困线以下； 今天，这一数字是10%左右。


Inequality has not fallen; but, contrary to what some critics claim, it has not increased either.	不平等性没有下降，但与一些批评者所宣称的不同，也没有上升。


The economist Albert O. Hirschman, arguably the most insightful outside observer of Latin American politics in the last half-century, was critical of what he called – borrowing from Flaubert – la rage de vouloir conclure, or the obsession of some Latin American leaders to try to bring everything to an immediate conclusion.	经济学家艾尔伯特·赫希曼（Albert O. Hirschman）也许是过去半个世纪中对拉丁美洲政治观察最深刻的外部人士，他对被他称为“急于求成”（la rage de vouloir conclure，福楼拜语，即某些拉丁美洲领导人热衷于立刻让所有事情都有个结果）持批评态度。


In its place, Hirschman called for leaders who had a “passion for the possible,” and who would patiently engage in “reform-mongering.”	赫希曼呼吁领导人要“对可能性有激情”，要耐心地参与“兜售改革”。


Aylwin answered this call.	埃尔文回应了这一呼吁。


So did Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil, Alan García of Peru, Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico, Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia, Ricardo Lagos of Chile, and Julio María Sanguinetti of Uruguay.	巴西的卡多佐（Fernando Henrique Cardoso）、秘鲁的加西亚（Alan García）、墨西哥的赛迪罗（Ernesto Zedillo）、哥伦比亚的桑托斯（Juan Manuel Santos）、智利的拉各斯（Ricardo Lagos）和乌拉圭的桑吉内蒂（Julio María Sanguinetti）亦然。


For a while, Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva seemed to be part of the group.	曾几何时，巴西的卢拉似乎也加入了这一集团。


Argentina’s Mauricio Macri is a strong applicant, but after only a few months in office it is too early to tell.	阿根廷的马克里表现也相当抢眼，但他上台执政才几个月，现在下定论为时尚早。


“Possibilism” is not the same as complacency.	“可能主义”（possibilism）和自满不一样。


On the contrary, it aims, in Hirschman’s words, “to widen the limits of what is or is perceived to be possible.”	相反，用赫希曼的话说，可能主义旨在“扩大可能或被认为可能的事情的极限”。


Once upon a time, it did not seem possible for Latin America to be well governed.	曾几何时，拉丁美洲似乎不可能得到良好的治理。


Today we know otherwise.	今天，我们知道绝非如此。


For that, we should thank leaders like Patricio Aylwin.	对此我们应该感谢埃尔文这样的领导人。


A Yukos Autopsy	剖析尤科斯事件


Yukos, once Russia’s leading oil company and a favorite of international investors, is in its death throes.	尤科斯，俄罗斯一度最大的石油公司和国际投资者最看好的对象，现在正经历着死亡前的阵痛。


At what many perceived to be a rigged auction, the company’s best assets were sold off to a previously unknown bidder and are now back in the hands of the Russian state.	在那次许多人看来存在舞弊的拍卖上，该公司的核心资产被廉价卖给一个名不见经传的出价者，现在又转回到俄罗斯政府手中。


The shell of what remains continues to challenge the company’s fate, notably in a Houston, Texas courtroom.	剩下的空壳儿仍然继续考验着公司的命运，特别是在休斯顿、德克萨斯的法庭上。


But these spasms will not revive the corpse.	但这些阵痛不会让尸体起死回生。


What matters now is whether Russia’s economy will share Yukos’s fate.	要紧的是俄罗斯经济是否会遭遇与尤科斯集团相同的命运。


The damage to Russia’s economic growth prospects from the Yukos affair may yet prove temporary, barring a repeat performance with other companies.	尤科斯事件给俄罗斯经济增长前景带来的损害也许是暂时的，只要其它公司不再重蹈覆辙。


But whether the Yukos affair proves to be an isolated case, as the Kremlin insists, depends on a reading of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s motives.	但是尤科斯事件是否像克里姆林宫所坚持认为的那样，只是个案而已，就要对俄罗斯总统普京的动机进行解读了。


One possibility is that Putin is not sincere about his aim of doubling Russia’s GDP in a decade.	一种可能性是普京关于十年内把俄罗斯国民生产总值翻一番的目标并不真诚。


Recent opinion polls suggest that this is the view of much of Russia’s cynical public.	最近的民意调查显示这是很多不满的俄罗斯民众的看法。


On this view, the privatizations of the 1990’s were a scam serving only the powers that be.	在这些民众看来，上个世纪九十年代的私有化仅仅是一场服务于当权者的骗局。


But any reversal of those privatizations – such as the effective expropriation of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his Menatep partners in Yukos – signifies not the dawn of social justice but rather a new group of bosses “expropriating the expropriators,” as Lenin used to say.	但是，任何私有化的逆转行为¾正像尤科斯集团的米哈伊尔·霍多尔科夫斯基和他在梅纳特普银行集团的商业伙伴行之有效的移交股权的行为一样¾也并没给社会公正带来曙光，而只是如同列宁曾说的，一个新的财团“征用了原所有者的财富”而已。


A less nihilistic view is that the Yukos affair suggests above all a series of improvisations by Putin rather than a coherent agenda.	稍微温和一些的说法认为尤科斯事件首先显现的是普京一系列随机应变的策略，而不是一个系统连贯的议程。


This is somewhat reassuring.	这倒让人感到安心一些。


Much evidence points to the affair originating not in a systematic nationalization project, but rather in the Kremlin’s perception that Khodorkovsky aimed to use his wealth to privatize the Russian state itself.	更多的迹象表明：该事件的起因并不在于俄罗斯想实施系统的国有化计划，而是因为克里姆林宫察觉到霍多尔科夫斯基旨在用他的财富完成对俄罗斯国有经济的私有化。


Such “state capture” occurred in Russia in the late 1990’s and to an even greater extent under the Kuchma regime in neighboring Ukraine which, ironically, Putin tried to preserve.	类似的“侵吞国有经济”行为曾在上世纪90年代的俄罗斯出现过，也在邻邦乌克兰的库奇马政权下以更大规模出现过。 有意思的是，普京当时还曾试图予以保护。


Neutralizing the perceived threat from Khodorkovsky meant depriving him of the means to achieve his ambitions by separating his Menatep Group from Yukos’s future cash flows.	压制来自霍多尔科夫斯基的潜在威胁就意味着通过把梅纳特普银行集团从尤克斯集团未来的现金流转中分离出来，以使他丧失成就野心的能力。


The massive tax claims against Yukos used for this purpose were precisely that – the means rather than the end.	针对尤科斯开出的巨额税单实际上是手段，而非目的。


Had the goal been mere recovery of tax arrears, there would have been no need to break up the company: Yukos could have settled even these colossal liabilities on a civilized installment schedule.	如果其目的只在于追偿所欠税款，就没有必要进一步瓦解该公司¾这些巨额债务，尤科斯集团本可以通过分期偿还逐步解决的。


To be sure, expropriating Menatep made shares in Yukos – a company that by 2003 attracted more domestic and foreign savings than any other in Russia – virtually worthless.	可以肯定的是，梅纳特普集团的股权分离使得这个截至2003年还是俄罗斯境内吸引国内外资金最多的尤科斯集团的股票一文不值。


But this seems like collateral damage from the pursuit of an overriding political objective.	但这对于追求高于一切的政治目标来说，更是一种间接损失。


Much now depends on whether the same is true of the other major outcome, which is that Yukos’s principal asset – Yuganskneftegaz – is now in state hands, while its remaining units appear doomed to nationalization.	现在具有关键性意义的是正在政府掌控下的尤科斯集团的核心资产¾尤甘斯克公司¾是否会遭受同样的结局，尤甘斯克的剩余资产看来必将被收归国有。


Is this another incidental by-product of the campaign against Khodorkovsky, or is it part of the core Kremlin agenda?	这难道是向霍多尔科夫斯基发起的战役中偶然获得的另外一件副产品吗，或者它是克里姆林宫核心议程的一部分？


Nationalization certainly seems to appeal to the powerful faction comprising Putin’s former KGB colleagues and associates from his native St. Petersburg, one of whom last year became the chairman of Rosneft, the wholly state-owned oil company which acquired Yuganskneftegaz.	国有化当然会吸引来实力雄厚的集团，包括普京从前在克格勃的同事以及他在圣彼得堡的旧交，其中一人去年出任俄罗斯国有石油公司（Rosneft）主席。 这家完全国营性质的公司并购了尤甘斯克公司。


But if the influence of these so-called	但是倘若这些所谓“有权力的人”（指上文“普京从前在克格勃的同事以及他在圣彼得堡的旧交”）肆意利用自身的影响力，另外几家公司也会受到类似的攻击。 实际上，即使罗曼·阿布拉莫维奇（俄罗斯石油大亨）（在西伯利亚的）的Sibneft石油公司¾这个因为寡头垄断以及实施与毁掉尤科斯集团相同的偷税阴谋而最易受到攻击的公司，需要对付的麻烦也仅仅是初步的清偿税款。


Even the nationalization of Yukos’s assets may reflect little more than the absence of alternative buyers, given the obvious political obstacle passing those assets on to other domestic private-sector players (i.e., oligarchs), and the legal and reputational barriers to foreign investors.	考虑到把尤科斯的资产转给国内私营企业主（即垄断财阀）存在明显的政治障碍，而转给外国投资者又涉及法律及国家声誉问题，对尤科斯资产的国有化或许仅仅反映出：除了政府并没有其它买主。


So the interpretation that best fits the facts so far is that the political aim of separating Khodorkovsky and Menatep from Yukos led in practice to nationalization, but that this was not the underlying goal.	因此到目前为止与事实最相符的解释就是：把霍多尔科夫斯基和梅纳特普银行集团从尤科斯集团分离出去的政治目的在事实上导致将其国有化，但国有化并不是最根本的目的所在。


There is no green light for opportunistic predators in and around the Kremlin who now control Yuganskneftegaz to grab other companies’ assets at will.	正在控制尤甘斯克公司的克里姆林宫的内部和周边并没有开启绿灯，使机会主义分子得以任意攫取其它公司的资产。


If so, the damage caused by the Yukos affair should be minimal.	如果是这样的话，尤科斯事件造成的损失将是最小的。


Yet, even on the assumption that Putin has no plans to nationalize key natural resource companies, he clearly desires strong state control over these “commanding heights” of the economy.	然而，即使我们假设普京没有将主要的自然能源公司国有化的计划，他也显然是想对这些高高在上的公司实施强硬的政府控制。


That in itself will result in overall GDP growth falling below potential, owing to the inferior productivity and greater corruption in the major companies that the state controls or heavily influences.	这在本质上会导致国民生产总值的整体跌落出乎意料，因为受政府控制或影响的大公司生产力相对较低，并且存在较严重的腐败问题。


In a speech marking the state gas monopoly Gazprom’s tenth anniversary in 2003, Putin stated his position explicitly, speaking of the company as one of the few strong geopolitical levers left to Russia after the Soviet collapse.	2003年，普京在庆祝国家天然气公司Gazprom建立十周年的讲话中明确了他的立场，称该公司是继苏���解体之后保留下来的为数不多的强有力的地缘政治杠杆之一。


Putin’s geopolitical preoccupations could be accommodated by sensibly preserving state ownership of pipeline infrastructure in the hydrocarbons sector, while allowing private companies to extract, process, and sell Russia’s oil and gas.	普京地缘政治的当务之急本可以通过保留碳氢工业管道建设的国家所有权和允许私有企业提炼、加工、出售俄罗斯的石油和天然气来实现。


Instead, Putin has allowed Gazprom’s management to block proposals from his own government on the long overdue unbundling of the company.	然而，普京却允许Gazprom公司自主经营，以阻止他自己政府早先提出的解散公司的建议。


Putin has sought an economic transformation of Russia similar in kind, if not in degree, to China’s boom.	普京已经探索出一套即使在程度上不同，却在性质上与中国经济繁荣轨道类似的改革方案。


The prize is higher living standards for Russia’s long-suffering people and a recovery in the country’s international standing.	这会提高长期经历苦难的俄罗斯人民的生活水平，并恢复俄罗斯的国际声誉。


Despite uncertainty about Putin’s intentions, that prize is not out of reach.	尽管普京的意图何在还不好说，这样的回报还是指日可待的。


Indeed, at this point the only action more harmful than the Yukos affair would be another Yukos affair.	确实，在这个节骨眼上，唯一比尤科斯事件更加糟糕的事情莫过于再次发生类似的事件。


It’s All Over Now, Baby Boom	结束了，婴儿潮一代


MUNICH – Carlos Barientos III was born at 6:45 on the evening of December 31, 1964, a few miles northwest of Honolulu.	慕尼黑——卡洛斯·巴兰托斯三世出生于1964年12月31日晚6：45分檀香山西北几英里处。


This year, he will turn 50, quite possibly making him the last member of the US “baby boom” to do so.	今年他即将年届五旬，很可能是美国“婴儿潮”一代最晚年届半百者。


The generation that once seemed to define for the world the energy, excitement, and even irritating nature of youth will officially be “old” – even if, some might say, not entirely grown up.	即使有人可能认为他们在心智上还没有完全成熟，但曾经被人视为活力、狂热甚至令人恼火的青年一代代名词的这代人已即将正式步入“老年”行列。


But what does this really mean?	但这究竟有什么意义？


The “baby boomers” are the generation that grew up in the United States, in particular, but also in Europe, Canada, Australia, and elsewhere, after World War II, when rapid economic growth was accompanied by rising birth rates.	“婴儿潮一代”特指二战后生长在美国的一代人，但同期生长在欧洲、加拿大、澳大利亚和其他地方的人同样也属于婴儿潮一代。 战后经济快速发展和出生率大幅飙升是这个时代的特征。


Those born during that 19-year period – from 1945 to 1964 – were part of the largest, most prosperous, best-educated and, some might say, most indulged and indulgent generation that the world has ever seen.	从1945到1964年这19年间出生的人组成了这个世界上最为庞大、繁荣、受过良好教育、并且按照某些人的说法，最被溺爱和放纵的一代。


From sex, drugs, and rock ‘n’ roll to the civil rights movements to the dot-com and housing bubbles, for better or worse, the boomer generation has shaped modern society.	从性、毒品、摇滚、民权运动到互联网和房地产泡沫，无论好坏，婴儿潮一代奠定了现代社会的基础。


And with one of its younger members currently in the White House, and others at Downing Street, the Élysée Palace, and the German Chancellery, it will continue to do so for years to come.	现在入主白宫的就是婴儿潮一代相对年轻的成员，而唐宁街、爱丽舍宫和德国总理府同样也是这代人入主。 婴儿潮一代仍将影响我们未来的道路。


But there are stark differences within the boomer generation.	但同是婴儿潮一代也有着显著的不同。


Early boomers – beginning with Kathleen Casey-Kirschling, whose birth one second past midnight on New Year’s Day, 1946, has made her a minor celebrity – grew up surrounded by the hippie counterculture, the music of the Beatles and Bob Dylan, and the Vietnam war.	早期成员——从凯瑟琳·凯西-克希林开始，她在1946年新年午夜钟声后一秒落地使她成为了不大不小的名人——嬉皮文化、披头士和鲍勃·迪伦的音乐以及越南战争构成了她的成长环境。


By contrast, Barientos and the other boomers of 1964 grew up playing video games and listening to disco music – or, if their tastes were closer to those of Barientos, the heavier sounds of Gary Moore, Thin Lizzy, and Van Halen.	相比之下，巴兰托斯和1964年出生的婴儿潮一代喜欢玩电子游戏、听迪斯科音乐——或者如果他们的口味与巴兰托斯相近，他们更崇尚加里·穆尔、瘦林奇和范海伦的重口味。


In fact, Barientos, who owns and runs his own guitar shop with his father, does not readily identify himself as a baby boomer; he feels closer to the “Generation X” that followed.	事实上，与父亲一道开吉他店的巴兰托斯并不认可自己是婴儿潮的一员； 他感觉自己与之后的“X一代”更有相似之处。


But Barientos’s interests are not all that set him apart from the likes of Casey-Kirschling.	但巴兰托斯与像克希林这样的婴儿潮一代还不止是兴趣上的不同。


While many of the early US baby boomers are now comfortably retired, enjoying the benefits of Medicare, Social Security, and tax-free Roth IRA disbursements, Barientos is still in his prime – and concerned about his retirement.	虽然较早出生的婴儿潮一代已经在舒适地享受退休生活，享受医疗保险、社会保障和免税退休账户支付，但巴兰托斯仍然正当盛年——并且很不放心自己的退休生活。


By 2031, when Barientos and the rest of the baby boomers are retired, more than 20% of the US population will be at least 65 years old, compared with only 13% in 2010.	与2013年仅有13%相比，到2031年巴兰托斯和婴儿潮一代余下的成员退休时，超过20%的美国人口都将达到65岁以上。


As a result, the old-age dependency ratio (the number of people aged 65 or over relative to the working-age population) is set to rise from 1:5 to 1:3.	因此老年抚养比（65岁或以上人口与劳动年龄人口之比）势必从1：5升至1：3。


This will intensify pressure on state pension funds and health-care systems considerably.	国家养老基金和医疗保健系统所受的压力将因此大幅增加。


As Barientos puts it, “It’s not like my dad’s generation, where you worked a job for a certain amount of time, saved some money, and then stopped working.”	正如巴兰托斯所说，“我们不像我父亲那代，工作一段时间、存点钱之后就停止工作。 ”相反，他解释说，“我们只是竭尽所能.


Instead, he explains, “we just do what we can…and keep moving forward.”	一直向前走。 ”


Not that Barientos would swap places with his father.	但这并不是说巴兰托斯愿意和父亲易地而处。


“I think I’ve been blessed in comparison to previous generations,” he says.	“我觉得自己比之前几代人都要幸运，”他说。


“Even compared to older members of my generation, I haven’t had to fight for my freedom.	“即便与同代当中的年长者相比，我都不必拼命去争取自由。


I didn’t have to go to Vietnam.	我不必去越南打仗。


I’ve been able to benefit from the hard work of people before me.”	前辈的辛勤工作让我能在某种程度上分享他们的成果。 ”


Definitions of the post-war baby boom vary by country.	各国对战后婴儿潮一代的定义各不相同。


Barientos’s claim to be the last US boomer rests on Hawaii’s position as America’s most westerly state in a time zone two hours behind the Pacific coast.	巴兰托斯据称是夏威夷岛最后出生的婴儿潮成员，位于美国最西端的夏威夷岛比同时区的太平洋沿岸晚两个小时。


It also means, though, that he lives a life that is somewhat different from that of many of his peers on the mainland.	但这也意味着他的生活与大陆同龄人相比有许多不同。


“The food, the language, the weather – Hawaii isn’t like the rest of the US,” he notes.	“食物、语言、天气——夏威夷都与美国其他地方有很大差异。


“The first time I left Hawaii, I was 25 years old.	”巴兰托斯说，“第一次离开夏威夷时我年仅25岁。


I went to Maryland to visit a friend for two weeks and ended up staying five years because I loved it so much.”	我到马里兰州拜访一位朋友，本来只打算待两星期，结果却因为太喜欢那里而待了五年之久。 ”


If he had the money, Barientos says he would probably be a “snow bird” – spending summers on the US mainland and winter in Hawaii.	如果有钱，巴兰托斯称自己可能变成一只“雪鸟”——在美国本土避暑，而后到夏威夷过冬。


“There are things I’d like to do with my family that we just can’t do here, such as [going to] museums, amusement parks, or large sporting events.”	“有些想和家人一起做的事在这儿根本做不了，比方说参观博物馆、游乐园，或观看大型体育赛事。


He could not leave permanently, though – there are too many things to enjoy at home.	”可永远离开这里他也做不到——故乡有太多东西令人无法割舍。


“I love the people, the culture – pretty much everything.”	“我爱这里的人、爱这里的文化——这里的一切都让我魂牵梦绕。 ”


When Barientos and his family spill out onto the beach to celebrate New Year’s Eve with the whole neighborhood, one of the last things he will think about is his age.	当巴兰托斯和家人涌向海滩与邻居们共庆新年前夜之际，他根本不会想到自己有多大。


“I don’t have time to be worrying about that!” he says.	“我没时间担心这些！ ”他说。


What about his status as the last of a generation?	他如何看待自己是一代人中的最后一个？


“I don’t know whether I’m the last baby boomer or not,” Barientos muses.	“我不清楚是不是婴儿潮最后出生的成员，”巴兰托斯沉吟道。


“If there was anyone born in Hawaii later than 6:45 on December 31, 1964, then they’ve got me beat.	“如果1964年12月31日 6:45分后夏威夷还有人出生，那我就不是最后一个。


But, you know what, if it means I get to meet some new people and talk about it, then it’s definitely cool.”	不过， 如果这意味着我能交到新朋友，跟他们聊天，那当然没有什么不好。 ”


Confronting the Global Threat to Democracy	直面民主的全球威胁


OXFORD – Across the world, populists are attracting votes with their promises to protect ordinary people from the harsh realities of globalization.	牛津——在世界各地，民粹主义者正借助在全球化严峻现实中保护普通民众的承诺来吸引投票者。


The democratic establishment, they assert, cannot be trusted to fulfill this purpose, as it is too busy protecting the wealthy – a habit that globalization has only intensified.	他们扬言民主机制完不成这项任务，因为民主体系忙于保护富人——全球化只不过强化了这样的做法。


For decades, globalization promised to bring benefits to all.	几十年来，全球化承诺为所有人带来好处。


On an international scale, it facilitated the rise of the Asian tigers and the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), produced rapid growth across Africa, and facilitated the boom in developed countries through 2007.	在国际范围内，它促成了亚洲四小龙和金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非）的崛起，推动了非洲大陆经济快速增长，并促进了2007年前发达国家的繁荣。 全球化还创造新机遇并促成了国内经济发展；


It also created new opportunities and augmented growth within countries.	但从2008年经济崩溃后，很多富裕国家已深陷紧缩； 亚洲经济体增长放缓；


But since the 2008 crash, many rich countries have been locked into austerity; the Asian economies have been slowing; the BRICS’ progress has been stalling; and many African countries have fallen back into debt.	金砖国家陷入发展停滞； 并且很多非洲国家再次深陷到债务当中。


All of this has contributed to rising inequality, which is now fueling discontent.	所有这一切都导致了日益严重的不平等，而不平等正在导致不满情绪滋生。


Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman calculate that in the United States, the wealth gap is already wider than at any time since the Great Depression, with the richest 1% of households now holding almost half the country’s wealth.	伊曼纽尔·赛斯和加布里埃尔·祖克曼计算出美国的贫富差距已经超过了大萧条以来的任何时候，1%的最富裕家庭现在几乎把持着国家财富的一半。


In the United Kingdom, the Office for National Statistics reports that in the period from 2012 to 2014, the wealthiest 10% of households owned 45% of total aggregate household wealth.	英国国家统计局报告从2012到2014年间，10%的最富家庭拥有家庭合计财富总额的45%。


Since July 2010, the top decile’s wealth has increased three times faster than that of the bottom 50% of the population.	从2010年7月以来，前10%富人的财产增长比后50%速度快3倍。


In Nigeria, astonishing economic growth, averaging 7% per year since 2000, may well have reduced poverty in the southwest of the country; but in the northeast (where the extremist group Boko Haram is most active), shocking levels of wealth inequality and poverty have emerged.	2000年来尼日利亚年均7%的惊人经济增长很有可能减少了该国西南地区的贫困； 但在该国东北部地区（极端组织博科圣地最活跃的地区），令人震惊的财富不平等和贫困水平已经出现。


Similar trends are apparent from China to Egypt to Greece.	从中国到埃及再到希腊，同样的趋势都十分明显。


Alongside inequality, declining public trust fuels the revolt against globalization and democracy.	除了不平等，公众信任的不断降低引发人们对全球化和民主制度的反抗。


Across the developed and developing worlds, many suspect that the rich are getting richer because they are not held to the same rules as everyone else.	无论在发达国家还是发展中国家，很多人怀疑富人变得更富是因为他们不必像其他人那样遵守规则。


It’s not hard to see why.	不难看出这是为了什么。


As the global economy slows, breaches of trust by those at the top become more apparent.	随着全球经济放缓，上层人士背弃信任的行为变得一目了然。


In the United Kingdom, Amazon, Starbucks, and Google attracted public outrage in 2013 for using loopholes to pay almost no tax, prompting the UK government to lead a G8 tax announcement aimed at reducing tax evasion and avoidance.	在英国，亚马逊、星巴克和谷歌2013年因利用漏洞逃税迫使英国政府牵头发表旨在减少逃税和避税现象的G8税务公告而引发了公众愤怒。


In 2015, an audit of the state-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation revealed that about $20 billion in revenue was never remitted to the authorities under the previous administration.	2015年，对尼日利亚国家石油公司的审计显示这家企业从未将上届政府执政期间约200亿美元的石油收入汇给政府。


And the problem appears to be systemic.	问题似乎涉及方方面面。


This year, the Panama Papers exposed how the global rich create secretive offshore companies, permitting them to avoid financial scrutiny and taxation.	今年，巴拿马论文揭露了全球富豪如何开设秘密海外企业，从而规避财务监管和税收。


And the world’s largest banks have faced unprecedented fines in recent years for brazen violations of the law.	而近年来世界规模最大的银行全都因为公然违法而接到过前所未有的罚单。


But, despite the negative publicity generated by such cases, the public has seen virtually no one held to account.	但尽管上述案件造成了巨大的负面影响，公众却几乎没有看到任何人为此而担责。


Almost a decade after the global financial crisis of 2008, only one bank executive has gone to prison.	2008年全球金融危机近10年后，进监狱的只有一家银行的高管。


Many bankers instead followed a path similar to Fred Goodwin, the head of Britain’s Royal Bank of Scotland, who racked up £24.1 billion ($34.2 billion) in losses, then resigned with a huge pension.	相反很多银行家走上了类似苏格兰英国皇家银行负责人弗雷德·古德温的道路，在古德温任职期间该银行积累了241亿英镑（合342亿美元）的亏损，但古德温自己却拿着巨额养老金退休。


Ordinary people – like the father of three who was imprisoned in the UK in September 2015 for accumulating £500,000 in gambling debts – do not enjoy such impunity.	普通民众——像2015年9月英国3个孩子的父亲因累计500,000英镑的赌债而入狱——却不可能像这样免于惩罚。


All of this helps explain why anti-establishment movements are gaining momentum around the world.	所有这一切都有助于解释反体制运动为什么在世界各地不断深入。


These movements share a sense of disenfranchisement – a sense that the “establishment” is failing to give ordinary citizens a “fair shake.”	普通民众感到公民权利被剥夺是这些运动的共同点——人们感到“体制”未能将“公平待遇”赋予普通民众。


They point to election results “bought” by special interests, and to arcane legal and regulatory frameworks that seem rigged to benefit the rich, such as banking regulations that only large institutions can navigate and investment treaties negotiated in secret.	他们指责特殊利益群体“购买”选举结果、受到操纵的神秘的法律和法规框架为富人带来好处，以及只有大型机构才能利用银行法和秘密谈判的投资协定。


Governments have permitted globalization – and peripatetic wealth-holders – to outpace them.	政府已经准许全球化——和逍遥的财富所有者——超越他们前进的步伐。


Globalization requires regulation and management.	全球化需要规范和管理；


It requires responsible business leaders.	需要负责任的企业领导人；


And it requires deep and effective global cooperation.	以及深入有效的全球合作。


When governments failed to cooperate in the 1930s, globalization came to a crashing halt.	当政府未能在20世纪30年代达成合作，全球化陷入到崩溃式的停滞当中。


It took a series of careful, highly managed efforts after World War II to open up the world economy and permit globalization to take off again.	二次大战后各国采取了一系列审慎措施开放世界经济，允许全球化再次腾飞。


Still, while many countries liberalized trade, capital controls ensured that “hot money” could not race in and out of their economies.	但很多国家在解放贸易的同时，靠资本管制保证“热钱”无法在本国自由地流入流出。


Meanwhile, governments invested the returns on growth in high-quality education, health care, and welfare systems that benefited the many.	不仅如此，政府将经济发展收益投向能让更多人受益的高质量教育、医疗及福利制度。


As the business of government grew, so did the resources put into it.	随着政府责任的增长，政府所掌握的资源也随之不断扩大。


By the 1970s, wealthy countries’ leaders in both government and business had become complacent.	到20世纪70年代，富裕国家的政府和企业领袖全都变得得意洋洋。


They took on faith the promise of self-equilibrating, self-restraining markets that would deliver continued growth.	他们相信自我平衡、自我约束的市场能带来持续的经济增长。


By the time this new orthodoxy spread to the leveraged financial sector, the world was on a crash course.	到这种新传统扩散到杠杆化的金融行业时，世界已经走上了崩溃的轨道。


Unfortunately, many governments had already lost the capacity to manage the forces they had unleashed, and business leaders had lost their sense of responsibility for the welfare of the societies within which they were flourishing.	不幸的是，许多政府已经无力管理他们所释放的力量，而企业领导人也已丧失了责任感，不再关注为他们创造繁荣环境的社会福利制度。


In 2016, we are re-learning that, politically, globalization needs to be managed not just to permit the winners to win, but also to ensure that they do not cheat or neglect their responsibilities to their societies.	2016年，我们重新认识到在政治上，全球化的管理不仅需要允许胜者获胜，还要确保他们不作弊、也不忽略社会责任感。


There is no place for corrupt politicians pandering to corrupt business leaders.	绝不能允许腐败的政客去迎合腐败的企业领袖。


Restoring confidence will be difficult.	重建信心将异常困难。


Business leaders will need to secure a “license to operate” from society at large, and contribute visibly to sustaining the conditions that support their prosperity.	企业领袖需要从整个社会获取“经营许可证”，并为确保其繁荣的社会条件做出显著的贡献。


They can start by paying their taxes.	第一步应该是缴纳税收。


Governments will need to distance themselves from the companies that fail to do their part.	政府必须与不履行义务的企业坚决疏远。


Moreover, they must overhaul their own operations, to prove their impartiality.	不仅如此，他们必须调整自己的作为，以证明其自身的公正性。


Robust regulation will require significant investment in government capacity and the legal services that support it.	稳健的监管需要大幅投资于政府能力以及相关的法律服务。


Finally, global cooperation will be crucial.	最后，全球合作将至关重要。


Globalization cannot be undone.	已经完成的全球化不能走回头路。


But with a strong, shared commitment, it can be managed.	但凭借共同的有力承诺，我们可以完成对全球化的监管任务。


Turkey’s Imprisoned Press	囹圄中的土耳其言论自由


PARIS – According to two pro-government newspapers in Turkey, Star and Yeni Akit, as well as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself, those who denounce the state of press freedom in Turkey are “terrorists.”	巴黎—据两份土耳其亲政府报纸《星报》（Star）和《新瓦基特报》（Yeni Akit）报道及土耳其总理埃尔多安本人的说法，谴责土耳其言论自由状况者属于“恐怖分子”。


That is the term that they were using last week to denounce the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists and the Paris-based Reporters Sans Frontières, both of which have issued reports saying that Turkey has imprisoned even more journalists than Iran and China.	他们在上周用这个词所指的是纽约的保护记者委员会（Committee to Protect Journalists，CPJ）和巴黎的无国界记者（Reporters Sans Frontières），这两家机构报道说，在土耳其遭羁押的记者甚至比伊朗和中国还要多。


Last October, the CPJ reported that there were 76 journalists imprisoned in Turkey, including 61 who were in jail for their journalistic work.	去年10月，CPJ报道说76名记者在土耳其遭到羁押，其中61人因新闻工作而被拘禁。


While the latter number declined to 49 by December, after some of those held were freed by the courts, that is still a lot of journalists to hold in prison.	12月，在法庭无罪释放了一批人后，这一数字降为49人，但仍有大量记者被关在监狱中。


The situation is especially dismaying, given that, for several years, Turkey’s human-rights performance had been improving dramatically under Erdoğan’s leadership.	多年来，在埃尔多安的领导下，土耳其的人权状况一直在显著改善，出现这样的状况令人无比沮丧。


The use of torture had declined sharply.	用刑的情况有了显著下降。


The cultural rights of the large Kurdish minority, including the right to use their own language, had advanced greatly.	人数众多的少数派库尔德人的文化权利（包括使用自己的语言的权利）有了很大进步。


Military control over the civilian government had been ended.	军方对文职政府的控制早已寿终正寝。


And more.	这些只是人权状况改善的部分例子。


Yet, as Erdoğan and his moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party have consolidated their power and their control of the country, their tolerance for dissent has declined.	但是，随着埃尔多安及其温和派伊斯兰正义和发展党巩固了手中的权力和对国家的掌控力，他们对异见人士的容忍度有所下降。


Today, Internet freedom has largely disappeared.	如今，互联网自由已基本消失。


Legislation provides for mandatory filtering of content, and many Web sites have been blocked for reasons that range from facilitating the use of drugs or stimulants to offenses under the Law on Crimes against Atatürk (the founder of the modern Turkish state and Turkey’s national hero).	法律授权政府对互联网内容予以过滤，大量网站被屏蔽，原因包括助长毒品使用或援引刑法攻击阿塔图尔克（现代土耳其国父、土耳其民族英雄）。


Though it is the Turkish government that is to blame for the precipitous decline in press freedom, the policies of the European Union and the United States have been contributing factors.	尽管土耳其政府才是言论自由状况急转直下的罪魁祸首，但欧盟和美国的政策也脱不了干系。


The EU had indicated that performance on human rights would be a key factor in determining whether Turkey would be admitted as a member.	欧盟曾表态说人权问题上的表现将是是否承认土耳其为成员国的关键决定因素。


Yet it was during the period of rapid progress on human rights that Europe seemed to turn its back on the country.	但在土耳其人权状况快速进步的时期，欧洲并没有伸出橄榄枝。


This outcome undermined those in Turkey who had promoted human-rights reforms.	这让支持土耳其人权改革之人感到十分沮丧。


Their claims that progress would lead to accession were shown to be false, and an important incentive for officials was eliminated.	他们所宣称的人权状况进步将使土耳其进入欧盟的前景成了水中之月，土耳其官员也失去了一大重要激励。


If the process leading to EU accession is put back on track, it will greatly aid the effort to ensure that Turkey becomes an open society.	如果通往欧盟的程序重回正轨，则将极大地有助于确保土耳其成为开放社会的努力。


The US government, for its part, tends to speak softly when it comes to human-rights abuses in Turkey.	至于美国政府，在土耳其出现侵犯人权行为时，它总是说些无关痛痒的话。


During the Cold War, Turkey’s strategic value, given its geographic proximity to the Soviet Union, outweighed other concerns.	冷战期间，作为苏联的近邻，土耳其的战略价值压倒了其他问题。


Today, geography still plays a role, though it is Turkey’s contiguity with Syria, Iraq, and Iran that has left the US reluctant to make a fuss about press freedom.	如今，地理因素仍起着作用，尽管让美国不愿就其言论自由状况大做文章的原因已不再是苏联，而是叙利亚、伊拉克和伊朗。


The US has supported Turkey’s accession to the EU, but its efforts would have more credibility in Europe if it also pressed Turkey to address its shortcomings.	美国曾支持土耳其加入欧盟，但若能敦促土耳其补足其短处，那么它的支持就会在欧洲拥有更高的信誉。


The situation is far from hopeless.	情况还远未到达无望的程度。


Turkey has a lively civil society, with proudly independent institutions that include some renowned universities.	土耳其是一个生机勃勃的公民社会，它拥有引以为豪的独立机构，其中不乏声誉卓著的大学。


The period of rapid progress is not in the distant past.	快速进步的时期过去没多久。


Europe would strengthen itself economically and militarily if Turkey became a member, and it should revive accession negotiations on the same basis as other member states if Turkey meets the political criteria, including press freedom.	如果土耳其成为欧盟成员国，那么欧洲从经济和军事上都能得到加强，而如果土耳其满足了包括言论自由在内的政治标准，那么它应该获得和其他成员国一致的准入谈判。


With John Kerry’s arrival as Secretary of State, the US ought to recognize that such a large Islamic country in a troubled neighborhood should show leadership on human-rights issues.	随着新任国务卿约翰·克里的来访，美国应该认识到，像土耳其这样的四邻麻烦重重的伊斯兰大国应该展现出在人权问题上的领导力。


As a role model for the region, it is especially important that Turkey should practice press freedom.	作为地区样板，土耳其应该有言论自由这一点是至关重要的。


If Europe and the US do their part, Erdoğan may be persuaded to resume the role of human-rights reformer that he played during his first several years in office.	如果欧洲和美国做好了分内工作，就可能说服埃尔多安重新成为人权改革者，这也是他在成为总理后最初几年所扮演的角色。


Back to Afghanistan	回到阿富汗


While the unremitting violence in Iraq grabs the world’s headlines, Afghanistan still struggles for peace.	正当伊拉克持续不断的暴力紧紧抓住全球媒体的头条新闻之时，阿富汗仍旧在为和平而挣扎。


The country’s parliament is packed with warlords, the drug trade is thriving, and violence is on the rise.	该国的议会充斥着军阀，毒品交易猖獗，而且暴力正在升级。


This week, world leaders have an opportunity to steer developments onto a new and more hopeful path when they meet in London to forge a new compact with Afghanistan.	本周，世界领导人们聚会英国伦敦，与阿富汗签订一项新协议，从而有机会将进展引入一个新的、更为充满希望的途径上来。


The compact builds on the 2001 Bonn Agreement, which laid the framework for a democratic Afghanistan but left much to be done to overcome that war-torn country’s tragic legacy.	这项协议将建立在2001年波恩协议基础之上。 波恩协议为民主阿富汗制定了框架，但是，在克服这一饱受战乱之苦的国家悲剧性的遗产上仍然有所欠缺。


The need for renewed attention to Afghanistan could hardly be greater.	现在急需重新把注意力集中到阿富汗上。


Decades of neglect coupled with foreign intervention left the country in ruins, with reverberations across the world.	长达几十年的漠不关心，加之外国干预使得该国民不聊生，并在全世界引发影响。


It is now in everyone’s interest to help Afghanistan rebuild.	现在，帮助重建阿富汗符合每个人的利益。


The drug trade exemplifies the far-reaching impact of domestic instability.	毒品交易就是该国国内不稳定造成的深远影响的例证。


Last year, the value of drugs produced in Afghanistan – the world’s largest supplier of opiates – is estimated to have reached up to 25% of GDP.	阿富汗是全球最大的鸦片制剂供应者。 据估计，去年在阿富汗生产的毒品价值高达国民生产总值的25％。


Security, too, remains a serious concern.	安全同样也还是令人忧心。


In 2005, more than 125 Coalition troops were killed, while suicide bombing emerged as a new and increasingly common tactic of the insurgency.	2005年，超过125名联合部队士兵被杀，而人肉炸弹涌现成为一个新的、而且是日益常见的叛乱战术。


Corruption is rampant, with government officials accused of cronyism and drug trafficking.	腐败盛行，政府官员被指控任人唯亲以及贩毒。


Several members of the newly elected parliament are known warlords with bloody records.	几个新近当选的议会议员是世人皆知的军阀，血债累累。


With international aid poorly coordinated and the United States reducing its troop strength, many Afghans believe that the outside world is abandoning them.	由于国际援助协调不善，美国正在削减其军队力量。 许多阿富汗人相信，外部世界正在抛弃他们。


But the massive scale of the challenges facing Afghanistan should not overshadow the opportunities for positive change.	但是，阿富汗面对的重重挑战不应当掩盖其积极性变化的机遇。


The Bonn process established the principle of democratic accountability, gave Afghanistan its first directly elected president, and provided a new constitution that – approved after genuine debate and compromise – created a legitimate central government.	波恩进程建立了民主负责制的原则，给了阿富汗第一个直选的总统，提供了一部在真切的辩论和妥协后批准的新宪法，并且建立了一个合法的中央政府。