That downturn is now upon us, but the results have been precisely the opposite of what Friedman predicted.	这一衰退业已降临，但是结果却与弗里德曼预计的恰恰相反。


Unemployment is rising – and with it populist posturing.	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 失业率在上升，而且民粹主义姿态也在抬头。


In countries like Italy, already suffering from Chinese competition, and Spain, which is experiencing a massive housing bust, the pain will be excruciating.	在像意大利这样已经忍受中国竞争以及西班牙这样经历巨大房地产泡沫崩溃的国家，其痛苦将会是难以忍受的。


Yet neither country shows any inclination to abandon the euro.amp#160;	但是没有任何一个国家表示想要放弃欧元。


They understand that even whispering about that possibility would panic investors.	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 它们知道，即使是轻声谈论这一可能性也将会引发投资者恐慌。


They see how countries like Denmark that maintained their own currencies have been forced to raise interest rates to defend their exchange rates when the United States Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank are cutting interest rates.	它们目睹丹麦这样维持本国货币的国家如何在美联储和欧洲中央银行降息的时候反而被迫提高利率来维持汇率。


They see how, if there was still a lira or a peseta, they would be experiencing capital flight.	它们目睹意大利和西班牙如果还是使用里拉和比塞塔将会发生资本外逃。


They understand that they would have to fend off an old-fashioned currency crisis at the worst possible time.	它们理解它们也会在最困难的时候抵御传统的货币危机。


They appreciate that there is stability and security in numbers.	现在局势稳定，数据稳妥，因此它们感到庆幸。


Similarly, the euro-collapse scenario in which such countries successfully pressure the ECB to inflate, compelling Germany to abandon the euro, has shown no signs of developing.	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 同样，也没有迹象表明欧元崩溃，导致这些国家成功地迫使欧洲中央银行实行通货膨胀以及德国放弃欧元。


The ECB, protected by statutory independence and a price-stability mandate, has shown no inclination to accede to pressure from French President Nicolas Sarkozy or anyone else.	欧洲中央银行在法律上保持独立，其使命是维持价格稳定。 它还没有表明愿意屈从于来自法国总统萨尔科奇或者其他任何人的压力。


One can argue that the worst is yet to come – that there will be more inflation and unemployment down the road – and that, when they come, the euro area will collapse.	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 人们可以说最大的危机还没有来，今后将会有更高的通货膨胀和失业。 而且等到它们发生的时候，欧元区将会崩溃。


Euro skeptics always make this argument.	欧元怀疑派人士总是这样说。


But, given recent events, it is now they who bear the burden of proof.	但是鉴于最近的事件，他们应该负有举证责任。


What neither Friedman nor anyone else anticipated in 1998 was that the first serious downturn following the advent of the euro would coincide with the mother of all financial crises.	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 弗里德曼和其他人在1998年所没有预料到的事情是，欧元诞生以后第一次严重的衰退与所有金融危机之母发生在同一时间。


Runs by panicked investors have required central banks to undertake unprecedented lender-of-last-resort operations.	恐慌不已的投资者撤走资金，迫使各国央行采取前所未有的最后借贷者的行动。


Extensive loan losses have required expensive bank recapitalization operations.amp#160;	大量的贷款损失已经迫使采用昂贵的银行注资行动。


There have been predictions that governments stretched to the limit by the financial crisis might respond by abandoning the euro.	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 有人预计，各国政府由于金融危机而疲于奔命，或许会放弃欧元。


They might resort to the inflation tax and inject the national currency to restore liquidity to their banking systems and financial markets.	它们或许会采用通货膨胀税收并且向其银行系统和金融市场注入本国货币来恢复流资。


In fact, the response has been the opposite.	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 实际上，对策正好相反。


The ECB has provided essentially unlimited amounts of liquidity to euro-area financial systems.	欧洲央行实际上向欧元区金融体系提供了无限量的流动资金。


The Stability and Growth Pact has been relaxed in order to increase governments’ capacity to borrow to recapitalize their banks.	同时也放松了欧洲稳定和增长公约以提高各国政府借款的能力来给银行注入资金。


It is European countries outside the euro area, still with their own currencies, that have suffered the gravest difficulties.	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 正是欧元区以外还继续使用本国货币的欧洲国家才承受了最大的困难。


Because their currencies are not widely used internationally, many of their bank liabilities are in euros.	由于它们的货币在国际上并不广泛使用，它们许多银行债务是用欧元结算。


This renders them dependent on interest rate hikes to attract – via the market and on swap lines from the ECB – the euro liquidity that their banks desperately need.	这就让它们依赖于升息通过市场以及欧洲中央银行的交换贷款来吸引其银行所急需的欧元流资。


So far, those swaps have been forthcoming, but with delay and political baggage attached.	目前还是提供了这些交换，但是却姗姗来迟并附加了政治条件。


The implication is clear.	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 这里的含义是明确的。


National banking systems need a lender of last resort.	各国银行系统需要有一个最后的借贷者。


In small countries, where a significant share of bank liabilities is in someone else’s currency, the national central bank lacks this capacity.	小国中大量的银行债务是以别国货币结算的，因此它们的中央银行缺乏这一实力。


The only options are then to slap draconian controls on the banking system or join the euro area.	唯一的选择就是对银行系统实行严厉控制或者加入欧元。


Given the difficulty of rolling back the financial clock and the constraints of the Single Market, it is clear which way European countries will move.	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 鉴于难以在金融体制上开倒车以及欧洲单一市场的限制，因此欧洲国家行动的方向也就明了了。


One already sees a shift in public opinion toward euro adoption in Denmark and Sweden.	人们已经看到丹麦和瑞典舆论转向采用欧元。


Poland has reiterated its commitment to adopting the euro. Hungary, given the trauma of an IMF program, is certain to do likewise.amp#160;	波兰已经重申其承诺采用欧元��鉴于国际货币基金组织项目的巨大困难，匈牙利也肯定会这样做。


Obviously, the crisis will be economically and financial challenging for Eastern Europe.	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 这一危机对于东欧的经济和金融都是具有挑战的。


It will heighten the difficulty of meeting the convergence criteria for euro adoption.	它将会抬高满足采用欧元标准的困难。


But it will also heighten the will to succeed.	但是这也会提高成功的意志。


The implication, then, is a larger euro area, not a smaller one, as more countries see the writing on the wall.	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 因此在各国预见危机的时候，结果将会是欧元区扩大而非缩小。


Indeed, there are already signs of countries not even in the European Union, notably Iceland and Switzerland, contemplating accession as a step toward adopting the euro and resolving their financial dilemma.	确实，现在已经有迹象表明非欧盟国家、主要是冰岛和瑞士正在考虑加入欧盟，进而采用欧元并解决其金融困境。


The one exception is probably Britain, whose currency is used internationally as a legacy of its history.	amp#160;amp#160;amp#160; 唯一的例外可能是英国，其英镑作为其历史遗产而在国际上使用。


In any case, Britain has always had one foot in Europe and one foot out.	无论如何，英国在融入欧洲上总是三心二意。


It is conceivable, therefore, that Europe will have two currencies, the euro and sterling, in the long run.	因此长久而言，欧洲就有可能有两种货币，也就是欧元和英镑。


But having three currencies, much less three dozen, is out of the question.amp#160;	但是三种货币、更不要说三十几种货币是不可能的。


The Non-Smoking Gun	非确凿证据


MEXICO CITY – Everyone these days, it seems, has their own favorite American diplomatic cable – or will soon – given that the 250,000 documents obtained by WikiLeaks include references to almost every country in the world.	墨西哥城——目前似乎人人都有最喜欢的美国外交电报——即便没有也很快就会有——因为维基解密（WikiLeaks）网搜集的250，000份文件几乎囊括了全世界所有国家的相关内容。


For Latin America, Wikileaks has so far provided enticing tidbits of both gossip and substance about Brazil and Argentina; interesting, first-rate analysis regarding Honduras, Bolivia, and Mexico; and a few intriguing notes about regional politics and international relations.	单就拉美地区而言，维基解密网到目前为止已经发布了供茶余饭后闲谈及有关巴西和阿根廷的诱人花絮、有关洪都拉斯、玻利维亚和墨西哥的引人入胜的一流分析，以及关于地区政治和国际关系的几份耐人寻味的笔记。


Nothing extraordinary has been revealed, but the cables now available allow readers and analysts to draw some preliminary conclusions about the Obama administration’s views of the region; about Latin American leaders’ attitudes toward the United States; and about the quality of US diplomatic and intelligence-gathering activities in the hemisphere.	目前公布的消息并没有什么特别，但已经解密的电报内容使读者和分析家能初步总结奥巴马政府的地区观念、拉美领导人对美国的态度、以及美国在西半球外交和情报搜集工作的进展状况。


Nothing to write home about, but a lot to write about.	虽然没有哪份电报值得大书特书，但值得一提的却有不少。


There have been some notable documents, though not many.	解密内容包括某些著名文件，虽然数量不算很多。


One is clearly the note written by Hugo Llorens, US Ambassador to Honduras, on July 24, 2009, immediately after the coup d’état that exiled President Manuel Zelaya.	其中一份显然出于美国驻洪都拉斯大使雨果·劳伦斯之手，时间就在2009年1月24日，驱逐曼努埃尔·塞拉亚总统的政变发生以后。


The American envoy got right what happened, its implications, and how to enable Barack Obama’s incoming administration to deal intelligently – and differently from the past – with one of its first crises in Latin America.	美国特使在电报中说明了当时的局势及其含义，以及巴拉克·奥巴马即将就任的内阁该如何明智——并与以往有所差别地处理它在拉美遇到的首次危机。


A coup was a coup, could not be accepted, and, however provocative Zelaya had been, the only possible US position was his unconditional return to power.	政变就是政变，政变不能容忍，而且无论塞拉亚曾经怎样向美国挑衅，美国唯一可能的立场就是支持他无条件回国。


Another impressive cable was sent on November 17, 2009, by Charles H. Rivkin, US Ambassador to France, regarding the competition between French companies and Boeing for a contract worth tens of billions of dollars to provide advanced fighter planes to Brazil.	另外一份令人印像深刻的电报发送于2009年11月17日，电报作者是美国驻法国大使查尔斯·H·里夫金，这份电报讨论法国企业和波音争夺向巴西出售先进战斗机的价值数百亿美元的合同问题。


The authors got it right: French President Nicolas Sarkozy was pulling out all the stops to close the deal, including support for Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on issues of interest to him, and acceptance of technological, legal, and military conditions imposed by Brazil on French firms, mainly the armaments manufacturer Dassault.	作者在电报中写道： 法国总统尼古拉·萨科奇使尽浑身解数力求达成这笔交易，包括在巴西总统路易斯·伊纳西奥·卢拉·达席尔瓦感兴趣的问题上为他提供支持，以及接受巴西对法国公司，主要是装备制造企业达索提出的技术、法律和军事条件。


Perhaps the reports were somewhat naïve in omitting any reference to the many rumors in Brazil regarding widespread corruption in relation to the contract (of course, US diplomats may have mentioned these issues elsewhere).	也许报告从未提及在巴西传得沸沸扬扬的有关军售合同的腐败问题显得有些天真（当然，美国外交官可能已经通过其他渠道提及了相关问题）。


Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that Dassault and France will probably win the contract, and that this will be seen as a milestone on the road to US irrelevance in South America.	尽管如此，达索和法国将很可能最终赢得这份合同，而这将会被看作南美摆脱美国影响道路上的一个里程碑。


Another good example of interesting and competent reporting lies in the cable sent from La Paz, Bolivia on March 30, 2006, by Ambassador David Greenlee, highlighting the tensions between the Cuban and Venezuelan advisers and security personnel surrounding President Evo Morales, as well as the circles of elites around him.	另一份有趣的报告是2006年3月30日发自玻利维亚拉巴斯的一份电报，发报人是大卫·格林利大使，这份电报涉及古巴和委内瑞拉顾问与总统莫拉莱斯身边的安全人员、及其高层人士之间关系紧张的问题。


While not terribly new, Greenlee put his finger on one of the ongoing challenges facing Morales – ensuring the loyalty of the Bolivian Armed Forces to his “revolution” – and his main tool for addressing it: Cuban and Venezuelan security backing to deter a military coup.	尽管算不上什么最新观点，但格林利将重点指向莫拉莱斯所面对的长期挑战之一——即确保玻利维亚武装部队效忠于他所发起的“革命”——以及能为它所用的主要工具： 古巴和委内瑞拉为防止发生军事政变在安全方面提供的支持。


Then there are cases of stridency or severe irritation.	此外还有些咄咄逼人或刺激性很强的例子。


Cables from Managua between 2006 and 2009 rehash old stories about Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega’s ties to drug traffickers like Colombian cocaine kingpin Pablo Escobar, including mention of a video purportedly showing Sandinistas off-loading cocaine from planes in 1984, and dwell on Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’s off-the-books financial backing for Ortega.	2006到2009年发自马那瓜的电报重新提及了有关尼加拉瓜总统丹尼尔·奥尔特加与哥伦比亚可卡因贩毒头目巴勃罗·埃斯科瓦尔之间的联系，包括提及一段据称录下了桑地诺解放阵线人员在1984年从飞机上卸载可卡因的录像，并详细说明了委内瑞拉总统乌戈·查韦斯向奥尔特加提供的不入帐册的财务支持。


There is also a quaint anecdote regarding Nicaraguan prizefighter Ricardo Mayorga, who was caught by Sandinista security while raping or harassing a young woman in his hotel; according to the cables, Ortega blackmailed Mayorga into sharing his boxing proceeds with him and supporting him in the elections that year.	电报中还有一则关于尼加拉瓜职业拳击手里卡多·马约尔加的离奇有趣的轶事，他被桑地诺解放阵线人员抓住在酒店里强暴或骚扰一名年轻女性。 按照电报上的说法，奥尔特加借机威胁马约尔加与其分享拳击收益，并在当年举行的选举中为其提供支持。


None of this is especially earth-shattering or original, except insofar as it seems to suggest the persistence of a Cold War mentality in US foreign-policy thinking about Latin America.	这些内容恐怕算不上惊天动地或独一无二，但它似乎可以表明美国对拉美的外交政策仍带有明显的冷战思维印记。


Similarly, a cable concerning a Mexican-sponsored attempt earlier this year to create something like the Organization of American States, but without the US and Canada, is chockfull of largely accurate but excessive rhetoric blasting Mexican diplomacy.	同样，有一份电报讲述今年初由墨西哥发起的成立类似于美洲国家组织的运动，但新成立的组织意图排斥美国和加拿大，这份电报充斥着严厉抨击墨西哥外交政策的激烈言论，这些言论从内容上看大致准确，但却充斥着过分的言辞。


Backing the creation of a “Community of Latin American and Caribbean States,” according to the cable, is logical for a would-be regional hegemon like Brazil, but somewhat absurd for Mexico, which does 90% of everything (trade, investment, tourism, immigration) with the US and Canada, and depends on US support in fighting the country’s drug cartels.	电报认为上述支持成立“拉美和加勒比国家联盟”的做法对巴西这种未来的区域霸主或许顺理成章，但对墨西哥而言却显得有些荒唐，因为墨西哥一切联系的90%来自美国和加拿大，而且全靠美国的支持才能与国内的贩毒集团斗争下去。


Obama plunged into Mexico’s drug war at the outset of his administration, and now faces perils that are barely touched upon in Washington, except in cables originating in Mexico.	奥巴马政府在就任伊始就全面陷入了墨西哥禁毒战争，目前正面临着在华盛顿几乎从未触及的种种危险，人们要了解这些危险只有从墨西哥发来的外交电报中。


Regarding the execution of Arturo Beltran Leyva, a leading drug kingpin, late last year, US Ambassador Carlos Pascual wrote that the “refusal” by SEDENA (the national defense secretariat) “to move quickly reflected a risk-aversion that cost the institution a major counter-narcotics victory.”	在去年下半年处决贩毒头目贝尔特兰•莱瓦的有关电报中，美国大使卡洛斯·帕斯科写道国防秘书处（SEDENA）“拒绝”快速行动的做法反应出一种风险厌恶情绪，正是这种情绪使该机构的一次大规模反毒胜利化为了泡影。


He then describes the utter lack of cooperation between intelligence agencies and the military, because many US and Mexican officials fear that whatever information they share with the army will be handed over to the cartels.	帕斯科接着描述情报部门和军队之间完全缺乏合作的状态，因为很多美国和墨西哥官员担心他们与军队分享的信息将会被传到贩毒集团的手中。


The logical conclusion of all this is evident: since Mexican President Felipe Calderón himself cannot be both president and drug czar, and is rightly unwilling and logically unable to carry out the necessary day-to-day interagency coordination in Mexico, the void will be filled by someone else.	这一切合乎逻辑的结论显而易见： 因为墨西哥总统菲利佩·卡尔德隆本人不可能身兼总统和禁毒官员二职，因此他当然不愿也不可能亲自负责墨西哥机构间必要的日常协调工作，因此其他人必须填补这个真空。


Increasingly, it is being filled by the US Embassy in Mexico City, staffed by first-rate diplomats who may be biting off more than they can chew.	这副重担越来越多地落在美国驻墨西哥城使馆身上，使馆人员大多是一流的外交家，他们可能因为接受的任务过多而一时无法完成。


There is no smoking gun in WikiLeaks’ releases about US policy toward Latin America (not yet, at least).	维基解密网（至少到目前为止）尚未发布美国对拉美政策证据确凿的公开消息。


But there is a rich lode of information, confirmations, reflections, and teachings that the region will be mining for insight for years to come.	但已经发布的消息中所蕴含的丰富的信息、证明、思考和讲授已经足以供我们在今后几年作细心研究之用。


The Normalization of Fatah	法塔赫的正常化之路


RAMALLAH – Fatah, the leading guerrilla movement within the Palestine Liberation Organization, has moved one step closer to becoming a normal political party.	发自拉马拉——作为巴勒斯坦解放组织中占据领导地位的游击运动阵线，法塔赫在成为一个一般意义上的政党之路上又向前迈进了一步。


Its just concluded sixth congress was held for the first time in the occupied territories, which meant that former guerrillas from Lebanon and Jordan were allowed entry by Israel.	随着刚刚闭幕的法塔赫第六次代表大会首次在以色列占领区内召开，意味着那些来自黎巴嫩和约旦的游击队领导人都获得了以色列方面的入境许可。


The conference, it appears, succeeded in reuniting and reinvigorating the movement, which has suffered since the death of its founder and long-time leader, Yasser Arafat.	而大会则向外界显示出，虽然法塔赫在其创建者和长期领导者亚希尔·阿拉法特去世后遭受了重创，但如今该组织已经成功地再次团结起来，并正在努力复兴。


More than 2,000 delegates, representing former Fatah fedayyin (guerrillas) and intifada activists, voted to continue all forms of resistance for the liberation of Palestine. Yet the term “armed resistance” was missing from all the documents approved at the conference.	本次大会上有超过两千多名来自前法塔赫游击队以及暴力反抗组织的代表参与了投票，并赞成继续以一切形式的反抗来谋求巴勒斯坦的解放，然而“武装反抗“这一字眼却从会议上通过的所有文件中消失得无影无踪了。


Mahmoud Abbas – unanimously elected as Fatah’s leader and commander-in-chief – made clear that while all options remain available for ending the occupation, the preference is still negotiations.	马哈茂德·阿巴斯一致当选为法塔赫领导人和总指挥，而他明确则表示，尽管在结束以色列占领方面法塔赫将不排除一切选项，但谈判依旧是优先选择。


While some (such as Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak) took the resistance rhetoric of some delegates seriously, Fatah spokesman Nabil Amr officially assured all concerned that Fatah is committed to “peaceful resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.”	而虽然有人（例如以色列国防部长巴拉克）对一些与会代表所发表的抵抗言论表示严重关切，但法塔赫发言人纳比勒·阿马尔还是正式向各方保证，法塔赫将致力于“以和平方式解决巴以冲突问题”。


Any organization that has not provided democratic mechanisms for change and renewal tends to age and become monotonous and ineffective.	事实上，如果一个组织不能采用民主机制来推动内部改革和更新的话，那么整个组织就会走向老化，僵化而且无效率。


This aging and dullness became most evident in the past few years, as Fatah first lost the 2006 legislative elections to Hamas, and then its presence in the Gaza Strip.	但在近几年来，这种老化僵化现象在法塔赫身上变得尤为明显，这从法塔赫于2006年在立法机关选举中首次败给哈马斯，随后还被赶出加沙地带的事件中可见一斑。


Signs that Fatah is moving towards becoming a normal political party were ample.	而如今在法塔赫身上则正在显现出某些清晰的迹象，显示其正在转变成为一个一般意义上的政治党派。


Gone were the khaki suits and militaristic paraphernalia, replaced by business suits and proper conference IDs for delegates.	从前常见的军人装束不见了，取而代之的是西装革履，佩戴着正式会议身份牌的代表。


Backroom decisions and top-down guidance was replaced by a democratic free-for-all that saw many of Fatah’s historic leaders fall to the wayside, making room for younger, locally popular leaders.	以前那种暗箱决策和至上而下的命令作风则被民主的自由参选的选举方式所取代，许多老一辈的法塔赫领导人因此而靠边站，让位给那些更年轻，且在当地更有民望的领导人。


Prisoners held in Israeli jails were granted 20 seats in the enlarged 100-member revolutionary council.	而在扩大后拥有100个席位的革命委员会中，有20个席位被依然关押在以色列监狱中的法塔赫成员夺得。


A jailed intifada leader, Marwan Barghouti, was among the highest elected new leaders to the central committee, the movement’s executive body.	比如马尔万·巴尔豪迪这个依然在押的暴力活动领袖就获选为中央委员会的新成员，而中央委员会则是法塔赫的最高执行机构。


Naturally, the 20-year hiatus since the last congress created a huge gap that was quickly filled by intifada veterans rather than old-style guerrillas, who had dominated the movement since its establishment.	必须指出的是，上次代表大会与本次代表大会竟然相隔了整整20年，而这长达20年的跨度很显然已经造成了一道巨大的政治裂缝，到如今填补这一裂缝已经是那些声名远播的暴力反抗老手，而不是那些自法塔赫创建之初就占据了领导地位的旧式游击队老兵。


Fourteen of the 19 elected members of the central committee are first-time members, most of whom represent the leadership of the 1987 uprising in the occupied territories.	中央委员会的19名委员中有14人是第一次当选，其中大多数都代表了在1987年占领区起义中崛起的领导势力。


The shifting age and geographic location of the Fatah membership was the reason for the failure of some of Fatah’s historic leaders, such as Ahmad Qureia and Intisar Wazir, the widow of the late Abu Jihad.	而法塔赫成员在年龄层次以及地理位置分布上的转变也成为某些著名领导人下马的原因，比如阿迈德·库赖，以及因蒂萨尔·瓦齐尔——她是阿布·吉哈德的遗孀。


Moreover, holding the congress in Palestine ended the role of many Fatah leaders who had opposed the Oslo accords, such as Farouk Qaddoumi and Mahmoud Jihad.	此外，大会选择在巴勒斯坦境内而不是在其他国家召开的这一举措，也结束了法塔赫领导层中许多奥斯陆协议反对者的政治生涯，比如法鲁克·卡杜米和马哈茂德·吉哈德。


Sidelining men like Qaddoumi, whose accusation, on the eve of the congress, that Abbas and Mohammad Dahlan had helped Israel poison Arafat, also distances Fatah from its one-time alliance with hard-line Arab countries such as Syria and Libya.	卡杜米曾在大会召开前夕指责阿巴斯伙同达赫兰协助以色列毒害阿拉法特，而对此人的边缘化亦同样使法塔赫疏离了先前的盟友——比如叙利亚与利比亚这些坚持走强硬路线的阿拉伯国家。


While the old guard had to strike a balance between the different Arab countries that backed the PLO, the new guard will have to find a workable solution with their rivals in Hamas if a viable compromise agreement with Israel is to be found.	从前老一辈领导人需要做的，就是在支持巴解组织的各个阿拉伯国家之间搞好平衡，而如今新领导层的任务则是妥善处理同其对手哈马斯的关系，以便能顺利��以色列达成一个可行的妥协性协议。


Opinions vary, with some calling for a tough position towards Hamas and others advocating a softer approach.	但法塔赫内部如今也众说纷纭，一些人呼吁对哈马斯保持强硬，而另一些人则呼吁采用温和手段。


Another major challenge facing the new Fatah leadership will be how it deals with the duality of holding party posts while also holding ministerial positions within the Palestinian Authority.	除此之外，新一届法塔赫领导层所面临的另一个主要挑战则是其领导人能否既在组织内担任领导职务，又巴勒斯坦当局内担任部长级官员的问题。


Some are calling for Fatah leaders to abstain from ministerial roles, whereas others see no reason why one can’t be a leader of a party and the government simultaneously.	有人呼吁法塔赫领导人应主动回避在巴当局担任部长职位，然而其他人则无法理解一个人又当政党领导又当政府高官有何不妥。


In his acceptance speech, Abbas referred to the leaders of the first Intifada, telling the congress that they drew the guidelines that have become the movement’s political platform. Leaders like Barghouti, former preventative security chief Jibril Rajoub, and Gaza’s Dahlan are now in the driver’s seat of the Fatah movement.	在就职演说上，阿巴斯提到了一些早期暴力抵抗运动领导人，并向与会代表指出他们提出的指导方针业已成为法塔赫的政治基础，而巴尔豪迪，还有前安全部队长官吉布里·拉贾布以及来自加沙地带的达赫兰这些抵抗分子，现在都已经成为了法塔赫的掌舵人。


Dahlan, accused by some of being responsible for the loss of Gaza to Hamas, gave a strong speech accusing the previous Fatah leadership of having lost Gaza long before it actually fell to Hamas in June 2007.	有人认为达赫兰应该为法塔赫让加沙地区落入哈马斯之手的事件负责，而他则在大会上措辞强硬地指责上一任法塔赫领导层早在2007年7月之前已经把加沙拱手让给了哈马斯。


Dahlan detailed how the former Fatah leadership repeatedly ignored his warnings and his pleadings with the central committee members to come to Gaza and see for themselves the situation on the ground.	他还详细地指出前领导层是怎样一再无视他的警告，而那些中央委员会成员是怎样毫不理会他要他们亲自到加沙视察当地情况的请求。


The Fatah congress also dealt a blow to the abuse and corruption that have plagued the movement in recent years, especially since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority.	本次代表大会也对近年来——特别是巴勒斯坦当局成立之后——不断腐蚀这个组织的滥权和腐败行为进行了整治。


Speaker after speaker insisted that the movement’s weakness was brought about by the fact that its leaders succumbed to the temptations that come with government positions.	一连串的发言人都提到说法塔赫的衰弱就是因为那些领导人都屈服于高官厚职所带来的诱惑。


Thus, for example, Ahmad Qurei (Abu Ala’a), a former prime minister and senior negotiator who is accused of owning shares in a Palestinian company that supplied cement for Israel’s construction of the hated wall that cuts through Palestinian territory, lost his position within Fatah’s leadership.	因此比如阿玛德·库瑞（阿布·阿拉阿）这样的前总理和高级谈判代表，就因为被指责在一家为以色列那条横贯巴勒斯坦领土而且臭名昭著的隔离墙供应水泥的巴勒斯坦公司拥有股份，丢掉了其在法塔赫的领导职位。


The Fatah movement has a long way to go before it becomes a full-fledged political party.	由此可见，如果要变成一个货真价实的政党，法塔赫还有很长的路要走。


The delegates overwhelmingly agreed that the movement must keep open the option of returning underground if negotiations for statehood fail, while being ready to become a political party if a Palestinian state is born.	与会代表们以压倒性的优势赞成说如果巴勒斯坦建国谈判失败，那么组织就不排除要转入地下活动，而如果建国成功，那么就得准备好变成一个政党。


Nevertheless, the results of the Sixth Fatah Congress reflect a clear bias in favor of becoming a party rather than an armed resistance movement.	然而，本次大会的决议结果已经清楚地说明，法塔赫更愿意变成一个政党，而不是一个武装反抗组织。


The North Korean Enigma	朝鲜迷局


CAMBRIDGE – What is going on in North Korea?	发自剑桥——朝鲜究竟出了什么问题？


On November 23, its army fired nearly 200 artillery rounds onto the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong, near the two countries’ disputed maritime border, killing four – including two civilians – and demolishing scores of houses and other structures.	在上月23日，朝鲜人民军向位于两国争议领海边界的韩国延坪岛倾泻了近200发炮弹，致使4人（包括两名平民）丧生，摧毁数栋民居建筑。


The presence of civilians, many of whom had to be evacuated, made North Korea’s attack even more provocative than its sinking in March of the South Korean warship Cheonan, which killed 46 sailors.	这些平民原本是应该被撤离的，而他们的出现则使朝鲜的袭击比3月击沉韩国天安舰并导致46名海军人员丧生的事件更具爆炸性。


And, just a few weeks before the shelling of Yeonpyeong, North Korea showed a delegation of American scientists a new and previously undisclosed uranium-enrichment plant, which will increase the regime’s capacity to make nuclear weapons.	而就在延坪岛事件几个月前，朝鲜向一个美国科学家代表团展示了一个事前并未公开的新铀浓缩设备，而该设备将提升该政权的核武制造能力。


North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has been a matter of concern for two decades.	朝鲜的核武器计划已经困扰了全世界近二十年。


Pyongyang violated its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by secretly reprocessing enough plutonium to produce two nuclear weapons in the early 1990’s.	平壤当局背弃了《核不扩散条约》的义务，并在1990年代初秘密重新提炼了足够的钚元素并制造了两颗原子弹。


After it withdrew from a restraining agreement negotiated by the Clinton administration in 1994, it expelled International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors and began reprocessing spent fuel that could produce another six bombs’ worth of plutonium.	在1994年退出了由美国克林顿政府调停的限制性协议之后，朝鲜驱逐了国际原子能机构的监察人员并开始重新提炼核废料，生产了出足以另造6颗原子弹的钚。


Now, with its new enrichment plant, North Korea’s access to fissile materials will greatly increase.	如今在新浓缩设备的帮助下，朝鲜获取核裂变物质的能力将大大增强。


Its leaders have a reputation for selling dangerous items such as missiles, narcotics, and counterfeit currency, and many worry that they might transfer nuclear materials to other countries or to terrorist groups.	朝鲜领导人早就因为销售导弹，毒品和伪钞而臭名昭著，许多人因此担心它会将这些核物质卖给其他国家或恐怖组织。


The recent WikiLeaks disclosures of classified American diplomatic documents, for example, suggest that North Korea has been helping Iran with its advanced missile program.	而维基泄密（WikiLeaks）网站最近公开的一份美国机密外交文件则认为朝鲜已经开始帮助伊朗开展其新型导弹计划了。


George W. Bush’s administration initially hoped that it could solve the North Korean nuclear problem through regime change.	小布什原本希望能用政权更替的方式解决朝鲜核问题。


The idea was that isolation and sanctions would topple Kim Jong-il’s dictatorship.	他认为孤立和制裁能推翻金正日的独裁统治。


But the regime proved resistant, and the Bush administration finally agreed to enter into six-party talks with China, Russia, Japan, and the two Koreas.	但这个政权却坚持了下来，最终小布什政府也只能无奈答应与中国、俄罗斯，日本和朝韩一道举行六方会谈。


In September 2005, it fleetingly appeared that the talks had led North Korea to agree to forgo its nuclear program in exchange for security guarantees and removal of sanctions.	事情到了2005年5月似乎有了一丝转机，朝鲜可能同意以放弃核项目为代价换取安全保证和解除制裁。


But the agreement soon collapsed, and North Korea refused to return to the talks until the United States stopped shutting down bank accounts suspected of counterfeiting and laundering money for Kim’s regime.	但协议却最终破裂了，而朝鲜声称除非美国将那些涉嫌为金正日政权伪造货币或洗钱的银行账户解冻，否则它就不会回到六方会谈。


Then, with diplomacy stalled, North Korea launched a series of missiles into the Sea of Japan.	接着趁外交僵局之机，朝鲜向日本海发射了数枚导弹。


All five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council agreed on a resolution condemning North Korea’s actions, and China warned North Korea to moderate its behavior.	联合国安理会五大常任理事国一致决议谴责朝鲜的行为，中国还警告朝鲜要注意自己的行为。


Instead, in 2006, North Korea detonated a nuclear device, and did so again in 2009.	作为回应，朝鲜于2006年爆破了一座核设施，在2009年又引爆了另一座。


Ostensibly, North Korea is a weak country with a disastrous economic system.	表面上，朝鲜是个经济上一塌糊涂的贫穷国家。


Starting from similar levels a half-century ago, South Korea has grown to become one of the world’s most prosperous economies, with nearly 50 million people enjoying a per capita income of $30,000 (at purchasing price parity). North Korea has half the population and per capita income of less than $2,000.	与它在半个世纪前同时起步的韩国早已成长成为世界上最为繁荣的经济体之一，5000万韩国人享受着3万美元（以购买力平价计算）的人均年收入，而朝鲜的2500万人口的人均年收入只有区区2000美元。


In the 1990’s, North Korea suffered extreme famine, which probably killed 1-2 million people, and even today North Korea depends on China for food and fuel.	朝鲜在1990年代遭受了严重饥荒，大概导致100~200万人丧生，而至今朝鲜还得靠中国来提供食品和燃料。


How, then, can North Korea manage to defy its neighbor?	那朝鲜又凭什么能得罪它的众多邻邦？


For one thing, North Korea has “the power of weakness.”	一则，朝鲜拥有所谓的“弱实力”。


In certain situations, weakness – and the threat that a partner will collapse – can be a source of bargaining power.	在某些特殊情况下，弱势——以及伙伴关系可能崩溃的威胁——可以转化为一种讨价还价的资本。


A bankrupt debtor who owes $1,000 has little power, but if it owes $1 billion, it may have considerable bargaining power – witness the fate of institutions judged “too big to fail” in the 2008 financial crisis.	一个欠了1000元债务的破产者可能是渺小的，但一个欠了1亿元的就大不一样了，后者可能拥有相当巨大的讨价还价能力——正如那些在2008金融危机中“大到不能任其倒闭”金融机构一样。


As the Financial Times observed, “North Korea’s Kim Jong-il is probably the only world leader who can make Beijing look powerless.	正如《金融时报》观察的那样：“朝鲜的金正日大概是世界上唯一个能令北京当局感到不知所措的领导人。


Diplomats say Kim brazenly plays on Chinese fears.	外交界都说金正日一直无耻地玩弄着中国的恐惧。


If the Chinese do not pump aid into his crumbling economy, he argues, they will face refugees pouring across the border and possible unrest.”	如果中国不给他提供援助，他就威胁要让大量难民涌入中国并制造骚乱。 ”


China does not want a nuclear or belligerent North Korea, but it is even more concerned about a failed state collapsing on its border.	中国当然不希望看到一个拥有核武器或四处叫战的朝鲜，但它更害怕的是一个令无数难民争相涌入己方边境的失败国家。


China has tried to persuade Kim’s regime to follow its market-oriented example, but Kim is afraid that an economic opening would lead to a political opening and loss of dictatorial control.	中国曾尝试说服金正日政权模仿其市场经济模式，但金正日害怕开放经济会导致政治解禁，最终丢掉自己的独裁权力。


So, while China is trying to moderate the current crisis, its influence is limited.	因此即便中国努力去缓解当前的危机，其影响力依旧有限。


The other source of North Korea’s power is its audacity in playing a weak hand.	朝鲜的另一个实力来源则是那种弱势之下不惜鱼死网破的气势。


Yes, a full-scale military invasion would meet with a devastating defeat by superior South Korean and US military forces, whose current naval exercises in the Yellow Sea are designed to remind North Korea of this disparity.	朝鲜的全面入侵无疑会遭到美韩优势兵力的毁灭性打击，两国最近在黄海的演习就是为了提醒朝鲜这一点。


But, with 15,000 artillery tubes embedded in the Demilitarized Zone, just 30 miles north of Seoul, North Korea knows that firing just a few shells could wreak havoc on the South Korean stock market and economy, while it has less to lose in comparison.	但依靠着在距离首尔只有三十公里的非军事区外部署的1. 5万门大炮，朝鲜深知只要几发炮弹就能给韩国股市和经济造成巨大破坏，而它自己不过是破罐子破摔，捡了便宜。


By flaunting its willingness to take greater risks, the North hopes to further enhance its bargaining power.	通过不断宣扬自己造成更大破坏的意愿，朝鲜希望能进一步增加其讨价还价的能力。


Most observers attribute the recent provocations to the anticipated succession of power in Pyongyang.	大多数观察家都将朝鲜最近的挑衅行为归隐于平壤当局的权力更替。


Kim Jong-il had years to prepare as an understudy to his father, Kim Il-sung , but many reports suggest that he is nearing  the end of his life.	金正日曾作为他父亲金日成的副手工作多年，但许多报告都显示他已经命不久矣了。


This autumn, he promoted his hitherto little-seen son, Kim Jong-un, to the rank of general, and introduced him at a Communist Party conference.	就在这个秋天，他将自己甚少露面的儿子金正恩提升为人民军大将，并在朝鲜劳动党大会上向大家介绍了后者。


Demonstration of military success in “protecting” the regime may indeed be designed to strengthen the 28-year-old general’s claim to power.	展示在“保卫”政权方面的军事胜利可能是就是为了加强这位28岁的青年将军接权的能力。


If so, the risky behavior we have seen recently is part of the process of solidifying a unique political system: a hereditary Communist monarchy.	如果这是真的话，我们最近见证的冒险行为可能就是某种程序的其中一环，为的就是巩固一个独特政治系统——一个世袭的共产主义君主国。


The North Pole in Peril	处于危险中的北极地区


PARIS – Ever since mankind began to map the world, the north and south poles have fascinated us, both poetically and scientifically.	巴黎-自从人类开始为地球画地图，南极和北极无论从浪漫的诗意还是从科学的角度上看，都让我们心驰神往。


But, save for a few whalers and explorers, not many people ever went to have a closer look.	但除少数捕鲸者和探险者之外，没有太多人曾有近距离接触它们的机会。


The serene stillness of the Arctic and Antarctic was a perfect match for human indifference.	肃穆寂静的南北极和人类的冷漠曾经匹配得如此完美。


The onset of global warming, however, has changed everything.	但全球变暖的出现，改变了这一切。


Of course, that old indifference was not universal.	当然，过去的冷漠也并非毫无例外。


In a rare spurt of collective political intelligence, and in order to prevent any risk of international conflict, an international treaty was signed in 1959 to govern Antarctica.	一次罕见的集体政治智慧的奋力协作，并也为了防止任何国际冲突的发生，使得一项治理南极洲的国际条约于1959年得以签署。


This treaty dedicated Antarctica to exclusively peaceful aims. It recognized the existing territorial claims, declared them “frozen,” and forbade all physical assertions of sovereignty on the land of Antarctica.	该条约规定南极洲只可作和平目的之用，它承认现有的对领土的声称，并宣布“冻结”领土声称，并禁止一切在南极洲土地上对主权的具体坚持的行为。


The nature and content of that treaty were purely diplomatic.	就其性质和内容来看，该条约纯粹是外交辞令式的。


Only after its ratification did the first environmental issues arise.	在条约通过后，才出现了首批环境问题。


These were added to a revised treaty in 1972 by a convention on seal protection, followed, in 1980, by a convention on wildlife preservation.	这些问题都已被加入了修订版的条约中，它们分别是1972年的海豹保护公约，之后是1980年的野生动物保护公约。


Most importantly, a protocol signed in Madrid in 1991, dealt with protecting the Antarctic environment.	最重要的是于1991年在马德里签署的有关保护南极环境的协议。


As French Prime Minister, together with Australia’s then Prime Minister Robert Hawke, I was responsible for proposing the Madrid protocol, which transformed the Antarctic into a natural reserve dedicated to peace and science for 50 years, renewable by tacit agreement.	当时我作为法国总理，与澳大利亚当时的总理罗伯特·霍克一起，我负责起草了马德里协议，该协议把南极洲变成了一个50年中用于和平与科学目的的自然保护区，到期后可由默认的方式继续生效。


It was not an easy success.	这个成功来之不易。


We had to reject first a convention on the exploitation of mineral resources that had already been negotiated and signed in Wellington in 1988, thus risking reopening very uncertain negotiations.	我们首先必须拒绝一个已经讨论过并已于1988年在惠灵顿签署了的开采矿产资源公约，从而冒了重开极不确定的谈判的风险。


We were bluffing, but our bluff worked.	我们的声势造得很大，但我们的声势起了作用。


The Antarctic environment is now effectively protected by the international community, which is the de facto owner of this continent, without any national differentiations.	目前，国际社会有效地保护了南极洲的环境，国际社会是此大陆事实上的拥有者，没有任何国家存在差异。


It is the only such case in the world.	它是世界上此类案例中唯一的一个。


Indeed, international lawyers who are seeking to define the legal status of outer space – Who will own the moon?	事实上，正在设法确定外层空间的法律地位的国际律师们往往以“南极条约体系”为范本，来回答如下之类的问题-谁拥有月球？


Who will own the resources that may one day be extracted there? – often look to the “Antarctic treaty system” for precedents and analogies.	谁将拥有也许有一天可以从那里提取的资源？


But Antarctica had one great advantage, as compared to the Arctic, which is now in peril: there were only penguins in Antarctica, not voters, especially voters of different nationalities.	但是相比目前处于危险境况的北极地区，南极有一个很大的优势：那里只有企鹅，而没有选民，尤其是没有不同国籍的选民。


Antarctica, though a huge continental archipelago, measuring 24 million square kilometers, and covered in ice that is 4-5 kilometers thick, is far from any inhabited continent.	尽管南极洲是一串巨大的大陆群岛，有二千四百万平方公里的面积，并覆盖着4至5公里厚的冰，但与任何有人居住的大陆却相距遥远。


The Arctic is only water, with the North Pole itself 4,200 meters under the surface.	北极地区有的只是水，北极本身在四千二百米的表面之下。


But five countries are very close: Norway, Russia, the United States, Canada, and Denmark (via Greenland, which will become independent in the coming years).	但是，五个国家与之非常接近：挪威，俄罗斯，美国，加拿大和丹麦（中间隔着格陵兰岛，而格陵兰岛在未来几年内将独立）。


Throughout most of human history, ice almost completely barred all navigation in the seas surrounding the North Pole, and the Arctic was asleep in a silent indifference.	人类历史的大部分历程中，严冰几乎让所有北极周围的海上航行完全不可能，北极在一片冷漠下沉睡着。


Everything has changed radically during the last three years.	而在过去三年中，一切都发生了巨变。


The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has established that global warming is not uniform: whereas temperatures rose, on average, by 0.6°C in the twentieth century, the increase in the Arctic region was 2°.	国际气候变化问题小组委员会（ IPCC ）证实，全球变暖在各地并不是一致的：尽管20世纪中平均气温上升了 0. 6 °C，但在北极地区则上升了2 °。


Some estimates suggest that about 20% of the world’s total oil reserves lie under the Arctic.	一些统计数字表明，约20 ％的世界石油储量在北极。


In 2008, for the first time in human history, two navigation channels through the polar ice field – in the East along Siberia, and in the West along the Canadian islands – were open for a few months, allowing boats to go from Europe to Japan or California via the Bering Straits, rather than the Panama Canal or the Horn of Africa, thereby saving some 4,000 or 5,000 kilometers.	2008年，两个穿越极地冰川的航道，在人类历史上首次开通了几个月-东沿西伯利亚，西沿加拿大群岛-让船只通过白令海峡从欧洲到达日本或加利福尼亚州，而不是通过巴拿马运河或非洲好望角，从而少走了大约四千或五千公里。


Given global warming, this may now become a regular occurrence: thousands of ships will pass through the Arctic passages, emptying their fuel tanks and causing oil slicks and other forms of pollution.	由于全球变暖，这可能成为常态：成千上万的船只将通过北极航道，排空其油箱，造成浮油和其他形式的污染。


This poses a real threat to the Eskimo and Inuit populations, as well as to polar bears.	这将对爱斯基摩人和因纽特人以及北极熊构成真正的威胁。


Moreover, according to the Convention on the Law of the Sea, countries’ enjoy absolute sovereignty in the first 12 nautical miles (about 20 kilometers) of their coastal waters sea, and almost absolute sovereignty, limited by a few conventions, within 200 nautical miles (360 kilometers) of their coasts.	此外，根据海洋法公约，所有国家享有其沿海水域12海里（约20公里）的绝对主权，而200海里内（ 360公里）的海岸，除了受一些公约的限制，所有国家享有几乎绝对的主权。


Any country that can prove that the seabed beyond 200 nautical miles is an extension of the continental shelf on which it is sovereign can claim sovereignty over it as well.	任何国家，只要能证明200海里以外的海底是其主权大陆架的延伸，则可以声称享有其主权。


Russia, which three years ago used a submarine to plant a platinum copy of its national flag at the North Pole, claims sovereignty over 37% of the surface of the Arctic Ocean.	俄罗斯在三年前用潜艇在北极插上了一面白金制作的国旗，声称拥有37 ％的北冰洋面积的主权。


The territories claimed by Russia include the North Pole and a huge oil field.	俄罗斯声称的领土包括北极和一个巨大的油田。


If this oil is exploited, the pollution risks will be far higher than anywhere else.	如果这些石油被开采，污染的风险将远远高于其它地方。


And could Russia, given its rearmament policy, be planning to set up underwater missile launch sites?	鉴于俄罗斯重整军备的政策，俄罗斯可能会考虑建立水下导弹发射基地吗？


It is therefore urgently necessary to negotiate a treaty that guarantees peace and environmental protection in the Arctic region.	因此，迫切需要协商制定一项条约，来保障北极地区的和平和环境保护。


It will probably be very difficult to achieve, but the effort should be viewed as a great cause for humankind.	这可能会很难实现，但这一努力应被视为一项为人类谋福的伟大的事业。


The Not So United Nations	并非如此联合的联合国


The good news for Ban Ki-moon is that he has become Secretary General of the United Nations at a time when the prospects for conflict between or among the world’s great powers – the United States, China, Japan, Russia, Europe, and India – are remote.	对于潘基文来说，他在现在这个时间成为联合国秘书长的好消息是，世界上的大国，即美国、中国、日本、俄罗斯、欧洲和印度之间不太可能发生冲突。


The bad news is that the prospects for just about every other sort of conflict are high and the international agenda is both crowded and demanding.	而坏消息是，其他各种冲突发生的可能性非常之高，国际性议程纷乱无章而且急迫。


Ban needs to begin with a cold, hard assessment of his new position.	潘基文需要对他新的职位作一个冷静的、艰难的评估。


A Secretary General of the UN is more secretary than general.	联合国秘书长更多地是一个秘书，而不是一个长官。


He cannot command. It is not the same as being a president or a CEO.	他不能像一个总统或者首席执行官那样发号施令。


He possesses more influence than power.	他所拥有的更多的是影响力，而不是权力。


Moreover, power at the UN is divided, not simply between the Security Council and the General Assembly, but more fundamentally between the 192 members and the UN itself.	此外，联合国的权力是分散的，不仅仅是在安理会和联合国大会之间，更本质地是在其192个成员国和联合国本身之间。


The UN is comprised of sovereign states, but it is not sovereign itself and cannot act as if it were.	联合国是由具有独立主权的国家组成的，但是它自己并不拥有主权，也不能像一个主权国家那样去行动。


More than anything else, the UN reflects the ability of the major powers (above all, the US, China, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom, the five permanent, veto-wielding members of the Security Council) to agree – and to back up their agreements with resources.	联合国更多地是反映了主要的大国（最主要的是安理会里五个可以行使否决权的常任理事国，美国、中国、俄罗斯、法国和英国）同意以及运用他们的资源支持他们的协议的能力。


When they are willing and able to do so, the UN can make a difference; when they are not, the UN can act in only the most limited way, if at all, regardless of what the Secretary General wants.	当他们想要这么做，并且能够这么做的时候，联合国可以带来一些变化； 当他们无法这样做的时候，联合国只能以最最有限的方式来行动（如果有的话），而不管秘书长想要怎样的行动。


Consider Darfur.	就拿苏丹的达尔富尔来说吧。


The world has largely stood by in the face of genocide.	世界面对他们的大屠杀更多地是袖手旁观。


This is not a failure of the UN or the Secretary General so much as a reflection of the reality that the major powers are divided.	与其说这是联合国或者秘书长的失败，倒不如说它反映了主要的大国不和睦的现实。


China clings to a notion of sovereignty that allows governments freedom of action within their borders.	中国坚持认为独立主权的概念就是各国政府在他们的国土范围内可以为所欲为。


In today’s world, such an unconditional definition of sovereignty is inadequate.	在当今世界，这种对于主权无条件的定义是不够的。


But the reality is that no amount of time spent negotiating in New York will turn things around.	然而现实是在纽约花费多少的时间来进行协商对于事情的进展都是没有帮助的。


What matters are the instructions sent to China’s UN ambassador from Beijing.	关键在于从北京传达给中国常驻联合国代表的指令。


In this case, Ban needs to spend time in China’s capital, making the case for the notion that governments have a responsibility to protect their citizens, and that when they fail to do so (as Sudan’s government clearly is), they forfeit some of the advantages that normally are associated with sovereignty.	因此潘基文需要花时间去北京，向他们表明政府有责任保护它的公民，而如果他们无法做到这一点、就像苏丹所明显表现出的那样，那么他们就丧失了通常主权联系在一起的某些优势。


Ban cannot simply reform the Security Council to reflect better the realities of this era.	潘基文无法改革安理会以更好地反映目前这个时代的现实情况。


But he can make the case that countries such as Japan, India, Germany, and others deserve an enhanced position in the UN’s most important body, one more commensurate with their power and status.	但是他可以表明像日本、印度、德国和其他一些国家在联合国最重要的机构内的地位应该得到加强，从而与它们的国力和地位更相符合。


Again, what is holding the UN back is not the UN itself, but its leading members, who cannot agree on what change is needed.	在这个问题上，拖住联合国后腿的不是联合国本身，而是它的主要成员国，它们不同意进行所需要的改革。


Ban can also make the case that there is no justification in today’s world for terror – defined here as the intentional harming of civilians for political purposes.	潘基文还可以表明在当今世界恐怖主义的存在是没有正当理由的，这里的恐怖行动指的是国际上为了政治意图而对平民故意造成伤害的行为。


Not just governments, but religious and other leaders need to be persuaded to denounce terror, shaming and de-legitimizing those who carry it out.	不仅仅是政府，宗教和其他组织的领导人也应该被劝说来谴责恐怖主义，是那些进行恐怖活动的人感到羞耻，并且宣布他们的非法的。


The Secretary General is positioned to make this point loudly and repeatedly.	联合国秘书长有实力大力并且不断地宣传这一点。


Two other areas exist where practical changes are both achievable and desirable.	还有两个领域也可以进行既可行同时又迫切需要的实际的改变。


Ban should support the creation of an international facility that would provide governments access to (but not physical control of) enriched uranium and plutonium for the generation of electrical power.	潘基文应该支持成立一个国际机构来使各国政府可以获得（但不是实质性地掌握）用来产生电能的浓缩铀和钚。


Such an innovation would help stem the spread of nuclear materials and weapons, while also contributing to a shift away from use of oil and gas, thereby reducing global warming in the process.	这样一种革新能阻断核原料和核武器的传播，同时能提供除使用石油和天然气之外的另一种途径，从而减缓全球变暖的进程。


The other area is peacekeeping.	另一个领域是维和。


Establishing a large, standing international force under the UN’s control is not feasible and may not be optimal.	建立一支在联合国控制下的庞大的常驻国际部队是不可行的，也许也并非是一个最佳选择。


But providing incentives for governments to maintain such forces at a high level of alert and setting standards for equipment, training, and professionalism is something the UN can and should do.	但是鼓励政府保持一支处于高度警戒水平的部队，并且为装备、训练和专业水平设置标准，是联合国能够并且也应该做到的。


All these suggestions highlight what might be any secretary general’s most important asset: his voice.	所有这些建议明确表明，作为一个联合国秘书长最最重要的资本是他的声音。


What Ban chooses to say, and how and where he says it, can enhance his influence.	潘基文选择说什么话，怎样说以及在什么地方说，都可以增强他的影响力。


Over time, enhanced influence will enable him to get more things done.	随着时间的推移，得到加强的影响力会使他有能力做更多的事情。


All this will be especially important now given the status of the US, the most powerful country in the world, but one with an often uneasy relationship with the UN.	考虑到美国，这个世界上最强大、但是与联合国总是不那么协调的国家的地位，所有这一切显得尤其重要。


Opinion polls indicate a good deal of support among the American public for the UN.	民意调查显示美国大多数民众对于联合国持支持的态度。


But there is also intense distrust of the UN among segments of the public and with certain elites.	但是部分民众，还有一些精英分子对于联合国也有着强烈的不信任感。


Here again, Ban would be well advised to leave New York and spend more time in the capital and around the country.	在这里，潘基文同样应该被建议离开纽约的办公室，而花更多时间到首都以及整个国家去转转。


The US needs and benefits from effective multilateralism in a global world, one in which challenges cannot be met by any single country acting by itself.	美国需要全球有一个有效的多边机制，同时也会从中获益，因为没有哪个国家能独自面对挑战。


The US has a particular need for effective international cooperation now, when it is stretched militarily, economically, and politically owing to its policies toward Iraq and Afghanistan.	现在当美国因为它对伊拉克和阿富汗的政策而在军事、经济和政治上战线拉得很长的时候，它尤其需要有效的国际合作。


Contributing to the emergence of a more productive relationship between the world’s most important international organization and its most powerful member would be no small feat.	能使世界上主要的国际组织及其最重要的成员国之间产生更有成果的关系，绝不是一个很小的业绩。


Syria’s Chemical Genie	叙利亚的化学幽灵


LOS ANGELES – Since Syria’s civil war erupted, its large chemical-weapons arsenal has haunted the conflict zone and beyond.	洛杉矶—自叙利亚内战爆发以来，其庞大的化学武库一直是冲突区内外挥之不去的阴影。


Now Israel says that chemical weapons have been used by the Syrian regime.	目前以色列声称叙利亚政府已经使用了化学武器。


Escalating fears have driven US President Barack Obama to declare repeatedly that any Syrian use or transfer of chemical weapons would cross a “red line,” for which President Bashar al-Assad’s regime would be “held accountable.”	逐步升级的担忧让美国总统奥巴马再三强调，叙利亚使用或转运化学武器的任何行为都意味着越过“红线”，总统巴沙尔·阿萨德政权将因此“被问责”。


But the practical implications of this warning remain vague.	但这一警告到底有什么作用还不清楚。


As dangerous as Syria’s chemical-weapons stockpile is, it pales in comparison with another risk that became evident in late February, when Syrian rebels overran a Scud-missile base in Al-Kibar, in the country’s remote northeastern desert.	叙利亚化学武库固然危险，但和去年2月以来逐步明显的另一大风险相比只算小巫见大巫。 叙利亚叛军在叙利亚东北部偏远沙漠地带的艾奇巴（Al-Kibar）发现了一个飞毛腿导弹基地。


Beneath the installation lay the buried remnants of the North Korean-engineered nuclear reactor that Israel’s air force had destroyed on September 6, 2007.	在发射架之下埋着朝鲜制造、2007年9月26日被以色列空军摧毁的核反应堆的残留。


Had Israel not learned of the secret plant, which was on the verge of launching operations to produce material for an atomic arsenal, the rebels effectively would have been in possession of a radiological weapon.	要不是以色列发现了这一眼看就要开始原子武器原料制造过程的秘密基地，叛军已经实际拥有了放射性武器。


The mere threat could have held the Syrian government hostage.	仅仅是发出威胁就能让叙利亚政府就范。


Far more worrying, had Syrian engineers built a lab at the site, or in other rebel-held territory, to extract plutonium from the reactor’s spent fuel, the insurgents might even have found themselves with the ingredients of an atomic bomb.	更令人担忧的是，如果叙利亚工程师在建有实验室，或在其他叛军控制地区建有实验室从核反应堆乏燃料中提取铀，则叛军甚至可能已经获得了制造原子弹的原料。


Fortunately, Syria does not face these threats today.	幸运的是，现在叙利亚并不需要面对这一威胁。


But Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran – all potentially unstable countries with growing nuclear enterprises – may in the future.	但未来巴基斯坦、朝鲜和伊朗——这些国家都是拥有日渐增强的核能力的不稳定国家——可能会面对这一威胁。


How concerned should the world be?	我们应该对此予以多大程度关注呢？


History provides grounds for optimism.	历史让我们有乐观的理由。


After all, host countries have been able to contain nuclear risks in the most challenging circumstances.	毕竟，东道国表现出了在最具挑战的环境中遏制核风险的能力。


During Yugoslavia’s violent collapse, adversaries never struck or invaded Serbia’s research reactor, powered by weaponizable enriched uranium.	在南斯拉夫的暴力解体过程中，敌对势力从未打击或侵入过塞尔维亚用武器级浓缩铀供能的研究核反应堆。


When Serbian fighter jets flew threateningly low over Slovenia’s nuclear power plant, they spared the reactor.	当塞尔维亚战斗机超低空掠过斯洛文尼亚的核电厂时，它们放过了核反应堆。


Likewise, during China’s Cultural Revolution, the imposition of martial law prevented attempts by rival factions to seize nuclear facilities in Xinjiang and Qinghai.	类似地，在中国文化大革命期间，戒严令的实施阻止了敌对势力占领新疆和青海核设施的图谋。


In 1961, as a group of former French generals revolted in French Algeria, an atomic-bomb test in the Sahara went off without a hitch.	1961年，一小撮前法军军官在法属阿尔及利亚起事，但撒哈拉沙漠中的原子弹试验仍顺利地进行了。


And, most significant, during the collapse of the Soviet Union, the vast nuclear arsenal remained intact.	最令人瞩目的则是苏联解体期间其庞大的核武库没有任何动静。


However, concern that the Syrian government could intensify  its use of chemical weapons against rebel-held areas, or that rebels could initiate attacks or respond with captured chemical weapons, raises questions about the pattern’s durability and the international community’s reaction.	但是，关于叙利亚政府可能对叛军控制区加大化学武器的使用，或者叛军会用缴获化学武器先发制人的担忧引出了关于这一模式的可持续性和国际社会如何反应的问题。


The United States, which has become the world’s leader in containing the chemical-weapons risk, seems befuddled.	世界遏制化学武器风险领袖——美国似乎并未惊醒。


Early last year, the US Department of Defense let it be known that 75,000 troops would be needed to secure Syria’s chemical facilities.	去年初，美国国防部长披露，保护叙利亚化学设施需要75000人的军队。


After the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is not surprising that this estimate did not exactly generate a groundswell of public support for military intervention in Syria.	在阿富汗和伊拉克战争之后，毫不奇怪，这一估计并没有激发民众对军事干预叙利亚的大力支持。


Recent statements from US officials have not been reassuring.	美国官员的近期言论无法令人放心。


In January, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said that the US was not pursuing options that involve “boots on the ground” to secure Assad’s arsenal during the conflict.	1月，时任国防部长帕内塔宣称美国并不追求“踏上叙利亚的土地”在冲突期间保护巴沙尔的化学武库。


At the same news conference, Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, conceded that preventing the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons would require such clear, comprehensive intelligence that obtaining it is “almost unachievable.”	在同一次新闻发布会上，参谋长联席会议主席邓普希（Martin E. Dempsey）承认，防止叙利亚政府使用化学武器要求明确、全面的情报，而获得这样的情报“近乎不可能”。


Appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 17, Dempsey added that he had no confidence that US forces could secure the arsenal given the number of sites.	在4月17日的参议院军事委员会听证会上，邓普希又说，由于化学武器基地过多，他没有信心美军能保护化学武库。


Such remarks from senior military authorities suggest that Obama’s warnings may be hollow.	高级军官的评论表明，奥巴马警告或许只是纸老虎。


Worse, they inspire little confidence that the US can deal with future cases in which countries with nuclear assets find themselves in revolt, civil war, or political collapse – and with compromised domestic atomic safeguards risking the spread of nuclear havoc to other regions.	更糟糕的是，他们没能激发人们关于美国能够应对未来某有核国家陷入革命、内战或政治崩溃——以及形成妥协的国内核力量有可能溢出边境进入他国——的情况的信心。


Such risks demand examination and planning.	这一风险需要检验和计划。


But, to rely on the US government alone to plot the most effective strategy in the shadow of possible internal group-think is asking too much.	但是，只依靠美国政府在潜在内部小团体思维的影响下谋划最有效战略有点要求过高了。


Outside vetting – including published reviews by congressional investigative bodies, think tanks, and scholars – could add important insights.	外部调查——包括国会调查机构、智库和学者所发表的观点——可以提供重要的洞见。


In the aftermath of America’s poorly executed recent wars and confounded planning with respect to Syria’s chemical weapons, such vetting is the least that Americans and their allies should expect in order to prevent the realization of the sum of all our fears: the first nuclear attack or intentional major radiological event of the twenty-first century.	美国在近期战争中表现拙劣，在叙利亚化学武器问题上的计划缺乏头绪，在这样的情况下，外部调查至少是美国人及其盟友为了防止我们的担心总爆发应该采取的行动：21世纪第一次核打击或重大国际放射性事件。


The Obama Doctrine and Africa	奥巴马学说和非洲


MADRID – President Barack Obama’s much discussed Cairo speech represented not only the demise of George W. Bush’s ideological drive to reconstruct the Muslim world through a democratic revolution; it marked the end of American liberalism’s quest to remake the world in its own image.	马德里——广受关注的巴拉克·奥巴马总统在开罗的讲话不仅标志着乔治·W·布什总统通过发动民主革命重建穆斯林世界的思想动力寿终正寝，而且还标志着美国自由主义势力按照自身形象重塑世界的努力走入死胡同。


Instead, Obama’s administration is guided by a relativist political realism that assumes respect for cultural and religious distinctions.	相反，奥巴马内阁奉行相对的政治现实主义政策，重新给予文化和宗教差异以应有的尊重。


His secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, underscored this tendency during her first visit to China, where her unmistakeable message was that order and stability take priority over liberty and human rights.	奥巴马的国务卿希拉里·克林顿在首访中国时特别强调这种新的发展趋势，她明确传递的信息是：秩序和稳定比自由和人权更重要。


But what about Africa, the forgotten continent that has been conspicuously absent from Obama’s hectic agenda?	而非洲，这块显然被奥巴马忙碌的议程排除在外的被人遗忘的大陆又该何去何从？


There, both the resilience of the local political culture and strategic imperatives are converging to define the limits of the West’s capacity to impose its values.	在这块大陆上，区域政治文化弹性和战略规则共同限定了西方把自身价值观强加于人的能力。


A fortnight before Obama’s Cairo speech, a delegation of the United Nations Security Council visited four African countries to express concern about the resurgence of unconstitutional change on the continent.	就在奥巴马发表开罗讲话前两个星期，一个联合国安理会代表团访问非洲四国，表达了对非洲大陆违宪行为沉渣泛起的担忧。


Africa does indeed present a gloomy picture, with countries virtually crumbling to dust as a result of autocracy and stagnation.	非洲的确呈现出一幅毫无希望的画面，这块大陆上的许多国家由于专制政治和经济停滞而濒于垮台。


But the emerging Obama doctrine suggests that “elections alone do not make true democracy,” and that, as has been the case in the Arab world, any abrupt move to democracy is bound to produce chaos.	但刚刚兴起的奥巴马学说认为“选举无法成就真正的民主”，而且阿拉伯世界的现实状况已经表明，任何试图一蹴而就实现民主的举动注定只会造成混乱。


Moreover, in Africa post-authoritarian rulers are not necessarily respectful of human rights and decent governance.	此外，非洲后独裁时期的统治者不一定能做到尊重人权和公平治政。


The West’s attitude toward democracy in the Third World has always been erratic.	西方对第三世界民主的态度一直反复无常。


It applauded the military takeover in Algeria in the early 1990’s aimed at curtailing the democratic emergence of an Islamist regime, and is happy to conduct business with authoritarian regimes throughout the Arab world.	它为20世纪90年代初军事接管阿尔及利亚击节喝彩，而这次行动的目的是要阻止伊斯兰民主政权的诞生； 它还兴致勃勃地与遍及阿拉伯世界的独裁政府保持商务往来。


Yet, public infatuation with the external trappings of democracy is usually the norm.	尽管如此，对于外部民主装饰的公众迷恋却常常会成为一以贯之的标准。


Take Guinea Conakry.	以几内亚为例。


After years of turmoil, lower-ranking officers headed by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara took power in December 2008 in what was a widely supported and peaceful takeover.	在持续多年的动荡之后，穆萨·卡马拉上校领导的下级军官在2008年12月一次广受支持的和平接管行动中夺取了执政地位。


Both the European Union and the United States immediately reacted by threatening the ruling junta with a total cut-off of aid unless constitutional rule and elections were restored.	而欧盟和美国的反应却是立即威胁立足未稳的新政府，声称除非重新恢复宪法统治和选举，否则就将彻底切断各项援助。


Though President Camara eventually succumbed to pressure and declared elections for the coming fall, he has a valid point in insisting that he first must secure stability so that elections do not become a mere prelude to civil strife.	虽然卡马拉总统最终屈服于压力，宣布在来年秋天举行选举，但他有理由坚持必须首先恢复稳定，才能使选举不致沦为内战的序幕。


The case of neighbouring Guinea-Bissau, where a blood-bath has just taken place ahead of general elections, should serve as a warning.	邻国几内亚比绍的情况应当让我们引以为戒，那里在总统大选前刚刚发生过一场血腥屠杀。


Why should the West insist on elections in a country that since 1984 was ruled by a Western-backed dictator, Lansana Conté, who himself came to power in a military coup?	对于一个1984年以来就由西方支持的独裁者兰萨纳·孔戴统治的国家来说，西方为什么要坚持选举呢？ 毕竟孔戴自己就曾依靠军事政变起家。


He maintained a constitution, and held elections, but this did not make him a democratic ruler, nor was he able to extricate his country from appalling backwardness despite its tremendous potential for economic development.	他保留了宪法和选举，但却并没有因此成为民主统治者，他也没有成功发掘出这个国家在经济发展方面的巨大潜质，把他的国家从令人震惊的落后状况中解救出来。


The problem in Africa is one of effective government, not of elections and high-minded constitutions.	非���的问题在于缺乏有效的政府，而不在于缺少选举和高尚的宪法。


Rulers should be encouraged instead to engage in bottom-up democracy building, create an honest police force and judicial system, and allow civic organizations to flourish.	因此要鼓励执政者进行自下而上的民主建设，打造诚实的警察部队和司法系统，实现社会组织的繁荣兴旺。


Training police forces to secure law and order without resorting to bloodshed is no less important than elections.	在不诉诸流血的情况下训练警察部队维护法律和秩序其重要性丝毫不在选举之下。


Elections and constitutions in Africa – Zimbabwe and Gabon’s dictatorship have both – have never been a safeguard against tyranny and human rights violations.	津巴布韦和加蓬的独裁政权既有选举也有宪法，但这两种制度却从来没有成为防止暴政和侵犯人权的法宝。


Camara’s test – indeed, the test for most African rulers – consists in protecting civilians and their property, in establishing law and order without oppressive measures, and in fighting corruption.	对卡马拉、实际也是对多数非洲统治者的考验在于保护普通民众及其财产，在不借助压迫性措施的前提下建立法律和秩序框架，以及消除腐败现象。


Highly responsive to international pressure, he was recently praised by Human Rights Watch for his “very important effort” in recognizing the destructive role of corruption and drug trafficking, and for launching an official crackdown on both.	卡马拉积极应对国际压力，在承认腐败和贩毒的破坏性作用并开展官方镇压方面“非常重要的努力”不久前刚刚得到了人权观察组织的赞扬。


Order and stability, even in the absence of constitutional rights, is what makes countries like Libya and Tunisia legitimate in the eyes of the international community.	即便在宪法权利缺位的情况下，秩序和稳定也是使利比亚和突尼斯这样的国家在国际社会眼中合法性尚存的法宝。


To recover the confidence of the international business community and the world’s mining giants, who were enraged in recent years by forced renegotiations of existing deals by governments in Congo, Mongolia and Guinea, Camara was also wise to retreat from his threat to renegotiate existing mining concessions.	为恢复国际商界和矿业巨头们的信心，卡马拉也明智地宣布将不会重新谈判现有的采矿权，近年来刚果、蒙古和几内亚等国强制重新谈判现有交易的行为深深激怒了国际商界和矿业巨头。


The West is right to insist on norms of decent government, but it risks losing its capacity to influence events in Africa when it automatically links aid to elections.	西方坚持公平治政的标准本身并没有错，但当它把援助自动与选举挂钩的时候就可能慢慢丧失对非洲局势的影响。


For as it does, China is using its colossal financial firepower to expand its strategic position on the continent, without linking aid and investment to pesky demands for good governance.	因为中国正在利用其巨大的金融资源巩固其在非洲大陆的战略地位，他们并没有把援助和投资事务与麻烦的善政要求挂钩。


China’s drive to retain a significant say in the pricing of iron and bauxite, of which Guinea is the world’s major producer, means that it can always receive a warm welcome from officials tired of being lectured to by Westerners.	中国保留对铁矿和铝土矿定价权的做法注定会受到非洲官员的热烈欢迎，几内亚是上述资源的主要产地，而几内亚国内官员早已厌倦了西方人没完没了的说教。


It is not good news for Western human rights champions if China ends up training policemen in countries like Guinea.	如果培训几内亚等国警察的任务最终落到中国头上，这对西方人权斗士来讲绝非善策。


Not much imagination is required to discern what norms the Chinese might inculcate into the 1,000 Central Asian policemen and judicial officials they are currently training.	不需要太多想象力就可以想见中国会给目前负责培训的1，000名中亚警察和司法官员灌输何种标准。


As Obama understands, such authoritarian aid is a serious challenge to the West’s geo-strategic interests, including the fight against drug traffic (Guinea has become a transit point on the route from South America to Europe).	奥巴马认为，如此专制援助是对西方地缘战略利益，包括反毒品斗争的一种严重挑战（几内亚已经成为南美到欧洲运毒路线上的中转国）。


It is also undermining the opportunity to lay the basis for true democratic reform throughout the continent.	这也破坏了在非洲大陆打下真正民主改革基础的大好机会。


The Obama Doctrine’s First Term	奥巴马主义的第一个任期


ASPEN – Public-opinion polls in the United States indicate a close presidential election in November.	阿斯彭—美国民调显示，11月大选竞争十分激烈。


While President Barack Obama outpolls the Republican challenger, Mitt Romney, on foreign policy, slow economic growth and high unemployment – issues that are far more salient in US elections – favor Romney.	奥巴马总统在外交政策上略胜共和党挑战者罗姆尼一筹，但经济增长不力和失业高企等对于美国大选重要得多的问题都有利于罗姆尼。


And, even on foreign policy, Obama’s critics complain that he has failed to implement the transformational initiatives that he promised four years ago.	而即使在外交政策方面，奥巴马的批评者也指出他没能推行四年前做出的转型承诺。


Are they right?	这样的批评中肯吗？


Obama came to power when both the US and the world economy were in the midst of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.	奥巴马上台时正逢美国和世界经济遭遇大萧条以来最严重的金融危机。


Indeed, some of Obama’s economic advisers counseled him that unless urgent steps were taken to stimulate the economy, there was a one-in-three chance of entering a full-scale depression.	事实上，奥巴马的一些经济顾问建议说，除非采取紧急刺激措施，否则经济将有三分之一的机会陷入全面萧条。


Thus, although Obama also inherited two ongoing wars, nuclear-proliferation threats from Iran and North Korea, and the continuing problem of Al Qaeda’s terrorism, his early months in office were devoted to addressing the economic crisis at home and abroad.	因此，尽管奥巴马接手了战争、伊朗和朝鲜核威胁以及基地组织恐怖主义等问题，但其白宫生涯的最初几个月都在应对国内外经济危机。


His efforts were not a complete success, but he managed to stave off the worst outcome.	他的努力算不上有多成功，但确实设法避免了最坏结果。


Obama’s rhetoric during his 2008 campaign and the first months of his presidency was both inspirational in style and transformational in objective.	奥巴马在2008年大选过程中以及总统生涯的前几个月里的口号在形式上颇为鼓舞人心，在目标上则相当具有变革性。 在担任总统的第一年里，他在布拉格的演讲上提出了无核世界的目标；


His first year in office included a speech in Prague in which he established the goal of a nuclear-free world; a speech in Cairo promising a new approach to the Muslim world; and his Nobel Peace Prize speech, which promised to “bend history in the direction of justice.”	在开罗的演讲上承诺将开启新的穆斯林世界； 而在诺贝尔和平奖获奖演讲中，他承诺“让历史驶上公正的方向”。


In part, this series of speeches was tactical.	从一定程度上说，这一系列演讲颇有些技术性。


Obama needed to meet his promise to set a new direction in foreign policy while simultaneously managing to juggle the issues left to him by George W. Bush, any of which, if dropped, could still cause a crisis for his presidency.	奥巴马需要兑现他的承诺，这样才能在设置外交政策新方向的同时设法应付好小布什留给他的问题，即使在今天，这些遗留问题稍有不慎就会给他带来总统连任危机。


Nonetheless, there is no reason to believe that Obama was being disingenuous about his objectives.	尽管如此，没有理由认为奥巴马没有把自己提出的目标当回事。


His worldview was shaped by the fact that he spent part of his youth in Indonesia and had an African father.	他的世界观的形成受到他在印尼的青年时代以及他的非洲父亲的影响。


In the words of a recent Brookings Institution book, Obama had an “activist vision of his role in history,” intending to “refurbish America’s image abroad, especially in the Muslim world; end its involvement in two wars; offer an outstretched hand to Iran; reset relations with Russia as a step toward ridding the world of nuclear weapons; develop significant cooperation with China on both regional and global issues; and make peace in the Middle East.”	用布鲁克林研究所新报告的话说，奥巴马对于“自己在历史中的角色抱有积极主义的愿景”，他意在“刷新美国的海外名声，特别是在穆斯林世界的名声； 让美国在两场战争中退出；


But his record of achievement on these issues has been mixed.	重塑美俄关系作为销毁世界核武器的一步； 在地区和全球问题上发展中美重要合作关系；


“Seemingly intractable circumstances turned him from the would-be architect of a new global order into a leader focused more on repairing relationships and reacting to crises – most notably the global economic crisis,” the report continued.	 “看似棘手的环境使他从新全球秩序的潜在设计者转变为更多关注修复关系、应对危机（最令人瞩目的是全球经济危机）的领导人，”该报告继续写道。


And while he eliminated Osama bin Laden and weakened Al Qaeda, some counterterrorism policies ended up undercutting his appeal in places like the Middle East and Pakistan.	尽管他除掉了本·拉登、削弱了基地组织，但仍有一些反恐政策仍让他在中东和巴基斯坦等地的欢迎度受到了影响。


Some of the half-empty glasses were the result of intractable events; some were the product of early naiveté, such as the initial approaches to Israel, China, and Afghanistan.	某些方面差强人意的原因是问题太棘手，某些方面则是拜一开始把事情想得太容易所赐，比如对待以色列、中国和阿富汗的初始态度。


But Obama was quick to recover from mistakes in a practical way.	但奥巴马很快就通过务实手段从这些错误中恢复了过来。


As one of his supporters put it, he is a “pragmatic idealist.”	正如他的一位支持者所指出的，他是个“实用主义的理想主义者”。


In this sense, though Obama did not back away from rhetorical expressions of transformational goals regarding such issues as climate change or nuclear weapons, in practice his pragmatism was reminiscent of more incremental presidential leaders like Dwight Eisenhower or George H. W. Bush.	从这个方面说，尽管奥巴马在气候变化和核武器等问题上仍然高调，提出了转型目标； 但在现实中，他的范式却令人想起较为谨慎的前任，如艾森豪威尔和老布什。


Despite his relative inexperience in international affairs, Obama showed a similar skill in reacting to a complex set of foreign-policy challenges.	尽管他在国际事务上相对缺乏经验，但奥巴马仍显露了类似的应对一系列复杂外交政策挑战的技巧。


This was demonstrated by his appointments of experienced advisers, careful management of issues, and above all, keen contextual intelligence.	比如，他任命了经验丰富的顾问、处理问题小心翼翼，最重要的，他显露出高超的因势利导的智慧。


This is not to say that Obama has had no transformational effects.	他改变了在伊拉克和阿富汗不受欢迎的政策； 使用了基于较低成本的动武和网络战等反暴动手段；


He changed the course of an unpopular policy in Iraq and Afghanistan; embraced counter-insurgency tactics based on less costly uses of military and cyber power; increased American soft power in many parts of the world; and began to shift America’s strategic focus to Asia, the global economy’s fastest-growing region.	增加了美国在世界各地的软实力； 还开始将美国的战略重点转向全球经济增长最快的地区——亚洲。


With respect to Iran, Obama struggled to implement United Nations-approved sanctions and avoid a premature war.	在伊朗问题上，奥巴马致力于实施联合国批准的制裁和避免持久战。


And, while the Arab Spring revolutions presented him with an unwelcome surprise, after some hesitation he came down on what he regarded as the side of history.	此外，尽管阿拉伯之春革命给他带来了意外的不受欢迎，但在犹豫一番后，他选择站在自己认为正确的历史潮流的一方。


In a new book, Confront and Conceal, David Sanger describes what he calls an “Obama Doctrine” (though he faults the president for not communicating it more clearly): a lighter military footprint, combined with a willingness to use force unilaterally when American security interests are directly involved; reliance on coalitions to deal with global problems that do not directly threaten US security; and “a rebalancing away from the Middle East quagmires toward the continent of greatest promise in the future – Asia.”	在新书《直面和隐藏》（Confront and Conceal）中，大卫·桑格（David Sanger）描述了他所谓的“奥巴马主义”（Obama Doctrine，尽管他攻讦奥巴马没能进行更清楚的沟通）：更少的军事干涉，辅以在牵涉到美国直接利益的问题上不惜单方面动用武力的决心； 依靠盟友应对不对美国安全构成直接威胁的全球问题；


The contrast between the killing of Bin Laden and the intervention in Libya illustrates the Obama Doctrine.	消灭本·拉登和干预利比亚这两件事上的反差表明了什么是奥巴马主义。


In the former case, Obama personally managed a unilateral use of force, which involved a raid on Pakistani territory.	对于前者，奥巴马亲自指挥了包括在巴基斯坦领土上实施袭击的单方面动武。


In the latter case, where national interests were not as clear, he waited until the Arab League and the UN had adopted resolutions that provided the legitimacy needed to ensure the right soft-power narrative, and then shared the leadership of the hard-power operation with NATO allies.	对于后者，美国在其中的国家利益并不明晰，因此他一直等到阿盟和联合国批准了解决方案、获得了正确施展软实力所必须的正当性之后才采取行动，即使如此，仍与北约盟友一起分担了领导任务和硬实力行动。


The long-term effect of the Obama Doctrine will require more time to assess, but, as he approaches the November election, Obama appears to have an edge over his opponent in foreign policy.	奥巴马主义的长期影响需要更长时间才能评估，但是，随着11月大选的临近，奥巴马似乎在与其外交政策的反对者的斗争中占据了上风。


Obama has not bent the arc of history in the transformational way to which he aspired in his campaign four years ago, but his shift to a pragmatic approach may turn out to be a good thing, particularly if voters continue to have doubts about the economy.	奥巴马并没有将历史的方向掰向四年前的竞选活动中热切渴望的转型之路，但他转向实用主义方法也许是件好事，特别是在选民对经济仍充满怀疑的时候。


The Obama Effect	奥巴马效应


LONDON – In the last two months, I have been in eight American cities – Boston, New York, Washington, Houston, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle.	发自伦敦——在过去的两个月间，我曾经到过波士顿、纽约、华盛顿、休斯顿、芝加哥、洛杉矶、旧金山和西雅图等8个美国城市。


Phew! I am left with several sentiments.	而这些经历给我留下了诸多感想。


First, if you have to travel from city to city in the United States, you would do yourself a favor if you could find a way of journeying by train.	首先，如果你不得不在美国各个城市间旅行，那么最好选择坐火车。


American airlines are pretty awful.	美国的航空公司是相当糟糕的。


They are lucky that hostility to competition in what purports to be the homeland of free-market capitalism has kept Asian airlines out of their domestic marketplace.	而他们之所以如此幸运的原因，则是因为在这个自我标榜为自由市场资本主义老家的国度里，对市场竞争的敌视竟能将所有亚洲航空公司隔绝在国门之外。


Do American air travelers know just how bad the service that they get really is?	不知美国国内的乘客是否意识到自己所得到的服务究竟有多差劲呢？


American airports are as dire as British ones, maybe worse.	美国航空公司的服务和英国的一样让人倒胃口，或许更糟。


Los Angeles gets the Oscar, with Soviet-style queues through security.	如果要评最差的，那么洛杉矶机场堪称独占鳌头，比如通过安检时人们排成的长队简直跟苏联时期有得一比。


How is it that America gives us Silicon Valley wizardry and Third World infrastructure?	美国怎么能在贡献给我们硅谷奇迹的同时却在使用堪比第三世界国家的基础设施呢？


But, for all the misery of air travel in America, when you get to your destination it can still blow your socks off.	但在坐飞机的种种痛苦之外，到达目的地之后的所见所闻仍然令人震惊。


The lakeside architecture of Chicago.	比如芝加哥的湖畔建筑；


The sight of Puget Sound in Seattle (one of my favorite cities).	普吉特湾的迷人景色（西雅图是我最喜欢的城市之一）；


The view across San Francisco’s bay from Nob Hill. Park Avenue in New York on a fine late spring morning.	还有从诺布山瞭望旧金山湾的壮阔景致，以及某个美好晚春早晨时分的纽约公园大道。


They are all, to borrow from Frank Sinatra, “my kind of town.”	借用弗兰克·西纳特拉的一句名言来说，这些城市都是“我的地方”。


What is surprising for a European – at least for this European – at the moment is the relative optimism in all these cities.	然而此时此刻令欧洲人——至少对我这个欧洲人来说——最惊讶的则是这些城市里弥漫的那种相对乐观的氛围。


Yes, the economic news has been and remains grim.	的确，财经新闻里一直都是严酷的坏消息。


Much of the automobile industry is bust.	大部分汽车产企业破产；


Car dealerships are being closed.	汽车经销商纷纷停业；


House prices remain pretty flat.	房价也相当低迷；


Unemployment and the budget deficit are soaring.	失业率和经济预算赤字也居高不下。


But there is not the same sense of gloom that envelops you in Britain and much of Europe.	但在这里你却感觉不到那种笼罩英国和欧洲大部分国家地区的萧瑟之情。


My guess is that much of this is the result of traditional American ebullience: the view that what goes down will sooner or later bounce back up.	我猜这在很大程度上是受到传统美式精神的影响：人们会相信所有跌落低谷的东西都有卷土重来的一天。


This is one of the reasons why America has represented a quarter or more of the world’s output for the best part of 150 years.	而这也是过去150年的绝大部分时间内美国经济一直能占据世界总产值四分一强的原因之一


But there is another factor at work.	但事实上，有另一个因素在起作用。


We often talk – a good Marxist point – about the impact of economics on politics.	我们经常讨论马克思的一个重要观点：经济是如何影响政治的。


And we have seen this recently in Britain. Down goes the economy and down goes the Labour government’s standing.	而且最近我们已经在英国看到了实例——工党执政的政府支持率随着经济状况一路下滑。


Britain’s Labour government is just about as unpopular as it is possible to be. It performed disastrously in recent elections for local councils and the European parliament.	工党政府正处在有史以来最不受欢迎的时期，它在最近的地方议会和欧洲议会选举中表现得惨不忍睹。


Prime Minister Gordon Brown is sustained in office primarily by the calculation of his ministers that getting rid of him would trigger an early election that they would lose heavily.	而戈登·布朗之所以还能保住首相之位，只不过是因为那些精于政治算计的部长们不愿推他下台，怕这会导致议会提前大选，而工党肯定一败涂地。


But what about the impact of politics on economics?	那么政治是如何作用于经济的呢？


That is what I believe you see today in the US.	此种情况我相信正如你所看到的如今在美国发生的那样。


The economy may look bad, but the president looks great.	经济形势也许看上去很差劲，但美国的新总统却棒极了。


Despite the ubiquitous efforts of Fox News, President Barack Obama dominates, enthralls, and enthuses the audience of American voters – consumers, workers, investors, one and all.	尽管福克斯电视台对他的攻击无处不在，但总统巴拉克·奥巴马却已经实实在在地占据、迷倒并激发了选民的狂热——所有的消费者、工人、投资者都为他着迷。


He is, as one American commentator calls him, The One.	而他本人，正如一位美国评论家所说，就是那个拯救美国的人。


Obama seems to have every political talent, and he passes the character test too.	奥巴马似乎具备一切政治天赋，而且他的人格魅力也得到了公众认可。


Moreover, his wife is a star in her own formidable right.	此外他的妻子（米歇尔·奥巴马）作为第一夫人也同样令人敬畏。


Turn on any TV channel and there they are: glamorous, decent, and smart.	随便换到任何一个电视频道都能看到总统夫妇的身影：魅力非凡，举止得体，头脑灵活。


So, while the economic numbers may look bad, the country’s political leadership looks great.	所以尽管经济数据看上去不太令人满意，但美国的领导层还是受人称道的。


And if you’re an American, you observe other countries around the world (especially in Europe) where people say, “If only he was ours.”	而且如果你是一个美国人，你在环顾世界其他所有国家（尤其是欧洲）就会发现人们都在议论：“如果奥巴马是我们的就好了。 ”


I am a fan myself: a fan with two worries. First, what happens if politics does not trump economics, and Obama’s policies don’t start to produce a recovery?	虽然我自己就是一个奥巴马迷，但我也有着两种担忧：首先，如果美国打出的这张政治牌对经济没有作用，奥巴马的政策不能使经济复苏怎么办？


That is when the old political calculus may take its grim toll.	到时候古老的政治算计又要开始发挥其可怕的破坏作用。


If there are no signs of economic recovery by the end of the year, the polls may start to turn.	如果今年年末仍然没有任何经济复苏的迹象，民意可能会发生逆转。


Obama is smart enough to understand this.	聪明的奥巴马很清楚这一点。


So why – my second worry – does he take quite so much on his own shoulders?	而我的第二个忧虑，则是奥巴马为什么要一力承担如此沉重的责任？


Every day, on every news bulletin, he is out there swinging.	每一天的每一条新闻都是他忙来忙去的报道。


He might argue that he has to be. There are so many issues, from health-care reform to the Middle East, that need his attention.	也许奥巴马会说他不得不这样做，因为摆在面前的议题如此之多，从医疗改革到中东问题，都需要他去关注。


I just worry about the boredom factor. If you assume that governing is like campaigning – that you have to be on top of the debate 24 hours a day, seven days a week – can you really anticipate a long shelf life?	我只是担忧奥巴马可能会感到厌倦：假如我们把政府治理看作一场总统大选，那么就意味着一周7天，一天24小时奥巴马都处于激烈辩论之中，这样你估计自己能坚持多久？


Don’t you risk becoming, even if you are smart as hell, too much of a good thing?	即使你绝顶聪明，这样的工作强度是不是也有点太过分了？


I hope I am wrong.	我只希望我的忧虑是错误的。


Barack Obama is a star. The world needs one.	巴拉克·奥巴马确实是个明星，而当今世界也正需要他这样的明星。


But it needs one who continues to shine brightly for several years to come.	但是这个世界需要的，是他在接下来的几年里，能一直闪亮下去。


The Obama Surprise	奥巴马会要做的让人惊奇的事情


NEW YORK – The high hopes surrounding Barack Obama’s presidency are mostly a good thing, as they remind us that much of the anti-American sentiment that is so apparent around the world is not and need not be permanent.	纽约-人们对奥巴马总统抱有厚望，这基本上是一件好事，因为这提醒我们，世界各地大部分的如此显著的反美情绪不是，也不应是，永久性的。


But this anticipation is also a problem for Obama, as it will be difficult – and in some instances impossible – for him to meet expectations.	但这种期望对于奥巴马也是一个难题，因为他想要满足人们的期望的话，将是不容易的-在某些情况下也是不可能的。


There will be no Palestinian state this spring; nor will there be a global climate change pact or a new trade accord or an end to poverty or genocide or disease anytime soon.	今年春天将不会出现巴勒斯坦国;全球气候变化协议或新的贸易协定也不会达成； 贫困、种族灭绝的行为或疾病的流行也不会马上结束。


The reasons go beyond the reality that big accomplishments require time and effort.	其原因并非仅仅是若想取得大成就需要时间和精力。


The incoming president faces extraordinary constraints – constraints that will make it essential for other countries to do more if stability and prosperity are to be the norm rather than the exception.	新总统面临着一些捆住他手脚的非常大的限制-若想让稳定与繁荣成为常态而不是例外，其它国家要更加和美国同舟共济显得如此至关重要。


The most obvious limitation stems from the state of the American economy.	最明显的限制源是美国的经济状况。


Two million jobs disappeared in the last four months alone.	在过去4个月里，失业人口增加了两百万；


The housing market continues to deteriorate.  America’s GDP is contracting at an almost unprecedented rate.	住房市场继续恶化； 而美国的国内生产总值几乎正在以前所未有的速度萎缩。


As a result, Obama will have no choice but to devote the lion’s share of his time and attention to reviving the economy.	其结果是，奥巴马将别无选择，他只能把他最大部分的时间和精力放在振兴经济上。


More than anything else, his success in this domain will determine the perception of his administration.	最重要的是，他在这方面的成功与否将决定人们对他政府的看法。


Even he acknowledges that this will require him to delay fulfilling several other campaign promises.	即使他自己也承认，这将需要他延缓履行其它几项竞选中作出的承诺。


A second constraint stems from all the crises that will greet the new president.  Israelis and Palestinians are fighting a low-level war.	第二个制约因素源于新总统将面临的所有的各种危机。 以色列人和巴勒斯坦人正在打一场低级别的战争；


The situation in Iraq is improving but is by no means assured.	伊拉克的局势正在改善，但谁也不能做任何保证；


Obama may have to choose between attacking Iran’s nuclear installations and living with an Iran that has the capacity to build a nuclear weapon in a matter of weeks.	奥巴马可能要在攻击伊朗核设施和容忍能在几周内制造出核武器的伊朗这两者之间作出选择；


Afghanistan’s government is losing ground in its struggle against a revived Taliban.	阿富汗政府正在失去与死灰复燃的塔利班斗争的优势；


Pakistan, which possesses dozens of nuclear weapons and is host to the world’s most dangerous terrorists, could become a failed state, as could nuclear-armed North Korea.	拥有几十枚核武器的巴基斯坦，是世界上最危险的恐怖分子的基地，巴基斯坦可能会成为一个失败的国家，而拥有核武器的北韩情况也一样。


Many of these challenges are less problems to be solved than conditions to be managed.	许多这些挑战与其说是要解决问题还不如说要控制住局势。


A third constraint stems from trends in the international system.	第三个因素来自于国际体系的趋势。


The era of American unipolarity is over.	美国的单极时代已经结束。


Obama will inherit a world in which power in all of its forms – military, economic, diplomatic, and cultural – is more widely distributed than ever before.	奥巴马将继承的世界，是一个一切形式的权力-包括军事、经济、外交和文化方面-比以往任何时候都更广泛地分散的世界。


This means that he will have to deal with a large number of threats, vulnerabilities, and independent actors who may resist bending to America’s will.	这意味着他将要处理大量的威胁事件、容易受打击的方面和不愿向美国意愿屈腰的独立行动者。


All of this will make it more difficult for the United States to get things done in the world – and for Obama to have any chance of meeting the expectations being set for him – without the active assistance of others.	所有这一切将使得美国若没有他国的积极协助便想在世界上办成事变得愈加困难-也让奥巴马满足人们对他的期望的可能性变得困难。


And since Obama will want to meet some of those expectations, other countries had better be prepared for American requests – and pressure – that they act with the US rather than act against it or sit on their hands.	由于奥巴马要满足那些期望，其它国家要最好作准备来自美国提出的要求-甚至是压力，即它们要与美国行动一致而不是背道而驰或袖手旁观。


China will come under pressure to revalue its currency (now being held at artificially low levels) so that Chinese exports are more expensive and imports from others (including the US) cheaper.	中国将受到重新估值其货币压力（人民币现在被控制在虚假的低水平）以使中国的出口货物更为昂贵而从其它国家（包括美国）进口的货物更为便宜。


And China and other developing countries will be expected to do their share to reduce carbon emissions and slow the pace of global climate change.	与中国和其它发展中国家会被要求尽自己的份额，以减少二氧化碳的排放量和减缓全球气候的变暖。


European countries should be prepared for US calls to do more to meet the increasing security challenge in Afghanistan.	欧洲国家应该准备好美国呼吁它们要采取更多的行动来应对阿富汗面临的日益严峻的安全挑战。


At stake is the relevance of NATO in a world in which the principal security challenges facing Europe are to be found outside the NATO treaty area.	如今欧洲安全所面临的挑战来自于北约国家以外的地区，因此，利害攸关的问题是北约的作用。


Countries of every sort will face requests to do their part to overcome hurdles to a new global trade accord.	各类国家都将面临要求尽自己的一份力量来克服障碍以达成新的全球贸易协定。


Tariff and non-tariff barriers will need to come down.	关税和非关税贸易壁垒需要降下来。


Rich countries will be asked to reduce subsidies; poor countries to open up their markets.	富裕的国家将被要求减少补贴;贫穷国家将被要求开放其市场。


Arab leaders that criticize the US for the perceived shortcomings of its policies toward the Middle East will be asked in turn how much more they are prepared to do to bolster the government in Iraq.	批评美国对中东政策的显然不足的阿拉伯领导人，将反过来被要求他们做好更多的准备来支持伊拉克政府。


Once the fighting between Israel and Hamas subsides, the question of what the Arab states will do to strengthen Palestinian moderates and to make peace with Israel is sure to arise.	一旦以色列和哈马斯之间的战争趋于缓和，阿拉伯国家将做些什么来支持巴勒斯坦温和派并与以色列和平相处的问题肯定会提上日程。


Russia and China should expect enormous pressure from Obama to do more to discourage Iran from proceeding with uranium enrichment. This will include calls for greater political and economic sanctions, and conceivably even support for limited uses of military force to buttress sanctions.	俄罗斯和中国应该做好来自奥巴马的巨大压力的准备，这些压力包括采取更多的行动来阻止伊朗进行铀浓缩活动，也将包括要求采取更大的政治和经济制裁，甚至可以想象包括支持有限地使用武力来加强制裁的方针。


This list is a long one, but it could easily be much longer.	这份名子很长的，但很容易就会被列得更长。


The rest of the world was often unhappy with George W. Bush, for both the content and style of his foreign policy.	过去全世界往往对美国总统布什感到不满，他的外交政策无论从内容到风格都遭人非议。


Now others will find that the alternative to America going it alone or withdrawing from the global scene is real multilateralism, which requires their willingness and ability to commit resources to deal with pressing challenges.	现在它国将发现，美国妄为独行或退出国际舞台这两种选择之外，另一种可行的方法是真正的多边主义，这就要求他们有意愿和能力承诺资源来处理紧急的挑战。


Obama is likely to be more diplomatic than his predecessor, but he is also likely to be more demanding.	奥巴马很可能比他的前任有更多的外交策略，但是他提出的要求也可能会更高。


The Official Pursuit of Happiness	政府对幸福感的追求


CAMBRIDGE – In a time of tight budgets and financial crisis, politicians nowadays look to economic growth as the centerpiece of their domestic policy programs. Gross domestic product is taken to be the leading indicator of national well-being.	发自剑桥——在这个预算紧缩和金融危机前后夹击的年代，政治家们纷纷将经济增长列为国内政策的重中之重，而GDP则成为反映国家幸福程度的首要指数。


But, as we look ahead to 2011 and beyond, we should ask ourselves: is it really wise to accord such importance to growth?	但展望2011年甚至更遥远的未来，我们理当自问：将增长摆在如此重要的位置，明智吗？


Granted, many studies have confirmed that wealthier nations tend to be happier than poor ones, and that rich people are generally more satisfied than their less affluent fellow citizens.	没错，许多研究都表明富国的国民要比穷国的幸福感更强，而富人则比其他收入较低的同胞们更有满足感。


Yet other findings from several relatively well-to-do countries, such as South Korea and the United States, suggest that people there are essentially no happier today than they were 50 years ago, despite a doubling or quadrupling of average per capita income.	但针对几个相对富裕国家（比如韩国和美国）的研究也显示，即便这些国家的国民人均收入已经比50年前翻了两番或是三番，但人们却并未觉得更幸福。


Moreover, in a recent Canadian study, the happiest people turned out to reside in the poorest provinces, such as Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, while citizens in the richest provinces, notably Ontario and British Columbia, were among the least happy.	另一份最近发表的加拿大国内研究成果也显示，那些幸福感最强的人们都居住在最贫穷的省份，比如纽芬兰和新斯科舍，而安大略和不列颠哥伦比亚这些最富裕省份的居民却自认最不幸福。


Since happiness is ultimately what people want the most, while wealth is only a means to that end, the primacy now accorded to economic growth would appear to be a mistake.	由于幸福感其实是由人们的终极欲望所决定，而财富只是实现这些欲望的其中一种方式，因此当前这种将经济发展奉为圭皋的做法很可能会误入歧途。


What seems clear from such research is that people do quite poorly at predicting what will make them happy or sad.	这些研究还清晰地表明在预测何事能令自己高兴/悲伤这方面，人们的能力其实很差。


They focus too much on their initial responses to changes in their lives and overlook how quickly the pleasure of a new car, a pay increase, or a move to sunnier climes will fade, leaving them no happier than before.	他们过度关注自身对生活中各种变化的初始反应，而且并未意识到买新车，加工资或者搬到更温暖的地区所带来的快感其实很快会消退，因此也无法为他们带来更多幸福感。


It is hazardous, therefore, for politicians simply to rely on opinion polls and focus groups to discover what will truly enhance people’s happiness.	倘若政治家们希望找出究竟哪些事物能真正增加人们的幸福感，但却仅仅依靠民意测验或者市民讨论小组这类手段的话，最终得到的结果往往会是错误的


In the findings to date, however, two conclusions have emerged that seem especially useful for policymakers to ponder. First, most of the things that do bring enduring satisfaction for individuals are also good for other people – strong marriages and close relationships of all kinds, helping others, engaging in civic affairs, and effective, honest, democratic government.	但在迄今为止的研究成果中，有两条结论非常值得政治家们深思：首先，大多数能为个人带来持久满足感的行为也会使其他人受益——比如美满的婚姻或是与其他人的亲密关系，助人为乐，热心公益的行为，以及高效廉洁民主的政府，因此促进个人幸福感的政策对整个社会都是有益的。


Second, experiences that bring lasting pleasure or unhappiness do not always command a high priority in government circles.	其二，能为人们带来持久幸福或者沮丧感的体验往往被放在政府施政过程中的次要位置。


For example, three medical afflictions that create especially acute and enduring distress – clinical depression, chronic pain, and sleep disorders – are all conditions that can often be treated successfully, to the vast relief of sufferers.	比如说对患者造成严重及持久困扰的三大医学病症——抑郁症，慢性疼痛和睡眠障碍——其实都可以被成功治愈并极大地缓解患者的痛苦。


But such people are frequently underserved by health-care systems.	但这类患者却经常得不到社会医疗体系的足够照料。


The natural response to all this is to ask whether happiness research is really reliable enough to be used by policymakers.	对此最直接的反应就是一个疑问：幸福感研究对政策制定者来说是否足够可信？


Researchers have paid close attention to this issue, and, after much testing, have found that the answers people give to questions about their well-being seem to correspond fairly well to more objective evidence.	其实研究者们也在密切关注这一问题，同时在经过大量试验之后，他们发现人们对幸福感问题的回答似乎与某些更加具体的事物高度相关。


People who claim to be happy tend to live longer, commit suicide and abuse drugs and alcohol less often, get promoted more frequently by their employers, and enjoy more good friends and lasting marriages.	那些自觉幸福的人往往寿命更长，更少出现自杀，滥用药物或者酗酒等行为，更容易升职，朋友更多，婚姻也更长久。


Their assessments of their own well-being also align quite closely with the opinions of friends and family members.	他们对于自身幸福的评估也与其亲友的观点更为接近。


So, overall, statistics about happiness seem to be as accurate as many of the statistics regularly used by politicians, such as public-opinion polls, poverty rates, or, for that matter, GDP growth – all of which are riddled with imperfections.	因此总的来说，幸福感统计似乎与政治家经常参考的其他统计数据（比如民意支持率，贫困率，或是GDP增长率）同样可靠，而且这些统计其实也都存在着大量缺点。


Of course, happiness research is still new.	当然，对幸福感的研究依然是个崭新的学术领域。


Many questions remain unexplored, some studies lack sufficient confirmatory evidence, and still others, like those involving the effects of economic growth, have yielded conflicting results.	许多问题还有待探究，许多研究还缺乏足够的实证支撑，而其他方面的研究，包括经济增长对幸福感所产生的效应，则得出了互相冲突的结论。


Thus, it would be premature to base bold new policies on happiness research alone, or to follow the example of tiny Bhutan by adopting Gross National Happiness as the nation’s principal goal.	因此单纯依靠对幸福感的调查来制定新政策，或者将小国不丹的国民幸福指数作为国家的首要目标都是不成熟的做法。


Yet the findings may be useful to lawmakers even today – for example, in assigning priorities among several plausible initiatives, or in identifying new possibilities for policy interventions that deserve further study.	但这些发现或许会对当今的政策制定者有所裨益——比如有助于确立一系列法案的先后次序，或者确定哪些政策介入的新可能性需要进一步研究。


At the very least, governments should follow Great Britain and France and consider publishing regular statistics on trends in the well-being of their citizens.	对此各国政府至少应当学习英法两国的做法���考虑定时发布国民幸福程度的变化趋势。


Such findings will surely stimulate useful public discussion while yielding valuable data for investigators to use.	而这些发现一方面能为研究者带来宝贵的数据，另一方面也肯定能激发有益的公众讨论。


Beyond that, who knows?	除此之外，谁知道呢？


Further research will doubtless provide more detailed and reliable information about the kinds of policies that add to people’s happiness.	进一步研究无疑将为那些提升人民幸福感的政策提供更多的细节和可靠信息。


Someday, perhaps, public officials may even use the research to inform their decisions.	或许某一天，政府官员甚至会令用这些研究来支持自己的决定。


After all, what could matter more to their constituents than happiness?	毕竟有什么比幸福感对他们的选民更重要呢？


In a democracy, at least, that should surely count for something.	至少在一个民主政体中，这是有其实际意义的。


The Old Economies Strike Back	旧经济的逆袭


TOKYO – The impact of Abenomics on Japan’s economy is gradually beginning to be felt.	东京—安倍经济学对日本经济的影响逐渐开始进入人们的感受。


Annual GDP growth in the first quarter has been revised upward, to 4.1%, exceeding market expectations and providing a strong indication that the Japanese economy is finally recovering, after two decades of stagnation.	一季度年GDP增长向上修正至4. 1%，超过了市场预期，强烈表明日本经济在经历了二十年的停滞后最终开始复苏。


Consumer spending is particularly robust, as wages show signs of upward movement.	随着工资出现上涨信号，消费支出特别稳健。


Moreover, the currency depreciation in the wake of the Bank of Japan’s efforts to increase the annual inflation rate to 2% is expected to benefit exporters, though a substantial effect on the trade balance is yet to be seen, probably owing to higher import costs.	此外，日本银行为使年通胀率增至2%的措施使日元贬值，预计将有利于出口商，但对贸易平衡的实质影响还有待观察，这可能是拜进口成本增加所赐。


In particular, thermal electricity plants have replaced the country’s nuclear plants – offline since the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 – and the weak yen has hit the import bill for oil and gas hard.	特别是，热电站取代了日本的核电站——后者自2011年东日本大地震以来便处于停机状态，弱势日元极大地影响了石油和天然气进口支出。


Japan’s growth revival comes at a time of increasing economic uncertainty in much of the developing world.	日本重现增长之时正逢发展中世界纷纷面临经济不确定性抬头。


For example, Japan’s trade statistics for May indicate that exports to the United States increased at a double-digit pace year on year, to around ¥5.1 trillion, while exports to China were sluggish, reaching ¥4.8 trillion.	比如，日本5月贸易统计数字表明对美国出口同比增长达到了两位数，至5. 1万亿日元左右，而对中国出口毫无亮点，只有4.


Indeed, the US has overtaken China as Japan’s main export market, as America’s economy, too, recovers from half-a-decade of sluggishness.	8万亿日元。 事实上，随着美国经济从五年停滞中走出，美国已经取代中国成为日本主要出口市场。


In China, by contrast, exports in May rose by just 1% year on year – the lowest rate since last July – while imports fell by 0.3%.	相反，中国出口的5月同比增长只有1%，为去年7月以来最低，而进口下降0. 3%。


Exports to Japan were down by 5.7%, while exports to the US and the European Union decreased by 1.6% and by 9.7%, respectively, with both falling for three months in a row.	对日本出口下降5. 7%，对美国和欧洲出口分别下降1.


As a result, the trade surplus continued to fall, to $20.4 billion, fueling growing concern about a Chinese slowdown.	7%，均出现连续三个月下降。 结果，中国贸易盈余继续减少至204亿美元，增加了人们对中国减速的担忧。


China’s downturn appears sudden; after all, its exports had been rising at double-digit rates every month this year until May.	中国的减速似乎突如其来； 毕竟，在5月之前，其今年的出口增长率一直保持在两位数水平。


In fact, the Chinese economy’s true condition had long been obscured, but has now been exposed by more stringent regulation of activities such as speculative trading of the renminbi masquerading as trade payments.	事实上，中国经济的真实状况早已无法摸透，但因目前更严厉的监管而暴露出来——比如将人民币的投机交易粉饰成贸易支付。


In particular, China’s “two systems in one country” enabled exports to bonded warehouses in Hong Kong to be used to pad trade statistics.	特别是，中国的“一国两制”使其可以用出口至香港保税仓库的东西记录为出口数字。


Moreover, Chinese exports sometimes would increase in the face of a slump in the volume of cargo being shipped from ports.	此外，在面临装船离港货运量下降时，中国的出口有时会增加。


The reason was simple: businesses benefit from tax exemptions or reductions for products that are exported.	原因很简单：企业从产品出口的减免税中获益。


So, when companies from the mainland dealt with each other, they would export to Hong Kong first and then import back to the mainland, resulting in the transaction being treated as an export.	因此，当大陆公司发生贸易往来时，它们会先出口到香港，然后进口到大陆，而这笔交易会记为出口。


For example, trade in Guangdong Province and Hong Kong in the first quarter of 2013 increased by 91.6% year on year.	比如，广东省和香港的贸易量在2013年一季度同比增加了91. 6%。


In particular, there was a sudden increase in exports via the free-trade zone in Guangdong.	特别是，通过广东自由贸易区的出口量突然大增。


After the regulatory authorities intervened in May, annual exports to Hong Kong rose by only 7.7%, down sharply from the 57% increase reported in April.	监管当局5月出手干预后，对香港出口年增长率从4月的57%猛降至7. 7%。


Economic conditions in China appear set to worsen further.	中国经济状况似乎还会进一步恶化。


The enormous investments launched in China’s interior as part of the government’s stimulus program following the 2008 global financial crisis have now become a burden and are increasingly showing up as bad debt on the balance sheets of the country’s banks.	大量作为2008年为应对全球金融危机而采取的刺激计划一部分的内地投资现在成了负担，越来越多地体现为中资银行资产负债表上的坏账。


China is not alone in finding its economy stumbling.	中国并非唯一遇到经济障碍的国家。


More broadly, as the US and Japan recover, cracks are starting to appear in emerging countries that, relative to the advanced countries, had enjoyed enviable rates of economic growth since 2008.	放眼望去，随着美国和日本的复苏，裂痕开始在2008年后经济增长速度令发达国家艳羡的新兴国家出现。


Growth in India has slowed significantly in the last two years, and large-scale street protests in Turkey and Brazil could herald hard times ahead in both of those countries.	印度增长在过去两年中大幅放缓，土耳其和巴西街头的大规模示威预示着两国前景艰难。


For most of the twenty-first century, emerging markets’ rising importance – and, with it, a reordering of the global economy and international relations – has been conventional wisdom.	在21世纪的绝大部分时间里，新兴市场日益重要并将由此引发全球经济和国际关系重构已成为传统智慧。


But, today, it is the two largest “old” economies – Japan and the US – that are showing signs of increasing vitality.	但是，如今，最大的两个“旧经济”——日本和美国——显示出越来越多的活力信号。


Japan is seeking to revive its economy through Abenomics.	日本在寻求通过安倍经济学重振经济。


The US economy’s road to recovery is being built on the shale-gas revolution, a revived manufacturing sector, and a decline in the US budget deficit in GDP terms.	美国经济的复苏之路建立在页岩气革命、制造部门复兴和美国预算赤字占GDP比重下降的基础上。


The “old” economies appear to be returning to the spotlight.	“旧”经济正在回到聚光灯下。


If current trends continue, they may well become the next new thing.	如果当前趋势持续下去，它们将成为下一个新事物。


Commodities on the Rise	处于涨势的商品


SEOUL – The commodity super-cycle – in which commodity prices reach ever-higher highs, and fall only to higher lows – is not over.	首尔—超级商品周期——商品价格创出历史新高，且回调高于前低——还没有结束。


Despite the euphoria around shale gas – indeed, despite weak global growth – commodity prices have risen by as much as 150% in the aftermath of the financial crisis.	尽管页岩气让人振奋不已，尽管全球增长萎靡不振，商品价格在金融危机后仍上涨了150%。


In the medium term, this trend will continue to pose an inflation risk and undermine living standards worldwide.	从中期看，这一趋势将维持下去，造成全球通胀风险和生活水平下降。


For starters, there is the convergence argument.	首先，存在一致意见。


As China grows, its increasing size, wealth, and urbanization will continue to stoke demand for energy, grains, minerals, and other resources.	随着中国的增长，其规模、财富和城市化的进展将继续助长能源、谷物、矿产和其他资源的需求。


For example, the US consumes more than nine times as much oil as China on a per capita basis.	比如，从人均水平看，美国消费的石油量是中国的九倍多。


As more of China’s population converges to Western standards of consumption, demand for commodities – and thus their prices – will remain on an upward trajectory.	随着更多的中国人向西方消费水平看齐，商品需求——以及价格——将保持上涨趋势。


Of course, not all commodities are equal.	当然，并非所有商品都是如此。


For example, although the case for copper seems straightforward, given that it is a key input for wiring, electronics, and indoor plumbing, a strong bid for iron is not as obvious, given the Chinese infrastructure boom that already has occurred in the last two decades.	比如，铜需求量大增一眼就能看出——因为它是电线、电子元件和室内水管的重要投入品，而钢需求量大增就没有这么明显——因为中国的基础设施繁荣发生在过去二十年中。


Worst-case estimates have China’s real GDP growing at around 7% per year over the next decade.	最坏的估计是，中国真实GDP增长率将在未来十年中处于每年7%左右的水平。


Meanwhile, the supply of most commodities is forecast to grow by no more than 2% annually in real terms.	与此同时，大部分商品的供给的真实年增长率估计不会超过2%。


All else being equal, unless China’s commodity intensity, defined as the amount of a commodity consumed to generate a unit of output, falls dramatically, its demand for commodities will be greater this year than it was last year.	在其他条件不变的情况下，除非中国的商品强度（即生产一单位产出所消费的商品量）大幅下降，其商品需求将逐年递增。


As long as China’s commodity demand grows at a higher rate than global supply, prices will rise.	只要中国商品需求比全球供给增加更快，商品价格就会上升。


And the rapid economic growth that China’s leaders must sustain in order to lift enormous numbers of people out of poverty – and thus prevent a crisis of legitimacy – places a floor under global food, energy, and mineral prices.	而中国领导人必须维持高速经济增长从而让大量人民走出贫困——并摆脱合法行危机——这决定了全球食品、能源和矿产价格不可能下跌。


To be sure, intensity of use has fallen for some commodities, like gold and nuclear energy; but for others, such as aluminum and coal, it has risen since 2000 or, as is the case for copper and oil, declines have slowed markedly or stalled at high levels.	实事求是地说，一些商品的强度已经有所下降，比如黄金和核能； 但铝和煤的强度自2000年以来有所上升，铜和石油的强度则下降缓慢或维持在高位不变。


As the composition of China’s economy continues to shift from investment to consumption, demand for commodity-intensive consumer durables – cars, mobile phones, indoor plumbing, computers, and televisions – will rise.	随着中国经济的组成从投资向消费转变，商品密集型耐用品——汽车、手机、室内水管、计算机和电视机等——消费量将会增加。


There is also the issue of the so-called reserve price (the highest price a buyer is willing to pay for a good or service).	还有所谓的保留价格问题（保留价格是指买家原因为某商品和服务支付的最高价格）。


The reserve price places a cap on how high commodity prices will go, as it is the price at which demand destruction occurs (consumers are no longer willing or able to purchase the good or service).	保留价格决定了商品价格的上限，因为这一价格是需求毁灭的开端（消费者将开始不愿或无力购买商品和服务）。


For many commodities, such as oil, the reserve price is higher in emerging countries than in developed economies.	对石油等许多商品来说，新兴国家的保留价格高于发达国家。


One explanation for the difference is accelerating wage growth across developing regions, which is raising commodity demand, whereas stagnating wages in developed markets are causing the reserve price to decline.	之所以会有区别，一个解释是发展中地区工资增长在加快，这增加了商品需求，而发达市场工资停滞不前，导致保留价格下降。


By implication, if nothing else, global energy, food, and mineral prices will continue to be buoyed by seemingly insatiable emerging-market demand, which commands much higher reserve prices.	不出意外的话，全球能源、食品和矿产价格将因新兴市场永不满足的需求（因而保留价格会高得多）而继续上涨。


Ultimately, emerging economies’ absolute size and rate of growth both matter in charting commodity demand and the future trajectory of global commodity prices, with per capita income clearly linked to consumers’ wealth.	最终，新兴经济体的绝对规模和增长率都会在商品需求和未来全球商品价格轨迹的决定中起作用，人均收入显然与消费者财富有关。


If people feel rich and enjoy growing wages and appreciating assets, they are less inclined to cannibalize other spending when commodity consumption becomes more expensive.	如果人民觉得富有，乐见工资增长和资产升值，那么他们就不太愿意在商品消费变得更贵时削减其他支出。


They just pay more and carry on.	他们会付出更多的钱维持消费水平。


Of course, upward pressure on commodity prices also stems from supply-side challenges.	当然，商品价格的上涨压力也来自供给面挑战。


It is not just that global supplies of resources are increasingly scarce, but also that supplies are increasingly falling into inefficient hands.	不但全球资源供给越来越稀缺，供给源越来越多地落入低效率的手中。


Around the world, governments are taking greater control of resources and imposing policies that hamper global production and ultimately force prices higher.	放眼全球，政府正在掌握更大的资源控制权并实施妨碍全球产量、最终推高价格的政策。


(Following the recent fracas surrounding Argentina’s nationalization of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF), Australia’s 2012 mining tax on iron and coal companies is a stark reminder that such tendencies are not limited to emerging-market politicians.)	（继阿根廷将YPF公司国有化引起争端后，澳大利亚2012年铁矿和煤矿公司矿业税让人警醒，这一趋势并不局限于新兴市场政客。 ）


Such price increases can prove particularly inflationary in countries that import commodities.	对于商品进口国，如此价格上涨能形成巨大的通胀压力。


And they can be disastrous to exporting economies, which risk rapid currency appreciation and thus a loss of competitiveness.	对于出口国来说，这也可能带来灾难——货币升值、竞争力下降。


Of course, technological advances, like hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) in the shale-gas industry, could increase supply and therefore lower prices.	当然，技术进步，比如页岩气产业的液压致裂，能够增加供给，从而降低价格。


But mounting environmental challenges, and the limited availability of commodity substitutes, suggest that a reprieve on commodity prices is not near.	但日益严峻的环境挑战和商品替代品的缺失意味着商品价格的下降在短期内很难实现。


There is a perennial temptation to focus on – even to overemphasize – the short-term, tactical drivers of commodity-price movements, at the expense of giving longer-term, structural factors their due.	人们总是倾向于关注——甚至过分强调——短期的、策略性的商品价格波动因素，而忽略长期的结构性因素。


While short-term factors – for example, political instability, weather-related disruptions, and speculative activity – are important determinants of prices, they tell only part of the story.	短期因素——如政治动荡、与气候有关的干扰和投机行为——虽然也是价格的重要决定因素，但只是部分因素。


The economic fundamentals of supply and demand remain the key factors in driving the direction of commodity prices and determining whether the commodity super-cycle will persist.	经济的供求基本面仍是决定商品价格方向和超级商品周期能否持续的关键因素。


In practical terms, this means that oil prices, for example, are more likely to hover near $120 per barrel over the next decade, rather than $50; and we are unlikely to see a $20 barrel of oil ever again.	从实践角度讲，这意味着（比如）石油价格更有可能在未来十年中徘徊于120美元/桶的水平而不是50美元/桶； 20美元/桶的日子怕是永远不会重现了。


A New Greek Test for Europe	希腊对欧洲的新考验


PRINCETON – Over the last year, it has been easy to lose sight of the Greek debt crisis.	发自普林斯顿——在过去一年中大家很容易会忽视了希腊的债务危机。


Brimming with official funds, Greece was apparently on the mend.	国库里充斥着各方援助，希腊的情况显然正在好转。


Though privatization plans lagged, the Greeks won high marks for doubling down on fiscal austerity.	尽管私有化计划停滞不前，但希腊在大幅推行财政紧缩方面赢得了很高的分数。


In Europe’s summer of quiet triumphalism, ever-lower expectations were easy to beat.	在欧洲这个暗怀必胜信念的夏天，继续下行的预期似乎是站不住脚的。


But Greece is set to test Europe again, with a vengeance.	但希腊注定将再次考验欧洲，而且这次的形势将更为严峻。


Greece’s crisis was spectacularly outsize.	希腊危机的规模是极为庞大的。


After it was revealed that successive governments had misled their way to mammoth fiscal deficits and macroeconomic imbalances, Greece lost access to international bond markets.	当历届政府领导失误导致巨量财政赤字和宏观经济失衡的情况被曝光后，希腊失去了从国际债券市场融资的途径。


Since 2010, the country has been dependent on unprecedentedly large official bailout funds.	自2010以来，该国一直依赖空前巨大的官方援助资金来维持。


But, because Greece’s creditors – the International Monetary Fund and European governments – misread the challenges facing the country, the rescue merely delayed the inevitable sovereign default and caused the Greek economy to contract sharply, magnifying the pain.	但由于希腊的债权人——国际货币基金组织和欧洲各国政府——误读了希腊所面临的挑战，援助只不过是推迟了不可避免的主权违约，并导致希腊经济大幅收缩，人民的苦难剧增。


The hope was that the Greeks would ultimately bear their own burden.	我们都希望希腊最终能承担起自身的责任。


That was never realistic.	但那是不现实的。


The Greek crisis was always destined to spill across national borders – the question was who would share the cost.	希腊危机注定会跨国蔓延——而问题则在于谁将分担这项成本。