Without complementary structural reforms that encourage private investment and innovation – and thus enable economies to adapt and compete in a global, technology-driven economy – a public-investment program will have a disappointingly weak impact on growth.	没有全面的结构改革鼓励私人投资和创新——从而让经济能够做出调整并在全球化的技术推动型经济中竞争——公共投资计划对增长的影响将令人无比失望。


Instead, debt-financed public investment will produce a short-run stimulus, at the cost of longer-term fiscal stability.	相反，债务融资的公共投资能产生短期刺激，但其代价是长期财政稳定。


The problem is that structural reforms are notoriously difficult to implement.	问题在于结构改革以难以实施闻名。


For starters, they face political resistance from short-run losers, including the companies and sectors that existing rigidities protect.	首先，它们面临来自短期输家的政治抵制，包括得到现有僵化结构保护的公司和部门。


Moreover, in order to ensure that such reforms ultimately benefit everyone, there must be a strong culture of trust and a determination to prevent more flexible arrangements from leading to abuses.	此外，为了确保这些改革最终能让所有人受益，必须有强大的��任文化和决心以防止更灵活的安排导致滥用。


Finally, structural reforms require time to take effect.	最后，结构改革需要时间才能见效。


This is particularly true in the eurozone, whose members abandoned a crucial tool for accelerating the process – exchange-rate adjustments to account for different economies’ productivity levels – when they adopted the common currency.	欧元区尤其如此。 加入共同货币区时，欧元区成员国放弃了加速过程的关键工具——调整汇率以契合不同经济体的生产率水平。


ECB President Mario Draghi recently argued that, because individual EU countries’ growth-retarding policies have negative external effects, perhaps they should not have unimpeded control in certain policy areas.	欧洲央行行长德拉吉最近指出，因为个体欧盟国家的拖累增长的政策产生了消极外部效应，也许它们不应该成为某些政策领域的核心政策。


Though member countries’ financial supervisory authority is already being limited through centralization of bank regulation and resolution mechanisms, Draghi’s suggestion is more far-reaching.	尽管成员国的金融监督权已经因为银行监管和破产清算机制的集中化而受到了限制，但德拉吉的建议仍具有深远意义。


One wonders if Draghi’s proposal is politically feasible in the EU context.	你也许会质疑德拉吉的建议在欧盟环境下是否具有政治可行性。


Even if it were, would it be necessary?	即使答案是肯定的，也还有必要性问题。


All economies have sub-units across which economic productivity, growth, and dynamism vary considerably.	所有经济体都有次结构，这些次结构的经济生产率、增长和活力彼此大不相同。


Indeed, differentials in the quality of governance and policies seem persistent, even in economies that perform pretty well overall.	事实上，治理质量和政策差异似乎是持久存在的，即使总体表现相当漂亮的经济体也是如此。


Perhaps part of the answer is to prevent sub-units – in the EU’s case, member countries – from falling short on reforms.	也许一部分答案在防止次结构——在欧盟的例子中就是成员国——在改革方面落后。


But centralization carries its own costs.	但集中也有其成本。


Given the risk inherent in betting on policy convergence, labor mobility – which enables highly valuable human capital, especially well-educated young people, to leave lagging regions for those that offer more and better employment opportunities – could prove to be a critical tool for adjustment.	押注于政策趋同有其内在风险，因此劳动力流动性——它让宝贵的人力资本特别是教育程度较高的年轻人离开落后地区，前往能提供更多更好就业机会的地区——能成为调整的关键工具。


As it stands, labor mobility is imperfect in the EU.	目前的情况，劳动力流动性在欧盟并不完美。


But, with language training and the implementation of something like the Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs (which aimed to create an innovative “learning economy,” underpinned by inclusive social and environmental policies), mobility could be enhanced.	但是，随着语言培训和类似于里斯本增长和就业战略（旨在创造创新型“学习经济”，以包容性社会和环境政策为基础）的政策的实施，流动性能够得到强化。


But more fluid labor mobility is no panacea.	但增强劳动力流动性并非万灵丹。


As with every other element of a growth strategy, mutually reinforcing efforts are the only way to achieve success.	与其他所有增长战略要素形成互相强化效应是实现成功的唯一办法。


Half a loaf may be better than none, but half the ingredients do not translate into half of the hoped-for results.	有半个面包也许比什么都没有更好，但只有一半要素是无法产生一半的想要结果的。


The Growth Conundrum	增长难题


BERKELEY – The world faces a major dilemma.	伯克利——世界正面临一个重大难题。


While rapid economic growth, such as that realized over the past 50 years, is critical to support development, we now also know that it can have serious adverse consequences, particularly for the environment.	虽然过去50年经济快速增长对支持经济发展至关重要，但我们现在已经了解增长也能带来严重的不良后果，特别是在环境领域。


How can we balance the imperatives of growth and development with the need to ensure sustainability?	我们该如何平衡必要的增长与可持续性之间的关系？


The unprecedented growth of per capita income during the last 20 years has lifted more than one billion people out of extreme poverty.	超10亿人已在过去20年来人均收入前所未有的增长中脱贫。


In developing countries, life expectancy has increased by 20 years since the mid-1970s, and the illiteracy rate among adults was almost halved in the last 30 years.	发展中国家预期寿命自20世纪70年代中期以来延长了20年，且过去30年来成人文盲率几乎降低了一半左右。


But rapid economic growth has placed enormous pressure on the environment.	但经济快速发展已经给环境造成了巨大的压力。


Moreover, it has been accompanied by rising income inequality, which has now reached historic highs within many countries (though, across countries, such inequality has declined).	此外，经济发展还造成收入差距不断拉大，现在在很多国家已经达到历史高位（尽管世界各国间缩小了这种收入差距）。


Given this, one might argue that slower growth would be good for the world.	有鉴于此，有人可能认为经济增长放缓对世界有利。


In that case, the solution would be at hand.	经济增长放缓已经近在咫尺。


According to a new report by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), aging populations and declining fertility rates in many parts of the world could dampen global growth considerably over the next 50 years.	麦肯锡全球研究院（MGI）新近发布的报告显示，全球诸多国家人口老龄化及生育率下降可能会在今后50年显著抑制全球经济。


Indeed, even if productivity were to expand at the same rapid rate as during the last half-century, global growth would fall by 40%, far below the anemic rate of the last five years.	事实上，即便生产率仍以与近半个世纪相同的速度增长，全球经济增长仍将下降40%，上述状况还远比不上过去5年本已乏力的增长率。


Employment growth is also set to slow significantly.	就业增长也将显著放缓。


As a result, even with slower population growth, per capita income growth would fall by about 19%.	这样一来，即便人口增长速度放缓，人均收入增长也将下降约19%。


To be sure, GDP would still triple, and per capita income would double, over the next 50 years.	可以肯定，未来50年GDP仍将增长到原来的3倍，而人均收入仍将实现两倍的增幅。


Nonetheless this rate of long-term growth would constitute a sharp break with the six-fold GDP expansion and nearly three-fold increase in per capita income of the last 50 years.	但这样的长期增长率仍与过去50年6倍的GDP增长和近3倍的人均收入增长不可同日而语。


Despite its potential benefits, especially for the environment, the impending growth slowdown carries significant risks.	虽然经济放缓尤其在环保领域确有其潜在的好处，但即将到来的经济增速放缓所伴随的风险也不可小觑。


While growth is not an end in itself, it enables the achievement of a broad set of societal goals, including the creation of economic and employment opportunities for millions of vulnerable and poor people and the provision of social goods like education, health care, and pensions.	虽然增长本身不是目的，但它能实现一系列社会目标，包括为成百上千万弱势群体和穷人创造经济就业机会并提供社会商品，比方说教育、医疗和养老保险。


So how do we ensure that these imperatives are fulfilled, despite demographic and environmental constraints?	那么，尽管有着人口和环境等诸多制约因素，我们如何确保这些需求能得到满足？


The first step is to secure economic growth through productivity gains.	通过提高生产率确保经济增长是一个开始。


The needed acceleration in productivity growth – by 80% to sustain overall GDP growth and by 22% to sustain per capita income growth at the rates of the last half-century – is daunting.	生产率增长是必要的加速器，完成保持GDP总量增长所需的80%生产率增长和人均收入增长所需的22%生产率增长其相关任务非常艰巨。


But, based on case studies in five economic sectors, the MGI report finds that achieving it, though “extremely challenging,” is possible – and without relying on unforeseeable technological advances.	但根据对五大经济部门的案例研究，麦肯锡全球研究院发布报告认为虽然不靠无法预见的技术进步实现这一目标“难度巨大”，但却并非绝无可能。


Three-quarters of the potential pickup in productivity could come from “catch-up” improvements, with countries taking steps – modernizing their retail sectors, consolidating automobile production into a smaller number of larger factories, improving health-care efficiency, and reducing food-processing wastage – that have already proven effective elsewhere.	四分之三的生产率提升可以源于“追赶型”增长，即各国采取措施实现零售部门现代化、完成对汽车制造业的兼并整合、提高医疗效率及控制食品加工中的浪费，这些措施的效果已经在诸多国家得到过证实。


The rest can come from technological, operational, and business innovations – for example, developing new seeds to increase agricultural yields, using new materials (such as carbon-fiber composites) to make cars and airplanes lighter and more resilient, or digitizing medical records.	其余则可以源于技术、运营和商业创新——比方说研发新种子提高农业产量、利用新材料（如碳纤维复合材料）生产更轻、更牢固的汽车飞机以及数字化病例。


Another significant growth opportunity lies in boosting the employment and productivity of women.	另一个显著增长机会在于提高妇女就业和生产率。


Today, only about half of the world’s working-age women are employed.	如今只有约半数的劳动年龄女性实现了就业。


They earn about three-quarters as much as men in the same occupations, and are over-represented in informal, temporary, and low-productivity jobs.	她们的收入约为同行业男性收入的四分之三，其中有很大比例从事低效和临时的非正式工作。


MGI estimates that increasing women’s labor-force participation rate could contribute almost 60% of potential labor-force growth during the next half-century.	麦肯锡全球研究院估计提升女性人口劳动参与率可以使未来半个世纪的潜在劳动力增长接近60％。


Realizing this potential will require efforts by both employers and governments to eliminate discriminatory practices that impede the recruitment, retention, and promotion of women, as well as credit, tax, and family support policies to help workers balance their responsibilities at work and at home.	实现这一目标需要雇主和政府消除妨碍女性入职、留任和晋升的歧视性做法，并实行协助劳动者平衡工作及家庭责任的信贷、税收和家庭支持政策。


Meanwhile, in order to mitigate the environmental impact of continued rapid growth, the world must improve its resource efficiency considerably.	此外，为减轻持续快速增长对环境的影响，各国必须大幅提高其资源利用效率。


MGI and others have identified numerous ecologically responsible growth opportunities emanating from the smarter use of limited resources.	麦肯锡全球研究院及其他机构已经寻找到源于明智利用有限资源的诸多对生态负责任的增长机会。


Consider improvements in energy efficiency, which could halve projected energy demand between now and 2020.	以提高能源效率为例，完全可以实现从现在起到2020年预计能源需求减半的任务。


As California – the world’s eighth-largest economy – has demonstrated, strict energy-efficiency standards can actually be good for growth and jobs.	世界第八大经济体加利福尼亚的经历已经证明严格的能效标准在现实中完全可以有利于经济增长和就业。


Indeed, such policies have kept California’s per capita energy demand constant for the last three decades – even as such demand grew by 50% in the rest of the United States – without compromising growth.	事实上，在过去30年美国其他地区人均能源需求增加50%的情况下，诸如此类的政策在不影响经济增长的前提下并未增加加利福尼亚的人均能源需求。


There is a strong business and consumer case for improving resource productivity, as it could lead to substantial cost savings.	因为可以导致巨大的成本节约，我们有充足的商业和消费理由提高资源生产率。


Fortunately, policies that support this goal are gaining momentum in developed and developing countries alike.	幸运的是，支持实现上述目标的政策在发达国家和发展中国家都正在悄然兴起。


Even if gains in female labor-force participation and resource-efficient productivity growth sustain high rates of economic growth, one key challenge remains: income inequality.	即使女性参与劳动和提高资源节约型生产率能够保持经济高速发展，一个关键的挑战依然是收入差距。


In fact, there is no simple relationship between growth and income inequality; after all, inequality has been increasing in both slow-growing developed economies and fast-growing emerging economies.	事实上，增长和收入差距之间的关系并不简单； 毕竟，收入差距在增长缓慢的发达国家和快速增长的发展中国家都有扩大的趋势。


According to the French economist Thomas Piketty, income inequality rises when the return on capital exceeds economic growth, meaning that, by itself, faster economic growth would reduce inequality.	法国经济学家托玛斯·皮克提认为当资本回报率超过经济增长时收入不平等增加，也就是说经济快速增长本身对不平等现象构成抑制。


Using a different approach, economists at the International Monetary Fund also find a positive relationship between lower income inequality and faster growth, concluding that policies that redistribute income can foster faster, more sustainable growth.	国际货币基金组织经济学家用其他方法也发现了缩小收入差距和快速增长之间呈正相关，并认定再分配政策可以增加经济增长速度并提高持续性。


Growth still matters.	经济增长仍具有重要意义。


As demographic tailwinds turn into headwinds, and environmental challenges become ever more apparent, businesses and governments need to think carefully about how to improve resource efficiency while fostering more inclusive economic growth.	随着人口环境的影响从正面转为负面，更加凸显出急迫的环境问题，如何在提高资源利用效率的同时促进更具包容性的经济增长成为企业和政府需要认真思考的问题。


Trump’s Foreign Admirers	特朗普的外国仰慕者


CAMBRIDGE – Donald Trump doesn’t like Latin Americans and advocates building a wall to separate them from the United States.	坎布里奇—唐纳德·特朗普不喜欢拉丁美洲人，还鼓吹建一道墙把他们与美国隔离开。


As usual with such snubs, Latin Americans tend to reciprocate the sentiment, as do Muslims and others who feel affronted by the Republican Party’s presidential nominee.	与往常的这类冷漠相比，拉丁美洲人总要以牙还牙，正如穆斯林和其他感到被这位共和党总统提名人冒犯的人一样。


But many of those who dislike Trump share his passion for restrictive immigration policies.	但许多讨厌特朗普的人对于限制性的移民政策却是无比热衷。


There are probably few areas of public policy where something that is so good for society is portrayed as being so bad.	对社会很有利的东西被描述为很恶劣，这样的公共政策领域少之又少。


Of course, projecting a society’s problems onto foreign scapegoats is an old political tactic.	当然，将社会问题归咎于外国替罪羊是政治老把戏。


But the extent to which hostility to immigration goes against the evidence of its salutary effects is surprising.	但移民的积极效应显而易见，而对他们的敌意如此之深，这着实令人震惊。


Recent research on immigration shows very large positive effects on the welfare of locals.	关于移民的最新研究表明，移民对本地人的福利具有巨大的积极效应。


Bill and Sari Kerr have shown that, while immigrants represent about 13% of the US population, they account for 26% of all entrepreneurs, and about 36% of new firms have at least one immigrant in the leadership team.	比尔和莎莉·科尔（Bill and Sari Kerr）指出，移民仅占美国人口的13%，但贡献了26%的企业家，36%的新企业领导团队中至少有一名移民。


This suggests that immigration is a large part of the story behind American economic vitality and job creation.	这表明移民是美国经济活力和就业创造的重要生力军。


This is not a uniquely American phenomenon.	不仅美国有这样的现象。


On the contrary, it’s pretty universal.	相反，这是一个普遍现象。


In Chile, immigrants from non-neighboring countries are four times more likely to be entrepreneurs than natives.	在智利，来自不相邻国家的移民成为企业家的可能性是本国居民的四倍。


In Venezuela, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese immigrants, who moved there mostly in the 1950s and 1960s, and whose level of formal schooling was lower than that of the natives, were ten times more likely to be entrepreneurs.	在委内瑞拉，意大利、西班牙和葡萄牙移民（大多在20世纪五六十年代迁徙而来，其正规教育水平不如本国居民）成为企业家的可能性是本国居民的十倍。


Today, Albanians returning to their country from Greece after the 2010 crisis there became entrepreneurs and increased the employment and wages of those who never left, as shown by Harvard’s Ljubica Nedelkoska.	哈佛大学的鲁比卡·尼德尔科斯卡（Ljubica Nedelkoska）发现，如今，2010年危机爆发后从希腊返回祖国的阿尔巴尼亚人纷纷成为企业家，提高了从未离开故土的阿尔巴尼亚人的就业和工资。


In ongoing research with Juan José Obach, we found that Panamanians who work in industries and regions with more foreigners earn significantly more than those who work where foreigners are less prevalent.	我和胡安·何塞·奥巴克（Juan José Obach）正在进行的一项研究发现，在外国人较多的行业和地区工作的巴拿马人的薪酬显著高于外国人较少的场合的人。


This indicates that it is in the interest of the locals to have more foreigners around.	这表明周围出现更多外国人符合本地人的利益。


Dany Bahar of the Brookings Institution and Hillel Rapoport of the Paris School of Economics have found that countries’ comparative advantage evolves toward that of their migrants’ countries of origin: the new country becomes good at producing what the old country successfully makes.	布鲁金斯学会的达尼·巴哈尔（Dany Bahar）和巴黎经济学院的西里尔·拉波波尔特（Hillel Rapoport）发现，一国的比较优势朝移民祖国的方向发展：新国家变得擅长生产旧国家成功造出来的东西。


The difference is that, in general, many developing countries have more restrictive immigration and foreign employment policies than the US does.	区别在于，一般而言，许多发展中国家的移民和外国就业政策比美国更加严格。


Such policies also have larger negative effects on migration, because these countries are not the most attractive destinations to begin with.	这些政策也对移民造成了更大的消极效应，因为这些国家原本就不是很有吸引力的目的国。


Consider Chile, one of Latin America’s richest and arguably most successful countries, which likes to compare itself to Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, well-run countries that are rich in natural resources.	以智利为例。 智利是拉丁美洲最富裕、也许也是最成功的国家之一，总是喜欢自比于澳大利亚、新西兰和加拿大等治理良好的资源富裕国。


But now Chile is in a rut: it is not catching up with richer countries, and it is having trouble diversifying its economy.	但如今智利变得故步自封：它没有在赶超更富裕的国家，并且在经济多样化方面遇到了麻烦。


As it ponders why, it would benefit from comparing itself to its role models in terms of the proportion of the population that is foreign-born.	在探讨个中缘由时，比较自己与榜样的外国出生人口比例很有裨益。


In Chile, it is less than 2%.	在智利，这一比例不到2%。


In Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, it is 27%, 28%, and 20%, respectively, a consequence in part of these countries’ activist immigration policies.	澳大利亚、新西兰和加拿大分别为27%、28%、和20%，这部分要归因于这些国家积极的移民政策。


Activist policies were also behind the almost one million Soviet Jews that Israel attracted in the early 1990s, representing 12% of the Israeli population.	积极的政策也帮助以色列在20世纪90年代初吸引了近一百万苏联犹太人，这相当于以色列人口的12%。


Studies have shown that this huge experiment had very large positive effects on the economy and on skilled locals.	研究表明这场巨型实验对以色列经济和高技能本地人产生了巨大的积极效应。


The missing immigrants in Chile can help explain the dearth of entrepreneurship, innovation, and diversification.	智利缺少移民有助于解释智利为何缺少企业家精神、创新和多样化。


The few Koreans that Chile let in helped revive its textile industry.	为数甚少的来到智利的韩国人帮助复兴了智利纺织业。


Colombia is much worse than Chile in this regard.	在这方面，哥伦比亚比智利糟糕得多。 在哥伦比亚，外国人仅占人口的不到0.


There, foreigners represent less than 0.3% of the population; indeed, there are more than 15 Colombians living abroad for every foreigner living in the country.	3%； 事实上，海外哥伦比亚人口是哥伦比亚海外人口的15倍。


Are the extremely low levels of immigration in Chile and Colombia a problem of low foreign demand or high domestic barriers?	智利和哥伦比亚移民水平极低是否是因为外国需求低迷或本国壁垒高企？


This question can be answered by studying a very sad ongoing natural experiment: the massive emigration from Venezuela, owing to the country’s catastrophic economic and social implosion.	这个问题可以通过研究一项正在进行中的非常可悲的实验回答：大量人口因为灾难性的经济和社会崩溃而从委内瑞拉移民。


Venezuelans, including the most talented, have been trying to find places to go.	委内瑞拉人，包括最有才华的群体，一直在寻找移民对象。


You would be mistaken if you imagined that bureaucrats in Chile and Colombia had more important things to do than restricting immigration.	如果你以为智利和哥伦比亚官僚有比限制移民更重要的事情，那你就错了。


Both countries have been letting very few Venezuelans enter, proportionally fewer than Costa Rica, Panama, Canada, Spain, Australia, and the United States, countries that are at both ends of Chile and Colombia in terms of income or skill level.	这两个国家接��的委内瑞拉人少之又少，远远不如哥斯达黎加、巴拿马、加拿大、西班牙、澳大利亚和美国。 智利和哥伦比亚在人口和技能水平方面都可以在这些国家中名列中游。


Colombia, for example, has suspended a Mercosur-based visa mechanism for Venezuelans on the grounds that Venezuela does not reciprocate.	比如，哥伦比亚以委内瑞拉没有给予同样待遇为由中止了针对委内瑞拉人的南方共同市场签证制度。


This decision is not just heartless; it is patently self-destructive, for it assumes that Colombia is exchanging Venezuela’s access to its country for access by Colombians to Venezuela.	这一决定不但冷血； 也相当具有自伤力，因为这意味着哥伦比亚用委内瑞拉进入本国换取哥伦比亚人进入委内瑞拉。


But the benefits to Colombia come from the skills, entrepreneurship, and diversity it attracts, not from the ones it lets go.	但对哥伦比亚来说，好处来自它所吸引的技能、企业家精神和多元化，而不是放行的人。


And who would want to go to Venezuela these days, anyway?	并且如今还有谁相去委内瑞拉？


Invoking reciprocity is nonsense worthy of Trump.	要求对等对于特朗普来说毫无意义。


The problem of bad immigration policies is not limited to Latin America.	坏移民政策的问题不仅局限于拉丁美洲。


South Africa, for example, would benefit enormously from relaxing its skills and entrepreneurship constraints through more liberal immigration policies.	比如，南非如果能通过更加自由的移民政策放松其技能和企业家精神约束，将受益良多。


But the country has instead moved in exactly the opposite direction.	但南非却反其道而行之。


The immigration policies that Trump wants for the US bear an eerie resemblance to the policies adopted in the countries he dislikes and that dislike him.	特朗普想在美国实施的移民政策诡异地与他所不喜欢和不喜欢他的国家所采取的政策如出一辙。


If adopted, Trump would most likely seek new scapegoats.	实施之后，特朗普极有可能寻找新的替罪羊。


But the current scapegoats should learn to dislike their own immigration policies as much as they appear to dislike Trump.	但当前的替罪羊应该学会像讨厌特朗普一样讨厌自身的移民政策。


Putting Economic Models in Their Place	摆对经济模型的位置


BERKELEY – When policymakers turn to economists for guidance, they expect the advice they receive to be grounded in science, not academic factionalism or political presuppositions.	伯克利—决策者向经济学家讨教时，他们期待获得基于科学的建议，而不是学术流派主义或政治预设。


After all, the policies they will be putting in place will have real implications for real people.	毕竟，他们所实施的政策会对真实的人民产生真实的影响。


Unfortunately, however, sound science is not always the driving force behind economic analysis and policy recommendations.	然而不幸的是，可靠的科学并不总是推动经济分析和政策建议背后的力量。


In a recent critique of what he calls the “mathiness” of modern economics, Paul M. Romer of New York University argues that economists should take measures to exclude academic factionalism and politics from the dismal science.	纽约大学的保罗·罗默（Paul M. Romer）最近批评了他所谓的现代经济学的“数学性”，认为经济学家应该采取措施排除这个沉闷科学中的学术流派主义和政治学。


Romer grounds his case in an ongoing debate in his field about the role that ideas play in promoting economic growth.	罗默的观点十分契合他所属领域的一场未完的争论——思想在促进经济增长中的作用。


Romer seems to be worried principally about some economists’ tendency to claim that what is true about certain types of theories is true of all theories and thus applicable to the real world.	罗默的主要担忧似乎是一些经济学家有一种倾向，将对于特定理论的真理称为对于一切理论的真理，因此适合真实世界。


As an example of this tendency, Romer cites the work of the University of Chicago economist Robert Lucas, who, in his 2009 paper “Ideas and Growth,” dismisses the role that books or blueprints can play in driving growth.	作为这种倾向的一个例子，罗默援引了芝加哥大学经济学家罗伯特·卢卡斯（Robert Lucas）的工作。 他在2009年的论文《思想和增长》（Ideas and Growth）中认为，书本或蓝图在促进增长中毫无用处。


“Some knowledge can be ‘embodied’ in books, blueprints, machines, and other kinds of physical capital, and we know how to introduce capital into a growth model,” Lucas argued, “but we also know that doing so does not by itself provide an engine of sustained growth.”	“一些知识可以‘包含在’书本、蓝图、机器和其他实物资本中，并且我们知道如何将资本引入增长模型，”卢卡斯说，“但我们也知道这样做本身并不能提供持续增长的引擎。 ”


The problem is that Lucas’s statement is true only for models of economic growth that are specified in such a way that the return on “embodied” capital drops to zero as capital accumulates.	问题在于卢卡斯的说法只适合一些经济增长模型，这些模型有严格的假设，即“包含的”资本回报会随着资本的积累趋近于零。


As Romer notes, there are many models for which this is simply not true.	罗默指出，许多模型根本不这么假设。


What Lucas makes out to be a general truth – that the path to economic growth cannot lie in creating and acquiring the kind of knowledge that is “embodied” in books, blueprints, and machines – rests on a barely examined decision to restrict attention to only a few kinds of models.	卢卡斯作为普遍真理所提出的东西——经济增长之路不可能通过创造和获取“包含在”书本、蓝图和机器中的知识找到——其基础是一个未受检验的决定，将注意力限制在少数几种模型上。


Lucas’s decision might be somewhat justifiable if the models he chose were the only ones that were correct.	从某种程度上说，卢卡斯的决定是可以论证的，如果他所选择的模型是唯一的正确模型的话。


But of course that is not the case.	但事实当然并非如此。


In addition to criticizing those that draw general conclusions from specific cases, Romer takes aim at those who claim that economic models permit only one mode of interaction and only one mode of individual decision-making.	除了批评从个例推出普遍结论的做法外，罗默还将矛头指向了认为经济模型只允许一种互动模式和一种个体决策模式的人。


Romer’s principle objection is to the assumption that the only interaction allowable in economic growth models is what is known as “price taking,” the buying or selling of goods and services at the price currently offered by the market.	罗默的主要反对点是一个假设：经济增长模型中唯一允许的互动式所谓的“价格接受”，即买卖商品和服务在由市场提供的当前价格水平上进行。


I would add to that my objection to the assumption that individual decision-making is always characterized by rational expectations.	我要在此基础上增加我对另一个假设的反对：个体决策永远是理性预期的。


Assumptions like these might be adequate as foundations on which to build models to help us understand the world, but only if market processes were structured exactly right, smoothing out at the aggregate level all the deviations from price-taking and rational expectations that are clearly evident at the individual level.	这些假设也许足以成为构建模型帮助我们理解世界的基础，但只有在市场过程构造完全正确，平稳地在总量水平上排除所有有大量证据证明存在于个体水平上的偏离价格接受和理性预期的情况。


Asking whether, which, and when market processes meet such criteria is an empirical question.	要知道市场是否符合这些标准、哪些市场符合这些标准、何时符合这些标准是一个实证问题。


Claiming that all market processes must be so structured is theoretical malfeasance.	宣布所有市场过程都必须如此构造理论“渎职”。


And it is widespread.	而这一情况普遍存在。


In the field of growth theory, Romer sees the current generation of neoclassical economists grind out paper after paper imposing the theoretical restrictions necessary for a price-taking equilibrium.	在增长理论领域，罗默认为当前一代新古典派经济学家的论文无不引入了价格接受均衡的必要理论限制。


As he correctly notes, such papers are useless for any purpose other than advancing their authors’ positions in academic status games.	他正确地指出，这些论文除了让作者在学术地位博弈中取得进步外别无其他用处。


Meanwhile, in my field, macroeconomics, I see economists, bankers, industrialists, technocrats, and politicians make the claim that the policies governments could implement to speed an economic recovery must be, if not counterproductive, at least too risky.	与此同时，在我的领域——宏观经济学中，我看到经济学家、银行家、实业家、技术官僚和政客都宣称政府可以实施用来加速经济复苏的政策风险太大，甚至不利于生产。


After all, that is what a model with a very restricted class of rational expectations would predict.	毕竟，这是极其严格的理性预期模型所预言的。


At the same time, we should recognize that the problem Romer pinpoints is not a new one.	与此同时，我们应该认识到，罗默所指出的问题不是什么新问题。


Just the other day, I came across critiques of expansionary fiscal and monetary policy made by the Canadian economist Jacob Viner and the French economist Étienne Mantoux.	几天前我读到了加拿大经济学家雅各布·维纳（Jacob Viner）和法国经济学家艾蒂尼·芒图（Étienne Mantoux）对扩张性财政和货币政策的批评。


They both argued in the 1930s (in the middle of the Great Depression!) that government efforts to boost employment would always result in undesirable and unwarranted inflation, and would probably reduce output in the long run.	他们在20世纪30年代（大萧条期间！ ）认为政府刺激就业的措施必然会产生令人厌恶的无端的通货膨胀，有可能导致长期产出下降。


What is most depressing about Romer’s argument is how unlikely it is to be heeded.	罗默观点最令人担忧之处是注意到这个问题非常困难。


Romer may be able to convince academic economists to be more cautious about making claims concerning the generality of theories of economic growth.	罗默也许可以说服学界经济学家在做出与经济增长理论的普遍性有关的结论时更加谨慎。


But it is less than clear that bankers, industrialists, technocrats, and politicians – who are responsible for the policies that impact people’s lives – will do the same.	但银行家、实业家、技术官僚和政客——他们负责制定和实施影响人民生活的政策——是否也会这样做就不好说了。


A Year of Divergence	分化之年


LAGUNA BEACH – In the coming year, “divergence” will be a major global economic theme, applying to economic trends, policies, and performance.	拉古娜海滩—在即将到来的明年，“分化”一词将成为全球经济主题，可以适用于经济趋势、政策和表现。


As the year progresses, these divergences will become increasingly difficult to reconcile, leaving policymakers with a choice: overcome the obstacles that have so far impeded effective action, or risk allowing their economies to be destabilized.	随着明年的临近，这些分化之势将越来越难以调和，让决策者面临一个选择：克服目前阻碍有效行动的障碍，或放任经济陷入动荡。


The multi-speed global economy will be dominated by four groups of countries.	多速的全球经济将由四组国家主导。


The first, led by the United States, will experience continued improvement in economic performance.	第一组以美国为首，经济表现将继续改善。


Their labor markets will become stronger, with job creation accompanied by wage recovery.	它们的劳动力市场将更加强劲，工资复苏伴随就业创造。


The benefits of economic growth will be less unequally distributed than in the past few years, though they will still accrue disproportionately to those who are already better off.	经济增长的好处的分配将不会像过去几年那样不平等，尽管已经获得好处的人还将拿走大部分好处。


The second group, led by China, will stabilize at lower growth rates than recent historical averages, while continuing to mature structurally.	第二组国家以中国为首，将稳定在比最近的历史平均水平更低的增长水平上，同时在结构上继续趋于成熟。


They will gradually reorient their growth models to make them more sustainable – an effort that occasional bouts of global financial-market instability will shake, but not derail.	它们的经济模式将变得更加可持续——间发的全球金融市场动荡会干扰这一努力但不会扼杀它们。


And they will work to deepen their internal markets, improve regulatory frameworks, empower the private sector, and expand the scope of market-based economic management.	它们还将致力于深化内部市场，改善监管框架，加强私人部门实力，扩大基于市场的经济管理范围。


The third group, led by Europe, will struggle, as continued economic stagnation fuels social and political disenchantment in some countries and complicates regional policy decisions.	第三组国家以欧洲为首，将陷入艰苦斗争，因为持续的经济停滞将助长一些国家的社会和政治觉醒、让地区政策决定复杂化。


Anemic growth, deflationary forces, and pockets of excessive indebtedness will hamper investment, tilting the balance of risk to the downside.	萎靡的增长、通缩压力和过度负债将拖累投资，带来下行风险。


In the most challenged economies, unemployment, particularly among young people, will remain alarmingly high and persistent.	在挑战最严峻的经济体，失业特别是年轻人失业将继续处于值得警惕的高位并持续下去。


The final group comprises the “wild card” countries, whose size and connectivity have important systemic implications.	最后一组国家构成了“两可”国家，它们的规模和联系具有重要的系统影响力。


The most notable example is Russia.	最显著的例子是俄罗斯。


Faced with a deepening economic recession, a collapsing currency, capital flight, and shortages caused by contracting imports, President Vladimir Putin will need to decide whether to change his approach to Ukraine, re-engage with the West to allow for the lifting of sanctions, and build a more sustainable, diversified economy.	面对经济衰退深化、货币崩溃、资本外逃和进口收缩导致短缺的局面，总统普京将需要决定是否改变对乌克兰方针，与西方合作以换取制裁放松并构建更加可持续、多样化的经济。


The alternative would be to attempt to divert popular discontent at home by expanding Russia’s intervention in Ukraine.	另一个方案是试图通过扩大俄罗斯对乌克兰的干预转移国内群众的不满。


This approach would most likely result in a new round of sanctions and counter-sanctions, tipping Russia into an even deeper recession – and perhaps even triggering political instability or more foreign-policy risk-taking – while exacerbating Europe’s economic malaise.	这一方针极有可能导致新一轮制裁和反制裁，使俄罗斯陷入更深的衰退——甚至可能引发政治动荡或更大的外交冒险——同时也深化欧洲的经济萎靡。


Brazil is the other notable wild card.	巴西是另一个值得关注的两可国家。


President Dilma Rousseff, chastened by her near loss in the recent presidential election, has signaled a willingness to improve macroeconomic management, including by resisting a relapse into statism, the potential benefits of which now pale in comparison to its collateral damage and unintended consequences.	险些输掉最近的选举的总统罗塞夫以释放出信号表示愿意改进宏观经济管理，包括阻止国家主义复萌。 眼下，国家主义复萌的潜在好处与其所造成的附带伤害和意外后果比起来不值一提。


If she delivers, Brazil would join Mexico in anchoring a more stable Latin America in 2015, helping the region to overcome the disruptive effects of a Venezuelan economy roiled by lower oil prices.	如果罗塞夫采取这一政策，巴西将与墨西哥一起稳定2015年的拉丁美洲，帮助该地区克服低油价扰动委内瑞拉经济带来的破坏效应。


This multi-speed economic performance will contribute to multi-track central banking, as pressure for divergent monetary policies intensifies, particularly in the systemically important advanced economies.	随着货币政策分歧的压力日趋增大，多速经济表现将带来多样化的央行政策，特别是在具系统重要性的发达经济体。


The US Federal Reserve, having already stopped its large-scale purchases of long-term assets, is likely to begin hiking interest rates in the third quarter of 2015.	美联储已经停止了其大规模长期资产购买操作，可能将于2015年三季度开始提高利率。


By contrast, the European Central Bank will pursue its own version of quantitative easing, introducing in the first quarter of the year a set of new measures to expand its balance sheet.	相反，欧洲央行将追求其自身的量化宽松，在明年一季度引入新措施扩大资产负债表。


The Bank of Japan will maintain its pedal-to-the-metal approach to monetary stimulus.	日本银行将保持货币政策火力全开。


Of course, there is no theoretical limit on divergence.	当然，分化没有理论边界。


The problem is that exchange-rate shifts now represent the only mechanism for reconciliation, and the divide between certain market valuations and their fundamentals has become so large that prices are vulnerable to bouts of volatility.	问题在于汇率变化是如今唯一的协调机制，而某些市场的估值和基本面的分歧极其巨大，价格极有可能陷入波动。


For the US, the combination of a stronger economy and less accommodative monetary policy will put additional upward pressure on the dollar’s exchange rate – which has already appreciated significantly – against both the euro and the yen.	对美国来说，走强的经济和不再有利的货币政策的组合将给美元汇率带来更多的对欧元和日元升值压力——目前美元已经有了大幅升值。


With few other countries willing to allow their currencies to strengthen, the dollar’s tendency toward appreciation will remain strong and broad-based, potentially triggering domestic political opposition.	很少有其他国家愿意让货币升值，因此美元的升值趋势继续走强走宽，有可能引发国内政治反对。


Moreover, as it becomes increasingly difficult for currency markets to perform the role of orderly reconcilers, friction may arise among countries.	此外，随着货币市场日益难以承担有序协调者的角色，各国之间有可能出现摩擦。


This could disturb the unusual calm that lately has been comforting equity markets.	这可能干扰反常平静、目前令人相当满意的股市。


Fortunately, there are ways to ensure that 2015’s divergences do not lead to economic and financial disruptions.	幸运的是，有办法确保2015年的分化不会导致经济和金融灾难。


Indeed, most governments – particularly in Europe, Japan, and the US – have the tools they need to defuse the rising tensions and, in the process, unleash their economies’ productive potential.	事实上，大部分政府——特别是欧洲、日本和美国——拥有需要的工具平息日益升级的紧张，并在此过程中释放经济的生产潜力。


Avoiding the disruptive potential of divergence is not a question of policy design; there is already broad, albeit not universal, agreement among economists about the measures that are needed at the national, regional, and global levels.	避免分化引起灾难不是侦测设计问题； 经济学家们已经有了一个相当广泛——尽管还没有形成完全一致——的关于国家、地区和全球层面需要什么措施的共识。


Rather, it a question of implementation – and getting that right requires significant and sustained political will.	这是一个实施问题——正确解决这一问题需要大量的持续政治意愿。


The pressure on policymakers to address the risks of divergence will increase next year.	决策者解决分化风险的压力将在明年增加。


The consequences of inaction will extend well beyond 2015.	不作为的后果的影响将远不止于2015年。


Messed-Up Macro	乱套的宏观


ITHACA – Until a few years ago, economists of all persuasions confidently proclaimed that the Great Depression would never recur.	伊萨卡—直到几年前，各种流派的经济学家还异口同声信心满满地宣布大萧条永远不会再次发生。


In a way, they were right.	从某种程度上说，他们是对的。


After the financial crisis of 2008 erupted, we got the Great Recession instead.	2008年金融危机爆发后，我们迎来的是大衰退。


Governments managed to limit the damage by pumping huge amounts of money into the global economy and slashing interest rates to near zero.	政府成功地通过向全球经济注入巨量货币、将利率大幅削减至零限制住了伤害。


But, having cut off the downward slide of 2008-2009, they ran out of intellectual and political ammunition.	但是，在遏制了2008—2009年的崩溃后，他们的知识和政治弹药库也用尽了。


Economic advisers assured their bosses that recovery would be rapid.	经济顾问们向他们的老板保证，复苏将很快发生。


And there was some revival; but then it stalled in 2010.	也确实出现了一些复苏； 但2010年就陷入了停滞。


Meanwhile, governments were running large deficits – a legacy of the economic downturn – which renewed growth was supposed to shrink.	与此同时，政府出现了巨额赤字——这是经济衰退的后遗症——这应该由复苏的增长来消化。


In the eurozone, countries like Greece faced sovereign-debt crises as bank bailouts turned private debt into public debt.	在欧元区，希腊等国家因为银行援助把私人债务转变为公共债务，而面临着主权债务危机。


Attention switched to the problem of fiscal deficits and the relationship between deficits and economic growth.	注意力转向了财政赤字问题以及赤字与经济增长的关系问题。


Should governments deliberately expand their deficits to offset the fall in household and investment demand?	政府应该有意扩大赤字以抵消家庭和投资需求的下降吗？


Or should they try to cut public spending in order to free up money for private spending?	还是他们应该试图削减公共支出以解放私人支出资金？


Depending on which macroeconomic theory one held, both could be presented as pro-growth policies.	两种观点都可以以促增长的政策面目出现，这取决于你持有何种宏观经济理论。


The first might cause the economy to expand, because the government was increasing public spending; the second, because they were cutting it.	第一种观点可以促使经济扩张，因为政府增加了公共支出； 第二种则是因为政府在削减公共支出。


Keynesian theory suggests the first; governments unanimously put their faith in the second.	凯恩斯理论认为第一种对； 而政府一边倒地相信第二种。


The consequences of this choice are clear.	这一选择的后果是显而易见的。


It is now pretty much agreed that fiscal tightening has cost developed economies 5-10 percentage points of GDP growth since 2010.	一个如今获得相当多一致赞同的结论是自2010年以来，财政紧缩导致发达经济体损失了5—10个百分点的GDP增长。


All of that output and income has been permanently lost.	所有这些产出和收入都永久地损失了。


Moreover, because fiscal austerity stifled economic growth, it made the task of reducing budget deficits and national debt as a share of GDP much more difficult.	此外，由于财政紧缩扼杀了经济增长，削减预算赤字和国民债务占GDP的比重的任务变得更加困难了。


Cutting public spending, it turned out, was not the same as cutting the deficit, because it cut the economy at the same time.	削减公共支出似乎与削减赤字不一样，因为它同时把经济也给“削减”了。


That should have ended the argument.	争论应该到这里就结束了。


But it did not.	但并非如此。


Some economists claim that governments faced a balance of risk in 2010: Cutting the deficit might have slowed growth; but not committing to cut it might have made things even worse.	一些经济学家宣称2010年时政府面临着风险权衡：削减赤字也许放慢了增长，但不致力于削减赤字可能导致情况更加糟糕。


The Keynesian remedy, the argument went, ignored the effect of fiscal policy on expectations.	这一观点认为，凯恩斯主义药方忽视了财政政策对预期的影响。


If public opinion believed that cutting the deficit was the right thing to do, then allowing the deficit to grow would annul any of its hoped-for stimulatory effect.	如果公共观点认为削减赤字是正确的事情，那么允许赤字增加将让一切希望发生的刺激效应泡汤。


Expecting that taxes would have to rise to “pay for” the extra spending, households and companies would increase their saving.	预期税收必须增加才能“支付”额外的支出会让家庭和公司增加储蓄。


Fearing sovereign defaults, bond markets would charge governments punitive interest rates on their borrowing.	担心主权违约会让债券市场要求政府为其借款支付极高利率。


And here was the clincher: By committing themselves to fiscal tightening, finance ministers gave themselves scope for some fiscal loosening.	还有一个紧箍咒：承诺财政紧缩让财政部长们给自己营造了一些财政放松的空间。


Proclaiming fiscal virtue enabled them to practice fiscal vice.	摆出一副财政美德的样子让他们得以行财政恶行之实。


They could create a fiscal illusion by cutting less than they promised.	他们可以通过比所承诺的少削减一些制造财政幻觉。


Most finance ministers did exactly that.	大部分财政部长做的就是这种事。


This is part of the mess into which macroeconomics has gotten itself.	这就是宏观经济学给自己造成的混乱局面的一部分。


Once beliefs and expectations are introduced into economics, as is surely reasonable, the results of fiscal policy become indeterminate.	信念和预期被引入经济学后（这看起来相当合理），财政政策的结果就变得含糊不清了。


Too much depends on what people think the results of the policy will be.	太多结论取决于人们认为政策结果会是如何。


In the economists’ lingo, policy results are “model-dependent.”	用经济学的行话说，政策结果是“模型依赖的”。


The Nobel laureate economist Paul Krugman has poured scorn on what he calls the “confidence fairy,” the claim that fiscal policy must command the support of the bond markets.	诺贝尔经济学奖获得者克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）对于他所谓的“信心仙女”嗤之以鼻。 “信心仙女”是指财政政策必须领导对债券市场的支持的观点。


But to show that actual policy made things worse does not mean that a better policy was actually available.	但证明实际政策让情况变得更糟并不意味着更好的���策是实际可行的。


The right policy’s success may depend on the public’s expectations of its effects.	正确的政策的成功也许取决于公众对其效果的预期。


The unanswered question is why the public should have the wrong expectations.	一个未知的问题是为何公众的预期是错的。


If fiscal policy is in a muddle, so is monetary policy.	如果说财政政策令人一头雾水的话，货币政策也不遑多让。


Central banks have tried to avoid the confidence fairy by printing money – technically, by buying government bonds on the secondary market.	中央银行试图通过开动印钞机——技术上通过在二级市场上购买政府债券实现——规避信心仙女。


The extra money is expected to percolate through the economy, quickening activity.	都出来的资金预期会在整个经济中渗透，加速经济活动。


The European Central Bank has just started a €1.1 trillion ($1.17 trillion) bond-purchase program to bypass the German veto on fiscal expansion.	欧洲央行刚刚开始一项1. 1万亿欧元的债券购买计划，以此绕开德国对财政扩张的否定。


But the effects of so-called quantitative easing also depend on expectations.	但所谓的量化宽松的效果也取决于预期。


If giving businesses extra cash makes them more confident, they will spend more.	如果给企业更多的钱能增强它们的信心，他们就会花得更多。


If they mistrust the policy, they will hoard the cash.	如果它们不相信这套政策，它们就会把现金囤积起来。


The results of quantitative easing in the United States and the United Kingdom have been equivocal.	美国和英国的量化宽松结果是模棱两可的。


Governments, it is true, could get their money cheaper as yields fell.	诚然，政府因为收益率的下降而可以以更低成本获得资金。


But banks were not lending the money made available to them, partly because they used it to pay down their own debts, and partly because of low demand for loans.	但银行并没有把可获得的资金用于贷款，部分是因为这些钱用来降低其自身的债务，部分则是因为贷款需求低迷。


The main positive effect of quantitative easing was on asset prices – chiefly financial assets.	量化宽松的主要积极效应体现在资产价格上——主要是金融资产。


But greater wealth for the rich does not necessarily produce much extra spending. It does increase inequality and threaten asset bubbles, which could lead to a new financial crash.	但富人更富并不一定会造成大量额外支出，倒确实增加了不平等性和资产泡沫的危险，而资产泡沫有可能带来新的金融动荡。


So we enter the post-crisis era without any settled view on the right macro policy for either recovery or prevention of future meltdowns.	因此，进入后危机时代的我们对于复苏和防止未来崩溃都没有一致意见。


Great hopes are pinned on better financial regulation to stop excessive credit creation.	人们寄厚望于改善金融监管以阻止过度信用创造。


But what is “excessive”?	但什么是“过度”？


Will central banks continue to target 2% inflation?	央行会继续保持2%的通胀目标吗？


Or should they rely on a “nominal income” target?	还是它们应该依赖“名义收入”目标。


What should the new fiscal rules be, and how – in the eurozone – should they be enforced?	新财政规则应该如何？ 对欧元区来说，又应该如何执行？


Economists debate whether market economies are naturally stable.	经济学家争论市场经济是否是天然稳定的。


As a Keynesian, I firmly believe that market economies need to be stabilized by policy.	作为凯恩斯主义者，我坚定认为市场经济需要通过政策来稳定。


But Keynesians have to face the uncomfortable truth that the success of stabilization policies may depend on the business community having Keynesian expectations.	但凯恩斯主义者必须直面一个令人不快的事实，即稳定政策的成功可能取决于企业界具有凯恩斯主义的预期。


They need the confidence fairy to be on their side.	他们需要信心仙女站在他们这一边。


Economics in the Age of Abundance	丰裕年代的经济学


BERKELEY – Until very recently, one of the biggest challenges facing mankind was making sure there was enough to eat.	伯克利—直到最近，人类所面临的最大挑战之一是确保有足够多的吃的。


From the dawn of agriculture until well into the Industrial Age, the common human condition was what nutritionists and public-health experts would describe as severe and damaging nutritional biomedical stress.	从农业雏形齐到工业时代，普通人的条件都处于营养学家和公共卫生专家认为严重和有害的营养生物医学压力状态。


Some 250 years ago, Georgian England was the richest society that had ever existed, and yet food shortages still afflicted large segments of the population.	大约在250年前，乔治英格兰是有史以来最富裕的社会，但食品短缺仍然困扰着很大一部分人口。


Adolescents sent to sea by the Marine Society to be officer’s servants were half a foot (15 centimeters) shorter than the sons of the gentry.	被皇家海洋协会（Marine Society）派去船上为官员服务的青少年要比上流人士的孩子矮15厘米。


A century of economic growth later, the working class in the United States was still spending 40 cents of every extra dollar earned on more calories.	在经历了一百年的经济增长后，美国工作阶级仍要把40%的收入用于增加卡路里。


Today, food scarcity is no longer a problem, at least in high-income countries.	如今，食品短缺已不再是个问题，至少在高收入国家是如此。


In the US, roughly 1% of the labor force is able to grow enough food to supply the entire population with sufficient calories and essential nutrients, which are transported and distributed by another 1% of the labor force.	在美国，大约1%的劳动力就能生产足够多的食品为全国人口提供足够的卡路里和必要营养素，而运输和分销这些食品则需要另外1%的劳动力即可。


That does not account for the entire food industry, of course.	当然，这并不是食品行业的全部。


But most of what is being done by the remaining 14% of the labor force dedicated to delivering food to our mouths involves making what we eat tastier or more convenient – jobs that are more about entertainment or art than about necessity.	但其余致力于将食品送到我们口中的14%的劳动力的工作是让我们吃得更美味或更方便——这与其说是必需品，不如说是娱乐或艺术。


The challenges we face are now those of abundance.	如今，我们面临的挑战是丰裕。


Indeed, when it comes to workers dedicated to our diets, we can add some of the 4% of the labor force who, working as nurses, pharmacists, and educators, help us solve problems resulting from having consumed too many calories or the wrong kinds of nutrients.	事实上，就致力于我们的饮食的工人而言，不妨加上另外4%的劳动力，他们是护士、药剂师和教育者，帮助我们解决因消费过多卡路里或错误的营养素所造成的问题。


More than 20 years ago, Alan Greenspan, then-Chair of the US Federal Reserve, started pointing out that GDP growth in the US was becoming less driven by consumers trying to acquire more stuff.	20多年前，时任美联储主席格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）开始指出，美国GDP增长不再主要由试图获得更多东西的消费者驱动。


Those in the prosperous middle class were becoming much more interested in communicating, seeking out information, and trying to acquire the right stuff to allow them to live their lives as they wished.	繁荣的中产阶级对于沟通、寻找信息和试图获得正确的东西实现想要的生活的兴趣要大得多。


Of course, the rest of the world still faces problems of scarcity; roughly one-third of the world’s population struggles to get enough food.	当然，世界其他地区仍然面临稀缺问题； 大约三分之一的世界人口难以获得足够的食物。


And there is no guarantee that those problems will solve themselves.	也没人能够担保这些问题自我解决。


It is worth recalling that a little over 150 years ago, both Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill believed that India and Britain would converge economically in no more than three generations.	不能忘记，150多年前，马克思和穆勒（John Stuart Mill）都认为，印度和英国不出三代人就能实现经济趋同。


There is no shortage of problems to worry about: the destructive power of our nuclear weapons, the pig-headed nature of our politics, the potentially enormous social disruptions that will be caused by climate change.	值得担忧的问题多得是：核武器的破坏力、愚蠢固执的政治、气候变化所带来的巨大的潜在社会破坏。


But the number one priority for economists – indeed, for humankind – is finding ways to spur equitable economic growth.	但经济学家——事实上，是人类——的首要关注点是找到办法刺激平等的经济增长。


But job number two– developing economic theories to guide societies in an age of abundance – is no less complicated.	但第二重要的任务——发展经济理论指导丰裕时代的社会——也同样复杂。


Some of the problems that are likely to emerge are already becoming obvious.	一些可能出现的问题已经显而易见。


Today, many people derive their self-esteem from their jobs.	如今，许多人从工作中获得自尊。


As labor becomes a less important part of the economy, and working-age men, in particular, become a smaller proportion of the workforce, problems related to social inclusion are bound to become both more chronic and more acute.	随着劳动力在经济中的重要性的降低，特别是工作年龄人口在劳动力中比例的降低，与社会包容相关的问题必然会更加长期、更加尖锐。


Such a trend could have consequences extending far beyond the personal or the emotional, creating a population that is, to borrow a phrase from the Nobel-laureate economists George Akerlof and Robert Shiller, easily phished for phools.	这一趋势的后果可能远远不止于个人或心理，而是造就——用诺贝尔经济学奖获得者乔治·阿克洛夫（George Akerlof）和罗伯特·希勒（Robert Shiller）的话说——轻易就上钩的愚民。


In other words, they will be targeted by those who do not have their wellbeing as their primary goal – scammers like Bernie Madoff, corporate interests like McDonalds or tobacco companies, the guru of the month, or cash-strapped governments running exploitative lotteries.	换句话说，他们会沦为并不把他们的福祉作为第一目标的人的目标——比如麦道夫（Bernie Madoff）这样的骗子、麦当劳或烟草公司这样的公司利益集团、占星大师、经营剥削式彩票（exploitative lotteries）的囊中羞涩的政府等。


Problems like these will require a very different type of economics from the one championed by Adam Smith.	这些问题需要与亚当·斯密所发轫的截然不同的经济学。


Instead of working to protect natural liberty where possible, and building institutions to approximate its effects elsewhere, the central challenge will be to help people protect themselves from manipulation.	核心挑战不是在可能的情况下保护天赋自由和构建机构在其他地区仿照其效果，而是帮助人们保护自己不受操纵。


To be sure, it is not clear that economists will have a comparative advantage in addressing these problems.	诚然，经济学家是否具有解决这些问题的比较优势尚��清楚。


But, for now at least, behavioral economists like Akerlof, Shiller, Richard Thaler, and Matthew Rabin seem to be leading the field.	但是，至少从现在看，阿克洛夫、希勒、理查德·赛勒（Richard Thaler）和马修·拉宾（Matthew Rabin）等行为经济学家正处于领先地位。


In any case, one need only glance at the headlines to comprehend that the issue has become a defining feature of our economic epoch.	无论如何，只需要一瞥标题你就能理解，这一问题已经成为我们的经济时代的决定性特征。


China’s Narrowing Policy Horizons	不断缩窄的中国政策回旋余地


BEIJING – Back in the last quarter of 2011, when the decline in China’s investment growth accelerated, concerns about a hard economic landing intensified, particularly given the authorities’ reluctance to pursue new expansionary policies.	发自北京——回顾2011年最后一个季度，当时中国的投资增长加速下滑，加上官方不愿实施新经济扩张政策，使人们对经济硬着陆的担忧不断加剧。


By May 2012, however, the government had changed its mind, with the National Development and Reform Commission approving ¥7 trillion ($1.3 trillion) in new projects.	然而从2012年5月开始政府转变了思维，国家发展改革委员会批准上马了总额达7万亿元人民币（折合1.


That, together with two ensuing interest-rate cuts by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), guaranteed an end to the economic slowdown in the third quarter of 2012.	3万亿美元）的新项目，再结合中国人民银行的连接两次降息，保证了经济放缓态势在2012年第三季度实现了扭转。


The Chinese economy’s performance has thus maintained the cyclical pattern familiar from the past two decades: rapid investment growth, supported by expansionary policy, drives up the economic-growth rate.	中国经济的表现因此保持了过去二十年来极为常见的循环模式:由经济扩张政策支撑的快速投资增长抬高了经济增长率。


Inflation follows, so policy is tightened and growth slows.	由此引发了通货膨胀，于是政策紧缩，导致经济增长放缓。


But inflation remains high or rising, so more tightening is imposed.	但通货膨胀率依然居高不下，甚至仍在上涨，所以需要强制实施更多的紧缩政策。


Inflation falls at last, but growth slows more than desired, owing to the overcapacity that resulted from excessive investment in the earlier phase of the cycle.	最终通货膨胀降了下来，但经济增长的减速程度超过了预期，这是经济周期早期的过度投资导致的产能过剩所引起的。


At this point, policy becomes expansionary again, and the cycle begins anew: led by investment growth, the economy rebounds.	此时政策又变成了扩张性的，而周期又重新开始了：在投资增长的牵引之下，经济再度实现反弹。


Thus, the acceleration of economic growth since the third quarter of 2012 should come as no surprise.	由此可见，2012第三季度以来的经济增长加速应属意料之内。


With the government still having room to wield expansionary monetary and/or fiscal policy, the economic revival was only a matter of time.	只要政府依然有使用扩张性货币和/或财政政策的空间，经济复苏就只不过是个时间问题。


There is no reason to doubt that the Chinese economy in 2013 will follow the old growth pattern.	毫无疑问，中国经济在2013年仍将遵循旧有的增长模式。


But China’s decision-makers should bear two things in mind. First, in the past, short-term macroeconomic stability was often achieved at the expense of structural adjustment and rational allocation of resources.	但中国的决策者们必须牢记两点：首先，在过去，短期的宏观经济稳定通常是以放弃结构性调整和资源合理配置为代价实现的。


To achieve sustained growth, a balance between short-term and long-term objectives must be struck.	要实现可持续发展，必须达成短期和长期目标的平衡。


Striking that balance is the biggest challenge facing China.	而如何实现这一平衡则是中国当前所面临的最大挑战。


Second, some financial vulnerabilities are embedded in the economy.	第二，中国经济存在着一些金融缺陷。


Unless they are defused in time, financial shocks may derail the economy from its normal growth path.	除非这些缺陷被及时处理，否则金融冲击有可能会使经济偏离正常的轨道。


According to preliminary reports, annual investment growth in 2012 reached roughly 14% – significantly higher than the GDP growth rate, which accelerated in the fourth quarter as a result of a strong rebound in investment in real estate and infrastructure.	根据初步报告，2012年的年投资增长率约为14%——比GDP增长率显著高了许多，由于房地产和基础设施投资的强劲反弹，这种情况在第四季度还进一步加速了。


In 2013, it can be expected that, barring major disruptions, strong investment growth will push China’s GDP more than 8% higher year on year.	2013年，可以预料得到的是，除非发生重大的破坏性事件，否则强劲的投资增长将在每一年度都推动中国GDP增长在8%以上。


The timing of the inevitable policy shift back to tightening depends on overall inflation, particularly house prices.	不可避免的政策回转到紧缩的时机取决于总体的通货膨胀，尤其是房价。


The problem is that the investment share of China’s GDP is already about 50%, while double-digit investment growth in 2013 is expected to push that rate still higher.	问题在于投资占中国GDP的比重已经达到了50%，而2013年高达两位数的投资增长预计会使得这一比率更高。


Such a growth path is simply not sustainable.	这样的增长模式根本是不可持续的。


The money supply has grown significantly faster than output for decades.	过去几十年来货币供给明显快过产出。


In 2012, the growth rate of M2 was about 14%, relatively low by historical standards, but still significantly higher than the nominal GDP growth rate.	2012年，M2的增长率约为14%，相对历史标准来说比较低，但仍然显著高于正常GDP增长率。


As a result of this chronically rapid growth in broad money, China’s M2/GDP ratio has surpassed 180%, the highest in the world.	由于这种广义货币的长期快速增长，中国M2对GDP的比率已经超过了180%，为全世界最高。


Though the full implications of this uniquely high ratio for macroeconomic stability need further investigation, it certainly implies financial fragility and a weakening of the PBOC’s ability to control overall liquidity in the economy.	尽管这种特有的高比率对宏观经济稳定的全面影响需要进一步的证实，它肯定意味着金融脆弱性和中国人民银行对经济中总体流动性控制力的削弱。


Third, though China’s public debt/GDP ratio is officially still under 20%, since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, its fiscal position has deteriorated. If the government’s contingent liabilities are included, China’s debt/GDP ratio may be closer to 50%.	此外，尽管中国国债对GDP比率官方宣称仍然在20%以下，由于2008的爆发的全球金融危机，其财政状况已经恶化，如果将政府的或有债务计算在内的话，中国的债务对GDP比率可能接近50%。


A worrying development in this regard is the rapid rise in enterprise debt, which, according to various studies, now surpasses 120% of GDP – much higher than the leveraging rates of nonfinancial enterprises in major developed countries.	另外一个令人担忧的情况是企业债务的快速上升，根据各种研究，现在已经超过了GDP的120%——这比主要发达国家非金融企业的杠杆率还要高得多。


Even if this does not trigger a crisis, it sharply narrows the government’s scope for using expansionary fiscal policy to stimulate the economy.	即便这不会引发危机，它也会急剧减少政府使用扩张性财政政策来刺激经济的运作余地。


In 2011 and early 2012, there was much talk of a crash in China’s housing market, and a chain-reaction of defaults in underground credit networks and local-government finance platforms.	在2011年及2012年初有很多关于中国房地产市场崩盘及地下信贷网络和地方政府金融平台违约的连锁反应的言论。


In 2013, the talk has changed to the danger of a resurgent housing bubble and the collapse of the shadow banking system, which consists mainly of wealth-management firms and trust companies.	2013年，这种言论转向了房地产泡沫重现和影子银行系统崩溃的危险，后者主要是那些财富管理企业和信托公司。


According to market sources, total assets managed by the shadow banking system have risen exponentially since 2009, totaling ¥14 trillion, or one-third of GDP, in the third quarter of 2012.	根据市场消息指出，��影子银行系统管理的总资产自2009年起已经以指数方式增长，至2012年第三季度已达14万亿元，相当于GDP的三分之一。


With relatively slow growth, corporate profitability, upon which the returns of the shadow banking system’s asset pools are based, is low and falling.	由于增长相对缓慢，公司的利润率——这是影子银行系统资产池的收益来源——很低且一直在下降。


Where, then, will the high returns of the financial products provided by the shadow banking system come from?	那么影子银行系统提供的金融产品的高回报又从何而来呢?


If the shadow banking system collapses, the consequences for the financial system will be much graver than the problems caused by underground credit networks and local-government finance platforms, which were much discussed in 2012.	如果影子银行系统崩溃，对金融系统的后果来说将会比地下信贷网络和地方政府金融平台所引起的问题更加严重，这些在2012年都有了很多的讨论。


No wonder, then, that one influential banker regarded as a possible successor to PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan has warned of the possibility of a “Chinese-style subprime crisis.”	因此，难怪被视为中国人民银行行长潜在的继任者—周小川(他本人同时也是很有影响力的银行家)曾提出警告：有可能会出现中国式的次贷危机。


For now, the Chinese economy, having received its cyclical dose of stimulus, should be okay.	目前，中国经济已经收到了其周期性刺激措施的成效，应该没什么大问题。


By the end of the year, however, the costs of the structural adjustment needed to shift China’s growth model away from investment demand could rise further.	然而到今年年底，用来把中国经济从依靠投资需求转型到其他增长模式的结构性调整所付出的代价可能会进一步增加。


A World of Underinvestment	投资不足的世界


MILAN – When World War II ended 70 years ago, much of the world – including industrialized Europe, Japan, and other countries that had been occupied – was left geopolitically riven and burdened by heavy sovereign debt, with many major economies in ruins.	米兰—70年前，当二战结束时，世界大部——包括工业化的欧洲、日本和其他占领国——因为地缘政治而被割裂，并背上了沉重的主权债务，许多主要经济体满目疮痍。


One might have expected a long period of limited international cooperation, slow growth, high unemployment, and extreme privation, owing to countries’ limited capacity to finance their huge investment needs.	你也许会认为，在相当一段长的时间里，国际合作将非常有限，增长将十分缓慢，失业率将保持高位，还会出现极端私有化啊，因为各国无力为巨大的投资需要提供融资。


But that is not what happened.	但事实并非如此。


Instead, world leaders adopted a long-term perspective.	相反，世界领导人采取了长期的远见卓识。


They recognized that their countries’ debt-reduction prospects depended on nominal economic growth, and that their economic-growth prospects – not to mention continued peace – depended on a worldwide recovery.	他们认识到，他们的国家的债务减少取决于名义经济增长，而它们的经济增长前景——更不用说持续和平了——取决于世界的复苏。


So they used – and even stretched – their balance sheets for investment, while opening themselves up to international trade, thereby helping to restore demand.	因此，它们利用——甚至扩大——资产负债表进行投资，同时向国际贸易开放自己，从而帮助重塑需求。


The United States – which faced considerable public debt, but had lost little in the way of physical assets – naturally assumed a leadership role in this process.	美国——它面临着巨大的公共债务，但实体资产基本安然无恙——自然在这一过程中起到了领导作用。


Two features of the post-war economic recovery are striking.	战后经济复苏有两个显著特点。


First, countries did not view their sovereign debt as a binding constraint, and instead pursued investment and potential growth.	首先，各国没有将主权债务视为硬约束（binding constraint），而是追求投资和潜在增长。


Second, they cooperated with one another on multiple fronts, and the countries with the strongest balance sheets bolstered investment elsewhere, crowding in private investment.	其次，它们在诸多前沿彼此合作，资产负债表最强的国家帮助别的国家刺激投资，吸引私人投资。


The onset of the Cold War may have encouraged this approach.	冷战的爆发也许鼓励了这一方针。


In any case, it was not every country for itself.	如论如何，各国并没有各自为战。


Today’s global economy bears striking similarities to the immediate post-war period: high unemployment, high and rising debt levels, and a global shortage of aggregate demand are constraining growth and generating deflationary pressures.	今天的全球经济与二战刚刚结束时有诸多惊人的相似之处：高失业、不断增加的高债务水平，以及全球总需求短缺制约着增长、形成通缩压力。


And now, as then, the level and quality of investment have been consistently inadequate, with public spending on tangible and intangible capital – a critical factor in long-term growth – well below optimal levels for some time.	与当时一样，今天的投资水平和质量也一直欠缺，对有形和无形资本——长期增长的关键因素——的公共支出持续大大低于最有水平。


Of course, there are also new challenges.	当然，现在也有新挑战。


The dynamics of income distribution have shifted adversely in recent decades, impeding consensus on economic policy.	收入分配的动态在近几十年中发生了恶化，阻止了关于经济政策的共识。


And aging populations – a result of rising longevity and declining fertility – are putting pressure on public finances.	而人口老化——寿命延长和生育率下降的结果——也在给公共财政制造压力。


Nonetheless, the ingredients of an effective strategy to spur economic growth and employment are similar: available balance sheets (sovereign and private) should be used to generate additional demand and boost public investment, even if it results in greater leverage.	尽管如此，刺激经济增长和就业的有效战略要素是类似的：可动用的（主权和私人）资产负债表应该用于制造总需求、刺激公共投资，即使这会增加杠杆。


Recent IMF research suggests that, given excess capacity, governments would probably benefit from substantial short-run multipliers.	最新的IMF研究表明，给定过剩产能，政府有望从有利的短期乘数中获益。


More important, the focus on investment would improve prospects for long-term sustainable growth, which would enable governments and households to pursue responsible deleveraging.	更重要的是，着重投资将改善长期可持续增长前景，让政府和家庭能够追求负责任的去杠杆化。


Likewise, international cooperation is just as critical to success today as it was 70 years ago.	类似地，国际合作对于今天的成功的重要性也不亚于70年前。


Because the balance sheets (public, quasi-public, and private) with the capacity to invest are not uniformly distributed around the world, a determined global effort – which includes an important role for multilateral financial institutions – is needed to clear clogged intermediation channels.	有投资余力的（公共、准公共和私人）资产负债表在全球不是均匀分布的，我们需要制定全球性方针——多边金融机构在其中要起到重要作用——疏通阻塞的中介渠道。


There is plenty of incentive for countries to collaborate, rather than using trade, finance, monetary policy, public-sector purchasing, tax policy, or other levers to undermine one another.	国家有大量的激励进行合作，而不是采取贸易、金融、货币政策、公共部门采购、税收政策或其他方式互相破坏。


After all, given the connectedness that characterizes today’s globalized financial and economic systems, a full recovery anywhere is virtually impossible without a broad-based recovery nearly everywhere.	毕竟，当今全球化金融和经济系统的一大特征乃是连通性，如果没有几乎遍地开花的广泛复苏，任何一地都不可能获得充分复苏。


Yet, for the most part, limited cooperation has been the world’s chosen course in recent years, with countries believing not only that they must fend for themselves, but also that their debt levels impose a hard constraint on growth-generating investment.	但是，近几年来，在绝大部分情况下，世界的合作相当有限，各国不但认为必须做好自我保护，还认为它们的债务水平构成了对刺激增长的投资的硬约束。


The resulting underinvestment and depreciation of the global economy’s asset base are suppressing productivity growth and thus undermining sustainable recoveries.	由此导致的投资不足和全球经济资产基��的折旧正在遏制生产率增长，从而破坏可持续复苏。


In the absence of a vigorous international re-investment program, monetary policy is being used to prop up growth.	在缺少强力国际再投资项目的情况下，各国使用货币政策刺激增长。


But monetary policy typically focuses on domestic recovery.	但货币政策通常注重国内复苏。


And, though unconventional measures have reduced financial instability, their effectiveness in countering widespread deflationary pressures or restoring growth remains dubious.	此外，尽管非常规手段降低了金融不稳定性，但它们抵挡普遍的通缩压力或重塑增长的效果仍令人怀疑。


Meanwhile, savers are being repressed, asset prices distorted, and incentives to maintain or even increase leverage enhanced.	与此同时，储蓄者受到抑制，资产价格被扭曲，保持甚至增加杠杆的激励获得了增强。


Competitive devaluations, even if they are not policymakers’ stated objectives, are becoming increasingly tempting – though they will not solve the aggregate-demand problem.	竞争性贬值——即使它们并非决策者公开承认的目标——的吸引力正在日益增加，尽管它们更本无法解决总需求问题。


This is not to say that sudden “normalization” of monetary policy is a good idea.	这并不是说突然的货币政策“正常化”是一个好主意。


But, if large-scale investment and reform programs were initiated as complements to unconventional monetary-policy measures, the economy could move onto a more resilient growth path.	但是，如果大规模投资和改革计划作为非常规货币政策的补充手段实施，经济可能走上恢复力更强的增长路径。


Despite its obvious benefits, such a coordinated international approach remains elusive.	尽管国际合作方针有着显而易见的好处，但仍鲜有实施。


Though trade and investment agreements are being negotiated, they are increasingly regional in scope.	尽管不少贸易和投资协定正在谈判中，但大多是地区规模。


Meanwhile, the multilateral trade system is fragmenting, along with the consensus that created it.	与此同时，多边贸易体系正在瓦解，创造这一体系的共识亦然。


Given the level of interconnectedness and interdependence that characterizes today’s global economy, the reluctance to cooperate is difficult to comprehend.	当今全球经济的显著特征是互连性和互相依存性，不愿合作是难以理解的。


One problem seems to be conditionality, with countries unwilling to commit to complementary fiscal and structural reforms.	一个问题也许在于制约性（conditionality），各国不愿承诺采取补充性财政和结构改革。


This is especially evident in Europe, where it is argued, with some justification, that, without such reforms, growth will remain anemic, sustaining or even exacerbating fiscal constraints.	这在欧洲尤其明显，人们指出——有一定道理——没有这些改革，增长将一直萎靡不振，维持甚至恶化财政约束。


But if conditionality is so important, why didn’t it prevent cooperation 70 years ago?	但如果制约性如此重要，为何它没有在70年前阻挡合作？


Perhaps the idea that severely damaged economies, with limited prospects for independent recoveries, would pass up the opportunity that international cooperation presented was implausible.	受损严重的经济体能看见独立复苏的有限前景，它们会拒绝接受国际合作带来的机会，这一观点可能无法令人信服。


Maybe it still is.	也许至今仍然如此。


If so, creating a similar opportunity today could change the incentives, trigger the required complementary reforms, and put the global economy on course to a stronger long-term recovery.	如果是这样，今天创造类似的机会可以改变激励，触发所需要的补充性改革，让全球经济走上更坚挺的长期复苏之路。


A Growth Pact for America	美国增长契约


NEW YORK – America, once again, will have a divided government, with the Democrats holding the White House, and the Republicans controlling both houses of Congress.	纽约—美国将再次迎来分裂的政府，民主党保有白宫，共和党控制国会两院。


But that does not necessarily mean that the final two years of Barack Obama’s presidency need to be defined by stalemate and mutual recrimination.	但这并不一定意味着奥巴马总统任期的最后两年一定会在僵局和互相指责中度过。


The electorate’s desire for change and fear of continuing slow growth, which pushed the Republicans to their victory in this week’s mid-term congressional election, will invariably prompt discussion about new policy options designed to raise growth, employment, and incomes.	选民渴望改变、害怕低增长持续，此乃共和党在本周国会中期选举中获胜的原因，也不可避免地激起了关于提高增长、就业和收入的政策选择的讨论。


Of course, America’s experience with divided government can leave one pessimistic about the two parties’ ability to compromise; but, as Mexico recently demonstrated when its three big parties agreed on a market-oriented “Pact for Mexico,” even bitterly opposed political parties can overcome their suspicions to embrace needed reforms.	当然，美国过去的政府分裂经验或许让人对两党形成妥协的前景感到悲观，但是，墨西哥的三大政党最忌在市场导向的“墨西哥契约”（Pact for Mexico）上形成了一致，这表明，即使是极端对立的两党也可以克服猜疑，共同实施需要的改革。


The list of potential policy actions that could benefit the United States – trade liberalization, comprehensive regulatory reform, and immigration and education reform, among others – is long.	有利于美国的潜在政策行动很多，包括贸易自由化、全面监管改革、移民和教育改革等。


But only two policies are particularly promising for such a “Pact for America”: federal infrastructure spending and corporate-tax reform.	但在“美国契约”中，只有两项政策最有希望：联邦基础设施支出和公司税改革。


Enactment of these reforms would generate a win for each side – and for both.	实施这些改革将令每一方都受益，取得双赢效果。


But such a bipartisan consensus requires removing both the left and the right’s ideological blinders, at least temporarily.	但这一跨党派共识需要克服左翼和右翼的意识形态障碍，至少暂时是如此。


On the left, a preoccupation with Keynesian stimulus reflects a misunderstanding of both the availability of measures (shovel-ready projects) and their desirability (whether they will meaningfully change the expectations of households and businesses).	左翼眼里只有凯恩斯主义刺激，这反映出对措施的可实施性（万事俱备的工程）和合意性（是否能对家庭和企业期望产生有意义的影响）的误解。


Indeed, to counteract the mindset forged in the recent financial crisis, spending measures will need to be longer-lasting if they are to raise expectations of future growth and thus stimulate current investment and hiring.	事实上，为了抵消源自最近金融危机的思维，要想提高未来增长预期从而刺激当前投资和就业，支出措施需要继续持续下去。


The right, for its part, must rethink its obsession with temporary tax cuts for households or businesses.	右翼必须反思其沉迷于临时性家庭和企业减税的做法。


The impact of such cuts on aggregate demand is almost always modest, and they are poorly suited for shifting expectations for recovery and growth in the post-financial-crisis downturn.	这些减税措施对总需求的影响几乎总是聊胜于无，在后金融危机时期的衰退中，也无助于改变复苏和增长预期。


Politics complicates matters further, because the exclusively short-term focus on the fiscal impact of spending and revenues clashes with policies whose benefits accumulate over time.	政治将问题进一步复杂化了，因为完全短视地专注于支出和收入的财政影响与收益需要长时间才能逐渐显现的政策互相矛盾。


While such benefits may not appear to be “stimulus,” their mounting effect better serves the objective of raising expectations of future demand and growth.	尽管这些好处可能无法体现为“刺激”，但其累积效应能更好地起到提高未来需求和增长预期的效果。


But the concerns of serious people, whether on the left or the right, are not so different.	但不管是左翼还是右翼，严肃的人的担心并没有如此不同。


Will economic growth accelerate sufficiently to boost job and income growth?	经济增长是否能够足以提振就业和收入增长？


Can the barriers that exclude many Americans from recovery and future prosperity be removed?	将许多美国人排除在复苏和未来繁荣的壁垒能否消除？


Federal infrastructure spending and corporate-tax reform should top the list of policies capable of attracting bipartisan agreement, because they promise significant long-term productivity, income, and employment gains, while also supporting short-term growth.	联邦基础设施支出和公司税改革应该成为吸引跨党派一致的最优先政策，因为它们有利于大幅提高长期生产率、收入和就业，同时也能支持短期增长。


A commitment to a multi-year federal infrastructure-spending program, for example, could increase demand, private investment, and employment, even though projects may not be immediately available.	比如，承诺多年期联邦基础设施支出计划能增加需求、私人投资和就业，即使这些工程可能眼下并不可行。


And such a program, normally proposed by Democrats, can and should be crafted to secure Republican support as well.	这样的计划常常由民主党提出，可以也应该加以修改以确保获得共和党的支持。


To that end, an infrastructure program should give states and localities a key role in selecting the projects to be funded, and these governmental units should have “skin in the game” by funding part of the costs.	在这方面，基础设施计划应该让州和地方在选择为那些项目提供资金方面扮演关键角色，这些政府单元也应该承担部分成本，将自己的利益牵涉其中。


Policymakers should also give serious consideration to regulatory reforms that would reduce the expense of new projects and assure their timely completion.	决策者还应该认真考虑监管改革以降低新工程的支出、确保按时完工。


An infrastructure program oriented in this way – as opposed to a grab bag of politically expedient shovel-ready projects – should be able to muster conservative support.	以此为导向的基础设施项目——而不是作为政策权宜之计的万事俱备工程——应该能够激发保守派支持。


And, done properly, federally funded infrastructure projects should provide substantial benefits to lower-income Americans.	如果实施得当，联邦出资的基础设施工程可以给低收入美国人带来巨大的好处。


Better transport infrastructure, for example, would not only create jobs, but would also reduce the costs of commuting to work.	比如，改善的交通基础设施不但可以创造就业，还能降低通勤成本。


Corporate-tax reform also offers a good opportunity for bipartisan agreement, especially given that Obama and congressional leaders of both parties have expressed interest.	公司税改革也有望获得跨党派一致，特别是考虑到奥巴马和两党国会领袖都表达出这方面的兴趣。


While gains from fundamental tax reform – say, replacing the current tax system with a broad-based consumption tax – are large, on the order of 0.5-1 percentage point per year of economic growth for a decade, corporate-tax reform would also boost growth.	根本性税收改革——比如以宽税基消费税取代当前税收体系——好处巨大，在十年的时间里可以提振0. 5—1个百分点的经济增长，而公司税改革也能够提振增长。


Reducing the tax rate for companies substantially, while eliminating targeted business-tax preferences and broadening the corporate-tax base, would increase both investment and workers’ wages.	大幅降低公司税率，同时取消定向企业税优惠并扩大公司税基将增加投资和工人工资。


Allowing multinational companies to repatriate overseas profits without paying additional US tax would also bolster investment and job creation at home.	允许跨国公司汇回海外利润而不必多缴美国税也能够刺激美国国内的投资和就业创造。


Given that recent research shows that much of the burden of corporate taxation is borne by workers in the form of lower wages, Democrats should embrace tax reform as a way to support income growth.	最新研究表明，公司税有很大一部���是通过低工资形式由工人承担的，因此民主党应该能接受将税收改革作为支持收入增长的方式。


One could add to such a reform further support for low-income Americans by increasing the Earned Income Tax Credit for single workers.	此外，还可以通过增加个体工人的劳动所得税抵扣（Earned Income Tax Credit）进一步支持低收入美国人。


Given their policy objectives, conservatives should support a well-crafted federal infrastructure program, and liberals should support corporate-tax reform.	考虑到其政策目标，保守派应该支持精心规划的联邦基础设施项目，自由派应该支持公司税改革。


But changes in the political process would help move matters ahead.	但政治过程的变化有助于推进进程。


Because the payoffs from infrastructure spending and tax reform do not fit neatly within the five-year or ten-year budget window used by America’s fiscal scorekeepers, measuring more completely the benefits from such policies is vital to attracting political support.	因为来自基础设施支出和税收改革的收益并不十分契合美国财政评估所使用的五年期和十年期预算窗口，因此要获得政治支持，更加全面地衡量这些政策的好处是至关重要的。


Moreover, any increase in spending on infrastructure or any revenue loss from tax reform should be offset elsewhere.	此外，基础设施支出的任何增加或税收改革所导致的任何收入减少应该通过其他手段抵消。


For example, future growth in Social Security benefits or the home-mortgage-interest tax deduction could be scaled back for more affluent individuals, as progressive indexation, proposed by conservatives in the US, and the adjustment of mortgage-interest tax deductions in the United Kingdom, started during the Thatcher administration, attest.	比如，丰裕个人的社会保障金或住房按揭利息税收抵扣应该减少，美国保守派所提出的的累进指数化（progressive indexation）和英国在撒切尔夫人执政时期所实施的按揭利息税收抵扣调整证实了这一点。


Clearly, the economy is Americans’ top concern.	显然，经济是美国人的首要关注点。


Its leaders must respond with a policy agenda focused on reviving growth now and sustaining it in the future.	其领导人必须采取专注于重振现在增长、持续未来增长的政策日程。


But that can happen only if enough legislators in both parties, and the president, remove their intellectual and political blinders and reach the long-term compromises needed to create jobs and increase incomes.	但若要如此，必须有足够多的两党立法者以及总统破除思想和政治成见，达成创造就业和增加收入所必须的长期妥协。


The time for a Pact for America has arrived.	美国契约（Pace for America）的时机已经成熟。


Economists on the Refugee Path	难民路上的经济学家


NEW HAVEN – Today’s global refugee crisis recalls the period immediately after World War II.	纽黑文—今天的全球难民危机让人想起了第二次世界大战刚刚结束的时候。


By one contemporary estimate, there were more than 40 million refugees in Europe alone.	据一项当代估算，光是在欧洲就有4,000万多难民。


These “displaced persons,” as they were called at the time, were forced to flee their homes because of violence, forced relocation, persecution, and destruction of property and infrastructure.	这些当时被称为“流民”的人因为暴力、强迫搬迁、迫害和房产和基础设施被毁而被迫逃离家园。


The dire postwar situation led to the creation in 1950 of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which was expected to serve only a temporary mandate, protecting displaced people for three years.	战后的凄惨景象让联合国在1950年成立了难民署（High Commissioner for Refugees），该机构原本只是临时性的设置，目标是在三年的时间里保护流民。


But the problem never went away.	但这一问题从未消失。


On the contrary, the UNHCR is not only still with us; it is sounding an alarm.	相反，联合国难民署不但仍然存在，还在敲响警钟。


In its 2015 mid-year report, the agency put the number of “forcibly displaced” people worldwide at 59.5 million at the end of 2014, including 19.5 million internationally displaced, which they define as true refugees.	在2015年年中报告中，联合国难民署认为2014年底全世界共有5,950万“被迫流离失所”者，其中包括1,950万国际流民（他们被定义为的真正的难民）。


Some countries – Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Ukraine – each accounted for more than a half-million forcibly displaced people at the end of 2014.	一些国家——阿富汗、阿塞拜疆、哥伦比亚、中非共和国、民主刚果、伊拉克、缅甸、尼日利亚、巴基斯坦、索马里、南苏丹、苏丹、叙利亚和乌克兰——各自都存在五十万以上被迫流离失所者。


The report noted that the total number had certainly grown substantially since.	报告指出，此后这一数字必定又有了极大的增长。


Unfortunately, the report underscores the incompleteness of our understanding of the refugee problem.	不幸的是，报告彰显出我们对难民为题理解的不足。


In fact, throughout history, the fate of refugees seeking asylum in another land has largely been unstudied.	事实上，从历史上看，远赴另一地寻求庇护的难民的命运很少有人研究。


Historians record wars, and they mention diasporas, but they rarely show much interest in how refugee crises arose or were resolved.	历史学家记录战争，也会提一提侨民，但他们很少有兴趣研究难民危机如何产生或如何解决。


To the extent that history is written by the victors, that is not surprising.	历史总是由胜利者书写的，因此这也不奇怪。


The knowledge that one’s country terrorized a minority to the point that its members had to flee, or that a substantial share of one’s forebears arrived in defeat and panic, is not exactly an inspiring source of national identity.	一国对某少数群体实施恐怖统治，以至于他们不得不逃往，或者某族人的祖先因为战败带着恐惧��到某地，这样的经历对于民族身份而言绝非令人振奋的源泉。


So the stories, unheard and untold, are lost.	因此，这些故事不会口口相传。


That is why we need more research on what can and should be done for refugees in the long term.	因此，我们需要更多地研究从长期看我们可以和应该为难民做些什么。


The UNHCR has been doing an important job in protecting refugees, but it cannot possibly address their needs alone.	联合国难民署在保护难民方面起着重要作用，但它不可能满足难民的全部需要。


Its budget of $7 billion in 2015 may seem large, but it amounts to only about $100 per displaced person – not enough to cover even essentials like food and shelter.	2015年，联合国难民署预算为70亿美元，看起来很大，但摊到每个流离失所者头上每人只有100美元——不足以覆盖食品和住所等最基本的需要。


As President of the American Economic Association for 2016, I felt a moral obligation to use our annual meeting earlier this month as a setting in which to bring attention to serious economic problems.	作为2016年美国经济协会主席，我感到一种道德责任，我们应该利用本月早些时候的美国经济协会年会关注严重经济问题。


And the refugee crisis, whatever else it may be, is an economic problem.	难民危机不论是什么，都属于经济问题。


But a dearth of papers addressing it had been submitted to the meeting.	但提交美国经济协会年会的论文中很少有关注此问题的。


So I decided to create a session entitled Sixty Million Refugees, and invited some of our discipline’s most distinguished scholars on migration.	因此我决定组织一个名为“六千万难民”的分会，邀请经济学界最杰出的移民学者与会。


I asked them to describe the dimensions of the refugee problem in economic terms, and to propose some sensible policies to address it.	我请他们用经济学角度描述难民问题的各个维度，并且提出一些明智的政策建议解决这一问题。


One of the papers, by Timothy J. Hatton of the University of Essex and Australian National University, examined refugee flows around the world, to see what drives them.	埃塞克斯大学和澳大利亚国立大学的蒂莫西·哈顿（Timothy J. Hatton）的一篇文章考察了全球难民流以研究背后的驱动因素。


Hatton confronts a popular argument against admitting refugees: that asylum-seekers are not really desperate, but are just using a crisis as a pretext for admission to a richer country.	哈顿面对的是反对接纳难民的流行的理由：寻求庇护者并不是真正的绝望人群，只是利用危机作为借口进入更加富裕的国家。


He finds that, contrary to some expectations, refugee flows are driven largely by political terror and human rights abuses, not economic forces.	他发现，与某些人的预期相反，难民流把主要由政治恐怖和侵犯人权行为驱动，而不是由经济力量驱动。


People in fear for their lives run to the nearest safe place, not the richest.	担心生命安全的人会逃到最近而不是最富的安全地点。


There is no escape from the moral imperative to help them.	帮助他们是无可逃避的道德责任。


Semih Tumen of the Central Bank of Turkey presented evidence regarding the impact of the 2.2 million Syrian refugees on the labor market in the border region.	土耳其中央银行的塞米赫·图门（Semih Tumen）给出了关于220万叙利亚难民给边境地区劳动力市场造成何种影响的证据。


Tumen’s paper, too, takes on an argument frequently used to oppose admitting refugees: that the newcomers will take locals’ jobs and drive down wages.	图门的文章也面对一个常常被用来反对接纳难民的理由：新来者会夺走本地人的饭碗并拉低工资。


He found that in the formal sector, jobs for locals actually increased after the influx of refugees, apparently because of the stimulative effect on the region’s economy.	他发现，在正式部门，本地人工作岗位在难民涌入后事实上是增加的，这显然是拜难民流入对地区经济的刺激效应所赐。


If further research backs up this finding, countries might actually welcome the inflow of labor.	如果更进一步的研究支持这一发现，那么各国也许就会欢迎劳动力的涌入了。


Another paper, by Susan F. Martin of Georgetown University, described the arbitrariness of our current refugee procedures, calling for “legal frameworks based on the need for protection, rather than the triggering causes of the migration.”	乔治敦大学的苏珊·马丁（Susan F. Martin）的一篇文章描述了当前难民程序是如何“任性”，呼吁建立“基于保护需要而非引发难民的原因的法律框架”。


But formulating such rules requires some careful economic thought.	但建立这样的规则需要进行一些仔细的经济考量。


The framers of a refugee system need to consider the rules’ incentive effects on the migrants themselves and on the governments of their countries of origin.	难民制度的制定者需要考虑规则对移民本身以及母国政府的激励效应。


For example, we do not want to make it too easy for tyrants to drive unwanted minorities out of their country.	比如，我们不希望让暴君能够轻而易举地将他不喜欢的少数群体赶出国家。


Finally, Jeffrey D. Sachs of Columbia University detailed a major new system for managing refugees.	最后，哥伦比亚大学的杰弗里·萨克斯（Jeffrey D. Sachs）为管理难民提出了一套详细的新制度。


Sachs is concerned with how such a system’s rules will shape the world’s economies in the longer run.	萨克斯关注这一制度的规则如何在长期影响世界经济。


He wants such a system to prevent encouraging a brain drain by enforcing a commitment to admitting low-skilled and desperate immigrants, not just those who are highly useful to the host country.	他希望这一制度强制要求承诺不但要接受对东道国很有用的移民，也要接受低技能和绝望移民，以此防止刺激人才流失。


Moreover, the rate of flow must be regulated, and economists need to develop a way to ensure equitable burden sharing among countries.	此外，难民的流动速度必须得到监管，经济学家需要制定新方法确保各国公平分担负担。


Under today’s haphazard and archaic asylum rules, refugees must take enormous risks to reach safety, and the costs and benefits of helping them are distributed capriciously.	在当今无序又陈旧的避难规则下，难民必须冒很大的风险才能抵达安全之地，帮助难民的成本和收益的分配也十分不确定。


It does not have to be this way.	这是完全可以改进的。


Economists can help by testing which international rules and institutions are needed to reform an inefficient and often inhumane system.	经济学家可以检验哪些国际规则和机构是改革无效并且常常不人道的制度所需要的，从而为解决难民问题做出贡献。


Economics in Denial	否定中的经济学


PARIS – In an exasperated outburst, just before he left the presidency of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet complained that, “as a policymaker during the crisis, I found the available [economic and financial] models of limited help.	发自巴黎——在离任欧洲中央银行总裁一职前，让-克劳德·特里谢（Jean-Claude Trichet）恼羞成怒地抱怨道：“作为一个危机时期的政策制定者，我发现现有的[经济和金融]模型作用很有限。


In fact, I would go further: in the face of the crisis, we felt abandoned by conventional tools.”	事实上我可以更进一步说：在危机面前，我们感觉被传统工具所抛弃了。 ”


Trichet went on to appeal for inspiration from other disciplines – physics, engineering, psychology, and biology – to help explain the phenomena he had experienced.	特里谢不断寻求来自其他学科的灵感——物理学，工程学，心理学，生物学——来帮助解释他所经历的现象。


It was a remarkable cry for help, and a serious indictment of the economics profession, not to mention all those extravagantly rewarded finance professors in business schools from Harvard to Hyderabad.	这是一个不同寻常的呼救声，是对整个经济学界，尤其是从哈佛大学到海德拉巴印度商学院那帮拿着奢侈报酬的金融学教授们的严厉控诉。


So far, relatively little help has been forthcoming from the engineers and physicists in whom Trichet placed his faith, though there has been some response.	虽然到目前为止已经得到一些回应，但特里谢从他所信任的工程师和物理学家那里获得的帮助还相对较少。


Robert May, an eminent climate change expert, has argued that techniques from his discipline may help explain financial-market developments.	著名的气候变化专家罗伯特·梅（Robert May）认为他的学科技术可以帮助解释金融市场的发展。


Epidemiologists have suggested that the study of how infectious diseases are propagated may illuminate the unusual patterns of financial contagion that we have seen in the last five years.	而流行病学家则认为对传染性疾病如何传播的研究可以用来阐述过去五年金融危机蔓延的模式。


These are fertile fields for future study, but what of the core disciplines of economics and finance themselves?	这些建议都为未来的研究提供了肥沃的土壤，但什么才是经济学和金融学自身的核心准则？


Can nothing be done to make them more useful in explaining the world as it is, rather than as it is assumed to be in their stylized models?	是否我们根本无法做点什么去让它们更有效地解释这个世界，只能假设它只是一个程式化的模型？


George Soros has put generous funding behind the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET).	乔治·索罗斯（George Soros）为新经济思维研究所（Institute for New Economic Thinking )提供了慷慨的资助。


The Bank of England has also tried to stimulate fresh ideas.	英格兰银行也试图鼓励新的想法。


The proceedings of a conference that it organized earlier this year have now been edited under the provocative title What’s the Use of Economics?	今年早些时候组织的一场会议也以“经济学的作用是什么？ ”这个启发性的标题来编辑会议纪要。


Some of the recommendations that emerged from that conference are straightforward and concrete.	会上提出了一些明确而切实的建议。


For example, there should be more teaching of economic history.	例如应该增加更多的经济史教学。


We all have good reason to be grateful that US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke is an expert on the Great Depression and the authorities’ flawed policy responses then, rather than in the finer points of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium theory.	我们完全应该庆幸美联储主席本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke）是一位研究当年大萧条以及政府错误政策回应的专家，而不是拘泥于动态随机均衡理论某些细节方面的学者。


As a result, he was ready to adopt unconventional measures when the crisis erupted, and was persuasive in influencing his colleagues.	因此当危机爆发时他已经准备好采取非常规措施，并在影响同僚方面发挥了自身的说服力。


Many conference participants agreed that the study of economics should be set in a broader political context, with greater emphasis on the role of institutions. Students should also be taught some humility.	许多与会者都同意应该将经济学研究构建在更宏大的政治背景上，更着重于体制所扮演的角色，也应该教学生懂得谦卑。


The models to which they are still exposed have some explanatory value, but within constrained parameters.	他们所接触的模型存在一些说明性的价值，但只是在限定的参数内。


And painful experience tells us that economic agents may not behave as the models suppose they will.	痛苦的经验也告诉我们，经济参与者可能不会按照模型所假设的方式去行动。


But it is not clear that a majority of the profession yet accepts even these modest proposals.	但是这并不意味着大多数同行能接受这些已经非常��和的建议。


The so-called “Chicago School” has mounted a robust defense of its rational expectations-based approach, rejecting the notion that a rethink is required.	所谓的“芝加哥学派”对其以理性期望为基础的研究方法展开了坚定的辩护，认为反思不是必要的。


The Nobel laureate economist Robert Lucas has argued that the crisis was not predicted because economic theory predicts that such events cannot be predicted.	诺贝尔奖得主，经济学家罗伯特卢卡斯（Robert Lucas）则认为经济危机是不可预测的，因为经济学理论认为这样的事件是不可预测的。


So all is well.	所以一切都是合理的。


And there is disturbing evidence that news of the crisis has not yet reached some economics departments.	还有令人不安的证据表明，危机的消息还没有到达某些经济部门。


Stephen King, Group Chief Economist of HSBC, notes that when he asks recent university graduates (and HSBC recruits a large number of them) how much time they spent in lectures and seminars on the financial crisis, “most admitted that the subject had not even been raised.”	汇丰银行集团首席经济学家史提芬·金（Stephen King）指出，当他询问应届大学毕业生（许多刚刚加入汇丰银行）他们花多少时间在关于金融危机的讲座和研讨会上时， “大多数承认这个问题甚至没有被提起过。


Indeed, according to King, “Young economists arrive in the financial world with little or no knowledge of how the financial system operates.”	”事实上正如史提芬·金所说，“年轻的经济学家进入金融领域时对金融系统如何运作知之甚少。 ”


I am sure they learn fast at HSBC.	我相信他们在汇丰银行会很快上手。


(In the future, one assumes, they will learn quickly about money laundering regulations as well.)	（有人假设说，他们将来也会很快了解与洗钱有关的监管条例。


But it is depressing to hear that many university departments are still in denial.	）但是令人沮丧的是许多大学的经济学部仍在否认这个问题。


That is not because students lack interest: I teach a course at Sciences Po in Paris on the consequences of the crisis for financial markets, and the demand is overwhelming.	这并非因为学生缺乏兴趣：我在巴黎政治学院教授一个关于危机对金融市场所产生后果的课程，而对这类课程的需求非常巨大。


We should not focus attention exclusively on economists, however.	但无论如何，我们不应该仅仅把注意力集中在经济学家身上。


Arguably the elements of the conventional intellectual toolkit found most wanting are the capital asset pricing model and its close cousin, the efficient-market hypothesis.	理论上说常规知识工具箱中最缺乏的组件是资本资产定价模型和其近亲：有效市场假说。


Yet their protagonists see no problems to address.	但这这些理论的倡议者们却没看到有什么问题需要解决。


On the contrary, the University of Chicago’s Eugene Fama has described the notion that finance theory was at fault as “a fantasy,” and argues that “financial markets and financial institutions were casualties rather than causes of the recession.”	与此相反，芝加哥大学尤金·法玛（Eugene Fama）阐述了一个理念，认为金融理论其实跟一个 “空想”那样谬误，并认为“金融市场和金融机构不是经济衰退的始作俑者，而是受害者。


And the efficient-market hypothesis that he championed cannot be blamed, because “most investing is done by active managers who don’t believe that markets are efficient.”	”他认为自己捍卫的有效市场假说不应受到指责，因为“大部分投资都是由那些不相信市场有效性的激进型资金管理者所做出的。 ”


This amounts to what we might call an “irrelevance” defense: Finance theorists cannot be held responsible, since no one in the real world pays attention to them!	这就是我们可能称之为“非相关性”的辩护：原来金融理论家们可以不负责任，是因为没有人在现实世界里关注他们！


Fortunately, others in the profession do aspire to relevance, and they have been chastened by the events of the last five years, when price movements that the models predicted should occur once in a million years were observed several times a week.	所幸的是该领域的其他专家确实希望追寻其中的关联，也经历了五年的历练。 在这五年里，经济模型所预测的那些一百万年才发生一次的价格运动在一周内就能出现几次。


They are working hard to understand why, and to develop new approaches to measuring and monitoring risk, which is the main current concern of many banks.	他们正在努力追根溯源，并创造新的方法来测量和监控风险，这也是目前许多银行所关注的主要问题。


These efforts are arguably as important as the specific and detailed regulatory changes about which we hear much more.	这些努力无疑与我们更多听说到的那些具体详细的监管政策变化同样重要。


Our approach to regulation in the past was based on the assumption that financial markets could to a large extent be left to themselves, and that financial institutions and their boards were best placed to control risk and defend their firms.	我们过去对控制的理解依据的假设是，金融市场可以在最大程度上自行运作，而金融机构及其董事会就是控制风险和保护自己企业的最佳人选。


These assumptions took a hard hit in the crisis, causing an abrupt shift to far more intrusive regulation.	这些假设在经济危机中遭受了致命打击，导致突然转向更具干预性的监管。


Finding a new and stable relationship between the financial authorities and private firms will depend crucially on a reworking of our intellectual models.	能否在金融机构和私营企业之间寻找一个崭新和稳定的关系，关键取决于我们的知识模型改造。


So the Bank of England is right to issue a call to arms. Economists would be right to heed it.	因此英格兰银行完全应该发出战斗的号令，而经济学家们也应该群起响应。


The Global Economy’s Hesitation Blues	全球经济的犹豫蓝调


NEW HAVEN – Economic slowdowns can often be characterized as periods of hesitation.	纽黑文—经济减速常常伴随着犹豫时代（periods of hesitation）。


Consumers hesitate to buy a new house or car, thinking that the old house or car will do just fine for a while longer.	消费者犹豫购买新房或新车，想着老房子和老车还能好好地用一段时间。


Managers hesitate to expand their workforce, buy a new office building, or build a new factory, waiting for news that will make them stop worrying about committing to new ideas.	管理者犹豫扩大招聘、购买新办公楼或建造新工厂，等待能让他们不再担忧落实新概念的消息。


Viewed from this perspective, how worried should we be about the effects of hesitation today?	从这个角度看，我们应该对今天的 犹豫的影响保持多大的担忧？


Hesitation is often like procrastination.	犹豫常常很像拖延。


One may have vague doubts and feel a need to mull things over; meanwhile, other issues intrude on thought and no decision is taken.	你也许有一种说不清的怀疑，觉得需要再好好想想； 与此同时，其他问题困扰着你的思考，让你做不出决定。


Ask people why they procrastinate, and you probably won’t get a crisp answer.	如果你问人们为何拖延，很有可能得不到干脆的回答。


So how does such behavior become sufficiently widespread to bring about an economic slump?	那么，这样的行为是如何普遍到足以让经济衰退的？


In fact, the reasons for postponing activities that would stimulate the economy may be difficult to discern.	事实上，暂停刺激经济活动的原因可能很难识别。


One thinks first of feedback from others who are hesitating.	首先想到的是来自其他人正在犹豫的反馈。


Income effects and crowd psychology may amplify individual vacillation.	收入效应和群体心理可能放大个体犹豫。


But there must have been some initial factor that started the feedback cycle – some underlying source of hesitation.	但必须有某种初始因素启动反馈环——某种犹豫的基本原因。


Loss of economic “confidence” is one possible cause.	失去经济“信心”或是其中之一。


Published confidence indices, available since the 1950s, are based on polls that ask consumers or businesspeople about their perceptions of business activity and expectations of future income and employment.	20世纪50年代开始公开发布的信心指数以调查为基础，消费者和商界人士被询问关于商业活动和未来收入和就业预期的感觉。


“Uncertainty” about economic policy is another possible source of hesitation.	关于经济政策的“不确定性”是另一个可能的由于原因。


If businesspeople don’t know what regulations, taxes, or worse, nationalizations, will be coming, they may dither.	如果商界人士不知道将面临何种规则、税收或更糟糕的国有化，他们就有可能出现犹豫。


The idea is an old one, expressed during the Great Depression of the 1930s; but it was not measured well, at least until recently.	这是一个很古老的概念，在20世纪30年代大萧条期间提出； 但这一概念没有得到很好的度量，至少直到最近是如此。


In a 2015 working paper, the economists Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis constructed Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) indices for a dozen countries using digital news archives.	在2015年的工作论文中，经济学家斯科特·贝克尔（Scott R. Baker）、尼古拉斯·布鲁姆（Nicholas Bloom）和史蒂文·戴维斯（Steven J.


The indices (covering Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, South Korea, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States) were created by counting the number of newspaper articles in each country and each month that had the trifecta of terms “economy” (E), policy” (P) and “uncertainty” (U).	Davis）利用数字新闻档案为几十个国家构建了经济政策不确定性（EPU）指数。 该指数覆盖加拿大、中国、法国、德国、印度、意大利、日本、俄罗斯、韩国、西班牙、英国和美国，构造方法为计算每个国家每个月包含“经济”（E）、“政策”（P）和“不确定性”（U）三词的报纸文章数量。


The index each month was the total number of articles with those three words, divided by the total number of articles in the targeted newspapers each month.	该指数的月度读数为包含这三个词的文章总数，除以目标报纸每月文章总数。


Native speakers in each country were consulted on the appropriate translations of the three words.	请各国母语使用者对这三个词进行合适的翻译。


The indices spanned decades, and in two countries, the US and the UK, went all the way back to 1900.	该指数覆盖数十年，美国和英国更是追溯到1900年。


The US index correlates with implied equity-price volatility in the options markets (VIX).	美国的指数与期权市场隐含股价波动率（VIX）相关。


They found that their EPU index foreshadows economic contractions in the 12 countries, and that for the two countries with long-term indices, the EPU values were high during the Great Depression.	三名经济学家发现，他们的EPU指数先行于12个国家的经济收缩，在具备长期指数的两个国家中，EPU值在大萧条期间相当高。


But do contractions cause uncertainty, they ask, or does uncertainty cause contractions?	但到底是收缩引起了不确定性，还是不确定性引起了收缩？


Given that we know that people are highly reactive to each other, the causality most likely runs both ways, in a feedback loop.	考虑到我们知道人们彼此存在高度互动，其中的因果关系很有可能是双向的，形成了一个反馈环。


The deeper and more interesting question concerns what initiates this uncertainty.	更深刻也更有趣的问题是什么启动了这一不确定性。


To answer it requires impressionistic characterizations of the extant stories and ideas that might influence public thinking – or avoidance of thinking – about the economy.	要回答这个问题，需要可能影响公众对经济的思考——或避免思考——的现有叙事和观念的大致特征（impressionistic characterizations）。


As for the Great Depression, one wonders if the high degree of EPU was linked to social trends after the excesses of the 1920s, fueling fear of Communism and, in the United States, of the New Deal.	对于大萧条，你也许会好奇高EPU值是否与20世纪20年代的过剩之后的社会趋势有关，它助长了对共产主义以及（在美国）对新政的担忧。


One wonders if fear of fascist regimes, and of a coming war, prolonged the depression after Hitler came to power in 1933.	你也许会好奇1933年希特勒掌权后对法西斯政权以及即将到来的战争的担忧是否延长了萧条。


The attention devoted to Johannes Steele’s 1934 book The Second World War, which predicted that eponymous event, indicates that fear of war must have been talked about enough to underpin some hesitation.	对预言了同名事件的约翰内斯·斯蒂尔（Johannes Steele）1934年的著作《第二次世界大战》（The Second World War）的关注表明，对大战的担忧一定获得了大量的讨论，足以导致某些犹豫。


To people who lived through World War I, the thought of a sequel must have seemed nightmarish.	对于活过第一次世界大战的人来说，再来一次大战的想法简直是一场噩梦。


Of course, whether the Great Depression was really prolonged by these stories or ideas cannot be proved.	当然，大萧条是否真的因为这些叙事或观念而延长是无法证明的。


How do we know which stories were affecting people’s thinking?	我们如何知道哪些叙事影响了人们的思考？


On the other hand, we can be fairly certain that some of these stories really do affect perceived economic uncertainty.	另一方面，我们相当确定这些叙事中的一些确实影响了人们对经济不确定性的感觉。


Psychologists have shown that people display an “affect heuristic,” or a tendency to tag memories with emotions and to let those emotions affect decision-making, even when the decision is unrelated to what caused the emotions.	经济学家证明，人会表现出一种“情绪启发式”（affect heuristic），即用情感给记忆贴标签并让这些情绪影响决策的倾向，即使决策与引起情绪的原因没有关系。


A mismatch of emotions can cause executive dysfunction, a failure to act, hesitation.	情绪错配可能导致执行功能障碍（executive dysfunction）、无法行动，即犹豫。


Some kinds of stories circulating today – related to growing nationalism or fear of challenges by immigrants to traditional cultural values – might underpin greater hesitation.	一些类型的叙事在流传在当下——与日益兴盛的民族主义或担心移民对传统文化价值观带来的挑战有关——它们可能造成更大的犹豫。


The Brexit vote in the United Kingdom last month has been viewed worldwide with extraordinary alarm as a signal of political instability.	英国上个月的“脱欧”投票被全世界视为政治动荡的一个及其显著的警示信号。


The rising incidence of terrorism has added a vivid emotional edge to such developments.	恐怖主义的日益频发又给这一趋势平添了生动的情绪面。


Will these fears fuel enough economic hesitation to bring on another worldwide recession?	这些担忧会产生足够的经济犹豫导致世界再次陷入衰退吗？


Any answer at this time would be impressionistic and imprecise.	此次的任何答案都将是大致而不精确的。


Given the importance of the consequences, however, we should not shrink from considering how such fears are affecting economic decision-making.	但是，由于后果极其重要，我们不能畏惧思考这些担忧怎样影响着经济决策。


Nobel Economics Versus Social Democracy	诺贝尔经济学奖与社会民主


OXFORD – Of the elites who manage modern society, only economists have a Nobel Prize, whose latest recipients, Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, have just been announced.	牛津—在现代社会管理精英中，只有经济学家有诺贝尔奖可得，刚刚宣布的最新获奖者是奥利佛·哈特（Oliver Hart）和班特·霍尔斯特罗姆（Bengt Holmström）。


Whatever the reason for economists’ unique status, the halo conferred by the prize can – and often has – lend credibility to policies that harm the public interest, for example by driving inequality and making financial crises more likely.	不管经济学家获得如此独特地位的原因何在，诺贝尔奖光环可以也确实常常让有害于公共利益——比如推动不平等和增加造成金融危机的可能性——的政策获得信誉。


But economics does not have the field entirely to itself.	但经济学并非一家独大。


A different view of the world guides the allocation of about 30% of GDP – for employment, health care, education, and pensions – in most developed countries.	一种不同的世界观将大约30%的GDP——用于就业、医疗、教育和退休金——配置给了最发达国家。


This view about how society should be managed – social democracy – is not only a political orientation; it is also a method of government.	这一关于应该如何管理社会的观点——社会民主不但是一种政治方向，它也是一种治国之道。


Standard economics assumes that society is driven by self-seeking individuals trading in markets, whose choices scale up to an efficient state via the “invisible hand.”	标准经济学假设社会由自利个体组成，他们在市场中交易，他们的选择通过“看不见的手”放大成一种效率状态（efficient state）。


But this doctrine is not well founded in either theory or practice: its premises are unrealistic, the models it supports are inconsistent, and the predictions it produces are often wrong.	但这一信条在理论和实践中都不太稳固：其前提条件并不现实，其所支持的模式自相矛盾，其产生的预测常常出错。


The Nobel Prize in economics was endowed by Sweden’s central bank, the Riksbank, in 1968.	诺贝尔经济学奖由瑞典央行在1968年赞助成立。


The timing was not an accident.	这一时间不是巧合。


The new prize arose from a longstanding conflict between the interests of the better off in stable prices and the interests of everybody else in reducing insecurity by means of taxation, social investment, and transfers.	这项新奖项产生于一个由来已久的冲突：一方是富裕阶层（better off）的利益，即物价稳定； 另一方是其他所有人的利益，即通过税收、社会投资和转移支付等手段降低不安全感。


The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences awarded the prize, but Sweden was also an advanced social democracy.	瑞典皇家学院（Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences）颁发该奖项，但瑞典同时也是发达的社会民主国家。


During the 1950s and 1960s, the Riksbank clashed with Sweden’s government over the management of credit.	20世纪五六十年代，瑞典央行与瑞典政府就如何管理信用的问题出现了冲突。


Governments gave priority to employment and housing; the Riksbank, led by an assertive governor, Per Åsbrink, worried about inflation.	政府的重点是就业和住房； 而坚定的佩尔·奥斯布林克（Per Åsbrink）领导的瑞典央行担心通货膨胀。


As recompense for restrictions on its authority, the Riksbank was eventually allowed to endow a Nobel Prize in economics as a vanity project for its tercentenary.	作为权限受限所获得的补偿，最后瑞典央行在其成立三百周年之际获得了赞助一项诺贝尔奖的殊荣。


Within the Academy of Sciences, a group of center-right economists captured the process of selecting prizewinners.	在皇家学院内部，一群中右翼经济学家把持着遴选获奖者的流程。


The laureates comprised a high-quality sample of economics scholarship.	获奖者均为顶尖经济学者。


An analysis of their influence, inclinations, and biases indicates that the Nobel committee kept up an appearance of fairness through a rigid balance between right and left, formalists and empiricists, Chicago School and Keynesian.	一项对他们的影响、倾向和偏见的分析表明，诺贝尔奖委员会通过左与右、形式和经验、芝加哥学派和凯恩斯主义之间的僵化平衡保持公平的表象。


But our research indicates that professional economists, on the whole, are more broadly inclined toward the left.	但我们的研究表明，职业经济学家总体而言广泛地左倾。


The prize kingmaker was Stockholm University economist Assar Lindbeck, who had turned away from social democracy.	诺贝尔经济学奖的最高决定者是斯托克霍姆大学经济学家阿萨尔·林德贝克（Assar Lindbeck），他以前是社会民主中人。


During the 1970s and 1980s, Lindbeck intervened in Swedish elections, invoked microeconomic theory against social democracy, and warned that high taxation and full employment led to disaster.	20世纪七八十年代，林德贝克干预瑞典选举，援引微观经济学理论对抗社会民主，并警告说高税收和充分就业导致灾难。


His interventions diverted attention from the grave policy error being made at the time: deregulation of credit, which led to a deep financial crisis in the 1990s and anticipated the global crisis that erupted in 2008.	他的干预将人们的注意力从当时所犯的巨大的政策错误上引开：信用去监管，它导致了20世纪90年代的深度金融危机，也是2008年爆发的全球危机的先声。


Lindbeck’s concerns were similar to those of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the US Treasury.	林德贝克的关注点与国际货币基金组织（IMF）、世界银行以及美国财政部类似。


These actors’ insistence on privatization, deregulation, and liberalization of capital markets and trade – the so-called Washington Consensus – enriched business and financial elites, led to acute crises, and undermined emerging economies’ growth.	这些行动方坚持私有化、去监管化以及资本市场和贸易的自由化——即所谓的华盛顿共识——这套政策肥了商界和金融精英，导致了剧烈的危机，也破坏了新兴经济体增长。


In the West, the priority accorded to the individualist self-regarding norms underlying the Washington Consensus created a nurturing environment for growth in corruption, inequality, and mistrust in governing elites – the unintended consequences of rational-choice, me-first premises.	在西方，根据作为华盛顿共识的基础的个人主义自利范式制定的重点为腐败、不平等以及对执政精英的不信任制造了温床——这也是理性选择、自我第一假设的意料之外的后果。


With the emergence in advanced economies of disorders previously associated with developing countries, Swedish political scientist Bo Rothstein has petitioned the Academy of Sciences (of which he is a member) to suspend the Nobel Prize in economics until such consequences are investigated.	随着发达经济体爆发此前发展中国家专属的失序，瑞典政治学家波·罗斯坦因（Bo Rothstein）要求瑞典皇家学院（他也是院士之一）暂停诺贝尔��济学奖直至查清这些后果。


Social democracy is not as deeply theorized as economics.	社会民主的理论化不如经济学深刻。