This underscores the case for a second area of action – ensuring that developing countries, including least-developed countries, have a greater say in global financial institutions, and strengthening regional bodies such as the African Development Bank.	这就强调了第二个方面的行动——保证发展中国家，包括那些最不发达的国家，都能在全球金融机构中获得更大的发言权，并加强非洲发展银行等区域组织的作用。


An equitable and fair global architecture means not only giving a greater say to the major emerging economies. It also means systematically including other developing countries.	一个公平合理的全球金融体系不仅意味着给主要的新兴经济体更大的发言权，也意味着系统地将其他发展中国家囊括在内。


The Bretton Woods Institutions such as the World Bank and IMF themselves recognize that becoming more inclusive would make them more relevant to the reality and diversity of today’s global community and more effective as vehicles for addressing climate change adaptation and poverty reduction.	那些源自于布雷顿森林体系的机构，比如世界银行和国际货币基金组织均认识到，获得比过去更强的包容性将会令他们与当今全球经济体的现实和多样性紧密结合，并能��自身转化成为一个应对气候变迁和减少贫困的更有效工具。


But the pace of change needs to be speeded up, ensuring that the IMF in particular is able to adapt to post-crisis challenges.	但是这样的变化进程需要提速才能确保类似国际货币基金组织的机构有能力去适应金融危机之后的众多挑战。


This calls for a broadening of the IMF’s surveillance mandate beyond macroeconomic and monetary policies so that it can deal with wider financial and regulatory issues.  It means establishing a very high-level political council to take strategic decisions critical to global stability.  And it also requires reforming the voting system to ensure decisions command the support of the majority of members.	已经有呼声要求放宽国际货币基金组织的监督权，使其不仅限于宏观经济和货币政策，以便能够处理更大范围的金融和监管问题。 这就意味着要建立一个级别非常高的政治委员会来作出对全球稳定至关重要的决策。


Architectural and institutional reform has to be complemented by a third achievement: agreement on a timetable for tackling the variety of biased trade rules, bloated subsidy regimes, intellectual property rules and other forms of market distortion which heavily disadvantage the developing world.	架构和制度改革必须有第三方面的成果作为支撑：必须有一个得到各方认可的时间表来处理各种被扭曲的贸易条例，滥发政府补贴，知识产权法规以及其他对发展中国家大为不利的市场干预行为。


Here the G-20 could play a particularly constructive role, especially when it comes to the revival of the Doha Trade Round, the reduction of duties, tariffs and quotas on exports from the least-developed countries, and the gradual elimination of domestic subsidies.	在此G20可以扮演一个特别有建设性的角色，尤其是当世贸多哈回合谈判重新启动，削减针对最不发达国家的出口特别税，关税和配额，并逐步取消组织各国的国内补贴。


Lastly, the G-20 could also help drive momentum on climate change.	最后，G20组织也可成为应对气候变化问题的助推动力。


Its members represent the vast majority of global greenhouse gas emissions; agreement among them at Pittsburgh would go a long way towards ensuring that December’s international Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen does not end in hot air.	因为其成员国涵盖了大多数温室气体排放大国； 各成员国在组织内部形成的共识将大大有助于12月的哥本哈根世界气候变化会议取得成功。


Progress is needed on emission-reduction targets and on sharing knowledge and technology more widely.	世界各国必须在减排目标方面以及分享减排知识和技术方面取得进展。


We also have to find a way to provide funding for adaptation and mitigation – to protect people from the impact of climate change and enable economies to grow while holding down pollution levels – while guarding against trade protection in the name of climate change mitigation.	而我们也必须为适应和减缓政策提供资金——以保护人们不受气候变化的影响并保证在减低污染程度的同时能取得经济发展——而且还要提防那些打着减缓气候变化措施旗号的贸易保护政策。


The challenges of our time are many, complex and intertwined.	我们这个时代确实挑战良多，而且更加错综复杂。


The G-20 in London was responsive to the concerns and special circumstances of the developing world, which resulted in some big thinking.	G20组织的伦敦峰会对发展中国家所关心的问题和特殊状况作出了响应，并随之催生了许多伟大的构想。


Sceptics fear that now that the collective financial threat is perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be manageable, the Pittsburgh Summit will result in a weak compromise that reflects divergent national interests rather than a sense of urgency about tackling climate change, chronic poverty and ineffective global governance.	怀疑者害怕目前许多国家会认为集体性的金融威胁已经是可以控制的了（这一看法的对错还不得而知），而匹兹堡峰将因此而变成各国间不同利益追求的虚弱妥协，而不是对气候变化，长期贫困和低效率全球管制的积极应对。


G-20 leaders need again to manage difficult domestic pressures, overcome narrow agendas and resist populist temptations – and prove the sceptics wrong.	G20的领袖们需要再度处理棘手的国内压力，走出狭隘的议题并抵受住民粹主义的诱惑——以证明那些怀疑论者都是大错特错了。


No to Green Fundamentalism	拒绝绿色原教旨主义


BORDEAUX – Climatology and its emphasis on global warming is a comparatively recent addition to science.	波尔多——气候学和其中有关全球变暖方面的研究是现代科学相对较新的分支。


Yet, despite the relative youth of this research, a clear consensus has emerged: climate change – for which human activity is significantly, though not exclusively, responsible – now threatens our way of life, so we must develop the means to combat it.	尽管这项研究历时较短，但已经达成了明确的共识：气候变化已经威胁到我们的生存方式，人类活动是造成气候变化重要，但不是唯一的原因，我们必须找到新的办法应对气候变化的威胁。


But I also believe that the fundamentalist approach that can be sensed in certain circles is skirting the limits of the acceptable.	但是我也相信某些领域内显露出来的原教旨主义做法已经越过了忍耐的限度。


How can fundamentalists advocate limiting economic growth as a solution to the problem of global warming when there are men, women, and children in their hundreds of millions, all over the world, who still lead lives of abject poverty and are in desperate need of help?	原教旨主义者怎么能在全球数以亿万计的男人、妇女和儿童仍然过着赤贫的生活并迫切需要帮助的情况下鼓吹用限制经济发展的方法来解决全球变暖问题？


People in poor parts of the world have a right to economic development so that they can produce their own food, gain access to clean water, live in adequate shelter, and have all the benefits represented by hospitals and schools.	生活在贫困地区的群众有权享受经济发展，这样他们就可以自己生产粮食、使用清洁水源、建设住房、并享受医院和学校带来的所有福利。


These are essential human rights, and they can be realized only through economic growth, not stagnation.	这些都是基本人权的组成部分，停滞于事无补，它们只有通过经济发展才能变成现实。


At the twentieth century’s start, only one person in ten lived in a town or city.	二十世纪初期，只有十分之一的人口生活在城镇或城市。


Today that figure is one in two – 3.3 billion people, according to United Nations statistics – and the percentage of urban dwellers is expected to reach 70% by 2050.	今天上述比例已经达到二分之一——根据联合国统计数据为33亿人——而城市居民的比例预计会在2050年达到70%。


Cities, then, represent the most important development challenge of all.	到那时，城市就会成为最重要的发展难题。


As cities continue to grow and spread across the world, reducing energy consumption and improving our quality of life require us to ensure that their inhabitants can travel relatively short distances to work	随着世界范围内城市区域的不断扩大，降低能耗和改善生活质量要求我们缩短城市居民的通勤距离。


The common expression in France that great rivers are created out of tiny streams captures the sort of strategy for countering global warming through sustainable development that I believe could be effective.	法国有句俗语叫涓涓细流汇成大河，在我看来这恰恰抓住了通过可持续发展应对全球变暖问题的战略实质。


Local actions that are then developed as part of an exchange between cities could have a global impact in the long term.	作为城市交流组成部分的区域措施从长远看可能会造成全球性的影响。


That is why I am keen to encourage local initiatives that have a global perspective.	因此我极力鼓励能够放眼全球的地方性倡议。


Among the issues raised at the Copenhagen climate conference last December was the EU member states’ failure to perfect a post-Kyoto international system for fighting global warming.	欧盟成员国未能成功完善应对全球变暖的后京都国际体系是去年十二月哥本哈根气候会议的议题之一。


Fortunately, though, things have changed since then, with the 110 countries responsible for 80% of greenhouse-gas emissions – including India, China, and Brazil – now giving their support to the Copenhagen agreement.	幸运的是，现在情况已经发生了改变，占温室气体排放量80%的110个国家——包括印度、中国和巴西——已经同意支持哥本哈根协议。


But it is important not to stop there.	但关键还是要再接再厉。


We must try to ensure that future climate-change meetings, like the Cancún summit this winter, are fully exploited as an opportunity to transform well-intentioned declarations into international agreements that apply to developed and developing countries alike.	我们必须保证未来的气候变化会议，比如说今冬的坎昆峰会，能够充分地将善意声明转化为对发达和发展中国家同样适用的国际协议。


The Copenhagen agreement envisages the world’s industrialized nations financing emissions reduction and other necessary adjustments in developing countries through a $30 billion aid package, which will rise to $100 billion between now and 2020.	哥本哈根协议设想世界工业化国家通过300亿美元的援助计划资助发展中国家的减排和其他必要调整措施，援助计划的金额从现在到2020年这段期间将增加到1000亿美元。


But the agreement fails to specify who will undertake what costs.	但协议未能明确规定将由谁来承担上述开支。


Instead, the agreement limits itself to responding to the widely accepted goal of keeping carbon-dioxide levels below 450 parts per million, and the rise in average global temperature below 2°C. But are these targets realistic?	反之，协议内容局限在回应普遍接受的将二氧化碳排放量限制在百万分之四百五十，以及将全球平均升温幅度控制在2°C以内的目标。 但这样的目标是否现实？


If not, we must bear in mind the warning of the Stern Report that failure to act now would make taking action in the future much more costly.	如果不现实，我们必须记住《斯特恩报告》的警告，现在不采取措施将使未来付出的代价更加昂贵。


That all countries taking part in the political process on climate change should be treated equally has ensured that Europe still exerts a good deal of influence.	平等对待参与气候变化政治进程的所有国家的原则能够确保欧洲仍然能发挥相当的影响力。


Things have clearly moved on from Copenhagen, when the priority was to reach agreement between those countries that have been chiefly responsible for global warming.	现在与哥本哈根时期相比已经取得了显著的进步，当时的重点是在对全球变暖负主要责任的国家之间达成协议。


And if my own country, France, has failed to set a good example to developing countries by equivocating over the terms of a carbon tax, then perhaps the time has come for its national carbon footprint to be linked with the European trading system for CO2.	如果我的祖国法国在征收碳税的问题上含糊其辞，不能为发展中国家树立好的榜样，那么也许是时候把国内碳足迹与欧洲二氧化碳交易系统联系在一起。


The sad truth, though, is that the solution of mixing quotas and taxes will not deliver results quickly enough to bring about a genuine and immediate move to low-carbon or even carbon-free economies.	但令人难过的是配额与税收相结合的解决方案无法迅速地产生结果，朝着低碳甚至是无碳经济立即迈出坚实一步的愿望很难变成现实。


Ever since Copenhagen, a majority of the main greenhouse-gas-emitting countries have been setting out ambitious goals – without hedging them with restrictive conditions.	哥本哈根会议后，绝大多数主要温室气体排放国都已经制定了不附带任何限制条件的雄心勃勃的计划。


At the same time, new mechanisms are being put in place to measure and evaluate emissions, which will allow much clearer comparisons between countries.	与此同时，衡量和评估排放量的全新机制也已经到位，这样就可以在各国之间进行明确的对比。


What remains to be done is to share these efforts in a way that is fair and manageable for all countries.	接下来还要完成的就是以对所有国家公平、并且便于管理的方式共同分享上述努力。


Will we, then, manage to sign a legal and binding agreement in Cancún?	那么我们能否在坎昆签订具有法律约束力的协议？


Will we be able to implement cooperation mechanisms between countries such as the UN’s Collaborative Program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries – the REDD program – so as to prevent deforestation and encourage technology transfer and financing?	我们能否在减少发展中国家毁林和森林退化所致排放量的联合国合作计划（REDD计划）缔约国间实施合作机制，从而防止森林砍伐，并鼓励技术和资金转移？


This is the real challenge, and although it may prove ambitious, many countries will arrive at the Cancún conference with renewed hope for the future, thanks to the progress made since Copenhagen.	这无疑是一个真正的难题，但多亏哥本哈根以来取得的进展，尽管完成任务或许难度很大，许多国家仍然会怀揣着对未来的希望来参加坎昆会议。


Markets’ Rational Complacency	市场的理性自满


NEW YORK – An increasingly obvious paradox has emerged in global financial markets this year.	纽约—今年，全球金融市场出现了一个日益明显的悖论。


Though geopolitical risks – the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the rise of the Islamic State and growing turmoil across the Middle East, China’s territorial disputes with its neighbors, and now mass protests in Hong Kong and the risk of a crackdown – have multiplied, markets have remained buoyant, if not downright bubbly.	尽管地缘政治风险四起——俄罗斯-乌克兰冲突、伊斯兰国崛起和中东日益动荡、中国与邻国的领土纠纷，再加上眼下的香港群众游行和镇压风险——但市场仍然欢腾不止。


Indeed, oil prices have been falling, not rising.	事实上，石油价格一直在下跌而非上涨。


Global stock markets have, overall, reached new highs.	总体而言，全球股票市场创出了新的高度。


And credit markets show low spreads, while long-term bond yields have fallen in most advanced economies.	信用市场也表现出低利差，大部分发达经济体的长期债券收益率都有所下降。


Yes, financial markets in troubled countries – for example, Russia’s currency, equity, and bond markets – have been negatively affected.	诚然，麻烦国的金融市场——比如俄罗斯的货币、股票和债券市场——受到了消极影响。


But the more generalized contagion to global financial markets that geopolitical tensions typically engender has failed to materialize.	但地缘政治紧张局势以往常有的全球金融市场传染性并未出现。


Why the indifference?	是什么让全球金融市场无动于衷？


Are investors too complacent, or is their apparent lack of concern rational, given that the actual economic and financial impact of current geopolitical risks – at least so far – has been modest?	是投资者过于自满了吗？ 或者，考虑到当前地缘政治风险至少到目前为止实际经济和金融影响颇为有限，投资者显而易见的莫不关系是理性的吗？


Global markets have not reacted for several reasons.	全球市场没有反应，原因很多。


For starters, central banks in advanced economies (the United States, the eurozone, the United Kingdom, and Japan) are holding policy rates near zero, and long-term interest rates have been kept low.	首先，发达经济体的央行（美国、欧元区、英国和日本）将政策利率保持在近零水平，长期利率也保持低位。


This is boosting the prices of other risky assets such as equities and credit.	这提振了股票和信用等其他风险资产的价格。


Second, markets have taken the view that the Russia-Ukraine conflict will remain contained, rather than escalating into a full-scale war.	其次，市场认为俄罗���-乌克兰冲突将保持克制，不会演变为全方位战争。


So, though sanctions and counter-sanctions between the West and Russia have increased, they are not causing significant economic and financial damage to the European Union or the US.	因此，尽管西方和俄罗斯之间的制裁和反制裁日益增加，但并没有给欧盟或美国造成重大经济和金融伤害。


More important, Russia has not cut off natural-gas supplies to Western Europe, which would be a major shock for gas-dependent EU economies.	更重要的是，俄罗斯没有减少对西欧的天然气供给，否则依赖俄罗斯天然气的欧盟经济体将遭受重创。


Third, the turmoil in the Middle East has not triggered a massive shock to oil supplies and prices like those that occurred in 1973, 1979, or 1990.	第四，中东动荡没有像1973、1979或1990年那样导致大规模石油供给和价格冲击。


On the contrary, there is excess capacity in global oil markets.	相反，全球石油市场处于产能过剩状态。


Iraq may be in trouble, but about 90% of its oil is produced in the south, near Basra, which is fully under Shia control, or in the north, under the control of the Kurds.	伊拉克也许麻烦重重，但其90%左右的石油产自什叶派完全控制的南部巴格达附近或库尔德人控制的北部。


Only about 10% is produced near Mosul, now under the control of the Islamic State.	只有大约10%的石油产于目前被伊斯兰国控制的摩苏尔附近。


Finally, the one Middle East conflict that could cause oil prices to spike – a war between Israel and Iran – is a risk that, for now, is contained by ongoing international negotiations with Iran to contain its nuclear program.	最后，可能引起油价飙升的中东冲突——以色列和伊朗开战——其风险目前被进行中的遏制伊朗核计划的国际谈判所遏制。


So there appear to be good reasons why global markets so far have reacted benignly to today’s geopolitical risks.	因此，如今全球市场对地缘政治风险反应冷淡似乎很有道理。


What could change that?	哪些因素有可能改变这一局面？


Several scenarios come to mind.	几种情形出现在脑海中。


First, the Middle East turmoil could affect global markets if one or more terrorist attack were to occur in Europe or the US – a plausible development, given that several hundred Islamic State jihadists are reported to have European or US passports.	首先，如果在欧洲或美国发生一起或多起恐怖袭击——这有着相当的可能性，据说数百伊斯兰国圣战者拥有欧洲或美国护照——则中东动荡可能影响全球市场。


Markets tend to disregard the risks of events whose probability is hard to assess but that have a major impact on confidence when they do occur.	市场总是无视概率难以评估、但一旦发生将对信心造成重大打击的事件的风险。


Thus, a surprise terrorist attack could unnerve global markets.	因此，出人意料的恐怖袭击可能令全球市场惊慌失措。


Second, markets could be incorrect in their assessment that conflicts like that between Russia and Ukraine, or Syria’s civil war, will not escalate or spread.	其次，市场可能对俄罗斯-乌克兰冲突或叙利亚内战等冲突存在误判，错误地认为它们不会升级或蔓延。


Russian President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy may become more aggressive in response to challenges to his power at home, while Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey are all being destabilized by Syria’s ongoing meltdown.	为了应对国内权力挑战，俄罗斯总统普京的外交政策可能变得更加激进，而约旦、黎巴嫩和土耳其都因为叙利亚的崩溃而正在受到冲击。


Third, geopolitical and political tensions are more likely to trigger global contagion when a systemic factor shaping the global economy comes into play.	第三，如果决定全球经济的系统性因素发生作用，那么地缘政治和政治紧张就更有可能引起全球传染。


For example, the mini-perfect storm that roiled emerging markets earlier this year – even spilling over for a while to advanced economies – occurred when political turbulence in a few countries (Turkey, Thailand, and Argentina) met bad news about Chinese growth.	比如，今年早些时候就发生了席卷新兴市场、甚至一度蔓延到经济体的迷你完美风暴。 当时，一些国家的政治动荡（土耳其、泰国和阿根廷）和关于中国增长的坏消息形成了共振。


China, with its systemic importance, was the match that ignited a tinderbox of regional and local uncertainty.	具有系统重要性的中国成为点燃地区和地方不确定性火药桶的火柴。


Today (or soon), the situation in Hong Kong, together with the news of further weakening in the Chinese economy, could trigger global financial havoc.	如今（或不久的将来），香港局势以及中国经济进一步萎靡的消息可能触发全球金融大破坏。


Or the US Federal Reserve could spark financial contagion by exiting zero rates sooner and faster than markets expect.	或者美联储也有可能因为比市场预期的更早更快地退出零利率而引发金融传染。


Or the eurozone could relapse into recession and crisis, reviving the risk of redenomination in the event that the monetary union breaks up.	又或者欧元区可能再度发生衰退和危机，重燃货币联盟解体引发的重新计价风险。


The interaction of any of these global factors with a variety of regional and local sources of geopolitical tension could be dangerously combustible.	这些全球因素与各种地区和地方地缘政治紧张因素的相互作用可能引起极其危险的后果。


So, while global markets arguably have been rationally complacent, financial contagion cannot be ruled out.	因此，尽管全球市场的自满大致算得上有理有据，但金融传染的可能性并没有被排除。


A century ago, financial markets priced in a very low probability that a major conflict would occur, blissfully ignoring the risks that led to World War I until late in the summer of 1914.	一个世纪前，金融市场认为重大冲突发生的可能性极低，陷入了一片歌舞升平，直到1914年夏末才意识到导致了第一次世界大战的风险。


Back then, markets were poor at correctly pricing low-probability, high-impact tail risks.	当时，市场在考虑低概率、高影响的尾部风险方面表现十分差劲。


They still are.	今天仍然如此。


Gouging the Gauchos	讹诈南美牛仔


NEW YORK – Like individuals, corporations, and other private firms that rely on bankruptcy procedures to reduce an excessive debt burden, countries sometimes need orderly debt restructuring or reduction.	纽约—和依赖破产程序降低过高债务负担个人、公司和其他私人企业一样，国家有时也需要有序债务重组或减记。


But the ongoing legal saga of Argentina’s fight with holdout creditors shows that the international system for orderly sovereign-debt restructuring may be broken.	但阿根廷与债权人的旷日持久的法律扯皮表明，有序主权债务重组的国际体系可能已经崩溃。


Individuals, firms, or governments may end up with too much debt because of bad luck, bad decisions, or a combination of the two.	个人、企业或政府可能因为倒霉、决策失误或两者的共同作用陷入过度负债状态。


If you get a mortgage but then lose your job, you have bad luck.	如果你背负按揭，然后失了业，这就叫倒霉。


If your debt becomes unsustainable because you borrowed too much to take long vacations or buy expensive appliances, your bad behavior is to blame.	如果你的债务是由于你借了太多的钱休长假，或者由于你买了昂贵的电器，那么应该归咎于你行为不当。


The same applies to corporate firms: some have bad luck and their business plans fail, while others borrow too much to pay their mediocre managers excessively.	公司企业也是如此：一些企业的商业计划因为倒霉而失败，也有一些借了太多的钱给平庸的管理层开过高的薪酬。


Bad luck and bad behavior (policies) can also lead to unsustainable debt burdens for governments.	倒霉和坏行为（政策）也可能导致政府背上不可持续的债务负担。


If a country’s terms of trade (the price of its exports) deteriorate and a large recession persists for a long time, its government’s revenue base may shrink and its debt burden may become excessive.	如果一国的贸易条件（出口品价格）恶化，并且陷入了长期大规模衰退，其政府收入基础就有可能被削弱，其债务负担就会变得过高。


But an unsustainable debt burden may also result from borrowing to spend too much, failure to collect sufficient taxes, and other policies that undermine the economy’s growth potential.	但不可持续的债务负担也可能来自过度借钱消费、没能征得足够税收，或其他削弱经济增长潜力的政策。


When the debt burden of an individual, firm, or government is too high, legal systems need to provide orderly ways to reduce it to a more sustainable level (closer to the debtor’s potential income).	当个人、企业或政府的债务负担过高时，就需要法律体系提供有序方式将之下降到可持续水平（接近于债务人的潜在收入）。


If it is too easy to default and reduce one’s debt burden, the result is moral hazard, because debtors gain an incentive to indulge in bad behavior.	如果违约太容易并且能够降低你的债务负担，那么结果将是道德风险，因为债务人有了做出不当行为的激励。


But if it is too difficult to restructure and reduce debts when bad luck leads to unsustainable debts, the result is bad for both the debtor and its creditors, who are better off when a reduced debt ratio is serviced than when a debtor defaults.	但如果是倒霉导致了不可持续的债务水平，而重组并降低债务又太困难，结果对债务人和债权人都不利，对后者来说，债务比率下降比债务人违约���好。


Finding the right balance is not easy.	找到正确的平衡决非易事。


Formal legal bankruptcy regimes for individuals and firms have evolved over time to accomplish this.	个人和企业适用的正式法律破产机制在经历了长期演变后才达到了这一点。


Because a formal bankruptcy regime for governments does not exist (though Anne Krueger, the International Monetary Fund’s then-deputy managing director, proposed one more than a decade ago), countries have had to rely on a market-based approach to resolve excessive debt problems.	由于不存在适用政府的正式破产机制（尽管时任国际货币基金组织副总裁的安妮·克鲁格（Anne Krueger）在十年前曾提出过这样一套机制），各国不得不依靠基于市场的办法解决过度负债问题。


Following this approach, the country offers to exchange old bonds for new bonds with a lower face value and/or lower interest payments and longer maturities.	根据这一方法，债务国提出以较低面值和/或较低利息和较长期限的新债券代替旧债券。


If most investors accept this offer, the restructuring occurs successfully.	如果大部分投资者接受这一方案，重组就可以成功进行 。


But this implies a key problem: Whereas a bankruptcy court can force holdout creditors to accept the exchange offer as long as a significant majority of creditors have already done so (a so-called “cram down”), the market-based approach allows some creditors to continue to hold out and sue to be paid in full.	但这隐含着一个关键问题：尽管只要压倒多数债权人已经照办，破产法庭可以强迫不情愿的债权人接受债券替换条件（所谓的“强制执行”（cram down）），但基于市场的方法允许一些债权人坚持不就范，并诉诸法院要求足额偿付。


That is why, over the last decade, governments have augmented the market-based approach with a contractual approach that resolves the holdout problem by introducing collective-action clauses (CACs) that can also cram down on holdouts the terms accepted by a majority of creditors.	正因如此，在过去十年中，政府扩大了基于市场的方法，并通过引入集体诉讼条款解决债权人抵制问题。


These clauses became standard in sovereign bonds but were missing in those issued by Argentina before 2001, when the crisis hit.	集体诉讼条款可以强制执行大部分债权人接受的条件，已经成为主权债务的标准条款，但2001年危机爆发之前所发行的阿根廷债务并不包含此项条款。


Though 93% of Argentina’s creditors accepted new terms for their bonds in 2005 and 2010 in two exchange offers, a small group of holdouts sued Argentina in the United States, and, with the US Supreme Court recently ruling on the issue, have now won the right to be paid in full.	尽管93%的阿根廷债权人接受了2005年和2010年的两次债券替换条件，但一小撮抵制者在美国将阿根廷告上法庭，美国最高法院最近做出裁决，原告有权获得足额偿付。


The US court decision is dangerous for two reasons.	美国最高法院的裁决是危险的，原因有二。


First, the court ruled for the first time that a country cannot continue to pay those creditors who accepted a big reduction (or “haircut”) on their claims until the holdouts are paid in full.	首先，法院第一次裁定一国不能继续偿付接受大规模债务削减（或“剃头”（haircut））的债权人，除非抵制者已经获得足额偿付。


So, why would any future creditor who benefits from an orderly restructuring vote for it if its new claims can be blocked by even a single holdout creditor?	那么，哪怕只有一个债权人抵制，新债权就得不到偿付，既然如此，未来债权人能从支持有序重组中获得什么好处呢？


Second, if the holdouts are paid in full, the majority of creditors who accepted a haircut can request to be paid in full, too.	其次，如果抵制者获得足额偿付，大部分接受“剃头”的债权人也可以要求足额偿付。


If that happens, the country’s debt burden will surge again, become unsustainable, and force the government – in this case Argentina, which is servicing most of its debt – to default again on all creditors.	如果发生这一情形，该国债务负担就会再次激增，达到不可持续水平，迫使政府——在阿根廷的例子中，政府正在偿付大部分债务——对所有债权人违约。


The inclusion of CACs in new bond contracts may help other countries avoid the holdout problem in the future.	在新债券契约中包含集体诉讼条款或有助于其他国家在未来避免抵制问题。


But even CACs may not fully help, because they are designed in a way that still allows a small minority of creditors to hold out and thus prevent an orderly restructuring.	但即使有了集体诉讼条款也未必完全高枕无忧，因为根据集体诉讼条款的设计，仍允许少数债权人发动抵制，从而阻止有序重组。


Either super-CACs need to be designed and introduced (though it will take years to include them in all new bond contracts) or the international community may want to reconsider whether the 2002 IMF proposal for a formal bankruptcy court for sovereign borrowers should be resurrected.	我们需要设计并引入超级集体诉讼条款（不过将其纳入新债券契约需要多年时间），否则国际社会可能不得不重新考虑2002年IMF关于建立正式主权债务人破产法庭的方案。


Holdouts must not be permitted to block orderly restructurings that benefit debtors and creditors.	必须禁止阻碍对债务人和债权人有利的有序重组的抵制者。


The Great Backlash	大阻力


NEW YORK – In the immediate aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, policymakers’ success in preventing the Great Recession from turning into Great Depression II held in check demands for protectionist and inward-looking measures.	纽约—2008年，金融危机爆发后不久，决策者成功地阻止了大衰退滑向第二次大萧条，秘诀就在于阻止了保护主义者和内向政策的要求。


But now the backlash against globalization – and the freer movement of goods, services, capital, labor, and technology that came with it – has arrived.	但如今反对全球化——以及随之而来的商品、服务、资本、劳动力和技术的更自由的流动——的力量来临了。


This new nationalism takes different economic forms: trade barriers, asset protection, reaction against foreign direct investment, policies favoring domestic workers and firms, anti-immigration measures, state capitalism, and resource nationalism.	这一新民族主义具有不同的经济形式：贸易壁垒、资产保护、针对外国直接投资的行动、偏袒本国工人和企业的政策、反移民措施、国家资本主义以及资源民族主义。


In the political realm, populist, anti-globalization, anti-immigration, and in some cases outright racist and anti-Semitic parties are on the rise.	在政治领域，民粹主义、反全球化、反移民甚至赤裸裸的种族主义和反犹主义政党正在崛起。


These forces loathe the alphabet soup of supra-national governance institutions – the EU, the UN, the WTO, and the IMF, among others – that globalization requires.	这些势力厌恶超国家治理机构的缩写简称——EU（欧盟）、UN（联合国）、WTO（世界贸易组织）和IMF（国际货币基金组织）等——这些机构都是全球化的必要条件。


Even the Internet, the epitome of globalization for the past two decades, is at risk of being balkanized as more authoritarian countries – including China, Iran, Turkey, and Russia – seek to restrict access to social media and crack down on free expression.	甚至成为过去二十年全球化缩影的或联网也面临惨遭分割的前景，因为极权国家——包括中国、伊朗、土耳其和俄罗斯——试图限制社交媒体的接入和镇压言论自由。


The main causes of these trends are clear.	这些趋势的主要原因是明确的。


Anemic economic recovery has provided an opening for populist parties, promoting protectionist policies, to blame foreign trade and foreign workers for the prolonged malaise.	从美国经济复苏开始，宣扬保护主义措施的民粹主义政���指责对外贸易和外国工人是经济长期萎靡的罪魁。


Add to this the rise in income and wealth inequality in most countries, and it is no wonder that the perception of a winner-take-all economy that benefits only elites and distorts the political system has become widespread.	使之雪上加霜的是收入和财富不平等在大部分国家呈现加剧之势，更不用说赢家通吃经济所造成的只有精英才能从中获益的感觉和政治制度扭曲的日益普遍了。


Nowadays, both advanced economies (like the United States, where unlimited financing of elected officials by financially powerful business interests is simply legalized corruption) and emerging markets (where oligarchs often dominate the economy and the political system) seem to be run for the few.	如今，发达经济体（比如在美国，财大气粗的商业利益集团为当选官员提供取之不竭的资金，而这是合法的腐败）和新兴市场（通常由寡头住在经济和政治体系）似乎都在为极少数人服务。


For the many, by contrast, there has been only secular stagnation, with depressed employment and stagnating wages.	相反，对很多人来说，看到的只有长期停滞，萧条的就业和不见增长的工资。


The resulting economic insecurity for the working and middle classes is most acute in Europe and the eurozone, where in many countries populist parties – mainly on the far right – outperformed mainstream forces in last weekend’s European Parliament election.	由此造成的工作和中产阶级经济不安全感在欧洲和欧元区最为尖锐，在该地区的许多国家，民粹主义政党——主要集中在极右翼——在上周的欧洲议会选举中表现胜过了主流政党。


As in the 1930’s, when the Great Depression gave rise to authoritarian governments in Italy, Germany, and Spain, a similar trend now may be underway.	正如20世纪30年代大萧条为意大利、德国和西班牙的集权政府崛起铺平了道路，今天我们也看到了相同的趋势。


If income and job growth do not pick up soon, populist parties may come closer to power at the national level in Europe, with anti-EU sentiments stalling the process of European economic and political integration.	如果收入和就业不能快速赶上，民粹主义政党将在欧洲的国家层面愈加接近掌权，反欧洲情绪将阻挠欧洲经济和政治一体化的进程。


Worse, the eurozone may again be at risk: some countries (the United Kingdom) may exit the EU; others (the UK, Spain, and Belgium) eventually may break up.	更糟糕的是，欧元区可能再次陷入风险：一些国家（英国）可能退出欧盟； 另一些国家（英国、西班牙和比利时）可能最终陷入分裂。


Even in the US, the economic insecurity of a vast white underclass that feels threatened by immigration and global trade can be seen in the rising influence of the extreme right and Tea Party factions of the Republican Party.	甚至在美国，广大白人下层阶级感到来自移民和全球化的威胁，他们的经济不安全感可以从极右翼和共和党的茶党派影响力日增中一窥端倪。


These groups are characterized by economic nativism, anti-immigration and protectionist leanings, religious fanaticism, and geopolitical isolationism.	这些群体的特征是经济本土主义、反移民和保护主义倾向、宗教狂热以及地缘政治孤立主义。


A variant of this dynamic can be seen in Russia and many parts of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, where the fall of the Berlin Wall did not usher in democracy, economic liberalization, and rapid output growth.	俄罗斯和许多东欧和中亚地区也可以看到这一动态的变种。 在这些地区，柏林墙的倒塌并没有带来民主、经济自由化和快速的产出增长。


Instead, nationalist and authoritarian regimes have been in power for most of the past quarter-century, pursuing state-capitalist growth models that ensure only mediocre economic performance.	相反，民族主义和集权主义政权统治了过去四分之一世纪中的大部分时间，追求只能保证低迷经济表现的国家资本主义增长模式。


In this context, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s destabilization of Ukraine cannot be separated from his dream of leading a “Eurasian Union” – a thinly disguised effort to recreate the former Soviet Union.	在这样的背景下，必须将俄罗斯总统普京动摇乌克兰的行为置于他领导“欧亚联盟”的梦想中加以考察。 “欧亚联盟”是略加掩饰的再建前苏联的计划。


In Asia, too, nationalism is resurgent.	在亚洲，民族主义也在卷土重来。


New leaders in China, Japan, South Korea, and now India are political nationalists in regions where territorial disputes remain serious and long-held historical grievances fester.	中国、日本、韩国以及现在的印度的新领导层都是政治民族主义者，该地区的领土纠纷依然严重，由来已久的历史恩怨也愈演愈烈。


These leaders – as well as those in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, who are moving in a similar nationalist direction – must address major structural-reform challenges if they are to revive falling economic growth and, in the case of emerging markets, avoid a middle-income trap.	这些国家的领导人——以及正在向类似的民族主义倾斜的泰国、马来西亚和印尼领导人——如果想要让回落的经济增长重新获得动力并且（对新兴市场而言）避免中等收入陷阱，就必须解决重大结构性改革挑战。


Economic failure could fuel further nationalist, xenophobic tendencies – and even trigger military conflict.	经济失败可能助长更大的民族主义和排外主义倾向——甚至触发军事冲突。


Meanwhile, the Middle East remains a region mired in backwardness.	与此同时，中东仍处于停滞不前状态。


The Arab Spring – triggered by slow growth, high youth unemployment, and widespread economic desperation – has given way to a long winter in Egypt and Libya, where the alternatives are a return to authoritarian strongmen and political chaos.	阿拉伯之春——拜低增长、高年轻人失业和普遍的经济绝望所赐——已经转变为埃及和利比亚的暗无天日，上述两国的替代方案是回归极权强人和政治混乱时代。 叙利亚和也门内战肆虐；


In Syria and Yemen, there is civil war; Lebanon and Iraq could face a similar fate; Iran is both unstable and dangerous to others; and Afghanistan and Pakistan look increasingly like failed states.	伊朗自身既不稳定，对其他国家也是威胁； 而阿富汗和巴基斯坦也越来越像是失败之国。


In all of these cases, economic failure and a lack of opportunities and hope for the poor and young are fueling political and religious extremism, resentment of the West and, in some cases, outright terrorism.	在所有这些例子中，经济失败以及穷人和年轻人看不见机会和希望助长了政治和宗教极端主义和对西方的仇恨，一些国家甚至因此兴起了恐怖主义。


In the 1930’s, the failure to prevent the Great Depression empowered authoritarian regimes in Europe and Asia, eventually leading to World War II.	20世纪30年代，没能阻止大萧条让欧洲和亚洲的极权政权赢得了权力，最终导致了第二次世界大战。


This time, the damage caused by the Great Recession is subjecting most advanced economies to secular stagnation and creating major structural growth challenges for emerging markets.	这一回，大衰退引起的危险让大部分发达经济体面临着长期停滞，也给新兴市场造成了严重的结构性增长挑战。


This is ideal terrain for economic and political nationalism to take root and flourish.	这简直是经济和政治民族主义理想的温床。


Today’s backlash against trade and globalization should be viewed in the context of what, as we know from experience, could come next.	今天的贸易和全球化阻力应该置于这样的环境下去审视：从历史经验看，接下去会发生什么？


Russia’s Eurasian Vision	俄罗斯的欧亚愿景


NEW YORK – The escalating conflict in Ukraine between the Western-backed government and Russian-backed separatists has focused attention on a fundamental question: What are the Kremlin’s long-term objectives?	纽约—正在乌克兰逐渐升级的冲突——一方是西方支持的政府，另一方是俄罗斯支持的分裂主义者——让人们开始关注一个根本问题：克里姆林宫的长期目标是什么？


Though Russian President Vladimir Putin’s immediate goal may have been limited to regaining control of Crimea and retaining some influence in Ukrainian affairs, his longer-term ambition is much bolder.	尽管俄罗斯总统普京的即期目标可能仅仅是重新掌握克里米亚的控制权并保持对乌克兰事务的某些影响力，但其长期野心远不仅于此。


That ambition is not difficult to discern.	普京的野心不难发现。


Putin once famously observed that the Soviet Union’s collapse was the greatest catastrophe of the twentieth century.	他曾经有一个著名的论断，苏联解体是二十世纪最大的灾难。


Thus, his long-term objective has been to rebuild it in some form, perhaps as a supra-national union of member states like the European Union.	因此，他的长期目标一直是以某种形式重建苏联，也许是一个类似于欧盟的由成员国构成的超国家联盟。


This goal is not surprising: declining or not, Russia has always seen itself as a great power that should be surrounded by buffer states.	这一目标并不令人惊奇：不管是否衰落，俄罗斯一直视自己为超级大国，周边应该有缓冲国围绕。


Under the Czars, Imperial Russia extended its reach over time.	在沙皇时代，帝俄不断扩张势力范围。


Under the Bolsheviks, Russia built the Soviet Union and a sphere of influence that encompassed most of Central and Eastern Europe.	在布尔什维克的领导下，俄罗斯建立了苏联和一个包括了大部分中欧和东欧的影响圈。


And now, under Putin’s similarly autocratic regime, Russia plans to create, over time, a vast Eurasian Union.	而如今，在普京类似的极权政权治下，俄罗斯计划逐渐建立一个巨大的欧亚联盟。


While the EAU is still only a customs union, the European Union’s experience suggests that a successful free-trade area leads over time to broader economic, monetary, and eventually political integration.	尽管欧亚联盟仍然仅仅是一个关税联盟，但欧盟的经验表明，假以时日，一个成功的自由贸易区能够带来更广泛的经济、货币以及最终的政治一体化。


Russia’s goal is not to create another North American Free Trade Agreement; it is to create another EU, with the Kremlin holding all of the real levers of power.	俄罗斯的目标不是成立第二个北美自由贸易协定； 而是建立第二个欧盟，由克里姆林宫控制所有真正的权力。


The plan has been clear: Start with a customs union – initially Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan – and add most of the other former Soviet republics.	计划是清晰的：从关税联盟开始，——最初由俄罗斯、白俄罗斯和哈萨克斯坦组成——然后加入大部分其他前苏联共和国。


Indeed, now Armenia and Kyrgyzstan are in play.	事实上，现在亚美尼亚和吉尔吉斯斯坦已经行动起来。


Once a broad customs union is established, trade, financial, and investment links within it grow to the point that its members stabilize their exchange rates vis-à-vis one another.	一旦建立了广泛的关税联盟，其内部的贸易、金融和投资联系就会达到一个水平，令其成员国将彼此之间的汇率固定下来。


Then, perhaps a couple of decades after the customs union is formed, its members consider creating a true monetary union with a common currency (the Eurasian ruble?) that can be used as a unit of account, means of payment, and store of value.	接着——也许需要在关税联盟成立好几十年后——其成员国将考虑建立真正的货币联盟，采用共同货币（欧亚卢布？ ）作为结算单位、支付手段和价值储藏工具。


As the eurozone experience proves, sustaining a monetary union requires banking, fiscal, and full economic union.	欧元区的经验表明，维持一个货币联盟需要银行、财政和完全的经济联盟。


And, once members give up their sovereignty over fiscal, banking, and economic affairs, they may eventually need a partial political union to ensure democratic legitimacy.	而一旦成员国放弃了财政、银行和经济事务上的主权，就有可能最终需要一个局部政治联盟保证民主合法性。


Realizing such a plan may require overcoming serious challenges and the commitment of large financial resources over a period of many decades.	实现这一计划也许需要克服严峻挑战，并在好几十年的时间里投入大量金融资源。


But the first step is a customs union, and, in the case of the Eurasian Union, it had to include Ukraine, Russia’s largest neighbor to the west.	但第一步是关税联盟，而在欧亚联盟的例子中，关税联盟必须包括位于俄罗斯西部的其最大邻国——乌克兰。


That is why Putin put so much pressure on former President Viktor Yanukovych to abandon an association agreement with the EU.	正因如此，普京才会向前乌克兰总统亚努科维奇施加如此巨大的压力迫使其放弃与欧盟的入盟协议。


It is also why Putin reacted to the ouster of Yanukovych’s government by taking over Crimea and destabilizing eastern Ukraine.	也正因如此，普京对亚努科维奇政府被推翻反应如此激烈，不惜吞并克里米亚和动摇东乌克兰。


Recent events have further weakened market-oriented, Western-leaning factions in Russia and strengthened the state-capitalist, nationalist factions, who are now pushing for faster establishment of the EAU.	最近的事件进一步削弱了俄罗斯国内亲西方的市场派，强化了国家资本主义和民族主义派，后两者正在试图加快欧亚联盟的建立。


In particular, the tension with Europe and the United States over Ukraine will shift Russia’s energy and raw-material exports – and the related pipelines – toward Asia and China.	特别地，在乌克兰问题上与欧洲和美国的紧张对立将让俄罗斯的能源和原材料出口——以及相关管道——转向亚洲和中国。


Likewise, Russia and its BRICS partners (Brazil, India, China, and South Africa) are creating a development bank that is to serve as an alternative to the Western-controlled International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.	类似地，俄罗斯及其金砖国家伙伴（巴西、印度、中国和南非）正在成立一个开发银行，作为西方控制的国际货币基金组织和世界银行的替代品。


Revelations of electronic surveillance by the US may lead Russia – and other illiberal states – to restrict Internet access and create their own nationally controlled data networks.	美国电子监控的曝光可能让俄罗斯——和其他不自由国家——限制互联网接入、建立自身的国家控制的数据网络。


There is even talk of Russia and China creating an alternative international payment system to replace the SWIFT system, which the US and Europe can use to impose financial sanctions against Russia.	甚至有消息说俄罗斯和中国正在建立一个国际支付系统，以取代可被美国和欧洲用来对俄罗斯实施金融制裁的SWIFT系统。


Creating a full EAU – one that is gradually less tied to the West by trade, financial, economic, payments, communications, and political links – may be a pipe dream.	建立一个完全的欧亚联盟——逐渐减少与西方的贸易、金融、经济、支付、通信和政治联系——也许只是空想。


Russia’s lack of reform and adverse demographic trends imply low potential growth and insufficient financial resources to create the fiscal and transfer union that is needed to bring other countries in.	俄罗斯缺少改革，人口趋势也不利，这意味着其增长潜力很低，金融资源不足以支撑将其他国家纳入进来的财政和转移支付联盟。


But Putin is ambitious, and – like other autocrats in Central Asian nations – he may remain in power for decades to come.	但普京很有野心，并且与中亚的其他独裁者一样，可以在未来几十年掌握权力。


And, like it or not, even a Russia that lacks the dynamism needed to succeed in manufacturing and the industries of the future will remain a commodity-producing superpower.	并且不管你喜不喜欢，哪怕是缺少在制造业和未来产业取得成功的活力的俄罗斯，也能够维持商品生产的绝对控制力。


Revisionist powers like Russia, China, and Iran appear ready to confront the global economic and political order that the US and the West built after the collapse of the Soviet Union.	俄罗斯、中国和伊朗等修正主义势力似乎准备好要挑战美国和西方在苏联解体后所建立的全球经济和政治秩序。


But now one of these revisionists powers – Russia – is pushing ahead aggressively to recreate a near-empire and a sphere of influence.	但如今，其中一个修正主义势力——俄罗斯——正在积极推进重新建立类似于帝国的势力范围。


Unfortunately, the sanctions that the US and Europe are imposing on Russia, though necessary, may merely reinforce the conviction among Putin and his nationalist Slavophile advisers that Russia’s future lies not in the West, but in a separate integration project in the East.	不幸的是，美国和欧洲对俄罗斯的制裁尽管不要，也许只能让普京及其民族主义斯拉夫派顾问们更加确信俄罗斯的未来不在西方，而在于在东方另起炉灶开展一个一体化工程。


US President Barack Obama says that this is not the beginning of a new Cold War; current trends may soon suggest otherwise.	美国总统奥巴马说，这不是新冷战的开端； 目前的趋势可能很快会指向相反的方向。


Bubbles in the Broth	酝酿中的泡沫


NEW YORK – As below-trend GDP growth and high unemployment continue to afflict most advanced economies, their central banks have resorted to increasingly unconventional monetary policy.	发自纽约——由于低于以往的GDP增长以及高失业率继续折磨大多数发达经济体，它们的央行也因此采取了越来越多的非常规货币政策。 一系列以字母简称命名的措施已经出台：ZIRP（零利率政策）；


An alphabet soup of measures has been served up: ZIRP (zero-interest-rate policy); QE (quantitative easing, or purchases of government bonds to reduce long-term rates when short-term policy rates are zero); CE (credit easing, or purchases of private assets aimed at lowering the private sector’s cost of capital); and FG (forward guidance, or the commitment to maintain QE or ZIRP until, say, the unemployment rate reaches a certain target).	QE（量化宽松，就是当短期政策利率为零时购买政府债券来降低长期利率）； CE（信贷宽松，或购买私人资产以降低私人部门的资本成本）；


Some have gone as far as proposing NIPR (negative-interest-rate policy).	和FG（前瞻指引，致力于维持量化宽松或零利率政策直到失业率降到某一水平）。 有些甚至提出了NIPR（负利率政策）。


And yet, through it all, growth rates have remained stubbornly low and unemployment rates unacceptably high, partly because the increase in money supply following QE has not led to credit creation to finance private consumption or investment.	然而经过了这一切之后增长率仍然低迷，失业率高得令人无法接受，部分原因是量化宽松的货币供应并未带动信贷增长以促进私人消费或投资。


Instead, banks have hoarded the increase in the monetary base in the form of idle excess reserves.	相反，银行以闲置超额准备金的形式淤积了货币基数的增长。


There is a credit crunch, as banks with insufficient capital do not want to lend to risky borrowers, while slow growth and high levels of household debt have also depressed credit demand.	同时还出现了信贷恐慌的情况，因为资金不足的银行不愿意贷款给高风险借款人，而增长的放缓以及高水平的家庭债务也抑制了信贷需求。


As a result, all of this excess liquidity is flowing to the financial sector rather than the real economy.	结果，所有这一切使得过剩的流动性都流向了金融部门而非实体经济。


Near-zero policy rates encourage “carry trades” – debt-financed investment in higher-yielding risky assets such as longer-term government and private bonds, equities, commodities and currencies of countries with high interest rates.	接近零利率政策鼓励的“套利交易”——以债务融资去投资收益更高的风险性资产，如政府和私人的长期债券、股票、大宗商品和高利率国家的货币。


The result has been frothy financial markets that could eventually turn bubbly.	其结果就是原本暗流涌动的金融市场最终演变成了泡沫。


Indeed, the US stock market and many others have rebounded more than 100% since the lows of 2009; issuance of high-yield “junk bonds” is back to its 2007 level; and interest rates on such bonds are falling.	事实上，自2009年低点以来，美国股票市场和许多其他国家的股票市场都已反弹超过100%； 高收益“垃圾债券”的发行量回到了2007年的水平并且利率有所下降。


Moreover, low interest rates are leading to high and rising home prices – possibly real-estate bubbles – in advanced economies and emerging markets alike, including Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Germany, France, Hong Kong, Singapore, Brazil, China, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.	此外，低利率会导致房价不断拉高——可能导致房地产泡沫——无论发达经济体和新兴市场都是一样，包括瑞士、瑞典、挪威、德国、法国、香港、新加坡、巴西、中国、澳大利亚，新西兰以及加拿大。


The collapse from 2007 to 2009 of equity, credit, and housing bubbles in the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Ireland, Iceland, and Dubai led to severe financial crises and economic damage.	2007至2009年间，美国、英国、西班牙、爱尔兰，冰���和迪拜的股票、信贷以及房地产泡沫爆破导致了严重的金融危机和经济损失。


So, are we at risk of another cycle of financial boom and bust?	那么我们是否正处于另一个周期性金融繁荣和萧条的风险之中呢？


Some policymakers – like Janet Yellen, who is likely to be confirmed as the next Chair of the US Federal Reserve – argue that we should not worry too much.	一些政策制定者——如最有可能被任命为下一任美国联邦储备局主席的珍妮特·耶伦——认为我们不应担心的太多。


Central banks, they argue, now have two goals: restoring robust growth and low unemployment with low inflation, and maintaining financial stability without bubbles.	他们认为各大中央银行当前有两个目标：恢复低失业率和低通胀情况下的强劲增长，以及维持金融稳定不出现泡沫。


Moreover, they have two instruments to achieve these goals: the policy interest rate, which will be kept low for long and raised only gradually to boost growth; and macro-prudential regulation and supervision of the financial system (macro-pru for short), which will be used to control credit and prevent bubbles.	此外，他们有两个工具来实现这些目标：一是政策利率将长期保持在低水平，只有在刺激经济增长时会逐步提高； 另一个是宏观审慎监管和监督金融体系（简称macro-pru），这将被用来控制信贷和防止泡沫。


But some critics, like Fed Governor Jeremy Stein, argue that macro-pru policies to control credit and leverage – such as limits on loan-to-value ratios for mortgages, bigger capital buffers for banks that extend risky loans, and tighter underwriting standards – may not work.	但是一些评论家，如美联储理事杰里米·斯坦（Jeremy Stein），认为用宏观审慎监管政策来控制信贷和杠杆——如限制按揭的贷款价值比率，扩大银行发放高风险贷款的资本缓冲，以及更严格的担保标准——可能没有效果。


Not only are they untested, but restricting leverage in some parts of the banking system would merely cause the liquidity from zero rates to flow to other parts of it, while trying to restrict leverage entirely would simply drive the liquidity into the less-regulated shadow banking system.	这不仅因为这些方法都未经检验，而且限制银行系统某些部分的杠杆作用只会导致由零利率产生的流动性流向其他部分，而试图限制杠杆完全只会推动流动性进入较少监管的影子银行系统。


According to Stein, only monetary policy (higher policy interest rates) “gets in all of the cracks” of the financial system and prevents asset bubbles.	根据斯坦的说法，只有货币政策（更高的利率政策）能“弥补（金融体系）的所有裂缝”并防止资产泡沫。


The trouble is that if macro-pru does not work, the interest rate would have to serve two opposing goals: economic recovery and financial stability.	麻烦的是，如果宏观审慎监管不起作用，利率将不得不走向两个对立的目标：经济复苏和金融稳定。


If policymakers go slow on raising rates to encourage faster economic recovery, they risk causing the mother of all asset bubbles, eventually leading to a bust, another massive financial crisis, and a rapid slide into recession.	如果政策制定者继续缓慢提高利率以刺激经济复苏，他们将面临孕育资产泡沫的风险，最终导致破产，引起另一场严重的金融危机，并迅速陷入衰退。


But if they try to prick bubbles early on with higher interest rates, they will crash bond markets and kill the recovery, causing much economic and financial damage.	但如果他们试图以高利率更早的戳破泡沫，他们会冲击债券市场和扼杀经济复苏，引起许多经济和金融损失。


So, unless macro-pru works as planned, policymakers are damned if they do and damned if they don’t.	所以，除非宏观审慎监管如计划那样起作用，否则无论如何作为，决策者都没有好下场。


For now, policymakers in countries with frothy credit, equity, and housing markets have avoided raising policy rates, given slow economic growth.	现在，很多拥有泡沫信贷，股市和房地产市场的国家的政策制定者都避免提高政策利率，让经济保持缓慢增长。


But it is still too early to tell whether the macro-pru policies on which they are relying will ensure financial stability.	但要判断他们所依赖的宏观审慎监管政策是否能确保金融稳定还是为时过早。


If not, policymakers will eventually face an ugly tradeoff: kill the recovery to avoid risky bubbles, or go for growth at the risk of fueling the next financial crisis.	如果答案为否，政策制定者最终将面临一个艰难的决定：要不扼杀复苏，避免危险的泡沫，要不在酝酿下一次金融危机的风险中继续增长。


For now, with asset prices continuing to rise, many economies may have had as much soup as they can stand.	如今随着资产价格的持续上升，许多经济体可能会在自身的承受范围内尝试尽可能多的政策。


The Changing Face of Global Risk	全球风险面目的改变


NEW YORK – The world’s economic, financial, and geopolitical risks are shifting.	纽约—世界经济、金融和地缘政治风险正在改变。


Some risks now have a lower probability – even if they are not fully extinguished.	一些风险如今可能性有所降低——即便尚未完全消除。


Others are becoming more likely and important.	也有一些风险变得更加可能、更加重要。


A year or two ago, six main risks stood at center stage:	一两年前，处于核心地位的是六大风险：


· A eurozone breakup (including a Greek exit and loss of access to capital markets for Italy and/or Spain).	·         欧元区解体（包括希腊退出以及意大利和/或西班牙无法金融资本市场）。


· A fiscal crisis in the United States (owing to further political fights over the debt ceiling and another government shutdown).	·         美国财政危机（由关于债务上限的政治斗争加剧和再度爆发政府关门导致）。


· A public-debt crisis in Japan (as the combination of recession, deflation, and high deficits drove up the debt/GDP ratio).	·         日本公债危机（衰退、通缩以及高赤字推升债务/GDP比率同时发生）。


· Deflation in many advanced economies.	·         多个发达经济体发生通缩。


· War between Israel and Iran over alleged Iranian nuclear proliferation.	·         以色列和伊朗因为伊朗核扩张爆发战争。


· A wider breakdown of regional order in the Middle East.	·         中东地区秩序破坏加剧。


These risks have now been reduced.	这些风险现在都有所降低。


Thanks to European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” speech, new financial facilities to stabilize distressed sovereign debtors, and the beginning of a banking union, the eurozone is no longer on the verge of collapse.	感谢欧洲央行行长德拉吉的“竭尽全力”讲话、新的��在稳定受困主权债务人的新金融便利以及银行联盟的起步，欧元区已经远离崩溃边缘。


In the US, President Barack Obama and Congressional Republicans have for now agreed on a truce to avoid the threat of another government shutdown over the need to raise the debt ceiling.	在美国，总统奥巴马和国会共和党现已同意休战以避免再一次政府关门，将其置于债务上限问题之上。


In Japan, the first two “arrows” of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s economic strategy – monetary easing and fiscal expansion – have boosted growth and stopped deflation.	在日本，首相安倍晋三的经济战略的前两支“箭”——货币宽松和财政扩张提高了增长、结束了通缩。


Now the third arrow of “Abenomics” – structural reforms – together with the start of long-term fiscal consolidation, could lead to debt stabilization (though the economic impact of the coming consumption-tax hike is uncertain).	如今，“安倍经济学”的第三支箭——结构性改革以及长期财政整合的开始将能带来债务稳定（尽管即将到来的消费税提升的经济影响尚不确定）。


Similarly, the risk of deflation worldwide has been contained via exotic and unconventional monetary policies: near-zero interest rates, quantitative easing, credit easing, and forward guidance.	类似地，世界通缩的风险已经通过近零利率、量化宽松、信用宽松和前瞻性指引等非常规货币政策得到遏制。


And the risk of a war between Israel and Iran has been reduced by the interim agreement on Iran’s nuclear program concluded last November.	以色列和伊朗开战的风险也随着去年11月就伊朗核计划达成过渡性协议而有所降低。


The falling fear premium has led to a drop in oil prices, even if many doubt Iran’s sincerity and worry that it is merely trying to buy time while still enriching uranium.	恐慌溢价的下跌导致油价下跌，尽管有很多人怀疑伊朗的诚意，担心它只是为进一步铀浓缩争取时间。


Though many Middle East countries remain highly unstable, none of them is systemically important in financial terms, and no conflict so far has seriously shocked global oil and gas supplies.	尽管很多中东国家仍处于高度动荡，但从金融角度看，它们没有一个具有系统重要性，到目前为止也没有冲突严重冲击了全球石油和天然气供应。


But, of course, exacerbation of some of these crises and conflicts could lead to renewed concerns about energy security.	但是，其中一些危机的加剧既有可能导致对能源安全的新担忧。


More important, as the risks of recent years have receded, six other risks have been growing.	更重要的是，随着近几年的风险的消退，六大其他风险开始增加。


For starters, there is the risk of a hard landing in China.	首先是中国的硬着陆风险。


The rebalancing of growth away from fixed investment and toward private consumption is occurring too slowly, because every time annual GDP growth slows toward 7%, the authorities panic and double down on another round of credit-fueled capital investment.	实现增长的再平衡从固定投资转向私人消费的进展太过缓慢，这是因为每当年GDP增长率向7%靠拢，当局都会慌忙采取新一轮信用推动的资本投资。


This then leads to more bad assets and non-performing loans, more excessive investment in real estate, infrastructure, and industrial capacity, and more public and private debt.	而这会造成更多的坏账和不良贷款、房地产、基础设施和工业产能的过度投资以及更多的公私债务。


By next year, there may be no road left down which to kick the can.	明年或许已无空间施展旧伎俩。


There is also the risk of policy mistakes by the US Federal Reserve as it exits monetary easing.	另一个风险是美联储的政策错误——退出量化宽松。


Last year, the Fed’s mere announcement that it would gradually wind down its monthly purchases of long-term financial assets triggered a “taper” tantrum in global financial markets and emerging markets.	去年，美联储仅仅宣布将逐渐减少其月度长期金融资产购买量便在全球金融市场和新兴市场引发了“取消”之怒。


This year, tapering is priced in, but uncertainty about the timing and speed of the Fed’s efforts to normalize policy interest rates is creating volatility.	今年，取消量化宽松已体现在价格中，但关于美联储政策利率正常化的时机和节奏的不确定性正在造成动荡。


Some investors and governments now worry that the Fed may raise rates too soon and too fast, causing economic and financial shockwaves.	一些投资者和政府现在担心美联储生息过快过急，掀起经济和金融冲击波。


Third, the Fed may actually exit zero rates too late and too slowly (its current plan would normalize rates to 4% only by 2018), thus causing another asset-price boom – and an eventual bust.	第三，美联储实际上可能太迟太慢地退出零利率（根据当前计划，将在2018年将利率正常化至4%水平），从而导致新一轮资产价格繁荣以及最终的破灭。


Indeed, unconventional monetary policies in the US and other advanced economies have already led to massive asset-price reflation, which in due course could cause bubbles in real estate, credit, and equity markets.	事实上，美国和其他发达经济体的非常规货币政策已经导致了大规模的资产价格再通胀，随时会引发房地产、信用、和股市泡沫。


Fourth, the crises in some fragile emerging markets may worsen.	第四，一些脆弱新兴市场的危机可能恶化。


Emerging markets are facing headwinds (owing to a fall in commodity prices and the risks associated with China’s structural transformation and the Fed’s monetary-policy shift) at a time when their own macroeconomic policies are still too loose and the lack of structural reforms has undermined potential growth.	新兴市场正在面临阻力（原因是商品价格的下跌以及与中国结构转型和美联储货币政策变化有关的风险），而与此同时，它们的宏观经济政策仍然太松，且结构性改革的缺位也破坏了潜在增长。


Moreover many of these emerging markets face political and electoral risks.	此外，许多新兴市场面临着政治和选举风险。


Fifth, there is a serious risk that the current conflict in Ukraine will lead to Cold War II – and possibly even a hot war if Russia invades the east of the country.	第五，当前的乌克兰冲突很有可能导致第二次冷战——如果俄罗斯入侵乌克兰东部，甚至有爆发热战争的可能。


The economic consequences of such an outcome – owing to its impact on energy supplies and investment flows, in addition to the destruction of lives and physical capital – would be immense.	这一结果的经济后果将十分严重，因为会影响到能源供给和投资流，并且造成生命和实体资本破坏。


Finally, there is a similar risk that Asia’s terrestrial and maritime territorial disagreements (starting with the disputes between China and Japan) could escalate into outright military conflict.	最后，亚洲领土和领海纠纷（首先是中日纠纷）也很有可能演变为全面的军事冲突。


Such geopolitical risks – were they to materialize – would have a systemic economic and financial impact.	这一地缘政治风险——如果成为现实的话——将带来系统性的经济和金融冲击。


So far, financial markets have been sanguine about these new rising risks.	目前，金融市场对这些新出现的风险表示乐观。


Volatility has increased only modestly, while asset prices have held up.	波动只是略微增加，资产价格也十分坚挺。


Noise about these risks has occasionally (but only briefly) shaken investors’ confidence, and modest market corrections have tended to reverse themselves.	关于这些风险的噪声偶尔（但只是极微小地）会破坏投资者信心，而市场在略作修正后也能够再创新高。


Investors may be right that these risks will not materialize in their more severe form, or that loose monetary policies in advanced economies and continued recovery will contain such risks.	投资者认为这些风险或许不会升级，或者发达经济体的宽松货币政策和持续复苏能够遏制这些风险，这也许是对的。


But investors may be deluding themselves that the probability of these risks is low – and thus may be unpleasantly surprised when one or more of them materializes.	但投资者认为这些风险的概率很低可能会吃亏，其中一种或多种风险成为现实将让他们震惊。


Indeed, as was the case with the global financial crisis, investors seem unable to estimate, price, and hedge such tail risks properly.	事实上，正如全球金融危机一样，投资者似乎无法合理地估计这些尾部风险、对它们定价并采取对冲措施。


Only time will tell whether their current nonchalance constitutes another failure to assess and prepare for extreme events.	只有时间才能告诉我们当前的漠不关心最后是否会变成失误，没有准确评估极端事件并未雨绸缪。


Now For An Arab Economic Revolution	阿拉伯经济革命的契机


BEIRUT – Revolution across the Arab world has forced the region’s peoples and governments to grapple with the need for change.	发自贝鲁特——席卷整个阿拉伯世界的革命浪潮已经把该地区的民众和政府推向了急需改革的风口浪尖。


Years of sclerosis have given way to a frantic push for reforms to match the aspirations and discontent of millions.	多年以来的保守僵化如今让位于一股近乎疯狂的改革动力，以满足数百万民众的意愿并平息他们的不满。


But reform momentum is tugging in two, quite opposite, directions.	但这股改革的势头却被两股背道而驰的力量撕扯着，一股力量要求政府为人民包办一切； 另一股则要求政府停止限制人民的自由，尤其是经济方面的自主权。


One push is for governments to provide for their people; the other calls for governments to stop restricting their people’s freedom, particularly their economic liberty. The first type of reform will likely only exacerbate the Arab world’s grave problems; the second offers hope for positive and sustainable change.	而前者只会令阿拉伯世界当前的危机进一步恶化； 后者却能为积极而持续的改革带来希望的曙光。


In several Arab countries, most notably Saudi Arabia, rulers have sought to quell popular discontent by providing a combination of cash, subsidies, guaranteed jobs, and free goods and services.	在以沙特为代表的几个阿拉伯国家，统治者们试图用提供一揽子现金、补贴、工作，免费商品和服务的方式来消解人民的不满。


Such largesse betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the causes of today’s discontent, because it assumes that these causes are purely material.	这种慷慨之举暴露出这些统治者其实误判了当今这场动乱的成因，因为他们以为这些都是由物质上的因素所引起的。


But any examination of the protesters’ slogans and demands clearly indicates otherwise.	但对示威者口号及其意愿的解读都会清楚地显示出暴乱的成因其实来自于其他方面。


The protests are much more about political and economic freedom than about material needs, reflecting a keen awareness that such needs are merely a symptom and consequence of the absence of political and economic freedom.	相对于物质需求，示威者们更加关注政治和经济方面的自由，反映出民众已经敏锐地意识到这些物质需要只不过是缺乏政治和经济自由所导致的症状和后果而已。


The dominant “handout approach” is not sustainable, and, if continued, would likely exacerbate the Arab world’s current economic malaise.	在阿拉伯世界占主流的“施舍统治手段”已经走向末路，如果继续这样下去的话只会令目前的经济低迷状况不断恶化。


Economic wealth cannot be created by government decree; it comes from productive jobs that create goods and services that people value.	须知经济财富是不可能通过政府指令创造出来的； 它只会来自于那些能创造出优质产品和服务的生产性工作。


Governments that hand out benefits are not making their citizens richer by generating new wealth; they are simply redistributing existing wealth.	那些大撒金钱的政府并不是通过创造新财富的方式来令自己的人民更加富裕，相反他们只是在分配已有的财富而已。 这一原理对于那些由政府创造并担保的工作同样适用；


This also applies to government-created and guaranteed jobs: if a job is indeed productive, its output would be rewarded by other members of society who benefit from it, without the need for government subsidies and guarantees. The fact that government guarantees a job implies that its output is not wanted.	如果这个职位确实是对社会有利的，那么它的产品肯定会得到受益者的回报，自然也不需要政府补贴或者担保，而政府担保职位的行为只能说明这个职位是多余的。


Such jobs are a liability for society, not an asset.	这些职位本身就是社会的负担，而非资产。


As citizens start relying on redistribution, productive work is discouraged, and real wealth creation suffers.	随着人民逐渐依赖于政府的再分配，生产性工作就遭到了抑制，进而损害了实际财富的创造能力。


Economic rot sets in as the ranks of dependent citizens grow, productive citizens dwindle in number, and society eventually runs out of other people’s money.	从事生产者日益减少，坐等分配者却与日俱增，以至于整个经济肌体逐渐腐烂，最终社会将其他人创造的财富全都消耗殆尽。


But the popularity of the handout option raises an important and instructive question: just how did the ruling classes in these countries amass fortunes so large that people are clamoring for them to be redistributed?	但这种施舍统治方式的流行也引出了一个重要的指导性问题：这些国家的统治阶级究竟是如何积累了如此巨额的财富，以致人们要用抗议的方式迫使他们将其拿出来重新分配？


Government officials and their cronies did not necessarily engage in straightforward theft or pillaging. Through innocuous-sounding government “supervision” and “regulation” – and under the guidance of the major international financial institutions – ruling elites managed to run entire sectors of the economy as personal fiefdoms.	事实上，政府官员及其亲信们并不是直接参与了盗窃抢劫，而是通过冠冕堂皇的政府“监督”和“规管”——而且是在各大重要国际金融机构的指导下——将整个国家金融部门变成了自己的私人领地。


While this pattern of official behavior is reprehensible, the real disaster is that it destroyed Arabs’ economic productivity and initiative.	这种官员行为本身应当受到谴责，但其真正的危害则在于破坏了整个阿拉伯地区的经济生产力和主动性。


This economic totalitarianism has been legitimated by government charity.	这种经济极权主义已经被政府的慈善行为合理化了。


Arab elites have been engaged in a false embrace of economic reforms for decades, with countless ministerial shuffles, five-year plans, and elaborate World Bank and International Monetary Fund programs. But all these reforms involve government handouts or government-created jobs and opportunities; rarely do they involve removing the government’s grip over people’s lives.	许多年以来阿拉伯精英们都在错误地实施着经济改革，无数的经济官员更替，5年计划以及精心筹划的世界银行和国际货币基金组织项目都无济于事，因为这些改革的内容大都是政府操控下的再分配或者创造就业；


By framing the debate on reform as being about the type of handouts, governments evade tackling the real problem: their control of economic activity.	只有极少一部份着手解除政府对人民生活的控制。 通过将改革的讨论仅仅局限在再分配形式上，这些政府都回避了真正的问题：那就是他们对经济的控制。


State handouts can be reliably financed only by controlling the economy’s productive sectors.  But in the Arab world, as everywhere else, this leads to theft, corruption, uncompetitive monopolies, a stifling of enterprise, and, eventually and inevitably, to decline and decay.	只有控制了经济的生产部门，才能有资金支持这种由国家出面发放救济的手段。  但跟世界各地一样，阿拉伯世界的这一举动导致了盗窃、腐败，毫无竞争力的垄断和企业僵化，最终使国家无法避免地滑向经济衰退和没落的深渊。


The toppled Tunisian and Egyptian regimes spent decades providing handouts while denying citizens economic freedom.	被推翻的突尼斯和埃及政权都执行了多年的发放救济政策，却一直拒绝给予其公民经济自由。


As Arabs confront far-reaching change, they must not be distracted into fruitless debates about the right types of government support for citizens.	随着阿拉伯地区面临着影响深远的变革，人们不能再被那些关于政府应当如何补贴市民的无意义讨论所迷惑。


What is needed is a root and branch transformation of the way that economic activity is carried out in all Arab nations.	而我们真正需要的则是一个整体性的根本转换，彻底改变所有阿拉伯国家实施经济活动的方式。


Arab countries need to become places where people can create their own productive jobs, pursue their own opportunities, provide for themselves, and determine their own future.	这些国家必须成为一个人们可以自主创造生产性职位，追求自身机遇，自力更生并决定自身未来的地方。


This freedom obviates the need for the charity of those in power, and more importantly, takes away from them the excuse for maintaining their iron grip over the economic lives of their citizens.	而这种自由的意义不仅是使人民不再仰仗于当权者的救济，更重要的是它封住了当权者的嘴，使他们再也没有任何钳制人民经济生活的借口。


Now is Our Time	到采取行动的时候了


New York – Every September, the world’s leaders gather at the United Nations to reaffirm our founding Charter – our faith in fundamental principles of peace, justice, human rights, and equal opportunity for all.	纽约——每年九月，各国领导人都会汇集联合国，重申我们的成立宪章——我们对和平、公正、人权和人人机会平等的信仰。


We assess the state of the world, engage key issues of the day, and lay out our vision for the way ahead.	我们评估世界局势、探讨关键事务、同时制定未来目标。


But this year is different.	但今年的情况则有所不同。


The 64th opening of the General Assembly asks us to rise to an exceptional moment.	第64届联大开幕要求我们迎接一个特别的时刻。


We are facing many crises – food, energy, recession, and pandemic flu – occurring all at once.	我们正面临多重危机的爆发——粮食、能源、经济衰退和流感。


If ever there were a time to act in a spirit of renewed multilateralism, a time to put the “united” back into the United Nations, it is now.	如果说我们要再次弘扬多边主义精神，将“联合”精神重新注入联合国的话，现在正是时候。


And that is what we are doing, as action on three issues of historic consequence demonstrates.	正如颇具历史意义的行动所表明的那样，这正是我们行动的目标。


First, world leaders are uniting to address the greatest challenge we face as a human family – the threat of catastrophic climate change.	首先，各国领导人正携起手来解决人类大家庭所面临的最大挑战——灾难性的气候变化。


Last week, 101 leaders from 163 countries met to chart the next steps toward December’s all-important UN climate change conference in Copenhagen.	上周，来自163个国家的101位领袖召开会议，确定12月即将在哥本哈根召开的联合国气候变化会议的重要步骤。


They recognized the need for an agreement that all nations can embrace – in line with their capabilities, consistent with what science requires, and grounded in “green jobs” and “green growth,” the lifeline of a twenty-first century global economy.	他们认为应当签署所有国家都认可的协议——符合科学要求和各国的能力状况，以“绿色就业”和“绿色增长”为基础，打造二十一世纪全球经济的生命线。


We at the UN have prepared carefully for this moment.	联合国工作人员谨慎地迎接这一时刻。


For two and a half years, ever since I became Secretary-General, we have worked to put climate change at the top of the global agenda.	在我就任联合国秘书长的两年半以来，我们一直齐心协力，让气候变化成为一项首要的全球议程。


Today, we have entered a new phase.	时至今日，我们已经进入了一个新的阶段。


Last week’s summit sharply defined the issue and focused attention in capitals the world over.	上周召开的峰会明确地阐述了这个问题，吸引了世界各国政府的关注。


To be sure, the issues are complex and difficult, especially those of financing adaptation and mitigation efforts in poorer countries.	可以肯定，这个问题复杂艰巨，特别是贫困国家的财务调整和缓和行动。


Yet leaders left New York committed to clear and firm instructions for their negotiators: seal a deal in Copenhagen.	但各国领导人离开纽约时还是对谈判人员发出了坚定不移的明确指示：在哥本哈根达成协议。


Japan issued a challenge, agreeing to cut CO2 emissions by 25% by 2020 if other nations follow.	日本发出了挑战，如果其他国家愿意跟进，它同意到2020年降低二氧化碳排放量25%。


China’s President Hu Jintao spoke about all that his country is already doing to reduce energy intensity and invest in “green” alternatives.	中国主席胡锦涛谈到了中国已经在降低能源应用强度和投资“绿色”替代能源方面所做出的努力。


He emphasized that China is prepared to do more under an international agreement, as did US President Barack Obama.	他强调如果达成国际协议，中国愿意付出进一步的努力，美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马也持同样态度。


Negotiators will gather for another round of UN talks on September 28 in Bangkok, and we are considering a smaller meeting of major emitting and most vulnerable nations in November.	谈判专家们将于9月28日在曼谷举行新一轮联合国会谈，我们还准备在十一月举办由主要排放国和主要受害国参与的小范围会谈。


We need a breakthrough in this make-or-break year.	我们需要在这个具有决定意义的年度取得突破。


We saw another turning point on a second issue of existential importance: nuclear disarmament.	我们看到了另一个重要问题的又一转折点：核裁军。


Finally, the assumption that such weapons are needed to keep the peace is crumbling.	终于，我们需要核武器才能维持和平的说法不攻自破。


At a special summit called by the President Obama, the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution that opens a new chapter in the UN’s efforts to address nuclear proliferation and disarmament.	在奥巴马总统提议召开的特别峰会上，联合国安理会一致通过了一项决议，翻开了联合国解决核扩散及核裁军问题的全新篇章。


That resolution improves prospects for expanding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty next May, and offers hope for bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty into force.	该决议增加了明年五月拓展《核不扩散协议》的可能性，带来了《全面禁止核试验条约》生效的希望。


It also sets establishes the contours of a legal framework for action against misuse of civilian nuclear technology for military purposes and reflects an emerging consensus, seen in meeting after meeting, that the time has come to increase pressure on countries that fail to respect these principles.	该决议还确定了反对将民用核技术滥用于军事目的行动的法律框架轮廓，反应了在历次会议后逐渐形成的共识，即已经是时候对未能遵守这些原则国家加大压力。


The world is united on a third front, as well.	此外，世界各国还在第三条战线上达成了一致。


Though some may speak of “turning the corner to recovery,” we see a new crisis emerging.	尽管有人可能在谈论“转过经济复苏的拐角”，我们却看到一场新的危机正在形成。


According to our recent report, “Voices of the Vulnerable,” the near-poor are becoming the new poor.	根据我们最新报告“弱者之声”，近乎于穷人的人正在加入穷人的行列。


An estimated 100 million people could fall below the poverty line this year.	今年估计会有1亿人跌到贫困线以下。


Markets may be bouncing back, but jobs and incomes are not.	市场或许会出现反弹，但就业和收入不会。


That is why, earlier this year, the UN put forward a Global Jobs Pact for balanced and sustainable growth.	这也是为什么今年早些时候，联合国提出了争取可持续平衡增长的全球就业计划。


It is also why we are creating a new Global Impact Vulnerability Alert System, giving us real-time data and analysis on socio-economic conditions around the world.	我们还为此建立了新的“全球影响及脆弱度警戒系统”，提供世界各国社会经济状况的实时分析和资料。


We need to know precisely who is being hurt by the financial crisis, and where, so that we can best respond.	我们需要了解究竟什么地方、和谁在金融危机中受害，以便更好地进行应对。


That is also why, next year at this time, we will convene a special summit on the Millennium Development Goals.	这也解释了为什么明年这个时候，我们将就千年发展目标召开特别会议。


We have only five years to meet the targets for health, education, and human security that we set for 2015.	我们只有五年的时间去实现2015年的医疗、教育和人类安全目标。


At the various G-20 summits over the past year, including the latest in Pittsburg, the UN has stood firm to speak and act for all those being left behind.	在去年举行的几次二十国峰会上，包括最近在匹兹堡召开的这次，联合国一直坚定地支持那些经济上的落后者。


Rhetoric has always been abundant at the General Assembly, action sometimes less so.	联大从来不缺乏言辞，有时却缺乏行动。


Yet listening to the world’s leaders speak, last week, I was struck by their passion, commitment, and collective determination to turn a page from a past of countries divided by narrow interests to nations united in the cause of a global common good.	但上周聆听了各国领袖讲话后，我仍然被他们的热情、承诺和集体的决心所感动，他们承诺彻底摆脱被狭隘利益割裂的过去，携起手来为全球的共同利益而奋斗。


From confronting climate change to creating a world without nuclear weapons to building a more equitable and sustainable global economy, I saw a sprit of renewed multilateralism, with the UN at the fore.	从应对气候变化到创造一个没有核武器的世界再��建设更加平等持久的全球经济，让我重新看到了联合国领导下的多边主义精神。


No country can deal with any of these challenges by itself.	任何一个国家都不可能独自应对这一挑战。


But as nations united, the United Nations can.	但如果世界各国联合起来，联合国就可以做到。


No, You Can’t	不，你做不到


COPENHAGEN – Several thousand officials from 194 countries just gathered in Cancún, Mexico, for yet another global climate summit.	哥本哈根——来自194个国家的数千名官员刚刚齐聚墨西哥坎昆，召开新一轮全球气候会议。


Dissatisfied with the pace of climate diplomacy, many individuals are now wondering what they can do about climate change on their own.	很多个人对气候外交的进展状况深感不满，想要凭借一己之力做些事情。


For years now, climate activists from Al Gore to Leonardo DiCaprio have argued that individual actions like driving more economical cars and using more efficient light bulbs are a crucial element in the effort to address global warming.	几年来，从阿尔·戈尔到莱昂纳多·迪卡普里奥的气候活动家一直宣称像开经济型轿车和使用节能灯泡这样的个人行为在解决全球变暖问题的过程中能起到至关重要的作用。


The United Nations’ climate panel and the International Energy Agency both echo this sentiment, insisting that higher energy efficiency could reduce energy consumption by up to 30% – making improved efficiency an effective remedy for climate change.	联合国气候小组和国际能源机构都赞同这种观点，坚持提出高能效可以降低能耗30%之多——提高能效也因此成为控制气候变化的一种有效途径。


But is this really true?	但事实果真如此吗？


Here’s something to think about.	下面是需要思考的问题。


Back in the early 1970’s, the average American expended roughly 70 million British thermal units per year to heat, cool, and power his or her home.	20世纪70年代，普通美国人每年用于供暖、空调和家庭用电的能耗约为每年7000万英国热量单位。


Since then, of course, we have made great strides in energy efficiency.	自那以后，我们毫无疑问已经在能效方面取得了长足的进步。


As The Washington Post recently reported, dishwashers now use 45% less power than they did two decades ago, and refrigerators 51% less.	正如《华盛顿邮报》不久前报导的那样，现在洗碗机的能耗比20年前降低了45%，冰箱则降低51%。


So how much energy do Americans use in their homes today?	那么美国人的家庭能耗状况究竟如何？


On a per capita basis, the figure is roughly what it was 40 years ago: 70 million BTUs.	从人均角度看，普通美国人的能耗量大约与40年前持平： 即7000万英国热量单位。


This surprising lack of change is the result of something economists call the “rebound effect.”	某些经济学家所谓的“反弹效应”造成了这种令人惊奇的结果。


It’s a phenomenon familiar to urban planners, who long ago discovered that building more roads doesn’t ease traffic jams – it merely encourages more people to get in their cars and drive.	这种现象城市规划师非常熟悉，他们早就发现铺设更多道路不能缓解交通堵塞——它只能鼓励更多的人开车。


The underlying principle is a decidedly counterintuitive fact of life.	生活中与直觉截然相反的现实是这种现象背后的基本原则。


You might think that learning to use something more efficiently will result in your using less of it, but the opposite is true: the more efficient we get at using something, the more of it we are likely to use.	你可能认为高效地使用某种事物会降低其使用频率，但事实却恰恰相反。 我们使用某种事物的效率越高，我们的使用频率也就越大。


Efficiency doesn’t reduce consumption; it increases it.	效率无法降低消费，相反却起到提高消费的作用。


The Breakthrough Institute recently highlighted on its blog some startling – and important – research findings along these lines, published in August in The Journal of Physics by energy economist Harry Saunders and four colleagues from the US Department of Energy’s Sandia National Laboratories.	突破研究所最近在博客上公布了重要而又惊人的相关研究成果，这篇论文发表在8月份的《物理学杂志》上，作者是能源经济学家哈里·桑德斯和美国能源部桑迪亚国家实验室的四名同行。


As Saunders noted in a summary on the blog, he and his colleagues, drawing on “300 years of evidence,” found that, “as lighting becomes more energy efficient, and thus cheaper, we use ever-more of it.”	桑德斯在博客上一篇总结文章中强调，他和他的同事研究了“300年来的证据”发现，“随着照明越来越节能，越来越廉价，我们对它的使用率也越来越高。 ”


For this reason, the proportion of resources that we expend on lighting has remained virtually unchanged for the past three centuries, at about 0.72% of gross domestic product.	正因为如此，我们用在照明方面的能耗比例在过去300年间几乎没有任何变化，一直占国内生产总值的0. 72%左右。


As Saunders and his colleagues observe in their journal article, “This was the case in the UK in 1700, is the case in the undeveloped world not on grid electricity in modern times, and is the case for the developed world in modern times using the most advanced lighting technologies.”	就像桑德斯及其同僚在期刊论文中总结的那样，“18世纪的英国是这种情况，尚未建成现代电网的不发达国家是这种情况，使用最先进照明技术的现代发达国家也是这种情况。 ”


The conclusion that Saunders and his co-authors draw from this is both surprising and hard to dispute: rather than shrinking our electricity use, the introduction of ever more efficient lighting technologies is much more likely to lead to “massive…growth in the consumption of light.”	桑德斯及其同事在这个问题上得出的结论既惊人又很难驳斥： 与其指望能够降低用电量，采用更加高效的照明技术导致“照明用电大幅增加”的可能性更大。


It’s difficult to overstate what these findings mean for climate policy.	上述研究成果在气候政策领域的意义可谓是一言难尽。


In a nutshell, they tell us that, while increasing energy efficiency is undoubtedly a good thing, it is most assuredly not a remedy for global warming.	简言之，研究成果告诉我们虽然提高能效毫无疑问是件好事，但可以肯定它不是解决全球变暖问题的方法。


Or, as Saunders puts it, “energy efficiency may be a net positive in increasing economic productivity and growth, but should not be relied upon as a way to reduce energy consumption and thus greenhouse gas emissions.”	或者就像桑德斯所说的那样，“能效在提高经济生产力和推动增长方面可能起到积极作用，但我们却不能靠它来降低能耗，进而降低温室气体排放。 ”


This is not an argument that should encourage anyone to go out and buy a Hummer.	这样说不是要鼓励任何人出去买一台悍马。


But we shouldn’t fool ourselves into thinking that swapping our current car for a Prius, or replacing our incandescent lights with energy-efficient fluorescent bulbs, will strike a meaningful blow against climate change.	但��们也不能自欺欺人地以为把现在的座驾换成普瑞斯，或把白炽灯换成节能荧光灯就能很好地应对气候变化。


The real fix to this problem will come when governments focus on research and development aimed at boosting the proportion of green energy sources in overall consumption.	真正的解决方法来自于政府全力开展提高绿色能源在总能耗中所占比例的研发项目。


It may be reassuring to believe there are cheap and easy things we can do as individuals to stop global warming, or that the answer is to continue chasing a chimerical global agreement on carbon cuts, as in Cancún.	相信我们作为个人可以有阻止全球变暖的廉价而简单的方法可能让我们感到安慰，或者相信解决之道在于像在坎昆那样继续一厢情愿地谋求签订全球碳减排协议。


But the real action that we can take is to press our politicians to put smarter ideas on the table.	但我们可以采取的真正行动在于迫使政治家拿出更明智的方法。


Defending Diplomacy in Court	在法庭上捍卫外交


DUBLIN – The recent revelations by the former US intelligence contractor Edward Snowden suggest, among other things, that surveillance devices were placed by the US National Security Agency in the European Union’s mission in Washington, DC.	都柏林—最近的前美国情报承包商斯诺登事件（和其他事件）表明，美国国家安全局（NSA）对欧盟驻华盛顿使团放置了监听装置。


Many Europeans, including me, find it difficult to understand why the debate about Snowden in the United States has devoted so little attention to discovering whether his allegations are true, and, if they are, what that means for international law, US diplomacy, and America’s national security.	许多欧洲人，包括我在内，难以理解为何美国国内关于斯诺登的争论将如此之少的精力放在他的指控是否为真，以及，若为真会对国际法、美国外交和美国国家安全意味着什么上。


The US must respond to the allegations – first leveled in a report published by the German magazine Der Spiegel – and give a proper accounting of its actions.	美国必须就指控（首先刊登在德国《明镜》杂志的一篇报道上）做出反应，并就其行为给出合理解释。


If it does not, the EU should take America to court.	若非如此，欧盟应该将美国诉诸法庭。


The 1961 Vienna Convention, ratified by the US, codifies the international law of diplomacy and diplomatic missions.	经美国批准，在1961年《维也纳公约》规定了关于外交和外交任务的国家法。


The US itself relied on the Convention in the case against Iran that it brought in 1980 before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, a year after Iranian students and others, with the revolutionary regime’s evident blessing, breached America’s embassy in Tehran and abducted its diplomats.	美国本身依据维也纳公约于1980年伊朗诉诸海牙国际法庭（ICJ）。 1979年，伊朗学生和其他人在伊朗革命政权证据确凿的放任下袭击了美国驻伊朗使馆，绑架了其中的外交官。


According to Article 22 of the Convention, “the premises of [a diplomatic] mission shall be inviolable,” and a “receiving state may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.”	根据维也纳公约第22条，“（外交）使团驻地神圣不可侵犯，”且“驻地所在东道国不能进入，除非有外交使团首脑允许。


Indeed, “[t]he receiving state is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion.”	”事实上，“东道国有特别人采取一切必要措施保护外交使团驻地不受任何侵犯。


Likewise, Article 24 stipulates that the “archives and documents of the mission shall be inviolable,” and Article 27 extends similar protection to the mission’s correspondence.	”类似地，第24条规定“外交使团的资料和档案神圣不可侵犯，”第27条将类似的保护范围扩大至使团通信。


In other words, a host state that enters a foreign mission without consent (none was given in my time as EU Ambassador in Washington, DC, from 2004 to 2009), or hacks into its computer system, would be acting in blatant violation of the Convention.	换句话说，东道国在未经允许的情况下进入外国使团驻地（在我2004—2009年任欧盟驻华盛顿大使以来从未发出过允许），或入侵其电脑系统，都将被视为对维也纳公约的公然践踏。


Reacting to Snowden’s allegations, US figures, like former CIA and NSA Director Michael Hayden, made no reference at all to America’s obligations under international law, to its interest in protecting diplomacy, or even to the unfairness and bad faith involved in spying on partners with whom one is supposedly negotiating in a transparent way.	针对斯诺登的指控，中央情报局（CIA）和NSA局长海登（Michael Hayden）一字不提美国的国际法义务、其保护外交使团的利益，甚至也没有提到监控其据信正在进行透明谈判的伙伴行为的不公和失信。


Nor did Hayden suggest any national-security concern that might justify spying on the EU (there is none).	哈登也没有提出可以论证监控欧盟（根本没有）合理性的国家安全考虑。


Instead, he sought to dismiss the entire issue by hinting vaguely about intelligence-gathering by some EU member states.	相反，他试图通过暧昧地暗示某些欧盟成员国的情报搜集行为为整个事件开脱。


But what is alleged to have happened was not a case of the US reciprocally countering supposed illegal activities by other states. It was hostile and illegal activity by the US directed against the EU itself.	但被指控的事件并非美国针对他国非法行为的以牙还牙，而是美国针对欧洲本身的非法敌对行为。


The EU has neither the capacity nor the authority to conduct any reciprocal surveillance of US missions in Europe, and it does not do so.	欧盟既没有能力、也没有权力针锋相对地监视美国驻欧洲使团，也没有这样做。


Hayden knows that perfectly well.	海登对此心知肚明。


So far, the US authorities have focused on bringing Snowden home to face espionage charges.	目前，美国当局意欲将斯诺登引渡回国以间谍罪起诉。


But it is in America’s national interest to ensure that the Vienna Convention is respected – without question and as a matter of routine – in order to ensure the safety and inviolability of its own missions abroad.	但确保维也纳公约得到尊重——作为惯例的不容置疑的尊重——符合美国利益，这能确保其本国驻外使团的安全和不可侵犯性。


Fundamental values are also at stake for the EU, whose members, ironically, have in some cases actively supported the US in its quest to extradite Snowden, despite being victims of America’s alleged breaches of international law.	对欧盟来说，根本价值也岌岌可危。 讽刺的是，尽管身为美国受控违反国际法行为的受害者，欧盟成员国中不乏积极支持美国引渡斯诺登者。


The founding idea of the EU was that relations between states should be governed by rules, not raw power.	欧盟的建立思想是国与国之间的关系必须由规则而不是赤裸裸的实力决定。


Indeed, the EU continues to exist precisely because its members respect treaties.	事实上，欧盟之所以能存续，正是因为其成员国尊重条约。


Take away respect for international law, and the EU would cease to exist – almost overnight.	不尊重国家，欧盟也无法继续存在——而且是马上。


There is no other force holding it together.	没有其他力量能将欧洲拧在一起。


For these reasons, and in light of the Vienna Convention’s specific terms, I believe that the EU cannot just move on and hope that the media furor over Snowden’s allegations will die down.	出于这些理由，并根据维也纳公约的具体条款，我认为欧盟不能视而不见，希望媒体对斯诺登指控的铺天盖地的报道会自然消停。


It must uphold international law.	欧盟必须拿起国际法武器。


One way for the EU to proceed would be to submit the dispute to independent arbitration, so that it does not adversely affect day-to-day relations with the US, which are crucial to economic recovery on both sides of the Atlantic.	欧盟的一个可行做法是将争端诉诸独立仲裁机构，从而使其不会妨碍作为大西洋两岸经济复苏关键的欧盟与美国的日常关系。


This approach has been adopted to address other issues – for example, bilateral trade disputes, with cases submitted to the World Trade Organization so that they do not interfere with other business between the EU and the US.	这一方法已用于解决其他问题——比如双边贸易争端提交至世贸组织，以使其不会干扰欧盟和美国之间的其他事项。


The EU – or member states acting on its behalf – should thus consider following the example set by the US itself in 1980.	因此，欧盟——或其代表成员国——应该考虑美国本身在1980年的先例。


This assumes that it can obtain sufficient documentary evidence of the allegations from, say, Snowden or Der Spiegel.	其前提是欧盟可以从（比如）斯诺登或《明镜》处获得关于指控的充分的书面证据。


Pursuing a legal route would depoliticize the issue in the short term, and allow time for tensions to ease.	寻求法律途径可以在短期使该案去政治化，并未消解紧张态势赢得时间。


If EU member states believe that taking America to court is too confrontational, they have the lesser option of asking the United Nations to seek an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the compatibility of the NSA’s alleged activities with the Vienna Convention.	如果欧盟成员国认为将美国诉诸法庭太不友善，那么还���替代方案：要求联合国就NSA被控行为是否符合维也纳公约的问题征求ICJ的意见。


In any event, the matter cannot rest where it is.	无论如何，这件事都不能照目前的方式继续下去。


Surveillance technology has advanced a great deal since 1961, when the Convention was concluded.	自1961年维也纳公约生效以来，监控技术有了长足的进步。


A new judgment from the ICJ in this case would be helpful.	ICJ就本案作出新裁决将是大有裨益的。


It would re-establish and modernize the norms of behavior that both the US and Europe would want all countries – notably, emerging powers like China – to respect in the future.	它能再次建立美国和欧洲希望所有国家——特别是中国等新兴大国——在未来能予以尊重的现代化的行为规范。


US President Barack Obama understands – probably better than any previous US president – the significance of international law, which is why he wants to bring countries like China fully within its strictures.	美国总统奥巴马明白——或许比此前的美国总统都更明白——国际法的重要性，这也是他欲将中国等国完全纳入国际法框架中的原因。


For that reason, he should welcome a robust reaffirmation of the principles of the Vienna Convention.	因此，他应该欢迎对维也纳公约的不折不扣的再确认。


Relearning to Love the Bomb	重新学会爱上炸弹


WASHINGTON, DC – The shocking thing about nuclear weapons is that they seem to have lost their power to shock.	华盛顿—关于核武器，令人震惊的事情是它们似乎已经失去了震慑力。


While the nuclear deal that was just reached with Iran in Lausanne might suggest otherwise and is very good news, that effort should not obscure the bad news elsewhere.	刚刚在洛桑达成的对伊朗的核协议也许表明了并非如此，并且是一个很好的消息，但这一成果无法压倒其他地区的坏消息。


The momentum toward a nuclear-weapon-free world driven by US President Barack Obama’s landmark 2009 speech in Prague, having faltered for the last few years, has now gone into sharp reverse.	由美国总统奥巴马标志性的2009年布拉格演讲推动的通往无核世界的努力在过去几年中动力渐失，如今更是急剧逆转。


When Russia annexed Crimea last year, President Vladimir Putin announced his readiness to put Russian nuclear forces on alert, and even signaled plans to “surprise the West with our new developments in offensive nuclear weapons.”	去年俄罗斯吞并克里米亚时，俄总统普京宣布已准备好让俄罗斯核力量进入警戒状态，甚至放言“用我们的进攻性核武器的新进步震惊西方”。


The world barely stirred.	世界不为所动。


Meanwhile, China and India are steadily increasing the size of their nuclear arsenals, and Pakistan is doing so even faster, even spelling out plans to combine battlefield nukes with conventional weapons.	与此同时，中国和印度也在稳步扩大核武库，巴基斯坦的动作更加迅速，甚至抛出了将战场核武器（battlefield nukes）与常规武器相结合的计划。


Again, the world shrugs.	世界再一次不为所动。


For its part, the United States plans to spend $355 billion upgrading and modernizing its vast nuclear arsenal over the next ten years.	美国则计划用3,550亿美元在未来十年升级和现代化其庞大的核武库。 其意图显然不是迈向核裁军，而是保持和强化美国现有陆基、海基和空基核能力的每一个要素。


Far from moving toward disarmament, the intention seems to be to maintain and enhance every component of America’s current land, sea, and airborne nuclear capability.	在3月份华盛顿举行的有800名核专家参加的会议上，娱乐的气氛比警戒更加浓厚，一位空军高级将领反常地提到了《奇爱博士》（Dr.


There was more amusement than alarm at a conference of 800 nuclear specialists in Washington, DC, in March, when a senior Air Force general, eerily channeling George C. Scott in “Dr. Strangelove,” offered a nostrils-bared defense of “an ability to allow no adversary to have sanctuary anywhere in the world.”	Strangelove）中的乔治·斯科特（George C. Scott），赤裸裸地为“不让任何对手在世界任何地方拥有避难所”辩护。


Spooked by Russia’s incursions into Ukraine, North Korea’s erratic intransigence, and China’s new foreign-policy assertiveness, US allies and partners in East Asia and Europe have rushed back to unthinking embrace of Cold War assumptions about the deterrent utility of nuclear weapons and their central importance in security policy.	俄罗斯入侵乌克兰、朝鲜难以捉摸的不配合，以及中国立场坚定的新外交政策让美国的东亚和欧洲盟友和伙伴惊慌不已，纷纷匆忙重拾冷战思维——强调核武器的震慑功能以及在安全政策中的核心重要性。


As my colleagues and I put it in our book-length report Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play 2015, launched in Geneva, Vienna, and Washington in March: “On the evidence of the size of their weapons arsenals, fissile material stocks, force modernization plans, stated doctrine and known deployment practices, all nine nuclear-armed states foresee indefinite retention of nuclear weapons and a continuing role for them in their security policies.”	2月份，我的同事和我在日内瓦、维也纳和华盛顿发表了长篇报告《核武器：2015年进展情况》（Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play 2015），报告中指出：“根据核武库、导弹材料库存、武装现代化计划、公开宣布的立场以及已知的部署情况看，所有九大有核国家都将无限期保留核武器以及核武器在安全政策中的地位。 ”


All of this has serious implications for the five-year review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), scheduled to begin in New York in late April.	所有这些给定于4月底在纽约召开的核不扩散条约（NPT）五年评估会议形成了严重影响。


The NPT has been the single most crucial factor in limiting the world’s nuclear-armed states to the current nine, rather than the 20-30 widely feared a generation ago.	NPT是将世界有核国家数量限制在当前的九个，而不是一代人之前人们普遍担心的20—30个的唯一最重要的原因。


But its credibility now hangs by a thread.	但如今，NPT的信誉命悬一线。


The NPT, after all, is based on a bargain: states that do not possess nuclear weapons promise not to acquire them, in exchange for a pledge by those that do to move seriously toward eliminating their arsenals.	说到底，NPT是讨价还价的产物：不拥有核武器的国家承诺不会拥有核武器，作为交换，已有核武器的国家认真对待削减核武库的问题。


And recent developments have once again jeopardized that bargain, with many states again asking why, if the US, Russia, and others need nuclear weapons, they do not.	最近的发展趋势再次破坏了这一讨价还价，许多国家再次质疑，为何美国、俄罗斯和其他国家需要核武器，而它们不需要。


Given such sentiments, it will prove almost impossible at the review conference to build a consensus in favor of further necessary strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, with improved safeguards, export controls, security disciplines, and sanctions against withdrawal from the treaty.	在如此情绪下，评估会议几乎不可能形成有利于进一步对核不扩散机制进行必要强化的共识从而改善安全、控制出口、强调安全纪律，并对退出条约的行为予以制裁。


The irrationality of such resistance is not likely to weaken it.	如此抵制是不理性的，但并未因此减少抵制。


Not all the news is bleak.	并非所有消息都是坏消息。


Aside from the Iran negotiations, other arms control cooperation is continuing, including between the US and Russia over the New START treaty to reduce strategic deployments, and over chemical weapons in Syria.	除了伊朗谈判，其他军备控制合作也在继续，包括美国和俄罗斯之间裁减战略核武器部署的新START条约和销毁叙利亚化学武器合作。


Despite lack of any visible progress toward ridding the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction, the signs are encouraging that Egypt and others in the region want to keep trying, and will not use the issue of a WMD-free zone to blow up the review conference, as had been feared.	尽管在消除中东大规模杀伤性武器方面仍没有取得可见的进展，但仍不乏令人鼓舞的信号，埃及和其他中东国家愿意继续努力，并且不会如许多人担心的那样利用无大规模杀伤性武器区来阻挠评估会议。


Most encouraging of all, a major new international movement is gathering pace to focus policy attention on the horrific humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, and to create the conditions for a treaty to ban them once and for all.	最令人鼓舞的是，一场新的大型国际惠东正在让政策焦点转向使用核武器带来的可怕的人道主义灾难并制造��成全面禁止核武器条约的条件。


Since 2012, major conferences have been hosted by Norway, Mexico, and Austria, and more than 155 states have pledged support for appropriate action, with only the nuclear-armed states and their allies and partners dragging their feet.	自2012年以来，挪威、 墨西哥和奥地利召开了重要会议，超过155个国家承诺支持合理的行动，只有有核国家和它们的盟友与伙伴没有加入其中。


The nuclear-armed states will not sign on any time soon to any treaty that bans the use of their weapons under all circumstances.	有核国家绝不可能在近期签订任何禁止它们在任何条件下使用核武器的条约。


They will resist even more strongly the outright elimination of their weapons, given that the world is probably still decades away from devising sufficient verification and enforcement measures.	对于全面销毁核武器，它们的抵制将更加强烈，因为世界可能还需要几十年时间才能发展出充分的证明和执行手段。


But if the NPT review conference is not to end in tears, with all the accompanying risks for world order that failure would entail, the five nuclear-armed states that are NPT signatories can and must be prepared to bring more to the table than they have so far.	但如果不想让NPT评估会议形同虚设，避免NPT失败给世界秩序所造成的危险，五大签署了NPT的有核国家可以也必须带来比目前做到的等多的东西。


Baby steps – improving their transparency in reporting, or agreeing on the meaning of technical terms like “strategic,” “deployed,” and “reserve” – will not begin to satisfy the many NPT countries that have been appalled by the recent re-emergence of Cold War mindsets and behavior.	初步措施——改善报告透明度或统一“战略”、“部署”和“储备”等技术术语的意义——无法满足许多因为冷战思维和行为死灰复燃而胆战心惊的NPT国家。


The nuclear-armed states can and should make serious commitments to dramatic further reductions in the size of their arsenals; hold the number of weapons physically deployed and ready for immediate launch to an absolute minimum; and change their strategic doctrines to limit the role and salience of nuclear weapons, ideally by committing to “no first use.”	保持实际部署武器的数量、准备立刻宣布一个绝对最小值； 并改变战略思维，限制核武器的作用和突出性，最好是通过承诺“不首先使用”。


Most important, they should agree on indicative target dates – from five to 15 years – for achieving all of these initial objectives.	最重要的是，它们应该形成一个指导性目标日期——五年到15年不等——以实现所有这些最初目标。


Deadlines have been indispensable for achieving sustainable-development and carbon-reduction goals: saving the world from the threat of nuclear annihilation is hardly a less urgent and important objective.	截止期对于实现可持续发展和减碳目标至关重要：让世界免受核灭绝的威胁也是个在紧迫性和重要性上绝不落下风的目标。


How Iran Is Winning	伊朗是怎样占据上风的


TEL AVIV – In 2003, the United States – which, along with its NATO allies, had already occupied Afghanistan – toppled Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq and overran his army.	特拉维夫—2003年，美国——它与它的北约盟友已经占领了阿富汗——推翻了伊拉克萨达姆政府，占领了他的军队。


Iran’s leaders, alarmed that they were being encircled, lost no time in offering the West a grand bargain covering all contentious issues, from nuclear-weapons development – they halted their military nuclear program – to regional security, including the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and their backing of Hezbollah and Hamas.	伊朗领导人警觉地发现自己陷入了包围中，毫不迟疑地向西方提出了一个大妥协，包括了从核武器开发（他们中止了军用核计划）到地区安全（包括以色列-巴勒斯坦和平进程以及他们对真主党和哈马斯的支持）的所有争议问题。


The recent framework agreement on Iran’s nuclear program has had the opposite effect.	最近的伊朗核计划框架协议起到了相反的效果。


Though the deal does slow Iran’s development of nuclear weapons, it does not restrain – or even address – the regime’s hegemonic ambitions in the region, for which it has already spent billions of dollars and suffered crippling sanctions.	尽管该协议确实延缓了伊朗核武器的开发，但它并不约束——甚至不遏制——伊朗政权的地区霸权野心。 为了这一野心，伊朗投入了数十亿美元，还遭致了令其损失惨重的制裁。


As a result, the framework agreement is creating strategic chaos in an already dysfunctional region.	结果，该框架协议正在已经混乱不以的中东地区创造战略动荡。


A future in which regional powers like Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia (which has worked closely with Pakistan on the nuclear front) possess threshold nuclear capabilities is becoming more likely that ever.	土耳其、埃及和沙特阿拉伯（已经与巴基斯坦在核方面展开紧密合作）等地区力量未来拥有临界（threshold）核能力的可能性大增。


These are glorious days for Iran.	现在是伊朗的光辉时刻。


After more than a decade of diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions, its status as a threshold nuclear state has been internationally legitimized.	在经历了十多年的外交孤立和经济制裁后，伊朗作为临界核国家的地位得到了国际合法化。


Moreover, it has managed to compel the US to abandon its dream of regime change, and to coexist – and even engage – with an Islamic theocracy that it finds repugnant.	此外，它成功地迫使美国放弃了推翻政权的想法，只能接受与和它对立的伊斯兰神权国家共存——甚至合作。


The regional balance of power is already tilting in Iran’s favor.	地区力量平衡已经在朝有利于伊朗的方向倾斜。


In Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria, Iranian proxies have prevailed over Saudi-backed groups.	在黎巴嫩、巴勒斯坦和叙利亚，伊朗的代理人战胜了沙特支持的集团。


And the Iran-backed Houthis remain in control of Yemen, despite Saudi airstrikes.	而尽管沙特实施了空袭，但伊朗支持的胡塞叛军仍控制着也门。


Iran’s leaders can thank George W. Bush.	伊朗领导人可以感谢小布什。


Far from producing the outcome that they feared in 2003, Bush’s wars in the Middle East left Iran as the most influential actor in Iraq.	布什的中东战争并没有创造出2003年伊朗所害怕的结果，而是让伊朗成为伊拉克最有影响力的行动方。


As Saudi officials have observed, Iranian militias fighting the Islamic State in predominantly Sunni regions north and west of Baghdad hope to reinforce their country’s control over Iraq.	沙特官员观察到，在以逊尼派为主题的北部和巴格达以西为伊斯兰国战斗的伊朗民间武装希望加强伊朗对伊拉克的控制。


The perceived threat posed by the Islamic State has also caused the US to drop ousting Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, Iran’s main regional ally, from its agenda.	感到伊斯兰国的威胁也让美国不在试图推翻伊朗的主要地区盟友——叙利亚的巴沙尔·阿萨德。


Indeed, the US has ended up indirectly allied with Hezbollah, a key Iranian proxy, which is fighting alongside Assad’s troops against foreign jihadi forces.	事实上，美国最后已开始与伊朗的重要代理人——与巴沙尔的不对共同抗击外来圣战势力的真主党间接结盟。


Meanwhile, America’s relationship with its traditional Arab allies – the region’s conservative Sunni regimes – is faltering, owing largely to US President Barack Obama’s failure to respond effectively in the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings.	与此同时，美国与其传统阿拉伯盟友——中东地区保守的逊尼派政权——的关系正在趋于平淡，这主要是因为美国总统奥巴马没有在阿拉伯之春动乱后有效响应。


Obama’s offers of security guarantees and “nuclear umbrellas” have not been able to restore their trust.	奥巴马所提供的安全保障和“核保护伞”没能重塑它们的信任。


(Such security guarantees are, after all, implicit.)	（毕竟，这些安全保障只是间接的。 ）


For Iran’s enemies, the message of the framework agreement is clear: protect your own vital interests, rather than waiting for the US.	对伊朗的敌人来说，框架协议的含义是明确的：保护你自己的关键利益，不要指望美国。


And that is precisely what countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia are doing, having established a joint Arab military force to fight Iranian influence in the region, as well as discreet security links with Israel, another self-declared victim of the framework agreement.	而这正是埃及和沙特阿拉伯等国家正在做的，它们成立了一支阿拉伯联军对抗伊朗的地区影响，并谨慎地与以色列——另一个自称为框架协议受害者的国家——建立安全联系。


Turkey is also engaging in strategic recalculations.	土耳其也开始了战略局势重估。


President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who called Iran his “second home” during a visit to Tehran last year, recently accused the Islamic Republic of “seeking to dominate the region.”	去年，土耳其总统埃尔多安在访问德黑兰期间将伊朗称为“第二故乡”，而最近，他指责伊朗“寻求主宰中东地区”。


As a result, Turkey now finds itself collaborating with Saudi Arabia in backing the Al Nusra Front, the Syrian arm of Al Qaeda, which captured Idlib in the first major military setback for Assad in recent months.	结果，土耳其现在与沙特阿拉伯合作支持基地组织叙利亚分支胜利阵线（Al Nusra Front），该组织在最近几个月以来巴沙尔的首次重大军事挫折中攻占了伊德利卜（Idlib）。


Still, Turkey’s recent behavior – from Erdoğan’s shocking call for an end to the Sykes-Picot system to its de facto collusion with the Islamic State’s siege of the Kurdish town of Kobani, just over the border in Syria – has discouraged the region’s major Sunni powers from pursuing closer ties.	但是，土耳其最近的行为——从埃尔多安令人震惊地呼吁结束赛克斯·皮科（Sykes-Picot）体系到其与伊斯兰国事实勾结包围位于土叙边境的库尔德人城镇科巴尼（Kobani）——让该地区主要逊尼派力量无法寻求与其的更紧密的合作。


But no regional leader is as frantic – or as dangerous – as Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu.	但中东地区最疯狂——或者最危险——的领导人莫过于以色列总理内塔尼亚胡。


In his vulgar use of Holocaust metaphors to portray the Iranian threat, he sounds more like the principal of a Jewish ghetto about to be annihilated by an agitated mob than the prime minister of the most powerful country in the Middle East.	他粗俗地用大屠杀隐喻描绘伊朗威胁，看上去他更像是眼看就要被激动的暴徒袭击的犹太居民区长老，而不像是中东最强大国家的总理。


Netanyahu’s lack of self-awareness is perhaps best exemplified in his interactions with Obama.	内塔尼亚胡缺乏自知之明的最佳写照也许莫过于他最近与奥巴马的互动。


He expects the US to offer Israel security assistance to face the challenge that Iran poses, even as he barges clumsily into Obama’s political backyard and forges alliances with his domestic opponents.	他希望美国向以色列提供安全援助以面对伊朗带来的挑战——哪怕他粗暴地闯入奥巴马的政治后院，与他的国内反对者结盟。


In fact, Netanyahu has fundamentally misunderstood the Iran challenge: It is not an existential threat, but part of a broader struggle for regional mastery.	事实上，内塔尼亚胡从根本上误解了伊朗的挑战：这不是一个生存威胁，而是事关地区主宰力的更广泛的斗争的一部分。


Rather than engaging in an unrealistic campaign to kill the nuclear agreement, Netanyahu should have been focusing on the strategic implications of Iran’s rise.	内塔尼亚胡不应该参合扼杀核协议的不现实的运动，而应该专注于伊朗崛起的战略影响。


It is Iran’s geopolitical behavior, not its threshold nuclear status, that matters.	伊朗的地缘政治行为，而不是其临界核地位，才是最重要的。


Of course, Netanyahu is intentionally exaggerating the Iranian threat to deflect attention from Israel’s real problems – especially its enduring conflict with Palestine.	当然，内塔尼亚胡在刻意夸大伊朗威胁以转移对以色列真正问题的关注——特别是以色列与巴勒斯坦的长期冲突。


But he can hope to obscure the sins of occupation only temporarily.	但他只能暂时掩盖占领的罪行。


If the Palestine issue is not resolved soon, there can be no lasting alliances with “moderate” Sunni powers to counter Iran.	如果巴勒斯坦问题不尽快解决，可能就无法形成与“温和”逊尼派力量的持久联盟以对抗伊朗。


In order to bring some semblance of stability to the Middle East, the US must think beyond the framework nuclear agreement with Iran and develop, with all stakeholders, a collective security regime – an initiative that will require the US to regain the trust of its allies in the region.	为了给中东带来些许稳定的外表，美国必须超越与伊朗形成框架核协议的思维，与所有相关利益方构建一个集体安全机制——这一机制需要美国重新赢得所有中东盟友的信任。


In reality, the key question has never been when Iran will develop a nuclear weapon, but how to integrate it into a stable regional system before it does.	在现实中，关键问题从来不是伊朗何时开发出核武器，而是如何在它拥有核武器之前将它纳入稳定的地区体系中。


Bottling the Sun	把太阳装进瓶中


LONDON – This December, world leaders will gather in Paris for the United Nations Climate Change Conference, where they will attempt – yet again – to hammer out a global agreement to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions.	伦敦——今年12月，各国领导人将汇聚巴黎召开联合国气候变化会议，届时他们将再次尝试制定一项温室气体减排的全球性协议。


Despite the inevitable sense of déjà vu that will arise as negotiators struggle to reach a compromise, they must not give up.	尽管谈判代表们全力达成妥协难免让人感觉似曾相识，但他们绝对不能放弃。


Whatever the political or economic considerations, the fact remains: if global temperatures rise more than 2˚C from pre-industrial levels, the consequences for the planet will be catastrophic.	无论考虑何种政治经济因素，都无法改变这样一个事实：如果全球气温比工业革命前上升超过2℃，给地球造成的后果将是灾难性的。


But the challenge does not end with reducing emissions.	但减排并不是唯一的挑战。


Indeed, even if we make the transition to a cleaner world by 2050, we will need to determine how to meet a booming global population’s insatiable appetite for energy in the longer term – an imperative that renewables alone cannot meet.	事实上，即使到2050年我们完成向清洁世界的过渡，长远看我们还需要确定如何满足不断膨胀的全球人口对能源永不知足的需求——上述需求仅靠可再生能源势必无法满足。


That is why we need to invest now in other technologies that can complement renewables, and provide reliable electricity for many centuries to come.	因此我们现在就要投资补充可再生能源及确保未来数百年电力供应的其他技术。


And one of the most promising options is nuclear fusion – the process that powers the sun and all stars.	其中最具前景的技术是核聚变——核聚变为太阳和星星提供了源源不断的能量。


Brought down to earth, nuclear fusion – a process fueled primarily by lithium and deuterium (an isotope of hydrogen), both of which are plentiful in seawater and in the earth’s crust – could provide a major source of low-carbon energy.	地球核聚变的主要能源来自锂和氘（氢的同位素），这两种主要集中在海水和地壳中的元素是低碳能源的源头。


A fusion power station would use only around 450 kilograms of fuel annually, cause no atmospheric pollution, and carry no risk of accidents that could lead to radioactive contamination of the environment.	核聚变电站每年只需要约450千克燃料，既不会造成大气污染，也不会发生导致环境放射性污染的事故。


But, while the fusion process has produced some power (16 million watts of it, to be specific), scientists have yet to create a self-sustaining fusion “burn.”	不过，虽然聚变过程产生了一定能量（具体来讲是1，600万瓦特），科学家们还没有成功完成能自我持续的核聚变“燃烧”过程。


Indeed, unlike nuclear fission, which went from the laboratory to the power grid within two decades, fusion has proved a tough nut to crack.	事实上，不同于在短短二十年中就完成了从实验室向电网过渡的核裂变，核聚变这块骨头要难啃得多。


The problem is that fusion involves joining two positively charged nuclei – and, as basic science shows, same-sign charges repel each other.	问题在于核聚变要连接两个带正电的原子核——基础科学显示同符号电荷是相互排斥的。


Only at extremely high temperatures – over 100 million degrees Celsius, or almost ten times hotter than the sun – do the nuclei move so rapidly that they overcome their repulsion and fuse.	只有在极端高温（超过1亿摄氏度）或比太阳炙热10倍的温度下，原子核的移动速度才能克服阻力实现聚合。


Scientists have spent the last 60 years trying to figure out the best way to create these conditions.	科学家们花了六十年时间试图找出创造这些条件的最佳方法。


Today, the frontrunner is a device known as a “tokamak,” a magnetic bottle in which the fuel, held at 100-200 million degrees Celsius, fuses, unlocking huge amounts of energy.	今天，领先的是一台名叫“托卡马克”的设备，该磁瓶温度高达1亿到2亿摄氏度，能使燃料在发生聚变的同时释放出巨大的能量。


Of course, holding the sun in a bottle is no small challenge, especially when one considers that the systems must be engineered so that they can create electricity for a price consumers are willing to pay.	当然，把太阳装进瓶子里是个不小的挑战，尤其还要确保消费者愿意为系统所产生的电能付费。


But in a sunny corner of southern France, a global megaproject is coming together that will, for the first time, test the technology on an industrial scale, creating the first controlled fusion burn.	但在法国南部一个阳光明媚的角落，一个以工业化规模测试相关技术、创造有史以来首次受控聚变燃烧的全球性大型项目正在进行当中。


Everything about the so-called “ITER reactor” is big.	所谓“国际热核聚变反应堆（ITER reactor）”的一切都极其庞大。 其重量超过三座艾菲尔铁塔；


It will be heavier than three Eiffel Towers; the material for its superconducting magnets would stretch around the equator twice; and it has a price tag of more than €15 billion ($16.8 billion), making it one of the largest international science endeavors in history.	所用超导磁体材料拉直后可以绕地球赤道两周； 该项目价值150亿欧元（合168亿美元），当之无愧成为史上规模最大的国际科研项目。


The ITER partners – China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States – represent half the world’s population.	ITER合作国——中国、欧盟、印度、日本、俄罗斯、韩国和美国——占据了全世界将近一半的人口总数。