But the existential challenge – political agreement on the key elements of banking and fiscal union – is only just beginning.	但生存挑战——在银行和财政联盟的关键要素上形成政治一致——才刚刚开始。


Unless it is met, the eurozone’s financial disintegration will eventually resume.	而除非形成一致，否则欧元区最终将迈向金融分裂。


Is Europe’s Housing Market Next?	是否轮到欧洲房地产市场破灭？


A bubble in the American housing market – fueled in part by so-called “sub-prime” mortgages – was the catalyst for today’s financial market turbulence.	    美国房地产市场在某种程度上由于所谓“次级”房屋贷款的推动而形成泡沫，这一泡沫成为当今金融市场动荡的诱因。


But the bubble was not confined to the United States.	但是这一泡沫并不限于美国。


In Europe, house prices have also increased sharply over the last decade – more dramatically than in the US in many cases.	在欧洲，过去十年中房地产价格也大幅度上升，在许多情况下比美国还有过之无不及。


The same is true of other OECD countries and emerging markets, where rapidly increasing incomes have put pressure on asset prices.	其他经合组织和新兴市场国家也是如此。 在这些国家中，迅速攀升的收入给资产价格施加了压力。


Indeed, with a few exceptions (essentially Germany and Japan), housing prices have risen almost everywhere to levels never seen before.	    确实，除了德国和日本等几个少数国家外，几乎所有地方的房地产价格都达到了前所未有的高度。


How could such a global pattern emerge when real estate is the most local of all assets?	房地产是所有资产中最为具有地域限制的，这样的全球性模式又是如何形成的呢？


Recent research suggests that the global housing boom was closely linked to the unprecedented increase in the supply of liquidity by major central banks.	    最近的研究表明，全球房地产繁荣与各大国中央银行前所未有地增加流动资金供给紧密相联。


To be sure, financial innovation, like lending to buyers who would not normally have qualified for mortgage loans (sub-prime borrowers) also played a role.	的确，像给一般情况下没有资格获得房屋按揭贷款(也就是所谓的次级房屋贷款)的购房人提供贷款这样的金融创新也发挥了一定的作用。


But sub-prime mortgages would probably not have been supplied on the same scale if central banks had not created an environment of ample liquidity and persistently low interest rates.	但是，如果各国中央银行没有创造充足的流动资金以及长期低利率的环境，大概不会以如此的规模提供次级房屋贷款。


The sub-prime crisis has so far affected mainly financial markets in the US and Europe.	    次级房屋贷款危机目前为止主要影响到美国和欧洲的金融市场。


This is not surprising if one considers that on both sides of the Atlantic prices have reached historical peaks and, until recently, had accelerated. 	如果人们考虑到大西洋两岸的房地产价格已经达到了历史高度而且最近又加速升高，这也就不足为奇了。


This is no mere coincidence.	    这并非一个巧合。


There has always been a correlation between American and European house prices.	美国和欧洲的房地产价格之间总是存在联系。


Over the last three decades, prices in the US and Europe have tended to follow three slow-moving, related boom-bust cycles.	在过去三十年中，美国和欧洲的房地产价格趋向于遵循三个缓慢移动、相互关联的从繁荣到崩溃的周期。


All previous peaks were followed by several years of declining prices (in real terms).	以往所有的价格高度都是伴随着几年的实际价格水平的下滑。


There is no reason to assume that this cycle will be any different.	人们没有理由假定这一次周期会有所不同。


Since last year, prices have declined in the US.	    从去年以来，美国的房地产价格已经下降。


Because data for the euro area will become available only much later, it is not yet possible to determine whether prices have already turned on the Continent as well.	由于欧元区的数据只有在等很长一段时间才能够得到，因此目前不可能确定欧洲大陆的房地产价格是否同样已经下滑。


But if the past pattern holds, house prices should start to fall very soon in (continental) Europe as well.	但是如果以往的模式还是这样的话，欧洲大陆的住房价格也会马上下降。


In both the US and Europe it seems that prices went 20-30% above their longer-term average values.	    美国和欧洲的房地产价格超过了长期平均价值的20%到30%。


Such a large overshooting is likely to be followed by some undershooting.	这样一个大的涨幅有可能伴随着某些跌幅。


This would imply that prices will probably have to fall at least by 20-30 %, but possibly considerably more before they find a bottom.	这将会意味着房地产价格可能会下降至少20%到30%，但是在探底之前可能会下降更多。


European policy makers thus have cause for concern.	    因此，欧洲的决策者们应当警觉。


While there is little evidence in the euro area of large-scale sub-prime lending, there is considerable evidence to suggest that house prices have an important impact on domestic demand, albeit with wide variations among individual countries.  	目前还没有证据表明欧元区存在大规模的次级房屋贷款，但是有大量证据表明，尽管各国情况不同，住房价格还是对国内需求有着重大的影响。


Almost everywhere, higher house prices have been associated with strong consumption.	    几乎在所有的地方，更高的房地产价格带来强劲的消费。


Lower house prices throughout Europe are thus likely to be accompanied by weaker consumption demand, as in the US.	整个欧洲房地产价格下降因此就有可能伴随着消费需求软弱，就像美国一样。


In Germany, for example, house prices have remained relatively low and consumption weak.	例如在德国，住房价格维持相对低下，消费也疲软。


The impact of house prices on construction activity has been more varied.	    住房价格给建筑业带来的影响更为有所不同。


In Spain and Ireland, construction investment has increased to a level (18-20% of GDP) far above that of the US and not seen in any other OECD country except Japan before its bubble burst in 1989.	在西班牙和爱尔兰，建筑投资增加到国民生产总值的18%到20%，这一水平远远高于美国，而且除了日本房地产泡沫破裂以前任何经合组织国家所未见。


In these two countries, lower housing prices are likely to be associated with a sharp and prolonged drop in domestic demand, which should be stronger even than what can be expected in the US.	在这两个国家中，房地产价格下降有可能伴随着国内需求长期大幅度下降，甚至要超过美国预计下降的幅度。


By contrast, in France and Italy, where house prices have increased almost as much as in the US, there is no evidence of a housing overhang.	    与此相比，尽管法国和意大利的房地产价格增长几乎和美国一样多，但是没有证据表明存在房地产过剩。


The negative impact of a downturn in housing prices in these two countries should thus be limited to a drop in consumption.	因此，这两个国家房地产价格下降的负面影响应当局限于消费的下滑。


Germany should be affected the least, because both house prices and construction activity have been below trend for some time.	德国应该受影响最轻微，因为住房价格和建筑活动一段时间以来一直低于大趋势。


In short, the downturn in house prices will not be limited to the US.	    总之，住房价格下降不会仅限于美国。


And, on both sides of the Atlantic, that decline is likely to undermine consumer spending.	而且，在大西洋两岸，这一下降有可能破坏消费。


Is Export Led Growth Passé?	出口带动增长是否已是明日黄花？


CAMBRIDGE – For five decades, developing countries that managed to develop competitive export industries have been rewarded with astonishing growth rates: Taiwan and South Korea in the 1960’s, Southeast Asian countries like Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore in the 1970’s, China in the 1980’s, and eventually India in the 1990’s.	剑桥--过去五十年以来，某些发展中国家发展竞争性出口产业取得了令人瞩目的经济增长率。 二十世纪六十年代的台湾和韩国，七十年代的马来西亚、泰国和新加坡等国，八十年代的中国以及最后九十年代的印度都是如此。


In all these cases, and a few others – also mostly in Asia – domestic reforms would surely have produced growth regardless of international trade.	所有这些案例以及其他主要是亚洲几个国家中，国内改革确实产生了经济增长，而无论国际贸易状况如何。


But it is difficult to see how the resulting growth could have been as high – reaching an unprecedented 10% or more annually in per-capita terms – without a global economy able to absorb these countries’ exports.	年度人均增长高达10%，前所未有。 但是人们难以想见，在全球经济难以消化这些国家的出口的情况下经济增长会如此之高。


Many countries are trying to emulate this growth model, but rarely as successfully because the domestic preconditions often remain unfulfilled.	许多国家正在试图模仿这一经济增长模式，但是少有如此成功。 这是因为国内的先决条件没有得到满足。


Turn to world markets without pro-active policies to ensure competence in some modern manufacturing or service industry, and you are likely to remain an impoverished exporter of natural resources and labor-intensive products such as garments.	如果一个国家没有前瞻性的政策确保某些现代制造业或服务行业具有竞争力就转向国际市场，就有可能无法摆脱出口自然资源以及服装等劳动力密集型产品的贫穷地位。


Nevertheless, developing countries have been falling over each other to establish export zones and subsidize assembly operations of multinational enterprises.	但是，发展中国家一直竞相建立出口加工区并且为跨国公司的组装工序提供补贴。


The lesson is clear: export-led growth is the way to go.	靠出口带动经济增长是必经之路，经验就是如此。


But for how long?	但是这一战略可以维持多久呢？


While reading the economic tea leaves is always risky, there are signs that we are at the cusp of a transition to a new regime in which the rules of the game will not be nearly as accommodating for export-led strategies.	尽管对经济前景做出预测总是难以准确，但是现在有迹象表明我们现正处在一个向新体系转型的开始。 在这一体系之中，游戏规则并不总是对出口带动战略如此青睐。


The most immediate threat is the slowdown in the advanced economies.	最为直接的威胁是发达国家经济减缓。


Europe and the United States are both entering recession, and fears are mounting that the financial meltdown accompanying the sub-prime mortgage debacle has not worked itself out.	欧洲和美国都步入衰退，人们越发担心伴随次级房贷危机而来的金融危机还远为结束。


All this is happening at a time when inflationary pressures hamper the usual monetary and fiscal remedies.	所有这些都恰逢通货膨胀压力阻碍正常货币和财政补救措施。


The European Central Bank, tightly focused on price stability, has been raising interest rates, and the US Federal Reserve may soon follow suit.	欧洲央行紧密关注价格稳定，已经提高了利率。 美联储或许也会效仿。


So the advanced economies will suffer for a while, with obvious implications for the demand for exports from emerging markets.	因此，发达国家经济将会在一定时间里受到打击，这会影响新型市场出口产品的需求。


On top of this is the almost certain unwinding of global current-account imbalances.	首当其冲的是全球经常项目失衡几乎肯定会得以纠正。


Emerging markets and developing countries ran a surplus of $631 billion in 2007, split roughly equally between Asian countries and the oil-exporting states.	新型市场国际和发展中国家2007年的盈余为6310亿美元，其中亚洲国家和石油出口国家大体上各占据一半。


This amounts to 4.2% of their collective GDP.	这相当于它们国民生产总值的4. 2%。


The US alone ran a current-account deficit of $739 billion (5.3% of its GDP).	美国自己的经常项目赤字就达到7390亿美元 (占其国民生产总值的5.


Neither the economics nor the politics of this pattern of current-account balances is sustainable, especially in a recessionary environment.	3%) 。 这种经常项目平衡模式从经济上和政治上都难以维系，在经济衰退的环境之下尤其如此。


The politics is clear to see.	政治上一眼便知。


Nothing works as potently to inflame protectionist sentiment as large trade deficits.	庞大的贸易逆差最为煽动保护主义情绪。


According to a December 2007 NBC/Wall Street Journal poll, almost 60% of Americans think globalization is bad because it has subjected US firms and workers to unfair competition.	2007年12月美国全国广播公司和华尔街日报联合民意调查显示，几乎60%的美国人认为全球化有害，因为它迫使美国公司和工人接受不公平的竞争。


If globalization has acquired a lousy reputation in the US, the external deficit deserves much of the blame.	如果全球化已经在美国名声不佳，那么，外债就要负主要责任。


US trade policy has been remarkably resistant to protectionist pressure in recent years.	近年来，美国的贸易政策一直顶住了保护主义压力。


But, regardless of who wins America’s presidency, the world should expect closer scrutiny of imports from China and other low-cost countries as well as of outsourcing of services to places like India.	但是，无论谁赢得美国总统大选，世界都将会看到对中国和其他低成本国家的出口产品以及印度等外包服务国家进行更加严格的审查。


As the US and other advanced economies become less hospitable to developing-country exports, rapidly growing emerging markets, help as they may, are unlikely to take up the slack and thus provide ample fuel for export-led growth.	在美国和其他发达国家经济体对于发展中国家的出口产品变得越发不友善的时候，快速发展的新兴市场国家不大可能收拾残局并且提供出口带动经济增长的强大动力。


Import tariffs tend to be higher in developing countries, making it more difficult to gain access to them.	发展中国家的进口关税将会趋向更高，使得市场准入更为困难。


Moreover, developing countries compete in similar products – consumer goods of varying levels of sophistication – so that the politics of expanded South-South trade looks even worse than the politics of North-South trade.	而且，由于发展中国家在相似的产品、也就是不同加工深度的消费品上进行竞争，因此在政治上，扩大南南贸易要比扩大南北贸易看上去还要困难。


Anti-dumping action against imports from China, Vietnam, and other Asian exporters is already commonplace in developing countries.	针对来自中国、越南以及其他亚洲出口国家进口产品的反倾销诉讼案件在发展中国家已经是家常便饭。


So exporting will become an even tougher business.	所以，出口将会变得越发艰难。


Countries like China that have large surpluses will have to rely much more on domestic demand to fuel their economies.	像中国那样拥有庞大贸易顺差的国家将会不得不越发依赖于国内需求来推动其经济发展。


This is not all bad, because China can certainly use more public investment in social sectors such as health and education.	这一情况并非完全不好，因为中国必定会使用更多的投资用于教育和医疗等社会部门。


But the impact will extend beyond the surplus countries.	但是这一影响却会超越贸易盈余国家之外。


If exporters from Brazil, Turkey, South Africa, and Mexico – all deficit economies – were already struggling to compete with China in third markets when those markets were wide open and expanding rapidly, imagine how they will fare under less hospitable conditions.	如果巴西、土耳其、南非以及墨西哥等贸易赤字国家在第三国市场大为开放、快速扩大之际还要努力与中国竞争，人们就可以想像得到在不是如此友善的环境下它们将会如何了。


The impact on growth will almost certainly be negative, even if domestic demand compensates fully for the decline in external demand.	对于经济增长的影响几乎可能是负面的，即使国内需求完全补偿了外部需求的下降。


The reason is microeconomic, not macroeconomic: you can sell only so much steel or auto parts at home, and labor productivity in service industries does not match that of export-oriented activities.	其原因是微观经济上的，而非宏观经济。 因为一个国家只能够在国内销售如此多钢铁或者汽车部件，而且服务产业的劳动效率并不与出口导向经济活动相匹配。


So shrinking export markets will slow down growth-promoting structural change at home.	所以，出口市场下滑将会引发国内经济增长促进结构改变。


None of this implies a disaster for developing countries.	这些并不表明发展中国家大难临头。


Long-term success still depends on what happens at home rather than abroad.	长久的成功依旧取决于国内因素而非国外因素。


What is moderately bad news at the moment will become terrible news only if economic distress in the advanced countries – especially the US – is allowed to morph into xenophobia and all-out protectionism; if large emerging markets such as China, India, and Brazil fail to realize that they have become too important to free ride on global economic governance; and if, as a consequence, others overreact by turning their back on the world economy and pursue autarkic policies.	现在稍微不妙的消息只有发生以下情况才会成为变得糟糕透顶，也就是任凭发达国家、特别是美国的经济困难演变成为排外和全面的保护主义，中国、印度和巴西等新兴经济大国无法认识到其经济已经变得十分重要而忽视全球经济管治以及因此其他国家回避世界经济转而实行封闭的政策。


Absent these missteps, expect a tougher ride on the global economy, but not a calamity.	如果没有这些错误发生，全球经济将会趋于更为艰难，而非出现灾难。


Is Fiscal Stimulus Pointless?	经济刺激方案没有意义么？


The Harvard economist Robert Barro, writing in The Wall Street Journal , recently made an intelligent argument against America’s fiscal stimulus.	哈佛大学经济学家罗伯特·巴罗在《华尔街日报》撰文反对美国经济刺激方案。


After wading through the drivel of ethics-free Republican hacks and knowledge-free academic hacks who claim, one way or another, that the basic principles of economics make it impossible for government spending decisions to alter the flow of economic activity, reading Barro comes as a great relief.	在缺德的共和党人和无知的学术打手的操弄下，经济学的基本原理使得政府支出决策无法改变经济活动的运行方向，看了巴罗的文章使人松了一口气。


But I think that Barro misreads how his own evidence applies to our current situation.	但我想，巴罗误读了其证据对我们目前情况的适用范围。


Barro writes that he “estimate[s] a spending multiplier of around 0.4 within the same year and about 0.6 over two years....	巴罗写到，他“预计当年刺激方案的系数是 0. 4 ，在两年内的系数是 0.


[T]he [tax] multiplier is around minus 1.1....	。 ”税收的系数 1.


[Thus,] GDP would be higher than otherwise by $120 billion in 2009 and $180 billion in 2010...,” and by $60 billion in 2011.	。 由此得出， GDP 将在 2009 年增加 1200 亿美元， 2010 年增加 1800 亿美元。


That means that roughly 1.3 million more people will be employed in America in 2009, 1.9 million more in 2010, and 0.7 million people employed in 2011.	这就意味着 2009 年美国增加 130 万多就业人口， 2010 年增加 190 万， 2011 年增加 70 万。


Suppose that what the government spent money on is worth to us two-thirds on average of what private-sector spending is worth.	想象政府的支出相当于私营经济支出的三分之二，这也是值得做的。


In that case, we will have spent $600 billion and gotten $810 billion worth of stuff in return, for a net social profit of $210 billion (and those who would otherwise be cyclically unemployed cannot be said to place a high value on their lost leisure).	在这种情况下，我们支出 6000 亿美元，收回 8100 亿美元的回报。 社会净利润达到 2100 亿美元（对于那些失业人口就不能说想要休假而不愿意工作了。


Only if you think that there are additional large costs lurking down the road – that the stimulus has destabilized price expectations and set in motion a destructive spiral of deflation, or that the stimulus has used up America’s debt capacity, driving up debt-service costs to a prohibitive level – can the social profit turn negative.	除非你认为有另外更大的政府支出在后头 —— 政府救助降低了价格预期的稳定性，产生通胀，或者说是用尽了美国债务能力，将债务水平推到了一个历史性的新高 —— 对社会产生负面影响。


Neither of those things has happened.	这两种情况都没有发生。


The long-term nominal and real Treasury rates continue to be absurdly low, so much so that I rub my eyes whenever I see them.	政府长期债券和实际财政债券利率依然非常之低，以至于我不得不揉揉眼睛看看是不是看错了。


And the market inflation forecast – the spread between Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities and normal Treasuries – remains extremely tame.	市场对通胀的预测 ——TIPS 和普通债券之间的利差 —— 依旧非常正常。


So I really cannot understand Barro’s last paragraph: “The fiscal stimulus package of 2009 was a mistake.	我真的不明白巴罗的最后一段：“ 2009 年的经济刺激是一个错误。


It follows that an additional stimulus package in 2010 would be another mistake...”	随后的 2010 年刺激更是错上加错。 。


It is as if he has not done his own arithmetic.	好像他不会算术似的。


The problem, I think, is that Barro tries to use the years of “total” war in the twentieth century – World War I, World War II, and the Korean War – to “realistically evaluate the stimulus,” because “the defense-spending multiplier can be precisely estimated....”	我认为，问题在于，巴罗试图使用 20 世纪的整个战争年代 —— 一战二战和韩战 —— 来“现实地评估刺激方案”，因为“国防支出��系数可以被精确地估算。 。


But this is like looking for one’s lost keys under the lamppost because the light is better there.	但这就像在路灯下找寻一个人丢失的钥匙，因为那里更亮一些。


Yes, the total war defense-spending multiplier can be relatively precisely estimated.	是的，整个国防开支系数可以准确估算。


But we are not interested in what the multiplier is when the unemployment rate is 3% and the government is trying to diminish consumption and boost private savings via rationing and patriotism-based bond drives.	但是当失业率为 3% ，政府通过配给制和爱国债券试图消除消费，鼓励储蓄时，我们对此系数不感兴趣。


We are interested in what the multiplier is under more normal conditions, and when the unemployment rate is 10%.	我们感兴趣的是，在更为正常的情况下，但失业率达到 10% 时的系数。


I think Bob Hall has a better read on what is going on: "With allowance for other factors holding back GDP growth during those wars, the multiplier linking government purchases to GDP may be in the range of 0.7 to 1.0... but higher values are not ruled out....	我认为鲍 勃·豪尔的判断更为正确。 “在战争年代，由于补贴抑制 GDP 增长，政府支出和 GDP 的比率大约在 0.


Multipliers are higher – perhaps around 1.7 – when the nominal interest rate is at its lower bound of zero, as it was during 2009...” (and is today).	当利率只有零时，系数就会较高 —— 约为 1. 7 ，就像 2009 年出现的情况那样。


There are other problems with Barro’s analysis.	巴罗的分析还有其他破绽。


He characterizes the stimulus bill as a two-year $600 billion increase in government purchases.	他将刺激方案看做是 2 年期 6000 亿美元的政府支出。


But about half of the stimulus money spent to date is on the tax and transfer side, and about a quarter is direct aid to states, which enables them not to raise taxes.	其实，大约一半的刺激资金用于税收上，四分之一由直接拨到各个州，以让它们不用增税。 巴罗应该在支出上加权 0.


Barro should be using a weighted average of his spending multiplier of 0.6 and his tax multiplier of 1.1 to get a multiplier of 0.9.	6 ，在税收上加权 1. 1 ，这样才能综合加权 0.


In that case, our social profit is not $210 billion but rather $390 billion, and we should certainly do this again.	在这种情况下，我们的社会利润就不是 2100 亿美元，而是 3900 亿美元。 我们当然应该这么做。


Indeed, we should do it repeatedly, until there are signs that additional stimulus may start to threaten price or debt-management stability, or until unemployment falls far enough to make Barro’s multipliers overestimates.	实际上，我们还应该反复地这么做，直到有迹象表明额外的刺激开始威胁到价格或是债务处理的稳定性。 或是直到失业率显著下降。


Moreover, Barro complains that because Christina Romer, who heads President Barack Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers, has “not [carried out] serious scientific research... on spending multipliers...,” he “cannot understand her rationale for assuming values well above one...”	再者，巴罗抱怨说是因为奥巴马经济委员会的主席克里斯蒂 娜· 罗默没有“进行认真的科学研究。 。


To say that policymakers should rely only on their own personal research to formulate policy seems to me simply bizarre.	。 ”说决策者应该仅仅依赖个人研究来制定政策未免有点过于夸张。


Finally, Barro assumes that higher spending in 2009-2010 will have to be offset by higher taxes later, claiming that “the timing of future taxes does not matter.”	最后，巴罗假设 2009-10 年的高支出会导致随后的税收增加，宣称：“未来的征税时机没什么大不了。


But it matters very much.	”但其实税收的时间点非常重要。


At the moment, the United States Treasury can borrow at a real interest rate of zero for five years – and shove the entire five-year inflation risk onto the lender.	现在，美国财政部可以零利率借贷 5 年 —— 将整个 5 年的通胀风险推给了借贷者。


Time preference means that the $600 billion addition to the debt today, which Barro sees as the cost of stimulus, is not nearly as burdensome as a demand to pay $600 billion now would be.	时间表明，今天的 6000 美元的债务，也就是巴罗看做的刺激方案的支出，不是未来需要偿还相同数额。


And when taxes are levied to retire the added debt induced by the stimulus, they will be levied at some time at which nominal interest rates are not stuck at zero.	而且，増税将偿还政府由于经济刺激而产生的负债，这些税收将在利率不为零的时候征收一段时间。


The Federal Reserve will thus be able to ease monetary policy then to offset the fiscal drag.	美联储就可以放松货币政策来偿还这些负债。


So Barro is simply wrong when he claims that although the stimulus boosts employment now, amortizing the stimulus must inevitably reduce employment at some point in the future.	于是巴罗就错误地宣称，尽管经济刺激现在拉动就业，随后的代价将会在未来最终减少就业人口。


Is France Unreformable?	法国是否无法改革？


It all began a year ago with the French “No” in the referendum on the European Constitution.	一年前，法国全民公决否决欧盟宪法。


It continued last fall with the wave of violence in the suburbs.	去年秋天，法国郊区发生暴力浪潮。


Now, France has again brought itself to the world’s attention with weeks of street demonstrations against the “contract of first employment” (CFE) proposed by Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin to address high youth unemployment.	现在，反对由总理得维尔潘提出的、意在解决居高不下的青年人失业问题的“首次就业合同”法案引发的街头抗议使得世界再一次关注法国。


These three sets of events, different as they are, together illustrate several deep-seated characteristics of social life in France.	这三场事件尽管各不相同，但是都表明了法国社会生活中几个根深蒂固的特征。


First, France has found it difficult to adjust to the demands of globalization.	首先，法国难以适应全球化的要求。


Beyond ordinary dissatisfaction with economic problems, the failed referendum in May 2005 expressed the rejection by an important part of the French electorate of the discipline imposed by EU policies ensuring free movement of people, goods, and capital – and thus of the primacy of economic competition.	2005年5月全民公决的失败，除了表现了普通民众对经济问题的不满，还表明法国选民中大多数人拒绝由欧盟政策施加的、确保人员、货物以及资本自由流通进而确保经济竞争主导地位的法规。


In a similar vein, last fall’s explosion of violence in the suburbs reflected the frustrations of disoriented young people facing the grim prospects that a modern economy offers to those who lack proper training and education.	类似地，去年秋天郊区暴力事件的爆发则反映了面对现代经济给那些缺乏适当培训以及教育的人所带来的严峻前景，无所适从的年轻人的沮丧和失意。


The young are also at the center of the most recent protests, but this time, the disaffected include all strata of French youth, including university graduates.	年轻人也出在最近抗议事件的中心，但是这一次，心存不满的人涵盖各阶层的法国年轻人，包括大学毕业生。


In combating the CFE, they express their refusal to accept a precarious life outside the French model of job security that their parents enjoyed in the context of a profoundly different economy.	通过抗议“首次就业合同”法案，他们表达的是拒绝接受他们的父辈在另一个完全不同的经济环境下所享受的法国式的终身就业模式以外、充满变数的生活。


There is something very French about all this, because, while the economic rules of the game have changed throughout Europe in the last couple of decades, the need for greater labor-market flexibility seems to have been accepted more easily in most other countries.	这一抗议浪潮具有很强的法国特征。 因为，尽管在过去数十年中经济游戏规则的变化席卷欧洲，但是，其他大多数国家似乎更为接收了更大范围的劳动力市场灵活度的需要。


In Spain, under a socialist government, roughly one-third of wage earners are working on temporary contracts; the percentage is even higher for the young.	在社会党执政的西班牙，大约三分之一的雇员签订的是临时性合同； 年轻人中这一比例甚至更高。


In Italy, greater employment flexibility was introduced by the Prodi government in 1997, and further strengthened under the so-called Biagi Law of 2003.	1997年，意大利的普罗迪政府实施了更为灵活的就业政策，并在2003年所谓的比亚吉法中得到了进一步的加强。


In Germany too, the coalition agreement between the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats includes a provision that extends from six months to two years the trial period during which an employee can be dismissed without explanation – the same duration contemplated in the Villepin’s CFE law.	德国也是这样。 社民党和基民党联合政府协议所包含的一项条款把雇员可以不经解释而遭解雇的试用期限由六个月延长到两年，同得维尔潘的法案规定的期限一样。


In all these European countries, the new employment laws seem to be accepted as inevitable.	所有这些欧洲国家中，新的就业法律看起来已经被接受成为不可避免的事情了。


In France, by contrast, the statist tradition – which, as Tocqueville so aptly observed, harks back to the Ancien Régime, and which is equally shared today by both the Gaullist and socialist ideologies – is strongly linked to a marked distaste toward the strictures of economic liberalism.	比较而言，法国的中央集权传统正如社会学家托克维尔所精辟地指出的那样可以上溯到1789年法国大革命前的旧制度，而且当今的戴高乐派和社会党意识形态同样传承这一传统。 这一传统与鄙视经济自由主义结构紧密相连。


Since the French Revolution, the imperative of equality has often triumphed over the concern for liberty.	自从法国大革命以来，平等至上经常战胜对自由的关切。


As a result, the French are enamored with the welfare state in all its manifestations.	结果，法国人依恋于福利国家的种种表现形式。


Not even the obvious failures of the French social model in today’s environment – mass unemployment (reaching 25% among the young), huge public deficits, the blockage of social mobility – have diminished its public prestige.	大规模失业（年轻人失业率高达25％）、公共赤字其高无比、社会阶层僵化不变都表明当今环境中法国社会模式明显地失败了。 但是即使如此，并没有降低其在公众心目中至高无上的地位。


It would be much more logical to take inspiration instead from the Scandinavian model of “flexisecurity,” which combines employment flexibility and social security (albeit at the cost of a tax burden that France would not easily accept).	斯堪迪纳维亚的“灵活加保障”模式结合了就业灵活以及社会保障（尽管其税负代价法国无法轻易接受），从中获得启发是更为具有逻辑。


Add to all this the French preference for ideological confrontation and the absence of a culture of negotiation and compromise, to say nothing of consensus, and one can understand why so many reform projects in France end up being contested in the streets.	除此之外，法国人偏好意识形态的对抗，缺乏谈判和妥协的文化，更不用说共识了。 这样，人们也就可以理解为什么法国如此众多的改革项目最终都以街头抗议游行而受到挑战。


Indeed, quite significantly, most observers have automatically associated the recent disturbances with those of May 1968, which continues to hold a strange fascination for the French.	实际上，非常重要的是，大多数的观察家们很自然地把最近的动乱与1968年5月的动乱相提并论。 法国人对那一动乱继续抱有一种奇怪的迷恋。


In truth, however, other than reflecting the French preference for the politics of the street, the two phenomena have nothing in common.	但是，实际上，这两者之间除了反映法国人对街头政治的偏好以外没有任何共同之处。


So is France unreformable?	那么，法国是否就无法改革了呢？


Certainly not.	当然不是。


The country has been transformed profoundly in the recent decades.	过去几十年来，法国发生了深刻的变革。


Whether it is the breakup of public monopolies, such as electricity, gas, telecommunications, and even the post office, or the replacement of military conscription by a professional military, or pension reform, France has changed much more than is commonly believed.	无论是打破公共垄断，例如电力、天然气、电信甚至是邮政，或者是用职业军人取代兵役，抑或是养老金改革，法国的变化都超乎通常的想象。


This is particularly true with respect to French companies, which have remarkably adapted to the demands of international competition.	这一点对于法国公司而言尤其如此，它们都很好地适应了国际竞争的要求。


But much remains to be done: the entire educational system, up through the university level, requires serious reform, and many taboos regarding employment rules, social security, and the functioning of the state must be questioned.	但是还有许多工作要做。 直至大学阶段的整体教育体制需要认真的改革，必须对许多有关就业规则、社会保障以及国家运作的禁忌提出质疑。


What the experience with the CFE shows is not that reform is impossible, but that it cannot be unilaterally imposed.	首次就业合同法案所引发的事件所展示的并非是无法改革，而是改革不能单方面强加。


Time must be taken for explanation, consultation, and negotiation.	必须花时间来解释、磋商以及谈判。


In a society like France, marked by uncertainty about the future and in great need of having its self-confidence restored, the time taken to build consensus and create legitimacy for further reforms will certainly be well spent.	法国社会对未来不甚明朗，急需重新树立自信。 在这样一个社会中，在建立共识、为进一步改革创造合法性上花费时间当然将会是值得的。


Is Free Trade With the US Right for Central America?	中美洲应该和美国进行自由贸易吗?


Ronald Reagan's death forced many people to confront once again the legacy of Central America's brutal wars in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua of two decades ago.	罗纳德·里根的去世让许多人不由得旧事重提，再次面对二十年以前发生在中美洲危地马拉、萨尔瓦多和尼加拉瓜的残酷战争的后遗症。


That the region's bloody history is truly behind it seems to have been confirmed by the recent signing of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) with the United States.	最近中美洲各国与美国签署的《中美洲自由贸易协定》(CAFTA)似乎标志着这段血腥的历史正式成为过去。


The symbolism of that treaty promises much, not least the idea that civil wars and US interventions may be things of the past.	这一协定的签署有许多象征意义，其中很重要的一点就是内战和美国的干涉或许已成为历史。


But the details of the treaty offer little comfort to a region that is still recovering from the economic devastation wrought by those wars.	但对于一个仍然在从那些战争所造成的经济破坏中恢复元气的地区，该协议的细节并没有带来多少慰籍。


Paramount to CAFTA is a concern about the extent to which Central American countries will liberalize their economies.	CAFTA中至关重要的一点就是中美洲各国应该在多大程度上实施经济自由化。


But more critical is whether the agreement will make for healthier economies.	但更关键的是该协议是否有助于这些国家的经济 更健康 地发展。


Although CAFTA represents an important opportunity in the region's quest to expand its access to the US market, it is unclear whether the new rules will strengthen or weaken Central American producers.	虽然CAFTA代表着该地区寻求扩大美国市场准入的过程中的一个重要机会，但新规则究竟是会加强还是会削弱中美洲生产者的实力现在还是个未知数。


Under CAFTA, 80% of US exports will be duty-free as soon as the treaty is ratified, and all tariffs will expire in 15 years.	在CAFTA的规则下，该协议一旦获得批准，80%从美国出口的货物将会免税，所有的关税都会在15年内取消。


Until recently, the region maintained a trade surplus with the US, but with liberalization, the region will increase imports of more affordable goods, thereby turning the surplus into a deficit.	直到最近，该地区在与美国的贸易中还保持着顺差，但随着自由化的实施，该地区会从美国进口更多消费得起的商品，从而将顺差转为逆差。


Consider Mexico's trade balance with the US since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect.	前车之鉴就是自《北美自由贸易协定》(NAFTA)生效以来墨西哥与美国之间的贸易差额。


In the years between 1995 and 2002, Mexico's annual trade deficit with the US increased to $1 billion.	在1995至2002年间，墨西哥对美国的贸易逆差增加到10亿美元。


Moreover, trade in agricultural products will benefit US exporters more than Central American farmers.	另外，农产品贸易给美国出口商带来的收益要比带给中美洲农民的收益高。


The US, for example, agreed to sugar imports that equal 1% of the total US market.	例如，美国同意其从中美洲进口的食糖占其市场总量的1%。


That figure can grow only to 1.4% over the next 15 years.	这一比例在未来15年中只会增加到1. 4%。


At the same time, the agreement eliminates most import tariffs for commodities like rice, yellow corn, or dairy products.	同时，该协议免除了大米、玉米或奶制品等商品的进口税。


This will force small and medium producers to become more competitive, but they must do so on an uneven playing field.	这会迫使中小生产者变得更具竞争力，但他们必须在不平等的竞争基础上实现这一点。


Unlike their counterparts in the US, Central American producers lack access to the capital and technology needed for them to expand and innovate.	与其美国对手相比，中美洲的生产者缺乏扩大产能和技术革新所必需的资本和技术资源。


So, instead of improving their competitiveness, the agreement is likely to increase the number of displaced workers and producers.	因此，该协议似乎会让更多的工人和生产商被排挤出相关行业而不是提高他们的竞争力。


For a glimpse at the future, look at what has happened to Mexican corn farmers since NAFTA.	只需要看看墨西哥的玉米种植者在NAFTA生效以来的遭遇，中美洲的未来就可见一斑了。


Central American textiles were also caught in a CAFTA snag.	中美洲的纺织品也被CAFTA的障碍困扰。


The US textile lobby insisted that knit fabrics exported north come from Central America.	美国纺织业的说客们坚持进口到美国的针织品应来自中美洲。


The trouble is that Central America relies on third countries for knit fabrics.	但问题在于中美洲自身的针织品也要靠第三国进口。


Finally, CAFTA fails to address labor issues in any significant way.	最后，CAFTA没有能够切实地解决劳务问题。


The agreement only stresses that labor rights are to be respected, highlighting that a party to the agreement "shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the Parties."	该协议仅强调尊重劳动权利，并着重指出协议中的任何一方"不得以任何持续或反复的作为或不作为及任何影响各方之间贸易的方式放弃有效实施其劳动法的责任。


In a region with weak enforcement and few mechanisms for redress, protection restricted to prevailing labor standards amounts to no protection at all.	"但在一个执法薄弱且缺乏矫正机制的地区，现行的劳动保护标准也就形同虚设了。


So why did Central America's leaders sign the agreement?	那么中美洲的领导人们为什么要签署该协议呢？


The region's economies have not experienced significant growth in the past five years (nor have they grown more than 5% annually in the past 20 years).	该地区各国的经济在过去5年中增长缓慢（即使是在前20年，该地区的年经济增长率也没有超过5%）。


Desperate for improvement, its leaders had few choices and limited time to explore other options.	急于实现经济增长的领导人们面对有限的时间似乎别无选择。


Instead of being creative, they have been inspired by a wave of neo-liberal nostrums that blinds them to other opportunities.	他们受到了新自由化浪潮的启发却不再发挥创造力。 新自由化的秘方似乎蒙蔽了其它的机遇。


But there are alternatives.	但其它的选择确实存在。


Remittances by emigrants offer one of the richest.	侨民汇款就是最值得挖掘的资源之一。


Nearly $7 billion dollars has entered the region in remittances, yet there is no single economic policy that attempts to leverage the development potential of this gift.	已有近70亿美元以汇款的形式进入该地区，但迄今为止该地区没有出台任何一项旨在发掘和利用这笔财富的经济政策。


Remittances normally grow more than 15% a year, and will continue to do so.	汇款额通常的年增长率是15%，且这种增长趋势是持续的。


Even in a good year, trade with the US is unlikely to grow that much.	而对美国的贸易增长即使在好年头也未见得能达到这一水平。


Central American leaders could implement limited banking reforms to offer incentives to emigrants to save remittances and invest in their home countries.	中美洲各国领导人完全可以通过实施有限的银行业改革鼓励侨民储蓄他们的汇款并投资祖国。


Instead, their attention is captivated solely by CAFTA's uncertain promises.	但他们的注意力却仅集中在CAFTA并不确定的承诺上。


What lies ahead is uncertain; the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean stressed that CAFTA's implementation will add 0.5 percentage points to the rate of annual GDP growth in the region.	前景并不明朗； "拉美及加勒比经济委员会"强调CAFTA的实施会给该地区的年GDP带来0.


This is welcome news.	5%的增长。


But the question is whether such growth will continue ten years from now or end up being a quick, but temporary, fix.	这一消息令人鼓舞。 但问题是这样的增长会从现在起保持10年还是昙花一现的繁荣？


Regardless of its prospects, CAFTA is far from a done deal, and it at least opens the way for more discussion and debate.	不论前景如何，CAFTA还远非铁板钉钉。 但它至少为进一步的磋商和争论开创了局面。


Maybe the best news about CAFTA is that the US Congress is reluctant to take it on during an election year.	可能关于CAFTA最好的消息就是美国国会并不情愿在大选之年将其纳入议事日程。


Is “Gene Doping” Wrong?	“基因兴奋剂”错了吗？


In recent years, the International Olympic Committee and other sports organizations have worried about the possible misuse of gene-transfer technology.	近年来，国际奥林匹克委员会和其它体育组织对基因转移技术可能被滥用表示担忧。


But the sports world seems intent on exploiting this technology in pursuit of gold medals and championships, and genetic testing may be the wave of the future.	但体育界似乎决意利用这项技术夺取冠军和金牌，基因测试也会在未来成为一种潮流。


Two Australian Football League teams have hinted that they are looking into tests that would indicate an athlete’s likely height, stamina, speed, and strength.	两支澳大利亚足球联盟所属的球队暗示：他们正在对能够预测运动员可能的身高、耐力、速度和力量的测试进行研究。


Indeed, for some, “gene doping” now represents the Holy Grail of performance enhancement, while for others it means the end of sports as we know it.	实际上在某些人眼中，“基因兴奋剂”就是目前提高运动成绩的圣杯，而另外一些人则认为这意味着我们所熟悉意义上的体育运动的终结。


The prospect of a future of genetically modified athletes incites alarm throughout the sports world, accompanied by portrayals of such athletes as inhuman or some form of mutant.	未来运动员将进行基因改造的前景引发了体育界的恐慌，随之而来的是把这些运动员视作非人类或某种形式的突变异种。


This is a misrepresentation of how gene transfer would alter humans, both therapeutically and non-therapeutically, should it ever be legalized.	这是对基因转移一旦获得合法地位，将如何在医疗及其它领域改变人类的一种误解。


But the fear that rogue scientists will take advantage of athletes – or that athletes will seek to enroll in gene-transfer experiments in an attempt to receive some undetectable performance benefit – is very real.	但人们对流氓科学家会利用运动员、或运动员会参加基因转移试验，以便获得无法预知的成绩提高的忧心与恐惧都是切实存在的。


The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) prohibited gene doping in 2003, but some scientists predict that its misuse in sport is likely to appear at the Beijing 2008 Olympics.	世界反兴奋剂机构（WADA）早在2003年就禁止使用基因兴奋剂，但有些科学家仍然认为，滥用基因兴奋剂的情况很可能会在2008年北京奥运会中出现。


It is in this context that the debate about gene doping erupted during the 2004 Olympics in Athens.	在这样的背景下，有关基因兴奋剂的辩论在2004年的雅典奥运会上爆发。


Unfortunately, because the discussion has so far been dominated by moral panic over the state of sports, many ethical considerations and important questions have been excluded.	不幸的是，由于到目前为止对体育现状的道德恐惧笼罩着这次讨论，很多伦理问题和重要领域反而没有得到充分的重视。


Policies concerning gene doping should not rely solely on the interests and infrastructures of sports organizations.	有关基因兴奋剂的政策不应完全依赖体育组织的兴趣和机构设施。


In particular, the monitoring committees on genetic technology that nations develop must be taken on board by the world of sport.	特别是国家设立的基因技术监管委员会理应与体育界相互融合。


A simple model based on prohibition and testing for gene modification will not be enough, assuming that detection is possible at all.	即便假设违法行为有可能被外界发现，但以禁止和试验基因改造为基础的简单模式也远远不够应对这种复杂的局面。


Moreover, ethics committees must be made aware of the special circumstances of sports, which limit the effectiveness of broader social policies on genetic modification.	不仅如此，道德规范委员会还必须理解体育领域的特殊背景，这些因素限制了广义的社会政策对基因改造所起的作用。


Again, regulation ought not to rely on one single global authority.	这里要再次强调，管理不应只依赖于单一的全球组织。


As has been made clear from the ethical debates on stem-cell research, a global policy cannot easily be adopted or enforced, nor should it be.	正如有关干细胞研究的道德辩论已经澄清的那样，单一的全球政策很不容易被人们接受或执行，而且这也丝毫不值得大惊小怪。


Above all, it is not acceptable for the world of sport to impose a moral view about the role of enhancement technology on nations that wish to participate in the Olympics, without implementing an extensive and ongoing consultative process to accompany its policy decision.	最重要的是，如果体育界没有进行广泛和长期的意见征集就做出决定，将成绩提升技术起到哪些作用的道德观点强加给希望参与奥林匹克的国家，这样的做法是不会被接受的。


This cannot involve the creation of working groups that merely pay lip service to ethical debate, but must enable non-sports organizations to develop their own policy framework for the regulation of ’gene doping’ and, more broadly, the use of genetic information.	仅仅建立能够在伦理辩论中夸夸其谈的工作小组还远远不够，还必须要让非体育组织建立自己管理“基因兴奋剂”的政策框架，上述框架从更广义的角度还将涉及基因信息的使用。


Policies governing gene transfer in sports must, therefore, be recognized as subservient to broader bio-ethical and bio-legal interests that recognize the changing role of genetics in society.	因此，管理体育领域基因转移的政策必须得到公众的认可，对广泛的生物伦理和生物法律利益有所帮助，并充分考虑到遗传学社会作用的变化。


The rhetoric surrounding “gene doping” relies heavily on its moral status as a form of cheating. Yet, this status relies on existing anti-doping rules.	围绕着“基因兴奋剂”的老生常谈往往说它是某种形式的道德欺骗，但这个前提却有赖于现行的反兴奋剂规则。


If we don’t ban gene transfer in the first place, then on one level, it is not cheating.	如果我们首先就不禁止基因转移，那么从某种意义上看，基因兴奋剂也就无所谓欺骗。


In any case, to describe genetically modified athletes as mutants or inhuman is morally suspect, for it invokes the same kind of prejudice that we deplore in relation to other biological characteristics, particularly race, gender, and disability.	无论如何，把经过基因改造的运动员贬斥为突变异种或非人类在道德上站不住脚，因为它引发了与其它生物特征，尤其是种族、性别和残疾相联系的同样的偏见，而我们对这些偏见理应深恶痛绝。


After all, many, if not most, top athletes are “naturally” genetically gifted.	毕竟就算不是绝大多数，很多顶级运动员也生来就在基因方面很有天分。


To refer to these people as mutants would surely invite widespread criticism.	把这些人称为突变异种肯定会招致广泛的批评。


Those who fear that gene doping heralds the “end of sports” should instead recognize this moment as an opportunity to ask critical and difficult questions about the effectiveness and validity of anti-doping tests.	那些害怕基因兴奋剂会导致“体育末日”的人恰恰应该将此视为一个难得的机遇，来研究有关反兴奋剂测试的效果和可行性等关键但却困难的问题。


Does society really care about performance enhancement in sport?	社会真的希望提高体育运动成绩吗？


That may sound like a radical question. But advancement in ethical inquiry relies on the conflict of beliefs and values.	这个问题听上去有些极端，但伦理研究的进步恰恰有赖于信仰和价值观的冲突。


For many years, commentators have expressed concerns about the culture of doping in elite sport. Yet, the culture of anti-doping is equally alarming, because it embodies a dogmatic commitment that limits the capacity for critical debate over what really matters in sport.	很多年以来，评论家们对精英体育的兴奋剂文化深表忧虑，但反兴奋剂文化也同样令人触目惊心，因为它包含了太多的教条性义务，限制了人们的能力，使什么才是体育核心的关键辩论无法展开。


If anti-doping authorities truly care about sports, then they have a responsibility to re-examine the basic values that underpin their work.	如果反兴奋剂当局真的关注体育，他们就有义务重新审视自己工作的基础。


They should begin by imagining what would happen if the child of a genetically modified human wanted to become an elite athlete.	一开始，他们就应该想象如果经过基因改造者的后代希望成为精英运动员，会导致什么结果。


At the very least, they might then be less prone to imposing the narrow moral position of the sports world on the parent.	这样，他们也许就不那么倾向于把体育界狭隘的道德立场强加给孩子们的家长。


Is Global Financial Reform Possible?	全球金融改革是否可能？


HONG KONG – Nowadays there is ample evidence that financial systems, whether in Asia in the 1990’s or a decade later in the United States and Europe, are vulnerable to breakdowns.	香港—时至今日，已有充分的证据表明，不管是20世纪90年代的亚洲，还是十年后的美国和欧洲，金融系统都难逃崩溃的命运。


The cost in interrupted growth and unemployment has been intolerably large.	增长中断和失业飙升的代价极其沉重。


But, in the absence of international consensus on some key points, reform will be greatly weakened, if not aborted.	但是，只要在某些关键点上不能达成国际共识，改革就会被严重削弱（如果不是胎死腹中的话）。


The freedom of money, financial markets, and people to move – and thus to escape regulation and taxation – might be an acceptable, even constructive, brake on excessive official intervention, but not if a deregulatory race to the bottom prevents adoption of needed ethical and prudential standards.	资金、金融市场和人口的自由流动——从而规避监管和征税——或许是一种可接受的（甚至是建设性的）防止官方过度干预的办法，但如果大家竞相去监管化，以至于连必须的道德和审慎性标准都抛弃了，就会适得其反。


Perhaps most important is a coherent, consistent approach to dealing with the imminent failure of “systemically important” institutions.	或许最重要的当务之急是形成连贯一致的办法处置摇摇欲坠的“具系统重要性的”机构。


Taxpayers and governments alike are tired of bailing out creditors for fear of the destructive contagious effects of failure – even as bailouts encourage excessive risk taking.	纳税人和政府不得不出手援助债权人，即使援助会鼓励过度冒险的行为也在所不惜，因为他们害怕倒闭产生毁灭性效应会蔓延开来。


By law in the US, new approaches superseding established bankruptcy procedures dictate the demise rather than the rescue of failing firms, whether by sale, merger, or liquidation.	根据美国法律，取代现行破产程序的新方针是让倒闭公司消失，而不是拯救它们——不管是通过出售、合并还是清盘。


But such efforts’ success will depend on complementary approaches elsewhere, most importantly in the United Kingdom and other key financial centers.	但新方针的成功取决于其他国家法律的配合，特别是英国和其他金融中心。


Strict uniformity of regulatory practices may not be necessary.	要求监管行动严格一致或许并不是必要的。


For example, the UK and the US may be adopting approaches that differ with respect to protecting commercial banks from more speculative, proprietary trading, but the policy concerns are broadly similar – and may not be so pressing elsewhere, where banking traditions are different and trading is more restrained.	比如，在保护商业银行免受投机性自营交易伤害方面，英国和美国可以采取不同的方针，但政策目标应该是广泛一致的，而在其他国家，这一问题也许并不迫切，因为那里的银行传统有所不同，交易活动的限制也更多。


But other jurisdictions should not act to undercut the restrictions imposed by home authorities.	但东道国不应该助金融机构逃脱母国规则所施加的限制。


Closely related to these reforms is reform of the international monetary system.	与这些改革紧密相关的是国际货币体系改革。


Indeed, one might legitimately question whether we have a “system” at all, at least compared to the Bretton Woods arrangements and, before that, the seeming simplicity of the gold standard.	事实上，一个相当合理的问题是现在我们到底有没有至少堪与布雷顿森林体系或再往前的金本位相比的“体系”。


No one today has been able to exert authority systematically and consistently, and there is no officially sanctified and controlled international currency.	如今，没人能系统性、一贯性地发号施令，也没有被正式认可和控制的国际货币。


Arguably, the ideal of a well-defined and effective international monetary regime has become more difficult to realize as markets and capital flows have become vastly larger and more capricious.	当然，由于市场和资本流规模和波动性的剧增，理想的明确且有效的国际货币机制更加难以实现了。


Indeed, the global economy, it is said, has grown – and emerging countries have flourished – without a more organized system.	事实上，有人说全球经济是在一个没有组织性的体系下成长，新兴国家也在这样的环境下发展壮大。


But what is too often overlooked is that international monetary disorder lay at the root of the successive financial crises of the 1990’s, and played an even more striking role in the crisis that erupted in 2008.	但是，被一再忽视的事实是，20世纪90年代接踵而至的金融危机的根源就在于国际货币失序，2008年爆发的危机更是如此。


The sustained and, in a sense, complementary imbalances in the US and Asia stand out.	从某种意义上说，美国和亚洲之间持续的互补性失衡非常扎眼。


From 2000 to 2007, the US ran a cumulative current-account deficit of roughly $5.5 trillion, with nearly symmetrical offsetting increases in reserves in China and Japan.	2000—2007年间，美国累计经常项目赤字约为5. 5万亿美元，基本上正好抵消掉中国和日本的外汇储备增��。


China found it useful to run a large trade surplus, using a very high rate of internal savings and inward foreign investment to support its industrialization and rapid growth.	中国发现维持巨额贸易盈余是有利的，可以利用极高的国内储蓄率和外国投资流入支持其工业化和快速增长。


By contrast, the US, in the face of slow growth, was content to sustain exceptionally high levels of consumption at the expense of personal savings, inflating a massive housing bubble that burst with a very large and deeply disturbing bang.	反之，面临增长缓慢问题的美国则乐于维持极高的消费水平，但这样的代价是个人储蓄下降、房地产泡沫越吹越大，并在破灭后留下了满目疮痍。


The practical and inescapable lesson is that when any country is left to its own policy devices, its preferences may lead to prolonged and ultimately unsustainable imbalances.	无可避免的现实教训是，任何国家只要能够自主制定决策，就会偏好于导致长期并最终不可持续的失衡的政策。


Sooner or later, adjustment will be necessary – if not by considered domestic policy or a well-functioning international monetary system, then by financial crisis.	或早或晚，调整都会到来——有可能是经过深思熟虑的国内政策和运转良好的国际货币体系，也有可能是金融危机。


Not so long ago, we were comforted by theorizing that floating exchange rates would mediate international adjustments in a timely and orderly way.	不久前，我们还笃定地论证浮动汇率会及时、有序地充当国际调整的媒介。


But, in the real world, many countries, particularly but not limited to small, open economies, simply find it impractical or undesirable to permit their currency to float.	但是，在现实中，许多国家——特别是（但不限于）小型开放经济体——发现，放任货币浮动既不可行，也不可取。


We are left with the certainty, however awkward, that active participation in an open world economy requires some surrender of economic sovereignty.	可以确定的是——尽管这种“确定”令人不安——积极参与开放世界经济需要牺牲一些经济主权。


Or, to put the point more positively, it requires a willingness to coordinate policies more effectively.	或者说，为了让结果更加积极，需要拿出精诚合作的意愿。


The possibilities include:	可行的办法包括：


·    Stronger surveillance by the International Monetary Fund and a firmer commitment by countries to abide by “best practices” and agreed norms.	·    由IMF行使更严格的监督，各国需要拿出更严格遵守“最佳行动”和一致规范的承诺。


·    Direct and public recommendations by the IMF, the G-20, or others, following mandatory consultation.	·    IMF、G20或其他机构在强制性磋商后给出直接、公开的建议。


·    Qualification or disqualification with respect to the use of IMF or other credit facilities (for example, central banks’ swap lines).	·    获得IMF和其他信用便利（比如中央银行互换业务）等方面的资质。


·    Interest or other financial penalties or incentives along the lines under consideration in Europe.	·    考虑在欧洲实施利息或其他财务惩罚或激励。


But, if approaches that build on past failure do not seem sufficiently effective, perhaps a new approach toward currency fluctuations would be more promising.	但是，如果基于过去的失败的方针效果不够好，那么也许形成新的货币波动方针的可能性就会大增。


That would require some agreement about appropriate “equilibrium” exchange rates, with a fairly wide band that would allow for uncertainty and permit the market to exert its own discipline.	这一方针要求就合理的“均衡汇率”形成一致，同时还要允许汇率在一个相当宽的区间内波动，以容纳不确定性并让市场发挥作用。


But individual countries would orient intervention and economic policies toward defending the equilibrium rate, or, more radically, an international authority might authorize aggressive intervention by trading partners to promote consistency.	但个别国家将倾向于采取干预和各种经济政策捍卫均衡汇率，甚至会有更极端的情况，形成国际当局允许贸易伙伴采取激进的干预措施以增强稳定性。


An appropriate reserve currency and adequate international liquidity represent another central concern.	合适的储备货币和充足的国际流动性则是另一大关键问题。


For years, the pragmatic answer has been the dollar, and to some extent other national currencies, giving rise to complaints of an “inordinate privilege” for the US.	多年来，一直由美元充当着这一角色（从某种程度上说也包括某些其他国家的货币），这引发了诸多关于美国拥有“过分特权”的抱怨。


But it is not in America’s interest to accentuate and extend its payment deficits at the expense of an internationally competitive economy with strong industry and restrained consumption.	但以丢掉国家竞争力和强大的工业并束缚消费为代价增加其国际收支赤字并不符合美国的利益。


And the rest of the world wants the flexibility afforded by the currency of the largest, strongest, and most stable economy.	而世界其他国家需要这个最大、最强、最稳定经济体的货币所提供的灵活性。


A useful reserve currency must be limited in supply, but have sufficient elasticity to satisfy the large, unpredictable needs that may arise in a turbulent financial world.	有用的储备货币的供应应该是有限的，但同时必须具有充分的弹性以满足动荡的金融世界所产生的大规模不可预期的需求。


Above all, confidence in its stability and availability must be maintained, which highlights the practicality of a national currency, or perhaps a variety of national currencies.	最重要的是，对储备货币稳定性和可获得性的信心不能削弱，这凸显了国家货币（也可能是一揽子多个国家的货币）的可操作性。


Is Gordon Brown Electable?	戈登·布朗可选吗？


Gordon Brown obviously wants to succeed Tony Blair as British prime minister. But it is less obvious that he is willing to do what is necessary to lead the Labour Party to victory in the next general election.	戈登·布朗显然想继托尼·布莱尔之后成为英国首相，但是他是否愿意采取必要的行动，带领工党在下一届大选中赢得胜利，答案却并不那么明 确。


In some critical sense, he must repudiate Blair’s legacy, which, at a minimum, means promising to take Britain out of the Iraq War.	严格地说，他必须抛弃布莱尔的传统，而这最少也意味着将英国拖出伊拉克战争的泥淖。


Brown has longed to be prime minister ever since May 12, 1994, the fateful day when John Smith, the Labour Party’s leader in opposition, dropped dead of a heart attack.	布朗一直渴望成为首相，这可以追溯到1994年5月12日，在这个决定命运的日子里，工党在野领袖约翰·史密斯因心脏病发作猝死。


Two weeks later, on May 31, Blair and Brown met in a small restaurant in North London, and debated who should take over the party leadership.	两周后，即5月31日，布莱尔与布朗在北伦敦的一家小餐馆里会面，讨论谁应该接掌工党。


By the end of their discussion, they had made a double deal: Brown would stand aside and support Blair as the next party leader; in return, Blair would later give up the leadership to him.	讨论结束后，他们达成了双重交易：布朗靠边站，支持布莱尔成为下任工党领袖； 作为回报，布莱尔以后要把领袖职位交给他。


Crucially, but inevitably, they did not agree when, or under what circumstances, Blair would fulfil his side of the bargain.	然而他们并未商定布莱尔应该在什么时候、或者在什么样的情况下，履行他在这笔交易中的义务。


Inevitably, they could not foresee that Blair would go on to win an unprecedented three successive election victories for Labour, in 1997, 2001, and 2005, and thus keep Labour in power for a record-breaking period of possibly as long as 13 years.	这是关键的一点，也是必然的。 当然，他们也未能预见到布莱尔会在1997年、2001年和2005年史无前例地连续三次在大选中为工党取得胜利，从而使工党破天荒地得以连续执政13个年头。


The key challenge for New Labour (as Blair re-styled it with his characteristic gift for spin), was the management of the British economy.	新工党（经布莱尔用他那善于混淆视听的特殊天赋重塑过）面临的主要挑战是英国经济的管理。


Since World War II, most British governments tried to manipulate the economy for short-term party advantage, usually with disastrous long-term results.	二战以来，英国历届政府大多企图操纵经济，谋求短期的党派优势，通常伴随着灾难性的长期后果。


This lamentable tradition was common to both Conservatives and Labour; and yet, unfairly, it was the Labour Party that was most contaminated by the smear that it could not be trusted to manage the economy.	这个可悲的传统保守党和工党都有，然而不太公平的是，工党最遭诟病，被认为没有管理经济的能力。


Brown decisively changed that reputation.	布朗一锤定音地改变了这个名声。


He has been probably the most outstanding Chancellor of the Exchequer in British history, not because of any inspiration or genius, but simply because he has built on a new tradition of prioritizing low inflation, low interest rates, and stable government finances.	他或许是英国历史上最杰出的财政大臣，其原因不在于任何灵感或天赋，而仅在于他发挥了一项新的传统，将保持低通胀、低利率和稳定的政府财政放在首位。


Brown understood that these priorities were essential, not just for the British economy, but also for the long-term prospects of Labour in power; and he entrenched this agenda by giving the Bank of England independent responsibility for keeping inflation low.	布朗明白这些要务不仅对英国经济来说是必要的，对于工党长期执政的前景来说也是至关重要的； 于是他授予英格兰银行保持低通胀的独立责任，巩固了这些工作。


As a result, Britain has had an unprecedented decade of low inflation and relatively high economic growth, outperforming many of its European counterparts.	结果，英国前所未有地连续十年保持低通胀和相对较高的经济增长，使许多欧洲国家相形见绌。


Yet, despite economic success, it became steadily clearer that Blair’s time was running out.	然而，尽管经济上取得了成功，布莱尔的时间还是不多了，这一点已经越来越明显。


The electorate grew increasingly disillusioned with the unavoidable shortcomings of an over-familiar government, and the party grew increasingly discontented with a leader who had outstayed his welcome.	选民对一个过于熟悉的政府不可避免的缺点越来越失望，政党也对长时间赖着不走的领袖越来越不满。


At first, Blair thought that he could claim the right to remain in power for a third full five-year term. But the pressure on him to go has steadily risen, to the point where he has now almost promised to give up in the summer of 2007.	开始的时候布莱尔还以为自己理所应当地可以执掌第三个完整的五年任期，但是他面临的压力越来越大，现在已经到了他几乎许诺在2007年夏季卸任的地步。


But no one knows exactly when, or how, Blair will step down.	但是没人知道布莱尔将在什么时候或以什么方式下台。


If there is a formal leadership contest, it seems likely that several rival candidates will aim to stand.	如果进行正式的领袖之争，似乎几位候选人都会放手一搏。


But almost all authoritative observers seem to agree that Brown is by far the most likely man to be the next Labour prime minister.	不过几乎所有权威观察员都一致认为布朗是迄今最有希望成为下一任工党首相的人。


That is the easy part.	这且不说。


From that point on, no one seems certain whether Brown knows what to do, or has what it takes, to fight and win another general election for Labour.	关键是在那之后，似乎没有人能肯定布朗知道怎样才能为工党赢得下一届大选，或者具备所需的条件。


His reputation for command and control of the economy is magisterial and unchallenged, but he has given almost no clue as to what he thinks of other government policies.	他在经济掌控方面声名赫赫，傲视同侪，但是对于其他政府政策，几乎从未表示过丝毫想法。


He has remained dour and almost silent, visibly chafing with impatience to come into his inheritance, but offering no hint of what difference he would make when he does.	他一直阴阴沉沉，几乎默不吭声，对于继任的不耐之意溢于言表，但却没有透露出些许信号，说明他在继任后会带来任何不同。


The one thing he cannot do is promises to continue Blair’s policies.	有一件事他绝对不能做，那就是许诺延续布莱尔的政策。


If Brown offers more of the same, he will lose.	如果布朗这样做，他就输定了。


After ten years of Blair, he must offer one or more policies that mark a clear break.	在经历了布莱尔执政的十年后，他必须提出一两条与前任划清界限的政策。


The most obvious candidate for such a policy switch is Iraq: if Brown wants to win an election as Labour leader, he must renounce Blair’s policy and announce the withdrawal, in short order, of British troops.	这样的政策转变最明显的选择就是伊拉克：如果布朗想以工党领袖的身份赢得选举，就必须与布莱尔的政策分道扬镳，在短期内宣布英国撤军。


In tactical terms, this should be easy and obvious: whatever the deceitful and illegal reasons originally given for invading Iraq, everyone now knows that this war has proved a political, strategic, and moral catastrophe.	从战略上来说，这样做不但容易，而且应该：不论当初入侵伊拉克有什么虚伪、无理的借口，现在所有人都知道这场战争是一场政治上、战略上和道德上的灾难。


Everyone knows that it cannot be “won,” whatever that means, and Brown knows that both the war and Britain’s servile subordination to the Bush administration are deeply unpopular in Britain.	所有人都知道这场战争无法“获胜”（不论这个词意味着什么），而布朗也知道这场战争和英国政府对布什政府的奴颜婢膝在英国非常不得人心。


This is the issue that is crying out to be addressed: but so far none of the main political parties has dared touch it.	这是一个亟待解决的问题：但是迄今为止主要政党全都避之唯恐不及。


In the past three weeks, Labour, the Liberal Democrats, and the Conservatives have all held their annual conferences.	工党、自由民主党和保守党都已召开了年会。


All of them concentrated on domestic policies; none dared discuss Iraq, because they all know that to do so would raise the question of withdrawal, which in turn would unleash a major and possibly explosive debate about Britain’s relationship with the US.	他们全都聚焦在国内政策上； 没人敢于讨论伊拉克，因为他们都知道这样做会引出撤军的问题，从而引发一场有关英美关系的激烈大辩论。


Does Brown have the stomach to take on the risks involved in confronting the Iraq question?	布朗��没有勇气直面伊拉克问题带来的风险？


Possibly not.	大概没有。


He may decide that it is too difficult, in which case he will be a lame duck prime minister, condemned to serve out the three years remaining in Labour’s current term with no hope of winning the next election.	他或许会觉得这个问题太难，这样的话他首相期满后就无法连任，只能任满工党现政权剩下的三年时间，没有赢得下届选举的希望。


That is not what he planned when he struck his bargain with Blair back in 1994.	这可不是他在1994年与布莱尔达成交易时的计划。


Is Greece Japan’s Future?	希腊的今天，日本的未来？


TOKYO – The Greek fiscal crisis has sent shockwaves through markets around the world.	发自东京——希腊财政危机已经严重冲击了全球市场。


In just two years, Greece’s budget deficit jumped from 4% of GDP to 13%.	在短短两年之内，希腊预算赤字占GDP的比例就由4%飙升到13%。


Now other European Union countries seem under threat, and the EU and the International Monetary Fund are grappling to stem the crisis before another nation trembles.	如今其他欧盟国家似乎也受到了威胁，而欧盟和世界货币基金组织正奋力赶在下一个国家爆发危机之前遏制住希腊危机的发展势头。


But the problem of excessive government debt is not confined to the EU.	然而政府超额债务问题不仅仅是欧盟的专利。


Indeed, Japan’s debt-to-GDP ratio is around 170% – much higher than in Greece, where the figure stands at around 110%.	事实上，日本的政府债务总额已经是GDP的170%——比希腊的110%还要高出许多。


But, despite the grim parallel, Japan’s government does not seem to think that it needs to take the problem seriously.	但在如此严峻的对比之下，日本政府却似乎没有想要认真对待这个问题的意思。


Last year’s general election brought regime change to Japan. Yukio Hatoyama’s Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) thrashed the Liberal Democratic Party, which had governed almost continuously for a half-century.	去年的大选在日本实现了政权更替，鸠山由纪夫所率领的日本民主党推翻了连续执政近半个世纪的自民党。


But Hatoyama’s government has ignored macroeconomic management by abolishing the policy board charged with discussing economic and fiscal policy.	但鸠山政府却解散了专门负责讨论经济和财政政策的政策委员会，并因此忽视了对宏观经济的管理。


Instead, the government has focused on increasing spending to meet its grand electoral promises, including a huge amount for new grants to households and farmers.	反过来，政府却开始集中于增加开支来兑现自己许下的宏大竞选承诺，包括对家庭和农民提供巨额新增补助。


As a result, the ratio of tax revenue to total spending this fiscal year has fallen below 50% for the first time in Japan’s postwar history.	结果在本财政年度，日本政府税收占总支出的比例下降到50%以下，这对战后的日本来说尚属首次。


If the government continues on this path, many expect next year’s budget deficit to widen further.	而如果政府继续这样下去的话，许多人都预计下一年的财政赤字将进一步扩大。


Despite the weakness of Japan’s fiscal position, the market for Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) remains stable, at least for now.	但尽管日本的财政状况如此差劲，日本政府债券（JGBs）市场却至今依然保持稳定。


Japan had a similar experience in the 1990’s, the country’s so-called “lost decade.” At that time, Japan’s budget deficit soared after the country’s property bubble burst, causing economic stagnation.	对于这个情况，日本在1990年代那个所谓“失落的十年”也是有类似经验的，当时日本的预算赤字在全国资产泡沫爆破后急剧膨胀，导致经济发展陷入停滞。


But JGBs are mostly purchased by domestic organizations and households.	但政府债券则大多由国内机构和家庭持有。


In other words, the private sector’s huge savings financed the government’s deficit, so that capital flight never occurred in the way it has in Greece, despite the desperate budget situation.	换言之，政府的赤字是由私人部门的巨额储蓄所支撑的，因此尽管预算情况陷于如此绝望的境地，类似希腊这样的资本外逃现象却没有发生。


But this situation has deteriorated recently, for two reasons. First, the total volume of JGBs has become extremely high relative to households’ net monetary assets, which stand at roughly ¥1,100 trillion.	然在情况在最近有所恶化，原因有二：首先，政府债券总额和日本家庭1100万亿日元左右的金融净资产密切相关，预计在未来三年内，政府债券总额将超过这个数量。


But in a mere three years, total JGBs will exceed this total. This suggests that taxpayer assets will no longer back government debt, at which point confidence in the JGB market is likely to shatter.	这意味着纳税人的资产已经不足以支撑政府债务，并可能导致对政府债务市场的信任度下滑。


Second, Japanese society is aging – fast.	其次，日本社会的老龄化正日趋加速。


As a result, the country’s household savings rate will decrease dramatically, making it increasingly difficult for the private sector to finance budget deficits.	因此家庭储蓄率将急剧下降，令私人部门逐渐难以支撑预算赤字。


Moreover, an aging population implies further pressure on fiscal expenditure, owing to higher pension and health-care costs, with all of Japan’s baby boomers set to reach age 65 in about five years.	除此之外，随着日本战后婴儿潮一代平均年龄在未来五年内达到65岁，一个老龄化的人口也预示着未来财政支出压力将逐渐增加，需要更高的退休金和医疗保健支出。


The increase in social-welfare costs is expected to start around 2013, three years from now.	社会福利成本的增加将在2013年开始，也就是3年之后。


Given these factors, the JGB market, which has been stable so far, will face serious trouble in the years ahead.	考虑到这些因素，目前依然稳定的政府债券市场将在未来几年遇到严重问题。


After averting its eyes since coming to power, Japan’s new government has finally started discussing tax hikes.	在夺得政权之后，忙于处理其他事务的新政府终于开始讨论加税。


One possibility is an increase in the consumption tax, which currently stands at 5% – low in comparison with other industrialized countries.	其中一种可能性就是将目前5%的消费税提高，因为该税率相对于其他工业国家都是比较低的。


But tax hikes alone with not close Japan’s fiscal black hole.	但如果仅仅是靠加税的话，是不足以填补日本的财政黑洞的。


What is most needed is consistent and stable macroeconomic management.	最迫切的则是实施持续而稳定的宏观经济管理。


Such management is possible.	这种管理是可行的。


Between 2001and 2006, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi aggressively tackled Japan’s fiscal problems.	在2001年至2006年间，小泉纯一郎首相就对日本的财政问题进行了大胆改革。


Koizumi sought smaller government and set clear numerical targets for fiscal consolidation, including a primary budget balance in 10 years.	他尝试缩小政府规模，并在财政债务清理方面设定了清晰具体的目标，包括在10年内实现基本预算平衡。


Surprisingly, Koizumi was almost successful.	令人惊讶的是，小泉几乎成功了。


Japan’s primary deficit of ¥28 trillion in 2002 was reduced to only ¥6 trillion by 2007.	日本的基础财政赤字从2002年的28万亿日元降低到2007年的6万亿日元。


If this effort had been continued for two more years, a primary budget surplus could have been realized.	如果这项努力能再持续两年的话，基本预算盈余将得以实现。


But over the past three years, the prime minister changed each year, and a populist trend in fiscal expenditure took hold.	但在接着三年之内每年都发生了首相更替，而在财政支出方面，向选民大洒金钱的民粹主义举措依然是主流。


What is needed most now is for the DPJ government to restore comprehensive economic management.	目前民主党政府���需要做的就是恢复对经济的综合管理。


A tax hike is only part of that. Without a strategy for growth, an effort to reduce government spending, and a policy to stop deflation, a tax hike will not solve the problem.	加税只是其中一部分，如果没有一个增长战略，一个减少政府支出的举措以及遏制通货紧缩政策的话，加税也不能解决问题。


Indeed, some economists fear that a fiscal crisis could erupt even aftera tax hike is passed.	事实上，有一些经济学家担心财政危机将在加税政策获得通过之后更加恶化。


Once that happens, the impact on neighboring countries – and on the world economy – will be huge compared to the current European problem.	一旦发生那种情况，对于周边国家——以及整个世界经济——的影响将比欧洲目前所面临的问题更为严重。


After all, Japan remains the world’s second largest economy, accounting for about one-third of Asia’s GDP, and 8% of global output, whereas the GDP share of Greece in the EU is about 3%.	因为日本毕竟是全球第二大经济体，占亚洲GDP总量的1/3，世界经济总产出的8%，而希腊GDP总量仅占欧盟的3%而已。


In some countries, lower military expenditures and interest rates has helped to improve a weak fiscal position.	在某些国家，更低的军费开支和利率将有助于改善弱势财政状况。


But in the case of Japan, military spending is already low, as are interest rates.	但在日本，军费开支和银行利率都已经在比较低的水平了。


This suggests that fiscal rescue will be extremely difficult if and when trouble starts – and underscores the urgent need for real political leadership now.	这意味着一旦问题恶化，就很难找到相应的财政拯救对策——这也是日本目前急需一个强有力的政治领导层的原因。


Is Ignorance Bliss?	无知是福份吗？


The age of the Renaissance man is long gone.	文艺复兴时代博学之人的时代早已逝去。


No one thinks it is possible anymore for an individual to grasp, fully, all areas of science and technology.	没人认为个人完全掌握科技的所有领域是可能的了。


Popular software contains millions of lines of code.	流行的软件包含数以百万行的编码。


Mechanisms of the immune response for just one kind of lymphocyte take up thousands of pages of scholarly journals.	仅仅是一种淋巴细胞免疫反应的机理就占据数以千页的学术刊物的位置。


An iPod's elegantly simple appearance masks underlying technology that is understood by only a tiny percentage of its users.	iPod优雅简洁的外观所掩盖的基本技术只有极少一部分使用者可以理解。


But, despite the vast incompleteness of our knowledge, recent research suggests that most people think that they know far more than they actually do.	但是，尽管我们的知识犹如沧海一粟，最近的研究表明，大多数人认为他们所知道的事情要远远超过实际知道的事情。


We freely admit to not knowing everything about how a helicopter flies or a printing press prints, but we are not nearly modest enough about our ignorance.	我们爽快地承认，我们对于直升飞机如何飞翔或者印刷机如何印刷一窍不通，但是对于我们的无知却并不足够谦虚。


The easiest way to show this is to have people to rate the completeness of their knowledge on a seven-point scale.	表明这一点的最简单的方法是让人们对他们的知识的完整性进行总分为七分的评级。


For any question, a “7” denotes the equivalent of a perfectly detailed mental blueprint, and a “1” implies almost no sense of a particular mechanism at all, just a vague image.	对任何问题而言，7代表了如指掌，1表示对具体的机制几乎毫无感觉，仅仅是一个模糊的图像。


People happily, and reliably, assign numbers to their understandings of everything from complex machines to biological systems to natural phenomena such as the tides; but these ratings are usually far higher than their actual knowledge.	人们高兴地而且是可靠地把数字分配到从复杂的机器到生物系统乃至类似潮汐那样的自然现象的理解上来。 然而这些评级通常要比人们的实际知识高得很多。


We can measure the discrepancy between what we think we know and what we actually know by simply asking people, after they have given their initial ratings, to tell us how some things work in as much detail as they can and then to rate their knowledge again in light of their attempt to explain.	在人们给出他们的初始评级后，我们只要让他们尽可能详细地告诉我们某些事物的运作方式，然后再根据他们试图作的解释再次评定他们的知识，就可以衡量我们认为我们所知道的和我们所实际知道的差距了。


Similarly, we can ask them to answer critical diagnostic questions (for example, “How does a helicopter go from hovering in place to flying forward?”)	同样，我们可以让他们回答关键性的分析性问题（例如，直升飞机如何从盘旋到向前飞行？


Or we can simply provide them with a concise but meaty expert explanation.	），或者我们只要告诉他们简明扼要的专家解释。


In all of these cases, people somewhat sheepishly confess that their level of understanding was far worse than they originally thought.	在所有这些情况中，人们有时羞愧地坦白说，他们的理解水平要远远低于他们原先所认为的。


People are often surprised and dismayed at their ignorance, but we are not generally bad at estimating how much we know.	人们经常对他们的无知感到惊讶和沮丧。 但是对于估计我们知道多少我们一般并不相差甚远。


Instead, we have a special deficit with regard to our explanatory understandings.	实际上，我们在我们的解释性理解上特别差劲。


We are good at estimating how well we know simple facts (such as the capitals of countries), procedures (such as how to make an international phone call), and narratives (such as the plots of well-known movies).	我们善于估计我们如何掌握简单的事实（例如各国首都），手续（例如如何拨打国际长途电话）以及叙述（例如熟知的电影情节）。


But we seem to have a specific “illusion of explanatory depth” – the belief that we possess a more profound causal understanding than we really do.	但是，我们似乎存有一种独特的“解释深度错觉”。 这一错觉相信，我们所掌握的有关深奥的因果关系的理解要高于我们的实际理解。


We can be appropriately modest about our knowledge of other things, but not so about our ability to explain the workings of the world.	对于其他事物的知识，我们可能适当地谦虚，但是对于解释世界运转的能力并非如此。


Several factors converge to create this illusion of knowledge.	几个因素造成了这一错觉。


When Leon Rozenblit and I uncovered the illusion and its specificity, we ran an extensive series of studies exploring why explanatory understanding is so vulnerable to a false sense of knowing.	当我和Leon Rozenblit发现了这一错觉及其特性后，我们进行了一系列的研究来探究为何解释性理解容易产生错误的知识感觉。


All of the factors that we identified are less influential for facts, procedures, and narratives.	我们所指出的所有因素对于事实、手续以及叙述而言影响力要低。


One important factor underlying the illusion of explanatory depth arises from the richly hierarchical nature of most complex systems, which means that they can be understood at several levels of analysis.	构成解释深度错觉的一个重要因素产生于大多数复杂系统丰富的等级性质。 这意味着可以在几个分析水平进行理解。


One can understand how a computer “works” in terms of the high-level functions of the mouse, the hard drive, and the display while not having any understanding of the mechanisms that enable a cursor to move when a mouse is moved, or allow information to be stored and erased, or control pixels on a screen.	人们可以从鼠标、硬盘以及显示器的高等级功能上理解电脑如何“工作”，而并不理解移动鼠标时光标移动、储存或者清除信息或者控制屏幕分辨率的机制。


This hierarchical structure of complex causal systems seduces us into a sense of understanding at a high level, which is then mistaken for having an understanding at a lower level.	这一复杂因果关系系统的等级结构诱使我们感觉具有高水平的理解，而这又使得较低水平的理解被误解为较高水平。


A second factor is the false comfort we derive from seeing the parts of a system.	第二个因素是我们从观察到系统的某些部分而得意。


The more parts you can see, the more you think you know how those parts actually work.	你观察到的部分越多，你就认为你越了解这些部分实际是如何运作的。


Thus, the illusion is stronger for objects with easy-to-inspect parts than it is for objects with more invisible, inaccessible, or microscopic parts.	这样，具有容易得到观察部分的物体与更为不可视、无法靠近或者微小部件的物体相比，其错觉就更大。


For example, we may think that we understand the mind much better than we do when we see images of glowing brain regions.	例如，我们可能认为，当我们看到发光的大脑区域的图像时，我们更为理解大脑而超出实际水平。


Finally, we often figure out things on the fly when they are in front of us, but then falsely assume that we came to the object with a full understanding in our heads rather than using and manipulating the object to decipher its mechanism.	最后，当事物在我们的面前时，我们常常匆忙理解它们，但是随后又错误地假定我们在头脑中完整地了解它们，而非利用和操纵物体来破解其机制。


There may be a silver lining to our inflated sense of understanding.	对于我们膨胀的理解感觉而言可能存有一丝慰藉。


The world is, of course, far too complex for any lone person to fully grasp.	当然，世界过于复杂，任何单个个人无法完全掌握。


If a gnawing sense of ignorance kept us diving deeper in our quest to understand everything we encountered, we might suffocate in the details in one area and miss other areas completely.	如果无知的痛苦感觉促使我们不断深入理解我们所遇到的每一个事物，那么，我们就可能窒息于某一领域的细节而完全遗漏其他领域。


The illusion of explanatory depth may stop us at just about the right level of understanding, one that enables us to know how to get more information from others when we really need it without being overwhelmed.	解释深度错觉也许会让我们止步于恰当的理解水平，在这一水平上，我们知道如何在确实需要更多信息的时候从其他人那里得到而又并不让大量信息所吞没。


It would perhaps be better if we recognized the limits our own explanatory ability, but there may be some adaptive value of those limits as well.	如果我们认识到我们自身的解释性能力局限可能更好，但是，那些局限中也包含适应性的价值。


Is Inequality Inhibiting Growth?	不平等性在抑制增长吗？


CHICAGO – To understand how to achieve a sustained recovery from the Great Recession, we need to understand its causes.	芝加哥—为了明白如何在大衰退中实现可持续复苏，我们需要先了解大衰退之因。


And identifying causes means starting with the evidence.	而识别原因需要从证据入手。


Two facts stand out.	有两个事实值得关注。


First, overall demand for goods and services is much weaker, both in Europe and the United States, than it was in the go-go years before the recession.	首先，与危机前的奔腾年代相比，不管是欧洲还是美国，商品和服务的总需求被大大削弱了。


Second, most of the economic gains in the US in recent years have gone to the rich, while the middle class has fallen behind in relative terms.	其次，美国近些年来所获得的经济效益大部分进了富人的腰包，而中产阶级的相对收入大大落后了。


In Europe, concerns about domestic income inequality, though more muted, are compounded by angst about inequality between countries, as Germany roars ahead while the southern periphery stalls.	在欧洲，对国内收入不平等的担忧不像美国那样强烈，主要忧虑在于国家间不平等，德国一马当先，而南欧外围国停滞不前。


Persuasive explanations of the crisis point to linkages between today’s tepid demand and rising income inequality.	对危机的令人信服的解释指向当今需求疲软和收入不平等性恶化两者之间的联系。


Progressive economists argue that the weakening of unions in the US, together with tax policies favoring the rich, slowed middle-class income growth, while traditional transfer programs were cut back.	进步论经济学家指出，在美国，工会的式微加上有利于富人的税收政策拖累了中产阶级收入的增长，而传统转移支付项目也受到了削减。


With incomes stagnant, households were encouraged to borrow, especially against home equity, to maintain consumption.	在收入停滞不前的情况下，家庭被鼓励进行借贷，特别是用房子作抵押来借贷，以维持消费水平。


Rising house prices gave people the illusion that increasing wealth backed their borrowing.	房价的上涨给了人们财富增加支持借贷行为的幻觉。


But, now that house prices have collapsed and credit is unavailable to underwater households, demand has plummeted.	但是，随着房价的崩溃，资不抵债的家庭不再能够获得信用，需求也随之大跌。


The key to recovery, then, is to tax the rich, increase transfers, and restore worker incomes by enhancing union bargaining power and raising minimum wages.	因此，复苏的关键在于对富人增税，增加转移支付，并通过加强工会讨价还价能力和提高最低工资重振工人收入。


This emphasis on anti-worker, pro-rich policies as the recession’s primary cause fits less well with events in Europe.	强调反工人、利富豪政策为衰退的主要原因，这样的逻辑并不怎么适合欧洲。


Countries like Germany that reformed labor laws to create more flexibility for employers, and did not raise wages rapidly, seem to be in better economic shape than countries like France and Spain, where labor was better protected.	德国等国家改革了劳动法，为雇主创造了更加灵活的空间，也没有快速提高工资水平，因此要比劳动力保护更完善的法国和西班牙经济表现更优。


So consider an alternative explanation: Starting in the early 1970’s, advanced economies found it increasingly difficult to grow.	因此，让我们来看看替代论解释：自20世纪70年代初以来，发达经济体发现实现增长越来越困难。


Countries like the US and the United Kingdom eventually responded by deregulating their economies.	美国和英国等国家的最终应对措施是放松对经济的监管。


Greater competition and the adoption of new technologies increased the demand for, and incomes of, highly skilled, talented, and educated workers doing non-routine jobs like consulting.	更强的竞争和新技术的采用增加了从事咨询等非常规职业的高技能、有才华、高学历员工的需求和收入。


More routine, once well-paying, jobs done by the unskilled or the moderately educated were automated or outsourced.	曾经收入颇丰、大多由低技能、低学历员工从事的常规岗位纷纷被自动化和外包。


So income inequality emerged, not primarily because of policies favoring the rich, but because the liberalized economy favored those equipped to take advantage of it.	因此，收入不碰等性出现了，其主因并非有利于富人的政策，而是有利于准备充分、善抓机会者的经济自由化。


The short-sighted political response to the anxieties of those falling behind was to ease their access to credit.	为了缓解落后者的不安，短视的政策反应是让他们更容易获得信用。


Faced with little regulatory restraint, banks overdosed on risky loans.	在监管约束放松的情况下，银行贷出了太多的高风险贷款。


Thus, while differing on the root causes of inequality (at least in the US), the progressive and alternative narratives agree about its consequences.	因此，尽管对不平等性的根源解释不同（至少在美国是如此），进步论和替代论在其后果方面是一致的。


The alternative narrative has more to say.	替代论还有进一步的解释。


Continental Europe did not deregulate as much, and preferred to seek growth in greater economic integration.	欧洲大陆的去监管化并没有那么强烈，那里更偏好于在增加经济一体化的过程中实现增长。


But the price for protecting workers and firms was slower growth and higher unemployment.	但保护工人和企业的代价是经济增长放缓和失业增加。


And, while inequality did not increase as much as in the US, job prospects were terrible for the young and unemployed, who were left out of the protected system.	此外，尽管不平等性不像美国恶化得那么剧烈，但劳动保护对身处保护系统之外的年轻人和失业者来说非常残酷。


The advent of the euro was a seeming boon, because it reduced borrowing costs and allowed countries to create jobs through debt-financed spending.	欧元的引入似乎带来了繁荣，因为它降低了借贷成本，让各国得以通过债务融资支出创造就业岗位。


The crisis ended that spending, whether by national governments (Greece), local governments (Spain), the construction sector (Ireland and Spain), or the financial sector (Ireland).	危机终结了此类支出——不管支出原本来自中央政府（希腊）、地方政府（西班牙）、建设部门（爱尔兰和西班牙）还是金融部门（爱尔兰）。


Unfortunately, past spending pushed up wages, without a commensurate increase in productivity, leaving the heavy spenders indebted and uncompetitive.	不幸的是，过去的支出推高了工资，但生产率并没有同等程度地提高，这导致了支出者负债累累，失去了竞争力。


The important exception to this pattern is Germany, which was accustomed to low borrowing costs even before it entered the eurozone.	这一模式的重要例外是德国，德国人在加入欧元区便已习惯了低借贷成本。


Germany had to contend with historically high unemployment, stemming from reunification with a sick East Germany.	德国必须与高失业这一历史遗留问题——由与疲软的东德重新统一产生——作斗争。


In the euro’s initial years, Germany had no option but to reduce worker protections, limit wage increases, and reduce pensions as it tried to increase employment.	为了增加就业，德国别无选择，只能降低对工人的保护，限制工资增长，降低养老金。


Germany’s labor costs fell relative to the rest of the eurozone, and its exports and GDP growth exploded.	相对欧元区其他地区，德国劳动力成本较低，其出口-GDP比重出现了大幅上升。


The alternative view suggests different remedies.	替代论给出了不同的解决办法。


The US should focus on helping to tailor the education and skills of the people being left behind to the available jobs.	美国应该专注于帮助达不到可得岗位要求者改善技能和教育。


This will not be easy or quick, but it beats having corrosively high levels of inequality of opportunity, as well as a large segment of the population dependent on transfers.	这样做不容易，更需要花费时间，但总比让机会不平等性高到十分危险的程度或让一大部分人口需要依赖转移支付过活强。


Rather than paying for any necessary spending by raising tax rates on the rich sky high, which would hurt entrepreneurship, more thoughtful across-the-board tax reform is needed.	为此，美国需要深思熟虑的全面税收改革，而不是简单地通过大幅提高富人税率为必须的支出融资。


For the uncompetitive parts of the eurozone, structural reforms can no longer be postponed.	对竞争力低下的欧元区国家来说，结构性改革已不能再拖了。


But, given the large adjustment needs, it is not politically feasible to do everything, including painful fiscal tightening, immediately.	但是，由于必须做出的调整规模太大，马上做好一切事情——包括痛苦的财政紧缩——在政治上并不可行。


Less austerity, while not a sustainable growth strategy, may ease the pain of adjustment.	更少紧缩尽管布什可持续增长战略之道，但或能减轻调整的痛苦。


That, in a nutshell, is the fundamental eurozone dilemma: the periphery needs financing as it adjusts, while Germany, pointing to the post-euro experience, says that it cannot trust countries to reform once they get the money.	一句话，这就是欧元区所面临的基本难题：外围国的调整需要融资，而德国根据后欧元时代的经验，认为这些国家拿到钱之后才不会进行改革。


The Germans have been insisting on institutional change – more centralized eurozone control over periphery banks and government budgets in exchange for expanded access to financing for the periphery.	德国人一直要求制度变革——对外围银行和政府预算实行中央化的欧元区控制，以此换取对外围国的融资支持。


Yet institutional change, despite the euphoria that greeted the latest EU summit, will take time, for it requires careful structuring and broader public support.	但制度变革——尽管在最近的欧盟峰会中得到了热烈欢迎——需要时间，因为这要求谨慎的构造和广泛的公众支持。


Europe may be better off with stop-gap measures.	权宜之计或许能令欧洲受益。


If confidence in Italy or Spain deteriorates again, the eurozone may have to resort to the traditional bridge between weak credibility and low-cost financing: a temporary International Monetary Fund-style monitored reform program.	如果意大利和西班牙的信心继续恶化，欧元区将可能不得不依靠传统的低信誉-低成本过桥贷款：IMF式的、暂时性、受监督的改革计划。


Such programs cannot dispense with the need for government resolve, as Greece’s travails demonstrate.	这样的计划并不能消除政府最终抉择的必要性，希腊的阵痛便是明证。


And governments hate the implied loss of sovereignty and face.	而政府讨厌失去此类计划所隐含的出让主权和丢脸。


But determined governments, like those of Brazil and India, have negotiated programs in the past that set them on the path to sustained growth.	但果断的政府（如巴西和印度）在过去便已有过让它们重回持续增长之路的谈判计划。


As a reformed Europe starts growing, parts of it may experience US-style inequality.	随着改革后的欧洲重新开始增长，其中一些国家可能将经历美国式的不平等。


But growth can provide the resources to address that.	但增长可以提供纠正这一问题所需要的资源。


Far worse for Europe would be to avoid serious reform and lapse into egalitarian and genteel decline.	对欧洲来说，更糟糕的事情是回避严肃的改革，然后陷入平等、体面的衰退。


Japan, not the US, is the example to avoid.	日本，而不是美国，才是欧洲所应避免的前车之鉴。


Is Inflation Returning?	通胀卷土重来？


CAMBRIDGE – Inflation is now low in every industrial country, and the combination of high unemployment and slow GDP growth removes the usual sources of upward pressure on prices.	美国剑桥—眼下，所有工业国通货膨胀都很低，高失业和低GDP增长的组合也消除了价格上涨压力的常规原因。


Nevertheless, financial investors are increasingly worried that inflation will eventually begin to rise, owing to the large expansion of commercial bank reserves engineered by the United States Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank (ECB).	尽管如此，金融投资者仍在日益担忧通胀终究会开始上升，因为在美联储和欧洲央行推动下，商业银行准备金增加了许多。


Some investors, at least, remember that rising inflation typically follows monetary expansion, and they fear that this time will be no different.	至少一部分投资者还记得，通胀抬头总是随着货币扩张而发生，他们担心这一回也不会有什么不同。


Investors have responded to these fears by buying gold, agricultural land, and other traditional inflation hedges.	投资者对这种担忧的反应是买入黄金、农地和其他传统通胀对冲工具。


The price of gold recently reached a four-month high and is approaching $1,700 an ounce.	最近，黄金价格触及四个月高点并向1700美元/盎司靠拢。


Prices per acre of farmland in Iowa and Illinois rose more than 10% over the past year.	艾奥瓦和伊利诺伊的每英亩农地价格也比去年上涨了10%多。


And the recent release of the US Federal Reserve Board’s minutes, which indicate support for another round of quantitative easing, caused sharp jumps in the prices of gold, silver, platinum, and other metals.	最新的美联储董事会备忘录暗示支持新一轮量化宽松，这导致了黄金、白银、铂金和其他金属的大幅上涨。


But, unlike private investors, Fed officials insist that this time really will be different.	但是，与私人投资者不同，美联储官员坚持认为这一回将完全不同。


They note that the enormous expansion of commercial banks’ reserves has not led to a comparable increase in the supply of money and credit.	他们指出，商业银行准备金的大幅扩张并没有导致相应规模的货币供给和信用增加。


While reserves increased at an annual rate of 22% over the past three years, the broad monetary aggregate (M2) that most closely tracks nominal GDP and inflation over long periods of time increased at less than 6% over the same three years.	在过去三年中，准备金以每年22%的速度增加，但与此同时，广义货币总量（M2，长期来看，该指标与名义GDP和通胀密切相关）只增加了6%。


In past decades, large expansions of bank reserves caused lending surges that increased the money supply and fueled inflationary spending growth.	在过去几十年中，银行准备金的大幅扩张导致贷款激增，从而刺激了货币供给和通胀性支出增长。


But now commercial banks are willing to hold their excess reserves at the Fed, because the Fed now pays interest on those deposits.	但如今商业银行宁愿将超额准备金存在美联储，因为美联储可以为这笔存款提供利息。


The ECB also pays interest on deposits, so it, too, can in principle prevent higher reserves from leading to an unwanted lending explosion.	欧洲央行也为存款提供利息，因此，从理论上说，也可以阻止准备金增加导致有害的贷款扩张。


The Fed’s ability to pay interest is the key to what it calls its “exit strategy” from previous quantitative easing.	美联储支付利息的能力是其所谓此前量化宽松的“退出战略”的关键。


When the economic recovery begins to accelerate, commercial banks will want to use the large volume of reserves that the Fed has created to make loans to businesses and consumers.	当经济复苏开始加速时，商业银行将愿意动用美联储所创造的大笔准备金向企业和消费者贷款。


If credit expands too rapidly, the Fed can raise the interest rate that it pays on deposits.	如果信用扩张过于迅速，美联储可以提高它向存款支付的利率。


Sufficiently high rates will induce commercial banks to prefer the Fed’s combination of liquidity, safety, and yield to expanding the quantity of private lending.	只要利率足够高，就能诱使商业银行偏好于美联储（兼具流动性、安全性和收益性），而不是扩大私人贷款规模。


That, at any rate, is the theory; no one knows how it would work in practice.	无论如何，这只是理论上的结论； 没人知道实际中会使怎样。


How high would the Fed – or the ECB, for that matter – have to raise the interest rate on deposits to prevent excessive growth in bank lending?	美联储——同理，也包括欧洲央行——需要把存款利率提高到何种程度才能阻止银行贷款的过度扩张？


What if that interest rate had to be 4% or 6% or even 8%?	如果利率需要提高到4%、6%甚至8%，情况将会怎样？


Would the Fed or the ECB push its deposit rate that high, or would it allow a rapid, potentially inflationary lending growth?	美联储或欧洲央行会把存款利率提高到如此高度吗？ 还是说，它们将允许贷款快增长并带来潜在通胀威胁？


The unusual nature of current unemployment increases the risk of future inflation still further.	当前的反常失业高企进一步增加了未来通胀的风险。


Nearly half of the unemployed in the US, for example, have now been out of work for six months or longer, up from the traditional median unemployment duration of just 10 weeks.	比如，近一半的失业者已有六个月甚至更长时间找不到工作，而常规中位失业期只有10周。


The long-term unemployed will be much slower to be hired as the economy recovers than those who have been out of work for a much shorter period of time.	当经济复苏时，长期失业者要花比失业期较短者多得多的时间才找得到新工作。


The risk, therefore, is that product markets will tighten while there is still high measured unemployment.	因此，风险在于，当统计到的失业状况仍然严峻时，产品市场将收紧。


Inflation will begin in product markets, rather than in the labor market.	通胀将肇始于产品市场而不是劳动市场。


Businesses will want to borrow, and banks will want to expand their lending.	企业将可望贷款，银行也将愿意贷款给企业。


Under these conditions, the Fed will want to raise the interest rate to prevent an acceleration of inflation.	在这样的环境下，美联储将提高利率防止通胀加速。


But, if the unemployment rate is then still relatively high – say, above 7% – some members of the Fed’s Open Market Committee may argue that the Fed’s dual mandate – low unemployment as well as low inflation – implies that it is too soon to raise interest rates.	但是，如果失业率继续保持相对高位（比如7%以上），那么美联储公开市场委员会的一些委员可能会说美联储的双重之责——低失业、低通胀——意味着升息仍为时过早。


There could also be strong pressure from the US Congress not to raise interest rates.	美国国会也可能施加强大的不升息压力。


Although the Fed’s legal “independence” means that the White House cannot tell the Fed what to do, the Fed is fully accountable to Congress.	尽管美联储的法定“独立”地位意味着白宫无权指挥美联储，但国会完全可以问责美联储。


The recent Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation took away some of the Fed’s powers, and the legislative debate surrounding the bill indicated that there could be wide support for further restrictions if Congress becomes unhappy with Fed policy.	最近的多德-弗兰克金融改革法削去了美联储的部分权力，围绕该法展开的立法争论表明，如果国会对美联储政策感到不满，那么对美联储采取进一步限制措施极有可能得到广泛支持。


Politicians’ desire to keep interest rates low in order to reduce unemployment is often in tension with the Fed’s concern to act in a timely manner to maintain price stability.	政客们希望保持低利率以便减少失业，这常常与美联储及时行动以保持价格稳定的想法产生冲突。


The large number of long-term unemployed may make the problem more difficult this time by causing the unemployment rate to remain high even when product markets are beginning to experience rising inflation.	大量长期失业人口的存在可能导致产品市场开始经历通胀抬头时失业率仍然保持较高水平，因此，这一回问题将特别棘手。


If that happens, Fed officials will face a difficult choice: tighten monetary policy to stem accelerating price growth, thereby antagonizing Congress and possibly facing restrictions that make it difficult to fight inflation in the future; or do nothing.	果真如此的话，美联储官员将面临艰难的选择：要么收紧货币政策以阻止价格加速上涨，但这相当于对国会宣战，可能面临更多的限制从而使未来反通胀斗争更加艰难； 要么什么都不做。


Either choice could mean a higher future rate of inflation, just as financial markets fear.	无论怎么选择，未来通胀都会如金融市场担忧的那样变得更高。


Although the ECB does not have to deal with direct legislative oversight, it is now clear that there are members of its governing board who would oppose higher interest rates, and that there is political pressure from government leaders and finance ministers to keep rates low.	尽管欧洲央行不必对付直接立法监督，但如今很显然其治理委员会成员中有不少人反对通胀抬头，而来自政府领导人和财政部长的压力则要求保持低利率。


Rising inflation is certainly not inevitable, but, in both the US and Europe, it has become a risk to be reckoned with.	通胀抬头绝不是不可避免的，但是，不管是美国还是欧洲，这都已成为不得不考虑的风险。


Is Inflation the Answer?	通胀是灵药吗？


CHICAGO – Recently, a number of commentators have proposed a sharp, contained bout of inflation as a way to reduce debt and reenergize growth in the United States and the rest of the industrial world.	芝加哥——最近，不少评论家指出，来一次可控的急剧通胀是削减债务、重振美国和其他工业化化国家经济增长的良方。


Are they right?	果然如此吗？


To understand this prescription, we have to comprehend the diagnosis.	为了评估这一药方，我们需要先理解症状。


As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff argue, recoveries from crises that result from over-leveraged balance sheets are slow and typically resistant to traditional macroeconomic stimulus.	正如卡门·莱因哈特（Carmen Reinhart）和肯尼斯·罗格夫（Kenneth Rogoff）所指出的，资产负债表杠杆过高所引起的危机之后的复苏是非常缓慢的，且传统的宏观经济刺激手段会失效。


Over-levered households cannot spend, over-levered banks cannot lend, and over-levered governments cannot stimulate.	过度负债的家庭无法增加支出，过度负债的银行无法增加贷款，过度负债的政府则无法加大刺激力度。


So, the prescription goes, why not generate higher inflation for a while?	于是，药方来了：为什么不让通胀飞一会儿呢？


This will surprise fixed-income investors who agreed in the past to lend long term at low rates, bring down the real value of debt, and eliminate debt “overhang,” thereby re-starting growth.	这会让过去愿意以低利率借长钱的固定收益投资者大为惊诧，拉低债务的实际价值，消除债务“宿醉”，从而重振增长。


It is an attractive solution at first glance, but a closer look suggests cause for serious concern.	乍一看，这一方案颇为诱人，但细考之则觉得大有商榷之处。


Start with the question of whether central banks that have spent decades establishing and maintaining anti-inflation credibility can generate faster price growth in an environment of low interest rates.	第一个问题是，央行在过去几十年中已经建立起并维系了反通胀的名声，它们能够在低利率环境下造成物价快速增长的局面吗？


Japan tried – and failed: banks were too willing to hold the reserves that the central bank released as it bought back bonds.	日本试过，但以失败告终——银行死抱着央行通过回购债券释放出来的准备金不放。


Perhaps if a central bank announced a higher inflation target, and implemented a financial-asset purchase program (financed with unremunerated reserves) until the target were achieved, it could have some effect.	或许央行宣布调高通胀目标，并实施金融资产买入计划（用未偿付准备金来融资）直至目标达成能起到一些成效。


But it is more likely that the concept of a target would lose credibility once it became changeable.	但更有可能发生的情况是，一旦目标不再恒定，其可信度就要大打折扣。


Market participants might conjecture that the program would be abandoned once it reached an alarming size – and well before the target was achieved.	市场参与者会预期，该计划一旦达到警戒规模就会被抛弃，而此时目标还远未达到。


Moreover, the central bank needs rapid, sizeable inflation to bring down real debt values quickly – a slow increase in inflation (especially if well signaled by the central bank) would have limited effect, because maturing debt would demand not only higher nominal rates, but also an inflation-risk premium to roll over claims.	此外，央行需要快速大规模的通胀才能迅速降低债务的实际价值——通胀的缓慢上升（特别是在央行释放出清晰信号的情况下）的效果有限，因为到期债务不仅会要求更高的利率，而且若要展期，就不得不额外支付通胀溢价。


Significant inflation might be hard to contain, however, especially if the central bank loses credibility: Would the public really believe that the central bank is willing to push interest rates sky high and kill growth in order to contain inflation, after it abandoned its earlier inflation target in order to foster growth?	不过，大幅通胀可能难以控制，特别是在央行可信度有所缺失的情况下：公众真的会相信，在抛弃早先的通胀目标来刺激增长后，央行还会愿意把利率大幅提升，不惜牺牲增长来控制通胀？


Consider, next, whether the inflationary cure would work as advertised.	接着考虑这个问题：通胀疗法真的能像宣传的那样有效吗？


Inflation would do little for entities with floating-rate liabilities (including the many households that borrowed towards the peak of the boom and are most underwater) or relatively short-term liabilities (banks).	通胀对负有浮动利率债务者（包括大量在繁荣期顶峰借钱、目前已身处资不抵债状态的家庭）和债务期限相对较短者（银行）影响甚微。


Even the US government, with debt duration of about four years, would be unlikely to benefit much from an inflation surprise, unless it were huge.	即使是债务久期在4年左右的美国政府，也未必能从通胀惊奇（inflation surprise）中捞到多少好处，除非通胀能有非常大的升高。


Meanwhile, the bulk of its obligations are social security and health care, which cannot be inflated away.	与此同时，美国政府债务的大部分来自社会保障和医疗保障支出，这部分支出可不会因通胀而缩水。


Even for distressed households that have borrowed long term, the effects of higher inflation are uncertain.	即使是对于负有长期债务的受困家庭，高通胀的效果也远非确定。


What would help is if their nominal disposable income rose relative to their (fixed) debt service.	如果他们的名义可支配收入能以相对于（固定）债务利息较快的速度增长，那他们会从中受益。


Yet, with high levels of unemployment likely to keep nominal wage growth relatively subdued, typical troubled households could be worse off – with higher food and fuel prices cutting into disposable income.	但是，由于失业高企，名义工资增长将相对平缓，因此普通受困家庭境况会恶化——食品和燃料价格上涨将吞噬他们的可支配收入。


Of course, any windfall to borrowers has to come from someone else’s wealth.	当然，债务人获益就必有人受损。


Inflation would clearly make creditors worse off.	毫无疑问，通胀将使债权人境况恶化。


Who are they?	哪些人是债务人？


Some are rich people, but they also include pensioners who moved into bonds as the stock market scared them away; banks that would have to be recapitalized; state pension funds that are already in the red; and insurance companies that would have to default on their claims.	一些是富人，但也包括因股市低迷而转战债券市场的退休者、需要重组的银行、已经入不敷出的州级退休基金，以及可能不得不对保单违约的保险公司。


In the best of all worlds, it would be foreigners with ample reserves who suffer the losses, but those investors might be needed to finance future deficits.	最理想的情况是，坐拥充足储备的外国人承受所有损失，但未来还要指望这些投资者来替赤字融资。


So central banks would have to regain anti-inflation credibility very soon after subjecting investors to a punishing inflation.	因此，央行不会让投资者长期承受惩罚性通胀，要不了多久就不得不重塑其反通胀名声。


In such a world, investors would have to be far more trusting than they are in this one.	这样才能赢得投资者的更多信任。


This does not mean that nothing can be done about the debt problem.	这并不意味着我们对债务问题束手无策。


The US experienced debt crises periodically during the nineteenth century, and again during the Great Depression.	美国在19世纪经常经历债务危机，在大萧条期间又经历了一次。


Its response was to offer targeted and expedited debt relief – often by bringing in new temporary bankruptcy legislation that forced limited debt write-downs.	对此，美国的反应是采用定向、加速的债务纾困计划，方法通常是引入新的暂时性破产立法，迫使有限度地进行债务减记。


In this vein, a recent proposal by Eric Posner and Luigi Zingales to facilitate mortgage-debt renegotiation would give a deeply underwater homeowner the right to file a pre-packaged Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition.	就这一点而言，最近，埃里克·波斯纳（Eric Posner）和路易吉·津加莱斯（Luigi Zingales）提出的便于按揭债务重新安排的方案给了在资不抵债深渊中苦苦挣扎的家庭新的权利，他们可以填写预备好的《破产法》第13章申请书。


This would allow her to write down the value of her mortgage by the average house-price depreciation in her postal zone since the borrowing date, in exchange for giving the lender a share of the future house-price appreciation.	这样，他们就能够减记按揭债务，减记幅度为所在邮区平均住房价格降幅（从按揭生效日起算），作为交换，他们必须向贷款人让渡一部分未来房价升值收益。


A bankruptcy judge would approve the petition, provided the court was satisfied that the homeowner could make the reduced payments.	只要破产法庭认为屋主能够偿还削减后的债务，就会批准申请。


Such automatic borrower-initiated filings, if made legal by Congress, could reduce the household-debt overhang without the need for government subsidies.	这样一种由借款人发起的自动破产机制如果能通过国会成为成文法律，将可以在不需要政府补贴的情况下减轻家庭债务宿醉。


To the extent that the alternative is costly foreclosure proceedings that make borrowers and lenders worse off, this proposal should attract the support of both sides.	否则的话，就不得不进入代价昂贵的收回抵押品赎回权程序，这将使借款人和贷款人都受损，从这个角度看，波斯纳和津加莱斯的方案应该能够获得借款人和贷款人双方的支持。


No solution is without weaknesses, though.	但是，任何解决方案都有弊端。


One reason that banks oppose debt write-downs is that many underwater homeowners continue to repay debt rather than default, even while cutting back on other spending.	银行会反对债务减记，原因之一是许多资不抵债屋主并未违约，而是在继续偿还债务，尽管这样会削减其他支出。


If these diligent payers are eventually expected to default, writing down their debt today makes sense.	如果这些诚信债务人最终被认为会违约，那��今天就减记其债务有利可图。


If they are expected to muddle through, a blanket debt write-down would weaken banks and might slow economic growth.	如果他们被认为会偿还债务直到偿清，那么一股脑的债务减记会削弱银行，甚至可能影响经济增长。


Policymakers espousing debt write-downs to spur growth should ask whether they have the political support to recapitalize banks if needed.	支持通过债务减记刺激增长的决策者得问一问，他们是能获得足够的政治支持，以在必要时重组银行。


Prescriptions like these – as with those for a jolt of inflation – have gained ground because the obvious solutions to economic stagnation have been tried and failed.	类似的药方——以及包括大幅通胀的药方——颇有市场，以往内对付经济停滞的常规手段已经试过并宣告失败。


But, as the proposals become more innovative and exotic, we must examine them carefully to ensure that they wouldn’t end up making matters worse.	但是，随着解决方案越来越标新立异，我们必须仔细考察，以确保它们不会适得其反。


Is Iraq Safe Yet?	伊拉克安全了吗？


WASHINGTON, DC – The Obama administration’s decision to withdraw the bulk of United Sates troops from Iraq over the next 19 months has sparked fears that Iraq will once again plunge into the wide-scale and debilitating violence that it endured from 2004 to 2007.	华盛顿特区-奥巴马政府决定在今后19个月内撤离在伊拉克的大部分驻军，这一决定引发了人们对伊拉克重现大规模破坏性暴力事件的担忧，这样的暴力事件从2004年至2007年间一直困扰着伊拉克。


Those fears are, for the most part, overblown.	而这些担心大都是过分的。


There are good reasons to believe that the level of stability achieved in Iraq can be maintained even without a large-scale US presence.	我们有足够理由相信，即使没有大范围的美国驻军，伊拉克也能维持至今已取得的稳定局势。


To understand why, it is important to know what else was going on inside Iraq in 2007, when President George W. Bush ordered the “surge” of 20,000 additional troops and General David H. Petraeus shifted US forces to a more aggressive strategy.	要理解这样说的原因，很重要的是要知道，在2007年美国总统布什下令急速增派二万名美国士兵进驻伊拉克以及戴维·彼得雷乌斯将军把美军的战略调整为更具进攻性时，伊拉克国内到底还发生了其它什么事情。


For, although the surge was important, two other factors played a critical role in bringing Iraq back from the brink.	因为，尽管增派部队显示了其重要性，而另有二个因素也起了重要作用，挽救了伊拉克于悬崖边上。


First, Baghdad had been transformed into a Shiite-dominated city.	首先，巴格达已经成了一个什叶派人占主导的城市。


Although exact statistics are hard to come by, in 2003 approximately 35% of Baghdad’s population was Sunni.	尽管准确的数据很难取得，但2003年巴格达的居民中逊尼派人占了大约35%。


Today, based upon the results of the recently held regional election, Baghdad is only 10% to 15% Sunni.	而如今，根据最近举行的地区选举统计结果，巴格达只有10%至15%的居民是逊尼派人。


This means that between one million and 1.5 million Sunnis have fled the capital.	这意味着有一百万至一百五十万逊尼派人离开了首都巴格达。


Most now are refugees in Jordan and Syria, and they are unlikely to be welcomed home anytime soon by the new Shiite elite running the country.	现在他们大部分成了约旦和叙利亚的难民。 近期内，在国内掌权的什叶派新精英分子不会欢迎他们回去。


The ethnic cleansing of many Baghdad neighborhoods in 2006 and 2007 was deplorable.	发生在2006至2007年间的种族清洗是可怕的，但它使逊尼派暴乱分子无法藏身也无法与其他居民杂居，也切断了他们的后勤和财政方面的来源。


But it made it difficult for Sunni insurgents to hide or blend in with the population, and deprived them of logistical and financial support.�It also provided a degree of safety and security for the Shiite-led government, which was largely the purpose of the well-organized campaign in the first place.	这也给什叶派领导的政府带来了安全和安定感，而这本来就是这场组织良好的行动的目的。


The second critical factor in stabilizing Iraq was its regional neighbors’ recognition of, and in some cases support for, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government.	让伊拉克稳定下来的第二个重要因素是该地区的邻国对马利基总理领导的政府的承认甚至是在某些情况下的支持。


This was a major change from the 2003-2005 period, when Iraq’s Sunni neighbors, fearing the country’s new Shiite elite, actively opposed the US occupation.	这和2003至2005间那段时期大不相同。 在那段时期内，伊拉克的那些逊尼派邻国因为害怕伊拉克的新的精英们，积极地反对美国军队的占领。


The multiple insurgencies that developed in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 were supported at least in part by money, materiel, and fighters from abroad.�Suicide bombers from all over the Arab world crossed into the country through the porous Syrian and Jordanian borders.	2003和2004年间在伊拉克境内出现的多起暴乱事件，至少部分是得到了海外的资金、人力和物力的支持。 来自全阿拉伯世界的自杀式人肉炸弹越过疏于防守的叙利亚和约旦与伊拉克接壤的边界进入伊拉克。


Regional governments may not have openly supported the insurgents, but they clearly avoided cracking down on the jihadist groups operating within their borders.	该地区的国家政府尽管不能公开支持暴乱分子，但也很明确地避免打击在它们国内活动的圣战组织。


Foreign governments began to change these polities after al-Qaeda in Iraq bombed three hotels in Amman, Jordan, in November 2005, killing 60 people.	活动在伊拉克的基地组织于2005年11月轰炸了约旦阿曼的三家宾馆并造成了60人死亡。 这次事件后，外国政府开始改变政策。


Frightened governments in the region realized that the type of violence occurring almost daily in Iraq was starting to spill across the country’s borders.	受到惊吓的该地区内的国家政府开始意识到，伊拉克每天上演的暴力事件正在开始越过伊拉克的边境向外部蔓延。


Soon after this incident, the highly effective Jordanian intelligence service began assisting the Iraqi government in going after the al-Qaeda network in Iraq.	此次事件发生后不久，约旦高效的情报部门开始协助伊拉克追捕在伊拉克境内的基地组织网络。


By June 2006, this effort was paying off.	到了2006年6月，这种努力有了结果。


Jordanian agents were instrumental in providing the intelligence that enabled US forces to kill Abu Zarqawi, the mastermind of the Amman bombing.	美国军队击毙了阿曼爆炸案的策划者阿布扎卡维，其中约旦情报部门提供的情报起了重要的作用。


Slowly but surely, throughout 2006 and 2007, Jordanian intelligence, working with Iraqi Sunni tribes, chipped away at al-Qaeda.	缓慢但扎实地，2006和2007年间，约旦情报部门和伊拉克的逊尼派部落削弱了基地组织。


Moreover, quiet efforts were made in the Arab world to curtail the recruitment and funding of suicide bombers headed to Iraq.	另外，阿拉伯世界中悄然开始努力停止吸纳和资助去往伊拉克的人肉炸弹。


Iran’s role in Iraq also changed.	伊朗在伊拉克的角色也发生了变化。


The Iranian government had been a major backer of Shiite militia groups, including the Mahdi Army, led by radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.�But the Iranians also had close ties from the beginning with elements of the Shiite-led coalition government.	伊朗政府曾一贯在背后支持什叶派民兵，包括由激进教士萨德尔领导的救世军武装。 但是伊朗人从一开始也和由什业派领导的联合政府成员有着紧密的联系。


In 2008, following Maliki’s military operation to clean out militia groups in Basra, Iran’s leaders seem to have decided that this two-faced strategy had run its course.	2008年马利基总理在巴士拉清除民兵组织的军事行动之后，伊朗似乎认定这种两面派的策略已经走到尽头。


Iran then helped broker a ceasefire that was highly favorable to Maliki, and cemented his commanding position inside the Iraqi coalition government.	伊朗然后就从中调停停火谈判，这对马利基十分有利，这巩固了他在伊拉克联合政府中的领导地位。


No doubt Maliki’s hard-line stance on the need for a firm timetable for the withdrawal of US troops was critical to Iran’s decision to throw its weight behind him.	毫无疑问，马利基在要求美国提供一个严格的撤军时间表问题上表现出的强硬立场，是伊朗决定在背后助其一臂之力的关键因素。


Both the transformation of Baghdad into a Shiite city and the recognition and support of Iraq’s neighbors for the country’s new political order have been instrumental in stabilizing the country.�These changes are likely to be permanent, and offer hope that the wide-scale violence that afflicted the country between 2003 and 2007 will not return after US forces depart.	巴格达变为一个由什业派人占主要人口的城市，加上其邻国对伊拉克新的政治格局的承认和支持，这两者对伊拉克的稳定都起了作用。 这些变化是有可能长久存在的，这使人看到了希望，即伊拉克在2003至2007年间所遭受的大规模暴力事件在美国撤军后不会卷土重来。


How Israel Is Losing America	以色列正如何失去美国的支持？