They should be obliged to repatriate foreign workers, as required in the standard migrant employment contract used by the Philippines.	它们应该有义务遣返外国员工，菲律宾标准移民雇用合同就纳入了这项规定。


They also should have evacuation plans for employees at all levels, not just executives.	它们也应该有不论层级的全体雇员撤离计划，而不仅限于高管。


It should be self-evident that we need to help all migrants in distress – not only those affected by conflicts and disasters, but also those abandoned by smugglers, countless more left in limbo for years in transit countries, and the millions working in slave-like conditions.	我们需要帮助所有受困移民，这是不言自明的真理——不仅包括受冲突和灾难影响的额移民，也包括被黑道打劫后遭到抛弃的移民，还有数不胜数的在出国后遭受多年如炼狱般生活的移民，以及数百万向奴隶一样工作的移民。


The principles and plans that we put in place to protect migrants in life-threatening situations eventually could – and should – be expanded in order to protect a much broader array of vulnerable migrants.	我们在保护移民面临受威胁生命状况的原则和计划最终可以——也应该——予以扩大，以保护范围更广的脆弱移民。


We need not be overwhelmed by the dizzying array of problems plaguing migrants.	我们不应该被移民所遭受的数不清的问题吓住。


With small groups of states, experts, international organizations, and civil society working together to trail-blaze solutions that might become global practices (a model that could be applied to other international problems), we can address the challenges facing migrants one by one and with the necessary resolve.	一小部分国家、专家、国际组织和公民社会精诚合作点燃的星星之火有望变成全球的燎原大火（这个模式可以应用于其他国际问题），我们能够拿出决心一个一个战胜移民所面临的挑战。


Faith in a Globalized Age	全球化时代的信仰


LONDON – For years, it was assumed, certainly in the West, that, as society developed, religion would wither away. But it hasn’t, and, at the start of a new decade, it is time for policymakers to take religion seriously.	发自伦敦——数十年以来，西方人都认定宗教这东西必将随着社会的不断发展而最终消亡，但事实却并非如此，因此在这个未来十年的起始之年，政策制定者们也应该认真考虑一下宗教问题了。


The number of people proclaiming their faith worldwide is growing.	世界上自认拥有宗教信仰的人正不断增多。


This is clearly so in the Islamic world.	在伊斯兰世界尤其如此。


Whereas Europe’s birthrate is stagnant, the Arab population is set to double in the coming decades, and the population will rise in many Asian Muslim-majority countries.	当欧洲国家的婴儿出生率停滞不前之时，阿拉伯世界的人口数量却将在未来十年内翻一番，还有许多穆斯林占大多数的亚洲国家的人口也在增加。


Christianity is also growing – in odd ways and in surprising places.	而与此同时，基督教徒的数量也有所增长——不过是以一种怪异的方式，以及在一些意料之外的地区。


Religion’s largest growth is in China.	宗教人口的最大增长其实发生在中国。


Indeed, the religiosity of China is worth reflecting on.	事实上，中国的宗教状况是值得仔细研究的。


There are more Muslims in China than in Europe, more practicing Protestants than in England, and more practicing Catholics than in Italy.	中国穆斯林的数量超过欧洲，新教徒的数量大于英国，天主教徒人数比整个意大利的还要多。


In addition, according to the latest surveys, around 100 million Chinese identify themselves as Buddhist.	此外，最新的调查显示有1000万中国人是佛教徒。


And, of course, Confucianism – a philosophy rather than a religion – is deeply revered.	而儒教——与其说是宗教不如说是一种哲学——也深深地根植在中国人心中。


There is a huge Evangelical movement in Brazil and Mexico.	在巴西和墨西哥都发生了大规模的福音主义运动。


Faith remains for many in the United States a vital part of their lives.	信仰也依然是许多美国人生命中的一个重要组成部分。


Even in Europe, the numbers confessing to a belief in God remain high.	即便是在欧洲，信上帝的人数量依旧庞大。


And, of course there are hundreds of millions of Hindus and still solid numbers of Sikhs and Jews.	当然世界上还有数亿印度教徒以及依旧虔诚的锡克教和犹太社区。


Those of faith do great work because of it.	这些信众都在信仰的驱使下做出了伟大的贡献。


Around 40% of health care in Africa is delivered by faith-based organizations.	非洲大概有40%的卫生服务都是由宗教团体来承担的。


Muslim, Hindu, and Jewish relief groups are active the world over in combating poverty and disease.	大量的穆斯林，印度教和犹太教团体活跃在全球扶贫抗病阵线上。


In any developed nation, you will find selfless care being provided to the disabled, the dying, the destitute, and the disadvantaged, by people acting under the impulse of their faith.	在许多发达国家，你会发现那些受宗教感召的人们为残疾人，垂死者，穷人和受压迫的人提供了无私的帮助。


Common to all great religions is love of neighbors and human equality before God.	基本上所有伟大的宗教都拥有同样的信条：爱你周围的人，在神面前人人平等。


Unfortunately, compassion is not the only context in which religion motivates people.	不幸的是，宗教带给人们的不仅仅是怜悯和同情。


It can also promote extremism, even terrorism.	它同时也会催生极端甚至是恐怖主义。


This is where faith becomes a badge of identity in opposition to those who do not share it, a kind of spiritual nationalism that regards those who do not agree – even those within a faith who live a different view of it – as unbelievers, infidels, and thus enemies.	此时信仰摇身一变成为了某种身份定义的符号，借以反对那些没有这身符号的人，最终演变成一种精神上的民族主义，将那些拥有不同意见的人——即便他们笃信同一宗教——视为不信教者，视为异教徒，并因此与之为敌。


To a degree, this has always been so.	这种情况自古有之。


What has changed is the pressure of globalization, which is pushing the world’s peoples ever closer together as technology advances and shrinks the world.	唯一改变的则是全球化的压力，随着科技的不断发展，这个不断“缩小”的地球正将全世界的人们更紧密地糅合在一起。


Growing up 50 years ago, children might rarely meet someone of a different cultural or faith background.	在50年前，一个孩子很少有机会接触来自其他文化信仰的孩子。


Today, when I stand in my ten-year-old son’s playground or look at his friends at his birthday party, I find myriad different languages, faiths, and colors.	而如今当我置身于自己儿子的十岁生日聚会中，就会发现自己被无数不同的语言，宗教和肤色所拥簇着，


Personally, I rejoice in this.	我个人是很喜欢这一点的。


But such a world requires that mutual respect replace mutual suspicion. Such a world upends traditions and challenges old thinking, forcing us to choose consciously to embrace it.	但这样一个世界要求的是互相尊重而不是互相猜忌，彻底颠覆了所有的传统和旧思维，迫使我们要么自觉地去接受，或者反其道而行之。


And there is the rub: for some, this force is a threat.	而这正是矛盾的地方：对于某些人来说，这股力量是一种威胁。


It menaces deeply conservative societies.	它对那些高度保守的社会造成了破坏。


And, for those for whom religion matters, globalization can sometimes be accompanied by an aggressive secularism or hedonism that makes many uneasy.	而对许多笃信宗教的人来说，全球化总是伴随着令人不快的世俗主义和享乐主义。


So we must make sense of how the world of faith interacts with the compulsive process of globalization.	因此我们必须小心考虑宗教世界如何与全球化的强大进程实现互动的问题。


Yet it is extraordinary how little political time or energy we devote to doing so.	但奇怪的是我们在这方面竟然只投入了非常少的政治时间和精力。


Most of the conflicts in today’s world have a religious dimension.	当今世界的许多冲突背后都有宗教的影子。


Extremism based on a perversion of Islam shows no sign of abating; indeed, it will not abate until it is taken on religiously, as well as by security measures.	基于歪曲伊斯兰教义的极端主义仍在不断膨胀； 事实上，只有靠宗教的方式（加上相应安全措施）才能遏制它的滋长。


This extremism is, slowly but surely, producing its own reaction, as we see from Islamaphobic parties’ electoral gains in Europe, and statements by European leaders that multiculturalism has failed.	这种极端主义也正在缓慢但逐步地孕育着自己的反对力量，正如我们看到反伊斯兰政党在欧洲大选中逐渐得势，而欧洲领导人关于文化多元化的宣言都沦为废纸。


Of course, throughout time, religion has often been part of a political conflict.	当然，从古到今，宗教从来就是政治冲突的其中一部分。


But that doesn’t mean that religion should be discounted.	但这不意味着宗教必须被抛弃。


On the contrary, it requires a special focus.	相反，需要对宗教给予特别关注。


I see this very plainly spending so much time in Jerusalem, where – East and West – there is an emphatic increase in religiosity.	这一点在耶路撒冷体现得特别明显，在那里——东边和西边——教徒的群体都不断壮大。


I started my Faith Foundation precisely to create greater understanding between the faiths.	而我创立信仰基金会的原因正是为了在不同信仰间促成更多的理解。


My reasoning is simple.	我的想法很简单。


Those advocating extremism in the name of religion are active, well resourced, and – whatever the reactionary nature of their thinking – brilliant at using modern communication and technology.	那些以宗教之名鼓吹极端主义的人非常活跃，有大量资源撑腰，而且无论其思想有多么保守反动，他们都很善于利用最现代化的通信和技术手段。


We estimate that literally billions of dollars every year are devoted to promoting this view of religion.	据我们估计，全世界每年都有数十亿美元资金投入到宣传这类宗教观点的运动当中。


So my Foundation has a university program – now underway in nine countries – that is designed to take religion out of the sole preserve of divinity schools and start analyzing its role in the world today.	因此我的基金会拥有一个大学项目——目前在九个国家的院校中推行——目的就是将宗教从神学院的高墙背后解放出来，并开始研究其在当今世界上所扮演的角色。


We have another program – in 15 countries, with others set to join – that links high school students across the world through interactive technology to discuss their faith and what it means to them.	我们还有另一个项目——目前已经有15个国家参与其中——通过互动技术将各国高校学生��联起来，让他们可以共同讨论自己的信仰以及这些信仰对自身的意义。


And we have an action program through which young people work with those of another faith to raise awareness of the Millennium Development Goals, the United Nations-led program to combat world poverty.	我们还设立了一个行动项目，拥有不同信仰的年轻人可以通过该项目进行合作，共同提高对千年发展目标（联合国带头设立的全球扶贫项目）的认识。


We are just one organization. There are others starting.	这个基金会只是众多投身于此的组织之一。


But governments should start to take this far more seriously.	但政府应该开始认真重视这个问题。


The Alliance of Civilizations, begun by Spain and Turkey, is one example.	由西班牙和土耳其政府共同启动的文明联盟（Alliance of Civilizations）项目就是其中一个范例。


The King of Saudi Arabia has also shown great leadership in this sphere.	沙特国王在该领域也表现了强大的领导作用。


Yet this is not just about bringing high-level people together.	但这不应仅仅是把那些头面人物聚集在一起。


It has to be taken down into the grassroots of nations, especially into the media of their young people.	而必须投身到各国的草根阶层，尤其是年轻人的交流媒介中去。


Finally, religious leaders must accept a new responsibility: to stand up firmly and resolutely for respecting those of faiths different from their own.	最终，宗教领袖们都必须承担一个新的责任：全心全意地尊重那些与自己持有不同宗教信仰的人。


Aggressive secularists and extremists feed off each other.	激进世俗主义者和宗教极端主义者是相伴而生的。


Together, they do constitute a real challenge to people of faith.	他们确实对信仰宗教的人们构成了极大的挑战。


We must demonstrate the loving nature of true faith; otherwise, religion will be defined by a battle in which extremists seize control of faith communities and secularists claim that such attitudes are intrinsic to religion.	我们必须显示出真正信仰的爱心本质； 否则的话，宗教将最终演变成一场斗争：极端主义者充斥着各个宗教社区，而世俗主义者则宣称这些态度就是宗教的本质。


This would be a tragedy.	这将是个悲剧。


For, above all, it is in this era of globalization that faith can represent reason and progress.	毕竟在这个全球化时代，信仰也可以代表着理性和进步。


Religion isn’t dying; nor should it.	宗教并不是在消亡，也不应该消亡。


The world needs faith.	因为这个世界其实是需要信仰的。


The Coming Wave of Oil Refugees	即将到来的石油难民潮


NAIROBI – The idea that oil wealth can be a curse is an old one – and it should need no explaining.	内罗毕—石油财富可能是一个诅咒，这一思想由来已久——也不需要解释了。


Every few decades, energy prices rise to the heavens, kicking off a scramble for new sources of oil.	每隔几十年，能源价格就会一飞冲天，人们争相寻找新的石油资源。


Then supply eventually outpaces demand, and prices suddenly crash to Earth.	接着，供给最终超过需求，价格有从天上落到地下。


The harder and more abrupt the fall, the greater the social and geopolitical impact.	暴跌越大越突然，社会和地缘政治影响就越大。


The last great oil bust occurred in the 1980s – and it changed the world.	上一次石油大崩盘发生在20世纪80年代——并且改变了世界。


As a young man working in the Texas oil patch in the spring of 1980, I watched prices for the US benchmark crude rise as high as $45 a barrel – $138 in today’s dollars.	1980年春，我还是德克萨斯州 油田上的一名年轻工人，我目睹美国基准原油价格上涨到每桶45美元——相当于今天的138美元。


By 1988, oil was selling for less than $9 a barrel, having lost half its value in 1986 alone.	到了1988年，石油价格还不到每桶9美元，1986年一年就暴跌了一半价格。


Drivers benefited as gasoline prices plummeted.	汽油价格大降让司机受益。


Elsewhere, however, the effects were catastrophic – nowhere more so than in the Soviet Union, whose economy was heavily dependent on petroleum exports.	但是，在其他方面，油价下跌的影响是灾难性的——最为明显的便是苏联，其经济严重依赖石油出口。


The country’s growth rate fell to a third of its level in the 1970s.	苏联经济增长率下降到只有20世纪70年代的三分之一。


As the Soviet Union weakened, social unrest grew, culminating in the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism throughout Central and Eastern Europe.	随着苏联的日益疲软，社会动荡开始增加，最终导致1989年柏林墙的倒塌和中东欧共产主义的崩溃。


Two years later, the Soviet Union itself was no more.	两年后，苏联本身也不复存在。


Similarly, today’s plunging oil prices will benefit a few.	类似地，今天石油价格的暴跌也会让一些人受益。


Motorists, once again, will be happy; but the pain will be earth-shaking for many others.	开车的人又会很愉快； 但对其他许多人来说将十分痛苦。


Never mind the inevitable turmoil in global financial markets or the collapse of shale-oil production in the United States and what it implies for energy independence.	全球金融市场难免动荡，意味着能源独立的美国页岩油生产难免崩溃，这些都不重要。


The real risk lies in countries that are heavily dependent on oil.	真正的风险位于严重依赖石油的国家。


As in the old Soviet Union, the prospects for social disintegration are huge.	和昔日的苏联一样，它们面临巨大的社会解体的风险。


Sub-Saharan Africa will certainly be one epicenter of the oil crunch.	撒哈拉以南非洲显然是石油地震的震中之一。


Nigeria, its largest economy, could be knocked to its knees.	非洲最大经济体尼日利亚可能一蹶不振。


Oil production is stalling, and unemployment is expected to skyrocket.	石油生产陷入停滞，失业率预计将一飞冲天。


Already, investors are rethinking billions of dollars in financial commitments.	投资者已经开始重新考虑数十亿美元的金融承诺。


President Muhammadu Buhari, elected in March 2015, has promised to stamp out corruption, rein in the free-spending elite, and expand public services to the very poor, a massive proportion of the country’s population.	2015年3月当选的尼日利亚总统布哈里承诺要铲除腐败，治理挥霍无度的精英，扩大对穷人（占该国人口大多数）的公共服务。


That now looks impossible.	这些看来已经无从实现。


As recently as a year ago, Angola, Africa’s second largest oil producer, was the darling of global investors.	几年前，非洲第二大石油生产国安哥拉是全世界投资者的香饽饽。


The expatriate workers staffing Luanda’s office towers and occupying its fancy residential neighborhoods complained that it was the most expensive city in the world.	在罗安达写字楼工作、居住在梦幻般的居民区的外来工作者抱怨这是世界上最昂贵的城市。


Today, Angola’s economy is grinding to a halt.	如今，安哥拉经济已经陷入停顿。


Construction companies cannot pay their workers.	建筑公司发不出工资。


The cash-strapped government is slashing the subsidies that large numbers of Angolans depend on, fueling popular anger and a sense that the petro-boom enriched only the elite, leaving everyone else worse off.	囊中羞涩的政府正在削减大量安哥拉人所依赖的大额补贴，这助长了群众愤怒，让人们感到石油繁荣只是肥了精英，而其他所有人今不如昔。


As young people call for political change from a president who has been in power since 1979, the government has launched a crackdown on dissent.	年轻人要求从1979年就上台执政的总统换人，政府因此弹压持异见者。


On the other side of the continent, Kenya and Uganda are watching their hopes of becoming oil exporters evaporate.	在非洲大陆的另一端，肯尼亚和乌干达眼睁睁看着成为石油出口国的希望破碎。


As long as prices remain low, new discoveries will stay in the ground.	只要价格保持低位，新的发现就只能呆在地底下。


And yet the money borrowed for infrastructure investment still must be repaid – even if the oil revenues earmarked for that purpose never materialize.	但基础设施投资贷款仍然必须偿还——即使用于此目的的石油收入无法实现。


Funding for social programs in both countries is already stretched.	两国社会项目资金都已经削减。


Ordinary people are already angry at a kleptocratic elite that siphons off public money.	老百姓已经感到十分愤怒，认为强盗精英霸占了公共资金。


What will happen when, in a few years, a huge and growing chunk of the national budget must be dedicated to paying foreign debt instead of funding education or health care?	几年后，当日益增加的庞大的国民预算比例必须用于偿还外债而不是提供教育或医疗时会发生什么？


The view from North Africa is equally bleak.	北非的情况也同样凄惨。


Two years ago, Egypt believed that major discoveries of offshore natural gas would defuse its dangerous youth bomb, the powder keg that fueled the Arab Spring in 2011.	两年前，埃及认为新发现的巨量离岸天然气能够解除其危险的“青年炸弹”——2011年阿拉伯之春的导火索——的威胁。


No longer.	如今不再如此。


And to make matters worse, Saudi Arabia, which for years has funneled money to the Egyptian government, is facing its own economic jitters.	更糟���的是，多年来一直为埃及政府提供资金的沙特阿拉伯也面临着自身的经济困难。


Today, the Kingdom is contemplating what was once unthinkable: cutting Egypt off.	如今，沙特王国正在考虑此前无法想象的事：甩掉埃及。


Meanwhile, next door, Libya is primed to explode.	与此同时，隔壁的利比亚眼看就要爆发。


A half-decade of civil war has left an impoverished population fighting over the country’s dwindling oil revenues.	五年的内战让赤贫的利比亚人为了争夺该国不断下降的石油收入大打出手。


Food and medicine are in short supply as warlords struggle for the remnants of Libya’s national wealth.	军阀争夺所剩无几的利比亚国家财富，这让食品和药品处于短缺状态。


These countries are not only dependent on oil exports; they also rely heavily on imports.	这些国家不但依赖石油出口； 它们也严重依赖进口。


As revenues dry up and exchange rates plunge, the cost of living will skyrocket, exacerbating social and political tensions.	随着收入的干涸和汇率崩溃，生活成本将节节攀升，加剧社会和政治紧张。


Europe is already struggling to accommodate refugees from the Middle East and Afghanistan.	欧洲已经疲于应付安置来自中东和阿富汗的难民。


Nigeria, Egypt, Angola, and Kenya are among Africa’s most populated countries.	尼日利亚、安哥拉和肯尼亚则是非洲人口最多的国家。


Imagine what would happen if they imploded and their disenfranchised, angry, and impoverished residents all started moving north.	想象一下，如果它们发生内乱，它们失去权利、愤怒、赤贫的居民都开始向北移动时会发生什么。


Farewell to Development’s Old Divides	向告别旧的发展鸿沟


NEW YORK -- The notion of a divide between the rich north and the poor and developing south has long been a central concept among economists and policymakers.	关于富裕和的北半球和贫困以及处于发展中的南半球之间的发展差距的观点很长时间以来都是经济学家和政策制订者的中心观点。


From 1950 to 1980, the north accounted for almost 80% of global GDP but only 22% of its population, and the south accounted for the remainder of global population and 20% global income.	从1950年到1980年，北半球贡献了全球GDP的大约80%，而其人口只占22%； 南半球则占据了全球其余人口及占全球经济收入的20%。


But the north-south divide is now obsolete.	但是关于南北差距的提法现在已经过时了。


The dynamic process of globalization has resulted in unprecedented levels of growth and interdependence.	全球化的有力进程带来了前所未有的发展水平和各国的相互依赖。


However, while this has blurred the old division, new ones have emerged, splintering today’s world into four inter-connected tiers.	然而，在旧的那种差距被冲淡时，也出现了新的发展差距，把今天的世界分成了四个相互联系的层面。


The first tier comprises the affluent countries, notably the United States, European nations, Australia, and Japan – with a combined population of around one billion and per capita incomes ranging from $79,000 (Luxembourg) to $16,000 (Republic of Korea).	第一层由富裕国家组成，主要是美国、欧洲国家、澳大利亚和日本。 其总人口约达10亿，人均国民收入在79000美元（卢森堡）至16000美元（韩国）之间。


For the past 50 years, these affluent countries have dominated the global economy, producing four-fifths of its economic output.	在过去50年间，这些富裕国家主导了全球经济，占据了全球经济总产值的五分之四。


However, in recent years, a new set of economies has emerged that is contesting the affluent countries’ economic dominance.	然而，最近这些年出现的一些新的经济体对富裕国家的经济主导地位发起了挑战。


These emerging economies – call them the Globalizers – constitute a second tier of about 30 poor and middle-income countries (including China and India), with per capita GDP growth rates of 3.5% or more, and a total population of 3.2 billion, or roughly 50% of the world’s population.	这些新兴经济体让我们称它们为全球化者，有大约30个中低收入国家（包括中国和印度）组成了第二层，其人均国民收入以3. 5%甚至更高的速度增长，总人口32亿，或者说大约占世界人口的50%。


These countries have experienced unprecedented levels of sustained economic growth that may well enable them to replace the “Affluents” as engines of the world economy.	这些国家经历着前所未有的持续经济增长，从而很可能使它们替代“富裕国家”成为世界经济的引擎。


The Globalizers are a large and diverse group of countries – in size, geography, culture, and history – that have learned how to integrate optimally with, and leverage, the global economy to catalyze their development.	全球化者由一组庞大并且差异很大的国家组成，不管是在国家的大小、地理位置、文化还是历史上都有很大的差异，它们已经学会如何最佳地融入以及撬动全球经济以刺激它们自己的发展。


A third tier is made up of roughly 50 middle-income countries with a combined population of 1.1 billion.	第三层由大约50个中等收入国家组成，总人口为11亿。


They are also home to many of the world’s critical natural resources, possessing around 60% of proven oil reserves.	它们蕴藏着许多对于世界至关重要的天然资源，拥有已探明石油储备的大约60%。


But these “Rentiers” have not been able to translate the rents of their natural resource wealth into sustained economic growth.	但是这些“靠租金生活的国家”没有能够把它们天然资源财富的租金转化为持续的经济增长。


The fourth tier comprises countries that are lagging behind – the world’s poorest economies, with more than a billion people.	第四层由那些落在后面的国家组成。 这些是世界上最贫穷的经济体，总人口超过10亿。


They continue to stagnate or decline economically.	它们的经济继续处于停滞或者下降中。


Mostly located in sub-Saharan Africa, these “Laggards” are largely isolated from the global economy, and they face crucial development challenges.	大多数这类国家位于撒哈拉以南的非洲。 这些“落后国”与全球经济基本处于隔离状态，并且都面临着严峻的发展挑战。


This emerging four-tier world presents three key challenges.	这个新出现的分成四个层面的世界带来了三个主要挑战。


First, we need to increase our efforts to ensure that the Laggards are no longer left behind.	首先，我们需要加大努力以确保落后国不再被甩在后面。


This requires policy changes as well as more generous and more effective aid.	这需要政策的改变以及更大和更有效的援助。


If one considers the issue of aid flows, one finds that though development aid rose in 2005 to $107 billion, most of the increase was geared towards “special circumstances,” such as debt forgiveness and for Iraq and Afghanistan.	如果看一下援助资金的情况，我们会发现尽管发展援助在2005年增加到了1070亿美元，但是其中大部分增加的资金都是被安排给“特殊情况”的，比如债务免除以及援助伊拉克和阿富汗的资金。


The sad truth is that development aid to Africa has decreased from $49 per person in 1980 to $38 per person in 2005.	一个令人伤心的事实是对非洲的发展援助从1980年的人均49美元降到了2005年的人均38美元。


The true development needs of Laggard countries and other parts of the world are not being met, despite the rhetoric of scaling up aid.	落后国家和世界其他地方真正的发展需求并没有得到满足，尽管大家都在口头上宣称要增加援助力度。


Second, the old powers need to accommodate the rise of Globalizer economies – particularly China and India – by reforming our international order.	其次，旧的强国需要通过改革我们的国际秩序来适应全球化者经济体尤其是中国和印度上升的地位。


The Affluents will continue to be major global players, but as the Globalizers’ relative economic power rises, they will demand a greater role in international affairs.	富国将依然扮演全球的重要角色，但是随着全球化者相对经济实力的上升，它们将需要在国际事务中扮演更重要的角色。


Most Affluents seem unprepared for this change, but such demands will need to be accommodated.	大多数富国看起来并没有准备好应对这种改变，但是这种需求应该受到大家的重视。


Finally, while the Globalizers have lifted millions of people out of poverty and reduced global inequality, this has not resulted in a more equal world, because star economies like India and China are experiencing a rise in domestic inequity.	最后，尽管全球化者使数百万人脱离贫困并减少了全球的不平等，但是这并没有带来一个更平等的世界，因为像中国和印度这样的明星国家在其国内正面临着越来越大的不平等。


Whether it is coastal versus inland or rural versus urban, these countries must tackle the widening disparities, because high inequality may well threaten their very ability to continue growing as they have.	无论是沿海地区对内陆地区还是城乡之间经济发展的不平等，这些国家必须想办法解决越来越大的差距，因为严重的不平等势必会影响它们继续保持增长的能力。


If we are to create a more equitable world, then traditional levers of development such as trade, investment, aid, and migration need to be scaled up comprehensively and coherently, and global institutions must be reformed.	如果我们想要创造一个更加平等的世界，��统的发展杠杆，比如贸易、投资、援助和移民等，需要得到全面和协调一致的扩大，并且必须改革全球性机构。


This would improve our ability to address global challenges and better our prospects for building a more equitable world.	这可以提高我们应对全球挑战的能力，并且能使我们更好地创建一个更加平等的世界。


Otherwise, we might bid farewell to old development divides only to welcome new ones.	否则，在我们对旧的发展鸿沟说再见后，很可能会迎来新的发展鸿沟。


Farewell to the Euro?	再见欧元？


MUNICH – “It’s not the euro that’s in danger, but the public finances of individual European countries.”	慕尼黑——“告急的不是欧元，而是某些欧洲国家的公共财政。


One hears this everywhere nowadays, but it’s not true.	”最近，这些话听得人耳朵都起老茧了。


The euro itself is at risk, because the countries in crisis have, in recent years, been running the eurozone’s monetary printing presses overtime.	但事实并非如此。 欧元本身正在面临威胁，因为陷入危机的那几个国家近几年来一直在迫使欧洲央行开足马力印欧元。


Some 90% of the refinancing debt that the commercial banks of the GIPS countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) hold with their respective national central banks served to purchase a net inflow of goods and assets from other eurozone countries.	四猪国（希腊、爱尔兰、葡萄牙和西班牙）商业银行90%左右的再融资债务是经各自国家央行点头的，发债的目的从其他欧元区国家购买商品和资产净流入。


Two-thirds of all refinancing loans within the eurozone were granted within the GIPS countries, despite the fact that these countries account for only 18% of eurozone GDP.	欧元区内部再融资贷款总量的三分之二来自四猪国，而这四个国家的GDP只占欧元区的18%。


Indeed, 88% of these countries’ current-account deficits over the last three years were financed via the extension of credit within the Eurosystem.	事实上，过去三年来，这四个国家经常项目赤字的88%是通过欧元体系内部的信贷扩张融资的。


By the end of 2010, ECB loans, which originated primarily from Germany’s Bundesbank, amounted to €340 billion.	截止2010年末，欧洲央行贷款（主要来源于德国央行）总量为3400亿欧元。


This figure includes ECB credit that financed capital flight from Ireland totaling €130 billion over the past three years.	这一数字包括了过去三年来为解决爱尔兰资本外逃问题提供的总量达1300亿欧元的欧洲央行信贷。


The ECB bailout program has enabled the people of the peripheral countries to continue to live beyond their means, and well-heeled asset holders to take their wealth elsewhere.	欧洲央行的援助计划让欧元区外围国家人民得以享受超出其支付能力的优渥生活，也使得手握重金的资产持有者从别处大发利市。


The capacity for continuing this policy will soon be depleted, as the central-bank money flowing from the GIPS countries to the core countries of the eurozone increasingly crowds out the money created through refinancing operations there.	这一政策持续实施的空间已经快要告罄了，因为从四猪国流向欧元区核心国的欧洲央行货币流正在挤出通过在四猪国进行的再融资操作所创造的货币。


If this continues for two more years as it has for the past three, the stock of refinancing loans in Germany will disappear altogether.	这一状况已经持续了三年，如果再持续两年，那么德国的再融资贷款存量将消耗殆尽。


Indeed, Deutsche Bank has already stopped participating in refinancing operations.	事实上，德意志银行已经叫停了再融资操作。


If German banks drop out of the refinancing business, the European Central Bank will lose the direct control over the German economy that it used to have via its interest-rate policy.	如果德资银行退出再融资业务，那么欧洲央行将失去其以往通过利率政策实现的对德国经济的直接控制。


The main refinancing rate would then only be the rate at which the peripheral EU countries draw ECB money for purchases in the center of Europe, which ultimately would be the source of all the money circulating in the euro area.	主要再融资利率将因此变为外围国家从中心国家获得欧洲央行货币的利率，而这笔货币最终将成为欧元区内所有流通货币的源泉。


The GIPS’ enormous current-account deficits – and the massive exodus of capital from Ireland, in particular – would not have been possible without ECB financing.	四猪国巨大的经常项目赤字以及（特别是爱尔兰的）资本大逃亡在没有欧洲央行融资的情况下是不可能出现的。


Without the additional money that GIPS central banks created in excess of their countries’ requirements for internal circulation, trade deficits could not have been sustained, and the GIPS’ commercial banks would have been unable to prop up asset prices (which all too often were those of government bonds).	没有四猪国央行所创造的超出其国内流通要求的过剩货币，贸易赤字将无法持续，四猪国商业银行早已无法支撑资产（通常就是各自的国债）价格。


Last year, with the ECB running out of tools to keep Europe’s troubled banks from precipitating a financial crisis, follow-up financing was agreed upon, and from 2013 onwards the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is meant to take on that responsibility.	去年，由于欧洲央行已没有工具能让欧洲受困银行摆脱金融危机冲击，欧洲各国达成了后续融资协议，从2013年开始，欧洲稳定性机制（ESM）将担起这一责任。


This may relieve some pressure, but it only shifts the problem from the ECB bailout fund to the community of states.	这或许纾解了一定的压力，但只是把问题从欧洲央行援助基金转移到了国家社区头上。


The ESM is a sure way to bring Europe to its knees, because the longer bailout loans continue, the longer the GIPS’ current-account deficits will persist, and the more their external debts will grow.	ESM必将严重拖累欧洲，因为援助贷款持续时间越长，四猪国的经常项目赤字问题就越顽固，它们的外部债务积累得就越多。


Eventually, these debts will become unsustainable.	最终，这些债务将无法持续。


The sole exception is Ireland, which is suffering not from a lack of competitiveness, but from capital flight.	唯一的例外是爱尔兰，爱尔兰的问题不在于缺乏竞争力，而在于资本外逃。


Ireland is the only country that has lowered its prices and wages, and its current-account deficit is about to swing into surplus.	爱尔兰是唯一一个调低了物价和工资的国家，其经常项目即将从赤字转为盈余。


By contrast, Spain’s external deficit is still above 4% of GDP, while Portugal and Greece recently recorded astronomical figures of around 10%.	与之相反，西班牙的外部债务仍然在GDP的4%以上，而葡萄牙和希腊的这一数字目前更是高达惊人的10%。


What Europe is trying to do in Portugal and Greece is reminiscent of central banks’ futile efforts in past decades to keep exchange rates away from the market equilibrium price level.	欧洲试图对葡萄牙和希腊所做之事让人想起了各国央行在过去几十年里��劳地意欲将汇率维持在远离市场均衡价格的水平。


Some central banks, such as the Bank of England in its unsuccessful fight against George Soros in 1992, got burned; when it became clear how much money was required to buck the market, the policy was abandoned.	有的央行为此付出了沉重代价，比如，英格兰银行在1992年被乔治·索罗斯击溃，当它终于了解到维持汇率需要耗费多少资金时，它放弃了原有政策。


Apart from China, central banks don’t intervene to protect their currencies anymore.	除了中国，各国央行已不再出于保护本国货币的目的实施干预。


Europe, too, will get a bloody nose if it keeps trying to artificially prop up asset prices in the periphery.	如果欧洲试图人为维持外围国家的资产价格的话，也必将碰个头破血流。


The sums required for this could ultimately run into trillions, according to an estimate by Citibank.	据花旗银行估算，这样做所需要的资金总数最终将达到数万亿之巨。


This would shatter Europe.	这将把欧洲拖入万劫不复。


Apart from financial restructuring, which is crucial, Greece and Portugal must become cheaper in order to regain their competitiveness.	除了关键性的财务重组，希腊和葡萄牙必须让自己更廉价以获得竞争力。


Estimates for Greece assume that prices and wages need to come down by 20-30%.	根据估算，希腊需要将价格和工资下降20—30%。


Things won’t be much different in Portugal.	葡萄牙的情况也差不多。


If these countries lack the political consensus they need to pull this off, they should in their own interest consider leaving the eurozone temporarily to depreciate their currencies.	如果这些国家不能达成实现这些条件所必须的政治共识，那么出于自身利益考虑，它们应该退出暂时欧元区以实现货币贬值。


The banking system would not survive this without help, so the EU’s bailout activities should be refocused accordingly.	如果没有帮助的话，它们的银行体系是无法幸存的，因此欧盟的援助行动应该据此转移重心。


But these countries’ real economies would benefit from a furlough from the eurozone.	但这些国家的实体经济将从暂时退出欧元区中获益。


Depreciation inside the eurozone in the form of deflation, on the other hand, would drive large parts of the real economy into excessive debt, because only the value of assets, not that of bank debts, would decline.	另一方面，不退出欧元区，而是以通缩方式实现贬值将把实体经济拖入债务泥淖，因为只有资产价值会贬值，银行债务不会。


The transitional independent privatization agency proposed by Jean-Claude Juncker for paying the Greek debt is not a good idea.	容克（Jean-Claude Juncker）建议成立过渡性独立私有化机构来偿付希腊债务，这并非良策。


First, it would at best aim to solve the debt problem; it would not increase competitiveness.	首先，该建议的目标充其量只能解决债务问题，而不能增加竞争力。


Second, Germany’s experience with this kind of agency shows that it is impossible to sell off large parts of an economy simultaneously.	其次，从德国类似机构的经验看，要同时出售一个经济体的一大块是很困难的。


Europe’s banks would make a killing without reducing Greek debt in any meaningful way.	欧洲银行将因此受害，而希腊债务并不会有实质性的减少。


It is time to face the fact that Europe’s peripheral countries have to shrink their nominal GDP to regain competitiveness.  The only question is whether they will take the euro down as well.	我们应该直面欧洲外围国家必须减少名义GDP以重获竞争力的现实。 唯一的问题是欧元是不是会被它们拖下水。


Farewell to the Neo-Classical Revolution	别了，新古典主义革命


LONDON – The looming bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and the forced sale of Merrill Lynch, two of the greatest names in finance, mark the end of an era.	伦敦-雷曼兄弟的即将破产，美林的被迫出售，这两个在金融业中著名的名字，标志着一个时代的结束。


But what will come next?	但是，接下来会发生什么呢？


Cycles of economic fashion are as old as business cycles, and are usually caused by deep business disturbances.	经济模式周期和商业周期一样古老，并且通常是由深层次的商业扰乱引发的。


“Liberal” cycles are followed by “conservative” cycles, which give way to new “liberal” cycles, and so on. 	“自由主义”周期紧接着就是“保守主义”周期，然后“保守主义”周期又会让位于新的“自由主义”周期，并如此循环往复下去。


Liberal cycles are characterized by government intervention and conservative cycles by government retreat.	自由主义周期以政府干涉为特征，而保守主义周期以政府退却为特征。


A long liberal cycle stretched from the 1930’s to the 1970’s, followed by a conservative cycle of economic deregulation, which now seems to have run its course.	从20 世纪30年代开始到20世纪70年代为止是一个长长的自由主义周期，接着就是一个放松经济监管的保守主义周期，该周期现在似乎已经走完了其历程。


With the nationalization of America’s two giant mortgage banks, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, following the nationalization earlier this year of Britain’s Northern Rock, governments have started stepping in again to prevent market meltdowns.	在今年稍早时候英国罗森若克银行被国有化之后，美国两家巨大的抵押银行房地美和房利美也被国有化，显示政府已经再次插手干预市场以防止市场崩溃。


The heady days of conservative economics are over – for now.	保守经济学火热的日子结束了——到目前为止。


Each cycle of regulation and de-regulation is triggered by economic crisis.	 每一个监管和放松监管周期都是由经济危机引发的。


The last liberal cycle, associated with President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal and the economist John Maynard Keynes, was triggered by the Great Depression, though it took World War II’s massive government spending to get it properly going.	上一个自由主义周期，与弗兰克林· 罗斯福总统的新政以及经济学家约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯联系在一起，是由大萧条引发的，虽然它花费了第二次世界大战巨额的政府开支才使其正常运行。


During the three-decade-long Keynesian era, governments in the capitalist world managed and regulated their economies to maintain full employment and moderate business fluctuations. 	在长达30年的凯恩斯时代，资本主义国家的政府管理和调控期经济，并以此来维持充分的就业和缓和经济的周期性波动。


The new conservative cycle was triggered by the inflation of the 1970’s, which seemed to be a product of Keynesian policies.	新的保守主义周期是由20世纪70年代的通货膨胀所引发的，该通胀似乎是凯恩斯政策的一个结果。


The economic guru of that era, Milton Friedman, claimed that the deliberate pursuit of full employment was bound to fuel inflation.	那个时代的经济学领袖人物米尔顿·弗里德曼声称，刻意追求充分的就业一定会助长通货膨胀；


Governments should concentrate on keeping money “sound” and leave the economy to look after itself.	政府应该专注于保护货币“安全”，让经济按照其自己的方式运行。


The “new classical economics,” as it became known, taught that, in the absence of egregious government interference, economies would gravitate naturally to full employment, greater innovation, and higher growth rates.	成名的“新古典主义经济学”教导说，在没有政府过分的干预的时候，经济会自然地朝充分就业、更大的创新以及更高的增长率的方向发展。


The current crisis of the conservative cycle reflects the massive build-up of bad debt that became apparent with the sub-prime crisis, which started in June 2007 and has now spread to the whole credit market, sinking Lehman Brothers.	当前保守主义周期的危机反映了在次级抵押贷款危机下变得明显的巨额坏账积累的事实，该次贷危机始于2007年6月，现在已经扩散到整个信贷市场，并使雷曼兄弟陷入破产境地。


“Think of an inverted pyramid,” writes investment banker Charles Morris. “The more claims are piled on top of real output, the more wobbly the pyramid becomes.”	“想象一个倒置的金字塔，”���资银行家查尔斯·莫里斯写道，“堆积在实际产量上的要求越多，金字塔变得越不稳定。


When the pyramid starts crumbling, government – that is, taxpayers – must step in to refinance the banking system, revive mortgage markets, and prevent economic collapse.	 当金字塔开始崩溃的时候，政府——也就是说，纳税人——必须插手为银行系统再次注入资金，振兴抵押信贷市场并防止经济崩溃。


But once government intervenes on this scale, it usually stays for a long time.	但是，一旦政府介入达到这个规模，它通常就会在停留很长一段时间。


At issue here is the oldest unresolved dilemma in economics: are market economies “naturally” stable or do they need to be stabilized by policy?	在这里的有争议的问题是经济学最古老的未决两难问题：市场经济是“天然”稳定的，还是要由政策来稳定它？


Keynes emphasized the flimsiness of the expectations on which economic activity in decentralized markets is based.	凯恩斯强调作为分散市场里的经济行为基础的预期的脆弱性。


The future is inherently uncertain, and therefore investor psychology is fickle.	未来具有内在的不确定性，因此投资者心理也是易变的。


“The practice of calmness, of immobility, of certainty and security, suddenly breaks down,” Keynes wrote. “New fears and hopes will, without warning, take charge of human conduct.”	“平静、稳定、确定以及安全的习惯突然中止了，”凯恩斯写道，“新的恐惧和希望在没有预兆的情况下，控制了人的行为。


This is a classic description of the “herd behavior” that George Soros has identified as financial markets’ dominant feature.	”这是乔治·索罗斯将其作为金融市场主要特征的“羊群行为”的经典描述。


It is the government’s job to stabilize expectations.	稳定市场预期是政府的职责。


The neo-classical revolution believed that markets were much more cyclically stable than Keynes believed, that the risks in all market transactions can be known in advance, and that prices will therefore always reflect objective probabilities.	新古典主义革命认为市场要比凯恩斯认为的更具周期稳定性，所有市场交易的风险都是可以预先知道的，价格因此而总是反映了客观可能性。


Such market optimism led to de-regulation of financial markets in the 1980’s and 1990’s, and the subsequent explosion of financial innovation which made it “safe” to borrow larger and larger sums of money on the back of predictably rising assets.	这样的市场乐观主义导致了20世纪80年代和90年代金融市场的放松监管，后来的金融创新大爆炸使在预期资产价格上涨的情况下，许多人认为借越来越多的钱很“安全”。


The just-collapsed credit bubble, fueled by so-called special investment vehicles, derivatives, collateralized debt obligations, and phony triple-A ratings, was built on the illusions of mathematical modeling.	刚刚破灭的由所谓的特别投资工具、衍生品、债务抵押债券以及虚假的3A评级助长的信贷泡沫，是建立在数学模型的幻想之上的。


Liberal cycles, the historian Arthur Schlesinger thought, succumb to the corruption of power, conservative cycles to the corruption of money.	. 历史学家阿瑟·施莱辛格认为，自由主义周期屈从于权力的腐败，保守主义周期屈从于金钱的腐败。


Both have their characteristic benefits and costs.	两者都有特有的好处和代价。


But if we look at the historical record, the liberal regime of the 1950’s and 1960’s was more successful than the conservative regime that followed.	但是，如果我们看看历史纪录就会发现，20世纪50年代和60年代的自由主义体制比随后的保守主义体制更为成功。


Outside China and India, whose economic potential was unleashed by market economics, economic growth was faster and much more stable in the Keynesian golden age than in the age of Friedman; its fruits were more equitably distributed; social cohesion and moral habits better maintained.	在中国和印度——市场经济释放了它们的经济潜能——之外， 凯恩斯黄金时代的经济增长要比弗里德曼时代更快，更稳定； 凯恩斯黄金时代的经济成果被更公平地加以分配，社会凝聚力和道德习惯更好地得到维持。


These are serious benefits to weigh against some business sluggishness.	这些都是抗衡一些商业萧条的重要益处。


History, of course, never repeats itself exactly.	当然，历史从来不会一成不变地重复自己。


Circuit-breakers are in place nowadays to prevent a 1929-style slide into disaster.	现在有断路机制来防止1929年式的危机沦为一场灾难。


But when the financial system, left to its own devices, seizes up, as it now has, we are clearly in for a new round of regulation.	但是，当听任其按照自己的方式运行的金融系统，像现在这样失灵了的话，我们显然必定要进行新一轮的调控。


Industry will be left free, but finance will be brought under control.	实业将会被听任自由发展，但是，金融业会被纳入控制之中。


The cycles in economic fashion show how far economics is from being a science.	 经济模式的周期说明了经济学离一门科学的距离有多远。


One cannot think of any natural science in which orthodoxy swings between two poles.	人们很难想象在任何一门自然科学中，正统说法会在两极之间摇摆。


What gives economics the appearance of a science is that its propositions can be expressed mathematically by abstracting from many decisive characteristics of the real world.	给予经济学它是一门科学的表象的东西是，它的命题可以通过提炼许多现实世界的决定性特征用数学加以表述。


The classical economics of the 1920’s abstracted from the problem of unemployment by assuming that it did not exist.	20世纪20年代的古典经济学是通过假定失业不存在的方式，从失业问题中抽象出来的。


Keynesian economics, in turn, abstracted from the problem of official incompetence and corruption by assuming that governments were run by omniscient, benevolent experts.	凯恩斯经济学是依次通过假定政府是由无所不能的慈善专家管理的方式，从政府无能和腐败问题中抽象出来的。


Today’s “new classical economics” abstracted from the problem of uncertainty by assuming that it could be reduced to measurable (or hedgeable) risk.	当今的“新古典主义经济学”是通过假定不确定性可以降低为可测量（或可对冲）的风险，从不确定性问题中抽象出来。


A few geniuses aside, economists frame their assumptions to suit existing states of affairs, and then invest them with an aura of permanent truth.	除少数天才之外，大多数经济学家都将他们的假设套入既存事实的框子里，然后授予它们永恒真理的光环。


They are intellectual butlers, serving the interests of those in power, not vigilant observers of shifting reality.	他们是知识分子仆人，为那些有权势的人的利益服务，而不是变化的事实敏锐的观察者。


Their systems trap them in orthodoxy.	他们的体系使他们落入了正统学说的圈套。


When events, for whatever reason, coincide with their theorems, the orthodoxy that they espouse enjoys its moment of glory.	当发生的事情不管因为什么原因和他们的理论巧合的时候，他们支持的学说就会享受其荣耀时刻。


When events shift, it becomes obsolete.	当事情发生了变化的时候，它就变得一文不值。


As Charles Morris wrote: “Intellectuals are reliable lagging indicators, near-infallible guides to what used to be true.”	正像查尔斯·莫里斯写的那样，“知识分子是可靠的落后指标，是对过去事实的几乎没有错误的向导。 ”


Farewell to the Revolution?	告别革命了？


“The FARC are finished, no matter how many men and weapons they may still have.”	“ 哥伦比亚革命武装力量完蛋了，不管它们还有多少人员和武器。


Former Salvadoran guerrilla leader Joaquín Villalobos’ lapidary conclusion about the Colombian narco-guerrilla movement is worthy of consideration, given his unmatched insight into Latin America’s armed, revolutionary left.	” 鉴于其在拉丁美洲左翼革命武装力量问题上无能人能比的洞察力，前萨尔瓦多游击队领导人霍亚金·维拉洛布思（Joaquín Villalobos）关于哥伦比亚缉毒游击战的珍贵结论值得人们思考。


So is the almost tearful acknowledgement by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’s ideological guru, Heinz Dieterich, that “Chávez’s speech on the FARC (calling on it to abandon armed struggle and free its hostages) is the equivalent of unconditional surrender to Washington’s hemispheric ambition.”	同样，委内瑞拉总统雨果·查韦斯的意识形态导师海因兹·迪特里奇，几乎含泪地承认“查韦斯关于哥伦比亚革命武装力量的讲话（号召它抛弃武装斗争并释放人质）相当于是向华盛顿的半球野心无条件的投降”，也是如此。


However hasty these judgments may end up being, it certainly seems that the region’s oldest and last political-military organization is, at long last, on the brink of defeat.	不管这些判断最终看起来多么草率，但是它确实显示了该地区历史最长的也是最后的政治军事组织似乎终于濒于失败。


Colombian President Alvaro Uribe’s strategy of “democratic security” appears to have paid off, supported by the United States-financed Plan Colombia, as well as by much plain good luck, such as finding thousands of incriminating computer files three months ago in an attack on a FARC camp in Ecuador.	在由美国提供经费的哥伦比亚计划以及良好运气——例如在三个月前袭击位于厄瓜多尔的哥伦比亚革命武装力量营地时发现的成千的证明其有罪的电脑文件——的帮助下，哥伦比亚总统阿尔瓦罗·乌里韦的“民主安全”策略看起来有了回报，


If events in the next few months confirm the FARC’s demise, Latin America would finally be rid of one of its main scourges over the past half-century.	如果接下来几个月的情形证实了哥伦比亚革命武装力量的灭亡，拉丁美洲将最终摆脱其在过去半个世纪里的一个主要灾难。


At least since December 1956, when Fidel and Raúl Castro, together with a young Argentine doctor, later known as Che Guevara, sailed from Mexico’s port of Tuxpan to Cuba and into history, the region has seen innumerable attempts by small left-wing revolutionary groups to take power through armed uprisings.	至少从1956年12月开始，当菲得尔和劳尔·卡斯特罗以及一个年青的阿根廷医生——后来闻名于世的切·格瓦拉，从墨西哥的图斯潘港出发航行到古巴并开始书写一段历史后，该地区已经见证了无数的小规模左翼革命团体试图通过武装起义来取得政权事例。


They have all invoked heroic precedents from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as well as the impossibility of proceeding otherwise under brutal right-wing dictatorships, such as Batista’s in Cuba, Somoza’s in Nicaragua, and military-oligarchic complexes in Guatemala, El Salvador, Bolivia, Argentina, Peru, Uruguay, and elsewhere – including Colombia.	它们都引用19世纪和20世纪初期的英雄先例以及强调在右翼的残暴独裁统治下——例如巴蒂斯塔在古巴的独裁统治，索摩查在尼加拉瓜的独裁统治，以及军事寡头联合体在危地马拉、萨尔瓦多、玻利维亚、阿根廷、秘鲁、乌拉圭和其他地方－包括哥伦比亚的独裁统治，不可能用其他方式取得政权。


In many of these cases, they were right: without recourse to guns and bullets, nothing in their countries would ever have changed.	在许多情形中，他们的观点是对的：不借助枪支和子弹，他们国家的都不会发生任何改变。 他们只取得了三个成功：1959年在古巴革命成功；


They achieved only three successes: Cuba, in 1959; Nicaragua, in 1979; and El Salvador, where, by 1992, they fought the US and the local army to a stalemate, bringing peace and growing prosperity to their country.	1979年在尼加拉瓜革命成功； 以及到1992年止在萨尔瓦多，他们和美国以及当地军队战争打成僵局的状态，给这个国家带来了和平和繁荣发展。


Everywhere else, for whatever reason – misguided strategies, tactical mistakes, erroneous theories, US intervention, etc. – they faced only defeat, repression, and futility.	在其他所有地方，不管是什么原因－被误导的策略，战术错误，不正确的理论，美国的干涉等等－他们面对的只有失败，镇压和无果而终。


By the early 1990’s, it became increasingly evident that the armed struggle for power in Latin American was winding down.	到上个世纪90年代初期，在拉丁美洲，为了取得政权的武装斗争正在逐步停止的趋势越来越明显。


Only a few groups remained: the Shining Path in Peru, the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front in Chile, for a brief time the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico, and the FARC in Colombia.	该地区只剩下了几个团体：秘鲁的光明道路，智利的曼纽尔·罗德里格斯（Manuel Rodríguez）爱国阵线，在墨西哥恰帕斯州短期存在的萨帕塔主义者和哥伦比亚的哥伦比亚革命武装力量。


Democratic transitions throughout the hemisphere had made guerrilla warfare unjustifiable: as Che foretold in his La Guerra de Guerrillas in 1962, wherever the trappings (or, one might add, the realities) of democratic rule prevailed, taking up arms was pointless.	该半球的民主转变使游击战争失去了存在的合理基础：像切·格瓦拉于1962年在其作品《游击战争》中预言的那样，无论在哪里，如果民主统治的趋势（或者，你可加上，民主统治的现实）获胜，那么拿起武器就变得毫无意义。


In country after country, the guerrillas were defeated, pacified, brought into the democratic process, or rendered irrelevant.	一个国家接着一个国家，游击队都被击败，被招安，被纳入民主进程，或者变得无关紧要。


By the end of the twentieth century, only the FARC endured, together with a smattering of splinter groups in Mexico.	到20世纪末期，只有哥伦比亚革命武装力量以及墨西哥的少数分裂团体继续存在。


So if Villalobos and Dieterich are right about the FARC’s imminent collapse, it would be a veritable milestone for the region, and a vindication of a strategy – Uribe’s – of which many of us were wary.	所以如果维拉洛布思（Villalobos）和迪特里奇关于哥伦比亚革命武装力量即将溃败的论断是正确的，那么这将成为该地区的一个里程碑式的事件，同时也为乌里韦的策略作出了辩护－我们中的许多人对这个策略保持警惕。


That strategy has rightly been criticized for human rights violations, but it seems to have proved successful.	批评这个策略侵犯人权是正确，但是现在事实似乎已经证实它取得了成功。


This is no minor matter for the hemisphere, for Colombia, and for Uribe.	这对这个半球，对哥伦比亚，对乌里韦都意义重大。


Nonetheless, three major problems remain. First, despite high desertion rates, the death of three of their seven leaders, and Chávez’s apparent decision to forsake them (at least for now), the FARC have proved remarkably resilient over the past 40 years.	虽然如此，但是还存在三个重要的问题：首先，尽管有很高的叛变率，7个领导人已经死亡3个，以及查韦斯明确决定抛弃他们（至少目前如此），在过去的40年里，哥伦比亚革���武装力量已经显示其有极强的恢复能力。


Yes, they are divided, unpopular, and devoid of international representation, but the ups and downs of guerrilla warfare are well known; the only truly dead guerrilla fighter is one who is buried.	是的，虽然他们被分裂，不受欢迎，没有国际代表，但是游击战争的起起落落众所周知； 只有被埋葬的游击队员才是真正死亡的游击队员。


Second, it would seem highly risky to conclude that one speech by Chávez is tantamount to a fundamental affirmation of principle.	其次，断定查韦斯的一个讲话就等同于对一个原则的根本性确认是极其危险的。


To be sure, Chávez is absolutely crucial to FARC’s survival, given its current, undoubtedly weakened condition.	固然，鉴于其现在毋庸置疑的孱弱处境，查韦斯对哥伦比亚革命武装力量的生存绝对至关重要。


But, having met Chávez personally a dozen times, it appears naïve, at least to me, to attribute great significance or conviction to anything he says – moderate, hard left, or in between.	但是，根据和查韦斯亲自会面十几次的经验，至少对我来说，对他说的任何话－不管是温和的，极左的还是中间的－赋予极大的重要性或者予以深信似乎都很天真。


He may well have opted for a minor tactical “correction,” only to wait to fight another day.	查韦斯可能已经选择了一个较小的战术“修正”，以等待在某一天进行战斗。


Finally, supposing Uribe is on the verge of victory, what should he do with it?	最后，假设乌里韦就要取得胜利，那么他应该对这个胜利做些什么呢？


Many have advocated negotiating pacification with the late FARC leader Manuel Marulanda’s successors.	许多人提倡和已故的哥伦比亚革命武装力量领导人曼纽尔·马鲁兰达（Manuel Marulanda）的继任者展开安抚谈判。


But, without any notion of power-sharing, this is easier said than done.	但是，没有任何分权的打算，这个倡议就是说起来简单做起来难。


After all, the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Agreements, which ended the Salvadoran civil war, were signed more than two years after it became obvious that neither side could win.	毕竟，结束萨尔瓦多内战的1992年查普尔特佩克和平协定，是在双方明显都不能取得胜利两年多后才签署的。


And this occurred thanks to skillful United Nations involvement, led by Alvaro de Soto; the talent of sophisticated FMLN leaders like Villalobos and chief negotiator Salvador Samayoa; strong pressure from the US and its point-man, Bernard Aronson; and Salvadoran President Alfredo Christiani’s undeniable courage and vision.	并且这一成果还要归于由阿尔瓦洛·德·索托（Alvaro de Soto）领导的联合国充满技巧的介入，法拉邦多·马蒂全国解放阵线（FMLN）久经世故的领导人维拉洛布思（Villalobos）以及首席谈判官萨尔瓦多·萨马约亚的才华，来自美国以及其排头兵伯纳德·阿伦森（拉丁美洲事务高级专员）的强大压力，以及萨尔瓦多总统阿尔弗雷多·克里斯蒂亚尼不可否认的勇气和远见。


Few of these ingredients exist in today’s Colombia.	在当今的哥伦比亚，这些因素几乎都不存在。


So perhaps Villalobos should be a bit more cautious, and Dieterich a bit less forlorn.	所以，或许维拉洛布思（Villalobos）应该更谨慎一点，而迪特里奇不应该那么绝望。


Who Will Suffer Most from Climate Change?	气候变化啊，谁最遭罪？


SEATTLE – A few years ago, Melinda and I visited with a group of rice farmers in Bihar, India, one of the most flood-prone regions of the country.	西雅图—几年前，梅琳达（Melinda）和我拜访了一群印度洪水最频繁地区之一的比哈尔（Bihar）米农。


All of them were extremely poor and depended on the rice they grew to feed and support their families.	他们都属于赤贫，依靠种的大米养活他们的家庭。


When the monsoon rains arrived each year, the rivers would swell, threatening to flood their farms and ruin their crops.	每年，当季风雨来临时，河水就会上涨，可能淹没他们的农田，毁掉他们的庄稼。


Still, they were willing to bet everything on the chance that their farm would be spared.	但是，他们愿意把全部身家押在农田不会受淹上。


It was a gamble they often lost.	这是一场他们常常会输的豪赌。


Their crops ruined, they would flee to the cities in search of odd jobs to feed their families.	庄稼被毁，他们就得流落到城市打零工养活家庭。


By the next year, however, they would return – often poorer than when they left – ready to plant again.	但是，下一年他们会回去——常常比他们离家时更加贫穷——再一次开始耕作。


Our visit was a powerful reminder that for the world’s poorest farmers, life is a high-wire act – without safety nets.	我们的访问有力地提醒我们，对全球最穷的农民来说，生活是一项高难度动作——没有安全网。


They don’t have access to improved seeds, fertilizer, irrigation systems, and other beneficial technologies, as farmers in rich countries do – and no crop insurance, either, to protect themselves against losses.	他们得不到发达国家农民可以得到的良种、肥料、灌溉系统和其他有益的技术——也没有农作物保险。


Just one stroke of bad fortune – a drought, a flood, or an illness – is enough for them to tumble deeper into poverty and hunger.	只要一点点坏运气——一场干旱、一场洪水，或一场疫病——就足以让他们陷入更深的贫困和饥饿。


Now, climate change is set to add a fresh layer of risk to their lives.	如今，气候变化给他们的生活有添加了一层新风险。


Rising temperatures in the decades ahead will lead to major disruptions in agriculture, particularly in tropical zones.	未来几十年中的升温将导致农业大崩坏，特别是在热带地区。


Crops won’t grow because of too little rain or too much rain.	庄稼将因为降雨过少或过多而无法生长。


Pests will thrive in the warmer climate and destroy crops.	病虫害将因为更温暖的气候而大量繁殖，毁坏庄稼。


Farmers in wealthier countries will experience changes, too.	富裕国家的农民也将经历变化。


But they have the tools and supports to manage these risks.	但他们有工具和支持管理这些风险。


The world’s poorest farmers show up for work each day for the most part empty-handed.	世界最穷农民日夜劳作，最后常常颗粒无收。


That’s why of all the people who will suffer from climate change, they are likely to suffer the most.	因此，在全部将因为气候变化而遭罪的人中，他们所遭的罪最严重。


Poor farmers will feel the sting of these changes at the same time the world needs their help to feed a growing population.	贫穷农民将感受到这些变化的痛处，而与此同时，世界需要他们养活日益增长的人口。


By 2050, global food demand is expected to increase by 60%.	到2050年，全球粮食需求预计将增加60%。


Declining harvests would strain the global food system, increasing hunger and eroding the tremendous progress the world has made against poverty over the last half-century.	收成的减少将制约全球粮食系统，增加饥饿，扼杀过去半个多世纪以来世界在减少贫困方面所取得的巨大进步。


I’m optimistic that we can avoid the worst impacts of climate change and feed the world – if we act now.	我很乐观地认为，我们能够避免气候变化最糟糕的影响并养活世界——如果我们现在就行动起来。


There’s an urgent need for governments to invest in new clean-energy innovations that will dramatically reduce greenhouse-gas emissions and halt rising temperatures.	我们急切地需要政府投资于能大量减少温室气体排放、停止气温上升的新清洁能源创新。


At the same time, we need to recognize that it’s already too late to stop all of the impacts of hotter temperatures.	与此同时，我们需要认识到，阻止所有气温上升带来的影响已经太晚了。


Even if the world discovered a cheap, clean energy source next week, it would take time for it to kick its fossil fuel-powered habits and shift to a carbon-free future.	即使世界下周就发现一种廉价清洁的能���资源，也需要时间改变化石燃料供能习惯，走向无碳未来。


That’s why it’s critical for the world to invest in efforts to help the poorest adapt.	因此，世界投资于帮助最贫穷人口适应这一新变化是至关重要的。


Many of the tools they’ll need are quite basic – things that they need anyway to grow more food and earn more income: access to financing, better seeds, fertilizer, training, and markets where they can sell what they grow.	他们所需要的很多工具十分基本——只要想种更多粮食、挣更多收入就必须用到这些工具：融资渠道、改良的种子、肥料、培训和出售庄稼的市场。


Other tools are new and tailored to the demands of a changing climate.	其他工具则是新工具，专为满足气候变化的需要。


The Gates Foundation and its partners have worked together to develop new varieties of seeds that grow even during times of drought or flooding.	盖茨基金会及其合作伙伴合作培育了多种能在干旱或洪水条件下生长的种子。


The rice farmers I met in Bihar, for instance, are now growing a new variety of flood-tolerant rice – nicknamed “scuba” rice – that can survive two weeks underwater.	比如，我在比哈尔所访问的米农现在种上了一种新的抗洪稻米——我们称之为“水肺”米——它可以在水下生活两周。


They are already prepared if shifts in the weather pattern bring more flooding to their region.	气候模式的变化可能给带地区带来更多的洪水，而他们已经做好了准备。


Other rice varieties are being developed that can withstand drought, heat, cold, and soil problems like high salt contamination.	其他米种也在培育中，它们具有抗旱、抗热、抗寒、抗盐碱化等特性。


All of these efforts have the power to transform lives.	所有这些努力都有改变生活的力量。


It’s quite common to see these farmers double or triple their harvests and their incomes when they have access to the advances farmers in the rich world take for granted.	如果能够拥有发达世界农民习以为常的进步，这些农民常常可以实现收成和收入翻一倍或两倍。


This new prosperity allows them to improve their diets, invest in their farms, and send their children to school.	这一新繁荣让他们能够改善饮食、投资农场、让孩子上学。


It also pulls their lives back from the razor’s edge, giving them a sense of security even if they have a bad harvest.	他们不用再过剃刀边缘的日子，即使收成不好，也能获得安全感。


There will also be threats from climate change that we can’t foresee.	气候变化还会带来我们无法预见的威胁。


To be prepared, the world needs to accelerate research into seeds and supports for smallholder farmers.	要想做好准备，世界需要加快种子研究和对小农的支持。


One of the most exciting innovations to help farmers is satellite technology.	一项最令人振奋帮助农民的创新是卫星技术。


In Africa, researchers are using satellite images to create detailed soil maps, which can inform farmers about what varieties will thrive on their land.	在非洲，研究者用卫星影像绘制详细土壤地图，指导农民应该在土地上种植哪种作物可以丰收。


Still, a better seed or a new technology can’t transform the lives of farming families until it’s in their hands.	但是，更好的种子和新技术无法改变农民家庭的生活，除非农民能够获得它们。


A number of organizations, including a non-profit group called One Acre Fund, are finding ways to ensure that farmers take advantage of these solutions.	许多组织，包括名为一英亩基金（One Acre Fund）的非盈利组织，正在寻找办法保证农民能够利用这些解决方案。


One Acre Fund works closely with more than 200,000 African farmers, providing access to financing, tools, and training.	一英亩基金与20多万非洲农民密切合作，提供融资渠道、工具和培训。


By 2020, they aim to reach one million farmers.	他们的目标是到2020年与一百万农民建立关系。


In this year’s Annual Letter, Melinda and I made a bet that Africa will be able to feed itself in the next 15 years.	在今年的年度公开信中，梅琳达和我打赌15年后非洲将能养活自己。


Even with the risks of climate change, that’s a bet I stand by.	即使存在气候变化风险，我对这个赌注相当有自信。


Yes, poor farmers have it tough.	是的，贫穷的农民生活艰辛。


Their lives are puzzles with so many pieces to get right – from planting the right seeds and using the correct fertilizer to getting training and having a place to sell their harvest.	他们的生活就像许多谜题——从种正确的种子、使用正确的肥料，到获得训练和找到能出售收成的市场。


If just one piece falls out of place, their lives can fall apart.	一招出错便满盘皆输。


I know the world has what it takes to help put those pieces in place for both the challenges they face today and the ones they’ll face tomorrow.	我知道世界拥有帮助他们正确处理今天所面临的和明天将要面临的挑战的条件。


Most importantly, I know the farmers do, too.	最重要的是，我知道农民也是这样。


Fatah’s Status Quo Congress	维持现状的法塔赫代表大会


HERZLIYA – The Sixth Fatah Congress, held recently in Bethlehem, was an important event for the future of the Arab-Israeli conflict and for the Palestinian movement.	发自赫兹利亚（以色列港口城市）——近日在伯利恒召开的法塔赫第六次代表大会是关乎阿以冲突及巴勒斯坦民族运动未来的重要事件。


But a careful look at the results of the Congress’s elections to Fatah’s Central Committee yields a picture that is quite different from what many will conclude about the meeting.	但如果认真观察一下的话，人们就会发现本次大会选举法塔赫中央委员会成员的最终结果，相较于外界的许多判断来说，勾勒出的是一幅相当不同的图景。


The Congress seemed to demonstrate three main points: Fatah has moved toward peace with Israel; it has adopted democratic procedures; and a new generation, or even a specific group called the Young Guard, has assumed leadership.	此次大会似乎是为了向人们证明三个重点：法塔赫正在向对以色列和平方面靠拢，并在自身运作方面引入了民主程序。 此外，新一代领导人，或者说是一个被称为“青年卫队”的特殊组织已经承担起法塔赫的领导责任。


But this interpretation is in large part wrong.	但其实，人们的以上三点解读在很大程度上都是错误的。


In terms of its approach to peace, the new Central Committee is roughly the same as the old one.	就推进和平进程的方式而言，新中央委员会同其前任相比几乎是如出一辙。


Of the 18 elected members (Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas will appoint four more later), no more than two (Nabil Shaath and Muhammad Shtayyeh) are really moderate.	当选的18名成员中（巴勒斯坦自治机构领导人穆罕默德·阿巴斯随后将增加任命4名成员），不超过两位，即只有纳比尔·沙阿斯和穆罕默德·施塔耶是真正的温和派。


At least four (Muhammad al-Ghuneim, Salim al-Zanoun, Abbas Zaki, and Nasser Kidra) are hardliners, and most of the rest follow pretty much the traditional Fatah line.	至少有四名成员（穆罕默德·阿尔-古奈姆，萨利姆·阿尔-扎农，阿巴斯·扎吉和纳赛尔·齐德拉）坚持走强硬路线，而其他大多数成员将会在很大程度上将遵循法塔赫传统的政策方针。


As for democracy, while the Congress was certainly a step forward from the past (when Fatah leader Yasir Arafat could handpick Fatah’s leadership), real limits remain.	而在组织内部民主方面，本次大会与过去相比无疑是向前迈出了一步（在阿拉法特主政时期，法塔赫领导层均由其亲自挑选），但其局限性也仍然存在。


Depending on one’s definition, Abbas chose between one-third and one-half of the delegates. The majority of the Central Committee, not surprisingly, are Abbas’s close associates and supporters.	根据他自己的意思，阿巴斯挑选并任命了占大会代表总数1/2至1/3之间的代表。 因以毫不意外，中央委员会的大部分成员都是阿巴斯的亲密合作者和支持者。


The fact that only one out of 18 members will be from the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip, which contains about half of all the Palestinians that Fatah governs, also skews the results.	而18名委员中只有一位来自哈马斯控制的加沙地带（须知法塔赫管辖的巴勒斯坦民众有一半都生活于此）的事实，也令本次选举的合法性大打折扣。


But there is one aspect of this election so dangerous that it might outweigh everything else.	而此次选举中还存在一个极其危险的因素，其严重性甚至可能超过其他一切方面，那就是得票数独占鳌头、拿下2/3选票的候选人阿布德·阿尔-马希尔·古奈姆，而认定此人为阿巴斯继承人的言论正愈演愈烈。


The candidate who came in first, with two-thirds of the vote, was Abd al-Mahir Ghuneim, who is increasingly being spoken of as Abbas’s successor.  Ghuneim is an unrepentant hardliner and an open opponent of the Oslo agreement, much less of a negotiated peace agreement with Israel.	然而古奈姆是一个顽固的强硬派，他本人就是奥斯陆协议的公开反对者，让他去和以色列谈判签订和平协议更是不可能。


If he becomes Fatah’s leader (and hence leader of the PA and the PLO as well), any compromise with Israel would become unimaginable.	如果古奈姆最终当选为法塔赫的领导人，并因此成为巴勒斯坦当局以及巴勒斯坦解放组织领导人的话，那么同以方达成任何形式的妥协方案都只能是无稽之谈了。


What about the transfer of power to a new generation?	那么在另一方面，法塔赫内部向新一代领导集体移交权力的情况如何呢？


This is accurate in purely chronological terms – old leaders inevitably get older, after all. Yet, while almost all the old members of the committee were not reelected, at least 15 of the 22 members will be old-style leaders (presuming Abbas will appoint such people to the four seats that he controls).	纯粹就时间而论，大会的召开正合时宜——毕竟老一届委员会成员都不可避免地日渐衰老，但在大部分上届委员会成员都没能继续留任的情况下，至少15到22名成员都将依然是那种“老派”领导人（预计阿巴斯将在四个额外席位中任命类似人选）。


Many of the newly elected members, moreover, are veteran Fatah bureaucrats.	此外，许多新当选的委员其实也都是些法塔赫老官僚。


The most interesting additions to the Central Committee are three younger men, though they have played leading roles in the organization for 20 years or more.	而中央委员会中最引起兴趣的是三位较年轻的成员的加入，虽说是“较年轻”，但这三人也已分别在法塔赫内部担任领导位置超过20年之久了。


Marwan Barghouti, the leader of Fatah’s grassroots group on the West Bank, is now in an Israeli prison for organizing the bloody uprising that began in 2000, and for direct involvement in planning the killings of many Israeli civilians.	其中之一是约旦河西岸法塔赫基层组织领导人马尔万·巴尔毫迪，此人现正在以色列监狱中服刑，罪名是领导了2000年爆发的流血叛乱，并直接参与策划多起谋杀以色列平民的事件。


While some will point to Barghouti’s election as a victory for the younger generation, not one of his followers will join him.	虽然有人认为巴尔豪迪的当选意味着更年轻一代领导人的胜利，但此人身陷囹圄，他的追随者自然也接触不到他。


The other two younger men, Muhammad Dahlan and Jibril Rajoub, built political bases of their own as commanders of security forces in the Gaza Strip and on the West Bank, respectively.	而另外两位较年轻的领导人：穆罕默德·达赫兰和吉布勒·拉杰卜分别作为加沙地带和约旦河西岸巴勒斯坦安全部队的领导人，已经在当地奠定了自己的政治基础。


But Rajoub has many enemies, and Dahlan was responsible for Fatah���s humiliating defeat by Hamas in the fight that led to the expulsion of Fatah from Gaza.	但值得注意的是，拉杰卜树敌众多，而达赫兰本人则对法塔赫被哈马斯驱逐出加沙地带这一屈辱性的失败负有直接责任。


In addition, all three of the younger men are rivals, not allies.	此外这三位“较年轻”领导人也并非盟友，而是相互竞争的对手。


In other words, there is no unified Young Guard.	换言之，团结统一的“青年卫队”并不存在。


Indeed, far from being an electoral revolution, only two of those elected – Barghouti and Muhammad Shtayyeh, who has headed PECDAR, the Palestinian agency that promotes transparency and economic development – can be considered at all critical of the Fatah establishment.	实际上，如果要把法塔赫第六次代表大会称为一次选举革命的话还有点困难，因为当选委员中只有巴尔豪迪，以及穆罕默德·施塔耶这位领导巴勒斯坦经济发展和复兴理事会���该机构旨在推进政治透明化和经济发展）的官员能够从根本上被认为是法塔赫组织机构的关键人物。


But, while the election did not usher in a leadership eager for peace with Israel and a Palestinian state achieved by compromise, nor was it a prelude to a renewal of violence.	但尽管此次选举没能产生出一个有意寻求以巴和平并通过妥协方案建立巴勒斯坦国的领导集体， 法塔赫第六次代表大会也不会导致新一轮暴力冲突的爆发。


There are several individuals in the new leadership who have many Israeli contacts, and who can pick up a phone and call or be called by their Israeli counterparts.	新领导集体中仍有若干领导人同以色列有多方面接触，甚至随时能与以方直接取得联系。


It is also extremely important that most of Fatah’s new leaders have a strong distaste for Hamas, which makes rapprochement between the two groups unlikely.	另外还有一点极为重要：大多数法塔赫的新领导人对哈马斯都怀有极大反感，这一点使得哈法两大阵营的关系重建希望渺茫。


Still, if Ghuneim takes over as the PA’s and Fatah’s leader, which could happen next year, a breakdown of negotiations with Israel and a new round of fighting would not be surprising.	但必须指出的是，假如来年古奈姆仍当选为巴勒斯坦当局及法塔赫的领导人，那么巴以和谈的终止和新一轮冲突自然也毫不奇怪。


The other interesting new face, though he has no chance of becoming a major leader, is Shtayyeh.	法塔赫六大上另一个引起关注的新面孔则是施塔耶。


A successful businessman, he could become an ombudsman and whistle-blower, which would be a real innovation.	尽管没有机会成为主要领导者，但作为一名成功的商人，施塔耶有能力担任组织内部监督者和揭发者这类的角色，而这将是一个革新性的举措。


But, while it will be interesting to see whether he speaks out or is shut up, one shouldn’t read too much into his election: he finished last among those elected, beating by a single vote Tayib Abu Rahman, one of Arafat’s most trusted lieutenants and an old-school hardliner.	然而，虽然施塔耶最终会变成大炮筒或者被封嘴的可能性是一个有趣的观察点，但是人们不应赋予他的当选过多含义：在所有当选人中他的得票最少，以一票之差输给了塔伊卜·阿布·拉赫曼，后者是阿拉法特最信任的副手之一，并且是一个老派强硬路线的执行者。


There is a wide range of views in the new Palestinian leadership.	由此可见，新巴勒斯坦领导集体中政见不一，各立山头。


This is neither a group that will make peace with Israel nor one that will ally itself with Hamas.	因此这样的领导集体既不能在将来同以色列实现和平，也难以与哈马斯重回同一阵线。


In other words, it is a group with which Israel can work on status quo issues, though not on a comprehensive agreement.	换句话来说，尽管这个领导集体能够与以色列一道，共同合作解决巴以一些眼前的现实问题，但双方将无法达成一个全面性的协议。


But if Muhammad al-Ghuneim does indeed become the new leader, the prospects for any peace at all look grim.	而如果古奈姆真的当选为巴勒斯坦当局的新一届领导人的话，那么一切巴以和平的前景，都将会黯淡无光。


The $4.3 Billion Shrug	43亿美元一耸肩


LONDON – In November, the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) announced a settlement in which six banks would be fined a total of $4.3 billion for manipulating the foreign-exchange market.	伦敦—11月，英国金融市场行为监管局（Financial Conduct Authority，FCA）宣布与六家银行和解。 这六家银行被FCA指控操纵外汇市场，将支付总共43亿美元的和解金。


And yet share prices barely reacted.	但股价并未因此起反应。


Why?	原因何在？


The nefarious practices and management failings uncovered during the yearlong investigation that led to the fines were shocking.	为期一年、导致如此巨大罚金的调查所揭露的恶劣行为和管理失灵令人震惊。


Semi-literate email and chat-room exchanges among venal traders revealed brazen conspiracies to rig the afternoon exchange-rate “fix” for profit and personal gain.	贪婪的交易员之间半真半假的电子邮件和聊天室记录表明，他们无耻地操纵午后汇率的“固定”（fix），以获得利润和个人好处。


Senior managers were so disengaged that they allowed their employees to act like vulgar, overpaid children.	高级管理人员形同虚设，放任手下如同手里钱太多的孩子一样做出任性下流的行为。


Using nicknames like “the three musketeers” and “the A-team,” they did whatever they liked, at an enormous cost to their institutions.	他们用“三个火枪手”、“A队”等绰号为所欲为，给所在机构造成沉重代价。


But, despite the huge FCA fine, no top executive was forced to fall on his or her sword, and investors did little more than shrug.	但是，尽管FCA对它们课以巨额罚款，但没有一位高管被迫为此负责，投资者对此也只是一耸肩。


One reason, of course, is that the settlement was known to be coming; only the details of the offenses and the scale of the fines were news.	当然，一个原因是和解是必然的； 只有罪名的细节和罚金的规模有待确定。


The more important reason, though, is that even $4.3 billion is small change when compared to the total fines and litigation costs incurred by the major banks over the last five years.	但是，更重要的原因是，即使罚金高达43亿美元，与大银行在过去五年来所支付的总罚金和诉讼成本来说也只是九牛一毛。


Morgan Stanley analysts estimate that the top 22 banks in the United States and Europe have been forced to pay $230 billion since 2009 – more than 50 times the cost of the FCA settlement.	摩根士丹利分析师估算，2009年以来美国和欧洲银行被迫支付了2,300亿美元——是FCA和解金的50多倍。


This is over and above the heavy losses that banks incurred from bad lending and overambitious financial engineering.	这个数字比银行因不良贷款和过度宏大的金融工程所蒙受的损失还要大。


American banks have incurred more than half of these massive penalties.	美资银行占了这些巨额罚金的大头。


The European bill amounts to just over $100 billion – roughly half of which was paid by the top seven British banks.	欧洲的罚单只有1,000亿美元出头——其中大约有一半是由七家英国大银行支付的。


But the numbers tell only part of the story.	但数字只是故事的一部分。


In the US, the penalties have been dominated by fines for sales of misleadingly marketed mortgage-backed securities, often to the two government supported entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.	在美国，罚金主要是因为销售误导性营销的按揭支持证券，销售对象通常是两家政府支持机构——房利美（Fannie Mae）和房地美（Freddie Mac）。


The banks, it would be fair to say, do not wholly accept regulators’ arguments about that, but they have bitten their tongues and paid up.	平心而论，银行并不完全接受监管者的这一观点，但它们还是忍气吞声付了罚金。


(US regulators have also imposed high penalties on foreign banks for breaches of American sanctions policies in relation to Iran.)	（美国监管机构还向外国银行美国分支开出了巨额罚单，理由是它们违反了美国与伊朗有关的制裁政策。 ）


In the UK, by contrast, the biggest penalties have come in the form of compensation payments made to individual mortgage borrowers who were sold Payment Protection Insurance.	相反，在英国，最大额罚金以补偿金的形式付给了买有支付保护保险（Payment Protection Insurance）的个人按揭借款人。


The regulators maintain that much of this insurance was worthless to borrowers and was mis-sold.	监管机构主张这一保险大多对借款人毫无价值，属于错误销售。


The banks believe that some of the claimants whom they are being forced to pay are unworthy, but they have nonetheless coughed up the money.	银行认为一些它们被迫偿付的索偿是没有价值的，但它们被迫出钱。


That unhappy episode has cost British banks $37 billion so far, with more to come – most likely another $5 billion or so.	到目前为止，这出不愉快的闹剧让英国银行付出了370亿美元，未来还会有更多——有可能还有50亿美元。


The Morgan Stanley analysis suggests that we can expect another $70 billion in fines and litigation costs over the next two years from already identified errors and omissions.	摩根士丹利的分析表明，在未来两年中，已发现错误和遗漏还将造成700亿美元的罚金和诉讼成本。


And new episodes could emerge; two years ago, no one anticipated the fallout from the manipulation of the foreign-exchange markets.	此外，有可能还有新案件出现； 两年前就没人预见到这一外汇市场操纵案的发生。


The irony here – not lost on the major banks’ finance directors – is that as fast as banks add capital from rights issues and retained earnings to meet the demands of prudential regulators, the funds are drained away by conduct regulators.	这里的讽刺之处——并非只有大银行财务主管——是银行在竭力通过发行股本和留存利润增加资本以满足审慎监管机构的要求，与此同时，这些资金又在以同样的速度被监管者罚没。


The scale of the penalties is now large enough to have a substantial impact on banks’ balance sheets, delay the restoration of their health, and constrain their lending capacity.	如今，罚金规模之大已足以对银行资产负债表造成重大影响，减缓它们的恢复速度，制约它们的贷款能力。


Some of the money, especially in the UK, has gone back to individual customers.	其中一些钱——特别是在英国——回到了个体客户手中。


But more has gone to the regulators themselves and onward to national governments.	但更多的钱进了监管机构本身的腰包，然后流入了国家政府。


In the UK, fines once helped defray the regulator’s costs: bad actors reduced the fees charged to the good ones, creating a positive feedback loop.	在英国，罚金曾经帮助支付了监管机构的成本：坏行为人减少了好行为人所需支付的费用，创造了积极反馈环。


Today, the payments have become so large that the government has seized them and channeled revenues exceeding the regulator’s enforcement costs to veterans’ charities.	如今，罚金规模是如此之大，以至于填补监管机构执法成本有余，剩下来的被政府用于老兵抚恤。


In the US, the end recipients are less clear; indeed, they are undisclosed.	在美国，最终受益者比较不明确； 事实上，到底是谁并未得到披露。


Charles Calomiris of Columbia University has challenged what he calls “a real subversion of the fiscal process” as funds are raised and spent in non-transparent ways.	查哥伦比亚大学的尔斯·卡罗米里斯（Charles Calomiris）提出了他所谓的“财政程序的真正破坏”质疑——资金的来源和去向都不透明。


The most important question, however, is whether fines on this scale serve as useful deterrents.	但是，最重要的问题是如此大规模的罚金是否能起到有用的威慑作用。


Clearly, the post-crisis period has revealed unacceptable behavior in many institutions.	显然，后危机时代披露了许多机构存在不可接受的行为。


It will be some time before we know whether large fines on corporations, paid principally by their shareholders, contribute to keeping the system honest.	在我们了解大额公司罚款——主要由股东掏腰包——是否有助于保持金融体系的诚信之前需要时间。


But that seems unlikely when banks and investors seem punch-drunk, barely reacting to regulators’ blows.	但在银行和投资者都是一笔糊涂账、对监管机构的出击无动于衷时，这似乎是不可能的。


The reputational impact of each new settlement is modest, despite the escalation in the level of fines imposed.	每一起新和解对名誉的影响都十分有限，尽管罚金规模在逐步升级。


The FCA has just announced a review of its pricing policies.	FCA刚刚宣布要检查它的定价政策。


“This is not a penalties race,” according to Georgina Philippou, the authority’s enforcement strategy director.	“这不是罚金比赛，”FCA执法战略主管乔治娜·费利佩（ Georgina Philippou）说。


Whether the current approach serves as an effective deterrent is a question that should be widely debated.	目前的办法是否有效威慑仍是一个值得广泛讨论的问题。


Senior bank managers and regulators have a common interest in developing a more effective system – one that punishes the guilty and creates the right incentives for the future.	发展更有效的体系——一个惩罚罪行、为未来提供正确激励的体系——符合银行高管和高层监管者的共同利益。


Fear and Freedom on the Internet	因特网上的恐惧和自由


Earlier this month it was reported that, at the request of China’s rulers, Microsoft shut down the Web site of a Chinese blogger that was maintained on a Microsoft service called MSN Spaces.	据报道本月月初，应中国统治者要求，微软关闭了一家建立在MSN分享空间上的中国博客网站。


The blogger, Zhao Jing, had been reporting on a strike by journalists at The Beijing News that followed the dismissal of the newspaper’s independent-minded editor.	博客版主赵静（音译）此前报导了《新京报》记者的罢工事件，这次罢工的起因是该报思想独立的编辑遭到解雇。


Microsoft’s action raises a key question: can the Internet really be a force for freedom that repressive governments cannot control as easily as newspapers, radio, and television?	微软的所作所为突显了一个关键问题：因特网真的能够成为高压政府无法像报纸、电台和电视台那样轻易操纵的自由力量吗？


Ironically, Microsoft’s founder and chairman, Bill Gates, has been an enthusiastic advocate of this view.	具有讽刺意味的是，微软的创立者和主席比尔·盖茨一直是这种观点狂热的倡导者。


Just last October, he said: “There’s really no way to, in a broad sense, repress information today, and I think that’s a wonderful advance we can all feel good about….[T]his is a medium of total openness and total freedom, and that’s what makes it so special.”	就在去年10月，他说过：“今天从广义上来讲，确实无法再压制信息了，我认为这是值得所有人高兴的奇妙的进步…互联网是完全公开和彻底自由的载体，这也正是互联网的特别之处。 ”


Despite these sentiments, Microsoft is helping the Chinese authorities to repress information as best they can.	尽管如此慷慨陈词，微软还是竭尽所能地帮助中国当局压制信息。


A Microsoft spokeswoman was reported as saying that the corporation has blocked “many sites” in China, and it has been known for several months that Microsoft’s blog tool in China filters words like “democracy” and “human rights” from blog titles.	据报导微软的一位发言人说该公司已经封锁了中国的“很多站点”，而且几个月来外界传言微软在华的博客工具一直从标题中过滤“民主”和“人权”这样的字眼。


Microsoft’s defense is that it must “comply with local and global laws.”	微软的辩护是它必须“遵守当地和全球的法律”。


But the MSN Spaces sites are maintained on servers in the United States.	但MSN分享空间的站点却是设在美国境内的服务器上。


The relevant local laws would therefore seem to be those of the US, and Zhao Jing’s discussion of the Beijing journalists’ strike does not violate any of them.	因此相关法律似乎应该是美国法律，而赵静有关北京记者罢工的讨论根本就没有任何违法之处。


Nor are there any global laws that prevent Chinese people from discussing events that their government would prefer them not to discuss.	此外世界上也没有任何一条法律阻止中国人民探讨政府不希望他们探讨的问题。


TheNew York Times, for example, is free to publish its report on the strike, even though it operates a Web site that anyone with unfettered Internet access can read.	比如《纽约时报》有权自由地刊登对罢工的报导，尽管它所经营的网站只要上网不受管制都可以阅读。


If the Chinese government does not want its citizens to read a foreign newspaper,then it is up to them to figure out how to block access to it. The newspaper is under no obligation to do it for them.	如果中国政府不希望人民阅读外国报纸，那么应该由它自己想出封锁的办法，而报纸本身却没有义务替它这么做。


So Microsoft’s defense misfires.	因此微软的辩护文不对题。


We can only guess at the company’s real reason for taking down the Web site, but fear of repercussions against its commercial interests in China seems likely to have been an important factor.	我们只能对它封杀站点的真正原因进行猜测，但害怕其在中国的商业利益受到损害很可能是一个重要的因素。


To be sure, a corporation can and should place limits on the use of its services.	可以肯定的是，企业有权也理应对服务使用者做出限制。


The absolutist line – let complete freedom of expression prevail – crumbles in the face of uncomfortable examples.	绝对论路线¾推行彻底的言论自由¾在令人不快的例证面前失去了根基。


According to Gates, Microsoft might prevent the use of its services to spread instructions about making nuclear bombs, to send pro-Nazi statements into Germany, where such material is illegal, and to propagate child pornography.	据盖茨讲，微软可能阻止使用它提供的服务来传播制造核炸弹的方法、将支持纳粹的言论传入视其为非法的德国、以及传播儿童色情文学等方面的言论。


But how relevant are such examples?	但这些例子的相关性又有多高呢？


In his classic defense of freedom of expression, On Liberty, John Stuart Mill argued that the most important reason for freedom of expression is to promote competition between the widest possible range of ideas, and that unfettered debate is the best way to test them.	在言论自由的经典著作《论自由》中，约翰·斯图亚特·密尔（John Stuart Mill）提出确保言论自由最重要的原因是尽可能促进各种思想之间的竞争，而无拘无束的辩论是检验思想的最佳方法。


For the government to protect ideas from criticism is to turn them into a lifeless and rigid dogma, regardless of whether they are true.	而对政府来讲，保护主张不受诘难的最好方法莫过于将其变成没有生命的僵硬教条，而不管这些思想是否正确。


If we agree with Mill, then only one of Gates’s examples falls into the category of expression that should be protected.	如果我们赞同密尔的论述，那么盖茨所举的例子只有一个属于言论保护的范畴。


Recipes for making nuclear bombs are techniques, not ideas.	制造核炸弹的秘诀应该是技术，而不是思想。


Nor is child pornography the expression of ideas.	儿童色情文学也不是思想的表达。


We may therefore restrict both of them without running afoul of Mill’s argument.	因此我们可以对这上述两者进行限制，而不违反密尔的观点。


(On the other hand, an essay arguing that there is nothing wrong with adults taking a sexual interest in children, and that such conduct should be permitted, expresses ideas, and thus should not be censored, no matter how poisonous we may consider them.)	（另一方面，有篇文章提出成人对儿童在性方面产生兴趣并无过错，这样的行为理应得到容忍，因为它们是人们思想的表达，因此无论它在我们看来是多么有害，都不应该受到审查。 ）


The most difficult of Gates’s three examples is that of pro-Nazi statements on a Web site aimed at Germany.	盖茨的三个例子中最难判断的一个就是在互联网上对德国传播纳粹主义言论。


It is easy to understand why Germany would wish to prohibit such statements.	德国为什么希望禁止这样的言论不言而喻。


Several countries’ laws proscribe incitement of racial hatred, which can be justified, consistently with Mill’s defense of liberty, if such laws really focus narrowly on incitement of hatred rather than on suppressing arguments, bad as they may be, that appeal to people’s intellectual capacities.	有几个国家的法律禁止煽动种族仇恨，如果它们禁止的范围真的仅限于煽动仇恨而不是压制人们的思维和言论，无论这样的言论有多坏，那么按照密尔为自由所做的辩护，这样的法律也可以算作正义的化身。


A defender of suppression of Nazi ideas might argue that have already been tried, and have failed – in the most horrendous manner imaginable – to produce a better society.	为压制纳粹思想辩护的人可能提出这种思想已经受到了审判，而且已经无法创造一个更加美好的社会，不仅如此，它还带来了人们想象之中最为可怕的后果。


Nevertheless, the best possible sign that Germany has overcome its Nazi past would be to focus its laws specifically on incitement to racial hatred, rather than on Nazism as such.	即便如此，德国已经把纳粹历史抛在脑后的最佳标志就是特别制定反对煽动民族仇恨，而不是纳粹主义的法律。


In any case, China’s crackdown on straightforward reporting and discussion of events taking place in that country is not the suppression of a discredited political ideology, but of open and informed political debate.	无论如何，中国压制对国内事件的直接报导和探讨并不是压制一种名誉扫地的政治理念，而是压制充分理解信息后的公开政治探讨。


If Bill Gates really believes that the Internet should be a liberating force, he should ensure that Microsoft does not do the dirty work of China’s government.	如果比尔·盖茨真的相信因特网应该成为一种开放的力量，那么他应该确保微软不会成为中国政府的帮凶。


Fear and Loathing in Europe	欧洲的恐惧和仇视


Two far-right parties, the Austrian Freedom Party and the Movement for Austria’s Future, won 29% of the vote in the latest Austrian general election, double their total in the 2006 election.	在最新的奥地利大选中，两个极右翼政党即奥地利自由党和奥地利未来运动赢得29%的选票，这是它们在2006年选举中获得总票数的两倍。


Both parties share the same attitudes toward immigrants, especially Muslims, and the European Union: a mixture of fear and loathing.	这两个党派对移民、特别是穆斯林移民以及欧盟抱有相同的态度，也就是恐惧和仇视。


Since the two parties’ leaders, Heinz-Christian Strache and Jörg Haider, despise each other, there is little chance of a far-right coalition taking power.	由于两党领导人斯特拉赫和海德尔相互蔑视，因此，极右翼联合政府组阁的可能性不大。


Nonetheless, this is Adolf Hitler’s native land, where Jews were once forced to scrub Vienna’s streets with toothbrushes before being deported and killed, so the result is disturbing.	但是，奥地利是希特勒的故乡，犹太人曾经被迫用牙刷清洗维也纳的街道，随后遭到驱逐和杀戮。 因此，这一选举结果令人担忧。


But how disturbing?	然而，担忧程度有多大呢？


That 29% is about 15% more than populist right-wing parties get in very good years (for them) in other European countries.	这29%的得票率要超过欧洲其他国家民粹主义极右翼政党在其好年景中所获票数15%。


Strache, the leader of the Freedom Party, wants the government to create a new ministry to manage the deportation of immigrants.	自由党领导人斯特拉赫想要让政府建立一个新部门来管理遣返移民。


Muslims are openly disparaged.	穆斯林遭到公开的贬低。


Haider once praised the employment practices of Hitler’s Third Reich.	海德尔曾经称赞希特勒第三帝国的就业措施。


Inevitably, the new rightists bring back memories of storm troopers and race laws.	新的右翼人物将会不可避免地带回纳粹突击队和种族法律的记忆。


Yet, to see the rise of the Austrian right as a revival of Nazism is a mistake.	但是，把奥地利右翼的崛起看成是纳粹主义的复苏是错误的。


Neither party advocates violence, even if some of their rhetoric might inspire it.	两党没有一个主张暴力，即便它们的某些严辞或许会引发联想。


Voters for the far right may be motivated less by ideology than by anxieties and resentments that are felt in many European countries, including ones with no Nazi tradition, such as The Netherlands and Denmark.	极右翼的选民们也许是受到担忧和仇恨、而非意识形态的鼓动而投票。 许多欧洲国家都感受到了这些担忧和仇恨，包括荷兰以及丹麦等没有纳粹传统的国家。


In Denmark, the hard-right Danish People’s Party, with 25 parliamentary seats, is the country’s third largest party.	在丹麦，极右翼的丹麦人民党拥有25个议会席位，是丹麦的第三大政党。


Dutch populists, such as Rita Verdonk or Geert Wilders, who is driven by a paranoid fear of “Islamization,” are putting the traditional political elites – a combination of liberals, social democrats, and Christian democrats – under severe pressure.	荷兰的民粹主义者如威尔德斯受到所谓“伊斯兰化”偏执恐惧的驱使，给传统政治精英、也就是自由党、社民党和基民党施加了巨大的压力。


This is precisely the point.	这就是问题所在。


The biggest resentment among right-wing voters in European countries is reserved for political elites, who, in the opinion of many, have been governing for too long in cozy coalitions, which appear to exist chiefly to protect vested interests.	欧洲国家极右翼选民最大的仇恨就是针对政治精英们。 在许多人眼里，这些政治精英在舒服的联合政府中执政时间过长，而这些政府看起来主要就是为了保护既得利益。


In Austria, even liberals admit that an endless succession of social democratic and Christian democratic governments has clogged the political system’s arteries, making it difficult for smaller parties to penetrate what is seen as a bastion of political privilege.	在奥地利，甚至连自由党都承认社民党和基民党政府无休止地轮流执政，已经堵塞了政治体系动脉。 小党派难以穿透政治特权的堡垒。


The same is true in The Netherlands, which has been governed for decades by the same middle-of-the-road parties, led by benevolent but rather paternalistic figures, whose views about “multiculturalism,” “tolerance,” and “Europe,” were, until recently, rarely challenged.	领导人都是好心好意而又家长式作风。 直到最近，人们很少质疑这些领导人有关“多元文化”、“宽容”以及“欧洲”的观点。


Expressions of nationalism in postwar European democracies were always tolerated in soccer stadiums, not in public life.	战后，欧洲民主国家只是在足球赛中容忍中表达民族主义，而非公共场合。


Skepticism about European unity was routinely denounced as bigotry, or even a form of racism.	对于欧洲联合持怀疑态度被指责为顽固，甚至是种族主义。


Attachment to national feeling was further undermined by governments’ habit of blaming unpopular policies on European Union bureaucrats, who are increasingly seen as yet another bunch of self-satisfied, privileged, and unaccountable elitists.	欧洲国家政府习惯于指责欧盟机构官僚要对不受欢迎的政策负责，从而进一步削弱了民族主义情感依附。 而人们越发把那些欧盟官僚们视为自我满足、享有特权以及不受问责的精英人物。


This is linked to resentment of immigrants.	这与仇视移民有关。


When the offspring of manual workers imported from countries such as Turkey and Morocco in the 1960’s began to form large Muslim minorities in European cities, tensions rose in working-class neighborhoods.	当六十年代来自土耳其和摩洛哥等国体力工人的后代们开始在欧洲城市中形成大量穆斯林少数族裔的时候，工薪阶层聚居区的紧张关系开始上升。


Complaints about crime and unfamiliar customs were often dismissed by liberal elites as “racism.”	自由派精英人物经常把对犯罪和陌生习俗的抱怨指责为“种族主义”。


People simply had to learn to be tolerant.	他们说人就是应该学会宽容。


None of this was necessarily wrong.	这些都没错。


Tolerance, European unity, distrust of nationalism, and vigilance against racism are laudable goals.	宽容、欧洲团结、不信任民族主义以及警惕种族主义值得赞许。


But promoting these aims without discussion, let alone criticism, resulted in a backlash.	但是在没有讨论、何况是批评的情况下推崇这些目标造成副作用。


When the Dutch, the French, and the Irish voted against the European constitution, they were expressing distrust of their political elites.	当荷兰、法国以及爱尔兰选民否决欧洲宪法的时候，他们是在表达对其政治精英的不信任。


And populists who promise to restore national sovereignty by rejecting “Europe,” fighting “Islamization,” and kicking out immigrants are exploiting this distrust.	那些保证通过拒绝“欧洲”、反抗“伊斯兰化”以及驱逐移民来恢复国家主权的民粹主义者正好利用了这一不信任感。


The rhetoric of xenophobia and chauvinism is unpleasant, and, in a country with Austria’s past, even alarming.	排外主义以及沙文主义的论调是难受的，而且，在奥地利历史背景下，也是令人担忧的。


But the new populism is not yet undemocratic, or even anti-democratic.	但是，新的民粹主义还不是非民主的，甚至也不是反对民主。


The phrase most often heard in Austria among voters of the right-wing parties is “fresh air.”	在奥地利极右翼选民中最为经常听到的词语是“新鲜空气”。


People say they voted for Haider and Strache to break the stranglehold of the ruling parties.	人们说他们投海德尔和斯特拉赫的票为的是打破统治党派的把持。


This is not an illegitimate motivation.	这一动机并非无理。


If people are anxious about their national identities, the sovereignty of their governments, the demographic and social complexion of their societies, such fears are best voiced in the political arena.	如果人们对其民族身份认同、政府的主权以及社会的人口和社会构成感到担忧，那么，这些恐惧最好在政治场合表达出来。


As long as people express their concerns, however distasteful to liberal ears, by votes, not violence, democracy will not be seriously harmed.	只要人们通过选票而非暴力表达关切，而无论这些关切在自由派听来有多么不顺耳，民主都不会受到严重伤害。


Running against the political elite is, of course, the essence of populism everywhere.	当然，全球各地民粹主义精髓就是反对政治精英。


American presidential candidates pretend to run against “Washington” even when they are the sons of former presidents.	美国总统候选人即使是前总统的儿子表面上也要对抗华盛顿的政治精英。


Real damage is done when people lose confidence, not only in the elites, but in the system itself.	当人们不仅对精英、而且对制度本身丧失信心就会产生真正的破坏。


This has not yet happened in Europe, not even in Austria.	这种事情在欧洲尚未发生，即使奥地利也是如此。


There is no need for liberal, traditional parties, in a fit of panic, to battle the right by pandering to the same resentments.	现在，传统自由党派没有必要惊慌失措，通过讨好相同的仇恨对抗右翼。


But those resentments should be taken seriously in political debates.	但是应该在政治辩论中严肃对待这些仇视。


That way, the dangers of popular antipathies will be contained.	这样就可以遏制民众反感。


Instead of damaging democracy, the rise of the right, by challenging the corruption of vested interests, might actually turn out to strengthen it.	右翼通过挑战既得利益的腐化崛起不仅不会破坏民主，或许还会到头来加强民主。


Fear and Loathing in the First World	第一世界的惧与怨


Within the last few years, people throughout the world's most advanced economies have become acutely worried about the economic prowess of China, India, and other emerging countries with large low-wage populations.	在过去的几年中，世界经济最发达的国家的人们开始对中国、印度和其它拥有廉价劳力大军的新兴国家的经济实力极度担心。


They fear for their own jobs and for their children's future in a world where they must compete alongside the world's poorest.	他们担心自己的饭碗和子女的未来。 他们必须同世界上最贫穷的国家展开竞争。


Those fears are testing political leaders in the world's richest countries.	这些担心正考验着世界上最富有的国家的政治领袖们。


Newspaper stories are an indicator of this rising concern.	新闻报道是这种日益强烈的担忧的一个指标。


I searched the Lexis-Nexis database of English-language newspaper stories around the world that contained all three of the words "outsourcing," "jobs," and "India."	我在Lexis-Nexis数据库里搜索了全世界英文报纸中关于"外包"、"工作"和"印度"三个关键词的新闻报道。


In 1999, Lexis-Nexis produced only 39 stories; by 2003, there were 749 stories.	在1999年，Lexis-Nexis只收录了39篇报道； 到2003年则有749篇报道。


In the first six months of 2004, there were already 1208 stories.	而在2004年的前6个月就已经有1208篇相关报道。


The results were much the same when I searched "outsourcing," "jobs", and "China."	当我用"外包"、"工作"和"中国"三个关键词搜索时，结果也是大同小异。


I found similar growth in the use of these three terms together when I searched in French, German, Italian, and Spanish: 90% of the stories were in 2003 and 2004.	在我用法、德、意和西班牙文搜索时发现这三个关键词连用的频率也有相似的增长：90%的报道出现在2003和2004年。


Why this explosion of concern?	为什么这种关注出现了爆炸性的增长呢？


After all, advanced countries have been losing manufacturing jobs to less developed countries for more than fifty years.	毕竟，制造性的工作从发达国家转移到欠发达国家已经持续了50多年了。


One reason is that the expanding development and use of new information technology, notably cell phones and the Internet, shrinks the world and makes competition from abroad more plausible.	一个原因是新的信息技术，特别是移动电话和因特网的快速发展和使用让世界变小，并使来自海外的竞争成为可能。


In fact, new technologies are probably the most important reason why globalization is advancing at a rapid pace.	实际上新技术很可能就是全球化急速行进的最重要原因。


Cell phones and the Internet link the minds of many people in different countries effortlessly and efficiently, encouraging trade in intellectual creations.	移动电话和因特网将不同国家的人们的思想便利而有效地连接起来，从而促进了知识产品的贸易。


At the same time, the new information technology makes us more aware that the kinds of jobs that are migrating to India and China are high-quality jobs, the jobs for educated and skilled people.	同时，新的信息技术让我们更清楚地意识到向印度和中国转移的工作都是高质量的，由受过良好教育和技术熟练的人从事的工作。


Over the last fifty years, people in advanced countries have increasingly sought university education and specialized training to protect them from an unforgiving labor market.	在过去的50年里，发达国家的人们日益重视通过大学教育和特别训练来确保自己不被残酷的劳力市场淘汰。


Now First-Worlders are uncertain whether even this will protect their economic status.	而现在第一世界的人们甚至不能确定这样做能否保障他们的经济地位。


Increased fear of competition from emerging countries is also a natural consequence of the collapse of the speculative bubble in equities in 2000; stock markets in some countries fell to less than half their peak value.	对来自新兴国家的竞争的恐惧也是2000年资产投机泡沫破裂的自然结果； 一些国家的股市市值跌倒不及顶峰时期的一半。


Once we saw our exaggerated hopes for our investments failing, we began to consider our other sources of income and wealth, only to confront the worldwide economic slowdown that began in 2001.	一旦我们发现对投资回报过高的期望不能实现时，就开始考虑其它收入和财富的来源。 但此时所要面对的却是始于2001年的世界性经济增速放缓。


Increased economic anxiety has, unsurprisingly, fueled increasing unease about foreign competition.	高涨的经济焦虑自然引发了对外国竞争的日渐强烈的不安。


Earlier this year, I surveyed people who recently bought homes in four American cities.	今年早些时候，我在美国的四个城市对最近购房的人们进行了调查。


My questionnaire asked: "Do you worry that your (or your household's) ability to earn as much income in future years as you expect might be in danger because of changes in the economy (someone in China competing for your job, a computer replacing your job, etc.)?"	我在问卷中问道："有鉴于经济变化（诸如中国的某人和你竞争同一份工作，电脑取代了你的工作等）可能带来的风险，你对你（或你的家庭）在未来赚取同样收入的能力感到担心吗？


Of 442 respondents, 11% answered, "Yes, I worry a lot," 36% replied, "Yes, I worry a little," and 52% said, "No, I don't worry at all."	"在442名受访者中，11%的人回答："是，我非常担心"，36%的人回答："是，我有点担心"，而有55%的人回答："不，我毫不担心。


Thus, while most respondents said they were not worried, nearly half expressed some worry.	"因此，虽然多数人表示不担心，但也有近半数的人表示了不同程度的担忧。


I asked this question of recent homebuyers on the theory that fear of job loss might help explain the remarkable boom in home prices in the US (as well as many other advanced countries).	我还询问了新近的购房者们是否同意美国（和其它许多发达国家）的房地产价格大幅上扬是因为人们担心失去工作这一理论。


After all, people who fear losing their jobs may seek greater economic security by investing in real property in their own wealthy country, bidding up prices in the process.	毕竟，担心失去工作的人们可能会通过投资不动产寻求更大的经济保障从而带动房地产价格上涨。


My survey's results lend some support to this theory.	我的调查结果在某种程度上支持了这种理论。


Although 81% of the respondents said fear of job loss had no effect on their decision to buy a house, of those who said it did, the number who said it encouraged home purchase outnumbered those who said it discouraged home purchase by a margin of two to one.	虽然81%的受访者表示失去工作的担忧并没有影响他们的购房决定，但在给予肯定回答的人中，认为这种担心鼓励人们购房的人数比持相反意见的人数多出一倍。


Growing fear of foreign competition ought to explain a lot of things in the future.	对外国竞争日益增长的恐惧在未来能够解释许多事情。


People used to feel insulated from economic problems that occurred beyond their country's borders.	人们曾一度认为自己不会受到发生在外国的经济问题影响。


No more.	而实际情况已不再如此。


Fear of competition from abroad is now fundamental, and will change the political process in advanced and relatively advanced emerging countries throughout the world.	对来自国外的竞争的恐惧现在具有根本性的影响，它还将会改变全世界发达国家和相对发达的新兴国家的政治进程。


It helps explain the rise of protectionism, and the failure of the WTO trade talks in Cancun last September to improve emerging countries' access to advanced-country markets.	它也能解释保护主义的抬头和世贸组织去年9月旨在改善新兴国家在发达国家的市场准入的Cancun谈判无果而终的原因。


As a professor, I find that my students often ask me for career advice with a different tone than in the past.	作为一名教授，我发现我的学生时常以一种与以往不同的语气向我寻求个人事业方面的建议。


What I hear is a fundamental lack of confidence that they will do well in any chosen career.	我所听到的是他们对自己能在所选择的职业方面表现出色缺乏根本的信心。


They want to figure out how they can compete with Chinese or Indian workers who have the same, or better, education.	他们想要明白如何才能与和受过同等甚至更良好教育的中国人和印度人竞争。


Despite bravado about American superiority, the students themselves do not seem to feel superior, and wonder if they will be living emerging-country lives of their own in coming years.	尽管有美国优越感的虚张声势，这些学生自身似乎并没有什么优越感，他们反倒在琢磨着自己是否会在未来的日子里过一种新兴国家似的生活。


This sudden fear of emerging countries presents a major dilemma.	这种对新兴国家的突然的恐惧代表着一种巨大的困境。


The fear is real and visceral, and politicians ignore it at their peril.	这种恐惧是真实而内在的。 忽视它的政治家们前途堪忧。


Its further increase could lead to counterproductive protectionist measures.	这种恐惧的继续增长可能会导致保护主义的反作用。


We must not let this happen.	我们决不能让这种情况发生。


The emerging countries are doing nothing more blameworthy than working towards their place as equals alongside advanced countries.	新兴国家所做的仅仅是努力发展向发达国家看齐因而无可厚非。


It is morally and practically vital that they succeed.	它们的成功在道德和实践上都是极为重要的。


The Fear Factor in Global Markets	全球市场中的恐慌因素


CAMBRIDGE – The phenomenal market volatility of the past year owes much to genuine risks and uncertainties about factors such as Chinese growth, European banks, and the oil glut.	坎布里奇—去年波澜壮阔的市场波动在很大程度上要归因于中国增长、欧洲银行和石油过剩等因素的真风险和不确定性。


For the first two months of this year, many investors were panicked that even the United States, the world’s most comforting growth story, was about to fall into recession.	对今年前两个月，许多投资者开始担心，就连全世界最令人放心的增长故事美国也即将陷入衰退。


Indeed, among the experts who participate in the Wall Street Journal’s monthly poll, 21% believed a recession was around the corner.	事实上，在《华尔街日报》月度调查做出预测的专家中，有21%认为衰退就在眼前。


I won’t deny that there are risks.	我不否认存在风险。


A big enough hit to China’s growth or to Europe’s financial system could certainly tip the global economy from slow growth to recession.	如果中国增长或欧洲金融体系受到足够大的打击，全球经济肯定将从慢增长转变为衰退。


An even more frightening thought is that by this time next year, the US presidency may have turned into a reality television show.	而更加可怕的观点是，明年今日，美国总统可能沦为一场现实电视秀。


Yet, from a macroeconomic perspective, the fundamentals are just not that bad.	但是，从宏观经济角度看，基本面根本没有那么糟。


Employment numbers have been strong, consumer confidence is solid, and the oil sector is just not large enough relative to GDP for the price collapse to bring the US economy to its knees.	就业数字一直强势，消费信心稳固，石油行业相对GDP的规模还没有大到油价暴跌导致美国经济要“跪”的地步。


In fact, the most under-appreciated driver of market sentiment right now is fear of another huge crisis.	事实上，目前最不受关注的市场情绪推动因素是另一场大危机。


There are some parallels between today’s unease and market sentiment in the decade after World War II.	今天的不安和二战后十年的市场情绪有一些相似之处。


In both cases, there was outsize demand for safe assets.	这两个时期都存在巨大的安全资产需求。


(Of course, financial repression also played a big role after the war, with governments stuffing debt down private investors’ throats at below-market interest rates.)	（当然，金融抑制在战后也起着重要作用，政府以低于市场水平的利率用债务扼住私人投资者的咽喉。 ）


Even a full decade after World War II, when the famous economist John Kenneth Galbraith opined that the world might experience another depression, markets went into a tizzy.	即使在二战结束整整十年后，著名经济学家加尔布雷斯（John Kenneth Galbraith）预测世界可能经历又一场萧条，市场应声慌乱。


People still remembered how the US stock market had fallen 90% during the early years of the Great Depression.	人们仍然记得美国股市如何在大萧条的开头几年跌去90%。


Back in the 1950s, it was not hard to imagine that things might go wrong again.	20世纪50年代，不难想象局势可能再次变坏。


After all, the world had just navigated through a series of catastrophes, including two world wars, a global influenza epidemic, and of course the Depression itself.	毕竟，世界刚刚从一系列灾难中走出，包括两次世界大战，一次全球流感大流行，以及大萧条本身。


Sixty years ago, the specter of atomic war also seemed all too real.	六十年后，原子战争的幽灵似乎随时都会成为现实。


People today need no reminding about how far and how fast equity markets can fall.	今天的人们不需要提醒就知道股市可以以多么快的速度下跌多么深。


After the 2008 financial crisis, US stocks fell by more than 50%.	2008年金融危机后，美国股市跌去50%以上。


Equity markets in some other countries fell significantly more: Iceland’s, for example, plummeted by over 90%.	一些其他国家的股市跌幅更大：比如冰岛股市跌去90%以上。


No wonder that once the recent market drop hit 20%, many people wondered how much worse it could get – and whether fears of a new recession could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.	毫不奇怪，当最近市场跌幅达到20%时，很多人不知道情况可能有多糟糕——也不知道新衰退恐慌是否会成为自我实现的预言。


The idea is that investors become so worried about a recession, and that stocks drop so far, that bearish sentiment feeds back into the real economy through much lower spending, bringing on the feared downturn.	这里的思想是投资者过于担心衰退，而股市跌幅过大，以致于看熊情绪通过大幅降低额支出反馈到实体经济，让担心的衰退成为现实。


They might be right, even if the markets overrate their own influence on the real economy.	这也许是对的，即使市场总是高估它对实体经济的影响。


On the other hand, the fact that the US has managed to move forward despite global headwinds suggests that domestic demand is robust.	另一方面，在全球增长乏��的情况下，美国仍在前进，这一事实表明内需强劲。


But this doesn’t seem to impress markets.	但市场似乎对此不买账。


Even those investors who remain cautiously optimistic about the US economy worry that the US Federal Reserve will view growth as a reason to continue raising interest rates, creating huge problems for emerging economies.	即使仍对美国经济抱谨慎乐观的投资者也担心美联储将增长作为继续提高利率的理由，给新兴市场带来巨大的问题。


There are other explanations for volatility besides fear, of course.	当然，除了恐慌，还有其他因素解释波动。


The simplest is that things really are that bad.	最简单的解释是事情真的有那么糟。


Maybe the individual risks aren’t of the same order of magnitude as in the 1950s, but there are more of them, and markets are starting from a much more inflated position.	也许个别风险与20世纪50年代不是一个量级，但现在的个别风险数量更多，并且时常是在一个通胀程度远远更大的起点起步的。


Moreover, financial globalization has profoundly deepened interlinkages, magnifying the transmission of shocks.	此外，金融全球化极大地深化了互联，放大了冲击的传播。


There are large pockets of fragility and weakness in world debt markets, with current monetary easing covering up deep-rooted problems beneath the surface.	世界债务市场存在巨大的脆弱性和弱点，目前的货币宽松政策掩盖了深层次的问题。


Some have pointed to a lack of liquidity in leading markets as driving the massive price fluctuations; in a thin market, a small change in demand or supply can sometimes require a big shift in prices to restore equilibrium.	一些人指出，领先市场缺乏流动性是价格大部震荡的原因； 在一个规模很小的市场中，有时需求或供给的微小变化就需要巨大的价格调整幅度才能重塑均衡。


The most convincing explanation, though, is still that markets are afraid that when external risks do emerge, politicians and policymakers will be ineffective in confronting them.	尽管如此，最令人信服的解释仍然是市场害怕当外部风险真的发生时，政客和决策者不能有效应对它们。


Of all the weaknesses revealed by the financial crisis, policy paralysis has been the most profound.	金融危机所揭示的最大的弱点之一正是政策瘫痪是如此严重。


Some say that governments did not do enough to stoke demand.	有人说政府在提振需求方面做得不够。


Although that is true, it is not the whole story.	诚然，但这不是问题的全部。


The biggest problem burdening the world today is most countries’ abject failure to implement structural reforms.	困扰当今世界的最大的问题是大部分国家没有实施结构改革。


With productivity growth at least temporarily stuck in low gear, and global population in long-term decline, the supply side, not lack of demand, is the real constraint in advanced economies.	生产率增长至少暂时处于低速挡，全球人口呈现出长期下降趋势，在这样的背景下，供给端，而不是需求端，才是发达经济体的真正约束。


In the long run, it is supply factors that determine a country’s growth.	在长期，供给因素决定着一国的增长。


And if countries cannot manage deep structural reform after a crisis, it is hard to see how it will happen.	如果国家无法在危机后管理好深层次结构改革，就难以预料会发生什么。


Running the government like a reality TV show, with one eye always on the ratings, is not going to do the job.	治大国如演真实电视秀，一只眼紧盯收视率绝不是做好工作的“正确姿势”。


Fear of Finance	金融恐惧症


Fear of finance is on the march.	对金融的恐惧正与日俱增。


Distrust of highly paid people who work behind computer screens doing something that doesn’t look like productive work is everywhere.	对那些拿着高薪在电脑前不知所谓地忙活的人的不信任感十分普遍。 纸上谈兵的比从事生产的赚得多；


Paper shufflers are doing better than producers; speculators are doing better than managers; traders are doing better than entrepreneurs; arbitrageurs are doing better than accumulators; the clever are doing better than the solid; and behind all of it, the financial market is more powerful than the state.	套利者比积累者赚得多； 而在这些表象的背后原因是金融市场比国家更强大。


Common opinion suggests that this state of affairs is unjust.	一般民意认为这种情况是不公平的。


As Franklin D. Roosevelt put it, we must cast down the “money changers” from their “high seats in the temple of our civilization.”	正如弗兰克林•罗斯福所说，我们必须将这些“钱商”从他们“在我们文明圣殿里的宝座上”推下来。


We must “restore the ancient truths” that growing, making, managing, and inventing things should have higher status, more honor, and greater rewards than whatever it is that financiers do.	我们必须“重建古老的真理”，即培植、制造和发明事物的工作应该比金融家们所做的享有更高的地位、更大的荣誉和更好的报酬。


Of course, there is a lot to fear in modern global finance.	当然，现代全球金融着实让人恐惧。


Its scale is staggering: more than $4 trillion of mergers and acquisitions this year, with tradable and (theoretically) liquid financial assets reaching perhaps $160 trillion by the end of this year, all in a world where annual global GDP is perhaps $50 trillion.	其规模令人震撼：今年的并购交易总额超过了4万亿美元。 可交易和（理论上的）流动性金融资产在今年年底可能达到160万亿美元，而全球的年度GDP却只有50万亿美元。


The McKinsey Global Institute recently estimated that world financial assets today are more than three times world GDP – triple the ratio in 1980 (and up from only two-thirds of world GDP after World War II).	麦肯锡全球研究院最近测算认为当今全世界的金融资产比全世界GDP高三倍多—三倍于1980年的比率（二战后的全球金融资产总值只比全球GDP高三分之二）。


And then there are the numbers that sound very large and are hard to interpret: $300 trillion in “derivative” securities; $3 trillion managed by 12,000 global “hedge funds”; $1.2 trillion a year in “private equity.”	还有一些巨大而令人费解的数字：300万亿美元的“衍生”证券； 其中3万亿美元由12000个“对冲基金”管理；


But important things are created in our modern global financial system, both positive and negative.	但在我们现代全球金融体系中有些重要的东西被创造出来，它们既有正面的，也有负面的。


Consider the $4 trillion of mergers and acquisitions this year, as companies acquire and spin off branches and divisions in the hope of gaining synergies or market power or better management.	想想今年总值4万亿美元的并购吧。 各个公司收购并剥离分支或部门希望获得协同效应、市场实力或是更好的管理。


Owners who sell these assets will gain roughly $800 billion relative to the pre-merger value of their assets.	相对于其资产在并购前的价值，资产的出售方会获得约8000亿美元的收益。


The shareholders of the companies that buy will lose roughly $300 billion in market value, as markets interpret the acquisition as a signal that managers are exuberant and uncontrolled empire-builders rather than flinty-eyed trustees maximizing payouts to investors.	收购方公司的股东则会损失约3000亿美元的市值，那是因为市场将收购理解为这样的信号，即：经理人们都是好大喜功、我行我素的野心家而不是为投资者创造最大化收益的、目光严峻的托管人。


This $300 billion is a tax that shareholders of growing companies think is worth paying (or perhaps cannot find a way to avoid paying) for energetic corporate executives.	这3000亿美元是成长性公司的股东甘愿为精力充沛的公司管理者所支付的税（或者也可能是他们不得不支付的税）。


Where does the net gain of roughly $500 billion in global market value come from?	约5000亿美元的全球市值收益从何而来？ 我们不得而知。


We don’t know.	有一部分可能是因为一些公司的垄断实力增长损害消费者而使股东得益；