They believe that Russia has inherited a cultural DNA that transcends revolutions, as if some kind of vicious gene was driving the Kremlin’s current imperialist aggression in Ukraine (and, if Putin’s threats are to be believed, Kazakhstan may soon be next).	他们认为俄国继承了某种超越革命的文化DNA，就好像某种恶性基因驱动着目前克里姆林对乌克兰的帝国主义侵略（而且，如果我们相信普京的威胁，哈萨克斯坦或许很快会成为下一个牺牲品）。


Others believe that this continuity works through national character.	还有人认为这种持续性源于民族性格。


They argue that Russians’ specific nature leads them to support Putin, just as they allegedly supported Stalin and the Romanovs.	他们认为俄国人的独特个性导致他们支持普京，就像他们曾经对斯大林和罗曼诺夫表示支持。


Such arguments do not withstand scrutiny.	这种说法经不起认真审视。


Empires come and go, as do their traditions.	帝国起起落落，帝国的传统也是。


For every expansionist Czar, or commissar, from Catherine II to Putin, there have been leaders prepared to retreat.	从叶卡捷琳娜二世到普京，虽然不乏奉行扩张主义的沙皇或政治委员，但也有领导人愿意让步。 亚历山大二世卖掉阿拉斯加；


Alexander II sold Alaska; Lenin withdrew from Ukraine in exchange for peace with Germany; and Gorbachev pulled back from central Europe in an effort to end the Cold War.	列宁撤出乌克兰换取对德和平； 戈尔巴乔夫为了结束冷战撤出中欧地区。


The belief that Russians desire an authoritarian leader is also misplaced.	认为俄国人渴望独裁领袖也是一种误解。


To be sure, as 2015 begins, Putin’s approval ratings remain high (though they are no more reliable an indicator than Russian budget projections, political pronouncements, or gas deliveries).	可以肯定，随着年终逐渐临近，普京的支持率仍然居高不下（虽然上述支持率并不比俄罗斯推测预算、政治声明或天然气供应指标可靠到哪去）。


But, even if the polls are accurate, his popularity is largely irrelevant: dictators do not rule through a social contract, and neither his position nor his legitimacy derives from popular appeal.	但即便调查结果准确，他究竟受欢迎与否基本上也无关紧要：独裁者统治并不通过社会契约，普京的地位及合法性也不来源于民意支持。


That distinction between state and people has long defined Western policy toward Russia.	这种国家和民众之间的差异一直决定着西方的对俄政策。


In his 1946 Long Telegram, which marked the start of the Cold War, the United States diplomat George F. Kennan understood that the Communist Party line did “not represent the natural outlook of Russian people.”	在1946年标志冷战开始的长电报一书中，美国外交官乔治·凯南认为共产党的路线并不“代表俄罗斯民众的自然风貌。 ”


In any case, though portrayed as a powerful leader, Putin cannot be said to be following Russia’s ultimate strongman, Stalin, in any meaningful respect.	无论如何，虽然被描绘成一位强势领袖，但普京无法与俄罗斯终极强人斯大林在任何有意义的层面进行比较。


Under Stalin, enthusiastic self-sacrifice and scientific rationality were promoted as ideals.	在斯大林治下，热情的自我牺牲和科学的理性被提升到理想的高度。


Industrial development and military victories, though coming at an intolerable human cost, were real.	工业发展和军事胜利尽管以无可容忍的人性成本为代价，但却在切切实实的发生着。


The regime depended on show trials and gulag labor, and used unprecedented violence to consolidate the power of dogmatic, ascetic bureaucrats.	政府有赖于公审秀和古拉格劳动力，并借助前所未有的暴力支撑奉行禁欲主义的教条官僚。


Corruption was a crime that was punished.	腐败被视为一种犯罪，并且必须受到惩罚。


Today, corruption is the norm, and show trials, though still occurring, do not happen on Stalin’s industrial scale.	今天，腐败却已成为常态，公审秀虽然仍在上演，但远比不上斯大林的产业化规模。


Putin and his circle are mainly concerned with survival and enrichment.	普京和他的圈子以生存和致富为主要目标。


He fears Ukraine’s 2014 uprising as a “revolutionary plague” only because it might erupt in Moscow’s own squares.	他害怕乌克兰2014年起义演变为一场“革命的瘟疫”，仅仅因为同样的起义可能发生在莫斯科自己的广场上。


Putin’s desire to preempt such an outcome explains the Kremlin’s brutal response.	普京先发制人地将这样的结果扼杀在摇篮里说明了克里姆林的对策有多么残暴。


Putin’s regime is simply a Russian version of clientelism, with wealth and economic opportunity distributed on the basis of political fealty.	普京政府其实无非是俄国版的庇护主义，按照政治效忠的程度来分配财富和经济机会。


The system’s crimes have been evident for years, and it is tragic that no international power has been able to punish it.	这种制度性犯罪已经持续多年，国际社会无力对其进行惩戒是一个悲剧。


Westerners who think otherwise and have acquiesced in Russia’s actions in Ukraine do so for no other reason than their own greed, fear, or self-deception.	有其他想法并默许俄罗斯在乌克兰行动的西方人这样做的理由无非是他们自身的贪婪、恐惧和自欺欺人。


Indeed, after sucking resources and money from Russia and its citizens, Putin and his obedient oligarchs have been allowed to invest their ill-gotten gains in European and US banks and real estate, paying fat fees that have fueled profit growth for Western firms.	事实上，在大肆吸取俄国家民众的资金和资源后，普京及其言听计从的寡头已获准把他们的不义之财投向欧美银行及房地产，为此支付的大笔费用推动了西方企业的利润增长。


The West’s gain, however, continues to cause enormous discomfort for ordinary Russians.	而西方国家的收益却使普通的俄罗斯民众非常受伤。


After almost a quarter-century of so-called “liberal” economic policy, everything from imported goods to bank mortgages are still far more expensive than in the West.	在将近四分之一世纪实行所谓的“自由”经济政策后，从进口商品到银行按揭的所有一切仍然比西方国家昂贵很多。


And recent sanctions have only worsened conditions.	近期的制裁只是让局势进一步恶化。


The Ukraine crisis has revealed how the longstanding collaboration between Russia and the West has undermined important principles of the modern global order.	乌克兰危机揭示了俄罗斯与西方间的长期合作如何破坏了现代世界秩序的重要原则。


Everyone knew about the underinvestment, over-exploitation, and lawlessness that characterize Putin’s Russia, but no international power was interested in discussing, let alone combatting, it.	所有人都知道普京领导下的俄罗斯投资不足、过度盘剥和违法，但没有哪一股国际势力愿意就此进行探讨，更不用说予以打击了。


Only when the Russian state decided in 2014 to elevate kleptocracy to a principle of foreign policy did Putin’s system of government become an international concern.	只有当俄罗斯政府在2014年决意将窃盗统治提升为外交政策原则的时候，普京的执政制度才引起了国际社会的关注。


Russia has had more than two decades to reshape itself into a country that would benefit its people, Europe, and the wider world.	俄国已有20年时间将自己重塑为对本国民众、欧洲和世界有益的国家。


Instead, it remains stuck in a post-Soviet netherworld, owing to the concerted efforts of an elite that has a strong interest in preventing the emergence of a productive, law-abiding country.	相反，它却停留在苏联解体后的悲惨世界里，因为精英阶层迫切需要联手阻止高效、守法国家的诞生。


That was not inevitable, though it is likely to continue in 2015.	这种现状并非不可避免，但仍将成为2015年的主流。


Putin’s Ark	普京的方舟


Recently I visited Moscow after five years away.	不久前，阔别5年的我重返莫斯科。


The city, which looked different and strange, impressed me by its ability to change.	这座城市看上去不同而且怪异，其变化的能力令我感到惊讶。


My days back in Russia were divided between official meetings, hours wasted in traffic jams, and nights spent with old friends who tried to show me the best of Moscow nightlife.	我返回俄国的日子白天参加官方会议，在交通拥堵中浪费几个钟头，晚上则跟着老友领略莫斯科最繁华的夜生活。


On my first free evening, I was invited to a place called “Shinok.”	第一个自由活动的夜晚，我应邀来到了一个叫“Shinok”的地方。


The restaurant had many of the traits found in ethnic restaurants everywhere.	和随处可见的民族饭馆一样，这里也有很多相似的特征。


Different bits of kitsch, this time Ukrainian, were richly represented.	不同风格的手工艺品，像这里的乌克兰风格，得到了完美的体现。


But the interior decoration had one unique element – an artificial wall with windows separating a part of the restaurant hall. Behind the wall was a stage set of a village yard.	但这里的内部装饰有一点与众不同ľ一面嵌着窗户的人造墙把餐馆的厅堂分成了两半，墙后面布置成了一个乡村庭院。


A real cow, as well as chickens and geese populated that ersatz farmyard.	这个人造庭院里栓了一头真奶牛，还散养着不少鸡鹅。


At times an old woman in traditional dress appeared to feed the animals.	一位身着传统服饰的老年妇女不时走来饲喂动物。


Visitors enjoying borscht and pirogi observed her efforts with satisfaction.	喝着罗宋汤吃着馅饼的客人满意地看着她劳作。


“She works for the restaurant,” my acquaintance explained.	“她为饭馆工作，”我的朋友解释说。


“She feeds animals and sits in the yard to create the rustic ambiance.”	“她或是饲喂动物，或是坐在当院，创造一种乡野氛围。 ”


Shinok was just an introduction to today’s new wave of Moscow restaurant culture.	Shinok只是今天莫斯科新潮餐馆文化的缩影。


A few days later, I visited “The White Sun of the Desert,” another ethnic hangout.	几天后，我又领略了另一家民族风格的餐馆，叫“沙漠艳阳”。


The White Sun existed in Soviet times. Back then, it was called “Uzbekistan” and was nothing more than an obligatory culinary demonstration of the supposedly unbreakable union of the USSR’s fifteen fraternal republics.	“艳阳”的历史要回溯到苏联时代，那时它名叫“乌兹别克斯坦”，这个叫法不过是苏联15个兄弟共和国所谓牢固联盟在餐饮文化中的强制体现。


Although the restaurant interior had completely changed since then, its decorative themes remained the same.	尽管餐馆的内部装饰此后有了彻底的变化，但装饰主题还是保留了下来。


Nowadays, however, the establishment is named after a popular Soviet borscht-western (or “eastern”) filmed in 1969 and set in Central Asia during the 1919 Civil War.	不过今天，饭馆的名称取自1969年拍摄的一部广受欢迎的“苏联西式（或东方风格）甜菜汤”。 影片故事发生在中亚，背景是1919年的内战。


The restaurant is decorated not only with oriental carpets, but with life-size figures of the movie’s heroes firing machine guns or sitting on crates of dynamite.	饭馆不仅铺着东方地毯，而且还有影片主人公真人大小的模拟像，端着机关枪扫射或是静静地坐在炸药箱上。


This Soviet “orientalism” is reinforced by pretty waitresses dressed in sexy outfits more inspired by the Arabian Nights than by any Central Asian reality – then or now.	身着性感服装的漂亮女招待更突出了这种苏联式的“东方风格”，但这一切似乎更像来自《天方夜谈》，而不是过去或现在的中亚现实。


But the Soviet past, not ethnic motifs, are the biggest element in contemporary Muscovite restaurant design.	但现代莫斯科餐馆装饰的流行主题不是民族风格，而是苏联的过去。


The club-restaurant “Major Pronin:” is conveniently located in the vicinity of the KGB-FSB headquarters. It is named after the hero of bad Soviet-era spy novels, a figure who was also the butt of many underground jokes.	俱乐部制餐馆“普罗尼上校”恰好位于克格勃总部附近，是以苏联时代拙劣间谍小说的主人公来命名的，此人也是很多秘密笑话中当之无愧的主角。


The restaurant’s interior is decorated with various pieces of espionage equipment. But the main attraction is a shooting gallery where patrons can test their skills between courses.	餐馆里摆放着很多间谍设备，但最引人注目的还是一条射击廊，供客人在上菜的间歇小试枪法。


Targets depicting serial killers and drug dealers have mottos like “Save a woman” or “Save a boy” on them. In the middle of the wall is a target representing New York’s World Trade Center being approached by an aircraft, with the inscription “Save America.”	连环杀手和毒贩形象的标靶旁写有“救救妇女”或“救救儿童”的题词，墙壁正中一架飞机正在接近纽约的世贸中心，旁边的题词是“救救美国。


A new club called “Zone” – Russian slang for a concentration camp – is designed to reproduce the feeling of gulag life.	新开业的“地带”俱乐部让人回忆起古拉格生活，“地带”是俄罗斯俚语中集中营的代名词。


Barking Alsatian dogs, stern guards, and waiters dressed in inmate uniforms work hard to recreate the gulag’s sinister atmosphere.	狂吠的阿尔萨斯犬、粗暴的卫兵和身着囚服的侍者共同塑造了古拉格的险恶气氛。


Russian literature is not forgotten.	俄国文学也没有被人们遗忘。


If the restaurant “Pushkin” on Tverskoy Boulevard not far from the monument to the great Russian poet is designed to recreate the “aristocratic atmosphere” of the early nineteenth century, the combined bar and diner called “Gogol” on Stoleshnikov Lane is an attempt to recreate a vanished Soviet institution called “rumochnaia.”	如果说Tverskoy大道离伟大诗人纪念碑不远处的“普希金”餐馆是为了重现十九世纪早期的“贵族”气氛，那么Stoleshnikov巷口的“果戈理”酒吧和餐馆则试图再现“rumochnaia”这种消失了的苏联文化。


A “rumka” is a vodka glass from which exhausted proletarians could revive themselves.	“rumka”是俄语中的伏特加酒杯，筋疲力尽的无产者可以用它来补充能量。


Of course “rumochnaia” had nothing in common with Nikolai Gogol, but the establishment named after the famous writer does have a skating rink that is used once a day by a man dressed up as Gogol.	当然“rumochnaia”与尼古拉·果戈理没有什么共同之处，但以这位名作家命名的餐馆确实有一座冰场，每天一次，身穿果戈理服装的演员在这里进行冰上演出。


After my return to Washington, I had a dinner with an American politician who had just visited Saint Petersburg.	回到华盛顿后，我和一位刚到过圣彼得堡的美国政界人士共进了晚餐。


As a special honor, his Russian hosts organized an excursion to Strelna, the “Russian Versailles,” which was recently restored from ruin to become the Petersburg residence of President Vladimir Putin.	作为一种特别的礼遇，俄国主人精心安排他到Strelnia旅行，不久以前，这里刚刚从废墟上整修一新，成了弗拉基米尔·普京总统在彼得堡的行宫。


The palace didn’t impress the American.	宫殿留给美国人的印象并不太好。


The amount of marble used for renovation seemed excessive, and the understanding of what constitutes luxury appeared to correspond to the standards of a Holiday Inn.	重修时过多地采用了大理石，对豪华的理解似乎和度假酒店相差无几。


The American’s excited Russian hosts asked him constantly for his opinion of the palace.	兴奋的俄国主人不停地询问对宫殿的看法。


Throughout the tour, the American answered with polite exclamations like “exquisite” or “striking.”	游览自始至终，美国人都用“太美了”、“太惊人了”这样的礼貌感叹词回答主人的提问。


Finally, they reached the attic.	最后，他们爬上了阁楼。


At last, the American was excited.	美国人终于兴奋了。


The attic of the presidential residence was designed as a belly of the seventeenth-century ship.	总统宅邸的阁楼修成了17世纪舰船的模样。


“The last time I saw something like this was in a Hamburg beer hall in the 1960’s,” the politician told me.	“我上次看到类似的设计是在20世纪60年代汉堡的一个啤酒大厅，”政治家跟我说。


How perfect, I thought, as I imagined Russia’s president climbing the stairs to the attic of his palace to play the role of Peter the Great.	想象着俄国总统登上官邸阁楼的台阶，扮演着彼得大帝的角色，我觉得简直太完美了。


Like the customers in that Ukrainian-style village restaurant, perhaps Putin found his attic ark reassuring in some unconscious way.	也许普京就像那家乡村风格乌克兰餐馆的客人一样，能从自己阁楼的方舟中获得潜意识的安慰。


A historical wave beyond his control had lifted the former KGB lieutenant colonel from out of the shadows to the pinnacle of power. But fate might also just as suddenly wash him away.	无法掌控的历史大潮将前这位前克格勃陆军中校从不知名的角落席卷出来，带到了权力的顶峰，但命运也可能以同样的速度将他再次冲走。


What could be better than to have an ark at hand if one day the political tides turn?	如果有一天政治的潮水改变了方向，有什么能比拥有一条方舟更令人惬意呢？


Please visit this link for full size photos:	请通过此链接获取完整大小的照片。


http://www.project-syndicate.org/akinsha/photos.html	project-syndicate. org/akinsha/photos.


Putin’s Brezhnev Syndrome	普京的勃列日涅夫综合症


Likewise, there is no doubt that Putin himself will win the presidential election due in March 2012. But the public enthusiasm that ratified Putin’s rule for a decade has vanished, something demonstrated by the poor performance of his party, United Russia, in the just concluded elections to the Duma.	巴黎——


Unlike Europe, beset by a sovereign-debt crisis, and the United States, whose leaders are wrangling over how to stem the deficit, Russia may look like an oasis of stability and continuity.	俄罗斯周日议会选举的赢家在意料之中：弗拉基米尔•普京为首的统一俄罗斯党。 同样毫无悬念的是，普京将在2012年3月举行的总统大选中获胜。


But that continuity is more reminiscent of the zastoi, or stagnation, of the Brezhnev era.	公众的热情让普京执政了十年，但是现在这份热情已经消失，普京的统一俄罗斯党在刚刚结束的杜马选举中表现平平，由此可见一斑。


Eight years of 7% average annual GDP growth during Putin’s previous presidency (2000-2008) allowed Russia to repay its debts, accumulate almost $600 billion in foreign-currency reserves, and join the leading emerging economies.	欧洲深陷主权债务危机，美国的领导人正在争论如何遏制赤字，与欧洲和美国不同，俄罗斯看起来好像是一个稳定而具有连续性的美好国度。


A decade after the 1998 crisis brought Russia to its knees, its leaders boasted that the country could weather the 2008 financial crisis.	但是这种连续性更加让人想起勃列日涅夫时代的停滞。


Given Russia’s economic fundamentals, Putin’s diminished popularity might appear surprising. The International Monetary Fund’s forecast of 4% growth in 2011 and subsequent years puts Russia well behind China and India, but far ahead of average growth rates in the rich G-7 countries.	普京上一个总统任职期间（2000年至2008年），8年来的国内生产总值年均增长率达7%，这让俄罗斯偿还了债务，积累了近6000亿美元的外汇储备并跻身主要的新兴经济体之列。


Moreover, Russia’s budget will be balanced as long as oil prices remain above $110 per barrel.	1998年的危机重创了俄罗斯，10年后，其领导人鼓吹本国能够挺过2008年的金融危机。


Longer-term trends have also improved.	考虑到俄罗斯的经济基本面，普京的支持率下降似乎令人吃惊。


Rapid demographic decline has been brought to a halt since the turn of the century (a time when coffins outnumbered cribs by seven to four), as generous government subsidies for a third child have boosted the fertility rate from its 1999 low of 1.16 children per woman to 1.58 in 2010.	国际货币基金组织预测，2011年及今后几年，俄罗斯经济将增长4%，虽然远远落后于中国和印度，但却遥遥领先于富裕的G7成员国的平均增长率。


That is still far below the replacement rate of 2.1, but higher fertility, together with successful measures to reduce male mortality, has slowed the pace of population shrinkage.	此外，只要油价仍然维持在每桶110美元以上，俄罗斯就能够实现预算平衡。


But Russia remains essentially a “rentier state” – that is, a state whose primary source of revenue is rent – in this case, oil and gas – rather than taxation, which thus keeps demands for political representation at bay.	自世纪之交以来（这段时间，死亡人口超过了出生人口，比率为7比4），由于政府给生育第三胎发放大量补贴，生育率从1999年每位妇女生育1. 16个孩子的低谷上升到了2010年的1.


Instead, the state is the target of political entrepreneurs who strive to capture it in order to capture the rents that it controls.	这仍然远远低于2. 1的替代率，但是较高的生育率以及减少男婴死亡率的成功措施已经使人口萎缩的速度放缓。


Russia has most of the usual features of rentier states: autocracy, weak political and judicial institutions, arbitrary governance, lack of the rule of law, little transparency, restraints on freedom of expression, widespread corruption, cronyism, and nepotism.	但是从本质上来说，俄罗斯仍然是一个“食利国”，即主要收入是租金——对俄罗斯而言，就是石油和天然气——而不是税收的国家，这样使人们对政治代表性没有什么需求。


Also common to rentier states are short investment horizons, vulnerability to commodity-price volatility – euphoria when they surge, crisis when they collapse – and an underdeveloped and uncompetitive manufacturing sector.	相反，国家成为了政治企业家的目标，他们努力控制国家从而获取国家所控制的租金。


Today’s Russia is a gigantic reservoir of raw materials, and its economy relies heavily on commodities – mining and drilling.	俄罗斯具有食利国的大部分一般特征：独裁统治、政治和司法机构薄弱、专制治理、法治缺乏、透明度极低、言论不自由、腐败盛行、任人唯亲和裙带关系。


Russia is the world’s largest oil and gas exporter, sitting on more than 25% of total proven gas reserves.	食利国还有一个共同之处是，投资目光短浅，易受大宗商品价格波动的影响——价格飙升，欢欣鼓舞；


Those commodities account for over two thirds of the country’s export earnings, and are the primary source of state revenue.	价格暴跌，危机爆发——以及制造业不发达，缺乏竞争力。


The impact on governance is all too predictable.	当前的俄罗斯拥有大量的原材料，其经济过度依赖大宗商品——采矿和钻井。


In 2011, Transparency International’s “corruption perception” index ranked Russia 143rd out 182 countries, on a par with Nigeria, and 182nd out of 210 for “control of corruption,” one of the World Bank’s worldwide governance indicators.  Regarding the rule of law, there has been only minimal improvement, with Russia ranked 156th.	俄罗斯是世界上最大的石油和天然气出口国，占到了探明天然气储量的25%以上。 这些大宗商品占到了该国出口额的三分之二以上，是该国的主要收入来源。


In the meantime, infrastructure is crumbling even within the vital extractive industry, while manufacturing is internationally uncompetitive.	这给国家治理带来的影响是可以预测的。


The Russian armaments industry has lost its strong position with India and China, once its two main customers. Despite the hype about nanotechnology and a “Russian Silicon Valley” at Skolkovo, spending on Rampamp;D is a mere one-fifteenth of the US level, and one-quarter of China’s.	2011年，在“透明国际”发布的“贪腐印象”指数中，俄罗斯在182个国家中位居143位，与尼日利亚并列。


As a proportion of GDP, it has been halved since the early 1990’s, and is now just 1% of GDP.	根据世界银行广泛的治理指标——“腐败控制”，俄罗斯在210个国家中位居182位。


Scientists and researchers, once the pride of the Soviet Union, have vanished, often lured by more rewarding opportunities, at home or abroad.	至于法治，俄罗斯略有改善，位居156名。


Indeed, Russian universities are almost absent from global rankings: only two appear in the Shanghai University Top-500 list and, at the very bottom, among the 400 rated by The Times Higher Education Supplement.	与此同时，重要核心产业的基础设施也在不断老化，制造业在国际上也没有什么竞争力。 俄罗斯的军工业较之印度和中国（它们曾是其两大主要买家），也失去了其巨大的优势地位。


Russia also fares poorly – 63rd – in the Global Competitiveness Index released by the World Economic Forum, well behind all developed countries and even many developing countries.	尽管大肆宣扬纳米技术和位于斯科尔科沃的“俄罗斯硅谷”，研发投入只占到了美国的十五分之一，中国的四分之一。 按国内生产总值的比重来算，自20世纪90年代初以来，研发投入减少了一半，目前只占到国内生产总值的1%。


The same holds for innovation capacity and technology.	科学家和研究人员曾经是苏联的骄傲，现在已经不复存在，国内外回报更好的机会常常会吸引他们。


Yet there are hints of hope. Russia no longer lags behind the developed world in Internet use, which has provided space for unregulated speech, allowing users to circumvent the official – and overwhelmingly pro-Putin – news media.	实际上，俄罗斯的大学几乎没有跻身全球大学排名榜单：在上海大学的世界500所顶尖大学榜单以及《泰晤士报高等教育副刊》评出的400强中，只有两所大学位列其中，在400强中的名次还是垫底的。


Moreover, after lengthy negotiations, Russia recently reached an agreement with the World Trade Organization to join, implying the need to comply with all relevant obligations regarding transparency and trading rules.	在世界经济论坛发布的“全球竞争力指数”中，俄罗斯也表现不佳，位居63位，��远落后于所有发达国家，甚至许多发展中国家。 创新能力和科技的情况也是如此。


But comprehensive transformation of Russia’s economy remains doubtful.	然而，还是暗含希望。 在互联网使用方面，俄罗斯不再落后于发达国家，互联网的使用提供了自由发表言论的空间，用户可以避开官方以及大力支持普京的新闻媒体。


One of Russia’s leading independent economists, Sergei Guriev, the rector of the New Economic School in Moscow, soberly noted in 2010 that	此外，经过长期的谈判，最近俄罗斯已经达成协议加入世贸组织，这意味着要遵守透明度和贸易规则方面的所有相关义务。


“meaningful reforms look highly unlikely – for the simple reason that they would harm the interests of Russia’s ruling elites.	但是俄罗斯经济的全面转型仍然存疑。 莫斯科新经济学院院长、俄罗斯主要的独立经济学家之一谢尔盖•古里耶夫在2010年明确指出“有意义的改革似乎不太可能，理由很简单，它们会损害俄罗斯执政精英的利益。


In any resource-rich and undemocratic country, the political class and the business interests that surround it have little or no incentive to support stronger property rights, the rule of law, and competition.	在任何资源丰富、不民主的国家，政治阶层以及伴随其左右的商业利益几乎没有什么意愿加强产权和法治，提升竞争力。


Indeed, such structural changes would weaken the elite’s grip on political and economic power.	实际上，这样的结构性改革会削弱精英们对政治和经济力量的控制。


The status quo – opaque rules, arbitrary decision-making, and lack of accountability – allows insiders to enrich themselves, especially by obtaining a share of commodity-export revenues.”	现状——不透明的法规、专制的决策以及问责制的缺失——能够让内部人士自身致富，尤其是通过获取一部分出口大宗商品的收入致富。


When Russia marks the twentieth anniversary of the collapse of the Soviet Union this Christmas, it will have much to celebrate.	今年圣诞节，在俄罗斯纪念苏联解体20周年之际，有许多方面值得庆祝。


Unfortunately, what hasn’t changed will give it much to rue.	可惜，毫无变化的方面会使俄罗斯有众多遗憾。


Putin’s Choice	普京的选择


BRUSSELS – Vladimir Putin’s return to the Kremlin as Russia’s president was always a foregone conclusion.	布鲁塞尔——弗拉基米尔·普京重返克里姆林宫担任俄罗斯总统已成定局。


But, when he is sworn in on May 7, he will retake formal charge of a country whose politics – even Putin’s own political future – has turned unpredictable.	但是，当他5月7日宣誓就职时，他将重新统治这个国家，而这个国家的政治，甚至普京自己的政治前途，已经变得不可预知。


Putin’s return to the presidency, following a period of de facto control as prime minister, was supposed to signify a reassuring continuation of “business as usual” – a strong, orderly state devoid of the potentially destabilizing effects of multiparty democracy and bickering politicians.	在担任总理拥有实际统治权之后，普京再次当选总统，这意味着他可以放心继续领导 一个强大安定的国家，而没有多党制民主和争吵的政治家埋下的潜在不稳定影响。


Instead, the Russian people have now challenged the status quo.	相反，俄罗斯人现在已经开始在挑战现状了。


Their reaction to Putin’s plan – from the announcement last September that President Dmitri Medvedev would stand aside for his mentor, to the deeply flawed parliamentary and presidential elections – and their accumulated resentment of Kremlin cronies’ massive enrichment, has placed pressure on Putin and the top-down system of government that he created.	从去年九月公布计划总统梅德韦杰夫将站在一旁为普京助阵，到有严重缺陷的议会和总统选举，俄罗斯人民对普京的计划及不断积累的对克里姆林宫亲信的不满情绪，给普京及其创建的政府自上而下的管理体系造成了很大的压力。


How Putin, an astute politician, responds to that pressure will determine his political legacy.	普京这样一位精明的政治家如何应对这种压力将决定他留下什么样的政坛业绩。


And the West’s response to Putin’s return to the presidency could have a marked effect on whether he presses for liberalizing reforms and survives, or follows his KGB-honed authoritarian instincts and stokes further protest.	西方国家对普京重返总统的回应将会对他是否推动自由化改革或他跟随克格勃磨练出的独裁本能和斯托克斯进一步抗议产生显著的影响。


Nothing illustrates Russia’s malaise under Putin better than the case of Sergei Magnitsky, a lawyer working for a British investment fund.	在普京的领导下俄罗斯萎靡不振，没有什么例子比英国投资基金工作的律师谢尔盖·马格尼茨基更合适了。


He uncovered a massive tax fraud and alleged widespread collusion by the authorities.	他发现了一起大规模的骗税，声称俄罗斯当局参与并勾结。


His reward for exposing this crime was to be imprisoned and mistreated until he died in mysterious circumstances.	他揭露这一罪行的奖励是被关押和虐待直到他神秘死去。


The Russian authorities are bizarrely continuing to prosecute him posthumously, as well as continuing to carry out the tax scams that he exposed.	奇怪的是，俄罗斯当局在他死后仍继续起诉他，继续开展他暴露的税收诈骗。


The United States Congress is currently debating a law that would impose asset freezes and visa bans on the 60 people identified as having had some responsibility for Magnitsky's detention and death.	美国国会目前正在讨论一项法律，该法律上将会对那些已经确定的对马格尼茨基的拘留和死亡负有责任的60余人实行冻结资产和签证禁令。


Many of the law’s supporters want it to replace the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment, a Cold War-era law that restricts US trade with Russia – and that the Obama administration is pushing to repeal.	许多该法律的支持者希望它代替所谓的杰克逊 ·瓦尼克修正案，这是一项冷战时期限制美国与俄罗斯贸易的法律，奥巴马政府正在推动废除该项法律。


Such a change would be doubly beneficial: it would both enhance trade and hold to account people responsible for egregious human-rights abuses.	这种变化将加倍有益——既增强贸易，又使那些侵犯人权之人伏法。


Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom, the House of Commons recently passed a resolution along the same lines as the proposed US legislation.	与此同时，英国下议院最近通过了一项与美国议会相同的决议。


London is a favorite destination for wealthy Russians, and the British government is now considering whether to support such an initiative, although there are indications that it will maintain an unofficial and unpublished list of the banned individuals in order to forestall legal challenges.	伦敦是俄罗斯富翁最钟爱的地方，英国政府正在考虑是否支持这种倡议，尽管有迹象表明，为防止法律上的挑战，它会持有一份非官方的和未公布的被禁止的个人名单。


In Ottawa, the Canadian parliament has called for similar measures, including asset freezes against those responsible for Magnitsky's death, as has the European Parliament, which has called for the European Union’s member states to take collective action.	在渥太华，加拿大议会也呼吁类似的措施，包括对那些为马格尼茨基的死负责进行资产冻结，欧洲议会也采取了这样的举动，呼吁欧盟成员国采取集体行动。


Introducing such targeted sanctions would be an indisputable sign that the West will not compromise on its fundamental values – values that Putin’s Russia claims to share.	推行这种有针对性的制裁将是一个不争的迹象，这表明西方不会损害其基本价值观，而这种价值观普京统治下的俄罗斯声称是共有的。


It would also set a precedent that could be extended to all of those in Russia and other countries who regularly violate human rights, and not just those rights concerning physical inviolability.	它还将开创一项先例，可以扩展到所有在俄罗斯和其他国家的经常侵犯人权的人，而不只是那些有关身体不可侵犯的权利。


For example, such measures could be extended to cover all of those who abuse the fundamental right of legal due process, such as the right to a fair trial.	例如，这些措施可以扩展到包括所有滥用法律正当程序的基本权利，例如公正审判的权利。


Doing so would highlight the famous case of former oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky, whose political ambitions alone landed him in prison, and who has been declared, after a second trial, a prisoner of conscience by Amnesty International.	这样做将突出前石油巨头霍多尔·科夫斯基的著名案例——他的政治野心就足以使他入狱，而在二审过后被宣布为国际特赦组织的“良知囚犯”。


Such measures could also include the abuse of prisoners’ rights, such as the case of Khodorkovsky’s former legal counsel Vasily Alexanyan, who was denied treatment for HIV in jail, and was released only after the intervention of the European Court of Human Rights.	这些措施可能还包括虐待犯人的权利，如前霍多尔·科夫斯基的律师瓦西里。 他在监狱中被拒绝对其进行艾滋病治疗，直到欧洲人权法院干预才被释放。


Medvedev’s announcement one day after Putin’s election on March 5 that the Khodorkovsky case will be reviewed is a hopeful start.	普京总统在3月5日的选举后，梅德韦杰夫宣布霍多尔·科夫斯基的案子将会重审，这是一个充满希望的开端。


Imposing travel sanctions on suspected human-rights abusers is a sensible and practical way forward.	对侵犯人权的嫌疑人施加旅行制裁是明智可行的方式。


It would show that the West does not seek to punish Russia or Russians generally, but only those individuals about whose role in human-rights violations the West has good evidence.	这表明西方国家并不寻求惩罚俄罗斯或俄国人，而只针对那些西方国家有充分的证据可以证明侵犯人权的人。


And it would remind Russia of its international legal obligations, specifically as a member of both the OSCE and the Council of Europe, which has 47 member states, including Russia and others who flout some its conventions.	这会提醒俄罗斯要履行国际法律义务，特别是作为欧洲安全与合作组织和拥有47个会员国的欧洲理事会的成员国，其中包括俄罗斯和其他一些无视其公约的成员国。


In the past, Putin successfully marketed himself as a strongman, the epitome of stability, a guarantor against chaos. But now Putin’s style of government is Russia’s primary source of instability, as the country’s middle class takes to the streets in protest against the corruption and inefficiency of his rule.	过去，普京成功地将自己打造成一个强人形象，稳定的缩影，混乱的担保人��但现在普京的政府作风是俄罗斯不稳定的主要来源，因为中产阶级走上街头抗议其政府统治腐败和效率低下。


The West has an opportunity – and an obligation – to convince Putin that protecting his own interests requires profound and permanent democratic reform in Russia, starting with an unambiguous commitment to the rule of law.	西方有机会和义务说服普京，保护自己的利益需要进行深刻而永久的民主改革，而这项改革需要以明确的法治承诺开始。


And Putin has a rare opportunity, as he begins his third term as President, to restore his deeply tarnished reputation.	普京也有一个难得的机会——他开始了总统的第三个任期——以恢复他那被深深玷污的声誉。


Putin’s Deadly “Great Game”	普京在自杀吗？


President Vladimir Putin will visit Ukraine, the scene of his biggest foreign policy blunder, this weekend.	本周末，普京总统即将出访他最大外交政策失误的发生地乌克兰。


Given his myopic actions at home, where he seems increasingly incapable of dealing with any institution that has any degree of autonomy, this seems unlikely.	鉴于他在应对国内具有任何自治程度的任何机构方面表现出的日益无能的短视行为，这一行动似乎有些出人意料。


For example, Putin recently abolished elections in Russia’s provinces.	比如，弗拉基米尔·普京总统最近废除了俄罗斯的省级选举。


From now on, presidential appointees will rule a country that is as complex and multi-national as the EU or the US.	从此以后，一个和欧盟或美国一样复杂的多民族国家将为总统任命的官员所统治。


That’s not a recipe for sophisticated thinking.	这并非获得深邃统治思想的秘方。


Indeed, elected officials in Russia have become an endangered species.	的确，在俄罗斯，民选的官员已经成为濒危品种。


The Kremlin black art of manipulating elections by deception and other means – called “political technology” by locals – will now be used only in other countries’ elections in, as these are the only real elections the Kremlin has to worry about, so neutered have Russia’s own votes become.	克林姆林宫运用欺骗和其他手法对选举进行操纵的巫术（在俄罗斯被称作“政治技术”）现在将仅用于乌克兰等外国的选举中。


The justification for canceling elections in Russia is the need to fight terrorism – the end that now justifies all means.	俄罗斯取消选举的理由是抗击恐怖主义。 现在，这已被用作所有手段的理由。


How did it happen that every contemporary problem, particularly in Russia, seems to have been reduced to terrorist attacks and counter-terrorist operations?	为什么当代的所有问题（特别是在俄罗斯）似乎已只剩下恐怖主义袭击和反恐行动？


Poverty, racism, and ideological legacies are just as visible now as they were three or thirteen years ago.	当前，贫困、种族主义、以及意识形态的遗产和三年前，乃至三十年前一样随处可见。


Terrorism has not exacerbated them.	恐怖主义并没有使它们恶化。


Security forces have not helped resolved them.	安全部队无助于解决它们。


On the contrary, the “double terror” induced by terrorism and counter-terrorism distracts public attention from those problems that, as some of us still remember, produced terrorism.	相反，恐怖主义和反恐怖主义带来的“双重恐怖”将公众的注意力从那些（就像我们部分人仍然记得的那样）产生恐怖主义的问题上引开。


Palestine and Chechnya, two sites of pain and terrorist infection, have not healed.	巴勒斯坦和车臣，两个痛苦和恐怖主义肆虐的地点，并没有愈合。


Their national independence is now more elusive than it was before the terrorist era began.	如今，他们的民族独立比恐怖主义时代开始前更加渺茫。


The past was, of course, far from perfect, but governments and peoples everywhere appeared more capable of tolerating failure.	当然，过去远非完美，但是各国政府和人民似乎都更能容忍失败。


When battles were lost, talks began.	如果打了败仗，就开始和谈。


These talks eventually resulted in the formation of respected countries, from Italy in the nineteenth century, to India in the middle of the twentieth century, to Eritrea near that century’s end.	这些谈判最终形成了值得尊敬的国家，从19世纪的意大利到20世纪中叶的印度，再到上世纪末的厄立特里亚。


Try to imagine Putin as Russia’s leader in 1920, when Poland gained its independence from Russia, or in 1991, when Georgia did.	试想象普京总统是1920年波兰从俄罗斯独立时，或者1991年格鲁吉亚独立时的俄罗斯领导人。


Would he ever have engaged in peace talks?	他会参加和平谈判吗？


Nowadays, Rudyard Kipling’s imperialist Great Game is decomposing into a vicious circle.	今天，吉布林的帝国“大竞赛”日益陷入恶性循环。


Security forces respond to the growth of terrorism.	为了应付恐怖主义的增长而建立安全部队。


The growth of terrorism responds to the strengthening of security forces.	恐怖主义又为了应付日益加强的安全部队而增长。


The heavier the hand, it seems, the stronger the resistance; the stronger the resistance, the heavier the hand.	看来，手腕越硬，反抗越强。 反抗越强，手腕越硬。


Real issues are buried beneath the crimes of the terrorists and the mistakes of the security forces.	真正的问题被埋在恐怖分子的罪行和安全保障人员的错误之下。


With every turn of the circle, both parties, terrorists and security forces, grow closer to each other.	每循环一次，双方，恐怖分子和安全保障人员，都彼此更加亲密。


Their common interest is continuation of the game.	他们的共同利益就在于这个竞赛的延续。


Opposing parties use the same weapons, develop comparable tactics, and preach increasingly similar ideals.	对立的双方使用同样的武器，制定相似的战术，鼓吹越来越相似的理想。


So it goes, until the rules of the game change.	这种情况持续下去，直到竞赛的规则改变。


But why would they?	但是这些规则为何要改变？


In Russian history, there is an analogous situation.	俄罗斯历史上存在一个类似的情况。


At the beginning of the twentieth century, socialist revolutionaries led by Evno Asef embarked on a series of terrorist attacks against state officials.	20世纪初，伊万诺·阿瑟夫领导的社会主义革命者对国家官员展开了一系列的恐怖主义袭击。


Somewhere along the line, Asef became a double agent.	在某种程度上，阿瑟夫成了双重间谍。


Sometimes he killed an official who was not on good terms with the police.	一方面他杀掉与警方关系不好的官员。


At other times, the police simply did not want to betray their precious agent.	另一方面，警方不愿意背叛他们宝贵的间谍。


Manipulating each other, the terrorists and the security guys became indistinguishable.	通过互相操纵，恐怖分子和安全保障人员变得难以区分。


Call this the “Asef” effect.	这可以被视作“阿瑟夫”效应。


Once such an alliance was shaped, nothing but revolution could stop it – in this case, the Bolshevik revolution.	这样的联盟一旦形成，就没有什么可以阻止它，除了革命——当时，发生了布尔什维克革命。


So the game must be stopped, if only for the survival of innocent bystanders – the rest of us.	所以，这个竞赛必须停下来，即使只是为了让我们这些无辜的旁观者幸存下来。


If you do not see humanity in your counterpart, you will not talk to him.	如果你不把对手看作是人，你就不和他谈判。


You will either use him or kill him.	你要不利用他，要不杀掉他。


So the “other” is elevated to the very center of high politics.	于是，“另一个”被抬高到高层政治的核心。


This is the Asef effect in action.	这就是行动中的阿瑟夫效应。


The Bolsheviks did it to the bourgeoisie.	布尔什维克这样对待资产阶级。


The Nazis did it to the Jews.	纳粹这样对待犹太人。


But classical empires learned not to do it to colonized people.	但是古代的帝国却学会了不要这样对待被殖民化的人民。


Over time, they invented fascinating ways to control their subjects, combining education, bribery, and force.	他们渐渐发明了巧妙的办法控制臣民，结合教育、贿赂和物力。


Learning the great art of Orientalism, the classical empires knew how to keep talking while keeping their distance.	古代的帝国通过学习东方主义的伟大艺术，知道如何继续谈判，同时保持距离。


Abolishing democracy in Russia’s provinces, including Muslim-populated regions such as Tatarstan and Dagestan, is a deadly act.	废除包括鞑靼斯坦和达吉斯坦等穆斯林聚居区在内的俄罗斯省份的民主是一个致命的行动。


Civil peace in these areas was one of the few accomplishments of which contemporary Russia could be proud.	这些地区的民间和平是当代俄罗斯值得引以为豪的少数成就之一。


So is Putin suicidal?	那么，普京在自杀吗？


Unfortunately not.	很不幸，不是。


He owes his career to Chechnya, as Bush may owe his presidency to Iraq.	他的事业应归功于车臣，就像布什的总统生涯应归功于伊拉克。


But Chechnya, obliging as it is, is small, poor, and idiosyncratic.	但是车臣，虽然乐于帮助，但却弱小、贫穷、古怪。


Converting vast areas of Russia into new Chechnyas, Putin and his clique calculate that – sooner rather than later – they will play out their games of terror and security with millions of Muslims in the oil-rich plains of Eurasia.	把俄罗斯大量的土地划入新车臣，普京和他的小集团算计——不会太久——和富含石油的亚欧平原上数以百万计的穆斯林之间的恐怖与安全游戏就要玩完。


Putin\u0027s Gold-Medal War	普京的金牌战争


LONDON – What does the “Olympics War,” otherwise known as Russia’s invasion of Georgia, really mean?	伦敦 – “奥林匹克战争”，也就是俄国对格鲁吉亚的入侵，真正意味着什么？


The war itself was, of course, predicable and predicted. Its results are equally clear.	首先，这场战争本身是可以预料的，也的确被预料到了，而战争的结果也同样地清晰而没有悬念。


First, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin remains in unambiguous charge in Moscow.	首先，总理弗拉基米尔·普京毫无疑问地仍然掌控着莫斯科。


He may play a “good cop-bad cop” routine with President Dmitri Medvedev.	他可以和总统德米特里·梅德韦杰夫联手玩“好警察恶警察”的老把戏。


But the bad cop, Putin, is the real boss.	但是，恶警察普京才是真正的老板。


Second, Putin cannot stand Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who admittedly is not an easy man to like.	第二，普京不能忍受格鲁吉亚总统米哈伊尔·萨科维利这个被公认为不讨人喜欢的家伙。


The Russian thought the Georgian had become too big for his boots. He waited for Saakashvili to go a step too far, and then came down on him and his poor country like a ton of bricks.	普京认为他已经自大得不知天高地厚，他就等着萨科维利跨出太过分的那一步然后以雷霆万钧之势狠命敲打他和他那可怜的国家。


Third, Russia has been stirring up trouble in South Ossetia and Abkhazia for years.	第三，俄罗斯历年来一直在南奥塞梯和阿布哈兹制造事端。


Moscow wants to keep Georgia weak.	莫斯科不想看到格鲁吉亚强大。


It plays the same game in Transdniestria to undermine Moldova.	它在德涅斯特河沿岸地区玩的也是同样的游戏，目的是要拖垮摩尔多瓦。


If an outsider had tried similar tactics in Chechnya, the Russians would rightly have howled with rage.	要是一个外来者在车臣也玩同样的把戏的话，俄国人早就咆哮怒吼了。


Fourth, today’s Russian leaders, like nineteenth-century Czars, want a sphere of influence around their borders.	第四，今天的俄罗斯领导人，和十九世纪的沙皇一样，想在其周边边境建立一个影响圈。


So far as they are concerned, the countries that were once part of the Russian empire in the Soviet Union should enjoy only limited sovereignty.	目前他们认为，曾经是前苏联帝国一部分的国家，只能享有有限的主权。


The message being transmitted from Georgia to Ukraine and the Central Asian Republics is heard very loudly.	格鲁吉亚目前发生的一切，是一个针对乌克兰和那些中亚共和国发出的信号，其寓意大家都清清楚楚地明白。


Russia has in particular opposed its neighbors joining NATO.	俄罗斯尤其反对其邻国加入北约。


What is NATO against, the Russians ask?	俄罗斯人会问：北约在反对什么？


Where is NATO’s front line?	北约的前沿阵地在哪里？


Are we Russians really the enemy?	我们俄罗斯人真的是他们的敌人吗？


If so how should we react?	如果是，那么我们应该如何反应？


Russia’s actions have had the reverse effect to what was presumably intended; the invasion of Georgia has made a powerful case for further NATO enlargement.	而俄罗斯所采取的行动却对其想要达到的目的产生了反效果； 而俄罗斯对格鲁吉亚的入侵，更是成为了继续扩展北约的一个强大的理由。


Fifth, Georgia itself provides an important link to Caspian energy for all those Europeans who do not want to be totally dependent on pipelines controlled by Russia.	第五，格鲁吉亚本身也是欧洲国家和里海地区能源之间的一个重要连接。 那些欧洲国家不想完全依赖受俄国控制的输油管。


Indeed, Georgia is Russia’s choke point in its policy of using oil and gas as strategic foreign policy weapons, which it has done repeatedly.	事实上，格鲁吉亚是俄国利用石油和天然气作为战略外交武器政策的咽喉，而俄国已经多次利用这种武器了。


The Swedish Defense Research Agency has reported that out of 55 deliberate gas supply interruptions, explicit threats, or coercive price actions by Russia since 1991, only 11 had nothing to do with politics.	瑞典国防部研究所研究报告指出，自从1991年以来，俄国的55次对天然气供应的故意中断或明确的威胁或威胁油价的行为，只有11起是和政治因素完全关系。


America has reacted strongly – at least verbally – to Russia’s attack on its neighbor, in which the Russian army moved in first and made things safe for the Russian-backed unofficial South Ossetian militias to burn and pillage Georgian property.	美国至少已经在口头上对俄罗斯攻击邻国的行为做出了强烈反应。 俄罗斯军队首先进入了格鲁吉亚，然后让受俄军支持的非官方的南奥塞梯民兵放心焚烧抢掠格鲁吉亚人的财产。


But America is not in a strong position to go any further.	但是美国除此之外没法有更多作为。


Its moral authority has been compromised in the Bush years, it cannot put more troops on the ground to defend Georgian sovereignty, and, even if it could, doing so would escalate the crisis.	美国的道德威信在布什执政期间已经受损，它不能再派兵来保护格鲁吉亚的主权； 即使它能这样做，也只能是加剧这场危机。


America’s position is further weakened in the absence of a strong and united European response.	美国的立场也由于缺乏欧洲各国强烈一致的反应而显得更加无力。


But you can forget about seeing that.	但是，不要对欧洲报如此希望。


Russia knows that when it comes to conducting a serious foreign and security policy, Europe is all mouth.	俄国人明白，当欧洲人要真正实行一项外交和安全政策时，他们只是在嘴上咋呼而已。


Russia has pushed Europe around for years on energy issues, cutting bilateral deals with the bigger countries and opposing efforts to create a common European energy policy.	俄罗斯历年来在能源问题上控制着欧洲，他们与欧洲大国谈判双边交易，并反对建立欧洲统一的能源政策。


Europe certainly needs Russian gas.	欧洲当然需要俄罗斯的天然气，但是俄罗斯也需要欧洲的消费者。


But Russia needs European consumers, and sooner rather than later it will seek more European investment in energy exploration and extraction.	而且，俄罗斯将寻求更多的欧洲对能源勘探和加工的投资，且此事宜早不宜迟。


But it is not the European Union that is being provocative. It is not Germany, France, and Italy that are invading their neighbors.	没有任何有理智的欧洲人想要重回冷战时期，但是，现在不是欧盟在进行挑衅，不是德国、法国或是意大利在入侵他们的邻国。


We Europeans seem to have forgotten our history.	我们欧洲人似乎忘却了自己的历史。


There were other times when we have stood by while a militaristic European power insisted that it had the right to intervene wherever it wanted to advance the interests of those who claimed shared ethnicity from the Baltics to the Caucasus.	曾经有过那些时刻，从巴尔地干到高加索，当某个军事欧洲国家坚认，为了维护那些声称享有相同文化的人们的利益，它有权去干涉它想干涉的任何国家，那时我们曾袖手旁观。


French President Nicolas Sarkozy claims to have brought peace to Georgia. Yet it looks suspiciously as though the deal that ended the fighting will leave Russian troops in that truncated country for years.	法国总统尼古拉斯·萨科齐声称已经为格鲁吉亚带来了和平，但是此桩结束了这场战争的交易看来令人怀疑，因为这会让俄罗斯军队在这个被割裂的国家中驻扎数年。


So what, exactly, will Europe do?	所以，到底欧洲会怎么做呢？


Perhaps initially Europeans should be cautious.	也许一开始欧洲人应该谨慎一点。


But I doubt whether anything tougher than strongly worded communiqués will ever be employed.	但是，我怀疑除了措辞强烈的声明之外，欧洲不会采取更严厉的行动。


Will we stop talking about our allegedly shared values with Russia?	我们是否该不再理会我们和俄国共享的价值观呢？


Will we press the pause button on further discussion of how to integrate Russia fully into the international community?	我们是否要暂停讨论怎样让俄国完全融入国际社会呢？


Will we cut off some of our contacts with Russia, reconsider its membership of the G8, or delay its entry to the WTO and OECD?	我们是否应该切断和俄国的一些接触并重新考虑其八国集团成员资格，或是拖延它加入世界贸易组织和经合组织的进程呢？


Will we put to the side for the time being negotiations on a partnership and cooperation agreement between the EU and Russia?	我们是否要搁置欧盟和俄国之间就合作伙伴关系协议的谈判呢？


I suspect that the answer to each of these questions is a resounding “no.”	我想对上述问题的答案是一个响亮的“不”。


It will be business pretty much as usual as Europeans prepare cheerfully in the years ahead for the Winter Olympics in Sochi, just up the road from the Russian missiles and tanks on Georgian soil.	接下去几年，该干什么还干什么。 欧洲人仍将兴高采烈地为将在俄罗斯索契举行的冬季奥运会做准备，而索契边上就是俄国驻扎在格鲁吉亚领土上的导弹和坦克。


Meanwhile, Europeans will continue to talk about their crucial role in world affairs.	同时，欧洲人将继续大谈他们在世界事务中关键性的角色。


It is enough to make even the cynical shake their heads in disbelief.	这些都足以让即便是愤世嫉俗的人也摇头叹息并表示难以置信。


You could not make it up.	现实是编造不出来的。


Europe's approach is weak and will cause bigger problems in the future.	欧洲软弱的态度将来会造成更大的麻烦。


So Putin wins the gold medal in his favorite event - bullying his smaller neighbors.	所以，普京在欺侮弱小邻国这项他最拿手的项目中拿到了金牌。


Putin’s Imperial Dreams	普京的帝国主义之梦


To divide a people in order to conquer them is an immoral strategy that has endured throughout recorded history.	为了达到征服目的而分裂一个民族，这种非道德的战术策略却在历史上沿用至今。


From Alexander the Great to Stalin the Cruel, variants of that strategy have been used to keep nations in thrall to the will of an emperor.	从亚历山大大帝时代到斯大林的冷血时代，统治者以各种形式实施此类策略，使人民臣服于他从而达到其个人意愿。


We are now seeing this strategy at work again as President Vladimir Putin stealthily seeks to restore Kremlin supremacy over the lands treated as “lost” when the USSR imploded in 1991.	现在我们却又看到了弗拉基米尔·普京正在不动声色底秘密谋求恢复克林姆林宫的统治霸权，找回1991年苏联解体后“丢失的”对这片土地的控制权。


In so overplaying his hand in Ukraine’s recent election, however, Putin clearly revealed to the world his neo-imperialist designs.	在近期乌克兰大选中，普京冒险插了一手，却向世界表明了他的新帝国主义规划。


In the wake of the euphoric mass protests in Kyiv, Russia’s president has since said that he can work with whatever government Ukraine’s people choose.	在基辅爆发大规模抗议活动之后，俄罗斯总统曾宣布他愿意和任何乌克兰人民选出的政府合作。


These are mere words, for in mind and action Putin does not want anyone to rule Ukraine that he has not put in place.	但这只是口头承诺而已，无论从心里还是在行动上，普京都不会允许任何一个他不希望上台的人去统治乌克兰。


No price is too high to achieve that end, so traditional threats about dividing Ukraine have been used.	为了达到这个目的，他不惜一切代价，因而传统的分裂威胁法又再次被使用。


I speak as someone who has been on the receiving end of Russian imperialist designs.	我是站在俄罗斯帝国主义规划的实施对象国的立场来说这些话的。


When Lithuania and then the other Baltic States – Estonia and Latvia – which were occupied by Stalin early in WWII, seized their opportunity for freedom in 1990-91, the Kremlin did not sit on its hands.	当立陶宛及其他一些波罗的海国家，如爱沙尼亚和拉脱维亚这些在二战期间被斯大林占领的国家，抓住了1990至1991年的机会成为独立国后，克里姆林宫再也坐不住了。


It knew that the rest of Russia’s colonies – the so-called “Soviet republics” – would want to follow the ungrateful Baltic countries into freedom.	它知道俄罗斯其余的殖民地——所谓的“苏维埃共和国”——将会紧跟着这些忘恩负义的波罗的海国家，相继争取独立。


Although Russia’s rulers were by then communists in name only, they didn’t hesitate to reach for the old Leninist recipes. They began to foster and incite splits and confrontations.	尽管那时俄罗斯统治者的共产主义性质已名存实亡，但他们毫不犹豫地运用了老列宁主义的做法，制造煽动分裂和冲突活动。


They stoked supposed resentments among different national or ethnic communities based on Lenin’s idea that even small groups of villages could demand territorial autonomy.	列宁认为，即使是村庄里的小团体也会要求领土自治权，他们根据列宁的这一观点，蓄意挑起不同国家和民族之间本不存在的种种仇恨。


Note the word “territory.”	注意这里的“领土”一词。


The demands were never about normal cultural autonomy as a means of continued identity and supposed self-protection.	这一要求与正常的文化自治没有任何关系，尽管文化自治是持续身份和自我保护的一种方式。


Only territorial autonomy, it seems, would do.	但是，这里只谈领土自治。


This way, minorities become easily manipulated majorities. Divide enough, stoke enough resentment, and a nation becomes nothing more than a ruined society within a national territory.	通过这种方式，各个少数民族很容易就被整合成了被统治的大多数。


Arm some of these manufactured minority structures so that they can demand autonomy at the barrel of a gun, and you get the kind of chaos the Kremlin can use to reassert its control.	经历了足够的分裂活动，目睹着仇恨步步累积，一个国家就这样变成了一个满目疮痍的社会，其所拥有的仅仅是一个地理领土范围。


Fortunately, Lithuanians – as well as Estonians and Latvians – understood this game.	幸运的是，立陶宛，和爱沙尼亚及拉脱维亚一样，看清了这场游戏的规则。


It failed also in Crimea when Russia sought to deploy its old strategy of divide and rule there in 1991.	1991年俄欲在克里米亚地区部署旧分裂战略并控制该地区，结果以失败告终。


But these defeats did not inspire the Kremlin to abandon the basic strategy.	但这次失败并没有使克里米亚放弃其基本策略。


On the contrary, Russia’s imperial ambitions persisted, and persistence has paid off.	相反，俄罗斯继续着它的帝国主义野心，而他的坚持得到了回报。


Around the Black Sea, Russia has called into being a series of artificial statelets.	在黑海地区，俄罗斯人为制造了一群小国家。


Georgia and Moldova have both been partitioned through the creation of criminal mini-states nurtured by the Kremlin and which remain under its military umbrella.	在克里姆林宫的资助及其军事力量的庇护下，乔治亚和摩尔多瓦被分裂成为两个可耻的傀儡小国。


Indeed, in the very week that Putin was meddling in Ukraine’s presidential election, he was threatening to blockade one of those statelets, Georgia’s Abkhazia region, after it had the temerity to vote for a president the Kremlin did not like.	事实上，在普京干预乌克兰统统选举的第一周，他就曾威胁要对他们进行封锁，因为乔治亚的阿布哈兹地区居然胆敢去投一个克里姆林宫不喜欢的总统候选人的票。


Moldova has been particularly helpless in the face of the Kremlin’s imperial designs.	面对克里姆林宫的帝国主义野心，摩尔多瓦尤其无助。


A huge Russian garrison remains deployed in Transdneister, where it rules in collaboration with local gangs.	它的特朗斯尼斯蒂尔地区长期驻扎着俄罗斯的卫戍部队，和当地军警合作统治着该地。


Proximity to this lawless territory has helped make Moldova the poorest land in Europe.	摩尔多瓦这种接近无法制的领土状态使它成为了欧洲最贫穷的一块土地。


To the east, Armenia and Azerbaijan were pushed into such bloody confrontation at the Kremlin’s instigation that the only way for them to end their ethnic wars was to call in the Russians – as in Transdneister – for a kind of “Pax Ruthena.”	而在东面，阿马尼亚和阿塞拜疆也陷入了这种流血冲突。 克里姆林宫不断进行鼓动，唆使他们唯一能够结束民族战争的方法就是回到俄罗斯——像Transdneister一样——颇有“罗马治下的和平”之意。


Now Ukraine’s people may face a similar test after supporters of Viktor Yanukovych threatened to seek autonomy should the rightful winner of the country’s presidential vote, Viktor Yushchenko, actually become president.	现在，乌克兰人民也许也面临着相同的考验，如果这场国家总统选举的合法获胜者维克托·尤申科成为总统的话，维克托·亚努科维奇的支持者们就威胁要谋求自治。


Who can doubt that the hand of Russia is behind this?	谁又能够肯定这不是俄罗斯在幕后操纵呢？


Would Moscow’s mayor Yuri Luzkhov, a loyal creature of Putin, have dared to attend the rally where autonomy was demanded without the sanction of the Kremlin’s elected monarch? Indeed, Putin openly claims this part of Ukraine as a Russian “internal matter.”	要不是有克里姆林宫主人的同意，莫斯科市市长卢茨科夫，普京的忠实追随者，怎敢参加要求自治的集会？


It is to be hoped that Ukraine’s Russian-speaking citizens, having witnessed the economic despair – and sometimes the bloodshed – caused by the Kremlin’s manufactured pro-autonomy movements, will realize that they are being turned into Putin’s pawns.	乌克兰俄语公民都亲眼目睹了由克里姆林宫导演策划支持自治运动以及由此引发的经济萧条和流血冲突，希望他们能够意识到他们正在被普京所利用。


The test for Viktor Yushchenko and his Orange revolutionaries, as it was for Lithuania’s democrats in 1990-91, is to show that democracy does not mean that the majority suppresses any minority.	维克托·尤申科和他的橙色革命所面临的考验，就像1990-91年立陶宛的民主主义者所面临的一样，表明了民主并非多数压倒少数。


Lithuania passed that test; I am confident that Viktor Yushchenko and his team will do so as well.	立陶宛安然度过了那场考验，我相信维克多·尤申科和他的支持者们也一样能做到。


But Europe and the world are also being tested. Russia is passing from being the Russian Federation of Boris Yeltsin to a unitary authoritarian regime under Vladimir Putin and his former KGB colleagues.	但是欧洲和整个世界也在面临着这样一个挑战，俄罗斯正从过去鲍里斯·叶利钦时代的俄��邦向弗拉基米尔·普京和他过去的克格勃同事们一手打造的单一集权统治过渡。


Europe, America, and the wider world must see Putin’s so-called “managed democracy” in its true light, and must stand united against his neo-imperialist dreams.	欧洲和美国必须看清普京的所谓“管理式民主”的实质，并联合力量抵抗他的新帝国主义野心。


The first step is to make Russia honor its binding commitment to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as to the Council of Europe, to remove its troops from Moldova and Georgia.	要使俄罗斯尊重他与欧洲安全和合作组织及欧洲议会签署的条款，第一步就是敦促俄从摩尔多瓦和乔治亚撤军。


Any plans to “defend” Yanukovych and the eastern part of Ukraine by military force must be confronted.	任何采取军事力量“保护”亚努科维奇和乌克兰东部安全的行动将受到质疑。


Putin’s Last Stand	普京的最后阵地


WASHINGTON – On April 2-4, NATO will hold its biggest summit ever in Bucharest, the capital of its new member, Romania.	华盛顿—4月2-4号，北约将在其新成员国罗马尼亚的首都布加勒斯特举行有史以来最大的一次峰会。


Incredibly, NATO has invited its fiercest critic, Russian President Vladimir Putin, to attend.	难以置信的是，北约竟然邀请了它最尖锐的批评者，俄罗斯总统普京与会。


For the first time since 2002, he will.	自2002年以来，他将第一次现身北约峰会。


His presence is an embarrassment to NATO, but an even greater disgrace for Russia.	他的出席是北约的尴尬，更是俄罗斯的耻辱。


The two biggest issues in Bucharest will be whether to invite Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to join NATO, and whether to offer applications to Ukraine and Georgia to start so-called “membership action plans.”	在布加勒斯特将要讨论的两个最重大议题是是否邀请阿尔巴尼亚、克罗地亚和马其顿加入北约，以及是否向乌克兰和格鲁吉亚提供启动所谓“成员资格行动计划”的申请。


These questions should be decided by NATO’s members, not outsiders.	这些问题应该由北约成员国，而不是局外人来决定。


In February 2007, Putin, in an anti-Western tirade delivered in Munich, declared: “I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernization of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe.	在2007年2月于慕尼黑发表的一篇措辞激烈的长篇演讲中，普京宣称：“我认为非常明显的是北约东扩与该联盟自身的现代化或确保欧洲的安全都无关。


On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.”	相反，它是一种损害互信的严重挑衅。 ”


So Putin’s views about NATO are clear.	因此普京对于北约的观点是明确的。


He will scandalize the summit by seeking to intimidate the former Soviet clients in the room.	他将会在峰会期间力图恐吓前苏联的附庸国而使会议变成一桩丑闻。


Such an aggressive attitude benefits a country’s foreign policy only up to a point – one that Putin passed long ago.	这种攻击性的态度对一个国家的外交政策所能带来的好处是有限的—而这个限度普京早已超越了。


Initially, he acted as an able diplomat and accommodator, but since his Munich speech, Putin has begun uniting the West against Russia.	起初他扮演着一位长袖善舞的外交家和调解人的角色，但自从慕尼黑演讲之后，普京开始将西方集结到俄罗斯的对立面。


In his speech on May 9, 2007, commemorating Russia’s victory in World War II, Putin compared the United States with Nazi Germany: “We have a duty to remember that the causes of any war lie above all in the mistakes and miscalculations of peacetime, and that these causes have their roots in an ideology of confrontation and extremism.	在2007年5月9日纪念俄罗斯二战胜利的演讲中，普京将美国和纳粹德国对比：“我们有责任牢记任何战争的起因首先都在于在和平时期所犯的错误和误算。 这些起因还植根于一种冲突和极端主义的意识形态。


It is all the more important that we remember this today, because these threats are not becoming fewer, but are only transforming and changing their appearance.	我们在当下牢记这一点尤为重要，因为这些威胁并没有减少而只是不断改头换面。


These new threats, just as under the Third Reich, show the same contempt for human life and the same aspiration to establish an exclusive dictate over the world.”	这些新的威胁，正如在‘第三帝国’统治下那样对人类生命表现出同样的蔑视并对建立一种对全世界的独裁表现出同样的渴望。 ”


Serious politicians do not speak like that.	严肃的政治家不用这样的方式讲话。


These are the rants of Putin’s few remaining friends – Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Belarus’s Alyaksandr Lukashenka.	这些粗野的咆哮属于普京为数不多的盟友—委内瑞拉的查韦斯、伊朗的内贾德和白俄罗斯的卢卡申科。


At home, awareness is rising that Putin is damaging Russia’s interests by insulting and intimidating everybody.	在国内，人们正愈渐意识到普京对所有人的侮辱和恐吓正损害着俄罗斯的利益。


He is isolating his country among the world’s pariahs; worse yet, he has achieved little.	他正（力图）让自己的国家鹤立鸡群； 但更糟糕的是收效不大。


When Putin became president in 2000, he named accession to the World Trade Organization as his foreign policy priority.	当普京于2000年成为总统时，他钦点加入世贸组织为其外交政策的重中之重，但却失败了。


He failed, because he gave in to petty protectionist interests, imposing a timber embargo against Finland and Sweden, a fish embargo against Norway, and various agricultural embargos against Lithuania, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and others.	因为他向保护主义的蝇头小利妥协，对芬兰和瑞典实施了木材禁运，对挪威实施了渔业禁运，并对立陶宛、乌克兰、摩尔多瓦、格鲁吉亚和其它一些国家实行了不同的农业禁运政策。


Russia’s foreign policy is focused on the interests of its state-dominated corporations, notably Gazprom, which has concluded agreements with many foreign countries and companies for monopolistic deliveries.	俄罗斯的外交政策主要关注其国有公司的利益，特别是Gazprom。 这家公司和许多国家和外国公司达成了垄断供应的协定。


But a Gazprom pipeline typically costs three times as much per kilometer as a similar Western pipeline, because of “leakage” (kickbacks and waste).	但由于“泄漏”（回扣和浪费），Gazprom管道的每公里成本通常是同类西方管道的3倍。


The primary purpose of Russia’s foreign policy seems to be to tap Russia’s state companies for the benefit of Kremlin officials.	俄罗斯外交政策的首要目的似乎就是利用国有公司来满足克里姆林宫官员的利益。


But customers do not trust suppliers who cut deliveries, raise prices unpredictably, expropriate competitors, and let production decrease in the way Gazprom and Russia’s other state companies have done.	但顾客对于那些减少供应、突然提价、鲸吞竞争对手或一如Gazprom和俄罗斯的其他国有公司一样故意减产的供应商并不信任。


As a result, Russia’s gas exports to Europe have started declining.	其结果是俄罗斯对欧洲的天然气出口量已开始下降。


Putin��s foreign policy also is evidently intended to whip up populist chauvinism.	普京的外交政策还明显企图挑动民粹沙文主义。


Beating up on foreigners may boost his authoritarian rule, but this, too, has a price.	鞭笞外国人可能会加强他的专制统治，但这也要付出代价的。


Not only the US and Europe, but all former Soviet republics feel alienated by Putin’s aggressive tactics.	不仅美国和欧洲，还包括所有的前苏联共和国都觉得与普京的攻击性策略渐行渐远。


Many are seeking to shield themselves from Russia’s capricious embargos – for example, by seeking alternative energy supplies.	许多国家都试图规避俄罗斯反复无常的禁运—例如通过寻找其他的能源供应。


Arguably, Russia has improved its relations with China under Putin, but at the cost of acceding to China’s demands for two big disputed islands over which the two countries fought in 1969.	或许在普京任内俄罗斯改善了与中国的关系，但其代价是同意中国对两大有争议的岛屿的要求。 两国曾在1969年为此发生战争。


Putin’s apparent aim was to secure financing for Rosneft’s purchase of the Yugansk oil field, which was part of the Yukos confiscation.	普京的目的明显是要为Rosneft收购Yugansk油田获得融资。 该油田是从尤科斯没收来的资产的一部分。


Yet China, too, is wary of Putin, and has been sending warm signals to leaders of former Soviet republics, such as Ukraine’s Yuliya Tymoshenko.	然而中国也对普京怀有戒心，并已经开始对包括乌克兰的季莫申科在内的前苏联各共和国的领导人示好。


Russia’s nationalists are also outraged by Putin’s foreign policy, because it has alienated former Soviet republics and weakened Russia’s military.	俄罗斯的民族主义者们也被普京的外交政策激怒了。 因为它��立了前苏联的各共和国并削弱了俄罗斯的军队。


The nationalist Council for National Strategy published a devastating report on the decay of Russia’s military under Putin.	民族主义者掌握的“国家战略委员会”发表了一份关于俄罗斯军力在普京任期衰落的具有杀伤力的报告。


Russian military procurement, it claims, has plummeted. For example, only three new military aircraft have been purchased since 2000.	它宣称俄罗斯的军购大幅下滑，例如自2000年以来只采购了3架新的军用飞机。


True, armaments costs have risen sharply, but only because Putin’s KGB friends, who monopolize weapons production, have stolen inordinate amounts.	的确，武器装备的成本大幅上升，但仅仅是因为普京那些垄断武器生产的克格勃党羽从中巧取豪夺。


Yet, despite this spending shortfall, Putin seems obsessed with making pointless and provocative gestures, such as resuming long-range nuclear bomber flights off the American coast.	然而，尽管军费不足，普京似乎还是沉迷于毫无意义的挑衅姿态中，比如恢复远程核轰炸机在美国海岸之外巡航。


In the early 1990’s, many westerners and Russians wanted Russia to become a full-fledged member of both the European Union and NATO, on the condition that Russia became a full-fledged democracy.	在1990年代早期，许多西方人和俄罗斯人都希望俄罗斯在成为一个真正的民主国家的前提下成为欧盟和北约的成员。


Unfortunately, the West never made that offer, and Russian democracy went astray.	不幸的是，西方从未伸出这片橄榄枝，而俄罗斯的民主也误入歧途。


Russia should be given a new chance, but only after Putin has departed.	俄罗斯应该被给予一次新的机会，但只有在普京离任以后。


Russia is no enemy of the West; Vladimir Putin is.	俄罗斯不是西方的敌人，普京才是。


Putin’s Rules of Attraction	普京的吸引法则


CAMBRIDGE – Russian President Vladimir Putin’s covert aggression in Ukraine continues – and so do Western sanctions against his country.	美国剑桥—俄罗斯总统普京对乌克兰的隐蔽侵略仍在继续——西方对俄罗斯的制裁亦然。


But the economy is not all that is under threat; Russia’s soft power is dwindling, with potentially devastating results.	但经济并没有受到那么大的威胁； 俄罗斯的软实力在削弱，可能引起灾难性后果。


A country can compel others to advance its interests in three main ways: through coercion, payment, or attraction.	一个国家可以用三种主要方式强迫其他国家满足它的利益：通过压迫、收买或吸引。


Putin has tried coercion – and been met with increasingly tough sanctions.	普京尝试了压迫——结果受到了日益严厉的制裁。


German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Putin’s main European interlocutor, has been expressing her frustration with Russian policy toward Ukraine in increasingly harsh terms.	普京在欧洲的主要对话者、德国总理默克尔一直在表达对俄罗斯对乌克兰政策的失望，并且用词越来越严厉。


Whatever short-term gains Putin’s actions in Ukraine provide will be more than offset in the long term, as Russia loses access to the Western technology it needs to modernize its industry and extend energy exploration into frontier Arctic regions.	不管普京对乌克兰的行为可以带来什么短期好处，都无法抵消长期坏处——俄罗斯将无法获得现代化其工业、将其能源勘探扩展到北冰洋地区所需要的西方技术。


With Russia’s economy faltering, Putin is finding it increasingly difficult to employ the second tool of power: payment.	随着俄罗斯经济的低迷，普京越来越难以把握第二种实力工具：收买。


Not even oil and gas, Russia’s most valuable resources, can save the economy, as Putin’s recent agreement to supply gas to China for 30 years at knockdown prices demonstrates.	即使是俄罗斯最有价值的资源——石油和天然气也无法拯救俄罗斯经济，最近普京以“地板价”与中国签订30年供气协议证明了这一点。


This leaves attraction – a more potent source of power than one might expect.	还剩下的就是吸引——这一实力源泉也许比你所预想的更强大。


China, for example, has been attempting to use soft power to cultivate a less threatening image – one that it hopes will undermine, and even discourage, the coalitions that have been emerging to counterbalance its rising economic and military might.	比如，中国一直在尝试使用软实力营造不那么具有威胁性的形象，以期这一形象能够影响甚至破坏为制衡其经济和军事实力而出现的联盟。


A country’s soft power rests on three main resources: an appealing culture, political values that it reliably upholds, and foreign policy that is imbued with moral authority.	一国的软实力有三个主要来源：动人的文化、踏实坚守的政治价值，以及充满道德权威的外交政策。


The challenge lies in combining these resources with hard-power assets like economic and military power so that they reinforce one another.	挑战在于将这些来源与经济和军事实力等硬实力资产相结合，让它们互相强化。


The United States failed to strike this balance with respect to its 2003 invasion of Iraq.	美国2003年入侵伊拉克就是寻求这一平衡失败的写照。


While America’s military power was sufficient to defeat Saddam Hussein’s forces quickly, it did so at the expense of its attractiveness in many countries.	尽管美国的军事实力足以迅速击败萨达姆的不对，但为此付出的代价是对许多国家吸引力的下降。


Likewise, though establishing a Confucius Institute in Manila to teach Filipino people about Chinese culture may help to cultivate China’s soft power, its impact will be severely constrained if China is simultaneously using its hard power to bully the Philippines in the territorial dispute over the Scarborough Shoal.	类似地，尽管在马尼拉建立孔子学院教菲律宾人中国文化有助于构建中国的软实力，但如果中国同时以硬实力在黄岩岛领土纠纷中欺凌菲律宾，孔子学院的影响也将严重受制。


The problem for Russia is that it already has very little soft power with which to work.	俄罗斯的问题是它手中没有多少软实力可用。


Indeed, as the political analyst Sergei Karaganov noted in 2009, Russia’s lack of soft power is precisely what is driving it to behave aggressively – such as in its war with Georgia the previous year.	事实上，政治分析家谢尔盖·卡拉加诺夫（Sergei Karaganov）在2009年时指出，俄罗斯缺少软实力正是其激进行事的原因——比如前年与格鲁吉亚的战争。


To be sure, Russia has historically enjoyed considerable soft power, with its culture having made major contributions to art, music, and literature.	平心而论，历史上俄罗斯拥有相当可观的软实力，其文化为艺术、音乐和文学做出过巨大贡献。


Moreover, in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the Soviet Union was attractive to many Western Europeans, owing largely to its leadership in the fight against fascism.	此外，在二战结束后苏联还吸引了大量西欧人，这主要是因为它在抗击法西斯主义中起到了领导作用。


But the Soviets squandered these soft-power gains by invading Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.	但1956年入侵匈牙利和1968年入侵捷克斯洛伐克将苏联的这些软实力挥霍殆尽。


By 1989, they had little soft power left.	到1989年，苏联已没有多少软实力了。


The Berlin Wall did not collapse under a barrage of NATO artillery, but under the impact of hammers and bulldozers wielded by people who had changed their minds about Soviet ideology.	柏林墙不是被北约的密集炮火轰塌的，而是改变了对苏联意识形态看法的人民用锤子和推土机推倒的。


Putin is now making the same mistake as his Soviet forebears.	普京正在犯与其苏联前辈一样的错误。


Despite his 2013 declaration that Russia should be focusing on the “literate use” of soft power, he failed to capitalize on the soft-power boost afforded to Russia by hosting the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi.	尽管他在2013年宣布俄罗斯应该专注于“精于使用”软实力，但他并没有利用好主办2014年索契冬奥会给俄罗斯带来的提振软实力的机会。


Instead, even as the Games were proceeding, Putin launched a semi-covert military intervention in Ukraine, which, together with his talk of Russian nationalism, has induced severe anxiety, particularly among ex-Soviet countries.	相反，尽管冬奥会仍在进行，俄罗斯仍然发动了对乌克兰的半隐蔽军事干预，再加上他的俄罗斯民族主义言论，激发了各国特别是前苏联国家的严重关注。


This has undermined Putin’s own stated objective of establishing a Russia-led Eurasian Union to compete with the European Union.	这有悖于普京自己宣称的目标——建立俄罗斯领导的欧亚联盟对抗欧洲联盟。


With few foreigners watching Russian films, and only one Russian university ranked in the global top 100, Russia has few options for regaining its appeal.	俄罗斯电影没有多少外国观众； 进入世界大学排名100强的俄罗斯大学也只有一所，这令俄罗斯很难重新赢得吸引力。


So Putin has turned to propaganda.	因此普京转向了宣传战场。


Last year, Putin reorganized the RIA Novosti news agency, firing 40% of its staff, including its relatively independent management.	去年，普京重组了俄罗斯新闻社（RIA Novosti），解雇了40%的员工，包括相对独立的管理层。


The agency’s new leader, Dmitry Kiselyov, announced in November the creation of “Sputnik,” a government-funded network of news hubs in 34 countries, with 1,000 staff members producing radio, social media, and news-wire content in local languages.	俄新社新领导人德米特里·基谢廖夫（Dmitry Kiselyov）在11月宣布成立“史普尼克”（Sputnik），一个由政府出资的新闻枢纽网络，遍布34个国家，拥有1,000工作人员用当地语言制作广播、社交媒体和新闻节目。


But one of the paradoxes of soft power is that propaganda is often counterproductive, owing to its lack of credibility.	但软实力的一个悖论是宣传常常起到反效果，因为宣传缺少可信度。


During the Cold War, open cultural exchanges – such as the Salzburg Seminar, which enabled young people to engage with one another – demonstrated that contact among populations is far more meaningful.	冷战期间，开放的文化交流——如让年轻人互相交流的萨尔茨堡研讨会（Salzburg Seminar）——证明了人口之间的联系要有意义得多。


Today, much of America’s soft power is produced not by the government, but by civil society – including universities, foundations, and pop culture.	如今，美国的大量软实力不是来自政府，而是来自公民社会——包括大学、基金会和流行文化。


Indeed, America’s uncensored civil society, and its willingness to criticize its political leaders, enables the country to preserve soft power even when other countries disagree with its government’s actions.	事实上，美国不受审查的公民社会及其对批评政治领导人的热衷让美国即使在其他国家不同意其政府行为时也能保有软实力。


Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the BBC retains its credibility because it can bite the government hand that feeds it.	类似地，在英国，BBC之所以仍然拥有可信度，是因为它可以反咬供养它的政府。


Yet Putin remains bent on curtailing the role of non-governmental organizations and civil society.	但普京仍然决定要打击非政府组织和公民社会的作用。


Putin may understand that hard and soft power reinforce each other, but he remains seemingly incapable of applying that understanding to policy.	普京也许明白，硬实力和软实力是相辅相成的，但他似乎无力将这一理解应用于政策中。


As a result, Russia’s capacity to attract others, if not to coerce and pay them, will continue to decline.	结果，俄罗斯队其他国家的吸引力——如果既不压迫也不收买的话——讲继续下降。


Putin’s Year of Living Dangerously	普京危险的一年


MOSCOW – In the spring of 2008, Russian President Vladimir Putin was on top of the world.	莫斯科 - 2008年春季，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京曾站在世界的顶端不可一世。


Oil and gas prices were sky high, with export revenues flooding the Kremlin’s coffers.	石油和天然气价格的高涨，让出口收入源源不断地涌进克里姆林宫的国库。


The country’s once powerful military, which collapsed with the demise of communism in 1991, was being rebuilt.	这个国家曾经强大但与共产主义在 1991年一起垮台的军事力量，正在得到重建。


And Putin’s handpicked successor, Dmitri Medvedev, had been eased into power, while Putin downshifted into the premiership.	普京亲自挑选的继任者德米特里·梅德韦杰夫，轻易地掌了权，而普京则改任总理。


The United States, moreover, remained a perfect foil for a leader with pretensions to global leadership.	此外，对于具有充当全球领袖之野心的人来说，美国仍然是个完美的陪衬。


The Bush administration’s incoherent foreign policy included a plan to build a missile defense shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, which allowed Putin to revive the Old Europe/New Europe divisions that began with the Iraq war, with this split appearing to enhance Russian influence on the continent.	布什政府不连贯的外交政策包括了在波兰和捷克建立导弹防御系统的计划，这使普京重弹始于伊拉克战争的划分老欧洲和新欧洲的论调，这种划分看来强化了俄罗斯在欧洲大陆的影响。


Russia’s seeming military revival also played a part in boosting the domestic economy.	俄罗斯的军事复兴似乎也曾在推动国内经济方面发挥了作用。


Arms sales, worth close to $8 billion, were again competing globally with Great Britain and the US, going to nearly 80 countries, including Venezuela, China, India, Algeria, Iran, Malaysia, and Serbia.	价值近80亿美元的军售再次使俄罗斯在全球范围内与英国和美国竞争。 军售的对象近80个国家，其中包括委内瑞拉、中国、印度，阿尔及利亚、伊朗、马来西亚和塞尔维亚。


And those arms sales were often closely tied to Putin’s foreign assertiveness, with the Russian army training and holding exercises in many places for the first time, including Venezuela, as if in preparation for another Cuban Missile Crisis, with Hugo Chávez assuming the role of Fidel Castro.	这些武器销售往往是和普京的咄咄逼人的外交政策紧密联系在一起的。 俄罗斯军队第一次在包括委内瑞拉在内的众多地方进行了训练和演习，像是在准备又一次古巴导弹危机似的，而总统乌戈·查韦斯则扮演着菲德尔·卡斯特罗的角色。


So good did things seem that Russia suddenly discovered that, perhaps for the first time since the early days of the Soviet era, the country actually had some “soft power.”	一切看来是如此之美妙，以致俄罗斯似乎突然间发现，这个国家实际上还有一些“软实力”，这也许是自苏联早期时代以来的首次。


This first became apparent when the International Olympic Committee awarded the 2014 Winter Games to the Black Sea resort of Sochi.	这一点最初的显现，是在国际奥林匹克委员会将2014年冬季奥运会的举办权授予黑海度假胜地索契的时候。


In 2007, Putin addressed the Olympic Committee (in English), and persuasively argued that the Games will “play a major role in Russia’s future. They will help Russia’s transition as a young democracy.”	2007年，普京曾向奥林匹克委员会发表了演说（用英文），并有说服力地论证，奥运会将“对俄罗斯的未来发挥重大作用，将有助于俄罗斯作为一个年轻的民主国家的转型。


In May 2008, Russia won the world hockey championship, beating Canada.	2008年5 月，俄罗斯击败加拿大赢得了世界冰球锦标赛。


In June, it almost won the Euro 2008 football championship, losing in the semi-finals to Spain.	今年6月，还几乎赢得了2008年欧洲足球锦标赛，只是在半决赛中输给了西班牙。


Next came the Eurovision Song Contest, an annual competition of pop (rarely first class) European singers, at which Russia’s Dima Bilan gained first prize for his musical clip “Believe.”	接下来是每年一次由欧洲流行歌手参赛的欧洲歌唱大赛（很难算得上是一流的大赛），俄罗斯的Dima Bilan以他的音乐剧片段“相信”，获得了冠军。


That, too, helped rekindle a sense of national pride, extending from the Kremlin to the streets.	这也有助于在官员到平民的心中重新激起一种民族自豪感。


Russians habitually respond with black humor to events both good and bad, and the events of 2008 were no exception.	无论是好事还是坏事，俄罗斯人通常报以黑色幽默的反应，而2008年发生的事件同样不例外。


One joke nicely encapsulates the hubris that Putin and his Kremlin allies felt: Putin and Medvedev discuss their newly found invincibility.	一个笑话很好地概括了普京和他的克里姆林宫的盟友们的傲慢：普京和梅德韦杰夫在谈论新发现的他们的所向无敌。


“Eurovision, hockey, soccer, smooth presidential transition – what a lucky streak,” muses Medvedev.	“欧洲歌唱大赛、曲棍球、足球以及新总统的顺利交接-那是多么幸运的一连串好事啊， ”梅德韦杰夫小心地说道。


“Indeed, time to initiate World War III,” enthuses Putin.	“的确是啊，该发动第三次世界大战啦” ， 普京热烈地反应道。


But, as usual, pride precedes a fall.	但是，通常是，自傲之后便是衰落。


The fall began with an event that Putin perceived as a mighty triumph – his blitzkrieg in August against Georgia.	衰落始于普京视为伟大胜利的一个事件-他在8月份对格鲁吉亚的闪击战。


Yes, the Kremlin was able to smack down the uppity Mikheil Saakashvili’s hope of reuniting his country by force.	是的，克里姆林宫是能毁灭米哈伊尔·萨卡什维利武力统一国家的希望。


But the world saw in Russia’s onslaught against so puny an antagonist a thuggish state determined to recapture its lost empire.	但是，全世界从俄罗斯攻击如此弱小的对手这一事件中，看到的却是一个一心想重温帝国之梦的恶棍国家。


All the post-Cold War certainties in Europe melted away, and with them went Putin’s reputation as a reliable manager of Russia’s economy.	所有的后冷战时期对欧洲的确定性消失了，普京能可靠地治理俄罗斯经济的声望也随之消失了。


Capital began to flee the country, which may not have mattered had the world economy not tanked in September.	资本开始逃离俄罗斯。 如果世界经济没有在9月中出现大动荡，这可能也没太大干系；


But tank it did, taking Russia’s economy with it.	但它确实发生了，而同时也带走了俄罗斯的经济。


The reserves that Russia accumulated during the oil boom years are steadily being drained away.	俄罗斯在石油繁荣岁积累的储备逐步耗尽了。


With oil prices collapsing, this pool of resources won’t be refilled quickly.	随着石油价格的崩溃，这种资源将不会很快重新获得。


That could prove to be devastating, because all of Russia’s fiscal assumptions were based upon high oil prices continuing for years to come.	事实可能证明这一切将是灾难性的，因为所有的俄国财政假设都是建立高油价能持续多年的基础之上的。


Nevertheless, Putin is trying to spend his way out of the crisis.	不管怎样，普京正在试图用自己的方式解决危机。


But such efforts are unlikely to be enough, because the heavy-handed state-dominated economy – with ex-KGB agents now embedded at the top of most state companies – lacks both the nimbleness and the diversification to recover speedily.	但是，这种努力是否足够，还很不靠谱，因为严厉的由国家主导的经济并不会迅速得到恢复，现在大多数国有企业的高管都是前克格勃特工，而俄罗斯的经济缺乏灵活性和多样性。


Moreover, with animosity between East and West at their highest since the Cold War’s end, Russia’s trading partners are anxiously looking for other options, which may mean that Putin has damaged Russia’s long-term prospects for an export-led recovery as well.	此外，东方与西方之间的敌意达到了自冷战结束以来的最高峰，俄罗斯的贸易伙伴们都在焦急地寻找其它选择，这可能意味着，普京也已毁掉了俄罗斯以出口为主导的恢复经济的长期前景。


Indeed, the Georgian war antagonized not only the west, but also China, which has a vital strategic interest in maintaining the post-Cold War geo-strategic settlement.	事实上，格鲁吉亚战争使俄罗斯不仅同西方而且同中国树了敌。 维持后冷战时期地缘战略的安定性，对中国具有重要的战略利益。


China, after all, has no desire to see a “Soviet Reunion” on its border.	中国毕竟不希望在边界上看到“苏联的重新出现”。


Besides antagonizing China, the Georgian war also exposed the hollowness of Russia’s military re-armament.	除了与中国交恶，格鲁吉亚战争也暴露了俄罗斯的重新装备军队的空虚性。


Yes, the Russian army could smash Georgia and most of its ex-Soviet neighbors, but its performance in Georgia shows that it remains the same lumbering, badly motivated outfit that it was in the 1990’s.	是的，俄罗斯军队可以打败格鲁吉亚和它大部分的前苏联邻国，但其在格鲁吉亚的战绩表明，它仍然和20世纪90年代一样，笨拙而且素质差。


Now that America is no longer saddled with a president loathed around the world, Putin has lost one of the key tools that had helped him boost Russia’s international standing.	现在，美国已不再背负着一位在世界各地受人讨厌的总统，普京已经失去了一个帮助他提高俄罗斯的国际地位的重要工具。


Poking Bush in the eye was a fine thing to do in the eyes of many people, particularly in Europe.	招惹布什，在许多人眼中，尤其是在欧洲人看来，是桩好事；


But to greet the elegant and popular President-elect Barack Obama with threats to station missiles on Europe’s borders, as Medvedev did the day after America’s presidential election, exposed before the world the Kremlin’s ham-handed ways once again.	而梅德韦杰夫在美国总统选举后的第二天，就威胁说要在欧洲边界布置导弹。 以这样的方式迎接优雅和受人欢迎的当选总统奥巴马，克里姆林宫其笨拙的方式再次展露在世人面前。


Putting Europe into the EU Budget	把欧洲放入欧盟预算


Most independent observers agree that the European Union’s budget no longer reflects its main tasks and policy goals.	多数独立观察者达成一致意见，认为欧盟的预算已不再反映它的主要任务与政策目标。


Aid to agriculture, a declining sector, consumes over 40% of spending and little is spent on the future (R&D) or on fields in which the EU must assume new responsibilities, such as internal and external security.	40%以上的开支被用于农业这样一个日益下滑的产业上，而用在未来研究和发展以及欧盟必须承担起新责任的领域（诸如：内部和外部安全）上的经费却寥寥可数。


Moreover, contributions from national budgets constitute the vast majority of revenues.	此外，欧盟收入的主体由来自各国国内预算的款项构成。


Member state governments consider these revenues “their money” and compare them to “their receipts.”	成员国政府将这些收入看作“他们的钱”并把它们比作“他们的收入”。


Thus, EU budget negotiations are framed exclusively in terms of what national treasuries have to pay and what farmers and regions at home receive.	于是，单单就国家财政必须所付以及欧盟内部农民和地区所得这两个问题的欧盟预算谈判得以形成。


European citizens have no clear perception of the Union’s total cost and are only interested in preserving transfers in their favor indefinitely.	欧盟公民对欧盟的总支出无清晰概念，他们只对无限期保持对他们有利的汇兑感兴趣。


The increasing detachment of the budget from the Union’s objectives is sustained by decision-making procedures that authorize the European Council, representing member governments, to take all the important decisions according to a rule of unanimity, with the European Parliament and the European Commission confined to a minor role.	欧盟的决策程序规定，代表各成员国政府的欧洲理事会在做重要决定时奉行一致通过原则，而将欧洲议会和欧洲委员会限制在一个较次要的地位，这使得欧盟预算与欧盟目标愈走愈远。


Negotiations for the new multi-year fiscal framework for 2007-13, already underway, are not tackling the issue, because the longer-term interests of the EU are absent from the negotiating table.	有关新2007-13多年度财政框架的谈判已经开启，但却无意向解决这个问题，因为欧盟的长期利益已经从谈判桌上消失了。


Neither of the two proposals on the table makes sense.	正在讨论之中的两项提案都无甚意义。


The Commission is proposing to increase budgetary appropriations to 1.24% of the EU’s combined gross national income.	欧洲委员会建议将预算支出提高至欧盟共同国民收入总值的1. 24%。


Without cuts in spending on agriculture, this would increase the national contributions of net payers to unsustainable levels, with scant value added to common policies.	但若不削减农业上的开销，这项提议将把成员国的财政支出提到一个难以为继的水平，对共同政策却鲜有价值。


In contrast to the Commission, the stated intention of a growing number of member states is to limit appropriation commitments to 1% of GDP.	与欧洲委员会形成对照的是，越来越多的国家发表申明要求将预算支出限制在国内生产总值的1%以内。


This would squarely shift most of the adjustment burden onto structural funds, a sure harbinger of bitter rows between old recipients and new entrants.	这将正好减轻结构基金所承担的大部分调整负担，却无疑预示着老成员国与新加入国之间的一场激烈争论。


What kind of budget makes sense?	怎样的预算才有作用呢？


Agricultural spending is a major distorting factor in the EU economy; therefore, all price support and subsidies should be scrapped.	农业支出是欧盟经济中一个主要失真因素； 因此，应当废除所有的农业价格支持和补贴。


Payments to farmers to keep them out of poverty should be shifted onto national budgets.	支付给农民以使他们脱贫的款项应当算进各国预算之中。


Substantial resources must continue to be devoted to promoting income convergence among the poorer member countries.	应当继续利用大量资源以促进较为贫穷的成员国内的收入趋同。


However, support should be limited in time and phased out as countries enjoy rising standards of living as a result of integration.	但是，当这些国家开始享受整合带来的生活水平的提高时，应当及时限制并逐渐停止援助。


To this end, eligibility should be based on objective, transparent criteria of relative economic and social development.	为了达到这个目的，将根据其相关经济和社会发展情况，采取客观透明的标准来决定该国是否享有此资格。


The EU’s role in fostering productivity gains, economic growth, and employment should increase, with as much as a quarter of spending from the EU budget devoted to human capital and research.	欧盟目前四分之一的预算用于人力资本和研究工作，但是欧盟在促进生产力发展、经济增长和提高就业率方面的作用还应加强。


Research spending should be made more effective by scrapping bureaucratic management by the Commission and Council and opening all national research funds to EU-wide competition.	打破欧盟委员会和欧盟理事会的官僚主义管理并将国内研究资金向欧盟领域内的竞争开放，将使研究费用得到更有效的利用。


Substantial resources will be needed for the Union to play its full role in the world and to provide strong security inside and outside its borders.	欧盟需要大量资源才能在世界舞台上扮演好它的角色，为欧盟境内以及欧盟边界外提供强有力的安全保障。


Altogether, this does not seem to require a major increase in the Union’s resources: 1% of aggregate GDP would suffice to perform these tasks.	总体来说，这看起来并不苛求欧盟资源巨幅增长：共同GDP的1%足以完成这些任务了。


On the revenue side, reform should rescind all links between national treasuries and the EU budget, so that the cost of Europe is made directly visible to the Union’s citizens.	从收入这方面来说，收入改革应当取消国家财政与欧盟预算之间一切关联，这样欧洲的花费将会被欧盟公民们直接看个清楚。


National tax systems should “dedicate” to Europe the revenue from one particular tax.	国家税收体系应当从一个特别税种拨款“贡献”给欧盟。


Efficiency and equity require that this tax be levied on a broad base, harmonized at the EU level, and set at a modest rate.	为了保证高效率和公平性，这个税种应当根据欧盟的平均水平调整至一个适度的利率并广泛征收。


A small surcharge on the existing VAT is the best, and, indeed, the only feasible, solution.	小幅增加现有增值税是最佳、事实上也是唯一可行的解决方案。


A flat rate of around 2% throughout the Union would cover all financing requirements.	在全欧盟实行约2%的统一增值税率将能满足所有的融资要求。


The receipts for all purchases subject to VAT would show the amount paid to the EU, making citizens aware of their contribution, which would be transferred automatically to Union accounts and would no longer be shown on national budgets.	所有以增值税为准的购买收据将会显示出支付给欧盟的金额数量，使欧盟公民意识到他们所付的数目。 这些资金将自动转账到欧盟账户并将不再算在国家预算中。


To achieve these reforms, a new decision-making procedure is required to ensure that EU-wide, not national interests, dominate the process.	要完成这些改革，必须要有一个全新的决策程序来保证处于此过程中主导地位的是欧盟利益而并非国家利益。


Decisions concerning both the multi-year framework and annual budgets should be taken by majority voting in the Council and Parliament, based on a formal proposal by the Commission, leaving decisions about the overall resource ceiling to the Council of Ministers and member states.	有关多年度框架和年度预算的决策应该根据一个欧盟委员会提交的正式提案、由欧盟理事会和欧盟议会多数投票决定，将有关全部资源限额的决定权交给欧盟部长理事会和各成员国。


This will require changing the EU’s Constitutional Treaty once it enters into force.	一旦改革得以生效，欧洲宪法条约须将有所改动。


Moreover, it would be useful to synchronize budgetary decisions with the Parliament’s electoral terms.	此外，若预��决定能与欧洲议会选举配合一致将颇有效用。


The EU budget should become a main theme in European Parliament election campaigns, increasing voter interest and thus turnout.	欧盟预算应当成为欧洲议会选举活动中的一个重要话题，增加投票者的兴趣继而提高投票率。


Amending the Constitutional Treaty will not be feasible until 2009.	欧洲宪法条约在2009年前还无法修改。


But a lot could be achieved now if the European Parliament sends out the right political signals in the ongoing budgetary negotiations.	但是如果现在欧洲议会对正在进行之中的预算谈判发出正确的政治信号，那么我们现在就能做很多事情。


It should tell the Council that it will accept a lower ceiling on overall spending, but that it will want to have a greater say over the composition of spending.	欧洲议会应当告诉欧洲理事会它将接受一个较低的支出总额上限，但是它要对支出构成拥有更大的发言权。


By accepting the ceiling on total expenditures, the European Parliament would gain credibility with governments and the electorate.	通过接受支出总额上限，欧洲议会将会获得各国政府和选民的信任。


In exchange, it will have a right to affirm its role in deciding what European public goods should be financed from the EU budget.	作为交换，它也将拥有决定何种欧洲公共产品将受到欧盟预算的资助的权利。


Putting Lebanon Together	黎巴嫩重整山河


Today’s crisis in Lebanon is a crisis of the Lebanese state.	今天在黎巴嫩发生的危机是黎巴嫩国家的危机。


It is this structural crisis that must be addressed if the violence is to stop.	想要停止暴力，就必须处理这一个结构性的危机。


When Israel withdrew its forces from southern Lebanon in 2000, the international understanding was that the Lebanese government would re-assert its authority in the evacuated area.	当以色列在2000年从黎巴嫩南部撤军的时候，国际社会的理解是，黎巴嫩政府将会在撤走的地区重新实施其权力。


Hezbollah, which led the armed struggle against Israeli occupation, was to disarm and re-invent itself as a political force, representing the Shiite community that was historically marginalized by Lebanon’s ruling Maronite, Sunni, and Druze elites.	领导反对以色列占领的黎巴嫩真主党将会放下武器并把自己改造成为一支代表什叶派穆斯林的政治力量。 黎巴嫩占统治地位的马龙派、逊尼派以及德鲁士的精英分子长久以来一直排挤什叶派。


None of this happened.	但是这些事情一件也没有发生。


Instead of deploying its forces in southern Lebanon, the weak government in Beirut acquiesced in Hezbollah’s determination to turn the area into a staging ground for attacks against Israel.	贝鲁特弱小的政府不仅没有在南黎巴嫩部署军队，反而默认了真主党把这一地区变成攻击以色列的策源地。


Over the last six years, Hezbollah established a virtual state-within-a-state: its militia became the only military force in southern Lebanon, setting up outposts along the frontier with Israel, sometimes only a few meters away from the border.	在过去六年里，真主党建立了国中之国。 其民兵成为南黎巴嫩唯一的军事力量，在与以色列的前沿建立了前哨阵地，有的距离边界只有几米远。


Occasionally, Hezbollah shelled Israel, and its leader, Hassan Nassrallah, continued his blood-curdling invective, not only against Israel and Zionism, but against all Jews.	真主党不时地炮轰以色列，而其领导人纳斯鲁拉继续其毛骨悚然的恶言谩骂，不仅针对以色列和犹太复国主义，而且针对所有的犹太人。


UN Security Council resolution 1559, which explicitly called for the disarming of all militias and the reassertion of Lebanese government authority in the south, went unheeded.	联合国安理会1559号决议明确要求解除所有民兵的武装，在南部重新实现黎巴嫩政府的权力。 而这一决议被搁置一边。


After the much-heralded “Cedar Revolution” of 2005, Hezbollah even joined the Lebanese government, while at the same time maintaining its armed militia and control of the south.	2005年被大肆赞扬的所谓“雪松革命”以后，真主党甚至加入了黎巴嫩政府，而与此同时维持其武装民兵对南部的控制。


Israel, for its part, still reeling from the trauma of its ill-begotten war in Lebanon in 1982, chose not to respond to Hezbollah’s attacks and hoped that the attacks would not escalate.	以色列方面，由于其1982年在黎巴嫩出师不利的战争依然深受其痛苦的震撼，因此决定不回应真主党的攻击并且希望攻击不会升级。


Yet such absurd situations tend to explode, as occurred with Hezbollah’s abduction of two Israeli soldiers within Israeli territory.	但是，这种荒谬的局势由于真主党在以色列的领土上绑架了两名以色列士兵而趋向于爆炸。


The continued existence of Hezbollah’s illegitimate state-within-a-state can no longer be tolerated.	真主党非法的国中之国继续存在无法再可以容忍。


Yet Lebanon itself is too weak to assert its sovereignty.	但是，黎巴嫩自身实在过于弱小无法实施权力。


On the other hand, Israel will not allow Hezbollah to re-establish itself along its border, or to maintain its missile capability.	另一方面，以色列不会允许真主党沿着边界重整旗鼓或者维持其导弹能力。


To achieve any reassertion of effective Lebanese sovereignty in southern Lebanon, a robust international effort is needed, beyond the current hand wringing and rhetoric.	为实现黎巴嫩在南黎巴嫩实施有效主权，就需要进行强有力的、超越当前怨天尤人和夸夸其谈的国际性努力。


The main elements of such an international solution are the following:	此类国际解决方案的要素应当包括：


Hezbollah is to free immediately, and without conditions, the two Israeli solders; Israel is to stop its military activities in Lebanon; Lebanon’s government is to ask for international assistance in implementing resolution 1559; For this purpose, a robust and adequately armed international implementation force is to be established. To succeed, this force must act very differently from the UN’s previous failed efforts in Lebanon.	为此，应当建立装备充足的国际实施部队。 为确保成功，这支部队的行为方式应当与联合国在黎巴嫩先前失败的努力大不相同。


The existing UN force in southern Lebanon, UNIFIL, is a sad joke.	联合国现有的在黎巴嫩南部的部队，即驻黎巴嫩临时部队是一个悲惨的笑话。


Like the UN presence in Srebrenica during the Bosnian war, UNIFIL has given the UN a bad name: it never stopped terrorists from attacking Israel, nor did it stop the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.	如同波斯尼亚战争期间联合国在斯雷布雷尼察的军事存在一样，驻黎巴嫩临时部队给了联合国一个坏名声，因为它从未制止恐怖主义者袭击以色列，也没有制止以色列在1982年入侵黎巴嫩。


What is needed is a military delegation that has a clear mandate to use force.	一个拥有明确授权使用武力的军事代表团就是所需要的。


It should be international, with the UN’s blessing, but it should not be a UN force.	它应当是国际性的，具有联合国的授权，但是它不应当是一支联合国部队。


It could be based on NATO capabilities, with a strong European ingredient.	它可以建立在北约能力的基础之上，具有强大的欧洲成分。


To add legitimacy for its delicate mission within an Arab country, soldiers from Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps Pakistan, should be added.	为了增加其在一个阿拉伯国家境内的微妙使命的合法性，应当增加来自摩洛哥、沙特阿拉伯以及可能巴基斯坦的士兵。


The mission of such a force should be to help deploy – by force, if necessary – the Lebanese Army in southern Lebanon, to participate in disarming Hezbollah, and to patrol the Israeli-Lebanese border, ensuring that no incursions take place from either side.	这样一支部队的使命应当是帮助在必要的时候使用武力在南黎巴嫩部署黎巴嫩军队、参与解除真主党的武装并且在以色列和黎巴嫩边境巡逻从而确保任何一方都不进犯边界。


Last but not least: it is not widely known that one anomaly of Lebanon’s status until this very day is that Syria has not fully recognized its existence as a sovereign nation (in Syrian school textbooks, Lebanon figures as part of Greater Syria).	最后，但不是最次要的是，目前许多人还不知道黎巴嫩现状的异常情况是，直到今天，叙利亚还不完全承认黎巴嫩作为一个主权国家的存在（在叙利亚的学校教科书中，黎巴嫩是大叙利亚的一部分）。


Consequently, there are no normal diplomatic relations between the two countries – no Syrian embassy in Beirut and no Lebanese embassy in Damascus.	因此，两国之间就没有正常的外交关系，贝鲁特没有叙利亚大使馆，而大马士革也没有黎巴嫩大使馆。


This is absurd and dangerous, and the hapless Arab League has never truly addressed it.	这种情况是荒谬和危险的，而软弱无能的阿拉伯国家联盟从来没有真正予以处理。


To bolster Lebanese independence and security, and in line with UN resolution 1559, which brought about the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, Syria should be pushed to recognize Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence.	为了增强黎巴嫩的独立和安全，应当根据联合国1559号决议推动叙利亚承认黎巴嫩的主权和独立。 联合国的这一决议实现了叙利亚军队从黎巴嫩撤出。


Hezbollah’s existence as a mini-state in southern Lebanon is a flagrant violation of Lebanese sovereignty.	真主党作为南黎巴嫩的国中之国存在下去���对黎巴嫩主权不能容忍的侵犯。


That vacuum of legitimate authority created the present crisis, and it must be extirpated.	合法政权的真空造成了目前的危机，因而必须终止。


Lebanon itself cannot establish its sovereignty in the country’s south, and Israeli military force is incapable of doing it.	黎巴嫩自身无力在其南部建立主权，而且以色列军事力量也无法做到这一点。


Empty words from St. Petersburg, Brussels, or UN headquarters will not suffice, nor will a mere ceasefire, as that would simply return the area to square one.	来自圣彼得堡、布鲁塞尔或者联合国总部的空洞之辞无济于事，仅仅停火也是一样，因为那就会把这一地区返回到最初状态。


Instead, fundamental change is needed.	相反，现在需要根本性的改变。


Only an effective military force, with international legitimacy, can supply it.	只有一支有效的、具有国际合法性的军事力量才能奏效。


Otherwise, we are all condemned to the continuation of the present cycles of violence.	不然，我们都必将深受当前的暴力循环之害。


Qatar’s Jihad	卡塔尔的圣战


ABU DHABI – Qatar may be tiny, but it is having a major impact across the Arab world.	阿布扎比—卡塔尔只是个蕞尔小国，但它在阿拉伯世界的影响力很大。


By propping up violent jihadists in the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond, while supporting the United States in its fight against them, this gas-rich speck of a country – the world’s wealthiest in per capita terms – has transformed itself from a regional gadfly into an international rogue elephant.	它支持着中东、北美和其他地区的暴力圣战主义者，也支持美国对圣战主义的斗争，这让这个芝麻大小的富油国——从人均角度看，它位居世界最富有国家行列——已经从地区牛虻转变为国际恶象。


Using its vast resources, and driven by unbridled ambition, Qatar has emerged as a hub for radical Islamist movements.	卡塔尔野心勃勃，凭借其巨大的资源成为极端伊斯兰运动的枢纽。


The massive, chandeliered Grand Mosque in Doha – Qatar’s opulent capital – is a rallying point for militants heading to wage jihad in places as diverse as Yemen, Tunisia, and Syria.	美轮美奂的多哈（奢华的卡塔尔首都）大清真寺已成为开往也门、突尼斯、叙利亚各地展开圣战的激进分子的聚集地。


As a result, Qatar now rivals Saudi Arabia – another Wahhabi state with enormous resource wealth – in exporting Islamist extremism.	结果，现在的卡塔尔足以挑战另一个坐拥巨大资源财富的瓦哈比派国家——沙特成为伊斯兰极端主义的主要输出地。


But there are important differences between Qatar and Saudi Arabia.	但卡塔尔和沙特之间存在巨大的不同。


Qatar’s Wahhabism is less severe than Saudi Arabia’s; for example, Qatari women are allowed to drive and to travel alone.	卡塔尔的瓦哈比主义没有沙特阿拉伯那样严重； 比如，卡塔尔妇女可以单独驾车和出行。


In Qatar, there is no religious police enforcing morality, even if Qatari clerics openly raise funds for militant causes overseas.	卡塔尔没有宗教警察监督道德； 尽管卡塔尔牧师公开为海外激进分子筹集资金。


Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising that, whereas Saudi Arabia’s sclerotic leadership pursues reactionary policies rooted in a puritanical understanding of Islam, Qatar’s younger royals have adopted a forward-thinking approach.	因此，沙特阿拉伯的顽固领导层追求反动政策是出于对伊斯兰教的刻板理解，而年纪更轻的卡塔尔皇室采取了前瞻性思维方式，这并不令人奇怪。


Qatar is the home of the Al Jazeera satellite television channel and Education City, a district outside of Doha that accommodates schools, universities, and research centers.	卡塔尔是卫星频道半岛电视台和教育城（Education City，位于多哈郊外的区，集中坐落着学校、大学和研究中心）的大本营。


Similar inconsistencies are reflected in Qatar’s foreign policy.	类似的不一致也反映在卡塔尔的外交政策上。


Indeed, the country’s relationship with the United States directly contradicts its links with radical Islamist movements.	事实上，卡塔尔与美国的关系和其与极端伊斯兰运动的联系直接冲突。


Qatar hosts Al Udeid air base – with its 8,000 American military personnel and 120 aircraft, including supertankers for in-flight refueling – from which the US directs its current airstrikes in Syria and Iraq.	卡塔尔是乌代德（Al Udeid）空军基地所在地，那里驻扎着8,000美军和120架飞机，包括巨型空中加油机，是美国目前所进行的叙利亚和伊拉克空袭的基地。


Camp As-Sayliyah – another facility for which Qatar charges no rent – serves as the US Central Command’s forward headquarters.	赛利亚营（Camp As-Syliyah，另一处卡塔尔免费出租的设施）是美国中央司令部前线大本营。


In July, Qatar agreed to purchase $11 billion worth of US arms.	7月，卡塔尔同意购买110亿美元的美国装备。


Moreover, Qatar has used its leverage over the Islamists that it funds to help secure the release of Western hostages.	此外，卡塔尔利用其所资助的伊斯兰教徒保证了西方人质的释放。


And it hosted secret talks between the US and the Pakistan-backed Afghan Taliban.	它还主办了美国和位于巴基斯坦的阿富汗塔利班的秘密谈判。


To facilitate the negotiations, Qatar provided a home, with US support, to the Taliban’s de facto diplomatic mission – and to the five Afghan Taliban leaders released earlier this year from US detention at Guantánamo Bay.	为了方便谈判，卡塔尔在美国的支持下为塔利班的实际外交团队——以及五名今年早些时候从美国关塔那摩监狱释放的阿富汗塔利班领导人——提供栖身之所。


In other words, Qatar is an important US ally, a supplier of weapons and funds to Islamists, and a peace broker all at the same time.	换句话说，卡塔尔是美国的重要盟国、伊斯兰教徒的武器和资金供应者，与此同时也是和平牵线者。


Add to that its position as the world’s largest supplier of liquefied natural gas and the holder of one of its largest sovereign-wealth funds, and it becomes clear that Qatar has plenty of room to maneuver – as well as considerable international clout.	除此之外，它还是世界最大的液化天然气供应国，拥有世界最大的主权财富基金之一，显然卡塔尔可以游刃有余地运筹帷幄——并且拥有可观的国际实力。


Germany’s government found that out when it was forced to retract its development minister’s statement that Qatar played a central role in arming and financing the Islamic State.	德国政府领教过这一点，被迫收回其发展部长关于卡塔尔在为伊斯兰国提供武装和资金方面起着关键作用的言论。


Qatar’s growing influence has important implications for the balance of power in the Arab World, especially with regard to the country’s rivalry with Saudi Arabia.	卡塔尔日益增加的影响力对阿拉伯世界的实力平衡有着重要影响，特别是考虑到其与沙特阿拉伯的对立。


This competitive dynamic, which surfaced only recently, represents a shift from a long history of working in tandem to export Islamist extremism.	这一最近才浮现的竞争动态代表着与输出伊斯兰极端主义共同发生的长期历史转变。


Both Qatar and Saudi Arabia generously supplied weapons and funds to Sunni extremists in Syria, opening the door for the emergence of the Islamic State.	卡塔尔和沙特阿拉伯都慷慨地为叙利亚的逊尼派极端分子提供武器和资金，为伊斯兰国的崛起打开了方便之门。


Both have bolstered the Afghan Taliban.	两国都支持阿富汗塔利班。


And both contributed to Libya’s transformation into a failed state by aiding Islamist militias.	两国都在利比亚变为失败之国中起着作用——援助伊斯兰军事势力。


During the 2011 NATO campaign to overthrow Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi, Qatar even deployed ground troops covertly inside Libya.	从2011年北约推翻卡扎菲的行动期间，卡塔尔甚至在利比亚部署了秘密地面部队。


Today, however, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are on opposite sides.	但是，如今的卡塔尔和沙特阿拉伯互相对立。


Qatar, along with Turkey, backs grassroots Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots in Gaza, Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, and the Levant.	卡塔尔和土耳其一样，支持草��伊斯兰运动，如穆斯林兄弟会及其在加沙、利比亚、埃及、突尼斯、伊拉克和黎凡特的分支。


That pits it against Saudi Arabia and countries like the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Jordan, whose rulers view such movements as an existential threat, with some, including the House of Saud, investing in propping up autocratic regimes like their own.	这让它站在了沙特阿拉伯和阿联酋、埃及、约旦等国家的对立面，这些国家的统治者将草根伊斯兰运动视为生存威胁。 包括沙特家族在内的一些人投重金扶持与自己类似的独裁政权。


In this sense, Qatar’s tack has produced a rare schism within the Gulf Cooperation Council, whose members collectively possess nearly half of the world’s oil reserves.	从这个角度讲，卡塔尔方针在成员国坐拥世界石油储量近一半的海湾合作委员会（Gulf  Cooperation Council）内部造成了罕见的分裂。


The proxy competition among rival monarchies, which led some of them to withdraw their ambassadors from Qatar in March, is intensifying violence and instability throughout the region.	对立君主之间的代理竞争已经导致其中一些人在3月份召回了住卡塔尔大使，也加剧了中东地区的暴力和动荡。


For example, the UAE, with Egyptian assistance, secretly carried out airstrikes in August to stop Qatari-aided Islamist militias from gaining control of the Libyan capital, Tripoli.	比如，阿联酋在埃及的协助下在8月份实施了秘密空袭，阻止卡塔尔援助的伊斯兰武装控制利比亚首都的黎波里。


Qatar’s leaders are willing to challenge their neighbors for a simple reason: They believe that the grassroots Islamist movements they support – which, in their view, represent majority political aspirations – eventually will win.	卡塔尔领导人情愿挑战邻国，原因很简单：他们相信他们所支持的草根伊斯兰运动能赢得最终胜利。 在他们眼里，这一运动代表了大部分人的政治愿望。


Anticipating that such groups will increasingly shape Arab politics, displacing strongman regimes, Qatar has set out to empower them.	卡塔尔预测草根伊斯兰运动将日益左右阿拉伯政治，取代强人政权，因此站出来为他们提供支持。


In doing so, Qatar is destabilizing several countries and threatening the security of secular democracies far beyond the region.	卡塔尔的这一做法正在动摇不少国家，也威胁着远在该地区之外的世俗民主国家。


For the sake of regional and international security, this elephant must be tamed.	为了地区命运和国际安全，必须驯服这头大象。


Qatar’s Source of Arab Springs	阿拉伯春天源于卡塔尔


CAMBRIDGE – There’s a joke making the rounds in the Middle East these days: three of Egypt’s former presidents, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar el-Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak, meet in hell and ask each other how they fell.	剑桥——如今在中东地区流传着一个笑话 ：三位埃及前总统贾麦尔·阿卜杜勒·纳赛尔、安瓦尔·萨达特和胡斯尼·穆巴拉克在地狱里碰面，询问彼此的感受如何。


Nasser replies “poison”; Sadat says “assassination”; and Mubarak answers “Al Jazeera.”	纳赛尔说“毒药”、萨达特说“暗杀”，而穆巴拉克则说“半岛电视台”。


During the 15 years that it has broadcast from Qatar, Al Jazeera has served as far more than a traditional television station.	在卡塔尔15年的播出生涯中，“半岛电视台”发挥了传统电视台无法比拟的作用。


With its fearless involvement in Arab politics, it has created a new venue for political freedom, which has culminated in its unreserved support for Arab revolutions.	这家电视台英勇地投身于阿拉伯政治，开辟了政治自由的新战场，并在此次毫无保留地支持阿拉伯革命的过程中达到了顶峰。


Al Jazeera has pushed the boundaries of information by providing live coverage of major developments in the Arab world and elsewhere.	“半岛电视台”实时报道阿拉伯世界和其他国家的重要事件，成功地拓展了信息的深度。


It is a platform for political and religious opposition groups in the Arab countries.	它已经成为阿拉伯国家政治和宗教反对势力的舞台。


It hosts Israeli spokespersons and embraces state-of-the-art broadcasting techniques.	半岛邀请以色列发言人发表观点，采用最先进的广播技术。


In short, it has become a global brand and a role model for other Arab media.	简言之，它已经成为一个全球品牌和其他阿拉伯媒体的榜样。


Success breeds confidence, but it also attracts envy.	成功可以带来自信，但也会招来嫉妒。


Al Jazeera has no shortage of enemies, from the most radical Islamic fundamentalists to American and Israeli intelligence gatherers.	“半岛电视台”不乏敌人，从最极端的伊斯兰原教旨主义份子到美以情报搜集者。


And, between these two extremes, there is fierce debate over whether Al Jazeera is friend or foe.	在上述两个极端之间，半岛电视台究竟是敌是友引发了人们激烈的争论。


Liberals who welcome it as a beacon of freedom and progress in the Arab world confront those who accuse it of Islamism and religious radicalization.	接纳这座阿拉伯世界自由进步灯塔的开明人士与指责其为伊斯兰主义和宗教激进主义者的观点激烈冲突。


Islamists who praise it as a platform for their own views must deal with the fact that it also offers a voice to Israelis.	称赞其为本方发表见解舞台的伊斯兰主义者必需面对这样一个事实：它同样允许以色列发表讲话。


Al Jazeera journalists are household names; they also suffer more harassment, imprisonment, and fatalities than their colleagues at other major news organizations.	半岛电视台的记者是家喻户晓的名人，他们需要比其他重要新闻机构的同行忍受更多的骚扰、监禁，甚至付出生命的代价。


Al Jazeera is not a tool of the CIA, Israel, or Al Qaeda.	“半岛电视台”不是中情局、以色列或基地组织的工具。


Rather, it is the sophisticated mouthpiece of the state of Qatar and its ambitious Emir, Hamad Al Thani.	确切的说它是卡塔尔国家及其雄心勃勃的埃米尔哈马德·阿勒萨尼见多识广的喉舌。


Simply put, the Al Jazeera success story would not have been possible without Qatar’s backing.	简言之，没有卡塔尔国家的支持就不可能有“半岛电视台”的成功。


For Al Thani, Al Jazeera is integral to the national “branding” of Qatar and its foreign-policy aspirations.	在阿勒萨尼看来，“半岛电视台”是卡塔尔国家“品牌”和外交政策理想的一部分。


The motivation for these aspirations is unclear, but a number of ideas are worth pondering.	这种理想的动机尚不明确，但有几种可能性值得考量。


After deposing his father in a palace coup in 1995, Al Thani was suddenly confronted with a hostile Saudi Arabia and Egypt, whose elites despised the ambitious young ruler and preferred his more timid father.	1995年发动宫廷政变罢黜其父后，阿勒萨尼冷不防需要面对充满敌意的沙特阿拉伯和埃及，那些精英更喜欢他胆小怯懦的父亲，而鄙视这位雄心勃勃的年轻统治者。


Qatar was perceived as increasingly rebellious, routinely defecting from the collective and mundane line of Gulf countries’ politics – inviting further pressures from the “big brothers.”	很多人怀疑埃及和沙特人是第二年针对阿勒萨尼军事政变的组织者。


In response, under the young Emir’s firm hand, Al Jazeera delivered a more assertive line of criticism against governments, such as those of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, that other Arab mainstream media would do their best to avoid alienating.	于是在年轻埃米尔的铁腕领导下，“半岛电视台”对两国政府发动了长年的攻击，几乎将卡塔尔和这两个国家的外交关系推上绝路。


Having received carte blanche from Qatar’s political leadership to support the Arab revolutions, Al Jazeera became fully engaged in live coverage of events in Tunisia, and then in Egypt, by relying on social-media networks away from the eyes of local security officials.	在接到卡塔尔政治领导层支持阿拉伯革命的全权委托后，“半岛电视台”借助远离当地安全官员视线的社交媒体网络，开始全面投身于对突尼斯和后来埃及革命运动的报道工作。


Its coverage was filled with Arab masses declaring their demands to the world.	这家电视台的报道中随处可见阿拉伯普通民众向世界宣布自己的要求。


Banned from local media and mostly on the run, revolutionaries used Al Jazeera to reach – and mobilize – their own people.	多数处于逃亡状态的革命者被禁止使用当地媒体，于是就利用“半岛电视台”联络并动员本方民众。


The channel canceled its regular programs, and was transformed into a round-the-clock workshop of live news and interviews, switching from one revolution to another.	“半岛电视台”取消了常规节目，转而成为从一国革命到另一国革命的全天候实时新闻和访问的讨论场所。


So, while the Arab Spring has been a genuine popular uprising against decades of corrupt and oppressive authoritarian regimes, its rapid spread, which caught almost everyone by surprise, was due in part to the influence of Al Jazeera, which became the voice of the voiceless throughout the Middle East.	因此，尽管阿拉伯春天的确是真正意义上反对数十年腐败暴虐独裁政府的民众革命，但它令所有人目瞪口呆的传播速度却部分归功于“半岛电视台”的影响，“半岛”已经成为中东地区沉默者的喉舌。


As for Qatar itself, Al Thani provided various forms of support to all of the Arab revolutions, except in Bahrain, where the Saudis and, more pointedly, the Americans, drew a very sharp red line.	至于卡塔尔自身，阿勒萨尼对除巴林以外的所有阿拉伯革命运动提供了各种形式的支持，在巴林问题上，沙特人、更确切的说是美国人划出了一条不可逾越的红线。


Al Thani’s political audacity stems partly from Qatar’s enormous gas resources, which have allowed him to develop vigorous policies in all areas, especially in foreign affairs.	阿勒萨尼在政治上的大胆部分源于卡塔尔庞大的油气资源，他借此在所有领域制定了强硬的政策，其中特别需要提到外交领域。


Protecting himself and Qatar by hosting the largest American military base outside the United States, his strategy has been to wrest control from regional third parties who might otherwise dominate the smaller Gulf states.	借助主办美国最大的海外军事基地为自己和卡塔尔提供保护，他的目的是从沙特等区域第三方手中争夺控制权。 若非如此，沙特等国就有可能控制这些海湾小国。


At the same time, Qatar has created strong links with both Israel and many Islamist movements, including Hamas and Hezbollah.	与此同时，卡塔尔也与以色列和很多伊斯兰运动建立了强大的关系，其中包括哈马斯和黎巴嫩真主党。


It has been an aggressive and risky foreign policy, but Al Thani clearly believes that he can fill a regional leadership vacuum.	这的确算得上激进而又冒险的外交政策，但阿勒萨尼显然相信他能填补区域领导方面的空白。


His support, via Al Jazeera, of the Arab Spring’s revolutions – and of the new generation of leaders that they have spawned – has only strengthened Qatar’s position.	他通过“半岛电视台”对阿拉伯春天革命及其产生的新一代领导人的支持——显然已经巩固了卡塔尔的地位。


The falling regimes consistently maintained that Al Jazeera wasn’t neutral.	正在瓦解的政权固执地认为“半岛电视台”并不中立。


They were right.	在这一点上他们是对的。


The QE Placebo	量化宽松安慰剂


BRUSSELS – It has now been nearly half a year since the European Central Bank declared its intention to buy some €1.1 trillion ($1.3 trillion) worth of eurozone bonds.	布鲁塞尔—自欧洲央行宣布将购买1. 1万亿欧元欧元区债券以来已经过去了近半年。


When it first announced the so-called “extended asset-purchase program” in January, the ECB emphasized that it was only expanding an existing program, under which it had been buying modest quantities of private-sector bonds, to cover government paper.	1月份，当欧洲央行第一次宣布所谓的“扩大资产购买计划”时，它强调这只是扩大已有的计划——在此之前，它一直在小量购买私人部门债券——将政府债券也包括进来。


But this pretense of continuity was just that: a pretense.	但这一持续性的姿态只是一个姿态。


In reality, by purchasing large volumes of government bonds, the ECB was crossing the Rubicon; after all, it is explicitly prohibited from financing governments.	在现实中，通过购买大量政府债券，欧洲央行已经跨越了楚河汉界； 毕竟，它被明令禁止为政府融资。