It is a 50-year-old technocratic bureaucracy established under a military dictatorship, with few legal instruments for political and social accountability.	巴西央行是一家有着50年历史的技术官僚机构，成立于军事独裁时期，几乎没有政治和社会问责的法律约束。


Institutional reform must therefore move beyond the BCB’s inadequate price-stability target, which is set according to a narrow inflation index that fails to reflect the experiences of ordinary Brazilian consumers.	因此，制度改革必须超越巴西央行不充分的价格稳定目标——该目标基于不能反映普通巴西消费者体验的狭义通胀指数制定。 比如，2013年的��告通胀率是5.


For example, the reported 2013 inflation rate was 5.9% (compared to a 4.5% target); but prices for food, a major share of most households’ budgets, rose by 8.4%, hitting the poor especially hard.	5%）； 但占大部分家庭预算大头的食品价格上涨了8.


The Rousseff administration has kept the reported inflation rate artificially low by suppressing prices for state-run services.	4%，穷人受到的冲击尤其严重。 罗塞夫政府通过压制国家服务价格人为压低报告通胀率。


Price stability should be accompanied by other targets, especially financial stability, but also, possibly, employment.	价格稳定应该伴随其他目标，特别是金融稳定，也可以包括就业。


Rousseff thwarted Congress’s attempts to introduce such targets in 2011, and they would, of course, need to be carefully designed to avoid past mistakes.	2011年，罗塞夫成功抵抗了国会引入这些目标的尝试，当然，应该小心设计这些目标以避免过去的错误。


But, done right, an expanded range of criteria by which to assess BCB policies, by enhancing accountability, would strengthen the legitimacy of granting policymakers legal autonomy.	但是，如果做得对的话，扩大评估巴西央行政策的标准的范围可以加强问责性，从而强化授予决策者法律独立地位的合法性。


There is also scope for institutional reform to promote greater financial stability.	在促进金融稳定性方面也存在制度改革空间。


The 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath highlighted the consequences of the BCB’s outdated institutional design.	2008年金融危机及其后果凸显出巴西央行制度设计过时的弊端。


The Bank had insufficient legal backing for action needed to stabilize the financial system.	巴西央行得不到足够的法律支持采取稳定金融体系所需要的行动。


This left then-President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, to resort to a series of dramatic measures, including the use of the deposit-insurance fund and state-owned banks to bail out failed financial institutions.	这让时任总统卢拉采取了一系列非常措施，包括使用存款保险基金和国有银行援助倒闭金融机构。


Lula claimed that this ad hoc approach gave Brazil a degree of flexibility lacking in other countries; but it was not cost-free, as he claimed, and the results did not endure.	卢拉声称这一权宜之计让巴西获得了其他国家所没有的一定程度的灵活性； 但如他所声称，这也不是没有代价的，并且成效并不持久。


Rapid expansion of private debt raises other, larger concerns.	私人债务的迅速扩张引起了另一个更大的忧虑。


Other central banks have recognized the need for new instruments to ensure financial stability; so must the BCB.	其他中央银行认识到采取新工具保证金融稳定的需要； 巴西央行也必须如此。


Institutional clarity on the BCB’s mandate for financial stability and the instruments at its disposal could help Brazil avoid future crises – or at least weather them more effectively.	制度上明确巴西央行的金融稳定权力以及它所能使用的工具有助于巴西避免未来危机——或至少更有效地抵御危机。


Brazil’s presidential election appears to offer two unsatisfying choices: a continuation of the status quo, with the BCB subject to political influence, under Rousseff; or an informally autonomous BCB with an outdated institutional apparatus, under Neves.	巴西总统选举似乎带来了两个无法令人满意的选项：继续现状，巴西央行在罗塞夫任上受到政治影响； 或者巴西央行在内维斯任上根据过时的制度框架获得非正式独立地位。


Only Silva’s initial proposal included calls for institutional reform of monetary policy and financial regulation; and it is far from certain that her endorsement of Neves in the run-off will sway his view should he win.	只有席尔瓦最初的方案要求采取货币政策和金融监管的制度改革； 而她对内维斯的支持是否能在后者获胜后改变他的观点还远未可知。


Brazil’s Economic Revolution	巴西经济革命


BRASILIA – Large emerging economies were hit hard in the past year – particularly in the first half – by the crisis in developed countries, with Europe in recession and the United States staging only a meager recovery.	巴西利亚—在过去的一年中，大型新兴经济体纷纷因发达国家危机引起欧洲的衰退和美国复苏乏力而遭受重创，特别是上半年。


But 2012 will also be remembered as the year when structural changes in the Brazilian economy were consolidated.	但2012年仍将成为巴西经济史上被人铭记的一年，这一年，巴西经济结构性变革得到了巩固。


The global economic crisis that began in 2008 is similar to the Great Depression of the 1930’s not only in terms of its depth and duration, but also in view of advanced countries’ policy errors and hesitation.	2008年开始的全球经济危机类似于20世纪30年代的大萧条，这么说不仅是因为深度和持续时间，也是因为发达国家面对危机的政策错误和犹豫。


It is worrying that European leaders find it so difficult to agree on fiscal adjustment policies that make room for the stimulus measures needed to revive economic growth.	令人担心的是，欧洲领导人总是无法就财政调整政策达成一致，从而为重振经济增长所必须的刺激措施创造空间。


Until now, European countries with fiscal leeway have insisted on spending and investment cuts that, together with tax increases, have reduced economic activity and increased unemployment, ultimately compromising tax collection – and thus fiscal consolidation.	到目前为止，仍有财政余地的欧洲国家要求支出和投资的削减，这与增税一道抑制了经济活动，增加了失业，最终破坏了税收——因而也拖累了财政整固。


In the US, despite a slight improvement, uncertainty lingers.	在美国，尽管情况有些许改善，但不确定性仍未消除。


In addition to the risk posed by the “fiscal cliff” in 2013, the main problem remains: the lack of effective counter-cyclical fiscal policies – for example, a public-investment program – to boost economic activity.	除了2013年坠下“财政悬崖”的风险，主要问题依旧：缺少有效的反周期财政政策（如公共投资计划）以提振经济活动。


Instead, the US has placed all of its chips on monetary easing, unleashing what I have called a currency war, in which global investors, chasing higher yields, flood into emerging countries, driving up their exchange rates.	相反，美国把全部力量用在了货币宽松上，发动了我所谓的货币战争，在这场战争中，全球投资者为了追寻高收益，纷纷涌向新兴市场，推高了它们的汇率。


The poor international environment hit Brazil’s economy mainly via foreign trade, aggressive competition in the Brazilian market, and echoes of the negative expectations prevailing in advanced countries.	糟糕的国际环境主要通过外贸、加剧巴西市场竞争和造成在发达国家普遍存在的负预期冲击了巴西经济。


To combat the downturn, Brazil’s government implemented measures that are now yielding clear dividends.	为了抗击衰退，巴西政府实施了一系列政策，目前已经收到了明显的效果。


The main change was a large reduction in interest rates, in line with an inflation-targeting framework, which has led to a more competitive exchange-rate policy.	主要变革是利率下降，与此一同下降的还有通胀目标框架，这促成了更具竞争力的汇率政策。


This was combined with a counter-cyclical fiscal policy has that kept deficits and public debt under control.	这些政策与反周期财政政策一道，使巴西赤字和公债水平处于可控状态。


More important, the government’s policies will have a permanent – indeed, revolutionary – impact on Brazil’s economy.	更重要的是，政府政策将对巴西经济产生永久——事实上，是革命性的——影响。


This will become more obvious throughout 2013.	这将在2013年表现得更加淋漓尽致。


For a long time, Brazil’s interest rates were among the highest in the world.	长期以来，巴西利率都是世界最高水平之一。


Besides damaging public accounts and imposing a severe fiscal sacrifice on the country, the abnormally high level of the Selic rate (the Brazilian overnight interbank rate) inhibited the “animal spirits” of entrepreneurship, distorted resource allocation, and impeded the development of the real-estate and capital markets, while causing currency appreciation.	除了恶化政府财政状况、给国家造成重大财政损失，反常高的基准利率（巴西隔夜银行间利率）还阻止了企业家的“动物精神”，扭曲了资源配置，阻碍了房地产和资本市场发展，并造成了货币升值。


Over time, the persistence of these conditions undermined the competitiveness of domestic industry, impeding sales of Brazilian products not only internationally, but also in the robust and growing internal market.	长此以往，这些状况的持续破坏了国内产业的竞争力，不但妨碍了巴西产品的国际销路，就连在国内市场的稳步增长都无法保证。


The government’s macroeconomic stabilization efforts, coupled with policies that increased the country’s growth potential, allowed the interest rate to fall over the last decade.	政府的宏观经济稳定措施与提升国家增长潜力的政策一道，让利率在过去十年中有所下降。


Nevertheless, until 2011, the Selic remained at levels that were incompatible with the economy’s clear strengths and low risks.	尽管如此，在2011年之前，基准利率仍处在与巴西经济显而易见的强势和低风险不匹配的高水平上。


Reducing borrowing costs without unleashing inflation was one of the main challenges faced by President Dilma Rousseff when she took office at the beginning of that year.	降低借贷成本而不造成通胀成为巴西总统罗塞夫当年初问鼎宝座后所面临的主要挑战。


The resurgence of crisis conditions, particularly in the eurozone, had halted the resumption of global growth – and provided an added incentive to accelerate domestic reforms.	危机的爆发，特别是欧元区，中止了全球增长的复苏，也增加了加速国内改革的激励。


The process of reducing interest rates – anchored on a solid tax policy and enabled by the removal of institutional obstacles (such as the rule of remuneration of savings accounts) – was extended to the second half of 2012, leading to a real annual rate under 2%.	降低利率的过程——以扎实的税收政策为锚，以消除制度壁垒（如储蓄账户补贴）为手段——在2012年下半年有所扩大，将真实年利率压低到2%以下。


This resulted in a significant reduction in the interest-rate differential with other countries, which, together with a more active intervention policy in the spot and future markets, brought the exchange rate to a much more competitive level, despite the global currency war.	这使得巴西于其他国家的利率差显著下降，再加上在现货和期货市场上的积极干预政策，在爆发全球货币战争的情况下将巴西雷亚尔汇率带到了更具竞争力的水平。


While these two fundamental changes are here to stay, Brazil’s government has gone even further.	除了这两大根本性变革，巴西政府还有后续措施。


We have pressed ahead on reducing the tax burden by decreasing various rates, particularly on payroll taxes, thereby reducing hiring costs without harming workers’ purchasing power – one reason why Brazil is now one of the world’s few major economies with low unemployment.	我们下定决心通过降低各种税率——特别是工资税税率——减轻税务负担，从而在不损害工人购买力的情况下降低用工成本，而这正是巴西成为目前少有的维持低失业率的世界主要经济体之一。


The fiscal bureaucracy, too, is being modernized, with the deployment of electronic tax notifications and other administrative reforms boosting revenue collection while diminishing the size of the informal economy.	财政也得到了现代化，税单电子化和其他行政改革加强了征税，同时抑制了地下经济。


To accelerate economic growth, the priority has been to stimulate investment and recovery in manufacturing, the sector that was hardest hit by the international crisis.	为了加速经济增长，当务之急是刺激投资和制造业复苏，后者是受国际危机冲击最大的行业。


We have launched a program worth more than $60 billion for highway and railway concessions, to be followed by a similar program for ports and airports.	我们推出了价值600亿美元以上的高速公路和铁路网计划，后续还有类似规模的港口和机场计划。


As a result of these measures, the Brazilian economy is returning to an annual growth rate of around 4%, which should be sustained in 2013.	在这些措施的作用下，巴西经济正在回到约4%的年增长率，并有望在2013年维持这一速度。


More important, the structural changes that we have implemented still have much to contribute to future growth.	更重要的是，我们已经实施的结构性变革对未来增长有很大作用。


With low interest rates, price stability, a more competitive exchange rate, a lower tax burden, plentiful resources for investment, and the reduction of electricity tariffs, Brazil is strengthening its potential for more rapid expansion.	在低利率、价格稳定、汇率更具竞争力、更低税负、投资资源充足和电价下调��推动下，巴西的快速扩张潜力正在增强。


Here, it is also important to note our efforts to end the fiscal war among Brazil’s states.	在这里，同样重要的是注意我们在结束巴西各州财政战争方面的努力。


With the ongoing reform of the interstate ICMS (a tax levied on the circulation of goods and services), investors will have greater legal clarity and security.	跨州ICMS（一种对商品和服务流通环节所征的税收）改革在继续进行，投资者将得到更大的法律和安全保障。


We will also seek to finalize the unification of the PIS/Cofins taxes, Brazil’s overly complicated – and much-criticized – federal taxes levied on businesses’ invoicing.	我们还将寻求完成PIS/Cofins税（巴西过度复杂、为人所诟病的联邦企业发票税）的合并。


With these initiatives, Brazil’s government has sought to ensure that annual growth remains above 4% for many years, regardless of the challenges – which will certainly persist in 2013 – posed by the international environment.	在这些措施的推动下，巴西政府战胜各种国际环境挑战，成功保证了多年经济增长率超过4%，2013年也将是如此。


Only through such sustained growth can per capita income approach the levels prevailing in the developed world.	唯有这一可持续增长之路能够让巴西人均收入接近发达国家普遍水平。


What we hope for most is that rich countries – and not only the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) – also contribute to global recovery.	我们最希望的是，发达国家，而不仅是金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国）能够为全球复苏做出贡献。


If we act together and pull in the same direction, we all will win.	如果我们携手共进，将能实现共赢。


Brazil’s Political Impasse	巴西政治僵局


SANTIAGO – It was the kind of politics Brazilians thought they had left behind: One day the sitting president appoints a popular former president to her cabinet in order to save him from prosecution, and pundits are quick to conclude that he is in charge.	圣地亚哥—巴西人认为，巴西政治把他们甩在了身后：有一天，在任总统任命了一位受人欢迎的前总统进入内阁以使他免于被起诉，专家们马上宣布他已经掌控局面。


The next day, a federal judge blocks his appointment, claims and counterclaims are filed before the courts, millions take to the streets demanding the president’s impeachment, and no one is quite certain who is in charge.	第二天，联邦法官驳回了他的任命，申诉和反诉纷至沓来，数百万人走上街头要求弹劾总统，没人确定谁掌控了局面。


Brazil is facing its biggest political crisis since the restoration of democracy in 1985.	巴西正面临1975年重建民主以来最大的政治危机。


President Dilma Rousseff has done much to earn her single-digit approval ratings.	总统罗塞夫花了很大的力气才获得一位数的满意率。


Until recently, she seemed likely to muddle through to the end of her four-year term in 2018, if only because opposition parties were reluctant to clean up the economic mess her government created.	直到最近，她也许可以得过且过地熬到2018年四年任期结束，不过这只是因为反对党不愿给她的政府所创造的经济烂摊子擦屁股。


Today, no one is sure.	如今，没人可以笃定。


By trying to save her predecessor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Rousseff made it harder to save her own presidency.	为了拯救她的前任卢拉，罗塞夫让拯救她自己的总统任期更加艰难了。


Now that the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), once the largest government party, has quit the ruling coalition, the two-thirds vote in Congress needed to impeach Rousseff is within reach.	如今，巴西民主运动党（PMDB，曾经是最大的执政党）已经退出执政联盟，弹劾罗塞夫所需要的三分之二国会投票似乎不再不可及。


The good news is that certain institutions of Brazilian democracy are working well.	好消息是巴西民主的一些机构仍然运转良好。


After all, it is not in every democracy that prosecutors and judges have the autonomy needed to go after billionaire businessmen or a once-popular former president.	毕竟，并非每个民主国家的检方和法官都有查办亿万富豪或曾经十分受欢迎的前总统所需要的自主权。


The bad news is that the political leadership needed to pull Brazil out of its crisis is nowhere in sight.	坏消息是让巴西走出危机所需要的政治领导力尚不知上何处寻找。


Latin Americans everywhere are telling pollsters they are sick and tired of establishment politicians.	拉丁美洲各国民调都表示，它们已经受够了建制派政客。


Brazil’s political legitimacy problem is particularly acute.	巴西政治遗留问题特别尖锐。


Not only are government leaders under fire; when opposition leaders joined the street protests two weeks ago, they were booed.	不但政府领导人如坐针毡； 但两周前反对派领袖加入街头示威时，也遭到了群众的嘘声。


The dismal state of Brazil’s economy makes strong political leadership especially urgent.	巴西经济的悲惨状态使得巴西特别需要强大的政治领导力。


The economic contraction of nearly 4% in 2015, together with a similar dip anticipated for this year, implies the deepest recession in a century.	2015年经济萎缩近4%，预计今年的情况也类似，这将是一个世纪以来最深的衰退。


Part of the problem is imported: The collapse in commodity prices and the tightening of international financial conditions hit Brazil hard.	部分问题是输入性的：大宗商品价格暴跌和国际金融条件趋紧重创了巴西。


Yet other commodity exporters in South America are in much better shape.	但南美的其他大宗商品出口国情况要好得多。


The contrast suggests that a good share of Brazil trouble is homemade.	这一对比表明巴西的麻烦很大一部分来自国内。


The world applauded when Brazil stepped on the fiscal accelerator to offset the domestic effects of the 2008 financial crisis.	当巴西踩下财政油门应对2008年金融危机对国内的影响时，世界是赞赏的。


Being able to implement a counter-cyclical fiscal policy was rightly viewed as a sign of economic maturity.	能够实施反周期财政政策被正确地视为经济成熟的标志。


But the Rousseff administration forgot to take its foot off the accelerator once the crisis was over.	但罗塞夫总统忘了在危机结束后放掉油门。


Last year, the total fiscal deficit exceeded 10% of GDP.	去年，总财政赤字超过了GDP的10%。


Because Brazil has some of the highest nominal and real interest rates in the world (interest payments on the public debt exceed 7% of GDP), snowballing debt dynamics are particularly tricky.	由于巴西名义和实际利率为世界最高之列（公债利息支付超过了GDP的7%），债务的滚雪球效应尤其难以应对。


Brazil may be the only country in the world where higher short-term interest rates can increase inflation, because they add to the fiscal deficit and to debt accumulation, in turn igniting fears of future monetization.	巴西也许是世界上唯一一个提高短期利率可以增加通胀的国家，因为这会增加财政赤字和债务累积，从而反过来助长对未来货币化的担忧。


Fortunately, the debt is mostly denominated in domestic currency, making a run on the public debt (which would leave the government unable to fund itself) unlikely.	幸运的是，债务大多为本币计价，因此公债挤兑（这将导致政府无法给自己融资）不太可能。


But this should not obscure the fact that Brazil’s fiscal situation is unsustainable.	但不应该因此对巴西财政状况不可持续的事实视而不见。


As the American economist Herbert Stein famously put it, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.”	美国经济学家赫尔伯特·斯特恩（Herbert Stein）有一个著名的论断：“如果一件事不能永远持续下去，它就会停止。


A corollary to Stein’s law is that the longer it goes on, the more likely it will end badly.	”斯特恩定律的一个推论是它继续得越久， 以悲剧收场的可能性更大。


That could well be the case of Brazil.	巴西很可能就是这样。


Financial markets have celebrated each and every one of Rousseff’s travails.	罗塞夫形势越危险，金融市场越兴奋。


The Brazilian real, which took a beating last year and during January 2016, has appreciated just as the government’s standing depreciates.	去年和2016年1月，巴西里亚尔曾经大幅贬值，而随着政府状况的恶化，里亚尔开始了升值。


But investors betting on a quick reversal of fortune for Brazil are likely to be disappointed.	但下注于巴西出现幸运反转的投资者可能会失望。


Even if Rousseff is impeached, it is far from clear that her successor would have the political will and support to make the necessary economic changes.	哪怕罗塞夫被弹劾，她的继任者是否具有政治意愿和支持做出必要的经济变革也远未可知。


Investors like to fantasize of economic reforms carried out by a post-Rousseff government headed by current Vice President Michel Temer and supported by Temer’s PMDB and parts of the opposition Brazilian Social Democracy Party of former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso.	投资者幻想，罗塞夫下台后的政府将由现任副总统米切尔·特梅尔（Michel Temer）领导，受到特梅尔的PMDB和反对党、前总统卡多佐的巴西社会民主党的一部分人的支持，实施经济改革。


Such a government would be an improvement over the current one, but it might not have the will – or the votes in Congress – to pursue economic reforms.	该政府将比现任政府有所改善，但也未必有意愿——或者足够多的国会票数——实施经济改革。


And according to a recent poll, only 16% of Brazilians would support it.	而根据当前民调，只有16%的巴西人支持经济改革。


Moreover, the size of the challenge is daunting.	此外，挑战的规模令人生畏。


Some trimming here and there will not be enough to solve Brazil’s structural fiscal difficulties.	零敲碎打不足以解决巴西的结构性财政困难。


A misconceived pension system is at the heart of the problem: Brazil spends more than 13% of GDP on pensions, more than any large industrialized nation except Italy, where the population is much older than in Brazil.	计划不周的养老金体系是问题的核心：巴西花在养老金上的钱超过GDP的13%，在大型工业化国家中只有意大利高于这一比例，而意大利的人口年龄要比巴西老得多。


More than 70% of fiscal expenditure is linked to entitlements, and there is little or no room to increase taxes (total revenue as a share of GDP is already the highest in Latin America).	超70%的财政支出与福利有关，并且增税已无空间（总税收收入占GDP之比已是拉丁美洲最高）。


Fixing Brazil’s fiscal woes will require a team of politicians with as much talent, skill, and ambition as Brazil’s national football teams used to have.	解决巴西财政乱局需要堪比巴西国家足球队的才华、才能和雄心的政客团队。


Fixing fiscal policy is necessary not just to reassure investors.	改进财政政策并不只是让投资者放心的必要条件。


Without a solution, there will be no sustained economic growth and job creation.	没有解决方案，就不可能有持续经济增长和就业创造。


Dissaving by the government contributes to a dismally low national savings rate.	政府入不敷出导致国民储蓄率极低。


Every time investment picks up, the current-account deficit grows too large for comfort.	只要投资略有抬头，经常项目赤字就会增加到令人不安的程度。


Once spooked foreigners begin to refuse to finance it, investment is forced down, impeding growth.	曾经受过惊吓的外国人开始拒绝提供融资，投资被迫降下来，制约增长。


And spending so much on interest payments will leave Brazil’s government with few resources for much-needed infrastructure investments.	而利息支付支出如此之高将让巴西政府没有资源可用于急需的基础设施投资。


At a conference I attended in São Paulo last year, an academic expert compared the current scandals in Brazil with Italy’s mani pulite (“clean hands”) investigations in the 1990s.	去年，在一次我参加的圣保罗会议上，一位学界专家比较了当前的巴西丑闻与20世纪90年代意大利“干净的手”（mani pulite）调查。


In Italy, citizens wanted to be rid of a tainted political elite, but “got Berlusconi, who was worse than any of them!”	在意大利，公民希望摆脱有污点的政治精英，但最终得到的是“贝卢斯科尼，他比他们中任何人都要遭！


The message was clear: Brazil could face a similar fate.	”教训是明确的：巴西可能面临同样的命运。


Populism often thrives when the legitimacy of political institutions declines.	民粹主义常常在政治机构的合法性有所下降时兴盛。


But Brazilians deserve better than a Berlusconi (or a Trump).	但巴西理应得到比贝卢斯科尼（或特朗普）更好的人选。


Brazil and Italy have met twice in World Cup finals (1970 and 1994) and both times Brazil outperformed Italy.	巴西和意大利两次在世界杯决赛中碰面（1970年、1994年），两次巴西都赢了。


May the same happen again, this time off the football pitch.	也许这一幕还会再发生一次，不过是在足球场外。


Breaking Free from Fossil Fuels	打破化石燃料的桎梏


BERN – There has never been a better time to break free from fossil fuels.	伯尔尼——摆脱化石燃料的桎梏从未有过更好的时机。


Record-breaking global temperatures, plummeting fossil-fuel prices, historic investments in renewable energy, and global pressure to honor climate pledges are all coming together to create the ideal setting for this world-changing shift.	破记录的全球气温、暴跌的化石燃料价格、可再生能源创记录的投资额度以及兑现气候承诺的全球压力都在缔造这一改变世界的转型过程中共同发挥着作用。


The shift could not be more urgent.	转型的紧迫性是毋庸置疑的。


The United Nations climate agreement forged in Paris last December reconfirmed the level of 2°C above pre-industrial levels as a hard upper limit for global warming, beyond which the consequences for the planet become catastrophic.	去年12月在巴黎签署的联合国气候协议再次确认了全球变暖的硬性上限是比前工业化水平高2℃，如果超过这一温度将为地球带来灾难性的后果。 但巴黎气候协议同样包含了“继续努力”将全球变暖限制在1.


But it also included commitments to “pursue efforts” to limit warming to 1.5°C. Judging by the latest data published by NASA, achieving that lower limit should be viewed as an imperative.	5℃以内的承诺。 从美国航空航天局公布的最新数据来看，达到这一下限应当是必须的选择。


The new data confirm that 2015 was the hottest year on record, and show that the global run of record-breaking temperatures continued through the first two months of this year.	新的数据证实，2015年是有记录以来最热的一年，并表明今年前两个月的全球气温将继续维持在破记录的高位。


According to NASA, global temperatures in February were 1.35°C above average, based on a 1951-1980 baseline.	美国航空航天局认为，2月的全球气温比以1951-1980年数据为基准的历史均值高1. 35摄氏度。


Fortunately, the privileged position of fossil fuels already seems to be weakening.	令人庆幸的是，化石燃料的特权地位似乎已经削弱。


In fact, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), global greenhouse-gas emissions and economic growth have already decoupled, with global energy-related CO2 (the largest source of human greenhouse-gas emissions) having remained at the same level for the second year in a row.	事实上，按照国际能源机构（IEA）的统计，全球温室气体排放量与经济增长已经实现了脱钩，与全球能源相关的二氧化碳排放（人类温室气体排放最大的来源）已经连续第二年保持在同样的水平上。


This means that fossil fuels are no longer the lifeblood of our economy.	这意味着人类的经济命脉不再是化石燃料。


It seems that the precipitous decline in oil prices – by two-thirds over the last 18 months – has not, as many feared, encouraged increased consumption.	看来油价急剧下降——过去18个月以来下降了2/3——并未像许多人担心的那样鼓励消费的增加。


What it has done is deal a major blow to the profits of fossil-fuel giants like Shell, BP, and Statoil.	但油价下降却沉重打击了壳牌、BP和挪威国家石油公司等石油巨头的利润状况。


Coal is not faring any better.	煤炭的情况同样不容乐观。


Following China’s announced moratorium on new coal-fired power plants at the end of last year, Peabody, the world’s largest coal company, recently filed for bankruptcy protection in the US, after it could no longer make its debt payments, partly because of waning demand for coal.	在中国于去年底宣布新建燃煤电厂的禁令后，世界规模最大的石油公司皮博迪最近部分因为煤炭需求减少导致无力偿还债务而在美国申请了破产保护。


Meanwhile, renewable energy sources are receiving record amounts of investment – some $329.3 billion last year, according to research from Bloomberg New Energy Finance.	与此同时，《彭博新能源财经》的一项研究结果显示可再生能源吸引的投资正在创下纪录——去年的总投资额达3293亿美元。


As a result, a cleaner, fairer, and more sustainable future, powered entirely by renewables, is starting to become a real option.	这样一来，完全由可再生能源驱动的更清洁、更公平也更可持续的未来正在开始成为真正的选择。


Yet there is still a long way to go.	但依然有很长的路要走。


Most governments are still clinging, to varying degrees, to destructive fossil fuels, with their volatile prices and devastating environmental impact, even as this dependence destabilizes their economies.	绝大多数政府依然在不同程度上坚持使用破坏性的化石燃料，尽管化石燃料价格动荡并能造成毁灭性的环境影响，即使这种依赖造成本国经济动荡他们也不改初衷。


Those committed to addressing climate change – from international organizations to local communities to individual citizens – must urgently build on the momentum acquired over the last year, by maintaining strong pressure on governments and companies to pursue the policies and investments needed to complete the break from fossil fuels.	那些致力于解决气候变化问题的力量——从国际机构到地方社团再到公民个人——必须立即巩固去年一年所取得的势头，向政府和企业施加强大的压力以落实完全摆脱化石燃料所必须的政策和投入。


Just as a warming planet puts us all at risk, scaling up action early benefits everyone.	因为全球变暖给我们每个人都带来危险，尽早加大行动力度对我们大家都有好处。


And it is up to everyone to hold leaders accountable to their promises, and to science.	确保让领导人兑现承诺并发展科学是每个人的义务。


Global movements such as Break Free have been exemplary in this regard.	冲破藩篱这样的全球运动在这方面起到了示范作用。


By backing campaigns and mass actions aimed at stopping the world’s most dangerous fossil-fuel projects – from coal plants in Turkey and the Philippines, to mines in Germany and Australia, to fracking in Brazil, and oil wells in Nigeria – Break Free hopes to eliminate the power and pollution of the fossil-fuel industry, and propel the world toward a sustainable future.	通过支持从土耳其和菲律宾燃煤电厂、到德国和澳大利亚矿山、到巴西水压油井、再到尼日利亚油井等一系列旨在阻止世界最危险化石燃料项目的活动及群众运动，冲破藩篱希望能够消除电力及化石燃料行业所带来的污染，并推动世界走向可持续发展的未来。


Recognizing the scale and urgency of the challenge ahead, Break Free is prepared to intensify its peaceful resistance against new and existing fossil-fuel projects.	因为清楚地认识到未来挑战的规模和紧迫性，冲破藩篱准备加强对新增及现有化石燃料项目的和平抵制活动。


The key will be the strength and bravery of communities demanding that we keep fossil fuels in the ground and instead build a healthier and more just world, in which everyone has access to sustainable energy.	关键在于民间组织要坚决勇敢地要求人类将化石燃料留在地下，并以此为基础建立一个更为健康和公平的世界，让人人都有可持续能源可用。


The world is closing in on a historic shift in our energy system.	世界即将经历能源系统历史性的转型时刻。


To accelerate progress, we must confront those who are profiting from climate change and defend the interests of ordinary people.	为加快转型进度，我们必须捍卫普通民众的利益，直面从气候变化中获益的人或机构。


Next month’s mobilizations against fossil-fuel projects are an important step in the right direction.	下个月的反化石燃料项目动员活动是向正确方向迈出的重要一步。


The struggle finally to break free from fossil fuels is a global one.	摆脱化石燃料桎梏的斗争最终要靠世界所有国家参与。


Nobody can afford to ignore it.	没有任何人能够忽视它。


Breaking the Climate Deadlock	打破气候的僵局


LONDON – On July 9, the leaders of the world’s largest economies will meet in L’Aquila, Italy, at the Major Economies Forum (MEF) to discuss progress towards a new global climate agreement.	伦敦——7月9日，世界上最大经济体的国家首脑们将在意大利的拉奎拉聚会，参加主要经济体论坛（MEF）。 在会上，大家将讨论如何推进全球气候协议的达成。


In six months, a deal is supposed to be struck in Copenhagen, so the MEF meeting comes at a vital moment.	六个月后哥本哈根会议上，全球各国的代表们有可能达成一个新协议。 如此来说，主要经济体论坛（MEF）就显得尤为重要。


When many of the same leaders met in April to address the economic crisis, they rightly pledged to do “whatever is necessary.” The same spirit needs to animate the L’Aquila meeting.	今年4月，同样也是这一群的领导人曾经一起讨论过经济危机的议题，在那次会上，大家一致喊出了“采取一切必要手段”的口号，本次拉奎拉会议也同样需要这样的态度。


There is enormous good will to do so.	现在，在全球气候问题上，各国都已经表现出积极配合的态度。


The new US administration is supporting strong American action.	新当选的美国政府首先表示了强烈的支持。


China is setting ambitious targets for reducing energy intensity and making massive investments in renewable energy.	中国也正在建立一个宏大的计划，目的是减少能源的使用和大力开发可再生能源。


India has put forward its own action plan.	印度也提出了自己的行动计划表。


Europe has set a goal of cutting emissions by 30% below 1990 levels by 2020 if there is an ambitious global agreement.	如果全球各国能够达成一个全球协议的话，欧洲方面的目标是，到2020年欧洲的碳排放量比1990年的水平要低30%。


Japan has published its proposals for major carbon reductions.	日本也提出了减少碳排放量的提案。


Across the world, commitments are forthcoming.	环顾世界，几乎每个国家都做出了一定的承诺。


But practical challenges remain.	但是，我们也面临着一些现实的问题。


What is being asked is that global emissions be less than half their 1990 levels by 2050, having peaked before 2020.	我们的目标是全球碳排放量到2020年达到最高高峰，随后到2050年将削减到不到1990年水平的一半。


Since emissions from the developing countries are on the whole lower than those of the developed world – and will need to continue to rise in the short-term as they maintain economic growth and address poverty – it has been proposed that developed countries cut emissions by at least 80% relative to 1990 by 2050, with major steps towards this goal over the next decade.	由于发展中国家的排放量低于发达国家——所以说，随着发展中国家的脱贫政策和经济的不断增长，在短期内碳排放量会上升——有人提议，到2050年，发达国家的碳排放量至少应该削减以达到1990年水平的80%。 要实现这个目标，看来还有很多事情要做。


Developing countries will also need to play their part, significantly slowing and peaking emissions growth in the coming decades.	发展中国家要做出自己的贡献，在随后的几十年中他们的碳排放量将逐步达到峰值，随后就应该显著地减少。


For the US, such commitments would mean cutting emissions to around one-tenth of today’s per capita level, while for China it would mean creating a new low-carbon model of economic development.	对于美国来说，如果要实现目标，就意味着要减少目前人均碳排放量的10%。 而对中国来说，就是实现一种全新的低碳排放发展模式。


For all countries, this is a major challenge – a revolution that implies a huge shift in policy.	看来，这对所有的国家都是一场挑战——各自国家都需要在政策上做出巨大的调整，这不亚于是一场革命。


The good news is that if we focus on clear, practical, and achievable goals, major reductions can be made in order to ensure that, whatever the precise interim target, the world will fashion a radical new approach within a manageable timeframe.	要实现这些目标，我们还是具备一些有利因素的，这包括我们已经设定了务实的，明确而且可操作性的目标。 不管设定什么样的中期目标，世界各国都需要在可控制的框架下的采取一个激烈的变革，以便实现最终的目的。


A new report from the “Breaking the Climate Deadlock” project, a strategic partnership between my office and The Climate Group, shows how major reductions even by 2020 are achievable if we focus action on certain key technologies, deploy policies that have been proven to work, and invest now in developing those future technologies that will take time to mature.	我的办公室和世界气候组织共同推出一项名为“打破气候僵局”的计划。 该计划指出，如果我们关注一些关键性的科技成果，配合行之有效的政策，同时加大对未来科技的投资，以便它们在不久的将来得以推广运用，如果这样操作，即便是2020年碳排放量的中期计划也是可以实现的。


Perhaps the most interesting fact to emerge is that fully 70% of the reductions needed by 2020 can be achieved by investing in three areas: increasing energy efficiency, reducing deforestation, and use of lower-carbon energy sources, including nuclear and renewables.	如果要实现到2020年将碳排放量减少70%的目标，我们可能还要关注以下三个方面：提高能源利用效率，减少森林砍伐和使用低碳能源，这包括核能源和可再生能源。 采取以下七项被证明行之有效的政策——可再生能源标准（例如长期保护性电价或是可再生配置标准）；


Implementing just seven proven policies – renewable energy standards (e.g., feed-in tariffs or renewable portfolio standards); industry efficiency measures; building codes; vehicle efficiency standards; fuel carbon content standards; appliance standards, and policies for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) – can deliver these reductions.	以及通过减少毁林与森林退化. 减少碳排放（REDD）的政策等——如果这么做，我们就可以达到减排的目的。


All seven policies have already been successfully implemented in countries around the world, but they need scaling up.	目前，所有的这七项政策都已经在全世界范围内成功地运用，但我们还需要进一步地推广。


While cap-and-trade systems or other means of pricing carbon emissions can help provide incentives for businesses to invest in low-carbon solutions, in the short term at least, these seven policy measures – and direct action and investment by governments – are needed to achieve the targets.	我们应该实行总量控制与交易制度，加上其他价格手段，迫使企业加大对低碳产品的投资。 从短期来看，这七项由政府主导的政策将能实现我们设定的目标。


In the longer term, we also need technologies such as carbon capture and storage (CCS), expanded nuclear power, and new generations of solar energy, together with the development of technologies whose potential or even existence is still unknown.	从长期来看，我们需要研究一些新的技术，例如碳捕获及存储技术（CCS），加大核���的开发，以及对太阳能的进一步利用等。 目前和未来科技的发展将会给我们带来什么成果，目前还不可预知。


The important thing for Copenhagen is that decisions are taken now for investments that will yield benefits later.	可以确定的是哥本哈根协议将有利于我们的未来发展。


For example, the overwhelming majority of new power stations in China and India – necessary to drive the industrialization that will lift hundreds of millions out of poverty – will be coal-fired.	目前，中国和印度正在兴建了大量的能源厂——这可以使得数亿人摆脱贫困——煤炭能源。


That is just a fact.	这都是正在发生的事实。


So developing CCS or an alternative that allows coal to become clean energy is essential for meeting the 2050 goal.	看来，我们要大力发展碳捕获及存储技术（CCS）或是找到煤炭的替代品，这样才会使碳变得更加清洁。


But we need to invest now, seriously and through global collaboration, so that by 2020 we are in a position to scale up CCS or be ready to deploy other alternatives.	为了实现2050年的目标。 我们必须现在就采取行动，通过国际间的合作，这样，到了2020年，我们就可以更好地利用CCS技术，或是利用替代煤炭的新能源。


Renaissance of nuclear power will require a big expansion of qualified scientists and engineers.	核电站的兴建需要大量合格的科学家和工程师。


Electric vehicles will need large adjustments to infrastructure.	电动汽车的出现也会对现有的基础设施提出挑战。


Smart grid systems can enable big savings in emissions, but require a plan for putting them into effect.	智能电网可以减少碳排放，但这需要我们制定计划，发挥它的效能。


These measures will take time, but require investment now.	所有的这些举措都需要时间，所以，我们现在就要行动起来。


Meanwhile, in the short term, low energy lighting and efficient industrial motors may sound obvious, but we are nowhere near using them as extensively as we could.	从短期来说，我们能做的就是运用节能灯和节能汽车，目前这项工作还做得还远远不够。


So we know what we need to do, and we have tools available to achieve our goals.	如此看来，我们已经知道了我们该做什么，我们有现成的工具来帮助我们实现目标。


MEF leaders can therefore have confidence in adopting the interim and long-term targets recommended by the scientific community: keeping warming to below two degrees Celsius; peaking emissions within the next decade; and at least halving global emissions by 2050 versus 1990.	这样一来，MEF会上的各国领袖们就应该更有信心，实现我们中长期的目标：将全球温度降低2摄氏度，在10年后碳排放量达到最大峰值，到2050年将碳排放至少减少到1990年水平的一半。 这也是科学界一致公认的目标。


Developed countries will be able to commit to reducing their emissions by 80% versus 1990 by mid-century, as many have already done, and provide the necessary financial and technology support for developing countries’ adaptation and mitigation efforts.	到本世纪中期，发达国家承诺将碳排放量减少到1990年水平的80%，目前，很多国家已经做到了这一点。


With that support, developing countries in turn will need to design and implement “Low-Carbon Growth Plans” that significantly slow and eventually peak their emissions growth.	发展中国家也应该设计和实行“低碳排放增长模式”，逐步达到最大碳排峰值，显著地减少本国的碳排放。


By making these commitments, the MEF leaders, whose countries account for more than three-quarters of global emissions, would lay a firm foundation for success in Copenhagen.	MEF的参会国占了全球碳排放量的四分之三，如果他们能取得共识，这将对哥本哈根会议打下一个坚实的基础。


Between L’Aquila and Copenhagen, there will undoubtedly be difficult discussions over interim targets for developed countries.	在拉奎拉和哥本哈根会议之间，发达国家有关中期目标的讨论无疑会是十分的艰难。


While such targets are important, what matters most is agreement on the measures that ultimately will set the world on a new path to a low carbon future.	但由于目标是如此的至关重要，一旦我们能达成协议，这将对未来世界的低碳排放开辟一条全新的道路。


For years, the emphasis has rightly been on persuading people that there must be sufficient “will” to tackle climate change.	多年以来，我们对公众的关于减少碳排放的教育已经深入人心。


But leaders, struggling to cope with this challenge even amidst economic crisis, need to know that there is also “a way.”	如今世界各国的领袖们在忙于处理经济危机的同时，还在为全球气候问题不断地努力工作，如今，他们已经找到了一条“解决之道"。


Only by combining the two will we succeed.	只有把民众的觉悟和领袖的认知结合起来，我们才能取得成功。


Fortunately, such a way – immensely challenging but nonetheless feasible – exists.	幸运的是，这条道路——虽然充满着挑战和艰难——已经被我们找到。


Breaking the Neoclassical Monopoly in Economics	打破经济学的新古典主义垄断


For 25 years, the so-called “Washington Consensus” – comprising measures aimed at expanding the role of markets and constraining the role of the state – has dominated economic development policy.	25年来，所谓的“华盛顿共识”——其中包含着旨在扩大市场和限制国家作用的各项措施——已经占据了经济发展政策的主导地位。


As John Williamson, who coined the term, put it in 2002, these measures “are motherhood and apple pie, which is why they commanded a consensus.”	正如发明这一词汇的约翰•威廉姆森（John Williamson）在2002年所指出的那样，这些措施“是十全十美，万无一失的，因此我们才有必要就此达成共识。 ”


Not anymore.	情况已经发生了变化。


Dani Rodrik, a renowned Harvard University economist, is the latest to challenge the intellectual foundations of the Washington Consensus in a powerful new book titled One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth .	著名的哈佛大学经济学家丹尼·罗德里克（Dani Rodrik）是在新书 《同样的经济，不同的处方：全球化、制度和经济发展》 中有力挑战“华盛顿共识”学术基础的最近一人。


Rodrik’s thesis is that though there is only one economics, there are many recipes for development success.	罗德里克的命题是尽管我们只有一个经济学，但通向发展成功的道路却不只一条。


Rodrik has rendered a major service by stating so openly the claim of “one economics.”	罗德里克公开提出“一个经济学”的说法称得起是一项重大的成就。


A critic who made the same claim that economics allows only one theoretical approach would be dismissed as paranoid, whereas Rodrik’s standing creates an opportunity for a debate that would not otherwise be possible.	提出发展只有一种理论方法的经济学家会被当作偏执狂一样不屑一顾，而罗德里克的立场却创造了讨论的机会，如果没有他的贡献，这种机会本来是不可能存在的。


The “many recipes” thesis is that countries develop successfully by following eclectic policies tailored to specific local conditions rather than by following generic best-practice formulas designed by economic theorists.	 “多条道路”理论指出国家可以通过符合自身条件的折衷政策成功地实现发展，而不是简单地遵循由经济理论学家所设计的最佳通用公式。


This challenges the Washington Consensus, with its one-size-fits-all formula of privatization, deregulated labor markets, financial liberalization, international economic integration, and macroeconomic stability based on low inflation.	这种说法挑战了“华盛顿共识”，该共识宣称只有私有化、解除劳动力市场管制、实现金融自由化、国际经济融合和建立在低通胀基础上的宏观经济稳定才是实现经济发展的唯一出路。


But, while the many recipes thesis has strong appeal and empirical support, and suggests a spirit of theoretical pluralism, the claim of “one economics” is misguided, for it implies that mainstream neoclassical economics is the only true economics.	尽管多条道路论很有吸引力、在符合实践经验的同时也合乎理论多元化的精神，但是“一个经济学”的提法还是受到了误导，因为它暗示只有新古典主义主流经济学才是真正的经济学。


Part of the difficulty of exposing this narrowness is that there is a family split among neo-classical economists between those who believe that real-world market economies approximate perfect competition and those who don’t.	曝光这一狭隘理念的部分难度在于在相信和不相信真实世界的市场经济接近完全竞争的新古典主义经济学家之间存在着派系分歧。 相信上述理念的经济学家被称为“芝加哥学派”，代表学者包括米尔顿·弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）和乔治·斯蒂格勒（George Stigler）。


Believers are identified with the “Chicago School,” whose leading exponents include Milton Friedman and George Stigler.	不相信这一理念则被称为与保罗·萨缪尔森（Paul Samuelson）相关的“麻省理工学派”。


Non-believers are identified with the “MIT School” associated with Paul Samuelson. Rodrik is of the MIT School, as are such household names as Paul Krugman, Joseph Stiglitz, and Larry Summers.	罗德里克属于麻省理工学派，其他像保罗•克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）、约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨（Joseph Stiglitz）和拉里•萨默斯（Larry Summers）等耳熟能详的名字也同样属于这一派系。


This split obscures the underlying uniformity of thought.	不同派系的分野模糊了下面所掩盖的统一思想。


The Chicago School claims that real-world market economies produce roughly efficient (so-called “Pareto optimal”) outcomes on which public policy cannot improve.	芝加哥学派声称真实世界的市场经济能够创造出公共政策无法改善的模糊高效（即所谓的“最优”）结果。


Thus, any state intervention in the economy must make someone worse off.	因此，任何对经济进行的国家干预都毫无疑问将损害某些人的利益。


The MIT School, by contrast, argues that real-world economies are afflicted by pervasive market failures, including imperfect competition and monopoly, externalities associated with problems like pollution, and an inability to supply public goods such as street lighting or national defense.	麻省理工学派则针锋相对地指出真实世界经济普遍受到市场失灵的困扰，包括不完全竞争和垄断，以及与污染、无法提供街道照明或国家防御等公共必需品等问题相关的外部缺陷。


Consequently, policy interventions that address market failures – as well as widespread information imperfections and the non-existence of many needed markets – can make everyone better off.	因此，能弥补市场失灵——以及涉及面很广的信息不完全和很多必需市场缺失——的政策干预能够提高每个人的生活品质。


None of this is about fairness, which is a separate issue.	这些理论全都与公平无关，公平是一个独立的问题。


Indeed, neither the Chicago School nor the MIT School say that market outcomes are fair, because actual market outcomes depend on the initial distribution of resources.	事实上，芝加哥学派和麻省理工学派都没有提到市场结果的公平性，因为真实的市场结果取决于资源的初次分配。


If that distribution was unfair, current and future outcomes will be unfair, too.	如果那次分配有欠公平，那么现有和未来的结果也将是不公平的。


Chicago economists seem to believe that real-world outcomes are acceptably unfair and, more importantly, that attempts to remedy unfairness are too costly, because tampering with markets causes economic inefficiency.	芝加哥经济学派似乎相信真实世界中经济结果的不公正可以接受，而且更为重要的是，修正这种不公正的企图代价太过高昂，会因为影响市场而降低经济效率。


They believe that government intervention tends to generate its own costly failures because of bureaucratic incompetence and rent-seeking, whereby private interests try to steer policy to their own advantage.	他们相信政府干预本身会因为官僚的无能和寻租理论带来代价惨重的失败，私有利益通过这些因素试图使政策向有利于自身利益的方向发展。


MIT economists tend to espouse the opposite: fairness is important, the real world is unacceptably unfair, and government failure can be prevented by good institutional design, including democracy.	麻省理工学派的经济学家倾向于支持相反的观点：公平非常重要，真实世��所存在的不公平令人无法接受，而好的制度设计，包括民主，则可以防止政府的运转失灵。


These differences reflect the intellectual richness of neo-classical economics, but they provide no justification for the claim that there is one economics.	上述分歧反应了新古典主义经济学在学术上的多样性，但却无法对“一个经济学”的观点进行论证。


On the contrary, heterodox economists like Thorsten Veblen and Joseph Schumpeter long ago raised many of today’s cutting-edge issues in neoclassical economics, including the role of social norms and the relationship between technological innovation and business cycles.	恰恰相反，索尔斯坦·范勃伦（Thorsten Veblen）和约瑟夫·熊彼特（Joseph Schumpeter）等非正统经济学家很早以前就在新古典主义经济学中提出了今天的许多前沿问题，包括社会规范的作用和技术创新与业务周期之间的关系。


Heterodox economics includes core theoretical concepts that are fundamentally incompatible with neoclassical economics in either of its two contemporary forms.	非正统经济学含有与新古典主义经济学的任何一种现代模式都根本不兼容的核心理念。


These concepts result in significantly different explanations of the real world, including income distribution and the determinants of economic activity and growth.	这些理念导致对真实世界截然不同的解释，包括收入分配、经济行为和发展的决定因素。


Moreover, they often result in different policy prescriptions.	不仅如此，理念的不同也经常会导致出台不同的政策指令。


The late Robert Heilbronner – one of Schumpeter’s most renowned students – viewed economics as “worldly philosophy.”	熊彼特最著名的弟子之一——已故的罗伯特·海尔布伦纳（Robert Heilbronner）——将经济学看作为“世俗的哲学”。


Just as philosophers are divided on the nature of truth and understanding, economics is divided on the workings of the real world.	正如哲学家按照真理的本质和对本质的理解分为不同的学派一样，经济学也按照真实世界中的运行模式进行了区分。


Paradigms should co-exist in economics, just as in other social sciences.	正如其他社会科学一样，不同的范例可以在经济学中共同存在。


Yet, in practice, the dominance of the belief in “one economics,” particularly in North America and Europe, has led increasingly to a narrow and exclusionary view of the discipline.	但在实际上，“一个经济学”信念的主导地位，特别是在北美和欧洲，已经越来越明显地导致了对该学科狭隘排他的片面理解。


This reality is difficult to convey.	这种现实很难表达。


One reason is that liberal neo-classical economists like Stiglitz and Krugman share values with heterodox economists, and shared values are easily conflated with shared analysis.	原因之一是斯蒂格利茨和克鲁格曼这样的自由新古典主义经济学家与非正统经济学家的价值观有某些相似之处，而价值观的近似又很容易与分析的近似相互混淆。


Another reason is that heterodox and MIT School economists also often agree on policy, even if their reasoning is different.	还有一个原因是即便推理过程有所差异，非正统和麻省理工学派经济学家却常能就政策达成一致。


Finally, most people are incredulous that economists could be so audacious as to enforce one view of economics.	最后，大多数人并不相信经济学家会大胆到要在经济学领域推行统一的观点。


The “many recipes” thesis enriches neo-classical economics’ contribution to the development debate, and many of its policy proposals will find support from heterodox economists.	 “多条道路”论丰富了新古典主义经济学家在发展讨论中的贡献，他们的很多政策建议都能从非正统经济学家那里得到支持。


However, it fails to engage the deep intellectual divisions regarding economic development, trade, and globalization, because it refuses to admit the legitimacy of such disagreements.	但是，它却无法触及有关经济发展、贸易和全球化的深层学术分野，因为它拒绝承认上述分歧的合理存在。


By repeating the claim of “one economics,” Rodrik inadvertently reveals the censorship embedded in contemporary economics.	通过重申“一个经济学”的论断，罗德里克无意中说出了现代经济学中植根的审查制度。


The great challenge is not to admit that there are many recipes, but rather to create space for other perspectives on economic analysis and policy.	最大的挑战不是承认多条道路的存在，而是为对经济分析和政策的其他看法留出空间。


Breaking the Windows Barrier	突破视窗操作系统障碍


Kyoto – As 2009 commences, Microsoft is previewing its next-generation operating system, Windows 7, which is remarkable only in that it is almost the same as every previous version.	京都－在2009年开始的时候，微软就在测试其下一代操作系统Windows 7了，这一操作系统因为和以前的版本几乎一样而引人注目。


Stagnation in computer design is not surprising, considering that familiarity is so comfortable.	考虑到操作系统有熟悉的地方让人感到舒服，在电脑设计方面的停滞不前就并不令人吃惊了。


But it can also stifle development.	但是，熟悉也会使发展窒息。


Military intelligence depends on ever-improving communication, so it is one area in which system design is constantly changing.	军事情报依赖不断改善的通讯向前发展，所以它是系统设计持续变化的一个领域。


Some of those innovations will eventually trickle into the mainstream, so a glimpse at current experiments can reveal what the future of ordinary computer interaction could look like, and what would be gained.	这些变化中的有些创新会最终成为主流的一部分，所以，看看当前进行的试验就可以揭示通常的电脑交互在未来是什么样的，以及会有哪些改进。


For the lay user, technology is encountered mostly as an interactive interface.	    对一般用户来说，在使用电脑中遇到的主要技术是交互式界面。


People rarely consider that the tangible features assumed to be intrinsic to the “computer” were imitations of other objects, with keyboards inherited from typewriters and screens from television.	人们很少意识到，被认为是“电脑”固有的有形特征，其实是对其他物体的模仿，键盘是模仿打字机的，屏幕是模仿电视的。


Inside the computer screen is a virtual 1950’s office, with paper documents, filing cabinets, and a garbage can.	在电脑屏幕里面，是一个虚拟的20世纪50年代的办公室，这个办公室里有文档、档案储存间以及一个垃圾桶。


This page-window format is known as Window-Icon-Mouse-Pointer, or WIMP, which, due to monopoly forces, has been the universal paradigm since the 1980’s – ancient history in computer years.	这种页面视窗格式就是知名的窗像单点界面，即WIMP，该界面因为垄断力量，从20世纪80年代起——在电脑的年代中属于久远的历史时代了，就成为通用的范式。


These formats are taken for granted, just as we accept telephone keypads and car dashboards, which are also user interfaces.	这些范式被不假思索地加以使用，就像我们接受也是用户界面的电话按键和汽车仪表盘一样。


It is easy to forget that, years ago, telephones had no buttons or dial – you had to pick up the handset and ask an operator to make the connection.	人们很容易忘记，在若干年前，电话没有按键也没有拨号盘——人们要拿起电话听筒，然后叫一个接线员接通电话。


The telephone dial didn’t appear until 1919, when the first group of self-designated “user interface scientists” at Western Electric considered what the most intuitive form should be.	直到1919年，当西电（Western Electric）的第一群自封为“用户界面科学家”的人，思考什么应该是最直觉的形式时，才出现了电话拨号盘。


When improving a computer interface, form is the key.	当改进一个电脑界面时，形态是关键。


We’ve seen hints of a new paradigm in Apple’s iPhone, which allows gestural finger motions, but in the intelligence community, concept visualization can be so radical that most ordinary users might barely recognize what it was.	我们已经在苹果的iPhone上看到了新范式的线索，iPhone可以进行手指动作识别，但是在智能技术界，概念可视化非常激进，以至于绝大多数的普通用户可能都不能意识到它是什么东西。


Designs are inspired by cognitive science, the arts, even science fiction.	设计从认知科学，艺术，甚至是科幻小说中获得灵感。


Ironically, a recent trend reaches far into the past, to a traditional Japanese concept known as  katachi , which is emerging as an international movement.	讽刺的是，电脑最近的趋势回到了久远的过去，回到了一个名为“形”的传统日本概念，而这正在成为一个国际趋势。


“Katachi” literally means “form” in Japanese, but the concept has complex connotations that do not exist in other languages.	“形”在日语里的字面意思是“形态”，但是　这一概念拥有在其他语言中不存在的复杂内涵。


The word is a composite of two terms, “kata” (pattern) and “chi” (magical power), so it includes nuances such as “complete assembly” and “shape that tells an attractive story.”	“形”是“kata”（模式）和“chi”（魔力）这两个术语的组合，所以它包含了诸如“全部集合”和“讲述一个迷人故事的形态”这样意义上的微妙之处。


This richer notion stems from ancient Japanese culture, which perceived the overlap between geometry and meaning.	“形”更丰富的内涵来自能认识到图形和意义之间交叠的古老的日本文化。


The Chinese symbol for “form” carries some of the same reasoning, due to its use of ideograms.	因为表意文字的使用，“形”的中文字符带有某些同样的推理。


Four thousand years ago, China developed a writing system that conveyed concepts both as idea and picture.	在四千年前，中国发展出一个将概念既作为思想又作为图像传达的书写系统。


Notions such as “wooden structure” and “beauty” were indicated by symbols which, when combined, could create a new concept, such as “form.”	诸如“木结构”以及“美”这样的观念，都是通过符号——当这些符号组合起来时，可以产生一个新的概念，例如“形”——来加以显示的。


Governments in countries colonized by China were forced to adopt this pictographic writing system in order to receive political regulations, but the pronunciation of the characters was not controlled.	为了接受政治控制，成为中国殖民地的国家的政府被迫采用这种图画文字系统，但是，这些字符的读音没有受到中国的控制。


The colonized were able to maintain aspects of their local culture through different aural versions of the same written “word” because the common meaning existed only in the shape. 	因为只有在特定的形状下才存在通用的意思，所以被中国殖民的地区可以通过同样的书面“词汇”的不同听觉版本，来保留它们当地文化的面貌。


Modern user interface scientists are interested in katachi because it can reveal how form facilitates human interaction.	现代用户界面科学家对“形”非常感兴趣，因为它能揭示形态可以怎样推进人类互动。


A traditional example is the tea ceremony, which was developed in Japan in the late sixteenth century.	对此的一个传统的例子是茶道，茶道是于16世纪晚期在日本发展起来的。


The format is simple – a host serves tea with some sweets, the guests drink it and then express thanks; that’s all.	茶道的形式很简单——主人在招待客人用茶的时候提供一些点心，客人喝完茶后表示感谢； 就完了。


Foreigners are often mystified as to why such a minimalist event can require years of training.	外国人经常感到迷惑，为什么这样简单的活动需要几年的训练。


But the motivation for this art is common to every culture: imagine a talented host from any country whose manner is so easy that guests are wrapped in a mood of quiet happiness.	但是，这种艺术的动机对每种文化来说都是共同的：想象一个来自某个国家的有才华的主人，其风格是如此的闲适，使客人们都沉浸到一种宁静的幸福中了。


In the tea ceremony, this ability has been refined into a skill that combines materials, meaning, and mood.	在茶道中，这种能力已经被浓缩到一种结合了物质、意义和情绪的技巧中去了。


Those with high ability know how the guests’ experience can be improved with careful preparations of tools, reflective conversations, and natural yet well-controlled body motions.	那些技巧高超的人知道怎样通过认真准备茶道工具，有意义的谈话以及自然但是控制良好的身体动作，来改善客人的茶道体验。


Physical movements embody the intended meaning of the event, so the whole environment becomes a signifier.	主人身体的移动包含了茶道要表达的意义，因而，整个环境都成了一个描述符。


Small innovations are often introduced into the style of hospitality to suggest the personality of the host.	而且，小创新经常会被引进到茶道主人待客的方式中，以此来展现主人的人格。


An operating system based on katachi’s insights would harness this overlap between shape, sense and environment.	一个建立在对“形”的领悟基础上的操作系统，可以利用形状、意义和环境之间的重叠。


It might allow you to feel the “form” of a concept with your hands.	这样的操作系统可能能使你用手感觉一个概念的“形状”；


Or it could indicate the reliability of data based on whether it was laid out neatly or had a scrambled appearance, so it could be assessed at a glance.	或者，它能基于是设计良好还是外表混乱，来说明数据的可靠性，从而使人瞟一眼就可以对其进行评估了 。


Perhaps future interfaces will allow us to communicate across language barriers by immersing us in assemblies of pictures – a hybrid between movies, architecture and email.	或许，未来的界面能通过让我们进入一个图片集合——处于电影、结构和电子邮件之间的混合物——的方式，使我们突破语言障碍进行交流。


Expressive icons represent thought, but can only communicate complex subtleties and situations if they allow multiple levels of understanding.	具有表现力的图标代表着思想，但是，只有在它们允许多层次理解的情况下，才就能够传达复杂的微妙之处和情形。


Computer scientists might be in a unique position to enable richer communication, and perhaps a more stable future as a consequence.	电脑科学家可能处在一个使交流更丰富的独特地位，并且，他们或许也因而使电脑的未来更稳定。


For this reason, let us hope that more developers explore this so-called “disruptive” side of technology during the coming year.	有鉴于此，让我们来期待更多的研发人员在接下来的一年里，去探索技术的所谓的 “破坏”面吧。


The Screening Myth	筛查神话


TORONTO – Breast-cancer screening has long been viewed as one of the most important tools for reducing mortality from the disease.	多伦多——乳腺癌筛查一向被看作降低该疾病死亡率的最重要的工具之一。


That is why recent doubts about its effectiveness – intensified by the publication in February of the 25-year follow-up to the Canadian National Breast Screening Study – have come as such a shock.	因此，不久前公布的对其有效性的质疑令人震惊——同样令人震惊的还有去年2月发表的加拿大国家乳腺筛查研究25年随访记录。


How can breast-cancer screening, which facilitates early detection of the disease, not prevent deaths from it?	乳腺癌筛查这样有利于疾病早期发现的手段怎么可能没有降低死亡率？


Understanding screening’s limitations requires, first and foremost, an understanding of the process.	了解筛查在作用上的限制首先需要了解筛查过程。


A mammogram (x-ray of the breast) is administered to ostensibly healthy people to detect unsuspected disease.	乳腺癌筛查需要对表面健康的人进行乳房X光照射，以检查是否存在未被怀疑的疾病。


If any abnormalities are found, a diagnostic test is conducted to confirm the presence of the disease.	发现任何异常状况需要进行诊断性实验，确认是否患上了疾病。


If the results are positive, treatment begins.	如果实验结果呈阳性，就需要开始治疗过程。


The first limitation of breast-cancer screening is obvious: where effective diagnosis and treatment are not available, screening cannot have any impact.	乳腺癌筛查最重要的限制因素显而易见：没有有效的诊断和治疗手段，筛查起不了多大作用。


But there is more to the issue – namely, whether screening ultimately fulfills its intended purpose of reducing breast-cancer mortality rates.	但这个问题还有更重要的意义——即筛查最终能否降低乳腺癌死亡率。


There have been several attempts to evaluate, through observational studies, the impact of screening in the general population.	人们曾多次尝试通过观察研究来评估筛查在大众中的作用。


But such studies, which are based on comparisons between uncontrolled groups, tend to produce biased results. None has been able to account for differences in treatment.	但上述基于非受控组比较的研究往往得出的结果会有偏差，因此在治疗上无法带来实质性的不同。


More important, none has found a reduction in advanced breast cancer in the screened groups – a requirement to deem screening effective.	更重要的是，筛查组中晚期乳腺癌病例也并未出现下降——而这是认定筛查有效的必要前提。


With observational studies producing inadequate results, scientists turned to a procedure developed years ago to evaluate new tuberculosis drugs: randomized screening trials.	因为观察研究得不出有意义的结果，科学家们转而采用随机筛选试验，这是多年前发明的一种评估新的抗结核药的方法。


Such trials begin with the selection of women at risk of developing breast cancer, and randomly allocate them to be screened or not.	上述试验开始时要挑选有可能患乳腺癌的女性，并把她们随机分入筛查组和对照组。


Any woman in either group who develops breast cancer is treated to the fullest extent possible, following the closest possible treatment plan to other participants in the trial (taking into consideration the stage of the disease at diagnosis).	两组中所有患乳腺癌的女性均按照与其他受试者最为贴近的治疗计划（考虑到诊断时乳腺癌所处的阶段）接受最积极的治疗。


Researchers follow the women’s progress over many years, with the goal of comparing the two groups’ mortality rates.	研究人员长期跟踪这些受试者的状况，目的是对这两组的死亡率进行比较。


In North America, where, for ethical reasons, randomization requires informed consent, only two such trials have been conducted.	北美地区因道德原因开展随机抽样需要知情同意书，因此上述试验只进行过两次。


The first was in New York in the 1960s, using annual mammograms and breast examinations for the screened group.	第一次是在2 0世纪60年代的纽约，筛查组每年接受X光乳腺造影和乳房检查。


The second, the Canadian National Breast Screening Study, which began in the 1980s, also used annual mammograms and breast examinations for the screened group.	第二次是20世纪80年代开始的加拿大国家乳腺筛查研究，筛查组同样每年接受X光乳腺造影和乳房检查。


But, in the control group, women aged 50-59 also received annual clinical breast examinations, and women aged 40-49 were given a single breast examination.	但对照组50-59岁的女性同样每年接受临床乳房检查，而40-49的女性则接受一次性乳房检查。


In Europe, one trial began in the United Kingdom in the 1970s, again using breast examinations and mammography for the screened group.	欧洲的英国在20世纪70年代进行过一次试验，筛查组同样采用X光乳腺造影和乳房检查。


A more recent British trial, performed on women aged 39-41, used only mammography, as did the largest of all, the Swedish two-county trial.	近期一次英国试验针对39-41岁的女性，和规模最大的瑞典两县试验一样只采用X光乳腺造影检查。


Though the trial results have been inconsistent, the conclusion is clear: breast-cancer screening does not reduce mortality rates.	虽然试验结果略有出入，但结论却十分明确：乳腺癌筛查并不能降低死亡率。


The trials that have shown a significant decrease in mortality are usually older, and other factors have compromised the results.	显示筛查能降低死亡率的试验往往为时较早，而且结果也受到其他因素的影响。


For example, the Swedish two-county trial was randomized by clusters of population groups, and the comparability between the women in the screened and control groups was not confirmed.	比方说，瑞典两县试验随机抽选不同的人群，无法确认筛查组和控制组能得出可比的结果。


Moreover, the trial was conducted before modern breast-cancer treatments were freely available.	此外，该试验进行时还没有免费的现代乳腺癌治疗技术。


More recent trials, such as that conducted in the UK, show at most a non-significant benefit from screening.	更多近期试验，比方说英国的那次试验，最多显示筛查能带来微弱的效果。


The results of the 25-year follow-up of the Canadian trial – which can be considered the most accurate, given that the women were carefully characterized according to risk factors and had access to the most advanced treatments – are even more damning.	被公认准确性最高的加拿大试验25年随访项目（鉴于参与者均按风险因素悉心整理过，并且能够获得最先进的治疗）得出的结论甚至更加糟糕。


Beyond showing no benefit from mammography screening, the Canadian trial highlighted one of the practice’s major disadvantages: over-diagnosis.	加拿大试验不仅未能证明乳腺X光筛查的好处，还突出了上述方法的一个主要缺陷：诊断过度。


Indeed, 22% of those in the screened group were over-diagnosed, meaning that the cancers found would not have become clinically detectable during the woman’s lifetime.	事实上，筛查组22%的人都存在过度诊断现象，也就是说发现的癌症在受试者一生中都不可能得到临床检测。


Add to that the in situ cancers – early-stage cancers that have not spread to neighboring tissue – and the number rises to 50%.	再加上原位癌——即尚未扩散到邻近组织的早期癌症——该比例增长至50%。


To be sure, over-diagnosis is inevitable with good screening tests.	可以肯定，过度诊断现象在好的筛查试验中不可避免。


The real problem is the over-treatment that follows, owing to the lack of reliable tests to differentiate observable lesions from those that actually require medical intervention.	真正的问题在于随之而来的过度治疗，因为尚没有可靠的试验能将观察到的病变与的确需要治疗的病变区分开来。


Many of the women who believe that their lives were saved by mammography screenings actually had so-called “IDLE” cancers (indolent lesions of epithelial origin), which would not have progressed before they died of other causes.	很多相信乳腺X光造影筛查挽救了自己生命的女性实际患上的是所谓“无效”癌（源于上皮组织的无痛病变），这些病变直到她们因其他原因去世都不会有任何发展。


Meanwhile, the very aggressive cancers, which are most likely to prove fatal, tend to present as “interval” cancers that appear between screenings.	此外，最有可能致命的攻击型癌症往往以“筛查”间期癌的形式存在。


In the deadliest cases, regular screenings would not make much difference.	对最致命的病例进行定期筛查不会带来多大差别。


Efforts to develop new, more sensitive screening tests are thus likely to do more harm than good, as they increase the rate of over-diagnosis, without improving outcomes among women with aggressive cancers.	因此研发新的、敏锐度更高的试验可能弊大于利，因为它们提高了过度诊断率，却无法为患有攻击型癌症的女性带来更多帮助。


What breast-cancer patients really need are tests that identify the risk that the disease actually poses, as well as new, lifesaving treatments.	乳腺癌患者真正需要的是明确疾病实际风险的测试，以及能够挽救生命的新的治疗手段。


It is time to recognize that breast-cancer screening does not save lives – and to focus on the strategies that will.	是时候承认乳腺癌筛查不能挽救生命——并把注意力转移到能挽救生命的策略上来。


Brecht on Brexit	布莱希特的脱欧论断


LONDON – In the wake of the 1953 workers’ uprising in East Germany, the playwright Bertolt Brecht mordantly suggested that “if the people had forfeited the confidence of the government,” the government might find it easier to “dissolve the people and elect another.”	发自伦敦——在1953年东德工人罢工事件之后，德国剧作家布尔托·布莱希特（Bertolt Brecht）尖锐地指出：“倘若政府发现民众已经对其丧失了信心”，那么解决这一问题的更有效方式莫过于“解散这届人民并选出另一届。


It is a sentiment that resonates with many in the United Kingdom today, in the aftermath of June’s Brexit referendum.	” 而在回顾六月的英国脱欧全民公投时，这种情绪也萦绕在许多人心中。


In the heat of the referendum campaign, Michael Gove, then the justice secretary and a leading member of the “Leave” camp, said, “I think the people of this country have had enough of experts from all kinds of organizations with acronyms, who have consistently got it wrong.”	在公投运动热火朝天的时候，“脱欧”阵营领军人物，司法部长迈克尔·戈夫（Michael Gove）声称：“我认为这个国家的人民已经受够了那些来自于某些首字母缩写词组织的，从来不曾做出过正确判断的专家了。


His targets were the IMF, the OECD, the LSE, and all the other covens of economists who argued that leaving the European Union would damage the British economy.	”他所指的是来自国际货币基金组织（IMF），经济合作与发展组织（OECD），伦敦政治经济学院（LSE）还有其他那些认定脱欧将损害英国经济的经济学家。


Unfortunately, Gove was right – not about what would happen to the economy, but about UK voters’ low regard for economic expertise.	不幸的是，戈夫是正确的——但是与经济走向无关，而是英国选民对经济专业人士藐视态度。


Despite the near-unanimous view of the economics profession that Brexit would tip the UK into recession and lower its long-term growth rate, voters went with their hearts, not their wallets.	尽管经济界人士一致认为脱欧会导致英国陷入衰退并降低其长期增长率，选民们却跟随着他们的情绪而不是钱包来做决定。


The “Remain” campaign was accused of using the economists’ warnings to try to frighten voters into submission.	人们指责“留欧”阵营引用经济学家警告的目的就是企图恐吓选民就范。


Some have argued that the blame for the referendum’s outcome lies with economists themselves, because they were unable to speak a language that ordinary people could understand.	有些人认为公投脱欧成功的责任在于经济学家自身，因为他们的说话方式一点都不接地气。


A similar charge is made against bankers and other financiers, who, widely perceived to be arguing from narrow sectoral self-interest, were equally unpersuasive.	银行家和金融家也受到了类似的指责，人们普遍认为他们的话同样没有说服力，因为目的都是为了追求本行业的狭隘私利。


There is undoubtedly some truth in this criticism, but the problem was not simply over-complex language and impenetrable jargon.	这种批评无疑是有一定道理的，但问题可不仅在于过于复杂的语言和令人费解的行话。


The economists all began from the assumption that the UK was doing fine, with GDP growth well above the European average, and unemployment well below. It seemed self-evident that EU membership was good for Britain, especially as we had avoided joining the euro and were thus not tied up in monetary and fiscal knots designed in Brussels and Frankfurt.	经济学家都是从英国经济健康运行，GDP增长和失业率分别远高和远低于欧洲平均水平的假设上进行分析，这似乎必然意味着欧盟成员资格是有利于英国的，尤其是在英国免于加入欧元区，因此无需与布鲁塞尔和法兰克福制定的货币和财政政策捆绑在一起的情况下。


The problem was that this rosy picture did not resonate with voters outside London and the Southeast of England, for reasons set out with great clarity in a recent speech by Andy Haldane, the Bank of England’s chief economist.	问题是这一美好前景无法令与伦敦以及英格兰东南部以外区域的选民产生共鸣。 对此英格兰银行首席经济学家安迪·霍尔丹（Andy Haldane）则在最近发表的一次演讲中极为清晰地阐述了造成这一问题的原因。


Haldane cites national statistics showing that Britain’s GDP is 7% above its pre-crisis peak, employment is 6% higher, and wealth is 30% greater. But, he adds, national income per head is flat.	霍尔丹援引国家统计数据指出相对于危机前的峰值水平，英国的GDP要高出7%，就业率要高6％，财富总额也增长了30％。


Median real (inflation-adjusted) wages have barely risen since 2005. The UK population has grown, partly owing to immigration.	但他同时也补充说，人均国民收入基本原地踏步，去除通胀因素后的实际工资中位数自2005年以来几乎没有上升，英国人口增长的一部分原因是移民。


The recorded increase in wealth has come about mainly from increases in property prices in favored areas, especially London, and in the value of occupational pensions.	统计中的财富增长主要来自热门地区（尤其是伦敦）的房地产价格以及企业年金价值的上涨。


If you are not lucky enough to own property in the Southeast of England, and are not in a final-salary pension scheme, your wealth has stagnated or fallen.	如果你时运不济，既没有在英格兰东南部买房，又没有参加最重薪资养老金计划，那么你的财富额就会停滞不前甚至缩水。


The regional breakdown of GDP figures shows that London and the Southeast are the only areas of the UK where people are better off, on average, than they were in 2009, at the trough of the recession.	按区域分类的GDP数值显示，平均而言伦敦和东南部地区是英国唯一民众生活相较2009年经济衰退的低谷时期进一步提升的区域。


It may well be true that Brexit will exacerbate these inequalities.	脱欧可能会令这种不平等状况进一步加剧。


If intra-European trade barriers are imposed, and companies choose to invest elsewhere to access Europe’s single market, lower-paid jobs in disadvantaged regions may disappear altogether, or wages will fall further.	如果欧洲对英施加贸易壁垒，企业选择投资其他地方来衔接欧洲单一市场，那么那些弱势地区的低收入工作岗位可能会完全消失或者进一步下调工资。


But that sounds like “expert” talk, and the former Leave campaigners have a response to it: economists are talking down the UK to prove that their gloomy forecasts were correct.	但这听起来很像“专家”的说法，而脱欧活动家们也早就做好了应对的准备：经济学家就是唱空英国，好证明他们的负面预测是正确的。


If the experts couldn’t be trusted before the referendum, they certainly can’t be trusted now.	如果这些专家在公投之前就丢掉了信誉，凭什么现在还要相信他们呢。


That is the inauspicious background against which talks on the UK’s future relationship with the EU will soon begin.	这就是关于英国与欧盟即将展开的未来关系会谈的负面背景。


It is especially unfavorable for the City of London.	对伦敦金融城来说这极为不利。


There is clearly a trade-off between access to the single market, which most financial firms greatly desire, and one of its main conditions: freedom of movement for EU citizens, which is seen as having contributed to wage stagnation in the rest of the UK.	很显然你必须在进军欧洲单一市场——这是大部分金融公司热切期望的——以及其主要条件之一，欧盟公民的自由流动之间作出权衡，而后者一直被视为导致英国其余地区工资停滞的原因。


So an outcome that benefits London (which, unsurprisingly, voted overwhelmingly to remain in the EU) must be advocated with subtlety and care, lest it be seen as sacrificing the wellbeing of the many to the interests of a few.	因此必须微妙和谨慎提倡任何有利于伦敦——该城不出意外地以压倒性票数赞成留在欧盟——的政策，以免被看作是牺牲多数人来为少数人牟利。


The strongest argument in favor of remaining in the single market is that putting the City of London at risk jeopardizes the entire UK economy.	赞成留在单一市场的强有力论据是损害伦敦金融城就等于损害整个英国经济。


Financial services may account for only 3% of employment, but they generate 11% of tax revenues.	金融服务业虽然只占3％的就业，但它们缴纳了全国11%的税收收入。


Killing the goose that lays the golden tax egg would be foolhardy: if the economy slows, which seems the best we can expect, those revenues will be sorely needed.	杀死下金蛋的鹅是种鲁莽行为：如果经济增长放缓——这似乎是我们可以期待的最好结果——那么英国就将迫切需要这笔税收收入。


And at a time when the UK’s balance-of-payments deficit is over 5% of GDP (the second largest in the OECD), the financial sector’s 3%-of-GDP trade surplus has been essential to prevent an external blowout.	而在当英国的国际收支逆差相当于GDP的5％以上时（位列经合组织第二大），金融业这相当于GDP3%的贸易顺差就成为了防范外部危机的必需品。


It is no surprise, therefore, that sterling has dropped sharply since the Brexit vote.	因此不出意外，英镑自从脱欧投票以来一路暴跌。


Some argue that exchange-rate depreciation will narrow the trade deficit by making British exports more competitive, but the experience of 2008, when the pound also fell sharply, is that the impact on the external deficit may not be great.	一些人认为，汇率贬值将通过增强英国出口更竞争力来减少贸易赤字，但2008年英镑大幅下跌的经验告诉我们此事对外部赤字的影响可能不会很大。


The UK has few price-sensitive exports for which there is significant spare capacity available to expand production.	英国价格敏感商品的出口本来就不多，也没有多大闲置产能来扩大生产。


So these are nervous times in London’s financial markets.	因此，这些都是在伦敦金融市场的紧张时期。


We need new experts, unadorned with despised acronyms like IMF, to explain the unpleasant facts of economic life to a highly suspicious public.	我们需要一些新的专家——与国际货币基金组织这类被藐视的机构毫无关系的人——来向满腹狐疑的公众解释经济生活中的不愉快事实。


No one should take Brecht’s ironic suggestion seriously.	任何人都不应该把布莱希特的讽刺建议当回事。


The British people have spoken, and a way must be found to achieve their desires at the lowest possible economic cost.	英国的民众已经做出了决定，现在要做的就是必须找到一种尽可能低成本的方法来实现他们的意愿。


Breivik’s Call to Arms	布雷维克的战争号角


NEW YORK – Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that Geert Wilders, the Dutch politician who is convinced that Europe is “in the final stages of Islamization,” is right: Anders Breivik, the Norwegian mass murderer, is mad.	发自纽约——为了方便讨论，让我们假设那位曾经声称欧洲“已经到了伊斯兰化最后阶段”的荷兰政客霍尔特·怀德斯是对的：挪威大屠杀凶手安德斯·布雷维克就是个疯子。


Wilders tweeted: “That a psychopath has abused the battle against Islamization is disgusting and a slap in the face of the worldwide anti-Islam movement.”	怀德斯在Tweeter上留言说：“那个侮辱反伊斯兰斗争的精神患者简直令人作呕，也对全球反伊斯兰运动造成了重大打击”。


This assumption is not so far-fetched.	这个假设并不那么荒谬。


Murdering more than 60 innocent young people at a summer camp with an assault rifle, after bombing a chunk of central Oslo, is, to put it mildly, morally eccentric – something most sane people would never dream of doing.	此人先是用炸弹袭击了奥斯陆市中心大片地区，然后用一支突击步枪屠杀了超过60名参加夏令营的年轻人，委婉地说，这个行为确实是非常怪异——因为心智健全的人永远都不会动这样的念头。


The same is true, naturally, of a group of young men who decide to commit suicide and mass murder by flying commercial airliners into large public buildings in New York and Washington.	自然，同样的事情也发生在一群年轻人身上，他们决定通过劫持民航客机撞向纽约和华盛顿的公共建筑来自杀和屠杀别人。


But neither Breivik, nor the terrorists of September 11, 2001, killed without reason, in the way some nihilistic American shooters do.	但不像美国某些虚无主义杀手那样，无论是布雷维克还是那些“9·11”恐怖分子，他们都杀戮都是有目的的。


Islamists view their acts of random mass murder not as a personal publicity stunt, but as a tactic in a holy war against the decadent, sinful West.	在伊斯兰极端分子眼中杀害大批无辜者并不是一场个人公众表演，而是针对罪恶而堕落的西方的一场圣战。


Breivik is, in his own mind, a warrior for the other side.	而布雷维克自认是一个斗士。


His aim was to protect the West from Islamization.	他的目的是就是保护西方免遭伊斯兰化。


His enemies are not just Muslims, but the liberal Western elites, and their children, who were destroying Europe from within through “multiculturalism” and “cultural Marxism.”	他的敌人不仅仅是穆斯林，还有西方那些自由派精英及其子女，这些人都在利用“文化多元主义”和“文化马克思主义”来毁灭欧洲。


In fact, what Breivik wrote in his rambling manifesto, entitled A European Declaration of Independence, is more or less what populists, such as Geert Wilders, have been saying.	事实上，布雷维克在他篇杂乱无章的《欧洲独立宣言》中所写的内容或多或少都是霍尔特·怀德斯这些民粹主义者的言论。


Of course, there was much else in the manifesto – fantasies about reviving the medieval Knights Templar, for example – that suggests a more bizarre disposition, and Wilders was quick to distance himself from Breivik’s violent methods.	当然这个宣言中还有很多其他内容——比如复兴中世纪圣殿骑士团的梦想——体现了他本人的怪异思维，而怀德斯则迅速与布雷维克的暴力方式撇清关系。


Indeed, only one right-wing European politician, Francesco Speroni of the Italian Northern League, which is part of Silvio Berlusconi’s government, was prepared to defend Breivik.	实质上只有一个右翼政客——来自意大利贝鲁斯科尼阵营的北方联盟议员弗朗西斯科·斯佩隆尼——试图为布雷维克辩护。


Speroni claimed that Breivik’s “ideas are in defense of western civilization.”	他认为布雷维克的“意愿是为了保卫西方文明”。


So, how seriously must we take the ideological reasons that killers like Breivik and the September 11 terrorists invoke to justify their murders?	那么面对那些类似布雷维克的杀手以及“9·11”恐怖分子用来为自身屠杀行为辩护的意识形态理由，我们究竟该给于何种程度的对待？


A few years ago, the German writer Hans Magnus Enzensberger wrote a fascinating essay about the “radical loser.”	几年前，德国作家汉斯·恩森斯伯格写了一部讲述“激进失败者”的著名小说。


Radical losers are mostly young men who are so enraged by their own lack of social, economic, and sexual self-esteem and the indifference of the world around them, that they long for a suicidal act of mass destruction.	所谓激进失败者就是那些在社会，经济和性方面缺乏自信且对周围世界的冷漠恼怒不已的年轻人，这些人长期幻想着制造一场破坏巨大的自杀式行为。


Anything can trigger such an act: rejection by a girl, being fired from a job, failing an examination.	任何东西都可以引发这样的行为：向姑娘求爱被拒，被老板解雇，考试不及格。


And sometimes the killers reach for ideological justifications: building pure Islam, struggling for communism or fascism, or saving the West.	有时这些杀手也会为自己的行为找一些意识形态上的理由：建立纯粹的伊斯兰国，为实现共产主义或者法西斯主义而奋斗，或者拯救西方。


The particular ideals might be unimportant – simply those that happen to be available, owing to fashion or other historical circumstances.	这些理想本身可能并不那么重要——不过是些信手拈来的，出于某种潮流或者其他历史性因素的东西。


Once a radical loser is in the mood to kill, any reason will do.	一旦一个激进失败者起了杀心，一切事物都可以成为理由。


Perhaps.	这种说法或者有理。


But does this mean that there is no link at all between the stated views of radical clerics or politicians and the acts committed in the name of those opinions?	但这是否就意味着那些激进牧师和政客的言论就和那些借此名义行凶的行为无关？


For all the finger pointing at Wilders, just because Breivik professed to admire him, the acts of a deranged killer, others caution, should not be used to discredit what he stands for.	因为所有人都指责怀德斯，因为布雷维克公开表示仰慕他，而其他人则警告说这么一个精神错乱者的暴行不应该被用来攻击怀德斯的理念。


After all, there is nothing irrational, or murderous, about claiming that multiculturalism is a flawed ideal, or that Islam conflicts with modern Western European views of gender equality or gay rights, or that mass immigration will cause serious social conflicts.	毕竟无论是声称多元文化主义是一个有缺陷的理念，或者伊斯兰教在性别平等和同性恋者权利与现代西欧理念格格不入，或者大规模移民将导致严重社会冲突的言论，都不是非理性或是旨在致人死命的。


These claims began to be made by respectable conservatives, and even some social democrats, in the 1990’s.	上述言论最初是在上世纪90年代由一些有名望的保守主义者甚至社会民主主义者所提出。


They reacted against a rather smug liberal establishment that tended to dismiss all critical thought about immigration or non-Western faiths and traditions as racism and bigotry.	他们的目的是反对一个相当自以为是的自由主义政体，而该政体倾向于将所有针对移民和非西方信仰传统的严肃思考视为种族主义和冥顽不化。


But, while there was nothing intrinsically wrong with discussing the social consequences of large-scale immigration from Muslim countries, some populists in Holland, Denmark, France, Germany, Belgium, Britain, and other countries, went much further.	但虽然对大规模穆斯林移民的讨论在本质上并没有什么错，但荷兰、丹麦、法国、德国、比利时，英国以及其他国家的民粹主义者却进一步借题发挥。


Wilders, in particular, likes to speak in apocalyptic terms of “the lights going out over Europe,” and “the sheer survival of the West.”	尤其是怀德斯喜欢用一些类似“欧洲的光芒正��渐黯淡”或者“命悬一线的西方”的启示录词汇。


And the problem is not just a particular strain of violent revolutionary Islam, but Islam itself: “If you want to compare Islam to anything, compare it to communism or national socialism – a totalitarian ideology.”	而且在他看来问题并不仅限于一帮特别热衷于暴力革命的伊斯兰分子，而是伊斯兰教本身：“如果你想将任何东西与伊斯兰教相提并论的话，想想共产主义或者国家社会主义吧——就是一个极权主义意识形态。 ”


This is the language of existential war, the most dangerous kind.	这是一种认为敌我双方你死我活，不共戴天的“存在战争”论调，而且是最为凶险的一种。


Indeed, the terminology of World War II is being deliberately revived.	事实上，整套二战词汇都被人刻意复活。


Those who oppose radical hostility to all forms of Islam are “appeasers” of, or “collaborators” with, “Islamofascism.”	那些反对向所有形式的伊斯兰教表现极端敌意的人就是“伊斯兰法西斯主义”的“调停人”或者“同谋”。


For some, September 11, 2001, was analogous to 1938, or even 1940.	对于某些人来说，“9·11”发生的2001年就等同于1938年甚至1940年。


The very survival of Western civilization is at stake.	西方文明的生存到了最危险的时候。


Is it really so surprising that certain people might mistake this rhetoric for a call to arms?	那么有些特定的人将这些言论误认为拿起武器的斗争号角就毫不奇怪了。


To be sure, neither Geert Wilders, nor even rabidly anti-Islamic bloggers in the United States, such as Scott Spencer and Pamela Geller (both of whom were quoted extensively in Breivik’s manifesto), have called for physical violence.	虽然可以确信无论是霍尔特·怀德斯，还有美国那两个极端反伊斯兰的博客写手斯科特·史宾沙和佩内拉·高勒（两人的言论也被布雷维克广泛引用），都没有号召使用暴力。


But their writings and statements have been sufficiently hysterical and hateful to incite a person with an unbalanced mind.	但他们的文章和言论都极为歇斯底里和充满仇恨，足以刺激一个心理不平衡的人误入歧途。


Indeed, Breivik’s interpretation of their words is, in an odd way, more rational than the idea that a war for our very survival can be fought with words alone.	事实上，布雷维克对上述这些人言论的理解——以一种怪异的方式——比认为一个事关我们存亡的战争可以用嘴皮子解决的想法更加理性。


Why Britain Should Remain European	为何英国应该留在欧洲


WASHINGTON, DC – On June 23, the United Kingdom will hold a referendum on whether to leave the European Union.	华盛顿—6月23日，英国将举行是否脱离欧盟的全民公决。


On the economic side of the “Brexit” debate are three main questions: Do European rules impose growth-stifling regulation on the UK?	在“英国退出”争论的经济方面，有三个主要问题：欧洲规则是否给英国带来了遏制增长的监管？


Would leaving the EU increase opportunities for British exports?	脱离欧盟能否增加英国出口的机会？


And what would be the likely impact of withdrawal on financial stability?	金融稳定减弱有什么可能影响？


These are complex issues, but the June 2014 report by the Centre for European Reform (CER) provides a sensible guide on the first two questions.	这些都是复杂问题，但经济改革中心（CER）2014年6月的报告为前两个问题提供了明智的指引。


And now the Bank of England (BoE) has weighed in clearly on the third.	现在，英格兰银行显然注重于第三个问题。


In economic terms, the facts favor staying in the EU.	从经济角度看，事实有利于留在欧盟。


Heated and relatively technical debates of this nature require one to decide which experts to trust.	这一性质的热烈又相对具有技术性的争论需要确定相信哪些专家。


The commission that prepared the CER report comprised sensible British and European economic thinkers and former policymakers with no illusions about how the EU really works.	撰写CER的委员会的成员都是理智的英国和欧洲经济思想家和前政策制定者，他们对欧盟如何真正运转不抱幻想。


Likewise, the BoE’s Financial Policy Committee was designed after the 2008 crisis to speak truth to authority on where systemic risks really lurk – and what to do about them.	类似地，英格兰银行的金融政策委员会为2008年危机后成立，初衷是为了向当局解释哪里会出现真正的系统性风险——以及应该怎样应对。


The CER report is strongest on the real (nonfinancial) economic issues.	CER报告对于实际（非金融）经济问题着力最大。


The most contentious point here is whether the British economy is held back in some way by red tape imposed by Brussels or by European treaty obligations.	这方面最有争议性的点是英国经济是否因为布鲁塞尔的官样文章或欧洲条约的义务而受到拖累。


It is very hard to find any such stifling effect in the data.	从数据上看，很难发现这些拖累影响。


The CER points out that product- and labor-market regulation in the UK are closer to that of the United States than to Western Europe, and the same broad pattern emerges from the OECD’s assessment of barriers to entrepreneurship.	CER指出，英国产品和劳动力市场监管更加类似于美国而不是西欧，经合组织对企业家精神的壁垒的评估也发现了类似的广泛模式。


The CER’s assessment is confirmed by the latest available information from the World Bank’s 2016 Doing Business indicators, which have the advantage of covering almost all countries in the world.	CER的评估受到世界银行2016年营商指标的最新信息的确认。 世界银行营商指标的优点是覆盖了全世界几乎所有国家。


These indicators are not perfect, but they do get at red-tape-related issues.	这些指标不完美，但都抓住了官样文章相关问题。


Britain is ranked sixth in the world – one place above the United States and behind only some very pro-business countries, such as Singapore, Hong Kong, and New Zealand.	英国在全世界排名第六——高于美国，仅次于一些非常有利于营商的地区，如新加坡、香港和新西兰。


Other leading EU countries have more impediments to doing business.	其他主要欧盟国家的营商环境更加不利。


For example, Germany is ranked 15th and France is 27th.	比如，德国排名第15，法国第27。


Italy, ranked 45th, surely has something to worry about – but its problems do not stem from Brussels.	意大利排名第45，显然值得担忧——但它的问题确实来自布鲁塞尔。


There is no sign here of the UK being dragged down by the EU.	在英国，没有迹象表明它是被欧盟所拖累。


If anything, the UK might aim to be a bit more like Denmark (an EU member, ranked third in the world) on some dimensions of the business environment, including property registration, construction permits, and paperwork reduction in international trade.	英国也许可以在营商环境的某些方面以丹麦为目标（丹麦是欧盟成员国，在全世界名列第三），包括产权注册、建筑许可和减少国际贸易中的文书工作等。


On the issue of trade, the assessment is even more straightforward.	在贸易方面，评估更加直白。


At the heart of European integration is the idea that barriers to trade – including tariffs and other impediments – can be and have been reduced.	欧洲一体化的核心思想是贸易壁垒——包括关税和其他阻碍——能够也已经降低。


In the CER’s view, EU membership has increased UK trade in goods with other member states by more than 50%.	在CER看来，欧盟成员资格让英国与其他成员国的商品贸易增加了50%以上。


Would leaving the EU create new robust trade possibilities that otherwise would not exist, either within the British Commonwealth or with emerging markets such as China?	脱离欧盟能带来留在欧盟得不到的稳健贸易机会，不管是英联邦内部还是与中国等新兴经济体？


This seems highly unlikely.	似乎可能性相当小。


And the biggest trade agreement on the horizon that will affect the UK is between the United States and the European Union – the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).	而眼下能影响英国的最大的贸易协定为美国和欧盟之间的跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系（TTIP）。


Such mega-regional trade agreements are complex, with many devils in the detail.	这类大型地区贸易协定十分复杂，细节中藏着诸多魔鬼。


The TTIP will most likely move forward after the US presidential election, and Britain most definitely needs to be at the negotiating table.	TTIP很有可能在美国总统大选后推进，英国显然需要留在谈判桌前。


International trade is about getting access to a bigger market, and trade agreements involve mutual reduction of barriers, including all kinds of non-tariff rules that minimize competition in the provision of services.	国际贸易事关进入更大市场，而贸易协定包括共同消除壁垒，包括所有最小化服务供应竞争的非关税规则。


Britain will do well from this kind of service-sector trade liberalization.	英国可以从这一服务部门贸易自由化中获得很大的好处。


But any country involved directly in such talks generally does better.	但一切直接参与这类谈判的国家总体而言都能获得好处。


In terms of Brexit’s impact on the financial sector – in addition to broader stability concerns – the BoE’s Financial Policy Committee is quite clear.	至于英国退出对金融部门的影响——除了广义的稳定性担忧——英格兰银行金融政策委员会相当清楚。


“[H]eightened and prolonged uncertainty,” owing to the impending referendum, “has the potential to increase the risk premia investors require on a wider range of UK assets, which could lead to a further depreciation of sterling and affect the cost and availability of financing for a broad range of UK borrowers.”	来自即将到来的全民公决的“高企而长期的不确定性”“有可能提高投资者对大量英国资产的风险溢价要求��而这可能导致英镑进一步贬值并影响英国各界借款人的融资可行性。


This is not likely to be good for consumers or for business investment.	”这对于消费者和商业投资来说可能不是好事。


Over the longer term, the UK financial sector needs to be well regulated; no one wants another major financial disruption.	在长期，英国金融部门需要好好监管； 没人希望看到又一场金融大破坏。


But such rules are entirely possible within the existing international and European framework.	但这些规则在现行国际和欧洲框架下是完全可能的。


Some other economic issues that have come up in the Brexit debate are either minor or red herrings.	其他一些与英国退出争论有关的经济问题要么无关紧要，要么会分散注意力。


As the CER report shows, immigration from EU member states, for example, benefits the UK economy, because it brings in more young people who pay taxes.	比如，CER报告显示，来自欧盟成员国的移民从英国经济中获益，因为这带来了更多纳税的年轻人。


And the post-Brexit reduction in UK government spending would most likely be minor.	而英国退出后英国政府支出的降低幅度可能非常小。


Of course, EU membership is not just about economics.	当然，欧盟成员地位并不只关乎经济。


There is also an important debate about Britain’s role in the world.	对于英国在全世界的作用也存在重要争论。


But it is difficult to see how the UK’s global stature and influence would increase if it left the EU – particularly given the significant adverse impact such an outcome would have on the British economy.	但很难说如果离开欧盟——特别是考虑到这一结果可能对英国经济造成的重大负面影响——英国全球地位和影响力的全球地位和影响力会如何。


The Brexit Alarm	英国退出警报


BERKELEY – I have no special expertise on the question of whether Britain should leave (or “Brexit”) the European Union.	伯克利—对于英国是否应该退出欧盟（“英国退出”）的问题，我不是专家。


True, I did live in the United Kingdom until a bit less than a year ago.	诚然，我在英国生活过，离开那里还不到一年。


And here in California, we have our own Brexit-like debate, with a movement to place a proposal to secede from the United States on the November ballot.	而在加利福尼亚，我们也有我们自己的类似于英国退出的争论，有一个运动提出要在11月份的选举中退出美国。


But while the idea of California independence might seem comical, the Brexit referendum on June 23 is no laughing matter.	加利福尼亚州独立的概念看上去滑稽可笑，但6月23日的英国退出全民公决绝非笑料。


Most obviously, Brexit would damage Britain’s export competitiveness.	最显而易见的是，英国退出将危害英国的出口竞争力。


To be sure, ties with the EU would not be severed immediately, and the UK government would have a couple of years to negotiate a trade agreement with the European Single Market, which accounts for nearly half of British exports.	诚然，与欧盟的联系不会立刻切断，英国政府也将获得几年时间与欧洲单一市场（目前占英国出口的近一半）进行贸易协定谈判。


The authorities could cut a bilateral deal like Switzerland’s, which guarantees access to the Single Market for specific industries and sectors.	有关当局可以形成一个类似于瑞士的双边协议，保证某些行业和部门进入单一市场。


Or they could follow Norway’s example and access the Single Market through membership in the European Free Trade Association.	也可以效仿挪威的例子，通过加入欧洲自由贸易联盟进入单一市场。


But Britain needs the EU market more than the EU needs Britain’s, so the bargaining would be asymmetric.	但英国需要欧盟市场甚于欧盟需要英国市场，因此讨价还价是不对称的。


And EU officials would most likely drive a hard bargain indeed, in order to deter other countries from contemplating exits of their own.	欧盟官员可能会提出苛刻的交换条件，从而震慑其他考虑退出欧盟的国家。


The UK would have to accept EU product standards and regulations lock, stock and barrel, with no say in their design – and would be in a far weaker position when negotiating market-access agreements with non-EU partners like China.	英国将不得不全盘接受欧盟产品标准和监管，无法对这些标准和监管置喙——并且其与非欧盟伙伴（如中国）进行市场准入协议谈判时的处境也会大大恶化。


In addition, Brexit would undermine London’s position as Europe’s financial center.	此外，英国退出将削弱伦敦作为欧洲金融中心的地位。


It is quite extraordinary that the principal center for euro-denominated financial transactions is outside the eurozone.	欧元计价的金融交易的主要中心位于欧元区之外，这相当反常。


This attests to the strength of EU regulations prohibiting discrimination within the Single Market.	这证明了欧盟禁止单一市场内部歧视的监管非常严格。


But in a post-Brexit world, Frankfurt and Paris would no longer be prevented from imposing measures that favored their banks and exchanges over London’s.	但在英国退出后，就无法再阻止法兰克福和巴黎采取有利于其自身银行和交易所而不利于伦敦的措施。


The City is also an example of a sector that relies heavily on foreign labor.	伦敦金融城也是严重依赖外来劳动力的行业的典型。


Upwards of 15% of workers in banking, finance, and insurance were born abroad.	在银行、金融和保险业，多达15%的员工出生于海外。


Attracting and retaining this foreign talent will become harder after Brexit, when EU workers moving to Britain will no longer be able to take their pension rights with them, and the other conveniences of a single labor market are lost.	吸引和留住这些外国人才在英国退出后将变得更加困难，流向英国的欧盟公认不再能够随身转移养老金权利，其他单一市场的便利条件也将失去。


Brexit could have more mundane, but highly noticeable, effects on Britain.	英国退出可能给英国带来更加普通但非常惹人注目的影响。


Anyone who has spent time in the UK knows that the single greatest gain in the quality of life over the last generation has been in the caliber of the food.	任何人只要在英国住过，就知道在过去一代人的时间里，生活质量提升最大的方面在于食物的丰富性。


One shudders to imagine the culinary landscape of a UK abandoned by its French and Italian chefs.	想象一下法国和意大利大厨纷纷离开后的英国厨房景象，令人不寒而栗。


Somewhat more weightily, a Britain that is just another middle power would be less able to project military and diplomatic influence globally than it currently is, working in concert with the EU.	稍稍更重要的是，仅仅作为又一股中间力量的英国将不再像现在那样，与欧盟一起在全球施加军事和外交影响力。


Although the UK would remain a member of NATO, we have yet to see how functional the Alliance will be in the era after US hegemony.	尽管英国将仍然是北约成员国，但我们尚未看到该联盟在美国霸权结束后的时代如何运转。


While the EU has yet to develop a coherent foreign and security policy, the ongoing refugee crisis makes clear that it will have to move in that direction.	尽管欧盟尚未形成一致的外角和安全政策，但眼下的难民危机清楚地表明，欧盟必须朝这一方向努力。


Indeed, this is the single most ironic aspect of the Brexit debate.	事实上，这是英国退出争论中最具讽刺性的一个角度。


After all, British public opinion first began to turn in favor of EU membership after the failed Suez invasion of 1956, which taught the country that, bereft of empire, it could no longer execute an effective foreign policy on its own.	毕竟，一开始，英国民意在1956年苏伊士入侵失败后是支持加入欧盟的，这场失败让英国知道，帝国解体后，它不再能够独力执行有效的外交政策。


All of which leads one to ask: What can Brexit’s proponents possibly be thinking?	所有这些不禁让人感到疑惑：英国退出的支持者到底在想什么？


The answer is that they are not – thinking, that is.	答案他们根本没有在想。


The Brexit campaign is tapping into the same primordial sentiments as Donald Trump is in the US.	英国退出阵营的初始情绪和美国的唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）一样。


Most Brexit supporters are angry, disaffected voters who feel left behind.	大部分英国退出支持者是认为自己被抛在别人身后的愤怒不满的选民。


Exposure to international trade and finance, which is what EU membership entails, may have benefited the UK as a whole, but it has not worked to every individual’s advantage.	欧盟成员地位意味着英国暴露在国际贸易和金融之下，这总体而言有利于英国，但未必符合所有个体的利益。


So the disadvantaged are lashing out – against trade, against immigration, and against the failure of conventional politicians to address their woes.	因此，处境不利者破口大骂——骂贸易，骂移民，骂传统政客没能解决他们的难处。


Fundamentally, a vote for Brexit is a vote against Prime Minister David Cameron, Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne, and the political mainstream generally.	从根本上说，支持英国退出就是反对首相卡梅伦、财政大臣奥斯本（George Osborne）和全体政治主流。


The real problem, obviously, is not the EU; it is the failure of the British political class to provide meaningful help to the casualties of globalization.	显然，真正的问题不是欧盟； 而是英国政治阶级没能为全球化的受害者提供有意义的帮助。


Within the last month, Work and Pensions Secretary Iain Duncan Smith resigned in protest over the government’s proposed cuts to welfare benefits.	上个月，就业和养老金大臣史密斯（Iain Duncan Smith）辞职抗议政府削减福利的方案。


And on April 1, the minimum wage was raised.	4月1日，最低工资获得提高。


Maybe the voices of the angry and disaffected are finally being heard.	也许愤怒不满的群众的声音终于被听到了。


If so, the Brexit debate will not have been pointless after all.	果真如此的话，英国退出争论倒也不是完全没有意义。


The Brexit of UK Banking	英国银行业的英国退出


LONDON – When I became the head of banking supervision in the United Kingdom in the mid-1990s, my friends did not see it as a glamorous or exciting career move.	伦敦—20世纪90年代中期，当我出任英国银行监督部门主管时，我的朋友们觉得这不是一个光荣或令人激动的差事。


Banking regulation was an obscure task, like cleaning sewers: essential, perhaps, but hardly front-page news.	银行监管是一个默默无闻的任务，就像清洗下水道：它很重要，但不太可能成为头条热点。


Expressions of curiosity about how I spent my working hours were typically a sign of friendly politeness rather than genuine interest.	有些人表示对我如何打发工作时间表示好奇，这通常只是友好的礼貌信号，而不是真正感兴趣。


Twenty years later, the structure of banking regulation in Europe has risen to the top of the political agenda in London.	二十年后，欧洲银行监管结构已经上升为伦敦政治日程的重中之重。


It is one of the key points in Prime Minister David Cameron’s renegotiation of the UK’s terms of membership of the European Union.	它是首相卡梅伦与欧盟重新谈判英国成员资格条件的关键点之一。


One of Cameron’s four major demands of the EU is a national derogation from elements of the uniform rulebook which the European Central Bank is seeking to introduce in the eurozone’s banking union to ensure a consistent approach across countries.	卡梅伦对欧盟的四个主要要求之一是英国可以背离统一规则的要素。 欧洲央行正在寻求将统一规则纳入欧元区银行联盟，以保证各国方针的一致性。


The French and others fear that this derogation could permit the UK, in search of competitive advantage, to loosen financial regulation in London, even though recent evidence suggests that bank capital requirements, and other controls on banks’ activities, are in fact now tighter in London than elsewhere in Europe.	法国和其他国家担心这一背离可能让英国为了赢得竞争优势而放松伦敦的金融监管，尽管最新证据表明，目前伦敦对银行资本要求和其他控制银行活动的要求实际上要比欧洲其他地方更加严格。


For example, there is no European equivalent of the British requirement to “ring-fence” retail and commercial banking, and the French and German governments’ opposition suggests that there is unlikely to be one.	比如，英国要求“隔离”零售和商业银行业务，而欧洲层面不存在这一要求，法国和德国政府的反对意味着不可能出现这样的欧洲规则。


Of course, the reason why banking supervision – and financial regulation more generally – has higher political salience now is obvious: The financial crisis of 2008 showed that bank failures could have catastrophic consequences for the economy as a whole.	当然，银行监督——以及更一般的金融监管——现在为何具备了更高的政治重要性的原因显而易见：2008年金融危机表明银行倒闭可能给整体经济带来灾难性后果。


That crisis followed a period during which the financial sector grew dramatically, especially in Europe.	这场危机之后迎来了金融业的迅速增长，特别是欧洲。


The bank-market ratio – the size of the banking sector relative to the size of equity and bond markets – roughly doubled in the UK and Germany in little more than a decade, while the ratio remained stable in the US, and at a much lower level.	英国和德国的银行-市场比率——银行业占股市和债市的比重——在短短十年间上升了一倍，而美国则保持稳定并且远低于英国和德国。


The difference is particularly marked in the eurozone, where two-thirds of non-financial firms’ external financing comes from bank loans.	欧元区的区别尤其显著，三分之二的欧元区非金融企业的外部融资来自银行贷款。


The comparable figure is nearer 20% in the US, where, as in the UK, equity and debt capital markets play a much more important role in financing business investment.	美国的可比数字为接近20%，和英国一样，在美国股票和债务资本市场对企业投资融资的作用比银行贷款重要得多。


The short-term consequence was that the credit crunch that began in 2008 had a more serious and longer-term impact on Europe’s heavily bank-based economies, as banks curtailed lending to preserve and rebuild their capital ratios.	短期后果是2008年开始的信用动荡对严重依赖银行的欧洲经济体造成的影响要严重得多，也更加长期，因为银行削减了贷款以维持和重塑资本比率。


That process is still under way in parts of continental Europe, though business lending by banks has recovered in the UK.	这一过程在一些欧洲大陆国家仍在进行，尽管英国的银行贷款已经有所恢复。


But a new study by Sam Langfield of the ECB and Marco Pagano of the University of Naples suggests that the longer-term implications are even more damaging than was previously suspected.	但欧洲央行的山姆·朗菲尔德（Sam Langfield）和那不勒斯大学的马可·帕加诺（Marco Pagano）的一份新研究指出，长期影响要比此前所怀疑的更有破坏性。


Langfield and Pagano point out that in the eight years since the crisis, the European Union’s GDP has grown by only 2%, compared to more than 9% in the US, and attribute this differential to transatlantic differences in financial structure.	朗菲尔德和帕加诺指出，在危机爆发以来的八年中，欧盟GDP只增长了2%，而美国超过9%，这一差异的原因是大西洋两岸金融结构的区别。


Analyzing data for a large number of countries, they find that “an increase in the size of a country’s banking sector relative to stock and private bond market capitalization is associated with lower GDP growth in the subsequent five-year period.”	在分析了来自大量国家数据后，他们发现“一国银行业相对股市和私人���券市场的规模的扩张伴随着随后五年更低的GDP增长。 ”


And the magnitude of the impact they assess is considerable.	他们所评估的影响的程度也颇为可观。 欧洲银行-市场比率在1990年时为3.


Europe’s bank-market ratio was 3.2 in 1990; by 2011, it had risen to 3.8.	2； 但在2011年，上升到3.


An increase on that scale is associated in their model with a 0.3-percentage-point reduction in annual growth, and twice that in a housing-market crisis, given the high proportion of mortgage lending on EU banks’ balance sheets.	根据他们的模型，如此规模的上升伴随着年GDP增长下降0. 3个百分点，而在住房市场危机期间，影响会翻番，因为按揭贷款在欧盟银行资产负债表中占比很高。


Many EU countries, notably Ireland and Spain, did experience a collapse in house prices after 2008.	许多欧洲国家，特别是爱尔兰和西班牙，确实在2008年后经历了住房价格崩溃。


So the relative size of EU banks might account for roughly half of the growth gap vis-à-vis the US.	因此，欧盟银行的相对规模可能解释了与美国增长差距的一半。


That explains why the ECB, and some EU governments, are keen on the Capital Markets Union project, which aims to find ways to stimulate the growth of non-bank financing channels across the continent.	这解释了为何欧洲央行，以及一些欧盟政府，热衷于资本市场联盟工程，这项工程的目标是找到办法刺激整个欧洲的非银行融资渠道的增长。


Progress would reduce dangerous over-reliance on banks.	这方面取得的进展将减轻危险的过度依赖银行的状况。


The UK, as ever, is to be found somewhere in the middle of the Atlantic.	和往常一样，英国的情况介于美国和欧洲大陆之间。


Cumulative economic growth from 2008 to 2015 was 6%.	其2008—2015年间累计经济增长为6%。


A little closer to the US than to the rest of Europe, though still a relatively weak rebound from a deep recession.	这略接近于美国而非欧洲其余部分，尽管仍属于较弱的深度萧条反弹。


The UK’s stock market is larger relative to its economy than most others in Europe.	英国股市相对经济的规模比大部分欧洲股价更大。


Its banking system is large and concentrated, though new entrants and new financing channels are changing that.	其银行体系庞大且集中，尽管新进入者和新融资渠道正在改变这一局面。


Peer-to-peer lending has expanded faster than elsewhere in Europe.	点对点贷款的扩张速度快于欧洲其他地区。


UK banks are also, on average, more oriented toward non-European markets, which makes the banking sector seem larger.	平均而言，英国银行业更加偏向于非欧洲市场，这让其银行业看上去更大。


And a third of the UK banking sector’s assets are in fact held by non-EU banks.	英国银行业三分之一资产实际上持有在非欧盟银行手中。


Only Luxembourg comes close, at just below 20%, while in France, Germany, and Italy, the overseas share of their domestic markets is negligible.	只有卢森堡的情况与英国接近，这一比例略低于20%，而法国、德国和意大利，国内市场的海外持有量可以忽略不计。


These differences may partly explain the UK’s reluctance to participate in the European banking union, while some other non-eurozone countries are keen to join it, fearing that, otherwise, they might be effectively excluded from ECB policymaking.	这些差异部分解释了为何英国不愿参与欧洲银行联盟，而一些其他非欧元区国家则急切地想加入其中，担心若非如此，它们可能被实际排除在欧洲央行决策之外。


In London, even pro-Europeans prefer to address Britain’s remaining financial-sector challenges on a national basis; the differences in structure make that an understandable choice.	在伦敦，即使是亲欧洲派也更愿意在国家层面上解决英国仍然面临的金融业挑战； 结构上的差异意味着这是一个可以理解的选择。


A Post-Referendum Agenda for Britain	英国后公投时期的议程


LONDON – The end of the wretched campaign to take the United Kingdom out of the European Union against the advice of our friends around the world is less than a month away.	伦敦——罔顾我们在世界各地盟友的建议游说英国退出欧盟的猥琐运动离结束只剩下不到一个月。


The Brexiteers, as they have come to be called, deny all evidence of the economic damage that the UK would do to itself by leaving.	这些所谓的英国退欧势力否认英国离开欧盟会为自身带来经济损失的一切证据。


Their disregard for reason and facts resembles that of Donald Trump, the reality-TV star and Republican presidential candidate, whose political style seems to have crossed the Atlantic on a cheap ticket.	他们对理性和现实的漠视像极了那位真人秀电视明星兼共和党总统候选人唐纳德·特朗普，此人的政治风格似乎借着一张廉价的机票越过了大西洋。


If voters choose to leave the EU, all bets are off; the UK will be taking a leap in the dark.	民众选择离开欧盟的代价是满盘皆输； 英国将落入无边的黑暗。


Fortunately, the bookies are increasingly predicting that voters will decide to remain.	幸运的是，越来越多的博彩公司预测选民们将会决定留在欧盟。


But even if sanity prevails, the effects of Brexitosis – a toxic combination of manic ambition (on the part of former London Mayor Boris Johnson, in particular), self-delusion, and mendacity – will linger long after the result is announced.	但即便理智占据了上风，英国退欧——结合了狂热野心（尤其体现在前伦敦市长鲍里斯·约翰逊的身上）、自欺欺人和满口谎言的有毒组合——也势必会在结果公布后的很长一段时间内继续造成影响。


Prime Minister David Cameron will face the unenviable task of trying to pull his Conservative Party together again.	卡梅伦首相将面临再次团结保守党的艰巨任务。


He will need to balance magnanimity with forceful assertion of leadership.	他必须在宽宏大量和强势领导力之间找到平衡。


One thing that never works is to pay Danegeld to disloyal members of parliament; give them one bun, and they will come back almost immediately for another.	向缺乏忠诚度的议员输送利益肯定不管用； 给他们一个面包，他们几乎马上会回来再要另外一个。


What will matter most for Cameron’s future is whether he can convince the losers to accept the voters’ verdict, instead of slinking away to plot another insurrection.	能否说服失利的一方接受选民的裁决、而不是躲到一边谋划另一次叛乱对卡梅伦的未来至关重要。


It would be understandable if Cameron were to conclude that Europe was the last thing he wants to spend time on this summer.	即使卡梅伦认定今年夏天他最不愿解决欧洲问题也可以理解。


But, for the sake of his country, and of Europe, Cameron should take the lead in trying to put in place a credible policy for dealing with mass migration.	但为了自己的国家、也为了欧洲，卡梅伦应当带头制定遏制大规模移民的可靠政策。


This is not just a short-term issue, driven by the conflicts in Syria and Afghanistan; it is a challenge that Europe will confront for decades.	这绝非是叙利亚和阿富汗冲突驱动的短期事务； 而是今后几十年欧洲都要面临的难题。


During the nineteenth century, as Europe’s population grew from one-fifth to one-quarter of the world’s total population, millions left their native countries for other continents.	19世纪，伴随欧洲人口从世界总人口的1/5增长到1/4，数百万人离开自己的祖国奔赴其他大陆。


Between 1815 and 1932, some 60 million Europeans emigrated.	1815至1932年间，欧洲移民人数达到约6，000万。


At the beginning of World War I, almost two out of every five people worldwide had European ancestry.	一战开始时，近2/5的世界人口拥有欧洲血统。


Today, the balance has been completely reversed.	今天，人口的天平已经完全逆转。


Europe’s population has fallen to well below 10% of the global total, and it will fall much further as populations skyrocket elsewhere.	欧洲人口已下降到全球总人口的10%以下，而且随着别国人口的猛增，欧洲人口还将进一步下降。


Over the last 40 years, for example, Egypt’s population has increased from 39 million to 93 million.	例如，过去40年来，埃及人口已经从3900万上升到9300万。


During a comparable period, Ethiopia’s population more than tripled, to 101 million.	在可比时期内，埃塞俄比亚人口增长超过3倍至1010万。


Nigeria, now home to more than 186 million people, has followed a similar trajectory; its population is predicted to rise to a half-billion by 2050.	目前拥有超过1. 86亿人口的尼日利亚也走上了类似的轨道；


During the first half of the twenty-first century, the population of Africa as a whole is expected to grow from about one billion to 2.5 billion.	其人口预计将在2050年增长至5亿。 21世纪上半叶，非洲人口总数预计将从10亿上升到25亿之多。


Failing states, as we have learned, export their problems – and their people.	失败国家，据我们了解，会出口他们的问题——以及他们的人口。


The world’s poorest countries are experiencing the fastest population growth.	世界最贫困国家正在经历最快速的人口增长。


They have the youngest populations, and, all too often, are among the most likely to see a breakdown in governance.	他们的人口最为年轻，而且很多时候，出现执政崩溃的可能性也最大。


The resulting flows of people will put developed countries under extreme pressure – nowhere more so than in Europe.	由此导致的人口流动会使发达国家承受极大的压力——其中尤以欧洲承受的压力最大。


Erecting more razor wire will not come close to being an adequate response.	架设更多铁丝网根本谈不上是恰当的对策。


The Mediterranean has become, tragically, a cemetery for some – but a barrier only for a few.	可悲的是，地中海已经成为某些人的坟墓——但却很少有人将此视为畏途。


Not even island countries like the UK can meet the migration challenge acting on their own.	如果各国自行其是，就连英国这样的岛国也无法解决移民难题。


What we require is a long-term program discussed and agreed upon by our neighbors and the United States.	我们需要的是我们的邻国和美国探讨并达成一项长期计划。


We need to coordinate our foreign, security, and development policies in order to prevent uncontrollable, unmanageable mass migration – a phenomenon that will lead to many migrant deaths and stoke xenophobia in the countries they try to reach.	我们需要协调外交、安全和发展政策，以实现防止无法控制的大规模移民的目标。 这种现象会导致众多移民死于非命，并在他们的目的地国掀起仇外的浪潮。


We need to agree on how we deal with failed states and help to put them back on their feet.	我们必须达成一致，帮助失败国家重新站起来。


We have to use our development assistance strategically, to help poor countries grow and provide their citizens a reason for staying at home.	我们必须从战略角度出发分配发展援助，协助贫困国家经济发展并为其民众提供留在国内的理由。


We also need more aggressive policies to tackle people smuggling, supported by United Nations Security Council resolutions where necessary.	我们还需要针对人口走私制定更为积极的政策，并在必要的情况下寻求联合国安理会决议的支持。