A recent confidential study by the German Intelligence Agency raises the possibility that the US could actually become an oil and gas exporter by 2020, in contrast to its present position as the world’s largest energy importer.	德国情报局（German Intelligence Agency）的一份最新机密研究认为，事实上，到2020年，美国便可能成为石油和天然气出口国，而目前它仍是世界第一大能源进口国。


That honor would likely fall to China, which would become increasingly dependent on the Middle East.	第一进口国的头衔可能会落到中国头上，后者将日益依赖中东。


As an extra bonus, the higher US proportion of gas use has reduced US carbon emissions to 1992 levels.	这还有一个额外的好处：美国天然气使用比重的增加将让美国碳排放量降至1992年水平。


The sense of US good fortune, a phrase that is not often heard around the world these days, increased with the panelists’ description of how lower energy prices for US manufacturing has a broad positive impact on the American economy’s competitiveness.	专家组大谈美国制造业能源价格的下降如何会对美国经济的竞争力产生全面的积极影响，对美国前景如此看好，这在近来实属罕见。


As a result, the country’s energy reserves have also become an investment magnet.	于是，美国的能源储备也变成了一块投资磁石。


German Minister of Economics and Technology Philipp Rösler said that many German firms are already relocating to the US because of lower energy prices.	德国经济和技术部长罗斯勒说，许多德国公司已经转向美国，原因就是能源价格的下降。


Equally important, the panelists reported on the rising importance of liquid natural gas relative to pipeline gas, which has enormous geopolitical implications.	同样重要的是，专家组还报告说，液化天然气将相对管道天然气变得更加重要，这将带来巨大的地缘政治效应。


In a nutshell, if gas is exported in liquid form, it is fungible.	简单讲，如果天然气以液态方式出口，则将成为可替代的。


In other words, if Russia restricts the flow of gas to Ukraine for political reasons, but the rest of Europe has gas from other sources, they can simply resell their gas to Ukraine and export it via the Baltic Sea.	换句话说，如果俄罗斯出于政治原因限制流向乌克兰的天然气量，但欧洲其他国家可以从别处获得天然气，那么它们就可以把自己的天然气通过波罗的海出口给乌克兰。


Jorma Ollila, Chairman of Royal Dutch Shell, described the global map of major shale oil and gas deposits.	皇家壳牌公司主席奥利拉（Jorma Ollila）描述了页岩油气的全球储量分布图。


Ukraine itself has the third-largest reserves in Europe; other countries with large deposits include Poland, France, China, Indonesia, Australia, South Africa, Argentina, and Mexico.	乌克兰本身拥有欧洲第三大储量； 其他拥有庞大储量的国家包括波兰、法国、中国、印尼、澳大利亚、南非、阿根廷和墨西哥。


And the US has already taken over from Russia as the world’s largest gas producer.	而美国已经超过俄罗斯，成为世界第一大天然气生产国。


All of this data got Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota’s attention.	所有这些数据引起了巴西外交部长帕特利奥塔（Antonio de Aguiar Patriota）的注意。


On a panel entitled “The Rising Powers and Global Governance,” Patriota referred to the energy discussion and noted that the rising powers should remember that “the established powers are not sinking powers.”	在“崛起势力和全球治理”专家讨论组中，帕特利奥塔提到了这场能源讨论，并评论说崛起势力应该记住，“老牌势力并不是衰落势力”。


In short, the pervasive narrative of Western decline suddenly reversed itself.	简言之，西方崛起的流行观念一夜之间自我反转了。


The horizon seemed brighter on the European side as well.	欧洲一侧的前景似乎也更加光明了。


In the opening panel on “The Euro Crisis and the Future of the EU,” cautious optimism prevailed.	在开场专家讨论组“欧元危机和欧盟未来”中，谨慎乐观随处可见。


No one thought that the European Union’s troubles were resolved, but no one thought that the eurozone was coming apart, either.	没有人认为欧元的麻烦已经得到了解决，但也没有人认为欧元区正在分裂。


On the contrary, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble made clear that German resolve to see the eurozone through its troubles was firm.	相反，德国财政部长朔伊布勒（Wolfgang Schäuble）明确表示，德国帮助欧元区走出困境的决心是坚定地。


And a prominent economist in the audience who has often predicted the eurozone’s demise was backtracking rapidly.	听众席上的一位经常预测欧元区解体的著名经济学家也很快更改了口风。


Aside from reports of a rising US (fiscal woes notwithstanding) and a stabilizing Europe (despite the common currency’s troubles), the conference featured a speech by Biden that went far beyond the reassuring rhetoric that US policymakers typically offer in European capitals.	除了美国崛起（尽管财政乱象未除）和欧洲稳定（尽管共同货币危机尚在），此次MSC的另一特色是拜登的演讲。 拜登所说的内容远远超过了美国决策者向欧洲各国做口头承诺的程度。


Biden told the audience that he and US President Barack Obama believe that “Europe is the cornerstone of our engagement with the rest of the world” and “the catalyst for our global cooperation.”	拜登告诉听众，他和美国总统奥巴马认为“欧洲是我们参与世界其他事物的基石”，也是“我们全球合作的催化剂”。


Biden pointed out that “Europe is America’s largest economic partner,” recalling figures that the Asia-focused Obama administration has often seemed to forget: “over $600 billion in annual trade that creates and sustains millions of jobs on the continent and at home, and a $5 trillion overall commercial relationship.”	拜登指出，“欧洲是美国最大的经济伙伴”，他提及专注于亚洲的奥巴马政府经常忘记的数字：“年贸易额6000亿美元，创造并维持了欧洲大陆和美国数百万个工作岗位；


Biden went on to suggest a “comprehensive transatlantic trade and investment agreement”; a week later, in his State of the Union Address, Obama announced the launch of negotiations for precisely such an agreement.	商业关系的总价值更是高达5万亿美元。 ”拜登继续指出，一周后，在国情咨文中，奥巴马将宣布开始“全面的跨大西洋贸易和投资协定”的谈判。


Biden concluded with a flourish.	拜登的结论非常吸引眼球。


“Europe remains America’s indispensable partner of first resort,” he declared. “And, if you forgive some presumptuousness, I believe we remain your indispensable partner.”	“欧洲仍是美国不可分割的第一伙伴，”他说，“如果你们不介意我有些专横的话，我相信我们也仍是你们不可分割的伙伴。


Those strong words reflect a new sensibility in Washington.	”如此强音反映了华盛顿的新态度。


As former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared in one of her last foreign-policy speeches, the US is not planning to pivot away from Europe to Asia, but rather with Europe to Asia.	正如前国务卿希拉里·克林顿在其最后一系列外交政策演讲之一中所指出的，美国并未准备把重点从欧洲移向亚洲，而是联合欧洲面向亚洲。


Western fortunes are rising, slowly but surely.	西方前景正在转好，虽慢但是事实。


Together, Europe and the US account for more than 50% of global GDP, have the largest military force in the world by many multiples, and control a growing proportion of global energy reserves.	欧洲和美国合起来占据世界GDP的一大半，拥有令其他势力望尘莫及的世界上最庞大的军队，还控制着不断上升的全球能源储备比重。


They also have a formidable diplomatic and development-assistance capacity, representing a peaceful community of democracies that share a common commitment to the rights, dignity, and potential of all human beings.	它们还拥有可怕的外交和发展援助能力，代表着在权利、命运和全人类潜力方面存在共同目标的和平民主国家。


Imagine that community spreading down the east coast of Latin America and the west coast of Africa.	想象一下这一和平民主国家集团在拉丁美洲东海岸和非洲西海岸的扩张。


It might be an Atlantic century after all.	说到底，这将是一个大西洋世纪。


Europe and Asia’s Arms Race	欧洲和亚洲的军备竞赛


When European unification was launched, it was thought that “ever closer union” would establish a community that would protect Europeans from political blackmail.	当欧洲统一开始实现时，人们认为“异常紧密的联盟”能够建立一个使欧洲人免受政治讹诈的共同体。


Now we see – though the lifting of the Union’s arms embargo may now be delayed thanks to US pressure and Chinese aggressiveness – that the European Union has become merely a tool for corruption when France and China draw up joint action plans.	现在我们发现—虽然由于美国的压力和中国的激进，欧盟解除武器禁运的时间可能会推迟—当法国和中国制定联合行动计划时，欧盟就沦落为腐败的工具而已。


The strategy is simple and ruthless.	这一战略是简单而无情的。


The world’s largest dictatorship is preparing to crush and occupy the first Chinese democracy in history – Taiwan.	世界上最大的独裁国家正准备击溃并占领历史上的第一个华人民主国家—台湾。


In order to do so, the People’s Republic needs much more sophisticated arms than those it possesses today.	为了实施这一战略，中华人民共和国需要比其现有的更为尖端的武器。


The United States naturally does not export such arms to China.	美国自然不会将这样的武器出口到中国。


Instead, the US is trying to deter China’s rulers from launching a military attack on the democrats in Taiwan.	相反，美国正尽力阻止中国的统治者向台湾的民主人士发动这样的军事进攻。


But if the EU ever begins to offer China extensive exports of powerful and offensive weapons systems, the military power of the People’s Liberation Army would be able to defeat Taiwan’s defense forces.	但如果欧盟一旦开始向中国全面出口强大的进攻性武器系统，人民解放军就会具备击败台湾防御力量的能力。


Over 600 missiles, already deployed on the mainland, are aimed at cities and military bases on the island.	大陆已经部署了超过600枚的导弹，瞄准着该岛的城市和军事基地。


The threat is more apparent than real – for now.	这种威胁暂时还有些虚张声势。


Russia currently sells certain arms to China, but avoids exporting its most sophisticated systems, since the Kremlin views China as a potential future threat.	俄罗斯目前向中国销售某些武器，但却避免向其出口最尖端的系统。 因为克里姆林宫将中国看作未来潜在的威胁。


However, if EU countries start competing for a share of the Chinese market, the Russians could soon be tempted to sell their best arms to the communist regime in Beijing.	但如果欧盟国家开始竞争中国的市场份额，那么俄罗斯可能很快就会不敌诱惑而向北京的共产党政权出售他们最好的武器。


China’s new armaments, together with the North Korean crisis, will probably force half a dozen countries in the region to renew their armed forces.	中国的新军备加上北朝鲜危机可能会迫使该地区的一些国家重新武装其军队。


Thus, by whenever the Union should decide to lift its ban on weapons exports to China, the EU could help fuel an arms race in East Asia.	因此，欧盟在任何时候决定解除对中国的武器禁运都可能为东亚的军备竞赛火上浇油。


How did China and France manage to fool the EU into thinking that it should ever take part in this?	中国和法国是如何愚弄了欧盟，使其决定要介入其中的呢？


When Jacques Chirac’s government decided to expound its economic co-operation with China, arms became an important component in the strategy.	当希拉克政府决定要解释与中国的经济合作时，武器成为该战略中的重要一环。


Just as a ruthless Prime Minister Chirac sold a nuclear reactor to Saddam Hussein in the 1970’s, so the President Chirac of today is being lured into doing big business with another aggressive dictatorship.	正如那位冷酷无情的希拉克总理在1970年代将核反应堆出售给萨达姆那样，当今的希拉克总统正被诱使着和另一个侵略性的独裁政权进行巨额交易。


The rest is a question of economic blackmail.	剩下的就是一个经济讹诈的问题。


French diplomats have of course informed China about the reluctance of other European countries about lifting the arms embargo, which was imposed after the massacre in Tiananmen Square in 1989.	法国的外交官们当然向中国通报了其他欧洲国家在解除武器禁运方面的尴尬。 这一禁运是在1989年天安门大屠杀以后实施的。


China then simply threatened to abandon or never to conclude trade deals with these EU members.	中国那时就威胁要撤销或停止与这些欧盟国家的贸易。


To the Germans, the Chinese probably murmur something about Siemens and Volkswagen.	对德国人，中国人可能悄声提到了西门子和大众；


To the Dutch their whispers are most likely about Philips.	对荷兰人，耳语中很可能有飞利浦的名字。


China follows the power game within the EU through its French friends, and therefore knows which governments need to be whipped into line.	中国通过其法国朋友关注着欧盟内部的权力游戏，因而掌握了相关政府的软肋。


In Sweden, it has probably been enough to whisper “Ericsson” and “Volvo” to make Primer Minister Göran Persson understand what is at stake for his country commercially.	在瑞典，可能只需轻声一句“爱立信”和“沃尔沃”就足以使Göran Persson首相明白该国与中国在商业上的利害关系。


What European nation, indeed, dares to put at risk a Chinese order for several billion euros?	的确，哪一个欧洲国家敢对数十亿欧元的中国定单等闲视之呢？


Typically enough, no EU-country has mentioned Taiwan as a reason not to resume arms exports.	从没有一个欧盟国家将台湾作为不能恢复武器出口的理由就可见一斑了。


Instead, the EU talks of a “code of conduct” (which probably does not mean very much, but sounds nice) and “free trade” (another charming euphemism for arms exports to dictatorships.	欧盟代之以“行为规范”（意义不大，但却顺耳）和“自由贸易”（向独裁政权出口武器的另一个委婉说法）的字眼。


This silence gives a hideous signal.	这种沉默是个可怕的信号。


For what the EU in practice says to China is this: “Taiwan’s cause in not our own.”	因为欧盟实际上向中国表明：“台湾与我们无关。


If and when the Union lifts the embargo, Europe will be refusing to take responsibility for the catastrophe that may be approaching.	”如果（当）欧盟有朝一日解除武器禁运，欧洲就会拒绝为可能降临的灾难负责。


As usual, it is up to America to protect a free nation that may otherwise be destroyed.	按惯例，应该由美国出面来保护可能陷入危难的自由国家。


Compare this situation to the drama 60 years ago.	将这样的情形与60年前的重大事件做一番比较。


Then it was American troops and arms that liberated Western Europe from Nazism.	那时是美国的军队和武器将西欧从纳粹的铁蹄下解放出来。


Now it may be European arms in the hands of the Chinese that will be aimed at American troops protecting a democracy with 23 million inhabitants (in other words, as many people as in all the Nordic countries combined).	现在欧洲的武器可能落在中国人手里，并瞄准着保卫一个2300万人口的民主国家（换句话说，这相当于北欧国家的人口之和）的美国军队。


As Tom Lantos, a Democratic US Congressman from California, put it, the move to lift the ban on arms exports to China clearly shows that the EU has “lost its moral compass.”	正如一位来自加利福尼亚州的美国民主党国会议员，Tom Lantos所言，解除对中国的武器禁运的意图清楚地表明欧盟已经“丧失了它的道德指南”。


Lantos knows about moral compasses: as a boy, he was rescued by Raoul Wallenberg from being deported to Auschwitz by the Nazis in Budapest.	Lantos对此深有体会：年幼的他正是在Raoul Wallenberg的援救之下才摆脱了被布达佩斯的纳粹送入奥斯威辛集中营的厄运。


Wallenberg was a Swede.	Wallenberg是瑞典人。


But now Sweden is revealing that it, too, lacks political morality.	但现今的瑞典也显得缺乏政治道德。


Several friends of mine in the Conservative party’s parliamentary group have long been engaged in supporting a free Taiwan.	我在议会保守党阵营的几位朋友长期以来就致力于支持自由台湾的事业。


Over the past ten years, we have held Scandinavian conferences on Taiwan in the parliaments in Copenhagen, Oslo, and Stockholm.	在过去十年里，我们在哥本哈根、奥斯陆和斯德哥尔摩的议会都召开过关于台湾问题的斯堪的纳维亚会议。


But a call from Prime Minister Persson was enough to render the Conservative party leader Fredrik Reinfeldt docile.	然而，来自首相Persson的呼吁就足以使保守党领袖Fredrik Reinfeldt改变初衷。


Persson had discovered that he lacked a majority in the Swedish parliament to lift the arms embargo on China.	Persson发现自己在瑞典议会中缺少取消对华军售的多数票支持。


By whispering “Ericsson” into Reinfeldt’s ear, it seems, Persson achieved the desired result.	而在Reinfeldt耳边轻声一句“爱立信”似乎就使Persson 达到目的。


Reinfeldt became the first Conservative party leader in Swedish history to encourage arms exports to a Communist dictatorship.	Reinfeldt 成为瑞典历史上第一位主张向共产党独裁政权出口武器的保守党领袖。


But Reinfeldt, like Jacques Chirac, has forgotten something.	然而和希拉克一样，Reinfeldt忘了些什么。


Liberal-minded people may very well prefer not just to exchange one cynical prime minister for another at the next election.	具有自由思想的人民在下一次大选中可能不仅仅想以一位愤世嫉俗的首相来代替另一位。


They may prefer a clear choice.	他们还可能更需要一种明确的选择。


European Defense Integration Now	当前的欧洲防务一体化


MADRID – During the European Union’s recent Bratislava summit, the first to take place without a British presence, several proposals to improve European security were made.	马德里——最近召开的首次没有英国参与的欧盟伯拉第斯拉瓦峰会提出了几项改善欧盟安全的提案。


Though some may argue otherwise, discussions on improved European security are both wise and necessary: after a period of paralysis and self-doubt for the European project, the EU must face its security problems and propose unifying initiatives.	尽管有人可能提出不同意见，但探讨改善欧洲安全问题依然既必要又明智：在经历了欧洲计划的瘫痪和自我怀疑期后，欧盟必须直面自身安全问题并提出统一的行动计划。


Europe’s citizens increasingly regard security as a high-priority issue and want the EU to show greater leadership.	欧洲民众日益将安全视为优先问题，并希望欧盟发挥进一步的领导作用。


The EU’s friends and allies expect improvement in European security as well.	欧盟的朋友和盟国也希望欧洲安全问题得到改善。


Offering EU citizens security within the Union’s borders requires more stability abroad.	确保欧盟民众在联盟边境内的安全首先要确保国外局势稳定。


Recent events have shown this clearly: the refugee crisis bedeviling the EU, for example, would be much easier to manage if the situation in Syria was different.	近来的事件清楚地表明了这一点：例如如果叙利亚局势发生变化，处理困扰欧盟的难民危机就会容易得多。


Because security at home and abroad are so interrelated, the EU should not compartmentalize its policies – an idea that is well developed in the proposed new “Global Strategy” for the Union, presented recently by High Representative Federica Mogherini.	因为国内外安全问题联系如此紧密，欧盟不应再按区域划分其政策——这一理念在近期由联盟高级代表费代丽卡·莫盖里尼提出的欧盟拟议新型“全球战略”中进行了详尽的阐述。


Traditionally, nation-states have defended themselves against foreign threats through military means, while running their internal affairs according to a set of norms designed to protect their citizens’ rights.	传统上，民族国家通过军事手段保护自身免受外来威胁，同时按保护公民权利的一系列标准管理其内部事务。


Today, military preparedness is still necessary to defend against external threats, but it is no longer sufficient.	今天，军事准备在抵御外部威胁时依然十分必要，但却已经不是唯一的因素。


A “civilian” angle is needed as well.	今天处理这问题同样需要顾及“民众”的角度。


All assets needed to achieve security must adapt to the reality of today’s threats and conflicts.	实现安全所需的一切资产都必须适应当今威胁和冲突的现实局面。


This means that the EU’s military capacities cannot be structured in isolation, but must work side by side with its civil capabilities (police agencies, intelligence units, the courts, and even non-governmental organizations).	这意味着欧盟的军事力量不能孤立构造，而必须与民事力量（警察机构、情报部门、法院甚至非政府机构）共同发挥作用。


The capacity for a fused civil-military response to crisis must become integral to EU policy and that of its member states.	融合军民危机响应能力必须是欧盟政策及其成员国所不可或缺的。


The EU has already undertaken deployments that combine military and civilian capabilities.	欧盟已经进行了军民力量相融合的部署。


But it has always been clear that much more is needed to improve the efficacy of such actions.	但很明显需要采取进一步措施来改进上述行动的效果。


Indeed, the EU’s Treaty of Lisbon includes many measures along these lines, but most have not yet been implemented.	事实上，欧盟里斯本协议包括这方面的许多措施，但多数仍处于待落实状态。


One reason for this is the distraction caused by the EU’s economic problems since 2008.	原因之一是2008年来欧盟经济问题所造成的注意力分散。


But now the gravity of the refugee problem requires that humanitarian and security issues be framed within a pan-European outlook.	但当前难民问题的严重性要求人道主义和安全问题必须在泛欧洲的前景构架内构建。


The division between the domestic and external capacities of EU member states simply is no longer sustainable.	欧盟成员国国内外力量的割裂完全不可持续。


Fortunately, many of the capacities available to member states in their internal policies are also useful for their defense deployments.	幸运的是，欧盟成员国国内政策的诸多力量在防御部署中同样可以发挥效果。


For example, it is increasingly clear that enhancing intelligence cooperation is essential.	例如，加强情报合作的必要性越来越明确。


If the EU wants to extend the reach of its security policies, it will need more resources; but, above all, existing capacities need to be used better and more cooperatively.	欧盟扩大其安全政策覆盖范围需要更多资源； 但最重要的是，需要加强合作更好地运用现有力量。


But such cooperation requires a strategic headquarters for all EU security-related operations, rather than maintaining the current model whereby operational centers are established on an ad hoc basis.	但这样的合作需要改变当前临时搭设行动中心的模式，建立管辖一切欧洲安全行动的战略总部。


Moreover, in order for the EU to achieve strategic autonomy, it needs a competitive European defense industry, with investment in research and development of defense technologies rising substantially as part of a common effort.	不仅如此，确保欧盟实现战略自主性需要有竞争力的欧洲国防工业，并需要各国共同确保大幅追加国防科技研发投资。


The European Defense Agency’s Capabilities Development Plan was designed precisely with these requirements in mind.	这些要求恰恰是欧洲防务局能力发展计划设计时所考虑的。


Advancing this plan will enable optimized use of existing member-state resources – thereby securing advantageous economic synergies – as well as precise identification of the additional resources required to achieve our goals.	推进这项计划可以优化现有成员国的资源运用——从而产生有利的经济协同效应——并准确找到实现我们目标所需的额外资源。


The legal basis for a mechanism for permanent, structured cooperation on security already exists, enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon.	结构性永久安全合作机制的法律基础已经存在，并记载在里斯本条约中。


Treaty provisions enable willing EU states to reinforce their military cooperation and deploy quickly for shared missions abroad.	条约规定允许具备相关意愿的欧盟成员国能够加强军事合作并快速部署完成国外的共同使命。


Activating this mechanism has been part of recent discussions within the European Council and seems to be the most viable way to deepen defense integration.	激活这一机制一直是与欧洲理事会近期谈判的组成部分，并且似乎是深化防务一体化最可行的方式。


And an EU with security and defense as one of its pillars would boost Europe’s global weight.	同时以安全和防务为支柱的欧盟可以加重欧洲的全球砝码。


Some still think that deeper defense integration may weaken other institutions, such as NATO, to which EU members belong.	仍然有人认为深化防务一体化可能削弱欧盟成员国所属的北约等其他机构。


But the truth is that Europe’s ability to provide an effective collective response in a crisis would be welcomed by NATO (which would have more resources at its disposal) and the United Nations.	但现实是欧洲在危机时采取有效集体对策的能力其实是（可以掌握更多资源的）北约和联合国所欢迎的。


Integrating EU defense, moreover, would facilitate NATO operations, so that groups of EU countries engaged in permanent structured cooperation could, for example, participate in the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s governing authority, as a single entity.	此外，整合欧盟防务可以促进北约行动，从而使参与永久结构性合作的欧盟国家团体能够以单一身份参与北大西洋理事会这一北约管理机构。


The EU is defined not only by how it protects its own citizens, but also by what actions it takes outside its borders.	欧盟的定义不仅取决于如何���护自己的公民，还取决于在境外采取何种举措。


Beyond ensuring that these actions are guided by international law, the EU should foster a global debate on the deficiencies of certain international norms in the face of today’s new conflicts.	除了确保在国际法的指导下采取行动外，欧盟应当在面对当前新的冲突时就特定国际规范的缺陷发起全球性探讨。


Even in this era of pervasive Euroskepticism, Europe’s citizens want a more decisive EU approach to foreign and security policy, which is necessary, beneficial, and part of our duty.	即使在这个欧洲怀疑主义甚嚣尘上的年代，欧洲民众仍然希望欧盟在外交和安全政策方面采取必要、有益且符合我们责任的更加果断的举措。


The EU, after all, will be defined by its actions, and peace and security are among the public goods that it must provide, both within and beyond its borders.	毕竟欧盟定义将取决于其自身的行动，而欧盟境内外的和平与安全属于其必须提供的公共产品范畴。


European Discrimination on Trial	欧洲歧视受到审判


What good are Europe’s treaties aimed at ensuring the legal equality of all citizens when entire groups face systematic discrimination?	在整个种族面临系统性歧视的时侯，欧洲旨在确保所有公民法律平等的公约有何作用呢？


That is the question that the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) faces this week as its Grand Chamber, consisting of 17 judges, begins considering an appeal of an initial ruling that rejected claims of discrimination against the Roma by the Czech Republic’s education authorities.	这就是欧洲人权法院（ECHR）本周所面临的问题。 由17人组成的大法庭开始考虑对一项最初裁决的上诉，该裁决拒绝了就捷克共和国教育部门对罗姆人所作歧视提出的指控。


All European states are members of the Council of Europe, all have signed the European Convention on Human Rights, 39 of the 46 member states have adopted the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, and 14 have ratified Protocol 12 on the prohibition against discrimination.	所有的欧洲国家都是欧洲理事会的成员，所有成员国都已经签署了欧洲人权公约，46个成员国中的39个已经采纳了关于保护少数民族的框架协议，14个成员国已经批准了关于禁止歧视的第12款议定书。


Nevertheless, the living conditions of many Roma remain appalling.	然而，许多罗姆人的生存状况仍然是令人震惊的。


Although recent reports published in 2006 by the European Union’s Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia and the Council of Europe’s Human Rights Commissioner note some improvements, they indicate Roma living conditions have stagnated, if not deteriorated.	近期由欧盟种族主义及仇外主义少监控中心以及欧洲人权委员理事会在2006年发布的报告显示了一些改进，但这些报告表明罗姆人的生存状况就算不恶化也停滞不前。


Roma are still victims of discrimination in access to housing, employment, healthcare, and education, despite significant local efforts at the Council of Europe’s instigation and with its support.	虽然在欧洲理事会的敦促及支持下当地作出了很大工作，罗姆人仍是住房、就业、保健和教育歧视领域的受害者。


Discrimination in educational access is particularly important, given its profound effect on its victims’ life prospects.	对获得教育的歧视是特别重要的，因为教育对受害者的生活前景具有深刻影响。


In the most extreme cases, the education system itself is segregated: isolated schools in remote camps; special classes for Roma children in mainstream schools; and an over-representation of Roma children in classes for children with learning difficulties.	在大多数极端案例中，教育系统本身就实行了种族隔离政策，也就是说，偏僻地区孤立的学校、主流学校罗姆孩子特殊班级以及为具有学习困难孩子所设的班级中罗姆儿童过多。


The EHCR was confronted with the third issue in the case D.H. and others vs. Czech Republic .	欧洲人权法院要审理D. H.


The Court was referred to 18 cases of girls and boys who, between 1996 and 1999, were placed in special schools for children with learning difficulties, either directly or after a period of time in primary schools.	及他人诉捷克共和国一案中涉及到的第三项问题。 向法庭提起了18个案例，其中的男孩和女孩们在1996至1999年之间被直接或在小学就读一段时间后被排在学习困难特殊学校。


The question was whether the children were victims of discrimination owing to their national minority status.	涉案问题是，孩子们是否是因为他们的少数民族身份而成为歧视的受害者。


The Czech government admitted that some of the special schools’ student bodies comprised 80% to 90% Roma children.	捷克政府承认，在某些特殊学校的学生中，80%到90%是罗姆孩子。


However, if there was discrimination, it was not direct, because under Czech law, such a move could be decided only by a school headmaster based on the results of an intelligence test at an educational psychology counseling centre, and subject to the approval of the child’s parents or legal guardian.	然而，就算存在歧视，那也不是直接的，因为按照捷克的法律，这种调动只能根据在教育心理咨询中心作的智力测试的结果由校长决定并且需得到孩子的家长或监护人的同意。


A difference in treatment is not discriminatory in itself.	待遇的不同本身并不是歧视。


According to the case law of national supreme courts and the ECHR, discrimination exists only when people in a similar situation are treated differently.	根据各国最高法院及欧洲人权法院的判例法，只有在处于类似情况中的人被区别对待的时侯方才存在歧视。


Yet national and international case law recognizes that a non-discriminatory measure in theory can be discriminatory in practice.	然而各国及国际判例法也确认，理论上的非歧视措施可能成为实践中的歧视。


So, in the current case, the alleged discrimination does not stem from the law itself, but from its effects, with the plaintiffs relying mainly on statistics showing the over-representation of Roma in special schools.	因此，在当前案例中，所指控的歧视并非根源于法律本身，而是根源于其影响，原告主要根据数据表明特殊学校中罗姆人过多。


Many other reports on the situation of Roma in the Czech Republic, including by the Council of Europe, are available.	现在有关于捷克共和国罗姆人情况的许多其它报告，包括欧洲理事会作出的报告。


But, as the Court rightly noted, it should rule only on the cases to which it is referred, and should not make known its opinion on the Czech education system’s legitimacy, as choices concerning educational opportunities fall under the jurisdiction of states and therefore can vary accordingly.	但是，法庭公正地提示，它仅会对所提交的案例进行裁决，不会表达其对捷克教育系统合理性的观点，因为关于教育机会的选择属于各国的管辖范围，因而可能会有所不同。


Working on this assumption and given the case it had to solve, an EHCR panel of seven judges ruled against the plaintiffs in February 2006, concluding that the law on special schools is not aimed specifically at Roma and does not apply only to them.	由七名法官组成的欧洲人权法院审议庭根据这一假设并考虑到所要解决的案件于2006年2月作出了原告败诉的裁决，并且判定，有关特殊学校的法律并不是特别针对罗姆人的，并且不是仅仅适用于他们的。


According to the Court, the law’s legitimate purpose is to adapt teaching to the difficulties of a specific category of pupils, and psychological tests seem to be objective enough not to be suspected of racial bias.	法庭认为，该法律合理的目的是为具有特殊困难的学生作出教学调节，并且，心理测试看上去是足够客观，并未牵涉到种族偏见。


Moreover, the requirement of parents’ approval for placing children in special schools remains valid, while Roma children who were initially placed in those schools could have returned to mainstream schools later, and thus reintegrated into normal schooling.	除此以外，将孩子安排到特殊学校需得到父母同意的要求依旧有效，而最初被排到这些学校的罗姆孩子稍后可以回到主流学校，因此重新融合到了正常教育之中。


As well-founded as the Court’s reasoning may be, a feeling of unease persists.	尽管法庭的推理是有根据的，但不安感仍然继续存在。


The statistics showing the enormous proportion of Roma children in those schools are hard to ignore, and the suspicion of discrimination is difficult to avoid.	显示这些学校存在大量比例的罗姆孩子的数据不容忽视，难以避免歧视嫌疑。


While laws have changed, mentalities do not always follow at the same pace, and we intuitively know that it is easy to get psychology to mean a lot of things.	虽然法律改变了，但是心态并不总是同步改变，并且从直觉上我们知道利用心理学来安排很多事情是很容易办到的。


Indeed, before announcing its decision, the Court felt it necessary to state that while it did not conclude that the Convention had been violated, statistics still revealed “worrying figures, and the situation in general in the Czech Republic regarding Roma children’s education needs to be improved.”	确实，在决定宣布以前，法院认为有必要指出，虽然未断定人权公约被违反，但数据仍然显示出“令人担忧的数字，并且捷克共和国罗姆孩子教育问题的总体情况堪待改进”。


The Court’s president, Jean-Paul Costa, expressed a similar view, without questioning the legitimacy of the decision, although Judge Cabral Barreto wrote a dissenting opinion.	虽然法官巴罗托提出了书面异议，法庭庭长科斯塔在未置疑其决定的合法性的情况下也表明了类似的观点。


Moreover, it is significant that the Court agreed, at the request of the parties, to refer the case on appeal to its Grand Chamber.	而且，在当事人的要求之下，法庭同意将该案例向大法庭提请上诉，这一举动意义重大。


According to Costa, rejecting the ruling in February 2006 would contradict previous case law.	根据科斯塔的观点，否决2006年2月的判决将与以前的判例法相抵触。


Will the Court, then, decide on the workings of the Czech education system itself?	那么，法庭会不会针对捷克教育系统的运作本身有所判决？


Or will it follow Judge Barreto, who calls for recognition of an obligation to adopt affirmative action policies aimed at benefiting Romanies?	或者是否会听从法官巴罗托的要求，承认有义务旨在为罗姆人利益而���取积极行动政策？


Whatever formula is adopted, it is certain that Roma children should be afforded the same opportunities as other children.	不管采取何种方案，罗姆儿童需得到与其它儿童同等的机会，这一点是毋庸置疑的。


It is this imperative that underlies the importance of the coming decision, for it provides an occasion for the Court to reassert the fundamental principle of non-discrimination that defines our democratic societies.	正是这一需要决定了即将作出的裁决的重要性，因为它为法院提供了一个时机来重申确定我们民主社会的非歧视的基本原则。


The Birth of Fiscal Unions	财政联盟的诞生


PRINCETON – Fiscal unification is often an effective way to enhance creditworthiness, and it may also create a new sense of solidarity among diverse peoples living within a large geographic area.	普林斯顿——财政联盟往往是提升信誉的有效方式，还可以在广袤地理区域的不同民族间创造出新的团结意识。


For this reason, Europeans have often looked toward the model of the United States.	欧洲人因此常常向往美国模式。


But they have never been able to emulate it, because their motivations for union have been so varied.	但他们从来没有仿效成功，因为他们具有形形色色的结盟动机。


Desperate countries often consider such unions to be the best way out of an emergency.	身处绝境的国家往往将财政联盟视为应对紧急状况的唯一方式。


In 1940, Charles de Gaulle proposed, and Winston Churchill accepted, the idea of a Franco-British union in the face of the Nazi challenge, which had already overwhelmed France.	1940年，面对纳粹的挑战，丘吉尔接受了由戴高乐提出的英法财政联盟，当时的法国在纳粹的铁蹄下已经沦陷。


In 1950, five years after the war, Germany’s first postwar chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, also proposed a union – this time between France and Germany – as a way out of his defeated country’s existential crisis.	战争结束5年后的1950年，德国战后首任总理康拉德·阿登纳同样提议成立财政联盟（这次是法德财政联盟）——借以摆脱战败国的生存危机。


Political unification was rejected; but economic association has had a brilliant career for more than six decades – until now.	政治联盟的提议最终遭到拒绝； 但经济联盟的辉煌却持续了六十多年——直到今天依然在延续。


The fundamental idea behind a fiscal union is that poorer, less creditworthy countries can gain from joint debt liability with richer countries.	财政联盟背后的基本思想是资信较差的贫困国家可以受益于与富裕国家的联合债务。


Indeed, one of the most fascinating proposals to this effect came at the beginning of World War I, when the Russian Empire found that its limited capacity to borrow on international capital markets and its low foreign-currency reserves left it unable to create an effective military force.	实际上，这方面最有趣的建议来自一战初期，当时俄罗斯帝国在国际资本市场有限的借贷能力和短缺的外汇储备导致其无法创建有效的军力。


So the Russian government proposed what would have amounted to a full fiscal union with Britain and France for war-related finances.	于是俄国政府提出与英法两国建立全面的战时财政联盟。


France latched onto the idea, because its borrowing capacity was also weaker than Britain’s.	这项提议得到了法国的支持，因为法国的借债能力要弱于英国。


The British wanted to win the war – but not so much that they were prepared to accept unlimited liability for debt incurred by the French and Russian governments.	英国当然希望打赢战争，但却并没有到愿意承担俄法两国政府无限债务责任的程度。


In reality, a fiscal union between such diverse political systems would have been unworkable.	现实生活中，在政治体制差异如此之大的国家间建立财政联盟其实是行不通的。


An autocratic or corrupt regime has a strong incentive to spend in a way that benefits the elite.	独裁或腐败政府具有为精英阶层谋利的强烈动机。


That incentive increases if it can command the resources of a more democratically governed state, where citizens agree to pay taxes (and pay off future debt) because they also control the government.	上述动机随着对民主国家资源的控制力而增强，民主国家的民众愿意纳税（并清偿未来债务）是因为他们同样能掌控政府。


The only circumstance in which democracies sign up to such a deal is when a clear security interest is at stake.	民主国家接受协议的唯一可能性是明确关系到安全利益。


It was that predicament that gave pre-1914 Russia unique access to the French financial market.	这样的困境让1914年前的俄国进入到法国的金融市场。


Yet, in 1915, the British, even in the face of an ongoing war, were unwilling to assume Russia’s liabilities.	但在1915年，英国即便在战时也不愿承担俄国的债务。


Perhaps the sheer degree of uncertainty in pre-war Europe, or the more amorphous nature of the threat, made security concerns trump financial risk.	也许纯粹是战前欧洲的不确定性、或者威胁性质的不确定性，让安全顾虑在与金融风险的博弈中占据了上风 。


Russia’s World War I credit arrangements anticipated some of the political maneuvering about debt and its relation to security that occurred in late-twentieth-century Europe.	俄国一战信贷方案预示了欧洲二十世纪末有关负债及其与安全关系的政治操纵。


Post-1945 West Germany was vulnerable for a long time, because it sat on the Cold War’s fault line.	因为处在冷战的分界线上，后1945年的西德在很长一段时期内非常脆弱。


As a result, West German governments offered neighboring countries financial help in exchange for security and political solidarity, especially at moments when they were uncertain about the reliability and continuity of US support.	西德政府因此为邻国提供财政援助以换取安全和政治团结，特别是在他们无法确定美国支持是否可靠、以及能否继续的时候。


But there were limits.	但这种财政援助并非没有限度。


In 1979, when West Germany adopted a fixed exchange-rate regime with a support mechanism for its partners (the European Monetary System), the Bundesbank ensured that it was not committed to unlimited currency interventions and that it might stop when the stability of the Deutsche Mark was endangered.	1979年，当西德实行带有合作伙伴（欧洲货币体系）保障机制的固定汇率制度时，德国央行成功地确保自己不受无限制的货币干预，并能在德国马克的稳定性受到威胁时终止固定汇率制度。


The logic was repeated on an even larger scale at the beginning of the 1990’s, but this time without any pre-determined limits.	相同的逻辑于20世纪90年代初再次在更大范围内上演，不过这次不存在任何预先确定的限制因素。


The European Union’s commitment to monetary union enabled the eurozone’s Mediterranean countries to improve their debt dynamics and public finances dramatically.	欧盟做出的货币联盟承诺显著改善了欧元区地中海国家的公共财政和债务状况。


Their borrowing costs fell as they locked their currencies into a union with countries – Germany, in particular – with a stronger reputation for stability.	实现本币与联盟国家（特别是德国）货币挂钩后上述国家的借贷成本大幅下降，因为德国具有极强的稳定声誉。


At that point, the problem of how to divide the eventual bill when things became costly was not addressed, and the problem of excessive debt was wished away by the establishment of convergence criteria (which were not fully implemented anyway).	出现危机时最终偿债责任如何划分的问题当时并没有解决，而过度负债问题则通过制定欧元趋同标准（反正该标准也没有全面实施）只当不存在。


But, since 2009, when financial distress in the eurozone’s periphery brought such problems to the fore, Europeans have faced the same question as the WWI Allies.	但自从2009年欧元区外围国家的财务困境将上述问题推上了前台，欧洲人面临的���题简直和一战盟国一模一样。


Are security and political interests so overwhelming that they justify assuming large and unlimited liabilities incurred by political systems over which they have no control?	安全和政治利益是否真的重要到值得冒险承担无法控制的政治体制所产生的无限巨额债务？


Because Europe is at peace, with no singular, overriding security threat, it is likely that when the extent of the bargain becomes clear, voters and politicians in the rich creditor countries will reject it.	因为欧洲持续和平、不存在单一压倒性的安全威胁，因此当议价程度变得清晰时，富裕债权国的选民和政治家将会选择拒绝。


But the more uncertain security challenges that Europe faces may just demand the kind of strong fiscal link that the French and Russians were willing to forge before 1914, and that the Germans and French embraced in 1950.	但欧洲更加无法确定的安全挑战可能恰恰需要1914年前法俄两国和1950年德法两国曾经乐于建立的那种牢固的财政连接。


The implications for the present are important: the only palatable way in which the necessary balance between liability and security can be achieved is through a process of political reform that dissolves corrupt oligarchies and weakens incentives for fiscal imprudence.	现实影响是非常重要的：只有通过解散腐败寡头、削弱财政冒险动机的政治改革进程，债务和安全之间的必要平衡才有可能达到。


One approach might be to ask citizens in all European countries whether they are prepared to accept some sort of fiscal compact involving a hard limit on debt.	方法之一或许是询问欧洲国家民众是否愿意接受涉及硬性债务限制的某种形式的财政契约。


Germans refer to this solution as a Schuldenbremse (debt brake).	德国人把这一方案称为Schuldenbremse（债务制动）。


It presupposes a profound process through which institutions and the assumptions underlying them come to be widely shared.	方案预先设定了制度及其基础性假设逐渐被广泛接受的意义深远的过程。


But that takes time, as the history of the US – the world’s most successful union born of emergency – amply demonstrates.	但实现这一过程需要时间，世界从危机中脱颖而出的最成功的联盟美国充分证明了这一点。


Europe and the Global Food Crisis	欧洲和全球食品危机


PARIS – The world has been shaken by unprecedented spikes in food prices, by hunger riots, and by social tensions that demonstrate that food supplies have returned as a source of insecurity – to which global warming and declining natural resources are adding unprecedented urgency.	巴黎--食品价格前所未有地暴涨震撼了世界。 因饥饿引发的骚乱以及社会紧张关系表明食品供应再次成为动荡因素，而全球气候变暖以及日益下降的自然资源则给这一空前的紧急局势火上加油。


By 2050, it is estimated that there will be nine billion people on earth, so the need for food may double – primarily among urban populations in the world’s poorest countries.	人们估计，到2050年全世界将会有九十亿人口，因此食品需求可能翻番，而这些需求主要来自世界最贫困国家的城市人口。


But there is more to finding a solution than simply identifying those nations that are capable of feeding the rest of the world.	但是为了寻找解决途经，仅仅确定那些有能力给世界提供粮食的国家是不够的。


It is increasingly urgent that every nation gain the means of feeding itself.	目前，每个国家在粮食上自给自足越发紧迫。


This means that agriculture should become an international priority, with the poorest countries helped to safeguard the security and independence of their food supplies.	这就意味着农业应该成为国际优先重点问题，帮助最贫困国家维护其食品供应安全和独立。


Countries and organizations are already mobilizing.	各国和国际组织已经行动起来。


The United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization argues that rising food prices could lead to increasing global conflicts.	联合国粮农组织认为，食品价格上扬导致全球冲突增加。


The Davos World Economic Forum ranks food insecurity as a major risk to humanity.	达沃斯世界经济论坛把食品供应脆弱列为对人类的主要威胁。


The World Bank has forcefully emphasized the importance of agriculture to jump-starting economic expansion and breaking the cycle of poverty.	世界银行已经大力强调农业在促使经济增长以及打破贫困循环上的重要性。


UN Secretary Ban Ki-moon has created a working group to define a common plan of action, and France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy has proposed a global partnership for food.	联合国秘书长潘基文成立了工作组来制定行动规划，而法国总统萨尔科奇建议创立全球食品伙伴关系。


Sarkozy’s proposed partnership has three pillars.	萨尔科奇的建议包括三大支柱。


First, an international group should draft a worldwide strategy for food security.	首先，一个国际小组应该拟定全球食品安全战略。


Second, an international scientific platform should be charged with evaluating the world’s agricultural situation, sending out warnings of upcoming crises, and possibly facilitating governments’ adoption of political and other strategic tools to deal with food crises.	其次，应该指派一个国际科学平台评估世界农业形势，对即将到来的危机发出警报并且在可能的情况下协助各国政府采纳政治和其他方面的战略工具以应对食品危机。


Finally, the international finance community, despite its current problems, must be mobilized.	最后，国际金融界尽管自身问题重重，也必须动员起来。


The reliability and size of the European Union’s farm output means that it can and should play the role of regulator in global markets.	欧盟农业产量稳定而又巨大，这就意味着它能够而且应该在全球市场上发挥监管者的作用。


If Europe cut back on its agricultural production, the increase in its own food imports would contribute significantly to a worldwide increase in food prices.	如果欧洲削减其农业生产，那么，其自身粮食进口增加将会大幅度提高全球食品价格。


This makes it imperative that EU food production levels be held steady – for the sake of Europeans and of people in the world’s poorest countries.	因此，保持欧盟粮食生产水平稳定至关重要，这对于欧洲人和世界最贫困国家人们而言都是如此。


But Europe cannot build up its own agriculture to the detriment of the less fortunate.	但是欧洲不能在危害贫困国家的基础上壮大自身的农业。


So the EU must harmonize its policies with poorer countries.	所以，欧盟必须与穷国协调其政策。


At present, export subsidies and support payments represent less than 1% of the European agricultural budget, and the EU has undertaken to eliminate them once it receives reciprocal undertakings from major food-exporting countries.	目前，出口补贴以及援助款项只占欧洲农业预算的1%不到，而且欧盟已经开始在得到其他主要食品出口国家对等许诺的时候消除它们。


Since 2001, with the “Everything but Arms” initiative, all products from poor countries – with the exception of weapons and munitions – can enter the EU single market on a duty-free basis.	从2001年以来，根据“排除军火”倡议，来自贫困国家的武器弹药以外的所有产品均可以免税进入欧盟单一市场。


This has led to the EU becoming the primary market for the poorest countries’ products.	这就让欧盟成为了最贫困国家产品的主要市场。


The EU is also developing ways to respond to new global challenges through changes to its Common Agricultural Policy.	欧盟还在制定措施，通过改变其共同农业政策来应对新的全球挑战。


This was reflected in the decision to suspend the “set aside” rule that requires a proportion of agricultural land to lie fallow.	这反映在其停止“闲置”规则决定之上。 这一规则要求一定比例的农田休耕。


Now the EU is preparing to increase dairy quotas progressively, and evaluating the impact on world markets of its decisions regarding bio-fuels.	现在，欧盟准备逐步提高奶制品配额并且正在评估其有关生物燃料的决定对世界市场的影响。


But Europe’s focus must be on encouraging the development of local agriculture.	但是欧盟必须关注于鼓励发展地区农业。


Doing so is the only way to achieve greater global food security and reduce poverty.	这是取得更大全球安全以及减少贫困的唯一途经。


It will also make it possible to ensure that today’s high prices for agricultural products are transformed into opportunity for poor farmers.	这也将会让确保今天的农产品高价转化为贫困农民的机遇。


This is vital because, according to the World Bank, growth in farming eliminates poverty twice as much as growth in any other economic sector.	这非常关键，因为根据世界银行的报告，农业增长消除贫困要比其他任何经济部门的增长都要大两倍。


Indeed, agriculture remains the primary productive sector in the world’s poorest countries, employing 65% of the working population and, on average, contributing more than 25% to GDP.	确实，世界最贫困国家中农业依旧是主要的生产部门，65%的人口以农业就业，而且平均而言对GDP的贡献超过25%。


But over the past 20 years, support for agricultural development has been declining.	但是在过去的二十年中，农业发展支持一直在下降。


Only 4% of public development assistance is now earmarked for agriculture.	现在只有4%的公共发展援助用于农业。


The European Commission and EU member states are therefore planning to increase their assistance, both through the European Development Fund and by developing new sources of financial support.	欧盟委员会和欧盟成员国因此规划通过欧洲发展基金以及发展新的财政支持来源来提高援助。


Further liberalization of farm trade will not ensure food security.	进一步开放农业贸易并不确保食品安全。


Faced with the erratic nature of agricultural markets, regulation is needed to soften the impact on poorer countries of volatile food prices.	农业市场起伏不定，因此就需要法规来减缓动荡的食品价格对贫困国家的影响。


This does not mean that protectionism is the way forward, only that taking account of specific issues that affect international farm trade – weather, price volatility, or health risks – may be necessary from time to time.	这并不意味着应该采取保护主义，而是有必要不时地考虑到影响国际农业贸易的具体问题，例如天气、价格波动或者健康风险等等。


But, in a world where productivity differentials can be as great as one to 1,000, it would be unwise to rely on markets alone to enable the poorest countries to expand their economies.	但是，当今世界的生产效率差异可以相差一千倍，仅仅依靠市场来让最贫困国家扩大其经济是不明智的。


Nor is it likely that much economic expansion will result from competition between multinational food distributors and producers in countries where famine still stalks the land.	跨国食品分销商和爆发饥荒国家的生产者之间的竞争并不大可能带来经济扩大。


Instead, bringing together outside expertise and local knowledge of the geography and environmental and economic constraints in order to spread risks and share the management of resources and projects is far more likely to help poor countries achieve food independence.	相反，汇集外部专业知识以及地理、环境和经济限制的当地知识以便分散风险，共担资源和项目管理更有可能帮助贫穷国家实现食品独立。


It was such an approach that, in less than 20 years, helped postwar Europe achieve food sovereignty.	在不到二十年的时间内，这一措施就帮助战后欧洲实现了粮食自主。


Countries that have protected their agricultural development from the threats posed by international markets – such as India or Vietnam – have achieved substantial reductions in agricultural poverty.	像印度和越南那些将其农业发展排除于国际竞争构成威胁之外的国家也大幅度削减了农村贫困。


The time has also come to prioritize agriculture in order to ensure growth with a more human face.	现在应该优先发展农业以便确保更加符合人道的发展。


At the heart of the EU, France wants to play its part in a collective effort that is fast becoming a major issue for us all.	法国位居欧盟核心地位，愿意在迅速成为全世界共同主要问题的集体行动上发挥作用。


Crisis and Transformation	危机与转型


ANKARA – It has become a cliché to characterize our era as one of multiple rapid transformations.	安卡拉——以多种快速转型并举来形容我们这个时代并不新鲜。


But 2012 was particularly eventful. Not a single day passed without requiring continuous and concerted attention to economic crises, political and military conflicts, social upheavals, cultural clashes, or environmental problems in some corner of the world.	但2012年尤其算得上多事之秋，经济危机、政治军事冲突、社会动荡、文化冲突、世界某个角落的环境问题无时无刻不在吸引着公众的注意力。


Turkey’s immediate neighborhood occupied the top spot on the global policy agenda in 2012, and will continue to so in 2013.	土耳其的近邻占据了2012年全球政策议程的头把交椅，2013年仍将延续这种格局。


To our north, Europe is at a crossroads, undergoing a process of creative destruction, with potentially far-reaching ramifications well beyond the confines of the European Union.	我们北面的欧洲正处在创造性毁灭的十字路口，由此产生的深远后果将远远超出欧盟本身的范畴。


To our south, an irreversible quest for dignity, freedom, democracy, and peace is altering the region’s political landscape.	而在我们南面，对尊严、自由、民主与和平不可逆转的追求正在改变着地区的政治格局。


Needless to say, economic measures alone cannot end the EU’s ongoing crisis.	毋庸置疑，仅靠经济措施无法结束欧盟目前的危机。


Europe must redefine itself and identify its mission anew if it wishes to retain its geopolitical weight.	若要保住地缘政治话语权，欧洲必须对自身及所要完成的使命进行重新定义。


The EU must decide whether it represents a community of values or a narrowly defined geographic entity whose exclusionary impulses will eventually erode its global relevance.	欧盟必须确定自身究竟代表价值观群体还是狭隘的地理实体，是否任由上述实体的排外冲动最终削弱欧盟整体的全球话语权。


As an integral part of Europe with EU membership as a strategic objective, Turkey is not an indifferent bystander; on the contrary, we strive to participate in the current debate by offering our own views and ideas.	土耳其不是一个冷漠的旁观者，我们是欧洲的组成部分并以加入欧盟为战略目标。 相反，我们尽力参与目前的讨论，说出自己的想法和意见。


We believe, for example, that EU integration needs to be wider as well as deeper, thereby maintaining its positive transformative influence in neighboring regions.	比方说我们认为欧盟一体化进程必须更为广泛深入，并以此保持对周边地区积极的改革影响。


Here, of course, the Middle East and North Africa should be of paramount concern.	既然如此，中东和北非当然是首要考虑的目标。


Historically, whatever happens on one side of the Mediterranean has had a direct impact on the other; given today’s high level of global interdependence, there is every reason to believe that this will remain true.	历史上地中海一侧发生的状况会对另一侧造成直接的影响； 鉴于当前全球高度的相互依赖性，我们完全有理由相信这一规律仍将发挥作用。


The Arab peoples’ genuine aspiration to secure for themselves the universal rights that Europeans enjoy refutes the West’s long-held orientalist perspective.	阿拉伯民众争取欧洲已有权利的真实愿望驳斥了西方人长期以来形成的东方观。


Of course, it is still too early to predict the outcome of the Arab Awakening, and the countries in transition still face daunting challenges.	当然，现在预测阿拉伯觉醒运动的结果还为时尚早，但转型中的国家面临严峻挑战却是不争的事实。


But none of the various nightmare scenarios materialized, which augurs hope for the future.	但人们想象中的噩梦并没有在现实中出现，这预示着未来仍有希望。


Moreover, in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, free and fair elections – the first in these countries’ history – were held in 2012.	此外，2012年突尼斯、利比亚和埃及举行了自由公正的选举，这在上述国家历史上当属首次。


But democracy is not only about elections. The task of creating essential democratic institutions – the rule of law, habits of accountability, gender equality, and freedom of expression and faith – still awaits these countries.	但选举绝不是民主的全部，建立基本民主制度（法治、问责、性别平等、言论和信仰自由）的任务仍有待这些国家去完成。


Yet the Arab peoples have finally experienced genuine empowerment, and have crossed the threshold of fear.	但阿拉伯人民终于体验到真正的天赋权利，成功跨过了恐惧的门槛。


I believe that they will continue to advance toward democracy.	我相信他们会朝着民主继续大踏步迈进。


That said, the situation in Syria and recent Israeli aggression in Gaza remain open wounds.	说完这些，叙利亚局势和以色列不久前对加沙的入侵行动仍然是无法回避的事实。


In Syria, a bloody civil war is laying waste to some of the world’s most magnificent ancient cities.	叙利亚的血腥内战正蹂躏着世界上最壮观的古代城市。


The Syrian people’s demands are the same as those heard in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt: a dignified, democratic life.	叙利亚民众像突尼斯、利比亚和埃及民众一样要求尊严民主的生活。


Instead, they have gotten an inhuman campaign of violence – including attacks by warplanes, helicopters, and tanks – by President Bashar al-Assad’s regime.	但他们却面临巴沙尔·阿萨德政权发动的惨无人道的暴力活动，包括战斗机、直升机和坦克的进攻。


The regime’s effort to turn its struggle for survival into an ethnic and sectarian conflict could wreak havoc across the region, starting with neighbors like Lebanon and Iraq.	阿萨德政权将垂死挣扎转化为种族和宗派冲突的行径将对整个地区造成严重的破坏，而首当其冲受到影响的就是巴嫩和伊拉克等邻国。


From the very outset of the Arab Awakening, Turkey has taken a principled stand on the side of legitimate and democratic aspirations.	自阿拉伯觉醒运动伊始，土耳其就坚定地支持民众的民主合法诉求。


Aware of our special role as a historical partner and, more so, as a source of inspiration to those demanding their rights and freedom, we felt particularly compelled to do so.	意识到身为历史性合作伙伴甚至权利自由追求者力量源泉的特殊作用，我们越发感到有义务这样做。


For Turkey, the civil war in Syria has created an additional challenge in the form of a humanitarian crisis.	对土耳其而言，叙利亚内战带来又一次人道主义危机挑战。


We are now hosting approximately 200,000 Syrians who fled their country’s growing violence, and have already spent more than $400 million to accommodate these desperate people – with almost no assistance from the rest of the world.	我们目前收容了约20万因暴力活动升级而背井离乡的叙利亚难民，用于支持难民生活的开支超过4亿美元——世界其他国家几乎没有提供任何援助。


But we will never be dissuaded from helping our Syrian neighbors in their most difficult hour, given the special bonds emanating from centuries of shared history.	但鉴于几个世纪共同历史所形成的特殊纽带，我们永远不会在邻国叙利亚最艰难的时刻对他们弃之不顾。


Two other fundamental and inter-related security challenges in the region – the Arab-Israeli conflict and the growing danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) – also must be resolved in order to ensure that the Middle East’s historic transformation leads to security, stability, and prosperity.	阿以冲突和大规模杀伤性武器（WMDs）扩散风险日益增强这两大相互关联的地区性根本安全挑战必须得到解决，才能确保中东历史性转型带来稳定、繁荣和安全。


Here, the recent violence in Gaza has once again demonstrated the risk of an all-out regional conflict.	不久前发生的暴力事件再次证明加沙存在爆发全面地区性冲突的危险。


Israel’s latest operation in Gaza brought it no benefit, either tactical or strategic.	从战略战术两方面而言，以色列最近的加沙行动没有取得任何收获。


On the contrary, this aggression, clearly staged for domestic political consumption, will harm Israel’s long-term security.	相反，此次出于国内政治目的而采取的行动明显有损于以色列的长期安全。


For the first time, Hamas proved capable of causing disruptions as far away as Tel Aviv, while Israel was forced to defend its behavior and reputation even with its traditional allies, including the United States.	哈马斯首次成功干扰到特拉维夫，迫使以色列在传统的盟友（包括美国）面前为自己的行为和声誉进行辩护。


But the biggest lesson for Israel is that it needs to comprehend better the new strategic environment following the Arab Awakening.	但在阿拉伯觉醒运动后更好理解新的战略环境是以色列应该吸取的最大教训。


It is imperative to adopt a more holistic approach to both of these problems.	上述问题有必要采取全面措施加以解决。


The reference point for such an effort should be parallel implementation of the 2002 Arab Peace Plan, which addresses Israel’s security concerns, and a regional disarmament mechanism based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, adopted in 1991 to enable the elimination of WMDs from the entire region.	执行2002年阿拉伯和平计划解决以色列安全问题并根据1991年通过的联合国安理会687号决议实现销毁地区大规模杀伤性武器理应作为上述措施的基础。


I deeply appreciate US President Barack Obama’s remarks at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2010, at which he supported this idea and invited other major actors to take the initiative on disarmament.	我非常支持美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马在2010年核不扩散条约审议大会上的讲话，奥���马在会上支持了上述想法，并要求其他主要国家就裁军问题采取行动。


This approach would enable a fair and lasting resolution of the Palestinian issue, which profoundly offends people’s sense of justice and causes instability and extremism, while eliminating tensions arising from the threat perceptions of Iran and other countries in the region.	上述方法可以在消除伊朗和其他国家威胁意识所带来的紧张局势，公正持久地解决严重违背人们正义感、并导致动荡和极端主义的巴勒斯坦问题。


Beyond this, advanced countries and international financial institutions should implement a comprehensive economic recovery program for the Arab countries in transition, similar to the Marshall Plan implemented after World War II.	此外，发达国家和国际金融机构应效仿二战结束后的马歇尔计划，在尚处于转型阶段的阿拉伯国家实施全面的经济复苏计划。


Europe and the international community have an opportunity to help the Mediterranean region to regain the prosperity and grandeur that it once had, and to turn the Middle East into a zone of peace, democracy, and stability.	欧洲和国际社会有机会协助地中海地区恢复其曾经拥有的繁荣和伟大，在中东地区实现和平、民主和稳定。


Turkey will play whatever part it can in order to realize this vision.	土耳其愿意为实现上述愿景而竭尽全力。


Europe and the New World Order	欧洲和世界新秩序


BERLIN – November 15, 2008, is a date to remember, because on that day history was made.	柏林 - 2008年11月15日是一个值得纪念的日子，因为这一天，历史被创造了。


For the first time, the G-20, the world’s 20 leading economies, came together in Washington, D.C., to find an answer to the global financial and economic crisis.	第一次，G - 20 这个世界上20个主要的经济体，为了找到全球金融和经济危机的解决方案，在华盛顿特区聚到了一起。


While this first meeting resulted in nothing more than declarations of intent, it still marks a historic turning point.	虽然这第一次会议的结果只是发表了意向声明，但它仍然是一个历史性的转折点。


Faced with the gravest financial and economic crisis worldwide since the 1930’s, the Western industrial nations (including Russia) that previously dominated the world economy are no longer capable of coming up with an effective response.	面对20世纪30年代以来全球最严重的金融和经济危机，以前主导世界经济的西方工业国家（包括俄罗斯），已不再能够拿出有效的对策。


Moreover, hopes for mitigating or, indeed, overcoming the global economic crisis rest exclusively with the emerging economic powers, first and foremost China.	此外，减轻，或者更确切地说，走出全球经济危机的希望就全部落在新兴的经济强国肩上，首先而且主要是中国。


As a result, the G-8, which excludes the most important emerging-market countries, has lost its significance for good.	因此，把最重要的新兴市场国家排斥在外的八国集团，已经永远地失去了其重要性。


Globalization has resulted in a lasting change in the distribution of power and opportunities, laying the groundwork for a new world order for the twenty-first century.	全球化导致了权力和机会之分配的长久性改变，并奠定了二十一世纪世界新秩序的基础。


Once the current global crisis is over, nothing will ever be the same again.	一旦当前全球经济危机结束，一切都会不同。


The West – the United States and Europe – are in relative decline, while the emerging Asian and Latin American powers will be among the winners.	西方国家-美国和欧洲-正在相对走弱，而新兴的亚洲和拉美国家将是赢家。


The US has responded to the decline of its global strength in an impressive manner, with the election of its first African-American president, Barack Obama.	美国已经对其全球实力的下降作出了反应，选出了第一位非洲裔总统巴拉克·奥巴马，这令人印象深刻。


Amidst one of the gravest crises in its history, America has proven to itself and the world its ability to reinvent itself.	在其历史上最严重的危机时刻，美国向自己和全世界证明了其自我改造的能力。


And it is clear even now that this decision will have three long-term consequences.	即使是现在马上来看，美国人民的这一选择将无疑带来三个长期影响。


First, the election of a black president will put to rest the tragic legacy of slavery and the American Civil War.	首先，选出一位黑人总统将结束悲惨的奴隶制和美国内战的遗留问题。


From now on, the issues of skin color, eye shape, or gender will no longer play a deciding role for a candidate for high, or even the highest, office.	从现在开始，皮肤的颜色、眼睛的形状或性别的问题在一个候选人竞争高职位甚至是最高职位时，将不再起决定性作用。


The US political system now reflects the country’s demographic changes, as non-white sections of the population grow the fastest.	美国现在的政治制度体现了这个国家的人口结构的变化，因为非白人人口增长最为迅速。


Second, Obama’s election will lead to a reorientation of US foreign policy in the medium term.	其次，奥巴马的当选将导致美国中期外交政策的重新调整。


In particular, the transatlantic/European focus of American foreign policy, which was previously a matter of course, will increasingly become a thing of the past.	特别是以前被认为是美国外交政策中的理所当然的跨大西洋/欧洲的重点，将越来越成为明日黄花。


Third, the internal realignment of America’s political-cultural perspective will be reinforced by the ongoing global shift of wealth and power from the West to the East.	第三，随着全球财富和权力不断从西方向东方转移，美国的政治文化视角的内部调整也将得到加强。


The Northeastern Pacific powers – China, Japan, and South Korea – are already America’s most significant creditors by far, and their importance will increase further as a result of the financial crisis.	东北太平洋地区的强国-中国、日本和韩国-已经成为美国最重要的债权国，金融危机的出现使这些国家的重要性进一步加强。


For the foreseeable future, the greatest opportunities for growth lie in this region, and for both economic and geopolitical reasons America will increasingly turn toward the Pacific region, thus downgrading its transatlantic orientation.	在可预见的未来，最大的增长机会将出现在这一地区，而出于经济和地缘政治的考虑，美国将越来越多地转向亚太地区，从而降低其跨大西洋定位的重要性。


All of this is bad news for Europe, because once this global crisis is over, Europeans will simply have become less important.	所有这一切对欧洲来说无疑都是坏消息，因为一旦全球危机结束，欧洲的重要性肯定会下降。


And, unfortunately, Europe is not only doing nothing to hold off or reverse its decline – it is accelerating the process through its own behavior.	不幸的是，欧洲不仅在努力阻止或扭转这种局面方面无所事事，且其自身的所作所为却在加快这种下行的过程。


With the election of Obama, America has turned toward the future within a globalized, multipolar world; Europe, on the other hand, is rediscovering national action in this time of crisis, and thus banking on the past!	随着奥巴马的当选，美国已经在全球化和多极化的世界框架中面对未来； 而另一方面，欧洲却在当今的危机中重新挖掘其采取国家行动的效果，因此还在吃老本。


The European constitution has failed, the Lisbon reform treaty is in limbo after the Irish rejected it, and stronger European economic governance is blocked by German-French disunity.	欧洲宪法已经失败，里斯本改革条约被爱尔兰拒绝后已无人问津，而加强欧洲经济治理受到了德法不团结的阻扰。


The reaction of EU member states to this ongoing self-inflicted impasse is unambiguous: rather than trying to reenergize the process of further political and economic integration, they are primarily acting on their own to try to fill the vacuum that has emerged.	欧盟成员国对这种旷日持久的自作自受所造成的僵局作出了毫不含糊的反应：各成员国主要靠自己的努力以填补出现的真空，而不是试图对政治和经济的进一步一体化进程重新注入活力。


Certainly, coordination between the member states exists, and is even successful at times, but without strong European institutions, such singular successes will not last.	当然，成员国之间的协调是存在的，有时甚至是成功的，但没有强大的欧洲机构，单个的成功将不会持续太久。


There is a very real danger that Europe will simply miss out on an historic strategic turn towards a multipolar world – and at a high price.	有一个非常真实的危险，那就是欧洲将完全错失历史性的战略转机以转入多极化的世界，并且要为此付出高昂的代价。


After the summit in Washington, it should have sunk in among Europeans everywhere – even the Euroskeptics of the British Isles – that this strategic realignment is taking place right now!	在华盛顿首脑会议之后，各地的欧洲人甚至是英国的那些对欧盟持怀疑态度的人，也应该意识到这一战略调整此刻就在发生着！


If Europeans cannot get their heads around the fact that the nineteenth century is over, the global caravan will continue to move forward into the twenty-first century without them.	如果欧洲人不能承认十九世纪他们的时代已经结束，那么全球列车没有他们也照样能朝二十一世纪继续迈进。


The Power of a European Energy Union	欧洲能源联盟的能量


DUBLIN – One of the top priorities established by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker ahead of his election last summer was the creation of a European energy union.	发自都柏林——在去年夏天当选之前，欧盟委员会主席让-克劳德·容克（Jean-Claude Juncker）提出的其中一个核心议题就是创立一个欧洲能源联盟。


He was right to do so.	这一举措是正确的。


Done properly, a more cohesive energy policy could achieve three strategic objectives simultaneously.	如果能正确实现的话，一个更具凝结力的能源政策将自动实现三大战略目标。


By coordinating research and investment, encouraging conservation, and integrating energy markets, an energy union would help fight climate change, provide Europe with a much needed economic stimulus, and protect the continent from supply shocks, such as those caused by the crises in North Africa and Ukraine.	通过将研究和投资相结合，鼓励节约能源，并将能源市场进行整合，一个能源将有助于对抗气候变化，为欧洲提供一项急需的经济刺激政策，并让整个大陆免受能源供应波动——例如北非和乌克兰危机——的冲击。


Of course, the European Union's ability to act is dependent on the willingness of its member states; and, though some of the continent's leaders have championed the initiative, others have proved less enthusiastic.	当然，欧盟采取行动的能力取决于其成员国的意愿，虽然其中一些领头国家不断推进这一动议，但其他国家却对此不甚热心。


A crucial test of their collective resolve will be whether they are willing to support key infrastructure projects that deliver on all three objectives.	而对各国集体决心的一个关键测试指标就是是否愿意支持建设那些促成上述三大目标的核心基础设施。


One good example of such a project is the North Sea Countries' Offshore Grid Initiative, a proposal that would link offshore wind farms to a new regional grid, and allow countries to balance variable power supplies across borders.	这一项目的其中一个模范样板就是北海沿岸诸国所提出的离岸电网动议，旨在将所有的风力发电站连接成一个新的区域电网，让各国可以跨境对各自的电力供应进行平衡。


The idea – first advanced in a 2009 memorandum of understanding signed by nine EU member states and Norway – has enormous potential; by 2030, North Sea winds could provide Europe with 10% of its electricity – carbon-free.	这一在2009年由欧盟九国及挪威签署的合作备忘录中首先提出的理念拥有巨大的潜力； 到2030年，北海的风力发电站提供的电力将占到全欧的10%——而且零碳排放。


But if the project is to go forward, it urgently needs a political mandate.	但如果要继续推进这一项目，就急需得到政治上的委任授权。


The integrated grid can be imagined as a large ring, connecting Norway with the United Kingdom, and then linking across the channel to France, Belgium, and Holland, before moving on to Germany and returning to Scandinavia.	我们可以把整合电网想象成一个巨大的环，从英国连接到挪威，然后穿越英吉利海峡与法国，比利时和荷兰对接，再接上德国并回到斯堪的纳维亚半岛。


Its implementation would allow Europe to introduce a free-trade zone for renewable energy, reducing the need for storage and excess capacity to back up variable power supplies.	它的实施将使欧洲得以建立一个可再生能源的自由贸易区，并因此减少为支撑其他各类能源供应所需的储存空间和过剩产能。


Not only would the grid pay for itself; once in place, it would reduce the cost of new wind farms by some 30%, by providing them with an existing connection to energy markets.	电网不但能维持自身的运营，而且可以通过提供与能源市场的已有连接通道，使新风力发电站的成本下降30%。


An interconnected energy system would make particular sense for the UK and Germany, which could use the one-hour time difference between them to smooth out the peaks and troughs in demand.	一个互联的能源系统对英国和德国尤其有用，因为两国可以利用互相之间的一小时时差去抹平本国能源需求的高峰和低谷。


Renewable energy production is by nature intermittent, and the sheer number of fluctuating power sources in Germany is already pushing its existing grid to the limit.	可再生能源的生产本身是有间歇性的，而德国不同能源来源供应量的大起大落已经将其现有电网逼到了极限。


Interconnection would also reduce the number of new onshore transmission lines the country needs.	互联也将有助于减少该国所需的内陆输电网数量。


The German government has produced a policy paper outlining how a more integrated regional market might work.	为此德国政府也制定了一份政策文件以描述一个进一步整合的区域能源市场应当如何运作。


Last year, the UK matched Germany's investments in clean energy, spending some $15.2 billion on solar panels and wind farms.	去年，英国在太阳能和风力发电站等洁净能源方面的投资达152亿美元，与德国相仿。


But Britain will need to do a lot more if it is to meet its climate targets.	但要达到其制定的气候目标的话英国还有很长的路要走。


According to a parliamentary report, “the cost of developing such a supergrid could be very high...but it may bring a host of economic benefits – including tens of thousands of new jobs in the offshore renewable industry."	据一份议会报告指出，“建设这样一个超级电网的成本将极为高昂……但将带来大量经济利益——包括在离岸可再生能源行业的数万新工作职位。


A regional initiative would also allow Prime Minister David Cameron to accommodate opposition within his party to onshore renewable energy plants.	”一个区域性动议也将让首相戴维·卡梅伦得以安抚本党内那些反对建设内陆可再生能源发电站的声音。


Each of the individual countries involved in the project would benefit from its construction.	每一个牵涉这一项目的国家都将从项目的建设中受益。


Holland and Belgium need a cost-effective way to develop their own offshore resources.	荷兰和比利时需要一个更具性价比的方法来发展自身的离岸能源资源。


Denmark already benefits from an interconnected electricity market; and the lesson it has learned is that it makes sense to integrate even further.	丹麦已经从互联的电力市场中得到了好处； 而从中得到的经验就是再进一步整合都是合理的。


Norway would be able to sell its hydropower and secure a backup supply should climate change leave it running dry.	挪威将得以出售自身的水电资源，就算气候变化导致该资源减少，也可以确保后备能源供应。


Advances in cable technology would allow Ireland to link to France, providing an alternative route to European markets if the UK elects to remain outside the network.	电缆传输技术的进步令爱尔兰和法国连接起来，那么即便英国议会投票选择置身于电网之外，也可以让前者有另一条连结欧洲能源市场的通路。


Juncker's €315 billion ($360 billion) investment plan, proposed in December, includes some €87 billion in interconnection projects.	容克在12月提出的3150亿欧元（折合3600亿美元）投资计划中包含了对各项互联项目的870亿欧元投资。


It would make sense to combine these into a single initiative, with common standards for technology, planning, and regulations.	而这些项目更应该��整合进一个单一动议之中，制定出技术，规划和监管方式的共同标准。


Doing so would lower the cost of capital on loans from the European Investment Bank and give a boost to European technology companies.	这一举动将降低从欧洲投资银行贷款的资金成本并刺激欧洲能源企业的发展。


The Baltic states are also planning their own offshore grid.	波罗的海诸国也在规划自身的离岸电网。


But it is not just Northern Europe that could gain from such an approach.	但受益的可不仅仅是北欧地区。


Europe's southeastern and Mediterranean countries could also benefit from sharing power.	东南欧和地中海沿岸诸国也会从能源分享中得益。


Most of the necessary legal and regulatory framework is already in place. There is no need for treaty changes or complex new legislation.	发展这类项目所需的大部分法律和监管框架都已经就位，无需修改条约或者纷繁复杂的新立法。


All that is needed is political direction, so that the European Commission can establish the necessary governance structures.	唯一需要的就是政治指向，好让欧盟委员会可以建立一个必要的治理架构。


The strength of Europe's commitment to a true energy union will be revealed when the European Council meets on March 19.	欧洲承诺建立一个真正能源联盟方面的决心将3月19日的欧洲议会会议上展现出来。


Among the decisions it will make will be whether to build these regional grids.	会上的众多决策之一就是是否建立这些区域电网。


If the EU and its member states reach an agreement, they could simultaneously boost their economies and improve their energy security.	如果能欧盟及其成员国可以达成协议的话，它们就能在促进自身经济发展的同时改善自身能源安全形势。


If not, they could end up buying the technology from China or the United States, which will be investing in their own grids in the coming years.	否则的话就只能从中国或者美国购买相关科技，并在未来投资于各国自身的电网建设。


Europe’s Energy Essentials	欧洲的能源要务


MADRID – At last month’s European Council meeting in Brussels, energy issues dominated the agenda – for the third time this year.	马德里—在上个月的欧洲理事会布鲁塞尔会议上，能源问题主宰了会议日程——这已是今年的第三次。


Energy’s emergence as a focal point for European leaders makes sense, given that it lies at the confluence of the three existential threats facing the European Union: a revisionist Russia, the declining competitiveness of European businesses, and climate change.	欧洲领导人把能源作为关注焦点是明智的，因为它是欧盟所面临的三大生存威胁的交汇点：修正主义俄罗斯、欧洲企业竞争力下降以及气候变化。


As these developments challenge Europe’s values, its social model’s viability, and the world’s long-term security, EU leaders must focus on building a new energy system that ensures a reliable supply, sensible pricing, and ecological sustainability.	这些发展趋势挑战了欧洲的价值、社会模式的可行性以及世界的长期安全，因此欧洲领导人必须专注于构建新的能源体系以确保可靠供给、合理定价和生态可持续性。


The good news is that a framework is already emerging that could facilitate this initiative.	好消息是已经有了能促进这一方向的框架。


Indeed, beyond widely discussed targets for energy production for 2030 – covering greenhouse-gas emissions, energy efficiency, and renewable resources – the European Council’s conclusions embrace key elements of a practical and effective approach to energy.	事实上，除了被广泛讨论2030年能源产量目标——该目标考虑了温室气体排放、能源效率和可再生资源等因素——欧洲理事会的决议包括了务实有效的能源方针的关键要素。


But, in order to move from aspiration to implementation, Europeans must muster the unity of purpose that so far has been conspicuously absent in EU energy policy.	但是，要想从构想走向实施，欧洲必须塑造同一目标，而这在欧盟能源政策中一直难觅踪迹。


The most tangible element of the EU’s emerging energy-policy framework is the internal energy market, which, once completed, will allow for the unimpeded flow of energy and related investments throughout the EU.	欧盟新能源政策框架中最看得见摸得着的要素是内部能源市场，如能完善这一市场，能源和相关投资就可以在欧盟内部畅通无阻地流动。


Such an integrated energy market would lead to significant savings – estimates go as high as €40 billion ($51 billion) annually by 2030 – thereby providing a much-needed competitiveness boost.	这一一体化能源市场将带来巨大的节约——到2030年估计可达每年400亿欧元——从而带来急需的竞争力提振。


The internal energy market would enhance Europe’s energy security as well.	内部能源市场还将增强欧洲的能源安全。


Though the EU as a whole maintains a balanced energy mix, with supply divided relatively evenly among gas, coal, oil, renewables, and nuclear generation, individual countries are often excessively dependent on a single source and, more dangerously, a single supplier: Russia.	尽管欧洲总体保持着平衡的能源组成，供给在天然气、煤炭、石油、可再生能源和核能之间的配比相对均匀，但个体国家通常过分依赖于某种能源，甚至（更加危险地）依靠单一供给国：俄罗斯。


Unrestricted energy flows within the EU would mitigate the risks of supply disruptions or shocks.	不受限制的欧盟内部能源流将坚强供给干扰或冲击的风险。


Of course, establishing an internal energy market is not just a matter of policy.	当然，建立内部能源市场并不只是政策问题。


The EU needs the right infrastructure to facilitate the movement of energy among states and regions.	欧盟需要正确的基础设施支持能源在国家和地区间的流动。


On this front, there is much to be done.	在这方面，欧洲有很多需要做的地方。


Spain, for example, can currently transmit only 1.5% of its electricity-generating capacity to the rest of Europe, owing to a lack of transmission infrastructure in the Pyrenees and France’s reluctance to open its energy market to competition from the Iberian Peninsula.	比如，西班牙目前只能将其发电产能的1. 5%输送给欧洲其他地区，其原因是比力牛斯山区基础设施不足和法国不愿开放能源市场接受来自伊比利亚半岛的竞争。


The European Council, recognizing the urgency of this issue, has called for greater electricity interconnection, targeting 10% of generating capacity by 2020 and 15% by 2030, with countries exporting 15 megawatts of power for every 100 megawatts they produce.	欧洲理事会意识到这一问题的紧迫性，呼吁加强电力互联性，目标在2020年和2030年分别达到产能的10%和15%，各国每发100百万瓦电力可以出口15百万瓦。


Achieving these benchmarks will require both significant capital investment and a shift in EU member states’ mentalities, so that fears like France’s do not continue to impede progress.	实现这些基准目标需要大规模资本投资和欧盟成员国思维的转变，以使类似于法国的担忧不再阻碍进展。


Countries need to know that their companies will not suffer either from outflows of electricity to other EU countries during shortages, or from price increases, owing to the rising emphasis on renewables.	各国需要理解它们的公司不会因为短缺期间电力外流其他欧盟国家而受损，也不会因为价格升高而受损（因为目前正在日益着重于可再生能源）。


The emerging European “energy union,” which the Council has endorsed, could be the ideal vehicle to facilitate this shift.	新兴的欧洲“能源联盟”（欧洲理事会支持这一联盟）能够成为这一转变的理想推动因素。


The problem is that EU leaders have yet to define a compelling and effective strategy for building it.	问题在于欧盟领导人尚没有找到如何构建这一转变的令人信服又有效的战略。


Indeed, though European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has established a vice-presidential post responsible for energy union – now held by Maroš Šefčovič – no one seems to know what exactly the position will entail.	事实上，尽管欧盟委员会主席容克已经设立了负责能源联盟的副主席职位——目前的人选是舍甫科维奇（Maroš Šefčovič）——但没人知道该职位的具体职责。


So far, Šefčovič has merely presented five vague pillars for the energy union, leading many to consider the current policy approach to an energy union hollow.	目前舍甫科维奇只是为能源联盟提出了五个笼统的基本要点，这让许多人认为当前的政策方向有名无实。


The EU needs a well-defined energy strategy that helps to overcome the trust deficit that is hampering effective solutions.	欧盟需要明确的能源战略以助克服妨碍有效方案的信任赤字。


This means, first and foremost, establishing clear and predictable community rules and cost-sensitive policies for the energy union.	这首先意味着为能源联盟建立明确且可预测的共同规则和成本敏感型政策。


Doing so would help the EU to achieve another critical goal: presenting a more united front to the rest of the world.	如此将有助于欧盟实现另一个关键目标：向世界其他地方展示一条更加团结的阵线。


The Council’s recent conclusions recognize this imperative, and the new Commission structure is conducive to policy coherence.	欧洲理事会的最新决议认识到了这一当务之急，新欧盟委员会结构也有利于政策凝聚性。


Member states must now fall into line.	成员国必须顺着这条线行动。


A major test will be next year’s United Nations climate change conference (COP21) in Paris.	明年的巴黎联合国气候变化会议（COP21）将是一场重要考验。


The 2009 conference in Copenhagen was an unmitigated disaster, as Europe’s “lead by example” approach failed to attract followers.	2009年的哥本哈根会议是一场彻头彻尾的灾难，欧洲的“用榜样引导”方针没有吸引到追随者。


The EU cannot afford to isolate itself, or misunderstand the geopolitical forces at play, yet again.	欧盟不能把再次自己孤立起来，也决不能再次误解起作用的地缘政治力量。


Fortunately, the Council seems to have internalized this lesson, leaving open the possibility of reconsidering its commitments after COP21.	幸运的是，欧洲理事会似乎已经消化了这一教训，打开了在COP21后重新考虑其承诺的可能性。


But it has a lot to do before then, not only to establish a unified approach, but also to translate that approach into strong tactics and a clear message at COP21.	但在此之前欧洲理事会已经做了很多，不但建立了统一的方针，还将在COP21上将该方针转化为强大的策略和明确的信号。


Success would provide a strong foundation for the broader EU energy agenda.	成功将成为更广泛的欧盟能源日程的一个稳固基础。


If the EU is to address the key challenges of energy security, competitive pricing, and sustainability, it will need a unified, comprehensive, and compelling policy approach.	如果欧盟想要解决能源安全、竞争性定价和可持续性等方面的关键挑战，就需要统一、全面和令人信服的政策方针。


The foundations of such an approach – an internal energy market, the framework of an energy union, and a cohesive external voice – are emerging.	这一方针的基础——内部能源市场、能源联盟框架和外部声音配合——正在形成。


Now Europe needs to follow through and make it work.	如今，欧洲需要再接再厉，落实这一方针。


Europe, An Engine of Peace	欧洲是和平的引擎


Critics of European monetary integration often point out that, in the absence of political union, monetary union is doomed to fail.	欧洲货币一体化的评论家们通常指出，在缺乏政治一体化的条件下，货币一体化注定要失败。


I agree with the critics’ conclusion, but not with their premise, for the success of the single currency so far has been due precisely to the political commitments of the Union’s member countries.	我同意评论家们的结论，但却不能苟同他们的假定前提，因为目前为止，与单一货币的成功休戚相关的正是欧盟成员国的政治义务。


In other words, it is not true that the European Union does not constitute a political union.	换而言之，欧盟确实组成了一个政治联盟。


European economic integration – in all its aspects – reflects the desire to integrate Europe politically, which, at least in my view, implies that European economic and monetary integration is irreversible.	欧洲的经济一体化——从所有方面来看——都反映了将欧洲政治一体化的意愿，在我看来这至少暗示着欧洲的经济和货币一体化是不可扭转的。


This has been true from the outset of the European integration process in 1952, when six countries established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).	自从1952年六国设立欧洲煤炭钢铁联合体(European Coal and Steel Community，简称ECSC)启动了欧洲一体化进程以来，这种不可扭转的趋势就一直保持着。


The aim of the ECSC was explicitly political: to remove control of the two most important raw materials for the production of heavy weaponry from states that had just fought the bloodiest war in history.	ECSC的目的明显是具有政治性的：消除重型武器生产中所需的两种重要原材料的控制权，该控制权来自曾在史上最为血腥残忍的战争中相互斗争的国家。


This drive for peace remained, quietly, the key motivation behind further steps toward Europe’s economic integration, which was regarded as the vehicle for achieving political integration. 	这种无声无息的对和平的推动一直是欧洲经济进一步一体化的主要动力，而欧洲经济一体化被看作是达到政治一体化的一种手段。


In 1951, French Prime Minister Rene Pléven proposed establishing a European Defense Community (EDC) alongside the ECSC.	1951年，法国总理Rene Pléven提议设立一个与ECSC相近的欧洲防卫共同体（European Defense Community，简称EDC）。


He failed, but the idea did not vanish.	他没有成功，但是这个观点却保留了下来。


Later that year, Robert Schumann – the French foreign minister at the time and a founding father of European integration – explicitly identified the ECSC with the drive for peace.	同年末，罗布特·舒曼（Robert Schumann）——当时的法国外交部长兼欧洲一体化的奠基之父——明确地用推动和平确定了ECSC。


He described it as a means for creating a “fusion of interests…that will be the leavening from which may grow a wider and deeper community between countries long opposed to one another by bloody conflicts.”	他将ECSC描述为“各种利益的融合……它将成为一块酵母，在那些由于流血冲突长期彼此敌对的国家之间培养出一个更为广泛更为深入的共同体。 ”


These words were echoed on the eve of the introduction of the single currency.	这些话在引进单一货币的当晚就获得了响应。


In particular, Germany under Chancellor Helmut Kohl often linked monetary integration with the objective of political union.	特别是在赫尔穆特·科尔（Helmut Kohl）总理带领下的德国通常将货币一体化与政治联盟的目的联系在一起。


Kohl once referred to the single currency’s success as a matter of “war and peace.”	科尔曾经将单一货币的成功看作一件和“战争与和平”同等重要的事情。


For this reason, I do not agree with those who argue that Germany’s support for European monetary integration was the price it paid for Europe’s acceptance of German reunification.	正是由于这个原因，我不同意那些认为德国对欧洲货币一体化的支持是他们为欧洲接受德国重新统一所付出的回报。


On the contrary, the historical record shows that Germany made the case for a parallel drive to monetary and political integration well before the fall of the Iron Curtain.	相反，历史记录表明，在铁幕落下之前，德国无论对货币一体化还是政治一体化都同样地致力于推动。


Of course, there are other motives behind support for economic integration.	当然，在支持经济一体化的背后还有其他动力。


The EU’s leaders are convinced that achieving the so-called four freedoms – i.e., freedom of movement of goods, services, capital, and people – will optimize the well-being of Europe’s population.	欧盟领导人确信，达到所谓的四大自由——即货物、服务、资金和人员流动自由——将最优化欧洲人民的生活水平。


They also aspire to increase the Continent’s strategic power.	他们也渴望着提高欧洲大陆的战略力量。


But peace was the principal driving force in the minds of people like Schumann and Jean Monnet at the beginning of the European integration process, as it was for Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing when they laid the foundations of the single currency and today’s European Central Bank.	但是正如赫尔穆特·施密特（Helmut Schmidt）和德斯坦（Valérie Giscard d’Estaing）为单一货币和今天的欧洲中央银行打下基础时候一样，在欧洲一体化进程刚开始的时候，和平是舒曼（Schumann）和让·莫奈（Jean Monnet）这些人心中的主要动力。


For half a century, the process of European integration proceeded – sometimes with setbacks, sometimes with giant steps forward – joining formerly separate markets by creating very close trade relations.	半个世纪以来，欧洲一体化进程一直在进行之中——有时候有挫折，有时候又向前一大步——通过建立非常密切的贸易关系把以前四分五裂的市场联合起来。


Over time, this stimulated ever-greater economic convergence.	随着时间的流逝，这刺激了前所未有的经济集中。


Of course, Europe’s economies have not become “look-alikes,” nor has GDP per capita been fully equalized.	当然，欧洲的各种经济体制还没有变成“相似者”，他们的人均GDP也没有完全平等。


But the differences between Europe’s economies were never so dramatic as to form an insurmountable barrier to embarking upon the most ambitious project of all: adopting a common currency.	但是，欧洲各经济体制之间的差异还没有这么剧烈以至于对启动所有计划中最为艰巨的一项——采取共同货币制——形成一个难以逾越的障碍。


Understanding this history is vital, because Europe’s Union once again stands at a threshold: should it keep its promise to start membership talks with Turkey?	理解这段历史十分关键，因为欧盟再一次站在了一个新开端上：是否应该遵守诺言开始与土耳其进行成员国谈话？


In the wake of the defeat of the EU’s Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands this spring, many say that Europe’s decade-old promise cannot and should not be kept.	随着欧盟宪法条约今年春天在法国和荷兰遭遇否决，许多人都说欧洲十年前的承诺不能够也不应该再去遵守了。


What strikes me as dangerous is that the issue of peace – the motor that has driven European integration from the start – rarely comes up in the debate about what to do in the wake of these events.	让我深感危险的是，和平问题——这个从一开始就推动欧洲一体化的引擎——在这些事件发生后的辩论中几乎不再出现了。


On the contrary, responsible statesmen and party leaders have come out openly against Turkish membership.	相反，恪尽职守的政治家和党派领导人已经公开对土耳其获得成员国资格表示反对。


I would have hoped that these people had learned from Schumann and Monnet what really matters for Europe and its future; sadly, this does not seem to be the case.	我真希望这些人已经从舒曼和莫奈那里学会什么才是对欧洲和欧洲未来真正重要的，可惜，事情看来并非如此。


Of course, I do not fear some sort of military clash between Turkey and the EU.	当然，我不担心土耳其和欧盟之间会��生某些形式的军事冲突。


After all, Turkey has been and remains a loyal member of NATO.	毕竟，土耳其已经并一直是北约的忠实成员。


But an increasingly virulent and violent clash of cultures is emerging in Europe – particularly in France, Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands – between Islam and the humanitarian, Christian, and Jewish traditions.	但是一种越来越充满敌意的、伊斯兰教和人道主义、基督教和犹太教传统之间的文化冲突正在欧洲出现——尤其在法国、德国、西班牙和荷兰。


For me, Europe’s integration of Muslim Turkey into its political union is the same sort of question of peace that Schumann and Monnet successfully confronted.	对我而言，欧洲将穆斯林土耳其一体化进它的政治联盟是舒曼和莫奈曾经成功克服的同一类和平问题。


Today, Europe needs peace between cultures as much as it once needed peace between nations, and it is for this reason that we must welcome Turkey into our midst.	今天，欧洲需要文化之间的和平共处，正如它曾经需要国家之间的和平一样，并且正是由于这个原因我们必须欢迎土耳其加入到我们中来。


The EU’s Bold New Strategy	欧盟大胆的新战略


BRUSSELS – When problems accumulate, as in Europe – where the failed coup in Turkey comes hard on the heels of the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union – attention is often focused on the most recent issue to arise.	布鲁塞尔——当各种问题像在欧洲一样累积时（英国退欧决策后接踵而来的是土耳其的政变失败）——吸引人们注意力的往往是最近发生的问题。


Earlier problems, now seeming less urgent, are neglected.	稍早发生的问题现在显得不那么紧迫，因此容易被人忽视。


For many years, we Europeans have seen how this plays out: in the end, none of the problems ever seems to be resolved.	多年以来，我们欧洲人对此早已见怪不怪：说到底，没有任何问题最终得到了解决。


The Turkish coup appears now to be resolving itself, though no one yet knows what long-term implications it will have for that vital country.	土耳其政变现在看似正在自我解决，尽管对那个重要国家会产生什么样的长期影响还没有人能够确定。


Brexit is, without doubt, a veritable blow to the European project.	英国退欧毫无疑问切实打击了欧洲项目。


A member state has regrettably chosen to move ahead alone. But this mustn’t lead the EU into the most damaging situation of all: paralysis.	一个成员国令人遗憾地选择独自前行，但这并不一定会令欧洲陷入到破坏性最强的瘫痪境地。


The many issues that the Union must still resolve won’t disappear merely with the passage of time.	欧盟必须解决的诸多问题不会只随时间的流逝而消失。


And one of the most urgent is Europe’s security: each day that passes without taking joint action is an opportunity lost and leads to greater risk.	欧洲安全是最紧迫的问题之一：没有采取联合行动的每一天都将失去一次机会，并且意味着更大的风险来临。


Addressing such issues effectively, rather than falling into the trap of the immediate, requires adhering to accepted strategies.	有效解决上述问题，而不是落入眼前的陷阱，需要对既定策略的坚持。


By identifying challenges, establishing long-term objectives, and designing collective action to achieve those objectives, strategies provide a framework for initiatives to address problems in a more far-sighted, coherent way.	既定策略能够找出问题、确定长期目标并设计实现这些目标的集体行动，以及提供必要的方案框架以连贯和更有远见的方式来解决问题。


With this in mind, Federica Mogherini, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs, and her team have designed and presented a Global Strategy for European security that has clearly defined aims befitting conditions both within and beyond our borders.	本着这样的理念，欧盟外交事务高级代表费代丽卡·莫盖里尼及其团队已经设计并提出了一套欧洲安全全球战略，战略明确指出了适合欧盟内外形势的目的。


Many observers have indicated that now is not the best time to elaborate a vision that assumes that all Europeans are united by common interests.	许多观察家均已提出现在并不是拟定一项假设所有欧洲人都团结在共同利益周围愿景的最好时机。


But, as the strategy clearly declares, cooperation is no longer a question of principle; it is an existential imperative.	但就像战略所明确宣布的那样，合作已经从原则性问题上升到生存的必须。


That is why I disagree with those who call the Global Strategy ill-timed and even useless.	因此那些说全球战略生不逢时、甚至毫无用处的见解恕我不能同意。


Even though it was presented to the European Council a week after the Brexit referendum, its aim is to implement the provisions foreseen in the Treaty of Lisbon, seven years after the treaty entered into effect.	虽然全球战略在英国退欧公投后一周才提交给欧洲理事会，但其目标是要在《里斯本条约》生效7年后真正落实条约所设定的规则。


It is also the result of a June 2015 mandate from the European Council itself.	全球战略也是2015年6月欧洲理事会本身命令的结果。


And it aims to develop a policy to strengthen the EU, which many citizens want.	其目的是像很多民众所希望的那样制定一项强化欧盟的政策。


To remain immobile would have been a grave error.	坐失良机会犯下严重的错误。


The Global Strategy defines clear objectives, considers the mistakes of the past, and is deeply anchored in the EU’s present-day reality.	全球战略制定了明确目标、吸取了过去错误的教训并深深植根于欧盟当今的现实。


It calls for a more responsible, united, and credible EU – the only response capable of overcoming Euroskepticism.	它呼吁建立更负责任、更团结可靠的欧盟——只有采取这样的对策才能克服欧洲怀疑主义。


It defines the actions Europe must take and the capacities it must have for its own defense and security.	全球战略明确了欧盟必须采取的行动，以及巩固国防及安全必须具备的能力。


It takes into account the long-term effects of its actions and understands that the development of the EU’s member states is essential to conflict prevention.	全球战略认真思考了其行动的长期影响，并认识到欧盟成员国的发展是预防冲突的关键问题。


And it recognizes that only greater unity will enable Europe to confront the challenges of terrorism, migration, and climate change.	全球战略认识到要想应对恐怖主义、移民和气候变化的挑战，欧洲只有加强团结。


A fundamental fact should be borne in mind when assessing the Global Strategy’s usefulness: The threats to Europe’s security are not common because some treaty or intergovernmental consensus has said so.	评估全球战略有效性的时候必须牢记一个基本的事实：并不是因为某些协议或政府间共识的规定才有了共同的欧洲安全威胁。


They are common because we are neighbors, and because, like it or not, the world around us is irremediably global.	我们面临着共同的威胁是因为我们是邻国，而且不管愿意与否，我们都生活在一个无可救药的全球化的世界。


One consequence of a document like the Global Strategy is the creation of a common discourse.	全球战略文件的结果之一是创造一种共同的话题。


In 2003, Europeans also needed to unite behind a common foreign policy, following the differences created by the intervention in Iraq.	2003年，欧洲人同样需要共同的外交政策，以克服伊拉克干预行动所造成的分歧。


But the problem today is on a very different level: the European project itself is being questioned.	但今天的问题处在一个完全不同的层面：欧洲项目本身正在遭到质疑。


Revealing the EU’s capacity to act effectively would help to confirm the necessity of its existence.	显示出欧洲具备采取有效行动的能力将有助于肯定其存在的必要性。


The Global Strategy can be useful here.	全球战略的作用恰恰在这里。


European citizens perceive terrorism and the refugee tragedy as questions of vital importance and want the EU to play a greater role in addressing them and other global issues.	欧洲民众认为恐怖主义和难民悲剧等问题至关重要，因此希望欧盟能发挥更大作用解决恐怖、移民和其他全球问题。


A Pew Research Center study in ten European countries (including supposed bastions of Euroskepticism like the UK, Poland, and Hungary) found that an average of 74% of those polled supported more decisive action by the EU abroad.	在欧洲十国（包括像英国、波兰和匈牙利等所谓欧洲怀疑论的堡垒）所进行的皮尤研究中心调查发现，74%的受调查者支持欧盟在海外采取更加果断的行动。


In recent years, we have seen how internal and external security conditions are closely linked.	近年来，我们亲眼目睹了国内外局势的密切联系。


That is why, in the interest of safeguarding internal security, the Global Strategy emphasizes the need for more and improved external action.	正因如此，全球战略强调有必要采取更多更好的外部行动以维护内部安全利益。


It is also why the EU requires an integral approach to conflicts and crises that uses every available instrument and policy.	欧盟也因此需要充分利用所有工具和政策的整体方案来应对冲突和危机。


Moreover, the manner in which we conduct external action characterizes us as Europeans.	不仅如此，我们身为欧洲人的形象取决于我们采取外部行动的方式。


In the field of human security, few organizations can deploy missions and operations as complete as the EU’s, combining military and civilian elements, such as police or judges.	在人类安全��域，鲜有机构能像欧盟一样整合警察或法官等军民元素完整地部署行动和任务。


Much has changed since the European Security Strategy of 2003: Europe must now find its place amid the competition of great powers and negotiate the conflicts and instability on its eastern and southern flanks.	2003年欧洲安全战略出台后形势发生了很大变化：欧洲现在必须在大国竞争中找到自己的位置并谈判东南侧翼的冲突和动荡问题。


There have been important changes within Europe as well, and opposition to strengthening the EU seems to be on the rise, as evidenced by the Brexit vote and the position recently expressed by the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia).	欧洲内部也发生了重要变化，英国退欧公投和维谢格拉德集团（捷克共和国、匈牙利、波兰和斯洛伐克）最近的立场表明，越来越多人反对欧盟加强自身实力。


With the presentation of the Global Strategy, those in favor of moving the European project forward have placed an initiative on the table.	借提出全球战略之机，那些赞成推进欧洲项目的人公开提出了自己的建议。


Without it, only proposals for less Europe would have been heard.	如果没有全球战略，人们只能听见反对欧洲扩张的声音。


Over the coming months, we must move our foreign and security policy forward, in order to implement the strategy’s objectives.	未来几个月，我们必须推进外交和安全政策以落实战略目的。


Those of us who are in favor of continuing to advance cannot remain silent.	我们这些希望欧洲继续前进的人不能沉默不语。


Europeanizing Europe	欧洲化欧洲


BERLIN – The eurozone is at the center of the global financial crisis, because only there, in the realm of the second most important currency after the dollar, does the crisis hit a weak “structure” rather than a state with real power.	柏林——欧元区已成为全球金融危机的中心，因为在欧元区——仅次于美元的第二大货币使用区——危机击中的是软弱的“结构”而不是拥有真实力量的国家。


It is a structure that is squandering the trust of citizens and markets in its ability to resolve conflicts – while pushing the international financial system to the brink of disaster.	这一结构挥霍公民和市场对其解决冲突的能力的信任，还把国际金融体系推向了灾难边缘。


In other words, the financial crisis now reflects a political crisis of the eurozone – one that calls into question the very existence of the European project as a whole.	换句话说，眼下，金融危机反映了欧元区的政治危机，一场让人质疑欧洲计划存在的合理性的危机。


If Europe’s monetary union fails, not much of the common market, or of European institutions and treaties, will be left.	如果欧洲货币联盟崩溃，那么所谓的共同市场以及欧洲机构和条约都不会得到保留。


We would have to write off six decades of successful European integration, with unknown consequences.	欧洲一体化进程60年的成就将一笔勾销，留给人们的将是充满不确定的未来。


This failure would coincide with the emergence of a new world order, as two centuries of Western predominance come to an end.	这样的失败将伴随世界新秩序的出现，两个世纪以来的西方主导模式将寿终正寝。


Power and wealth are shifting towards East Asian and other emerging countries, while America will be preoccupied with its own problems and turning from the Atlantic towards the Pacific.	权力和财富正在向东亚和其他新兴市场国家转移，美国将忙于处置自己的问题，并将重心从大西洋转向太平洋。


If Europeans don’t address their interests now, no one will do it for them.	如果欧洲人现在不能维护好自己的利益，那么没有人会帮他们完成这一任务。


If Europe today does not become the agent of its own destiny, it will become the object of new world powers.	如果欧洲现在不能成为自身命运的代言人，那么它将沦为新势力的目标。


The cause of the European crisis is not three decades of neo-liberalism. Nor is it the result of the collapse of a speculation-fueled asset bubble, the violation of the Maastricht criteria, ballooning debt, or greedy banks.	造成欧洲危机的原因并非30年来的新自由主义，也不是投机活动越吹越大的资产泡沫的崩溃、对马斯特里赫特条约的违反、日渐膨胀的债务或是贪婪的银行。


As important as all of these factors are, Europe’s problem is not what happened, but what did not happen: the creation of a common European government.	与这些因素同样重要的是，欧洲的问题并不在已发生的事情，而在于未曾发生的事情——成立共同的欧洲政府。


At the beginning of the 1990’s, when the majority of the European Union’s member states decided to form a monetary union with a common currency and a central bank, the idea of a central government lacked support.	20世纪90年代初，欧盟多数成员国决定成立一个货币联盟，使用共同货币，由一家央行管理，但成立中央政府的思想并没有得到支持。


As a result, that phase of the monetary union’s construction was postponed, leaving an impressive edifice that lacked a strong foundation to ensure stability in times of crisis.	结果，货币联盟建设的这一阶段被中止了，虽然建成了一幢耀眼的大厦，其根基却并不牢固，不足以在危机爆发时保证稳定性。


Monetary sovereignty was made a common cause; but the power needed to exercise it remained in national capitals.	货币主权成为了欧洲的共同事业，但执行它所需要的权力依然掌握在各国手中。


It was believed at the time that formalized rules – imposing mandatory limits on deficits, debt, and inflation – would be enough.	当时，人们相信，形式化的规则——设置关于赤字、债务和通胀的强制性限制——已经足够了。


But this foundation of rules turned out to be an illusion: principles always need the support of power; otherwise they cannot stand the test of reality.	但这一规则的基础本身被证明只是一场幻觉：原则从来都需要权力的支持，否则无法经受现实的考验。


The eurozone, a confederation of sovereign states with a common currency and common principles and mechanisms, is now failing that test.	而如今，欧元区作为一个采用共同货币和共同原则及机制的主权国家联合体在现实的考验中失败了。


Unable to respond decisively to a crisis, the eurozone is losing the confidence that is any currency’s most important asset.	欧元区没能对危机作出决定性的反应，因此失去了比黄金还要宝贵的信心。


Unless political power in Europe is Europeanized, with the current confederation evolving into a federation, the eurozone – and the EU as a whole – will disintegrate.	除非欧洲的政治权力也得到欧洲化，让现在的联合体进化为联邦，否则欧元区——以及整个欧盟——将分崩离析。


The political, economic, and financial costs of renationalization would be enormous; an EU collapse is feared around the world for good reason.	再度国家化将导致巨大的政治、经济和财政成本； 欧盟的瓦解足以让全世界产生恐慌。


By contrast, if the currency union’s political deficit is addressed now, first by establishing a fiscal union (a common budget and common liabilities), a real political federation will be possible.	相反，如果货币联盟的政治赤字能够现在就解决掉——第一步是成立财政联盟（共同预算和共同债务）——那么建立真正的政治联邦仍有可能。


And let us be clear: anything less than a United States of Europe will not be powerful enough to prevent the looming disaster.	我们要认清形势：唯有欧罗巴合众国才有防止迫在眉睫的灾难的力量。


Like it or not, the eurozone will have to act as the EU’s avant-garde, because the EU as a whole, with its 27 member states, will be neither willing nor able to accelerate political unification.	不管你愿不愿意承认，欧元区是欧盟的前哨，因为拥有27个成员国的欧盟既没有意愿，也没有能力加快政治统一日程。


Unfortunately, unanimous support for the necessary EU treaty changes simply could not be secured.	不幸的是，没有人可以保证对欧盟条约进行必要修改的建议能获得一致通过。


So, what should be done?	那么，我们应该做些什么？


Europeans made decisive progress on integration outside the scope of the EU treaties (but very much in the European spirit) when they agreed to open their borders with the so-called Schengen Agreement (today a part of the EU treaties).	欧洲曾签署过所谓的申根协议（如今是欧盟条约的一部分），开放边境，这是在欧盟条约之外（但仍带有鲜明的欧洲精神烙印）迈出的具决定性意义的统一步骤。


Drawing on that successful experience, the eurozone should avoid the EU’s original sin of creating a supra-national structure that lacked democratic legitimization.	从这一成功先例看，欧元区应该避免欧盟建立缺乏民主合法化基础的超国家结构的原罪。


The eurozone needs a government, which, as things stand at the moment, can consist only of the respective heads of state and government – a development that has already started.	欧元区需要一个政府，从目前的情况看，这个政府可以仅由各国政府首脑组成——此步骤已经开始了。


And, because there can be no fiscal union without a common budget policy, nothing can be decided without the national parliaments.	此外，由于财政联盟不可能在没有共同预算政策的情况下产生，因此不通过各国议会，什么事情都决定不了。


This means that a “European Chamber,” comprising national parliaments’ leaders, is indispensable.	这意味着由各国议会首脑组成的“欧洲议事厅”（European Chamber）也是必不可少的。


Initially, such a chamber could be an advisory body, with the national parliaments maintaining their competencies; later, on the basis of an intergovernmental treaty, it must become a real parliamentary control and decision-making body, made up of national parliaments’ delegated members.	欧洲议事厅可以先以咨询机构的形式存在，各国议会依然保有各自职能。 然后，在共同政府条约的基础上，欧洲议事厅必须成为名副其实的议会控制和决策机构，由各国议会代表成员组成。


Of course, because a treaty of this kind would mean extensive transfer of sovereignty to European intergovernmental institutions, it would need direct popular legitimization through referendums in all member states, including (and especially) Germany.	当然，由于此类条约意味着主权向欧洲共同政府机构的大规模转移，因此需要通过所有成员国（特别是德国）公投实现直接的、广受人民支持的合法化。


None of this addresses important questions, such as common policies to ensure economic stability and promote growth.	所有这些都无法解决重要问题，比如确保经济稳定和刺激增长的共同政策。


But, if we have learned anything from the current crisis, it is that such issues cannot even be framed unless and until the eurozone has a reliable institutional framework, with a sturdy foundation consisting of a real government, effective parliamentary control, and genuine democratic legitimization.	但是，如果说我们能够从当前危机汲取什么教训的话，那就是，除非欧元区拥有一个以实际政府、有效议会控制和真正民主合法化为基础的可靠的制度性框架，否则这些问题甚至连如何界定都无法实现。


Europe at War	战争中的欧洲


NEW YORK – By invading Ukraine in 2014, President Vladimir Putin’s Russia has posed a fundamental challenge to the values and principles on which the European Union was founded, and to the rules-based system that has kept the peace in Europe since 1945.	纽约—2014年入侵乌克兰意味着俄罗斯总统普京对作为欧盟成立基础的价值和原则以及对自1945年以来保持欧洲和平的基于规则的体系进行了根本挑战。


Neither Europe’s leaders nor its citizens are fully aware of the scope of this challenge, much less how to deal with it.	欧洲领导人和欧洲人民都没有充分认识到这一挑战的规模，更不用说如何应对这一挑战了。


Putin’s regime is based on rule by force, manifested in repression at home and aggression abroad.	普京政权基于武力统治，这一点可以从其国内镇压和国外侵略中看出。


But it has been able to gain a tactical advantage, at least in the short term, over the EU and the United States, which are determined to avoid direct military confrontation.	但它至少在短期成功地赢得了相对欧盟和美国的战术性优势，后两者决意避免直接军事冲突。


Violating its treaty obligations, Russia annexed Crimea and established separatist enclaves in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.	俄罗斯违反条约义务，吞并了克里米亚并在东乌克兰的顿巴斯地区建立分裂主义飞地。


When it appeared last summer that the Ukrainian government might win the war in Donbas, Putin ordered an invasion by regular Russian armed forces.	去年夏天，在乌克兰政府似乎可以赢得顿巴斯战争时，普京下令俄罗斯正规武装力量入侵。


Preparations for a second wave of military action began in November, when Putin provided separatists with a new influx of armored columns and personnel.	第二轮军事活动在11月开始准备，此时，普京还为分裂主义者提供新的装甲装装备和人手。


The West, sadly, has provided embattled Ukraine with only a façade of support.	不幸的是，西方给予饱受战乱的乌克兰的只有象征性的支持。


Equally disturbing has been the continuing reluctance of international leaders to provide new financial commitments to Ukraine, despite growing pressure on its foreign-currency reserves and the specter of a full-blown financial meltdown.	同样令人不安的是国际领导人一直不愿给予乌克兰新的金融承诺，尽管其外汇储备压力日增，大有爆发全面金融崩溃之势。


As a result, the mere threat of military action may be sufficient to bring about Ukraine’s economic collapse.	结果，仅仅是军事行动的威胁就有可能足以让乌克兰经济崩溃。


Putin seems to be holding out the prospect of a grand bargain, with Russia helping in the fight against the Islamic State – for example, by not supplying S300 missiles to Syria (thus preserving US air domination) – in exchange for the US giving Russia control over its so-called “near abroad.”	普京似乎假装抛出大妥协的前景，俄罗斯帮助打击伊斯兰国——比如不向叙利亚提供S300导弹（从而保证美国的制空权）——以换取美国让俄罗斯控制其所谓的“近邻”。


Should US President Barack Obama accept such a deal, the entire structure of international relations would be dangerously altered in favor of the use of force.	美国总统奥巴马接受这一交易的话，整个国际关系结构就将大大偏向于使用武力。


That would be a tragic mistake, with far-reaching geopolitical consequences.	这将是一个悲惨的错误，带来深远的地缘政治后果。


The collapse of Ukraine would be a tremendous loss for NATO and indirectly for the EU and the US.	乌克兰的崩溃将是北约的惨重损失，并且间接剧烈影响到欧盟和美国。


A victorious Russia would pose a potent threat to the Baltic states, with their large ethnic Russian populations.	胜利的俄罗斯将给存在大量俄罗斯族人口的巴尔干国家形成严重威胁。


Instead of supporting Ukraine, NATO would have to defend itself on its own soil, exposing both the EU and the US to the danger they have been so eager to avoid: direct military confrontation with Russia.	北约不再能够支持乌克兰，反而必须在自己的土壤上自卫，使欧盟和美国都暴露在你它们急切地想要避免的风险之下：与俄罗斯发生直接军事冲突。


The threat to the EU’s political cohesion is even greater than the military risk.	欧盟政治凝聚力风险甚至比军事风险还要大。


The euro crisis has transformed an ever-closer union of equal sovereign states, willingly sacrificing a share of their independence for the common good, into an association of creditor and debtor countries, with the debtors struggling to meet the creditors’ terms.	欧元危机已将一个由平等主权国家自愿牺牲一定独立性以追求共同利益而形成的无比紧密的联盟转变为一个由债权国和债务国组成的联合体，债务国为了满足债权国的条件而焦头烂额。


This new EU is neither equal nor voluntary.	这一新欧盟既不平等，亦非自愿。


In fact, for many young people in the debtor countries, the EU seems like a foreign oppressor.	事实上，对许多债务国年轻人来说，欧盟就像是一个外国压迫者。


And about 30% of the recently elected European Parliament ran on anti-European platforms.	大约30%的新当选欧洲议会由反欧盟政党占多数。


It is this internal weakness that has allowed Putin’s Russia – which, on its own, is far from attractive – to emerge as a potent rival to the EU.	这一内在软弱性导致普京的俄罗斯——其本身吸引力也相当弱——成为欧盟的劲敌。


Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has gone so far as to cite Putin as his role model – and he is no anomaly.	匈牙利总理奥班居然将普京引为榜样——并且这样做算不上异类。


Neither Europe’s leaders nor its citizens seem to recognize that Russia’s attack on Ukraine is indirectly an assault on the EU and its principles of governance.	欧洲的领导人和公民都没有认识到俄罗斯袭击乌克兰是对欧盟及其治理原则的间接打击。


It should be clear that it is inappropriate for a country, or association of countries, at war to pursue fiscal austerity, as the EU continues to do.	必须明确，对于一国或一个国家联盟，在战时还追求财政紧缩是不合适的，而欧盟一直在这样做。


All available resources should be put to work in the war effort, even if that requires running up budget deficits.	所有的可用资源都应该用于战争用途，即使这需要增加预算赤字。


Europe is fortunate that German Chancellor Angela Merkel has behaved as a true European with regard to the threat posed by Russia.	欧洲是幸运的，德国总理默克尔在面对俄罗斯的威胁时表现得像一个真正的欧洲人。


The foremost advocate of sanctions, she has been more willing to defy German public opinion and business interests on the issue than on any other.	她是最坚定的制裁支持者，比其他领导人都更愿意在这个问题上否定德国的公众意见和商业利益。


But Germany has also been the main advocate of fiscal austerity, and Merkel needs to understand the contradiction between these positions.	但德国也是财政紧缩的主要支持者，默克尔需要明白这些立场中的矛盾。


Sanctions against Russia are necessary, but they are not without repercussions.	针对俄罗斯的制裁是必不可少的，但也不是没有副作用。


European economies, including Germany, are suffering, as the sanctions’ depressive impact aggravates the recessionary and deflationary forces that are already at work.	欧洲经济体（包括德国）正在蒙受损失，因为制裁的抑制效应放大了已经起作用的衰退和通缩力量。


By contrast, helping Ukraine to defend itself against Russian aggression would have a stimulative effect on Ukraine and Europe.	相反，帮助面临俄罗斯入侵的乌克兰自卫能给乌克兰和欧洲带来刺激效应。


The EU’s members are at war – and they need to start acting like it.	欧盟成员国陷入了战争——它们必须开始这样行动。


That means modifying their commitment to fiscal austerity and recognizing that they are better off helping Ukraine to defend itself than hoping that they will not have to defend the EU themselves.	这意味着丢掉财政紧缩承诺、认识到帮助乌克兰自卫比希望他们不必捍卫欧盟本身更好。


Ukraine needs an immediate cash injection of, say, $20 billion, with a promise of more when needed, in order to stave off a financial collapse.	乌克兰需要立刻注入现金，比如200亿美元，并许以需要时还能追加的承诺，以避免金融崩溃。