Another promising approach is exemplified by Johannesburg’s Vulindlel’ eJozi program, which aims to eliminate barriers to entry-level employment for young people by providing skills like digital literacy.	另外一种前景不错的方法是约翰内斯堡的Vulindlel’ eJozi计划，该计划旨在通过数字扫盲为青年人扫除最基本的就业障碍。


Such skills enable young people to move not only out of the informal sector, but also out of undesirable formal jobs, such as in South Africa’s private-security industry, which employs more than 412,000 people.	数字技能不仅可以让年轻人退出非正规行业，还可以让他们摆脱不理想的正规行业工作，比如雇工人数超过412,000人的南非私人保安业。


The industry has faced criticism for poor working conditions; even where that is not the case, it does not develop the types of skills that can support stable and sustainable economic growth.	南非私人保安业因工作环境恶劣而屡遭批评； 即使抛开工作环境问题不谈，上述就业岗位也无法让人掌握足以支撑稳定及可持续经济增长所需要的技术。


As more people gain the skills and access the opportunities to fill productive jobs in the formal sector, where they are registered and recognized, governments will get a better sense of the labor market.	随着越来越多人掌握相关技术并在正式行业中从事正式注册并得到认可的创造性工作，政府对劳动力市场的了解将会越来越多。


But to maximize the effectiveness of efforts to provide those skills and opportunities, not to mention ensuring that those who remain in the informal sector are not invisible, initiatives aimed directly at improving data collection are also needed.	但为了最大限度地提升能提供上述技能和机会的工作效率，更不要说确保那些留在非正式行业工作的人不成为政府监督的盲点，就仍然需要开展直接改善数据搜集效率的工作。


One such initiative is the Africa Programme on Accelerated Improvement of Civil Registration and Vital Statistics, which was formally launched in 2011.	2011年正式启动的加快改进民事登记和重要统计数据非洲计划就是这样一个项目。


While it may not provide instant results, it begins to lay the groundwork for the development and implementation of programs based on hard data about African populations.	尽管效果可能并非立竿见影，但上述计划为依据非洲人口硬数据制定和实施各项计划奠定了基础。


Reducing unemployment and poverty are not the responsibility of governments alone.	减少失业和贫困并不仅仅是政府的职责。


Private-sector actors and ordinary citizens can also help.	私营部门经营者和普通民众也可以提供帮助。


For example, we can support informal activities, such as waste recycling, that give low-skill young people a chance to earn money.	比方说，我们可以支持废品回收等非正式活动，让低技术年轻人也可以得到赚钱的机会。


And we can encourage and facilitate apprenticeships that provide technical skills and opportunities for civic education.	我们还应当鼓励并推动为公民教育提供技能和机会的学徒岗位。


Africa has addressed complex and far-reaching problems before.	非洲以前也曾解决过复杂且影响深远的问题。


For example, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, which once seemed insurmountable, has now largely been brought under control.	比方说，曾经看似不可逾越的艾滋病毒/艾滋病现在大体已经得到了控制。


The key to tackling that challenge was cooperation among governments, development partners, and local communities in collecting, processing, and using data to adjust strategies.	应对这一挑战的关键在于政府、发展伙伴和当地社区在搜集、处理、使用数据调整战略等方面展开合作。


We should be doing the same to address the job shortage.	我们应当采取同样的措施解决就业机会不足等问题。


If Africa’s economies are to absorb the 122 million young people expected to enter the labor force in the next few years, we must get the accounting right – starting now.	如果非洲经济想要吸纳今后几年即将进入劳动力市场的1. 22亿年轻人，我们就必须搞清具体数字——而且从现在开始。


Reshaping the Labor Landscape	改变劳动力形势


DAVOS – As the global economy changes at an ever-quickening pace, the labor market in many countries is not merely struggling to keep up, but seems to have broken down in important ways.	达沃斯—全球经济的变化速度越来越快，许多国家的劳动力市场眼看着无法跟上节奏，出现了诸多大问题。


High unemployment coexists with unfilled jobs.	高失业和岗位空缺并存。


Rising productivity fails to translate into higher wages.	生产率的提高没有转化为工资的提高。


And, for many, upward mobility is beyond reach, even though the economy has begun to recover.	对许多人来说，向上流动可望而不可及，虽然经济已经开始复苏。


Fortunately, change seems to be underway.	幸运的是，变化正在发生。


Four global trends are reshaping the world of work, helping to resolve contradictions and overcome dysfunction in the labor market as companies, workers, and governments adapt to a new demographic, technological, and economic environment.	四大全球趋势正在改变工作形势，随着公司、工人和政府适应新的人口、科技和经济环境，这些趋势有助于解决矛盾、克服劳动力市场功能失调的情况。


The first trend is demographic.	第一个趋势是人口趋势。


In much of the world, aging societies and declining birth rates mean that the days of abundant labor are coming to an end.	在世界大部分国家，社会老龄化和生育率下降意味着劳动力富余的日子快要结束了。


Some 60% of the world’s population lives in countries with stagnant or shrinking workforces.	大约60%的世界人口生活在劳动力数量停滞或减少的国家。


China’s working-age population peaked in 2010; by 2050, more than a quarter of its people will be over 65 (today, just 8% are).	中国工作年龄人口在2010年见顶； 到2050年，四分之一中国人将超过65岁（如今只有8%）。


In Germany, the labor force is projected to shrink by six million over the next 15 years.	在德国，预计劳动力将在未来15年减少六百万人。


As labor becomes increasingly scarce, employers and policymakers are being forced to think differently about sourcing talent.	随着劳动力越来越稀缺，雇主和决策者被迫以不同思维看待人才招徕。


In Japan, where a quarter of the population is older than 65, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has championed a major effort to bring more women and older workers into the labor market.	日本四分之一人口超过65岁，首相安倍晋三花大力气引导更多女性和老年工人进入劳动力市场。


As a result, even though Japan’s working-age population, traditionally defined, has shrunk 8% over the past decade, the labor force decline totaled just 1%.	结果，尽管日本按传统定义的工作年龄人口在过去十年减少了8%，但劳动力数量只下降了1%。


Elsewhere, other strategies to fill the labor gap are emerging.	其他国家纷纷采取了其他填补劳动力空缺的战略。


Aerospace companies, faced with graying workforces, have pioneered flexible working hours, phased retirements, “encore careers,” and a slew of knowledge-transfer programs to train the next generation of employees.	工作人员日益老化的航空公司率先采取弹性工作制、阶段退休制、“发挥余热”制和各种知识转移计划，培训下一代员工。


Companies that cannot find the talent they need in one country are using remote workplaces to employ people elsewhere.	在某一国无法招聘到所需人才的公司正在采用远程办公聘请其他地区的员工。


And firms are making attempts to attract underrepresented groups, including women, young people, minorities, people with disabilities, and migrants.	企业正在尝试吸引劳动力大军中的少数群体，如女性、年轻人、少数民族、残疾人和移民。


At the same time, another trend, the rise of individual choice, is providing workers with unprecedented flexibility.	与此同时，另一个趋势——个人选择的增加——给工人带来了前所未有的灵活性。


With millions of job postings just a click away, it is easier to shop around for work; most millennials expect to change course several times during their careers.	轻点鼠标就能找到数百万工作岗位，这让求职者可以货比三家； 大部分“千禧一代”整个职业生涯中的跳槽次数将比前辈增加数倍。


Rather than attempting to hang on to a job for life, the goal today is to remain employable – to develop the skills, experience, and expertise necessary to move on or up, regardless of the employer.	今天，人们的目标不是在一个岗位上干一辈子，而是保持“能干”（employable）——发展升职所需要的技能、经验和专业知识，不管雇主是谁。


As a result, wages and opportunities are increasingly being dictated by skills, rather than tenure.	结果，工资和机会日益由技能而不是年资决定。


Those with sought-after talents have more bargaining power, are better able to manage their careers, and command higher salaries.	拥有紧俏才干者拥有更大的讨价还价能力，更能管理好自己的职业生涯和要求更高的薪水。


Those without in-demand skills are struggling and feel disposable.	没有紧俏技能者则时刻担心自己的饭碗。


So far, this abundance of choice has discouraged companies from spending resources on training employees, who might, after all, soon decide to join a competitor.	目前，这一选择的多样性让公司不再花如此多的资源用于培训员工，反正他们很快就可能跳槽加入竞争对手。


However, as talent shortages loom, the need to retain employees could tip the balance back toward greater investment in professional development.	但是，在人才短缺局面下，留住员工的需要可能让平衡倾向投入更多资源用于职业发展。


Employers that provide learning opportunities will become a destination for talent.	提供学习机会的雇主将成为人才的目标。


The third trend reshaping labor markets is rapid technological change.	改变劳动力市场的第三个趋势是迅速的技术变革。


Few industries are safe from disruption.	几乎没有哪个行业可以幸免于破坏。


Automation, facilitated by better artificial intelligence, is poised to have a major impact on jobs.	自动化借助人工智能进步的东风，将对就业岗位形成巨大冲击。


Up to 47% of the jobs that existed in the US in 2010 are highly likely to be computerized out of existence in the next two decades.	在2010年美国存在的所有工作岗位中，高达47% 极有可能在未来二十年被计算机完全取代而消失。


If history is a guide, new industries and opportunities will replace those that are lost; nonetheless, the transition will be painful and could last decades.	历史经验表明，新产业和机会将取代消失的旧产业和机会； 尽管如此，转型过程将是十分痛苦的，并且可能延续几十年之久。


And yet, there is reason for optimism.	但也有乐观的理由。


Even as technology sweeps away industries, it is facilitating the emergence of new models that could help solve some of the problems in the labor market.	即使技术席卷各行业，它也正在促���新模式的崛起，这些新模式有助于解决劳动力市场的一些问题。


PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates that the five main sectors of the sharing economy – peer-to-peer finance, online staffing, peer-to-peer accommodation, car sharing, and music video streaming – could grow from around $15 billion in revenue today to $335 billion by 2025.	普华永道估计，共享经济的五大主要部门——点对点（p2p）金融、在线员工、点对点住宿、拼车和音乐视频流——的收入将从今天的150美元增加到2025年的3,350亿美元。


To be sure, the industry is small.	诚然，这一行业规模很小。


But it has nonetheless unleashed a torrent of creativity focused on the basic question of how better to align supply and demand for labor in a faster-paced world.	尽管如此，它仍然释放出一股关注如何在节奏越来越快的世界中更好地匹配劳动力供求的创新潮流。


A fourth global trend evident in today’s labor market is the rapid embrace among technologically sophisticated employers of data-based approaches to human resources.	当今劳动力市场第四个显而易见的全球趋势是技术先进的公司纷纷迅速采取基于数据的人力资源方法。


Talent management has gone from being an art to a science, as organizations have applied big data and supply-chain techniques to recruiting and retention.	人才管理已经从一种艺术转变为一种科学，组织应用大数据和供应链技术招聘和留住员工。


With the proliferation of so-called people analytics – behavioral and intelligence tests, digital performance scorecards, and better information systems – companies know their workers like never before.	所谓的人力分析（people analytics，即行为和智商测试、数字表现记分卡和更好的信息系统）的兴盛让公司能够比以往任何时候都更好地了解自己的员工。


It is easier to see where the best talent resides within a company, or where the gaps might be.	找出公司内部最好的人才在哪里，或者在哪里可能出现缺口变得更加容易了。


Companies are using these data to think more strategically about how to source talent.	公司正在使用这些数据进行对招徕人才问题的更具战略性的思考。


For example, given the difficulty of staying up to speed with changing technology, firms are increasingly outsourcing information-technology management to third-party experts.	比如，跟上技术变化的节奏十分困难，因此企业日益将信息技术管理外包给第三方专家。


This, in turn, creates new efficiencies, allowing cyber-security providers to monitor attacks against a wide range of clients and share strategies and solutions.	这反过来制造了新的效率，让网络安全提供商能够监测针对各种客户的袭击，并共享策略和解决方案。


Recruitment is another area in which companies are turning to outsourcing in order to obtain expertise and increase efficiency.	招聘是另一个公司日益采用外包来获得专业服务和增加效率的领域。


In short, I am an optimist.	简言之，我是乐观派。


The churning, difficult period in which we find ourselves will create new opportunities.	我们发现我们正处在一个困难时期，但这个时期将制造出新机会。


The growing realization that labor markets have fundamentally and permanently changed will spur policymakers, employers, and workers to address new challenges in ways that benefit everyone.	日益认识到劳动力市场已经发生了永久性根本变化将刺激决策者、雇主和工人以所有人都能获益的方式解决新挑战。


Big shifts are never easy, but when they are managed properly, they can make us stronger and better off.	大变化永远不容易适应，但如果能够恰当地管理，它们可以让我们变得更强更好。


From Welfare State to Innovation State	从福利国家到创新国家


PRINCETON – A specter is haunting the world economy – the specter of job-killing technology.	普林斯顿—一个幽灵，岗位节约型技术的幽灵，正在世界经济头上飘荡。


How this challenge is met will determine the fate of the world’s market economies and democratic polities, in much the same way that Europe’s response to the rise of the socialist movement during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries shaped the course of subsequent history.	如何应对这一挑战将决定世界市场经济和民主政治的命运，一如十九世纪末、二十世纪初欧洲应对社会主义运动的方式决定了随后的历史进程。


When the new industrial working class began to organize, governments defused the threat of revolution from below that Karl Marx had prophesied by expanding political and social rights, regulating markets, erecting a welfare state that provided extensive transfers and social insurance, and smoothing the ups and downs of the macroeconomy.	当新工业工人阶级开始组织起来时，政府通过扩大政治和社会权利、监管市场、建立提供大规模转移支付和社会保险的福利国家、平滑宏观经济起伏等手段消弭了马克思所预言的革命的威胁。


In effect, they reinvented capitalism to make it more inclusive and to give workers a stake in the system.	事实上，它们重新发明了资本主义，让它变得更包容，让工人在体系中也能占据一席之地。


Today’s technological revolutions call for a similarly comprehensive reinvention.	今天的技术革命也需要类似的全面再发明。


The potential benefits of discoveries and new applications in robotics, biotechnology, digital technologies and other areas are all around us and easy to see.	发现和在机器人、生物技术、数字技术和其他领域的新应用所带来的潜在好处可谓无处不在。


Indeed, many believe that the world economy may be on the cusp of another explosion in new technologies.	事实上，许多人认为世界经济正站在又一场新技术大爆炸的边缘。


The trouble is that the bulk of these new technologies are labor-saving.	麻烦在于这些新技术大多是劳动力节约型。


They entail the replacement of low- and medium-skilled workers with machines operated by a much smaller number of highly skilled workers.	它们将用由一小撮高技能工人操纵的机器取代中低技能工人。


To be sure, some low-skill tasks cannot be easily automated.	平心而论，一些低技能任务无法轻易地自动化。


Janitors, to cite a common example, cannot be replaced by robots – at least not yet.	举个常见的例子，门卫就不可能用机器人取代——至少目前还不能。


But few jobs are really protected from technological innovation.	但极少有岗位可以真正免受技术创新影响。


Consider, for example, that there will be less human-generated trash – and thus less demand for janitors – as the workplace is digitized.	比如，随着工作场所的数字化，人造垃圾就会减少，因此门卫的需求也会降低。


A world in which robots and machines do the work of humans need not be a world of high unemployment.	机器人和机器代替人类工作的世界未必失业率就高。


But it is certainly a world in which the lion’s share of productivity gains accrues to the owners of the new technologies and the machines that embody them.	但毫无疑问在这个世界中，生产率进步的大部分将向新技术以及作为新技术具体体现的机器的所有人集中。


The bulk of the workforce is condemned either to joblessness or low wages.	大部分劳动力要么失业，要么接受低工资。


Indeed, something like this has been happening in the developed countries for at least four decades.	事实上，类似的情况在发达世界至少已经开始了四十年。


Skill and capital-intensive technologies are the leading culprit behind the rise in inequality since the late 1970s.	技能和资本密集型技术是20世纪70年代末以来不平等性增加的罪魁祸首。


By all indications, this trend is likely to continue, producing historically unprecedented levels of inequality and the threat of widespread social and political conflict.	所有指标都表明这一趋势可能继续下去，形成历史上前所未有的不平等程度，可能引发普遍的社会和政治冲突。


It doesn’t have to be this way.	这并不是宿命。


With some creative thinking and institutional engineering, we can save capitalism from itself – once again.	通过一些创新思维和制度改良，我们可以实现资本主义的自救——再一次实现。


The key is to recognize that disruptive new technologies produce large social gains and private losses simultaneously.	关键在于认识到破坏性新技术同时造成了巨大的社会收益和私人损失。


These gains and losses can be reconfigured in a manner that benefits everyone.	这些收益和损失可以通过让所有人都受益的方式重组。


Just as with the earlier reinvention of capitalism, the state must play a large role.	正如此前的资本主义再发明，国家必须扮演重要角色。


Consider how new technologies develop.	想一想新技术是如何发展的。


Each potential innovator faces a large upside, but also a high degree of risk.	每位潜在创新者都面临巨大的潜在收益，但也承担了巨大的风险。


If the innovation is successful, its pioneer reaps a large gain, as does society at large.	如果创新成功，开发者就能斩获巨利，社会整体也能得到巨大好处。


But if it fails, the innovator is out of luck.	但如果创新失败，创新者就倒霉了。


Among all the new ideas that are pursued, only a few eventually become commercially successful.	在所有正在酝酿的新思想中，只有少数能取得商业成功。


These risks are especially high at the dawn of a new innovation age.	这一风险在新创新时代开始前尤其高昂。


Achieving the socially desirable level of innovative effort then requires either foolhardy entrepreneurs – who are willing to take high risks – or a sufficient supply of risk capital.	随后，实现社会渴望水平的创新努力要么需要依靠一根筋的企业家——他们愿意承担高风险——要么需要足够的风险资本供给。


Financial markets in the advanced economies provide risk capital through different sets of arrangements – venture funds, public trading of shares, private equity, etc.	发达经济体的金融市场通过不同安排提供风险资本——创投基金、公开上市、私募股权，等等。


But there is no reason why the state should not be playing this role on an even larger scale, enabling not only greater amounts of technological innovation but also channeling the benefits directly to society at large.	但没有理由认为国家不应该在更大范围内承担这一角色，从而不但带来更多数量的技术创新，也将收益直接引导至社会整体。


As Mariana Mazzucato has pointed out, the state already plays a significant role in funding new technologies.	正如 玛丽安娜·马祖卡托（Mariana Mazzucato）所指出的，国家在资助新技术方面已经扮演了重要角色。


The Internet and many of the key technologies used in the iPhone have been spillovers of government subsidized R&D programs and US Department of Defense projects.	互联网和iPhone中所使用的许多关键技术正是来自政府补贴研发项目和美国国防部项目的溢出效应。


But typically the government acquires no stake in the commercialization of such successful technologies, leaving the profits entirely to private investors.	但通常政府不会在这些成功技术的商业化过程中分一杯羹，利润全部流入了私人发明家的腰包。


Imagine that a government established a number of professionally managed public venture funds, which would take equity stakes in a large cross-section of new technologies, raising the necessary funds by issuing bonds in financial markets.	想象一下，政府建立大量专业化管理的公共创投基金，它们将在大量跨部门新技术中拥有股权，通过在金融市场中发行债券筹集必须的资金。


These funds would operate on market principles and have to provide periodic accounting to political authorities (especially when their overall rate of return falls below a specified threshold), but would be otherwise autonomous.	这些基金将根据市场原则运营，必须向政治当局提供定期会计报告（特别是当它们的总回报率下降至特定阈值之下时），除此之外，运营完全是自主的。


Designing the right institutions for public venture capital can be difficult.	设计正确的公共创投资本制度是困难的。


But central banks offer a model of how such funds might operate independently of day-to-day political pressure.	但中央银行为这些基金如何独立于日常政治压力运营树立了榜样。


Society, through its agent – the government – would then end up as co-owner of the new generation of technologies and machines.	社会通过其代理人——政府成为新一代技术和机器的共同所有人。


The public venture funds’ share of profits from the commercialization of new technologies would be returned to ordinary citizens in the form of a “social innovation” dividend – an income stream that would supplement workers’ earnings from the labor market.	公共创投基金在新技术商业化中的利润份额将以“社会创新”分红的方式返回给普通公民——这个收入流将补充工人来自劳动力市场的薪水。


It would also allow working hours to be reduced – finally approaching Marx’s dream of a society in which technological progress enables individuals to “hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner.”	这还能带来工作时间的减少，最终实现马克思的梦想——一个技术进步让个体能够“在早上打猎，在下午钓鱼，在黄昏喂养家畜、在晚饭后指点江山”。


The welfare state was the innovation that democratized – and thereby stabilized – capitalism in the twentieth century.	福利国家就是一项创新，二十世纪，它实现了资本主义的民主化，从而也实现了稳定。


The twenty-first century requires an analogous shift to the “innovation state.”	二十一世纪也需要类似的向“创新国家”的转变。


The welfare state’s Achilles’ heel was that it required a high level of taxation without stimulating a compensating investment in innovative capacity.	福利国家的阿克琉斯之踵在于它需要高税收，又不能刺激补偿性创新力投资。


An innovation state, established along the lines sketched above, would reconcile equity with the incentives that such investment requires.	按照上文内容建立的创新国家能够协调这类投资所需要的所有权和激励。


Why Press Freedom is Good Business	为何新闻自由是好事


LONDON – Press freedom and independence, a staple ingredient of democracy worldwide, is declining at an alarming pace, according to the 2015 World Press Freedom Index.	伦敦—新闻自由和独立是全世界民主的主要成分，据2015年世界新闻自由指数，它正在以令人警觉的速度下滑。


But the transparency and vigilance that a free and independent press provides are critical not only to democracy; they also serve as powerful weapons against forces, ranging from corruption to bad business practices, that undermine economic prosperity.	但自由而独立的新闻所提供的透明性和警惕性不但对民主至关重要； 也是对抗从腐败到企业恶行的破坏经济繁荣的力量的强大武器。


Simply put, without high-quality journalism, achieving better, stronger, and more robust economies is not possible.	简言之，没有高质量的新闻，就不可能实现更优秀、更强大、更坚挺的经济。


Every day brings examples of the threats, and in some cases attacks, that the press increasingly confronts, whether from authoritarian leaders or as a result of nonviable business models.	每一天我们都会看到新闻日益受到威胁乃至袭击，不管是来自极权主义领导人，还是因为不可持续的商业模式所赐。


Either way, at a time when we need serious investigative journalism and intelligent analysis of economic trends and business activities more than ever, the capacity to deliver them is rapidly being eroded.	无论如何，我们比以往任何时候都需要关于经济趋势和商业活动的严肃的调查报道和明智分析，而实现这一点的能力正在快速消退。


One problem is that, with print advertising in terminal decline, media companies are finding it harder to subsidize the long-term research that in-depth reporting typically requires.	一个问题是，随着终端印刷广告的减少，媒体公司日益难以补贴深度报道通常需要的长期研究。


Yet, by identifying and bringing to the fore issues that may influence political agendas and public life for years to come, the impact of such reporting can be enormous.	但是，这类报道辨别可能影响多年后的政治日程和公共生活的问题，并把它们曝光于天下，其影响可能十分巨大。


Consider Reuters’ 2012 investigation – requiring months of meticulous research – into Starbucks’ tax-avoidance scheme.	以路透社2012年对星巴克避税机制的调查为例。 该报道需要为期几个月的细心研究。


The journalist Tom Bergin analyzed years of complex documentation to discover, expose, and explain the ins and outs of how the company was circumventing local taxation in the countries where it operates.	记者汤姆·博金（Tom Bergin）分析了多年的复杂档案，发现、曝光和解释了星巴克公司规避其经营地所在国的本地税收的来龙去脉。


His investigation triggered an avalanche that continues to reverberate around the world today, as many other multinational companies come under scrutiny.	他的调查至今仍在全世界引起回响，因为许多其他跨国公司也遭到了调查。


And research like that does not come cheap.	而这样的研究绝不便宜。


But a financing model that ensures the provision of this vital public good is of no use in the face of political repression, which is increasing worldwide.	但在政治压迫环境下——如今它正在全世界愈演愈烈——确保这一重要公共品的供应的一个融资模式变得一无所用。


At the beginning of March, for example, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government shut down the country’s highest-circulation newspaper, Zaman, and security forces fired tear gas and rubber bullets at protesters outside the paper’s headquarters.	比如，3月初，土耳其总统埃尔多安政府关闭了土耳其发行量最大的报纸《时代报》（Zaman），土安全部队向该报总部外的示威群众发射催泪弹和橡皮子弹。


European leaders, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, and French President François Hollande, all made the Zaman case a part of their discussions with Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu when they met recently to discuss the refugee crisis.	欧洲领导人，包括德国总理默克尔、意大利总理伦齐和法国总统奥朗德在内，都将《时代报》事件作为最近与土耳其总理达武特奥卢会晤讨论难民危机时的话题之一。


World leaders must continue to speak out – and to be adamant in their support of press freedom in their own countries.	世界领导人必须继续发出声音——并且坚决支持本国的新闻自由。


After all, the signal that such official behavior sends is one of a country going backwards – a stunting of innovation and growth.	毕竟，这些官方行为所传递的信号是国家正在倒行逆施——这将制约创新和增长。


China, now the world’s second-largest economy and a crucial source of global manufacturing and investment, would seem to belie any link between press freedom and economic success.	如今已是世界第二大经济，也是全球制造和投资重要来源的中国似乎可以否定新闻自由与经济成功之间有任何联系。


And yet a fundamental lesson of the surge in financial volatility that began last summer is that state-controlled information is often bad information.	但去年夏天开始的剧烈的金融波动的一个基本教训是国家控制的信息常常是不良信息。


Investors, it seems, have begun to appreciate the risk of doing business in an economic and business environment that they cannot fully understand.	投资者似乎开始认识到在他们不能完全理解的经济和商业环境中营商的风险。


Chinese media organizations are under constant scrutiny by the authorities, and editors have chafed at (and even attempted to defy) censorship.	中国媒体组织一直受到当局的监督，编辑们因为审查而愤怒（甚至试图违抗审查）。


Most recently, the South China Morning Post’s Chinese language edition had its social media accounts blocked.	最近，《南华早报》中文版社交媒体账号被禁。


Many foreign news websites, ranging from the BBC to Reuters, are routinely blocked from Chinese readers.	许多外国新闻网站，如BBC和路透社，常常被中国所屏蔽。


In 2012, the New York Times website was blocked in China after the paper reported that the extended family of China’s then prime minister, Wen Jiabao, controlled assets worth at least $2.7 billion.	2012年，《纽约时报》网站被中国屏蔽，原因是它报道时任中国总理温家宝的庞大家族控制着价值至少27亿美元的资产。


Similarly, foreign media organizations often cannot investigate Chinese companies and economic activity freely and accurately.	类似地，外国媒体组织常常无法自由而准确地调查中国公司和经济行为。


Ursula Gauthier, the Beijing correspondent for L’Obs (formerly Le Nouvel Observateur), was forced to leave China in 2015 after the authorities refused to renew her visa.	2015年，《新观察家》（Le Nouvel Observateur）驻北京记者高蒂埃（Ursula Gauthier）因为当局拒绝为她延长签证而被迫离开中国。


She is far from being the only Western journalist to be “neutralized” in this manner.	她绝不是唯一一个通过这种方法被“中和”的西方记者。


Then there are countries that don’t receive as much attention as they should.	还有一些国家没有受到应有的关注。


The ranking of Andorra, a tax haven, in the World Press Freedom Index fell sharply in 2015, because journalists cannot easily secure access to information about the banks operating there.	避税港安道尔在2015年世界新闻自由指数排行榜上大幅下滑，因为记者无法轻松确保能获得在该国经营的银行的相关信息。


The country suffers a “lack of any legal protection for freedom of information, such as the confidentiality of journalists’ sources.”	安道尔因为“缺少对信息自由的任何保护，如记���来源保密”而排名大受影响。


And what little coverage Andorra’s banks do receive – such as the US Treasury Department’s money-laundering investigation into Banca Privada d’Andorra – has been disturbing.	而关于安道尔银行凤毛麟角的报道——如美国财政部针对安道尔私人银行（Banca Privada d’Andorra）的洗钱调查——十分令人不安。


The list of countries where press freedom is limited or under threat goes on, from Africa and the Middle East to Russia and most of the other ex-Soviet republics.	新闻自由被限制或受到威胁的国家还有很多，从非洲和中东到俄罗斯和大部分其他前苏联国家。


Even the United States is seeing alarming signs, with the frontrunner for the Republican Party’s presidential nomination, Donald Trump, directing vitriol – and arguably inciting violence – toward journalists during his campaign rallies.	甚至美国也出现了令人警惕的迹象，在共和党总统候选人提名战中领先的特朗普（Donald Trump）在其竞选集会上向记者大泼脏水——甚至可以说在煽动针对记者的暴力。


Alarmingly, Trump has said that if elected president, he would change the country’s libel laws in ways that would endanger the free-speech principles enshrined in the First Amendment of the US Constitution.	令人警惕的是，特朗普说，如果他当选总统，将修改美国诽谤法，而其修改方式将危及受美国宪法第一修正案保护的新闻自由原则。


An active, engaged, and independent press provides a fundamental public good: the transparency that makes political and economic accountability possible.	积极、投入而独立的新闻提供了一项基本公共品：让政治和经济问责成为可能的透明度。


In an increasingly complex and specialized world, its provision must be supported, protected, and encouraged.	在日益复杂和专业化的世界中，这种公共品的提供必须得到支持、保护和鼓励。


Yes, media organizations must find ways to finance worthwhile reporting, investigation, and analysis.	诚然，媒体组织必须找到办法为值得的报道、调查和分析提供资金。


Unfortunately, too many countries would be happy to have such problems.	不幸的是，太多国家很乐意存在这些问题。


Ladies First, Women Last	女士优先，女性最后


NEW YORK – Many people still believe that the attacks of September 11, 2001, were not just acts of political terrorism, but part of a cultural war, a clash of civilizations.	纽约——很多人仍然认为，2001年的9·11袭击并非仅仅是政治恐怖主义那么简单，它是文化战争的一部分，体现了文明之间的冲突。


The two things that get people most excited in cultural conflicts are religion and sex, specifically the way that men treat women.	在文化冲突中，有两种东西特别能够令人兴奋，那就是宗教和性别，尤其是男性对待女性的方式。


They are of course intimately linked: religion is commonly used as a way to regulate sexual behavior and relations between the sexes.	当然，这两种东西之间有着密切的联系：宗教通常是用来规定性别行为和性别关系的一种方式。


The cultural interpretation of 9/11 as a civilizational clash explains why a number of former leftists have joined conservatives in their hostility to Islam.	从文化的角度将9·11解读为文明冲突有助于解释为什么大量前左翼分子会怀着对伊斯兰的敌意加入到保守阵营。


In the past, most American leftists would have regarded the war in Afghanistan as a neo-imperialist venture.	放在过去，大多数美国左翼会将阿富汗战争视为新帝国主义行径。


But, since 9/11, the tone has changed.	但是，9·11袭击的发生让事情起了变化。


The Taliban subjugated women, stopped them from being educated, and kept them wrapped in burqas.	在塔利班统治下，女性被剥夺了受教育的权利，还被禁锢在布卡罩袍中。


So a war against the Taliban and their guest, Osama bin Laden, could be construed as a war for female liberation.	因此，一场针对塔利班及其客人本·拉登的战争就被包装成了一场妇女解放战争。


It is, in fact, unlikely that feminism played any role in President George W. Bush’s decision to take the United States to war.	事实上，女权主义根本不可能是布什总统决定发动战争的考虑因素。


But cultural concerns allowed him to recruit quite a few unlikely allies.	但文化因素却让他赢得了一些意想不到的支持。


The response to 9/11 and to Dominique Strauss-Kahn’s recent encounter with an African chambermaid in a New York hotel have very little in common, except for one thing: once again, cultural conflict was invoked in a misleading way.	9·11事件所遭致的反应以及斯特劳斯-卡恩在纽约饭店中与非洲女佣的过节之间毫无共通之处，但在一点上，它们有异曲同工之妙：在卡恩事件中，文化冲突再次起到了误导作用。


Whatever happened between the former managing director of the International Monetary Fund and his accuser, the fact that he was arrested and paraded in front of the press as a criminal suspect has been much criticized in France.	不管前IMF总裁及其起诉者之间发生了什么，他被逮捕并作为嫌疑犯被媒体大肆渲染这一事实已在法国引起了大量批评。


One allegation, made recently by a well-known French publicist, is that the arrest was typical of American puritanism.	某著名法国国际法学者最近断言，逮捕卡恩的行为是典型的美国清教主义。


The French, he alleged, being from a Latin culture, have a more liberal understanding of sexual behavior.	他说，法国人受拉丁文化哺育，对性行为持有更为自由的态度。


They are more tolerant of human frailties, and have a more refined appreciation of the art of seduction.	法国人对人的劣根性具有更大的包容度，对勾搭异性也持有有保留的欣赏态度。


More than that, the arrest of DSK was supposedly revenge for France’s protection of another man accused of sexual crimes, Roman Polanski, and for the French ban on the burqa.	此外，逮捕卡恩被认为是对法国庇护另一位性侵犯嫌犯罗曼·波兰斯基以及法国禁止布卡罩袍的行为的报复。


In other words, the DSK case was part of another clash of cultures over sex, and, if only tangentially, religion.	换句话说，卡恩案是另一场关于性别（要是能与宗教沾点边就更好了）的文化冲突的组成部分。


One problem with the cultural argument is that it is often used to defend or excuse the behavior of the powerful against the weak.	文化争论的一大问题是，它经常被用来替强者欺凌弱者辩护或寻找借口。


Taliban men no doubt believe that the subjugation of women is a cultural privilege, as well as a religious duty.	毫无疑问，塔利班男性认为压迫女性是一种文化特权，也是一种宗教责任。


Authoritarian leaders in Asia routinely claim that their countries are culturally unsuited to democracy.	亚洲独裁者通常也总是宣称，他们的国家不适合民主文化。


But even in the more liberal West – let alone in countries with less liberal traditions, such as Japan – culture comes to the rescue of the powerful more often than it protects the weak.	但即使是在更自由的西方——更不用说自由传统没有那么强的日本等国家了——文化也更多地被用来作为强者的开脱之词，而不是用来保护弱者。


Both Polanski and DSK were engaged in sexual activities with women who were far from being their equals, in age and social status, respectively.	波兰斯基和卡恩的性侵行为对象都是与他们大不平等的女性（波兰斯基案中是年龄，而卡恩案中则是社会地位）。


Understanding their “human frailties,” then, comes down to excusing the behavior of powerful men towards women with no power at all.	理解他们身上的“人的劣根性”就意味着为强势男性对毫无还手之力的弱女子为所欲为的找借口。


The rather strict use of law in the US to regulate sexual behavior might reflect a puritanical culture, but it is more likely the result of cultural diversity.	美国对性行为的严格法律管制可能反映了其清教文化，但更大的可能是，这是文化多样性的结果。


In a society of immigrants, people come from a wide variety of traditions and faiths, with very different views of sex and the treatment of women.	在移民社会中，人们来自各种传统和信仰，对性别和对待女性的问题看法各异。


Since Americans can’t rely on homogeneous mores, the law is the only way to regulate behavior.	由于美国人无法依赖整齐划一的习俗来规范行为，那么法律就成了唯一的办法。


Old societies have customs and traditions; new ones have courts and legislatures.	年代悠久的社会有其习俗和传统，而新社会所拥有的是法院和立法机关。


But that is not the whole answer, either.	但这也不是答案的全部。


Sweden, a country of limited cultural diversity, has even more stringent laws on sexual behavior than the US.	瑞典的文化多样性就相当有限，但其关于性行为的法律比美国还要严苛。


And France, beneath its veneer of republican equality, is culturally and ethnically diverse.	而在标榜共和平等的法国，文化和伦理实际上是相当多样化的。


One cannot expect the law to solve all cultural conflicts.	我们不能指望法律可以解决所有文化冲突。


But it can play a positive role as a tool of emancipation.	但法律可以成为解放的工具，起到正面作用。


At best, the law is a great equalizer.	往大了说，法律是强有力的平等推进器。


The end of the Western slave trade did not come because European culture changed, but because the British changed their laws.	西方奴隶贸易的终结并不是因为欧洲文化改变了，而是因为英国法律改变了。


In Japan, sexual harassment of women has sometimes been excused (by Japanese males) to foreigners as part of Japanese culture.	在日本，对女性的性骚扰行为有时（被日本男性）向外国人开脱为日本文化的一部分。


And the female victims often put up with it by thinking that this is true.	而女性受害者通常认为��实是这样，因而忍气吞声。


No doubt many Afghan women in burqas are equally convinced that covering their faces is a cultural command – and therefore a natural duty.	毫无疑问，许多阿富汗女性同样也认为身穿遮盖面孔的布卡罩袍是一种文化责任，因此是天生的义务。


But more and more Japanese women are fighting back against unwelcome male attention, not by denying tradition or culture, but by going to a lawyer and suing.	但越来越多的日本女性开始对不受欢迎的异性关注发起反击，她们的武器不是传统和文化，而是去找律师和诉诸法律。


Their problem is not with sex, or the art of seduction, but with the abuse of power.	她们的问题不是性别，也不是异性相吸，而是强者肆意妄为。


Muslim women in strict authoritarian societies do not usually have the option of seeking the law’s protection.	生活在严格独裁社会中的穆斯林女性通常无法寻求法律保护。


Men who wish to maintain their control over women will no doubt continue to use culture and religious tradition to justify their dominance.	为了维持他们对女性的控制，穆斯林男性毫无疑问会继续借助文化和宗教传统来为自己的支配地位寻找合法性。


It would no doubt be better, especially for women, if the citizens of countries like Afghanistan were equal before the law.	毫无疑问，如果像阿富汗那样的国家能够做到法律面前人人平等，那么它们的人民（特别是女性）日子将更好过。


Likewise, it would be better if powerful Frenchmen were to stop using “Latin culture” as an excuse for abusing their social inferiors.	同样，如果强大的法国男性停止使用“拉丁文化”来为其虐待社会弱者的行为开脱，法国人的日子也会更美好。


But the solutions to these problems are political and legal.	但这些问题的解决方案是政治性的，也是合法的。


That is why DSK was arrested.	这就是为何卡恩会被捕的原因。


As for women in Muslim countries, there may not be much that people in the West can do to improve their lot.	而对穆斯林国家的妇女而言，那里的人民不像西方人那样可以为大大改善她们的现状助一臂之力。


But it is unlikely that much good will come from bombing them.	但是，对穆斯林国家进行狂轰滥炸也不会令局面有所好转。


Africa’s French Roadblock	非洲的法国障碍


DAKAR – In recent years, China and Africa have formed one of the modern era’s most successful economic and trade partnerships.	达喀尔—近几年来，中国和非洲建立了现代社会最成功的经济和贸易伙伴关系。


China benefits from Africa’s oil, minerals, and markets, while Africa benefits from increased trade and investment in infrastructure, health, education, small-scale businesses, and low and medium technologies.	中国得益于非洲的石油、矿产和市场，而非洲得益于贸易和基础设施、卫生、教育、小企业和中低档技术投资的增加。


Some Western observers – and some Africans – have condemned China’s involvement on the continent as a new form of colonialism.	一些西方观察者——以及一些非洲人——指责中国“染指”非洲大陆是新形式的殖民主义。


But such criticism is largely misplaced.	但这样的批评大错特错。


The development model that China is facilitating, which combines productive investment and trade with concessional loans and aid, is helping to break the cycle of under-development in Africa – a goal that Western-led development strategies have failed to achieve.	中国所助力的发展模式——生产性投资和贸易与优惠贷款和援助相结合——有助于打破非洲欠发达的循环，这是西方领衔的发展战略所没能达到的成就。


Moreover, African countries are building on their relationship with China to advance cooperation with other emerging markets, including India, South Korea, Turkey, Brazil, and Malaysia.	此外，非洲国家正在建设对华关系以促进与其他新兴市场的合作，包括印度、韩国、土耳其、巴西和马来西亚。


Such efforts have bolstered global demand for commodities, while diversifying African economies and enhancing the productive capacity of domestic suppliers.	这些举措刺激了全球商品需求，同时也让非洲经济实现了多样化，提高了国内供给者的生产能力。


Today, Africa’s rate of economic growth is second only to Asia’s.	如今，非洲的经济增长率仅次于亚洲。


This could just be the beginning.	着可能只是开始。


With Africa’s current market of one billion people set to swell to three billion by 2045 – including 1.1 billion people of working age (more than in China or India) – its long-term economic and commercial prospects are reminiscent of China’s when it opened up more than three decades ago.	目前非洲市场拥有10亿人口，到2045年将增至30亿，其中11亿人处于工作年龄（多于中国和印度）——其长期经济和商业前景和三十年前中国改革开放伊始等量齐观。


These developments are motivating American and European investors to rethink their strategies in Africa, prompting a terms-of-trade revival and generating interest in Africa’s expanding regional markets.	这些发展正在促使美国和欧洲投资者重新思考他们的非洲战略，有助于重整贸易条件、催生对扩大中的非洲地区市场的兴趣。


But progress has not been evenly distributed across Africa.	但非洲的进步并不平均。


Some countries – for example, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, South Africa, Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe – have benefited substantially from Chinese involvement, and now rank among the world’s fastest-growing economies.	一些国家——比如加纳、尼日利亚、肯尼亚、埃塞俄比亚、南非、卢旺达、乌干达、安哥拉、莫桑比克和津巴布韦——因与中国有涉而获益良多，目前已步入世界增长最快经济体行列。


But others – including the 14 countries that form the franc zone (12 of which are former French colonies) – lack major Chinese investment, and are missing out on Africa’s economic boom.	但其他国家——包括法郎区的14国（其中12个是前法国殖民地）——缺少来自中国的大项目投资，正在被非洲的经济繁荣抛弃。


The franc zone’s plight is being compounded by distorted and dysfunctional economic and monetary policies.	法郎区的困境因扭曲而功能失调的经济和货币政策而恶化。


While GDP growth in the African Financial Community (CFA) largely outpaced the rest of Africa in the 1990’s, it has since stalled.	20世纪90年代，非洲金融共同体（CFA）的GDP增长率大多高于其他非洲国家，但此后就陷入了停滞。


Furthermore, the CFA has yet to establish a functional common external tariff, and intra-franc-zone trade stands at a mere 12% of its members’ total exports and imports.	此外，CFA没能建立运转良好的共同对外关税机制，法郎区内部贸易只占成员国进出口总额的12%。


In this context, the decision to retain the CFA franc, a freely convertible common currency that is pegged to the euro at a significantly overvalued exchange rate, is dubious.	在这样的环境下，决定保留CFA法郎——一种以大为高估的汇率盯住欧元自由可兑换共同货币——是站不住脚的。


The current scheme breeds structural fiscal deficits, excessive reliance on imports, endemic corruption, money laundering, narcotics trafficking, and massive capital flight.	当前机制滋生了结构性财政赤字、对进口的过度依赖、根深蒂固的腐败、洗钱、毒品走私和大规模资本外逃。


Particularly damaging is the $17.7 billion in foreign-exchange reserves that France keeps in a special Treasury account at an interest rate of only 1.5%, thereby guaranteeing the convertibility of the CFA franc, which it underwrites.	危害尤重的是法国存放在特别财政部账户中的177亿美元外汇储备，这笔储备每年的利率只有1. 5%，用于保证由其担保的CFA法郎的可兑换性。


In other words, France uses African reserves to finance part of its budget deficit at a concessional interest rate.	换句话说，法国利用非洲储备以优惠利率为其预算赤字提供了部分融资。


Meanwhile, French banks charge at least 5-6% interest on the loans that they grant to African governments to finance their budget deficits.	与此同时，法国银行对其贷向非洲政府用于预算赤字融资的贷款课以至少5—6%的利率。 商业贷款利率高达18%，这导致法郎区私人部门信用量降至GDP的12.


With the commercial lending rate at a high of 18%, bank credit to the franc zone’s private sector has dropped to 12.7% of GDP, compared to 36.5% in Sub-Saharan Africa and 78.9% in South Africa, the region’s leading economy.	7%，而撒哈拉以南非洲地区为36. 5%，南非（地区领先经济体）为78.


Senegalese Prime Minister Abdoul Mbaye has cited high interest rates as a major impediment to GDP growth.	塞内加尔总理阿卜杜拉·姆贝耶（Abdoul Mbaye）将高利率称为GDP增长的重大障碍。


Last November, at a conference marking the Central Bank of West African States’ 50th anniversary, Senegalese President Macky Sall pleaded for an interest-rate reduction.	去年11月，在几年西非国家中央银行（Central Bank of West African States）成立50周年的会议上，塞内加尔总统麦基·萨尔（Macky Sall）要求削减利率。


But neither France’s near-total control of money and credit, nor its strong influence over politics and security, is wholly responsible for keeping the franc-zone countries mired in poverty and instability.	但不管是法国对货币和信用的近乎完全的控制，还是其在政治和安全方面的强大影响力，都不能承担让法郎区国家陷于贫困和动荡陷阱无法自拔的责任。


By misappropriating public funds for personal use, franc-zone leaders serve as accomplices to France’s institutionalized exploitation of CFA countries and citizens.	法郎区领导人挪用公共资金作私人用途，他们好比是法国对FCA国家和人民的制度性剥削的共谋。


Côte d’Ivoire, the franc zone’s leading economy, was a net rice exporter in the early 1970’s, until the country’s elite followed the advice of French expatriates to import rice rather than produce it.	法郎区领先经济体科特迪瓦在20世纪70年代初是大米净出口国，直到该国精英采纳了法国人的建议，采取进口而不再生产大米。


With the help of import licensing, then-Finance Minister Konan Bédié earned his first billion CFA francs within a year.	拜进口许可所助，时任财政部长柯南·贝蒂（Konan Bédié）在一年之内赚到了人生第一个10亿CFA法郎。


Around the same time, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the former Ivorian president and a figurehead of African independence movements, publicly warned Africans of the risks of keeping their fortunes in Africa.	与此同时，前象牙海岸总统、非洲独立运动精神领袖菲利克斯·霍普尔特-博瓦尼（Félix Houphouët-Boigny）公开警告非洲人可能无法将财富留在非洲。


More recently, Karim Wade, the son of former Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, was arrested on suspicion that he amassed a fortune of roughly $1.5 billion during his father’s presidency, when he held senior ministerial positions.	最近，前塞内加尔总统阿卜杜拉耶·��德（Abdoulaye Wade）之子卡里姆·瓦德（Karim Wade）因涉嫌在其父总统任职期间（他在此期间担任矿产部门要职）敛财约15亿美元而被捕。


It is time for franc-zone leaders to break the cycle and chart effective national development strategies for their countries.	法郎区领导人应该打破循环，为自己的国家设定有效的国民发展战略。


They should begin by pursuing complete emancipation from France, abandoning the CFA franc, and building relations with China, and others, who want to pursue mutually beneficial trade and business with Africa.	他们应该从追求完全摆脱法国控制、放弃CFA法郎、建设对华关系和其他愿意追求与非洲展开共赢贸易和商业的国家的关系等方面入手。


Cultural Vandalism in America	美国的文化破坏


STONY BROOK – Whenever I hear about Islamic State militants bulldozing archaeological treasures and smashing sculptures and statues, I think about the assault on the scientific process being carried out by US politicians.	斯托尼布鲁克——每次听到伊斯兰国武装推倒考古珍品、打碎雕塑雕像，我都会想起美国政客对科学化进程所进行的攻击。


Our scientific infrastructure – the principal means by which we understand the world, identify and ward off threats, and pursue a better future – is coming under attack by lawmakers who regard science as an obstacle to achieving their goals, and thus as a target that must be eliminated.	我们的科学基础设施——人类赖以认识世界、识别和抵御威胁和追求美好未来的主要手段——正在受到那些将科学视为实现目标绊脚石的立法者的威胁，他们认定必须淘汰科学基础设施。


The comparison may seem over the top.	这样的比喻可能貌似有些夸张。


Interfering with ideas, one might argue, is not in the same category as destroying precious objects, and elected officials tinkering with legislation cannot be compared to militants whose other activities include hacking off the hands and heads of innocent people.	或许有人会说干涉思想和破坏珍贵文物不同，民选官员干预立法不能与砍掉无辜者头颅和双手的武装分子划归一类。


Anyone making such comparisons might seem to have fallen victim to the irrational political rhetoric that is already pervading America’s presidential election campaign.	作此比喻的人似乎已经成为充斥美国总统竞选的非理性政治言论的受害者。


But consider this: In 2010, the North Carolina Coastal Resources Commission’s Science Panel, using advanced methods, estimated a sea-level rise that could threaten certain low-lying communities over the next century.	但想象一下：2010年，北卡罗来纳州海岸资源委员会科学小组采用先进方法估算海平面上升可能会在下个世纪对某些低洼群体构成威胁。


State legislators responded by passing a bill that prohibited policymakers from using the panel’s findings, thereby undermining officials’ ability to fulfill their fundamental duty to protect their state’s coastline, resources, and citizens.	州立法者通过一项法案禁止决策者采用该小组的研究成果，从而阻止官员履行保护国家海岸线、资源和民众的基本职责。


At the national level, the US House of Representatives recently passed the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2015, which would forbid the use of Department of Energy-funded research in policymaking.	国家层面，美国众议院最近通过了2015年美国竞争再授权法，禁止能源部资助的研究成果应用于决策过程。


The language, which appears in a section on energy, was apparently inserted to protect oil and gas interests from findings about their activities’ impact on climate change.	相关段落出现在某能源版块，目的显然是保护油气开发商的利益，禁止油气活动对气候变化造成威胁的研究成果付诸应用。


But if the bill is passed by the Senate and signed by the president, its implications would likely extend far beyond climate change, with officials unable to use any taxpayer-funded DOE research to protect US citizens.	但如果参议院通过上述法案并交由总统签署，其影响很可能远远超出气候变化的范畴，致使官员无法利用纳税人资助的能源部研究成果为美国民众提供保护。


Meanwhile, Lamar Smith, a Texas Republican who sponsored the COMPETES Act, is continuing his two-year quest to use the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, which he chairs, to alter the peer-review and grant-making process at the National Science Foundation, effectively opening it up to congressional review.	同时，竞争法的最初发起者德克萨斯共和党人拉玛尔·史密斯仍然继续其为期两年的努力，利用自己主持的众议院科学、空间、技术委员会改变国家科学基金会的同行审查和批准过程，从而使上述法案能有效提交国会审核。


These are not cases of politicians disagreeing about whether or how to address threats like sea-level rise and climate change; those would be political issues, and appropriate topics of discussion within a democratic system.	这不属于政客对海平面上升和气候变化问题是否要解决或如何解决存在分歧的状况； 那些是适合民主制度探讨的政治问题。


Instead, they are examples of politicians willfully blocking critical information relating to serious threats, for entirely partisan, if not personal, reasons.	相反，它们是政客完全出于党派甚至个人原因故意封杀与严重威胁相关重要信息的实际例子。


They have decided that policy should be based solely on what they have already chosen to believe, rather than empirical evidence obtained through the scientific process.	他们认定的政策基础并非经科学过程获得的经验证据，而仅仅是他们所相信的事实。


Herein lies the link between US politicians and the Islamic State: both are engaging in ideologically motivated cultural destruction.	这当中可以找到美国政客和伊斯兰国之间的联系：两者都以基于意识形态的文化破坏为目的。


The difference is that the politicians will not admit their ideological impulses.	不同之处在于政客不会承认自己基于意识形态动机。


Instead, they justify their positions by sowing distrust in the scientific infrastructure that produced the findings they dislike and then offering thin arguments about “scientific uncertainty.”	相反，他们以不相信得出他们不喜欢的研究成果的科学基础设施为借口，并因此提出经不起推敲的“科学不确定性”依据。


Not only is this disingenuous; it also prevents constructive discussion of important issues and, worse, calls into question the scientific processes and institutions on which modern civilization depends.	这种做法不仅虚伪； 还妨碍就重要问题进行有建设性的探讨和质疑，更糟的是，挑战了现代文明赖以存在的科学流程和体系。


To put it another way, suppose that your own personal intuited notion of how to travel obliges you to embark on a long car journey without basic supplies like a jack and a tire iron or any kind of map or navigation system.	换句话讲，假设你个人的直觉信仰迫使你踏上没有千斤顶、卸胎棒或任何地图或导航系统等基本工具的一次漫长的汽车旅行。


Before you leave, you delete the contact information for a roadside service provider from your cell phone, based on the unfounded belief that such providers are deceitful and self-interested.	出发前因为毫无根据地相信沿途维修商自私欺骗，你又从手机里删除了的上述维修商的联系信息。


Finally, you take several others along for the journey, without informing them about how well (or poorly) equipped you are.	最后，你带着几个人一道去旅行，而不告诉他们你有着怎样的装备。


According to US law, such actions would amount to “reckless endangerment” or “culpable negligence.”	根据美国法律，这样的行为犯下了“鲁莽危害罪”或“重大过失”。


Yet politicians are taking citizens on precisely such a ride – and facing very little pushback.	但政客正带领民众踏上这样的旅程——而且根本没有遇到什么阻力。


Fact-based arguments, such as those in a recent editorial in Science magazine, should be enough to compel US leaders to change their approach.	像科学杂志最近一篇社论那样基于事实的观点应该足以让美国领导人改变方式。


But facts cannot compete with ideology.	但事实却无法与意识形态竞争。


Indeed, any opposition – even when backed by empirical evidence – is portrayed as an attack on politicians’ own (superior) ideology, whether it be libertarian or informed by religious fundamentalism.	事实上，任何反对意见——就连那些有经验证据支持的意见也不例外——无论划归自由主义还是宗教原教旨主义，均被视为攻击政客个人的（优秀）思想。


Against this background, jarring – and potentially incendiary – comparisons, such as to the Islamic State, seem to be the only hope of exposing the scale of the damage these politicians are doing.	在上述情况下，像伊斯兰国那样令人震惊——甚至可能有煽动性的——比喻似乎是揭示政客破坏���的唯一希望。


Perhaps at the next debate among presidential candidates, participants should have to distinguish – from a moral standpoint – politicians attacking the scientific process from Islamic State militants destroying ancient artifacts.	或许在总统候选人的下一次辩论中，参与者应该从道德角度阐述攻击科学进程的政客和破坏古代文物的伊斯兰国之间有何区别。


That should get the conversation moving.	这样谈话才能进行下去。


Lame Ducks in Love	美元、欧元：一对相互搀扶的跛鸭


FLORENCE – Fears about sovereign debt and doubts about the euro rescue package have pushed the question of international reserve currencies to the fore.	佛罗伦萨——对主权债务安全的担忧、对欧元营救方案的疑虑，已把国际储备货币的问题推到了前台。


Until this spring, most observers had assumed that the share of the dollar in international reserves would gradually fall, while that of the euro would rise, and that the world would gradually and smoothly make a transition to a multi-reserve regime.	直到今年春天，大多数的观察家都还认为，美元在国际储备中所占的比重将逐渐下滑，欧元的比重将上升，而全世界将平缓地过渡到一种多元储备的格局。


Up to now, the global financial crisis was historically remarkable in having no major impact on foreign-exchange markets.	到目前为止，本轮全球金融危机尚未对外汇市场发生显著影响，这在历史上相当罕见。


The shares of the major reserve currencies were stable, with the dollar accounting for 62% of foreign-exchange reserves in 2009 and the euro 27%.	各大储备货币的份额基本保持稳定，2009年，美元占全球外汇储备的62%，欧元占27%。


Any major changes came not from deliberate decisions by central banks to reallocate reserves, but rather from the simple arithmetic of changing exchange rates: a stronger dollar raised the dollar’s share in total global reserves, while a weaker dollar reduced it.	凡有较大的变动，并不是由于各国央行出台了什么重新配置外汇储备的措施，而是源于汇率波动带来的算术上的变化：美元走强提升其在全球储备中的份额，走弱则减低该份额。


In fact, a sort of balance of terror obstructed any major reallocations by the big holders of reserves.	事实上，有一种“恐怖平衡”让主要的外储国家不敢进行大规模的重新配置。


An effort to diversify by selling a particular asset would have such a large impact on markets that it would produce large losses for any central bank that tried it.	谁若想通过出售某种资产来进行多元化，由此产生的市场影响将为其自身招致巨大亏损。


The euro crisis has challenged the view that the transition to a multi-reserve regime will have a smooth dynamic.	向多元储备格局过渡将是一个平缓的过程，这一观点遭到了欧元危机的挑战。


Asian and Middle Eastern central banks with large euro reserves have become jittery about the euro’s political underpinnings.	亚洲和中东一些国家的央行持有大量欧元储备，它们战战兢兢地关注着欧元的政治基础。


But America’s large fiscal deficit, along with continuing uncertainty about its financial markets, mean that the dollar is also potentially vulnerable.	但另一方面，美国还背着巨额赤字，外加金融市场长期处于不确定性，意味着美元也可能很脆弱。


There are some historical precedents for this situation.	当前这种局势在历史上有先例。


In the 1960’s, the British pound was the world’s second reserve currency.	20世纪60年代，英镑还是世界第二大储备货币。


American policymakers expended considerable effort devising ways to support the pound, because they knew that the same factors that made the pound vulnerable also threatened the dollar.	美国的政策制定者费尽心机来支持英镑，因为他们知道削弱英镑的因素同样也威胁着美元。


The pound was thus seen as part of the dollar’s perimeter defense.	他们把英镑看作美元的外围防线。


Critics saw it as a case of two lame ducks propping each other up.	当时的批评者讥讽这种局面，说是跛脚鸭子搀着跛脚鸭子。


The recent frenzy of high-level telephone diplomacy, in which US President Barack Obama pressed European leaders to act to rescue the euro, showed this dynamic to be alive and well.	近日来，美国总统贝拉克·奥巴马极为频繁地展开电话外交，敦促欧洲领导人行动起来，拯救欧元，这表明当年“跛鸭相搀”的内在动力依然有效。


It was an extraordinary demonstration not only of how difficult European leaders found coordinating their response to the crisis to be, but also of the strategic importance of a second reserve currency for the largest reserve currency.	欧元危机所极其清楚地显示的，不仅是欧洲领导人协调一致应对危机的困难，而且还有第二大储备货币对于第一大储备货币所具有的战略意义。


The US economy would be highly vulnerable in the case of a euro collapse, so today’s lame ducks need to embrace each other.	一旦欧元崩溃，美国经济将变得极为脆弱，如今的跛鸭们得赶紧抱成团。


The 1960’s analogy raises the question of whether and when a new major international currency could emerge.	既然拿20世纪60年代来类比，自然就引出一个问题：会不会崛起一个新的主要国际货币？


Within the space of a few years, the pound’s reign as a trusted international currency was over.	如果会，又会在什么时候？ 当年英镑丧失国际货币地位，只不过用了短短几年时间。


The yen and the Deutschemark emerged as new potential reserve currencies, although the Japanese and German governments and central banks were profoundly worried about this new role for their currencies and the volatility that it might entail.	日元和德国马克崛起为潜在的储备货币，尽管日本和德国的政府和央行对其本币的新角色颇感惶恐，因为这一角色可能意味着很强的波动性。


In retrospect, many people have cast the shift as inevitable, but at the time it seemed wildly improbable.	许多事后诸葛亮都说，当年的这一轮更替是不可避免的，然而，人们当年却普遍觉得不大可能。


The rise of the yen and the Deutschemark occurred only 20 years after the catastrophic devastation of World War II, which had inevitably been accompanied by inflation.	日元和德国马克的崛起上距二战浩劫只不过20年，而两国在二战期间都经历了严重通货膨胀。


During the immediate postwar occupation, US military planners had to impose new currency regimes and central banking institutions.	在战后占领时期，美国军事当局不得不重建两国的货币和央行体系。


Even more extraordinarily, when these new currencies emerged as the new claimants to reserve status, they had only recently become convertible for current-account transactions, and capital flows were still restricted.	更不一般的是，这两种货币获得储备货币地位之时，上距它们变成经常项下可兑换才没多久，而资本流动仍然受到限制。


Germany had moved to current-account convertibility in 1958, but Japan only in 1964.	德国于1958年放开了经常项下可兑换，日本则要到1964年才放开。


More over, Japan in particular was not especially wealthy in an international comparison, and neither country had deep or well-developed capital markets.	此外，以当时的国际标准来衡量，日本算不上特别富裕的国家，它和德国也都还没有具有深度、发育良好的资本市场。


Only one fact really mattered: powerful export performance, with both countries maintaining large trade surpluses over several years and through different stages of the economic cycle.	只有一个事实是真正作数的：强劲的出口表现。 两国都保有巨大的贸易盈余，历经多年，并且在都经济周期的不同阶段都未改变。


This made them appear a source of greater currency stability than the the US and Britain.	这使得它们显得胜过美国和英国，可以充当货币稳定性的来源。


The buildup of assets associated with external surpluses, together with continuing export strength, looked like a guarantee of their currencies.	由对外盈余累积起来的资产，加上持续的强劲出口表现，似乎是两国货币的担保。


Unlike the dollar and the pound, the yen and the Deutschemark did not depend on attracting foreign inflows.	不像美元和英镑，日元和德国马克靠的不是吸引外资流入。


Of course, developing as a potential reserve currency created a substantial vulnerability.	当然，变成潜在储备货币的确会加剧波动性。


Both Japan and Germany were slow in liberalizing their domestic financial systems as they tried to limit capital inflows for a substantial period of time in order to avoid rapid currency appreciation and the consequent erosion of their export competitiveness.	在国内金融体系自由化方面，日本和德国当年的脚步都很慢； 在相当长一段时期内，它们试图限制资本流入，以避免本币过快升值，削弱出口竞争力。


China moved to current-account convertibility in 1996, but retained a substantial number of controls on capital movements, which have served as a shield against financial contagion.	中国在1996年放开了经常项下可兑换，但仍然对资本流动实施相当多的管制，以预防金融传染的影响。


Are these still needed?	这些措施是否还有必要存在？


The lesson of the 1960’s suggests that a fully convertible renminbi could rapidly become a major international reserve currency.	根据20世纪60年代的教训，我们可以推断，一旦人民币变成完全可兑换的，它将迅速成为一种主要的国际储备货币。


It would be attractive not simply because the People’s Bank of China and other major Chinese institutions have massive overseas assets, but because China produces goods that the world’s consumers continue to want.	它的吸引力不仅在于，中国央行和其他金融机构持有数额巨大的海外资产，更重要的是因为，全世界消费者会持续购买中国的产品。


The historical experience of Germany and Japan, and the recent financial turmoil of the big industrialized countries, seems to warn against such a policy shift.	德国和日本的历史经验以及主要工业化国家近期的金融动荡似乎证明，中国没有必要急于改弦易辙。


But, as a big country, China would not have the vulnerabilities of smaller strong currencies (the Norwegian krone or the Swiss franc, for example).	当时，中国是一个大国，人民币不会像其他一些较小的强势货币（如挪威克朗、瑞士法郎等等）那样脆弱。


And, as a provider of a reserve currency, China would not need to continue its own quest for reserves, which has been a major contributing factor to global financial instability.	而且，作为储备货币提供者，中国自身将无需继续保有外汇储备，这将为全球金融稳定性作出重要贡献。


The addition of the renminbi as a possible reserve option would free today’s lame ducks from their forced marriage.	把人民币列为一种储备选项，可以把今天的跛鸭从它们被迫的联姻中解脱出来。


La Strada on Wall Street	华尔街杂技团


VIENNA – Apologists for neo-liberalism assume not only that states should be run like companies, but also that, as far as possible, they should not intervene in the economy.	维也纳－新自由主义的拥护者认为，国家不仅要像公司那样经营，而且应该尽可能地不干预经济；


The market, they insist, regulates itself.	他们坚持认为，市场可以自己调节自己。


But, more than 50 years ago, the Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson contradicted this idealization of markets in graphic terms: absolute freedom for the market will lead to Rockefeller’s dog getting the milk that a poor child needs for healthy development, not because of market failure, but because “goods are placed in the hands of those who pay the most for them.”	但是，在50多年前，诺贝尔奖获得者保罗·萨缪尔森就用生动的语句证实了这种将市场理想化的观点的错误：市场绝对的自由会导致洛克菲勒的狗喝掉贫穷儿童健康成长所需的牛奶，这不是因为市场失灵，而是因为“货物会被那些出价最高的人取得”。


This distributional quandary lies at the heart of the capitalist system, which is one of never-ending competition fueled by the drive to maximize profits.	这种分配困境是资本主义制度的核心问题，该制度是一种受利润最大化动机驱使的永远无法停止的竞争。


In such a world, there is no room for a social conscience.	在这样的一个世界里，没有社会良知存在的空间。


It is the state that, to a greater extent in some societies than in others, must fill the gap.	国家必须弥补这种缺陷，虽然在有些社会中，比起在其他社会中，更是如此。


The market economy is unsurpassed as a system for creating wealth, but only social compensation ensures that this wealth is distributed in a just manner.	市场经济作为一种创造财富的制度是非常卓越的，但是只有社会补偿机制可以保证这些财富以公正的方式得到分配。


Europe’s social-market economies, far more than the Anglo-Saxon neo-liberal model, regard mitigating the inequalities created by markets as the state’s duty.	远远超越了盎格鲁撒克逊新自由主义经济模式的欧洲社会市场经济认为，减轻市场造成的不平等是国家的责任。


In fact, the market economy can function only if the state does intervene.	事实上，市场经济只有在国家干预的情况下才会起作用。


The US financial crisis demonstrates what happens when markets are given free rein.	美国的金融危机说明了，当给予市场完全的行动自由时，会发生什么。


Rather than regulate themselves, market players destroy themselves, however much they might be marveled at as golden calves.	市场参与者不是调节自己，而是毁掉自己，不管他们是怎样被人们惊奇地奉为偶像。


Indeed, investment bankers transformed stock markets into a surreal circus.	确实，投资银行家将股票市场变成了一个超现实主义的杂技团。


For the most part, they resembled high-wire artists juggling borrowed money without a safety net.	在很大程度上，他们像走钢丝的艺术家那样，在没有安全网的情况下耍弄借来的钱。


They threatened to crash – until the state stepped in.	他们扬言要坠落下来——直到国家干预为止。


In Fellini’s film “La Strada,” the circus artists lived on the margins of society; in the “Wall Street Circus,” they lived like gods, making millions.	在费里尼的电影《La Strada》（中文名《大路》）中，杂技团的艺术家们生活在社会的边缘； 在“华尔街杂技团”中，投资银行家们过着神仙 般的生活，赚着大钱。


That’s over for a while.	这种生活在一段时间内结束了。


Wall Street has collapsed.	华尔街已经崩溃了。


The present crisis, the fall of Wall Street, is to neo-liberalism what the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was to communism.	当前华尔街崩溃的危机，对新自由主义经济学的影响，就像是1989年柏林墙的倒塌对共产主义的影响那样。


The global dimension of this crisis surprisingly also has a positive side.	令人惊奇的是， 这场危机的全球影响有积极的一面。


The international community is now charged with thinking about how to reorganize the financial sector and minimize the risk of similar catastrophe in the future.	现在国际社会充满了对怎样改造金融部门，以及在将来将类似灾难的风险降到最低的思考。


Until now, a major part of the problem was countries’ unwillingness to cooperate.	直到现在，问题的主要方面仍然是各国不愿意合作。


Previous demands for stricter regulations came to nothing because of financial sector opposition.	以前要求更严格的监管因为金融部门的反对而没有任何结果。


When should this stance change if not now?	如果现在不改变这种局面，更待何时呢？


A start needs to be made at the European Council meeting of the heads of state and government in Brussels in mid-October.	十月中旬在布鲁塞尔召开的欧盟理事会国家和政府首脑会议上，应该开始采取行动了。


It is crucial that the European Union accepts the challenge of the financial crisis at the highest level, draws the appropriate conclusions, and takes the logical next steps.	欧盟在最高层面上接受金融危机的挑战，得出适当的结论，接下来采取合理的措施，是至关重要的。


So what lessons are to be learned from the failure of the neo-liberal economic model?	那么，从新自由主义经济模式的失败中可以得到什么教训呢？


First, markets need clear rules.	首先，市场需要明确的规则。


Stronger regulation means legally binding, globally applicable rules and standards.	更严格的监管意味着具有法律约束力并且全球适用的规则和标准。


While important areas of economic policy are subject to rules that allow penal sanctions, the financial sector has a special status that is no longer acceptable.	在经济政策的重要领域都遵守允许有刑事制裁的法律规则的时候，金融部门拥有特殊的地位再也无法令人接受了。


Those areas of the financial sector that have suffered the most reputational damage are the ones least subject to regulation and supervision: the derivatives market, hedge funds and private equity funds, and the ratings agencies.	金融部门遭受最严重名誉损失的领域是那些监管最少的领域：衍生品市场，对冲基金和私募股权基金，以及评级机构。


Voluntary codes of good conduct have been a dismal failure.	自愿的良好行为准则已经是一个令人沮丧的失败。


We urgently need globally applicable regulatory minimum standards similar to those, say, within the WTO.	我们急需全球适用的像WTO规则那样的最低监管标准。


We need a democratically legitimized world finance organization, equipped with the necessary regulatory instruments, which would supervise major global financial institutions.	我们需要一个民主并具有正当性的世界金融组织，该组织拥有监督全球主要金融机构的必要的监管工具。


This organization should also have authority to create conditions for greater transparency, and to implement better early-warning systems and instruments for crisis management.	这个世界金融组织也应该拥有创设更大透明度的条件以及为了风险管理而实施更好的预警机制和工具的权力。


The newly created regulation need not apply to everyone.	新创设的监管规则没有必要对每个人都适用。


But only those financial institutions that subject themselves to these rules would be able to rely on the support of the public authorities in case of a crisis.	但是，只有那些遵守这些规则的金融机构在危机发生的时候，能够期望得到公共机构的支持。


This would ensure both fiscal stability and fiscal innovation – in contrast to the present situation, in which no one obeyed any rules and, when crisis erupted, taxpayers had to come to the rescue.	这将既可以保证财政稳定，又可以保证财政创新——和当前没有人遵守规则，当危机爆发的时候，纳税人不得不进行救助的情形形成对比。


Second, welfare-state institutions should be strengthened.	其次，应该加强国家福利机构。


The crisis has made clear that the provision of people’s elementary needs must not be made dependent on speculation and stock market curves.	危机已经使这一点很清楚了：人们基本需求物品的供应不能依靠投机和股票市场的走势。


Expansion of public financing for pensions, nursing care, and health insurance is therefore crucial.	因此，扩大对养老金、护理以及健康保险的公共投资至关重要。


Finally, we need a European economic stimulus program – a “Big Bargain” – and we need it now.	最后，我们需要有一个欧洲经济刺激计划——一个“大甩卖”——我们现在就需要它。


The crisis in international financial markets has had a noticeable impact on Europe’s real economy.	国际金融市场的危机对欧洲实体经济的冲击显而易见。


Some large EU countries are on the brink of recession.	有些欧盟大国已经处于衰退的边缘。


Japan in the early 1990’s waited too long to act and missed the right opportunity to enact countermeasures, which is why Japan has still not recovered from its long stagnation.	在20世纪90年代早期的危机中，日本等待了很长的时间没有采取措施，从而错过了制定对策的恰当时机，这就是日本仍然没有从其长期的经济停滞中恢复过来的原因。


Public investment in infrastructure (such as a massive expansion of the European railroad network), as well as climate protection and environmental technology, will be needed.	在基础设施（例如大规模扩张欧洲的铁路网络）以及气候保护和环境技术上的公共投资，是必要的。


To strengthen purchasing power and to stimulate consumption, tax cuts on low- and medium-income households are essential.	为了增强购买力和刺激消费，对低收入和中等收入家庭的减税措施也是很关键的。


Of course, EU member states should determine the concrete form that such economic stabilization programs take for themselves.	当然，欧盟成员国应该自行决定这样的经济稳定计划采取的具体形式。


But that shouldn’t stop European governments from working together closely.	但是，这并不应该阻止欧洲政府之间的密切合作。


To be effective, any stimulus program will need Europe’s nations to act in concert.	为了取得成果，任何刺激计划都需要欧洲国家采取一致的行动。


The Great Greek Bank Robbery	希腊银行大劫案


ATHENS – Since 2008, bank bailouts have entailed a significant transfer of private losses to taxpayers in Europe and the United States.	发自雅典——自2008年以来，银行救助计划已然将本应由私人企业承担的巨额损失转嫁到了欧洲和美国的纳税人身上。


The latest Greek bank bailout constitutes a cautionary tale about how politics – in this case, Europe’s – is geared toward maximizing public losses for questionable private benefits.	而最新的希腊银行救助则给我们讲述了一个值得警醒的故事，有关政治操纵——此处特指欧洲政治——是如何为了值得质疑的私人利益而最大化公众损失的。


In 2012, the insolvent Greek state borrowed €41 billion ($45 billion, or 22% of Greece’s shrinking national income) from European taxpayers to recapitalize the country’s insolvent commercial banks.	在2012年，破产的希腊政府向欧洲纳税人借了410亿欧元（折合450亿美元，或相当于希腊不断萎缩的国民收入的22％）来注资该国无力偿付的商业银行。


For an economy in the clutches of unsustainable debt, and the associated debt-deflation spiral, the new loan and the stringent austerity on which it was conditioned were a ball and chain.	对于一个深陷不可持续债务以及其连带债务通缩螺旋的经济体来说，新贷款和及其附带的严厉紧缩政策堪称一副脚镣。


At least, Greeks were promised, this bailout would secure the country’s banks once and for all.	但至少希腊人得到了一个承诺，就是此次救助将确保该国银行长治久安。


In 2013, once that tranche of funds had been transferred by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the eurozone’s bailout fund, to its Greek franchise, the Hellenic Financial Stability Facility, the HFSF pumped approximately €40 billion into the four “systemic” banks in exchange for non-voting shares.	当这批资金于2013年通过欧洲金融稳定基金（欧元区的救助基金）转到其分支机构希腊金融稳定基金后，后者随即向四家“系统性”银行注资大约400亿欧元以换取无投票权股份。


A few months later, in the autumn of 2013, a second recapitalization was orchestrated, with a new share issue.	几个月后，在2013年秋又精心策划了第二次注资，并发行新股。


To make the new shares attractive to private investors, Greece’s “troika” of official creditors (the International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank, and the European Commission) approved offering them at a remarkable 80% discount on the prices that the HFSF, on behalf of European taxpayers, had paid a few months earlier.	为了吸引私人投资者买入新股，希腊的官方债权人（国际货币基金组织，欧洲央行和欧盟委员会）这“三驾马车”批准私人投资者享有希腊金融稳定基金在几个月前代表欧洲纳税人支付价格的八折优惠。


Crucially, the HFSF was prevented from participating, imposing upon taxpayers a massive dilution of their equity stake.	至关重要的是，全过程希腊金融稳定基金都被排除在外，等于强制大规模稀释纳税人股权。


Sensing potential gains at taxpayers’ expense, foreign hedge funds rushed in to take advantage.	嗅到这种牺牲纳税人利益的潜在收益，国外的对冲基金立刻猛扑上来。


As if to prove that it understood the impropriety involved, the Troika compelled Greece’s government to immunize the HFSF board members from criminal prosecution for not participating in the new share offer and for the resulting disappearance of half of the taxpayers’ €41 billion capital injection.	似乎是为了证明它意识到了所涉及的不当行为，三驾马车迫使希腊政府对希腊金融稳定基金董事会成员不参与新股买入以及由此导致的纳税人410亿欧元注资一半蒸发免于刑事起诉。


The Troika celebrated the hedge funds’ interest as evidence that its bank bailout had inspired private-sector confidence.	三驾马车为对冲基金的踊跃额手相庆，认为这证明其银行救助计划提振了私人部门的信心。


But the absence of long-term investors revealed that the capital inflow was purely speculative.	但长期投资者的缺失意味着资本流入只是纯粹投机。


Serious investors understood that the banks remained in serious trouble, despite the large injection of public funds.	严肃的投资者明白虽然注入了大笔公共资金，但银行仍然身陷泥沼。


After all, Greece’s Great Depression had caused the share of non-performing loans (NPLs) to rise to 40%.	毕竟希腊的大萧条已经导致不良贷款比例上升到了40％。


In February 2014, months after the second recapitalization, the asset management company Blackrock reported that the burgeoning volume of NPLs necessitated a substantial third recapitalization.	到了2014年二月，就是第二轮注资刚过几个月后，黑石资产管理公司报称不良贷款的不断增长使得有必要进行第三轮注资。


By June 2014, the IMF was leaking reports that more than €15 billion was needed to restore the banks’ capital – a great deal more money than was left in Greece’s second bailout package.	到2014年6月，国际货币基金组织泄漏出来的报道称还需超过150亿欧元来充实银行的资本——这可比希腊第二轮救助一揽子计划还要巨大得多。


By the end of 2014, with Greece’s second bailout running out of time and cash, and the government nursing another €22 billion of unfunded debt repayments for 2015, Troika officials were in no doubt.	到2014年底，随着希腊第二轮救助计划的时间和现金双双告急，而希腊政府眼看要在2015年偿付的另一笔220亿欧元资金也没有着落，三驾马车的官员们也明白了过来。


To maintain the pretense that the Greek “program” was on track, a third bailout was required.	为了维持希腊“计划”一切正常的假象，很有必要进行第三轮救市。


The problem with pushing through a third bailout was twofold.	推动第三轮救助所带来的问题有两部分。


First, the Troika-friendly Greek government had staked its political survival on the pledge that the country’s second bailout would be completed by December 2014 and would be its last. Several eurozone governments had secured their parliaments’ agreement by making the same pledge.	首先，亲三驾马车的希腊政府已经承诺该国的第二轮援助将在2014年十二月完成而且也将是最后一轮，否则其政治生命不保——好些欧元区国家政府也是通过相同的承诺来获得本国议会许可的。


The fallout was that the government collapsed and, in January 2015, our Syriza government was elected with a mandate to challenge the very logic of these “bailouts.”	紧接着亲三架马车政府垮台，随后在2015年1月，我们的激进左翼联盟政府上台，受命去挑战这些“救助”的基本逻辑。


As the new government’s finance minister, I was determined that any new bank recapitalization should avoid the pitfalls of the first two.	作为新政府的财政部长，我决定任何新的银行资本重组应避免再次落入前两种的陷阱。


New loans should be secured only after Greece’s debt had been rendered viable, and no new public funds should be injected into the commercial banks unless and until a special-purpose institution – a “bad bank” – was established to deal with their NPLs.	只有在希腊的债务已经盘活后才能发行新贷款，同时除非并直到建立一个特殊目的机构——某种“坏账银行”——来处理不良贷款，否则不得将新的公共资金注入到商业银行。


Unfortunately, the Troika was not interested in a rational solution.	不幸的是，三驾马车对一个合理的解决办法不感兴趣。


Its aim was to crush a government that dared challenge it.	其真正目的是摧毁一个敢于挑战它的政府。


And crush us it did by engineering a six-month-long bank run, shutting down the Greek banks in June, and causing Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’s capitulation to the Troika’s third bailout loan in July.	为此它们操纵了长达六个月之久的银行挤兑，在六月关闭希腊各银行，令总理亚历克西·齐普拉斯（Alexis Tsipras）只得在七月有条件第屈从于三驾马车的第三轮救助贷款。


The first significant move was a third recapitalization of the banks in November.	第一项显著举措是银行在十一月的第三轮注资。


Taxpayers contributed another €6 billion, through the HFSF, but were again prevented from purchasing the shares offered to private investors.	纳税人通过希腊金融稳定基金贡献了另外60亿欧元，但再次被禁止采购提供给私人投资者的股份。


As a result, despite capital injections of approximately €47 billion (€41 billion in 2013 and another €6 billion in 2015), the taxpayer’s equity share dropped from more than 65% to less than 26%, while hedge funds and foreign investors (for example, John Paulson, Brookfield, Fairfax, Wellington, and Highfields) grabbed 74% of the banks’ equity for a mere €5.1 billion investment.	其结果是，尽管注资约470亿欧元（2013年410亿+2015年60亿），纳税人的权益份额却从超过65％下降到不足26％，而对冲基金和外国投资者（例如，John Paulson, Brookfield, Fairfax, Wellington和Highfields）只用区区51亿欧元就攫取了银行74%的股权。


Although hedge funds had lost money since 2013, the opportunity to taking over Greece’s entire banking system for such a paltry sum proved irresistibly tempting.	虽然自2013年以来对冲基金亏了钱，但用这么一点小钱接管希腊整个银行体系的机会显然是无法抗拒。


The result is a banking system still awash in NPLs and buffeted by continuing recession.	其结果是银行体系仍然充斥着不良贷款并继续遭受衰退的冲击。


And with the latest round of recapitalization, the cost of the Troika’s determination to stick to the practice of extend-and-pretend bailout loans just got higher.	而随着新一轮注资，三驾马车坚持“扩大兼瞒骗”路线的成本也只会有增无减。


Never before have taxpayers contributed so much to so few for so little.	而对纳税人来说，他们付出如此之多，得到的却是如此之少。


Latin America After Bush	布什走后的拉丁美洲


Once again, America’s president has come up short in Latin America.	美国的总统再一次在拉丁美洲没有取得多少成果，即便布什总统在他所访问的五个国家都受到了主人传统拉丁美洲的好客和热诚的接待。


Granted, President George W. Bush was well received by all his hosts in the five countries he visited, with traditional Latin American hospitality and cordiality.	没有发生重大、不幸的事件； 虽然有持续不断的刺耳的抗议声，但是并不出格，参加的人也不多；


There were no major, unfortunate incidents; the constant protests were strident but not especially violent or well-attended; no significant slights or mishaps took place; and President Bush achieved what he probably was most interested in: sending a message back to the United States that he actually is interested in more than Iraq.	没有发生明显的冷落或不幸的事情； 并且布什总统获得了或许是他最感兴趣的东西，即向美国传递一个信息，那就是他所感兴趣的不仅仅是伊拉克。


He also accomplished, in a somewhat round-about way, another goal: showing the flag, so to speak, in the face of the mounting challenge from Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, who, thanks to virtually unlimited supplies of oil dollars and Cuban doctors and foot-soldiers, is riding high across Latin America.	他还以某种迂回的方式取得了另一个成果，即面对委内瑞拉总统查维斯越来越强烈的挑衅表明他对拉丁美洲的忠诚。 查维斯得益于他几乎源源不断的石油美元、古巴医生和步兵，在拉丁美洲的地位越来越高。


Chávez baited Bush at almost every stop along the way, but the US leader evaded the provocations, and indeed, probably bested Chávez in the sense that an unpopular US president managed to dominate the agenda and take the battle of ideas directly to Latin American audiences, with whom the Venezuelans and the Cubans are in contact every day.	查维斯几乎在布什行程的每一站都在对他进行着折磨，但是美国领导人回避了他的挑衅，并且事实上，作为一个不受欢迎的美国总统能够支配他的行程，并且能够直接面对委内瑞拉人和古巴人每天都在接触的拉丁美洲听众进行思想的论战，某种程度上也许他是打败了查维斯。


Bush was also able to partly change the tone of the US message in the hemisphere: from free trade and fighting terrorism, to combating poverty and strengthening democracy and human rights.	布什同时也部分改变了美国在这个半球的形象，从自由贸易和对抗恐怖主义，到与贫穷作斗争以及加强民主和人权。


If Bush had made this trip several years ago, things would be different today.	如果布什能够早几年进行这次访问的话，今天的情况会有很大的不同。


But everyone would also be in better shape today if Bush had been able to actually deliver on the main issues his interlocutors took up with him.	但是如果布什能够真正关切他的对话者所提出的问题的话，今天每个人的日子都会好得多。


Here, despite the photo-ops and the hugs and the local cuisine, the American president was simply not ready, willing or able, to give satisfaction to his colleagues, from capital to capital.	但是今天在这里，尽管有大量的照片宣传、拥抱以及当地的美食，但是美国总统并没有准备好、不愿意也无法给他所到的各个国家的首脑带去满足。


In Brasil, President Luiz Ignacio da Silva Lula’s main issue, demand and hope was for a reduction or elimination in the US tariff on ethanol imports.	在巴西，卢拉主要关心的问题、要求和希望是美国能减免或者取消乙醇进口的关税。


Bush said no, since the tariff is congressionally mandated, and thus greatly diluted the importance of the bio-fuel cooperation agreement the two governments signed.	但是布什没有答应，因为关税是国会决定的，而这大大削弱了两国签订的生物燃料合作协议的重要性。


In Uruguay, President Tabaré Vázquez went out on a limb simply by hosting Bush, given that his problems with his Chávez-friendly neighbor in Argentina, Nestor Kirchner, can only worsen as a result of these “dangerous” acquaintances.	在乌拉圭，塔瓦雷总统因为接待了布什而身处困境，这种“危险”的款待只会恶化他跟与查维斯友好的邻国阿根廷总统基什内尔的业已存在问题。


Vázquez needed some cover on the status of Urugayan immigrants in the US, and mainly, increases in quotas for its exports to the American market.	巴斯克斯要求在美国的乌拉圭移民能够身份问题上得到某种保护，还有主要是要增加其对美国市场的出口配额。


Again, Bush left him hanging.	但是布什再次没有满足他的要求。


Alvaro Uribe of Colombia was happy just to have a US Chief of State visit Bogotá; the last one to do so was Ronald Reagan in 1982.	哥伦比亚的阿尔瓦罗·乌里韦对于有一个美国领导人访问波哥大已经感到很高兴了，因为上一次来访的美国总统还是1982年时的里根。


In fact, Bush’s was a brave gesture: despite Uribe’s success in combating drugs, paramilitaries and guerrillas, his capital is not an especially safe place.	事实上，布什作出的是一个很勇敢的举动：因为尽管乌里韦在与毒品、准军事组织和游击队员的斗争中取得了成功，但是他的首都还不是一个特别安全的地方。


Bush also gave him his backing on human rights concerns, which, coming from the gentleman responsible – in the eyes of most of the world -- for Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib, is perhaps damning with faint praise.	布什还对他对人权的关注表示了支持，但是这种支持来自于一个在全世界大多数人眼中应该对关塔纳摩监狱和阿布格莱布监狱的存在负责的人口中，也许就大大打了折扣。


But most disappointingly for Uribe, though understandably, the US President was unable to bring with him guaranteed congressional support either for Colombia’s Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US, nor funding renewal for the so-called Plan Colombia.	但是最让乌里韦感到失望的，尽管这可以理解，是美国总统没能带给他他曾经保证过的国会的支持，无论是对于哥伦比亚与美国的自由贸易协定，还是对所谓的哥伦比亚计划继续注资。


In Guatemala, once again, President Oscar Berger was obviously proud to receive Bush, but failed to obtain a commitment from him to stop the inhuman, hateful Homeland Security raids by US law enforcement officers against undocumented immigrants, exemplified by the detention and attempt at deportation, on the eve of Bush’s visit, of nearly 300 Guatemalans working at a Massachussetts, military vest factory.	在危地马拉，奥斯卡·伯格总统显然同样对能够接待布什来访感到很自豪，但是却没能得到他制止美国执法官员对于没有证件的移民进行的非人道的、可恶的国家安全搜查的承诺。 就在布什到访之前，在马萨诸塞州的一个军用背心厂工作的大约300名瓜地马拉人被拘禁并准备驱逐出境就是一个很好的例子。


Where Bush fared best, perhaps, was in Mérida, Mexico, where Felipe Calderón not only received him as the gracious host Mexican presidents always are – though he rightly slammed his guest on the fence the US is building here and there along the two countries’ border-- but got in return what he needed, and wanted most.	布什获得最大成功的，也许是在墨西哥的梅尔达，在那里卡尔德隆不但以墨西哥总统总是会表现出的热情好客接待了他，尽管他不无道理地指责他的美国客人在两国边境所建造的防护墙，但是他得到了他所需��、并且是最想得到的回报。


The American made a firm, explicit and apparently sincere commitment to lobby as strongly as possibly for what he calls “comprehensive immigration reform” and what in Mexico is commonly known as “the whole enchilada.”	美国人作出了坚定、明白无误并且显然是真诚的承诺，答应将尽全力游说国会议员同意他所称作的“全面的移民改革”， 墨西哥人通常称之为“事情的方方面面”。


Whether Bush can deliver the goods is obviously open to question, but since Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid traveled to Mexico City two days later to make the same commitment, it seems that Mexico’s six years of vain efforts might finally prove fruitful.	布什究竟是否能兑现他的承诺显然还是一个疑问，但是既然两天后参议院多数党领袖哈里·里德来到墨西哥城也作出了同样的承诺，看上去墨西哥六年徒劳无益的努力最终证明是有成果的。


Needless to say, Calderón was thrilled, particularly because he had begun backing away from the emphasis his predecessor, Vicente Fox, placed on the immigration issue.	勿需多言，卡尔德隆非常高兴，尤其是因为他已经开始从他的前任福克斯对于移民问题所强调的观点向后退了。


Conversely, if Bush cannot come up with enough Republican moderates in the US Senate – they are actually already there, probably -- and in the US House of Representatives, the letdown and resentment in Mexico (as well as everywhere in Central America, the Caribbean, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia) will be immense.	相反，如果布什在参议院以及在众议院不能拥有足够多的共和党温和派（在参议院也许实际上已经有了），那么墨西哥（以及中美洲的每个国家，即加勒比各国、秘鲁、厄瓜多尔和哥伦比亚）将感到极大的失望和愤怒。


So where do the US and Latin America go from here?	那么美国和拉丁美洲将走向何处呢？


Several crucial decisions lay ahead.	有几个重要的决定摆在面前。


The first is for the US and the rest of the region to wholeheartedly support, and if possible reinforce, the democracy and human rights protection instruments developed over the years, given the precarious nature of democracy and respect for human rights in nations like Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia and others.	第一是美国和这个地区的其他国家应该全力支持，如果可能的话应该加强多年来发展起来的民主和人权保护手段，因为厄瓜多尔、委内瑞拉、玻利维亚和其他国家的民主态势和对人权的尊重还处于很不确定的情况中。


Second, the White House must not only get the pending free trade agreements ratified by Congress, but should improve them, learning from the NAFTA experience, make them more poverty-sensitive, more environmentally- and labor-oriented, and provide more support for infrastructure and training.	第二，白宫不但必须让悬而未决的自由贸易协定获得国会的批准，而且应该接受北美自由贸易协议的教训，完善这些协定，使它们更关注穷人，更以环境和劳工为中心，并且给基础建设和教育提供更多的支持。


Third, and perhaps most importantly, Bush has to finally achieve the immigration reform he has promised for so long.	第三，也许是最重要的，布什必须完成他很早就承诺过的移民改革。


Stop building fences – even if they do make good neighbors -- and cease the harassment of undocumented people in the US.	停止修筑防护墙，即便它们确实使边境变得安定了，并且不要再扰乱身处美国的无证件者。


It’s hateful, needless, and futile: as Bush said himself, the US will never, could never, and should never deport twelve million people, illegal or not.	这是可恶、没有必要并且是没有用的。 正像布什自己所说的，美国永远不会、不能也不应该驱逐1200万人，不管他们是不是合法的。


Latin America’s Moment	拉丁美洲时刻


NEW YORK – Much of the world’s attention is understandably focused on developments in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia.	纽约—不难理解，世界的大部分目光集中在中东、欧洲和亚洲的发展态势上。


These regions represent the vast majority of global population and wealth, their geopolitics are the most stressful (and highly consequential), and in recent decades – if not centuries – they have accounted for most of what has constituted world history.	这些地区占据了全球人口和财富的绝大部分，地缘政治局势最为紧张（后果也非常重大），并且在最近几十年乃至几百年间构成了世界史的绝大部分。


But an unintended consequence of this focus is that many governments, corporations, and people are missing much of what is going on in Latin America.	但注重这些地区的一个意料外的后果是许多政府、公司和人忽视了拉丁美洲正在发生的事情。


And much of what is going on in Latin America right now happens to be good.	而拉丁美洲正在发生的事情中有很多碰巧相当积极。


This may not seem obvious.	这并非显而易见。


Brazil, the region’s largest country, is in the middle of a severe political crisis; the incumbent president, Dilma Rousseff, may well be on trial while the Olympics are being staged in her country later this summer.	拉丁美洲地区最大的国家巴西陷入了严重的政治危机； 当今年夏天巴西举办奥运会之际，在任总统罗塞夫很可能需要出庭受审。


Meanwhile, the economy shrank by nearly 4% in 2015 and is projected to contract by a similar margin this year.	与此同时，巴西经济在2015年萎缩了近4%，预计今年还将萎缩相当的幅度。


The impact of the Zika virus on public health is greater in Brazil than anywhere else.	寨卡病毒对巴西公共卫生的影响比其他任何地方都要大。


Corruption is endemic and has compromised nearly everyone in public life.	腐败已成顽疾，公职人员几乎无一人能够幸免。


But what is also extraordinary about Brazil is that all of this has thus far taken place without violence.	但巴西也有过人之处，到目前为止，所有这些都没有引起暴力。


Just as important, the political process is being conducted according to constitutional requirements and led by judges acting independently.	同样重要的是，巴西政治进程根据宪法要求进行，并由独立行动的法官主导。


Media of every sort are covering what is going on with great intensity.	各路媒体密集报道进展情况。


The ability to self-correct is essential for any country, and having it may be what saves Brazil from past mistakes and mismanagement.	自我纠正能力对任何国家来说都是至关重要的，而拥有这一能力或能拯救巴西免蹈过去的错误和管理不善。


And, yes, Venezuela – a country blessed, or quite possibly cursed, with the largest hydrocarbon reserves in the world – is in far worse shape.	而委内瑞拉也诚然每况愈下。 委内瑞拉拥有全世界最大的碳氢化合物储量，这是它的幸运，很可能也是诅咒。


The country’s economy and currency have plummeted along with the price of oil.	委内瑞拉经济和货币随着石油价格的暴跌而崩溃。


Inflation has soared.	通货膨胀一飞冲天。


Political dysfunction is severe, and civil unrest and large-scale internal violence cannot be ruled out.	政治瘫痪非常严重，民众骚乱和大规模内部暴力难以避免。


Yet even here there is a bit of good news.	但委内瑞拉也有一些好消息。


The political opposition won a large majority in the December 2015 parliamentary election.	政治反对派在2015年12月的议会选举中赢得多数。


And lower oil prices may trigger further political change, ultimately ushering in a government that begins the process of making Venezuela a country of institutions and laws, not personality cults and abuse of power.	而石油价格下跌或能触发进一步政治变革，最终形成一个启动让委内瑞拉成为制度和法律之国，而非黑帮和权力滥用之国的进程的政府。


More broadly, many of the most important trends in the region are on balance positive.	更广泛地讲，拉丁美洲的大部分重要趋势都算得上积极的平衡（balance positive）。


Mexico, for decades a one-party state, is now a robust democracy that has experienced several rotations of political leadership through the ballot box.	墨西哥在经历了几十年的一党执政后，如今已是强大的民��国家，经历了多轮通过选票箱实现的政治领导层更迭。


In addition, its economy is doing relatively well.	此外，墨西哥经济表现相对较好。


To be sure, challenges exist, particularly when it comes to addressing drug-related crime and violence, but these problems can be managed with sustained effort.	诚然，墨西哥仍面临挑战，特别是在解决毒品犯罪和暴力方面，但这些问题可以通过持续措施得到管理。


Colombia has emerged at long last from a prolonged civil conflict.	哥伦比亚终于从漫长的内战中走出。


Thanks in part to assistance from the United States, the government was strong enough to make it clear to the country’s FARC rebels that they could not shoot their way into power.	部分归因于美国的协助，哥伦比亚政府足够强大地向哥伦比亚FARC叛军明确表明他们无法通过枪杆子取得权力。


The cease-fire is holding, and prospects for a peace agreement are good.	停火已经形成，达成和平协议的前景十分乐观。


Meanwhile, the economy is growing at a 3% annual rate, lower than in the recent past, but still higher than in many emerging economies.	与此同时，哥伦比亚经济正在以每年3%的速度增长，虽然不如最近几年，但仍高于许多新兴经济体。


Argentina provides the most recent good news.	最近的好消息来自阿根廷。


The new government, in its first six months, has taken a number of difficult steps to restore international confidence.	新政府执政不出六个月就实施了大量艰难的措施重塑国际信息呢。


In no way does this minimize what the government must achieve to reduce inflation and restore sustainable growth, but there is a palpable sense that the country, now led by a talented team of technocrats, has turned the corner.	这并没有减轻政府降低通胀和重塑可持续增长的任务的负担，但明显可以察觉到，在干练官僚团队的领导下，阿根廷已经扭转了颓势。


This is good news – and not just for Argentina, because what happens there will affect thinking and behavior elsewhere, particularly in Brazil.	这是好消息——不仅仅对阿根廷是如此，因为阿根廷所发生的事情间更影响到其他国家的思维和行为，特别是巴西。


Progress in Argentina would show that those who violate the law can be held accountable, that excessive state intervention in the economy leads to insolvency and promotes corruption, and that democracy and markets represent the future.	阿根廷的进步表明，违反法律的人可以被问责，国家对经济的过度干预导致破产、刺激腐败，民主和市场才是未来的代表。


Cuba in ten years is more likely to resemble its more politically and economically open neighbors than vice versa.	未来十年，更有可能是古巴模仿这些政治和经济上更开放的邻居，而不是反过来。


Again, none of this is to say that Latin America lacks real problems and challenges.	当然，所有这些都不是说拉丁美洲不存在真正的问题和挑战。


On the contrary, it has plenty of both.	相反，问题和挑战多得是。


But for the most part, these are matters of political and economic governance, state capacity, and corruption within states.	但在绝大部分情况下，这些是国家内部的政治和经济治理、国家能力和腐败问题。


Missing almost entirely are problems stemming from relations between states – geopolitics – that so dominate and plague other parts of the world.	几乎完全不存在的是来自国家间关系——地缘政治——的问题，这些问题主宰和折磨着世界其他地区。


This is a tremendous advantage, as it means that governments’ attention and resources can be focused on meeting domestic needs.	这是一个巨大的优势，意味着政府的注意力和资源可以集中于满足国内需要。


The Middle East is unraveling.	中东正在崩溃。


Asia is challenged by territorial disputes, the rise of Chinese power, and a reckless North Korea.	亚洲受领土纠纷、中国力量崛起和不计后果的朝鲜的挑战。


Europe is all but overwhelmed by refugees, terror, and Russian revanchism.	欧洲被难民、恐怖主义和俄罗斯复仇主义压得透不过气来。


And Africa is being held back by civil conflicts, terrorism, and poor governance.	非洲受内战、恐怖主义和治理不善的拖累。


Latin America, by contrast, looks pretty good.	相反，拉丁美洲看上去情况非常出色。


Indeed, if current trends persist, it could eventually replace Europe as the world region that others regard with more than a little admiration – or even envy.	事实上，如果当前趋势持续下去，它可能最终取代欧洲，成为人人向往甚至嫉妒的地区。


Getting Industrial Policy Right	推行正确的产业政策


DAVOS – At a time of lackluster global economic growth, developing countries are dusting off some old strategies – particularly the use of industrial policy to drive the development of particular sectors and turn them into engines of growth and employment.	发自达沃斯——在全球经济增长乏力之时，发展中国家正在逐渐重拾一些旧策略——尤其那种利用产业政策推动特定产业发展，使之成为经济增长和就业动力的做法。


But the history of such policies, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean, is filled with failure and cautionary tales.	但纵观这类政策的历史，特别是在拉美和加勒比海地区，都充满了失败和警示的教训。


In the 1950s and 1960s, many Latin American and Caribbean countries embraced industrial policy enthusiastically.	回望二十世纪五六十年代，许多拉美和加勒比国家都极为热衷于产业政策。


By substituting imports with domestic production, relying on government planning to target priority sectors, and implementing selective trade protection (for example, by imposing tariffs, quotas, and import licensing), they attempted to accelerate their transitions from raw-materials suppliers to manufacturing-based economies.	通过以国内生产替代进口，依靠政府计划来聚焦优先领域，实施选择性贸易保护（例如，征收关税、配额、进口许可），它们试图加快从原材料供应商到制造业经济的转型进程。


While East Asian countries like South Korea used such policies to enable selected industries to compete on a global scale, Latin American and Caribbean countries rarely got it right.	当韩国这样的东亚国家通过这类政策来让特定行业进行全球范围竞争时，拉丁美洲和加勒比国家却几乎没有走对过路子。


Despite some notable successes, such as the aircraft manufacturer Embraer in Brazil and salmon farming in Chile, governments largely picked losers – not least because political pressure, not firms’ competitive potential, drove the selection process.	尽管拥有如巴西航空工业公司（飞机制造商）和智利鲑鱼养殖这样的优秀榜样，但各国政府却基本上选择了失败者——而推动这个选择过程的可不仅仅是政治压力和企业竞争潜力。


In the 1980s and 1990s, Latin America abandoned such policies in favor of a more cautious approach.	在上世纪80、90年代，拉美放弃了这种政策而选择了更谨慎的路径。


Rather than backing individual sectors, some countries promoted innovation with across-the-board subsidies and tax breaks, while opening their economies to foreign competition and embracing market-oriented reforms.	相对于支持个别行业，一些国家提倡一刀切的补贴和税收减免来推动创新，同时向外国竞争者开放市场并进行市场化改革。


But these changes, though necessary, were insufficient to deliver growth in productivity and output.	虽然这些变化是有必要的，却不足以支撑生产力和产出的增长。


Almost two decades later, with Latin American governments again exploring the potential of activist industrial policy, avoiding the mistakes of the past will require a thorough understanding of why previous attempts failed – and a concrete strategy to guide future efforts.	大概二十年后，拉美各国政府再次着手探索积极产业政策的潜力，为了避免重蹈覆辙，就需要彻底弄明白以前尝试的失败原因，并且需要切实的策略来指导未来的努力。


A recent report by the Inter-American Development Bank (of which I am President) does precisely that.	而本人担任行长的美洲开发银行最近发布的一份报告正是因此而生。


Beyond assessing what went wrong previously, the report identifies three fundamental questions that policymakers in any emerging economy should answer before pursuing industrial policy:	除了评估之前错误的原因之外，报告指出，任何一个新兴经济体的决策者都应该在推行产业政策之前回答三个基本问题：


·         Is there a clear market failure that justifies government intervention?	•是否存在需要政府干预的明显市场失灵？


·         Will the proposed policy be effective in remedying the market failure?	•即将提出的政策是否能有效弥补该市场失灵？


·         Does the country have the institutions necessary to execute the policy?	•国家是否拥有执行该政策所需的机构？


Consider sectoral policies in Costa Rica and Argentina.	对比一下哥斯达黎加和阿根廷的部门政策。


In Costa Rica, the rice industry took the traditional route of lobbying for protection.	在哥斯达黎加，水稻产业采用了传统政治游说手段来寻求自保。


Though there was no market failure to remedy, the government obliged, introducing high import tariffs and subsidies for powerful local growers; as a result, productivity declined.	虽然不存在需要弥补的市场失灵，但是政府却就范于该产业，强行引入高进口关税并补贴本地大种植者； 结果水稻生产力一路下滑。


By contrast, farmers in the Argentine province of Entre Ríos requested that the National Institute of Agricultural Technology (INTA) ramp up research into new rice varieties, even agreeing to pay a tax to augment INTA’s research budget (thereby overcoming what economists call private-sector coordination problems).	相比之下，在阿根廷恩特雷里奥斯省的农民则要求国家农业技术研究所（INTA）加强对新水稻品种的研究，甚至同意为此支付税收以增加研究经费（因此克服了经济学家所称的私人部门协调问题）。


When a new rice variety was introduced, productivity soared.	在引入一个新的水稻品种后，大米产量大幅提高。


Unsurprisingly, the intervention in Argentina passed all three tests: the market suffered a coordination failure that was addressed effectively through public policy carried out by appropriate institutions.	不出所料，阿根廷的干预通过了之前说到的三项测试：市场协调失败，而通过由适当机构执行的公共政策而得到有效解决。


Instead of coddling an entire industry with subsidies or import restrictions, the provincial government and INTA provided a public good that bolstered production in a specific sector.	相比于以补贴或进口限制来娇惯整个行业，阿根廷省政府和国家农业技术研究所在特定领域提供了一项可以提高生产力的公共产品。


Other successful examples of this approach include sanitary certifications of agricultural products and training programs for the software industry.	采用这种方法的其他成功例子还包括农产品卫生安全证书和软件业培训计划。


Once governments identify an opportunity that passes these three tests, they are in a much better position to use measures like temporary subsidies or targeted incentives effectively.	一旦政府发现一个能通过这三项测试的运作契机，就更有利于它们有效地运用类似临时补贴或指定激励措施这类手段。


In Mexico’s Mayan Riviera, for example, public support for investments in lodging and transportation helped create a world-class tourist destination.	例如在墨西哥的玛雅海滨，对住宿和交通投资的政府支持就协助将这里打造成世界级旅游圣地。


Costa Rica, despite its rice-industry failure, has also had some success with such policies.	而哥斯达黎加尽管在稻米产业上折戟，却也有一些政策取得了类似的成功。


When the medical-device industry was blocked from producing lucrative products like heart valves, owing to the lack of specialized firms to provide sterilization services, the government used incentives to attract such companies.	由于缺乏专门的公司提供消毒服务，医疗器械行业被禁止生产心脏瓣膜等高利润产品，于是政府用奖励政策来吸引这类企业。


As a result, exports of more sophisticated, higher-value-added medical devices soared.	因此，更复杂且附加值更高的医疗设备出口量猛增。


Ensuring adequate institutional capacity is essential to prevent private and political interests from shaping policy, as occurred in the 1950s and 1960s.	为防止私人利益和政治利益像在上世纪50、60年代那样主导政策走向，就必须确保有足够的机构实力。


Ireland, often praised for its success in picking winners, relied on the technical competence of its renowned Industrial Development Agency to safeguard the integrity and effectiveness of the selection process.	常因成功挑选出优势行业而广受好评的爱尔兰就依赖其知名的工业发展局（Industrial Development Agency）的技术实力来保障甄选过程的一致性和有效性。


Chile, despite possessing reasonably strong institutions, turned to a third party, the Boston Consulting Group, to ensure that the most promising sectors were selected objectively.	智利，尽管其自身机构也能力不俗，却转向第三方波士顿咨询集团，以确保能客观地挑选出那些最有前途的行业。


Fostering industrial development is a complex challenge.	促进产业发展是一个复杂的挑战。


Policymakers must periodically reassess their efforts and promptly abandon failures.	政策制定者必须定期重新评估自身的举措并及时放弃失败案例。


There will be hits and misses, but, if officials consistently ask the right three questions, their chances of success will be much higher.	成功与失败都是可能的，但如果官员们能坚持用那三个问题作为标准的话，他们成功的几率会更高。


Why Latin America’s Center is Holding	拉丁美洲中间派正在得势


SANTIAGO – The Viennese writer Stefan Zweig allegedly said, “Brazil is the country of the future – and always will be.”	圣地亚哥—据说维也纳作家斯特凡·茨威格（Stefan Zweig）曾说：“巴西是未来之国——永远都是这样。


Likewise, centrist politics in Latin America has perpetually been on the horizon – until now.	”类似地，拉美中间道路政治永远都在前方——直到最近。


To outsiders, the region is virtually synonymous with political polarization.	外部人看来，拉美地区是政治极化的同义词。


Fatigue-clad guerrillas, charismatic populists, and reactionary military junta leaders have long cut much larger figures than moderate politicians in boring gray suits.	疲惫不堪的游击队员、魅力超凡的民粹主义者、保守的军事集团领导人的支持率总是比身穿无趣灰西装的温和派政客更受欢迎。


But Latin America has a long – if not always fruitful – history of centrist liberal reformers.	但拉丁美洲的中间派自由主义改革历史悠久——尽管并非总能产生成果。


In the nineteenth century, liberals laboriously separated their nascent states’ institutions from those of the Catholic Church.	十九世纪，自由派费尽心机让各国机构与天主教会脱离关系。


In the 1930s, politicians of the moderate left, responding to the havoc wreaked on the region by the Great Depression, built the rudiments of a modern welfare state.	20世纪30年代，温和左派政客为了应对大萧条给拉美地区造成的影响，建起了现代福利国家的雏形。


In the 1960s, centrist politicians of different stripes – many of them Christian Democrats – struggled to find an alternative to the threat of armed revolution and the totalitarian politics of Fidel Castro’s Cuba.	20世纪60年代，不同阵营的中间道路政客——其中许多人是基督教民主党人（Christian Democrats）——竭力寻找不同于古巴的菲德尔·卡斯特罗的武装革命和极权政治的其他道路。


But there were two problems: centrist politics did not always take root, and it seldom lasted.	但有两个问题：中间派政客并不总能稳固根基，也往往无法持久。


There is truth in the cliché that middle-class citizens tend to be politically moderate; open societies and reformist politics often go together.	中产阶级公民在政治上往往比较温和； 开放社会和改革政治往往携手共进，这样的老生常谈不无道理。


In Latin America, however, rigid class divisions and deep income inequalities created fertile ground for populism.	但是，在拉丁美洲，顽固的阶级分裂和深刻的收入不平等造就了民粹主义的温床。


And when populist experiments collapsed, as they often did, under the weight of unsustainable debt and high inflation, it was right-wing budget-cutters, allied with conservative businessmen, who took over.	而当民粹主义实验失败时——经常如此——在不可持续的债务和高通胀的压力下，右翼削减预算派就会与保守的商人结成联盟，夺取权力。


The center could not hold.	中间派无法得势。


In the last two decades, however, this has begun to change.	但是，在过去二十年中，这一点开始发生变化。


With some exceptions (a particularly troubling one is Venezuela), democracy was consolidated in the region.	除了一些例外（其中委内瑞拉的例子尤其麻烦），民主正在拉美地区日渐稳固。


Elections have given rise to some capable governments and some mediocre ones, but only the lunatic fringe would advocate political change by means other than the ballot box.	选举产生了一些有能力的政府和一些平庸政府，但只有狂热分子才会鼓吹不通过投票箱实现政治变革。


Economic stabilization, plus a decade-long commodity boom, gave Latin America a growth spurt.	经济的稳定，加上长达十年的大宗商品繁荣，刺激了拉丁美洲的增长。


And, although that growth could not be sustained when commodity prices weakened, as they have now, it, together with enhanced social policies, did lift family incomes, reduce poverty, and sharply enlarge the middle class.	此外，尽管这一增长在大宗商品价格下跌时无法维持（现在就是如此），但它与强化的社会政策一道，确实增加了家庭收入，减少了贫困，也大大扩大的中产阶级。


Today, a middle-class family living on the outskirts of Bogotá, Montevideo, São Paulo, or Santiago has an average income that is much lower in dollar terms than that of its counterparts in North America or Europe.	如今，生活在波哥大、蒙得维的亚、圣保罗或圣地亚哥市郊的中产阶级，他们的平均收入（美元值）仍远低于北美或欧洲。


But that family likely lives in its own home (which it bought with a bank mortgage).	但这些家庭有可能生活在属于自己的房子中（通过银行按揭购买）。


If it has not yet purchased a car, it will sooner rather than later.	即使没有没有车，也很快就会去买。


And the kids have a growing chance of going to university.	而孩子们也有更大的机会上大学。


Members of the new middle class suffer from the low quality of public services (particularly health and education); fret over job insecurity; are incensed by the persistence of discrimination in the labor market; and fume over jammed traffic and crime.	新中产阶级面临的问题是公共服务质量低劣（特别是卫生和教育）； 工作岗位无保障令人心忧；


But precisely because they have a hard time making ends meet, middle-class citizens have little patience for leaders who cause inflation and interest rates to skyrocket.	糟糕的交通和犯罪情况也惹人恼怒。 但正是因为他们历经艰辛才有了今天，中产阶级公民绝不会容忍造成通胀和利率一飞冲天的领导人。


Sure enough, the children of the middle class have often taken to the street in protest, as they did in Chile starting in 2011 to complain about education, for example, and in Brazil in 2013 to demonstrate against rising bus fares.	毫无疑问，中产阶级的孩子常常参加街头游行，比如2011年智利抱怨教育的游行和2013年巴西反对公交费用上涨的示威。


But critics from the orthodox left are wrong to claim that such protests necessarily aim to overthrow “the economic model.”	但正统左派的批评家错误地认为这些示威根本目标是颠覆“经济模式”。


Many of the marchers simply want the system to open its doors and let them in.	许多游行参与者只是想要体系能开一扇门，让他们进去。


In political terms, this calls for well-executed reforms that last and do not imperil economic stability.	从政治上讲，这需要不会危及经济稳定的、持久的、执行情况良好的改革。


And that message is music to the ears of moderates, who understand that middle-class, middle-of-the-road voters are often pivotal in national elections.	而对于温和派来说，这是个天大的好消息，他们知道，作为中间道路选民的中产阶级往往能左右国家选举的结果。


As populists in the mold of Venezuela’s late president, Hugo Chávez, lose ground, a reform-minded liberal center has gathered strength.	随着追随委内瑞拉已故总统查韦斯的民粹派的逐渐失势，持改革思维的自由中间派正在得势。


Looking back, prime examples are the two terms of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil and the 20 years (1990-2010) of Concertación governments in Chile.	回头看，巴西总统卡多佐的两个任期和智利民主联盟（Concertación）执政的20年都是显例。


Recent Peruvian administrations have all governed from the center, even if they did so under widely differing rhetorical styles and party labels.	新一届秘鲁政府完全由中间派占据，即使他们的言辞风格和政党标签相去甚远。


And in Colombia, President Juan Manuel Santos’s administration has a history on the center-right, but has raised taxes and implemented a reform agenda that some of its ministers like to call “social democratic.”	而在哥伦比亚，总统桑托斯的政府曾经属于中右翼，但它采取了增税措施，并实施了几位部长称为“社会民主色彩”的改革日程。


In the not-too-distant future, politicians of the reforming center could reach power in two of Latin America’s larger countries.	过不了多久，改革中间派政客就可能在拉丁美洲的两个大国执掌权力。


In Argentina, Buenos Aires Mayor Mauricio Macri’s party, once conservative and strong only in the capital, has moved both to the political center and the provinces through its alliance with the center-left Radical Party.	在阿根廷，布宜诺斯艾利斯市长马克里（Mauricio Macri）所属政党（曾经属于保守派，只在首都拥有优势）通过与中左翼的激进党（Radical Party）结盟而转向政治中间派并向各省渗透。


And in Brazil last year, Cardoso’s Social Democratic Party, led by Aécio Neves, nearly beat the incumbent president, Dilma Rousseff.	而在巴西，去年卡多佐的社会民主党（Social Democratic Party）在尼维斯（Aécio Neves）的领导下几乎击败了在任总统罗塞夫。


If the election were held today, Neves or other plausible candidates from his party would win handily.	如果今天举行选举，尼维斯或其他可靠的社���民主党候选人将轻松获胜。


If Rousseff, plagued by scandals and a stalled economy, manages to complete her term, the social democrats look well-placed to win three years from now.	如果深陷丑闻和经济停滞困局的罗塞夫能成功完成任期，那么社会民主党很有可能在三年后获得胜利。


To seize these opportunities, centrist leaders must overcome at least three challenges.	要抓住这些机会，中间派领导人必须克服至少三个挑战。


First, they must seize further ground from populists, by delivering reforms that yield tangible short-term benefits.	首先，他们必须通过能带来短期实在好处的改革进一步从民粹主义者手中争夺选票。


Employment subsidies for jobless women and young people, expanded access to childcare, improved public transport, and effective anti-crime measures are all policies that boost both fairness and efficiency, now.	向失业妇女和年轻人发放就业补助、扩大儿童医保、改进公共交通，以及有效的反犯罪措施都能马上改进公平和效率。