Former President Álvaro Uribe is now leading those who stridently oppose the peace deal on the grounds that it does not go far enough to punish FARC militants.	前总统乌里韦现在是和平协议坚定反对力量的领导者，反对的理由是这份协议没有惩罚哥伦比亚革命武装力量的武装份子。


Nonetheless, the accord signed in Havana is historic and innovative, because it emphasizes truth-telling without eschewing justice altogether.	即便如此，因为哈瓦那协议在直面真相的同时并未完全回避正义，我们也不能否认这份协议的签署是一种历史性的创新。


Its focus is not on vengeance and retribution, but on “restorative justice,” a principle Archbishop Desmond Tutu used to describe South Africa’s transition to majority rule after apartheid.	该协议的重点不在于报复和复仇，而在于打破种族隔离制度后德斯蒙德·图图大主教曾借以形容南非向多数人统治过渡的“恢复性司法”原则。


The Colombian model of transitional justice acknowledges that national reconciliation is achievable only if the communities broken by the long, savage war are repaired and revitalized.	哥伦比亚过渡司法模式承认只有当毁于长期野蛮战争的民间社团得以振兴和修复，实现民族和解才成为可能。


In other words, Colombia’s approach to transitional justice puts the victims first – more so than any peace process seen in recent years.	换言之，哥伦比亚的过渡司法强调受害者地位——并在这一点上远远超过近年来的任何和平进程。


Victims’ delegations even joined the Havana talks and met with the FARC leadership that was responsible for so many past atrocities.	受害者代表团甚至参加了哈瓦那会谈并会见了曾制造过去诸多屠杀行为的哥伦比亚革命武装力量领导人。


The Colombian government’s pioneering approach seems to have benefited from a gender sub-commission that considered proposals from nongovernmental organizations representing women’s rights and the LGBT community.	哥伦比亚政府如此开创性的做法似乎也离不开性别小组委员会的工作，该委员会负责审议提案，对代表女性及同性恋群体利益的非政府机构提案展开审议进程。


The government was also wise to establish a special sub-commission to examine the history of the bloodshed, because disagreement about the past often constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to peace and reconciliation.	政府还明智地成立了一个特别小组委员会调查流血事件的历史，因为对过去的分歧往往会极大地阻碍和平与和解进程。


Colombian domestic politics should now move to the forefront of attention, because peace processes are vulnerable to public opinion.	哥伦比亚国内政治现在应当成为舆论关注的焦点，因为公众舆论往往能在很大程度上左右和平进程。


While war often unites countries, peace tends to divide them, because it inevitably requires concessions and sacrifices.	战争往往能让国家团结在一起，而和平则因为不可避免地需要做出让步和牺牲而起到分裂作用。


Peace comes at a cost, and people often disagree about who should foot the bill.	和平的到来需要付出代价，而人们往往就由谁来买单产生争执。


For a democratic leader, negotiating peace is – perversely – riskier than waging war.	对民主领袖而言，和平谈判所涉及的风险往往不可思议地大于发动战争。


This is especially true for an asymmetric peace process between a democratically elected government and an unaccountable non-state actor, which doesn’t have to worry about upcoming elections, opposition political parties, the press, or a skeptical public.	民选政府和不必承担责任的非国家主体间的非对称和平尤其如此，因为不必承担责任的非国家主体不必担心即将举行的选举、反对派政党、媒体或持怀疑态度的公众。


Despite these enormous constraints, the Santos government never deviated from proper democratic procedures.	尽管面临这些艰苦的限制条件，桑托斯政府从未偏离正确的民主进程。


It considered proposals from popular assemblies around the country, and it maintained transparency throughout the process.	它认真听取了全国各地人民议会的提案，并在整个过程中成功地保持了透明。


Santos has overcome formidable challenges, and the next one is a forthcoming plebiscite, where the Colombian people, one hopes, will recognize that their country has furnished a conflict-ridden world with a new model for peace.	桑托斯成功克服了艰巨的挑战，接下来摆在面前的挑战是即将到来的全民公决。 我们希望哥伦比亚民众能够认识到他们为充满了冲突的世界提供了新的和平模型。


The international community should take note of this and assist Colombia in the difficult transition ahead as it implements policies in accordance with the new agreement.	国际社会应当对此做出充分的认识，并在未来协助哥伦比亚完成按照新协议施政的艰难的转型。


The post-conflict phase will be no less demanding than the peace process itself.	后冲突阶段任务的艰巨性丝毫不小于和平进程本身。


Colombia’s Eternal Agony	哥伦比亚永远的痛


Colombia is in better shape today than it has been for years, thanks largely to President Alvaro Uribe’s leadership, but it remains a bizarre place, one facing strange and intractable challenges.	哥伦比亚今天的局势比以往若干年都好，这不能不说是阿尔瓦罗·乌里韦·贝莱斯（Alvaro Uribe）总统领导有方； 但哥伦比亚在很多方面却十分怪异，不得不去面对奇怪而又棘手的挑战。


Colombia’s FARC guerrillas have held some of their kidnapping victims for many years.	有些被绑人质已经被哥伦比亚革命武装部队（FARC）民兵关押了多年。


Child soldiers still linger in paramilitary groups, and there are compromising video recordings of leading Colombian politicians and drug lords.	准军事组织依然在吸收未成年战士，媒体也曾披露过哥伦比亚政客与毒品大鳄妥协的录像资料。


Perhaps weirdest of all, there are imprisoned guerrillas who refuse to be set free, and a government that insists on liberating them, even against their will.	但最奇怪的也许是，被监禁的民兵拒绝获释出狱，而政府却不惜违反他们的意愿，坚持要给他们自由。


Uribe was re-elected just over a year ago by a landslide, a tribute to the popularity and effectiveness of his “democratic security” policy of combating both the guerrillas and the country’s generalized violence.	短短1年多以前，乌里韦凭借压倒性票数再次当选，这不仅因为与民兵和国内一般武装力量斗争的“民主安全”政策具有广泛的群众基础，还因为上述政策确实行之有效。


Latin America’s oldest standing two-party system was decimated in that election, as the Polo Democrático presidential candidate won more votes than the Liberal Party’s contender, finally giving electoral expression to left-wing forces that had never been able to see more potential for change at the ballot box than by fighting in the mountains.	拉丁美洲历史最为悠久的两党制度在那次选举中被摧毁，标志是民主变革中心党（Polo Democrático）的总统候选人比自由党（Liberal Party）竞争者赢得了更多的选票，从而最终赋予了从未在投票箱旁看到过变革潜力的左翼势力通过选举表达自己的机会，而在此之前，他们宁愿选择在深山里打游击。


Negotiations on Colombia’s Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States had been finalized.	有关哥伦比亚与美国之间自由贸易协定（FTA）的谈判也进入了最后阶段。


Even the questionable deal Uribe cut with the right-wing paramilitary AUC groups, pardoning up to 30,000 of their members for often horrendous crimes in exchange for their disarmament, appeared successful.	即使是乌里韦与右翼准军事化的哥伦比亚联合自卫队（AUC）达成的协议（赦免了30,000名联合自卫队战士犯下的可怕罪行，以换取他们放下武器）似乎也取得了成功。


With Uribe in charge, Colombia seemed to be on a roll.	在乌里韦的领导下，哥伦比亚似乎好运连连。


But much of this success has since been squandered, with both Colombia and Uribe now in deep trouble.	但自此之后很多成果被白白地浪费，导致现在的哥伦比亚和乌里韦麻烦重重。


The so-called parapolítica scandals have rocked Uribe’s government, forcing the resignation of some cabinet ministers, and embarrassing others, including the president himself.	所谓的“ parapolítica ”丑闻撼动了乌里韦政府，迫使内阁部长提出辞呈，也致使其他人（包括总统本人）陷入到尴尬的境地当中。


Photographs, videos, and audio recordings of politicians and paramilitary thugs (including one who boasts of having personally killed more than 300 of his enemies) have discredited a political elite that, while never very popular, has now had some of the worst suspicions that many held about it graphically confirmed.	有关政客和准军事化暴徒（其中一名曾吹嘘亲手杀死了300多名敌人）的照片、录音和录像资料彻底摧毁了某位政界名流的声誉，尽管从未赢得过民众的信任，但真实的图片材料却最终证实了某些人有关于他的最坏的猜疑。


For years human rights activists and scholars suspected the obvious: the emergence of an enormous, vicious, well-armed, and well-trained parallel army to fight the guerillas was not some spontaneous act.	多年以来，人权积极分子及学者一直质疑一个明显的现象：出现规模庞大、穷凶极恶、武器精良、训练有素的军队与民兵作战并非是一种自发的现象。


It was, many believed, a deliberate policy devised and carried out by the official military and the political elite to wage war “off the books.”	很多人相信，这是由正规军和政治精英们特别制定并实施的一种策略，目的是向民兵武装发起一场“非正式”的战争。


The parapolítica or paragate revelations seem to confirm another suspicion as well: the distinction between the paramilitaries and the drug cartels, like that between the guerrillas and the cartels, is a nuanced one.	“ parapolítica ”或“ paragate ”披露的消息似乎确认了另外一种疑惑：准军事力量和贩毒卡特尔之间的界限与民兵武装和贩毒卡特尔之间一样，差别可谓是微乎其微。


Unfortunately, these revelations come at the worst possible moment.	不幸的是，上述事实披露发生的时间却很不恰当。


Colombia’s FTA with the US was in danger the moment the US Republicans lost their majority in both houses of Congress last November.	哥伦比亚与美国的自由贸易协定从共和党去年11月在参众两院失去多数席位起就一直处在危险状态。


Still, it seemed more likely to pass than the other two pending Latin American trade deals with Panama and Peru.	尽管如此，哥伦比亚协议通过的可能性还是大于另外两个拉美国家（巴拿马和秘鲁）的贸易协定。


Now it appears that President George W. Bush’s closest ally in the hemisphere will not only have its FTA rejected, owing to human rights concerns in the US House and Senate. Moreover, it might also lose Plan Colombia, the huge – and hugely controversial – American aid program that has funneled tens of billions of dollars into Colombia since the late 1990’s, ostensibly to fight the drug cartels, but also, in fact, to wage counter-insurgency.	但从目前的情况看，不仅乔治·W·布什总统在北半球最亲密盟友的自由贸易协定由于人权方面的原因在参众两院难获通过，而且同样这位盟友还面临着失去哥伦比亚计划（Plan Colombia）的危险，这项数额巨大、引起争议也异常巨大的美国援助计划从20世纪90年代开始就将成百上千亿美元注入到哥伦比亚，上述资金表面上看是为了对付毒品卡特尔，但实际目的也是为了镇压起义力量。


Uribe has spent weeks directly and personally lobbying key American legislators, and he is undoubtedly his own best advocate.	乌里韦花费了数周时间面对面地直接游说美国的重要立法者，这位哥伦比亚总统无疑是他自己最好的宣传员。


But, just as former US Vice-President Al Gore recently refused to share a dais with Uribe in Miami, many members of Congress refuse to approve a trade agreement or an aid package that may link them to a government tainted by egregious human rights abuses, complicity with drug lords, or both.	但正如前美国副总统阿尔·戈尔前不久在迈阿密拒绝与乌里韦同台演讲一样，很多国会议员都拒绝批准可能把自己与因侵犯人权或与毒品大鳄合谋而臭名昭著、或者兼有上述恶行的遍布污点的政府联系在一起的贸易协定或援助法案。


The US has never really wanted to include human rights issues in trade agreements; at best, and only when forced, US presidents have consented to incorporating labor and environmental chapters.	美国从未真正希望将人权问题纳入到贸易协定，在面对压力的时候，美国总统最多同意添加一些劳工和环境方面的要求。


The European Union thinks differently; in its economic cooperation and free trade agreement with Mexico, for example, it insisted on – and achieved – the inclusion of a “democracy clause” that made its economic benefits conditional on ongoing respect for democratic rule and human rights.	而欧盟的想法却差异巨大，例如在与墨西哥签订的经济和自由贸易协定中，欧盟坚持¾并最终成功写入了“民主条款”，使得对民主规则和人权的一贯尊重成为了获得经济收益的前提。


Colombia’s blemished human rights record is affecting its government’s international standing and providing ammunition for those who wish to sabotage the FTA.	哥伦比亚遍布污点的人权记录不仅影响到哥政府的国际声誉，而且为有意破坏自由贸易协定的力量提供了充足的弹药。


For example, protectionist Democrats in the US Congress have been able to insulate themselves from charges of opposing free trade if they scuttle Colombia’s FTA, because they will most likely ratify the deals for Panama and Peru.	举例来讲，美国国会中赞同保护主义的民主党议员如果能够拒绝批准哥伦比亚自由贸易协定，就可以避免受到反对自由贸易的指责，即使他们很可能批准巴拿马和秘鲁贸易协定也改变不了这样的状况。


Can Uribe survive his current travails?	乌里韦能否渡过目前的困难时期？


The answer is almost certainly yes, unless the parapolítica mess reaches him directly, or the US explicitly rejects the FTA and postpones or attaches conditions to renewal of funding for Plan Colombia.	答案几乎肯定是可以，除非他本人直接陷入“ parapolítica ”困境，或者美国明确否决自由贸易协定，并推迟为哥伦比亚计划提供后续的资金，或者为继续注资提出附加条件。


Uribe’s political demise would hurt everyone, but the rejection of the FTA on human rights grounds could set a healthy precedent.	乌里韦的政治覆灭会让所有人受到伤害， 但出于人权方面的考虑否决自由贸易协定却能够开创健康的先河。


In a region where threats to democracy and human rights are growing, linking trade and economic policy to these considerations is not a bad idea.	在民主和人权历经高速发展的区域，将贸易和经济政策与这些理念挂钩是种不错的选择。


Uribe may not deserve such a fate, but history works in strange ways.	乌里韦也许不该遭受这样的命运，但历史却会以一种奇特的方式发挥作用。


Comeback Cancers	癌症的复发


LONDON, ONTARIO – Progress is being made against many types of cancer, with more patients surviving longer, thanks to research on two fronts: improved methods for earlier detection, and development of therapies that are more effective and less toxic.	发自加拿大安大略省伦敦市——人类在多种癌症的治疗方面都取得了进展，而病人的存活期也不断延长，这有赖于两方面的研究：癌症的早期诊断，以及更有效且毒性更低的治疗方法。


Indeed, it is estimated that there are now more than 10 million cancer survivors in the United States alone, and this number has been steadily increasing.	事实上，美国目前约有1000万名癌症康复者，且数量还在稳步上升。


Similar numbers, in proportion to population sizes, are found in other developed countries.	其他发达国家康复者占总人口的比例也与美国相当。


Cancers that are detected early – when they are small and less likely to have metastasized (spread away from the primary tumor) – are more likely to be treatable with local therapy, whereas successful treatment is ultimately unlikely once metastatic tumors develop.	那些早期发现的癌症——当癌瘤较为细小且尚未扩散（指从原发瘤处蔓延开来）时——更容易通过局部治疗来应对，但一旦扩散则任何治疗方案的成功率都将微乎其微。


And improved therapies mean that patients can be treated with drugs that work better (and that patients are more likely to receive the full dose needed).	而改良的疗法意味着病人可以得到更有效的药物治疗（也更可能得到足够的所需剂量）。


But our dramatic progress in detecting and treating cancer has also led to growing awareness of the problem of tumor dormancy: a patient appears to be cured, only to have the same cancer return years or even decades later.	但我们在检测和治疗癌症方面所取得的重大进展也引起了对肿瘤休眠问题的更多重视：病人往往似乎被治愈了，但却在数年甚至数十年之后复发。


In breast cancer or melanoma, for example, recurrences 25 years after initial treatment have been reported.	比如在乳腺癌和黑素瘤方面就有25年后再度复发的报告。


With a growing number of cancer survivors, we need to understand better the twin processes of tumor dormancy and metastatic cancer recurrence.	随着癌症康复者的数量不断增多，我们需要进一步了解肿瘤休眠和转移性复发这两个过程。


While remarkable progress has been made in understanding the biology of cancer – leading in part to the development of new, less toxic drugs – our understanding of the biology of tumor metastasis, and especially the development of metastases after a long period of tumor dormancy, has lagged.	虽然我们对癌症生理特征的理解大幅推进——因此在某方面促进了新低毒药物的研制——但对肿瘤转移尤其是长期肿瘤休眠之后的转移则相对较少。


We do know that metastasis is a very inefficient process, with most cancer cells that escape into the blood stream failing to form metastatic tumors in distant organs.	我们都知道转移是一个非常缓慢的过程，因为游离到血液中的大多数癌细胞都无法在其他器官中形成转移瘤。


Recent studies – from both the laboratory and the clinic – suggest that many cancer cells that leave the primary tumor may lodge themselves in new organs and go into a dormant state.	但同时来自来自实验室和临床的最新研究却发现许多游离出原发瘤的癌细胞都能寄居在其他器官中并进入休眠状态。


We also have evidence that says that these dormant cells may resist most current treatments.	同时也有证据证明这些休眠细胞可以抵抗目前大多数治疗方案。


This means that adjuvant cancer therapy, designed to kill presumed micrometastatic disease, may be missing an important fraction of disseminated cancer cells, some of which may eventually wake up.	这意味着那些专门用于杀灭潜在微转移病症的癌症辅助疗法可能会忽略了一部分重要的弥散性癌症细胞，而这些细胞最终会醒来做恶。


Moreover, we are beginning to identify molecular mechanisms that regulate the entry of cancer cells into a dormant state, as well as their re-awakening at later times.	此外，我们正着手识别那些控制癌症细胞进入冬眠状态并随后唤醒这些细胞的分子机制。


Our knowledge of the regulation of tumor dormancy is really in its infancy. But, given the growing numbers of cancer survivors, the need for this knowledge is becoming more pressing.	我们对肿瘤休眠控制的认识还处于非常初级的阶段，但考虑到癌症康复者的数量不断增加，对这一知识的渴求也更加迫切了。


Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that tumor dormancy is a valid target for therapy.	事实上，有证据显示肿瘤休眠是治疗的有效部位。


For example, in some types of breast cancer, patients may be treated for more than a decade with anti-hormone therapies, and these long-term treatments are working – they are successful at preventing some of the cancer recurrences that occur with shorter treatment.	比如对某些类型的乳腺癌来说，患者可能已经接受了超过十几年的抗荷尔蒙治疗，而且这些疗法也取得了成果——成功防止了在某些短期疗法中可能出现的复发状况。


But, while these long-term therapies are relatively safe, they do have side-effects, and the number of cancer recurrences that they prevent is small.	但这些长期疗法虽然相对安全，却同时也存在副作用，而且只成功预防了少量的癌症复发。


The challenge today is thus to understand the processes of tumor dormancy and metastasis better, in order to determine more accurately which patients will benefit from long-term therapy.	因此目前的挑战就是进一步了解肿瘤休眠和扩散的过程，并以此确定哪个病人更适合长期疗法。


We have much to learn, and at this stage don’t even know all of the questions to ask.	我们还有许多东西要学，甚至目前该阶段连该问什么问题不知道。


Would intermittent therapy be as useful as long-term treatment?	比如说：间接给药法是否和长期疗法一样有效？


Are there features of the primary cancer, or of individual patients, that can help us predict who will develop late recurrences and metastatic disease?	某些原发癌或者是单个患者的某些特征是否能帮助我们预测谁将随后复发并出现扩散？


What if late recurrences simply cannot be predicted at diagnosis?	后期复发是否根本无法在诊断中预测出来？


Are there modifiable factors – for example, lifestyle, immune-system status, or environmental conditions – that influence whether or not patients develop late recurrences?	是否有某些可变因素——比如生活方式，免疫系统状况或者环境状况——可以影响患者是否发生后期复发？


The answers to these questions will require research, and research into metastasis and tumor dormancy is difficult.	对这些问题的答案都需要研究，但针对扩散和肿瘤休眠的研究是相当困难的。


It requires patience, development of models, and willingness to undertake long-term studies.	它需要耐心，创设相关模型，以及进行长期研究的决心。


We also need to understand better the prevalence of long-term dormant disease in patients.	我们研究的现象是否具有普遍性？


How common is the phenomenon we are examining? It may be that many cancer patients harbor disseminated tumor cells, and not all of these cells are destined to re-awaken.	可能许多癌症康复者身上都携带有弥散性肿瘤细胞，但只有其中一部分会重新激活。


In some ways, the success of cancer research is fueling pressure to “cure” cancer quickly, steering clinical and laboratory researchers away from the tricky problems of metastasis and long-term tumor dormancy.	在某些方面，癌症研究的成功也给迅速“治愈”癌症施加了压力，导致临床和实验室研究者们更倾向于回避那些棘手的扩散和长期肿瘤休眠问题。


This focus ultimately may be shortsighted, as the increasing number of cancer survivors leads to an increase in late recurrences.	但这种做法最终将可能是短视的，因为癌症康复者的增加也导致了后期复发的增加。


Metastases, not the primary tumor, are responsible for most cancer deaths.	事实上，扩散（而非原发瘤）才是大多数癌症致死的原因。


If we are to continue to improve on cancer survival statistics, we need to learn how to prevent, delay, or thwart the processes that give rise to metastatic disease.	如果我们希望继续提高癌症康复方面的数据，就必须学会如何防止，延迟或阻断导致这些转移性疾病的进程。


The Coming Anti-National Revolution	即将到来的反民族革命


NEW HAVEN – For the past several centuries, the world has experienced a sequence of intellectual revolutions against oppression of one sort or another.	纽黑文—过去几个世纪中，世界经历了一连串各式各样的反压迫知识革命。


These revolutions operate in the minds of humans and are spread – eventually to most of the world – not by war (which tends to involve multiple causes), but by language and communications technology.	这些革命发生在人的思维中，不是通过战争（战争总是有多重根源），而是通过语言和通讯技术传播，最终遍及世界绝大部分地区。


Ultimately, the ideas they advance – unlike the causes of war – become noncontroversial.	最后，这些革命所推动的思想——与战争的根源不同——变得无可争议。


I think the next such revolution, likely sometime in the twenty-first century, will challenge the economic implications of the nation-state.	我认为，下一场这类革命可能会在二十一世纪发生，它将挑战民族国家的经济意义。


It will focus on the injustice that follows from the fact that, entirely by chance, some are born in poor countries and others in rich countries.	这场革命将聚焦于不公，而不公源自一个事实，即一些人完全是因为运气而生在穷国，而另一些人生在富国。


As more people work for multinational firms and meet and get to know more people from other countries, our sense of justice is being affected.	随着越来越多的人在跨国公司工作，能够遇见来自其他国家的人，我对于公平的感觉也在受到影响。


This is hardly unprecedented.	这并不是全新的情况。


In his book 1688: The First Modern Revolution, the historian Steven Pincus argues convincingly that the so-called “Glorious Revolution” is best thought of not in terms of the overthrow of a Catholic king by parliamentarians in England, but as the beginning of a worldwide revolution in justice.	在《1688：第一场现代革命》（1688: The First Modern Revolution）一书中，历史学家史蒂文·平克斯（Steven Pincus）令人信服地指出，看待所谓的“光荣革命”的最佳角度不是英格兰议会派推翻了天主教国王，而是开启了世界公平革命的新时代。


Don’t think battlefields.	不要光盯着战场。


Think, instead, of the coffeehouses with free, shared newspapers that became popular around then – places for complex communications.	相反，要想想当时流行起来的提供免费分享的报纸的咖啡屋——即复杂交流的场所。


Even as it happened, the Glorious Revolution clearly marked the beginning of a worldwide appreciation of the legitimacy of groups that do not share the “ideological unity” demanded by a strong king.	即便如此，光荣革命显然标志着全世界开始尊重不赞同强势君主所要求的的“思想统一”的群体的合法性。


Thomas Paine’s pamphlet Common Sense, a huge bestseller in the Thirteen Colonies when it was published in January 1776, marked another such revolution, which was not identical with the Revolutionary War against Britain that began later that year (and had multiple causes).	1776年1月，托马斯·潘恩（Thomas Paine）出版小书《常识》（Common Sense），成为美国十三个殖民州的头号畅销书。 该书标志着另一场此类革命，它不同于一年多后爆发的独立战争（独立战争有着多重根源）。


The reach of Common Sense is immeasurable, because it wasn’t just sold but was also read aloud at churches and meetings.	《常识》所触及到的层面是无法衡量的，因为它不但被出售，更是在教堂和集会上被大声朗读。


The idea that hereditary monarchs were somehow spiritually superior to the rest of us was decisively rejected.	世袭君主在精神上主宰我们其他人的思想遭到了决定性的拒绝。


Most of the world today, including Britain, agrees.	当今世界，包括英国在内都同意这一点。


The same could be said of the gradual abolition of slavery, which was mostly achieved not by war, but by an emerging popular recognition of its cruelty and injustice.	奴隶制的逐渐废除也是如此，它主要不是靠战争，而是靠日益兴起的对残酷和不公的群众意识。


The 1848 uprisings around Europe were substantially a protest against voting laws that limited voting to only a minority of men: property holders or aristocrats.	此后的1848年欧洲大暴动是对只有少数男性（地主和贵族）才能参与的选举法的示威。


Women’s suffrage followed soon after.	妇女选举权紧随其后。


In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, we have seen civil rights extended to racial and sexual minorities.	在二十世纪和二十一世纪，我们看到民权扩大到种族和性少数群体。


All of the past “justice revolutions” have stemmed from improved communications.	所有这些过去的“公平革命”都源自通讯进步。


Oppression thrives on distance, on not actually meeting or seeing the oppressed.	镇压因距离而兴，因并不实际面对或目睹被镇压者而兴。


The next revolution will not abolish the consequences of place of birth, but the privileges of nationhood will be tempered.	下一场革命不会消除出生地的影响，单民族成分特权将得到遏制。


While the rise in anti-immigrant sentiment around the world today seems to point in the opposite direction, the sense of injustice will be amplified as communications continue to grow.	尽管如今遍及全球的反移民情绪的兴起似乎指向相反的方向，但随着通讯的继续增长，不公平感会放大。


Ultimately, recognition of wrong will wreak big changes.	最后，对错误的认识将带来巨大的变革。


For now, this recognition still faces strong competition from patriotic impulses, rooted in a social contract among nationals who have paid taxes over the years or performed military service to build or defend what they saw as exclusively theirs.	现在，这一认识仍然面临爱国冲动的强大竞争，爱国冲动的根源是国民之间的社会契约。 多年来，国民缴纳税收、参军服役，参与建设或保卫他们视之为专属于他们的东西。


Allowing unlimited immigration would seem to violate this contract.	放任无限量移民涌入似乎与这一期约相悖。


But the most important steps to address birthplace injustice probably will not target immigration.	但解决出生地不公的最重要举措可能不会针对移民。


Instead, they will focus on fostering economic freedom.	相反，它们专注于构建经济自由。


In 1948, Paul A. Samuelson’s “factor-price equalization theorem” lucidly showed that under conditions of unlimited free trade without transportation costs (and with other idealized assumptions), market forces would equalize the prices of all factors of production, including the wage rate for any standardized kind of labor, around the world.	1948年，保罗·萨缪尔逊（Paul A. Samuelson）的“要素价格均衡定理”清楚地表明，在无限制的无运输成本自由贸易（以及其他理想化假设）的条件下，市场力量将让全世界所有生产要素价格趋于一致，包括所有标准化劳动的工资率。


In a perfect world, people don’t have to move to another country to get a higher wage.	在完美世界中，人们不必搬到外国追求更高的工资。


Ultimately, they need only be able to participate in producing output that is sold internationally.	最终，他们只需要能够参与生产在国际市场上销售的产出。


As technology reduces the cost of transportation and communications to near the vanishing point, achieving this equalization is increasingly feasible.	随着技术让运输和通讯成本降低到接近于消失的水平，实现这一价格一致化也变得越来越现实。


But getting there requires removing old barriers and preventing the erection of new ones.	但价格一致化需要消除旧壁垒、防止新壁垒。


Recent free-trade agreements under discussion, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, have suffered setbacks as interest groups attempt to bend them to their own aims.	最近正在谈判中的自由贸易协定——跨太平洋合作伙伴关系 和跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系因为利益集团妄图借此实现自身目的而陷入僵局。


But, ultimately, we need – and probably will get – even better such agreements.	但是，最终我们需要——也有望获得——比它们更好的协定。


To achieve factor-price equalization, people need a stable base for a real lifetime career connected to a country in which they do not physically reside.	要实现要素价格的一致化，人们需要一个稳定的基础，让现实生活职业生涯与他们并不实际居住的国家联系起来。


We also need to protect the losers to foreign trade in our existing nation-states.	我们还需要保护现有民族国家中的对外贸易输家。


Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) traces its roots in the United States back to 1974.	美国贸易调整援助计划（TAA）的根源可以追溯到1974年。


Canada experimented in 1995 with an Earnings Supplement Project.	加拿大在1995年进行了收入补充计划实验。


The European Globalization Adjustment Fund, started in 2006, has a tiny annual budget of €150 million ($168.6 million).	始于2006年的欧洲全球化调整基金年预算只有1. 5亿欧元。


US President Barack Obama has proposed to expand the TAA program.	美国总统奥巴马提出要扩大TAA计划。


But, so far, this has meant little more than experiments or proposals.	但是，到目前为止，这一提议还仍然只是实验或提议。


Ultimately, the next revolution will likely stem from daily interactions on computer monitors with foreigners whom we can see are intelligent, decent people – people who happen, through no choice of their own, to be living in poverty.	最终，下一场革命可能来自日常互动——我们在电脑屏幕上与我们所见的聪慧体面外国人的互动，他们碰巧——而不是出于自身选择——生活在贫困中。


This should lead to better trade agreements, which presuppose the eventual development of orders of magnitude more social insurance to protect people within a country during the transition to a more just global economy.	这应该能带来更好的贸易协定，更好的贸易协定带来社会保险的数量级增长，社会保险在向更公平的全球经济的转型过程中保护一个国家中的人民。


Coming Soon: Capitalism 3.0	即将到来的资本主义3. 0


CAMBRIDGE – Capitalism is in the throes of its most severe crisis in many decades.	    剑桥--资本主义现在处于近百年来最严重的危机之中。


A combination of deep recession, global economic dislocations, and effective nationalization of large swathes of the financial sector in the world’s advanced economies has deeply unsettled the balance between markets and states.	严重的衰退、全球经济脱节以及世界上发达经济体金融部门实质上大量国有化已经深深地破坏了市场和国家之间的平衡。


Where the new balance will be struck is anybody’s guess.	人们都在猜测新的平衡在哪里可以找到。


Those who predict capitalism’s demise have to contend with one important historical fact: capitalism has an almost unlimited capacity to reinvent itself.	    那些预言资本主义灭亡的人必须面对一个重要的历史事实，那就是，资本主义具有几乎无限量的重新塑造自我的能力。


Indeed, its malleability is the reason it has overcome periodic crises over the centuries and outlived critics from Karl Marx on.	的确，资本主义的可塑性是它克服几百年来周期性危机并且挺过了从马克思以来的抨击的原因。


The real question is not whether capitalism can survive – it can – but whether world leaders will demonstrate the leadership needed to take it to its next phase as we emerge from our current predicament.      	资本主义能否存活不是问题，它肯定可以。 真正的问题是，世界各国领导人是否展示出必要的领导力，在我们从当前危机中脱身的时候把资本主义带入下一个阶段。


Capitalism has no equal when it comes to unleashing the collective economic energies of human societies.	    在释放人类社会共同的经济能力上，资本主义无人可比。


That is why all prosperous societies are capitalistic in the broad sense of the term: they are organized around private property and allow markets to play a large role in allocating resources and determining economic rewards.	这就是为何从广义上说所有繁荣的社会都奉行资本主义。 这些社会围绕私有财产而建立，并且允许市场在分配资源、决定经济奖赏上发挥重大作用。


The catch is that neither property rights nor markets can function on their own.	然而前提条件是，财产权利和市场都无法依赖自身运行。


They require other social institutions to support them. 	他们需要其他社会机构予以支持。


So property rights rely on courts and legal enforcement, and markets depend on regulators to rein in abuse and fix market failures.	    所以，产权依赖于法院和执法，市场依赖于监管者来限制滥用并且解决市场崩溃问题。


At the political level, capitalism requires compensation and transfer mechanisms to render its outcomes acceptable.	在政治层面上，资本主义需要报酬和转移机制以便使得其结果可以让人接受。


As the current crisis has demonstrated yet again, capitalism needs stabilizing arrangements such as a lender of last resort and counter-cyclical fiscal policy.	正如当前危机再次证明的一样，资本主义需要稳定性的安排，例如最后靠山的借贷者以及反向周期的财政政策。


In other words, capitalism is not self-creating, self-sustaining, self-regulating, or self-stabilizing.      	换言之，资本主义并非自我创造、自我维系、自我监管或者自我稳定。


The history of capitalism has been a process of learning and re-learning these lessons.  Adam Smith’s idealized market society required little more than a “night-watchman state.”	    资本主义的历史就是一个学习和重新学习这些道理的过程。 亚当斯密理想化的市场社会要求国家仅仅起到守夜人的作用，仅此而已。


All that governments needed to do to ensure the division of labor was to enforce property rights, keep the peace, and collect a few taxes to pay for a limited range of public goods.	政府所要做的全部事情就是确保其分工就是落实产权、维护和平并且征收些许税款用于有限范围的公益。


Through the early part of the twentieth century, capitalism was governed by a narrow vision of the public institutions needed to uphold it.	    二十世纪早期，有限的公共机构管理资本主义加以维系。


In practice, the state’s reach often went beyond this conception (as, say, in the case of Bismarck’s introduction of old-age pensions in Germany in 1889).	在实践上，国家发挥的作用经常超越这一观点(例如，1889年陴斯麦在德国推出了养老金)。


But governments continued to see their economic roles in restricted terms.	但是各国政府继续用限制的眼光来看待其经济作用。


This began to change as societies became more democratic and labor unions and other groups mobilized against capitalism’s perceived abuses.	    这一局面随着社会越发民主、工会以及其他团体越发团结一致反对人们所视的资本主义剥削而开始改变。


Anti-trust policies were spearheaded in the Unites States.	美国试行了反托拉斯政策。


The usefulness of activist monetary and fiscal policies became widely accepted in the aftermath of the Great Depression. 	经济大萧条之后，积极的货币和财政政策作用变得广为接受。


The share of public spending in national income rose rapidly in today’s industrialized countries, from below 10% on average at the end of the nineteenth century to more than 20% just before World War II.	    当今工业化国家中公共开支在国民收入中的比例快速上升，从十九世纪末的平均百分之十不到上升到二次大战前的百分之二十以上。


And, in the wake of WWII, most countries erected elaborate social-welfare states in which the public sector expanded to more than 40% of national income on average. 	二战结束后，大��数国家建立了精密的社会福利。 在这些国家中，公共部门扩大到国民收入的平均百分之四十以上。


This “mixed-economy” model was the crowning achievement of the twentieth century.	    这一“混合经济”模式是二十世纪的杰出成就之一。


The new balance that it established between state and market set the stage for an unprecedented period of social cohesion, stability, and prosperity in the advanced economies that lasted until the mid-1970’s. 	在国家和市场之间建立的新平衡开创了发达国家前所未有的社会凝聚、稳定以及繁荣时期。 这一时期一直持续到七十年代中期。


This model became frayed from the 1980’s on, and now appears to have broken down.	    从八十年代以来，这一模式受到创伤，现在似乎已经崩溃。


The reason can be expressed in one word: globalization. 	可以用一个词来解释其原因，那就是全球化。


The postwar mixed economy was built for and operated at the level of nation-states, and required keeping the international economy at bay.	    战后混合经济是为民族国家建立并且在这一层面上运转的。 这一局面需要阻止国际经济。


The Bretton Woods-GATT regime entailed a “shallow” form of international economic integration that implied controls on international capital flows, which Keynes and his contemporaries had viewed as crucial for domestic economic management.	布雷顿森林体系和关贸总协定体制导致国际经济联合的“影子”形式。 这一形式对国际资本流动施加控制。


Countries were required to undertake only limited trade liberalization, with plenty of exceptions for socially sensitive sectors (agriculture, textiles, services).	凯恩斯及其同时代人将其视为管理国内经济的关键所在。 这要求各国实行仅仅是有限的贸易自由化，而且对社会敏感部门，例如农业、纺织品以及服务做出了大量的例外。


This left them free to build their own versions of national capitalism, as long as they obeyed a few simple international rules.	这样，各国只要遵守几个简单的国际规则就可以自由地建立自身的国家资本主义版本。


The current crisis shows how far we have come from that model.	    当前的危机表明形势发生了多大的变化。


Financial globalization, in particular, played havoc with the old rules.	特别是金融全球化破坏了旧有的规则。


When Chinese-style capitalism met American-style capitalism, with few safety valves in place, it gave rise to an explosive mix.	当中国模式的资本主义遇到美国模式的资本主义的时候，由于没有什么保障体系，就会导致爆炸性的混合。


There were no protective mechanisms to prevent a global liquidity glut from developing, and then, in combination with US regulatory failings, from producing a spectacular housing boom and crash.	没有什么保护性机制来防止全球流动资金过剩。 随后加上美国监管不力，造成庞大的房地产泡沫和崩溃。


Nor were there any international roadblocks to prevent the crisis from spreading from its epicenter.	国际上也没有什么东西可以阻拦危机蔓延。


The lesson is not that capitalism is dead. It is that we need to reinvent it for a new century in which the forces of economic globalization are much more powerful than before.	    人们得出的教训并不是资本主义已经死了，而是我们应该重新塑造适应新世纪的资本主义。


Just as Smith’s minimal capitalism was transformed into Keynes’ mixed economy, we need to contemplate a transition from the national version of the mixed economy to its global counterpart.	在这一新世纪中，经济全球化的力量要远远大于以往。 正如亚当斯密基本资本主义转变成为凯恩斯的混合经济，我们需要考虑各国混合经济转型到全球经济。


This means imagining a better balance between markets and their supporting institutions at the global level .	    这就意味着我们需要构想市场及其支撑机制在全球层面上更好的平衡。


Sometimes, this will require extending institutions outward from nation states and strengthening global governance.	有时，这就要求把各种机制从民族国家中延伸开来并且强化全球管治。


At other times, it will mean preventing markets from expanding beyond the reach of institutions that must remain national.	另外有些时候，这意味着防止市场扩展到机制范围以外，而这些机制又必须限于国家的范围。


The right approach will differ across country groupings and among issue areas.	正确的措施将会因国情以及问题范围不同而各不相同。


Designing the next capitalism will not be easy.	    设计下一代资本主义并非易事。


But we do have history on our side: capitalism’s saving grace is that it is almost infinitely malleable.	但是我们的确可以有历史可以证明，那就是资本主义的可取之处就在于其几乎可以无限可塑。


Coming to Grips with History	正确认识历史


May 9th will be the mother of all celebrations in Moscow.	五月九日将会是莫斯科最重要的庆典。


The victory over Nazi-Germany 60 years ago will be commemorated and the human sacrifices to this end honoured.	这是战胜纳粹德国的60周年纪念日，为此而牺牲生命的人们将被隆重地纪念。


So far, so good.	到目前为止，一切顺利。


But some nations will be missing from the party.	但有几个国家将会缺席聚会。


Two Baltic presidents have decided to stay home, because their hosts are not willing to concede that there is more to the history of WWII’s end than the victory over Hitler.	两位波罗的海国家的总统决定不出席，因为他们的东道主拒绝承认第二次世界大战结束的历史比战胜希特勒有着更多的内容：由于希特勒和斯大林在战争之初达成的交易，他们的民族不得不面对长达半个世纪的占领。


Their peoples had to face half a century of occupation because of a deal struck before the war’s onset by Hitler and Stalin, the so-called Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 that divided Eastern Europe between Nazi-Germany and the Soviet Union.	这个交易就是将东欧在纳粹德国和苏联之间瓜分的所谓1939年《莫洛托夫与里宾特洛甫协议》（Molotov-Rippentrop Pact）。


I have to admire the third Baltic president – Vaira Vike-Freiberga from Latvia – who decided to go to Moscow, honouring what should be honoured, and speaking aloud about what should not be hidden.	而我对第三位波罗的海国家总统—拉脱维亚的瓦伊拉·维凯-弗赖贝加(Vaira Vike-Freiberga)—表示由衷的敬佩。 她决定前往莫斯科，向值得致敬的人致敬，同时也大声指出不应被隐藏的历史。


By doing so she demonstrates the strong position her country has obtained as a member of NATO and the EU, and she will be the one riding the high moral ground.	通过这样的方式，她表明了她的国家作为北约和欧盟成员的强硬立场，同时也使自己处在道义上的强势地位。


It is a pity that the Russian leadership of today has chosen not to condemn the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that damaged the development of the whole Baltic Sea region for so many years – and still is a source of political pollution threatening to poison relations between neighbors around the Baltic Sea.	遗憾的是当今的俄罗斯领导人选择不对多年以来对整个波罗的海地区的发展造成破坏的《莫洛托夫与里宾特洛甫协议》加以谴责。 而该协议至今仍是严重威胁俄罗斯及其波罗的海邻国之间关系的政治污染源。


I find it difficult to accept those who tend to describe the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact as only a measure to build up Soviet national security.	我认为将《莫洛托夫与里宾特洛甫协议》解释为仅仅是建立苏维埃国家安全的一种方式的说法是难以接受的。


In the Baltic Sea Region we have a particularly difficult history to deal with, if we look at the last 90 years.	如果我们回顾过去的90年，波罗的海地区有着一段让我们特别难以应对的历史。


After the end of WWI and the old order – “Die Welt von Gestern” – the Baltic region saw bloody revolutions, terrible civil wars, fascism, communism, genocide, occupations, oppression, terrorism, deportations – you name it, in our part of the world we have indeed had our share of all the horrors of the modern history.	在第一次世界大战和旧秩序-“Die Welt von Gestern”-终结以后，波罗的海地区见证了血腥的革命、恐怖的内战、法西斯主义、共产主义、种族大屠杀、占领、镇压、恐怖主义和流放—不胜枚举。 在这世界的一隅，我们经历了现代社会的所有恐怖。


When the Cold War ended, it seemed clever to say that this was “the end of History.”	当‘冷战’结束时，将其说成是“历史的终结”似乎是聪明的。


But if we believe that – if we put a lid on history and leave it behind us – we run a risk that history will resurrect itself with all its horrors.	但如果我们信以为真—如果我们将历史封藏并遗忘—我们就冒着让历史在恐怖中重演的风险。


Therefore we must come to terms with history, particularly in the Baltic Sea region, where such a reckoning is a fundamental precondition for building mutual confidence and cooperation.	因此我们必须正确认识历史，特别是在波罗的海地区，这种认识是建立互信与合作的根本前提条件。


If you want to open “new chapters” in relations between old adversaries, you cannot simply close “old chapters” by denying or suppressing history.	如果你想在与宿敌的关系中开辟“新的篇章”，你就不能简单地以否定或压制历史的方式合上“旧的篇章”。


Nothing good comes out of doing so – and we have seen enough of that in the past.	这样做不会有任何好处—这样的事情我们在过去已经见得太多了。


For too many years the Baltic Sea was a blind alley on the political map of Europe – divided by the Iron Curtain.	多年以来波罗的海地区就是欧洲政治地图上的一条死胡同—被“铁幕”分割开来。


It was not a “Sea of Peace” – as the communist propaganda tried to describe it – it was a Sea of Threats, a sea of insecurity and lost opportunities.	它不是共产主义的宣传中所称的“和平之海”，而是充满不安定和失落的机会的“威胁之海”。


To my country – Denmark – WWII’s end meant a return to freedom and democracy, and we could use the rest of the 20th century to strengthen our freedom, bolstering it with affluence.	对我的国家丹麦而言，二战的结束意味着自由和民主的回归，并且我们可以用20世纪余下的时间去强化我们的自由，并辅之以富裕。


But to the three Baltic countries the end of WWII led to half a century of occupation and lost opportunities.	但对于这三个波罗的海国家而言，二战的结束却将它们引入了长达半个世纪的占领和机遇的丧失。


We know to day the cause: the secret protocol to the Treaty of Non-aggression between the Soviet Union and Nazi-Germany, signed in 1939 – the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact – defining the spheres of interest of the two dictatorships in eastern Europe which led to the war with Finland, the occupations of the Baltic countries, the assault on and division of Poland, and probably also the occupations of Norway and Denmark.	我们都知道背后的原因：1939年苏联和纳粹德国在《互不侵犯条约》下签订的一个秘密协议- 《莫洛托夫与里宾特洛甫协议》-明确了东欧两个独裁政权彼此的势力范围，导致了与芬兰开战，对波罗的海国家的占领，对波兰的进攻与分割，并很可能也导致了对挪威和丹麦的占领。


In short, this pact with its excrescence had an enormous impact on the history of our region, right up to this day.	简言之，这一协定及其赘生物对我们地区的历史造成了重大影响并一直延续到今天。


That it why it will continue to haunt us, continue to disturb normal relations between the countries in this region with so much unused potential, as long as we do not deal with it in a forthright manner.	这就是为什么它仍然阴魂不散，只要我们不直面它，它就会继续搅扰这一地区充满潜力的国家之间的正常关系。


Debating, recognizing, denouncing – whatever…. anything but suppressing!	可以用辩论、承认、抨击—除了压制以外的任何方式。


You cannot build lasting future relations between countries that have each in their own way suffered so much, without coming to terms with the past.	如果不能正确地认识过去，你就不能在这些历经磨难的国家之间建立起长久的未来关系。


It was not until 1989 that the existence of this protocol was officially admitted, thanks to the Glasnost-policy of Mikhail Gorbachev.	直到1989年，在戈尔巴乔夫的公开化政策之下，这一协议的存在才正式被承认。


But too many people still have difficulties with acknowledging this pact for what it really was.	但有很多人依然在承认这一协议的问题上极为勉强。


Such denial is in no one’s interest.	这样的否认是有百害而无一利的。


Not in the kind of Europe we still have to build – a Europe where big and small countries are assured that they share the same rights and obligations, where minorities feel safe, where basic human rights are accepted as an inextricable part of our political system, and where neighbors are regarded with respect and expectations, not fear and anxiety.	更别说是在我们努力建设的这样一个欧洲—国家不论大小都确保享有同等的权利和义务，少数民族有着安全感，基本人权作为政治体系不可分割的一部分而深入人心，对邻国充满尊重和期许而不是恐惧和焦虑。


But it is no surprise that coming to terms with history can be damnably difficult.	然而在正确认识历史的问题上困难重重也是意料之中。


The Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard put his finger on one of the more fundamental problems: “Life must be lived forwards – but can only be understood backwards”.	丹麦哲学家祈克果（Soren Kierkegaard）指出了更为根本的问题之一：生命必须在前进中延续—但却只能在回顾中明了。


In order to look forward with confidence, you also have to look back – and understand what went wrong.	为了充满信心面对未来，你必须回顾历史—去了解问题的症结所在。


Every leader in Moscow May 9th should remember this.	五月九日莅临莫斯科的每一位领导人都应该记住这一点。


Commercialize the SDR	特别提款权的商业化


BERKELEY – Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of the People’s Bank of China, made a splash prior to the recent G-20 summit by arguing that the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights should replace the dollar as the world’s reserve currency.	伯克利——中国人民银行行长周小川在近期的20国峰会之前的一番言论引发了国际社会的争论。 他说IMF的特别提款权（SDR）应该取代美元，成为国际上外汇储备的币种。


His reflections elicited nothing if not mixed reactions.	各界对此反响不一。


Sympathizers acknowledged the contradictions of a system in which a national unit is used internationally.	支持者认为一个国家的货币作为全球货币系统的流通货币本身就有点矛盾。


Central banks understandably seek more reserves as their economies grow.	当一个国家的经济增长时，该国的中央银行当然会储备更多的外汇。


But if those reserves mainly take the form of dollars, then their rising demand allows the United States to finance its external deficit at an artificially low cost.	如果储备的货币只能是美元的话，美国政府就会人为地降低其价值，以达到减轻美国本国外债的目的。


In turn, this allows unsustainable imbalances to build up, leading to an inevitable crash.	这样的 后果就是导致全球金融系统的动荡，甚至全面崩盘。


Recent events have highlighted this problem – and Governor Zhou thus was right to call for a different system.	近期的事件就是这样一个例子——从这点来说，周行长要求建立另外一个系统的建议是有道理的。


But skeptics question whether the SDR could ever replace the dollar as the world’s leading reserve currency, for the simple reason that the SDR is not a currency.	也许会有人质疑特别提款权能否真正替代美元成为世界的主要货币。


It is a composite accounting unit in which the IMF issues credits to its members.	原因很简单，特别提款权不是一个货币，它是IMF给其成员国发放信贷时的一种组合计算单位。


Those credits can be converted into dollars and other currencies at the Fund, and can be used in official transactions among IMF member countries.	这些信贷可以转换成为美元或其他货币，在IMF成员国之间进行转移。


But they cannot be used in the other transactions in which central banks and governments engage.	但在各国中央银行和政府之间，它并不能进行划转。


They cannot be used to intervene in foreign-exchange markets, or in other transactions with market participants.	同样也不能作为干预外汇市场的手段，或是用于在其他金融市场。


This means that the SDR is not an attractive unit for official reserves.	因此，特别提款权不能作为国家官方的外汇储备单位。


This would not be easy to change.	如果想有改变这种情况，这并不是一件容易的事情。


Despite the trials and tribulations of the American economy, dollar securities remain the dominant form of reserves because of the unparalleled depth and liquidity of US markets.	虽然美国经济面临种种困难，美元以其不可比拟的深度及美国市场良好的流动性一直把持着各国外汇储备的比重。


Central banks can buy and sell dollar securities without moving those markets.	各国中央银行可以随意买卖美国债券，而不会影响本国市场的波动。


There is also the convenience factor: dollars are widely used in a variety of other transactions.	这就是美元的优势。 美元也同样运用于其他金融市场的交易中。


As a result, not even the euro has seriously challenged the dollar as the dominant reserve currency.	连欧元都不能撼动美员在外汇储备中的地位。


Doing so would be even more difficult for the SDR.	更不用说特别提款权了。


But difficult does not mean impossible.	有困难并不说明不可能实现。


If China is serious about elevating the SDR to reserve-currency status, it should take steps to create a liquid market in SDR claims.	如果中国真的想要将特别提款权作为外汇储备货币的话，就应该创造一个特别提款权的流动市场。


It could issue its own SDR-denominated bonds.	例如发行以特别提款权为币种的债券。


Better still, it could encourage other G-20 countries to do likewise.	或更进一步，中国可以鼓励20国峰会的其他国家也这么做。


They would pay a price, since investors in these bonds would initially demand a novelty premium.	当然，这样做是会有成本的，例如最初购买这些债券的投资者会要求一定的费用。


But nothing is free.	天下没有免费的午餐。


That price would be an investment in a more stable international system.	从长期来看，这对金融市场的稳定有好处。


Of course, an earlier attempt was made to create a commercial market in SDR-denominated claims.	当然，以往也有创造特别提款权流动市场的尝试。


Back in the 1970’s, there was some limited issuance of SDR-denominated liabilities by commercial banks and SDR-denominated bonds by corporations.	早在20世纪70年代，就出现过商业银行及公司颁发的有条件的特别提款权为单位的债券。


But these efforts ultimately went nowhere.	但现在已经消失。


The dollar being more liquid, its first-mover advantage proved impossible to surmount.	美元更具有流动性，作为老大的地位不容易被撼动。


Overcoming that advantage now would require someone to act as market-maker for private as well as official transactions and subsidize the market in its start-up phase. The obvious someone is the IMF.	如果要改变这个现状的话，在最初阶段，需要一个官方或是私人机构来启动这个项目，显然，这个角色非IMF莫属。


The Fund could stand ready to buy and sell SDR claims to all comers, private as well as official, at narrow bid/ask spreads competitive with those for dollars.	IMF可以在官方和民间，进行特别提款权的买卖。 缩短和以美元为单位的竞价差距。


The dollar originally acquired international currency status in the 1920’s, when the newly established Federal Reserve started buying and selling dollar acceptances, backstopping the market and enhancing its liquidity.	美元在20世纪20年代获得了世界货币的地位。 当时新成立的美联储开始买卖美元，建立相应的市场并增加其流动性。


If the international community is serious about the SDR as an international currency, it will have to empower the IMF to do likewise.	如果国际社会真的想把美元作为国际货币的话，IMF也应该被赋予相应的权利。


Again, there would be a cost.	当然，这这样做是有一定代价的。


The IMF would be using real resources to subsidize the market until private market-makers saw it as attractive to provide those services at comparable cost.	最初IMF必须对特别提款权市场进行补贴，等到其他私人市场慢慢地看到特别提款权的好处，自然会效仿。


The Fund’s shareholders would have to agree to incur those costs.	IMF的成员国必须愿意支付最初的费用。


But, again, what is this if not an investment in a more stable global monetary system?	但是，如果对国际金融市场的稳定有好处的话，难道不值得一试么？


Transforming the SDR into a true international currency would require surmounting other obstacles.	特别提款权如果要成为一个真正的国际货币的话，还需要克服一些障碍。


The IMF would have to be able to issue additional SDRs in periods of shortage, as when the Fed provided dollar swaps to ensure adequate dollar liquidity in the second half of 2008.	当特别提款权供应不足的时候，IMF要适当地增发，就如同2008年下半年，美联储为了增加市场流动性而增发美元那样。


At the moment, countries holding 85% of IMF voting power must agree before SDRs can be issued, which is no recipe for liquidity.	如果还需要有85%以上的成员国同意，特别提款权才可以发放的话，市场的流动性就不可能增加了。


The IMF’s management would also have to be empowered to decide on SDR issuance, just as the Fed can decide to offer currency swaps.	如同美联储对美元，IMF应该被赋予发放特别提款权的权力。


For the SDR to become a true international currency, in other words, the IMF would have to become more like a global central bank and international lender of last resort.	如果特别提款权要成为真正意义上的国际货币的话，那么IMF就要成为类似一个全球的中央银行和国际借贷的最终提供者。


Before the crisis, such ideas would have been dismissed out of hand.	在此次经济危机之前，以上的提法可能不会被接受。


Even now they won’t materialize overnight.	即使在现在，也不可能马上实现。


But they are the real implications of Governor Zhou’s remarks.	但周行长的讲话的内涵值得引起大家的深思。


Why Are Commodity Prices Falling?	大宗商品价格为何下跌？


CAMBRIDGE – Oil prices have plummeted 40% since June – good news for oil-importing countries, but bad news for Russia, Venezuela, Nigeria, and other oil exporters.	美国剑桥—6月以来，石油价格暴跌40%——这对石油进口国来说是好消息，但对俄罗斯、委内瑞拉、尼日利亚和其他石油出口国来说是坏消息。


Some attribute the price drop to the US shale-energy boom.	一些人将油价下跌归因于美国页岩能源的爆发。


Others cite OPEC’s failure to agree on supply restrictions.	也有人认为这是因为欧佩克没有就削减供给达成一致。


But that is not the whole story.	但这不是故事的全部。


The price of iron ore is down, too.	铁矿石价格也在下跌。


So are gold, silver, and platinum prices.	金、银和铂价格也是如此。


And the same is true of sugar, cotton, and soybean prices.	糖、棉花和大豆价格也在下跌。


In fact, most dollar commodity prices have fallen since the first half of the year.	事实上，大部分大宗商品的美元价格今年上半年都下降了。


Though a host of sector-specific factors affect the price of each commodity, the fact that the downswing is so broad – as is often the case with big price swings – suggests that macroeconomic factors are at work.	尽管一些具体的部门因素影响着每种商品的价格，但价格下跌是如此广泛——剧烈波动时往往会发生这种情况——这一事实表明有宏观经济因素在起作用。


So, what macroeconomic factors could be driving down commodity prices?	那么，是什么宏观经济因素促使大宗商品价格下跌？


Perhaps it is deflation.	也许是通缩。


But, though inflation is very low, and even negative in a few countries, something more must be going on, because commodity prices are falling relative to the overall price level.	但是，尽管通胀很低，甚至有的国家出现了负数，但这绝不是唯一原因，因为商品价格相对于总体价格水平也在下跌。


In other words, real commodity prices are falling.	换句话说，大宗商品的真实价格在下跌。


The most common explanation is the global economic slowdown, which has diminished demand for energy, minerals, and agricultural products.	最普遍的解释是全球经济减速导致对能源、矿产和农产品需求下降。


Indeed, growth has slowed and GDP forecasts have been revised downward since mid-year in most countries.	事实上，自年中以来，大部分国家的增长都出现了减速，GDP预测也纷纷做出了向下修正。


But the United States is a major exception.	但美国是个显著的例外。


The American expansion seems increasingly well established, with estimated annual growth exceeding 4% over the last two quarters.	美国的扩张似乎正在日益坐实，预计今年后两季度年增长率将超过4%。


And yet it is particularly in the US that commodity prices have been falling.	但美国的大宗商品价格下跌情况尤其严重。


The Economist’s euro-denominated Commodity Price Index, for example, has actually risen over the last year; it is only the Index in terms of dollars – which is what gets all of the attention – that is down.	比如，《经济学人》（The Economist）的欧元大宗商品价格指数在去年实际上还有所上涨，下跌的只是该指数的美元值，而受到所有关注的正是这个美元指标。


That brings us to monetary policy, the importance of which as a determinant of commodity prices is often forgotten.	这就提醒我们关注货币政策，货币政策作为大宗商品价格的决定因素的重要性常常被忘却。


Monetary tightening is widely anticipated in the US, with the Federal Reserve having ended quantitative easing in October and likely to raise short-term interest rates sometime in the coming year.	在美国，人们普遍预期货币将会紧缩，美联储已经在10月结束了量化宽松，并有可能在来年提高短期利率。


This recalls a familiar historical pattern.	这让人想起了似曾相识的历史模式。


Falling real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates in the 1970s, 2002-2004, and 2007-2008 were accompanied by rising real commodity prices; sharp increases in US real interest rates in the 1980s sent dollar commodity prices tumbling.	20世纪70年代、2002—2004年以及2007—2008年，真实（经通胀调整的）利率的下降伴随着真实大宗商品价格的上升； 20世纪80年代美国真实利率的急剧上升导致大宗商品美元价格暴跌。


There is something intuitive about the idea that when the Fed “prints money,” the money flows into commodities, among other places, and so bids their prices up – and thus that prices fall when interest rates rise.	直觉似乎告诉我们，当美联储“印钱”时，资金流入大宗商品和其他领域，推高它们的价格——因此，当利率升高时，价格就下跌。


But, what, exactly, is the causal mechanism?	但是，其中的因果关系到底在哪里？


In fact, there are four channels through which the real interest rate affects real commodity prices (aside from whatever effect it has via the level of economic activity).	事实上，真实利率影响大宗商品价格有四个渠道（除了它对经济活动水平的任何影响之外）。


First, high interest rates reduce the price of storable commodities by increasing the incentive for extraction today rather than tomorrow, thereby boosting the pace at which oil is pumped, gold is mined, or forests are logged.	首先，高利率增加了在今天而不是未来开发可储存商品的激励，从而 压低了它们的价格，加速了石油开采、黄金勘探和森林采伐的速度。


Second, high rates also decrease firms’ desire to carry inventories (think of oil held in tanks).	其次，高利率还抑制了企业保留存货的意愿（想想保存在油罐中的石油）。


Third, portfolio managers respond to a rise in interest rates by shifting out of commodity contracts (which are now an “asset class”) and into treasury bills.	第三，投资组合经理对利率升高的反应是了结大宗商品合约（如今它们属于一个“资产类”），买入国债。


Finally, high interest rates strengthen the domestic currency, thereby reducing the price of internationally traded commodities in domestic terms (even if the price has not fallen in foreign-currency terms).	最后。 高利率促使本币升值，从而降低了在国际市场上交易的大宗商品的本国价格（即使外币价格并未下跌）。


US interest rates did not really rise in 2014, so most of these mechanisms are not yet directly at work.	美国没有在2014年提高利率，因此这些机制大部分还没有直接起作用。


But speculators are thinking ahead and shifting out of commodities today in anticipation of future higher interest rates in 2015; the result has been to bring next year’s price decrease forward to today.	但预计2015年会出现升息的投机者正在抢先一步了结大宗商品头寸； 结果是让明年才应该出现的价格上涨提前到今天。


The fourth of the channels, the exchange rate, has already been functioning.	第四个渠道，即汇率，已经开始起作用。


The prospect of US monetary tightening coincides with moves by the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan toward enhanced monetary stimulus.	在美国货币预计将紧缩的同时，欧洲央行和日本央行正在加强货币刺激。


The result has been an appreciation of the dollar against the euro and the yen.	结果是美元相对欧元和日元升值。


The euro is down 8% against the dollar since the first half of the year and the yen is down 14%.	今年上半年以来，欧元对美元贬值了8%，日元对美元贬值了14%。


That explains how so many commodity prices can be down in terms of dollars and up in terms of other currencies.	这就解释了为何如此多的大宗商品的美元价格出现了下跌，而其他货币价格出现了上涨。


The Commodity Roller Coaster	翻飞的商品云霄飞车


CAMBRIDGE – The global commodity super-cycle is hardly a new phenomenon.	发自剑桥—— 全球大宗商品的超级周期并不是一个新现象。


Though the details vary, primary commodity exporters tend to act out the same story, and economic outcomes tend to follow recognizable patterns.	虽然细节各不相同，主要的大宗商品出口国都倾向于按照同样的剧本行事，而经济表现也往往遵循已知的模式。


But the element of predictability in the path of the commodity-price cycle, like that in the course of a roller coaster, does not make its twists and turns any easier to stomach.	但在商品价格周期路径中的可预见性元素，就像坐云霄飞车的过程一样，上下翻飞急转急停，让人吃不消。


Since the late eighteenth century, there have been seven or eight booms in non-oil commodity prices, relative to the price of manufactured goods. (The exact number depends on how peaks and troughs are defined.)	自十八世纪末以来，非石油商品相对于制成品的价格曾先后出现过七到八次的上涨（确切的数目取决于波峰和波谷的定义。


The booms typically lasted 7-8 years, though the one that began in 1933 spanned almost two decades.	）这类上涨一般持续7~8年，但始于1933年的那次延续了近二十年。


That exception was sustained first by World War II and then by the post-war reconstruction of Europe and Japan, as well as rapid economic growth in the United States.	这一例外是首先是得益于二战后欧洲和日本的重建以及美国经济的快速增长。


The most recent boom, which began in 2004 and ended in 2011, better fits the norm.	而最近这场始于2004年终于2011年的上涨则更符合常规。


Commodity-price busts – with peak-to-trough declines of more than 30% – have a similar duration, lasting about seven years, on average.	商品价格下跌——从波峰到波谷下跌超过30%——也会延续差不多长的时间，平均约七年。


The current bust is now in its fourth year, with non-oil commodity prices (relative to the export prices of manufactures) having so far fallen about 25%.	目前的下跌目前已进入第四个年头，非石油商品价格（相对于制成品出口价格）迄今已下跌了约25％。


Commodity-price booms are usually associated with rising incomes, stronger fiscal positions, appreciating currencies, declining borrowing costs, and capital inflows.	大宗商品价格上涨通常与收入增加，更佳的财政状况，货币升值，借贷成本下降以及资本流入有关。


During downturns, these trends are reversed.	而在经济低迷时期，这些趋势是相反的。


Indeed, since the current slump began four years ago, economic activity for many commodity exporters has slowed markedly; their currencies have slid, after nearly a decade of relative stability; interest-rate spreads have widened; and capital inflows have dried up.	事实上，由于目前的低迷已经持续了四年，许多商品出口国经济活动显着放缓； 他们的货币币值在近十年的相对稳定后都有所下跌，利率利差扩大；


Just how painful the downturn turns out to be depends largely on how governments and individuals behave during the bonanza.	低迷的痛苦程度在很大程度上取决于在上涨过程中政府和个人的所作所为。


If they perceive improvements in their terms of trade as permanent – a view that gains traction as prices climb – increases in consumption and investment tend to outpace income gains, and public and private leverage grows.	如果他们认为自身贸易状况的改善会是长期的——这一观点在价格攀升时往往成为主流——消费和投资的增加往往会超出收入增长，同时公共和私人杠杆率都会提升。


The risk is that when the roller coaster careens downward, a debt crisis will derail markets.	风险在于一旦云霄飞车调头向下，债务危机就将荼毒市场。


And, indeed, during commodity-price downturns, banking, currency, and sovereign-debt crises tend to proliferate – and crisis-avoidance becomes a hot topic for policymakers, as highlighted in the International Monetary Fund’s most recent World Economic Outlook.	而事实上，在商品价格低迷时期，银行，货币和主权债务危机很可能猛增——而如何躲避危机将成为政策制定者的热门话题，正如国际货币基金组织最新发布的《世界经济展望》中指出的那样。


It is no accident that the last commodity-price collapse, which ran from the late 1970s until 1992, coincided with more than a decade of sovereign-debt crises in the developing world.	但这并非偶然，在从1970年代末一直延续到1992年的大宗商品价格暴跌过程就伴随着一众发展中国家超过10年的主权债务危机。


Of course, that was no ordinary downturn.	当然，这不是一场普通的下跌。


On the contrary, it was the most severe commodity-price collapse to date, resulting in a 40% peak-to-trough decline.	相反，它是迄今为止最严重的商品价格暴跌，从顶到底跌了40%。


More atypical, it involved three waves of price declines, divided by 1-2 year respites.	更反常的是，它包含了三波价格下跌，波与波之间间隔1~2年。


The first wave was connected with the US Federal Reserve’s efforts to bring inflation under control in the fall of 1979, which caused international interest rates to spike, triggering a deep recession in the US and elsewhere.	第一波与1979年秋季美国联邦储备委员尝试控制通胀的努力有关，导致国际利率飙升，在美国和其他地区引发了严重经济衰退。


The second wave, which began in 1985, reflected a supply glut, as many commodity exporters simultaneously sought to raise hard currency, often in the midst of economic crisis.	第二波始于1985年，当时出现了供应过剩，因为在经济危机之其间许多大宗商品出口国都想方设法去赚些硬通货。


The third wave, from 1989 to 1992, was fueled by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which caused output there to collapse.	第三浪从1989年到1992年，当时苏联解体导致该区域经济产出暴跌。


The question now is whether the current crash will follow a similar trajectory, with the recent break soon giving way to another drop.	如今的问题是当前的大跌是否会遵循类似的轨迹，因为近期的喘息很快又让位于另一次下跌。


The answer lies primarily (but not exclusively) with China.	而答案则主要取决于（但不限于）与中国。


If China’s economic slowdown persists – as those following investment booms and fueled by debt overhangs often do –the commodity downturn is likely to continue, as no other economy is capable of picking up the demand slack.	如果中国经济增速继续放缓——正如那些由债务支撑的投资繁荣所经常导致的那样——商品经济衰退很可能会持续下去，因为没有其他的经济体能够补足这一需求缺口。


The US economic expansion is likely to slow soon, as the Fed raises interest rates.	随着美联储提高利率，美国的经济扩张可能很快放缓。


And Europe’s relatively recent recovery will probably be moderate and tilted toward domestic services.	同时欧洲相对近期的复苏将可能不甚强劲且向国内服务倾斜。


Furthermore, at this stage of the commodity cycle, price declines typically retain downward momentum.	此外，大宗商品周期的现阶段，价格下降通常会保持下行势头。


By the end of the boom, many commodity exporters had already initiated investment projects to expand production.	在上涨周期的末期许多大宗商品出口国往往已经启动投资项目来扩大产能。


As these investments bear fruit, the increased supply will sustain downward pressure on prices.	随着这些工程陆续投产，供应量的增加将继续保持对价格的下行压力。


And many emerging-economy governments’ understandable aversion to running substantial and persistent current-account deficits will lead them to counter weaker export prices by increasing export volume, even if that drives down prices further.	同时许多新兴经济体的政府都不愿意维持大量和持续的经常账户赤字（这可以理解），将导致他们通过增加出口量来应对疲软的出口价格，即便这将进一步压低价格。


This commodity-price roller-coaster ride is probably not over yet.	这段商品价格的云霄飞车旅程可能还没有结束。


While we cannot know for sure what will happen, it would be prudent to brace ourselves for another drop – and do what we can to avoid a crash.	虽然我们无法确切知道会发生什么，但审慎的做法莫过于打起精神迎接另一次下坠——同时竭尽所能，避免车毁人亡。


Getting to Normal	回归正常


BRUSSELS – A financial crisis erupts when a large volume of assets in the financial system suddenly appears to be risky and investors want to get rid of their holdings.	布鲁塞尔—当金融系统内的大量资产突然变得极具风险、投资者希望卖光手里的持有量时，金融危机就爆发了。


These assets become “toxic” – not simply risky, but carrying a risk that cannot be quantified.	这些资产变成了“有毒”资产，不仅高风险，而且是不可量化的高风险。


Toxic assets are not traded according to a normal risk-return calculus.	有毒资产不能根据常规风险-回报计算交易。


Given that their risk cannot be calculated, their owners just want to sell them – sometimes at any price.	由于其风险无法计算，其所有者希望卖掉它们——不管什么价格，能卖就行。


In 2007-2008, this was the case for a class of securities based on residential mortgages in the United States (RMBS, or residential mortgage-backed securities).	2007—2008年，美国住宅按揭抵押证券（RMBS）就出现了这种情形。


During the boom phase, these securities were sold as risk-free, on the assumption that US house prices could not decline, as this had never happened before in peacetime.	在繁荣阶段，这些证券被认为是无风险的，人们假设美国房价永不会下跌，因为和平时代还没有发生过这种状况。


But this assumption was shattered when a broad-based decline in real-estate prices began in 2007 and loss rates on mortgages suddenly increased.	但2007年，房地产价格开始全面下跌，按揭损失率激增，这一假设也随之破产。


As a result, RMBS were found to be much riskier than anticipated.	结果，人们发现RMBS的风险比预计的高得多。


Initially, there was little basis for re-pricing them rationally, because the event (a peacetime decline in US house prices) was unprecedented.	一开始，人们找不到以什么为基础来对它们进行理性的重新估价，因为所发生的事件（美国房价在和平时期下跌）是前所未有的。


Moreover, banks and other financial institutions, which held large volumes of RMBS, were ill-equipped to measure the risk, and in some cases would have been bankrupted had they been forced to sell their holdings at the fire-sale prices prevailing at the height of the crisis.	此外，大量持有RMBS的银行和其他金融机构的风险测量手段有问题，在危机爆发高峰期，如果被迫以跳楼价甩卖手上的RMBS存货，可能导致它们破产。


The euro crisis followed a similar pattern.	欧元危机的模式也是一样的。


Until recently, public debt was considered the ultimate safe asset.	直到最近，公共债务才不再被认为是终极安全资产。


Indeed, its risk-free status was embedded in the European Union regulatory framework, which allows banks to hold large volumes of any eurozone country’s public debt without having to put aside any capital to cover potential losses.	事实上，其无风险的地位被写入了欧盟监管框架，银行可以持有大量任意欧元国的公债，而不需要拔备任何资本覆盖潜在损失。


As with RMBS, this view that public debt was totally safe was underpinned by the “fact” that no advanced country, at least in the post-1945 era, had ever defaulted.	与RMBS一样，公债是完全安全的这一观念也有“事实”支撑——没有哪个发达国家曾经违约过，至少1945年之后是如此。


Investors thus assumed that they did not need to assess the credit risk of eurozone countries’ (national) public debt.	因此，投资者假定他们根本不需要去评估欧元区国家的（国家）公债信用风险。


The de facto default by Greece early this year ended investors’ complacency.	今年初希腊的事实违约打破了投资者的这一幻觉。


The government bonds of peripheral eurozone countries thus became toxic.	欧元区外围国国债也因此变为有毒资产。


Given the unprecedented nature of the Greek default, the market valuation of peripheral debt has been fluctuating widely, still searching for “fundamentals,” such as deficit or debt levels, that could explain the evolution of risk premia over time.	希腊违约的性质是前所未见的，受此影响，市场对外围国债务的估值开始大幅波动，直到现在还在寻找能够解释风险溢价随时间变化演进的“基本面”，如赤字和债务水平等等。


Moreover, many banks had so much public debt on their balance sheets that they would have been bankrupted in the event of a full-blown default.	此外，大量银行在资产负债表上持有了太多公债，如果发生全面违约，它们将会破产。


This led to extreme instability in the eurozone’s banking system.	这导致了欧元区银行系统的大动荡。


A financial crisis ends when the doubtful debt either has been socialized, or its valuation has stabilized, and it has migrated to investors who are solvent enough to bear the risk.	当可以债务要么被社会化，要么估值得到稳定并转移到了有能力充分承担风险的投资者手中时，金融危机就结束了。


This was the case in the US.	美国便是如此。


The authorities acquired some of the “toxic” assets, which over time became easier to value, as a few years of data on mortgage delinquency rates allowed investors to find ways to measure the risk.	当局收购了一些“有毒”资产，随着时间的推移，这些资产逐渐变得容易估值，因为几年来的按揭违约率数据让投资者得以找到了测量风险的方法。


The market prices of most RMBS rebounded as losses due to homeowners simply abandoning their properties were much lower than had been feared at the height of the crisis.	大部分RMBS的市场价格出现了反弹，因为业主放弃物业所造成的损失远比危机高峰期人们担忧的要小。


Moreover, holdings of RMBS migrated to institutions that were able to support and manage the remaining risk.	此外，RMBS持有者变成了有能力支持和管理剩余风险的机构。


Today, RMBS are no longer considered toxic, allowing the market to function normally again.	如今，RMBS不再被认为是有毒的，因此市场也再次回归了正常运转。


In the end, the US authorities even made a small profit on the assets that they had acquired at the height of the crisis.	最终，美国当局还因为在危机高峰期的收购行为略有盈利。


This pattern can be only partly repeated in the eurozone, where both debt socialization and a return to normal risk assessment appear more difficult.	这一模式在欧洲只能部分被复制，因为在欧洲，债务社会化和正常风险评估的回归都要更加困难。


Limited capacity for debt socialization reflects the EU Treaty’s no-bailout clause, which bars outright mutualization at the eurozone level of (national) public debt.	债务社会化能力有限反映了欧盟条约的不援助条款，该条款禁止对（国家）公债施以欧元区层面的直接共同化。


Moreover, the lending capacity of the new rescue fund, the European Stability Mechanism, is capped at €700 billion ($905.6 billion), which represents only a fraction of the total public debt of the countries potentially needing financial assistance.	此外，新的援助基金欧洲稳定性机制的贷款能力也被限制在7000亿欧元，只相当于可能需要财政援助国家总公债水平的几分之一。


Only the European Central Bank could implement true socialization of national debt in the eurozone.	只有欧洲央行可以实施欧元区国家债务的社会化。


But EU law expressly forbids any form of ECB financing of deficits.	���欧盟法律明文规定禁止任何形式的欧洲央行赤字融资。


A return to normal risk assessment is also more difficult in Europe.	回归正常风险评估在欧洲也更加困难。


The European Council has solemnly declared that Greece’s de facto default (orchestrated through so-called “private-sector involvement”) remains an exceptional and unique case.	欧洲委员会庄严宣布，希腊的事实违约（用所谓的“私人部门加入”来巧妙安排）仍属特例，且仅此一例。


But the promise of a return to the status quo ante of risk-free public debt is not compatible with the continuing limits on the socialization of national debt.	但让公债回到无风险的原状的承诺与不断地对国家债务社会化加以限制的做法是不相容的。


Indeed, the risk has become more concentrated as banks in the periphery have increased their investment in their own countries’ bonds.	事实上，随着外围国银行增加了对母国债券的投资，风险变得更加集中了。


A sovereign default in Europe will never be a mere value to be plugged into some statistical risk model.	欧洲发生主权违约绝不仅仅是在统计风险模型中加上几个值那样简单。


These differences imply that the return to normal market conditions will be slower in the case of the euro crisis.	这些区别意味着，欧元区危机需要更长时间才能回归正常市场条件。


Nevertheless, the crisis should abate somewhat, because the most risk-averse institutions have by now sold their holdings of peripheral countries’ sovereign debt.	尽管如此，这场危机已经有所减轻，因为大部分风险厌恶机构现在已经卖光了手里持有的外围国家主权债务。


Moreover, the ECB has clearly stated that it will not allow the euro to disintegrate.	此外，欧洲央行明确表示它不会允许欧元解体。


That guarantee has insured investors against their biggest risk.	这一保证为投资者的最大风险提供了担保。


Egypt’s Economic Siren	埃及的经济警报


NEWPORT BEACH – Facing a turbulent political situation and recurrent street protests, Egypt’s political elite would be well advised to focus on the economic implications of the current turmoil, whether they are in government or in opposition.	发自纽波特滩——面对政治局面动荡和街头抗议频发，埃及的政治精英们（不管是执政还是在野党）的稳妥做法应是关注当前动荡的经济含义。


Doing so would lead them to recognize seven compelling reasons why a more collaborative approach to solving Egypt’s problems is in the country’s collective interest, as well as in their own individual interests.	这么做会让他们明白为什么采用一个更具协作性的方法来解决国内的问题能更符合整个国家的集体利益，同时也符合他们自身的个体利益，对此令人信服的理由有以下七条：


First, if the social and political disorder persists, Egypt’s economy will end up with crippling inflation, severe balance-of-payments problems, and a budgetary crisis.	首先，如果社会动荡与政治骚乱持续，埃及经济将会以严重的通货膨胀、国际收支问题和预算危机告终。


The risk of a vicious, self-reinforcing downward spiral would rise sharply.	而催生一个自我强化的恶性堕落循环的风险将急剧上升。


But, rather than collapse (in the style of Asian and Latin American economies during the debt crises of old), Egypt’s economy would risk a return to stifling controls and black markets.	然而，与其说埃及经济会崩溃（上次债务危机期间亚洲和拉丁美洲国家就是如此），它更可能会冒险回到令人窒息的管制和黑市交易。


Economic efficiency, investment, and employment would take a significant hit, while slower growth would be accompanied by higher prices, including for basic food items.	经济效率、投资和就业将会受到严重冲击，然而伴随更缓慢增长的则是更高的商品——包括基本口粮——的价格。


Most segments of society would be harmed, with the poor, the unemployed, and the young suffering disproportionately.	大部分社会阶层都会受到损害，而穷人、失业者和年轻人受到的伤害尤甚。


With that, the legitimate objectives of the revolution that began on January 25, 2011 – inclusive growth, social justice, and human dignity – would prove even more elusive.	鉴于这样的现实，始于2011年1月25日改革的合法性目标——包容性增长、社会公正和人性尊严——将更加难以实现。


Second, no durable economic and financial solutions are possible without cooperatively addressing the country’s political quagmire.	其二，如果不合作解决本国的政治困境，就不可能出现持久的经济和金融解决方案。


No matter how well intentioned and gifted, technocrats cannot ensure proper policies and deliver optimal outcomes.	不管用心有多良苦，技术官僚都不能保证能实施恰当的政策并得到最佳的结果。


They need the backing of a unifying national vision, credible leadership, and citizens’ support.	他们需要统一国家愿景的支撑、可信赖的领导力以及公民的支持。


Third, faced with chronic economic disorder and political instability, Egyptians increasingly lament the “hijacking” of the revolution, fueling mistrust of the country’s governing elites.	第三，面对长期的经济混乱和政治不稳定，埃及人越来越对革命的“操纵现象”感到失望，这加剧了他们对国家统治精英的不信任。


Empowered by their success in ousting former President Hosni Mubarak, and then sending the country’s armed forces back to the barracks, many are readily returning to the streets to hold leaders accountable.	既然曾经成功推翻了前总统胡斯尼·穆巴拉克（Hosni Mubarak）并把国家武装力量送回兵营，很多人都随时准备再次走上街头去让领导人承担罪责。


Fourth, repeated street protests, combined with a weak police force, fuel small pockets of criminal activity.	第四，连番的街头抗议加上薄弱的警力助长了一系列小型犯罪活动。


Opportunistic thugs foment fear and chaos – real and perceived – that far exceed their number and power, amplifying the country’s general sense of malaise.	机会主义暴徒煽动远超过他们人数和力量的恐惧和混乱——无论是真实的还是人们感觉到的，这扩大了该国总体的不安意识。


Fifth, external financial assistance cannot postpone the day of reckoning forever.	第五，外部经济援助并不能永久地推迟算总账的日子。


Emergency support from a few friendly governments has so far limited the erosion of Egypt’s foreign-currency reserves at a time of mediocre tourism earnings and growing imports of food and other basic necessities.	在这个旅游收入一般，需要不断进口食品和其他基本必需品的时期，目前为止一些友好政府给予的紧急支援减缓了埃及外汇储蓄不断缩小态势。


Facing external payments obligations, and with the currency under pressure, the government will again seek a proposed $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund and co-financing from other multilateral and bilateral sources.	在面临外部支付义务且本国货币倍受压的情况下，政府再次向国际货币基金组织寻求48亿美元贷款，并从其他多边及双边来源进行融资。


But securing this financing is becoming more complicated.	但要保证这种融资顺利实现则变得越来越困难。


Sixth, the Egyptian economy’s potential, given the proper political context, should not be underestimated.	第六，如果有适当的政治环境，埃及经济的潜力不可低估。


Current conditions are keeping economic performance well below potential.	目前的环境让经济表现显著低于其潜力。


This could be addressed promptly; while eliminating inefficiencies and re-orienting institutions that were co-opted by the old system to serve the few rather than the many would increase potential output significantly.	这个问题可以迅速得到解决； 那就是消除低效并重新定位那些由旧体系指派的，服务于少数人而不是多数人的机构则可以显著增加潜在产出。


Finally, the country’s political leaders can learn from other countries.	最后，埃及的政治领导人可以向其他国家学习。


Egypt is not the first country to struggle in the critical revolutionary pivot from a repressive past to a better and more just future.	埃及并不是第一个处在从压抑的过去走向更好更公正未来的革命中挣扎的国家。


Nor is it the first country to combine an uncertain political transition with worrisome economic and financial conditions.	它也不是第一个同时具备不确定的政治过渡期和令人担忧的经济金融环境的国家。


It is tempting to dismiss other countries’ experiences, particularly after Egypt’s youth-led grassroots movement delivered something that no one thought possible (toppling in just 18 days a president that had ruled with an iron fist for 30 years).	人们很容易倾向于拒绝其他国家的经验，尤其是在埃及由年轻人发起的草根运动做出了一些没人觉得有可能会发生的事情之后（18天内推翻铁拳统治了30年的总统）。


And some countries do indeed differ from Egypt to such an extent as to make potential lessons misleading.	而有些国家确实与埃及有不同之处，借鉴它们的经验则会令埃及误入歧途。


There is no single transition country that offers a guiding light for Egypt.	没有一个转型国家能给埃及提供参照。


But there may be a group of four countries – South Africa, Brazil, Indonesia, and Turkey – whose combined experience is relevant and would resonate among many segments of the Egyptian population when it comes to orderly economic and political transitions.	但也许有四个国家——南非、巴西、印度尼西亚和土耳其——的经验结合起来与埃及相关，而当涉及到有序政治和经济转型时，它们会在许多方面与埃及许多阶层的人产生共鸣。


Each of the four faced what many deemed overwhelming odds.	这四国都面对过全面的劣势。


Yet, by responding properly to their economic and political challenges, they all delivered poverty reduction, greater social justice, and expanded civil liberties.	然而，通过恰当地对其经济和政治挑战作出回应，它们都能做到减少贫困、促进社会公正并扩大公民自由。


South Africa under President Nelson Mandela illustrated the upside of channeling popular sentiment away from retribution toward national renewal.	总统纳尔逊·曼德拉(Nelson Mandela)领导下的南非显示了引导大众情绪远离复仇走向国家复兴的积极一面。


While no single Egyptian leader can credibly convey Mandela’s message of “forgive but don’t forget,” together – working collaboratively and cooperatively – they can help to shift the country’s focus from the rear-view mirror to the road ahead.	然而没有一个埃及领导可以可靠地传递曼德拉的信息“原谅但不要忘记”，并一起协同合作——他们能有助于把国家的重点从过去转移到眼前的道路上。


Brazil under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva demonstrated how basic reforms can be implemented in the context of turmoil caused by a major domestic political transition, fleeing investors, and an inhospitable global context.	总统路易斯·伊纳西奥·卢拉·达席尔瓦（Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva）领导下的巴西展示了基本改革如何在由重大国内政治转型、投资者撤离以及不友好的全球环境所引起的骚乱下实施的。


In 2004-2008, Brazil, which had been perennially known as the country of the future – as in “always has been and always will be” – recorded 5.5% annual average GDP growth.	2004年至2008年期间，曾长期以未来之国著称的巴西——“一直都是也永远都会是”——其GDP年增长率为5. 5%。


It reduced the proportion of citizens living in poverty from some 40% to under 25%.	它减少了生活在贫困水平的居民比例——从40%减少到25%以下。


And it improved the 100-point Gini coefficient of income inequality by a full five points.	并在收入不平等方面降低了整整5个点的基尼系数（以100分计算）。


Finally, both Indonesia (after the Asian financial crisis of 1997) and Turkey (after its 2001 crisis) are recent examples of Muslim-majority countries that decisively overcame economic mishaps while dealing with major domestic political transitions.	最后，印度尼西亚（在1997年亚洲金融危机之后）和土耳其（在2001年危机后）都是近期穆斯林人口占多数国家的例子，它们在处理重要的国内政治过渡时果断地克服了经济灾难。


The longer Egypt’s current disarray persists, the more its political elites will lose the battle for the hearts and minds of a population whose basic aspirations are summed up by four well-founded demands: bread, dignity, social justice, and democracy.	埃及目前的混乱持续得越久，它的政治精英就越有可能失去民心，这些人民的基本诉求可以总结为：面包、尊严、社会公正和民主。


But, with enlightened leadership and constructive cooperation, Egypt can overcome its current troubles.	然而，只要有开明的领导和建设性的合作，埃及就可以克服当前的问题。


In the past, a growing gap between what the country’s governing elites delivered and the population’s legitimate aspirations would have been addressed by imposing further repression.	在过去，该国统治精英所做的一切与民众合理诉求之间越来越大的差距可以通过实施进一步镇压来解决。


The new Egypt will not allow this.	然而新的埃及不会允许为这种行为。


The empowerment of ordinary Egyptians has fundamentally changed things.	那些赋予普通埃及人的权力已经从根本上改变了一切。


Egypt’s political elites do not have unlimited time, and current economic trends are making the need to act increasingly urgent.	埃及的政治精英并没有无限的时间，而目前的经济趋势使得他们采取行动的需要日渐紧迫。


Completing the G-20’s Agenda	完善20国峰会议程


NEW YORK – The near-complete collapse of financial systems worldwide has exposed fundamental weaknesses in their architecture and in how they are regulated.	纽约 — 几近崩溃的全球金融系统显示出该系统在结构上的缺陷和监管上的问题。


In calling for measures to “guard against systemic risk,” the G-20 summit has begun the process of reconstruction by recognizing that the system in its entirety, not just individual institutions, must be regulated.	如何“防御系统性的缺陷”再度发生，二十国峰会开始重新审视整个系统，并对其整体，而不是单一的机构进行监管。


Unfortunately, the G-20 communiqué offers only more of the same prescriptions for managing systemic risk that the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the United States Federal Reserve, and others have put forward. These proposals have focused on the problems caused by poor transparency, over-leveraging, outsized financial institutions, tax havens, bad incentives for financial bosses, and credit rating agencies’ conflicts of interest.	不幸的是，二十国峰会依然老调重弹，依然遵循着金融稳定论坛（Financial Stability Forum），美联储和其他机构的做法，这些做法包括针对金融机构的不透明性，过度金融杠杆作用，过于庞大的金融机构，逃税天堂和对金融大亨贪婪的报酬奖励，信用评级机构的利益冲突等问题的方案。


All of these are important, but they miss a fundamental point.	以上的问题都很重要，但唯独忽视了一个基本要点。


No one now denies that the past year’s sharp downswings in housing and equity prices, which followed long upswings – far above historical benchmark levels – helped to trigger and fuel the crisis.	没有人会否认在过去的一年房价和股市的跳水，如此快速长期的价格下滑——远远超出了历史上的纪录——更加引发并加重了危机的产生。


As these downswings continue, there is a danger that they, too, may become excessive, dragging the financial system and the economy even deeper into crisis.	现在下滑的趋势还在继续，有着进一步恶化的可能。


Containing systemic risks, therefore, requires not just ensuring transparency and managing leverage in the system, but also recognizing that these risks vary along with asset values.  If institutions that were heavily exposed had understood this, they would have raised their capital buffers during the run-up in housing and equity prices in order to protect themselves against the inevitable reversals.	为了制约系统的风险，不仅仅需要对透明度和杠杆系统的监管，还要意识到风险会随着资产价格的变化而变化。 如果金融机构意识到这一点的话，他们会提取资本准备金，以防止房屋价格和证券价格逆转下跌而带来的风险。


But, as we now know, they did not.	但我们知道，他们并没有这么做。


One reason for this failure is that pillar 1 of the Basel II Agreement, which outlines how banks around the world should assess credit risks and determine the size of capital buffers, makes no explicit allowance for long-swing fluctuations in asset markets.	失败的一个原因是新巴塞尔资本协议（the Basel II Agreement）的主要条款一：规定了银行如何评定信用风险等级，以及如何界定资本提取准备金，这却体现不出长期资本市场的价格变化。


Instead, it relies on value-at-risk (VaR) measures that link risk to standard notions of short-term market volatility.	反之，仅仅依靠风险值的概念来评估短期市场波动的情况。


The problem here is that these measures implicitly assume that risk declines when markets are doing well: they demand less capital during calm periods and more capital during volatile periods.	问题出在这些方法的假设前提是市场表现良好的时候，风险会降低：在平稳的时期对资金的需求量减少，在市场动荡的时期对资金的需求量增加。


In effect, the presumption is that capital losses are random, so the sharp reversals and losses that usually ensue after excessive upswings in prices are disregarded in risk calculations.	实际上，假设的前提是资本的损失是偶然的，市场的巨变发生在价格的剧烈变化之后，而不是由风险计算的方式来决定的。


Indeed, because standard measures of the probability of default fall when the economy is doing well and rise when it is not, capital requirements based on these measures tend to be pro-cyclical.	实际上，当经济表现良好的时候，价值的衡量体系可能会发生作用。


But this increases systemic risk, rather than reducing it.	但市场趋势发生变化时，对资本的需要具有一定的循环性，这样就更加增加了系统的风险性。


The G-20 has now called for revising the Basel II standards so that capital requirements become countercyclical, and Spain’s experience with such requirements suggests that doing so is a step in the right direction.	20国峰会现在要对目前的新巴塞尔资本协议作出修改，使它变得反循环性。 西班牙的经验告诉我们，这样做的效果很是成功。


But such revisions of Basel II are not enough, because bank portfolios – especially those of international banks with large trading books – are vulnerable to the risks stemming from long-swing fluctuations in asset markets.	但如此的改变还远远不够，原因是现在银行的资产——特别是有着巨额的交易跨国银行——对资本市场长期波动性的风险抵抗是脆弱的。


As a result, not only are countercyclical measures needed, but banks’ capital requirements should vary inversely with the boom-and-bust fluctuations in the asset markets to which they are heavily exposed.	因此，我们不仅需要反循环的系统，银行资本金提取也必须随着市场上资产的泡沫和波底进行不断地调整。


Banks’ defenses need to be fortified during excessive upswings in asset prices so that they are able to weather the inevitable reversals.	银行必须建立一定的防卫堡垒，以抵御在市场在转向的时候作出必要的调整。


The connection between financial risk and asset-price swings emerges from the use of a new approach – Imperfect Knowledge Economics (IKE) – to understanding risk and fluctuations in asset markets.	金融风险和市场价格需要一个新的价格体系来评估——不完全知识经济Imperfect Knowledge Economics (IKE)——用来理解风险和资产波动的关系。


This approach implies that more can be done to reduce systemic risk, beyond reforming how risk is measured and capital buffers determined.	此种方法说明了有更多的解决系统风险的方法，以便于风险的识别和资本准备金的确定。


IKE acknowledges that, within a reasonable range, the market does a far better (though not perfect) job in setting prices than regulators can. But it also recognizes that price swings can become excessive, in the sense that participants may bid asset prices far from levels that are consistent with their long-term values.	不完全知识经济 (IKE)认为，在一定的范围内，市场自身的调节比监管机关更加有效，但同样指出，价格的变化会变得有叠加效应，市场的参与者应该在长期来看，远离市场价值。


History teaches that such swings are not sustainable, and that the more excessive they become, the sharper and more costly are the eventual reversals – and the graver the consequences for the financial system and the economy.	历史的经验告诉我们，市场的波动是不稳定的，波动越是剧烈，后期的翻转效应也越是明显——对金融体系和经济的影响也越是明显。


The lesson of this crisis is that excessive swings need to be dampened with a set of prudential measures.	从此次危机中得到的教训是应该采取谨慎的方法，对循环的波动必须加以阻止。


One possible measure is to announce “guidance ranges” for asset prices, with targeted variations of margin and capital requirements, not to eliminate, but to help damp down movements outside these ranges.	一个可行的选项是对资产的价格宣布“指导原则”，目的是区分，而不是消除利润和资本金，帮助调整这些范围。


The key feature of these measures is that they are applied differently depending on whether an asset is over- or undervalued relative to the guidance range.	解决问题的关键是如何对不同的资产制定不同的处理方式。


Their aim is to discourage trading that pushes prices further away from the range and to encourage trading that helps to bring them back.	目的是让价格不要变得十分离谱，让它回到一个理性的轨道上来。


Improving the ability of financial markets to self-correct to sustainable values is the entire point of prudential regulation.	监管的目的是将金融市场回到一个相对理性的领域。


By contrast, wholesale restrictions on short-selling (and other such measures that pay no regard to whether an asset is over- or undervalued) – an option that some have suggested – could actually lead to greater instability.	相反的，一些人认为对卖空行为（其他一些办法例如低估价值）的严格禁止，反而会使得市场越来越不稳定。


Rules that are beneficial in some circumstances may become counterproductive in others.	规则在某些环境下会有效而在另一些环境下会失去作用。


So the idea that what the world needs now is more fixed rules will not do.	所以严格遵循一些规则在目前来看不是一个好的选择。


Unfortunately, contemporary economic theory, with its presumption of perfect price discovery in asset markets, has discouraged economists and policymakers from paying any attention to the role of asset-price swings in managing systemic risk.	不幸的是，目前经济学的理论假设的前提是完美的价格，这让经济学家和政策制定者忽视了资产价格波动在系统中存在的风险。


Today’s global crisis shows that we can no longer afford to ignore this vital factor.	当今已经发生的全球金融危机让我们再也不能忽视这些致命的因素。


Saving Refugees to Save Europe	挽救难民、挽救欧洲


NEW YORK – The refugee crisis in Europe was already pushing the European Union toward disintegration when, on June 23, it helped drive the British to vote to Brexit the EU.	纽约——当6月23日欧洲难民危机推动英国公投脱欧时，它已经开始推动欧盟朝着解体的方向发展。


The refugee crisis and the Brexit calamity that it spawned have reinforced xenophobic, nationalist movements that will seek to win a series of upcoming votes– including national elections in France, the Netherlands, and Germany in 2017, a referendum in Hungary on the EU refugee policy on October 2, and a rerun of the Austrian presidential election on December 4.	由此酿成的难民危机和英国脱欧灾难已经强化了排外的民族主义运动，上述运动将试图赢得一系列即将举行的大选——其中包括2017年法国、荷兰及德国全国选举、10月2日欧盟难民政策匈牙利全民公决以及12月4日再度上演的奥地利总统大选。


Rather than uniting to resist this threat, EU member states have become increasingly unwilling to cooperate with one another.	欧盟成员国不仅没有团结起来抵制这种威胁，反而越来越不愿意相互合作。


They pursue self-serving, beggar-thy-neighbor migration policies – such as building border fences – that further fragment the Union, seriously damage member states, and subvert global human-rights standards.	它们实行自私自利、以邻为壑的移民政策——比如修建边境围栏——进一步加剧联盟碎片化、严重损害成员国利益并颠覆全球人权标准。


The current piecemeal response to the refugee crisis, culminating in the agreement reached earlier this year between the EU and Turkey to stem the flow of refugees from the Eastern Mediterranean, suffers from four fundamental flaws.	目前零零碎碎的难民危机政策在年初欧盟与土耳其签署遏止东地中海难民流入协议时达到高潮，并存在着四大致命缺陷。


First, it is not truly European; the agreement with Turkey was negotiated and imposed on Europe by German Chancellor Angela Merkel.	首先，协议并不能真正代表欧洲； 它由德国总理默克尔出面与土耳其谈判并强加给欧洲各国。


Second, it is severely underfunded.	其次，执法资金严重不足。


Third, it has transformed Greece into a de facto holding pen with inadequate facilities.	第三，它实际将希腊变成了一座临时监狱，而且监狱的设施严重匮乏。


Most important, the response is not voluntary.	最重要的是，上述对策不是自愿的。


The EU is trying to impose quotas that many member states strenuously oppose, forcing refugees to take up residence in countries where they are not welcome and do not want to go, and returning to Turkey others who reached Europe by irregular means.	欧盟正试图强加很多成员国奋力反对的难民配额，迫使难民在他们不愿前往也并不欢迎他们的国家居住，同时将通过非常规手段抵达欧洲的其他人送回土耳其。


This is unfortunate, because the EU cannot survive without a comprehensive asylum and migration policy.	这种局面非常不幸，因为没有全面庇护和移民政策的欧盟就缺乏存在的基础。 当前危机不是一次性事件；


The current crisis is not a one-off event; it augurs a period of higher migration pressures for the foreseeable future, due to a variety of causes.	因为各种各样的原因，它预示着可以预见的未来移民压力很大。 其中包括欧洲人口不足和非洲人口爆炸；


These include demographic shortfalls in Europe and a population explosion in Africa; seemingly eternal political and military conflicts in the broader region; and climate change.	更大区域内看似永恒不变的政治和军事冲突； 以及气候变化。


The agreement with Turkey was problematic from its inception.	与土耳其的协议从一开始就有问题。


The very premise of the deal – that asylum-seekers can legally be returned to Turkey – is fundamentally flawed.	这笔交易的前提——即庇护寻求者可以合法地返回土耳其——从根本上看是有缺陷的。


Turkey is not a “safe third country” for most Syrian asylum-seekers, especially since the failed coup in July.	尤其是在7月爆发未遂政变后，对多数叙利亚庇护寻求者而言土耳其并非是“安全的第三国”。


What would a comprehensive approach look like?	那么全面解决方案又将如何？


Whatever its final form, it would be built on seven pillars.	无论采取何种形式，它都必须以七大支柱为基础。


First, the EU must take in a substantial number of refugees directly from front-line countries in a secure and orderly manner.	首先，欧盟地区必须以安全有序的方式从前线国家直接接收大量难民。


This would be far more acceptable to the public than the current disorder.	这远比当前的混乱状态更能让公众接受。


If the EU made a commitment to admit even a mere 300,000 refugees annually, most genuine asylum-seekers would view their odds of reaching their destination as good enough to deter them from seeking to reach Europe illegally – an effort that would disqualify them from legal admission.	哪怕欧盟承诺每年只接收300,000难民，多数真正的庇护寻求者也会从抵达目的地的概率的角度重新审视自己的行为，从而遏制他们寻求非法进入——因为非法进入者首先已不具备合法的移民资格。


Second, the EU must regain control of its borders.	其次，欧盟必须重新夺回边境控制权。


There is little that alienates and scares publics more than scenes of chaos.	最能让公众疏远和恐慌的莫过于局面的混乱。


Third, the EU needs to find sufficient funds to finance a comprehensive migration policy.	第三，欧盟需要筹措足够资金以资助全面的移民政策。


It is estimated that at least €30 billion per year will be needed for a number of years, and the benefits of “surge funding” (spending a large amount of money up front, rather than the same amount over several years) are enormous.	据估计开始几年每年至少要投入300亿欧元，而且“集中投资”（一开始就投入大量资金，而不是在若干年内投入同样的数额）的收益非常巨大。


Fourth, the EU must build common mechanisms for protecting borders, determining asylum claims, and relocating refugees.	第四，欧盟必须建立保护边境、审核庇护申请及重新安置难民的共同机制。


A single European asylum process would remove the incentives for asylum shopping and rebuild trust among member states.	统一的欧盟庇护程序可以消除庇护投机并在各成员国之间重建信任。


Fifth, a voluntary matching mechanism for relocating refugees is needed.	第五，要建立重新安置难民的自愿匹配机制。


The EU cannot coerce member states to accept refugees they do not want, or refugees to go where they are not wanted.	欧盟不能迫使成员国接收他们不想要的难民，或者难民前往不想去的成员国。


A scheme like the one used by Canada could elicit and match the preferences of both refugees and receiving communities.	加拿大正在执行的移民计划可以引导和匹配难民和接收社区的偏好。


Sixth, the EU must offer far greater support to countries that host refugees, and it must be more generous in its approach to Africa. Instead of using development funds to serve its own needs, the EU should offer a genuine grand bargain focused on the needs of recipient countries.	第六，欧盟必须为难民接收国提供更大的支持，并且对非洲实施更为慷慨的计划���欧盟应提供真正现实的计划满足接收国的需求，而不是单纯利用发展基金满足自己的需要。


This means creating jobs in refugees’ home countries, which would reduce the pressure to migrate to Europe.	这意味着在难民所在国创造工作机会，并以此减轻移民欧洲的压力。


The final pillar is the eventual creation of a welcoming environment for economic migrants.	最终营造出欢迎经济移民的宽松氛围是最后的支柱。


Given Europe’s aging population, the benefits migration brings far outweigh the costs of integrating immigrants.	鉴于欧洲持续老龄化，移民带来的好处远远超过整合移民的成本。


All the evidence supports the conclusion that migrants can contribute significantly to innovation and development if they are given a chance to do so.	所有证据都显示只要给他们相应的机会，移民可以显著促进创新与发展。


Pursuing these seven principles, described in greater deal elsewhere, is essential in order to calm public fears, reduce chaotic flows of asylum-seekers, ensure that newcomers are fully integrated, establish mutually beneficial relations with countries in the Middle East and Africa, and meet Europe’s international humanitarian obligations.	坚持其他地方更大规模协议所述的上述七项项原则对于安抚公众情绪、控制庇护寻求者混乱、确保新移民完全融入、与中东和非洲国家建立互惠关系和履行欧洲国际人道主义义务起着至关重要的作用。


The refugee crisis is not the only crisis Europe has to face, but it is the most pressing.	难民危机并非欧洲面对的唯一危机，但却是最紧迫的。


And if significant progress could be made on the refugee issue, it would make the other issues – from the continuing Greek debt crisis to the fallout from Brexit to the challenge posed by Russia – easier to tackle.	如果难民问题可以取得重大进展，就能够降低其他问题——从持续不断的希腊债务危机到英国脱欧所造成的动荡局势再到俄罗斯所带来的挑战——的解决难度。


All the pieces need to fit together, and the chances of success remain slim.	拼图的所有部分必须完美贴合，并且成功的希望依然渺茫。


But as long as there is a strategy that might succeed, everyone who wants the EU to survive should rally behind it.	但只要存在可能取得成功的战略，希望欧盟存在下去的人们就应当团结执行。


The Future of Computing	计算的未来


ZURICH – Ever since the American computer scientist John McCarthy coined the term “Artificial Intelligence” in 1955, the public has imagined a future of sentient computers and robots that think and act like humans.	苏黎世—1955年，美国计算机科学家约翰·麦卡锡（John McCarthy）创造了“人工智能”一词，自此以后，公众构想出一个有意识的计算机和机器人能像人一样思考和行动的未来。


But while such a future may indeed arrive, it remains, for the moment, a distant prospect.	但尽管这一未来确实可能到来，目前还至相当遥远。


And yet the foreseeable frontier of computing is no less exciting.	但可以预见的计算前沿亦相当令人激动。


We have entered what we at IBM call the Cognitive Era.	我们已经进入了IBM所谓的认知时代。


Breakthroughs in computing are enhancing our ability to make sense of large bodies of data, providing guidance in some of the world’s most important decisions, and potentially revolutionizing entire industries.	计算的突破正在增强我们利用大量数据的能力，为某些全世界最重要的决定提供指导，并有望革命整个产业。


The term “cognitive computing” refers to systems that, rather than being explicitly programmed, are built to learn from their experiences.	“认知计算”一词是指这样的系统，它没有明确的程序，而是为了学习经验而打造。


By extracting useful information from unstructured data, these systems accelerate the information age, helping their users with a broad range of tasks, from identifying unique market opportunities to discovering new treatments for diseases to crafting creative solutions for cities, companies, and communities.	这些系统从无结构的数据中提取有用的信息，从而加快了信息时代，帮助用户完成范围甚广的一系列任务，包括识别独特的市场机会、发现疾病新疗法、为城市、公司和社区制定创新解决方案等。


The Cognitive Era marks the next stage in the application of science to understand nature and advance human prosperity.	认知时代标志着应用科学理解大自然和推动人类繁荣的新阶段。


Its beginning dates to early 2011, when the cognitive computing system Watson beat two human champions on the game show “Jeopardy!”.	其滥觞可以追溯到2011年，认知计算机系统沃森在游戏秀《Jeopardy! 》中打败了两位人类冠军。


Since then, Watson has gone on to do much more, demonstrating how cognitive computing can use big data to tackle some of the most difficult systemic issues facing humanity.	此后，沃森又继续取得了大量成就，证明了认知计算可以使用大数据处理某些人类所面临的最困难的系统性问题的。


Broadly, cognitive systems offer five core capabilities.	广泛而言，认知系统提供了五项核心能力。


First, they create deeper human engagement, using data about an individual to create more fully human interactions.	首先，它们创造了更深度的人类参与，使用关于个体的数据创造更加完整的人类互动。


Second, they scale and elevate expertise, learning from experts in various fields and making that know-how available to broad populations.	其次，它们扩大和提升专家知识，从不同领域的专家中学习，让这些知识能为广泛的群众所用。


Third, they provide products, such as those connected to the Internet of Things, with the ability to sense the world around them and to learn about their users.	第三，它们提供产品，比如连接到物联网的产品，这些产品具有感知周边世界、了解它们的用户的能力。


Fourth, they allow their operators to make sense of large amounts of data, helping manage workflows, providing context, and allowing for continuous learning, better forecasting, and improved operational effectiveness.	第四，它们让操作员得以利用大量数据，有助于管理工作流、提供情境、实现持续学习、改善预测、改进经营效率。


And, finally – perhaps most important – they allow their users to perceive patterns and opportunities that would be impossible to discover through traditional means.	最后——也许也是最重要的——它们让用户能够感知传统方法无法发现的模式和机会。


Cognitive systems are inspired by the human brain, an organ that still has much to teach us.	认知系统的灵感来自人的大脑，这个器官仍有许多内容等待我们探索。


With systems growing in size and complexity, traditional computer architecture seems to be reaching its limits, as power consumption soars and the transmission delay between components becomes increasingly burdensome.	随着系统规模和复杂程度的增加，传统计算机架构正在走向极限，因为耗电量的激增和元件之间的传输延时日益成为负担。


Indeed, when it comes to energy efficiency – measured in terms of the number of computations per energy unit on “unstructured” data – the human brain performs roughly 10,000 times better than the best man-made machines.	事实上，就能源效率而言——用“无结构”数据上每能源单位的计算次数衡量——人脑表现要比最佳人造机器还要高出大约10,000倍。


Today, computers consume about 10% of the world’s electricity output, according to Mark Mills, CEO of the Digital Power Group.	如今，据数字力量集团（Digital Power Group）CEO马克·米尔斯（Mark Mills）的数据，计算机消耗了大约世界发电量的10%。


In order to benefit fully from the Cognitive Era, we will have to be able to harness huge amounts of information; during the next 15 years, the amount of “digitally accessible” data is expected to grow by a factor of more than 1,000.	为了充分实现认知时代的好处，我们必须能够处理巨量信息； 在未来15年，“数字上可接触”的数据数量预计将增加1,000多倍。


Performing the calculations necessary for using such a large amount of data will not be possible without huge strides in improving energy efficiency.	只有在能源效率实现巨大的改进，才有可能实现使用如此大量数据所需要的计算量。


Matching the performance and efficiency of the human brain will likely require us to mimic some of its structures.	赶超人脑的表现和效率可能需要我们模仿某些大脑结构。


Rather than attempting to squeeze energy-intensive performance out of ever-larger chips, we can arrange computer components in a dense 3D matrix similar to a human brain, maximizing not performance, but energy efficiency.	我们不必试图从越来越大的芯片中榨取能源密集型性能，可以重新排布计算机元件，组成类似于人脑的密集3D矩阵，从而实现能源效率而不是性能的最大化。


Arranging computer chips in a 3D environment puts the various elements of the computer closer to one another.	在3D环境中部署芯片让计算机的各种要素彼此之间更加接近。


This not only reduces the time they take to communicate; it improves energy efficiency by a factor of as much as 5,000 – potentially providing computers with efficiency close to that of a biological brain.	这不仅缩短了它们的通讯时间； 也改善了能源效率，幅度可达5,000倍——有望产生能源效率接近生物脑的计算机。


Already, a much denser computer built from available mobile technology and hot water cooling allows for ten times higher efficiency than a conventional system.	目前，通过可用移动技术和热水冷却建造的密度大幅提高的计算机已经实现了比传统系统高十倍的能源效率。


But man-made computers are so inefficient not only because they need to power the chips, but also because they need energy to run the air conditioners that remove the heat generated by the processors.	但人造计算机效率低下不仅是因为它们需要为芯片供能，也是因为它们需要能源运行空调从而带走处理器所产生的热量。


The human brain has a lesson to teach here as well.	人脑在这方面也能提供教益。


Just as the brain uses sugar and blood to provide energy and cooling to its various regions, a 3D computer could use coolant fluid to deliver energy to the chips.	正如大脑使用糖分和血液提供能源、冷却各个区域，3D计算机也可以使用冷却液体为芯片输送能量。


In addition to dissipating heat, the fluid could be used to power an electrochemical system providing power to the processors.	除了散热，这种液��还能用于为向处理器提供能量的电化学系统供能。


This, in turn, would allow for further increases in packaging density – and thus efficiency.	这反过来能进一步增加封装密度——从而提高效率。


By adopting some of the characteristics of the human brain, computers have the potential to become far more compact, efficient, and powerful.	通过模仿人脑的某些特点，计算机有望大大增加紧凑性、效率和性能。


And this, in turn, will allow us to take full advantage of cognitive computing – providing our real brains with new sources of support, stimulus, and inspiration.	而这反过来能让我们充分利用认知计算——为我们的真正的大脑提供新的支持、仿真和启发资源。


Confessions of a Financial Deregulator	一个金融自由化主义者的自白


BERKELEY – Back in the late 1990’s, in America at least, two schools of thought pushed for more financial deregulation – that is, for repealing the legal separation of investment banking from commercial banking, relaxing banks’ capital requirements, and encouraging more aggressive creation and use of derivatives.	发自伯克利——回顾1990年代，在美国至少有两派人马鼓吹进一步推进金融自由化——也就是撤销禁止商业银行和投资银行混合经营的法律规定，放松银行资本要求，并鼓励创设高风险金融产品和使用金融衍生品。


If deregulation looks like such a bad idea now, why didn’t it then?	问题是如今人人喊打的金融自由化，当年为何就能招摇过市呢？


The first school of thought, broadly that of the United States’ Republican Party, was that financial regulation was bad because all regulation was bad.	第一大派系由美国共和党主导，基本理念就是既然所有监管行为都是错误的，那么金融监管肯定也不是好东西。


The second, broadly that of the Democratic Party, was somewhat more complicated, and was based on four observations:	另一大派系则由民主党担纲，其理念也更为复杂，主要基于以下四点观察：


·        In the global economy’s industrial core, at least, it had then been more than 60 years since financial disruption had had more than a minor impact on overall levels of production and employment.	·        至少在世界经济的核心地带，各国已经过了超过60年的安稳日子，期间没有任何金融动荡能够对总体层面上的生产和就业造成重大影响。


While modern central banks had difficulty in dealing with inflationary shocks, it had been generations since they had seen a deflationary shock that they could not handle.	虽然现代中央银行在应对通胀冲击方面办法不多，但几十年来在抵抗通缩方面却相当得心应手。


·        The profits of the investment-banking oligarchy (the handful of global investment banks, including Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and JP Morgan Chase, among others) were far in excess of what any competitive market ought to deliver, owing to these banks’ deep pockets and ability to maneuver through thickets of regulations.	·         借助自身雄厚经济实力和钻监管规则的空子，各大投资银行寡头（就是包括高盛，摩根士丹利和摩根大通在内的那几个跨国投资银行）的盈利已经大大超越了任何竞争市场所能给予的盈利水平。


·        The long-run market-return gradient – by which those with deep pockets and the patience to take on real-estate, equity, derivative, and other risks reaped outsize returns – seemed to indicate that financial markets were awful at mobilizing society’s risk-bearing capacity.	·        长期市场回报梯度数据似乎显示金融市场在调动社会风险承担能力方面成效惊人——当然这些数据也是由那些财宏势大且有足够耐心借助地产，股票，金融衍生品和其他风险投资攫取超额回报的企业所取得的。


·        The poorer two-thirds of America’s population appeared to be shut out of the opportunities to borrow at reasonable interest rates and to invest at high returns that the top third – especially the rich – enjoyed.	·        占美国人口1/3的中上层阶级——尤其是富人——能够以合理的利率贷款并投资于高回报领域，而另一外2/3的中低收入者则无此机会。


These four observations suggested that some institutional experimentation was in order.	这四点观察意味着某些制度实验取得了良好效果。


Depression-era restrictions on risk seemed less urgent, given the US Federal Reserve’s proven ability to build firewalls between financial distress and aggregate demand.	鉴于美联储成功隔绝了经济风险对总需求的影响，萧条时代流传下来的风险限制措施也似乎不那么重要了。


New ways to borrow and to spread risk seemed to have little downside.	新的借贷和风险分散手段仿佛没什么缺点。


More competition for investment-banking oligarchs from commercial bankers and insurance companies with deep pockets seemed likely to reduce the investment banking industry’s unconscionable profits.	坐拥巨资的商业银行和保险企业也加入了与投资银行寡头的竞争，估计也会迫使投资银行业降低其不合理利润。


It seemed worth trying. It wasn’t.	这东西看上去确实值得一试，但却种下了苦果。


Analytically, we are still picking through the wreckage of this experiment.	平心而论，我们如今都还在收拾这场实验的残局。


Why were the risk controls at highly-leveraged money-center universal banks so lousy?	那些高杠杆跨国金融核心银行的风险控制为何如此糟糕？


Why weren’t central banks and governments willing and able to step up and maintain the flow of aggregate demand as the financial crisis and its aftermath choked off private investment and consumption spending?	在金融危机及其余波摧毁私人投资和消费支出的时候，各国中央银行和政府为何没能出手增加和维持总需求水平？


More questions arise from the policy response to the subsequent recession. Why, once the magnitude of the downturn became clear, weren’t governments eager to step in to return unemployment to normal levels, especially in the absence of higher inflation expectations, upward pressure on prices, or even interest-rate increases that would crowd out private investment spending?	随后的衰退应对政策则引发了更多的质疑：在经济下行风险逐渐清晰，但高通胀预期，高物价压力，甚至挤压私人投资支出的利率上调尚未出现的时候，政府为何没能介入并将失业率恢复到正常水平？


And how has the financial industry managed to retain so much political power to block regulatory reform?	金融业又何以调动如此庞大的政治力量将监管改革拒之门外？