The fact is that the original objective of central banks was not consumer-price stability; consumer-price indices did not even exist when most of them were founded.	事实上，央行的最初目标并非消费物价稳定； 消费物价指数在大部分央行成立时根本不存在。


Central banks were established to provide war financing to governments.	成立央行是为了给提供战争融资。


Later, their mission was expanded to include the role of lender of last resort.	后来，央行的任务有所扩大，包括了最后贷款人角色。


It was not until the excessive inflation of the 1970s that central banks discovered – or, in a sense, rediscovered – the desirability of keeping the value of money stable.	直到20世纪70年代发生过度通胀，央行才发现——或者，从某种程度上讲，是重新发现——保持货币价值稳定是值得追求的。


But how to measure the value of money?	但如何衡量货币价值？


One approach centers on prices, with the consumer price index appearing to be the most obvious indicator.	一种方法是以价格为中心，而消费物价指数是最显而易见的指标。


The problem is that the relationship between the money supply (which ultimately determines the value of money) and prices is an unstable one.	问题在于货币供给（决定货币价值的最终因素）和物价之间的关系并不稳定。


For starters, the lag time between changes in the money supply and price movements is long, variable, and unpredictable.	首先，货币供给变化和价格运动之间的时滞很长，易变并且不可预测。


Given this, targeting consumer prices in the next 2-3 years will not guarantee that the value of money remains stable in the long term.	因此，锁定未来2—3年的消费物价目标无法保证长期货币价值稳定。


Moreover, different methods of collecting consumer prices yield different results, depending on how housing costs are treated and the hedonic adjustment applied.	此外，不同的消费物价收集方法导致不同的结果，取决于如何处理住房成本和应用享乐调整（hedonic adjustment）。


In short, monetary policy has been shaped by an imprecise, small, and shrinking subset of prices that exhibits long and variable lags vis-à-vis changes in the money supply.	简言之，货币政策由价格的子集决定，这个子集不准确，规模小并且不断缩小，其与货币供给变化之间存在漫长且易变的时滞。


Unfortunately, monetary policymakers’ effort to operationalize the objective of ensuring that the value of money remains stable has taken on a life of its own.	不幸的是，货币决策者将确保货币价值的目标可操作化的措施仍然大行其道。


Today’s economics textbooks assume that a primary objective of central banks is to stabilize consumer prices, rather than the value of money.	今天的经济学教科书假设中央银行的主要目标是稳定消费物价，而不是货币价值。


Furthermore, economists now understand inflation as a rise in consumer prices, not as a decline in the value of money resulting from an excessive increase in the money supply.	此外，今天的经济学家将通胀理解为消费物价的上涨，而非货币价值因为货币供给增加过度而导致的下降。


Making matters worse, central banks routinely deny responsibility for any prices other than consumer prices, ignoring that the value of money is reflected in all prices, including commodities, real estate, stocks, bonds, and, perhaps most important, exchange rates.	更糟糕的是，央行常常否认它们对除消费物价外的任何价格负有责任，完全不顾货币价值反映在所有价格中，包括大宗商品、房地产、股票、债券以及——也许也是最重要的——汇率。


In short, while price stabilization through inflation targeting is a commendable objective, central banks’ narrow focus on consumer prices – within a relatively short time frame, no less – is inadequate to achieve it.	简言之，通过设定通胀目标稳定物价是一个很好的目标，但央行狭隘地关注消费物价——并且只限于相对较短的时间框架——这不足以实现这一目标。


This was highlighted by the surge in many countries’ housing prices in the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis, the steep decline in asset and commodity prices immediately after Lehman Brothers collapsed, the return to asset-price inflation since then, and recent large currency fluctuations.	2008年金融危机前多国房价的飙升、雷曼兄弟公司倒闭后资产和大宗商品价格应声暴跌、此后资产价格通胀的回归，以及最近的剧烈货币波动都是显著的例子。


All are inconsistent with a stable value of money.	所有这些都与货币价值稳定不符。


Central banks’ exclusive focus on consumer prices may even be counterproductive.	央行只关注消费物价甚至可能会拖累生产。


By undermining the efficient allocation of capital and fostering mal-investment, CPI-focused monetary policy is distorting economic structures, blocking growth-enhancing creative destruction, creating moral hazard, and sowing the seeds for future instability in the value of money.	专注CPI的货币政策破坏资本的有效配置、导致投资失当，从而扭曲经济结构、阻碍有利于增长的创新性破坏、制造道德风险，并给未来货币价格动荡埋下祸根。


Within a complex and constantly evolving economy, a simplistic inflation-targeting framework will not stabilize the value of money.	在一个不断演化的复杂经济中，简单的通胀目标框架无法稳定货币价值。


Only an equally complex and highly adaptable monetary-policy approach – one that emphasizes risk management and reliance on policymakers’ judgment, rather than a clear-cut formula – can do that.	唯有同样复杂和高度适应性的货币政策方针——强调风险管理和依赖据侧着的判断而非非黑即白的公式——能够实现这一点。


Such an approach would be less predictable and eliminate forward guidance, thereby discouraging excessive risk-taking and reducing moral hazard.	这一方针更难以预测，也断绝了前瞻指引，从而遏制过度冒险、降低道德风险。


History hints at what a stability-oriented framework could look like.	历史表明了稳定导向的框架应该是什么样子。


In the last quarter of the twentieth century, many central banks used intermediate targets, including monetary aggregates.	在二十世纪的最后二十五年，许多央行采用了包括货币总量在内的中间目标。


Such targets could potentially be applied to credit, interest rates, exchange rates, asset and commodity prices, risk premiums, and/or intermediate-goods prices.	这些目标可以用于信用、利率、汇率、资产和大宗商品价格、风险溢价，以及/或者中间商品物价。


Short-term consumer-price stability does not guarantee economic, financial, or monetary stability.	短期消费物价稳定并不能保证经济、金融或货币稳定。


It is time for central banks to accept this fact and adopt a comprehensive, long-term monetary-policy approach – even if it means that, in the short term, consumer-price inflation deviates from what is currently understood as “price stability.”	央行应该接受这一事实，采取全面、长期的货币政策方针——即使这意味着短期消费物价通胀偏离目前所认为的“物价稳定”。


Temporary fluctuations in a narrow and imprecisely measured CPI are a small price to pay to secure the long-term stability of money.	和确保长期物价稳定比起来，暂时性的窄幅波动和CPI测量不准的代价微不足道。


Rethinking Sovereignty	关于主权的重新思考


For 350 years, sovereignty – the notion that states are the central actors on the world stage and that governments are essentially free to do what they want within their own territory but not within the territory of other states – has provided the organizing principle of international relations.	350年来，主权¾也就是国家是世界舞台上的核心演员，政府可以自由地在本国境内为所欲为，而在其它国家的领土上则没有随意行事的权力¾构成了国际关系的组织原则。


The time has come to rethink this notion.	而现在到了重新思考这一观点正确与否的时候了。


The world’s 190-plus states now co-exist with a larger number of powerful non-sovereign and at least partly (and often largely) independent actors, ranging from corporations to non-government organizations (NGO’s), from terrorist groups to drug cartels, from regional and global institutions to banks and private equity funds.	目前，全世界共有国家190多个，它们与很多强大的非主权组织、或者至少是一定程度（常常是很大程度）上的独立机构和平共处，这些机构从企业到非政府组织（NGO）、从恐怖团体到毒品联盟、从地区和全球机构到银行和私有资产基金无所不有。


The sovereign state is influenced by them (for better and for worse) as much as it is able to influence them.	主权国家能够对它们施加影响，但也在同样程度上被它们影响着（无论这种影响是好是坏）。


The near monopoly of power once enjoyed by sovereign entities is being eroded.	主权国家曾经享有的垄断权力已经受到了侵蚀。


As a result, new mechanisms are needed for regional and global governance that include actors other than states.	因此，地区和全球统治需要新的机制，允许除国家以外的演员登上舞台。


This is not to argue that Microsoft, Amnesty International, or Goldman Sachs be given seats in the United Nations General Assembly, but it does mean including representatives of such organizations in regional and global deliberations when they have the capacity to affect whether and how regional and global challenges are met.	这么说并不是要在联大为微软、国际大赦组织或者高盛谋求席位，但的确需要允许这些组织的代表参加地区和全球会谈，因为它们有能力影响我们是否，或怎样去迎接地区和国际挑战。


Moreover, states must be prepared to cede some sovereignty to world bodies if the international system is to function.	此外，如果希望国际系统正常运转，国家就必须向世界组织牺牲某些主权。


This is already taking place in the trade realm.	这种情况在贸易领域已经发生了。


Governments agree to accept the rulings of the World Trade Organization because on balance they benefit from an international trading order even if a particular decision requires that they alter a practice that is their sovereign right to carry out.	政府同意接受国际贸易组织的裁决，因为总体上看它们从国际贸易秩序中获益非浅，即便世贸组织可能在某个特定的裁决中要求主权国家修改其做出的决定也不例外。


Some governments are prepared to give up elements of sovereignty to address the threat of global climate change.	有些国家的政府准备放弃一些主权要素，以应对全球气候变化的挑战。


Under one such arrangement, the Kyoto Protocol, which runs through 2012, signatories agree to cap specific emissions.	《京都议定书》就是这样一纸协议，它的有效期截至到2012年，之前各缔约国同意共同限制特定种类的排放。


What is needed now is a successor arrangement in which a larger number of governments, including the United States, China, and India, accept emissions limits or adopt common standards because they recognize that they would be worse off if no country did.	现在需要的是一份后续协议，协议中需要包括美国、中国和印度在内的很多政府接受排放限制或共同标准，它们对协议的接受都基于这样一个事实：如果所有的国家都拒绝这项协议，那它们自身的状况将会变得更糟。


All of this suggests that sovereignty must be redefined if states are to cope with globalization.	所有这些都表明，要想适应全球化的发展，国家的主权观念就必须重新界定。


At its core, globalization entails the increasing volume, velocity, and importance of flows – within and across borders – of people, ideas, greenhouse gases, goods, dollars, drugs, viruses, emails, weapons, and a good deal else, challenging one of sovereignty’s fundamental principles: the ability to control what crosses borders in either direction.	从本质上看，全球化会使人员、思想、温室气体、货物、美元、毒品、病毒、电子邮件、武器和其它很多物品在境内外流动的数量越来越大，速度越来越快，重要性也越来越强。 这对主权最根本的一项原则构成了挑战：那就是控制所有领域中的越境能力。


Sovereign states increasingly measure their vulnerability not to one another, but to forces beyond their control.	随着时间的流逝，主权国家不再计较相互之间孰优孰劣，而是把人们无法控制的力量看作它们共同的敌人。


Globalization thus implies that sovereignty is not only becoming weaker in reality, but that it needs to become weaker.	这样，全球化不仅导致主权在实际上有所减弱，而且也使削弱主权成为了一种必然。


States would be wise to weaken sovereignty in order to protect themselves, because they cannot insulate themselves from what goes on elsewhere.	国家为了自我保护而削弱主权其实是明智之举，因为任何国家都无法使自己与别处发生的事情绝缘。


Sovereignty is no longer a sanctuary.	主权已经不再是国家的庇护所。


This was demonstrated by the American and world reaction to terrorism.	美国和世界对恐怖主义的态度说明了这个问题。


Afghanistan’s Taliban government, which provided access and support to al-Qaeda, was removed from power.	阿富汗的塔利班政府由于为基地组织提供藏匿和支持而被剥夺了权力。


Similarly, America’s preventive war against an Iraq that ignored the UN and was thought to possess weapons of mass destruction showed that sovereignty no longer provides absolute protection.	与此相似，美国不顾联合国的反对单独对伊拉克发动了预防性质的战争，因为后者被怀疑拥有大规模杀伤性武器，这些都说明主权再也不能为胡作非为的国家提供绝对的保护。


Imagine how the world would react if some government were known to be planning to use or transfer a nuclear device or had already done so.	想象一下如果大家都知道某个政府正在策划使用或转移核设施或者已经做了这样的事情，那么世界其它国家会做出什么样的反应。


Many would argue – correctly – that sovereignty provides no protection for that state.	很多人可能会说主权再也不能为那个国家提供保护，而且我认为他们是正确的。


Necessity may also lead to reducing or even eliminating sovereignty when a government, whether from a lack of capacity or conscious policy, is unable to provide for the basic needs of its citizens.	在政府缺乏能力或不讲道德、无法满足国民基本需要的前提下，我们有必要削弱主权的影响，甚至完全弃之不顾。


This reflects not simply scruples, but a view that state failure and genocide can lead to destabilizing refugee flows and create openings for terrorists to take root.	这样做不仅是出于谨慎，还因为国家衰弱和种族灭绝能够导致危害稳定的难民风潮，并为恐怖主义份子扎根创造条件。


The NATO intervention in Kosovo was an example where a number of governments chose to violate the sovereignty of another government (Serbia) to stop ethnic cleansing and genocide.	北约对科索沃的干预就是一例，这次事件中，几个政府选择对另一个政府（塞尔维亚）的主权进行干预，目的是阻止种族清洗和屠杀。


By contrast, the mass killing in Rwanda a decade ago and now in Darfur, Sudan, demonstrate the high price of judging sovereignty to be supreme and thus doing little to prevent the slaughter of innocents.	恰恰相反，10年前发生在卢旺达的大规模屠杀和目前苏丹的达尔富尔事件表明了把主权视为至高无上，因而面对屠杀无辜者无动于衷所要付出的高昂代价。


Our notion of sovereignty must therefore be conditional, even contractual, rather than absolute.	因此，我们对主权的尊重必须符合相应的条件，甚至要赋予它契约的性质，而不能是绝对无条件的。


If a state fails to live up to its side of the bargain by sponsoring terrorism, either transferring or using weapons of mass destruction, or conducting genocide, then it forfeits the normal benefits of sovereignty and opens itself up to attack, removal, or occupation.	如果国家没有遵守自己的承诺，支持恐怖主义、转移或使用大规模杀伤性武器、或实行种族灭绝，那就要剥夺它作为主权国的一切权益，如果它首先破坏契约，就可以受到攻击、铲除和占领。


The diplomatic challenge for this era is to gain widespread support for principles of state conduct and a procedure for determining remedies when these principles are violated.	这个时代我们所面临的外交挑战是为国家行为准则和准则遭到破坏后的补救办法争取最广泛的支持。


The goal should be to redefine sovereignty for the era of globalization, to find a balance between a world of fully sovereign states and an international system of either world government or anarchy.	我们的目标是在全球化时代重新定义主权，在完整的主权国家和世界政府或无政府国际体系中寻求平衡。


The basic idea of sovereignty, which still provides a useful constraint on violence between states, needs to be preserved.	主权的基本理念仍然能有效地防止国家间的纷争，因此它仍然具有存在的价值。


But the concept needs to be adapted to a world in which the main challenges to order come from what global forces do to states and what governments do to their citizens rather than from what states do to one another.	但当今世界秩序的主要挑战来自国际力量对国家的影响和政府对国民的影响，而不是来自国家之间的矛盾。


Rethinking the Growth Imperative	反思增长的必要性


CAMBRIDGE – Modern macroeconomics often seems to treat rapid and stable economic growth as the be-all and end-all of policy.	美国剑桥—现代宏观经济学通常将快速稳定的经济增长视为最重要的政策。


That message is echoed in political debates, central-bank boardrooms, and front-page headlines.	这一现象反复出现于政治辩论、央行会议室和报纸头版标题中。


But does it really make sense to take growth as the main social objective in perpetuity, as economics textbooks implicitly assume?	但把增长作为永远的首要社会目标（这正是经济学教科书所暗含的假定）真的合理吗？


Certainly, many critiques of standard economic statistics have argued for broader measures of national welfare, such as life expectancy at birth, literacy, etc.	诚然，许多对标准经济数字的批评指出，应该采取更广的衡量标准定义国民福利，比如出生寿命与其和读写能力等。


Such appraisals include the United Nations Human Development Report, and, more recently, the French-sponsored Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, led by the economists Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi.	提出这一观点的有《美国人权发展报告》中，以及最近的由法国出资、以约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨（Joseph Stiglitz）、阿玛蒂亚·森（Amartya Sen）和让-保罗·菲特西（Jean-Paul Fitoussi）等经济学家为首的“经济表现和社会进步衡量标准委员会”。


But there might be a problem even deeper than statistical narrowness: the failure of modern growth theory to emphasize adequately that people are fundamentally social creatures.	但除了统计口径过于偏隘之外，还有另一大问题：现代增长理论无视了人从本质上是社会动物。


They evaluate their welfare based on what they see around them, not just on some absolute standard.	人类评估自身福利的基础是他所能看到的周边情形，而不仅仅是绝对标准。


The economist Richard Easterlin famously observed that surveys of “happiness” show surprisingly little evolution in the decades after World War II, despite significant trend income growth.	经济学家理查德·伊斯特林（Richard Easterlin）有一个著名的观察：对“幸福”的调查令人吃惊地表明，二战以来人们的幸福几乎没有增长，尽管趋势收入增长相当大。


Needless to say, Easterlin’s result seems less plausible for very poor countries, where rapidly rising incomes often allow societies to enjoy large life improvements, which presumably strongly correlate with any reasonable measure of overall well-being.	不消说，伊斯特林的结果对贫穷国家来说并不成立，在这些国家，收入的快速增长通常会使社会享受到较大的生活改善，而生活的改善被认为与任何总体福利（不管用什么标准衡量）密切相关。


In advanced economies, however, benchmarking behavior is almost surely an important factor in how people assess their own well-being.	不过，在发达经济体，基准行为毫无疑问是人们评估自身福利的重要因素。


If so, generalized income growth might well raise such assessments at a much slower pace than one might expect from looking at how a rise in an individual’s income relative to others affects her welfare.	果真如此的话，那么一般化的收入增长便不可能像相对于其他人的个体收入的增长那样能够决定一个人的幸福。


And, on a related note, benchmarking behavior may well imply a different calculus of the tradeoffs between growth and other economic challenges, such as environmental degradation, than conventional growth models suggest.	此外，由此产生的一个相关议题是，基准行为还可能暗示，相对传统增长模型，我们必须以不同的算术计算增长和其他经济挑战（如环境破坏）之间的权衡。


To be fair, a small but significant literature recognizes that individuals draw heavily on historical or social benchmarks in their economic choices and thinking.	平心而论，经济学中有一个较小但相当重要的分支指出，个体的经济选择和思维在很大程度上取决于历史和社会基准。


Unfortunately, these models tend to be difficult to manipulate, estimate, or interpret.	不幸的是，这方面的模型通常难以处理、估计和解释。


As a result, they tend to be employed mainly in very specialized contexts, such as efforts to explain the so-called “equity premium puzzle” (the empirical observation that over long periods, equities yield a higher return than bonds).	结果，它们通常只会在相当专业化的教科书中出现，比如作为解释所谓的“股权溢价之谜”的内容被提及。 （股权溢价之谜是一项实证观察：从长期看，股票会产生比债券更高的回报。


There is a certain absurdity to the obsession with maximizing long-term average income growth in perpetuity, to the neglect of other risks and considerations.	人们沉湎于试图永久最大化长期平均收入增长，而忽视其他风险和考虑，这看起来有一定的荒谬性。


Consider a simple thought experiment.	我们来做个简单的思想实验。


Imagine that per capita national income (or some broader measure of welfare) is set to rise by 1% per year over the next couple of centuries.	想象一下，人均国民收入（或某个更广泛的福利衡量标准）在接下来的几百年时间里每年固定增长1%。


This is roughly the trend per capita growth rate in the advanced world in recent years.	这个增长率大体上就是近几年来发达国家的趋势人均增长率。


With annual income growth of 1%, a generation born 70 years from now will enjoy roughly double today’s average income.	如若收入的年增长率为1%，那么70年后出生的人将享受到两倍于今日水平的平均收入。


Over two centuries, income will grow eight-fold.	而在200年后，收入会增长8倍。


Now suppose that we lived in a much faster-growing economy, with per capita income rising at 2% annually.	现在，假设我们生活在一个增长得更快的经济中，人均收入每年能增长2%。


In that case, per capita income would double after only 35 years, and an eight-fold increase would take only a century.	在这一情形中，人均收入过每35年便可翻一番，增长8倍只需要100年时间。


Finally, ask yourself how much you really care if it takes 100, 200, or even 1,000 years for welfare to increase eight-fold.	最后，问问你自己，花100年、200年抑或1000年让收入增长8倍对你有区别吗？


Wouldn’t it make more sense to worry about the long-term sustainability and durability of global growth?	担心全球增长的长期可持续性和持久性有意义吗？


Wouldn’t it make more sense to worry whether conflict or global warming might produce a catastrophe that derails society for centuries or more?	���心冲突或全球变暖会造成灾难性后果从而导致社会在未来几百年内脱轨难道不是更有意义吗？


Even if one thinks narrowly about one’s own descendants, presumably one hopes that they will be thriving in, and making a positive contribution to, their future society.	即使你只关心自己的后代，当然你希望他们能够发达，并能为未来社会做出贡献。


Assuming that they are significantly better off than one’s own generation, how important is their absolute level of income?	假设他们比你这一代的福利要好得多，那么，他们的绝对收入水平有多重要？


Perhaps a deeper rationale underlying the growth imperative in many countries stems from concerns about national prestige and national security.	或许许多国家紧抱增长不放的深层次理由来自对国家地位和国家安全的担忧。


In his influential 1989 book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, the historian Paul Kennedy concluded that, over the long run, a country’s wealth and productive power, relative to that of its contemporaries, is the essential determinant of its global status.	在1989年的名著《大国兴衰》（The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers）中，历史学家保罗·肯尼迪（Paul Kennedy）总结道，从长期看，一国相对于对手国的福利和生产力从根本上决定了它的全球地位。


Kennedy focused particularly on military power, but, in today’s world, successful economies enjoy status along many dimensions, and policymakers everywhere are legitimately concerned about national economic ranking.	肯尼迪将最主要的注意力放在了军事实力上，但是，在当今世界，成功的经济体在多个领域都享受着超凡的地位，世界各国的决策者都无可厚非地纠结于国民经济排名。


An economic race for global power is certainly an understandable rationale for focusing on long-term growth, but if such competition is really a central justification for this focus, then we need to re-examine standard macroeconomic models, which ignore this issue entirely.	角逐全球实力的经济竞赛专注于长期增长，这不可不谓不无道理，但如若这一竞赛真是专注于长期增长的中心理由的话，那么我们就需要重新考察完全忽略了这一问题的标准宏观经济学模型。


Of course, in the real world, countries rightly consider long-term growth to be integral to their national security and global status.	当然，在现实世界中，各国正确地将长期增长视为其国家安全和全球地位的决定因素之一。


Highly indebted countries, a group that nowadays includes most of the advanced economies, need growth to help them to dig themselves out.	重债国（如今包括许多发达经济体）需要增长来助自己走出逆境。


But, as a long-term proposition, the case for focusing on trend growth is not as encompassing as many policymakers and economic theorists would have one believe.	但是，作为长期战略，专注于趋势增长并不像众多决策者和经济理论家那样无比重要。


In a period of great economic uncertainty, it may seem inappropriate to question the growth imperative.	在面临重大经济不确定的时代，质疑增长的必要性似乎有些不合时宜。


But, then again, perhaps a crisis is exactly the occasion to rethink the longer-term goals of global economic policy.	但是，我要再次指出，危机正是反思全球经济政策长期目标的好机会。


Re-Thinking the Iranian Nuclear Threat	重新思考伊朗核威胁


Would it be a great disaster if Iran had nuclear weapons?	如果伊朗拥有核武器，那会是一个巨大的灾难吗？


As a habitual contrarian, I pose the question because almost everyone seems to believe that it would, and that it must be prevented at all costs.	因为几乎每个人似乎都认为这会是个灾难并且必须不惜任何代价地加以阻止，作为习惯性的逆向思维，我提出了这个问题。


But is that true?	但是，这是真的吗？


John Bolton, the former United States Ambassador to the United Nations, said in April that “if the choice is [Iran] continuing [towards a nuclear bomb] or the use of force, I think you’re at a Hitler marching into the Rhineland point.”	前美国驻联合国大使约翰·波顿（John Bolton）在四月份说，“如果[伊朗]选择继续寻求核弹或使用武力，我认为你们面临的情况就像希特勒进入莱茵兰（Rhineland）时世界所面临的情况那样。


Bush, too, has compared Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Hitler.	”布什也将伊朗总统马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪－内贾德比作希特勒。


But these so-called statesmen never consider what might have happened had Germany and Britain both had nuclear weapons in 1939.	但是这些所谓的政治家从来没有考虑，如果在1939年德国和英国都拥有核武器，那会发生什么。


Would Hitler, wicked as he was, have gone to war had he faced an assured threat of total destruction?	如果其面对一个确定而完全的毁灭的威胁，像希特勒这样邪恶的人会发动战争吗？


Have we forgotten all about the theory of deterrence?	我们都忘记了威慑理论吗？


Of course, the world would be safer if Iran did not have nuclear weapons, not because it is a “rogue” state, but because any spread of nuclear weapons is likely to make the world more dangerous.	当然，如果伊朗没有核武器，世界可能会更安全一些，这不是因为伊朗是一个“流氓”国家，而是因为任何核武器的扩散都可能使世界更危险。


That is why it is worth continuing to make every effort to dissuade Iran from “going nuclear.”	这就是为什么为劝说伊朗放弃核武器所做的每个努力都是值得的。


Suppose, though, that it becomes clear that Iran is playing the West along, simply buying time to build a bomb and develop a delivery system to hit Israel. Would that justify a pre-emptive military strike, as certain circles in Israel and the US advocate?	即使，假设伊朗在糊弄西方以获取建造核武器和发展打击以色列的发射系统的时间，这也可以成为一些以色列和美国人士支持的先发制人的军事打击的正当理由吗？


Military intervention in Iran could go either way.	对伊朗的军事介入可能会有两种结果。


Iran might lie down peacefully like Libya did when America bombed it, or turn into another Iraq.	伊朗可能像美国轰炸利比亚时的利比亚那样，和平屈服，或者它会变成另一个伊拉克。


My own instinct is that it would unleash a train of uncontrollable events.	我自己的直觉是这会引起无法控制的后果。


It would ignite an already incendiary part of the world, with the added risk of global economic collapse if the Strait of Hormuz, through which one-fifth to one-third of the world’s oil passes, is blocked.	它会点燃世界上本来就不稳定的地区的愤怒情绪，而且，如果输送世界石油的五分之一到三分之一的霍尔木兹海峡（Strait of Hormuz）被封锁，这也增加了全球经济崩溃的风险。


On this view, if America is determined to use force to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state, it would have to establish a quasi-permanent empire in the Middle East.	从这一点上考虑，如果美国决定使用武力阻止伊朗成为一个拥有核武器的国家，它将不得不在中东建立一个似乎永久的帝国。


It is to avoid this imperialist logic that sensible Americans like Henry Kissinger and George Shultz have revived the dream of a nuclear-free world.	为了避免这样的帝国主义逻辑，像亨利·基辛格和乔治·舒尔茨这样明智的美国人复兴了一个无核世界的梦想。


First proposed in the Baruch Plan of 1945, versions of it have surfaced ever since as the number of nuclear weapons states increased.	该设想首先在1945年的巴拉奇计划（Baruch Plan）中被提出，但是自拥有核武器的国家的数字不断增多之后，各种正式的表述就出现了。


The main idea of the Kissinger initiative is large reductions in US and Russian nuclear stockpiles, backed by improved security arrangements for fissile materials, a more intrusive inspection regime for the nuclear powers, and assistance for civilian nuclear programs.	基辛格倡议的主要观点是在改进后的易裂变材料安全安排、对核国家更深入的检查以及对民用核项目的帮助的支持下，大规模减少美国和俄罗斯的核武器储备。


A better arms control system would undoubtedly make it more difficult for non-nuclear weapons states to acquire nuclear capability; but it is hard to see why reductions alone, however dramatic, in the huge number of American and Russian warheads should induce aspiring nuclear powers to give up their nuclear ambitions.  Even if America and Russia agreed to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear warheads from 5,000-6,000 each to 1,000 each, why should that stop Iran from wanting to build 50-100 nuclear warheads and short-range delivery systems if it perceives this to be in its national interest?	但是，很难看见单独的削减美国和俄罗斯巨量的核弹头措施——不管这些措施是多么激烈——会导致野心勃勃的核国家放弃他们的核野心。 即使美国和俄罗斯同意将他们分别拥有的5,000-6,000枚核弹头储备削减致各拥有1,000枚，但是，如果伊朗认为这符合其国家利益，为什么这应该阻止它寻求建造50-100枚核弹头以及短射程发射系统？


The risk is that if Iran is allowed its bomb, uncontrollable nuclear proliferation would follow.	伊朗被允许拥有核弹的风险是接下来会发生的不可控制的核扩散。


However, since the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970, only three new nuclear states have emerged – India, Pakistan, and Israel.	但是，自从1970年签署了《不扩散核武器条约》(NPT)之后，只出现了三个新的核国家——印度，巴基斯坦以及以色列。


There are two reasons for this.	这有两个原因。


First, the control system established by the NPT made it very hard for non-nuclear states to acquire nuclear weapons capability.	首先，由《不扩散核武器条约》确立的控制体系使非核国家很难获得核武器；


Second, most non-nuclear states were happy enough to live under the security umbrella provided by the superpower nuclear duopoly.	其次，绝大多数非核国家都��高兴地生活在超级大国核双头垄断提供的安全保护伞之下。


Given the huge obstacles – technological, economic, and political – to acquiring nuclear weapons, states must have quite specific reasons for wanting to go nuclear, such as the need for security against a regional threat or a perception that a superpower itself threatens the state’s political independence.	. 鉴于获取核武器的巨大障碍——技术障碍，经济障碍和政治障碍，不拥有核武器的国家必须具有寻求获得核武器的相当具体的理由，例如反对地区安全威胁的需要或者一个超级大国本身威胁到这个国家的政治独立。


Large barriers to nuclear proliferation thus exist independent of the NPT. There is no reason to believe that they would fall if Iran built its own weapon.	因此，在《不扩散核武器条约》之外还存在巨大的核扩散障碍，所以没有理由认为，如果伊朗建造自己的核武器这些障碍就不存在了。


It seems that fear of the US rather than Israel has been the main reason for Iran’s nuclear ambition.	伊朗产生核野心的主要原因似乎是对美国而不是对以色列的恐惧。


That is why the attractive idea of a nuclear-free Middle East, in which Iran would renounce nuclear weapons in exchange for a similar move by Israel, appears unrealistic.	这是为什么无核的中东这样有吸引力的一个观点——在这个观点中，伊朗放弃核武器以换取以色列同样的行动——似乎是不现实的。


It is the US, not Israel, that Iranian hardliners want to deter, using Israel as a hostage.	伊朗的强硬派想要威慑的是美国而不是以色列，并且他们使用以色列作为人质；


They see going nuclear as a way of limiting US military and geopolitical involvement in the Middle East. They bank on eventual American acquiescence, as happened with India.	他们将核作为限制美国在中东的军事和地缘政治介入的手段，并且期望美国的最终默许，就像在印度成为核国家时美国的态度的那样。


Where do we go from here?	我们由此得出什么结论呢？


While voluntary Iranian renunciation of nuclear weapons would be the best outcome for the West, there is no reason to believe that a nuclear-armed Iran would be a danger to the world.	虽然伊朗自愿放弃核武器对西方来说是最好的结果，但是也没有理由认为拥有核武器的伊朗会成为世界的威胁。


The floodgates to nuclear proliferation would not open; a more likely outcome would be a “balance of terror” between Israel and Iran, as exists between India and Pakistan.	核扩散的安全阀不会打开； 更可能的结果是在以色列和伊朗之间产生“恐怖平衡”，就像在印度和巴基斯坦之间存在的那样。


However, if Iran were allowed to become a nuclear weapons state, it should be done by agreement with the five “legal” nuclear powers (the US, Russia, Britain, France, and China) – that is, by an officially sanctioned enlargement of the nuclear club, which would include India, Pakistan, and Israel.	. 但是，如果伊朗被允许成为一个拥有核武器的国家，这可以通过和五个“合法”拥有核武器的国家（美国，俄罗斯，英国，法国和中国）达成协议来完成——也就是说，通过正式认可的方式扩大核俱乐部，该俱乐部也将包括印度、巴基斯坦和以色列。


This would be the best way to bind Iran to acceptable rules of behavior.	这是约束伊朗按照可接受的规则行为的最好方法。


At the very least, we should be clear that military intervention is the third-best (that is, worst) option.	至少，我们应该清楚军事干涉是第三优选择（也就是说，是最糟的选择）。


We might be driven to it if the other two fail, but it would be utterly wrong to contemplate it now.	如果另两个选择失败，或许我们会被迫使用第三优选择，但是现在考虑它绝对是错误的。


The Creeping Public-Pension Debacle	崩溃中的养老金体系


LONDON – If developed countries acted rationally, and in the interest of electorates that understood how their tax money is spent, they would set their public-pension retirement age at or above 70.	发自伦敦——如果发达国家能遵照理性行事，并且愿意维护那些了解自身税收是如何花费的选民的利益，就一定将会把合资格领取社会养老金的退休年龄设定在70岁以上。


But most developed countries have retirement ages below this mark, and, despite some progress, it will be decades before they catch up.	然而大多数发达国家的退休年龄依然低于这一数值，尽管已经出台了一些措施，但真正达标还需数十年。


In the meantime, Western welfare states will remain financially unviable, economically sickly, and politically strained.	与此同时，西方福利国家将仍然陷于财政无力，经济病态和政治紧张的局面。


Demographic aging is the social and economic equivalent of climate change: it is a problem that we all know must be addressed, but which we would rather leave for future generations to solve.	人口老龄化的影响之巨，堪与气候变化比肩，只是前者更关乎社会和经济而已：我们都知道这是一个必须解决的问题，但宁愿留给下一代来解决。


The impulse to put things off for a later day is understandable, given current economic and political troubles; but when it comes to public pensions, procrastination comes at a high cost – even more so than in the case of global warming.	考虑到当前的经济和政治困局，这种拖延症式的冲动是可以理解的； 可这一旦涉及公共养老金，拖延所付出的代价就会极高——甚至比全球变暖的后果更为严重。


In 1970, the average effective retirement age for French male workers was 67, which was roughly the same as male life expectancy at that time.	在1970年代，法国男性劳动者的平均实际退休年龄为67岁，与当时的男性预期寿命大致相同。


Now, the effective retirement age in France is just below 60 (the official retirement age is 65, but in practice public pensions can be drawn much sooner), even though male life expectancy is nearly 83.	而如今法国男性的预期寿命已近83岁，但实际退休年龄却为60岁低一点（虽说法定退休年龄是65岁，但实际上公共养老金可以更早地被提取）。


It is no wonder that France spends the equivalent of nearly 14% of its GDP annually on public pensions.	难怪法国每年的公共养老金的支出相当于其GDP的近14％。


Early retirement is even costlier for Italy, which tops OECD rankings of public-pension spending, with an annual outlay equivalent to nearly 16% of its GDP.	提前退休对意大利来说成本更高，该国位居经合组织公共养老金支出排名榜首，年支出相当于其GDP的近16％。


In all, 13 OECD countries – including Japan, Germany, Poland, and Greece – devote the equivalent of 10% or more of their GDP to public pensions every year.	总而言之，13个经合组织国家——包括日本、德国、波兰和希腊——每年将相当于其国内生产总值10％或以上的资金用于发放公共养老金。


These and other countries are taking money mainly from working taxpayers and giving it to retirees.	这些国家主要从在职纳税人获得金钱用于支持退休人员。


When German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck invented the world’s first statutory pension scheme in 1889, he set the eligibility age at 70; few people were expected to live long enough to collect benefits, and certainly not for many years.	当德国总理奥托·冯·俾斯麦（Otto von Bismarck）在1889年发明了世界上第一个法定养老金计划时，他将合资格年龄定为70岁； 当时很少有人能够活到这个岁数，就算活到了也领不了几年。


Now, Italians who retire on average at 61-62 can expect to receive their pensions for several decades, and in some cases, for almost as many years as they worked.	现在这些平均退休年龄介乎61~62岁的意大利人预计可以享受几十年的养老金，有些人领取养老金的时间甚至和工龄一样长。


With around one-fifth of advanced economies’ populations over 65 (a proportion that is expected eventually to rise to one-third), public-pension expenditures will increasingly crowd out other public spending.	约有1/5的发达国家人口超过65岁（预期最终将达到三分之一），公共养老金支出将越来越多地挤占其他公共支出。


Moreover, reducing public-debt levels will become more difficult unless there is a miraculous revival in economic growth, which current pension policies makes less likely every year.	此外除非经济增长出现奇迹般的复苏，降低公共债务水平将变得越来越困难，使得目前的养老金政策逐渐变得无以为继。


This is not just a question of how we treat older people.	这可不仅仅是一个我们如何对待老年人的问题。


Tax revenues transferred to pensioners could have been invested in infrastructure, education, scientific research, defense, and all the other urgent causes that politicians claim to support.	转移给养老金领取者的税收本可被投资于基础设施，教育，科学研究，国防以及政治家声明支持的所有其他紧急事业。


Pensioners do spend the money they receive, so this revenue isn’t wasted; but it could be better spent to propel stronger economic growth.	虽然养老金领取者也在花钱消费，不至于令这笔收入闲置； 但它其实可以被善用以推动更强劲的经济增长。


Developed countries have been raising their retirement ages gradually, but trade unions and pensioner groups lobby hard against any increase.	各发达国家正逐步提高退休年龄，但工会和养老金群体也在竭力游说来抵抗任何增幅。


In fact, in 2014 Germany’s governing coalition yielded to union pressure and actually reduced the retirement age for some manual workers, despite frequently lecturing other eurozone countries to do the opposite.	事实上虽然德国人经常撺掇其他欧元区国家调高退休年龄，2014年时其执政联盟却屈服于工会的压力，把一些体力劳动者的实际退休年龄又降低了一点。


Beyond lobbying, the current system is upheld by mythology: the belief that keeping older people in the workforce worsens unemployment.	除了游说之外，当前的体系还得到某种神奇理论支持：认为让老年人继续参加工作会加剧整体失业状况。


It does not, and this is what economists call the “lump of labor fallacy” – the idea that handing out pensions frees up employment for younger people, as if there were a fixed number of jobs to go around.	恰恰相反，这就是经济学家所说的“劳动合成谬误（lump of labor fallacy）”——认为社会中的工作职位数量是固定的，让老人退休领养老金就是为年轻人腾出位置。


In reality, more people earning, consuming, and paying taxes leads to more economic growth.	而在现实中，更多的人工作赚钱，消费和纳税会带来更多的经济增长。


Delaying retirement does not steal jobs; it creates them.	延迟退休不仅没有占用工作岗位； 反而创建了更多。


On August 29-31, I moderated the World Demographic & Aging Forum in St. Gallen, Switzerland, where attendees arrived at a clear conclusion: although we have increasingly rich data and sophisticated knowledge about future population trends, our concerted action to address those trends falls woefully short.	在8月29~31日，笔者主持了于瑞士圣加仑举办的世界人口和老龄化论坛，与会者得出了一个明确的结论：虽然我们对于未来人口趋势有着日益丰富的数据和成熟的认识，但我们一致行动来应对这些趋势的时间却短得可怜。


Public policy is one part of the problem, but corporate behavior has been an even bigger obstacle to commonsense pension reforms.	公共政策是问题的一部分，但企业行为是普遍性养老金改革的更大障碍。


For starters, corporate pay and promotion structures are biased toward early retirement, because companies tend to push out older workers first when they need to cut costs.	首先，企业薪酬和晋升架构都偏向于提前退休，因为它们需要削减成本时往往会首先裁减年长员工。


Even companies catering to the “silver market” (elderly consumers) have barely begun to develop more age-friendly employment practices.	即使是那些面向“银发市场”（老年消费者）的企业也不怎么会制定更适宜于年长员工的措施。


The slow recovery following the 2008 financial crisis has obscured the long-term reality that developed countries now face.	2008年金融危机后的缓慢复苏掩盖了发达国家当前面临的长期现实。


Any country required by its public-pension policy to transfer billions of dollars to citizens for decades-long retirement periods risks bankruptcy or, at best, stagnation.	任何因为退休金政策规定而要为公民数十年的退休生活支付数十亿退休金的国家都可能走向破产，最好的结果也只能是停滞不前。


One of the most urgent tasks for governments, companies, and individuals today is to rethink the length and pattern of our working lives.	而政府，企业和个人当前最紧迫的任务之一，就是是重新思考我们工作生涯的长度和模式。


Reversing Brexit	逆转英国脱欧


LONDON – How should the European Union respond to the narrow decision by voters in the United Kingdom to leave?	伦敦——欧盟应如何回应英国脱欧的狭隘决策？


European leaders are now focusing, rightly, on how to prevent other countries from leaving the EU or the euro.	欧洲领导人现在正集中全力，防止其他国家离开欧元区或欧盟。


The most important country to be kept in the club is Italy, which faces a referendum in October that could pave the way for the anti-euro Five Star Movement to take power.	要留在欧盟俱乐部的首要国家是意大利，意大利正面临着10月即将举行的公投，此次公投有可能为反欧元五星运动得势铺平道路。


Europe’s fear of contagion is justified, because the Brexit referendum’s outcome has transformed the politics of EU fragmentation.	对欧洲危机蔓延的恐惧合情合理，因为英国退欧公投的结果成功导致了欧盟碎片化政治的转型。


Before, advocates of leaving the EU or euro could be ridiculed as fantasists or denounced as fascists (or ultra-leftists).	之前，退出欧盟或欧元运动的鼓吹者可以被讥笑为空想家或被谴责为法西斯分子（或极左分子）。


This is no longer possible.	但现在已经不再可能。


Brexit has turned “Leave” (whether the EU or the euro) into a realistic option in every European country.	英国脱欧已经将“退出”（无论是欧盟还是欧元）变成了所有国家的一种现实选择。


Once Britain gives the Union formal notice (by invoking Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon), that option will enter the mainstream of political debate everywhere.	一旦英国向欧盟提交正式通知（通过激活《里斯本条约》第50条），那种选择将进入各地政治辩论的主流。


Research by the European Council on Foreign Relations has found 34 anti-EU referendum demands in 18 other countries.	欧洲外交关系委员会所进行的研究已经发现还有18个国家提出了34项反欧盟的公决要求。


Even if each of these challenges has only a 5% chance of success, the probability of at least one succeeding is 83%.	即便每项挑战仅有5%的成功机会，但其中至少一项有高达83%的概率取得成功。


Can the genie of disintegration be put back in its bottle?	能否将分裂的魔鬼重新装回瓶中？


The EU’s breakup may well prove unstoppable once Britain leaves; but Britain has not yet invoked Article 50.	事实很可能证明英国一旦脱欧欧盟的解体将不可阻挡； 但英国迄今为止尚未援引第50条。


The bottle could still be sealed before the genie escapes.	人们或许可以在妖怪逃跑之前把瓶子封上。


Unfortunately, Europe is using the wrong threats and incentives to achieve this.	不幸的是，欧洲正在利用错误的威胁和激励机制来达到目标。


France is demanding that Britain accelerate its exit.	法国正在要求英国加速退欧。


Germany is playing the “good cop” by offering access to the single market, but only in exchange for immigration rules that Britain will not accept.	德国则唱白脸承诺单一市场准入，但却要求英国接受它不可能接受的移民规则。


These are exactly the wrong sticks and carrots.	这些恰恰是错误的胡萝卜和大棒。


Instead of rushing Brexit, Europe’s leaders should be trying to avert it, by persuading British voters to change their minds.	欧洲领导人不但不应催促英国退欧，反而应当竭力阻止，说服英国选民改变初衷。


The aim should not be to negotiate the terms of departure, but to negotiate the terms on which most British voters would want to remain.	欧盟的目标不应是谈判退欧条件，而应是谈判在何种条件下英国选民愿意留欧。


An EU strategy to avoid Brexit, far from ignoring British voters, would show genuine respect for democracy.	欧盟避免英国退欧的战略与无视英国选民有着很大的不同，能够显示欧盟对民主的真正尊重。


The essence of democratic politics is responding to public dissatisfaction with policies and ideas – and then trying to change the judgment of voters.	民主政治的核心是响应公众对政策和理念的不满——然后试图改变选民的看法。


That is how numerous referendum outcomes – in France, Ireland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Italy, and Greece – have been reversed, even when deeply emotional issues, such as abortion and divorce, were involved.	法国、爱尔兰、丹麦、荷兰、意大利和希腊等国多次公投结果因此得到逆转，即使其中涉及堕胎与离婚等有浓重感情色彩的内容。


If European leaders tried the same approach with Britain, they might be surprised by the favorable response.	如果欧盟领导人对英国采取这样的方式，他们可能会惊讶于由此带来的有利反应。


Many Leave voters are already having second thoughts, and Prime Minister Theresa May’s uncompromising negotiating position will paradoxically accelerate this process, because voters now face a much more extreme version of Brexit than they were promised by the Leave campaign.	许多脱欧选民本来已经开始后悔，而特蕾莎·梅首相毫不妥协的谈判立场将自相矛盾地加速这一进程，因为选民现在面临的脱欧版本远比脱欧宣传所承诺的极端得多。


May has stated unequivocally that immigration control is her over-riding priority and that Norway or Switzerland can no longer be models for Britain’s relationship with the EU.	梅已明确指出出入境管制将是她压倒一切的优先事项，因此挪威和瑞士不可能成为英国与欧盟关系的模型。


Her new “Brexit Ministry” has defined Britain’s main objective as tariff-free access to Europe and free-trade agreements with the rest of the world.	她新设立的“英国脱欧部”已经确定将以零关税进入欧洲市场和与世界其他国家签署自由贸易协议作为英国谈判的主要目标。


That means abandoning the interests of Britain’s financial and business services, because services are unaffected by tariffs and are excluded from most free-trade deals.	这意味着放弃英国金融和商业服务业的利益，因为服务业不受关税影响，因此被从多数自由贸易协议中排除。


As a result, the new government will soon be politically vulnerable.	新政府的政治脆弱性因此可能会很快暴露。


In fact, most British voters already disagree with its negotiating priorities.	事实上，多数英国选民已经不赞同确定的谈判优先事项。


Post-referendum polls show voters giving priority to single-market access over immigration restrictions by a two-to-one margin or more.	后公投期民调显示选民关注单一市场准入相对移民限制的优势比例为2:1或者更多。


Making matters worse for May, her slender parliamentary majority depends on disgruntled “Remain” rivals.	对梅来讲更糟的是，她原本不值一提的议会多数还有赖于不满的“留欧”对手。


As the British economy sinks into recession, trade deals prove illusory, and legal and constitutional obstacles proliferate, May will find it hard to maintain the parliamentary discipline needed to deliver Brexit.	随着英国经济陷入衰退、事实证明贸易协议一文不值且法律和宪法障碍数不胜数，梅可能发现很难保持“脱欧”所需的议会规则。


A strategy to avert Brexit therefore has a good chance of success.	逆转英国脱欧的对策因此极有可能取得成功。


The EU could advance this strategy by calling May’s bluff on “Brexit means Brexit.”	欧盟可以在“脱欧就是脱欧”的问题上向梅摊牌。


May should be told that only two outcomes are possible: either Britain loses all single-market access and interacts with Europe solely under World Trade Organization rules, or it remains an EU member, after negotiating reforms that could persuade voters to reconsider Brexit in a general election or a second referendum.	告诉梅只可能出现两种结果：英国失去所有单一市场准入并完全按照世贸组织规则与欧洲互动； 或在谈判可能说服选民在大选或二次公投中重新考虑英国脱欧问题的改革后仍然选择留在欧盟。


This binary approach, provided EU leaders showed genuine flexibility in their reform negotiations, could transform public attitudes in Britain and across Europe.	上述二元制方案只要欧盟领导人在改革谈判中表现出真正的灵活性，就��可能改变英国和整个欧洲公众的看法。


Imagine if the EU offered constructive immigration reforms – for example, restoring national control over welfare payments to non-citizens and allowing for an “emergency brake” on sudden population movements – to all members.	想象一下欧盟进行建设性移民改革——如恢复所有成员国对非公民福利支付的国家控制并允许在出现突发人口流动时踩下“紧急刹车”会是什么结果。


Such reforms would demonstrate the EU’s respect for democracy in Britain – and could turn the tide of anti-EU populism across northern Europe.	这样的改革可以表达欧盟对英国民主的尊重——并且有可能扭转整个北欧地区的反欧盟民粹主义浪潮。


The EU has a long history of adapting in response to political pressures in important member states.	欧盟面对重要成员国所造成的政治压力调整政策是有悠久历史的。


So why is this strategy not being considered to counter the existential threat of Brexit?	那么应对英国退欧所造成的生存威胁为什么不考虑采用这样的对策？


The answer has nothing to do with supposed respect for democracy.	答案无关乎所谓对民主的尊重。


The Brexit vote is no more irreversible than any other election or referendum, provided the EU is willing to adopt some modest reforms.	英国退欧公投并不比其他任何选举或公投的不可逆性更强，前提是欧盟愿意推行一些温和的改革。


The real obstacle to a strategy of persuading Britain to remain in the EU is the EU bureaucracy.	说服英国留欧策略的真正障碍是欧盟官僚机构。


The European Commission, once the EU’s source of visionary creativity, has become a fanatical defender of existing rules and regulations, however irrational and destructive, on the grounds that any concessions will beget more demands.	曾经是欧盟远见和创造力来源的欧盟委员会已经成为现行不合理和破坏性规则及制度的狂热捍卫者，他们固步自封的理由是任何让步都会带来更多的要求。


Concessions to British voters on immigration would inspire the southern countries to demand fiscal and banking reforms, eastern countries would seek budget changes, and non-euro countries would demand an end to their second-class status.	就移民问题向英国选民让步可能鼓励南欧国家要求进行财政和银行改革、东欧国家可能要求改革预算、而非欧元国家可能要求自己的二等公民地位就此结束。


The Commission is right to believe that demands for EU reform would extend well beyond Britain.	委员会认为不止英国会提出欧盟改革要求是完全正确的。


But is this a reason to resist all change?	但这是不是抵制所有改革的理由？


That type of rigidity broke up the Soviet Union and nearly destroyed the Catholic Church.	那种刚性曾经导致苏联解体并几乎摧毁了天主教。


It will destroy the EU if the bureaucracy remains incapable of reform.	如果官僚体系仍然拒不改革，它还将摧毁欧盟。


It is time for Europe’s politicians to overrule the bureaucrats and re-create a flexible, democratic EU capable of responding to its citizens and adapting to a changing world.	欧盟政界人士现在是时候推翻官僚体制并重新建立能响应民众需求并适应世界变化的灵活、民主的欧盟。


Most British voters would be happy to remain in that kind of Europe.	多数英国选民会很乐意留在那样一个欧洲。


India’s Antiquated Penal Code	印度刑法典已过时


NEW DELHI – A number of seemingly unrelated controversies in India actually have one important element in common: They all relate to criminal offenses codified by India’s British imperial rulers in the mid-nineteenth century that India has proved unable or unwilling to outgrow.	新德里—在印度，许多看似无关的矛盾其实有一个重要共同点：它们都与英国殖民统治者在十九世纪中叶制定的刑法有关，而印度不能或不愿在此基础上有所进步。


The problematic features of the British-drafted Indian Penal Code include the prohibition of “sedition,” defined loosely as speech or actions promoting “disaffection against the government established by law”; the criminalization of homosexual acts; and the uneven prosecution of adultery.	英国制定的印度刑法典的问题包括禁止“暴动”（sedition）、同性恋有罪以及不公平的通奸指控。 暴动的定义十分松散——煽动“对法定政府的不满”的言论或行为。


The first two, in particular, have lately been the source of considerable public outrage – and rightly so.	特别是前两个问题，它们是最近民情汹涌的源头——理应如此。


These provisions – as I argued when introducing amendments to them in the lower house of parliament (of which I am a member) – can easily be misused by the authorities in ways that infringe upon Indians’ constitutional rights.	这些条款——正如我在下议院（我为议员）提议修订它们时所指出的——很容易被当局滥用，抵触印度人民的宪法权利。


Consider sedition, against which a draconian law that was established in 1870 to suppress any criticism of British policies – even criticism that, as one Briton candidly put it, did not involve “an absolute breach of the peace.”	以暴动为例，1870年制定了一项镇压对英国警察的批评的严苛的反暴动法律，任何批评，甚至如一位直率的英国人所指出的，不包括“绝对违反和平”的批评，都是镇压对象。


The result was Section 124A of the penal code, under which any person who used “words, signs, or visible representation … to excite disaffection against the government” could be charged with sedition and potentially sentenced to life imprisonment.	后来它成为印度刑法典第124条A款，根据这一条款，任何人使用“语言、信号或视觉呈现……煽动对政府的不满”都可能被诉以暴动罪，可判终身监禁。


In other words, no free speech for Indians.	换句话说，印度没有言论自由。


But even that was not sufficient for Britain’s leaders, who tightened the law further in 1898, making it even harsher than the sedition law in England.	但英国领导人人不满足，他们在1898年进一步收紧该法，使其比英国反暴动法还要严厉。


The British had concluded, in the words of the British lieutenant governor of Bengal, that “a sedition law which is adequate for a people ruled by a government of its own nationality and faith may be inadequate, or in some respects unsuited, for a country under foreign rule.”	英国人认为，用英国孟加拉代理总督的话说，“对于由本国人或本国信仰的政府治理的民族来说已经足够的反暴动法，对于一个由外国人治理的国家来说可能是不够的，有从某种程度上讲也是不合适的。 ”


Sedition was thus explicitly intended as an instrument to terrorize Indian nationalists; indeed, Mahatma Gandhi was among its prominent victims, though far from its last.	于是，暴动被明确用作恫吓印度民族主主义者的工具； 事实上，圣雄甘地就是这一法律的主要受害者之一，但绝不是最后一个。


In fact, just last month, students at New Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University were arrested on charges of sedition, for using “anti-Indian” slogans in their protests against the execution of the convicted terrorist Afzal Guru.	事实上，就在上个月，新德里尼赫鲁大学学生还因为暴动指控被捕，因为他们在反对处决被判有罪的恐怖分子阿夫扎尔·古鲁（Afzal Guru）的游行中使用“反印度”标语。


These arrests, which shocked many Indians, would not have been possible without the loose wording of the law.	逮捕他们震惊了很多印度人，要不是这条法律用词过于宽泛，他们根本不会被捕。


My amendment would limit sedition charges to situations where an individual’s words or actions lead directly to the use of violence or incitement to violence, or where they constitute an offense – such as murder or rape – that, under the Indian Penal Code, is punishable by life imprisonment.	我提出的修正案将暴动指控局限于个人言论或行动直接导致使用暴力煽动暴力，或者它们构成根据印度刑法典可判终身监禁的侵犯行为——如谋杀或强奸——的情形。


By clarifying that simply criticizing the government’s actions does not constitute sedition, such an amendment would reinforce freedom of speech – fundamental to any democracy – while safeguarding against speech that actually incites violence.	通过澄清仅仅是批评政府行为并不构成暴动，这一修正案将强化言论自由——这是民主的基础——同时遏制真正煽动暴力的言论。


Then there is Section 377 of the penal code, which was enacted in 1860 and criminalizes “carnal intercourse against the order of nature” – wording so archaic that it would invite derision in most modern societies.	还有刑法典第377条，该法实施于1860年，规定“有悖于自然规律的肉体关系”为犯罪——如此“老封建”的用词足以引起现代社会的嗤笑。


Even in the past, there was no taboo against homosexuality in Indian culture and social practice; it was the British Victorians who introduced it.	即使在过去，印度文化和社会实践中也不存在同性恋禁忌； 是英国“老封建”把它引入印度的。


By criminalizing sexual acts in private between consenting adults, Section 377 violates the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 (life and liberty, including privacy and dignity), Article 14 (equality before the law) and Article 15 (prohibition of discrimination) of India’s constitution.	刑法第377条将你情我愿的成年人之间的私人性生活入罪，它违反了印度宪法第21条（生命和自由，包括隐私和尊严）、第14条（法律面前人人平等）和第15条（禁止歧视）所保护的基本权利。


The real-world consequences of this are jarring: In the last two years, 58 Indians have been arrested under Section 377 for acts carried out in the privacy of their homes.	该法引起了严重的真实世界后果：在过去两年中，58位印度人根据刑法典第377条因为在家中进行私密活动而被捕。


My amendment to Section 377 would have decriminalized sex between consenting adults of any gender or orientation.	我对377条的修正案规定，不管性别和性取向如何，自愿的成年人之间的性行为无罪。


Unfortunately, conservative members of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) voted against the bill’s introduction in parliament, citing a 2013 Supreme Court judgment upholding the law.	不幸的是，执政的印度人民党的保守派议员在议会中向这一法案投了反对票，援引2013年最高法院的判例维持该法。


But there is still some reason for hope: The Supreme Court has agreed to hear a curative review petition against its earlier judgment.	但仍然可以保持希望：最高法院同意就其早前的判例听取效果评估起诉。


The Indian Penal Code is not much easier on heterosexual women than it is on homosexuals.	印度刑法典对异性恋女性并不比同性恋好多少。


According to Section 497, a husband can prosecute his adulterous wife, and the man with whom she had sexual relations, but a woman cannot sue her adulterous husband, unless his partner is underage or married.	第497条规定，丈夫可以起诉通奸的妻子，以及与她发生性关系的男性； 但女性无法起诉通奸的丈夫，除非通奸对象为未成年或已婚。


This is an appalling and outdated double standard.	这是令人震惊的不合时宜的双重标准。


It is time for India’s government to get out of its citizens’ bedrooms, and also to recognize that a pernicious sedition law has no place in a lively and contentious democracy.	印度政府应该远离印度公民的卧室，并承认有害的反暴动法在有活力的争论民主中没有立足之地。


Indeed, the British, who created these problematic offenses, have since eliminated all of them at home – a reflection of the changing times.	事实上，炮制了这些有问题的侵害行为的英国人在自己国家已经取消了所有这些法律——这反映了时代的变化。


(One of the worst legacies of colonialism is that its ill effects outlasted the empire – in India, occupied Palestine, the Caribbean, and elsewhere.)	（殖民主义���恶劣的遗产是其影响要远远长于帝国存在时间——印度、被占领的巴勒斯坦和加勒比海地区莫不如此。 ）


President Pranab Mukherjee, for one, feels it is time to take India’s penal code into the twenty-first century, underscoring last month, on the code’s 155th anniversary, the need to revise it thoroughly.	总统慕克吉是认识到应该让印度刑法典适应二十一世纪的人之一，上个月，在印度刑法典立法155周年之际，他支持需要彻底修订该法。


India’s criminal law, he declared, was largely “enacted by the British to meet their colonial needs,” and must be revised to reflect our “contemporary social consciousness.”	他说，印度刑法主要是“英国人为了殖民需要而制定”，必须进行修订以反映我们的“当代社会良知”。


Only then can it be a “faithful mirror of a civilization underlining the fundamental values on which it rests.”	惟其如此，刑法才能成为“文明的忠实镜子，强调作为其基础的基本价值。 ”


With that speech, Mukherjee threw down the gauntlet to the right-wing BJP government.	慕克吉的这番话不啻向右翼的印度人民党政府下战书。


One hopes that its leaders respond, though their fondness for autocratic measures and indulgence of illiberal and intolerant statements by their supporters – behavior that has spurred serious concern across the political spectrum – raises serious doubts that they will.	我们希望印度人民党领导人能够回应，尽管他们喜欢专制措施，他们的支持者热衷于不自由和偏隘的言论——这些行为让政治各派别都十分担忧，并让人们严重怀疑他们的意愿。


As long as they exist, laws that can be misused will be misused.	只要它们存在，可能被滥用的法律就会被滥用。


In order to prevent this, and to create a liberal legal framework fit for a modern democratic country, homosexuality and adultery must be decriminalized, and sedition must be approached from a far more liberal perspective.	为了防止这一点，并建立适合现代民主国家的自有法律框架，同性恋和通奸必须脱罪，暴动必须从更加自由的角度看待。


As the recurring debates consuming the country indicate, it is manifestly time for a change.	印度频发争论表明，现在显然是做出改变的时候。


Taking On Revisionist Russia	应对修正主义的俄国


MADRID – For some countries, military or political defeat is so intolerable, so humiliating, that they will do whatever it takes to overturn what they view as an unjust international order.	马德里——对某些国家而言，军事或政治失败是无法忍受的耻辱，对于所谓的不公正国际秩序他们会不惜一切代价进行颠覆。


One such revisionist power was Egypt, which resolved to undo its 1967 defeat by Israel and regain the Sinai Peninsula.	埃及就是这类修正主义大国之一，当年曾决意挽回其在1967年埃以战争中的失败并夺回西奈半岛。


This was ultimately achieved, but only after President Anwar Sadat embraced a strategy of peace by journeying to Jerusalem.	但只有当萨达特总统接受和平战略访问耶路撒冷，才最终实现了上述目标。


The most ominous case, however, was Germany in the 1930s, which systematically shredded the European order that had emerged after World War I.	最恐怖的实例是20世纪30年代的德国，一战后形成的欧洲秩序几乎被德国彻底颠覆。


History suggests that a revisionist power can be disciplined in two ways.	历史表明有两种方式能够制衡修正主义强国。


It can be opposed with equal fervor, like that which enabled Europe's conservative powers to defeat Napoleon in 1815 and the Allies to defeat Germany in World War II.	其一是以同样的热情与之进行对抗，就像欧洲保守势力1815年击败拿破仑和盟国在二战中击败德国。


Or it can reach the limits of its military and economic strength, as in the case of the Soviet Union at the time of its disintegration.	另一种方法是超越其军事和经济实力的极限，苏联解体就是这方面的具体例子。


At that point, the country has a choice.	目前，俄国还可以选择。


It can, as Germany did, opt for reconciliation with the international order.	它可以像曾经的德国那样选择接受国际秩序。


Or it can take the route of President Vladimir Putin's Russia, and develop a new revanchist strategy – in this case, to overturn the order that emerged from the Soviet Union's Cold War defeat.	也可以坚持弗拉基米尔·普京总统领导下的俄罗斯路线，制定新的复仇战略——也就是颠覆苏联冷战失败后形成的国际秩序。


Though Putin is undoubtedly the main actor driving this strategy, Ukraine's pursuit of closer ties with the European Union – a move that Europe and the United States generally welcomed – was bound to accelerate it.	虽然普京无疑是推动上述战略的主要力量，但乌克兰寻求与欧盟建立更亲密的关系——此举总体受到欧洲和美国的欢迎——注定要加速俄国的复仇步伐。


Putin knew that he could take advantage of Ukraine's ethno-religious division (the eastern regions are overwhelmingly Russian Orthodox and loyal to the Kremlin) to undermine these efforts.	普京知道他可以利用乌克兰的民族宗教分裂（东部地区绝大多数是忠于克里姆林宫的俄罗斯东正教人士）来破坏上述努力。


Europe, it seems, underestimated Russia's determination to uphold what it considers a core interest in Ukraine.	现在看来，欧洲似乎对俄罗斯在乌克兰捍卫所谓核心利益的决心估计不足。


The struggle for influence in Ukraine is a game that Putin cannot afford to lose.	普京输不起这场在乌克兰争夺影响力之战。


For the West, the principle of not redrawing borders by force is a vital political concern – indeed, it is a pillar of a civilized world order.	对西方而言，避免以武力重划边界是一项重要的政治原则——事实上也是文明世界秩序的支柱。


But both the US and Europe have made it clear that Ukraine's sovereignty is not worth dying for, with the EU disinclined even to follow America's lead in imposing increasingly tough sanctions.	但美欧均已明确表示不值得为乌克兰主权付出牺牲。 欧盟甚至不愿跟随美国进一步加强对俄制裁的力度。


Putin gained the upper hand early in the crisis with the annexation of Crimea.	普京吞并克里米亚并在危机初期占据上风。


Now, in eastern Ukraine's Donbas region, he is shrewdly forcing a divided and risk-averse West to choose between war and accommodation.	现在，在乌克兰东部的顿巴斯地区，他敏锐地迫使害怕风险并四分五裂的西方在战争和妥协间进行选择。


While neither option is particularly appealing, the dangers of a war with Russia cannot be overestimated.	虽然说两害相权取其轻，但如何重视对俄的战争风险都不为过。


After all, in such a fight, both sides would possess large nuclear arsenals.	毕竟，在这样的战争中，双方都拥有大型的核武库。


That is why, as Sir Adrian Bradshaw, NATO's second in command, recently suggested, war can be contemplated only if Russia invades a NATO state – a step that Putin is unlikely to take, even as he ramps up his provocations, including cross-border kidnappings.	北约二把手阿德里安布拉德肖爵士因此在 不久前表示只有在俄国入侵北约国家时才会考虑发动战争——尽管普京进一步加大了包括跨境绑架在内的挑衅力度，但他不太可能会入侵北约盟国。


And, even then, there would be reasons for hesitation.	而且，就算他真的决定入侵，迟疑的理由也不会消除。


The Western powers' aversion to war raises risks of its own.	西方列强厌恶打仗本身也是有风险的。


Russia's blatant disregard for the 1994 Budapest Memorandum – in which it, the US, and the United Kingdom promised that Ukraine's territorial integrity would be respected if it surrendered its own nuclear weapons – is sending a dangerous message to nuclear states like Iran, North Korea, India, and Pakistan.	俄罗斯公然无视1994年布达佩斯备忘录——当时美英等国承诺如果乌克兰交出核武器其领土完整会得到尊重——向伊朗、朝鲜、印度和巴基斯坦等国传递了危险的信号。


They know that if Ukraine still had its nukes, it would almost certainly still have Crimea.	他们知道如果乌克兰还有核武器，几乎可以肯定克里米亚仍将在它手中。


Nonetheless, the West's views about a war over Ukraine are unlikely to change.	但西方对乌克兰战争的看法是不可能改变的。


And sanctions, despite having crippled Russia's economy, have proved inadequate, thus far, to breaking Putin's will.	而事实证明尽管制裁削弱了俄罗斯经济，但迄今为止并不足以解决乌克兰问题，进而摧毁普京的意志。


This leaves only accommodation – which means effectively granting legitimacy to the Kremlin's claim to authority over Ukraine and, presumably, the rest of its “near abroad."	于是只剩下妥协一条路——也就是说实际默认克里姆林对乌克兰及其“近边界地区”提出的管辖权要求。


In this scenario, Russia would avoid attempting to govern Ukraine directly but would insist that Ukraine refrain from joining hostile blocs and alliances.	在这种情况下，俄罗斯不会直接插手管理乌克兰，但会坚决阻止乌克兰加入任何敌对阵营和联盟。


As then President-elect Dmitri Medvedev said in 2008 “no country would be happy about a military bloc to which it did not belong approaching its borders."	2008年时任当选总统德米特里·梅德韦杰夫曾说“哪个国家都不愿看到自己没有加入的军事集团把势力拓展到边境上。


If the West acquiesces on this critical point, Putin will be eager to end the current war, which Russia's economy is losing badly.	”如果西方在此紧要关头表示默许，普京将急于结束目前这场战争，以挽救受到沉重打击的俄罗斯经济。


But the Kremlin-driven crisis would not be over.	但克里姆林主导的危机绝不会就此结束。


Indeed, Putin's revisionist agenda extends far beyond Ukraine to include the “Finlandization" of other nearby states, including EU members like Hungary and Romania.	事实上，普京的修正主义计划远非乌克兰所能局限，包括对临近其他国家实施“芬兰化”，其中也包括匈牙利和罗马尼亚等欧盟成员国。


If Putin's dangerous brinkmanship is to be stopped, Western leaders will need to find a way to initiate strategic cooperation with Russia.	要想阻止普京危险的边缘政策，西方领导人必须找到某种方法启动与俄罗斯的战略合作。


Specifically, they must devise a grand bargain for peace that addresses the fundamental questions relating to global security norms and arms control that have so far impeded such cooperation.	具体而言，他们必须制定宏伟的和��计划，解决全球安全规范和军备控制等一直妨碍合作的基本问题。


Of course, Russia is no longer a global superpower.	当然，俄罗斯已经算不上全球超级大国。


But it retains the vocation and characteristics of a major power: a rich culture and history, vast size, formidable nuclear capabilities, strong influence across Eurasia, and the capacity to be a spoiler in many conflicts.	但仍具有大国的禀赋和特点：丰富的文化历史、庞大的规模、强大的核能力、跨越欧亚大陆的巨大影响，以及能搅局很多冲突。


Any realistic grand bargain would have to account for this.	任何现实的大型交易必须考虑到上述特色。


As for Ukraine, the way forward is difficult to discern – not least because of the conflicting experiences of buffer states in the past.	乌克兰前进的道路还难以辨认——这不仅因为缓冲国过去的经历有矛盾之处。


Kaiser Wilhelm II invaded neutral Belgium to start WWI.	德皇威廉二世入侵中立比利时发动首次世界大战。


Hitler swallowed Austria and Czechoslovakia when it suited him; but Austria's neutrality after 1955 was enough to satisfy the Cold War's two blocs, and now it is part of the EU.	希特勒一待时机成熟就吞并了奥地利和捷克斯洛伐克； 但1955年后奥地利的中立得到了冷战两大阵营的认可，而奥地利现在已成为欧盟成员国。


Likewise, since 1967, Jordan has served as an informal buffer state between Israel and the rest of the Arab world.	同样，1967年后，约旦一直在扮演以色列和阿拉伯世界间非正式的缓冲国角色。


Any future Palestinian state would have to assume a similar position, as Israel would never accept its accession to some hostile military alliance.	未来任何巴勒斯坦国必须承担起类似的任务，因为以色列永远不可能允许它加入敌对军事联盟。


The Franco-German plan for Ukraine calls for a demilitarized zone separating government and separatist forces, and granting what French President François Hollande defined as “rather strong" autonomy to the Russian-speaking eastern regions.	法德乌克兰计划呼吁建立非军事区隔开政府和分裂势力，并赋予法国总统奥朗德 所谓的讲俄语的东部地区以“较强”的自主权。


In other words, it fulfills Russia's vision of a federated Ukraine, whereby the Russian-oriented east would have a say in foreign affairs and security matters.	换言之，它符合俄国的乌克兰“联邦”构想，亲俄的东部地区将拿到外交和安全事务发言权。


But such a plan cannot be counted on to curb Putin's broader revisionist ambitions.	但不能指望借此遏制普京更大的修正主义野心。


Only a united and determined West can do that.	要想实现这一目的，西方必须团结一致、众志成城。


Reviving a Policy Marriage	政策联姻的回归


WASHINGTON, DC – Not long ago, the separation of financial supervision and monetary policy was in vogue in many countries.	发自华盛顿特区——不久之前，许多国家都热衷于将金融监管和货币政策分割开来。


Some countries – like the United Kingdom and Australia – went so far as to unbundle these functions by assigning responsibility for financial stability to specialized agencies and extricating their central banks from financial supervisory issues altogether.	其中有几个国家——比如英国和澳大利亚——走得更远，它们将这些职能分离出来并把维护金融稳定的责任委派给特定机构，使其中央银行能摆脱相关金融监管事务。


In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, however, financial supervision and macroeconomic management have been forced to reunite.	但在最近对全球金融危机的重新检讨中，金融监管和宏观经济管理这两项职能却又被迫重新整合起来。


This rapprochement is a consequence of the growing recognition that asset-price cycles must be taken into account for both macroeconomic management and financial supervision.	这种回潮是源自于一种不断加深的认识，认为宏观经济管理和金融监管都必须考虑资产价格周期的因素。


Prior to the crisis, asset-price cycles were seen by many as basically harmless or, at least, as a relatively insignificant monetary-policy channel.	在危机之前，许多人都认为资产价格周期是一种基本无害，或者至少是相对较不显著的货币政策渠道。


Even when the frequent appearance of asset-price bubbles was acknowledged, most believed that efforts to detect and prick them at an early stage would be impossible – and potentially harmful.	即便是在资产价格泡沫频繁出现的时候，大多人依然相信这些泡沫是不可能——甚至不应该——被提早发现并消除的。


Interest-rate cuts after bubbles burst would be a safer way to safeguard the economy.	而一旦泡沫爆破，利率削减将是一个保护经济的安全之策。


The dominant policy blueprint looked roughly as follows: the monetary authorities’ focus on inflation-targeting in setting interest rates should suffice to maintain price stability and economic growth near its potential rate.	主流的政策蓝图大概是这样的：那些致力于控制通胀的货币主管部门已经足以维持物价稳定并保证经济以其潜在速率增长。


As for financial supervision, stability would be guaranteed by ensuring that individual financial institutions adopt sound prudential rules that preserve capital cushions commensurate with their risk exposure.	在金融监管方面，只要确保金融机构能遵守一套健全的谨慎规则，确保其资本缓冲能力能与所承担风险相对称，那么稳定也是保证的。


While central banks should be in charge of maintaining adequate levels of liquidity in the system, so-called “microprudential” financial regulation should independently oversee financial institutions’ soundness and the protection of depositors.	当中央银行负责保证系统中有充足流动性的时候，所谓“微观谨慎”的 金融监管应当独立监督金融机构的稳健性并对存款人进行保护。


The crisis has shattered the belief that well designed microprudential rules alone are sufficient.	但危机彻底打破了那种认为单凭设计完善的微观谨慎监管系统就万无一失的观点。


It is now increasingly recognized that significant asset-price increases (for example, in real estate or existing equities) may well be reinforced by the pro-cyclical nature of risk assessment embodied in those rules.	因为如今人们逐渐认同这些规则的风险评估体系中存在着延长经济周期的特性，并可能推动显著的资产价格增长（比如在房地产和现有的证券资产）。


What this means is simpler than it sounds: the rising value of collateral tends to be seen as offering higher repayment probabilities.	这一观点的内在含义其实比字面上简单：附属担保品的价值增长一般都会被视为是偿还可能性的提升。


Moreover, if financial institutions follow their own risk assessments when estimating appropriate capital cushions, the costs associated with such provisions decline.	此外，如果金融机构在预备恰当的缓冲资本时以其内部的风险评估标准为依据，那么与这些缓冲储备相关的成本就会降低。


Better repayment prospects and lower regulatory capital costs then fuel the asset-based financing of further acquisition of assets.	于是更佳的偿还前景和更低的资本监管成本将助长以资产为基础的融资行为，帮助其进一步取得更多资产。 。


If asset-price bubbles develop, balance sheets may look sound individually, but the entire network of interlinked asset-liability structures will become increasingly dependent on overvalued collateral, and thus vulnerable to financial contagion.	倘若资产价格泡沫继续扩大，单一企业的资产负债表或许看上去还比较完美，但整个连环资产-债务网络将逐渐依赖于估值过高的附属担保品，并因此容易受到金融腐败的影响。


The unraveling of such a network – through panic and runs against financial institutions, asset fire sales, credit crunches, and the like – then becomes a nightmare for financial supervisors and monetary authorities alike.	而这个网络的破碎和肢解——通过对金融机构的恐慌和敌意，低价甩卖资产，信贷紧缩等——将成为对金融监管这和货币主管部门的噩梦。


Moreover, systemic risks potentially created during periods of booming asset prices escape the purview of macroprudential rules.	此外，系统性风险通常都是在不断上涨的资产价格脱离了宏观谨慎的监管范围时逐渐孕育的。


In the advanced economies at the core of the recent financial crisis, the rules, implicit or explicit, of strict inflation-targeting regimes led monetary authorities to stay put while a massive pyramid of debt was built on a base of overvalued collateral.	在最近遭遇金融危机中的发达国家中，过度着眼于通货膨胀的监管条例（不管是清晰还是模糊的）都使得货币主管部门一方面看着基于估值过高的附属担保品的债务不断积累，另一方面却无动于衷。


Now financial risks are deemed to be sufficiently important for macroeconomic management to warrant regulatory arrangements going beyond that of the microprudential supervisor.	而如今人们对金融风险都有了足够重视，要求宏观经济管理的介入以提供那些超出微观谨慎监管者职能范围的监管安排。


With respect to financial supervision, there has been increasing support since the crisis for countercyclical capital requirements, at least for banks.	在金融监管方面，自危机发生以来对反周期资本需求的支持不断增加（至少对银行来说）。


Capital buffers to absorb losses during the downturn of the cycle can be more easily built during the upswing.	在衰退时吸收损失的缓冲资本更容易在光景好的时候预备下来。


Furthermore, by raising regulatory capital costs in boom times, some counterweight to the pro-cyclical bias intrinsic to financial systems would be introduced.	此外，通过在经济繁荣期提高资本监管成本，还可以引入一些手段来抵消延长金融系统周期的偏向性。


Such countercyclical capital requirements are likely to be added to the toolkit of macroprudential rules and policies, the use of which has risen as enthusiasm for light-touch financial supervision has faded.	这类反周期资本需求将可能被列入到宏观谨慎规则和政策的工具之中，因为人们对过往那种蜻蜓点水式的金融监管已经缺乏热情了。 这些工具包括与借款者的相关特性，贷款额与抵押物价值的比率有关的融资上限；


Those tools include caps, linked to borrowers’ characteristics, on loan-to-value ratios; direct limits on currency and maturity mismatches in financial institutions’ balance sheets; limits on their balance sheets’ interconnectedness; and minimum reserve requirements for specific financial instruments.	直接限制金融机构资产负债表中的货币和到期错配； 限制其各个资产负债表之间的相互关联；


Beyond capital rules, however, monetary policy and financial supervision must cooperate very closely on liquidity management, particularly through credit mechanisms.	然而在资本监管条例之外，货币政策和金融监管必须在流动性监管方面紧密合作，尤其是通过信用机制。


Given modern financial systems’ demonstrated ability to create (and destroy) liquidity endogenously – via financial innovation and global mobility – financial and macroeconomic stability may become more difficult to achieve if monetary instruments and macroprudential tools are not used in a consistent manner.	考虑到现代金融系统人所共知的创造（或销毁）流动性的能力——通过金融创新和全球流动——如果不持续使用货币工具和宏观谨慎工具的话，金融和宏观经济的稳定将更难实现。


Policy harmonization, rather than separation, seems to be the key to happy cyclical endings.	事实上，政策的统一，而非分裂，似乎才是实现良好周期循环的关键。


Reviving Arms Control in Europe	重整欧洲军备控制


BERLIN – European security, to the surprise of many, is under threat once again.	柏林—欧洲安全，出乎许多人意料，再一次受到了威胁。


So, once again, Europe’s security must top our political agenda.	因此，再一次，欧洲安全必须成为我们的政治日程重点。


Even before the Ukraine conflict began in 2014, there were growing signs of a brewing confrontation between rival blocs.	即使在2014年乌克兰冲突爆发前，也已经有越来越多的信号表明对立阵营之间正在酝酿冲突。


This new confrontation, however, is not defined by antagonism between communism and capitalism, but by a dispute over social and political order – a dispute about freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights – as well as by a struggle for geopolitical spheres of influence.	但是，这一新冲突并非由共产主义与资本主义的对立决定，而是由社会和政治秩序纠纷——关于自由、民主、法治和人权的纠纷——以及由地缘政治势力范围斗争决定。


Russia’s annexation of Crimea violated international law and called into question the very foundations of Europe’s security architecture.	俄罗斯吞并克里米亚违反了国际法，也让欧洲安全架构的基础受到了考验。


Moreover, the nature of conflict, as Ukraine has demonstrated, has changed dramatically.	此外，如乌克兰所表明的，冲突的性质已经发生了剧变。


So-called hybrid warfare and non-state actors are playing ever-greater roles.	所谓的混合战争和非国家行动方所起的作用越来越大。


New technologies – offensive cyber capabilities, armed drones, robots, and electronic, laser, and standoff weapons – carry new dangers.	新技术——网络攻击力、武装无人机、机器人以及电子、激光和远距离武器——带来了新危险。


New combat scenarios – smaller units, higher fighting power, faster deployment – are not covered by today’s existing arms-control regimes.	新斗争情景——更小的作战单位、更大的战斗力、更快的部署——无法用当前现有的军备控制机制覆盖。


The danger of a new arms race looms large.	新军备竞赛势在必行。


Ever since the Harmel Report, which redefined NATO strategy back in 1967, the West has followed a two-track approach to its relations with Russia: deterrence and détente.	1967年重新定义北约战略的哈默尔报告（Harmel Report）出台以来，西方对俄关系遵循双轨方针：威慑和缓和。


NATO renewed its commitment to this dual strategy at its Warsaw Summit earlier this summer.	北约在今年夏天早些时候举行的华沙峰会中更新了承诺。


We adopted the necessary measures to provide military reassurance, and at the same time reaffirmed our political responsibility for cooperative security in Europe.	我们采取了必要措施以提供军事保障，与此同时还重申了欧洲安全合作的政治责任。


This dual approach is subject to an inherent difficulty: deterrence is real and visible to everyone; but détente must also be real and visible if it is to play its part.	这一双重方针面临一个内在困境：威慑是实实在在的，人人都能看见； 但要想起到作用，缓和也必须是实实在在的，人人都能看见。


Whenever this policy balance is lost, misperceptions arise, and little remains to counteract the risk of escalation.	只要这一政策平衡被打破，就会出现误解，而能够遏制升级风险的方法少之又少。


To mitigate this risk, we should advance a concrete goal: the re-launch of arms control in Europe as a tried and tested means of risk-reduction, transparency, and confidence building between Russia and the West.	为了遏制这一风险，我们应该推进一个切实的目标：重启欧洲军备控制。 军备控制是曾经尝试过并经受过考验的遏制风险、透明度和在俄罗斯与西方之间构建信心的方法。


Arms-control agreements, history has demonstrated, are not the result of existing trust – they are a means to build trust where it has been lost.	历史证明，军备控制协议并非现有信任的产物——而是在失去信任之处重新构建信任的方法。


In 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear confrontation.	1962年，古巴导弹危机让全世界险些陷入核冲突。


Soon after the crisis – when the US-Soviet relationship was at an all-time low – both superpowers decided that it was time to work across the divide, through small and concrete steps.	这场危机后不久——当美苏关系位于历史谷底时——两大超级大国均决定应该通过切实的小步骤跨越分歧。


This principle was also at the heart of Willy Brandt’s Neue Ostpolitik in the 1960s and 1970s.	这一原则也是20世纪六七十年代威利·布兰特（Willy Brandt）新东方政策的核心。


Today, new and deep rifts have opened up between Russia and the West, and I fear we will not be able to close them in the near future, however hard we try. No one should underestimate the challenges we face in this regard, especially given manifold crises – in eastern Ukraine, Syria, Libya, and elsewhere – at a time when we are not immune from renewed escalation or further setbacks.	如今，俄罗斯与西方之间出现了新的深层裂痕，我担心这一裂痕无法在近期未来弥补，不管我们多么努力。


Only one thing is certain: If we don’t try, peace in Europe and beyond will be tenuous. So we should heed the lesson of détente: however deep the rifts, we must try to build bridges.	我们决不能低估我们在这方面所遇到的挑战，特别是考虑到我们在无法避免新一轮升级或更多挫折的情况下面临多重危机的状况——包括东乌克兰、叙利亚、利比亚等等。


Unfortunately, the existing arms-control and disarmament regimes are crumbling.	不幸的是，现有军备控制和裁军机制举步维艰。


Russia is no longer implementing the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which led to the removal of tens of thousands of tanks and heavy weapons from Europe in the years after 1990.	俄罗斯已不再实施欧洲常规武装力量条约，1990年以来，该条约成功减少了数万辆坦克和重武器。


Likewise, the transparency and confidence-building mechanisms enshrined in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s 2011 Vienna Document have grown increasingly ineffective, and Russia opposes the steps needed to modernize them.	类似地，2011年欧安组织维也纳文件中所包含的透明度和信心构建机制也日益无效，而俄罗斯反对将这些条约现代化所需要的步骤。


The OSCE’s Treaty on Open Skies, too, is being limited in its application.	欧安组织的开放天空条约的应用也在受到限制。


And Russia’s annexation of Crimea has rendered obsolete the Budapest Memorandum.	俄罗斯吞并克里米亚让布达佩斯备忘录变成了一纸空文。


The trust that was carefully accumulated through decades of hard work has been squandered.	通过几十年的艰苦工作小心翼翼地累积起来的信任被挥霍一空。


Yet, at the same time, Russia has repeatedly called for a new debate on conventional arms control in Europe.	但与此同时，俄罗斯一再要求��欧洲常规军备控制进行新的辩论。


In this sense, it is high time to take Russia at its word!	从这个角度讲，信任俄罗斯正当其时！


Re-launching conventional arms control should be based on a principle that was at the heart of Brandt’s Ostpolitik: security in Europe must not be framed as a permanently adversarial process.	重启常规军备控制应该基于一个原则，这一原则也是布兰特的东方政策的核心：欧洲的安全决不能作为一个永久性的对峙过程。


Security is not a zero-sum game.	安全不是零和博弈。


Increased security for one side must not be perceived by the other side as reducing its own security.	一方安全的增加决不能被另一方认为是自身安全的减少。


So, in my view, a re-launch of arms control must cover five areas.	因此，在我看来，重启军备控制必须覆盖五个方面。


We need agreements that:	我们需要这样的协议：


· define regional ceilings, minimum distances, and transparency measures (especially in militarily sensitive regions such as the Baltics);	·       定义地区上限、最小距离和透明度措施（特别是在巴尔干等军事敏感地区）；


· take into account new military capabilities and strategies (smaller, mobile units, rather than traditional, large armies, taking resources such as transport capabilities into consideration accordingly);	·       纳入新军事力量和战略（规模更小的行动单位，而不是传统的规模宏大的军队，并相应地将运输能力等资源也纳入考虑）；


· integrate new weapons systems (for example, drones);	·       纳入新武器系统（比如无人机）；


· permit effective, rapidly deployable, flexible, and independent verification in times of crisis (carried out by, say, the OSCE);	·       允许危机时期采取有效的、可快速部署的、灵活的、独立的确认（比如由欧安组织进行）；


· can be applied where territorial status is disputed.	·       能共适用领土状态存在争议的领域。


On these complex issues, we want to launch a structured dialogue with all those who share responsibility for European security.	在这些复杂问题上，我们需要启动结构化对话，所有对欧洲安全负有共同责任的行动方都要参加。


The OSCE, which Germany is chairing this year, is one important forum for such a dialogue.	今年由德国担任主席国的欧安组织是这一对话的重要场合之一。


It’s not certain that such an undertaking can succeed at a time when world order is eroding and relations with Russia are strained.	在世界秩序沦丧、对俄关系吃紧的时候，这样的举措能否成功尚未可知。


But it would be irresponsible not to try.	但不做尝试是不负责任的。


True, Russia has violated basic principles of peace – territorial integrity, free choice of alliances, and recognition of international law – that are non-negotiable for us in the West.	诚然，俄罗斯违反了西方不容谈判的和平基本原则——领土完整、自由选择盟友，以及承认国际法。


But we must likewise be united in seeking to avoid an upward spiral of antagonism and confrontation.	但我们必须同样团结寻求避免对立与冲突的上升螺旋。


In the West, as in Russia, our world seems increasingly dangerous.	和俄罗斯一样，在西方，我们的世界似乎越来越危险。


Islamist terrorism, savage conflicts in the Middle East, failing states, and the refugee crisis imply risks for all Europe.	伊斯兰恐怖主义、野蛮的中东冲突、国家失败以及难民危机对全体欧洲制造着风险。


Security capabilities on both sides are stretched to the limit.	双方的安全能力都已经达到了极限。


Nobody wins and everyone loses if we exhaust ourselves in a new arms race.	如果我们在新的军备竞赛中耗尽全力，最后没人能成为赢家，所有人都是输家。


By re-launching arms control we can make a tangible offer of cooperation to all those who want to shoulder responsibility for Europe’s security.	通过重启军备控制，我们可以向所有希望承担欧洲安全的行动方提供切实的合作。


It is time to try the impossible.	是时候尝试不可能的任务了。


Renewing the South Korean Miracle	再造韩国奇迹


SEOUL – South Korea’s incoming president, Park Geun-hye, takes over a country that has been a global role model for economic development.	发自首尔——即将登场的韩国新总统朴槿惠接手的是一个曾为全球经济发展楷模的国度。


But, with the economy slowing, it has become a model in need of renewal.	但随着经济不断放缓，韩国已经转变为一个需要复兴的典型。


The so-called “Miracle on the Han River” took root with the reforms initiated by Park’s late father Park Chung-hee, the country’s ruler for much of the 1960’s and 1970’s.	所谓的“汉江奇迹”植根于朴槿惠已故的父亲朴正熙——韩国20世纪60年代到70年代的统治者——所发起的改革。


A measure of South Korea’s success is that it was the first country to make the transition from being a recipient of OECD aid to becoming a donor, with per capita GDP today exceeding $30,000 (in purchasing power parity terms).	韩国的成功体现在它是第一个从经济合作与发展组织（OECD，简称经合组织）受援国转变为捐赠国的国家，而且目前其人均GDP已经超过3万美元（按购买力平价计算）。


But the growth formula that long underpinned South Korea’s success – a form of state-guided capitalism that focuses on export-led manufacturing – is no longer working for many South Koreans.	然而长期支撑韩国成功的增长模式——一种着重于出口导向型制造业的国家宏观调控模式——对很多韩国人来说不再起作用了。


GDP has nearly tripled over the past 20 years, but, with real wages rising at less than half this rate, growth has become decoupled from the fate of ordinary citizens.	GDP在过去的20年里翻了三倍，但实际工资增长还不到GDP增长速度的一半，经济增长与普通市民的境况已经不再息息相关。


More than half of middle-income households spend more each month than they earn.	超过一半的中等收入家庭每个月的支出超过其收入。


The signs of social distress are multiplying.	社会陷入困境的迹象成倍增加。


South Korea’s divorce rate has doubled, fertility rates have fallen to the fourth lowest among advanced economies, and the suicide rate is the highest in the OECD.	韩国的离婚率翻了一倍，生育率在发达国家中位列倒数第四，而自杀率却是经合组织成员国中最高的。


South Korea is troubled for two key reasons. First, although some parts of the economy reached advanced industrialization in record time, other parts (and institutions) are struggling to catch up.	有两大关键因素困扰着韩国：首先，尽管该国经济中的某些部门以创纪录的速度实现了先进工业化，其他部门（以及机构）却仍在苦苦追赶。


Manufacturing conglomerates such as Hyundai, LG, and Samsung have morphed into highly productive global giants whose growth creates fewer high-quality jobs at home than before.	制造业集团如现代、LG和三星已经演变成高效的全球巨头，但它们的增长却导致国内的高质量工作岗位日渐稀少。


Employment at the country’s largest companies is falling, and the share of South Korean jobs at such companies has dropped by one-third since 1995.	该国最大的企业所提供的就业机会正在下降，这些公司提供的岗位占韩国全国工作岗位的比重自1995年以来已经下降了1/3。


But South Korea does not have a well-developed service sector to provide a new source of high-paying jobs.	但韩国并没有一个发达的服务业来提供高收入工作。


Worse, service industries are falling further behind large manufacturers in terms of productivity and wages.	更糟糕的是，服务业在生产率和薪酬方面越来越落后于大型制造商。


This leads to the second challenge: the dire financial straits of middle-income households.	这引发了第二个挑战：中等收入家庭面对严重的财务困境。


Many families now face stagnating wages, owing to the kinds of jobs now available, but are determined to cling to a lifestyle that they can no longer afford.	在目前的工作岗位供应状况之下，很多家庭的工资收入都停滞不前，但他们却都决心维持不再负担得起的生活方式。


Families with children are engaged in an escalating “educational arms race,” devoting large shares of their income to private education and tutoring to prepare children for entrance to elite universities and a shot at a secure job at a major corporation.	有儿女的家庭都忙于进行不断升级的“教育军备竞赛”——把一大部分收入投入到私立教育，好让孩子能进入精英大学最终在大公司求得稳定工作。


Middle-income families also insist on buying homes, despite the highest multiple of home price to income among advanced economies and a housing-finance system that imposes high borrowing costs.	尽管韩国的房价/收入��数是发达国家中最高的，同时其住房金融体系施加了高昂的借贷成本，中等收入的家庭仍旧坚持买房。


South Korean women still drop out of the labor force when they marry or have children; only 38% of families have two wage earners (half the OECD average).	韩国女性在结婚或有孩子后依然像以前一样选择离职回归家庭； 韩国仅有38%的双职工家庭——约为经合组织成员国平均数据的一半。


One of the most pernicious effects of the squeeze on middle-income households and the cost of the educational arms race is a voluntary one-child policy that has reduced the country’s fertility rate to 1.2 births per woman, among the lowest in the industrialized world.	对中等收入家庭的压榨以及高成本教育军备竞赛所造成的最恶劣影响之一是自发的独生子女政策——这让该国的出生率降低到每个妇女生育1. 2个小孩，处于工业化国家中的最低水平。


The population is aging at an accelerating rate, and the net flow of working-age citizens into the labor force has turned negative.	韩国的人口老龄化正在加速，适龄人口进入劳动力大军的净流量已经变成了负数。


Without action, the economy faces the threat of declining consumption and even shrinking output.	再不采取行动，韩国就要面对消费下降甚至总生产萎缩的威胁。


South Korea badly needs measures to relieve the stresses on middle-income finances and a new growth formula based on a globally competitive service sector and entrepreneurial small and medium-size (SME) businesses that create well-paying jobs.	韩国极度需要减轻中等收入家庭财政压力的措施，并需要一个基于具有全球竞争力的服务业、能创造高收入职位的创新性中小企业的增长模式。


Major reforms are necessary to help middle-income families escape crushing monthly payments for housing and education.	韩国需要进行重大改革来协助中等收入家庭摆脱每个月的房价和教育支出高压。


Housing payments are higher because mortgages are of short duration (an average of ten years) and tight loan-to-value restrictions force borrowers to seek additional higher-cost loans from second-tier deposit institutions and non-financial companies.	由于抵押期较短（平均十年），住房支出变得更高了，同时严厉的贷款占总房价比例限制迫使借款人额外从二级存款机构和非金融企业寻求更高成本贷款。


These conditions need to change.	这些情况需要改变。


Because banks would need to accept higher risk, a secondary market for mortgages is necessary.	银行需要去承受更高的风险，因此有必要建立一个抵押贷款二级市场。


Policymakers should also consider measures to reduce demand for home ownership, including relaxing regulations on investment by insurance and other companies in residential housing, thereby creating better rental choices for middle-income households.	决策者也应该考虑采取措施以减少民众的房屋所有权需求——这包括放松对保险公司以及其他企业投资住宅项目的限制，从而为中等收入家庭创造更好的租赁选择。


South Korea also needs to improve its public schools, particularly at the secondary level, and significantly upgrade vocational training.	韩国也需要改善其公立学校，尤其是公立中学，并大力提升职业培训水平。


Families invest in private education because they fear that the public education system will not get their children into elite universities and good jobs.	家庭之所以在私立教育上投资是因为害怕公立教育体系无法让孩子进入精英大学并获得好工作。


“Meister” high schools, introduced in 2010 specifically to prepare young people for high-skilled jobs, are a positive step.	2010年引进的“迈斯特（Meister）模式”高中专门培养年轻人接受高技能的工作，就是积极的一步。


Aggressive development of services – such as transport, retail, and restaurants, which today are dominated by low-productivity, low-paying local businesses, many run by sole proprietors – is another imperative.	服务业的积极发展——比如交通、零售和餐厅，这些行业今天都是由低生产率、低薪的当地企业和个体户所经营——又是另一个必要的措施。


South Korea has excellent opportunities to build up health-care services and to compete in the global medical-tourism business.	韩国有很好的机会来建立医疗服务并在全球医疗旅游业上竞争。


Other tourism, too, can expand to take fuller advantage of cultural and sports attractions.	其他的旅游业也能通过更好地利用文化和体育运动的魅力来发展。


In financial services, the government should aim to produce 3-4 regional champions.	在金融服务业，政府应致力于扶持三到四个区域霸主。


Finally, Koreans must relearn the entrepreneurialism that built the chaebol, the family-owned industrial conglomerates that powered the economy’s development.	最后，韩国人必须重新学习创造了韩国财阀——推动经济发展的家族工业巨头——的创业精神。


Today, South Korea has many small, family-owned businesses, but few entrepreneurs.	今时今日的韩国拥有许多小型家族企业，却极度缺乏企业家人才。


Fostering a more dynamic, innovative SME sector that will produce tomorrow’s globally competitive large companies requires removing disincentives to growth, such as the inheritance-tax exemption for family-owned businesses, which rewards owners for keeping their businesses small.	要培养一个更有活力更能创新，并催生未来具有全球竞争性大企业的中小企业部门就要去除一些不利于经济增长的因素，比如对家族企业的遗产税豁免——这鼓励了企业持有者保持其企业的小规模。


A bankruptcy system that allows entrepreneurs to survive the inevitable failures that accompany innovation, as well as stronger protection of intellectual property and improved access to equity finance, are also needed.	同时还需要一个允许企业家在创新中遭受不可避免的失败后存活下来的破产系统、加强知识产权保护并改善获得股权融资的渠道。


Park takes over at a pivotal point in South Korea’s history.	朴熙惠在韩国历史的关键时刻接管了这个国家。


The new government needs to take the pragmatic steps that can overcome the limitations of today’s economic model and save the country from declining growth, higher unemployment, and rising inequality.	其新政府需要采取务实的措施来克服当前经济模式的限制并把国家从经济增长下滑、失业率上升及贫富差距加大的境况中拯救出来。


The task is no less than to achieve South Korea’s second miracle on the Han River.	从这个任务的艰难程度上来看，可不亚于实现第二次汉江奇迹。


Reviving Europe’s Universities	La nécessaire renaissance des universités européennes


COPENHAGEN -- Writing at home sometime ago, with Wimbledon on TV in the background, it occurred to me that just as Britain hosts the world’s top tennis tournament but never wins it, so we Europeans are in a similar situation with education.	COPENHAGUE -- Un jour que j’étais chez moi en train d’écrire, et que la télévision diffusait un match de Wimbledon en fond sonore, la pensée m’est venue qu’en termes d’éducation, nous autres les Européens étions dans une situation analogue à celle de la Grande-Bretagne qui accueille le plus grand tournoi du monde mais ne le gagne jamais.


The world’s first university was Plato’s Academy in Athens, venerable old universities are scattered across Europe from Coimbra to Cambridge to Copenhagen, and the modern university, uniting research and education, was pioneered by Wilhelm von Humboldt in Berlin.	La première université du monde était l’académie de Platon, à Athènes. Des universités aussi anciennes que vénérables ponctuent l’Europe entière, de Coïmbre à Cambridge en passant par Copenhague, et l’université moderne, alliant recherche et éducation, a été lancée par Wilhelm von Humboldt à Berlin.


Yet today, universities in the United States easily outperform their European counterparts.	Pourtant, aujourd’hui, les universités des États-Unis sont bien meilleures que leurs homologues européennes.


Less than 2% of the European Union’s GDP is devoted to research, compared to 2.5% in the US and 3% in Japan.	Moins de 2 % du PIB de l’Union européenne est consacré à la recherche, comparé à 2,5 % aux États-Unis et à 3 % au Japon.


Spending per student on tertiary education is just over $9,000 in France, slightly under $11,000 in Germany, and almost $12,000 in the UK.	Les dépenses par étudiant dans l’éducation tertiaire représentent un peu plus de 9 000 $US en France, un peu moins de 11 000 $US en Allemagne, et presque 12 000 $US au Royaume-Uni.


Some EU countries, such as Denmark, do better, but still lag far behind the US, which spends more than $25,000.	Quelques pays de l’UE, comme le Danemark, font mieux, tout en restant bien loin derrière les États-Unis, qui dépensent plus de 25 000 $US par étudiant.


Measuring the quality of output is difficult, although The Times Higher Education Supplement attempts to do so every year.	Mesurer la qualité des résultats a beau être un exercice délicat, The Times Higher Education Supplement tente de le faire chaque année.


Only three European universities – Oxford, Cambridge, and Imperial College in London – made it into the top ten in the most recent list; all the rest were American.	Seules trois universités européennes : Oxford, Cambridge et l’Imperial College de Londres, ont réussi à se hisser parmi les dix premières places de la dernière liste ; toutes les autres sont américaines.


Only ten universities from the entire EU have ever made it into the top 50.	Seules 10 universités de toute l’UE ont jamais figuré parmi les 50 meilleures.


Germany’s top university, Heidelberg, ranks 58th.	La meilleure université d’Allemagne, Heidelberg, se classe à la 58e place.


As a result, roughly 400,000 European scholars currently reside in the US, and almost 60% of European citizens who received doctorates in US from 1998 to 2001 chose to remain there.	De ce fait, environ 400 000 universitaires européens résident actuellement aux États-Unis, et presque 60 % des citoyens européens qui ont passé leur doctorat aux États-Unis entre 1998 et 2001 ont choisi d’y rester.


There are twice as many Europeans studying in the US as there are Americans studying in Europe.	Il y a deux fois plus d’Européens étudiant aux États-Unis que d’Américains étudiant en Europe.


Europe’s “education gap” doesn’t stop at the Atlantic.	Le “fossé de l’éducation” européen ne s’arrête pas à l’Atlantique.


China and India represent more than mushrooming factories and low-cost semi-skilled labor.	La Chine et l’Inde ne se limitent pas à des usines-champignons et à de la main d’œuvre à bas prix et peu qualifiée.


Just as in Europe, the industrial revolution in “Chindia” is also creating an ambitious new middle class that is willing and able to send its children to university.	Tout comme en Europe, la révolution industrielle en Chine et en Inde crée une nouvelle classe moyenne ambitieuse, désireuse et capable d’envoyer ses enfants à l’université.


But in today’s world, students and researchers choose a university much as consumers shop in the international marketplace.	Seulement, dans le monde actuel, les étudiants et les chercheurs choisissent une université comme les consommateurs font leurs courses : sur le marché international.


Europe has made some modest efforts to regain university competitiveness.	L’Europe a fait quelques modestes efforts pour rendre ses universités compétitives à nouveau.


In March 2000, EU leaders meeting in Lisbon set the goal of making Europe the world’s most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy by 2010, and two years later they agreed that investment in R&D must reach 3% of GDP by 2010.	En mars 2000, la rencontre des dirigeants de l’UE à Lisbonne s’est fixé le but de faire de l’Europe l’économie basée sur le savoir la plus compétitive et la plus dynamique du monde d’ici 2010, et deux ans plus tard ces mêmes pays se sont mis d’accord pour que l’investissement en R&D atteigne 3 % du PIB d’ici 2010.


Such ambitious goals, however unrealistic, can have a disciplining effect, leading some EU countries to increase their spending, while the EU itself has launched a number of promising schemes.	Des objectifs si ambitieux, aussi irréalistes soient-ils, peuvent provoquer une dynamique de discipline, et pousser certains pays de l’UE à augmenter leurs dépenses, alors même que l’UE a lancé un certain nombre de programmes prometteurs.


The seventh Framework Program, worth some €50 billion – a 40% increase over the sixth program – is perhaps the most prominent funding source tool through which the EU supports R&D activities.	Le septième programme-cadre, d’une valeur de quelque 50 milliards d’euros, soit une augmentation de 40 % par rapport au sixième programme, est peut-être le moyen de financement le plus important par lequel l’UE soutient les activités de R&D.


But the EU and European governments must do more.	Mais l’UE et les gouvernements européens doivent faire davantage.


Overall spending is still dwarfed by US federal research and development spending, which will total $137 billion in the 2007 fiscal year.	Les dépenses globales semblent encore dérisoires comparées au budget fédéral consacré à la recherche et au développement, qui se montera à 137 milliards de dollars pour l’année fiscale 2007.


European leaders must therefore substantially increase research funding when the EU budget is next due for revision in 2008 and 2009.	Les dirigeants européens devront augmenter de façon substantielle le financement de la recherche quand le budget de l’UE sera révisé en 2008 et 2009.


Although the core financial burden will be on the member states, the EU level can make an important contribution.	Bien que le cœur du fardeau financier repose sur les États-membres, l’UE peut faire à son niveau une contribution importante.


Moreover, although the European Commission clearly has a duty to prevent mismanagement and fraud, every application for EU funding requires extremely onerous procedures.	En outre, même si la Commission européenne a clairement le devoir de d’empêcher la mauvaise gestion et la fraude, il se trouve que chaque demande de financement de l’UE demande des procédures extrêmement onéreuses.


Eliminating bureaucratic red tape, as the Commission has now pledged to do, would be a substantial boon to European researchers.	L’élimination de la paperasserie, à laquelle la Commission s’est engagée, constituerait une véritable aubaine pour les chercheurs européens.


Finally, Europe must place more emphasis on basic research.	Enfin, l’Europe doit insister davantage sur la recherche fondamentale.


Of course, our scientists should respond to current problems in society.	Certes, nos scientifiques doivent répondre aux problèmes de la société actuelle.


But if basic research is neglected, attempts to produce quick innovations through applied research will be futile.	Mais si l’on néglige la recherche fondamentale, les tentatives d’innovations rapides par la recherche appliquée s’avèreront improductives.


Basic research is the primary organism in the food chain of scientific endeavor.	La recherche fondamentale est l’organisme de base de la chaîne alimentaire de l’effort scientifique.


The European Research Council, which is to award research grants on the basis of peer-reviewed excellence, will therefore be an important step forward, and the EU should further increase its funding.	Le Conseil européen de la recherche, qui devra accorder des bourses de recherche sur la base de l’excellence jugée par des pairs, constituera par conséquent un important progrès, au financement duquel l’UE devra participer de manière plus conséquente.


But just throwing money at universities isn’t enough.	Mais jeter de l’argent aux universités ne suffit pas.


As the former Financial Times editor Richard Lambert, together with Nick Butler, commented in a report published by London’s Centre for European Reform entitled The future of European universities: Renaissance or decay? , EU governments are stuck in a vicious circle: “The universities will get no more money unless they reform, and they cannot reform without more money”.	Comme le commentaient Richard Lambert, ancien rédacteur en chef du Financial Times , et Nick Butler, dans un rapport intitulé The future of European universities: Renaissance or decay? publié par le Centre for European Reform de Londres, les gouvernements de l’UE sont coincés dans un cercle vicieux : “Les universités n’obtiendront pas plus d’argent sans se réformer, et elles ne peuvent entamer de réformes sans davantage d’argent.


The Danish government has sought to break free from this vicious circle by introducing reforms before pledging to increase budgets.	Le gouvernement danois a cherché à se libérer de ce cercle vicieux en introduisant des réformes avant de promettre une augmentation des budgets.


In 2003, Denmark’s universities were turned into self-governing institutions run by governing boards dominated by external representatives.	En 2003, les universités du Danemark ont été transformées en institutions autogérées, dirigées par des conseils d’administration dominés par des représentants extérieurs.


Last year, the government merged 12 universities into eight in order to achieve substantial economies of scale, and the Danish parliament approved a nearly 50% increase in government spending on research by 2010.	L’année dernière, le gouvernement a fait fusionner douze université en huit afin de réaliser de substantielles économies d’échelle, et le parlement danois a approuvé une augmentation de presque 50 % des dépenses gouvernementales dans le domaine de la recherche d’ici 2010.


The Danish case highlights the pivotal role of governance reform if Europe is ever to meet its Lisbon goals.	Le cas danois souligne le rôle pivot de la réforme des modes de gouvernance si l’Europe veut atteindre les objectifs fixés à Lisbonne.


The University of Copenhagen’s mergers with the Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University and the Danish University of Pharmaceutical Sciences have made it the largest university in Scandinavia.	La fusion de l’Université de Copenhague avec l’Université vétérinaire et agricole royale et avec l’Université danoise des sciences pharmaceutiques en a fait la plus grande université de Scandinavie.


We now aspire to becoming the most significant health and life science research center in Europe, owing to a remarkable cluster of knowledge based 5,000 researchers, an excellent medical school, 11 university hospitals, and a thriving biotech business environment that already includes market leaders in diabetes and neuroscience.	Nous aspirons aujourd’hui à devenir le plus important centre de recherches sur la santé et la vie d’Europe, grâce à un regroupement de 5 000 chercheurs, une excellente école de médecine, 11 centres hospitaliers universitaires et un environnement biotechnologique commercial florissant, qui comprend déjà des leaders du marché dans le domaine du diabète et des neurosciences.


Until we embarked on governance reform, this would probably have been impossible.	Cela aurait sans doute été impossible avant que nous ne nous lancions dans des réformes de gouvernance.


Our experience so far has taught us that university managers should not accommodate rising student populations by inflating their core business.	Notre expérience actuelle nous enseigne que les dirigeants des universités ne doivent pas accueillir le nombre croissant d’étudiants en se contentant d’augmenter leurs activités de base.


However fierce the global competition, they should concentrate on safeguarding quality and achieving excellence in research and education.	Si féroce que soit la compétition mondiale, ils doivent se concentrer sur la sauvegarde de la qualité et sur la quête de l’excellence dans le domaine de la recherche et de l’éducation.


Reviving Georgia’s Western Dream	Reviving Georgia’s Western Dream


Georgia’s recent instability has dealt a blow to its international reputation as a new democracy, and poses a challenge to the European Union as well.	格鲁吉亚最近的不稳定沉重打击了它作为一个新兴民主国家的国际名声，同时也对欧盟提出了挑战。


Faced with street protests in November, President Mikheil Saakashvili claimed that Russian-Georgian tycoon Badri Patarkatsishvili was conspiring to bring down the government.	面对11月份出现的街头抗议活动，萨卡什维利总统宣称俄罗斯-格鲁吉亚大亨帕塔尔卡齐什维利正在密谋推翻政府。


So he closed the opposition-leaning private Imedi TV station (owned by Patarkatsishvili) and introduced a state of emergency for nine days, before calling an early presidential election for January 5.	因此他下令关闭了亲反对派的私有的伊梅季电视台（帕塔尔卡齐什维利是该电视台的所有人），并且实行九天的紧急状态。 此前他已经下令在1月5日提前进行总统选举。


Ever since Saakashvili’s inauguration in January 2004, following the 2003 “Rose Revolution,” Georgia’s government has displayed EU flags on official occasions.	自从萨卡什维利通过2003年的“玫瑰革命”最终在2004年1月上台以来，格鲁吉亚政府在官方场合一直悬挂欧盟的旗帜。


Georgians share that enthusiasm.	格鲁吉亚人也怀着这样的梦想。


A poll conducted by the International Republican Institute in September 2007 indicated that 81% of Georgians support joining the EU.	国际共和学会在2007年9月进行的一项民意调查显示有81%的格鲁吉亚人支持加入欧盟。


But, regardless of the election’s outcome, the recent crisis exposes a lack of commitment by the EU to security and democracy in Georgia.	但是，不管这次选举的结果如何，最近的危机显示了欧盟在保护格鲁吉亚的安全和民主上还做得很不够。


Despite Georgia’s strategic location on the Black Sea, bordering Russia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey – and on a key trade route linking the EU, Iran, Russia, and Central Asia – Europe has dragged its feet on the country’s most enduring political problems.	尽管格鲁吉亚与俄罗斯、阿塞拜疆和土耳其接壤，并且处于连接欧盟、伊朗、俄罗斯和中亚的重要贸易线路上，占据着黑海的战略位置，但是欧洲在这个国家最持久的政治问题上却表现得迟缓误事。


On the Georgian side, It is well understood – at least by the political elite – that EU membership is a distant prospect at best.	对于格鲁吉亚来说，这很好理解，至少政治精英们是这样理解的，即成为欧盟的成员国至多是一个遥远的憧憬。


This weakens the political importance of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), an initiative developed in 2004 to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors.	这削弱了欧洲邻国政策的政治重要性，该政策是2004年制定的，用以避免扩大的欧盟与其邻国因新的分界线而出现紧急事件。


An EU-Georgia ENP Action Plan was signed in November 2006, but it is unlikely to meet expectations.	2006年11月欧盟与格鲁吉亚签订了一份欧洲邻国政策行动计划，但是它不太可能达到双方预想的状况。


Indeed, the ENP comes second to co-operation with NATO as a priority for Georgia, in part because Georgians, feeling threatened by Russia, crave security above all.	事实上，欧洲邻国政策在其重要性上被格鲁吉亚排在与北约合作的后面，这部分是因为格鲁吉亚感觉受到俄罗斯的威胁，而把安全问题放在首要的位置。


Moreover, while the recent state of emergency was a serious setback, NATO membership, unlike EU accession, is still within reach.	此外，尽管最近的紧急状态是一个严重的倒退，相比加入欧盟而言，北约成员国资格依然还是有可能获得的。


This makes all the difference.	这使两者的地位变得截然不同。


The security interests of Georgia and the EU coincide least when it comes to the so-called “frozen conflicts” in the Kremlin-backed breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia – it is no accident that “Promoting Peaceful Resolution of Internal Conflicts” ranks only sixth among the ENP Action Plan’s priorities.	在受到克里姆林宫支持的试图脱离国家的阿布哈兹和南奥塞梯所谓的“冻结冲突”的问题上，欧盟与格鲁吉亚并没有太多共同的安全利益。 这并非偶然，因为在欧洲邻国政策行动计划中，“推动国内冲突的和平解决”只排在首要考虑的问题的第六位。


Georgia wants a reluctant EU to be more engaged, but each side understands engagement differently.	格鲁吉亚希望欧盟能够更多地介入进来，但是双方对于介入的理解并不相同。