But time and again, researchers and health workers in Bangladesh have demonstrated their expertise at containing cholera outbreaks and saving lives.	但一次又一次，孟加拉国的研究者和卫生工作者证明他们在遏制霍乱爆发和拯救生命方面的专业精神。


As the world looks for new ways to curb opportunistic epidemics, it must not overlook the science that developing countries already possess.	当世界寻找遏制机会型疫情（opportunistic epidemics）的新方法时，决不能忽视发展中国家的现成的科学知识。


Cholera is back in the Global South.	霍乱在全球南方卷土重来。


But, as our work in Bangladesh demonstrates, the Global South has the skills to beat it.	但是，我们在孟加拉国的工作证明，全球南方拥有击败它的本事。


Convicts for Export	服刑人员出口


NEW DELHI – China has devised a novel strategy to relieve pressure on its overcrowded prisons: employ convicts as laborers on overseas projects in the developing world.	新德里——中国发明了一项新策略，来缓解监狱人满为患的压力： 雇佣服刑人员在发展中国家的海外项目中充当劳动力。


The practice has exposed another facet of China’s egregious human-rights record, which, when it comes to the overseas operations of Chinese companies, includes the government’s failure to enforce its own regulations.	这种状况暴露了中国糟糕人权记录的另外一个侧面，也就是当涉及到中国公司的海外经营时，政府无法严格执行自己制定的法律。


China executes three times as many people every year as the rest of the world combined.	中国每年处决的犯人是世界其他国家总和的三倍。


Amnesty International has estimated that, in 2007, China secretly executed on average “around 22 prisoners every day.”	据大赦国际2007年估计，中国秘密处决的罪犯平均“每天约为22人”。


In addition to being the world’s leading executioner, China has one of its largest prison populations.	除了是世界执行人数最多的国家外，中国监狱的服刑人数也居世界首位。


The 2009 “World Prison Population List” compiled by the International Center for Prison Studies at King’s College, London, put the total number of inmates in Chinese jails at 1.57 million – larger than the population of Estonia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Swaziland, Trinidad & Tobago, Fiji, or Qatar.	2009年由伦敦英皇学院国际监狱研究中心编纂的《世界监狱人口列表》将中国监狱的总收容人数确定为157万——比爱沙尼亚、几内亚比绍、毛里求斯、斯威士兰、特立尼达和多巴哥、斐济货卡塔尔的人口还要多。


The forced dispatch of prisoners to work on overseas infrastructure projects raises new issues regarding China’s human-rights record.	向海外基建项目强制派遣服刑人员提出了有关中国人权记录的新问题。


It also adds a new element — the dumping of convicts — to its trade and investment policy, which has been much criticized for dumping goods.	它也为中国因为货物倾销而饱受批评的的贸易和投资政策增加了一项新的元素。


Thousands of Chinese convicts, for example, have been pressed into service on projects undertaken by state-run Chinese companies in Sri Lanka, a strategically important country for China as it seeks to enhance its regional position in the Indian Ocean.	例如，数千名中国服刑人员被强制派往驻斯里兰卡的中国国有企业项目工地工作，中国试图增强自己在印度洋的区域地位，而斯里兰卡在这方面的战略意义非常重要。


After providing Sri Lanka’s government with offensive weapon systems that helped end the country’s decades-long civil war, China has been rewarded with port-building, railroad, and other infrastructure projects.	在为斯里兰卡政府提供攻击性武器系统，帮助这个国家结束了长达10年的内战后，中国得到了建设港口、铁路和其他基础设施的项目作为回报。


Chinese convicts also have been dispatched to the Maldives, where the Chinese government is building 4,000 houses on several different islands as a government-to-government “gift” to win influence.	中国服刑人员也被派到了马尔代夫，中国政府正在那里的几个岛上建设4，000栋房屋，作为获取影响力的政府对政府的“礼物”。


So far, however, China has failed to persuade the country’s president to lease it one of the 700 uninhabited Maldivian islands for use as a small base for the Chinese navy.	但到目前为止，中国还未能说服马尔代夫总统租借700个马尔代夫无人小岛中的一个，建设中国海军的小型基地。


Chinese companies’ operating practice for overseas projects, including in Africa, is to keep the number of local workers to a bare minimum and to bring in much of the workforce from China, some of which comprises convicts “freed” on parole for project-related overseas work.	中国企业在非洲等海外项目中的经营惯例是将当地工人人数控制在最低限度，而绝大多数劳动力则从中国国内抽调，这些人员中有时就包括假释的服刑人员。


Convict laborers, like the rest of the Chinese workforce on such projects, are housed near the project site.	服刑人员和其他中国劳工一样，居住在项目工地的附近。


That way, if any convict worker escaped, he would be easy to find in an alien setting.	这样的话，如果有任何服刑工人逃跑，那么他在陌生环境中很容易被发现。


In theory, such practices run counter to regulations promulgated by the Chinese commerce ministry in August 2006, in response to a backlash against Chinese businesses in Zambia following the death of 51 Zambian workers in an explosion at a Chinese-owned copper mine.	按理说，这样的做法与中国商务部2006年8月颁布的法规不符，之所以颁布这项法规是因为当时赞比亚的中国国有铜矿发生爆炸，51名赞比亚工人丧生导致爆发了针对中国企业的集体抗议活动。


These regulations called for “localization,” including hiring local workers, respecting local customs, and adhering to safety norms.	上述法规号召企业实行“本地化”，包括雇佣当地员工，尊重当地习俗并遵守各项安全规范。


During an eight-nation 2007 African tour, Chinese President Hu Jintao made a point of meeting with Chinese businesses to stress the importance of corporate responsibility in their local dealings.	在2007年访问非洲八国期间，中国主席胡锦涛在与企业界的会晤中强调了在当地开展业务时企业责任的重要性。


Moreover, in October 2006, the State Council – China’s cabinet – issued nine directives ordering that Chinese overseas businesses, among other things, “pay attention to environmental protection,” “support local community and people’s livelihood cause,” and “preserve China’s good image and its good corporate reputation.”	此外，2006年10月，国务院——也就是中国内阁发布了9项指令，命令中国企业尤其要“注意保护环境”、“支持当地社会和国民的民生事业”和“维护中国的良好形象和企业信誉。 ”


But Chinese regulations are sometimes promulgated simply to blunt external criticism, and thus are seldom enforced, except when a case attracts international attention.	但中国有时出台法律只是为了减少国外的批评，因此除非某个案例引发了国际关注，否则也很少会真正执行。


For example, in 2003 China enacted a law on environmental-impact assessments, which was followed in 2008 by “provisional measures” to permit public participation in such assessments.	比如，中国在2003年通过了环境影响评估法，2008年又接着出台了允许公众参与上述评估的“临时措施”。


Yet Chinese leaders remain more zealous about promoting exports and economic growth than in protecting the country’s air and water.	但中国领导人仍然更加热衷于推动出口和经济增长，而不是保护国内的水源和空气。


Similarly, the State Council’s 2006 nine directives to Chinese overseas companies have been subordinated to the drive for exports and growth, even when it imposes environmental and social costs on local communities abroad.	同样，国务院2006年对中国海外企业的九项指令更多地服从于推动出口和增长的目标，即使这种增长增加了当地社会的环境和社会成本也在所不惜。


Indeed, as part of the government’s “going global” policy, Chinese companies are offered major incentives and rewards for bagging overseas contracts and boosting exports.	事实上，作为政府“走出去”政策的组成部分，囊括海外合同、促进出口的中国企业可以拿到丰厚的奖励。


The use of convict laborers adds a disturbing new dimension to this strategy.	服刑劳工的使用为这项政策增添了令人不安的新问题。


But even before convicts became part of China’s overseas development effort, some Chinese projects, especially dam-building schemes, were embroiled in disputes with local communities in Botswana, Burma, Pakistan, Ghana, and Sudan.	但即使在服刑人员参与中国海外开发项目之前，有些中国项目，特别是大坝修建计划，已经在博茨瓦纳、缅甸、巴基斯坦、加纳和苏丹卷入了与当地社区的冲突。


In fact, several small bombs exploded less than three months ago at the site of Burma’s Myitsone Dam, whose construction by a Chinese company in insurgency-torn Kachin State is displacing thousands of subsistence farmers and fishermen by flooding a wide swath of land.	实际上，几枚小型炸弹不到三个月前在缅甸的密松大坝工地爆炸，中国企业在饱受叛乱蹂躏的克钦邦修建大坝需要淹没成千上万农民和渔民赖以生存的大片的土地。


Chinese companies cannot get thousands of prisoners released on their own, let alone secure passports and exit permits for them.	中国企业仅靠自身的力量无法释放数千名服刑人员，更不用说为他们办理护照和出国许可证。


It is obvious that the practice of pressing convicts into service on overseas projects has been instituted at the instance of the Chinese government.	很显然要求服刑人员参与海外项目的真正实施者是中国政府。


Until the Chinese government’s treatment of its own citizens and those of other countries is guided by respect for basic human rights and the rule of law, China is unlikely to command the respect that it seeks on the world stage.	除非中国政府以尊重基本人权和法治的方式去对待本国和其他国家的公民，否则不大可能得到它在国际舞台上希望得到的那种尊重。


Time for Helicopter Money?	从直升机上撒钱的时机到了？


WASHINGTON, DC – “Out of ammo?” The Economist recently asked of monetary policymakers.	华盛顿——《经济学家》杂志最近询问货币政策决策者，“你们是不是没有弹药了？


Stephen Roach has called the move by major central banks – including the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank, and the Bank of Sweden – to negative real (and, in some cases, even nominal) interest rates a “futile” effort that merely sets “the stage for the next crisis.”	”斯蒂芬·罗奇形容包括日本、欧洲和瑞典央行在内的各大央行推行负实际利率（某些情况下，甚至是负名义利率）之举为“徒劳无功”，仅仅是“为下一次危机铺平了道路”。


And, at the February G-20 finance ministers meeting, Bank of England Governor Mark Carney reportedly called these policies “ultimately a zero-sum game.”	而且，在2月召开的20国集团财长会议上，据报道英格兰银行行长马克·卡尼将上述政策称之为“终极零和游戏。


Have the major advanced economies’ central banks – which have borne the burden of sustaining anemic post-2008 recoveries – really run out of options?	”这些一直承担着2008年后维持弱复苏任务的主要发达经济体央行是否真的已经别无选择？


It certainly seems so.	看上去确实如此。


Central-bank balance sheets have swelled, and policy rates have reached their “near zero” lower bounds.	央行的资产负债表已经膨胀，而政策利率已经达到“接近零”的下限目标。


There is plenty of cheap water, it seems, but the horse refuses to drink.	看似廉价的水在四处流淌，但马儿却不肯喝。


With no signs of inflation, and growth still tepid and fragile, many anticipate chronic slow growth, with some even fearing another global recession.	因为看不到通胀迹象，而且经济增长依然温和而脆弱，很多人预计全球经济将长期增长缓慢，有些人甚至担心全球衰退将再次爆发。


But policymakers have one more option: a shift to “purer” fiscal policy, in which they directly finance government spending by printing money – a so-called “helicopter drop.”	但决策者们还有一个方案：那就是转向“纯粹的”财政政策，即通过印钞来直接推动政府支出——这就是所谓“从直升机上撒钱战术。


The new money would bypass the financial and corporate sectors and go straight to the thirstiest horses: middle- and lower-income consumers.	”新增货币将绕过金融和企业部门，直接流向最缺水的马：即中低收入消费者。


The money could go to them directly, and through investment in job-creating, productivity-increasing infrastructure.	这笔钱可以通过投资就业机会创造和提高生产率的基础设施直接为他们所用。


By placing purchasing power in the hands of those who need it most, direct monetary financing of public spending would also help to improve inclusiveness in economies where inequality is rising fast.	通过为最需要的人提供购买力，公共支出的直接货币融资还将有助于让不平等快速上升的经济体更加包容。


Helicopter drops are currently proposed by both leftist and centrist economists.	从直升机上撒钱的战略目前得到了左翼和中间派经济学家的一致赞成。


In a sense, even some “conservatives” – who support more public infrastructure spending, but also want tax cuts and oppose more borrowing – de facto support helicopter drops.	在某种意义上，就连某些支持扩大公共基础设施支出但同时希望减税并反对扩大借贷的保守派人士同样在事实上支持从直升机上撒钱。


Recently, more radical proposals have surfaced, reflecting a sense of urgency and widespread disappointment with the impact of current monetary policy.	最近，更多激进的提案已经浮出水面，这反映出民众对当前货币政策影响的紧迫感和普遍失望。


Beyond advocating higher minimum wages, some are calling for “reverse income policies,” with governments imposing across-the-board wage increases on private employers – a move that would drive up prices and defeat deflationary expectations.	除倡议提高最低工资外，有些人正在呼吁实行“逆向收入政策”，即要求政府强制私营雇主实行全面的工资上涨——此举将推动价格上涨并战胜通缩预期。


The fact that economists whose views typically fall nowhere near those of the far left are even thinking about such interventionism shows just how extreme circumstances have become.	就连那些观点一贯与极左翼人士相去甚远的经济学家都在考虑实行上述干预政策表明实际局面已经变得多么极端化。


I favor all of these proposals, in some form.	从某种意义上讲，我支持所有这些提案政策。


The details of their implementation would obviously have to vary, depending on each economy’s circumstances.	上述政策的执行细节当然会有所不同，这取决于各个经济体的不同状况。


Germany, for example, is in a strong position to implement a reverse income policy, given its huge current-account surplus, though there would undoubtedly be major political barriers.	比方说德国有很好的条件来执行“逆向收入政策”，因为其拥有巨额经常账户盈余，虽然无疑要克服重大的政治障碍。


More spending on education, skills upgrading, and infrastructure, however, is a no-brainer almost everywhere, and is politically more feasible.	但扩大教育、技术升级和基础设施支出在任何地方都是无需思考即可作出的决策，而且在政治上的可行度更高。


But there is another dimension of the challenge that has so far not been emphasized nearly enough, despite the warnings of Carney, Roach, and others.	但迄今为止挑战的另一方面还强调得远远不够，尽管卡尼、罗奇和其他人已经提出过警告。


Zero or negative real interest rates, when they become quasi-permanent, undermine the efficient allocation of capital and set the stage for bubbles, busts, and crises.	当零负实际利率成为准永久性政策，就会破坏资金的有效配置，为泡沫、萧条和危机打下基础。


They also contribute to further income concentration at the top by hurting small savers, while creating opportunities for large financial players to benefit from access to savings at negative real cost.	此类政策还将损害小储户的利益，促进收入进一步在顶层集中，同时它还将创造机会，让实际成本为负的储蓄资金惠及大型金融机构。


As unorthodox as it may sound, it is likely that the world economy would benefit from somewhat higher interest rates.	虽然听上去与正统观点相去甚远，但某种程度上稍高一些的利率将会为世界经济带来好处。


Raising interest rates cannot, however, be a stand-alone policy.	但加息绝不能是一项孤立的政策。


Instead, small policy-rate increases must be incorporated into a broader fiscal and distributional strategy, implemented alongside more public spending on infrastructure and skills upgrading, as well as some gentle forms of income policies, employing, for example, “moral suasion.”	相反，必须将小幅的政策利率升高纳入到更广泛的财政和分配政策，扩大基础设施和技术升级领域的公共支出，并同时执行某些形式更加温和的收入政策，比方说开展“道义劝说”。


Even with such an approach, however, major central banks would have to coordinate their policies.	即使实行这样的策略，各大央行也必须协调相关政策。


If a single major central bank attempted to introduce higher interest rates, its economy would immediately be “punished” through currency appreciation, declining competitiveness, and falling exports, all of which would undermine aggregate demand and employment.	如果单一央行试图提高利率，其国内经济将立即通过货币升值、竞争力下降和出口下降而遭到“惩罚”，所有这些都将破坏总需求和就业状况。


If the major central banks decided to increase their policy rates simultaneously, these spillover effects would cancel one another out.	如果各大央行决定同时提高政策利率，上述溢出效应将会互相抵消。


A coordinated move, perhaps raising rates in two modest 25 or 30 basis-point increments, would be neutral in terms of exchange rates and short-term competitiveness, even as it moved real interest rates back into positive territory.	一次经过充分协调的行动，也许仅需加息两次，每次25或30基点，既能将真实利率调回正值区间，又对汇率和短期竞争力构不成太大影响。


If successful, this effort could eventually be followed by further small increases, creating space for more traditional monetary-policy “ammunition” to be deployed in the future.	如果成功，可以继续执行小幅加息政策，从而创造空间，以便在未来部署更多传统意义上的货币政策“弹药”。


Success also hinges on the simultaneous pursuit of fiscal expansion worldwide, with each country’s efforts calibrated according to its fiscal space and current-account position.	最终的成功还取决于世界各国同时实行财政扩张政策，各国的扩张程度应当与其国内财政空间和经常账户状况相对照。


The expansion should finance a global program of investment in physical and human infrastructure, focusing on the two key challenges of our time: cleaner energy and skills for the digital age.	财政扩张政策应资助实体和人力基础设施投资领域的全球计划，重点应对我们这个时代两大关键挑战：洁净能源和数字时代技术。


A coordinated and well-timed policy package could boost global growth, improve capital allocation, support a more equitable income distribution, and reduce the danger of speculative bubbles.	时机恰当、协调统一的政策组合可以促进全球经济增长、改善资本配置、支持更加公平的收入分配，同时控制投机泡沫的爆发。


The various meetings in the run-up to the G-20 summit in China, including the spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, would be ideal forums for designing such a package, and advancing its implementation.	中国20国集团会议召开前的一系列会议，包括国际货币基金和世界银行春季会议，将是设计上述组合政策并推进其落实的理想讨论场所。


Economic orthodoxy and independent actions have clearly failed.	经济正统理论和单独行动显然已经失败。


It is time for policymakers to recognize that innovative international policy cooperation is not a luxury; sometimes – like today – it is a necessity.	是时候让决策者认识到创新国际政策合作并非奢侈品； 有时——比方说今天——就必须执行这样的合作。


The Better Corporation	更好的公司


LONDON – Around the world, the corporate governance landscape is shifting, as efforts to improve business practices and policies gain support and momentum.	伦敦—放眼世界，公司治理版图正在发生变化，改善商业实践和政策的努力赢得了支持和动力。


The wave of reform has become visible everywhere – from tough new regulations in Japan to sovereign wealth funds like Norway’s Norges Bank Investment Management taking a more active approach to their investments – and it is certain to continue to rise.	改革浪潮随处可见——日本采取了严厉的新监管措施； 挪威央行投资管理公司（Norges Bank Investment Management）等主权财富基金对于投资也采取了更加积极的方针——并且这一浪潮必然还会继续兴盛。


Three factors are driving these developments.	三个因素推动了这些发展趋势。


First, today’s deep economic uncertainty has broadened ordinary people’s awareness of the influence that companies have on politics, policy, and their own daily lives.	首先，当今深刻的经济不确定性扩大了普通民众对于公司对政治、政策和他们的日常生活的影响的认识。


And, as I have noted previously, people are not only paying greater attention; they also have more power than ever before to make their voices heard.	此外，正如我此前所指出的，人们不但更加关注，也拥有了比以往更大的力量让他们的声音被听到。


Second, there has been a burgeoning awareness among governments that economic growth requires a proactive regulatory approach.	其次，越来越多的政府认识到经济增长需要前瞻性监管方法。


Robust and resilient economies need strong businesses, and to build strong businesses, governments must play a role in ensuring high-integrity oversight of business activity.	强韧的经济需要强大的企业，而要想建设强大的企业，政府必须在确保高度整体地监督商业活动方面起到作用。


Company stewardship and country stewardship are increasingly linked, and authorities now recognize that paying to ensure good governance now is far less costly (both financially and politically) than paying for the consequences of bad governance later.	公司管理和国家管理联系日益紧密，如今当局认识到，花钱确保好治理比花钱收拾坏治理的烂摊子成本低得多（不管是财务上还是政治上）。


In Japan, the Financial Services Agency enacted a Stewardship Code in 2014, with a Corporate Governance Code from the Tokyo Stock Exchange entering into force this June.	日本金融厅在2014年实施了一项管理办法（Stewardship Code），今年6月，东京证交所的公司治理办法（Corporate Governance Code）开始生效。


By creating a more equal environment among shareholders, ensuring more disclosure and transparency, specifying the responsibilities of company boards, and requiring outside independent directors on company boards, the codes enshrine changes that make Japan more attractive for foreign investors.	这些办法为股东创造了更加平等的环境，确保了更多的披露和透明度，具体定义了公司董事会的责任，并且要求公司董事会设置独立董事，这些变革将增加日本对外国投资者的吸引力。


More generally, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has emphasized that good corporate governance is critical to long-term economic growth and prosperity.	在更一般的层面上，首相安倍晋三强调好的公司治理是长期经济增长与繁荣的关键。


Toshiba’s recent accounting scandal – the company was found to have inflated its profits by ¥151.8 billion ($1.2 billion) over several years since 2008 – presents an opportunity for Japan’s government to demonstrate its seriousness about the new regulations.	最近的东芝会计丑闻为日本政府提供了一次证明其是否严肃对待新监管措施的机会。 东芝被发现在2008年以来的多年中虚增利润1,51.


Toshiba CEO Hisao Tanaka and other senior executives have had to resign; the interim CEO apologized to Abe’s office; Norio Sasaki, the company’s vice chairman and former CEO, has quit his posts on government panels; and the former chairman of Toshiba’s audit committee has stepped down from the government accounting panel.	公司副董事长兼前CEO佐佐木则夫（Norio Sasaki）退出政府委员会； 东芝审计委员会前主席也从政府会计委员会去职。


In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission enacted a rule at the beginning of August requiring public companies to disclose the pay gap between workers and CEOs.	美国证券与交易委员会（SEC）从8月初开始实施一项规则，要求上市公司披露员工与CEO之间的薪酬差距。


Corporate behavior and governance has emerged as a campaign issue for US presidential candidates.	公司行为和治理已成为美国总统选战的一个话题。


Hillary Clinton gave a speech at the end of July decrying “quarterly capitalism” that chases short-term growth at the expense of sustainable business development, as well as addressing the exponential growth of CEO pay, and the need for a minimum-wage increase.	希拉里·克林顿在7月底的演讲中谴责“季度资本主义”（quarterly capitalism）追求短期增长而牺牲可持续商业发展，并批评了CEO薪酬的指数式增长，指出有必要提高最低工资。


The European Union and its member states are also taking an increasingly active approach to corporate governance, including regulations concerning boardroom diversity.	欧盟及其成员国也在对公司治理采取日益积极的方法，包括关于董事会多元化的监管措施。


Italy, France, Spain, Norway, and others have all enacted boardroom gender quotas, with companies required to fill 30-40% of independent board seats with women.	意大利、法国、西班牙、挪威和其他一些国家都规定了董事会性别比，公司独立董事席位的30—40%必须由女性担任。


The latest example can be found in Germany, where, after much debate, new quotas require that from 2016 large companies fill 30% of non-executive board seats with women.	最近的例子是德国，在经历了激烈的争论后，新的性别比要求，从2016年开始，大公司非执行董事席位的30%必须是女性。


The third, and perhaps most important, factor underpinning recent changes in corporate governance has been the sharp rise in cross-border investing.	第三个，也许是最重要的一个推动当前公司治理变化的因素是跨国投资的迅速兴起。


Sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, global investment banks, and hedge funds do not invest only in their own backyard.	主权财富基金、退休基金、全球投资银行和对冲基金并不只投资于自己的后院。


They scour the planet looking for places to put their money, and they expect companies that receive it to play by rational rules.	他们翻遍全球寻找投资目标，并且希望获得投资的公司根据理性的规则行事。


The Olympus scandal of 2011-2012 – when investigations in Japan, the United Kingdom, and the US revealed that company executives falsified accounts to hide losses of ¥117.7 billion – is a watershed example of a traditional closed corporate culture coming up against international scrutiny.	2011—2012年的奥林巴斯丑闻是传统封闭型公司文化与国际监督的碰撞的分水岭事件。 日本、英国和美国的调查发现奥林巴斯高管做假账隐瞒1,17.


As the full extent of the cover-up was revealed, foreign investors, like GIC Private Limited (Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund), rebelled.	7亿日元亏损。 丑闻的盖子被揭开后，新加坡政府投资公司（GIC Private Limited，新加坡的主权财富基金）等外国投资者反应强烈。


Singapore sold nearly all of its 2% stake almost immediately, and other foreign investors and analysts reacted similarly.	新加坡几乎立刻将其2%的持股基本全部卖出，其他外国投资者和分析师的反应也差不多。


It was a turning point for Japan, as the country’s clubby investment culture came up against global transparency and accounting standards.	这是日本的一个转折点，该国的排外投资文化与全球透明度和会计标准发生了正面冲突。


Things have not been the same since, either for Japan or for companies’ understanding of the expectations and influence of international investors.	自此以后局面就有了变化，不管是日本还是公司对国际投资者的预期和影响的理解。


International investors are in a unique position to encourage, or even enforce, global best practices in corporate governance.	国际投资者地位独特，他们能够鼓励甚至强制执行公司治理全球最佳实践。


If such investors show that they are willing to withdraw financing, they will gain real influence in bringing about sustainable change – to the benefit of us all.	如果这些投资者表现出他们准备收回资金，就能形成真正的影响力带来持续变化——让我们所有人都受益。


This is especially true if investors are guided by principles that go beyond financial returns.	如果投资者所遵循的指导原则不只限于财务回报，情况就更加如此了。


Global funds that uphold high ethical standards concerning labor practices and environmental protections are safeguarding the global ecosystem on which they, and the rest of us, depend.	坚持劳动和环境保护高道德标准的全球基金在捍卫全球生态系统，他们以及我们其他所有人都需要依赖这一生态系统。


As they establish and implement such principles, the resulting momentum has been changing corporate governance and behavior across industries and regions.	随着他们树立并实施这些原则，由此产生的动能在改变各行业、各地区的公司治理行为。


This is evident from several high-profile examples.	许多人们耳熟能详的例子证明了这一点。


CalPERS (the California Public Employees’ Retirement System), a $300 billion pension fund, has published its corporate governance principles, which include boardroom diversity, fair labor practices, and environmental protection.	拥有3,000亿美元的退休基金CalPERS（加利福尼亚公职人员退休金系统）发布了其公司治理原则，内容包括了董事会多元化规则、劳动公平规则、环境保护规则等。


Norges Bank Investment Management, Norway’s $870 billion sovereign wealth fund (the largest in the world), has also pushed for changing governance rules, including separating the role of chief executive and chairman and better reporting by companies on how they are addressing climate change.	拥有8,700亿美元的主权财富基金挪威央行投资管理公司（世界最大规模）也推动了治理规则的变化，包括将首席执行官和董事长的角色相分离以及要求公司更好地报告治理气候变化行为等。


The shift in emphasis on best-practice corporate governance is real, and it is here to stay.	强调最佳实践公司治理的变化是实实在在的，并且还会继续下去。


It comes from people finding and raising their voices, from politicians recognizing the importance of corporate governance for sustainable economic growth, and from influential investors putting genuine pressure on companies to change their behavior.	它来自人们的发现和提高他们的声音，来自政客认识到公司治理对于可持续经济增长的重要性，来自有影响力的投资者给公司真正的压力促使它们改变行为。


Companies and boards ignore this trend at their peril.	公司和董事会如果忽视这一趋势，将付出沉重代价。


GDP Should Be Corrected, Not Replaced	应被修正而非取代的GDP


ZURICH – Respected economists have long pointed out that gross domestic product is an inadequate measure of economic development and social well-being, and thus should not be policymakers’ sole fixation.	发自苏黎世——许多有名望的经济学家早就指出，国民生产总值（GDP）不是一个衡量经济发展和社会福祉的恰当标准，因此不应成为政策制定者唯一关注的东西。


Yet we have not gotten any closer to finding a feasible alternative to GDP.	然而我们至今都还无法找到一个更可行的GDP 替代指标。


One well-known shortcoming of GDP is that it disregards the value of housework, including care for children and elderly family members.	GDP有一个众所周知的缺陷就是无视家务劳动的价值，包括照顾儿童和老年家庭成员。


More important, assigning a monetary value to such activities would not address a deeper flaw in GDP: its inability to reflect adequately the lived experience of individual members of society.	更重要的是，将货币价值分配给这些活动也无法解决GDP的一个更深层次缺陷：它无法充分反映社会个别成员的生活经验。


Correcting for housework would inflate GDP, while making no real difference to living standards.	针对家务劳动的价值矫正会令 GDP 膨胀，却不会对生活标准产生切实的改变。


And the women who make up a predominant share of people performing housework would continue to be treated as volunteers, rather than as genuine economic contributors.	在从事家务劳动者中占主要份额的妇女将继续被视为志愿者，而不是真正的经济贡献者。


Another well-known flaw of GDP is that it does not account for value destruction, such as when countries mismanage their human capital by withholding education from certain demographic groups, or by depleting natural resources for immediate economic benefit.	另一个路人皆知的缺陷则是它没有考虑到价值的破坏，例如当某些国家拒绝为某些人口群体提供教育导致人力资本流失，或者过度消耗自然资源以获取直接经济利益。


All told, GDP tends to measure assets imprecisely, and liabilities not at all.	总而言之，GDP 在衡量资产有所偏差，而对负债就根本不管了。


Still, while no international consensus on an alternative to GDP has emerged, there has been encouraging progress toward a more considered way of thinking about economic activity.	然而，虽然尚未就GDP替代指标的问题达成国际共识，但在对经济活动进行更周全的思考方面已经取得了可喜的进展。


In 1972, Yale University economists William Nordhaus and James Tobin proposed a new framework, the “measure of economic welfare” (MEW), to account for sundry unpaid activities.	1972年耶鲁大学经济学家威廉·诺德豪斯（William Nordhaus）和詹姆斯·托宾（James Tobin）提出了一个名为“经济福利尺度” (Measure of Economic Welfare)的框架来涵盖各类不收取报酬的活动。


And, more recently, China established a “green development” index, which considers economic performance alongside various environmental factors.	最近中国也建立了一个“绿色发展”（green development）指数，将经济绩效与各种环境因素一并考虑在内。


Moreover, public- and private-sector decision-makers now have far more tools for making sophisticated choices than they did in the past.	此外，公共和私营部门的决策者们如今也可以借助更多的工具去做出比过去更为成熟的选择。


On the investor side, demand for environmental, social, and governance data is rising steeply.	在投资者方面，对环境、社会和治理数据的需求正在急剧上升。


And in the public sector, organizations such as the World Bank have adopted metrics other than GDP to assess quality of life, including life expectancy at birth and access to education.	在公共部门方面，世界银行等组织采用了一系列GDP 以外的指标来评估生活质量，包括出生时预期寿命和受教育机会。


At the same time, the debate around gross national income has been gaining steam.	与此同时，围绕国民总收入（Gross National Income，GNI）的争论也日趋激烈。


Though it shares fundamental elements with GDP, GNI is more relevant to our globalized age, because it adjusts for income generated by foreign-owned corporations and foreign residents.	虽然它与GDP有着基本的关系，但 GNI 与我们这个全球化时代更相关，因为它针对外国企业和外国居民所产生的收入进行了调整。


Accordingly, in a country where foreign corporations own a significant share of manufacturing and other assets, GDP will be inflated, whereas GNI shows only income the country actually retains (see chart).	因此在一个外国企业在制造业和其他资产中占有较大份额的国家，GDP 将会膨胀，而 GNI 只显示该国实际留存下来的收入 (见图表)。


Ireland is a prominent example of how GNI has been used to correct for distortions in GDP.	爱尔兰就是一个表明 GNI 如何被用来修正GDP扭曲的突出例子。


In 2015, Ireland’s reported GDP increased by an eye-popping 26.3%.	在2015年，爱尔兰报告说 GDP 出现了26. 3%的惊人增长。


As an October 2016 OECD working paper noted, the episode raised serious questions about the “ability of the conceptual accounting framework used to define GDP to adequately reflect economic reality.”	但正如2016年10月经合组织的一份研究报告所指出的那样，这一事件引发了对“用于定义GDP以充分反映经济现实的概念性会计框架的能力”的严重质疑。


The OECD paper went on to conclude that GDP is not a reliable indicator of a country’s material well-being.	该经合组织的文件接着得出结论，认为GDP不是衡量一个国家物质福祉的可靠指标。


In Ireland’s case, its single year of astonishing GDP growth was due to multinational corporations “relocating” certain economic gains – namely, the returns on intellectual property – in their overall accounting.	爱尔兰在该年实现的惊人 GDP 增长实际上是由于跨国企业将某些经济收益——因知识产权产生的回报——在其总体会计中“挪了个位置”。


To address the growing disparity between actual economic development and reported GDP, the Irish Central Statistics Office introduced a modified version of GNI known as GNI*) for 2016.	为解决实际经济发展与纸面GDP之间差距日益悬殊的问题，爱尔兰中央统计办公室在2016采用了修订后的GNI版本(名为GNI*)。


The gap between GDP and GNI will likely close soon in other jurisdictions, too.	GDP和GNI之间的差距也可能很快在其他司法辖区内得到弥合。


In a recent working paper, Urooj Khan of Columbia Business School, Suresh Nallareddy of Duke University, and Ethan Rouen of Harvard Business School highlight a misalignment in “the growth in corporate profits and the overall US economy” between 1975 and 2013.	在最近发布的一份工作文件中，哥伦比亚大学商学院的乌鲁吉·汗（Urooj Khan），杜克大学的苏雷什·那拉雷迪（Suresh Nallareddy）以及哈佛商学院的伊森·卢恩（Ethan Rouen）指出了在1975~2013年间“企业利润和美国整体经济增长”之间的失调。


They find that, during that period, average corporate-profit growth outpaced GDP growth whenever the domestic corporate-income-tax rate exceeded that of other OECD countries.	他们发现在这一时期，当国内企业所得税率高于其他经合组织国家时，企业利润增长的平均值就会超过了 GDP 增长。


In late December, this disconnect was addressed with the passage of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.	在去年12月下旬通过的2017年减税和就业法案就是为了解决这种脱节问题。


By lowering the corporate-tax rate to a globally competitive level and granting better terms for repatriating profits, the tax package is expected to shift corporate earnings back to the United States.	通过将公司税率降低到具备全球竞争力的水平并给予更好的利润归国条件，该税收计划有望将企业收益转移回美国。


As a result, the divergence between GDP and GNI will likely close in both the US and Ireland, where many major US corporations have been holding cash.	因此美国和爱尔兰的GDP和 GNI 差距很可能会缩小——美国的许多主要企业都在两地持有现金。


Looking ahead, I would suggest that policymakers focus on three points.	展望未来，我建议政策制定者关注三点。


First, as demonstrated above, the relevant stakeholders are already addressing several of the flaws in GDP, which is encouraging.	首先，如上所述，相关的利害关系方已经在解决GDP中的一些缺陷，这是令人鼓舞的。


Second, public- and private-sector decision-makers now have a multitude of instruments available for better assessing the social and environmental ramifications of their actions.	第二，公共和私营部门的决策者现在可以选择多种工具来更好地评估自身行动的社会和环境影响。


And, third, in business one must not let the perfect become the enemy of the good.	第三，在商业中，你不能让完美成为优秀的对立面。


We have not solved all of the problems associated with GDP, but we have come a long way in reducing many of its distortions.	我们并未解决与GDP有关的所有问题，但我们在减少其许多扭曲方面已经走了很长的路。


Instead of seeking a new, disruptive framework to replace current data and analytical techniques, we should focus on making thoughtful, incremental changes to the existing system.	我们应该专注于对现有的系统进行深思熟虑的、渐进性的改变，而不是寻求一个新的、破坏性的框架来取代当前的数据和分析技术。


The Education Antidote to Radicalization	用教育化解激进化


DUBAI – No visitor to the Middle East can avoid noticing the yawning gap between the educational, entrepreneurial, and occupational aspirations of the region’s young people and the harsh reality that deprives so many of them of a positive future.	迪拜—只要你来到中东，就一定会注意到该地区青年的教育、企业家精神和职业志向与剥夺他们大多数人的积极为来的严酷现实之间的巨大差距。


Indeed, in the Middle East, half of those aged 18-25 are either unemployed or underemployed.	事实上，在中东，有一半的18—25岁群体处于失业或半失业状态。


Aggravating this situation is the global refugee crisis, which has displaced some 30 million children, six million from Syria alone, very few of whom are likely to return home during their school-age years.	全球难民危机令这一状况雪上加霜。 难民危机导致3,000万儿童流离失所，光是叙利亚就有六百万，其中极少部分有望在学龄阶段返回家园。


It should come as no surprise that the group known in the region as Daesh (the Islamic State) believes that it can find fertile ground for recruitment in this vast population of dispossessed and disaffected young people.	因此，毫不奇怪该地区称为达伊莎（Daesh，即伊斯兰国）的集团相信它能够在这个为数巨大的无产且不满的年轻人群体中轻松募集人手。


Daesh propagandists are misusing social media in the way that their extremist predecessors and contemporaries have sometimes misused mosques – as a forum for radicalization.	达伊莎宣传家滥用社交媒体，正如他们的极端主义前辈和同辈有时滥用清真寺——将它用作激进化的论坛。


The group consistently posts content that challenges the possibility of coexistence between Islam and the West and calls young people to jihad.	该集团一直在发布抹杀伊斯兰教和西方共存可能性的内容，号召年轻人加入圣战。


The grotesquely violent videos that Daesh produces have shock appeal.	达伊莎所制作的令人发指的暴力视频具有极大的冲击力。


But what really attracts disaffected young people is the invitation to be part of something that seems larger than themselves and the societies in which they live.	但真正吸引不满青年的是他们获邀加入比他们自身和他们所生活的社会更宏大的事业中。


Shiraz Maher of the International Center for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR) at King’s College London identifies a common thread of sentiment among recruits: “righteous indignation, defiance, a sense of persecution, and a refusal to conform.”	伦敦国王学院国际激进化研究中心（ICSR）的希拉兹·马赫（Shiraz Maher）发现这些达伊莎新兵之间有一个共同点：“义愤、反抗、感到受到迫害，拒绝妥协”。


As a recent Quilliam Foundation report concludes, Daesh plays on the youthful desire to be part of something worthwhile; it is the organization’s utopian appeal that is most alluring to new recruits.	最新的奎利安姆基金会（Quilliam Foundation）报告认为，达伊莎利用青年的渴望作为价值的一部分； 该组织的乌托邦诉求是对新圣战斗士吸引力最大的东西。


Given this, few would disagree that we find ourselves in a generational battle for hearts and minds that cannot be won by military means alone.	因此，没有人可以否认我们陷入了一场关于心灵和思想的代际战争，这场战争不可能只靠军事手段获得胜利。


Hard power can eliminate Daesh’s hardcore leaders.	硬实力可以清除达伊莎的强硬领袖。


But we will need more than that to convince nearly 200 million young Muslims that extremism is, quite literally, a dead end.	但我们还需要其他手段让近2亿穆斯林青年相信，极端主义绝对是一条死路。


There are many examples of under-the-radar operations working to counter extremism across the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East: children’s magazines in Pakistan, videos aimed at teenagers in North Africa, radio stations in the Middle East, and books and publications opposing Al Qaeda.	在印度次大陆和中东，有大量未被注意到的有效抵御极端主义的例子：巴基斯坦儿童杂志、面向北非十几岁青少年的视频、中东广播电台，以及反对基地组织的书籍和出版物。


They can help to expose the truth about life in Daesh – that it is brutal, corrupt, and prone to internal purges – in several ways, including by drawing attention to defections.	它们有助于以多种方式、包括将注意力吸引到背叛方面来揭露达伊莎的真正生活，揭露其残酷、腐败、动辄内部清洗的本质。


As a 2014 report states, “[the very existence of defectors] shatters the image of unity and determination that [the group] seeks to convey.”	一份2014年的报告指出：“[存在背叛者这一事实]打破了团结的形象，也打破了[该集团]试图展现的决心。 ”


But we must be more ambitious if we are to win the war of ideas, sustaining the cultural space that Daesh calls the “the grey zone,” which it longs to destroy. It is a space in which Muslims and non-Muslims can coexist, discover their shared values, and cooperate.	但如果我们想要打赢这场人心之战，维持达伊莎称之为“灰色地带”、一直试图摧毁的文化空间，就必须有更大的雄心。


Peter Neumann, the director of the ICSR, has proposed a YouTube contest for videos that explain the failings of Daesh.	在这个空间中，穆斯林和非穆斯林实现共存，发现他们的共同价值，并精诚合作。


“You would receive 5,000 videos in no time,” he says. “Four thousand are junk, but 1,000 of them are effective – 1,000 videos against [Daesh] propaganda.”	ICSR主任彼得·纽曼（Peter Neumann）提出举行一次Youtube竞赛，评比解释达伊莎失败之处的视频：“你会立刻收到5,000个视频，”他说，“其中4,000个是垃圾，但其他1,000个很有效——1,000个反[达伊莎的]宣传。


The best long-term tool for countering extremism, however, is education.	但是，打击极端主义的最佳长期工具是教育。


In Jaffa, Israel, a school run by the Church of Scotland teaches the virtues of tolerance to Muslim, Jewish, and Christian children.	在以色列雅法（Jaffa），一家由苏格兰圣公会（Church of Scotland）经营的学校向穆斯林、犹太人和基督徒儿童传授宽容的美德。


Throughout Lebanon, a common school curriculum championing religious diversity – including the “refusal of any radicalism and religious or sectarian seclusion” – is being taught to Sunni, Shia, and Christian children starting at the age of nine.	在黎巴嫩，支持宗教多样化的共同学校课程——包括“拒绝一切激进化和宗教或世俗隔离”——正在面向九岁以上逊尼派、什叶派和基督徒儿童开设。


The country has also introduced double shifts in its school system to accommodate some 200,000 Syrian refugee children.	黎巴嫩还在学校系统中引入了双班倒，以接收200,000叙利亚难民儿童。


If troubled Lebanon, wracked by sectarian violence and religious divides, can champion coexistence and provide Syrian refugees with a chance to study, there is no reason other countries in the region should not follow its example.	深陷宗派暴力和宗教分裂的黎巴嫩都能宣传共存、为叙利亚难民提供学习的机会，其他中东国家也没有理由不效仿它的榜样。


The choice could not be clearer.	选择显而易见。


We can stand by and watch a new generation of web-savvy Muslim youth be deluged with false claims that Islam cannot coexist with Western values.	我们可以袖手旁观新一代精通网络的穆斯林青年受到伊斯兰教无法与西方价值共存的错误主张的荼毒。


Or we can recognize that the young people of the Middle East and the rest of the Muslim world share the aspirations of young people in every other part of the world.	我们也可以认识到中东和穆斯林世界其他地区的青年与全世界青年有着共同的志向。


All the evidence indicates that the region’s young people want education, employment, and the chance to make the most of their talents.	所有证据都表明，中东地区青年渴望教育、就业和充分发挥才能的机会。


Our resolution for 2016 should be to make that happen.	2016年，我们应该以实现他们的这些渴望为目标。


Can We Have Too Much Sex?	多频繁的性爱能令我们快乐？


LONDON – “Sex is like money,” John Updike wrote, “only too much is enough.”	发自伦敦——“性爱就像钱一样，” 约翰·厄普代克（John Updike）写道，“是个多多益善的东西”。


As it turns out, that is not strictly true, at least not in the context of monogamous relationships.	然而事实证明这并非完全正确，至少在一夫一妻制的关系中并非如此。


So how much sex is enough?	那么究竟多频繁的性爱才算足够？


In 2015, a group of University of Toronto-based psychologists set out to find out.	在 2015年，一群多伦多大学的心理学家们开始了对这个问题的探寻。


In their study, “Sexual Frequency Predicts Greater Well-Being, But More is Not Always Better,” Amy Muise, Ulrich Schimmack, and Emily Impett revealed that there is, in fact, a precise rate of sex that, for the average couple, optimally benefits the partners’ wellbeing: once per week.	在他们的研究中，“性爱的频率预示着更美满的生活，但越多并不总是意味着越好,” 艾米·穆斯（Amy Muise），乌利希·施马克（Ulrich Schimmack），和艾米莉·因佩特（Emily Impett）发现，事实上对那些普通夫妇来说存在一个精确的频率可以为生活带来正面影响：那就是每周一次。


The study found that the difference in wellbeing for people in relationships who engage in sex once per week, compared with those who have sex less than once per month, was greater than the difference in wellbeing for those earning $75,000 versus those making $25,000.	这项研究发现，每月性生活少于一次与每周有一次性生活的人之间的幸福感差异要大于年收入2. 5万美元与7.


In other words, having sex four times as much boosted participants’ moods as much as an additional $50,000 per year would do.	5万美元的人之间的差距。 换句话说，频率高出四倍的性生活对受试者情绪的激励作用相当于每年增收5万美元。


But, just as having sex too infrequently can leave couples less happy, having sex too frequently can end up being more stressful than pleasurable, particularly if busy couples feel under pressure to do so.	但正如过少的性生活会让夫妻不那么开心一样，过于频繁的性生活会带来的也是更大的压力而非愉悦，尤其是本已忙碌的夫妇感觉自己不得不去做的时候。


Yet such pressure – stemming, at least partly, from social expectations and comparisons – is very real.	而这种压力——至少部分源自于社会期望和比较——是非常真实的。


The University of Colorado sociologist Tim Wadsworth, in his 2014 study, “Sex and the Pursuit of Happiness: How Other People’s Sex Lives are Related to our Sense of Well-Being,” repeats Updike’s assertion that sex is like money.	科罗拉多大学社会学家蒂姆·华斯沃夫（Tim Wadsworth）在其2014发表的《性和对幸福的追求：其他人的性生活如何与我们的幸福感有关》研究中重复了厄普代克的判断：性就像金钱。


But, in Wadsworth’s argument, what they have in common is that they both derive value from comparison.	但在华斯沃夫看来，两者的共同点在于都能从比较中获得价值。


As Wadsworth points out, past research has shown that it is not absolute income levels that determine happiness, but rather income levels relative to those around you – the colleagues, neighbors, former classmates, and others who form your reference group.	华斯沃夫指出，过去的研究表明，确定幸福感的不是绝对收入水平，而是相对于你周围的人的收入水平——同事、邻居，前同学和其他构成你参考组的人。


That is why a rising income does not necessarily bring a corresponding increase in happiness: it is crucial that the incomes of one’s reference group aren’t also rising.	这也是为何收入的增加不一定会带来相应的幸福感增长：因为至关重要的一点在于参考群体的收入不能也随之增加。


Similarly, Wadsworth’s survey found that respondents who believe that they have more sex than their reference group are happier, while those who believe that their cohorts are having more sex than them are less content.	同样的，华斯沃夫的调查发现，那些认为自己比自身参考组拥有更频繁性生活的受访者会更快乐，而那些认为自己附近的人比自己的性生活更多的人则不那么满意。


Wadsworth therefore concludes that happiness is positively correlated with one’s own sexual frequency, but negatively correlated with the sexual frequency of others.	因此，华斯沃夫认为一个人的幸福感与自身性生活频率呈正相关，但与其他人的频率负相关。


But, beyond a certain point – roughly once per week, apparently – the benefits that a couple derives from sex wane.	但在超过某个频率后（显然大概是每周一次），一对夫妇从性生活中获得的幸福感就会出现衰减。


This suggests that there is more to the relationship between sex and happiness than keeping up with the Joneses.	这表明，性与幸福感之间的关系要比单纯的攀比更紧密。


And, in fact, by putting pressure on couples to have sex as often as possible, the sense of competition may be doing more harm than good.	而事实上，通过给夫妻施加压力让他们尽可能多地做爱，这种竞争的结果可能弊大于利。


A recent study – “More Than Just Sex: Affection Mediates the Association Between Sexual Activity and Well-Being” – offers a novel theory regarding the link between sex and happiness.	最近的一项研究——《不仅仅是性爱：关爱对性生活和幸福感之间联系的调和作用》——提供了一个关于性与快乐之间联系的新理论。


Its authors – Anik Debrot, Nathalie Meuwly, Amy Muise, Emily Impett, and Dominik Schoebi – contend that the true power of sex in a relationship lies in the capacity of sex to foster a stronger connection between partners through shared affection, not just shared pleasure.	其作者安妮克·德波特（Anik Debrot）、纳塔莉·莫里（Nathalie Meuwly）、艾米·穆斯（Amy Muise），艾米莉·因佩特（Emily Impett） 和多米尼克·斯楚比（Dominik Schoebi）认为性在一段关系中的真正力量取决于性可以在伴侣之间通过分享关爱来建立一种更强的联系，而不仅仅是分享快感。


The authors even suggest that sex and affection could compensate for each other in supporting wellbeing, with increased affection counterbalancing reductions in sexual activity during some life phases, such as just after childbirth – a period sometimes associated with higher risk for infidelity in male partners.	作者们甚至认为，性和关爱可以在支撑幸福感方面互相弥补，在生命的某些阶段关爱的增加可以抵消性活动减少的负面作用，比如刚刚分娩后——该时期有时与男性伴侣表现不忠的风险呈现更高相关性。


The idea is that more alternative expressions of affection may help to sustain wellbeing, thereby decreasing the temptation to stray (though, because men generally report higher sexual desire, they may rely more on sex as a way of experiencing affection than the average woman does).	对此的看法是更多的替代性关爱表达方式可能有助于维持幸福感 ，从而减少到别处拈花惹草的诱惑 ( 不过因为男性一般自认有更高的性欲望 ，所以相对于一般女性来说他们可能会更依赖性作为一种体验关爱的方式)。


It seems that psychology may rebut Updike’s dictum that only too much sex is enough.	这样看来心理学似乎驳斥了厄普代克关于性是多多益善的格言。


In fact, while regular sex is vital to promote intimacy and foster happiness through shared affection, more is not always better.	事实上，虽然经常性的性爱对于促进亲密关系以及通过分享关爱来孕育幸福感是至关重要的，但更多并不总意味着更好。


So sex may be like money, but only in that too little is bad.	所以性可能就像金钱，但只有在太少时才是坏的。


The Holy Grail of Genetic Engineering	基因工程的圣杯


HONG KONG – Since its introduction four decades ago, genetic engineering has been a source of high hopes for health, agriculture, and industry.	香港—自从四十年前诞生以来，基因工程便被卫生、农业和工业界寄予厚望。


But it has also provoked deep anxiety, not least owing to the laborious nature of the genome-editing process.	但由于基因编辑过程的复杂性，它也引起了深刻的忧虑。


Now, a new technique, CRISPR-Cas, offers both precision and the ability to modify the genome text at several places simultaneously.	如今，一种新技术——CRISPR-Cas既具备了精确性，又能够同时修改多处基因组文本。


But this has not eliminated reason for concern.	但担忧的原因并未就此消除。


The genome can be viewed as a kind of musical score.	基因组可以视为一种乐谱。


Just as sheet music tells musicians in an orchestra when and how to play, the genome tells the cell’s component parts (generally proteins) what they must do.	正如活页乐谱让乐队的乐师们知道何时演奏，基因组让细胞各组成部分（主要是蛋白质）知道应该干什么。


A score may also include notes from the composer, showing possible changes, frills that can be added or omitted depending on the circumstances.	乐谱还应该包括作曲家的注释，说明可能的变奏，可以根据具体情况添加或省略的音符。


For the genome, such “notes” emerge from cell survival over many generations in an ever-changing environment.	对基因组来说，这些“注释”来自多代细胞从不断变化的环境中的生存过程。


The DNA genetic program is akin to a fragile book: the order of its pages can change, with some even being moved to another cell’s program.	DNA基因计划就像是一本被活页的书：页码顺序可以改变，一些页面甚至可以移植入其他细胞的程序。


If a page is, say, laminated, it is less likely to be damaged as it is moved around.	比如，将一个页面叠起来，就能降低移动的过程中受到损坏的可能性。


Likewise, elements of a genetic program protected by a solid coating are better able to invade a variety of cells, and then to reproduce as the cell reproduces.	类似地，基因程序中的要素，如果有坚固的外衣保护，就能更好地侵入不同的细胞，然后随着细胞的复制而得到复制。


Ultimately, that element becomes a virus, spreading rapidly.	最终，这一要素变成一种病毒并迅速传播。


The next step is for the cell that reproduces a virus, whether useless or harmful, to develop some way to resist it.	下一步，复制了无用或者有害病毒的细胞要发展出抵抗它的办法。


And, in fact, it was in this manner – as a bacteria’s defense against invading viruses – that the CRISPR-Cas process first emerged.	事实上，CRISPR-Cas过程第一次出现就是以这种方式——作为细菌对入侵病毒的抵抗。


That process allows acquired characteristics to become inherited.	这一过程让获得的特征能够得到遗传。


In the course of a first infection, a small fragment of the viral genome – a kind of signature – is copied into the CRISPR genomic island (an extra piece of genome, outside of the parent genome text).	在首次感染过程中，病毒基因组的一个小碎片——一种签名——被复制进入CRISPR基因组岛（一片亲代基因组文本之外的额外的基因组）。


As a result, the memory of the infection is retained across generations.	结果，感染的记忆在代际间得到了保留。


When a descendant of the cell is infected with a virus, the sequence will be compared to the viral genome.	当一个后代细胞被病毒感染时，这一序列会拿来与病毒基因组比较。


If a similar virus has infected a cell’s parent, the descendant will recognize it, and ad hoc machinery will destroy it.	如果相似的病毒已经感染过细胞的亲代，则后代就能识别它，特别机制就会摧毁它。


This complex process took many decades for scientists to decipher, not least because it controverted standard theories of evolution.	这一复杂的过程耗费了科学家好几十年去破译，因为这否定了标准的进化论。


But now scientists have figured out how to replicate the process, enabling humans to edit, with the utmost precision, specific genomes – the Holy Grail of genetic engineering for nearly 50 years.	但如今，科学家已经弄清楚了如何去复制这一过程，让人类能够最精确地编辑具体的基因组——这便是近50年来的基因工程圣杯。


This means that scientists can apply the CRISPR-Cas mechanism to correct problems in the genome – the equivalent of typos in a written text.	这意味着科学家可以运用CRISPR-Cas机制来纠正基因组中的问题——相当于文本中的拼写错误。


For example, in the case of cancer, we would want to destroy those genes that allow the multiplication of tumor cells.	比如，以癌症为例，我们想摧毁那些让肿瘤细胞激增的基因。


We are also interested in introducing genes in cells that never gained them by natural genetic transfer.	我们还想向细胞中引入它们永远无法通过自然基因传输获得的基因。


There is nothing new about these objectives.	这些目标都早已有之。


But, with CRISPR-Cas, we are far better equipped to achieve them.	但是，有了CRISPR-Cas，我们就获得了实现这些目标的“大杀器”。


Previous techniques left traces in the modified genomes, contributing, for example, to antibiotic resistance.	此前的技术会在被改写的基因组中留下痕迹，导致（比如）抗生素耐药性。


A mutation obtained by CRISPR-Cas, by contrast, is not distinguishable from a mutation that emerged spontaneously.	反之，通过CRISPR-Cas获得的变异，无法与自然发生的变异相区分。


That is why the US Food and Drug Administration has ruled that such constructs do not need to be labeled as genetically modified organisms.	因此，美国食品和药品监督局判定这类构造无需标注为转基因生物体。


Previous techniques were especially arduous if one needed to modify several genes, because the process would need to occur sequentially.	如果要修改多个基因的话，此前的技术将极其费力，因为这一过程需要按照顺序进行。


With CRISPR-Cas, the ability to perform genome modifications simultaneously has already enabled the creation of fungi and apples that do not oxidize, or turn brown, when they come into contact with air – a result that required several genes to be deactivated simultaneously.	在CRISPR-Cas的帮助下，同时进行基因组修改的能力已经能够创造出与空气接触后也不会氧化或便褐色的真菌和苹果——这一结果要求同时给多个基因去活。


Such apples are already on the market, and are not considered genetically modified organisms.	这类苹果已经上市，并不被认为是转基因产品。


Other applications are in development.	其他运用正在开发中。


The so-called gene drive procedure for manipulating the genome could diminish the harm caused by disease-carrying insects.	所谓的操纵基因组的基因驱动程序能够减少携病昆虫所造成的伤害。


Targeted modification of gametes in mosquitoes – the world’s deadliest animal to humans – would render them incapable of transmitting a virus or parasite.	定向编辑蚊子配子——蚊子是全世界致人死亡数量最多的动物——能够让它们无法传播病毒或寄生虫。


But the application of CRISPR-Cas must be approached with care.	但应用CRISPR-Cas必须谨慎。


While the technology could prove a boon in the fight against many deadly diseases, it also implies serious – and potentially entirely unpredictable – risks.	该技术可以成为消灭许多致命疾病的福音，也可能隐含严重的——并且可能是完全不可预料的——风险。


For starters, because genomes multiply and spread with reproduction, modifying an entire population would require modifications to only a limited number of individuals, especially if the organism’s lifecycle is short.	首先，由于基因组通过复制大量增长和传播，修改全部基因组只需要修改有限数量的个体，特别是对于生命周期较短的生命体而言。


Moreover, given the ubiquity of hybridization among neighboring species, it is possible that the modification of a mosquito species would also spread progressively and uncontrollably to other species.	此外，由于相近物种间的杂交是普遍现象，有可能对一种蚊子的修改会逐步地、不可控地扩大到其他物种。


Analysis of animal genomes shows that such events have taken place in the past, with species invaded by genetic elements that could have affected ecosystem balances and species evolution (though it is impossible to say how).	动物基因组分析表明，这类事件在过去曾经发生过，物种被能影响生态系统平衡和物种进化（尽管不可能知道如何实现）的基因要素入侵。


And, if modifying a mosquito population is dangerous, there is no telling what could happen if we modify human cells – in particular, germ cells – without doing our due diligence.	此外，如果修改蚊子种群是危险的话，在不进行尽职调查就贸然修改人类细胞——特别是生殖细胞——会发生什么也很难说。


CRISPR-Cas technology is poised to change the world.	CRISPR-Cas技术即将改变世界。


The imperative now is to ensure that those changes are positive.	现在的重点是确保这些变化是积极的。


Strategies for Responsible Gene Editing	负责任的基因治疗策略


CAMBRIDGE – The discovery of a powerful new tool capable of addressing health and environmental problems as diverse as malaria, Lyme disease, and invasive species should be a cause for celebration.	坎布里奇——发现可以治愈疟疾、莱姆病等多种健康和环境问题的有效新工具确实值得庆贺。


But, because the tool, called CRISPR, can alter entire populations of wild organisms (and thus shared ecosystems), ensuring that these interventions are developed responsibly poses an unprecedented challenge for science and society.	但因为这种称之为CRISPR的工具能改变整个野生生物种群（并进而改变共同的生态系统），确保上述工具的研发必须本着负责任的态度也为科学和社会带来了前所未有的挑战。


Humans have been altering animals and plants through selective breeding for millennia; but, because these changes typically reduce the capacity for survival and reproduction in the wild, they do not spread to wild populations.	人类通过选择性育种改变动植物的历史已经延续了数千年之久； 但因为这些改变往往会降低野外生存和繁殖能力，因此不会影响到野生种群。


Alterations accomplished using CRISPR, which enables scientists to edit a cell’s DNA with unprecedented precision, are different in one crucial respect: The process can result in “gene drive,” a naturally occurring feature of some genes that enables them to spread through a population over generations, even if they do not help survival (and thus reproduction).	但CRISPR疗法带来的改变可以让科学家以前所未有的准确度修改DNA，并因此导致了至关重要的不同：上述过程可能会导致“基因驱动”，具体来讲就是即便不具备提高生存（以及繁殖）能力的效果，但同样可以实现在种群内部代际传递某些基因自然产生的功能。


Simply put, we can now contemplate altering wild populations in very specific and consequential ways.	简言之，我们现在可以考虑以非常具体和重要的方式改变野生种群。


Those changes can be highly positive.	上述改变可能会产生显著的积极作用。


By altering certain features of mosquitos, we could reduce or even eradicate ancient scourges such as malaria and dengue that afflict hundreds of millions of people each year.	通过改变蚊虫的某些特点，我们可以减少甚至彻底消除疟疾和登革热等古已有之的灾难，这类疾病每年都在困扰数百万人。


(Malaria alone kills a child every 90 seconds, on average.)	（仅疟疾一种病平均每90秒就导致一名儿童丧生。


By permanently immunizing the relevant animal populations, we could prevent new cases of Lyme and other diseases that originate in wild organisms, or we could block newly emergent pathogens such as the Zika virus, which has been linked to an epidemic of stunted brain development in newborns in Latin America.	）通过对相关动物种群展开永久性免疫，我们可以预防起源于野生动物的莱姆病及其他疾病新发病例，或者防止寨卡病毒等新型病原体的产生，现代医学已经证实导致拉美新生儿大脑发育迟缓的一种传染病其实是由这种病毒造成的。


As for the environment, human activities have already impacted every ecosystem on Earth, with far-reaching consequences – for us and many other species – many of which are yet to unfold.	具体到环境方面，人类活动已经对地球所有生态系统造成了意义深远的影响——对人类自身和其他物种的诸多影响尚处在逐渐明朗的过程当中。


Gene drive elements could potentially reverse much of this damage.	基因驱动因素有可能在很大程度上扭转上述损害的后果。


For example, limiting invasive species – such as cane toads in Australia, mosquitoes in Hawaii, or rats and mice almost everywhere – could help to restore damaged biomes.	比方说，限制澳大利亚蔗蟾蜍、夏威夷蚊虫和几乎随处可见的大鼠小鼠等外来入侵物种可以帮助恢复受损的生物群落。


And eliminating pests’ attraction to our crops, without diminishing their capacity to fulfill their other ecological roles, would remove the need for toxic pesticides.	在不影响其他生态作用的前提下消除害虫对农作物的依赖可以消除使用有毒农药的必要性。


As we attempt to realize these tremendous potential benefits, however, we must bear in mind that the effects of gene drive interventions will be shared by entire communities.	但在我们试图实现上述巨大潜在利益的同时，我们必须牢记整个种群将共同承担基因驱动干预方法的效果。


Given the vast complexity of ecosystems, careful research will be needed to assess the consequences of each intervention before proceeding.	鉴于生态系统难以言喻的复杂性，必须在这一切开始前展开细致的研究，评估各项干预措施可能造成的后果。


CRISPR gene drives also highlight a problem that goes beyond ecology: Existing systems for developing and evaluating new technologies are woefully inadequate for powerful new tools with broad impacts.	CRISPR基因运动同时凸显了生态环境以外的一个问题：现有的新技术研发和评估体系在影响深远的有效新工具面前还远远不够。


It should be self-evident that technologies like gene drives, which don’t require widespread adoption to have a widespread effect, should never be released without informed community consent.	毋庸讳言，像基因驱动这样不需要广泛采用就能带来广泛影响的技术只有在全社会知情同意的情况下才能够公布。


Yet history shows the opposite pattern, with decision-making seldom factoring in environmental consequences or citizens’ opinions.	但历史模式却恰恰相反，决策过程极少考虑到民众意见和环境后果。


Nowadays, there are few opportunities for public input until after products are developed, when it is typically too late to make changes.	现在的情况是产品研发成功之前极少听取公众的意见，研发完毕后再想修改却往往太迟了。


By ignoring potentially helpful contributions from an increasingly knowledgeable public, closed-door technological development has precluded balanced assessments and created acrimony – a dangerously irresponsible and wasteful outcome for both science and society.	但闭门造车的技术研发却不顾越来越了解情况的公众可能大有裨益的贡献，并因此在丧失均衡评估机会的同时招致了公众刻薄的态度——这对科学和社会而言都是高度不负责任且浪费的后果。


CRISPR gene drives offer an opportunity to chart a new course.	CRISPR基因驱动技术有机会开辟一条全新的道路。


For starters, public notification and broadly inclusive discussions should always precede and inform development of gene drive interventions in the lab.	首先，公众宣传和广泛的包容性讨论应始终领先于并指导实验室基因驱动技术的研发工作。


A clear description of the potential impact of an experiment – as my colleagues and I have provided for the technology as a whole – must be followed by transparency throughout the development process.	像我和同事们那样对技术总体状况做出试验可能后果的清晰描述必须与整个研发进程的高度透明相结合。


This community-guided approach to research provides opportunities to identify and address potential problems and concerns during development.	这种与群体为导向的研究方法提供了找到和解决研发过程中潜在问题和关注焦点的机会。


If a perceived problem cannot be adequately addressed, researchers should be prepared to terminate the project.	如果特定问题无法得到充分解决，则研究人员理当准备好结束项目。


Transparency and collective scrutiny would also help to ensure that scientists fulfill their fundamental responsibility to protect against laboratory accidents.	透明度和集体审查也有助于确保科学家履行防止试验事故的基本职责。


Experiments involving gene drive organisms are almost unique in terms of the potential harm that a mishap could cause beyond the lab.	涉及基因驱动的生物试验在事故可能造成实验室以外的潜在损害方面几乎是独一无二的。


Though DNA-level changes spread by one gene drive can be overwritten by another gene drive – an important safeguard against unwanted side effects and misuse – the ecological impacts would not be so easy to reverse.	尽管一种基因驱动可以改变由另一种基因驱动带来的DNA水平变化——这是防止意想不到的副作用和滥用的重要保障——但要想扭转生态影响却绝不是那么容易的。


To be sure, most gene drive experiments will pose little, if any, environmental risk.	可以肯定，多数基因驱动实验即使带来环境风险也都算不上严重。


Nonetheless, an accidental release would prove devastating to public confidence in researchers' ability to develop this powerful technology with wisdom and humility.	但事实证明偶然泄露会严重损害公众对研究人员谦逊和明智地研发这项有效技术的信任度。


That is why my colleagues and I have detailed, demonstrated, and publicized several easily implementable confinement strategies.	我和我的同事也因此详细论述、说明并公布了几项比较便于实施的限制对策。


Another feature of a responsible approach would be a commitment by scientists to evaluate each proposed gene drive intervention – say, immunizing mice so that they cannot transmit Lyme disease to ticks – individually, rather than making a blanket decision on the technology as a whole.	负责任做法的另一特点是科学家致力于独立评估拟议中的各项基因驱动技术——如对小鼠进行免疫以杜绝它们对扁虱的莱姆病传播——而非就总体技术做出全局性决策。


After all, the benefits and risks of each intervention would be entirely different.	归根结底，每种疗法的收益和风险都是完全不同的。


A final safeguard against the irresponsible development of gene drive technology is to ensure that early interventions are developed exclusively by governments and nonprofit organizations.	防止不负责任研究基因驱动技术的终极保障是确保完全由政府和非营利组织从事基因驱动技术的早期研究。


Given the potential of financial incentives to skew the design and results of safety tests, keeping the profit motive out of the development and decision-making processes will encourage balanced assessments.	鉴于曲解安全测试设计和结果的经济动力可能存在，将利润动机排除在研究和决策过程之外将有助于得出均衡的评估结果。


The bottom line is that existing models for technological development are inadequate for technologies with broadly shared effects.	最低限度是现有的技术研发模式对能产生广泛效果的技术而言还远远不够。


Only with early discussion, transparent research, careful safeguards, and community guidance can we build a responsive model of scientific development well suited to ecological technologies.	只有依靠早期讨论、透明研发、细心保障和社会指导才能建立起灵活的科学研发模式以适应生态技术。


Given the life-saving (and environment-saving) potential of CRISPR gene drive interventions, let us determine how to develop them – and when to decline to do so – together.	鉴于CRISPR基因驱动技术挽救生命（和环境）的潜力，让我们共同决定采用何种研发方式——以及何时拒绝研发。


The Return of the Currency Crash	货币崩溃归来


CAMBRIDGE – Currency-market volatility has been around for decades, if not centuries.	坎布里奇—货币市场波动已经存在了几十年甚至几百年。


Wide gyrations in exchange rates became a staple of international financial markets after the Bretton Woods system broke down in the early 1970s, and mega-depreciations were commonplace later in the decade and through much of the 1980s, when inflation raged across much of the world.	20世纪70年代布雷顿森林体系崩溃后，汇率大起伏成为国际金融市场的标签，在随后的十年以及20世纪80年代大部分时期，剧烈贬值成为家常便饭，而通胀在全世界肆虐。


Even through much of the 1990s and early 2000s, 10-20% of countries worldwide experienced a large currency depreciation or crash in any given year.	即使在20世纪90年代和21世纪的第一个十年的大部分时间里，每年都有10—20%的国家经历过货币大幅贬值或崩溃。


And then, suddenly, calm prevailed.	接着，突然之间平静下来。


Excluding the mayhem associated with the global financial crisis of late 2008 and early 2009, currency crashes were few and far between from 2004 to 2014 (see figure).	除了与2009年底、2009年初的全球金融危机的大乱象，从2004年到2014年期间，货币崩溃非常罕见（见图）。


But recent developments suggest that the dearth of currency crashes during that decade may be remembered as the exception that proves the rule.	但最近的发展趋势表明，这个十年中鲜见货币崩溃的现象有可能只是例外，而不是规则。


The near-disappearance of currency crashes in the 2004-2014 period largely reflect low and stable international interest rates and large capital flows to emerging markets, coupled with a commodity price boom and (mostly) healthy growth rates in countries that escaped the global financial crisis.	2004—2014年期间货币崩溃基本消失主要是因为稳定的低利率和大量资本流向新兴市场，同时大宗商品价格繁荣，（大部分）摆脱全球金融危机的国家增长率十分健康。


In effect, many countries’ main concern during those years was avoiding sustained currency appreciation against the US dollar and the currencies of other trade partners.	事实上，许多国家在这一时期的主要担忧是避免货币持续兑美元和其他贸易伙伴货币升值。


That changed in 2014, when deteriorating global conditions revived the currency crash en masse.	2014年，情况发生了变化。 全球环境的恶化让货币崩溃复活了。


Since then, nearly half of the sample of 179 countries shown in the figure have experienced annual depreciations in excess of 15%.	自此以后，本文图表样本中的179个国家中有近一半经历过一年贬值15%以上的情况。


True, more flexible exchange-rate arrangements have mostly eliminated the drama of abandoning pre-announced pegged or semi-pegged exchange rates.	诚然，更有弹性的汇率安排避免了放弃先前宣布的盯住或准盯住汇率机制的闹剧。


But, thus far, there is little to suggest that the depreciations have had much of a salutary effect on economic growth, which for the most part has remained sluggish.	但是，到目前为止，没有迹象表明贬值对经济增长起到了有益作用，大部分地区的经济增长依然处于停滞状态。


The average cumulative depreciation versus the US dollar has been almost 35% from January 2014 to January 2016.	从2014年1月到2016年1月，兑美元平均累计贬值幅度接近35%。


For many emerging markets, where depreciations have been considerably greater, weakening exchange rates have aggravated current problems associated with rising foreign-currency debts.	许多新兴市场的贬值幅度远高于15%，对它们而言，汇率贬值加剧了外币债务增加所带来的问题。


Moreover, in an interconnected world, the effects of currency crashes do not end in the country where they originate.	此外，在互联世界，货币崩溃的影响并不只局限于危机发生地。


Back in 1994, China reformed its foreign-exchange framework, unified its system of multiple exchange rates, and, in the process, devalued the renminbi by 50%.	1994年，中国改革了其汇率安排，统一了汇率双轨制，在此过程中，人民币贬值50%。


It has been persuasively argued that the Chinese devaluation resulted in a loss of competitiveness for Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, which had pegged (or semi-pegged) their currencies to the US dollar.	一个极具说服力的观点认为，中国的贬值导致泰国、韩国、印度尼西亚、马来西亚和菲律宾竞争力下降，后几个国家货币都盯住（或准盯住）美元。


Their cumulative overvaluation, in turn, helped set the stage for the Asian crisis that erupted in mid-1997.	而它们的逐渐升值反过来酝酿了1997年年中爆发的亚洲危机。


Overvalued exchange rates have been among the best leading indicators of financial crises.	汇率高估是最佳的金融危机领先指标之一。


So one cannot help but wonder if we are facing a repeat of what happened from 1994 to 1997 – only this time with the roles reversed.	因此，你免不了要疑问，我们是否面临1994—1997年的情景重现——只不过“演员”对换罢了。


Since early 2014, the renminbi has depreciated by a mere 7.5% against the dollar, compared to the euro’s roughly 25% depreciation in this period, not to mention even faster currency weakening in many emerging markets.	自2014年年初以来，人民币兑美元仅仅贬值了7. 5%，而同期欧元贬值了25%左右，许多新兴市场货币贬值更是要快得多。


For a manufacturing-based economy such as China’s, the overvaluation-growth connection should not be underestimated.	对中国这样的以制造业为基础的国家来说，高估-增长链条不容小觑。


China’s announcement last August of its intent to allow modest depreciation and eventually move the renminbi toward greater exchange-rate flexibility triggered a roller-coaster ride in financial markets.	去年8月，中国宣布准备允许人民币略有贬值，并计划最终实现人民币更加自由的浮动，这引起了金融市场的“过山车”。


To provide reassurance, policymakers issued statements to the effect that China would move only gradually in that direction.	为了安抚市场，决策者发布声明，中国的措施将是渐进的。


But perhaps the cautionary tale from the Asian crises is that gradualism on this front carries its own risks.	但也许亚洲危机的教训告诉我们，在这方面采取渐进主义同样有风险。


Of course, the potential beggar-thy-neighbor effects of the spike in currency crashes in the past two years are not unique to China.	当然，过去两年间，货币突然崩溃的潜在以邻为壑效应并非中国所独有。


They may also apply to any country that has maintained a comparatively fixed exchange rate (a category that includes major oil producers).	任何维持相对固定汇率的国家（包括主要石油生产国）都有可能造成这一效应。


What distinguishes the Chinese case from others is the sheer size of its economy relative to world GDP, as well as its effects on numerous countries across regions, from suppliers of primary commodities to countries that depend on Chinese funding or direct investment.	中国与其他国家的不同之处在于其经济相对世界GDP规模较大，其措施对于各个地区的众多国家的影响也较大，不管是初级商品供给国，还是依赖中国资金或直接投资的国家。


The broader point is a simple one: Emerging markets now account for around 60% of world GDP, up from about 35% in the early 1980s.	更广泛的要点很简单：新兴市场目前占世界GDP的60%左右，而20世纪80年代初只占35%左右。


Restoring global prosperity requires a much broader geographical base than it did back then.	重塑全球繁荣需要比30多年前更广的地理基础。


The return of the currency crash may make achieving it all the more difficult.	货币崩溃的回归可能让这一点更加难以实现。


The Currency Manipulation Charade	货币操纵的伪装


NEW HAVEN – As the US Congress grapples with the ever-contentious Trans-Pacific Partnership – President Barack Obama’s signature trade legislation – a major stumbling block looms.	纽黑文—美国国会为了跨太平洋洋合作伙伴关系（ Trans-Pacific Partnership ，总统奥巴马的标志性贸易立法）而吵到不可开交隐显一个重大障碍。


On May 22, the Senate avoided it, by narrowly defeating – 51 to 48 – a proposed “currency manipulation” amendment to a bill that gives Obama so-called “fast-track” authority to negotiate the TPP.	5月22日，参议院以微弱多数——51比48——避免了这一障碍成为现实——在授予奥巴马所谓的“快车道”TPP谈判权的立法中不加入“货币操纵”修正条款。


But the issue could be resurrected as the debate shifts to the House of Representatives, where support is strong for “enforceable currency rules.”	但这一问题可能随着争论战场转移到众议院而死灰复燃，在众议院，对“强制性货币规则”的支持十分强大。


For at least a decade, Congress has been focusing on currency manipulation – a charge leveled at countries that purportedly intervene in foreign-exchange markets in order to suppress their currencies’ value, thereby subsidizing exports.	至少十年来，国会一直关注货币操纵——指控一些国家刻意干预外汇市场以抑制本币价值，从而补贴出口。


In 2005, Senators Charles Schumer, a liberal Democrat from New York, and Lindsey Graham, a conservative Republican from South Carolina, formed an unlikely alliance to defend beleaguered middle-class US workers from supposedly unfair competitive practices.	2005年，纽约州自由派民主党参议员查尔斯·舒默（Charles Schumer）和南加州保守派共和党参议员林赛·格雷厄姆（Lindsey Graham）组成了一个不可能的联盟，捍卫身陷重围的美国工人免受不公平的竞争手段的影响。


Stop the currency manipulation, went the argument, and America’s gaping trade deficit would narrow – providing lasting and meaningful benefits to hard-pressed workers.	他们指出，停止货币操纵能让美国巨大的贸易赤字减小——给困难重重的工人带来持续的真正福利。


A decade ago, the original Schumer-Graham proposal was a thinly veiled anti-China initiative.	十年前，最初的舒默-格雷厄姆提案赤裸裸地针对中国。


The ire that motivated that proposal remains today, with China accounting for 47% of America’s still outsize merchandise trade deficit in 2014.	促使他们提出提案的怒火今天仍然存在——2014年美国的商贸赤字依然巨大，而中国占了其中的47%。


Never mind that the Chinese renminbi has risen some 33% against the US dollar since mid-1995 to a level that the International Monetary Fund no longer considers undervalued, or that China’s current-account surplus has shrunk from 10% of GDP in 2007 to an estimated 2% in 2014.	自1995年年中以来，人民币兑美元升值了33%，国际货币基金组织（IMF）已不再认为人民币被低估； 中国的经常项目盈余占GDP之比也从2007年的10%降低到2014年的2%（估计值）。


China remains in the crosshairs of US politicians who believe that American workers are the victims of its unfair trading practices.	但这些都不重要。 中国仍然是认为美国工人受害于不公平贸易行为的美国政客的眼中钉。


While this argument has great emotional and political appeal, it is deeply flawed, because the United States has an insidious saving problem.	尽管这一论调在情绪上和政治上颇具号召力，但却是严重错误的，因为美国存在着严重的储蓄问题。


America’s net national saving rate – the sum total of household, business, and government saving (adjusted for the depreciation of aging capacity) – currently stands at 2.5% of national income.	美国的净国民储蓄率——家庭、企业和政府储蓄总和（经老化产能折旧调整）——目前占国民收入的2. 5%。


While that is better than the negative saving rates of 2008-2011, it remains well short of the 6.3% average of the final three decades of the twentieth century.	这比2008—2011年间为负的储蓄率已经好了不少，但仍远低于二十世纪最后三十年6. 3%的平均水平。


Lacking in saving and wanting to grow, America must import surplus savings from abroad.	储蓄不足又想增长，美国就必须从国外进口储蓄盈余。


And to attract that foreign capital, it has no choice but to run equally large balance-of-payments deficits.	而要吸引外国资本，唯一的办法是保持等量国际收支赤字。


So it is no coincidence that the US economy has a chronic current-account deficit.	因此，美国经济存在 长期经常项目赤字绝非偶然。 尽管这一缺口已从2006年占GDP的5.


While this shortfall has narrowed from a peak of 5.8% of GDP in 2006 to 2.4% in 2014, it still leaves the US heavily dependent on surplus foreign savings in order to grow.	8%的最高峰下降到2014年的占GDP的2. 4%，但仍意味着美国要想增长就必须严重依赖外国储蓄盈余。


This is where the trade deficit comes into play.	贸易赤字就是这样来的。


The US does not just pluck surplus foreign savings out of thin air.	美国不只是凭空吸收外国储蓄盈余。


To attract the capital it needs, America must send dollars overseas through foreign trade.	要吸引它需要的资本，美国必须通过对外贸易输出美元。


And it is here that the currency manipulation argument falls apart.	货币操纵论的命门就在这里。


In 2014, the US ran trade deficits with some 95 countries.	2014年，美国对95个国家存在贸易赤字。


In other words, America does not suffer from a small number of bilateral trade deficits that can be tied to charges of currency manipulation by countries like China, Japan, Malaysia, or Singapore.	换句话说，美国所存在的不是可以归结为中国、日本、马来西亚和新加坡等国家贸易操纵的小额双边贸易赤字。


Rather, the US suffers from a multilateral trade imbalance with many countries, and this cannot be remedied through the imposition of bilateral penalties such as tariffs.	相反，美国存在的是对大量国家的多边贸易失衡，而这无法通过关税等双边惩罚措施解决。


Without fixing its savings problem, restricting trade with a few so-called currency manipulators would simply redistribute the US trade deficit to its other trading partners.	不解决储蓄问题，限制与少数所谓货币操纵国的贸易只能让美国的贸易赤字转移到其他贸易伙伴身上。


In effect, America’s trade balance is like a water balloon – applying pressure on one spot would simply cause the water to slosh elsewhere.	事实上，美国的贸易平衡就像是一个水囊——你朝一点施加压力只能让水从其他地方鼓出。


Moreover, this approach could easily backfire.	此外，这一方针极有可能弄巧成拙。


For example, assuming that there is no increase in domestic US saving, penalizing a low-cost producer like China for currency manipulation would most likely cause the Chinese piece of America’s trade deficit to be reallocated to higher-cost producers.	比如，假设美国国内储蓄不增，则以货币操纵为由惩罚中国等低成本生产国极有可能导致中国占美国贸易赤字的比重转移到成本更高的生产国身上。


That would be the functional equivalent of a tax hike on middle-class families – precisely the constituency that so concerns Congress.	这在功能上等同于对中产阶级家庭增税，而中产阶级正是国会最关心的选民。


Further complications would arise from putting the verdict on currency manipulation – presumably dependent on some type of “fair value” metric – in the hands of politicians.	让政客决定货币操纵的结论（应该取决于某些“公平价值”指标来做决定）还会造成其他副作用。


This is also the twist that underscores the ultimate congressional hypocrisy.	这也是国会最大的伪善。


The charge of currency manipulation is nothing but a foil for the US to duck responsibility for fixing America’s saving problem.	货币操纵指控无非是美国逃避解决国内储蓄问题的责任的幌子。


Lacking any semblance of a strategy to boost savings – not just a long-term fix to the federal government’s budget deficit, but also meaningful incentives for personal saving – US politicians have turned to yet another quick fix.	美国政客拿不出刺激储蓄的战略——不仅仅是解决联邦政府预算赤字的长期办法，还包括有意义的个人储蓄激励——因而转向了速效办法。


In the end, there is no way around it: If Congress does not like trade deficits, it needs to address America’s saving problem and stop fixating on misplaced concerns over currency manipulation.	最终，周旋余地将耗尽。 如果国会不喜欢贸易赤字，就需要解决美国的储蓄问题并停止关注完全无关紧要的货币操纵问题。


None of this is to argue that the US should ignore unfair trading practices.	所有这些都不是说美国应该忽视不公平贸易行为。


As a member of the World Trade Organization, the US has ample opportunity to use that body’s dispute-resolution mechanism to adjudicate major problems with its trading partners.	作为世界贸易组织成员国，美国有的是机会用高机构的纠纷解决机制裁决与其贸易伙伴的重大问题。


And it has enjoyed success with this approach.	并且美国用这一方法取得了成功。


What Congress cannot do is pretend that wrong-footed trade policy is the answer to its inability or unwillingness to refocus its domestic policy agenda.	国会决不能假装采取让对方措手不及的贸易政策就可以掩盖其无力或不愿将着眼点重新聚焦于国内政策日程上的问题。


Of course, it is always easier to blame others than to look in the mirror.	当然，指责别人永远比自我批评容易。


But history has not been kind to major trade blunders.	但历史对于重大贸易错误向来绝不宽容。


Just as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 sparked a global trade war that may well have put the “great” in the Great Depression, Congressional enactment of enforceable currency rules today could spark retaliatory actions that might devastate the free flow of trade that a sluggish global economy desperately needs.	1930年斯穆特-霍利关税法（Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act）挑起了一场全球贸易战，大萧条之所以成为“大”，原因恐怕就在于此，而今天国会颁布强制性货币规则可能引起报复性措施，给停滞不前的全球经济所急需的贸易流造成灾难性打击。


The US Senate was wise in rejecting this dangerous option.	美国参议院拒绝这一危险选项的决定是明智的。


We can only hope that similar wisdom prevails in the House of Representatives.	我们只能希望众议院也能拥有相同的智慧。


Currency manipulation legislation is one tragedy that can and should be avoided.	货币操纵立法是一场可以也应该避免的悲剧。


Securing the Digital Transition	捍卫数字转型


NEW DELHI – Every year, the World Economic Forum publishes a Global Risks Report, which distills the views of experts and policymakers from around the world.	新德里—每年，世界经济论坛都会发布《全球风险报告》（Global Risks Report），其中总结了全球专家和决策者的观点。


This year, cybersecurity is high on the list of global concerns, as well it should be.	今年，网络安全在全球关注榜上名列前茅，理应如此。


In 2017, the world witnessed a continued escalation in cyber attacks and security breaches that affected all parts of society.	2017年，世界连续发生网络袭击和安全漏洞，影响了社会的方方面面。


There is no reason to believe 2018 will be different.	没有理由认为2018年会有所不同。


The implications are far-reaching.	影响是深远的。


Most immediately, we must grapple with governance of the Internet as well as on the Internet.	最紧迫的是，我们必须网络治理和在网治理两手抓。


Otherwise, the opportunities afforded by digital technologies could be squandered in a regulatory and legal arms race, complete with new borders and new global tensions.	否则，数字技术所产生的机会将会因为监管和法律部门的竞争而白白浪费，最终形成新的界限和新的全球紧张。


But there’s a broader issue: For all the speed with which we are racing into the digital age, efforts to ensure global stability are lagging far behind.	但还有一个更广泛的问题：我们以极快的速度迈向数字时代，但确保全球稳定的措施远远落后了。


In many respects, our world is still organized within a Westphalian framework.	在诸多方面，我们的世界仍在一个威斯特伐利亚框架下组织。


States with (mostly) recognized borders are the building blocks of the international system.	有（大部分）受承认的边界的国家构成了国际体系的基本组成部分。


Their interactions, and their willingness to share sovereignty, define the existing world order.	它们之间的互动，以及它们共享主权的意愿，决定了当前世界秩序。


But globalization has gradually changed the realities on the ground.	但全球化已经逐步改变了基本现实。


And while its force – waxing and waning since the decades preceding World War I – is nowadays being tempered by geopolitics, and by the impulse to slow the pace of technological change, the digital transformation will propel globalization forward, albeit in a different form.	全球化的力量——在一战前的几十年以来一直起起伏伏——最近受到了地缘政治，以及降低技术变革速度的力量的制约，但数字转型将推动全球化继续前进，不过是以不同的方式。


After all, the Internet’s key feature is its non-territorial architecture.	毕竟，互联网的关键特征便是无领土架构（non-territorial architecture）。


By breaking down traditional borders, it poses a direct challenge to the very foundation of the Westphalian order.	互联网打破了传统的界限，对威斯特伐利亚秩序的基础构成了直接挑战。


This is a profoundly positive development, because it facilitates free expression and the cross-border exchange of goods and ideas.	这是非常具有积极意义的发展趋势，因为它便利了言论自由和跨境商品和思想交换。


But, as with all human inventions, the Internet can be abused, as evidenced by the rise in cybercrime, online harassment, hate speech, incitement to violence, and online radicalization.	但是，和一切人类发明一样，互联网可能被滥用，网络犯罪、在线骚扰、仇恨言论、煽动暴力以及在线激进化的崛起说明了一切。


Minimizing such abuses in the years ahead will require close international cooperation to establish and enforce common rules.	在未来几年中尽力打击这些滥用互联网的行为需要紧密的国际合作以建立和执行共同规则。


There can be no solution in isolation, because no single government can tackle the problem on its own.	孤立不是出路，因为没有哪个政府能够单枪匹马解决自身的问题。


Over time, an alphabet soup of organizations has emerged to bring together the technical community, businesses, governments, and civil society.	随着时间的推移，出现了一大批“字母汤”组织将技术界、企业、政府和公民社会联合起来。


And bodies such as ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force), and W3C (World Wide Web Consortium) now provide de facto governance of the Internet’s architecture.	如今，ICANN（互联网名称和数字地址分配机构）、IETF（互联网工程任务组）、W3C（万维网联盟）提供者互联网构架的事实治理。


But governance on the Internet is far more complex.	但在网治理要复杂得多。


Here, the institutional landscape is both crowded and unsettled.	在这方面，机构众多，互不协调。


It is crowded because numerous actors are competing to shape the normative framework of cyberspace.	说它拥挤，是因为为数众多的行动方在为确定网络空间规范框架而竞争。


Many countries have multiple relevant ministries regulating online activity.	许多国家存在多个相关部门监管网络活动的情况。


Websites and online services have vastly different community guidelines and terms of service.	不同网站和在线服务的社区章程和服务条款大相径庭。


Public- and private-sector developers determine the design of the Internet’s changing infrastructure.	公共和私人部门开发者决定着不断变化的互联网基础设施的设计。


And numerous civil-society groups are proposing their own sets of cyber principles, while international organizations attempt to develop multilateral agreements.	各种公民社会组织也在提出自己的网络原则，而国际组织则试图制定多边协议。


The landscape remains unsettled because intergovernmental cooperation has largely stalled, owing to conflicting priorities among countries.	说它不协调，是因为拜各国工作重点彼此冲突所赐，政府间合作基本陷入停顿。


Making matters worse, there are still too few dedicated spaces for different stakeholders to interact and devise operational solutions.	更糟糕的是，专门供不同相关利益方进行互动和制定操作方案的空间太少。


In the absence of mutually agreed frameworks, governments will tend to adopt short-term unilateral measures – mandatory data localization, excessive content restrictions, intrusive surveillance – to address immediate concerns, or as a response to domestic political pressure.	在缺少一致同意的框架的情况下，各国政府往往会采取短期单边措施——强制性数据本地化、过度的内容限制、侵入性监视等——来解决眼前的顾虑，或作为对国内政治压力的响应。


But by doing so, they could fuel a dynamic that heightens, rather than minimizes, international tensions.	但这样一来，它们也有可能助长加剧而不是遏制国际紧张的动态。


Digital governance touches on everything from cybersecurity to the economy to human rights, and uncertainty about which laws apply in different jurisdictions weakens enforcement in all of them, leaving everyone worse off.	数字治理涉及从网络安全到经济和人权的一切，而由于在不同的司法辖区适用哪些法律方面还存在不确定性，结果是所有法律的执行都遭到了削弱，所有人都因此蒙受损失。


Moreover, measures to address one dimension can easily affect the others, which means that uncoordinated and rash policy decisions can have negative consequences across the board.	此外，解决一个层面的问题的措施，可能很容易影响到其他层面，这意味着不协调的匆忙决策可能造成消极的跨境后果。


When I had the honor of chairing the Global Commission on Internet Governance, our 2016 report highlighted these risks, and called for “a new Social Compact” to ensure that the Internet of the future will be accessible, inclusive, secure, and trustworthy.	我曾经有幸主持互联网治理全球委员会，我们的2016年报告强调了这些风险，并提出制定“新的社会契约”来确保互联网的普及性、包容性、安全性和可靠性。


Progress since then has been limited.	此后的进展十分有限。


Because efforts at the United Nations to establish global cyber rules have reached an impasse, alternative initiatives will have to drive the process forward.	由于联合国制定全球网络规则的努力遇到了瓶颈，必须有其他方案推动这一进程。


Fortunately, the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace recently issued an important “Call to Protect the Public Core of the Internet.”	幸运的是，网络空间稳定全球委员会最近发布了重要的《保护互联网公共核心倡议》（Call to Protect the Public Core of the Internet）。


And the upcoming Global Internet and Jurisdiction Conference in Ottawa will provide another valuable opportunity for policymakers to continue working toward solutions.	而即将在渥太华召开的全球互联网和司法会议（Global Internet and Jurisdiction Conference）将为决策者提供新的宝贵机会继续朝着制定解决方案努力。


Such technical and legalistic proceedings are essential for shaping the global transition from the industrial to the digital era.	这些技术和法律事宜对于全球从工业时代到数字时代的转变至关重要。


To avoid a legal arms race, policymakers will need to develop a smart approach to a variety of tricky issues, from mutual assistance frameworks for investigations to the role of domain-name administrators and service providers in addressing abusive speech online.	要避免法律军备竞赛，决策者需要为各种微妙问题制定明智的方针，包括调查的互助框架、域名管理机构和服务提供商在治理在线人身攻击方面的作用等。


Achieving policy coherence across jurisdictions should be a top priority.	实现不同司法辖区间的政策一致性应该作为工作重点。


Doing so will require direct, sustained interactions among all stakeholders.	这需要所有相关利益方进行直接持续的互动。


Only then can we create a framework to preserve the cross-border nature of the Internet, protect human rights, fight abuse, and sustain a truly global digital economy.	惟其如此，我们才能建立一个保护互联网的跨国性质、保护人权、打击滥用，并维持真正的全球数字经济的框架。


As Kofi Annan said back in 2004, “In managing, promoting, and protecting [the Internet’s] presence in our lives, we need to be no less creative than those who invented it.”	2004年，科菲·安南（Kofi Annan）说，“在管理、促进和保护[互联网]在我们的生活中的存在时，我们需要的创造力不比发明互联网更少。


Westphalia is behind us.	”威斯特伐利亚已经离我们远去。


What comes next is up to us.	接下来会出现什么取决于我们。


Surveying the Damage of Low Interest Rates	低利率伤害调查


WASHINGTON, DC – For years after the 2008 financial crisis, policymakers congratulated themselves for having averted a second Great Depression.	华盛顿—2008年金融危机后的多年中，决策者因为避免了第二次大萧条而为自己“点赞”。


They had responded to the global recession with the kind of Keynesian fiscal and monetary stimulus that the moment required.	他们用当时做需要的凯恩斯主义财政和货币刺激应对全球衰退。


But nine years have passed, and official interest rates are still hovering around zero, while growth has been mediocre.	但九年过去后，官方利率仍在零水平线上徘徊，而增长则一直平庸。


Since 2008, the European Union has grown at a dismal average annual rate of just 0.9%.	自2008年以来，欧盟平均年增长率只有0. 9%。


The broad Keynesian consensus that emerged immediately after the crisis has become today’s prevailing economic dogma: as long as growth remains substandard and annual inflation remains below 2%, more stimulus is deemed not just appropriate, but necessary.	在危机后立即形成的广泛的凯恩斯主义共识已经成为当今流行的经济教条：只要增长保持萎靡，年通货膨胀率保持不到2%的水平，那么加大刺激不但是合适的，更是必须的。


The arguments underlying this dogma do not hold water.	这一教条背后的观点是有缺陷的。


For starters, measures of inflation are so poor as to be arbitrary.	首先，通胀指标很拙劣，可以随心所欲地控制。


As Harvard’s Martin Feldstein notes, governments have no good way to measure price inflation for services and new technologies, which account for an ever greater share of advanced economies’ GDP, because quality in these sectors varies substantially over time.	哈佛大学的马丁·费尔德斯坦（Martin Feldstein）指出，政府没有什么好办法测量服务和新技术的价格通胀，而后两者占发达经济体GDP的比重越来越大。 这是因为这些部门的质量会随时间而发生重大变化。


Moreover, real estate and other assets are not even included in the accounting.	此外，不动产和其他资产甚至没有被纳入通胀的计算中。


The dictate that inflation must rise at an annual rate of 2% is also arbitrary.	认定通胀必须达到2%的年率也可谓武断。


Swedish economist Knut Wicksell’s century-old concept of a “natural” interest rate – at which real (inflation-adjusted) GDP growth follows a long-term average while inflation remains stable – makes sense.	瑞典经济学家克努特·维克赛尔（Knut Wicksell）一百年前就提出了“自然”利率的概念——在这个利率上，真实（经通胀调整的）GDP增长跟随长期平均值，而通胀保持稳定，这个概念至今仍有意义。


But why should the inflation rate always be 2%?	但为何通胀率永远应该保持在2%？


And why aren’t services, new technologies, or, say, Chinese manufactured goods excluded from the measure of core inflation, alongside energy and food?	为什么要将服务、新技术以及（比如）中国制造商品与能源和食品一起排除在核心通胀之外？


Given these shortcomings, it is worth asking if central banks’ doctrine of “inflation targeting” will suffer the same fate as monetarism in the 1980s, when policymakers obsessed over the supply of money.	考虑到这些缺陷，应该问问，央行的“通胀目标”教条会不会遭遇到20世纪80年代货币主义的命运。 当时，决策者沉溺于货币供给。


As with inflation today, central bankers then had no credible way even to measure the quantity of money, let alone deliver desired monetary-policy outcomes.	以今天的通胀水平看，当时的央行连衡量货币数量的可信方法都没有，更不用说实现合意的货币政策结果了。


We should consider the effects of large budget deficits as another dubious form of stimulus.	我们应该考虑庞大的预算赤字可能也是可疑的刺激形式的影响。 2017年，欧盟经济增长徘徊在2.


In 2017, economic growth in the EU swung up to an annual rate of 2.3%, after member states had finally reduced their budget deficits to an average 1.5% of GDP, down from 6.4% of GDP in 2010.	3%的年率水平上，在此之前，成员国已经将预算赤字从2010年平均占GDP的6. 4%，下降到平均占GDP的1.


Apparently, the fiscal stimulus after the crisis was not all that stimulating.	5%。 显然，危机后的财政刺激未必起到了刺激效果。


By contrast, tighter fiscal policies in recent years seem to have had a positive effect.	相反，近几年来的货币紧缩倒是似乎起到了积极影响。


Usually, a financial crisis gives rise to major structural reforms.	通常，金融危机会带来重大结构改革。


But neither the 2008 crisis nor the subsequent euro crisis, which was caused by excessive public debt, led to significant deleveraging or Schumpeterian creative destruction in the affected countries.	但不论是2008年金融危机，还是随后的欧元危机（因公共债务过多引起），都没有导致受影响国家出现大规模去杠杆化或熊彼特式创造性破坏。


Clearly, the flood of government spending alleviated the need for difficult reforms, and allowed incumbent enterprises to shore up their positions with cheap finance.	显然，政府支出的洪流打消了进行艰难改革的必要，老牌企业利用廉价融资巩固了自己的地位。


Any chance at structural renewal was smothered in the crib.	一切结构更新的希望都被扼杀在萌芽状态。


Among EU countries, average public debt increased from 73% of GDP in 2009 to 86% of GDP in 2016, far above the ceiling of 60% of GDP set by the Maastricht criteria.	在欧盟国家中，平均公共债务水平从2009年占GDP的73%升高到2016年占GDP的86%，远高于马斯特里赫特条约所制定的占GDP60%的上限。


In Southern Europe, public debts are so large that they will depress growth for years to come.	在南欧，公债水平甚至高到了对未来多年的增长形成抑制效应的程度。


And yet the past decade of ultra-low interest rates will likely prove even more pernicious than the years of deficit spending.	然而，过去十年中的极低利率，有可能比赤字支出的毒害作用更大。


There is no telling when or where the next financial bubble will burst.	下一次金融泡沫破裂会发生在何时、何地，我们尚不清楚。


But we would do well to heed the findings of economists such as the late Charles Kindleberger and Harvard’s Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart, and tread carefully.	但我们应该认真领会已故的查尔斯·金德尔伯格（Charles Kindleberger）和哈佛大学的肯尼斯·罗格夫（Kenneth Rogoff）和卡门·莱茵啊哈特（Carmen Reinhart）的发现，谨慎行事。


After all, one can spot potential bubbles all over the place.	毕竟，泡沫随处可见。


Real-estate and other asset prices are at record highs in much of the world.	不动产和其他资产价格在世界大部频创新高。


And the value of bitcoin in circulation has increased tenfold just this year, to $170 billion, although the cryptocurrency’s underlying value remains dubious at best.	流通中的比特币币值在今年增加了十倍，达到了1,700亿美元，尽管这种加密货币的基本价值仍然颇为可疑。


Ultra-low interest rates have also created such a scramble for higher yields that even a poor, mismanaged country like Tajikistan can sell Eurobonds.	极低利率还导致人们争夺高收益率，哪怕治理不善的穷国如塔吉克斯坦也可以发行欧元债券。


For Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, that certainly beats seeking help from the International Monetary Fund, which would demand substantial reforms.	对塔吉克斯坦总统拉赫蒙来说，这肯定比求助于国际货币基金组织（IMF）更好，后者会要求他进行重大改革。


Thanks to low interest rates, Rahmon can continue to misrule his former Soviet republic as he sees fit.	感谢低利率，拉赫蒙可以继续在他的前苏联共和国中为所欲为。


The many other victims of ultra-low interest rates should be all too apparent.	极低利率的其他受害者也已经呼之欲出。


Middle-class savers have watched the real value of their bank deposits decline annually at a rate of about 2%, and many retirees have suffered a real decline in their pensions, which are invested in safe assets and thus yield minimal returns.	中产阶级储蓄者眼看着自己的银行存款的真实价值以每年2%的速度缩水，许多退休者也遭遇到退休金真实价值缩水，这些资金被投资于安全资产，因此几乎无法产生回报。


The same is also true for many forms of insurance.	许多保险形式也是如此。


Insurers themselves seem to be doing fine, but that is because they have been cutting benefits to the point that their customers will soon wonder why they bothered to take out policies in the first place.	保险商本身做得还不错，但这是因为他们一直在削减保额，大概过不了多久，他们的客户就要怀疑为什么要投保了。


Even banks are beleaguered.	就连银行也是压力重重。


In advanced economies, traditional lenders are now subject to such a mass of regulation that they have had to withdraw from foreign activities.	在发达经济体，传统贷款人受制于各种监管，不得不收缩海外业务。


Not surprisingly, less regulated intermediaries in the shadow banking system have stepped in to seize much of their business.	毫不奇怪，监管较少的中介（影子银行系统）插进来夺走了它们的大部分业务。


Traditionally, the banking business centered around attracting deposits and issuing loans.	传统上，银行业务的核心是吸引存款，发放贷款。


But as a result of “low-for-long” interest rates, that share of banking has become ever smaller, and banks have had to charge ever-higher fees for various other financial services.	但拜“长期低迷”的利率所赐，银行业务的比重越来越低，而银行不得不在各种其他金融服务上收取越来越高的费用。


Moreover, low interest rates have diverted money toward less transparent and more speculative financial institutions, such as private-equity and hedge funds.	此外，低利率让货币流向了比较不透明、投机性质更大的金融机构，如私募股权基金和对冲基金。


Such institutions thrive on cheap credit, which enjoys more favorable treatment than equity financing under most Western tax regimes.	这些机构因廉价信贷而繁荣——在大部分西方国家的税收制度中，信贷比股本融资享受更有利的条件。


The benefits of low interest rates have accrued not to the population at large, and certainly not to the middle class, but to billionaires – the top 0.1%.	低利率的好处没有流向大众，更没有流向中产阶级，而是流向了富豪——最顶层的0. 1%。


The global wealth gap has widened significantly in the past decade alone, and especially in the US, where billionaires pay little to nothing in taxes thanks to special rules such as “carried interest.”	在过去的十年中，全球财富差距大幅扩大，美国尤甚，由于存在“附带收益”等特殊规则，富豪几乎不纳税。


And under the new Republican tax plan, they will pay even less.	而根据新的共和党税收计划，他们的纳税额还会进一步减少。


The question now is whether Western institutions are strong enough to contain the global plutocracy that low interest rates have wrought.	现在的问题是西方制度是否足够强大，能够遏制低利率所造就的全球财阀。


The Case Against Cash	反现金事务


CAMBRIDGE – The world is awash in paper currency, with major country central banks pumping out hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth each year, mainly in very large denomination notes such as the $100 bill.	发自剑桥——世界已经陷入了纸币的汪洋大海之中，各主要国家央行每年都会释放出等值于数千亿美元的货币，而且主要是类似100美元这样的大面额现钞。


The $100 bill accounts for almost 80% of the US’s stunning $4,200 per capita cash supply.	这些100美元大钞夸张地占据了美国4200美元年人均现金供应的近80％。


The ¥10,000 note (about $100) accounts for roughly 90% of Japan’s per capita cash holdings at almost $7,000.	1万日元钞票（约合100美元）则占了日本货币总量的90%，而该国人均现金持有量约达7000美元。


And, as I have been arguing for two decades, all this cash is facilitating growth mainly in the underground economy, not the legal one.	与此同时，正如笔者在近二十年来一直指出的那样，所有这些现金都主要用于促进地下经济——而非合法经济——的增长。


I am not advocating a cashless society, which will be neither feasible nor desirable anytime soon.	笔者并不是在提倡一个无现金社会，因为这在短期内既不可行，也不可取。


But a less-cash society would be a fairer and safer place.	但一个现金较少的社会将会是一个更公平也更安全的所在。


With the growth of debit cards, electronic transfers, and mobile payments, the use of cash has long been declining in the legal economy, especially for medium and large-size transactions.	随着借记卡，电子转账和移动支付的发展，现金的使用已经在合法经济（特别是大中型交易）中逐渐减少。


Central bank surveys show that only a small percentage of large-denomination notes are being held and used by ordinary people or businesses.	央行调查显示只有一小部分大面额纸币是由普通民众或企业持有和使用。


Cash facilitates crime because it is anonymous, and big bills are especially problematic because they are so easy to carry and conceal.	现金有利于犯罪，因为它是匿名的，而易于携带和隐藏的大面额钞票则尤其有问题。


A million dollars in $100 notes fits into a briefcase, a million dollars in €500 notes (each worth about $565) fits into a purse.	你得有一个公文箱才能装下总值100万美元的100美元钞票，而同样的数额如果用500欧元钞票的话用一个小手提包就够了。


Sure, there are plenty of ways to bribe officials, engage in financial crime, and evade taxes without paper currency.	当然还有许多种无需借助纸币就能贿赂官员，从事金融犯罪以及逃避税收的手段。


But most involve very high transaction costs (for example, uncut diamonds), or risk of detection (say, bank transfers or credit card payments).	但这大多涉及非常高昂的交易成本（比如未切割的裸钻）或被侦测的风险（例如通过银行转帐或信用卡付款）。


Yes, new-age crypto-currencies such as Bitcoin, if not completely invulnerable to detection, are almost so.	此外例如比特币这样在逃避侦查方面近乎无懈可击的新时代加密货币几乎都能被用于上述目的。


But their value sharply fluctuates, and governments have many tools with which they can restrict their use – for example, by preventing them from being tendered at banks or retail stores.	但它们的价值经常大幅波动，政府也可以有许多手段来限制其使用——比如禁止银行或零售商店接受这类货币。


Cash is unique in its liquidity and near-universal acceptance.	而现金则不会存在这样的问题，因为其流动性强而且近乎畅通无阻。


The costs of tax evasion alone are staggering, perhaps $700 billion per year in the United States (including federal, state, and local taxes), and even more in high-tax Europe.	而光逃税的成本就大得惊人，仅在美国就达7000亿美元（包括联邦，州和地方税），而在高税收的欧洲甚至更多。


Crime and corruption, though difficult to quantify, almost surely generate even greater costs. Think not just of illegal drugs and racketeering, but also of human trafficking, terrorism, and extortion.	犯罪和腐败虽然难以量化，但几乎肯定会产生更大的成本，不仅包括非法毒品药品和诈骗，还有贩卖人口，恐怖主义和敲诈勒索。


Moreover, cash payments by employers to undocumented workers are a principal driver of illegal immigration.	此外，雇佣者向无证工人支付现金的行为已经成为非法移民的主要驱动力。


Scaling back the use of cash is a far more humane way to limit immigration than building barbed-wire fences.	而打击现金使用则是比修建铁丝网更人性化的遏制非法移民方式。


If governments were not so drunk from the profits they make by printing paper currency, they might wake up to the costs.	如果政府不是迷醉于印刷纸币所带来的利益的话，它们可能会意识到成本有多么庞大。


There has been a little movement of late.	但如今也有了一些亡羊补牢的举动。


The European Central Bank recently announced that it will phase out its €500 mega-note.	欧洲央行近日宣布将逐步淘汰500欧元纸币。


Still, this long overdue change was implemented against enormous resistance from cash-loving Germany and Austria.	然而这一迟到的变革却面对着热爱现金的德国和奥地利人的极力阻挠。


Yet even in northern Europe, reported per capita holdings of currency are still quite modest relative to the massive outstanding supply in the eurozone as a whole (over €3,000 per capita).	但即便是在北欧，其人均货币持有量仍然相对于欧元区整体的大量超标纸币供应（人均超过3000欧元）为少。


Southern European governments, desperate to raise tax revenue, have been taking matters into their own hands, even though they do not control note issuance.	而不顾一切想要提高税收收入的南欧各国政府则，虽然无法控制印钞，却也已经有所行动了。


For example, Greece and Italy have been trying to discourage cash use by capping retail cash purchases (at €1,500 and €1,000, respectively).	比如希腊和意大利就一直试图通过给零售现金使用额设定上限（分别为1500和1000欧元）来遏制现金使用。


Obviously, cash remains important for small everyday transactions, and for protecting privacy.	很显然，现金对小额日常交易以及保护隐私来说都依旧重要。


Northern European central bankers who favor the status quo like to quote Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky: “Money is coined liberty.”	那些赞成维持现状的北欧银行家都喜欢引用俄国小说家陀思妥耶夫斯基的名言：“金钱是凝固在货币里的自由。


Of course, Dostoevsky was referring to life in a mid-nineteenth century czarist prison, not a modern liberal state.	”但陀思妥耶夫斯基指的是在十九世纪中叶沙俄监狱里——而非现代自由国家——的生活。


Still, the northern Europeans have a point.	尽管如此，北欧人也是不无道理的。


The question is whether the current system has the balance right. I would argue that it clearly does not.	问题是当前体系是否取得了合理的平衡，而笔者认为它显然没有。


A plan for reining in paper currency should be guided by three principles.	一套驾驭纸币的方案应具备三个指导原则。


First, it is important to allow ordinary citizens to continue using cash for convenience and to make reasonable-size anonymous purchases, while undermining the business models of those engaged in large, repeated anonymous transactions on a wholesale level.	首先，有必要让普通市民继续享受现金的便捷性以及合理的匿名购买数额，同时遏制那些从事大规模反复匿名交易的批发商业模式。


Second, any plan should move very gradually (think a decade or two), to allow adaptations and mid-course corrections as unexpected problems arise.	其次，任何计划应以非常缓慢的速度推进（设想10~20年），允许调整和中期修正来应对预想之外的问题。


And, third, reforms must be sensitive to the needs of low-income households, especially those that are unbanked.	第三，改革必须关注低收入家庭（尤其是那些无银行账户者）的需求。


In my new book, The Curse of Cash, I offer a plan that involves very gradually phasing out large notes, while leaving small notes ($10 and below) in circulation indefinitely.	在笔者的新书《现金的诅咒》中则提供了逐步淘汰大额钞票，只余留下小额钞票（10美元或以下）的方案。


The plan provides for financial inclusion by offering low-income households free debit accounts, which could also be used to make government transfer payments.	通过向提供低收入户免费银行借记账户——也可以用来接收政府的转移支付，该方案得以在金融上存在一定的包容性。


This last step is one that some countries, such as Denmark and Sweden, have already taken.	而包括丹麦，瑞典在内的一些国家也已实施了这一最后步骤。


Scaling back paper currency would hardly end crime and tax evasion; but it would force the underground economy to employ riskier and less liquid payment devices.	减少纸币的使用不会终结犯罪和逃税行为； 但会迫使地下经济使用风险更大，流动性较差的支付方式。


Cash may seem like a small, unimportant thing in today’s high-tech financial world, but the benefits of phasing out most paper currency are a lot larger than you might think.	虽然在当今的高科技金融世界中现金似乎微不足道，但逐步淘汰大多数纸币的好处可比你想象中要大得多。


Restructuring Debt in the Dark	黑暗中的债务重组


CAMBRIDGE – As the Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank begin in Washington, DC, one member country is conspicuously absent: Venezuela.	坎布里奇——随着国际货币基金组织和世界银行华盛顿年会的召开，一个成员国的缺席非常引人瞩目：那就是委内瑞拉。


Yet there is much to be discussed about the country’s finances.	但有关该国财政状况需要讨论的问题仍有很多。


Indeed, a sovereign-debt crisis is inevitable.	事实上，一场主权债务危机是不可避免的。


All major sovereign-debt crises of the past – including in Mexico and Greece – have generated changes in the rules, jurisprudence, or strategies adopted by debtors, creditors, and international financial institutions.	过去所有重大的主权债务危机——包括墨西哥和希腊主权债务危机——都曾带来过债权人、债务人和国际金融机构的规则、法理或战略变化。


Most recently, Argentina’s 15-year legal battle with its creditors – in which holdouts did measurably better than creditors who had years earlier accepted a debt exchange – destabilized the international financial architecture and generated a new set of rules.	最近，阿根廷与债主间爆发长达十五年的法律纠纷——那些拒不合作的债权人的状况比那些数年前就接受债务交换的债权人要好很多——这场法律纠纷破坏了国际金融构架并诞生了新的规则。


Venezuela will be the first country to navigate the new rules; the country can ill afford to get it wrong.	委内瑞拉将成为适用新规则的首个国家； 这个国家承担不起搞砸的后果。


Venezuela is in a severe crisis of its own making.	委内瑞拉如此严重的危机完全是自己造成的。


The government used the period of high oil prices from 2004 to 2013 to quintuple its external debt, expropriate significant chunks of the economy, and impose draconian price, labor, and currency controls.	政府在2004-2013年的高油价期间借了高达五倍的外债，侵占了大片经济部门，并对价格、劳动力和货币强制实行严酷的管制政策。


As the price of oil collapsed in 2014, the government, having lost access to capital markets because of its profligacy, chose to continue servicing its bonded debt and default on its obligations to importers and most non-financial creditors.	随着2014年油价崩盘，因挥霍无度而失去资本市场借贷能力的委内瑞拉政府选择继续偿还其债券债务，但对进口商和多数非金融债权人的债务实施违约。


The government also eschewed both advice and financing from the IMF, instead balancing its foreign-exchange flows by mandating the biggest import contraction in Latin America’s history.	委内瑞拉政府也没有接受国际货币基金组织的建议和出资，而是强制授权拉美历史上最大规模的进口缩减以求平衡外汇。


This caused output to plummet over 30% (owing to the cut in imported inputs), triggered 700% inflation, and led quickly to widespread shortages of essentials.	这导致产量下降30%以上（由于进口投入缩减），引发700%的通胀并迅速导致大面积的必需品短缺。


Among other things, this unprecedented skewing of priorities led to a collapse in oil production, because the national oil company PDVSA failed to maintain its productive infrastructure and defaulted on payments to key contractors in order to pay its bondholders – thereby killing the goose that laid the golden eggs.	除此之外，此次史无前例的重点倾斜导致石油生产陷于崩溃，因为国家石油公司PDVSA未能保住其生产性设施并为向债券持有人偿还债务而拖欠对关键承包商的付款——并因此杀死了会下金蛋的母鸡。


Venezuela’s lack of market access means that it cannot roll over its obligations, except under conditions that worsen its solvency, as PDVSA is trying to do.	委内瑞拉失去资本市场意味着除非像PDVSA那样以恶化偿付能力为代价，否则无法实现债务延期。


Nor can it generate sufficient foreign exchange to pay its debts as they come due.	该国也无力换取足够的外汇偿还其到期债务。


So, one way or another, Venezuela will need to restructure its existing debt.	因此，无论采用哪种方式，委内瑞拉必须要对现有债务进行重组。


A restructuring is ultimately in everybody’s interest; starving the economy of imports merely weakens Venezuela’s capacity to produce and repay.	归根结底，重组符合所有人的利益； 彻底切断进口只能削弱委内瑞拉的生产和偿债能力。


But what tools does Venezuela have at its disposal to secure a cooperative solution with its creditors in a post-Argentina world?	但委内瑞拉可以采用哪些工具在后阿根廷世界与债主达成和解协议？


And what role should international financial institutions play to facilitate an efficient outcome?	国际金融机构应当发挥什么样的作用才能促成有效的结局？


A critical component of successful debt restructuring is to ensure that similarly situated creditors receive comparable treatment.	成功债务重组的关键要素是确保类似处境的债权人得到类似的待遇。